The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances

Cold War History Series General Editor: Saki Dockrill, Senior Lecturer in War Studies, King’s College, London The new Cold War History Series aims to make available to scholars and students the results of advanced research on the origins and the development of the Cold War and its impact on nations, alliances and regions at various levels of statecraft, and in areas such as diplomacy, security, economy, military and society. Volumes in the series range from detailed and original specialised studies, proceedings of conferences, to broader and more comprehensive accounts. Each work deals with individual themes and periods of the Cold War and each author or editor approaches the Cold War with a variety of narrative, analysis, explanation, interpretation and reassessments of recent scholarship. These studies are designed to encourage investigation and debate on important themes and events in the Cold War, as seen from both East and West, in an effort to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon and place it in its context in world history. Titles include: Günter Bischof AUSTRIA IN THE FIRST COLD WAR, 1945–55 The Leverage of the Weak Christoph Bluth THE TWO GERMANIES AND MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (editors) WAR AND COLD WAR IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1942–62 Saki Dockrill BRITAIN’S RETREAT FROM EAST OF SUEZ The Choice Between Europe and the World, 1945–1968 Martin H. Folly CHURCHILL, WHITEHALL AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1940–45 John Gearson and Kori Schake (editors) THE BERLIN WALL CRISIS Perspectives on Cold War Alliances Ian Jackson THE ECONOMIC COLD WAR America, Britain and East–West Trade, 1948–63 Saul Kelly COLD WAR IN THE DESERT Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945–52 Dianne Kirby (editor) RELIGION AND THE COLD WAR

Wilfred Loth OVERCOMING THE COLD WAR A History of Détente, 1950–1991 Donette Murray KENNEDY, MACMILLAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Andrew Roadnight UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA IN THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER YEARS Kevin Ruane THE RISE AND FALL OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–55 Helene Sjursen WESTERN POLICY–MAKING IN THE POLISH CRISIS International Relations in the Second Cold War Antonio Varsori and Elena Calandri (editors) THE FAILURE OF PEACE IN EUROPE, 1943–48

Cold War History Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–79482–6 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

The Berlin Wall Crisis Perspectives on Cold War Alliances Edited by

John P. S. Gearson King’s College London

and

Kori Schake National Defense University, Washington, DC

Editorial matter and selection © John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake 2002 Chapters 1–9 © Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–92960–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Berlin Wall crisis : perspectives on Cold War alliances / eds., John P. S. Gearson, Kori Schake. p. cm. — (Cold War history series) “This book grew out of an international research project, the Nuclear History Programme (NHP) conducted in the late 1980s and the 1990s . . .”—Pref. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–92960–8 1. Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany—1961–1989. 2. Cold War. 3. Berlin (Germany)—Politics and government—1945–1990. 4. Germany (West)—Politics and government. 5. Germany (East)—Politics and government. I. Gearson, John P. S., 1963– II. Schake, Kori N. III. Series. DD881 .B4767 2002 943′.155087—dc21 2002072342 10 11

9 8 10 09

7 08

6 07

5 06

4 3 05 04

2 03

1 02

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents vi

Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

vii

Notes on the Contributors

viii

Editors’ Introduction

x

Berlin Crisis Timeline

xv

1

Berlin and the Cold War Lawrence Freedman

1

2

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62 John Gearson

3

A Broader Range of Choice? US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises Kori Schake

10

22

4

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62 John Gearson

5

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon Cyril Buffet

73

The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis Hope Harrison

96

6

43

7

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62 Jill Kastner

125

8

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61 Leopoldo Nuti and Bruna Bagnato

147

9

Three Hats for Berlin: General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958–62 Gregory W. Pedlow

175 199

Index

v

Acknowledgements This book grew out of an international research project, the Nuclear History Programme (NHP) conducted in the late 1980s and the 1990s on the history of nuclear weapons and the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union and the countries of Europe. The NHP included teams working to recount the national histories of nuclear programmes, gain new insights into the major nuclear crises (Berlin, Cuba and others), and open up archival material in a variety of countries. The authors were nearly all junior academics whose research was funded and judgement was trained by the Nuclear History Programme. The notable exception is Lawrence Freedman, who has been a mentor to several of the contributors to this volume. Gregory W. Pedlow, who is historian at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, was also a senior colleague. The Berlin research effort, in which many of the authors worked together, included Marc Trachtenberg, Wolfgang Krieger, and David Allan Rosenberg and focused on the role of nuclear weapons in the 1958 and 1962 Berlin crises. We are indebted to them for their leadership and the opportunities they provided. William Burr of the National Security Archive was of great assistance in identifying documents concerning the Berlin crisis and was an active collaborator in the NHP’s Berlin studies.

vi

List of Abbreviations EAC EEC EFTA FRG GDR/DDR ICBM IRBM NATO SACEUR UK US USSR/SU WEU WTO

European Advisory Council European Economic Community European Free Trade Area Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) United Kingdom United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Western European Union Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Warsaw Pact)

vii

Notes on the Contributors Bruna Bagnato is Associate Professor of History of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Florence. She is the author of Storia di una illusione europea. Il progetto di unione doganale italo-francese (1995) and is currently editing the journal of Luca Pietromarchi, Italian Ambassador to the USSR from 1958 to 1961, and is completing a volume on Italo-Soviet relations 1958–1963. Cyril Buffet is Political Adviser to the Chairman of the French National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee. He has published widely on French and German foreign and security policy and has held research fellowships from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and from the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin. He holds his doctorate from the Sorbonne (Paris IV). Lawrence Freedman is Professor of War Studies and Head of the School of Social Sciences and Public Policy, King’s College London. He is author of Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (2000). John Gearson is Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies, King’s College London. He has published widely on Cold War history and is author of Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1958–1961: The Limits of Interests and Force (1998). Hope Harrison is Assistant Professor of History and International Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington, DC. Her book, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961, is forthcoming in 2003. Jill Kastner received her PhD in 1999 from Harvard University, where she focused on German–American relations during the Cold War. She has worked with the Presidential Recordings Project at the University of Virginia on Berlin policy during the Kennedy administration, and was most recently a visiting Research Fellow at King’s College, London. Leopoldo Nuti is Professor of History of International Relations at the School of Political Science, University of Roma Tre. With a number of viii

Notes on the Contributors

ix

other Italian Cold War historians, he promoted the creation of the Machiavelli Centre for Cold War Studies. He has published extensively on US–Italian relations and Italian foreign and security policy, and is author of Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia (1999). Gregory W. Pedlow is Chief of the Historical Office at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO’s military headquarters for Europe. In 1990–91 he wrote the official history of LIVE OAK, the Allied crisis management staff for Berlin contingency plans and operations, after it was disbanded because of German unification. Kori Schake is Senior Research Professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, US National Defense University, and also teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Editors’ Introduction Kori Schake and John Gearson

The Berlin crises have been much studied for their lessons about East– West friction, Soviet policy making in a time when there was little transparency into that government, linkages between Berlin and the Cuban missile crises, and how governments function in managing crises. Less attention has been paid to the effects of successive Berlin crises on the relations among allies, either in the NATO alliance or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). This volume seeks to highlight the complex intra-alliance politics of what was seen as the likeliest flash-point of conflict in the Cold War. It recounts the evolution of policy during the 1958 and 1961 Berlin crises from the perspective of each government central to the crisis, one on the margins (Italy), and the military headquarters responsible for crafting an agreed Western military campaign. By creating a mosaic of the national perspectives, this volume explores the ways in which their similarities and differences affected the course of the Berlin crises as well as the broader framework of alliance relations during the Cold War. The research presented by the authors of this work demonstrates how strongly determinant were concerns about relationships with allies in the choices made by all the major governments. Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (otherwise known as West Germany), the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), France, the Soviet Union and the United States were all deeply concerned about how the choices of their allies in the crisis would propel them into positions contrary to their interests. All were suspicious of the reliability of their allies, none more so than West Germany, which had the most exposed position and the least ability to protect its interests without allied support. Yet all understood from the outset that they could not dissociate themselves from the choices of their allies – none, not even the United States, were autonomous actors in the crises over Berlin. All of the countries were bound to their allies’ policies because of common defence commitments: none could refuse their support for Berlin, the contingency most likely to cause World War III, while maintaining the protection of all for their own defence. States on the periphery of the crisis, like Italy, sought an active role in order to forestall x

Editors’ Introduction

xi

what they believed to be mistaken policies of their allies. They feared being dragged into a conflict by their alliance commitments when they had little influence over the policy choices of the central actors. But even the governments most involved in shaping Berlin policies, such as Britain, considered themselves tightly constrained by the others’ conflicting preferences and unable to establish a course of action independently, to such an extent that they resigned themselves to participation in World War III rather than pull away from an agreed allied policy, always hoping that such a decision would not be presented to them. Allied policies were also bound through linking of solidarity in Berlin to other central issues, as the Soviet need for East German renunciation of the Chinese and the US need for Western European agreement to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in alliance war-fighting strategy clearly demonstrate. All the countries whose policies are explored in this volume had their government choices substantially constrained in the crisis by the need to ensure alliance cohesion. The deep-seated tensions between allies is palpable throughout the crisis, perhaps especially because each government understood the limits of their ability to act except in concert with those same allies. As the following chapters on these different government policies demonstrate, none of the states achieved the central objectives they had identified in the complex sifting of motive and opportunity presented by tension over Berlin. Britain failed to reposition itself as an ‘Atlantic-facing European leader’. West Germany failed to prevent a sense of its increasing isolation within the Western camp developing. East Germany failed to prevent the exodus of its citizens until the construction of the Berlin Wall, and lost the façade of ideological parity with West Germany when it demonstrated the need to hold its citizens by force. France failed to restructure NATO in ways that institutionalised parity between the United States, Britain and France. Italy failed to be included in the inner circle of Western decision making or pose itself as a mediator. The Soviet Union failed to fracture Western solidarity or shake Western resolve sufficiently to change the status quo in Berlin. The United States failed to reduce the costs and risks of defending Europe. In each case, these failures are substantially attributable to the needs of compromise with allies, rather than preventing conflict with adversaries. Lawrence Freedman’s chapter opens the book by explaining the strategic importance of Berlin during the Cold War. Soon after the end of World War II, Berlin became a symbol of the freedom and dynamism of the West, but an embarrassing portal of escape for the captive populations

xii Editors’ Introduction

of the Warsaw Pact and a demonstration of the ‘illegitimate and therefore frail Soviet hold over its European satellites’. Freedman argues that the Berlin crisis captured the essence of the Cold War because it contrasted the political and economic strength of the West demonstrated by Berlin with the military strength of the East casting its repressive shadow over Berlin’s vulnerability. John Gearson’s Chapter 2 is included to ensure familiarity with the evolution of the Berlin problem from its antecedents in the division of Germany at the end of World War II, through the breakdown of cooperation and the resulting 1948 Berlin blockade that highlighted the high stakes and tenuous nature of Western rights in the city, and recounting the events leading up to the 1958 and 1962 crises. This removes the necessity for authors of subsequent chapters on national policies to reference events that would become repetitive over the course of seven different national and institutional perspectives. Kori Schake’s Chapter 3 contrasts the policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations in the 1958 and 1961 crises. As the only national government with a leadership change in the period and one that ushered in a new generation of policymakers less tied to the World War II decisions, the US experience showcases the ultimately unsuccessful struggle of a new administration to create more choices from an unpalatable menu of options in the nuclear age. The Kennedy Administration’s failure to follow through on its hard-line approach when the Berlin Wall was built raised serious questions about the practicality of the new military strategy of flexible response and about the reliability of the US to its European allies. John Gearson’s Chapter 4 traces the course of British policy, highlighting how Britain’s uncertainty about its post-Suez role was played out over Berlin. Harold Macmillan’s efforts to simultaneously effect détente with the Soviet Union, strengthen relations with France and the US, and disengage Britain from Germany did not take into account the extent to which achieving any one of these objectives required beneficial linkages that were withheld by allies and enemies alike. Gearson concludes that Macmillan’s approach ‘revealed an intellectual vacuum at the heart of British foreign policy towards Germany, Europe and the USSR’ that continues to affect UK politics to this day. Cyril Buffet’s Chapter 5 on French policy recounts Charles De Gaulle’s shrewd exploitation of the Berlin crises (which he viewed as having little effect on the status quo) for the broader goals of establishing equality with the US and Britain and lasting superiority over Germany. Buffet argues that acquisition of nuclear weapons was central to De Gaulle’s

Editors’ Introduction

xiii

ambitions; it was the critical determinant of status and would provide France the leverage to affect a change in NATO that dominated French strategic thinking. De Gaulle’s concept of four pillars, in which ‘Germany would be “the advance guard”, France would occupy “the principal position”, Britain would give them “cover” and America would be “the reserve”,’ was rejected by all three states he envisioned harnessing in this manner, but did provide opportunities for a subtle shifting of allegiances within the Western camp to France’s advantage. Hope Harrison is one of very few scholars to have reviewed the Soviet and East German archives, and her Chapter 6 elucidates the complicated alliance relations between East Germany and the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union had motives of shoring up the GDR and establishing equality with the US, Harrison demonstrates that the length and intensity of the Berlin Crisis, as well as the decision to build the Berlin Wall, were dictated by East German rather than Soviet initiatives. East German leader Walther Ulbricht used the threat of GDR collapse that would necessitate a Soviet intervention similar to that during the 1953 East German uprising to prod Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev away from cautiousness. Harrison’s research suggests that despite Ulbricht’s pressure and the damaging impact of emigration from East Germany, the Soviet Union may have agreed to GDR construction of the Wall in return for GDR loyalty with respect to China and Albania’s ideological challenge to Soviet leadership of the socialist world. Jill Kastner’s Chapter 7 illustrates how far West Germany was able to effect the same trick of a relatively weak ally precipitating action by the stronger among the Western Allies, albeit at the price of Germany’s increasing alienation within the Western alliance. Adenauer’s intransigence on Berlin coupled with a near-paranoiac need for reassurance of Western support exacerbated his fear of isolation and increased his distrust of Germany’s allies. Kastner concludes that ‘Adenauer, who had once counted on America as his most reliable ally, was permanently embittered toward both Washington and London’ by the end of the Berlin crises because he believed they were threatening to betray the agreements from the 1950s that established Germany’s security and for which Germany had made painful and costly sacrifices. Leopoldo Nuti and Bruna Bagnato recount Italian policy in Chapter 8, demonstrating Italy’s efforts to both prevent a war in which they would inevitably have to participate and a ‘hasty détente’ that would affect Italian domestic politics and economic recovery. Italy’s frustration at being excluded from Western policymaking, and the influence of the Italian Communist Party (exploited by the Soviets in their 1957

xiv Editors’ Introduction

offer to include Italy) were considered opportunities for Italy to play a mediating role in East–West conflict, but Nuti and Bagnato show that the Italian government ultimately concluded ‘this was a duet between America and Russia, and the European countries do not matter; Great Britain, France and Germany were the satellites of the United States.’ Gregory W. Pedlow’s Chapter 9 considers the crises from the perspective of General Lauris Norstad, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, who had responsibility for creating consensus on a common defence, building allied military forces capable of defending the NATO countries, deterring Warsaw Pact attacks, and planning for a tri-partite defence of Western rights in Berlin – all without provoking the Soviets to a challenge, or precipitating an unwillingness by Western publics to shoulder the burdens of the Cold War. Pedlow demonstrates how Norstad’s innovative thinking about Western strategy introduced greater flexibility, and also highlights his principled refusal of the Kennedy Administration’s approach on the basis that ‘we must keep in mind the fact that our NATO strategy must be generally acceptable to our allies if they are to have either the will to face up to possible military operations or the inclination to build up their forces.’ It serves as a defining epithet for the demands of alliance politics in the Berlin crises and beyond.

Berlin Crisis Timeline

1943 Oct

European Advisory Commission established to consider terms of German surrender.

1944 12 Sep

Quadripartite Agreements: Protocol of Zones of Occupation establishes Kommandatura for control of Berlin and right of armed presence in city for UK, US, USSR and France.

1945 29 Jul 30 Nov

Meeting between Zhukov, Clay and Weeks discusses allied access to Berlin. Air Corridor Agreements assigns Western allies three air corridors to Berlin.

1947 June

Marshall Aid programme announced.

1948 24 June

Berlin blockade begins.

1949 Apr 5 May 8 May

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation formed. New York Agreements terminates Berlin blockade. Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed with its capital in Bonn: Basic Law refers to Berlin as a Land (Federal State), but it remains an ‘occupied city’ and Western allies insist (on 13 May) that Berlin representatives only attend Bundestag (parliament) as observers. xv

xvi Berlin Crisis Timeline

7 Oct

German Democratic Republic proclaimed with its capital in Pankow.

1953 June

Following Stalin’s death, workers’ uprising in East Germany crushed by Soviets.

1954 Oct

Paris Agreements allow FRG rearmament; UK and France declare that they will maintain forces in Berlin and will treat an attack on Berlin as an attack on themselves.

1955 May

FRG joins NATO; Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Warsaw Pact) is formed.

1957 Nov

Sputnik earth satellite launched by USSR. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposes nuclear free zone in Central Europe to include East and West Germany.

1958 Mar 27 Mar Apr Jul 10 Jul Aug 14 Sep 17 Sep

FRG Bundestag votes to accept basing of dual-key US nuclear weapons in West Germany after long debate. Khrushchev becomes the Premier of the USSR. NATO approves MC-70 allowing for stockpiling of tactical nuclear weapons in FRG and other European states. US and UK send troops to Lebanon and Jordan to prevent coups. Walter Ulbricht, head of the East German Socialist Unity Party, demands the ‘normalisation’ of the Berlin Situation. Off-shore islands dispute sees Quemoy and Matsu shelled by People’s Republic of China. Adenauer and De Gaulle meet in Colombey for the first time. De Gaulle secretly proposes triumvirate for NATO of US, UK and France.

Berlin Crisis Timeline xvii

31 Oct

10 Nov 15 Nov 22 Nov 24 Nov

25 Nov

26 Nov 27 Nov

31 Dec

Tripartite Conferences on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests are held between the US, UK and USSR at Geneva. Khrushchev demands that the Western Allies leave Berlin in speech at Polish embassy in Moscow. UK sends steering telegram indicating that ultimate recognition of GDR is inevitable. FRG formally requests US to supply it with IRBMs. US-initiated proposal on outer space is adopted by the UN Political Committee, despite the objections of the USSR. Stating its composition was ‘one-sided’, the USSR refuses to participate further with the Committee on Space Research and boycotts the UN Outer Space Committee. Second meeting between De Gaulle and Adenauer in Bad Kreuznach. Soviets demand that Western powers leave Berlin and proposes the creation of a demilitarised free city in West Berlin setting a six-month deadline. In a reply to Khrushchev, the Western Allies reject Soviet demands for the evacuation of Western occupation rights and oppose the ‘free city’ demand. The Western Allies propose East–West negotiations to settle the Berlin question.

1959 Jan 10 Jan

16 Feb 21 Feb–3 Mar

19–20 Mar

Tripartite planning group on Berlin begins meeting in Washington. The US proposes a peace conference to be held on Germany, but the USSR rejects the Allied claim that Berlin be discussed in the context of the German problem. The US proposes a four-power Foreign Ministers Conference on all aspects of Germany. Macmillan–Khrushchev talks held in Moscow to discuss methods of limiting forces and weapons in an agreed area of Europe. Eisenhower and Macmillan meet in Washington to discuss Berlin.

xviii Berlin Crisis Timeline

14 Apr

15 Apr May–Aug

4 Sept 7 Sept 26–7 Sept

8 Oct 19–21 Dec

Tripartite Staff established by General Norstad to undertake military contingency planning in Berlin code name: LIVEOAK. Dulles resigns as secretary of state and is replaced by Christian Herter. Geneva meeting of foreign ministers from UK, US, France and USSR (plus observers from FRG and GDR) discuss Berlin. Laos requests aid from the UN to stop the invasion of communist troops from North Vietnam. US, UK, France and USSR establish a ten-nation committee to begin new disarmament talks. Khrushchev and President Eisenhower hold discussion at Camp David where they agree to reopen negotiations on Berlin. British general election won by Harold Macmillan’s conservative party. US, UK, France and, in part, Germany, hold discussions in Paris where heads of government talk about matters relating to and East–West summit conference.

1960 14 Feb 1 May

7 May 10 May

15–18 May

27 June 1 July 9 July

France becomes world’s fourth atomic power, exploding device in Sahara. Tensions rise as a U-2 American reconnaissance plane is downed by Soviet rocket fire over the USSR (incident announced by Khrushchev on 5 May). Khrushchev publicly calls Norway, Pakistan and Turkey accomplices in the ‘spy’ flight. Khrushchev warns nations allowing bases to be used by US planes that they will be hit by Russia if an incident similar to the U-2 one occurs again. Summit between Khrushchev, De Gaulle, Eisenhower and Macmillan in Paris ends with Khrushchev walking out over U-2 incident. USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania walk out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference. Soviet Union shoots down a US Air Force RB-47 reconnaissance bomber over the Barents Sea. Khrushchev promises to aid Cuba in case of US aggression.

Berlin Crisis Timeline

14–29 Aug

29 Aug

8 Sept

13 Sept

22 Sept

23 Sept

3 Oct

xix

At a meeting of Organisation of American States (OAS), the US accuses Cuba of establishing training programmes for communist agents and guerrillas to spread Communism throughout Latin America. The US also states that ‘the leaders of the Soviet Union and Communist China are exploiting the situation in Cuba in order to intervene in inter-American affairs’. The East German Government announces the plan of a special five-day restriction on entry into East Berlin by residents of the Federal Republic. The East German Government decrees that the citizens of the Federal Republic are required to have permits issued by East Germany in order to enter East Berlin. East Germany announces that it will no longer accept West German passports ‘unlawfully issued’ to West Berliners for travel to bloc countries. President Eisenhower addresses the UN General Assembly. He proposes that nations who produce nuclear weapons immediately assemble experts to design systems for terminating all production of materials used for weapons purposes. Eisenhower says that the US ‘would be willing to match the USSR in shutting down major plants producing fissionable materials, one by one, under international inspection and verification’. Khrushchev speaks to the UN General Assembly and proposes an item entitled ‘Basic provisions of the Treaty on general and complete disarmament’ for consideration. He also calls for the Office of Secretary-General to be replaced by an executive body. This body would be comprised of three people each representing a certain group of states. Khrushchev calls on Secretary-General Hammerskjold to resign, citing that he has been biased in favour of the West.

1961 3 Jan 13 Mar

23 Mar

The US breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba. The US announces a new ‘Alliance for Progress’ programme; the plan calls for large-scale US aid to Latin American countries. President Kennedy says that the US will not stand ‘idly’ by while communists take over Laos.

xx Berlin Crisis Timeline

3 Apr 17 Apr

18 Apr 3–4 June

6 Jun 19 July

13 Aug

17 Aug 19 Aug 20 Aug Sep Sep–Oct 1 Sep 17 Sep 20 Oct

US asks Cuba to abandon ties with Soviet bloc. Cuban exiles launch an unsuccessful invasion at ‘Bay of Pigs’ to overthrow Castro. Reports surface that the exiles were aided by the US Central Intelligence Agency. USSR promises ‘all necessary assistance’ against the attack on Cuba. Kennedy and Khrushchev meet at Vienna to talk about key world problems, among which are Germany and disarmament – Khrushchev issues new ultimatum on Berlin. Kennedy delivers televised address to the nation on Berlin. Kennedy approves Acheson policy recommendations on Berlin, but rejects declaration of National Emergency (announces it to the nation on 25 July). The intra-city border between East and West Berlin is sealed off by East Germany eventually resulting in the Berlin Wall. First official allied objection to the closing of the sector boundary. Vice-President Johnson and Lucius Clay visit West Berlin. Construction of Wall begins. US Battle Group arrives in West Berlin. Secretary of State Rusk begins meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Soviet Union resumes nuclear weapon testing. First Italian comment on closing of sector boundary expresses ‘disappointment’. FRG elections see Adenauer’s party lose overall majority. Draft NSAM109 put to Norstad setting Berlin contingency in four escalatory phases.

1962 10 Jan 7 Feb Oct

Norstad refuses to implement NSAM109 as a NATO policy. Soviets begin harassment of allied aircraft in Berlin air corridor. Cuban missile crisis.

1963 June

Kennedy visits West Berlin – ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech.

Berlin Crisis Timeline

1972

Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and signing of Basic Treaty between FRG and GDR.

1989 Nov

Berlin Wall collapses.

xxi

1 Berlin and the Cold War Lawrence Freedman

Introduction When in the early 1960s Peter Watkins, the British documentary maker, wanted to find a way to start World War III to demonstrate the horrors of nuclear war for his film The War Game he began at Checkpoint Charlie, the entry-point into East Berlin from the American sector. This was the spot to where Soviet and American tanks had trundled in a famous standoff in September 1961 before President John F. Kennedy and Chairman Nikita Khrushchev found a way of backing down. He was not alone in his choice. The powder trail from Berlin to a nuclear catastrophe always had a simplicity and credibility that more contrived scenarios lacked. Khrushchev reinforced the link with a ferocious series of nuclear tests, culminating in the largest ever – 56 megatons – in October 1961. Certainly during the tense summer of 1961 Kennedy himself was prepared to give disturbing odds on the Berlin crisis provoking a nuclear war, to the point where he urged construction of fallout shelters as well as higher defence spending. Even if a crisis had nothing to do with Berlin, that was where it was likely to end up because that was where the West was at its most vulnerable, where the famous choices between suicide or surrender, holocaust or humiliation could well be confronted. Berlin still tended to appear as the flashpoint in scenarios for a European war over the succeeding years, although as the Cold War settled down to a routine, and a new fourpower agreement regularised the position of Berlin in the early 1970s, the credibility was becoming strained. Yet even in 1961 it would have taken unusual recklessness and extraordinary bad luck to get a war started. Some famous crisis games organised by the Rand Corporation at the time notably failed to do so. While the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1

2 The Berlin Wall Crisis

August 1961 was one of the defining moments of the Cold War, and heightened the sense of tension, looking back it now appears as the moment when the crisis was stabilised. Even as it became increasingly apparent that Berlin was, thankfully, unlikely to provide a hot war, it provided the Cold War with its most conspicuous symbol, a regular stop for any visit to the city, a chance to stand and look over into a grey east and compare it with the wealth behind. There was no doubt that the Cold War was really over when the Wall came down in November 1989. This book harks back to the period when East–West rivalry and antagonism was at its most intense, before it was clear that communism was bound to lose ideologically, and how those involved attempted to manage the tension between the two at this most sensitive point. This chapter offers a background to the Berlin crisis and the issues at its heart as an introduction to the more detailed chapters that follow. In demonstrating its importance to the Cold War my aim is also to show how it captured the essence of the Cold War as a mixture of great power politics and ideological competition.

Berlin and Germany Berlin was the pivot on which the Cold War turned during the critical period of the late 1950s/early 1960s. If the Cold War was ever going to turn hot Germany always seemed the most probable cause, and Berlin the likely trigger. Germany had already been disturbing European affairs for a century. Its history, size and location meant that if Europe as a whole was to feel secure then some arrangements had to be found that would allow it to function without spreading instability. Germany was divided after World War II – first into four, with American, British, French and Soviet sectors, and then into two, as the three Western sectors coalesced to form the new Federal Republic of Germany, leaving the Soviet sector to turn into the German Democratic Republic. This was a division with which most other European countries felt quite comfortable – ‘I like Germany so much I want two of them’ was a notorious comment from France, not Russia. One of the two Germanys was liberal capitalist and the other was illiberal socialist. Other schemes for post-war Germany, such as the ‘pastoralisation’ briefly canvassed by the Americans, would have produced a Germany united but denuded of its industrial strength. The rejection of this option, which would have created a dependent state unable to look after itself, meant that instead the two entities engaged in a competition of modern industrial societies, to see which system could best deliver

Berlin and the Cold War

3

the goods and address the needs of ordinary people. In relation to their own ideological camps both Germanys were soon to the fore in growth and productivity, but in the competition between the two, West Germany won hands down. This competition was felt most keenly in Berlin, where the two systems operated side by side and where people voted with their feet by seeking refuge in the Western part. It was ideology that gave the Berlin crisis its edge, giving meaning to the balance of power and introducing a particular source of instability. The ability of Berlin to have this effect was another consequence of the war-time understandings between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. These had been expected to provide temporary solutions until something more definitive could be agreed. In the event they turned out to be remarkably durable. The capital might have been left as an integral part of East Germany, but instead, following Germany as a whole, it was also divided into sectors allocated to each of the wartime ‘big three’ plus France. When Stalin wanted to express his opposition to Western efforts to aid the economic and political recovery of Germany he responded, in 1948, by laying siege to West Berlin. It survived as a liberal outpost with the utmost difficulty. Whatever the prudent thoughts of later years that the Cold War would have been neater and tidier and therefore more stable if the West had accepted a fait accompli in the face of this pressure, the city’s population was kept fed, clothed and heated until well into 1949 by means of a stupendous allied effort, requiring a massive and unceasing airlift. This made Berlin a source of pride and a sort of prize. It was a Western trophy in the communist heartland, and the foundation for the healing process between the Western democracies and their recent enemy. West Germany, led from its creation until 1963 by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, accepted its dependence upon its new-found allies in NATO. It was well aware of the hostility of Moscow, and the sheer weight of military power that faced it from across the inner-German border. It relied upon the allies, and in particular nuclear deterrence as provided by the United States, to keep this power at bay. Adenauer found the dependence uncomfortable. It was not hard to imagine how Germany might be let down. Instead of resisting a Soviet-led invasion on the border the allies might be tempted to conduct a strategic retreat, so that Germany would provide a battleground and see its own society trampled underfoot by warring armies. Hence the insistence in NATO planning on Forward Defence, so there could be no doubt that not a metre of West German territory was to be conceded. If push really came to shove it was still hard to be confident that the allies would accept the risk of facing

4 The Berlin Wall Crisis

a nuclear catastrophe in order to defend Germany. And with such thoughts in the back of their minds, could Western political leaders, especially such conciliators (in German eyes) as Harold Macmillan of Britain and Kennedy of the United States, be tempted to reach a deal with Khrushchev at Germany’s expense. At one level this was unthinkable. Gloomy as they were over the predicament in which they found themselves because of Berlin, and irritated as they were by Adenauer’s incessant demands for reassurance that no sell-out was planned, neither London or Washington accepted that they could concede any part of West Germany or West Berlin in battle or through negotiation. The difficulty was that the position they were supposed to defend was not so straightforward. They had also been asked to sign up to Bonn’s view that no long-term position other than unification of all Germany could be accepted, and that allied rights in East Berlin must be preserved, if only as an earnest of a refusal to accept the de facto post-World War II settlement. To the Soviet Union the status quo of a divided Germany was as good an arrangement as likely to be found in the context of the Cold War, and as good a guarantee as was available that it was unlikely to break out of the flimsy post-war constraints and indulge in another bout of aggressive activity, directed as before in Russia’s direction. In public the West refused to sign up to a permanent division, thereby raising the spectre of the marriage between German militarism and American imperialism that provided the staple imagery for propagandists. In practice the West was more satisfied with the status quo than could be officially admitted. Even Adenauer was not interested in early unification, which he saw as threatening the electoral position of his Christian Democrats. He clung to the objective of unification as a means of selling to his countrymen the attachment to the West, although that must in the first instance accentuate the division and rule out a united but neutralist option. Adenauer did not see neutralisation as an option: Germany would be left at the mercy of well-armed neighbours. By opting for the West he had been able to set in motion the process of rehabilitation, including rearmament which was authorised under the 1954 Paris agreements, albeit with safeguards which were meant to be taken seriously. This certainly had the polarising effect feared. An exaggerated prospect of German revanchism was used to scare the Soviet satellite countries into an artificial solidarity. The Warsaw Pact was itself set up as a notional response to German rearmament. The instability in the situation, however, stemmed not from West Germany’s aspirations, nor really from anxieties about these aspirations

Berlin and the Cold War

5

in Central and Eastern Europe. It stemmed from the weak ideological hold the communist parties had on popular opinion, and the consequent necessity to maintain order by means of the full apparatus of repression. As Hungary demonstrated in 1956, local repression could always be backed up by Soviet tanks, but by and large the local effort, supplemented on occasion by the odd concession, sufficed. The state socialist system had been imposed on the ‘liberated’ countries of Central and Eastern Europe because Stalin wanted an ideological as well as physical buffer. Stalin could not allow any of the satellite states to develop distinctive forms of socialism because that would cast doubt on the validity of his own model. Vanguard parties had to lead, because the links these parties had to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provided an essential instrument of control. Only Tito in Yugoslavia, who had his own political base as a result of leading the partisans during the German occupation, was able to resist Stalin’s dominance. By the late 1950s communist parties had been marginalised in western countries, with the ideological stuffing knocked out of them by Khrushchev’s 1956 denunciations of Stalinism. The basic source of instability in Europe was the illegitimate and therefore frail Soviet hold over its European satellites. The repressive apparatus was sufficiently robust and intimidating to keep the lid on popular disaffection. Only in Berlin did this fail, because only in Berlin was there a semblance of a choice. By the start of the 1960s people were transferring in large numbers from East to West in search of a better life. This might have been considered a useful safety valve. The malcontents and troublemakers could be let go, but this risked including the bulk of the educated, professional work force. This was not the only source of tension in the Berlin situation – the fact that the city had the highest density of spies per square metre was another – but until the Wall went up in August 1961 it provided the major motor to the crisis, a proposition underlined by the fact that the crisis subsided following the Wall, albeit not immediately. In the run up to the Wall’s construction the gathering sense of crisis stimulated an even larger flow of refugees, and helped to bring the crisis to a head. So while Khrushchev was happy with the status quo as far as a divided Germany was concerned he was extremely unhappy with the status quo in Berlin. It allowed a Western showcase into the heart of communist territory, and it became even more of a showcase as West Berliners’ lifestyles were heavily subsided to persuade them to stay in the city and not migrate back into West Germany proper for a less isolated and fraught existence. Garrisons of British, French and American troops were

6 The Berlin Wall Crisis

also permitted and rights for these countries to roam around East Berlin. It was the garrisons that provided the basis for the autobahn and air corridors from West Germany to Berlin. Whether the allies ever really believed they had obligations to the people of East Berlin was another matter – Khrushchev eventually correctly gambled that they did not – but so long as the showcase and the garrison were in place, then Berlin would be a source of insecurity for all communist regimes.

Western attitudes to the Berlin question From the Western point of view the ideological advantages provided by the sustenance of West Berlin were not matched on the military side. Located well into East Germany territory, in strict terms it was not defensible by NATO. If the East Germans and the Soviet Union decided to squeeze Berlin they could do so. The occupying powers – Britain, France and the United States – could respond, but only at the risk of escalation. Somehow they had to convince Moscow that if their units were overwhelmed then a nuclear riposte was a possibility. So the Warsaw Pact was much better placed for a military showdown. The East’s position had improved since the days of the airlift: now more aggressive measures could be taken against aircraft making use of the air corridors. Furthermore, the backdrop to the 1958–61 crisis was an apparent Soviet confidence that the ‘correlation of forces’ was shifting decisively in its favour. The first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test and the first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik I, in 1957 undoubtedly gave Moscow a public relations boost and caused a crisis in self-confidence in the United States. This was the era of the ‘missile gap’ with Khrushchev egging on alarmist generals, senators and pundits in the West with his talk of missiles coming off the Soviet production lines like sausages. There was doubt for the first time as to whether the capitalist system was inherently more innovative and technologically advanced than the communist. The key strategic issue was whether it would also give Moscow a sufficiently material military boost so that it could force the pace in a crisis. President Eisenhower was dubious that the Soviet position was as good as Khrushchev and American alarmists claimed, and he made the political judgement that Khrushchev did not want war, especially on behalf of Germany. He held to this view when the Soviet leader upped the ante with his ultimatum in 1958, and he refused to show any sign of uncertainty or hesitation when it came to sticking up for the established Western position on Berlin and the German question. History has

Berlin and the Cold War

7

treated his judgement more kindly than did contemporary opinion. Contrary to the fears of the missile gap proponents, who saw this as a time of great strategic peril, mutual deterrence was working. Minds were concentrated less by the faint prospect of a nuclear victory than the likely consequences of any nuclear war, almost irrespective of how it began and finished. One of the most important critics of Eisenhower’s sanguinity was Dean Acheson, who had been Harry Truman’s Secretary of State during the formative years of the Cold War. He had taken the view then that over the longer term (which he hoped to extend through the development of the ‘hydrogen’ bomb) nuclear weapons could not work to the West’s strategic advantage because of the ease with which they could be neutralised. Acheson advocated instead the build up of conventional forces to match those of the communists. This was the message of his most famous publication – NSC 68 – which in 1950 operationalised containment in military as well as political terms. Eisenhower had balked at the cost of the rearmament required by NSC 68 and authorised as a result of the Korean War and decided that, at least for the time being, there was more deterrence to be extracted from the nuclear strength of the US. Acheson had seen this as a wasted opportunity and now, as the Kremlin gained the upper hand in the nuclear as well as the conventional field, he was convinced that the balance of power was swinging further away and Khrushchev need only bide his time. In 1961, as he was called upon to advise a new President from the Democratic Party, John Kennedy, he was urging that the balance of power must swing back, and that this required major investment in conventional forces backed by a serious display of courage when it came to contemplating nuclear war. Without this, whenever the Warsaw Pact pushed, NATO was fated to crumble, as the weaker brethren among the allies (and he had the British particularly in mind) would succumb to the first whiff of war. When Khrushchev used his first, and only, summit with Kennedy in June 1961 to revive his Berlin ultimatum, Acheson saw his worst fears being realised and for some weeks he even convinced Kennedy that this was so. His argument, however, had become too fateful. While Eisenhower could stand firm because he did not believe the military ground was slipping from under him, Acheson had managed to create a powerful argument for concessions unless he could identify military measures that could retrieve matters in short order. As geography would always tell against the West in the defence of Berlin, and as the allies could not put on a credible show of nonchalance in the face of nuclear hostilities this was not going to be possible.

8 The Berlin Wall Crisis

At one level concessions were not too hard to find and need not be that controversial. The refusal to formalise the de facto division of Germany and the rest of Europe was perfectly compatible with this geopolitical fact and it was hard to see how anybody was going to go to war to protect something as apparently trivial (certainly when compared with the devastation of Western civilisation) as allied rights in East Berlin. Nor were there profound objections to keeping West Germany nonnuclear, although it would be difficult to find a formula that did not single out Germany as a special case. The problem was that to be able to claim diplomatic progress Khrushchev needed the departure of the garrisons from West Berlin and the unification of the city under East German supervision. Those in the West, and in particular Macmillan and Kennedy, who wanted a deal just to remove this issue from East– West relations, could not go that far and so there was no deal to be done. There was, however, a lot to be talked about, and in the end the 1961 crisis was deflated by Western diplomats demonstrating that they could engage in tedious and non-productive negotiations as stubbornly as their Russian counterparts. Another reason why Khrushchev became more cautious when he failed to intimidate Kennedy into concessions was that by the autumn of 1961 his bluff had been exposed. Informed by a combination of reconnaissance satellites and the spy Oleg Penkovsky, the Americans were happy to report that the missile gap had failed to materialise, except in a reverse sense that they enjoyed a lead in the production and deployment of ICBMs which they intended to extend. One reason why the Soviet leader tried to get medium-range missiles into Cuba the next year was as a quick means to redress the balance, and to provide him with a sufficient propaganda coup so that he might even be able to revive pressure on Kennedy over Berlin. Certainly in October 1962 the president was convinced that the Cuban missile crisis would end in Berlin – the natural response to an American blockade of the Caribbean island was a Russian blockade of this German island.

Conclusion After the Cuban missile crisis, Berlin never loomed as large on the superpower agenda as it had done in the early 1960s. Under Live Oak’s umbrella the key NATO countries continued with contingency planning, although fortunately the fact that the main contingency of a communist attempt to cut the city off never arose, meant that it did not matter too much that the planners and their governments had never managed to

Berlin and the Cold War

9

resolve the difficult issues of principles that would have arisen once an escalatory process began in earnest. With the people of East Berlin trapped they were unable to challenge the communist state by leaving and they knew too much about Soviet attitudes to try an insurrection. With both sides acknowledging that there was no hope of a real military victory in any NATO–Warsaw Pact war, physical force offered no means of changing the balance of political power in Europe. On the surface the Cold War congealed all political relations, providing them with a permanence that they could not have otherwise sustained. Beneath the surface the communist system was in terminal decline, unable to compete in terms of freedom and prosperity with the West. In 1989 the pressure of events in East Germany, as well as the development of an alternative escape route via Hungary into Austria, led to the Wall being breached. This set Germany on its way to being united, confirming Adenauer’s claims to his people that the apparent provocation to the East of alignment to the West would eventually serve their national purpose, and the Soviet empire in Europe was in retreat. Soon the Soviet Union itself would fragment. The Berlin Wall signified the separation of two competing ideological systems. Once one of those systems became drained of legitimacy the separation became pointless.

2 Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62 John Gearson

Early discussions The problem of Berlin had its roots firmly in wartime discussions regarding the future of Germany.1 Memories of the failure of the 1919 peace settlement after World War I and the obviously central role the Soviet Union would play in any agreement coloured British and American discussions on the future of Germany.2 The basic aims, naturally enough, started with the need to contain and prevent renewed German aggression. However, this was qualified in the minds of many by the longstanding fear of a Russo-German alliance as epitomised by the 1922 Rapallo Treaty. Numerous schemes circulated for the post-war order, envisaging a change in the balance of power in Europe, the breakup of German industrial power and the possible dismemberment of Germany. The adoption of the policy of unconditional surrender by the allies in January 1943, during the Casablanca conference, served only to obscure the lack of agreement on post-war policy regarding Germany – the problem had become not what terms to impose on Germany, but how to agree among each other on how to occupy the country. Critically, the British and Americans, preoccupied with the conduct of the war and unable to agree internally, failed to coordinate their policies fully. Churchill promoted a Council of Europe to include American and Soviet membership, while the Americans refused to join anything but a world security organisation. 3 Despite the lack of agreement on policy, discussions on the machinery to administer the occupation of Germany did take place. In October 1943, during meetings in Moscow between the foreign ministers of Britain, the US and the USSR, an European Advisory Commission (EAC) was established to consider the terms for the German surrender. 4 The Tehran summit conference which followed in November, extended 10

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62

11

the EAC’s brief to consider post-war policy towards Germany. The debate was at times as complex between Britain and America as between Russia and the Western allies – a pattern that was to repeat itself in the crises of the 1950s and 1960s. The Free French, whose presence was promoted by the British, were excluded by the Americans and Soviets. 5 On his way to the Tehran meeting, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had addressed himself to the question of possible zones of occupation in Germany. British proposals, developed early in 1943 by a cabinet committee chaired by the British deputy prime minister Clement Attlee, were rejected by him. The Attlee Plan envisaged splitting Germany into three occupation zones with Britain in the north-west, America in the south and the Soviet Union in the East. Berlin was to be administered by a separate regime of joint occupation, although no provision for transit rights was included in the plan. This was probably because the occupation was expected to be definitely temporary, negating the need for such explicit agreements.6 Roosevelt’s objections centred on America being placed in the south. Not only would the British get the industrial heartland of the Ruhr, but he also doubted French stability and was concerned to ensure access to the sea for US forces for their possible dispatch to the Far East after the defeat of Germany. In a meeting with the joint chiefs of staff, he apparently pencilled a map of Germany with his own proposed set of occupation zones, placing Berlin on the frontier between the American and Soviet zones, stating that the United States must have Berlin. 7 At Tehran though, the leaders merely referred the question of Germany and Berlin to the EAC in London and avoided detailed discussion. Later in Cairo, Roosevelt appears to have been convinced by Churchill that Berlin should after all be a special area of tripartite responsibility, but continued to demand the northern part of Germany. 8 The EAC’s long-running deliberations proved inconclusive, however, and failed to produce an agreed allied position on the future of Germany. 9 The EAC did manage to agree on zones of occupation. At the first formal meeting of the Commission on 14 January 1944, the British tabled a paper ‘Military Occupation of Germany’ which proposed the division of Germany into three zones, within the 1937 borders – the intention was that the division should be temporary.10 It was essentially the Attlee Plan and its presentation took the American team by surprise. Roosevelt had taken little interest in the EAC from the start and this hampered the US delegation.11 This may explain his indifference to the London talks, perhaps assuming he could control the EAC discussions when necessary. Thus, American policy-makers, hampered by bureaucratic

12 The Berlin Wall Crisis

in-fighting and a lack of clear lines of responsibility, lost sight of Roosevelt’s objections to the Attlee plan and his demand that ‘the US get Berlin’ – indeed Winant, the US representative, probably had never even heard of the president’s objections. The Americans consequently found themselves ‘bounced’ into an agreement they had done little to formulate.

The quadripartite agreements of 1944 On 18 February 1944, before any considered American objections were formulated, the Russians agreed, without amendment, to the British zones as proposed. In agreeing to the British plan, Fedor Gusev, the Soviet delegate, also proposed detailed arrangements for Berlin to include a ten to fifteen kilometre zone around Berlin to be jointly occupied by the three powers. A crisis now arose within the American government. The US Army, claiming jurisdiction as the body charged with carrying out any occupation, argued the plan was unacceptable and proposed a radically different version be negotiated. One of Winant’s assistants, George Kennan, met Roosevelt in April 1944 to explain that with the USSR and Britain agreed on the proposed zones of occupation, to negotiate a new version (including a substantially smaller Russian zone as proposed by the US Army) would be difficult if not impossible. The president, keen to preserve the wartime alliance with the Soviets, accepted the inevitable and agreed on the division of Germany, but remained preoccupied with securing the northern occupation zone for US forces. The original agreement left blank which Western power would occupy which zone. Western access had at no time been discussed and was assumed to be ‘implied’ in the right to occupy Berlin. The final ‘Protocol on Zones of Occupation’ signed on 12 September 1944, made no reference to access rights. 12 Despite this omission, it remained the basis for the Western presence in Berlin (110 miles inside the Soviet zone) for 44 years. 13 The protocol established an inter-allied governing authority, or Kommandatura, of the three commandants, which would decide on matters affecting Berlin. Decisions were to be unanimous, i.e. each party had a veto, a factor which was to deadlock the entire control machinery when disputes later emerged. Immediately after the signing of the protocol, Winant took it to Quebec, where Churchill and Roosevelt were meeting, in order to secure their agreement on the dispute over their respective zones, specifically who would get the Ruhr. The future of Germany dominated their talks. The need to prevent German militarism plunging the world again into war had yielded some fantastic and

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62

13

ill-conceived ideas, most notably the Morgenthau Plan. This envisaged the pasturalisation of Germany into un-industrialised cantons of simple peasants and was vigorously promoted in Quebec by the president. The fact that a power-vacuum of a magnitude never before seen in Europe would be established at its heart, or the potential obstacles to the de-industrialisation of Europe’s leading pre-war industrial economy, were ignored. The British believed that the plan would lead to economic chaos in Europe and might require Britain to send food to Germany, holding back any European recovery. Churchill reluctantly endorsed the plan (although later withdrew this), getting in exchange Roosevelt’s agreement on Britain retaining northern Germany – but with the US getting Bremen and Bremerhaven. Ironically, and in marked contrast with the question of access to Berlin, the US joint chiefs of staff insisted on iron-clad British guarantees that American access through the British zone would be ensured.14 The Morgenthau Plan meanwhile was dropped soon after the Quebec meeting. An amendment to the EAC Protocol was signed on 14 November 1944 assigning Great Britain the north west zone of Germany and of Berlin, America the southern sectors, and the Russians the Eastern zones. France was later brought into the agreement at the Yalta summit and was allocated its own zone of occupation in Germany (but was taken from parts of the British and American zones only). The French sector of West Berlin was not agreed until the Potsdam conference in 1945 and again was taken from the area already occupied by Britain and America.

Potsdam and after With the rapid allied advance through Western Europe in early 1945 (but after the Yalta summit) questions arose about whether the Attlee proposals were necessarily correct. Despite the collapse of German resistance west of the Rhine in March 1945, it was decided not to race against the Russians for Berlin. Partly this reflected the extent to which a possible Nazi redoubt in the Alps, full of fanatical Werewolf cadres, transfixed American planners until late April 1945. 15 It also demonstrated the tension between military and political objectives in the prosecution of wars. The military had been given considerable freedom in 1945 and on military grounds, the Elbe was decided on as the final objective for allied forces, with Berlin dismissed as a ‘non-military prestige target’, not worth losing a possible 100,000 men for.16 The political importance of the city appeared irrelevant to the allied supreme commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who decided to make the

14 The Berlin Wall Crisis

destruction of the enemy’s forces his objective. In an extraordinary message to Stalin, Eisenhower revealed his intention not to aim for Berlin and disclosed the allied order of battle. 17 Appeals by Churchill to Roosevelt to make Berlin a prime objective were rejected. Eisenhower had made a tactical decision and the president (now gravely ill) backed his choice. Churchill was not only surprised but appalled at this assumption of politico-strategic authority and by the revelation that the Supreme Commander had so little notion of the political importance of Berlin.18 As a result, American troops waited for Russian forces to meet them on the Elbe for two weeks in some cases. In any case, the occupation zones had been agreed on at Yalta and the allies actually withdrew their forces following the German defeat from a number of areas. Therefore, reaching Berlin first would have had little effect, unless the Yalta agreements were abandoned – an unrealistic option. The difference in appreciation between Churchill and Harry S. Truman (who replaced Roosevelt on 12 April 1945) following the defeat of Germany is well documented. 19 The Soviets, who had assumed by far the greatest burden in the defeat of Germany, were, in the minds of the Western public, heroes and allies. Power politics of the sort favoured by Churchill, and soon afterwards practised by Stalin, were not, as yet, to Truman’s taste. Only later did the wartime alliance break down over the question of Eastern Europe as Stalin’s objectives became clearer. The Potsdam conference saw a shift in the balance of power between ‘the big three’ in Stalin’s favour. America was represented by the inexperienced Truman who appeared to mistrust British ambitions almost as much as Soviet ones.20 Furthermore Britain was sidelined, when in the middle of the conference, news came that Churchill had lost the British general election and he left early. During the meeting it was agreed to give equal treatment to all parts of Germany, control it as a single economic unit and to regulate production. However, the control was to be by four separate zones each under its own military governor. Reparations were at the forefront of Soviet and French ambitions, while the British and Americans perceived the need to rebuild Germany. The provinces east of the Oder–Neisse line were turned over to Polish administration pending final determination of Poland’s Western border and East Prussia was split between Poland and Russia. The regions were to be depopulated of their German peoples. The French

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62

15

sector in Berlin was also agreed on at Potsdam, although the Soviets refused an American request that it be made up of territory of all three occupiers. In the end the French were assigned part of the British sector and the Kommandatura became a four-power authority. Despite the semblance of unity over Berlin, the wartime coalition was already beginning to fracture. Western occupation troops were not admitted into the city until the beginning of July 1945 (while, as a reign of terror engulfed Berlin, the Soviets established their own civil organisation) and then only after the Western powers agreed to withdraw entirely from the Soviet designated zone. In a crucial meeting in Berlin held on 29 June 1945, General Lucius Clay and Lieutenant General Sir Ronald Weeks, representing America and Britain respectively, met with Marshall Grigori Zhukov to discuss the matter of access. The Russian, the senior officer, chaired and first got agreement for the withdrawal of allied forces from Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt to take place on 1 July 1945. On access to Berlin significant problems emerged. The Soviets refused to grant Clay’s requests for a number of access routes, restricting the Western allies to one main road, a railway line and two air corridors. As the allocation of these routes was regarded as temporary, the agreement was oral and nothing was signed. Clay later stated that he did not want any agreement in writing that established anything less than unrestricted access. 21 The West’s position in Berlin was thus from the start tenuous and totally at the behest of the Soviets. The only written accord on Western rights of access was agreed by the Allied Control Council on 30 November 1945, in the Air Corridor Agreement. In it three air corridors were assigned to the Western allies: Berlin–Hamburg, Berlin–Hannover, and Berlin–Frankfurtam-Main. This proved crucial when the land routes were blocked in 1948. Berlin, following the end of hostilities, became a microcosm of the breakdown of wartime cooperation in Germany as a whole. In March 1946, attempts by the Communist Party in the Soviet zone of occupation, the SED, to merge with the socialist SPD in Berlin failed after a vote by members overwhelmingly rejected it. Thereafter, moves to hold free city-wide elections in Berlin were resisted by the Soviets, which, when they finally were held in October 1946, saw a massive defeat for the Communists (who accrued only 20 per cent of the vote). When the city council later elected Ernest Reuter mayor, the Soviets vetoed his appointment in the Kommandatura, with the result that city council refused to elect anyone else. For eighteen months he retained the title, but was barred from office by the Soviets.

16 The Berlin Wall Crisis

The Berlin blockade On the general level, cooperation between the wartime allies was breaking down over the question of German economic reconstruction and reparations, and over the post-war order throughout Europe. These continuing disagreements led the Americans and British to announce in September 1946 their intention to merge their zones of occupation into ‘Bizonia’ from 1947 onwards.22 Thereafter, the Truman administration responded vigorously to Soviet attempts to extend their influence. The Truman Doctrine and the more tangible and important Marshall Aid programme announced in June 1947 meant that the temporary division of Germany was unavoidable. Western attempts to revive the German economy were rebuffed by the USSR and a campaign of harassment on the inter-zonal railways was initiated. The harassment culminated on 24 June 1948 with a total blockade of Berlin by the Soviets in response to the currency reform sponsored by the Western powers in West Germany and Berlin, four days before. 23 All the ground access routes were closed by the Soviets – the scene was set for a dramatic showdown. However, neither side wanted directly to risk war through a confrontation on the road to Berlin. Clay (now the American military governor in Germany), acting initially largely on his own authority, organised an airlift of food and supplies from 25 June. The Pentagon urged caution, but Truman backed Clay’s action, although he refused the general’s request to force passage through by road. 24 In a far-reaching policy decision taken at an ad hoc meeting and with little preparation, the president stated that the United States would be staying in Berlin ‘period’. 25 Truman’s firm stand proved effective and the Soviets did not prevent access through the air corridors, contenting themselves with regular harassment. To shoot down American and British aircraft would have been an act of war which the Soviet leader appeared unwilling to make. The atmosphere of crisis heightened when, as a warning to Stalin, Truman despatched B29 heavy bombers capable of attacking the USSR to British bases in July 1948. 26 Crucially, the Soviet Union was not to test its own atomic device until August 1949 and the United States still enjoyed an atomic monopoly during the crisis. The blockade was to last almost 11 months and witnessed the greatest airlift of material the world has ever seen. Two and a-half million Berliners were supplied by the Luftbrücke (air-bridge) at the cost of 79 British and American air crew and German ground staff, killed in accidents. The New York agreement of 5 May 1949, which terminated the

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62

17

blockade, in effect represented acceptance by the Soviets of Western access rights to Berlin. It undertook to restore communications which had existed prior to the Berlin blockade and by implication the German civilian rights of access.

Results of the blockade The blockade underscored the division of Germany and hastened efforts towards the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. 27 In lieu of a constitution, which was to await reunification, a ‘Basic Law’ was proclaimed on 8 May 1949. Overriding German objections, the Western allies objected to Berlin acquiring the status of a separate Land or state, arguing it was an occupied city, thus retaining the legal fiction of a four-power status – the basis of all subsequent Western rights. In the Basic Law, the city is referred to as a Land, but an allied reservation of 13 May 1949 led to the compromise that representatives from Berlin could attend Bundestag (parliamentary) meetings only as observers. Thus, the West Berlin city assembly had to pass all West German laws before they could apply to West Berlin. Bonn was picked as the provisional capital of the new state pending reunification and a return to Berlin. For West Germans, Berlin was to be the custodian of the national future, in practice – the one place where the unfinished business of World War II remained clear. Following the ending of the blockade the West attempted to re-establish the operation of the fourpower Kommandatura but abandoned it when the Soviets made clear that a veto was their price. The blockade, in its way, hastened a number of other developments too. In April, before its end, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, committing America to the defence of Western Europe and, by clear implication, the whole of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to the defence of West Berlin. The ambiguity of Berlin’s position was that while economically and politically, the city relied on the FRG for its survival, its security depended on the protection of the Western allies. In this they were acting not under the NATO agreements (although they would doubtless be invoked in a crisis) but under the wartime agreements with the Soviets establishing four-power status and the right of armed presence in the city. The NATO treaty also committed the new German state to the closest possible alignment with Western policies and it is doubtful whether this would have been agreed so quickly without the pressure of the Berlin blockade.28 The crisis had concentrated minds extraordinarily. Shortly after these developments on 7 October 1949, the German

18 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Democratic Republic (GDR) was proclaimed in Pankow. Berlin was left alone and the division of Germany solidified. Despite the lull following the lifting of the blockade, periodic harassment served to illustrate the continuing vulnerability of the Western presence in Berlin. In May 1952, the East Germans cut telephone links and denied allied access by road for a week. Aircraft were buzzed in the corridor and in 1953, a British bomber was shot down over the Elbe just outside the Hamburg air corridor by a Mig fighter. 29 The number of refugees fleeing the Soviet zone periodically rose and fell but had been steadily high from the establishment of the East German state onwards. Most migrants used Berlin as their escape route. In June of the same year, following the death of Stalin, a building workers’ strike in the eastern sector of Berlin escalated into a popular uprising which was put down by Soviet troops. The Western response was to disclaim any complicity in the uprising. The status quo had apparently been accepted, but the period following Stalin’s death did appear to offer new hope for solution of the German problem. In 1955, the Austrian State Treaty was signed and with the first post-war summit conference in Switzerland, the so-called ‘Spirit of Geneva’ reflected the improved relations. 30 A German settlement seemed possible. At Geneva the leaders directed their foreign ministers to work towards reunification of Germany by free elections in discussions to follow the summit. The hopes were short-lived. In the autumn, the Soviets accorded the DDR full diplomatic recognition and gave them responsibility for all road traffic to and from Berlin, except that of allied forces. There was little the West could do beyond stating that they continued to hold the Soviet Union responsible for the fulfilment of all previous agreements regarding Berlin and refusing to recognise the DDR. Berlin had become something of a liability. Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the FRG, saw the creation of a viable West German state as more pressing than the pursuit of reunification. For this purpose, he worked to identify West Germany totally with the Atlantic alliance. This was to be achieved through the gradual build-up of German economic and military strength to attain equality with the Western alliance. Consequently, there was tendency at times to regard Berlin with apparent indifference and as a purely allied concern. The three Western occupying powers determined to press upon the FRG its responsibilities regarding Berlin and refused to allow the problem to be left entirely to them, but simultaneously denied the West Germans representation in their meetings. In 1950, the Bundestag accepted the FRG’s role in Berlin, which essentially took the form of economic support. Some German

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62

19

statesmen, such as Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the SPD, saw the Berlin blockade as a Soviet attempt to divide Germany, while others such as Reuter, the mayor of Berlin, saw it as part of a plan to conquer the whole of Germany and that the only hope of salvation lay in alliance with the West. These two strands of German opinion preoccupied the FRG’s allies for much of the post-war period.31 Berlin posed a dilemma. It symbolised the Cold War division, but at the same time was a beacon of hope for German reunification. As long as the occupation status for the city remained a fact, the principle of not dividing Germany permanently was kept intact. Not only did many in the West regard such an outcome as a mixed blessing (and one which they could live without), they also perceived the tensions which arose over Berlin as artificial and avoidable. Of particular concern was the vulnerability to interference of the civilian traffic, which was not covered by the wartime agreements. Harold Macmillan repeatedly emphasised this point during the 1958–1961 crisis, arguing that the West would be powerless to prevent such a move and indeed an answer was never forthcoming, but Khrushchev never took the step. These risks were endured because if the West allowed its position in Berlin to be eroded, or worse was forced out it would be apparent to the Germans that the Western alliance had given up all hope of reunification. To present them with this stark admission before the integration of the FRG within Western Europe was irreversible would have threatened a neutral Germany, undermining the entire basis of the post-war Western recovery. So, the cost of paying lip-service to the goal of German reunification was the unstable Berlin situation. At times this cost appeared too great.

