Global Migration and Development

Global Migration and Development

Routledge Studies in Development and Society

1. Searching for Security Women’s Responses to Economic Transformations Edited by Isa Baud and Ines Smyth 2. The Life Region The Social and Cultural Ecology of Sustainable Development Edited by Per Råberg

9. Environment and Development in the Straits of Malacca Mark Cleary and Goh Kim Chuan 10. Technical Knowledge and Development Observing Aid Projects and Processes Thomas Grammig

3. Dams as Aid Anne Usher

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4. Politics of Development Cooperation NGOs, Gender and Partnership in Kenya Lisa Aubrey

12. Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Development Hartmut Brandt and Uwe Otzen

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13. Political Conflict and Development in East Asia and Latin America Edited by Richard Boyd, Benno Galjart and Tak-Wing Ngo 14. Marine Natural Resources and Technological Development An Economic Analysis of the Wealth from the Oceans Marco Colazingari 15. Global Migration and Development Edited by Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers

Global Migration and Development

Edited by

Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers

New York London

First published 2008 by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2008 Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Global migration and development / edited by Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan, and Annelies Zoomers. p. cm. — (Routledge studies in development and society ; 15) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-415-96247-6 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Transnationalism—Economic aspects. 2. Economic development. 3. Emigrant remittances. I. Naerssen, A. L. van. II. Spaan, Ernst. III. Zoomers, E. B. JV6217.G56 2008 338.9—dc22 ISBN 0-203-93839-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-96247-1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-93839-9 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-96247-6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-93839-3 (ebk)

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Contents

List of Figures List of Tables List of Boxes Preface and Acknowledgments 1

Globalization, Migration, and Development

ix xi xv xvii 1

TON VAN NAERSSEN, ERNST SPAAN AND ANNELIES ZOOMERS

PART I

The Role and Impact of Family Remittances 2

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods: A Moroccan Case Study

21

HEIN DE HAAS

3

International Migration in Indonesia and its Impacts on Regional Development

43

GRAEME HUGO

4

Migrant Remittances and Development in Bolivia and Mexico: A Comparative Study

66

VIRGINIE BABY-COLLIN, GENEVIÈVE CORTES AND LAURENT FARET

5

The Role of Remittances in the Transnational Livelihood Strategies of Somalis

91

CINDY HORST

PART II

Diasporas and Development at Home 6

Migration, Collective Remittances, and Development: Mexican Migrant Associations in the United States GASPAR RIVERA-SALGADO AND LUIS ESCALA RABADÁN

111

vi

Contents

7

Global Workers, Local Philanthropists: Filipinos in Italy and the Tug of Home

130

FABIO BAGGIO AND MARUJA M. B. ASIS

8

Migrant Involvement in Community Development: The Case of the Rural Ashanti Region–Ghana

150

MIRJAM KABKI, VALENTINA MAZZUCATO AND TON DIETZ

9

We Are Bridging Cultures and Countries: Migrant Organizations and Development Cooperation in the Netherlands

172

TON VAN NAERSSEN

PART III

Transfer of Knowledge, Skills, and Ideas 10 The Diaspora Option as a Tool Toward Development? The Highly Qualified Ghanaian Diaspora in Berlin and Hamburg

195

KATHARINA GOETHE AND FELICITAS HILLMANN

11 The Development Potential of Caribbean Young Return Migrants: Making a Difference Back Home

213

ROBERT B. POTTER AND DENNIS CONWAY

12 (Post) Colonial Transnational Actors and Homeland Political Development: The Case of Surinam

231

LIZA M. NELL

PART IV

Comprehensive Studies 13 Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration: Cases from Senegal and Lebanon

253

FENNEKE REYSOO

14 Migration and Development: Migrant Women in South Korea HYE-KYUNG LEE

269

Contents vii 15 Homeward-Bound Investors: The Role of Overseas Chinese in China’s Economic Development

288

MAGGI W. H. LEUNG

16 Conceptualising Indian Emigration—The Development Story

309

PARVATI RAGHURAM

Contributors Index

327 333

List of Figures

2.1

Ideal-typical household migration trajectories within the household life cycle, Morocco

31

2.2

Age and labour migration participation of men, Morocco

34

2.3

Mean income composition by household migration status, Morocco

38

3.1

Indonesians by country of residence, OECD Countries

45

3.2

Number of Indonesian overseas workers processed by the Ministry of Manpower, 1979–2005

47

Indonesia: Province of origin of officially registered overseas workers, 1989–1992

50

Indonesia: Areas of origin of workers deported from Sabah to East Kalimantan, 1994–1998

52

3.5

Indonesia: Growth of remittances, 1983–2005

53

3.6

Indonesia selected areas: Remittances compared with regional government revenue (PAD) in billion Rupiah, 2001–2003

54

Goods/money brought back at the time of the last return (the % of the migrants that brought back some goods/money in each area), Bolivia and Mexico

73

Migratory remittances use typology (% of the number of families), Bolivia and Mexico

75

Migrants with productive investments by age bracket, Bolivia and Mexico

78

3.3

3.4

4.1

4.2

4.3

x 4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

List of Figures Distribution of remittance amounts according to gender at the time of the last migration (% of migrants), Bolivia and Mexico

79

Households with productive investments according to the family profiles of activity in the places of origin, Bolivia and Mexico

81

Remittance capacities according to the migratory status at the time of the last migration, Bolivia and Mexico

82

Remittance capacities according to migration periods (% of migrants with remittances according to the year of their last departure), Bolivia and Mexico

84

Families with productive investments according to the number of journeys made, Bolivia and Mexico

84

Families with productive investments according to family migratory duration, Bolivia and Mexico

85

10.1 Development over time of the number of Ghanaians in Germany, male and female (1967–2005)

200

14.1 Marriages between foreigners and Koreans, according to sex, 1990–2004

276

14.2 Nationality of foreign female spouses, Korea, 1990–2004

276

15.1 Map of China

291

15.2 Special Economic Zones, Open Coastal Cities, and Open Economic Regions in China

298

List of Tables

2.1

Position within household by migration status of individuals above 15 years, Morocco

29

2.2

Economic activities by household migration status, Morocco

36

2.3

Sources of income by household migration status, Morocco

37

3.1

Settler arrivals, birthplace country Indonesia by occupation and sex, 1998–99 to 2004–05

46

Indonesia: Estimated stocks of overseas contract workers around 2005

48

Indonesia and the Philippines: Workers’ remittances relative to exports and imports in US$ Million, 1980–2005

49

East Flores study village: Return and recent migrants: The main use made of the money sent home within the last five years, 1998

56

Survey villages migrants still away: Family perceptions of whether absence of migrant had effected agricultural production, East Nusa Tenggara

58

East Flores survey villages migrants still away: Effects on family decision making

61

Migratory characteristics in the zones of study, Bolivia and Mexico

70

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

4.1

xii 4.2

4.3

6.1

List of Tables Amount of remittance (sent and/or brought back) for the last stay abroad (as part of the total of migrants for each area of study), Bolivia and Mexico

72

Family use of the remittances (% of families that quoted the type of use in every zone of study), Bolivia and Mexico

75

Number of Mexican HTAs in the United States by states of origin and destination (1998–2003)

114

6.2

Total funding for the ‘3 for 1 Program’ in Zacatecas

117

6.3

Investment amounts and types of projects funded through the ‘3 for 1 Program’ for the periods 1999–2003, 2004–05, and 2006

118

Annual deployment of Filipino workers and remittances, 1975–2005

131

Top ten destinations of landbased OFWs deployed in 2005 (new hires and rehires), the Phillipines

135

7.3

Profile of respondents, Filipinos-Italy

136

8.1

Volume of migrant support to 26 rural Ashanti communities

152

(Appendix) Migrant support to public utilities in 26 rural Ashanti communities since the period of mass migration

167

Institutions and rules pertaining to development in Asiwa, Brodekwano, Offinso, Kumawu, and Mampong, anno 2004

156

Breakdown of 2003 Asiwa Easter Harvest: contributions made towards Asiwa development

158

14.1

Female migrant workers by industry (%) Korea, 2002

273

14.2

Employment of foreign wives in Korea, 2005

278

15.1

Top ten origins of foreign direct investment in China, 2005

293

7.1

7.2

8.1

8.2

8.3

List of Tables xiii 15.2

15.3

Distribution of foreign direct investment by aggregated sector in China, 2002–2004

295

Geographical distribution of foreign direct investment in China, 2002–2004

297

List of Boxes

8.1

Asiwa electrification project

162

8.2

Brodekwano education project

163

8.3

Mampong market project

165

Preface and Acknowledgments

Human mobility is a core feature of globalization and is one of the most debated issues of today. Although there is still a bias on the impact of migration on countries of destination in the existing literature, attention is shifting toward the positive role of migrants for local development in the countries of origin. As investors, transnational entrepreneurs, and brokers of knowledge and technology, migrants have been discovered as important actors in development by academics, policymakers, and international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The aim of this book is to contribute to the international discussion on migration and development by presenting novel insights on the basis of new empirical evidence from original research in various countries around the globe. From the start we strived to go beyond the purely economic aspects of the migration and development nexus and to focus on a wide range of impacts including the economic, political, and social. The contributions in the book reflect this intention. The book has its origin in the Conference “Asia and Europe: Exploring Transnationalism, Multiple Linkages and Development,” held in Manila in January 2005. At the end of the conference, the initiators announced the intention of starting a book project around this subject, along with the expansion of the regional focus to include Africa and Latin America as well. Shortly afterwards, the Migration and Development Research Group (Chair Human Geography) at Radboud University, Nijmegen (The Netherlands) started its activities. In addition, a working group International Migration and Development was organized within the framework of the Dutch Research School of Resource Studies for Development (CERES). One of the first activities was to participate at the CERES Summer School in June 2005 where the papers presented included a number by some of the contributors to this volume. Not long after, a call for contributions was made and in autumn 2006 a book proposal was submitted to the publisher, who accepted it with some minor revisions some months later. We like to thank a number of people and institutes without which this book would not have come to fruition. First, we thank the authors for their patience and willingness to revise and shorten their contributions. We are

xviii

Preface and Acknowledgments

grateful to CERES and the Chair of Geography, Radboud University Nijmegen for supporting the CERES work group and financially contributing to the book project. Thanks are also due to Ludgard Roelen of InfoBever for assisting in technical editing and On the Record for English language correction. At Routledge, Benjamin Holtzman and Liz Levine provided valuable guidance in preparing the manuscript. Finally, we appreciate the institutional support for this project from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), the Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation in Amsterdam and the Radboud University Nijmegen. The Editors June 2007 Nijmegen (The Netherlands)

1

Globalization, Migration, and Development Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers

International migration is one of the key issues of today. Even though people have moved and settled across borders ever since early history, it has never reached the magnitude and extent as presently. The United Nations estimated that there were 191 million migrants worldwide in 2005, an increase of 26 million compared to a decade earlier (United Nations, 2006a). In the period 1995–2005, the proportion of women among the migrant population remained at about 50%, and the geographical distribution of migration was rather stable: Europe (33 to 34% of total stock) and North America (from 23 to 26%) showed a slight increase at the expense of Africa (11–9%), Asia (29–28%) and Latin America (4–3%). International migration is increasingly important, even though the majority of today’s population movements still is internal and takes place in poor countries with high rates of population growth and rural-urban migration. Some 3% of the total world population was born outside the country where they are currently living. The impact is, however, far greater than this percentage suggests. International migration not only touches the lives of the migrant population, but also influences the lives of nonmigrant populations. Once people decide to cross borders and to settle in other countries, both their personal life and that of their families they leave behind will profoundly change, not only economically, but also socially and culturally. This also applies to the people with whom they live and communicate within the localities and regions of settlement. Contemporary migration manifests itself in all corners of the globe and transforms entire societies as a consequence of a constant stream of people leaving and/or entering. Migration systems connecting places by way of flows of people are becoming increasingly complex (Skeldon, 1997). International migration takes place in many directions: from south to south, between east and west, from south to north, and vice versa. The majority of international migration takes place among neighbouring countries in the poorer parts of the world, in part due to wars that leads to massive displacements of people who seek protection across the borders. Except for south-south migration, in recent years, within Europe, substantial cross-border east-west labour

2

Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers

migration took place (van Naerssen & van der Velde, forthcoming). Nevertheless, south-north migration is also increasing. People from the south migrate north searching for new opportunities to improve their lives, and although in many developing countries the welfare has improved, as demonstrated by the growth in GNP per capita, higher life expectancy and improvement of basic services, widespread unemployment and poverty continue to exist (United Nations Development Programme, 2006). People in poor countries have better possibilities than before to observe the welfare and life styles of people in the rich countries by global means of communication (TV, video, mobile phone, and internet), which raise their expectations and provide them with information about opportunities elsewhere and the trajectories along which to move. Immigration to the north is generating new patterns of transnationalism, heterogeneity, and hybridism (e.g., dual citizenship), which is often perceived as a source of ethnic tensions and/or threat to the nation-state. Notwithstanding the fact that mobility is an integral and essential feature of globalization, at present rich countries are implementing restrictive international migration regimes. Although stimulating the free movement of capital and commodities as part of neoliberal policies, governments of destination areas (i.e. the United States and the European Union) are searching for new ways to effectively control labour migration. This book aims to provide an up-to-date overview of the diverse forms and global nature of international migration in relation to development processes. It is within the framework of globalization, world poverty, people’s mobility, and restrictive migration regimes that the question of international migration and its impact on development in countries of origin has entered the (political) arena. This book addresses the subject and intends to present an up-to-date account, to show the complexity of the problem and to open up new perspectives for future research. At the international level, reports of the World Bank (2003a; 2003b; 2006), the International Organization for Migration (2001; 2005; Farrant, MacDonald & Sriskandarajah, 2006), the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005), and the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (held September 2006) optimistically pointed out that international migration comprises a huge potential for development. In particular, the size and the growth of migrants’ remittances are mentioned as positive factors. According to the World Bank, remittance transfers to developing countries increased from US $58 billion in 1995 to about US $167 billion in 2005, which is more than the official development aid. Remittances are said to have contributed to a decline in poverty (World Bank, 2006). Optimism also colours the opinion on the role of transnational communities in development, which also receives increasing attention from state and multilateral institutions (Levitt & Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004). However, there are several reasons why international migration will not automatically lead to development. Much will depend on the volume and

Globalization, Migration, and Development

3

direction of migration (i.e. the shifts in migration frontiers), the composition of the flows (low versus highly skilled etc.), the degree of feminization of labour migration, the consequences of the rise of migration industries (labour recruiters and smugglers), the degree of circulation and return of migrants and the politicization of migration. Migration is defined on the basis of a multitude of different concepts and definitions (such as place of birth, citizenship, residence, duration of stay and purpose of stay) and comparison between countries is complicated, and it is not easy to make generalizations. Migration is increasingly complex—there are many subcategories of labour migrants, and each of these will have its own impact. In addition to the coerced migrants (e.g., political refugees) and voluntary migrants (e.g., labour migrants), there are long-distance and short-distance migrants; permanent migrants, temporary migrants who stay on contract for 3–5 years abroad, and (transient) circular migrants on short-time contracts who regularly return to their home places, etcetera. Migrants can further be differentiated by age groups (children, working-age people, and pensioners), by gender, by education and skills (low skilled and high skilled) and generation (first, second, and even third generation). These various categories of migrants will maintain diverse links with the origin countries and by consequence impact in different ways on the development in the home areas (many of these subcategories will be dealt with in this volume). Much value is currently attached in discussions to the developmental role of migrant communities and diasporas. Even though strictly speaking the notion of diaspora only relates to the forced displacement of an ethnic group outside its original area (such as the Jews and the Armenians), the terms are often used intermittently. Diasporas usually encompass the whole ethnic group living abroad—regardless of the length of stay in the country of settlement, whereas migrant communities usually comprise two or three generations only. Migrant communities are assumed to be transnational and by consequence their members will live in two countries, mentally as well as behaviourally. These transnationals are now considered as agents for development and their finance, knowledge and skills should be mobilized (see the earlier cited international reports), although there are also critical voices. A key question concerns the understanding of development. The concept of development itself is a contested concept. It encompasses more than economic development and contains different and inter-related aspects. Development can be defined as sustainable economic growth, as social advancement, as increasing equity, as increasing democracy and freedom, and as all of these together. The links between international migration and development are thus multidimensional and complex. Fundamental questions concern which people at home benefit from migration, where they live, in what processes of development they are involved and whether these are sustainable or not.

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Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers

MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES AND THEORIES During the past decades different approaches to and discourses on the migration-development nexus have been devised and discussed (Spaan, Hillmann & van Naerssen 2005). Nevertheless, until recently, the multifaceted link between migration and development has not really come to the fore in theory and research. Where the relationship between migration and development processes was explicitly acknowledged, the emphasis was mainly on economic aspects, among which the impact of remittances and the detrimental consequences of the brain drain for local labour markets in the countries of origin (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991 p. 5). Only recently, phenomena such as circular migration, brain gain, skill formation, migrant entrepreneurship, social remittances, transnational philanthropy and politics, and the role of (return) migrants and the diasporas in development in origin countries have been emphasised more. The neoclassical migration approach, framed within the modernization approach of development and underdevelopment, basically posits an imbalance in the spatial distribution of resources (land, labour, capital), which through migration flows are adjusted until a new equilibrium has been reached. According to this approach, people from areas and countries characterized by resource deficiencies, unemployment, low wages and marginal productivity, are attracted to areas or countries characterized by relative labour scarcities but with abundant capital, resources and higher wages. The outflow of labour migrants from the underdeveloped and rural regions is beneficial because it will lead to a more balanced distribution of capital and labour that furthers economic development in the out-migration region. In the destination country, the inflow of cheap labour fosters production and ultimately the differentiation between sending and receiving areas flats out and a new balance in wages and resource distribution has been achieved (Todaro, 1969). The decision to migrate is assumed to be voluntary and grounded in a rational, individual decision taking into account the expected income differentials and employment opportunities (Harris & Todaro, 1970). The theories based on the neoclassical approach are rather optimistic about the impact of migration on sending areas since they expect that overpopulation, unemployment, and poverty will be reduced. A contraflow of investment capital is assumed to take place as well as a limited flow of highly-skilled workers (Massey et al., 1993 p. 433). As long as the benefits of staying and working abroad (e.g., in terms of wages, education, and prestige) outweigh the costs, neoclassical theories assume that migrants will not return (Constant & Massey, 2002). This approach is based on a number of assumptions that can be challenged, particularly in the context of developing countries. First, migration is not necessarily voluntary, as it is often induced by sheer necessity resulting from poverty, war, oppression, or restrictive state policies. The assumption of the rational cost-benefit calculating individual is also contestable;

Globalization, Migration, and Development

5

nonmigrants often stay for social reasons even when conditions at home are less favourable. Migration decisions are not taken individually, but prospective migrants are embedded in social units and hierarchical power relations, such as households, kinship systems, patron-client relations and gender roles, which constrain their autonomy and individual decision-making power. Moreover, it is assumed that potential migrants dispose of full knowledge about wages and job opportunities elsewhere on the basis of which they make their decisions. In reality, information on other countries is incomplete and often filtered by actors who have an interest in migration. Particularly, in the worldwide migration industry, run by recruitment agencies, labour brokers and smuggling networks, information is often a valuable commodity that is manipulated for commercial purposes. In short, neoclassical theories are too economic in nature and leave out social, cultural and policy dimensions. One of the theories of the general neoclassical approach explicitly focuses on the migration-development nexus. The so-called balanced growth approach postulates the net positive effects of rural out-migration for individual migrants and their areas of origin (Kindleberger, 1965; Griffin, 1976). It emphasizes the basic notion that out-migration from underdeveloped, peripheral regions will lead to a new equilibrium between capital and labour. It argues further that migrant remittances will contribute to the welfare because they create a new demand for locally produced commodities and services, which has a positive effect on local employment and income. This theory is also optimistic about the beneficial effects of the remittances on income distribution in the sending areas. Besides, return migrants bring back innovative ideas and skills, all of which can be put to use in a productive way. In reaction to the neoclassical modernization approach, the historicalstructural approach, including dependency theories, centre-periphery models and world system theory focus on the macro level and emphasize the unequal distribution and exchange of resources, including human capital. In this view, next to flows of capital, commodities, and knowledge, international labour migration is part of a process of historical socioeconomic transformation. The developed world and the less developed countries become increasingly interdependent, whereby capitalist accumulation in the developed world goes hand in hand with the incorporation and exploitation of developing economies. International labour migration only reinforces the unequal distribution of resources in that investment in the skilled and innovative population is lost to the sending countries through out migration, thus aggravating underdevelopment (brain drain). In a similar vein, the positive outlook of the balanced growth model was challenged: during the late 1970s and 1980s the contrasting asymmetrical growth approach, rooted in dependency and world system theory, gained ground (Abadan-Unat, 1975; Lewis 1986). This approach is far more pessimistic as to the consequences of migration for areas or origin and emphasizes

6

Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers

the correlation between underdevelopment in migrant sending areas and development in migrant receiving areas. Unequal power relations within the systems of neocolonialism cause the unbalanced distribution of benefits and resources. Far from leading to a new equilibrium, it is argued that the loss of the young, healthy, and skilled people will lead to a decrease in productivity, labour and skill shortages, and even a deterioration of social cohesion and communal institutions (exchange labour). As migrants end up at the lower end of the labour market (3-D jobs) at destination, they learn few new skills that can be capitalized upon after return. Instead of investment, remittances are mainly used for consumptive purposes and lead to price inflation and dependency on external income sources (Russell, 1993). Another negative effect of migration is a furthering of interhousehold inequality, through the concentration of land and the increasing differences between rural migrant and nonmigrant households. Taylor (1998) proposed that lucrative migration activities drain migrant sending areas of labour and capital and crowd out local production of tradable goods (migrant syndrome theory). Also, because communities and regions specialize in migration and migration becomes self-perpetuating over time, this process is progressively disadvantageous. More recent theories have taken a different stance. The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), challenges both the neoclassical approach and historical structural models. NELM focuses on the household, rather than the individual, and theorizes that migration forms part of household livelihood strategies (Stark, 1980, 1991). By way of (international) migration and the resulting remittance flows households spread risks by diversifying their economic base and self-finance (new) production technologies and business ventures. Once constraints are overcome, migration is assumed to have a positive impact on development in the long run (Massey et al., 1998 p. 263). Return migration is considered a logical outcome of a migration project, once migrants have achieved their objectives in terms of meeting household needs, savings, insurance, and acquisition of investment capital and skills (Cassarino, 2004). The social networks of migrants and the role they play in migration processes also constitutes a relatively new field of research (Massey et al., 1998). By stressing the importance of support systems of relatives and friends, social networks theories explain why potential migrants decide to move or stay and why they originate from and move to particular places and communities (Faist, 2000). Moreover, they explain chain migration and other forms of cumulative migration processes. Migrant entrepreneurship in destination countries can also often be linked to network systems. Closely related to these theories, studies on transnationalism (e.g., Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton, 1993; Vertovec & Cohen, 1999) have made clear that international migration entails the development and maintenance of multifarious economic and noneconomic relationships between home and host countries. As diasporas and transnational communities tend to reproduce

Globalization, Migration, and Development

7

their sociocultural practices abroad, they form an extended national market fostering the development of migrant businesses in the country of origin and of destination as well. These transnational businesses generate significant multidirectional flows of commodities, capital, skills, and ideas that contribute to social, political, and cultural links, in addition to economic impacts (Portes, 1997; Portes, Haller & Guarnizo, 2001). Along with the development of theory, there have been several shifts in the tone of the debate on migration and development. The foregoing clarifies that there have been optimistic and pessimistic proponents through the years. However, until recently, those holding a more pessimistic view on the outcome of migration on development in the origin areas have been dominant in the debate. An influential study that asserted that migration on balance rarely makes a significant contribution to economic take-off in migrant sending areas was that of Papademetriou and Martin (1991). After the dawn of NELM and transnationalism studies, a more optimistic discourse emerged. The more positive impacts of international migration were emphasized, in particular the impact of remittances on reducing poverty. Thereby it is often taken for granted that the increased welfare of migrant families will be translated in productive investments and cause multiplier effects in migrants’ areas of origin. The potential contribution of the (highly-) skilled diaspora community abroad is now recognized rather than being indicative of the brain-drain effect. The current discourse calls for attention to the mobilization of migrants’ skills and networks for development purposes at home. Return or circular migration, business networking, virtual return (e-learning) and transfer of knowledge and technology are all considered instrumental in this respect. Transnational entrepreneurship is now more and more recognized as a beneficial by-product of international migration (Cassarino, 2000; Guarnizo, 2003). The case of expatriate IT workers from India and China in Silicon Valley illustrates the great potential of diasporas for development of businesses at home (Saxenian 1999). Apart from economic engagements, return migrants can also play a role in the transformation of domestic political and administrative systems through their newly acquired skills, ideas, and authority (Skeldon, 2004). In addition, more attention is paid to diaspora involvement in local development efforts and philanthropic activities. Such activities can extend to second- and third-generation migrants and also take place in disaster and (post-) conflict situations whereby the diaspora pool funds for relief or reconstruction efforts, but also for covertly supporting political struggle or illegal activities. Maximizing diaspora engagement with their country of origin presupposes the creation of an enabling environment for investment and innovation and requires active policies on the part of the countries of origin and destination. This includes the fostering of circular migration and strengthening migrant’s rights in terms of dual citizenship, voting, and transferability of property and social security benefits (Ionescu, 2006).

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To summarize, during the past decade the debate on migration and development has broadened. Although the emphasis on the more economic aspects of the migration-development nexus (in particularly the impact of family remittances), and human resources (brain drain) has been maintained, new themes such as knowledge and technology transfer, transnational entrepreneurship, diaspora involvement in homeland politics and collective remittances (contributions to charity, relief efforts, and development projects) have been added to the agenda. Scholars and policy makers have more regard now for the social embedding of the links between international migrants and development processes. The shifts in views concerning migration and development have gone along with changing perspectives in general development theory, the subject matter of the next section.

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT Although many publications on migration and development acknowledge that the concept of development involves more than economic growth alone, in practice the concept mostly refers to growth of household incomes and assumes beneficial spread effects to productive activities in the region of origin. In particular when remittances are used for setting up small businesses, they are regarded as contributing to development. Yet it has been pointed out that the so-called unproductive consumptive use of overseas money is a misnomer because increased consumption does lead to a rise in supplementary economic activities, for example in retail and construction. Moreover, the remitted money is often used for education of children, which is a rational use of the money and a wise investment in the long run. In short, the difference between productive and unproductive use is rather vague and difficult to make operational. This debate, however, stays within the modernization approach that considers economic growth as equal to development and defines the development problem as a matter of capital to be obtained and invested. The approach originated in the 1950s and signified the start of international development cooperation. The approach is still adhered to nowadays, but a major difference is that the original approach attached high value to the role of the state, while its current successor, the neo-liberal approach to development is based on the operation of a supposedly free market (van Naerssen, 2002). Especially because the modernization approach assumed that the poor countries should follow the same development trajectory as the rich countries, it became heavily criticized. At the end of the 1960s, the concept of development was intensively debated and several approaches and many theories came into being (Potter, Binns, Elliott, & Smith, 2004). The concept widened from a one-sided interest in GNP per capita to distributional issues and structural north-south dependency relations. Besides a change in the

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definition of development, a change in the goals of development occurred, more in particular the goal of ecologically friendly or sustainable development was stressed. From an institutional angle, Sen (1999) pointed to the importance of democratic structures and access to resources to advance material and nonmaterial welfare of people in poor countries. Finally, in post-colonial thinking there is a search for alternatives to all universally defined paths for development. It is important to emphasize that the modernization approach as well as the historical-structural approach, the latter including the more radical dependencies theories, are located within the same discourse, because both stress economic-oriented development strategies. However, at the end of the 1970s ecological concerns initiated alternative development thinking, putting question marks to the development goals of the earlier approaches. Here the concept of Another Development must be introduced, defined as need-oriented (both material and nonmaterial), endogenous (according to values of each society), self-reliant (based primarily on the own strength and resources of each society) and ecologically sound and based on structural transformation (toward self-management and participation in decision-making; Hettne, 1990 p. 153–154). These debates regarding the aims, the strategies and the ethics of development are often overlooked in studies on the migration-development nexus, which usually do not problematise development and conveniently overlooks alternative development, perhaps because the diaspora option is in flagrant contradiction to self-reliant theories. Moreover, since the 1980s globalization and the neo-liberal approach have dominated development policies and prevent that line of alternative thinking from becoming mainstream. Yet a radical variant of alternative thinking survived in post-development theories that stress alternatives to development (rather than alternative development). This approach derives its specific character from post-modern and post-colonial thinking, and pretends to reject the idea of development entirely. In particular it stresses the Eurocentric origin of development thinking and the freedom of each society to define development according to its own rules, ethics, and visions (Escobar, 1995; Rahnema & Bawtree 1997). At the activist level it survived in the anti- or another globalization movement. Alternative development in a more moderate form, however, has a great impact in multi-dimensional definitions of development, emphasizing sustainable and equitable economic growth, social advancement, human empowerment, democracy, and freedom. A widely accepted example is the United Nations Human Development Indices that besides income (GDP/capita measured in purchasing power parity terms) comprises variables such as life expectancy, literacy, and gender. Another example is the rights approach of Oxfam International, stressing the universal right on sustainable livelihood, access to social services, security, freedom of speech, and identity (gender, ethnic minority rights). The concepts of international migration as

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well as development are multi-dimensional and comprise many interrelated aspects. For these reasons, the relation between the two is extraordinary complex and simple, straight-forward links between migration and development can not be assumed.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS VOLUME While dealing with various themes and geographical areas, the chapters of this volume clearly bring out the complexity and the multifarious nature of migration and its developmental implications. This volume opens with a first section that discusses the use and impact of family remittances of international migrants, dealing with the question of to what extent this is a sufficient factor for encouraging development. Much will depend on the volume of remittances; investment capacities in sending areas; mechanisms for redistribution; and the degree of sustainability. The contribution by Hein de Haas (Chapter 2) on remittances and regional development of the Todgha Oasis in Morocco is based on both qualitative research and a survey among 507 non-, internal and international migrant households. The study shows how the remittances of international migrants have contributed to improved standards of living and economic development in the households involved. They invest significantly more than nonmigrant households in education, housing, agriculture, and other enterprises. Remittance expenditures and investments have contributed to diversification of the regional economy and because of that have triggered a counter-flow of reverse internal migration. In the next chapter Graeme Hugo (Chapter 3) argues that in a large and complex nation such as Indonesia, the levels of international out-migration and their impact on regions are very uneven. Moreover, international labour migration is likely to have more significant impacts upon economic development in regions of origin than upon the nation as a whole. Based on empirical findings in poor regions in Eastern Indonesia, it appears that the potential for labour migration to contribute to the development of rural areas of origin is considerable. In this, his contribution confirms the findings of Hein de Haas. However, contrary to what happens in the Todgha Oasis, the development potential is at best partially realized, because migrants are embedded in systems of exploitation, and transport and other infrastructure facilities have to be improved to create investment opportunities. Only then will there be an environment that offers returning migrants and their families other options than consumption and house construction. In the following contribution, Virginie Baby-Collin, Geneviève Cortes, and Laurent Faret (Chapter 4) demonstrate the different impacts of remittances on local economies by comparing four rural out-migration communities in Mexico and Bolivia. In these countries of traditional and strongly structured emigration, the high levels of remittances have a substantial

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impact on local development processes. In their analysis of remittances formation, variables such as the patterns of displacement, local economic situations, and life cycles are taken into account. One of the main findings is that, in the Mexican communities, out-migration is a structural component of family life and does not lead to the development of other or new economic activities. Inversely, in Bolivia, remittances are much more frequently invested in economic projects, such as the preservation of agricultural activities, improved access to land, and economic diversification. The authors thus confirm the context dependency of remittances use. Cindy Horst (Chapter 5) in considering the role of remittances in the transnational livelihood strategies of Somali refugees explicitly focuses on their agency. She interviewed Somalis in Kenyan refugee camps and in Minneapolis in the United States as well. In this way she understands the refugee remittances from the perspective of both the receivers in the camps and the senders in settlement countries. She concludes that remittance sending is indeed important for survival in the refugee camps, because the area where they are located provides extremely limited livelihood opportunities and the international community’s aid flows into the camps are highly insufficient. However, for migrants abroad the obligation to send money to relatives is often a burden and this threatens the continuity of transnational networks and remittances. In many cases, this burden is managed with an idea of temporality and the Somalis in Minneapolis try to assist those who are dependent on them to migrate from the region or encourage investments that enable people’s self-sufficiency. In other words, it remains to be seen whether and for what period remittances will be sustained, and in this Horst agrees with the observation of Baby-Collin et al. that migrant remittances reduce poverty but that financial security or the long-term development of areas of out-migration is not guaranteed. In the second part of this volume, the focus shifts from individual family remittances to collective remittances, or more specifically, the role of migrant and diaspora organizations in implementing development projects. Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Luis Escala Rabadán (Chapter 6) examine the role of Mexican migrant organizations in the United States. Through their fundraising activities, hometown associations (HTAs) are involved in an extensive array of initiatives that range from public works to sectors such as education and health. The Mexican government has implemented several policies toward its diaspora, aiming at their participation in the development of their hometowns and regions of origin. Mexican HTAs were actively participating in the promotion and shape of this binational public policymaking. The authors conclude that Mexican HTAs have a pervasive presence in the country and as such this can be viewed as a success of the organizational capacities and strategies among Mexican migrant communities. Fabio Baggio and Maruja Asis (Chapter 7) present the case of Filipinos in Italy and the collective links they maintain with their communities of origin. Although their approach is different, similar to the technique deployed by

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Cindy Horst, data were collected in the sites of destination and of origin as well. In the Philippines, interviews were conducted among the members of left-behind families and officials/members of community-based organizations in Batangas, one of the major origin areas of Italy-bound Filipino migrants. These were complemented by interviews among Filipino migrants in Milan and Rome. Contrary to the Mexican experience, they found that the appreciation of migrants’ contributions to community life and welfare is not translated into policies or approaches to development from the local and regional government side. The engagement with overseas Filipinos is still very informal and relies on the left-behind families soliciting migrants’ support for community projects. The authors suggest that to encourage more involvement of migrants in local development, first of all, the local government must consider them as a stakeholder. Another, local institutional perspective is given by Mirjam Kabki, Valentina Mazzucato, and Ton Dietz (Chapter 8) who analyze migrants’ involvement in community development in a rural region in Ghana. They seek to explain why some rural Ashanti communities are more able to successfully involve migrants in the development of their communities than others. According to them, the institutional environments of the home communities constitute the key explanation. Small communities with 3,000 to 7,000 inhabitants are found to generally have effective sanctioning systems, active leaders, and high levels of trust, leading to higher chances of successful migrant involvement in development. Ton van Naerssen (Chapter 9) focuses on the links between migrant organisations in the Netherlands and Dutch development cooperation. As examples he takes Southeast Asian and subSaharan diasporic groups. The role of the diasporas in Dutch development cooperation is a contested one. Proponents argue that they should play a larger role in decision making, whereas others are sceptical. In this chapter, it is argued that through their transnationalism migrant communities offer a promising potential for development cooperation that should be exploited by dialogues and capacity building programmes. However, one should be cautious about treating national diaspora associations as a homogenous entity because they are divided among lines of class, ethnicity, gender, and political orientation. Moreover, although transnational social networks offer opportunities for development, they might also be constraints because of the lack of objectivity due to strong ties with interest groups at home, but also in their areas of destination. In the third part, three chapters deal with social remittances (i.e. transfers of ideas, knowledge, and information) and the consequences for development, including processes of political mobilization. Katharina Goethe and Felicitas Hillmann (Chapter 10) consider the role of Ghanaian high skilled migrants in knowledge transfer. Migrant networks of Ghanaian scientists are still nonexistent in Germany and the authors’ interviews with highly qualified Ghanaians in Hamburg and Berlin show that knowledge transfer happens on an individual basis. Technology transfer has

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often been abandoned owing to high fees and high levels of bureaucracy in Ghana. Remittances vary considerably in size and are sent only sporadically. However, provided that certain prerequisites are fulfilled, most interviewees are willing to engage in development in their home country. The authors conclude that what they call the diaspora option can only be one part of a wider strategy of development policies and can not serve as alternative to development funding or technical cooperation. Robert Potter and Dennis Conway (Chapter 11) interviewed Caribbean—one-and-half and second generation—migrants of working age, who decided to give back home a try. In Grenada transnational links provide functional spaces in which entrepreneurial return migrants are successfully able to operate. Through their experiences abroad, returnees are able to create flexible transnational enterprises and careers that allow them to keep a foot in Grenada as well as abroad. In addition, they combine their metropolitan, formal professional experience with more informal, social connections and know-how to be successful entrepreneurs. Thus the authors conclude that many of these transnationals offer brain gains as development potential in island societies of (their parents) origin. The chapter written by Liza Nell (Chapter 12) analyzes the impact of (post) colonial transnational actors and political development in Surinam. Contemporary Surinamese politics is pervaded by postcolonial history: emigration to and return migration from the former mother country, the Netherlands. This chapter examines how migrants as political actors make use of transnational ties to precipitate political change in their (former) homeland. Although the responsiveness of actors in the home country—nonmigrants and long-term returnees as well—is crucial, the existing literature on transnationalism has largely ignored this factor. Three cases from different periods in history illustrate how political actors used transnational ties to support, oppose, and establish political parties in Surinam. Success depended on the strength of these ties: those based on kinship persisted over time while those relying on ideology or common goals did not. The final and fourth part of this volume starts with two contributions focussing on gender. It is generally agreed that the feminization of labour migration is a major feature of current international migration. Fenneke Reysoo (Chapter 13) considers two seemingly very different cases of female migration that concern respectively internal migration in Senegal and international migration from Sri Lanka to Lebanon. Both cases illustrate how female migrants are embedded in larger social arrangements and family livelihood strategies. Reysoo also shows the ambivalence of migration on women’s position in society. Many young women will obtain new opportunities, economic freedom, enhanced self-esteem, and new modes of consumption but others experience downward professional mobility, separation from the family and matrimonial conflicts. Finally, although more research should be done in this field, one can safely assume that the absence of migrant women has a great impact on existing gender regimes at home.

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Hye-Kyung Lee (Chapter 14) analyzes the trends and patterns of gendered migration to South Korea. Since the late 1980s the country transformed from being a labour-exporting nation to a labour-importing one, and immigration of domestic workers, sex workers, and brides accelerated. As a patriarchal society where a gendered division of labour prevails, migrant women labour tends to fill the care vacuum and to reinforce gender stereotyped ideology associating housework and care work with women. In order to break through this ideology, the protection, and empowerment of migrant women is vital. Recently, the central and local government began to offer various support programs for migrant women. Strong civil society movements contributed to the human rights improvements and inclusion of women and foreigners. The two final chapters of this volume focus on comprehensive policies and have the giant states of China and India as cases. Maggi Leung (Chapter 15) argues that the availability of overseas Chinese capital and expertise has been a unique advantage for China’s leap forward in economic growth and reintegration into the world economy. Overseas Chinese have provided crucial institutional substitutes in laws and regulations, trading networks, managerial skills and business culture, and, on the project-specific level, they are active in managing new ventures in China. At different geographical levels the state is an active agent in orchestrating the level and nature of overseas Chinese investment, implementing investor-friendly policies, infrastructural development and the construction of a discourse that celebrates migration as a patriotic and modern act. This volume closes with a contribution of Parvati Raghuram (Chapter 16) who demonstrates how the way Indian policymakers view and assess the impact of migrant communities is intertwined with visions of the nation and its territoriality. As the concept or nature of nation-states alters, different aspects of the migration-development nexus are emphasised. Migration implies both developmental losses and gains at different geographical scales ranging from the national to the community and depending on factors such as gender, religion, and caste. As, among others, the forms of migration and the paths to development change, the nation’s own imagery changes too and it is increasingly being scripted through narratives of developmental success to which migrants abroad are doing their bit. This marks a shift from the period after Independence, when nationalism meant disavowing displaced populations.

SOME FINAL REFLECTIONS The contributions to this volume demonstrate the diverse forms and the global nature of current international migration. They cover a wide range of themes while leading the reader to a variety of places: an oasis in north Africa, districts in Indonesia and the Philippines, Andean foothills, local communities in Ghana, Somali camps in Kenya, the island of Grenada, two German

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cities, the small country of Surinam and the giant nations India and China. International migration is indeed a global phenomenon, connecting worldwide all kinds of localities and constructing new chains of relationships. This book presents an up-to-date look at the links between international migration and development processes, going beyond the economic impact of financial remittances (which is usually stressed in literature). It makes clear that rather than solely focussing on the economic impact of remittances, more attention should be given to the social and cultural consequences, not only for the communities from which the migrants originate, but also looking at the impact for the surrounding regions. Furthermore, the specific conditions under which migration can contribute to sustainable development, whilst avoiding or mitigating any negative impact, warrants more attention. While generating flows of financial remittances, international migration also contributes to the transfer of skills and human capital that will sometimes produce brain drain, but can also contribute to brain gain and brain circulation, dependent on the local circumstances. Social remittances—ideas, perceptions, practices, and attitudes—are spreading through the migrant networks and this will influence the lives of people in receiving and sending areas, economically, socially, culturally, and even politically. International migration should be studied from a gender perspective. As a consequence of the feminization of labour migration, important transformations take place in the power relations and labour division within households, while also producing wider processes of societal change. Migrant and diaspora organizations in different areas of destination play important roles in stimulating development, as demonstrated, amongst others, for the Mexican hometown associations and for church-related Philippine migrant groups. The role of second- and third-generation migrants in migrant or transnational organisations should be further explored, while acknowledging that male and female migrants play different roles in transnational networks. As Massey and Taylor (2004 p. 6) and many authors in this volume emphasize, universal relationships between (specific forms of) migration and development do not exist, because both relate to context-specific processes, including policies (Zoomers & van Naerssen, 2006). The impact of international migration varies and depends on a number of factors, such as the socioeconomic structure of the home region, the attitude of and the active role played by policymakers towards migrants in both sending and receiving countries, and the features (and history) of the diaspora. Globalization processes, and structural change, will affect the size, composition, direction, and timing of international migration. However, the developmental impact of migration cannot be explained by structural factors alone and human agency is of decisive importance. Migrants and those staying behind in the sending regions play an active role and are involved in a continuing process of negotiation, which also determines the outcome of migration on development processes.

16 Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers In order to be able to gain a better understanding of the development implications of international migration, it must be acknowledged that development is multidimensional and that sufficient attention needs to be paid to the economic, social, environmental, political, and/or cultural implications. We should go beyond the dichotomy of rich and poor countries and the north-south divide and acknowledge that migration is producing chains of development in various areas simultaneously. It implies that the study of international migration and development should be broadened to include the impact of migration in the regions of reception, transit, and settlement. International migrants are locally embedded, but cannot be understood without also looking at them from a global perspective. REFERENCES Abadan-Unat, N. (1975). Migration and development. A study of the effects of international Labor migration on Bogazliyan District, Turkey. Ankara: Ajans Turk Press. Al-Ali, N. & Koser, K. (Eds.). (2002). New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home. London: Routledge. Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1993). Nations unbound : Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states. New York: Routledge. Cassarino, J. P. (2000). Tunisian new entrepreneurs and Their past experiences of migration in Europe. Resource mobilization, networks and hidden disaffection. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Cassarino, J. P. (2004). Theorising return migration: The conceptual approach to return migrants revisited. International Journal of Multicultural Societies, 6(2), 162–188. Castles, S. & Miller, M. J. (2003). The age of migration. London/New York: The Guilford Press. Constant, A. & Massey, D. S. (2002). Return migration by German guestworkers: Neoclassical versus new economic theories. International Migration, 40(4), 5–38. Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development. The making and unmaking of the third world. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Faist, Th. (2000). The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational spaces. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Farrant, M., MacDonald, A., & Sriskandarajah, D. (2006). Migration and development: opportunities and challenges for policymakers. IOM Migration Research Series 22. Geneva: IOM International Organization for Migration. Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). (2005). Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action. New York: United Nations. Griffin, K. (1976). On the emigration of the peasantry. World Development 4(5), 353–361. Guarnizo, L. E. (2003). The economics of transnational living. International Migration Review, 37(3), 666–699. Hettne, B. (1990). Development theory and the three worlds. London: Longman. Haas, H.G. de. (2003). Migration and development in southern Morocco. The disparate socio-economic impacts of out-migration on the Todgha Valley. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands. Harris, J. & Todaro, J. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: a two-sector analysis. American Economic Review, 60(1), 126–142.

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International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2001). The link between migration and development in the least developed countries, Geneva: IOM. Retrieved July 23, 2007, from http://www.iom.int/ . . . /site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/ mainsite/published_docs/books/wmr2003/ZZ1_Annexes.pdf International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2005). World migration 2005. Costs and benefits of migration. Geneva: IOM. Ionescu, D. (2006). Engaging diasporas as development partners for home and destination countries: Challenges for policymakers. Migration Research Series 26. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Kindleberger, Ch. (1965). Emigration and economic growth. Rome: National Bank. Levitt, P. & Nyberg-Sørensen, N. (2004). The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies. Global Migration Perspectives 6. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration. Lewis, J. R. (1986). International labour migration and uneven regional development in labour exporting countries. Journal for Economic and Social Geography (TESG), 77(1), 27–41. Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pelegrino, A. & Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review and appraisal. Population and Development Review, 19(3), 431–466. Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouchi, A., Pellegrino, A. & Taylor, J. E. (1998). Worlds in motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Massey, D. S. & Taylor, J. E. (2004). International migration. Prospects and policies in a global market. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Naerssen, T. van (2002). Ontwikkelingstheorieën: terugblik en vooruitzicht. Voorheen de Derde Wereld. Ontwikkeling anders. Amsterdam: Metz, 162–190. Naerssen, T. van & Velde, M. van der (Eds.). (forthcoming 2008). Migration in a new Europe. East-west migratory movements in the enlarged European union: Rome: Home of Geography/International Geographical Union. Nyberg-Sørensen, N. (2004). The development dimension of migrant remittances. Migration Policy Research Working Paper Series. Geneva: IOM. Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Van Haer, N. & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). The migrationdevelopment nexus. Evidence and policy options. State of the art overview. International Migration, 40(5), 3–47. Oestergaard-Nielsen, E. (Ed.). (2003). International migration and sending countries: Perceptions, policies, and transnational relations. Houndsmill, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan. Papademetriou, D. & Martin, P. (1991) The unsettled relationship. Labor migration and economic development. New York: Greenwood Press. Piper, N. (2006). Gendering the politics of migration. International Migration Review 40(1), 133–164. Portes, A. (1997, September). Globalization from below: The rise of transnational communities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University: Author. Retrieved 8 December 2006 from http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/portes.pdf Portes, A., Haller, W. & Guarnizo, L. E. (2001, February). Transnational entrepreneurs: The emergence and determinants of an alternative form of immigrant economic adaptation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University: Author. Retrieved 8 December 2006 fromhttp://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/ WPTC-01–05%20portes.pdf Potter, R. B., Binns, T., Elliott, J. A., & Smith, D. (2004). Geographies of development. Harlow: Longman. Rahnema, M. & Bawtree, V. (Eds). (1997). The post-development reader. London: Zed Press, 377–403.

18 Ton van Naerssen, Ernst Spaan and Annelies Zoomers Russell, S. (1993). Migrant remittances and development. International Migration, 31, 267–287. Saxenian, A. (1999). Silicon valley’s new immigrant entrepreneurs. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knof. Skeldon, R. (1997). Migration and development. A global perspective. Harlow: Longman. Skeldon, R. (2004, November 9). More that remittances other aspects of the relationship between migration and development (UN/POP/IG/2004). Paper presented at the Third Coordination Meeting on International Migration, New York: United Nations Population Division. Spaan, E., Naerssen, T. van & Hillmann, F. (2005). Shifts in the European discourses on migration and development. Asia Pacific Migration Journal, 14(1–2), 35–70. Stark, O. (1980). On the role of urban to rural remittances in rural development. Journal of Development Studies, 16, 369–374. Stark, O. (1991). The migration of labor. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Taylor, J. E. (1998, 29 June–3 July). The new economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process. Paper presented at the UNFPA Technical Symposium on International Migration and Development, The Hague, Netherlands. Taylor, J. E. (2004). Remittances, savings, and development in migrant-sending areas. In: D. S. Massey and J. E. Taylor (Eds.), International migration. Prospects and policies in a global market (pp. 157–173). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Todaro, M. P. (1969). A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries. The American Economic Review, 59(1), 138–148. United Nations. (2006a). Trends in total migrant stock: The 2005 revision. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Retrieved 11 April 2007 from http://esa.un.org/migration United Nations. (2006b). Internationalmigration and development: Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations. Retrieved 24 July 2007 from http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:0wV5Iyq0GmUJ:migrantsrightsinternational.blogspot.com/2006/07/international-migration-and.html+United+Nations +%22International+migration+and+development+report+of+the+secretary+gen eral+%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&gl=us United Nations. (2007). World population prospects. The 2006 Revision. Population database. Retrieved 5 May 2007 from http://esa.un.org/unpp United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2006). Human development report 2006. New York: UNDP. Retrieved 22 July 2007 from http://hdr.undp. org/hdr2006/report.cfm Vertovec, S. & Cohen, R. (Eds.). (1999). Migration, diasporas and transnationalism. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. World Bank. (2003a). Global development finance. Striving for stability in development finance. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2003b). Global economic prospects 2003: Economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC: World Bank . World Bank (2006). Global economic prospects 2006: Economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. Zoomers, A. & Naerssen, T. van (2006). International migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin (Working Papers Migration and Development Series 14). Nijmegen, Netherlands, Radboud University, Department of Geography Migration and Development Research Group.

Part I

The Role and Impact of Family Remittances

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The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods A Moroccan Case Study Hein de Haas

There is a certain tendency to portray migration as the antithesis of development both in its causes and consequences. The dominant narratives in most policy and some academic circles tend to be based not only on the assumption that migration is at an all-time high, but also that migration is a threat to social cohesion, economic growth and even security. In particular south-north migration tends to be seen as a problematic phenomenon caused by poverty and a general lack of development (which, it is believed, makes people move) in the countries and regions of origin and as a potential threat to development in both the sending (e.g., the brain drain) and receiving societies. Rather than migration and development, it often seems there can be only development or migration. It is striking that dominant policy discourses but also many academic discourses aim—sometimes explicitly, but mostly implicitly—at stopping or at least decreasing internal (rural-to-urban) and international migration (Todaro & Maruszko 1987 p. 111; McDowell & Haan 1997). For instance, the aim of many rural development programs is to reduce migration. However, this antimigrationist objective is rarely justified and, in fact, taken for granted. Migration is typically seen as a problem that needs to be solved, and this solution usually implies a form of migration management aimed at combating this phenomenon. This exemplifies that migration tends to be put a priori in a strongly negative light. Poverty and oppression are commonly seen as the root causes of migration. However, popular images of massive flows of migrants do not only magnify the actual magnitude of migration, they also seem theoretically ungrounded, because they arise from an inaccurate analysis of the root causes of migration. Although migration evidently emanates from the desire to improve one’s livelihood, it is rarely the poorest and most destitute who migrate most (cf. Skeldon, 1997). Migration involves considerable costs and risks, and also requires, besides knowledge and social networks, the necessary aspirations. This explains the paradox that socioeconomic development in the form of rising incomes, educational levels, and access to information tends to be initially associated with increasing migration. Rather than absolute poverty, a certain level of socioeconomic development, combined with

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relative deprivation in the form of spatial inequalities in life opportunities, seems to be the more fundamental cause of migration. Although recognizing the historical uniqueness of each specific migration experience, the processes of social and economic development or modernization seem to be universally associated with the increasing concentration of economic and social activities in urban areas, and, hence, increasing migration. In many ways, this process of development and urbanization is fundamentally conditional on rural-to-urban migration (McGee, 1994 p. iii; Skeldon, 1997 p. 196; Todaro, 1969 p. 139). In this light, it is not surprising that attempts by governments to turn the tide, that is, to stop the rural exodus and to fix rural populations on their homesteads, typically fail (Bebbington, 1999; de Haan et al., 2000). In fact, rural development and infrastructural projects can have the paradoxical effect of stimulating migration (cf. Beauchemin & Schoumaker, 2005; Rhoda, 1983). In order to conceptualise migration as part of broader transformation processes, it is useful to discuss the main theoretical approaches explaining migration occurring from developing countries. Neoclassical migration theory has tended to see migration as the result of spatial inequalities of income. From the assumptions of neoclassical push-pull and equilibrium models, income-maximising individuals are expected to respond to geographical differences in the supply and demand for labour by migrating from low-wage, labour-surplus regions to high-wage, labour-scarce regions. In a perfectly neoclassical world, this process of factor price equalization (the Heckscher-Ohlin model) will eventually result in growing convergence between wages at the sending and receiving end (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Schiff, 1994; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). Migration will cause labour to become less scarce at the destination and scarcer at the sending end. Capital is expected to move in the opposite direction. In the long run, this process would remove the incentives for migrating. A radically different interpretation of migration was provided as of the 1960s by the historical-structural paradigm on development, which has its intellectual roots in Marxist political economy (Castles & Miller, 1993 p.22–23). Historical structuralists have criticized neoclassical migration theory, stating that individuals do not have a free choice, because they are fundamentally constrained by structural forces. Within this perspective, migration is not a matter of free choice, but people are forced to move because traditional economic structures have been undermined as a result of their incorporation into the global political-economic system. Historical structuralists have not developed a migration theory as such, but perceive migration as a natural outgrowth of disruptions and dislocations that are intrinsic to the process of capitalist accumulation. Andre Gunder Frank (1966), the frontrunner of the dependency theory, argued that global capitalism contributed to the development of underdevelopment. Likewise, structuralists interpret migration as one of the many manifestations of capitalist expansion and the increasingly unequal terms of trade

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

23

between developed and underdeveloped countries (Massey et al., 1998 p. 36). In the perspective of the related world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980) the incorporation of peripheral regions and countries into the capitalist economy is associated with putting a (migration) drain on them. Consequently, migration would therefore ruin stable peasant societies, undermine their economies and uproots their populations, which become part of the urban proletariat to the benefit of the core areas that rely on cheap (immigrant) labour. However, both neoclassical and structuralist migration theory seem too rigid and determinist to deal with the complex realities of migration and development interactions. Both approaches tend to see migration as the outflow of the interplay between macro-forces. Whereas in a neoclassical world, migrants are seen as homogeneous, income maximising individuals automatically reacting to wage differences, historical structuralists tend to perceive individuals as passive pawns or victims that passively adapt to macro-forces. In fact, both approaches basically rule out agency. In the 1980s and 1990s, the emerging new economics of labour migration (NELM) offered a more subtle view (cf. Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999). Instead of perceiving migration as an individual endeavour, NELM perceives migration as the risk-sharing behaviour of households or other social groups, which are better able than individuals to diversify resources like labour in order to minimize income risks. NELM theory integrates motives other than individual income maximization that play a role in migration decision making. Migration is primarily perceived as a household response to income risks, because remittances serve as income insurance for households in the country of origin (Lucas & Stark, 1985 p. 902). In addition, migration may play a vital role in providing a potential source of investment capital, which is especially important in the context of the imperfect credit (capital) and risk (insurance) markets that prevail in most developing countries (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999). NELM has striking conceptual parallels with the livelihood approaches which have evolved as of the late 1970s among geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists conducting microlevel research in developing countries. A growing body of empirical work has raised awareness that the poor are not only passive victims of global macroforces—whose existence they generally did not deny by the way—but try to actively improve their livelihoods within the constraining conditions in which they live (Lieten & Nieuwenhuys, 1989). This points to the fundamental role of human agency. Bebbington (1999) stressed the need to broaden our understanding of rural livelihoods in the developing world, without automatically restricting the analysis to agriculture or natural resources. In most rural areas of the developing world, households tend to increasingly draw on multiple activities inside and outside agriculture. In this context, migration can be seen as one of the main strategies to diversify, secure, and, potentially, durably improve livelihoods, often in combination

24 Hein de Haas with other strategies, such as agricultural intensification and local nonfarm activities (McDowell & de Haan 1997 p. 1–3). Instead of just a short-term survival or crisis-coping strategy or a flight from misery, migration is seen as a deliberate decision to improve livelihoods, facilitate investments (Bebbington, 1999 p. 2027), and help to reduce fluctuations in the family income, which has often been entirely dependent on climatic vagaries (de Haan et al., 2000 p. 28; McDowell & de Haan, 1997 p. 18). Migration can then be seen as a means of acquiring a wider range of assets to insure against future shocks and stresses (de Haan et al., 2000 p. 30). In fact, if we see migration as part of a broader, multilocal household livelihood strategy to diversify income and overcome market and other structural-institutional development constraints, this comes very close to the premises of NELM.

AIMS AND METHODOLOGY There is still a limited understanding on the precise role of migration in broader livelihood strategies of households and, on the macrolevel, its role in broader contextual transformation processes. First, the relation between poverty and migration choice is yet unresolved. Whereas poverty is likely to increase incentives to migrate, poverty can coincide with a lack of resources to migrate. Second, although migration and remittances might stabilise household income, there is still debate on whether they can durably improve livelihoods and do not lead to a one-sided remittance-dependency. Third, analyses of migration as part of livelihoods tend to be rather static, with limited attention for the different roles migration might play in successive stages of household life cycles. Finally, the roles of internal and international migration in livelihoods are rarely put into a comparative perspective. Studies tend to focus on either form of migration, although both movements are known to be often interrelated and to be part and parcel of the same general transformation processes (Skeldon, 1997; Zelinksy, 1971). The remainder of this article examines the role of internal and international migration in shifting household livelihood strategies in one particular sending area in south Morocco: the oasis of the Todgha valley.1 It will first examine how the interrelated phenomena of internal and international migration from this area are part of the more general historical process of structural change affecting Moroccan rural areas since French colonial intrusion in the Maghreb. Subsequently, we focus on the microlevel through examining how internal and international migration are connected to broader livelihood strategies over the course of household life cycles. Through this analysis, we hope to answer the question to what extent internal and international migration should be considered as survival or crisis-coping strategies that sustain or even increase dependency or rather as investment strategies that allow households to secure and durably improve their livelihoods.

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

25

Data collection by the author took place between September 1998 and June 2000. Following a participatory appraisal, a socioeconomic household survey was conducted among 507 households containing 3,801 individuals, including 237 international (150 current and 87 returned) and 457 internal (292 current and 165 returned) migrants, in six villages. These villages were located across the Todgha valley and were selected on the basis of a spatially clustered, nonrandom sample, such that the survey covered the different migratory, ethnic, agricultural, and geographical settings prevailing in the valley. In addition to continuous participant observation, open interviews were conducted on migration, agricultural practices, investments, and sociocultural relations. In 2003, additional interviews were conducted among prospective migrants.

THE MOBILITY TRANSITION OF THE TODGHA VALLEY The Todgha is an oasis river valley located on the southern slopes of the High Atlas Mountains in Morocco. The Todgha is a medium-sized river oasis, with a cultivated area almost 40 km in length and varying in width from 100 m near it’s sources to four km downstream. In 2000 the valley housed approximately 70,000 inhabitants living in 64 villages and the booming town of Tinghir. The Tamazight (Berber) speaking population of the valley is composed of two main ethnic groups: the sedentary Aït Todoght (those of the Todgha) in the water abundant upper Todgha valley and members of the formerly seminomadic Aït ‘Atta tribe who have settled in the downstream, water-scarce part of the valley over the past two to three centuries. A strong antagonism prevails between the Aït Todoght and the Aït ‘Atta. Within both Aït Todoght and Aït Atta villages, the basic traditional unit of sociopolitical organization on village level is the so-called ighs (pl. ighsan), or the ethnic patrilinear lineage consisting of a group of extended families all sharing one common ancestor. Depending on their population size, most villages comprise two to eight ighsan. Compared to surrounding mountain and desert areas, the central Todgha oasis valley inhabited by the Aït Todoght has a relatively well-developed infrastructure and public amenities. Especially in the late 1980s and 1990s, also the relatively marginal (downstream, off-road and predominantly Aït ‘Atta) parts of the valley have been increasingly opened up, with an almost completed electrification, an expanding drinking water system, and the establishment of markets, primary and secondary schools, and administrative services. Road connections and transport facilities to destinations outside the Todgha have also been improved in the past decades. Until colonization the oasis dwellers were largely dependent on irrigated subsistence agriculture, which was enabled by the perennial flow of water in the Todgha. Like most of rural Morocco, the Todgha valley remained largely free of central sultanic state power based in the cities west of the

26

Hein de Haas

High Atlas until the 20th century. Due to fierce resistance from inland tribes the French only gained control over most parts of the valley in 1931, 19 years after the formal establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco. The French were able rapidly to establish a modern administrative structure in the valley, which remained largely intact after Moroccan independence in 1956. On the one hand, the incorporation of this formerly stateless society of free Berbers in the modern French, and—after independence—MoroccanArabic state, implied loss of tribal autonomy, the decline of regional and trans-Saharan (caravan) trade networks as well as and nomad-peasant trade relations. These processes including a dramatic population increase following the introduction of modern health care have played a role in undermining traditional livelihoods predominantly based on subsistence agriculture. On the other hand, the incorporation of the Todgha into the state and the capitalist economy along with the concomitant expansion of infrastructure transports created new livelihood opportunities through wage labour within, but in particular outside, the valley. Colonial occupation triggered a process reminiscent of what Zelinsky (1971) called the mobility transition, resulting in increasing labour migration from, within, and toward the Todgha. This is not to say that migration from the Todgha is a new phenomenon. Seasonal, circular, and more long-term migration by harvest workers or occupational specialists (notably well diggers) toward northern and western Morocco has existed for centuries (cf. Büchner, 1986). Nevertheless, incorporation of the Todgha into the state and the capitalist economy changed the character and radically enlarged the geographical scope of population mobility in the form of remittance-based wage labour migration to the cities along the Atlantic coasts and, later, to Europe. In fact, this mobility transition set off well before French occupation of the valley with the French colonization of neighbouring Algeria in 1830. In the second half of the 19th century, Todghawi went to work in the cities and on the farms of French colons in Algeria. This early form of international migration was an extension of even earlier forms of seasonal and circular migration within Morocco. The instauration of the French protectorate over Morocco (1912–1956) and the concomitant urbanization created increasing possibilities for internal migration, which was mainly directed at coastal cities like Rabat and Casablanca. Algeria remained the principal destination for Todgha’s international migrants until the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the combined effect of Algerian independence (1962) and the economic boom in Europe caused a reorientation of international migration flows, which shifted toward France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium and the Netherlands and Arab oil countries. The late 1960s and begin 1970s were the Golden Age of migration, when workers were directly recruited, costs and risks of migration were relatively low, and a large number of Todghawi migrated abroad. Labour recruitment was

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

27

only important in the early phase of migration. Whereas 53% of the labour migrants that went abroad in the 1960s were directly recruited, this percentage fell to 17% in the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, all migrants went on their own force, mostly assisted by already migrated kin. Increasingly restrictive European immigration regulations as of the 1970s did not lead to a dramatic decrease in out-migration. Most guestworkers decided not to return and this lead to large-scale family reunification in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by family formation in the 1980s and, especially, the 1990s. The expatriate networks of Todghawi played a facilitating role in perpetuating migration from the valley. Many Todghawi are able to enter Europe legally each year through family reunification and marriages with family or acquaintances living abroad. Another consequence of restrictive European immigration policies has been a significant increase in irregular migration. A final development was the geographical diversification of migration flows between 1985 and 2000, during which Italy and particularly Spain emerged as new destination countries for both legal and irregular migrants from the Todgha. Through legalization campaigns, many irregular migrants have obtained residency papers. In fact, after a relapse between 1975–1990—when family migration dominated—a surge in new primary labour migration to southern Europe has occurred in the 1990s. Rural-to-urban migration further increased in the post-colonial era to the detriment of the historically-rooted seasonal migration of harvest workers, for instance to the Middle Atlas. In addition to the traditional destinations of the Atlantic coast (e.g., Rabat, Casablanca), smaller boomtowns of the northern Rif (e.g., Nador, Tétouan) have also become important destinations. Internal migration tends to function as a precursor to international migration. Many Todghawi first moved to the cities, where they worked, saved money, and informed themselves, before leapfrogging to Europe. Interestingly, migration from the relatively opened up Todgha valley occurred earlier and more massively than from the surrounding, more isolated Saghro and Atlas Mountains. Also within the Todgha, there is a pattern of ethnic and spatial differentation in migration participation. The relatively centrally located, opened-up parts of the valley inhabited by the Aït Todoght witnessed more intensive internal and international migration than the more isolated and poorer (Aït Atta) villages. In fact, relatively few Aït Atta participated in the large-scale labour migration to France of the 1960s and 1970s, and only started to participate massively in international migration (mainly to Spain) since the late 1980s. International migrants typically do unskilled jobs in industry, agriculture, and services. Internal migrants typically worked in construction (28%) or do service jobs (24%). A distinct, relatively wealthy, and educated elite of internal migrants comprises civil servants and private-sector professionals (7%) as well as the rapidly growing category of student migrants (22%). These students tend to eventually settle in cities as civil servants and professional workers or move abroad.

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Migration network theory predicts that the costs and risks of migration fall over time due to the facilitating role established migrant communities play in the migration of other community members. In this way, migration would become less selective over time and migration experience is diffused throughout communities. However, the survey data do not sustain this hypothesis. Only four (out of 35) ethnic lineages (ighsan) representing 6% of the total surveyed population account for more than 21% of all the international migrants who have left since 1980, and 14 lineages representing 17% of the population do not contain any international migrants at all. The distribution of international migration participation measured at the lineage level did not become less unequal after 1980. For migration before and after 1980, the Gini indexes are 0.463 and 0.471, respectively. Access to international migration through marriage migration and various kinds of migration assistance is largely determined by the access to social capital in the forms of largely kinship-based migrant networks. Restrictive immigration policies in Europe have increased the costs and risks of international migration—especially to the classical destination countries. This has led to increasing dependency on this form of social capital. This is reinforced by the preference for consanguineous marriage, through which migration capital is monopolized within the same ethnic group. Outside networks, considerable financial resources are needed to move abroad—for instance, to pay for bride prices, the increasingly complex, costly, and uncertain visa application procedures, or sums to be paid to smugglers to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. Therefore, in the Todgha, migration networks are facilitating to people belonging to lineages (ighsan) and extended families containing international migrants, but tend to be exclusionary for people not belonging to such groups. This case of the so-called downside of social capital (cf. Portes & Landolt, 1996), points to the limitations of migration network theory. In the Todgha, migrant networks do not extend ad infinitum as particular lineages tend to monopolize access to migration.

THE PLACE OF MIGRATION IN HOUSEHOLD LIFE CYCLES The survey data strongly suggest that internal and international migration tend to occupy distinct positions in the household life cycle. Two thirds of internal migrants are unmarried, compared to only one fifth of all international migrants. Considering the position of migrants within the household (Table 2.1), 49% of international migrants are household heads themselves, whereas 69% of internal migrants are the son of the household head, and only 18% the head himself. Internal migrants also tend to be younger than international migrants (average age on departure 23.3 and 27.5 years, respectively), but internal return migrants also stayed away for shorter periods compared to international returnees (8.2 years and 17.1

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

29

year, respectively). This explains that the average age of current internal migrants was 29.9 years against 40.9 years among current international migrants. The average age on return is 32 for internal returnees and 48 for international returnees. However, if we take the mode as the measure of central tendency, we come out at the 25–29 and 60–64 age categories as the typical age on return, respectively. These differences can be explained by the fact that the economic, social, and legal obstacles to internal migration are comparatively low, and this is in line with the earlier observation that internal migration often precedes international migration. Labour migrants tend to be male. Although an increasing number of Moroccan women have been migrating to southern Europe since the 1990s, still few women from this culturally conservative region are migrating independently. International migrants from the Todgha are not significantly more or less educated than nonmigrants of the same age category. By contrast, internal migrants are significantly better educated that nonmigrants, also when excluding the group of student migrants. This seems related to the fact that most job opportunities for higher educated people (i.e. ex student migrants) are found in the large towns and cities, and that they therefore tend to stay away. The incidence of landlessness is 22% among nonmigrant households and 19% among internal migrant households, compared to only 4% and 2% among international and returned migrant households. Only few international migrants are from landless households. This suggests that the poorest have generally not been able to migrate abroad.

Table 2.1 Position within household by migration status of individuals above 15 years Relation to household head

Migrants (%) Nonmigrants

Internal

Returned internal

International

Returned international

Total

Head

14.5

18.6

37.0

50.0

75.9

20.9

Spouse

24.8

0.0

2.4

0.0

2.3

18.1

Child

39.1

70.0

47.9

32.9

11.5

41.9

Child in-law

8.0

1.1

0.0

3.4

0.0

6.1

Brother/sister

3.8

6.8

9.7

10.3

5.7

5.0

Grandchild

2.1

2.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.7

Other

7.7

1.4

3.0

3.4

4.6

6.3

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

N

1,741

280

165

146

87

2,419

Source: Household survey.

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Figure 2.1 is an ideal-typical graphical representation of the different and reciprocally related spatio-temporal migration trajectories or migration careers that Todgha households pursue. The underlying assumption is that these trajectories are linked to the different phases of the household life cycle. At T1, the household consists of young parents with young children. At a later stage, T2, there is more room for income diversification and migration with the growing number of adults in the household. The typical internal migrant is the grown-up son who moves to town (arrow a in figure 2.1) to gain additional family income. According to the survey data, such internal migration lasts 7 to 9 years on average. Doing often irregular, badly paid work living without family in the cities is generally considered as a temporary stage, upon which to go migrate abroad, to establish a household in town, or to return to the Todgha. The critical age at which internal migrants and their households decide what to do afterwards lies currently somewhere around the age of 30, which more or less represents the threshold between T2 and T3. This is currently the typical age of marriage for men and the age of return for the majority of return migrants. The ultimate ambition of most internal migrants is to gain access to international migration through saving enough money either to obtain a passport, a visa, and other paperwork, or to cross the Gibraltar Strait illegally, or through network marriages. Normally, and certainly nowadays, considerable financial resources are needed to fulfil the aspiration of going abroad for those lacking access to social migration capital. Each year several Todghawis succeed in leapfrogging from cities to Europe (arrow c), legally or illegally. Others move directly to Europe (arrow b). In the 1960s and early 1970s, such direct international migration was achieved through direct recruitment, the procurement of labour contracts through family or community members, or spontaneous migration. Nowadays, such direct migration is achieved either through marriage migration (family formation) or through irregular migration. Internal migrants who do not migrate abroad, but who have succeeded in finding more or less stable employment in towns and cities, may go on to live separated from their newly married spouses, but generally end up transferring their wife and children (arrow d) after suitable housing has been found. In this case, the entire household functionally disappears from the oasis. If internal migrants do not succeed in migrating overseas or finding stable employment in the towns or cities, many return to the Todgha (arrow e). This moment of return migration more or less coincides with marriage. Nowadays, the typical age of marriage for men lies between 25 and 35. The money saved during migration often serves to pay for the bride price, festivities, and other costs associated with marriage. In line with ancient traditions of circular migration, many internal migrants return to set up their own families. They may migrate again for longer or shorter periods if not enough money can be earned locally. However, staying away from one’s family is

b

a

e

c

d

T3 i

f

h

g

Remittances

reunified

reunified

relocated

Return migrant

T4

Separated household status

Household mobility

international

reunified

relocated

Migrant

Reunified household status

Individual mobility

international

internal

Migrant

T2

Figure 2.1 Ideal-typical household migration trajectories within the household life cycle.

Non migrant

T1

Abroad

Internal

Origin

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods 31

32

Hein de Haas

generally considered as undesirable, and the proportion of internal migrants above 40 years living separated from their families in cities is very limited. When their own children grow up, the cycle of migration may start again. International migrants tend to stay away much longer than internal migrants. Whereas returned international migrants stayed away 17 years on average, this is 8 years for returned internal migrants. Although migrants typically move abroad with the intention of coming back, most international migrants tend to stay away for (almost) their entire working age (T2 and T3), provided that a residence status has been acquired at the destination. Once they have accepted the de facto long-term or permanent character of migration, many international migrants tend to reunify their families in Europe (arrow f). This family reunification moment generally lies 5 to 15 years after the initial separation, and entails the factual disappearance of the household from the oasis. However, households that settled in Europe often fulfil a function in enabling stay-behinds to migrate through marriage migration, which is partially a form of labour migration in disguise. Notwithstanding the magnitude of family reunification, a considerable proportion of Todgha migrants have continued to live in Europe alone, while maintaining their nuclear and extended families in Morocco via remittance transfers. There are several reasons for not reunifying families at the destination. Most respondents said that they feared that their wives and children would become too westernized and lose their religious faith in Europe. Many migrants also argued that—back in the 1970s and 1980s, when migrants were confronted with rising unemployment and racism in Europe—they estimated that their children would have a better future in Morocco in the (erroneous) expectation that higher education would procure them secure, civil-servant jobs. However, other reasons might play an important role behind this official, socially acceptable discourse. Failure to fulfil the legal (i.e. status as a permanent resident) and financial (i.e. sufficient income) conditions for family reunification also seem important reasons, which most migrants are, however, not willing to admit. Other, more personal reasons opposing family reunification are marital conflict, estrangement, or divorce. Long-term international migrants who do not cut ties with the household of origin typically return towards the end of their working age, at T4, in their fifties or early sixties, to form returned international migration households (arrow h). Subsequently, their children may start the cycle again (arrow i). Some migrants return far earlier, often with the intention to invest their money in their own enterprises. By 1999, most of the international migrants who left in the late 1960s and early 1970s migration boom had either reunified their families or returned home at the turn of the century. However, classic distinctions between permanent and return migration are becoming increasingly blurred. Transnational Todgha communities maintain intensive contacts with either side of the Mediterranean. A sizable number of retired and unemployed migrants are commuting between Europe and the Todgha,

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

33

living for a part of the year in each place. This growing group of pendulum migrants often combines this commuting with commercial activities (De Haas, 2006b). Other migrants have opted for the strategy of relay migration, in which only one or two children (traditionally sons) move to Europe prior to their father’s return. In this way multilocal households are able to maintain their stake in the international migration market over the generations without reunifying the entire household in Europe. Finally, some international migrants decide to relocate their households from their village to Tinghir, Todgha’s urban centre, or towns elsewhere in Morocco while abroad or upon their return (arrow g). Such relocation is often a flight from asphyxiating social pressures to share remittance-derived financial wealth with family and community members and the conflicts this often entails between migrants’ wives and her extended family-in-law.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN HOUSEHOLDS’ LIVELIHOODS Figure 2.2 illustrates the high incidence of migration among Todghawi men. All the age cohorts between 20 and 70 contain more than 50% current or returned migrants. It equally reveals that young men are mainly involved in internal migration compared to relatively older men, who are more involved in international migration. These data also appear to suggest that there is a persistent, but decreasing participation in international migration among younger generations. When comparing the 30–39 cohorts with older cohorts, the differences in participation in international labour migration seem too large to be explained by age alone. It might be partly explained by the increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe and the increasing reliance on family and irregular migration—which does not appear in the figure—to the detriment of primary labour migration. Nevertheless, the data also reveal that the overall tendency to migrate (internally or internationally) has not decreased, and has remained constant at levels of around 60%. Nowadays, most households in the Todgha have been in some way affected by internal and international migration. Many households count two or three generations of migrants. More than 40% of all the surveyed households are involved in international migration and 25% in internal migration, and several households are involved in both types simultaneously. Only one third of all households have not been directly affected by some kind of migration. Yet also nonmigrant household tend to be indirectly affected by the general social, economic, and cultural impacts of migration. Moreover, on the basis of the prior analysis of spatio-temporal migration trajectories that households pursue over their life cycles, one might hypothesise that many nonmigrant households that currently do not participate in migration are likely to do so in the near future.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

age

Figure 2.2 Age and labour migration participation of men.

0-9 survey. 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 Source: Household

migration participation

>/ 80

Returned international International Returned internal Internal Nonmigrant

34 Hein de Haas

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

35

Over the 20th century, oasis households have progressively moved away from predominantly agricultural livelihoods to an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and sources of income. Stimulated by population growth and increasing aspirations, this diversification process has been enabled by the increasing possibilities to gain an additional nonagricultural income, initially mainly through migration, but in recent decades also increasingly from within the Todgha valley itself. Only a small minority (6%) among all households are active in only one economic sector and 1% have no economic activity at all. The first group mainly consists of exclusively agricultural households, whereas the latter group consists of either passive receivers of remittances or extremely poor and landless household that live on charity. Nearly 60% of oasis household depend on three, four, or even more economic activities simultaneously. The average number of economic activities per household tends to be higher among internal and, in particular, international migrant households. About 45% of all international migrant households are active in four or more economic sectors2, compared to 14% among nonmigrants. This suggests that migrant households do not tend to rely solely on remittances but instead tend to continue or even extend the number of economic sectors in which they are active. Contemporary oasis livelihoods are increasingly characterized by multiactivity and multilocality (Table 2.2), in which we can witness a general diversification and partial de-agrarisation of activity patterns, especially among young men. This applies both to migrant and nonmigrant households, although migrant households tend to have more diversified livelihoods than nonmigrant households. There is a strong labour division between men and women, in which most adult men either work in the expanding nonagricultural sectors in the Todgha, or have migrated outside the valley. The quasi totality of women works in the household and agriculture. The deagrarization of men’s activities seems to have increased the agricultural burden of women, in addition to their housekeeping and child-rearing activities. If migration were a livelihood strategy to diversify and increase the income of the households left behind we would expect migrants to send considerable amounts of remittances back to their households, and that their incomes would be substantially higher than those of nonmigrant households. The data indicate that international remittances tend to be far more important than internal remittances in terms of their mean contribution to household income. In 1999, the average value of 1 US dollar was equal to 9.8 dirham. Whereas households involved in international migration tend to receive between 2,000 and 3,000 dirham per month, internal migrant households receive an average of 860 dirham in remittance payments. Between 10% and 20% of the households without internal migrants nevertheless receive internal remittances from nonhousehold members. For the total population, the average household received about 1,090 dirham per month in international remittances and 326 dirham in internal remittances.

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Table 2.2

Economic activities by household migration status

Economic activities

Agriculture*

Household migration status (%) Nonmigrant

Internal migrant

Indirect international

45.7

51.2

78.9

Current Returned international international 57.8

47.7

Construction

32.6

51.2

23.7

67.6

33.8

Commercial

18.3

23.2

13.2

14.7

24.6

Industrial

13.1

15.2

5.3

26.5

24.6

Civil servant/ professional

5.7

11.2

2.6

2.0

10.8

Service sector

24.0

44.8

39.5

40.2

35.4

175

125

n

38

102

65

Source: Household survey. Note Non-migrant households have never been involved in international migration and are currently not involved in internal migration. Internal migrant households only contain internal migrants. Indirect international migrant households are not directly involved in international migration, but have extended family members working abroad by whom they are financially supported. Current international migrant households have at least one member of the household currently living abroad. Returned international migrant households with at least one international return migrant, but do not currently contain members living abroad. * The figures mainly represent the activities of men. Most women have important agricultural duties, which are seen as an integral part of their household tasks. Therefore, most women have not reported agriculture as a distinct activity.

Table 2.3 reveals the income structure of households by showing the two most important sources of household income per household migration category. The table indicates that the vast majority of households have various sources of income outside agriculture, either from migration or from local noneconomic activities. The number of households that completely rely on subsistence agriculture is small (4%), and seems to be disappearing, reflecting the general tendency toward diversification of economic activities. One quarter of all households live on a combination of local agricultural and nonagricultural income. Half of all nonmigrant households live on such a combination, and one quarter of this group live on nonagricultural income only. Even in terms of local cash income, nonagricultural sources of revenue seem to have become dominant. Three quarters of internal migrant households live on a combination of internal remittances and local sources of income, whereas remittances seem most important in their contribution to total income. All categories of international migrant households tend to

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods Table 2.3

37

Sources of income by household migration status Household migration status (%)

Sources of monetary income

Internal

Indirect intnl

International

1.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.6

Only agricultural

12.0

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.3

Agriculture>local non-agricultural

4.8

1.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.0

Agriculture
44.0

21.0

0.0

1.0

19.4

23.0

Only local non-agricultural

27.7

8.1

0.0

0.0

3.2

11.9

Internal remittances< local

4.8

25.0

0.0

0.0

3.2

8.4

Internal remittances> local

4.8

43.5

0.0

0.0

1.6

12.9

Internal and international remittances.< other sources

0.0

0.0

5.6

1.0

0.0

0.6

Internal and international remittances.> other sources

0.0

0.0

11.1

11.0

8.1

4.1

International remittances.< other sources

0.0

0.0

36.1

15.0

11.3

7.2

International remittances.> other sources

0.0

0.0

47.2

72.0

53.2

25.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

No source of income from own labour

Non

Total

100.0

100.0

N

166

124

36

100

Returned Total intnl

62

100.0 488

Source: Household survey. Note The ‘<’ and ‘>’ signs indicate which sources of income is highest.

live primarily on international remittances, although they usually have additional sources of income. About 10% of international migrant households have simultaneous income from international and internal remittances. Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the monthly household income for different household migration categories. This includes internal and international migrant remittances, locally earned salaries, income from renting,

a igr nm

nt

e int

in

l

ec dir

r na t in

te c

al

en ur r

n tio r na t in

te ret

al

e ur n

n tio r na n te di

Source: Household survey.

