From guest workers into Muslims: the transformation of Turkish immigrant associations in Germany

From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany

By

Gok<;e Yurdakul

CAMBRIDGE

SCHOLARS

PUBLISHING

From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany, by Gokc;:e Yurdakul This book first published 2009 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright© 2009 by Gokc;:e Yurdakul <\.11 rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copY.right owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-0060-0, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-0060-0

For Michal and Daphne

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. of.F.tgures ........................................................................................... VIII ... L1st Acknowledgments ...................................................................................... ix Copyright Permissions ................................................................................. x List of Abbreviations ................................................................................. xii Preface ........................................................................... ,.......................... x1n Elisabeth Beck-Gemsheim Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Introduction Chapter Two ................................................................................................ 9 German Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation Chapter Three ............................................................................................. 23 The Emergence and Historical Development of Turkish Immigrant Associations Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 4 7 Workers' Associations and the Decline of Workers' Rights Discourse Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 67 Ethno-National Associations and the Rise of Citizenship Rights Discourse Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 87 Religious Associations and Problems of Muslim Integration in Germany Chapter Seven .......................................................................................... 107 Conclusion References ............................................................................................... 117 Index ........................................................................................................ 141

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Number of Guest Workers in Germany 1961-1973

25

Figure 4.1. Turkish Workers in German Unions (DGB)

56

Figure 5.1. Relationship between the BTBTM and the TBB

70

Figure 5.2. Selected Sub-organizations of the TBB

72

Figure 5.3. Selected Sub-organizations of the Cemaat

75

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is a pleasure to thank the participants, scholars, family, and friends

who contributed to this book in different ways. I am grateful to all the participants who agreed to be interviewed. Without their help, this research would not have been possible. While doing the fieldwork, I participated in a lively and interesting discussion group in Berlin, IFADE, where colleagues and friends who were then PhD candidates at various German, American and Canadian universities, discussed our dissertations. This group was particularly helpful to me in the fieldwork process; we put together two workshops (Humboldt University in 2001 and Bilgi University in 2004) and a book (Insider-Outsider, transcript Verlag, 2005). Among the members of the IFADE, Semra <;elik, Nevim <;il, Helen Krumme, Biilent Kii~iik and Safiye Ytldtz were supportive during the research and writing process. In addition, Sel~uk Iskender, Banu Bredderman, Filiz Yiireklik and Metin Agacgozgii from Regenbogen Buchhandlung provided contacts for my fieldwork. Gerdien Jonker, Werner Schiffauer, Czarina Wilpert, Ruth Mandel and Yasemin Karaka~oglu read and commented on early drafts of this book. I owe thanks to Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim who kindly agreed to write the Preface. I am lucky to have a supportive group of friends and colleagues: Nedim Karakayah, Lesley Kenny, Andrew McKinnon, Trent Newmeyer, Djordje Stefanovic and Denis Wall at the University of Toronto Sociology Department. My academic soul mate Pascale Fournier, my dear friends Mamie Bjornson and Elina Guralnik, and kader arkada~zm Ayse K. Uskul have been always there for me. Robert Mackay and Sara Abraham from the Sociology department and Gavin A. Smith from Anthropology provided invaluable feedback in the writing process. My thanks go to Ytldtz Ecevit in Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology, my mentor who taught me the meaning of women's solidarity. Bahar Sahin at Bilgi University deserves thanks, as she patiently and meticulously transcribed all the interviews. Thanks to Anna Korteweg, Ronit Lentin, Esra Ozyiirek, Jeff Peck, Galya Benarieh Ruffer and Elizabeth Thompson who contributed to this book in different ways.

X

Acknowledgments

The research for this book has been partially funded by the following: Connaught Fellowship, School of Graduate Studies Research Grant, Joint Initiative for German and European Studies Research Grant and Sir Val Duncan Grant at the Centre of International Studies, University of Toronto. While I was conducting research in Germany, I was affiliated with Institut fiir Sozialwissenschaften and Institut fiir Europaische Ethnologie an der Humboldt Universitat, both of which helped me to establish connections with leading scholars and interesting students. I specifically would like to thank to Hartmut HauBerman who helped me organize meetings and a workshop at Humboldt. Last but not least, I am grateful to the ones who are closest to me: Eda, Oguz, Tibet, Nurit, Michal and Daphne. Specifically, I would like to acknowledge the intellectual contribution of Michal. Without him, I would not have been able to start or finish this book.

COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS

I am grateful to the journals and publishers who generously provided copyright permissions to reprint the following chapters. Chapter 4 was previously published as "We are Together Strong: The Unhappy Marriage Between Migrant Associations and Trade Unions in Germany," in Citizenship and Immigrant Incorporation: Comparative Per.spectives on North America and Western Europe, edited by Gok<;e Yurdakul and Michal Bodemann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). The German version appeared as ,'Wir sind gemeinsam stark?': Die tmgllickliche Ehe zwischen Migrantenvereinigungen und Gewerkschaften," in InsiderOutsider: Bilder, ethnisierte Riiume und Partizipation im Migrationsprozess (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2005). Chapter 5 was published as "State, Political Parties and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Berlin," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32 (3): 435-53 (2006). Some parts of Chapter 5 were published as "Secular Versus Islamist: The HeadscarfDebate in Germany," in Strategies of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, edited by Gerdien Jonker and Valerie Amiraux. (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006) and as "Muslim Political Associations of Turks in Germany" in Council for European Studies at Columbia University, 2005 .

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works frequently cited are identified by the following abbreviations. AABF: Foderation der Alewitischen Vereine in Deutschland (Federation of Aleviten Associations in Germany) Christian Democratic Union CDU: Christian Social Union CSU: Ausliinderberatungsstelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, DGB: Landes Bezirk Berlin-Brandenburg (German Trade Union Federation Foreigners Commission) Demokratischen Arbeitervereine in Deutschland or DIDF: Demokratik i~r;i Dernekleri Federasyonu (Federation of Democratic Workers' Association) Diyanet i~leri Turk islam Birligi (Religious Affairs DITIB: Turkish Islam Union) Europiiisch Turkischen Zivilplatform (European Turkish ETZ: Civil Platform) Free Democratic Party FDP: GEW: Gewerkschaft fiir Erziehung und Wissenschaft (Union for Education and Science) The Union for Metal Industry IGMetall: IGMG: Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goriis (Islamic Community National Perspective) KdOR: Korperschaft des offentlichen Rec}l!_s (Status of Corporation of Public Law) Yekitfye Kame/en Kurdistan (Union of Associations KOMKAR: from Kurdistan) Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers' Party) PKK: Social Democratic Party SPD: TBB: Turkische Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (BerlinBrandenburg Turkish Federation) TDKP: Turkiye Devrimci Komunist Partisi (Turkish Revolutionary Connnunist Party) TGB or Cemaat: Turkische Gemeinde zu Berlin or Berlin Turk Cemaati (Turkish Community of Berlin) Ver.di: Die Vereinte Dienstleitungsgewerkschaft (United Union of Service Supplies)

PREFACE LOOKING AT IMMIGRATION THROUGH IMMIGRANT EYES ELISABETH BECK-GERNSHEIM

In the 1950s, Germany was, to a great extent, an ethnically homogeneous country. At that time, foreigners made up only one per cent of the inhabitants. Today, eight per cent of the population consists of foreigners, including those who, although they have a German passport, are considered persons "with a migration background," i.e. those for whom migration is part of a personal or family history. Within the population as a whole, every fifth person has a "migration background," and among children under six, it is every third child. The Federal Republic of Germany has become the "colourful Republic of Germany." A demographic transformation of such magnitude changes the very coordinates of society. German politics has reacted to the subsequent challenges in a variety of ways. The first phase of political reaction was characterized by not acting. Urgent action did not seem necessary because, according to general expectations, the increase in foreigners was only temporary. Because the migrant laborers of the 1950s and 1960s, notably referred to ac~ workers," would soon return to their home countries-why th.en should the GermB? government occupy itself with groups who after a few months would no longer be in Germany? This notion was refuted by the subsequent ban on recruitmer~;t (1973), which was meant to bring about a reduction in the for~ign-born population. Paradoxically and unexpectedly, however, it contributed to its increase. Instead of returning to their countries of origin, many migrants decided to bring their families to Germ.any. German

XIV

Preface

policy, surprised by these unintended consequences, reacted for the most part in a helpless manner, especially with a strategy of denying reality. When it was obvious that for many, the time as a guest was turning into permanent settlement, the Kohl Government (1982-1998) sullenly countered with the motto: "We are not a country of immigration." After the interlude of the red-green government, which at least brought about a reform of the citizenship law, the next phase has begun with the government of Angela Merkel. The new slogan integration is finding a consensus across party lines. Integration is the magic word, the magic formula, whiClfeveryone refers to when the topic of migration is discussed in Germany today. Such general agreement may occur because integration is a term that allows many interpretations. In the media, politics, and in public, for example, it often includes a criticism of migrants. Sometimes in an unspoken undertone, sometimes overtly addressed is the idea that migrants are isolating themselves, even building up parallel societies. "They," the migrants, need to change, must come out of their niches and work on becoming closer to Germany and the Germans. This perspective, even if it does encounter broad agreement, has a decisive flaw. It is one-sidedly fixated on the "other" of the migrants, on that which is unfamiliar and therefore conspicuous, and for that reason this perspective is unable to see what many migrants have already accomplished in terms of acclimating to German culture-and at a time when no one was speaking of integration. Herein lies the significance of this book. It is an eye-opener, a term meant to be taken literally. By presenting the perspective of the migrants and not the dominant society-"looking at integration and citizenship from the immigrants' eyes" (p.2), Gokye Yurdakul manages to show the situation in a completely new light. Her case study focuses on Turkish migrant ass.oc_rnti.Q_ns-which :_!!le dominant society considers to be forrris qf isolation, of abiding in the ethnic niche. Yurdakul perceives them as the total opposite: namely, as forms of integration. ·· To summarize the main thesis, in such groups, migrants negotiate their social localization not in Turkey or elsewhere, but in

From Guest Workers into Muslims

XV

Germany. Their participation and/or obligation is not towards rights and duties in their country of origin, but towards those of the host country. They form their own interest groups-just like other groups in Germany, such as Catholics, doctors, women, homosexuals, handicapped people, and so on. Consequently, the interim arrangement is over: the migrants have arrived, and they are adjusting to life in the new' country. By guiding the focus in this direction, Gok9e Yurdakul's study takes on a task that belongs to the classic concerns of sociology: it both enlightens and ~ducates. The study delivers visual instruction on the topic of integration. It tells us that integration can only succeed if the domiQ.ant society does not insist on its understanding of integration as the only true concept; rather, it must accept the perspective of its migrants. Not least, the members of the dominant society must recognize and respecf what Yurdakul presents in her study in a detailed manner, based on large amounts of material"how immigrants create their own strategies of integration"_ (p.l ). Anyone serious about integration will be interested in this study's look at the problem areas of pr,actical implementation, which until now have \rarely been discussed. For one thing, Yurdakul reports on the Turkish union members who time and again ~ttempt to build- connections with German unions, only, to fmd that the Interest of the Germans is limityd to a type of obligatory program: "On almost all oc_c~~i-~-~ German union leaders have been invited to give talks and engage in discussions .... They generally do not stay for discussions or even until the end -of the conference" (p.56). Yurdakul has similar experiences while conducting research. When she attempts to interview German and Turkish politicians on the topic of immigration policy, she is forced to -note that the willingness to answer is rather one-sided: "[A]lthough political party members of Turkish and Kurdi.sh backgrounds were generally available for interviews, German political members were not" (p.5). One can interpret such examples in different ways. One can regard them, from the perspective o( the dominant society, as trivial or coincidental individual stories, and therefore meaningless. Or one can view them a!' an impetus to think about the situation, to _[~verse the COI11IT10n perspective. One can

XVI

Preface

begin to ask: "Who is remaining in their own ethnic niche? Who is showing little willingness to grow closer and to act together?" Such questions are important, not only in Germany but in other western countries where the age of ethnic homogeneity is over and fundamental demographic change has begun. When such questions are posed, the cohabitation of groups is placed on a new foundation. When the members of the dominant society begin to realize what the world looks like from the eyes of the minority-"looking. through immigrant eyes"-then the grag~_project of integration ca.n truly succeed.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, and more recently, with the formation of the European Union, Europe, in a sense, has gradually devolved into a larger region; yet along with consolidation ?as come a host of new problems. Notably, it has become a region of migrants with problems of social and political membership. And among all countries of the European Union, Germany has emerged as a key source of debate in terms of its migration policy and treatment of migrants (Soysal 1994; Rathzel 1995; Joppke 1999; Sasseh 1999; Castles 2000; Kastoryano 2002; Klopp 2002; Joppke and Morawska 2003). Specifically, the case of Turkish immigrants has become a paradigm for challenges faced by immigralJ.ts with respect to Ge!ll}ap civic traditions, norms and valuesJAbadan-Unat 1976, 1985; Caglar 1994; Soysal1994, 2000; Amiralix 1997, 2003; Schiffauer 1997, 2000; Kaya 2001; Jonker 2004; Mandel2008). In this book, I discuss immigrants' claim for political representation, with specific reference to five of Berlin's Turkish immigrant associations, all located in the Turkish enclave· of Kreuzberg; Berlin. One of these associations extends to the other parts of Germany, namely Hamburg and Cologne, where I have also conducted interviews. I examine how these immigrants shape their political repn.~sentatLon as well as their social integration, either by collaborating with the receiving state or by challenging state hegemony over immigrant integration. What I do here, unlike the existing studies, is to discuss immigrant political representation through immigrant associati,ons and their claims for membership through their participation in the politics of the new society. ~ other words, I explore how immigrel:!l!s_create their own strategies of integration by political participation and negotiate their social rights and obligations with the German state.' This is the major ~

2

Chapter One

contribution of this book: looking at integration and citizenship from the immigrants' eyes. While I argue that Turkish immigrants in Germany politically incorporate into the majority society through their immigrant associations, I contend that they do· so in diverse ways. To be specific, the immigrant associations are shaped by the sociopolitical contexts in which they have emerged and developed. It therefore follows that the socio-political dynamics shaping these associations also deeply affect strategies of integration. In order to reflect the diversity of integration strategies, I offer a comparative analysis of the following five Turkish immigrant associations: the Turkish Federation of J;lerlin-Bran_denburg (Tilrkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg, hereafter TBB), an ethnic orient~d association; the Turkish Community of Berlin (Turkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, hereafter Cemaat), a nationalist religious oriented association; Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union (Diyanet j§[eri Turk js[am Birligi, hereafter Diyanet), a Muslim religious association that is mainly supported by the Turkish state; the Federation for Democratic Workers' Associations (Demokratik j§t;i Dernekleri Federasyonu, hereafter DIDF), a left wing association that supports workers' rights; and the Islamic Community' Milli Goril§ (Islamische Gemeinde Milli Goril§, hereafter Milli Goril§), a· Muslim religious association that is not supported by the German or Turkish states and which, in fact, is considered a "threat" to both German and Turkish societies. By examining these associations' views on assimilation/ multiculturalism, nationalism/ ethnicity, and secularism/ Islam, as well as their relations with mainstream German political parties and trade unions, I show that immigrants are not passive recipients of the German state's political decisions. Rather, these immigrant associations develop their own patterns of integration, depending on their interactions with the receiving state. In this process, Turkish immigrant elites become important political actors in the negotiation. of rights and memberships for their ethno-national group, and in some cases, also for other disadvantaged groups. In sum, I suggest an approach that recognises the agency of the immigrants in both socio-political discourse and the governing process.

Introduction

3

Three main questions crosscut the chapters of this book. First, how do immigrant associations participate in politics and establish social networks and political lobbies? Second, how do immigrant associations confront and/or modify traditional concepts (such as nationality/ ethnicity, secularism/ Islam, assimilation/ multiculturalism) and civic traditions (such as citizenship)? And · lastly, how does the relationship between state authorities, political parties, trade unions, and immigrant associations influence immigrants' integration? Specifically, how .does interaction with German institutions and the socio-political environtnent shape Turkish associational policies and campaigns? In short, I analyze how immigrant associations shape the integration of Turkish immigrants in German society, in an effort to understand how these immigrant communities transform German civic traditions. This book unfolds as follows. In Chapter Three, which deals with the history of immigrants in Germany after 1961, I focus on the situation of Turkish immigrants, the emergence of immigrant associations according to different migration waves, and their shaping in key events, with specific reference to historical changes in Turkey and in Germany. Chapters Four, Five and Six are based on my fieldwork, mostly in Berlin, but also in Hamburg and Cologne. In each chapter, I discuss a specific immigrant association in terms of its historical development and its particular relationship with Turkish and German states and politics. Then I locate associational claims for political representation on the axis of multiculturalism/assimilation, nationalism/ethnicity, and secularism/Islam, showing how the association's relationship with the state influences its political representation and the development of its social integration model. Finally, I illustrate some typical outcomes of this relationship by using a particular court case, the headscarf debate which can be considered as a political claim, or ideological stance. Within this framework, I analyze the DIDF as a marginalized immigrant association which establishes relations with German trade unions (Chapter Four). I look at the TBB which receives support from the German state and promotes the idea of assimilation, comparing it to the Cemaat which receives political support from the Turkish state and campaigns for Turkish

4

Chapter One

nationalism in Germany (Chapter Five). And I compare the Diyanet and Milli Gorii§ which received public attention specifically after September 11 (Chapter Six). I conclude by noting that immigrants' claim for political representation results in the social transformation of both the immigrant associations and the civic traditions of the German state. I explore the nature of this challenge by locating the headscarf debate within Turkish immigrant associations and German political parties. For this book, I interviewed five different groups of people connected with the five immigrant associations: (1) executive committee and managing staff; (2) managers of sub-associations; (3) clients; (4) critics of the organization, including former members; and (5) politicians. The executive committee and the managing staff provided information about the management of the organization, its history, and its relations with other organizations and the German state. They provided access to the offices, archives, and related documents, and recommended potential interview participants. I also found phone numbers of the member organizations through the managers. In short, the interviews with the managing staff gave me a view of the overall structure of the organization and its relationship with both German society and.the Turkish community. Member organizations provided information about how they relate to the larger organization and what they expect from this cooperation. They told me about their own projects and goals, which I evaluated in relation to their umbrella association. They provided brochures, newspaper articles, and other relevant documents about their organization. In certain cases, they invited me to their public meetings to observe. Through these interviews, I discovered the relationship between the sub-associations and the umbrella associations. Clients explained how they benefit from the policies and actions of the organization. I paid attention to the fact that clients are representative of first- and second-generation immigrants, men and women, employed and unemployed. For their part, critical people, such as former members of the organizations, provided valuable information about how and why they criticize the organization and offered suggestions as to what might be changed. Through such

Introduction

5

interviews, I learned things that had not been revealed to me by the umbrella associations themselves. With respect to German authorities and political parties, I conducted participant observations with two groups of people: a) Foreigners' Officers in different municipalities and the Coordinator to the Chair of the Berlin Foreigners' Office; and b) political party members with connections to the immigrant organizations. Foreigners' Officers provided information about government policies and their relationship to these immigrant organizations. I asked questions about the specifics of the relationship, such as financial support, collaborative campaigns, and personal connections. I evaluated relationships in terms of agreements or disputes over common policies and projects, specifically with respect to issues of education and employment. Political party members with connections to immigrant organizations also provided information. I approached members of the Biindnis 90/Die Griinen (Green Party), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party), Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union), and Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism) responsible for foreigners' policies. I asked how the current immigrant integration policies are constructed and enacted. I addressed the issue of what kind of campaigns they carry out with immigrant associations, how they relate to each other, and what kind of agreements or disputes they may have. Interestingly enough, although political party members of Turkish and Kurdish backgrounds were generally available for interviews, German political members were not. Therefore, in the latter case, I collected information through their press consultants, public speeches, websites, newspapers, and local TV channels. I looked at newspapers, government reports, and publications of the immigrant organizations. First, I scanned hard copies of major German and Turkish newspapers. I pulled out the important events for the Turkish community, such as campaigns, street protests, or the introduction of immigration policies. I found newspaper articles relevant to the TBB, the Cemaat, the DIDF, Diyanet i~leri and the Milli Gorii~, and listed these newspaper clippings chronologically. In this way, I could detect how the associations have responded to

6

Chapter One

the major events, organizations, and public figures in Berlin. This was also important in order to determine how the immigration organizations have developed their policies in relation to social, political, and economic events. I analyzed the detailed and informed historical account of the Turkish community in Berlin by situating these immigrant organizations within the key events of the past 14 years (1991-2005). Second, government reports provided useful information about the declared policies of the state and political parties with respect to Turkish immigrants. In these texts, I found legal procedures, statistics, and lists of recognized organizations. Legal procedures showed the difference between law and practice. Government lists of recognized associations revealed that the government recognizes the legitimacy of only certain immigrant organizations (such as the Wegweiser in the Ausliinderbeauftragte, which lists immigrant organizations in Berlin). These organizations evidently appeal to state policies and needs, and therefore may be eligible to receive state funding. I evaluated these government reports in relation to the findings of my participant observations and interviews. Third, I examined the publications of the immigrant organizations. These included brochures, quarterly journals, and media announcements. I assessed the information in these publications by comparing them to newspapers and government reports to see whether various agencies (German society, Turkish immigrants, and immigrant associations) have different perspectives about a given issue. Fourth, I analyzed associational archives, newspaper clippings, journal clippings, local brochures, newsletters, e-mails, handouts, websites, and government reports, highlighting the appropriate themes in each. On occasion, I taped local television programs to catch relevant interviews, press releases, or commercials. Finally, I gathered demographic facts from the German Statistical Office website. Official statistics of the German state provided information about how governments have perceived the Turkish immigrant population. I particularly benefited from the statistics of the German Statistics Office (DESTATIS). As noted above, I am primarily concerned about how immigrant associations seek political representation in the new country and

Introduction

7

how the political agendas of the immigrant associations lead to a variety of integration patterns. To this end, by drawing upon five Turkish immigrant associations, in the following chapters, I show how each has created its own relations with the receiving state, its own integration patterns, and its own attitudes towards secularism/ Islam, nationalism/ ethnicity and assimilation/ multiculturalism. In sum, I emphasize the important role of immigrant associations in both shaping the integration patterns of immigrant communities and transforming the majority society.

•

CHAPTER TWO

GERMAN CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

The nation-state . and the concept of national citizenship have faced major challenges in the current era of globalization. Many of these challenges are the consequences of the migration flows which have accompanied globalization and the concomitant politicar and economic expansion of nation-states across national boundaries (Guamizo and Smith 1998). Immigrants today often develop ties that cross national, political, and cultural boundaries (Clifford 1994; Faist 2000), thereby contesting the concept of a unilinear relationship with a single nation-state, and forming "multi-stranded socjal relations that linlc together their societies of origin and settlement" (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994: 7). Recently, some European states, such as the Netherlands and France, have changed their immigration policies, abandoning the idea of cultural pluralism in favour of a "new" assimilation (Brubaker 2001; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008). The retreat of multiculturalism in more than one European country is not coincidental; rather, it is related to the high unemployment levels and economic instability in those countries carrying the lion's share of the financial burden of the European Union, such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Borders have become tighter, and immigration regulations have become harsher, as one ideology (multiculturalism) yields to another (new assimilation) in Europe (Brubaker 2001). Given these countervailing trends-the increasing migration flows and the tendency to tighten state borders-the political rights of immigrants are an important and often contentious topic. In some countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, immigrants are

10

Chapter Two

encouraged to participate in the political decision-making process (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008). This is not the case, however, in many EU countries, even when immigrants have been residents for decades, and this is becoming an increasingly problematic political issue. Some scholars argue that non-EU nationals, residing in EU -countries should have political rights as soon as they satisfy residence requirements (Baubock 1996). In this way, naturalization of immigrants will become merely a symbolic concern, and political integration into the new country will be greatly facilitated. In some cases, immigrants who choose to be naturalized are asked to give up their citizenship in their country of origin (Brubaker 1989a, 1989b; Layton-Henry 1990). However, as Rainer Baubock argues it may be unfair to require such renunciation, especially as many naturalized immigrants pursue projects that are tied to their country of origin, regardless of whether they maintain legal citizenship there (also see Cinar 1994). Drawing on the growing literature on immigrant integration, I argue that we should also look at the political integration of immigrants from the perspective of immigrant associations, taking into account their inner dynamics. By so doing, it is possible to see how immigrant associations mobilize to claim rights, negotiate memberships, and how their members become citizens through participation. This is particularly significant in Germany, where citizenship has been heavily defined in ethnic terms (especially until 2000) 1 (Hansen and Kohler 2005). Studying immigrant associations as a syncretic point at which immigrant political participation is activated, allows us to see the discussion of group rights from a new and complementary angle.

The Challenge The migration literature has chiefly concentrated on how the majority society perceives and deals with immigrants as a source of potential prpblems (Bourdieu 2004) and has rarely investigated how In 2000, German government introduced a new citizenship law that combines jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenships. 1

German Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation

11

immigrants transform the country of settlement (for exceptions, see Kemp et al. 2000; Goldring 2001; Klopp 2002; Jacobson and Ruffer 2004). Studies of immigrants and the theoretical approaches that analyse immigrant rights in Europe also tend to consider immigrants as victims of the receiving comftry's political decisions (Berger 1975; Gitmez 1979; Castles 1980; Abadan-Unat 1985), and this may not always be the case. Furthermore, such studies usually focus on macro levels (Soysal 1994; Sassen 2003), rarely acknowiedging the significance of immigrant political mobilisation in the negotiation of social membership. In this book, I look at how immigrants transform the civic traditions of the new country through their own associations. I analyze how immigrant associations formulate and enact their political representation and how immigrants make claims and negotiate memberships through immigrant associations. I consider how they make political decisions, organise organize campaigns, and develop strategies in relationship to the political organisations organizations of the majority society. I attempt to show that immigrant associations are not isolated and passive recipients, but rather, active political agents in the political system (Kemp et al. 2000). Of course, the issues around immigrant political representation, participation, and integration have been discussed in the social sciences literature (Miller 1981, 1989; Gitmez and Wilpert 1987; Ozcan 1989; Schmitter-Heisler 1992; Baubock 1996, 1999, 2003), but such studies are mainly concerned with the function of immigrant associations in representing immigrants' rights and interests. Since the permanent residence of migrants was not a concern in Europe during the 1980s, these earlier studies did not propose long-term solutions to immigrant political representation; nor did they consider its relation to citizenship. As immigrants have become increasingly important political actors in European countries, interest in immigrant political representation has mounted. Several recent studies focus on immigrant claims-making and/or immigrant incorporation (Soysal 1994, 2000; Statham 1999; Ogelman 2003; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy 2005). But these studies deal with state-immigrant relations through an external perspective

12

Chapter Two

and fail to fully show the .inner dynamics of the immigrant associations. It is these inner workings which shape the associations' reactions to state authorities. A recent study by Eva 0stergaard-Nielsen (2003) and an earlier study by Werner Schiffauer (2000) attempted to show how the politics of the country of origin have been carried to the political Tealm of the country of settlement by immigrant associations. Both studies successfully show the inner dynamics of specific immigrant associations, using ethnographic field methods. But even in these more sophisticated and insightful researches, the attempts made by immigrant associations to influence the political decision-making processes in the receiving state have not been a primary concern. My aim, therefore, is to explore the ways in which immigrant associations seek political representation in the country of settlement, and how these lead to a variety of integration patterns. Through their associations, immigrants seek to integrate into the majority society in their own ways, rather than in the ways imposed on them by state authorities. Immigrant associations emerge as legitimate political actors in the receiving country, as their members attempt to be accepted as citizens through civic participation, transforming their own communities and the civic traditions of the receiving state in the process. More specifically, in the book, I ask three key questions: I) Why do immigrants form political associations? 2) How do immigrants use them to solve their conflicts within the majority society's politics? 3) What are the consequences of this immigrant political mobilization for both the immigrant communities and the majority society? In seeking the answers to these questions, I draw on Baubock's discussion on conflicts between the majority society and immigrants. I review how certain key conflicts form between immigrants and the majority society, namely, distributive, cultural, and boundary conflicts2 (Baubock 1996). Distributive conflicts derive from economics and assume that immigrants are fmancial burdens on the majority society. The counter-argument states that Baubock includes ideological conflicts, but in my fieldwork, ideological conflicts seemed to dissolve into the other three, especially cultural conflict. 2

Gennan Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation

13

immigrants actually contribute, more than they take financially from the majority society (Fox 2004; Neumayer 2004; Cunningham and Tomlinson 2005). The notion of cultural conflicts stems from the argument that immigrant cultures and norms threaten the homogeneity of the majority society. Counter-arguments propose solutions to integrate immigrant culture and norms into the majority society (Joppke 2004; Pautz 2005). The last conflict, boundary conflict, questions whether immigrants can be legal, political, and social members of the country of settlement (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1999). This argument is based on three propositions of immigrant integration: assimilation, cultural pluralism, and postnational membership. Each proposes different solutions to immigrant integration. The three types ·of conflict cited above are central immigrant problems in Western liberal states today, appearing specifically in the current socio-political context of Germany (Castles 2000; Klusmeyer 2001; Pecoud 2002; Allievi and Nielsen 2003; Nielsen 2003), where they constitute the primary reasons for immigrant mobilization. Immigrant associations are primary actors dealing with these conflicts.