Notes 1. For a general history of Berlin in this period see Ann Tusa, The Last Division: Berlin and the Wall (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1996). 2. See Jean E. Smith, The Defense of Berlin (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 3. See D. C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965), pp. 28–52. 4. The work of the EAC and allied discussion at the time are discussed in detail in D. J. Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978). 5. Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (London: Coronet, 1989), p. 21. 6. The boundaries drawn up by the Attlee committee closely resemble those that eventually emerged in central Europe. See Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp. 15–16, and Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp. 29–32.

20 The Berlin Wall Crisis 7. Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp. 16–17. A copy of the National Geographic map on which he pencilled his ideas is reproduced by Smith. 8. Nelson, Wartime Origins, p. 33. When asked to consider the president’s idea for American and British forces zones to be swapped, the military planning staff wondered if it was a joke. A major reason for not changing the zones was that they followed logically from planning for the Overlord landings which had assigned the British the left flank and the US the right. Peter Calvocoressi, Total War, Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1989) p. 562. 9. The representatives were John Winant, the American ambassador in London (US), Fedor Gusev, the Soviet ambassador in London (USSR) and Sir William Strang, later permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office (UK). 10. Edwina Moreton (ed.), Germany Between East and West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88. 11. The president’s method of leadership under his ‘New Deal’ and during the expansion of the government bureaucracy with the onset of war had been to establish numerous, often competing agencies charged with resolving questions. Here his ambitious deputies could debate things before he took a decision. See David Brinkley, Washington Goes to War (New York: Ballantine, 1988). 12. Robert Murphy suggests that Winant, who argued that questioning access arrangements would promote Russian distrust, must accept much of the blame for this omission. He accepts, however, that Roosevelt himself believed it was most important to ensure the Russians trusted the West. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London: Collins, 1964), pp. 283–7. 13. The protocol is reproduced in Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp. 177–8. 14. Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp. 27–8. 15. The Werewolves were armed bands which would operate after the defeat of Germany – it proved to be a propaganda ploy. 16. Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 39, quoting General Omar Bradley. See also Tusa, Berlin Blockade, pp. 37–43. 17. His motive may well have been to avoid clashes between the advancing Russian and American armies and to establish Russo-American cooperation, but Stalin thought the message a trick and hastened his plans to reach Berlin claiming to his commanders that the allies were about to mount an offensive for the city; Calvocoressi, Total War, pp. 563–6. 18. Calvocoressi, Total War, p. 564. 19. Truman’s case is in Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (Bungay: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955). See also John Coleville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, Vol. 2 (London: Sceptre, 1987). 20. The president was also concerned to get Soviet support in the continuing war against Japan. 21. Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City: Doubleday, 1950) p. 26. On the politics of the post-war administration of Germany see Clay (ibid.) and Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors. On the British policy see Anne Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1990). 22. The French, who favoured decentralisation, resisted such a move, but in the summer of 1948 agreed to join their zone with the British and American bizone to form one political and economic unit. Clay, Decision in Germany, Ch. 9.

Origins of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62

21

23. For an account of the blockade see Tusa, Berlin Blockade. 24. The British also objected – General Sir Brian Robertson had told Clay his plan to send a military convoy down the autobahn would lead to war, Peter Hennesey, Never Again: Britain 1945–1951 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992) p. 351. 25. Tusa, Berlin Blockade, p. 206. 26. Although not equipped to carry the atomic bomb. 27. On US policy in this period see Alan Thomas Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (London: Harvard University Press, 1991); and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). 28. Philip Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945–1962 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), p. 128. 29. Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 141. 30. On the tortuous negotiations which led to the Austrian State Treaty see Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle for Austria 1945–1955 (London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 31. Smith, Defense of Berlin, Ch. 8.

3 A Broader Range of Choice? US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises Kori Schake

Introduction The 1958 and 1961 Berlin crises are strikingly similar in their content, although different in their outcome. The Soviet Union issued the same ultimatum: unless the West acknowledged the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union would precipitate recognition by turning over Soviet rights in Berlin to the GDR. This transfer of rights would seem a trifling legality, hardly an issue to go to war over. However, West Germany’s commitment to the West was contingent on the NATO allies refusing to legitimise the long-term division of Germany; the technicalities of four-power agreements on Berlin thus masked the great political issues to which they were tied. In 1958, the Eisenhower Administration believed the Soviet Union was probing Western vulnerabilities in Berlin in order to focus attention on the German problem. Consequently, the focus of Berlin policy making was on finding a diplomatic solution consistent with allied, and particularly German, concerns. The Kennedy Administration did not understand the 1961 crisis in these political terms. They viewed Soviet pressure on Berlin as a military challenge to declining US superiority, and concentrated their efforts on military responses. The Administration began a series of defence improvements and public commentary that exacerbated the instability of the East German regime and raised US–Soviet tensions. They abandoned this confrontational approach in August of 1961 when the Berlin Wall was constructed, opting instead to reduce US–Soviet tensions by supporting the long-term division of Germany. While it is questionable whether the Kennedy Administration, new to office and without Eisenhower’s war fighting credibility, could have succeeded with the Eisenhower approach to Berlin, the stridency with which the Kennedy 22

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 23

Administration approached the crisis exacerbated the problem, both with the Soviet Union and among the Western allies. The US failure to follow through on its hardline approach when the Berlin Wall was built raised serious questions about the practicality of the Kennedy Administration’s new military strategy and the reliability of the US for its European allies.

The Eisenhower Administration President Eisenhower had been six years in office when Soviet Premier Khrushchev issued the November 1958 ultimatum on Berlin. In addition to Eisenhower’s personal experience as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, the Administration had developed a strategy that provides an important context to understanding their choices during the Berlin crisis. Eisenhower ran a structured, cabinetbased Administration. The secretaries of state and defense controlled the respective political and military departments, with the president establishing executive guidance. Strategy was reviewed annually as the first step in building foreign affairs and defence budgets. The Eisenhower strategy had three components that particularly affected the Administration’s choices during the Berlin crisis: first, that while war between the Soviet Union and United States was extremely unlikely, limited war between the USSR and the US was impossible; second, that the political cohesion among the Western allies was the fundamental goal that strategy and the use of force were supposed to achieve; and third, that shared decision making, even to the point of sharing nuclear weapons with America’s allies was critical to maintaining their confidence.1 Eisenhower believed that Soviet nuclear developments would induce a ‘stability of the stalemate’ in which both the US and Soviet Union would refrain from challenging each other’s central security interests. 2 In rejecting the FY 1958 Joint Chiefs of Staff request for increased military spending, Eisenhower said ‘if we do not now have enough military strength to deter the Soviet Union . . . [we] could not be sure that 20 times as much military strength would succeed.’ 3 Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons neutralised the advantages of large land armies, and that ‘a few Marine battalions or Army units’ were sufficient to judge Soviet intentions. Eisenhower simply did not believe that the US and Soviet Union could become involved in a conventional war without it escalating to become a nuclear war. As a result, both US Army forces, and their missions in any war in Europe were significantly reduced. 4

24 The Berlin Wall Crisis

But by 1957, President Eisenhower concluded that the ‘concept of deterrent power has gone as far as it can. In view of this incredible situation, we much have more fresh thinking on how to conduct ourselves.’5 The review concluded that the only real options for warfare in the nuclear age were the existing strategy and more than doubling current conventional forces in order to avoid nuclear weapons use. President Eisenhower rejected that option on fiscal grounds, but that rejection is also consistent with his often expressed view that it was wrong for an American president to commit US military forces to wars since the country was not committed enough to use nuclear weapons in order to reduce casualties and insure victory. 6 Military strategy was, for Eisenhower, a function of the political interests engaged rather than the military means employed; and given all that the US had at stake in Europe, any war there with the Soviet Union would not remain limited. 7 Eisenhower policies considered the security of NATO allies genuinely indivisible from America’s. Their national security strategy, NSC 5501, stated that ‘in the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks in defence of its security.’ 8 And President Eisenhower was himself ‘clear in his own mind that in any war with Soviets we would use nuclear weapons’. 9 As a result, there was no role for flexible uses of force in European contingencies where US political interests were so heavily engaged. Secretary Dulles alone in the Administration opposed nuclear weapons being integral to US military operations, on the basis that allies would not support their use. 10 The Eisenhower Administration gave Germany a veto over any US positions on German unification, conventional force limits and recognition of the GDR, and was deploying nuclear weapons with German units. A set of American policies, or even a successful military campaign that would cost the US its European allies a strategic defeat, because the political purpose of fighting in Europe was to ensure ‘the voluntary alignment of our allies’. 11 The central concern about Europe in the Eisenhower Administration was that America’s European allies – and particularly Germany – would chose neutrality, which, given Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, would result in an intimidated Western Europe. 12 Eisenhower and Dulles worried that Western European states were losing their willingness to make the difficult decisions and domestic sacrifices associated with resisting Soviet domination.13

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 25

The US was prohibited by law from sharing nuclear weapons information with any country except Britain. President Eisenhower was nonetheless ‘willing to give, to all intents and purposes, control of the weapons. We retain titular possession only.’14 In response to concerns about proliferation, Eisenhower replied ‘for God’s sake let us not be stingy with an ally . . . instead of being generous, we treat many of our NATO allies like stepchildren, and then we expect them to turn around and commit themselves to fight with us. By such actions we cut our own throats.’ 15 In July of 1957, the Administration proposed establishing a NATO force of medium-range ballistic missiles under SACEUR’s authority (in order to skirt McMahon Act restrictions). NATO strategy at the inception of the 1958 Berlin crisis was an alliance version of the Eisenhower New Look: significant conventional forces, nuclear weapons used integrally with conventional forces, and rapid escalation to general war. Military Committee 14/2 (the guiding NATO document) was a strategy intended to deter conflict, foster political cohesion, and limit the financial costs of Western defence (by relying on nuclear rather than conventional forces). MC 14/2 reinforced allied cohesion by having all allies, including the US, bear the burden of early damage to their territories. It was a strategy with the political purpose of making European defence inseparable from that of the US. The main lines of tension in NATO about strategy were between Britain and Germany. The British government had a fiscally-driven preference for reducing to a ‘trip wire’ of conventional forces before escalating to nuclear war. The German government wanted large NATO conventional forces, to deter a Soviet attack, defend as far forward in German territory as possible, and reduce European concerns about German military forces. 16 Eisenhower rejected the trip wire strategy, although it was the logical conclusion of his own thinking in the New Look, because of its ‘effect on Germany and our friend Adenauer’.17 The Supreme Allied Commander, General Norstad, built on the strengths of MC 14/2 and ameliorated its weaknesses by establishing an operational ‘pause’ in military responses to localised incidents before escalation to general war. Norstad’s pause was intended to give room for more flexible uses of military forces. It allowed a means to help the NATO political leadership judge Soviet intentions, and prevent miscalculations over local incidents from escalating to general war. It continued the Eisenhower Administration’s practice of planning for nuclear use in the initial stage of conflict, but limited nuclear use to circumstances in which NATO conventional forces were being defeated. Norstad’s amendments

26 The Berlin Wall Crisis

to the NATO strategy in 1957–59 were the initial steps toward a strategy of flexible response. The 1958 crisis The Soviet ultimatum in November of 1958 called on the Potsdam Treaty signatories to ‘liquidate the occupation regime’ in Berlin by concluding a peace treaty with the two German states within six months.18 President Eisenhower judged that ‘the Soviets are engaged in confronting the US with a series of crises . . . Berlin must not throw us off balance and render us hysterical. We are going to live with this type of crisis for years.’19 The Administration believed that Soviet objectives in provoking a crisis were to force de facto recognition of the GDR, and encroach just enough on Western rights that the Western allies would themselves narrow the scope of their activity out of concern for the possibility of war.20 The president, Secretary of Defence McElroy, and the Director of Central Intelligence all expressed the view that the Soviets would turn over their four-power rights to the GDR, but would prevent the GDR from provoking the West into military action.21 The Eisenhower Administration’s position was ‘based on the premise that we will not move an inch from our rights . . . the status quo must stand and be recognized.’ 22 It refused any dealings with GDR representatives. However, the Administration was also careful to give the Soviets a way out of the crisis: they did not threaten the Soviets in public, and also offered negotiations over the status of Berlin, although the president considered the prospects for a solution ‘very slight’. In response to Congressional concerns about proceeding with planned reductions in US military forces, ‘the President answered nothing is needed. A mobilization would probably provide us two or three more divisions with which to counter the Soviet force of 175. This makes no sense. He expressed the conviction that the actual decision to all-out war will not come, but if it does come, we must have the crust to follow through.’23 Four days after the initial ultimatum, the Soviet military detained a US Army convoy, refusing passage until they inspected the vehicles. General Norstad requested authority to begin military operations based on contingency plans previously approved by Britain, France, and the US. The plans called for dispatching a second convoy; if it too were detained, Norstad proposed to ‘extricate US military personnel and equipment by the minimum force necessary’.24 The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend sending a division-sized convoy to Berlin to break the initial convoy free. Secretary Dulles opposed the JCS plan, arguing that

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 27

a graduated political escalation would be required to build public support before a provocative Western challenge should be attempted. President Eisenhower opposed the JCS recommendation on the basis that a division was too small to be victorious against local Soviet and GDR forces, insufficient to keep the corridor open, but large enough to be viewed as an aggressive move by the West. He argued instead for escalating political moves in which ‘gradual increasing of pressure such as withdrawal of Ambassadors, breaking of relations, issuing an ultimatum, etc. before major military action is resorted to’.25 Only then would a political and military basis have been laid for coalition war. Eisenhower denied both the CINCEUR and JCS requests to escalate pressure on the Soviets by using larger conventional units. He simply did not believe that an expanded range of conventional military options produced a broader range of political choice. The fundamental choice was whether to go to war once it had been determined through political means that was the Soviet intention. The Eisenhower Administration’s policy for building consensus among the NATO allies, which also served as guidance to military commanders about Berlin, contained sequential politico-military components: (1) refuse to accept GDR forces as ‘agents’ of the Soviet Union; (2) initiate quiet military preparations detectable by the Soviet Union; (3) upon receipt of presidential approval, send a small convoy along the autobahn with instructions to fire only if fired upon; (4) suspend all transit in the corridors if the convoy were detained, alert the United Nations Security Council, initiate more consequential and visible military preparations, and evacuate military dependents from Berlin and Germany; (5) seek governmental approval for any additional use of force; and (6) invite the Soviets to a four-power meeting on German issues.26 As a military plan, it contained a critical flaw: it contained no guidance on what to do if Western forces were detained but not fired upon. It was a plan for military stalemate, with action directed into diplomatic channels. The Western powers differed on the three main issues raised by the Soviet ultimatum: the degree to which the West should legitimise the GDR, how to respond to harassment of Western rights in Berlin, and the timing of Western military action. The US position deferred to West Germany’s, on the basis that ‘in the last analysis the German position must necessarily be determining since it is basically the German future that is at stake’.27 In responding to the Soviet ultimatum, the Eisenhower Administration coordinated a unified response from the British, French and US governments that denied the Soviets could unilaterally divest them of their rights in Berlin and reaffirmed their determination

28 The Berlin Wall Crisis

not to abandon the city. 28 Two days later, the Eisenhower Administration orchestrated endorsement of the position by all NATO allies, committing all of them to support any military action taken in Berlin as a NATO war. 29 Having determined not to give up any Western rights in Berlin, allowed Germany to set the parameters for using force, and secured NATO consensus, the Eisenhower Administration’s approach to the crisis was in place. On 10 January 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev withdrew the deadline for action on Berlin. Negotiating Berlin Negotiations on a German treaty convened in May of 1959, but made little progress. Khrushchev ‘made clear that nothing would satisfy him that failed to perpetuate the division of Germany’.30 The Western plan proposed unifying Germany through elections, taking measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe (after the expected withdrawal of Soviet troops from a unified Germany), reducing military forces worldwide, and initiating a transition from four-power to German authority in Berlin. 31 Soviet Premier Khrushchev dismissed the plan as lacking ‘a single element suited for negotiations’.32 The foreign ministers’ meeting dragged on for six weeks with no appreciable progress, was adjourned for almost a month and then reconvened for another four weeks. During the stalemate, President Eisenhower encouraged his Cabinet to broaden the scope of Western proposals and develop new subjects for negotiation that would not be viewed as concessions on Berlin. He suggested as possibilities removing intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) missiles from NATO’s flanks once technological advances eliminated the need for their forward stationing, limits on Western intelligence activities in Berlin, and even making Berlin a UN protectorate, if protections could be found to ensure Berlin’s links to the FRG. But Eisenhower insisted that the limit of US flexibility also be clearly communicated; he said ‘we cannot and will not abandon two million West Berliners or the West Germans . . . he was ready to negotiate on any subject, but had to make it very clear that we would not let down our friends.’33 When it was clear no agreement would be reached on a broad settlement, out of concern that Western unity would not hold if the conference produced no agreement at all, the US proposed an interim settlement on Berlin. The interim agreement would last two and a-half years, during which time Western rights in Berlin would be maintained, Western troops would be limited at the current 11,000 level, the West would agree not to station nuclear weapons in Berlin, Soviet troops would be

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 29

withdrawn, and Western powers would allow GDR personnel to serve as ‘agents’ of the Soviet Union in the conduct of four-power responsibilities.34 East–West differences (or, at least, US–Soviet differences) over Germany were so fundamental that there was no basis for agreement. The conference finally ended when President Eisenhower invited Premier Khrushchev to the US for informal discussions. During Vice-President Nixon’s July 1959 trip to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev expressed a willingness to ‘slow this question down’ if the West would ‘tell Adenauer’ to negotiate with the East Germans. For Eisenhower, forcing the West German government into direct negotiations with the GDR or leaving them to secure a deal without Western support would sacrifice the political goal of post-war Europe – the voluntary Western orientation of the Federal Republic. Prior to the Camp David summit, Eisenhower set the parameters of the US position as ‘what can be done that Adenauer will accept’. 35 At Camp David, Eisenhower told Khrushchev that ‘the Berlin question was a symbolic one, irritating to the Soviets and unpleasant for us. The Soviet threat to take unilateral action had brought about a serious crisis . . . [but] we cannot abandon those responsibilities until there is an acceptable settlement.’ Khrushchev assured Eisenhower that the Soviets would not take unilateral action and retracted any time limit associated with a German settlement, claiming ‘the two sides had understood differently the Soviet initiative in Berlin last November. The US had mistakenly thought Khrushchev was delivering an ultimatum.’36 In return for these concessions, Eisenhower agreed to continue negotiations on Berlin and hold a four-power summit about broader German issues. The 1960 Paris Summit proved spectacular because of the U-2 spy plane revelations, but with the diminution of Soviet pressure on the German issue, there was no longer much urgency to the Berlin crisis.

The Kennedy Administration The 1961 Berlin crisis is generally perceived to be more dramatic and dangerous than its 1958 predecessor. The Kennedy Administration was more inclined than its predecessor to consider East–West disagreement over Berlin a crisis: President Kennedy gave a grim speech to the nation about preparing for war and embarked on a $3.4 billion military build-up in the summer of 1961; refugee flow into Berlin reached a thousand people per day; the GDR constructed a wall encircling West Berlin; and US and Soviet forces had a dramatic confrontation at a military checkpoint in Berlin.

30 The Berlin Wall Crisis

The basic facts of the situation in 1961 were not essentially different from those faced by the Eisenhower Administration in 1958, however. Premier Khrushchev threatened to grant the Soviet Union’s rights under the four-power agreements to the GDR unless the West agreed to a treaty codifying the existence of two German states. There had been no substantial change in Soviet military capabilities; although the Kennedy Administration had campaigned on a ‘missile gap’ threatening the US, intelligence briefings to the new Administration had demonstrated it to be an unprovable claim. Governments in the UK, France, West Germany, East Germany and the Soviet Union did not change leadership. In a situation so similar in its basic parameters, the Kennedy Administration made very different policy choices than had the Eisenhower Administration. This difference, more than anything else, accounts for the very different course of events in the 1961 Berlin crisis. Both during and after the election, the Kennedy Administration caricatured the Eisenhower strategy as indiscriminate large-scale nuclear use. Candidate Kennedy attacked the complacency of such an approach, saying ‘the notion that the Free World can be protected simply by the threat of “massive retaliation” is no longer tenable’.37 In the spring of 1961, the Kennedy Administration submitted to Congress requests for $4 billion in defence spending for fiscal year 1961 to supplement the Eisenhower budget. The central security concern of the Kennedy Administration was conflict prevention, and, in particular, ‘to prevent direct confrontations between Russian and American power in the chaotic time ahead’.38 Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson led reviews of NATO policy and Berlin, and his opinions on European policies were uncontested in the first seven months of the Kennedy Administration.39 Acheson’s report on NATO focused primarily on issues of strategy and nuclear weapons. The report reflected Acheson’s concern that the Eisenhower Administration had neglected conventional forces and strategies, relying too heavily on the threat of nuclear war. The report recommended NATO countries spend an additional $25 billion more than programmed spending levels in order to extend the conventional phase of conflict before requiring nuclear weapons use. 40 The Acheson report also recommended retracting the Eisenhower Administration’s 1957 programme to create a NATO medium-range missile force under SACEUR’s authority, justified on three bases: its expense would siphon funds away from conventional forces, the vulnerability of forward based missiles, and the need to centralise nuclear decision making.41 To balance the rescission of nuclear sharing in NATO

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 31

and prevent development of national nuclear forces by France or Germany, Acheson advocated allowing a restricted group of NATO countries to develop NATO guidelines for nuclear use. In a speech to the Canadian Parliament, President Kennedy outlined a NATO policy based on the Acheson approach. It introduced an idea for a NATO nuclear force intended to redress Acheson’s concerns: a sea-based NATO nuclear force would be considered – once allies met their conventional force levels.42 The speech’s extortionate suggestion that the US would withhold nuclear capabilities, deemed essential by Europeans for their defence – until the allies met US standards of performance in conventional forces was not well received among America’s NATO allies. The 1961 Berlin Wall crisis Acheson’s report on Berlin advised that ‘All courses of action are dangerous and unpromising. Inaction is even worse. We are faced with a “Hobson’s choice.” If a crisis is provoked a bold and dangerous course may be safest . . . there is no “solution” for the Berlin problem short of the unification of Germany.’43 Acheson’s report on Berlin argued that the Soviets would provoke a crisis in Berlin to take advantage of US conventional force inadequacies and humiliate the new Administration. Neither the State Department nor the CIA supported the Acheson assessment on Berlin; the US ambassador in Moscow, Llewelyn Thompson, expressed particular concern about the Administration overestimating the importance of Soviet military capabilities and emphasising military rather than political solutions to Soviet challenges.44 The CIA described the Soviet approach as a policy of limited risks, in which they were using military threats in order to secure their political objectives, but would not go to war.45 However, neither CIA nor State was central to policy making on Berlin; the White House advisers and DOD were the architects of Kennedy Administration thinking, and they supported Acheson’s view. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy endorsed the Acheson report, urging the president that ‘Berlin is no place for compromise and our general friendliness and eagerness for improvement on many other points really requires strength here in order to be rightly understood.’ 46 The aggressive tone of the Acheson approach and its support in the Administration contrasted with the political compromises President Kennedy sought on Berlin. In late May, support coalesced around a negotiating policy of holding onto access rights to Berlin coupled with a willingness to acknowledge the long-term division of Germany as the

32 The Berlin Wall Crisis

basis for an agreement with the Soviet Union.47 At the Vienna summit, Khrushchev issued to President Kennedy an ultimatum on Berlin virtually identical to that given President Eisenhower in 1958: a six month interim for negotiation of a peace treaty between the two German states and a separate SU–GDR treaty if one were not achieved between the Germanys. President Kennedy responded that ‘the question is not that of a peace treaty with East Germany but rather of other aspects of this proposal which would affect our access to Berlin and our rights there.’48 Khrushchev’s belligerent behaviour at the Vienna summit convinced the president of the Acheson argument. 49 The president delivered a sombre television address to the nation on 6 June about the state of relations with the Soviet Union and the potential for crisis over Berlin, while Secretary of State Rusk delivered a similar message to NATO allies. 50 Dean Acheson began work on an additional set of recommendations to the president about Berlin. The State Department scoured legal accords in an attempt to develop the fresh negotiating position the president wanted. The Defence Department reviewed war plans. Both Senator Fulbright and Congressman Mansfield advocated turning Berlin over to UN authority rather than risk war. Khrushchev further fuelled concern by publicly reiterating his intention to sign a peace treaty by the end of 1961. Ambassador Thompson in Moscow advised the Administration to make no negotiating proposals and take no provocative action until after the September 1961 German elections, out of concern that the Administration would either undercut the Adenauer government or frighten the Germans into negotiating directly with the Soviets about German unification.51 However, President Kennedy and his closest advisers were instead persuaded by the militant approach of the Acheson report on Berlin. Acheson argued that ‘only by winning the test of will can we change the Soviets’ purpose’, and that only a dramatic build-up of conventional forces would reinvigorate the credibility of America’s deterrent. The report advocated a two-tiered military build-up of near-term measures specific to Berlin coupled with a longer-term sustained increase in US forces. The near-term programme included military preparations to increase conventional and nuclear force readiness, enable naval countermeasures to a Soviet blockade of Berlin, declaration of a national emergency and a call up of Guard and Reserve forces. Should the Soviets blockade Berlin, it recommended corresponding American blockades of the Baltic, Black Sea and Soviet Pacific Coast, and an airlift for allied military traffic to Berlin. If the airlift were

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 33

interfered with, ‘the Western powers should abandon the air effort and prepare for a large scale use of ground force’. Acheson recommended a battalion-sized probe of autobahn access to Berlin to give ‘the most convincing demonstration of which the West was capable that the Western allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet demands and would use whatever force was necessary’.52 An essential element of the conflict envisioned by Acheson was engagement of Soviet, rather than just GDR forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that a Western conventional force of seven divisions and four air wings would overpower GDR forces and require the Soviets to intervene.53 In terms of a political settlement, the Acheson report on Berlin favoured making Berlin a ‘free city’, but Acheson thought that could not be offered with the Soviet ultimatum in force, because it would cause ‘a political crisis within the Western Alliance’. Acheson recommended accepting the substitution of GDR personnel for Soviets without a formal recognition of GDR authority. The Acheson report considered efforts since 1958 to prevent Soviet pressure on Berlin as ‘fairly successful’, which the report attributed to ‘Soviet doubt that they could take their threatened unilateral action without precipitating a major crisis involving the risk of war’. However, none of Acheson’s reports even attempts to explain why the US position would no longer be credible in 1961, nor provide evidence that the Soviet assessment had changed. And no one in the Kennedy Administration’s decision making circle challenged Acheson to prove his case or questioned adopting a confrontational Berlin policy so at odds with the Administration’s paramount security objectives of preventing conflict with the Soviet Union. The report’s assumption that Soviet confidence in their military power was leading to adventurism and its policy prescription that a conventional military build-up was the only currency that would change Soviet thinking was accepted. The president’s only comment during the NSC review was to express some concern about the prospect of reciprocal Soviet force improvements. In contrast to the degree of emphasis in Administration planning for military measures, the president was primarily concerned with Acheson’s recommendations on the Western negotiating position. President Kennedy clearly wanted to negotiate Berlin off the East–West agenda and viewed Western support for German unification, and the deference given to German government positions, as the impediments to successful negotiations. President Kennedy asked ‘whether really it was to our advantage to press the argument for unification’, since it had little public appeal. US support for German unification, ended with almost no debate. 54

34 The Berlin Wall Crisis

The SACEUR was instructed to plan for up to twelve divisions in ‘large-scale non-nuclear action’ over Berlin. 55 Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara wanted ‘to raise substantially the level of non-nuclear force which is applied, and to broaden the range of alternative ways to use it’. General Norstad was also instructed that ‘firm commitments to execute these plans must be made on the part of all governments concerned’. 56 DOD concluded that the conventional options would be ‘effective in demonstrating that we are deadly serious in our resolve to fight a limited war for limited objectives in Europe’. 57 It was only after the 13 July NSC meeting that concern about the Acheson approach caused second thoughts among the Kennedy team. White House Adviser Henry Kissinger argued against the more dramatic measures, as President Eisenhower had against similar proposals in 1958, on the basis that they gave the Soviets a psychological advantage and relied too heavily on conventional rather than nuclear forces. Kissinger, McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor, Theodore Sorensen, and Henry Owen all argued against declaration of a national emergency and for long-term, general improvements in US conventional forces rather than short-term measures related specifically to Berlin. They argued that such a provocative approach would ‘engage Khrushchev’s prestige to a point where he felt he could not back down’ and create the perception of a ‘trigger-happy’ US that would diminish allied support. 58 On 19 July, the president approved the approach to Berlin outlined in the Acheson Berlin report, minus the declaration of a national emergency. Because of the Soviet threat to Berlin, President Kennedy requested a third defence supplemental funding request for fiscal year 1961 of $3.2 billion to send six additional US Army divisions to Europe by the end of 1961, additional fighter aircraft and transport squadrons, anti-submarine and other naval activity, and a 50 per cent increase in the alert rate for strategic bombers. The president also asked Congress for stand-by authority to call up reserves and triple draft calls.59 Because the Administration had conceded the long-term division of Germany, it determined that ‘neither the peace treaty nor the substitution of East Germans for Russians along the Autobahn is a fighting matter’. The policy advocated extending ‘serious feelers to the Soviets with respect to the elements of an eventual settlement of the crisis’ and insisting only on Western rights in West – as opposed to all of – Berlin. 60 The programme of military improvements coupled with an offer to negotiate East–West differences was announced by President Kennedy in an address to the nation on 25 July. 61

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 35

The GDR sealed the East Berlin border on 13 August, proceeding to construct a concrete wall on 19 August. While from an historical perspective, building the Wall seems to have shored up the GDR regime and the crisis declined from that point, contemporaneously the Kennedy Administration believed the Wall constituted the beginning, not the end, of the crisis. 62 The Administration responded by avoiding any action that could provoke the Soviets or East Germans: a US protest over construction of the Wall was not dispatched until four days later and explicitly termed the Wall a GDR matter, since neither West Berlin nor allied traffic had been disrupted. On 14 August, the Kennedy Administration initiated negotiations with the Soviets over the status of Berlin. While acknowledging that ‘there may be some Allied worry about our “reliability”’, the Kennedy Administration also adopted the position that the West Germans should negotiate with the GDR on access to Berlin and considered formal recognition of the GDR as a means of defusing the crisis. 63 When tested, the militancy of the Acheson approach and the Kennedy Administration’s carefully calibrated strategy of military escalation were both abandoned in an effort to prevent conflict by means of diplomatic concession. In an effort to stem the allied crisis of confidence that was evidenced most poignantly in Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt’s 16 August public letter to President Kennedy, the Administration dispatched Vice-President Johnson, General Lucius Clay (the hero of the 1948 Berlin airlift), and a large battle group to Berlin. US policy became erratic, as General Clay took a confrontational approach whenever he was able. When the GDR blocked ground access to the Western enclave of Steinstuecken, residents were airlifted in and out of their homes rather than challenge East German forces. Yet when GDR officials required an American embassy employee to show identification when crossing into East Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie, General Clay brought tanks forward to escort the official, resulting in a several days’ standoff before (as agreed by President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev through back-channel communications) the Soviets withdrew. The Berlin wall crisis convinced President Kennedy of the need to solve the Berlin problem, and that America’s European allies were preventing a diplomatic breakthrough. While the opposition of NATO allies did not previously appear to influence Kennedy administration policies on Berlin, on 21 August President Kennedy wrote to Secretary of State Rusk:

36 The Berlin Wall Crisis

I no longer believe that satisfactory progress can be made by Four Power discussion alone. I think we should promptly work toward a strong US position in both areas and should make is clear that we cannot accept a veto from any other power . . . we should this week make it plain to our three Allies that this is what we mean to do and that they must come along or stay behind. 64 By early September, the Kennedy Administration was reconsidering the conventional force build-up (which had disappointing allied diplomatic support and no evident force improvements), considering submitting the Berlin problem to the World Court for adjudication, transferring West Berlin to United Nations protection, and creating an international authority to monitor access to Berlin. 65 The Soviet response was so disappointing that McGeorge Bundy later said President Kennedy regretted pushing America’s allies to accept positions the Soviet Union would not. Military planning for Berlin continued through the fall of 1961, even though the crisis itself subsided. The Administration developed a policy on military actions for Berlin (NSAM 109) that consisted of ‘a sequence of graduated responses’ and ‘readiness to fight with significant nonnuclear forces’ and instructed the SACEUR to implement it in NATO. 66 In addition to concerns about the controllability of escalation, precision of signalling, and establishment of a fire-break between conventional and nuclear warfare inherent in the Kennedy Administration’s approach to Berlin, General Norstad argued against the new strategy on the basis that: We must keep in mind the fact that our NATO strategy must be generally acceptable to our allies if they are to have either the will to face up to possible military operations or the inclination to build up their forces . . . any policy which might appear to suggest trading large areas of Europe for time in which to seek to avoid the spread of war to the US or which appears to deny the use of capabilities and weapons which might divert or destroy the Soviet threat to European lives and territory, will have hard going. 67 When the Administration sent a briefing team to outline the new US approach, NATO allies voiced such similar concerns that Henry Kissinger accused General Norstad of attempting ‘to sabotage any dramatic change in strategic planning’.68 Despite their concurrence with allied sentiment, General Norstad’s views were formally refuted by the president

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 37

and the secretaries of state and defence on 5 December. 69 Secretary of Defence McNamara presented US plans for moving NATO from its nuclear dependence to an expanded range of conventional options at the May 1962 NATO North Atlantic Council meeting, but the allies refused to support them.70 The Kennedy Administration was unable to gain allied support for a common approach to Berlin until September 1962, more than a year after the Berlin Wall was constructed; and that common position did not address the questions of when and how to employ nuclear weapons or the duration of conventional operations before crossing the nuclear threshold. 71 The strategy of flexible response was not approved by NATO for nearly five more years, and France chose to leave NATO’s military wing rather than adopt it.

Conclusion The Eisenhower Administration’s approach to Berlin was predicated on a willingness to choose war in order to preserve Germany’s freedom of choice on terms for agreement on Berlin and the broader German issues. President Eisenhower committed the United States and the NATO allies to resist by force any Soviet attempt to interfere with the status quo. Eisenhower never appeared to have considered that Khrushchev would not find that threat credible. And, in fact, nothing about the 1958 Berlin crisis indicates that it was not credible to Khrushchev: the Soviet Union allowed deadlines to lapse four separate times without turning its rights over to the GDR.72 Elaborate planning efforts were undertaken in the political realm to lock up NATO support and explore avenues for progress with the Soviets that the West German government might support. By contrast, relatively little was done in the military sphere once existing plans had been reviewed. Eisenhower simply believed that there was little range of choice once force was used and the US and Soviet Union were at war. In the 1961 crisis the Kennedy Administration had retreated from the political objectives that had guided Berlin policy for at least a decade, and had done so under threat. The Acheson approach had collapsed; rather than meeting a Soviet challenge with military means, the Administration’s efforts were focused on preventing conflict with the Soviet Union. The promise of Secretary McNamara and other key advisers that ‘reinforcement of NATO’s non-nuclear capability would serve to broaden the choice of response’ did not materialise during the Berlin crisis. 73 The expanded range of conventional force options did not translate into an expanded range of political choices. The Administration’s rapid retreat

38 The Berlin Wall Crisis

from the Acheson line was even more pronounced because President Kennedy had build up European expectations that the US would counter any challenge with military force. The diminution in Western solidarity that resulted from the 1961 Berlin crisis was less a function of what the Kennedy Administration did during the zenith of the crisis than from the difference between the assertive military actions by the US in the two months preceding the Wall and their timidity following it. According to Theodore Sorensen, President Kennedy subsequently believed it had been a mistake ‘to push the Germans to accept ideas which he could not interest Khrushchev in anyway’.74 The Kennedy Administration’s actions during the 1961 Berlin crisis raise serious questions about whether the strategy of Flexible Response actually created a wider set of choices in crisis. The Kennedy Administration was very cautious during the Wall crisis not to take any military actions that could further increase tension, probing Soviet intentions in diplomatic channels rather than by military means. Although the Kennedy Administration’s military strategy was designed to allow force to be used without a localised conflict escalating, the Administration’s choices did not appear to solve the problem of ‘very little choice as to how you face the moment of thermonuclear truth’.75 The Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961 suggest that the range of political choice is defined less by military capabilities (beyond a level of sufficiency in retaliatory forces) than by the nature of the political conflict that gives rise to the use of force and by the willingness of adversaries to accept risk in order to achieve their political goals. The Eisenhower Administration was principally concerned with maintaining Germany’s voluntary allegiance to the West. Eisenhower allowed allied solidarity to be the defining criteria, both for negotiating positions and the use of military force, and succeeded in managing the 1958 Berlin crisis in ways that both prevented serious threat of war and increased Germany’s adhesion to the West. The Kennedy Administration was principally concerned about preventing war between the US and the Soviet Union, and repudiated Allied vetoes over both the diplomatic and the military strategy in order to give the US greater latitude in dealing with the Soviet threat. This approach succeeded in preventing armed conflict, but at the cost of serious damage to the NATO alliance. Had the Kennedy Administration not taken such a confrontational approach toward the Soviets at the inception of the 1961 Berlin crisis, or been willing to compromise in the military or political aspects of its policy to accommodate allied concerns, it might have achieved its aims at much lower cost. However, there is little in their own records of the 1961 Berlin crisis to suggest that the

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 39

Kennedy Administration understood the delicate West–West political context in which Berlin crises were conducted.

Notes 1. The area of greatest strategic debate in the Eisenhower Administration was over the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars. President Eisenhower himself appears to have held conflicting views. However, this issue in the Eisenhower strategy does not affect their approach to the 1958 Berlin crisis, because they did not believe East–West conflict in the region of their greatest political commitments – Europe – would remain limited. 2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 320th Meeting of the National Security Council, 17 April 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1955–57, XIX p. 482. 3. Memorandum of Discussion at the 307th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 December 1956, ‘US Military Program for FY 1958’, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, p. 390. 4. Eisenhower’s quote is in Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 18 April 1956, FRUS 1955–57, XIX , p. 302. The Army unsuccessfully contested reductions throughout the Eisenhower Administration. See: 3 January 1955 Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary, FRUS, 1955–57, XIX , p. 3; Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary, 1 February 1955, FRUS 1955–57, XIX , p. 59; Supplementary Notes of the Legislative Leadership Meeting, 1 March 1955, FRUS 1955–57, XIX , p. 57; Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 1954: The Military Program, FRUS 1952–54, p. 76; Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence, 12 March 1956, FRUS 1955–57, XIX , pp. 235–6. 5. ’Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook’, Memorandum of Discussion at the 309th Meeting of the National Security Council, 11 January 1957, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, p. 409. 6. For a typical statement of Eisenhower’s views, see Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 18 April 1956, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, pp. 302–3. 7. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 24 May 1956, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, p. 312, in which the president and Admiral Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were reviewing the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. 8. NSC 5602, Basic National Security Policy, 15 March 1956, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, p. 247. 9. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 30 March 1956, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, p. 281. 10. Memorandum of Discussion at the 325th Meeting of the National Security Council, 27 May 1957, FRUS, XIX, pp. 499–501. 11. Notes on a Bipartisan Conference, 12 July 1955, FRUS 1955–57, V, p. 307. 12. A 1955 National Intelligence Estimate corroborated Eisenhower’s concern about European attitudes. NIE 100-5-55, Implications of Growing Nuclear

40 The Berlin Wall Crisis

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30.

31.

Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World, 14 June 1955, FRUS 1955–57, XIX, pp. 85–6. Secretary of State Dulles frequently expresses this mutual concern to President Eisenhower in his dispatch from NATO meetings. See Memorandum by the Secretary of State 6 September 1953, FRUS 1952–54, II, Part 1, pp. 457–60; Message From the Secretary of State to the President, 5 May 1956, FRUS 1955–57, IV, p. 75. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 9 June 1959, National Security Archive Berlin collection of documents (hereafter referred to as NSA/Berlin). Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 November 1955, FRUS, XIX, editorial note #41, p. 151. The British view is outlined in an 18 July 1956 letter from Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, FRUS 1955–57, IV, pp. 90–1. FRUS 1955–57 IV, fn. 7, pp. 92–3. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944–61 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 361. Administration Briefing for Congressional Leadership, 6 March 1959 (DDEL/Whitman File/DDE Diaries); the passage is also cited in Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–61 (New York: Doubleday, 1965) pp. 347–9. USCINCEUR to JSC, EC 9-6296, 16 November 1957, NSA/Berlin. Administration Briefing for Congressional Leadership, 6 March 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DDEL/Whitman File/DDE Diaries). Memorandum of Conference with the President, 12 December 1958, NSA/ Berlin. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 6 March 1959, FRUS 1958–60, VIII, pp. 428–37. USCINCEUR to SECDEF, EC 9-6071, 15 November 1958; Eisenhower also recounts Norstad’s request and his rejection in his Waging Peace, p. 331. Comments on Memorandum of Conclusions of White House Conference on Berlin, 29 January 1959, NSA/Berlin. J-5 to JCS Secretary, J-5M 99-58, 17 December 1958 recounts the 24 November through 9 December US government decisions; the guidelines are contained in Telegram from Department of State to Embassy in Germany, 11 December 1958, FRUS 1958–60, VIII, pp. 177–80. President’s Background Book, Subject: Status of Preparations for Foreign Minister’s Conference, April 1959, US National Archives and Record Service (hereafter NARS), DOS/Conference Files/Lot 64 D560/CF 1449. Four Power Communiqué on Berlin, Paris, 14 December 1958, NSA/Berlin. North Atlantic Council Communiqué, 16 December 1958 (Brussels: NATO Information Service). Soviet Premier Khrushchev, quoted by the US Ambassador Lywellyn Thompson; Telegram from Embassy in Soviet Union to the Department of State, 25 June 1959 (dispatches 739, 741) NSA/Berlin. Summary of the Western Peace Plan, 14 May 1959 (Department of State Press Release #330, 14 May 1959; see also President’s Background Book for Western Summit, December 1959, NARS op. cit.).

US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises 41 32. ‘Post-War Berlin: An Unofficial Chronology’ (United States Information Agency, March 1960), p. 9. 33. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower 9 July 1959, FRUS 1958–60, VIII, p. 972. 34. Telegram from Secretary of State to Department of State, FRUS 1958–60, VIII, pp. 858–61. 35. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 21 August 1959, FRUS 1958–60, IX, p. 5. 36. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Opening Discussion, 15 September 1959, NSA/Berlin. 37. John F. Kennedy, quoted in New York Times, 3 September 1960. 38. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 348. 39. Ibid., p. 303; Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 292. 40. NATO and the Atlantic Nations, 20 April 1961, FRUS XIII, p. 285. 41. Record of a Meeting Held at the White House, P. M.(W)(61)2nd Meeting, UK Public Records Office (hereafter PRO), PRO/CAB133/244, 5 April 1961. 42. Public Papers of the President, 1961, #192, Speech to the Canadian Parliament, p. 382. 43. Dean Acheson, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Berlin, 3 April 1961, NSA/Berlin. 44. Telegram from Embassy Soviet Union to Department of State, 4 February 1961, FRUS XIV , p. 7; similar sentiments are also expressed by Thompson on 16 March 1961, ibid., pp. 30–3. 45. Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany, NIE 11-7-61, 25 April 1961, FRUS XIII, pp. 56–7. 46. McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 4 April 1961, NSA/Berlin. 47. McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, 29 May 1961; see also President’s Visit to De Gaulle, Paris, 31 May–2 June 1961, NSA/Berlin. 48. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna, 4 June 1961, FRUS XIV, p. 90. 49. Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 55–7. 50. Public Papers of the President, 1961, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning from Europe, pp. 441–6. 51. Ambassador Thompson, Memorandum for the Secretary, Subject: The Berlin Question, 19 June 1961, NSA/Berlin. 52. The Acheson Report, 28 June 1961, FRUS XIV, pp. 138–59. 53. JCS to McNamara, Berlin Contingency Planning, 26 June 1961, FRUS XIV–XVI Supplement #75. 54. Memorandum for the Record, ‘Discussion at NSC Meeting June 29, 1961’ FRUS XIV , p. 161; McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Discussion in the National Security Council, July 13, 1961, FRUS XIV pp. 192–4. 55. Lemnitzer to Norstad (JCS 998202), 27 June 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (hereafter JFKL) National Security Files/Germany/Berlin/ Cables. 56. Secretary of Defence Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27 July 1961, NSA/Berlin.

42 The Berlin Wall Crisis 57. Maj Gen James H. Polk, Director, Policy Planning OASD/ISA, ‘A New Approach to Berlin,’ (I-14950/61), 26 June 1961, NSA/Berlin. 58. Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Some Observations Regarding Call-ups of Reserves, 15 July 1961; Theodore Sorensen, Memorandum to the President, ‘The Decision on Berlin,’ 17 July 1961; McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, Subject: This Afternoon’s Meetings, 19 July 1961; and Maxwell Taylor to the President, 19 July 1961, all in NSA/Berlin. 59. National Security Action Memorandum 62, 26 July 1961, FRUS XIV, pp. 225–6. 60. McGeorge Bundy, Minutes of Meeting of Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin, 26 July 1961, NSA/Berlin. 61. Public Papers of the President, 1961, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, 25 July 1961, pp. 533–40. 62. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, p. 79. 63. McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President, Subjects: (1) Berlin Negotiations and (2) Possible Reprisals, 14 August 1961, FRUS XIV, pp. 330–1. 64. Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, Subject: Berlin Political Planning, 21 August 1961, FRUS XIV, p. 359. 65. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 431. 66. President to General Norstad, 20 October 1961, FRUS XIV, pp. 520–1. 67. Robert McNamara, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Military Build-Up and Possible Action in Europe, 18 September 1961, FRUS XIV, pp. 521–3. General Norstad’s comments appear in Appendix A to the memo. 68. Henry Kissinger, Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 3 October 1961, NSA/Berlin. 69. Bundy to SACEUR, 5 December 1961; Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence, Memorandum for the President, 5 December 1961 (DDEL/Box 104, Lauris Norstad Papers/Kennedy, John F., US President (3)). 70. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Berlin, Athens NAC, 3 May 1962. 71. Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 205–8. 72. The initial deadline expired on 27 May 1959; a deadline evoked towards the end of the 1959 Foreign MinisterS’ Meeting was extended with the invitation by Eisenhower for Khrushchev to come to Camp David; the deadline was officially withdrawn at Camp David, and Khrushchev’s revival of a deadline associated with progress at the Paris Summit was never repeated after May 1960. 73. Robert McNamara, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Military Build-Up and Possible Action in Europe, 18 September 1961. 74. Sorensen, Memorandum to the President, p. 598. 75. McGeorge Bundy, Covering Note to Henry Kissinger’s Memo on Berlin, 7 July 1961, JFKL National Security Files/Box 381/Germany/Berlin/General/ Kissinger Report.

4 Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62 John Gearson

Introduction The problem of Berlin during the late 1950s and early 1960s offers a unique insight into the crisis management approach of British foreign policy makers in the post-Suez environment, revealing the extent to which Britain’s world role still was not clear at a time of profound change. Inasmuch as Britain still harbours an ambiguous approach towards its European partners, still conceiving a unique role for herself in transatlantic relations, the events of the Berlin crisis have important implications for understanding how Britain’s future role remains unclear to many even today. Indeed the Berlin crisis was the background to the decision to seek membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and as such, the event perhaps as profoundly as Suez, shaped Britain’s later placement in the world. Pointedly, it was during the Berlin Wall crisis that Dean Acheson, the former secretary of state and Berlin adviser to President John F. Kennedy, famously commented that Britain had lost an Empire but had yet to find a role. During the crisis intra-alliance problems loomed almost as large as the broader East–West dispute, as the disagreements within the Western alliance over how to defend the West’s position in Berlin grew. Indeed, the results of the Berlin crisis were felt more in Britain’s relationships with her main allies, than with the Soviet Union (USSR). Ostensibly, more than any other Western power, Britain saw little profit and great dangers in standing firm on Berlin, or at least was prepared to articulate such fears clearly to her main allies. The Government of Harold Macmillan tended to conceive of the Berlin question as it related to other issues and not on its own merits. Without an explicit Berlin policy, the British 43

44 The Berlin Wall Crisis

often became merely reactive. Even the Foreign Office representative in Berlin in 1961 when the Wall was built appeared unsure of what he was supposed to be doing there: ‘In spite of all their words and many papers I read on the subject I never really discovered whether or not we had a policy on Berlin’. 1 British policy came from the top and during the crisis Macmillan, the prime minister, often initiated policy or involved himself directly in its formulation – not least when the general election grew closer in 1959. The prime minister’s influence was not all-powerful, however. Selwyn Lloyd, his foreign secretary until 1960, did occasionally act as a restraining influence on the prime minister, regularly reflecting the view of the Foreign Office establishment. In common with many post-war British leaders the realities of changed circumstances had yet to impose themselves and an independent role on the international stage for Great Britain still appeared not only possible, but profoundly necessary. Macmillan was wrong on both counts, not least because since he lacked a clear conception of what he actually wanted to achieve, attempts to play the honest broker were doomed to failure. A desire for a détente shaped his international policy and led him to concentrate on relations with the USSR – to the detriment of those with West Germany. This policy led Macmillan to embark on a personal diplomacy to Moscow in early 1959 and thereafter to push for a summit of the ‘great powers’ involved in Berlin which finally occurred at the Paris U-2 summit of May 1960. Both initiatives proved abject failures, but his response thereafter was to focus on relations with France and America, not Germany, attempting to convince John F. Kennedy of the need for another great summit. Macmillan’s experiences of World War I, in which he fought and had been wounded, coupled with the lack of personal chemistry between him and Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) first chancellor, proved insurmountable obstacles to building an AngloGerman understanding during his premiership. Overall, a failure of imagination underlay Macmillan’s entire approach and the lack of a coherent strategic vision enfeebled his entire European policy.

British policy towards Germany and Berlin British policy in the 1950s towards Germany was rooted in an essentially schizophrenic approach to Germany and the Germans, with two conflicting strands at its heart: her commitment to a permanent continental military presence in Europe; and the continuing search for

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

45

agreement on European security with the USSR. Under the 1954 Paris Agreements, the British had adopted a semi-permanent continental commitment through the Western European Union (WEU). In October 1954, the UK, US and France further declared they would maintain forces in Berlin and treat an attack against Berlin as an attack upon themselves. The following year the FRG joined NATO and Britain was fully committed to West Germany’s integration within the Western alliance, both as a baulk against German neutralism and ‘another Rapallo’ – the possibility of Russo-German agreement. Almost immediately after agreeing to these commitments, the British had appeared eager to backtrack on their obligations. Partly rooted in the need for economies, at a deeper level this ambivalent British attitude reflected the continuing illusion that Britain could stand apart from the political tangle on the continent.2 An air of equivocation appeared to surround Britain’s approach to Germany – an aura Macmillan did little to dissipate when he came to power. We have always said that our aim is a re-unified Germany, with free elections . . . What is the real view? Do we want a united Germany on any terms that we are likely to get in the next decade or so?3 The issue of reunification lay at the heart of the ‘German problem’ and clearly in asking for the ‘real view’ Macmillan had no illusions about the matter. To his biographer he remarked ‘we always had to talk about (reunification) but it was something of a fraud’.4 Quite apart from reunification there were enough areas of disagreement between the two countries to sour relations. These had remained ‘cool and distant’ following the war, reflecting not only traditional mistrust and the still painful memories of war, but also the relative power status of the two countries, which was changing in favour of West Germany. 5 Nonetheless, reunification was of such central importance to the FRG that no ally, least of all Britain, could risk the opprobrium of not giving whole-hearted verbal support to the principle.6 In private it was different. Winston Churchill had been convinced that if reunified, Germany would never ally herself with the USSR against the West and remained committed to not letting Adenauer down – on moral grounds if nothing else. 7 The chancellor insisted on a Western commitment to reunification, based on the closest links with the West, a policy rooted in the assumptions that only with superpower agreement could unification be achieved and that the material balance would shift in the West’s favour in time.8 Whether or not this calculation was shared by any of

46 The Berlin Wall Crisis

the Western powers, division was more acceptable than losing the whole to the other side. The ‘Control of Germany’ issue outweighed the ‘unity of Germany’ issue. The way was easily open for a tacit acceptance of the reality of the ‘two Germanies’. 9 By the late 1950s however, the problem for the Western powers was that the FRG had become indispensable to Western defence. The more she was relied upon as the linchpin of NATO plans, the more the Western powers became hostage to the goal of reunification. Sir Frederick HoyerMiller, the permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office probably reflected the feeling of many in his ambivalent attitude to the rapprochement with the Germans. I must confess never to have been entirely convinced that our own selfish interests will really be better served by the early emergence of a reunified and greatly strengthened Germany, capable of dominating Central Europe, than by the continuation of the status quo . . . Still we must of course still try to anchor the FRG to the West. 10 The British public was by no means whole-heartedly in favour of reunification either, with an important section of the Labour Party’s leftwing and part of the Conservative’s right-wing very unhappy with the rearmament of Germany and by no means advocates of reunification. 11 Indeed, in 1960 the Labour and Liberal Parties called for the recognition of East Germany.12 As the issue of reunification was so closely bound up with the issues of European security and disarmament, the discussion of one automatically involved the other. Notwithstanding some reluctance by the Western powers to pursue reunification, the desire for an accommodation with the USSR on European security and disarmament led the West inevitably into discussion of the German problem. This in turn conflicted with the Federal Republic’s insistence that reunification precede any European settlement.13 Macmillan, though aware of the need to keep the FRG within the Western alliance, tended towards a greater emphasis on European security than on German reunification and it was the issue on which his relationship with Adenauer ultimately foundered. Macmillan convinced himself that the ice could be broken between East and West if a summit conference could be arranged and was determined to pursue it, despite evident lack of enthusiasm on the part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. 14

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

47

It loomed larger in his mind than the need for Germany to be reunited, although the latter could not be neglected as it was bound to emerge in some form at a summit. Selwyn Lloyd probably shared his desire to make progress on European security issues, but had no natural inclination for summit diplomacy and summits themselves, seeing them as an ‘occupational weakness of any incumbent of No. 10’.15 Replying to Macmillan’s request for the ‘real view’ on German reunification, the Foreign Office advised that reunification should remain Britain’s real ultimate objective. You asked what our real view is about a united Germany. It is tempting to argue that we do not want Germany to be reunited at all. A reunited Germany might dominate Europe, and emotionally we are all of us, including the Russians, fairly content to see the division persist even though the situation has its obvious and immediate dangers, e.g. Berlin . . . to say so and to go for a deal with the Russians for the acceptance of the status quo would completely forfeit the good-will of the Federal German government . . . whatever the emotional and other arguments in favour of a divided Germany may be . . . its continued division ought not even to be the tacit objective of our policy . . . (our objective) should be to make sure that if a reunited Germany is attached to one system rather than to another, it should be to ours and not to (the USSR’s) . . . in this matter we are for the time being largely the prisoners of Dr. Adenauer’s policy.16 The Foreign Office concluded, ‘the continued division of Germany is preferable to reunification on terms other than our optimum ones.’ 17 The political logic of this may well have been accepted by Macmillan, but his pursuit of some sort of security accommodation with the USSR led the FRG to distrust British motives at the start of the Berlin crisis. Complicating matters further was the concept of military ‘disengagement’ which had become fashionable in the late 1950s as a panacea to all of Europe’s ills – essentially the creation of buffer zones between opponents. Macmillan may well have agreed with the many Britons who saw no reason why German reunification should hinder agreement with the Russians and disengagement potentially offered large financial savings if the British Army in West Germany could be reduced as a consequence. A top-secret report by civil servants under the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, in June 1958 made gloomy reading, reporting that Britain’s lack of resources was critical. If

48 The Berlin Wall Crisis

worldwide commitments were not reduced, domestic spending would have to be cut, the report said, arguing that the only meaningful defence savings possible was abandonment of the independent nuclear deterrent, or a total withdrawal from Germany. 18 British reliability came to be judged by Adenauer not on the basis of verbal support for the principle of reunification and a free Germany, but on its attitude to the recognition of East Germany and disengagement. 19 British interest in disengagement was not predicated on its likely effect on Germany, but on its appeal to the USSR and here too, the British misjudged matters. Convinced about the need for face to face contact with the Soviets, as early as 1946 Macmillan had told the House of Commons that the USSR’s need for security could only be reconciled ‘by direct and personal negotiation’. 20 He had been most impressed with Churchill’s search for a summit in 1953 and thought the Austrian State Treaty an important precedent. 21 At the start of the 1958 Berlin crisis then, Macmillan was emotionally and logically predisposed to an accommodation with the USSR at the expense of West German security interests. The Berlin crisis reopened the debate on the future of Germany and ended ongoing discussions of disengagement in Britain, but Anglo-German relations had already suffered serious damage. Macmillan’s policy of seeking an accommodation with Khrushchev, along with Adenauer’s natural suspicion of British intentions resulted in one of the worst periods of misunderstanding and antipathy between the two countries and, through the involvement of the US and France, a NATO alliance hopelessly at odds in facing the challenge of Khrushchev’s intrigues and threats over Berlin. The exploration of negotiating options with respect to Berlin . . . became a surrogate for the continuing debate over the military strategy of the Atlantic Alliance.22 Macmillan was slow to appreciate the shift in the strategic landscape and remained attached to the idea of a European security scheme for much of the crisis. During his abortive visit to Moscow, disengagement cropped up in the final communiqué to the dismay of Britain’s allies. When Macmillan visited Adenauer afterwards the Chancellor bluntly demanded who wrote the Moscow communiqué and who put in disengagement?23 The British protestations that the reference to ‘study of a scheme for the limitation of armaments in an agreed region of Europe’ did not mean disengagement or discrimination against Germany, failed to placate Adenauer.