Figure 2.3 Mean income composition by household migration status.

no

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

n tio r na

al

To

tal

International remittances

Internal remittances

Agricultural income

Leasing/renting

Local salary/business

38 Hein de Haas

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

39

and agricultural income. The table reveals a positive association between participation in international migration and household income. The average income of households directly involved in international migration is more than double that of nonmigrant and internal migrant households, a difference that mainly reflects remittances sent from abroad. Internal migrant households earn only slightly higher average incomes than nonmigrants, although the proportion of extremely poor households is far higher among nonmigrants. 37.0% of nonmigrant households live on less than 1,000 dirham per month, against 18.5% among internal migrants. This might be partly related to the fact that, also in the case of internal migration, it is not the poorest who migrate, as they cannot afford the risks and costs of migrating, although it might also be the partial effect of the income-stabilizing effect of income diversification through migration—it is difficult here to disentangle causes and effects. International migrant households tend to earn higher on average local incomes than other households, in particular from agriculture. Average agricultural cash incomes of households involved in international migration are about twice as high as in nonmigrant households. Indirect international migrant households tend to have a relatively high income from leasing land and houses. Internal migrant households, on the contrary, tend to have lower local earnings than nonmigrants. This suggests that it is mainly through international migration that households can substantially improve their livelihoods.3

CONCLUSION At the macro level, rather than the independent cause of livelihood diversification, migration is first and foremost a constituent part of broader transformation processes. At the regional level, ethnic groups living in the central parts of the Todgha have migrated earlier and more massively than ethnic groups living in more marginal areas. Rather than the result of poverty, it appears to be a certain degree of development—which increases capabilities and aspirations—that has enabled and motivated people to migrate. The analysis, of how household migration trajectories evolve across time and space, indicated that internal and international migration tend to be reciprocally and functionally related over household life cycles. On the micro-level, migration is part of a more general tendency of households to diversify and improve their livelihoods. This exemplifies that it would be erroneous to portray migration as the simple result of poverty and misery. Increasing labour migration has coincided with the increasing multiactivity and multilocality of contemporary oasis livelihoods, which are characterised by a general diversification and partial deagrarisation of activity patterns. Although agriculture remains important as a source of cash and inkind income, its role has changed from being the pillar of the oasis economy

40

Hein de Haas

to now being just one of the many sources of income. Nowadays, there are only very few oasis households left that base their livelihoods on agricultural resources only. This corroborates the point raised by Bebbington (1999 p. 2021) that we should cease to crunch rural livelihoods into the category of agricultural and natural resource-based strategies. International remittances have allowed for significant improvements in household income and living conditions. Migrant households tend not to rely passively on remittances, but intensify local economic activities through remittance investments, and also tend to have higher non-migratory incomes than other households. However, this only seems to apply to international migration. On the short term, internal migration does generally not allow households to improve livelihoods. Spreading income risks therefore seems to be the main rationale behind internal migration. However, it is important not to jump to the conclusion that internal migration is thus merely a survival or crisis coping strategy and not an accumulation strategy. The picture is considerably more complex: In several ways, and especially on the longer term, internal migration can be a strategy that improves livelihoods in a more durable way: besides being a potential precursor to international migration, internal migration increases the chances of obtaining better paid urban jobs and the presence of migrants in cities can facilitate higher education of younger siblings. Internal migration can also be the consequence of international migration through household relocation and migrants’ investment in the education of their children. This corroborates the notion that internal and international migrations are part of the same general process that has increased mobility in general. Migration has generally had a positive impact on economic development in the Todgha valley. However, the poorest and marginal groups lacking financial resources and social capital in the form of migrant networks tend to be excluded from internal migration and, in particular, increasingly costly, and risky international migration. Although nonmigrants may indirectly profit from remittance-fueled investments, this raises some scepticism about the potentials of migration to reduce absolute poverty. There is an apparent contradiction between the argument that migration is a poverty-reducing strategy and the observation that poorest are likely to have less capabilities and aspirations to migrate. More fundamentally, it would be erroneous to depict migration as the one and only cause of livelihood changes as such. Rather than the independent cause of livelihood diversification, migration is part of a broader strategy of oasis households to diversify and improve their livelihoods. The substantial internal and international migration that occurred from the Todgha over the 20th century should primarily be seen as an integral part of a more general process of political, infrastructural, economic, and social integration of the Todgha valley into a changing national and international context, and the concomitant increasing flows of products (e.g., trade), money (e.g., remittances), people (migration), and information (e.g., education and media)

The Complex Role of Migration in Shifting Rural Livelihoods

41

between the Todgha and the outside world. This makes it difficult to disentangle causes and effects of migration. Finally, because migration is a constituent part of broader transformation processes—which are usually labelled as development—it seems an illusion that migration policies can curb migration. Migration cannot be combated as if it were an isolated phenomenon, because it is part of structural shifts toward increasingly diverse and multi-local livelihoods across the world. Therefore, policies to keep migrants down on the farm (Rhoda, 1983) seem bound to fail because of a general inability to understand the developmental root causes of migration. NOTES 1. The effects of migration and remittances on regional development of the Todgha are addressed in another paper (De Haas, 2006a). 2. The following sectors have been distinguished: agriculture, agricultural labour, construction, commerce, industry, civil servant/professional, and other. 3. In another paper, we demonstrated that international migration and remittances have significantly improved standards of living, enabled the partial emancipation of subaltern ethnic groups, and have enabled households to invest in agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. Remittance expenditure and investments have stimulated the growth of the regional economy, from which also nonmigrants profit, and have triggered a counter-flow of reverse internal migration (De Haas, 2006a).

REFERENCES Beauchemin, C. & Schoumaker, B. (2005). Migration to cities in Burkina Faso: Does the level of development in sending areas matter? World Development, 33(7), 1129–1152. Bebbington, A. (1999). Capitals and capabilities: A framework for analyzing peasant viability, rural livelihoods and poverty. World Development, 27(12), 2021– 2044. Büchner, H. -J. (1986). Die Temporäre Arbeitskräftewanderung nach Westeuropa als Bestimmender Faktor für den Gegenwärtigen Strukturwandel der TodrhaOase (Südmarokko). Mainz: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität. Castles, S. & Miller, M. J. (1993). The age of migration. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press Ltd. De Haas, H. (2006a). Migration, remittances and regional development in southern Morocco. Geoforum, 37(4), 565–580. De Haas, H. (2006b, January 5–7). International pendulum migration to Morocco: Multi-local residential strategies of ageing migrants in the Todgha Valley. Paper presented at ASEF Workshop on ‘Pensioners on the Move,’ Singapore. Frank, A. G. (1966, September). The development of underdevelopment. Monthly Review, 18(4), 17–31. Haan, A. de, Brock, K., Carswell, G., Coulibaly, N., Seba, H. & Toufique, K.A. (2000). Migration and livelihoods: Case studies in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Mali. Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. Harris, J. R. & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two-sector aanalysis. American Economic Review, 60, 126–142.

42

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Lieten, G. K. & Nieuwenhuys, O. (1989). Introduction: Survival and emancipation. In G. K. Lieten, O. Nieuwenhuys, & L. Schenk-Sandbergen (Eds.), Women, migrants and tribals: Survival strategies in Asia. New Delhi: Manohar. Lucas, R. E. B. & Stark, O. (1985). Motivations to remit: Evidence from Botswana. Journal of Political Economy, 93(5), 901–918. Massey, D .S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1998). Worlds in motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press. McDowell, Ch. & Haan, A. de (1997). Migration and sustainable livelihoods: A critical review of the literature. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. McGee, T. G. (1994). The future of urbanisation in developing countries: The case of Indonesia. Third World Planning Review, 16(1), iii–xii. Portes, A. & Landolt, P. (1996). Unsolved mysteries: The Tocqueville files II. The downside of social capital. The American Prospect, 7(26). May 1–June 1. Rhoda, R. (1983). Rural development and urban migration: Can we keep them down on the farm? International Migration Review, 17(1), 34–64. Schiff, M. (1994). How trade, aid, and remittances affect international migration. Washington DC: World Bank. Skeldon, R. (1997). Migration and development: A global perspective. Essex, UK: Longman. Stark, O. (1991). The migration of labor. Cambridge & Oxford: Blackwell. Taylor, J. E. (1999). The New Economics of labour migration and the role of remittances in the migration process. International Migration, 37(1), 63–88. Todaro, M. P. (1969). A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in lessdeveloped countries. American Economic Review, 59, 138–148. Todaro, M. P. & Maruszko, L. (1987). Illegal migration and US immigration reform: A conceptual framework. Population and Development Review, 13(1), 101– 114. Wallerstein, I. (1974). The modern world system I, capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the sixteenth century. New York: Academic Press. Wallerstein, I. (1980). The modern world system II, mercantilism and the consolidation of the European world-economy, 1600–1750. New York: Academic Press. Zelinsky, Z. (1971). The hypothesis of the mobility transition. Geographical Review, 61(2), 219–249.

3

International Migration in Indonesia and its Impacts on Regional Development Graeme Hugo

Increased appreciation of the role of south-north migration as an engine for development in origin countries (United Nations, 2006; World Bank, 2006a; Global Commission on International Migration, 2005) focuses attention on the largest south countries of China (2006 population 1,311.4 million), India (1,121.8 million) and Indonesia (225.5 million). These countries are distinctive not only because of their large populations but also their vast geographical size and diversity. Inevitably international migration is less likely to have impacts at the national scale that occur in smaller nations. Indeed much of the increase in personal mobility is channelled into internal migration with intranational economic and spatial inequalities being analogous to international inequalities driving south-north migration out of smaller less developed economies to more developed countries. International migration is, however, of increasing demographic and economic significance in the three Asian demographic giants but the impact of this migration is spatially concentrated within particular regions and communities from which migrants are disproportionately drawn. In such regions the impacts are substantial and because increasing attention is being paid to widening inter-regional inequalities and the need to supplement sectoral economic development strategies with regional development initiatives in LDCs, such concentrated impacts are of significance. Nevertheless in the meagre literature relating to economic effects of migration upon origin countries in Asia the bulk of analysis has been conducted at the national and individual levels of analysis while regional and community effects have been neglected. This chapter seeks to summarize and evaluate evidence of the effects of migration on development, focusing on the communities and regions in Indonesia which have experienced significant emigration. The regional and local impacts relate both to the passive impacts of the loss of human capital on the local economy as well as the more active effects of the injection of remittances and outside influences into the local economy. When such a regional or community level of analysis is adopted, the effects of

44

Graeme Hugo

emigration are considerable, especially in areas of limited local development potential. Nationally formulated development policies, programmes, and strategies often not only do not take account of these effects but in some cases hamper the realisation of the full potential benefits. Although all of the migration impacts are not beneficial to regions international migration, especially labour migration, offers one of the few avenues open to lagging areas to obtain, and invest, capital in the local area.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FROM INDONESIA: AN OVERVIEW Indonesia has the hallmarks of a quintessential emigration and labour export country. It is the world’s fourth most populous nation and despite halving fertility levels over the last quarter century its population is increasing at around 1.3% per annum. Moreover, its labour force is increasing at almost twice this rate—a net increment of around 1.9 million workers are added annually to the almost 106 million currently in the labour force. Although GDP grew at more than 5% for much of the 1970s, 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Figure 3.1 shows that the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s had a devastating impact and recovery from it has been slow. With a GDP per capita of US $1,260 (World Bank, 2006a p. 288), Indonesia remains a low income nation and the Indonesian Central Statistical Agency reported that 19.6% of the population lived in poverty in 2004 compared with 11.3% in precrisis 1996. The World Bank (2006a p. 290) estimates that in 2002, 52.4% of the population earned less than US $2.00 per day. Although the unemployment rates are relatively low, the poor in Indonesia simply cannot afford to be unemployed and must take on whatever work they can get regardless of the low income, low status and long hours associated with it, its appropriateness to their qualifications and so forth. Nevertheless underemployment is around 21% (40 million workers) and almost 70% of the labour force work in the informal sector. Unemployment rates are increasing however, especially among the better educated, due to a mismatch between the mix of education and training opportunities available on the one hand and the needs of the contemporary labour market on the other. Significant structural change occurred in the 1990s with the proportion of workers employed in agriculture falling below half for the first time. There is evidence of significant labour displacement as agriculture becomes more commercialized. Hence although demographically, economically and socially Indonesia is experiencing rapid and far reaching change, it remains emphatically a labour surplus nation and one which in a globalizing world has become an important origin country of international migrants. International migration out of Indonesia is generally of two types. On one hand is south-north migration directed predominantly toward OECD

Source: OECD database of immigrants and expatriates.

Figure 3.1 Indonesians by country of residence, OECD countries.

UK

less than 1,000

50,000

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

NUMBER OF INDONESIA-BORN

International Migration in Indonesia 45

46

Graeme Hugo

Table 3.1

Settler arrivals, birthplace country Indonesia by occupation and sex, 1998–99 to 2004–05 Males

Females

Total

Sex Ratio

Managers/Admin

2,647

998

3,645

265.2

Professionals

1,947

1,864

3,811

104.5

Associate Professionals

509

246

755

206.9

Tradespersons and Related Workers

75

73

148

102.7

Advanced Clerical and Service Workers

14

231

245

6.1

Intermediate Clerical, Sales & Service Workers

148

243

391

60.9

Intermediate Production & Transport Workers

29

1

30

2900.0

Elementary Clerical, Sales & Service Workers

100

103

203

97.1

42

16

58

262.5

4,817

8,937

13,754

53.9

Labourers & Related Workers Not in Workforce Not in Employment Not Stated Total

68

144

212

47.2

527

280

807

188.2

10,923

13,136

24,059

83.2

Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), Movements Database.

nations. Figure 3.1 shows the number of Indonesia-born enumerated in censuses in OECD nations around 2000 and indicates significant numbers in Europe (especially the Netherlands), Australia and North America. The numbers have increased even faster in recent times. In Australia, for example, the Indonesia-born population increased by 50% between 2001 and 2005. The outflow comprises a number of groups. Table 3.1 shows the occupational breakdown of Indonesia-born settlers in Australia over the last decade or so. As is the case with other Asian countries there has been a large outflow of Indonesian students to study in other countries. Although in recent years there have been major flows to other Asian countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore, OECD nations have been the major destination. There is a nexus between student migration and eventual permanent settlement in OECD nations. In Australia in 2004–2005 some 1,675 Indonesians with a student visa applied for, and obtained, permanent residence in Australia. In addition 1,671 Indonesian citizens applying for entry to Australia under the skills

International Migration in Indonesia

47

program had Australian qualifications. Although the numbers of Indonesians involved in south-north migration are significant they are substantially smaller than those of China and India and of several other Asian nations. The main form of contemporary emigration in Indonesia is however labour migration to the Middle East and other Asian nations. Although there is some permanent settlement involved in this movement it is predominantly circular. It is not possible to provide an accurate picture of the scale of the labour export from Indonesia because the statistics available only indicate part of the totality of movement. The Ministry of Manpower monitors the movement of legal OCWs (Overseas Contract Workers) but has no information concerning the substantially larger numbers who leave the nation legally but do not register as OCWs with the Ministry of Labour, and who leave the nation without going through any official border check points. Figure 3.2 shows the number of official Indonesian overseas labour migrants and the increasing tempo of movement is apparent as is the dominance of the Middle East as the major destination until the mid 1990s. In mid 2006 the Minister of Labour (Asia Migration News 1–15 August 2006) indicated there were 2.7 million official Indonesian OCWs and this was expected to rise to three million at the end of 2006. One of the features of this official movement is the dominance of women, mostly destined to be employed as domestic workers. In recent years there have been three official female labour migrants for every male OCW.

600,000

Other Malaysia/Singapore Middle East

500,000

Number

400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000

1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*

0

Year * To June 2005

Figure 3.2 Number of Indonesian overseas workers processed by the Ministry of Manpower, 1979–2005. Sources: Pusat Penelitian Kependudukan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1986:2; Indonesia, Department of Labour, Republic of Indonesia, unpublished data; Departemen Tenaga Kerja, Republic of Indonesia, 1998:14; Soeprobo, 2003 and 2006.

48

Graeme Hugo

There is an increasing tendency for labour migration from Indonesia to be directed toward Asian countries experiencing labour shortages. In 2004 Asian destinations accounted for more than 40% of migrant workers. Undocumented labour migration out of Indonesia however is substantial and differs in many respects from the legal movement; being male dominated and predominantly focused on Malaysia although illegal migration to other destinations such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia occurs. Illegal entry to Malaysia from neighbouring Indonesia is neither difficult nor excessively expensive and most Indonesians are ethnically similar to the Malay majority in Malaysia. Much of the movement involves syndicates and complex webs of middlemen, recruiters and other intermediaries (Spaan, 1994). Periodically there have been crackdowns by authorities in Malaysia leading to expulsions of Indonesian workers; most recently following the introduction of tough new laws aimed at reducing the influx of undocumented workers in August 2001 (Inglis, 2002). However the fact that foreign workers make up more than a fifth of the workforce and dominate some sectors of the economy has meant that the migration continues. The migration to Malaysia is dominated by males but females have become more significant with over 380,000 being estimated to be employed as domestic workers (Asian Migration News 16–30 November 2006). Most

Table 3.2 Indonesia: Estimated stocks of overseas contract workers around 2005 Destination Saudi Arabia and Kuwait United Arab Emirates Malaysia Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan

Estimated Stocks 1,200,000 35,000 1,700,000 102,100

Source Migration News, April 2004 Asian Migration News, 30 April 1999 Antara News, 20 September 2006 Media Indonesia Online, 30 November 2006

40,000

Jakarta Post, 17 March 2004

100,000

Jakarta Post, 6 October 2006

South Korea

25,473

Asian Migration News, December 2002

Japan

22,862

Okushima 2005, 14

Philippines

26,000

SCMP, 10 December 1998

Brunei USA (Los Angeles) Total

2,426 100,000

Scalabrini Migration Center, 2000 Asian Migration News, 30 September 2001

3,353,861

Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), Movements Database.

International Migration in Indonesia

49

work in low skill, low security, and low status types of work which are eschewed by Malaysians so that there is a highly segmented labour market (Hugo, 1995). It is difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the number of Indonesian workers overseas. There are more than a million Indonesian female migrant domestic workers in the Middle East and Asia (Huang, Yeoh, & Rahman, 2005 p. 398). Table 3.2 presents estimates of Indonesian workers currently abroad. The crucial difference between the permanent migration to OECD nations and the labour migration to the Middle East and other parts of Asia is that while the former mostly involves skilled, better off groups the latter are drawn more from poorer, rural-based households.

SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF THE IMPACT OF MIGRATIONS The national impact of international migration in the large nation of Indonesia is limited. In 2004 Indonesia’s export income was US $64.2 billion (Athukorala, 2006 p. 179). In 2004 the remittance income in Indonesia was estimated at US $3.15 billion (Firdausy, 2005)—equivalent to 4.9% of export income. The official number of workers overseas is equivalent to around 5% of the Indonesian workforce. The total estimated numbers of Indonesians living and working overseas at any one time is likely to be

Table 3.3 Indonesia and the Philippines: workers’ remittances relative to exports and imports in US$ Million, 1980–2005 Total Merchandise R X

R M

10,834

0.2

0.3

33,815

27,280

0.8

1.0

57,159

31,289

3.8

7.0

2,900

86,285

68,736

3.4

4.2

1980

421

5,744

8,295

7.3

5.1

1992

2,222

9,790

15,465

22.7

14.4

2003

7,578

37,065

39,301

20.4

19.3

2005

10,689

41,224

46,257

25.9

23.1

Imports (M)

33

21,908

1992

264

2002

2,180

2005

Year

Indonesia

1980

Philippines

Workers’ Remittances

Exports (X)

Country

Sources: Hugo 1995; World Bank, World Development Report, various volumes; Soeprobo 2005: 10; IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, various volumes; Migration News, July 2006; http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/spei/tab11.htm

Source: Hugo 1998.

Figure 3.3 Indonesia: province of origin of officially registered overseas workers, 1989–1992.

50 Graeme Hugo

International Migration in Indonesia

51

around four million or equivalent to less than 2% of the national population. Hence Indonesia’s diaspora is numerically small compared with that of nations like China and India, and proportionately compared with countries like the Philippines. The economic impact of migration is certainly significant and increasing but it is not, as Table 3.3 shows the major proportion of the economy that is in other Asian emigration countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Nevertheless it is argued here that international migration is an important element in Indonesian development for the following reasons. At national level, while the impacts are relatively smaller than other nations they are of significance, and indeed, of increasing significance. Further on, international migration has been used as an important way of diversifying the sources of income of the nation, communities and households at times of economic crisis. Above all the developmental impact of migration tends to be concentrated in particular parts of the country, and often, in poor areas. In assessing the developmental impact of international labour migration in a large and diverse nation such as Indonesia it is of crucial importance to recognize that migrant workers are not a random representative cross section of Indonesian workers. They are selectively drawn from particular groups and areas due to the significance of networks and chain migration and the fact that once a migration network is established it facilitates and encourages further movement along that network. Figure 3.3 shows that the bulk of official OCWs are recruited from within Java, especially the province of West Java. There is also concentration of areas of origin of official OCWs within provinces. A World Bank report (2006b p. 2) notes the concentration of the origins of Indonesian female migrant workers in the Kabupaten of Sukabumi, Cianjur and Indramayu (West Java), Cilacap and Wonosobo (Central Java), Malang, Kediri and Ponorogo (East Java) and Kulan Progo in Yogyakarta. Determining the origins of undocumented workers is much more difficult. However, some indications can be gained from data on deported workers from Malaysia. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the provinces of origin of Indonesian migrant workers detected in Sabah without the requisite immigration papers and deported into East Kalimantan. This shows the dominance of undocumented workers being from Southern Sulawesi and the two Nusa Tenggara provinces. It is interesting that the migrant origins of undocumented migrants is quite different to that for legal OCWs. For example, on Java where West Java is the dominant origin of official migrant workers, East Java is undoubtedly the main area of origin of undocumented workers (Spaan, 1999). Elsewhere (Hugo, 2004), in a study of the province of East Nusa Tenggara, perhaps Indonesia’s poorest province, it is demonstrated that within the province it is particular areas and particular villages which are the main areas of origin of migrant workers leaving the province. Fieldwork there indicated that this pattern of spatial concentration of the origins of migrants (and of the impacts of migration) is due to a number of factors:

52

Graeme Hugo

Figure 3.4 Indonesia: Areas of origin of workers deported from Sabah to East Kalimantan, 1994 to 1998. Source: Provincial Development Office of the province of East Kalimantan Samarinda.

• Chain migration effects whereby once a migrant worker has gone overseas they encourage fellow villagers to follow them both directly through facilitating that movement and indirectly by demonstrating that migration can have a successful income. • The activities of recruiters tend to be concentrated in particular areas. Recruiters are usually subagents of larger city-based enterprises and often ex-migrants who operate in their areas of origin. • Historical factors such as the linking of a village in some way to outside communities. For example in East Nusa Tenggara the retreat of Japanese occupiers who took some local people with them to Sabah was a major factor in the postwar migration from the area to Malaysia. THE SCALE OF REMITTANCES Remittances from migrants to their home communities have been at the center of the focus on the beneficial impact of migration upon development

International Migration in Indonesia

53

in home countries (Terry & Wilson, 2005). The World Bank (2006c p. 85) estimates that in 2005 international migrant remittances to developing countries reached US $167 billion but it may be up to 50% higher given problems with data. The increase in remittances in Indonesia is shown in Figure 3.5, but they are relatively small in value alongside Indonesia’s imports and exports although it has increased from 0.1% the size of merchandise exports in 1980 to 4.2% in 2005. Remittances however are severely underestimated by official data (World Bank, 2006c p. 6–7) and are likely to be greater than earnings from Indonesian agricultural exports and perhaps as great as nonoil and gas mining export earnings. The impact of remittances is much greater at the local and regional level. For example, in the province of West Nusa Tenggara, one of the poorest in the country, it was reported in 1995 (Indonesian Observer 18 March 1995) that: At least 16,000 people from West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) province are currently working in Malaysia because the province can not provide enough job opportunities. Together they sent between Rp96 billion and Rp120 billion per year to their families in the province, Antara reported here yesterday. The amount was higher than NTB provincial budget in 1995/1996, which only reached Rp80.4 billion. In 2005 the provincial administration reported 42,000 official migrant workers departing and remittances of Rp400 billion (US $44 million) (Asian Migration News 16–28 June 2006).

3,500 3,000

Million $US

2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

0

Year

Figure 3.5 Indonesia: Growth of remittances, 1983–2005. Sources: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks, Soeprobo 2006:.8; Asian Migration News, 15-31 January 2006; Migration News, July 2006.

54

Graeme Hugo

Titu Eki (2002 p. 257) collected data on remittances in a single kabupaten (regency) within the neighbouring (also very poor) province of East Nusa Tenggara from two banks and the post office and the total added up to the equivalent of Rp 4,234.8 million (US $466 million) in 1997. Although an understatement of total remittances it was four times higher than the Eastern Flores kabupaten local government budget and 36.7 times greater than provincial earnings from exports. In the same province, Hugo (2004 p. 120) conservatively estimated the annual flow of remittances into the kabupaten of East Flores at US $20 million a year and argued that the remittances are the major financial flow into the region. An example of the regional impact of international labour migration is provided by a report (Republika 19 February 1996) of the kabupaten of Tulungagung, East Java (Population, 1990 p. 889, 893). It was estimated that some 20,000 people had gone to Malaysia as OCWs (only 9,000 of them legally) and that in 1995 their remittances totalled Rp 61.4 billion

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500 West Nusa Tenggara Province PAD Remittances

BILLION RUPIAH

1000

Sukabumi Kabupatan

East Java Province PAD Remittances

PAD Remittances

500

500

0

0 2001

2002

2003

2004

2001

2002

2003

Figure 3.6 Indonesia selected areas: Remittances compared with regional government revenue (PAD) in billion Rupiah, 2001–2003. Source: World Bank 2006c: 7.

International Migration in Indonesia

55

(US $24.6 million) well in excess of the kabupaten’s government budget of Rp 2.9 billion (US $1.16 million). The World Bank (2006c p. 7) have demonstrated that remittances are significantly larger than regional government revenue in the provinces of East Java and West Nusa Tenggara and in Sukabumi Kabupaten in West Java (Figure 3.6). However, they warn that the remittances data are severe underestimates. We examine some of the impacts of remittances in one such province—East Nusa Tenggara—in the following section.

Use of Remittances in East Nusa Tenggara What is the impact of remittances on origin areas? The effect on family and village economies is immediately apparent when one enters rural communities with large numbers of OCWs. Houses tend to be made of brick or stone rather than wood or atap (palm leaves) and have glass windows, televisions, and other modern appliances and there is an air of prosperity. The impact of expenditure of remittances on housing in the emigration kabupaten of East Flores in East Nusa Tenggara is evident in the fact that whereas only 18.2% of total households in the province had houses with brick walls this applied to 40% in East Flores. The expenditure of remittances on electricity generating facilities for villages not yet included in the national grid is also evident with 13.2% of East Flores houses having such electricity compared with 1.6% province wide. Indeed groups of migrants often club together to pay for village electricity generating facilities, extension wiring and so forth. The high levels of ownership of televisions also reflect the impact of remittances in these rural areas. In one of the major emigration areas, East Flores in East Nusa Tenggara there has been a number of studies of the impact of remittances (Hugo, 2004). Table 3.4 presents data from one such study by Titu Eki (2002 p. 264) and indicates the main use made of remittances in 144 households with returned migrants or migrants still away. He found that day to day household consumption accounts for less than a third of remittances. Of course such consumption can have positive local developmental efforts by flow-on efforts to local workers. Debt repayment is also important. This is often associated with loans raised to pay for the costs of travel. However there are also costs incurred in meeting customary (adat) obligations especially bride price (bilis) weddings, funerals, and so forth, and these are often met with remittances. Titu Eki (2002 p. 265) explains that debts associated with adat can even be the initiating trigger of migration to East Malaysia to work. The striking feature however of Table 3.4 is the substantial part of remittances which is devoted to investment in development-related activity. Some 23.6% are devoted to educational expenses. Goma, Mantra, and Bintarto (1993, p. 407) found that a fifth of remittances in their village study went to meet education costs. Field interviews confirm that this is a major use of money remitted from Malaysia and an increasing amount is spent in sending teenage children elsewhere in Indonesia (especially Java) where there is

56

Graeme Hugo

Table 3.4 East Flores study village: Return and recent migrants: The main use made of the money sent home within the last five years, 1998 Indicator Household consumption Debts and adat (customary law) costs Consumptive necessities

Return Migrant

Recent Migrant

Total No.

%

20

22

42

29.2

7

12

19

13.2

27

34

61

42.4

Physical assets (housing, land)

15

11

26

18.0

Educational fees

16

18

34

23.6

Bank (saving accounts)

14

9

23

16.0

Investments

45

38

83

57.6

Total

72

72

144

100.0

Source: Titu Eki 2002.

better higher secondary and tertiary education institutions. In some cases young adults go to work in Malaysia for a few years in order to earn enough to send themselves through school in Java. Hence some of the remittances for education are not spent in the local area but in major urban centres in Java, Makassar in Sulawesi or Kupang in Timor. There is also considerable investment in improvement of housing. This has multiple effects because it involves largely local labour and materials. Some remittances are used to purchase land but traditional methods of division of land prevent exchange of land through selling. There is some evidence of investment in transport—through purchase of one of the minibuses which now ply the regional, and rocky village, roads. Titu Eki (2002 p. 269) reports that 45 minibuses had been purchased from remittances in five kecamatan (subdistricts) in East Flores. In some cases groups of returned migrants have invested in the minibuses. Transport improvement is one of the key infrastructure needs if development in the region is to progress. As yet there are few shops in the villages but increasing commercialisation is evident and this is a growing avenue for investment of the earnings of migration. Another productive use of remittances in East Nusa Tenggara is for the construction and maintenance of water sources, tanks, and distribution infrastructure. East Flores is one of the driest areas in Indonesia and water shortage is a major constraint on agricultural development (Barlow, Gondowarsito, Birowo & Jayasuriua, 1990). Titu Eki (2002 p. 287–288) found that remittances were used to construct public and private tanks to collect water in the

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rainy season and run pipes from tanks or springs to the centre of villages. Another major investment is generators because most migrant villages are not connected to the national grid (Kapioru, 1995 p. 34). One important impact of remittances in East Flores has been the introduction of more cash-based activity and increased involvement with formal financial institutions—again a necessary factor for development. Remittances are one of the main sources of cash for communities in East Flores where much of the food of households is grown by them. Moreover remittances have been the mechanism whereby people in the region have become familiar with formal financial institutions, namely banks. Banks in the migration area are much more active than in neighbouring regions not only in receiving financial transfers and offering savings products but also as a source of loans (Titu Eki, 2002 p. 275).

LOCAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF MIGRATION Remittances are providing a significant capital flow into emigration communities in Indonesia and they are having some positive impacts on development in those areas by raising consumption levels and increasing commercialisation and monetisation of the local economy. They increase the demand for a range of services especially in education, but also in health and other social services and provide the money to pay for them. They create employment in the construction sector and improve infrastructure to a degree. The development impacts of migration are not restricted, however, to the effects of remittances. One impact is to reduce the economically active population in the main outmigration areas and ease local unemployment and pressures on land resources. This is reflected in the lack of population growth in these areas (Hugo, 2004). Certainly it is apparent when visiting the villages, where there are few young adult men to be seen and women, children, and older men are predominant. One study in East Nusa Tenggara among the families of migrants still absent found three quarters reported that the absence of the migrant had impacted their agricultural activities (Table 3.5). This was more the case when a male migrant (82.6%) was absent than was the case with females (45.8%). However, there does not appear to have been a reduction in food production in the villages due to the absence of the men. Women have taken on more agricultural tasks than they have done traditionally and there is a strong extended family and community tradition of mutual self-help. The major work inputs are needed when there is new land to be cleared for a new garden and it is then that the men tend to come back from Malaysia. Titu Eki (2002 p. 228) found that migrant households often bring in other family members when the migrant worker is absent to take on some of the roles of the absentee. The average number of extended family members in

58

Graeme Hugo

Table 3.5 Survey villages migrants still away: Family perceptions of whether absence of migrant had effected agricultural production Male Whether Effected Agricultural Production

Female

Total

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Yes

76

82.6

11

45.8

87

75.0

No

16

17.4

13

54.2

29

25.0

Total

92

100.0

24

100.0

116

100.0

Source: Hugo 1998: 120.

migrant households was 1.6 compared with 0.8 in nonmigrant households. He also found (2002 p. 245) that children of migrants take on more agricultural and other work tasks than children in nonmigrant households. It has been established elsewhere in Indonesia that the marginal productivity of labour in many rural areas is very low so the loss of migrant workers has little or no impact on agricultural production (Meindertsma, 1997; Hugo, 1987). In the several studies of migration impact in East Nusa Tenggara there is little evidence of migration leading to significant changes in local agriculture such as a transformation from subsistence to cash cropping. Moreover, there is little evidence of investment of remittances in purchase of agricultural equipment or livestock, although this has been observed elsewhere in Indonesia (Hugo, 1987). This may be partly a function of the poor quality of the land and water resources in the region and also the lack of readily accessible markets for agricultural produce. There are a number of significant constraints upon development in East Nusa Tenggara, both in terms of physical and human resources and undoubtedly these are both a cause of the outmigration and compromise the extent to which migrants are able to invest in local agricultural development. Among the physical constraints upon development the following are particularly significant, such as the archipelago nature of the province and the lack of roads on the larger islands that have prevented the full exploitation of the province’s resources. This is exacerbated by the broken topography of the major islands. The climate and soil resources of the province are limited with erosion being significant in some areas and rainfall deficits exposing some areas to frequent droughts and problems of water supply. The distance of the province from the main centre of decision making in Jakarta and the nation’s major urban markets in Western Indonesia is a relevant factor too. These physical constraints upon development are exacerbated by limited investment in the province, low average levels of education and training, low productivity of the workforce, lack of diversity in the local

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economy which is dominated by agriculture and a high level of ethnolinguistic diversity. On the other hand, it is clear that there are also some definite areas of development potential if these obstacles can be overcome. However it is unlikely that potential small investors such as those represented by the migrants from East Flores and their families are going to be able to overcome these barriers alone. This will only occur if a conducive climate for small investors is created by providing sufficient infrastructure (especially in transport) investment and careful planning. Some of the most promising areas of development potential are as follows: • In agriculture, despite problems of over cultivation in some areas there remains potential for dry land crops and expansion of marketing of agricultural products especially fresh fruit and vegetables to the huge and growing urban markets in Java if transport, processing and management can be improved. • The fi sheries subsector offers enormous potential with only 25% of the potential sustainable capacity in the 200,000 square km of the province’s oceans being exploited. There is huge scope to sell fresh and processed fish to the huge markets in Java if transport, management, and processing could be greatly improved. • There is considerable scope to improve production of cattle and cattle products, especially with the rapidly expanding fresh meat market in Java with the improvements to income and growth of Indonesia’s urban-based middle class which is highly concentrated in Java. • There is considerable opportunity for value adding to locally produced primary industry products. There is virtually no fish and meat processing plants locally and there is a considerable need to develop this. • Now many consumption items such as furniture and processed foods come from Java to the province. There is considerable scope for local production of day to day items, especially as transport improves and makes rapidly expanding urban places like Kupang more accessible to other parts of the province. • Manufacturing is still very limited but there are possibilities in salt production and processing, natural gas, cement manufacture, and the unique handicrafts of the region. • Tourism is one of the most promising areas which also has significant human resource implications since it is relatively labour intensive and has significant training requirements. The province has a wealth of natural attractions for tourists as well as marvellous beaches and a wide variety of fascinating cultural groups and a varied and rich handicraft industry especially in hard woven textiles. Clearly one of the constraints on developing this potential is the lack of investment capital. Migrant remittances constitute one of the few local

60 Graeme Hugo sources of capital yet there has been limited investment by migrants in these areas. This is in contrast to some other areas in Indonesia such as West Nusa Tenggara as has been demonstrated by Ndoen (2000). The reason why there has not been such an investment among migrants in East Nusa Tenggara appears to be the following. Compared with other migrant areas East Nusa Tenggara is an isolated peripheral area where the lack of local large scale infrastructure (transport etc.) makes it difficult for small and medium scale business people to be successful. Moreover, the illegality of some migrants sending the remittances plays a role. At the policy level what is needed is to improve the physical infrastructure, especially transport infrastructure, to create a favourable environment for small investors, to integrate remittance recipients into regional planning efforts, to offer appropriate training/education programs to assist returning migrants in making effective investment decisions, and to provide relevant financial products and advice which would facilitate the use of remittances by returning migrants to develop enterprises. It is somewhat paradoxical that while the export of labour has been explicitly incorporated into national planning efforts during the Sixth Five Year Plan 1994–1999 in Indonesia (Hugo, 1995), in a poor province where labour migration is one of the few flows of funds into the region, it is not being considered at all in regional development planning. Hence despite the substantial inflow of remittances East Nusa Tenggara remains Indonesia’s poorest province (Alisjahbana & Manning, 2006 p. 254).

SOCIAL IMPACTS The focus here has been overwhelmingly on the impacts of international migration on economic development at regional and local levels in Indonesia. However the social effects of migration are also significant although neglected. Moreover they do impinge on development in the areas of origin of migrants. One such impact is that migration has often widened the roles of women left at home in the village. Their role in family decision making has increased in household budgeting, in making decisions about the schooling of children, in agriculture and animal husbandry, and their community involvement has undoubtedly increased (Kapioru, 1995). In East Nusa Tenggara this increased independence is being asserted in a younger generation of women who are now migrating independently to Sabah to seek work whereas in the past the movement was male dominated (Hugo, 1998). There has also been an impact on family decision making. Table 3.6 indicates that in a quarter of surveyed families the absence of a migrant family member led to a major change in family decision making. There is a striking sex differential here with a third of families with male migrants absent indicating that the absence had produced an influence on family decision making whereas this was the case in only a single household where a female migrant had left.

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Table 3.6 East Flores survey villages migrants still away: Effects on family decision making Male

Effects on Family Decision Making

No.

Yes

29

No Total

Female

Total

%

No.

%

No.

%

31.5

1

4.2

30

25.9

63

68.5

23

95.6

86

74.1

92

100.0

24

100.0

116

100.0

Source: Hugo 1998: 123.

It is apparent, however, that there are also negative social aspects associated with the long absences of migrants. In East Nusa Tenggara migration places considerable strain on marriages and some men and, to lesser extent, women have taken an extra or substitute spouse in Malaysia. In the early 1990s concern over this issue was so great that there was a regional government move to initiate a transmigration scheme to resettle the wives and families of men working in Malaysia to East Kalimantan so that they could visit more frequently. This however did not gain any acceptance because it is apparent that the local matrix of extended family, community, and church support is an important source of support to the women left behind. The role of women has changed in East Flores as a result of the heavy migration to Sabah. This is not only a result of women themselves participating in migration but also because of their changed roles due to the absence of a father, brother, or husband. Graham (1997 p. 6) explains that traditionally women did not work the gardens which produce local food. However, the migration of men to Malaysia has resulted in them working gardens and women gain de facto control of the land of men away in Malaysia (Graham, 1997 p. 8). It is also apparent that the independent earning of money by women migrants has an impact on the status of women in East Flores. A case reported in the Kupang Post (30 October 1997) involved a female migrant gaining employment as a household servant in Hong Kong where she is able to earn Rp 1.2 million per month and send back around Rp one million to her parents every few months. She was part of a group of 108 women sent from the region to Hong Kong to work as household assistants. The bulk of use the money is put to provide the necessities of life for her parents but also to greatly improve their house. There has been a growing concern on the impact of labour migration on children left behind by one or both of their parents. In a study of a village in East Java where 50% of the total male population are away working in Malaysia women were reported to be living as widows, had to take on extra work, were experiencing difficulty maintaining security in the village and were finding it hard to control and discipline children (Hugo, 1992

62

Graeme Hugo

p. 193). Titu Eki (2002 p. 230) reports only isolated cases of problems in bringing up children in migrant households in East Flores because of the involvement of extended family in childbearing. Nevertheless Graham (1997 p. 3) reports: Formally married or not, young women in the village frequently face the experience of carrying a child to term and giving birth without the assistance, financial or otherwise, of the baby’s father. Indeed as soon as the couple’s first child is conceived many a young father-to-be leaves for Malaysia for a period of 2 to 3 years. Young women who lose a child in its infancy in these circumstances are sometimes doubly distressed by the fact that the father has never seen the child and by the apprehension that he may suspect they had not cared for it properly in his absence. The Kupang Post, the main newspaper in East Nusa Tenggara (23 October 1997) reported that around 254 residents of Desa Ndetundora II in kecamatan Ende in Flores who had sought to earn their income in Malaysia over the 1995–1997 three year period, some 200 had left a wife and children in the village. The secretary of the village indicated that the failure of some husbands and fathers to return to the village constituted a significant problem in the village. Indeed many had not even sent back any news. Graham (1997 p. 3) points to two sources of opposition to labour migration in the village she studied in East Flores. The Catholic Church locally has come out strongly against the migration because of the social disruption it causes. Labour migration is seen to disrupt Christian family life in Flores. The East Flores regency officials were also seen to be against the illegal migration partly because it is out of their control but also partly because it undermines local attempts to achieve regional development.

CONCLUSION In a large and complex nation like Indonesia international labour migration is likely to have more significant impacts upon economic development in regions than it is upon the nation as a whole. This is especially the case in peripheral, poor, and lagging regions such as Eastern Indonesia. Although the empirical work on migration and development in Indonesia is limited, it appears that the potential for labour migration out of rural areas to contribute to the development of those areas is considerable. However this potential is at best only being partially realized. Although the nation’s overall planning strategy explicitly incorporates labour export as one of the tools of economic planning, for this potential to be fully realized in a regional context it will be necessary for national and provincial governments to be more involved. Firstly, a mechanism should be developed to enable the migration itself to be legalized with minimal disruption to the flows of movement as they are currently occurring so that uncertainties and chances of exploitation confronting migrants are eliminated.

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Secondly, transport and other infrastructure need to be greatly improved in the origin areas to create investment opportunities in peripheral areas. Only then will there be an investment environment which makes it possible for returning migrants and their families to have options other than house construction as a way to invest the fruits of their migration. Thirdly, there needs to be an acceptance at all levels of government that labour migration is an important element in regional development which should be encouraged in the absence of development of other work opportunities and integrated into regional and local planning policy and programmes. Although labour migration is not the long term solution to poverty in rural Indonesia it is important in the short and medium terms that the benefits of this well established and successful migration system be maximized for the households directly affected by it and the region in which they live. REFERENCES Alisjahbana, A. S. & Manning, C. (2006). Labour market dimensions of poverty in Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 42(2), 235–261. Athukorala, P. (2006). Post-crisis export performance: The Indonesian experience in regional perspective. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 42(2), 177–211. Barlow, C., Gondowarsito, R., Birowo, A. T., & Jayasuriya, S. (1990). Development in eastern Indonesia: The case of Nusa Tenggara Timur (International Development Issues, 13). . Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services (AGPS). Department Tenaga Kerja, Republic of Indonesia. (1998). Strategi Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia Ke Luar Negeri. Jakarta: Departemen Tenaga Kerja, Republic of Indonesia. Firdausy, C. M. (2005, July 6–8). Size, nature, issues and policies of international labor migration from Indonesia to Asia. Paper presented at the UN Meeting on International Migration, United Nations Headquarters, New York. Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). (2005, October). Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action. Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva. Goma, J. N., Mantra, I. B., & Bintarto, R. (1993). Labour force mobility from East Flores to Sabah Malaysia and the extent of the influence in the village origin: A case study at Nelereren Village. Beasiswa Pendidikan Pasca Sarjana-Universitas Gadjah Mada (BPPS-UGM), 6(4A), 401–412. Graham, P. (1997). ‘Widows’ at home, workers abroad: Florenese women and labour migration.Unpublished manuscript, Monash University, Melbourne. Hill, H. (1994). The economy. In: H. Hall (Ed.), Indonesia’s new order: The dynamics of socio-economic transformation. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Huang, S., Yeoh, B. S. A., & Abdul Rahman, N. (Eds.). (2005). Asian women as transnational domestic workers. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. Hugo, G. J. (1987). Demographic and welfare implications of urbanization: Direct and indirect effects on sending and receiving areas. In: R.J. Fuchs, G.W. Jones, & E. Pernia (Eds.), Urbanization and urban policies in Pacific Asia (pp. 136–165). Boulder: Westview Press. Hugo, G. J. (1992). Women on the move: Changing patterns of population movement of women in Indonesia. In S. Chant (Ed.), Gender and migration in developing countries (pp. 174–196). London: Belhaven Press. Hugo, G. J. (1995). Labour export from Indonesia: An overview. Asean Economic Bulletin, 12(2), 275–298.

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Hugo, G. J. (1998). International migration in eastern Indonesia. Paper prepared for East Indonesia Project. Canberra: Australian National University. Hugo, G. J. (2004). International labour migration and village dynamics: A study of Flores, East Nusa Tenggara. In T. R. Leinbach (Ed.), The Indonesian rural economy: Mobility, work and enterprise (pp. 103–133). Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies. Inglis, C. (2002 1 October). Malaysia wavers on labor crackdown, Migration Information Source. Retrieved 25 July 2007 from http://www.migrationinformation. org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=63 Kapioru, C. (1995). Mobilitas Pekerja Yang Berstatus Suami, Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Perubahan Status Wanita Dan Kondisi Sosial Ekonomi Rumah Tangga. Kupang: UNFPA. Meindertsma, D. (1997). Income diversity and farming systems. Modelling of farm households in Lombok, Indonesia. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute. Ndoen, M. L. (2000). Migrants and entrepreneurial activities in peripheral Indonesia. A socio-economic model of profit-seeking behaviour. Free University, Amsterdam, research series, Thela Thesis. Okushima, M. (2005). Introduction to a special issue: International trends of Indonesian migrant workers, and their employment system in Japan. Intercultural Communication Studies 17, 1–147. Population Reference Bureau. (2006). 2006 World population data sheet. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau. Pusat Penelitian Kependudukan, Universitas Gadjah Mada. (1986). Mobilitas Angkalan Kerja ke Timur Tengah. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University. Scalabrini Migration Center. (1999). Asian migration atlas 1999. Retrieved July 25, 2007 from http://www.scalabrini.asn.au/atlas/amatlas.htm Scalabrini Migration Center. (2000). Asian migration atlas 2000. Retrieved July 25, 2007 from http://www.scalabrini.asn.au/atlas/amatlas.htm Soeprobo, T. B. (2003, February 6–7). Recent trends of international migration in Indonesia. Paper presented at the Workshop on International Migration and Labour Markets in Asia, Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo, Japan. Soeprobo, T. B. (2005, January 20–21). Recent trends of international migration in Indonesia. Paper presented at the Workshop on International Migration and Labour Markets in Asia, Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo, Japan. Soeprobo, T. B. (2006, February 17). Recent trends in international migration in Indonesia. Paper prepared for Workshop on International Migration and Labour Market in Asia organized by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Japan Institute of Labour, Tokyo,Japan. Solomon, J. (1997, February 20). What political risk? Far Eastern Economic Review, 56. Spaan, E. (1994). Taikongs and Calos: The role of middlemen and brokers in Javanese international migration. International Migration Review, 28(1), 93–113. Spaan, E. (1999). Labour circulation and socioeconomic transformation: The case of East Java, Indonesia (Report 56). The Hague: NIDI. Terry, D. F. & Wilson, S. R. (Eds.). (2005). Beyond small change: Making migrant remittances count. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Titu Eki, A. (2002). International labour emigration from Eastern Flores Indonesia to Sabah Malaysia: A study of patterns, causes and consequences. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Population and Human Resources, Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies, University of Adelaide. United Nations. (1997). The sex and age distribution of the world populations: The 1996 revision. New York: United Nations. United Nations. (2006, April 3–7). World population monitoring, focusing on international migration and development. Commission on Population and Development,

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Report of the Secretary-General, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York:United Nations. World Bank. World development report, various volumes. New York: Oxford University Press. World Bank. (2006a). World development report 2007: Development and the next generation. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2006b, January). Migration, remittance and female migrant workers. Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Bank. (2006c). Global economic prospects 2006. Economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

4

Migrant Remittances and Development in Bolivia and Mexico A Comparative Study Virginie Baby-Collin, Geneviève Cortes and Laurent Faret

At a global level, Latin America and the Caribbean appear to be the top regions receiving migratory remittances, with a strong growth in volume during the last two decades. Evidently, this position mainly relates to Mexican migration (SELA, 2005). According to the report Panorama Social de América Latina 2005 of the CEPAL (2005) remittances sent by Latin American and Caribbean emigrants have reached a sum of 45 billion dollars for the year 2004, of which 55% comes from Mexico (40) and Central America (15), 31% from other South American countries, and 14% from the countries of the Caribbean. In terms of the flow of people and money, Mexican migration thus remains incomparable with other Latin-American countries. However, by considering the relative volume of the remittances in the receiving countries, the results from the studies of the BID (Inter-American Bank of Development), FOMIN (Multilateral Fund of Investments), and Bendixen and Associates (2005), show that 18% of the adult population in Mexico is receiving remittances. This proportion is lower than what can be found in some Central American and Caribbean countries (28% in El Salvador and 38% in the Dominican Republic), yet rather close to Andean countries like Peru or Bolivia (11%). In this context, we propose a comparative approach to the local impact of the family migratory remittances in Mexico and Bolivia, countries that, on a continental scale, also have in common a traditional and strongly structured emigration (toward the United States for the first, mainly toward Argentina for the latter). Mexican migration to the United States arose at the end of the 19th century to strongly grow during the second half of the 20th century. Historically, Mexican migration to the United States developed as seasonal migration, primarily focused on agriculture, that is: the bracero program, between 1942 and 1964. Since the 1980s, the transformation of the migratory models is due to a rise in emigration, a more durable establishment of migrants in the United States and the dispersing flows toward new destinations in this country (Durand & Massey, 2003; Faret, 2003).

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In regard to Bolivia, the flow toward Argentina, beginning with the 1920s, intensified during the 1960s and transformed from rural-rural migration headed to the frontier areas of the northwest of Argentina (Jujuy, Salta, Mendoza) to migration headed toward the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires (Sassone, 2002). The formation of specific poles of concentration in the receiving countries constitutes, in Mexico as well as in Bolivia, a factor in the reinforcement of the link between the migrants and their places of origin. A deep transformation of the manner of displacements and more structured forms of transnational exchanges arise, in which remittances hold a key place. The importance of migrant remittances and especially the use in which this money is put in the receiving societies are centremost to the strong current debate on the relations between migration and development processes. For this reason, the CEPAL (2005) insists on the fact that migrant remittances would have reduced poverty levels for more than 2.5 million people1 in Latin America, but that they do not assure concrete financial security and the durable development of places and countries affected by migration. This statement calls for a more precise questioning of the remittance systems and its functioning based on both regional and micro-local scales. Using data from surveys carried out in 2002–2003 in various Bolivian and Mexican rural regions, we propose an evaluation and characterization of the impact of migratory remittances on the development of sending areas. We attempt to identify, more specifically, convergences and divergences upon the effects of different local contexts and forms of mobility. The first objective is to deal with the volume of individual and family migratory transfers as well as how these remittances are used, that is, the priorities given to forms of productive and unproductive investments. Secondly, we propose to illustrate and compare this phenomenon between the different areas according to various sociodemographic and economic parameters, while also taking the temporalities of migration in consideration.

MIGRATORY CONTEXT AND METHODS OF STUDY The four micro-regions under study are in contrasting rural contexts and diversely integrated into their respective regional and national environment. Toco, in Bolivia, the first area of study, is a municipality situated in the province of Esteban Arze, in the department of Cochabamba. Located in the high valley of the Andean foothills, the rural communities belonging to the Quechua area are tightly linked, through diversified agricultural economies, to the small local towns (notably Cliza) and the regional capital of Cochabamba, located on the national strategic axis La Paz- Santa Cruz. Centrally positioned, the region is endowed with a certain economic dynamism. However, with territorial structures falling apart, strong demographic pressure, and recurring drought, migration toward Argentina is ancient and well

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embedded, even if the border is about a day’s bus ride away. The second area in Bolivia, that of Tupiza, a municipality of the province of South Chichas, is found very close to the Argentinean border (three hours by bus), in a much more peripheral area, namely in the south of the department of Potosi. Quite distanced from the bigger national axes, isolated and poorer, the communities of dispersed rural dwellings are but slightly organized under influence of the town of Tupiza, and their activities remain largely dominated by subsistence agriculture. The effect of the proximity of the border, doubled by an ancient cultural mobility, explains the permanence of seasonal migrations toward the agricultural provinces of neighbouring northwestern Argentina, even if destinations are now changing. This dual Bolivian context echoes both areas of study upheld by the research in western Mexico, a region of traditional emigration to the United States, despite the distance of the northern country border. The Jalostotitlan district (within the state of Jalisco), situated in Les Altos de Jalisco, is a region traditionally dominated by cattle ranches. This small town with around 20,000 people is a pole of attraction for surrounding rural areas and its economic activities are diversified. In a region marked by urbanization and industrialization processes, Jalostotitlan is found on an axis of communication at the heart of a triangle of active industrial and commercial towns: Guadalajara (in the south), Aguascalientes (to the north), and Leon (on the east). This regional situation, favourable to this town’s accelerated demographic growth, participates in a well-established migratory tradition going back to the 1940s. The small town of Urireo, the last area of study in the extreme south of the state of Guanajuato near Michoacan, does not benefit neither from this economic diversification nor of this solid regional integration. Just a few kilometers from the town of Salvatierra (the municipal’s main location), Urireo remains in the southeast outskirts of the large, irrigated, and intensive agricultural plain of El Bajío. Its little diversified economy is dominated by pluvial agriculture, supplemented by bovine stockbreeding and local traditional commercial activity. More recent than in the preceding area, international migration developed from the 1970s on, even if it initially started at the time of the contracts of braceros. The varied contexts of the rural worlds of Bolivia and Mexico explain the specific outlines for the four micro-regions. The data for this study, collected between April and August 2002, is part of the PARMI program activities.2 A common working plan permitted the execution of quantitative surveys pertaining to a total of 1,060 households (6212 individuals in total), composed of at least one individual with international migration experience. The scattering of rural homes, in the Toco (Cochabamba) area in Bolivia, justified the choice of 254 households surveyed in eight communities (population 5,870).3 In Tupiza, the same number of households was selected out of 12 communities comprising 4,159 inhabitants.4 In Mexico, where assembled dwellings prevail in the areas surveyed, 325 interviews were completed in the town of Jalostotitlán (population 20,201) and 227 in the village of Urireo (population 8,633).

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Two levels of analysis were built into the surveys: a collective level—that of families, and an individual level—that of members of the household with at least one migratory experience. This double approach permits the articulation of an individualized view of migratory remittances within the domestic context. The number of migrants out of the whole population taken into account in the study is variable: 30% in Tupiza, 22.8% in Jalostotilan, 20% in Uriero, and 19.4% in Toco. To conclude, the quantitative surveys were completed through qualified interviews conducted with individuals, disposing of migratory experiences of both significant cyclical duration and intensity, some contacted at the moment of their return to their place of origin. This latter development of the study has provided, more specifically, an enriching knowledge concerning the strategies of remittances sending and use.

The Different Migratory Systems The migratory systems studied proffer significant characteristics in terms of spatial and economic organization and profile of displacement. The Bolivian migration follows a very strict metropolitan polarization directed to the Buenos Aires area (the federal capital and its surroundings), including 28.6% of the total flows (but 38% in Toco, and 25% for Tupiza). Nevertheless, the migrants of Toco, give preference to the town of La Plata, neighbor to Buenos Aires (45% of the recorded flow), whereas Mendoza is the number one destination in the countryside of Tupiza (35% of the flow). However, the Tupizeños distinguish themselves through dispersion to other locations: San Salvador de Jujuy (18%), Cordoba (10%), Mar del Plata, and Bahia Blanca. The spatial configuration of these flows is explained by traditions, proximity, and especially through migrants’ economic practices of insertion in Argentina. Preserving a long tradition of seasonal emigration of rural/rural type, the migrants of the border region of Tupiza leave to work essentially in agriculture (harvesting sugarcane in Jujuy, fruits and vegetables in the urban belts of Mendoza or Buenos Aires), construction work, and domestic services for the women. At Toco, situated two days from the border, the primary destination (Buenos Aires/La Plata) relates to an insertion in secondary activities or urban service sectors: principally construction, commerce, or textiles manufacturing for the women. A system of migratory flows with specific canalization is also observed in the two microregions studied in Mexico. In Jalostotitlan, 70% of the flows are headed toward California (a long established migratory route), particularly to the urban region of Los Angeles (more than 36%), that of San Francisco (20%), and the central Californian valleys (8.6%). The flows leaving from Urireo are less intensively tied to a dominant regional destination, and appear more dispersed. There are two major poles of attraction, namely the urban region of Chicago (34% of the flows), and that of Miami (21%). However, the states of Texas and Colorado account for 7% and 6.5% of

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the flows respectively, whereas California attracts 6% of the migrants. Concerning the labour market insertion of the migrants, this is less pronounced as compared to the Bolivian case: in the Californian poles, the activities are diversified, reflecting the urban economies, but with the service sector the most represented. We also note an important proportion of nonactive migrants, that is, retirees or homemakers. In the central Californian valleys, nonetheless, the majority of workers remain agricultural (31%). The sectors of activity in the United States for migrants from Urireo are less diversified: they are factory workers, employees in food service or other services in Chicago. In Florida, the agricultural activities remain prominent, parallel to landscaping and construction jobs.

Volumes and Migratory Rhythms The survey recorded up to six past migratory events (counted for a total of 2,118 migrants) and shows that nearly 86% of cross-border movements took place between 1995 and 2002 for the totality of the zones studied, thus a lapse of time relatively short during a recent period.5 One of the

Table 4.1 Migratory characteristics in the zones of study Bolivia Migratory indicators

Mexico

Toco

Tupiza

Average number of migrants per family

1.9

2.8

Average number of journeys per migrant

2.6

Average time spent abroad per migrant (cumulative in years)

5.7

Synthetic qualification of migratory practices

mild, temporary, rural/ urban, individual, mainly to Argentina

Urireo

Jalostotitlan

1.7

1.9

10

5

5

10.7

7.8

9.1

very intense, seasonal, rural/rural, individual and familial, mainly to Argentina

intense, temporary, rural/ urban, individual, mainly to USA

intense, temporary, rural/urban, individual, mainly to USA

Source: Data from the PARMI program, 2002. Number of respondents = 2118.

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71

major characteristics of the four zones of study is precisely the strong current migratory activity, enabling a comparative research. On the other hand, the intensity and patterns of mobility are not similar in each zone (Table 4.1). Tupiza, strongly identified by a seasonal and traditional migration to proximate international borders, distinguishes itself with a strong intensity of migratory movement (viz., number of migrants per family and number of voyages per migrant), by a longer stay abroad, as well as by a larger number of recurring movements of relatively short duration (3 months to 1 year). The mobility structures of the other three zones are organized around individual rural–urban migrations, temporal but of highly varied durations (stays of 1 to 2 years are the most numerous). Jalostotitlán is distinguished, like Tupiza, by frequent journeys to the United States.

CIRCULATION OF MONEY AND GOODS: VOLUME AND USE The way in which the remittances are used is a key indicator of the impact of migration on the local and regional development of the origin countries. We clarify the differentiated trajectories of development based on the use of the monetary transfers and the forms of investment carried out in the communities of origin. Identifying the parameters of classification and interpretation of remittance utilization is necessary, because it relates and gives meaning to both individual and family contexts.

Measuring the Capacity of Remittance Based on a certain number of variables, the survey allowed emphasis on what we call the capacities of remittance in each area of study. Both the money brought back at the time of return and the money sent by the migrant abroad are taken into consideration. However, measuring remittances proves to be difficult as the transferred volumes are often underestimated, either because the modes of transfer are multiple (what often makes counting incomplete), or because the money amount declared by the families are undercounts. The impact of remittances was first assessed by measuring the investments made at a family level over the total time of the migratory experiences of all the members of the family.7 The first point emphasized is the importance of the investments, which translates to a substantial monetary transfer. Out of all the families included in the surveys (both in Mexico and Bolivia), 63.4% expressed having invested in one or more different areas during their life. However, a certain differentiation must be made between the four zones: a greater portion of families make investments in the Toco area in Bolivia (81%) whereas the other three areas of study have comparable percentages (between 56% and 59%). This tendency is confirmed by a second variable dealing with the amount of savings accumulated (or sent) by the migrant during his last stay abroad.

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Table 4.2 Amount of remittance (sent and/or brought back) for the last stay abroad (as part of the total of migrants for each area of study) Bolivia Amount of remittance

Toco

Mexico

Tupiza

Urireo

Jalostotitlán

Total

Less than $1/day

15.3

22.2

12.6

4.1

14.2

$1 to $5/day

26.1

36.0

29.6

20.5

28.6

More than 5$/day

12.3

7.0

30.7

30.4

18.5

Unknown

13.8

1.0

10.3

13.8

8.9

No remittance

32.4

33.8

16.8

31.2

29.8

100%

100%

100%

100%

100.0%

Total

Source: data from the PARMI program, 2002. Number of respondents = 2118.

Considering the transitory situation at the time of the survey, this variable does not escape the effects of the economic situation of a migratory event, successful or not. Nevertheless, it permits a comparison between the four areas of study, establishing what one could call the monetary profitability of the last migration.8 Thus, in order to compare, the amounts are expressed in dollars per day for the four studied areas. Out of all the migrants surveyed, 70% had transferred money at the time of their last return and 61% declared an amount (Table 4.2). Bolivian and Mexican migrations are characterized by relatively limited monetary profits for a significant part of the migrants: more than one third of them make monetary transfers that do not exceed $5 per day. Bolivia presents the most unfavourable situation: less than 15% of the migrants transfer more than $5 per day into their households, as opposed to 30% in Mexico. The area of Tupiza has the lowest capacity of saving: 58% of the migrants do not manage to transfer more than $5 per day. This differentiation, though clearly showing variations in terms of impact on the local development between the two countries, is difficult to interpret: it is the result of several aspects which are due to the economic context of each international migratory configuration and to the specificity of flows in the areas studied. The working conditions in the country of migration—in terms of access to the labour market as well as wage levels—partly explain the capacity for more considerable remittances for the Mexican migrants, even if the cost to reach and remain in the United States is also higher. This aspect is considered later on, when broaching spatial disparities of the capacity of remittance, which is closely related to the geography of the labour market. On the same note, the impact of the remittances is to be

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73

assessed by considering the regional and local contexts in which they are received. If the amounts received in Mexico are higher, their impact is not therefore more important than in Bolivia, because the cost of living is overall higher (the ratio of GDP per capita was 1:4 between Bolivia and Mexico beginning of 2000).

Goods Brought Back During the Return of Migrants In Bolivia as in Mexico, return migration very often involves a transfer of goods that, although less studied, constitutes one of the significant aspects of the impact of the migration in the original communities (Faret, 2003). Considering our sample as a whole, nearly six of every ten migrants brought back goods and/or money to their homes at the time of their last return (the rate is three out of every four in Tupiza, and closer to one out of every two in other areas). As shown in Figure 4.1, money comes as an important part of these contributions, particularly for Bolivia. Money is often brought home by migrants or close relatives, since many migrants consider the modes of transfer by other channels less profitable (too expensive and sometimes unsure). Moreover, the fact of bringing back money when returning has a strong symbolic dimension and works as a matter of pride and ostentation for the one who succeeded. In addition to the transfer of money, it is important to note the importance of the current goods of consumption. Clothes are often brought back (second to all other goods), yet in a much more obvious way for Mexico (quoted in 70% of the cases, as opposed to less than 40% in Bolivia). Returning migrants also bring back domestic supplies and household utensils. Interviews with Mexican migrants indicate that those products can also be purchased in their country of origin, but at higher prices, especially if the migrant does not have to pay a tax at the border. In addition, mutual aid plays an important part in this transfer of goods toward the Mexican places

90% 80% 70%

Money Clothing Housewares Food Car Goods for a Specific Activity Other

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Toco

Tupiza

Urireo

Jalostotitlan

Figure 4.1 Goods/money brought back at the time of the last return (the % of the migrants that brought back some goods/money in each area).

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of origin: migrants benefit from their regular returns by car to help several compatriots bring back supplies to the village (such as refrigerators, stoves, microwaves, etc.). Finally, merchandise of a productive or expensive nature, destined to develop an economic activity (such as cars), are less quoted. In Mexico however, the proportions are higher, appearing logical when related to the higher profits obtained by migration, as noted before.

The Individual and Family Use of Remittances Use of remittances is analyzed here according to the distinction between productive and unproductive uses. We refer to unproductive uses as money that is used for everyday consumption (food, clothing, etc.) or for the improvement of the overall level of material comfort (housing, household equipment). Productive investments are defined as remittances used in the development of an economic and professional activity that can increase additional incomes for the family. Considering the investment this former usage produces, the effects the remittances have on local development are obviously more important. Whatever the economic sector concerned (agriculture, trade, or services), such investments attest for the existence of a local dynamism which can result in the creation of wealth and employment opportunities, possibly leading to upward (professional) mobility, and therefore generally a process of development for the areas of origin. From a methodological point of view, we use two variables from the survey: the investments made in the place of origin during the trajectory of family migration and the possible uses (realized or envisaged) of the remittances of the last migration. First, the family investments made through the course of the migrations reveal, throughout all of the survey, a hierarchy of ways in which the remittances are used (Table 4.3). As expected, we find here in first position investments in the real estate and housing activities (construction of a house, purchase of equipment, etc). Around 37% of the families quote this type of investment; land follows at 29% and vehicle purchases at 16%. It is worth mentioning that a significant part of the remittances are dispatched into the development of a commercial or entrepreneurial activity. Contrariwise, the negligible proportions of remittances used on health and education must also be noted. If we proceed to categorize the many ways of remittance use, a clear differentiation between the two countries appears: investments known as productive9 are more widely quoted in Bolivia (46.5% and 75.2% of the households in Toco and Tupiza, opposed to 11.5% and 12% in Urireo and Jalostotitlan, respectively). The distribution is more balanced for unproductive investments (between 34% and 51%) with a slightly higher proportion for Jalostotitlán. This categorization may lead to a family typology10 in every area of study (Figure 4.2). We find a reversed relationship between the two countries: where only 11.7% of the families in Mexico carry out productive investments (exclusive or associated to other uses) in Bolivia 60.8%

Migrant Remittances and Development in Bolivia and Mexico Table 4.3 Family use of the remittances (% of families that quoted the type of use in every zone of study) Bolivia

Mexico

Toco

Tupiza

Urireo

Jalostotitlán

Total

House

22.0

43.7

42.3

39.1

36.8

Land

40.9

72.4

3.1

4.6

29.2

Vehicle

16.5

10.6

11.9

24.0

16.4

Animals

6.7

18.1

0.4

2.2

6.7

Trade/business

4.7

6.7

6.6

4.3

5.5

Tractor

1.2

0.0

1.8

1.2

1.0

Children’s education

0.8

0.8

1.8

0.0

0.8

Swing-plough

0.4

1.2

0.0

0.0

0.4

Well

0.0

0.0

1.3

0.0

0.3

Health

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.3

0.2

Other

1.2

2.8

7.0

1.5

2.9

Note: These percentages account for the families who answered at least one of the items above. Since a family may have quoted several items or none at all, the sum of the percentages do not equal 100.

Jalostotitlan

Urireo only prod. invest. (mixed) prod. invest.

Tupiza

only non-prod. invest. Toco

other none

total pop.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Figure 4.2 Migratory remittances use typology (% of the number of families).

75

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are. On the other hand, only 8% of the Bolivian families assign their savings to only unproductive investments, such as the improvement of their living conditions and comfort, as opposed to 41.8% in Mexico. In Tupiza, there is what we call extreme family profiles, in which more than one third of the families only carry out productive investments, with strong agricultural investments (purchase of land, animals, or swing-ploughs quoted at 92% of families). The testimonials concerning investment strategies are numerous, emphasizing that migration resources in the agricultural activities remain the essential rural development option in this area. Processes of activity diversification and establishment of microbusinesses, although a minority, may also be noticed in the Tupiza area (quoted by 6.7% of the families). The area of Toco shows an average profile, but with a less remarkable agricultural use of their remittances: 22.4% of the households make exclusively productive investments, mainly on land and animal purchases, sometimes related to the mechanization of the production system and the increase of cultivated surfaces. A slightly higher proportion of families dedicate their savings to only nonproductive investments, but the latter figure includes the purchase of vehicles (quoted by 16.5% of the families), which actually often corresponds to the installation of a productive transport activity. This kind of investment is part of the diversification of the rural activities of this area, supported by the urban proximity, where a strong migration impact is made. As already mentioned, we see reverse tendencies in Mexico. The studied areas in the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato are characterized by a majority of families that tend to use their saving for exclusively nonproductive investments (respectively 45% and 38% of the families), with a rather clear priority given to the house. As in Bolivia, the purchase of a vehicle often includes both domestic and productive vocations (as for instance merchandise transportation). Nevertheless, the resources produced by migration are above all complementary—or sometimes exclusive—to the constitution of the family income. According to this, it is rather logical that the uses mentioned are those needed to satisfy basic daily needs including, when possible, an improvement of living conditions (apparent in the question of housing, whose symbolic and demonstrative dimensions are not negligible). A common feature in both Mexican areas—radically opposing Bolivian profiles—is the minority of families that have exclusively productive investments, or productive investments associated to other uses. Low investments on land explain this opposition with Bolivia, because less than five 5% of the Mexican families dedicates remittances to land (as opposed to 40% in Toco and 72% in Tupiza). Considering on an individual basis the ways in which savings from remittances (after the last migration) are put to use, we find results corresponding to the previous ones. On one hand, we notice both the important number of expenses related to lodging in the four zones studied, and the amount of investments made on land by Bolivian migrants. On the other hand, taking the previously mentioned category and adding another called basic consumption (including the food articles and debt payments); we observe the

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77

same inverted relationship between the two countries. In Bolivia, the priority is given to productive investments (exclusive or associative) whether in the Toco area (24% of the migrants) or that of Tupiza (26%), whereas in Mexico the proportions are less important (8% and 5%). The priority of how the remittances are used has shifted to a newer element related to expenses of a basic nature (i.e. food), especially in Tupiza and Urireo (as confirmed by one out of two migrants). Moreover, it is in Tupiza that we observe the majority of migrants, whose remittances are only dedicated to costs of livelihood, confirming a stronger degree of poverty in this region. Another noticeable element, seemingly insignificant in the family variables, is the expenses pertaining to education and health (respectively 10.7% and 7.3% for the sample’s total)—fundamental indicators of development. The role played by young migrants, often the eldest sibling, in providing educational financing for their younger brothers, is made evident in numerous interviews. Whether on an individual or collective scale, differentiation between the uses of remittances analyzed in this chapter deal, for the most part, with the particularity of the socioeconomic environment of the regions studied. The important variations concerning productive investments probably reflect several realities. As observed, we deal with distinctly varied rural profiles between Bolivia and Mexico. In Bolivia, rural societies are characterized by traditional agricultural activities which still have a leading role in family economies today, facing poor insertion opportunities and diversification in the local or urban labour market. Land, being a strong target for investment, has a major economic function. It is worth remembering that it also sustains a sociocultural and patrimonial dimension (in terms of identity and communal attachment and social reproduction), including symbolic meanings (Andean cosmology is very devoted to nourishing mother earth). Overall, migration plays an important role in daily family livelihood and is also a means to escape poverty by way of socioeconomic and productive investments (agriculture, transportation, etc.). In Mexico on the other hand, a more structured logic embedded in a long duration, guides migratory strategies. Given that the migration resources are very significant on a regional scale (strongly contrasting with local levels of remuneration), only a minority of migrants value these resources in a productive manner. For most of the families, migration first constitutes an immediate improvement of living conditions, or in certain cases conserves an already acquired level of living. Thus confirming survey results, the interviews with migrants in Mexico emphasized the importance of expenses related to the improvement of material conditions, in particular, restoration of equipment for the home, including telephone lines. However, if productive investments are less apparent in Mexico, local processes illustrate original initiatives. Some migrants of Urireo and Jalostotitlán could initiate, thanks to savings from migration, relatively profitable commercial activities—examples being

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money transfer, currencies exchange, and material supplies for construction or furnishing.

EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MIGRATORY REMITTANCES

Sociodemographic Factors We first focus on sociodemographic variables taken from survey data, such as labour market insertion, migrant status in the countries of destination, and also temporalities of migratory systems. Undeniably, for both individuals and families, the migration process is embedded into specific life trajectories and projects. So far, we can assume that the significance and function of remittances vary by migrant’s age and the specific life cycle stage at which migration occurs (Canales, 2004). How does age affect the importance of remittances and the way in which they are used? In Bolivia, the number of migrants who have not made any investment during their last migration (including the migrants without remittance) tends to decrease with age. Inversely, the proportion of Bolivian migrants who make productive investments increases practically linearly with age (Figure 4.3). Both these correlations do not appear with Mexican migrants. In Urireo, the proportion of migrants claiming to make

45% 40% 35% 30%

less than 20 years 21-25 years 26-30 years 31-40 years 40 and older

25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Toco

Tupiza

Urireo

Jalostotitlan

Figure 4.3 Migrants with productive investments by age bracket.

Migrant Remittances and Development in Bolivia and Mexico

79

productive investments is comparable in both extreme age ranges, whereas in Jalostotitlan, productive investments seem to decrease with age. In other words, in Bolivia, remittance and investment capacities seem to correlate directly to a maturity of age, most likely tied to migratory cycles that underlie family trajectories (Cortes, 2000).11 In Mexico however, migration investments do not seem so closely related to life cycles. We may assume that in the United States higher monetary profits during the first migration (related to higher wages) do not motivate young migrants to wait for a more profitable migratory cycle to save. Productive investments oriented towards activities in their place of origin can thus occur somewhat earlier in their life cycle. In Latin America, the tendency for female migration seems to grow and disperse. In this context, what role do women play in the local dynamics related to remittances? The migration of Bolivian women is traditionally much more important than of Mexican women, particularly in the area of Tupiza (40% of migrants are women, and in Toco 34%). In Urireo and Jalostotitlan, proportions are 16.5% and 21% respectively. However, all areas studied show the same tendency: remittance capacity is relatively higher for men than for women (Figure 4.4).12 In Mexico, only 45% of the women declare remittances, as opposed to 81% for men. This difference is higher than in Bolivia (58% of the women declare remittances against 70% of the men). In the same way, we observe higher quantities of remittances for men than for women in both countries, with distinctly higher proportions in Mexico. How can this relation between gender and remittances be explained? First of all, we must recall that professional insertion for women abroad does not follow the same model. In Bolivia, 86% of migrant women declare having an occupation at the time of their last migration. This very active migration

100%

100%

90%

90%

80% 70%

more than $5 per day $1 to $5 per day less than $1 per day amount unknown none

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% women

Mexico

men

80% 70%

more than $5 per day $1 to $5 per day less than $1 per day amount unknown none

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% women

men

Bolivia

Figure 4.4 Distribution of remittance amounts according to gender at the time of the last migration (% of migrants).

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concerning women coincides with two processes in accordance to the area of study. In general, migration in Tupiza more often identifies with a family strategy in which men and women produce complementary incomes. In contrast, migration in Toco is based more on the individual and is sharply connected to the agricultural calendar of the place of origin. This usually concerns rather young, often unmarried, or recently married women. In Mexico, only 52% of women declare a professional activity during their last stay in the United States, which explains the relatively low number of remittances from women. A great part of the female migration thus relates to a process of family regrouping, even if the migration of young and active women is also increasingly frequent in Mexico.

The Role of Professional Activities and Migratory Status According to the amounts measured in the survey, the most profitable sectors for Mexicans are construction, restoration, and agriculture (as traditional sectors), and landscaping (a relatively recent sector of insertion). In Bolivia, crafts industry (welding, plastering) appears to be the most profitable sector, along with construction. The service sector (essentially domestic), textile, agriculture, and especially trade are the least profitable sectors. These tendencies confirm the low remuneration specific to female employment, often held under extremely difficult conditions (i.e. no formal contracts, low wages, employer abuse), particularly in clandestine textile workshops in Buenos Aires. Choices relevant to investments are also obviously related to local socioeconomic contexts in the places of origin. When considering the household distribution of activities in the place of origin, various rural profiles are apparent in Mexico and Bolivia. In the latter, families with strictly agricultural activities or associated with other rural nonfarm activities include more than 70% of the households in contrast to only 33% in Mexico. Tupiza, where more than 80% of households are only involved in agricultural activity, is characterized by strong and dominant rural/agricultural activities, whereas in Toco, situations showing multiple activities are more frequent, that is, mainly services associated with agriculture. In Mexico, economic activities in the places of origin are more diversified. For instance, the sharing of the exclusively secondary sector is relatively important in both areas (more than 10% of the families). In more urban Jalostotlitlán, the proportion of families in pluri-activity situations out of the primary sector is more significant (15%). In addition, the number of families without any activity (such as students, unemployed, retired people) in the place of origin is clearly higher in Mexico (20% as opposed to 6% in Bolivia). In other words, a considerable proportion of the Mexican households depend exclusively on migration incomes produced by one or more family members. Beyond the differentiation between local economic contexts, what connection can we establish between the family use of remittances and the

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Tupiza Toco

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% primary sector only

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percentage f or the whole families

60%

Urireo

50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% primary secondary sector only sect or only

merchant service sector only

multiple with primary sector

no activity

percentage for the whole families

Figure 4.5 Households with productive investments according to the family profiles of activity in the places of origin.

activity profiles in the places of origin? In Bolivia, the relation between productive family investments and local sectors of activity is not very clear (Figure 4.5).13 In Tupiza, productive investments are not associated with a diversification of activities (multiple and primary).14 Therefore, migration does not involve a structural modification of the local economy, which remains largely focused on agriculture and cattle breeding. Productive investments in Toco are more likely to occur in households that have multiple income sources and combine agricultural and nonagricultural activities. Thus, migration does not involve a transfer of sectors in the family economy, but rather the development of activities complementary to agriculture.

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The Mexican profile presents similarities with what we find in Toco. Indeed, the productive investments appear relatively correlated to familial multiple activity situations, associated with agriculture or breeding activities. However, considering that productive investments are not a part of the primary activity, a real process of transition from the primary sector to other activities is clearly observable. In addition, the case of Urireo shows special patterns of productive investments concentrated in families exclusively oriented toward the commercial tertiary sector. This process of expansion of the service sector instigated by migration points to significant change in the local and economic structure, where agriculture tends to be overridden by other activities. In terms of migratory status, legality is another important parameter that strongly distinguishes the two countries. According to our data, more than half of Bolivians were in a legal situation during their last migration (either with resident status or due to the fact that they were born in Argentina) and only 15% migrated without legal documentation. In Mexico, on the other hand, more than half of the migrants were in an illegal situation (70% in Urireo). This fact clearly indicates a much more restrictive migratory control in the United States than in Argentina. Nevertheless, this strong dissimilarity should be considered relatively: the situations of illegality are

Toco

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Figure 4.6 Remittance capacities according to the migratory status at the time of the last migration.

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generally underestimated in Bolivia, where, for example, many migrants stay in Argentina after their tourist visa expires. However, the relation between legal status and remittance volume show similar characteristics in the four zones (Figure 4.6). First of all, situations of illegality do not negatively affect remittance volumes. On the contrary, more migrants without documentation declare remittances in the two countries.15 But migratory status remains a key factor in terms of remittance volume: in Bolivia as in Mexico, undocumented migrants send small amounts (less than one dollar per day), whereas migrants with residency documents transfer higher amounts. This relation is particularly apparent in Urireo, where about 40% of the migrants with legal residency documents transfer more than five dollars per day. This tendency obviously reflects the strongest vulnerability of undocumented migrants, both observable in terms of access to work and salary levels.

Temporalities of the Remittances and Mobility Systems Monetary transfers to the places of origin are strongly articulated with mobility systems whose temporalities vary from one region to another (Stark & Lucas, 1988; Canales, 1999). But how do migratory experience and the intensity of displacements play a role on the evolution of remittances? In Mexico, as in Bolivia, migratory systems respond to a prolonged evolution of the flows, subjected to the effects of economic situations. As already mentioned, a large majority of migrations surveyed are concentrated in the recent period (departure between 2000 and 2002). Even so, two tendencies clearly oppose Mexico and Bolivia (Figure 4.7). In the latter country, we may observe a reduction in the capacity of remittance over the recent period, probably related to the incidences of the 2001 crisis in Argentina. Reduction in migrant savings (and thus in transfer possibilities) is clearly attested by interviews in Bolivia, in relation with brutal suspension of wage payment by employers (as an effect of the corralito, i.e., freezing of bank accounts and forbidding bank withdrawals). For many migrants, the loss of a job was common, especially in the construction sector. In Mexico, on the other hand, we have a clear tendency in remittance improvement capacities, particularly in Urireo (70% of migrants in the first period have remittances, against 85% for the 2000–2002 period). This would match Orozco’s conclusions (2005), suggesting that Mexican migratory remittances escape the immediate economic situation. In terms of volume, remittances keep on increasing over a long period of time, in spite of the global economic recession and its impacts in the United States. We may assume that the overall improvement of the skill levels of Mexican migrants in the United States explain higher wages over time. Repetitive journeys are a significant indicator of the intensity of circularity between one country and another, and thus a good parameter

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Virginie Baby-Collin, Geneviève Cortes and Laurent Faret 95% 85% 75% 65% 55% Toco

Tupiza

average during all periods

Urireo up to 1994

1995-1999

Jalostotitlan 2000-2002

Figure 4.7 Remittance capacities according to migration periods (% of migrants with remittances according to the year of their last departure).

to describe migratory experiences. In the four areas studied, remittance capacity appears to be positively related to the number of journeys of family members. The fact is particularly true in Bolivia, whereas the relation is not so direct and linear in Mexico (with no significant difference between the two areas of study). Bolivia shows a clear relation between repetitive movements and the different ways they are used; productive investments are more important for families with intense circulation as we may call it (Figure 4.8). The migratory experience, in terms of the (total) time spent abroad during a life span, doesn’t affect remittance capacities (in terms of volume). Nevertheless, it interferes with the way remittances are used. When considering migratory durations and investments on a family level,16 the part of Bolivian households without any investment decreases as durations increase. In Mexico, the correlation is less obvious, although the absence of investment characterizes the shortest migratory durations (up to 4 years). Figure 4.9 presents the types of investment made: for both countries, the share of productive investments increases with the duration of family migrations.

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Figure 4.8 Families with productive investments according to the number of journeys made. Note: Please note the different scales.

Migrant Remittances and Development in Bolivia and Mexico % of migrant families

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Figure 4.9 Families with productive investments according to family migratory duration. Note: Please note the different scales.

On the whole, the survey shows a clear correlation between processes of sending remittances and migratory experience, whether in terms of duration or repetition. The fundamental role of migratory competence is obviously found in the core of the analysis: the knowledge about places, conditions, and opportunities, acquired progressively during successive migrations, tend to support the capacity of saving and thus of monetary transfers. Information on professional and residential matters (such as working stability and wage levels), added to the consolidation of networks are also elements that foster transfer capacity. The trajectories of Bolivian and Mexican migrants confirm this close link between migratory experience and use of remittances. Migrants who succeed in accumulating and investing a monetary capital in profitable activities in the places of origin often have long migratory experience, with intense circulation patterns. In Mexico, for example, the migrant entrepreneurs for whom we could reconstitute the mobility course have spent a long time in the United States, usually in possession of permanent residency documents. An illustration of this is the case of Miguel: with nearly 25 years of circulation experience between the United States and Uriero, he was finally able to set up several agencies of remittance transfer and change in his hometown. In the same way, Amelia started with a clothing store in Urireo after 20 years of alternating stays in one country and another. Antonio, who opted for an investment in real estate and land possession, is still living in Los Angeles while returning every year to Jalostotitlan for a few months. So far, experienced migrants who are organizing their life around a circular migration have made a success of their socioeconomic trajectory, while maintaining a strong connection in their places of origin, where they became key actors in local development. But opposing and more frequent situations must be emphasized: many migrants wrapped up in a more or less temporary mobility system remain in difficult and aleatory situations due to working clandestinely in the United States. Submitted to the risks of labour market variations as well as the border crossing uncertainty, they regularly express the difficulties they have to save and to invest in other fields than that of daily consumption or housing equipment.

