Globalizing de Gaulle
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Globalizing de Gaulle
The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Series Editor: Mark Kramer, Harvard University Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948 Edited by Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak Triggering Communism’s Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland’s Transition Marjorie Castle The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism Bradley F. Abrams Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in Eastern Germany 1945–1955 Gary Bruce At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946 Jamil Hasanli The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? Edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953 Hua-yu Li The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War Edited by Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: The Emergence and Development of East-West Conflict, 1939–1953 Gerhard Wettig Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance under Pressure, 1953–1960 Steven Brady China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present Edited by Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-yu Li The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Edited by Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969 Edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin
Globalizing de Gaulle International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969
Edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin
Lexington Books A division of ROW M A N & L I T T L E F I E L D P U B L I S H E R S , I N C .
Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
Published by Lexington Books A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.lexingtonbooks.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2010 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Globalizing de Gaulle : international perspectives on French foreign policies, 1958-1969 / edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin. p. cm. -- (The Harvard Cold War studies book series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-4248-6 (cloth : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7391-4250-9 (electronic) 1. France--Foreign relations--1958-1969. 2. Gaulle, Charles de, 1890-1970. 3. World politics--1945-1989. 4. Cold War. I. Nünlist, Christian. II. Locher, Anna. III. Martin, Garret, 1980DC420.G55 2010 327.44009’046--dc22 2009030904
™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America
Contents
Editors’ Preface
vii
╇ 1.╇╇Introduction: De Galle and Gaullism in France’s Cold War Foreign Policy Mark Kramer
1
Part I:╇ Europe ╇ 2.╇╇De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow Marie-Pierre Rey
25
╇ 3.╇╇A “Cordial Potentiality?” De Gaulle and the Franco–German Partnership, 1963–1969 Carine Germond
43
╇ 4.╇╇From Words to Actions: Reinterpreting de Gaulle’s European Policy Piers Ludlow
63
Part II:╇ Transatlantia ╇ 5.╇╇NATO Strategies toward de Gaulle’s France, 1958–1966: Learning to Cope Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist ╇ 6.╇╇ Dealing with de Gaulle: The United States and France Carolyne Davidson v
85 111
vi
Contents
╇ 7.╇╇Britain, de Gaulle’s NATO Policies, and Anglo–French Rivalry, 1963–1967 James Ellison
135
Part III:╇ Asia ╇ 8.╇╇The U.S. Escalation in Vietnam and de Gaulle’s Secret Search for Peace, 1964–1966 Yuko Torikata ╇ 9.╇╇ Seeking a Multipolar World: China and de Gaulle’s France Qiang Zhai 10.╇╇A Hot Summer: France, Israel, and the Middle East Crisis in 1958 Gadi Heimann
155 181
203
Part IV:╇ Africa and Latin America 11.╇╇“Je ne vous ai pas compris”: De Gaulle’s Decade of Negotiation with the Algerian FLN, 1958–1969 Jeffrey James Byrne
225
12.╇╇De Gaulle and Sub-Saharan Africa: From Decolonization to French Development Policy, 1958–1963 Guia Migani
251
13.╇╇The Hero on the Latin American Scene Joaquín Fermandois
271
14.╇╇Conclusion: A Gaullist Grand Strategy? Garret Martin
291
Index
309
About the Contributors
315
Editors’ Preface Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin
The towering personality of French President Charles de Gaulle (1958– 1969) has consistently fascinated€contemporaries and historians. His challenge to€ U.S. Cold War hegemony, a key theme in Cold War history, has produced an industry of political biographies and€analyses of the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic. Much of the existing literature has focused on national perspectives on French foreign policies and€ bilateral relations in the de Gaulle era. A comprehensive international€perspective on de Gaulle’s foreign policies, emanating from multinational€and multiarchival historical research into newly available records, has€been missing so far. This volume seeks to close this gap by integrating€scholarship on the subject both from traditional and less conventional angles. The first six chapters deal with Europe and transatlantic affairs—de€Gaulle’s immediate sphere of activity and challenge. They include sections on French–Soviet, French–German, and French–U.S. relations—integrating the latest research and offering original interpretations—and€contributions examining the EEC and NATO, drawing on national and, remarkably,€institutional archives in Florence and Brussels. The second set€ of six chapters deals with Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for the first time incorporating materials from the Chilean, Chinese, Israeli, and Algerian€ archives, and scholarship largely unavailable in English. All chapters thus integrate previously neglected regions, actors, and topics into a global perspective on the foreign policies of the Elysée in the 1960s.€ The concluding chapter of the volume argues that there was far more to€Gaullist foreign policy than simply mere posturing. De Gaulle’s ambitious€ grand design to overcome the bipolar order of the Cold War had a significant€ worldwide impact at the time, and it still reverberates today.€ vii
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This re-evaluation of de Gaulle’s global agenda promises a new and better understanding of one of the radical European challenges to U.S. leadership during the Cold War, but also of the complex international policymaking of the 1960s. Approaching the period in the framework of international history proper does make a difference: It places French policies in a broader context and above all reveals that the East–West confrontation was much more than a bilateral conflict. Zurich and Washington, January 2010
1 Introduction: De Gaulle and Gaullism in France’s Cold War Foreign Policy Mark Kramer
During the first quarter of a century after World War II, no West European political leader—not even Konrad Adenauer—could rival the international stature of Charles de Gaulle. Born in 1890, de Gaulle gained prominence in the 1930s as a military theorist (albeit one whose views met stiff resistance in the hidebound French Army) and then earned much greater renown in the early 1940s as commander of the Free French Forces resisting German occupation.1 From mid-1944 to early 1946, de Gaulle served as president of France’s provisional government after the ouster of the disgraced Vichy regime. He waged an unsuccessful battle against the proposed constitution for the Fourth Republic, arguing that it gave too much power to the legislature and crippled the president. In late 1946, after the constitution for the Fourth Republic was narrowly approved in a referendum, de Gaulle left the political fray, seemingly disillusioned. Over the next decade he remained active in party politics (though with only mixed success) but otherwise stayed mostly at his country home in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises.2 Not until 1957, after France’s humiliating retreat in Suez, did de Gaulle experience a clear turnaround in his political fortunes. In May 1958, after the ill-fated Fourth Republic entered its terminal crisis, de Gaulle steadily gained ascendance, winning pledges of loyalty from French military commanders in Algeria. On June 1 he was appointed acting French premier.3 When parliamentary elections were held in November 1958 for the newly created Fifth Republic, his supporters achieved a substantial majority. A month later, the Electoral College overwhelmingly chose de Gaulle as president of the Fifth Republic, a post he held until his final retirement from public life in April 1969. De Gaulle’s eleven years at the helm defined France’s role in the Cold War, as he became synonymous not only with the policy of grandeur but with the French state itself. 1
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De Gaulle’s approach to the Cold War, and to foreign policy more generally, was shaped by his desire to restore France to the ranks of the world’s great powers and to forge a “European Europe”—a Europe that under French leadership would no longer be divided between East and West. Part and parcel of this conception was a curtailment of France’s military and economic dependence on the United States. De Gaulle accelerated the French nuclear weapons program (the force de frappe) despite international opposition, and in March 1966 he pulled French troops out of the integrated military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), sparking a major crisis within the Western alliance. De Gaulle did not ultimately take France out of NATO’s political councils (though he repeatedly hinted that he might), but he did seek to distance his country as much as possible from the Western military bloc (especially the “AngloSaxon” powers) and to pursue a genuinely independent foreign policy and defense posture, establishing France once again as the chief “guardian of Europe” and a great power on the world stage. To be sure, some of the reorientation of French foreign policy had begun well before de Gaulle returned to power. France launched its own nuclear weapons program shortly after World War II, and the program subsequently was endorsed by every government of the Fourth Republic.4 When de Gaulle pushed ahead with France’s first nuclear test explosion in February 1960, he was merely reaffirming a decision made in April 1958 by the final Fourth Republic government, headed by Félix Gaillard. De Gaulle’s desire for an independent force de frappe (especially after his proposal for a trilateral NATO directorate was rejected) was therefore not radically different from the policies of the successive Fourth Republic governments. Nor did his espousal of an independent nuclear force amount to a call for absolute autarky. Under an “Agreement for Cooperation in the Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems for Mutual Defense Purposes” signed by the U.S. and French governments in July 1961, French nuclear weapons scientists apparently received at least a modicum of indirect advice from U.S. weapons specialists in the 1960s.5 Nonetheless, even though de Gaulle was not starting from scratch, he accelerated the existing trends and took new steps to attain a special status for France vis-à-vis the transatlantic alliance and the Cold War standoff. De Gaulle’s policy of grandeur became such an indelible part of France’s dealings with the outside world that most elements of it were preserved by his successors, including his erstwhile nemesis François Mitterrand. Even when de Gaulle’s immediate successor, Georges Pompidou, decided to lift the long-standing French veto on Britain’s application to join the European Economic Community (EEC), this move did not signal any erosion of France’s aspiration to be a leading world power and the dominant force in an integrated Europe. Instead, Pompidou’s action was motivated solely by
Introduction
3
a desire to overcome the increasingly bitter recriminations and near-paralysis of the EEC that had resulted from de Gaulle’s refusal to accept British membership. In a few more limited ways as well, French foreign policy did gradually change after de Gaulle—neither Pompidou nor Mitterrand shared de Gaulle’s penchant for flamboyant gestures or his obvious zest for antagonizing the United States—but in most respects the pattern under de Gaulle’s successors was one of continuity rather than discontinuity with Gaullist grandeur.6 Long after de Gaulle stepped down as president in 1969 and died a year later, the French government’s external behavior was still universally described as “Gaullist”—an adjective denoting France’s bid to reassert itself as a great power with global interests separate from those of NATO and the United States. *** The scholarly literature on de Gaulle’s presidency and foreign policy is immense. Thousands of books and articles have appeared in French, English, German, and other languages, and many new items are being published every year. The literature is so vast and is expanding so rapidly that even the largest bibliographies are bound to be incomplete. The continued outpouring of scholarship on French foreign policy under de Gaulle stems in part from enduring interest in his presidency and in part from the ongoing declassification of archival materials and the release of other primary sources, which allow for reassessments of key events and themes. Over the past ten to fifteen years, French scholars who have gained particularly good access to the French archives have produced outstanding overviews of France’s external relations during the de Gaulle era.7 Specialized studies of French military policy and programs under de Gaulle, especially the role of nuclear weapons in his thinking, the expansion of France’s weapons manufacturing sector, the uneasy state of civil-military relations in the wake of the “Generals’ Coup,” and the restructuring of the French high command after the pullout from Algeria, have also been proliferating.8 In addition to analyzing foreign policy “outputs,” numerous scholars have limned the policymaking process, showing how it influenced de Gaulle’s agenda and circumscribed or facilitated his actions.9 Despite the wealth of literature surveying various aspects of de Gaulle’s foreign policy, no comprehensive anthology of essays has yet appeared on France’s relations in 1958–1969 with countries around the world—countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as Europe and North America. Most analyses of French foreign policy under de Gaulle have focused on a specific country or region or on a particular issue such as European integration, NATO, or decolonization.10 Books and articles about France’s bilateral ties with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), with Britain, and with the
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United States have been so numerous that a bibliography of the literature on any of these topics would come to around 1,000 pages or more.11 In 1985 an anthology offering an array of international perspectives on de Gaulle’s foreign policy (as analyzed by French scholars rather than by scholars based in the relevant countries) was put out in Paris, but it appeared well before most of the relevant archival sources from the 1960s had become available either in France or elsewhere.12 That anthology had the further drawback of being relatively limited in its geographic scope, omitting any discussion of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. (On the other hand, the book did contain a useful chapter on de Gaulle’s controversial stance vis-à-vis Canada and another about French policy during the June 1967 Mideast war.) The editors of the current volume—Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin—seek to provide a fuller and much more thoroughly documented picture. The thirteen essays that follow this introductory chapter are all based on pathbreaking, multicountry archival research by scholars well-versed in the latest historiography. Some of the authors reassess topics that have been discussed extensively in the past, whereas others deal with countries or issues that have been largely unexplored up to now. The volume as a whole presents a systematic evaluation of French policies around the globe and of international responses to de Gaulle’s actions. The chapter by Marie-Pierre Rey looks at Soviet policy toward France during the de Gaulle era, building on an earlier essay she published in French.13 Rey contends that Soviet officials were hopeful that they could use de Gaulle’s bid for greater independence as a wedge against NATO and the United States. As early as January 1958, before de Gaulle had even returned to power, the ruling Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) adopted a resolution vowing to “weaken the ties linking France with NATO and [to] strengthen the social and political tendencies in France that strive for greater independence from the United States.”14 The resolution had been inspired by the sharp rift that emerged between France and the United States in November 1956 during the Suez Crisis. Two weeks after the CPSU Presidium adopted its resolution, a Soviet diplomat who met with de Gaulle reported that the general had affirmed that “France’s dependence on the United States will not be eternal.”15 Thus, by the time de Gaulle was appointed premier in June 1958, Soviet leaders were distinctly optimistic about the prospects of working with him. For the first several years, however, as Rey points out, “Soviet hopes and calculations proved unfounded.” In particular, de Gaulle refused to go along with Moscow’s position regarding Germany, the issue on which “Soviet disappointment was keenest.” Not until 1966, after de Gaulle severed France’s military ties with NATO and demanded the removal of U.S. troops from French soil, did Soviet leaders once again become hopeful that growing tensions in U.S.–
Introduction
5
French relations would “push de Gaulle closer to the USSR.” De Gaulle’s highly publicized trip to the Soviet Union in the early summer of 1966, culminating in a joint declaration and other agreements, seemed to bear out Moscow’s optimism. Rey argues that the French president’s effort to forge a rapprochement with the Soviet Union was part of “an ambitious attempt to overcome the Cold War and the division [of Europe] into blocs.” But tensions between France and the USSR resurfaced in 1967 and 1968 when, as Rey notes, de Gaulle began “calling on the [East European] satellites to refuse submission to Moscow.” The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 marked “the end of [de Gaulle’s] dreams of overcoming the Cold War” and came as a bitter disappointment to him. For the Soviet Union, too, the rapprochement with France ultimately failed to produce most of the anticipated benefits. By the time de Gaulle left office, according to Rey, “Soviet disillusionment with him had been a long time coming.” If nothing else, the experience made clear that the USSR’s security goals in Europe depended far more on Washington and Bonn than on Paris. In the next chapter, Carine Germond explores the up-and-down relationship between France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the late 1950s and 1960s. Initially, de Gaulle worked closely with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to strengthen the amicable bilateral ties that had evolved in the 1950s. This effort culminated in the Elysée treaty of January 1963, which laid out a framework of bilateral friendship and cooperation. From that point on, however, the room for further improvements of relations diminished. Germond argues that despite the historic reconciliation between the two countries, “France and Germany proved unable to achieve consensus on most [EEC] and world issues during de Gaulle’s presidency.” As a result, “the Franco–German alliance, as originally envisioned by de Gaulle, remained largely unfulfilled during his presidency.” The main reason for the lack of further progress, according to Germond, was the basic “conflict between the Gaullist and West German foreign policy orientations.” De Gaulle was hoping that the FRG would join him in his effort to counter the “Anglo-Saxons” and sever most ties with NATO, but neither Adenauer nor his successor, Ludwig Erhard, was willing to curtail West Germany’s close links with the United States and NATO. Erhard’s “preference for Washington rather than Paris” placed inherent limits on how far the French–FRG partnership could go. Erhard also opposed de Gaulle’s attempts to forge a privileged bilateral relationship with West Germany at the expense of the EEC. The advent of Kurt Kiesinger as West German chancellor in 1966 sparked renewed hope in Paris of steady improvements in relations with the FRG. Some modest gains did indeed occur, but on balance, as Germond notes, “profound divergences on key foreign policy issues persisted.” The pursuit of Ostpolitik by Kiesinger and his foreign minister, Willy Brandt, initially heartened de Gaulle, who saw the policy as
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conducive to his own promotion of “détente, entente, and cooperation.” But Germond points out that even though French and West German leaders saw eye-to-eye on the need for overtures to the Eastern bloc, “the Franco– German ‘consensus’ on Ostpolitik came to a brutal end [in August 1968] with Moscow’s suppression of the Prague Spring,” an event that de Gaulle blamed partly on the FRG’s “activism” in Czechoslovakia. By early 1969, Kiesinger had come to believe that “as long as de Gaulle governs, there is not much [we] can do with France.”16 De Gaulle thus failed to achieve either of his major goals in policy toward the FRG—an “independent Western Europe with the Franco–German link at its core,” and a “Franco–German partnership within a European Community under French leadership.” De Gaulle’s general policy on European integration is the focus of the next chapter, by N. Piers Ludlow, who argues that the French president’s rhetoric often diverged from the concrete actions he took vis-à-vis the EEC. De Gaulle’s barbed public comments led many to believe that the general “despised [the EEC’s] supranational institutions,” but Ludlow contends that “the reality of French behavior toward the supranational institutions throughout the 1958–1969 period was . . . very different from that implied by these public attacks.” The de Gaulle era actually witnessed “a close pattern of cooperation with the supposedly despised and illegitimate European Commission.” This cooperation, Ludlow avers, suited France’s commercial interests. Because of France’s key role in the EEC, the French government enjoyed considerable leverage in intra-EEC negotiations and was wont to insist on financing and administrative arrangements that disproportionately benefited France. De Gaulle obtained lucrative subsidies for French farmers and blocked Britain’s application to join the EEC, thus forestalling any challenge to France’s preeminence within the Community. The resulting surge of French agricultural and industrial exports to EEC member-states, Ludlow writes, “contributed significantly to a French economic boom that, until 1968 at least, did much to bolster the confident and assertive stance that Gaullist France sought to adopt on the world stage.” Nonetheless, over time, as Ludlow notes, “the better France did, the more its European partners would conclude that France needed [to preserve] Europe”—a trend that undercut the credibility of French threats to pull out of the EEC and thereby reduced France’s negotiating leverage. Although de Gaulle continued to engage in brinkmanship to secure advantageous terms—most notably when he provoked the so-called Empty Chair crisis of 1965—“few of de Gaulle’s counterparts [any longer] believed that France would actually withdraw from the EEC.” By the mid-1960s, as Ludlow puts it, “France needed Europe as much as Europe needed France.” Hence, the other EEC member-states could be more “steadfast in resisting de Gaulle’s institutional demands.” For a while the desire to avoid another crippling standoff caused all the EEC countries, including France, to “eschew
Introduction
7
the type of forceful diplomacy that had led to the [Empty Chair] breakdown,” but efforts to avert another prolonged impasse came to an end in late 1967 when de Gaulle again blocked Britain’s attempt to join the EEC. This veto plunged the EEC into a nearly fatal crisis for the rest of de Gaulle’s time in office. Ludlow concludes that “de Gaulle’s tactics so wounded and offended many of his partners that French European successes became subject to a law of diminishing returns. . . . Resentment at French behavior and mistrust of [de Gaulle] mounted steadily, thwarting his ambitions for European political union, undermining the effectiveness of Franco–German cooperation, condemning the EEC to a succession of increasingly extreme diplomatic crises, and ultimately bringing the Community to total paralysis by the end of the decade.” In the next chapter, Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist discuss how NATO was able to contain the damage from de Gaulle’s decision in 1965– 1966 to pull French troops out of the alliance’s integrated military command. As early as February 1958, de Gaulle had expressed his dissatisfaction with NATO to a U.S. journalist: “If I governed France, I would quit NATO. NATO is against our independence and our interest.”17 In September 1958, a few months after de Gaulle was appointed prime minister, he sent his now-famous memorandum to the U.S. and British governments proposing to establish a new security framework within NATO consisting of France, the United States, and Britain as leaders of the alliance. De Gaulle regarded this proposal as an alternative to a situation in which “the whole show is effectively being run by the United States,” but neither the Americans nor the British were willing to pursue the idea.18 In subsequent years, the NATO governments and officials at the alliance’s headquarters in Paris increasingly sensed that de Gaulle was going to pose a more direct challenge to NATO. Serious planning began both in Paris and in the fourteen individual capitals to try to limit the fallout. These preparations were crucial in giving allied governments confidence that they could weather the storm. Locher and Nünlist point out that by late 1965 the consultations among allies revealed that “France was isolated in NATO.” Because French diplomats provided ample warning to the other NATO countries that de Gaulle intended to pull French forces out of NATO’s joint military command, the French president’s démarche on March 7, 1966 hardly came as a surprise. For a while, the crisis did spark considerable anxiety that NATO’s survival might be at stake, especially after de Gaulle’s landmark trip to Moscow in mid-1966, which caused some U.S. and British officials to worry that the Soviet Union would try to woo other West European countries. Ultimately, though, no country followed France’s lead, and concerns about NATO’s resilience proved unfounded. The lengthy preparations spearheaded by Brussels and by U.S., British, and West German officials in 1965 and early 1966 enabled the alliance to fend off de Gaulle’s challenge without any lasting
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detriment. Indeed, far from weakening NATO, the French president’s decision to lay down the gauntlet proved to be a catalyst for action that actually strengthened the alliance in the long run. Locher and Nünlist contend that the U.S. government’s “systematic behind-the-scenes consultations of allies” and NATO’s other “comprehensive preparations before [France’s] actual withdrawal” in March 1966 turned what could have been a catastrophe for the alliance into a rare moment of opportunity. Close coordination well in advance of de Gaulle’s announcement “facilitated both the smooth acceptance of the French withdrawal in 1966 and the revitalization of NATO in 1966–1967.” The next chapter, by Carolyne Davidson, examines the often fractious relationship between Gaullist France and the United States. Davidson argues that de Gaulle’s aversion to NATO “forced the United States to recognize the tension between the control it wanted . . . in Western Europe and the multilateralism on which its credibility rested.” Gaullist opposition to U.S. hegemony in the alliance dogged every U.S. president from Dwight Eisenhower through Lyndon Johnson. In de Gaulle’s view, the basic problem was that Americans could not conceive of relinquishing their domination of the alliance or of accepting France as a genuine equal. Davidson contends that U.S. leaders, especially John F. Kennedy, often did have trouble finding the right balance between “being a partner in an alliance in which all states were ostensibly equal” and “exercising control in Western Europe when it mattered.” Tension between Paris and Washington became acute during the Kennedy administration, when de Gaulle not only denounced U.S. preponderance within NATO but also sought to exploit the growing U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. During the Johnson administration the expansion of France’s nuclear force de frappe, coupled with the French pullout from NATO’s integrated military command and de Gaulle’s demand that U.S. forces be removed from French soil, ensured that bilateral tension remained at a high level. Johnson was able to deflect some of the Gaullist onslaught by quietly shelving U.S. plans to create a Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO. The MLF, which would have given U.S. allies (including West Germany) a share of control over NATO’s long-range nuclear forces, had been proposed as a way of burnishing the U.S. role in Europe, but the controversy that emerged around it ended up detracting from U.S. leadership and playing into de Gaulle’s hands. Johnson’s acquiescence in the demise of the MLF kept a bad situation from becoming worse. What helped the U.S. position even more was the Johnson administration’s deft handling of the crisis posed by France’s move away from NATO in 1965– 1966. Working closely with allied countries, the United States used the crisis as an opportunity to rejuvenate NATO through the adoption of the 1967 Harmel Report, which, as Davidson notes, codified “an American-led NATO embracing both deterrence and détente.” Davidson gives high marks to
Introduction
9
Johnson, who she says “was far more flexible than Kennedy” in dealing with both NATO and France.19 According to Davidson, “Johnson found— and accepted—the limits of a democratic alliance. . . . If Johnson had chosen to berate Charles de Gaulle publicly, to withdraw (with no more than symbolic effect) NATO Article V protection in the event of an attack on France, or to demand immediate financial compensation for the costly withdrawal of U.S. troops and the relocation of the supreme allied military headquarters from Paris to Mons in 1967, he would have undermined the democratic spirit of NATO as a voluntary alliance.” Another aspect of de Gaulle’s stance vis-à-vis NATO and the EEC comes up in James Ellison’s chapter, which examines the antipathy that developed between Gaullist France and the United Kingdom. De Gaulle had long viewed Britain as a stalking horse for the United States, and he also worried that the UK might displace France as the leader of an integrated Europe. Ellison shows that as ties between Paris and London waxed increasingly acrimonious in the 1960s, British leaders came to see the French president as “more of an enemy than an ally.” Officials in London did everything they could to weaken de Gaulle’s influence in Europe and to bolster NATO as a counterweight to Gaullist France. But Britain’s leverage in dealing with de Gaulle was inherently limited because the British government had determined that UK membership in the EEC would be crucial both economically and politically. Ellison stresses that “as long as Britain’s future was dependent on EEC entry, and as long as de Gaulle barred it, British governments faced a French obstacle of fundamental significance for Britain’s national and international standing.” Even though the UK failed to gain admission to the EEC until after de Gaulle left office, British leaders were successful in their other major goal of safeguarding NATO against the French president’s assaults. The reinvigoration of NATO in the face of de Gaulle’s challenge, and the maintenance of a hegemonic U.S. role in the alliance, were, as Ellison writes, major “setbacks for de Gaulle’s greater ambitions.” British officials were instrumental in the process leading to the Harmel Report, and, as Ellison notes, they “played a decisive part” in persuading de Gaulle to acquiesce in the report. They accomplished this latter feat by convincing U.S. officials that some of de Gaulle’s proposals for reform in NATO (especially regarding the pursuit of détente with the Eastern bloc) were sensible and could be accommodated without any adverse effect on the alliance. The NATO governments’ acceptance of the Harmel Report came only a few weeks after de Gaulle had vetoed Britain’s EEC application for a second time. Ellison concludes that by the late 1960s, in the wake of de Gaulle’s second veto of British entry and the adoption of the Harmel Report, “Britain’s newly enthused interest in European integration and its support for NATO’s multilateralism chimed with the anti-de Gaulle mood present in transatlantic relations.”