Defining the "Crisis" In discussing how immigrants pose a challenge to the CIVIC traditions of the nation-state (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008), I tum to Gramsci's use of the term "crisis," and Stuart Hall and his collaborators' use of the same term in Policing the Crisis (1978). Gramsci shows that organic crises in society, such as Black or immigrant political resistance, erupt not simply in the class struggle but also in industrial and economic life and in debates about sexual, moral, and intellectual questions in relation to political representation. In his book, Hall and his co-authors take Gramsci's definition to discuss crime in contemporary London. They note that Black youth are targeted as notorious muggers. One cannot detect an increase in the number of mugging cases in the "crisis" period, however, and Hall finds evidence that the "crisis" has been constructed by the police and British media, who also represent mugging as Black youth crime.

14

Chapter Two

In a similar fashion, immigrants are targeted as the cause of "social disintegration" in Germany. In the Gramscian sense, the "crisis" or "social disintegration," as it is referred in the social sciences literature, shows itself at different levels of society. As the problems of the EU-expansion jeopardize German politics, immigrants are accused of being a burden on German society by German politicians and the German media. In this "crisis," state strategies, such as compulsory German language courses for immigrants, the banning of double passports, and the requirement of full-time employment, represent an intensive and rigid control of immigrants' lives, specifically for those from non-EU countries. In this "crisis" period, even as German politicians and the German media target immigrants as sources of "social disintegration," political resistance is being strengthened among immigrants. As immigrants have lost faith in the sincerity of the German state, and doubt the ability or the desire of political parties and labour unions to protect immigrant rights, more politicized immigrant political resistance has developed in Germany (Tiirkische Gemeinde in Deutschland 2003; Akgiin 2004; Kanak Atak2005). Echoing back to Hall's argument that the term "Black" is not only a racialized identity but also a common experience of racism and marginalization in Britain, we see that in Germany, immigrants share a common anti-immigrant experience, and this leads to political resistance. Here, Hall's argument overlaps with Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Gramsci shows that a class cannot become hegemonic if it only promotes class interests; it should also include the struggles of those people who do not have class character (Gramsci 1971; Simon 1991). In the German case, the political resistance of the Turkish associations reflects their unique qualities and cannot be reduced to a class struggle, even though it is not unrelated. That is, the associational struggle has what Gramsci calls a "national-popular" dimension, as well as a class dimension. As the leaders and members of the immigrant associations participate in German political parties, establish immigrant political groups within labour unions, and intensify their relations with German institutions and non-governmental organizations, the national-popular dimension of their political resistance becomes

German Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation

15

more apparent. In the Gratnscian sense, then, the immigrant political resistance is not confined to the economic sphere; rather, it challenges cultural, ideological, and even sexual spheres of the majority society. One also observes the growth of an immigrant subculture, including movies that portray the lives of secondgeneration Turks in Germany, anti-racist hip-hop and gangsta rap music culture promoted by Turkish youth, and a proliferation of immigrant press usually published in both German and Turkish. This active subculture emphasizes the politicization of immigrant lives in social spheres other than the economic one. As German state authorities and political leaders represent "Germany as a divided society" and "immigrants as sources of social disintegration" (Europiiische Kommission 2004; Geis 2004; Stoiber 2004), immigrants develop strategies of political resistance, reacting against the "secondariness" that is established and maintained through class relations, racial and ethnic discrimination, and religious bias (Hall et al. 1978). In the case of women immigrants, gender discrimination adds to these factors (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008; also see Beck-Gemsheim 2006); in the complex process of political resistance, wearing the Islamic headscarf becomes a symbol for "dignity" within a hostile environment that threatens the cultural values of immigrant women (Mandel 1989; Hoodfar 2003). Finally, involvement in the antiracist movement allows immigrant associations to attract attention to immigrant "secondariness" (Gilroy 1987).

Circumstances of Conflict Within this political context, I focus on the three types of conflict mentioned above (distribution conflicts, cultural conflicts, and boundary conflicts) within countries of settlement, as proposed by Rainer Baubock (1996), showing that they motivate immigrant associations, in this case Turkish ones, to emerge as political actors. I analyze the process within which Turkish immigrant associations become part of German political debates, not only demanding political representation for immigrant groups in Germany, but transforming the dvic traditions of the German political system, such as the Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (citizenship law) and

16

Chapter Two

Zuwanderungsgesetz ((im)migrants' law). In the body of the book, I focus on boundary and cultural conflicts and I explore how these conflicts are carried to political debates and used to challenge civic traditions. Specifically, in Chapters Four, Five and Six I show how different immigrant associations participate in and at times challenge German politics. Distributive Conflicts

In an ideal egalitarian society, all members should receive a fair share of goods and services. But as Baubock makes clear, "if the parties to a conflict share a conception of good and recognize each other as belonging to the same community, then what is at stake is usually how that co1lllp.odity should be distributed among them" (1996: 103). Although Rawls (1971) weighs income, wealth, and protection against social risks as the basis of distributive conflicts, Walzer (1983) adds that they may also be related to political power (see also Baubock 1996). However, they agree that the distribution of a commodity should be fair and equal among the members of a society, and the distributive institutions are expected to be just and neutral in their distribution of goods and services. Social welfare policies are the primary source of distributive conflicts (Baubock 1996). Concerning taxation and the welfare system, it has been widely debated in economics whether immigrants are a burden on the host society. The European Commission's Report on Migration and Integration (2004) states that although it is difficult to "derive a reliable estimate of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants," their tax payments do not exceed their contributions as individual public transfers and services due to the high unemployment level among immigrants. Furthermore, the report states that asylum seekers who are not permitted to work or only permitted to work under restrictive conditions increase the number of immigrants who receive social assistance. In sum, it is debatable whether immigrants bring vitality to the economy as workers, employers, and tax payers, or whether they are a drain on the economy as recipients of social assistance. In February 2000, the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, Marieluise Beck, admitted that "the unemployment rate among

German Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation

17

. migrants remains at almost 20 per cent, demonstrating that foreigners continue to be subject to unemployment twice as often as Germans" (efms 2000). In 2005, the unemployment rate for Turkish immigrants in Germany was 31.4 per cent and 10 per cent for Germans (Bundesagentur fiir Arbeit 2007). From this statistical data, one may assume that the unemployment level among the "immigrant population is generally higher than that of Germans, making them more likely to depend on social assistance. However, it is equally true that foreigners employ Germans, work in German businesses, and pay taxes to the German state. It is estimated that there are 61,300 Turkish companies in Germany (Zentrum fur Turkeistudien 2005). In other words, many guest workers have been transformed into employers. These companies, most commonly in the retail sector (34.1 per cent) and in food industry (23 per cent), employ approximately 319,000 people in Germany, and their yearly turnover is 28.9 billion EUR. The assumption that immigrants are a burden on the majority society is therefore an oversimplification-at least in the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Indeed, the most common recipients of welfare are not immigrants or refugees, but Germans. Heiner Ganssmann (2004) shows that in 1997, unemployment in the former East Germany was twice as high as in the former West Germany. As a result, 50 per cent of the gross public transfers of social welfare were transferred to the East, placing a huge economic burden on the German welfare system. In sum, one can argue that some immigrants are dependent on welfare because of the high levels of unemployment among the immigrant population; nevertheless, many immigrants contribute to the German economy by participating in the work force and opening businesses. Cultural Conflicts

Within nation-states, it is usually accepted that "the political community should consist of a group of like-minded members who banded together to nurture their own common identity and who reserve the right to accept or reject new members" (Barbieri 2004: 17). It is, moreover, generally assumed that in nation-states cultural

18

Chapter Two

homogeneity is the basis of democracy. This leaves three options for minorities and immigrants: assimilation, social exclusion, or departure. Cultural homogeneity as a principle of nation-states assumes that the culture of the majority·is neutral and represents the norm (Anderson 1983). However, neutrality is a problematic concept and has been . widely criticized in the political philosophy literature (Ackermann 1983). Critics of the neutrality of the liberal state argue that it is built on the "necessity of having a secure culture" (Kymlicka 1989: 896). Will Kymlicka argues that if a "collectively determined ranking of the value of different conceptions of good" does not exist, a perfectionist state may take action to "formulate and defend the conception of good" (1989: 900). For him, this is not necessarily desirable, because nation-states may prioritize dominant ways of life to the exclusion of the values and practices of marginalized and disadvantaged groups. Minority groups would be "convinced" to transform their values, norms, and practices to fit into the majority's conception of good. In Kymlicka's view, this reinforces the cultural conservatism of the dominant group over the minority. In the following chapters, I bring this argument to bear on my analysis of the headscarf debate in Germany. This particular debate brings up the problematic issues of neutrality of the state and the concept of "common good." While exploring how different immigrant associations dealt with this conflict, I argue that it is manipulated by specific state authorities who use vague definitions of the state's obligation to be neutral. As Kymlicka says (1989), when there is ambiguity with respect to the collectively determined notions of common good, nation-states will define these notions and prioritize dominant values over others. The headscarf debate presents an ideal test case of this notion. Boundary Conflicts

Lastly, nation-states rely on the assumption that the polity should be based on certain shared characteristics, such as "ethnic or blood ties, a shared history and a common ascriptive identity" (Barbieri 2004: 17). Nation-states construct these hegemonic

German Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation

19

categories in their institutions, policies, and practices during the nation-building process (Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Blanc 1994). One of the major premises of nation building is to ensure the unity of the nation. In tum, the unity of the nation is comprised of national belonging to the nation-state and the racial and cultural hmnogeneity of its members. Paul Gilroy says that the unity of the nation (in this case, Britain, but certainly elsewhere) relies on the ambiguous relationship between race and nation (1987). Nina Basch and her colleagues add that "to talk about nation, therefore, ~s to talk about race" (1994: 37). In general, citizenship is associated with the concept of full membership in the community. For the most part, earlier conceptualizations of citizenship are national (Marshall 1965). Therefore, theoretically, one can become a member of a nation-state independent of one's racial or ethnic background. However, "even "if immigrants have acquired the citizenship of the receiving state, they are often not content with enjoying equal rights" (Joppke 1999: 630). In the following, Gilroy quotes a speech by Enoch Powell, a controversial right-wing politician in Britain, in which he distinguishes between citizenship and ethno-national membership: "The West Indian does not by being born in England, become an English man. In law, he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or an Asian still" (1987: 46). In this statement, Powell points out the difference between receiving citizenship by place of birth and receiving citizenship through ancestry. For Powell, citizenship by ancestry overlaps with ethnonational membership, and citizenship by birthplace does not necessarily indicate.ethno-national membership. Although citizenship and ethno-national membership are assumed to overlap in the nation-building processes (i.e. a United Kingdom citizen is an English person), this link is steadily being eroded by immigrant challenges. 3 Nira Yuval-Davis suggests that "citizenship needs to be examined ... not in terms of one state, but in terms of multiple formal and informal citizenships in more than one country" (1997b: 9). Nation-states are confronted by new social Jacobson states that rights have come to be predicated on residency not ethno-national membership (1996).

3

20

Chapter Two

developments, such as transnational migration and globalization of the capitalist system, and national citizenship has been challenged by the changing world order. For example, in my fieldwork, I found that immigrants challenge jus sanguinis ·and jus. soli forms of citizenship by claiming citizenship through civic participation (Bloemraad et al. 2008). However, civic participation for immigrants does not mean that they have absolute bargaining power · over decision-making processes that affect their lives. In fact, there are serious limits to immigrant political power that comes with civic participation.

Proposing Limits to Immigrant Political Power Building on Stuart Hall's perspective in "New Ethnicities" ( 1996), I introduce sexism as the first limitation of immigrant associations. As Hall notes, some Black representations may exacerbate other forms of social inequalities; in this case, we observe how immigrant associations limit immigrant women's participation in the public sphere and perpetuate sexism. I argue that migrant associations can be restrictive in their tendency to be ruled by male elites and their subjection to politico-legal rules of the state. A recent example of this is found in Luin Goldring's work on Mexican immigrant associations in the United States. Goldring looks at two nation-states, Mexico and the US, to examine power relations in the Zacatecas Federation, a Mexican hometown association in the US (200 1). She fmds that women are not located in power positions or have limited political participation. In her view, Mexican immigrant women appear as "passive recipients of state policy, but not as agents, claim-makers or active citizens" (200 1: 504), because state-led organizations reinforce patriarchal values. Her conclusion is that men are more likely to dominate homeland-oriented citizenship practices, because masculinity is privileged in these spaces. Women, however, are more likely to practice political participation and citizenship in the country of settlement context, because US society is relatively more open to women's political participation. I observed this also in my fieldwork: immigrant women's rights are considered secondary in

German Citizenship and Immigrant Political Representation

21

immigrant politics. Even a very "female" issue, such as the headscarf debate is dominated by male discussants. , The second limitation of immigrant associations is that associationallives may be strongly influenced by the legal system and political climate of the country of origin. For example, Smith and Guamizo comment that many countries of origin "promote 'transnational reincorporation' of migrants into their state-centred projects" (1998: 7). This reincorporation, according to the authors, is essential for the survival of the countries of origin, because they are dependent on the remittances of migrants. In the case of Philippines, the Marcos government provided assistance to its citizens to obtain labour contracts in the US. Guamizo and Smith note that immigrants who sent money back to Philippines were lauded as "honorary ambassadors" (1998: 8). Through their remittances, these immigrants subsidized projects and helped create new businesses in their hometowns. As I demonstrate in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, these criticisms are relevant to Turkish immigrant associations in Berlin. For one, the associations emphasize the voice of the male elite, as in the case of the Cemaat in Chapter Five, or as in the cases of Diyanet and Milli Gorii~ in Chapter Six. For another, they do not necessarily always resist, as in the case of the TBB in Chapter Five. When these associations try to include the voices of the specific disadvantaged .groups, such as the Turkish working class or the Muslim believers in Germany, they run the risk of not being "representative" of the whole community; this, in tum, prevents them from making legitimate claims 4 on state authorities. This danger is particularly pronounced in the case of the DIDF (Chapter Four) and the Milli Gorii~ (Chapter Six). Immigrant political representation is vital for immigrant communities and for the majority society, because democratic societies cannot fulfil their promise of democracy without including immigrants in decision-making processes as members of the polity. In the following chapters, I continue to develop this theme, discussing five immigrant associations, how they represent By "legitimate claims," I mean claims that find a political and legal response from state institutions and authorities.

4

22

Chapter Two

themselves politically, and how they deal with circumstances of conflict in Germany. These five case studies demonstrate the diversity among immigrant communities. As I show in Chapter Three, the associations were formed during different immigration flows and represent different political beliefs. I discuss workers' associations (Chapter Four), ethno-nationalist oriented associations (Chapter Five), and Muslim religious associations (Chapter Six). Because they come from different political backgrounds, their understanding of political resistance and political representation are necessarily different, and in my analysis, I demonstrate how they approach distributive, cultural, and boundary conflicts in their own umque ways. It is important to note that their ways of dealing with conflicts are not static, but change according to the political context. Specifically, in the aftermath of September 11, social democratic associations started to publicly celebrate Muslim religious holidays as a part of their publicity campaigns, whereas, in the 1990s, such celebrations would have been a sign of bigotry. The following chapters will illuminate this growing heterogeneity among immigrant associations, as this book delves into the transformation of the political representation of immigrants over time in Germany.

CHAPTER THREE THE EMERGENCE AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS

In this chapter on the history and current situation of Turkish immigration in Germany, I discuss the following six events that have played major roles in the lives of these particular immigrants: 1. Labour migration under the guest worker system (1961-1972). 2. The arrival of family members after the introduction of the family reunification law (1973-1979). 3. The settlement of asylum seekers in Germany after the military coup d'etat in Turkey (1980-1988). 4. The fall of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath (1989-1998). 5. The introduction of the new citizenship law (1999 onwards). 6. September 11 and its aftermath (2001 onwards).

I provide a historical analysis of and contextual depth for the emergence of immigrant associations, while demonstrating how specific events have shaped certain immigrant associations through the incorporation of excerpts from my interviews with the Turkish immigrants. First, I discuss the labour migration under the guest worker system and the political organization of guest workers under German unions. When the guest worker system officially came to an end in 1973 and the family reunification law was introduced, the composition of migrants began to shift demographically from the workers themselves to their family members. Concerning this second phase, I discuss the arrival of the migrants' families and their kin, and the emergence of Landsmannschaften associations (compatriot clubs). In this period, the rural/urban distinction in the

24

Chapter Three

Turkish immigrant communities sharpened with the rise in the number of Turkish university students who came to study in German universities. I therefore explore the varieties of associations that emerged as a result of the growing rural/urban distinctions. The third factor to consider is the 1980 coup d'etat in Turkey, which shifted the demographics of the migrant population from family members to asylum seekers. At this time, many leftist asylum seekers started to establish their own associations in Germany, benefiting to a great extent from the already existing informal leftist networks. The fourth event that shaped immigrants' lives and German political history is the fall of the Berlin Wall. I explore the effect on immigrants, noting the increasing number of xenophobic events and· the increasing levels of unemployment (Fournier and Yurdakul 2006). I also sketch how immigrant associations responded to xenophobia. 1 Finally, I consider the introduction of the new citizenship law (1999), and September 11 (2001). I explore the current state of immigrant associations and show how these associations are organizing campaigns to exist as Muslims and as Europeans-which seem paradoxical identities in the eyes of many Europeans. The analyses of these six events constitute background detail for the following chapters, as I go on to discuss reactions of each association to them.

Labour Migration under the Guest Worker System: 1961-1972 Although there were Turkish migrant workers in Germany before 1961 who worked at Schiffbaufirmen (shipbuilding plants) (Krumme 2002), Turks started to systematically immigrate to Germany after the Second World War when Germany needed a greater labour force to rebuild the country. The government decided to import labour from nearby countries and to this end signed Although there are associational responses to the xenophobia after the fall of the Wall, archives usually contain general responses of the immigrant population without referring to specific associations. The earliest archives belong to the TBB and include some newspaper clippings about its haphazard protests. I

25

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

bilateral agreetnents with the governments of Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Paine 1974; Martin 1991; <;aglar 1994). On 30 October 1961, a treaty titled Anwerbung und Vermittlung ausliindischer Arbeitnehmer (Recruitment and Procurement of Foreign Workers) was signed between the Turkish Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. As a result of this agreement, semi-skilled Turkish labourers were recruited by German state institutions to work in Gennan factories. These workers were referred to as Gastarbeiter (guest workers), thereby emphasizing their temporariness in the new country (Herbert 1990). Table 3.1. Number of Guest Workers in Germany 1961-1973

L

N~~~~;.:r

Year r··----------------i96T···T·---------------------5-o7:4i9_______

Gurks .I T_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Men

I

Women

ioj·3·o·------T·---------------------------·--=-----------------·:J·--------------------------~------:·----------

_

r--·19~[---655,463 _,~----~5,3'18- r-----~~45-:r---

L_ 1963 _L _811,2.13_ L _ _

r

27,1~4

J_ __

2~,161-- 1 _ _

1,273

.2,977

1964 _r:-------93-2,932-·-··-r-·----69 ,2i1- r·-···---6z~2SO- r----6~-~-

1 ______ 1965

LI:T64:364"·r----w.m-r--ws:s66"'r-

c}~?.6_1

:r--

14,555

_ _1,314,031 1. 157,978 1 13~,853 16,125 r-_ _ ---~?67-- r-·--i-o23~747___ r···-----------iis~-o8T- r-----------~il,692-- r·------~~5 ,3-89____ _ r·············-·····i968"'••- r·····-··············"i-:o-i4:·7-74······ [. . . . . . . . . . . .i3'9j3_6_____ r······-··············-·io"9:i6"7"""'"" ,--···-·····-·-···········3o·:_·i·6·9·········

r--

1~~9 _

1,372,059 1 212,951 n65,954.l 46,997 ll9y~ r--·Ts38,s59-- ~-------327 ,985- r--·25~,949_]_______72,036-_

1 _____

r··-------------------i97"i_ _ _

l

T_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ii6sj·6·6·--··r····--------------424-:3-74______ r··-------------------33':3-:o-3"9···--r··--------------------·-9·i:3·6·5·---------

19?2 _c-2,346,800 :r-497,296 r--383,771---r -

,---~m-r2~33i~i731

Source: BfA (1974: 70).

113,525-

____528Ai4--l-339,6o~ r-"'"~i28:S08

26

Chapter Three

Because of the poor economic situation in Turkey, this agreement led to a mass migration of human labour (Berger 1975). John Berger depicts the guest workers' travel from Istanbul to Germany as follows: From Istanbul the majority of migrants go to Germany. Their crossing of the frontier is officially organized. They go to the Recruitment Center. There they are medically examined and undergo tests to prove that they possess the skills which they claim to have. Those who pass, sign a contract immediately with the German firm, which is going to employ them. Then they get into a labour train and travel for three days. When they arrive they are met by representatives of the German firm and taken to their lodgings and the factory. (Berger 1975: 16) Reportedly, many of these migrants were actually skilled and semiskilled workers, and some were already employed in Turkey. However, they were looking for better pay and improved working conditions (Gitmez 1979), and they were running away from the lack of choice, scarcity of land, and limited social services (Berger 197 5). Their main aim was to earn and save money which would enable them to buy property in the homeland and establish a better future for their families (Yiicel1987; Eryllmaz and Jamin 1998). My informants described the recruitment of guest workers by German firms located in Turkey as complicated and at times humiliating. The selection processes were difficult for many candidates; for example, all workers had to go through a detailed health examination from head-to-toe. My informant Filiz put it in the following way: One hundred workers had to go to the health clinic the next day. I mean, they controlled from A to Z, our hair, our feet, our fingers, our nails, everything... We were totally naked, only with our underwear during the health examinations. Think about it, 30-40 women lined up naked in one room. A male doctor and a translator. .. This is in the [German] recruitment agency [located in Turkey]. It is like they were buying animals. (Yiireklik 2002)

Emergence and Historical Development oflnnnigrant Associations

27

Men recruited by German agencies were semi-skilled workers, such as construction workers, tailors and drivers. They worked in mines, the iron industry, and the automobile industry, including Mercedes-Benz and Volkswagen. Women, who constituted more than 20 per cent of the migrant workers were also semi-skilled workers, including tailors and farmers (Inowlocki and Lutz 2000). After 1962, many women workers came to Berlin because the montage industry was located here. Women workers were especially welcomed in this industry, because they had nimble fingers to assemble the tiniest parts of machines (Elson and Pearson 1981 ). Other women who came to West Germany worked in various industries, ranging from canning factories to fisheries and the textile industry. Among these factories, the ones most frequently mentioned by my informants were Siemens and Telefunken. From my interviews with women, I found that those who immigrated were not only running away from poverty; they were also escaping a patriarchal family system that restricts women's presence in the public space and female sexuality, and accepts violence against women. My informant, Filiz, for example, came to Germany to work because it was shameful for women to work in Turkish society in the 1950s and 1960s. ~iikran, on the other hand, revealed that she wanted to go to Germany as a worker because she was fed up with her husband's beatings and wanted to get a divorce, smnething almost impossible for a fmancially dependent wife with children, living in a village in the Aegean Region. Another woman confessed that she decided to go to Germany as a worker when she had a baby out of wedlock. She was convinced that it would be too difficult to survive in a patriarchal society with an illegitimate child. After their arrival in Germany, these workers were bound by the rules of their one-year work contracts. These rules included eighthour workdays, and living in workers' lodgings which they called Heime.Z The living conditions in Heime were described as

2 For

research on Heime, see Uyaner (1996).