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CONCLUSION Beyond certain convergences between Bolivia and Mexico, examining the impacts of migratory remittances on the places of emigration studied here, highlights differentiated models of development. In the two countries, the surveyed volume of remittances appears to be under international evaluations or certain localised estimations.17 However, remittance volumes are more important in Mexico than in Bolivia, which should lead to stronger local economic impacts. Remittances definitely enable an improvement in the quality of life for the Mexican families (access to consumption goods, housing possibilities, transportation opportunities), in much higher proportions than in Bolivia. Migration then, in all evidence, is embedded in the differentiation of the various levels of development that characterize LatinAmerican societies (Martínez Pizarro, 2003; Portes, 2005). However, contrary to what is observed in Bolivia, Mexican migration only slightly produces processes of productive investments. In other words, migration strongly appears as a structural component of family economic patterns in Mexico. This professionalisation of migration turns it into a pillar for the family economy and does not necessarily lead to the development of other or newer economic activities in places of emigration. In Bolivia, on the other hand, migration and remittances are much more established in economic projections, developed along a life span and individual migratory trajectories (essentially through the construction of an agricultural land patrimony). Another inquiry guided our reflection: does the amplification of migration and the complication of mobility systems—where circulation frequently emerges as a structural dimension (Zahniser, 2000; Ma Mung, Dorai, Hily & Loyer, 1998; Charef, 1999)—constitute an opportunity for development processes in emigration countries? In other words, what is the relation between the movement of people and the circulation of money? The comparative studies in Mexico and Bolivia tend to show that, beyond regional contexts, individual migration/circulation increases the probability of monetary and economic repercussions on local spaces, mainly by the setting of strong social and spatial relations, especially when legal status makes mobility easier. This relation appears both in terms of remittance volumes and in productive investment capacities. Moreover, we may connect this analysis with an investigation of the efficacy of restrictive policies on the circulation of people, which turn out to be in contradiction with development opportunities of emigration areas. It is in this fashion that in Bolivia, more so than in Mexico, migration has strong impacts on productive development in rural areas of origin, for example, the preservation of agricultural activities, access to land, cultural innovations, activity diversification, and so forth. These observations are confirmed in the study of Fomin/BID and S. Bendixen (2005) which points out that Bolivia holds a particular position in the Latin-American panorama in terms of relations between international migration and development. Whereas the

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amount of Bolivian remittances was low in comparison with remittance flows of Mexican migrants, the proportion of Bolivian remittances used in basic spending (daily subsistence) is the lowest of all the Latin-American and Caribbean regions (45% against 60% and 84% for Central America and the Caribbean region respectively). Can we conceive of a development dependent upon migration fluctuations? Migratory remittances constitute, undoubtedly, a major concern for local societies and families as well. Providing a vital support for millions of households, these flows have evident multiplying effects on the rural and regional economies (Orozco & Lapointe, 2003; Papail, 2002; Durand, Parrado & Massey 1996). But remittances are much more than simple financial transfers: they also signify that the separation of families and fracturing of national economies must be admitted, along with very high social, emotional, and psychological costs (Terry, 2005) as well as a human capital loss (Altamirano Rua, 2005). In addition, to expect a positive impact on local and regional development, migration would have to occur in socioeconomic environments potentially receptive to entrepreneurial initiatives, which supposes a real endorsement of public policies (Garcia Zamora, 2002), rather than an imposition from the top of what should be the use of individual or family remittances (Lozano Ascencion, 2005). In other words, migratory remittances cannot replace other development models for rural territories and larger national economies. The importance and the impacts of remittances, such as observed in Bolivia and Mexico, should never justify any disengagement of public policies and/or development of international aid. In regard to this, migrants are not easily fooled, as collective interviews show in Chaco Pampa, Bolivia: “With money from Argentina, we improve our houses. We also put money in agriculture. The area is deeply changing. But we need support to advance. Loans, land, roads. The government relies on us to invest. We hang on because people here are used to go out when money is missing. The government knows that people here live off Argentina. And it suits them fine.” NOTES 1. More than 50% of people residing in households that receive remittances are considered to live below the national poverty line without the money from the migration. 2. PARMI is a research program supported by the French Ministry of Investigation (2001–2005), « Parcours de mobilité et processus de territorialisation des migrants internationaux à l’heure des regroupements régionaux latino-américains (comparaison Bolivie-Mexique) », under direction of Geneviève Cortes. 3. Each of these communities (Toco, Sichez, Chillijchi, Ana Rancho, Sobra Ana Rancho, Chua Loma, Chulpa Loma, Toquillo) number between 140 and 1500 inhabitants. 4. Each of these communities (Chacona, Chacopampa, Charaga, Chuquiago, Iricina, Jose de Pampa Grande, Peña Blanca, Quiriza, Talina, Tocloca, Titihoyo) number between 120 and 560 inhabitants.

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5. The movements are more spread out than in the case of Toco, where nearly 40% of departures registered took place during the period of 1995–1999. 6. Seasonal migration refers here to mobility patterns organized by agricultural activities, when temporary migration refers to a wider range of nonpermanent activities abroad. 7. The survey used the following question “what did migration within your household allowed you to finance?” after which an enumeration of the belongings was done. For this variable, the term no investment does not systemically mean that there were no migratory remittances for the family: migration may have produced remittance without including investments, according to the person surveyed. 8. This migratory profitability is based on the amount of money declared by the migrant and the duration of his last stay abroad. Considering that monetary incomes remain difficult to assess through survey methods, this is only an estimation of the amount of the remittances. 9. The productive investments include those intended for the development of an economic activity, agricultural or not: the purchasing of land and animals, tractors, swing-plough, trade, and enterprises. Unproductive investments refer to expenses for the house, vehicles, or the education of the children. All other uses (health, festivals, etc.) are in the category other. 10. We consider five different types of family uses: families that make (a) no investment (b) only nonproductive investments (c) only productive investments (d) productive investments associated with other ways of use (e) other (all other configurations). 11. Migration corresponds to a succession of different migratory cycles. Young people usually start with a stage of initiation and training, with small profits mainly dedicated to savings and everyday consumption. The next involves settling down in his home (household formation, house construction, etc.). Lastly, there is a consolidation of economic family assets that enable productive investments to be made. 12. Our results are congruent with studies carried out at a global level (Lozano Ascencion, 2005). This does not mean, though, that such a disparity between men and women can be generalized. On the contrary, some studies indicate that women tend to send more remittances than do men, showing a willingness to help the members of their family left behind (Ortiz quoted by Vargas Lundius, 2004). Every two out of three remittance receivers in Latin America are women, according to BID/FOMIN reports for 2003 and 2004 (CESOP, 2004). 13. We focus on the most significant profiles of family activities, that is, at least 5% of the families in Bolivia and 10% in Mexico (taking into account the higher diversity of activities in the Mexican areas of study). 14. Productive investments remain high in Tupiza whatever the main sector of activity in the place of origin (including households without activity). This result indicates both the high level of dependency toward remittances as well as a strong pattern of seasonal migration as soon as profitable investments may be done. 15. This corroborates observations of Lozano Ascencion (2005), who shows that legal migrants in the United States, supposed to be more durably installed and inserted in the country, are less prone to send remittances. This may explain why in Tupiza migrants born in Argentina are less likely to send remittances. 16. The family migratory duration is the cumulated time spent abroad for the migrant members of one family. 17. Two thirds of Mexican and Bolivian migrants transfer less than $150 monthly to their place of origin. These estimations are lower than what is

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indicated by Orozco (2005): monthly remittance amounts would be about $350 for Mexican migrants in the United States and around $250 for Bolivian migrants in the same country. The study of BID/Fomin, Bendixen and Associates (2005), among 1,523 people receiving remittances in Bolivia, indicates only $110 monthly, taking in account all the countries of destination, though mainly Argentina. The amount of Bolivian remittances for the year 2004 is approximately 900 million dollars, low in comparison with the 16 billion annual dollars that Mexican migrants transfer into their country. However, the proportion of Bolivian remittances used for daily subsistence is the lowest of all the Latin-American and Caribbean regions. The remainder is dedicated to savings, education, or productive investments, which could provoke a strong potential for public policies designed to propel local development based on remittances (micro-credits in particular). The latter findings are closer to our results.

REFERENCES Altamirano, T. (2005). Transnationalismo y remesas : el caso peruano. In SELA, Migraciones y remesas en America Latina y en el Caribe : los flujos intraregionales y los determinantes macroeconómicos. Caracas: Sistema Económico Latinoamericano. Canales, A. (2004). The role of remittances in the making of transnational family relations, In Guerassimoff (Ed.), Migrations internationales, mobilités et développement. Paris: L’Harmattan. Canales, A. (1999). Periodicidad, estacionalidad, duración y retorno. Los distintos tiempos en la migración México-Estados Unidos. Papeles de Población, 5(22), 11–41. CESOP. (2004). Migración y remesas familiares : conceptos y perspectiva comparada. México: Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública, Cámara de Diputados. CEPAL. (2005). Panorama social de América Latina 2005. Santiago de Chile: Comisión Económica para America Latina y el Caribe. Charef, M. (1999). La circulation migratoire marocaine : un pont entre deux rives. Rabat: Edition Sud Contact. Cortes, G. (2000). Partir pour rester. Survie et mutations des sociétés paysannes andines (Cochabamba, Bolivie). Paris: IRD Editions. Durand, J. and Massey, D. (2003). Clandestinos. Migración Mexico—Estados Unidos en los albores del siglo XXI. Mexico: MA Porrúa–U. de Zacatecas. Durand, J., Parrado, E. and Massey, D. (1996). Migradollars and development: A reconsideration of the Mexican case. International Migration Review, 30(2), 423–444. Faret, L. (2003). Les territoires de la mobilité. Migrations et communautés transnationales entre le Mexique et les Etats-Unis. Paris: CNRS Editions. Garcia Zamora, R. (2002). Los retos actuales de la teoría del desarrollo. Red International de migración y desarrollo. www.migración y desarrollo.org Lozano Ascencio, F. (2005a). Tendencias actuales de las remesas de migrantes en America Latina y Caribe : una evaluación de son importancia econoómica y social. In SELA, Migraciones y remesas en America Latina y en el Caribe : los flujos intraregionales y los determinantes macroeconómicos. Caracas: Sistema económico latinoamericano. Lozano Ascencio, F. (2005b). Migración, remesas y desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe. L’Ordinaire Latino-Américain, 200–201, 149–158. Ma Mung, E., Dorai, K., Hily, M. A., & Loyer, F. (1998). Bilan des travaux sur la circulation migratoire. Rapport à la Direction de la Population et des Migrations, Ministère de la Solidarité et de l’Emploi. Poitiers: Migrinter.

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Martinez Pizarro, J. (2003). Panorama regional de las remesas durante los años noventa y sus impactos macrosociales en América Latina. Migraciones Internacionales, 2(5), 40–76. Orozco, M. (2005). Remesas hacía America Latina y el Caribe: Cuestiones y perspectivas acerca del desarrollo. In SELA, Migraciones y remesas en America Latina y en el Caribe : los flujos intraregionales y los determinantes macroeconómicos. Caracas: Sistema económico latinoamericano. Orozco, M. & Lapointe, M. (2003). Migrations, envois de fonds et secteur rural en Amérique Latine. In Convergence : mouvements d’intégration régionale. PNUD: Coopération Sud. Papail, J. (2002). Migrations internationales, transferts monétaires et investissements dans les milieux urbains du Centre Ouest mexicain. Autrepart, 23, 89–105. Portes, A. (2005). Convergencias teóricas y evidencias empíricas en el estudio del transnacionalismo de los inmigrantes. Migración y Desarrollo, 4, 2–19. Sassone, M. S. (2002). Geografias de la exclusion. Inmigración limítrofe indocumentada en la Argentina. Del sistema-Mundo al lugar. Buenos Aires: Tesis de Doctorado. SELA. (2005). Migraciones y remesas en America Latina y en el Caribe : los flujos intraregionales y los determinantes macroeconómicos. Caracas: Sistema económico latinoamericano. Stark, O. & Lucas, R. (1988). Migration, remittances, and the family, Economic Development and Cultural Change. 36(3), 465–481. Terry, D. F. (2005, Julio–Septiembre). Para mejorar el impacto de las remesas en el desarrollo. Foreign Affairs En Español, 5, 3. Vargas Lundius, R. (2004). Remittances and rural development. Discussion Paper, Latin America and Carribean Division. IFAD. Zahniser, S. (2000). One border, two crossings: Mexican migration to the United States as a two-way process. In: N. Foner, R. Rumbaud, & S. Gold (Ed.), Immigration research for a new century. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

5

The Role of Remittances in the Transnational Livelihood Strategies of Somalis Cindy Horst1

In recent years, interest in the transnational activities of migrants, and in particular their remittance sending behaviour, has rapidly increased. Government and UN bodies as well as NGOs are investing much in attempts to understand this aspect of international migration and develop policies that maximize the benefits of remittances. Expectations are so high that they are being dubbed the new development finance (Wimaladharma, Pearce, & Stanton, 2004). But in order to develop relevant policies, sound knowledge on remittance sending and receiving behaviour is vital. Although substantial research is now available on the potential of migrant workers’ remittances to their countries of origin (Adams & Page, 2005; Carling, 2005; Russell, 1993; World Bank, 2005; Van Hear & Sorensen, 2003), far less information is available on the scale, nature, and impact of refugees’ remittances. One possible reason for this is that in typologies and theories of international migration, refugees have normally been seen to constitute the political element and labour migrants the economic element of international migration (Koser, 1997 p. 591). Literature on refugees and exiles has rarely extended its focus to consider the wide range of nonpolitical transnational activities, including remittance sending, that are so central to most studies amongst other migrant communities (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001 p. 615). Yet, it is incorrect to assume that, because refugees do not in the first place migrate for economic reasons, they refrain from engaging in economic activities that assist their relatives or benefit their home country. Including refugees’ activities in the current attempts to understand and improve the development dimensions of remittances is vital. This is partly so because existing literature does not acknowledge the fact that remittances sent by refugees may serve many of the same purposes as migrant worker remittances (Nyberg Sorensen, 2004); contributing to the survival of communities as well as development in their home country. But it is also important because of the significant differences between the two groups and the situation in their home country. A first element of difference concerns the relation between refugees and the state, which needs to be studied on a case-by-case basis. It has been assumed that refugees generally remit less than economic immigrants because they oppose the regime from which they

92 Cindy Horst fled (Diaz-Briquets & Perez-Lopez, 1997). This may be true during certain periods in specific countries, like in the case of Cuba, where the government for years has tried to prevent its citizens in exile from establishing contacts with their relatives and friends.2 But other governments, like Eritrea, have actively sought the assistance of its citizens in diaspora (e.g., Koser, 2001). Another distinctive element is the fact that refugees often find their relatives scattered throughout the region, being internally displaced or living as refugees in camps or urban centres. Thus, remittances sent by refugees do not only benefit the home country but also have a wider regional impact. A third difference is that in many cases, the home country is in shambles both economically and politically and regional refugees live in situations of great duress, which increases the importance of remittances. Various studies have pointed out that a significant characteristic of migrant remittances is their stability during times of crisis and acute hardship (e.g., Wimaladharma, Pearce & Stanton, 2004; Weiss Fagen & Bump, 2006). Refugees feel a great sense of responsibility to transfer money especially because of the level of deprivation they know their relatives face. Besides, the remittances they send may contribute not only to survival and investments activities but also to wider economic and political processes taking place in their, often war-torn, home countries. Although refugees only constitute a small percentage of the total number of international migrants3, they do play a vital role in processes of development and reconstruction. Questions related to the flow and importance of refugee remittances have only just begun to be explored (e.g., Diaz-Briquets & Perez-Lopez, 1997; Lindley, 2006; Van Hear, 2001). And yet, we can learn a lot about the potential and pitfalls of remittance transfers by looking at their role within the livelihoods of refugees in the west and in neighbouring countries, as well as stayees in the home country; and by observing similarities and differences with other groups of migrants. This chapter contributes to the debate by addressing two important questions posed earlier by those identifying gaps in our understanding of refugee remittances: First, are the transfers made by refugees essential for the survival of those left languishing in refugee camps (Van Hear & Sorensen, 2003 p. 26)? And second, what is the level of capacity and desire amongst refugees in resettlement countries to engage in remittance sending (Al-Ali, Black & Koser, 2001)? These questions are explored using ethnographic material collected amongst Somalis in Kenyan refugee camps and in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Sound ethnographic material on the importance of receiving remittances in regional camps and the ability and will to send remittances in resettlement countries is still scarce (e.g., Dick, 2003; Horst, 2006b; Riak Akuei, 2005). An important aim of this chapter is to contribute to an improved understanding of refugee remittances from the perspective of receivers in the region as well as senders in resettlement countries. Furthermore, based on the ethnographic descriptions provided, the chapter comes to policy recommendations on how to maximize the benefits of refugee remittances.

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 93 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The data for this chapter has been collected during various fieldwork trips between July 1999 and May 2004. I spent an initial one-year fieldwork period in the Dadaab refugee camps, Garissa town and a Nairobi suburb, and then collected additional material during one month in August 2001 and in May 2004. Being an anthropologist by training, I relied greatly on participant observation for collecting information. In Dadaab, I stayed in the compounds of CARE International in the three camps of Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera. I observed and participated in daily events in the blocks, agency offices and offices of the taar (radio transmitters) and xawilaad (money transfer companies); and participated in occasional events like the registration of new arrivals, evaluation missions and card revalidation exercises. Besides, I volunteered as a teacher of English composition to standard eight pupils and organized various trainings and workshops for refugees and staff. As such, I established rapport with a wide variety of people, after which I was able to conduct various formal and informal interviews and collect life histories. I collected formal interview material from 144 refugees in the camps through snowball sampling. Over 60% of these interviews were carried out by research assistants, who had participated in a one-week ‘Data collection and report writing’ workshop I organized in each of the camps. Then, I collected life histories from ten refugees in the three camps, combining those with mobility maps and family trees. Furthermore, I collected written and oral texts like letters, English compositions, resettlement applications, and transcribed cassettes. Finally, I worked with participatory tools such as ranking and scoring exercises, mapping, matrix exercises, pie charts, and organised various focus group discussions to discuss my findings. Conducting fieldwork on resettled Somalis, I was based in Minneapolis for well over a month in November-December 2003. Here, I lived with a group of young Somali and familiarized myself with Somali life in Minneapolis by following them in their daily life activities; including work, education, and social visits. This brought me in touch with various Somali families as well, whom I frequently visited. Also, I spent much time at the Brian Coyle Centre, a community centre which hosts one of the main Somali NGOs in the Minnesota area. Here, I met Somali social workers, who allowed me to be present during their work in- and outside the centre, and their clients, including single mothers, elderly and youth. I collected formal interview material from 15 refugees through snowball sampling, and organized focus group discussions with students, older refugees, youth, and elders. Finally, after fieldwork I disseminated my research findings through electronic media, enabling a fascinating discussion of my work in both Dadaab and Minneapolis with the Somali diaspora and those directly involved in the research (Horst, 2006c). In both instances, my aim was not to determine exactly how much money was actually sent and received, or to come up with other types of statistics. Due to the private nature of remittance sending and expenditures, such an exercise

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would be extremely challenging and not justified for the type of information the research aimed to gather. Selecting an anthropological approach, my main aim was to get a better understanding of individual refugee’s actions, motivations, and aspirations. The research data are not necessarily representative for all Somali refugees, but they do give insight into individual decision-making and reasoning.

THE IMPORTANCE OF REMITTANCES FOR REFUGEES IN DADAAB The Dadaab refugee camps are situated in Kenya’s Northeastern Province, a vast stretch of semi-arid land that has been the object of dispute between Kenya and Somalia since independence. Currently, approximately 135,000 refugees are estimated to be living in the Dadaab area, with the large majority coming from Somalia. They live in an area with limited livelihood opportunities, due to ecological restrictions, a poor infrastructure, and high levels of insecurity. Originally, this area was very scarcely populated, allowing pastoral nomads to survive there. After the collapse of the Somali state in December 1990, the Dadaab region was faced with far larger numbers than it could incorporate ecologically, and thus, the refugees need assistance from the international community in order to survive in the camps. Yet, the hand-outs provided are highly insufficient, consisting of only three kilograms of maize per person per fifteen days during many months of my stay in 1999–2000. Water is rationed and scarce, firewood is distributed only occasionally and in insufficient amounts, and shelters have been built mainly by the refugees themselves with local material; at times assisted by plastic sheets from the agencies. The large majority of refugees are only allowed to stay in Kenya if they remain in the camps, but there, the search for an independent livelihood is complicated by two factors. First, the refugees are not granted work permits, so as a consequence, they are forced to work as incentive workers for NGOs or have to carve out a living in the informal sector illegally. Second, their location in the Dadaab camps complicates the attempts of the Somali refugees to secure a livelihood. Although it is common for refugee populations to be concentrated in camps that are located in ecologically marginal areas, this fact clearly frustrates attempts to make an independent living. Agricultural opportunities are almost nonexistent due to the poor quality of the soil and limited rains, and collecting natural resources like firewood or building material is an activity that brings very little profit and involves great risk. Shifta (bandits) operate in the area and may rape women during firewood collection, making it one of the riskiest income-generating activities. Rather than being based on these marginal activities or the insufficient international aid, the social security mechanisms that enable survival in the camps are largely based on historical precedents; including migration, strong assistance networks, and dispersed investments (Horst, 2006b).

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 95 Migration has for centuries played a vital role in Somali lives and livelihoods; through Islam, in nomadic pastoralism, in ancient-old trade patterns as well as in the migration of workers, professionals, and students (Horst, 2006a; Kleist, 2004). This has led to the establishment of a Somali diaspora that is spread worldwide, with large communities in neighbouring countries, the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, and Australia. Simultaneously, for many decades the Somali have invested in systems that enabled these migrant communities to keep in touch with those they left behind. Especially communication and money transfer systems were much needed and thus well developed. Somali migrant workers who worked in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia during the oil boom in the 1970s, transferred remittances through the so-called franco valuta system.4 Then, as civil unrest started to rise in the late 1980s, xawilaad companies were set up to deal with the growing streams of remittances from other regions in the world. Xawil is a Somali word derived from Arabic, meaning transfer; usually of money or responsibilities. The xawilaad is a worldwide, informal system of value transfer operated and used by Somalis for remittance sending and business transactions (Horst & Van Hear, 2002). The few studies available on the xawilaad suggest that remittance sending to Somalia and Somaliland has been vital both for the respective economies of those countries as well as for household survival (e.g., Ahmed, 2000; Marchal, 2000; UNDP, 2001). Research in Dadaab similarly indicates how remittances enable the survival of a large group of refugees in an area where they would otherwise not have survived. Besides, as I illustrate, the financial flows into the camps are invested in productive activity and improve general conditions in the camps.

The Role of Transnational Assistance in the Survival of Remittance Receivers in Dadaab Strong assistance networks, mainly based on kinship but also amongst neighbours and women groups, are vital in Dadaab. These networks can be found locally, between refugees in the camps, where for example during food distributions, collections are carried out amongst member of the same clan in order to support the most needy families. Also, money-go-round systems operate between women, and neighbours who are in a better position assist those who have less (Horst, 2006b). Besides these kinds of local assistance initiatives, regional remittance flows are important for livelihoods in Dadaab; operating between the camps and Somali homelands, other African countries, or Nairobi. Although conditions in many parts of Somalia are comparable to those in Dadaab, some family members are in a better position in their homeland and thus send small amounts to the camps. Others find life in Dadaab too harsh and, despite this being illegal, move to Nairobi in order to gain a livelihood independently and assist their relatives in the camps. The majority of the Somali refugees do have relatives in the region, and often can count on them in times of need. Yet, opportunities

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for making a living are not much better in Nairobi or Kismaayo than they are in Dadaab. Thus, although just a small minority of all Somali refugees live in Western countries, the remittances that these refugees send through the xawilaad are far more important for the livelihoods of refugees in Dadaab. Research amongst other groups of migrants also indicates that, “whereas households are generally more likely to receive domestic or regional than international remittances, the value of international remittances dwarfs other types of remittances” (Sander, 2003 p. 7). On average, I estimate that at least 10% to 15% of the population in the camps benefit directly from the xawilaad (Horst, 2006b). Of this 10% to 15%, about half receive regular (mostly monthly) remittances, whereas the other half receive remittances only occasionally. Monthly remittances received in the camps vary between fifty and two hundred dollars; as those who receive larger amounts often use the certainty of a regular, substantial income to move to Garissa or Nairobi. In Dadaab, a regular amount of for example one hundred dollars enables a large Somali family to live a comfortable life; paying for their basic expenses such as food, clothing, and shelter. Those who receive more than they spend on daily living, invest the money in small productive activities such as baking bread or samosa; packing goods like detergent, tea, or cigarettes in smaller quantities to sell in table shops in the blocks; or operating other small businesses such as a tea shop in the market. Refugees who receive occasional sums often receive money because they requested it; mostly in response to a contingency. In interviews, Somalis indicated receiving an occasional amount of roughly two hundred to five hundred dollars once, twice, up to five times a year. The frequency depends on the number of relatives who stay overseas, their willingness, and ability to send money and the kind of situation that money is needed for. At times, sums of several hundreds of dollars are requested at once in order to be able to start up a larger business; such as a video shop, a computer training centre, a butchery, a shop for selling material and clothes, a tailoring shop or a taar business. This allows the refugee in Dadaab to make a living independently, while relatives are relieved of sending monthly amounts after the business establishes itself.

The Impact of Remittances in the Refugee Camps: Potentials and Risks Remittances hardly stay within the nuclear family of the person who receives them. They are spread and benefit a much wider group of people, thus enabling the subsistence of many refugees who could not have survived in the region otherwise, considering current levels of humanitarian aid provision. Indirect beneficiaries first include relatives of those receiving remittances, who are usually assisted in money or kind. Second, neighbours are often assisted by those who are in a position to do so. As Adoy Moxamed5 explained to me: “If your neighbour does not have anything, you should

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 97 yourself not eat. If you put sugar in your tea and your neighbour does not even have anything to cook tea from, you will have to share.” According to Adoy, it is both a cultural and religious responsibility to assist those who have less: “The Qoran says that if someone who lives close to you suffers, he or she should be assisted before you assist a relative who is far away.” Besides relatives and neighbours, remittances entering the camps benefit the xawilaad owners and workers, who make a living out of remittance sending directly, and other business people, who profit from the extra money circulating in the camps. Even those refugees with very limited social and/or economic capital may benefit from remittances, as those who receive remittances often employ maids or labourers for building houses, herding animals, digging latrines, and collecting water and firewood. Beyond helping Somalis to survive in the refugee camps, the remittances transferred give people a choice. The money can be invested in business, it may be used to assist others and thus build social capital, or it can be invested in educational opportunities for the children. The recipient can also decide to use it to move: away from insecure areas, toward economic opportunities, a better life, or family members. If remittances are sufficient, the decision can be made for the whole family to move to an urban area, for example; if not, the money can be used to enable one or two family members to move to town and try to gain an income for the whole family there. As such, remittances give refugees in difficult conditions the capacity to assist themselves, and others. But besides enabling the survival of many, these transnational resources also led to development initiatives. For example, a refugee in Hagadera used the money received from a cousin in Canada to buy computers and provide computer-training facilities in the market. Because he lived in the camps he knew the main concerns of the Somalis well, and his business proved to be very successful. Many refugees, and in particular the youth, were very concerned about the lack of educational opportunities in Dadaab and thus eager to pay for his initiative. Remittance sending not only brings benefits to the camps but may also carry disadvantages. Within migration studies, it has been argued for long that remittances may create dependency and those receiving remittances may even stop working for their daily bread, expecting to be assisted or waiting to migrate themselves (Russell, 1986). This is similar to the idea within refugee studies that receiving international aid for extensive periods of time will lead to a dependency syndrome. Yet, the main problem for refugees in Dadaab is that they are forced to operate in an artificial environment with very limited opportunities to gain an independent livelihood (Horst, 2006b). During my fieldwork, I did come across cases in which monthly remittances led to a passive attitude, or dollars sent from overseas were used for chewing qat (mildly stimulant narcotic leaves). Yet, such behaviour is likely to lead to a reduction or even cut of remittance flows. The large majority of those receiving remittances actively try to improve their livelihood opportunities; creatively using the extra opportunities provided to them through this regular income.

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But as long as the larger political-economic structures in which they have to operate remain unchanged, and these refugees are expected to continue living in refugee camps that cannot sustain them, their livelihood strategies will remain fragile. A further possible disadvantage of remittances entering the camps is that if the refugees hope or expect to receive remittances from their relatives overseas, they may spend scarce resources trying to contact them. Having hopes for a better future is very important in an opportunity-scarce place like Dadaab, but if these hopes are false and lead to risky investments, they may at the same time be quite damaging. Even those refugees without relatives overseas are affected, because of the improved livelihoods they can observe from others. This is an effect of remittance sending that has been observed amongst migrants for long. Russell (1986) for example mentions an increase in social and economic tensions and rifts between households receiving and those not receiving remittances. In Dadaab, these effects are present but mitigated by the fact that many people beyond the receiver alone benefit from remittance sending; through local assistance networks and business or job opportunities. One of the main benefits of remittance sending is that it provides social security, as in times of contingency at least a section of the camp population has relatives in the west to call upon. Due to remittances entering the camp economy, the general standard of living in the Dadaab area has improved considerably over the last 10 years.

SOMALI REMITTANCE SENDING FROM MINNEAPOLIS It is clear from the previously mentioned that transnational links with relatives in resettlement countries are vital for the ability of Somalis to cope with their refugee lives in the camps. Yet, in order to evaluate whether transnational networks can provide durable solutions, as Van Hear (2002) suggests, it is important to understand the capacity and desire amongst resettled refugees to engage in remittance sending. I conducted research amongst Somalis in and around Minneapolis, Minnesota, to answer this question. The largest amounts of remittances in Dadaab are sent from the United States, and the Somali community in Minneapolis is said to be the largest within the United States. This section first provides background information on this community, after which practices of and visions about remittance sending are discussed.

Remittance Sending: Transnational Livelihood Responsibilities There is quite some variation in the level of success amongst Somalis in Minneapolis; with age, gender, education, English proficiency, length of stay, type of employment, social network, and number of dependants being vital determinants. A small percentage of Somali professionals and top businessmen

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 99 form a highly successful elite; a reasonably large middle class is formed by social workers, teachers, university students, and so forth; the group of (nonEnglish speaking) Somalis with low-skilled jobs is similar in size; and a small percentage of the Somali community, mainly consisting of single mothers and some older people without relatives, are really struggling to make ends meet. Yet, financially stable or not, all Somalis in Minneapolis I spoke to at least send some money to their relatives left behind. Dahabo Abdulahi, a single mother of four, works at the food shelf for needy people for 20 hours a week and goes to adult High School for 20 hours, receiving social welfare. She told me: “We have to send. We know that life in Somalia and Kenya and those regions is very difficult. If my mother calls and tells me that she does not have food on the table that night, I will have to send something. I know their difficulties. But it is not easy for me, having four daughters to take care of. At times, I send 50 dollars, at times 100, at times nothing; it depends on the expenses I have that month.” Dahabo’s case is an example of someone struggling to make ends meet, and others are able to send much more. The monthly amounts that were mentioned during interviews ranged from $200 up to $1,000, with larger amounts being sent to a number of families. The sending of large amounts does not necessarily indicate the wealth of the sender. Many of those who send very large amounts are young men and women who work in manual jobs and whose main aim it is to provide an income for their family members left behind or arrange their resettlement. This is illustrated by data I gathered during a trip to a small village close to Minneapolis, where a large group of Somalis had migrated to work in a turkey factory. A tour through the factory gave an impression of the monotone and filthy jobs people had. Afterwards, we visited a number of men who worked in the factory at their home; an empty apartment decorated with a huge flag of Somalia. I questioned them about remittances, and the young men all informed me they sent $400 home monthly, volunteering to tell me that women usually sent double that amount, because they worked over-hours and did not spend money like men did. Hassan Aden said in this respect: “I thought about working overhours, but whether I have 1,000 or 400 in my pocket, I will send it anyway. So I might as well send the 400 and not over-work myself.” I wanted to know whether their family members in Somalia and the region knew where the money came from. Hassan told me that he had visited relatives in Kenya recently, telling them he sold mobiles and cars for a living. The contrast between the image being created and the actual life these Somali refugees lived was great. On one hand, they created dreams to deal with reality and add to their status as successful migrants. On the other hand, however, the images created made reality of life in turkey town more unbearable as it confronted them with the discrepancies between their own dreams in the past and the reality they found themselves in, and because it created high demands from relatives in the region. This example illustrates some of the complexities of remittance sending for Somalis in the diaspora.

100 Cindy Horst Their local life- and livelihood choices are to a great extent determined by the responsibilities they have toward relatives elsewhere. This transnationalism may be forced (Al-Ali, 2001 p. 115), with people having no option but to send to those left behind in far worse circumstances. Yet, at the same time, fulfilling family obligations is also a choice made. Khadija Osman, who works for a Somali self-organization, explained to me how the $150 she sends to her brother in Kakuma refugee camp and the $150 she sends to relatives in Somalia are part of her monthly bill and she always pays them before even paying the rent: “If I cannot pay the rent, I will still manage. But if those people do not get the money I send them, life will be too tough for them.” Besides affecting patterns of expenditure, transnational responsibilities also affect migration decisions. I met quite a number of Somalis who had migrated from the Netherlands, and one of the reasons they mentioned for their move was the difficulty of gaining sufficient income in order to send remittances from the Netherlands (Reek & Hussein, 2003). Interestingly, transnational family responsibilities do not only lead to migration but also restrict movements. Rashid Kasim, a student who had moved from Egypt some years before, told me: “I cannot go back to Cairo, because my family is there and I have to take care of them. No matter how difficult life may be here, at least I can provide for my family. In Cairo, I could not send them anything, now I send money to my sister in Cairo and my parents and siblings in Somalia every month.” Besides influencing expenditure and migration patterns, transnational responsibilities also affect gender relations. Dhofa Abdi, a student and social worker, told me that she would only marry if her husband would agree for her to continue working: “A number of my relatives are simply dependent on me, so even if I get married I will remain responsible for those back home. Many of my friends stopped working after getting married and they just sit at home. The problem is that the husband has to provide an income for them and maybe children, as well as for his family. He has to work many extra hours in order to pay for everything. If her family calls and needs assistance, she will want them to receive money as well and this might lead to conflicts. Also, she will ask him what he sends to her family in comparison to what he sends to his family.6 Her family will put their stresses on her life, and the husband will never be able to provide for all these people. People get divorced over these issues, and that is why I would really want to continue working.” Although this quote clearly illustrates how family obligations can cause great pressures in the personal lives of Somalis in Minneapolis, many of them feel that this is not sufficiently appreciated by their relatives.7 Misunderstanding arise between Somalis in the region, who are disappointed with the amounts they receive, and resettled Somalis, who are unable to meet expectations and are suspicious of the ways in which their money is used. Dhofa Abdi told me how she recently went to Mudug to visit her relatives, and stopped sending $800 a month after that: “I used to be very

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 101 sensitive when they call and work on my conscience. But at least since I went, feelings of guilt have reduced. I asked them what they did with all the money I had sent them throughout the years. Where did it go? They could not answer me.”

Communal Projects Remittance sending is not only done on an individual basis but also includes community development—and emergency aid projects as well as investments in housing and facilities for eventual return. Research has analyzed how Somalis in Scandinavia and the United Kingdom set up cooperative organisations to enable repatriation to Somaliland through both private and public investments, possibly benefiting development in the region (Kleist, 2003). During fieldwork in Minneapolis, I similarly learned about community-based projects; both in response to crisis situations in Somali areas as well as in attempts to contribute to improved livelihoods in the region. These projects were largely organized by region and thus often by clan. Humanitarian aid projects were directed at Sool and Sanaag regions, where serious droughts occurred late 2003. Abdulhakim Axmed informed me about the way that the aid was organized: “We engage in various activities, such as sending letters to Somalis who originated from Sanaag region and expecting them to contribute $20 until June 2005 or pay the total amount of $440 at once. We expect to collect about $6,000, which will be send to Abu Dhabi, where others involved in the project will buy food, water and other basic needs for nomads in that region. They will send us the receipts, and the goods will be send to Galgacayo, where the receiving families have to sign letters to prove that they received the money.” Communal development efforts were carried out in the field of improved water supplies, education and health care. In the offices of one of the Somali NGOs working in Minneapolis, a poster advertised a fund raising for a primary school, inviting everybody to come and contribute. Suleiman Hashi, the head of one of the Somali NGOs providing social services for his community in Minneapolis, explained how a good friend of his had set up a High School in Mogadishu. They were colleagues at the University of Mogadishu, and as the director of the school, his friend received very positive reports. Because it is difficult to run such a school financially in Somalia, Suleiman and a number of his friends in the United States agreed to contribute to the school, in order to enable the director to get additional funding elsewhere. Besides their financial contributions, they also offered him advice, because most of them are highly qualified professionals; many with a background in education. In these kinds of efforts, it is not uncommon for Somalis to share responsibilities and costs with international NGOs or institutions. However, when I asked Suleiman for his views about a more systematic cooperation between the Somali community and NGOs, he proved sceptical because of problems

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of ownership and responsibility: “There are Somalis who set up their own NGO and then tried to get other NGOs to contribute. Some were successful in setting up schools or water projects etcetera. Still, I believe that at times it is better for individuals or the community to set up these projects, as they should not always expect things. They should not always think that they will be assisted. Besides, there seems to be more respect for private property than public property. Nowadays, all schools, clinics etcetera are private property. If governments or NGOs get involved, there is a far higher chance that these buildings will be looted.” A number of NGOs and governments currently show great interest in the development potential of remittances. Much of this interest is not only directed toward this situation, and the ways migrants are handling remittance sending. Rather, these actors are trying to find ways to get involved in existing practices, gaining control by formalizing transfer mechanisms and having a greater say in the use of remittances; in order to increase their contribution to development as defined by these actors. It needs to be realised that such objectives may clash with views within the Somali community.

CONCLUSION This chapter started off by noticing that, in order for the current policy initiatives related to remittances and development to be successful, more knowledge on refugee remittances is vital. The case of Somalis in refugee camps in the region and those resettled in the United States has been presented in order to answer two questions. First of all, how essential are remittances for survival in regional refugee camps. And second, how capable and willing are refugees in resettlement countries to send remittances. The importance of remittance sending for survival in the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya is illustrated by the fact that the area provides extremely limited livelihood opportunities and the international community’s hand-outs in the camps are highly insufficient. The refugees are confined to an ecologically marginal, insecure region and are not granted work permits, so they would not be able to survive in the refugee camps without transnational assistance networks. These networks are based on social security strategies that have a long history amongst the Somali, including migration and strong social networks. Remittances sent within these networks assist 10% to 15% of the camp population directly, and spread to benefit a much wider group of people through social networks as well as business and job opportunities. The spending patterns of the refugees in the camps are very comparable to recorded spending patterns amongst economic migrants, with the majority of remittance monies being used on household expenditure and the remainder saved or used on micro enterprise and other forms of investments (e.g., Wimaladharma, Pearce & Stanton, 2004 p. 3; Van Hear & Sorensen, 2003 p. 26). It is obvious that, under the circumstances of life in

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 103 Dadaab, a large part of the money received is simply needed for survival. The remainder is vital in providing the refugees with a level of choice and allowing them the capacity to assist themselves, and others. The financial flows into the camps are invested in business activities, education, or migration; and have led to initiatives that improved the standard of living in the area considerably since the establishment of the camps. At the same time, the livelihood strategies of refugees in camps will remain highly fragile if they continue to live in protracted refugee situations (Crisp, 2003) without any durable solution in sight. As local integration is not an option for the Kenyan government and the situation in Somalia remains too unsafe for refugees to return, this is the case. As such, most refugees will continue to need remittances in order to survive. Thus, the second question becomes highly relevant: how durable are current remittance patterns, considering the willingness and capacity of resettled Somalis to engage in remittance sending? Almost all Somalis in Minneapolis are sending the little or much they can afford to send, pushed by a mix of a strong sense of responsibility, pressures from their relatives in the region, and the status and capital this act provides them with. As such, livelihood decisions amongst Somalis in Minneapolis are determined by transnational factors, not only affecting their patterns of expenditure but also their migration decisions and personal lives. Yet, the continuity of transnational networks may be threatened by the fact that the obligation to send money to relatives in Kenya or Somalia is often a real burden. In many cases, this burden is managed with an idea of temporality: eventually, sending remittances may no longer be necessary or at least the amount can be lessened considerably. In order to achieve that, Somalis in Minneapolis try to assist those who are dependent on them to migrate from the region (Moret, Baglioni & Efionayi-Mader, 2006). Alternatively, they try to encourage investments that enable people’s self-sufficiency; either individually or in communal initiatives. Especially communal development initiatives are the focus of institutional interest. The question, however, is how necessary the analytical distinction between remittances used for supporting relatives and those used for development initiatives is (Carling, 2004). As I have indicated in the Dadaab case, the remittances that enter the camp economy greatly contribute to the general welfare in the camps. Although, due to the poor conditions in the area, they are largely spent on consumption, increased purchasing power in the camps gives businessmen greater room for investing in productive activities. Besides, the remittance transfer business stimulates other areas, such as transportation of people and goods, trade, and telecommunication; which in turn may stimulate remittance transfers (Horst, 2006b). The common assumption is that personal remittances are less beneficial to development because of their assumed disadvantages: they are said to create dependency and lead to luxurious, wasteful spending. Stories of unwise spending and low incentives to work do circulate in Somali society, but such attitudes

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cannot last. Whereas some claim that remittances are the only unrequited source of finance in developing countries (Kapur, 2003), my data indicate that this is not completely true. Whereas financial reciprocity may not be expected, senders do make social claims on the receivers. If those receiving money do not use their hard-earned money wisely, there is always the sanction of remittances coming to a halt. Taking all these factors into account, how can the impacts of remittances on broader aspects of development be enhanced through policy measures? Nyberg Sorensen (2004) has provided relevant recommendations in this respect. She argues that governments and development agencies trying to mobilize remittances for development should acknowledge the fact that diasporas are already agents of development. The Somalis in Minneapolis contribute substantially to the lives and livelihoods of their relatives in the region and also engage in communal development activities in cooperation with those in the regions. Many Somalis have an excellent knowledge on the situation in their home country and neighbouring countries. As such, they need a much stronger voice in policy developments that affect their region of origin; taking into account the heterogeneity of the community in exile and their various interests. Currently, the ability of resettled Somalis to assist their relatives in the region is still quite limited compared to expectations and needs, and the political-economic position of those in the region also hardly offers potential for contributing to development. Thus, measures need to be taken that improve the economic and political position of refugees in their host countries as well as transnationally. Reaching out to the diaspora could involve increasing political support, dual citizenship rights, inviting diaspora groups to participate in forums for dialogue on development and cooperating with diaspora communities in joint income-generating schemes for their local communities (Nyberg Sorensen, 2004, p. 25). Host countries in the region and in the west can do much more in order to tap diaspora resources, but this would require linking their migration and development policies. Receiving governments in the west have to realize that the policies they develop to deal with refugees, including their legal rights and responsibilities, have an impact on development initiatives in the home country and the region. After all, the livelihood strategies of refugees in the region and the west, and thus their potential to contributing to development, are determined transnationally as well as locally. NOTES 1. I wish to thank Valentina Mazzucato, Mayke Kaag, Ilse van Liempt, and the reviewers for their useful comments to an earlier version of this chapter. 2. For an extensive description of the various policies implemented by the Cuban government, see Barberia (2002) and Eckstein (2003). 3. The total number of international migrants, including refugees, was estimated in 2005 to be 200 million (GCIM, 2005), whereas the total number

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 105

4.

5. 6. 7.

of refugees in that year was estimated to be 11,5 million (USCRI, 2005); almost 6%. Somali traders collected hard currency from the migrant workers, using this to purchase commodities for sale in Somalia. The equivalent in Somali currency, or goods, was then handed over to the migrants’ families and kinsmen. Annually, the remittances transferred through this system amounted to two or three times the Somali Republic’s export earnings (1994). All names of those who participated in the research are pseudonyms, so as to respect their privacy. This is a very common scene is proved by similar dialogues in the Somali theatre play “Qaabyo.” This problem is not unique to the Somali diaspora, as research amongst Sudanese refugees indicates (Riak Akuei, 2004).

REFERENCES Adams, R. & Page, J. (2005). Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries? World Development, 33(10), 1645–1669. Ahmed, I. (2000). Remittances and their impact in postwar Somaliland. Disasters, 24(4), 380–389. Al-Ali, N. (2001). Trans- or A-national? Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands. In: K. Koser & N. Al-Ali (Eds.), New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home (pp.96–117). London: Routledge. Al-Ali, N., Black, R. & Koser, K. (2001). Refugees and Transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4), 615–634. Barberia, L. (2002). Remittances to Cuba: An evaluation of Cuban and U.S. government policy measures. Boston: The Inter-university Committee on International Migration. International Migration Working Paper Series. Carling, J. (2004). Policy options for increasing the benefits of remittances. Oxford: COMPAS. COMPAS Working Paper. Carling, J. (2005). Migrant remittances and development cooperation. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). Crisp, J. (2003). No solutions in sight: The problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa. Geneva: UNHCR. New Issues in Refugee Research. Diaz-Briquets, S. & Perez-Lopez, J. (1997). Refugee remittances: Conceptual issues and the Cuban and Nicaraguan experiences. International Migration Review, 31(2), 411–437. Dick, S. (2003). Changing the equation: Refugees as valuable resources rather than helpless victims. Praxis. The Fletcher Journal of International Development, XVIII, 19–30. Eckstein, S. (2003). Diasporas and dollars: Transnational ties and the transformation of Cuba. Boston: The Inter-university Committee on International Migration. International Migration Working Paper Series. GCIM. (2005). Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action. Geneva: GCIM. Horst, C. (2006a). Buufis amongst Somalis in Dadaab: The transnational and historical logics behind resettlement dreams. Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(2), 143–157. Horst, C. (2006b). Transnational nomads. How Somalis cope with refugee life in the Dadaab camps of Kenya. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books. Horst, C. (2006c). Virtual dialogues? The value of electronic media for research amongst refugee diasporas. Refuge, 23(1), 51–57.

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Horst, C. & Van Hear, N. (2002). Counting the cost: Refugees, remittances and the ‘war against terrorism.’ Forced Migration Review, 14, 32–34. Kapur, D. (2004, April). Remittances: The new development mantra?(No. 29) New York and Geneva, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Paper prepared for the G-24 Technical Group Discussion Series. Kleist, N. (2003). Somali-Scandinavian dreaming. Visions of home and return in Somscan and UK cooperative associations. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen. Kleist, N. (2004). Nomads, sailors and refugees. A century of Somali migration. Sussex: University of Sussex. Centre for Migration Research. Sussex Migration Working Paper. Koser, K. (1997). Social networks and the asylum cycle: The case of Iranians in the Netherlands. International Migration Review, 31(3), 591–611. Koser, K. (2001). War and peace in Eritrea. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research. Living on the Edge: Migration, Conflict and State in the Backyards of Globalisation. Lewis, I. M. (1994). Blood and bone: The call of kinship in Somali society. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. Lindley, A. (2006). Migrant remittances in the context of crisis in Somali society. A case study of Hargeisa. London: Overseas Development Institute. Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. Marchal, R. (2000). Globalization and its impact on Somalia. Nairobi: UNDOS. Moret, J., Baglioni, S. & Efionayi-Mäder, D. (2006). The path of Somali refugees into exile: A comparative analysis of secondary movements and policy responses. Neuchatel: Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM). Nyberg Sorensen, N. (2004). The development dimension of migrant remittances. Geneva: IOM, Department of Migration Policy, Research and Communications. Migration Policy Research Working Paper Series. Reek, E. v. d. & Hussein, A.I. (2003). Somaliers op Doorreis: Verhuisgedrag van Nederlandse Somaliers naar Engeland. Tilburg: Wetenschapswinkel Universiteit van Tilburg. Riak Akuei, S. (2004). Remittances as unforeseen burdens: Considering displacement, family and resettlement contexts in refugee livelihood and well being. Is there anything states or organisations can do? UNHCR Livelihoods Network. Riak Akuei, S. (2005). Remittances as Unforeseen Burdens: The Livelihoods and Social Obligations of Sudanese Refugees. Geneva: GCIM. Global Migration Perspectives. Russell, S. (1986). Remittances from international migration: A review in perspective. World Development, 14(6), 677–696. Russell, S. (1993). Migrant remittances and development. International Migration, 31, 267–287. Sander, C. (2003). Migrant remittances to developing countries. A scoping study: Overview and introduction to issues for pro-poor financial services. Bannock Consulting. UNDP. (2001). Somalia human development report. Nairobi: UNDP. USCRI. (2005). World refugee survey 2005. Washington DC: US Commitee for Refugees and Immigrants. Van Hear, N. (2001). Sustaining societies under strain. Remittances as a form of transnational exchange in Sri Lanka and Ghana. In: K. Koser & N. Al-Ali (Eds.), New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home. London: Routledge, 202–223. Van Hear, N. (2002). From ‘durable solutions’ to ‘transnational relations’: Home and exile among refugee diasporas. In B. Folke Frederiksen & N. Nyberg Sorensen (Eds.), Beyond home and exile: Making sense of lives on the move. Copenhagen: Roskilde University, 232–251.

The Role of Remittances in Transnational Livelihood Strategies 107 Van Hear, N. & Sorensen, N. (2003). The migration-development nexus. Geneva: IOM. Weiss Fagen, P. & Bump, M. (2006). Remittances in conflict and crises: How remittances sustain livelihoods in war, crises and transitions to peace. New York: International Peace Academy. The Security-Development Nexus Policy Paper. Wimaladharma, J., Pearce, D. & Stanton, D. (2004). Remittances: The new development finance? Small Enterprise Development Journal, 15(1). World Bank. (2005). Global economic prospects 2006. Economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Part II

Diasporas and Development at Home

6

Migration, Collective Remittances, and Development Mexican Migrant Associations in the United States Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Luis Escala Rabadán

In recent years, migration analysts have observed the steady growth of immigrant-led organizations, and most particularly hometown associations (HTAs) in different parts of the world. Despite their voluntary structure and relative formality, these groups have increasingly gained visibility by becoming an effective means to improve the social and economic conditions of their hometowns in their nations of origin, by raising funds which are then transformed into collective remittances. As a result, these migrant associations have become a recurrent topic within the nexus of migration, the expanding flow of remittances, and development. However, while some scholars (Caglar, 2006 p. 3) point out that HTAs have turned into a worldwide phenomenon, most of the resulting literature focuses on HTAs in the United States established by migrants from Latin America, namely from Mexico. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s HTAs (which appear under various names, including civic clubs, social clubs, and committees) and home state federations had become the most prevalent organizational type among Mexican groups with a long migratory tradition, such as those from western central Mexico, as well as from new sending regions from the southern, central, and eastern states. These associations promote the well-being of their communities by collecting money in the United States to use in building public infrastructure and undertaking community projects. In many cases, their memberships pay special attention to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in their hometowns of origin. The growing importance of these migrant groups lies in their significance as bridging agents between Mexico and the United States and as pivotal supporters of well being in their communities of origin through the various philanthrophic and infrastructure works they fund. In principle, there seems to be an agreement on the limited impact of Mexican migrants’ individual or family remittances regarding the promotion of regional development in their impoverished hometowns in Mexico, because this money is almost entirely dedicated to satisfy the basic needs of the members of the household left behind by migrants. However, collective remittances funelled through

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HTAs, although constituting a small fraction of overall flow of remittances, have been regarded as a potential source of sustainable development, thus opening a promising confluence between migration, remittances, and economic development (García Zamora, 2006). Starting about a decade ago the terms migration, remittances and development began appearing together in a series of articles, reports, and conference themes, which was a continuation of a lively discussion that took place during the 1970s and 1980s “about whether or not remittances contributed to development” (Goldring, 2004). This trend is an indicator of what Goldring (2004) has called an “emerging remittance-based component of development and poverty reduction planning” among institutionalized actors such as multilateral institutions and governments of sending countries like Mexico. In this sense, there is some consensus about a positive impact of family remittances by reducing the level and depth of poverty in sending communities of countries like Mexico (Adams & Page, 2003; Goldring, 2004; De Haan, 2006). Sometimes these remittances are the main source of income for entire villages. Mexican government statistics estimate that there are 1.6 million households that receive remittances on a regular basis, and for 47% of them, they are the main source of income (Rubalcava & Teruel 2005). However, while it may be true that remittances help reduce poverty among households that receive them, there is strong evidence that migration and remittances lead to greater inequality within communities and across regions. As de Haan argues, “there is some evidence that the poorest, least skilled, least physically capable, and without [migratory] networks tend to migrate less” (2006 p. 4). It is clear now that, despite the growing interest in the possibilities of linking the concepts of migration, remittances, and development, studies keep raising new questions and challenges. For one, the idea itself of linking remittances to development is still controversial, to the extent that some observers have warned of the risks of perceiving them as the key single factor to alleviate the problems of development, especially in countries such as Mexico. There are some migration scholars whose work has shed some light into the economic impact of migration in their communities of origin at the microcommunity and even regional levels (Cohen, 2002, 2005). But for the most part there are important intellectual challenges facing migration and economic studies in terms of understanding the complex dynamic between migration, remittances, and development. The overarching premise of this chapter is to put to the test the feasibility of this convergence, by looking at the interconnection of migration, collective remittances and development not only from a theoretical perspective, but also by grounding our analysis on the perspective of the migrants themselves. Our main argument is that organized Mexican migrants in HTAs have become key transnational actors between their societies of origin and destination, as a result of their extended ability and experience through the implementation of community works in their hometowns in Mexico. Nevertheless, in recent

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years these groups have begun to expand the scope of their philanthropic activities with the purpose of supporting productive investment projects in their localities in Mexico, thus aiming to have a more direct impact in the reactivation of local economies and the creation of job sources. In this sense, Mexican HTAs, as well as other social actors, have been joining forces to orient their actions toward this goal as an expanded vision of their binational actions, social networks, and aim for development.

MEXICAN HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES The consolidation of strong social networks between specific regions in Mexico and the United States has encouraged the emergence of fellow towners, or paisano (a term used for people who were born in the same village) organizations that base themselves in their locality, municipality, ethnic group, or state of origin. These associations can trace their origins to informal networks of migrant paisanos which have risen and waned for decades.1 But from the 1970s onward, there was a proliferation of Mexican clubs and associations with varied social and ethnic constituencies and distinct levels of organization (Bada, 2003a; Espinosa, 1999; Goldring 2002; Rivera 2003; Rivera-Salgado 1999a; Smith 2001). A key element in the emergence and development of these associations is the strengthening of ties between migrants and their towns in rural Mexico, which transform hometowns into powerful reference points for creating a collective identity among migrants from the same community or region. The paisano connection becomes an essential part of the migrants’ social organization, akin to the ties that bind family and friends. Ties with the little homeland, far from weakening or disappearing with distance, are strengthened and transformed into paisano networks that eventually lead to the construction of associations as a privileged way of translocal belonging. In this context, working together in the United States as an organized group allows migrants to promote and consolidate a feeling of shared cultural identity. A clear indication of the importance achieved by HTAs among the different Mexican migrant communities is their steady growth during the last few years, as well as their expanding presence throughout the United States. Table 6.1 illustrates this growth during the period of 1998–2003, as the total number of HTAs registered nationwide went from 441 to 623. Although this data is limited, there is a clear pattern of growth in the numbers of HTAs and their expanding presence in different parts of the United States. However, California and Illinois concentrate 80% of the total number of HTAs in 2003, a figure that is consistent with the increase and clustering of the Mexican migrant population. According to the 2000 Census, 70% of the 9.2 million Mexican migrants are concentrated in three states (California, Texas, and Illinois). Despite these clusters, their distribution throughout

114

Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Luis Escala Rabadán Table 6.1 Number of Mexican HTAs in the United States by states of origin and destination (1998-2003) States of origin in Mexico

1998

Zacatecas

2003

113

126

Jalisco

74

100

Guerrero

23

51

Michoacán

19

51

Guanajuato

40

48

Oaxaca

22

36

Other States

150

211

Total

441

623

States of Destination in the U.S.

1998

2003

California

240

329

Illinois

82

170

Texas

73

48

New York

15

27

Other States

31

49

441

623

Total

Source: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (1999, 2003).

the United States points out not only their growth but also the expanded points of destination of this migrant influx. As we will elaborate later, this well organized minority constituted the critical mass that has been pivotal in the promotion of a more defined binational civic and political participation among Mexican migrants. Literally hundreds of these HTAs now exist across the United States. In many cases they are informal groups known only to their members and have little contact with other groups in either Mexico or the United States. This early structure is sometimes the first step toward organizational formalization, which then allows for the integration of migrants’ communities in the United States by linking them through paisano relations based on town and region of origin in Mexico. The main activities of these groups are fund-raising events to finance philanthropic projects in their towns in Mexico. According to Orozco (2002), these projects are mainly of five kinds: charity (toys, clothes, church donations), infrastructure (parks, cemeteries, street and main plazas’ construction, ambulances, etc.), human development (scholarships, sport utilities, libraries, health facilities and equipment, etc.), investment (income generation activities for the communities), and

Migration, Collective Remittances, and Development

115

general fund-raising. In a recent study, Orozco (2003) points out that Mexican HTAs have a core membership of around ten people, including board members, they hold elections for president once or twice per year, and their projects’ implementation is usually coordinated with a counterpart in the hometown, taking at least 6 months to complete. As we pointed out, despite their increasing distribution throughout the United States, the Chicago and Los Angeles metropolitan areas constitute the main clusters of these groups. Indeed, in 1995, the Mexican consulate in Chicago recorded 35 Mexican HTAs in that area. Today, this consulate lists 270 HTAs in their database (Barceló Monroy, 2005). These associations are organized in 17 umbrella federations and one Confederation of Mexican Federations, representing an extensive array of Mexican states. This growth pattern in Chicago is representative of the steady expansion we have witnessed of these Mexican migrant-led associations in the United States in the last two decades, with significant implications for the future of civic life in this nation.2 For example, and in contrast with this growth, membership in many conventional American voluntary associations has simultaneously declined by roughly 25% to 50% since the 1970s (Putnam, 2000). In an era when classic American civic associations (Elks fraternal organizations, Red Cross, Parents and Teachers Associations, Lions’ Clubs, etc.) are facing difficulties keeping their rosters alive, the Mexican HTAs in places like Chicago are spreading across the Midwest with great vitality (Bada, 2003b). Nevertheless, the most important cluster of these groups is located in the state of California, namely in the Los Angeles region, which has witnessed the rise and consolidation of Mexican HTAs and state federations throughout the last two decades, as well as the intertwining between migration, collective remittances, and initiatives to promote local development in their communities of origin in Mexico.

MIGRANTS’ ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR BINATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY ENGAGEMENT The increasing importance of migrant clubs and federations, as well as the implementation of new policies pertaining to migrants, has led the Mexican government, at the state and federal levels, to implement a wide array of programs to facilitate relations between communities on both sides of the border and to optimize the material and financial resources provided by the different groups. Not only have these programs been useful for channeling resources from organized migrants to their places of origin, but they have also created a predictable institutional framework through which migrant associations can interact with local, state, and federal governments in Mexico. A noticeable outcome of this interaction has been a sometimes comfortable, sometimes conflictive, relationship between these HTAs and the various levels of government.

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Although Mexican migrant communities themselves laid the foundations for their new organizational structures, we have to keep in mind that Mexico’s government involvement, particularly in the 1990s, has been crucial in consolidating the HTAs and their umbrella federations as an organizational model.3 Indeed, almost all Mexican migrant communities have adopted this model, probably because of the advantages it offers in the interaction between the government and the migrant associations. On one hand, federations are better able to interact with other agencies in Mexico, particularly with municipal and state governments, as well as with Mexican consulates in areas like Los Angeles, a fact that enables them to better support the objectives and initiatives of their member HTAs. On the other hand, the various Mexican government agencies find it more efficient to work with the federations, which can negotiate agreements and more easily overcome any obstacles that emerge.4

ZACATECAN ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE 3 FOR 1 PROGRAM FOR MIGRANTS The case of the Zacatecas Federation is very telling in this respect, because they have been able to build a solid relationship with Mexican government officials, particularly from the state and federal levels. These links, along with the federation’s organizational history, have made it an important intermediary between its member clubs and Mexico’s government. The Zacatecas clubs in California have taken extensive advantage of their effective intermediation to implement infrastructure projects in their communities of origin. Through the Two for One program, established in 1992, and the Three for One program created in 1999 (under the former program, federal and state governments match every dollar the clubs provide for social infrastructure projects; the latter adds a match from municipal governments), the Zacatecas Federation has generated more investment funding and implemented more infrastructure projects than any other Mexican migrant group. This program, that matches migrants’ investments in their home communities, grew out of the relationship between this migrant organization and the Zacatecas state government, attesting to the federation’s ability to create effective intermediation between its member associations and communities of origin in Mexico.5 In 2002 the program was officially federalized during a ceremony led by Mexican President Vicente Fox. According to official figures for 2005 the program spent a total of 66.5 million dollars at the national level (a contribution of 16.6 million dollars for each of the four sectors participating) on projects supported by migrants organized in HTAs in the United States. Initially, federal officials had designated a share of 2.7 million dollars for the state of Zacatecas (a global investment of 10.9 million). Nevertheless, and

Migration, Collective Remittances, and Development Table 6.2 Year

117

Total funding for the ‘3 for 1 Program’ in Zacatecas Investment

Investment by Migrants

Number of Projects

1999

$5 million

$1.25 million

93

2000

$6 million

$1.5 million

95

2001

$7 million

$1.75 million

113

2002

$8.6 million

$2.15 million

149

2003

$20 million

$5 million

308

2004/2005

$31.1 million

$7.75 million

667

2006

$6.7 million

$1.7 million

88

TOTALS

$84.4 million

$21.1 million

1513

Source: SEPLADER Zacatecas (2006).

through savvy negotiations led by the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, they achieved that the Zacatecas share of the 3 for 1 program be increased by 7.3 million dollars to 18.3 million. In addition, they also agreed that the rules of the program be adjusted so that the following year it can be used to fund productive projects. This level of access and the ability to shape important decision-making processes about the allocation of real money illustrates how far along in terms of political weight this federation has come, shaping in a very decisive way not only important policies emanating from the Mexican governments at the state and federal level, but also taking leadership in their implementation and modification. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the 3 for 1 Program in Zacatecas grew steadily since it became a federal program in 1999. In that year the total investment of the program was almost $5 million US dollars (migrants contributed $1.25 million dollars) which provided funding for 93 projects in 27 municipalities. In 2000, Zacatecan HTAs contributed $1.5 million which, when added to the government contributions at the local, state and federal levels, totaled $6 million, providing funding for 95 community projects. Most notable was the promotion of a new type of social project: scholarships for students from first grade through college in two communities in Zacatecas. In 2001, the program invested $7 million in 113 projects; in 2002, that figure rose to $8.6 million invested in 149 projects; and in 2003, it reached the $20 million mark invested in 308 projects. This significant growth is explained by the new contributions by the municipal governments and the direct involvement of municipal presidents, who were very actively promoting the formation of new Zacatecan migrant organizations in the United States in order to obtain funding for their own projects and expand the size of future investments during their own administration.

88

57

85

81

34

34

21

13

Education

Sewer systems

Urbanization projects

Electrification projects

Productive and irrigation areas Sports facilities

Community health centers

Cattle ranching infrastructure

951

46,437,000

0

56,000

389,000

539,000

1,269,000

1,906,000

1,661,000

2,123,000

2,136,000

2,903,000

100

0

0.1

0.8

1.1

1.8

3.6

2.7

4.1

3.6

4.6

4.6

6.2

8.4

11

12.3

34.7

%

667

0

9

21

7

13

4

115

98

37

34

29

62

9

78

107

44

Projects

31,124,000

218,000

118,000

649,000

219,000

672,000

156,000

2,279,000

2,070,000

1,236,000

2,159,000

442,000

3,607,000

333,000

4,175,000

4,447,000

8,344,000

Amount

2004–2005

100

0.7

0.3

2.1

0.7

2.1

0.5

7.3

6.6

4

7

1.4

11.6

1

13.4

14.3

26.8

%

88

8

0

1

4

4

7

9

6

5

1

11

2

13

6

11

Projects

Source: Secretaría de Planeación y Desarrollo Regional-SEPLADER. Coordinación General del Programa 3 por 1 en Zacatecas. The amounts and percentages are rounded off, and estimated in U.S. dollars.

Total investment

0

833,000

52

Potable water systems

Technical assistance

1,698,000

76

0

3,915,000

41

Temples/churches

Scholarships

5,152,000

116

Social assistance & community services Rural roads

5,725,000

16,132,000

69

184

Amount

Pavement of streets

Projects

1999–2003

Pavement of roads

Type of exp.

Year

6,692,000

0

140,000

0

38,000

135,000

586,000

360,000

359,000

386,000

225,000

34,000

561,000

133,000

820,000

562,000

2,353,000

Amount

2006 %

100

0

2.1

0

0.5

2

8.7

5.4

5.3

5.7

3.3

0.5

8.3

2

12.2

8.4

35.1

Table 6.3 Investment amounts and types of projects funded through the ‘3 for 1 Program’ for the periods 1999-2003, 2004– 2005, and 2006

118 Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Luis Escala Rabadán

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In terms of the projects funded though the 3 for 1 Program it is important to note their wide variety funded by HTAs in their communities of origin. Table 6.3 provides some detail on the types of projects funded, as well as the percentages of the total investment of the 3 for 1 Program in the state of Zacatecas. The most relevant are those that could be categorized as basic infrastructure projects: road and street paving, construction of dirt rural roads, potable water, sewer and electrification systems, and urbanization projects (building of parks and central plazas). The second type can be classified as social services and educational projects: construction of community development centers, health clinics, education projects (schools and learning centers), sports facilities, and scholarship to students. The third type would be economic productive projects: irrigation systems and cattle ranching infrastructure. Finally, the fourth type would be religious projects: the building of churches and temples of worship. By looking in detail at the data on tables 6.2 and 6.3, we can observe that between 1999 and 2006 the total investment of the 3 for 1 Program in Zacatecas has been of about $84.4 million dollars to finance 1,706 projects in that state alone. Zacatecan migrant HTAs contributed one-fourth of this amount, with $21.1 million in direct investment in their communities of origin. By looking closer at the type of projects that have been funded through this mechanism, we find that basic infrastructure projects are the dominant type where the lion share of investment is concentrated. In the eight-year period where the data is available, infrastructure projects command about 65% of the total investment of the 3 for 1 Program. Social services and education and health projects represent about 21% of the investment, followed by religious projects at 9%. Finally, productive projects represented only an average of 5% of the total investment, except in the year 2006 when the investment in productive projects jumped to 8.75% of that year’s total. These numbers open a series of questions regarding the impact of the 3 for 1 Program in terms of fostering economic development and lowering poverty rates in the communities of origin of the migrants involved. They also open the question about the participation of migrant-led organizations like HTAs in this partnership program with their state and national governments. Scholars and analysts have already pointed out that collective remittances like the ones mobilized for the 3 for 1 Program appeared at first to have overcome the debate about whether remittances, in this case family remittances, should be conceptualized primarily as income/wage supporting the households’ basic needs, or whether remittances could also become capital for investment fostering economic development activities in the communities of origin of migrants. As Goldring (2004) has pointed out, how we defined development and the institutional mediating mechanisms and the type of public policies associated with each type of remittance matters a whole lot in our assessment of their impacts in the lives of people receiving money from their relatives working abroad.

120 Gaspar Rivera-Salgado and Luis Escala Rabadán In order to assess the impact of collective remittances and the impact of intervention policies such as the 3 for 1 Program, we must define the meaning of economic development in broader social terms rather that the more narrow view of development merely as economic growth. As we may observe from our previous discussion regarding the breakdown of the projects financed under this program, almost 80% fall under the rubric of basic infrastructure and social services, health and education. This is a compelling indicator that illustrates that when projects have the public good as their guiding principle, collective resources can be mobilized effectively. Indeed, building a road can be used by everyone, and a clinic or a school clearly improves the well being of many families and provides for basic infrastructure so that life can be more bearable for the people left behind by migrating workers. Clearly, collective remittances are not the magic bullet that will cure poverty and marginalization in poor sending communities, but by building roads and introducing potable water, electricity and sewer systems, many of these communities are not only better off health wise, they are also laying down the basic foundation so that economic activity may flourish in the future.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, JOINT INVESTMENT, AND REMITTANCE PHILANTHROPHY Mexican HTAs and their federations have become more organized, diverse, and substantial in terms of their philanthropic drive, and they have significantly increased their social investment under the form of collective remittances in their communities of origin in Mexico. These funds are primarily used to build urban infrastructure and to support basic community projects. As a result, these initiatives aim to promote social change, especially by targeting vulnerable populations like children and the older people, by financially supporting key sectors like education and health in their hometowns. In fact, as Burgess (2005) has found out, Mexican HTAs from states with a long migratory tradition have had an impact in the decentralization of governance and the promotion of local development. Furthermore, these migrant groups seem to be contributing to a more equitable distribution of benefits, through their participation with government initiatives and cooperation mechanisms, by channeling a majority of their projects to those communities outside the municipal main towns, or cabeceras municipales, which historically tend to be smaller, more rural, and with little government spending on them (Burgess, 2005 p. 119). The centrality achieved by these migrant groups reveals the increasing importance and evolving relationship between development, migration, and remittances. However, this relationship raises some important considerations. The first one refers to a more realistic assessment of the role and influence of HTAs. It would be unwise at best and negligent at worst to assume organized migrants are the key ingredient to tackle the migration-poverty puzzle.

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Indeed, as several migration scholars have manifested (Red Internacional de Migración y Desarrollo, 2005), recent initiatives raised by the Mexican government at different levels seem to adopt this assumption by overemphasizing the importance of productive-investment projects in the future agendas of these groups. As Merz (2005 p. 5) asserts, “despite the promising potential for remittance flows, migrants cannot and should not assume primary responsibility for development in the communities they left behind.” Similarly, Ghosh (2006 p. 81) concludes in his study on the development potential of “remittances for investment from the diasporas should not, however, be taken for granted. And it would be unwise to be euphoric about their possible contribution to development in an unreserved manner.” Furthermore, the feasibility of this path requires a basic infrastructure that most of the times does not exist in the migrants’ hometowns (Zarate-Hoyos, 1999). A second consideration refers to adequately evaluating HTAs’ performance vis-à-vis their capacity to promote equity and development in their home countries. Certainly, when migrant associations finance the building of public infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, the local economies improve and that facilitates economic transactions. Similarly, financing the education and health-care infrastructure is an investment in human capital. In this sense, there seems to be an agreement between scholars, practitioners, and funders that HTAs promote development as long as their philanthropic giving aims to generate wealth through their investments. And while it is important to keep in mind these cautionary considerations, we need still more systematic analyzes to assess the opportunities and challenges of HTAs regarding the improvement of their communities of origin, as well as their role and capabilities to articulate a coherent development strategy. Between 2003 and 2005, a group of scholars, consultants, and leaders of the Zacatecan Federation, with the pivotal support of the Rockefeller Foundation, designed and implemented a pilot project in order to create opportunities for HTAs to build relationships with a wide range of social and political actors, both in Mexico and in the United States. This initiative aimed in principle to facilitate the formation of expansive multisector, binational networks through a participatory process, which would ultimately help create the necessary conditions to promote productive-investment projects in several Zacatecan hometowns, with the prime support of organized migrants in the United States. This participatory process focused on the convergence of interests of the different participant actors, creating an extensive array of links across borders and sectors and has fostered the formation of networks regarding the feasibility of productive projects. In addition, this program made possible for the participants to have genuine access to policymakers, financial institutions, and other sectors that can provide the resources needed to ensure the success of agricultural and microenterprise productive projects. By empowering all stakeholders and emphasizing the crucial role each stakeholder group plays, the process also led to improved political accountability.

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The implementation of this pilot program involved different facets and outcomes, which are summarized in the following sections.

BINATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BUILDING AND RESEARCH Binational relationship building and research provided the foundation for this pilot program. In this sense, two primary sets of actors were targeted in the binational planning process. The first were the Zacatecan Federations and the Zacatecan migrant organizations across the United States that can provide remittance investments. The second were the business owners (namely migrant entrepreneurs) and regional organizations of agricultural producers in Zacatecas seeking investments and binational networks to grow their businesses and generate jobs. The supporting actors in this binational planning process were: (a) local, state, and federal government agencies; (b) elected officials from different political parties; (c) financial institutions; and (d) various technical assistance and capacity building groups. In order to reach-out to these supporting actors, representatives from three key sectors were incorporated (government, NGOs, and organized agricultural producers) in Zacatecas during the planning stages of the program. In principle, one of the most tangible outcomes was the formation of three types of alliances. The first was between the Zacatecan Federation in Los Angeles and the other Zacatecan Federations located across the United States. The second type of alliance was between these migrant organizations in the United States and small businesses, migrant entrepreneurs and regional organizations of agricultural producers in Zacatecas. Increasingly, these two actors are developing a better understanding of each other’s goals. Finally, a third type of alliance was multisectoral in nature and included all of the actors described earlier. The binational meetings on productive projects implemented throughout this program addressed the issue of developing this three-way alliance between different actors by inviting key representatives from six different sectors: migrant organizations, organizations of agricultural producers, migrant entrepreneurs, financial sector, government officials (federal, state and local), and the academic, NGO and technical assistance communities.

BINATIONAL MEETINGS The initial stage of this project required several training workshops and planning meetings in Los Angeles with the Board of Directors of the Zacatecan Federation in order to consolidate the core group from this Federation that would serve as the main promoter and partners in the implementing this project. The planning sessions focused on developing a common understanding of productive projects, the discussion of key challenges facing

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small business owners, and the selection of the different sectors to invite to participate in this initiative. In the past, these sectors had operated as isolated entities, holding meetings among themselves and not engaging other sectors in a meaningful, collaborative fashion. Having a participatory, safe, and neutral process helped participants understand that transformative and positive change can be accomplished. Taking this approach, a commitment was made from the key players in the binational meetings and in the program as a whole. The peak of this process was the December 2004 Binational Conference on Productive Projects, held in the city of Zacatecas. This event was a major success, bringing together a large number of participants from six different sectors (migrant organizations, organizations of producers, migrant entrepreneurs, academics, government officials, and foundation representatives). The conference created a neutral space for open discussion across social, political, gender, and sectoral lines. As a result, it produced several concrete outcomes: 1. It provided an opportunity for agricultural producers to meet potential investors and showcase their products to various institutions. 2. Through a participatory planning process and democratic decisionmaking, it made possible to develop strategic action plans and work plans, as well as enabled individual commitments to improve the success rate of agricultural productive projects in Zacatecas. 3. It solidified the relationship between migrant organizations, their investors and producers, and businesses seeking investments and facilitated the cultivation of relationships across sectors. 4. It secured government commitments, such as the streamlining of municipal permitting processes. 5. It also made possible to obtain commitments to attend follow-up conferences and meetings. 6. Finally, it facilitated the creation of an specific instance for technical support (the Zacatecan Center for Economic Development & Technical Assistance, spearheaded by the Autonomous University of Zacatecas). An additional outcome was the April 2005 Binational Conference, as a follow-up meeting. At this conference, the binational alliance participants affirmed their support of the three-year strategic plan, which provides a comprehensive framework to incubate and support sustainable economic development projects in Zacatecas, Mexico. This comprehensive framework includes: (a) culturally competent entrepreneurial technical assistance services; (b) organizational capacity building services for immigrant organizations, migrant entrepreneurs, regional agricultural producers, and business owners; and, (c) local, state, and federal policy alignment related to financing, import-export procedures, and other business-related issues.

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Accordingly, these binational conferences, as well as the planning meetings, have positioned the Zacatecan Federation as an important convener of diverse constituencies and sectors, as well as a builder of networks and collaborations for productive projects.

DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR JOINT INVESTMENT OF REMITTANCES With the goal of creating a model for binational power alignment to support productive projects, this pilot program aimed to build on the successful track record of the Zacatecan Federation in funding infrastructure-social projects in their communities of origin in the state of Zacatecas, Mexico. For the past 20 years, the more than 50 HTAs that are members of the Zacatecan Federation have been funding philanthropic and social infrastructure projects such as those discussed earlier. The majority of these projects cost an average of $15,000, with the funds coming from individual members of the hometown associations through their fundraising events. The ability of these HTAs to raise substantial amounts of capital for collective remittances to fund social projects in Zacatecas demonstrates the promise of grassroots philanthropy. Building on their success, the core group behind the program worked to develop a strategy to utilize collective remittances to support productive projects. As a result of the implementation of this program, we observed several key practices of collective remittance investment in social infrastructure projects by the Zacatecan Federation that convey the convergence between migrant remittances, philanthropy, and development. The two best practices that better encapsulate the achievements of this program are the following: 1. The most successful projects are those that have the public good as their defining characteristic. These projects are sometimes defi ned by members of HTAs as the projects that benefit the whole community (benefician a toda la comunidad). This is important because it makes fundraising among members of the HTAs much easier when they can see the direct benefit of a given project to the residents of their community of origin. 2. The most successful projects are also the ones that are based on a commonly identified need and that are a priority for both the community in Zacatecas and the HTAs in California. Conflict sometimes arises when a project is perceived to be imposed either by the HTA leadership in California or by the elected officials in the community of origin in Zacatecas. Joint binational planning is, therefore, critical to the timely and successful implementation of social infrastructure projects. In sum, the transition to invest collective remittances into productive projects has to be a strategy built on these two principles of successful practices

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with social infrastructure projects: The public good and joint transnational planning must be at the center of the projects. At the same time, such a strategy must be taken much further because productive projects are much more complex investments in terms of their aim to create jobs, generate incomes, and become sustainable over the long term. As a result, new successful practices need borrow from other fields that can serve as role models.

CONCLUSIONS Migrant grassroots groups like hometown associations illustrate not only their organizational strategies in their places of destination but also their growing importance for their nations of origin. Through their fundraising activities with the aim of implementing the betterment of their communities, they have carried out an extensive array of initiatives that frequently benefit some of the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, these initiatives usually range from public works to vital sectors like education and health, which convey a clear relationship between migrants and the development of their country of origin. This relationship is particularly significant in key contexts of migrant destination like the United States, where migrant organizations from Latin America have gained centrality by forging ties on both sides of the border through their collective remittances and donations to their families and communities. Nevertheless, in light of the marked growth of Mexican migration to that country during the last decade, Mexican HTAs constitute the bulk of migrant grassroots groups among the migrant communities from that region. As a result, in recent years we have witnessed an increasing interest among political leaders, foundations, and scholars in these groups. On one hand, these associations provide a privileged standpoint through which it is possible to examine in detail the inner organizational dynamics of Mexican migrant communities in the United States. On the other hand, most of this interest focuses on the role of these groups in the promotion of local and regional development through their collective remittances. In this chapter, we documented and examined the rise, expansion, and dynamics of Mexican HTAs in the United States, as well as their relationship to development. These groups currently have a pervasive presence in this country, which demonstrates the success of this organizational strategy among Mexican migrant communities. In addition, the Mexican government has implemented several policies toward its diaspora, aiming to participate and expand the range of benefits promoted by these groups in favor of their hometowns and regions of origin. As a result, several cooperation mechanisms—namely matching-grant programs—have been successfully adopted between Mexico’s state and federal governments and migrant associations, thus constituting the departing point for an effective transnational policymaking.

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It is in the context that Mexican HTAs have demonstrated their role as active participants in the promotion and shape of this binational public policymaking. Far from being mere dependent variables of government plans, these groups have forcefully participated in the orientation of these matchinggrant programs. However, in order to articulate a more coherent development strategy, several observers have pointed out the importance for these groups to improve their contact with new actors and community stakeholders. In this sense, the final stage of our chapter includes a brief discussion of a pilot program in that direction. Experiences like this illustrate the importance of breaking the relative isolation of some of these groups, but most of all the relevance of joining efforts between HTAs and their community counterparts, the government, donor foundations, and other social and political actors in order to evaluate, design, and put into practice the development potential of feasible projects. By properly assessing and supporting these migrant groups’ performance, it is likely that HTAs will be better positioned to strengthen civic activity and development in contexts like Mexico. NOTES 1. For the historical evolution of Mexican migrant associations, see, for example, García, 1996; Taylor, 1997; Díaz de Cossío, Orozco & González, 1997. There is an extensive literature on the importance of social networks in the Mexico-US migratory process; see, among others, Massey, Alarcon, Durand, & Gonzalez, 1987; Mines, 1981; and Zabin, Kearney, Garcia, Runsten & Nagengast, 1993. 2. The civic and political contributions of these migrant-led associations is beyond the scope of this work. We examined this specific participation in more detail in Rivera-Salgado, Bada, and Escala-Rabadán, 2005. 3. An extensive literature on these transnational communities and their organizational forms set the basis for the rise of transnational studies or, simply, transnationalism. See, for example, the classic collection compiled by Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc, 1994. More recent works in this fruitful analytical field are Levitt, 2001; and Lanly and Valenzuela, 2004. However, this perspective has also been subject to criticism; see for example, Fitzgerald, 2004; Morawska, 2001; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004; and Weber, 1999. 4. Much of the literature on this issue has emphasized the Mexican government’s role in this relationship and analyzed its importance. See for example, Goldring, 1995, 2002, and 2004; Moctezuma, 2000b; and Smith, 1995. See also Guarnizo’s (1998) comparative work on Mexican and Dominican migrants and the policies of their respective governments. 5. Practically all writings about the Zacatecas Federation and clubs in Los Angeles have underlined the achievements of cooperative mechanisms as an indicator of their solidity. In addition to the works already cited, see Esparza, 2000; and García Zamora, 2000.

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Global Workers, Local Philanthropists Filipinos in Italy and the Tug of Home Fabio Baggio and Maruja M.B. Asis1

The (re)discovery of the magnitude of migrants’ remittances has been a key factor in reviving discussions about migration and development and is instrumental in the shift toward a more optimistic view of the development impacts of migration. According to the World Bank, remittance transfers at the global level dramatically increased from US$102 billion in 1995 to about US$232 billion in 2005. During the same period, remittances to developing countries went up from 57% (US $58 billion) in 1995 to 72% (US $167 billion) in 2005 (United Nations, 2006 p. 54). The Philippines, with more than three decades of sustained labour migration, figures among the major recipients of remittances. In 2004, it ranked fifth after India, China, Mexico, and France in terms of remittance receipts (United Nations, 2006: 54, Table 11).2 Macroeconomic indicators underscore the important role of remittances to the Philippine economy. Table 7.1 presents the steady growth of remittances alongside the climbing numbers of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) deployed overseas over the years. Since the 1970s, remittances have overtaken top-ranking exports as the primary source and mainstay of foreign reserves. The uninterrupted flow of remittances from overseas Filipinos has saved the country from economic collapse through the years of painful structural adjustment programs and periods of severe economic crises. The argument that remittances are a stable source of wealth transfers has come to the fore as the economy held its ground amid the political crises that hit the country in recent years. In 2005, despite governance and legitimacy issues against the Arroyo government, the economy did well, scoring a 5% GDP growth for the year and a 5.7% GNP growth spurred by record high remittances.3 Foreign investors may have been intimidated by the uncertain political situation, but remittances continued to pour in and by the end of 2005 and 2006, total remittances amounted to US $10.5 billion and US $12 billion, respectively. Remittances are expected to hit US $14 billion in 2007. The boost in remittances contributes to improving the country’s credit ratings and balance of payments position. For their zeal and sacrifices to be able to send hard-earned currencies to their families, the government considers OFWs

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Table 7.1 Annual deployment of Filipino workers and remittances, 1975–2005 Number of OFWs Deployed

Remittances

Year

Land-based

Sea-based

Total

Amount (US $million)

1975

12,501

23,534

36,035

103.00

1980

157,394

57,196

214,590

421.30

1985

320,494

52,590

372,784

687.20

1990

334,883

111,212

446,095

1,181.07

1995

488,173

165,401

653,574

4,877.51

2000

643,304

198,324

841,628

6,050.45

2005

733,970

247,707

981,677

10,689.01

Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (as cited in Asis, 2006).

as the country’s new heroes.4 However, for all the economic advantages remittances bring, there are also grave concerns that they may have delayed the implementation of needed reforms to gear the economy towards development that generates jobs and development outcomes that truly improve the living conditions of the population. The development impacts of remittances at the micro level are more convincing. Because remittances are essentially private transfers, the families/households of migrant workers are the ones who directly benefit from money sent by kin based overseas. According to studies, in the short term, families of migrant workers have benefited from remittances. Families of migrants are more likely to own land, to own better homes, to send their family members to private schools, and to save or start small businesses than families of nonmigrants. The investments in education made by families with migrant members were affirmed in recent studies that inquired into the impacts of international labour migration on the children left behind. A nationwide study of young children, 10–12 years-old, found that the children of migrant fathers, mothers, or both parents, fared as well if not better than the children of nonmigrant parents. The children of migrants reported higher levels of ownership of homes and consumer durables (including higher levels of mobile phone ownership). Popular perceptions that the children of migrants were trailing behind in academic performance— presumably because of lack of parental supervision—were not supported by the study. On the contrary, they scored favourably in academic indicators

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(higher grades, being in the honour roll, participation in extra-curricular activities) than the children of nonmigrants. This advantage seems to suggest that remittances are being channelled into investments in children’s education, the very reason that prompted parents to work abroad (ECMI/ AOS-Manila, SMC & OWWA, 2004). Nonetheless, there are concerns that at the household level, families are becoming dependent on remittances for sustenance. The temporary work arrangement becomes more or less permanent as migrants keep on renewing their contracts or find another job/employer/country country to continue supporting their families. In a study on women migrants who had returned to the country, returning home for good only applied to a few; many had plans of returning to work abroad or were considering another go at overseas employment for lack of employment alternatives in the country (e.g., Asis, 2001). Overall, remittances have made a dent in improving the material conditions of migrants’ families. Migrants’ investments in their children’s education are also a means to improve the life chances of the next generation. As noted by Merz & Chen (2005), alongside the interest generated by the scale of remittances (and how they have dwarfed official development assistance), there is also increasing interest on migrant philanthropy. Also known and referred to as diaspora philanthropy, transnational philanthropy (Opiniano, 2005), diaspora giving or migrant giving, this kind of philanthropy involves migrants contributing toward projects in their home countries, oftentimes, their hometowns. Speaking about the phenomenon of migrant giving among Latin American immigrants in the United States, Levitt (2002) writes, “Rather than elites, ordinary individuals who migrate to the US are making major contributions to local development in the communities they come from. Instead of working through well-established organizations, they are creating their own groups, raising their own funds, and using their own labour to bring about these changes.”