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The next five chapters deal with French policy toward countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The essay by Yuko Torikata explores de Gaulle’s attempts to serve as a mediator in the Vietnam War in 1964–1966, the years when U.S. military involvement was sharply escalating. Torikata shows that although de Gaulle “was quite serious about making peace in Vietnam, each of his diplomatic actions was simultaneously designed to contribute to his other objective of enhancing France’s grandeur.” De Gaulle worried that the deepening U.S. embroilment in Vietnam would intensify Washington’s pressure on NATO allies (including France) to build up their own conventional forces and thereby make up for any U.S. troops that were diverted to Southeast Asia. In addition, as Torikata contends, de Gaulle believed that “by mediating peace, [he] could promote France’s image as an equal and respected partner of the United States.” The rapidly escalating U.S. military effort in Vietnam seemed an inauspicious backdrop for French peace diplomacy, but de Gaulle was confident that his overtures to the Communist states involved in the conflict—the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam—would give him greater negotiating leverage with all sides, especially the United States. Torikata contends that “by pursuing rapprochement with the Eastern bloc, de Gaulle was trying to extract concessions from the United States by increasing his bargaining power as a go-between.” But in fact the opposite proved to be the case. The more that France’s relations with the Communist governments improved, the more suspicious that U.S. officials became of the French president’s motivations. Torikata points out that “de Gaulle’s overtures to the Communist powers ended up generating tension with the United States and reduced the acceptability of France’s proposal for mediation.” The Johnson administration’s steady escalation of the war hardened the resolve of North Vietnam and China and made them even more uncompromising. China, in particular, “never failed to apply pressure” and urge the North Vietnamese to seek an outright military victory. Thus, de Gaulle’s peace mediation ended up having no lasting impact on any of the combatants. In late summer 1966, having failed to achieve any progress, de Gaulle spoke in Phnom Penh before 100,000 people and declared that the Vietcong guerrillas were engaged in “national resistance” and that “France is totally confident that the United States will not be able to bring about a military solution.”20 The Phnom Penh speech, which won praise from Third World and Communist governments, antagonized the United States and thus signaled that de Gaulle had abandoned any further effort to serve as a peace mediator. Torikata concludes that “de Gaulle sacrificed good relations with the United States to gain more influence among the Communists and to demonstrate his political independence from the United States.” The French president was thus able to take his failed policy and convert it into at least a partial success.
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In the next chapter, Qiang Zhai scrutinizes de Gaulle’s policy toward China both before and after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between France and the PRC in January 1964. Initially, French ties with the Guomindang government on Taiwan inhibited any improvement of France’s relations with the Communist government in China, but de Gaulle soon affirmed that he was willing to sacrifice all links with the government in Taipei. A greater stumbling block was posed by the PRC’s strong political and military backing for the separatist guerrillas in Algeria, who set up a provisional government which Beijing promptly recognized. Qiang Zhai argues that the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, regarded the Algerian independence fighters as the latest in “a powerful emerging trend of national independence movements,” who could be enlisted in his struggle against the “revisionist” Soviet Union. Rather than trying to devise a face-saving exit for France, Mao repeatedly urged the Algerian revolutionaries to strive for a decisive military outcome. France’s retreat from Algeria in 1962, humiliating though it was, opened the way for progress in Franco–Chinese relations. De Gaulle hoped that an improvement of ties with Beijing would give him valuable leverage in his efforts to mediate a peace settlement in the Vietnam War. Mao, for his part, shared de Gaulle’s aversion to a world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. Qiang Zhai writes that Mao was intent on forging “a broad international united front of all countries and groups that opposed American–Soviet hegemony” and that sought to “reconfigure global politics and establish a multipolar world.” This description applied equally to de Gaulle, who, like Mao with China, wanted France to play a great-power role independent of the U.S.–Soviet standoff. Over U.S. objections, the French government extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC on January 27, 1964, followed a few months later by the exchange of ambassadors.21 Qiang Zhai convincingly argues that France’s establishment of diplomatic relations with China “reflected the convergence of their strategic interests,” especially their desire to “maintain their respective influence in world order,” their “resistance to American–Soviet hegemony,” and their hopes of “creating a multipolar international system.” But whether Qiang Zhai is justified in saying that the “new relationship introduced complexity and instability into the Cold War system” is more doubtful. France’s recognition of the PRC caused a brief stir in international political circles, but over the longer run de Gaulle gained very little. Despite the French president’s hope of working with the PRC to secure a peace settlement in Vietnam, Mao maintained an ultramilitant stance toward the war and exhorted the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to continue fighting for victory rather than seeking a negotiated settlement. Moreover, the extreme radicalization of Chinese foreign policy during the first two years of China’s Cultural Revolution (starting in August 1966) caused Sino–French relations to deteriorate significantly, not only because
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Chinese officials were promoting Maoist revolution in francophone Africa but also because Mao avidly supported French students in their violent protests against de Gaulle in May 1968. The French government swiftly retaliated by cracking down on Maoist political groups and blocking the dissemination of Maoist political literature. Gadi Heimann’s chapter shifts the discussion to the Middle East, explaining how the crisis engulfing Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon in July–August 1958—shortly after de Gaulle returned to power—presaged the tension that marred French–Israeli relations during and after the June 1967 Mideast War. The 1958 crisis underscored the importance of each side’s misperceptions of the other. Israeli officials mistakenly thought that de Gaulle, like his U.S. and British counterparts, regarded Soviet-backed nationalist leaders and subversives as the chief threat in the Middle East. The Israelis were aware of de Gaulle’s antipathy toward Egyptian President Gamal abdel Nasser, and they erroneously assumed that this meant the French leader shared their view that the Soviet Union and its Arab proxies, rather than the United States and Britain, were France’s chief rivals in the Middle East. Israeli officials had long hoped that the major Western powers (the United States, Britain, and France) would reinforce their presence in the Middle East, and they welcomed the joint U.S.–British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. By contrast, de Gaulle, who failed to grasp the depth of Israeli leaders’ concern about their country’s survival amid hostile Arab neighbors, was concerned only about France’s relative standing in the Middle East. French officials had not been consulted about the U.S.–British intervention before troops from the two countries landed, and de Gaulle was angered by the exclusion of France and staunchly opposed to any outcome that would strengthen U.S. and British positions in the region while leaving out France. Heimann notes that de Gaulle “agreed with the invasion itself” as the only means of bolstering the governments in Jordan and Lebanon against radical elements, but “he expressed strong opposition to the fact that this was not done in coordination with France.” The French leader realized that France “did not have sufficient resources to compete effectively” with the United States and the Soviet Union for influence in the region, and he therefore sought “an arrangement in which each [superpower] would neutralize the other and create a kind of vacuum from which France could benefit.” The French had long been the chief supplier of weaponry to Israel, and the Israeli government hoped to strengthen its security relationship with France by forming an alliance against radical pan-Arab forces backed by Moscow. But Israel’s support for a greater U.S. and British military presence in the region ran contrary to de Gaulle’s agenda, and he declined the Israeli government’s bid for a full-fledged alliance. Heimann writes that “the incompatibility between the French and the Israeli goals did not lead to tension in relations between the two states, let alone a break,” but this was mainly
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because France provided material and political support to Israel even while turning down the proposal for an alliance. According to Heimann, Israel and France continued to have a “broad basis for cooperation” over the next several years, but the crisis had highlighted the two countries’ fundamentally divergent assessments of U.S. and British actions in the region. This divergence, though limited at the time, was a harbinger of the deep rift that emerged in 1967. The next chapter, by Jeffrey James Byrne, explores de Gaulle’s policy toward Algeria, discussing not only the war itself (which was instrumental in de Gaulle’s return to power) but also its aftermath.22 Debunking the selfcongratulatory account in de Gaulle’s memoirs, Byrne shows that the French leader failed both in his original war aims and in his implementation of the March 1962 Evian accords that ended the war. The counterinsurgency campaign under de Gaulle, as French troop levels in Algeria rose to 600,000 by 1959, initially made some headway, but ultimately the components of de Gaulle’s political-military strategy “failed to satisfy either the European or the Muslim community” in Algeria, forcing the besieged French president to end the war on terms that previously would have been deemed unacceptable. When the Evian accords were signed in 1962, de Gaulle presented them as a new model for North–South cooperation untarnished by the superpowers, but in fact the settlement represented far-reaching concessions by de Gaulle, including the granting of full independence and full Algerian control of energy resources in the Sahara. Byrne points out that the government of the newly independent Algeria, headed by leaders of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) guerrilla army, committed itself to “economic nationalism, unfettered independence, and monolithic Arabism,” in contrast to de Gaulle, who was hoping for “economic interdependence, limited sovereignty, and multicommunal federalism.” The years after the Evian accords, Byrne shows, “witnessed the steady dismantling of French economic [and political] interests, culminating in the nationalization of Algeria’s oil and gas in 1972.” De Gaulle went quietly along with the “piecemeal obliteration of Evian” and never candidly acknowledged that his entire “policy in Algeria was under constant assault from the [FLN’s] revolutionary agenda.” The mass exodus of nearly all of the loyalist community (pieds-noirs) from Algeria, the stepped-up withdrawal (under duress) of French military forces from Algeria, the transfer of France’s nuclear weapons test site from the Sahara to the South Pacific, the wholesale nationalization of French property, and the acrimonious disputes over French oil companies’ rights underscored that “the real content of cooperation fell far short of the grand aims aired by its architect.” Byrne concludes that although the Evian accords had “constituted a central plank of de Gaulle’s ambitious strategy to restore France’s global influence,” they were a “failure” when judged by “de Gaulle’s own ambitious goals.” The final symbolic blow to de Gaulle came when he died in 1970,
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and the new leader in Algeria, Houari Boumedienne, pointedly declined to go to France for the funeral. Guia Migani’s chapter, building on a book she published in 2008, explains how decolonization proceeded in Sub-Saharan Africa after spreading there from North Africa.23 Migani points out that by the time de Gaulle returned to power in mid-1958, “French authority in the colonies was in crisis.” Initially, de Gaulle sought a new relationship with the colonies in the form of a Franco–African Community that would supplant the Union française established in 1946. The new arrangement, codified in September 1958, gave the colonies the option of full independence. Guinea immediately embraced full independence, and the other territories followed suit in 1960, undermining the viability of the Franco–African Community, which was replaced by a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral accords. Migani argues that “during the decolonization process de Gaulle aimed to maintain French influence in Sub-Saharan Africa” through continued large-scale assistance, but in July 1961 the French president publicly acknowledged that “there is no alternative to decolonization,” regardless of the precise outcome.24 By that point, France had begun to compete for influence in Sub-Saharan Africa with other countries (especially the two superpowers) and international organizations, notably the EEC. Migani contends that when de Gaulle devised a new framework of relations with francophone Africa, he “tried to assume the role of mediator between North and South,” hoping to overshadow the United States and the Soviet Union. French economic, cultural, and military assistance to its former colonies continued at a significant level. Migani argues that even though de Gaulle’s initial goal of a Franco–African Community proved ephemeral, “the independence of the African states contributed to a new orientation of [France’s] foreign policy.” Migani credits de Gaulle with having “profoundly transformed [France’s] relationship with the Sub-Saharan African states” within just a few years, minimizing the damage that might otherwise have ensued. The penultimate chapter, by Joaquín Fermandois, covers a topic that has gone largely unexplored in the literature: de Gaulle’s policy toward Latin America, especially Chile. Focusing on de Gaulle’s extended visit to ten Latin American countries in September–October 1964, Fermandois highlights the interaction between the French president’s domestic and external priorities. De Gaulle, Fermandois argues, “required a demonstration of his significance on the global stage” in order to “bolster his image in French politics with a view to the presidential elections of December 1965.” De Gaulle’s wartime reputation and his desire to offset U.S. hegemony ensured that he would be given a warm reception in Latin America. Fermandois notes that the French president’s “acceptance of the decolonization process” in Sub-Saharan Africa and his ending of the war in Algeria eliminated any potential obstacles to his visit. In a detailed account of de Gaulle’s visit to
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Chile, Fermandois concludes that the visit “was the most important event in the entire history of Chilean–French relations. . . . From the French point of view, the visit was a complete success.” Fermandois contends that “de Gaulle’s presence [in Latin America in 1964] supported the yearnings of a continent that did not want to be identified entirely with U.S. policies or with Marxist views of world order.” The goodwill that de Gaulle earned in Latin America from his visit persisted through the rest of his presidency and contributed, at least in a small way, to his policy of grandeur. The final chapter, by Garret Martin, seeks to distill some broad thmes from de Gaulle’s policies in far-flung parts of the world, concentrating in particular on the question of whether de Gaulle had a grand strategy to end the bipolar division of the world. Martin argues unequivocally that “de Gaulle did have a grand design, one that centered on recapturing France’s great-power status and overcoming the Cold War order in Europe.” According to Martin, de Gaulle regarded the Cold War as “an abnormal state of affairs” and “perceived the bipolar division of the world as an anomaly and one that was inherently unstable, as opposed to past multipolar systems that could more easily create an equilibrium.” This notion that a stable equilibrium was more likely in a multipolar than a bipolar system was at odds with the writings of some scholars of international relations, who saw a bipolar system as inherently more stable.25 But de Gaulle’s push for a multipolar world, regardless of the particular rationale offered, was tied up most of all with his desire to restore France as a great power. Some observers, as Martin notes, have argued that the broad aim of restoring French grandeur did not actually yield a grand design. In the views of some, de Gaulle relied mostly on improvisation, and according to Andrew Moravcsik, the general often was guided more by domestic exigencies than by foreign policy goals. Martin contests these characterizations, arguing that de Gaulle’s “traditional quest for great-power status for France” was intimately connected with his “radical attempts to challenge the Cold War order.” According to Martin, de Gaulle had an overweening desire to “avoid any form of subordination, be it to another state or within an international organization. [France as] a great power had the right to act according to its interests, even if this meant irritating allies.” Hence, de Gaulle’s emphasis on the need for an independent French nuclear arsenal. Similarly, de Gaulle’s wariness of NATO and his opposition to British membership in the EEC stemmed from his “fear that the United States, because of its might, could be tempted to try to dominate its European allies.” Martin claims that de Gaulle not only “consistently strove to overcome the division of Europe into two antagonistic blocs” but also “aimed to establish a sort of pan-European security system” whose “two main pillars would of course be France and the Soviet Union.” According to Martin, de Gaulle’s policies in the Third World and his efforts to mediate a settlement of the Vietnam War
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also reflected his larger foreign policy strategy. Martin concludes that de Gaulle’s “ambitious grand design to overcome the Cold War bipolar order had a significant worldwide impact at the time and still does today.” Taken as a whole, the thirteen chapters give readers a solid basis for considering two major sets of questions about de Gaulle’s foreign policy: First, how successful was de Gaulle in achieving his aims? Did he merely end up demonstrating that NATO could thrive without France and that France was not truly the great power he claimed it was? How did the other aspects of de Gaulle’s foreign policy discussed in this book—his abortive efforts to work closely with the Soviet Union and China in mediating a settlement to the Vietnam War, his inability to prevent the collapse of French influence in Algeria, his oversight of France’s independent nuclear weapons program, his relative success in handling decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa, and his laudatory reception in Latin America—color perceptions of France’s global standing? Was de Gaulle’s steadfast opposition to a U.S.- and Soviet-dominated world order—a position widely supported in the Third World—sufficient to restore French grandeur? To what extent, if any, did de Gaulle actually mitigate superpower domination of the Cold War international system? Second, to what extent was de Gaulle guided by a conscious strategy to overcome the Cold War and achieve a unified Europe that would include the Soviet Union? Garret Martin, Marie-Pierre Rey, and several other contributors argue that de Gaulle did in fact have a clear strategy for overcoming the Cold War and that he actively pursued it: Others such as Jeffrey Byrne are less sure, seeing de Gaulle as mainly trying to gloss over the failure of his policies in Algeria. The book does not provide ironclad answers to either of these sets of questions, but it does enable readers to ponder them more clearly and comprehensively. *** Finally, in retrospect, one might ask whether the reorientation of French foreign policy in the 1960s could have occurred in largely the same manner under someone other than de Gaulle. Suppose that the general had declined to return to public life after 1946. The Fourth Republic would undoubtedly still have collapsed in the late 1950s, and a Fifth Republic with a stronger presidency would likely still have emerged, albeit perhaps in somewhat different form. A leader of the new Fifth Republic who lacked de Gaulle’s colorful personality and penchant for bluntness would probably not have had as visible a presence on the international scene, but this does not necessarily mean that France’s foreign relations from the late 1950s through the late 1960s would have been fundamentally different if someone other than de Gaulle had become president in 1958. To the extent that Realpolitik has been the standard motif of French foreign policy over the
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past few centuries (apart from the ideologically charged years of the French Revolution), one might argue that in this respect there was nothing particularly distinctive about de Gaulle. Even though he occasionally gave vent to moralistic rhetoric, he was in fact an avid practitioner of Realpolitik, eschewing sentimentality and focusing his energies on the promotion of “a certain idea of France” (une certaine idée de la France). Indeed, “Gaullist” would be an apt description of the “units” depicted in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, the seminal “neorealist” text on international relations.26 Waltz’s book emphasizes the structure of the international system and refers to individual states as mere “units” that have a strong incentive (because of the systemic pressures they face) to act in accordance with Realpolitik.27 A French leader other than de Gaulle in the late 1950s and 1960s might well have behaved in roughly the same manner. Hence, one cannot automatically assume that a “Gaullist” reorientation of French foreign policy would not have occurred even in the absence of de Gaulle. To try to assess how much de Gaulle himself mattered in France’s change of direction, it is worth noting six features of the post-1945 international system that helped to shape French foreign policy from the early years of the Cold War through the end of de Gaulle’s presidency: • the debilitating impact of World War II on European colonial empires and the growing pressure for decolonization; • the dramatic ascendance of the United States, which emerged from the war in an immensely more powerful position both globally and in Europe; • the concomitant ascendance of the Soviet Union, which, despite suffering appalling human and material losses in the war, emerged at the end as the dominant European military power; • the total defeat of Germany in 1945, resulting in the four-power occupation and subsequent bifurcation of German territory; • the gradual division of Europe and East Asia into two rival military blocs, one led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union; and • the U.S.-assisted drive for European economic integration, which took on a life of its own with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Each of these factors was bound to have a far-reaching impact on French foreign policy after 1945, establishing parameters in which all postwar French leaders operated. In combination, the six factors facilitated some French actions but impeded or precluded others. No French leader who might have come to power in 1958—not de Gaulle nor any plausible alternative—would have had unlimited leeway to define France’s place in the
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world. That said, the chapters in this book make clear that even if we take full account of the structural changes resulting from the war and its aftermath, the course of France’s Cold War policy might have been markedly different if de Gaulle had not returned as president in 1958. He left a large, distinctive imprint on French foreign policy that endured throughout the Cold War and even after. Most likely, no other French leader would, or could, have taken France in the same direction. To be sure, some of the policies embraced by de Gaulle were merely a logical continuation of what had come before. This was true, for example, of France’s development of an independent nuclear weapons program, which, as noted above, had been launched shortly after the war and supported by the Fourth Republic. Similarly, the French parliament’s rejection of the accord for a European Defense Community in 1954 signaled incipient French dissatisfaction with the structures of NATO and with the apparent U.S. desire to keep France from acquiring its own nuclear weapons. Doubts in France about the country’s ability to rely on NATO—and especially on the United States—increased all the more in the wake of the humiliating French experience during the 1956 Suez crisis, when the United States took a firm stance against French and British efforts to dislodge Nasser through military force. No matter who had come to power in Paris in 1958, the trauma of Suez would have instilled greater wariness of relying on NATO. De Gaulle’s pursuit of closer relations with the FRG also owed a good deal to the Fourth Republic’s policies. By the time de Gaulle took office, the historic reconciliation between France and (West) Germany was well advanced and was reflected in international structures as far back as the ECSC. The Elysée treaty merely codified and strengthened trends that had been under way for some fifteen years. De Gaulle’s inability after the Elysée pact to achieve further progress in French–FRG relations was closely connected with his aversion to NATO, but this did not undo the close bilateral relationship that had emerged. In dealing with the FRG, de Gaulle benefited from the major achievements of the Fourth Republic. The pressure for decolonization after the Second World War was another factor that would have shaped French policy in Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s no matter who had been leading the country. The Fourth Republic governments, reflecting broad public and elite sentiment, had sought to preserve France’s colonial possessions and to stave off decolonization, but as early as May 1954 the French authorities yielded at Dien Bien Phu and accepted a full-scale retreat from Indochina, which gained independence under the July 1954 Geneva accords. By the time de Gaulle returned to power in mid-1958, the pressure for decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa was growing against the backdrop of the war in Algeria. Even though French elites and the French public were still in favor of maintaining most of the
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colonies, any leader who had come to power in Paris in mid-1958 would have been forced to confront the issue.28 Nonetheless, despite the constraints and policies that de Gaulle inherited from the Fourth Republic, his breaks with the past and the distinctive patterns of his foreign policy were at least as notable as the continuities. In Algeria, for example, he inherited a complex, negative situation that could easily have gone in a much worse direction under someone else. De Gaulle’s eventual policy of extricating France from Algeria was flawed and, to a degree, improvisational, but the point to be stressed about it is that it was clearly his policy. The same is true of his bombastic pronouncements and his antagonistic approach toward NATO, the United States, and Britain. De Gaulle’s ability to project his “certain idea of France” and to gloss over his numerous failures enabled the French public to believe that France mattered more in the world than it actually did. De Gaulle was particularly adept at depicting weakness as strength and putting the best face on setbacks. In the meantime, the French economy was rapidly growing, based in part on the major benefits de Gaulle had gained from the EEC in the face of strenuous resistance. Even though his cachet in both domestic affairs and foreign policy had fizzled by the time he resigned in April 1969, he left France in a stronger position than when he began his presidency. When he died in November 1970, he was one of the few remaining larger-than-life figures from the Second World War—a stature he had exploited as best he could in his foreign policy. In some sense, he remains larger than life in France and in French foreign policy to this day, and the chapters in this book help readers to understand why.
Notes ╇ 1.╇ For an insightful and meticulously researched biography, see Eric Roussell, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 2002). ╇ 2.╇ Matthias Waechter, Der Mythos des Gaullismus: Heldenkult, Geschichtspolitik und Ideologie 1940 bis 1958 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), pp. 317–453. ╇ 3.╇ René Rémond, 1958: Le retour de De Gaulle (Brussels: Ed. Complexe, 1998), pp. 117–138. ╇ 4.╇ Dominique Mongin, La bombe atomique française, 1945–1959 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1997). ╇ 5.╇ Pierre Mélandri, “Aux origines de la coopération nucléaire franco-américaine,” in Maurice Vaïsse, ed., La France et l’atome: Études d’histoire nucléaire (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994), pp. 267–281; Richard Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, No. 75 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–33; André Bendjebbar, Histoire secrète de la bombe atomique Française (Paris: Le cherche midi éditeur, 2000), pp. 309–320; and Maurice Vaïsse, “Aux origines du mémorandum de septembre 1958,” Relations internationales, No. 59 (Autumn 1989), pp. 297–300.