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

49

Adenauer viewed the Macmillan government as being quite willing to seek détente at the expense of both reunification and German security, to trade Berlin’s freedom for the possibility of a broad (and unacceptable) European settlement with the Russians. 24 Throughout the 1958–61 crisis there was a persistent tension between what was perceived to be the broad-based general foreign policy and the fear that events might slip out of control. Disengagement was returned to time and time again by Macmillan as part of grandiose schemes for a final settlement of World War II, but a fundamental contradiction arose. Any settlement with the USSR would have to be at Germany’s expense – just as Britain increasingly needed German support on the question of the future ordering and development of Western Europe. As the crisis developed, the one thing Britain had to offer the FRG – firmness in resisting Soviet pressure on Berlin – was exactly what British public opinion was least disposed to give. The public was not alone – Macmillan perceived the West’s position in Berlin to be fundamentally weak and adjusted his policy accordingly. From his personal visit to Moscow in 1959 to the minimal military measures adopted by Britain following the closing of the sector boundary in Berlin in August 1961, Macmillan was always perceived to be the weakest link in the Western alliance. De Gaulle’s concrete actions, as opposed to verbal response to Khrushchev’s threats were similar to Macmillan’s, but he convinced Adenauer of his support and was believed. By contrast, British ambiguity towards Germany was all too obvious and Macmillan’s motives fundamentally suspect in Adenauer’s eyes. Eisenhower noted that the chancellor seemed to have ‘developed almost a psychopathic fear of what he considers to be “British weakness” ’.25 He had tried to reassure him that in a ‘showdown’ Macmillan would stand firmly on principle, but could not assuage the Chancellor’s latent concerns.26 In a now famous outburst in June 1959, Adenauer laconically stated, ‘I have only three enemies: the communists, the British and my own foreign office.’27 The Berlin crisis revealed an intellectual vacuum at the heart of British foreign policy towards Germany, Europe and the USSR. On a variety of issues the British simply got things wrong. The appeal of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) to the Germans was misjudged, with London convinced that it would be picked by West Germany in preference to the EEC. Following Khrushchev’s initial threats over Berlin in November 1958 Macmillan even attempted to link EFTA and Berlin, proposing to warn Adenauer that the FRG’s behaviour over EFTA had

50 The Berlin Wall Crisis

been unsatisfactory. German support for the EFTA had been hesitant and Macmillan saw the problem of Sixes (the EEC) and Sevens (the EFTA countries) in Europe as the central question of the time. Macmillan later professed to being more concerned abut the economic threat of the Six than of harm by the Russians from war.28 But the chance for West German support on EFTA and later British entry into the EEC (if any existed), was thrown away by Macmillan’s limited support for Adenauer on Berlin. With German support, the British might have been able to overcome de Gaulle’s opposition before he became politically too strong following the French election of November 1962. 29 Macmillan could not have it both ways: either he linked EFTA with Berlin and supported Adenauer, or he pursued his ideas for an East– West security structure at Germany’s expense, risking his relations with Adenauer. Earlier proposals for a security pact in Europe by Western leaders such as Anthony Eden had been accepted by the FRG only because they were expressly linked to steps towards reunification and, critically, came into effect following the reuniting of Germany. Macmillan’s promotion of schemes for limitation of forces or disengagement in the late 1950s, not unintentionally, blurred this distinction – a point never lost on Adenauer. The suspicion that Britain was prepared to accept de facto, perhaps even de jure recognition of the GDR as a price worth paying for settlement of the Berlin crisis compounded matters. At the start of the crisis, Lloyd set out in stark terms the British policy. First, and most importantly, Britain would not contemplate abandoning its position in Berlin. Second, dealing with the East Germans on a de facto basis would be a reasonable course and perhaps just a first stage. He noted: ‘I would not much mind if it ended up with the recognition of the DDR Government.’30 Macmillan’s problem was to convince his allies that he drew a distinction between recognition of the GDR and abandoning Berlin. Britain’s public declaratory position of seeking German reunification was constantly undermined by the temptation of probing the East regarding clarification of what sort of security arrangements might prove acceptable to the USSR.

The deadline crisis In the event, following Khrushchev’s initiation of the ‘deadline crisis’ in November 1958, the British revealed their predisposition towards compromise to the dismay of their main allies. A major steering telegram sent to Washington and Paris in November, which, though later

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

51

dismissed by London as a discussion piece, suggested to her allies that Britain’s Berlin policy was fundamentally weak, claiming the West had few options. It would . . . be foolish not to proceed on the assumption that Khrushchev is going to do more or less what he has said that he is going to do, i.e., that sooner or later he will ‘hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic those functions in Berlin which are still maintained by Soviet organs’. We cannot stop him from doing this.31 Britain’s position on the question of maintaining the status quo on access arrangements and her attitude to the West’s continued presence in Berlin was distinct, as the brief showed. We will under no circumstances withdraw our forces from Berlin or abandon the West Berliners whom we are pledged to support. In the declaration of October 1954 we said that we would treat any attack against Berlin as an attack upon ourselves. This implies that rather than submit to Berlin being starved out, if it ever came to that, we would resort to force with all the risks that might entail. I feel sure the French and Americans will agree that we must proceed on the assumption that this must be the ultimate basis of our policy.32 Evidently Britain drew a firm distinction between the objectives of staying in Berlin and reaching an accommodation on recognising the GDR. On civilian access rights, accommodations had already been reached where the FRG dealt with the GDR de facto – it was a small step for the allies to begin dealing with the DDR on a practical basis and would make matters easier, London argued. The analysis was predicated on the assumption that Khrushchev had limited objectives, would be satisfied with bolstering the East German regime and that recognising it would not really be a set-back for the West. The telegram was sensational and caused a major upset, suggesting that Britain intended to depart from the official allied policy of seeking German reunification through free elections. ‘We put it in very off-hand way . . . but, in fact, it had Macmillan’s approval.’33 It also accurately reflected what was to be the basis of his policy for the rest of the crisis. The British had to convince their allies that they drew a distinction between recognition of the GDR and abandoning Berlin, but Macmillan

52 The Berlin Wall Crisis

crucially misjudged how to handle Adenauer in what was to prove a seminal period in the post-war relations between Britain, France and the FRG. The British believed the emerging Franco-German rapprochement would founder under the strain of General de Gaulle’s ideas for a NATO triumvirate, but in fact after a tentative first meeting at Colombey in September 1958, Adenauer and de Gaulle had met at Bad Kreuznach on 26 November and had got along famously.34

The voyage of discovery They say, in effect, that they have complete confidence in me. (Macmillan, 16 January 1959)35 You will be asked whether the Americans were consulted in advance. The true answer is that they were consulted and reluctantly agreed, but this you must not say. (Foreign Office, 2 February 1959)36 The reaction of Britain’s allies to the telegram convinced Macmillan that an individual initiative by him was vital to prevent a catastrophe and he decided to embark on a ‘Voyage of Discovery’37 to Moscow and a meeting with Khrushchev, to negotiate a way out of the Berlin problem. Notwithstanding the shock of the 1956 Suez crisis to British self-esteem, in 1958/59 the British foreign policy establishment still conceived an independent role for Britain on the world stage. Macmillan’s decision to visit Moscow was the logical extension of this self-image and its subsequent failure perhaps the logical result of the changes in international power structures that had already occurred. Urgency was added by American contingency planning and the apparent eagerness of sections of the US military to test USSR resolve to the brink of war had concerned the prime minister greatly.38 Convinced that in a real test the West would eventually compromise, he believed a way had to be found to persuade his allies that a negotiated settlement (if it preserved the Western military presence in Berlin) was preferable to brinkmanship. Macmillan was aware that British public opinion favoured negotiations and was mindful that a general election was pending. Astounding his advisers, allies and public, he decided in early 1959 to visit Moscow to avert a disaster. Merely by undertaking the visit, Macmillan plunged the Western alliance into another crisis of confidence about British resolution, but the dangers were seemingly unappreciated by the prime minister once he had set his mind on an independent initiative. In Moscow, he was

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

53

subjected to a series of humiliations, confirming the worst fears of Britain’s allies, before the visit ended on a positive note with Khrushchev withdrawing his ultimatum. Berlin became the backdrop to one of the last major independent actions by a British premier. The compromises required of a dutiful ally were sacrificed, once again, to the needs of a bold individual initiative, but Britain’s scope for truly independent action had long since vanished. Either Macmillan spoke for the Western alliance (which did not) or he spoke for a new and detached British policy (which he could not). The suspicions and mistrust engendered by his visit to Moscow were avoidable. For Britain the illusions of a great but declining power perceiving an independent role for itself, increasingly came into conflict with the realities of alliance politics. Macmillan’s voyage of discovery achieved little, largely serving to deepen the fissures developing between Britain and her main allies. Whether correct or not in their assumptions about how to deal with the Berlin crisis, British foreign policy makers were unable to carry alliance opinion. From the inception of his idea to visit Moscow to his debriefing of his allies following it, the prime minister faced incomprehension and thinly veiled hostility. Britain’s view of her role did not accord with the facts. Adenauer, already convinced that Britain was unreliable, saw Macmillan’s proposed trip to Moscow as an election manoeuvre. 39 The French similarly believed the proposed visit to Moscow to be linked to the election, with de Gaulle characterising the trip as ‘unnecessary and unhelpful’.40 Adenauer, still professing to like Macmillan personally, felt that British policy was essentially ‘unreliable and anti-German’.41 In a speech to the CDU parliamentary party on 17 February 1959 he complained about public opinion in Britain and especially the interest in disengagement.42 Contrary to the worst fears of his allies though, Macmillan was robust from the start and firm on Berlin and the right of the Western powers to be there, telling Khrushchev he had come to Moscow to see if ‘it was possible to work out some way for avoiding the dangers’ which the two sides faced. 43 Khrushchev stated the USSR position arguing that the basic question facing East and West was whether the solution of the German question should come before or after that of European security. 44 Macmillan stood firm and probed in vain for signs of flexibility, saying that ‘the situation was very serious and, if the Soviet position was indeed as Mr. Khrushchev had described it, it was very dangerous’. 45 Unexpectedly, Khrushchev withdrew his six-month deadline when challenged on the fact that he had issued an ultimatum which included

54 The Berlin Wall Crisis

a deadline. If the West did not like 27 May (six months after the Soviet Note which began the deadline crisis) he said, let them name any other date in June or July: ‘There was no time limit’.46 This in fact represented the end of the ‘deadline crisis’ and reveals Khrushchev’s ultimate pragmatism, 47 but was followed by various threats of nuclear devastation and eventually even Macmillan lost his legendary composure, saying, ‘If you try to threaten us in any way, you will create the Third World War. Because we shall not give in, nor will the Americans.’ Khrushchev leapt to his feet shouting ‘You have insulted me!’48 One observer noted, ‘His face went the colour of rather too old leather and he was furious . . . rocking to and fro.’49 Later in the famous toothache incident Khrushchev said that he would not now be accompanying Macmillan to Kiev ‘because you’ve insulted me’, adding ‘moreover I’ve got the most terrible toothache’. 50 A prime minister without teeth was no use, the Russian said. ‘He could hardly imagine Mr. Khrushchev without teeth’, quipped Macmillan. 51 The prime minister now faced a serious political crisis and hints were given regarding the maximum Britain could offer to defuse the crisis: the recognition of East Germany.52 ‘If the Soviet Union wished to create a successor state, they must see that the state carried out the existing obligations.’ 53 The offer appeared to have had the desired effect, for the next morning Khrushchev sent a message to Macmillan reporting that his tooth was much better now thanks to his dentist’s use of a British dentistry drill.54 The limits of British interests had been reached and he knew it. Merely undertaking the visit had stretched alliance cohesion to breaking point. That it would not stand any significant divergence from the Western position on Berlin was shown by Macmillan’s refusal to budge on the West’s rights. Even on the question of a summit, where he agreed with Khrushchev’s position, he could do no more than suggest the fudge of linking a summit with the foreign ministers conference. Eventually, Khrushchev even accepted a foreign ministers meeting without a specific link to a summit. Macmillan repeatedly announced his desire to find areas where common ground could be explored, but faced with an intransigent Khrushchev, could only repeat the Western mantra on Berlin. Thus, his greatest achievement in visiting Moscow may well have been to demonstrate his impotence. Even if Macmillan and the cabinet did not fully realise it yet, Khrushchev had discovered that even Britain, the most apparently wobbly member of the Western alliance, could not act independently of its allies on matters of substance. The West was standing firm on Berlin.

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

55

Although precipitating a crisis within the Western alliance, perversely the Macmillan trip to Moscow strengthened it externally. More fundamentally, it was to be one of the last acts of independence by a British premier in the face of total opposition from the United States. The crisis moved on to its next stage but from this point on the British played an essentially supporting role in the great questions of East and West relations. The importance of the crisis from now on, and the lessons associated with it, shifted to Britain’s relations with her European allies and the Anglo-American relationship.

Influencing America Macmillan had placed a rapprochement with Eisenhower at the heart of his foreign policy, but the crisis over Berlin led to significant tensions in their relationship and ultimately grave disappointment on the part of Macmillan when his personal relationship with Eisenhower was not sufficient to deter him from certain courses. Eisenhower was not prepared to countenance a summit meeting with Khrushchev unless there was a basis for agreement, which he did not see. Talks in Washington during the spring of 1959 between Macmillan and Eisenhower (very unusually) became quite heated, as Macmillan failed to dent the American position and had difficulty in dispelling unease over what had transpired in Moscow. He became ‘exceedingly emotional’, telling the president that: World War I – the war which nobody wanted – came because of the failure of the leaders at that time to meet at the Summit. Grey instead had gone fishing and the war came in which the UK lost two million young men. 55 Eisenhower agreed only to accept a summit ‘as soon as developments in the foreign ministers meeting warrant it’. 56 The ongoing dispute with West Germany over disengagement continued to sour Anglo-German relations during the summer and culminated in an extraordinarily ill-tempered meeting between Macmillan and Adenauer in November. In the interim, the Western allies found themselves embroiled in an interminable, and what was to turn out to be futile series of foreign ministers meetings in Geneva. From the outset, the British mooted the idea of linking measures of disengagement with an interim agreement on Berlin and dropped the link between German reunification and such schemes, a link their allies insisted upon.

56 The Berlin Wall Crisis

When their initial efforts failed, the British pushed for an interim Berlin settlement involving measures well beyond what the FRG was prepared to accept. The conference finally broke up following Eisenhower’s invitation to Khrushchev to visit America, which had rendered the foreign ministers’ deliberations somewhat irrelevant. The invitation to Khrushchev arose in part from the British preoccupation with, and pressure for, a summit meeting. Paradoxically, Macmillan’s proselytising zeal for a summit meeting may have worked against his own interests, prompting Eisenhower instead to seek to exclude him altogether from the negotiation with Khrushchev. The issue of the link between the Khrushchev visit and a summit (and crucially the order) was to put an enormous strain on Macmillan’s relations with Eisenhower. For Macmillan, what was important was the link between the two. Eisenhower told Macmillan that while he had not identified progress at Geneva which justified a summit, he had invited Khrushchev in an attempt to ‘take the edge off’ the Berlin situation. Macmillan’s whole strategy was disintegrating – the summit was being put off until the winter (and after a possible general election in Britain) and his main ally was intending to exchange visits with Khrushchev. It would appear the US and USSR were coming to some bilateral agreement behind Britain’s back.57 Lloyd attempted to reassure him that such were the burdens of being the US’s main ally. The whole trouble is that the president is an amateur and Herter is new to the job. I believe they are both genuinely dedicated to the Anglo-American alliance. Our role is guide, philosopher and friend; this is an exasperating and thankless job, but, I fear, a necessary one. 58 It was all rather unedifying – the leading nation of the Western alliance was not trusted by its main ally to conduct bilateral talks with the USSR. It is almost impossible to see anything other than electioneering at work here, for there was no indication that the future of the Western alliance was being questioned by its other members. Macmillan was not just trying to adjust events to his electoral benefit, he was potentially upsetting moves which might stabilise the Berlin crisis. Even if the British had seen the Americans come around to their point of view on the need for direct high-level contacts, they were the wrong kinds of contacts, between the wrong leaders. The end result would exclude Britain from the high table, just weeks before a possible general election date – a bleak prospect.

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

57

Macmillan’s influence over Eisenhower was not been enough to divert him from his course once he had set himself the task of direct negotiations with Khrushchev, despite ‘hysterical appeals’ from his closest ally. Although he won the general election comfortably, Macmillan was angry and disappointed, and it may be from this point that he began to fundamentally question his whole approach to Europe and America. In December 1959, an important shift in Macmillan’s approach to Europe emerged, the genesis of which probably was the events of the summer. British foreign policy stood at a crossroads in the autumn of 1959, as Berlin and the German question continued to unsettle Western policy and Western policy makers. Unable to decide on a European policy and threatened by the development of the EEC, Macmillan and his advisers began to consider dramatic changes in the structure of European defence in the hope of constructing a leading European role for Britain in conjunction with France, at the expense of Germany. However, the realities of the Berlin question and de Gaulle’s unwillingness to abandon Adenauer politically put paid to such day-dreaming. The prime minister was tempted by a partnership with France, but felt unable to sacrifice the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ in pursuit of it. When Eisenhower appeared willing to countenance some degree of tripartitism, he saw an opportunity to develop this policy. He decided to side with the Americans on Berlin, where there were signs of flexibility, but on the future of the alliance France would be supported as far as possible. The reason was the EEC, which increasingly appeared to be a permanent fixture, despite British attempts to neuter it through the EFTA. ‘The question is how to live with the Common Market economically and turn its political effects into channels harmless to us.’59 The political problem was how to deal with France and Germany – the core of the market. Macmillan even hoped to use the Berlin problem to gain leverage over Adenauer on the EEC issue as he had at the start of the crisis in November 1959. The dilemma he faced was that as the weakest alliance partner on Berlin, he had little to offer Adenauer in exchange for support on the EEC. Essentially anti-German, and emotionally drawn to an entente with the French, Macmillan remained a committed Atlanticist when pushed to choose between Europe and America. A fundamental contradiction arose though: the very area where he considered revolutionary change in support of Britain’s trade interests – the structure of Western defence, was the only real area where the special relationship functioned in a meaningful way. In choosing America, Macmillan revealed that a

58 The Berlin Wall Crisis

privileged defence and intelligence relationship with America was more important to him than trade relations with Europe.

Recasting European defence Another opportunity for Macmillan to attempt to play the honest broker between East and West came in May 1960 when Eisenhower eventually agreed to hold a summit with Khrushchev in Paris. Macmillan’s strategy of the preceding two years finally appeared about to be realised, but in the event was frustrated by the realities of the Berlin problem. Face to face contact could not alter the fact that Khrushchev claimed to be committed to ending the occupation regime in Berlin and the Western powers were not prepared to abandon their position in the city. These realities had begun to sour US–USSR relations in advance of the summit and the shooting down of a U-2 spy plane two weeks before the meeting finished the job. In Paris Macmillan was concerned that the culmination of a year’s effort to arrange a summit was coming to nothing. Urging compromise, he focused on the worst case possible. It would of course be very bad for the morale of the West to lose Berlin. But it would be still worse to say that the West would defend the position and then find . . . that it was in fact impossible to defend it. 60 Macmillan remained curiously transfixed by the spectre of a ragged retreat from the city and an honourable East–West détente appears to have been more important to him than Adenauer’s place within the Western alliance. It is questionable whether an honourable compromise was on offer. If Khrushchev’s threats over Berlin were part of a strategic campaign to secure the settlement that World War II had not, as seems likely, adjustments to the West’s presence in Berlin would not have satisfied him. Eisenhower remained firm on Berlin and was supported by de Gaulle. In a frantic attempt to hold the conference together Macmillan attempted to play the honest broker, but in trying to steer an almost neutral course between Eisenhower and Khrushchev (while de Gaulle whole-heartedly supported the American president) he gave the impression of an Anglo-American split. Khrushchev tried to exploit this and when the summit finally broke down completely, he blamed the British for not having induced Eisenhower to climb down. 61

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

59

The outcome of the Paris summit ‘was the most tragic moment of my life’, Macmillan later claimed. 62 Even allowing for exaggeration, it was a serious personal failure, but this was not reflected in his personal popularity and his biographer claims Macmillan was now seen as ‘the strong man of the shaken alliance, stepping in to restore some balance and sang-froid’. 63 The American conclusion was that it was de Gaulle who came out of the affair best. ‘France’s international prestige has not been higher in a long time’.64 By contrast Macmillan had tried to play the honest broker between East and West and had failed again. I never saw him more depressed. He was really cast down and glum after it. Apart from all the effort he had personally put into it, this was the moment he suddenly realised that Britain counted for nothing; he couldn’t move Ike to make a gesture towards Khrushchev, and de Gaulle was simply not interested. I think this represented a real watershed in his life.65 Macmillan decided to emphasise a strengthening of the Western alliance, seeking agreement with his allies on a constructive solution to Berlin, to remove it from Khrushchev’s armoury. Interdependence within the West would be promoted, not only through economic cooperation, but also through consideration of organisations additional to NATO. 66 Following the conference Eisenhower agreed to a modest form of tripartitism between the US, France and the UK. But the ambitions of de Gaulle were too great and Macmillan could not give the general the support he wanted, in part because he still did not know for sure what he himself wanted. I am afraid that both I and my colleagues keep switching from one side to the another in this affair. First one wants to play with the Americans, then with the French, and sometimes even with the Germans. I think what we really have to make up our minds about is what is our main difficulty, what are we most afraid of . . . I am more frightened of the Six doing us harm than I am of the Russians doing us harm, I mean by total war. If so what is it we want to get from the Six?67 The question of the EEC was becoming acute and he had become preoccupied with it. To achieve his ‘grand design’ Macmillan saw no need to play up to ‘the vested interests in NATO’ as he saw them and even considered threatening a withdrawal from the organisation. This was

60 The Berlin Wall Crisis

too much for the Foreign Office which, Hoyer-Millar reported after consulting with his senior colleagues, could not agree with Downing Street.68 1) NATO is not an institution which we can support or discourage according to the requirements of the European situation. No NATO, no American participation in our defence. No American participation in our defence, no defence. 2) There is a great danger of the Alliance falling apart if no stand is made. 3) The best way for us to encourage dissension among the Six is to support the Americans and encourage the Germans, Italians and Benelux in their opposition to General de Gaulle’s plans for reorganising NATO. 4) To give the impression that we are prepared to sacrifice NATO to the General in the hope of getting some economic concessions out of him would only disillusion the smaller European countries and increase the risk of an American withdrawal from NATO. 69 Whether it was from a sense of weakness following the summit or just disillusionment with the Americans which spurred Macmillan, in the autumn of 1960 he questioned Britain’s whole commitment to the existing structure of the Western defence. 70 He had convinced himself that Britain’s future relationship with Europe depended on de Gaulle, which proved correct although not in the way he intended. During his State visit to London, the general had asked Macmillan directly if Britain would join the Common Market and the answer, had been no. 71 A civil service study in the summer had concluded that the balance of arguments now pointed to British entry, but in a final version, the Foreign Office warned, it was still too early to say if the EEC would work.72 Only a year later would the balance of argument shift decisively in British minds. 73 Macmillan’s exaggerated regard for his personal relationships with the world’s leaders had brought few benefits and his inability to influence Eisenhower at the critical juncture of the Paris summit probably did affect him. The election of a new president would plunge the prime minister into considerable uncertainty and doubt. His Berlin policy remained predicated on an assumption of Western weakness, the need to stabilise the ‘abnormal situation’ in the city and for concessions to the USSR. The best hope for this was that the change of administration in America would lead to a concurrent change in Berlin policy. Attempts by the British to play the honest broker between East and West were at an end. The independent actor on the world stage

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

61

was going to have learn to accept the restrictions of being a junior partner.

Finding a role: junior partnership With the arrival of the Kennedy Administration, Britain’s role in the crisis changed. The failure of Macmillan’s personal diplomacy at Paris had not dimmed his enthusiasm for summitry, but the signs were that the new administration agreed on the need for direct contact between East and West. Hence, there was little for the British to contribute, beyond repetition of their previous arguments for an interim agreement on Berlin. An early attempt by the prime minister to advise the president on how to deal with Khrushchev failed and he was ‘somewhat brusquely’ made aware by Kennedy that he was not going to use him as an ‘honest broker’ to set up a summit with Khrushchev.74 While the Kennedy Administration never completely agreed with the British on a Berlin strategy, notably on military preparations, nonetheless there did develop broad agreement on the need to negotiate. As the Berlin crisis reached a climax in the summer of 1961 with the closing of the sector boundary and later the building of the Wall, the Western alliance became polarised between Germany and France on one side and the Anglo-Saxons on the other. While the crisis in retrospect can be seen to have been stabilised by the Wall, Khrushchev’s action sharpened the differences between Britain and her European allies, as once again she was seen as the weakest of the Western allies. De Gaulle’s exploitation of this in the following years revealed the consequences of British indecision on its European policy. Macmillan believed that to encourage true interdependence in the free world Britain might ‘have to contemplate isolation in order to force through co-operation’. The problem was how to balance Germany and France. Profoundly miscalculating the importance of the Franco-German rapprochement, he thought French fears about a revived Germany offered some hope for Britain.

Might there be lurking danger of a complete reversal – neutralism in exchange for some degree of German reunification? . . . Under the influence of a growing fear of Germany’s wealth and strength, the French might be persuaded to accept an agreement between EEC and EFTA and a political structure in Europe which brought Britain in as a balance.75

62 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Macmillan mused that Adenauer might be alarmed about losing British support in the defence of the ‘Empire of Charlemagne and its outpost Berlin’, unless he supported the British on the EEC–EFTA. If serious the prime minister was deluding himself about the importance Adenauer attached to ‘British support’ on Berlin, which had been highly suspect for two years, but did conclude that Adenauer would support de Gaulle, ‘unless very extreme pressures are put on him’.76 These ideas were brought together in the ‘Grand Design’ which was dispatched to Kennedy in the form of a long ‘think-piece’ at the end of December 1960 – Macmillan anxiously awaited his response. His suggestion that a mild form of tripartitism be pursued evoked a stony response from Washington. Indeed, the ‘think-piece’ was mislaid and ended up in the White House nursery of Kennedy’s three-year-old daughter, Caroline, from where it was retrieved when Professor J. K. Galbraith arrived to discuss it with the president. 77 When the two leaders met to discuss Berlin, Dean Acheson, invited by the president to present his as yet unfinished report on the crisis, gave a ‘blood-curdling recital’ which ‘distressed’ Macmillan. 78 He argued Berlin was a general test of will and if the West failed it, Germany would be prised away from the Western alliance. Some kind of military response would be required in the event of substantial interference with civilian or military access, although not over purely formal matters such as stamping of passes. Responding by threat of nuclear action would be unwise and reckless and moreover would not be believed. What was needed was a test of will, making clear that Western interest in access was more important than USSR interest in preventing access. On the ground the West could raise some difficult questions for the Soviets, through a division, with another in support, attempting to force passage to Berlin. There would be no resort to nuclear weapons and the West would have tested Soviet determination over Berlin. If the Soviets repulsed the attempt, there would a general realisation of the need to increase defensive efforts, as in the Korean War. 79 Macmillan proposed bilateral talks be held on what to do if access was blocked, which was agreed, and that the West’s rights be based on a new treaty to allow Khrushchev to ‘get off the hook’. Acheson denied that the USSR was on the hook. Khrushchev was not a legalist, he was pushing to divide the allies, he said.80 Overall, this first Macmillan– Kennedy contact had been quite successful and broke the ice between the two leaders, although, even by June, the relationship remained ‘quite tentative’.81 In Vienna, in a famous exchange, Khrushchev restated his familiar terms on Berlin to Kennedy. 82 Stopping off in London on

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

63

the way home, the president appeared to Macmillan ‘rather stunned’ by his Vienna experience. 83 Eschewing a formal meeting, at Macmillan’s suggestion, the two leaders met privately in Macmillan’s rooms for two hours – an important stage in their developing friendship, which was to become ‘Kennedy’s closest personal relationship with a foreign leader’. 84 Thereafter the relationship between Macmillan and Kennedy grew warmer and: ‘a fondness developed between them which went beyond the necessities of alliance’. 85 Kennedy thanked Macmillan after his London stop, ‘It was a very helpful meeting, for me, and I value our open and friendly conversations more and more.’86 As before in the crisis, the British decided to do nothing overt in case the Americans made the UK ‘the scapegoat for the adoption of a weak policy on Berlin’.87 Macmillan endorsed the eventual policy that Kennedy decided upon for a military build-up coupled with an offer of negotiations in early July.88 Privately he regarded the American contingency planning as ‘absurd’.89 American acceptance of the need to keep open the possibility of negotiations was crucial in his decision. As Kennedy had made this clear in a television address in late July 1961, the arguments over military plans had the air of irrelevance to the British. The president was clearly cautious about precipitating a military clash over Berlin, but believed the West’s will needed to be demonstrated through active and credible military preparations. The British response, to criticise and refuse to endorse any explicit planning and training for ground action, ensured that doubts about their resolve continued. Overall though, the American assessment of British reliability remained fundamentally unchanged from the Eisenhower period – anti-German, fundamentally inclined to compromise, but ultimately supporting American policy. 90 Negotiations remained the main plank in Macmillan’s policy, but as this had been accepted by the Americans as part of their doublebarrelled policy of military preparations and talks, 91 he had little to contribute, beyond advice on the form and content of any discussions. 92 In fact, the British found themselves disagreeing with both barrels of the American policy at once: the military measures proposed would be difficult for the UK, not least because it would be politically highly problematic to reintroduce conscription; and American pressure for negotiations with the Soviets was becoming so intense it had begun to worry the French and Germans. Douglas Home, the British foreign secretary found himself trying to restrain Dean Rusk, the US secretary of state over negotiations ahead of the NATO meeting in Paris. 93 The danger, in British eyes, was that the French and Germans might turn

64 The Berlin Wall Crisis

against all negotiations if the US pushed too hard, while military preparations only added to the air of crisis. The British continued to argue against raising the nuclear threshold, preferring to maximise uncertainty for the USSR, which underscored their resistance to building up conventional forces in Germany. 94 When the sector boundary was closed on 13 August 1961, the Americans eventually sent a battle group up the autobahn to West Berlin, but no British troops arrived in the city that day. The prime minister noted ‘militarily this is nonsense’ and fretted that ‘with both sides bluffing, disaster may come by mistake’.95 Inclined to do nothing, he refused to send a battalion from Britain to reinforce Berlin although some armoured cars were eventually sent by train as a gesture. British public opinion appeared largely indifferent to Berlin.96 As it became clear that the Western presence in West Berlin was not being directly threatened, the British sought to play down the air of crisis, with the Soviet action judged to be essentially defensive and not part of an escalating campaign.97 The British found themselves agreeing ‘on almost every aspect of the problem’ with the US. 98 However, Macmillan’s preoccupation with accidental war limited what he was prepared to accept in the field of military planning. Accepting that aircraft might have to be pre-positioned near the air corridor, he demanded that a special order be sent on the rules of engagement: ‘(To make) it clear to all Commanders that no reply to any Russian attack, e.g. if they attack an aeroplane of ours, is to be made without the express approval of the Heads of Government.’ 99 Golfing in Scotland when the crisis broke, he had emphasised an air of sang-froid, refused to cut his holiday short and avoided appearing excited, but privately fretted about an accidental disaster. Caught by the press on the eighteenth tee at Gleneagles he lost his legendary temper and said the crisis had been ‘got up by the press’, adding ‘nobody is going to fight about it’. 100 The British were by no means unhappy with the outcome of the Wall. The ugly barrier between the two Berlins demonstrated the failure of the communist system, while the Soviet fait accompli reduced pressure on the West’s position in the city, making the Western negotiating position easier.101 Instead of seeking to overturn the situation, the British now saw a continuation of things as they were, in exchange for de facto dealings with the GDR and recognition of the Oder–Neisse Line (the post-World War II German–Polish border), as the best the West could hope for and believed such an outcome could be presented by both sides as a victory. 102 Pace British fears Khrushchev did not terminate the

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

65

occupation regime in Berlin when he finally acted in the city and built the Wall. Macmillan’s focus on talks may have calmed the situation down, but the threat of armed force contained in the American military preparations in the summer of 1961 provided an effective deterrent to further Soviet action. The prime minister’s policy added very little and the Wall which followed meant the end to his hopes of détente with the USSR for the time being. Junior partnership with America was to be the best that a British prime minister could hope for – the ultimate expression of which was the Nassau agreement in December 1962 which saw Macmillan charm his American partner out of Polaris missiles and Britain out of EEC membership when de Gaulle subsequently vetoed British entry.

Conclusion Macmillan’s policy during the Berlin crisis reveals the extent to which British foreign policy makers still conceived of an independent and leading role for Britain in foreign affairs. For the entire Berlin crisis, Macmillan dreamed of an accommodation with the Soviets which was fundamentally inimical to Britain’s alliance commitments and profoundly damaging to the FRG. That it was seriously considered at the highest levels of the British establishment for so many years illustrates how far Britain’s self-image had failed to keep abreast of reality. Macmillan faced almost no opposition to his foreign policy stance on Berlin during the years 1958–1961 and was only presented with determined opposition from the Foreign Office when his wild schemes for the leadership of Europe became predicated on the break-up of NATO. As a result, the opportunities of the time were squandered, most seriously the possibility of German support for Britain’s stance on Europe. By consistently appearing the weakest link in the Western defence chain around Berlin, the British government was irrevocably tainted in Adenauer’s eyes. By 1961 Macmillan had come to conclude that Britain’s future lay in Europe, but could not bring himself to really consider Germany as an equal partner. This was all the more surprising given the exaggerated focus on trade relations which Macmillan displayed throughout the Berlin crisis. Although it was misconceived to regard the EFTA–EEC dispute as linked and important in the Berlin question, given that premise, the need for German support should have been obvious. Contrary to the argument that British policy towards Germany and East–West

66 The Berlin Wall Crisis

relations in this period advanced détente, in reality, Macmillan’s highprofile pursuit of the chimera of regular summit meetings, almost ‘a revival of the concert of Europe’, ended in tatters with the farce of the Paris summit in May 1960. 103 It revealed not only the futility of summit meetings in the absence of any true basis for agreement, but also the dangers. The greatest of these proved to be how easily a British prime minister could convince himself of the opportunity for agreement in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary. When the summit failed, much of Macmillan’s whole approach to East–West relations, and by implication to Germany too, was redundant. By emphasising the need for face-to-face contact as a way out of the Berlin dilemma, Macmillan flew in the face of reality, both the reality of Britain’s position and influence, and the reality of the division of Germany. Elegant constructions of the same fundamentals could not alter the fact that the West was not prepared to see its rights in West Berlin abrogated and the East was determined to extinguish all remnants of the occupation regime. The atmosphere of division and upset was needless because, ultimately, British policy was never going to really deviate from that of the alliance, nor could it. At the working level the foreign policy establishment of Whitehall knew this and repeated this mantra for almost four years. At the political level, a period of collective self-delusion appears to have overtaken the British foreign policy establishment. Macmillan could not decide, but remained tempted by the idea of a ‘traditional’ detachment. With such attitudes at the heart of British policy, his belated decision in 1961 to apply to join the EEC, which grew out of the reassessment following the fiasco of the 1960 Paris summit, made no difference. De Gaulle’s resulting veto, and Adenauer’s acquiescence in it, revealed the failure of Britain’s approach to a whole spectrum of problems. The over-riding objective of British policy appears to have always been to merely get over the short-term crisis, rather than face the need for fundamental change, a bankrupt approach to foreign relations as was demonstrated. Almost more surprising than the lack of a strategic vision was the extent to which Macmillan and his advisers appeared to believe that fundamental changes in the ordering of Europe were still possible by the start of the 1960s. The dynamic phase of the Cold War was over, but apparently this was not yet appreciated in London, with the prime minister considering moving Germany in this way and that – hopelessly overstating the flexibility which existed for any of the main powers involved. Detailed negotiations with the USSR over access rights which the West were not prepared to give up and which the Soviets

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

67

wanted to terminate were never going to succeed. Offers to the USSR of security schemes which would have fundamentally altered (if not destroyed) the security structures which had been built up over the preceding 15 years in Western Europe were never going to prove acceptable to Macmillan’s allies. Britain could not act as an honest broker between East and West because she was a committed member of the Western defence structure and thus could not really take a lead. Since this was probably appreciated by most of the officials concerned, why was the almost inevitable opprobrium of Britain’s allies risked? Britain positioned itself awkwardly within the alliance. On the one hand, she was a loyal and broadly reliable ally of America, but not one which wholeheartedly backed American leads and so was not wholly trusted to stand firm. On the other hand, Britain was a European power of great importance to the continent and its future, but whose policy on the security structure of the Western alliance was deeply suspect to the FRG (the linchpin of Western defence) and whose Atlantic pretensions would ensure French hostility to her integration within the emerging community. Macmillan must bear much of the blame for the situation. Britain was admittedly torn between the continent and America, but his policy simply exacerbated an already difficult situation. From his doomed attempts to pursue an independent policy, the acceptance of junior partnership with America, to his belated turn to Europe, he undermined his efforts through a lack of appreciation for the importance of Germany and an arrogance that Britain would always be seen by her allies as indispensable. If the Berlin crisis revealed the limits of interests and force to both East and West – confirming the post-war status quo – it also illustrated the hollow nature of Britain’s pretensions to independence. To play the role of an Atlantic-facing European power, as has continued to be the British preference, required sacrifices. The Berlin crisis demonstrated to British policy makers what they were going to be.

Notes 1. Geoffrey McDermott, Berlin: Success of a Mission? (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963) p. 11. As an occupied city, each power had a military commandant in Berlin – in the British case Major General Delacombe. McDermott, the senior political adviser, was deputy commandant in Berlin from 2 July 1961. 2. On the historical relationship between Britain and the continent, see Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Ashfield Press, 1989).

68 The Berlin Wall Crisis 3. PM’s Minute, Macmillan to Lloyd, 17 December 1957, Public Records Office (hereafter PRO) FO371/137398. (Emphasis added.) 4. Alistair Horne, Macmillan Vol II 1957–1986 (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), p. 120. 5. Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 144. 6. One author notes this was no magnanimous gesture, but was only given ‘perhaps because it was so patently unrealistic that one would not have to worry about the possibility that it might succeed’. Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America and Europe (London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 139. 7. PM’s Note to Sir William Strang, 6 July 1953 and PM’s Minute to Strang, 31 May 1953, PRO PREM11/449. 8. This policy came in for much criticism, not least from Adenauer’s political opponents. In 1990 it was noted that the realisation of reunification could be seen as a ‘posthumous triumph for Adenauer’ and his patient policy of negotiation from strength, Harold James, ‘Moscow’s well-trodden path to German unity’, The Times, 4 May 1990. 9. D. C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 128–9. 10. FO Minute, Hoyer-Miller to G. Harrison, 7 February 1956, PRO FO371/ 124544. 11. See D. C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965). 12. Hans von Herwarth, Von Adenauer zu Brandt: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Propyläen, 1990), p. 224. 13. For a discussion of the contradictions inherent in Adenauer’s position see Hanrieder, Germany, America and Europe, pp. 131–70. 14. On Macmillan’s interest in a summit see Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956–1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971); and Horne, Macmillan Vol II, Ch. 5. On Eisenhower’s cool response see PRO PREM11/2327. Eisenhower was president until January 1961. 15. D. R. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 287. 16. Taken from a draft reply to Macmillan by Lloyd on German reunification dated 10 January 1958. Although never signed by Lloyd, the contents were discussed with Macmillan and the draft was later sent to Downing St. Direct quotations from this paper appear in position papers on German reunification for the rest of 1958, PRO FO371/137398. 17. Draft reply, Lloyd to PM, 10 January 1958, PRO FO371/137398. 18. Report by officials, 5 June 1958, PRO PREM11/2321. 19. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1991), pp. 467–501. 20. In this speech of 20 February 1946 (two weeks before Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech at Fulton) Macmillan suggested that Soviet policy was essentially defensive, Alistair Horne, Macmillan Vol I 1891–1956 (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), p. 306. 21. Lord (Julian) Amery quoted in John P. S. Gearson, ‘British Policy and the Berlin Wall Crisis 1958–1961: Witness Seminar’, Contemporary Record, 6 (1) pp. 107–77 (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 138. 22. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon and Schuster, 1994) p. 600.

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

69

23. Record of visit by PM to Bonn, 12–13 March 1959, Meeting No. 1, Palais Schaumberg (12 Mar), PRO PREM11/2676. 24. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics, p. 145. 25. Memcon, Eisenhower and Adenauer, 27 May 1959, Whitman files, Box 41, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL). 26. The German ambassador also believed Britain could be relied upon to stand by Germany in the last resort, Herwarth, Von Adenauer, p. 223. 27. Steel to FO, No. 658, 26 Jun 1959, PRO PREM11/2706. 28. PM’s Minute, Macmillan to Bishop, 31 Jul 1960, PRO PREM11/2983. See Ch. 6. 29. Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957–1963: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995), p. 8. 30. Lloyd to Wash No. 8112, 15 November 1958, PRO FO371/137336. 31. (Emphasis added) FO to Wash No. 8113, 15 November 1958, FO371/ 137336. 32. FO to Wash No. 8113, 15 Nov 1958, PRO FO371/137336. In October 1954 the Western powers reasserted their rights in Berlin following the establishment of the GDR, which the West refused to recognise. 33. Sir Bernard Ledwidge, quoted in Gearson, ‘British Policy and the Berlin Wall Crisis’ (1992) pp. 129–30. 34. Terrence Prittie, Adenauer (London: Tom Stacey, 1972), p. 265; and Charles De Gaulle, trans. Terrence Killmartin, Memoirs of Hope (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 217. 35. Diary entry 16 January 1959, Macmillan, 1971, pp. 580–1. 36. FO Minute, CP Hope, 2 February 1959: Briefing to News Dept by Rumbold, PRO FO371/143433. 37. The trip, which was the first visit in peacetime to the Soviet Union by a British prime minister, became known as a Voyage of Discovery and is the title of the chapter dealing with it in Macmillan, Riding the Storm, Ch. 18. 38. Lord Carver recalled talks in Washington on contingency planning which became rather heated. Michael Carver, Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshal (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 286. 39. During Dulles’ visit in Feb, Adenauer asked rhetorically whether anyone knew the date of the coming British elections. Memcon, Dulles and Adenauer, 8 February 1959, State Dept. 762.00/2-859, US National Archive and Record Service (hereafter NARS). 40. Memcon, M Alphand (French Am. to US) and Robert McBride (State Dept), 8 February 1959, State Dept. 762.00/2-859, NARS. 41. Steel to FO, No. 227, 14 Feb 1959, PRO PREM11/2708. The German ambassador rarely heard Adenauer criticise Macmillan, only his policies, Interview by author with Herr Hans von Herwarth. 42. Steel to FO, No. 243, 18 Feb 1959, PRO PREM11/2708. 43. Record of visit, p. 11, PRO PREM11/2609. 44. Record of visit, p. 11, PRO PREM11/2609. 45. Record of visit, p. 12, PRO PREM11/2609. 46. Record of visit, p. 31, PRO PREM11/2609. 47. Hints had come earlier though – a Soviet Note to the Western powers in January had made no reference to the deadline.

70 The Berlin Wall Crisis 48. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 125. This exchange is not reported in the official record and is based on interviews by Horne with Macmillan. 49. Lord Tom Brimelow, quoted in Gearson, ‘British Policy and the Berlin Wall Crisis’ (1992) p. 138. 50. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 126. Based on interviews by Horne with Macmillan. In the official record and Macmillan’s memoirs mention is only made of the toothache and not any attributed insult. Whether Macmillan recalled the bizarre meeting incorrectly or preferred to be diplomatic is not clear. 51. Record of visit, p. 37, PRO PREM11/2609. 52. Record of conversation, Lloyd & Kuznetsov, 28 February 1959, Record of visit, pp. 60–1, PRO PREM11/2609. 53. The Berlin discussion is only reported in a Top Secret annex to record of visit, p. 4. 54. Record of visit, PRO PREM11/2609, p. 61. 55. Memcon, Eisenhower & Macmillan, 20 March 1959, re reply to Soviet Note, National Security Archive Berlin Series (hereafter NSA). (An odd explanation for World War I which came about after a period of enormous rearmament by the great powers.) 56. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 132. 57. PM’s telegram to Lloyd, T420/59, 30 July 1959, PRO PREM11/2675. 58. Lloyd to Macmillan, No. 367, 29 July 1959, PRO FO371/145888. Christian Herter became Secretary of State following Dulles’ death. 59. PM’s Tel T381/59, PM to Lloyd, 22 October 1959, PRO PREM11/2679. 60. Statements by the PM in Record of a meeting, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Eisenhower at the Elysee, 15 May 1960, PRO PREM11/2992. 61. Lloyd to Herter and Couve in Record of a meeting at the Quai d’Orsay, 18 May 1960, PRO PREM11/2992. 62. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 231. 63. Ibid. 64. Telegram, Herter to State, 18 May 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960 Volume IX: Berlin Crisis 1959–1960: Germany; Austria (Washington DC: USGPO, 1993), pp. 497–8. 65. Philip de Zulueta quoted in Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 231. 66. PM’s minute M177/60, PM to Lloyd, 24 May 1960, PRO PREM11/2988. 67. PM’s Minute No. 268/60 (Secret and Personal) Macmillan to Bishop, re his paper of 8 July 1960 on external relations, 31 July 1960, PREM11/2983. 68. The cabinet had been reshuffled at the end of July 1960. Heathcote Amory, the chancellor of the exchequer, retired from politics and Lloyd, somewhat surprisingly, replaced him at the treasury. Lord (Alec) Home was given the Foreign Office. 69. Note, JW to Tim Bligh, 19 September 1960, PRO PREM11/3334. 70. His biographer ascribes it to a sense of weakness, Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 256. 71. Record of conversation between Macmillan and de Gaulle, 5 April 1960, PRO PREM11/2978. 72. FO Memo: Britain and the Six, 14 June 1960, PRO FO371/153116. 73. On 31 July 1961 Macmillan announced Britain’s application to join the EEC. 74. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 296.

Britain and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62

71

75. PM’s memo on future policy, 29 December 1960–3 January 1961, PRO PREM11/3325. 76. ‘Germans, in particular, never yield to force of arguments, but only to the argument of force.’ Ibid. 77. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 286. 78. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 380. The British record of this meeting has been withheld, but has been reproduced in Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963 Volume XIV Berlin Crisis 1961–1962 (Washington DC: USGPO, 1993), pp. 36–40. 79. FRUS 1961–1963 Vol XIV p. 37. See also Crisis over Berlin Pt 5. pp. 14–16. 80. Crisis over Berlin Pt 5. p. 18. 81. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 375. 82. The US record of the talks is in Memcons 4th & 5th June 1961, Meeting between the president and Khrushchev, NSA. See also Michael Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisis Years 1960–63 (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), Ch. 9, pp. 211–36; Crisis over Berlin Pt 5; and FRUS 1961–1963 Vol XIV. 83. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 303. 84. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 376. No record of the private meeting has been released by either side. Macmillan’s briefing paper on Berlin for the meeting has been withheld. One source is: Note of points made during the Private Discussion between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Admiralty House on June 5, 8 June 1961, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL) White House Private office files Box 127a, Folder: UK Security Folder 3. 85. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), p. 558. 86. Kennedy to PM, 10 June 1961, PRO PREM11/3328. 87. FO Minute Killick, 14 July 1961, PRO FO371/161206. 88. ‘I am sure our right line is to sit tight and say and do as little as possible at this stage.’ PM’s comments, 11 July 1961, PRO PREM11/3616. 89. Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 1959–1961 (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 389. 90. Bruce, diary entry, 16 July 1961, reporting telegram to Washington, NSA. 91. FO Minute, Home to PM, PM/61/109, 3 August 1961, PRO FO371/160542. 92. Note by Shuckburgh, 9 August 1961, PRO FO371/160543. 93. Record of conversation, Home and Rusk, 5 August 1961, PRO FO371/ 160541. 94. Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis 1958–1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 154–5. Schick perhaps goes too far in claiming the British saw tactical nuclear weapons as a substitute to a probe – they were against all forms of military action. 95. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 312. 96. Letter, Steel to Shuckburgh (10149) 21 August 1961, stated that The Times correspondent warned him that the UK public was indifferent to Berlin and tended towards neutralism. Shuckburgh notes in margin ‘I’m afraid he is not far wrong’, PRO FO371/160511. 97. Roberts to Shuckburgh, 23 August 1961, PRO FO371/160548. 98. Record of conversation with US ambassador, 15 August 1961, FO371/ 160544.

72 The Berlin Wall Crisis 99. PM’s note of telephone conversation with Home, August 25 1961, FO371/ 160544. 100. Horne, Macmillan Vol II, p. 312. Macmillan qualified this shortly afterwards and sent Kennedy an explanation, PM to Kennedy No. 5877, August 27 1961, PRO FO371/160547. He notes in his memoirs ‘It was undoubtedly a “gaffe”’, Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 395. 101. Letter, Steel to Shuckburgh, 25 August 1961, PRO FO371/160548. 102. FO Minute, Killick, 23 August 1961, (plus comments by Shuckburgh) PRO FO371/160548. 103. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany, p. 139.

5 De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon1 Cyril Buffet

‘Thank you for giving me the instrument of my policy.’ (General de Gaulle to French Air Force officers)2 There are films about history, the history of which itself reflects history. One of them is the beautiful film by the American director Lewis Milestone about a novel written by a German writer, Erich Maria Remarque, on World War I, All Quiet on the Western Front (1930). When this pacifist movie was shown for the first time in Berlin in the early 1930s, the Nazis obstructed the screening by setting free white mice in cinemas where the film was shown. After this event, the film was forbidden. Sixty years later, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, it was once more possible to gain access to certain underground stations in East Berlin which had been closed for 28 years. There, on the walls of the stations, could be seen posters and advertisements dating from August 1961; they included the cinema programme of that time. One of the films advertised there was All Quiet on the Western Front. Many Berliners felt that this title was a good illustration of the shameful passiveness of the Western powers in 1961, of their impotence, and perhaps even their relief that all had remained quiet when in the East, the Wall had gone up. Just after the construction of the Berlin Wall, the German popular newspaper Bild ran the headline: ‘The West does nothing. Kennedy keeps quiet . . . Macmillan is going hunting . . . and Adenauer scolds Brandt.’ No mention, however, of General de Gaulle.3 Why? What was the French president doing at that time? Like his American and British counterparts, he was on holiday, in his cottage at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises. The forcible isolation of the Eastern sector of Berlin did not seem to surprise, 73

74 The Berlin Wall Crisis

worry or disturb the general: he only returned to the Elysée Palace four days after the beginning of the operation ‘Great Wall of China’. Nor do de Gaulle’s memoirs betray much anxiety in the face of the events in Berlin, to which he only dedicated three lines.4 The French government’s silence was all the more surprising as Charles de Gaulle had adopted a firm position from the beginning of the crisis, three years earlier. After 13 August 1961, he estimated that the crisis was over. One month later, in a press conference, he presented his interpretation of the second Berlin crisis. He declared that it was an ‘absolutely ridiculous red herring’.5 In fact the Wall, which concretised the division of the world by a real ‘Iron Curtain’, was described by him as a mere confirmation of the status quo, better, in any case, than a Soviet gain.6 The Wall marked a provisional solution of the issue of the future of the German capital. As the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, would admit: ‘For us, that resolves the Berlin problem’.7 Nevertheless, the French used this issue to develop a new diplomatic strategy which would allow France to be recognised again as a world power and to play a greater role in the reorganisation of the international system. In order to achieve this aim, de Gaulle wanted to obtain the atomic bomb. He believed that he would thus be the equal of the Americans and the British. Furthermore the acquisition of the nuclear weapon constituted for him the preliminary condition for a rapprochement with Adenauer, because it was a guarantee of a lasting superiority over Germany. 8 De Gaulle had a very particular conception of international relations in which ‘war is against our enemies, peace is against our friends’.9 And he seemed to implement this forceful formula throughout the years of his presidency. But he did not succeed in changing the terms of the power struggle, either within NATO or between East and West. He also tried to obtain Adenauer’s support to put pressure on the Americans. That was one of the reasons why, before the construction of the Wall, de Gaulle made such a great display of firmness in his policy towards Berlin. He was also deeply convinced that the Soviets were only bluffing. 10 In Rambouillet in December 1959, he told Eisenhower and Macmillan of his belief that ‘the Russians don’t want war’. 11 This to him justified an uncompromising stance. The years of the second Berlin crisis (1958–1962) coincided with French efforts to be acknowledged as leaders of Western Europe (De Gaulle refused to let the Americans pretend to be the ‘spokesmen’ of the allies but he in turn claimed to play this role for the Germans). De Gaulle used the nuclear weapon – the so-called strike-force (force de frappe) – as a political instrument to realise this key objective, and also

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 75

to enhance the position of France relative to Great Britain and the United States. Yet in reality, he did not possess the means to determine the course of events.

Ultimate memorandum It seems that from the beginning, de Gaulle took advantage of the Berlin crisis to try to reorientate the US position concerning the internal reorganisation of the Atlantic Alliance and to bring about a reconciliation with Germany. On 14 September 1958, he met Chancellor Adenauer for the first time at Colombey; the two statesmen exchanged general ideas on the future. Adenauer expressed doubts about ‘the long-term attitude of the United States’ and he recommended in consequence to ‘create an independent Europe’. He proposed that France and Germany should open ‘the era of the permanent dialogue’. De Gaulle agreed, but he particularly insisted on the necessity to modify the relationship with the Americans. He denounced the ‘unsatisfactory’ working of NATO, lamenting the lack of ‘political unity’: he emphasised that ‘the unity of NATO will be possible only if America is linked to Europe’. De Gaulle was never against the Atlantic Alliance. His reform project aimed in his mind not to weaken it but on the contrary to strengthen it.12 For instance, he spoke to Macmillan of ‘our Atlantic Alliance’, ‘the bases and the functioning’ of which had to be ‘thoroughly reconsider[ed]’.13 The General wanted to establish a new relationship founded on equality: ‘We want to cooperate without being the instrument of America’. De Gaulle finally suggested to Adenauer to introduce a ‘permanent consultation’ mechanism with regard to five ‘practical questions’, especially disarmament and joint arms production. 14 In brief, he wanted to strengthen the understanding between Paris and Bonn. But could this possibly, at the time, be a relationship between equals? Unlike the FRG, France still had worldwide responsibilities, and one of these, only one of these, was the responsibility for the fate of Berlin, and of Germany as a whole. That was why General de Gaulle did not breathe a word to Adenauer of his intention, only three days later, to send a memorandum to Eisenhower and to Macmillan, proposing a tripartite directorate for the Atlantic Alliance.15 This behaviour on the part of de Gaulle was certainly not the best way of creating an atmosphere of confidence between France and Germany. Adenauer was furious not to have been informed.16 The German Chancellor believed that the French General wanted to compensate the

76 The Berlin Wall Crisis

increasing economic and military weight of the Federal Republic by obtaining a privileged position within the Atlantic Alliance and in Europe. To avoid the French strategy and the establishing of a triumvirate, Adenauer relied on the support of the Americans and he accentuated the tension between the British and the French concerning the Common Market. 17 Although de Gaulle’s memorandum was kept secret, it was Western disagreements such as these which Khrushchev may have sought to exploit through the Berlin crisis. The need for the restructuring of NATO was at that time the top priority of de Gaulle’s foreign policy which aimed to restore the international prestige and authority of France: 18 he wanted ‘to elevate France out of the ruck of European countries’. 19 His ambition was to replace integration with cooperation.20 What he wanted was ‘a closer form of consultation’ between the three Western powers.21 As he explained later to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, he had in mind ‘a special body such as the Allies had maintained in permanent session following the Versailles Treaty for political cooperation between governments to deal with both political and military matters’. 22 In the same vein, de Gaulle with his nostalgia for the lost world of the nineteenth century tried to elicit Selwyn Lloyd’s support by proposing ‘something analogous to the Concert of Europe which had kept the peace between 1870 and 1914’, a concept which he knew evoked fond memories also in Britain. Now, however, what was needed was ‘a World Concert’. 23 Yet weakened by the burden of the Algerian war which continued to trouble France throughout the entire duration of the Berlin crisis, de Gaulle was not really in a good position to win acceptance for his views. Nevertheless he argued that the Western differences about Berlin underscored the lack of coordination within the Alliance and justified the French proposal concerning a tripartite strategic consultation. He thought that since the advent of nuclear parity between the two superpowers, the American promise of protection had become illusory. In his view the Berlin crisis was proof that the United States was not ready to defend Europe at all cost. De Gaulle concluded that France as a NATO member was neither mistress of her own fate, nor could she rely on America’s nuclear guarantee, the worst of all bargains. In these conditions, the only solution was to strike a new bargain, in which ‘the defence of France must be French’ and in which ‘France must have a nuclear force de frappe capable of intervening in the whole world’.24 Yet de Gaulle strove in vain to modify the NATO structure at the top, while according absolute priority to France’s national independence in matters of defence.