28

Chapter Three

"difficult" by my informants. 3 Women's and men's Heime were separate. Sixty workers lived on one floor of a Heim, four to six to a room. They shared the kitchen and bathroom; there were two kitchens and two bathrooms on each floor, and these served for

the 60 residents of that floor. Filiz says: Sixty people were living on one floor. Thirty people used one kitchen. There are six stoves, three large, three small. We were coming from the factory at the same time, we were going to shop for groceries at the same time, we were coming to the Heim all at the same time, we were lining up to cook at the same time .... We were slaves. There were no forks, no knives in the Heime, they were even charging us for a single bed, they put one shower for 30 people. No washing machine, nothing .. .I cannot tell you how the situation was. One has to live through it to understand. (Yiireklik 2002)

According to Filiz, Heime had strict regulations. She recalled her days in the Heim as follows: On the weekdays, workers could enter Heime until 10 p.m. and on the weekends until midnight. After these hours, they were not allowed into the building. They were expected to pay rent, a cost of30 German Marks per month. A regular worker earned two Marks and 28 Pfennig per hour. That is, a worker's twoday pay covered the compulsory Heime costs. Moreover, my informants noted that cleaning service was not provided; workers were expected to clean their Heime themselves, including common areas, such as kitchens and bathrooms. Workers' lives were divided between Heime and factories. The factories employed hundreds of workers who worked· at tedious, exhausting, and alienating assembly lines. Many workers worked in shifts; because day shifts paid less than night shifts, workers had to decide which shifts to work according to their budgets. Filiz describes conditions in Bosch, where she worked for four years: First, I worked in changing shifts. One week from 6 a.m to 2:30 p.m and another week from 10:30 p.m. to 11 a.m. My work was Descriptions of Heime are restricted to those in Berlin. Heime in other parts of Germany may have been different. 3

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

29

Kunstoff-Abspitzerei, it was basically preparing parts on plastic patterns. The antennas of cars are mOtmted to the cars by screws, and then there is a cord that goes to the electric system of the car. I was working on a plastic pattern machine and preparing the part between the screw and cord. The machines were three times as big as I was. My work was to prepare a tiny part, but the machines were huge. They were old machines, which were prepared after the war.... I pressed a button, and then prepared; pressing a button, and then preparing, pressing a button and then preparing. At the end of four years, I went to my boss, and I said that I didn't want any night shifts anymore. (Yi.ireklik 2002)

Most jobs were exhausting, but worst of all was the competitive working conditions of the workers, which they called Akkord. Filiz describes the Akkord system in another factory, Telefunken: Think about a very large hall. Everyone was sitting in lines. On every floor, there was another workshop. But you could not go to other floors, because you didn't have time. You must finish 800 pieces every day. You must do this. If you were sick one day, and you couldn't meet this figure, your boss could give you a warning, because he received promotion according to your work. If you gave him smaller number of pieces, then he got less money. Even if you sacrificed from the money that you would earn, your boss would not sacrifice. He would ask: "Why are you giving less number of pieces? You have to do more." (Yi.ireklik 2002)

The harsh working conditions, such as those found in Akkord, caused health problems among immigrants in the long run. Siikran came to Germany as a young woman from a village in the Aegean Region, Odemi~. She cannot speak German; she also has difficulty reading and writing Turkish. She worked in a German drill factory but had to leave in 1981 because of health problems. She says: When I carried these heavy cases in the factory for many years, my knees began to get weak, my dear. I went to a bone doctor here. I had to get injections for five years. I had many X-rays. My legs were getting crippled when I was going to work. I was crying as if my two eyes were two fountains. (Uras 2002)

30

Chapter Three

When health conditions did not permit these workers to take factory jobs, they received job training to get other jobs, including construction machine operator for men, and elderly care for women (this was not appreciated by German workers). The Arbeitsamt provides funding for projects for job training in these two fields. Two informants, Canan and Filiz, were asked to work in elderly care by the Arbeitsamt, although they are both in their late 50s and such work would be exhausting for them. Canan says: The Arbeitsamt recommended me to work as a caregiver for the elderly. My job training is in cosmetics and foot care, but I have a problem in my spine, I cannot work in jobs that require long hours of sitting. So the Arbeitsamt does not let me do that cosmetic care. Then I had to do elderly care. (Kara 2002)

Many of these immigrant women who cannot find jobs today have worked in German companies since the 1960s and 1970s. Of these, many have been active in trade unions which became the first public spaces in which guest workers could express political ideas (Herbert 1990). Between 1973 and 1978, the number of migrant workers in unions increased by 40 per cent, even though the number of migrant workers in the work force decreased (Dale 1999: 134). From 1969 to 1973, foreign workers occupied the frontlines in strikes, the most militant of which were the Pierburg Strike (Miller 2008) and the unofficial strike at and occupation of Ford in Cologne (Miller 1981; Dale 1999). Bolstered by their support, unions were interested in recruiting more foreign workers; at the same time, they feared that such workers might take on jobs with lower pay than German workers (Herbert 1990). The major handicap of guest workers' union participation, specifically by Turks, was that many did not have the German language skills to speak for themselves. A few were encouraged to represent the foreign workers, but language became a handicap for them when they wanted to participate in decision-making processes: There were extremely respectable friends, but they did not speak any German. But they still strongly contributed to the union activities. You didn't have to master in German language in order

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

31

to participate in the union. They still wanted to express their ideas; they still wanted to be involved in the process of brain storming. But in the union meetings, you cannot tell these Germans: "My friend, wait, we [Turkish workers] want to discuss among ourselves what you have just said." You just cannot say that, can you? In those meetings, things are discussed, and are completed. The decisions are made. In earlier times, there was a Turkish workers' group. It was specially organized only for Turkish speaking people to discuss after the union meetings. (Turan 2003)

The guest worker system ended in 1973 after an economic recession in the late 1960s. The exact number of Turkish guest workers who came to Germany between 1961 and 1973 is not known. Paine states that the Turkish population in the Federal Republic was 6,500 in 1961, but when the guest worker agreement ended in 1973, there were approximately 600,000 (Paine 1974: 58). BfA (Bundesversicherungsanstalt fur Angestellte-Institute of Federal Insurance for Employees) records show, however, that the number of Turkish guest workers was 10,130 in 1961 and 528,414 in 1973. Twenty-four per cent of this population was female (Table 3.1). Lena Inowlocki and Helma Lutz say that 865,000 people migrated from Turkey to Germany from 1961 to 1973 and 21.4 per cent of this population was female (Inowlocki and Lutz 2000: 304). Based on the above estimates, we can assume that approximately 550,000 Turkish workers migrated to Germany before 1973, and more than 20 per cent of these were women. In 1973, the guest worker program ended, and the family reunification law was introduced; the migration flow from Turkey to Germany was transformed to the migration of family members.

Family Reunification Law (1973-1979) With the 1973 family reunification law, Turkish migrants were allowed to bring their wives/husbands and their underage children to Germany. The family reunification law was supported by the governing parties of the time, a coalition of Social Democrats and the Free Democrats who supported the idea that the migrant workers could bring their relatives to facilitate their integration to

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Germany (Herbert 1990). Naz1m came to Germany to join his mother in 1979: I was staying with my grandmother [in Turkey]. I used to call her "mother." My mom left us when I was three, and came here to earn a living. Because we were poor. My mom saw that I will not be. well if I stay in Turkey. She wanted to take me here. Then I came here when I was 16. (Uras 2002)

The German government aimed to restrict the influx of more foreign workers on the one hand, and facilitate the integration of already existing workers on the other (Herbert 1990). In the following years, the government also decided that the children's allowance could be extended to include foreign worker families, thus encouraging families to bring their children to Germany (Herbert 1990). Understandably, this policy led to a demographic increase, but a social change was observed among the Turkish migrant population as well. People from the same town (hem§ehri in Turkish, Landsmann in German (Landsmannschaft: hem~ehrilik), and compatriot in English), settled together and formed mutual aid societies, such as Schwarzmeer Kulturverein (Black Sea Cultural Association) or Bahaddznlzlar Dernegi (Bahaddins' Association). Today, one sees many Landsmannschaften organizations in Turkish neighbourhoods. In a social sense, first generation immigrants, specifically men, were organized around coffeehouses. In these coffeehouses, which serve the purpose of a public sphere in which to discuss politics, Turkish men play cards, drink tea and coffee, watch television, and talk about daily events (Meeker 2002). The windows are covered with curtains or frosted glass to cut off the outside world. In some instances, they put chairs in front of the coffeehouse, chat in the fresh air, and observe the passers-by. Such coffeehouses were the precursors of immigrant associations, specifically the compatriot and nationalist associations in Berlin. Following his wife, Adnan Giindogdu came to Berlin after the introduction of the family reunification law. Currently, he is a member of the executive committee of the Tiirkischer Minderheitsverein (Turkish Minority Association.) He witnessed

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

33

the early organization of the Turkische Gemeinde zn Berlin (Cemaat): In 83, when I first got here, I had nothing to do. I thought of what to do for two-three months. I am from Rize,4 what can I do? I can make tea. I bought a coffeehouse. At that time, coffeehouses were very popular among the Turkish clientele. We opened a coffeehouse, my brother-in-law, my father-in-law and I. Then we started to manage this coffeehouse ... This coffeehouse was close to the mosque, we had a large clientele of people from the Black Sea, the Aegean, and Central Anatolia. Among them, there were people from the Cemaat. On a Saturday, when the coffeehouse is crowded, we put the tables together, the founding president of the Cemaat and others came to introduce the Cemaat. What is it? What does it do? ... Consequently, the foundation of the Cemaat took place in that coffeehouse. (Gundogdu 2003)

According to the information provided by Giindogdu, neighbours and local entrepreneurs established the Cemaat in the Kreuzberg coffeehouse in 1983. But the Cemaat did not remain as a local coffeehouse association. Between 1985 and 1997, the composition of activists within the Cemaat changed substantially. As it became stronger in the political arena, there was a need for better-educated professionals fluent in the German language to express political claims. When a new executive committee was elected in 1997, the leaders were composed. of engineers, lawyers and teachers. Some local entrepreneurs and religious leaders (imams) also stayed on the committee. The Cemaat is an exception. Not all organizations established in coffeehouses have become politically active immigrant associations, quite the reverse, in fact. Some Landsmannschaften associations are basically coffeehouses for Turkish men. According to German law, social service associations, which are chartered as e. V. (eingetrageners Verein-registered organizations), do not pay taxes. Knowing this, many coffeehouses registered themselves as social service associations. These associations are usually located in 4

Rize is a city in the Black Sea region, famous for its tea production.

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the Turkish neighbourhoods, and boast the name of a region's cultural association. On the outside walls, they hang signs such as DigiTurk, Turkish satellite television provider which broadcast football games. In Kreuzberg, Landsmannschaften organizations represent the majority of immigrants who come from rural areas in Turkey. A relatively small number come from urban centres like Istanbul; these are usually seeking higher education. They too have formed associations; for example, some engineering and economics students of Turkish background recruited other students to join a student association, the BTBTM-Tiirkisches Wissenschafts und Technologie Zentrum e. V. Berlin (Turkish Science and Technology Centre Foundation, Berlin). This student organization was founded by Turkish students at the Technical University of Berlin in 1977. Since its inception, the BTBTM has defended the rights of immigrant workers, and fought for equal rights for international students, especially Turkish students. In the first flow of immigration, -union-organized guest workers marked the frrst examples of immigrant political mobilization. In the second period, immigrants came under the family reunification law and organized in Landsmannschaften organizations, leading to the establishment of more professional immigrant associations in the mid-1980s. Finally, the university students organized under the students' associations, and this eventually led to the rise of the social democratic immigrant association, the TBB. The next period of note concerns the settlement of asylum seekers after the military coup d'etat in 1980.

Settlement of Asylum Seekers in Germany: 1980-1988 The Turkish military coup d'etat, known as the "80 darbesi" (1980 coup d'etat) or "12 Eyliil" (12 September), took place on 12 September 1980. It was led by the Turkish Military Forces and General Kenan Evren and caused a massive destruction of the Turkish left. The coup destroyed informal Turkish civil initiatives and non-governmental organizations and led to a ban on political parties. It also severely abused human rights (Tanor, Boratav, and Ak~in 1997).

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

35

In the aftermath, 23,667 non-governmental associations were banned, 458 periodicals were closed down, 937 movies were prohibited, and approximately 30,000 Turkish citizens (including Kurds) sought asylum in other countries (Karaca 2001). Many asylum seekers were members of left wing organizations, such as THKO (Tilrkiye Halkzn Kurtulu§ Ordusu-Turkish People's Liberation Army, later TDKP-Tilrkiye Devrimci Komilnist Partisi-Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party), TIP (Turk j§r;i Partisi-Turkish Workers' Party), TKP/ML-TIKKO (Tilrkiye Komilnist Partisi Marksist Leninist-Tilrkiye j§r;i Koylil Kurtulu§ Ordusu), PKK (Partiye Karkeran Kurdistan-Kurdish Workers' Party), and Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path) and its youth association Dev-Genr; (Revolutionary Youth). Some came directly to Germany by means of the diasporic network of organizations already present in Europe; others first escaped to Greek islands from Turkey and then arrived in Germany. Adnan Keskin, from Dev-Yo!, came directly to Germany in 1987: I came to Germany by plane with the help of my Dev-Yol friends, with a fake passport. Shortly after my departure, six people were arrested while they were trying to escape from Turkey at the airport. Out of eight people, only two people succeeded. 6 people returned to the prison. They were released in 1991, when the criminal code has changed. Since then, I have been living in Germany, specifically in Cologne .... As soon as I arrived, I applied for asylum. My application was accepted in 10 months and I became a refugee. I have been living as a refugee since then. (Karaca 2001: 131)

The massive number of asylum seekers led to the establishment of Turkish refugee associations around the early 1980s. In fact, these groups had already formed informal networks in a number of European countries, including Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and to some extent Sweden, when the political situation in the late 1970s became difficult. The networks helped asylum seekers come to Germany, supported them financially, and found them accommodation. As the number of asylum seekers in Germany increased, an umbrella organization was established, the

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DIDF (Demokratik j§9i Dernekleri Federasyonu-Federation of Democratic Workers' Association). Its major aim was to provide support for the TDKP refugees in Germany and to defend the rights of Turkish guest workers. Germany has been a major receiving country for asylum seekers in Europe, encouraged by the Green party and the Social Democratic Party, who were particularly prone to accept asylum seekers. This trend has been changing in recent years, however. First, the number of asylum seekers from Turkey to Germany reached its highest level in 1980 due to the military coup. Second, the number of asylum seekers increased from 1989 to 1993 when Kurds constituted the majority; they were running from the conditions which resulted from the violence in southeastern Turkey. 5

The Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989-1998) The year 1989 marked a great event in world history with the fall of the Berlin Wall. But for many immigrants, the reunification of Germany meant losing their jobs, as well as encountering xenophobia and growing poverty. When the Berlin Wall came down, there was a flow of people from East Berlin (influenced by the Soviet Union and communist ideology) to West Berlin (formerly controlled by the Western powers). East Berliners were curious to see "the fancy and colourful American section" of Berlin. In exploration of their long forbidden fantasies, such as tropical fruits in the supermarkets and sex-shops, they had their first encounter with the migrant population of West Berlin. Unaware of the forthcoming social problems, some entrepreneur Turkish market

Although the immigration histories of Turks and Kurds from Turkey are interrelated, I am unable to go into the details of the history of Kurdish migration to Germany here. During my fieldwork, I attended Kurdish associations, interviewed Kurds, and established friendships with Kurdish refugees. However, I believe that Kurdish migration to Germany should be the subject of a whole book; it would be an injustice to discuss this important issue here. 5

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

37

sellers parked their fruit trucks near the Berlin Wall, to sell intentionally pricey bananas to East Berliners. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the social instability continued with mass layoffs. Some interviewees noted that employers offered a minimal amount of compensation to Turkish workers. 6 Ummii, one of my interviewees, stated that she had to leave her job whether she liked the compensation money or not. Complementing her statement, Ziihriye said that after the collapse of the Wall, she had to give up her factory work, in which she had worked for 16 years. The Turkish migrants organized street protests to attract attention to the deteriorating conditions of migrants in Germany (AL-Fraktion June 1990: 28). Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the celebrations of unification were replaced by a political and economic crisis. Growing unemployment, job dismissals, and increasing taxes shook the voters' confidence in the government (Dale 1999). The migrants and refugees became the first target of politicians who wanted to find scapegoats for the failing economy and political chaos. According to these politicians, migrants robbed the Germans of their jobs, and refugees abused the welfare system (Bild Zeitung 10 July 2002). The changing political discourse from celebratory speeches to expressions of racism was the main trigger for a series of racist attacks against refugees and immigrants that culminated in the fire bombings of houses of Turkish families in Molin (23 November 1992) and Solingen (29 May 1993). Turkish migrants in Berlin organized a street march to protest these events (Berliner Morgenpost 1993; Milliyet 1993). The xenophobia and job dismissals had a tremendous effect on the Turkish migrant population. There is a saying in Kreuzberg that "When the Wall came down, it collapsed on Turks" (Duvar

6

Specifically, interviews with Ummti Schild, Filiz Ytireklik, Ztihriye and Hilmi Kaya Turan.

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Turkler'in uzerine dil§til). A Turkish journal, Ekin 7 attests to the threat against Turkish people in Berlin: They say that there is no safety on the subway. A few skinheads or Neo-Nazis enter the car and start attacking people ... They are going to assign the border police to the subway as security guards. Then I will wait for that as everyone else, I don't take the S-Bahn8 until that time .... .In the city of H., they threw stones to the residence of refugees. They also tried to firebomb the building. Some people are wounded by the fire. Were there any deaths? The public stood by and applauded: "Foreigners Out!" ... Everyone knows that the program of Neo-Nazis is not limited to the refugees. First them, then other foreigners, then the Slavic minority in the eastern section of Berlin. Do you think they can come to Kreuzberg? (Ortac; 1991: 3)

Layoffs and xenophobia led to an increase in migrant independent businesses, such as Imbisse 9 or small restaurants, and encouraged the formation of a petit-bourgeoisie among Turks. These ethnically specific businesses relied heavily on family labour. The Kohl government offered compensation to Turks who were willing to permanently return to Turkey in 1983-4. Although the situation of Turkish migrant workers in Germany had worsened, the number of volunteers who wanted to return permanently to Turkey was minimal 10 (Hurriyet 1992). After 1989, Turkish migrants became increasingly dependent on welfare. For example, the rate of social assistance recipients in Kotbusser Tor was 44.2 per cent in 2000. 11 The training 7

This is a rare copy I found in the basement of a Turkish bookstore; the journal is no longer published. I would like to thank to the owner of Regenbogen Buchhandlung, Metin. 8 S-Bahn is the subway line under the East Gennan part of Berlin. 9 Imbiss: a stand buffet. 10 Turkish Embassy authorities estimate that 40,000 Turkish immigrants per year permanently return; see . 11 See also .

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

39

opportunities were not sufficient, since most of these migrants had neither the proper formal education nor the German language skills to express themselves. Since they are now in their 50s, the German state is not willing to recruit them back to the labour force. Most have permanent health problems because of the difficult working conditions in the factories. Many migrant women are forced to work illegally as cleaning women, and they also depend heavily on welfare.

The Introduction of the New Citizenship Law Although immigrants constitute more than 10 per cent of the German population, they lack equal opportunity in employment and equal opportunity in education. A main concerti of the Turkish migrant population is the high unemployment level of its people; they also point to problems in education, as I have discussed in the previous chapter. The problem of chronic unemployment is exacerbated by discrimination against immigrant children in the education system. Second and third generation German citizens of Turkish background and Turkish immigrant children complain that they are not given equal opportunity in the education system (am Orde 2002). First, the German education system determines a child's prospective school career at an early age. Second, discrimination against migrant children in German schools has had a tremendous effect on the German Turkish population (Keskin 2002). As a result, "While only eight per cent of German young people and adults remain without vocational training, the rate of unskilled Turkish young people is five times higher, at about 40 per cent" (Commissioner for Foreigners' Issues 2000; also see Die Tageszeitung 2002). Compounding the problem are school quota restrictions, introduced by the Berlin Senate, under which a regular class must include 30 per cent German (deutschstiimmige) children 12 (Mutlu 12

Please note that this quota restriction may be decided differently for other Lander.

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1999; Berliner Morgenpost 2002b). The regulation, aimed at preventing the marginalisation of German children in the classrooms, as well as encouraging integration between German and non-German children, does not have any known effects in improving the conditions of German and Turkish children. In fact, many Turkish and other minority children have ended up in lower educational level schools, such as Hauptschule or Realschule. And Germans were shocked by the result of "the OECD sponsored survey of reading, math, and science skills among 15-year-olds", in which German students "finished 25th out of 32 countries" in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) (Sautter 2002: 36). 13 Unfortunately, many Germans targeted immigrant children as the source of this disturbing test result, seeing a "close link between academic achievement and a pupil's social background" (Sautter 2002: 36). In order to deal with the interrelated problems of high unemployment and low education among immigrants, federal, and local state institutions provide funding to specific projects undertaken by immigrant associations. These include job training projects (such as clerical job training), neighbourhood centre projects with recreational and educational facilities (such as Nachhilfe, ~fter-school help for students), and consultation offices (providing help with bureaucratic problems, such as taxes, immigration status, and bank and credit problems). Since many Turkish immigrant associations conduct their projects solely with the funding they receive trom state institutions or work on a volunteer basis, they are regarded primarily as social service providers, rather than political interest groups by German state authorities. This is not entirely the case, however. By law, immigrants have access to some social citizenship rights: basic schooling, full employment, proper housing, health insurance, and pensions. Yet in reality, Turkish immigrants have limited access to these rights, including citizenship. Turkish immigrants who have worked for more than 40 years for the advancement of the German economy and who have accepted Germany as their home deserve to be naturalized, possibly more than many ethnic Germans who 13

Following PISA studies yield better results for Germany.

Emergence and Historical Development of Immigrant Associations

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cannot even speak German: "immigrant Polish speakers who could produce a grandfather's Waffen-SS papers were already almost Gennans [whereas the] vast 1najority of an ever-growing number of German-born, German-speaking, German-educated Turks were not" (cf. Schoenbaum and Pond 1996: 56 in Dale 1999: 142). The German government recently introduced reforms in line with changes in European Union policies ainied at facilitating immigrant integration, namely granting German citizenship. According to "the ethno-cultural understanding of nation-state membership" in German nationhood, belonging to a state (Staatsangehorigkeit) assumes belonging to an ethno-cultural community (Volkszugehorigkeit) (Brubaker 1992: 51). Nonetheless, until 1999, this definition of ethno-cultural nationhood and the citizenship law excluded immigrants from collective incorporation. Unlike the state-centred French nationhood which provides citizenship to immigrants to ameliorate their assimilation into French society, to this point, the Volk-centred German nationhood had prevented the naturalization of immigrants-acquiring a German citizenship meant much more than merely possessing a German passport (Brubaker 1992). To briefly sketch the citizenship situation: traditionally, the German nation has primarily been constructed by descent or by blood and has excluded those "others" not thus linked to the nation (Brubaker 1992; Rathzel 1995; Barbieri 1998). Under these terms, to receive German citizenship, an applicant had to provide evidence of male German ancestors. 14 Under the traditional jus sanguinis principle of citizenship in the German nation-state, then, the unity of the nation and the question of ancestry were key themes: along with blood unity, a unified nation required homogenization in terms of language, religion, and race. But with the introduction of a new citizenship law (Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz) in 1999, the German state partially discarded the idea of ancestral origin and started naturalizing the 14

In my first-hand experience in the German naturalization office in 2006, the officer asked for three generations of male ancestors for one to be considered German.

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migrant population. The new citizenship law can be summarized as follows: If they are born in Germany, children of foreign parents acquire German nationality, provided certain prerequisites are fulfilled. They must however decide between the ages of 18 and 23 years whether they want to retain their German nationality or the · nationality of their parents. Provided that certain other prerequisites are fulfilled, foreigners in general have the right to become naturalized after only 8 years of habitual residence in the Federal Republic of Germany, instead of 15 as was the case before. For naturalization, it is necessary to prove adequate knowledge of German A clean record and commitment to the tenets of the Basic Law (Constitution) are further criteria. The person to be naturalized must also be in a position to pay for his/her own maintenance .... The principle of the avoidance of multiple nationality still marks the law on nationality. Those applying for naturalization must in principle give up their foreign nationality. If release from the foreign nationality is legally impossible or unacceptable for such persons, for example due to high release fees or degrading methods of release, they can retain their previous nationality. This is also the case if the release from the foreign nationality would bring considerable disadvantages, especially economic disadvantages or problems with property and assets. (Auswiirtiges Amt 2004)

According to the Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz, children born in Germany after the year 2000 can be granted dual citizenship: German citizenship and their parents' native citizenship. However, this major change from jus sanguinis to jus soli has a condition: in order to be granted German citizenship, a child born in Germany has to give up the citizenship of his/her parents' native country between the ages of 18 to 23 (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fiir Migration 2000). Although this is a revolutionary change in German citizenship law, it is not yet clear whether granting citizenship rights to immigrants will alleviate their socio-economic inequality.

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September 11 and Its Aftermath September 11 has had major effects in the Turkish Muslim communities. For one thing, the difference between state-supported Islam and Islam as a threat to the state has become more sharply demarcated. While the former has become an example for good integration, the latter is associated with Islamist terrorism discourse. The most important test of immigrant associations now is the compatibility of a Muslim identity with European norms and values. Specifically~ in the aftermath of September 11, the German police and mass media started to focus on Islam and Muslim communities. The gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and religious associ"-tions, became targets of state inspections and attracted flashy newspaper headlines calling them "shelters for terrorists." Many Muslim associations opened their doors to Germans to show their innocence (Der Tagesspiege/2004); others felt threatened by the police raids and journalists and minimized their interaction with the rece1v1ng society (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goru~ 2004). A series of dramatic events in Europe occurred as aftershocks of September 11. One was the murder of a Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan origin. This event, more than any other, brought anti-Muslim rage to a fever pitch in the Netherlands. The street fights and fire-bombings of mosques in the Netherlands moved quickly to Ge1many, where mosques, houses of Muslims, and Muslim slaughterhouses were firebombed. Another is the removal of all religious symbols from public places, something that received a great deal of public attention in Germany, France, and England. While the French government banned all religious symbols, including the headscarf, from public places, in Germany, small religious symbols, such as a small cross as a pendant, or the Jewish kippah were allowed in public. However, wearing headscarf in public services became a hot topic in Germany (and was simultaneously debated in other European countries). In late 2003, a controversial public debate ignited in Germany about whether Muslim women teachers could attend classes

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wearing headscarves. A German schoolteacher of Afghan origin, Fereshta Ludin, insisted on wearing the hijab in school. She was dismissed from her teaching job and subsequently complained that she was being discriminated against on the grounds of her religious beliefs. When her case 15 was brought before Bundesverfassungsgericht (the constitutional court of Germany), the court ruled that "Germany's constitutional law did not explicitly forbid the wearing of headscarves in the classroom in state-run schools" (Deutsche Welle 2003). However, the court expressed a fear that the headscarf as a religious symbol would, in and of itself, threaten the school's educational mission: 16 If teachers introduce religious or ideological references at school, this may adversely affect the state's duty to provide education which is to be carried out in neutrality .... It at least opens up the possibility of influence on the pupils and of conflicts with parents that may lead to a disturbance of the peace of the school and may endanger the carrying out of the school's duty to provide education. The dress of teachers that is religiously motivated and that is to be interpreted as the profession of a religious conviction may also have these effects. . . . If a teacher wore a headscarf in lessons, this could lead to religious influence on the students and to conflicts within the class in question, even if the complainant had credibly denied any intention of recruitment or proselytising. The only decisive factor was the effect created in students by the sight of the headscarf. The headscarf motivated by Islam was a plainly visible religious symbol that the onlooker could not escape. (Fournier and Yurdakul2006) 17

Presented as a "potential situation of danger" 18 in the classroom, the court regarded the headscarf as an expression of Islamic fundamentalism: "In the most recent times, it is seen increasingly as a political symbol of Islamic fundamentalism that expresses the It was generally believed that Ludin was supported by the lawyers of the Milli Gorii~, but this has not been publicly confirmed. 16 The following was written exclusively by Pascale Fournier in our coauthored article; see Fournier and Yurdakul (2006). 17 Bundesverfassungsgericht (2003), Supra, Note 24, Par. 1 (6). 18 Bundesverfassungsgericht (2003), Supra, Note 24, Par. 3 (1). 15

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separation from values of western society" 19 (Fournier and Yurdakul2006). But the court left it to individual Lander to enact a ban: However, the Land legislature responsible is at liberty to create the statutory basis that until now has been lacking, for example by newly laying down the permissible degree of religious references in schools within the limits of the constitutional requirements. In doing this, the legislature must take into reasonable account the freedom of faith of the teachers and of the pupils affected, the parents' right of education and the State's duty of ideological and religious neutralitY. 20

Most German Lander favoured the ban, particuJarly states governed by the conservative CDU/CSU party, such as BadenWurttemberg who noted that the German "constitution is based on the Christian-occidental tradition and they would begin to draw up legislation to ban headscarves in the classroom as soon as possible" (Deutsche Welle 2003). In these terms, nuns who come from the aforementioned Christian tradition may wear their headscarves while teaching, while Muslim women are not, because their Oriental religious attire is incompatible with the "cultural homogeneity" of the majority society (Schieck 2004: 3). The Stuttgart school authority (the school where Ludin worked) claimed the problem was that "the headscarf symboliz[ed] a desire for cultural disintegration that was irreconcilable with the state's obligation to neutrality" (Schieck 2004: 2). Referring to the Court's statements on religious neutrality, the school authority Revision Board (Oberschulamt Stuttgart) carried the topic further-to the conflicting religious beliefs of parents and teachers. They argued that students would be influenced by the headscarf of the teacher as a religious statement. When the debate began to include issues of state neutrality, the "common good" of the society, religious freedom, and gender inequality, Ludin gave up hope. She moved to Berlin and took a job at the Jslamische Gesamtschule, a private 19Bundesverfassungsgericht

(2003), Supra, Note 24, Par. 2 (Sa). 20Bundesverfassungsgericht (2003), Supra, Note 24, Par. 72.