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╇ 6.╇ On this point, see Tamara Keating, Constructing the Gaullist Consensus: A Cultural Perspective on French Policy toward the United States in NATO (1958–2000) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004). ╇ 7.╇ See, for example, Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Maurice Vaïsse, La puissance ou l’influence? La France dans le monde depuis 1958 (Paris: Fayard, 2009); and Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). ╇ 8.╇ For insightful analyses of several key topics, see the essays in Maurice Vaïsse and François Bedeaux, eds., Armement et Ve République: Fin des années 1950, fin des années 1960 (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2002). On de Gaulle’s military thinking both before and during his presidency, see Pierre Messmer and Alain Larcan, Les écrits militaires de Charles de Gaulle: Essai d’analyse thématique (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1985). ╇ 9.╇ Paul Godt, ed., Policy-Making in France: From de Gaulle to Mitterand (London: Pinter, 1989); Philip Thody, The Fifth Republic: Presidents, Politics, and Personalities (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 4–36; and Alfred Grosser, Affaires extérieures: La politique de la France, 1944–1984 (Paris: Flammarion, 1985). 10.╇ For a varied sample of these sorts of studies, see Frédéric Bozo, Deux stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’Alliance atlantique 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996); Erin R. Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960–1963: A Troubled Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Michael Sutton, France and the Construction of Europe, 1944–2007: The Geopolitical Imperative (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 85– 175; Guia Migani, La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957–63: Histoire d’une décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008); Paul Legoll, Charles de Gaulle et Konrad Adenauer: La cordiale entente (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004); Corine DeFrance and Ulrich Pfeil, eds., Der Elysée-Vertrag und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 1945–1963–2003 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2005); Manfred Seinkühler, Der deutsch-französische Vertrag von 1963: Entsehung, diplomatische Anwendung und politische Bedeutung in den Jahren von 1958 bis 1969 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002); Marine Lefévre, Charles de Gaulle du Canada français au Québec (Montreal: Leméac, 2007); Miriam Rosman, La France et Israël, 1947– 1970: De la création de l’état d’Israël au départ des vedettes de Cherbourg (Paris: H. Champion, 2009); Bernard Tricot, ed., L’éstablissement de relations diplomatiques entre la France et la République populaire de Chine (27 janvier 1964) (Paris: Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1995); L’Amérique contre De Gaulle: Histoire secrete, 1961–1969 (Paris: Éditions du seuil, 2000); and (for an African perspective) Saloum Dakté, Sekou Touré face au Général de Gaulle (Dakar: Éditions feu de brousse, 2007). 11.╇ See, for example, Deter Menyesch and Bérénice Manach, eds., France-Allemagne: Relations internationales et interdépendances bilatérales—une bibliographie, 1963–1982 (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1984). 12.╇ Elie Barnavi and Saül Friedländer, eds., La politique étrangère du général de Gaulle (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1985). 13.╇ Marie-Pierre Rey, “De Gaulle, l’URSS et la sécurité européene, 1958–1969,” in Maurice Vaïsse, ed., De Gaulle et la Russie (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2006),
Introduction
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pp.€213–227. For other recent studies of Soviet policy toward France during the de Gaulle era, see Mikhail Narinskii and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., Les crises dans les relations franco-soviétiques, 1954–1991 (Paris: Pedone, 2009); Marina Azarkanyan and Aleksandr Chubaryan, Sharl’ de Goll’, 1890–1970 (Moscow: Institut Vseobshchei Istorii, 2000); and Julie M. Newton, Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 14.╇ “Vypiska iz protokola No. 872 Prezidiuma Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS,” Resolution (Top Secret), January 21, 1958, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), Fond (F.) 013, Opis’ (Op.) 49, Portfel’ (Por.) 11, Papka (Pap.) 277, Delo (D.) Listy (Ll.) 2–3. 15.╇ “Zapis’ besedy s gen. Sharlem de Gollem, 6 fevralya 1958 g.,” Memorandum No. 93 (Secret), to Moscow from Soviet Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov, February 7, 1958, in AVPRF, F. 013, Op. 49, Por. 4, Pap. 276, D. 8, Ll. 47–50. 16.╇ “Hintergrundgespräch Kiesingers mit Herbert Kremp and Lothar Rühl im Bundeskanzleramt,” January 23, 1969, in Archiv der christlich-demokratischen Partei, Nachlaß Kiesinger, I–226–A008. 17.╇ C. L. Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 198. 18.╇ Remark recorded by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a memorandum to President Dwight Eisenhower, December 15, 1958, in Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Dulles-Herter, Box 10. The memorandum summarizes a private conversation between Dulles and de Gaulle at a NATO summit. 19.╇ The most authoritative study of this matter—Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003)—also offers a glowing appraisal of the Johnson administration’s management of the crisis. 20.╇ Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, 7 vols. (Geneva: Éditions Édito-Service, 1970), vol. V, p. 76. 21.╇ For an illuminating discussion of this event, see Garret Martin, “Playing the China Card? Revisiting France’s Recognition of Communist China, 1963–1964,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 52–80. 22.╇ An immense amount of scholarship on this subject continues to appear every year. For a small sampling of recent studies, see Pierre Vallaud, La guerre d’Algérie, vol. 2: 1958–1962: La marche à l’indépendance (Paris: Acropole, 2005); Benjamin Stora, Le mystère De Gaulle: Son choix pour (Paris: Laffont, 2009); Jacques Simon, Algérie: L’abandon sans la défaite, 1958–1962 (Paris: Harmattan, 2009); Frank Renken, Frankreich im Schatten des Algerienkrieges: Die Fünfte Republik und die Erinnerung an den letzten grossen Kolonialkonflikt (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2006); Florence Beaugé, Algérie, une guerre sans gloire: Histoire d’une enquête (Algiers: Chihab, 2006); Michèle Cointet, De Gaulle et l’Algérie française, 1958–1962 (Paris: Perrin, 1995); Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Quest for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Roger Lajoie-Mazenc, La guerre de là-bas: Anciens d’Algérie—Un demi-siècle de parcours du combattant (Firmi, France: R. Lajoie-Mazenc, 2009); and Bernard Crochet and Gérard Piouffre, La guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Éditions de Lodi, 2009). 23.╇ Guia Migani, La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957–1963: Histoire d’une décolonisation entre idéaux eurafricains et politique de puissance (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008).
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24.╇ “Allocution radiotélévisée prononcée à l’Elysée, 12 juillet 1961,” in de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. III, pp. 329–330. 25.╇ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, vol. 93, no. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 163–176; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “War in Neorealist Theory,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Raab, eds., The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 44–48. After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Waltz said he had been “mistaken” in “conflating peace and stability.” He averred that rather than being more stable, bipolar systems are merely less war-prone than multipolar systems. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 45. 26.╇ Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 27.╇ Waltz acknowledges that under conditions of anarchy (i.e., in the absence of a world government that can enforce international order), states “are free to do any fool thing they choose,” but he emphasizes that “they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not.” Expectations of these costs and benefits should in the end, according to Waltz, cause states to heed structural pressures when deciding “to do some things and to refrain from doing others.” See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4 (December 1997), p. 915. 28.╇ This point is stressed by authors of widely different perspectives such as Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (New York: Longman, 1994); Catherine Hodeir, Stratégies d’empire: Le grand patronat colonial face à la décolonisation (Paris: Belin, 2003); and Alain Ruscio, La décolonisation tragique: Une histoire de la décolonisation française, 1945–1962 (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1987).
I Europe
2 De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow Marie-Pierre Rey
Introduction In 1958, after a long period in the desert, General de Gaulle came back to politics and from the start he affirmed his desire to question some of the principles and practices defended by the Fourth Republic. His credo of putting at the heart of his activity the independence and grandeur of France was obviously not new to the leaders of the Soviet Union. Since 1944, during his visit to Moscow to sign a treaty of alliance and assistance with the USSR, de Gaulle had proclaimed his will to restore France’s national independence and his intention to balance transatlantic ties with a trusting relationship with Moscow. But in 1958, the international situation was quite different from that of 1944: the wartime grand alliance had collapsed, the Cold War had set in, and Franco–Soviet relations had significantly deteriorated. To protest against the ratification of treaties establishing the European Defense Community (EDC), the Soviets in 1955 had denounced the bilateral treaty signed in 1944; one year later, the Suez Crisis gave rise to sharp Soviet criticism of French imperialism, while the Soviet repression in Budapest aroused consternation and anger in France. Finally, in 1957, France adhered to the Treaty of Rome, much to the regret of Soviet diplomacy, which did not cease criticizing the European Economic Community (EEC) project, considering it a noxious instrument in the service of West–European and American interests.1 In this strained context, how was the return of de Gaulle to power analyzed by Soviet diplomacy? Was it seen as a favorable opportunity—or on the contrary, as harmful? Was the French president perceived as a hostile leader or as a potential€ally? What conceptions did Soviet decision-makers 25
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have of him and what impact did these conceptions have on Soviet diplomacy? Finally, did these conceptions evolve over the period from 1958 to 1969, and if so, as a result of what factors?2 To try to respond to these questions, we will first focus on the period between 1958 and 1964. Marked by ambivalent perceptions mingling presuppositions that were ideologically hostile and considerations that were pragmatic, the Khrushchev years were the first phase of a rapprochement that ultimately had few concrete effects. On the contrary, starting in 1964– 1965 and until the General left office in 1969, the new geopolitical situation and de Gaulle’s views of the new Soviet leaders in power favored the establishment of a trust unprecedented in the history of East–West€ relations—which will be the object of the second part of this chapter.
1958 to 1964: The Soviets Regard de Gaulle with Ideology and Pragmatism Even before his return to the political scene, de Gaulle aroused great interest among Soviet decision-makers. While burdened by a certain number of hostile and stereotyped judgments dictated by ideological considerations and the weight of the Cold War, these decision-makers were not long in betting on a Gaullist uniqueness that they perceived as potentially useful. Even though in 1944 the General had gone to Moscow to sign that bilateral treaty, and just after the Second World War had brought Communist ministers into his government, in 1958 Soviet observers were generally hostile to him, and most did not expect his return to power. For these observers, the very circumstances of his return to power could only be an ill omen, and very quickly de Gaulle was described as an apprentice dictator linked to the big business bourgeoisie. In the weeks that followed his becoming president, the Soviet embassy in Paris dealt the following verdict in a report to the Ministerstvo Inostrannych Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MID): “On May 13, 1958 in Algiers, there was a successful military-fascist putsch used by the great French bourgeoisie to install an authoritarian dictatorship in France led by de Gaulle.”3 On June 29, 1958, Kliment Voroshilov, then President of the Presidium, affirmed in a meeting with the United Press Agency that with de Gaulle in charge, relations between France and the USSR could only get worse.4 Due to a crudeness ill-suited to diplomatic customs, Voroshilov’s declaration aroused the MID’s disapproval and he was obliged to apologize before the Presidium. Nevertheless, de Gaulle widely appeared to the current ruling circle as a pillar of French imperialism and as a classic representative of the authoritarian right. Neither his position back in 1944 nor his opposition to the ratification of the treaty establishing the EDC in 1954 (although that
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 27
opposition was shared with the Soviet government and the French Communist Party) was counted to his credit. This hostility was also detectable in Nikita Khrushchev’s perception of the French leader. In 1962, the Secretary-General of the CPSU did not hesitate to declare during a Politburo meeting devoted to foreign policy: “What is de Gaulle? The same thing as Guy Mollet. After de Gaulle, evidently, it will be Guy Mollet, if de Gaulle is not assassinated and raging extremists come into power, quite simply fascists.”5 Yet, within this chorus of stereotyped and hostile judgments, some in the MID expressed different views. In 1956, while Khrushchev was more reserved about de Gaulle, Sergei Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador in Paris, began to wager on the General’s future, now affirming that de Gaulle “is the only French political personality capable of distancing himself from the Atlantic Alliance.”6 At the end of 1957, Vinogradov began to enter into contact with de Gaulle via some of the advisors of the French leader.7. To Vinogradov (and this view was gradually shared by other diplomats in the foremost European office of the MID in charge of French questions), de Gaulle as a convinced nationalist could play a useful role of “party spoiler” on the Western stage—and thereby serve the interests of Soviet diplomacy in advancing its own objectives. In a context of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev’s diplomacy proclaimed grand ambitions. The settlement of questions linked to European security— with the German issue in the foreground—remained, as it was after World War Two, the prime objective of Soviet diplomats. And for Khrushchev, this settlement had to occur through the freezing of European frontiers, through the legal recognition of the political and territorial status quo inherited from Potsdam, and without any challenge to the Oder–Neisse border. But for Khrushchev, as for the diplomats at the MID and experts in the International Department of the Central Committee, the German menace was henceforth compounded by two other threats: “Atlanticism,” an expression referring to the military and political tutelage exercised by the United States over the Old Continent via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and “Europeanism,” an expression designating the Communitarian process. For the USSR, in effect, the dynamism of both the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC tended to structure Western Europe and to organize it into a political, military, and economic bloc that distanced the USSR from a continent where it thought it had a “natural” right to be influential. Also, in parallel with the actions undertaken on the German question, it sought to weaken European unity and to harm the legitimacy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to bring about its demise.8 To achieve this, Gaullist diplomacy, by its independent stance, could possibly prove inadvertently helpful. As of January 1958, a protocol adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU echoed this hypothesis by affirming that it should do everything to
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“weaken the ties uniting France to NATO and to strengthen the social and political tendencies in France that aspire to greater independence from the United States.”9 This theme also appeared in filigree in the meetings that Vinogradov regularly organized with the leaders of the French Communist Party (FCP). Tossed around in these meetings was the issue of de Gaulle, his character, his convictions, his choices in foreign policy; recurrently the interlocutors wondered if he was capable of becoming an effective ally and aiding Soviet diplomacy in weakening NATO and obtaining the gradual disengagement of the Americans from European soil. On February 1, 1958, during a very long meeting in Cannes, Ambassador Vinogradov and the Secretary General of the FCP, Maurice Thorez, were able to review France’s domestic and foreign situation and to discuss once again the personality of de Gaulle. Thorez stressed de Gaulle’s keen sense of the national interest; in an aside, he recalled that during the “events of Hungary” neither the General nor his close advisors (including Minister of Culture André Malraux, Thorez specified) had made any anti-Soviet statement. This very fulsome conversation quickly had an impact on Soviet foreign policy; five days later, on February 6, Vinogradov met de Gaulle, whom he skillfully flattered about his nationalism; and the future French president declared—a statement that Vinogradov relayed immediately in his report to the MID—that “France’s dependence vis-à-vis the United States would not be eternal.”10 A few months later, when de Gaulle had just been named prime minister, Thorez, in another meeting with Vinogradov in June 1958, supported “regular contacts” with de Gaulle that might be likely to foster a Franco–Soviet rapprochement, and later counterbalance Franco– American relations. Thorez soon got Vinogradov’s assent.11 The relatively welcoming attitude of Vinogradov, Thorez, and the European Department of the MID was strengthened in 1959 thanks to the declarations and positions taken by de Gaulle. In the spring of 1959, Soviet decision-makers saluted the start of France’s disengagement from NATO; at the press conference of March 25, when the French president declared himself favorable in the long term to a reunification of Germany that would take place within the existing borders,12 and favorable in the short term to a gradual normalization of relations between East and West Germany.13 Both declarations were warmly approved.14 In September 1959, Khrushchev told Ambassador Maurice Dejean in Moscow that “he was pleased with the declaration by General de Gaulle. He stressed that only General de Gaulle, with the courage that was specific to him, could have made such a declaration.”15 However, at the same time, other Gaullist positions were perceived as hostile by the Soviets: his attachment to establishing a Franco–German rapprochement and his desire (proclaimed in the spring of 1959) for France to
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 29
acquire nuclear weapons, at a time when Soviet propaganda was calling for general disarmament,16 irritated Soviet leaders and provoked virulent criticisms, if not threats, from them.17 But, despite these differences, Soviet decision-makers, in search of support from Western Europe, were rather more open with respect to Gaullist diplomacy. In June 1958, a certain number of “signals” were sent to the French authorities. After de Gaulle was appointed prime minister, Vinogradov sent him a letter from Khrushchev calling for a “tightening of bilateral ties and a more independent policy by France.”18 And throughout the Algerian crisis, Soviet decision-makers opted for a low profile, even when this discretion, which ran contrary to their own ideological convictions, created a dilemma in relation to their Third World allies, as Khrushchev implicitly admitted in September 1959, in a conversation with Pierre Sudreau, French minister of construction, during his visit to Moscow. Khrushchev had just declared his support for a rapprochement with France, and then mentioned the Algerian question, underlining the “favorable treatment” that the French government was benefiting from: “Our discretion over the Algerian question is far from being understood by all the Algerians, since on all other questions relating to colonial policy, we have fought, and we do fight, firmly.”19 This favorable treatment is largely explained by the crucial importance that the Soviets were then giving to European issues (the Berlin Crisis was not resolved and a Four-Party summit was foreseen for the spring of 1960) and by their desire to obtain the support of the French President in these difficult negotiations. Isolated in its dialogue with the West, the Soviet Union was counting on help from France in exchange for its moderation on anticolonialist declarations and demands; the Algerian card was thus an important source of leverage.20. The French were perfectly aware of the reason for this Soviet benevolence over the Algerian issue. In October 1959, Dejean stated to Khrushchev. “General de Gaulle has charged me to tell you that he is very satisfied with the position adopted by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. V. Kuznetsov, at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Kuznetsov did not raise the Algerian question during the discussion, and that leads us to think that the Soviet Union does not want to embarrass France and put it in a difficult situation.”21 But Soviet hopes and calculations proved unfounded. While behaving with kindness and consideration toward Khrushchev when he came to France in April 1960, de Gaulle refused to discuss the issue of the status of West Berlin and the possibility of signing a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Having no regard for Soviet hopes, the French president thus remained close to the positions taken by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and firmly attached to the Western camp. And he also proved an inflexible ally of Adenauer during the Berlin Crisis of 1958; during the U-2 affair, which compromised the summit that was
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supposed to take place in Paris in May 1960, de Gaulle equally gave firm support to U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.22 The firmness of French positions soon provoked disillusionment and readjustments on the Soviet side. In effect, after the failure of the Paris summit, Khrushchev opted for far harder positions over Algeria: in August 1960, speaking at the United Nations, he virulently denounced French colonialism and decided to recognize the Algerian provisional government de facto, while during the second half of 1960 the Soviet press orchestrated a violent anti-French campaign.23 Moreover, the French Communist Party, on orders from the MID, launched into harsh criticism of the French president’s Algerian policy.24 Nevertheless, although they were disappointed by French shifts and increasingly critical of de Gaulle, who was showing none of the anticipated lapses in his solidarity with the American and West German governments, Soviet decision-makers did not give up on establishing privileged ties with him. In order to do so, they promoted the idea of pan-European cooperation from 1960–1961, which seemed to echo the Gaullist theme of a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. On September 12, 1960, in a letter addressed to de Gaulle by the intermediary of Ambassador Vinogradov, Khrushchev made himself the advocate of a “pan-European cooperation” that could lead gradually to the birth of a “grand Europe.”25 Ten days later, in a second letter addressed to the French president, he developed his conception of this cooperation, proposing the creation of a pan-European organization that, respecting the Charter of the United Nations, would work towards the disappearance of the two military alliances and greater commercial and cultural links between the two parts of Europe.26 Finally, on May 17, 1963, in an even more deliberate manner, Khrushchev sent the French government an enthusiastic note that resembled a seduction operation towards France, trying to promote a Franco–Soviet privileged relation and to weaken the Franco–German rapprochement which, after the signature of the Elysee Treaty, was passing through trouble after the preambule voted by the Bundestag. It is no exaggeration to say that if the USSR and France, as great powers of the European continent, together pronounced on the essential issues upon which the future of Europe depends, there would be no force capable of rising up to undertake reshaping the map of Europe. Relations of friendship between the Soviet Union and France might become the linchpin that would reunite Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and generally aid in the establishment of peaceful cooperation among nations.27
Nevertheless, this call for rapprochement and this attempted seduction would only have limited effects, since de Gaulle and the Quai d’Orsay were
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 31
more than reserved in the face of the various propositions from Khrushchev. Some concrete accomplishments did take place: On April 2, 1960, during Khrushchev’s trip to Paris, a banking protocol and one on scientific cooperation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy were signed. Then in 1963, a first protocol for cultural exchanges over two years was concluded.28 But on the political level, the advances were nonexistent. On the German question, while de Gaulle in fact favored the freezing of existing European borders, he was not favorable to an institutionalized recognition of the existence of two German states: this institutionalization would amount to perpetuating the logic of blocs at the heart of Europe when he wished precisely to challenge this bipolar logic. It would be incomprehensible to the West German authorities and could only deal a severe blow to the rapprochement between France and Germany. It was exactly on this point that Soviet disappointment was keenest: De Gaulle’s meetings of September 1958 at his home in Colombey with Adenauer, the Berlin Crisis of November 1958 that united the French and West Germans in the same intransigence toward the Soviets, the unfolding of the Geneva Conference in the spring of 1959 (during which French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville refused once again any official recognition of two German states),29 and finally, Adenauer’s trip to France and de Gaulle’s to the FRG in 1960—all these events confirmed the fact that for de Gaulle, the Franco–German rapprochement was the priority, whereas the Franco– Soviet dialogue remained peripheral. Persistent differences were also observed over European questions as a whole. On the strategic level, de Gaulle held to the idea that France should possess a nuclear arsenal and so he refused to sign the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on limiting nuclear tests. He was not a priori hostile to any disarmament plan, but he insisted on the necessity of envisaging East–West disarmament as a gradual process framed by rigorous multilateral supervision. Meanwhile the Soviets rejected the establishment of any effective system of supervision and inspection, considering that once trust was established, states would naturally arrive at control measures. The two points of view were clearly not compatible. There were similar divisions on pan-Europeanism. For de Gaulle, panEuropean cooperation was meaningless unless it allowed the gradual loosening of the Soviet stranglehold over Eastern Europe. But, after the repression of Budapest in 1956 and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, there was no sign of a lightening of Soviet tutelage, far from it—which pushed the General to a less dilatory attitude to pan-Europeanism, which aggrieved the Soviets. Finally, another sore point for the Soviets was that de Gaulle’s independence had at no point endangered Euro–Atlantic cohesion, and during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, de Gaulle even proclaimed unfailing solidarity with the United States.
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When in 1964 Khrushchev was forced to resign, it was clear that the hopes initially placed by the Soviets on a rapprochement with General de Gaulle had not led to any concrete results. Still, the period 1958 to 1964 had been marked by mutual interest and goodwill, which would lead to an unprecedented rapprochement between the USSR and France in 1966–1969.
The USSR and de Gaulle 1964–1969: Tempted to Rapprochement30 A New Approach Benefiting Franco–Soviet Rapprochement Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964 by a troika (Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny, Alexei Kosygin) that upon its arrival to power, renounced some of Khrushchev’s postulates and questioned several of his diplomatic orientations. For Brezhnev, as for Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, it was no longer possible to nurture illusions about the disappearance of the EEC or NATO. Rather, their existence had to be admitted in order to establish a dialogue capable of facilitating the settlement of outstanding European issues, an orientation which at the same time would not prevent Soviet decision-makers to do their best to weaken Western organizations. Moreover, it was time to relaunch the project of a conference on European security, first proposed by Vyacheslav Molotov in 1954, but stalled under Khrushchev. To move forward in this project, the support of France could be useful. Finally, while the USSR was experiencing a clear decrease in its economic growth rate, the Soviet leaders had to try to develop economic and commercial exchanges with the West, since recourse to importing manufactured goods, the purchase of key ready-made factories, and the transfer of technology from the West could contribute to the country’s economic modernization. For this new strategy to work, West–European assistance was necessary—hence the particular attention paid once again to General de Gaulle and French diplomacy. To these structural considerations were added more opportunist perspectives: indeed, by the end of 1964, French and Soviet diplomats shared the same hostility for the MLF project.31 And on this sensitive matter, the Soviet leaders were in quest of a support which, coming from a great European military power, could be particularly valuable. Starting in October 1964, the new decision-makers set aside their critique of the French strike force and increased their gestures of goodwill to Gaullist France. Nicolas Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade, was in Paris from October 23 to November 1, 1964 and signed a commercial agreement for a 60 percent increase in trade over the next five years, and for a substantial rise in industrial orders from France. This goodwill toward France was also evident in the signing on March 22, 1965 of the SECAM agreement on
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 33
cooperation over color television, which committed the two countries to a joint project on a major scale. Finally, in May 1965, a bicultural protocol, as well as cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was concluded in Moscow. Within a few months, one witnessed an accelerated pace of ministerial meetings between the French and Soviet governments: rapprochement was being realized in concrete texts. On the political level, contact also increased from July 1965 onward, on the Soviet side’s initiative, as confirmed by a note written by the Soviet embassy in Paris favorable to regular political cooperation with France.32 At a moment when Franco–American relations were deteriorating (after criticizing U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo, de Gaulle disapproved of the American intervention in Vietnam and attacked the International Monetary System that assured and accentuated the supremacy of the dollar), Soviet decision-makers continued, as under Khrushchev, to see French independence as favorable to their interests. A note by the Soviet embassy in France at the end of 1965 claimed that French foreign policy “destabilizes the Western camp in its current organization and objectively weakens the United States.”33 But, the novel fact in the second half of 1965 was that Soviet decision makers, in search of support for the conference on European security, endeavored, as stressed in his memoirs by Yuri Dubinin,34 then an embassy advisor in France, to rally French diplomacy to the project. Received at his request by de Gaulle on July 5, 1965, Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin, who had succeeded Vinogradov, asked the French President for “concerted action” by France and the USSR on European security. And when he met Couve de Murville on the July 28, he expressed “his concern to see our relations progress, especially on the question of Germany and on European security, where we should take a concrete step.”35 Yet, in the face of this offensive, de Gaulle remained prudent. The points of convergence between the two states were not negligible: Paris and Moscow still refused to tolerate West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons, they were jointly hostile to the American plan for the Multi Lateral Force (MLF), and they shared the same attachment to European borders.36 But, for de Gaulle (as for Couve de Murville), these points would not obscure the fact that the long-term normalization of East–West relations should not lead to opportunistic and hasty positions susceptible of harming Western solidarity. While the plan for a European conference could settle some unresolved questions, it also presented serious risks: on the one hand, such a conference was likely to ratify the division of Germany and give the GDR full international legitimacy, and on the other hand, the conference might tackle disarmament proposals from the East that did not encompass Soviet territory and would leave the French in the cold. 37 Consequently, French diplomacy opted for a dilatory attitude that was disappointing to the Soviets, as illustrated by the very vague commu-
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niqué on European issues adopted on November 2, 1965 at the end of Maurice Couve de Murville’s visit to the USSR.38 But, the year 1966 would significantly change the situation and rekindle Soviet hopes. The 1966 Turning Point: Toward New Relations? The French government announced on March 7, 1966 that it was withdrawing its armed forces from NATO’s integrated military command, confirming to the world its concrete will to disengage from American tutelage. De Gaulle had been pondering this decision since 1958, as he told Vinogradov,39 but it had become inevitable since the Pentagon’s adoption of the strategic doctrine of limited response, and it was precipitated by the war in Vietnam. For the French president, the European continent was no longer being guaranteed U.S. aid in the event of a conflict with the USSR, on the one hand, and on the other, it risked becoming involved by the Atlantic Alliance in a conflict that did not concern it, specifically in a Sino–American conflict to which the Vietnam War might possibly lead. De Gaulle’s decision was poorly understood by the U.S. government and by a large part of French opinion—his own majority disapproved of choices that placed the country in a situation that was strategically more fragile visà-vis the USSR.40 But this decision was soon saluted by the Soviet troika who saw it as a historic decision and an opportunity they should seize. In Soviet eyes, the deterioration of Franco–American relations could only push de Gaulle closer to the USSR. It was in this context that during the French president’s trip to the USSR in the summer of 1966, they tried by pomp and circumstance to seduce him and to make an exemplary model of Franco–Soviet relations. De Gaulle’s trip to the Soviet Union from June 20 to July 1, 1966 was indeed characterized by splendor and cordiality.41 Although no foreign dignitary had previously been so doubly honored, de Gaulle was invited to visit the aerospace base at Baikonur, where he witnessed the launch of a satellite, and at the Kremlin he met all the main figures of the Soviet staff headquarters. And he was the first Western head of state to give a speech that was broadcast live, and thus uncensored, on Soviet television. This mutual cordiality and trust rapidly had concrete and beneficial effects. For while in the course of the early political discussions de Gaulle had spoken out against maintaining the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe and had reaffirmed the necessity and inevitability of a union of the European continent, at the same time he did agree with his hosts on two points: refusing atomic weapons to both Germanys, and a definitive recognition of the Oder–Neisse borderline. Similarly, while the French president refused to sign “a treaty of assistance and friendship” with the Soviet side, he accepted some significant institutional extensions to his stay.