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 77

For at least several months after the delivery of the memorandum, the General hoped to obtain some compensations from his allies.25 That was why he did not attempt to increase collaboration with the FRG. The second meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer on 26 November 1958 (just a day before Khrushchev announced his ultimatum) at Bad Kreuznach demonstrated France’s reticence. Despite the strong insistence of the Chancellor, de Gaulle several times evaded any discussion of Berlin, although the French delegation had brought along a voluminous file on that question. The final communiqué of the conference only mentioned the ‘attachment’ of Paris and Bonn to the respect of the status quo in Berlin. During the first months of the Berlin crisis, the French tried again and again to promote the idea of the institutionalisation of a tripartite directorate of the Atlantic Alliance. Early in November 1958, Maurice Couve de Murville explained to Harold Macmillan in London that the French Government were anxious to discuss long-term planning with the United States. He agreed that in some cases the United States authorities did not know themselves what their long term plans were but tripartite consultation might at least have the effect of stimulating such planning which was badly needed.26 One month later, John Foster Dulles came to Paris to visit de Gaulle. The latter tried to reassure and convince the Secretary of State that France, of course, did not want to smash NATO, but in present circumstances she was not prepared to add to her present contribution. In particular she did not agree to IRBM’s in France, atomic stockpiles in France or the air defence of Europe under conditions where France would not have control of the situation. 27 At the same time de Gaulle told the British foreign secretary that he was categorically opposed to any arrangement whereby a nuclear war could be started with weapons deployed on French territory and controlled by another power.28 Protesting his good faith, General de Gaulle sought to demonstrate the soundness of his views in referring to the international context: De Gaulle’s line was on the whole very tough. He declared that the West should never yield in the face of force. The only way to prevent a war was not to refuse to accept a challenge of war . . . De Gaulle was

78 The Berlin Wall Crisis

at pains to represent that he was not trying to profit from the present situation in Berlin to induce his allies to accept his ideas as regards co-ordination of policy generally. The Berlin crisis had arisen after he had put forward his plan, but it was true, he thought, that it ‘showed flaws’ in the existing alliance . . . It was for that reason that he believed that we should try to hammer out a common policy . . . All this showed, he said, how unsatisfactory the present system of consultation was, but he repeated that his criticism had no connection with the maintenance of allied unity as regards Berlin. On the other hand, it was true that the whole working of the Western alliance was now in jeopardy. As regards the real objective of France in proposing tripartite consultations it was, broadly speaking, to get going on what he called pourparlers organiques29 in Washington in order to foresee all possibilities. In addition to this there should be some common strategic understanding . . . In a word, if France was useful to NATO, then France should, in a way, be able to speak for NATO.30 Dulles was not persuaded by de Gaulle’s arguments. He only agreed to ‘informal’ consultations, but, in fact, as Macmillan wrote to the British ambassador in Washington after a meeting with Adenauer, the French proposals were ‘unacceptable’.31 General Norstad was even more outspoken: he ‘said quite firmly to the French that as they were always last in every contribution to the real power of NATO he did not see how they could claim the first place’. 32 The French initiative seemed to be a spanner in the works of NATO. In any case, the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Heusinger, complained in August 1959 to his Defence Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, that, since the previous autumn, NATO had been ‘in limbo’, because the French were not willing to ‘co-operate positively’.33

Moscow on the Rhine During the entire winter of 1958–59, intense discussions between the Allies took place in the United States. From the beginning of January 1959 a tripartite Ambassadorial Group met in Washington. Two months later a similar structure was created in New York with the three UNO delegates. The French member played ‘a limited part’ in the deliberations of this small committee and in any case he did not contribute to get out of the East–West ‘deadlock’.34 The French interpreted the Soviet ultimatum as the attempt to obtain at best the ‘neutralisation of Germany’ and at the very least the ‘reinforcement of the GDR’s international

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 79

position’. 35 Like Paris, London considered that ‘the greater danger would be a neutralisation of Germany which would subsequently lead to a new Russo-German collusion’. Selwyn Lloyd estimated that the best way for warding off this danger was ‘the maintenance of the two Germanies, each included in opposed blocs, the whole topped by an agreement creating a zone of disengagement’.36 Such ideas fed the public debate in Europe concerning the German question. The Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) presented a Deutschlandplan37 and in France, two political key figures presented their own solution of the Berlin problem. 38 In early April, the former prime minister (President of the Council of Ministers) Pierre Mendès France, in a press conference put forward his project for a ‘security system’. He did not want to follow the Rapacki Plan of October 1957, as he considered the American military presence in Europe as an ‘essential security factor’. But he also wanted a force reduction in the area where the two blocs confronted each other. Therefore he wanted to ‘de-Berlinize’ the German question. He suggested that this should be done by creating three symmetric bands on each side of the inter-German border: in the middle, the ‘zero band’ with a breadth of 50–100 kilometres, would be totally disarmed. In the subsequent zones (band one) on each side, which included Berlin on the Eastern side, only conventionally armed national forces would be allowed, and this would also be a denuclearised zone. In both the bands two following on each side, all types of weapons would be allowed. Mendès France concluded that the Berlin problem would thus be resolved. All foreign troops would leave the former German capital and the United Nations would police the lines of communication between Berlin and the West. He criticised sharply the ‘negative and static’ attitude of the French government which clung to a status quo solution, something ‘everybody knows is undefendable’.39 A week later, the former Socialist home secretary and expert on disarmament questions, Jules Moch, publicised his views on the subject: he also thought of the maintenance of the status quo in Berlin as ‘explosive’, and yet he could not agree with Mendès France’s plan. Instead, he recommended the ‘Berlinization’ of the entire German problem by creating ‘concentric sectors centering around Berlin’. The city itself would constitute sector A: the four occupying powers would evacuate Berlin and would be replaced by ‘a small, symbolic UNO force’. Sector B would be ‘completely disarmed’ and only limited numbers of troops would be admitted into Sector C.40

80 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Neither of the two plans changed the position of the French government. At the same time, another security expert entered into the debate: the well-known General Pierre Gallois described the ‘Berlin affair’ as ‘the fear of a shadow’. In Gallois’s view, since the launching of Sputnik and Lunik, the Soviet Union had been trying to exploit the ‘political value’ of its ballistic missiles. But he added that ‘certain military measures, easy to take, can in future prevent an attack by thermonuclear missiles’. The development of tactical nuclear weapons would reduce the Soviet conventional superiority. Like de Gaulle, he established a link between the Berlin crisis and the creation of the force de frappe. He put forward two principal reasons: first, that the ‘possession of nuclear arms will be the only way to command respect for the independence and sovereignty of a state’. Secondly, he estimated that military alliances would only be effective in minor disputes in view of the high risks one was incurring in backing an ally in a major confrontation, if only that ally [here: West Germany, or worse still, only West Berlin] was threatened. Thus General Gallois made a case for the absolute necessity of having a French nuclear force. But he formulated two conditions: first, that Central Europe must not be demilitarised, because that would destroy the Western defence organisation; second, that the Americans must stay on the Continent in order to become involved automatically and directly in any conflict, and thus to be able to project the deterrent threat of nuclear escalation. The physical presence in Europe of the American forces to him was all the more indispensable as the Soviet intercontinental missiles underlined the vulnerability of American territory. General Gallois concluded by asserting that, ‘despite its importance, Berlin does not deserve that one even considers remotely the possibility of an exchange crushing thermonuclear blows’. Consequently, unlike Mendès France or Jules Moch, he though that ‘the status quo is doubtless what the West can obtain most easily and least dangerously’. 41 And it was this that de Gaulle said to Adenauer when they met on 4 March 1959 in Marly-le-Roi. The General promised to the Chancellor his total support with regard to Berlin. The British diplomat Bernard Ledwidge suggested that de Gaulle’s firmness resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union could no longer consider France as a ‘nuclear target’ after the withdrawal of the American nuclear weapons from France and the refusal of the French government to have American ICBMs on its territory.42 There is another explanation of the French firmness, regarded as ‘sticky’ by France’s allies: 43 they feared that a withdrawal

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 81

from Berlin would lead to the ‘neutralization’ of Germany. 44 Maurice Couve de Murville told his British counterpart, Selwyn Lloyd, that there was ‘a very serious danger of Germany going neutralist’, and that the French ‘thinking was completely governed by the need to tie Germany as tightly as possible to a Western association’.45 For the French ambassador in Bonn, it was essential that Germany should never have ‘the possibility to choose between West and East’. 46 De Gaulle summed up his own view by conjuring a daring geographic metaphor: it would be ‘very important not to have Moscow on the Rhine’.47 It was thus that he adopted his firm stance on the issue, refusing to take recourse to the United Nations for the resolution of the crisis.48 Instead, he preferred to plan, together with France’s allies, for ‘all the possibilities of ground action’ if the Khrushchev ultimatum were to come into effect.49 But the French rejected at the beginning the American proposal on ‘the use of military force . . . to maintain surface access’ to Berlin. In fact, as the NATO General Secretary Paul-Henri Spaak noticed, if ‘General de Gaulle’s attitude was extremely firm on policy’, it was on the contrary ‘vague on its execution’.50

Chêne Vivant In March 1959 General Norstad proposed the creation of a top secret quadripartite allied military planning group (LIVE OAK) thinking about the problems on access to Berlin. General Ely, French chief of staff, immediately gave a positive answer, even before the official approval of his government. The first draft elaborated by LIVE OAK planned that the French, after having ‘increased their stockpile in Berlin up to a 12 month level’, ‘should increase the use of the Autobahn for military traffic’.51 During the early period, they seemed to be satisfied with LIVE OAK which met besides near Paris. At the end of 1959, the French ‘were thinking of increasing the size of the LIVE OAK organisation’, 52 perhaps because they believed that they had finally reached their aim, the transformation of NATO’s leadership into a US–British– French troika. Indeed, during a Western summit held at Rambouillet, President Eisenhower proposed to de Gaulle and Macmillan on the Sunday morning of 20 December 1959 ‘the establishment of a tripartite machinery to operate on a clandestine basis’. The General ‘expressed himself very satisfied [sic]’. In a spirit of conciliation, he added that ‘he did not challenge the idea of a Supreme Command in war, nor would he object to this being an American’. 53 For his part, Macmillan was also delighted by the results of the meeting. He believed that he had

82 The Berlin Wall Crisis

succeeded in bringing ‘the French back to thinking of us as their main ally, and of Germany as a country that must be looked after for the general benefit’. 54 But this Sunday seemed to be another ‘Day of Dupes’ leading to a dead end, because the American Administration did not pursue this path any further. Consequently, the French returned to their charge, attempting again to change the course of Western policy. With regard to Berlin, they realised that LIVE OAK did not mean a first step towards the institutionalisation of a tripartite directorate of the Alliance. Maurice Couve de Murville later explained ‘that the liaison between the Ambassadorial Group and LIVE OAK exercises was still causing difficulties’ because LIVE OAK ‘was really without any physical contact with a political point of view’.55 Therefore at the beginning of 1960 the French suggested ‘a radical change in the organisation of contingency planning for Berlin’. They proposed to the Department of State and the Foreign Office ‘that a new group be set up in Paris to replace the three main groups [the Ambassadorial Groups in Washington and Bonn, and LIVE OAK at Camp des Loges in the outskirts of Paris] in the existing organisation’ in order to study ‘more elaborate military measures’. De Gaulle’s government criticised the incoherence of the contingency planning. They wanted to create ‘a single new group of high-ranking diplomats and general officers assisted by some experts’ which ‘would be established in Paris to facilitate liaison with SHAPE’. But in reality, the French plan had ‘political grounds’: once again, Paris tried to reduce ‘the disproportionate American influence’ and to introduce a new relationship among her allies, who rejected this plan considered as ‘unnecessary’ and ‘undesirable’.56 The timing of the French proposal is noteworthy, coming at just a few weeks after the explosion of the first French atomic bomb in the Sahara. The same day, General Gallois gave the unofficial interpretation of this event: after repeating the argument about nuclear parity and the strategic vulnerability of the United States, he explained that the force de frappe lessened the burden on the United States and ‘considerably reinforced the power of the defensive system of the free world’, because the existence of different decision-making centres should increase the fear of retaliation in the minds of the Soviet leaders. This use of the ‘second centre theory’ was taken by Gallois from the British Defence White Papers since 1957. Gallois saw the French bomb as an extension and improvement of existing deterrence. He added that NATO’s problems resulted from the divergence between

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 83

the strategy of means (la stratégie des moyens) which were national, and operational strategy (stratégie des operations), which was inter-allied. He recommended a joint effort among the Atlantic partners, mobilising all their intellectual and material resources, to compete with the ‘formidable rival’ which was the USSR. In this context, the French nuclear programme would constitute ‘the national contribution to the Western strategy of means’. 57 That meant that France wanted to have a share in the definition of the Alliance’s strategy. De Gaulle clearly declared just a few days after the French nuclear test at Reggane that France ‘must have allies, she does not need a protector’. 58 The bomb allowed France to recover her previous position of power and status, a fact that was recognised internationally with the summit meeting held in Paris in May 1960. The French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, admitted that de Gaulle deliberately delayed the date of this meeting, as he wanted ‘to explode “his” bomb’.59 This delay allowed him to create a de facto situation in favour of France as he feared that the summit would broach the subject of nuclear test stops. 60 Before the summit, de Gaulle arranged to meet Khrushchev for the first time just at the moment of the second French nuclear test. Preparing this meeting, the Soviets envisaged ‘to persuade de Gaulle to move away from the far reaching support’ to Adenauer and to convince him that the proposal of a peace treaty was a good solution to avoid that ‘the world can again find itself pulled into war by Germany’. That was why the Federal Republic ‘cannot have nuclear arms’. The Soviet Union tried to bring out ‘the definite similarity of views’ with France as regards Germany. 61 Khrushchev illustrated this supposed strategic convergence by showing himself interested by the idea first formulated by Jules Moch and then presented by de Gaulle in Paris. 62 The General told him that he objected to a ban of nuclear testing but that he was in favour of ‘general nuclear disarmament’, beginning for example with ‘some form of limitation of rockets and strategic aircraft’, systems which France did not yet possess. 63 De Gaulle intimated the same proposal to Washington and London. The minister of the Armed Forces, Pierre Messmer, told his British counterpart, Harold Watkinson, that the force de frappe was ‘in no sense negotiable’ and emphasised that ‘there would be no going back on that decision’. 64 Unfortunately for the General’s grand designs, the summit meeting ended in a failure on account of the U-2 incident, but the firmness of de Gaulle impressed his allies.65

84 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Tactical convergence De Gaulle had to resort to another initiative to reach his aim of improving the international standing of France, this time in Europe. But for this he needed West Germany’s support. Therefore, de Gaulle invited Adenauer to Rambouillet for 29 and 30 July 1960, just a few days after the draft of the first five-year defence programme (loi de programmation militaire) which gave top priority to the nuclear armament. During these two days spent in the palace of Rambouillet, the two statesmen had three very important private discussions which were frank, and yet full of ulterior designs. The General wanted to solder a close union with the Chancellor, what the British ambassador to Paris, Gladwyn Jebb, called ‘the curious love affair’ between de Gaulle and Adenauer. 66 This conference initiated a radical change in the French attitude. De Gaulle still wanted to reform the Atlantic Alliance but this time by using the weight of Europe and especially by trying to ‘capture’ the German power. In all this bliss, the Chancellor nevertheless indicated that in his view, the force de frappe upset the delicate balance of the Franco-German relationship. He doubted that it would be operational in the very near future, and he expressed his conviction that it was in no way able to substitute for American protection. He did not believe that France could bear the double burden of nuclear and conventional defence forces. Consequently, he suggested that the Bundeswehr should be the main conventional power to offset the powerful Red Army. But Adenauer agreed that the United States should share the control and the power to release nuclear weapons.67 The French president tried to loosen the bonds between Adenauer and the Americans – a manoeuvring that the latter thwarted all the more easily because the German Chancellor wanted above all an increasing American presence in Europe and because he also used the so-called de Gaulle alternative to put pressure on the United States for winning a larger political and strategic influence. For instance, the American Secretary of State warned the French ambassador in Washington that ‘the United States would very definitely be disturbed’ if ‘a French– German axis’ developed ‘at the expense of NATO and the Atlantic Community’. Hervé Alphand could only protest ‘that such intent had been expressly denied’.68 However that may be, de Gaulle said to Adenauer that the Berlin crisis proved that European security depended on ‘the whims of the Americans’. It was also possible that he believed in the reality and credibility of the American deterrence, but he used this

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 85

fear to put pressure on Adenauer and to justify the necessity of the force de frappe. The General wanted to bait his German colleague: he proposed his collaboration in the construction of a European defence organisation which would establish a new balance of power within the Atlantic Alliance. The General explained that this organisation would be founded on ‘a union between France and Germany’, which would ‘doubtless . . . imply that from a certain moment, it would not lack nuclear weapons’. De Gaulle’s declaration was deliberately ambiguous: it was not clear whether he was talking about the ‘union’, or about Germany, although, according to the rules of good French grammar, he would have been referring to Germany.69 Was it de Gaulle’s belief that this was inevitable; was this something he found acceptable in view of the faith he had in Adenauer, or was this a purely tactical move? According to the French journalist Tournoux, de Gaulle later would have told Adenauer ‘Don’t be impatient. You will get it, your bomb.’70 It is quite possible that de Gaulle used the threat of a German nuclear force to put pressure on the British and the Americans in order to gain substantial political and strategic advantages for his country. Thus he insidiously told Macmillan at Birch Grove that ‘although France had no present intentions of sharing nuclear knowledge with the Germans, the French could not say this would always be the case. The Russian menace was too great and the Russians too close to the Elbe for France to give any such binding assurance.’71 Yet on other occasions, representatives of the French Government expressed very different views to their Anglo-American allies. Pierre Messmer told his British colleague that he feared that the FRG was keen to join the ‘nuclear club’. And he firmly declared that ‘certainly France would not help the Germans in’. 72 That was also the reason for Paris to oppose a NATO nuclear force. De Gaulle told Macmillan that in his view ‘the proposal for a NATO nuclear force had simply been intended to prevent the development of the French force de frappe’.73 In Rambouillet, de Gaulle outlined to Adenauer his idea of the new Western strategic architecture which clearly aimed to increase France’s power and the recognition of her leading role in Europe. He explained that his ideal would be for the future Atlantic Alliance to be built on ‘four pillars’: Germany would be ‘the advance guard’, France would occupy ‘the principal position’, Britain would give them ‘cover’ and America would be ‘the reserve’.74 This concept did little to assuage the fears of the Germans who had no illusions about the purposes, the interests and the capabilities of France. According to the German minister of defence, the French had a constant tendency to think of the FRG

86 The Berlin Wall Crisis

as a glacis (Vorfeld ) and thus to create a ‘logistic dependency’ of Germany on France.75 In fact the interests of France and the Federal Republic seemed to be contradictory as General Speidel explained: the one wanted to defend its territory, the other had a forward defence.76 The Germans did not support the force de frappe – referred to disparagingly as a ‘bomblet’ by Heinrich Krone, the influential head of the CDU’s parliamentary group, 77 because it was not considered as a credible alternative to the American atomic umbrella,78 all the more so since the main objective of Adenauer was a reinforcement of the Atlantic integration.

A memorable date De Gaulle saw himself as a pragmatic visionary. And he was sometimes right. Early in 1961 he predicted that ‘the Berlin question had begun to bore the world’ and that ‘all the statesmen found themselves up against blank walls’.79 International tension began to increase again in the Spring of 1961. At the NATO ministerial meeting in May in Oslo, Maurice Couve de Murville declared that the Soviets would ‘relinquish their responsibilities over Berlin’ in the Autumn and ‘sign a peace treaty with the GDR’. In these circumstances the West must decide ‘whether to deal [with Moscow] . . . or to begin a war’.80 The French were particularly concerned about American policy. De Gaulle was afraid that the new young inexperienced American president could easily be ‘hoodwinked’ by Khrushchev.81 On the way to Vienna, Kennedy met de Gaulle in Paris. The latter told Kennedy to stay firm about Berlin. In order not to weaken the Western position, the General declared that he preferred to postpone for a time his demands for the reorganisation of NATO, ‘in form because of the impending threat over Berlin, but in fact because his position would be stronger when the French Army had been brought back from Algeria’. 82 Besides, Pierre Messmer informed Harold Watkinson a few weeks later that a division had already been repatriated from Algeria. But in case of an acute crisis France was not ready ‘to die for Berlin’ if her rights were not menaced directly by some Soviet action. Moreover the French were not satisfied with the preventive measures adopted by the allies. For example Pierre Messmer found that ‘the LIVE OAK planning certainly did not seem very realistic’. 83 The American, British and French foreign ministers discussed this matter in Paris just a couple of days before the construction of the Wall, but they came to no important decision, except to meet again in New York in September. 84

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 87

At the first tripartite meeting Maurice Couve de Murville did not seem to appear as firm as before, although he demanded that the West must not be ‘weak’. Unlike his American counterpart, the French minister stated that he would be able to talk about Berlin ‘more frankly’ in the absence of their German colleague, which threw a particular light on Franco-German relations and underlined the way France considered herself a power with world responsibilities (nevertheless Heinrich von Brentano participated in the following sessions of the ministerial conference). Maurice Couve de Murville claimed to agree that Berlin was ‘really crucial for our relations with Germany and the future of the Atlantic Alliance’. He added that, as Khrushchev already thought the West would ultimately come to accept the Soviet position, ‘perhaps in the last analysis he is right but it would certainly be wrong to give him the immediate impression that he is right’. 85 Like Dean Rusk and Lord Home, the French minister adopted a cautious attitude. If the situation degenerated into ‘a real crisis’, he recommended ‘that we arrange things so that we were not obliged to be the first to shoot’. Practically he did not want to ‘begin land operations’, but at the same time he estimated that a repetition of an airlift like in 1948–49 ‘was not possible because of the nuclear balance’. Instead, he favoured indirect countermeasures like economic sanctions. Nevertheless France had ‘already recalled one good division’ from Algeria and ‘would complete its reconversion for European warfare early in September’. It could take also other measures ‘if necessary’, such as ‘the recall of reservists’. Finally Maurice Couve de Murville proposed that the three Western powers could consider the opportunity to make to Moscow an ‘offer on negotiations’ in September. He stressed particularly the ‘timing’ and ‘what is negotiable’.86 On that subject de Gaulle clarified for Dean Rusk his point of view in the course of a ‘clear explanation’; he did not ‘like the idea of commencing negotiations without knowing what we are negotiating about’. The General emphasised again, in his view, that the Americans could not speak for the Europeans, because they were ‘not as immediately nor as directly concerned’.87 Like Kennedy and Macmillan, de Gaulle did not react immediately to the physical division of the former German capital. De Gaulle only left his summer residence on 17 August, four days after the closing of the sector boundary. That day, after sending a moderate protest note to Moscow, the French president summoned his defence Council which decided on ‘a reinforcement of the ground and air defences’ of France and West Germany. 88 That was all.

88 The Berlin Wall Crisis

That second Berlin crisis increased French concerns about a lack of determination to defend Europe on the part of the United States. In that sense 13 August was, according to Maurice Couve de Murville, ‘a memorable date’, not least because it proved to the Germans that ‘American defence was no longer sufficient to protect their interests’. 89 This situation accentuated French apprehensions about German neutralism, but Paris also tried to exploit the situation for the purposes of establishing French leadership in Europe. For this reason de Gaulle ‘saw no advantage in embarking on negotiations’ with the Soviets, which the American government had suggested.90 He condemned ‘the frenzy for negotiating’ of the United States.91 France refused constantly any kind of negotiations because ‘what we now have in Berlin is better than we could get’, as the French ambassador in Washington observed. 92 During a few months, the disagreement remained complete. Maurice Couve de Murville repeated several times that ‘exploratory talks’, ‘ambassadorial soundings’ or any ‘approach’ is ‘a completely vain effort’, indeed even ‘unrealistic’. 93 But the Berlin crisis reinforced even more de Gaulle’s conviction of the necessity of the force de frappe which would be able, he thought, to ‘destroy twenty Russian cities’ already in the following year, and by 1965 it should be able to ‘annihilate about 65 per cent of the Soviet potential’. 94 Pierre Messmer, the French defence minister, told Dean Rusk that the United States must accept the fact that his country was already a nuclear power. He admitted that the Soviet Union could annihilate France ten times, but France could destroy the USSR only once and it would be enough. 95 De Gaulle was convinced that a nuclear force was the indispensable shield if one wanted to refuse an ultimatum, especially if the Americans gave the impression that they hesitated to intervene, immediately and massively. 96 The French considered that there was no guarantee and the American attitude confirmed this opinion. For example, while McNamara allowed Pierre Messmer to read the famous ‘Poodle Blanket’ planning paper on the defence of Berlin, concerning the four steps of an allied response to Soviet action, he refused to let him take away a copy; moreover, he told him nothing about the final phase, all-out nuclear war.

Conclusion The second Berlin crisis crystallised the fears of France concerning her own security. It served at once both as a catalyst and a clarification of

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 89

ideas. The crisis demonstrated to de Gaulle the necessity of a reform of NATO and the justification of the force de frappe: it was more than just a ‘status symbol’, as the British described it disparagingly.97 Nevertheless, the French nuclear bomb was certainly more of a political instrument than a strategic tool in de Gaulle’s hands. He once asserted: ‘One has to formulate policies under the shield of the atomic balance between East and West’. 98 This remark makes it possible to understand de Gaulle’s understanding of the Berlin crisis and of the way he made use of it. He considered it above all as a political and diplomatic crisis in a nuclear context. They also show the limits of his foreign policy with its all-too ambitious aims and modest means. In early September 1962, de Gaulle went to Germany on an official visit, the first such visit a French head of state had made for many centuries. He spent six days travelling throughout the country of Adenauer, ‘this good German’, in de Gaulle’s words.99 He visited Bonn, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Munich and Ludwigsburg. But he did not include Berlin in his itinerary. At no point during his time in government, neither as head of the Provisional Government in 1945, nor as President of the Fifth Republic, did he visit Berlin. De Gaulle himself never explained why. His diplomatic adviser, Pierre Maillard, speculated that the General did not want to seem to recognise or approve of the existence of the Wall, or to fuel the Cold War. Nevertheless, Pierre Maillard recognised that this matter was a ‘mystery’, and he conceded that, retrospectively, this omission in de Gaulle’s travels was a ‘mistake’. 100 Thus de Gaulle deprived himself of the opportunity to make a memorable speech before the population of the divided city, along the lines of ‘I have understood you’, or ‘Long live a free Berlin!’, and he certainly would not have told them that he was ‘ein Berliner’, that he identified with them. The bottom line is that de Gaulle did not like Berlin: the city never ceased to symbolise for him a hated centralistic, militaristic Prussia. He may have had more positive feelings towards the Catholic Rhineland or Bavaria, but it is beyond doubt that he had a strong dislike of Prussia. He dismissed Prussia as a ‘deceitful’ and ‘ambitious’ state. Like Adenauer, he felt ‘a sense of disquiet’ with regard to this ‘whole mix of Protestant and Socialist Prussianism’. 101 In sum, General de Gaulle was satisfied that ‘West Germany could and did live without Prussia’. 102 But it is not as clear that his politics of grandeur could easily have done without Berlin.

90 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Notes 1. A earlier version of this paper was published in Leopoldo Nuti and Cyril Buffet, Dividing the Atom: Proliferation and Nuclear Politics 1957–1969 (Rome: Editione Internazione, Relazioni Scientificce, 1998). 2. Quoted by Jean-Raymond Tournoux, La Tragédie du Général (Paris: Plon, 1967), p. 331. 3. Only a few books study French policy during the second Berlin crisis: Jean Schwoebel, Les deux K, Berlin et la paix (Paris: Julliard, 1963); Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, Un mur à Berlin (Brussels: Complexe, 1985); André Fontaine, Histoire de la guerre froide, vol. II 1950–1967 (Paris: Fayard, 1967); Alfred Grosser, La politique extérieure de la Ve République (Paris: Le Seuil, 1965); Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, vols. II and III (Paris: Le Seuil, 1985); Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne (Paris: Plon, 1990); (Collective editorship:) L’Aventure de la bombe. De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire (1958–1969) (Paris: Plon, 1985); Frédéric Bozo, La France et l’OTAN. De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen (Paris: Masson, 1991); Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle et les Américains 1958–1964 (Paris: Flammarion, 1984). 4. Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir, vol. I Le renouveau 1958–1962 (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 273. 5. Articles et Documents, No. 1142, 12 September 1961. 6. Maurice Couve De Murville: Une politique étrangère 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1971), p. 185; Maillard: De Gaulle et l’Allemagne, p. 210; Lacouture: De Gaulle III, pp. 292–3. 7. Theo Sommer: ‘Die bitteren Realitäten: das westliche Nichtstun nach dem 13. August entsprang der nuklearen Ohnmacht’, Die Zeit, 34, 20 August 1971, p. 4. 8. Ernst Weisenfeld, Welches Deutschland soll es sein? Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit seit 1945, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), p. 92. 9. Jean-Raymond Tournoux, La tragédie du Général, p. 326. 10. John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (London: Viking Press, 1970), p. 91. 11. Charles de Gaulle, Memoires, p. 236. De Gaulle said to Macmillan in March 1959 in Paris: ‘If this course resulted in war, then war must be done . . . After all, war was war and none knew exactly what would happen in one. In a world war, one would risk everything,’ Public Records Office, Kew, Britain [henceforth PRO], FO 371/145616. When the Soviet ambassador in Paris told de Gaulle that there was a risk of war about Berlin, de Gaulle answered: ‘Well, Mister Ambassador, we will die together!’ Quoted by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours (7th issue, Paris, 1978), p. 637. Eisenhower seemed to have first adopted the same position: ‘If the Russians want war over Berlin, they can have it.’ Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Christian A. Herter Papers, Box 6, 22 November 1958. 12. Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris, France (hereafter MAE), NUOI 275: J. Laloy to F. Seydoux, Paris, 11 March 1959, No. 1345/57. Jean Laloy, high diplomat and one of the few French Kremlinologist was perhaps not very convinced because he was absolutely not a Gaullist. See Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucléaire. Les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous la Cinquième République (Paris: Hachette, 1986), p. 93. For instance, Jean Laloy told

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 91

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

25.

Gladwyn Jebb that with regard to NATO, ‘the General was living in a vanished world and did not have the remotest idea what he was talking about’. PRO, FO371/145617, report on a conversation between G. Jebb and Jean Laloy, Paris, 8 April 1959, Secret. PRO, PREM11/2996, Letter from de Gaulle to Macmillan, Paris, 24 August 1959. MAE, Meeting Between General De Gaulle And Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, 14 September 1958, Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises, Top Secret. Maurice Vaisse, ‘Aux origines du mémorandum de septembre 1958’, Relations Internationales, 58, Summer 1989, pp. 253–68. François Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-Rhin (Paris: Grasset, 1975), p. 224. The Foreign Office kept the West German Foreign Ministry informed on this matter. PRO, PREM11/3701, FO to British Embassy in Bonn, 24 November 1958, No. 2459, Secret. Georges-Henri Soutou, ‘Problèmes de sécurité et rapports franco-allemands 1956–1963’, Relations Internationales, 57, Spring 1989, pp. 102–3. Frédéric Bozo and Pierre Melandri, ‘La France devant l’opinion américaine: le retour de de Gaulle, début 1958–printemps 1959’, Relations Internationales, 58, Summer 1989, pp. 195–215. For the American news magazine Time, de Gaulle was in 1958 the ‘man of the year’. PRO, PREM11/2996, Macmillan to Lloyd, 22 December 1959, Secret. PRO, FO371/145616. PRO, PREM11/3701, Foreign Office to Bonn, 24 November 1958, No. 2459. It should be noted, incidentally, that the British Chiefs of Staff themselves proposed in mid 1952 that there should be a joint ‘central direction’ in the Western conduct of the Cold War, implying institutionalised cooperation between Britain, the US and France, and furthermore: ‘that the allied aim should now be to establish a tripartite body [made up of Britain, the US and France] under which each theatre [of war] would have its own defence organisation designed specifically to meet its own peculiar needs and problems.’ From the Global Strategy Paper of 1952, §§ 69–70, published in Alan Macmillan and John Baylis, ‘A Reassessment of the British Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, International Politics Research Paper No. 13 (Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1993), p. 33. National Security Archives, Washington, Berlin Series (hereafter NSA/BS), Report on the meeting between Dean Rusk and de Gaulle, Paris, 8 August 1961, Secret. PRO, PREM11/3002, Report of a conversation between S. Lloyd and de Gaulle, Hôtel Matignon, Paris, 12 December 1958, Secret. De Gaulle at the Ecole militaire, 3 November 1959. Quoted by Paul-Marie de La Gorce, La guerre et l’atome (Paris: Plon, 1985), p. 85. De Gaulle told his Prime Minister: ‘Nobody in America can say where, when and how nuclear weapons would be employed to defend Europe . . . The integration into the American system deprives us of all national strategy in Europe without any benefit in Europe.’ Quoted in Michel Debré, Mémoires, vol. III 1958–1962 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), pp. 376 and 385. According to the French Ambassador in Bonn, the General was ‘mocking’ (goguenard): ‘If this succeeds that’s fine. If this fails he will have put the

92 The Berlin Wall Crisis

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

American President and the British Prime Minister in such a difficult position that they cannot then criticise him for going ahead on his own.’ François Seydoux; Mémoires d’outre-Rhin (Paris: Grasset, 1975), p. 224. PRO, FO371/137272 Meeting between Macmillan and Couve de Murville, London, 6 November 1958. PRO, FO371/137266 Report on the conversation between John Foster Dulles and General de Gaulle, Paris, 16 December 1958, Secret. Maurice Vaisse, Relations Internationales, p. 261. In French in the original. PRO, FO371/137272 Meeting between Macmillan and Couve de Murville, London, 6 November 1958. PRO, FO371/137378 Note by Macmillan, 9 October 1958, No. 7124, Secret. PRO, PREM11/3701 Report on the meeting between Macmillan and Norstad, 28 November 1958, Secret. Bonn, Collection of the Nuclear History Programme (hereafter NHP-Bonn) Doc. 036/1–11. Report by General Heusinger to F. J. Strauss, Bonn, 26 August 1959, No. 50/59. MAE, NUOI 275 Vaucelles, New York,11 March 1959, No. 418–425. Vaucelles New York, 17 March 1959, No. 326–331. MAE, NUOI 275 Note by Jean Laloy, Paris, 11 January 1959; Note by Maurice Dejean, Moscow, 19 February 1959, No. 724/728. MAE, NUOI 275 Note by Jean Chauvel, Paris, 6 March 1959, No. 775/90, Top Secret. Before its official publication, Carlo Schmid informed the French ambassador in Bonn about this project, MAE, NUOI 275: Note by François Seydoux, Bonn, 6 March 1959, No. 630/635. See Jean Schwoebel, ‘Le dossier de la question allemande et de la sécurité européenne’, Le Monde diplomatique, 61, May 1959. Paris press conference of Pierre Mendes France, on 2 April 1959, Le Monde, 4416, 4 April 1959. Jules Moch, ‘Déberliniser?, Oui, mais comment?’, in Le Monde, 4421, 10 April 1959. Pierre M. Gallois: ‘L’affaire de Berlin ou la peur d’une ombre’, La Nef, 27 April 1959, pp. 25–31. Furthermore since March 1959 the French Mediterranean fleet was no longer under NATO command. After this withdrawal, which had ‘serious military implications’, the French government: ‘indicated to SACEUR that the French naval forces might be returned to NATO if the Western Mediterranean [MEDOC] was established as a French command directly under SACEUR’. In addition to that, the French Minister of Defence ‘has made proposals to SACEUR for cooperation’. But General Norstad only wanted to discuss the question whether the French Mediterranean Fleet would return under NATO command. PRO, PREM11/2998, Brief for the First Sea Lord, London, March 1960, Secret. PRO, FO371/14580, Report of the Four Power Working Group, London 13–23 April 1959. MAE, NUOI 27, Laloy to Seydoux, Paris, 11 March 1959, No. 1343/57. PRO, FO371/145627, Note by Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan, 11 November 1959, Secret. General Norstad shared the French apprehensions nourished

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 93

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

by Adenauer. In April 1960, Norstad reiterated to Macmillan his view that ‘if we let the Germans down, they might shift their own position and even go neutralistic’. Eisenhower ‘was very worried about who would then hold the central bastion in Europe’ quoted in William Burr, ‘New Sources on the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 2, Fall 1992, p. 22. MAE, NUOI 275, Note from Seydoux, Bonn, 13 February 1959, No. 399/411. PRO, FO371/145616, Report on the visit of Macmillan to Paris, 10 March 1959. MAE, NUOI 275: Note from Daridan to Vaucelles, Paris, 10 March 1959, No. 919–923. Ibid., From Joxe to Alphand, Paris, 14 February 1959, No. 1410/12, Top Secret. PRO, PREM11/3002, Letter from Frank Roberts to FO, Paris, 2 March 1959, No. 146, Secret. PRO, DEFE 5/91, COS(59)85, 22 April 1959. The heads of the French delegation at LIVE OAK during the Berlin crisis were General Christian Geliot (April–June 1959), General Pierre Dailler (July–Sept. 1959), Colonel Léonard Hounau (October 1959–July 1960) and General François de Susbielle (Aug. 1960–Dec. 1962). The author warmly thanks Dr Gregory Pedlow for his precious help concerning the history of LIVE OAK. PRO, DEFE 47122, COS(59)73, 26 November 1959. PRO, PREM11/2991, Record of the Rambouillet meeting, 20 December 1959. PRO, PREM11/2996, Note from Macmillan to Lloyd, 22 December 1959, Secret. While the British prime minister deluded himself with regard to the general tenor of Franco-British relations, his style of conducting these relations was very matter-of-fact. He claimed to be ready to support de Gaulle’s desire to join the ranks of the Great Powers, and to encourage him to get the fruits of his famous memorandum, and so forth. In return he must give to me the greatest practical accommodation that he can on the economic front. The future of British trade in Europe is far more important than whether a few French fighters are or are not to be put under the command of SACEUR. If there is a global war the fighters will be useless anyway. As we do not believe there will be a global war, what is really important is British trade interests.

55. NSA/BS, Minutes of the first meeting of the quadripartite conference of Foreign Ministers, Washington, 15 September 1961, Secret. 56. PRO, DEFE 5/1100, COS(60)58, 7 March 1960. 57. Pierre M. Gallois, ‘Puissance et limitations des armes de la dissuasion’, Le Monde, 14–15 February 1960. 58. Quoted by Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, Vol. III Le Souverain (Paris: Le Seuil, 1985), p. 471. 59. Quoted by Hervé Alphand: L’étonnement d’être: Journal 1939–1973 (Paris: Fayard, 1977), p. 316. Raymond Aron explained that ‘de Gaulle had no dauphin, but a dauphine, the bomb’, quoted by Ernst Weisenfeld, Charles de Gaulle: Der Magier im Elysée (Munich: Beck, 1990), p. 77. 60. The French representative to the NATO Council had said a year before that Khrushchev was very concerned about an extension of the ‘nuclear club’: MAE, NUOI 275: Report by de Leusse, Paris, 28 February. 1959, Diplomatie

94 The Berlin Wall Crisis

61.

62. 63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

Paris No. 48. But according to the journalist Jean-Raymond Tournoux, La Tragédie du Général, pp. 365–6, Khrushchev is more likely to have thought that: ‘if France had 100 thermonuclear bombs, that would not worry us in the least. But if Germany had only one little bomblet, it would change the world situation.’ Archives of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow, AVP, RF, List 4, Portfolio 9, File 22, Secret report ‘On questions concerning Germany’ from I. I. Il’ichev (head of the Third Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry) to V. A. Zorin (deputy Foreign Minister), Moscow, 26 December 1959. The author wishes to thank Hope Harrison very warmly for sharing and translating this document. André Fontaine, Histoire de la guerre froide, p. 374. PRO, FO317/153914, report on the meeting between Harold Macmillan and General de Gaulle, Buckingham Palace, 5 April 1960. PRO, FO371/161231: Report on the meeting between Harold Watkinson and Pierre Messmer, Paris, 13 April 1960, Top Secret. When Khrushchev read out his communiqué very loudly, de Gaulle commented that there was no reason to shout, because the acoustics of the room were very good. See Vernon A. Walters, Services discrets (Paris: Plon, 1979), p. 201. PRO, FO371/145617: Report on a conversation between G. Jebb and Jean Laloy, Paris, 8 April 1959, Secret. According to Laloy, ‘the General sometimes saw himself as a new Charlemagne graciously accepting the Iron Crown of the Lombards’. MAE, Report on the meeting between General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, Rambouillet, 29–30 July 1960, Top Secret. NSA/BS, Report on a conversation between Dean Rusk and Hervé Alphand, Washington, 7 September 1962. MAE, Report on the meeting between General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, Rambouillet, 29–30 July 1960, Top Secret. Quoted by J.-R. Tournoux, La Tragédie du Général, p. 500. PRO, CAB129/10.7. PRO, FO371/161231 Report on the meeting between Pierre Messmer and Harold Watkinson, Paris, 13 April 1961, Top Secret. Messmer added that he hoped ‘to accept co-ordinated targeting’ once France had her own nuclear force. PRO, FO371/161097: Report on the conversation between Harold Macmillan and General de Gaulle, Rambouillet, 28 January 1961, Top Secret. MAE, Report on the meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer, Rambouillet, 29–30 July 1960, Top Secret. NHP-Bonn, Doc. 55, Note from Franz Josef Strauss to Adenauer about the first meeting of the French and German chiefs of staff, Bonn, 7 February 1961. Cyrus L. Sulzberger, An Age of Mediocrity: Memoirs and Diaries 1963–1972 (New York: Houghton, 1973), p. 950. Quoted by Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer. Epochenwechsel 1957–1963 (Stuttgart/Wiesbaden: DVA, 1983), p. 118. A report of the West-German Defence minister stipulated that the force de frappe was not ‘unterstützungswürdig’ (worthy of support).

De Gaulle, the Bomb and Berlin: How to Use a Political Weapon 95 79. PRO, FO371/161097: Report on the meeting between Macmillan and de Gaulle, Rambouillet, 29 January 1961, Top Secret. This metaphor was very current at the time. The special correspondent of Le Monde, Michel Tatu, in No. 5082 (21–2 May 1961), entitled one article: ‘Mr. Khrushchev has Mr. Kennedy with his back against the wall over Berlin’. 80. NSA/BS, Memorandum of conversation, Oslo, 7 May 1961, Secret. 81. Hervé Alphand, L’étonnement d’être, p. 352. 82. PRO, CAB128/35, C.C.(61)30, 6 June 1961. Report by Macmillan about his conversation with Kennedy after his trips to Paris and Vienna. 83. PRO, FO371/160459: Report on the meeting between Harold Watkinson and Pierre Messmer, London, 25 July 1961, Secret. 84. See Maurice Couve De Murville, Une politique étrangère, p. 273. 85. NSA/BS, Ministerial consultations on Berlin, Paris, 5–6 August 1961, Secret. 86. Ibid. 87. NSA/BS, Report on the meeting between Dean Rusk and General de Gaulle, Paris, 8 August 1961, Secret. 88. Le Monde, 19 August 1961; Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets 1961–1963, (Paris, 1986), pp. 129–31. Maurice Couve de Murville said to his ambassador in Washington: ‘We will send a note and that’s that.’ Quoted by Hervé Alphand, L’étonnement d’être, p. 361. 89. PRO, FO371/160446 Report on the lunch between Couve de Murville and the Lord Privy Seal, Paris, 11 September 1961. 90. PRO, CAB129/107, C.(61)194, FO No. 8711, 27 November 1961. 91. DE GAULLE: Lettres, notes et carnets, p. 230. 92. NSA/BS, Memorandum of a conversation between Dean Rusk and Hervé Alphand, Washington, 24 August 1961, No. 13550, Secret. 93. NSA/BS, Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, Washington, 14 September 1961, No. 13668, Secret. 94. Alphand: L’étonnement d’être, p. 368. 95. Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 206. The Americans found these words ‘rash’. 96. P. Messmer explained to his British colleague that a small deterrent in Europe could be as effective as a very much larger deterrent in America, because the Russians knew that France could not tolerate Russian troops on the Rhine but might suppose that the Americans would accept a fait accompli. PRO, FO371/161231, Report on the meeting between Harold Watkinson and Pierre Messmer, Paris, 13 April 1961, Top Secret. 97. Ibid. 98. Quoted by Tournoux, La tragédie du Général, p. 338. 99. De Gaulle, Discours et Messages II (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 344. De Gaulle and Macmillan agreed that Adenauer was ‘a good man’, but, after all, ‘one could never be sure of Germans’. FO, PREM11/2996, Record of a conversation at the Elysée Palace between Macmillan and de Gaulle, Paris, 21 December 1959, Top Secret. 100. Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne, p. 179. 101. Ibid., p. 156. 102. FO, PREM11/2996, Record of a conversation between Harold Macmillan and General de Gaulle, Paris, 21 December 1959, Top Secret.

6 The German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall Crisis Hope Harrison

The focus of this book is on the Western alliance and the various separate and joint Western responses to the Berlin crisis, but since it was the Soviets who launched the crisis, this book would not be complete if their side of the crisis was not also examined. Just as alliance politics were a crucial part of and a complicating factor in the Western response to the crisis, so they were an essential element of the Soviet side as well. Indeed, a thorough and accurate picture of the Soviet side of the crisis is not possible without understanding the difficult alliance politics they had to manage with the East Germans.1 While the American leaders had to take into account the different approaches and interests of the West Germans, British, and French in their handling of the Berlin crisis, the Soviet leaders had to take into account the preferences of the East Germans, as well as some of their other allies, in their handling of the crisis. As we shall see, a variety of direct and indirect forms of pressure from the East Germans had important effects on Soviet options and Soviet policy making during the Berlin crisis. In particular, the length and intensity of the Berlin crisis and the decision to build the Berlin Wall were in large part due to East German pressure. The extent to which the Western powers believed that the aggressive, unilateral moves undertaken by the East Germans during the Berlin crisis were actually instigated by the Soviets would have inclined them to be less accommodating toward the Soviets. Thus, East German policies may to a certain extent have interfered in the efforts of the superpowers or the Four Powers to reach an agreement. On the grounds that it was ‘politically unacceptable and grossly simplistic’, the Soviets in fact resisted East German requests to close the border around West Berlin for at least eight years, on the grounds that such a move would alienate and embitter the Berliners, the Germans 96

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 97

and the Western powers.2 They finally acquiesced in the summer of 1961 to the claim of East German leader Walter Ulbricht that closing the border was the only sure way to stop the refugee exodus from East Germany to West Germany via West Berlin and to shore up the East German economy and state. The Soviets had urged the East German leaders to deal with their problems by other means, such as by instituting a more flexible form of socialism which would entice people to stay at home instead of fleeing West, since they knew building a wall would make them look bad and would be an admission of defeat. Ulbricht, however, did not want to loosen his grip on power and favoured a more hard-line resolution of the refugee problem exemplified in the building of the Wall. Direct and indirect actions by Ulbricht and his allies, therefore, aimed to ensure that the Soviets would ultimately see no other option than closing the border if they wanted to support a continued socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR). Prior to the opening of archives in the former Soviet bloc, scholars had very few primary sources to draw on from the communist side and thus had to rely largely on Western sources supplemented by speculation. Thus, it was very difficult to get a full picture of the decision making process on the Soviet side and to determine their motivations and the factors influencing them in the Berlin crisis and in general. While scholars believed the East Germans played some role in the crisis, they ascribed most of the influence on Soviet policy to the Soviet desire to prevent West Germany from gaining access to nuclear weapons, Soviet efforts to undermine the Western alliance, and to domestic pressures on Khrushchev to appear tough to critics of his reformist anti-Stalinist policies. 3 Archival evidence released over the past dozen years from the former Soviet Union, East Germany and other former communist countries reveals that Khrushchev’s concern about the GDR and pressure from the GDR were the most consistent influences on him during the crisis. Khrushchev’s goals regarding the stabilisation and strengthening of the GDR, combined with the actions of the East German leaders, were essential parts of the crisis, particularly in the final year leading up to the erection of the Berlin Wall. While the Kremlin archives with their files of the top level of Soviet decision making still remain closed for the majority of scholars, the accessibility of the archives of the Foreign Ministry and the Central Committee of the former Soviet Union, as well as the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Socialist Unity Party, and secret police (the Stasi) of the former GDR, combined with archives of other former Soviet bloc countries and memoirs by former communist officials

98 The Berlin Wall Crisis

allow us to put together a much more complete picture of the Soviet bloc side of the Berlin crisis than ever before. 4 Accessible archival documents include letters and records of meetings between Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and Ulbricht and other high ranking officials; Soviet and East German reports on and analyses of the political, economic, military and other conditions in Germany and Berlin, and of Soviet–East German relations; recommendations by Soviet officials for Soviet policy toward Germany; recommendations by East German officials for relations with the Soviets; preparatory materials by the Soviets and East Germans for their meetings; records from East German Politburo and Plenum meetings; Soviet and East German analyses of Soviet–US relations; Soviet Interior Ministry analyses of the East German refugee exodus; and detailed East German plans for closing the border around West Berlin. One particular dynamic of Soviet–East German relations stands out from these documents: as the crisis went on without an East–West resolution, Khrushchev grew increasingly cautious and wary of risking war; and Ulbricht grew increasingly aggressive, impatient and willing to take steps which raised the risk of a war over Berlin. The crisis began with Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November and ultimatum to the Western powers of 27 November in which he demanded that they sign a peace treaty with both parts of Germany or with a united Germany and agree to transform West Berlin into a demilitarised ‘free city’, all within six months. 5 If the Western powers did not acquiesce, Khrushchev declared that he would turn over to East German authorities control over the access routes across 110 miles of territory between West Germany and West Berlin. Given that many East Germans were fleeing to the enticing economic, political, and cultural freedom of West Berlin and West Germany, it was assumed that the GDR leaders would close off the access routes if given the power to do so. Khrushchev tried to use the West’s vulnerability regarding the access routes on GDR territory as leverage to force the West to recognise the GDR and to change the status of the capitalist ‘show window’ and espionage centre, West Berlin. Yet as the crisis went on, Khrushchev found that the same levers he sought to use against the West, the borders around West Berlin and the access routes, were used by Ulbricht to put pressure on him to carry out his threats to the West and his promises to the East Germans. Khrushchev found it increasingly difficult to control the process he had started, because his ally took matters into his own hands. After watching Khrushchev wait patiently for two years for the Western powers to make concessions regarding West Berlin and the GDR, Ulbricht lost

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 99

patience by the autumn of 1960 and began to take unilateral measures to gain the control over the borders and access routes. Khrushchev launched the crisis in 1958 with the primary aim of getting Western recognition of the GDR (after all, he had recognised the FRG in 1955, and wanted the West to reciprocate), which he hoped and assumed would help to stabilise the GDR and raise its legitimacy and prestige.6 If the Western powers and the rest of world recognised the GDR regime as legitimate, presumably its own citizens would also. From a larger perspective, Khrushchev wanted the West to accept the postWorld War II status quo in Europe, recognising the German and Polish borders as permanent and the Soviet sphere of influence in the area. In addition, with his free city proposal, 7 Khrushchev sought to reduce Western influence in West Berlin which seeped into East Berlin and the GDR. By transforming West Berlin into a demilitarised free city, Khrushchev hoped to separate it from West Germany and the other Western powers and pull it more into the communist sphere or at least significantly reduce its negative effect on the GDR and East Berlin. West Berlin posed a three-fold threat to the Soviets and East Germans. First, it was the only ‘loophole’ left for citizens of the GDR to escape, since the border between East and West Germany had been closed in 1952. Second, in addition to and as a result of its luring of refugees, West Berlin was an economic threat to the GDR. The numbers of skilled, well educated East Germans – the intelligentsia – fleeing across the border to West Berlin was a drain on the East German economy. So was the Grenzgänger problem – the roughly 50,000 East Berliners working in West Berlin.8 These people had the advantage of the low cost of living in East Berlin, but contributed their labour to the West Berlin economy and were paid in Western currency. Another economic drain on the East was the fact that with open borders, West Berliners could come into East Berlin and buy goods and services for much cheaper prices than they had to pay in West Berlin, thus depleting the number of goods and services available for the less wealthy East Berliners. The third threat that West Berlin posed was its status as a base of espionage and subversion vis-à-vis East Berlin and East Germany. In his 27 November ultimatum, Khrushchev was very critical of this, arguing that Western use of West Berlin for ‘subversive activities’ against East Germany and other countries of the Soviet bloc was indication that ‘the very essence of the allied agreement on Berlin has vanished’.9 The location of West Berlin, ‘spy central’, inside the GDR was perfect for American, British, French and West German intelligence agencies to recruit East Germans and listen in on East German and Soviet communications.10 Khrushchev

100 The Berlin Wall Crisis

and Ulbricht wanted to put a stop to this, as well as to hostile or critical radio and television transmissions from West Berlin. There were two other important, somewhat connected factors behind Khrushchev’s launching of the Berlin crisis, and these would also gain in significance as the crisis went on. First, for matters of personal and national prestige, Khrushchev wanted to be involved in summit-level dialogue with the leaders of the Western powers, especially the US. He wanted to force the West to the negotiating table on Germany and Berlin, but also perhaps just to be at the negotiating table with the West and then see what concessions his forceful personality could wrest from the West. Ulbricht, on the other hand, wanted to find the fastest route to solving his problems, which he doubted was in lengthy negotiations with the West. Second, Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate to his domestic and foreign (especially China) critics that he was not weak, that he was not just appeasing the ‘paper tiger’ West with peaceful coexistence, but was really putting pressure on the West. Khrushchev’s goals in launching the crisis and his goals as they developed during the crisis were not always consistent. His priorities would change as he felt different threats (of GDR collapse or of conflict with the West) and different opportunities (for resolving the problems in the GDR or for putting pressure on the West). His view of whether West Berlin and its access routes were a means to threaten the West, ‘a sword of Damocles’ as he would call them,11 or whether they were a prize he would give Ulbricht also evolved as the crisis went on, as he witnessed Ulbricht’s risky policies and grew increasingly reluctant to give Ulbricht any more power in Berlin. The evolution of Khrushchev’s goals and tactics during the crisis was often in the opposite direction from that of Ulbricht, and the latter’s stance would greatly complicate and influence Khrushchev’s approach to the crisis. Before examining the very complicated alliance dynamics of the final year of the Berlin Wall crisis, we must first have an understanding of the mutual commitments and needs of the two alliance partners and also of their different perspectives on and stakes in the crisis. The Soviet alliance system was not at all as simplistic as most people in the West assumed during the Cold War. Certainly the East Germans needed the Soviets to keep their regime in existence, as the Soviet use of tanks to quell the June 1953 East German uprising made abundantly clear. But a sense of need in the alliance was not only in one direction. Khrushchev also felt it was important to him, to the Soviet Union, and to the communist cause that East Germany continue to be in the communist camp and that socialism prove itself to be superior to capitalism in

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 101

Germany. Thus, on many occasions he professed to Ulbricht, ‘the GDR’s needs are our needs’,12 by which he meant, as Khrushchev’s closest colleague, Anastas Mikoian, told the East Germans in June 1961: ‘If socialism does not win in the GDR, if communism does not prove itself as superior and vital here, then we have not won. The issue is this fundamental to us. Therefore, we cannot proceed in such a way with any other country. And this is also the reason that the GDR occupies first place in negotiations or in credits.’13 In essence, Khrushchev felt that developments in the GDR could make or break the reputation of the Soviet Union and of communism. 14 As John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out, the two superpowers ‘attached their own reputations to their respective clients’ and ‘fell into the habit of letting their German allies determine their German interests, and hence their German policies’. 15 Since Khrushchev made his commitment to the triumph of socialism over capitalism in Germany so clear to Ulbricht, this gave Ulbricht the chance to define for Khrushchev what it would take to achieve this triumph: massive Soviet economic aid and closing the borders around West Berlin. The importance of a strong, socialist GDR to the Soviets gave the East Germans power in the relationship. Khrushchev’s eagerness not to be accused, as secret police chief Lavrenti Beria and Prime Minister Georgi Malenkov were in 1953, of pursuing policies which would mean the liquidation of the socialist GDR also added pressure on him to support the GDR. In November 1958, Khrushchev told Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka: There were some among us who believed that we would have to withdraw from Berlin. Beria proposed this, and he was supported by ‘feeble’ Malenkov. They believed that we should give up the GDR and Berlin. That was in 1953. What would we have accomplished after that? . . . Are we supposed to give up a population of 18 million in the GDR for nothing, without a fight? That’s stupidity. We should fully support Ulbricht and [Premier Otto] Grotewohl.16 Similarly, Khrushchev reminded Ulbricht in 1961 that ‘Malenkov and Beria wanted to liquidate the GDR, but we fired one and shot the other and said that we supported a socialist Germany.’ 17 Thus, Ulbricht knew full well Khrushchev’s eagerness to set himself apart from Beria and Malenkov and the room this could give him, Ulbricht, to press Khrushchev for increasing his support for the GDR. This was also the case with the Sino-Soviet split,18 which Ulbricht exploited in different ways to push Khrushchev into agreeing to what

102 The Berlin Wall Crisis

he wanted in the GDR and Berlin. Initially Ulbricht sought to use the closeness of East German–Chinese relations due to the similarity of their national situations (i.e., each was the leader of part of a divided country with ‘imperialists’ occupying the other part) and their critical views of Khrushchev’s reforms in domestic and foreign policy to pressure Khrushchev.19 Both Ulbricht and the Chinese leader Mao Zedong felt that Khrushchev was not being hard enough on the West and was not sufficiently helping each of them to push the West out of West Berlin, West Germany and Taiwan, but rather was showing ‘unnecessary tolerance’ for the West. 20 In 1961, Ulbricht switched to openly siding with Khrushchev against the Chinese and their allies, the Albanians, especially at the Warsaw Pact meeting of August 1961, to show what a loyal Soviet ally he was and how he deserved to be rewarded with permission to close the border in Berlin. Ulbricht and the other East bloc leaders had witnessed the open and vehement arguments between the Soviets and the Chinese and between the Soviets and the Albanians at various communist bloc meetings and knew the pressure Khrushchev was under. At their 30 November 1960 summit meeting in Moscow, Ulbricht had also seen Khrushchev eager to show himself more supportive of the GDR than China was: ‘we aren’t China; we aren’t afraid of giving the Germans a start’ with economic help. ‘For the Chinese the moral factor seems to decide everything. But our people also make demands for butter and other things.’ 21 As with the legacy of Beria and Malenkov, so the effects of the Sino-Soviet split helped Ulbricht obtain more aid from Khrushchev who needed to avoid being seen as anything less than fully supportive of a socialist GDR. Ulbricht was very shrewd at using all possible means to get what he wanted, and Khrushchev made it easy for him to see the pressure he felt regarding the GDR from the legacy of Beria and Malenkov and from the SinoSoviet split. Ulbricht’s capacity to affect developments in the Berlin Crisis was also augmented by his distance from Moscow and his ability to interfere with things on the ground in Berlin, at the checkpoints on the borders of East and West Berlin. In spite of all the Soviet troops and advisers in the GDR, the Soviets still were not always able to enforce their policies and prevent the East Germans from acting independently and contrary to Soviet interests and expressed desires. The roughly 400,000 Soviet troops in the GDR may have deterred the population from repeating the uprising of 1953, but they were not able to deter the East German leaders from acting contrary to Soviet interests at some key moments.

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 103

Ulbricht’s strong personality, his tenaciousness, and his willingness to act unilaterally were crucial to the Berlin crisis. As is often the case with the weaker state in an alliance, the East Germans had more to lose, more at stake, in the crisis than the Soviets did and thus were more motivated and persistent in pursuit of their narrow goals.22 This translated into increased bargaining strength for the East Germans, who could, especially after the 1953 uprising, always claim that the GDR would collapse and be absorbed into West Germany if the Soviets did not do X and Y, such as grant them significant economic aid and close the Berlin borders. Under the pressure of the crisis, the differing goals, priorities, and strategies of the East German and Soviet leaders were accentuated. Their different positions as superpower and local power led Khrushchev and Ulbricht to have different policy preferences. While both Khrushchev and Ulbricht wanted to end the refugee exodus from East to West, obtain Western recognition of the GDR regime (in part by finally signing a peace treaty for World War II), uphold socialism in the GDR, and reduce or eliminate the Western presence in West Berlin, they had significant differences over how important these goals were and what they were willing to risk to achieve them. The main difference underlying Khrushchev and Ulbricht’s behaviour during the Berlin crisis was the fact that Khrushchev had larger, more global concerns and different issues at stake than just those directly connected to the Berlin crisis and to his ally the GDR. 23 As the leader of a superpower, Khrushchev had to deal with broader issues of war and peace between East and West, Soviet– US relations, the Soviet status in the world, and his own status in the world. Ulbricht’s goals were narrower, focused on preserving his tight hold on power in the GDR and maintaining the GDR as a state. Broader East–West concerns did not interest him. Khrushchev wanted both to ‘solve the West Berlin problem’ and have good relations with the West, whereas Ulbricht was only concerned with the former and in fact believed he gained more from tense than from relaxed East–West relations. In their private communications about policy during the Berlin Crisis, Ulbricht was much more impatient and aggressive and Khrushchev was much more patient and restrained about actually carrying out his threats vis-à-vis the West. Khrushchev began the crisis confident of his ability to keep it under his control and to gain the concessions he desired from the West. Yet as he was faced with Western reluctance to make significant concessions, he found himself also faced with East German unilateral behaviour that challenged his control over the crisis. It is to this phenomenon that we now turn.