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school where she could teach wearing her headscarf (Die Tageszeitung 2004: 5). Meanwhile, immigrant organizations began jostling for position in the public sphere in a bid to promote and defend their views. I will weave together each immigrant association's position on the headscarf debate in the coming chapters, specifically in Chapter Six on .religious organizations. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the history of Turkish immigrants and their associations in Berlin is that immigrant associations are not homogeneous. Nor are they passive entities forming in a social vacuum. In the literature that deals with multiculturalism, immigrant groups are typically constructed in terms of homogeneity and fixed boundaries, and the interests of specific immigrant elites. are represented as the interests of the whole group (Bloemraad et al. 2008). As Yuval-Davis also suggests, in many studies of immigrant groups, the power positions and in-group conflicts are not addressed (1997a and b). In fact, these diversities within immigrant groups develop and intensify during interaction with political organisations. This is the case with these associations' responses to key immigration debates in German and Turkish history. Turkish immigrants have formed active and heterogeneous associations which are different in background, strategy, and goals. These associations participate in politics and negotiate their positions differently. Each is shaped by the relations between two states, the geographic area, and the historical period in which it has emerged. In the following chapters, I explore this diversity in a comparative perspective.

CHAPTER FOUR WORKERS' ASSOCIATIONS AND THE DECLINE OF W ORI<ERS' RIGHTS DISCOURSE

In essence, Turkish immigration to Germany is labour immigration, and immigrant mobilization has been part of the German workers' movement since the 1970s. In this chapter, I focus on the politicaJ representation of Turkish immigrants through trade unions. I ask how the participation of migrant workers in union activity facilitated their incorporation into German society in the early years of guest worker migration. I consider union support of immigrant associations, such as the DIDF (Demokratik l§fi Dernekleri Federasyonu-Federation of Democratic Workers' Associations). Immigrant associations like the DIDF which focus on workers' rights discourse receive political support from German unions: the DIDF has formal and informal ties to such unions as Ver.di and IGMetall. It is interesting to note that the union-related political discourse of migrants has changed from being centred on workers' rights to expressing concerns for citizens' rights; I examine this shift in discourse which developed among Turkish migrant workers in Germany in the 1990s, asking how the specific case of the DIDF helps us understand it. I begin with an historical overview of the DIDF's associational features in the social context of Turkey during the late 1970s and 1980s and discuss the rise of Kurdish nationalism in the mid-1990s, which led to the weakening of leftist immigrant and refugee associations' power in Germany. 1 After this historical overview, I

1

The following associations were established: KOMKAR-Yekit'fye Komelen Kurdistan (Union of Associations from Kurdistan) in 1979; AABF-Foderation der Alewitischen Vereine in Deutschland (Federation

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explore the refugee incorporation process in Germany, within which the refugees' transnational ties weakened, as the idea of miteinander (with each other) as an integration policy, gained importance in associational campaigns. I analyze how the discourse of immigrant political participation has shifted from "guest worker rights" to "citizenship rights" and how their mobilization, in unions, has been transformed into civil society initiatives. I conclude that as an immigrant association attempting to integrate into German society by means of German unions, the DIDF has been largely ineffective. It has not provided legitimate immigrant political representation, partly because of the strengthening neoliberal discourse globally, and partly because of the marginalization of class struggle as a political discourse. As a result, Turkish immigrants are seeking out new civil society associations, specifically minority-focused ones, for their political representation.

An Overview of the DIDF The DIDF is founded on the idea that Turkish migrant workers constitute an important part of a segmented German labour market. They believe that racism, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and gender inequality are power relations intrinsic to market relations. They argue that migrant workers should join the German working class and organize a revolutionary front in order to overthrow capitalism. Throughout its history, the DIDF has struggled to incorporate Turkish migrant workers into the German working-class movement through its relations with German unions. It has had to deal with class fractions (the splitting of the Kurdish movement from Turkish associations), the rise of neoliberal policies and subsequent weakening of unions, and the shift in immigrant political discourse from workers' rights to citizens' rights. In a final analysis, the case of the DIDF illustrates the transformation of immigrant mobilization from worker associations to minorityfocused civil society initiatives.

of Alevite Associations in Germany) in 1988; PKK-Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (Workers' Party ofKurdistan) in 1974.

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49

The DIDF was established by the TDKP (Tilrkiye Devrimci Komilnist Partisi-Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party) members who escaped from Turkey after the military coup in 1980 and sought refuge in Germany. It is a federal-level immigrant workers' organization, and has branches in many German cities, specifically Berlin, Stuttgart, Cologne, Bielefeld, and Hanau. There are DIDF centers in France and Switzerland. The DIDF in Germany is actively engaged in German unions. At the time of its foundation in Germany, the DIDF included 13 immigrant associations and 17 independent associational committees (dernek kurma komitesi). It now has a non-hierarchical and egalitarian organizational structure, and members voluntarily take over tasks. It has youth and women's sub-associations, as well as cultural centres. 2· There are democratic elections to choose the chair and administrative members every two years. The DIDF also supports publication of the daily newspaper Evrensel in Turkish and the periodical Tats ache in German. 3 In its mandate, the DIDF is a left-wing immigrant association that aims to incorporate Turkish and Kurdish immigrant workers and their families into German society by promoting the idea of miteinander, or the unification of the Turkish, Kurdish, and German working classes. As an emblem of this ideology, the DIDF flag is designed as a Turkish/Kurdish male worker with black hair (and in some emblems with a moustache) shaking hands with a blonde German worker. The sentence on the flag reads: "Wir sind gemeinsam stark." The ethno-national character of the DIDF is defined as Tilrkiyeli, which means "from Turkey" instead of Turk (Turkish). The reason for using this inclusive term is to avoid an ethnic association with Turkishness and, therefore, to represent other ethnicities, such as Kurds from Turkey. Kurdishness is usually self-defined, and in For the DIDF-Berlin, this cultural centre is Omayra. Its members organize theatre, football tournaments, poetry readings, women's day celebrations, and similar events, to contribute to the social and cultural development of immigrant workers. 3 Evrensel is a daily newspaper <www.evrensel.de>; Tatsache has infrequently published only a few issues. 2

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some cases can be recognized by place of birth (eastern Turkey, such as Tunceli!Dersim, Diyarbakrr) or by name (names specific to the Kurdish language include .Rojda, Zozan, Baran), but there are no official statistics about the number of Kurds in Germany or in Turkey. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the percentage of Kurds within the leftist movement or even in the DIDF. Because of this uncertainty, it is also impossible to know whether Turks and Kurds are found in similar or different segments of the labour market. All DIDF members meet on certain occasions, such as Bundesdelegierten Konferenz (the federal delegates' conference) or enternasyonel gece (international entertainment night). Members are expected to pay minimal fees, five to 10 Euro every month. DIDF members are industrial workers, teachers, students, and unemployed people. The younger DIDF members, who are in their early 20s, are usually involved in cultural events, whereas older members take over administrative positions. Although these positions are generally held by male members, the DIDF supports women who would like to be active in administration. How did Leftist Turkish Migrant Associations Lose Their Strength? Traditionally, Kurdish groups were the major strength of urbanbased leftist associations in rural parts of Turkey, and they maintained this stance in Germany. In fact, many of the leftist associations in Turkey merged with Kurdish groups when the Turkish Left went underground after 1972.4 Even though there is no statistical evidence about the ethnic character of the Turkish leftist associations, it is certain that they depended on Kurdish support. Hiiseyin Avgan puts it in the following words:

This movement underground occurred when Deniz Gezmis, one of the leaders of the Turkish leftist tradition, and a founder of the THKO (Turkiye Halk Kurtulu~ Ordusu-Turkey People's Liberation Army), was executed by the Turkish government on May 6, 1972 (c;ubuk~u 1996). 4

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The ties of Turkiyeli and Kurdish workers to Turkey were much stronger in the 1980s. Naturally, the workers [in Germany] were concerned with the workers' [in Turkey] struggle for democracy in Turkey, their fight for work and bread, and generally to earn a living. In this sense, one of our aims was to support the campaigns for the struggle against anti-democractic practices in Turkey and to organise campaigns to find other supporters in the European public sphere. (Avgan 2003)

The DIDF lost many members with the rise of Kurdish nationalism in eastern Turkey from the mid-1980s to the 1990s. But Kurds, who sought a free Kurdistan in eastern Turkey, actually started to establish their own associations as early as 1974. 5 These include PSK Partiya Sosyalist a Kurdistan (Kurdistan Socialist Party-established in 1974), 6 which aimed at political negotiation and the PKK Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers' Party,

Leader of PSK (Kurdistan Socialist Party), Kemal Burkay, says the Turkish Workers' Party was not attentive to Kurdish issues in the 1970s: "PSK Kuzey Ktirdistan'da, Ktirtler tarafmdan olu~turulan ilk sosyalist partidir. Daha onceki donemde biz Kurt sosyalistleri legal Ttirkiye i~9i Partisi i9inde yah~1yorduk. TiP, bir sosyalist parti olarak KUrt sorununda da, diger partilerden farkh, demokratik ve olumlu bir yakla~1ma sahipti. 1970 yllmda yapllan 4. Btiytik Kongresinde KUrt sorunuyla ilgili olduk9a ileri, olumlu bir karar aldt; ama daha sonra yoneticiler mahkemeler kar~1smda bu karan geregi gibi savunmadtlar. TiP daha sonra da KUrt sorunu konusunda geri ad1m ath. Bu nedenle yollanm1z aynld1" (Burkay 2004). English: "PSK is the first socialist party that is established by the Kurds in Northern Kurdistan. In the previous phase, we, the Kurdish socialists, were working in the legal Turkish Workers' Party (TIP). The TIP, as a socialist party, was different from other parties, in the sense that it had a positive approach to the Kurdish issue. It had a positive and progressive decision about the Kurdish issue in its 4th Grand Congress in 1970; however the executives did not defend this decision in the courts. Then the TIP withdrew [its decision] about the Kurdish issue. Because of this, our ways separated." 6 KOMKAR is an extension of the PSK in Europe, specifically in Germany. 5

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established in 1974),7 which culminated in its armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984. 8 In this latter period, many supporters of Turkish leftist associations, both in Turkey and in Germany, left to join Kurdish nationalist groups and associations, seeking an independent Kurdish state in eastern Turkey, and including those parts of Kurdistan found in Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Syria. 9 As noted, the rise of the PKK and the subsequent Kurdish nationalist movement marked the decline of Turkish leftist organizations in Germany in the mid-1990s. Lyon and Dearer (200 1) estimate that 500,000 PKK members arrived in Germany in 1984, that is after the Turkish state declared the PKK a "terrorist organization." Not surprisingly, perhaps, given its goals, the PKK continued its armed struggle in Turkey, targeting Turks and Turkish stores in Germany with attacks and fire bombings (Lyon and Dearer 200 1). Thus, in 1993, it was listed as a terrorist organization in the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Office of the Protection of German Constitution, in other words, the German Secret Service) (Lyon and Dearer 2001). To some extent, the activities of this organization ended with the imprisonment of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, tn 1999. 10 7 In

1974, Abdullah Ocalan helped create the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, to seek Kurdish independence; see Be~ik~i (1991); Mumcu (1994); Yavuz (1998). 8 During the insurrection, an estimated three million Kurds were forced from their homes, including many cleared from the 3,000 remote villages destroyed by troops to prevent villagers from supporting Kurdish forces. 9 It is estimated that eastern Turkey has the largest Kurdish population in the world, at 20 million. In the Sevres Treaty signed with European countries, Turkey was to guarantee the rights of its minorities; it also proposes autonomy for Kurdistan. The treaty was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne, which does not mention Kurds in Turkey. The idea of "minority" for the Republic of Turkey involves non-Muslims; therefore, according to the Republic's official ideology, Kurds are not a minority group. 10 The Kurds in Europe renamed the group KONGRA-GEL in late 2003, and sought to develop a new political concept: they campaigned for peace, even as they carried out attacks and refused disarmament.

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After the loss of Kurdish groups, the Turkish leftist associations in Germany lost a great deal of their strength. Ultimately, only a few leftist groups survived; one example is Dev-Yol. Although the DIDF also lost many of its Kurdish supporters to Kurdish associations, it too survived. Arguably, as can be ~een in the following section, it owes its survival to an ability to change its focus from homeland politics in Turkey to immigration politics in Germany. The Weakening of Transnational Ties During the 1980s, DIDF campaigns in Germany mostly protested against anti-democratic practices in Turkey. DIDF Chair, Huseyin Avgan, recalls that in Germany they organized protests of the execution of TDKP metnber Erdal Eren in Turkey. In addition, a subcommittee of the DIDF, called the Freedom for Turkey Committee, organized a march to protest human rights violations; it took place between Dusseldorf and Strasbourg and ended with a meeting in front of the European Parliament. But Avgan admits that the DIDF's ties to the Left movement in Turkey have gradually weakened. A major reason for this is the DIDF attempt to incorporate Turkish workers into German politics and society, and its concomitant attempt to develop a miteinander ideology. Over time, the asylum-seekers of the 1980s established families and friendship circles in Germany. Not surprisingly, their immediate concerns became the political struggle of Turkish immigrant workers in Germany, rather than the struggle of Turks in Turkey. Nor did they have an established associational counterpart in Turkey: the leftist struggle for democracy had weakened in Turkey with the systematic destruction of leftist organizations by the Turkish state. Consequently, the DIDF was more interested in organizing a common struggle with German unions, than in campaigning against antidemocratic regulations in Turkey. Huseyin Avgan explains: Our campaigns that are directed to Turkey are minimal today .... Many of these people say "it is not possible for me to go back to Turkey anymore." But his/her ties to Turkey prevent him/her to

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Chapter Four establish a life here. We are trying to accelerate this period [of integration] as a federation. This is our [aim]. When s/he has the idea of return in his/her mind, s/he does not try to find solutions to her/his problems here. (Avgan 2003)

In recent years, the DIDF has organized campaigns directed towards immigrant workers' lives in Germany. Among these campaigns, I have attended the following: the March against War (during the occupation of Iraq by the US on 15 February 2003), May Day Celebrations (2003), International Women's Day (2003), a Conference on Immigrant Integration (31 January-2 February 2003), a Conference on miteinander Ieben ("Living with Each Other," 21 October 2001), and a Conference on Immigrant Integration, with a specific emphasis on education and employment (14 December 2002). All were oriented towards immigrant workers' lives and problems in Germany. In one campaign, the March against the War, the purpose was to activate a peace movement against the possible occupation of Iraq by American forces. In all these events, Turkey and Turkish politics have not been an issue. In fact, at the May Day March, the members of the DIDF marched together with the German unions and carried banners with statements that spoke out against the social reforms of the German government. Although the DIDF's primary goal is the integration of Turkish immigrant workers into German society, this does not mean that the members of the DIDF are concerned about German politics to the exclusion of Turkish issues. In fact, many members have families and friends in Turkey, and many, except of course, the asylumseekers, go back to Turkey to visit them. It was apparent that DIDF members were interested in Turkish politics when many of them gathered in the common room of the Omayra (the cultural association of the DIDF) one Sunday evening, in front of a television connected to the Turkish channels through sat~llite dish, in order to watch the Turkish national elections (3 November 2002). Even the asylum-seekers, who cannot go back to Turkey, are

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concerned about Turkish politics, and want their party, the EMEP (Emegin Partisi-Labour Party), to gather more votes. I I Relations with German Unions

Since Turkish immigration to Germany is primarily labour immigration, it has a history of unionization. The first institutions in which immigrants participated politically were German worker unions; this occurred as early as the 1970s. In fact, 34 per cent of Turkish workers were members of German unions in 1974; this had increased to 48 per cent in 1985 (Demokratik i~yi Demekleri Federasyonu 2002). In 2004, the Chair of IGMetall Jiirgen Peters announced that there were approximately 120,000 Turkish members in this union. This number is slightly less than the 2002 figures, when IGMetall had 127,000 Turkish members (Table 4.1). The Foreigners' Commission of this union is composed of 15 immigrant workers, nine of whom are Turks (AB 2003). In an April 2005 interview with me, Safter <;mar, Foreigners' Commissioner in the DGB, noted that the trade unions in Germany no longer provide statistics according to the ethno-national background of the workers. The latest figures regarding the participation of Turkish workers in trade unions date back to 2001; the recent figures mentioned earlier are merely estimates. As members of German unions, Turkish immigrant workers have participated in campaigns against privatization, unemployment, underpaid work, the freezing of workers' salaries, and hours worked per week. The most important campaigns have been the strikes supporting a 35-hour work week in 1985 and opposition to the can~ellation of the 116th Regulation of the Workers' Agreement, in a govetnment bid to limit workers' social rights. In 2004, the DIDF protested Agenda 2010, specifically, the social reforms of the Schroder government which will bring about drastic changes in workers' social rights. Although the EMEP established a coalition with the Kurdish-oriented HADEP (Hal/an Demokrasi Partisi-Democratic People's Party) and the SDP (Socialist Democracy Party), it did not receive enough votes to enter Parliament in 2002. 11

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Figure 4.1. Turkish Workers in German Unions (DGB)

I

IGBau (Co11struction) -.-.·r

10,302

r--IGBCE: . 1.---3-5-,8-28-.- - - :,-·-·--··-··---····-------··--·-·········---·------·---······1·-·····-············-·--·--·-·-·-·-····-····-······----: :. . GEW (Education) . . . . (estimated) 2,40~ ... ·r----··--·---··--··--·--···-·-··-----·---·-------·-·-··--· r·····-····-···-··--...----·-·--·-··---,

·

IGMetall (Metal Industry)

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127,008

f----Noa---.------.-..... -·-r-··-"},"34~- . r-···················--·~········~-·-···········"···-····-

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(estimated)112,500 •

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--·--- . . . ..-_,.. ,.,. .-,. -. . ,...,.,...,...,...,...,...,_,,...,....,.=,..." .::.···... · · · ...• . 8~~,(?7? >:<;'.:!!::i: .-,...,----~--",-·

<.

Source: Migration Online, 01 January 2002.

On almost all occasions, German union leaders have been invited to give talks and engage in discussions in events organized by the DIDF. They are usually from the Foreigners' Commissions of the DGB, IGMetall, Ver.di, or GEW. They generally do not stay for discussions or even until the end of the conferences, usually leaving after the major talks. At the DIDF conference on .14 December 2002, there were only four Germans among the 200 people in the IGMetall conference hall, three of whom had been invited to give talks. Apparently, Germans attend DIDF events to show solidarity but are not actively engaged in their events. It is also noteworthy that only the German union leaders attend these events, not the German workers. Nevertheless, DIDF members are looking for ways to interest more German workers in their activities. Certainly, at their member meetings, they discuss the question of "how to attract more Germans to our events" (Omayra 2003). Although DIDF members want to reach German workers, their strategies have not been very effective. During the member meeting of 26 January 2003, it was decided that the members would distribute informative leaflets and posters in a bid to attract more people to the DIDF events. But the

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places where the leaflets and posters were to be distributed included Kreuzberg, N eukolln, and Wedding, and in front of mosques, Turkish grocery markets, and workplaces where Turkish immigrants congregate. None of these places is likely to attract many Germans. Although the DIDF is an immigrant association that actively campaigns for the unification of Turkish and German working classes, and while it works together with German unions, it has failed to politically incorporate Turkish immigrant workers and refugees into German society. I propose two main reasons for this failure. First, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there were serious disputes between German unions and immigrant workers. Turkish migrant workers belong to a so-called secondary labour market and have been kept away from better working conditions, not to mention bargaining power. In a period of mass unemployment in Berlin, German workers and union members do not give priority to immigrant workers' problems, specifically those with lower seniority, or who are either semiskilled or unskilled. Notably, when workers from the former East Germany began to look for work, Turkish migrants were the first to be dismissed; they were employed in jobs that required a lower skill level and, therefore, could easily be replaced. Although there is no empirical evidence that the Turkish workers were dismissed from their jobs because of their ethnicity, this is what most Turkish immigrants believe. And it seems likely that they are oppressed by both the owners of production and the German unions, who did not support the workers with lower seniority during this period of downsizing. In this context, the DIDF idea of miteinander or "the unification of the Turkish and German working classes" has proved ineffective; many German workers have distanced themselves from the problems of migrant workers who are being dismissed from their jobs. Second, with the changing modes of production in Europe, specifically in Berlin/ 2 the discourse of immigrant political Before the Wall fell, Berlin's industry was subsidized by the German state. Afterwards, the government stopped subsidizing Berlin's industry, resulting in mass job dismissals and bankruptcy in many Berlin plants. 12

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participation has shifted from "guest worker rights" to "citizens' rights." As a result, many immigrant workers previously active in German unions have started to tum to other civil society initiatives for political representation. I look more closely at this shift in the following section.

The Shift from Workers' Rights to Citizens' Rights: The DIDF versus the TBB The shift from workers' rights discourse to citizenship discourse is a very important and, in fact, a global phenomenon. With the rise of neoliberal policies and the weakening of unions, immigrants have shifted from political participation through unions to participation through ethnic associations. At the same time, the notion of ethnicity, rather than class, has become a fundamental organizing principle in the Left and in intellectual circles. Finally, government foundations that sponsor civil society associations are exerting pressure to make class struggle and the notion of class marginal within these associations. My key question is why Turkish immigrants have shifted their political participation from organizing within German unions to organizing within minority-focused civil society initiatives. Why are formerly active union members now involved in minority politics? I examine these questions through the comments of two Turkish immigrant union leaders, DG and AB. 13 What is especially noteworthy is their essential difference of opinion. One blames the shift on the unions; the other finds that immigrant workers themselves should be held accountable. Weakening Unions

In 1981, DG was the workers' union representative (Betriebsrat) at Mercedes Benz, which at that time, employed approximately 3,500 workers. He states that Turkish immigrant workers were always on the front lines during union campaigns and strikes. The first workers laid off were low-skilled immigr-ant workers, some of whom volunteered to leave their jobs for compensation. 13 Names have been anonymized for confidentiality reasons.

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Furthermore, he says that this active participation in unions resulted in the fact that Turkish workers are now "unwanted" by the employers: For example Siemens Haushaltsgeriite Werft employed more than 2000 people. In previous times [before the Wall] a majority of the workers were Turks. Many of the Betriebsrat were Turks. Now the same workplace employs only 150 Turkish workers. The others are Germans and Poles. [Being active in the unions] played against Turks. Now [the employers] try to hire Poles, they are quiet and do not engage in struggles ... also [they hired] Vietnamese for a while. (DG 2003)

According to DG, not only the German employers, but also the German labour unions had a problematic relationship with Turkish immigrant workers. While labour unions sought out immigrant workers to increase their number of supporters, they did not give priority to workers' problems that stemmed from an immigrant background: hnmigrant workers have specific problems. For example, foreigners' law is not important for a German. Residence permit, work permit. ... They don't have problems like that. Or simply, racism and discrimination at the workplace are not their primary concerns. Now IGMetall is abolishing its foreigners' commission, because it costs them a lot of money. They have to organise a meeting in every four years, this costs them five million marks, approximately 500 delegates join these conferences from all over. (DG 2003)

DG' s criticism of German unions is not shared by AB, Chair of IGMetall Foreigners' Commission. While DG would argue that IGMetall is cutting back its budget on foreigners' conferences and commissions because it is not concerned with immigrant issues, AB says that IGMetall, the largest German union, is abolishing the foreigners' commission because Turkish immigrants do not sufficiently participate in the unions. IGMetall union executives do not see any legitimate reason for the presence of this commission. AB argues that immigrant workers who were active in the 1970s and 1980s had lost their fervour by the end of the 1990s:

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Chapter Four The number of immigrant union members is 10 per cent. For the workers' representatives of immigrant background, this number decreases to 6-7 per cent. The Betriebsrat leaders are 1-2 per cent. In the union commission, as you go to the upper levels of decision making, the number of immigrant workers' participation decreases. It has reasons, of course. For example in the delegate meetings that happens three or four times every year, our nUiilber [immigrants' participation] is 2. 7 per cent. But when immigrants become candidates for delegation, they are always elected. 14 This means that we [immigrant workers] do not sacrifice time and effort to participate in the union activities. (AB 2003)

Certainly, the relationship between immigrant workers and labour unions has lost its intensity in the last two decades. The immigrant workers, specifically the immigrant union leaders, became convinced that they would not be able to reach their goals (such as equal rights in employment) by joining labour unions. In order to receive equal rights in Germany, the primary demand of the Turkish immigrants today is German citizenship. Specifically, after 1989, the immigrant organizations shifted gears from labour unionization to xenophobia. The massacres in Molin (23 November 1992) and Solingen (29 May 1993) further influenced the policies of immigrant organizations. Today, immigrant organizations, especially ethno-national or antiracist ones, direct their policies to political and social equality in all areas. They aim for dual citizenship and full citizenship rights for Turks in Germany. DG emphasizes that the political participation of Turks in German unions is limited because immigrants do not trust the unions. He says that although unions were the first state institutions to speak out in favor of immigrant claims, in recent years they have been hypocritical in their politics toward immigrant workers. He points to the fact that the unemployment level among Turkish workers is higher than that of Germans. In fact, the general unemployment rate in Germany was 11.7 per cent in March 2006. In Berlin, where there is a significant number of immigrants, this rate climbed to 19 per cent. The unemployment rate among Turks is This is AB's observation, but it is difficult to find statistics to prove whether this is actually the case. 14

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steadily increasing, going from 24.5 per cent in 2004 to 32.1 per cent in 2005. DG blames the unions for not supporting immigrant workers while they were being subjected to mass job dismissals after the fall of the Wall, and believes that the German unions are not sincere in their politics toward immigrants. He describes the process of mass job dismissals in some detail: Why did the majority of Turkish workers leave their jobs? The workplace workers' representative is the major opposition, major power against the employers to fire their workers. If the workers' representative cannot prevent job dismissals, then s/he fails to do his/her job. 8/he has to negotiate with the employer which worker will be dismissed and how much compensation that worker is going to get. This is called Sozialplan, which is a burden for the employers and for ·the workers' representatives. Because s/he has to decide which workers are going to leave their jobs. [After the fall of the Wall] many employers approached some workers and offered them compensation to leave their jobs. The Betriebsriite were quiet in this process. As Turkish workers were leaving their jobs for money, they found this as a strategy to reduce the number of workers in the workplaces. (DG 2003)

AB claims that while racism and discrimination against immigrant workers is not the union's priority, it remains an important concern for the IGMetall union, and specifically for the DGB, which organizes workshops, conferences, and campaigns against racism and discrimination. Moreover, AB is opposed to DG' s idea that the unions are no longer important for immigrant political participation. He argues that unions are still very important for immigrants to make claims, specifically for the second- and third-generation Turks in Germany, who have better language skills and can engage more fully in union activities. AB also admits, however, that the representation of immigrants in the unions is not sufficient. Specifically, immigrant workers are not fairly represented in decision-making positions. According to him, immigrants generally have not been involved in politics since the mid-1990s; this is reflected in the decreasing number of their representatives within the unions.