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 35
Signed on June 30, 1966, the “joint declaration” foregrounded the major points of political convergence between the two countries (deploring the situation in Vietnam, pronouncing in favor of disarmament, and calling for the normalization of European issues—although Moscow regretted the absence of explicit recognition of the GDR) and it established a new framework to foster the development of a political dialogue. The two countries promised to collaborate regularly at the presidential and ministerial levels on major international problems, without imposing any periodicity on these consultations; they decided to “establish between the Kremlin and the Elysée a line of direct communication.”42 Finally, to foster a takeoff in economic and commercial exchanges, they planned for the creation of a joint commission. Two other accords were also concluded during the presidential trip. The “agreement on scientific, technical and economic cooperation” defined the forms that cooperation should take, enumerated the sectors to be covered, and established a joint commission, the “Great Commission” to promote cooperative operation that would meet alternately in Paris and in Moscow at least once a year. Moreover, a ten-year agreement on “cooperation for the study and exploration of space for peaceful purposes” was concluded, leading to an ambitious program for collaborative work in space science, spatial meteorology, and the study of telecommunications by the intermediary of artificial earth satellites. Thus space became the emblematic flagship of bilateral scientific collaboration. Within a few days, therefore, arrangements for dialogue and cooperation that were completely unprecedented in East–West relations were put in place43 and these arrangements were crucial from a political point of view as well as from a symbolical one. Indeed, by calling for “détente, entente and cooperation” and by promoting a concrete rapprochement with the USSR, de Gaulle was engaging France in an ambitious attempt to overcome the Cold War and the division into blocks.44 In the following months, these arrangements were strengthened even more. During Kosygin’s trip to France in December 1966, a bilateral Chamber of Commerce was created, along with a Small Commission (structured into joint working groups) to guarantee a concrete follow-up to cooperative operations. Henceforth the time was for “détente, entente and cooperation” and for Franco–Soviet relations€to be amicable and fertile, as de Gaulle stressed in his televised speech on December 31, 1966. So, attached to overcoming the hostility and prejudices inherited from the Cold War, and participating in the political field as much as in the economic and cultural fields, Franco–Soviet relations thus appeared at the end of 1966 as unrivaled in the broader East–West dialogue. The wager made by Soviet decision-makers on the personality of General de Gaulle and his independent stance now appeared to be a winning bet. Still, despite this undeniable success and despite the mutual goodwill expressed on both
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sides, the political dialogue soon faced a number of obstacles that it could not overcome. Toward a Less Euphoric Future? Throughout the period 1966–1969, de Gaulle’s foreign policy, very critical of the United States, was viewed favorably in Moscow. Similarly, French positions during the Six Day War (de Gaulle firmly condemned Israeli aggression) were well appreciated by Soviet decision-makers. But, on European questions, the entente was less clear: Soviet leaders were not long in feeling some disappointment over a Gaullist diplomacy that they judged dangerous, due to its unpredictable nature and incapable of promoting their own approach to European issues. The Gaullist idea of a Greater Europe running from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains had at first pleased the Soviets—they saw it as a means of distancing the United States from the Old Continent—but it began to disturb them as of 1967–1968, when General de Gaulle became the promoter of this idea during trips to Eastern Europe, clearly calling on the satellites to refuse submission to Moscow. In September 1967, in Gdansk, he summoned the Polish people to shake off Soviet tutelage and recover their independence, quickly drawing an objection on the part of Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka; in May 1968, this time in Romania, he adopted the same theme. For de Gaulle, if relations with Moscow were essential, it did not prevent France from also seeking a rapprochement with the Popular Democracies and seeking to relax the stranglehold on these nations. But quite evidently, these stances calling for the independence of satellites clashed with a Soviet strategy that had been patiently elaborated since 1945, and they were not long in arousing anguish and tension in Moscow. In 1968, the Czechoslovak reform movement was observed with interest and sympathy in Paris but in the first weeks of July, de Gaulle privately expressed his anxiety and his pessimism, predicting a Soviet armed intervention.45 And on the August 20th, when at 1:30 a.m., de Gaulle was personally informed by Zorin, the Soviet ambassador in Paris, of the coming invasion,46 this was, at least in a short term, the end of his dream of overcoming the Cold War and the division into blocks.47 At the same time, from the Soviet point of view, the anticipated benefits of the rapprochement with France did not seem to bear fruit on the European terrain. The declaration signed on June 30, 1966 did mention the need for European cooperation and specified that unresolved problems would be tackled within a European framework, which would be a first step toward an agreement in principle on the opening of a conference on European security. On the French side, however, despite Soviet benevolent attitude to de Gaulle during the French May crisis,48 caution dominated, as the
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 37
diplomats of the Quai d’Orsay themselves recognized. In May 1968, a memo written by the Eastern European Office entitled “On the USSR and European Security” stressed the following: The USSR and its partners submitted their proposal to the governments of Western Europe on the occasions of many ministerial visits that took place in 1965. The principle of a conference on European security was accepted, with various kinds of nuances and always under the condition of adequate preparation by Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Holland. Of all the countries mentioned in the joint communiqués signed with the Communist states, France has adopted the most circumspect attitude.49
In the following months, the prudent (if not wait-and-see) attitude of the French authorities persisted, despite the rallying of the Atlantic Community to the project. In June 1968, the NATO Council meeting in Reykjavik agreed in principle to the idea of a European conference, though making two prior stipulations: a tangible improvement in the East–West climate regarding issues in suspense—including foremost the German question, and the acceptance by the USSR of East–West negotiations on the reduction of weapons in Europe. This last point was suggested by the American representatives: at a time when the U.S. Congress was increasing the pressure for a reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Europe, it seemed more judicious to “sell” this possible withdrawal to the Soviets rather than to offer it to them. Hesitating over an offer of negotiations on arms reductions that took them by surprise, the Soviets did not respond immediately, hostile to any idea of double negotiations that might lead to risky bargaining. They preferred to relaunch the project of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with a new communiqué, written as the outcome of a meeting of member-states of the Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest in March 1969, which did not arouse favorable reactions on the part of Western diplomats. For the latter, the Soviet bloc was still aiming at the legalization of the GDR and the institutionalization of the two German states in their current frontiers;50 consequently, the member-states of NATO preferred to stick to the conditions enunciated in June 1968 in Reykjavik, specifically an improvement in the East–West climate and the acceptance by the USSR of negotiations on reduction of armed forces in Europe. Although it appeared relatively consensual within NATO, this second condition aroused the determined opposition of French diplomacy: for General de Gaulle, indeed, there could be no question of bloc-to-bloc discussions about a possible reduction of armed forces in Europe, since on the one hand this would amount to reviving the bipolar logic he rejected, and on the other hand it would mean engaging in a process that in time would risk harming France’s strategic independence. Moreover, in the president’s view, the evolution of the European context—marked by the tragedy of the
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Prague Spring and the clear ideological hardening that characterized all the popular democracies afterward—did not seem propitious for dialogue with the East. And nor was it a moment for concessions, as explicitly expressed by Ambassador Roger Seydoux in Moscow in an April 1969 conversation with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikolai Kozyrev. When Kozyrev solicited a Franco–Soviet conversation in commitment to the European conference,51 Seydoux refused to go along: I recalled that in Paris this appeal [from Budapest] had been seen as a favorable sign, that its moderate tone had been appreciated, as well as the evident will to ameliorate East–West relations. Still, people wondered about the objectives that might be fixed at the envisaged conference and about the problems posed by the participation of certain states that would be included. We also wondered if the process of détente, delayed by the events in Czechoslovakia, was sufficiently advanced to be able to convene it with any chance of success. In effect, it is better to have no conference at all than to have a meeting that ends in failure. On the other hand, while the French government wished for détente, which it had been the first to propose and to work for, it was not favorable to negotiations taking place between two groups of states that would result in the consolidation of the existing blocs. Instead of discussing bloc to bloc, it was necessary, in order to continue the policy of détente, to use the bilateral route, as Paris had done for three years with Moscow—and successfully, on the whole. In short, we could certainly not reject the principle of a European conference, but convening it would encounter many obstacles and it would have to be prepared with great care before one could dream of such a gathering.52
From now on, barely three years after President de Gaulle’s trip to the USSR, he appeared to be the most reserved of the Western leaders in the face of the Soviet plan for a conference on European security. Soviet disillusionment with him had been a long time coming, but their hopes were now abandoned. Thus, whereas in 1958 and still more after 1964, Soviet leaders had seen the independent stances of General de Gaulle as a trump card benefiting Soviet foreign policy and therefore they had actively worked for rapprochement, by 1969 they now had to accept that the results of this strategy were mixed. Certainly the Franco–Soviet rapprochement, steered by a common anti-Americanism, had achieved concrete agreements that made Franco– Soviet relations appear unique within the larger East–West context. But, at no moment did this rapprochement allow the Soviets to advance on European questions any more than it contributed durably to challenging Western solidarity. And it was perhaps the awareness of this failure that brought them in the following years to diversify their Western interlocutors—by establishing a privileged dialogue with Washington and by reacting favorably to the Ostpolitk of German Chancellor Willy Brandt. At the same time, for
De Gaulle, French Diplomacy, and Franco–Soviet Relations as Seen from Moscow 39
de Gaulle, the rapprochement was disappointing because in the short term, it was unable to overcome the division of Europe into blocks and to prevent the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. However in a longer term, the Franco–Soviet rapprochement initiated by de Gaulle paved the way for a renewed Franco–Soviet dialogue during Pompidou’s Presidency which was to play a key role during the CSCE negotiations.
Notes ╇ 1.╇ See Marie-Pierre Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe? Les décideurs soviétiques face à l’intégration ouest-européenne, 1957–1991,” Journal of European Integration History 11, no. 1 (2005), pp. 7–27. ╇ 2.╇ For an overall view of Franco–Soviet Relations during peaceful coexistence and détente, see Thomas Gomart, Double détente, les relations franco–soviétiques de 1958 à 1964 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003); Julie M. Newton, Russia, France and the Idea of Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Marie-Pierre Rey, La Tentation du Rapprochement: France et URSS à l’heure de la détente 1964–1974 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), and Le dilemme russe: la Russie et l’Europe occidentale d’Ivan le Terrible à Boris Eltsine (Paris: Flammarion, 2002). ╇ 3.╇ Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AVP RF), referentura po Francii, (f. 136), opis 46, papka n°269, delo n°4. The document is quoted without any precise date by Evgenia Obitchkina in her chapter “L’URSS et la décolonisation de l’Algérie et de l’Afrique noire sous de Gaulle,” in De Gaulle et la Russie, ed. Maurice Vaïsse (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2006), p. 142. ╇ 4.╇ See A.A. Fursenko, Rossiia i Mezhdunarodnye Krizisy seredina XXogo veka (Moscow: Nauka, 2006), p. 195. ╇ 5.╇ Quoted in Fursenko, Rossiia, p. 192. ╇ 6.╇ Quoted by Philippe Bernert in Le Journal de Genève, March 11, 1965. ╇ 7.╇ See the meeting between Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Ambassador Vinogradov, December 22, 1957, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°48, por n°11, papka n°279, delo n°4, Zapisi besed posla (Reports from Ambasssador’s meetings). ╇ 8.╇ For a precise view of Soviet perceptions of the EEC and diplomatic consequences of these perceptions, Rey, “Le retour à l’Europe?” ╇ 9.╇ Excerpt from protocol no. 872 adopted on January 21, 1958 by the Central Committee of the CPSU, AVP RF, referentura po Frantsii, opis n°48, por n°11, papka n°277. 10.╇ Minutes of the February 6, 1958 meeting between Vinogradov and de Gaulle, sent on March 7, 1958, n° 93, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°48, por n°4, papka n°276. 11.╇ Minutes of June 27, 1958 meeting between Vinogradov and Thorez, sent on February 3, 1959, n° 205, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°49, por n°11, papka n°280, politicheskie voprosy (About Political Questions). 12.╇ In particular for the Oder–Neisse border. 13.╇ A large excerpt from this press conference can be found in Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: Le Souverain (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), p. 311.
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14.╇ 12 Minutes of September 12, 1959 meeting between Khrushchev, Sudreau and Dejean, sent on October 27, n°2450, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°49, por n°3, papka n°279. 15.╇ Minutes of September 12, 1959 meeting between Dejean and Khrushchev. 16.╇ On February 13, 1960, the first French nuclear test was detonated at Reggane in Algeria. 17.╇ See, for example, the article written by M. Nekrassov and published in Pravda on January 19, 1963: “Not only is the French desire to acquire an independent nuclear force unrealistic and dangereous, but France could not use its nuclear weapons without being destroyed herself.” 18.╇ Minutes of a September 12, 1959 meeting between Khrushchev and Sudreau, sent on October 27, n°2450, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°49, por n°3, papka n°279. 19.╇ Ibid. Author’s emphasis. 20.╇ This link which implicitly appears in the Soviet archives that I consulted is also defended by Evgenia Obitchkina in her chapter “L’URSS et la décolonisation de l’Algérie et de l’Afrique noire sous de Gaulle,” in De Gaulle et la Russie, pp. 141–145. 21.╇ Minutes of a October 16, 1959 meeting between Khrushchev and Dejean, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°49, por n°3, papka n°279. 22.╇ Even if, privately, he disagreed with Eisenhower’s management of the crisis. 23.╇ See, for example, the TASS statement on December 14, 1960 and the article published in Izvestia, on November 19, 1960. See also SSSR I strany Afriki, 1946– 1962, Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Nauka, 1963), pp. 133–34, quoted by Evgenia Obitchkina, “L’URSS et la décolonisation de l’Algérie et de l’Afrique noire sous de Gaulle,” p. 145. 24.╇ Minutes of December 3, 1960 meeting between Duclos and Vinogradov, sent on December 21, 1960, n°2348, AVP RF, referentura po Francii, opis’ n°50, por n°4, papka n°282. 25.╇ Minutes of September 12, 1960 meeting between de Gaulle and Vinogradov, ibid. 26.╇ Khrushchev’s letter to de Gaulle, September 30, 1960, n°1921, ibid. 27.╇ Quoted by Philippe Devillers, in Espoir (Paris, 1972), p. 42. 28.╇ Marie-Pierre Rey, Tentation du Rapprochement, France, pp. 20–21. 29.╇ See Couve de Murville’s statement on May 14, 1959 at the Geneva conference, quoted in Gomart, Double détente, p. 270: “There are, if we can say so, two Germanies. There is Eastern Germany and Western Germany. But to go from recognizing this fact, which is evident, to saying that the French Government recognizes the so-called government of Eastern Germany, is a step that I personally cannot take.” 30.╇ This refers to the title of my book La tentation du rapprochement. 31.╇ For an analysis of de Gaulle’s policy toward the MLF and French–Soviet convergences on this matter, see Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p 110. 32.╇ See Mikhail Narinsky, “Le retrait de la France de l’organisation militaire de l’OTAN vu de Moscou,” in De Gaulle et la Russie, p. 163. 33.╇ The exact date of the note is not mentioned. See Narinsky, “Le retrait de la France de l’organisation militaire de l’OTAN vu de Moscou,” p. 164.
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34.╇ See Yuri Dubinin, Moscou-Paris dans un tourbillon diplomatique, témoignage d’un ambassadeur (Paris: Imaginaria, 2002). 35.╇ Quoted in a note from the Sous-Direction d’Europe orientale, Quai d’Orsay, October 22, 1965, in the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affaires (AMFAE), Europe, 1961–1965, URSS, box 1933. 36.╇ See telegram n°200, sent by Charles Lucet to the French embassy in Moscow after Couve de Murville’s trip to USSR in November 1965, which states, “the French and Soviet position are aligned when it comes to German borders and armament.” AMFAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, box 1933. 37.╇ See the two Rapacki plans and the Gomulka plan of 1963. 38.╇ Communiqué of November 2, 1965, AMFAE, Europe 1961–1965, URSS, box 1933. 39.╇ See supra. 40.╇ Cf. the heated debates that took place at the National Assembly on 13, 14 and April 20, 1966. 41.╇ For a precise and detailed description of this trip, see Rey, Tentation du Rapprochement, p. 427. 42.╇ The full declaration can be found in Les relations franco–soviétiques, 1965– 1976: documents et matériaux€(Paris–Moscow, Politizdat—La Documentation Française, 1976), p. 33. 43.╇ On the organization and the specifics of these arrangements, see Rey, La tentation du rapprochement, pp. 277–84. 44.╇ For a discussion of the balance sheet of de Gaulle’s East–West policies, see Frédéric Bozo, “France, ‘Gaullism,’ and the Cold War,” in Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 2, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 45.╇ See Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 547, and Rey, Tentation du Rapprochement, pp.€62–63. 46.╇ See Hervé Alphand, L’Etonnement d’être, Journal, 1939–1973, (Paris: Fayard, 1977) p. 512. 47.╇ For a recent and stimulating study of the diplomatic and strategic consequences of 1968, see Vojtech Mastny, “Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 1 (2005), pp. 149–177. 48.╇ As analyzed by Vladislav Smirnov in his paper “La crise de 1968 au miroir de la presse soviétique,” in De Gaulle et la Russie, pp. 171–77, Soviet leaders remained benevolent to de Gaulle, accusing French Trotskyist movements to intend to destabilize France. After de Gaulle’s May 30, speech which contained direct attacks against communism, Soviet leaders began to be a little bit more critical but this did not change their general perception of de Gaulle. For them the French crisis was a secondary question. 49.╇ AMFAE, Europe, Organismes internationaux et grandes questions internationales, sécurité, 1966–1970, box 2034. 50.╇ See the excerpt from the call from Budapest of March 18, 1969, quoted and commented in the note of the Direction des Affaires Politiques européennes of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 12, 1969, AMFAE, Europe, Organismes internationaux et grandes questions internationales, sécurité européenne, 1966–1970, box 2035.
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51.╇ Telegram nos. 1911–1913 from Roger Seydoux, April 17, 1969, AMFAE, Europe, organismes internationaux et grandes questions internationales, sécurité européenne, 1966–1970, box 2035. 52.╇ Ibid.
3 A “Cordial Potentiality?” De Gaulle and the FrancoÂ�–German Partnership, 1963–1969 Carine Germond
Europe is the combined affair of the French and the Germans together. [. . . ] Alone we don’t have the means to lead Europe. But, together, we can. —Charles de Gaulle to Konrad Adenauer, March 10, 1966
Introduction Most of Charles de Gaulle’s biographers have stressed the central influence of Germany on his formative years, his military and political career.1 His social milieu, his intellectual and military formation and his own thoughts on French and German conflictive history led him for a long time to see in Germany the principal threat.2 Yet, the post-1945 world dominated by the ideological conflict between the two superpowers in which Europe, let alone France, had little say, as well as the rise of the communist danger, stressed the common strategic destiny of France and Germany. Because de Gaulle viewed a divided Germany as a key factor in the European balance of power, a Franco–German entente, designed to form the core of a new power constellation, became a prerequisite for his design of an independent Europe that would reassert itself in the international arena. When de Gaulle came back to power in June 1958, the Franco–German rapprochement was at an advanced stage and, since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, embedded in the new institutions of European integration. Yet, his return to the Elysée Palace caused a radical change in relations between Paris and Bonn both in form and content. In German chancellor Konrad Adenauer de Gaulle found the 43
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appropriate partner to push forward the idea of a privileged partnership— albeit one of unequal partners—and to “weave a network of preferential ties with Germany,”3 which the Elysée treaty of January 22, 1963 formally organized and legally underpinned. De Gaulle’s vision of a Franco–German European hard core was shortlived, though. In his press conference of September 9, 1965, less than two years after seeking collaboration with Adenauer’s successor, Ludwig Erhard, de Gaulle denounced Franco–German cooperation as being merely a “cordial potentiality.”4 Again in January 1967, he complained to the new German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger that the treaty had been implemented “but, above all, in the form of exchanges and finer feelings and as a potentiality.”5 In spite of the progressive building-up of a “bilateral acquis,” France and Germany proved unable to achieve consensus on most community and world affairs during de Gaulle’s presidency, although this was an explicit objective of the Franco–German treaty. The inability of both partners to agree on key European and international issues regularly translated into bilateral and European crises that revealed the underlying conflict between the Gaullist and German foreign policy orientations. Except for the account of witnesses,6 the recent scholarly literature on Franco–German relations in de Gaulle’s era stops at the signature of the Elysée treaty or shortly thereafter.7 Moreover, although new connections between European integration, East–West relations and, its co-related issue, German reunification, conferred a new importance to and opened new perspectives for a Franco–German institutionalized bilateralism as instituted by the Elysée treaty, there is no comprehensive analysis of the interconnections of these phenomena. Based on research conducted in France and Germany, this chapter proposes to “bilateralize” and to reevaluate Franco–German interactions and dynamics in Europe from Erhard’s investiture in October 1963 to de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969, a critical period during which the still fragile Franco–German “couple” was constantly put to the test. I argue that, more than de Gaulle’s “cordial potentiality,” the Franco–German partnership was a “cordial disagreement.” As a result, the Franco–German alliance, as originally envisioned by de Gaulle, remained largely unfulfilled during his presidency.