104 The Berlin Wall Crisis

What to do about the problem of West Berlin, and when, was a subject of long-standing debate within East Germany, within the Soviet Union, between the East Germans and Soviets, and within the Warsaw Pact. As the Soviet ambassador to the GDR, Mikhail Pervukhin, observed in a December 1959 report, ‘The presence in Berlin of an open and essentially uncontrolled border between the socialist and capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts the population to make a comparison between both parts of the city, which, unfortunately, does not always turn out in favour of Democratic Berlin.’24 There were differences of view on whether the West Berlin ‘problem’ – its position as a refugee-enticing capitalist enclave surrounded by East Germany – could be resolved separately from and before a German peace treaty. This debate was addressed at a 12 May 1958 meeting between Peter Florin, then head of the International Department of the SED Central Committee, and O. Selianinov, a counsellor at the Soviet embassy in the East Berlin: Regarding the Berlin problem as a whole, Florin said that there are still big differences of opinion among the German comrades on how to approach its resolution. ‘We still do not have an agreed upon concept on this question, just as there is not a united, agreed upon position between us, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist camp. In particular, some German comrades believe, for example, that the Berlin question cannot be resolved as long as Germany is not united. Others, on the other hand, believe that the Berlin question can be gradually resolved by starting now to carry out a determined line of political and economic conquest of West Berlin so as to create the preconditions for the unification of Berlin in the future.’ Florin noted that he is a proponent of the second point of view. 25 Ulbricht was also a proponent of this second point of view, as were Pervukhin and Selianinov. Selianinov, however, emphasised to Florin that although he agreed that they should start to resolve the West Berlin issue independently of a broader German settlement, this ‘demanded the preparation of a whole series of political and economic measures by the GDR and other socialist countries’. 26 In other words, the GDR should not act alone, but should work out its approach with other socialist countries, including most importantly, of course, the Soviet Union. As we shall see, the GDR did not always do this during the crisis. Indeed, in the final year of the crisis, Soviet officials in Berlin would send more frequent warnings to the Kremlin leaders that the East Germans, in

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 105

spite of Soviet instructions not to do so, were planning to ‘stop free movement between the GDR and West Berlin as soon as possible with any means’. 27 In the face of unilateral East German policies, Khrushchev repeatedly instructed Ulbricht, in vain, to wait for him to conduct negotiations with the West and not to introduce policies ‘which could exacerbate the situation’. 28 Frustrated with Khrushchev’s patient approach after almost two years, Ulbricht began taking matters into his own hands in September 1960. In an effort to emphasise the separation of West Berlin from West Germany, as well as to gain more de facto Western recognition of the GDR, the East Germans announced on 21 September 1960 that Western diplomats accredited to embassies in Bonn had to obtain permission from the East German Foreign Ministry to enter East Berlin. 29 As the New York Times noted at the time, this was ‘by far the strongest (measure) yet taken in the Communists’ mounting campaign to undermine Greater Berlin’s four-power status and isolate West Berlin’. 30 The Soviets had not sanctioned or even known about the GDR measures announced on 21 September, as is indicated by the record of two meetings in Berlin on 23 and 26 September between the GDR ambassador to Moscow, Johannes König, and Selianinov. The latter was clearly taken aback that the East German border guards had insisted the US ambassador to West Germany, Walter Dowling, show identification before allowing him to drive into East Berlin in his official car. In both meetings with König, Selianinov was ‘astounded’ at the East German policy and ‘very concerned that measures by GDR officials against the ambassadors or diplomats of Western embassies could possibly also be directed against the Soviet embassy personnel in their visits to West Berlin. It was clear that the Soviet embassy wanted to be informed in the future about measures of this kind.’31 Three days later Selianinov told Ulbricht of a new Soviet directive calling for intensified Soviet contacts ‘in relation to West Berlin, regarding trade, culture, etc.’ and which would entail more frequent visits by Soviet officials to West Berlin, all with the aim of pulling West Berlin away from its close ties with the West.32 The Soviets did not want Western retaliation for the new East German measures to make it harder for their officials to enter West Berlin. Selianinov made it clear to König that East German and Soviet policies ‘must not conflict with each other’. 33 Ulbricht, however, was not at all in favour of an expansion of direct contacts with West Berlin by the Soviets or other socialists, such as the Poles or the Czechs. He wanted to be the sole mediator between the socialist countries and West Berlin so as to be able to control these

106 The Berlin Wall Crisis

relations. He also feared that the increased contacts, instead of increasing socialist influence in West Berlin, would actually raise the prestige of West Berlin. As Ambassador Pervukhin noted in his annual report on the GDR for 1960: certain measures are adopted in the GDR that contradict the policy aimed at increasing the influence of socialist countries, including the GDR, in West Berlin. Some measures of the friends, on the contrary, lead to the isolation of West Berlin from the GDR and socialist countries, as well as to a deterioration of the situation and to complications in the resolution of the West Berlin issue. In particular, the German friends are rather jealous of the development of direct trade ties between the socialist countries and West Berlin. In the development of these ties, they see only one side, namely, that it would lead to the economic strengthening of West Berlin, forgetting that the development of economic ties between West Berlin and the countries of the socialist camp inevitably would lead to the elimination of the one-sided orientation of the West Berlin economy toward the West. To the same degree, there is a negative attitude of the GDR toward the development of direct cultural ties between the socialist countries and West Berlin.34 Pervukhin opined that ‘GDR policy concerning West Berlin must have a more flexible character and assist our general line of increasing the influence of socialist countries in West Berlin’,35 but he did not seem particularly optimistic at being able to enforce this. Instead, he noted that GDR policies regarding West Berlin ‘are, as a rule, unilateral and have a primarily administrative character, which does not help in winning over the West German citizens to the GDR side. In general, these measures are mostly all kinds of limitations concerning movement between both parts of the city, job placement, etc.’36 As an example of this and of ‘a certain inflexibility of the GDR leaders in practical activity concerning West Berlin’, Pervukhin cited the September episode: ‘In September of the current year, the friends tried without prior consultation with us to establish a new order of control over crossing the sectoral border in Berlin for the citizens of West Germany, foreigners, and diplomatic and military representatives of the three Western Powers.’37 Not to be deterred by Selianinov’s objections to König, Ulbricht himself continued the König–Selianinov dialogue directly with Khrushchev in a letter on 18 October 1960 in which he forcefully defended the

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 107

necessity of the East German measures on the sectoral border. Ulbricht complained about the Western powers trying to use the ‘former Four Power status’ of Berlin as grounds for their right to enter East Berlin without East German permission and about Khrushchev being hesitant to practice what he had been preaching to the West: ‘We cannot have a situation in which a Four-Power status is in principle not recognized [i.e., by Khrushchev in his public statements], but in reality the representatives of the states which do not want to recognize the GDR government can come into the capital of the GDR without identifying themselves.’ He added, contrary to Selianinov: ‘We do not believe that the work of the Soviet organs in West Berlin will be complicated by our new border measures.’38 The day before Ulbricht sent this bossy letter to Khrushchev, A. P. Kazennov, second secretary at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, reported to the Central Committee and the Foreign Ministry on 17 October that: our friends [the East Germans] are studying the possibility of taking measures directed towards forbidding and making it more difficult for GDR citizens to work in West Berlin, and also towards stopping the exodus of the population of the GDR through West Berlin. One of such measures by our friends could be the cessation of free movement through the sectoral border and the introduction of such a process for visiting West Berlin by GDR citizens as exists for visiting the FRG. In so far as measures in this direction would have definite consequences for the work of the embassy in West Berlin and for the development of direct Soviet contacts with West Berlin, it would be expedient to discuss with our friends at the appropriate level the question of the regime on the sectoral border in Berlin. 39 Khrushchev responded to the developments of September and October by letter to Ulbricht on 24 October saying that they would discuss all these matters when they met in Moscow at the end of November and that in the meantime ‘no measures should be carried out which would change the situation on the border of West Berlin’. 40 When they met on 30 November, Khrushchev again vetoed Ulbricht’s plans to tighten up the Berlin border, referring to his promise to President-elect Kennedy: we gave our word that we would not change the existing situation until the summit meeting of the heads of government [which would not occur until Khrushchev and Kennedy met in Vienna in June 1961]. And if we change something now, this will look as if we are

108 The Berlin Wall Crisis

violating our word. Since we already missed this opportunity, we cannot now correct the situation unilaterally. Let us wait until the moment before which we said we would not change the situation. There isn’t much more [waiting] to endure now. 41 As Pervukhin summarised the meeting later in his annual report on the GDR: It was stipulated that the GDR government would not unilaterally take steps toward the liquidation of the remnants of the last war, although they run counter to GDR sovereignty, but their removal by unilateral acts could lead to an aggravation of the situation and hinder the negotiations of the USSR with the Western Powers on a peaceful settlement of the German question. This concerns, above all, the control regime for the crossing of the sectoral border in Berlin.42 Ulbricht, however, was much more responsive to the increasing numbers of refugees, especially skilled workers, fleeing West via West Berlin than to Khrushchev’s admonitions. The numbers of East Germans fleeing had dropped significantly in 1958 and 1959 due in part to tighter regulations for travel West, but there was an increasingly overwhelming focus on West Berlin as the escape hatch. The overall numbers rose again dramatically in 1960 and 1961. According to East German and Soviet figures, refugee numbers rose from 120,230 in 1959 to 182,278 in 1960 and continued to rise even more in 1961, as did the number of East German Grenzgänger, which rose from 50,000 to 65,000 in 1961.43 Both the East Germans and Soviets were concerned about this and met monthly to discuss the refugee exodus, its causes and possible remedies. 44 In a letter to Khrushchev on 10 October 1960, Ulbricht told him what a harsh economic toll had been taken by the ‘fact that in the last ten years over two million people have gone to West Germany’ and that ‘(m)igration this year is particularly high . . . (I)t includes many construction workers, technicians, and engineers, as well as doctors and teachers.’45 Momentarily restrained after his 30 November meeting with Khrushchev from taking further actions at the Berlin border, Ulbricht found another way to put pressure on Khrushchev to carry out his threats to the West instead of continuing to wait patiently for what he believed were unlikely Western concessions. On 18 January 1961, an East German delegation led by Politburo member Hermann Matern showed up

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 109

unexpectedly in Moscow on its way to Peking for a month. Planning this trip, without giving the Soviets any advance notice, to the Soviets’ rival in the socialist camp in the midst of East German negotiations with the Soviets on policy regarding Berlin may well have been intended to step up the pressure on the Soviets, although Matern assured the Soviets that they were only going to discuss economic issues with the Chinese, not political issues.46 At the meetings in Beijing, however, the Chinese and East Germans discussed more than just economics. They compared their similar concerns about West Berlin and Taiwan, which Foreign Minister Chen Yi said ‘have much in common’ and he admitted to having ‘romantic images of imagining that the Americans would give up both positions’. He declared that the Chinese completely supported GDR policy regarding West Berlin. 47 Located on distant edges of the socialist bloc, the East Germans and Chinese each recognised the pressure on the other and supported the other in its flank position.48 Chinese Premier Chou Enlai told GDR Ambassador Hegen in June 1961: The socialist camp has . . . two fronts, one in the East and one in the West, whereby the strategic front is the one in the West. Thus, we understand very well that the GDR has a heavy load to carry . . . The main problem is Germany. The struggles on all fronts have direct or indirect relation to the struggle in Germany. Accordingly, we support your fight in Germany. 49 Even after the East German trip to Beijing, however, Khrushchev continued to make Ulbricht hold off on any changes in the Berlin border regime until he met with Kennedy. 50 The same held true at the 28–9 March Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow. 51 In the interests of peace and stability and in the hopes of scoring a diplomatic coup, Khrushchev favoured finding a resolution to the problems in Berlin and Germany together with the Western powers; a resolution would also be more long-lasting if supported by the West. Ulbricht, however, had a more immediate concern, namely the increasingly costly refugee exodus, and needed to resolve it as soon as possible, which to him meant unilaterally, instead of by agreement with the Soviets and the Western powers. Accordingly, on 19 May, Ambassador Pervukhin wrote to Foreign Minister Gromyko that the East Germans wanted to close the Berlin sectoral border immediately and were not following Soviet policy on Berlin:

110 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Our friends would like to establish now such control on the sectoral border between democratic and West Berlin which would allow them to, as they say, close ‘the door to the West’ and reduce the exodus of the population from the Republic and weaken the influence of economic conspiracy against the GDR, which is carried out directly from West Berlin . . . Trying to liquidate the remnants of the occupation period as soon as possible, our German friends sometimes exercise impatience and a somewhat unilateral approach to this problem, not always studying the interests of the entire socialist camp or the international situation at the given moment. Evidence of this, for example, is their efforts to stop free movement between the GDR and West Berlin as soon as possible with any means, which in the present conditions would complicate carrying out the struggle for a peace treaty. 52 The Soviets felt that that East German efforts to limit movement across or close the Berlin sectoral border would be incompatible with an effort to get a four-power peace treaty with Germany and the transformation of West Berlin into a free city. The Soviet focus was on the latter issues, and the East German focus was on the former. Commissioned by the Foreign Ministry to write his 19 May report ‘on the position of the GDR government on the peaceful regulation of the German problem’, Ambassador Pervukhin found that East German concerns were very specific and immediate and more focused on getting ‘control of the sectoral border’ and ‘full control over all GDR territory, including full control over the links between West Berlin and the FRG that go through the GDR’ than on a peace treaty per se.53 The East Germans wanted control over the borders and access routes to hinder the refugee exodus and economic losses and to increase East German prestige and sovereignty. The tense interactions between Khrushchev and Kennedy at Vienna over Berlin and their unwillingness to reach an agreement54 removed the last impediment to Khrushchev agreeing to Ulbricht’s request to close the border. From the available documentary evidence, it appears that Khrushchev sanctioned Ulbricht’s request some time between 15 and 25 July. On 25 July, Ulbricht sent Khrushchev a copy of the speech he would give at the upcoming Warsaw Pact meeting on Germany and Berlin. The speech justified the necessity, especially economic, of ‘strengthening control’ of the border around West Berlin. In Ulbricht’s cover letter, he told Khrushchev: ‘With regard to control over the movement of GDR citizens to Berlin and the movement of people from

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 111

the capital of the GDR to West Berlin on roads and streets, we have prepared all the necessary measures.’55 Yuli Kvitsinky, an attaché at the Soviet embassy in the GDR, gives the most elucidating account of the Soviet motivation for convening a meeting of the socialist allies in Moscow before closing the borders. Flying to Moscow with Ambassador Pervukhin, probably on 1 August, Kvitsinsky learned that there would be a Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow. Pervukhin told him that the Warsaw Pact meeting was being held for two reasons: first, to inform the other members of the decision to close the borders and get their agreement; and second, to present to the West the border closure as an act of the entire Warsaw Pact, thus deterring the West from stopping it. Pervukhin told Kvitsinsky: ‘We cannot let the GDR’s action [i.e., closing the border] be seen as only its plan; this could provoke the Federal Republic and its allies to an intervention. The Soviet Union and the entire Warsaw Pact must stand in front of the GDR so it will be clear to all that there is no way back.’ 56 Accordingly, the Warsaw Pact Declaration, carried at 1 a.m. on 13 August by the GDR press agency ADN, announced that the border closure was being carried out at the request of the Warsaw Pact member states so as to ‘securely block the way to subversive activity against the countries of the socialist camp’. The Western powers had ‘used the order now existing on the border of West Berlin for their own perfidious, subversive aims. An end must be put to the present abnormal situation through stronger protection and control on the border with West Berlin.’ 57 The records of the 3–5 August WTO meeting reveal two key reasons Khrushchev decided to sanction the building of the Wall but ultimately would not support the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the GDR which would turn over control of the access routes to the GDR: economic and military. As the title of the conference ‘for the exchange of opinions on issues connected with the preparation and conclusion of a Germany peace treaty’ suggested, it was expected that the WTO states would reach agreement on signing a separate peace treaty with the GDR which would include transferring control over the access routes from the Soviets to the East Germans. Yet, the fears voiced by Khrushchev and the East Europeans that the West could respond to this with an economic embargo and/or war, held them back. Although Khrushchev told the conference participants that the ‘adversary had proved to be less tough than we assumed’, he confessed that ‘no one can give a guarantee that there will be no war’ and that it was always safer to ‘prepare for the worst’.58 In addition, the reluctance of the East Europeans

112 The Berlin Wall Crisis

to help the GDR economically if it was faced with a West German embargo was probably the final straw leading Khrushchev to see that he had to agree to close the border around West Berlin to help the GDR. Ulbricht made it overwhelmingly clear in his 4 August speech (as well as in his letter of the same day to Khrushchev entitled ‘Information on the Sources of the Economic Difficulties of the GDR’ 59) on the situation in the GDR and East Berlin that the main reason he needed to close the ‘open border’ in Berlin was economic and in particular the need to stop the loss of skilled workers to West Berlin and West Germany. 60 Khrushchev then pressed strongly for all of the other socialist countries to help the GDR economically. To his clear frustration and even anger, however, the East European socialist leaders, Wladislaw Gomulka, Antonin Novotny, and Janos Kadar presented a wall of polite yet detailed protest, making it clear that they had their own economic problems and, while they agreed to do what they could for the GDR and understood the need to do so, they lacked the capacity to give significant aid to the GDR. Khrushchev responded angrily: Now, comrades, we will all help the GDR. I will not say who of you will help most. All must help and must help more. Let us look at it this way: if we do not now turn our attention to the needs of the GDR and we do not make sacrifices, they cannot endure; they do not have enough internal strength. What would it mean if the GDR was liquidated? It would mean that the Bundeswehr would approach the Polish borders, it would come up to the border with Czechoslovakia; it would mean the Bundeswehr would come closer to our Soviet border and to the borders of other countries. I think that if this happened as a result of our lack of understanding, it would cost us more, and significantly more, not only in the political but also in the material regard, than it is now necessary to do to help the GDR and strengthen it. By strengthening its position, we strengthen our position. Therefore, comrades, this would be help, I would say, not only to Comrade Walter and to the Germans of the GDR, but also to us ourselves. 61 It became clear to Khrushchev at this conference, however, that the only sure way to help the GDR, given the constraints he and the others felt about giving the GDR any more substantial economic aid, was by allowing it to close the border around West Berlin. Following the WTO meeting, at an East German Politburo session on 7 August, Ulbricht gave a report on the Moscow meeting and said that

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 113

‘the beginning of the planned measures for control will occur in the night from Saturday to Sunday [12–13 August] on the basis of a resolution of the Council of Ministers’. 62 On 11 August, Mielke informed high-level Stasi officials: ‘Measures will be taken against flight from the republic, whereby especially the ring around Berlin will be the focus.’ 63 ‘Since in the next days, decisive measures will be decided, any hostile activity must be hindered.’ 64 ‘All preparatory work is to be carried out under the protection of conspiracy and under the strictest secrecy. The entire operation has the code name “Rose”.’65 The Soviet Embassy officials had the final pre-border closure meeting with the East German leaders 24 hours before commencement of the operation.66 The Soviets still did not quite trust Ulbricht not to go too far. Referring to the less than friendly personal relations between them, Ambassador Pervukhin told Ulbricht: ‘you can have whatever view of me you want, but now the situation is critical’. Pervukhin thus asked him to move ahead on all issues only together and not to conceal anything from one another. ‘This is also in your own interest’, Pervukhin observed, ‘If something goes wrong, we’ll both lose our heads.’ Ulbricht nodded and said that Pervukhin did not need to have any doubt of his complete loyalty.67 Erich Honecker headed the operation in great secrecy from Berlin police headquarters with a very small staff. At 4 p.m. on 12 August, Ulbricht signed the orders to close the border, and at midnight on 12 August the alert was given and the border closure operation began. 68 Free movement on foot, by car, train, boat, etc. from East to West Berlin was stopped. The U-bahn, S-bahn, tram, and buses were all stopped from crossing the border, and their old crossing points were blocked. Thirteen border crossing points initially remained open for East German border guards to check documents of people entering East Berlin, but on 23 August this was reduced to seven: one for foreigners (Checkpoint Charlie), one for West Berliners (Invalidenstrasse), and five for West Germans. In reporting to Khrushchev on 15 September regarding the implementation of the measures to close the border, Ulbricht wrote: The carrying out of the resolution for the closing of the border to West Berlin went according to plan. The tactic of carrying out the measures gradually made it more difficult for the enemy to orient himself with regard to the extent of our measures and made it easier for us to find the weak places in the border. I must say that the enemy undertook fewer counter-measures than was expected.69

114 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Two weeks earlier, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi had commented to the East Germans: ‘The fact that the West has still not taken any serious countermeasures indicates . . . that the West must of necessity recognize the new situation.’70 Similarly, Honecker reported on 18 September to representatives of socialist countries accredited to the GDR: ‘One can say that as a whole the GDR’s measures of 13 August 1961 occurred with better results than we expected during their preparation. The implementation of these measures did not entail any serious complications.’71 Honecker also concurred with Ulbricht’s remark to Khrushchev on the success of the strategy to close the border gradually. Honecker told the socialist diplomats: ‘Due to tactical considerations, originally movement across the border in Berlin was only closed for residents of the GDR and [three days] later also for citizens of West Berlin. By this, the closure of the borders as a whole was vitally facilitated.’72 Gradually closing off movement across the Berlin sectoral border gave both the GDR and the West time to adjust to the changes. As the supervisor of ‘Rose’, the border closure operation, Honecker patted himself on the back with the socialist diplomats, telling them: ‘The events of 13 August were unexpected for the West. In spite of the fact that the measures taken for strengthening the GDR’s borders with West demanded much preparatory work, the adversary did not anticipate the carrying out of such measures. This is, without question, a defeat of Western intelligence. Many in the GDR were [also] astounded by the precise and rapid implementation of the measures of 13 August.’73 In light of the resumption of Soviet–Western talks on Berlin and Germany in September and October, Gromyko observed with apparent glee to the Central Committee: ‘the Western Powers are not even raising in talks the question of eliminating the control on the borders of West Berlin. Even more, representatives of the USA recognized in talks that the measures of 13 August 1961 correspond to the vital interests of the GDR and the other socialist states.’ 74 The Soviets were definitely relieved that their decision to finally acquiesce in East German pleas to close the border had not raised tensions in Soviet–Western relations. Yet, they still feared that Ulbricht might do something on the Berlin border which would put the newly-resumed Soviet–Western talks at risk. Accordingly, Khrushchev wrote Ulbricht on 28 September: Under the present conditions, since the measures for the securing and control of the borders of the GDR with West Berlin were carried out successfully, and since the Western powers are tending towards

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 115

negotiations and there have already been contacts established between the USSR and the USA in New York, such steps which could exacerbate the situation, especially in Berlin, should be avoided. In this connection it is especially appropriate to abstain from new measures which would change the control order set up by the GDR government on the border with West Berlin. 75 Khrushchev’s concern about Ulbricht’s provocative behaviour at the border must have been greatly increased the following month. The American scholar Bruce W. Menning, who has had exclusive access to files on Berlin for 31 August to 31 December 1961 at the Soviet General Staff archives, found continued Soviet frustration and concern over East German unilateral and dangerous behaviour in Berlin even after the border closure.76 The files, based on daily reports of events at the post-wall border in Berlin, contain multiple complaints by the Soviets that the East Germans were shooting too readily and frequently at people at the border and were being too restrictive of Western allied access to East Berlin, both of which the Soviets feared could lead to ‘undesirable serious consequences’ and threaten US–Soviet relations. 77 After Marshal I. Konev, commander of the Soviet forces in the GDR, and others had complained in vain to Ulbricht and Honecker several times in August and September about ‘disorderly firing’ along the border, East German unilateral policies against Western allied officials, and the need for East German restraint, Gromyko and Defence Minister Rodion Malinovsky advised Khrushchev on 19 October ‘that Ulbricht be counselled against taking any new measures without prior discussion with the Soviets’. 78 Again on 25 October, they felt the need to tell Khrushchev: ‘We consider it necessary to review the situation created in the GDR and request that comrade Ulbricht take measures to halt such actions of the police and GDR authorities which create tensions not corresponding with the requirements of the given moment.’79 As Menning summarises, Soviet reports about the situation on the border in Berlin ‘indicate both growing apprehensions about the ability to contain incidents and growing impatience with the East German penchant for violence. They also reveal a willingness to seek compromise on issues likely to provoke additional confrontations, especially at Checkpoint Charlie.’80 Drawing on Menning’s evidence of Soviet complaints about East German unilateral policies on the border and Soviet concern that East German border guards not demand identification of allied personnel, Richard Smyser asserts that the Checkpoint Charlie incident, beginning

116 The Berlin Wall Crisis

on 22 October when East German border guards requested the identification papers of Allan Lightner, the chief of the US Mission in Berlin, and climaxing with US and Soviet tanks at a standoff at the border crossing, was a result of this unilateral East German policy. 81 Michael Lemke’s research in archives of the former GDR also leads him to the conclusion that this one and only direct face-off of Soviet and American tanks during the entire Cold War was indeed brought on by unilateral East German policies aimed at torpedoing Soviet–American talks. While the Soviets and Americans withdrew their tanks in relief from Checkpoint Charlie, ‘Ulbricht decorated the VoPos and others who were based at the Friedrichstrasse [Checkpoint Charlie] crossing.’82 In a similar vein, in his yearly report on the GDR for 1961, Ambassador Pervukhin worried that in East German efforts to gain control over the access routes between West Germany and West Berlin, ‘the GDR leadership gives insufficiently deep consideration to questions regarding how to accomplish (this) without causing a military conflict’. 83 Ulbricht’s tenaciousness in working toward the erection of the Berlin Wall contributed, on the one hand, to Khrushchev’s acquiescence to closing the border around West Berlin and, on the other hand, to Khrushchev’s ultimate refusal to give Ulbricht any more of what he wanted, such as a separate peace treaty and control over the access routes. Khrushchev clearly did not trust his ally or his ability to control his ally and thus did not want to put any more instruments of power in his hands. After initially resisting Ulbricht’s pleas, Khrushchev finally came to see Ulbricht’s concrete ‘rose’ not only as a way to save the GDR by stemming the refugee exodus, but also as a way to wall in Ulbricht in East Berlin so that he could not enact measures on the inter-Berlin border that would risk bringing about an East–West military conflict. Alliance management on the Soviet side of the Berlin Wall Crisis was far more complicated than probably understood by Western policymakers at the time. While the GDR leaders could not, or would not, close the Berlin border without Soviet approval, they had significant means of persuading the Soviets to close the border. Their persistent and highly motivated appeals to the Soviets, lack of implementation of more flexible socialist policies, and unilateral actions at the Berlin border, as well as their taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the legacy of Beria and Malenkov’s alleged desire to abandon the GDR, Western unwillingness to back down, and Khrushchev’s commitment to the triumph of socialism over capitalism in Germany all ultimately allowed the East Germans to push the Soviets into a situation in which they saw the Berlin Wall as the only realistic option for saving the GDR. Both the

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 117

US and the Soviet Union were faced with complicated alliance dynamics in mapping their course during the Berlin Wall crisis, and this contributed to the length and difficulty of the crisis.

Notes 1. For works challenging the traditional notion that studying the superpowers is sufficient for understanding the Cold War, see Tony Smith, ‘New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 24(4) (Fall 2000), pp. 567–91; Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened’, Foreign Affairs 75(4) (July/August 1996), 122, pp. 128–31; and Odd Arne Westad, ‘Russian Archives and Cold War History’, Diplomatic History, 21(2) (Spring 1997), esp. pp. 268–70. The standard approach of international relations theory, neorealism, propounded by Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, asserts that allies do not play significant roles in bipolarity, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 163, pp. 168–72. 2. Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov’s recommendation to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers for a reply to the East German request, 18 March 1953, AVPRF, Fond (F.) 06, Opis’ (Op.) 12, Papka (Pap.) 18, Portfel’ (Por.) 283. 3. For scholars who have stressed Khrushchev’s fears of West German nuclear weapons as a motivation for his launching of the Berlin crisis, see Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73, 2nd edn. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 610, pp. 619–20, p. 639; and more recently, Marc Trachtenberg, ‘The Berlin Crisis’, in History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 169–234 and idem., A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). On the role of domestic politics, see James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressure and Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Robert Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet–American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). For an early recognition of the role of the Sino-Soviet split on the Berlin Crisis, see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–61 (NY: Atheneum, 1964). In the first thorough account of the Berlin crisis, albeit without access to Soviet-bloc sources, Hannes Adomeit gives a good summary of the argument for East German influence on Soviet policy, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 271–4. For more recent works which recognise significant East German influence on Soviet policy, see Michael Lemke, Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963: Interessen und Handlungsspielräume im Ost–West-Konflikt (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995); and Ann Tusa, The Last Division. A History of Berlin, 1945–1989 (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1997).

118 The Berlin Wall Crisis 4. This chapter relies on the author’s research in the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Russkoi Federatsii (AVPRF), and the post-1952 Central Committee Archives, the Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremmenoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) in Moscow and the archives of the former East German ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv (SAPMO-BArch, ZPA), the former East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Aussenstelle Berlin, Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (MfAA), and the former East German secret police (the Stasi), the Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratische Republik, abbreviated here as BStU (Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes). 5. For English translations of the 10 November speech and 27 November ultimatum, see George D. Embree (ed.) The Soviet Union and the German Question: September 1958–June 1961 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 14–20, 23–40. 6. For more on the factors leading Khrushchev to launch the crisis, as well as more detail on the whole crisis itself, see the following works by Hope Harrison: ‘Ulbricht and the Concrete “Rose”: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961’, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Centre, May 1993); ‘Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower, and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958–61’, Cold War History, I(1) (August 2000): 53–74; and her forthcoming book on Soviet–East German relations from 1953–61. 7. For evidence of Khrushchev’s personal role in coming up with the free city idea, see Hope Harrison’s ‘New Evidence on Khrushchev’s 1958 Berlin Ultimatum’, CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994): 35–9. 8. See Ulbricht’s discussion of this at his 30 November 1960 summit with Khrushchev as well as Pervukhin’s comments on this in his report, ‘O nekotiruikh voprosakh ekonomicheksogo i politicheskogo polozheniia v demokratichekom Berline (politicheskikh pis’mo)’, 10 December 1959, AVPRF, Fond: Referentura po GDR, Op. 4, Por. 3, Pap. 27, Inv. 022, pp. 18–21. 9. Translation of Khrushchev’s ultimatum in Embree, 1963, p. 33. 10. David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). It was not, however, just the Western powers using Berlin as an espionage base, the East Germans and Soviets were also doing so. Secretary of State Herter went into great detail at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in June 1959 about the ‘highly objectionable’ activities of the East German Stasi directed at ‘subverting the existing constitutional and social order in West Berlin and West Germany’. ‘Statement by Secretary Herter Regarding Berlin, Geneva, June 5, 1959’, US Department of State (ed.) Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, Publication 9446 (Washington, DC). 11. At a Moscow summit with Ulbricht on 18 June 1959 during the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, Khrushchev implied to Ulbricht that he was just using the access routes as a lever on the West, but probably would not really sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR and turn over to it control of the access routes. See the intro, annot., transl. by Hope Harrison,

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 119

12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

‘Summary of the Talks with the GDR Party-Governmental Delegation on 18 June 1959. On the Soviet side, the same people took part as in the previous meting, and also A. N. Kosygin and N. S. Patolichev,’ 4 July 1959, notes taken by Beletskii, Kotomkin, Mial’dizin, in CWIHP Bulletin, 11: p. 213. For two examples, see Khrushchev’s comments on 30 November 1960, ‘Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva s tovarishchem V. Ul’brikhtom, 30 noiabria 1960 goda,’ AVPRF, F. 0742, Op. 6, Por. 4, Pap. 43, 14; and on 4 August 1961, ‘Iz stenogrammui soveshchaniia pervuikh sekretarei TsK kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii stran-ychastnits Varshavskogo Dogovora po voprosam, sviazannuim s podgotovkoi k zakliucheniiu Germanskogo mirnogo dogovora,’ published by Bernd Bonwetsch and A. M. Filitov, Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia. 2 (March–April 1999): 72. ‘Anlage 2 zum [Politburo] Protokoll Nr. 24 vom 6.6.1961. Niederschrift über die wichtigsten Gedanken, die Genosse Mikojan in einem Gespräch mit dem Genossen Leuschner in kleinstem Kreis . . . äusserte,’ SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/2/766, pp. 1–3. For the analogous view on the Western side of attaching the US reputation as an ally to how it treated West Berlin, which was, in William Burr’s words, a ‘superdomino’, see William Burr, ‘Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958–January 1959’, Diplomatic History, 18(2) (Spring 1994): pp. 177–205. Quote from p. 180. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 150. See Douglas Selvage’s translation of the Polish minutes of the 10 November 1958 meeting, in ‘Khrushchev’s November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives’, CWIHP Bulletin, 11 (Winter 1998): p. 202. Khrushchev’s comments to Ulbricht, 30 November 1960, ‘Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva s tovarishchem V. Ul’brikhtom, 30 noiabria 1960 goda,’ AVPRF, F. 0742, Op. 6, Por. 4, Pap. 43, 13. On the Sino-Soviet split, see Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and Stanford University Press, 1998); Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–61; and Vladislav Zubok, ‘Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!: Deng Xiaoping and the SinoSoviet Split, 1956–1963’, CWIHP Bulletin, 10 (March 1998): 152–62; Chen Jian, ‘Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s ‘Continuous Revolution’ and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder’ in ibid., pp. 162–4; and the related documents in ibid., pp. 165–82. Hemen Ray, ‘Peking und Pankow: Anziehung der Gegensätze’, EuropaArchiv, 16 (1963): 819–25; Martin Esslin, ‘East Germany: Peking–Pankow Axis?’ The China Quarterly, 3 (July–September 1960), pp. 85–8; and Carola Stern, ‘Relations Between the DDR and the Chinese People’s Republic, 1949–1965’, in William E. Griffith (ed.) Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change, and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 97–119. See Ulbricht’s comments at the 4 January 1961 SED Politburo meeting, ‘Stichwort-Protokoll der Beratung des Politbüros am 4. Januar 1961 über

120 The Berlin Wall Crisis

21. 22.

23. 24.

25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

Die gegenwärtige Lage und die Hauptaufgaben 1961’ ‘Reinschriftenprotokoll Nr. 1 vom 4.1.1961’, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/2/743, pp. 8–9. ‘Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva s tovarishchem V. Ul’brikhtom, 30 noiabria 1960 goda’, AVPRF, F. 0742, Op. 6, Por. 4, Pap. 43, 14, 16. On the positive effects on bargaining power of ‘weaker’ states, see Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. Lawler, Bargaining: Power, Tactics, and Outcomes (Washington: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1981), 186, 190; Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); and Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1990). Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour, p. 272. ‘O nekotoruikh voprosakh ekonomicheskogo i politicheskogo polozheniia v demokraticheskom Berline (politicheskoe pis’mo),’ AVPRF, Referentura po GDR, Op. 4, Por. 3, Pap. 27, 1. ‘Zapis’ besedy s zav. mezhdunarodnuim otdelom TsK SEPG P. Florinom,’ 12 May 1958, from the diary of O. P. Selianinov, adviser to the USSR Embassy in the GDR, 16 May 1958, TsKhSD, Rolik (R.) 8873, F. 5, Op. 49, Delo (D.) 76, 1. Ibid., 2. (emphasis added). See for example, the letter from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko, 19 May 1961, AVPRF, Referentura po GDR, Op. 6, Por. 34, Pap. 46, 2–3. Khrushchev’s 28 September 1961 letter to Ulbricht, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV/ 2/202/130, 2. See also the SED Politburo resolutions on this of 29 September 1960, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/2/727, point 4. Sydney Gruson, ‘Red German Curb Perplexes West. New Berlin Squeeze Feared as Entry of Envoys Posted to Bonn is Restricted’, New York Times, 22 September 1960. Letter from König to Ulbricht, 23 September 1960, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/202/128, Band (Bd.) 4, pp. 1–2. For the Soviet directive, dated 17 August 1960, see SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/202/333. Letter from König to Ulbricht, 27 September 1960, ibid. pp. 1–2. ‘Otcheot o rabote Posol’stva SSSR v GDR za 1960 god,’ 15.12.60, Pervukhin, TsKhSD, R. 8948, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 287, 85. Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 77. See also Pervukhin’s 19 October 1960 report to Gromyko, ‘K voprosu o razruive zapadnoi Germaniei soglasheniia o vnutrigermanskoi torgovle s GDR,’ AVPRF, F. 5, Pap. 40, D. 40, 3. Ulbricht’s 18 October 1960 letter to Khrushchev, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/202/128, Bd. 4, 4. ‘Zapis’ besedy s sekretarem Berlinskogo okruzhkoma SEPG G. Daneliisom,’ 17 October 1960, from the diary of A. P. Kazennov, second secretary of the USSR embassy in the GDR, 24 October 1960, TsKhSD, R. 8948, F. 5, Op. 49, Del. 288, 5. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/202/66. ‘Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva s tovarishchem V. Ul’brikhtom, 30 noiabria 1960 goda,’ AVPRF, F. 0742, Op. 6, Por. 4, Pap. 43, pp. 9–10.

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 121 42. ‘Otcheot o rabote Posol’stva SSSR v GDR za 1960 god,’ 15.12.1960, Pervukhin, TsKhSD, R. 8948, F. 5, Op. 5, D. 287, 88. 43. On 7 April 1961, Pevukhin sent to the CPSU CC a report written up by V. Sul’din of the Soviet Embassy in the GDR, ‘K voprosu ob ukhode naseleniia GDR v Zapadnuiu Germaniiu (kratkaia spravka)’, TsKhSD, R. 8979, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 381, Attachment No. 1, ‘Ykhod naseleniia iz GDR v ZG v 1950–1960gg.’ West German figures for the same years show a somewhat less dramatic rise in refugee numbers, going from 137,437 in 1959 to 186,640 in 1960 and then 133,574 from January–July 1961 and 208, 332 for all of 1961. Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1956/ 1949–1961, 339, 47. On Grenzgänger, see ‘Zapis’ besedy s Predsedatelem Gosplana GDR B. Leuschnerom’, 15 May 1961, from Pervukhin’s diary, 19 May. TsKhSD, R. 8980, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 383, 4. 44. For records of these meetings in 1960, see TsKhSD, R. 8946, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 281, and in 1961 see TsKhSD, R. 8979, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 381. The discussants were usually V. A. Sul’din, first secretary of the Soviet embassy, and Bergman, head of the Department of Internal Affairs at the GDR Ministry of Internal Affairs. 45. Ulbricht’s 10 October 1960 letter to Khrushchev, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA J IV 2/ 202–29. 46. See the one-page report was sent by Yuri Andropov to the Central Committee on 18 January 1961, and written by I. Kabin, Chairman of the German section in the CPSU CC Department on Relations with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, TsKhSD, R. 8978, F. 5, Op. 49, Del. 377. The SED Politburo met on 17 January to discuss Matern’s trip to Peking. Unfortunately, the Reinschriftenprotokoll of the meeting supplies no information on the discussion. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/2/745. 47. ‘Aktenvermerk über den Abschiedsbesuch beim Stellv. Ministerpräsidenten und Minister für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der VR China, Genossen Tschen I, am Montag, den 30. January 1961, 10:00 bis 11:00 Uhr,’ written up by GDR ambassador to Peking Paul Wandel, 30 January 1961, SAPMOBArch, ZPA, IV 2/20/123. 48. See Ulbricht’s letter to Mao on his 65th birthday on 18 December 1958, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, IV 2/20/114; and the joint declaration on 27 January 1959 ending a Chinese–GDR summit in Beijing, ‘Kurzbericht über die Entwicklung der Beziehung zwischen der DDR und der Volksrepublik China im Jahre 1959,’ Sektion China, MfAA, A6661, 7. See also ‘Vermerk über den Antrittsbesuch Botschafter Hegens beim Ministerpräsident der VR China, Genossen Tschou En-lai am 9.6.1961,’ written up by Hegen, 12 June 1961, Staatssekretär Winzer, MfAA A17879, 2–3. 49. ‘Vermerk über den Antrittsbesuch Botschafter Hegens beim Ministerpräsident der VR China, Genossen Tschou En-lai am 9.6.1961,’ written up by Hegen, 12 June 1961, Staatssekretär Winzer, MfAA A17879, 2–3, 6. 50. See Khrushchev’s 30 January 1961 letter to Ulbricht, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/202/129 and the Soviet draft of this in AVPRF, F. 0742, Op. 6, Por. 34, Pap. 46 which was even more blunt in instructing Ulbricht to avoid ‘open unilateral action’. 51. References to this meeting can be found in Honore M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin: Berlin

122 The Berlin Wall Crisis

52.

53. 54.

55.

56. 57.

58. 59.

60.

61. 62.

63. 64.

Verlag, 1980), pp. 48–51; Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and a Showdown in the Heart of Europe (New York: Dorset Press, 1986), pp. 71–2; Hermann Zolling and Uwe Bahnsen, Kalter Winter im August (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1967), pp. 102–4. See also the references to the meeting made by Khrushchev at the August Warsaw Pact meeting: his 3 August 1961 opening speech, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130 and his 4 August speech published by Bonvech and Filitov, ‘Iz stenogrammui soveshaniia pervuikh sekretarei TsK kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii stran-uchastnits varshavskogo dogovora po voprosam, sviazannuim s podgotovkoi k zakliucheniiu germanskogo mirnogo dogovora,’ Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 2 (1999): 63–4. Report from Ambassador Pervukhin to Foreign Minister Gromyko, 19 May 1961, AVPRF, Fond: Referentura po GDR, Op. 6, Por. 34, Pap. 46, pp. 2–3. For the complete English translation, see Harrison, Appendix C to ‘Ulbricht and the Concrete “Rose”.’ Ibid., 2. ‘Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna,’ Vienna, 4 June 1961, 10:15am; Charles S. Sampson (ed.) Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963. Vol. XIV: The Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 87–96; and ‘Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna Meeting Between the President and Chairman Khrushchev’, Vienna, 4 June 1961, 3:15pm, ibid., pp. 96–8. July 1961 letter from Ulbricht to Khrushchev, copies in Russian and German, with the Russian probably the final version, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/202/129. Julij A. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1993), pp. 181–2. ‘Declaration by the Warsaw Pact Powers Urging Establishment of “Reliable Safeguards and Effective Control . . . Around the Whole Territory of West Berlin”, August 13, 1961’, Documents on Germany: 1944–1985, p. 774. See also Ann Tusa, The Last Division, p. 271. Khrushchev’s 4 August speech, published by Bonvetch and Filitov, ‘Iz stenogrammui sovershchaniia . . .,’ op. cit., pp. 63–4, p. 69. 4 August 1961 letter from Ulbricht to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, ‘Information über die Ursachen die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten der DDR,’ SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, DY 30/J IV 2/202/30. For an English translation of Ulbricht’s 4 August speech to the WTO (labelled 3 August), see the author’s ‘Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose’, Appendix H. Khrushchev’s 4 August speech published by Bonvech and Filitov, ‘Iz stenogrammui soveshaniia . . .,’ op. cit., p. 72. ‘Protokoll Nr. 39/61 der ausserordentlichen Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am Montag, dem 7. August 1961 im Sitzungssaal des Politbüros,’ SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV, 2/2/781, p. 1–2. ‘Protokoll über die Dienstbesprechung am 11.8.1961,’ top secret, ZAIG 4900, MfS archives, p. 1. Ibid., p. 3.

The GDR, the SU and the Berlin Wall Crisis 123 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70.

71.

72. 73.

74.

75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80.

Ibid., p. 6. Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, p. 182. Ibid., p. 184. Erich Honecker, From My Life (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 210–11. Ulbricht’s 15 September 1961 letter to Khrushchev, SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, 1. Khrushchev had also remarked at the WTO PCC meeting on 4 August that he and his colleagues felt that the West had been reacting less severely to Soviet proposals about Berlin than they had expected. He said that they had ‘expected more force’, but the strongest intimidation was Kennedy’s speech.’ Khrushchev’s 4 August speech, op. cit., p. 141. ‘Aktenvermerk über ein Gespäch des Botschafters mit dem Mitglied des Pbs und Aussenministers der VR China, Genossen Tschen Ji, mit anschliessendem Mittagessen am 31.8.61 in der Zeit vom 11.00 bis 12.45 Uhr’, written up by Ambassador Hegen, 5 September 1961. MfAA A17879, Staatssekretär. Chen Yi may have been responding to Khrushchev’s ‘Note From the Soviet Union to the United States Stressing the Temporary Nature of the Travel Restrictions Imposed by the East Germans in Berlin, August 18, 1961’, Documents on Germany, 780–81. In his note, Khrushchev said that the ‘temporary travel restrictions’, i.e., the closing of the border around West Berlin, would last only until the conclusion of a German peace treaty and resolution of the situation in West Berlin through the peace treaty. ‘Zapis’ informatsii chlena PB, sekretkaria TsK SEPG, c. Honnecker dlia glav diplomaticheskikh predstabitel’stv sotsialisticheskikh stran v GDR,’ secret, written up by G. Zhiliakov, advisor at Soviet embassy, 18 September 1961. TsKhSD, R. 8981, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 385, 1. With a cover letter from Pervukhin to Andropov on 23 September 1961, this was sent on to the CPSU CC. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., pp. 2–3. On the West being caught off-guard, see also Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 376–9; Peter Wyden, Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 133–6, 142–3, 239–42; Gelb, The Berlin Wall, p. 183, 189–96; and Curtis Cate, The Ides of August: The Berlin Crisis, 1961 (New York: M. Evans and Company, 1978), pp. 255–61, 301, 306–7. ‘Proekt materiala po voprosy o germanskom mirnom dogovore dlia obsyzhdeniia i soglasovaniia s dryz’iami,’ sent from Gromyko to the CPSU CC on 22 October 1961. AVPRF, F. 0742, Op. 6, Por. 36, Pap, 46, 10. SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, J IV 2/202/130, 2. Bruce W. Menning, ‘The Berlin Crisis from the Perspective of the Soviet General Staff’, in William W. Epley (ed.) International Cold War Military Records and History. Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Military Records and History Held in Washington, D.C., 21–26 March 1994, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defence and the United States Army Centre of Military History (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defence, 1996), pp. 49–62. Ibid., p. 5, 6–60. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., p. 60. Ibid.

124 The Berlin Wall Crisis 81. W. R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin. The Cold War Struggle Over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1–1 now Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 172–6. 82. Lemke, Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963, p. 175. 83. ‘Otcheot o rabote Posol’stva SSSR v GDR za 1961 god,’ 22 February 1962, written up by Pervukhin and sent to Andropov, TsKhSD, R. 8980, F. 5, Op. 49, D. 382, pp. 72–3.

7 The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62 Jill Kastner

Introduction The Berlin crisis affected the Federal Republic of Germany more profoundly than any other Western power. It threw a shadow across West Germany’s economic and political recovery, threatened to destabilise the previously unshakable coalition government, and held out the grim possibility of another war on an already blood-stained German soil. One of the casualties of the Berlin crisis was West Germany’s relations with her allies. The strains of trying to balance German national interests with allied diplomacy accelerated the erosion in relations with both Britain and the United States that had begun in the mid-1950s. By the time the crisis had died down in late 1962, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had once counted on America as his most reliable ally, was permanently embittered toward both Washington and London. His increasing closeness with French President Charles de Gaulle was in part a reaction to this development. From the earliest moments, the crisis would reveal long-simmering fissures in the alliance and open up new ones, while at the same time driving Adenauer steadily into an isolated corner both at home and abroad. If Khrushchev’s goal was to sow dissension within NATO, he was a great success.

Background on Berlin Adenauer had worried over NATO unity ever since the Suez crisis of 1956, when Britain and France had invaded Egypt only to be forced out by American opposition. The crisis had nearly ruptured the NATO alliance. Adenauer blamed the ill-advised American policy of abruptly 125

126 The Berlin Wall Crisis

cancelling funding for the Aswan dam, a move that led directly to Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. 1 Suez had deeply shaken Adenauer’s faith in American leadership of NATO, and it had convinced him of the need for European nations to band together to protect their interests against arbitrary or unilateral American action. NATO unity was thus already a sore topic, and nowhere was it more sensitive than over the fate of Berlin. Adenauer had tiptoed a fine line on Berlin ever since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, when he and his key advisers had deliberately left Berlin under Allied control. They had correctly believed that doing so would give the Soviets a much more formidable foe if tensions over Berlin should arise. During subsequent troubled times, such as the June 1953 uprising in East Germany, Adenauer’s primary concern was to avoid violence while boosting West Berliners’ morale as a bulwark against defeatism and eventual Communist victory. This would continue to be his position, particularly during the Wall crisis of 1961. Berlin was simply too valuable an asset to lose. It was an important symbol of Western prosperity and freedom, but it also served a practical purpose as both a gateway for East Germans seeking refuge and an intelligence gathering base for the West. 2 More importantly, Berlin was crucial to the West German–NATO alliance, for the Allied presence there symbolised Western commitment to West Germany in general and Adenauer’s policies in particular. Throughout the 1950s, Adenauer had relied heavily on close relations with his allies, particularly the United States, for his political legitimacy. What would he tell the German people if those allies suddenly decided Berlin was not worth fighting for? The political fallout would be devastating. In Adenauer’s mind, German membership in NATO and the limitations on German sovereignty that came with it were part of a bargain. In exchange for a firm commitment to the West, Bonn expected the NATO allies to support the idea of German reunification and the principle that a peace treaty ending World War II could only be negotiated by a democratically elected German government. Time and circumstance would eventually make this an unwieldy tenant, but in Adenauer’s heyday, this meant no separate peace treaties with the two German governments and no diplomatic recognition for the East German regime in Pankow. In Adenauer’s mind, it was better to wait it out until the forces of tyranny in the East eventually exhausted themselves. Germany would then be united under democratic government.3

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

127

The view from Bonn: 1958 Khrushchev’s initiation of the Berlin crisis came at the end of a tense year. The Bundestag had voted in March to approve nuclear arms for the German army, but only after a rancorous and debilitating debate that left the governing coalition battered and Adenauer personally exhausted. In the Middle East, American and British troops had invaded Lebanon and Jordan in July in an attempt to stave off rumoured coup attempts. Adenauer spent long hours relaying messages between representatives of the United Arab Republic and the United States, acting as a behind-the-scenes mediator in the conflict.4 Yet he blamed America and Britain for much of the problems in the region, and his irritation over Anglo-American policies led him to openly criticise the US and Britain in his first meeting with de Gaulle in September.5 The invasion of Lebanon shattered a growing sense within NATO that cooperation within the North Atlantic Council was leading to a modification of US policy on disarmament and a summit. From Adenauer’s perspective, NATO was in disarray and American leadership was so dismal as to actually encourage Soviet belligerence. European exasperation with the US and Britain did not go unnoticed. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned Eisenhower during the crisis that he feared NATO was ‘beginning to fall apart’. 6 No sooner had tensions subsided in the Middle East than communist China began shelling the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The danger of American involvement and escalating violence seemed imminent. Back in Europe, political instability had threatened in neighbouring France, only to be quelled by the election of General Charles de Gaulle as President. De Gaulle’s communist sympathies in the 1940s made Adenauer extremely wary of the new French leader. His fears were assuaged only in September, when he was delighted to discover in meeting de Gaulle for the first time that the General had greatly changed his views. He and Adenauer now saw eye to eye on many important issues. These were the conflicts of 1958, but for Adenauer there was an even greater issue: conventional disarmament in Europe. He had lobbied strenuously throughout 1957 for progress on conventional disarmament talks between the Soviets and his NATO allies, becoming increasingly frustrated with Eisenhower and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the process. He believed that the nuclear stalemate made conventional forces more important, and thus felt that a reduction in conventional arms would increase security in Europe.

128 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Adenauer accepted the idea that Soviet hostility toward West Germany was largely driven by Russian fear of a German nuclear arsenal. He himself had renounced the Federal Republic’s ability to produce nuclear weapons in 1954, but he had understood from that time on that there was no question of the FRG’s acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, this had been both tacitly and explicitly agreed in dealings with the Western allies ever since. His stance toward nuclear weapons was unequivocal. Arms cuts across the board would increase security in Europe (this could include limiting access to nuclear weapons as well), but any arms control agreement that singled out or victimised West Germany was inherently dangerous and completely unacceptable. What better way to stoke the embers of resentment in Germany? What better way to divide and weaken NATO? As a result, Adenauer rejected any proposals for special status, such as the Rapacki Plan of 1957. Subsequent British proposals to create special zones of disarmament or neutrality in Europe were equally suspect. Thus, as of 1958, West Germany was still on track to receive nuclear weapons as part of NATO agreements. The US had offered IRBMs to the NATO allies at the December 1957 NATO conference, and in April 1958 NATO had approved MC-70, which included plans for stockpiling tactical nuclear weapons in several European countries, including Germany. 7 Yet there was a curious delay between the date that the US offered the IRBMs in December 1957 and the Federal Republic’s formal request for the missiles, on November 22, 1958, despite the fact that the Bundestag had passed the appropriate legislation in March. Historian Philip Nash has noted that: ‘what caused this seven-month lag is unclear . . . Perhaps Khrushchev’s speech and actions beginning on 10 November, which foreshadowed the crisis over Berlin he would formally precipitate on the 27th, removed whatever restraints had kept (Defence Minister Franz Josef) Strauß from requesting IRBMs earlier’. Khrushchev’s move no doubt pushed the Germans to request the missiles, but this does not account for the delay. No doubt the difficulty in getting land for the Nike bases was a harbinger of even greater obstacles for the IRBM bases; this may have been one reason Adenauer wanted to postpone.8 Other reasons included military considerations (stationing such vulnerable weapons near the perceived front line in a potential war did not seem the most reasonable of programmes), and local elections in July. But even more crucial was Adenauer’s quiet attempt to trade part of the German nuclear arsenal for an agreement on conventional disarmament. In late 1957 and early 1958, Adenauer had begun to perceive that the Soviets might be ready to allow some progress on conventional

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

129

disarmament. He was convinced that Khrushchev’s tinkering with the Soviet economy, including decentralisation of industry, creation of tractor collectives, and even the nationalisation of cows, stemmed from the Soviet leader’s need to boost his legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian people.9 Adenauer took a gamble that the Soviets’ fear of nuclear weapons in German hands, combined with Khrushchev’s need for a status ‘victory’, would bring results in conventional disarmament. During talks with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan in April 1958, Adenauer offered to halt the process of acquiring nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr in exchange for a disarmament agreement. 10 It is unclear exactly what Mikoyan reported back to Moscow, but Adenauer received no response to his offer before Khrushchev’s speech. Given the nature of that speech, it is possible that Adenauer concluded that Khrushchev was seeking to gain by force and intimidation what Adenauer had been willing to offer in exchange for a disarmament agreement. If so, his stubbornness in dealing with the Soviets over Berlin takes on a whole new perspective.11

Khrushchev’s speech: Western reaction Khrushchev’s Berlin ultimatum on November 10 and his subsequent letter on November 27 did not seem like the start of a crisis. Numerous signals of renewed chill had been coming from Moscow in the months leading up to November. 12 Yet the six-month deadline seemed to indicate moderation rather than urgent threat. Indeed, after the Soviet Union delivered the official note on Berlin a week later, Western reaction was one of relief rather than alarm. Most observers on both sides of the Atlantic had anticipated some sort of crisis over Berlin before Christmas. The New York Times reported a ‘sense of relief’ at the British Foreign Office, and a State Department ‘relieved at delay’.13 It was unclear exactly what Khrushchev’s motivations were.14 Adenauer imagined the bluster might be directed toward the upcoming Communist Party Congress, scheduled for the end of January. He also thought it could be directed at France, since de Gaulle had so obviously warmed to Germany in the short time since taking office. More ominously, it could also have indicated that Soviet ICBMs were now operational. Adenauer had discussed that problem extensively with his old friend John McCloy in December 1957. 15 The initial Western reaction to the speech was one of outward resolve and internal chaos. Official statements from Washington, London and NATO headquarters stressed the inalienable right of the Western powers to be in Berlin. Bonn issued a sharp

130 The Berlin Wall Crisis

rebuke, while the British recommended reviewing plans for another airlift.16 But among the allies, all was not going smoothly. The British, despite their calm at the onset of the crisis, took the position that the recognition of the GDR was virtually inevitable, a position which officials in Washington regarded with alarm even though it was nothing new. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Norstad were pushing for a more aggressive stance, but were told that any contingencies for the actual use of force would have to wait until further consultations with the French, British and Germans.17 Eisenhower was convinced of the need to stand firm but irritated by NATO’s untenable military position. ‘Here is another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions that are wholly illogical’, he grumbled. 18 De Gaulle believed no recognition of the GDR was possible, and that the Western powers should continue with contingency plans including an airlift to supply military garrisons in Berlin and a commitment to use force if necessary.19 The Germans, already chafing at being kept in the dark on Allied contingency planning, cabled Washington on 13 November asking for details of what the West intended to do should the Soviets turn over access control to the East Germans. They received their answer when Dulles, in a pre-arranged press conference on November 26, stated that the US would deal with the East German authorities as agents of the Soviet Union. This approach would allow the West to tiptoe around the issue of recognising the East German regime while at the same time avoiding a confrontation over the seemingly small issue of checking passports. 20 Dulles’s words caused a firestorm in Berlin and consternation in Bonn (which had already been informed of his ideas on November 20), but they were not an indication of a sudden flexibility on his part toward the East Germans. The so-called agency theory had in fact been the cornerstone of tripartite Allied contingency planning on Berlin ever since 1954. It had not been widely disseminated to the other NATO allies or to the Germans due to concern in Washington that they would not understand such an approach.21 This reservation was justified. For the Germans, such a policy merely employed slick semantics to deny a de facto recognition of the East German regime. From that point on, the issue of contingency planning marred the inter-Allied relationship throughout the Berlin crisis. The need for secrecy within NATO itself exacerbated the confusion between Adenauer and his allies. The element of bluff necessary to deal effectively with the Soviets naturally precluded good communications with the German allies,

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

131

since they did not yet participate in NATO planning and Bonn was known to be notorious for leaks. The US ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, recommended that the Soviets and West Germans be informed of tripartite intentions to use force to maintain road and air communications with Berlin. The US, Britain and France would agree secretly beforehand that this was a bluff, and if that bluff were called, they would call for a top level meeting with the Soviets instead of resorting to force. ‘Realize extremely dangerous to attempt to bluff Soviets’, Thompson cabled from Moscow, ‘but I cannot see that we would have much more to lose than we will if present weak British position is accepted.’ The plan went so far as to include an NSC meeting at which the decision to use force would be taken.22 Even though Eisenhower had a history of ignoring Thompson’s advice, his cable sheds light on the intricate play between secrecy and disclosure among allies. What was more, the forum for consultation within NATO, the North Atlantic Council, was thought to be infiltrated by the Soviets. This made honest discussions of contingency planning impossible. Despite the fact that both the US and Britain leaned toward the use of another airlift in case of a blockade of Berlin, it was important for the psychological campaign that the Soviets think that the allies would try a ground probe first. This was not communicated to the Germans, again probably due to fear of leaks. Consensus between the State Department and the London Embassy held that ‘it is most important to avoid giving the USSR the impression or intelligence that under anticipated circumstances the West would immediately resort to an airlift rather than try to force the issue on the ground. It believes that discussion of the problem by the NATO Council involves the danger of having the USSR learn of Western intentions.’23 Full disclosure among the allies was never a reality, creating misunderstanding, confusion and suspicion, particularly with Adenauer. It did not help matters that Bonn was the occasional target of tripartite disinformation aimed at the Soviets. Contingency planning would remain a contentious issue throughout the Berlin crisis. Planners in Washington believed that even if they planned an airlift, they could never mention it for fear the Soviets would develop countermeasures well in advance. Both Britain and France were hesitant to commit ahead of time to ground manoeuvres, however, since such a move could involve them much more deeply in a ground war without their acquiescence. For his part, Adenauer was determined to block any recognition of the East German regime. Such a move on the Allies’ part would mean

132 The Berlin Wall Crisis

political disaster for him and his coalition, as well as a renunciation of the ‘bargain’ which had brought Germany into NATO and into the Western camp in 1955. Even worse, the Soviet actions seemed a clear rebuff to the offer Adenauer had made to Mikoyan in April. Adenauer was convinced that the Soviets were bluffing over the use of force – why would they destroy the very prize they sought (West German economic power) in the process of gaining it? He was joined in this belief by both de Gaulle and Lucius Clay, who told Eisenhower at the beginning of the crisis that ‘the Russians will not go to war over Berlin but unless it is made clear that we would, there is no base from which we can negotiate.’24 Adenauer viewed Khrushchev and his colleagues as highly rational, tough bargainers. The only way to deal with them was to be equally tough and to never give anything away without getting something in return. The diplomatic beau geste and the gentleman’s reciprocity expected to follow it had no place in dealing with the Soviets. At the opposite end of the spectrum, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was privately stressing the need for negotiations over Berlin. Macmillan’s startling visit to Moscow in February 1959 was interpreted by Adenauer, Eisenhower and Dulles as pure political grandstanding for his domestic audience. Macmillan returned humiliated, having failed to secure any sort of agreement with Khrushchev and having been subjected to a number of snubs while in Moscow. Adenauer was already leery of British antipathy toward Germany and fearful of Britain caving in on the Berlin issue. Macmillan’s move only made things worse. His trip exacerbated Adenauer’s already pronounced distrust of the British. Throughout the early months of 1959, the strains within the alliance intensified. Adenauer, felled by flu in the first weeks of January, met with John Foster Dulles when the latter came through Bonn on a whirlwind tour of European capitals in February. Dulles sought to cobble together a unified Allied position on talks with the Soviets, but he failed to bridge the gap between German insistence on standing firm and British insistence on bargaining. Dulles returned with a clear impression that the alliance was wobbly, telling Eisenhower ‘there is some disarray as between the British, French and Germans on how to deal with the Soviet threat in Germany, and even danger of head-on collisions between the Western governments in the next few months.’25 Already suffering from cancer, the Secretary of State completed the trip and checked immediately into Walter Reed Hospital, to be replaced by Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter. Dulles’s departure from the political scene left a vacuum that Macmillan attempted to fill, further exacerbating Anglo-German tensions.