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Nevertheless, the number of immigrants involved in the minority-focused associations indicates that immigrants are participating in politics, albeit not in the unions. In fact, DG and AB, as leading immigrants in the German unions, are members of the minority-focused associations, such as Turkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB); Safter <;1nar, who is the Au_slanderberatungsstelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, (DGB Foreigners' Landes Bezirk Berlin-Brandenburg Commissioner), is the spokesperson of the TBB. Thus, it would seem that immigrant associations are taking over some of the unions' roles. Among these, the TBB, a secular and social-democratically oriented immigrant association since 1995, appears to be an alternative for Turkish immigrants who look for political representation. The TBB aims to attract young German Turks and claims to fight against racism in Germany, a claim which supports its "assimilated minority" policy. As the TBB's spokesperson, <;1nar, puts it, "to organize around a common problem," in this case racism in Germany, turns the TBB into a minority organization fighting for the welfare of German society in general. As <;1nar argues, the resulting organisational concept will necessarily shift from that of a worker association to that of a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) that fights social problems, such as racism. It will erase the idea of a separatist Turkish community and introduce the concept of an assimilated Turkish community involved in, and concerned with, Germany's problem of racism. But how did the TBB become an alternative to the other associations? And how did the workers' rights discourse among the Turkish immigrant communities shift to citizenship discourse? In other words, how did ethnicity become a popular basis for organizing? In the following section, I examine these questions by means of a striking example. The Popularity of Ethnicity as a Basis for Organizing In a conference organized by the DIDF (14 December 2002,) Sanem Kleff, a leading female immigrant member of the GEWGewerkschaft fiir Erziehung und Wissenschafl (Union for Education and Science) in Germany, was invited to give a talk about the

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situation of immigrant children in the German secondary school education system. 15 Kleff said that among immigrant children, only one in three can complete the Abitur. 16 Her solution was to mobilize immigrant families. She argued that immigrant families have to put pressure on the German state and demand more opportunities for their children. She pointed out that immigrant families remained silent when the German government recently cut back the budget by 50 per cent for German-language courses for children who speak German as a second language. She concluded by stating that having a good education for their children is basic to immigrants' rights: We need to voice our demands for the government to invest in our children. It is already too late. We can not risk another generation to live in misery on the streets·. Why should my child have to go to the Hauptschule? I also pay taxes in this country; why shouldn't my child have the same access to education [as the German kids]? 17 (Kleff2002)

After Kleff s speech, Hiiseyin Avgan, Chair of the DIDF, was introduced. 18 In contrast to Kleff, Avgan argued that the low education level is not just a problem for immigrant children, but for working-class children generally: Can we solve the education problem by putting emphasis on the Turkish children's situation? This is a problem of millions of students in Germany. The situation of Turkish children is bad, because they are workers' children. The children of German working class are also bad. The working class children who finish high school are 9,5 per cent. The Turkish children who finish high school are 8,5 per cent. If we reduce our struggle to the struggle of 15

Kleff was raised in Germany; claiming that her German is better than her Turkish-language skills, she gave her talk in German, and at times translated some sentences into Turkish. 16 In total, 8,2 per cent of all foreigners completed the Abitur in Germany in 2006 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). 17 From Sanem Kleffs talk at the DIDF conference on 14 De~ember 2002: "Ben de bu Ulkede vergi oduyorum. Benim t;ocugum neden (Alman t;ocuklarzyla) aynz egitimi alamaszn?" 18 A vgan' s talk was in Turkish.

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Turkish parents, we divide the struggle of these people [working class]. 19 (Avgan 2002)

While Kleff emphasized the importance of immigrant citizens' rights, saying, "I also pay taxes in this country," Avgan argued that it is the right of the entire working class to receive a _good education fo~ their children. In fact, Avgan emphasized that Kleff s argument divided the working class; her reduction of the education problem to the case of Turkish children, emphasized ethnic rather than class politics. At this point, Kleff left the conference hall, and there was no opportunity for further discussion. As shown in this example, citizenship rights discourse has become a strong alternative to workers' rights discourse in immigrant communities. Whereas Avgan stresses the importance of workers' rights to fight for better education for immigrant children, Kleff emphasizes the importance of citizenship rights. The former brings the worker into the discourse, while the latter marginalizes the class struggle. On a larger scale, the emphasis on citizenship while making claims to the state points to the salience of ethnicity, now a popular basis for immigrant association. Marginalization of the Class Struggle Ethnic politics has become a major basis for political representation, not only among immigrants in Germany but also among immigrants in Europe and in North America. Ethnic and minority-based associations now receive funding from state institutions, and with the strengthening of minority politics, many immigrants, including some unionists, are increasingly attracted to associations emphasizing minority rights. For their part, associations like the TBB openly welcome unionists, feeling they will benefit from having union representatives as active members, especially at high administrative levels in the organization. Minority associations can receive firsthand information about political decisions within German unions through these immigrant union leaders; by the same token, ethno-national associations can 19 The

exact words in Turkish are "Bunlarm miicadelesini bolmii~ oluruz."

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65

be influential within German unions by using these leaders. As stated in the TBB executive committee report of 2001-2003, this is a conscious strategy; such union leaders are called "multiplicators"- people who connect the minority-focused associations to larger social institutions. The efficacy of the TBB strategy can be assessed by comparing it to the DIDF. While the TBB has connections to the German unions through its "multiplicators," the DIDF fails to attract decision-making union leaders. Nor is the DIDF supported by state institutions and governmental foundations, as is the TBB. In fact, a significant portion of the TBB' s financial support comes from state institutions. My interviewee AB compares the financial situation of the DIDF to the TBB: I have friends in the DIDF, but we [IGMetall and the DIDF] could not work efficiently together.... The TBB's projects are very good. These projects have never been conducted before. We support them. They are all our friends .... The TBB conducts these projects with the financial support from the German state institutions. That is why their projects are doing so well. The DIDF is trying to stand on its own feet. (AB 2003)

Basically speaking, through organizational problems, the DIDF has weakened over time; it has lost its ability to efficiently facilitate immigrant incorporation into the German society. It is being replaced by immigrant associations like the TBB, which can assume a political discourse related to immigrant civil rights rather than merely worker rights. There are three "push" factors for immigrant union leaders to take on executive-level jobs in the TBB and for the concomitant recent surge in TBB 's popularity among Turkish immigrants. First, the German unions .were not supportive of immigrant workers after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the recent cutbacks in the unions have primarily and directly affected the Foreigners' Commissions. Therefore, many immigrant workers and their leaders do not see the German unions as a solid basis for claimsmaking or political participation. Second, with the rise of neoliberalism, a "workers' rights" discourse has been replaced by

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"citizens' rights." The grounds for immigrant political participation have shifted from unions to civil initiative associations. Third, civil initiative associations have begun to be recognized as consultative bodies by German state institutions; this· may prioritize immigrant issues in state institutions, something which cannot be achieved by unions. As a result of these three factors, immigrant union leaders increasingly turn to the TBB (instead of the unions themselves or the DIDF) to make claims. As mod~s of production are transformed, neoliberal policies are strengthened, and the unions become weaker, the class struggle, indeed, the very notion of class, has become marginal to immigrant political representation. The transformation from class-focused organizing to ethnicity-based organizing is particularly salient in the DIDF's loss of sympathizers to the TBB. The shift of unionists from the worker associations to the minority-focused civil society initiatives is a result of strengthening minority politics in Europe. As a consequence, among immigrant communities, a workers' rights discourse has been replaced with a citizenship rights discourse. Realizing this, the DIDF made an informal alliance with the PDS (the Left Party in Germany) in the 2005 elections. DIDF's reasoning was obvious: it would be present in the political arena, promoting citizenship rights in accordance with worker rights. The PDS is the perfect partner because of its socialist background. The PDS has a history of anti-immigrant discourse, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but was aiming to gain immigrant votes with this new partnership. As a result of the alliance, Sevim Dagdelen, born in Duisburg in 197 5 to a guest worker family, became a member of the Nordrhein Westphalian Parliament, and was subsequently elected to the federal parliament. This development shows that the DIDF is attempting to make changes in order to penetrate the German political arena. While the political benefits of the PDS-DIDF alliance are as yet unknown, it is unarguable that the DIDF took an important step in the evolution of immigrant political participation by integrating the discourse of workers' rights into the discourse on citizenship rights.

CHAPTER FIVE ETHNO-NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS DISCOURSE

As the discourse around immigrant representation has shifted from workers' rights to citizens' rights, ethnic-oriented associations such as the Tiirkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg (TBB) and the Cemaat have become increasingly important political actors in the defence of immigrant rights in Germany. Although I touched briefly on this issue in the previous chapter, here I discuss in more detail the emergence of these two associations, as well as their strategies, as they bid to become significant actors in German politics. As outlined in Chapter Three, the neo-liberal policies of the 1990s introduced new debates about immigrants and immigration. Briefly stated, during the late 1990s and into the early years of the new millennium, the class struggle has been marginalized and unions are weakening, while discourses around minority rights and ethnicity are increasingly significant. In this period, the TBB and the Cemaat emerged as two of Berlin's umbrella immigrant organizations (Dachorganisationen) and became strong political actors. As I have mentioned in Chapter One, the unemployment rate for Turkish immigrants in Germany was 31.4 per cent, and 10 per cent for Germans in 2005 (Bundesagentur fiir Arbeit 2007). In an attempt to deal with the interrelated problems of high unemployment and low education among immigrants, federal and state institutions provide funding for specific projects undertaken by immigrant associations. These include job training projects (such as clerical job training), neighbourhood centre projects with recreational and educational facilities (such as Nachhilfe, after-

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school tutoring for students), and consultation offices (help with bureaucratic problems, such as taxes, immigration status, bank and credit problems). Many Turkish associations conduct their associational projects solely with the funding they receive from state institutions; thus, they are regarded primarily as social service providers, rather than political interest groups by the German state authorities. As the two major associations in the Berlin-Brandenburg region, the TBB and the Cemaat are developing projects to address the high unemployment and low educational levels among Turkish immigrants. Each claims to represent the Turkish immigrant community in Berlin. However, they differ in terms of their policies and in terms of the immigrant groups they represent. Comparing them provides a broader picture of the Turkish immigrant population that organized itself around ethno-national associations. For one thing, the associations appeal to two different and distinct political spheres within the Turkish immigrant population, namely social democrats and conservatives. The former praises secularism, women's rights, and the assimilation of Turkish immigrants into German society as a minority; the latter appeals to an immigrant population that favours Turkish-Islamic values and the importance of Turkishness as a national identity in German society. But the most significant differentiation between these two associations is their policy direction. The TBB emphasizes that its policies and campaigns are directed towards Germany, claiming that the politics of the Turkish state do not influence their policies. Consequently, the TBB does not make public statements about Turkey and Turkish politics. The Cemaat, meanwhile, is transnationally oriented, believing that Turkish immigrants in Germany are tied to their homeland and affected by socio-political changes in Turkey.

The TBB and the Cemaat The TBB began as a part of a student movement at the Technical University of Berlin, when engineering and economics students of Turkish background recruited other students to join an association, the BTBTM (Tiirkisches Wissenschafts und Technologie Zentrum

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e. V. Berlin-Turkish Science and Technology Centre Foundation Berlin). This student association fought for equal rights for international students, specifically Turkish students. Initially, this student association had strong social democratic tendencies. It was deeply affected by the rising tensions between left and right wing political parties in Turkey at the end of the 1970s, tensions which resulted in the abolishment of all non-governmental associations after a military coup d'etat in 1980. In fact, the official letterhead of the BTBTM in 1977 bluntly revealed the organization's political position: "Turkish Science and Technology Centre Foundation Berlin, Political tendency: Democratic Left." BTBTM' s 1977 archives show the student association's open solidarity with mso (Jungsozialistlnnen-Y oung Socialists), the youth organization of the SPD; the two attended common events, such as student meetings. But in the late 1970s, BTBTM's major focus was its ties with social democratic Turkish politics, specifically its ties with Biilent Ecevit, the founder of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party). In various venues, such as annual reports or press releases, two main themes emerged: the BTBTM's strong political support for the social democrats in Turkey and its awareness of the problems of Turkish workers in Germany. By 1992, the Turkish students of the BTBTM started to welcome second generation Turks in Germany. That is, the children of guest workers had grown up, began to attend German universities, and joined the Turkish students' political movements. Also in the early 1990s, the executive committee of the BTBTM began discussing the idea of an umbrella organization under which all Turkish immigrant associations might shelter. The resulting organization was first called BETB (Bund der Einwanderer/nnen aus der Tilrkei in Berlin-The Federation of Immigrants from Turkey in Berlin) and became the TBB in 1991 (Milliyet 1991, 1995). There is a close connection between the BTBTM's executive committee in 1988-1989 and the executive committee of the TBB in 2002-2003 (Figure 5.1), showing that the BTBTM was a core part of the formation of the TBB.

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.

Figure 5.1. Relationship between the BTBTM and the TBB BTBTM Position, 1988-891 Name I Position, 2002-2003 President, BTBTM I Cern Gem;tiirk I Project Leader, TBB Vice President, BTBTM I Berrin Hiiner (Alpbek) I Treasurer, TBB Treasurer, BTBTM I Ceyhun Kara I Journalist Secretary, BTBTM I Dilek Demirel (Kolat) I Parliament Member, Berlin Senate, SPD fraction Revisor, BTBTM I Ali~an Gen<; I VP, Tiirkische Gemeinde in

Deutschland Revisor, BTBTM Kenan Kolat Executive Director, TBB Source: TBB archives

The foundation of the Cemaat is not as clearly demarcated. At any rate, in contrast to the activist immigrant university students of the TBB, it was local activists who formed the Cemaat. According to the information I gathered from interviews, neighbours and local entrepreneurs established the Cemaat in a coffeehouse in Kreuzberg in 1983. However, it did not remain a local coffeehouse organization, and between 1983 and 1997, the composition of activists within it changed substantially. As the Cemaat became stronger in the political arena, there was a need for better-educated professionals fluent in the German language who could better express their political claims. When a new executive committee was elected in 1997, the leaders were engineers, lawyers, and teachers. Some local entrepreneurs and religious leaders (imams) also stayed on the executive committee. Although both associations were organised by immigrant elites, we should differentiate between two types of elites. In a Gramscian sense, the founders of the TBB are traditional intellectuals, educated in the best schools in Turkey. The spokesman of the TBB is also the leader of the DGB Foreigner's Commission

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(Auslanderberatungsstelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Landesbezirk Berlin-Brandenburg-Counselling Office of the Federation of Gennan Unions in the Land of Berlin-Brandenburg). Other members occupy high positions in state institutions or private enterprises. They are quite different from immigrants who own an Imbiss (snack or doner kebap buffet) or work shifts in German factories. By way of contrast, the Cemaat is organised by people who are strongly embedded in the Kreuzberg Turkish community. Some of its executive members work as religious leaders in the Turkish Sunnite mosques, or as teachers in local schools, or are local entrepreneurs. In other words, many members of the Cemaat' s executive cmmnittee are "organic intellectuals" who come out of local communities and appeal to a larger group of ordinary Turkish immigrants than the TBB. It could be said that the Cemaat started as a grassroots movement, unlike the top-down elitist formation of the TBB. Another key difference is that the TBB accepts associations and some individuals as members, whereas the Cemaat accepts only associations. The TBB has 19 member associations; the Cemaat has 42. An interesting similarity that perhaps bears further examination is that the TBB, the Cemaat, and their member associations do not have a registry of individual members. In terms of member associations, the TBB appeals to social democratic and secular associations. Cemaat associations have Sunnite religious and Turkish nationalist orientations. Most members come from the DITIB (Diyanet j#eri Turk jslam Birligi-Directorate of Religious Affairs and Turkish Islamic Union) who control most of the Sunnite mosques in Germany. Sunnite religious associations, such as Islam Kultur Merkezleri (Islam Culture Centres) and Columbiadamm Mosque and Cemetery and the nationalist oriented associations, such as Turkische Minderheit e. V. (Turkish Minority Association) and Turkiyemspor (a well-established football team) are members of the Cemaat. Some members, such as the Turkischer Elternverein (Turkish Parents Association) the Bahaddin Solidaritatsverein (Bahaddin Solidarity Association), and the Turk jslam Kultur Dernegi (Turk Islam Culture Association) are active associations with formal offices, services, and registered members. Others

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function less well because of a lack of resources; indeed, some have very limited activities. Figure 5.2. Selected Sub-organizations of the TBB

r_Bahaddin SolidariUitsverein ····--'--····-·--···-·--·---·-·····--·-·-···-·--··--··-·---··-·-····--··--·-------······-····----···-·-------,

•. 1 Bengi TUrkisches Folklore Zentrum (Bengi Turkish Folklore .................... Center) •. . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . ..... . . .. .. .. . .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.fBirikim Kulturzentrum (Birikim Cultural Center)

r r

FC G()ztepe.

Freunde der TUrkisch Deutschen Europa Schule (Friends of Turkish Germ~11 Europe Scho()l) EM-DER (Association-of-R-et_ir_e_d_P_e-op_l_e)··---------.--·---·--

r·I~t~;lnilt~reil~-S~~i~Id~~~~~t;~-(fut;~~i!;~"Cs~~i;w~;~~~)-·-.---

·1-K~l~~rein S~hwarzmeer (C:ultural Center Black Sea)

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•

....... .

... -------.--..

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r·s-q-k~~-sp~;·--···--···----·-··----·····-··-·····-··-··-·-··········-····--·-·····-··········--··---···---

l.~~illllTI~.~er_l(u~ture11(_v()ic_e. ()f~l:lltures)

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. -·---···-----·---------.. . --.. . . . . .-------·-· .. .

•, TUrkischer Elt~mverein (Turkish Paretrts' Association) ·1 Turkischer Frauenverein (Turkish_W __o_m_e_n_'s-A-s-so-c-ia-t--io_n_)-------~ .r··-Tiliki;~h~;--i(~l~~ai-(1'-;~i";h

--···---..·---·---..· -. ·-------·-----··

c~~~~;·c~~-;;il)

______________ . _______ , __________ , I

Turkisches Wissenschaft und Technologie Zentrum (Turkish Science and Technology Center)

Verein Tiirkischer Reiseagenturen Berlin (Turkish Travel Agencies Associ~tion) . . .. ... . Deutsch Turkisches Akademiker Forum (German Turkish Academics . .Forum) . . . . . . . . . . . . ._. . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . .____. . . . . . . . . . _. ._____._. __. . . . . . .__,_. . . . . . . _. . . . . ._. ___. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _......_.___. . . _. . ._.____. . r Bund tiirkischsprachiger Fachkrafte in psychosozialen Bereich und · Gesundheitswesen Source: Turkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg <www.tbb-berlin.de>.

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The current political tendency of the TBB remains social democratic, but members emphasize equality for immigrants, specifically Turkish immigrants. Spokeswoman Eren Dnsal describes their goals and their clientele in the following way: The political aim of the TBB is the thesis that immigrants do not have equal rights [with Germans]. Our aim is to ensure that they have equal rights. And we organize our campaigns according to this aim. [Our campaigns are] not only directed to Turks; they are directed to everyone who is not German. The TBB appeals more to Turks. Turkish people feel sympathetic to us and become our members. But our campaigns and projects are directed to all people who are not European, who are not German. (Onsal 2002)

In a general sense, Eren Dnsal is right about the aims and clientele. However, TBB's,aim is not solely to defend immigrants' rights; rather, it seeks to mobilize politically against all sorts of discrimination against immigrants and foreigners in Germany (Antidiskriminierungsnetzwerk Berlin des Ti.irkischen Bundes in Berlin-Brandenburg 2003). In this sense, the TBB is revising its previous stance when, as the BETB, it attempted to defend Turkish immigrants' rights. In terms of clientele, the TBB appeals to associations with a social democratic tendency, such as the Tiirkischer Elternverein (Turkish Parents' Association). It has 19 member associations (Figure 5.2) and some individual members who are in politically powerful positions, such as Mehmet Ek~i, a politically active teacher and researcher in the Aziz Nesin Europiiische Schule (Aziz Nesin European School), 1 and Mustafa Yeni, Chair of the Foreigners' Commission in one of the most powerful unions in Germany, IGMetall (as described in the preceding chapter). The clientele of the Cemaat are mostly conservative Turkish immigrants with strong ties to Turkish nationalist and TurkishMuslim identity (Figure 5.3), even though the president of the Cemaat denies this: 1 Aziz Nesin

Europiiische Schule introduced bilingual education in Turkish and in German.

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Some people want to see the Cemaat as a religious association, but this is not the case. The Cemaat is labelled as such, because it represents associations such as DITIB and the Islam Cultural Centres. Of course, we are Muslims, our religion is Islam. If one wants then one can pray [namazzm kzlar] or not This is everyone's individual problem. But everyone can be our member, except the extremes. Milli Goru~ cannot be our member. PKK supporters ·cannot be our member. Extreme right and extreme left wing supporters cannot be our members. We are closed to all of them. (Yatkm 2003a)

Yatlan denies that the Cemaat is a Turkish nationalist and religious association, but the links are obvious in his discourse and his personal background? When he describes the philosophy of the Cemaat, he often uses. the following words and phrases: our religion, our language, our flag and our state; people who support these principles can work with us. By saying "our religion," he obviously refers to Islam, and the following words refer to the Turkish language, the Turkish flag, and the Turkish state. According to Yatlan, only those who support the presence and protection of the Turkish state and Islam can be members of the Cemaat. The C.emaat is unique in its unification of different kinds of Turkish nationalist and Islamic associations under its umbrella. For example, it is quite unusual to represent the Diyanet i§leri, the Islamic organisation of the Turkish state, as well as the Siileymancz (also known as Islam Cultural Centres in Germany), an Islamic order forbidden to hold practices in Turkey (Jonker 2004). However, these associations do not want to form separate groups; rather, by working together, they hope to create a stronger lobby vis-a-vis the German state authorities. The Cemaat creates a political concept for all these associations, which would otherwise not be recognised by the German authorities because of their Islamic or extreme Turkish nationalist affiliations. And the

Yatkm was a member of Ataturk ve Turk Gem;lik Te~kilatz (Ataturk and Turkish Youth Organisation) in 1985 and founder of the Aydmlar Birligi (Union of Intellectuals) in 1989. 2

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executive committee of the Cemaat enJoys representing and mobilising a large group of members. Broadly stated, in their policies, the Cemaat emphasizes Turkishness and the Sunnite Islamic religion as the glue holding Turkish immigrants together. The TBB also emphasizes Turkishness, but with a different conceptual understanding. For the Cemaat, Turkishness is a nationality, and Turks should not give up their passports in exchange for a German passport. But for the TBB, Turkishness is an ethnicity, and therefore, Turks should become German citizens. I discuss this difference in the following section. Figure 5.3. Selected Sub-organizations of the Cemaat DITffi- Diyanet I~leri Turk Islam Birligi (Directorate of Religious j\.ffairs T1J~k~sh Islam Uni~n)

Oii!Ici~<;J:tt!r :rv:l~~er.h~i~s_y(!_r~itl (['1J!l9.~h. Mitlm:ity 1\~~()C.i~~i()n) ..

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r. . . . . .

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Tur.k _G:tir.e(KJ.ubii (Tt!r.kish Wrestling Club).

.

.

..

.

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. . . . . . ..

·--····-·--~---·-~·--~-----

![ .. ... . . . .Tii!k. :l(adml~rBirligi {Turk~sh \\fmnen's Union) . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Turk·-~~~itiik·-c·~~ii (f~rki~h i\~i~rt;;~~ M~~q~~y

r--·- Berlin Spor.}3irligi (Berlin Sports Unio;s-----------...·---------

r- Tiirkiyetnspor [_. . r. . . . . .

_------

---·--..---·-----·-·-------~--

So;yal~e;;;~icr~Tri~t=flegi"·c-s~~~-~~~i'~~~~~~ts:·:\~~~~i~ti~~j··--· . -.. . . --·-··-·-···---~---·

.

i3~;ii~-M~ht~r--T~1~1-(i3~~li~ M~ht~~-i3~~d)-·····----

. . . . . .-.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Source: Interviews with Cemaat members.

Approaches to Integration: Social Democrats versus Conservatives As noted, the main difference between the TBB and the Cemaat in terms of their understanding of immigrant incorporation is their approach to Turkish ethno-national identity. The TBB leaders

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frequently state that Turkishness is an ethnicity, and argue that Turkish immigrants in Germany form a minority. Their approach to incorporation, therefore, necessitates that Turks assimilate into German society, making their Turkish ethnicity a private matter (Yurdakul 2002). The Cemaat, however, argues against this idea and is in favour of keeping Turkishness as an ethno-national identity vis-a-vis Germanness. This difference in their policies can be illustrated in a few concrete examples. 3 On 22 November 2002, I attended the 10-year commemoration of the Molin pogrom, one of the most brutal racist events in Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the night of 23 November 1992, Nazi skinheads firebombed a house in Molin. In the fire, three innocent members of a Turkish family were burned to death: a 51-year-old woman, her 10-year-old grandchild, and her 14-year-old nephew. This and similar racist attacks in Solingen, Rostock, and elsewhere, have become symbols for the anti-racist movement that emerged after the fall of the Wall. In 1993, many Turks and anti-racists organised protests to draw attention to racism. Turkish shop owners in Berlin closed down their shops for an hour to protest the increasing racist attacks against immigrants in Germany. The banners which hung in the shop windows demanded safety and equal rights for immigrants in Germany. In 2002, the TBB organised a Berlin commemoration of the Molin pogrom. It started with leaving a bouquet of flowers at the Mahnmal .fii.r die Opfer von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft (Memorial for the Victims of War and Tyranny), a central German national memorial, and continued with speeches at Berlin City Hall. The many invitees included Minister of Health Dr. Heidi Knake-Werner, Lea Rosh, Vorsitzende des Forderkreises zur Errichtung eines Denkmals .fii.r die ermorderten Juden Europas (Chair of the Supporting Committee for the Establishment of a Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe), and Walter Momper, President of the Berlin Senate. Other leaders of the Jewish Community and the Jewish Cultural Association watched from the front rows. When the spokesman of the TBB, Safter c;1nar, began his speech, it became apparent that the presence of leading people from 3

Also see Peck (1998).