A Difficult Partnership: de Gaulle and Erhard, 1963–1966 When Ludwig Erhard arrived at the federal chancellery in October 1963, a chapter of Franco–German relations was closed. Paris had become Bonn’s privileged partner in Europe although Washington remained an irreplaceable ally for Germany. Institutional implementation of the Elysée treaty had
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started well with the first meetings organized between the heads of states and government, the ministers and their administration. Erhard, the longtime federal minister for Economics, was by no mean a complete stranger in Paris where his pro-American and economically liberal reputation had preceded him.8 Atlanticist tendencies of the new government were further amplified by Gerhard Schröder’s remaining at the Auswärtiges Amt, the German foreign ministry. Worse still, Erhard had been a supporter of the interpretative preamble to the Elysée treaty which re-specified the axioms of German foreign policy—European integration within the European Communities (EC), enlargement of the existing EC, cooperation with(in) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States—in clear contradiction with de Gaulle’s ambitions for a Franco–German partnership. Erhard was not opposed to Franco–German cooperation per se and certainly acknowledged its specific responsibilities in Europe, but he refused any exclusive bilateral alliance that would become a substitute for a wider Europe.9 Therefore, relations between de Gaulle and Erhard were characterized by a deep disagreement over the function of the Franco–German partnership in Europe. On a personal level, de Gaulle and Erhard found it hard to connect. The pragmatic Erhard was exasperated by the visionary de Gaulle,10 while the latter refused to consider his counterpart as a statesman.11 They were “two worlds,” indeed.12 In spite of reservations on both sides of the Rhine, cooperation seemed to start under good auspices. Erhard took care to emphasize in his governmental declaration his commitment to Franco–German cooperation.13 He also handled relatively well the difficult exercise of balancing friendship with both Paris and Washington as the French ambassador acknowledged.14 His first trip as chancellor was to Paris so to show the continuity of German policy toward France. These first contacts between de Gaulle and Erhard were marked by the contrast between courteous dialogues and profound disagreements on substance. The conflicts were numerous: from the “Argoud affair”15 or Kennedy’s proposal of a Multilateral Force (MLF)16 to the delaying tactics of the German government in agricultural negotiations at Brussels in December 1963 or to Bonn’s bitter reaction to France’s recognition of Communist China in January 1964.17 On the first anniversary of the signature of the Franco–German treaty, a more realist approach had replaced the initial optimism on both sides of the Rhine. The Quai d’Orsay, the French foreign ministry, showed increased frustration and impatience over Bonn’s pro-American tendencies and its reservations about an exclusive Franco–German entente.18 The Auswärtiges Amt did not shy away from publicly criticizing the lack of results of bilateral consultations.19 At their biannual summit meeting in Bonn in July 1964, de Gaulle saw his hope for a Franco–German core of a Europe playing the role of a third power shattered by Erhard’s unwillingness to accept his vision. Angered by the chan-
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cellor’s pro-American stance and disillusioned by Franco–German cooperation,20 de Gaulle came to Bonn determined to make Erhard choose between Paris and Washington.21 In a controversial attempt to rally the German partner, he proposed to State Secretary Karl Carstens a (vague) German participation in the French Force de frappe.22 In the concluding session, de Gaulle made a vibrant plea for closer Franco–German cooperation that was left unanswered by Erhard and Schröder. De Gaulle’s bullying efforts had been in vain, not because the Germans did not understand the general’s intentions—in a confidential note, Carstens said de Gaulle had never before expressed so clearly his aspiration for Franco–German union within a ‘European Europe,’ independent from the United States23—but because they could not agree to them.24 “I remained a Virgin” was de Gaulle’s summary of the meeting.25 The July 1964 summit crisis escalated with de Gaulle’s press conference of July 23, in which he painstakingly enumerated all areas of disagreement between Paris and Bonn: defense, the Atlantic alliance, Ostpolitik, frontiers and nationalities, China, Asia, Africa, Latin America, the EEC and the common agricultural policy (CAP).26 More than a simple catalog of the shortcomings of bilateral cooperation, it was an all-out indictment of Erhard’s foreign policy. Henceforth, de Gaulle systematically hindered Erhard whose political leadership was increasingly contested by the “Gaullists” and the “Atlanticists” within his own party.27 De Gaulle first opposed the chancellor’s project for a re-launch of the discussions on a European political union which Erhard had tirelessly supported since his investiture.28 Erhard wanted a political counterweight to economic integration, whose supranational “drifts” he—as de Gaulle— disapproved.29 Yet, their attitudes towards the project and its intended consequences differed profoundly.30 Erhard expected it to strengthen the EuroAtlantic partnership while de Gaulle insisted on independence; Erhard imagined a “Europe of the Free and the Equal” while de Gaulle intended it to be under French leadership. Thus, Erhard’s campaign earned little support in Paris where de Gaulle repeatedly expressed his skepticism at a new initiative. Even Adenauer’s proposal of a Franco–German Union as a first step toward a political Europe—made to de Gaulle on July 3, 196431 and immediately watered down by Schröder with a bilateral study commission32—met with France’s halfhearted support since Erhard specified that the aim was not “to do a Europe à deux.”33 The German proposals, established in close cooperation with the French, were eventually presented on November 4, 1964. Erhard’s plan, which drew on the failed Fouchet Plans of 1962, was a valuable attempt to reconcile French intergovernmentalism with German federalism but failed to bridge the diverging viewpoints.34 De Gaulle, disappointed by the failure of the Fouchet plans and of the Elysée treaty, had lost interest in political cooperation. Although he had agreed at the Franco–German summit in Ram-
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bouillet in January 1965 to partake in an EC summit conference, he declined the Italian government’s invitation two months later, using the handy pretext of forthcoming CAP negotiations.35 Even though de Gaulle lukewarmly supported Erhard’s initiatives, he evidently did not believe in their success and, moreover, estimated the institutional viewpoints of the Six—particularly those of France and Germany—to be too different to be harmonized. France’s delaying attitude toward Erhard’s European activism also resulted from de Gaulle’s intention to keep his “hands free” in order to assert France’s independence. Indeed, the general viewed the emergence of a political Europe as a potential obstacle to his “détente, entente, and cooperation” policy with the Eastern Bloc that he started to actively pursue from the mid-1964 and accelerated in the course of 1965. In the EEC, Franco–German confrontations occurred more frequently, predictably on the CAP. General de Gaulle, who had made the CAP a “sine qua non condition of France’s participation to the EEC,”36 had forced a reluctant Erhard to adopt successively in December 1963 and December 1964 a series of market regulations for essential agricultural products.37 Facing critical negotiations in mid-1965, de Gaulle allowed the talks on financing the CAP to collapse. The ensuing “Empty Chair Crisis” not only revealed France’s growing isolation in the EEC but also the profound discrepancy between France and Germany on economic and institutional development of the European Communities (EC). The failure of Franco–German consultations, both at lower and higher diplomatic levels, prior the decisive meeting of June 30, 1965, along with the inflexible attitudes on both sides of the Rhine, were important factors for triggering the conflict.38 Franco–German efforts to reach a compromise stumbled over differing views on President of the European Commission Walter Hallstein’s proposals of March 1965, especially the strengthening of the European institutions—the Commission and the European Parliament, which de Gaulle denounced as a “technocratic, stateless and irresponsible areopagus”39—and the duration of the transition period. The lack of genuine bilateral cooperation aggravated the conflict which shifted from a disagreement over an agricultural-political aspect of European integration to an institutional crisis since de Gaulle had decided to challenge the transition to qualified majority voting by January 1966, as he revealed in his press conference of September 9, 1965.40 Maurice Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister, is thus partly right when he claims that the 1965 crisis resulted from the impossibility for French and Germans to harmonize their views at their summit meeting in mid-June 1965,41 although this opinion was discarded by the German negotiators, Schröder and State Secretary Rolf Lahr.42 The German government, no longer willing to give in to Gaullist blackmailing, rejected de Gaulle’s “reciprocal prerequisites,” i.e., French promised support to re-launch political talks between the Six in exchange
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of a German agreement on the CAP. But de Gaulle underestimated Erhard’s resolution “to wait for as long as necessary to give our agreement to the CAP until France consents to the realization of the customs union and fiscal harmonization,”43 both of which were of particular interest for Germany. The Empty Chair Crisis also revealed the superficiality of the Franco–German rapprochement obtained at Rambouillet six months earlier. The Luxembourg compromise of January 30, 1966 partially solved the institutional questions while the work program adopted in May and July, which gave priority to agricultural issues but guaranteed progress in other industrials areas, satisfied both France and Germany. The Franco–German partnership had nonetheless been a collateral victim of the 1965 crisis. In March 1966, de Gaulle went against another axiom of the FRG’s foreign policy when he withdrew French forces from NATO, the integrated military structure of the Atlantic Alliance. Franco–German conflicts over military integration were certainly not new. Already 1964 saw de Gaulle’s growing opposition to the MLF,44 mostly because Erhard’s support of the U.S. project highlighted his preference for Washington rather than Paris. De Gaulle’s proposal of July 1964 to Carstens was in fact designed to “loosen the ties that exist between us and the United States and replace them by an even closer tie with France,” as the state secretary suspected.45 France’s 1966 withdrawal from NATO was by far more radical than earlier partial withdrawals and represented, to the German government, a serious threat to the cohesion of the West and to the FRG’s security. Beyond the wider geostrategic calculations of de Gaulle’s decision,46 France’s withdrawal posed an immediate problem to Paris and Bonn: the status and mission of the French forces stationed in Germany (FFG) under France’s WWII victor status, the Potsdam agreement of 1945 and regulations agreed between Germany and the Western Allies in the 1950s. George-Henri Soutou has stressed that the FFG issue was decisive for de Gaulle’s decision to remain in the Atlantic Alliance as France would otherwise have been forced to withdraw its forces from Germany, thus losing its military control (and one of its prestige attributes) over the German partner.47 Indeed, the French archives show that the French government was determined to keep the FFG stationed in Germany based on the previous accords, notably the 1954 Paris agreements, though a German agreement would be necessary, at least symbolically:48 “It would be a political rather than a legal decision” noted the Pactes division.49 Bonn’s attitude toward the FFG problem was ambiguous, if not contradictory.50 The federal authorities affirmed that they wanted the FFG to remain on German territory, yet they had two preliminary demands that exasperated Paris. While the French insisted on bilateral talks, the Germans demanded negotiations not only between France and Germany, but also between France and the fourteen NATO partners to determine the exact
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mission of the FFG in case of a conflict (especially with regards to the forward defense). Moreover, Germany considered the treaties ruling the FFG’s situation as a “political and legal unity.”51 Accordingly, it argued that the Paris agreements of 1954 no longer applied to France since it had withdrawn from NATO. Hence a new status needed to be negotiated, which should clearly state Germany’s sovereignty and subordinate the FFG’s stationing to Bonn’s approval. Bonn’s insistence on the “legal void” created by France’s withdrawal eventually alerted the French services, which suspected an attempt to undermine France’s “reserved rights” in Germany: If we allow the legal basis of our presence in the FRG to be questioned, we risk appearing, notably in the Soviet Union if not in Great Britain and the United States, as accepting a limitation of the responsibilities that we took upon ourselves for the peace settlement in Germany. In other words, we need to fear that to abandon the Convention of October 23, 1954 would infringe upon our status as a victorious power of the Third Reich and the rights that ensue to our benefit.52
De Gaulle’s repeated stance that France was not demandeur and that, should the Germans decide otherwise, it would withdraw its forces, was essentially tactical. He could not lose control over the evolution of the German question, as he prepared to travel to Moscow and needed France’s grandeur to be solidly underpinned.53 The six-month exchanges of notes and memoranda between Paris and Bonn over the FFG’s status eventually ended in December 1966 with an agreement between Paris and a new German government who had made the resolution of this problem the prerequisite of an ambitious program to re-start the stalled Franco–German engine. Franco–German conflicts also developed over East–West détente and its correlated issue, German reunification, since Erhard’s Germany could not follow France on the path lay down by de Gaulle. The French president had early on proposed a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural.”54 This new European order, in which the German question would be ultimately solved, would only be achieved progressively, but France, with Germany’s participation, was to play a key role. Paris would use détente to establish itself as a privileged interlocutor with the Soviet Union, who held the key of the German problem. Hence, France would be in a better position to promote what de Gaulle summarized in his famous triptych “détente, entente, cooperation,” defining the three stages that would govern France’s relations with Eastern Europe. Reunification was also a core element of the new chancellor’s foreign policy and, during all his chancellorship, he actively pursued this objective. Erhard’s activism produced a series of initiatives, which had an unequal destiny. An audacious plan “to buy reunification,” which Erhard developed in December 1963, was rapidly discouraged by the Western Allies;55 a “Peace
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Plan,” presented in January 1964 by Schröder, was deemed uninteresting and soon discarded; the secret invitation of Nikita Khrushchev, preceded by a visit to Bonn of his son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, led to nowhere as the Soviet general secretary was dismissed before he could come to Bonn. At the end of 1964, the Auswärtiges Amt was forced to acknowledge that their efforts had been in vain.56 Erhard was also overtaken by de Gaulle’s Eastern overtures: While Germany clung to the Hallstein doctrine and its “policy of movement,”57 Gaullist France surged ahead and actively courted the East bloc. At the Franco–German January 1965 Rambouillet summit, Erhard, whose previous initiatives had not been concerted with France, changed tactics and suggested that de Gaulle take the lead.58 A month later, during a press conference, de Gaulle went back at length over the question of East–West relations and reunification, which he defined as the “European problem par excellence”59 that should be solved with the agreement of the Europeans neighbors of Germany. Yet, in May 1965, the Germans pushed the idea of an Allied tripartite declaration whose text met with France’s predictable reservations and was soon abandoned but at the cost of another noticeable cooling of Franco–German relations. De Gaulle’s note of February 4, 1966 highlighted his exasperation over the German reluctance to admit the basics—recognition of all the borders agreed at Potsdam, in particular the German–Polish Oder–Neisse line,60 and renunciation to nuclear armament (including by way of the MLF): “We note that the Germans do not take the path of reunification.”61 Chancellor Erhard’s last attempt, the Peace Note of March 25, 1966, was more symbolic than practical as the Germans did not alter any of their position on the frontiers. Confronted with the failure of his Eastern policy toward the end of his mandate, Erhard strove to get closer to Paris and, during the July 1966 summit meeting—a month after de Gaulle’s trip to Moscow during which he relentlessly took Bonn’s defense— evoked the possibility of a closer Franco–German cooperation, even a common Ostpolitik.62 But he left office before he could implement anything. The idea was, however, not lost on his successors.63
Disillusioned Cooperation: de Gaulle and the Grand Coalition, 1966–1969 The replacement of Erhard’s government by a grand coalition formed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), positively altered bilateral relations. The composition of the new government was indicative of its foreign policy orientation. Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a Christian-Democrat, who had served as the representative of the Federal Government for cultural affairs within the cooperation framework of the
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Elysée treaty, clearly stood for the revival and improvement of Franco– German relations. Kiesinger’s nomination was thus viewed as a “French victory”64 and French officials hoped that the new government would implement both the letter and spirit of the treaty. Foreign Minister and ViceChancellor Willy Brandt symbolized the will to develop détente and relations with the East although his party, the SPD, had emphasized in a programmatic paper the need to increase Franco–German cooperation in various fields.65 De Gaulle and Brandt had also good personal relations that were based on mutual esteem, their common experience of resistance and exile and, perhaps, as Maurice Vaïsse suggests, a shared nonconformism.66 As a result, de Gaulle and Couve de Murville expected bilateral cooperation to be easier than under Erhard.67 This positive judgement seemed to be confirmed by the grand coalition’s first initiatives. Kiesinger’s governmental declaration detailed the possibilities to strengthen Franco–German cooperation. He also skillfully balanced relations with both Paris and Washington in terms that were sufficiently allusive (if not elusive) so they could bridge German positions vis-à-vis NATO and de Gaulle’s independence policy and reconcile the “Gaullists” and “Atlanticists” of his party.68 Meeting with de Gaulle and Couve de Murville in Paris in December 1966, Brandt stressed his government’s desire to re-start bilateral cooperation.69 Though their motives were not necessarily identical, both coalition partners agreed on the need to improve relations with Paris. But, Chancellor Kiesinger personally supervised and coordinated German efforts to intensify bilateral cooperation. The chancellery believed that the treaty constituted the framework to strengthen Franco– German collaboration.70 Kiesinger and Brandt thought that a procedural improvement would facilitate an intensification of cooperation,71 and thus submitted a series of institutional innovations in 1967 to “revive the original intentions of the Franco–German treaty.”72 The core idea of the grand coalition’s proposals was not only to improve bilateral dialogue but to change the institutional practice of Franco–German relations. Their expectations were soon disappointed. The climate between Paris and Bonn thawed rapidly but the eagerly awaited change was still a long time coming. The decisions agreed upon at the Franco–German summit meeting of July 12–13, 1967 were implemented, although the new institutional consultation mechanisms they created could not hide very long the fact that profound divergences in key foreign policy issues persisted.73 The grand coalition found that determination was not enough to cooperate with Paris while de Gaulle realized that a Francophile German government did not mean an unconditional support of his foreign policy. In the EEC, a revitalized Franco–German entente had stirred hopes that it would help overcome the European stagnation and achieve progress toward both deepening and widening, but the new “couple” was soon confronted
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with problematic issues. The first was the “Hallstein problem,” a legacy of the empty chair crisis, which threatened to delay the implementation of the Merger Treaty signed in April 1965. De Gaulle was determined to get rid of Hallstein because he disliked the latter’s tendency to “think of himself as the president of the supranational government.”74 Franco–German discussions on Hallstein’s possible nomination as the head of the new Single Commission had led, by the time the grand coalition took office, to a stalemate. Aware that the deadlock over Hallstein not only threatened the bilateral rapprochement, as sought by his government, but had also become increasingly counterproductive to European integration, Kiesinger sought a compromise acceptable for each parties.75 In the first half of 1967 and after some confusion, the eventual compromise was a shortened tenure of Hallstein. Even though a Franco–German clash had been avoided, Hallstein’s inglorious abandonment by the grand coalition left a bitter taste in Bonn.76 The invitation of the Italian government early in January 1967 to convene in Rome a summit conference to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Rome treaties revived the political cooperation issue, which, after the aborted Venice summit of spring 1965, had been relegated to the background of the community agenda. As with past German governments, European integration was the linchpin of the grand coalition’s foreign policy. Both Kiesinger and Brandt favored closer political cooperation among the Six, but they preferred to improve political cooperation between Paris and Bonn first. Yet, they welcomed the Italian invitation but with few illusions about progress on political cooperation as long as Gaullist France remained opposed to supranationality.77 At Rome, the Franco–German entente, slightly disrupted by the quarrels about Hallstein, was restored. The mutual support that de Gaulle and Kiesinger showed during the summit accounted for the mention of a new summit conference, prepared by the foreign ministers, in the final communiqué.78 The return of the question anglaise in fall 1966, however, had resurrected an old Franco–German contentious issue and would delay the convention of a new summit of the Six until December 1969. In spite of a rapprochement on the issue of transatlantic relations, mainly due to the weaker atlanticism of the new German leaders and the relatively good relations of de Gaulle with Richard Nixon, Bonn could not convince Paris to accept enlargement of the European Community. The grand coalition was still in favor of a British EEC membership and Community enlargement; but, as Piers Ludlow points out, what had changed was that neither Kiesinger nor Brandt was willing to provoke a showdown with General de Gaulle over the British question.79 Although de Gaulle mostly resorted to economic arguments, it was obvious that he opposed the British application politically as a threat to French influence in Europe. Moreover the Francophile grand coalition had revived hopes in Paris that the Elysée
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treaty could be more than just a cooperation framework and eventually embody this nucleus of the Europe européenne de Gaulle envisioned. Both foreign ministries had a similar analysis of Britain’ economic state, yet they drew opposite conclusions of its implications for the Community. While the French estimated that Britain should first bring order into her economy and finances before adhesion negotiations could start—as a proof of her commitment to join the Community—the Germans believed that Britain’s entry would act as a powerful factor for economic modernization.80 The British membership not only blocked the EEC’s integration agenda— “indeed, stagnation was not overcome” recalled Brandt81—but damaged the Franco–German relationship too. The initially promising rapprochement initiated by the grand coalition soon faded away.82 Kiesinger’s pro-French attitude certainly guaranteed that Bonn would not confront Paris too directly. But the Chancellor received little recognition for his dedication. To his “open door policy,”83 the French responded with delaying and obstructive tactics.84 Kiesinger not only failed to bring de Gaulle around, but the Chancellor’s willingness to compromise likely encouraged the general in his policy. As a German diplomat concluded in April 1968, “The FRG did not succeed in arguing concessions out of France in any essential European issues by way of consultations. The outside demonstration of solidarity of the federal government spares France isolation and encourages it to continue in the hitherto policy.”85 De Gaulle’s seemingly unmovable opposition to British membership also increased tensions between CDU and SPD and gradually undermined Kiesinger’s political influence in the grand coalition. Thus, the 1968 Franco–German trade arrangement scheme was a “test” for Kiesinger’s pro-French policy.86 At first, it seemed a promising initiative. Indeed, Paris co-sponsored the idea of a commercial arrangement idea with the bilateral declaration of February 16, 196887 but then rejected subsequent German efforts to turn it into anything more concrete. Brandt’s succeeding proposals of March and September 1968 were a valuable attempt to satisfy the French, the British and the anglophile European partners all together, but given the inflexible attitude of each country his plan was likely to fail.88 Even when the Franco–German entente produced positive outcomes, such as the February declaration, it met with suspicion amongst the other European partners who feared a Franco–German fait accompli. As Lahr reminisced, “the saddest is that, when the Franco–German friendship treaty actually works, it is a motive of distrust for the others.”89 Bonn’s uncomfortable mediating role therefore never fulfilled its objectives. President de Gaulle had succeeded in delaying enlargement but at the cost of France’s almost complete isolation in Europe and another cooling of relations with Bonn. The deadlock was lifted at the Hague conference in December 1969 when Georges Pompidou, in exchange of German support on CAP’s financing reform, agreed to enlargement.90 This was less due to Bonn’s broker
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skills than to France’s interest in the continuation of the CAP and concerns at Germany’s increased self-confidence in the EEC and in Eastern Europe. Ostpolitik was a key element of the new entente between Paris and Bonn. Brandt was a proponent of a more proactive Ostpolik. The grand coalition gradually renounced the obsolete Hallstein Doctrine and subscribed to de Gaulle’s “détente, entente and cooperation” policy—with certain essential restrictions, notably the frontiers issue, as Bonn’s indignant reaction to the French president’s declarations in Polish Zabrze in September 1967 highlighted.91 Egon Bahr, the chief of the strategy office in the Auswärtiges Amt, combined the Gaullist triptych formula with the Tutzing slogan of 1963 (“change through rapprochement”) in “rapprochement, entente and cooperation,” a manifest proof of the Gaullist influence on German Ostpolitik thoughts.92 Accordingly, the French government encouraged and actively supported German efforts. For instance, it gave a helping hand—the so-called “shielding operation”—when the grand coalition resumed diplomatic relations with Romania in January 1967. At the same time, there was an effort to harmonize geo-strategic conceptions over the long term as evidenced with the creation of a Franco–German study committee for security and defense in Europe in the 1970s in July 1967, which was charged with the elaboration of common studies on the long-term geopolitical evolutions—including the German question—that would affect Europe’s security and defense in the next decade.93 But, the Franco–German rapprochement on Ostpolitik was undermined by several ambiguities. Though similar in their concepts—the gradual establishment of a new pan-European order—they ultimately acted on completely different premises. As early as January 1967, Bahr was aware of the operational limits set to common Franco–German initiatives in Ostpolitik and recommended that Germany alone should take the decisive steps.94 Also, for Brandt and Bahr, Paris’ role was limited to a moral and political support as to facilitate Bonn’s moves in the East. On the contrary, de Gaulle saw the grand coalition’s Ostpolitik as fulfilling his détente policy and he knew that his détente-entente-cooperation scheme largely depended on the FRG’s ability to normalize its relations with Eastern Europe. Hence, there was never a complete adequacy between the French and German approach to Ostpolitik. Moreover, if bilateral political cooperation on Ostpolitik worked relatively well—it was extensively discussed in each bilateral discussion—economic rivalry in Eastern Europe increased. While encouraging German Ostpolitik initiatives, de Gaulle was undermining France’s—often illusory—mediator position between the West and the East. Indeed, the more Bonn asserted itself in Eastern Europe, the more it became the privileged interlocutor. The Franco–German “consensus” on Ostpolitik brutally came to an end with the Prague Spring in the summer 1968. During their biannual meeting in Paris in September, de Gaulle blamed German “activism” in Czechoslovakia for the Soviet invasion while also reproaching Bonn its lack of solidar-
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ity with France: “We do not have the impression that you have done much, in practice, for French and Germans to show solidarity above all in their existence, in their feelings and their activities.”95 Twenty years later, a close collaborator of Chancellor Kiesinger described this summit “as the tensest of the overall six consultation talks between Kiesinger and de Gaulle.”96 Kiesinger was “broken down, appalled and in an almost pitiable condition” and “faced the ruins of his policy toward France,” wrote Bahr to Brandt a few days after the summit.97 De Gaulle’s unjustified harsh reaction was an indication of weakness rather than of force. The economic and monetary difficulties, which France faced after the social unrests of May 1968, had brought to light the ever-more obvious German prowess in this areas and the waning French Grandeur. The refusal of the federal government to reevaluate the German Mark during the November monetary crisis had reinforced French angst in front of a more powerful, independent and self-confident Federal Republic Also, de Gaulle resented the pro-Atlantic and pro-integration reorientation of the grand coalition, which, after the Czech events, demanded a reinforcement of NATO and of the EC, notably by way of enlargement. But, more fundamentally, de Gaulle realized that Germany was escaping his control. By pursuing a proactive Ostpolitik, the FRG no longer was a mere object of the Cold War. Paris had to acknowledge Bonn’s gradual emancipation from historical constraints, its growing ability to translate economic prowess into political power, its will to take upon its responsibility and not solely rely on its allies. As a result, the general attempted to move closer to the United Kingdom in a clumsy initiative, the controversial “Soames Affair,” and tried to regain political leeway in the EC. In the spring 1969, disclosures from the Quai d’Orsay seemed to indicate that the French Government was considering a new European initiative towards enhanced political cooperation among the Six. 98 Bonn’s reaction to these indications was moderate.99 Only Chancellor Kiesinger, eager to exploit the sensible amelioration of Franco–German relations since the bilateral summit of March 1969, supported the French overture in which he saw a chance to promote his own idea of a Kerneuropa.100 De Gaulle’s unexpected resignation on April 28, 1969 disrupted any further initiative but was greeted with relief in Bonn. In January 1969, Kiesinger had already shared his profound disillusion with two journalists of the German Newspaper Die Welt: “as long as de Gaulle governs, there isn’t much to do in terms of France.”101
Conclusion The European crises of the 1960s owed much to the inability of Paris and Bonn to harmonize their positions. Franco–German (rare) agreements and
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(regular) disagreements revealed the depth of French and German dissent over European integration, transatlantic relations and détente. De Gaulle criticized Erhard for implementing “not the bilateral treaty but the unilateral preamble that changed all of its meaning.”102 From 1964–1965 on, he consequently abandoned his hope for an independent Western Europe with the Franco–German tandem at its core and re-directed its efforts toward the East in order to implement the reorganization of the European system he strove to achieve. The arrival of the grand coalition, eager to revive the Paris–Bonn axis and to implement a more practical Ostpolitik momentarily revived de Gaulle’s expectations. But, the noticeable improvement of relations under the grand coalition was superficial rather than substantial. Trying to reconcile the divergent French and German foreign policies amounted to “squaring the circle” as the two-time ambassador in Bonn, François Seydoux, remarked in his memoirs.103 The Elysée treaty thus ended up with a relative failure—the “cordial potentiality” deplored by de Gaulle—because the conceptions of the two partners on the function of the Franco–German partnership in Europe and on European unification were far too divergent. Although the treaty gradually developed into a stabilizing element of the Franco–German tandem, obstacles constantly arose in the way of the ambitious goals laid down in it. Its institutional tools failed to fulfill their prime objective, i.e., the convergence of Paris’ and Bonn’s foreign policy. The Quai d’Orsay rightly underlined that political differences between Paris and Bonn were the major obstacles that ultimately prevented them to “fully exploit all the potentialities of the treaty.”104 The latter became the cornerstone of a pattern of institutionalized cooperation but it failed to establish a Franco–German leadership in and of Europe, as de Gaulle wished. As a result, the French president’s design of a Franco–German partnership within a European Community under French leadership fell also short.