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

133

German reaction: the Globke Plan Despite complaints from Washington and London about German rigidity, inflexibility and lack of imagination in dealing with the Berlin issue, the Germans did grudgingly present some proposals. Although Adenauer resisted the idea of responding to Soviet threats with offers of negotiations, he did accept a plan from State Secretary Hans Globke in January 1959 designed to provide some form of German input on the issue. 26 At its core was an insistence on democratic legitimacy as a basis for any solution on Germany. Globke proposed a plebiscite on reunification to take place within five years. For purposes of such a plebiscite, the Federal Republic and the GDR would be treated separately parallel to elections throughout both Germanys. The all-German representatives would then elect a government and decide for either NATO or the Warsaw Pact – neutrality was not an option. The area withdrawing from its alliance would be free of all military alliances, structures and bases. The GDR would receive diplomatic recognition under the Globke Plan, but there would be many strings attached. Like the Federal Republic, the East German government would be forced to submit itself to a plebiscite, and, if a majority voted for reunification in both German states, be willing to submit to free elections and dissolve. All limits to inter-German traffic would be eliminated, leaving East Germans free to venture out and see the prosperity and freedom in the West for themselves. The result would be the complete discrediting of the Pankow regime – or so Adenauer and his aides hoped. The most crucial aspect of the plan for Adenauer was its reliance on a five-year moratorium before any of these actions could take place. Such a plan would preserve the status quo exactly as it was (with no definitive division of Germany and no recognition of the East German regime) while giving time for conditions to shift more favourably toward Bonn. This had served Adenauer well in the past, particularly in obtaining a favourable settlement on the Saarland in the first half of the decade, when his patience and willingness to stall had paid off handsomely. He would continue to employ such tactics throughout the Berlin crisis. Under no circumstances was the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr to be made a subject of negotiations. This, in Adenauer’s view, would mean giving the Soviets exactly what they wanted, almost as a reward for their threats.27 Stalling was perfectly acceptable to Adenauer because he did not want or anticipate German reunification anytime in the near future. Despite his public adherence to the idea, and his insistence that his allies also pay lip service to it, Adenauer was in no hurry, due in part to the danger

134 The Berlin Wall Crisis

of SPD electoral gains in Berlin and the East, which were considered SPD strongholds. In Adenauer’s mind, losing Bundestag seats to the SPD would have a more far-reaching impact than simply a loss of CDU power. The anti-Western rhetoric and rejection of the market economy espoused by the SPD’s fiery post-war leader, Kurt Schumacher, was still very much alive in West German memories, especially Adenauer’s. The party itself had gone largely unreformed, and its dismal political fortunes after Schumacher’s death in 1952 reflected this.28 In Adenauer’s mind, an SPD government would lead Germany towards a policy of neutrality, severing the link with the West and leaving Germany vulnerable to Soviet intrigue. It would only be a matter of time before the communists took over. He had seen it all before, in Prague, in his own home city of Cologne in the aftermath of World War I, and in the division of Germany as well. Further, Adenauer could wait for reunification because democratic elections were simply more important to him. Strangely enough, his colleagues in other capitals did not always appreciate this. Dulles did, and could communicate Adenauer’s positions coherently to Eisenhower. But Macmillan and Foreign Minister Selwyn-Lloyd were under the illusion that reunification was one of Adenauer’s top priorities. Indeed, Macmillan was taken aback when Adenauer finally set him straight during their meetings in March 1959. 29 The Globke Plan was never intended to be offered at the outset of a negotiation with the Soviets. Rather, it contained concessions the Germans would consider in the course of negotiations. Again, due to the problems of clear communication among the allies, this message did not reach the other Allied leaders. Confusion and occasional exasperation with the Germans was the result. In early March, Eisenhower complained that Adenauer was retreating from his fixed position on reunification by free elections only. ‘Adenauer now says that we might bring up other approaches during a course of negotiations with the Soviets,’ he told his National Security Council. 30 Eisenhower did not mention where his information originated, but the lines of the Globke Plan were clearly visible. Again, because of the piecemeal way in which the information came across, confusion was often the result.

Meeting with the Soviets: 1959, 1960 The Soviet Peace Treaty delivered in January proposed a settlement for all of Germany that would begin with Berlin. The free city model for Berlin would be extended to Germany as a whole, with reunification coming

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

135

about via agreements between the governments of the FRG and the DDR. West Germany would not be allowed to participate in any alliances, including NATO, nor would it be allowed to ban communist groups or tolerate anti-Soviet groups in West Germany. No foreign troops, bases or nuclear weapons would be permitted on West German territory, and its economy would be limited to ‘peaceful production’. The plan meant the destruction of West Germany as it had come to exist. 31 It was clear that talks of some sort would have to take place; the Western response of 31 December 1958 had accepted the idea of negotiations. But there was much debate among the allies about the level at which those talks should take place. While Khrushchev had been angling for a summit since early 1958, a summit was the last thing on Adenauer’s mind. Eisenhower and Dulles shared this opinion. Macmillan, on the other hand, considered a summit a fine idea, in part because of his belief that accommodation over Berlin was inevitable and necessary. One way of avoiding a summit was to create a lengthy series of Foreign Ministers’ meetings, and this is exactly what happened during 1959. In May and June, and again in July and August, the foreign ministers of the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union met in Geneva to attempt negotiations on Berlin and Germany.32 Their efforts were fruitless. Finally, frustrated with the slow pace and seeking to avoid British pressure for a summit meeting, Eisenhower issued a unilateral invitation to Khrushchev to visit the United States in September 1959 for talks. Eisenhower’s move was a disaster to Adenauer, who believed Khrushchev had been rewarded for his threats and belligerence with a headof-state meeting. But it was not a complete surprise. Eisenhower’s style of diplomacy had always rubbed Adenauer the wrong way. The ‘Open Skies’ proposal and the Spirit of Geneva in 1955 had come as a surprise after months of careful inter-Allied negotiations about a unified position. Eisenhower’s sunny smile and his apparent interest in leaving a legacy of peace for his presidency meant that the Soviets would see him as a pushover, and would convince him to take unilateral action at the expense of Germany and NATO. Over the course of the previous decade Adenauer had come to seriously doubt Eisenhower’s conviction or ability to stand firm, and he relied heavily on Dulles for reassurance. (Indeed, after meeting with Macmillan in March 1959, Adenauer requested that a secret communiqué be delivered to Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital instead of to Eisenhower, a move that put US Ambassador David Bruce in a delicate position.) After Herter replaced Dulles in April 1959, Adenauer began to fear that American policy was shifting even more towards London and away from Bonn. And his fears were not

136 The Berlin Wall Crisis

without merit. Herter clearly did not hold the alliance with the Federal Republic in the same esteem as Dulles had. Without Dulles to articulate Adenauer’s views in Washington, and with a somewhat unsympathetic Secretary of State in his place, Eisenhower began to reconsider many of the key policy points on Germany and Berlin. Adding to Adenauer’s troubles was a growing rift between the old Chancellor and many of his closest colleagues. Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano made a stab at independence from Adenauer’s line by seeking to propose a plan similar to the Rapacki Plan at the Four Power Working Group meeting in Washington at the end of March. Adenauer sent a stern and furious message that no proposals for security zones or anything else of that nature would be acceptable. Upon his return to Bonn, von Brentano was so humiliated that he offered his resignation, which Adenauer refused. Having always preferred to act as his own foreign minister, Adenauer had little use for replacing the malleable von Brentano with someone who might actually prove to be more independent.33 Von Brentano was not the only voice of discontent over Berlin policy, as rumblings could be heard throughout the Auswärtiges Amt as well. In a more spectacular imbroglio of his own creation, Adenauer destroyed a great deal of political capital with his handling of the question of his own succession. Contrary to the notion that the old man was clinging desperately to power, Adenauer had actually been seeking a graceful way to reduce his workload since early 1958. Suffering from recurring ill health and exhausted from political battles like the one fought over nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr, Adenauer had decided it was time to move aside, and proclaimed his candidacy for Bundespräsident, a position that would still allow him to exercise considerable influence. He made this announcement in early 1959 and set about trying to push his chosen successor, Finance Minister Franz Etzel, into the position of Chancellorship. The only problem was that most of his coalition favoured Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, whom Adenauer and many others considered to be a pompous blowhard insufficiently devoted to the cause of European unity. (The famous collaboration between Adenauer and Erhard which had brought victory in the crucial 1949 elections had long since dissolved into mutual contempt.) The more Adenauer pushed for Etzel, the harder his political colleagues touted Erhard. The decisive moment in the succession crisis came when Adenauer held separate private talks with Eisenhower and John McCloy in Washington on 27 May, the day of John Foster Dulles’s funeral. Both men clearly expressed the same reservations about Erhard that Adenauer felt.

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

137

Given the absence of Dulles’s strong hand, and in light of the ongoing tensions over Berlin, Adenauer felt he could ill afford to turn over the helm of government to Erhard. He subsequently renounced his intention to seek the Presidency, and fought tooth and nail to hang on to the Chancellorship from that point on.34 Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September paved the way for planning on a summit of the four powers. The date was set for May 1960. During the run-up to the summit, Adenauer watched his position with his allies steadily erode. Macmillan’s influence on Eisenhower became more and more pronounced, while de Gaulle continued to manoeuvre for tripartite discussions before the summit, excluding the West Germans, as well as a triumvirate within NATO. At the summit of Western leaders in Paris in December 1959, Adenauer and de Gaulle were both alarmed by Eisenhower’s willingness to consider such steps as reducing the military garrison in West Berlin in exchange for guarantees of Western rights in the city. For once, even Macmillan agreed with them. The Western position was in shambles. 35 As the spring of 1960 unfolded, Adenauer found himself increasingly isolated. Relations with Britain had hit an all-time low in the course of the previous year. Adenauer had found himself speaking up for de Gaulle to Eisenhower, and urging the Frenchman to take a more active leadership role in the alliance. On almost every issue, from nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr to the status of the Eastern borders, it seemed that Adenauer’s allies were moving away from him. Whatever proposals he could make would only be distasteful in light of his reluctance to make any proposals at all. Just as Adenauer was faced with a very depressing scenario in Paris, he was saved by a stroke of pure luck. The downing of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory and Eisenhower’s subsequent denials of American involvement eventually scuttled the summit. The delegates went home. The Berlin issue would wait for a new president in Washington before resuming its rocky course. Adenauer could not have been more pleased, chortling to Press Secretary Felix von Eckardt, ‘We got lucky again!’36

A glimmer of hope for the Alliance: Kennedy as president The November elections in the United States brought a new generation into the White House. Adenauer considered John F. Kennedy inexperienced but very bright, and he had great hopes that the stagnation of the Eisenhower period was over. He was especially pleased with Kennedy’s

138 The Berlin Wall Crisis

rhetorical promises to get the nation moving again. Surely American leadership within NATO would once more become decisive and reasonable. Surely the new president would appoint a secretary of state who would have a more sympathetic ear for Germany than the outgoing Christian Herter. Adenauer knew the young president would need time for a smooth transition. The Democrats had, after all, been out of power for eight years. After the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs (in which Kennedy assured Adenauer the US had played no role) and the US difficulties in Laos, Adenauer believed that Kennedy would understand even more clearly that the US must stand firm on Berlin. 37 If only Adenauer had known the extent to which his thinking diverged from that of the new Administration in Washington. Kennedy’s idea of reinvigorating American leadership in NATO took more the form of America acting unilaterally, or in concert with Britain, rather than that of the American leadership of the early 1950s which Adenauer may have remembered with fondness. Kennedy’s performance during his June meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna alarmed Adenauer. When the president announced on 25 July plans for a rapid build-up of conventional forces in Europe and simultaneously called for Four Power negotiations, Adenauer was even more perturbed. American emphasis on combining a military build-up with a willingness to negotiate was, in Adenauer’s mind, merely confusing to the allies and encouraging to the Soviets. Neither Adenauer nor de Gaulle believed that Khrushchev would actually go to war over Berlin. This unity of mind on the most crucial issue of the Berlin crisis helped to cement their collaboration. Kennedy and Macmillan were much more focused on the conundrum facing the West if the East Germans should block the routes to West Berlin. Knowing the nuclear straight-jacket in which they were placed by the current strategic doctrine, they were anxious to avoid a situation where they would be forced to either give in to the East Germans or initiate hostilities that could all too easily escalate to nuclear war. Adenauer, having never been fully informed of American military planning, received an unpleasant shock when confronted with its realities both in 1959 and 1961. Adenauer’s difficulties were compounded by American expectations of Germany after Kennedy’s announced military build-up. Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauß reported that the US expected West Germany to bring its divisions immediately to war strength and mobilise three extra divisions by 1 January 1962. This would require German recruits staying with their units long past their rapidly approaching release date.

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

139

This was perhaps a good idea for the Berlin crisis, but a bad idea for the upcoming German elections. Public reaction was sure to be negative. In Adenauer’s mind, one of the goals of the Soviet move was to hurt his party at the polls. The voter alienation that would result from holding back the recruits was exactly what the Soviets sought.

The Wall and its aftermath In the weeks after Kennedy’s speech, Adenauer’s primary goal was to prevent the Americans from making a hasty offer of negotiations to the Soviets before the West German elections could take place. But his attention was also focused on Berlin, where the number of East Germans using the city as an escape point had swelled to the explosive levels of 1953. There were signs that trouble was brewing. Allied Headquarters received reports of shipments of cement and barbed wire into the Eastern sector, but raised no alarm since these were legitimate construction materials. The East Berlin authorities went around to many of the 53,000 East Berliners who crossed the border daily to jobs in West Berlin, registered them, and confiscated their ID cards with a warning to find work in the East. West German intelligence warned Bonn that some measures would be taken in Berlin to stop the exodus of refugees, but this news was nothing new and no specific dates were mentioned. 38 The problem was abruptly solved on the night of 13 August, when the East Germans erected a barricade of steel and barbed wire across Berlin, cutting off West Berlin but taking care not to encroach on Western territory. Although the Wall itself did much to stabilise the situation in Berlin, there ensued in its immediate aftermath a crisis between Adenauer and the Kennedy Administration that enormously undermined relations between the two. Adenauer’s greatest concern in the crisis was that an uprising in Berlin would provoke violence. The ‘lessons’ of the 1953 uprising, when Soviet tanks had rolled into the city and untold numbers of civilians had been killed or detained, were foremost in his mind. On numerous occasions, the sector border between East and West had been closed with barbed wire and barriers, but they had always been reopened. As a result, Adenauer chose to remain in Bonn and continue with his election campaigning, fearful that a mad dash to Berlin would escalate the crisis.39 In addition, since Berlin fell under Four Power control, Adenauer was not in a position to make any declarations for fear of being corrected by the Allies. The best he could do was sit tight and wait for the Western powers to answer the East German move. (He would

140 The Berlin Wall Crisis

later claim that he had maintained silence at the behest of the American Embassy.) The wait went on for quite a long while. A Western protest note was not issued until 15 August, despite pleas from Allied officials in Berlin, including USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, for a strong condemnation of the move. Adenauer, chafing at his inability to speak out, finally asked the Soviet ambassador if his government would exercise restraint in Berlin. He was rebuffed. 40 It seemed from Bonn that the West was dragging its feet on a response to the crisis in Berlin. Meanwhile, the mood in the city grew ever uglier and morale began to plummet. The outcome could only be a disaster for Western policy and for the CDU–CSU government. Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, a rising star in the newly revamped SPD, garnered headlines and an outpouring of support in the city when he sent Kennedy a letter equating Western inaction with a de facto recognition of the GDR. In the midst of the hotly contested election campaign, Brandt’s move was interpreted by both Adenauer and Kennedy as pure election grandstanding. Kennedy was furious. Finally, six days after the barricades appeared, Vice President Lyndon Johnson was dispatched to Bonn and Berlin in a display of support. Adenauer asked Johnson if he could accompany him on the flight from Bonn to Berlin. Johnson refused on the grounds that doing so would give the CDU an unfair advantage in the election. This was a shock to Adenauer, whom Eisenhower and Dulles had openly supported during the elections of 1953 and 1957. Adenauer didn’t arrive in Berlin until two days later, and only after the SPD had seized upon the incident, sponsoring a campaign of newspaper ads and editorials trumpeting that the US had more confidence in Brandt than in Adenauer. Despite Adenauer’s complaints to the American ambassador, and despite attempts by Senator Thomas Dodd, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, who had been present in Berlin during the crisis, to elicit an apology or statement from Johnson in support of Adenauer, no gesture toward the old Chancellor came from Washington. His sense of betrayal was palpable. To make matters worse, the CDU lost its absolute majority in the September elections.41 Adenauer’s behaviour during the Wall crisis has been much maligned by historians. In particular, he is criticised for continuing his election campaign at a moment of national crisis and for indulging in unseemly attacks on Brandt, based on a speech delivered in Regensburg in which he referred to ‘Brandt, alias Frahm’. The line was touted by the SPD as a swipe by Adenauer at Brandt’s illegitimate birth. Yet Adenauer deserves

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

141

a bit a rehabilitation here. In his thinking, the East German moves were designed precisely to founder the upcoming elections, paving the way for the SPD to take power and lead the country into neutrality and eventual Soviet domination. The SPD party reforms outlined in the Bad Godesberg programme of 1959 hardly seemed capable of replacing a decade of anti-NATO and neutral sentiment in two short years. Continuing the election campaign was, to Adenauer’s way of thinking, the most effective way to combat what he considered the ultimate Soviet and East German goal. In addition, Adenauer’s reference to Brandt’s birth name came in the context of labelling the Berlin Mayor as a socialist radical. The taking of aliases had always been popular with the far left (witness Lenin and Stalin), and Adenauer sought to refer to Brandt’s past activities, not his birth. Indeed, Adenauer had made the same comment, in the same context, in 1957. 42

Fallout: September 1961–May 1962 It took two months for Adenauer to cobble together a coalition after the disastrous election loss. During that time, the Kennedy Administration began shifting its policies, moving toward acceptance of the GDR and the Oder–Neiße border and possibly accepting separate peace treaties for the two Germanys. In September, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko initiated a series of negotiations that would last into 1962. Kennedy chafed at Allied, and particularly German, hesitation over the Berlin negotiations, and he began to pursue a unilateral course. ‘I no longer believe that satisfactory progress can be made by Four-Power discussions alone,’ he wrote to Rusk. ‘I think we should promptly work toward a strong US position (on both the substance and the timetable of negotiations) and should make it clear that we cannot accept any veto from any other power.’43 Adenauer found himself more and more at odds with the most powerful member of the alliance. And in this he was not alone. Even some British representatives agreed with Adenauer that squabbling among Kennedy’s advisors contributed to a lack of American leadership and thus unity in the alliance, and that this egged Khrushchev on. De Gaulle agreed as well. By the spring of 1962, relations between Bonn and Washington had deteriorated tremendously, while relations between Bonn and Paris had blossomed. American pressure for continued negotiations with the Soviets, and especially American proposals for an International Access Authority to deal with the Berlin problem, made coherent dialogue between

142 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Adenauer and Kennedy virtually impossible. Moments of brutal tension exacerbated the problem, especially during the standoff between American and Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in October and during episodes of dangerous harassment by Soviet fighters in the air corridors in February 1962. In April, unknown parties in Bonn leaked a set of (in Adenauer’s view) outrageous American negotiating proposals for which the US had attempted to force a hasty acceptance by the Adenauer government. A bitter round of mutual recriminations ensued, ending with the recall of the German ambassador from Washington and eventually a half-hearted apology from Kennedy.44 In a final break, Adenauer held a series of polite but startling press conferences in Berlin on 7 and 8 May, publicly criticising the American negotiating strategy and dismissing the American idea of an International Access Authority. Adenauer’s comments were aimed at both Kennedy and his own Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, who had known about the ‘surprise’ proposals for weeks. For a man whose primary goal had always been the unity of NATO, this move came at a high personal cost.

Concluding the crisis: Cuban missiles and beyond The summer of 1962 was a time of tension and waiting. Harassment over Berlin continued, mostly in the form of flyovers and annoyances at military checkpoints. Relations between West Germany and her allies remained steady, with continued distrust toward America and Britain and continued focus on France. When the Cuban missile crisis erupted in October, Adenauer stood firmly on the side of strong action, even supporting an invasion of Cuba. From the perspective of Bonn, Kennedy’s tough public stand forced Khrushchev to back down (German leaders knew nothing of discussions about removing the Jupiter missiles from Turkey). In Adenauer’s view, the Americans had finally learned that standing tough against the Russians was the only way to protect Western interests. There is a tendency to see the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis as the finale of the Berlin crisis as well. In some ways this is understandable, since the Berlin issue faded from public view thereafter and viewing the Cuban missile crisis as calming Berlin presents a neat ending to an otherwise sloppy and confusing episode in Cold War history. But the Berlin issue continued to fester well past the autumn of 1962. Anxious discussions about contingency planning and East German harassment continued in all the Allied capitals well into 1963, and the issue itself was only laid to an uncomfortable rest with the signing of the Basic

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

143

Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) between the Federal Republic and the GDR on 21 December 1972. For the Federal Republic, the Berlin crisis had the greatest impact on relations with its NATO allies. The tug-of-war between Atlanticists and Gaullists in the government and foreign office often made German policy seem contradictory and incoherent. Adenauer, increasingly isolated and distrustful, confided less and less in those around him, adding to rumours of his senility and to factionalism within the ruling coalition. His relations with Washington and London were permanently soured by the crisis, just as his relationship with de Gaulle was permanently strengthened. By the time the crisis faded from public view in late 1962, France and the United States had virtually reversed roles in Adenauer’s mind. Now Washington was the villain, erratic, unreliable and threatening to betray all of the agreements which Adenauer had so painstakingly cobbled out over the course of the 1950s. De Gaulle may have been occasionally unpredictable (as with his idea for a triumvirate in NATO excluding Germany, or in his decision to withdraw from the NATO integrated military commend in 1966), but to Adenauer he was a much better ally on the Berlin issue than either the US or Britain. Throughout the crisis, Adenauer never lost sight of what he believed to be Germany’s best interests, and in this sense he acted with initiative and stubborn independence throughout. His approach to de Gaulle stemmed from a conviction that West Germany’s interests were best served by a closer relationship with France. That decision was based on his perception that Anglo-American and German ideas of how to deal with the Soviets were fundamentally different, and that West German interests were best promoted in a policy that unfortunately conflicted with London and Washington. While he was careful to avoid a break – which would have been impossible for both sides, given their converging interests in the fundamentals of the Cold War – he went his own way and remained a critic of Britain and the United States until his death in 1967.

Notes 1. See Gesprächsaufzeichung Adenauer und Senator Green, 28 October 1957, StBKAH, III/55. 2. See David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997).

144 The Berlin Wall Crisis 3. Had he witnessed the events of 1989, he no doubt would have said, ‘I told you so!’ 4. Jill Kastner, The Ambivalent Ally: Adenauer, Eisenhower and the Dilemmas of the Cold War (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1999), Ch. 5. 5. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), (hereafter Schwarz II), p. 456. 6. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower. Volume Two: The President. (New York: Simon & Schuster 1984), pp. 482–5. 7. Adenauer was lukewarm about the IRBMs, preferring to focus on the switchover of equipment for American forces from Honest John and Corporal rockets, with a 75-mile range, to Redstone rockets, with a 150-mile range. See Gesprächsaufzeichnung Adenauer und Ambassador David Bruce, 18 Januar 1958, StBKAH III/70. 8. Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 57–60. 9. Conversation with Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary General of NATO, 22 April 1958, StBKAH III/70. 10. Aufzeichnung, Adenauer and Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan, 26 April 1958, StBKAH III/70. 11. Accounts of Adenauer and the IRBMs, none of which refer to this idea or to Adenauer’s conversations with Mikoyan, can be found in Mark Cioc, Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defence Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991) and Nash, Other Missiles. 12. Adenauer, whose conversations with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Smirnov had become increasingly contentious, had detected ‘a chill wind from the East’. Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1955–1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1967), p. 439. 13. New York Times, 28 November 1958, p. 12. 14. We now know much more about Khrushchev’s motivations than Adenauer or his allies knew at the time. East German pressure on Khrushchev for a solution to the problems in Germany, particularly the problem of Berlin, played a key role in the decision to build the Berlin wall in August 1961. Khrushchev was probably also guided by his fear that Bonn would obtain nuclear weapons, raising the danger of escalation if a nuclear-armed West Germany faced an uprising in the East similar to that of June 1953. In such a case, would the world be willing to go to nuclear war over a West German invasion of East Germany in the name of reunification? In light of all of these scenarios, settling the Berlin issue would clearly stabilise the situation in Germany. It would also conveniently humiliate the Western allies and Adenauer’s government at the same time. In light of this, Khrushchev’s demands over the course of the next four years become more coherent. Turning West Berlin into a demilitarised free city, reducing and eventually eliminating the Western military garrisons in the city, halting ‘subversive activity’ in West Berlin against the GDR, and forcing the West and West Berlin to negotiate access agreements with the GDR instead of the Soviet Union would all reduce or eliminate the Western ability to support Berlin

The Berlin Crisis and the FRG, 1958–62

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

145

in a crisis, remove Berlin as an irritant and boost the prestige of the East German regime. The Western response of December 1958 offered to begin negotiations not about Berlin but about the German question in general. Most discussions of an all-German settlement involved elections of some kind, a condition which the Soviets and the East German regime were loath to accept. See also Hope Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose, Cold War International History Project Working Paper, Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC; and Marc Tractenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). A summary of Adenauer’s conversation with McCloy can be found in HansPeter Mensing, Adenauer-Heuss. Unter Vier Augen. Gespräche aus den Gründerjahren, 1949–1959 (Siedler Verlag, 1997), (hereafter Unter Vier Augen), Doc. 60, pp. 254–9. Aufzeichnung, Gespräch Adenauer mit Sir Christopher Steel, 11 November 1958, StBKAH III/56. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 85–90. Memorandum of Conversation with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, 20 November 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 142–3. Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 26 November 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 131–2. Jack Schick, The Berlin Crisis: 1958–1962 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 31–2. Telegram from the Department of State (Dulles) to the Embassy in Germany, 14 November 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 65–6. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 21 November 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, p. 98. Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President, 27 January 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter DDEL) AW File, DDE Diary Series, Box 38, Goodpaster Briefings – January 1959. Letter from John J. McCloy to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), 10 December 1958, FRUS 1958–1960. Vol. VIII, pp. 180–3. Memo of Conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, 9 February 1959. FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 354–6. For full details, see Schwarz II, pp. 478–80. Schwarz II, p. 482. It was only after major reforms in 1959 that the SPD could be seriously considered for a leadership role. Future Chancellor Willy Brandt would play a major role in those reforms and in the rehabilitation of the party. Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower, Macmillan, Dulles and Lloyd, at Walter Reed Hospital, 20 March 1959, DDEL, JFD Papers, WH Memo Series, Box 7, Meetings with the President – 1959 (1). The March talks between Macmillan and Adenauer generated much confusion and irritation in Washington, since the two sides reported very different versions of the talks. Macmillan asserted that the Germans had agreed to a summit with Khrushchev as one of a series of summits, to begin in August 1959. Adenauer cabled that he had disagreed with Macmillan’s proposal for

146 The Berlin Wall Crisis

30. 31. 32.

33.

34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

a summit conference, suggesting a series instead, linked to a freeze on the status quo for 5 years. Macmillan was focused on a summit, while Adenauer was fixated on the 5-year status quo. See Letter from British Ambassador (Caccia) to Acting Secretary of State Herter, 13 March 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 469–71; Message from the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce) to Director for Central Intelligence Dulles, undated (probably 14 March 1959), FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 478–82. Adenauer finally decided to put an end to the confusion by publicly denouncing Macmillan’s idea of a zone of limited armament in Europe. Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President, 18 March, 1959 (Top Secret), DDEL, AW File, DDE Diary Series, Box 40, Briefings March 1959. Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council, 5 March 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. VIII, pp. 419–25. Schick, Berlin Crisis, pp. 22–3; Adenauer, Erinnerungen III, pp. 454–68. During the course of these talks, the Germans offered proposals for a zone of security in Central Europe, but one based on coordinates instead of country names. See Aufzeichnung, Gespräch Adenauer mit Herter, 9 May 1959, StBKAH III/72. Indeed, there was no love lost between Adenauer and von Brentano. Adenauer had been complaining about Von Brentano’s leadership of the Auswärtiges Amt (and his smoking habits!) since 1957. Gespräch HeussAdenauer, 22 July 1957, Unter Vier Augen, pp. 220–5. Aufzeichnung eines Gesprächs mit McCloy, 27 May 1959, StBKAH III/57; Memorandum for the President, 1 June 1959, DDEL, AW File, International Series, Box 15, 1959–1960 (2). For example, Eisenhower wanted to pull some US forces out of Germany as a new measure on Berlin. His reasons for the troop reductions were grounded in the current US balance of payments problems, but the troop reductions were something which had been on his mind for years. The only problem it posed was the total alienation of the German allies. Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 16 October 1959, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. IX, pp. 69–72. Schwarz, II, p. 560. Aufzeichnung eines Gesprächs Adenauers mit britischen Botschafter Sir Christopher Steel. 30. Mai, 1961, StBKAH III/75. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 24. See Statement, 13 August 1961, BA B136, Bd. 6543. Letter of Hans Globke, printed in Dulles, The Wall, p. 96. The elections were really a victory for the FDP. The SPD made only modest gains. See Gespräch Heuss-Adenauer, 22 July 1957, Unter Vier Augen, pp. 220–5. Kennedy to Rusk, 21 August 1961, NSF/82/Germany. Berlin. General. 8/21/ 61/JFKL, quoted in Trachtenberg, p. 227. Schwarz II, pp. 742, 743, 749.

8 Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61 Leopoldo Nuti and Bruna Bagnato

Introduction During the Berlin crisis, and in particular in the period immediately before the construction of the Wall, Italian foreign policy displayed a strong penchant for mediation and a distinct willingness to compromise. This attitude was influenced by several factors, the first and foremost of which was probably the desire to play a role in what was seen as a crucial turn in Europe’s post-war history, when the future of Germany and of the whole continent was to be decided and a rash decision might precipitate a dramatic confrontation between the blocs. Traditional national sensitivities to any exclusion from the ‘ruling circles’ of the international system also enhanced the Italian government’s desire to be consulted by its allies about a possible settlement of the German question, which would otherwise be shaped without taking into account Italian interests. The other crucial component of Italian foreign policy between 1958 and 1961 was a complex mixture of economic interests and attention to the domestic repercussions of a possible East–West détente: the Italian position during the crisis, in fact, was also influenced by the desire to carve out an economic foothold for its own industrial production in the Soviet Union as well as by the attention to craft a prudent foreign policy which would tilt in the desired direction the delicate transition of the country’s political system. In order to demonstrate these assumptions, this chapter will focus in the first section on the interplay between all the three factors in order to provide the necessary background to the subsequent evolution of Italian foreign policy during the crisis. The second section of the chapter will analyse the various means through which the Italian government 147

148 The Berlin Wall Crisis

tried to make its voice heard during the crisis. The third section concentrates on the analysis of the Italian ambassador in Moscow, Pietromarchi, whose detailed journal has been recently made available for research, while the fourth and final section looks at the initiatives taken in the final weeks that preceded the construction of the wall, as well as at the immediate Italian reactions.1

Italy and the beginning of the Berlin crisis: the background Traditionally, Italian diplomacy has always been extremely sensitive to all matters of status and prestige: the least of the European great powers always tried to make up for its lack of power by resorting to the diplomatic skills of its foreign service and to some more or less elegant and successful balancing acts. After the failure of Mussolini’s attempt to thrust the country into the top rank of world powers by a more forceful policy, the aftermath of World War II saw the return of Italian foreign policy to the previous reliance on skillful diplomatic manoeuvres to work its way into the exclusive circles of the West. Formally a defeated country, Italy strove to recover a position of parity with the other Western European powers by paying particular attention to its inclusion in all the various Western groupings, from the OECE to the Atlantic alliance to the various steps of European integration. Inclusion in the UN took a longer time due to Soviet opposition, but was finally accomplished in 1955. It should be no surprise, therefore, that Italian diplomacy was particularly hostile to the creation of any arrangement from which it may be excluded and openly resented any attempts to set up any ‘inner circles’ in the organisations it belonged to – unless, of course, it was admitted to the club: any inkling that the German question might be solved by any such ‘inner circle’ of the Western powers would run against the basic tenets of post-war Italian diplomacy. Finally, this sensitivity was enhanced by the precarious domestic balance on which Italian foreign policy rested: with one-third of the electorate staunchly supporting the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its anti-Western foreign policy, any Italian government had to prove to its domestic constituency that its pro-Western choices paid off and that Italian diplomacy was taken into due consideration by its allies whenever important international decisions had to be made. The leftwing opposition, in fact, never let go the chance of pouring scorn on the government whenever its Western allies failed to take Italian interests into account.2 The delicate basis on which Italy’s Western alignment rested, moreover, affected the formulation of its foreign policy in other ways as well. After

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

149

the Christian Democrats (DC) lost in 1953 the absolute majority with which they had ruled both Houses of Parliament until then, Italian politics entered a period of prolonged instability, as the DC was forced to shift from one end of the political spectrum to the other in order to muster enough votes to retain control of the Parliament. In turn, this led many Italian politicians to look for a solution which might inject some stability into the system by cutting a deal between the pro-Western majority run by the Christian Democrats and the hitherto fellow-travelling and pro-Soviet Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The third largest party in the country after the DC and the Communists, the PSI, in the mid-1950s had begun a cautious withdrawal from its previous alliance with the PCI and a vacillating attempt at working its way into the government. The possible DC–PSI alliance, however, was regarded with the utmost concern both in Washington and by Italian conservative and pro-Western forces – and in particular by the Italian Foreign Ministry; and it was made all the more suspicious by the inclination of the PSI leader, the charismatic Pietro Nenni, not to sever his party’s ties with the Communists in an abrupt and dramatic showdown. Foreign policy quickly became one of the contested grounds in which the game was played. The supporters of the ‘opening to the left’ believed that Italian foreign policy would be a possible field for cooperation between the DC and the PSI, and to this purpose they propounded a new formula soon dubbed ‘neo-Atlanticism’, i.e. a mixture of defence of the country’s traditional national interests, of détente between the blocs and of a more intense cooperation with the newly independent countries in the Mediterranean – and all of this more or less firmly anchored in the old NATO framework. 3 The enemies of the ‘opening to the left’, on the other hand, saw the PSI as the Trojan horse of the PCI and believed that ‘neo-Atlanticism’ would weaken Italy’s ties with the West. To them, the fact that the supporters of the new domestic formula also advocated a détente with the Eastern bloc was the clearest confirmation that the PSI could not be trusted as a member of the government. Thus, while both the right and the left found a common ground in advocating a role for Italy in any future negotiations about the settlement of the German question, they held strongly different views about the opportunity of an East–West détente. Supporters of the opening to the left believed that an international détente would also ease the dialogue between DC and PSI, while the enemies of the new formula opposed any relaxation of tensions at the international level for exactly the same reason.

150 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Closely interrelated to these issues was the third crucial element that affected the formulation of Italian foreign policy on the Berlin issue, namely the desire, by and large shared by those political forces who wanted to promote the DC–PSI rapprochement, to encourage some form of dialogue with the Soviet Union in the economic field. This approach was backed not only by the moderate left, but also by some of the most influential names of Italian economy, such as the general manager of FIAT, Vittorio Valletta, and the president of the State Oil Company (ENI, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) Enrico Mattei: the former, however, preferred working behind the scenes, while Mattei, in his constant search for cheap energy sources for Italy and in his no-holds-barred fight against the Anglo-Saxon oil majors, had no qualms about striking a number of surprising commercial agreements with the Soviet Union from 1958 on. To sum up, by the time the Berlin crisis got started Italian foreign and domestic policies were in a state of flux. While remaining loyal to its Western commitments, Italian foreign policy was increasingly subjected to strong strains which threatened to alter its hitherto more predictable course.

Italy and the Berlin crisis: resentments and gambits Before the crisis In 1957–58, when the Western powers began to formally consult among themselves about possible solutions to the problem of German reunification, Italy clearly resented its exclusion from the quadripartite working group created by the US, the UK, France and the Federal Republic. The memoirs of Ambassador Egidio Ortona, who was at the time the vice-chief of mission in Washington, reveal that from its inception the idea of the four-power working group generated a near state of panic among the ranks of Italian diplomacy and in the Foreign Ministry in Rome. Ambassador Brosio shuttled back and forth between the Italian embassy and the State Department to forcefully protest the Italian exclusion, but to no avail.4 When US Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Italy in March 1957, the three most important political figures in the country, President Giovanni Gronchi, Prime Minister Segni and Foreign Minister Martino, all made clear their desire that Italy be consulted on a more regular basis by the US. 5 The follow-up to Nixon’s visit clearly shows the domestic implications of any affront – real or not – to the country’s prestige. Shortly after Nixon’s departure, in fact, President Gronchi wrote a personal letter

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

151

for President Eisenhower in which he repeated his disappointment about the Italian exclusion from the quadripartite Working Group, and added that any future arrangement about Germany should take into account his country’s point of view – much to the chagrin of the Italian Foreign Ministry, which resented this display of personal presidential diplomacy not because of its substance, with which it entirely agreed, but because it feared that, if delivered, the letter would enhance the position of the president in the domestic arena, where Gronchi was regarded as one of the staunchest proponents of the ‘opening to the left’. 6 The Foreign Ministry, therefore, never forwarded the missive and a few weeks later both the Italian ambassador in Washington, Brosio, and Foreign Minister Martino, presented the case to John Foster Dulles: while they grudgingly acknowledged that the Four Powers had a ‘special responsibility’ on Germany, they insisted that the exclusion of Italy was being exploited by President Gronchi to ‘undermine the government and build up the strength of the Left’. On the other hand, Martino added, the German problem was strictly connected to the broader issues of European security and disarmament, in which Italy obviously had a very keen interest. To alleviate any possible tensions between the Western Allies, Martino therefore proposed the creation of a number of Working Groups inside NATO, a suggestion which found Dulles interested but sceptical about its chances of success. 7 The issue was further compounded by the Soviet diplomatic offensive of late 1957, when Moscow raised the prospect of a conference to deal with other issues in addition to the German one, such as disarmament and the end of nuclear testing. This raised the opportunity that Italy be included in the group that would approach the Soviets to explore the chances of a conference, but Italian hopes were almost immediately frustrated.8 Several proposals and counterproposals were put forward in the following months, 9 and as speculation about a summit conference rose, so did Italian pressures to be included in any future gathering: the request was officially made by the Italian Prime Minister, Adone Zoli, in a letter in early 1958, in which he asked that Italy be allowed to participate in all stages of a possible summit conference.10 In May 1958, at the Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Minister Pella dramatically repeated the appeal, linking it to the possibility of swinging a large number of votes at the impending political elections: the best that Italy could get, however, was a communiqué in which the US, the UK and France acknowledged that any future summit conference should not be limited to the countries participating

152 The Berlin Wall Crisis

in the preliminary talks with the Soviets and explicitly cited Italy as a possible participant. 11 By the time the Berlin crisis got started, therefore, Italy had already accumulated quite a large amount of frustrations at having its aspirations to play a role in any conference on Germany and European security almost completely neglected. In the next few months, this would strongly influence the Italian reactions to the crisis. During the crisis During the period from the Khrushchev memorandum to the construction of the Wall, four different Italian cabinets followed each other (led, in turn, by Fanfani, Segni, Tambroni and by Fanfani again), but only the second and the fourth lasted long enough to shape Italian policy on the Berlin issue, while the others were too short lived to have any impact. Tambroni’s government, in particular, was too deeply absorbed in its domestic troubles to be able to dedicate much time to the issue. All the four prime ministers were Christian Democrats, but there were important shades in their political orientation, Fanfani being inclined toward the ‘opening to the left’, while Tambroni’s and Segni’s were much more conservative. These political differences had a remarkable influence on the cabinets’ attitude toward détente, but in spite of their contrasts all shared the assumption that Italy must play a role in the management of the crisis and be fully consulted by its Allies. 12 After Khrushchev’s ultimatum the first reaction of the Foreign Ministry was to define the Soviet move as ‘considerably more serious’ than any of the previous harassments over Berlin, and in early December the ambassadors in Bonn, at the NATO council and in the capitals of the Eastern bloc were all summoned to Rome for a review of the situation. 13 Prime Minister Fanfani, however, took a less dramatic position: while he asserted his belief that the Soviet move called for some ‘new thinking’, he acknowledged the fact that in the Western camp the response should come from the Federal Republic and that Italy should not take any initiative, in particular if it could count on receiving ‘separate briefings’ from the State Department through Ambassador Brosio. If, however, there was to be an international conference, Italy did want to be counted in, since its government recognised that ‘while there was a special four-power responsibility for Germany, if European security questions were discussed Italy at once became involved since this was concern of all’.14 In the following months this cautious, balanced attitude was modified in several ways and led to rather contradictory policies. The Fanfani

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

153

cabinet was replaced in February 1959 by a new one with Segni as prime minister and, once again, Giuseppe Pella as foreign minister. The new team initially wavered between a conciliatory and an assertive role, even going as far as taking some timid steps towards an improvement of its relations with Moscow.15 This policy was soon abandoned, however, to be replaced by a more hard line approach: by the end of March, the Italian government concluded a nine-months long negotiation with the US (which had been initiated by Fanfani in July 1958) and became the first continental European country to deploy on its territory thirty ‘Jupiter’ IRBMs under a dual key arrangement. No sooner were the weapons deployed than Pella and other Italian diplomats began harping on the theme that Italy’s new heavy nuclear responsibilities entitled the country to participate in any international meeting where security issues were being discussed. 16 At the same time, the harsh Soviet reaction at the deployment of the missiles basically excluded the possibility of playing the role of the mediator at the international level. There followed what basically amounted to a split in the conduct of Italian foreign policy if it were not for the fact that both lines of action maintained the common objective of having Italy play a role in the evolution of the crisis.17 On the one hand, Segni and Pella abandoned any aspiration to mediate between the USSR and the West, and actually began to stress at every possible moment the perils of détente, recommending to all and sundry the virtues of firmness against the Soviet threats and warning that any talk of détente was not only illusory but dangerous for its domestic consequences. 18 Faced with a rather precarious domestic balance and forced to rely on the votes of the extreme right, they knew that an international détente would make easier a reprise of the domestic dialogue between the PSI and the DC, and they did their very best to prevent this from happening. This led to some rather humorous moments, as when in their Washington trip of September 1959 both Segni and his foreign minister believed it necessary to warn President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter of the dangers of a hasty détente for its unpredictable impact on the Italian domestic scene – without thinking that perhaps Ike’s order of priorities might have been slightly different.19 After their initial hesitations, therefore, Segni and Pella eventually chose to side with those hardliners like de Gaulle and Adenauer who opposed the very idea of negotiating with the Soviets under the pressure of Khrushchev’s ultimatum. If there had to be a negotiation, its real goal was to demonstrate the ultimate Soviet duplicity and unmask their propaganda, which, as Segni tirelessly repeated, only made life easier for the Italian communists. 20

154 The Berlin Wall Crisis

This stance of the Italian government was opposed by many powerful forces inside the country, first of all by the president of the Republic himself who insisted that Italy should try to mediate between the West and Moscow. Gronchi was probably motivated by his desire to reassert Italy’s prestige at a time when negotiations with the Soviets had eventually taken place in Geneva without Italy being invited, as well as to bring about the opening to the left in Italian politics, which he regarded as impossible without a relaxation of tensions at the international level. Thus he led an almost personal foreign policy, relying on the advice of the Italian ambassador in Moscow, Luca Pietromarchi, 21 and on the powerful support of ENI’s Enrico Mattei, who not only shared his desire to bring about the opening to the left but was also quite interested in the economic possibilities of an agreement with the Soviet Union. Their policy led to two rather momentous events, which signalled to Italy’s partners its willingness to play a more conspicuous role as the crisis was unfolding. In early 1960, after a rather ambiguous postponement at the last moment, President Gronchi visited the Soviet Union – the first head of State of a Western country to do so after World War II. As would be the case with the Fanfani trip a year later, it was not entirely clear where the initiative came from, but it is likely that the Soviet invitation had been solicited by someone in Gronchi’s staff; 22 in any case, the president had made clear for a long time his ambition to visit the USSR, since the Soviet ambassador in Rome, Kozyrev, already knew about it in October 1958.23 Gronchi’s expectations for a momentous breakthrough, however, were severely disappointed as his meetings with Khrushchev turned into harsh debates over the virtues of the opposite political camps. At one particular moment Gronchi actually found himself playing a role he would not probably have ever imagined, as he had to bluntly oppose Khrushchev’s statements over Germany; and in the most embarrassing episode of the whole trip, he had to face some rather tasteless antiItalian jokes that Khrushchev uttered during a public reception – which in turn in the following days led Gronchi to extol the virtues of Italian culture over the Russian one.24 The trip, therefore, had basically no consequences from the international point of view; it had, however, some unexpected domestic repercussions, leading to the downfall of the Segni government and to a phase of protracted turmoil which ended only four months later with the resignation of the new prime minister, Ferdinando Tambroni. During this period, ENI worked hard to modify the previous commercial agreements with the USSR, and in the autumn of 1960 a new agreement

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

155

was signed in Moscow according to which Italy would import 12 million tons of Soviet crude oil in four years, and export to the USSR synthetic rubber, diesel engines and, above all, 240,000 tons of steel pipelines.25 By itself, the overall percentage of Soviet oil to be imported did not make Italy dependent on Moscow for its supplies (Soviet crude imports remained the 13 per cent of Italy’s total in 1960), but it represented a large increase over the previous amount, and above all it came at a time when the Western oil majors were beginning to worry about the Soviet ‘oil offensive’ towards the West. Italy was therefore regarded by the majors as little less than an accomplice in Moscow’s effort to disrupt the traditional channels of world oil distribution, in particular because the purchase of Italian pipelines greatly improved Moscow’s capabilities to export its crude to Western Europe. Taken together with Gronchi’s initiative, therefore, Mattei’s oil deal seemed to outline the contours of a different Italian policy towards the USSR – asserting a somewhat more independent line from the other Western countries in spite of the reassurances coming from Rome. While Italy alternated between the Segni–Pella and the Gronchi– Mattei lines, Italian diplomacy strove hard to be included in the East– West negotiations, but to no avail: Italy was not invited to the Geneva meetings of foreign ministers, and the best that Palazzo Chigi could get was a face-saving invitation to Pella to come to Geneva for a separate encounter with the new US Secretary of State, Christian Herter, in which they discussed a number of broad issues and Pella repeated the customary plea. 26 Only by the end of the year did Italian efforts lead to some rather modest results: in September Italy was included in the so-called Ten Nations Committee set up by the United Nations to work on disarmament problems, and a few weeks later, when a number of small Working Groups were created to coordinate the position of the Western countries in preparation for the May 1960 Summit conference, it was again included in the group dealing on disarmament problems, which formally began its meetings in January 1960.27 In spite of this, however, Italian diplomats regarded the situation as quite unsatisfactory, as ambassador Brosio expressed to the State Department in rather blunt words in early 1960.28

Negocier, negocier, negocier toujours: Ambassador Pietromarchi and the view from Moscow Throughout the crisis an important role in shaping Italian policy towards Moscow was played by the Italian ambassador in the Soviet

156 The Berlin Wall Crisis

Union, Luca Pietromarchi, whose interpretation of the Soviet diplomatic offensive and coherent suggestions provided a steady, if somewhat over-optimistic counterpoint to the comings and goings of the various cabinets in Rome. A professional diplomat at the end of a long career, Pietromarchi was appointed ambassador to the USSR in October 1958 at his own request, as he acknowledged in his memoirs: ‘I wanted to study Communism “on the spot” in order to understand directly the practical value of the ideas underlying it, to assess the limits and the results of the application of Marxism’s fundamental principles, and to compare Communism and Capitalism.’ 29 During his term, which ended in March 1961, the ambassador dedicated much attention to the economic and social aspects of Soviet life, as the unpublished version of his journals reveals.30 The goal of his mission, of course, went beyond the mere scholarly comparison of the virtues of the two political systems. On 6 October 1958, two days after arriving in Moscow, at a meeting with the secretary general of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Podresov, he openly stated that he intended: to hasten and get rid of those little nuisances that created an attrition between Moscow and Rome, in order to move forward towards an atmosphere of trust, friendly comprehension and cooperation. Italy was perhaps the only Western country which held no serious grudge [against Moscow] and which could therefore – better than anybody else – dedicate itself to the necessary work of clarification, détente, and moderation with the impartiality and the serenity of a friend. 31 Pietromarchi used a similar language in his first meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on October 22. At the end of a difficult, sometimes even harsh conversation about the most irksome issues in the relationship between the two countries, namely war reparations and POWs, the ambassador told the minister that: he was in a hurry to eliminate these small and irritating issues to start a serene cooperation in the interests of peace. [He regarded] the international situation as terrible, and [felt] that every effort was necessary to improve on it. One could not live indefinitely in such a heated atmosphere. It was mandatory to re-establish a minimum of mutual trust.