THE OFWS’ NEW CLOTHES: MIGRANTS AS AGENTS OF DEVELOPMENT? The philanthropic practices of Latin American immigrants in the United States have received a great deal of research and policy attention. In particular, the role of hometown associations (HTAs) in mobilizing the contributions of migrants and using these collective remittances to support various projects in their home communities occupies a prominent place in the literature (e.g., Orozco, 2003; Guarnizo, 2003; Levitt, 2002; Alarcon, n.d.; Ortiz, n.d.). These initiatives have contributed to painting a more positive view of the migration-development nexus. Apprehensions that migration may increase the inequality between migrants’ families and nonmigrants’ families5 have been tempered by growing evidence that migrant’ remittances benefit not just their families, but their communities as well. Moreover,

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recent literature on migrant giving indicates that aside from contributions to celebratory events such as fiestas, migrants’ collective remittances target programs and projects that contribute to local development. In Mexico and El Salvador, and to some extent, in the Dominican Republic, migrant philanthropy has underwritten the construction of roads, health centres, and other infrastructure, supported scholarship programs, and set up or supported cooperatives, among others. In the case of Mexico and El Salvador, the government has taken notice of HTAs and has developed a policy to engage with their diaspora communities; both countries have fashioned an incentive scheme encouraging partnership with their diaspora communities. In Mexico, the example of Zacatecan HTAs paved the way for the government to partner with HTAs via the so-called tres por uno (three by one) arrangements, where each dollar contributed by migrants is matched dollar for dollar by the federal, state, and municipal governments. In October 2005, the partnership has evolved into 4 x 1, with the addition of a fourth contributor, First Data Corporation, the owner of Western Union, in the scheme (cited in Silva, 2006 p. 43).6 In the Philippines (and in Asia in general), the research and literature on migrant giving is relatively new. Among the initial studies done in this area are those of Opiniano (2005), Powers (2006) and Silva (2006). In practice, however, giving (specifically collective or organized giving) by Filipino migrants has been taking place in various forms, but these initiatives have not just been as thoroughly documented and analyzed as the Latin American experience. In the Philippines, the government agency mandated to look after the concerns of emigrants, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), introduced a program in 1989 known as LINKAPIL (an acronym for Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino or Service to Fellow Filipinos), which aims to tap and match the donations of overseas Filipinos to fund health, education and welfare projects in the Philippines. More recently, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) spearheaded the Classroom Galing sa Mamamayan Abroad (CGMA) in response to the classroom shortage in the Philippines. Overseas Filipinos, including the large numbers of overseas Filipino workers and their employers, as well as other benefactors based in the Philippines and abroad give donations earmarked for the construction of classrooms. As of March 22, 2006, a total of 312 classrooms have been built while another 62 are in various stages of construction in different regions.7Prior to and beyond the LINKAPIL and CGMA programs, individual migrants and migrants’ associations8have been known to support projects in the Philippines and in their home communities (Opiniano, 2005; Powers, 2006). What is new is the participation of the state in introducing a mechanism to encourage migrants’ identification and involvement with the homeland and also to effect a better matching of migrants’ donations and the needs of communities in the Philippines. Other mechanisms of transfer and engagement with other actors and institutions have been noted (for details Opiniano, 2005).

134 Fabio Baggio and Maruja M.B. Asis This study aims to contribute to this emerging field in the Philippines by exploring migrants’ perceptions, practices and plans of giving back to their home communities. This issue was examined in relation to migrants’ continuing interest in national and local affairs in the Philippines and the role of state agencies and local governments in maintaining ties with migrants. The study endeavoured to ascertain the appreciation by local governments of the migration phenomenon and its developmental dimensions. There are several reasons for focusing on the subnational picture. Given the selectivity of the migration process, the local contexts of migration are more likely to experience the impacts of migration up close. On the part of migrants, it is possible that they will be more aware and more interested in local development than the national situation. Moreover, local government officials are expected to be more attuned to the needs and concerns of their constituents than national government officials. By focusing on migrants originating from the same province in the Philippines, the study hopes to distil deeper insights on factors that promote transnational practices, particularly the potential contributions of migrant philanthropy to development. This study involved collecting data in the migrants’ home province, Batangas, the Philippines, and Rome and Bassano del Grappa (Vincenza), Italy, where Filipino migrants are based. These parishes were chosen because of the presence of pastoral workers who agreed to help with data collection. The two sites also happen to provide two different contexts: Rome, a metropolitan city, is a major destination of Filipino migrants in Italy and Bassano del Grappa, a nonmetropolitan locale, is not a major destination but nonetheless is host to a sizable Filipino population. Data collection was undertaken between June and November 2005 in both sites. In Italy, the Filipino migrant ministry in Santa Pudenziana Parish in Rome and the pastoral centre for migrants in Bassano del Grappa facilitated the recruitment of respondents and the administration of the survey. A total of 50 self-administered questionnaires were completed. Our research cooperators in these two parishes distributed the questionnaires to Filipinos who are known to come from Batangas.9 In the Philippines, interviews were conducted with the development and planning officers of the provincial government of Batangas; the local government of Batangas City, the provincial capital; and the local government of the municipalities of Mabini and Bauan.10 Other key community figures, such as municipal and village/neighbourhood (barangay) officials, representatives of nongovernment organizations, church leaders, and four visiting migrants from Italy were also interviewed.

MIGRATION AS A ROUND-TRIP TICKET: FROM BATANGAS TO ITALY AND BACK At this historical moment, international migration is indelibly part and parcel of Filipino life. As of December 2005, the Filipino diaspora of 7.9

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135

Top ten destinations of landbased OFWs deployed in 2005

(new hires and rehires) Country

No. of OFWs

1 Saudi Arabia

194,350

2 Hong Kong

94,598

3 United Arab Emirates

82,039

4 Taiwan

46,737

5 Kuwait

40,306

6 Japan

38,803

7 Qatar

31,421

8 Singapore

24,403

9 Italy

21,167

10 United Kingdom

15,001

Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, (accessed 5 February 2006).

million accounts for close to 10% of the country’s 85 million-population. Filipinos are present in virtually all the world’s countries, but the largest Filipino communities are in the United States (2.6 million), traditionally the object of Filipino migration, and Saudi Arabia (994,671), the new promised land since the 1970s.11 As of 2005, Italy hosts the second largest population of overseas Filipinos in Europe, estimated at 123,386 (next to the United Kingdoms’s at 133,095). According to Italian data sources, the Filipino population in Italy stood at 76,099 (immigrants with regular visa) as of January 2004 (Istat, 2005). Italy is one of two European countries that are among the top ten destinations of Filipino workers in 2005 (Table 7.2). Without historical ties (unlike the colonial links between the Philippines and Spain), the migration trail to Italy was uncharted territory when Filipinos started to make their way there in the 1970s. It was a migration that was spontaneous, invisible, clandestine, and largely female in contrast to the organized, large-scale, legal and predominantly male migration to the oil-rich Gulf countries in the 1970s (Asis, 2005). Women from the Philippines are acknowledged as one of the migrant groups with a longer history in Italy. More recent data indicate that women from Eastern Europe—those from Romania, Ukraine, and Albania—have outranked Filipinas as the largest group in Italy (Chaloff, 2005). Through regularization exercises, erstwhile unauthorized migrants

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Table 7.3

Profile of respondents

Background Characteristics Gender Female Male

Marital Status 77.6

Single

21.3

22.4

Married

72.3

(n=49)

Sep/div/wid

6.4 (n=47)

Age

Education

24 and below

10.0

Elementary

10.0

25-29

10.0

High school grad

20.0

30-34

14.0

Some/Comp.College

56.0

35-39

24.0

Other/vocational

8.0

40-44

12.0

Studying in Italy, no details

6.0

45-49

6.0

50 and up

(n=50)

24.0 (n=50)

Migration to Italy Year of arrival in Italy

No. of immediate family members in Italy

2003-2005

4.1

0

20.0

2000-2002 1995-1999

34.1

1-2

24.0

10.2

3-4

32.0

1990-1994

32.7

5 and more

24.0

1985-1989

8.2

1984 and earlier

(n=50)

10.2 (n=49)

Legal status

Job

Legal

85.7

Domestic worker

Not legal

14.3

Other

(n=49)

None, looking for a job, student

81.4 4.7 14.0 (n=43)

obtained permit not only to work and reside in Italy but also the possibility to bring their spouses and minor children. As a result, the Filipino population in Italy now includes men and children, although it still remains predominantly female.

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The profile of respondents adheres closely to the patterns described earlier (Table 7.3). The respondents consisted mostly of women (77.6%), which reflect the highly feminized characteristic of Filipino migration to Italy. The respondents’ ages ranged from 17 to 60 years old, with the largest percentage (24%) belonging to the 35–39 age group. About half of the respondents came to Italy in the 1990s. The earliest migrant arrived in 1979, and the most recent arrival came in 2005. In terms of origin in Batangas, some 35% of respondents were from Mabini. The municipality of Mabini is renowned in Batangas for its many residents who are working in Italy. Interviews with Mabini residents revealed that the migration trail started in the 1980s when three residents left for Italy. Many later followed suit. Presently, around 4,000–5,000 are said to be in Italy. As one resident noted, they simply know that there are “many, really many” Mabini locals in Italy.12 The role of family networks in furthering migration is suggested by the presence of immediate family members in Italy. Four in five respondents had at least one immediate family in Italy; only one in five does not have such connections. One respondent had as many as ten immediate family members living in Italy. The large majority (86%) reported that they had papers, that is, they had legal status in the country. The household sector is indisputably the largest employer of Filipino migrants in Italy—81.4% of respondents were employed as domestic workers, baby sitters, and housekeepers. As to whether they will stay in Italy for good, their answers suggest three possibilities: 29.2% responded “yes” (mostly because they earn more and can support their family); 37.5% said “no” and 33.3% answered “maybe.” Despite their considerable length of residence in Italy, the great majority of migrants maintain various ties to the Philippines. To begin with, in Italy, Filipinos generally tend to stay within their own group. Because they work in households, their individual employment does not allow them to form employment-based associations. Working in private households and isolated from other workers in the same sector, the church is one of the few venues that provide a space for associations and communities to develop. Just coming to church provides a Filipino migrant with a passport to the larger Filipino community (or more aptly, communities) in Italy. With the support of the Catholic Church, the ministry to Filipino migrants is one of the largest, if not the largest ministry, with 80 Catholic pastoral centres, run by priests or religious (both male and female) as of April 2006. The centres are located as follows: 43 in Rome; 6 in Milan; 2 in Bologna, Genova, Bari, Lucca, and Padova; and 1 each in Reggio Calabria, Caserta, Naples, Modena, Parma, Reggio Emilia, Bergamo, Como, Ancona, Ascoli Piceno, Torino, Lecce, Palermo, Messina, Firenze, Prato, Terni, Treviso, Verona, Vicenza, and Bassano del Grappa.13 Not surprisingly, in the survey, 9 out of 10 respondents belonged to at least one organization, with church-based organizations taking a large share. Region/province/hometown associations are another common type of organization formed by Filipinos.

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The role of communications technology in enabling migrants to participate in the life of their home country is very much evident in the everyday transnational practices of Filipino migrants in Italy. Eighty-six percent of respondents reported that they communicate with their families back home often, that is at least once a week; 16% of this group said that they keep in touch with their families everyday. The mode of communication is a combination of phone calls and/or sending SMS (or texting, as Filipinos call it). Letter-writing or voice tapes, the modes of communication between migrants and their families before the 1990s, have definitely gone out of fashion.14 The sending of remittances is another regular motif in the transnational practices of Filipino migrants—70% send remittances every month, 20% do not send every month (sometimes, when there is a need, when they have extra money), and only 10% do not send remittances (this group includes two students). Banks are now the method of choice of sending money to the Philippines, a development that has been observed in other destinations as well. Visits to the Philippines are another indicator of the continuing ties that migrants maintain with the homeland. Seventy-eight percent have returned home at least once. Of this group (i.e. balikbayans or returnees), close to half returned in 2005, another half visited between 2002 and 2004. Although these visits are mostly for family reasons, they may also provide migrants an opportunity to get reacquainted with their community and its needs. In the case of Mexican and El Salvadorian migrants based in the United States, their regular and frequent visits to their hometowns (as part of maintaining transnational ties) were among five critical factors that enabled HTAs to mobilize collective remittances regularly and in a more sustained manner—specifically, these visits and exchanges with stakeholders enhance the motivation and personal affinity of migrants to the programs they support (Silva, 2006).

Links Beyond the Family As the preceding discussion intimated, maintaining ties with their families is the primary and enduring link of Filipino migrants to the homeland. The study also explored whether there is more to the family that keeps overseas Filipinos interested in the Philippines. Ninety percent of respondents affirmed that they are interested in what goes on in the Philippines. Personal networks—friends and family—continue to be an important source of information about the Philippines. The Internet, the Filipino Channel and newspapers were the other sources. Considering the source, family-related events were of the greatest interest to migrants—but in addition, migrants expressed interest in a myriad of concerns and events in the Philippines—the political situation and economic situation, business opportunities, local community happenings, and to a lesser extent, show business, and sports.

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With the passage of the Absentee Voting Act in 2003, overseas Filipinos had the opportunity to participate in the national election in May 2004. Only 28% of respondents cast their votes in the 2004 electoral exercise. Of those who did not vote, some were not aware that overseas Filipinos have been granted the right to vote whereas some failed to register. Close to half of the nonvoters said that they may register for the next elections, which leaves another half who seemed disinterested or oblivious to exercise their political right. Half of the migrants had been approached by Philippines-based institutions to support projects and community events at home. Except for one request from a national foundation, the rest were solicitations for local community projects—the most common were requests for assistance with church construction or renovation, followed by solicitations for fiestas, Christmas activities, and sport events. Two respondents were asked to support a scholarship program, one was for Mangyans (one of the indigenous communities in the Philippines), and another was for seminarians. Two-thirds of respondents had provided support—in cash, service or in kind—to community projects, of which an overwhelming number were church-related projects. We looked into whether background variables (age, gender, marital status, education), residence and legal status in Italy, and transnational connections to the Philippines (had ever visited the Philippines, voted in the 2004 elections) had some association with having contributed to projects in their home communities. Of the eight variables, only marital status and legal residence were associated with ever contributing to community projects, with married respondents and those with legal residence being more likely to have ever contributed to community projects than those who were not married and without legal status in Italy. The study specifically asked if there is a project in their hometown that they would like to support, and what project would that be if ever. About 40% responded yes and if ever, they would support projects such as church construction, church programs, charity program, town or barrio fiesta, school improvement or school projects, and projects to help poor people. Only about a third (31%) of respondents said that their organization had a plan to support a project in the Philippines. The responses suggest a great interest in helping the poor, a concern that was revealed in other studies of giving among Filipino migrants and migrants’ associations (Silva, 2006; Powers, 2006; Opiniano, 2005). The patterns of giving to the CFO’s LINKAPIL program also speak of projects to help the poor (Ateneo Center for Social Policy, 2005). At least three respondents specifically mentioned supporting Gawad Kalinga (to give care), a project of the Couples for Christ, a Catholic Church-inspired organization, that aims to provide shelter to poor Filipinos.15 Those who were thinking of supporting a project in the Philippines named the church as the institution that they would like to work with as well as family and friends, NGOs and Gawad Kalinga.

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PERSPECTIVES FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Although migration is now a national phenomenon, some regions and some provinces are associated with higher levels of out-migration than others.16 Batangas is one of the top ten provinces of origin of migrants; this dates back to the 1970s, when many Batangueños were among the pioneer migrants who went to the Middle East. They have diversified their migration portfolio since then, of which Italy has come out as one of the major destinations. This long history of migration is not lost on the consciousness of the people of the province. This reality, however, is hardly considered in the formulation of development-related policies at various levels of the local government. Based on our interviews and observations, the response of the local government to the phenomenon appears to be reactive rather than proactive. This is apparent in responding to reported problems of OFWs, which are addressed by referring the cases to relevant government offices or departments. A review of the development plans drafted by the various offices revealed no mention of the out-migration of Batangueños and its impact on the province’s development prospects. The previous administration of the Batangas provincial government had sought to contact Filipino organizations based abroad. Distinguished overseas-based Batangueños are honoured with the Dangal ng Batangas (Honour of Batangas) award. Recently, the Association of Batangueños of California held a medical mission in the provincial capital. The mission offered various services—surgical, dental, optical, consultation, medicines. The provincial government hosted a meal for the doctors, nurses, and volunteers to thank them for their efforts. Overseas Filipinos can contribute to the development of Batangas by way of investing in the province, patronizing Batangas-made products, giving financial contributions and by participating in project implementation. For its part, the provincial government is prepared to provide all the support in working with Filipinos abroad. This partnership can be formalized by way of a memorandum of agreement between the concerned parties. The government should be prepared to address the concerns of overseas Filipinos because it is responsible for protecting its nationals.17 The Provincial Planning and Development Office has yet to approach OFWs in general to support projects in the province. Perhaps, as a key informant noted, migrants may identify more with their local communities than with the province in general: You know, the migrants, especially those in Italy who come from Mabini, based on the information that I get, they are more inclined to support projects in their barangays. The houses are beautiful and big in those places. You will know that they have overseas workers. It might be an exaggeration, but from what I hear, about five families can afford

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to hold a fiesta for the whole sitio or barangay when they return. If the municipality or barangay has projects, most likely they [OFWs] are among the donors who contribute to development or projects. Then, if the municipality has a project, usually the mayor taps the balikbayans [returnees] and those in Italy for donations or contributions to their big project.18 In order to engage with Batangueños based abroad, among others, it would be helpful to have data about this population. According to the province’s Social Welfare and Development Office, they do not have data on OFWs, which is one reason why they do not have programs geared to OFWs and their families. The focus of the Population Development Office at the moment is internal migrants. There are plans to gather data on the situation of OFWs, beginning with the OFWs in Hong Kong, so that they can extend assistance to women migrants. Their office cooperates with NGOs such as Atikha19 and municipal governments for their programs dealing with leftbehind families.20 Indeed, at the municipal and barangay levels, the contributions of migrants are more palpable. Mabini, the municipality famous for having many migrants in Italy, has not been forgotten by its residents. The construction of the church received a lot of support from migrants. The previous parish priest visited Italy to rally support for the church’s construction. Since then, the church has not asked the migrants for other assistance. The local church is now focused on the implementation of the province-wide initiative of the Catholic Church to organize the families of OFWs, which includes a special program, Anak Batangueño (Batangueño Children), specifically geared to address the concerns of the left-behind children of OFWs.21 The NGO Atikha was drawn to Mabini on account of the large population of OFWs originating from this community. Thus far, it has introduced programs for the left-behind families of OFWs. One interesting program is the organization of the children of OFWs (i.e. those below 21 years old) into Batang Atikha (Children of Atikha) Clubs, through which members get to participate in values formation, workshops, and other activities. A spin-off program is the Batang Atikha Savers Club, which teaches children how to manage their money and to encourage them to save. Four savers clubs have been organized in Mabini (www.atikha.org). Atikha plans to develop social enterprises in the community (and later on, for the whole of Batangas). These prospects bank on the support of Filipino organizations abroad whose contributions can be used for developing enterprises in the Philippines. In San Pablo City, US-based Filipinos pool their resources to invest in the production of virgin coconut oil (www.atikha.org). Atikha is looking into the possibility of developing a viable enterprise in Mabini. This will require the organization of migrants, as well as the organization of families in the community—in other words, the idea of the partnership is for both parties to bring something to the table. To date, migrants’

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contributions have gone into church construction, road construction, and sponsoring fiestas.22 In another municipality, in Bauan, migrants contributed to fiestas, chapel construction and school construction or repair. The municipal government or the barangays have approached migrants for help with various community projects. They have written to their residents based abroad to ask for their support for some projects. Bauan residents based abroad are allegedly very easy to approach for help. Migrants, however, have not been known to initiate a project in Bauan, the reason being that “their life abroad is difficult.” Migrants, though, have a role in the development of Bauan— among others, they can contributed in the funding of livelihood projects. The municipal government does not have regular contacts with migrants; they are able to communicate with migrants through their relatives.23 In the smaller and more personalistic setting of barangays, the contributions of OFWs in general and OFWs in Italy in particular, are more readily appreciated. The need for a formal mechanism to keep in touch with migrants also seemed superfluous. In Barangay Pitugo, for example, the barangay captain said that they did not have to collect and keep records about OFWs for the simple reason that they know everyone in the village.24 They just rely on the left-behind children or parents to convey message of solicitation to migrants. During his term, he has asked for assistance from the OFWs in Italy, who promptly sent money to finance the installation of a baluster and the furnishings of the barangay office. Similarly, in Barangay Talisay, OFWs (not just those from Italy), donated funds for the installation of street lamps. The church in the village was also constructed with donations from migrants.25 All the key informants unanimously identified livelihood programs as an area that would benefit from the contributions of migrants. Although there is recognition of migrants’ contributions to community life, this appreciation is not translated into policies or approaches to development. The approach in engaging with overseas Filipinos is very informal, relying heavily on the left-behind families to convey messages in soliciting the migrants’ support for community projects. The system seems to work—except that the interaction between migrants and local institutions is limited. To encourage more involvement of migrants in local development, first of all, the local government must consider them as a stakeholder. The ad-hoc and informal system of communicating with migrants is not sufficient to engage migrants more meaningfully. An information/education campaign about the needs of the community can be relayed to migrants to help them make decisions on what projects to support back home.

CONCLUSIONS This exploratory study on migrant giving among OFWs in Italy has demonstrated that migrants are interested in giving something back to their

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community. Among others, this openness can be traced to Filipino values that emphasize giving or sharing, namely bayanihan (helping each other), damayan (empathy or being one with those in need), and pakikipagkapwa (sharing with one’s fellow being). These values are reflected in many instances of spontaneous giving by Filipino migrants, for example, passing the hat to help fellow migrants in distress or to raise funds in response to disasters at home. More collective forms of giving have also been noted, but this needs further documentation. To date, migrant giving has been directed largely toward church-related projects and activities, although findings from this study also suggest that migrants are open to a more development-oriented type of giving. However, this will not come about automatically but will require more engagement between migrants and key institutions in the destination countries and in the Philippines. Several points can be flashed for further reflection, particularly in fostering possibilities of collective giving (through migrants’ associations) for development objectives: • A word of caution about HTAs as agents of local development is in order. In the case of the Filipino diaspora, HTAs are one of various types of associations formed by Filipino migrants. By virtue of their affi nity with their local communities, HTAs are likely to respond more readily to need that will help their communities. It is in this sense that migrant philanthropy via HTAs may be selective—that is while they may promote the development of migrants’ home communities, they may also increase the disparity between migrant communities and nonmigrant communities. As the study has demonstrated, the projects supported by respondents are largely in their hometowns. Other types of migrants’ associations, such as professional organizations, may be more persuaded to assist projects in other areas that truly need support. • Migrants expressed an interest in partnering with the Catholic Church in the Philippines for possible projects. This may have been pronounced in this study because of the strong role of the Catholic Church in the promotion of migrants’ well-being in Italy. Furthermore, this study was conducted through the auspices of church networks. Nonetheless, there are also reasons to believe that the fi ndings from this study may not be limited to Filipino migrants who are active members of the Catholic Church in Italy. Filipino migrants tend to connect or establish links with the Catholic Church in the various destination countries; also, the Church is one of the sources of support and assistance to Filipino migrants (e.g., Asis, 2002). The Church and religious organizations were identified as one of three major beneficiaries of Filipino HTAs in Canada; the two others were the government and NGOs (Silva, 2006). The Church’s access to migrants and the migrants’ access to the Church is an important starting point. It is interesting to note that in the 2006 consultation

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of the worldwide ministry to Filipino migrants, Church-based organizations reportedly engaged in various philanthropic projects in the Philippines (ECMI, 2006). 26 As one of the stakeholders in promoting the Filipino diaspora’s contributions to local development, the Church will need to be more proactive in integrating development concerns in its ministry with migrants. Among others, bishops and local clergy will have to invest in the training of pastoral workers and community leaders to prepare them for work related to migration and development. Cooperation and coordination on development issues will have to be forged between churches in the destination countries and the home communities. The experience of Gawad Kalinga, a successful and respected Church-inspired organization, may provide some guidelines for Church-based organizations’ engagement with diaspora communities. • The fact that government institutions, both national and local, were hardly mentioned by migrants as possible partners in the Philippines deserves further reflection. The survey questionnaire did not probe into the reasons why government institutions did not figure in migrants’ philanthropic plans; findings from other studies may provide some clues on the reasons behind this. The study on Filipino HTAs in Canada also noted the reluctance of migrants to work with the government and the main reason was migrants’ distrust of government institutions (Silva, 2006). The infrequent visits of Filipino-Canadians to the Philippines and the lack of constructive engagement between stakeholders contributed to migrants’ sense of philanthropic projects as risky and a waste of their time and resources (Silva, 2006). On the other hand, overseas Filipino groups can exert pressures on local institutions to be more accountable and transparent (e.g., Powers, 2006). In addition to demonstrating accountability and transparency, the national and governments can also develop a more active role in working with the diaspora communities. In LINKAPIL and CGMA programs, the government’s role is basically facilitative. In contrast, Mexico and El Salvador have taken a step further by providing an incentive to motivate their diasporas to contribute to development projects via matching funds schemes. In Mexico, the 3x1 scheme (and later, 4x1) involves the federal, state, and municipal governments in matching the donations of HTAs; in El Salvador, the matching program basically involves the national government (e.g., Silva, 2006). These schemes suggest that the government is also putting its money where its mouth is. On the whole, the national government in the Philippines needs to mainstream international migration in national development plans, with policies aimed at more proactive approaches, such as promoting migrant philanthropy toward development goals, strengthening linkages with diaspora communities, supporting migrants’ associations, involving overseas Filipinos in the crafting of national development plans, exploring ways and

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means to facilitate the transfer of resources from migrants to development projects in the homeland (e.g., exploring tax exemptions, reducing red tape, etc.), and working with NGOs and the private sector. On the part of local governments, there is also lack of awareness of the role of migrants as possible agents of development. The approach of municipal governments or barangays, thus far, has been ad-hoc, piece-meal and informal. The role of migrants has been framed mostly as a source of funds for infrastructure projects, particularly church construction, and for community events, notably fiestas. Educational/training programs to enhance local governments’ capacity to promote the development potentials of migration are in order. In our conversations with local officials and development/planning officers in the province and selected municipalities of Batangas, they were keen in knowing more about Mexico’s tres por uno model. Similar best practices can be part of the training program for local officials and development officers. There is much that the government, NGOs, church-based organizations and other stakeholders have to learn to integrate the potentials contributions of the eight-million strong Filipino diaspora to the country’s development. The motivation of overseas Filipinos to help the country to develop must be matched by the willingness and effectiveness of Philippine-based institutions to think and act transnationally in charting the country’s development path. NOTES 1. We wish to thank Ms. Michelle Taguinod and Ms. Ma. Cecilia Guerrero for their excellent research assistance. Fr. Joselin Gonda and Ms. Teodora Inabayan, Jr. of the Lipa Archdiocese Commission for Migration and Mission introduced us to the communities and key informants in Batangas. In Italy, Fr. Albert Guevarra, Sr. Melanie Yllana, Fr. Antonio Grasso, and Sr. Josephine de Leon administered the survey. Our deepest thanks go to all the migrants and key informants who participated in this study. 2. The World Bank reports the same countries as the top five recipients of remittances, although the rankings in 2005 and 2006 vary. For 2005, the top five recipients of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers are: (1) India, (2) China, (3) Mexico, (4) the Philippines, and (5) France; for 2006 (based on estimated remittances), the rankings are: (1) Mexico, (2) China, (3) India, (4) the Philippines and (5) France. See , accessed on December 14, 2006. 3. ‘The Philippines: Country Brief,’ , accessed on September 4, 2006. The same report indicated that remittances account for 13% of the Philippines’ GNP. 4. The Philippines has several special days devoted to honoring or remembering its overseas nationals. The government has designated June 7 as Migrants Day (to commemorate the signing of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) and December as the month of overseas Filipinos (which has as

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5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

Fabio Baggio and Maruja M.B. Asis highlight the bestowing of awards to exemplary individuals or organizations). The NGOs have December 18, International Migrants Day. The Catholic Church holds National Migrants’ Sunday on the first Sunday following Ash; it is a special day dedicated to pray for migrants and their families. In the Philippines, see for example, Vasquez (1992) and Go (2002). In addition to material resources, migrants may also contribute what Peggy Levitt (2001 p. 54) termed as social remittances, which refer to ‘ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from host-to-sending country communities.’ In general, this is less studied compared to monetary remittances. ‘CGMA classrooms built to reach 400 mark,’ News Article, March 22, 2006, Department of Labor and Employment. Available at: www.doke.gov.ph/news/ print.asp?id=N000001749, accessed on December 2, 2006. As used in this article, the term refers to associations and organizations initiated and run by migrants themselves. Organizations which pursue the concerns and interests on behalf of migrants are not included from this definition. Considering the workload of our Italy-based cooperators, we could not ask them to undertake more research-related activities other than the administration of the survey. It would have been ideal to conduct more in-depth interviews; this was not possible due to time and budgetary constraints. The Philippines has three major islands: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The country is divided into the following geo-political units: 17 regions, 79 provinces, 117 cities, 1,500 municipalities, and 41,975 barangays. The barangay is the smallest administrative/political unit (http://nscb.gov.ph, accessed on February 5, 2006). Data are from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, unpublished document. The stock estimate is broken down into 3.4 million permanent settlers, 3.7 temporary migrants, 881,123 and irregular migrants. One of the authors (Asis) had known about Mabini in the 1990s while she was looking for a research site for a study on social change in communities of origin. According to an NGO source, there are about 4,400 Mabini residents in Italy (Interview with Mary Grace Vera, October 12, 2005). Mabini has a population of 37,474 (as of the 2000 census). There is an attempt by the parish church to collect information on the families of OFWs. However, the residents are wary of providing information for fear that they may be victimized by syndicates (Interview with Fr. Godofredo Mendoza, October 12, 2005). Data on Filipino Catholic pastoral centers are sourced from Fondazione Migrantes, ‘Centri pastorali dei principali gruppi etnico linguistici e nazionali,’ , accessed on 22 September 2006. In our study on left-behind children and families, respondents in the Philippines also mentioned the constant and frequent communication with family members based abroad (see ECMI/AOS-Manila/SMC/OWWA, 2004). Aside from shelter, health, education, and livelihood were added in the Gawad Kalinga villages. More than 850 villages, each of which comprises 50–100 homes, have been established. Gawad Kalinga acknowledges the support of overseas Filipinos in building homes for poor Filipinos (see www.gawadkalinga. org; see also, www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Citation/CitationMelotoAnt.htm). The reports of chaplains/pastoral workers involved with the ministry to Filipino migrants in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Germany also mentioned Gawad Kalinga as a beneficiary of donations from migrants’ associations in these countries (see ECMI, 2006). The Gawad Kalinga Community Development Foundation and its executive director, Antonio Meloto, received the 2006 Ramon Magsaysay Award for community leadership. The Philippines has three major islands: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Administratively, the country is divided into 17 regions (including two autonomous

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17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

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ones, namely, the Cordillera Autonomous Region and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao), 79 provinces, 117 cities, 1,585 municipalities, and 41,984 barangays (as of June 2006, see www.nscb.gov.ph, accessed on August 30, 2006). A barangay is the smallest political and administrative unit in the country. Interview with Mr. Arsenio Cay, Jr., Planning and Development Coordinator, Province of Batangas, November 10, 2005. Interview with Mr. Arsenio Cay, Jr., Planning and Development Coordinator, Province of Batangas, November 10, 2005. Atikha is an NGO established in 1996 which aims to address the social costs of migration and to explore the development potentials of migration. In line with these objectives, it provides economic and social services to OFWs and their families. It operates in San Pablo City, Laguna; in 2003, it started its programs in Mabini (see www.atikha.org). Interview with Ms. Jocelyn Montalvo, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Province of Batangas, November, 29 2005. Interview with Fr. Godofredo Mendoza, Parish Priest, Mabini, October 12, 2005. Interview with Ms. Mary Grace Vera, Atikha, October 12, 2005. Interview with Mr. Richard Cabral, Planning and Development Coordinator, Municipality of Bauan, October 20, 2005. Interview with Mr. Apolinario Manalo, Barangay Captain, October 12, 2005. Interview with Mr. Marco Gajon, Barangay Secretary, June 25, 2005. For example, as one chaplain commented, Filipinos in Auckland, New Zealand have been practicing migrant philanthropy for the last 20 years before the term (and the topic) became fashionable (ECMI, 2006 p. 38).

REFERENCES Alarcon, R. (n.d.). The development of home town associations in the United States and the use of social remittances in Mexico. Online. Accessed December 2, 2006 from http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/alarcon.pdf Asis, M. M. B. (2006, January). The Philippines’ culture of migration. Migration Information.Accessed February 5, 2006 from http:www.migrationinformation. org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=364 Asis, M .M. B. (2005). Caring for the world: Filipino domestic workers gone global. InS. Huang, B. Yeoh, & N. Abdul Rahman (Eds.), Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Asis, M. M. B. (2002, December 5–6).Being church for migrants: The Catholic church and the care of migrants in Asia. Paper presented at the conference on Gender, Migration, and Governance in Asia in The Australian National University, Canberra. Asis, M. M. B. (2001). The return migration of Filipino women migrants: Home, but not for good. In C. Wille & B. Passl (Eds.), Female labour migration in SouthEast Asia: Change and continuity. Bangkok: Asian Research Centre for Migration, Chulalongkorn University. Ateneo Center for Social Policy. (2005). Tapping Filipino migrants’ remittances for local economy development: case studies, issues, and recommendations for policy consideration. Accessed October 16, 2006, from http:www.ercof.org/papers/fils/ Tapping_Filipino_Migrant_Remittances.pdf Atikha (n.d.). December 6, 2006 from www.atikha.org.ph Chaloff, J. (2005, September 26–27). Immigrant women in Italy. Paper presented at Migration, Women and the Labour Market: Diversity and Challenge in OECD and European Commission Seminar, Brussels.

148 Fabio Baggio and Maruja M.B. Asis Department of Labor and Employment. (2006, March 22). CGMA classrooms built to reach 400 mark. Accessed December 2, 2006 from www.doke.gov.ph/news/ print.asp?id=N000001749. Episcopal Commission on the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People (ECMI). (2006, September 11–14). Appraising the Filipino diaspora and its challenges to evangelization. Report of the Fifth International Consultation Meeting on the Filipino Ministry Worldwide, Tagaytay City, Philippines. Episcopal Commission on the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People/Apostleship of the Sea-Manila, Scalabrini Migration Center and Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (ECMI/AOS-Manila, SMC & OWWA). (2004). Hearts apart: Migration in the eyes of Filipino children. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. Also available online at http://www.smc.org.ph/heartsapart/index.html Fondazione Migrantes. (n.d.). Centri pastorali dei principali gruppi etnico linguistici e nazionali. Accessed on September 22, 2006 from http://www.migrantes.it/ Gawad Kalinga. (n.d.). Accessed December 6, 2006 from www.gawadlkalinga.org Istat. (2005). Gli stranieri in Italia: gli effetti dell’ultima regolarizzazione. Accessed September 22, 2006 from http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20051215_00/testointegrale.pdf Go, S. (2002). Remittances and international labour migration: Impact on the Philippines. Accessed December 18, 2006 from http://www.international.metropolis. net/events/croatia/Dubrovnik_paper.doc Guarnizo, L .E. (2003). The economics of transnational living. International Migration Review, 36(3), 666–699. Levitt, P. (2002, Spring). Migrant philanthropy in Latin America: move over United Way. Harvard Review of Latin America. Accessed April 20, 2006 from http:// www.fas.harvard.edu/~drclas/publications/revista/Volunteering/migrant.html Levitt, P. (2001). The transnational villagers. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Merz, B. & Chen, L. (2005, December). Diaspora giving and equitable development in Mexico. Alliance[online], 10(4), pp. 14–15. Accessed April 28, 2006 from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~acgei/PDFs/PhilathropyPDFs/aaliance.pdf National Statistical Coordinating Board. (n.d.). Accessed on February 5, 2006 from http://nscb.gov.phOpiniano, J. (2005). Filipinos doing diaspora philanthropy: The development potential of transnational migration. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 14(1–2), 225–241. Orozco, M. (2003). Hometown associations and their present and future partnerships: New development opportunities? Report commissioned by the US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. Accessed April 28, 2006 from http://www. thedialogue.org/publications/country_studies/remittances/HTA_final.pdf Ortiz, R .M. (n.d.) Mobilizing remittances from Jalisco hometown associations to productive investment projects. AvailableAccessed December 2, 2006 from http:// naid.sppsr.ucla.edu/confs&class/class/UP/comp00/ch2_report.doc Powers, S. (2006). Bayanihan across the seas: diaspora philanthropy and development in the Philippines. Unpublished Fulbright Research Grant report submitted to the Philippine American Education Foundation, Makati, Philippines. Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation. (n.d.). The 2006 Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership—Citation for Antonio Meloto.Accessed December 6, 2006 from www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Citation/CitationMelotoAnt.htm Silva, J. (2006). Engaging diaspora communities in development: an investigation of Filipino hometown associations in Canada. Unpublished thesis. Vancouver, Canada: Simon Fraser University. United Nations. (2006). International migration and development: Report of the secretary-general. New York: United Nations.

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Vasquez, N. (1992). Economic and social impact of labor migration. In G. Battistella & A. Paganoni (Eds.), Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. World Bank. (n.d.a). The Philippines: Country Brief. Accessed September 4, 2006 from http://www.worldbank.org.ph/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ COUNTRIES/ EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/PHILIPPINESEXT/0,contentMDK:20203978~page PK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK;332982,00.html World Bank. (n.d.b). Accessed December 14, 2006 from http://sitesources.worldbank .org/INTPROSPECTS/3349341110315015165/ Remittances/Data.GEP2006.xls.

8

Migrant Involvement in Community Development The Case of the Rural Ashanti Region—Ghana Mirjam Kabki, Valentina Mazzucato and Ton Dietz1

Today, the development of many rural communities in the Ashanti Region of Ghana is to a considerable extent being supported by migrants. Community development is defined here as the activities to arrive at an increased presence of, or improved access to, public (not commercially exploited) facilities at the village level. These include facilities that are financed with both public funds and private funds, both locally and from migrants. In spite of the wealth of publications about migrant remittances and community development, few studies have investigated the processes that take place in the communities where the migrant support arrives and that can influence successful involvement of migrants in community development. Knowledge about these processes is important because it may explain why some communities are successful in involving migrants in the development of their communities although others are not. Some exceptions of studies that do pay more attention to these processes are Cotula and Toulmin (2004), Akolongo (2005), and Mohan (2006). However, much of the literature either describes the types of migrant support and the impact on communities, or focuses on the motivations and characteristics of senders (e.g., Addison, 2004; Levitt & Nyberg-Sorensen, 2004; Higazi, 2005; Loup, 2005; Orozco, 2005; World Bank, 2006). Despite the lack of academic attention, policy, and practice institutions are expressing a growing interest in the prospects of involving migrants in development activities. There is thus need for more studies with evidence from communities and the functioning of migrant-financed development (Loup, 2005; European Commission, 2004). While acknowledging that there are migrant-related factors that may influence the willingness of migrants to support their home communities, this chapter looks at particular institutional environments of the home communities for explanations for the differences in success of migrant involvement in community development. This contribution is based on research that forms part of a larger research program involving transnational networks with members in the Netherlands, Accra, and rural Ashanti communities in Ghana (Mazzucato,

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2000). As part of the rural Ashanti project, an appraisal was conducted in 2003, consisting of interviews with community leaders in 26 rural and semirural communities varying in size from 800 to 36,000 inhabitants. The in-depth analysis of the functioning of the institutional environment within communities is based on five case-study communities. Two are small (3,000 and 4,000 inhabitants), two are mid-sized (13,000 and 16,000 inhabitants), and one is a relatively large community (32,000 inhabitants). These five communities were visited on a weekly basis over a period of 15 months. Observations were recorded and semistructured interviews were conducted with traditional leaders, local government officials and opinion leaders, as well as other inhabitants. In-depth interviews were focused on the history of migrant involvement in each of the five communities, with particular reference to migrant-financed projects. In addition to the interviews, detailed financial accounts of development, tax collections, migrant contributions, and the costs of development activities were collected. Care was taken to build up relationships of trust with the leaders as well as the inhabitants of these communities to facilitate access to these documents. The section found later provides a brief overview of the levels of development and differences in migrant support within the five rural Ashanti case-study communities. This information serves as the background for the main parts of the article: the analysis of the institutional environments (defined as the set of institutions, rules, and norms in a community) to identify the factors that may relate to the differences between these communities in migrant involvement. These include local inhabitants’ contributions to development (section two), the link between funerals and community development (section three), and the importance of leadership in communities (section four). At the end of this chapter some conclusions are drawn.

MIGRANT SUPPORT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT The word migrant is used for people who live outside Ghana and thus refers to international, and mainly transcontinental migrants. In this sense, all 26 communities researched have migrants. In each community, scores were given for migrant contributions to development. These scores were corrected for community size and for the proportion of migrant households in the community. The ideal scoring method would be to divide the value of the migrant contributions by the number of migrants overseas, but because information on the exact value of projects and the exact numbers of migrants is not available, estimate scores were given based on the assessments of local leaders, discussions with inhabitants, and some recordings of actual migrant contributions toward electrification, health, education, and additional development projects. If, for example, a large community has many migrant households and twenty schools, but only one school received

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Table 8.1 Volume of migrant support to 26 rural Ashanti communities Size of rural community

Migrant support

Very small 800–2,500 inh.

Relatively much relatively little Total (N=26)

Small 3,000– 7,000 inh.

Mid sized 8,000– 16,000 inh.

Large 17,000– 36,000 inh.

#

%

#

%

#

%

#

%

1

14%

7

88%

2

29%

0

0%

6

86%

1

12%

5

71%

4

100%

7

100%

8

100%

7

100%

4

100%

Source: Rural appraisal 2003 (see Appendix Table 8.1 for more details).

migrant support in the form of books, the contribution would be recorded as relatively little, whereas if in a small community with few migrant households one of the two local schools is supported with extra class rooms and a bursary fund, the contribution would be recorded as relatively much. Of the communities with between 3,000 and 7,000 inhabitants, 88% receive relatively much migrant support. In the large and mid sized communities this percentage is considerably lower, as well as in the communities smaller than 2,500 inhabitants (see Table 8.1). Of the five case study communities, Asiwa and Brodekwano fall into the category of small communities with relatively much migrant support. Asiwa (3,000 inh.) has about 90 migrants who have paid 88% of the costs of the ongoing electrification project and donated toward the construction of a marketplace. Their donations over the past 3 years are more than €8,000. Brodekwano (4,000 inh.) has about 100 migrants who are currently financing a community-based Education Development Fund and are constructing classrooms for one of the two schools in the community. These migrants have also cofinanced the electrification of their community, they have contributed to water provision, and they have built a library. An estimated €3,500 has been raised by Brodekwano migrants during the past 3 years. Migrant contributions to community development were less in the other three communities, certainly in relation to their size and proportions of migrants. Migrants from Kumawu (16,000 inh.) have supported hometown development by financing street lights in two streets, sending computers for a senior secondary school, and donating money for the local health centre. Mampong (32,000 inh.) citizens abroad have contributed toward street lights and sent books for the library. Most support contributed by Mampong migrants was, however, specifically directed to the District Hospital in

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Mampong, which received various kinds of equipment. In Offinso (13,000 inh.), the only migrant donation that could be recalled by inhabitants and leaders was a limited quantity of hospital equipment and a private car for the Queen Mother, both sent by Netherlands-based migrants. Because the car does not really serve the community as a whole it is contestable whether this can actually be labelled community support. There are no communities smaller than 3,000 inhabitants among the five case study communities and therefore no in-depth information about this category is available. However, because six of the seven very small communities have received relatively little migrant support (Appendix Table 8.1 gives more details about the type of support), the argument seems to be justified that, of the 26 villages, those with 3,000 to 7,000 inhabitants received considerably more support than either the smaller or the larger communities. One plausible reason for the low migrant involvement in very small villages is that the numbers of migrants are simply too small to raise enough funds for any substantive project to be undertaken in the community. Migrant involvement can also take the form of private businesses. These are more likely to occur in larger communities because in these communities there is more and better physical development such as basic road infrastructure, basic communication services, and health and education facilities. These private businesses and their impact on development, however, are not the focus of this article. Asiwa and Brodekwano, the two smallest communities among the five case study communities, have no piped water, no education facilities beyond junior secondary level, no health personnel, and no postal and telecommunication facilities, whereas Offinso and Kumawu, the two mid-sized communities, have all these facilities plus a public transportation system and a senior secondary level school. Mampong, the largest community, even has semiurban facilities such as a university department, a hospital and maternity home, and limited mobile phone and internet services. It is likely that small communities do not (as yet) have business ventures that are profitable enough to mobilise migrant support, and that community services are the most effective way for development-minded migrants to get something done. It is also likely that the choice of public/community support opportunities for pioneering new things locally is still available in small communities, although they have all been realised in larger communities, leaving only the more difficult and more easily corruptible ventures which easily can go wrong, for community involvement.

LOCAL INHABITANTS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Local inhabitants in the communities themselves are a relatively small resource for community development activities. One of the ways in which the contributions of inhabitants are being collected is in the form of local

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taxes. Each community has its own rules. Asiwa residents pay €2 per head per year for general development purposes and Brodekwano residents pay €0.80 (males) and €0.40 (females). No development tax is collected in Mampong and in Offinso and Kumawu only ad hoc and subcommunity level collections are organised (see Table 8.2). In addition to taxes, an important fund-raising mechanism is the collection of contributions at funerals, which are recorded on funeral donation cards. Another is the collection of funds through annual public collections (locally called harvests). Contributions through funerals are only collected in Brodekwano and Asiwa where 10% of compulsory funeral donations is reserved for community development (the next section elaborated further on this system). With regard to public collections, the 2004 Brodekwano Easter Harvest, to which all local residents as well as visitors from outside and special guests were invited, yielded €1,500. Offinso and Kumawu celebrate traditional festivals2 that attract local inhabitants, migrants, other nonresidents, and visitors to the community. During these festivals appeals are made and these yield considerable amounts of money. These funds are managed by the traditional leaders and are meant for community development. No public accounts of the expenditure of these funds are available, but it is commonly known that a considerable percentage is spent on the renovation or decoration of the chief’s palaces. Mampong does not celebrate a local traditional festival, but fundraising for community development used to be organised at Christmas or Easter. Since 2002, however, Mampong inhabitants decided to boycott these harvests, because the traditional leaders could not account appropriately for the money raised. Local inhabitants contribute to projects not only financially, but also through their labour. This form of contribution is common practice in smaller communities. Examples include the labour to erect the poles for the migrant-financed electrification project in Asiwa and the labour used in the construction of the migrant-financed classrooms in Brodekwano. In Asiwa and Brodekwano bricklayers and carpenters are exempted from paying development tax, but instead they have to use their skills in contributing to communal labour. In the larger communities of Offinso, Kumawu, and Mampong communal labour is hardly practised. Only in rare cases do people in a neighbourhood come together to solve a local problem, to clean out a gutter or remove weeds from a stream, for example. In short, the local rules and norms pertaining to local inhabitants’ contributions to development differ across the five communities. The smaller communities are more persistent in collecting contributions from their inhabitants than are the mid-sized and large communities. Transparency in handling the funds collected from local people is an important issue, which seems to go wrong more easily in larger communities. The direct communication between the leaders and the population contributes to the transparency in small communities.

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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONING THROUGH FUNERALS Ashanti people refer to the place where their ancestors were born as their hometown and especially if they have been born there themselves this is the town with which they will feel lifelong connection. Eventually, this will also be the soil in which they will want to be buried. This allegiance may lead migrants to donate voluntarily toward hometown development, but migrants do not always make their donations out of free will. In general, people who leave their hometown for a larger town within Ghana or for greener pastures abroad and stay there for some years are perceived to be rich by those in the hometown; those who migrate abroad are thought to be richer than those who migrate within Ghana. Most people in small communities with low levels of development perceive the difference in wealth between migrants and themselves as enormous and expect something back from the migrants. The sharing of wealth, and honour in giving, are deeply-rooted values in the Ashanti culture. In Asiwa and Brodekwano, the two smaller villages, those who leave for greener pastures are explicitly expected to share their wealth with the village. This expectation is so strong that if a nonresident citizen does not contribute to village development, the family in the village would lose respect and the migrant would not receive a warm welcome on a visit to the village or on permanent return. In the case of a generous donation, however, the village would treat the migrant’s family with great respect and honour the migrant upon return. Funerals are one of the most important life-cycle events at which migrants are expected to donate. They are the main form of entertainment in small villages and are celebrated much more lavishly than marriages, birthdays, or outdoorings (when newborn babies are brought outside for the first time). In Asiwa and Brodekwano, the expectation that all inhabitants, and migrants in particular, should contribute to development is formalised in the local rules regarding funerals. A retired teacher who raises funds among migrants from Brodekwano explains: Here we derive our funds from funerals. It is there and then that those who default in paying their rates are made to settle them before they are permitted to celebrate their funerals. This rule applies not only to migrants and their families, but to all inhabitants. In 2004, for example, two Brodekwano residents died and their families were not allowed to hold their funerals until they had paid a total of €150 of outstanding development fees. In such cases the actual burial can take place in village soil, but the family is not allowed to hold a funeral in which they collect donations from visitors. When a large amount that cannot be paid immediately is due, but the funeral cannot be postponed, the practical solution often applied is for the funeral to be held, but the amount

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Sanctions and incentives

Taxes and collections

Table 8.2

Institutions and rules pertaining to development in Asiwa, Brodekwano, Offinso, Kumawu, and Mampong, anno 2004 Asiwa

Brodekwano

Offinso

Kumawu

Mampong

Population

3,000 inh.

4,000 inh.

13,000 inh.

16,000 inh.

32,000 inh.

Compulsory development tax for local residents

yes

yes

only ad hoc and at sub community levels

only ad hoc and at sub community levels

no

Compulsory development tax for migrants

no

yes

no

no

no

Appeal for voluntary migrant contributions to development

yes

yes

only ad hoc and at sub community levels

only ad hoc and at sub community levels

only ad hoc and at sub community levels

Compulsory communal labour for local residents

yes

yes

no

no

no

Annual harvest for development

yes

yes

yes*

yes*

no

Funeral donation card system (10% of compulsory funeral donation is directed to development)

yes

yes

no

no

no

Local residents’ compulsory participation in all funerals of community members

yes

yes

no

no

no

Migrants who have not contributed to development have to pay a fine before holding a funeral in the community

yes

yes

no

no

no

Migrants who make a substantial donation receive honour in the community

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

(continued)

Migrant Involvement in Community Development Table 8.2

Institutions and rules pertaining to development in Asiwa, Brodekwano, Offinso, Kumawu, and Mampong, anno 2004 (continued) Asiwa

Brodekwano

Offinso

Kumawu

Mampong

3,000 inh.

4,000 inh.

13,000 inh.

16,000 inh.

32,000 inh.

Presence of development minded leader(s)

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Trust in development minded local leader(s)

yes

yes

no

no

No

Population

Leaders

157

Source: Own data. Note: * These harvests are organised by the traditional leaders and used mainly for the decoration or renovations of their palaces.

due plus a fine, which is often more than the actual fee, is deducted from the donations the family receives during the funeral. If the total amount to be paid is larger than the donations, the family would have to pay the remainder after the funeral (see Table 8.2). In Asiwa and Brodekwano, funerals are organised monthly. In 1997, the Unit Committees3, which are responsible for development activities, introduced the donation card system, now common in small Ashanti villages. In this system, compulsory fixed funeral donations are collected from the inhabitants at every funeral, whether they physically attend or not. Ten percent of these donations is devoted to community projects and 90% is given to the bereaved family. Donations are recorded on special funeral donation cards that the adults in each of the two communities hold, both residents and nonresidents. Between 1997 and 2003, there were 64 funerals held in Asiwa. In 2003, the compulsory donation for each funeral was €0.054 and of the total €200 donated in that year, €20 became available for Asiwa development5. The Asiwa Unit Committee does not force migrants who are known to be unemployed to contribute to development but, says the chairman; “if a family member dies, the community will show that it is serious.” Unemployment can only exempt migrants from paying toward hometown development temporarily, but this obligation cannot be cancelled completely. The relatives of migrants in the village can also free ride without much problem as long as all family members are alive. They can even take drinks and enjoy themselves at other people’s funerals without being approached by the Unit Committee for their dues, but as soon as death comes to their own family, there is nothing else to be done to avoid major loss of face than pay the dues. According to the chairman of the Asiwa Unit Committee,

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Table 8.3

Breakdown of 2003 Asiwa Easter Harvest: contributions made towards Asiwa development

Asiwa 2003 Easter Harvest (Development Collection) Sources of Money

€

Asiwa residents, voluntary donations

38

Fines for not coming physically to people’s funerals1 (these three people donated but did not attend funerals)

50

Two goats killed and sold (fine for their owners for leaving them roaming about)2

19

Fine for defaulting communal labour, ten people2 Fine for defaulting registered labour for sanitation2 Plot allocation fee, six people

8

Asiwa citizens elsewhere in Ghana, voluntary donations

111

from within Ghana €111

246

partly from within Ghana, partly from abroad

Fine for people who did not pay their 2002 contribution and who celebrated a funeral or ‘ekatetie’ celebration* in the meantime, six people1

from within Asiwa

11

€135

9

€492

€246

District Assembly

59

National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) donation of roofing sheets**

180

Total

private funds

from government €239

public funds €239

€731

Source: Own data. Notes * Some of these people are not from Asiwa, but wanted to have this celebration in Asiwa in addition to a funeral elsewhere. ‘Ekatetie’ is a shorter version of a funeral where people sit down and collect donations. Each of them paid €5. ** The roofing sheets were meant for victims of a rain storm, but after a meeting with village leaders it was decided to use some sheets to roof the police quarters. The rest were sold and the money was used for the market project. 1 funeral-related fines 2 non-funeral-related fines

Migrant Involvement in Community Development

159

some migrants only pay toward development when a family member dies and their payment includes a penalty, which would be much higher than the amount actually due. This attitude is, however, deplored in Brodekwano, where one of the leaders said: As long as there is death and people refuse to pay their special rates for development until they get funerals, we can realise some funds. But do we have to tarry for people to die before we can go on with our projects? The strength of the sanctioning element becomes clear in relation to the amounts collected at the development collections that are held annually. These collections are festive events at which inhabitants, including migrants, and visitors are invited to donate. These events form an important local source of income for development activities in addition to taxes and the 10% of compulsory funeral donations. They also form the yearly opportunity to collect fines from people who did not pay their compulsory funeral donations. The 2003 Asiwa Easter Harvest, for example, yielded €731. Table 8.3 gives the complete breakdown of this Harvest and shows that funeral-related fines amount to 40% of the total amount (€50 fines for not coming physically to people’s funerals and €246 fines for people who did not pay their 2002 contribution and celebrated a funeral in the meantime). Funeral-related plus nonfuneral-related sanctions amounted to €88, making fines 46% of the total amount collected. Only one fifth (€135) of the total amount of €731 was contributed by inhabitants of Asiwa, the ultimate beneficiaries of development activities or projects in their community. Roughly half (€357) came from migrants in Ghana and abroad and about one third (€239) from the government. In addition to the €731, an amount totalling €3,000 for the ongoing electrification project was asked from migrants. The dependence of the community on the benevolence of nonresidents and particularly migrants thus becomes clear.

Comparison of Funerals in Small Communities and in Midsized and Large Communities In Offinso, Kumawu, and Mampong the situation is different. Migrants who ignore donations toward the development of their towns can still organize grand funerals for their family members. However, the funeral of a migrant (or a family member) who is publicly known to have made a considerable contribution will receive noticeably more visitors and so the funeral will be more beneficial for the family, because of the higher amount of donations received. An example was the funeral in 2002 of a person from a family in Mampong who was actively involved in a biodiversity project including snail farming and tree planting. His funeral was attended by considerably more people than usual in the community. As a sign of appreciation for what the person had done for the community, the Mampong chief attended the funeral, thereby earning the family great respect.

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In contrast with the small communities, people in the midsized and large communities of Kumawu, Offinso, and Mampong, are generally free to choose which funerals of community members they attend and which they do not. Five or more funerals may be celebrated in a community on one day, so it would be physically impossible to attend them all, but there is also more ethical freedom. If someone in Mampong decided not to attend any funerals at all, the consequences would be less severe as it is more difficult in large communities to keep an eye on everyone. There is no such freedom in small villages like Asiwa and Brodekwano, where not attending a funeral would result in gossip and, more importantly, in having to pay a fine. Another difference with small communities is that the compulsory funeral donation system is not in place in midsized and large communities, implying that it is not through funerals that 10% of fixed donations automatically become available for development. In summary, in the two small villages of Asiwa and Brodekwano, funerals and community development are interlinked in four ways. First, people who have not paid all the compulsory development fees in the past are denied the right to organize a funeral for family members. Second, at each funeral 10% of compulsory registered donations are earmarked for development. Third, people who fail to attend other inhabitants’ funerals are fined and this money is also used for development purposes. Fourth, local residents or citizens outside the village who donate generously to development are well respected and their funerals are attended by many more people than other funerals. The bereaved family benefits from a larger amount of donations received from visitors. This last link between funerals and development is the only one that also operates in the mid-sized and large communities of Offinso, Kumawu, and Mampong. The sanctions used in the two small communities to force migrants to contribute to development have a cultural and a financial element as well. The cultural element is the importance attached to holding a fitting funeral as the last respect paid to a deceased person; the financial element concerns the consequences for individual families of nonpayment of the development fees. These two elements make sanctioning very effective in small villages. The compulsory funeral donation card contributions to development in Asiwa and Brodekwano show that, although the amounts collected form just a minor additional amount to the development taxes and special rates that are collected from inhabitants, not obeying the system can have severe consequences for families. The honour that is attached to making donations is deeply rooted in Ashanti culture. The dishonour attached to not contributing is a painful sanction in itself for both migrants and their families in small villages, where it can become the talk of town. Asiwa shows that if these feelings are institutionalised effectively, migrants may be motivated to donate generously to development. Asiwa community leaders realise that development depends strongly on outside support; they ensure ongoing development by seeing to it that the system of attracting support works effectively.

Migrant Involvement in Community Development

161

LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND TRUST

Asiwa Electrification Project: The Leader as Networker In 2004, Asiwa was the only one of the five case study communities without electricity. In principle, it is the government’s responsibility to provide electricity to all towns and villages in Ghana, but because remote villages tend to be served more slowly than larger and more economically viable towns, getting electricity in a small community may take a long time. If a community does not want to wait for its turn, the people have to raise the money themselves. The items that are necessary to electrify a community are high- and low-tension wooden electricity poles and wires. Each house will then have to purchase a meter from the electricity company before electricity is provided. The government will serve communities where electricity poles have been purchased and erected by the local population more quickly than communities where this has not been done. Communities with development-minded leaders who are able to motivate their people to spend private money on a communal facility like electricity will thus be rewarded by receiving electricity more quickly than other communities. In the past, the Asiwa community only enjoyed electricity when large (often migrant-financed) funerals were celebrated and a generator was hired. Some of the surrounding communities already have electricity and, through constant communication and comparison with other communities, Asiwa people perceive themselves to be lagging behind those with electricity. Many people in Asiwa have expressed their eagerness to have permanent electricity and are willing to contribute to it personally. However, raising the estimated €9,000 to purchase the 90 electricity poles necessary for the government to install the wires would be virtually impossible for the local inhabitants. Support from outside must therefore be sought (see Box 8.1). The electrification project in Asiwa shows that the contacts that the committee chairman made with overseas citizens were vital in mobilizing migrant money. It was his creativity and persistence in reaching them that resulted in €5,000 plus an expected additional €3,000 from the migrants. In fact, international migrants contribute for 88% in the cost of the electrification project, internal migrants and local people each for 6%. Without that money, Asiwa would have had to wait a long time before getting electricity.

Brodekwano Education Project: The Leader as Organizer The case of the Brodekwano education project clearly shows the importance of a local leader. Brodekwano migrants have been contributing to the construction of classrooms for one of the two existing schools in the community and to the Brodekwano Education Development Fund, a local fund that pays for secondary school education for the four best primaryschool leavers of the community each year. The relatively small group of

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Box 8.1 Asiwa electrification project. In the period in which Asiwa was preparing the electrification project, an obligatory fee was imposed on all local and nonresident citizens of Asiwa. Males had to pay €5 and females €3 specifically for electrification. Asiwa citizens abroad were not asked for a fixed amount, but were invited to make group donations, for example with home town associations. The chairman of the Unit Committee responsible for community development made an effort to contact Asiwa migrants around the world. He did so through contacts with four migrants in United States, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The migrants have no formal obligation to contribute to the project, which is understandable, because they would not make use of the electricity. On the other hand, local residents expect the migrants to share their perceived wealth. €5,000 was donated by all the migrants together over a period of some years, while only €1,000 was raised by local residents and Asiwa citizens in other towns within Ghana; probably around €500 came from people residing in places like Accra and Kumasi. The missing €3,000 is expected to be donated by those abroad. Local people’s contribution amounts to only 6% of the total cost even though they are the ones to benefit from the electricity. In nonfinancial terms, however, their contribution was larger, because the electricity poles were erected in the village with voluntary local labour.

Brodekwano migrants have thereby made a considerable impact on the standard of education in their home community. Migrant support alone, however, would not have brought about a change in Brodekwano, because the implementation of the project in the village itself is a crucial stage of the project, where things can still go wrong. A retired teacher, popularly known as Teacher, has been the driving force behind the project from the start. With his passion for education, he maintains contact with migrants, raises money from them, makes plans for the construction, enlightens people about the importance of education, and encourages people to participate in communal labour for the classrooms construction. Because of the high illiteracy rates among Brodekwano adults, the relatively high costs of education, and a number of other reasons many parents in Brodekwano are not very enthusiastic about sending their children to school. The adults are frequently compelled to involve their children or grandchildren in agricultural work to reduce labour costs. With some exceptions, the population of Brodekwano does not see much added value in education for their children. When Teacher suddenly lost his wife in October 2005 and could not be present in Brodekwano for 2 months, it became clear how important it is for someone to be physically present to motivate people for a project. In these 2 months the Brodekwano inhabitants had only attended work once. Teacher now worries

Migrant Involvement in Community Development

163

Box 8.2 Brodekwano education project. Teacher taught in Brodekwano from 1968 to 1976. Some of his former pupils currently reside abroad. In 2001, when Teacher was 60 years old, he set out to raise the standard of education in Brodekwano. He initiated the local Brodekwano Education Development Fund and asked migrants to donate to it. He keeps records of the school results of all Brodekwano primary school students. At the end of the year, he takes the top four from his list and provides them with all materials and fees for their junior secondary school (JSS) education. In this way he tries not to waste talent in his village, because the children always run the risk of not being allowed by their parents to continue their education after primary school. It particularly frustrates Teacher that none of the Brodekwano-based youth (thus not counting those who have left the village and reside in larger towns) have ever reached senior secondary school level (SSS). By providing students with JSS education he hopes that some of them will eventually reach SSS. A circumstance that adds to his frustration is that he is surrounded by highly-educated people in his family. His (late) wife was Education Officer and four of his children are studying at Kumasi University (KNUST), Accra University (University of Legon), Harvard in United States, and Oxford in United Kingdom. The construction of the classrooms had quite a few problems. Free local labour was used for carrying sand and other unskilled work for the construction. Masons and carpenters in Brodekwano also used their skills in the construction. They used to do so without charge, but one day they decided that they wanted to be compensated for their time on the project, because they could have done paid work in that time. Teacher, who is in charge of the construction, decided that they were right and gave them an allowance slightly lower than they would have earned elsewhere, in contrast with the unskilled labourers, who still received nothing. But the unskilled labourers found it unfair that they were not being paid, because they too could have used their time productively, for example on their farms. An emergency meeting was called to discuss the problem. An important part of the meeting was dedicated to enlightening the people once again about the importance of education. Teacher explained that the precious funds received from the migrants would be wasted if labour were to be hired while free labour could be had from their own population. He explained why it was not reasonable to ask skilled labourers to work for free. In the end the people agreed and decided to resume work.

about who can take his stead in mobilising the people for the communal labour that is required. Teacher mobilises migrant money mainly through letters and phone calls to one person in the Netherlands, who in turn acts as a spider in the web with other migrants. As a return service to the migrant, Teacher spends time and money conveying reliable information to this migrant

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about the situation of his family in Brodekwano. In particular news about illnesses in the family and requests for money to pay for treatment reach the migrant through Teacher. Because of Teacher’s involvement, the migrant trusts the truth content of the stories. Teacher also looks after the welfare of the migrant’s niece whose higher education the migrant is sponsoring. Teacher sends the girl’s school results to the Netherlands so that the migrant can monitor her progress. The examples of community projects suggest that an essential prerequisite for the success of migrant involvement in development projects is that the leader’s behaviour instils trust among migrants and local people. Both Brodekwano and Asiwa have trustworthy leaders who have managed their projects properly and transparently. Local inhabitants as well as migrants were able to monitor the expenditure on the projects, they had their say in decisions, they were regularly informed about progress, and many of them participated in construction activities. The confidence of both migrants and local inhabitants was built up and they became willing to participate in the projects. The Brodekwano project in particular suggests that trust in the community itself is crucial. Because Asiwa and Brodekwano are small communities where most people know and communicate regularly with each other, it is relatively easy for leaders to understand the problems of the community and for the people to ask for accountability from their leaders. A hypothesis to be tested in further research is whether small communities more successfully create the favourable circumstances with regard to trust in local leaders and thereby enables local leaders to involve migrants (as well as local people) in development projects.

Mampong Market Project: A Lack of Trust and Transparency The situation in Mampong is quite different from that of Brodekwano. In the recent past, two incidents in Mampong have severely eroded the trust of both migrants and local people in the local leaders and contributions to development have consequently stopped.6 One of these incidents involved a market project that had started in 1960 with migrant support, but by 2004 had to be rated a failure as a result of the disagreements and misunderstandings between migrants and local leaders. The other incident was the repeated misuse by traditional leaders of large sums raised in three Easter Harvests since 1992. The Mampong market project became a failure in various ways. First, the construction took more than 40 years to complete. A Mampong leader visited the first migrants in the United States and the United Kingdom in 1960 as part of a government delegation and was able to generate some support from them for the market project, which started around that time. However, as for now the old unhygienic market place is still in use. Second, local leaders did not involve migrants, vendors, or consumers in decisions about important issues such as the location of the market, the size of the

Migrant Involvement in Community Development

165

Box 8.3 Mampong market project. Mampong has a decades-old marketplace situated in the centre of the town. All market vendors from Mampong and the surrounding villages use this location for their business. It is a cramped place with many small wooden stalls. It is not roofed and the lanes are not tarred, so in the rainy season it becomes muddy, smelly, and unhygienic. Although people are not happy with the poor circumstances, they still like the place because of its centrality. In 1960, the construction of a new marketplace on the outskirts of town started. Local leaders chose a place about ten times larger than the old market. Money was allocated by the local government and some donations were received from an early group of migrants. Other migrants also promised money. Long lanes of roofed cement stalls were constructed as well as store rooms and sanitary facilities. But, in spite of its neat and attractive appearance, Mampong people are unenthusiastic about the market and so it has never been used. Vendors complain that the new stalls are too small and customers complain about the long distance they would have to walk for their daily groceries. Besides, there are not enough sanitary facilities. The initial enthusiasm has totally disappeared and critics fear that the only way to get the new place functioning is by force. Moreover, migrants who wanted to support the project did not intend their support to be a free gift. An agreement was drawn up between the migrants and the local leaders that the rent paid by vendors for the stalls would be transferred into an account so that part of this money would flow back to the migrants. But local leaders did not keep to this agreement. In addition, there was no communication with the migrants about the decisions made during the construction. Migrants who initially promised money later withdrew from the project, because they lost confidence in it altogether.

stalls, the number of sanitary facilities, and the use of the proceeds of the trade, so that all parties lost trust in the project and migrants who initially promised money later withdrew. Third, because migrants withdrew their support, alternative money sources had to be sought for the completion of the project. Finally, because neither vendors nor consumers are enthusiastic, it is highly doubtful whether the market will ever be successfully used. A large difference between the Mampong market project and projects in Brodekwano and Asiwa is that, because the Mampong project has taken more than 40 years, many different local leaders have been involved in the project, in contrast with Brodekwano and Asiwa, where one person has mainly been responsible. Because Mampong people have yet to see any positive results, they lost trust and were hesitant about participating in new projects. And because their traditional leaders could not account for the amounts of money collected in three fundraisings since 1992, which yielded quite impressive amounts of €4,000, €6,000, and €10,000 from both local

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inhabitants and migrants, by the late 1990s both migrants and local people had lost trust in their leaders. What happened in Mampong is indicative of the dynamics incurred in other large communities and to some extent also in mid-sized communities. Leaders may start projects enthusiastically and with good intentions, but in the end the institutional environment in a community is decisive for a project’s success. One of the traditional leaders in Offinso visits migrants occasionally and is able to collect funds for development. Her handling of the projects is not like that in Mampong, however. Perhaps out of foresight about how things can go wrong, she does not collect money on behalf of local leaders, but for small-scale women’s and orphan’s projects, which she coordinates herself. In Kumawu there is a development minded person who actively approaches migrants during their visits home and requests them for developmental support on behalf of the community. He does not involve in the implementation of community projects himself. However, the handling of the money, which is donated by the few migrants he is able to persuade, needs professionalization in order to become more effective. Only few small projects have been implemented with the help of migrant money and therefore the impact of his actions remains limited.

CONCLUSION This chapter started with the observation that—in relative terms—communities with population sizes between 3,000 and 7,000 receive more migrant support than other communities. The differences in the institutional environments of the five communities form an explanation for the differences in migrant involvement. In small communities, the enforcement of migrant involvement in development comes from within communities. Sanctioning systems are very effective and are strongly embedded in cultural Ashanti values by being inextricably bound with funerals. In larger communities, contributions to development have a more voluntary character through the absence of effective sanctioning systems. Leadership and projects are also more easily corruptible, and inhabitants are less motivated to contribute to development activities because there is more freedom from gossip and less dishonour for people who decide not to contribute. Sanctioning is only possible if there are leaders who can impose these sanctions and who can motivate people in communities to live up to their obligations. The presence of leaders is crucial for development initiatives in a community. The Brodekwano and Asiwa examples have shown the different attributes that leaders should have in order to be successful. Actively networking among migrants is one of them; enlightening local people about the need of certain improvements, being able to manage conflict situations, and handling financial resources responsibly are most important. The Mampong example has shown that the room for corruption in larger

small

mid sized

large

13,000

12,000

11,000

9,000

8,500

8,000

6,000

5,000

4,500

4,000

4,000

Offinso

Juaben

Ejisu

Agona

Juaso

Nyinahin

Kuntanase

Domeabra

Dominase

Abonu

Akyease

27,000

Konongo

25,000

32,000

Mampong

16,000

36,000

Pankrono

Kumawu

(B)

(A)

Agogo

Inh.

Community

++

++

++

++

++

++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

++++

++++

++++

++++

(C)

Number of migrant households2

+

+

++

+

++

+

++

+

++

++

+++

+

++

+++

+++

+

(D)

Number of migrant business in the community3

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

(E)

Electrified in 2003?

++

-

++

++

++

+++

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

(F)

Electrification4

-

-

++

-

++

+

++

++

-

++

+

+

+

++

+

-

(G)

Health5

++

-

-

++

-

+

+

++

-

?

-

++

-

+

-

-

(H)

Education6

-

?

+

++

-

-

-

-

?

+++

-

+

+

-

-

?

(I)

community centre

road

day care centre

street lights

public toilet

(J)

Other

Sector and level of successful migrant support1

low

high

high

high

high

low

low

low

high

low

low

low

low

low

low

(L)

(continued)

++++

-

+++++

++++++

++++

+++++

+++

++++

-

+++++

+

++++

++

+++

+

-

(K)

Overall migrant support7

Appendix Table 1 Migrant support to public utilities in 26 rural Ashanti communities since the period of mass migration

Migrant Involvement in Community Development 167

800

800

Sehwi

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

++

++

++

(C)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

+

+

+

(D)

Number of migrant business in the community3

no

no

no

yes

no

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

(E)

Electrified in 2003?

-

-

+

+

++

++

+

+++

-

++

(F)

Electrification4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

++

-

(G)

Health5

-

+

-

-

-

++

-

-

-

+++

(H)

Education6

?

+

+

+

-

-

+

++

++

++

(I)

Other (J)

bridge

road

street lights

street lights

market

community centre

water, library

Sector and level of successful migrant support1

Source: Appraisal 2003. Notes: 1 Estimated as the value of the most important migrant financed projects in these sectors. Estimates are based on the assessments of local leaders, discussions with inhabitants, and some recordings of actual migrant contributions. 2 ++++ 1,000-2,500 (appr. 30% of households) +++ 160-900 (appr. 20% of households) ++ 60-150 (appr. 10% of households) + 5-50 (less than 10% of households)

1,000

2,500

Piase

Obbo

2,500

Senfi

Pepee

3,000

Asiwa

1,500

3,500

Pramso

1,500

4,000

Brodekwano

Nkowi

(B)

(A)

Ankase

Inh.

Number of migrant households2

-

++

++

++

++

++++

++

+++++

++++

low

low

low

low

low

high

low

high

high

high

(L)

(continued)

+++++++

(K)

Overall migrant support7

Migrant support to public utilities in 26 rural Ashanti communities since the period of mass migration (continnued)

Community

Appendix Table 1

small (continued)

very small

168 Mirjam Kabki, Valentina Mazzucato and Ton Dietz

7

6

4 5

3

Migrant support to public utilities in 26 rural Ashanti communities since the period of mass migration (continued)

+++ many ++ some + few none Includes the costs utility poles. Includes items such as hospital beds, wards, medical instruments. Migrant support from Konongo and Juaso migrants was for the Agogo hospital hence also did not only serve local community development. Includes items such as computers, books, sports equipment and the construction of schools. Scores for columns F, G, H, I: no or negligible migrant support + limited migrant support ++ average migrant support +++ considerable migrant support ? no information available about migrant support column K is sum of scores of columns F, G, H, I. column L is a conversion of scores of column K: large communities: 6 or more ‘+’ high 5 or less ‘+’ low mid sized communities: 5 or more ‘+’ high 4 or less ‘+’ low small communities: 4 or more ‘+’ high 3 or less ‘+’ low very small communities: 3 or more ‘+’ high 2 or less ‘+’ low

Notes (continued)

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communities is greater and that development projects can go wrong if leaders do not behave in a trustworthy and transparent manner. Offinso and Kumawu show that inactive or inefficient community leadership may lead to very few or no migrant financed community projects. In these communities, projects tended to be initiated on a personal level by active people with migrant contacts. Summarizing, in order to successfully involve migrants in community development, the institutional environment of rural Ashanti communities must contain at least three elements. These are effective sanctioning institutions, the presence of active leaders, and above all an atmosphere of trust. From a policy perspective, the findings of this chapter are encouraging for small communities, because they indicate that, as long as the institutional environment is kept intact, migrants will be able to help develop their home communities. But findings for larger communities sound pessimistic about the possibilities of involving migrants in community development. However, the findings from this research indicate that initiatives for migrant financed community projects should explore organizing migrant support at the neighbourhood, association or church level in these larger villages and towns. It is conceivable that trust, leadership, and sanctioning are more effective at those levels in these larger settlements, thereby increasing the chances of success. NOTES 1. This paper reports on results of a collaborative research program, Ghana TransNet, between the University of Amsterdam (AMIDSt), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (AOE), Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID), and African Studies Centre Leiden, in the Netherlands and the Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER), in Ghana. It was funded by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO, grant number 410–13–010P). The authors wish to express their gratitude to Jan Willem Gunning for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. 2. Offinso has the Mmoaninko Festival, which celebrates the victory after the second Ashanti-Dorma war in the eighteenth century and the vast stretch of land that was awarded to the then Offinso chief, Nana Wiafe Akenten I. Kumawu has the Papa Festival to commemorate the brave warriors who died in the many wars against the former great overlord Ataala Fian of the Afram Plains. 3. Unit committees (previously called town development committees) handle money that is collected for development purposes, coordinate actual activities, discuss developmental issues with all family heads of local clans and maintain contact with district government bodies. The Asiwa Unit committee has seven members and its secretary is in contact with migrants. 4. From 1997 to 1998 the donation was €0.02 and until 2001 €0.03 was collected. In 2001 the compulsory donation was increased to €0.05. 5. 500 people donated €0.05 to eight funerals, 10% of which is meant for development. 6. Elsewhere (Mazzucato & Kabki, 2007) the authors develop the aspect of power relationships between migrants and local leaders that affect the way development projects are carried out especially in larger communities.

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REFERENCES Addison, E. K. Y. (2004). The Macroeconomic impact of remittances in Ghana. In: T. Manuh (Ed.), At Home in the World? International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana and West Africa. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers. Akolongo, S. Z. (2005). The role of diaspora-based organizations in socio-economic development at the local level in Ghana. In T. Manuh (Ed.), At Home in the World? International Migration and Development in Contemporary Ghana and West Africa. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers. Cotula, L. & Toulmin, C. (2004). Till to tiller: Linkages between international remittances and access to land in West Africa. LSP Working paper 14, FAO. European Commission. (2004). Worker’s Remittances as a source of development finance. Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs. Brussels, 1–6. Higazi, A. (2005). Ghana Country Study. A part of the report on informal remittance systems in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Ref: RO2CS008). ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). University of Oxford, United Kingdom. Levitt, P. & Nyberg-Sorensen, N. (2004). The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies. Global Migration Perspectives, 6. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration. Loup, J. (2005). The Economy of solidarity. Expatriate workers’ remittances to Sub Saharan Africa. Paris: Fondation pour l’Innovation Politique. Mazzucato, V. (2000). Transnational networks and the creation of local economies: Economic principles and institutions of Ghanaian migrants at home and abroad. Grant application for Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, grant number 410.13.010P, Abridged version accessed on March 1, 2007 fromhttp://www2.fmg.uva.nl/ghanatransnet/ program/index.html Mazzucato, V. & Kabki, M. (2007, July). Small is beautiful: The politics of transnational relationships between migrant hometown associations and communities back home. Paper presented at African Alternatives: Initiative and Creativity beyond Current Constraints AEGIS. University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands. Mohan, G. (2006, February). Cosmopolitan states of development: Homelands, citizenships and diasporic Ghanaian politics. Paper presented at workshop on Researching Ghanaian Networks, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Orozco, M. (2005). Diasporas, development, and transnational integration: Ghanaians in the U.S., U.K., and Germany. Report commissioned by Citizen International through the Agency for International Development. World Bank / International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (2006). Global economic prospects, economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC.

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We Are Bridging Cultures and Countries Migrant Organizations and Development Cooperation in the Netherlands Ton van Naerssen

It is currently widely acknowledged that overseas migrants can play a positive role in development processes in the countries of origin. Remittances by individual migrants to their families at home, who use the money for food, consumer goods, education of children, construction, and small business enterprises, attract most of the attention but it is also pointed out that migrants abroad as well as circular and return migrants transfer knowledge, offer access to capital and information for companies, constitute markets that would otherwise not exist, and are a source of tourism back home (United Nations, 2006; World Bank, 2006). They initiate what Farrant, MacDonald & Sriskandarajah (2006) called diasporic flows, consisting of a triad of knowledge, investment, and trade that has a direct and visible impact on the economic development in countries of origin. In addition to being embedded in individual transnational networks, migrants have their own social networks in the host countries. Migrants create formal and informal ethnic, national or regional associations to feel home away from home and to accommodate and facilitate the arrival and stay of newcomers in a foreign and largely unknown environment. Although these organizations are mainly meant for socializing in the host countries, they usually maintain or develop multifarious linkages with the areas of origin and in this way impact on their social and economic development. In due time, contributing collectively to development at home could be an explicit goal of the associations, which then commit themselves to small-scale development projects and programmes in the field of education, health, and infrastructure in the communities and regions of origin. Migrants might also contribute through knowledge transfer, for example through networks of highly skilled migrants (Goethe & Hillmann, this volume; Meyer & Brown, 1999). These philanthropic financial and social remittances (Opiniano, 2005) and other forms of altruistic collective behaviour also have a welfare and symbolic value, and keep transnational networks alive.1 Thus there are good reasons to study migrant organizations and their role as actors in development processes (Ionescu, 2006; United Kingdom Parliament, 2004).

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Besides contributing to economic development through remittances, individual migrants can also play an important role in social change by consciously or unconsciously to break through traditional customs and taboos and, for example, promote the emancipation of women and minority groups in countries of origin. Alternatively, migrant organizations might also strive to encourage political debates and democracy, and to strengthen civil society through sustaining local organizations. Naturally the countries of origin, where the existence of patron-client relations and authoritarian attitudes are usually the rule, do not always appreciate this role. Even more problematic and contentious is the role of migrant and diasporic organisations in home politics, as for example analyzed by Ellis & Zafar Khan (2002) for the Kashmiri diaspora and Oestergaard-Nielsen (2002) in the case of the homeland politics of Kurds in Germany. This role builds on a tradition (cf. Nell in this volume; Sheffer, 1986) and can be traced back to the Third World movement of the mid-sixties in the case of diasporic organisations involved in human rights advocacy at home.2 This tradition has been continued through the current interest in the role of the diaspora in conflict interventions and peace initiatives (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Haer, & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; University for Peace, 2006). National governments have discovered that they can make use of this potential. A well-known case concerns the Mexican hometown associations and the Mexican government programme 3+1, whereby for each dollar collected and transferred home by migrants, the federal, state and municipal governments each will contribute one dollar (see the contribution of Rivera & Escala, this volume). This example of a good practice has led to an interest in the role of home governments in capitalizing on diaspora initiatives (World Bank, 2006 p. 70). As a matter of fact, as far as the economy concerns, many developing countries now appreciate the role of migrant organizations. International migration is considered as a major instrument of national economic development, in which a combination of migration, remittances, brain-gain, government, and organized migrants support might contribute to an economic take-off in countries of the south. However, not only are the governments of sending countries increasingly recognising the potential of migrants and migrant associations for development processes but also in host countries there appears to be a growing interest. Governmental and non-governmental development agencies have discovered migrant associations as agents for change and actors in development cooperation. They consider family remittances as a private matter but they are willing to support migrant collective transnational engagement for development cooperation. Moreover, as far as Europe concerns, there is an increasing pressure to manage and regulate international migration. Thus governments in host countries have attempted to promote development as a means of alleviating the adverse conditions causing underdevelopment and conflict, while at the same time reducing propensities for migration to Europe.