Notes ╇╇ 1.╇ Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle (Paris: Seuil, 3 vol., 1984–1986), Eric Roussel, Charles de Gaulle, (Paris: Gallimard, 1990); Knut Linsel, Charles de Gaulle und Deutschland 1914–1969, (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1998); Peter Schunck, Charles de Gaulle: Ein Leben für Frankreichs Größe (Berlin: Propyläen, 1998); Peter Schunck, “De Gaulle et ses voisins allemands jusqu’à la rencontre avec Adenauer. Le problème politique et militaire d’une vie,” in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. V (Paris: la documentation française, 1992), pp. 32–42; Jean-Paul Bled, “L’image de l’Allemagne chez Charles de Gaulle avant juin 1940,” in Etudes Gaulliennes, no. 17 (1977), pp. 59–67; Jacques Binoche, “La formation allemande du général de Gaulle,” in Etudes Gaulliennes, no. 17 (1977), pp. 29–35. See also Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne: Le rêve inachevé (Paris: Plon, 1990).
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╇╇ 2.╇ Bled, “L’image de l’Allemagne,” p. 17. ╇╇ 3.╇ Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavour (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 173. ╇╇ 4.╇ Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages [DM], vol. IV (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 385. ╇╇ 5.╇ Archives nationales [AN], 5 AG 1/163 and Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [AAPD], 1967 I, no. 14, pp. 64–77, here 66. ╇╇ 6.╇ See the accounts of Maurice Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère (Paris: Plon, 1971); Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne, Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1994–1997); François Seydoux, Dans l’intimité franco–allemande: Une mission diplomatique (Paris: Edition Albatros, 1997); François Seydoux, Mémoires d’Outre-Rhin (Paris: Grasset, 1975); Herbert Blankenhorn, Verständnis und Verständigung. Blätter eines politischen Tagebuchs 1949–1979 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976); Karl Carstens, Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Bold Verlag, 1995); Paul Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft—ein Diplomat macht Inventur (Stuttgart: DTV, 1981); Heinrich Krone, Tagebücher—2. Band, 1961–1966 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003); Hermann Kusterer, Der Kanzler und der General (Stuttgart: Neske, 1995); Rolf Lahr, Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg: Private Briefe 1934–1974 (Hamburg: Albrecht Knaus Verlag, 1981), Horst Osterheld, Außenpolitik unter Ludwig Erhard 1963–1969. Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1992). ╇╇ 7.╇ See Ulrich Lappenküper, Die deutsch–französischen Beziehungen 1949–1963: Von der “Erbfeindschaft” zur “Entente élémentaire,” 2 vols. (München: Oldenburg, 2001); Eckart Conze, Die gaullistische Herausforderung: Die deutsch–französischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958–1963 (München: Oldenburg, 1995); Martin Koopman, Das schwierige Bündnis: Die deutsch–französischen Beziehungen und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1958–1965 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000); Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002). ╇╇ 8.╇ Couve de Murville, Politique étrangère; Maillard, De Gaulle, p. 226€; Etienne Burin des Roziers, Retour aux sources: 1962 l’année décisive (Paris: Plon, 1986), p. 144; François Puaux, “Les limites de la coopération politique franco-allemande depuis l’époque de Gaulle-Adenauer,” in Paris-Bonn. Ein dauerhafte Bindung schwieriger Partner, ed. Klaus Manfrass (Bonn: Thorbecke, 1986), p. 206; Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle II; Edgard Pisani, Le Général indivis (Paris: Albin Michel, 1974), p. 90. ╇╇ 9.╇ See Karl Hohmann, Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnte (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1972). ╇ 10.╇ Osterheld, Außenpolitik, p. 199. ╇ 11.╇ Peyrefittte, C’était de Gaulle II, p. 287. ╇ 12.╇ Archiv der christlich–demokratischen Partei [ACDP], I-028-076/1, Tagebuch Krone, 3./4.6.1964. ╇ 13.╇ in Hohmann, Gedanken, p. 825. ╇ 14.╇ Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris [AD//MAE], EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1528, TGA de Margerie à MAE a/s Erhard, Bonn, 19 octobre 1963; AD/MAE, DECE, Papiers du Directeur Olivier Wormser, vol. 2, Note a/s du gouvernement Erhard, Paris, 25 novembre 1963.
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╇ 15.╇ Colonel Antoine Argoud was a former French officer and a leader of the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), a clandestine pro-French Algéria organization, which sought to overthrow President de Gaulle early in the 1960s. Argoud was hiding in the Federal Republic where he was kidnapped in February 1963 by French special services. Argoud’s kidnapping provoked a diplomatic crisis between France and Germany. The federal authorities accused the French government of having violated the Federal Republic’s sovereignty and wanted Argoud to be trialled in Germany while de Gaulle resented the inaction of the German government, which had forced the French intervention. ╇ 16.╇ On the MLF, see Koopman, Schwierige Bündnis; Georges-Henri Soutou, L’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996). ╇ 17.╇ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [PAAA], B 21, Bd. 535, Aufzeichnung betr. Anerkennung Rot-Chinas durch Frankreich, Bonn, 23. Januar 1964. ╇ 18.╇ Documents Diplomatiques Français [DDF], 1964 I, Doc. 75, Note de la S/DEC a/s application du traité franco-allemand, 6 février 1964, p. 165; AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1600, Note a/s de l’application du traité du 22 janvier 1963, Paris, 25 juin 1964. ╇ 19.╇ Per Fischer, “Des consultations politiques,” in Documents, 5 (1964), pp. 6–14. ╇ 20.╇ Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle II, p. 257. ╇ 21.╇ AN, 5AG1/162, Tête-à-tête entre le général de Gaulle et le chancelier Erhard du 3 juillet 1964 (matin), AAPD, 1964 II, no. 180, pp. 713–23, here p. 715. ╇ 22.╇ AAPD, 1964 II, no. 187, pp. 768–77. ╇ 23.╇ PAAA, B 150, Bd. 32, Vermerk von St.S. Carstens an Schröder betr. Deutschlands außenpolitische Lage nach dem de Gaulle-Besuch vom 3./4. Juli 1964, St.S. 1280/64I geh., Bonn, 6. Juli 1967. ╇ 24.╇ AAPD, 1964 II, no. 210, pp. 884–93. ╇ 25.╇ Krone, Tagebücher, p. 309; Kusterer, Der Kanzler und der General, p. 419. ╇ 26.╇ De Gaulle, DM IV, pp. 229f. ╇ 27.╇ On the internal divisions of the CDU/CSU between the pro-French and the pro-American wing, see to Klaus Hildebrandt, “‘Atlantiker’ verus ‘Gaullisten’: Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der sechziger Jahre,” in Revue d’Allemagne 23, no. 4 (1990), pp. 583–92; Tim Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten: Außenpolitischer Konflikt und innerparteilicher Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU, 1958–1969 (Munich: Oldenburg, 2008). On the wider German domestic debate on de Gaulle’s foreign policy, see Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionspartien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle, 1958 bis 1969 (Munich: Oldenburg, 1996). ╇ 28.╇ See Carine Germond, “La France et l’Allemagne face à l’Europe politique dans les années 1960,” in Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes, ed. Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (Brussels: Bruylant, 2001), pp. 206ff.; Carine Germond, “Les projets d’union politique de l’année 1964,” in Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–1969, ed. Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), pp.€109–18. ╇ 29.╇ AN, 5AG1/161, CR de la séance élargie, 22 novembre 1963€; AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, Questions Internationales Européennes [QIE], carton n°1956, traduction des principaux passages de la déclaration d’Erhard devant le Bundestag, 9 janvier 1964.
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╇ 30.╇ Jeffrey Vanke, “The European Collaborations of France and Germany, 1963– 1969,” in Crisis and Compromises, pp. 94–99. ╇ 31.╇ DDF, 1964 II, Doc. 6, pp. 15–18, here p. 16; AAPD, 1964 II, no. 184, pp. 749–55, here p. 750. ╇ 32.╇ AN, 5AG1/162, entretien Couve de Murville-Schröder, 4 juillet 1964; AAPD, 1964 II, no. 185, pp. 755–66. ╇ 33.╇ AN, 5AG1/162, entretien de Gaulle-Erhard, 4 juillet 1964; AAPD, 1964 II, no. 187, pp. 768–77. ╇ 34.╇ Refer to footnote no. 29. ╇ 35.╇ Déclaration de Alain Peyrefitte, in Cahiers mensuels de documentation européenne, n°4 (avril 1965), p. 1. ╇ 36.╇ See de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, p. 159, Pisani, Le Général indivis, p. 63€; Alain Prate, La France en Europe (Paris: Economica, 1995), p. 43f. ╇ 37.╇ See Hans von der Groeben, Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Das Ringen um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958–1966) (BadenBaden: Nomos, 1982), pp. 148–53. ╇ 38.╇ For complete details of Franco–German negotiations, refer to Carine Germond, “Le couple France–Allemagne et la crise de la chaise vide, 1965–1966,” in Quelle(s) Europe(s)? Nouvelles approches en histoire de l’intégration européenne, ed. Katrin Rücker and Laurent Warlouzet (Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang, 2006), pp.€79–96. ╇ 39.╇ De Gaulle, DM IV, p. 379. ╇ 40.╇ Ibidem, pp. 380–81. ╇ 41.╇ Couve de Murville, Politique étrangère, p. 263. See also AD/MAE, SG-EM, vol. 26, Note a/s des conditions dans lesquelles ont été rompues, le 30 juin, les négociations sur le règlement financier et la responsabilité particulière de l’Allemagne, Paris, 1er février 1966. ╇ 42.╇ PAAA, B 150, Bd. 156, Drahterlass Nr. 2884 von St.S. Lahr betr. deutsche Haltung zur gegenwärtigen EWG-Kontroverse, Bonn, 9. July 1965. ╇ 43.╇ PAAA, B 150, Bd. 52, Aufzeichnung betr. Darstellung und Analyse der derzeitigen französischen Außenpolitik und Vorschläge für unser Verhalten, Bonn, 11. Mai 1965. ╇ 44.╇ Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, p. 269. ╇ 45.╇ AAPD, 1964 II, no. 210, p. 886. ╇ 46.╇ See Garret Martin, “‘To Link Or Not To Link€ ?’ 1966 and the Changes in France’s European Policy,” in Quelle(s) Europe(s)?, pp. 285–97. ╇ 47.╇ Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, pp. 291f. ╇ 48.╇ AD/MAE, Pactes, vol. 261, Note a/s de la présence des troupes françaises en Allemagne, DAP, Service des Pactes, Paris, 25 février 1966, Note a/s inventaire des problèmes soulevés par notre retrait des organismes militaires OTAN et la suppression de l’implantation étrangère en France, DAP, Services des Pactes, Paris, 4 mars 1966, Note pour M. Alphand, 4 mars 1966; AD/MAE, Pactes, vol. 261, Fiche de Deudon, conseiller juridique au Commandement en chef des FFA à M. le Général, chef d’Etat-Major du CCFFA, 15 janvier 1966. ╇ 49.╇ AD/MAE, Pactes, vol. 261, Note a/s de l’Alliance, 9 mars 1966. ╇ 50.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1463, TGA de Seydoux à MAE a/s conférence de presse de von Hase, Bonn, 15 mars 1966, n°1474/77, TGA de Sey-
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doux à MAE, Bonn, 16 mars 1966; AD/MAE, Pactes, vol. 262, TGA d’Aumale à MAE a/s déclarations de Schröder et débat au Bundestag, Bonn, 21 mars 1966. ╇ 51.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1963–1970, s/s RFA, TGA de Seydoux à MAE, Bonn, 12 mars 1966, n°1448/53. ╇ 52.╇ AD/MAE, Pactes, vol. 263, Note pour le service des Pactes a/s des problèmes de l’OTAN (fondements juridiques de la présence des FFA), 213/JJB, 22 avril 1966. ╇ 53.╇ Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, p. 295. ╇ 54.╇ See Alain Larcan, “‘L’Europe de l’Atlantique à l’Oural,’” in De Gaulle et la Russie, ed. Maurice Vaïsse (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2006), pp. 181–98. ╇ 55.╇ Benedikt Schönborn, La mésentente apprivoisée: De Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963–1969 (Paris: Puf, 2007), pp. 253–61. ╇ 56.╇ AAPD, 1964 II, no. 400. ╇ 57.╇ Franz Eibl, Politik der Bewegung. Gerhard Schröder als Außenminister, 1961– 1966 (Wien: Oldenburg, 2001). ╇ 58.╇ AN, 5AG1/162, CR de l’entretien entre de Gaulle et Erhard, 19 janvier 1965. ╇ 59.╇ De Gaulle, DM IV, p. 338. ╇ 60.╇ See de Gaulle’s press conference of March 25, 1959, in which he declared that the reunification of the two fractions in one Germany that would be free was the “normal destiny” of the German people provided it accepts the existing borders, “in the West, in the East, in the North and in the South.” In De Gaulle, DM III, pp. 84–85. ╇ 61.╇ AD/MAE, Secrétariat Général-Entretien et Messages [SG-EM], vol. 26, Exposé de de Gaulle sur l’Allemagne, 4 février 1966. ╇ 62.╇ AN, 5AG1/163, CR de l’entretien entre de Gaulle et Erhard, 21 juillet 1966; Osterheld, Außenpolitik, p. 332. ╇ 63.╇ PAAA, B 2, Bd. 132, Vermerk von St.S. Carstens betr. Möglichkeiten der deutsch–französischen Zusammenarbeit, St.S. 2015/66, Bonn, 17. Oktober 1966. ╇ 64.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1386, TGA n°6310/10 de Seydoux à MAE, Bonn, 11 novembre 1966. See also Seydoux, Dans l’intimité franco–allemande, pp. 81–82; François Seydoux, “Eine französische Stimme zur Wahl des neuen Bundeskanzlers,” in Begegnungen mit Kurt Georg Kiesinger. Festgabe zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Dieter Oberndörfer (Stuttgart: DVA, 1984), p. 361. ╇ 65.╇ ACDP, NL Schröder, I-483-020/1, Aufgaben einer neuen Regierung [o.D.]; AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1386, TGA de Seydoux à MAE a/s Programme du SPD, Bonn, 5 novembre 1966. ╇ 66.╇ Einhart Lorenz, “Willy Brandt, Frankreich und die Emigration,” in Willy Brandt und Frankreich , ed. Horst Möller, Maurice Vaïsse (München: Oldenburg, 2005), p. 38; Maurice Vaïsse, “De Gaulle et Willy Brandt: deux non-conformistes au pouvoir,” in Brandt und Frankreich, p. 103. ╇ 67.╇ Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle III, p. 193; Couve de Murville, Politique étrangère, p. 275. ╇ 68.╇ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Kiesinger vor dem deutschen Bundestag am 13. Dezember 1966 (Auszug betr. Außenpolitik), in Europa-Archiv, 22 (1967), pp. D 17–18. ╇ 69.╇ AN, 5AG1/163, entretien Couve de Murville-Brandt, 13 décembre 1966; AAPP, 1966 II, no. 396; AN, 5AG1/163, entretien de Gaulle-Brandt, 15 décembre 1966; AAPD, 1966 II, no. 398.
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╇ 70.╇ Bundesarchiv Koblenz [BAK], NL Guttenberg, Bd. 154, Aufzeichnung von Boss an Kiesinger betr. Vorschläge für eine Intensivierung der deutsch–französischen Zusammenarbeit, Bonn, 5. Juni 1967. ╇ 71.╇ BAK, NL Carstens, N 1337, Bd. 640, Aufzeichnung von Lahr betr. Möglichkeiten und Aussichten einer verstärkten deutsch–französischen Zusammenarbeit, Bonn, 5. Juni 1967. ╇ 72.╇ AN, 5AG1/163, premier entretien de Gaulle-Kiesinger, 12 juillet 1967; AAPD, 1967 II, no. 261. ╇ 73.╇ AD/MAE, SG-EM, vol. 31, Lettre de Couve de Murville à Brandt a/s relevé des décisions prises à Bonn par le général de Gaulle et le chancelier Kiesinger, les 12 et 13 juillet 1967, DAP, Paris, 12 octobre 1967€; AD/MAE, Pactes, vol. 322, Lettre de Brandt à Couve de Murville a/s coopération franco–allemande (traduction officielle), DAP, Paris, 23 octobre 1967, PAAA, B 150, Bd. 111, Brandt an Couve de Murville, BMA, IA1-80.11/3198I/67, Bonn, 16. Oktober 1967. ╇ 74.╇ Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle II, p. 286. ╇ 75.╇ See Philip Gassert, “Personalities and the Politics of European Integration: Kurt Georg Kiesinger and the Departure of Walter Hallstein, 1966/67,” in Crises and Compromises, pp. 265–84. ╇ 76.╇ Lahr, Zeuge, p. 469. ╇ 77.╇ PAAA, B 130, Bd. 2386a, Aufzeichnung betr. aktuelle europäische Fragen, Bonn, 18. April 1967. ╇ 78.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, QIE, carton n°2723, Note a/s de la RFA et de la coopération politique; PAAA, B 21, Bd. 737, Leitlinien für die Gesprächsführung. ╇ 79.╇ N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the crises of the 1960s (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 137. ╇ 80.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1641, Note a/s de l’attitude de la RFA à l’égard de la candidature britannique, Paris, 2 février 1968. ╇ 81.╇ Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960–1975 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campte, 1982), p. 205. ╇ 82.╇ See Seydoux, Dans l’intimité, pp. 106–9. ╇ 83.╇ BAK, NL Guttenberg, N 1397, Bd. 90, Vermerk von PSt.S. Guttenberg, 23.5.[1967]. ╇ 84.╇ For further details, see Carine Germond, “The ‘Recalcitrant Partner’ and the ‘Honest Broker’: France, Germany and Britain’s Second Application to the EEC, 1966–1969,” paper presented at the IEHC, Helsinki, August 2006, accessible at www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Germond.pdf. ╇ 85.╇ ACDP, NL Schröder, I-483-086/2, Aufzeichnung von Frank, 26. April 1968. ╇ 86.╇ AD/MAE, DE-CE, carton nr. 785, Lettre de Seydoux à MAE a/s problèmes relatifs à la candidature britannique de la Grande-Bretagne aux Communautés européennes, Bad Godesberg, 10 avril 1968. ╇ 87.╇ AN, 5AG1/164, Déclaration commune franco–allemande à l’issue des entretiens des 15 et 16 février 1968 à Paris, MAE, Direction des services d’information et de presse, Paris, 16 février 1968. A German translation of the declaration can be found in Europa-Archiv, 23 (1968), p. D137. ╇ 88.╇ Vorschläge der deutschen Regierung für eine handelspolitische und technologische Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und anderen europäischen Staaten, in Europa-Archiv, 23 (1968), pp. D141–45.
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See also Willy Brandt, Der Wille zum Frieden: Perspektiven in der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1972), pp. 212–20. ╇ 89.╇ Lahr, Zeuge, p. 485. ╇ 90.╇ Carine Germond and Henning Türk, “Der Staatssekretärausschuss für Europafragen und die Gestaltung der deutschen Europapolitik 1963–1969,” in Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaft 1 (2004), pp. 73–79; Claudia Hiepel, “In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator: Germany and the Hague Summit Conference 1969,” in Journal of European Integration History 9, no. 2 (2003), pp. 63–81. ╇ 91.╇ AD/MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, s/s Couve de Murville 1958–1968, Réactions allemandes au voyage du président de la République française en Pologne (6–12 septembre 1967), DAP, EU, S/DEC, Paris, 12 octobre 1967; PAAA, B 1, Bd. 336, Aufzeichnung betr. Staatsbesuch General de Gaulles in Polen vom 6-12.9.1967/ vorläufige Analyse, Bonn, den 14. September 1967. ╇ 92.╇ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung/Willy-Brandt-Archiv [FES/WBA], NL Bahr, Bd. 400, Thesen zur Osteuropapolitik, Mai 1967. ╇ 93.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1457; PAAA, B 150 (the German minutes of the meetings and studies of the study committee are scattered in several files of this inventory). ╇ 94.╇ FES/WBA, NL Bahr, Mappe 441, Aufzeichnung betr. Konsultation des Herrn Bundeskanzlers mit dem französischen Präsidenten am 13./14. Januar 1967, Bonn, 11. Januar 1967. ╇ 95.╇ AN, 5AG1/164, entretien de Gaulle-Kiesinger, 27 septembre 1968; AAPD, 1968 II, no. 312. ╇ 96.╇ ACDP, NL Kiesinger, I-226-A312, Vermerk betr. deutsch-französische Spannungen im Herbst 1968, Bonn, 30. November 1984. ╇ 97.╇ FES/WBA, NL Egon Bahr, Bestand Planungstab/Vermerk Bahrs an Brandt, Bonn, 1. Oktober 1968. ╇ 98.╇ PAAA, NL von Braun, Bd. 132, Aktenvermerk von von Braun betr. Europa, VSV (o.D.); PAAA, NL von Braun, Bd. 125, Aktenvermerk von von Braun, 17. April 1969 and Aktenvermerk von von Braun, 24. April 1969. ╇ 99.╇ PAAA, B 21, Bd. 736, Aufzeichnung betr. Möglicher Vorstoß der französischen Regierung zu erneuten Bemühungen um politische Zusammenarbeit der Sechs, Abt. I, IA1-80.05/0, Bonn, 7. März 1969. 100.╇ See Henning Türk, “Kurt Georg Kiesingers Kerneuropakonzept”, in Europäische Gesellschaft—Grundlagen und Perspektiven, ed. Wilfried Loth (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), pp. 230–44. 101.╇ ACDP, NL Kiesinger, I-226-A008, Hintergrundgespräch Kiesingers mit Herbert Kremp and Lothar Rühl im Bundeskanzleramt, 23. Januar 1969. 102.╇ De Gaulle, DM V (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 101–2. 103.╇ Seydoux, Dans l’intimité , p. 25. 104.╇ AD/MAE, EU 1961–1970, s/s RFA, vol. 1648, Note a/s des relations franco– allemandes, Paris, 22 novembre 1966.
4 From Words to Actions: Reinterpreting de Gaulle’s European Policy Piers Ludlow
Introduction As far as Europe was concerned, Charles de Gaulle was a man of many words. His public declarations about the continent’s condition, place in the world, and future, began during the Second World War, punctuated his years in the political wilderness between 1946 and 1958, and continued throughout his eleven years at the Élysée presidential palace. Europe indeed became a staple of his regular but almost always attention grabbing press conferences. Those of May 1962, January 1963, July 1964, September 1965, and February 1966 are regarded as major milestones in the history of European integration during the Gaullist era.1 Likewise important portions of several volumes of his memoirs were devoted to the subject.2 Such public statements were, moreover, supplemented by innumerable more private comments—often in the form of deliberately provocative boutades or verbal hand-grenades—delivered to faithful ministers and visiting statesmen alike. Many of these leaked out in the course of the General’s lifetime—as may well have been the intention.3 Many others were diligently recorded by de Gaulle’s interlocutors and have been given pride of place in their recollections and memoirs devoted to the 1960s. The voluminous collections of Gaullist wit and wisdom published in the course of the 1990s by Alain Peyrefitte are probably the best known example of these last.4 These verbal outpourings, often beautifully crafted and delivered with de Gaulle’s inimitable mastery of the French language, have dominated both contemporary assessments of his European policy and much of the historiography about French European policy in the 1958 to 1969 period. This is all the more so given the persistent failure of his descendents to release 63
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most of his private working papers from his eleven years as French President. Other portions of the French administrative machine have, admittedly, complied with the customary thirty-year rule and permitted access to their archives. Much can therefore be established about French priorities, tactics and actions in Brussels with reference to files of the Quai d’Orsay, the Ministère des Finances, or the Secréteriat Géneral de Coordination Interministérielle (SGCI), not to mention the private collections of a number of the General’s closest collaborators, notably Maurice Couve de Murville and Michel Debré. But de Gaulle’s own voice remains frustratingly absent from most of these papers. Given the widely perceived notion that the president, and the president alone, determined the general thrust of French foreign policy and French European policy during the Gaullist years, this absence of de Gaulle’s own papers has forced many historians back to the General’s public and semi-public utterances. De Gaulle’s rhetoric thus still dominates historical assessments of what his country was up to in its European policy to an extent unparalleled amongst the president’s contemporaries in London, Bonn, Brussels or Washington. Two contrasting interpretations of the French leader’s European policy have emerged from this distinctive source-base. The first, associated with both de Gaulle’s former collaborators looking back at French policy making during the 1958–1969 period, and with Gaullist-leaning historians, paints a picture of the General as a hard-headed realist who rescued the European Economic Community (EEC) from a number of pitfalls into which his more idealistic fellow leaders would have otherwise stumbled but was also able to drive through a number of more positive European advances.5 In 1958, it was thus thanks to de Gaulle’s readiness to implement sweeping financial reforms, that France was able to comply with the tariff liberalization time-table foreseen by the Treaty of Rome in a way in which his Fourth Republic predecessors—for all their supposed “European” commitment—would in all likelihood not have been able to do. In November of that year, this same strain of tough-minded European “realism” led the French leader to put out of their misery the lengthy but illconceived negotiations over the British-inspired Free Trade Area scheme—a set of talks which might well have proved fatal to the nascent EEC had they been brought to fruition. De Gaulle’s determination to protect the still fragile European structures from a premature and potentially disastrous engagement with Britain and its Commonwealth and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) entourages also explain both the 1963 and the 1967 vetoes of British membership of the EEC. And a similar readiness to confront the uncomfortable realities other leaders shied away from explain the forceful diplomacy employed by the French in 1965–1966 to prevent a wholesale move by the EEC to the generalized use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. Such a step would have been hazardous
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in a Community lacking the mutual trust and solidarity which only a genuine political union would have created. Political union, according to the “loyalist” account, was the great disappointment of Gaullist European policy-making.6 De Gaulle’s vision of a political union, most clearly formulated in the 1961 Fouchet Plan, but outlined by him from at least 1959 onward, was a genuinely positive one which his partners were ill-advised to have rejected. A Europe equipped with the intergovernmental structures for foreign and defense policy coordination foreseen by de Gaulle would not only have been able to emancipate itself much earlier than proved the case from superpower dominance. It would also have anticipated by decades the forms of foreign policy cooperation devised since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The 1962 rejection of the Fouchet Plan by the Dutch and Belgians was thus not merely a source of disappointment to the French leader, but also a major opportunity lost by the whole of Western Europe. In the agricultural field, by contrast, the French did succeed in realizing their vision, enabling the EEC to equip itself with its first major common policy in the form of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This—flanked perhaps with the Association arrangements with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific also devised during the 1960s and formalized in the Yaoundé and then Lomé accords— stands as a monument to the positive intent of Gaullist France’s European policy making. Overall, de Gaulle’s approach to integration was, thus forceful but effective, able to push the Community forward when necessary but also ready to prevent it from making erroneous advances which might have undermined the whole venture. A very different interpretation of the General’s intentions and impact emerges from the writings of those who have criticized his European policy. De Gaulle’s critics—and once again this includes both former adversaries looking back at the 1960s and more recent analysts of his actions—place a much greater emphasis on the basic divergence between de Gaulle’s European vision and that of most other European leaders.7 De Gaulle, it is argued, did not really believe in Community Europe. He hence accepted participation in a European project he had been bequeathed by his Fourth Republic predecessors only reluctantly and with ill-grace, and sought repeatedly to modify his inheritance. The most famous instance of this attempt to reform the EEC was the empty chair crisis of 1965–1966 when de Gaulle obliged his partners to accept a significant curtailing of supranationality in the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise. But a disregard for the basic rules and norms of communautaire behavior was also apparent in his two brutal vetoes of UK membership each of which prevented an enlargement of the Community which all of his partners eagerly desired. And for the most Machiavellian of interpreters, a similar desire to subvert the EEC was evident in the abortive Fouchet Plan of 1961. For had this
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seemingly innocent and pro-European plan been accepted by his partners, it would have been used by France not merely to drag Western Europe away from its Atlanticist foreign policy alignment close to the United States in the ongoing East–West conflict, but also to marginalize the existing Community structures in favor of the new, purely intergovernmental bodies situated in Paris which the Fouchet scheme was designed to bring into being. De Gaulle’s overall intent was thus to undermine the EEC and to strip its structures of the supranationality which had been its greatest originality and the key ingredient of its success. That the Community survived at all was due to the perspicacity of the Dutch and Belgians in seeing through the Fouchet Plan, the strength and solidarity of the “Five” (remaining members of the EEC) in their determination not to let France impose its will in the course of the Empty Chair Crisis, and the general inability of Gaullist France to win backing for its wider foreign policy from its Western partners. As it was, however, de Gaulle’s anti-EEC crusade did enough damage to the EEC to sap its vitality throughout the 1970s and early 1980s and to ensure that the promise and élan of its early years were only belatedly recaptured in the mid-1980s.8 This chapter will argue, however, that both of these readings of de Gaulle are too influenced by what he said rather than what he did at a European level. For while Gaullist rhetoric did matter—and was indeed specifically intended to have a major impact on his contemporaries (and perhaps even on future historians)—it did not necessarily match up with the way in which the French representatives were actually behaving in Brussels. An assessment of French European policy between 1958 and 1969 which supplements French declaratory policy with a detailed examination of the positions adopted by French representatives in Brussels—as they emerge from French government papers, but also the records of the other five Community member states and the archives of the Community institutions themselves—therefore provides a number of important new perspectives on de Gaulle’s European policy.