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

157

He believed in ‘the Soviet Union’s peace policy and in its willingness to alleviate the tension’, and therefore in the possibility of building better relations. In short, he wanted Italy to play a clarifying role between the blocs, and the first step was to improve its relations with Moscow. Pietromarchi’s language might have been a simple expedient to alleviate the tension with Gromyko – ‘a dark, bulky, gloomy man’ whose ‘resistance’ he found superior to his worse expectations – in order to smoothen the elaboration of a compromise on reparations and POWs, two issues which the Italian Foreign Ministry really wanted to get out of the way. On the other hand, getting rid of these controversies might have been just a short term goal, whose achievement would allow Italy to move forward towards more ambitious objectives. A détente with Moscow would open such broad vistas to Rome’s foreign policy as to make the idea of turning Italy into a bridge between East and West less unreal and utopian. Personally, Pietromarchi had no doubts that this was to be the master plan, but inside the Italian government there were doubts aplenty. In Rome, the ambassador remarked ‘there was no clear vision of what we want to do, of why we should do it, and above all of where we want to arrive’. Among the members of the Atlantic alliance, our country is the only one which does not have any large pending issues with the Soviet Union and which can therefore play a clarifying and moderating role to alleviate the international tension. Any other of our Allies would be happy to have this opportunity and to assume such an important function. We have been distracted by petty squabbles, hesitations and rancours which have hidden the importance of the task that becomes us. It is not just for the sake of the country’s prestige that Italy must assume this role, but for a much more vital reason: for the sake of world peace . . . What must be stressed as clearly as possible is that we are not going to loosen our Atlantic ties, but to build upon them and to ease the efforts of all men of goodwill to save peace and consolidate the security of all peoples. The action which is required of us and that fits us is a covert job, because it will be all the more effective if it will be discreet and confidential, as it becomes a loyal and trustworthy ally. Complying to the role of the supine servant lest we irritate the master is not a policy. It is an abdication to have such a policy and we were not born to be anyone’s eunuchs or the harem’s guards. 32

158 The Berlin Wall Crisis

The paradigm that Pietromarchi proposed, however, had to be reconciled with the uncertain orientation – or, even worse, the lack thereof – of the Italian government’s Soviet policy. The ambassador’s journals emphasise a variety of messages, directives and suggestions from Rome, frequent blackouts whenever there was a change at the top of the Ministry, and many long waits in the antechamber of the minister’s office, whenever his excellency was engaged in some more pressing business. The policy the ambassador suggested, moreover, should also take into account the mood of Italian public opinion, which would not understand the new strategy of friendliness towards Khrushchev unless it had been adequately prepared and persuaded of its advantages. And finally, the whole project of turning Italy into the moderator of the East– West relationship hung on the development of the dialogue between Rome and Moscow: would the Kremlin ‘understand the importance of the role which Italy could play’ and, to that end, stop ‘insisting on such petty requests’ as the payment of war reparations?33 Difficult as they might have been, these variables of the equation were at least known and predictable quantities and would make possible the formulation of a policy. What Pietromarchi could not expect when he drafted his programme was that in a few weeks a new dramatic crisis would be opened in the heart of Europe, but he soon came to the conclusion that the confrontation over Berlin could be turned into a good test to evaluate Italy’s capacity to translate into concrete proposals the vague aspirations to mediate between the blocs. From its start, the Berlin crisis became the leitmotiv of Pietromarchi’s notes. He followed it with the greatest attention, trying to understand why the Kremlin’s attitude seemed so erratic and what could be its future development, and above all trying to figure out the possible windows of opportunity for an Italian initiative in what many regarded as a confrontation limited to the superpowers alone. In his own reconstructions of the crisis – be they made on the spot or at a later time – the ambassador believed that its starting point was 10 November, when Khrushchev and the Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka, in a rally held at Moscow’s Sport Palace, launched into a violent tirade against the Federal Republic of Germany ‘for its revanchiste policies and above all for the threat posed by its rearmament, in particular its nuclear one’. At the end of his invectives against Bonn, Khrushchev stated the necessity to denounce the Four-Power arrangement in Berlin and his intention to turn over to the German Democratic Republic the functions hitherto executed by the Soviet authorities in the former German capital. ‘The prevailing interpretation – Pietromarchi noted in his

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

159

journals – is that this stance was caused by two things: the concern for the situation in East Germany, and the interest in justifying to the Polish public opinion the necessity of an intimate union between Poland and Russia to face the dangers of German militarism’; 34 even later, Pietromarchi would always regard the Polish variable as crucial to understand Khrushchev’s Berlin offensive.35 None of the many diplomats with whom the ambassador was in touch in the Soviet capital, however, held an answer to the crucial question ‘How far is Russia willing to go?’ 36 As for himself, the ambassador personally thought that the Kremlin’s tactics envisaged a first violent blow to sound Western reactions, and the following developments of the crisis confirmed him in his initial perception. 37 The Western reaction was therefore extremely important for the evolution of the crisis, all the more so because Pietromarchi believed that the impulsive Khrushchev did not have a clear line of conduct and that he improvised many of his initiatives.38 Pietromarchi maintained that this reaction should first of all be based on a firm display of unanimity, since Khrushchev was probing for the weak spots in the opposite coalition.39 The critical issue, which Pietromarchi repeated ad nauseam, was that the Soviet Union could not afford the luxury of a war: the launch of the extremely ambitious sevenyear economic plan made a truce an inescapable necessity for the Kremlin. This practical impossibility for Moscow to bring its diplomatic offensive to its extreme consequences represented the main advantage that the West had at its disposal. The West should be firm, and at the same time avoid any threats, intimidations or provocations; and while this firmness excluded any cession, it did not preclude the search for a mutually satisfactory compromise.40 Finally, even if the Kremlin had been forced to act by the joint pressure exercised by Ulbricht, Grotewhol and Gomulka, Pietromarchi believed that Khrushchev’s goal went beyond a mere solution for the status of Berlin and even beyond the prevention of a West German nuclear rearmament: his real aim was a Summit conference to solve not only the German question but also to discuss the broader issues of security. The preparation for such a Summit would be long and difficult, punctuated by many intermediate meetings at all levels, and in the meantime the Soviet manoeuvre on Berlin would lose its dramatic overtones. In short, the West should ‘buy time by negotiating’41 and reply to the Soviet tactic with a similar one, based on ‘intransigence over the substance of the matter and willingness to negotiate over its form, for the sake of appearance’.42

160 The Berlin Wall Crisis

As for the Italian government, Pietromarchi believed it should prepare for a Summit conference by promoting a policy of détente towards the Soviet Union while it was still in time: only if it could persuade the Kremlin of its favourable attitude would Italy be accepted inside the exclusive club of world powers. Thus he recommended to his government to act swiftly, clear the ground of all the embarrassing obstacles inherited by World War II and re-establish a climate of mutual trust: presenting itself to Moscow as an understanding and friendly government, which could become a trait d’union between East and West, was the necessary precondition for being admitted to the future Summit. In order to play this role Pietromarchi believed it was necessary to verify the validity of some assumptions within a very short time, because the crisis over Berlin had impressed a sudden acceleration to the usual tempo of international diplomacy. First of all, the strategy of détente with Moscow could not be developed by the ambassador himself, but merely interpreted by him: in other words, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be united in advocating its necessity and firm in believing in its implementation. The ambassador and his Ministry, however, were not always on the same wavelength, and as we have seen there were other Italian institutions which wanted to have a say in the country’s Russian policy, from the president of the Republic to the prime minister. Whenever he was back in Rome, Pietromarchi’s schedule always included a meeting with President Giovanni Gronchi, with whom he found himself in almost total agreement. Thus when in early December 1958 he was summoned to Rome for a top secret meeting of all the ambassadors posted behind the Iron Curtain, Pietromarchi used that meeting to stress Khrushchev’s longing for peace, and then went to the Quirinale Palace and championed the need for Italy to play a clarifying and mediating role – a role which should be played ‘in the utmost secrecy’ and that should aim ‘at finding out the Soviet intentions on German unity, on disarmament and on the Middle East’.43 And later, in April–May 1959, when he was back in Rome for a talk with the new Foreign Minister, Giuseppe Pella, he did not miss the opportunity to visit Gronchi and harshly criticise Adenauer, who had taken a sterile position of absolute intransigence ‘without facing the Soviet manoeuvre with any counter-manoeuvre and without taking into his own hands – as the leader who should have had the strongest interest in negotiating – the thread of the Allied counterproposals’. Perhaps, Pietromarchi concluded with a hint of malice, ‘Adenauer’s rigidity was the effect of a senile arteriosclerosis’.44

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

161

His Roman trip in the Spring of 1959 had been solicited by the ambassador himself with an initiative that sheds some light on the key aspects of his personal strategy. At the end of March the Soviet viceminister of Foreign Affairs, Zorin, had stressed to Pietromarchi his country’s interest in cooperating with the European countries, had foreseen a very long preparation for the Summit conference, and declared his government’s intention to include in the negotiations the most important European countries.45 Excited at the idea of a resurrection of ‘the concert of the European powers’, Pietromarchi rushed to write to Rome and stress the need for Italy to arrive at the appointment in the best possible conditions: Moscow would uphold an Italian application to the conference only if the grounds for their bilateral relations had been cleared by all the obstacles and the policy of détente with the Kremlin had really moved forward. In his own journals he noted: ‘it’s been four months already since I last received any instructions, even if I have requested them almost every week, either in formal reports or in personal letters to the Minister. Clearly in Palazzo Chigi non si sa che pesci pigliare.’ Pietromarchi asked Pella to be authorised to make some gesture of goodwill, but the minister replied that Italian public opinion was not prepared for it. Not easily deterred, the ambassador wrote to Rome trying to ‘insinuate the doubt that the Russians would oppose our participation to the Summit because of our hostile position, which we defend so stubbornly.46 It would be the failure of Pella’s policy, since he has staked everything on it.’ ‘Since I was posted here I foresaw what is happening, namely that we would insist to participate in a Summit conference and that we needed time to normalize our relations with Russia – he annotated in a rather disheartened mood – but everybody has been so shortsighted as not to notice this necessity. Even Fanfani did his best to maintain a very rigid position.’ This time Pietromarchi’s warning had an impact, albeit only temporarily. At the end of April 1959 his position was partly accepted: both the director general for Political Affairs of Palazzo Chigi, Straneo – with whom, incidentally, Pietromarchi had a rather strained relationship – and Pella himself authorised him to make a gesture of goodwill towards the Soviets by entering into a negotiation for a cultural agreement and by granting the commercial credits Moscow had been requesting for some time. ‘The Minister wants me to contact the Soviet government as soon as possible and make clear to them that on the issues to be discussed Italy intends to maintain a balanced and moderate position, which can play a clarifying role.’47 The hope of harnessing Soviet support for an Italian participation to the Summit conference, however,

162 The Berlin Wall Crisis

was shortlived: the debate on the installation of the Jupiter missiles was resumed in very violent tones shortly after Pietromarchi’s meeting with Pella and forced the ambassador to stop the negotiation he had barely started, making it almost impossible to secure a Soviet support for the Italian application to join the preparatory meetings to the Conference. Italian diplomacy, on the other hand, was far from being unanimous in supporting the policy that Pietromarchi advocated so warmly, and did not share his belief that Italy had to be included in the global negotiations at all costs. In a conference in Frankfurt-on-Main held at the end of May 1959, the ambassador in Bonn, Pietro Quaroni, openly declared that ‘this was a duet between America and Russia, and the European countries do not matter; Great Britain, France and Germany were the satellites of the United States’. Pietromarchi found that ‘the thesis had some value, but Italy should not insist on it, since its main beneficiary would be only the Soviet Union . . . Quaroni does not share the interest in participating to the Summit conferences. His refrain is that Italy does not count.’48 In the following months, Pietromarchi would relentlessly persevere in his efforts to work for a détente in Italy’s relations with the Soviet Union, with the mixture of successes and failures we have tried to highlight in the previous paragraph. He firmly believed that the fact that Italy’s political weight did not grant her a seat at the Summit was no justification for a supine and passive policy, and he warmly supported Gronchi’s trip and Mattei’s commercial initiatives.49 His confidence in a negotiated solution of the German problem, however, was probably misplaced and might have cost him his post: when he was finally replaced, in March 1961, his successor Straneo told a French diplomat in Moscow that ‘Pietromarchi était coinvancu que M. Khrouchtev abandonnerait, le moment venu, la RDA. L’insistance qu’il avait mise à essayer d’amener son Gouvernement à partager sa manière de voir avait été une des raisons de son rappel.’50

Fanfani’s Moscow trip and the Wall Pietromarchi might as well have been recalled for a certain naïve obstinacy in recommending a détente with the Kremlin, but the policy he suggested was not abandoned. Surprisingly enough, it was Fanfani – who in late 1958 had openly stated that Italy should take a very cautious attitude on the crisis – who picked up the pieces of Pietromarchi’s strategy and tried a startling initiative on his own.

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

163

Back in power at the end of July 1960, Fanfani imposed a renewed dynamism to Italian foreign policy. On the German issue, there are clear signs that already by the end of 1960 he was thinking that it was necessary to resume the initiative without waiting for a new Soviet move, and that the West should propose a Summit conference to deal not only with Berlin (for which Fanfani was probably toying with the idea of a change of status for the Western rights of occupation) but also with disarmament and security issues. 51 Fanfani also welcomed the election of John F. Kennedy as a leader who might reinvigorate a rather faltering Atlantic alliance, and was looking forward to the chance of coordinating his own foreign policy with him. When Averell Harriman visited Rome in March 1961 to present the strategy of the new administration, Fanfani repeatedly expressed his approval of what he heard and the two agreed that very soon the Italian prime minister would be invited to Washington to meet with the new president. The trip took place in June 1961, shortly after Kennedy’s dramatic Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, and the two leaders found themselves on the same wavelength on almost every issue, including Berlin.52 During the conversation on Berlin, in particular, Fanfani insisted that the Italian opinion was ‘very firm indeed’ on this issue and then privately told Kennedy that he would understand if the US, the UK, France and the Federal Republic reached a decision secretly and then informed other Allies, while in a separate conversation Foreign Minister Segni repeated the customary Italian objection that his country would not be bound by any decision taken without her being consulted. 53 In light of the above, and of the importance that Fanfani attached to maintaining a good relationship with the new US president, what happened afterwards is rather surprising. 54 In early July 1961 the proCommunist Roman daily Paese sera published an article revealing the striking news that Prime Minister Fanfani was about to announce his impending trip to the Soviet Union. Shortly afterwards the Italian Foreign Ministry confirmed to the main Western ambassadors that Fanfani had been invited by the Soviet government to an official visit, and that he was inclined to accept the offer.55 A few days later the prime minister tried to blame the Soviet embassy for the leak, but the suspicion lingered that he had engineered it in order to face the State Department with a fait accompli and prevent any American attempt to stop his trip. 56 The State Department, as a matter of fact, was not utterly pleased with the news: Secretary Rusk believed that the Soviet invitation was

164 The Berlin Wall Crisis

strictly related to the raising tension over Berlin and that it aimed at generating the impression that the Italian government did not share its allies’ concerns about the gravity of the new Soviet diplomatic offensive. To Rusk, the invitation was a clever ruse to divide Italy from its allies or, at the very least, to soften its position on the eve of a new major international crisis. 57 He asked the US ambassador in Rome, G. Frederick Reinhardt, to represent his concerns to Fanfani as soon as possible and to inquire if it would not be possible to postpone the visit to a time when the Berlin issue had been removed from the agenda.58 Reinhardt, however, found Fanfani firmly committed to go to Moscow: the prime minister told him that he had to make the trip for a number of reasons, but above all to demonstrate to Italian public opinion that the government had taken all possible steps to avoid a crisis. In any case he promised that he would try to delay his trip for as long as possible.59 Fanfani’s firm intentions and his reference to his domestic problems persuaded the US not to take a position of overt opposition to the trip: on 17 July, the US State Department authorised Reinhardt to tell the Italian prime minister that if he really regarded this trip as necessary, the sooner it was done the better. 60 Rusk also repeated that the only advice he could give Fanfani was to tell Khrushchev once more how dangerous were his pressures on Berlin.61 Clearly Fanfani’s trip would enable him to present himself to the Italian public as the man who had tried his best to keep open all channels of communication with Moscow at a time when the international situation was taking a turn for the worse. Such a position, as many noted almost immediately, was very close to the role envisaged by the Italian socialists for the foreign policy of a centre-left government, which should try above all to promote a détente between the blocs. By accepting the Soviet invitation, therefore, Fanfani killed two birds with one stone: he seemed to regain for Italy an important role at a time when his country’s freedom of manoeuvre was seriously hampered by the impending crisis, and at the same time he encouraged the gradual rapprochement between the PSI and the DC.62 Fanfani’s talks in Moscow took place between August 3 and 5. Khrushchev’s behaviour seemed to confirm the expectations of those who anticipated a Soviet attempt to weaken Italy’s Western ties on the eve of a renewed diplomatic offensive over Berlin, since he submitted Fanfani to an emotional roller-coaster of blandishments and threats. One day the Italian prime minister would be received by a Soviet economist whose library conspicuously displayed Fanfani’s economic writings, while another day Khrushchev would draw a crude map of Italy revealing the

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

165

country to be a prime target for a Soviet nuclear strike in case of war – as Khrushchev duly explained, this was made inevitable by the fact that Italy hosted nuclear missiles clearly aimed at Soviet territory. 63 Aside from Khrushchev’s more theatrical performances, most of his talks with Fanfani focused on Berlin. The Soviet leader repeated almost obsessively his intention to solve the Berlin problem once and forever by signing a separate peace treaty with the DDR, boasting his confidence on Soviet nuclear superiority over the US and repeatedly uttering all sorts of threats against US nuclear bases in Italy. Fanfani, in turn, probed his host searching for any possible gap which might revitalise the chances of a negotiation over Berlin and invited him not to take any unpredictable risks; he also made clear, however, that if things turned out for the worst Italy would firmly support its allies. From these three days of protracted diplomatic skirmishes Fanfani came away with the clear-cut impression that there still was a serious chance to reopen a fruitful negotiation on the German problem. 64 Once back in Italy, he hastened to inform Kennedy about this impression, stressing his belief in the opportunity to open negotiations as well as in the necessity to maintain a low profile on the rearmament adopted by the Western countries. This last measure, in particular, was necessary to ease Khrushchev’s position, since Fanfani believed that the Soviet leader was already under the intense pressure of his military to keep a stronger line on Berlin. 65 Fanfani recommended a mix of caution and willingness to negotiate also to Chancellor Adenauer and to Secretary Rusk, both of whom he saw shortly after his return. Rusk, however, seemed to believe that none of the statements made by Khrushchev during his talks with Fanfani contained any substantial innovation compared to his previous declarations, and that there were no particular openings that could lead to a successful and fruitful negotiation. 66 Ambassador Reinhardt came up with a similar conclusion after being briefed on the talks by the director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fornari.67 Even if none of his recommendation were heeded, Fanfani could still console himself with the good publicity his trip had produced for himself: the international media stressed his firm pro-Western stance during the conversations in Moscow, and his supporters quickly worked on this success to build up his image.68 From the domestic point of view, moreover, the trip spurred an important initiative from Nenni, who openly expressed a positive evaluation of Fanfani’s conduct – thus bringing the Socialist party one step closer to open support for the government.69

166 The Berlin Wall Crisis

From a more substantial point of view, however, the trip had no impact on the solution of the Berlin issue, and Fanfani was actually smitten by the fact that nobody seemed to pay attention to his suggestions to negotiate. When a few days later the East Germans began setting up the first roadblocks to separate East and West Berlin, his disappointment increased even further. In their early reactions to the erection of the Wall, however, Italian diplomats seemed to regard what was going on as something which should not cause too much concern among the Western Allies – and that above all should not lead to any hasty decision. As Ambassador Quaroni explained to the British Foreign Office, the Italian government felt that the worst had yet to come and that therefore it was important to avoid any dramatic reaction while keeping open the chance of a dialogue.70 Besides, the government was fully aware that any high profile on this issue could exacerbate a domestic political situation which was already extremely tense. For all these reasons, the Italian government did not release any official declaration about the building of the Wall until early September. It was only then, under the dramatic impact of the Soviet declaration to interrupt its moratorium of nuclear testing, that the Italian government officially expressed its disapproval of ‘the unilateral Communist decisions about Berlin and of the grave announcement about the reprise of Soviet nuclear testing’.71 After debating the issue within his cabinet, Fanfani wrote to Khrushchev warning him that these Soviet unilateral steps would seriously hamper those negotiations which at the time of their meeting he had reason to believe could still be possible. He also concluded, however, that he believed there still were enough margins for improving the relations between the blocs.72 Fanfani’s trip had a rather bizarre epilogue when the Italian press reported a strange declaration attributed to the prime minister, which seemed to imply that the main responsibility for the erection of the Wall did not lie with the Soviets but with the Allies, who had refused to follow his suggestions to negotiate; and even if his office denied that Fanfani ever mentioned these words, the suspicion remained that his real thinking was very much along those lines. Furthermore, Fanfani used a private, unofficial channel to send Kennedy a copy of a letter he received from Khrushchev in late August, raising some perplexities in the State Department for this unorthodox behaviour.73 Coming as it did shortly before the construction of the Wall and the interruption of the moratorium of Soviet nuclear tests, Fanfani’s Moscow trip turned out to be little more than a mere gesture of goodwill. It took place, moreover, when the dust raised by the conclusion of

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

167

the Soviet–Italian trade agreement of the previous autumn had not completely settled, and many observers believed there was a logical continuity between the two episodes. Rather than pointing at the Italian desire to play a larger role in the international arena at this critical juncture, many observers saw these two episodes as the result of the growing influence of a dangerous ‘neutralist’ trend in Italian foreign policy caused by the constant need of the DC to attract the consensus of the Socialist left.74 The State Department’s Italian Desk gave a more negative appraisal of Fanfani’s trip: Fanfani’s dialogue with the Soviets had been ‘harmful’, it had generated much confusion and had distracted Italian public opinion from the need to face any Soviet move with serious military preparations. On the other hand, any open US criticism could cause a cabinet crisis and weaken Italian support for the Western position on Berlin, which meant that for the time being it was better for the US not to voice any further comment on what happened. 75 A more balanced conclusion was reached by Ambassador Reinhardt, who concluded that Fanfani really believed that it was in the general Western interest to open a serious negotiation on Berlin as early as possible, but that at the same time he was also exploiting the situation for his own domestic purposes: by emphasising the gravity of the international situation, he might have been trying to reduce the chances of a cabinet crisis, and by launching an appeal to negotiate he was probably appeasing the widespread Italian desire to remove the threat of a crisis, a desire which was particularly intense among the Italian left.76

Conclusion Several years of constant pressure and many efforts at enhancing the country’s international standing in one way or the other had not achieved any remarkable result, nor did Italian manoeuvres affect the outcome of the Berlin crisis, since most of the country’s Western partners displayed a limited interest in the quality of the information and of the suggestions advanced by Rome. Nevertheless, it would probably be unfair to conclude with a strong criticism of Italian diplomacy during the Berlin crisis not only because it operated under rather difficult domestic constraints, but also because in fact Fanfani’s suggestion to reopen a negotiation with Moscow was eventually followed by the US, which in the autumn of 1961 – after the dramatic confrontation at the Friedrichstrasse – quietly went back to try finding an agreement with Khrushchev over Berlin. Italian foreign policy during the Berlin crisis

168 The Berlin Wall Crisis

also heralded a new phase in the country’s post-war diplomacy: from then on, with the experiment of opening to the left finally under way, Italian foreign policy would be strongly influenced by the new centreleft majority and repeatedly try to play the role of the mediator in many an international dispute, from Vietnam to the Middle East.

Notes 1. As the documents of the Italian Foreign Ministry have not been declassified for the period after 1957, for this essay we had to rely on what has been made available in other public and private Italian archival collections and on published sources such as journals and memoirs. We made ample use, of course, of American, French and English records – both published and unpublished. Both authors claim a joint responsibility for the content of the essay; for the sake of copyright, however, Leopoldo Nuti was mostly responsible for sections 2, 3 and 5, while Bruna Bagnato was responsible for section 4. 2. Which explains why, for instance, by 1952–53 the issue of Trieste had become such a crucial one for Italian foreign policy. For a vivid presentation of the Italian predicament vis-à-vis its leftwing critics, see Letter from the Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Secretary of State, 31 August, 1956, in FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 378–80. 3. On ‘neo-Atlanticism’ see Alessandro Brogi, ’Ike’ and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy’s ‘Neo-Atlanticist’ Agenda’, paper presented at the Conference US and Italy 50 years after the Marshall Plan, Rome, March 1998. See also A. Brogi, L’Italia e l’egemonia americana nel Mediterraneo (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1996). 4. Egidio Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. 2, La diplomazia, 1953–1961 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986), pp. 234–9. 5. Dispatch from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State, 24 March, 1957 (Conversation During Visit of Vice-President Nixon), in FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 406–07. 6. The full episode is narrated in detail in Leo Wollemborg, Stelle strisce e tricolore. Trent’anni di vicende politiche tra Roma e Washington (Milano: Mondadori, 1983). Wollemborg also includes a copy of Gronchi’s letter: L. Wollemborg, Stelle, strisce e tricolore, pp. 586–9. 7. Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Martino, 1 May, 1957; Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State, May 29, 1957, both in FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 409–10, p. 416. 8. E. Ortona, Anni d’America, vol. 2, La diplomazia, pp. 278–88. 9. See for instance Telegram POLTO 2287 from Paris to the State Department, 30 January 1958, in National Security Archive (hereafter NSA), collection of SD files related to NATO (740.5); Office Memorandum from Elbrick to Reinstein, ‘Four Power Working Group on German Reunification’, 21 February 1958, in NSA; Berlin Crisis Collection, doc. # 0098.

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

169

10. For the Zoli letter, see State Dept. Memo, 11 April 1958, in DDRS, 1993, # 0826 11. Pella’s appeal in Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State, 5 May 1958; the communiqué in Footnote 2 to Telegram from the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State, 6 May 1958: both in FRUS, 1958–1960, Volume VII, Part 1, Western European Security and Integration; Canada, p. 337, 338. 12. During the Summer of 1958, Italian diplomats discussed the chances that under the new leadership of general de Gaulle France would try to set up a tripartite directorate inside NATO, an event which – as is well known – eventually took place in September of 1958 eliciting a most vehement Italian response: for the Summer 1958 debate, Daniele Caviglia, De Gaulle e il tentativo di spostare l’asse politico europeo: il piano Fouchet (PhD Dissertation, University of Florence, 1999), pp. 190–2; for the Italian reaction, see E. Ortona, Anni d’America, cit., p. 322–5; Memorandum of Conversation (The President, The Acting Secretary, The Italian Ambassador, Mr. Jandrey): ‘Representations of Ambassador Brosio to the President re. de Gaulle letter, 6 October 1958, in National Archives Washington (hereafter NAW) RG59, CDF 1955–1959, box 3155, 740.5/10–758. Obviously the French move heightened the traditional Italian sensitive to this issue. 13. Memorandum of conversation, 2 December 1958, in NAW, RG84, Classified Rome embassy files 1956–58, b. 1, f. 320 Italy 1958; for the meeting of the ambassadors from the Eastern Capitals, see below. 14. Memorandum of Conversation, 26 January 1959, in NSA, Berlin collection, doc. n. 672. 15. See above, pp. 155–62. 16. For the attempt to take advantage of the deployment, see Tel. 2480 from Rome (Zellerbach) to State, 27 March 1959, document released through the FOIA; Memo of Conversation, 31 March 1959, and Telegram from the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State, 13 July 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Volume VIII, Berlin Crisis 1958–1959 (Washington: USGPO, 1994), docs. 248 and 433. 17. The French ambassador in Rome, Gaston Palewski, seemed to believe that this was actually a return of the Italians’ ‘natural inclination’ to deliberately have two policies at the same time: ‘Il semble . . . que, retrouvant des tendances anciennes, la politique extérieure italienne se partage en deux courants: l’un, que suit le gouvernement, de fidelité aux alliances, l’autre, qui porte M. Mattei à la coopération avec les pays neutralistes et communistes.’ G. Palewski à Quai d’Orsay, n. 82/EU ‘Politique de l’ENI’, Roma, 15 gennaio 1959, in Archives Historiques du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères – Paris , (from now on, AMAE), Serie Z Europe 1944–1960, sous-série Italie, b.288. 18. See for instance Pella’s long tirade during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six: Consultation des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des Six Pays Membres des Communautés Européennes, ‘5–26 janvier, in Documents Diplomatiques Français, (from now on, DDF), 1960, Part 1, Doc. 35, pp. 83–4 and 85–6. 19. Memorandum of conversation, 30 September 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. VII, Part 2, Western Europe, pp. 538–43, in particular p. 540; Memorandum

170 The Berlin Wall Crisis

20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

of Conversation, 1 October 1959, ibidem, pp. 556–8; Memorandum of conversation, 2 October 1959, ibidem, pp. 567–70. Tel. 1139 from Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 6 December 1959, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1955–59, b. 3615, f. 765.001/1-258, 765.001/12-659; telegram from the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State, 2 May 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. IX, Berlin Crisis 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, p. 367. On Pietromarchi’s role see above, pp. 162–7. The US Embassy believed the initiative had come from a journalist close to Gronchi: FSD 879 from Rome to the Department of State, ‘President Gronchi’s Visit to the USSR, 6–11 February 1960’, 16 March 1960, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, box 1916, 765.11/3–1660. Kozyrev discussed Gronchi’s intention with the Italian ambassador in Moscow, Pietromarchi, at the end of October 1958: Archivio Storico della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Fondo Luca Pietromarchi (from now on, FLP) quaderno n.1, note of 25 October 1958 (from now on, cited under the number of each quaderno and the date of the journal’s note). Representative of the Western Diplomatic Corps in Rome were also well aware of Gronchi’s ambitions: see for instance Gaston Palewski à Quai d’Orsay, n.1895/EU, Roma, 17 December 1959, in AMAE, sèrie Z Europe, 1944–60, sous-série Italie, b.294. FSD 879 from Rome to the Department of State, ‘President Gronchi’s Visit to the USSR, February 6–11, 1960’, 16 March 1960; Tel. 2133 from Moscow to the Secretary of State, February 13, 1960; Tel. # 2533 from the Secretary of State (Herter) to the Embassy in Rome, February 15, 1960; Tel. # 2900 from Rome to the Secretary of State, 15 February 1960; Tel. # 2554 from State to Rome, February 16, 1960; Tel. # 2941 from Rome to State, 17 February 1960, all in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–63, b.1916, 765.11/2-1360, 765.11/ 2–1560, e 765.11/2–1760. See also Dispatch no. 20 from the British embassy in Moscow, 13 February 1960: PRO, FO371/153310; and a long semi-official memorandum on the visit handed by the Italian Ambassador in London, Zoppi, to the Foreign Office, on 23 February 1960, ibidem. On the trip and its impact see L. Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra, 1953–1963. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1999), pp. 394–402. Memorandum of Conversation, 12 July 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. VII, Part 2, Western Europe, doc. 240; Telegram from the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to the Department of State, 13 July 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. VIII, Berlin Crisis 1958–1959, doc. 433. Editorial Note, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. IX, Berlin Crisis 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, p. 269. Memorandum of Conversation, 18 January 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. IX, Berlin Crisis 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, p. 269. Luca Pietromarchi, Il mondo sovietico (Milano: Bompiani, 1963), p. 5. Prof. Bagnato is editing the unpublished version of the journals, under an agreement with Ambassador Pietromarchi’s heirs and with the Luigi Einaudi foundation, where the journals are stored. FLP, quaderno n.1, note of 6 October 1958. FLP, quaderno n.1, 20 October 1958. Ibidem.

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

171

34. FLP, quaderno n.1, 13 November 1958. 35. See for instance FLP, quaderno n.3, 12 March 1959. 36. FLP, quaderno n.1, 13 November 1958. Since the beginning of his mission, Pietromarchi believed that the frequent exchange of views with his other Western counterparts could somehow compensate the dearth of contacts with Soviet officials: quaderno n.1, 4 October 1958. Such meetings were frequent indeed, in particular with the US and the West German ambassadors. 37. FLP, Quaderno n.1, 13 November 1958. 38. FLP, quaderno n.3, 12 March 1959. 39. FLP, quaderno n.3, 12 March 1959. 40. FLP, quaderno n.3, 27 March 1959. 41. Ibidem. 42. FLP, quaderno n.2, 4 December 1958. 43. FLP, quaderno n.2, 3 December 1958. 44. FLP, quaderno n.3, 6 May 1959. 45. FLP, quaderno n.3, 28 March 1959. 46. Ibidem. 47. FLP, quaderno n.3, 3 May 1959. 48. FLP, quaderno n.3, 27 May 1959. 49. It is not entirely clear, however, to what extent Pietromarchi was informed of the substance of the negotiations that led to the economic agreement of October 1960. 50. Archives d’histoire Contemporaine – Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, Paris, Fonds Maurice Couve de Murville, dossier 7: correspondance 1958–1964, Lettera di M. Dejean, Moscou, a Couve de Murville, 21 février 1962. 51. Entretiens franco-italiens de Rome, 26 novembre 1960, in DDF, 1960, Part.2, doc. 232, in particular pp. 642–5. 52. On the Kennedy–Fanfani talks, see L. Nuti, Gli Stati Uniti e l’apertura a sinistra, cit., pp. 358–69. 53. Tel. 3558 from Dept. of State to American Embassy Rome, 15 June 1961, in NAW, RG 59, Conference Files, b.255, f. CF 1912; Memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Italian PM Fanfani, 12 June 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Vols.XIII/XIV/XV, Microfiche supplement, Western Europe: Berlin, doc. n. 67. 54. Unless one wants to follow Khrushchev’s interpretation, namely that Fanfani acted with JFK’s secret approval: while Fanfani was still in Moscow, in fact, Khrushchev declared to the Conference of the First Secretaries of the Socialist countries that Fanfani pretended to have come by his own initiative, but that he had really been pushed by Kennedy – without telling Rusk. This could be explained, according to Khrushchev, with the fact that inside his own administration Kennedy represented a different faction from his secretary of state: in any case, Khrushchev said to the first secretaries that it could not have been the Soviet government to extend the invitation, since in such a delicate moment this would have been tantamount to an open display of its own weaknesses. Conference of First Secretaries of Central Committees of Communist and Workers parties of Socialist countries for the exchange of views on the questions related to preparation and conclusion of German peace treaty, 3–5 August 1961. We want to thank Hope

172 The Berlin Wall Crisis

55. 56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61. 62.

63.

Harrison for having provided us with her full copy – in English – of this document. Part of the document has been published, with a commentary by Vladislav Zubok, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin #3. This was the opinion of the British ambassador in Italy: Rome (Sir A. Clarke) to the FO, 13 July 1961, in PRO, FO371/160668/CJ,103138/1(A). Fanfani’s attempt to blame the leak on the Russians: Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State, 15 July 1961, in FRUS, 1960–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 812–14. For the Roman rumours: Conversation with Leo Wollemborg, in JFKPL, Robert H. Estabrook Papers, f. Diary Notes Europe, 3/8/62–3/15/62. Rusk’s opinion: Department of State to the Embassy in Rome (Tel. # 35), 7 July 1961, in JFKPL, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF: CO: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General 7/1/61–8/31/61. The same opinion was expressed by the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, Cattani, to Sir Ashley Clarke: Rome (Sir A. Clarke) to the FO, 12 July 1961, in PRO, FO371/160668/CJ, 103138/1, and was shared by the Foreign Office: Jacket Minutes, 14 July 1961, in PRO, FO371/160668/CJ,103138/1. Foreign Minister Segni, predictably, gave to Reinhardt the impression of being ‘not too happy’ about the visit: Footnote n.1, p. 812, in FRUS, 1960–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada. As for the new Italian ambassador in Moscow, Straneo, he too displayed little enthusiasm for the visit and seemed to regard it as a Soviet manoeuvre to weaken the West before a new offensive: Moscow (Sir F. Roberts) to the FO, 15 July 1961, in PRO, FO371/160668/CJ/103138/1(c) . Department of State to the Embassy in Rome (Tel. # 35), 7 July 1961, in JFKPL, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF: CO: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General 7/1/61–8/31/61. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State, 15 July 1961, in FRUS, 1960–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, cit., pp. 812–14. The gist of the talk between Reinhardt and Fanfani can also be found in Memorandum of Conversation (M. Claude Lebel, French Embassy; William L. Blue, William E. Knight, Phillip H. Valdes) Subject: Italian Matters, 18 July 1961, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, 765.00/7-1861, box 1918. Footnote 2, p. 814, in FRUS, 1960–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada. The same concept was repeated to Ambassador Fenoaltea: Memorandum of Conversation (The Secretary, Ambassador Fenoaltea, Mr. William L. Blue), Subject: Consultation and the Fanfani Visit to Moscow, 17 July 1961, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, 765.00/7-1861, box 1918, [also in FRUS, 1960–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 814–17]. Tel. 244 from the Dept. of State to the Embassy in Rome, 27 July 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome embassy CF 1959–61, b.4 f. Italy 1961. Rome (Sir A. Clarke) to the FO, 13 July 1961, in PRO, FO 371/160668/ CJ/103138/1(A). See in particular what was said by Minister Gonella to Reinhardt, in Tel. 339 from Rome to the SecState, 29 July 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome Embassy CF 1959–61, b.4 f. Italy 1961. The first episode was told by Wollemborg, Stelle, strisce, cit.; for the second, Pierre Salinger to President Kennedy (eyes only), 8 August 1961, in NSA Berlin Documents Collection, # 2276.

Italy and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–61

173

64. Verbale dei colloqui tra il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri dell’Unione delle repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche Nikita S. Chrusciov e il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri della Repubblica Italiana Amintore Fanfani, colloqui del 2, 3, 5 agosto 1961, reproduced with a commentary by Gianluca Azzoni, ‘La missione di Fanfani e Segni a Mosca (2–5 agosto 1961)’, in Storia delle relazioni internazionali, vol. 9, n.2 (1993), pp.169–226. The document reproduced was found by Dr. Azzoni in the archives of the former SED in Berlin. 65. Pierre Salinger to President Kennedy (eyes only), 8 August 1961, in NSA Berlin Documents Collection, # 2276. 66. Memo from Tyler to the Secretary of State. Subject: Visit of the Italian Ambassador at 4:45 p.m., 31 July 1961, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, b. 1918, f. [ . . . ] For the Rusk–Adenauer talks, see Memorandum of Conversation (Secretary of State, Amb. Dowling. Mr. Brown; Chancellor Adenauer, dr. Von Brentano, Mr. Weber), Subject: Review of Paris Ministerial Consultations, 10, 1961, in NSA, Berlin Documents Collection, # 2279. 67. Tel. 162 from Rome to the SecState, 7 August 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome Embassy CF 1959–61, b.4, f.Italy 1961. 68. See the remarks by Congressman Victor L. Anfuso in Congressional Record, Appendix, A6110, 7 August 1961, and his letter to Fanfani: Victor Anfuso to A. Fanfani, 8 August 1961, in Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island, NY Papers of Victor Anfuso, Subgroup II, Papers pertaining to Anfuso activities as a US congressman, 1955–1962, box 13, f.132 (Italy, correspondence, letters sent 1958, 1961–1962). Adlai Stevenson also expressed his congratulations to Fanfani: Stevenson to Fanfani, 9 August 1961, in Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Adlai Stevenson Papers, selected Correspondence, box 831, folder Fanfani, Amintore, 1961; and a similar positive evaluation was expressed by the Foreign Office: Moscow (Sir Frank Roberts) to the Foreign Office [No. 1458], 5 August 1961, in PRO, FO371/ 160668/CJ103138/4. 69. P. Nenni, Gli anni del centro-sinistra, 12 agosto 1961, p. 187. 70. Memoire of a conversation between Mr. Godber, [Minister of State] and Ambassador Quaroni, 18 August 1961, in PRO, FO 371/160670/CJ/1051/7. Per la prima reazione dell’ambasciata italiana a Washington, cfr. Memorandum of Conversation (ambassador Fenoaltea, Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Mr. August Velletri), Subject: Berlin, 14 August 1961, in NSA, Berlin Documents Collection, # 2298. 71. Riunione del Consiglio dei Ministri, 1 settembre 1961, in ACS, Verbali delle riunioni del Consiglio dei Ministri. 72. D. Korn to Mr. Navez, Copy of Fanfani’s letter to Khrushchev, 23 September 1961, in NAW, Record Group 59, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, box 1918. 73. Letter from Prime Minister Fanfani to President Kennedy, 26 August 1961, in FRUS, 1960–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 818–19. Cfr. anche Tel. 693 from Rome (Reinhardt) to SecState, 29 August 1961, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, Box 1918; Memo of conversation (PerroneCapano, Tyler), ‘Premier Fanfani’s Communication to President Kennedy’, 30 August 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome embassy CF 1959–61, b.4, f. Italy 1961; Tel 630 from the State Dept. (Rusk) to Rome, 3 September 1961, in NAW, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, box 1918; Tel. 661 from Rome to the

174 The Berlin Wall Crisis SecState, 6 September 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome embassy CF 1959–61, b.8, f. 350 Berlin situation 1961. 74. FSD 199 from Rome to the SecState, ‘The Berlin Crisis: Italian Attitude’, 6 September 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome embassy CF 1959–61, b.8, f. 350 Berlin situation 1961. 75. Tel. 767 from the Dept. of State to the Embassy in Rome, 7 September 1961, in NAW, RG 84, Rome embassy CF 1959–61, b.8, f. 350 Berlin situation 1961. 76. Rome (Reinhardt) to the Secretary of State, 31 August 1961, in JFKPL, Papers of President Kennedy, NSF: CO: Italy, box 120, folder Italy General, 9/1/61–9/ 20/61. Memorandum for the Secretary of State, ‘Effect of Internal Politics on Italian Diplomacy’, 1 September 1961, documento ottenuto tramite il FOIA.

9 Three Hats for Berlin: General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958–62 Gregory W. Pedlow

The crisis begins After learning of Nikita Khrushchev’s 10 November 1958 announcement that the Soviets wanted to turn over their functions in Berlin to the East Germans, a move designed to undermine and ultimately eliminate the position of the Western Allies in Berlin, General Lauris Norstad – NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) – directed his staff to gather all available information on Allied troops in Berlin and their legal obligations in the event of a Soviet or East German attack or incursion in Berlin.1 Then on 14 November the sense of crisis deepened when the Soviets detained a US convoy from Berlin for eight and a-half hours. General Henry I. Hodes, Commander of US Army Europe (USAREUR), proposed testing Soviet intentions by sending another convoy from Berlin and – if it was also detained – using force if necessary to extract the personnel and equipment. Norstad supported this proposal and relayed it to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Convinced that the convoy incident was a ‘deliberate probe’ by the Soviets, Norstad believed that if the Allies waited too long to react, they would ‘run the danger of seeming to recognize a de facto state of blockade’.2 Although initially sympathetic to Hodes’ and Norstad’s proposal, the JCS were convinced by the State Department on 17 November to withhold their approval because the idea did not have Allied support and thus might leave the US isolated on the issue and because ‘an attempt to push through now would be the wrong time and probably the wrong issue’. Norstad was frustrated and told his political adviser, Raymond L. Thurston, that something strong should be done or the West would be ‘nibbled to death’. If a strong approach was not acceptable, however, 175

176 The Berlin Wall Crisis

‘a conference of Foreign Ministers of the four Occupying Powers, together with German experts, should be called in to focus the attention of the world on this problem’. This ‘carrot and stick’ approach of a firm line on Allied rights in Berlin coupled with an offer of negotiations formed the basis of Norstad’s approach throughout the crisis. Soon afterward Norstad warned the JCS, ‘Unless we are willing to begin a humiliating process of yielding step by step to the GDR [German Democratic Republic], we must draw the line now and the Russians must understand we will use force to support this position if necessary.’ Three days later Norstad expressed similar views in a meeting with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Macmillan then asked about the possibility of staging another airlift, and Norstad replied that an airlift was ‘manageable but it was not a permanent solution’.3 In mid-December 1958 high-level tripartite discussions took place in Paris prior to the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session. In preparation for these discussions, Norstad met with the secretaries of State and Defense on 13 December 1958 at the US Embassy in Paris. Continuing to advocate his carrot and stick approach, Norstad stressed that by simultaneously proposing a conference, the United States would make it easier for Britain and France to give their support. He cautioned against ‘going it alone’. The other senior US military officer present at this meeting, JCS Chairman Nathan B. Twining, took a much more confrontational stance stating, ‘We certainly have to stop this somewhere. We must ignore the fear of general war. It is coming anyway. Therefore we should force the issue on a point we think is right and stand on it.’4 Two days later Norstad conferred with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who asked if it would be possible to take a number of military measures ‘to show the Soviets that we mean business’. Such measures should ‘not be so dramatic as to cause panic in Europe, but should be sufficiently apparent to the Soviets to back up our hand in standing firm’. Norstad suggested several possible moves, such as increasing the number of US fighter aircraft in Europe. He also thought that the British and French governments might be willing to take similar actions and suggested that Dulles encourage them to do so. Afterwards Norstad directed his US European Command (USEUCOM) staff to draw up a list of possible measures.5 The JCS then prepared a study which stated that the allies should meet a Soviet challenge to Berlin access on the ground, not with an airlift. The study recommended a series of military measures ranging in size from a small convoy to a reinforced division, with Norstad to be

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 177

responsible for planning and implementation. This forceful Defense Department stance did not become official US policy, however. On 29 January 1959 President Eisenhower approved the initial measures that had been proposed but decided that ‘the application of additional military force was reserved for governmental decision in the event that an initial probe followed by other measures would be unsuccessful.’6 The crisis over Berlin heated up in February 1959, when the Soviets began interfering with Western access to Berlin on the autobahn. On 2 February Soviet guards stopped a US convoy of four trucks after its commander refused to comply with a Soviet demand for inspection of the vehicles’ contents. Tension mounted as the vehicles sat for more than fifty hours; local US military authorities began to consider sending troops to free the convoy. Norstad preferred a political solution, however, and sent a strong recommendation to the JCS that the United States protest to the Soviet Union at ‘high political level’. Noting that local protests had already proved unproductive, Norstad stated that, before he attempted military measures to free the convoy, there should be ‘immediate action at the Washington–Moscow level . . . to impress the Soviets with the seriousness we attach to this unwarranted interference with our rights’. 7 While the convoy was still blocked, Norstad flew to London to meet with Secretary of State Dulles before continuing on to Washington. At this meeting the general was more restrained than the diplomat. Norstad disagreed with Dulles’s view that the Soviets were deliberately stiffening their position to create a precedent before turning over control to the GDR; instead Norstad suggested that the convoy blockage may have resulted from ‘a local Soviet interpretation of the inspection procedure’. When asked about possible military action, Norstad replied that under existing plans, two small task forces (one consisting of five light tanks, the other a reinforced infantry battalion) were available for use in attempting to reopen access. Military measures proved unnecessary, however. The Soviets finally allowed the convoy to proceed after the United States sent a strongly worded protest note and President Eisenhower held a press conference to publicise the Soviets’ actions.8 The February convoy incident highlighted the need for better Allied coordination of ways to meet the growing Soviet threat to Berlin access, so on 18 February 1959, soon after his return to Paris, Norstad ordered ‘the establishment at HQ US EUCOM of a small concealed US-only group, to be a nucleus for any tripartite staff I might have to form, and meanwhile to consider military problems concerned with access to Berlin’. After receiving support from British and French officials for the

178 The Berlin Wall Crisis

creation of a tripartite staff, Norstad pressed the JCS for a decision, saying, ‘If trouble starts, the whole military problem, whether on a NATO or a national basis, falls squarely into my lap.’ The JCS finally gave its assent, and beginning on 31 March the French, UK and US foreign ministers met in Washington and worked out the arrangements for the new tripartite military planning staff that was given the code name LIVE OAK. The staff would operate ‘under the supervision of General Norstad’ and would be responsible for planning preparatory measures as well as military steps to be taken in an actual access crisis. General Norstad’s control over LIVE OAK quickly became a ‘third hat’ for him, but unlike his SACEUR and USCINCEUR hats, the ‘Commander, LIVE OAK’ hat did not involve true command authority. All LIVE OAK plans and decisions required the approval of all three (later four) powers involved; very little authority was delegated to General Norstad. Political direction for the work of LIVE OAK came from the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group, which consisted of the French and UK ambassadors in Washington plus a senior US State Department official. Soon after the basic political agreement was signed in Washington on 4 April 1959, British and French personnel arrived at the USEUCOM compound at Camp des Loges in St Germain en Laye, some 20 kilometres west of Paris. The LIVE OAK staff was now tripartite.9 Meanwhile Norstad continued to call for actions to demonstrate US firmness on the Berlin issue, including flights above the Soviet-imposed limit of 10,000 feet. He also sent a US task force on 1 April 1959 to a training area in NATO’s British-controlled Northern Army Group sector, which contained the autobahn access route to Berlin. This move was designed to provide a force capable of carrying out probes or larger operations (including participation in a tripartite division that was already a feature of US contingency planning) in the event that access via the autobahn was blocked. The task force remained until 16 May. Another move to put pressure on the Soviets was the announcement on 30 April that US atomic delivery units would deploy to the NORTHAG area for ‘training’, an announcement designed to indicate to the Soviets that the task force would have atomic support available if it ventured into hostile territory. 10 Drawing on work that had already been done by US planners, LIVE OAK produced its first study on ‘Quiet Preparatory and Precautionary Military Measures’ just two weeks after coming into existence. By midMay a second paper followed; it proposed options for a probe to test Soviet intentions in the event that access to Berlin was blocked. These initial studies engendered little controversy (except for some US and UK

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 179

concerns that one of the probe options was too weak) and received rapid approval from the three governments. Far more controversial was the final task set forth in the Tripartite Basic Paper, the study of additional military steps that could be taken in the event that the initial probe proved unsuccessful.11 In mid-June 1959 the LIVE OAK planners provided General Norstad with a draft study of ‘More Elaborate Military Measures’, a paper that had been strongly influenced by the British view that if an initial probe showed that the Soviets were willing to use force to deny access to Berlin, there was no point in further Allied attempts to use military force on the ground to restore access. Norstad found the study unacceptable because it gave the overall impression that ‘there are no military measures which can be taken by the Tripartite Powers, short of thermo-nuclear war, in the event we are denied access to Berlin.’ He therefore returned the study to LIVE OAK for revision, calling for the addition of larger ground operations (in reinforced battalion strength or greater) that would ‘compel the Russians to face the unmistakable imminence of general war should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin’. Thus if one or more initial probes proved unsuccessful, Norstad wrote, ‘a substantial effort should first be made to reopen ground access by local action in order to raise the stakes, convince the USSR of the determination of the Three Powers to maintain their lawful rights even at the risk of war, and to exclude the possibility of a successful Soviet bluff.’12 The LIVE OAK staff revised the paper to include larger operations, and Norstad approved it in early August, but by this time such plans seemed much less relevant as the crisis atmosphere no longer existed. Khrushchev’s original six-month ultimatum had expired at the end of May without any further action by the Soviets, and in September 1959 he visited the United States and told President Eisenhower that there was no longer any ‘time limit within which he would sign a Soviet–East German peace treaty’. The low level of tension over Berlin led to suggestions that LIVE OAK could now be disbanded, but Norstad decided to keep it in existence so as not to lose the pool of specialised knowledge that had been built up. He did, however, reduce it in size and eliminate all of the general officer positions. 13 During 1960 LIVE OAK worked on plans for a division-sized tripartite operation. This planning effort encountered constant opposition from the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, who had only reluctantly agreed to planning for a battalion-sized operation and considered any larger operations to be completely unsound from a military point of view. They

180 The Berlin Wall Crisis

also believed that before any military operations above the level of a small probe were undertaken, the forces of NATO should be alerted and mobilisation should be underway. 14 Norstad’s own views on such operations were similar, but he refused to rule out contingency plans solely on military grounds, believing that it was best to have many different plans on the shelf for use in unforeseen circumstances. In August 1960, when Norstad was pressing for the development of contingency plans for a tripartite division, the senior British officer at LIVE OAK, Colonel R. J. Chaundler, informed the UK Chiefs of Staff that Norstad’s views ‘corresponded closely’ to theirs. Although unable to envision circumstances which would justify the use of a division-sized force, Chaundler explained, Norstad nevertheless ‘felt that it would be only prudent to prepare this plan in case future circumstances arose which made its use imperative as a last resort’. In Chaundler’s opinion, Norstad ‘could not accept that a battalion-sized operation should be the last and largest in the series before posing the ultimate threat of nuclear war’. 15

The crisis reawakens On 3 June 1961 Khrushchev renewed the Berlin crisis with threats made at his meeting in Vienna with the new US President, John F. Kennedy, and this was soon followed by an ultimatum that a peace treaty would be signed with the German Democratic Republic by the end of the year (thus giving the East Germans control over access to Berlin). Under these new and far more ominous circumstances, the tripartite governments quickly approved a proposal by General Norstad to enlarge the LIVE OAK staff and make it capable of directing tripartite operations. In early August LIVE OAK underwent yet another far-reaching change, becoming quadripartite with the addition of a German liaison officer at the same time that the entire Allied crisis management system became quadripartite through the decision to add the Federal Republic of Germany to the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group (which then changed its name to the Washington Ambassadorial Group). 16 The sudden escalation of tension over Berlin was a shock for the new US president, who then turned to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson for advice. Acheson established a task force which on 28 June 1961 recommended a substantial build-up of US and Allied conventional forces in Europe and the development of plans to reopen access to Berlin by force if necessary, with the largest option being one of seven divisions and four air wings.17

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 181

While General Norstad does not seem to have been consulted about the Acheson proposals, he was thinking along similar – although not so extreme – lines. In the spring and summer of 1961 he called for air and naval reinforcements to be sent to Europe and for an increase in the manning and equipment levels of Army units stationed there. 18 As for large-scale operations in a Berlin access crisis, Norstad proposed to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in May 1961 that the US consider developing plans for a corps-sized operation to reopen access to Berlin. On the surface such a proposal seems inconsistent with his previously expressed views in favour of smaller operations, but Norstad may have made the proposal in order to put his own strong reservations about such large-scale operations on record. Thus his letter contains only one possible justification for a corps-sized operation – ‘to rescue a probe’ – while listing major disadvantages for such a plan: A large probe, that is, one of several divisions, could be stopped almost as easily as a small one, perhaps even by the East Germans without Soviet assistance, and the greater the force used, the greater the embarrassment which would result from failure. The use of successively increasing force levels would start a dangerous escalation without any real hope of success if the Soviets were determined to oppose it. It would, on the other hand, run the risk of conditioning us, and in fact the entire West, to defeat. We must also, in considering the size of the effort to be used, remember that nothing would impress the Soviets less than wasting in the corridor the forces that are known to be essential to our over-all defense.19

The Berlin Wall When the Berlin sector boundary was closed early on the morning of 13 August 1961, Norstad was working on a message to the JCS requesting 38,000 more troops to make USAREUR ‘ready for initial combat’ and capable of sustained operations. The East Germans’ action did not come as a surprise to him, as he told a group of North American politicians a few months afterward, and the delay in reacting to the Wall was a ‘policy action’ rather than the result of any failure in communications. His own views on what the West might have done were reflected in a conversation with Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson in late September 1961. Norstad remarked that if he had been the military commander on the scene, he would have ‘slung a hook across the barbed wire when it was erected, attached the hook by a rope to a jeep and torn down the

182 The Berlin Wall Crisis

wire’. He also stated that he would have felt justified in ‘battering down the wall with a tank’. After expressing these strong personal feelings, however, he returned to political reality and concluded that he did ‘not believe orders to take such action could be delivered by a government to a local commander’.20 The Kennedy Administration’s passivity in the face of the East German action caused a major crisis of confidence of West Berliners regarding Allied willingness to continue to protect West Berlin. In response to a plea for assistance from West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, President Kennedy met with his closest advisers on 17 August and decided to send a battle group to reinforce the Berlin garrison and bolster the morale of the West Berlin population. This was clearly a political decision, since transferring a major US combat unit from Western Germany to the military indefensible location of Berlin did not make sense militarily and had therefore been opposed by both McNamara and JCS Chairman Lyman L. Lemnitzer.21 As was often the case in military decisions taken by the Kennedy Administration, General Norstad was not consulted about this move. When General Lemnitzer informed him of the administration’s decision on 18 August, noting that ‘the decision was made for political, psychological and morale purposes and not for military reasons’, Norstad immediately cabled back his agreement that there was ‘no military justification’ for the move. While acknowledging the need to address the concerns of the West Berliners, Norstad informed Lemnitzer that a much more effective way of doing so would be to meet ‘long established and legitimate military needs which could be sustained on a long-term basis’. Thus instead of sending a battle group, Norstad suggested that the US fill existing requirements for an engineer company and additional armoured personnel carriers for the Berlin garrison. The resultant column of vehicles would make an impressive convoy entering Berlin. In addition, Norstad added, some of the garrison troops currently undergoing training in West Germany could also be returned to Berlin, making the convoy even larger. While recognising that a firm decision might already have been taken, Norstad hoped that his suggestion might be taken up with McNamara. There is no evidence that it was, and that evening the White House made a public announcement of the transfer of the battle group. 22 As additional support for the morale of the West Berliners, President Kennedy announced that Vice-President Johnson and retired General Lucius D. Clay (hero of the Berlin airlift) would be travelling to West Berlin. Norstad considered the use of General Clay ‘a brilliant stroke’

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 183

but opposed sending the Vice-President, arguing that his visit was ‘a big gun which we may need and need badly in the weeks and months to come’. Afterward Norstad admitted to Vice-President Johnson that the trip had been a ‘tremendous success’ but added that he still believed that such a visit should have been kept in reserve as part of a calculated ‘build-up programme’ in the ‘war of nerves’. Norstad was concerned that ‘we have committed our reserves and I believe committed them too early’. Thus if another morale crisis arose in West Berlin, the only possible remaining step was ‘sending the President himself’.23 While Norstad had supported the idea of sending General Clay to visit Berlin in August as a morale booster, the latter’s subsequent appointment as the president’s Special Representative would cause many headaches for Norstad in the months that followed, as Clay’s highly aggressive stance clashed with Norstad’s efforts to keep the Berlin crisis from boiling over. On one occasion Clay even made preparations to tear down part of the Wall (around the Steinstücken enclave) on his own initiative and was only prevented from doing so by the fortuitous arrival of General Bruce C. Clarke, the USAREUR commander. After learning of this incident, General Norstad told Clarke, ‘Thank God you were in Berlin!’24

Diverging views of Norstad and the Kennedy Administration In the aftermath of the Wall crisis, Norstad worked to encourage the other nations in the Alliance to follow the lead of the United States and increase their military preparedness. On 19 August 1961, Norstad and his staff at SHAPE produced the ‘Plan of Action: NATO Europe’ with proposals for raising the manning and equipment levels of existing combat units, making additional combat units available, and increasing the number and capability of support units. 25 Meanwhile the Kennedy Administration continued to consider additional military measures to be taken in response to the perceived increased threat to the Allied position in Berlin in the wake of the construction of the wall. On 8 September Kennedy gave McNamara a list of questions related to the issue of whether or not four National Guard divisions should be called to active duty so that by January a total of six additional divisions could be sent to Europe. With the help of JCS Chairman Lemnitzer, McNamara prepared his response and sent it to Norstad for review on 13 September. McNamara’s main conclusion was that the additional six divisions would ‘build up an alternative between inaction and nuclear war’, giving the Allies the ability to conduct

184 The Berlin Wall Crisis

limited ground operations (up to a corps in size) in East Germany toward Berlin. 26 Norstad’s response expressed major disagreement with McNamara’s thinking and warned that ‘we must not confuse the wish with the fact. We should therefore consider very carefully our ability to enforce a gradual, controlled development of the battle, and not overestimate the extent to which we can dictate the Soviet response, particularly in a situation where it is unlikely that we would have the initiative.’ Norstad then went on to say that he was ‘disturbed by what may be over-optimism with respect to . . . our ability to defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet bloc for as much as a month or more, without having to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.’ Norstad pointed out that the proposed reinforcements would only bring NATO’s force levels up to what had been previously established as the minimum required for an effective defense of Europe with nuclear weapons. In Norstad’s opinion, the Kennedy Administration’s desire to defend Europe solely with conventional forces was a ‘policy that could be construed by the Soviets as permitting them to become involved, and then, if they decide the risks are too great, to disengage’. He therefore argued that it was ‘absolutely essential that the Soviets be forced to act and move at all times in full awareness that if they use force they risk general war with nuclear weapons’. 27 Norstad had thus called into question the very essence of the administration’s new strategic thinking, and to strengthen his argument he then asked McNamara to consider the impact of the proposed changes in strategy upon the European allies: We must keep in mind the fact that our NATO strategy must be generally acceptable to our allies if they are to have either the will to face up to possible military operations or the inclination to build up their forces. Unreasonable as such an interpretation would be, any policy which might appear to suggest trading large areas of Europe for time in which to seek to avoid the spread of war to the US or which appears to deny the use of capabilities and weapons which might divert or destroy the Soviet threat to European lives and territory, will have hard going. I am sure you agree that nothing we do should suggest that our goal is to confine the fight for allied rights in Europe to Europe.28 At the beginning of October 1961, Norstad went to Washington for a series of high-level meetings, during which he continued to

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 185

push for 40,000 reinforcements for USAREUR to round out the units already in Europe plus an armoured cavalry regiment and an infantry battle group to replace the one that had been sent to Berlin. During his 3 October meeting with the president, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, the president’s Military Representative General Maxwell D. Taylor, the JCS, and other key officials, Norstad noted that ‘in strictly military terms’ he ought to ask for six to eight divisions but did not wish to do so at this time because it might lead the Europeans to relax their efforts and would also lead to Soviet reinforcements. In Norstad’s view, ‘it was useless to stack up more forces on both sides in a situation in which the end result would leave us still out-numbered’. To Norstad the United States was ‘in a poker game’, and when the reinforcement ‘card’ had been played, the United States would ‘not have it left to play later’. Asked when he would play this card, Norstad replied that he ‘would do it only when the situation seemed bound to deteriorate’. Norstad also added that ‘there was no great desire in Europe for these forces’. 29 As a result of this key White House meeting, the State and Defense Departments developed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 109, which divided US military actions in a Berlin conflict into four phases. In the first phase, which would be triggered by Soviet interference with Allied access but not a complete blockade, the tripartite powers would execute agreed contingency plans for ‘probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller forces on the ground and by fighter escort in the air’. Phase II, in which the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic had indicated determination to maintain the blockage of access, envisioned ‘such noncombatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action’. During this phase the NATO Allies should mobilise and reinforce Europe. In Phase III the Allies would undertake ‘appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access’. Then the Allies would embark on expanded non-nuclear military courses of action such as air action ‘to gain local air superiority’ or ‘ground operations into GDR territory in division and greater strength, with strong air support’. Phase III also envisioned ‘maritime control, naval blockade, or other world-wide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets’. Only in the fourth and final phase was the use of nuclear weapons in a Berlin access crisis considered:

186 The Berlin Wall Crisis

If, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary: A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons. B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective. C. General Nuclear War.30 On 20 October 1961, President Kennedy sent Norstad a draft of NSAM 109, expressing the ‘desire that it serve as the guidance for your discussions with our Allies and for your planning of detailed military operations’. But Norstad was not happy with the new US policy, and on 7 November 1961 he met with President Kennedy, Secretary McNamara, and General Taylor in Washington. Saying that he wished to speak ‘very frankly’, Norstad stated that NSAM 109 was ‘replete with clichés and jargon’ and was ‘poorly drafted, ambiguous and contradictory’. It therefore need to be ‘clarified and simplified’, since in its present form it could not be used as a basis for instructions to SHAPE planners. Norstad then promised to draft and transmit to the president a paper ‘which would be consistent with the “US Policy” and at the same time prove acceptable to our NATO Allies’. Kennedy expressed interest in Norstad’s suggestion that ‘at a certain stage in Berlin contingency activity . . . it might be desirable to summon Chairman Khrushchev to an emergency meeting in Berlin to discuss the crisis.’ This suggestion resembled Norstad’s 1958 ‘carrot and stick’ policy of calling for a foreign ministers’ conference on Germany.31 Norstad’s paper, known as ‘SACEUR’s Instructions to SHAPE Planners’, was finished on 16 November. The paper listed a number of possible actions in a Berlin access crisis, beginning with the LIVE OAK plans for probes and battalion-sized operations. If these were stopped without major combat ensuing, Norstad suggested that the problem could be referred to the United Nations or some other world body in order to gain time for the West. Another possible action would be for the president to announce that he and the leaders of France and Britain would arrive in Berlin within the next twelve hours for face-to-face talks with Khrushchev. Other possibilities at this stage were worldwide political pressure against the Soviet Union, the initiation of a naval blockade,

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 187

and economic measures. If these measures failed to improve the situation, Norstad’s plan called for: (1) limited ground offensive operations into Eastern Germany; (2) air operations, either in support of or independent of the ground operations; and (3) ‘action involving the limited and selective use of nuclear weapons, independently or in connection with the foregoing military actions, in order to demonstrate the will and the ability of the Alliance to use these weapons’. Although Norstad’s overall sequence of events was similar to NSAM 109, he rejected the thought of dividing all the actions into neat phases that gave the impression that the United States could control the timing of events: We must prepare a broad catalog of plans to meet the situation at ascending levels of political and military involvement, but we must do so with full awareness that the choice of timing and action rests at least as much with the Soviets as with us. We must plan for many contingencies on various levels, but cannot with complete assurance plan on any particular pattern or sequence. Norstad’s greatest disagreement with the Kennedy Administration’s position was his rejection of the idea of attempting to engage in armed conflict over Berlin for an extended period of time without using nuclear weapons: The use of armed force, even in limited quantity, risks the danger of explosive expansion to higher levels of conflict, including the highest level. This risk is accepted, and therefore we stand ready to use all forces and weapons available, including nuclear weapons, if necessary, to protect the territory and people of the NATO nations and to defend our other vital interests.32 Secretaries Rusk and McNamara then prepared a lengthy evaluation of Norstad’s letter showing numerous key differences with the president’s policy. General Taylor also informed the president that Norstad’s views were completely inconsistent with those of the administration and recommended sending a personal emissary to him. President Kennedy then sent Norstad Rusk’s and McNamara’s evaluation of the SHAPE study, adding a brief covering note stating that he approved these comments which were to serve as ‘your guidance in planning and in future relations with your NATO colleagues’. Kennedy also mentioned that the two secretaries would be in Paris the following week and would want to talk to him.33

188 The Berlin Wall Crisis

The meeting with Rusk and McNamara did not go well. When Norstad told them that he couldn’t do what they wanted, not only because it was wrong but because he had obligations to the Europeans, the meeting deteriorated rapidly, as Norstad later recalled: One of the secretaries said, ‘That’s the question we have – just to whom do you have an obligation?’ In other words . . . challenging my loyalty. My first instinct was to hit him and I thought that wouldn’t be very dignified, but – so I didn’t do that. I just stood there and I tried to smile and cool off a bit and I gave him a short explanation of what NATO meant and what the supreme commander meant in that whole cloth, whole picture. And I said, ‘Well, gentlemen, I think this ends this meeting.’ Whereupon I walked out and slammed the door. 34 Rusk and McNamara had failed in their effort to convince Norstad to adopt the administration’s new strategy. On 10 January 1962 he informed the administration that he had ‘decided not to issue formal instructions to the SHAPE Planners. Thus the position paper “US Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict” [NSAM 109] will serve as general background and guidelines but will not be translated into specific directions to my Allied staff’.35 As a NATO commander, Norstad was under no obligation to accept guidelines from the US government for use by his Allied staff; his policy directives came from the North Atlantic Council in which the United States was only one of fifteen members. But in his USCINCEUR hat he served at the pleasure of the president, so his rejection of NSAM 109 placed him on a collision course with the Kennedy Administration. 36

Norstad’s NATO hat becomes involved After the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 raised fears that the Berlin crisis was escalating, the North Atlantic Council requested and received a detailed briefing from General Norstad on LIVE OAK and its contingency planning for Berlin at the end of September 1961. The Council then issued ‘Instructions to NATO Military Authorities’ on 17 October, directing SACEUR and SACLANT (the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) to prepare military plans for use by the Alliance in case the crisis escalated to a point where LIVE OAK planning had to be employed but proved insufficient to restore access. In the months that followed, SACLANT prepared a series of MARCONs (Maritime

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 189

Contingency Plans) for use on the world’s oceans to put pressure on the Soviet Union, while SACEUR and the SHAPE staff worked on BERCONs (Berlin Contingency Plans) for use on the access routes to Berlin. 37 By January 1962 the BERCONs were ready in draft form. They were subdivided into series, with BERCON ALPHA plans covering air operations, BERCON BRAVO dealing with nuclear weapons, and the BERCON CHARLIE series covering ground operations. The series were broken down as follows: 38 BERCON ALPHA 1: A large-scale fighter escort operation in a Berlin air corridor. BERCON ALPHA 2: A conventional battle for air superiority over East Germany. BERCON BRAVO: Employment of up to five low-yield nuclear weapons against selected targets to demonstrate the West’s willingness to use nuclear weapons. BERCON CHARLIE 1: Attack of a reinforced division along the axis Helmstedt–Berlin. BERCON CHARLIE 2: Two division attack to pinch off the Kassel salient. BERCON CHARLIE 3: Three-four division attack from Helmstedt along the line of the Mitteland Canal to the Elbe River. BERCON CHARLIE 4: Three-four division attack to seize the Thuringer Wald. With plans including nuclear demonstrations, battles for air superiority over Eastern Germany, and invasions to seize portions of the German Democratic Republic that were not even connected to the access routes to Berlin, the BERCONs seem hard to believe. The British Chiefs of Staff considered all but BERCON ALPHA 1 to be ‘militarily suspect’; the ground operations in particular were seen as ‘highly dangerous’. Norstad’s own outlook on the BERCONS was similar to his views on the LIVE OAK contingency plans: he wanted to provide the political leadership with a wide range of military options even though he did not think they were all feasible from a purely military point of view. Thus he emphasised to the UK Chiefs of Staff that the BERCONs ‘represented no more than a catalogue of alternatives and did not necessarily have his support’. He may even have been trying to appease the Kennedy Administration by including an escalating series of plans for major conventional operations, even though he knew they were impractical. On 24 March 1962 he informed NATO’s Standing Group that the current NATO force structure was not strong enough to support the BERCON operations, which meant

190 The Berlin Wall Crisis

that he realised that NATO was not capable of launching major ground offensive operations into East Germany or fighting for air superiority over East Germany without putting at risk its ability to defend Europe successfully in the event of war.39

The air corridor crisis and Norstad’s departure On 7 February 1962 the Soviets began to obstruct Allied air traffic in the corridors by reserving extensive blocks of air space and time for their own aircraft. If allowed to stand unchallenged, the Soviet reservations would have greatly handicapped Allied aerial access to Berlin. General Norstad therefore used previously-delegated authority from the US and UK governments to order ‘aerial probes’ to be flown by military transport aircraft in defiance of the Soviet restrictions. In doing so he had the strong backing of not only the US government but also the British government, which – in contrast to its reluctance to confront the Soviets on the ground – was determined to defend Allied rights in the air corridors since these would be vital to the future conduct of an airlift. The Allied probes encountered Soviet harassment in the form of fighter aircraft flying next to them for identification purposes or even ‘buzzing’ them by flying past or in front of them at high speed, but the Allied flights proceeded.40 In the weeks that followed, the attempts to exclude Allied aircraft through reservations of blocks of time or specific altitudes in the corridors continued, as did the buzzing incidents, including one on 15 February when a Soviet fighter aircraft attempted to force a US transport aircraft to land. The Soviets also demanded changes in Allied flight procedures and in early March they dropped chaff in the corridors to interfere with Allied radars.41 Throughout this period of Soviet challenges to Allied air access to Berlin, Norstad and the LIVE OAK organisation carried out carefully measured responses, which John Ausland of the US Berlin Task Force characterised in poker terms as ‘matching but never raising Soviet bets’.42 In March 1962 Norstad requested and received tripartite authorisation to take control of the scheduling of all Allied military and civilian flights in the air corridors. He did not, however, choose to exercise other powers delegated to him by the Allied governments, including flying aircraft above 10,000 feet or employing fighter aircraft in the corridors under certain circumstances. Norstad’s moderate approach was sharply criticised by President Kennedy’s special representative in Berlin, General Clay, who demanded a far more aggressive stance.