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In this respect, the French co-dévelopment policy and its Spanish equivalent of co-desarrollo (co-development) deserve attention. The French initiative, which started in 1997, attempts to forge a link between immigration control and development processes in sending countries. It built on already established transnational development initiatives by the African diaspora in France. The policy advocates possibilities for temporary immigration for (vocational) training or facilitation of business creation, along with more conventional measures such as repatriation support. It specifically aims to involve state agencies and migrants’ associations and business and professional networks as well. The officially stated rationale is that by boosting development in countries of origin, migration pressure will be reduced. Although it has not been proven that the latter objective has been reached, migrants and migrant associations have shown a certain distrust toward the programmes, which are mainly perceived as vehicles to push migrants back to their home countries. The programmes are being continued currently without an explicit link with migration control (Abad, Aragall, et al., 2005). From the development point of view, however, the effort to establish forms of cooperation between development agencies and migrant associations is of major importance. The challenge is now to link development cooperation agencies in host countries with migrant organizations or networks, without intervening too much in spontaneous initiatives and processes. In this respect programmes such as Migration and Development (MIDA) and Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) initiated by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) deserve attention (cf. Oucho, 2007 for African return migration initiatives). Another example is the United Kingdom-based diaspora network African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), which has already gained a reputation by advocating migrant rights, development programmes and research (Akologo, 2005) and is supported by United Kingdom development agencies.3 In this chapter we focus on (a) the role of migrant organizations in development and (b) their relations with governmental and nongovernmental development agencies in the Netherlands. It should be stated beforehand that although the Dutch government and Dutch funding agencies have demonstrated their interest in the migration-development nexus, the practice of policies is still in the experimental phase. The examples are drawn from Southeast Asian and African migrant organizations in the Netherlands. We consider the fairly broad range organizations that define themselves as such, including refugee organizations and second-generation migrant’s organisations to be migrant organizations. All migrant organizations with explicit development objectives, even although their major goal is to support integration in the host country are regarded as development migrant (diaspora) organizations (DMOs). Development is considered in a broad sense comprising economic, social, and political dimensions as well. A major part of this contribution is based on interviews among African

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DMOs in the Netherlands, mainly carried out in 2006 (Naerssen, Kusters, & Schapendonk, 2006).4

THE DUTCH MIGRATORY AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION CONTEXT The population of the Netherlands numbers around 16.4 million persons. Of these 16.4 million, some 1.7 million are born abroad and 3.2 million are considered as allochtonen,5 a specific Dutch expression indicating that someone or one of his parents is born outside the Netherlands—it makes no difference whether this person is a Dutch passport holder or not. People born in the Netherlands to original Dutch parents are called autochtonen.6 Large allochtonen groups originate from the former colonies: Indonesian (Dutch East Indies) born and their descendants are currently estimated at some 450,000, whereas around 330,000 persons are of Surinamese origin. Two other large groups concern the former immigrant workers from Turkey and Morocco and their descendants, who both number over 320,000 persons (CBS, 2007). Other conspicuous nonwestern migrant groups are from Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Cape Verde, Somalia, and Ghana. In the Randstad, which includes the four largest cities of the Netherlands7, over 40% of the population is allochtoon. By consequence, transnationalism and loyalty toward the host country and the country of origin as well are common. For many years the interest of the Dutch government in the migrationdevelopment nexus, and particularly of the Directorate General of International Cooperation (DGIS) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was focused on the reasons for migration, brain drain, and return migration. After 1990 transnationalism and the role of migrant communities received more attention, but it was only after the turn of the century that a real change in the discourse took place (Spaan, Hillmann & van Naerssen, 2005). In addition to the DGIS, Dutch cofinancing agencies (CFAs) partly subsidized by the Dutch government, such as Cordaid, HIVOS, ICCO and Oxfam/NOVIB, followed their own trajectories in efforts to engage with migrant organizations. In the LINKIS programme, DGIS and the CFAs came together to cofinance small-scale development projects being run by Dutch civil society organizations, including migrant and refugee organizations, up to a maximum of 100,000 Euro (http//www.linkis.nl). At another level the discourse on migration and development was given new impetus by the publication of a policy paper Development and Migration, written on behalf of both the Minister of Development Cooperation and the Minister for Foreigners Affairs and Integration. The latter is significant: The discourse on migration and development became connected to the internal problems of the Dutch society regarding legal and undocumented immigration and the multicultural society. The two variables used are remittances

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and human capacity building. The general conclusion of the policy paper is that the impact of international migration on development depends on the development environment, constituted by variables such as political stability, economic growth, quality of government, policy, and business climate and whether the emigrants are high or low skilled. Based on this analysis, a new policy has been devised. Among others, the policy paper states that the government will involve migrant organizations more intensively in the design of Dutch development cooperation and in the debate on brain drain. Moreover, efforts of migrant organizations to contribute to development in the countries of origin will be supported. It further considers the promotion of circular migration as a suitable strategy that unifies the interests of the migrants, the countries of origin, and the destination countries. These conclusions imply that the governmental policy acknowledges that the transnational links of migrant organizations have promising potential for economic and political development in the home countries. Following this policy document, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IOM organised a workshop in February 2005 focusing on the migration and development nexus and titled Mainstreaming Migration into Development Policy Agendas. At this workshop, a call was made to engage organized migrants as agents for development. Various initiatives such as support to migrant networks, the participation of migrant organizations in the process of policy making in development programmes and the establishment up of a database were discussed. Later, encouraging return and circular migration as well as the temporary migration of higher skilled migrants were added to the agenda. It is not the intention of this contribution to give an overview of all initiatives. In his report commissioned by Oxfam/NOVIB, Hein de Haas (2006) gave a fairly comprehensive overview of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field of international migration and development. He referred to a number of recent policy documents, several initiatives concerned with return migration in programmes such as MIDA, a rather modest interest in facilitating private remittances, and a strong link with civil society development initiatives through the Dutch cofinancing agencies (CFAs). His overview showed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is intensively following the migration and development debate but a clear policy with regard to the role of migrant organizations in development in the home countries has not yet been developed.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN DIASPORAS AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES The first wave of nonEuropean immigrants in the Netherlands occurred shortly after World War II when many tens of thousands of people of Indonesian-Dutch (mestizos or of mixed European-Indonesian origin bearing

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European family names) and Moluccan soldiers in service of the colonial army, left Indonesia. The former group and their descendants now number about 400,000. The latter group was initially considered temporary immigrants, as they (were) expected to return to the Moluccas after the planned establishment of an independent Moluccan Republic. However, because this Republic never came about in an independent Indonesia, they stayed in the Netherlands and their current number has been estimated at about 40,000 people (Beets, Walhout & Santo Koesoebjono, 2002). The colonial past of the Netherlands and the multiple links of the Dutch, whether or not from mestizo origin, with Indonesia explain the existence of many local organizations that support small-scale projects in Indonesia. The majority of these projects are private initiatives. Moluccans have their own transnational networks. The ideal of a free Moluccan republic, the adat (traditional law) and pela (kinship) connections still play a strong role in constituting the Moluccans as a migrant group with a clear, well-defined identity. Another factor reinforcing their cultural identity is the fact that many Moluccans were housed in specific ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods, because they and the Dutch government initially expected their stay as temporary. Kinship relations are important in keeping up the links with Moluccan islands in East Indonesia and are considered more important than religion (most of the Moluccans are Christian but there is an Muslim minority). Remarkably the younger third generation is engrossed with their Moluccan identity, and emphasize Moluccan values and the Malay language (Verkuyten, Calseijde & Leur, 1999). In 1999–2001 violent ethnic and religious conflicts occurred in the region of origin, during which at least 5,000 people died and 500,000 were displaced. Many Christian villages were attacked by armed Islamic groups and vice versa. Rumours blamed the Indonesian army for deliberately creating unrest and in this way trying to abort the newly established Indonesian democracy of 1998.8 The Moluccans in the Netherlands undertook various initiatives and demonstrations to express their solidarity, thereby stressing joint efforts by Christian and Muslim Moluccans. Political pressure for peace to be made and calling for an end to the violence was exerted, both on politicians in the Netherlands and in Indonesia, and a delegation of prominent members of the diaspora twice visited political leaders in Indonesia. The diaspora also became much involved in relief efforts. Campaigns were held to collect money, at the national level by way of a national aid campaign supported by two Dutch mayors and the Dutch Red Cross as well as by numerous local activities. The national campaign raised 5.5 million Dutch guilders (around 2.75 million Euros) in 2001. Steijlen (2004) suggests that the interethnic conflict of 1999–2002 has reinforced ethnic identity of the diaspora and strengthened transnational ties. In due time the emergency assistance developed into development-oriented small-scale projects. The second example of a migrant group in the Netherlands supporting development in the region of origin is much more small scale. It concerns

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the Papuans in exile and their descendants from West Papua (Irian Barat— renamed Irian Jaya in 1973). The region was separated from the rest of Indonesia by the Dutch during the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. After intervention from the United Nations, it became a province of Indonesia in 1962. The Papuans and their descendants in the Netherlands only number a few hundred. They are a much smaller group than the Moluccans, and by consequence there are only a few diaspora organizations. Nevertheless, these have remained active over the years. The core of the MDOs consists of Papuans but their membership includes Dutch sympathizers. HAPIN (Hulp aan Papua’s in Nood), which stands for Support to Papuans in Distress, is a case in point. It claims to have 12,000 member-contributors. It combats human rights abuses by the Indonesian authorities and the army in West Papua and supports the regional autonomy and decentralization laws of Indonesia that should lead to greater inclusion of Papuans in regional decision-making. HAPIN also has various project activities, such as support to four boarding schools, emergency aid, information, and support to refugees in Papua New Guinea. In 2003/2004 grants were given to 450 students for higher education both in West Papua and elsewhere in Indonesia. Besides, a small-scale project fund supports initiatives of local populations in the field of small-scale production and education. The fund has been supported since 2002 by the Dutch funding organization Oxfam/NOVIB through the LINKIS programme (see the next section). Our third example concerns the Philippine migrants in the Netherlands. According to the Dutch Central Office of Statistics there are about 9,400 allochtonen of Philippine descent, which includes some 3,000 legal immigrants from the Philippines and 6,400 of their children. To these we should add an estimated 3,000 undocumented immigrants, which gives the total of around 12,400 first- and second-generation Filipinos in the Netherlands. The Philippine migrant group in the Netherlands is well organized and comprises national and regional organized socializing groups, groups of different political adherence and various DMOs. An example of an initiative supported by the Dutch government is a project of the Dutch-Filipino organisation PASALI, an organisation of Filipino seafarers. It initiated a project from brain drain to brain gain, with the aim of using the knowledge and skills of expatriate Filipinos to develop the fishery and agricultural sector; to foster the economic and social reintegration of returnees and to help avoid the migration of Filipino graduates. Another initiative concerns the Katapiran Foundation, which started its activities in 1990. At current it comprises eight organizations and a number of individuals who are implementing community-based projects in the field of micro-credit, literacy, and street children on the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. Katapiran is also supported via the LINKIS programme. These examples of diaspora groups from Southeast Asia demonstrate, (a) how the relations between migrant groups and their countries of origin could be inter-generational and maintained for decades; (b) the diversity of

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the development initiatives ranging from small scale projects to peace and reconstruction programmes; and (c) the interest of Dutch funding agencies and the Dutch government in mobilizing the resources of migrant organizations for development.

AFRICAN DMOS IN THE NETHERLANDS Some 180,000 persons of (subSahara) African origin are currently living in the Netherlands. The largest groups are from Somalia (16%), Cape Verde (11%) and Ghana (10%; Foquez Etnomarketing, 2005). They are well organized (van Heelsum, 2004; van Heelsum, 2006; Kessel & Tellegen 2000). The majority of them are oriented toward home making in the Netherlands, but quite a few aim to support the welfare in their places and regions of origin. The following sections are based on a survey among 30 DMOs that was carried out in 2006.9 We explored the development activities of the African DMOs, their views on development and their expectations of Dutch development cooperation, on the base of which we draw some policy conclusions. The African DMOs in the Netherlands vary substantially with regard to size, reach, budget, types of initiated projects and the political and economic context wherein these projects need to be realized. The majority of the DMOs are less than ten years old and their members are first generation immigrants mainly. They usually start their activities as refugee or migrant organizations with as major objectives to look after the interests of their supporters, to facilitate integration into the host country’s society and to maintain their commonality by social and cultural events. Providing information on the Dutch culture, to interpret, to advice in matters of finance, study and employment are main activities. Some DMOs were set up with an explicit political aim and the other objectives of facilitating integration and supporting development projects are derivatives of the major one. Although there are exceptions, they seldom call themselves explicitly a development organisation. The majority of the African DMOs start with their development activities after a relatively short period of around two or three years. It depends on the nature of the organization whether a clear view on development exists or not. The DMOs are supported by various Dutch organisations and institutions such as the Dutch CFAs, local governments and charity organizations. Private business is less involved. Roughly speaking, one can distinguish large DMOs that are supported by the Dutch development cooperation agency and/or CFAs, and a broad circle of smaller organizations around them. An example of a large professionally run DMO is the Somali organization HIRDA (Himilo Relieve and Development Association; cf. ) It started its activities in 1998 and currently has a membership of 120.10 HIRDA maintains good relationships

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with the CFAs. It has an annual budget of about one million Euros and is engaged in a fairly large number of projects in Somalia, where it established a branch office with a considerably larger staff than that in the Netherlands, amounting to 69 full-timers end 35 part-timers in 2006. Contrary to HIRDA, most of the DMOs are small. Half of them are foundations with a limited number of members, often relatives or close friends. Sometimes the Board includes people from Dutch origin. a typical example is a foundation run by an African-born medical doctor and his wife, with a membership of ten people (their diaspora in the Netherlands is also small). This is not say that these DMOs are less effective or efficient than the larger ones. These organizations that operate outside the institutional development cooperation arena are either recently founded, deliberately want to be small, or they belong to a country of origin that is not considered as a core country for Dutch development cooperation and consequently are not entitled to funding. The reach of these small organizations can also be larger than one would expect. One such small organization, for example, claims to have an Internet mailing list of 900 people, who live in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as well. In most cases respondents indicated that their organizations are open and accessible to everyone regardless of ethnicity or nationality. In practice, there are examples of ethnic differences and tensions within the associations. In particular when the country of origin or the migrant group is large (D.R. Congo, Sudan) the organizations tend to be regionally bound. Nuba Mountains Solidarity Abroad (NMSA) aims at the Nuba in Sudan; the Organisation of Southern Sudan Community in the Netherlands is regionally oriented, as is the case of Gowraar Aid Organization, specialised in health matters in the area of Gedo. As for this regional attachment, a second-generation migrant commented: Many migrants are focussed at their supporters in the home country. We want to get rid of this attitude and to be open. We opted for guaranteeing the heterogeneity of our organization. Everyone must be able to identify with us, that is why we get support from migrants from all parts of the country. In many cases DMOs are linked to umbrella organizations, such as the Dutch Refugees Organization (Vluchtelingen Organisatie Nederland or VON), Afroneth (a platform of African diaspora organizations in the Netherlands) (cf. ) and Afrika Netwerk. Informal consultative structures are of major importance. Once migrant organizations are established, they often search for possibilities to cooperate in order to enlarge the impact of their activities. This often involves joint projects in the Netherlands, such as the organization of an African festival. The cooperation is often temporary and nonformal but offers the structure through which to connect each other quickly when it is needed.

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AFRICAN DMOS, THEIR PROJECTS AND VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENT The projects of the DMOs in the countries of origin are mostly small scale. Their impact is local but their reach ranges from a few dozen people to several hundreds. They are particularly represented in the sectors of education, health care, and microcredit. A large organization such as HIRDA has more encompassing projects, among others a regional hospital that covers an area with some 70,000 inhabitants. But this example is not representative for the majority of African DMOs. • Examples in the education sector are: the building of schools in the countryside, a carpenter workshop for town orphans, scholarships for secondary school pupils, and computers for students. • Health projects include: the collection of glasses for people with river blindness and fi nancial and material support for a regional hospital. • Infrastructural projects concern an engine to pump water from a river for irrigation purposes, the organization of a solid waste collection system in two urban neighbourhoods, and a bus project. • Livelihood projects receiving assistance are a poultry project and farmers’ cooperative to provide microcredits. • Socially oriented examples include a women’s empowerment project and a remigration project. • In the field of politics we fi nd lobbying for good governance and an awareness programme for peace and human rights. Nevertheless, the reach of small-scale projects can be fairly large such as in programmes of microcredit (400 beneficiaries) and awareness rising (250). Unfortunately, the question of the sustainability of the projects is hard to answer because most of these projects started only recently; much depends on the local situation too. Most often relatives and/or friends who are closely involved constitute the social capital of these projects. The projects usually take place in the hometown or region from where the initiators of the projects come. When I visited the village where my father lives, I noticed that not much has changed since I left; the development of the village stagnates. That is why I decided to do something. Education is important for development. With knowledge a positive cumulative process can set in motion. Therefore, our foundation has been set up to give as many children as possible a scholarship to go to school. However, it turned out that the school was not capable of giving good teaching. The school building was dilapidated and the teaching material was outdated. By consequence, we broadened our aim to the improvement of education and the building of schools in the region.

182 Ton van Naerssen Informal relations with the village chief are often mentioned as of crucial importance. The reasons for not engaging with local formal structures are (assumed) corruption and lack of efficiency. So we have that project of collecting glasses in the Netherlands for blind people in our region. We started with 700 glasses, which we succeeded to obtain by co-operating with an optician in the town we live in Holland. We took them with us at our own cost. We consider glasses as important not only because people will see better, also because in this way they will be socially included. The project has a fairly large reach. We now have hundreds of glasses available in the Netherlands. A village chief has offered us a piece of land to start something sustainable in future, for example, a clinic for eyes. Now we have this micro-finance project that enables women to obtain a loan. We require candidates to send their children to school. The chief of the tribe is responsible for these women—it is by way of him that the loans will be arranged. We don’t want to co-operate with the formal development institutions and authorities since we don’t want to disturb the efficiency of our initiatives. We want to work directly to avoid bureaucracy. Of course, at the informal level the village chief and the village council are engaged in our projects. It appears that there are differences in attitude between first-generation and second-generation migrants. The latter has less personal ties with people of the country of origin, which has both advantages and disadvantages. a disadvantage is that the second generation is usually less engaged in individual remittances but an advantage is that they are inclined to support collective remittances. Among the Cape Verdian community in the Rotterdam agglomeration (where it is concentrated), the first generation activities are localized in the locality of origin, although the second generation takes more distance of the locality and prefers a structural approach (Zappey, 2005). A successful development project contributes to sustainable welfare improvement and empowerment of the target group. The success factors of African DMOs are the same as the ones of Dutch agencies and developmentoriented organisations. Apart from factors related to the specific regional or country contexts, the major factors that contribute to success are adequate anticipation of the demand, visible results, professionalism of the project initiators, and, especially, ownership of the project by the target group. In the beginning people were only out to get money and they were afraid of being exploited, as has happened some time before. The distrust has been broken through because our organization has shown that our projects work.

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The project is well received by the local community. The women who participate in the project are members of a farmers’ association. In the beginning we were waiting anxiously since you introduce something new into the community and relations will shift, but it went well. The strength of our project is the consultation with the people there; we have looked at their demand. Now we reach some 90 families. We are well aware of the fact that our projects must be fit in with local initiatives. Sustainability, transparency, and ownership are important. Professionalism concerns technical skills and social awareness (whether a project will be sustainable embedded in local structures) as well. Understandably the respondent DMOs did not elaborate on failed projects but they did mention the problems they met: political instability, corruption, differences in mentality, bad communication, and a lack of a suitable follow-up. There is much miscommunication and because of the bad infrastructure the project proceeds slowly. In the beginning the computer project was a success. However, the key to success was lacking: sustainability. We paid for Internet for a period of three months but after that we noticed that people were not able or willing to maintain payment for the Internet connection. The political situation is unstable and might cause the sudden standstill of a project. a reliable government that guarantees security does not exist, so you must be prepared that everything can happen at once. Last June a warlord entered the region, which caused much tension and unrest and had a negative impact on our projects. There is not much you can do against it. Along with collective remittances African DMOs consider knowledge transfer and information to potential migrants as major tasks. It is important to raise awareness among migrants and to encourage enthusiasm for development cooperation. With their expertise and knowledge migrant organizations can mean much for the countries of origin. Attention must be paid to the youth in African countries. Their ideas about life in Western Europe need to be changed. That is why our foundation tells them that it is not all roses here and that one needs to work hard and will miss things such as the language, the family, and all kind of customs.

184 Ton van Naerssen Many respondents expressed their interests in remigration projects. This should occur in cooperation with the Dutch government and the government of the home country or reliable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well. Some DMOs had already been involved with return migration in the past. Up to 1993 re-migration was normal. Students went abroad and returned. Since then the labour market for skilled people has deteriorated in many African countries and re-migration has decreased. At present we discuss re-migration in terms of: What kind of employment can return migrants find back home? African DMOs are generally well aware of the broader context in which the projects are implemented. They know that development is more than erecting a building or donating computers to students. The need to involve the community is common wisdom and the complexity of development processes is acknowledged. However, one has to start somewhere and the resources are limited. With the support of CFAs, some DMOs are involved in peace-building processes. Only a small number of MOs are explicitly involved in issues of good governance and processes of democratisation (mostly in the form of information campaigns). Initiatives in this direction deserve strong support; the more so because these are issues that the DMOs themselves consider crucial to the development process and that are high on the agenda of Dutch development cooperation.

AFRICAN DMOS AND DUTCH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION In 2005, participants of diaspora organisations in the Netherlands came together at a roundtable workshop of the Dutch Institute of Multicultural Development FORUM to make a self-analysis of the strengths and weaknesses and the threads and opportunities of the diasporas with regard to the migration-development nexus.11 As weaknesses they found that: • the majority of the DMOs works as solo performers and in its own interests, there is a lack of trust in each other and in the concept of unity; • there is a lack of knowledge and resources (fi nance, office space) to encourage cooperation; • there is a lack of professionalism in how they present themselves to the outside world, in part because of a lack of knowledge of Dutch language; • a dependency on funding agencies exists; • there is lack of self-criticism, self-analysis, and a common vision.

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The workshop considered the lack of the latter as crucial. It admitted that more attention has to be paid to capacity building and the creation of networks of migrant organizations but it also demanded the participation of diasporas in any decision making on migration and development cooperation matters. Specific expertise appears the strongest asset of the migrant organizations: they know the regions and the target groups and dispose of transnational social capital. Transnationalism is also considered as a strong point because migrant organizations are able to build bridges between the cultures of migrants (allochtonen) and the native Dutch (autochtonen), and between the Netherlands and the countries of origin. Our interviews of African DMOs confirm this self-image. Even more potently, many interviewees consider loyalty to the country of origin as an asset. Migrants are faithful and show perseverance, they know the misery there and want to improve the situation. They are willing to inform the Dutch: The Dutch government and the academic world should talk more often with migrant organizations in order to obtain a better view with regard to the role of remittances in development cooperation. The majority of the DMOs are small, which in many cases is considered as an advantage: It is easy to have an overview over what happens within the organization, the communication structure is effective and these advance the quality of the projects. One DMO mentioned that the small size enforces specialization, which it considers as desirable. The reliance on volunteer work, which creates uncertainties, constitutes a threat. The need to cooperate is often expressed: We need to continue with our current activities and at the same time create a think tank with similar organizations. We should exchange information. We have to leave the island policies that separate our migrant organizations. We should create more networks and unite instead of these island policies. As mentioned earlier a world wide change has taken place in the relationship between the governments of countries of origin and MOs. Emigrants are no longer viewed as defectors but as citizens abroad who can contribute to development. Ghana is a case in point. The country supports initiatives of knowledge transfer, among others the MIDA (migration and development) programme Ghana Health project coordinated by IOM-Netherlands. Another example is Cape Verde, which aims to encourage migrants’ investments and is considering cooperation with the IOM to initiate a return migration programme. In our interviews, reference was made to the efforts of the representatives of Burkina Faso and Kenya in the Netherlands to link with their diasporic groups for development purposes.

186 Ton van Naerssen In other European countries there are other, and more large scale examples of cooperation between governments and their diasporas, such as the co-développement programmes of France (since 1997) and the initiatives of ACCORD in the United Kingdom. The earlier mentioned initiatives of the Mexican and Philippine diasporas with their governments are also a case in point. Nevertheless, it appears that the African DMOs in the Netherlands are not inclined to influence or exert pressure to realize this kind of policies: they expect little from their home government. As expressed by a respondent: The major obstacle to development is our own government, in particular the local governments. They are badly structured, corrupt and usually very slow. Although there is a certain unwillingness to cooperate with the home government, the DMOs expect advice and financial support from the Dutch government and CFAs. Nevertheless, this is also a field of much misunderstanding and pitfalls. More attention and dialogue and a stronger involvement in Dutch development policy are high on the agendas of the DMOs. The CFAs are important for the MOs. They encourage professionalism among the migrants and their support enables programmes and projects to be implemented at a larger scale. From their viewpoint, the development projects of the DMOs are often ad hoc and not embedded in a well thought-out development strategy. They also lack a professional basis. On the other hand, among the DMOs widespread criticism of CFAs exists and the fact that some countries—and by consequence the migrant organizations concerned—are excluded from development cooperation funding is not well understood.12 Many DMOs admit that they have to improve their capacity to have a larger development impact but they also want more understanding for the problems caused by their dependency on volunteer work. Some migrant organizations view the attempts to integrate diaspora activities with formal development aid as unnecessary since they consider themselves capable of running operations themselves in an efficient and autonomous way. The existence of a field of tension is expressed by two CFA representatives: Migrant organizations differ from each other, so we should not generalize. But what they say about our bureaucracy, our lack of decisiveness and the like, unfortunately, is true. The difficulty is also that our choice for a selective group of countries is difficult to explain. a great problem of the CFAs and the migrant organisations is that both sides are arrogant. They both think that they know everything, instead of cooperating to share knowledge and join forces.

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CONCLUSION: DO DIASPORAS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? The role of the diasporas in Dutch development cooperation is a contested one. Although proponents of the involvement of DMOs in development cooperation argue that they should play a larger role (de Haas, 2006), others put their role into perspective or are sceptical (Meer, 2006; Zoomers, 2006). The question is whether the strong assets of the DMOs, namely their strong motivation, transnational networks and local knowledge constitute an added value compared to the activities of Dutch development agencies. However, it is not yet clear as to what extent local knowledge and personal and social capital are decisive for the success of projects. First of all, the tendency to treat diaspora associations as a homogenous entity has much to do with what Pries (2005) called methodological nationalism. It is often overlooked that such a homogenous diaspora does not exist and that migrant communities are divided among lines of class, ethnicity, and political orientation. The gender dimension in diasporic initiatives is also unclear and under-researched. For example, Piper reminds us that the hometown associations of Latin American diaspora in the United States are male dominated, while women might have a more prominent role in professional organizations such as those formed by nurses (2006 p. 154). Such differences might have a different impact on local development in origin countries (cf. Proceedings, 2006). Second, social networks and intimate knowledge of a foreign culture can be a strength as well as a weakness in development processes. Because DMOs usually possess social networks and knowledge at the local and regional level, it might well be that, viewed from the national level, their development efforts will work out negatively for example in enlarging local and regional disparities. Social networks are useful but they might also constrain development since strong links and obligations might lead to less objectivity and efficiency. For Ghana, Akologo (2005) has demonstrated that it makes a substantial difference whether the collective remittances are guided by traditional chiefs, local development councils or development NGOs (he preferred the latter). Local knowledge and local relations are, of course, important but it should also be realized that they are no substitute for professional and technical skills. Finally, the perception of people in the home countries regarding emigrants is not necessarily always positive. There are several hundreds of initiatives undertaken by Dutch civil society in the field of development cooperation with nonwestern countries. These NGOs are mostly locally or regionally based, their projects are small scale and their funding sources diverse. The development-oriented African MOs fit into this pattern. Although they possess specific assets such as knowledge of foreign cultures and languages, there are no reasons to give them a privileged position for participation (having a say) in development cooperation and funding. The major criterion for funding should be the professional

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qualities of the implementers and the quality of the project. The target of development is not here but there, in the home countries of the MOs. However, the development potential of migrants and their organisations is a different matter. To a large extent DMOs exist because of transnationalism, the feeling of being rooted in and part of two countries and the behaviour that fits the feelings. Like all people, migrants have multiple loyalties and identities. The difference with nonmigrants is that migrants are often willing and able to built bridges between countries, regions and cultures. Development projects in countries of origin may constitute pillars of such bridges and have a beneficial impact on local and regional welfare as well. In short, transnationalism offers a huge potential for development cooperation. This potential should be exploited, and optimised among others by dialogues, information on funding opportunities, and capacity building programmes. Special attention should be paid to the second or even third generation of migrants, who, as we tried to demonstrate with the example of Indonesian diasporas, could be as well motivated as their parents The dialogue between Dutch development agencies and DMOs is of recent origin. Small-scale projects, peace and reconstruction initiatives, and return migration are now on the agenda. This agenda could be broadened by paying attention to and encouraging collective remittances, transnational entrepreneurship, private investments and tourism in countries of origin. Special attention should also be paid to opportunities of DMOs to engage in programmes in the field of good governance and democratisation processes in the countries of origin. DMOs do not act in a vacuum and useful lessons could be learned from earlier experiences and practices, in particular with regard to lobbying national governments for migrants’ rights and facilitating collective remittances. Lessons could also be learned from existing initiatives and programmes in other European countries. NOTES 1. Guarnizo (2003) reminds us that along with contributing to development processes and keeping the homelands alive, motives such as obtaining status and recognition in the places of origin might also play a role. 2. As the author of this chapter can testify, because he has been involved in activities of diasporic organizations advocating and lobbying for human rights in various Southeast Asian countries between 1965–1995. 3. For an overview of European-linked multilateral initiatives see Haas (2006), who referred to the Cotonou Agreement–a framework initiated by the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and the partnership of countries in the Mediterranean region. 4. The sources for this section are the expert meeting on International Migration and National Development: Viewpoints and Policy Initiatives in the Countries of Origin (Nijmegen, August 2006); a survey among African MOs in the Netherlands registered at the Chambers of Commerce (Van Naerssen, Kusters & Schapendonk, 2006); some of the author’s own experiences with Southeast Asian migrant organizations over the years.

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9.

10. 11. 12.

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This translates as aliens, immigrants, foreigners. This translates as indigenous, native. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. After Ir. Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, was toppled by a coup d’état, General Suharto held office from 1967 to 1998. The so-called New Order was a military dictatorship that ended after the Asian crisis of 1997 and domestic unrest in 1997–1998. Since then a delicate balance exists between the elected president and the army. The survey was part of a larger research programme on International Migration and National Development commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs. (Zoomers & van Naerssen, 2006). The programme focused on sub-Sahara: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo (Democratic Republic), Ethiopia, Ghana, Cape Verde Islands, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. On the basis of information from the Dutch development agencies, Internet and other sources of information, DMOs connected to these countries were listed. We focused on formal DMOs registered with the Dutch Chambers of Commerce. At the end, the list comprised 67 DMOs (Kusters et al., 2006), from which is selection was made. For each country two organizations were selected randomly. In addition, a number of umbrella and network associations and two CFAs were interviewed. However, not all the selected DMOs could be reached, among others because the survey was held during June-July, which is partly the holiday period in the Netherlands. With respect to Kenya, only one MO could be reached, and we were unable to find a DMO for Burkina Faso. It had a membership of 400 before but many Somali left for the United Kingdom since. The meeting took place 17th June 2005. Although the participants were mainly from the traditional large migrant groups (Turkish, Moroccan), we feel that the self-analysis also applies to the African DMOs. The Dutch government has a list of countries on which development cooperation should be focused; countries that are not on the list, e.g., when they are not considered to be one of the poorest, are not eligible for Dutch development aid.

REFERENCES Abad, L. V., Aragall, Z. et al. (2005). Codesarollo: Migraciones y desarrollo mundial. Madrid: CIDEAL. Akologo, S. Z. (2005). The role of diaspora-based organizations in socio-economic development at the local level in Ghana. In T. Manuh (Ed.), At home in the world? International migration and development in contemporary Ghana and West Africa (pp. 335–350). Accra: Institute of African Studies/UNDP. Beets, G., Walhout, E., & Santo Koesoebjono, S. (2002). Demografische ontwikkeling van de Molukse bevolkingsgroep in Nederland. Maandstatistiek van de Bevolking, 6, 13–17. Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). (2007). Statline. Retrieved April 30, 2006 from http://statline.cbs.nl Ellis, P. & Khan, Z. (2002). The Kashmiri diaspora: Influences in Kashmir. In N. AlAli & K. Koser (Eds.) , New approaches to migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home (pp. 169–201). London: Routledge. Farrant, M., MacDonald, A. & Sriskandarajah, D. (2006). Migration and Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Policymakers. IOM Migration Research Series 22. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM).

190 Ton van Naerssen Foquez Etnomarketing. (2005). Afrikanen. Nieuwegein. Retrived from http://www. foquez.nl/allochtonen/afrikanen on May 4, 2007. Haas, H. de (2006). Engaging diasporas. How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries. a Study for Oxfam Novib. Den Haag. Heelsum, A. van (2004). Migrantenorganisaties in Nederland. Deel 1, aantal en soort organisaties en ontwikkeling. Utrecht: FORUM, Instituut voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling. Heelsum, A. van (2006). Afrikanen uit Angola, DR Congo, Ethiopië, Eritrea, Nigeria en Soedan in Nederland, een profiel. The Hague: Ministry of Justice. Retrieved on February 15, 2006 from http://www.justitie.nl/images/1620_Afrikanen.pdf Ionescu, D. (2006). Engaging diasporas as development partners for home and destination countries: Challenges for policymakers. Geneva: IOM Retrieved August 30, 2006 from http://www.iom.int/jahia/webday/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/ mainsite/published_doc Meer, J. van de (2006). Meer dan bedelaars. Migranten en de toegankelijkheid van de front offices. a study on behalf of Seva Network. Unpublished manuscript. The Hague. Meyer, J.-B. & Brown, M. (1999). Scientific diasporas: a new approach to the brain drain. Management of social transformations. Discussion Paper 41. Budapest: UNESCO-ICSU. Retrieved April 24, 2007 from http://www.unesco.org/most/ meyer.htm Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2004, July). Development and Migration. The Hague. Policy memorandum. Retrived April 30, 2007 from http://www.minbuza.nl/en/ developmentcooperation/themes Naerssen, T. van, Kusters, J. & Schapendonk, J. (2006). Afrikaanse migrantenorganisaties in Nederland. Ontwikkelingsactiviteiten en opinies over ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Working papers migration and development series, 12. Nijmegen, Radboud University, Migration and Development Research Group (Department of Geography). Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Van Haer, N. & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). The migration-development nexus. Evidence and policy options. State-of-the-art overview. International Migration, 40(5), 3–47. Oestergaard-Nielsen, E. (2002). Working for a solution through Europe: Kurdish political lobbying in Germany. In N. Al-Ali & K. Koser, K. (Eds.), (2001), New approaches to migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home. London: Routledge, 186–201. Opiniano, J. M. (2005). Filipinos doing diaspora philanthropy: The development potential of transnational migration. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 14(1– 2), 225–241. Oucho, J. O. (in press). African brain drain and gain, diaspora and remittances: More rhetoric than action persists in countries of origin. In: Adepoju, T. van Naerssen, & A. Zoomers (Eds.), International migration and national development in sub-Sahara Africa. Leiden: Africa Studies Centre. Piper, N. (2006). Gendering the politics of migration. International Migration Review 40(1), 133–164. Pries, L. (2005). Configurations of geographic and societal spaces: a Sociological proposal between ‘methodological nationalism’ and the ‘spaces of flow.’ Global Networks, 5(2), 167–190. Proceedings of the Conference ‘Remittances and Poverty Reduction in Africa.’ (2006, March 7). Organized by HIRDA, African Humanitarian et al. The Hague: Oxfam Novib. Sheffer, G. (Ed.). (1986). Modern diasporas in international politics. Kent, UK: Croom Helm.

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Spaan, E., Naerssen, T. van & Hillmann, F. (2005). Shifts in the European discourses on migration and development. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 14(1–2), 35–69. Steijlen, F. (2004). Molukkers in Nederland: geschiedenis van een transnationale relatie. Migrantenstudies, 20(4), 238–251. United Kingdom Parliament. (2004). International development—Sixth report. Sixth Report of the House of Commons Development Committee HC 79-II. London: the Stationary Office, 157–168. Retrieved February 2, 2007 from http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2000304 United Nations. (2006). International migration and development: Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations. University for Peace. (2006). Capacity building for peace and development: Roles of diaspora. Final Report Expert Forum Diaspora Conference 2006, October 19–20. Toronto: University for Peace. Verkuyten, M., Calseijde, S. van de & de Leur, W. (1999). Third generation Moluccans in the Netherlands: The nature of their identity. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25(1), 63–79. World Bank. (2003). Global development finance 2003. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2006). Global economic prospects, economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC. Zappey, H. (2005). Verbreding van het Kaapverdië-programma en de rol van de Kaapverdiaanse gemeenschap in Nederland. Internal memo, 8 March 2005. Mimeograph. Zoomers, A. & Naerssen, T. van (2006). International migration and nNational development in sub-Saharan Africa. Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. Working papers migration and development series 14. Nijmegen: Radboud University, Migration and Development Research Group (Department of Geography). Zoomers, E. B. (2006). Op zoek naar Eldorado. Over internationale migratie, sociale mobiliteit en ontwikkeling. Inaugural Speech. Nijmegen. Radboud Universiteit.

INTERNET SOURCES http://www.afroneth.nl (accessed 24 April 2007). http://www.hirda.org/index7.php (accessed 24 April 2007). http//www.linkis.nl (accessed 20 April 2007). http://www.unesco.org/most/meyer.htm (accessed 24 April 2007).

Part III

Transfer of Knowledge, Skills, and Ideas

10 The Diaspora Option as a Tool Toward Development? The Highly Qualified Ghanaian Diaspora in Berlin and Hamburg Katharina Goethe and Felicitas Hillmann

Since the early 1960s, when the first African states gained independence, thousands of students as well as many highly qualified workers have left their countries of origin in pursuit of better working and living conditions, higher wages, or better training. Many of them left permanently. In general, this brain drain is considered as having negative consequences for the countries of origin. However, a recent development strategy stresses the positive impact of emigration, especially the involvement of migrant communities in development cooperation with their home country: the diaspora option.1 Skilled migrants and businessmen occupy a special position in this strategy, which assumes that the transfer of money (remittances) and know-how have a positive development impact at home in the country of origin and reflects the extent of those transnational activities. This chapter focuses on the highly qualified Ghanaian diaspora in Hamburg and Berlin (Germany), and examines the question of whether or not it contributes to the development in its country of origin. Most of the African migrants in Germany come from subSaharan Ghana. Until now academic research on this group is sparse and little is known about the structure and the role of the Ghanaian community in terms of migration and development. The structure of our chapter is as follows: A short description of the diaspora option and its argumentative background, focusing on the field of knowledge transfer, will be followed by a historical outline of the Ghanaian migration to Germany. After that we discuss the results of a recent qualitative and explorative study on knowledge transfer by highly qualified Ghanaian migrants to their country of origin.2 Finally, we discuss the particular features of the diaspora option in Germany and highlight those measures of development cooperation, which might be relevant for the diaspora option.

THE DIASPORA OPTION Since the 1960s, when the emigration of highly qualified personnel from less developed countries to the industrialized, developed countries first increased

196 Katharina Goethe and Felicitas Hillmann substantially, the consequences of this brain drain for the respective national economies of the countries of origin have usually been regarded as negative. Several attempts to combat the problem of outflow of skilled personnel were made and some strategies were tested in the context of UNCTAD’s preparation of its reverse transfer of technology concept. According to this approach, either emigration of the highly qualified should be prevented or measures should be taken allowing a fair compensation for the losses suffered by the countries of origin. Restrictive measures included deterring the highly qualified from emigration through appropriate legislation and border controls. The possible destination countries were asked to refrain from granting permanent work permits to highly qualified personnel from developing countries. Retention measures were meant to keep the highly qualified from emigrating by offering them an attractive research environment and paying them attractive salaries (Lucas, 2001). Also taxing highly qualified emigrants in order to cut the emigration countries’ economic losses was discussed after being proposed by Bhagwati in 1976 (Bhagwati, 1976). However, this concept of taxing the immigrants was difficult to implement and soon lost impact (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997). Owing to the limited success of restrictive, preventive or reparation measures like Bhagwati’s tax proposal, many countries strove to support the temporary emigration of their highly qualified personnel and their subsequent return to their country of origin. Various emigration countries, such as China, Ghana, Guyana, Iran, Colombia, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan (Ghosh, 2000 p. 195), established to support return migration organizationally and financially. These programmes showed strong regional differences. The examples of Taiwan (cf. Meyer et al., 1997 p. 287) and South Korea (Song, 1997) show that a fast-growing economy, the active involvement of the respective governments through incentive schemes, active engagement by the private sector, and headhunting for returnees in the developed countries were crucial for the success of the programmes. In contrast, return programmes of countries without comparably high economic growth rates were unable to attract highly qualified emigrants or were successful only for a short period because the returned personnel left the country again after a couple of years (Ghosh, 2000 p. 196). In summary: apart from single success stories, the majority of the programmes should be considered as barely effective in the short and long term. More recently, the diaspora option has been advocated as a new strategy for satisfying the interests of the highly qualified, the countries of origin and the more developed host countries at the same time. Along with the growing interest in transnational migration, transnational social spaces, and transnational communities, the focus is on new aspects on the relationship between migration and development. The remittance of financial assets has already earlier been described as a positive side effect of emigration (Papademetriou & Martin, 1991 p. 3). The active dissemination of new knowledge and thoughts, advertisement for native goods in foreign markets, the expansion

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of the tourism industry through home visits of the emigrants, the exertion of political influence, and several other ways for the emigrants to contribute to the development of their home countries are now being addressed as new fields of interest. The nexus of migration and development has since become widely known among international organizations and politicians concerned with development (cf. IOM, 2003; Nyberg Sørensen, Van Hear & EngbergPedersen, 2002). We refer to these policies attempting to advance and promote the development potentials of emigrants as the diaspora option. Here, diasporas are defined as ‘ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing in host countries but maintaining sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands’ (Sheffer, in Koser 2003 p. 5). According to this definition, diaspora also includes migrant communities whose members do not necessarily live in forced exile. It does not inevitably imply the dispersion of emigrants to different countries, or living in diaspora over several generations, or the exiled wishing to return home. Diaspora refers to an established and settled community rather than to a group of temporary migrants who wish and are able to return to their homelands (Newland & Patrick, 2004 p. 1). Unlike earlier policies, the diaspora option in the sense of this definition is not particularly aimed at the physical repatriation of the emigrants but at the mobilization of the distant diaspora and its resources. Although the contacts between the diaspora and the home countries are close, they are often organized individually. The diaspora option now attempts to increase these contacts, to expand them and to include more participants, aiming to systemize them. The new interest is primarily connected with the rising impact of globalization and the increased mobility going along with it. In addition, politicians face faltering economic growth in many places and decreasing investment in official development aid, and thus do show an increasing interest in finding alternative sources of funding. The different aspects of the diaspora option vary in importance with respect to the development potential of the highly qualified. Obviously, the transfer of knowledge from the diaspora to the country of origin plays a crucial role. Other components, such as remittances or political involvement, are not restricted to the highly qualified, but are also practiced by a large number of other, variously qualified members of the diaspora or the transnational community. The new academic and political interest in knowledge transfer from the diaspora back to the countries of origin is, as stated earlier, connected to the process of globalization. Transnational corporations provide the institutional framework for intracompany transfer of personnel (cf. Rudolph & Hillmann, 1998). Faster, easier, less expensive means of travel, as well as the highly advanced information and communication technologies, allow highly qualified emigrants to transfer the knowledge they have acquired back to their countries of origin and become employers. The new information and communication technologies also play a central role in the establishment of networks. Such networks now make it much easier

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for scientists to get in touch with each other—as well as with colleagues in their home countries—across borders and over long distances. These networks are designed to promote professional and scientific exchange between highly qualified emigrants and their colleagues and research institutes in their countries of origin (cf. Meyer & Brown, 1999, who identified 41 such networks). Networks may vary in their regional extension, in the purpose of their work and by ethnic affiliation. The example of Asian-born entrepreneurs who run IT businesses in Silicon Valley illustrates this point. Saxenians’s study showed that new IT businesses in Taiwan, India, and China were mainly established by entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley who today operate businesses in both the United States and the Asian country of origin. Entrepreneurs who operate businesses in both their host and their home countries not only created jobs in their home countries as a result of direct investments, but also were able to provide knowledge transfer through the technology that is used to create the products (Saxenian, 2000, 2002). Those entrepreneurs might thus be regarded as a new avant-garde of transnational entrepreneurs. Unlike local area networks of entrepreneurs, other networks are not restricted to certain regions or occupational groups and are not primarily designed to promote the professional careers of their members, but to advance the members’ home countries. Of the networks identified by Meyer and Brown (1999) 25 out of 41 can be assigned to this category; they were all independently initiated and established by members of the diaspora. Two of the largest and most active networks are CALDAS (The Colombian Network of Researchers and Engineers Abroad) and SANSA (The South African Network of Skills Abroad), whose members are organized in 30 and 57 different countries respectively (Meyer & Brown, 1999 p. 7). The modes of knowledge transfer include the arrangement of temporary stays in the home countries in order to resolve certain labour market imbalances, the organization of conferences in cooperation with research institutes in the home countries, as well as initiating discussions on such topics as the means and possibilities of technology transfer. CALDAS also conducts collaborative research projects for Colombian network members and scientists (Meyer et al., 1997 p. 304ff.). Yet another kind of international network of the highly qualified are the programmes now conducted by international organizations like IOM to ensure knowledge transfer from the highly qualified diaspora through fixedterm, one-off or recurrent stays in the home countries on a voluntary or paid basis. Two such programmes are Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) operated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). MIDA was launched in 2001 by IOM in cooperation with the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Its objectives include the development of an

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extensive database of qualified African-born people in Europe and North America as well as the identification of sectors in the African countries with a shortage of qualified personnel, and the temporary filling of the identified positions with suitable members of the database. To increase the effectiveness of such operations, the participants attended special preparatory courses in their home countries. The first project phase, in which highly qualified personnel from Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo currently living in Belgium were placed in their home countries, finished in 2004 and was evaluated positively (DGDC & IOM, 2004). The Belgian government has assured follow-up funding. Further projects involving other European and African partner countries have entered the implementation phase (cf. Goethe 2005; Spaan, Hillmann & van Naerssen, 2005). The UNDP-operated TOKTEN has been established for a long time and pursues an objective similar to that of MIDA. During the first twenty years of its existence, between 1977 and 1997, 5,000 qualified workers were placed on voluntary short-time assignments in 49 different countries (Newland & Patrick, 2004 p. 29). One example of the programme’s work is the TOKTEN Mali regional programme. Between 2000 and 2001, twelve Malians then living abroad returned to Mali to become guest lecturers, thus taking over vacant positions that could not be filled otherwise. (Johnson & Sedaca, 2004 p. 60). Today, programmes are conducted in collaboration with other partner countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, and Lebanon. As stated earlier, Ghanaians form the largest African Community in Germany. So we might ask whether their emigration should be considered as a brain drain from Ghana—as would appear to be the case on first sight. In addition, we want to investigate the different possibilities of cooperation between highly qualified Ghanaians and their country of origin, Ghana. Which forms of cooperation do they use and to what extent do these actions live up to the expectations of development politics? If there is no cooperation, what might be the reasons for not doing so and not making use of the diaspora option? Most of the Ghanaian citizens living in Germany are registered in Berlin and Hamburg, so our empirical study centred on those two cities. The next section presents some background information on the structure of the Ghanaian community in Germany. Afterwards the results of our exploratory qualitative study are presented, concerning respectively questions of money transfer and knowledge transfer.

THE GHANAIAN COMMUNITY IN GERMANY3 When looking at the available statistical data on Ghanaian migrants in Germany, it becomes clear that the role Ghana played in Germany’s

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migration history is in no way comparable to that of the recruitment countries of Gastarbeiter (guest worker), such as Italy, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and later Morocco, and Tunisia. Although several African countries had proposed recruitment agreements in the past, the German government steadfastly refused to conclude such an agreement with any of the subSaharan countries (Schönwälder, 2004 p. 249f). This may be part of the explanation why there is a relatively low number of nonEuropean foreigners compared to the overall foreign population (currently about 6.8 million) in Germany. Only one fifth (19.4%) of the overall foreign population are from nonEuropean countries: 4% are Africans, of whom Ghanaians are the largest group (20,609 individuals or 0.3% of the overall foreign population) from the subSaharan countries.4 Three regional concentrations of Ghanaians can be identified: Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Berlin, these being the three federal states with the largest population of Ghanaian citizens (Federal Statistical Office Germany, 20065). Hamburg (5,538) has the largest number of inhabitants with Ghanaian nationality, followed by Berlin (1,945), Bremen (1,072), Düsseldorf (1,060), Frankfurt (595), Essen (488), Hanover (495), and Dortmund (434).6 Although in the first years after Ghana gained independence in 1957 it was mainly students who migrated to Germany, in the 1970s the groups of immigrants became more and more heterogeneous. One of the results of the severe economic crisis in Ghana in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that even more educated academics (mainly doctors and teachers) left the country (Addy, 1997 p. 4). Repressive domestic policies and neoliberal economic reforms resulted in further emigration, and when Great Britain tightened its immigration laws, many Ghanaians chose the Netherlands and Germany as alternatives (ibid.).

Figure 10.1 Development over time of the number of Ghanaians in Germany, male and female (1967–2005). Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (2007); Graph: K Goethe.

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With 5,769 and 6,994 applicants respectively, the years 1986 and 1992 saw the largest number of applications for political asylum ever (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). As a result, in the 1990s, for the first time, the majority of the over 20,000 Ghanaians living in Germany were registered as asylum seekers (Addy, 1997 p. 3). However, the number of asylum applications actually granted was always low and never higher than 0.8% in 1994. Family reunions, which have gained more and more importance since the 1980s, resulted in a higher percentage of women immigrants. In the 1990s, Ghana’s economic situation was as precarious as before, but when the German government passed a considerably more restrictive law regulating foreigners in 1993, the number of immigrants decreased significantly. Today, the number of Ghanaian students in the overall Ghanaian population in Germany is marginal and is actually lower than in the 1960s. The majority of the Ghanaians registered in Germany hold a safe residence status: By December 31, 2004, 5,932 permanent residence permits, 2,813 residence permits, and 7,189 limited residence permits were granted (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees). During our talks with experts and our interviews with Ghanaians, however, we were often reminded of the large number of Ghanaians who live in Germany illegally. Also, since the 1990s, more Ghanaians with permanent residence status have become self-employed, so that today there are not only doctors in private practice in many German cities, but also Ghanaian-run travel agencies, grocery stores, ethnic shops, taxi firms, and night clubs (Addy, 1997 p. 5). This information could be regarded as evidence for the relatively successful integration of Ghanaians into the German society. Nevertheless, for reasons of alien and labour laws or due to discrimination, many (highly) qualified Ghanaians are still forced to accept employment below their level of qualification (Addy, 1997 p. 5; Haferkamp, 1995 p. 175). Recent years have seen a developing institutional and organizational environment: several cultural organizations exist in cities with a large Ghanaian community. Many of these organizations focus on individual ethnic groups of Ghanaians. With the founding of the All Ghana Union in May 2004, the initiators hope to achieve a nationwide union of all the Ghanaian organizations as well as a network of all Ghanaians, regardless of their religious or ethnic background (The African Courier, 2004 p. 14). The local groups of the Ghana Union in Berlin and Hamburg were founded in 1990 and 2002, and now number about 100 and 150 members, respectively. Both local groups consider the support of the Ghanaian-born population of Berlin and Hamburg to be the main focus of their work. Even though financial aid is collected for development projects in Ghana—such as the construction of wells, equipping hospitals, and helping street children, as well as supporting the Ghanaian national soccer team—this work is only of secondary priority. In one case the Ghana Union also collects information about the requirements for establishing a new business in their country for those members who are intending to return to Ghana. Neither of the groups currently maintains a

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stable network for knowledge transfer. Both groups consider themselves as a connecting resource between Ghana’s government or its embassy in Germany and the Ghanaian diaspora. The Ghana Unions are nonpartisan organizations and are entirely funded through membership fees. It should be stressed, however, that despite the recently increasing networking and organizational activities, and compared to other communities of immigrants (the Turkish community, in particular), the Ghanaian community is still loosely organized. No Ghanaian scientific network as described by Saxenian or Meyer seems to exist in Germany. This might be due partly to the relatively low total number of Ghanaians in Germany, but also the often precarious residence status of many Ghanaians might add to this.7

The Structure of the Interview Sample A total number of eleven qualitative, guided, biographical interviews were conducted for this exploratory study. Interviewees had been contacted through snowball sampling. Through additional conversations conducted in both cities, Hamburg and Berlin, representatives of Ghanaian and other African associations emphasized the existence of a well-established diaspora community in the interview sample. The interview structure comprised questions on the migration background, that is, date and reasons for emigration, subsequent destinations, and the immigration to Germany. Special attention was given to educational and professional development as well as to a set of questions on the relationships with Ghana (e.g., travels, contacts to family and friends, remittances, other kinds of engagement). A total of eleven highly qualified migrants were being interviewed. Of the 11 interviewees, three were women and eight were men, all were aged between 32 and 64. All interviewed persons held a university degree. Four of the interviewees were already part of the second generation of immigrants. With the sole exception of a woman who had come to Germany in the 1990s, all interviewees of the first generation had immigrated to Germany in the 1960s. Four of the interviewees were Ghanaian citizens, six held German nationality, and one of the interviewees claimed to possess dual German-Ghanaian citizenship. The immediate families of all interview partners lived in Germany. Although there was exchange with the larger family and a circle of friends in Ghana, Germany had definitely become their centre of life. The results of our exploratory study show that they had contacts with Ghana; however, except for exchanges via mail and telephone, these contacts happened in most cases on an irregular basis.

MONEY TRANSFER During the time of our research, all of our interviewees were engaged in paid work. Seven subjects of our sample were self-employed; four were engaged in

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standard employment as salaried employees. Among the self-employed were three doctors in private practice, one person working in the field of logistics, one lawyer in private practice, one freelance journalist, and one designer. The group of the salaried employees consisted of a hospital doctor in an outstanding professional position, an employee of an international organization, a member of a development organization who worked as an educational consultant for a Christian church, and a landscape planner who was preparing for a two-year working stay in Accra at the time of interview. From the results of our interviews, it is possible to give a rough impression of the remittance behaviour of the Ghanaian immigrants. Remittances were sent by all but one of the interviewees—so there is continuous activity in this respect. The money was transferred to family members, usually parents, nieces and nephews, and in most cases, the money was spent on school fees, health care, and house renovations. The size of these transactions varied significantly among the various interviewees, and while some sent as much as €2,000 per year, the amounts usually tended to be much smaller. Surprisingly only two of the interviewees transferred set amounts on a regular monthly basis. The others sent money sporadically, some perhaps only every few years. Apparently the intensity of the personal relationship to the people receiving the money, rather than the amount of income in Germany, turned out to be the decisive factor for the total amount of money sent and the regularity with which it was transferred: One of the two people sending money on a regular basis was a 31-year-old landscape planner who was born in Germany to Ghanaian parents. Although he had just finished university he had been sending €100 per month for the last three years to his fiancée living in Ghana in order to help her complete her studies. Another influencing factor on the decision to remit money apparently was the numbers of years after emigration: The longer the time since our interviewees had left Ghana, the looser their relationship to those left behind became. Three of them, all of whom immigrated to Germany in the 1960s, stated that they had remitted more money in earlier years. However, the example of the interviewee who remitted the largest amount of money shows that a close relation to the recipients was not necessarily a decisive factor for the size of remittances. One of our respondents, a professional in the medical field, remitted €2000 per year. This person was also one of two interviewed persons who were also active members of Ghanaian-based organizations in Germany. In this case the nongovernmental organization sought to support children from poor families in their education and was the recipient of most of the money this person sent back as remittances. Our study shows that in most cases, the money was transferred through informal channels. These results parallel the findings of Black and Tiemoko, who found that highly qualified migrants travel more frequently to their countries of origin (or know others who travel and entrust the money to them) and thus they do have more possibilities to take money in cash than

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less qualified persons (Black, Tiemoko & Waddington, 2003 p. 7). Unlike the results of other studies, our research indicates that the money is not often spent on consumer goods and likewise. Although the previously mentioned monies might not be considered direct investments in businesses, they should still not be disparaged as merely consumptive, but those investments in the education of the young generation should be judged rather more as investments in the future. The amounts, the infrequent character of the transactions, and the purposes for which the money was spent also correspond with the information the interviewees provided about their comparatively well-to-do families, who did not need to rely on regular payments to sustain their everyday needs. The results of our study are in line with those of earlier studies in so far as apparently highly qualified workers often come from rather well-off families that were not in need of money or other forms of support (cf. Lowell, 2001 p. 20).

KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER As stated earlier, the dimensions of knowledge transfer are difficult to be traced. One of the most striking results concerning the educational structure of our respondents was that all of them had studied in Germany. Only one of them had already earned a first university degree in Ghana before his or her emigration. At this point it becomes debatable to classify this type of migration as brain drain in a narrow sense. In Germany, a country where there are no tuition fees, the government covers the costs. In addition to university education free of charge, some of the interviewees had also received grants from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) or other German organizations, so these costs were not borne by the families in Ghana themselves (and thus, indirectly, the Ghanaian economy) but by the German government. Nevertheless, this finding does not contradict other findings that Ghana has suffered for a long time from an exodus of its qualified personnel. It does suggest that these people rarely emigrate to Germany but rather to other countries. One of the interviewees, a doctor, recalled from his own experience: No, these people [i.e. the qualified personnel in the medical sector] don’t go to Germany or to Europe, not even to the States. People go to the Saudi Arabia or Eastern Africa. In our interview sample, nine out of the eleven respondents had received unrestricted work permits, in most cases through marriage to a German or by having a German parent, and thus, had privileged access to the German labour market. All of them had at the time of the interviews a job appropriate to their level of education. However, the interviewees repeatedly stated

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that they had experienced discrimination in the German labour market in the past. For example, the person working in the field of logistics stated that after having finished his degree in engineering he was unable to find a job. That was when he then completed a second degree in business in order to be independent from German employers. In the context of our question, this is interesting in so far as professional careers inhibited in this way result in limited opportunities to gain work experience and, thus, limited possibilities of knowledge transfer. This again might result in restricted knowledge transfer and remittances. Apparently, a large number of highly qualified Ghanaians in Hamburg and Berlin are not given the opportunity to find work appropriate to their level of qualification owing to Germany’s restrictive legislation regulating foreigners.8 Knowledge transfer was conducted differently in the past than currently and it was possible to differentiate various forms of transfer. First, a small, but well prepared group of doctors had returned to Ghana or other places in Africa in the 1970s, with the intention of staying permanently or for a longer term. All of the members of this group were highly specialized and well known in their field of expertise. They all had a strong wish to help their home country’s development process. The inability to work was not the reason for leaving Germany; they had all already at that time been granted unlimited residence and work permits. However, after four and two years respectively, two of them returned to Germany, demotivated by Ghana’s poorly equipped hospitals: Problems everywhere. The Ghanaian government, in those days, used to spend money rather on arms than on medical equipment for hospitals. The patients had to bring their own razor blades for an operation and we had to sew the wounds with hair yarn. For one of them, an additional deciding factor was that his German wife wanted their children to be schooled in Germany. Another doctor, who was working in a hospital at the time the interviews were conducted, belonged to this group as well; at the invitation of the country’s Ministry of Health, he had gone to Liberia to help with the construction of a hospital, but owing to the military coup in Liberia in 1980, he was forced to return to Germany prematurely. In our study a second group could be identified, whose members had permanent residence in Germany, but who regularly returned to Africa for shortterm stays to transfer their knowledge in courses and lectures. Among the members of this group was a designer who had already worked as a design consultant several times a year on behalf of different development organizations in Ghana and other African countries. Focusing mainly on the sustainable preservation of Ghanaian craftsmanship, the 39-year-old designer, who had spent his childhood in Germany, also tried to convince the people of Ghana of the necessity to regain ‘respect for their own culture.’

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Katharina Goethe and Felicitas Hillmann There have been enough masks and drums by now—you can’t sell that anymore. In order to maintain the local arts markets in Africa on a sustainable basis, you need to create new things, you need design. [ . . . ] And the import of design through designers from abroad is not sustainable.

At the time the interviews were conducted, a hospital doctor had organized an ultrasound course in Cape Town, South Africa, for the second consecutive year, in which doctors from different African countries, including Ghana, participated. It was our interviewee’s own idea to initiate these courses and to run them without pay during his vacations. A third group of such Ghanaians who provided knowledge transfer were those who worked at that time on development projects for different organizations in Ghana and other African countries. They made use of their knowledge in the everyday practice of their professions as well, but, unlike the second group, they did not offer it through teaching. One member of this group was a doctor who provided dental treatments in Ghana when there during the holidays. Apart from this directly traceable knowledge transfer by the three doctors in private practice, both in the past and in the present, technology has been transferred as well; the doctors have always tried to procure medical equipment free of charge and ship it to Ghana to ensure adequate provision in the country. From this it is apparent how strongly technology transfer depends on the occupations practiced in the host country. However, one doctor had already given up collecting and shipping these items, frustrated by the difficulties he encountered. It’s so much effort. Even if you managed to get all this stuff for free here in Hamburg, you face so many problems with the bureaucracy back in Ghana; you have to pay so many fees if you want to import these instruments. I just can’t afford that. Our findings show that, contrary to what one might expect, the knowledge transfer for the interviewees was not organized through a knowledge network of the diaspora community. Although the exchange often took place through the interviewees’ private or professional networks, these networks were never primarily designed for knowledge exchange. In every case, the knowledge transfer was initiated by the interviewees themselves and not by means of a network designed for this particular purpose. It can be assumed that the case of the highly qualified Ghanaians in Germany differs from other diasporas as mentioned by Meyer and Brown (1999) because their relative small number might not allow for a close and effective network. Interviewees complained that the Ghanaian government had announced its willingness to cooperate more actively with the diaspora, but that no concrete measures had followed this announcement

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so far; an African cultural institute whose members included ambassadors of several African countries saw itself acting as a possible initiator for the development of such a network in the future. One interviewed doctor— himself a member of said cultural institute—stated that, given support by the institute, he would arrange the setting up of a database of highly qualified Africans in Germany. However, it must be emphasized that knowledge exchange is currently exclusively provided at the initiative of individuals and that none of the interviewees is actively involved in a scientific network of the diaspora that is specifically designed for cooperation with the respective home countries. Similarly, political engagement is not being realized within diaspora organizations. It exists at two levels. Two of the interviewees had been actively involved in the political affairs of their home country. One was a freelance journalist who has published articles in several German newspapers about Ghana’s political situation but also about the situation of Ghanaian people and foreigners in general in Germany. He was the only one who stated that he had emigrated for political reasons. The other interviewee was working in the field of logistics and was working at the same time as campaign manager for an influential Ghanaian party. Although the majoritys were not directly involved in politics, they still participated in a regular exchange of information with their home country, which leads to the assumption that they acted as catalysts for new ideas and norms. Apart from this influence at a rather private level, four of the interviewees who worked in development aid or as a lawyer in Ghana and elsewhere, were particularly likely to make a contribution to the country’s development by introducing western concepts of democracy and human rights, as well as changed expectations about governmental benefits.

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK In view of our findings, the question arises why there is this rather weak connection between the members of the diaspora in Germany and their home country. Contrary to the ongoing international discussion on the potential of the diaspora to assist the development of the countries of origin, what we see in the diaspora community in Germany is that this potential does exist, but it could not really be considered as capable of expansion under the current circumstances. There are several obstacles that slow down, if not completely prevent, the closer exchange of knowledge by the Ghanaian diaspora. Our results indicate that strong integration into the German society can be named as one reason for the fluctuating temporal and financial involvement: With family and work based in Germany this detracts attention from Ghana. Hence, it seems that with one exception, none of out interview partners can actually be classified as transnational migrant—living in between here and the county of origin. It can be concluded that owing to the strong

208 Katharina Goethe and Felicitas Hillmann ties with Germany, any sense of commitment to Ghana takes second place to the temporal and financial requirements arising from life in Germany. It can further be assumed that in general only weak relationships were established with highly qualified workers in the country of origin since the immigrants’ university studies were completed in Germany, which has consequences for any possible later cooperation with former fellow students. Another bottleneck is the legal situation of highly qualified Ghanaians in Germany. For the transfer of knowledge and remittances, it is of vital importance to have a qualified and appropriately paid job in the country of residence. However, Germany has a very restrictive policy on granting work permits. Even though this affected our interviewees to a lesser extent, they confirmed that the general impact of these regulations on Ghanaians living in Germany is high. Finally, the situation in Ghana itself acts as a bottleneck. The majority of the interviewees indicated that the country’s economic situation was the reason for their engagement on a mainly voluntary basis in their country of origin. Even if the sample in our study was rather small, it was possible to state that today there is no direct brain drain in the sense of scientists migrating to Germany after completing their studies in Ghana. In the past, three of the four interviewed doctors have attempted to return to Ghana, but had to abandon their plans owing to the poor working conditions abroad. It must therefore be noted that if these doctors had stayed in Ghana, the country would have experienced a brain loss in the sense of an economic loss caused by a situation that forces highly qualified persons to take up work below their level of qualification. In light of these facts, the question must be carefully considered as to whether there really is a brain drain. On one hand, Ghana was deprived of essential knowledge and skills because medical personnel stayed in Germany. On the other hand, the doctors were not provided with the opportunity to take up employment in their profession in Ghana that corresponded with the standards of their education in Germany. Our interviews therefore confirmed the existence of a problem that Ammassari and Black have referred to before: often, the qualification of the returnees or the diaspora does not meet the urgentlyneeded qualification requirements in the country of origin (Ammassari & Black, 2001 p. 5). In short, although there is a general involvement in the development of Ghana, this engagement does not quite live up to the high expectations placed in the current diaspora option by many politicians concerned with development. Partially, this is due to the incomplete use of existing potentials, but also to unrealistic expectations of members of the diaspora. However, there are positive signs that the situation is improving. The development of Education and Research in Ghana has made significant progress over the last two decades, so that despite the limited possibilities for scientific cooperation in the past, there are good chances that these possibilities may arise in the future. The political situation in Ghana can be

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described as stable and, provided that this stability lasts, this will positively affect the highly qualified interviewees’ willingness to involve themselves more strongly in the future. What might be possible approaches to a better use of existing potentials, with particular regard to development cooperation? In the first place, networks and organizations of the diaspora need support to be able to perform time-intensive and more complex cooperation tasks with their home country, which cannot be performed today, because most of the work in these organizations is carried out by volunteers. It should be a careful examination of which of the existing organizations are best qualified for the respective tasks. If an organization is currently focused mainly on the integration of migrants into German society, a stronger involvement in the cooperation with the home country might result in less successful completion of the organization’s current work. It is further necessary to facilitate stronger integration of the highly qualified diaspora as advisors and consultants in the technical cooperation of German development organizations. In this way, it would be possible to integrate those who cannot commit themselves to voluntary humanitarian engagement owing to financial reasons or prior commitments. The high number of informally sent remittances by our respondents proves that it might be necessary to create an infrastructure that allows more remittances to be transferred also through official channels. This can only be achieved in the long term through the improvement of Ghana’s banking sector and through lower transfer fees as a result of increased competition. A first step in this direction could be an overview of the transfer fees of different banks on the website of the Ghanaian embassy. Generally, the creation of a secure savings and investment climate in Ghana would facilitate the remittances and such would then not only reach the migrants’ families, but also benefit the national economy. Finally, programmes similar to the Mexican 3+1 Programme9 might also increase the willingness of the Ghanaian diaspora to donate to local development projects. Measures to support the diaspora cannot be implemented as isolated processes in the effort to solve the so-called brain drain problem. It is only recently, for example, that doctors have been able to pursue their profession in Ghana in a way that is appropriate to their qualification. Moreover, diaspora-aided scientific networks of Colombia and South Africa show that these networks can only work efficiently when a basic stock of scientists in the home countries already exists. The diaspora-aided way of development can therefore only be one of a whole range of measures of development cooperation to counteract imbalances in the labour markets of the developing countries and to further their improvement. Our exploratory study may have shown that, before starting to work on the diaspora option as a tool for development, there is a strong need to learn more about this group of immigrants. Far too little is known yet about the structure of the community, about the motives and about the potentials

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that shape all further action addressed to the country of origin. The little that is known is often contradictory or not yet researched in depth. NOTES 1. Literature uses the term diaspora in different ways. In this paper, it is applied in the sense of established migrant communities. On the semantic change of the term diaspora from exile communities to more general communities see Spaan, Hillmann & van Naerssen, 2005 p. 36. 2. Highly qualified is understood as persons with a university degree. 3. If not stated otherwise, all data used in this chapter are part of requested cross-sectional statistics provided by the statistical offices at the provincial and federal level and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The respective office is indicated in italics. 4. Cf. <www.destatis.de>, Tables 12521–0002 and 12521–0004. 5. Ibid. 6. Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein (2006); Statistisches Landesamt Berlin (2006), Statistisches Landesamt Bremen, Statistisches Landesamt Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. 7. However Nieswand stresses the importance of modernist churches for the integration of Ghanaians in Germany and emphasizes the transnational character of theses churches (Glick Schiller et al., 2005 p. 33f). 8. Although we did not have the opportunity to interview highly qualified persons in employments below their level of qualification, most of the interviewees referred to this as a fact. In addition, a large number of our interview partners with a German spouse or a German parent pointed out that for Ghanaians without such family relations the chances of obtaining a residence and work permit are slim—a statement that also corresponds with the biographies of those affected. 9. Under the Mexican 3+1 Programme, the Mexican federal state, the provinces and local governments each provide one dollar for each dollar spent by migrants on certain local development projects.

REFERENCES Addy, D. N. (1997). Ghanaer in Deutschland. In Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung (Eds.), (1991–1997). Ethnische minderheiten in Deutschland. Berlin: Parabolis. All-Ghanaian Union is born! (2004, April/May). The African Courier 7 , p. 15. Ammassari, S. & Black, R. (2001). Harnessing the potential of migration and return to promote development: Applying concepts to West Africa. Sussex Migration Working Papers, 3. Retrieved February 15, 2007 from http://www.sussex.ac.uk/ migration/documents/mwp3.pdf Bhagwati, J. (1976). The brain drain tax proposal and the issues. In J. Bhagwati & M. Partington (Eds.), Taxing the brain drain. A proposal. Amsterdam: NorthHolland Publishing Company. Black R., Tiemoko, R. & Waddington, C. E. (2003). International migration, remittances and poverty: the case of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Paper prepared for the World Bank. Sussex: Sussex Centre for Migration Research. Direction Générale de la Coopération au Développement Belgique and IOM (2004). Mobilisation des ressources humaines et autres de la diaspora africaine de Belgique en faveur du développement des Pays d’origine. Rapport d’évaluation conjoint. Unpublished evaluation report. Brussels.

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Gaillard, J. & Gaillard, A. M. (1997). The international mobility of brains: Exodus or circulation? Science, Technology and Society, 2(2), 195–228. Ghosh, B. (2000). Return migration: Reshaping policy approaches. In B. Ghosh (Ed.), Return migration. Journey of hope and despair. Geneva: International Organisation for Migration. Glick Schiller, N., Nieswand, B., Schlee, G., Darieva, T, Yalcin-Heckmann, L. & Fosztó, L. (2005). Pathways of Migrant Incorporation in Germany. Transit, 1(1), Article 50911. Retrieved on March 16, 2007 from Goethe, K. (2005). Der diasporaansatz zur bekämpfung des brain drains—ein entwicklungspolitischer ansatz im zeitalter der transnationalen migration. Eine fallstudie über die hochqualifizierten ghanaer in Hamburg und Berlin. Unpublished thesis. Freie Universität Berlin. Haferkamp, R. (1995). Die ghanaische Minderheit. In C. Schmalz-Jacobsen and G. Hansen (Eds.), Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ein Lexikon. München: Beck. IOM (International Organization for Migration) (2003). World Migration. Managing Migration. Geneva: IOM. Johnson, B. & Sedaca, S. (2004). Diasporas, emigrés and development: Economic linkages and programmatic responses. Washington: Carana Foundation. Retrieved February 15, 2007 from http://www.tessproject.com/products/special_ studies/diasporas_emigres_and_development.pdf Koser, K. (2003). New African diasporas. An introduction. In K. Koser (Ed.), New African diasporas. London and New York: Routledge. Lowell, B. L. (2001). Some developmental effects of the international migration of the highly skilled persons. International Migration Papers 46. Geneva: ILO. Retrieved February 15, 2007 from http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ migrant/download/imp/imp46.pdf Lucas, R. E. B. (2001). Diaspora and development: Highly skilled migrants from East Asia. Report prepared for the World Bank. Retrieved on February 15, 2007 from http://www.bu.edu/econ/ied/dp/papers/dp120.pdf Meyer, J.-B., Charum, J., Bernal, D., Gaillard, J., Granés, J., Leon, J., et al. (1997). Turning brain drain into brain gain: The Columbian experience of the diaspora option. Science, Technology and Society, 2(2), 285–315. Meyer, J.-B. & Brown, M. (1999). Scientific diasporas: A new approach to the brain drain. Management of social transformations. Discussion Paper 41, Budapest: UNESCO-ICSU. Retrieved February 15, 2007 from http://www.unesco.org/most/ meyer.htm Newland, K. & Patrick, E. (2004). Beyond remittances: The role of diaspora in poverty reduction in their country of origin. Washington: Migration Policy Institute for the Department of International Development. Retrieved on February 15, 2007 from http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC17672.htm Nyberg Sørensen, N., Van Hear, N. & Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). (Eds.). The migration-development nexus. Evidence and policy options state of the art overview. CDR Working Paper 02.6. Copenhagen: CDR. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The politics of migrants’ transnational political practices. International Migration Review, 37(3), 760–786. Papademetriou, D. G. & Martin, P. (1991). The unsettled relationship. Labour migration and economic development. New York: Greenwood Press. Rudolph, H. & Hillmann, F. (1998). The invisible hands need visible heads. In K. Koser & H. Lutz (Eds.), The new migration in Europe: Social constructions and social realities. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Saxenian, A. (2000, September 29). Brain drain or brain circulation? The Silicon-Valley-Asia connection. Speech given at the Modern Asia Series, Harvard University,

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Asia Center. Retrieved February 15, 2007 from http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/ ~anno/speeches/braindrain.html Saxenian, A. (2002). Brain circulation: How high-skill immigration makes everyone better off. The Brookings Review, 20, 28–31. Schönwälder, K. (2004). Why Germany’s guestworkers were largely Europeans: The selective principles of post-war labour recruitment policy. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 55(27), 248–265. Sheffer, G. (2003). Diaspora politics. At home abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spaan, E., Hillmann, F. & Naerssen, T. van (2005). Shifts in the European discourses on migration and development. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 14(1–2), 35–69. Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig Holstein (2006). Statistischer Bericht A I 4-j/05 H, Ausländische Bevölkerung in Hamburg. Hamburg: Statistisches Landesamt Hamburg. Statistisches Landesamt Berlin (2006). Statistischer Bericht A I 4/S-hj 2/05. Melderechtlich registrierte Ausländer in Berlin am 31.12.05. Berlin: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). (1974). The reverse transfer of technology: Economic effects of the trained personnel from developing countries. Geneva: UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, GI74–45088.

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11 The Development Potential of Caribbean Young Return Migrants Making a Difference Back Home Robert B. Potter and Dennis Conway

For many Caribbean islanders, relatively permanent migration or temporary circulation has long been a strategic response to the realities of island existence: small territorial size, limited and skewed resource bases, colonial and post-colonial social inequalities, and numerous environmental vulnerabilities (Conway 1998; Potter, Barker, Conway & Klak, 2004; Klak & Conway, 1998). The range of movements has been wide and varied, extending from permanent migrations—both voluntary and coerced—to transient or circular, temporary movements. A common feature, however, is that many international migrants intend to return home, sooner or later (see, for example, Byron, 1994; Rubenstein, 1979; Thomas-Hope, 1998 among many others). And, that intention to return has manifested itself in the generation of return flows, even though permanent emigration and nonreturn also feature prominently as Caribbean migration outcomes (Conway, 1988, 2004b). Emerging from current discourse on international population movement in today’s new era of globalization has been the identification of transnational migration, where the people involved interact in multilocal transnational networks of communication, movement, exchange of knowledge, skill acquisition, business entrepreneurialism and social and cultural hybridity. Caribbean transnational migrants live between two worlds; their new migrant communities in the metropolitan North— North America and Europe—and their home communities in the Caribbean (Conway & Potter 2007). Far from being an homogeneous category of failed migrants, who are returning because they could not make successful transitions abroad, Caribbean transnational return migrants are demographically selective, socioeconomically diverse, highly varied in their risk-taking and risk-averse propensities, and they possess differing stocks of human and social capital. Their transnational experiences and multilocal social networks provide social support systems of immersion and acculturation that help prepare them for transnational livelihoods and behaviours (including return migration(s)). Consequently, contemporary transnational migrants have divergent attitudes, contrasting and varied images of their island homelands, and constitute a global potpourri

214 Robert B. Potter and Dennis Conway of metropolitan and local hybrid backgrounds. Their experiences, adaptations, and behaviours back home are lived as individuals, within, or beyond, nuclear and/or extended family groupings, with color-class distinctions, race-class divisions, and insider-outsider contestations contextualizing their adaptation experiences on return. Their experiences are rarely commonly shared, so as to mobilize and provide a solidarity movement to initiate societal change in accordance with Bovenkerk’s (1974, 1981) wishful thinking that such a lack of solidarity among Surinamese returnees contributed to their inability to act as agents of societal change. As erstwhile invisible minorities, though more often than not distinguished by accents, dress codes, manners of speaking, eating, walking, driving, schooling and the like, returning young or youthful transnational migrants both fit in, and don’t fit. Our stance in this chapter is that many of those returning in contemporary times as second-generation or one-and-a-half-generation transnationals do, however, have the potential to make a difference back home. Possessed of considerable social and human capital accumulated during their metropolitan life-courses, selective flows of young or youthful professional British-West Indians, American Afro-Caribbeans and CanadianCaribbeans, who have grown up as members of transnational families are returning to the island homes of their parents, or parent, or are returning to their own birthplaces that they left as children, students, or as adventurous youthful adults (Potter, Conway, & Phillips, 2005; Conway & Potter, 2007). It is these returning transnational migrants who offer the development potential to be brain gains for the island societies their parents (and some of them) left, as part of an earlier brain drain. It is the experiences of such returning citizens by descent, foreign-born nationals or returning young professionals that constitute the principal topic of concern in this chapter. In what follows, we first explain how the intention to return is a deeply embedded sentiment or ideology among Caribbean international migrants, and is also embraced by Caribbean transnational migrants. Even if some of the latter do not intend to return permanently, their transnational strategies involve personal visits, maintaining communication with family, kin, and friends, and a continued involvement in bipolar or multilocal transnational networks. The chapter’s underlying conceptual base is then presented, namely that today’s Caribbean transnational return migrants are effective human agents of change, regardless of their collective numerical size, or their degree of visibility/invisibility. It is their youthful age and intention to make a difference back home that are two noteworthy distinctions of this small, new cohort. In empirical sections of the chapter which then follow, migrant respondents’ own words and life-histories are drawn upon. The chapter concludes with our more general assessment of the development potential—short and long term—of today’s young and youthful returning transnational migrants to the Caribbean.

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RETURN MIGRANTS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE Going off the island, whether for temporary or contractual work, or for longer opportunistic searches for employment, adventurous escapades, or youthful restlessness and the like, many migrants retain a return ideology in which they have every intention of not permanently severing ties with their Caribbean homes (Philpott, 1973). Goin’ away, or the move abroad, was rationalized by harboring a return ideology, or a myth of return, in which the goals and objectives of the move were couched in terms of investing in a return, or accumulating wealth for an eventual return, or sending back remittances in anticipation of a return, and so on. Common adherence in the past to such a return ideology eventually became institutionalized as a multigenerational phenomenon characterising Caribbean societies and affecting all classes of the small island societies therein (Rubenstein, 1982). Chamberlain (1995) found that several important family dimensions were involved in the maintenance of return ideologies among emigrant Barbadians living in Britain (see also Philpott, 1973), among them: (a) the existence of a migration dynamic as a family dynamic which determined behaviour and which gave it meaning; (b) the interplay between this migration dynamic and other family dynamics (such as colour), and family goals (such as social mobility); (c) the importance of the family in approving and enabling migration; and (d) an ethos reflecting and reproducing a broader culture of migration which perhaps ran parallel, but did not necessarily conform with, the vagaries of international labour demands (Chamberlain, 1995 p. 256). Maintaining an intention to return is not incongruous with the creolization of Caribbean peoples’ identities away from home, whether in Britain, or North America. Hybridity and living in transnational multilocal worlds is built into the narratives of exile, and the family-traditions, family-tales and nostalgic reminiscences of island pasts that the first emigrant generation passes on to successive generations (Chamberlain, 1997). The affiliation of migrants with fellow nationals in sporting associations, neighborhood associations, marriage partnering, and a sharing of common interests and experiences, all revolve around the maintenance of ties to the home society and the intention to return some day (Philpott, 1973). Of course, the opposite occurs, with some emigrants deliberately avoiding fellow nationals, severing their ties to home, and eschewing their social obligations to dependents left behind, or to the wider extended family they intend to leave behind for good. Social/segmented assimilation and absorption into their new metropolitan social milieu is, of course, an emigration option for many, but by no means for all (Conway, 1988). Critical of the consequences of return migration and remittances for island development, and characterizing them as the latest round of migration-induced external dependency, early research dwelt upon the unproductive nature of expenditures and the various problems return migration and remittances appeared to cause (Brana-Shute & Brana-Shute, 1982; Griffith,

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1985; Rubenstein, 1983; Stinner, de Albuquerque & Bryce-Laporte,1982; Bovenkerk, 1981 among others). Contemporary commentary, however, tells the opposite story (Brown, 2006; Conway, 2000; Oroczo, 2004). There is now a growing consensus among development agencies that in aggregate terms, remittances do indeed have significant macroeconomic effects on many Caribbean societies and others in the global South that are significant emigration sources to the global North—North America and Europe in particular (IADB, 2006; Kirton, 2005). Indeed, remittances are increasingly regarded as significant private transfers of capital between donor migrants and their families at home, between donor migrants, home town associations and local communities, and between donors and crisis-relief efforts, among other influxes to Caribbean locales. Of equal importance to this last observation, it is of considerable salience that as well as being capital transfers, remittances also take the form of nonmonetary transfers, gifts in kind, symbolic exchanges, material expressions, familial obligations, of continued family altruism, and the like (Cohen, 2005; Goldring, 2004). Levitt (1998) has even gone so far to advocate that the role of social remittances— local-level, migration-driven forms of cultural diffusion and exchange—is important in transforming societies’ social and political life in a high remittance-receiving country such as the Dominican Republic.

“MAKING A DIFFERENCE BACK HOME . . .” THE NARRATIVES OF YOUNG RETURN MIGRANTS TO TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO In such small open societies—territorially, demographically and culturally well-defined—though not closed systems by any means, it may well be the case that a relatively small number of return migrants, rather than the existence of a numerically large return migration flow, effectively mobilize their human and social capital to contribute to, and participate in, local development, which is environmentally sustainable (Conway, 2000; Gmelch, 1992). When these potential agents of change build upon their transnational backgrounds, their metropolitan experiences and professional competencies, they are further mobilized and motivated to succeed and fit in by their positive attitude, a deep-seated feeling of belonging and a strong sense of obligation to give something back, or make a difference, to the island home of their parents, or of their childhood. Utilizing a four-country set of in-depth interviews conducted by the authors in Barbados, St. Lucia, Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago since 2000, a selective sample of young and second-generation migrants and their narratives of return provide qualitative evidence in support of this chapter’s claims that there are transnational returnees who are contributing to local development and progressive societal change in their ancestral homes. These individual return migrants’ stories about their experiences back home, reveal

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a considerable wealth of entrepreneurialism, creative talent, innovativeness, social impact, as well as significant socioeconomic and political economic contributions. Initially we turn to our recent interviews carried out in 2004–2005 with 40 young transnational migrants to Trinidad and Tobago. To start with, in this section we first present a representative set of interview extracts exemplifying the migrants’ overall views as to their potential in initiating socioeconomic and developmental change in their new island home. Following this thematic overview, in the section that follows, we briefly present a number of life-history profiles examining the contributions made by particular second-generation migrants to St Lucia, Barbados, and Grenada. This dual approach is specifically designed to offer comparative insights— between different territories and combining both narrative and selected life history approaches. Turning to the narrative approach, one of our informants in Trinidad explained how he had first been recruited to work in Trinidad. In doing so, he goes to considerable lengths to stress that pure financial rewards were not his primary goal in deciding to live and work in Trinidad and Tobago: . . . I met with the whole Board, who were the top contractors in the country, and I said: ‘You don’t have to hire me to do this, but this is what you need to do.’ So, they voted again and said right there that they wanted to hire me. And I basically said, ‘Well okay.’ I didn’t really come back to make a lot of money. I really came back to make a difference. It’s really what I wanted to do! This notion of making a difference and giving back to one’s ancestral home was clearly expressed by another young professional, who in doing so, made the distinction between the contribution he feels he can make in Trinidad, as opposed to what he could achieve in a so-called developed nation: . . . yet I still had that yearning to be back once I had qualified. Because I always feel that once I have qualified enough, I would be able to give back. I would feel better that I am contributing to my society, rather than a developed country—they wouldn’t feel any input from me per se, because they are already developed. I feel I would be able to contribute something and feel proud of it that I can contribute to the development of my country. An essentially similar sentiment was expressed by a medical practitioner who talked of his working life in the Global North with a certain amount of regret as to the impact he made: Well, I used to think—here I am doing all these things and it is not my people . . .