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the Jewish community was no coincidence, for <;mar noted the similarities between the Molin tragedy and anti-Semitic events in Germany (Hiirriyet 2001 ). In reminding the audience of the Holocaust, he made it clear that German Turks, as the residents of Germany, were ready to shoulder this part of German history. <;mar referred to former Chancellor Helmut Kohl's argument that the new generation of Germans is not responsible for the anti-Semitic German past, because they were not born at the time: that is through the Gnade der spiiten Geburt (the grace of late birth). Emphasizing that there is neither a grace accorded to late birth, nor a grace of foreign birthplace, ·Turks who want to be residents of Germany must assume full responsibility for German history: As the residents of this land, we must share the responsibility for this past crime. I don't know how to define this share-maybe it doesn't need any definition-we must take on our share of responsibility. And we must be ready to carry this responsibility with us. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to formulate it as the following: There can be no excuse of late birth ... and there can be no excuse of another birthplace. (<;mar 2002)

<;tnar uses the reference to anti-Semitism as a springboard to his expression of TBB policy: if Turkish immigrants want to be seen as an official minority group in the country, they must also assume responsibility for the country's history. In contrast to the TBB 's idea of Turks as a minority ethnic group in Germany that associates itself with German Jews (Yurdakul and Bodemann 2006), the Cemaat fosters the idea of "Turks as a nation," organising "The Turkish March" (Turk Giinii Yiiriiyii§ii 2003) to display "the power of Turks in Germany." This event featured a gathering of Turkish immigrants from different German Lander (states) on a specific date in Berlin. They organised a march from the Alexanderplatz, one ofBerlin's main squares, to the Brandenburg Gate, and carried Turkish, German, and European Union flags. While the German newspapers reported 18,000 Turks in the march (Sey 2003), according to the members of the Cemaat, there were about 100,000 people. As this example indicates, the

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Cemaat 's policy is to oppose assimilation. The President, Taciddin Yatkm states: For Germans, integration is assimilation. They act that way [i.e. they want to assimilate Turks into the German society.] However, the Turkish community, Turkish children will never be assimilated. Never! (Yatkm2003b)

Unlike the Cemaat which states that Turks will never be assimilated into German society, the TBB believes that Turks can maintain a strong minority status in Germany by receiving German citizenship, thereby becoming entitled to social and political rights (Hurriyet 1994; Tiirkiye 1995). The TBB's executive director has made this clear: Let's think that 40 thousand Turks4 have received German citizenship. This means [that they are] potential voters in the elections. Political parties will take notice of this potential. They will be attentive to our problems. (Hurriyet 1994)

In another example, in an integration course for Turkish immigrants, organised by the TBB, the teacher encouraged newlyarrived immigrants to apply for German citizenship for themselves and for their children. Some participants, emotionally tied to their Turkish citizenship, were not willing to give it up for a German passport. They were admonished by the teacher: "Take your Turkish passport, throw it on the floor and step on it. Your heart should be Turkish, not your passport." The TBB, then, urges Turkish immigrants to assimilate into German society, at least in the public sphere. Turkishness should be an issue of ethnicity, not an issue of nationalism. Echoing Rogers Brubaker's argument on assimilation (2001), Safter <";mar has said that future immigrant generations will have life styles which are similar to those of the other local residents. There is no enforcement in assimilation (Turkiye 2001). Kolat and other like-thinking political leaders emphasize that the Turkish migrants should receive German citizenship in order to create a 4 Note

that this interview appeared in the Turkish newspaper in 1994.

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mass of potential voters (Berlin Aktiiel 1998; Berliner Morgenpost 2002a). They can then put political pressure on political parties, forcing them to pay attention to the problems of German citizens of Turkish background. The Cemaat is completely opposed to this strategy of assimilation. Members emphasize the religious and national differences of Turkish immigrants and argue that German state authorities should recognize the Turkish nation and culture in Germany. They strongly support the recognition of their cultural differences as political rights. In the words of the Cemaat's president: "The German state [authorities] sees us as a bridge between Turkey and Germany. They see us as Verbindungspersonen, a connection" (Yatk1n 2003b ).

Political Positions of the TBB and the Cemaat Not surprisingly, the TBB and the Cemaat take different political positions in debates in Germany. Consider, for example, three key debates involving immigrant issues: the effects of the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, the 1999 Citizenship Law, and the he~dscarf debate in the aftermath of September 11. Perhaps surprisingly, the latter debate has emerged as the most contentious. As shown in previous chapters, immigrants faced increasing xenophobia in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. While there are no available archives for the Cemaat in this period, the TBB began anti-racism campaigns to raise awareness of racist events. These campaigns included the protest of the closing down of the Linden Strasse in Berlin to immigrants5 (Milliyet 1992). However, most TBB protests are small-scale and attract attention only when organized with other associations. One such example was the above-mentioned closure of Turkish stores to protest racism in Germany (Milliyet 1993). This newspaper report on this issue is the following: Linden Strasse in Berlin was closed down by some of its residents so that immigrants would not pass from this street. This xenophobic event was protested by the immigrant organizations at that time. The photo in the newspaper report shows immigrant leaders in front of the street during the protest. 5

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Another recent debate centres on the new citizenship law passed in 1999. In this instance, the TBB and the Cemaat collaborated. Briefly stated, the SPD (Social Democratic Party) attempted to reform citizenship rights by introducing the jus soli principle into German citizenship law. One of the strongest reactions to this came from the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union) parties. In January 1999, they organised a campaign against the changes and were supported by such dignitaries as the mayor of Berlin, Eberhardt Diepgen (Hurriyet 1999a). A major slogan of the campaign was "For integration-against dual nationality" (Klopp 2002: 2). The two umbrella immigrant associations, the TBB and the Cemaat, quickly responded with a joint counter-campaign. In a press release, they said that the CDU/CSU campaign should be perceived as a prevention of immigrant integration; they emphasized that a new definition of "German" should rightly include Germans with non-German background (Tiirkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg 1999). Although the reactions of immigrant associations have not been very effective, they still put political resistance on conservative German political parties. However, the TBB and the Cemaat do not always collaborate; in particular, they assume different political positions on the topic of Turkish-Muslim identity in Germany. One .area of difference concerns the explosive headscarf debate which came to the fore in the aftermath of September 11 (Berliner Morgenpost 2003; Migration und Bevolkerung 2003). As I will further elaborate in the coming chapters, German political parties were divided on the issue of banning Muslim women's headscarves from public places: some were in favour of the ban, while others were opposed. Immigrant organizations were similarly divided. Religious immigrant organizations, such as the Cemaat argued that immigrants' religious and cultural differences should be regarded as political rights, and therefore, Muslim women should not be prevented from practicing their religion in the public sphere. In contrast, secular immigrant organizations, such as the TBB, supported the ban of all religious symbols from the public sphere (Abendroth et al. 2004). The TBB issued a press release and informed Germans of the differences between the regular headscarf and the Islamic fundamentalist headscarf and warned the public against the evils of

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the latter. The traditional headscarf has a loose knot under the chin, leaving some hair out, whereas the political headscarf, also known as turban or hijab, is a conservative covering of the head, leaving no hair out, and having a tight wrapping around the neck. The former, they said, is eligible to "cross the border" from immigrant society to the mainstream host society; whereas the latter must be eliminated from the public sphere. The TBB accused religious immigrant organizations of being Islamic fundamentalists, and the supporters of the traditional headscarf for being naive. In a press release, the TBB said: When... the headscarf, veil and burka are "instruments for the oppression of women and when they represent basic political symbols," then this naivete [of Marieluise Beck and her supporters] is incomprehensible especially in a time of stronger ftmdamentalist activities. (Tiirkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg 2003a)

As cultural interpreters of Turkish-Islam, a form unfamiliar to many Germans, the TBB warned the Germans that wearing religious symbols in the public sphere will hinder assimilation, and exacerbate discrimination against immigrants, specifically against Turkish women. Tl;lis is a telling argument, as the aggravation of racism in German society is the last thing that German state authorities want. Moreover, by emphasizing that the Muslim headscarf is a threat to the religious neutrality of the German state, the TBB and similar secular Turkish immigrant associations argue that one of the most important principles of German democracy is under scrutiny by Muslim communities (Schieck 2004; Yeneroglu 2004). In fact, as mentioned above, the major aim of the TBB is to erase all ethno-national and religious differences from the public sphere, so that German Turks can enjoy equal rights as the German citizens. The TBB represents the Turkish immigrant as a "good citizen" who subscribes to the French-Jacobin idea that religion and ethno-national identity are private matters. The Cemaat supports wearing the headscarf; to this end, the organization employs women with headscarves. Even so, executive members have refrained from releasing any information about their political positions. A major reason is that they do not want to

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jeopardize political relations between Turkish and· German state authorities. Because the Cemaat is regarded as a "bridge" between Turkey and Germany, in the Cemaat's President's words, a proheadscarf statement might prove too controversial. As a result, the Cemaat has not made any public statements on the issue. The TBB and the Cemaat, then, have different political positions in key debates on immigrant issues. The TBB is in favour of an assimilated minority status for Turkish immigrants and consider Turkishness as ethnicity; the Cemaat is opposed to this. For the Cemaat, Turkishness is a national identity vis-a-vis the German national identity; therefore they are against the assimilation of Turks into German society. Instead, they favour the recognition of cultural and religious differences as political rights. However, they refrain from making any political statements or legal cases to demand these rights from the German state.

Relations with the German State Authorities and Politics Relation's between German state authorities and the two associations can be compared in three different areas. The frrst is the type of project the association takes on. The TBB receives funding from the German state to develop associational projects directed towards Turkish immigrants; the Cemaat, meanwhile, does not have large scale projects and offers to do such things as to control youth crime in the Turkish neighbourhoods on behalf of the German police. Stemming from this, a second area of difference lies in the Cemaat's "gatekeeper" status vis-a-vis the German police. Finally, each association builds its own brand of intensive relations with German political parties in a bid to lobby for its own campaigns. As mentioned above, German state authorities give funding to immigrant associations to conduct associational projects. Many associations, such as the TBB and the Cemaat, survive solely on the funding they receive from state institutions; thus they are regarded as social service providers, not political interest groups by German state authorities. Although the Cemaat attracts more Turkish immigrants than the TBB, it does not get as much state support as the TBB. The executive director of the TBB states that the TBB

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receives over a million Euros to conduct training and other projects for immigrants. The budget of the Cemaat is by no means comparable: about 27,000 Euros. 6 Despite these differences, the former Ausliinderbeauftragte (Foreigner's Commissioner), and prominent member of the CDU, Barbara John, maintained an equal distance from all Turkish immigrant groups, and was supportive of all of them during her 20year period in office. Although progressive immigrant groups criticized her of being too inclusive, she acquired the informal title of "John Abla" (elder sister John) among Turkish immigrants. Because of its inclusive and non-conflictual policy, therefore, the Ausliinderbeauftragte has played an important role in establishing and maintaining contact with immigrants. Nevertheless, it is important for an immigrant association to be proactive, to actively work within the German political system and to lobby to gain support for community projects. Among the TBB's current projects, the most important include job training for young German Turks, and meeting the needs of the German job market. In these projects, immigrant women train to work in clerical office jobs or more recently, in the area of care for the sick and elderly. For their part, immigrant men train to become construction machine operators (Interkulturelle QualifizierungsmajJnahmen) {Tiirkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg 2003a). While the TBB's projects focus on job training, the Cemaat takes a totally different approach: crime control in Turkish areas. For example, Berlin police pay frequent visits to the Cemaat's main office to receive information about immigrants and crime. During one such visit when I was also present, 12 young policemen were asking questions to Taciddin Yatktn, Cemaat President. Of this interaction, Yatktn commented: When the police officers have a problem with the Turkish kids, you should come to the Tiirkische Gemeinde [the Cemaat]. We will reach their families and try to find a solution to the problem. Because we know their families, we know these kids. We can find them. (Yatkm 2003a) 6

These are 2002-2003 figures.

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In fact, the Cemaat organised a meeting to bring together members of the Berlin police and young Turkish men accused of attacking nine police officers in a street fight. On one side, the young men blamed the police for overreacting to residents of Kreuzberg when they sent 17 police cars and 75 police officers to prevent the fight. On the other side, the police officers complained about the difficulties of being on duty in Kreuzberg, known to be a highcrime area with drug dealing and street fights. As a result of the meeting, the Cemaat advised the Turkish men that they should not be violent and rebellious against the police (Hiirriyet 1999b). The paternalistic attitude of the Cemaat is obviously appreciated by the German authorities. In this particular meeting ( 1 February 2003) Yatlan also assured the police that the mosques affiliated with the Cemaat are "under control". Yatkm said that "the strangers" attending prayers in these mosques are questioned about their political affiliations and are prevented from attending mosque activities if they have Islamic fundamentalist purposes. In this fashion, the Cemaat maintains order against religious terror. Many German political authorities refer to the TBB and the Cemaat as the supporters and guardians of "immigrant integration." In return, these associations maintain close contact with parliament members and political parties. Although the spokespeople of the TBB emphasize their good relations with all political parties, there is an obvious affiliation of the TBB's executive committee with the SPD. The executive director of the TBB was working as the chair of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration (Migration Working Group) within the SPD in 2002-3. 7 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration is a working group that specializes in immigrants' issues to present reports to the party authorities. The treasurer of the TBB was a member of the SPD in the women's commission in the same years, and it is a well known fact that the executive director of the TBB is married to Dilek Kolat, member of the Berlin Senate in the SPD fraction.

Note that the executive director of the TBB subsequently became the Head of the Turkish Community in Germany. 7

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Although many details indicate a close link between the TBB and the SPD, the spokesman of the TBB, Safter <;mar, would deny this. In his view, it is the duty of the TBB to mobilize the German Turks' votes in elections; however, he also says that the TBB should not motivate them to vote for a specific party. He claims that the TBB is a non-governmental association, and therefore, a specific political ideology is not imposed on its members. On the reverse side of the coin, the TBB has limited influence over the SPD' s immigrant politics. The Land level ministry in Berlin, namely Senatsverwaltung fur Soziales und Gesundheit (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health) supports the TBB's social project for its Anlauf und Beratungsstelle (Accessibility and Consultation Office). The federal level ministry Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Services) supports Berufs und Bildungsmotivierung (Job and Job Training Motivation). But although both are SPD ministries, their financial support is related to public interest, rather than a political alliance between the TBB and the SPD. In the words of the TBB treasurer: We are not a political party; we can only show the stick under the coat [scare the political parties covertly]. Look, if you do this and that, then the immigrants will vote for you. That is how it is. In the recent elections we saw how important the immigrants' voting power, especially Turkish immigrant vote power is. This shows that the immigrants vote for the SPD. (Alpbek 2002)

In a similar fashion, the Cemaat has relations with such political parties as the CDU, the SPD, and the FDP (Free Democratic Party). As I went through a list of invitees for a religious dinner (iftar yemegi daveti) in 1998, for example, I found that six members of parliament were invited from the CDU fraction, three from the SPD, and one from the FDP. No member of the Green Party or the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) was invited. Moreover, as noted, until 1997, the President of the Cemaat worked in close contact with the Ausliinderbeauftragte (Foreigners' Officer) Barbara John, a CDU member. The former mayor of Berlin and prominent CDU 1nember, Eberhardt Diepgen, is also an honorary

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member of the Cemaat. Recently, in a talk at the Cemaat, the Vice President of the Berlin Senate and former Chair of the CDU, Christoph Stolzl, pointed to the division between the TBB and the Cemaat over the recruitment of German Turkish voters to the CDU, and emphasized: The over-proportionate votes to the Red-Green Coalition from the Turkish voters block the communality between the CDU and the Turkish society. One can replace "C" with an "R,'' as in Religious. Social democrats perform materialist justice. But our origin is the employment of religion. Despite of all the secularization, we still have an interest in religion. This is the greatest affiliation between Turks and the CDU.

Although the TBB and the Cemaat collaborate on certain events, such as the campaign for dual citizenship or Turkey's membership to the European Union, they represent two different political positions: social democrats and conservatives. This deep political divide among Turkish immigrants in Germany prevents them from forming a strong lobby with German state authorities to negotiate political and legal claims. In the long term, it will be interesting to see which immigrant organisation will win the battle of officially representing Turkish immigrants. Will it be the TBB, which argues for total immersion into the German society, or will it be the Cemaat, which emphasizes the importance of grassroots organisations and the recognition of cultural differences? The answer may well reflect the future direction of immigration policy in Germany. In the aftermath of September 11, both ethnonationally oriented associations have focused more on Muslim identity and Islam in Germany. Although ethnicity remains an important part of their politics, the religious identity of immigrants has emerged as a stronger theme in their campaigns and policies. In the next chapter, I discuss the religious oriented associations, the Diyanet j§leri, a sub-association of the Cemaat and an umbrella organisation in its own right, and the Milli Gorii§, its political counterpart.

CHAPTER SIX RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF MUSLIM INTEGRATION IN GERMANY

Religiously oriented associations have always been popular among Turkish immigrants in Germany, increasingly so, perhaps in the aftermath of September 11, when these associations have redefined Muslim identity. After the terrorist attacks, the Muslim characteristics of the Turkish immigrant community gained popularity as a form of immigrant political mobilization and representation, and many Turkish immigrant associations began to articulate their political demands along religious lines. At the same time, German politicians and the German mass media began to look more closely at Islam in general and at Muslim communities in particular. Gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and religious associations, were targeted for state inspections and appeared in flashy newspaper headlines as "shelters for terrorists" (/slamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goril§ 2004). While many Muslim associations opened their doors to the members of the majority population to demonstrate their "innocence" (Der Tagesspiegel 2004), others were threatened by police raids and journalistic hype and consequently minimized their interactions. 1

1 Burhan

Kesici, the current leader of the Islamische Foderation in Berlin, has had negative experiences with journalists: "We have a very positive interview [with the journalist]. Then we look at the newspaper, he wrote all the negative stereotypes [about us]. We call him: 'Why did you do this?' He says: 'This is the order from the Redaktion.' Then why does he take our time for three hours? He can write whatever he likes" (Kesici 2004).

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In essence, two forms of Muslim communities and two representations of Islam were shaped 2 in the aftermath of September 11 : a state-supported Islam, on the one hand, and Islam as a threat to the state, on the other. In a recent book, Mahmoud Mamdani refers to this split as "good Muslim, bad Muslim": After an unguarded reference to pursuing a "crusade," President Bush moved to distinguish between "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims." From this point of view, "bad Muslims" were clearly responsible for terrorism. At the same time, the president seemed to assure Americans that "good Muslims" were anxious to clear their names and consciences of this horrible crime and would undoubtedly support "us" in a war against "them." But this could not hide the central message of such a discourse: unless proved to be "good," every Muslim was presumed to be "bad." All Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining a war against "bad Muslims." (Mamdani 2004: 15)

At the level of immigrant associations, in this chapter, I explore the "good Muslim, bad Muslim" distinction in two types of Turkish religious immigrant organizations in Germany, with a view to compare their approaches to Muslim integration. The first association is the Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union (Diyanet j§feriTurk Islam Birligi, hereafter Diyanet j§~eri), an association mainly supported by the Turkish state but also partly supported by German state institutions. The second is the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli G6rii§ (hereafter Milli Gorii§), which is not supported by either state, and in fact, is considered a "threat" to both German and Turkish societies (Schiffauer 2004a). I have chosen these two associations to represent the "good Muslim/bad Muslim" distinction at the associational level, because they are considered the two major Turkish religious organizations, each having a distinct ideology and a large nun1ber of members. 3 This distinction existed before September 11 but was sharpened afterwards; see Faist (2006). 3 It is almost impossible to collect accurate numbers, since the registered members of these associations do not reflect all affiliated immigrants (i.e. frequenters of mosques). Many associations distinguish between taban 2

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The Diyanet j#eri controls 800 mosques in Germany alone, and the Milli Gorii~ controls 514 mosques in Europe, most of which are located in Germany. Both have established a social service network over several decades in Germany; both have women's and youth groups, Quran reading courses, and funeral funds; and both try to attract the same Muslim clientele4-second-generation Muslims in Germany (Karaka~oglu 2003). By exploring the historical development and policies of these associations, we can see how Turkish Muslim associations define and enact diverse integration patterns and policies, specifically after September 11. To this end, I first review the historical background of the two associations and their contentious relationship. I compare their political position in key debates in Germany, with an emphasis on post-September· 11 and the headscarf debate which polarized opinion both inside and outside Muslim associations. I analyze the relationships of religious associations with Turkish and German state authorities and political parties, and examine divergences in their understanding of Muslim integration.

Diyanet i~Ieri and Milli Gorii~ Although the Diyanet j~zeri and the Milli Gorii~ share a common goal, that is to provide religious services to Turkish immigrants in Germany, they have different political perspectives. The Diyanet j~zeri was established in Germany in 1983 as a result of the Turkish parliament's decision to set up religious centres for Turkish immigrants in Europe. Contrary to the common belief that the Diyanet j~zeri is a formal representative of the Turkish state institution called Religious Affairs, its members emphasize that they have only an informal agreement (M1d1k 2003). A religious attache is appointed to the association to serve a four-year term, and the imams sent to Germany are funded by the Turkish state. Other activities, such as youth groups, the mosque, or women's groups are funded by associational resources. In sum, the Diyanet j~zeri is (base) and iiye (official member), but distinctions are blurred and sometimes overlap. 4 For more information, see <www.diyanet.org> and <www.igmg.de>.

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careful not to make any statements in its internal or external affairs that would offend the official relations between the Turkish and German states. The Milli Gorii~ was present as an informal network in Europe even in the early 1970s. In Germany, it emerged as a diasporic association of the members of Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), the banned party of Necmettin Erbakan, a former prime minister of Turkey and the spiritual leader of the Milli Gorii~ ideology. Its ideology has been well-represented in the Turkish political arena by a series of religiously-oriented political parties, such as Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, founded in 1970 and banned from politics by the Constitutional Court in 1971 ); Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, founded in 1972 and banned in the 1980 coup); Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, founded in 1983 and banned in 1998); Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, founded in 1997 and banned in 2001); and Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party, founded in 2001 ). During these various bans from political activities and the subsequent re-establishment of the party under different names, Milli Gorii~ was strengthened as a diasporic network of Turkish Muslims in Europe, specifically in Germany. 5 Both the Diyanet j~zeri and the Milli Gorii~ provide religious services to Turkish immigrants in Germany, but they do not collaborate because of the dramatic differences in their political views. In fact, the Diyanet members do not think very highly of the Milli Gorii~: We supported the establishment of the DITIB (Diyanet j§[eri). We didn't support the Milli Gorii§, because we don't support their views. They have political views. Religion must be separated from politics. This is why we established the DITIB (Diyanet j§[eri). (Giilvek 2003)

In tum, the Milli Gorii~ criticizes the Diyanet j§[eri:

Milli Gorii§ appears as a diasporic network in many European countries and in North America. The networks in Germany, the Netherlands, and France are the best known. 5

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The Diyanet is established in 83. After the Kenan Evren's6 coup d'etat, it is established against the rising Islamic trends in Europe .... Unlike the Diyanet, we are not staying quiet when there are changes in the society. We express our opinion for every matter. Our opinions are crystal clear. Our aim is not to provocate people, but we take a firm position. Other associations do not do that. And therefore, Milli Gorii§ causes allergy in the conservative milieu. They say "ha, they have a certain discourse." (Yeneroglu 2004a)

Even the women's groups have different tendencies. Although women have never been at the forefront of the Milli Goril§ movement, in the headscarf debate, Milli Goril§ actively defended women's right to wear a headscarf in public places. The Diyanet or its women's groups, meanwhile, did not make any public statements concerning the debate (Die Zeit 2004). The activities of the Diyanet women's groups are limited to Quran reciting courses, German language courses, and sewing and literacy courses. Interestingly, Koran reciting courses are funded by Turkish state authorities, whereas German language courses are paid for by the German state. The differences between the Diyanet j§/eri and the Milli Goril§ are not restricted to political ideology. Here, Milli Goril§ has a big disadvantage: it is listed in the Bundesverfassungsschutz (the intelligence agency of Germany) as a "threat" to German democracy. It is considered part of a political Islam which prevents immigrants from achieving full integration into German soCiety (Schiffauer 2004a). The Bundesverfassungsschutz also states that Milli Goril§ pursues anti-integrative efforts; specifically through its instance on Islamic education of children. As proof, it cites statements appearing in Milli Goril§ publications, noting the antiGerman and anti-Semitic statements in the Milli Gazete. 7 The label Kenan Evren was the military leader of the coup d'etat of 12 September 1980. 7 Milli Gazete is a daily newspaper, considered as the major publication of Milli Gorii§ supporters in Turkey. The Milli Gorii§ in Germany rejects the claim that Milli Gazete is related to their organization. The Milli Gorii§ also publishes several German periodicals not affiliated with the Milli Gazete, such as Perspektive. 6

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"threat" largely restricts Milli G6ri1§ activities and campaigns, and puts Milli G6ri1§ members under suspicion (Bodemann 2004; Schiffauer 2004a). Therefore, the Diyanet is an attractive alternative to many second-generation Turks in Germany, who, after September 11, only want a secure atmosphere for prayer.

The Headscarf Debate The major event that pitted Muslim associations against German state authorities was September 11. The terrorist attacks caused all Muslim associations to revise their policies and campaigns, and the religious, political, and cultural differences between Muslims and German society were more closely scrutinized by state authorities. One of the key debates that appeared in the aftermath of September 11 concerned the removal of the Islamic headscarf from public places. Here, as elsewhere, the political positions of the Diyanet, the Milli Goril§, and the TBB (a non-religious association, as discussed in the previous chapter) have differed. While the Diyanet is rarely present in the debate, refraining from making comments that might offend Turkish state authorities, the Milli Gorii§ and the TBB have assumed an oppositional stance. Turkish Muslim religious immigrant organizations, such as Milli Gorii§ argued that religious and cultural differences should be regarded as constitutional rights, and therefore, Muslim women should not be prevented from practicing their religion in the public sphere. In contrast, the social democratic-oriented immigrant organizations, such as the TBB, supported the ban of all religious symbols from the public sphere, a position in line with the Turkish state's secularism. 8 The Diyanet commented very briefly on the The tension between these opposing views should be also conceived in relation to the headscarf debate in Turkey (see Gole 1997; Gocek 1999; Cizre 2003), where the headscarf ban was recently lifted (2008). An important court case concerns a university student, Leyla Sahin, who wanted to wear her headscarf at university; she brought her case to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Court decided in favour of the Turkish state, stating that it is the state's right to protect public order. 8

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headscarf in German newspapers, downplaying the importance of the headscarf for Muslims in Germany (Die Zeit 2004). In other words, the Diyanet refrained from getting into arguments about the headscarf ban with German state authorities, while the Milli G6rii§ took a firm political position against the ban. Sixty-five Islamic organisations in Germany released a public declaration in April 2004 supporting the headscarf; the declaration stated that "the woman is commanded to cover herself-hands, feet and face excluded. The covering of the hair unanimously is clearly a part of this." The Diyanet did not sign this document, however. As the representative of "good Muslims," it made no statements that would jeopardize its relations with German state authorities; as a result, the Milli Gorii§ bec~me the "bad Muslims." Meanwhile, the TBB issued a press release and informed the Germans of the differences between the regular headscarf and the Islamic fundamentalist headscarf and warned of the evils of the latter. They described the traditional headscarf as having a loose knot under the chin, leaving some of the front hair out; the political headscarf, also known as turban or hijab, on the other hand, is a conservative covering of the head, leaving no hair out, and is tightly wrapped around the neck. The former is eligible to "cross the border" from immigrant society to the mainstream host society, but the latter must be eliminated from the public sphere. Throughout the headscarf debate, the TBB consistently supported the idea that religion is a private matter and discouraged the wearing of religious symbols in the public sphere. In its role as cultural interpreter of a Turkish-Islam that is unknown to many Germans, the TBB warned Germans that wearing religious symbols in the public sphere would hinder immigrant assimilation. Moreover, by calling the Muslim headscarf a threat to the religious neutrality of the German state, the TBB argued that one of the most important principles of the German democracy was under scrutiny by the Muslim communities (Schiek 2004; Yeneroglu 2004b). When the spokespersons of the TBB warned the Germans of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, they were referring to religiouslyoriented immigrant groups, such as the Milli Gorii§ (<;1nar 2005). Unlike the TBB, the Milli Gorii§ representatives and related

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associations 9 argued that women should be allowed to wear headscarves in public places, a stance put forward in Milli Gorii§ publications, such as Milli Gorii§ Perspektive. Oguz U9tincti, Secretary General of the Milli Gorii§ in Germany says: The religious freedom of Muslim teachers who wear headscarves get restricted and their free entrance to jobs in the public service, which are their rights in the constitutional law, become impossible. This navishes prejudices against Muslims, encourages to further discrimination against Muslims in all social fields and negatively affects the integration efforts by Muslims. The essence of the judgement is that the state would have to declare neutrality. This principle of governmental action with a Muslim as a teacher is· incompatible if she would want to wear a headscarf while teaching. Obviously the judge proceeds from a wrong understanding of the principle of neutrality. COvtincli 2002)

U9iincii stresses that a headscarf ban would exacerbate discrimination against Muslim women and hinder Muslim integration. He juxtaposes two important concepts of democratic states-freedom of religion and state neutrality-and argues that in the court decision mentioned above, the judge misinterpreted the state's neutrality in religious matters. U9tincti says that state neutrality in religious matters encourages religious plurality. Finally, taking exception to the court's finding that the wearing of a headscarf by a teacher could lead to religious influence on students and to conflicts in the class, U9tincti argues: One of the aims of education is to make students think of other cultures and religion. This would be supported by a Muslim teacher who is wearing a headscarf. Through this, she could help reducing prejudices and provide a better understanding. (Uvtincli 2002)

Like D9iincu, Mustafa Yeneroglu, the Milli Gorii§ lawyer in Cologne, takes a fiercely defensive position. In his interview with me, he brought up the controversial connection between the headscarf and Islamic terrorism:

9

Such as Jslamische Foderation Berlin and SCHURA Hamburg.