Abusing and Using Europe At the heart of the divergence between de Gaulle’s deeds and words existed the issue of supranationality and the power of the Community institutions. As far as de Gaulle’s public and private statements were concerned, there appeared to be little doubt that he despised supranational institutions and believed that political power could only legitimately be exercised by nation states. This was the thrust of the Gaullist critique of the European Defence Community.9 This was the message of the famous—or infamous—May 1962 press conference which was so scathing about pro-European “volapuk”
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that several pro-European centrist ministers resigned from the French government in protest.10 And this seemed to be the underlying theme of the multiple verbal tirades launched by de Gaulle against the powers and institutional pretensions of the European Commission. These included the description of those who worked for the Brussels institution as “apatrides”— stateless individuals—and the terming of the European Commission itself as a colossal “technocratic aereopagus”;11 the series of disparaging remarks about the Commission and its German President, Walter Hallstein, in particular made in the run-up to the 1965 empty chair crisis12; and the wellknown portion of his memoirs in which he laid into the delusions of grandeur harbored by the Commission President. Walter Hallstein is the President of the Commission. He strongly believes in the idea of a super-state and uses all his skill to give to the Community this character and appearance. He has made Brussels, where he resides, his capital. There he is, complete with all the trappings of sovereignty, directing his colleagues and dividing tasks amongst them, served by many thousands of civil servants who are appointed, given responsibilities, promoted, and paid on the basis of his decisions, receiving the credentials of foreign ambassadors, insisting on full state honours during his official visits, eager, indeed, to advance the grouping of the Six which he believes destined to fulfil his ambitions.13
In 1965, however, the assault was widened to include the whole operation of the Community system. The September press conference attacked not only the European Commission but denounced the planned increase of majority voting within the Council of Ministers.14 De Gaulle’s message, moreover, seemed to be echoed by his foreign minister, Couve de Murville, who used a speech before the French National Assembly the following month to call for a “revision d’ensemble” and to outline a programmed of radical institutional reform.15 Given that French representatives were engaged at the time in a large-scale boycott of the Brussels process, and were refusing to resume cooperation within the Community structures unless and until their institutional grievances were addressed, it is little wonder that many of de Gaulle’s interlocutors believed the French president to be intent upon a radical alteration of the way in which the European institutions functioned. The empty chair crisis thus came to be perceived as a life and death struggle over the very survival of supranationality within the EEC.16 The reality of French behavior toward the supranational institutions throughout the 1958 to 1969 period was, however, very different from that implied by these public attacks. From 1958 onwards, the French developed a close pattern of cooperation with the supposedly despised and illegitimate European Commission. By the time the British applied to join the EEC in 1961, necessitating detailed negotiations amongst the Six about the way in which the Community should respond to this membership bid, the
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pas de deux between French national representatives and the Commission personnel involved in the enlargement talks had become so close and so effective that one observer compared it to the cooperation between the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor.17 The choice of analogy may of course have hinted at an awareness that this could be a combative as well as a cooperative relationship. Popes and Emperors had quarreled and fought one another for power as often as they had lined up together. But in the context in which it was made the assessment was clearly intended to underline the closeness and effectiveness of the relationship, and to capture the way in which both actors had different but complementary reasons to be firm toward the British. France’s determination to prevent the entry of new member states from destroying much of what had been agreed amongst the Six, dovetailed almost perfectly with the Commission’s treaty-given duty to protect the acquis communautaire and the sanctity of the European treaties. In the course of the fifteen months of negotiations between the Six and the applicants, the Commission and France had thus formed a formidable partnership insistent that the onus of adaptation lay with those states which wished to enter rather than with the Community. It was for the British, Danes, Irish and Norwegians to change their ways so as to conform to the EEC, and not vice versa. Much of the discomfort which the British in particular were to endure during the 1961–1963 bid was attributable to this joint French and Commission line.18 And it was a partnership only broken by France’s sudden—and totally non-communautaire—decision to veto the British application in January 1963. A similar and more enduring marriage of convenience also developed over the CAP. For France this was quickly identified as an economic necessity, not only a necessary complement to the industrial liberalization foreseen by the Treaty of Rome, but also a valuable mechanism for addressing the serious socioeconomic crisis confronting much of the country’s rural population.19 As Edgard Pisani, de Gaulle’s most effective minister for agriculture, would put it in somewhat apocalyptic terms, “to imagine for French agriculture the absence of the Common Market, is to imagine a revolution in France.”20 European funding would be needed to help French farmers cope with the rigors of postwar economic conditions. The European Commission meanwhile saw the CAP as its flagship policy, an initiative that would not merely demonstrate its policy-making prowess to the Six and to the world—under Treaty of Rome rules, it is the Commission which is responsible for proposing all Community legislation—but would also provide the institution with enduring responsibilities and a significant revenue stream in the years and decades ahead. This would go a long way to securing its future and advancing its long-term political ambitions.21 Furthermore, Hallstein and his colleagues were highly aware of the fact that completing a policy of such economic benefit to Gaullist France was likely to limit the ability of the Paris
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government to attack either the Community as a whole or the Commission in particular. The Commission President spoke quite explicitly about the CAP as one of several “threads” making the Community fabric less vulnerable to any potential French attempt to tear it apart.22 The concrete result of these convergent interests was that France and the Commission became extremely close allies in most of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the CAP. In all but one of the crucial marathon talks which brought the agricultural regime into being, the Commission and France were on the same side of the argument, and able to cooperate very effectively in their efforts to pressurize the Germans in particular into swallowing a support system for European farmers of much greater interest to agriculturally exporting nations like France and the Netherlands than it was to agricultural importers like the Germans.23 The sole exception to this pattern of cooperation, revealingly, was the spring and summer of 1965 when the talks about how to pay for the CAP ended in acrimonious failure, triggering the French boycott of the EEC.24 And French reliance on Commission support went beyond merely acting together in the course of the lengthy and often acrimonious negotiations. For the French also played a significant role in supporting the allocation of significant powers of control to the Commission over the CAP. In 1964 for instance, French representatives in Brussels aggressively and successfully resisted a German attempt to prune the powers of the Commission-chaired management committees which ran the agricultural policy on a day-to-day basis.25 Supranationality, in other words, ceased to be an anathema to Gaullist France when it served to consolidate and accentuate the benefits for French farmers which had been secured through the CAP.
No Irrevocable Steps There did admittedly seem to be genuine change in 1965. Even before the outbreak of the empty chair crisis, de Gaulle’s representatives in Brussels launched a systematic attack on the European Commission’s independence of action and ability to represent the Community internationally.26 In the course of the crisis itself, de Gaulle and his lieutenants sought actual changes to the way in which the EEC worked. These included a ten-point wish list for the curtailing of Commission powers and a severe limitation of the extent to which majority voting would be used in future negotiations in the Council of Ministers.27 And after the crisis was resolved by means of the famous Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966, the French proved steadfast in their opposition to a renewal of Walter Hallstein’s mandate as Commission President.28 The stalemate between Bonn and Paris on this issue would only be broken in 1967 when the first Commission President
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resigned in disgust at the Federal Republic’s compromise suggestion that he might be reappointed for half rather than a full term. All of this would appear to suggest that in the 1965 to 1967 period at least, there was a Gaullist bite to go with the incessant Gaullist bark. Upon closer examination however, it is striking how careful the French remained even during this two year apogee of their crusade against supranationality. In the run-up to the empty chair crisis itself, French representatives do seem to have made a genuine if fruitless effort to avert a breakdown, scaling down their demands significantly in the search for agreement and seeking to buy off their Italian opponents at least by offering to reduce substantially the amount of money which Rome would have had to contribute to the CAP budget.29 During the crisis months themselves, moreover, the French were careful to moderate the effects of their symbolic withdrawal. They thus withdrew their permanent representative (i.e., their de facto ambassador to the EEC) but instructed his deputy to remain in Brussels. French representatives continued to attend those meetings of Brussels committees and working groups which were deemed to be about the ‘management’ (gestion) of the Community rather than the deepening of cooperation, and the French also showed a willingness to complete a limited amount of Community legislation during the months of the boycott by means of the Council of Ministers’ little-used written procedure.30 On those occasions, furthermore, when the General did decide to up the ante and remind his partners of how much was at stake, he appears to have made sure that he took steps which would not lead to an irrevocable breakdown. Thus in December 1965, his controversial decision not to allow the Community budget for 1966 to be approved through the written procedure was taken only once he had verified that an emergency mechanism existed which would allow the Community to survive the failure to agree a budget.31 Throughout the crisis, French forcefulness was thus accompanied by a strong element of caution designed to prevent too much damage being done to either the Community structures themselves or to relations between France and its European partners. Likewise, the French proved willing to end their boycott despite securing much less than they had initially demanded. The original “Decalogue” on Commission form was watered down to a much less aggressive and totally nonbinding “Heptalogue.”32 The compromise on majority voting left both the Treaty text and Council rules unaltered and merely acknowledged the difference of views between France and the Five on the question of whether majority votes could be taken on issues where “vital national interests” were deemed to be at stake.33 And while the French did prevent Hallstein from serving a new term, they dropped their insistence that Sicco Mansholt, the Vice President, be punished as well.34 Perhaps even more telling was their readiness to allow Emilio Colombo to be chosen as the ideal replacement for Hallstein.35
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The€Italian minister turned down the job, but the mere fact that he was offered it at all does clearly indicate that none of the member states, France included, wanted the European Commission to be led by an ineffective cipher. Instead the French appeared to derive real satisfaction at the effectiveness shown by the European Commission in its role as principal European representative in the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations which reached their climax in 1967.36 The intensity of de Gaulle’s verbal assault on supranationality was thus unmatched by French actions, even in the period of most intense confrontation between the Paris government and the Brussels institutions. Furthermore, the underlying caution of the French approach to the empty chair crisis suggests that the more extreme demands for widespread institutional change advanced by both the President himself and Couve de Murville ought to be seen as tactical ploys rather than as accurate indications of the type of Community which Gaullist France actually wanted to create. This gap between rhetoric and reality was quite deliberately maintained by the French. Ever since 1950, France had done rather well out of European integration. Such success was in part due to the undoubted skills of those who had represented French interests in European negotiations. It may also have constituted a reward for the country which had after all initiated the process with its Schuman Plan proposal. More important than either, however, had been France’s position as one of only two countries without which the integration experiment could not proceed—“Europe” had been built without Britain, and could have gone ahead without Italy or the Benelux states—and the only one of the central Franco–German partnership which had the international freedom of manoeuvre to walk away should it no longer believe the building of Europe to be in its interests. West Germany given its precarious international position and its need to live down the recent past could not afford to appear as the destroyer of the dream of a united Europe. France, as the 1954 failure to ratify the EDC had underlined, could take this risk. The result was well put by the Italian ambassador to Paris as he sought to explain the outcome of the Treaty of Rome negotiations in the course of which the French had managed to secure most of what they sought: “Europe cannot organize without France and, to get her in, prices must be paid which may seem exorbitant. As the soldiers say, France has the geography.”37 So strong a position was unlikely to endure indefinitely, however. The better France did, the more its European partners would conclude that France needed Europe and could hence no longer realistically threaten to withdraw. Germany, Italy and the Benelux states would consequently stop being willing to pay “exorbitant” prices. And the fundamental strength of the French negotiating position would be seriously undermined. De Gaulle’s rhetorical broadsides against European integration slowed this erosion of France’s bargaining power. For most of the early years of the
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EEC, his periodic tirades against the Commission and supranationality, and his repeated insistence that France needed to maintain les mains libres (free hands) in all that it did, helped mask the extent to which his country benefited from both the industrial liberalization process and the agricultural support system brought about by the Community. In late 1963, for instance, Sir Pierson Dixon, the British Ambassador to Paris and the former lead official during the 1961–1963 membership negotiations between Britain and the Six, was still predicting that the French president intended to demolish the whole Community structure, despite the fact that de Gaulle’s own ministers had privately warned the General a year earlier that were the EEC to collapse, France would lose more than any other member state bar Italy.38 Likewise an Italian cartoon from 1964 portrayed Europe as an elegant ocean going sailing ship, bedecked in the flags of the countries taking part. Two observers on the quay were admiring the vessel through a telescope, with one commenting to the other “The French flag? It keeps disappearing and reappearing.”39 Ongoing fears about de Gaulle’s intentions enabled the French leader credibly to threaten to leave the EEC were France not allowed to get its way in several of the key negotiations about the shape of European integration. In both 1963 and again in 1964, the French government was able to issue such threats at the height of delicate Brussels negotiations about the establishment of the CAP contributing in no small measure to the eventual success of French negotiators.40 By the mid-1960s admittedly de Gaulle’s counterparts amongst the Six were showing signs of seeing through the General’s charade. In 1964, Ludwig Erhard, the German Chancellor commented to the U.S. Ambassador in Germany George McGhee, that he did not any longer believe French threats of withdrawal since France was the country which gained most from the integration process.41 Revealingly, however, within weeks Germany had again caved in, bowing to pressure from France and others to allow a common price to be set for cereals—a central component of the CAP.42 More worryingly still for the French, in early 1965 three member states and the European Commission appear to have independently decided that so keen would France be to obtain the next, crucial, element in the EEC’s agricultural policy—the so-called financial regulation which would determine how Europe’s subsidy regime would be paid for—that Paris would be willing to pay a substantial quid pro quo. The German, Italian and Dutch positions in the run-up to the empty chair crisis, not to mention the stance adopted by the European Commission, all suggest a determination to call France’s bluff and force the French to make substantial concessions to their partners’ European priorities before being able to secure an advantageous CAP deal.43 The forcefulness of the French response—both the empty chair tactics themselves and the raft of institutional demands advanced by de Gaulle
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and Couve de Murville in the autumn—served temporarily to restore the uncertainty about France’s European commitment and with it some of the strength of the French bargaining position. Few of de Gaulle’s counterparts believed that France would actually withdraw from the EEC. But such were the inherent risks involved in an exercise in brinkmanship of the sort being carried out by the French, and such was the damage to the Community’s effectiveness and prestige caused by the French boycott, that each member state became anxious to step back from the extreme tactics which had precipitated the crisis. While the Five member states other than France were thus fairly steadfast in resisting de Gaulle’s institutional demands, they did underline their desire to facilitate France’s return to normal Community cooperation. Furthermore, once a deal had been struck in Luxembourg that allowed each side to return to normal EEC activity with their heads held high, all of the member states, including the French, eschewed the type of forceful diplomacy which had led to breakdown in the summer of 1965. The negotiations about the CAP and the Kennedy Round held in the spring and summer of 1966 were thus characterized by a degree of flexibility and willingness to compromise which had been sorely missed a year earlier.44 In the meantime de Gaulle sought to reinforce the message about how France’s European commitment could not be taken for granted—a message aimed both at his domestic rivals who accused him of taking reckless risks with the French national interests wrapped up in European integration and at France’s European partners. The presidential election of campaign of 1965 was thus littered with Gaullist references to how well France would be able to do without the EEC.45 Once more, however, such rhetoric had little to do with reality. Indeed, the internal investigations carried out by the French civil service in the course of the crisis months seemed to point to the opposite conclusion. For not only had the French discovered how legally difficult it would be to withdraw entirely from the EEC even had they chosen to do so, but the multiple studies carried out by various ministries highlighted how much France had gained from European cooperation and how unlikely it was to be able to devise a comparably favorable set of arrangements in any other context.46 France needed Europe, as much as Europe needed France. Overall, therefore, the Gaullist approach to Europe, as it emerges from his actions and his words, rather than just the latter, can be said to have stood on its head Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy dictum about “talking softly and carrying a big stick.” In the 1960s France certainly did not talk softly. On the contrary, de Gaulle’s remarkable showmanship and sense of drama ensured that every one of his words was heard very clearly and analyzed with great attention by each of his interlocutors. But arguably this vociferousness was intended to conceal the extent to which Gaullist France did not, and could not, carry a big stick as far as Europe was concerned.
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French Achievements . . . In practical terms de Gaulle’s European policy accomplished much, especially in its early years. The president’s forceful rhetoric, backed up by arguably the most impressive set of diplomatic representatives that any of the founding member states were able to send to Brussels, and a widely admired and much copied administrative mechanism for ensuring that each of the French spokesmen adopted compatible stances in the multiple Community negotiations underway at any given time, helped push the early EEC towards a number of French priorities. Such success was perhaps most evident in agriculture, where the development of a working CAP despite its shaky treaty-base and the discomfort felt by several member states including the Federal Republic about too complex and expensive an agricultural support regime, was an extremely impressive accomplishment. Naturally France was not solely responsible. Any complete assessment of how the CAP came into being needs to factor in the role of the Dutch and the European Commission as well, not to mention the hesitations and tactical mistakes made by those like the Germans and Italians who were most ambivalent about the development of a grandiose European support system for agriculture.47 But without the forceful diplomacy which Gaullist France deployed in favor of the CAP, it is difficult to believe that it would have emerged by 1968 in the form that it took. Moravscik is hence right to emphasize the French role in promoting agricultural integration, even if he overstates the extent to which the quest for a CAP became the defining feature of French engagement with the EEC.48 Nor was French success confined to agriculture. French representatives were also central players in the emergence of a working association regime between the EEC and a number of African and Caribbean countries, most of them former French colonies. The signature of the Yaoundé Agreement in 1963 to supersede the provisions of part IV of the Treaty of Rome made obsolescent by the decolonization process, and then its eventual replacement in 1970 by the first Lomé accord, bear witness to France’s desire to use the Community structures to channel new money to Francophone Africa and to preserve and if possible expand the trade links between Europe and the former French empire.49 France also succeeded in negotiating other, special arrangements for those former colonies like Morocco and then Algeria which were not suitable for inclusion in the Yaoundé system. Still more importantly, the French were also able to exercise a strong influence over the pace and profile of the Community’s tariff removal programmed. They were thus very much in accord with the Commission’s 1960 proposal to accelerate the rate at which internal tariffs were dismantled, thereby differentiating de Gaulle’s regime strongly from Fourth Republic France at whose behest the original, highly cautious, timetable for tariff removal had
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been drawn up.50 And they were also prominent amongst the architects of the EEC’s tough but positive engagement with the Kennedy Round negotiations in the GATT. Contrary to some of the more alarmist claims by de Gaulle’s opponents, there is no evidence to suggest that France ever desired the failure of the ambitious world trade talks. But what France did want, and largely obtained, was that the Community representatives in Geneva participated in the talks in a forthright manner, determined to protect the EEC’s commercial interests and not to show too much deference to the United States which had hitherto dominated all GATT rounds.51 In the view of the most comprehensive published assessment of the talks so far, this objective was largely accomplished.52 Furthermore the balance struck between achieving genuine liberalization in the industrial sector, but not much more than token change in world agricultural trade, was also in accord with French priorities. Just as important was the fact that French exporters, both industrial and agricultural, proved capable of seizing the opportunities presented by European integration. How much this was the result of the policies of the Gaullist government—or whether by contrast more credit should go to the economic modernization of France carried out under the much maligned Fourth Republic—is beyond the scope of a chapter focused on de Gaulle’s European policy, although the Pinay–Rueff reforms of 1958 were certainly important in releasing the untapped potential of the French economy. But what is beyond dispute is that economically the French made the most of their first twelve years of Community membership. As is well known France profited greatly from the CAP, displacing the Dutch as Europe’s largest agricultural exporter by the end of the decade and emerging as the greatest recipient by some margin of funds from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF).53 Vitally, however, this strong performance in agriculture was more than matched by the successes of French industry. Between 1957 and 1969, the total value of French exports to its EEC partners rose fivefold, the greatest part of this increase coming from rising manufactured exports rather than farm produce. This growth outstripped all other EC member states apart from Italy.54 And it contributed significantly to a French economic boom which, until 1968 at least, did much to bolster the confident and assertive stance that Gaullist France sought to adopt on the world stage. The commercial successes of de Gaulle’s European policy had a significance, in other words, that stretched beyond the specialized realm of EEC trade politics. De Gaulle also succeeded in preventing the EEC from developing in directions which he did not like. As far as the Community’s institutional development was concerned this meant resisting determined pressure from most of his partners—and the Dutch in particular—to allow a significant increase in the powers of the European Parliament.55 But it also meant
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pressing ahead with the fusion of the EEC Commission, that of Euratom, and the High Authority of the ECSC, as well as actively participating in the more general trend toward ever tighter control of the EEC’s development by the means of the Council of Ministers and its subordinate bodies, notably the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).56 In policy terms, the French helped ensure that there was little progress towards the integration of transport policy (despite this having as much weight in the original Treaty as the common agricultural policy) and only rudimentary steps toward a European social policy. And most importantly of all the French were twice able to block Community enlargement.57 By so doing they helped preserve their own preeminence within the early EEC, guarantee that they and not the British would have the dominant role in shaping the direction of the early common policies, and cement the central role of French administrative culture in the way in which 1960s Brussels worked. Those authors who highlight the effectiveness of de Gaulle’s European policy do therefore have a genuinely strong case.