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Other second-generation migrant informants expressed very similar sentiments, highlighting the desire to do something for my country: I always kept in contact with what was happening in Trinidad and Tobago because Trinidad is my home. I love Trinidad and I always said, ‘look, after I qualify and stuff like that, I’d like to return home and do something for my country.’ And it sounds very clichéd, but I have always wanted to do something for my country. . . . So, I choose to create—or try to at least—set up a company and create avenues and/or create wealth for people who don’t have it and thereby helping my generation of people. Others were more specific in emphasizing that they possessed skills and experiences acquired overseas, which they felt were lacking and which could help in the future development of Trinidad and Tobago. This is cogently exemplified in the following extracts: . . . and I felt that I was ready to utilize some of the skills that I had acquired abroad here. And I felt like I had enough skills that I could come here, because I found so many needs here. That’s the other thing, I found so many needs. And, plus, I had some outstanding experience. I mean I didn’t just work for any (type of) firm. I mean, I worked for the largest (type of firm) in the southwest. I worked for one of the top (type of) firms in (place). . . . when you outside and when you are exposed to certain things and you come back home—so, you know people getting a bill of goods as they say. So, that aspect was the driving force for me wanting to return. I bring with me my experience and I bring with me a lot of knowledge to help Trinidadians as a whole . . . the experience and the knowledge to help uplift the people and to contribute to the society in helping the youths to better their lives—or just education. Many people said this was the best thing to do: contribute to society. One of our second-generation informants expressed her wish to contribute to specific social welfare enhancements in Trinidad, and also more optimistically, to contribute to the reduction of gross inequalities within the nation: My dream is to open a set of half-way houses for battered women with children in Trinidad and Tobago . . . so, I am in touch with a lot of NGOs involved, and I would like to still do that in my free time . . .

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I would like to work in a capacity properly for myself that could help re-distribute some of the income to ensure basic needs are being met, as opposed to just a few people driving Mercedes-Benz. Interestingly, another of our interviewees specifically mentioned the idea that their migration was helping to counter the brain drain of first-generation migration who were lost to the developed world: I grew up in a background where my parents always feel committed to government and the public service. So, I think that was the environment and they always talking about serving, and if everybody leave, they talk about the brain drain and all this kind of thing. So that, from very early on, it was always an option for me to return to Trinidad. Attesting to the dynamics involved in their migration, several of our second-generation informants were a little more measured about the degree to which they felt they were able to contribute at the present time, implying that things had to change before young migrants would be able to have a full developmental impact on Trinidad and Tobago: I spoke to a few who did come back—to work in the system. The number one frustration is the country is not ready to receive them and make use of them . . . And I am meeting a lot more young people who have gone through similar things. Young professionals who said they came back, had the challenge, but when people realized that their work was good—some of them architects, professionals, doing some great development work now—because when their work winning awards all over the place and our people had to wake up to realize that: ‘hey, some of our people do know what they are doing.’ If we are recognized overseas, it makes no sense why we can’t be recognized in a small, little 1.3 million people country! These are what some of our Trinidad and Tobago transnational migrants had to say about making a difference back home. Clearly, making a contribution is part of their return ideology, even though some realize that this is not going to be an entirely straight-forward matter and would take both time and effort.

MAKING A DIFFERENCE BACK HOME . . . BRIEF LIFEHISTORIES OF SELECTED SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANTS TO ST. LUCIA, GRENADA, AND BARBADOS In this section we examine the experiences of a small number of individual youthful return migrants to other Caribbean countries, who have the potential

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to make a difference—one from St Lucia, one from Barbados, and two from Grenada (see also Potter & Phillips 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Rodman & Conway, 2005). Tony, for example, was born in St. Lucia but was sent to England to attend school from the age of eight. To start with he lived with family friends, but after a time he moved in with his sister in Inner London and attended a large comprehensive school. He was eventually educated to college level, qualifying as an electrical engineer. While living in the United Kingdom, Tony married a British West Indian from another small island. At the time we interviewed them they had two children. Tony reported that in the United Kingdom he had been a successful salesman of telesurveillance equipment and had attended courses in order to become acquainted with the technical side of the business. He reported with some dismay that when he first arrived in the Caribbean he had applied for many jobs, but had got absolutely nowhere with any of them. He put this down to lots of job adverts not being real, the job already being destined for somebody prior to the advert being placed. After a time, Tony travelled round to all the security companies on the island, explaining how they could make use of electronic security equipment. However, nobody seemed interested as to that date the island had never had a bank robbery. But when the first such robbery occurred in 1996, suddenly everybody wanted to install a system and his business took off. Although he modestly commented that he was in the right place at the right time, in reality, this represented a clear example of a working-aged returning migrant introducing a new technology into his adopted Caribbean island home, and clearly one that is having a considerable impact on the business environment. Since then his firm has prospered and it now operates throughout the Caribbean region, providing a range of employment. Tony and his family live in a large house with splendid scenic views and he continues to subscribe to a private health insurance scheme off the island. As well as contributing to the business life of St. Lucia, both Tony and his wife are active members of a prominent religious order. Born in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Valerie is a 38-year-old who left the island of her birth with her family when she was 10 years old. From that point onward she was educated in the United Kingdom. She attended a well-known red brick university where she gained a bachelors degree and qualified in law. When she was made redundant from her job in the United Kingdom in 1993, she decided to move to Barbados and give it a try, feeling that there might well be more scope for her to build her own home and eventually start her own business. Within a relatively short period she had met and married a Barbadian national, and at the time she was interviewed, they had two small children. On the work front Valerie originally secured a good job in Barbados with a leading multinational company, and then within a few years, moved to another major multinational firm as a Section Manager. At the time she was interviewed her plans to launch a commercial enterprise offering a corporate rewards scheme for UK businesses

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were well advanced. The scheme, which would allow UK firms to reward the performance of their employees by means of vacations and activities in the Caribbean, represented a classic example of using her new island home as the launching pad for a business serving the needs of enterprises in her former home. Valerie was also keen to have a wider social impact. For example, with several other young returning nationals, she had started a support group for such migrants. As a part of this she was intent on providing advice based on her own migration experience, stressing, for example, that young returnees should not sell their property in the UK but should rather maintain a foothold, taking several extended vacations in Barbados before making a final decision to make a go of it. It was hard not to get the impression that this articulate, intelligent, and energetic individual is a mover and shaker who has huge potential to contribute to the development of Barbadian society in the future. Carl, is a 34-year-old Grenadian who wanted to return and make a difference. He had spent 5 years in Toronto and New York City, obtaining his Bachelor’s degree in Geology, before working for 2 years as a materials engineer in the United Arab Emirates, Botswana, and Jamaica. He then subsequently returned to Grenada to work in the public sector: I always felt that I would come back and live in Grenada. So I wanted to see how Grenada had developed and what was needed . . . That was one of my biggest needs—to work with a company that . . . work in Grenada that would let me see what was needed; which direction to go . . . About one and a half years after [moving back to Grenada] I got an offer to move closer to my field of study, which is materials and testing and so on. I took it up and I’m here, basically . . . this is my contribution to Grenada . . . I always felt that I really wanted to return to contribute, see what there is to get into. I never felt that I have to come back, but I felt that I wanted to come back. Kendall, a returning physician pinpointed the appreciation and reward he felt when practicing medicine in Grenada, compared to practicing in the British Isles, as a determining factor in his decision to return to the Caribbean: I thought Grenada needed me. As much as I needed Grenada, Grenada needed me as well. And, you know, in Ireland you’re just . . . I always fighting for one job. In England everybody’s fighting for higher jobs in medicine. And I realized if you died the next day you wouldn’t be missed at all! They’d probably be relieved that you died because then another person could get a job! I always felt I wanted, um . . . I suppose I felt it my duty to help Grenada. I suppose that’s why I’m back here. Among some of the return migrants in Grenada, transnational linkages provide flexible and functional spaces in which entrepreneurial young Grenadians

222 Robert B. Potter and Dennis Conway are able to operate. Having obtained valuable business education and experience abroad, these young transnational returnees are able to apply these skills, capital, and experience to Caribbean insular market opportunities. In addition, they combine this metropolitan, formal professional experience with their more informal, social connections and know-how, to enable them to become successful entrepreneurs in their home island. They find they are able to efficiently use their informal relations in Grenada to create businesses and, subsequently, take advantage of their overseas experience and introduce new ideas that foster profitable enterprises. Creative business opportunities in Grenada, as perceived by returnees through a lens of overseas experience, are captured in the following extract: There are qualified people [in Grenada], but they don’t do anything . . . You need to know who you are . . . People don’t have any innovation . . . you need to pursue a career and take initiative . . . Lots of people are coming back [to Grenada] but they are not doing anything. People lack initiative in business . . . and there is a lack of empowerment of people in Grenada . . . I started a car business to cater to medical students. I started with one car. I had to have flexibility and I had to experiment. By the second year I had three cars and by the third year I began to diversify. In a like manner, Anthony, who we interviewed in the summer of 2003, attributed much of his business success in Grenada to his hard work and to his 9 years of experience gained in Canada, where he had enrolled in several business administration courses. Additionally, through their experiences abroad, returnees are occasionally able to create flexible and strategic transnational enterprises and careers that allow them to keep a foot in Grenada as well as abroad. As an instance of this, one respondent recalled how he was able to publish and circulate a low-end magazine that focused on events in Grenada while he was living in south Florida. At the time, the respondent had a sufficient enough operational-network of contacts with Grenada, through personal trips, communication with family and friends, and the interactive use of the internet, to make such an endeavor possible. When we interviewed him, this transnational businessman was in the midst of a six week stay in Grenada, during which he was attempting to establish a small-scale media and communications outfit. He hoped to begin his operation by attracting sponsors in Grenada using the informal, personal connections he had established while working for the state-run TV station during his years of growing up in Grenada, before eventually expanding his company’s reach to the wider Caribbean and the United States. As he cogently put it: The idea right now is to get it’s [his company’s] feet wet in the Grenadian culture, Grenadian business culture, establish an identity here. Let people know you’re here. Two main partners, we both live overseas . . .

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Although from Florida . . . I’m gonna try to do some stuff from Florida with the Grenada Board of Tourism . . . The long-term goal, obviously, is to have a multi-media outfit that serves not only Grenada, but the Caribbean and the Grenadian and West Indian markets in North America . . . There’s a lot of mediocrity here. And people settle for it. We wanna show people [in Grenada] that you can do things at a very high standard and still get paid well, and still make a lot of money, which is what we are doing . . . Just under a month, I mean we managed to set up a company and have it running and we are on-stream to make EC 50,000 in revenue in about a month. That’s from a company that started six weeks ago. We had the office for the first two weeks in the car. You know, it’s not bad. Wider more recent media attention to return migrant’s contributions in Caribbean corporate-business circles has noted the repatriation of Chief Executive Officers, such as Eleanor Brown, who at the age of 31 is now Managing Director of her own financial services company in Jamaica (Economist, 2003), or Ian Quan-Noon, a returnee from New York’s Wall Street, who opened his international financial business in Port of Spain, Trinidad in 1999 (Business Guardian, 2004). Importantly, these returning transnational businessmen and businesswomen recognize the potential demonstration effect their enterprises may have on the business community of the island; reinforcing the notion that many returnees have a vested interest in the growth and development of their country. Via overseas experience, returnees are able to see new opportunities for businesses in Grenada. There appears to be more opportunities for the introduction of foreign ideas and attitudes in the private sector than in the public sector of today’s Caribbean islands, because returnees are more able to apply their transnational business experience in the private sector, where growth, development, and profit are the motivations for success. CONCLUSIONS

Young and younger return migrants, who have variously been referred to as second-generation returnees, foreign-born returning nationals, and citizens of decent (Potter, Conway & Phillips, 2005), have only recently become the focus of specific academic attention (see Potter, 2001; Plaza, 2002; Potter, 2005a, 2005b; Potter & Phillips, 2006a, 2006b; Phillips & Potter, 2005, 2006). This group has remained relatively invisible as a return migration cohort, largely because of the relatively small numbers involved, although they have occasionally formed part of wider samples of returnees (De Souza, 1998, 2005; Byron, 2000; Byron & Condon, 1996). Most saliently, recent research is unearthing the new spaces of transnational return migrant experiences in the Caribbean at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Potter, Conway, & Phillips 2005; Plaza & Henry, 2006).

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As well as the expected counter-stream of older people returning first-generation retirees, youthful and younger Caribbean transnational migrants of working age, in their 30s and 40s, have decided to give it a try back home. Clearly, as the narratives presented in this chapter have demonstrated, some among this much more diverse group of citizens by descent, foreign-born nationals, young returning professionals, second-generation returnees and one and a half-generation returnees, are coming back home to make a difference. Some are returning to build transnational business connections, and take advantage of their transnational networks and connections, thereby making a difference indirectly, rather than by design or purpose. Others are returning for less altruistic reasons, and for more personal, individual, or family-related reasons. Others are less sure of their life-goals, and are returning to test the waters, or to see whether they like it back home. Many, possibly most, of these young returnees are likely to be endowed with considerable stocks of human capital, being more skilled than the firstgeneration older returnees. They are coming back at earlier stages in their working and professional careers and are likely to possess more advanced technological skills and better professional training. Further, they are likely to be much more adept at handling the contemporary logistical systems of our computer-age. They have more information available at their fingertips via the internet, telephone, and other global networked systems. They also have work experience abroad to transfer, as well as technological and logistical knowledge to bring to bear in their working environments. As foreign- and overseas- trained, they appear to have ready access to professional openings and employment in the most modern of local corporate businesses and the island’s modernizing/changing public sectors. Their hybridized British-ness, American-ness and Canadian-ness may result in a degree of social ostracism, but it also distinguishes them as experienced, more worldly and readily employable in the job market back home (Potter & Phillips, 2006a). Some transnational returnees might very well be moving back temporarily to see if they can enhance their standards of living and the quality of their lives. Some may be returning to give something back, whereas others keeping their options open to re-migrate later. Some may be set on returning for good, while using their transnational ties and network to maintain their global connections and sustain a metropolitan-cum-local livelihood between two worlds, which may now be centered on their island home, but which still involves a transnational life of travel, communication, and experience. Others may be returning for a while, to assess whether they can make it, whether they can make a difference, whether they can overcome the anticipated problems that a different pace of life, lower technology environments, fewer resources, different work ethics, and outmoded business models might throw at them. Some may be returning to follow their first-generation emigrant parents, motivated by familial ties and daughtermother mutual self-help arrangements for infant child-care, or prompted by

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aged family health needs, and other within-family obligations. Some may be tied-returnees, with the security of a marriage partner lowering the risk, or the decision of the marriage partner determining the return, while the spouse is reluctant. The reasons for the return of this cohort of young and youthful transnational migrants are always going to be extremely diverse and wide ranging. On their return, the adaptation process will be replete with surprises and difficulties, and the degree to which their experiences differ from expectations is likely to be wide. Some will persevere after the first reverse culture shocks, and settle in relatively smoothly as they successfully adjust to island life, socially, culturally, and economically. Some will encounter such difficulty that they will re-migrate, whereas others will encounter difficulties but stick it out, adapt and settle. All these points reflect the essential conclusion that transnational mobility is part and parcel of the increasingly unequal neoliberal world order, one that is giving rise to further heterogeneity and difference, rather than homogeneity and uniformity (Conway & Heynen, 2006; Potter, Conway, & Phillips 2005; Potter, Binns, Elliott & Smith, 2004). Today’s Caribbean transnational return migrants are people endowed with social capital, potential and realized, in respect of which social and cultural knowledge as well as economic human capital comprise a significant bundle of re-investments (Conway, 1985, 1993). Return of the skilled, the experienced, the professionally seasoned and the innovative is especially important for Caribbean communities, where successive waves of emigration and brain drains have taken their toll on middle-class cohesion, professional life in the service sectors, and the whole gamut of societal contributions; political party involvement, community services, education, and vocational contributions and the like. Remittances, invested or spent, by return migrants are flows and stocks of financial capital that add to the bundle that is repatriated (Connell & Conway, 2000). Concurring with our assessment of the considerable latent potential of second-generation returnees, Levitt (2004 p. 6) has gone so far as to characterize such transnational migrants as children raised in households saturated by home influences, who “at critical stages in their lives . . . may activate the potential contacts and identities available to them and become transnational activists.” We would add the proviso that it is the quality of the social and human capital returned, which is most likely to be of equal importance to the quantity, unless of course, the numbers are too small relative to the resident population. In such cases, the contributions of such a miniscule number of returnees are likely to be overwhelmed by the accumulated deficits in human and social capital that the brain drain has incurred, and their agency will be unable to effect much in the way of overall change. In today’s globalizing world, Caribbean transnational return migrants and those repetitive circulators undertaking more temporary sojourns or return visits are demonstrating they can make a difference, They are more diverse, in terms of age, life-course transition, class and gendered social positions,

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family networks, and migration histories. Youthful return migrant experiences have been found to differ according to island context, but research has not reached the point where a comprehensive, regional comparative generalization can be drawn (although see Gowricharn, 2006; Potter, Conway, & Phillips, 2005; Plaza & Henry, 2006 for the extant coverage). Experiences appear to differ according to the metropolitan backgrounds of the returnees in the context of some islands, but not in others. Dual citizenship and multiple identities are the rule, rather than the exception, as returnees in the 30s, 40s and 50s age-cohorts choose island life, and choose to live, work (and play) in island society rather than struggling to make their livelihoods in the metropolitan centres of their youth. They do not, however, sever ties with their metropolitan past, but rather retain property, keep in close touch with extended family members and friends there, and generally adhere to transnational strategies to live in, and between, two worlds—or indeed sometimes in three or more, if their family’s international reach is multi-local (Fog-Olwig, 2001; Potter, Conway & Phillips, 2005). Today’s younger Caribbean transnational return migrants offer the promise of becoming even more effective agents of change when compared with their predecessors. They are returning in small numbers, it is true. But, with much needed professional skills, and with transnational networks that offer support, flexibility, and a wider scope for facilitating exchanges of goods, services, knowledge and capital, their return is much more likely to contribute to progressive change in social institutions, business circles, the expanding private sphere, and the modernizing public service sectors. The intention to make a difference among many, if not all, is a nation-building sentiment of considerable power and authority. Whether they stay permanently, or leave after a period and re-migrate or circulate, the development potential of this newest cohort of Caribbean transnational migrants—the second-generation and one-and-a-half generation—promises much. In qualitative terms, a brain gain might very well be underway, and it remains an optimistic hope that such a counter to the regional brain drain will not only continue, but grow in its institutional significance and overall societal impact. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors acknowledge the financial generosity of the National Geographic Society, The Leverhulme Trust and the Institute for Advanced Study, Indiana University in supporting the research reported in this chapter. We should also like to thank the return migrants who gave freely of their time in speaking with us about their experiences. REFERENCES Bovenkerk, F. (1974). The sociology of return migration: A bibliographic essay. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

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Bovenkerk, F. (1981). Why returnees generally do not turn out to be ‘agents of change’: the case of Suriname. Nieuwe West-Indische Gids, 55, 154–173. Brana-Shute, R. & Brana-Shute, G. (1982). The magnitude and impact of remittances in the eastern Caribbean: a research note. In W. F. Stinner, K. de Albuquerque & R. S. Bryce-Laporte (Eds.), Return migration and remittances: Developing a Caribbean perspective (Occasional 3, 267–289. Washington DC: The Smithsonian Institute, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies. Brown, S. S. (2006). Can remittances spur development? A critical survey. International Studies Review, 8, 55–75. Business Guardian (2004, July 1). From Belmont to Wall Street: Ian Quan-Noon sets up shop in Newtown. Trinidad Business Guardian. Byron, M. (1994). Post-War Caribbean migration to Britain: The unfinished cycle. Aldershot, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney: Avebury. Byron, M. (2000). Return migration to the eastern Caribbean: Comparative experiences and policy implications. Social and Economic Studies, 49(4), 155–188. Byron, M. & Condon, S. (1996). A comparative study of Caribbean return migrants from Britain and France: Towards a context-dependent explanation. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 21, 91–104. Chamberlain, M. (1995). Family narratives and migration dynamics: Barbadians in Britain. Nieuwe West-Indische Gids, 69, 253–275. Chamberlain, M. (1997). Narratives of exile and return. London and Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Caribbean Studies. Chamberlain, M. (1998). Caribbean migration: Globalised identities. London and New York: Routledge. Cohen, J. H. (2005). Remittance outcomes and migration: Theoretical contests, real opportunities. Studies in Comparative International Development, 40(1), 88–112. Connell, J. & Conway, D. (2000). Migration and remittances in island microstates: a comparative perspective on the South Pacific and the Caribbean. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(1), 52–78. Conway, D. (1985). Remittance impacts on development in the Eastern Caribbean. Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, 11, 31–40. Conway, D. (1988). Conceptualizing contemporary patterns of Caribbean international mobility. Caribbean Geography, 2(3), 145–163. Conway, D. (1989). Caribbean international mobility traditions. Boletin Latino Americanos y del Caribe, 46(2), 17–47. Conway, D. (1993). Rethinking the consequences of remittances for eastern Caribbean development. Caribbean Geography, 4, 116–130. Conway, D. (1994). The complexity of Caribbean migration. Caribbean Affairs, 7, 96–119. Conway, D. (1998), Microstates in a macro world. In T. Klak (Ed.), Globalization and neoliberalism: The Caribbean context (pp. 51–64). London: Rowman & Littlefield. Conway, D. (2000). The importance of migration for Caribbean development. Global Development Studies, , 2(1–2), 73–105. Conway, D. (2004a). On being part of population geography’s future: Populationenvironment relations and inter-science initiatives. Population, Space and Place [WileyInterScience online], 10(4), 295–302. Available at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/. Conway, D. (2004b). Population and migration. In R. B. Potter, D. Barker, D. Conway and T. Klak (Eds.), The contemporary Caribbean (pp. 48–94). London: Pearson Education/Prentice Hall. Conway, D. & Heynen, N. (2006). Globalization’s contradictions: Geographies of discipline, destruction and transformation. London: Routledge.

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Conway, D. & Lorah, P. (1995). Environmental protection policies in Caribbean small islands: Some St. Lucian examples. Caribbean Geography, 6(1), 16–27. Conway, D. & Potter, R. B. (2007). Caribbean transnational return migrants as agents of change. Geography Compass, 1, 1. De Souza, R-M. (1998). The spell of the cascadura: West Indian return migration. In T. Klak (Ed.), Globalisation and neoliberalism (pp. 227–253): The Caribbean context. London: Rowman and Littlefield. De Souza, R-M. (2005). No place like home: Returnees R & R (Retention and Rejection) in the Caribbean homeland. In R. B. Potter, D. Conway, & J. Phillips (Eds.), The experience of return, migration: Caribbean erspectives(pp. 135–136). Aldershot, UK & Burlington, US: Ashgate. Duval, D. T. (2005). Expressions of migrant mobilities among Caribbean migrants in Toronto, Canada. In R. B. Potter, D. Conway & J. Phillips (Eds.), The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives (pp. 245–262). Aldershot, UK and Burlington US: Ashgate. Economist. (2003, October 11). Brain gain. The Economist, 369 (8345), 38–39. Fog Olwig, K. (2001). New York as a locality in a global family network. In N. Foner (Ed.), Islands in the city: West Indian migration to New York (pp. 142– 160). Berkeley, CA & London: University of California Press. Gmelch, G. (1987). Work, innovation and investment: The impact of return migrants in Barbados, Human Organization, 46, 131–140. Gmelch, G. (1992). Double passage: The lives of Caribbean migrants abroad and back home. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Goldring, L. (2004). Family and collective remittances to Mexico: A multi-dimensional typology. Development and Change, 35(4), 799–840. Gowricharn, R. (2006). Caribbean transnationalism: Migration, pluralization, and social cohesion. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, & Oxford: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield. IADB. (2006). Sending money home: Leveraging the development impact of remittances. New York: Inter-American Development Bank, Multilateral Investment Fund. Available at:http://www.migrantremittances.org Kirton, C. D. (2005). Remittances: The experience of the English-speaking Caribbean. In D.F. Terry and S.R. Wilson (Eds.), Beyond small change: Making migrant remittances count (pp. 261–294). Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Klak, T. & Conway, D. (1998). From neoliberalism to sustainable development. In T. Klak (Ed.), Globalization and neoliberalism: The Caribbean context (pp. 257–276). London: Rowman & Littlefield. Levitt, P. (1998). Social remittances: Migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. International Migration Review, 32(4), 926–948. Levitt, P. (2004, October). Transnational migrants: When ‘home’ means more than one country. Migration Information Source. Available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=261. Orozco, M. (2004, January). Distant but close: Guyanese transnational communities and their remittances from the United States. Report to U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. Phillips, J. & Potter, R. B. (2005). Incorporating race and gender into Caribbean return migration: The example of second-generation ‘Bajan-Brits.’ In R. B. Potter, D. Conway, & J. Phillips (Eds.), The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives (pp. 69–88). Aldershot, UK & Burlington US: Ashgate. Phillips, J. & Potter, R. B. (2006). ‘Black skins, white masks’: Postcolonial reflections on race, gender and second generation return migration to the Caribbean. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 27, 309–325.

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Philpott, S. (1973). West Indian migration: The Montserrat case. London: Athlone Press. Plaza, D. (2002). The socio-cultural adjustment of second generation British-Caribbean ‘return migrants’ to Barbados and Jamaica. Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, 27, 135–160. Plaza, D. E. & Henry, F. (2006). Returning to the source: The final stage of the Caribbean migration circuit. Mona, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press. Potter, R. B. (2001). Narratives of socio-cultural adjustment among young return migrants to St. Lucia and Barbados. Caribbean Geography, 12, 70–89. Potter, R. B. (2005a), Citizens of descent: Foreign-born and young returning nationals to St. Lucia. Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, 30, 1–30. Potter, R. B. (2005b). ‘Young, gifted and back’: Second generation transnational return migrants to the Caribbean. Progress in Development Studies, 5, 213–236. Potter, R. B. (2005c). The socio-demographic characteristics of second generation return migrants to St. Lucia and Barbados. In R. B. Potter, D. Conway, & J. Phillips (Eds.), The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives (pp. 22–48). Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT, US. Potter, R. B. (2005d). ‘Tales of two societies’: narratives of adjustment among second generation return migrants to St. Lucia and Barbados. In R. B. Potter, D. Conway. & J. Phillips (Eds.), The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives (pp. 49–68). Burlington, VT, US & Aldershot, UK.: Ashgate. Potter, R. B. & Phillips, J. (2006a). ‘Mad dogs and transnational migrants?’ BajanBrit second-generation migrants and accusations of madness. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96(2), 586–600. Potter, R. B. & Phillips, J. (2006b). Both black and symbolically white: The ‘Bajan-Brit’ return migrants as postcolonial hybrid. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29, 901–927. Potter, R. B., Barker, D., Conway, D. & Klak, T. (2004, July). The Contemporary Caribbean. London: Pearson Education/Prentice Hall. Potter, R. B., Binns, T., Elliott, J. & Smith, D. (2004). Geographies of development. (2nd ed.) London & New York: Pearson-Prentice-Hall. Potter, R. B., Conway, D. & Phillips, J. (2005). The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives. Burlington, VT, US & Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Rodman, J. & Conway, D. (2005). Young returnees in Grenada: Adaptation experiences. In R. B. Potter, D. Conway, & J. Phillips (Eds.), The experience of return migration: Caribbean perspectives, (pp. 89–108). Burlington, VT, US & Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Rubenstein, H. (1979). The return ideology in West Indian migration. In R. E. Rhoades (Ed.), The anthropology of return migration. Papers in Anthropology, 20, 330–337. Rubenstein, H. (1982). The impact of remittances in the rural English-speaking Caribbean: Notes on the literature. In W. F. Stinner, K. de Albuquerque, & R. S. Bryce-Laporte (Eds.), Return migration and remittances: Developing a Caribbean perspective. (Occasional Papers 3, 237–266). Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies. Rubenstein, H. (1983). Migration and underdevelopment: The Caribbean. Cultural Survival Quarterly, 7(4), 30–32. St. Bernard, G. (2006). Episodes of return migration in Tobago: a phenomenological study. In D. E. Plaza & F. Henry (Eds.), Returning to the source: The final stage of the Caribbean migration circuit, (pp. 188–213). Mona, Jamaica: University of West Indies Press. Stinner, W. F., Albuquerque, K. de & Bryce-Laporte, R. S. (1983). Return migration and remittances: Developing a Caribbean perspective, (Occasional paper,

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3). Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute, Research Institute on Immigration and Ethnic Studies. Thomas-Hope, E. M. (1985). Return migration and its implications for Caribbean development. In R. A. Pastor (Ed.), Migration and development in the Caribbean: The unexpected connection (pp. 157–177). Westview Press: Boulder, CO. Thomas-Hope, E. M. (1986). Transients and settlers: varieties of Caribbean migrants and the socio-economic implications of their return. International Migration (Geneva), 24(3), 559–571. Thomas-Hope, E. M. (1998). Globalization and the development of a Caribbean migration culture. In M. Chamberlain (Ed.), Caribbean migration: Globalised identities (pp. 188–202). London & New York: Routledge.

12 (Post) Colonial Transnational Actors and Homeland Political Development The Case of Surinam Liza M. Nell1

The political development of many migrants’ homelands is interwoven with (post) colonial history. Typically, colonialism created political structures that saw elites of colonized societies educated in the metropole (see for the Netherlands-Surinam Sedoc-Dahlberg, 1971; Mohogu, 2000 for Belgium-Congo). In response to political and economic instability at home and prospects for socioeconomic progress in the former metropole, migration of groups other than elites continued after independence (see Kagné, 2000; Gowricharn & Schüster, 2001). Although it is widely accepted that such push and pull factors affect emigration and return migration motives, little empirical research has focused on the consequences of postcolonial migration for the political development of the homeland itself. How individual return migrants contribute to their home country’s socioeconomic development has been thoroughly addressed in studies on return migration (Cerase, 1974; Gmelch, 1980; Bovenkerk, 1982; Olesen, 2002). More recently a growing body of literature has addressed diasporic communities, migrants’ transnationalism, and political developments in the home country (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc, 1994; Guarnizo, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Faist, 2000; Adamson, 2002; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Smith, 2003). Less attention, however, has been directed to the interaction between postcolonial immigrants in the country of settlement and nonmigrants and return migrants in the country of origin. Rather than exclusively focusing on relations between emigrants and the government of the home country, this chapter argues that relations between emigrants and political parties in the home country are an integral part of transnational political life. Three types of actors may attempt to use transnational ties to influence politics in their home country: return migrants, emigrants, and nonmigrants. The first type, return migrants, have multiple reasons to leave the immigration society (Cerase, 1974). Here I focus on elite returnees who return with the aim of contributing to their home country’s development. These so-called returnees of innovation—or brain gain (Olesen, 2002 p. 137)—hope to make use of skills acquired during their sojourn, even if this alienates them from broader society (Cerase, 1974; see also Gmelch,

232 Liza M. Nell 1980). In addition to return migrants’ own motives, many governments of sending countries try to stimulate brain gain by developing special policies for returnees (Zweig, 1996; Thomas-Hope, 1999; Arowolo, 2000; Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Furthermore, the political landscape of both sending and receiving countries are central to the return-decision (see Manuh, 2003). However, not all returnees return permanently. Some fail and re-emigrate to the former country of settlement, although others return occasionally, seasonally or temporarily (see Gmelch, 1980; Duval, 2004). In contrast, emigrants who succeed in receiving societies do not hope to return (in the near future) but may try to use their financial and social capital to contribute to the development of the home country. This process can be facilitated or weakened by sending countries’ policies to (former) nationals abroad (Freeman & Ögelman, 1998; Howard, 2003; Koser, 2003; Martínez-Saldaña, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). How do these return migrants and emigrants involve themselves in homeland politics? To what extent are they invited or discouraged by nongovernmental homeland actors such as political parties and non(return) migrants? Like sending country governments’ policies, nonmigrant political actors’ interaction with emigrants and return migrants can significantly affect transnational political outcomes. Nonmigrants, as local or national power holders can determine the success or failure of transnational activity. Cerase found for example that innovator returnees often ended up bitterly disappointed, wanting to change society but with skills unsuited to the situation in their new surroundings and their ambitions blocked by local power holders (1974 p. 258). Other studies found that especially elite emigrants and return migrants in the 1980s were seen as a threat to the cultural and social status quo and failed to readjust in their home countries (Gmelch, 1980; Bovenkerk, 1982; Guarnizo, 1997). More recently, however, studies show that some return labour migrants have attained political positions in the home country through their transnational activities in the immigrant society (Amiraux, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). This chapter asks how (post) colonial political actors—including emigrants, return migrants and nonmigrants—in both countries of settlement and origin attempt to use transnational ties rooted in migration history to influence politics in their (former) homeland. Which conditions—in both sending and receiving countries—determine the success or failure of homeland political change? The former Dutch colony of Surinam will illustrate the theme. Surinam is located on the northeast coast of South America and was a colony of the Netherlands between 1667 and 1975. With colonization Surinam became a multiethnic society of African slaves, planters and administrators from Europe, Jews from Portugal and Brazil, indentured labourers from China, British India and the Dutch East Indies, and Lebanese and Chinese traders. Migrants who became the first transnational political actors arrived after World War II. These colonial migrants generally arrived in the

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Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s with government-sponsored university scholarships (Sedoc-Dahlberg, 1971). When a Creole-dominated government in 1973 declared its goal of Surinamese independence by 1975, it created fears of race riots, as had happened in Guyana around decolonisation (Gowricharn & Schüster, 2001 p. 159). This triggered a hysteric migration of eventually 200,000 Surinamese who left for the Netherlands. New waves of emigration followed the coup d’état in 1980, while individual emigration and family reunification continued. With a population of 329,430 in 2005, Surinamese are the second largest immigrant group in the Netherlands after the Turks who number 358,846.2 This is remarkable given Surinam’s 2004 population of 433,000.3 The actual return migration rate is low. A quarter of all emigrants returned in the 1950s. This decreased to 10% in the 1960s, to less then 5% in the 1970s and to less than 2% a year in 1982 (Bovenkerk, 1982 p. 196). From the mid 1990s to 2004 the rate of return was roughly 1%.4 The influence of the Netherlands and the Surinamese emigrant community on personal and public life in Surinam is, however, enormous due to family visits and the official language being Dutch. As Bovenkerk already noted in 1982, it is not its size but the qualitative impact of returnees and emigrants on Surinam that needs to be taken into account. The case of Surinamese migration to the Netherlands is illustrative as migration phases led to different types of home country-directed political activity. To study the most direct form of politics, the cases will focus on support of, opposition to, and formation of political parties or regimes in Surinam rather than other types of political activity such as lobbying by immigrant organisations. Three case studies emphasize the influence of homeland political developments and the usage of transnational ties. The first case examines how colonial migrants were involved in Surinamese politics and how they attempted to utilize their transnational social capital gained in the Netherlands to contribute to Surinamese politics after their return. Social capital is defined here as ties organised in networks through which political experience, trust, knowledge, normative structures, and codes of conduct are exchanged (see Putnam, 1993). Their actions will be categorized as transplanted immigrant politics. The second case shows how political developments in Surinam during the military dictatorship and its aftermath affected transnational political involvement among exiles and settled migrants in the Netherlands, and among nonmigrants and return migrants in Surinam. Exiles’ activities can be labeled diaspora politics, because the former are barred from political participation in the home country (see Koopmans & Statham, 2003). Exiles politicized the immigrant community by importing homeland political conflicts to the country of settlement, which led to transplanted homeland politics (see for this type Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Finally, settled migrants—whether or not encouraged by actors in Surinam—were involved in homeland politics as they used resources in the Netherlands to further

234 Liza M. Nell political change in Surinam. The last section highlights how transnational actors in a postcolonial democracy use their ties with Surinamese and Dutch political parties in homeland politics. Although the types of transnational politics that evolve have consequences for migrants’ political participation and integration in the country of settlement (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003; Koopmans & Statham, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a), the main focus here is on politics in the country of origin.

STUDENTS’ TRANSPLANTED IMMIGRANT POLITICS (1950–1980) Surinamese colonial students who arrived in the Netherlands between 1950 and 1975 became the first transnational political actors to organize activities with a home country-directed political goal collectively. Even though other individual actors were transnationally active through Dutch political parties, their organization and mobilization capacity was minimal compared to the students. Students formed organizations in the Netherlands and used their acquired skills to form political parties or movements upon their return to Surinam. For over 25 years, however, these student organizations in the Netherlands and the parties they formed in Surinam were highly fragmented. Divisions mainly reflected different phases of emigration and ideology, but also cities of settlement and ethnicity. Furthermore, these students groups were small, limited to an active cadre of five to ten persons—usually a charismatic leader supported by fellow students. This reflected the absence of Left/Right and progressive/conservative divisions in Surinam, where institutional politics are based on ethnic mobilization in a segmented society (Dew, 1996). In a political system characterized by “strongly person-oriented networks, where party morality predominates above public, the Surinamese politician acts as a particularist whose actions are generally dependent on its significance for his ethnic group, his party and himself” (Ramsoedh, 2001 p. 91–92). What the students did have in common was that, once in the Netherlands, they developed their own view on Surinamese nationalism and relations with the motherland. Leaving Surinam with the idea that they were Dutch, they soon realized they were different, while the international movement for decolonization and socialist ideology inspired them to criticize Surinam’s relations with the colonizer. This view was transplanted from the Netherlands to Surinam, not from official Dutch policy, but from a political counter movement that also targeted the Dutch government. Returning to Surinam with their new ideas, the former students were met with suspicion. They were better educated than the political elite that had stayed in Surinam, which was felt to be a threat by the existing parties, even if some had similar ideologies. In addition, they were young, ambitious and wanted change, something older politicians rarely appreciated. All important return student leaders sooner or

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later founded their own political parties, thereby perpetuating the divisions between their student organizations in the Netherlands. Between 1960 and 1970 three return student leaders—from a Creole nationalist organization in Amsterdam, a student organization in Leiden and an Indo-Surinamese (or Hindustani) student group—entered Surinamese politics. The first was Eddy Bruma, who founded the Wi Eegi Sani movement (WES—Our Own Case) in Amsterdam around 1950 (Jansen van Galen, 2000). The nationalist WES, encouraged by anti-imperialist ‘communist ideologies,’ campaigned for Surinam independence and the Surinamese lingua franca Sranantongo. After Bruma’s return, established politicians in Surinam saw him as a communist threat. Bruma did not join an existing party, but established the Partij Nationalistische Republiek Suriname (PNR—Nationalist Party of the Surinamese Republic) in 1961 (Hoogbergen & Kruijt, 2005 p. 15). The PNR also recruited a representative in the Netherlands, a former WES member. The PNR thus became the first Surinamese political party founded by a return migrant with a branch in the Netherlands. Ideologically as well as in personnel, it had its roots in the WES student movement. Individuals who had positions in the movement in the Netherlands received positions in the party in Surinam or in the branch in the Netherlands. In Surinam the party slowly gained ground in parliament and government; in 1969 Jules Sedney, a former WES activist, became president. Four years after the foundation of the PNR, a new group of returnees from Leiden created their own political party in Surinam. In 1965, Ronald Venetiaan, former chairman of the Leiden Surinamese Studenten Vereniging (SSV—Surinamese Student Association), together with the organization’s secretary, Hans Prade, launched the Nationale Volkspartij (NVP—National Peoples Party). Prade later reflected: “People expected us to join the NPS (Nationale Partij Suriname—National Party of Suriname), but we had invited ministers of governing parties to the SSV and posed critical questions, a capital sin those days. Our reputation had been made . . . .”5 The NVP never gained ground as a party; the two board members found their way into existing parties. Twenty-five years after their return, in 1991, the two return students ran for president. Venetiaan won, as he did again in 2000 and 2005. The third group of transnational actors in the 1960s was ethnically organised. As a response to the Creole nationalism of the WES, a small group of Indo-Surinamese students tried to establish its Indo-Surinamese variant in the Netherlands. Though the WES claimed to struggle for a national cause, they were seen by Indo-Surinamese as a movement for and by Creoles (Jansen van Galen, 2000). Nationalist Indo-Surinamese students did not establish a new party in Surinam but formed a party branch of the Verenigde Hindostaanse Partij (VHP—United Hindustan Party) in the Netherlands instead. The branch aimed to stimulate a sense of responsibility toward Surinamese society among Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands, rather than criticizing the colonial tie with the Netherlands. Contact with the mother party

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initially meant regular visits and the branch’s financial and moral support during election campaigns. This support, however, went politically unrewarded when one of the VHP branch founding-members, Evert Azimullah, returned to Surinam in 1971. Even though he was not an ideological threat, the VHP kept him at a distance. He explains: “I did a suspicious study (political sciences, LN) in a suspicious city (Amsterdam, LN).”6 Having been politicized in Amsterdam—considered the heart of Dutch and Surinamese communist movements by the Surinamese government—prevented his full inclusion into the party in Surinam. From the late 1960s up until to 1980 student leaders unsuccessfully attempted to unite the divided Surinamese student organisations (SSVs) and politicize the Surinamese student movement at a national level. Divisions between cities remained, however; each SSV continued to plan for the founding of their own political party when members returned to Surinam. For example, the SSV in Leiden was preparing for the launch of the Volkspartij (VP—Peoples Party), established upon the chairman’s return in 1973. The functions of chairmen and secretary within the party were similar to the former board of administration of their student organisation. The foundation of the VP angered the communist Democratisch Volksfront (DVF—Democratic Peoples Front) led by nonreturnees. The DVF considered the VP a threat and tried to tarnish its reputation by claiming its leader was neither a real communist nor a real Surinamese, but a Dutch intellectual (KPS/ML, 1975). To strengthen the party financially and morally, the VP used its former contacts in the Dutch Surinamese student movement to establish a branch in the Netherlands. By politicising students, the chairman aimed to create cadres who could quickly return to Surinam. Thirty years later, the VP chairman Lie Paw Sam sees support in the Netherlands as “a family process, it wasn’t Leninist,” as he had wanted.7 Looking back, he deplores that members in the Netherlands were not driven by ideology, but by friends and family in the organisation. Moreover, newly arrived students escaped the political schooling of the VP’s leader, now in Surinam. Lie Paw Sam found his main opponent in Iwan Krolis, first in the Netherlands and later in Surinam, a charismatic student leader of SSV Wageningen. Krolis also lectured on the political line students should follow once they returned. Still in the Netherlands, SSV Wageningen decided to support an existing Marxist-Leninist organisation in Surinam. Nevertheless, once back in Surinam, the Marxist-Leninist organisation mistrusted the returnees. Krolis explains: “we returned with extra intellectual baggage . . . ‘You should not think that you can take from us what we have built,’ was their stance.”8 This attitude motivated Krolis in 1977 to found the Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie (PALU—Progressive Workers and Peasants Union) in Surinam, with a branch in the Netherlands. The latter supported the mother party financially and morally during election campaigns. It was dissolved when the last chairman returned to Surinam in 1999.

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After the return of the communist student leaders Lie Paw Sam and Krolis, former SSV groups created the Landelijke Organisatie van Surinamers in Nederland (LOSON—National Organisation of Surinamese in the Netherlands) in 1973. LOSON aimed to stimulate return migration. But in contrast to earlier student organizations, LOSON also sought to improve the position of Surinamese in the Netherlands (LOSON 1976). Just before independence, LOSON became a member of the communist DVF in Surinam, and alongside the VP and PALU, it raised funds in the Netherlands (LOSON, 1976). But after 3 years LOSON left DVF, complaining that the DVF excluded it from the party’s decision making (SBS, 1979). Students’ political come-back in Surinam was not as smooth as expected. Their political activity in the Netherlands clearly had consequences for their political careers in Surinam, and student leaders often founded their own political parties instead of cooperating with other returnees or existing political parties. Toward this end, they transplanted their social capital and organisational skills from the Netherlands. This transplantation of immigrant politics angered existing Surinamese parties. Returnees who had supported existing Surinamese parties while still living in the Netherlands eventually left them when they returned. However, some earlier return students eventually did achieve high political office: they were less radically Left than the new arrivals and simply being earlier, were in time to fill the openings (see also Bovenkerk, 1982). Ideological, ethnic, and/or geographical divisions between student organisations were transplanted from the Netherlands, just as this fragmentation had earlier been imported from Surinam. After their return, students’ contacts with the organisations they left behind in the Netherlands quickly weakened, and along with them, the connections needed to support their party. After independence in 1975, students’ collective transnational activities declined. The main goal—independence—had been achieved. This radically changed the position of Surinamese students. Second, the composition of the Surinamese community changed and enlarged. Surinamese now officially became immigrants instead of Dutch citizens. Immigrant and transnational activities became more differentiated, and primarily focused on residence in the Netherlands instead of return to Surinam.

EFFECTS OF HOME COUNTRY POLITICAL CHANGES ON TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS DURING MILITARY RULE (1980–1987) A military coup d’état in Surinam in 1980 dramatically changed the direction of transnational politics. Until 1982, some return students in Surinam supported the coup and had advisory positions. Their branches in the Netherlands thus supported them. In general, Surinamese immigrant organisations that considered themselves as Left sympathized with the so-called revolution

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resulting from the coup while sympathizers of the old ruling parties opposed it. This homeland directed form of politics changed into diaspora politics and transplanted homeland politics when in 1982 the revolutionary leaders killed fifteen opponents of the regime. Political refugees schemed in diaspora to overthrow the regime. The noncommissioned officers who staged the coup in 1980 had their military training in the Netherlands. They were educated in a Dutch military organization where they learned how to speak up for their rights, a reality far removed from the Surinamese context. Around independence they returned with “a suitcase full of initiatives” (Lotens, 2004 p. 20), but were not taken seriously by their superiors. However, according to leader of the junta Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse, the coup would not have been successful without the assistance of the Dutch colonel of the military mission in Suriname (Sedoc-Dahlberg, 1990b p. 26). The Nationale Militaire Raad (NMR—National Military Council), under the leadership of Bouterse, took charge in 1980. Political parties were banned, the parliament suspended, the constitution adjourned and elections postponed (ibid.). The NMR surrounded itself with intellectuals of different signatures, both returnees from the Netherlands and people who had never left Surinam (Lotens, 2004 p. 24). Parties such as the PALU that grew out of the 1960s Marxist-Leninist Surinamese student movement in the Netherlands played a crucial role during the military regime of the 1980s. In the 1970s their revolutionary ideas did not appeal to the constituency; by 1980 they did (Sedoc-Dahlberg, 1990a p. 175). Surinamese immigrant groups in the Netherlands responded differently to the coup. Some organizations supported the coup and tried to mobilize other immigrants in favour of the revolution (SBS, 1980). Sympathizers of the traditional political parties that were put aside by the NMR rejected the coup. Some of the latter were active in Dutch political parties of different signatures and tried, unsuccessfully, to influence their parties’ policies regarding Surinam. Proponents of the coup aimed to stimulate return migration. On the request of the NMR, a return migration desk was founded by immigrants four days after the coup (De Ware Tijd, 1980). A month later, around four hundred persons had registered, willing to return when the NMR would ask them to (Trouw, 1980). The return migration desk did not exist for long and it is unknown how many people ultimately returned. Its proponents united in a national umbrella organization, the Revolutionaire Beweging van Ondersteunende Surinaamse Organisaties (REBOSON—Revolutionary Movement of Surinamese Supporting Organisations) in 1981. REBOSON maintained close contact with the NMR and included organizations and branches of parties that advised the NMR in Surinam such as the PALU (PALU, 1982); its main goal was to increase return migration and to lobby for the resumption of frozen Dutch development aid (REBOSON, 1983). So far the central transnational actors—immigrants—in the Netherlands were all engaged in homeland directed politics. For or against the coup,

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they were organized in existing Left-wing immigrant organizations and party branches. In all cases features of transplanted homeland politics are visible as branches or sympathizers of parties in Surinam adopted the point of view of their mother party. This radically changed after fifteen critics of the revolution were assassinated on December 8th 1982 in Surinam; political refugees arrived in the Netherlands thereafter. Influencing Dutch Foreign Affairs’ policies now became an important strategy for transnational actors in the Netherlands and Surinam. With the appearance of new emigrants— exiles—diaspora politics entered the transnational arena. This fostered radicalization of transplanted homeland politics and paralyzed the activities of immigrants who rejected the regime. In early 1983 exiles founded the Raad voor de Bevrijding van Suriname (RBS—Council for the Liberation of Suriname) in the Netherlands. Most RBS members had high political functions in Surinam, even the presidency. RBS held the Dutch government responsible for the coup, claiming that the Dutch military mission had murdered Surinamese democracy and encouraged the sergeants to stage the coup (RBS, 1986 p. 8). In their activities RBS appealed to the responsibility of the Netherlands to help reinstall democracy; it also strengthened contacts with representatives of Dutch parties. As their main goal was to return to Surinam, they did not cooperate with Surinamese immigrant organizations more focused on improving their position as immigrants in the Netherlands. In addition to RBS’ elite exiles, student leaders who had organized demonstrations against the NMR’s university reforms and then fled to the Netherlands, became active in diaspora politics. Exile students grouped together and tried to mobilize nonexile Surinamese students in the Netherlands, aiming to improve cooperation with Surinamese students willing to join resistance and support the RBS. However, mobilization of a broad student resistance group failed. Just as senior immigrant organizations were not willing to work with senior exiles in resistance organizations, immigrant students were unwilling to join resistance organizations of students in exile. Although still supportive of a democratic Surinam, exile students’ activities came to resemble those of a foreign student society rather than one of militant exiles. A student movement can not develop resistance activities from here, they argued, after your study you return and resist over there.9 In other words, diaspora politics is pointless—one needs to return to Surinam to make effective change. On the prorevolutionary side relations with key persons in Surinam improved after December 8th 1982. To oppose the RBS and promote the Surinamese ruling order, proponents launched the Liga van Surinaamse Patriotten (LSP—League of Surinamese Patriots) in the Netherlands. In fact it was a continuation of REBOSON. For the Left immigrant organisations, the decision to continue actions was largely based on whether relatives, friends or political leaders supported by the organisation had been among the victims of the murders (see De Waarheid, 1983). They did not create

240 Liza M. Nell an umbrella organisation like the LSP or RBS, of which they were critical; the RBS, consisting of the former political elite, was considered a continuation of ‘old’ politics (Kollektief Jumpa Rajguru, 1984). Logically, those who opposed the dictatorship rejected the LSP. Activities of the resistance movement in the Netherlands triggered the Surinamese ruling order to take reprisals against RBS and their relatives in Surinam. In both countries—or on holidays—people watched their steps. According to a former resistance leader, this led to social isolation within the Surinamese community in the Netherlands: “People were terrified to be associated with us.”10 This fear increased after a group of musicians were killed in a room where the RBS was scheduled to meet in 1985.11 After December 8th 1982, transnational political activism became more differentiated. The murder of opponents of military rule on Dutch territory was a clear example of transplanted homeland politics. Activities of Surinamese in the Netherlands had consequences for their relatives in Surinam, one reason why most immigrants did not participate in resistance activities even if they rejected the revolution. Supporters of the regime on the other hand became more home country directed, maintaining strong ties with the ruling order, though their position in Surinamese politics remained informal. Exiles had few (secret) transnational contacts in this period; they tried to achieve their goals via the Dutch government and relations with third country governments and political parties. New prospects for the resistance movement in the Netherlands appeared when Ronnie Brunswijk, former sergeant and bodyguard of Bouterse, began his revolt against the army in 1986. Soon Brunswijk was the most wanted criminal in Surinam. He sought asylum in the Netherlands, where two resistance leaders encouraged him to begin guerrilla struggle: “ . . . we agreed to overturn the military regime and to reinstall democracy. That is not possible without military violence. I was to start the resistance here and people in the Netherlands would support me.”12 In Surinam Brunswijk formed the Jungle Commando, formally the Surinamese National Liberation Army (SNLA), consisting mainly of maroons, descendents of run-away slaves, from Eastern Surinam. Both in the Netherlands and Surinam, many maroons from Eastern Surinam (a deprived and impoverished group) identified with Brunswijk’s struggle. The conflict gained a new dimension: the emancipation of maroons. From this moment the RBS took a supporting rather than a leading role in resistance.13 Now active on Surinamese territory, exiles became wanted terrorists in Surinam (Herrenberg, 1986). It ended in the 1986–1992 civil war between the SNLA and the National Army, when the SNLA controlled one-third of the country (De Vries, 2005). In the end the support of resistance organisations in the Netherlands was ineffective, characterized by promises, stated Brunswijk in an interview with a Dutch journalist (Van Beek, 1987). The resistance movement, consisting of RBS and some other organisations in the Netherlands and the SNLA in Surinam, was divided. Brunswijk’s attempt in 1987 to unite them

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failed. However, the RBS’ close contacts with Dutch political parties was in part behind the Dutch government’s indirect financial support of the SNLA under the banner of humanitarian aid for the maroon communities of Eastern Surinam (Storms, 1987). In December 1986 Desi Bouterse, economically hard pressed by the termination of Dutch development aid and the depressed market price for bauxite, announced elections for the following year (Hoogbergen & Kruijt, 2005). The old parties that had existed before independence, organised along ethnic lines, united in an electoral front that won easily. After the installation of a civilian government, resistance groups in the Netherlands officially ended their activities (Bakker, Dalhuisen, Hassankhan, & Steegh, 1998), though the SNLA continued its struggle, arguing that real democracy where the army was subordinate had not been achieved. On Christmas Eve 1990 the Army staged another coup, giving the former revolution leaders in the NDP another chance to prove themselves in an interim government. Following new elections in 1991, formal democracy and definitive peace between the army and the SNLA came in 1992. Military rule from 1980–1987 had a great impact on transnational politics and showed the fragmentation of transnational actors, both in Surinam and the Netherlands. This fragmentation reflected the political cleavages of the homeland, first imported into the immigrant society by students and later transnationalized in ties between settled immigrants in the Netherlands and return- and nonmigrants in Surinam. The divisions weakened mobilization capacity to influence political change; although military rule politicised the immigrant community in the Netherlands, transnational actors had little impact—their small-scale actions only supported specific groups. Although some return migrants (of whom the former revolution leader Bouterse is the most striking example) radically changed Surinamese politics, their transnational ties mattered little once in power. Likewise, transnational ties were vital to the creation of the SNLA, but actors in the Netherlands had little influence over the SNLA’s subsequent development.

TRANSNATIONAL PARTY POLITICS IN A POSTCOLONIAL DEMOCRACY (1987 AND THEREAFTER) The motives and activities of transnational actors changed when Surinam entered its period of postcolonial democracy. Influencing international relations between the Netherlands and Surinam became less important. Exiles did not return directly—some never did—but started to act as immigrants in the Netherlands. Both diaspora politics and radical transplanted homeland politics (i.e. import of homeland conflicts) faded away. Formal transnational party politics—ties between political parties in Surinam and their sympathizers in the Netherlands—mainly channelled home country directed transnational politics. The resemblance of the political fate of returnees in the 1990s

242 Liza M. Nell with the ones who returned before independence is striking. They clashed with the ruling political elite and with Surinamese political culture and created new marginal parties after—or instead of—joining existing parties. Contacts between Dutch parties and Surinamese immigrants and exiles were used quite differently during authoritarian rule. Especially exiles engaged in diaspora politics used such contacts to influence Dutch policy towards Surinam. When democracy was recovering, the same strategy was used to improve frozen international relations. Ironically, it was Bouterse, former revolution leader and now chairman of the Nationale Democratische Partij Suriname (NDP—National Democratic Party), who first used his transnational connections to try to influence Dutch politics. For this he invited a Dutch local politician of Surinamese origin from the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), who had supported him after the coup, to observe the 1987 elections. This, however, did not have the desired impact on relations between the Netherlands and Surinam or on the PvdA’s stance toward Bouterse. Instead the episode provoked criticism within the Surinamese community in the Netherlands (Nieuwe Bijlmer, 1987). In the run-up to the 1991 elections, much of the preelection debate in Surinam centred on the proposal of Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers to create a Commonwealth arrangement, the main aim of which was to reduce the role of the army in Surinamese political life (IACHR, 1992). In the Netherlands former resistance leaders backed such a Commonwealth. Toward this end, they began cooperating with immigrant elites to smooth relations between Surinam and the Netherlands by advising political parties in both countries. They now acted as Surinamese immigrants rather than exiles. In Surinam, Bouterse, who had just staged the second coup and had considerable power within the Army, wanted a new relationship with the Netherlands but not in the form of a Commonwealth. To improve communication between the two countries he invited Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin to exchange thoughts on the future of Surinam after the 1991 elections (De West, 1991). This time the Surinamese host selected local politicians of different Dutch parties from different cities. In several interviews the delegation members stated explicitly that they were politicians in the Netherlands. Their aim was not to “ . . . tell them in Paramaribo what to do” but “to influence their Dutch parties’ standpoint regarding Suriname” (Weekkrant, 1991). They thus became transnational actors trying to influence Dutch parties’ foreign policies. The Commonwealth was not to be: relations between Surinam and the Netherlands became more business-like while Surinamese interest in the Netherlands waned over time. This can be seen in party programs and election speeches: for instance, DA’91 in 1991 and 1996 campaigned for monetary union with the Netherlands, while in 2005 the Netherlands was only mentioned in passing. Bouterse’s NDP used its antagonistic relations with the Netherlands in election mass meetings in 2005 to emphasize the party’s independence and to denounce ongoing Dutch attempts to interfere with

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Surinamese politics and society. NPS leader Venetiaan emphasized Dutch exploitation of Surinam and the Netherland’s financial responsibilities toward Surinam. Rather than continuing to focus on the Netherlands, most parties, including the NPS and NDP, emphasized international relations within the Caribbean and with powers such as Brazil and China. These developments and the fact that Surinam is now a democracy gives Dutch politicians of Surinamese origin little reason to influence Dutch foreign policy on Surinam. When President Venetiaan visited the Netherlands he was received by a group of politicians of Surinamese origin. They received the Surinamese president as Dutch politicians with a special interest in Surinam (De Volkskrant, 2004) rather than as Surinamese politicians in Holland. When parties were allowed to re-enter politics in the run-up to the 1987 elections, Dutch branches were (re)created or formalized. It should be emphasized that most party branches in the Netherlands consist of very small groups of people with close personal relationships with party cadres in Surinam. This reflects Surinamese party formation based on ethnicity, religion, and/or family. One result is the large number of parties relative to the size of the electorate: 23 parties competed for 335,275 potential voters in 200514—a marked difference to the 15 parties that competed for roughly 12 million votes in the 2002 elections in the Netherlands.15 These figures show the small-scale support of political parties in Surinam, which is also reflected in transnational party politics. In general, the function of Dutch party branches is to support their parties financially. Because political parties do not receive financial support from the Surinamese government (Krishnadath, 2000), support from branches in kind and money is welcome. Political support is the other main contribution, with branches organising meetings for Dutch members and their Surinamese party leaders—physically or via a live phone connection. This is regardless of the fact that Surinamese in the Netherlands have no right to vote. Two party alliances believed that a Dutch campaign would influence voting behaviour in Surinam through family ties.16 They thought that people in Surinam would look up to their relatives in the Netherlands who had studied, earned good salaries and had made it in Dutch society; their voting advice would be taken seriously. The NDP had another motive to campaign in the Netherlands: to gain members among temporary Surinamese students who would one day return to Surinam.17 Sympathisers of all Surinamese parties, organised in party branches in the Netherlands, travelled to Surinam to support their parties in person. This was not organised by the parties; the ones who were able to leave their jobs and could afford to come did so. In most cases, this meant between three and ten people per party. During their stay they were often present at board meetings; public appearances were rare. Members of the Dutch branches assisted with logistics, handed out propaganda, performed administrative tasks, and acted as observers at voting stations. But when it came to concrete policy proposals, advice from the Dutch branches was generally

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ignored, even though individual party members in the Netherlands routinely advise individual politicians in Surinam. Although such advice is requested often and taken seriously, it is usually channelled through ties between relatives or very old friends. Few (former) members of the Dutch branches were approached by Surinamese party leaders for political positions. Former VHP chairman Lachmon in the late 1980s was well aware that a large part of the Surinamese intelligentsia resided in the Netherlands (Elsevier, 1989); in 1991 he approached a member of the VHP branch in the Netherlands to become Minister of Justice (Boerboom & Oranje, 1992). Soewarto Moestadja, past chairman of the Kerukanan Tulodo Pranatan Ingit (KTPI—Party for National Unity and Solidarity) branch in the Netherlands, was requested by his party leader to return and become Minister of Social Affairs in 1996. But party members reacted negatively to Moestadja’s special position and his Dutch working methods; Moestadja left the KTPI to found his own party, Democraten van de 21ste eeuw (D 21—Democrats of the 21st Century).18 For most return migrants, involvement in Dutch branches has been no guarantee of high position in Surinam. According to present VHP chairman and vice president Sardjoe, looking for expertise in the Netherlands is no longer necessary: “We have a pool of graduates here, coming straight from our own university. Academics who studied in the Netherlands used to be received as heroes when they returned . . . Now they just go up in the mass.’19 As in the 1970s, return migrants in the 1990s established their own parties; at least two took part in elections for the first time in 2005. Although these party leaders had networks among Surinamese in the Netherlands, they did not establish branches there. As with returnees’ parties in the 1970s, they received few votes in 2005; what was new was the exclusive focus on mobilization in Surinam. If successful, they could expand their field to the Netherlands. Another obstacle for return migrants with political ambitions is their Dutch nationality. By giving up Dutch nationality one loses Dutch social security rights should return migration fail. In 2005 politicians of three different parties took their chances and obtained Surinamese nationality to become political candidates. In one case citizenship became a serious issue. Just before the presidential elections (i.e. just after the general election), it turned out that the NDP candidate had not given up his Dutch nationality. Nevertheless, the controversial elections went ahead. In their campaign the counter partycombination Nieuw Front (New Front) had television spots in which they portrayed the NDP as wanting to return Surinam to the Dutch.20 Political stability in Surinam makes diaspora politics and radical transplanted homeland politics redundant. Likewise, the strategy of achieving influence via Dutch foreign policy has lost legitimacy. Surinamese transnational party politics are more successful when ties are based on friendship and family. Compared to ties between parties of return graduates and Dutch student organizations, branches based on friendships and family

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have higher chances of success: their transnational ties are strong and foster frequent communication.

CONCLUSION This chapter has discussed transnational politics over 50 years of Surinamese history—as a colony nearing independence, under a military regime, and as a postcolonial democratic republic. The pattern is one of immigrants’ transnational political activity being successful only when they support an existing party’s position and leadership and do not challenge other political parties or the political elite as a whole. Politically ambitious return migrants often wanted to change the Surinamese political landscape, something that was never tolerated by nonmigrants or long-term return migrants. Newly arrived return migrants were thus excluded, or excluded themselves, from the circle of political power. Settled return migrants, however, remain visible in contemporary Surinamese politics, with over half of present party leaders having spent at least some of their formative years in the Netherlands. Although a new generation of politicians educated in Surinam and waning interest in the Netherlands are weakening the transnational component of Surinamese politics, strong ties between friends and relatives make it unlikely that this transnational component will disappear. Its impact should not be underestimated; individuals in the Netherlands can have great influence on the political decisions of individual Surinamese politicians. Reflecting Surinamese politics, such influence will become more individualized and informal. The Surinamese case shows how political circumstances in the (post) colonial home country have influenced emigration and return migration motives, and thereby the direction of transnational politics and the actors involved. Since the 1950s, organized politics in Surinam did not welcome the use of transnational ties to contribute to politics while the transnational ties that lasted reflected Surinamese political organization. Thus, success or failure of home country directed politics depends on the responsiveness of actors based in the home country. This emphasizes the importance of including nonmigrants and long-term returnees in studies on transnationalism. NOTES 1. Fieldwork in Suriname (May–July 2005) was made possible through a travel grant of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I thank Meindert Fennema, John Jansen van Galen, Daniel Mügge, and Rinus Penninx for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter and Takeo Hymans for editing it. 2. www.cbs.nl (Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands). 3. Surinamese Bureau of Statistics cited on www.suriname.nu. 4. www.cbs.nl.

246 Liza M. Nell 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Interview with the author, Rotterdam, 6 May 2005. Interview with the author, Rotterdam, 13 April 2005. Interview with the author Paramaribo, 16 June 2005. Interview with the author Paramaribo, 13 June 2005. Discussiegroep notes of a meeting held 29 June 1985, Bijlmermeer, personal archive of Pancho Samson received in Paramaribo, August 2005. Interview with Jules Sedney, former board member of the Pendawa Lima, Paramaribo, 30 July 2005. Ibid. Interview with the author, Paramaribo, 29 August 2005. Notes of meeting of students with Chin A Sen, 27 October 1986: personal archive of Pancho Samson received in Paramaribo, August 2005. http://www.suriname.nu/102alg/kiezerslijsten.html. http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g61leshz. Interview with Jules Wijdenbosch, DNP 2000 chairman, Amsterdam, 3 August 2004; interview with Harry Kisoensingh, former chairman of HPP and UPS, Nickerie, 22 July 2005. Interview with Earl Abrahams, chairman of the Dutch NDP, Amsterdam, 11 April 2005. Interview with Soewarto Moestadja, chairman of D 21, Paramaribo, 12 August 2005. Interview with the author, Paramaribo, 27 August 2005. Fieldnotes Paramaribo/Nickerie, 22 July-1 August 2005.

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De Ware Tijd. (1980, 11 March). Remigratieburo voor Surinamers opgericht. De West. (1991, 11 March). Nederlandse politici op bezoek. Dew, E. (1996). The difficult flowering of Surinam. Ethnicity and politics in a plural society. Paramaribo: Vaco. Duval, D. T. (2004). Linking return visits and return migration among Commonwealth Eastern Caribbean Migrants in Toronto. Global Networks, 4(1), 51–67. Elsevier. (1989, 6 May). Wie echt vaderlandslievend is, neemt risico’s. Jagernath Lachmon en de Surinaamse verbroedering. Faist, T. (2000). The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freeman, G. P. & Ögelman, N. (1998). Homeland citizenship policies and the status of third country nationals in the European Union. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(4), 769–788. Gmelch, G. (1980). Return migration. Annual Review of Anthropology, 135–159. Gowricharn, R. & Schüster, J. (2001). Diaspora and transnationalism: The case of the Surinamese in the Netherlands. In R. Hoefte & P. Meel (Eds.), 20th Century Surinam (pp. 155–174). Leiden: KITLV Press. Guarnizo, L. E. (1997). The emergence of a transnational social formation and the mirage of return migration among Dominican transmigrants. Identities, 4(2), 281–322. Guarnizo, L. E., Portes, A. & Haller, W. (2003). Assimilation and transnationalism. determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants. American Journal of Sociology, 108(6), 1211–1248. Herrenberg, H. F. (1986, 20 September). Het verschijnsel Ronnie Brunswijk. Lezing gehouden in het IPV gebouw, centrum VFB. Hoogbergen, W. & Kruijt, D. (2005). De oorlog van de sergeanten. Surinaamse militairen in de politiek. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. Howard, D. (2003). Dominicans abroad: Impacts and responses in a transnational society. In Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (Ed.), International migration and sending countries. Perceptions, policies and transnational relations (pp. 57–76). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Jansen van Galen, J. (2000). Hetenachtsdroom. Het Surinaams nationalisme. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact. Kagné, B. (2000, November). L’immigration africaine, diversité des trajectoires. Agenda Interculturel, 188, 4–10. Kollektief Jumpa Rajguru (1984). Kollektief. Kollektief, 1(1). Koopmans, R. & Statham, P. (2003). How national citizenship shapes transnationalism: A comparative analysis of migrant claims-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. InC. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), Toward assimilation and citizenship. Immigrants in liberal nation-states (pp. 195–238.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Koser, K. (2003). Mobilizing new African diasporas. In K. Koser (Ed.), New African diasporas (pp. 111–123). London: Routledge. KPS/ML. (1975). Vijf jaar kommunistiese beweging, 24 juni 1970–24 juni 1975. Paramaribo: Proleks. Krishnadath, J. R. P. (2000). Political party and campaign financing in Suriname. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy–International IDEA: OAS. Levitt, P. (1998). Social remittances: Migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. International Migration Review, 32 (4), 926–948. Ley, D. & Kobayashi, A. (2005). Back to Hong Kong: return migration or transnational sojourn? Global Networks, 5(2), 111–127. Lier, R. A. J. van (1971). Frontier society. A social analysis of the history of Surinam. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. LOSON. (1976). Wrokoman. Wrokoman, 3(1).

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Lotens, W. (2004). Omkijken naar een ‘revolutie.’ Surinaamse intellectuelen onder militairen. Paramaribo: Eigen beheer. Manuh, T. (2003). ‘Efie’ or the meanings of ‘home’ among female and male Ghanaian migrants in Toronto, Canada and returned migrants to Ghana. In K. Koser (Ed.), New African diasporas (pp. 140–159). London: Routledge. Martínez-Saldaña, J. (2003). Los Olvidados become heroes: The evolution of Mexico’s policies towards citizens abroad. In E. Østergaard-Nielsen (Ed.), International migration and sending countries. Perceptions, policies and transnational relations (pp. 33–56). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mohogu, M. (2000). Kongolezen: gemeenschapsvorming door organisaties. In I. van Kessel & N. Tellegen (Eds.), Afrikanen in Nederland (pp. 149–165). Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen. Nieuwe Bijlmer. (1987, 3 December). Bijlmerpolitici naar Suriname. Deelraad accepteert invitatie bijwonen verkiezingen. Organisation of American States. (1992). Annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1991. Olesen, H. (2002). Migration, return, and development: An institutional perspective. International Migration, 40(5), 125–150. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003a). Transnational politics. Turks and Kurds in Germany. London/New York: Routledge. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003b). Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’: Overseas nationals as an ambiguous asset. In E. Østergaard-Nielsen (Ed.), International migration and sending countries: Perceptions, policies and transnational relations (pp. 77–98). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. PALU. (1982). Palu-Informatie. PALU-Informatie, 3(1). Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ramsoedh, H. (2001). Playing politics: Ethnicity, clientalism, and the struggle for power. In R. Hoefte & P. Meel (Eds.), 20th century Suriname: Continuities and discontinuities in a new world society (pp. 91–110). Leiden: KITLV Press. RBS. (1986). RBS Bulletin. RBS Bulletin, 2(6). REBOSON. (1983). De dekolonisatie van Suriname. Wageningen: Reboson. SBS. (1979). Surinaamse informatie. Suriname Informatie, 6(1). SBS. (1980). Na de staatsgreep. Suriname Informatie, 7(3). Sedney, J. (1997). De toekomst van ons verleden. Democratie, etniciteit en politieke machtsvorming in Suriname. Paramaribo: Vaco. Sedoc-Dahlberg, B. (1971). Surinaamse studenten in Nederland. Een onderzoek rond de problematiek van de toekomstige kadervorming in Suriname. Amsterdam: Dissertatie. Sedoc-Dahlberg, B. (1990a). Struggle for democracy in Suriname. In B. Sedoc-Dahlberg (Ed.), The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for democracy (pp. 173–190). New York: Gordon and Breach. Sedoc-Dahlberg, B. (1990b). Suriname: 1975–1989. Domestic and foreign policies under military and civilian rule. In B. Sedoc-Dahlberg (Ed.), The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy (pp. 17–34). New York: Gordon and Breach. Smith, R. C. (2003). Transnational localities: Community, technology and the politics of membership within the context of Mexico and U.S. migration. In M. P. Smith & L. E. Guarnizo (Eds.), Transnationalism from below (pp. 196–240). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Storms, P. (1987). Op de 25ste is het stil in de jungle. De Nieuwe Revu, 9–15. Thomas-Hope, E. (1999). Return migration to Jamaica and its development potential. International Migration, 37(1), 183–207.

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Part IV

Comprehensive Studies

13 Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration Cases from Senegal and Lebanon Fenneke Reysoo1

In 2004, an International Conference on Female Migration and the New International Division of Labour was organized at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies in Geneva (Verschuur & Reysoo, 2005). At the Conference, academic researchers, representatives of International Organizations, development practitioners and feminist activists debated themes ranging from feminization of migration (Reysoo, 2004); the international policy context (The Hague Declaration; Module IV by the WTO); and the lived experiences of concrete female migrants. Theoretical debates conceptualized the new international division of labour, empowerment, and exploitation. This chapter attempts to share, with a broader audience, some of these thought-provoking discussions and insights into the phenomenon of female migration and its transformative impact on gender regimes and the status of women in migrant households and families as a major aspect of the migration-development nexus. The first part contextualizes the feminization of migration as a social and theoretical problem. The second part analyzes two concrete cases of female migration (rural-urban migration in Senegal and transnational migration from Sri Lanka to Lebanon) to illustrate the diversity of motivations and modalities of migratory trajectories at the microlevel, while also highlighting their family resemblance at the macrolevel in the context of open labour markets and globalization.

THE FEMINIZATION OF MIGRATION The expression feminization of migration refers to at least three empirical and theoretical domains. First of all, there is a strong idea about the recency of the phenomenon of female migration. Migrants are here defined as persons who live for more than one year in a country other than that of their nationality or birth. Statistics released by the United Nations show that over the past 40 years, women have always constituted about half of the migrant populations (Zlotnik, 2003). Why then is the feminization of migration suddenly an issue of interest? The answer might be an epistemological issue.

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Studying migration in ungendered ways has for a long time normalized male experiences and hidden women’s ones. Researchers (see Oso, 2005 p. 35–42) distinguish three main historical periods of academic interest in female migration. The first period, which runs till the mid-1970s, is characterized by an absence of scientific attention toward female migrants. It was presumed that international labour migration concerned only male workers. At a particular moment in their migratory history, men were able to unite their families and bring spouses and children to their new homelands. This characterized the second period of research. Generally, spouses and children obtained dependent resident permits and lacked autonomous status. This led to a distinction made by scholars between active and passive migrants; active with a male connotation, passive a female one. Research interests were focussing on active migrants and female migrants continued to be a blind spot. Nevertheless, the proportion of foreign women to the total number of migrants increased from 38% in 1973 to 49% in 1990 in Germany, from 39% in 1968 to 45% in 1990 in France, from 38% in 1976 to 45% in 1990 in the Netherlands (United Nations Secretariat, 1995 op. cit. Oso, 2005 p. 40). Only from the 1980s onwards, did academic research discover the new phenomenon of economically active female migrants, who are subjects of their migration (Oso, 2005; Diouf, 2004 p. 12). Women migrants’ low visibility in migration studies was not only related to their dependent status, but also to the fact that they occupied jobs in rather marginal economic sectors which implied lower social visibility as well. The absence of labour regulations and women’s so-called proneness to obedience has made them muted actors in sectors ranging from domestic work and entertainment-sex work to labour-intensive industrial plants in Free Trade Zones in national contexts where they tried to earn an income. Summarizing, we notice that the scientific community first silenced female migrants, then allotted them a passive role in migration, and finally recognized their role as protagonists in the new economic global labour market structure. Another theoretical interest is that the feminization of migration is intrinsically linked to globalization and in particular to the new international division of labour (Federici, 2002; Huang, Yeoh, & Abdul, 2005; Parreñas, 2001). The motivation to migrate lies in the poverty of their home communities and the increasing demand for female labour in the particular sectors mentioned earlier. Whereas in western countries, female labour force participation has tremendously increased over the last 30 years (Sanghera, 2004), state agencies have not reconsidered the reorganization of reproductive labour in Marxist terms. Women were massively integrated in the market economy to increase the GDP of their nation, but the infrastructure for child-care, care for the sick and elderly was not assured by the State at the same pace. The new social category of working mothers induced a new way of envisaging the organization of the domestic sphere. Hiring—cheap and

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 255 temporary—foreign domestic workers ensured the social reproduction of middle class gender regimes (especially sexual division of labour) and led to a new international division of labour (Federici, 2002). Overseas domestic workers—either through placement agencies or through informal networking—could benefit from food and lodging in the employers’ family. It brought about a reversal of the known migratory trajectories. In former times, a male breadwinner went first and tried to create conditions for family reunification; in recent times, female spouses earned the family income abroad, leaving childcare to husbands or grandmothers, and eventually their husband and children joined them (Mexicans in United States, Moroccans in Spain, for example). These new livelihood strategies of families reverse the symbolic construction of man-the-breadwinner model. It also impacted on family organization in the home communities by involving either men in care activities or integrating grandmothers in a second cycle of mothering. Why do traditional families have to take recourse to strategies that reverse the normal gender regimes? As suggested earlier, in particular contexts, female migrants have a better chance of employment in the labour market of receiving countries, which is the case in some Middle Eastern, European, and American countries. Especially, being employed as domestic workers in contexts where the own (often middle class) women have entered the labour market (Sanghera, 2004), as in Europe or the United States. In addition to the pull factor, several push factors have contributed to the increase in autonomous female migrants. In many sending countries, we observe massive male unemployment. In communities and families where man-the-breadwinner is a mere symbolic construction without any empirical foundation, women are the buffers and have to guarantee meals and care for the family. In Senegal this is called économie de la débrouille (bootstrapping economy; Mottin Sylla, 1991). It is undeniable thus that the increase in female migrants is linked to structural changes in the world economy. Interestingly, these changes in the global economy trigger off new configurations of gender regimes. But what does migration mean for migrant women and men? Grounding my reflections in a phenomenology of experiences of concrete actors, I want to draw attention to local lived realities of women and men, unmarried and married, who at a particular moment in their social life cycle decided to leave their families or communities to improve the living conditions of their families. As a methodological challenge, I propose to juxtapose and compare the rural-urban migration within the boundaries of the Nation-State of Senegal with the transnational migration of Sri Lankan women to Lebanon. The first case has been thoroughly documented by Diouf (2004) who documented the lived experiences of the Serere migrants and questioned the gender specific modes of integration (insertion sociale) of unmarried Serere rural people who migrate to the capital city of Dakar, with emphasis on young girls employed as domestic workers in town. The second case is based on secondary data and inspired by the tremendous increase

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in married Sri Lankan women who contribute to their family incomes by temporarily being employed as domestic workers in the Middle-East, specifically in Lebanon. Although I am aware of the limitations of reasoning from one or two particular cases, and of the epistemological leap required to link the particular to the general (Passeron & Revel, 2005 pp. 27–36), I think that these cases of female migration constitute a family resemblance (Wittgenstein, 1953) and that these—at first sight—diverse cases contain similarities with regard to the articulation of global economic restructuring and changing gender regimes. The comparison highlights that women in concrete contexts are adjusting differently to the needs of global restructuring. The questions that underlie the analysis of the two cases are: What are the motivations for unmarried Serere men and women to migrate to Dakar? What are the motivations of married Sri Lankan women to migrate to Lebanon? How is the migratory trajectory organized and how does it relate to the larger global economic processes? How does the migration of women affect traditional gender regimes? What can be said about the link between migration and social development?

THE SENEGALESE CASE: RURAL TO URBAN MIGRATION OF UNMARRIED SERERE PEOPLE2 The social organization of the Serere-Sine group (living in the region between the towns of Kaolack, Fatick, Diourbel) is complex and based on two groups (residential compound unit called mbind; and the production and consumption unit called ngak) and two lineage groups (one patrilineal that regulates inheritance of property and social functions, one matrilineal that regulates marriage arrangements, savings, funerals, and professional orientation). Belonging to all these groups at the same time means that a Serere is never alone and always embedded in a social arrangement. Traditionally, the Serere-Sine depended on subsistence agriculture and livestock. In the course of the last four decades, agriculture activities have undergone a profound structural change. With the introduction of peanuts as cashcrop, the agricultural cycle has been intensified and soil has deteriorated. The introduction of the peanut monoculture also brought about a structural change in the traditional sexual division of labour and women who contributed with their labour and crops to the subsistence of the family, were marginalized. Fewer subsistence products, poorer soil, climatic changes, and relative overpopulation led to out-migration. In the early 1960s, men started migrating and this was not appreciated in traditional communities. However, the transformation of the agricultural production system did not leave enough work for all. Persons who tried to earn an income elsewhere became a reality and the perception of them changed rather quickly. From being perceived as adventurers and losers,

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 257 they became successful and respected family members. When women, especially unmarried girls, of the age of 10–20 years, started migrating toward the end of the 1960s, reluctance had already weakened (Diouf, 2004 p. 49). Finally labour migration was greatly appreciated as migrants participated to substantially increase a family’s (ngak) income through remittances (in kind, i.e. gifts, and in cash) back home. Marital strategies changed accordingly. In former times, families would marry their daughters rather young to prevent them from migrating. Nowadays, marriages are postponed to allow unmarried girls to participate in the gathering of their bride-wealth. Although these changes in practices and perceptions seem logical and appreciated, ambivalent feelings remain. Out-migration is seen as a necessary nuisance. From a survival strategy perspective of the production and consumption unit, sending an unmarried girl is a mouth less to feed and eventually represents monetary gains. However, her departure from the community also means lesser control on her whereabouts. Rural exodus thus contributes both to increased material welfare of the ngak and the disintegration of the basic social groups. This is the shadow side of economic development. Why are Serere mothers nowadays more eager to send their young unmarried daughters to town and what motivates these young girls to migrate? What about unmarried young men? Are we witnessing rationale choices that contribute to the diversification of a family’s income? The first aim is to find a paid job in Dakar and send money back home. But for the girls themselves, being in town without the direct supervision of parents also means relatively more liberty and personal development (Diouf, 2004 p. 48). The unmarried girls interviewed by Diouf (2004 p. 50) explain that their move to town provides them with an opportunity to become more autonomous, with the money they earn they can buy clothes and cosmetics. They are also proud to be able to help their ngak back home by sending money. On top of this, they all plan to buy utensils, sheets and so on as components of their bride-wealth. During his field research, Diouf (2004 p. 51) also found that unmarried girls (aged 7 to 14 years) are called for by residential groups of the family (mbind) to assist in domestic chores. In this case, they will not earn an income, but will get a so called urban upbringing. This system of confiage does not have a male counterpart, that is, boys are hardly ever given as free workforce to another family. Sending a boy would mean for the mbind another mouth to feed without any services provided. Motivations for unmarried boys to migrate are different. On the one hand, a bad agricultural season might be a push-factor, but often it is a school drop-out or simply a quest for adventure. Boys will try to develop savings for a dowry. And last, sending gifts—in kind—back to the home community will give them symbolic prestige. The age at the moment of migration is higher among boys (17–20 years) than among girls (starting from the age of 7 onwards). The decision to migrate lies with the members of the ngak. At this level it will be decided if a loss of workforce (especially in the case of male members)

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or a mouth less to feed (in the case of female members) is desired. In case of a decision concerning a girl of the ngak, her maternal uncle who is supposed to survey her moral education has the last say. The utmost failure of a migration project is that a girl gets pregnant out of wedlock; virginity until marriage is a central cultural and moral value among the Serere (Diouf, 2004 p. 52).3 The gendered dimension of such decision making is that boys only need the approval of the ngak and not that of their maternal uncle, who theoretically also surveys the moral behaviour of his sister’s sons. Within these social dynamics, the decision surrounding the departure of a boy seems to be easier and less controversial (Diouf, 2004). Once the decision is taken that a family member will leave the rural community, all kinds of rituals and sacrifices are organized to protect the person and assure his/her success in Dakar. If the migration is not in response to the demand of a family in Dakar, networks are mobilized to organize their move to the town. This mobilization is more intensive when it concerns a girl. The migration project is really a family affair and not just an individual project. The migrants—both male and female—receive all kinds of admonitions such as: “Do not forget those you have left behind and their economic conditions,” “Beware that we trust in you,” “We know that you will never forget us,” or “We will constantly pray for you” (Diouf, 2004 p. 54, my translation). On top of that, girls get special instructions on sexuality issues from their paternal aunt (fap o tew or female father). Each person migrating to town thus carries along the expectations of the whole family, in addition to his or her own aspirations. It is culturally accepted that people visit families without announcing their arrival. It is a duty to receive a family member who knocks on the door of the head of a residential compound. New migrants will always have a place to stay when they come to Dakar. But they have to share contiguous space and whatever food is served. Girls and women will immediately give a helping hand in household chores whereas boys and men will not (and are not supposed to) contribute in kind. Independence being a key component of male identity, they will rapidly seek a paid job and a place of their own to stay (renting or corenting a room). Girls and women on average stay longer at their guest families, but even when they find a job outside they will continue to participate in household chores. Rural exodus of women thus implies additional pressure on the residential space of urban families. The prevailing housing crisis in Dakar makes it difficult for young women to access property. Additionally, it is morally less accepted for young girls to rent a room of their own unless collectively. Many of the young unmarried Serere women who arrive in Dakar are illiterate and get employed as domestic workers. Household activities in Dakar are numerous and according to her age and experiences, a girl will get involved in tasks as diverse as fetching water from collective water fountains, washing clothes, cleaning houses, grinding millet, washing the dishes, making the fire, going to the market, cooking, bringing food to third persons

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 259 elsewhere in town, taking care of children, carrying them on her back, playing with them and feeding them. According to age differences, salaries range from 2000 to 5000 FCFA per month to 20 to 30.000 FCFA per month (€3 to €7.5 and €30 to €45 per month). Once in town, the girls actively seek an employer and negotiate their salaries themselves or with the help of their peers. After having come to an oral agreement, they start working. When the girl is dissatisfied with the working load or conditions, she can immediately quit the place. According to Diouf (2004), there is a relatively high turn over. Because of the high work load, low salaries, little free time and lack of respect, the girls constantly try to find better places. However, their need for money is real and earning an income is highly appreciated. Hence, they sometimes accept suboptimal conditions. Part of it will be sent home and another part will be used for personal consumption goods, dresses, and cosmetics. I have expanded on the social and engendered details of these Serere migrants to highlight the complexity of decision making when it comes to a plan for migration. This case study goes beyond a simple paradigm of push and pull factors and conceptualizes new economic strategies of a family. It shows how women and men, girls and boys, contribute differently to assure economic assets in kind or in cash, in social capital or in morality gains. It also shows that migration is part of an economic and social development strategy of families and communities as well as a personal development strategy of individuals. Increasingly appreciated over the years for what migrants can contribute to the material welfare of a family, migration is also perceived as the root cause of social disintegration, especially as unmarried girls start earning, gaining autonomy and sometimes transgressing traditional moral and cultural codes for example by getting pregnant out of wedlock. This gain in liberty in Dakar cuts both ways: it exerts more control on them by their moral guardians (maternal uncle, paternal aunt), while also contributing to their emancipation in the sense that they enjoy more freedom of movement and more access to money. Some young women who have tasted the advantages of economic independence and (sexual) liberty postpone marriage. Others, who return to their villages, may at some point in their lives go back to Dakar to complement the family income or fully sustain their family if the men are unable to access formal employment and stable incomes. From this, we learn that migration has been induced by radical changes in the agricultural production system (from subsistence agriculture to export-oriented peanut cultivation). It resulted in controversial, though collective, dynamics linking up livelihood strategies of families and communities with individual empowerment, especially emancipatory opportunities for young women. This case of migration, in particular, the strategies and dynamics around female migrants, sketches the contours of the modalities and modes of other forms of migration, especially transnational flows. In the next case, we present the massive flow of Sri Lankan married women who enter the domestic labour market of Lebanon.