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The decision of the Constitutional Court on the headscarf is wrong. Although it seems like the decision is in advantage [of wearing headscarfin public places], when you look at other decisions of the Constitutional Court in religious matters, this one is a wrong decision. The Court left the freedom of religion, a matter of basic freedom, to the decision of land level parliaments. It left it to political initiatives .... Whatever I say, in all the reports of the constitutional institutions, it is stated that "these are fundamentalists, Islamists, radicals, extremists .. .they are terrorists." This is how it is perceived. (Yeneroglu 2004a)

In these statements, it becomes clear that a main aim of the Milli Goril~ is to introduce some exclusively Muslim practices, such as the headscarf, into German political discussions. 10 As the paragraphs above makes clear, a difference of approach and opinion among immigrant associations emerged during the headscarf debate: while the Milli Goril~ was bringing Muslim practices into open debate, the TBB was accusing Muslim associations of being Islamic fundamentalists, defining them as threats to German society, and the Diyanet i~leri remained tellingly silent.

Approaches to Integration The model that the Milli Goril~ draws for itself is social engagement with German society. Mustafa Y olda~, Chairman of the Schura, Rat der Islamischen Gemeinschaften, (Council of Islamic Communities) is a prominent member of Milli Goril~ and explains his approach to integration: We have no problem about integration. However, many politicians expect assimilation instead of integration. I will tell you the difference. If integration is contributing to this society and being socially engaged with it, I am well-advanced in integration. I have been in Germany for 24 years and I am a German citizen for 11

10

These Muslim practices are listed in the Islamische Charta 2002.

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Chapter Six years. I speak better German than Edmund Stoiber. 11 I have been residing in Germany much longer than Angela Merkel. I have an academic career here. I donate blood every eight weeks. I am a member of the Red Cross. I have been to Africa three times with a project on inter-religious dialogue. I don't think you can find anybody who voluntarily works as much as I do for the promotion of inter-religious dialogue in North Germany. If this is integration, then I am integrated. But if what you want is to dye our hair blonde, wear blue contact lenses, then drink Hopfenbier, eat Bratwurst and sing Deutsche Volkslieder, 12 then you have to wait for a couple of cenhrries. I don't think this is going to happen. (Yolda~ 2004)

Diyanet takes a more structured approach towards integration: intercultural dialogue. Its members claim they have no political position, and that religion must be separated from politics. That is, they support the Turkish state's politics on Islam which favours state control over religious affairs through state institutions. This form of Islam is not considered a threat to German society, because it is controlled by the Turkish state. In this sense, the intercultural dialogue emphasizes the cultural component of religion: Muslims should enter into a dialogue with the majority society in order to introduce the cultural components of Islam. Therefore, the major distinction in terms of integration politics between the Diyanet and the Milli Gorii~ is their interpretation of Muslim life. The Diyanet sees Muslim life as cultural difference between the majority and the Muslims, whereas the Milli Gorii~ takes a holistic approach to Muslim life in Germany. They want to integrate specificities of Muslim life into the German public sphere and claim some rights, such as Islamic education, ritual slaughtering of animals, and Muslim-only cemeteries. I further explore these claims later in the chapter. In sum, both integration Edmund Stoiber is the Chair of the CSU and a former candidate for Prime Minister of Germany. Angela Merkel was the Chair of the CDU when the interview was conducted. She is the current Chancellor. 12 Hopfenbier and Bratwurst (beer and sausage) are traditional German drinks and snacks that usually come together. Deutsche Volkslieder means German folk songs. 11

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policies are claims rather than practices. Milli Goril§ claims to establish a visible Muslitn community which engages with German society in specific ways. The Diyanet j§leri claims to campaign for intercultural dialogue, but most of their campaigns and policies promote Turkish-Islam as a religious ideology in Germany. Thus, these integration policies represent the associations' ideals and may or may not be realized in the future.

Relations with the German State Authorities and Politics Although most of its members are Turkish Muslims, the Milli Goril§ community has the desire to establish a multicultural Muslim cmmnunity in Germany, inclusive of other Muslim groups and to be officially recognized by German state authorities. However, this ideal does not find favour among German state authorities. Mustafa Yolda~ gives the following reasons for the apparent unwillingness to recognize Muslims as an institutionalized religious community: They want to prevent Muslims to institutionalize in Germany. I mean, they do not want us to have an institutionalization like Jews and Christians. When we have Korperschaft des offentlichen Rechte/3 (corporation of public law) status, we can have kindergarten, cemeteries, taxes or membership payments. We can use these funds in th<:? Pflegeheim (foster home) schools ... They don't want that. Therefore, it does not matter if I have super ideas. We want institutionalization [of Islam]. I want the German government to support us. We don't want money, we want legal counter-parts. (Yolda~ 2004)

In Germany, "a special partnership exists between the State and religious communities with the status of a corporation under public law." If they fulfill certain requirements, including assurance of permanency, size of organization, and loyalty to the State, organizations may request to be granted "public law corporation" status, which, among other things, entitles them to levy taxes on their members; these taxes are collected by the State for the church. (Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2007, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90177 .htm, accessed on April28, 2008). 13

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One major reason that the Milli Goril~ has not been able to find supporters among German authorities is that it is listed in the Bundesverfassungschutz as mentioned above. The young Milli Gorii~ leaders believe this is a political· game played by German politicians over Islamic politics. Mustafa Yeneroglu, the leader of the legal office in the Cologne branch of the Milli Goril~ puts it in the following words: A current minister said nonsense things [about the Milli Gorii~], I sued him and I won. Then I sued him in four more cases .... He said things like "Milli Gorii~ is an enemy of Christians. Milli Gorii~ is happy for the September 11." He called me and asked to get together .... He said "Can you drop the court cases?" I said "Why?" He said "Please take them back. I don't want to be openly renounced in the society. You know I am a politician. I lost the previous court case, but I got a lot of applause from my supporters .... This is a democratic society, it is normal to give messages to our potential voters in order to carry the votes to the ballot boxes. It is necessary for us to make popular statements in order to mobilize the masses. I request you to withdraw your complaints from the court." This is exactly how he says it...exactly .... When he talks to me he says that he actually appreciates the Milli Gorii~ because we organize campaigns to facilitate integration [of Muslim immigrants]. (Yeneroglu 2004a)

While noting that Islam and Muslim immigrants are represented as a potential threat to German society by German politicians in order to gain right wing votes, Y eneroglu points out the hypocrisy in German politics, stating that the Milli Goril~ is created as an icon of Islamic peril by German politicians. Although the Milli Gorii~ leaders cannot find supporters among German politicians and state authorities and are represented as a threat to the German society, they still make claims to the German state in a bid to create a socio-political space for Muslims in Germany. However, since it has no credibility, it must use different channels, associations, and representatives. One such association is the Islamische Foderation Berlin (IFB) that has the privilege of teaching Islam courses in German secondary education in the German language (Sabah 1999; HauBler 2001; Berliner

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Morgenpost 2002c). Burhan Kesici, an executive member in the Islamische Foderation Berlin explains their ambition in introducing the courses: This is what we wanted to do for 24 years: to teach Islam courses in German schools. [ ... ] First, we had a political struggle for sixseven years. Then we sued them. Because according to the German legal system, the state authorities have to legally recognise your association. When they did not, we sued them. After 14 years of legal struggle, we won the court case .... But we experienced funny events, we had to tell them: "Look we are Muslims, you have to accept that we are Muslims." (Kesici 2004)

As a result of this legal struggle, the IFB has gained the right to teach Islam as a religion course in public schools. In 2002-2003, 1,607 students in Berlin (852 girls and 805 boys) were taking Islam as a religion course in Berlin: 74 per cent were of Turkish nationality and 21 per cent were Arabs (Die /slamische Foderation in Berlin 2005; Die Tageszeitung 2004). In 2007-2008, IFB claimed to have 4600 students taking Islam as a religion course in public schools; according to this estimate, the number had tripled in five years. Other than the educational rights, the following have been introduced as legal court cases by the Milli Goril§: the right to ritual slaughter (positively decided in 2002), Muslim teachers' right to wear religious attire in schools (negatively decided in 2003) and the right to have religious education (positively decided in 1984), Muslim girls' right to withdraw from swimming courses when both sexes are present (positively decided in 1993), the right to add Muslim names in conversion to Islam (positively decided in 1992), availability of Muslim services in social and medical institutions (under discussion), the right to burial according to Muslim rituals (under discussion), the right to call to Islamic prayer (ezan) with speakers (not yet in court), the right to receive permission from the employer for daily prayer times (namaz) and for religious holidays (dini bayram) (not yet in court) (lslamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goril§ 2005). Even though some of these cases have been successfully defended in the German courts, the Milli G6ril§ specifically, and

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Muslim associatiOns in general, face three major problems in claims-making. First, German state authorities do not legally recognize the Milli Goril§ or any other Muslim association as representing Muslims in Germany, nor do they give public law corporation status to Muslim associations. Therefore, Muslim associations are not legal groups who can levy taxes on their members. Second, even if Muslim groups make claims by introducing court cases, they may face difficulties when their claims are met. For example, in the case of the ritual slaughtering of animals, implementation has been restricted, and the slaughterhouses allowed to practice ritual slaughter have been subject to suspicious and violent attacks. A Muslim slaughterhouse which won the right to ritual slaughtering in a court case in Hessen was firebombed on 27 November 2004. Third, even if Muslim groups receive permission from the German courts to practice their religious customs and meet no other resistance from German society, the Muslim associations may not always be fully equipped to carry out the procedures. They may be handicapped because of their lack of institutionalization or by restrictions in their organizational structure. For example, Burhan Kesici says that the leaders of the Islamische Foderation have trouble finding appropriate teachers: Many well-educated theology teachers came to us, but we did not take them, because their perspectives did not overlap with ours. Or their perspectives were not appropriate for this society. They have to know the psychology of these children. They have to know the social environment of these children. For example, the Islam that is lived in Turkey or the Islam that is lived in Saudi Arabia is different from the Islam that is lived in Berlin. (Kesici 2004)

Mustafa Yolda~, Chair of Schura (Hamburg ·council of Islamic Communities), emphasizes the difficulties of finding imams (religious leaders) who can speak sufficient German to express themselves during the Friday religious services (cuma), and who are fully acquainted with German norms, values, and social life. Some religious leaders even give anti-German speeches in

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mosques. An example is the imam's Friday speech (hutba) at Mevlana Mosque, a well-established mosque in Kreuzberg directed by the Islamische Foderation in Berlin. The imam was filmed by German TV station ZDF during an anti-German speech to Muslim men who had come to the mosque for Friday .14 Among other things, the imam said Germans will go to hell, they do not shave their armpits, and they stink. After the broadcast, the imam apologized, but the IFB decided to remove him from his position. As shown in this example, the pro-integration claims of Milli Gorii§ can be destroyed by lack of organizational structure and insufficient control over cmnmunity members. In sum, the relations between German state authorities and the Milli Gorii§ have been contentious, and while the Milli Gorii§ claims have been successful to some extent, members have not systematically mobilized to claim rights. The Diyanet, counterpart of the Milli Gorii§, has limited relations with German state authorities. It has not raised any court cases or made any legal claims in Germany. Instead, it acts as a religious representative of the Turkish state in Germany and refrains from making any statements that would offend GermanTurkish state relations. As the Diyanet has limited relations with German state authorities, and more intensive relations with the Turkish state, it acts as a formal representative of the Turkish state in Germany; consequently, many Muslims trust their religious services. Compared to the Milli Gorii§ which is listed in the Bundesverfassungsschutz as an anti-integrative association, the Diyanet seems a reliable alternative, where religious services are legitimized by Turkish state authorities. Its aim is explained by executive committee member, Ali Giilyek: When DITIB (Diyanet) was founded in 1983, there were various religious communities, such as Milli Goru~ or SU!eymanczlar. The state [authorities] knew that these Milli Goril~ or Suleymanczlar have political positions. But our community does not have political tendencies like theirs. Then we decided to establish DITIB. It was founded as a private association with the contribution of the hodjas [religious leaders] from DITIB in Turkey. This is the first and last

14

Filmed on 23 November 2004, for Frontal21, ZDF <www.zdf.de>.

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aim of the DITffi: To provide a better and conscious religious service for our community. (Gii19ek 2003)

Gii19ek witnessed the foundation of the Diyanet and related mosques in Germany; in fact, his father was one of the founders. Although he is an electrical engineer, he has worked actively with mosque members and in the youth associations related to these mosques. He says that the Diyanet was founded to provide religious services, such as providing Turkish state-appointed imams for German mosques, but has since expanded to include other social services; it now has a wide range of sub-associations, including women's organisations, Koran reciting courses, a funeral fund and a youth organisation. Although Giilyek it~sists that the Diyanet has no political affiliations, except its alliance with the Turkish state, this is not entirely true, and, in fact, is somewhat of a paradox. The Diyanet represents the ideology of religion that is accepted and regulated by the Turkish state. Therefore, it is . difficult to receive in-depth information from the Diyanet officers and executive committee members, as they do not want to make statements that would go against Turkish politics or stir up relations between Turkey and Germany; thus, they watch their words very carefully. Yet the religious attache and the imams who are appointed by the Turkish state for five-year terms are often not fluent in speaking German which may limit their relations with the German society. These religious leaders refer interviewers, researchers, and journalists to Diyanet executive committee members. The religious leader appointed by the Turkish state has symbolic power, rather than an active role in the Diyanet. Almost all religious and social services are conducted by Diyanet members who are permanent residents in Germany. Although the religious leaders have only symbolic power, they bring a sense of stability to the Diyanet by representing the Turkish state. For example, an important source of income for the Diyanet is the Funeral Fund. This fund has attracted many Turkish immigrants who pay instalments to be buried in Turkey. As evidenced in the popularity of this fund, the Diyanet has been successful mainly

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because it has strong and reliable contacts with Turkish state authorities. The relations between the Milli Gorii§ and Turkish state authorities have not been as successful as the Diyanet' s. As mentioned above, Milli Goril§ in Gennany is the diasporic network of the religious parties banned in Turkey. The first Milli Gorii§ party in Turkey, Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) was banned in 1971 for being against the secular system in Turkey. This ban implied that the Milli Nizam Partisi had the desire to establish a religious state. In a nutshell, Milli Goril§ is a political ideology that attempts to save Turkish economy and society from Western imperialism and democracy, and seeks to found a just Islamic society. Their emphasis on bringing Islamic religious order to the Turkish political system is considered a threat to the secular Turkish republic. Milli Goril§ became a contentious issue in transnational political relations between Germany and Turkey. After the ban of the religiously oriented Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) in 2001, the Milli Goril§ community was divided into two camps--conservatives and innovators. Conservatives supported Necmettin Erbakan, the spiritual leader of the Milli Goril§. They founded the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) in 2001. The innovators supported Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current Prime Minister of Turkey and Chair of Adalet ve Kalkznma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), the current governing party. In the last decade, Milli Goril§ has seceded from Erbakan' s strict ideology and gained new impetus in Turkey and Germany. The seceding group is comprised of a younger generation called yenilikr;iler (innovators). With the establishment of two major parties from within the Milli Goril§ community, the question naturally arises as to who is "the real representative" of Milli Goril§ ideology (~en 2004: 10). Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the innovators founded the Justice and Development Party, which received 34 per cent of all votes in the most recent election in 2007 and became the governing party of the Turkish Republic. This is a particular surprise for Turkey which has been governed by unstable and contentious coalition parties for many years. Prime Minister Erdogan was a follower of Erbakan and an activist in Milli Goril§, specifically in the youth groups. He was first

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elected Municipal Chair in Istanbul, then separated from Erbakan and founded his own party. He is specifically recognized by his statement, "Milli Gorii§ gomlegini r;zkardzk" (We took off the Milli Goril§ shirt) which may reflect his break from his Milli Goril§ past. However, whether the Justice and Development Party can really offer new political perspectives to Turkish society has been a controversial issue (Sen 2004). For some, the Justice and Development Party is just another Milli Goril§ party in the evolution of Milli Goril§ ideology; for others, the Justice and Development Party reflects a major change in the Milli Gorii§ ideology. 15 In my view, the generational change in Milli Gorii§ in Turkey marks a major shift in this community. However, I should emphasize that this is a shift in party politics and should not be seen as a break from the Milli Goril§ community. A similar split between conservatives and innovators can be observed in the Milli Gorii§ community in Germany. Conservatives can be described as the first-generation immigrants who formed a rigid structure around Erbakan, whereas the innovators emphasize the importance of understanding the facts about Germany. They underline that it is necessary to be flexible and to adapt to German realities. In the view of German innovators, Erbakan is not informed about the realities of immigrant lives in Germany or about current political debates. Here, it may be useful to compare the discourse of the former Turkish parliamentary speaker from the AKP, Bulent Ann9/ 6 to the Milli Gorii§ representatives in Germany: I mean we are in a closed circle, in a roller coaster. In this tradition, certainly Erbakan has a role. I am a very close person to Erbakan; but I also criticized Erbakan for that. I have said that this is wrong in the national executive meetings and in city representatives meetings. Erbakan listened to me with respect.... After our congress neither the chair nor Erbakan asked us what is to be done. Serdar Sen argues that the Justice and Development Party is part of the evolving Milli Gorii~ ideology and can be categorized as just another Milli Gorii~ party, much like the Virtue Party or the Felicity Party. 16 The interview was conducted before the Justice and Development Party was established on August 14, 2001. 15

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They did not want to learn. They expressed that they are uncomfortable about it. (<;aktr and <;ahnuk 2001: 135-36)

In fact, the discourses of Ann9 and the Milli Goril§ representatives in Germany both pay tribute to Erbakan; at the same time, they both express resentment. According to the innovators in Germany: We cannot be removed [from the Bundesverfassungschutz] before Erbakan dies. I don't know. He was born in 26, he must be around 78. I mean I like my hodja, 11 and I respect him. But my hodja does not know the facts [of Germany]. Of course, if he would say, "This is a flag race. I ran for 1000 meters and I will hand in the flag to the next person," then the problem will be solved smoothly. But instead [he said]: "These are children, they don't know anything." He scared many people. I personally resent the position of my hodja. He could have been recorded as a hero in history, but he didn't use it to his advantage. (Yolda~ 2004)

The shift from Erbakan and the conservatives to Erdogan and the innovators marks a major event in the evolution of Milli Goril§. It is essential to understand that party politics in Turkey were reflected in the Milli Goril§ in Germany. Even so, many innovators in the Milli Goril§ community in Germany argue that Germany is a different political atmosphere and has its own social dynamics, independent from Turkish politics. In that sense, they say, discussing the Milli Goril§ fractions in Turkey does not bring anything to Milli Goril§ in Germany: Milli Goril§ in Germany should be perceived in its own social and political atmosphere. In sum, the Diyanet and the Milli Goril§ have very different experiences of the Turkish state and its politics. The Diyanet supports the Turkish state in Germany; perhaps paradoxically, this relationship brings reliability to its activities. Meanwhile, for many decades, the Milli Goril§ leaders have had controversial relations with Turkish state authorities, thus rendering suspect its religious and political activities. Even though the Milli Goril§ is trying to peel off the "bad Muslim" label that accompanies its listing on the The members of the Milli Goril~ community describe Erbakan as Hodja, which means teacher and religious leader. 17

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Bundesverfassungsschutz, the current Diyanet services seem sufficient for many Turkish Muslims who, after· September 11, only want a secure atmosphere for prayer. Muslim communities in Germany may eventually require a legitimate body to convince the German state authorities to meet Muslim immigrant needs. That body may well be one of the two Turkish Muslim associations discussed here, but only time will tell which is best able to fill that role. Is Milli Gorii§ really trying to create a space for Muslims in Germany that is independent from Turkish politics? Is the Diyanet j§!eri really campaigning for intercultural dialogue rather than promoting Turkish-Islam as a religious ideology in Germany? Do Muslim associations, in general, really have a hidden agenda that they will reveal once they receive legal status? Considering the growing Muslim population in Germany and in Europe in general, it is clear that the discussion will only become more intriguing.

CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSION

While doing this research, I was asked many questions by my informants, colleagues, friends, and family about the study. The most challenging question was why I was working on this particular subject. Why was I interested in immigrant political representation and associational mobilization, rather than, say, immigrant identity formation? This has to do with my background in Turkey. I grew up in a middle-class Turkish family in Istanbul that cared a great deal about family honour, proper social standing, and modesty. My father, my uncle, and my grandfather were highranking military officers. We lived in a strictly protected military residence, and my friends were children of military officers. I was taken to school every day in a grey military bus with other children from our military residential area. Even as a young child, I was aware of the social pressure which accompanied discipline, privilege, and over-protection. This confined life has never been broken, not even during the military coup d'etat in 1980. Even then, nothing could penetrate our protection in the military zones. While in 1980, thousands of people were jailed, tortured, killed, or forced to flee Turkey, my family and friends and I were living in a cocoon, oblivious to the politics around us. For us, the only option was to support the military coup d'etat against the "trouble makers" who committed crimes against our state. I came to realize that there was something wrong with our family life when ·I started university in 1991. Mingling with students from various class, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, I saw that there was more than the military way of life and the prostate ideology of my family. At the university, I met students who challenged the status-quo of state authorities, university regulations, and even deeply-embedded family values. These students were bold

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enough to occupy the presidential building, protest against state authorities who visited our university, and even resist the price increases of meals in the university cafeteria. My family was terrified that I was going to be involved in politics, and I was forbidden b.y my family members to join student associations. For them student associations might have political alliances with antistate establishment associations. When my friends were ordered by university professors to take off their headscarves on the university campus, I knew there was something wrong with state authority. Later, when some students occupied the presidential building for a couple of days (1994), and the police had to draw them out with tear gas, I wanted to understand the meaning of political resistance. And when President Gorbachev visited the Middle East Technical University campus (1995), and the students protested his visit by throwing eggs at his car, I wanted to find out why. This recognition of the tension between pro-establishment authority and political resistance marked a turning point in my life. I wanted to understand why and how people establish associations and make claiins against the authorities, while my family members were supportive of the 1980 military coup d'etat. I wanted to understand the over-protection, discipline, and submission that clouded my life and restricted my relations with the people outside the military zones. I wanted to know why other people resisted and asked for political recognition. Why did they not approve of authority as my family did? When I started this research in Germany, I realized that the questions that I ask here are the questions I ask myself in my private life. By understanding why people establish associations and resist politically, I attempt to see why I was prevented from having contact with politically engaged people. By politically engaged, I mean people with different opinions, for my family is also politically engaged, albeit in state ideologies. For instance, my grandfather has a life-size portrait of Kemal Atatiirk in his living room (see also Ozyurek 2006). For us, pro-state ideology is the norm, and other ideologies are "deviant." My family has never realized that this obsession with pro-establishment ideology prevents us from having contact with "real" people who have "real" problems, such as high unemployment in Turkey, civil war in

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Eastern Turkey, or serious problems in the health care system. As my family lives far away from the realities of Turkey, I feel as if I grew up in Turkey without knowing anything about it. Even now, when I talk to people from Turkey about political events of the 1980s and early 1990s, I have few personal experiences to share. Like many social scientists, I aim to understand "the Other," in this case, the people who establish associations to politically resist and claim recognition. In the sense that they are different from me {I, who grew up with pro-establishment norms and values), "the Other" represents people who are "deviant." That is why comparing pro-establishment associations to anti-establishment associations is a main theme here. For instance, I compare the Diyanet j~feri which is a pro-state association to the Milli Goril~, which is in the opposition. The findings of this research provide some modest answers to the following ambitious questions. Why do immigrants form political associations? How do they use them to solve conflicts within the majority society's politics? What are the consequences of such immigra~t political mobilizations for both immigrant communities and the majority society? As discussed in Chapter Two, with the transformation of the citizenship tradition in Western Europe, specifically in Germany, immigrants are beginning to be located somewhere in the blurred boundary between citizenship and denizenship (Soysal 1994). This blurring of the boundaries of civic traditions, the changing of temporary to permanent settlement, and the variety of integration policies and practices result in political representation demands by immigrant groups. However, by definition, mainstream German politics caters to citizens' claims and concerns, and does not include the individuals and groups who occupy the no-man's land between citizen and non-citizen. As Gavin A. Smith (1999) argues, Marshallian citizenship (to which the German notion of citizenship can be linked) derives from deeply middle-class, English, male and white cultural values. It does not take into account individual subjectivities and cultural differentiations (Benhabib 2002). More importantly, in Germany, the differences in citizens' and noncitizens' experiences of state rules and regulations have not been a subject of citizenship discussions (Smith 1999). Finally, immigrants

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are subject to the rule of the state, even though they have not officially consented to be ruled in this way. Thus, in the process of transforming the content of membership in contemporary Germany, the following question is normative, as well as practical: "Who are those towards whom the political rule must be legitimated?" (Baubock 1996: 200) Should political rule include immigrants? As my fmdings show, in many circumstances, political rule does not recognize the differences in terms of how immigrants experience state power. Just as Nancy Fraser (1992) argues that the public sphere is constituted of male bourgeois ·elites who use their wealth and power to influence state power, so, too, mainstream German politics include "the citizens" who fit into state regulated categories of "citizenship," and exclude immigrants who have limited rights from political representation. In the case of German politics, the tradition of jus sanguinis citizenship makes "rights" almost a biological trait that can only be inherited. Immigrants, who do not have the same ancestry, are excluded. This distinction between citizen and non-citizen (immigrants) is very important in the case of immigrant mobilization and representation. The people who are legitimately included in mainstream German politics also possess the right to make legitimate claims against state authorities. Therefore, the people who are included within the democratic German polity can promote political resistance, self-determination, and self-development by means of state institutions. Immigrants' access (or lack of access) to mainstream German politics raises questions about who can legitimately make claims against the state and how immigrants' claims-making can be made legitimate (Young 2000: 186-7). Political representation of immigrants can be legitimized through political participation. The right to vote and to be elected is the most obvious political right of citizens. In the context of the European Union, non-EU immigrants' access to political participation varies between countries. For example, Sweden granted political rights to immigrants in 1975, and all foreigners who have resided there for three years can vote and can be elected in municipal, regional, and religious elections. Since the 1980s, after five years, foreigners who reside in the Netherlands can vote in local elections and take part in referenda. And Portugal grants