. . . vs. French Casualties Simply to accept this positive assessment of de Gaulle’s impact on the early EEC would be unwise, however. For while the General’s distinctive mixture of ‘shock words’ but more subtle if still forceful actions in Brussels certainly did contribute to the achievement of some of France’s European policy aims, they also played their part in the failure of one of his more cherished European ambitions. In a rapidly growing EEC, it is also questionable whether it was entirely necessary to press for French priorities with quite such single-minded determination. The Federal Republic, after all, also did very well out of 1960s Brussels despite its rather gentler (and more disorganized) approach and made far fewer enemies in the process.58 Furthermore, de Gaulle’s tactics so wounded and offended many of his partners, that French European successes became subject to a law of diminishing returns. Indeed de Gaulle’s European policy had brought the Community to a state of near paralysis by the end of the General’s years in power, and had ultimately to be jettisoned as unsustainable by his successor, Georges Pompidou. Those who criticize de Gaulle for the damage which he did to the nascent EEC also therefore have some merit in their case, even if they tend to overstate the long-lasting nature of the changes which he wrought. The first casualty of de Gaulle’s overly forceful tactics was his dream— shared by many other European leaders—of some form of European political union—i.e., a Europe capable of adopting a coordinated stance on the major foreign policy issues of the day. In 1960–1961 this seemed an attainable objective. The appeal of the idea was widespread—helping to
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end Europe’s marginalization on the world stage had after all been one of the driving forces of the integration process since the outset—and de Gaulle’s proposals hit a receptive chord among many pro-Europeans.59 But the Fouchet Plan’s prospects were bedeviled by the widespread mistrust of de Gaulle. Admittedly this was not merely the result of the General’s ambiguous stance towards European integration. His unorthodox ideas about the cold war were also regarded with some alarm by his much more Atlanticist counterparts amongst the Five who feared that France would seek to use any new arrangements for foreign policy coordination to distance Western Europe from the United States. But central to the eventual failure of the scheme was the suspicion that the plan was intended to marginalize the supranational EEC institutions and replace them with an intergovernmental Europe des Patries.60 The disappointment of Gaullist hopes for a political Europe was thus closely linked to his outspoken rhetoric, whether on European integration or on the evolution of the cold war. A second casualty was Franco–German cooperation which never lived up to its full potential during the General’s Presidency. Rapprochement between Paris and Bonn was one of the great achievements of de Gaulle’s early years in power. The very public Franco–German honeymoon of 1962 was certainly built upon the solid foundations laid by Robert Schuman and others during the 1950s.61 But Adenauer’s state visit to France in the summer of 1962, de Gaulle’s triumphal tour of Germany that autumn, and the signature of the bilateral Élysée treaty in January 1963 seemed to take the efforts to overcome the decades of hostility between the two neighbors to an entirely new level.62 A real advance in cooperation between the two most powerful EEC member states seemed possible. But in the short-term at least this prospect was dashed largely by de Gaulle’s decision, days before the signature of the Franco–German treaty, publicly to oppose British EEC membership. This step was hugely unpopular in Germany, contributed significantly to Adenauer’s progressive marginalization by Erhard and Gerhard Schröder, neither of whom were as committed to Franco–German cooperation as the ageing Chancellor had been, and largely explains the German parliamentary fronde which resulted in the addition of a preamble to the Elysée treaty which reaffirmed the Federal Republic’s loyalty to the existing structures of Atlantic and European cooperation.63 Relations between de Gaulle and Erhard continued to fester, moreover, leading to a number of rather public disagreements and totally stymieing German efforts to restart the search for European political union.64 The full promise of 1962 and all that effective Franco–German cooperation could mean for the more general development of European cooperation would not be recaptured until the partnerships between Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt in the 1970s and François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl in the 1980s and early 1990s.
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De Gaulle’s approach also led to a build up of resentment against France and the proliferation of the type of hardline tactics which the French had pioneered in Brussels. The first sign that this was happening came in January 1963, when de Gaulle’s first veto of UK membership led to a series of extremely acrimonious exchanges and multiple threats of retaliation from France’s frustrated partners.65 In the event some skillful mediation by the Germans, facilitated by some emollient diplomacy from the French and the ongoing lure of policy success within the EEC, sufficed to cool tempers all round and to ensure that within a few months the Community was back at work much as before.66 A warning signal had nevertheless been posted about how disruptive forceful French behavior could be. This would be confirmed in 1965 when the tactics employed by the Germans, Italians, Dutch and Commission representatives in the crucial discussions about CAP finance owed much to the accumulation of resentment at France’s disproportionate success within the EEC, and to a belief that only an imitation of hard-hitting French diplomacy would prevent de Gaulle from securing yet another success.67 France could only respond to this new, more aggressive approach from its partners, by increasing the forcefulness of its own actions and beginning the six month boycott of the EEC Council of Ministers. This time it would take nearly a year before all involved abandoned their intransigence and rediscovered the ability to compromise.68 Final confirmation that de Gaulle’s approach had outlived its effectiveness would come in 1968–1969 with the crisis which beset the Community after the second veto of UK membership in late 1967. In marked contrast to 1963, the Six were not able to shrug off their disagreement about the second veto, leading to a situation in which several members of the Five plotted quite openly with the British, where the Dutch in particular systematically refused to permit any form of advance in Brussels, and where repeated attempts at German mediation signally failed to restore effective cooperation. De Gaulle’s successor, Georges Pompidou, would thus be obliged to lift France’s veto so as to enable the EEC to resume the forward movement which was needed were those multiple French interests wrapped up in the Community not to be seriously damaged by impasse amongst the Six.69 A deal linking the widening of Community membership to the completion and deepening of its cooperative activities would finally be struck at the Hague summit in December 1969 paving the way to the first enlargement of the EEC in 1973.70
Conclusion The track record of de Gaulle’s European policy is therefore much more mixed than most existing accounts imply. Once the actual behavior of the French in Brussels is analyzed alongside the rhetorical outpourings that have
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tended, hitherto, to dominate assessments of de Gaulle, some of the traditional stereotypes do disappear. The French President was certainly not a systematic opponent of European integration, intent on undermining all that had been agreed in Brussels, and successful in his ambition to cripple supranational cooperation within the EEC. As has been argued in this chapter, his hostile rhetoric against supranationality and the activities, powers and prerogatives of the European Commission in particular was accompanied by a rather more subtle readiness to strike up a highly effective partnership with Hallstein and his colleagues and to accept supranational rules when it was in French interest to do so. Furthermore, the clearest apparent assault on the institutional arrangements of the early EEC—the empty chair crisis of 1965– 1966—was probably never intended to bring about a total transformation of the Community’s character, was characterized throughout by a persistent effort by the French not to allow the confrontation to spiral out of control, and was brought to an end by a compromise that fell well short of what Paris had seemingly demanded. This combination of talking loudly but not carrying a big stick proved reasonably effective for much of de Gaulle’s eleven years in power. France’s apparent ideological opposition to supranationality helped mask the extent to which the country was actually doing extremely well out of the EEC and was hence very unlikely to be able to implement its periodic threats of withdrawal. This ruse contributed significantly to the ability of French representatives to obtain many of their policy ambitions in Brussels. During the 1958 to 1969 period, the French not only managed to steer the EEC toward a highly advantageous CAP, but also realized many of their objectives concerning the Community’s association regime with the former French empire, the development of the Community’s tariff strategy, and the institutional evolution of the EEC. A strategy reliant on keeping his partners off balance proved decreasingly successful over time, however. Resentment at French behavior and mistrust of the General mounted steadily, thwarting his ambitions for European political union, undermining the effectiveness of Franco–German cooperation, condemning the EEC to a succession of increasingly extreme diplomatic crises, and ultimately bringing the Community to total paralysis by the end of the decade. Central to this declining effectiveness was the fundamental dispute between the French and their partners over whether the Community should be allowed to enlarge and bring in the British—arguably a much more serious and insoluble disagreement than the apparent divergence between the French and their partners over the institutional development of the EEC. De Gaulle’s departure in April 1969 did not come a moment too soon for the European integration process. For it was only with the General gone that Pompidou was able to rebuilt trust between France and its partners, and strike a comprehensive agreement which would allow the Community to both expand its membership and its field of activities in the course of the 1970s.
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Notes ╇ 1.╇ Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vols. 3, 4, and 5 (Paris: Plon, 1970). ╇ 2.╇ Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir, vol. 1, (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 173–210. ╇ 3.╇ See for instance John Newhouse, Collision in Brussels. The Common Market Crisis of June 30, 1965 (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 145. ╇ 4.╇ Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, vols. 1–3 (Paris: Fayard, 1994, 1997, and 2000). ╇ 5.╇ The leading historian in this school is Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998). See also Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5 (Paris: Plon, 1992). Amongst the many former collaborators to have recorded their memories, see esp. Maurice Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1971). ╇ 6.╇ See Couve de Murville, Une politique, pp. 347ff. ╇ 7.╇ Prominent amongst “contemporary critics” was Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats inachevées, vol. 2, (Paris: Fayard, 1969). Historians taking a similar, if inevitably somewhat more nuanced account, include Eric Roussel, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 2002); Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht, De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1991) and Hans-Dieter Lucas, Europa vom Atlantik bis zum Ural?: Europapolitik und Europadenken im Frankreich der Ära de Gaulle (1958– 1969) (Bonn: Bouvier, 1992). ╇ 8.╇ See, e.g., Bino Olivi, L’Europe difficile: histoire politique de la Communauté européenne (Paris: Gallimard, 1998). ╇ 9.╇ De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 480–87. 10.╇ De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 3 (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 406–9. 11.╇ De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 4, p. 379. 12.╇ Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, vol. 2, p. 282. 13.╇ De Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir, vol. 1, p. 195. 14.╇ De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 4, pp. 380–81. 15.╇ Débats de l’Assemblée Nationale, 1965, pp. 3889–92. 16.╇ For an account of the empty chair crisis, see N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (London: Routledge, 2006), chaps. 2–4. 17.╇ Nora Beloff, The General Says No (London: Penguin, 1963), p. 76. 18.╇ On the first application in general, see N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing With Britain: the Six and the First UK membership to the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 19.╇ Edgard Pisani, Le Général indivis (Paris: Albin Michel, 1974), p. 64. 20.╇ Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, vol. 2, p. 265. 21.╇ For the Commission’s motives, see N. Piers Ludlow, “The Making of the CAP: Toward a Historical Analysis of the EU’s First Major Policy,” Contemporary European History 14, no. 3 (2005), pp. 356–58. 22.╇ Memcon, Ball, Tuthill, McGhee, and Hallstein, Bonn, November 17, 964. Cited in Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), vol. 13, p. 112. 23.╇ See, e.g., Council of Ministers’ Archives, Brussels (CMA). 1666/64. Procès-verbal de la 153ème session du Conseil de la CEE (November 30 and December 1, 1964).
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24.╇ CMA. R/850/65, Procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte tenue à l’occasion de la 172ème session du Conseil CEE (June 28–July 1, 1965). 25.╇ European Commission Historical Archives, Brussels (ECHA), BDT 214/1980, Coreper reports, multiple documents. 26.╇ See, e.g., Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris (MAE), Europe 1961–1965, Série 38, SS 2, Dossier 3, tel. 530/35, Boegner to Quai, May 7, 1965. 27.╇ MAE, Série DE-CE 1961–1966, carton 402, aide-mémoire, January 17, 1966; the text of the decalogue can be found at www.ena.lu?lang=1&doc=1457. 28.╇ For an analysis of this battle and its eventual resolution, see Philipp Gassert, “Personalities and the Politics of European Integration: Kurt Georg Kiesinger and the Departure of Walter Hallstein, 1966/7” in Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–1969, ed. Wilfried Loth (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), pp. 265–84. 29.╇ Ludlow, European Community, p. 69. 30.╇ Ibid., p. 73. 31.╇ UK National Archives (PRO), FO371 188375; M10836/4, Robinson to HughJones, January 6, 1966. 32.╇ The text of the Heptalogue can be found on www.ena.lu?lang=1&doc=19632. 33.╇ Rolf Lahr, “Die Legende vom ‘Luxemburger Kompromiß,’” Europa-Archiv 38, no. 8 (1983), p. 226. 34.╇ For the original French desire to remove Mansholt, see Netherlands Foreign Ministry (NLFM), 996.0 EEG, Box 175, Bentinck to FM, Tel. no. 560, October 22, 1965. 35.╇ CMA, C/112/67, Procès verbal de la conférence des gouvernements (June 5, 1967). 36.╇ David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community (London: George Allen and Unwin), p. 194. 37.╇ Cited in Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 223. 38.╇ PRO, FO371 171451, No. 792, Dixon to FO, December 12, 1963; MAE. Serie DE-CE 1961–1966, Bte 517; Compte-rendu du Conseil sur les Affaires Européennes qui s’est tenu le mardi 31 juillet 1962 sous la présidence du Général de Gaulle, August 1, 1962. 39.╇ Reprinted in Edmond Jouve, Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l’Europe (1945–1966) (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1967), vol. 2, p. 856. 40.╇ De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 4, pp. 128–29; Le Monde, October 22, 1964. 41.╇ Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1964 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), vol. 2, pp. 1224–25. 42.╇ Hélène Delorme, “L’adoption du prix unique des céréales,” in Pierre Gerbet and Daniel Pepy (eds.), Le décision dans les Communautés européennes (Brussels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1969), pp. 269–96. 43.╇ Ludlow, European Community, pp. 58–69. 44.╇ Ibid., pp. 105–9. 45.╇ Roussel, Charles de Gaulle, p. 783. 46.╇ Archives Nationales, Fontainebleau, SGCI files, versement 900638, article 26, dossier ‘Bilan et situation dans les Communautés Européennes,’ Annexes 1, 2, and 3, October 1, 1965.
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47.╇ Ludlow, “The Making of the CAP,” pp. 354–65. 48.╇ Andrew Moravcsik, “Between Grain and Grandeur: the political economy of French policy toward the EEC (1958–1969),” Journal of Cold War Studies, 2, nos. 2 and 3 (2000), pp. 3–43 and pp. 4–68. 49.╇ Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Gérard Bossuat (eds.), L’Europe Unie et l’Afrique: de l’idée de l’Eurafrique à la Convention de Lomé (Brussels: Bruylant, 2005). 50.╇ Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 253–65. 51.╇ N. Piers Ludlow, “The Emergence of a Commercial Heavy-weight: The Kennedy Round Negotiations and the European Community of the 1960s,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 18, no. 2 (2007), pp. 361–63. 52.╇ Thomas Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), esp. pp. 244–45. 53.╇ Ludlow, The European Community, p. 55. 54.╇ Ibid., p. 53. 55.╇ Ibid., p. 45. 56.╇ Ibid., pp. 118–24. 57.╇ For French motivations behind the second veto, see Helen Parr, “Saving the Community: The French Response to Britain’s Second EEC Application in 1967,” Cold War History, 6, no. 4 (2006), pp. 425–54. 58.╇ Ludlow, European Community, pp. 211–12. 59.╇ Georges-Henri Soutou, “Le Général de Gaulle et le Plan Fouchet d’Union Politique Européenne: un projet stratégique,” in Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957–1963, ed. Alan Milward and Anne Deighton (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 55–71. 60.╇ The most comprehensive account remains Robert Bloes, Le ‘Plan Fouchet’ et le problème de l’Europe politique (Bruges: College of Europe, 1970). 61.╇ Ulrich Lappenküper, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949–1963 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), vol. 1. 62.╇ Ibid., vol. 2. 63.╇ Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), and Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer (Stuttgart: DVA, 1987), pp. 709–25. 64.╇ Georges-Henri Soutou, L’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco–allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), pp. 272–77; see also Benedikt Schoenborn, La mésentente apprivoisée: De Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963–1969 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007). 65.╇ Ludlow, European Community, pp. 11–14. 66.╇ Ibid., pp. 15–32. 67.╇ Ibid., pp. 58–70. 68.╇ Ibid., pp. 94–109. 69.╇ Ibid., pp. 146–98. 70.╇ See Journal of European Integration History, 9, no. 1 (2003), special issue on The Hague summit.
II Transatlantia
5 NATO Strategies toward de Gaulle’s France, 1958–1966: Learning to Cope Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist
Introduction Charles de Gaulle’s return to power in France in June 1958 marked the beginning of a serious threat to the nascent political cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The General had strong ambitions for his country. He claimed a global political and military role for France, as the voice of continental Europe, and asserted rights for his country that were equal to those of the United States and Britain. Once he realized he failed to achieve this goal, he started to reduce the extent of French military cooperation in the alliance, a process culminating in the withdrawal from NATO’s military arrangements in 1966. De Gaulle did not regard NATO as a permanent alliance, but rather as the embodiment of a traditional temporary coincidence of interests. The French leader was the “nonally par excellence”: While he used the rhetoric of alliance and partnership, de Gaulle was an individualist and a strategic maverick who tried to advance the interests of France to the utmost, even at the expense of other allies. The story of the French challenge to NATO in the 1960s has been told and retold, but scholars have so far largely focused on the three major powers—the United States, Britain, and France.1 In contrast, we propose a genuine NATO perspective: How was de Gaulle’s challenge perceived at NATO headquarters in Paris and among the other 14 national NATO missions present in Paris? This chapter investigates the reactions of NATO bodies and practitioners to the long-lasting NATO crisis evoked by de Gaulle, and the strategies devised to overcome it. We study the beginning and the end of de Gaulle’s strategy to reform NATO. The first part reveals the time and energy NATO insiders spent be85
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tween June and December 1958 to handle the French challenge to the alliance. The second part examines the schemes that NATO protagonists developed to meet the imminent withdrawal as of 1965. Our focus on “NATO Paris” brings to light insights that help explain more comprehensively the nature of transatlantic relations at crucial moments during the Cold War. We reveal that NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak played an important role in the transatlantic discussions on how to react to de Gaulle’s famous September 1958 memorandum, which proposed a three-power French–United States–UK directorate to harmonize the military and political strategy of the West. Spaak vehemently fought for the established habit of NATO political cooperation among all fifteen—not just the Big Three. Together with the smaller NATO allies, he succeeded in preserving the principle of NATO consultations at least on this occasion. Also, we argue that in 1965, when de Gaulle’s plans on NATO developed more specifically, NATO apologists reacted with a broad range of countermeasures, including fostering allied cohesion, as a means of bolstering alliance activities in view of French obstruction. In the event, NATO allies could not prevent de Gaulle from taking a radical move away from NATO, but they collectively managed to absorb it to a remarkable degree. We agree with recent scholarship according to which the events of 1966 constituted more of an opportunity for the alliance than a moment of crisis.2 However, this did not happen as a matter of course, but was a concrete achievement of NATO insiders: French behavior was indeed regarded as critical since 1958, and the crisis was prevented from deteriorating into a catastrophe due to multifaceted anticipatory and preparatory measures on the part of the loyal Fourteen. Examining de Gaulle’s challenge to U.S. and British dominance within the alliance from an NATO perspective, we show that after first seeking to engage the General, and after several years of perplexed meandering in relations with France, the NATO machinery learned to cope with the challenge and compensated for the 1966 withdrawal crisis quite well.
de Gaulle vs. NATO, 1958 For the political evolution of NATO, de Gaulle’s return to power in June 1958 did not bode well. In December 1956, NATO governments had sanctioned the principle of political consultations in the landmark report of the Three Wise Men, the “gospel of NATO”. Under the active leadership of Spaak, the permanent NATO Council in Paris (NAC) had proven to be a practical multilateral framework for harmonizing the individual national strategies of the 15 NATO members. Multilateral debates on East–West relations in 1957–1958 demonstrated that NATO could play an important role in the political Cold War—beyond its traditional military defense and de-
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terrence role.3 This success story was seriously challenged by de Gaulle. In February 1958, he had explained to U.S. journalist Cyrus Sulzberger: “If I governed France, I would quit NATO. NATO is against our independence and our interest.”4 De Gaulle’s stance was no secret within NATO circles. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer warned in mid-May 1958 that de Gaulle’s ascent to power had to be prevented to avoid the triple danger of a direct line between Paris and Moscow, a disentanglement of France from NATO, and the end of European integration.5 Washington, too, anticipated troubles for NATO. The U.S. State Department feared that de Gaulle would try to steer NATO out of the U.S. hegemonic sphere and to subordinate the alliance to French interests. The prospect for NATO’s future looked bleak: “NATO as we know it today and the cooperative working relationship of NATO would be transformed.”6 In the first few weeks of de Gaulle’s tenure as prime minister, the West was uncertain about the direction of French foreign policy. As a result, there was a profusion of diplomatic visits in the French capital. The first Western statesman to meet de Gaulle was—Paul-Henri Spaak.7 On June 24, de Gaulle explained to him that he was not strictly against NATO, but felt that the U.S. and British influence within the alliance was too strong.8 Spaak, who at that time sympathized a good deal with Gaullist ideas,9 tried to establish a good working relationship with de Gaulle. In a lengthy memorandum, he subsequently encouraged France to play a more active role in NATO.10 In subsequent meetings with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the French leader mentioned for the first time his idea of an “NATO executive committee” consisting of the United States, the UK, and France.11 Learning this from Dulles, Spaak sought to prevent the impending split of NATO into a two-class alliance. He asked Adenauer to tell de Gaulle that Bonn would not accept de Gaulle’s claim for France to act as a mouthpiece for Continental Europe vis-à-vis the United States and Britain.12 Adenauer’s encounter with de Gaulle on September 14–15, however, took a quite different course than Spaak had hoped. Both leaders railed against the Eisenhower government and agreed to work toward a Europe that was less dependent on the United States. They€also deplored the condition of NATO. However, neither Adenauer nor de Gaulle raised the delicate issue of a tripartite United States–UK–French directorate.13 Rather than defending NATO against de Gaulle’s imminent “attack,” Adenauer instated West Germany as France’s ally of first choice. De Gaulle Strikes Out—and Tries to Split NATO Spaak thus failed to deter de Gaulle from launching his proposal for a radical reform of NATO. In a brief memorandum addressed to Dwight D. Eisenhower and Macmillan and finally dated September 17, the French
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leader argued that NATO in its present form no longer met the security requirements of the Western world. De Gaulle demanded the establishment of a worldwide security organization consisting of the U.S., the UK, and France (the word “directorate,” however, was not used in the letter). As a first step, the letter required the three countries to convene a consultative meeting in Washington to discuss the questions raised.14 De Gaulle explicitly asked that the content of his letter remain secret.15 Yet the Quai d’Orsay informed the German and Italian governments along general lines about the “personal message” from de Gaulle to Eisenhower and Macmillan, asking Bonn and Rome to treat this information confidentially.16 By distributing this message in two different versions to the United States and UK on the one hand and to West Germany and Italy on the other hand, asking all four countries to observe secrecy, it may well be that the French were trying to stir up trouble within NATO. As a result, odd encounters took place within NATO circles in Paris. Italian NATO Ambassador Umberto Grazzi, for example, asked the U.S. Deputy NATO Ambassador Fritz Nolting whether he had already heard of de Gaulle’s letter to Eisenhower. Nolting pretended he was not aware of such a communication, although Dulles had oriented him about it.17 Spaak’s Search for a “NATO Solution” De Gaulle’s “September memorandum” provoked bilateral discussions between the United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, and—underexplored by historians to date—NATO Secretary General Spaak, designed to produce an appropriate response. Interestingly, de Gaulle had personally handed over a copy of his memorandum to Spaak on September 24—in fact, one day before it was delivered to Eisenhower and Macmillan.18 Spaak recorded his reaction to de Gaulle’s bombshell as “dumbfounded” (stupéfait).19 At once, he was aware of the great danger of de Gaulle’s short letter for NATO. Immediately, he started a bustling “shuttle diplomacy” in order to limit the damage to the alliance. In a first step, Spaak discussed de Gaulle’s memorandum with Dulles in Boston. Dulles told him that the U.S. reaction to de Gaulle’s demands was negative: Washington’s key concern was that Germany and Italy would never accept such paternalism.20 Dulles encouraged Spaak to craft his own reply to de Gaulle, with the goal of returning the debate to the NATO forum.21 In a speech in Boston, Spaak reacted indirectly to de Gaulle’s gauntlet. He praised the extraordinary flexibility that NATO had exhibited since 1949, claiming that NATO was no longer only the most powerful military alliance of all times, but also constituted an unprecedented international forum for political consultation. The Western alliance was “the very center of the most significant diplomatic innovation ever attempted,” Spaak emphasized.22 Dulles complimented Spaak on his “perfect response” to de Gaulle’s mem-
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orandum and told him that he figured that de Gaulle’s questions would become the most critical issue at the NATO ministerial meeting in December.23 Spaak was appreciative and offered to write a memorandum on NATO political consultation in the run-up to the December meeting and to address the topical problems of the alliance. However, he warned that one had to be careful not to destroy recent achievements in NATO political cooperation by launching such a controversial debate.24 At the same time, Spaak upheld the interests of West Germany and Italy, and informed NATO ambassadors Herbert Blankenhorn and Adolfo Alessandrini that de Gaulle’s original letter had a different content compared to the version the Italians and Germans had received—which had not included de Gaulle’s demand for a three-party directorate. When he learned of the French inner-circle ideas, Blankenhorn told Spaak that de Gaulle’s anachronistic proposals were “completely unrealistic” and totally unacceptable to West Germany. He added that they would mean “the swift end of NATO.” He was convinced that Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, and Turkey would share this view. Like Spaak and Dulles, Blankenhorn thought that an internal review of NATO consultative methods and its strategic planning was the best response to de Gaulle’s challenge. After Spaak had spilled the beans about the two differing versions of de Gaulle’s letter, the Quai d’Orsay had to hand out the complete version of the original memorandum to Bonn and Rome.25 As encouraged by Dulles, Spaak responded to de Gaulle’s memorandum before Eisenhower or Macmillan did so. In his letter of October 15, he agreed that Communism at present mostly threatened areas out of Europe. Yet, he emphasized that all NATO members had an interest in Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific. Spaak therefore characterized de Gaulle’s idea of a tripartite directorate as “neither practical nor fortunate” (ni pratique ni heureuse). It would mean “the end of the Atlantic alliance,” since Italy, West Germany, and the smaller NATO countries would never give their consent to the French idea of a global steering committee from which they were excluded.26 De Gaulle never replied to Spaak. This does not diminish the importance of the fact that the NATO secretary general had proactively taken the initiative to mediate between France and the rest of the alliance in the discussion on a reform of NATO. In his reply to de Gaulle, Adenauer suggested that de Gaulle meet with Spaak to informally discuss the question of changing the political structure of NATO.27 Adenauer hoped—like Dulles—that Spaak would succeed in convincing de Gaulle to compose a new memorandum, leaving out the offensive parts, which could then be circulated and discussed in NATO.28 However, by informing Bonn and Rome about de Gaulle’s radical NATO reform proposal, Spaak had made the realization of such a scenario less probable. Within a week, Spaak had lost his utility as a mediator between France and NATO, as he had already lost de Gaulle’s trust.
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Trying to Educate de Gaulle: A Clear but Polite “No” In the meantime, Dulles and Eisenhower had in principle agreed to convene three-party consultations on de Gaulle’s memorandum at the level of