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THE LEBANESE CASE: TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION OF MARRIED WOMEN FROM SRI LANKA4 The Sri Lankan Government initiated an active overseas employment policy from the late 1970s onwards following the opening up of the Sri Lankan economy. Export-oriented production replaced the import substituting industries and the structure of the labour market changed profoundly. The increase in unemployment and the loss of male household incomes made Sri Lankans, including married women, candidates for migration. From the Government perspective, an ever increasing trade deficit meant that labour had become an important export commodity. For example, in 1999, total remittances from Sri Lankan workers abroad totalled one billion US dollars (compared to 0.7 billion trade deficit; Jureidini, 2003 p. iii). These massive migratory flows had to be regulated. This task was taken up by the Government. With the increase in volume of labour migration and, linked to it, the increase in the number of foreign labour agents, it became essential to extend government measures. That led to the so-called ‘Foreign Employment Agency Act no. 32’ of 1980. This law provided the supervision of recruiters and was aimed, more than before, at the protection of migrants’ interests. (Eelens & Speckmann, 1990 p. 303) The particularity of Sri Lankan labour migration is that it is one of the rare countries from which far more women than men leave for overseas employment.5 The notion of feminization of migration thus gains strength when considering Sri Lankan labour migration patterns. Out of a total of 130,000 female migrants from Sri Lanka, about 15,000 women migrated to Lebanon annually between 2000 and 2004, as against 400 Sri Lankan men who migrated to Lebanon yearly over the same period. Of these Sri Lankan female migrants, around 80 to 90% are domestic workers (Annual Statistical Report, 2004). According to statistics released by the Lebanese Ministry of Labour, Sri Lankan migrants compose more than half of all legal immigrant workers in Lebanon (ACS, 1998). According to Jureidini and Moukarbel (2000 p. 3), before the 1980s, domestic work was carried out by unmarried Lebanese and Middle East women from poor rural families. They were young (aged above 10 years) and usually left when it was time to get married. The immigration of Asian women probably started with the on-set of the civil war in Lebanon. For security reasons, domestic workers from Syria and Egypt opted to return home. The vacuum created was filled up with workers from Asia, who were also cheaper in the bargain. In course of time, the influx of women from Asia has introduced a racial element to domestic work and led to an economic depreciation of the work. As a result, local people now reject such low status work. At the national level, the Lebanese Government accepted the influx of cheap foreign labour as a measure to contain inflation (Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2000 p. 2).

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 261 Not only are there more women than men leaving Sri Lanka for overseas employment, but also curiously enough, two thirds of the women are married and leave their husbands and children behind. Eelens and Speckmann (1990 p. 317) draw attention to the fact that it is culturally considered inappropriate for women to leave the house for an extended period of time without the company of a male relative. However, aware of the necessity for better incomes, women sacrifice their roles as mothers and spouses to improve the living conditions of the family. This fact has drawn the attention of UNICEF which reports that around 40,000 children under the age of 5 have a mother living and working in the Middle East (Gunatilleke, 1987; see also Asis, 2003; Battistella & Conaco, 1998) which has consequences for the sexual division of labour and the configuration of traditional gender regimes back home. “These women are motivated simply by the desire for a better life for their families and for themselves. Failure on the part of the successive governments to provide at least for basic needs of these citizens make these illiterate poor women migrate to these countries and work under . . . trying circumstances” (Report Forum for Human Dignity, 2002 p. 8). Migration is seen as the most important strategy to overcome economic deprivation (Eelens & Speckmann, 1990 p. 313). Many migrants have “earned up to three or four times what they could have earned if they had not migrated” (Jureidini, 2003 p. 12). The remittances are as vital for the families as for the Government. Migration mitigates the serious problem of unemployment in Sri Lanka. Policies of temporary work contracts in the receiving country are meant to prevent these migrants from permanently settling down and claiming citizenship rights such as family reunification. As long as family reunification is not a real option, this form of contracted labour migration leads to the dislocation of families. This is the shadow side of the economic development policy of the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan Department of Foreign Affairs (Seva Vanitha Unit) issues a Guide for Sri Lankan Women Seeking Employment in the Middle East in which they provide an all but rosy presentation of working conditions in the Middle East. A first point insists on the expenses an employer makes and therefore that HE (my emphasis) expects the employee to work hard and serve him (sic). Second, it is mentioned that working hours are long and work is hard. Third, in the absence of labour laws governing employment of domestic workers, it is difficult to make claims for Fridays off (Eelens & Speckmann 1990 p. 304–305). With this information in mind, many women still materialize their migration project. In order to avoid abuses, recruitment had to be managed through agents registered with the Foreign Employment Bureau and employers have to be registered with the Sri Lankan diplomatic mission created in 1998 (Jureidini, 2003 p. 8). A Report written by the Forum for Human Dignity (2002) reveals parallel circuits next to the official lines of the Bureau of Foreign Employment. “The demand for foreign employment has led to a thriving

262 Fenneke Reysoo recruitment sector and to enormous illegal activities also among authorized employment agents” (Eelens & Speckmann, 1990 p. 297). Because the migrant workers are monetary assets, travel agencies and job agents enter the market and recruit women under false pretences. Employers have to make substantial up-front payments that range from 1,500 to 3,000 US dollars. For these reasons, passports and other documents are sometimes withheld upon arrival rendering these women completely dependent on the caprices of their employers or agents. Additionally, the women are told repeatedly that they have spent money to get them there. The Report of the Forum for Human Dignity informs that in 2002, more than 308 dead bodies of young Sri Lankan migrant workers were sent home, besides the many unidentified bodies in the mortuaries. After the denunciation of abuses, the Sri Lankan Bureau for Foreign Employment created safe houses in the embassies in Lebanon and other countries in the Middle East (Nonis, 1999 op. cit. in: Jureidini, 2003 p. 11). Jureidini and Moukarbel (2000) elaborate on the modalities of getting a work contract in Lebanon. Referring to Bales (1997, p. 19), they argue that the way Sri Lankan domestic workers are contracted falls into the realm of contract slavery, which they define as a situation in which contracts are legal fictions rather than legally binding employment agreements. In principle, the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Labour identifies Lebanese agencies or sponsors to employ a domestic worker. These agencies and/or employers make “up-front costs of airfares, agency charges, visas, work permits and residency permits” (Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2000 p. 2). Employers happen to consider these investments as a loan/credit to the employee which is often used to pressure the domestic worker to do things not regulated by the contract. Furthermore, in the survey of seventy Sri Lankan domestic workers conducted by Jureidini and Moukarbel, 71% did not really sign a contract, either in Sri Lanka or in Lebanon. They appear to have entered an employment relation without conditions. Those who have signed contracts find it difficult to get it enforced. Because they have no recourse to unions, nor are they covered by Lebanese labour laws. Bales concludes that the whole procedure is merely a ruse, “an enticement to trick an individual into slavery” (Bales, 1997 p. 20 op cit. in: Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2000 p. 2). Despite such conclusions on the contract slavery of Sri Lankan (and other Asian) domestic workers in Lebanon, not all of them live and work under the same conditions. Jureidini and Moukarbel (2000 p. 3–5) have distinguished three types of domestic workers in Lebanon. The first is the live-in maid, the second the freelancer and the third the runaway. The ‘livein’ resides within the employer’s household and has little liberty. These are domestic workers who: “clean, wash, serve meals, cook or prepare food, care for children, tidy up, remove the garbage, water plants, shop, walk the dog, feed the cat and so on. The average length of the workday is between 16 and 17 hours, and they are often on call 24 hours a day . . .” (Jureidini, 2003 p. 8). Eelens and Speckmann (1990 p. 300) report similar exploitive

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 263 conditions and add “furthermore, their time off is very limited; in a number of countries with strong traditional values they are not allowed to go out by themselves.” They can not change employers without the approval of the Lebanese authorities which provided the work permit. Freelancers live on their own and have the freedom to withdraw their services as they wish. This category looks like the Serere domestic workers who do not stay with their employers and can change jobs whenever they decide. However, Asian domestic workers in Lebanon need to have a sponsor to remain within the law. Needless to say, this sponsorship institution leads to abuse and blackmail (for more details see Jureidini & Moukarbel, 2000). Runaways are domestic workers who flee and seek refuge either in embassies or sometimes with compatriots. As soon as a woman runs away, she becomes an illegal and can be arrested by the General Security if she does not show her identity documents. Publications by human rights organizations denounce the harsh conditions under which these runaways are hosted, either in safe houses at the Sri Lankan embassy or in prison. The increasing number of mysterious deaths and suicides among Sri Lankan women in Lebanon is a sign on the wall (Report Forum for Human Dignity, 2002).

DISCUSSION The strength of comparing the rural-urban migration in Senegal with transnational migration from Sri Lanka to Lebanon lies in the unravelling of a family resemblance at the macro level, while nuancing it with lived experiences at the micro level. Indeed, in both cases, a new economic situation transformed local production systems and pushed local people to search for an income elsewhere. In Senegal initially individual men left the communities, but after some proved to provide a positive economic return, migration began to be perceived as an alternative strategy for survival. In this context, we have to understand that families were starting sending their daughters to Dakar. It can be seen as a rational economic choice, because the departure of a girl reduces food consumption and increases monetary remittances. However, the cultural and moral dimensions made it a complex decision-making process involving many family members with particular strategies for settling down and finding a job in Dakar. An important element of female outmigration is the question of guardianship. How can the moral behaviour of girls who escape from direct supervision be controlled? How can elders ensure that family honour will not be setback? When the Sri Lankan Government opened up its economy to the world market, it created conditions for the export of labour benefiting the balance of payment. To regulate labour migration, the Government created the Bureau for Foreign Labour Employment and started liaising with agents in various receiving countries, especially in the Middle East. One such country was Lebanon where there was a high demand for domestic workers. The

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domestic economic situation in Sri Lanka was such that many men were not able to provide for a family and women were sent abroad to fill in this gap. Doing so, women left the traditional feminine private sphere and entered public space. Thus Sri Lankan women’s overseas migration also implies questions of transgressing gender borders and morality. The congruence in the two cases is that women—as part of new economic strategies of a family—are playing an active role in generating an income and in contributing to the material welfare of their families. In both cases, they are integrated in the monetary economy—that is, in a developmental process—although this integration is informal in Dakar and is made visible in GDP by remittances in Sri Lanka. Both cases challenge neoclassical theory that pretends that migrants make rational and individual choices to migrate. The cases illustrate the embeddedness of women in larger social arrangements and thus in family strategies. Additionally, leaving children and husbands behind in Sri Lanka or profiting from entertainment and consumption in Dakar defying traditional norms impact on prevailing gender relations. This ambivalence of female migration triggers a reinterpretation of traditional social norms. Notwithstanding resemblances, nuances emerge when we compare an intranational migration with a transnational one. As we have seen, Serere migrants can build on social networks to get settled and find a job in Dakar. They belong to social arrangements that will not let them down. The move of Sri Lankan contractual workers to Lebanon is professionalized and impersonal. Often the workers come immediately to their employer’s house and have to adapt to customs, food and language they do not know (Abu-Habib, 1998; 2005 p. 166). Social isolation contributes to feelings of distress. Both case studies point to harsh treatment of domestic workers. The Serere women in Dakar can deploy strategies to find another employer, which is much more difficult for Sri Lankan domestic workers who are engaged in a contractual—and financially mediated—work relation. Serere women are not bound by up-front financial investments by their employers and as citizens are free to go around. Sri Lankan women in Lebanon are not only made aware of their debts, but also their passports are sometimes withheld to impede their liberty of movement. If they run away and leave their documents at their employer’s place, they immediately become illegal persons and run the risk of arrest by the General Security. More than the absence of labour law enforcement or union membership (which do not exist in Senegal either), the absence of citizenship status makes transnational migrants more vulnerable (see for example the Report Forum for Human Dignitiy, 2002). How does the migration project combine with plans for the future and social development? The Serere girls are aware that part of the money they earn will be used to make up their bride-wealth, that is, part of assets that they will bring to a marital relationship. The passage in town may postpone marriage, but the ideal is to marry one day. In contrast, many Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon are married women and contribute to the survival of their husbands, children and kin, implying new forms of division

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 265 of labour in their home communities (Gamburd, 2000). Oxfam conducted a study in 1997 on Sri Lankan domestic workers who had returned home after some years in the Near East (see Jureidini, 2001). The study showed that many women are stigmatized because they have been living out of their communities without any form of social control. They are suspected of being prostitutes. Further, their husbands have rarely been faithful. Brochmann (1993 p. 178 op. cit. in: Abu-Habib, 2005 p. 168) concludes that Sri Lankan women who return from temporary contract labour in the Near East do not gain social prestige, autonomy, or economic security. In Senegal, young women seem to have entered the process of empowerment. Despite debates about the positive and negative aspects of this citadinisation (meaning both a process of urbanizing and civilizing) of young women (Diouf, 2004 p. 101), it is definitely a process in which women gain selfconfidence and strength.

CONCLUSION The increase in the number of women seeking employment outside their home communities and countries independent of husbands and/or fathers is called the feminization of migration. More and more women are willing or are obliged to quit their native families to generate an income. In this chapter, we dealt with Serere women in the capital city of Senegal, Dakar, and Sri Lankan women in Lebanon who find jobs as domestic workers. This sector of the international care economy is a booming business in countries as diverse as the USA, Europe and the Middle East, but does also exist in the major urban areas in the South. The demand for care services in many countries is closely linked to the new international division of reproductive labour. This situation has led many authors to interpret the phenomenon ranging from neoslavery, to the failure of feminist restructuring of society and neoimperialism (Federici, 2002; Bales, 1997; Parreñas, 2001), on the one hand. On the other hand, this phenomenon is seen as a dire economic contribution to national balances of payment and to family incomes and thus constitutive of economic development (Jureidini, 2003). Instead of choosing sides on either side of these debates, in this chapter I tried to unravel the ambivalence of these developments. Without falling in the trap of glorifying these often informal and unprotected jobs, it is undeniable that female migration provides empowerment opportunities to great numbers of women longing for an income of their own. As a consequence, many young women get acquainted with new opportunities, economic freedom, enhanced self-esteem, and new modes of consumption. But others experience exclusion and marginalization due to downward socioprofessional mobility, matrimonial conflicts, conjugal dumping and heartbreaking separations. Both scenarios definitely have an impact on existing gender regimes for better or worse. From this perspective, I join Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2003) who talked about a world-wide gender revolution.

266 Fenneke Reysoo EPILOGUE Between the first draft and the final publication of this article Lebanon has been bombed by Israel’s armed forces in the summer of 2006. Tens of thousands Asian domestic workers have tried to flee the war zone. As to Sri Lankan migrants “the whole block around the Sri Lanka’s embassy has become a temporary refugee camp with thousands of women sleeping in the open . . . ” (O’Loughlin, 2006). From being a provider of a family, they suddenly became stranded migrants in distress in terms of the United Nations. The vulnerability, exploitability, and ambivalence of their status came right to the fore. The Sri Lankan ambassador stated: “the majority are owed money” and O’Loughlin adding: “repatriation will be a relief but not a blessing” (idem). I ignore how many have died or are missing. Be they memorized in this place. NOTES 1. I owe special thanks to Abdou Diouf, who carried out a research on the gendered integration of Serere people in Dakar for his Diploma in Development Studies at IUED (Geneva). I am also very grateful to Veena N. based in Bangalore who skillfully edited the English. 2. This case is based on the Master thesis by Abdou Diouf (2004) ‘Insertion différentielle des migrantes et migrants sérères à Dakar,’ Genève: IUED, Mémoire Diplôme de Recherche, sous la direction de Fenneke Reysoo, p. 106. 3. Married women only migrate with the approval of their husbands in consultation with their maternal uncles. In the opposite case, a wife cannot contest her husband’s plan for migration. 4. The information on Lebanon is based on recent research among seventy female Sri Lankan domestic workers in Lebanon conducted by Jureidini and Moukarbel, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, at the American University of Beirut. Another important source of information is the research by Eelens and Speckmann conducted in 1986 among 891 Sri Lankan return migrants from the Middle East and 866 family members of current migrants. 5. These figures are based on information on the number of work permits issued. Those who have entered the country with a tourist visa, those who entered the country illegally and those who have expired (not renewed) permits have not been included.

REFERENCES Abu-Habib, L. (1998). The use and abuse of female domestic workers from Sri Lanka in Lebanon. Gender and Development, 6(1), 52–56. Abu-Habib, L. (2005). Les abus contre les travailleuses domestiques srilankaises au Liban. In: C. Verschuur and F. Reysoo, Genre, nouvelle division internationale du travail et migrations (pp. 163–169). Cahiers Genre et Développement, 5. Paris: L’Harmattan et Genève: IUED-EFI. ACS (Administration Centrale de la Statistique). (1998). Etudes Statistiques: La Population Active en 1997, 12. Beyrouth: République Libanaise.

Ambivalent Developments of Female Migration 267 Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment. (2004). Colombo: Sri Lankan Bureau for Foreign Employment. Retrieved June 14, 2006 from www.slbfe.lk/ feb/stat_content.html Asis, M. (2003). Hearts apart. Migration in the eyes of Filipino children. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. Bales, K. (1997). Disposable people: New slavery in the global Economy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Battistella, G. & Conaco, C. (1998). The impact of labour migration on the children left behind: A study of elementary school children in the Philippines. Sojourn, 13(2), 220–241. Brochmann, G. (1993). Middle East avenue: Female migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf. Jackson, TN: Westview Press. Diouf, A. (2004). Insertion différenciée des migrantes et migrants Sérères à Dakar. Mémoire de diplôme de recherche, sous la direction de Fenneke Reysoo, unpublished. Genève: IUED. Eelens, F. & Speckmann, J. D. (1990). Recruitment of labour migrants for the middle east: The Sri Lankan case. International Migration Review, 24(2), 291–322. Special Issue Recruiting Organizations in the Developing World. Ehrenreich, B. & Hochschild, A. (Eds.). (2003). Global woman: Nannies, maids and sex workers in the new economy. New York: Metropolitan Book. Federici, S. (2002). Reproduction et lutte féministe dans la nouvelle division internationale du travail. In C. Verschuur & F. Reysoo, Genre, mondialisation et pauvreté (pp. 45–72). Cahiers Genre et Développement, 3. Paris: L’Harmattan. Gamburd, M. R. (2000). The kitchen spoon’s handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s migrant housemaids. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gunatilleke, G. (1987). Children in Sri Lanka, a status report. Colombo: Marga Institute. Huang, S., Yeoh, B. S. A. & Abdul, N. (2005). Asian Women as transnational domestic workers. Singapore: Times Academic Press. Jureidini, R. & Moukarbel, N. (2000). Foreign female domestic maids in Lebanon. Lebanese NGO Forum, retrieved May 24, 2006 from http://www.lankalibrary.com/ phpBB/viewtopic.php?p=758 and sid=533009cdfb60163fb0129d53029a58bd Jureidini, R. (2001). Migrant women domestic workers in Lebanon. Working paper 48. Geneva: ILO. Jureidini, R. (2003). Migrant workers and xenophobia in the Middle East. Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper 2. Geneva: UNRISD. Mottin Sylla, M. H. (1991). Les femmes et l’argent. Dakar: ENDA-Synfev. Nonis, A. (1999, May 16). Safe Houses for Sri Lankan Workers abroad. Sunday Observer. O’Laughlin, E. (2006). Lebanon’s domestic workers clamour to escape. Retreived February 20, 2007 from http:www.theage.com.au/news/world/lebanons-domestic-workers Oso, L. (2005). Femmes, actrices des mouvements migratoires. In C. Verschuur & F. Reysoo (Eds.), Genre, nouvelle division internationale du travail et migrations (pp. 34–54). Cahiers Genre et Développement, 5. Paris: L’Harmattan et Genève: IUED-EFI. Parreñas, R. S. (2001). Servants of globalization: women, migration and domestic work. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Passeron, J. C. & Revel, J. (2005). Penser par cas. Raisonner à partir de singularités. In J.C. Passeron & J. Revel dir), Penser par cas (pp. 9–44), collection Enquête. Paris: EHESS. Report of Forum for Human Dignity. (2002). Sri Lankan migrant women workers and their travails. Jana Sammathaya Folk Consensus, 1, (33). Retrieved May 24, 2006 from http://newsletters.ahrchk.net/js/mainfile.php/0133/166/

268 Fenneke Reysoo Reysoo, F. (2004). Féminisation de la migration. In F. Reysoo and C. Verschuur (Eds.), Femmes en mouvement. Genre, migrations et nouvelle division internationale du travail (pp. 17–27). Genève: IUED et Berne: Commission nationale suisse pour l’UNESCO. Sanghera, J. (2004). Floating borderlands and shifting dreamscapes: The nexus between gender, migration, and development. In F. Reysoo & C. Verschuur (Eds.), Femmes en movement:. Genre, migrations et nouvelle division internationale du travail (pp. 59–69). Genève: IUED et Berne: Commission nationale suisse pour l’UNESCO. Verschuur, C. & Reysoo, F. (2005). Genre, nouvelle division internationale du travail et migrations. Cahiers Genre et Développement, 5. Paris: L’Harmattan et Genève: IUED-EFI. Wittgenstein, L. (2001, org. 1953). Philosophische untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition. Frankfurt aM: Wissenschafltiche Buchgesellschaft. Zlotnik, H. (2003, March 1). The global dimensions of female migration. Migration Information Source.Retrieved February 10, 2007 from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=109

14 Migration and Development Migrant Women in South Korea Hye-Kyung Lee

South Korea has experienced rapid economic development and demographic transition in the last five decades. It Gross National Product (GNP) per capita increased from US$79 in 1960 to US$14,162 in 2004. The total fertility rates dropped from 6.0 in 1960 to 1.16 in 2004. Furthermore, the proportion of those aged 65 years and above has increased from 2.5% in 1960 to 9% in 2005. A serious concern in Korean society is the prospect of a population decrease in the near future. Until the late 1980s, a common slogan adopted by the Korean government in national family planning was fewer children. However, this backfired because the total fertility rates decreased to less than 1.2 at the beginning of the 21st century. As a result of this, the government formed the Low Fertility and Aging Society Committee, which is chaired by the president and includes all government agencies. The low birth rate is attributed to what some call women’s rebellion, because it is hard for working mothers to manage both their careers and family life simultaneously. In some countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, importing foreign domestic workers was a measure that was taken in order to increase local women’s participation in the national labour force by alleviating some of the latter’s household responsibilities. The Korean government did not opt for a similar policy until December 2002, when it permitted nonnative Koreans to work as domestic workers. This is not aimed at increasing Korean female labour force participation but to address complaints made by nonnative Koreans. Nowadays, most young Korean women opt to marry later and have children after they have established their careers. If they cannot find a suitable partner, then they opt to pursue their career. One outcome is that since the late 1980s, lower-class Korean men, such as farmers; disabled; and poor men, whom Korean women are reluctant to marry, began to import foreign brides. The flows of foreign domestic workers, sex workers, and marriage migrants are important factors leading to the feminization of migration.1 Because of better job opportunities and prospects, the number of foreign women working overseas has increased. The demand for labour, in the ever expanding service industry in host countries, is a pull factor that encourages

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the migration of women. In other words, if construction, manufacturing, and fisheries are representative of the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) industries which attract male migrant workers, then housekeeping and other service-oriented are representative 3D jobs for migrant women; the fact that these jobs are regarded as inferior by native Koreans also induces the feminization of migration. The recent increase in marriage migration also affects the feminization of migration since more women than men tend to migrate for marital purposes. It has been more than 15 years since the influx of foreign workers to Korea began. However, among foreign workers in Korea, women make up 30–35%, which is a relatively low level of feminization of migration compared to other Asian countries.2 One reason is that countries such as Singapore and Taiwan in 1980 and 1992, respectively introduced an employment permit system. As such, these countries have the highest level of legal foreign migrant workers, including foreign domestic workers. The feminization of migration has developed more slowly in Korea, because of the persistence of the policy of the industrial training system, which admitted more males than females, and also because it is illegal to employ foreign workers in the service industry. Nevertheless, 42% of migrant women worked in the service industry in May 2002. Then in December 2002, the employment of nonnative Koreans through the introduction of the Employment Management System in the service sector was permitted. Moreover, the Bill concerning the employment permit system was passed in July 2003 and came into effect on August 17, 2004. Accordingly, six sectors in the service industry, food, business support, social welfare, cleaning, nursing, and domestic workers began to open substantially to nonnative Koreans. Therefore, an increase in the feminization of migration is expected in the future, implying an increase in female migrants from countries such as China, Russia, and Uzbekistan, where a significant number of ethnic Koreans already reside. Meanwhile, the in-migration of foreign women as spouses is also increasing. Because official relations with China began in August 1992, the number of Korean-Chinese women who entered Korea to marry native Korean men between 1990 and 2004 is about 70,000. The number of Japanese women who married Korean men is approximately 15,000, whereas the number of Filipino women who married Korean men is 6,000. Recently, the range of the nationalities of foreign wives of Korean men has expanded to include women from Vietnam, Russia, and Uzbekistan. At the same time, the rate of marriages of convenience for employment purposes has also increased. In 2004, among a total of 450,000 migrant workers, 150,000 of them were women and out of 200,000 foreign spouses in Korea 120,000 of them were women. Due to the short history of labour immigration, there has been little effort to include immigration policies within broader national development policies. The sudden influx of migrant workers, foreign brides and sex workers in the 1990s into the so-called ethnically homogeneous Korean society

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caused the Korean government to hesitate in making a clear immigration policy but to react in an ad hoc manner. This chapter analyzes the trends and patterns of gendered migration to Korea, focusing on migrant domestic workers, foreign brides and sex workers in Korea. The main research questions are: (a) What are the general impacts of migration, especially gendered migration, on development? (b) Is the foreign domestic worker policy a beneficial option for national development? (c) What is the government doing to aid the successful integration of families of international marriages into the homogeneous Korean society?

THE INFLUX OF KOREAN CHINESE TO SOUTH KOREA The category Korean Chinese refers to ethnic Koreans and their succeeding generations who have resided in China since migrating there in the 19th century. There are two million Korean Chinese in China and they are amongst one of the 55 minority ethnic groups in China. Some voluntarily crossed the Duman River to escape famine and natural disasters after the mid-19th century while others, some of whom were forced, migrated to the Manju area during the 1920s and 1930s, after Japanese colonisation. After Korea was liberated in 1945, and when the Communist Party took over China in 1948, the Korean-Chinese communities were unable to return to their home country due to severed diplomatic relations between South Korea and Communist China. Therefore, they settled in three provinces in the north-eastern part of China, predominantly in Yanbin, a Korean autonomous prefecture, maintaining their own language and culture under China’s favourable minority policy (Lee, 2005b p. 351). However, Korean-Chinese communities are concentrated in marginal areas of China that have not experienced rapid economic development as in other parts of China. Since the late 1980s, due to a normalization of ties between China and South Korea, visits to their relatives opened their eyes to economic opportunities. As many of them stayed on and became undocumented workers and peddlers, the Korean government began to find ways to reduce their influx, primarily by setting a minimum age limit on those intending to visit their relatives in South Korea (Lee, 2005b p. 351).3 With the establishment of official relations between Korea and China in 1992, international marriages between Korean men and Korean-Chinese women increased. Farmers and lower-class Korean men, whom Korean women were reluctant to marry, tried to import foreign brides. Korean-Chinese women were preferred to other Asian women, because of a common ethnicity and the emphasis on the purity of blood lines. Some local governments initially organised these international marriages. Later, private agencies and some Korean Chinese who were already residing in Korea began to arrange such marriages (Lee, 2003 p. 143). It is ironic that while the Korean government is anxious to limit the return of the Korean

272 Hye-Kyung Lee Chinese, its promotion of international marriages between Korean farmers and Korean Chinese has resulted in opening the doors for both young and older Korean-Chinese women to enter the country. This has meant that international marriages have become not only an easy and important channel for young Korean-Chinese women, but it also provides a route for older Korean-Chinese women to return to Korea because Korean-Chinese wives can send two invitation letters to their parents to come to Korea. Exploitation of the invitation of parents visas (as well as the visiting relatives visas with a certain age limit) has resulted in a distinctively older age profile of Korean-Chinese female migrants. For example, the proportion of middleaged or older Korean-Chinese women in their forties and above increased from 40% in 1993 to 60% in 2002 (Lee, 2005b p. 354).

THE FOREIGN DOMESTIC WORKERS The Korean government did not officially import foreign domestic workers. Since December 2002, it began to permit nonnative Koreans to work in certain service sectors including domestic work, but prohibited other nationalities to carry out similar jobs. The Korean government had different goals than Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, where importing foreign domestic workers is a means of increasing their local women’s labour force participation rates. Instead, the 2002 Employment Management System, which allows nonnative Koreans to work in certain service sectors, is symbolic and legitimises an existing practice. A significant number of KoreanChinese women were already working in the service industry since the early 1990s. Furthermore, if the Overseas Korean Law includes Korean Chinese from 2004, restrictions on their entrance and employment in Korea will no longer apply.4 The availability of large numbers of older Korean-Chinese women in the labour market and the need for cheaper live-in domestic workers seemed to have coincided since the late 1990s. These women find it difficult to work in factories which usually have a preference for younger women. Instead, those in their forties tend to work in the kitchens of Korean restaurants, while those in their fifties and above prefer domestic work. Ironically, as more Korean-Chinese daughters become unpaid housewives through international marriage with Korean men, their mothers (whether their biological mothers or those have purchased invitation letters) often become paid domestic workers in Korea (Lee, 2005b). The concentration of older Korean Chinese in domestic work is indicated by data compiled from a recent 2002 amnesty data, showing that 96% of unauthorised migrants voluntarily registered with the local authorities between March and May 2002 (Table 14.1), so as to be allowed to stay in Korea until March 2003, then later postponed their stay till November 15, 2003. Based on this registration data and other data from the Ministry of

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Table 14.1 Female migrant workers by industry (%), 2002 Service

Documented1

Female Migrants

Agriculture/ Fishery

Manufacturing

Construction

All

Domestic Work Other

12,791

0.08

99.9

0.02

2

Undocumented

89,556

0.7

25.2

6.8

47.9

(10.2)

19.5

Korean-Chinese

41,660

0.6

8.7

7.8

66.4

(15.0)

16.4

Chinese

30,855

0.4

33.7

7.7

44.3

(8.6)

13.9

Filipinos

6,648

0.2

81.0

0.4

2.7

(0.9)

15.7

Vietnamese

4,732

0.1

83.3

0.7

1.5

(0.1)

14.4

Indonesian

2,790

0.0

86.8

0.4

1.1

(0.1)

11.7

Thai

4,316

1.5

65.0

0.8

1.5

(0.2)

31.2

Mongolian

6,368

0.5

56.4

3.3

12.5

(1.4)

27.3

Uzbekistan

1,459

2.0

66.1

3.0

11.4

(0.7)

17.5

Others

3,519

1.2

62.7

3.4

6.7

(0.7)

26.0

102,347

0.6

34.5

6.0

41.9

(8.9)

17.0

Total

Sources: 1 Ministry of Justice, ROK (2002a), the number was summed up in December 2002. 2 Ministry of Justice, ROK (2002b), the number was summed up in May 2002.

Justice (2002a), Table 14.1 categorizes female migrant workers by industry. One notes ethnic concentration in certain industry for example, KoreanChinese women in services, and Filipino, Vietnamese, and other Southeast Asian women in manufacturing. There are about 9,000 unauthorised migrant domestic workers, the majority of whom are Korean Chinese (6,200), followed by Chinese (2,600), Mongolians (88) and Filipinos (57). It should be noted, however, that some Korean Chinese tend to report themselves as Chinese, and therefore the number of Korean Chinese domestic workers is likely to be under reported. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that while it is a relatively uncommon option for Korean households, hiring migrant workers as live-in domestic workers is largely confined to the employment of Korean-Chinese women (Lee, 2005b p. 354). The concentration of Korean-Chinese women in domestic work can be explained by several factors. First, while the employment of migrant workers in the service sector has been prohibited for a long time, a significant number of Korean-Chinese are able to bend the rules given their ability to speak Korean and given similar physical features as native Koreans. Second, modern Korean families living in apartments prefer not to employ young women as live-in domestic workers (for example Filipino migrant women), and those with young children or elderly parents to care for prefer older women to provide services.

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However, where the live-in domestic worker is a local older woman, a younger employer may also feel ill at ease directing or instructing her, as it conflicts with the Korean norm of respecting the elderly. Where older Korean-Chinese women are concerned, however, their employment as live-in domestic workers can be justified on the base that they are foreigners and not part of Korean society, and their employment is a means of offering employment opportunities to “disadvantaged, poor visitors” (Lee, 2005b pp. 355–356). The ability of the Korean Chinese to speak Korean is also an added advantage in the eyes of Korean employers. Finally, Korean-Chinese communities are able to access information for available jobs in the domestic service through their friends, relatives, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that advertise for job openings and job-seekers on bulletin boards and on the internet job-search sites for the Korean-Chinese (Lee, 2004a; 2005b). However, since the commencement of the Employment Management System in December 2002, such private job promotion was prohibited, and therefore, private bulletin boards and internet sites were closed from April 1, 2003. Nevertheless, domestic workers still continue to get jobs through friends and relatives (Lee, 2005a; Lee, 2004). Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the major reason for Korea’s low reliance on migrant domestic workers lies in the position of women in the labour market, which is characterised by very slow growth of labour force participation rates, typical ‘M-shape’ career patterns5, irregular employment, and occupational gender segregation, few professional and managerial positions vis-à-vis the many blue-collar positions for women (Kim, 2003).6 In Korea, the level of education and labour force participation rates among women has showed a negative relationship, although it is beginning to change with the younger generations. In other words, there have been few job opportunities for highly educated married women, although there are some opportunities for less educated married women. Currently, the demand for domestic workers—either locals or migrants—cannot exceed the supply (Lee, 2004a). The relatively weak position of Korean women in the labour market tends to reduce the need for domestic workers. Although the Korean government tries to increase local women’s labour force participation rates by providing child-care facilities and offering maternity leave, most increased job opportunities are irregular ones, which will not require more migrant live-in domestic workers. Moreover, although it has been possible to hire Koreans of foreign nationality since the end of 2002, the salary of a domestic worker has increased to such an extent that only those in the middle classes and higher can still afford to hire domestic workers.7 The Employment Management System was introduced on December 9, 2002 to solve the scarcity of manpower in the service industry, and also to satisfy the aspiration of domestic employment amongst Koreans with foreign nationalities. That is, to enable visiting relatives with a foreign nationality to qualify for a visa, thereby allowing them to enter Korea. After which, they are allowed to find jobs in some service industries through the employment

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agency of the Ministry of Labour. Because the employment permit system has been in effect since August 2004, the Employment Management System also operates within this new system. Employers of foreign domestic workers have to be dual income earners with more than one child, or responsible for the care of someone who has been sick for more than six months. Families that are allowed to hire a foreign domestic worker must fulfil one of the following conditions: they are responsible for the care of someone who has difficulties in mobility or has dementia; or someone in the eighties and older. Before Koreans are allowed to hire a foreign domestic worker, they must make an effort to seek a native domestic worker for more than a month (the search period has been recently shortened). The same labour law applies to a Korean with foreign nationality, who has been employed in the service industry through the Employment Management System, as to native workers. The domestic workers, however, do not fall under the law, but are encouraged to join the accident insurance scheme which guarantees that employers are obliged to honour any delayed payment. Furthermore, without the approval of the Minister of Labour, they cannot switch employers. Therefore, there is a possibility that Korean-Chinese domestic workers may be worse off than before the implementation of the Employment Management System in the following ways. First, the difficulty of the application of the labour standard law, because the workplace of foreign domestic workers is a private area (a household). Also, monitoring and ensuring proper working conditions are difficult. If the influx of foreign domestic workers persists, there is a possibility of countermeasures, such as the setting up of labour unions of foreign domestic workers similar to those in Hong Kong.8 Second, although the admission of foreign domestic workers is a device to increase the employment of Korean women in the national economy, this influx could reinforce a gendered division of labour and stereotypical gender ideology by presupposing that only women are responsible for caring and housework. It violates the goal of equality between both sexes, and it is an undesirable developmental policy in the long run.

FOREIGN BRIDES Figure 14.1 shows the number of foreigners, according to sex, who married Koreans between 1990 and 2004. Until the beginning of 1990, international marriages mostly involved Korean women, with Korean men accounting for merely 600 cases. But the Korean men’s rate of international marriage started to increase in 1992, and in 1995, the number of men participating in international marriages surpassed that of women. The cumulated number of internationally married Korean men was 130,000, from 1990 to 2004; of these, 87,000 had Chinese nationality, 15,000 were Japanese, and 6,000 were Filipino. Figure 14.2 shows the nationality of foreign women who married Korean men after 1990. Since 1992, the biggest group of female foreigners who

276 Hye-Kyung Lee 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

F.Male Spouses

F.Female Spouses

Figure 14.1 Marriages between foreigners and Koreans, according to sex, 1990–2004. Source: Korea National Statistical Office (1999-2004).

30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000

19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04

0

American

Japanese

Chinese

Other

Figure 14.2 Nationality of foreign female spouses, 1990–2004. Source: Korea National Statistical Office (1999-2004).

married Korean men comprise Chinese (mostly Korean-Chinese) women. In 1996, international marriages involving Korean-Chinese women gradually began to decrease as marriages of convenience became a social issue. The

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factors responsible for the decrease are complicated procedures in the application of marriage between Koreans and Chinese (1996–2003)9, the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997–1998, and the amendment of the Korean Nationality Act (1998). The government revised the Korean Nationality Act on November 18, 1997, which went into effect on June 14, 1998. One improvement made was highlighting the concerns surrounding international marriage, especially the need to abolish sexual discrimination in acquiring citizenship. Until then, female foreigners who married Korean men could obtain Korean citizenship immediately after their marriage, whereas male foreigners who married Korean women had to wait 2 years, and meet certain eligibility requirements in order to apply for Korean nationality. The new Act however, enforced a 2-year waiting period for both foreign male and female spouses. Although it is true that the revision of the Korean Nationality Act has addressed the issue of sexism, its main purpose was to prevent marriages of convenience by female foreigners, especially Korean Chinese.10 Nevertheless, starting from 1999, international marriages with female foreigners increased again, and in the following years, 2003 and 2004, the number reached 20,000 and 26,000 respectively. This was due to an increase in female foreigners married to Korean men as a result of 15 years of international migration to Korea. In addition, in August 1999, marriage agencies were not required to obtain licenses from local government and became free businesses, which spawned an increase in the number of agencies, and also raised the number of mediated international marriages. The Ministry of Health and Welfare initiated an investigation into the problems that migrant women in international marriages face in Korea (Seol et al., 2005), and a countrywide survey was carried out during May and June 2005 among 945 foreign brides. According to this data (Seol et al., 2005), there were four main avenues through which foreign women found Korean husbands: first, by way of recommendations of acquaintances; second, through direct meetings; three, via religious groups, and fourth, by using intermediary agencies. The first mode applied mostly to Korean-Chinese women, the second to Chinese and Mongolian, while the third was mostly used by Japanese, Filipino, Thai women. The last applied to Vietnamese, Mongolian, and Russian women. In the beginning of the 1990s, international marriage with Korean men was primarily promoted among bachelors who were farmers, and who found it difficult to find their partners domestically. After 1999, as marriage agencies increased, international marriage became an important alternative for Korean men who wanted to remarry. Korean men who divorced native women prefer Chinese (Korean-Chinese) women as their second wives. Gradually, more female foreigners were entering Korea especially to marry urban men, many from the lower economic classes, and as a consequence, 75% of families of married immigrants resided in urban areas in 2005 (Seol et al., 2005). Three-quarters of these were nuclear families, in contrast with

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a more equal distribution between nuclear and extended families of married immigrants in rural areas, suggesting that foreign brides in the rural areas have to take care of their parents-in-law as well as children. Meanwhile, 31% of female foreigners, who are married to Korean men, are employed in Korea.11 Considering the local women’s labour force participation rate of 51% in 2005, it means that fewer foreign women than native women are participating in economic activities. About half the female foreigners are working in the service sector for example as waitresses, cooks, and domestic workers. The remaining women work in factories (14%), and in professions such as teaching, or owners of small business (13 %). Most of the Korean Chinese work in places such as restaurants: 63% of Korean Chinese in the cities, and 47% of them in rural areas. On the other hand, women from other foreign countries also worked in the service sector, the majority in the cities. Besides this, many of these women work as factory workers in the cities, and as simple labourers in rural areas (Table 14.2). As much as 88% of foreign female employees wish to carry on working, which reflects their aspiration for employment and 93% of the ones who were not working at present wished to work in the future. The reasons given for not

Table 14.2

Employment of foreign wives in Korea, 2005 Cities

Employed

Rural Areas

Total

Korean Chinese

Other foreign nationalities

31.0%

39.4%

28.7%

Korean Chinese

Other foreign nationalities

32.5%

16.0%

(Total cases)

(945)

(368)

(334)

(80)

(162)

Professional/ Management

12.6

13.8

13.5

11.5

3.8

Clerical worker

8.2

11.0

5.2

3.8

7.7

Factory worker

14.0

9.7

25.0

7.7

3.8

Service industry

51.9

63.4

42.7

46.2

26.9

Farmers/ Fishermen

5.1

0.7

0

26.9

26.9

Simple labour

8.2

1.4

13.5

3.8

30.8

100.0% (293)

100.0% (145)

100.0% (96)

100.0% (26)

100.0% (26)

Total (n)

Source: Seol et al. (2005).

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working were child rearing (43%), or failure in finding the right job (21%), or lack of fluency in the Korean language (10%).

FAMILIES OF INTERNATIONAL MARRIAGE The presence and employment of foreign female spouses and workers raise some social concerns, such as poverty, domestic violence, marital disruption, and prostitution. According to our data (Seol et al., 2005), it was discovered that 53% of the families of migrant women lived below the official poverty line in 2005. In fact, 44% of the families survived with a family income below 50% of the minimum cost of living. This shows that most foreign female spouses cannot maintain the basic subsistence level because of the lack of an adequate social welfare system in Korean society. For example, 15.5% of foreign female spouses have experienced near-starvation due to poverty. The basic social security policy is dysfunctional because it excludes families of foreign female spouses. The reasons why the basic social security policy is fairly useless to families of migrant women are because the families are excluded due to the fact that they are considered foreigners. Half of the migrants are not aware of the existence of the policy itself. In addition, one third of all foreign female spouses are not in the medical insurance system, many of them were not even aware of whether or not they were covered by medical insurance. Most of them presumed that foreigners were not eligible for medical insurance, reflecting how insufficient public awareness campaigns have been on this issue. Violence against foreign wives is the main focus and concern of organizations for migrant women. Several cases of domestic violence involving foreign wives have been documented in the newspapers, including Filipino women who reported their husbands’ violence to the police, and filed court cases (The Hankyoreh 21 November 2002; 4 June 2003; 26 March 2003). According to research by the Gwangju City Women’s Development Center in October 2002, 30% of the female foreigners living in Gwangju (55 women), and Jeonnam (45 women) have been habitually abused by their husbands. Unfortunately, most cases of domestic violence are closely related to alcohol abuse among poor male Koreans. Marital disruption is also a cause of concern. According to the Ministry of Justice (2001), among 20,172 foreign spouses who married natives and who were in possession of a visitors visa (F-1), there were 111 cases of divorce, accounting for only 0.6% of the total. However, when the number of women who ran away from their abusive spouses is included, it appears that almost 10% of foreign women do not live with their Korean spouses. The majority of these were Chinese (1,206) and Filipinos (106), meaning that 16% of Chinese spouses and four per cent of Filipino spouses have experienced such separation.

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The entertainment sector has also attracted attention. The influx of foreign female entertainers has increased since 1996, when the Korea Special Tourism Association imported women to work in clubs and bars around military camps. The Philippines was the major sending country until 1998, after which Russia became the major source sending female entertainers to Korea until 2003. According to a report released by the Ministry of Justice, about 90% of these entertainers were working in bars, clubs, and hotels near the US military bases in Korea (Josun Newspaper 27 September 2002). Entertainment (E-6) visa was processed on behalf of and controlled by foreign-related organisations or agencies approved by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The women enter the country with an E-6 visa, which permits them to work in the arts and entertainment industry, but many of them find themselves confined to clandestine brothels and forced to work as sex workers, with their passports confiscated by bar owners and club owners (Lee, 2003 p. 139). The slave-like working conditions and human rights violations, such as confinement, violence, forced prostitution, withholding of passports and salaries, and trafficking, were exposed in 2002. Since then several researchers (Back, 2000; Seol, Kim, Han, Ko, & Yea, 2003) and NGOs (Kim, 2001; PAHRM, 2000) have criticised the situation, and highlighted the severity of the situation. In 2003 the Ministry of Justice stopped issuing E-6 visas for such purposes, and the influx of the entertainer (E-6) visa holders has decreased. The revised bill on the Prohibition and Sanction of Prostitution (submitted in November 2001), finally passed the National Assembly on March 2, 2004 and became effective from November 2004. This law permits the punishment of traffickers and recognises women in the sex industry as victims rather than criminals. In addition, this law offers protection and offers shelter for sex-trafficked locals as well as migrant women.

DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF MIGRATION, IN PARTICULAR GENDERED MIGRATION Within the relatively short history of importing migrant labourers into Korea, migrant workers have contributed to Korea’s development. The major contribution is in the alleviation of labour shortage in 3D jobs, while also contributing to important changes in laws, policies, and social attitudes.

Economic Impact The most important impact of labour migration in Korea is the workers’ contribution to solving the problem of labour shortages, which were felt more seriously in smaller firms and in the manufacturing industry. For example, unfilled jobs in the medium-sized (10–299 workers) manufacturing facilities numbered 163,000 (or 10%) in 1991 (Seol, 2004 p. 130). However, this decreased to around 38,000 (or about 2%) in 2000–2001,

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and then hovered around 80,000 (or 3–4%) from 2002 to 2005 (Ministry of Labour, Labour Statistics http://labourstat.molab.go.kr). In recent years, restaurants experienced similar difficulties in finding employees. This labour shortage is more serious in metropolitan areas such as Seoul and Gyeonggido. Nowadays local women are reluctant to work in restaurants because of long working hours and few holidays. About 30,000 migrant women worked in restaurants in the metropolitan area in 2002 (Ministry of Justice 2002b; see also Table 14.2), which means that 13% of the 223,000 restaurants in the metropolis hired migrant women. Therefore, the impact of migration in general and gendered migration in particular has contributed greatly to reducing labour shortages in 3D jobs in the manufacturing and service industries. Since 2002 the government has adopted strict measures to round up and deport undocumented workers, so more Korean-Chinese women married to Koreans and with Korean citizenship have tended to fill the vacancies once occupied by the undocumented Korean-Chinese female migrants. Although Lee (1994) worried about the probable substitutive effect of migrant workers in the early 1990s because of the income difference between local and migrant workers, the migrant workers have stepped in and supplemented the shortage to fill the vacancies created by local workers. Since 2002 and since the start of the Employment Permit Programme in 2004, earning differentials among different nationalities have been greatly reduced and so the role of foreign workers will be complementary in the future.

Changes in the Immigration Law Until the early 1990s, Korea’s immigration law prohibited the entry of unskilled labour migrants. This was to change with the main influx of migrant workers from neighbouring Asian countries. As labour shortages worsened, the Korean government began to utilise existing trainee programmes as an avenue for importing unskilled migrant workers, as from November 1991. The government introduced the Industrial Trainee Programme in November 1993 and later modified it into the Employment After Trainee Program in 1998 (Lee, 2003 p. 132). The Industrial Trainee Program created several problems because of the definition of foreign trainees. Because trainees were not regular labourers by definition, their allowances were very low. Even with the provision of nonwage allowances such as food and housing, their wages did not match the levels of Korean workers and foreign undocumented workers engaged in comparable work. As a result, large numbers of trainees left their designated workplaces in search of better pay and conditions. As a result, the programme led to the employment of undocumented workers and consequently serious exploitation and human rights violations. Strong civil society movements have pressurised the government to implement a work permit programme since 1995. From August 2004, finally, the new Employment Permit

282 Hye-Kyung Lee Program was implemented to function alongside with the old Employment After Trainee Program. The new programme replaced the old one at the beginning of 2007. Strong civil society movements with significant changes in the political milieu in Korea have contributed to the changes in the immigration law. Labour and civil society movements became active during the 1980s, and became more vigorous at the start of Kim Young Sam’s Administration (1993–1998), the first civilian President. Until the early 1990s, the labour unions and labour-related NGOs opposed imported labour because of the perception that migrant labour would exert a negative impact on local labour movements, wages, working conditions, and unemployment rates. However, the presence of significant numbers of migrant workers who were working under difficult conditions prompted some local religious and civic groups to pay attention to the situation of migrant workers (Lee, 2003 p. 144). In August 1992, the Consulting Centre for Migrants (CCM) was established in the Myungdong Catholic Church, a well-known place for labour movements even during the oppressive military regimes. The CCM not only offers services and assistance on labour- and immigration-related matters, but also supports the formation of migrant workers’ organisations. The Sampaguita Philippines Community and the Nepalese Consulting Committee were established in September 1992 and January 1993, respectively (Lee, 2003 p. 144). After two significant public protests by migrant workers in January 1994 and January 1995, several civic NGOs formed coalitions, such as the Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK). The JCMK has actively advocated the re-organisation of the industrial training programme into the work permit program. The number of migrant-supporting NGOs was about 30 in 1994, but it grew to 155 in 2003 (Seol, 2002 p. 4; 2003 p. 27).

Changes in the Nationality Law and Prostitution Prohibition Law As the number of migrant-supporting NGOs grew, these NGOs became more professional in their approach to specific issues such as gender. From 1996 on, some NGOs began to focus on migrant women’s issues such as low pay, sexual harassment, maternity benefits, and abortion. As the number of migrant women and foreign brides increased, genderspecific issues became prominent in Korea. These revolved around the human rights problems of families of international marriage and problems faced by foreign female entertainers. On the one hand, the old Korean Nationality Law between 1948 and 1998 was patriarchal, and it stipulated provided that the nationality of children in international marriages should follow a paternal line. It meant that the old law did not allow children in international marriages to have Korean nationality by birth, if the father were a foreigner. Instead, the children took up their father’s nationality. In addition, it was impossible for unauthorised migrant workers to register their marriage. Even if they could register their marriage later, they could not find

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employment on the basis of their Visiting and Joining Families (F-1) visa. The predicament of those affected by these laws was greatly reduced when the Nationality Law became effective from 1998, and changes were made in the related immigration policies from 2002 onwards (Lee, 2003). On the other hand, the human rights issues of trafficked women for sex work in US military bases and other districts in Korea were highlighted by NGOs since the late 1990s. Strong women’s movements and migrant related movements also pushed for the passing of the revised Prostitution Prohibition Law in 2004, which is applicable for migrants as well as local women.

Changes in the Government’s Programmes and Services With the increase in public awareness of migration and gendered migration issues, the central and local governments began to offer various programmes and services for migrants and international marriage families. For example, since 2002 the Ministry for Women (now the Ministry for Gender Equality and Family) began to support and organise several shelters for migrant women and sex-trafficked migrant women. It also started to support a translation service for foreign women in need of professional counselling and shelter and who are victims of sex trafficking, sexual abuse, and domestic violence. The translation service aims to facilitate communication between victims and counsellors, and is available in English, Russian, Japanese, and Chinese. The service provides 16 women’s hotlines (the number is 1366), five sex-trafficking counselling centres, and two shelters for migrant women. In addition, the Ministry of Labour supports campaigns to prevent workplace sexual harassment for migrant women and it has published a leaflet in various languages that outlines key information that foreign workers should be aware of, such as definition of sexual harassment in the workplace, how to respond to harassment, and where to seek help. The Ministry for Gender Equality and Family as well as several local governments offer various courses to teach the Korean language, as well as courses about pre and postnatal care, and childcare for married migrant women. Information booklets for these programmes are published in Chinese, Vietnamese, English, and Russian. The central and local governments plan to introduce more of such support programmes to aid female migrant spouses to comfortably settle in Korea. In response to the government research findings (Seol et al., 2005), the Ministry of Health and Welfare plans to include migrant women issues into the existing social security system and to inform foreign brides about the available medical benefits.

Changes in Social Attitudes As migrant and gender-specific migrant issues caught public attention, social awareness of discrimination against migrants as well as migrant women heightened. An increase in the presence of foreign brides in some neighbourhoods

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influenced some Korean women to organise cross-cultural social associations. The first association was formed in Chungnam in 1994, where 25 middle-aged Korean women and their families acted as hosts to neighbouring Korean-Chinese wives, visiting them and touring together. Since 1996, Japanese Wives Associations have been established in several cities, and their members have volunteered their services for example teaching Japanese to some (aged) Koreans. Such organisations have been formed by other foreign nationalities in several regions (Lee, 2004b). From the beginning, women initiated the organisation of cross-cultural associations. However, recently, men who were preparing for cross-cultural marriage with Korean-Chinese women started an online group, called the Korean-China Marriage Association. Another civil movement is for the second generation of cross-cultural families. Acknowledging the history of how Korean society has discriminated against mixed-blood children, originally those born to Korean women and US military men during the Korean War (1950–1953) and thereafter, this movement began to campaign to abolish the phrase mixed blood and replace it with second generation of cross-cultural families. This movement has worked to fight discrimination against such children under the slogan “not them, but us” since December 2003 (Hankyoreh Newspaper 8 December 2003).

CONCLUSION This chapter has examined the trends and patterns of gendered migration to Korea. The migration of domestic workers, sex workers, and brides has been accelerated by recent globalization trends. Migrant women tend to fill the care vacuum, being the so-called serving classes (Sassen, 2002 p. 264). A patriarchal society where a gendered division of labour prevails tends to cause gendered migration. In addition, the latter can reinforce further stereotypical gen ideology associating housework and caring with women. In order to stop the perpetuation of these effects, the protection and empowerment of migrant women are vital. Today’s low birth rates (interpreted by some as an expression of women’s rebellion), related to difficulties in managing both work and family simultaneously, leads to a reliance on migrant women to fill the care vacuum. An alternative is to consider introducing family leave and paternity, allow fathers to take time off and to look after the family. Also, providing more child-care facilities and better working conditions to encourage procreation are both better policy options than depending on migrant domestic workers. This, however, entails a change in people’s views and attitude toward caring for children and the elderly, namely, that it is not solely women’s responsibility, but a joint responsibility of both men and women. South Korea’s contemporary history has now attained a substantive level of democratisation. Instead of rapid development, harmonious development

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has become a leading goal since the beginning of President Rho Moo Hyun’s administration (2003–present). One of the government’s 12 national policy goals is to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex as well as nationality. Although Korea’s economic development has slowed down, its efforts in protecting human rights and the inclusion of women and foreigners are significant. Strong civil society movements have contributed to these changes. The developmental impact of migration in general was that it relieved labour shortages in 3D jobs especially in the manufacturing industry. Another contribution was a significant change in the immigration law. The year 2004 was a memorable year because a new Employment Permit Programme was introduced. Although it does not eradicate the problem of significant numbers of undocumented foreign workers, it will protect migrant workers for whom the basic standard labour laws are now also applicable. However, the application of the labour law is limited where migrant domestic workers are concerned, because their workplaces is in the private sphere, the home. Gendered migration relieved labour shortages in certain services involving restaurant personnel and live-in domestic workers in the metropolitan areas of Seoul and Gyeonggi-do. It also contributed to changes in laws. The revision of the Nationality Law (1998) and the Prostitution Prohibition Law (2004) are good examples. Recently, the central and local government began to offer various support programmes for migrant women in general and married migrant women in particular. The government also plans to include married migrant women into the social security system. Overall, civil society movements in conjunction with a more active policy of integration by the state has led to a reconsideration of nationality, equity and citizenship issues within Korean society. NOTES 1. The feminization of migration, in quantitatively terms, is a phenomenon where more than 50% of the migration flows consists of migrant women. Qualitatively, the women are not tied movers, following their husbands, but overseas workers who are seeking jobs independently. 2. Among foreign workers, women account for 60% in Taiwan and Singapore at present, and about 45% in Japan (Lee, 2005a). 3. The age limit was 55 years in 1992, rose to 60 years, then decreased to 55 years in 1998 and 45 years in 2002 (Hong, 2000). 4. After the 1997 economic crisis, the government tried to stimulate overseas Koreans’ participation in the process of Korea’s redevelopment. The Overseas Korean Foundation was established in October 1997, followed by the Overseas Koreans Law in 1998. The law permits free entry, a longer stay, and aids business activities such as buying and selling of land and other properties; however, this law only applied to overseas Koreans who had left Korea after 1948. Therefore, (relatively poor) ethnic Koreans in China and the former Russian states who had left Korea before the Japanese colonisation (1910– 1945) were excluded. In November 2001 the Constitutional Court decided that the exclusion of Korean Chinese and Korean Russians by the law was a violation of the Constitution. Therefore, the amended law will extend similar

286 Hye-Kyung Lee

5. 6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

privileges to Korean Chinese and Korean Russians from 2004 onwards (Lee, 2003 p. 135). The labour force participation rate was highest among women aged 18–24 years, decreasing during their childbearing and child-rearing period (25–34 years), and peaking again after the age of 35 years. In 1999, Korean women worked as professionals, managers, and technicians (9.4%), clerical workers (7.7%), sales and service workers (37.4%), farmers and related workers (14.6%), operators and other blue-collar workers (30.9%) (Korean Women’s Development Institute, 2000). There were about 4.6 million employed married women in urban areas in 1999. Among them about 0.5 million worked as managers, professionals, and technicians, and these women would probably need domestic need. The average monthly earnings of live-in Korean-Chinese domestic workers were about 100–120 million Korean won (about US$964–1157) in 2004 (Lee, 2004a). Moreover, it is an inspiring fact that the Foreign Domestic Workers Charter’ has recently been drawn up by the EU. This charter acknowledges the status of workers and ensures a proper application of standard labour laws, along with the setting up of the labour unions, and the right to change employers (www. solidar.org). On that account, the Korean Government must also establish a policy that can protect these workers. According to the memorandum of understanding that has operated since 1996 for the prevention of marriages of convenience, if Korean and Chinese wanted to marry, they had to go through various complicated procedures. This international memorandum of understanding between Korea and China was abolished on July 1, 2003, therefore enabling people to register their marriage at the institution related to census registration in both countries, and obtain a marriage visa from the consulate of the Korean ambassador to China (The Hankyoreh 20 June 2003). Since the revision of the Korean Nationality Act, some have indicated the difficulties that a female foreigner faces if she wanted a divorce after less than 2 years of marriage, for she has to leave her children and return to her mother land. Some sections of the Korean Nationality Act regarding simple naturalisation were revised on December 2003. In the event that the period of stay is less than 2 years, one is allowed to apply for naturalization in the following cases: if a husband died, or is missing; if one is forced by ones husband to live apart or divorce; or if one has to take care of underaged children. But in the case of divorce and legal separation, one has to be able to prove that is was the husband who forced the wife to comply. 31% refers to full-time work. If part-time employment is included, this figure rises to about 60%.

REFERENCES Back, J. H. (2000). A study on the migrant women into Korean sex industry: With a focus on Filipinos in military camp towns. Masters Thesis, Seoul: Ewha Womans University. Hong, K. H. (2000). The gender politics of migration viewed through marriages between Chosun-jock (Korean-Chinese) women and Korean Men. Masters Thesis. Seoul: Graduate School of Ewha Woman’s University. Kim, H. S. (2001). Female migrants in Korean sex industry: Conditions and suggestions. Report presented at the International Symposium on Fighting for AntiTrafficking and Building Networks in Asia. Seoul.

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Kim, W. Y. (2003, February 21). The dynamic analysis of women’s labour force participation rates through marriage and child-birth. Paper presented at the Conference on Korean Labour Panel Studies, Korea Labour Institute. Seoul. Korea National Statistical Office. (1999–2004). Annual report on marriages and divorce statistics. Seoul. Korea Women’s Development Institute. (2000). Statistical yearbook on women. Seoul. Lee, H. K. (1994). The employment of foreign workers: Its impact on labour market. Korean Journal of Sociology, 28, 89–114. Lee, H. K. (2003). Gender, migration and civil activism in South Korea. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 12(1–2), 127–153. Lee, H. K. (2004a). Foreign domestic workers in Korea. Korean Journal of Population Studies, 27(2), 121–153. Lee, H. K. (2004b, August 14–17). Migration and international marriage in South Korea. Paper presented at the 99th Annual Meeting, American Sociological Association, San Francisco. Lee, H. K. (2005a). Marriage migration to South Korea: Issues, problems and responses. Korean Journal of Population Studies, 28(1), 73–106. Lee, H. K. (2005b). Changing trends in paid domestic work in South Korea. In S. Huang, B. S. A. Yeoh, & N.A. Rahman (Eds.), Asian women and transnational domestic workers. London: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Lee, J. Y. (2004). Domestic work experience of Korean-Chinese female migrants in Korea. Masters Thesis. Yonsei University, Seoul. Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea. (2001). The residential condition of foreign spouses. Inside Report. Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea (2002a). Annual report on emigration and immigration. Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea (2002b). Registration of unauthorized migrants between March and May 2002. Inside Report. PAHRM (Pusan Association for Human Rights of Migrants). (2000). Field research on Russian women into Pusan sex industry. Pusan. Seol, D. H. (2002). Issues and problems of migrant support NGOs. Civil Society, 6, 34–46. Seol, D. H. (2003). Survey of foreign migrant workers and the NGOs supporting them in Korea. Seoul: Korea International Labour Foundation. Seol, D. H. (2004). Alternative labour shortage statistical measures for small and medium enterprises in Korea. Korean Journal of Population Studies, 27(1), 121–146. Seol, D. H., Kim, H. M., Han, G. S., Ko, H. W. & Yea, S. (2003). A research on foreign female sex workers in Korea. Seoul: The Ministry of Women. Seol, D. H., Kim, Y. T., Kim, H. M., Yoon, H. S., Lee, H. K., Yim, K. T., Chung, K. S., Ju, Y. S. & Han, G. S. (2005). A research on the actual condition of the migrant women through international marriage, and the plan for supporting policy of health and welfare. Seoul: The Ministry of Health and Welfare. Sassen, S. (2002). Global cities and survival circuits. In B. Ehrenreich & A. R. Hochschild (Eds.), Global woman: Nannies, maids, and sex workers in the new economy. New York: Metropolitan Books.

15 Homeward-Bound Investors The Role of Overseas Chinese in China’s Economic Development Maggi W.H. Leung

Viewing the current world economic statistics it is easy to forget that China only opened its economy to the world market and foreign investment in the 1970s. Ever since the adoption of the Open Door Policy, China has become the most attractive foreign direct investment (FDI) destination in the world.1 In 2005, China’s inward FDI amounted to US$72.4 billion, up 19.42% over that of 2004.2 This figure made China the third largest FDI recipient in the world, following the UK (US$165 billion) and the United States (US$99 billion; UNCTAD, 2006). FDI has been important for China’s economy to overcome shortage of domestic funds in the beginning of the reform period. In addition, it is trusted as a means to readjust China’s management practise, improve the economy’s productivity and competitiveness, create job opportunities and increase exports in exchange of foreign currencies. Among the investors venturing into China, overseas Chinese were pioneers. Cheng (2004) estimates that 70% to 80% of FDI to China since 1978 originates from overseas Chinese.3 In fact, the availability of this capital and expertise has been considered as a unique advantage for China’s huge leap forward in its economic growth and rapid reintegration into the world economy. China’s enviable economic reform would certainly have taken a very different path without the different forms of contribution, especially the handsome amount of investments, brought in by overseas Chinese especially from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Drawing upon the Chinese experience, this chapter illustrates the diverse potential of diasporas in their homelands’ economic development, that is, beyond conventional notions of remittances or a permanent physical return. Special attention is also put on the nature and spatial characteristics of their investment. This contribution demonstrates that overseas Chinese investment is more than patriotic acts initiated by the sojourners only. The role of the Chinese state at different geographical levels as active agents in orchestrating overseas Chinese investment is illustrated for this purpose. Some of the negative impacts of these investments are then discussed before the chapter concludes with some of the challenges faced by overseas Chinese investors under the impact of Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization and the development of a more high-tech oriented economy.

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OVERSEAS CHINESE: FROM TRAITORS TO PATRIOTS Diaspora is a diverse and dynamic phenomenon. Although some diasporas display predominantly the traditional character of victimisation and expulsion, others are transnational communities comprising many of the crème de la crème who have opted to migrate for a more prosperous future. As Skeldon (2004) stresses, the concept of diasporas must not be essentialised. They are not homogenous and made up of individuals and communities with diverse aspiration, fear, potential, limitations, and agenda. In the course of time, each diaspora also takes on new identities, with changing composition, nature, and capacity. When considering the potential of a diaspora in the development of their home country, it is also important to consider how the diaspora state considers its diaspora. Overseas Chinese invested and donated significant sums in postimperial China, mainly in their ancestral areas in south-eastern China and in urban centres such as Shanghai. Overseas Chinese nationalism, transfer of investment and other financial support reached its climax during the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s. The flight of the Nationalist Party to Taiwan and the takeover of the Communist Party in the mainland in 1949 complicated overseas Chinese affairs. Although the Nationalist government maintained its policy in Taiwan, the Communist government also worked to gain overseas supporters. Unlike in Taiwan, however, the relation between the Communist Party and overseas Chinese has endured a greater number of ups and downs. The Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 marked the beginning of prosecution of anyone with overseas contacts as they were viewed as class enemies or agents of imperialism. During the Cultural Revolution repatriated Chinese were seen as traitors linked to foreign conspiracies and were harshly discriminated against. Overseas Chinese affairs officially came to a halt between end of 1960s and late 1970s. Nevertheless contacts never ceased completely even then. The repatriation of overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia provides an exceptional case. Most of these few hundred thousand returnees were young adults who fled anti-Chinese sentiments in their countries (e.g., Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia, Vietnam, and India) and identified with China’s communist ideology. Many of these returnees were sent to the poor rural villages or ‘overseas Chinese farms’ (Fitzgerald, 1972). The adoption of the Open Door Policy marked a new era for the comradeship between the Chinese state and its diaspora. As Deng Xiaoping engineered the economic reform in the 1970s, he emphasised that overseas Chinese represented a unique opportunity for China’s development and instructed therefore to open the doors for their investment. Deng particularly welcomed and trusted them because, as opposed to other foreign investors, overseas Chinese investors were perceived as patriots who wished to contribute in the development of the socialist motherland (Deng, 1983). Subsequent Chinese leaders have maintained this positive attitude toward overseas Chinese capitalists and professionals.

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Can this special relationship between overseas Chinese capitalists and the Chinese state be explained completely by the notion of patriotism? LeverTracy, Ip & Tracy (1996) argue that there is an economic synergy between the parties. In addition to patriotism—and in my opinion more important than that, most overseas Chinese investors make their venture decision being lured by the competitive production costs and expanding domestic market in China. In order to navigate in a reforming economy that is yet to mature, overseas Chinese transform their cultural capital (e.g., cultural and language skills) to social capital (i.e. networks) and consequently economic benefit. The importance of these personal relationships in economic transactions has inspired analysts to study the nature and functioning of this allegedly peculiarly Chinese—which I do not agree—‘guanxi economy’ (e.g., Chu & Ngan 2000; Haley, Haley, & Tan, 1998; Mitchell, 1995; Smart, 1993; 1998; 2000; Yang, 1994), how they make use of the bamboo networks (Weidenbaum & Huges, 1996; Phar, 2004), creating a Chinese empire. Personal relationship and informal practices are particularly important when the national legal infrastructure for guarantees is fluid and lacking transparency. This is true not only in China. Compared to foreign investors of nonChinese backgrounds, overseas Chinese are more equipped in gaining vital information on how to operate a successful business in China, speeding up bureaucratic procedures and avoiding paying official fees often by conducting corrupt practices.

DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM DOLLARS TO IDEAS Before I discuss the contributions made by overseas Chinese in the rapid economic development in China, it is important to emphasise that there should not be an assumed link between migration (or diaspora) and development. The relationship between the two is complex. A conclusive evaluation of any migration flow demands reliable data over time and a careful examination of the spatial and social manifestations. Diasporas can contribute to development and the Chinese case is often cited as a convincing example. Development comprises different aspects that are inter-related. It can be defined as sustainable and equitable economic growth, social advancement, human empowerment, democracy, and freedom. Although this chapter focuses on economic connections between China and its diaspora, it should be noted that economic connections do not only bring economic changes. Through remittance, trade, and investment projects, overseas Chinese exchange also ideas, practices, affection, and other social and cultural changes beyond economics with their counterparts in China.

Remittances Although studies on migration and development cover increasingly diverse aspects of the complex phenomenon, remittance remains a major focus.

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This emphasis is understandable both due to its absolute volume and its share relative to other sources of external capital. According to the World Bank (2006) remittances to developing countries reached a total of US$167 billion in 2005. In addition, remittances have been proven to be the most stable supply of external finance and are channelled often to geographical areas less attractive to investors, thus providing important economic and social insurance for many communities. China received US$21.3 billion remittance in 2005, making it the second top receiver of remittances in the world after India (US$21.7 billion; World Bank, 2006 p. 90). Remittance has played an important role in the livelihood of migrants’ families and communities ever since Chinese people began to work overseas, even throughout the Cultural Revolution period. It is a particularly important source of income for traditional migrant-sending communities in Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang Provinces, and increasingly in Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang, Shandong, Hebei Provinces and Tianjin (Figure 15.1). In addition to remittance directly transferred to families, overseas Chinese have also provided funds for disaster relief and social development also in regions outside of the donors’ ancestral villages.

Figure 15.1 Map of China.

292 Maggi W.H. Leung

Trade Migrants have contributed to the development process of their homeland also through trade (Gould, 1994; Light, 2000; Tseng, 1995; Yoon, 1997). They create a demand for consumer goods (e.g., food products, entertainment) and services (e.g., travel, banking, legal advice) between their different home economies. In addition, it is also theorised that migrants bear lower transaction costs in international trade because of their cultural fluency in their different home places, which explains their tendency to be involved in trading—as in the case among Asian Americans (Tseng, 1995; Yoon, 1997), migrants of non-English speaking backgrounds in Australia (Stranger, 1992) and the Chinese diaspora (Zhang, 2000). Overseas Chinese have been China’s most important trading partners since the economy opened for trade in 1970s. Hong Kong is the most important entrepôt for China and was China’s third largest trading partner after Japan and the United States, accounting for 9.6% of its total trade in 2005 (HKTDC, 2006a). Though sharing a sensitive political relationship, Taiwan and China have also been close trading partners. Trade between China and Taiwan has increased from US$553.3 million in 1984 to US$71.1 billion in 2005 (Tang, 2006).

Investment Though the spotlight on overseas Chinese investment has been put on the flow of capital since the late 1970s, diaspora investment in China has a much longer history. Between the 19th century and 1949, Guangdong and Fujian (the two main migrant-sending provinces) and Shanghai were the destination of the largest volume of investment. The investment record during that period was however a grievously painful history for investors. Although some businesses failed due to their internal weakness, the unstable political and bureaucratic environment accounted heavily for this dismal record (Pan, 1999 p. 110). During the Cold War, China was isolated economically and politically from the nonCommunist counterparts. Overseas Chinese offered the only linkages to the capitalist world. The Chinese state encouraged overseas Chinese to invest by providing privileges and protection, and constructing a discourse instilling patriotism in the media overseas (Huang, 1950).4 In the 1950s the Chinese state established Overseas Chinese Investment Corporations, which guaranteed annual dividends for investors. China’s communist political orientation was however unattractive to most investors. It was not until the adoption of the Open Door Policy when the political-economic environment became conducive enough to once again make the patriotic act of investment back home appealing. Though the proportion of overseas Chinese investment has decreased in recent years, it is estimated that 60% of all FDI (or over US$100 billion) originated from the Chinese diaspora in the 1990s (Dade, 2006). Hong

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Kong remains the largest source of investment (Table 15.1). According to the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC, 2006a), among all the overseas-funded projects registered in China in the end of 2005, 45.9% were tied to Hong Kong interests. The overwhelming dominance of Hong Kong as a source of FDI in China is however exaggerated as a portion of the FDI formally from Hong Kong originates de facto from other sources. Many investors, including overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and nonChinese investors, have used Hong Kong and less so Taiwan and Macau as springboards to invest in China, thus exaggerating the amount of such patriotic capital. And some of such FDI is in fact investment by domestic Chinese round-tripped through Hong Kong. According to World Bank estimation, as much as half of recent Hong Kong investment is actually recycled money from mainland China (World Bank, 2002 p. 41). Partly due to the increasing openness of the Chinese economy, more and more foreign investors now invest in China under their own name, leading partially to the recent decline in the share of FDI from Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the share of FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan still accounted for one-third of the total in 2005, justifying the state’s honouring these investors as “engines in the motherland’s efforts to build a modern and affluent society” (China Daily, 2003). Overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia are also an important source of capital, technology, and trading experience for China. Investment from them made up about 15% of all FDI in 1990s (Tefft, 1994). Again, its relative importance has reduced in recent years, to around 8% of all FDI (about US$7 billion) to China as in 2002 (Phar, 2004).

Table 15.1

Top ten origins of foreign direct investment in China, 2005

Origin Hong Kong

(Billion US$)

Percentage of Total

17.95

29.8

British Virgin Islands

9.02

15.0

Japan

6.53

10.8

South Korea

5.17

8.6

United States

3.06

5.1

Singapore

2.20

3.6

Taiwan

2.15

3.6

Cayman Islands

1.95

3.2

Germany

1.53

2.5

West Samoa

1.35

2.2

Total (all FDI)

60.33*

100

* The figure excludes FDI in financial services. Source: PRC Ministry of Commerce cited in US-China Business Council (2006).

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In addition to direct investment, Hong Kong has also provided the space for Chinese enterprises to raise foreign capital. By the end of 2005, a total of 335 mainland companies were listed in Hong Kong with a total market capitalisation of US$409 billion. In the past decade, mainland companies have raised US$141 billion in Hong Kong (HKTDC, 2006b). This voluminous inflow of capital into China has provided the necessary financial resource for China’s economic take-off and continuous growth.

Beyond the Dollar Sign In addition to capital flow and trade, Zhang (2000 p. 75) identifies three additional types of crucial contributions of overseas Chinese in supporting China’s economic reform, namely institutional substitutes, ideas and intermediary function. When China decided to open its economy to the outside world in the late 1970s, it lacked a well-functioning market institutions and business culture that were necessary for its growing connection with the world market. Chinese reformers looked upon the economic success of Hong Kong and Singapore as models and followed their examples in the establishment of many market institutions practised in these economies. Overseas Chinese have provided crucial institutional substitutes for many of the China’s deficiencies, including those in laws and regulations, trading networks, managerial skills, and business culture. Zhang (2000 p. 77) considers the overseas Chinese as important actors in this process of organic assimilation of Western market institutions in China. On project-specific level, overseas Chinese have also been invited to manage new ventures in China. Many of the Economic and Technological Development Zones have been developed and managed by joint ventures between domestic and Hong Kong partners. Overseas Chinese provide not only institutional substitutes, their ideas have also been important to Chinese development. In the eyes of the Chinese state, overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, scholars, and officials are more capable in providing useful advice to China’s reformers, as compared to nonChinese economists. In addition to personal meetings and consultations, overseas Chinese press, media, and other archives have offered the Chinese state vast amount of information about the world economy in Chinese language. Furthermore, overseas Chinese’ intermediary role as bridges between China and the rest of the world is of importance. Many foreign firms hire overseas Chinese, who are considered to be more appropriate cultural adaptors, as managers for their operation in China. More recently, overseas Chinese business networks have also served as channels for Chinese firms to invest in foreign countries, and get listed in Hong Kong or US Stock Exchanges. Diaspora as a source of knowledge and skills has become an increasingly important objective as China develops its high-tech and knowledge-based sectors. Although the increasingly vibrant circulation networks and return

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of talent in the Chinese case suggest that certain success of the Chinese state in harnessing the knowledge and skills from its diaspora, Xiang (2005) is critical about the outcome. According to him, most of the projects involving these returnees have been business-driven, whereas knowledge exchange and transfer has been considered as supplementary. He further argues that a mere focus on immediate deliverables and profits would fail the mandate to promote knowledge exchange and consequently the development of knowledge-based industries in China, which is by definition a long-term process. A modification of the policy focus is recommended to engage skilled overseas Chinese in the development of science and technology, and knowledgebased services in China.

FROM POTATOES TO COMPUTER CHIPS Investments from overseas Chinese have hitherto been concentrated in labour-intensive manufacturing industries, real estate, hotels, and infrastructure (Table 15.2). But the nature of FDI is dynamic. Hong Kong investment has increasingly moved from the traditional low-technology manufacturing to large-scale infrastructure and real estate projects (Smart & Hsu, 2004). Among the Taiwanese investors, there has been a change from footwear, toys and light consumer goods manufacturing to higher technology, yet

Table 15.2 Distribution of foreign direct investment by aggregated sector in China (2002–2004) Year 2002

Aggregated Sector

Actually Utilised Value (Billion US$)

Total Primary Sector

2003

100

1.028

1.95

Secondary Sector

39.465

74.83

Tertiary Sector

12.250

23.23

Total

53.505

Primary Sector

2004

52.743

Percentage of Total

100

1.008

1.87

Secondary Sector

39.710

74.22

Tertiary Sector

12.794

23.91

Total

60.630

Primary Sector

100

1.114

1.84

Secondary Sector

45.463

74.98

Tertiary Sector

14.053

23.18

Source: China Commerce Yearbook (2005).

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labour-intensive and price-sensitive assembly of personal computer power supply units, keyboards and scanners in 1990s, and more recently expanded to the higher value-added activities ranging from motherboards, video cards to laptop computer manufacturing (Saxenian, 2005). The Chinese state has been proactive in encouraging foreign investors to venture into the new and high-tech industries in recent years. Existing activities range from computer hardware production, software development, hi-tech assembly equipment, high precision machining to biotech medicine research, among others. The central government, provincial governments and universities across the nation have established thousands of new and hightech development zones and science parks, in which many research results in science and technology have been practised in production. There are 53 National High-Tech Development Zones and 54 National Economic and Technological Development Zones. Although these high-tech development projects in China are not reserved for overseas Chinese investors, the Chinese state has continued its usual practice in initiating special programmes to encourage overseas Chinese to be involved. As of 2006, there were over 130 pioneering or entrepreneur parks for overseas Chinese scholars in China, set up exclusively for companies started by returnees, hosting thousands of firms (Guangzhou Municipality Government, 2006). They provide special service such as speeding up the bureaucratic process involved in establishing residency, guaranteeing access to high-quality housing and prestigious, often bilingual, schools for their children (Saxenian, 2005). Lastly, I would like to allude briefly to the overseas Chinese farms despite their relatively small turnover and difference in nature compared to other FDI projects. These farms were set up by the state in the 1950s to 1970s to accommodate the returnees from overseas who had no relatives in their ancestral villages and had no special skills. Most of these farms were established in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, although some were also found in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, settling about 210,000 returnees (Lu & Quan, 2001). Nowadays, there are 84 overseas Chinese farms. These farms produced a gross output of over 8.5 billion RMB (about 2,000 RMB per capita) in 2000. Local governments with these farms also try to make them more attractive to overseas Chinese investors by improving the basic infrastructure, such as providing better transportation, communications, and water conservancy facilities. Some of these efforts have been fruitful. Overseas Chinese farms in Guangdong, for examples, attracted US$1.5 billion utilised FDI and the establishment of 536 foreign enterprises in 2004 (China.org.cn, 2005).