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 191

Finally the president informed Clay, ‘I am aware of your differences with General Norstad. On balance, in the situation as it stands so far, I have found myself in agreement with General Norstad and I have accordingly approved his recommendations.’43 Norstad’s moderate approach also won the support of the British and French governments, and the air corridor crisis never escalated to a direct confrontation with the Soviets, who suddenly stopped their campaign of harassment on 30 March 1962. The reasons behind this Soviet campaign are still unclear. Norstad’s own view was that it ‘started out as a reminder that Berlin is a problem and as an attempt to undermine the confidence, particularly of the West Berliners, in the one secure means of transportation.’44 Although President Kennedy had been very pleased with Norstad’s handling of the air corridor crisis, opposition to Norstad was growing within the administration over his refusal to support its policies on Berlin and NATO strategy. As assistant secretary of defense Roswell Gilpatric later put it, Norstad was acting like a ‘proconsul in Outer Gaul’. Norstad was well aware that his days as SACEUR/USCINCEUR were numbered. Immediately after his clash with Rusk and McNamara in December 1961, he called together his senior staff to say, ‘Gentlemen, we aren’t going to be together very much longer. They can’t put up with me after this, and I can’t put up with them – so one way or another it’s going to come to an end.’ The end came after Norstad was summoned to Washington in mid-July 1962 to meet with the JCS, McNamara, and then the president. After arriving back in Paris, he told his friend French Brig. Gen. Pierre Gallois, ‘Pete, I’ve been fired.’ Norstad then prepared a brief letter of resignation to President Kennedy with a desired date of 1 November. Norstad lingered on as a ‘lame duck’ SACEUR until the end of 1962, but his impact on the further conduct of the Berlin crisis was henceforth quite low. The Berlin crisis itself moved on to the ‘back burner’ during the second half of 1962, and during the Cuban missile crisis in October, which raised fears – fortunately unjustified – that tensions might spread to Berlin, Norstad was basically just a spectator in all three of his hats. One by-product of the Cuban missile crisis was the extension of his service as SACEUR until the end of the year.45

Conclusion When evaluating Lauris Norstad’s role in the second Berlin crisis, it is important to recall that this was essentially a political and diplomatic

192 The Berlin Wall Crisis

crisis. The political leaders of the United States, the tripartite powers, and the NATO Alliance had the final say in the policy decisions of the US, LIVE OAK and NATO respectively, and Norstad’s role was thus one of providing military plans and advice to assist the decision-making process. Even in his military role, Norstad was not at the top of the hierarchy in any of his three hats. As USCINCEUR he did not normally have direct contact with the US political leadership, especially after the Kennedy Administration came into office. Thus even though he met with senior officials or the president himself on a number of occasions, there are just as many examples of times when he was not consulted regarding key decisions affecting his command. Personal ties with Eisenhower had given him much more influence during the previous administration, but under both administrations, the primary source of military advice to the president was supposed to be the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it was to this body, not the Cabinet, that Norstad reported. Under President Kennedy, however, Norstad’s influence was diluted even further, because the Joint Chiefs themselves were frequently bypassed by the Kennedy Administration’s officials, as was symbolised by the creation of a new source of military advice for the president, his ‘Military Representative,’ General Maxwell D. Taylor. 46 As Commander of LIVE OAK, Norstad’s plans and decisions were first subject to review by the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of each of the tripartite powers before being sent to the political leaders for a final decision. In NATO he was theoretically subordinate to the Standing Group and the Military Committee, but in reality he was the predominant military figure in the Alliance. Thus it was in NATO that he had the most independence and the greatest access to political leaders. As a result, Norstad was able to draw up military plans and advocate strategies that were not in keeping with the official strategy of the alliance – MC 14/2 – with its heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons. In so doing Norstad was in many ways a pioneer in the development of the new strategy that would be adopted by NATO as MC 14/3 (‘flexible response’) in 1967. He consistently called for stronger conventional forces so that the Alliance’s initial response to a low-level attack or incursion could be made with conventional weapons. He said that NATO’s forward-deployed units – the ‘Shield’ – should be strong enough to be able to force a ‘pause’ in an enemy attack, so that there might be time for the attacker to reconsider his actions in the face of the Alliance’s impending nuclear response. He spoke of the necessity of ‘raising the threshold’ for the use of nuclear weapons, so that this would be a conscious decision taken at a level above that of the combat

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 193

units. Despite all this flexibility, however, Norstad’s views were unacceptable to the new Kennedy Administration because he did not go far enough in postponing or even rejecting the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, he refused to be bound by rigid timetables such as McNamara’s goal of a period of up to thirty days of conventional warfare before nuclear weapons might be employed.47 In addition to such fundamental differences on NATO strategy, Norstad was often not in accord with the Kennedy Administration’s manner of dealing with the Berlin crisis itself. He saw the administration as too impulsive – unwilling to take measured steps while holding back other actions for possible later use. This was why he opposed sending both Clay and Johnson to Berlin in August 1961, arguing that the Vice-President’s visit should have been held in reserve. His advice on military actions was also carefully measured. Thus he did not favour sending a large number of new US divisions to Europe, preferring instead to strengthen those that were already there by filling in missing troops and equipment. Opposing the administration’s tendency to try to quantify military strength by simply counting divisions, he advocated ensuring that these divisions were not hollow. Similarly, he believed that Kennedy’s decision to send a battle group to Berlin in August 1961 was misguided and argued that it would have been equally reassuring but far more sensible militarily to fill the real equipment and support needs of the garrison rather than take away a combat unit that was sorely needed on the front line in Germany. As a crisis manager, Norstad was also quite measured in his actions. After his initial advocacy of the possible use of force at the start of the crisis in November 1958, he became much more cautious and frequently recommended courses of action that would not back the Soviets into a corner but would give them a way out, as was the case with his late 1958 proposals for a firm line on Berlin coupled with an offer to hold a meeting of foreign ministers on Germany. Similarly, in 1961 he suggested that before the Allies resorted to the use of substantial force to reopen access to Berlin, they should attempt to make the Soviets negotiate by announcing that the three Western leaders were flying to Berlin for an emergency summit meeting with Khrushchev. His desire for flexibility in planning led him to advocate the development of a wide range of US, tripartite, and NATO plans for Berlin contingencies. Although he did not always believe in all of the plans himself, he felt it was best to have as wide a choice as possible available for the politicians to choose from at the decisive moment. Thus he rejected British arguments that many of his plans were militarily

194 The Berlin Wall Crisis

unsound; he knew that ultimately the plans were political signals, not purely military operations. Norstad’s measured approach to the second Berlin crisis was most evident during the air corridor crisis of early 1962, when he directed the Allied response to the Soviet campaign of harassment in the vital air corridors to Berlin. Ignoring General Clay’s calls for a more confrontational course, Norstad proved to be a master of moderation, responding with just enough force to meet the Soviet challenge without increasing the level of tension. President Kennedy praised Norstad’s ‘alert and measured response’ and his ‘combination of coolness with determination’. The importance of Norstad’s moderate approach to the second Berlin crisis can best be appreciated by contemplating what the outcome of the crisis might have been if someone like General Clay – who constantly called for direct military confrontation of the Soviets – or General Twining – whose pessimistic belief that a general war was inevitable made him want to ‘force the issue’ – had instead been wearing the three hats of SACEUR, USCINCEUR, and Commander, LIVE OAK and thus directing the Allied military response in Europe to the Soviet threats against the West’s position in Berlin.

Notes 1. Memo for Record, Daily Morning Meeting, 12 November 1958, in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Norstad Papers (hereafter cited as DDEL, NP), Box 105, Memoranda for Record July–December 1958 (3). For an examination of Soviet motives for starting the crisis see Marc Trachtenberg, ‘The Berlin Crisis’, in History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton up, 1991), pp. 170–3, and his more recent work A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999), pp. 251–6. For more information on Norstad’s career, see Robert S. Jordan, General Lauris Norstad: Cold War Alliance Commander (London and New York, 2000). 2. Thurston to Dulles, PARIS 1799, 16 November 1956, Berlin Project Files of the National Security Archive (hereafter cited as NSA BPF), a private organisation in Washington, DC, that collects declassified government documents. See also Norstad to McElroy and Twining, EC 9–6071, 15 November 1958, NSA BPF. 3. The results of the meeting between the State Department’s Foy D. Kohler and the JCS on 17 November are summarised in Livingston T. Merchant to Murphy, ‘US Military Truck Convoys to and from Berlin’, 20 November 1958, NSA BPF. Norstad’s comment to Thurston is in ‘Memo for Record, Daily Morning Meeting, 20 November 1958’, DDEL, NP, Box 105, Memoranda for

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 195

4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

Record July–Dec 1958 (3). The warning to the JCS is Norstad to Twining, EC 9-6265, 23 November 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter cited as FRUS], 1958–1960, vol. 8, The Berlin Crisis, pp. 115–17. The conversation with Macmillan is found in ‘Note by the Prime Minister,’ 26 November 1958, United Kingdom Public Record Office [hereafter cited as PRO], PREM 11/3701. US Delegation to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Berlin’, 13 December 1958, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:195. US Delegation to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Berlin’, 15 December 1958; Norstad to CJCS, 23 December 1958, NSA BPF. Christian K. Herter to Eisenhower, ‘Berlin Contingency Planning’, 4 March 1959, NSA BPF. Norstad to Twining, ALO 290, 3 February 1959, NSA BPF. US Embassy London, Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Berlin’, 4 February 1959, NSA BPF (a less complete version is contained in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8: pp. 316–17); Robert M. Slusser, ‘The Berlin Crises of 1958–59 and 1961’, in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, (eds) Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington: Brookings Institution 1978), p. 369. Norstad’s message to the JCS is USCINCEUR to JCS, ALO 284, 17 March 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:495–7. The tripartite agreements on LIVE OAK are found in Tripartite Paper, Berlin Contingency Planning, 4 April 1959 (attachment to State Department to American Embassy Bonn, ‘Berlin Contingency Planning’, 6 April 1959), DDEL, NP, Box 86, Berlin-LIVE OAK 1958–60 (3) [the text of this ‘Tripartite Basic Paper’ is also found – although not under this title – in FRUS, 1958–1960, 8:584–9]; Arthur G. Kogan, Crisis Over Berlin: American Policy Concerning the Soviet Threats to Berlin, November 1958–December 1962 (US Department of State, Historical Office, 1966), Part I, 105. For more information about the creation and early years of LIVE OAK see Gregory W. Pedlow, ‘Allied Crisis Management for Berlin: The LIVE OAK Organization, 1959–1963’, in William W. Epley (ed.,) International Cold War Military Records and History: Proceedings of the International Conference on Cold War Records and History Held in Washington, DC, 21–26 March 1994 (Washington: Dept. of Defense, 1996), pp. 87–116. USAREUR, Historical Office, Annual History 1959, 13, NSA BPF. The British Political Adviser in Berlin, Sir Bernard Ledwidge, recalled in a 1991 oral history interview that Norstad also arranged for B-52 bombers to carry out polar orbits during mid-March to put pressure on the Soviets, but I have not found any documents confirming this. Ledwidge’s interview is in John P. S. Gearson, ‘Berlin: When the Wall Went Up’, Contemporary Record: The Journal of Contemporary British History, 6 (Summer 1992), p. 134. ‘Berlin Contingency Planning: Copy of a Memorandum dated 18th April 1959 from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff’ and attached LIVE OAK Memorandum, ‘Quiet Preparatory and Precautionary Military Measures of a Kind Which Will Not Create Public Alarm but Which Will Be Detectable by Soviet Intelligence’, PRO, DEFE 5/91, COS(59)85, 22 April 1959; SACEUR to Tripartite Chiefs of Staff, 13 May

196 The Berlin Wall Crisis

12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

24. 25.

26.

1959, and LIVE OAK Memorandum, ‘Berlin Contingency Planning: Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions’, PRO, DEFE 5/91, COS(59)116, 20 May 1959; Pedlow, ‘Allied Crisis Management’, 92. ’Berlin Contingency Planning – More Elaborate Military Measures: Copy of a Letter (Reference L.O.-T.S.-59–1005) dated 26th June, 1959 from General Norstad to Major General K. C. Cooper, Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK’, PRO, DEFE 5/92, COS(59)155, 29 June 1959. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, vol. 2, Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 447. For talk of LIVE OAK being disbanded see PRO, DEFE4/120, COS(59)52(4), 18 August 1959; Pedlow, ‘Allied Crisis Management’, pp. 94–5. ‘Possible Means of Restoring Access to Berlin: Report by the Joint Planning Staff’, 16 October 1959, PRO, DEFE 4/122, COS(59)68(13)/JP(59 )122(F); DEFE 4/128, COS(62)52(3), 23 August 1960; DEFE 4/130, COS(60)66(2), 25 October 1960. PRO, DEFE 4/129, COS(60)53(3), 31 August 1960. Pedlow, ‘Allied Crisis Management’, pp. 100–02. Previously there had been informal liaison between LIVE OAK and the German National Military Representative at SHAPE, but August 1961 marked the beginning of a fulltime and growing German presence at LIVE OAK. Acheson, ‘Memorandum for the President’, with attached ‘Report on Berlin’, 28 June 1961, NSA BPF. For Acheson’s NATO study and initial thinking on Berlin see Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971 (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992), 117–26, 135–42. US Air Forces Europe, ‘Air National Guard Deployment to USAFE Area, 1961–1962’, 11–12, NSA BPF. Norstad to McNamara, 29 May 1961, NSA BPF. ‘Notes on General Norstad’s Question-and-Answer Period with the North American Politicians Group’, SHAPE, 21 November 1961, SHAPE Historical Office files; ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador Finletter and General Norstad at the United States Embassy, Paris France, 30 September 1961’, NSA BPF. Legere to Taylor, ‘The Middle of 1961’, 30 June 1969; State Department to Paris, 17 August 1961; State Department to London, 17 August 1961; Lemnitzer to Norstad, 18 August 1961, NSA BPF. Norstad to Lemnitzer, 18 August 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: pp. 350–1. ‘Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador Finletter and General Norstad at the United States Embassy, Paris, France, Sept. 30, 1961’, NSA BPF. Honoré M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1980), pp. 132–6, 152. ‘NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis’, attachment to Paul H. Nitze, Memorandum for the Vice President, Subject: ‘Briefing Notes for Your Paris Discussions’, 27 September 1961, NSA BPF. McNamara to Norstad, JCS 1364–61, 13 September 1961, NSA BPF. McNamara’s views, along with supportive statements by Lemnitzer and dissenting opinions from the other Joint Chiefs of Staff and Norstad, are

General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis 197

27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

34.

35. 36.

37.

38.

summarised in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, Germany and the Berlin Question, vol. 3 (Washington: Dept. of Defense, 14 December 1961), pp. 70–87. Norstad to McNamara, 16 September 1961, NSA BPF. There are two different copies of this document in the National Security Archive’s Berlin files, each with different deletions, so both should be consulted. Ibid. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, ‘Memorandum of Conversation, Tuesday, 3 October 1961, 4:30 p.m.’, 4 October 1961, NSA BPF. NSA BPFM 109, ‘US Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict’, 23 October 1961, NSA BPF. Kennedy to Norstad, 20 October 1961, with enclosure, ‘US Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict’, 20 August 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14:520; the 7 November 1961 meeting is described in ‘Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State’, 9 November 1961, Ibid., 14:559; Kennedy’s interest in Norstad’s suggestion of a meeting with Khrushchev is found in Kennedy to Rusk, 8 November 1961, NSA BPF. Norstad to Kennedy, 16 November 1961, with enclosure, ‘SACEUR’s Instructions to SHAPE Planners’, 16 November 1961, FRUS, Microfiche Supplement for Vols. XIII, XIV, XV, No. 242. Maxwell D. Taylor, Memorandum for the President, ‘Response to November 16 Letter from General Norstad’, 4 December 1961, NSA BPF; Bundy to Norstad, 5 December 1961 (enclosing text of Kennedy’s letter), NSA BPF. Norstad Oral History Interview, 11 November 1976, 50–52, DDEL, NP. Norstad did not provide a date for this confrontation, but the only time that both Rusk and McNamara (the only two cabinet secretaries who would have had any reason to meet with him to discuss NATO) were in Paris during the period leading up to his resignation was the NATO Ministerial Meetings of 10–16 December 1961. This was the visit mentioned by Kennedy in his 5 December note attached to Rusk’s and McNamara’s negative evaluation of Norstad’s response to NSA BPFM 109. Norstad to Kennedy, 10 January 1962, NSA BPF. At the same time Norstad was also out of step with the Kennedy Administration’s views on NATO strategy, in particular their desire to postpone as long as possible any use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe. Thus in the autumn of 1961, Norstad and the SHAPE staff developed a new Emergency Defence Plan (EDP) that to British Minister of Defence Watkinson ‘reflected the concept of the use of nuclear weapons if necessary after a brief pause’. Watkinson was pleased that ‘the concept expressed in SACEUR’s new Emergency Defense Plan was very closely linked to British thought, whatever its relation to US thinking might be’. Gregory W. Pedlow, ‘Flexible Response Before MC 14/3: General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962’, Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 13 (1) (1998): 260. Headquarters, USAF, History of the Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, vol. 22, 1 July 1961–31 December 1961, p. 51, NSA BPF; PRO, DEFE 4/145, COS(62)34(4), 10 May 1962. The release of the 1962 British documents in January 1993 provided the first details concerning the long-secret BERCONs. See ‘Berlin Contingency

198 The Berlin Wall Crisis

39.

40.

41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

46.

47.

Planning – Phasing of Military Operations’, 19 January 1962, PRO, DEFE 4/142, COS(62)7(4)CA/JP(62 )6 (Final), ‘Brief for Anglo-German Staff Talks,’ 22 June 1962; PRO, DEFE 4/146, COS(62)44(9)/JP(62)72(Final). See also Sean M. Maloney, ‘Notfallplanung für Berlin: Vorläufer der Flexible Response, 1958–1963’, Militärgeschichte, 7 (1) (1997): 9–13. The views of the UK Chiefs of Staff are found in PRO, DEFE 4/142, COS(62)7(4)/JP(62)6(Final), 19 January 1962; DEFE 4/143, COS(62)21(1), 23 March 1962, while Norstad’s reply is in PRO, DEFE 4/142, COS(62)5(5), 16 January 1962. Norstad’s statement to the Standing Group is found in Nitze to Lemnitzer, I-8886/92, ‘Build-Up Planning for Berlin Crisis’, 31 July 1962, NSA BPF. PRO, DEFE 4/142 COS(62)10(1), 10 February 1962; Norstad to Lemnitzer, 9 February 1962, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: pp. 800–02; State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, ‘Assessment of Current Soviet Intentions in the Berlin Crisis, February 15–21’, 23 February 1962, NSA BPF. Historical Division, USAFE, History of Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, 1 January–30 June 1962 (15 February 1963), 29–33, NSA BPF. John C. Ausland, ‘Six Berlin Incidents, 1961–1964: A Case Study in the Management of US Policy Regarding a Critical National Security Problem’ (Paper Presented to the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, 1964–65), p. 6. Kennedy to Clay, 15 March 1962, NSA BPF. For Norstad’s moderate stance and Clay’s calls for more aggressive measures, see JCS, Historical Division, Germany and the Berlin Question, vol. 5, (2 April 1962), pp. 32–5, 47–8; vol. 6, (20 March 1963), pp. 11–12, 24–5, 31–4, 36–8, 42, 47. Norstad to Kennedy, 9 March 1962, NSA BPF. Gilpatric’s comments are in his Oral History Interview, 5 May 1970, John F. Kennedy Library, cited in Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown 1993), p. 145; Norstad’s remarks to his staff in December 1961 are found in his Oral History Interview, 11 November 1976, 52, DDEL, NP; General Gallois’s comments came in a conversation with the author, Paris, France, 17 October 1992. For the decline of the importance of the JCS under the Kennedy Administration see Lawrence S. Kaplan, ‘The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: Views from the Pentagon’, in William W. Epley (ed.) International Cold War Records and History (Washington: Dept. of Defense, 1996), p. 67, 69. For more information on Norstad’s differences with the Kennedy Administration on nuclear strategy, see Pedlow, ‘Flexible Response Before MC 14/3,’ p. 260, 248, 266–7.

Index access rights to Berlin, 12, 13, 15, 16–17, 66–7 British policy on, 51 US policy on, 31–2, 62 Acheson, Dean, 7, 30 Berlin report, 31, 32–3, 34, 37, 62 on Britain, 43 Plan, 33, 180–1 Adenauer, Konrad, xiii, 3, 18, 143 and de Gaulle, 52, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 74, 75, 125, 143 electoral position, 4, 32, 134, 136, 139 and Kennedy, 139–42 Macmillan’s relations with, 44, 46–9, 51–2, 53, 55, 132, 134 as mediator for US in Middle East crisis, 127 meeting with Dulles (1959), 132 meetings with de Gaulle (1959), 80–1, 127; (1960) 84, 85; (1962), 89 Pietromarchi’s opinion of, 160 tactics, 9, 131–4 agency theory, 130 Air Corridor Agreement (1945), the, 15 air corridor crisis (1962), the, 190–1, 194 Albanians, the, 102 Algerian war, the, 76, 86 Allied Control Council, the, 15 allied policies, x–xix, 61–2 All Quiet on the Western Front (film), 73 Alphand, Hervé, 84 ambassadors, GDR measures against Western, 105 threat of withdrawal of, 27 Aswan Dam, the, 126 Atlantic Alliance, de Gaulle and the, 75–8, 84–6 Italy in, 148 atomic bomb, France and the, 74, 82 Attlee, Clement, 11

Attlee Plan (1943), 11–12, 13 Ausland, John, 190 Austria, escape route into, 9 Austrian State Treaty (1955), 18, 48 Bad Kreuznach, meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle (1958), 52, 77 Bagnato, Bruna, viii, xiii–xiv, 147–74 balance of power, 3, 7, 10, 14–15, 85–6 Basic Law (1949), 17 Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) between FRG and GDR (1972), 143 Beijing, East German meetings (1961), 109 BERCONs (Berlin Contingency Plans), 189–90 Beria, Lavrenti, 101, 102, 116 Berlin, British policy towards, 44–52 Checkpoint Charlie, 1, 35, 113, 115–16, 142 de Gaulle’s attitude to, 89 division into sectors, 3 elections (1946), 15 as a ‘free city’, 33, 98–9, 134–5 and FRG, 125–6 Friedrichstrasse, confrontation at, 167 and Germany, 2–6, 22 interim agreement mooted, 55–6 Invalidenstrasse (border crossing point), 113 as a Land, 17 meeting between Zhukov, Clay and Weeks (1945), 15 movement from East to West, 5–6, 139 negotiations on a German treaty (1959), 28–9 ring round as ‘Rose’ operation, 113–14 seeks membership of EEC, 43 199

200 Index Berlin – continued as source of insecurity for communist regimes, 5–6 Soviet desire for unification under East Germany, 8 Soviet reign of terror (1945), 15 Soviets block Western access on autobahn (1959), 177, 178 Soviets detain US convoys (1958), 175; (1959), 177 Steinstücken access blocked, 35, 183 strategic importance in Cold War, xi–xii, 1–9 tripartite responsibility mooted (1943), 11–12 see also East Berlin; West Berlin Berlin blockade (1948), xii, 16–17 results, 17–19 Berlin Crises, timeline, xv–xxi Berlin Crisis (1958), British policy and the, 48, 52–67 French response to, 74, 78–81 Italian response to, 150–5 origins of, 10–21, 175 US policy and the, 26–9, 175–94 Western reaction, 129–32 Berlin Wall, breached (1989), 9, 73 construction (1961), 1–2, 22, 35, 97, 116, 139, 181 sanctioned by Khrushchev, 111–12 symbol of Cold War, 2, 19, 29, 74 Berlin Wall crisis (1961), aftermath, 5, 139–41 British response to, 44, 64–5 French response to, 74, 88–9 GDR’s view of Western non-response, 114–15 Italian response, 166–7 Soviet and GDR responses to, 96–117 US policy, 29, 31–7, 61–5, 180–94 Bild, 73 ‘Bizonia’ proposed, 16 Bonn, 4, 127–9, 129–30, 133 as capital, 17 leaks from, 131, 142 Brandt, Willy, 140, 182 letter to Kennedy (1961), 35, 182

Bremen, in US hands, 13 Bremerhaven, in US hands, 13 Brentano, Heinrich von, 87, 136 Britain, xii, 43–72 crisis management policy, 43–67 influence on US, 55–8 role in relation to US, 55, 61–5 role on world stage, 43, 52, 61–5 ‘special relationship’ with US, 57–8 Brook, Sir Norman, 47–8 Brosio, Ambassador, 150, 151, 152, 155 Bruce, David, 135 buffer zones, 47–8 Buffet, Cyril, viii, xii–xiii, 73–95 Bundestag, accepts FRG’s role in Berlin (1950), 18–19 approves nuclear arms for FRG, 127, 128, 133, 136 Berlin representatives at (1949), 17 Bundeswehr, 84, 112, 129 Bundy, McGeorge, 31, 34, 36 Cairo, (Roosevelt–Churchill meeting), 11 Camp David, Eisenhower’s meeting with Khrushchev (1959), 29 capitalism, liberal, 2 versus communism, 6, 100, 156 versus socialism, 100, 104, 116 Casablanca conference (1943), 10 CDU, 4, 53, 86, 134, 140 CDU–CSU government, 140 Central and Eastern Europe, communist parties, 5 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 26–7, 31 Chaundler, R. J., 180 Checkpoint Charlie incidents, 115–16, 142 Chen Yi, 109, 114 China, xi, 102, 109 attacks Quemoy and Matsu, 127 relations with USSR, 100, 101–2, 116 Chou Enlai, 109 Christian Democrats (DC), Italian, 149, 150, 152, 153

Index and Italian Socialist Party (PSI), 150, 153, 164, 167 Christian Democrats, German see CDU Churchill, Winston, 10, 11, 12–13, 14, 45, 48 loses general election (1945), 14 CIA see Central Intelligence Agency Clarke, General Bruce C., 183 Clay, General Lucius, 15, 16, 35, 132, 190–1, 194 visit to West Berlin, 182–3, 193 coalition, wartime, 15 Cold War, the, 1–9, 19 Colombey, meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle (1958), 52, 75 communism, versus capitalism, 6, 100, 156 communist parties, Central and Eastern Europe, 5 Communist Party in Berlin (see SED) Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 5 communist system, terminal decline, 9, 64 Concert of Europe (1870–1914), 76 conscription, Britain unwilling to re-introduce due to Berlin Crisis, 1961, 63 Conservative Party (UK), 46 containment, military (Acheson’s NSC 68 message, 1950), 7 contingency planning for Berlin, 8–9, 130–1, 142–3, 180, 188–90 conventional forces, build up, 7, 34, 36, 37–8, 138, 180–1, 184 reduction in Europe, 127 ‘trip wire’ strategy of, 25 Copenhagen, North Atlantic Council, Ministerial Meeting (1958), 151–2 Council of Europe, the, 10 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 74, 77, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88 Cuban missile crisis (1962), the, 8, 142–3, 191 currency reform, 16 Czechs, and West Berlin, 105

201

DDR see German Democratic Republic defence, Western, strategy of, x, 25 recasting European, 57, 58–61 de Gaulle, Charles, xii–xiii, 49, 53, 59, 73–95 and Adenauer, 52, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 74, 75, 143 and the Atlantic Alliance, 75–8, 84–6 election (1962), 50 election as president (1958), 127 Four Pillars strategy, xiii, 85–6 and Kennedy, 86 meetings with Adenauer (1959), 80–1, 127; (1960) 84, 85; (1962), 89 tactical convergence strategy, 84–6 Department of Defense (DOD) (US), 31, 34 détente, British desire for, 44–67 repercussions on Italy, 147, 152–3, 157, 160, 161–2, 164 deterrent power, 23–4, 32 see also nuclear deterrence diplomats, Italian, 148–68 Western permission from East Germany to enter East Berlin, 105 disarmament, conventional, 127, 128–9 in Europe, 127, 151, 155, 163 nuclear, 83 DOD see Department of Defense (US) Dodd, Thomas, 140 Dowling, Walter, 105 Dulles, John Foster, 24, 26–7, 77–8, 127, 130, 134, 135, 136 and Italian diplomacy, 151 meeting with Adenauer (1959), 132 and Norstad, 176–7 EAC see European Advisory Commission East Berlin, allied rights in, 4, 8 garrisons in, 5–6 people trapped, 9, 166 uprising (1953), 18, 100, 126, 139 see also Grenzgänger problem

202 Index Eastern Europe, reluctance to help GDR economically, 111–12 Stalin’s objectives in, 14 see also Central and Eastern Europe East Germany see German Democratic Republic (GDR) East Prussia, split between Poland and Russia, 14 Eckardt, Felix von, 137 economic reconstruction, German, 1946, 16 Eden, Sir Anthony, 50 EEC see European Economic Community EFTA see European Free Trade Area Egypt (Suez Crisis 1956), 125–6 Eisenhower administration, xii, 22, 23–6, 37–8 consensus-building policy with NATO allies, 26–8, 38, 131 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 13–14, 26–7, 127, 151 judgement that Khrushchev did not want war, 6–7 and Macmillan, 46, 49, 55–8 meeting with Khrushchev (1959), 29, 135, 179; (1960), 58 message to Stalin, 14 New Look, 25 and Norstad, 177, 192 Elbe, the, 13, 14 Ely, General, 81 ENI, commercial agreements with USSR, 150, 154–5 Erhard, Ludwig, 136 espionage, in West Berlin, 5, 28, 98, 99, 126 Etzel, Franz, 136 Europe, balance of power, 3, 7, 10, 14–15, 85–6 disarmament, 127, 151, 155, 163 recasting defence of, 58–61 security issue, 46–7, 53, 151, 159, 163 European Advisory Commission (EAC), 10–12

European Economic Community (EEC), Berlin seeks membership, 43 Britain and the, 59–60, 65, 66 De Gaulle vetoes British entry, 65, 66 and EFTA, 50, 57, 62, 65 European Free Trade Area (EFTA), 49–50, 57, 62, 65 Fanfani, Amintore, 152–3, 161 trip to Moscow (1961), 162–7 Far East, 11 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), xiii, 125–46 requests IRBMs from US, 128–9 Adenauer’s policies, 18–19 and Berlin, 125–6 British army in, 47–8 elections (1961), 32 formation of (1949), 2, 126 and GDR, Basic Treaty (1972), 143 joins NATO (1955), 45, 46 and Kennedy, 137–9, 141–2 meetings with Soviet Union (1959, 1960), 134–7 policy, 127–9 relations with her allies, 125–43 flexible response strategy (NATO’s), 26, 36–8, 192–4 Florin, Peter, 104 force de frappe see nuclear weapons foreign ministers meetings, (1959), 135 proposed, 54, 55 Foreign Office (UK), 44, 47, 52, 60, 65 Fornari, Giovanni, 165 Four Powers see Quadripartite Agreement (1972) France, xii–xiii, 13, 73–95, 127 diplomatic strategy, 74–89 election of de Gaulle, 127 opposition to flexible response strategy, 37 ‘second centre theory’, 82–3 ‘security system’ strategy, 79–81 Franco-German rapprochement, 52, 61–2, 74, 75–8, 84–6

Index Frankfurt-on-Main conference (1959), 162 Freedman, Lawrence viii, xi–xii, 1–9 Free French, 11 FRG see Federal Republic of Germany Fulbright, Senator, 32 Gaddis, John Lewis, 101 Galbraith, J. K., 62 Gallois, Pierre, 80, 82, 191 GDR see German Democratic Republic Gearson, John, viii, x–xiv, xii, 10–21, 43–72 Geneva, foreign ministers meetings (1959), 55, 135 German Democratic Republic (GDR), concerns over Berlin, 96–117 formation of, 2 and FRG, Basic Treaty (1972), 143 proclaimed (1949), 18 recognition issue, 18, 26, 50, 99, 105, 130, 140, 141 sealed East Berlin border (1961), 35 Soviet troops in, 102 and the Soviet Union xiii, 96–124, 180 Germany, Berlin and, 2–6, 22 Berlinization or de-Berlinization, 79–80 border between East and West closed (1952), 99 British policy towards, 44–50 democratic legitimacy, 133–4 free elections proposed (1955), 18; (1959), 133 land routes blocked (1948), 15 Nazi, 13, 73 post-war policy on, 10–12 reunification issue, 45–7, 50, 61, 126, 133–4, 134–5 unification, 4, 9, 19, 31, 33 zones of occupation, 11–12 see also Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); German Democratic Republic (GDR) Gilpatric, Roswell, 191 Globke, Hans, 133 Globke Plan (1959), the, 133–4

203

Gomulka, Wladislaw, 101, 112, 158–9 ‘Great Wall of China’ operation, 74 Grenzgänger problem, 99, 107, 108, 139 Gromyko, Andrei, 109–10, 114–15, 141, 156–7 Gronchi, Giovanni, 150–1, 154, 160 visit to Soviet Union (1960), 154, 162 Grotewohl, Otto, 101, 159 Gusey, Fedor, 12 Harriman, Averell, 163 Harrison, Hope, viii, xiii, 96–124 Hegen, Ambassador, 109 Herter, Christian, 132, 135–6, 138, 153, 155 Heusinger, General, 78 Hodes, General Henry I., 175 Home, Douglas, Lord, 63, 87 Honecker, Erich, 113, 114 Hoyer-Miller, Sir Frederick, 46, 60 Hungary, repression in, 5 hydrogen bomb, development of, 7 ICBM see intercontinental ballistic missiles ideology, competing systems of, 3, 9 imperialism, American, 4 inter-allied governing authority see Kommandatura intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 28 first test (1957), 6 refusal of France to have US on its territory, 80 Soviet lead in, 8, 80, 129 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), NATO force, 25 Soviet attempt to base in Cuba, 8 US offers NATO (1957), 128 see also Jupiter missiles International Access Authority proposed, 141–2 IRBM see intermediate range ballistic missiles Italian Communist Party, xiii, 148–9, 153

204 Index Italian Socialist Party (PSI), 148–9, 165 and Christian Democrats, 150, 153, 164 Italy, xiii–xiv, 147–74 commercial agreements with USSR, 150, 154–5, 161, 167 foreign policy, 147–68 Nixon’s visit (1957), 150 suspicion by the West of ‘neutralism’, 167 Jebb, Gladwyn, 84 Johnson, Lyndon B., 35, 140, 181 visit to West Berlin, 182–3, 193 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 26–7, 33, 130, 175, 185, 192 study on ground access military action, 176–7 Jordan, 127 Jupiter missiles, installation in Italy, 153, 162 removal from Turkey, 142 Kadar, Janos, 112 Kastner, Jill, viii, xiii, 125–46 Kazennov, A. P., 107 Kennan, George, 12 Kennedy administration, xii, xiv, 22–3, 29–31, 35, 37–9 Britain and, 61–5 and FRG, 137–9, 141–2 and Norstad’s views, 183–8, 190–4 reaction to Berlin Wall, 182–3 Kennedy, John F., 1, 4, 33, 35–6 address to the nation (July 1961), 34, 63 and Adenauer, 139–42 and de Gaulle, 86 display of force, 7–8, 29, 36 and Italy, 163 Macmillan and, 44, 62, 63 summit with Khrushchev (1961), 7, 32, 107–8, 110–11, 163, 180 Khrushchev, Nikita, xiii, 1, 4, 19 concerns about GDR, 97–117 denunciations of Stalinism, 5 dissatisfaction with Berlin situation, 5–6 domestic policies, 129

meetings with Gronchi (1960), 154 reasons for sanctioning Berlin Wall closure, 111–12 summit with Eisenhower (1960), 58, 137 summit with Kennedy (1961), 7, 32, 110–11, 163, 180 talks with Fanfani (1961), 164–6 tirade against FRG, 158–9 visit to Eisenhower (1959), 179 Khrushchev Ultimatum (1958), 6–7, 22, 23, 26, 50–2, 98 deadline withdrawn (1959), 28, 53–4, 179 German reaction, 133–4 revived (1961), 7 US reaction, 175–80 Western reaction, 129–32 Kissinger, Henry, 34, 36 Kommandatura, 12–13, 15 abandoned (1949), 17 Konev, Marshal I., 115 König, Johannes, 105 Korean War, the, 7, 62 Kozyrev (Soviet ambassador in Rome), 154 Krone, Heinrich, 86 Kvitsinky, Yuli, 111 Labour Party (UK), 46 Laos (US and), 138 Ledwidge, Bernard, 80 Lemke, Michael, 116 Lemnitzer, Lyman L., 182, 183 Liberal Party (UK), 46 Lightner, Allan, 116 limited war, 23, 34 use of nuclear weapons in, 39n LIVE OAK, 8, 178–80 becomes quadripartite, 180 France and, 81–3, 86 ‘More Elaborate Military Measures’, 179 Norstad and, 81, 177–80, 186–90, 192 ‘Quiet Preparatory and Precautionary Military Measures’, 178–9 London, de Gaulle’s visit to Macmillan (1960), 60

Index Luftbrücke, the, 16 Lunik, Satellite, Soviet launch of, 80 McCloy, John, 129, 136 McElroy, Neil (US Sec. of Defense), 26 McMahon Act, 25 Macmillan administration, 43–4 Macmillan, Harold, xii, 4, 8, 19, 43–67, 75 de Gaulle and, 85, 176 and Eisenhower, 55–8 electoral priorities, 44, 52, 56–7 ‘Grand Design’ (1960), 62 as ‘honest broker’, 58–60 and Kennedy, 44, 62, 63 relations with Adenauer, 44, 46–8, 51–2, 53, 55, 132, 134 visit to Moscow (1959), 48, 49, 52–5, 132 McNamara, Robert, 34, 37, 88, 181, 182, 183–4, 185, 186, 193 response to Norstad’s plan, 187–8, 191 Maillard, Pierre, 89 Malenkov, Georgi, 101, 102, 116 Malinovsky, Rodion, 115 Mansfield, Mike, Congressman, 32 Mao Zedong, 102 MARCONS (Maritime Contingency Plans), 188–9 Marly-le-Roi, Adenauer meeting with de Gaulle (1959), 80–1 Marshall Aid programme (1947), 16 Martino, Edoardo (Italian Foreign Minister), 150, 151 Marxism, 156 Matern, Hermann, 108–9 Matsu, Shelled by China, 127 Mattei, Enrico, 150, 154–5, 162 MC-70 on stockpiling tactical nuclear weapons, 128 Mediterranean countries, 149 Mendès France, Pierre, 79 Menning, Bruce W., 115 Messmer, Pierre, 83, 85, 86, 88 Middle East, 127, 160 Mielke, Erich (Head of Stasi), 113 Mikoyan, Anastas, 101, 129, 132 Milestone, Lewis, 73 militarism, German, 4, 12–13, 159

205

Military Committee 14/2 (NATO document), 25 military ‘disengagement’, 47–8, 49, 53, 55, 79 military objectives, tension with political objectives, 13–14, 23–4, 38–9, 191–4 ‘Military Occupation of Germany’, British paper (1944), 11 ‘missile gap’, 6, 8, 30 Moch, Jules, 79, 83 Morgenthau Plan, 13 Moscow, East German delegation (1961), 108–9 Fanfani’s trip to (1961), 162–7 Gronchi’s visit (1960), 154 Italian ambassador in, 148, 155–62 meetings (1943), 10 ‘on the Rhine’, 78–81 summit (1960), with East Germany, 102 visit of Macmillan (1959), 44, 48, 49, 52–5, 132 Murrow, Edward R., 140 Mussolini, Benito, 148 Nash, Philip, 128 Nassau agreement (1962), 65 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 126 National Security Council (US), meeting (1961), 34, 131 see also NSC NATO, alliance, x, 149 Britain and, 59–60, 65 conference (1957), 128 dissension within, 125, 127, 143 established (1949), 17 Forward Defence planning, 3 France and, 75–8, 143 guidelines for nuclear use, 31 MC-70 on stockpiling tactical nuclear weapons, 128 Military Committee 14/2, 25 military strategy debate, 48 ministerial meeting in Oslo (1961), 86 Norstad’s role, 188–94 proposal for a nuclear force, 85

206 Index NATO – continued reform, 89 reliance on (FRG), 46, 126 Standing Group, 189–90 strategy in 1958 Berlin crisis, 25–6 and the Suez crisis, 125–6 and the US, 24–5, 138 Warsaw Pact and, 7 see also LIVE OAK; Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) negotiations, Italian, 155–62 Nenni, Pietro, 149, 165 neo-Atlanticism, Italian, 149–68 neutralisation, German (danger of), 4, 24, 61, 78–9, 81, 88, 133–4 New Look, Eisenhower’s, 25 New York, agreement (1949), 16–17 tripartite UNO delegates (1959), 78 New York Times, 105, 129 Nixon, Richard, trip to USSR (1959), 29 visit to Italy (1957), 150 Norstad, General Lauris, xiv, 25–6, 34, 130, 175–98 divergent views from Kennedy administration, 183–8 and Dulles talks, 176–7 on the French, 78 opposition to military action in Berlin, 36 ‘Plan of Action: NATO Europe’ (1961), 183–8 resignation, 191 role in NATO, 188–94 ‘SACEUR’s Instructions to SHAPE Planners’, 186–7 see also LIVE OAK North Atlantic Council, 127, 131, 188 ‘Instructions to NATO Military Authorities’, 188–9 meeting (1962), 37 Ministerial Meeting (1958), 151–2, 176 North Atlantic Treaty (1949), 17 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation see NATO Novotny, Antonin, 112 NSAM (National Security Action

Memorandum) 109, ‘US Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict’, 185–6, 188 NSC 68 (1950), (Acheson publication), 7 NSC 5501, (US security strategy), 24 nuclear deterrence, 3, 6–7, 80, 82–3, 84–6 nuclear tests, French, 82, 83 Soviet (1949), 16 Soviet (1961), 1, 166 Soviet proposal to end (1957), 151 nuclear war, France and, 73–95 possibility of, 1, 23, 184–8 stages in escalation to, 25–6, 185–6 nuclear weapons, balance of, 88, 89 French policy, 74–5, 76–7, 80, 84–6, 89 for FRG, 127, 128 in Italy, 153, 162, 165 NATO and US policy, 25, 30–1, 192–3 proliferation, 25, 80 role of, xi, xii–xiii, 7, 23, 24 sharing of information, 25, 84 tactical, 80, 128 use in limited war, 391 n. US monopoly (until 1949), 16 see also atomic bomb Nuti, Leopoldo, viii–ix, xiii–xiv, 147–74 Oder–Neisse line, 14, 64, 141 OECE (Organisation of European Economic Cooperation), 148 oil offensive, Soviet, 155 ‘Open Skies’ proposal, 135 Ortona, Egidio, 150 Oslo, NATO ministerial meeting (1961), 86 Owen, Henry, 34 Paese sera (publishes article on Prime Minister Fanfani’s impending trip to Moscow), 163 Palazzo Chigi, 155, 161 Pankow regime, East German, 18, 126, 133

Index Paris, NATO meeting, 63 summit (1960), 29, 44, 58, 66, 83, 137 tripartite discussions (1958), 176 Paris Agreements (1954), 4, 45 pastoralisation (of post-war Germany), 2, 13 Pedlow, Gregory W., ix, xiv, 175–98 Pella, Giuseppe, 151–2, 153, 155, 160, 161 Pentovsky, Oleg, 8 Pervukhin, Mikhail, 104, 106, 108, 109–10, 111, 113, 116 Pietromarchi, Luca, 148, 154, 155–62 Plenum meetings, East German, 98 Podresov (Secretary-General of Soviet Foreign Ministry), 156 Poland, western border, 14, 99, 112 Polaris missiles, 65 Poles, proposed contact with West Berlin, 105 Polish administration, 14 Khrushchev and, 158–9 Politburo, East German, 98 political objectives, tension with military objectives, 13–14, 23–4, 38–9, 191–4 post-war policy on Germany, 10–12 Potsdam conference (1945), 13–15 pourparlers organiques (De Gaulle’s proposals to Dulles, 1958), 78 prisoners of war (POWs), 157 ‘Protocol on Zones of Occupation’ (1944), 12–13 amendment, 13 Prussia, 14, 89 psychological warfare, 52, 130–2, 182–3 Quadripartite Agreements (1944), 12–13; (1972), 1 Quaroni, Pietro, 162, 166 Quebec, meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt (1944), 12–13 Quemoy, Shelled by China, 127

207

railways, Soviet harassment on inter-zonal, 16 Rambouillet, de Gaulle meets Adenauer (1960), 84, 85 De Gaulle meets Eisenhower and Macmillan (1959), 74, 81 Rand Corporation, the, 1 Rapacki Plan (1957), 79, 128 Rapallo Treaty (1922), fear of another, 10, 45 rearmament, of Federal Republic of Germany, 4, 46 Red Army, the, 84 refugees, from East to West Germany via West Berlin, 97, 99, 103, 108, 109, 126, 139 from Soviet zone of Berlin, 18, 29 Regensburg, Adenauer’s speech against Brandt, 140–1 Reggane, French nuclear test, 83 Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 164, 165, 167 Remarque, Erich, All Quiet on the Western Front, 73 reparations Soviet–French, 14 of Germany to the allies, 16 between Italy and Moscow, 1958, 157, 158 Reuter, Ernest, 15, 19 Rome, Quirinale Palace, 160 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 11–13, 14 ‘Rose’ operation, 113–14 Ruhr industrial area, 11, 12 Rusk, Dean, 32, 35, 63, 76, 87, 88, 141, 163–4, 185 response to Norstad’s plan, 187–8, 191 Russo-German alliance, fear of, 10 Saarland, the, 133 SACEUR see Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic), MARCONS (Maritime Contingency Plans), 188–9 Sahara, first French atomic bomb, 82 Saxony, withdrawal of allied forces from, 1945, 15

208 Index Saxony-Anhalt, withdrawal of allied forces from, 1945, 15 Schake, Kori, ix, x–xiv, xii, 22–42 Schröder, Gerhard, 142 Schumacher, Kurt, 19, 134 SED (Socialist Unity Party: East German Communist Party), 15, 97, 104, 118 n. 4 Segni, Antonio, 150, 152, 153, 154, 163 Selianinov, O., 104, 105 Selwyn Lloyd, John, 44, 47, 50, 56, 76, 79, 81, 134 settlement, negotiated (Macmillan–Khrushchev), 52–5 SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), 82, 183, 186–7, 189–90 Sino-Soviet split, 101–2, 116 Smyser, Richard, 115–16 Social-Democratic Party of Germany see SPD socialism, 2, 5, 97 versus capitalism, 100–1, 104, 116 Socialist Unity Party, 97 Sorensen, Theodore, 34, 38 Soviet Peace Treaty (1959), 134–5 Soviet Union, archival evidence from, 97–8 British relations with, 44–67 commercial agreements with Italy, 150, 154–5, 161, 167 East German relations, 96–117 fragmentation, 9 and FRG meetings (1959, 1960), 134–7 and German Democratic Republic (GDR), xiii, 96–124 relations with Italy, 147–68 relations with US, 98, 103, 115 seven-year economic plan, 159 usefulness of divided Germany to, 4–5 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 81 SPD, Bad Godesberg programme (1959), 141 in Berlin, 15, 19, 134, 140, 141 Deutschlandplan, 79

Speidel, General, 86 ‘Spirit of Geneva’ summit (1955), 18, 135 Sputnik 1 (1957), 6, 80 Stalinism, Khrushchev’s denunciations of, 5 Stalin, Joseph, 3, 5, 14, 16, 18 Stasi, the (East German Secret Police), 97 Straneo (Director-General for Political Affairs), 161, 162 Strauss, Franz Josef, 78, 128, 138 Suez Canal Company, the, 126 Suez crisis (1956), 43, 52, 125 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), xiv, 188 build-up of conventional forces, 34, 36 IRBMs, 25, 30 Norstad as, 175–94 ‘SACEUR’s Instructions to SHAPE Planners’, 186–7 Switzerland, 18 Taiwan, Western presence in, 102, 109 Tambroni, Ferdinando, 152, 154 Taylor, General Maxwell D., 34, 185, 186, 187, 192 Tehran summit conference (1943), 10–11 Thompson, Llewelyn, 31, 32, 131 Thuringia, withdrawal of allied forces from, 1945, 15 Thurston, Raymond L., 175 Tito, Marshal, 5 Tournoux, J.-R., 85 Truman Doctrine, 16 Truman, Harry, 7, 14, 16 Turkey, removal of Jupiter missiles from, 142 Twining, Nathan B., 176, 194 U-2 spy plane, shooting down, 29, 58, 83, 137 Ulbricht, Walter, ‘Information on the Sources of the Economic Difficulties of the GDR’, 112 and Khrushchev, xiii, 97–117, 159 letters to Khrushchev (1960), 106–8

Index Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) see Soviet Union United Arab Republic, 127 United Kingdom (UK) see Britain United Nations, 186 Italy in, 148 Ten Nations Committee, 155 to police communication between Berlin and the West, 79 United Nations Security Council, 27 United States of America (US), British influence on, 55–8 national security strategy (NSC 5501), 24 opposition to Britain, 55, 63 policies, xii, 22–42 proposes interim settlement on Berlin, 28–9 USAREUR (US Army Europe), 175, 181, 183, 185 USEUCOM (US European Command), 176, 178 USINCEUR (US Commander in Chief Europe), Norstad as, 175–94 USSR see Soviet Union Valletta, Vittorio, 150 Versailles Treaty (1919), 76 Vienna summit (1961), 32, 62–3, 86–7, 110–11, 138, 163 War Game, The (film), 1 Warsaw Pact, x, 4, 104 Declaration on border closure (1961), 111 meeting (1961), 102, 109, 111 military showdown, 6 relations with NATO, 7 Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) see Warsaw Pact Washington, Four Power Working Group (1959), 136 talks between Macmillan and Eisenhower (1959), 55–60

209

Tripartite Ambassadorial Group (1959), 78, 178, 180 Washington Ambassadorial Group (formerly Tripartite), 180 Watkinson, Harold, 83, 86 Watkins, Peter, 1 Weeks, Sir Ronald, 15 West Berlin, city assembly has to pass West German laws, 17 crisis of confidence in Allies, 182 as a demilitarised ‘free city’, 98, 110 espionage centre, 5, 28, 98, 99, 126 French sector, 13, 14–15 harassment from East Germans, 18 jealousy by GDR of, 106 keeping non-nuclear, 8 position inside East Germany, 6 Stalin’s blockade of (1948), 3 threat to Soviets and East Germans, 99–100 see also Grenzgänger problem Western attitudes to Berlin, 6–8 Western Europe, US commitment to defence of, 17 Western European Union (WEU), 45 West Germany see Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) WEU see Western European Union Winant, John, 12 World War I, Macmillan in, 44, 55 peace settlement (1919), 10 World War II, division of Germany into four then two sectors, 2 WTO see Warsaw Pact (Warsaw Treaty Organisation) Yalta summit, 13, 14 Yugoslavia (resists Stalin), 5 Zhukov, Grigori, 15 Zoli, Adone, 151 Zorin, Valerian (Soviet Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs), 161