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voting rights to Portuguese-speaking nationals after five years of residence. In France, however, only French nationals can vote and stand for election, and there are no political voting rights for immigrants (European Union Parliamentary Assembly 2005). In Germany, non-EU immigrants, whatever their national background, cannot participate in elections; that is, in Marshallian terms, they do not have access to political rights. However, they have full access to all social citizenship rights, such as education, employment, and health care. Having access to social rights but not political rights creates a paradoxical situation: immigrants do not have the decision-making power to change the socio-economic conditions that affect their lives. For example, as I demonstrated in Chapter Five, although Turkish immigrants have access to jobs in Germany, the statefunded job training projects for immigrants tend to be restricted to the clerical sector or to geriatric care for women, and to construction machine operation for men. Moreover, very few of these training projects target the elderly immigrants who worked in German industry for many years, but who lost their jobs after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany. Since TurkisV. immigrants do not have access to political participation in order to influence the decision-making processes, they are unable to change this path-dependent process: thus, Turkish immigrant employment remains mostly in the low-paying, low-prestige, and dead-end jobs. I have provided another example of immigrants' lack of decision-making power in Chapters Three and Six. Religious oriented associations support Muslim women who wear religious attire in public places. Yet some German Lander oppose this by stating that the German "constitution is based on the Christianoccidental tradition and they would begin to draw up legislation to ban headscarves in the classroom as soon as possible" (Deutsche Welle 2003). Since Muslim immigrants do not have legitimate political power, they are not included in the political decisionmaking processes ·that continue to impose Christian-occidental tradition on their communities. The German state authorities justify this lack of political rights for non-EU immigrants in two ways. First, they point out that many

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of these immigrants came as guest workers between 1961 and 1973. When they came to Germany, they knew that political rights would not be available for them. Therefore, in choosing to come to Germany, they gave tacit consent to residing there without political rights. This perspective, of course, is misleading and does not take into account the historical transformation of the Turkish immigrant communities in Germany. Second, German state authorities argue that a democratic polity 1 cannot include everyone. They choose to include people who have German ancestry (Aussiedler), children born in Germany after the year 2000, refugees with a German passport, and Jews 2 in their democratic polity. The people outside the boundaries of this definition are excluded from political representation and participation. Why can immigrants not be fully included in the German polity? The answer to this question is illustrated in the debates around whether Germany is a country of immigration and around the Leitkultur (the guiding culture)3 • For many conservative politicians,

In Baubock's view, "a polity only includes citizens, i.e. those whose membership is of political rather than a social nature. The boundaries of polities can be controlled by the political decisions made on membership so that individuals who are not admitted, or who are excluded, will clearly not be members regardless of their social relationship to the state" (1996: 206). 2 The German constitution facilitates the acquisition of citizenship for former German citizens (and their descendants) who were persecuted during the Second World War (Grundgesetz Article 116 par. 2). According to this law, Jews of German Jewish ancestry can reclaim German citizenship. Apart from this law, Jewish immigrants from former Soviet Union countries, known as Kontingentflilchtlinge (quota refugees) are accepted to Germany on humanitarian grounds. For detailed information on recent Jewish immigration to Germany, see Bundesamt fur Migration und Fliichtlinge, Sonja Haug unter mitarbeit von Peter Schimany, Jiidische Zuwanderer in Deutschland (2005). 3 Leitkultur debate has been quite controversial in German immigrant integration politics. Simply put, it is based on the political idea that there is a homogeneous common German culture that immigrants and minorities must conform. For detailed discussion on this topic, please refer to Klusmeyer 2001 and Mandel 2008. 1

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such as a number of Christian Democrats, immigrants can never be a part of German polity, because they do not have the necessary ascriptive requirements, such as being part of the Christian culture. This attitude automatically excludes immigrants from participating in the mainstream polity and from making legitimate claims for the betterment of their community. At this point, readers may raise a red flag, saying that it is unfair to accuse German institutions of the domination and oppression of immigrant groups, when, in fact, the German state has introduced important social and political rights for immigrants in the last decade (Klopp 2002). This is true to a certain extent. Immigrants have some share of the distribution of goods and services in German society. For example, they are de jure entitled to some social citizenship rights, such as employment, health care, and education. Moreover, they have some access to political representation: there are German Turkish parliament members in the federal Land level parliaments, and in the municipalities, who work to facilitate immigrant representation. Even if immigrants have some share in the distribution of material goods and are represented at the state level, they are usually subjected to vertical or horizontal discrimination, however. In terms of employment, immigrants form the majority in the cleaning, elderly care, and construction sectors; and they occupy the bottom of the hierarchy in each of these sectors. Czarina Wilpert's studies (1990) showed that 73 per cent of immigrant women workers were employed in manual jobs, such as cleaning and service sector jobs, whereas only 30 per cent of German women were employed in the same sectors. In a recent study of immigrant women from Turkey to Berlin, 59 per cent of the participants stated that they were employed as cleaners, and 43 per cent of the currently unemployed women who participated stated that they worked as cleaners in their last job (Erdem 2004). At this point, there are a handful of parliament members who, as immigrant women themselves, are occupied with immigrant issues. Unfortunately, such issues are somewhat marginal in parliamentary

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discussions, when compared, for example, to financial affairs4 or education. Thus, the political exclusion of immigrant groups and the unequal distribution of resources are structurally maintained in the German society, through the segregation of immigrant groups into certain sectors and themes. However, we do not yet know the effects of the recently introduced social and political policies for immigrants and their children in the areas of employment, education and political inclusion. As my findings show, immigrants establish associations in order to politically resist the status quo that denies them rights. What I have attempted to show is that immigrant groups should not necessarily. be considered victims of German society and politics, because they politically resist the status quo and challenge the civic traditions of the state .. Most of the immigrant associations are motivated by the presumption that German society contains deep institutional injustices, and they aim to transform the civic traditions of the German social and political system, thereby overcoming its impediments. In other words, they actively attempt to participate in German politics in their own ways; they struggle for political representation, not only for themselves but also for other discriminated-against groups, such as women, people of colour, ethnic and religious minorities, other immigrant communities, and people from the working class. Each association has emerged in a different immigration flow; each has been shaped by diverse political interests, and each has reacted to key debates in different ways. For example, for the TBB and the Cemaat, the new citizenship law was a political priority. Both released press notes, formed political lobbies, and established a firm position. However, the DIDF's political interests were different. This association focused on the weakening of unions and protested against the rise of ethno-national politics among immigrant groups. In essence, its political interest was bringing together the German and Turkish working classes, rather than lobbying for citizenship rights. The positions of the Diyanet j~feri and Milli Gorii~ are fundamentally different again. They focus on PM Dilek Kolat from the SPD section is an exception; she is a member of the financial section in the Berlin parliament.

4

Conclusion

115

Muslim religious rights in Germany, and as demonstrated in Chapter Six, the headscarf debate and other cultural and ideological conflicts have been their political priorities. Unlike the DIDF, they are not interested in the weakening of unions or the rise of ethnonational politics among immigrant groups. In sum, there is no uniform pattern applicable to all of these organizations. Each immigrant association has its own ways of dealing with conflicts according to the socio-political context and associational interest of its members. This precludes any mechanistic approach to immigrant integration. Although immigrant associations are necessary for immigrant communities to mobilize their resources, make claims to state authorities, and fulfil the services that the state cannot and/or does not provide, they also act as key interlocutors, and in representative democracies, they politically represent immigrant communities visa-vis state authorities, making claims in the name of the immigrant group. Therefore, in these specific cases, their tasks involve the political mobilization and representation of immigrant groups. As Turkey is negotiating its accession to the European Union, Turkish immigrant associations in various European countries are forming political lobbies in a bid to influence European polity in favour of Turkey's admission. In their attempts to influence the political decision-making process of EU membership, immigrant associations perform a transnational interlocutor role. For example, some associations hold common campaigns in Germany and Turkey; such events include the Turkish March, organized by the Cemaat (Chapter Five). In this way, immigrant associations, such as the Cemaat, become political representatives of Turkish immigrants in both countries. Although immigrant political mobilization is a potentially effective method of gaining political representation, there is a lack of unity among Turkish immigrant associations which decreases their ability to manage big campaigns and throws into question their reliability as representatives of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Ethno-nationally oriented associations, such as the TBB and the Cemaat, rarely cooperate, except in campaigns for dual nationality or in Turkey's candidacy to the European Union. There is a similar lack of political unity among Turkish Muslim immigrant

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associations. As shown in Chapter Six, the TBB and Milli Gorii§ are fundamentally opposed to each other's political interests. Moreover, although Milli Gorii§ is attempting to establish political associations with other Muslim associations, its effectiveness in political lobbying remains questionable. In short, the effectiveness of immigrant associational mobilization for political representation as· a whole is limited at this point, due to the political strife and competition among these associations. In addition, women's political representation is extremely limited in the immigrant associations. The five immigrant associations discussed here are dominated by oligarchic elite male groups who pursue power on immigrant issues, while dominating other groups, such as immigrant women. Even the headscarf debate was primarily the subject of immigrant incorporation politics, discussed among male members of the immigrant associations, rather than immigrant women's groups. Although immigrant associational mobilizations have unintended consequences, such as the lack of political unity and the lack of representation of immigrant women, they are vital for immigrant communities to gain political representation. Even though they resist politically only at a modest level, it is encouraging to know that Turkish immigrants have associations which oppose regulations and policies that discriminate against them in Germany. My hope is that immigrant groups will have sufficient political power to fully participate in German institutions that facilitate their integration into the German society. And as German society and its immigration system continue to change, the German political class and its bureaucrats will learn to recognise the immigrant perspective in the socio-political discourse, including an unequivocal acceptance of what might well be seen as the immigrant country in their midst.

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INDEX

A AB, Chair IGMetall Foreigners' Commission, 55, 58-61 (passim) Abadan-Unat, Nermin, 1, II Abendroth, Elizabeth, 80 Abitur, 63 Ackermann, Bruce A., 18 Aegean, immigrants from, 27, 29, 33 Agenda 2010, 55 Akgtin, Lale, 14 Akkord system, 29 Ak~in, Sina, 34 Al-fraktion, 37 Allievi, Stefano, 13 Alpbek, Berrin, 85 am Orde, Sabine, 39 Amiraux, Valerie, 1 Antidiskriminierungsnetzwerk Berlin des Tilrkischen Bundes in Berlin-Brandenburg, 73 Anwerbung und Vermittlung ausliindischer Arbeitnehmer (Recruitment and Procurement of Foreign Workers), 25, 26 Arbeitsamt, 30 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration, 84 Army, Biilent, 104-5 Article 116, 55 assimilation, 2-3, 7, 13, 18, 68, 76, 78-9,81,84,86,91,93 new, 9 asylum seekers, 23-4, 34-6, 53, 54 Atatiirk, Kemal, 108 Ausliinderbeauftragte (see Foreigners' Commissioner) Aussiedler (German ancestry), 112 Auswiirtiges Amt, 42 Avgan, Hiiseyin, 50, 51, 53-4, 63-4

Aziz Nesin Europiiische Schute, 73 B Bahaddznlzlar Dernegi (Bahaddins' Association), 32, 71 Barbieri, William, 17, 18, 41 Basch, Linda, 9, 19 Baubock, Rainer, 10, l1, 12, 12n2, 15, 16, 110, 112nl Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fiir Migration Flilchtlinge und Integration, 42 Beck, Marieluise, 16, 81 Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth, xiii-xvi, 15, 16 Benarieh Ruffer, Galya, 11 Benhabib, Seyla, 109 Berger, John, 11, 26 Berlin, 1-116 (passim) Berlin Aktilel, 79 Berlin Wall, fall of, 23-4, 36-9, 57, 61, 65, 66, 76, 79, 111 Berliner Morgenpost, 37, 40, 79, 80, 98 Be~ikyi, Ismail, 52n7 Betriebsrat (union representative), 58,59,60,61 Bielefeld, 49 Bild Zeitung, 37 Bloemraad, Irene, 10, 13, 20, 46 Bodemann, Michal Y., 77,92 Boratav, Korkut, 34 Bosch, 28 Brubaker, Rogers, 9, 10, 41, 78 Bund der Einwanderer Innen aus der Tilrkei in Berlin (Federation of Immigrants from Turkey in Berlin, BETB), 69, 73 Bundesagentur fiir Arbeit, 17, 67

142 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 44-5 Bundesverfassungsschutz (Secret Service), 52, 91, 98, 101, 105, 106 Bundesversicherungsanstalt fiir Angestellte (Istitute of Federal Insurance for Employees, BfA), 25, 31, Biindnis 90, 5 Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 97nl3 Burkay, Kemal, SinS

c <;aglar, Ayfje S., 1, 25 <;aktr, Rusen, 105 <;almuk, F., 105 Castles, Stephen, I, 11, 13 Cemaat, 2, 3, 5, 21, 33, 67-86, 114, 115 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Party, CDU), 5, 45, 80,83,85-6,96nll, 113 Cinar, Dilek, 10 <;mar, Safter, 55, 62,76-7, 78, 85, 93 citizenship rights discourse, 58-66 (passim), 67-86, 110 citizenship issues, 9-22 citizenship law, new, 10n1, 15-16, 23-4, 39-42, 79-80 Cizre, Umit, 92n8 Clifford, James, 9 coffeehouses, 32-4 Cologne, 1, 3, 30, 35, 49, 98 conflicts, types of, 12-13 boundary, 12-13, 15, 18-29 cultural, 12-13, 15, 17-18 distributive, 12-13, 15, 16-17 coup d'etat, Turkish, 23-4, 34-6, 69, 91, 107 <;ubuk9u, Aydm, 50 cultural pluralism, 9, 13 Cunningham Steve, 13

Index D Dachorganisation der Gewerkschaften in Deutschland (Confederation of German Trade Unions, DGB), DGB, 52, 55, 56, 61, 67, 70 Dagdelen, Sevim, 66 Dale, Gareth, 30, 37, 41 Demokratik i§9i Dernekleri Federasyonu (Federation of Democratic Workers, DIDF), 2, 3,5,21,36,47-66, 114,115 Demokratic Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party), 69 denizenship, I 09 Der Tagesspiegel, 43, 87 Deutsche Welle, 44, 45 , Ill deutschstiimmige, 39 Dev-Gen9 (Revolutionary Youth), 35 Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Path), 35, 53 DG, Mercedes Benz Union Representative, 58-61 (passim) Die Tageszeitung, 39, 46,99 Die Zeit, 91, 93 Diepgen, Eberhardt, 80, 85 Diyanet i§leri, 2, 4, 5, 21, 71, 74, 86, 87-106, 114 E Ecevit, Biilent, 69 efms (European Forum for Migration Studies), 17 eingetrageners Verein (registered organizations, e.V.), 33-4 Ekin, 38 Ekfji, Mehmet, 73 Elson, Diane, 27 Emegin Partisi (Labour Party, EMEP), 55 England, 13, 43 Erbakan, Necmettin, 90, 103-5 Erdal, Eren, 53 Erdem, Esra, 113 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 103-5

From Guest Workers into Muslims Erytlmaz, Aytay, 26 ethno-national associations, 67-86, 115 Europiiische Kommission (European Commission), 15, 16 European Union Parliamentary Assembly, Ill Evren, General Kenan, 34, 91 Evrensel Gazetesi, 49

F Faist, Thomas, 9, 88n2 family reunification law, 23-4, 31-4 Ford, 30 Foreigners' Commissioner (or Officer), 5, 6, 16, 39, 55, 56, 62, 65, 70, 73, 83, 85 . Fournier, Pascale, 24, 44, 45 Fox,Cybelle, 13 France, 9, 35, 43, 49, 90, 111 Fraser, Nancy, Ill Free Democratic Party (FDP), 85 Freedom for Turkey Committee, 53 Funeral Fund, 102-3

G Ganssmann, Heiner, 17 Gastarbeiter (see guest workers) Geis, Norbert, 15 German Statistics Office (DESTATIS), 6 Gewerkschaft fiir Erziehung und Wissenschaft (Union of Education and Science, GEW), 56,62 Gezmis, Deniz, 50 Gilroy, Paul, 15, 19 Gitmez, Ali, 11, 26 Giugni, Marco, 11 Glick-Schiller, Nina, 11, 20 Gnade der spiiten Geburt (grace of late birth), 77 Gocek, F.M., 92n8 Goldring, Luin, 11, 20 Gole, Nilufer, 92n8

143

good Muslim, bad Muslim, 88, 93, 105 Gorbachev, President, 108 Gramsci, Antonio, 13-15 Greece, 25 Grundgesetz Article 116, 112 Griinen (Green Party), 5, 36, 85 Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, 9, 21 guest workers, 23-31, 47, 58 GUlyek, Ali, 101-2 Gundogdu, Adnan, 32-3

H Hal/an Demokrasi Partisi (Democratic People's Party, HADEP), 55nll Hall, Stuart, 13, 14, 15,20 Hamburg, 1, 3 Hansen, Randall, 10 Haug, Sonja, 112n2 Hauptschule (or Realschule), 40 HauBler, Ulf, 98 headscarfdebate, 3, 4, 15, 18, 21, 43-6, 80-2, 89, 91,92-5, 111, 115, 116 Heime, 27-8 Herbert, Ulrich, 25, 30, 32 Hessen, 100 Hodja (teacher, religious leader), 105 homogeneity, cultural, 17-18, 41, 46 Hoodfar, Homa, 15 Hiirriyet, 38, 77, 78, 80, 84 I IGMetall, 47, 55, 56, 59-60, 61, 65 lmbisse (food stands), 38, 71 lnowlocki, Lena, 27, 31 Islamic education, 91, 96, 97-9 Islamic fundamentalism, 43-5, 81, 84,95 Islamic terrorism, 52, 84, 87, 94, 95 Islamic threat, 91-2, 93, 98 Islamische Charta, 95n10

144

Islamische Foderation in Berlin (IFB), 87nl, 94n9, 98, 99, 100, 10I Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goril~ (see Milli Goril~) Islamische Gesamtschule, 45 Istanbul, 26, 34 Italy, 25 J Jacobson, David, II, 13, 19n3 Jamin, Mathilde, 26 John, Barbara, 83, 85 Jonker, Gerdien, I Joppke, Christian, 1, 13, 19 jus sanguinis, 10n1, 20, 4I, 42, 110 jus soli, 10n1, 20, 42, 80 JUSO (Young Socialists), 69 Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi), 103-4 K KanakAtak, 14 Kara, Canan, 30 Karaca, Emin, 35 Karaka~oglu, Yasemin, 89 Kastoryano, Riva, 1 Kaya, Ayhan, 1 Kemp, Adriana, 11 Kesici, Burhan, 87n1, 99, 100 Keskin, Adnan, 35 Keskin, Hakki, 39 Kleff, Sanem, 62-4 Klopp, Brett, 1, 11, 80, 113 Klusmeyer, Douglas, 13, 112n3 Knake-Werner, Heidi, 76 Kohl, Helmut, xiv, 77 Kohler, Jobst, 10 Kolat, Dilek, 84 KOMKAR, 47n1, 51n6 KONGRA-GEL, 52n10 Koopmans, Ruud, I1 Korteweg Anna, 9, IO, 13, 15 Kotbusser Tor, 38

Index Kreuzberg, 1-50 (passim), 57, 71, 84, 101 Krumme, Helen, 24 Kurds (and Kurdish issues), 35, 36n5,47,48,49-53 Kymlicka, Will, 18 L Lander,39n12,45, 77, Ill Landsmannschaften associations (compatriot clubs), 23, 32-4 Lausanne, Treaty of, 52n8 Layton-Henry, Zig, 10 leftist migrant associations, 50-3 Leitkultur (guiding culture), 112-3 Linden Strasse, closing of, 79 London, UK, 13 Ludin, Ferishta, 44-5 Lutz, Helma, 27, 31 Lyon Alynna J., 52

M Mamdani,Mahmood, 88 Mandel, Ruth, I, 15, 112n3 March against War, 54 Marshall, T.H., 19, 109, Ill May Day Celebrations, 54 Meeker, Michael, 32 Mercedes Benz, 27, 58-9 Merkel, Angela, xiv, 96 Mevlana Mosque, I 01 Mexican immigrants, 20 Mtdtk, Hilseyin, 86 Migration und Bevolkenmg, 80 Miller, Jennifer A., 30 Miller, Mark J., 11, 30 Milli Gazete, 91 Milli Goril~, 2, 4, 5, 21, 43, 44nl5, 74,87-106,114,116 Milli Gorii~ Perspektive, 91n7, 94 Milliyet, 37, 79 miteinander (union of Turkish and German working class), 48, 49, 53,57 Molin, 37, 60, 76-7 Momper, Walter, 76

From Guest Workers into Muslims Morawska, Eva, 1 Morocco, 25 multiculturalism, 2-3, 7, 9, 46 multiplicators, 65 Mumcu, Ugur, 52n7 Mutlu, Ozcan, 40

N Nachhilfe, 40, 67 nationalist associations in Cemaat, 71, 73-5 Netherlands, 9, 35, 43, 90, 110 Neukolln, 57 Neumayer, Eric, 13 Nielsen, Jorgen, 13

0 Oberschulamt Stuttgart (Revision Board, Stuttgart), 45 Ocalan, Abdullah, 52 Ogelman, Nedim, 11 Omayra, 54, 56 Orta~, Ali, 38 0stergaard-Nielsen, Eva, 12 Ozcan, Ertekin, 11 Ozyiirek, Esra, 108 p Paine, Suzanne, 25, 31 Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS), 5, 31, 66, 85 Partiya Sosyalist a Kurdistan (Kurdistan Socialist Party, PSK), 51 Partiye Karkeran Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers' Party, PKK), 35,47nl,41,52, 74 Passy, Florence, 11 Pautz, Hartwig, 13 Peck, Jeffrey, 76n3 Pecoud,Antione, 13 Peters, Jiirgen, 55 Philippines, 21 Pierburg Strike, 30

145

political resistance (or mobilisation), immigrant, 13-15, 22, 87, 108, 115-6 Pond, Elizabeth, 41 Portugal, 25, 110 post-national membership, 13 Powell, Enoch, 19 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), 40 Rathzel, Nora, 1, 40 Rawles, John, 16 religious associations, 86, 87-106, 111 religious political parties (Turkey), 90, 103-4 remittances, immigrant, 21 Report on Migration and Integration (EU), 16 ritual slaughter, 96, 99, 100 Rize, 33 Rosh, Lea, 76 Rostock, 76

s Sabah,98 ~ahin, Leyla, 92n8 Sassen, Saskia, 1, 11, 13 Sautter, Ursula, 40 Schieck, Dagmar, 45, 81, 93 Schiffauer, Werner, 1, 12, 88, 91, 92 Schiffbaufirmen (shipbuilding plants), 24 Schild, Ummii, 37 Schimany, Peter, 112n2 Schmitter-Heissler, Barbara, 11 Schoenbaum, David, 41 Schura Hamburg, 94n9, 100 Schwarzmeer Kulturverein (Black Sea Cultural Association), 32 ~en, Serdar, 103, 104 September 11, 4, 22, 23-4, 43, 79, 80,86,87-9,92,98,106 Sevres Treaty, 52n9 sexism in immigrant associations, 20-1 Sey, C., 77

146 Shrader government, 55 Siemens, 27, 59 Simon, Roger, 14 Smith, Gavin A., 109 Smith, Michael Peter, 9, 21 social disintegration in Germany, 14-15 Solingen, 37, 76 Soysal, Y asemin, 1, 11, 13, 109 Sozialdemokratische P artei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party, SPD), 5, 31, 36, 55nll, 80, 84-5 Spain, 25 Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (see citizenship law) Statham, Paul, 11 Statistisches Bundesamt, 63n 16 Stoiber, Edmund, 15, 96 Stolzl, Christoph, 86 Stuttgart, 45, 49 Siileymancz (Islam Cultural Centres), 74, 101 Sunnite associations (and religion), 71, 75 Sweden, 9, 35, 110 Switzerland, 35, 49 Szanton Blanc, Cristina, 9, 19

T Tanor, Biilent, 34 Tatsache, 49 TBB, 2, 3, 5, 21, 34n1, 34, 58-66, 67-86,92,93,95,114,115,116 Technical University ofBerlin, 34, 68-9 Telefunken, 27, 29 Tomlinson, Jo, 13 Tunisia, 25 Turan, Hilmi Kaya, 30-1, 37n6 Turk j$r;i Partisi (Turkish Workers' Party, TIP), 35, 51n5 Turkey, 1-116 (passim) Tiirkische Gemeinde in Deutschland, 14

Index Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (see Cemaat) Tiirkischer Bund BerlinBrandenburg (see TBB) Tiirkischer Elternverein (Turkish Parents' Assocation), 71, 73 Tiirkischer Minderheitsverein (Turkish Minority Association), 32, 71 Tiirkisches Wissenschafts und Technologie Zentrum e. V. Berlin (Turkish Science and Technology Centre Foundation, Berlin, TBTBM), 34, 68, 70 Turkish March, 77, 115 Tiirkiye, 49, 78 Tiirkiye Devrimci Komiinist Partisi (Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party, TDKP), 35, 36,49 Tiirkiye Hal/an Kurtttlu$ Ordusu (Turkish People's Liberation Army, Tfll(0),35,50n4 Tiirkiye Komiinist Partisi Marksist Leninist/Tiirkiye j$r;i Koylii Kurtulu$ Ordusu (TKP/MLTIKKO), 35 Dearer, Emek M., 52 U9iincii, Oguz, 94 unions, xv, 3, 14, 30-1, 47-66 (passim), 67, 114-5

u United States, 20, 21, 90 Unsal, Eren, 73 Uras, Nazim, 32 Uras, $iikran, 27, 29 Uyaner, Metin, 27n2

v van Gogh, Theo, 43 Verbindungspersonen, 79 Ver.di, 47, 56 Volkswagen, 27 Volkszugeh6rigkeit (ethno-cultural community), 41

From Guest Workers into Muslims

w Waltzer, Michael, 16 Wedding, 57 Wegweiser, 6 Wilpert, Czarina, 113 workers' rights discourse, 4 7-66, 67

X

y Yatkm, Taciddin, 73-4, 78-9, 83-4 Yeneroglu, Mustafa, 81, 91, 93, 945,98 yenilik9iler (innovators), 103-5 (immigrants' law), 16

Yolda~,

147

Mustafa, 95-6, 97, 105 Young, Iris Marion, 11 0 Yi.icel, Ersan, 26 Yugoslavia, 25 Yurdakul, Gok9e, 9, 10, 13, 15, 24, 44,45, 76,77 Yiireklik, Filiz, 26-30, 37n6 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 19, 46

z Zacatecas Federation, 20 ZDF Television Station, 101 Zentrum fiir Tiirkeistudien, 17 Zuwanderungsgesetz