GEOGRAPHY OF OVERSEAS CHINESE INVESTMENTS Table 15.3 illustrates how investments from FDI display a high level of spatial disparity in China. Until now, FDI is highly concentrated in the coastal

Homeward-Bound Investors Table 15.3

Geographical distribution of foreign direct investment in China, 2002-2004 Actually Utilised Value (100 Million US$)

Percentage of Total

Year

Geographical Region

2002

Total

527.43

100

Eastern

457.29

86.70

Central

50.09

9.50

Western 2003

20.05

3.80

Total

535.05

Eastern

459.51

85.88

Central

58.31

10.90

Western 2004

297

17.23

100

3.22

Total

606.3

100

Eastern

522.07

86.11

Central

66.8

11.02

Western

17.44

2.88

Source: China Commerce Yearbook (2005).

provinces, particularly around large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, as well as in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along the coastal area (Figure 15.2). Even within these preferred areas, there has also been observable spatial development in the course of time. Although more than 90% of businesses in Hong Kong and Macau invested in Guangdong Province traditionally, they have gradually expanded their scope to other coastal areas in recent years. Many Taiwanese investors have also moved from Guangdong Province to Shanghai and Jiangsu, Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, whereas overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia and the United States favoured Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian and Shandong Provinces, Beijing and Shanghai municipalities and the Bohai Bay area (Xinhua, 2004). That the traditional migrant-sending provinces Guangdong and Fujian have absorbed the largest amount of FDI from the diaspora community is not a coincidence. One may understand this from a cultural point of view. The ancestral homes of many overseas Chinese are located in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. Many overseas Chinese investors retain a cultural and emotional attachment to the ancestral roots. Such affection is translated to investment in their birthplace of birthplace of their ancestors. Shared language, customs, and familial ties also became cultural and social capital that facilitates the smooth operation in business. The potential of such emotional

Figure 15.2

Special Economic Zones, Open Coastal Cities and Open Economic Regions in China.

298 Maggi W.H. Leung

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connection between home and the diaspora shaped Deng’s spatially and temporally paced Open Door Policy, which generally favoured the southern and eastern coastal regions. He tactically identified four special places for the Chinese in diaspora as initial SEZs in 1980. These include: Shenzhen, the border city adjacent to Hong Kong; Zhuhai, the area next to Macau; Xiamen, across from the strait from Taiwan; and Shantou, the (ancestral) home of many overseas Chinese. As Smart (2000) maintains, these SEZs are strategically positioned to facilitate the mobilisation of the resources of the overseas Chinese, and to serve the goals of eventual reunification of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau with the mainland. Following the success of the SEZs, the central government set up 14 other coastal ports for FDI in 1984. However, Deng voiced his reservations about the SEZs and open cities in June 1985, leading to an order to restrict FDI to four of the biggest coastal cities among the original 14—Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, and Guangzhou. In spite of the official policy of the central government, local administrators continued to market these cities among foreign investors. In addition to the open cities, three open economic regions: Yangtze River Delta Economic Region, Pearl River Delta Economic Region and the Minnan Delta Economic Region, were also designated in 1985. The establishment of these open regions served to spread the benefits of economic growth to areas surrounding the ports or SEZs. As the reform progressed, the central governments proceeded to set up economic zones of various natures to attract and guide investments in different sectors spatially. These include the Industrial Zones, Economic and Technology Development Zones, and the Hi-Tech and New Technology Development Zones (Figure 15.2). There is a considerable spatial imbalance in the distribution of these zones. The eastern coastal and central regions are still more favoured. Not only have the coastal provinces been attracting large sum of investments, but they also lead in the upgrading of their production. After over two decades of low-technology manufacturing, coastal provinces are now striving for the next high-tech boom, while the traditional kinds of low-technology manufacturing industries have moved northward and westward, imitating the wild geese model which has been used to describe the development pattern in East and Southeast Asia. The diffusion of lower-tech productions westward suits the state’s go west policy, which has indeed witnessed a certain level of success. Although the coastal provinces still lead miles ahead in absolute terms, the increase in land, labour and living costs in these areas, and the potential domestic consumer market in the inland regions provide good reasons for foreign investors to set up their production and sales operation in the interior provinces. In addition to the central administrative strategies in planning the initial geography of overseas Chinese investment, governments at more local level (e.g., county, township, or province level) have arguably contributed at least as much in shaping the consequent spatial pattern of the investments.

300 Maggi W.H. Leung This is particularly important as the buffer function of the SEZs diminished in the course of the reform. Smart (2000 pp. 66–67) goes so far to argue that local capitalisms have emerged. The political-economy systems found in different locales in China are products not so much of state-level central planning, but by locally produced conditions that are varied considerably across space. Smart concludes further that overseas Chinese investors have played a significant role in this emergence process of local capitalisms, by demonstrating how Taiwanese and Hong Kong capitalists were engaged in very localised guanxi capitalism in Guangdong. Because guanxi capital cannot be easily transferred somewhere else, overseas Chinese investors tend to concentrate in certain geographical areas, namely in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. In other words, the power of local capitalisms has exacerbated the spatially uneven development in China. The importance of this sort of local capitalism has also promoted the rise of smaller-scale investments made by overseas Chinese as compared to those from western transnational corporations, which conduct their business transactions more likely via formal channels. Another impact of the decentralised capitalist reform is the intense competition observed among provinces, and even counties and locales. Rosen (1999) and Zweig (2002) have demonstrated the rigorous rivalry among localities to attract foreign capital, such as by offering more benefits to foreign investors than they are officially allowed to, sometimes causing serious problems with the central state. Although Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing have always been the most aggressive in this competition, localities in north-eastern provinces Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning have also recently joined in the race and benefited from an increase in FDI.

GOING ALL OUT TO WOO THE PATRIOTS In order to make the conditions more attractive for the patriotic investors, Deng Xiaoping began to implement different policies to court the overseas Chinese. These include returning properties confiscated after the 1949 revolution and installing various tax and regulatory advantages to, and opening up physical and economic space for overseas Chinese investors, particularly those from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Confronted with the rising number of young migrants leaving China in recent years, the Chinese state has also put much effort in enticing the new migrants. Among these, newly departed students have been the focus of recent Chinese diaspora politics (Luo, Guo, & Huang, 2003). In addition to setting up Pioneering Parks to attract potential entrepreneurs, the state has also adopted policies to encourage overseas Chinese graduates to return to China to work. Besides privileges in mobility in entering and leaving the country, ownership of foreign residency, housing, social insurance, jobs for spouses, schools for children, returnees are also guaranteed intellectual

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property rights. Those who make a significant contribution are rewarded. Frequent tours and seminars are organised in China and overseas to publicise the new policy, help potential returnees to understand China and its economy, identify business opportunities, and inform all technical details about investing in China. As a result of the booming economy in China, the number of returnees has increased at a yearly rate of about 13% since 1995. By 2005, 198,000 have made their way back to China, either to join existing companies or establish their own companies. Many of these returnees have graduate degrees, including a high percentage of PhDs and MBAs (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 2005). County and township governments, especially but not exclusively from Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, are eager to establish incentives to attract overseas Chinese who share connections with them, for example by setting up institutions based on kinship, birthplace and university affiliations and so forth and sending marketing delegations to strategic destinations. Saxenian (2005) reports that there is almost a continuous flow of delegations of company and state representatives from different functions and levels to take part in this treasure hunt in concentrated sources of talents like Silicon Valley in California. These delegates come no longer only from coastal provinces, but central and western provinces as well. Catching on to the cyber-trend, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Offices of various provinces are also active in the cyberspace in disseminating information and encouraging exchange among browsers, both in Chinese and English languages. On top of concrete policies and initiatives, the Chinese state also attempts to shape a diasporic culture using more symbolic methods. Nyíri (2001) provides an insightful analysis on how the contemporary Chinese state constructs discursively the new migrant culture and celebrate migration as a patriotic and modern act. By encouraging transnational practises among these new migrants, the Chinese state hopes to entice them to contribute to the modern transnational nation-building. The cultivation of diaspora nationalism is of course not a new invention. Chinese language schools overseas have been an old instrument used, historically by the Taiwanese government mainly. In March 2004, President Hu Jintao was personally involved in the organisation of the Joint Conference on Overseas Chinese Language Education which served to raise funds for the establishment of a Chinese Language Education Development Foundation. The State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office declares its objectives in strengthening Chinese language education and patriotic education among the descendants of overseas Chinese, and through which hopefully to enhance their connections and emotional ties with their motherland. Such a move to institutionalise overseas Chinese language centres can be considered as a new step taken by the Chinese state. Moreover, similar to the efforts of many diasporic states (e.g., Israel, the Philippines), the Chinese state also organises root-seeking programmes to arouse and deepen a sense of nostalgia and duty among those who were born and perhaps grew up in

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China, and the children of overseas Chinese who might never have set foot in their homeland. Root-seeking camps have been routine programmes of the Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Office since 1980. Tens of thousands of overseas Chinese from all world regions have visited China through these programmes. Although the future economic impact of these root-seeking tours is hard to estimate, diasporic states all over the world are convinced that it is worth the efforts promoting it. At least, these visitors, or even better potential investors or returnees, participate in the vibrant economy of diasporic tourism in the homeland states (Leung, 2005).

DARK SIDES OF OVERSEAS CHINESE INVESTMENTS In this paper, I focused on the positive impact of overseas Chinese investment in the development in China. However, one cannot conclude categorically that overseas Chinese investment has only brought positive changes to the Chinese society. Overseas Chinese capitalism is after all also based on exploitation of labour and the environment, which costs and benefits are distributed unequally spatially and socially. I illustrated the uneven development at provincial level earlier. Certainly, when one examines the manifestation of the economic miracle more closely, disparity can be observed at different levels ranging from the community, household, and individual ones. At macroeconomic level, some scholars are highly critical of the FDIcentric policy approach. Huang (2003), for instance, argues that domestic capital has been systematically disadvantaged; FDI has thus exacerbated some of the economic weaknesses in China, rather than compensating for them. On an individual level, preferential treatments for returnees have widened the differences between returnees and local professionals, thus creating tensions between the two groups (Luo, Guo, & Huang, 2003). This preference for foreign experience increases the appeal of migration as a step for rapid career advancement. FDI activities in China are infamous for exploitations of different kinds. Many researchers and labour rights advocates have voiced their concern over the low level of labour right standard in China. Chan (2001) documents labour right violations in China, which are also commonly documented in factories owned by overseas Chinese entrepreneurship from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The gendered aspect of these violations has also been highlighted. Not only that the majority of the workers employed in the manufacturing sector is female, but research has also confirmed that discrimination against women workers in salary, promotions and forced retirement is common (Compa, 2004). Migration of workers also imposes social costs. Though there has been a spatial spreading of FDI, the concentration of job opportunities in the coastal area and large cities still persists and has prompted the migration of millions of workers from the rural interior of the country. This has brought

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social problems such as left behind families on the one hand, and ill treatment of migrant workers in the coastal areas on the other. Last but not least, as China becomes the world’s factory, the environmental impact of the abundant, often highly-polluting industrial activities has caused anxiety. A World Bank report (Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2005) concludes that compared to investment from other origins (e.g., OECD countries), investment from overseas Chinese sources (i.e. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) lags seriously behind in environmental standards. These observations help perhaps to answer the question whether overseas Chinese investors are patriotic and interested in the long-term welfare of their motherland, or rather behaving like (or worse than) other capitalists following economic rationality ignoring social and environmental sustainability concerns.

CONCLUSIONS AND LOOKING FORWARD This chapter illustrates how the availability of overseas Chinese capital and skills has been crucial for China’s recent breath-taking economic growth. The Chinese case is indeed exemplary in demonstrating how a diaspora can be a tool for economic development. Nevertheless it is important to remember that development and migration are both context-specific processes, and that a deterministic relationship between the two does not exist. Even in the Chinese case, it would be naïve to romanticise the diaspora-led development process. Although the bulk of the FDI to China comes from the diaspora, only a small proportion flows through migrant networks or small family business. As Li (2000) reminds us, most of the patriotic capital flows can be explained by economics, in which migrant networks may or may not be a determinant. Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs were unarguably crucial in the beginning of the economic reform because many other investors, who lacked the cultural and social understanding in China, were not willing to take the risks in the quickly evolving and nontransparent market. A vast and poor economy on the one hand, and a large and resourceful diaspora on the other hand, provided good ingredients for the miracle, as correctly realised by Deng Xiaoping when he brought the reform to life. Ever since then, overseas Chinese business people and China share a symbiotic relationship. It is obvious that being patriotic is particularly feasible and attractive when economic benefits are to be reaped simultaneously. It would be interesting to ponder what would happen to the patriotic investors if China loses its competitiveness to other countries with even cheaper land and labour, and even laxer environmental and labour right regulations. Changes in the global investment landscape will most likely alter the direction of capital from overseas Chinese as well. Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, China has undergone major reforms of its trade, investment, and foreign exchange management systems. Policies will increasingly have to be aligned with international practices.

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These new rules and arrangements have reduced the advantages enjoyed by the overseas Chinese capitalists who have knowledge of when, where and how to get things before clear and internationally accepted rules were being drafted or implemented. The formalisation and internationalisation of the Chinese economic governance system have helped foreign-funded enterprises, especially large transnational corporations to operate in China. These large corporations bring with them a large volume of capital, brand names, and cutting-edge technology that overseas Chinese investors tend to lack. The traditional ways of investment and doing business in China are not only challenged by external forces brought by the WTO regime. In fact, the nature and effect of the broadly-defined overseas Chinese style investments have also evolved reacting to the changes in the local and global economic conditions. As the more affluent provinces become more costly and localities strive to create a high-tech future, traditional labour-intensive, low-technology manufacturers have to find their next sanctuaries probably in poorer regions and provinces. The power of soft capital such as cultural and social understanding is rather locale-specific, that is, Hong Kong Chinese investors might not be able to navigate well in northern provinces, for instance, as opposed to in Guangdong Province. In other words, guanxi might not always work as magic fix for the patriotic capitalists. Not only does guanxi have a spatial aspect, but it also carries sectoralspecificity. As overseas Chinese move to other kinds of investments, they need to redefine their comparative advantages. Many overseas Chinese investors, especially those from Taiwan, have switched to higher technology manufacturing in the last decade. As Smart and Hsu (2004) and Saxenian (2005) demonstrate, relational networks take on different faces when they are used in different industrial sectors. In the case of the new booming computer manufacturing, while ethnic ties in the form of shared language and culture still help to smoothen and quicken transactions as they used to in traditional manufacturing industries, there has also been a demand for qualified and skilled specialists who have to be identified and connected using new channels, such as university alumni associations and professional organisations. One of the solutions to compete in the computer field, which requires flexibility and quick response, is to construct the guanxi network transnationally. For example, a transnational technical community straddling Silicon Valley in California, Hsinchu in Taiwan and Shanghai Triangle in China has been created in the chipmaking industry (Saxenian, 2005). As economic conditions in China and the nature of Chinese diaspora change, new developments in the way overseas Chinese investments take shape and space are expected. This chapter aims to bring forth the contribution of overseas Chinese investment in China, namely as a welcome source of financial, human and social capital to fuel the economic engine for growth and development. Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to generalise that FDI only brings positive a impact to the economy. To this end, I provide a brief discussion of the

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darker sides of overseas Chinese investment toward the end of the paper. A more equitable distribution of costs and benefits induced by diaspora investments, like that brought about by migration itself, requires policy interventions and management. Although a conclusive evaluation of the international movements of people and capital is not possible, certain is that more longitudinal, quantitative and qualitative data are necessary to help us better understand their opportunities and constraints. Such knowledge is crucial in our era, as the movement of people and capital will almost certainly intensify and speed up in the years to come.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The earlier draft of this article was written while the author was affiliated with the Department of Geography and Resource Management of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Helpful comments by the editors and anonymous referees on earlier drafts are appreciated. NOTES 1. China was considered an attractive location by 87% of transnational corporations and 85% of experts—at least 30% more than that for the next best performer (UNTACD, 2005). 2. This figure includes FDI in financial services. Data on inward FDI before 2006 did not include investment in this sector because of its relatively small volume. Total FDI in 2005 amounted to US$60.3 billion (a drop of 0.5% from 2004) when investment in financial services is excluded. 3. I refer to Chinese in Hong Kong and Macau overseas Chinese even though they have become Chinese nationals in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Taiwanese of Chinese descent are also considered as overseas Chinese here. From the Chinese official point of view, Chinese people in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan belong to a unique compatriots (tongbao) category and are given differential treatments. And China refers to the Republic of China from 1911 to 1949 and the People’s Republic of China since 1949. 4. For example, Huang (1950) preached that overseas Chinese, instead of being afraid of socialism, should embrace the ideology and contribute to its success by investing in their motherland. By condemning the corruption and failure of the presocialist past, Huang guaranteed that investment in the People’s Republic would only be successful as the regime was independent from the pseudo colonisation by capitalism and imperialism.

REFERENCES Chan, A. (2001). China’s workers under assault: The exploitation of labor in a globalizing economy. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Cheng, X. (2004, May 10–14). Observations and ethnic Chinese: Significance as a research topic and problems of establishing an academic discipline. Paper presented at the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Overseas Chinese.Helsingør, Denmark.

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China Daily. (2003. October, 1). China invites investment from overseas Chinese. Retrieved May 4, 2005 from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–10/01/ content_269026.htm China.org.cn (2005, November, 21). Zhongguo tuijin huaqiao nongchang jiegou hexie shehui. Retrieved on January 2, 2006 from http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/ChineseCommunity/1036577.htm Chu, D. & Ngan, R. (2000). Business networks, guanxi and foreign investment. In Y.M. Yeung & D. Chu (Eds.), Fujian: A coastal province in transition and transformation (pp. 231–256). Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. =Compa, L. (2004). Justice for all: The struggle for worker rights in China. Washington DC: American Center for International Labor Solidarity. Dade, C. (2006, May 11). Policy consideration for working with diaspora populations. Paper presented at Workshop on Diaspora Contributions held at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. New York. Dean, J., Lovely, M. & Wang, H. (2005). Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 3505. Deng, X. (1983). Deng xiaoping wen xuan. Beijing: Renmin Publisher. Fitzgerald, S. (1972). China and the overseas Chinese: A study of Peking’s changing policy, 1949–1970. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gould, D. (1994). Immigrant links to the home country: Empirical implications for US bilateral trade flows. Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), 302–316. Guangzhou Municipality Government (2006). Returned overseas Chinese scholars Can receive a maximum of RMB 300,000 to start their business. Guangzhou International homepage. Retrieved January 17, 2007 from http://english.gz.gov. cn/vfs/subsite/QFZZQNCH-UEYR-RYE4-CQEP-PO0PXEO7LORY/content/ content.jsp?contentId=435360&catId=3262 Haley, G., Haley, U. & Tan, C. C. (1998). New Asian emperors: The overseas Chinese, their strategies and competitive advantages. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC). (2006a). Economic & trade information on Hong Kong. Retrieved January 12, 2006 from http://www.tdctrade.com/main/economic.htm#7 Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC). (2006b). Market profile on Chinese mainland. Retreived January 12, 2006 from http://www.tdctrade.com/ main/china.htm Huang, C. (1950, March). Huaqiao gankuai huiguo touzi canjia jianshe. Xinzhongguo gongshangyejia zhi daolu,pp. 82–84. Huang Y. (2003). Selling China: Foreign direct investment during the reform era. New York: Cambridge University Press. Leung, M. (2005). Keeping compatriots on the move: A study of ethnic Chinese migrant-owned travel agencies in Germany. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 14(1–2), 193–224. Lever-Tracy, C., Ip, D. & Tracy, N. (1996). The Chinese diaspora and mainland China: An emerging economic synergy. Houndmills: Macmillan Press. Li, P. (2000). Overseas Chinese networks: A reassessment. In K. B. Chan (Ed.), Chinese business networks: State, economy and culture (pp. 261–284). Singapore: Prentice Hall. Light, I. (2000). Globalization, transnationalism and trade. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 10(1), 53–79. Lu, H. Y. & Quan, H. S. (Eds.) (2001). Guiqiao qiaojuan gaishu. Beijing: Huaqiao Chubanshe. Luo, K., Guo, F. & Huang, P. (2003). China: Government policies and emerging trends of reversal of the brain drain. In R. Iredale, F. Guo, & S. Rozario (Eds.),

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Return skilled and business migration and social transformation (pp. 71–90). Wollongong: Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong. Mitchell, K. (1995). Flexible circulation in the Pacific Rim: Capitalisms in cultural context. Economic Geography, 71(4), 364–382. National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2004). China statistical yearbook 2004. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China. Nyíri, P. (2001). Expatriating is patriotic? The discourse on ‘new migrants’ in the People’s Republic of China and identity construction among recent migrants from the PRC. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4), 635–653. Pan, L. (Ed.). (1999). The encyclopedia of the overseas Chinese. Richmond: Curzon. Phar, K.B. (2004, November 5). ‘Bamboo network’ trumps Taiwan tension. Asia Times [online].Retrieved May 31, 2005 from http://atimes.com/atimes/China/ FK05Ad06.htmlRosen, D. (1999). Behind the open door: Foreign enterprises in the Chinese marketplace. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Saxenian, A. (2005). Brain circulation and capitalist dynamics: Chinese chipmaking and the SiliconValley-Hsinchu-Shanghai Triangle. In V. Nee & R. Swedberg (Eds.), The economic sociology of capitalism (pp. 325–351). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Skeldon, R. (2004, October). More than remittances: Other aspects of the relationship between migration and development. Third Coordination Meeting on International Migration, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, New York. Smart, A. (1993). Gifts, bribes, and guanxi: A reconsideration of Bourdieu’s social capital. Social Anthropology, 8(3), 388–408. Smart, A. (1998). Review essay: Guanxi, gifts and learning from China. Anthropos, 93 (4–6), 559–564. Smart, A. (2000). The emergence of local capitalisms in China: Overseas Chinese investment and patterns of development. In S. M. Li & W.S. Tang (Eds.), China’s regions, polity, and economy: A study of spatial transformation in the postreform era (pp. 65–). Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Smart, A. & Hsu, J. Y. (2004). The Chinese diaspora, foreign investment and economic development in China. The Review of International Affairs, 3(4), 544–566. Stranger, A. (1992). Ethnic small business in Australia: A policy review and research agenda Small Enterprise Research, 1, 17–31. Tang, S. C. (2006). New trends in the cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Asia Europe Journal, 4(4), 555–562. Tefft, S. (1994, March 30). The rootless Chinese—The repatriates transform economy, yet endure persistent resentment. Christian Science Monitor. Tseng, Y. F. (1995). Beyond Little Taipei: The development of Taiwanese immigrant businesses in Los Angeles. International Migration Review, 29(1), 34–45. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2006). World investment report 2006: FDI from developing and transition economies: implications for development. Geneva: United Nations. Weidenbaum, M. & Huges, S. (1996). The bamboo network: How expatriate Chinese entrepreneurs are creating a new economic superpower in Asia. New York: The Free Press. World Bank.(2002). Global development finance 2002. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2006). Global economic prospects 2006: Economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. Xiang B. (2005). Promoting knowledge exchange through diaspora networks (The case of People’s Republic of China). Center on Migration Policy and Society. Oxford: University of Oxford.

308 Maggi W. H. Leung Xinhua (2004). Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs shift investment focuses. Retrieved November 7, 2005 from http://english.people.com.cn/200402/13/eng20040213_ 134728.shtml Yang, M. (1994). Gifts, favors and banquets: The art of social relationships in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Yoon, I. J. (1997). On my own: Korean businesses and race relations in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zhang, W. W. (2000). The role of the overseas Chinese. Transforming China: Economic Reform and its Political Implications (pp. 75–82). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Zhongguo qingnian bao (2005, December 22). Chuangxinchuangye baoxiao zuguo: Wangzhaoguo zai 2005 haiwai xueren huiguo chuangyezhou huodong kaimushishangde jianghua. Retrieved January 5, 2006 from http://www.bjyouth.gov.cn/ ywdd/tzyyw/71678.shtml Zweig, D. (2002). Internationalizing China: Domestic interests and global linkages. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

16 Conceptualising Indian Emigration— The Development Story Parvati Raghuram

A large and growing literature on the migration-development nexus suggests that migration may be read as both a cause and an effect of development (Sørensen & Van Hear, 2003; Xiang, 2004). In some studies underdevelopment is one important cause for migration (Sørensen & Van Hear, 2003; and see Gent, 2002 for a critique) whereas in others development is argued to be necessary for migration to be triggered (Sriskandarajah, 2005). The effects of migration on development may also be seen as either positive or negative. For instance, the loss of development potential that follows migration is highlighted in the growing brain drain literature (Bach, 2004; Stillwell, Zurn, Connell, & Awases, 2005). On the other hand, a range of state-led transnational endeavours have been instituted as the gains that migration offer have been made more apparent (Aneesh, 2000; Margheritis, 2007). However, contemporary discourses of migration and development often problematically assume a prefigured nation or community and a commitment to a modernising developmentality with migrants mediating the relationship between the two.1 In this paper I use examples of narratives of loss and gain that surround emigration from India to highlight how the nation is itself being produced in narratives of migration and development. The scripts of migration and development are usually being cowritten alongside those of the nation-state (Haas, 2006). Thus, as the nature and aspirations of nation-states alter they emphasise different aspects of the migration-development nexus. Shifts in the imaginaries of nation and its territoriality, and the politics of the relationship between the two also influence how the impacts of extra-territorial populations on the nation are scripted. For instance, in narratives of loss the nation-state is often seen as a project that has to be continuously secured, sometimes through and sometimes despite its distanciation from its extra-territorial populations. Expansive definitions of affiliations to a mother country are, on the other hand, adopted in narratives of migration as gain. And the definition of nation may itself be altered to accommodate the nature of engagement with the diaspora, subjugating residential location to other forms of linkages that people may have to countries from which they or their ancestors hold connection. And although the effects of migration on development are

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always complex and contradictory narratives of gain or loss may predominate depending on the context in which the nation is procuring its identity. These interrelated processes of nation-building and narratives of migration and development are particularly clear in the case of India. In this chapter I outline some of the ways in which this relationship has been established, to trace some of the narratives of impacts of migration on development in India and the responses of the Indian government to the possibilities and pitfalls that migration brings. In doing so I emphasise how both nation and migration have been coimagined (Veer, 1995) through migration-development debates. The Indian government’s approach to its migrant populations has been influenced by the history of the emergence of India as a nation-state. In the post-partition turmoil, defining a centrifugal force, a narrative of India, meant that the Indian administration became inward looking. From 1947, the nation-state project and internal integration dominated the national agenda and its foreign policy priorities were ‘based on the ideology of economic self-sufficiency, anti-imperialism and nonalignment (Lall, 2001 p. 6). In trying to make India internally coherent the Government distanced itself from the concerns of its émigrés (Shah, 1994; Premi & Mathur, 1995; Nair, 1999). The preindependence strategy of drawing all Indians in different parts of the world into the nationalist movement and urging them to lobby for a home-nation was therefore at least partially over-turned. This was most clearly enunciated by India’s first prime-minister’s Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision for India, when he argued that Indian nationals abroad should attempt to assimilate in their countries of residence, rather than seek to obtain Indian citizenship. This was also undoubtedly influenced by the redrawing of national boundaries that accompanied independence and the desire to limit the territorial claims of those who were part of the old India. With few exceptions this attitude to definitions of the nation set the framework for dealing with those in the Indian diaspora and the development possibilities that follow. Yet through this period a range of intersecting perspectives have been deployed to understand the effect of migration on those left behind. These narratives of migration also place migrants in particular frameworks in their relationship with the mother country as outlined later.

MIGRATION AS LOSS Although there was little policy response by the Indian government to the problems that emigration could pose for India, migration commentators have been more forthright. A number of writers have expressed a range of views on the economic and social consequences of emigration (see Nayyar, 1994; Khadria, 1999; Zachariah, Mathew, & Irudaua Rajan, 2003a and 2003b for some comprehensive studies). One of the real concerns they express is over the loss that migration poses for India’s developmental future. This loss

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varies widely in scale but I want to focus on two aspects of this loss—the impact of the haemorrhaging of technical skills on India’s developmental possibilities, and the impact of migration on households, especially on the women who have been left behind after male migration. Some of the most developed expressions of the former concerns crystallised in the 1970s as skilled migrants increasingly left India, especially for the United States and the United Kingdom (Bhagwati, 1976; Mejía, 1978). This brain drain migration, particularly the movement of scientific personnel, researchers and doctors was widely portrayed as loss of manpower, of technical know-how and of critical competitive advantage. The importance of science and technology in development had been particularly highlighted by Cold War politics and the competition between the United States and USSR to gain economic and therefore political superiority. The loss of Indian scientists to both countries, but especially the United States, was therefore seen as a blow to development, whereby development was primarily viewed through the modernisation lens.2 The questions that were asked concerned the effects of skilled emigration or brain drain on sending countries, of brain gain on receiving countries and of brain waste, that is, the loss of human capital due to the lack of recognition and utilisation of skills, for both the individual and the receiving and sending countries. The analysis is marked by some of the primary characteristics of the modernization thesis, a focus on nation-state as the development unit, on economic growth as the primary criterion for development, and an implicit faith in the role of human capital, of skills and education, in the development trajectory. Although this migration may have had an important influence on development in India, there was little legislative attempt to control or manage it. Rather the first set of changes to emigration regulations in post-independence India (Emigration Act, 1983) removed the controls on skilled labour that had been introduced through the Emigration Act of 1922. In a wide-ranging study of the effects of Indian brain-drain migration, particularly to the United States, Binod Khadria (1999) demonstrates the long-term and intense effects of this form of migration. He argues that a number of purported positive benefits of such emigration, technological resource flow, financial resource flow, and human resource flow have largely failed to materialise. There are real limits on knowledge sharing, as most skilled workers are employees whereas much of the knowledge is held in patents that are owned by the foreign employers. It is widely recognised that skilled workers remit less than lesser skilled workers so that financial flows from brain drain migrants too remain limited (but see later). Furthermore, as receiving countries cherry-pick skilled workers and offer them rights such as that of family reunification and settlement, these workers are first, likely to drop the amount they remit and then to withdraw any money left in accounts in India, as their families permanently emigrate (Tanner, 2005; Haas, 2005). In sum, the limited extent of embeddedness of technology,

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labour and capital within national territories and the relationship between these new IT based networks and entrepreneurs and former capitalisms within India are seen as posing questionable development contributions to India (Upadhyay, 2004). The emigration of doctors and more recently of substantial numbers of nurses forms part of this story of loss (Mullan, 2006; Percot, 2006). For instance, Khadria (2004) found that 54% of graduates from India’s premier medical institute All India Institute of Medical Sciences migrated. These moves abroad are of long duration as systemic knowledges play a greater part in medical migration so that complete and frequent transference between different health systems cannot be achieved at the same frequency as in the case of say IT workers and so represent a loss to the skills base and provision of health care in origin countries.3 The ethics of such migration have to be conceptualized within the terms of redistributive justice as the erosion of human capital in this field has a direct impact on the provision of welfare and can be measured in terms of falling health indicators (Pang, Langsang & Haines, 2003; Marchal & Kegels, 2003). In India, this loss has been offset by the growth in number of medical colleges so that the volume of doctors produced in India is greater than can be absorbed by the government health system. Hence, most qualified doctors find employment in the private sector, especially in urban areas and their contributions to improving public health among the poor are therefore limited. Migration often provides a route for doctors to enhance their own skills in ways that were not available in India (Khadria, 2004; Raghuram, 2006) and if they return their contributions to India’s health systems can indeed be impressive (see later). However, as poor primary care, especially in rural areas is the main problem that besets Indian health provision, the benefits of enhanced skills obtained abroad are more likely to benefit the urban elite and hence have little effect on poverty reduction. The effect on primary care health is likely to be even more marked in the case of nurse emigration, a growing trend in India (Brush, Sochalski, & Berger, 2004). Significant proportions of nurses arrange and move individually, but since January 2001 nurse migration to the United Kingdom has been institutionalised as the Indian and UK Governments have entered an agreement enabling the NHS to recruit nurses from India (apart from within the following regional states: Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal). The effects of such emigration must be set within the context of internal migration of nurses within India—many of whom move from Kerala to other parts of India. Besides, the nature of nursing in India is itself changing with a large growth in nursing colleges in India and a shift in the gender balance amongst nursing students (New Kerala, 2005) as nursing comes to be recognised as a skill that enables migration.4 Together the effects of the migration of nurses has not been seen as wholly negative, because although the loss of nurses represents a loss of skilled labour power, the effects of global nursing shortage has also spurred people to enter the

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profession and generated ancillary training services and growth in employment in these sectors However, the loss of skilled migrants represents not only a loss of skills but also a loss of the social and affective contributions of individual members of social groups such as families, communities, and neighbourhoods. Nursing as a highly gender-selective profession5, leads not only to the loss of health workers but also the loss of women and ultimately to the loss of family units when nurses induce the migration of men and children. As the proportion of women who migrate increase, the effects on family forms and societies left behind are yet to be fully understood (but see George, 2005). Migration has been shaped by, as well as helped to reconfigure, the demography of sending regions. For instance, the age structure of the population in regions with large-scale emigration of workers alters the dependency ratio, which often increases as young children and older people are left behind. Investments in such regions often focus on the needs of those left behind— hospitals and schools being the primary beneficiaries. However, migration of young families can have an important impact on the care of the older people in a society that has low acceptability for institutional arrangements for the provision of such care (Zachariah, Mathew & Irudaya 2003b). What we see in the narratives of migration is the idea of the nation as a territorially bounded unit. Given the history of precolonial divisions, differential forms of incorporation into the British colony and the divisions that accompanied the formation of India, attempts to forge an identity amongst those who lived within the country took precedence over attempts to secure the contributions of migrants to the development of the nation. Imagining the nation required a laissez faire attitude to diasporic populations. The most significant exception is where diasporics come to be seen as a threat to the nation. Then the Indian government lobbies other governments to temper the activities of divisive elements and separatist movements funded by the diaspora who use the freedom that extra-territoriality gives them in order to help reshape India’s territorial boundaries. This is most visible in the support and funding that groups such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Sikh Khalistan movement were able to obtain from diasporic Indians (Jain, 1998). Their influence on political development in India can be substantive as they can redefine territorial boundaries. The frictions between national identity, territorial residentiality, and development become particularly obvious in this scenario.

THE RETURNS FROM MIGRATION The contradictory effects of migration are however smoothed over in the increasingly positive narrative of migration that is being scripted in India today. The recognition that India had much to gain from migration became increasingly clear from the mid-1970s. Migrants seeking to benefit from

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the opening up of Middle East countries to expatriate labour following the oil boom in the Middle East in 1973–1974 found their efforts thwarted by the restrictions on unskilled migration within the Emigration Act of 1922. The Indian government therefore suspended the operative part of the Act in 1976 as it debated a new Act (Nair, 1993). It introduced the Emigration Act of India 1983 in order to govern and monitor the migration of Indian workers. The Act introduced compulsory registration of all recruitment firms, and by 2002, around 1,250 recruiting agents had valid registration certificates with the Protector of Emigrants, Ministry of Labour (2003, p. 111). But the culture of clandestine operation set up before the Act’s promulgation could not be overturned and the rising fee to be paid by firms has encouraged this trend. This disproportionately increases the costs of emigration for the lesser skilled that are most dependent on such agents. For instance, in a study of emigration to the Gulf from Bihar, Anisur Rahman (2001) found that 45% of migrants whom they interviewed had sold assets in order to finance migration. Over 70% of the sample were lesser skilled, unskilled or unemployed. The complexities of obtaining a no-clearance certificate has often encouraged irregular migration which conversely makes it more difficult for such migrants to access any government support as support is predicated upon being registered as migrants rather than the fact of migration.6 One of the primary impacts of the migration to the Gulf has been the remittances sent back to India and this led to a reevaluation of the importance of migrants to development in India. In particular, the narrative of loss came to be overlaid by the story of gain with lesser skilled migrants’ contributions to the country becoming recognised. A further fillip to India’s relationship with its diaspora came in 1991. Dr. Manmohan Singh (then Finance Minister) was faced with an unbridgeable trade deficit caused by a range of factors such as loss of remittances due to expatriation of Indian workers because of the Gulf War, financial pressures due to inflation, inflated exchange rate and a drop in credit rating of India. In response the Indian government attempted to bolster its finances by offering a number of concessions to nonresident Indians (NRIs) in order to encourage them to invest in India. It also commissioned a report on the India Diaspora (Ministry of External Affairs, 2001) in order to better understand the nature of the Indian diaspora, its demands and requirements, expectations from the mother country, and the possible role that NRIs could play in India’s development.7 The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (established in 2004) now fosters this relationship between the Government and the Indian diaspora. The relationship between migration and development were rewritten as the nation reembraced its extra-territorial populations. Arguably, remittances form the pivot around which the migration-development nexus revolves. Since 2001, India has usually been the single largest recipient of remittances (World Bank. 2003). In 2003, they were worth about 17.4 billion US$, that is, 2.9% of the gross national product (Maimbo,

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Adams, Agrawal, & Passas, 2005). By 2005 they were estimated to be 21.7 billion US$ (Economic and Political Weekly, 2006). Remittances also more than offset the loss of tax revenue in most developing countries. For example, the net fiscal loss associated with Indian emigration to the United States was estimated at 0.24% to 0.58% of Indian GDP in 2001 (Desai, Kapur & McHale, 2001), but remittances amounted to at least 2.1% of GDP in the same year. However, net amounts in NRI deposits have stayed more even— between two and three billion US$ through this decade. Foreign investment inflows (Reserve Bank of India, 2006; also see Government of India, 2003) on the other hand have increased rapidly from about 6.7 billion US$ in 2000–2001 to over 20 billion in 2005–2006. The figures for remittances are recognised as a gross underestimate because of high accounting leakages and the undocumented form of many transactions—as money and goods brought back either personally or through friends and exchanged in the parallel economy (Athukorala, 1993). The extent of underreporting is particularly high in South Asia, with the money remitted through the informal Hawala system is estimated to be as much as ten times the size of that sent through official sources.8 These remittances often go directly to the poor, especially in rural areas (Seddon, 2004) and so may be seen to be one of the most effective forms of development aid. There are increasing efforts to regulate these remittances and to reduce transfer costs. Thus, in January 2006, the Government launched an E-remittance Insta Remit system which will enable NRIs to instantly remit money to about 14,500 settlements across the country (The Hindu, 2006a, 2006b). The importance of remittances varies significantly by region with some of the major emigration states (Gujarat, Punjab, and Kerala) likely to be the greatest beneficiaries.9 However, there is no systematic data collection or reporting of remittance data by Indian regional states. One exception to this is Kerala because of its high dependence of remittances, particularly from the Gulf states (Zachariah et al., 2003). It is estimated that over one-third of the migrants in the Gulf region come from Kerala (Rajan, 2003). By the end of the 1990s, remittances reached such levels that they were well above the total State Government expenditure and net inflow through NRI deposits had increased to about Rs.10 crores10 (US$2.32 billion). Workers’ remittances to Kerala (about Rs.13.65 thousand crores or US$2.9 billion by the turn of the century) constituted as much as 22% of the Net State Domestic Product in 1999. By 2004 remittances had grown further to Rs 18.46 thousand crore and per capita income in Kerala increased by Rs 5,678. Overall the value of remittances was larger than the annual budget of Kerala for the year 2001–2002 so that migration seems to have been the single most dynamic factor in the otherwise slow growth and dreary employment scenario of Kerala (Kerala State Planning Board, 2003, p. 27). The state government has recognised the importance of its diaspora and set up a separate ministry—NORKA—in December 1996 in order to

316 Parvati Raghuram facilitate the welfare, investments, and rehabilitation of nonresident Keralites (Nair, 1999). As Zachariah et al. (2003a; 2003b) highlight the retail sector in consumption goods, services (education and health) and housing have been the primary beneficiaries of remittance expenditure. At a household level, better housing, sanitation, availability of electricity, possession of water pumps and access to gas based cooking (Bannerjee, Jayachandran & Roy, 2002; Rahman, 2001) have undoubtedly improved the lives of those left behind. In Kerala, the poor investment climate (high labour costs and worker militancy) has meant that the prospects for nonresident Keralites to contribute to the industrial development of their state are somewhat limited, beyond those spurred by their consumption patterns. At the same time remittances can also instigate further migration significantly influencing local economies. Finally, as remittances are primarily routed through families, they can influence family dynamics in both positive and negative ways, leading to individualised benefits but also to rivalries and inequalities that can have wider social effects in the regions of emigration (Walton-Roberts, 2004).11 Through the 1990s, especially during the information technology (IT) boom years, migrants who made many short-term, repeated movements opened up a new lens for analysing the migration of skilled persons—from brain drain to brain circulation (Aneesh, 2000; Gayathri, 2002; Saxenian, 2000). The important role played by diasporic professionals in off-shoring and outsourcing of IT services, especially from the United States to India, and its local effects, particularly in terms of job creation and through transfer of technology have been lauded. Moreover, return migrants and diasporic Indians have also contributed to the development of the IT sector in India (Khadria, 2004). For instance, 19 of the top 20 software businesses have been set up by or are managed by diasporic Indian professionals. Moreover, there are continuing linkages between diaspora-led professional organizations in India and abroad, and diaspora-led subsidiaries in key markets such as the United States with transfer of ideas, technologies and markets across the spatial divide (Asian Development Bank, 2004).12 This investment climate has also led to strong gains in portfolio equities, where India recorded a $6.4 billion increase over the past 2 years, bringing its share to one-third of the total for the developing world (World Bank, 2003, p. 19). However, it is also recognised that these effects may be limited to enclaves where these industries are set up. In particular there is an urban bias to such development (WSIS, 2005). The skills held by Indian diasporics are being solicited through a range of initiatives. The Indian government has for long interphased with Indian professionals abroad in order to limit the effects of the loss of skilled labour— encouraging professionals to share their knowledge and even return to India in order to advance science and technology in India. Two programmes in which the Central Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is involved are particularly notable: TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Know-how Through

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Expatriate Nationals) and INRIST (Interface with NonResident Indians in Science and Technology). However, Khadria (1999) argues that they have not been successful in building active knowledge networks. In November 2004, the Indian government decided to reinstate the scheme but despite the public commitment to facilitating such return, it is unclear whether this route back into research posts will help returnees to find a foothold in the University sector. More recently, the Government has also introduced a web-based platform within the Ministry of Science & Technology (Department of Science & Technology—DST) to enhance the developmental possibilities that scientific and technology personnel of Indian origin can offer their home country. This platform is an integral part of the overall Indian Diaspora initiative of Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, that attempts to develop research capacity, facilitate links between diasporic professionals and their alma mater, and to encourage entrepreneurship in technology but aims to do this not through the familiar language of return of migrants but of partnership, aid and technology transfer.13 The narrative of migration as gain is however tempered by a recognition that the benefits of the diaspora have not been as substantive as in the Chinese case—in 2003 the net inward Foreign Direct Investment in China 2003 was 53.5 billion US$ whereas in India it was only 4.3 billion US$. Although this is now growing rapidly, the role played by the diasporic population in this investment climate is somewhat different. Some reasons suggested for this discrepancy include the differences in the nature of the two diasporas (professional rather than business-oriented), their differing skills (service related professional skills rather than marketing and management skills) and the differences in the government’s policies toward such inward investment (Balasubramaniyam & Mahambare, 2003). Since 1991, the government is however attempting to make it easier to invest in India although there are significant regional variations in the extent to which these changes have come into force. States like Kerala are also trying to emulate its northern neighbour (Karnataka, whose capital Bangalore is the centre of investment for IT companies) by recognising the importance of its skilled workforce and facilitating the establishment of IT parks. These initiatives have largely targeted skilled migrants. A large proportion of the emigrant labour force are however, irregular migrants, often lesser skilled and their needs are not met within the current system. Such emigrants were often unemployed prior to migration but achieved some occupational mobility and reduction in unemployment after migration (Rajan, 2003). Commonly, they were unable to sustain this mobility on their return and much more needs to be done in order to ease their return. Selectivity of emigration means that these efforts need to recognise that migration and return migration are gendered, classed, as well as localised. The nation is not the only territorial scale that is being resculpted through a recognition of the development effects and possibilities of migration. Some regional states have embraced their diaspora much more fully than others—

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Andhra Pradesh, being a case in point. In West Bengal, on the other hand, the impact of the diaspora has been more limited, highlighting the extent to which the effects of migration depend not merely on the extent of migration or the remittances sent back but also the political, social, and cultural environments from which migrants have originated. The nature of the relationship being developed also varies, with cultural linkages being highlighted much more fully in some regional states, economic development in others, and welfare of migrants in yet others.14 The Gujarat government has established a Gujarat State nonresident Gujaratis Foundation in order to identify ways in which nonresident Gujaratis can contribute to Gujarat’s development (Government of Gujarat, 2004; 2006). They were mobilised effectively in 2001 during the devastating earthquake in Bhuj. The Indian diasporic community responded hugely both financially and by sending volunteers. Increasingly the Government of India is also asking individual regional states to develop their own linkages with their diasporic populations. Indian NRI organizations have been at the forefront of this effort to facilitate a positive engagement between the diaspora and the government. Organisations such as GOPIO (Global Organization of Persons of Indian Origin, a group that originated in order to lobby against human rights violations in India, meeting first in New York in 1989) have pressed for greater accountability and for cutting down of red-tape and the investment potential of NRIs and have lobbied for access to dual citizenship (Newland with Patrick, 2004). These ideational effects have also helped to shape wider development policy (Kapur, 2004). The efforts of the diasporic population to reshape policies in India and to reformulate government practices have at least been partially successful. For instance, the Planning Commission of India along with Charities Aid Foundation has attempted to improve the credibility of the voluntary sector by engaging in a validation programme of all voluntary organisations in 2000. This is part of a response to engender confidence in the NRI population who were reluctant to engage with the voluntary sector because of their anxieties about corruption and misuse of funds by NGOs. It is hoped that enhancing standards of accountability in voluntary organisations will encourage the diasporic population to engage in philanthropic activity (Viswanath, 2000; Gopa Kumar, 2003). The welfare sector has seen much of this investment. One of the key developments in the past few years has been the creation of hospitals by returning Indian doctors, the most famous being the Apollo chain of hospitals. These hospitals have primarily provided elite private health care for Indians and have made much less impact on public health in general. However, they have been at the hub of medical tourism from the West, treating several tens of thousands of patients who have travelled to India in order to obtain low cost operations. Education is another sector that has seen considerable investment by diasporic Indians. The limited period of movement has meant that the Gulf

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Indians have lobbied to set up institutions that will facilitate their return to India. For instance, 38 schools that follow the Indian higher secondary curriculum have been set up in the region in order to facilitate reintegration of migrant’s children into the Indian education system, and in particular, to enable them to be considered for admission to Indian universities. However, NRIs have also then invested in setting up higher education institutions that will accommodate their own children and help them to meet their aspiration of making children into particular kinds of professionals—typically doctors and engineers. The introduction of the Overseas Indian citizenship which allows the children of those holding this form of citizenship to compete with Indian nationals may however, remove some of the impetus for this form of development. What is clear is that this form of investment although useful is inadequate if it is not supplemented by strategic philanthropy which can have systemic effects (Kapur, Mehta & Moon Dutt, 2004). Without such strategic vision and input, the introduction of select services can lead to increasing inequities rather than redistributive development. At a local level, many diasporic development initiatives have had gendered outcomes and been led by men (Omelanuik, 2005; Sørensen 2005). As Walton-Roberts (2001) has argued men who anticipate returning to India have tried to improve infrastructure in their home villages, for example, by setting up sanitation projects that will help to ease their return. However, these ventures also provide proof (in the shape of bricks and mortar) of the success of the emigration strategy in very gendered ways (Osella & Osella, 2000; Simpson, 2003). What is clear is that very often diasporic development may target particular villages so that the effects of such strategies are localised, producing new vectors of inequality (see Ballard, 2004). These vectors also rework existing social divisions based around religion and caste (Srivastava, 2005). Prema Kurien’s detailed study of three villages in Kerala (2002)—a Muslim village in Mallapuram district, a Hindu village in north Thiruvananthapuram district and a Christian village in south-central Kerala—suggests that for Muslims, emigration to the Gulf has led to a heightened awareness of their linkages with Muslim cultures elsewhere and thus encouraged them to distinguish themselves from other groups in Kerala. The lower caste Hindu Ezhava migrants were able to utilise the economic benefits of migration to challenge their caste status whereas the Syrian Christians who have a higher educational profile and are connected to missionary groups in other countries were able to utilise the migration experience to enhance these networks and to maximise the benefits of migration. The development of individuals as a result of migration is particularly highlighted in research on Kerala (Zachariah et al., 2003a; 2003b). For instance, the social consequences of a heavily male-dominated migration stream on Kerala society were explored by Leela Gulati’s seminal study In the absence of their men (1993). The findings of this as well as later studies suggest that loneliness was a key problem faced by women left behind, especially if they were young. Women had to shoulder considerable degree of responsibility, particularly

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with regard to children’s education. Women left behind either set up or stayed in their nuclear households or returned to their parents’ or parents’-in-law’s households, but the choice of where to stay was often dictated by children’s educational needs. Zachariah et al., (2003a; 2003b) suggest that women’s status and authority have increased due to remittances with about half of the Gulf wives surveyed in their study owning land, 70% holding and managing their own bank accounts and 40% having their own income which they controlled. Hence, the studies show that while women had increased stresses and responsibilities, their sense of autonomy also increased in the absence of men so that the gender selectivity of migration was not wholly detrimental to women).

CONCLUSIONS Currently, the dominant narratives of the Indian government on the Indian diaspora are of cultural connections especially with the older diaspora, the value of remittances from sojourners and global economic networks with the largely skilled migrants in the new diaspora (Bhat, 2003). This imagination of the nation as a territory that reaches out to its migrant people was particularly clear in the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh’s address to the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas annual conference in January 2006: “For us, globalization is a natural means of linking up with the international community of Indians. As I said last year, if there is one phenomenon in the world over which the sun truly never sets, it is the phenomenon of the global community of people of Indian origin” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2006). In moving beyond the laissez faire attitude to migrants, the nation has reimagined itself as well as its relations with its diasporic population in increasingly positive ways and the effects of migration viewed in a positive frame. As a result there has been a shift toward incorporating the achievements and potentials offered by diasporic Indians even without their relocating to India, to accept the benefits of transnationalism and to foster it through state-led initiatives. This marks a new form of nationalism, one that highlights territorial location not through residentiality but through affirming emotive place-based connections with spatially relocated populations. It also marks a shift from the relationships with migrants that were forged through the post-Independence era, when nationalism meant disavowing populations who were displaced both through colonialism and through partition. Migration has always sparked developmental losses and gains at a range of scales from the national to community-level, familial and individual and these have varied across vectors such as gender, religion, and caste. But the government of India is increasingly privileging narratives of diasporic success as the nature of the diaspora, the forms of migration, the paths to development and the nation’s own imaginary changes. The nation is increasingly being scripted through narratives of developmental success to which migrants are seen to be doing their bit.

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NOTES 1. In this chapter the multiple definitions and dimensions of development are not explicitly explored. The chapter also largely focuses on issues of development as they pertain to the people still in India rather than the diasporic populations themselves. For an extensive discussion of the migration development nexus see Sørensen and Van Hear, 2003. 2. This is partly a reflection of the period when some of the analysis took place, that is, the 1960s and 1970s when the modernization paradigm was particularly influential in the development literature. Brain drain has once again come back to focus and this time the interest is less likely to wane (Bach, 2004). 3. In 1987 only 0.38% of trained graduates (all subjects) emigrated to industrialised countries so the proportion of emigrants to total skilled people is still relatively small (Nayyar, 1994). However, as stated earlier, the extent of emigration is much higher from some of the premier institutions. 4. There has been a large increase in the number of registrations in nursing personnel in India—from 875,442 in 1998–1999 to 1,283,775 in 2002–2003, an increase of 4.34%. Currently, 55% of nurses work in the public sector (Disti Market Intelligence report, 2003). 5. For a discussion of the contours of migration in another highly gender-selective occupation, domestic work, see Raghuram, 2005. 6. Given the extent of irregular migration from the region–estimated at 30–50% of total migrants from the region in some destination countries such as the Gulf states (Shah, 1998)—this is a significant issue that needs to be addressed. 7. This was the date on which Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, returned from South Africa to India in 1915. Since 2003 the date has been marked by an annual conference. 8. The Hawala (or Hundi) system consists of an international network of agents operating in both sending and receiving countries and interlinks with global commodity trading networks (Seddon, 2004; Wimaladharma, Pearce & Stanton, 2004). 9. Extent of remittances also varies across a range of other factors, such as familial strategies and gender, with women (Ramirez, Dominguez, Garcia & Miguez Morias, 2005) and those who leave behind families most likely to remit. 10. Crore equals 10 million. 11. See Singh (2006) for an interesting discussion on the meaning of money sent by migrants and for an anthropological research agenda on remittances. 12. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs will partner with the state governments to establish a Diaspora Knowledge Network which will build upon and enable knowledge sharing, particularly around ICT, but also to use the knowledge resources of the overseas Indian community in the social sector (The Hindu, 2006a). 13. The plans to link the scientific diaspora with India’s development have been given a further boost by the Government’s plans to develop a Diaspora Knowledge Network (The Hindu, 2006a). 14. See for instance, Talbot &Thandi, 2004 for Punjab.

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Contributors

Maruja M.B. Asis is Director of Research and Publications at the Scalabrini Migration Center (SMC) Manila. She is a sociologist whose major research interest is the study of international migration and social change. Besides being Associate Editor of the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, she is co-editor of the bi-weekly Asian Migration News. She has published widely in journals and books and has participated in numerous international conferences and expert group meetings on migration issues. She recently completed a study on the educational, work and life aspirations and migration intentions of young Filipinos. Virginie Baby-Collin is an Assistant Professor in Human Geography at the University of Provence (Aix-Marseille I). She specializes on slums and marginality in Latin-American cities (especially Caracas and La Paz). Together with Geneviève Cortes and Laurent Faret, she studies the socio-spatial organization of international circulation of Latin-American migrants in America (Mexico-USA, Bolivia-Argentina). Fabio Baggio is a missionary of the Scalabrinian Congregation. He worked as researcher in the Center for Latin-American Migration Studies (CEMLA), in Buenos Aires, from 1998 to 2002. At present, he is extraordinary professor at the Pontificia Universitas Urbaniana in Rome, Italy, and Professor at the Mayhill School of Theology (SMT) in Manila, Philippines. He is director of the Scalabrini Migration Center (SMC) in Manila and editor of the Asian Pacific Migration Journal and Asian Migration News. Dennis Conway is Professor Emeritus of Geography at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. He has published widely in four related areas— migration, urbanization, development and environmental sustainability— with the Caribbean and Nepal as regional specializations. His recent books include The Experience of Return Migration: Caribbean Perspectives (with Robert Potter and Joan Phillips 2005, Aldershot) and Globalization’s Contradictions: Geographies of Discipline, Destruction and Transformation (with Nik Heynen, London, New York 2006). He is currently conducting

328

Contributors

research on transnational migration in the Caribbean, specifically focusing on young returning professional’s migrant experiences in Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada. Geneviève Cortes is Assistant Professor in Human Geography at the University of Montpellier. She is a specialist in rural development and migration in Latin-American countries, and has published various articles about Andean migrations. She is the author of Irse para Quedarse, a book about migration in Bolivia published in Spanish and French. Ton Dietz is Professor in Human Geography at the University of Amsterdam and at Utrecht University (Faculty of Social Sciences) as well as scientific director of the Dutch Research School of Resource Studies for Development (CERES). He is vice-chairman of the Dutch fund for development-related research (WOTRO) and chair of the Netherlands section of the International Geographical Union. Together with others, he is responsible for the project on Ghana-Netherlands migration for the Netherlands Research Council. Luis Escala Rabadán is a sociologist currently attached to the research faculty of the Department of Social Studies at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, Mexico. His research interests focus on Mexican transnational communities and migrant associations in the United States, resulting in publications in Migraciones Internacionales and Migración y desarrollo, and in The Ties that Bind Us. Mexican Migrants in San Diego County (edited by Richard Kiy and Christopher Woodruff. San Diego 2005). Laurent Faret is an Associate Professor at the University Paris 7-Denis Diderot. Together with Virginie Baby-Collin and Geneviève Cortes, he studies the socio-spatial organization of international circulation of LatinAmerican migrants in America (Mexico-USA, Bolivia-Argentina). Together or separately, they have published different works on local and regional impacts of Bolivian and Mexican migration. Laurent Faret recently published Les territoires de la mobilité. Migration et communautés transnationales entre le Mexique et les Etats-Unis (Paris 2003). Katharina Goethe studied geography, economy and history at the Freie Universität Berlin. She obtained her MA with a thesis on diaspora and the fight against brain drain in 2005, after which she worked as a junior researcher in a project on state-aided programmes for the integration of the foreign population into the labour market in Germany. Currently she is a Ph.D. student in the Geography Department at Bremen University. Hein de Haas is a Research Officer at the International Migration Institute (IMI) in Oxford. He obtained his MA in Human and Environmental Geography at the University of Amsterdam and his Ph.D. in Development

Contributors

329

Studies at the Radboud University in Nijmegen. He held researcher and lecturer positions at both universities and was visiting fellow to the Forced Migration and Refugees Studies programme of the American University of Cairo. His research focuses on the reciprocal linkages between migration and broader development processes, primarily from the perspective of migrant-sending societies. He did extensive fieldwork in the Middle East and North Africa and particularly, Morocco. He recently published on remittances and development in International Migration Review and Third World Quarterly. Felicitas Hillmann has been Professor in Human Geography at Bremen University since 2006. She previously worked as a lecturer at the Free University in Berlin and as a senior researcher at the Social Science Research Center (WZB) in Berlin. Her research and publications focus on international migration, ethnic entrepreneurship, labour market integration and migration and development. She co-edited Asian Migrants and European Labour Markets (London, New York 2005). Other recent publications include ‘Shifts in the European Discourses on Migration and Development,’ Asian-Pacific Migration Journal, 14 (1–2), 2005 (with E. Spaan and T. van Naerssen) and Migrants care work in private households or: The strength of bilocal and transnational ties as a last(ing) resource in global migration, in: Care work in Europe, edited by Birgit Pfau-Effinger und Birgit Geissler (London 2005). Cindy Horst is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). She is an anthropologist by training, having obtained a PhD at the University of Amsterdam, with a specialization in Forced Migration Studies from the Refugee Studies Centre in Oxford. Her interests in Somali transnational activities have led to various international publications, including a monograph, entitled Transnational Nomads (Oxford, New York 2006). Furthermore, as the moderator of UNHCR’s Refugee Livelihood Network, she focused on refugee (transnational) livelihoods, leading to a guest-edited volume of the Refugee Survey Quarterly (25: 2). Currently, she is developing research in the area of diasporic activities through the use of electronic media and intra-European African mobility. Graeme Hugo is Federation Fellow, Professor of the Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies and Director of the National Centre for Social Applications of Geographic Information Systems at the University of Adelaide. His research interests are in population issues in Australia and South East Asia, especially migration. He published Australia’s Changing Population: Trends and Implications (Melbourne 1986) and was co-editor of The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development (Oxford, etc. 1987), Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium (Oxford 1998), and New Forms of Urbanisation:

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Contributors

Beyond the Urban-Rural Dichotomy (Aldershot 2004). In 2002 he secured an ARC Federation Fellowship over five years for his research project ‘The new paradigm of international migration to and from Australia: dimensions, causes and implications.’ Mirjam Kabki holds a Master’s Degree in Development Studies from the Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, and is currently completing her Ph.D. project on Ghanaian transnational networks and their impact on home communities at the University of Amsterdam. She has published on the economic impact of remittances on rural Ashanti in Population, Space and Place (2004). Key words in her present research are: support networks, remittances, institutions, migration and community development. Hye-Kyung Lee is Professor at the Department of Sociology & Media Information, Pai Chai University, South Korea. Since she obtained her Ph.D. degree in Sociology from University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in 1988, she has published many papers on migration and transnational communities, gender and work. Recent articles focussed on foreign domestic workers, marriage migration and Korean overseas students. She has served as a Women’s Policy Advisor to the Major of Daejon City and as an advisory committee member for the Korean National Statistical Office, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the Ministry of Labour and the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. Maggi W.H. Leung is a geographer, at present affiliated as Humboldt Research Fellow with the Department of Geography at the University of Bonn, Germany. She was born and raised in Hong Kong. She received her BA Degree (1994) from Dartmouth College (Hanover, NH) and MA Degree (1996) from the University of Minnesota (Twin Cities, MN) in the USA. She conducted her Ph.D. research on the ethnic Chinese migrant communities in Germany, and received her doctorate degree from the University of Bremen in 2002. Leung taught at the Department of Geography and Resource Management of the Chinese University of Hong Kong from 2002 to 2006. Her book Chinese Migration in Germany: Making Home in Transnational Space (Frankfurt 2004) earned her the Young Researcher Award in 2004. Valentina Mazzucato is a senior researcher at the Department of Geography and Planning, University of Amsterdam, and visiting scholar at the Department of General and Development Economics at the Free University, Amsterdam. She heads an interdisciplinary research program on Transnational Networks and the Creation of Local Economies: Economic Principles and Institutions of Ghanaian Migrants at Home and Abroad. She has published in various journals and published a chapter on transnationalism in Globalization and Development: Themes and Concepts in Current Research (London 2004).

Contributors

331

Ton van Naerssen is Associate Professor in Development Geography at the Department of Geography, Faculty of Management Sciences, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, where he is coordinator of the master programme ‘Globalisation and Development.’ He is also co-ordinator of the research programme ‘Urban and Regional Development,’ which includes the module Globalisation, Migration and Development. He co-edited Healthy Cities in Developing Countries. Lessons to be Learnt (Saarbrücken 2002), Asian Migrants and European Labour Markets (London 2005), and EastWest Migration in a New Europe (Rome forthcoming). Liza M. Nell (1976) holds an MA in Cultural Anthropology and works at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam. She is currently writing her dissertation on a comparative study on the transnational political ties of the two largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands: Surinamese and Turks. Robert B. Potter is Professor of Human Geography at the University of Reading. He was previously Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway College, University of London. He is the Founding Director of the Centre for Developing Areas Research (CEDAR) at Royal Holloway College, University of London. His research and teaching interests span development geography and development studies; urban geography; transnationality and issues of identity; and contemporary Caribbean development. Since 2000, his research has also focused on second-generation return migrants to the Caribbean. He co-authored Geographies of Development (Englewood Cliffs 2004), The Experience of Return: Caribbean Perspectives (Aldershot 2005) and Doing Development Research (London 2006). He is founding Editorin-Chief of the journal Progress in Development Studies. Parvati Raghuram is Lecturer in Geography at the Open University in Milton Keynes, UK. Her Ph.D. focused on coping strategies of migrant domestic workers in India. Since then she has turned an analytical lens to focus on the migration of both skilled and lesser skilled women and men, particularly those moving from the Indian subcontinent. In a series of papers she has been exploring the intersection between the family, labour markets (particularly health and IT sectors and domestic work) and immigration regulations. She has also published widely on ethnic minority women in business and has co-edited South Asian Women in the Diaspora (Oxford 2003) and Gender and International Migration in Europe: employment, welfare and politics (London 2000). Fenneke Reysoo (1957) is an anthropologist. Her career has lain on the crossroads of anthropology and development. She has taught at various universities, in Morocco, Mexico, France, Switzerland and the Netherlands, and conducted research in diverse regions of the world, among them the

332

Contributors

Arab Muslim world and Latin America. In her current position as deputy director and as coordinator of gender issues at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED), Geneva, she is actively involved in current debates and discussions concerning gender and globalization. Among others she co-edited Genre, migrations et nouvelle division internationale du travail (Paris, Geneva 2005). Gaspar Rivera-Salgado received his PhD in Sociology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and is currently Project Director at UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education. He has previously held positions at the University of Southern California, University of California at Santa Cruz and San Diego, and Columbia University, and was holder of the Prince Claus Chair in Development and Equity for 2004/2005 in Utrecht University in the Netherlands. He serves as an advisor to several migrant organizations in California and has extensive experience as an independent consultant on transnational migration, grassroots philanthropy and Mexican economic development. Among others, he co-edited Indigenous Mexican Migration in the United States (San Diego 2004). Ernst Spaan is a social anthropologist with an interest in population and development issues, international migration and health systems. He has been senior researcher at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in The Hague since 1997. Among others he published Labour Circulation and Socio-economic Transformation. The Case of East Java, Indonesia (The Hague 1999) and co-edited Asian Migrants and European Labour Markets. (London 2005) and ‘Contemporary Migrations in Asia and Europe: Exploring Transnationalism, Multiple Linkages and Development’ (Special Issue of Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 2005). Annelies Zoomers is Professor in Regional Development Policy and International Migration at the Department of Geography, Radboud University, Nijmegen and Associate Professor at the Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA), University of Amsterdam. Her specialisations include rural and regional development, sustainable livelihood and development policy, and international migration. She has acted as consultant to various development programmes in African and Latin American countries. Recent articles have been published in Development and Change, International Development Planning Review and Journal of Economic and Social Geography (TESG). She is the co-editor of various books, including la Ruta Andina about sustainable tourism in the Andes region (Quito, Cuzco 2006), Imagining the Andes: Shifting margins of a Marginal World (Amsterdam 2003), Current land policy in Latin America and Land and Sustainable Livelihood in Latin America (Amsterdam/Madrid 2000 and 2001).

Index

A Agriculture 41 n. 2; and employment 44, 59, 80–81; and livelihoods 23, 36–38, 80; and migration 27, 58, 66, 69, 259; and remittances 10, 74, 77, 82, 87; and women 35, 60, 273; and subsistence 25–26, 68, 256 Algeria 26 Argentina; and migration 66–69, 82–83, 87, 88 n. 15, 89 n. 17 Ashanti 12, 150–152; and community development 167–170; and culture 155, 160, 166, 170 n. 2; and funerals 157 Asylum 201, 240 Australia; and Filipinos 146 n.15; and Indonesians 46; and migrants 292; and Somalis 95

B Balikbayan (Philippine: returnees) 138, 141 Bangladesh 51 Banks 56–57, 138, 220, 320 Bolivia 10, 67, 88 n.3; and employment 80; and migration 67, 68, 73, 78, 86; and remittances 11, 70–77, 79, 83–87, 89 n.17; and undocumented migrants 83 Brain circulation 15, 316 Brain drain 7–8, 195–196, 208–209, 225– 226, 311 Brain gain 173, 178, 226, 231–232, 311 Britain see United Kingdom (UK) Brokers 5 Burundi 189, 199 Business 60, 122–123, 165, 242; and care 265; and culture 14, 294, 297, 300, 304; and migrants 153,

167–168, 201, 220–224, 290; and networking 7, 224, 226, 294, 301, 303; and remittances 96–98, 102–103, 172; and transactions 95; and women 278

C California; and migration 69–70, 113, 301, 304; and home town associations (HTAs) 113–118, 124, 140 Canada 97, 143, 144, 222 Capacity building 122–123, 176, 185, 188 Capital 2, 4–5, 7, 312; city 67, 69, 134, 140, 255, 317; and investment 4, 23, 55–57, 117–124, 290–304; social capital 28, 225, 232–233, 290, 304–305 Chain migration 6, 51–52 Children, and education 8, 40, 131, 181– 182, 300 and employment 162; and household 57, 269, 273, 278, 284; and migration 32–33, 61–62, 131–132, 141–142, 254–255 China 243; and investment 14, 198, 288–297, 301–304, 317; and migration 47, 196, 232, 270–271, 300–301; and population 42, 130, 284; and remittances 145 n.2 Circulations 3, 84–86, 213, 294, see also brain circulation Circular migration 4, 7, 26, 30, 85, 17 Citizenship 104, 202, 226, 277, 281, 318–319 Co-development 174 Colonialism 230, 320 Communal development 101, 103–104, 161 Communal identity 77

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Index

Communal institutions 6 Communal labour 154, 156, 158, 162–163 Congo, Democratic Republic 180, 189 n. 9, 199, 231 Consumption 59, 86, 256–257, 263, 264– 265; and remittances 55–57, 73–74, 85, 103, 316 Crisis coping strategy 24, 40 Culture 179, 187, 225, 242, 271; and Ashanti 155, 160; and business 14, 222, 294; and migration 215, 222, 301, 304, 314

D Dependency see remittances; see theory Dependency ratio 313 Deprivation 22, 92, 261 Development aid 186, 197, 238, 241, 315 Development cooperation 12, 173–180, 183–188, 209 Development theory 8–10 Discourse, see migration and development discourse Discrimination 201, 205, 277, 283–285, 302 Domestic workers 47, 69, 255–261, 272– 274 Dominican Republic 66, 126, 133, 216

E East Nusa Tenggara 51–62 Economic crisis 44, 101, 200, 258, 277 Education 44; and migration 3–4, 40; and remittances 55–56, 118–121, 131–133, 161–164 Empowerment 9, 14, 222, 259, 290; and women 181, 253, 265, 284 Entrepreneur(s) 85, 122–123, 198, 294–300, 312 Entrepreneurship 6–8, 188, 302, 317, 329 Ethnicity 12, 180, 187, 243, 271 Ethnic group(s) 25, 28, 234, 271 and diaspora 3, 113, 201 Europe, and migration 1, 213, 232, 255, 265; and Africans 199; and Moroccans 26–33; and Filipinos 135; and Indonesians 46; and Somalis 95 European Union (EU) 2, 286 n.8,

F Female migration 13, 79–80, 253–266 Feminization of migration 3, 253–256, 260, 269–285

Flores 54–63 Florida 70, 222–223

G Gender and migration 12, 13–15, 136, 187, 283; and regimes 13–14, 253–256, 261, 275, 282–283; and remittances 79, 321 n.9; and rights 9; and roles 5, 100, 264, 312 Generation 60, 132, 204; and first generation migrants 179, 182, 202, 215, 219, 224; and second generation migrants 15, 174, 182, 202, 217–226; and third generation migrants 7, 13, 15, 177, 188; and Filipinos 178 Germany 1, 173, 254, 293; and Ghanaian migrants 195–210 Ghana 12–13; and migration 150–171, 195–21 Globalization 1–16, 197, 213, 253–254, 284 Grenada 13, 14, 216–223 Guanxi 290, 300, 304 Gujarat 315, 318 Gulf States 95, 315

H Hawala (Indian agent network) 315, 321 n.8 Health care 26, 203, 312, 318; and projects 101, 121, 181 Highly skilled 3, 4, 7, 172 Home town associations (HTAs) 11, 111– 126, 124, 162, 216 Host country 174, 175, 206 Hong Kong 272, 288; and investments 292– 295, 297, 300–304; and migrant workers 48, 135, 141, 269, 275 Household 24; and income 8, 35—39, 40, 260; and livelihood 6, 35, 80, 95; and migration, 23–24, 28–33, 55–56, 275, 316; and remittances 35–40, 41 n. 3, 88 n.7, 132 Human capital 15, 214, 224–225, 311; Human rights 178, 263, 280–283, 285, 318

I Identity 9, 77, 113, 177, 258, 310, 313, Illegal migration 48, 62, see also irregular migration Income 4, 62, 104; and agricultural 36, 38– 39, 81; and household 24, 36, 99, 259, 279; and distribution 5,

Index 44, 281; and diversification 24, 30–39, 81, 254–255, 264; and maximizing 22–23; and remittances 49, 112, 119, 257, 315 India 7, 131, 198, 232, 289, 291; and migration 7, 309–321 Indonesia 43–63, 177–178, 189 n. 8, 289 Inequality 6, 112, 132, 319 Infrastructure 25, 56, 59–60, 94, 153; and migrant investments 111–121, 124, 145, 295–296 Integration 40, 68, 264, 310; and migrants 114, 174, 179, 209, 285 Internal migration 29–30, 33–40, 41 n. 7, 59, 312 Investments 7, 225, 262, 288, 295–305, 213; and education 131–132; and HTAs 116–117, 122–123, 125; and remittances 40, 56, 66–86, 101–102 IOM 174, 176, 185, 198, 199 Irregular migration 27, 30, 33, 314, 321 n. 6 Islam 95 Italy 11, 27; and migration 130–145, 200

J Java 51–61

K Kenya 185, 189 n. 9; and Somali refugee camps 92, 94; 99, 102–103 Kerala 312–319 Kinship 13, 28, 95, 177, 301 Knowledge transfers 12, 172, 183, 185, 195–206 Korea see South Korea

L Labour 22 n. 2, 133, 147 n. 7 Labour markets 44, 70, 72, 78, 209; access to 72, 204–205, 253–254; segmented 49, 189, 260; urban 77; see also women. Labour migration 2, 3, 5, 33; impact on children 61, 131; and (under)development 5, 10, 44, 51, 62–63; feminization of 3, 13, 15, 260–263; to large regions 27, 47, 49, 48; of men 34, 254; undocumented 48; see also undocumented migrants and NELM Latin America 67, 79, 86–89, 125, 133; and US immigrants 132, 187

335

Lebanon 13, 199, 253, 255–256, 260–266 n.4 Livelihoods 8, 23, 43, 146 n. 15, 291; rural 21–41, projects 142, 181; strategies 6, 13, 24, 255, 259; transnational 11, 91–105, 213, 224, 226; see also remittances Local development 12, 115, 132–134, 142–144, 216; and diaspora 11, 209, 210 n. 9, 217; impact on 55, 72, 89 n. 17, 120, 187; and emigrants 12, 101, 132–134, 142–44; potential 44

M Malaysia 46, 48, 51–57, 61–62, 289 Manufacturing 59, 270, 280–281, 285; investments in 295–296, 299, 304; and women 69, 273, 302 Marriages 27, 30, 155, 256–259, 264; for employment 270, 286 n.9; and divorce 302; international marriages 279–280, 283–284; of men 30, 275; and migration 27–32, 61, 269–272, 275–277; and return migration 30, 225 Mbind (Senegal: compound) 256–257 Medical sector 140, 204, 312, 318; and equipment 169, 205–206; and insurance 279, 283 Mexico 66–89, 111–126, 130, 133, 144–145 MIDA 174, 176, 185, 198–199 Middle East 95, 261, 266 n.4; labour migration to 47, 140, 255, 260–263, 314; and domestic workers 49, 256, 260 Migrant communities 3, 113, 143, 195, 210 n. 1; developmental role 3, 12, 91, 195; organizational capacity 11, 95, 116, 125; and transnationalism 3, 12, 14, 91, 195 Migrant networks 12, 15, 28, 40, 174, 303 Migration and development nexus 4–14, 174–178, 253, 309, 314 Migration and development 3–15, 130, 144, 175, 195–197, 309–310; and policies and planning 62, 104; and remittances 67, 290; see also MIDA Migration and development discourse 4, 7–9, 175–176, 213, 309–314 Migration discourse 7, 21, 175, 229, 292 Migration industry 5 Migration management 22

336

Index

Migration policy, see policy Migration regimes 2 Migration routes 69 Migration strategies 319 Migration systems 1, 63 Migration theory see theory Migration trends 14, 271, 312 Mobility 2, 40, 67, 197, 225; cultural 68; professional 13, 74, 265, 317; structure 71; system 83–86; and transition 25–28 Modernization 4–5, 8, 22, 311, 321 n. 2 Monetary transfers, see remittances Morocco 21–41, 175, 200, 329, 331 Muslims 147 n. 16, 177, 319, 332

N Nationalism 187, 234–235, 289, 301, 320 Nationality 180, 253, 274–275; Chinese 275; Dutch 244; German 202; Ghanaian 200; Korean 277, 282–283, 285, 286 n.10; Surinamese 244 Nation-state 2, 14, 271, 309–311 Netherlands 12–13, 46, 100, 254, 172–190; and Ghana 150, 162, 163–164; and Surinam 231–245 Networks 28, 51, 85, 112–113, 197–198; and assistance 94–95, 98; and business 7, 198, 254, 312; church 143; and circulation 294; and diaspora 174, 185, 206–209; family 137, 226, 303; professional 172, 174, 198, 202, 206; and development 7, 113, 174; and local knowledge 187, 202, 317; and migration 28, 51; and marriage 30; social 21, 98, 102, 172, 213; and smuggling 5; and trade 14, 26, 294, 321 n.8 ; transnational 15, 102–103, 150, 172, 213–214 New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 6, 7, 23, 24 Ngak (production unit in Senegal) 256–258 NGOs 102, 122, 141, 146 n. 12, 147 n. 19 Nigeria 189 n. 9 Nonmigrant households 6, 10, 29–39, 58; and migrant households 29–41 North America 1, 46, 95, 199, 214, 214– 216, 233 Nurses 140, 187, 312–313, 321 n. 4

O OECD 44, 46, 49, 303

Open Door Policy 288–289, 292, 299

P Pakistan 51, 199 Passport 30, 137, 175, 262, 280 Pela (kinship in the Moluccas) 177 Philanthropy (Philanthropic) 7, 113–114, 130–147, 172, 318; and Mexican HTAs 120–124 Philippines 51, 130–147, 178, 196, 280 Policy 5, 132, 242–244, 253, 270–271; and development 176, 186, 261, 318; discourse 21; employment and labour policy 260, 269, 286 n. 8 , 295; emigration policy 26; immigration policy 174, 208, 271, 284; local and regional policy 63, 170; national policy 285, 299, 302, 305, 310; recommendations 92, 102, 123, 126, 175–176 Policymakers 8, 14, 15, 121, 125 Poverty 2, 44, 77, 112, 279; absolute poverty 21, 40; and development 21, 39; in home communities 119, 254; and migration 4, 24, 39–40, 63, 77; and organized migrants 120; and poverty reduction 40, 112, 312; and remittances 7, 11, 67, 87 n. 1, 120 Primary sector, see agriculture Professionals 27, 95, 214, 289, 302; highly qualified 101, 316–319; young returning 214, 224; women 286 n. 6 Pull 22, 231, 255, 259, 269 Punjab 315 Push 22, 174, 232, 255, 257, 259

R Recruiters, see also brokers, middlemen, smugglers 3, 48, 52, 260 Recruitment 5, 26, 30, 200, 261–262, 314 Refugees 3, 11, 91, 178, 201; and politics 238–239; and remittances 91–105 Regulations 14, 254, 294, 303, 311; immigration 27, 208 Remittances 2, 66, 260, 290, 314; collective 111–126, 182–183, 187–188; and community 150–170; and consumption 6, 77; and dependency 11, 24, 28, 97, 103; development cooperation 185; and

Index local development 10–11, 43, 66–87, 316; and national development 7–8, 10, 216, 314, 315; and regional development 21–41, 43–63, 315, 318; and education 55, 56; and employment 5, 261; and infrastructure 56; and family income 74, 80, 257; and household income 35–40; 41 n. 3 , 88 n. 7 ;and housing 56; and income distribution 5, 316; and investment 55, 56, 71, 74–78; and livelihood 91–104, 291; social remittances 4, 12, 216; strategies 69 Repatriation 101, 174, 197, 266, 289 Residence 3, 208, 210 n. 8, 237, 310; permanent 46, 201, 205; status of 32, 139, 201–202, 205 Resources 4–6, 9, 98, 120–121; agricultural 40, 57–58; financial 28, 30, 40, 115, 166;household 23–24; human 8, 58; knowledge 321 n. 12 ; and migration 76– 77, 115, 141, 144–145; natural 23, 94; social 146 n.6; transnational 97, 224; and diaspora 104, 179, 184–185, 315 Return migration 6, 32, 213, 244, 333; and marriage 30; and original communities 73, 196, 223, 237–238; and development 174–176, 184–185, 188, 215–216; motives for 231, 245 Risk 23, 94, 213, 225, 264 Rural areas 23–24, 39, 68, 278, 312; of origin 10, 86; and outmigration 58, 62; and remittances 55, 315 Rural development 22, 76, 328 Rural-urban migration 1, 71, 253, 255, 263 Rwanda 189 n.9, 199

S Sabah 51–52, 60–61 Saudi Arabia 48, 95, 135, 205 Savings 6, 57, 71, 83, 209; use of 76–77, 88 n. 11, 89 n. 17, 257 Seasonal migration 27, 67, 88 n. 6, n. 14 Second generation 13, 174, 178–182, 214– 226, 202 Security 9, 21, 61, 183, 260; and benefits 7; economic 265; financial 11, 67; social 94, 98, 102, 244, 279 Sending countries 146 n. 6, 232, 280

337

Senegal 13, 253, 255, 263–265 Service sector 70, 80, 270, 273, 278 Sex workers 14, 269–271, 280, 284 Sex industry, see sex workers Singapore 47–48, 269–270, 272, 274, 285 n. 2, 294 Skilled labour 311–312, 316 Skills 6–7, 154, 231, 290, 313; managerial 14, 294; medical 208, 312; organizational 237; professional 226, 317; technical 183, 187, 224, 311; transfer of 15, 178, 218, 222, 294–296 Smugglers 3, 28 Social capital 28, 40, 97, 213, 225; and development 146 n. 6, 181, 185, 187, 216 Social network see networks Social remittances see remittances Somalia 91–105, 105 n. 4, 175, 179–180 South Korea 14, 196, 269–286, 293, 330 Spain 27, 135, 223, 255 Sri Lanka 13, 51, 196, 254, 260–264 Surinam 13, 15, 231–246 Statistics 47, 178, 288–289; of migrants 252, 260; and remittances 93, 112 St. Lucia 216, 219–220 Students 27, 46, 80, 181, 312; and migration 195, 200–201, 208, 300; and remittances 138, returning 214, 234–246; primary school 163; and scholarships 117, 119, 178

T Taiwan 48, 196, 198, 289, 301; and China 288, 292–305, 305 n. 3; migration to 48, 269–274, 285 n. 2, 289 Technology transfer 7–8, 12, 198–206, 293–305, 316–317; and braindrain 311 Temporary migration 88 n. 6, 176 Todgha valley 24–25, 27, 35, 40 Tourism 57, 72, 188, 204, 302; medical 318 Theory 4, 7, 22; on alternative development 9; balanced growth 5, 21; dependency 5, 6, 22; development 8; structural 9, 23; migrant syndrome 6; modernization 4, 8, 22, 311; neoclassical 4, 6, 22, 23, 264;; social network theory 6, 28; on transnationalism 12, 13, 126 n. 3, 188, 231; world system theory

338

Index

5, 23; see also New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) Tobago 216–219 TOKTEN 174, 198–199, 317 Transnational 3, 175, 185, 188, 196; actors 13, 112, 228–246; business 77, 222, 223, 224; communities 12, 32, 126 n. 3; 197, 289; corporations 197, 300, 304, 305 n. 1, entrepreneurship 7–8, 188, 198, 222; strategies 11, 226; organizations 15 see also diaspora; policy making 125, 238–246; practice 134, 138, 195, 232, 301; social capital 185, 233; nationbuilding 310 Transnationalism 2, 6, 12, 100, 320; and migrant communities 175, 185, 188; and politics 13, 231, 245 Transport 10, 25, 56, 77; transport infrastructure 59, 60, 63 Transportation 76, 103, 153, 296 Travel agents 201, 262 Tres por Uno (Three for One) programme 116–120, 133, 145 Trinidad 216–219, 223

U Uganda 189 n. 9 UN High Level Dialogue 2 Underdevelopment 5–6, 22, 173, 309 Undocumented migrants 51, 83 UNDP 198, 199 Unemployment 4, 32, 44, 157, 317; of males 255 UNICEF 261 United Kingdom 200, 215, 220–221, 288, 312 United States 2, 11, 132–138; and China 283, 292, 297; and India 311, 315–316; and migrants 198,

222, 255; and transfer of remittances 66–89, 98–102, 111–126 Unskilled labour 163, 281

V Visa 30, 46, 135, 262, 272; marriage visa 286 n. 9; and procedures 28, 274, 280; tourist visa 82–83, 266 n. 5 ; visiting visa 28, 279; see also passport Voting 7, 243 Voting Act 139 Vulnerability 83, 266

W Wages 4–5, 79–80, 83, 195, 281–282 War 4, 92, 222, 240, 266; Cold War 292, 311; Gulf War 314; Korean War 284; World War II 176, 232 West Nusa Tenggara 53, 55, 60 Women 60–62, 137, 141, 253–266; 269–286; and abuse 218, 229; and diaspora 181–183, 187; in emigrant communities 35, 57, 61–62, 95, 319–320; and gender regimes 13, 60–61, 253, 264, 320; and health sector 187, 313; and labour market 14, 135, 270–274, 278, 281; and law 282; and marriage 266 n.3, 269–271, 275–279; and recruitment 262; and remittances 79–80, 88 n. 12, 99, 321 n. 9; see also domestic workers World Bank 44, 150, 173; and remittances 2, 43, 51, 303, 316; reports 2, 43, 51, 303, 316

X Xawilaad (Somali: money transfer) 93, 95–97

Y Youth 97, 163, 183, 214–215, 224–226