Exemplification and the Cognitive Value of Art

Exemplification and the Cognitive Value of Art Douglas J. Dempster Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Mar., 1989), pp. 393-412. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28198903%2949%3A3%3C393%3AEATCVO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/ips.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.org Tue Jul 31 23:43:24 2007

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. XLIX, NO. 3, March 1989

Exemplification and the Cognitive Value of Art DOUGLAS J . DEMPSTER

Eastman School of Music, University of Rochester

Introduction Nelson Goodman has claimed that the arts and the sciences are not so different after all: the arts and the sciences, he thinks, are all "symbol-minded" activities whereby artistic and scientific communities try to construct more "fitting" or appropriate or true renderings of the world.' Both the arts and the sciences, he also claims, by virtue of being symbolic activities, are cognitively valuable: [Tlhe arts must be taken no less seriously than the sciences as modes of discovery, creation, and enlargement of knowledge in the broad sense of advancement of understanding, and thus the philosophy of art should be conceived as an integral part of metaphysics and epistemology. [WOW, p. I O ~ ] "

And Goodman complements this view by deriding the commonplace suggestion that works of art are essentially valuable in some hedonistic sense. The arts and sciences are unified and distinguished within the framework of Goodman's theory of symbols, which is laid out in Languages of Art and elaborated in his later works: Scientific discourse is characterized by the employment of unambiguous, notational symbol systems; the arts I would like to thank Jerrold Levinson and Colin Lyas for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. See also LA, p. 255-65. All references to the works of Nelson Goodman will be abbreviated as follows: Languages of Art (LA), (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); Ways of Worldmaking (WOW), (Cambridge: Hackett, 1978); Of Mind and Other Matters (MOM), (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1984); Problems and Projects (PP), (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.)

EXEMPLIFICATION A N D THE COGNITIVE VALUE O F ART

393

are characterized by the employment of non-notational symbol systems that tend toward ambiguity and repleteness. An obvious obstacle to Goodman's ideas about the symbolic function and cognitive value of art is that much art, and certainly most music, is not seemingly meaningful or representational in any way. But works of art, even when not representational, may still be expressive. Goodman turns that observation to advantage by construing expressiveness as a symbolic relation of a special kind. Expressiveness in art, he says, is metaphorical exemplification.' Exemplification is, in turn, a strain of reference, and refGoodman calls exemplifying symbols erence a variety of symb~lization.~ 'samples', and believes that works of art are "symptomatically," though not necessarily, sample^.^ Consequently, Goodman's assimilation of the arts to his theory of symbols depends importantly on his account of works of art as samples or exemplifying symbols. In the second and third parts of this paper, I shall consider Goodman's account of exemplification. I shall argue that his account, insofar as it can be made clear, is neither necessary nor sufficient, and that it fails to distinguish exemplification from other elementary forms of reference. More exactly, I cannot see how Goodman can manage t o give a referential account of exemplification within the ontological constraints of nominalism. In order to salvage his claims about exemplification and the cognitive value of art, I shall argue that either the referential analysis of exemplification or the nominalist constraints will have to be abandoned. Before turning to that argument, I want to suggest, in the first part of this paper, that Goodman's account of exemplification may also play an essential role in his nominalist solution to the problem of fictive descriptions and representations. His well knpwn solution to these problems seems to require something like an exemplificational relation between predicates with empty extensions and descriptions of those predicates. If his account of exemplification should have difficulties, as I think it does, then it will also jeopardize his proposed solution. And if that solution Philosophers of art have traditionally been troubled by talk of the expressive properties of art because such attributions usually include psychological predicates: works of art are often described as being despairing, anguished, exuberant, light hearted, etc. But at least on the face of the matter, paintings, performances, and other media do not have the psychological stuff that such states are made of. Though it is not his principal concern. Goodman's account of expressiveness also addresses this traditional problem in a fairly standard way: descriptions of the expressive properties of a work of art are in some sense metaphorical attributions. And to his credit, Goodman gives an account of metaphor to support his solution. But I mean to avoid in this paper any discussion of metaphor. See LA, p. 59. See also LA, pp. 252-55;WOW, pp. 67-69;MOM, pp. 135-38.

394

DOUGLAS J. DEMPSTER

should fail, then doubt is cast on Goodman's entire theory of meaning and symbol systems. In the final section of the paper, I shall make some brief suggestions about how to salvage claims about the cognitive value of art in more pragmatic terms while abandoning the need to characterize all works of art as having a symbolic or referential function. I thereby reserve the prospect of nominalism.

As a nominalist, Goodman excludes intensional entities, such as meanings, senses, or concepts, from his ontology. This makes for special difficulties in explaining differences of meaning between "fictive" terms, predicates, or descriptions. (In this section I am going to follow Goodman in using the term 'predicate' in a pretty causal way. A predicate, for Goodman, seems to be any expression that has a denoting function.) A fictive predicate is not one that is itself a fiction, but one that would denote fictional or otherwise non-existent entities if any existed. Common sense insists that the predicates 'centaur' and 'unicorn' have different meanings, but they clearly have identical empty extensions. So not even the nominalist can attribute all differences of meaning to differences of extension. Goodman attempts to solve this problem while avoiding "the dismal search through Never-Never land for some ghostly entities call 'meanings"' [PP, p. 2251. He proposes that two predicates have the same meaning just in case they have the same primary and secondary extensions [PP, p. 2271. Everything denoted by a predicate comprises its primary extension. Everything denoted by compound expressions in which a predicate appears comprises its secondgry extension [PP, 2271. So, 'centaur' and 'unicorn' have the same empty primary extension, but they have very different secondary extensions due to the fact that not all descriptions of centaurs are descriptions of unicorns and not all pictures of centaurs are pictures of unicorns. Thus, the secondary extension of the terms differ, at least with respect to some of their compounds, and that difference makes the semantic difference that Goodman is looking for. Now this proposal has to be qualified in order to meet some obvious objections. First, the secondary extension of a predicate must not influence the truth value of existential sentences in which it appears. No predicate will have, on Goodman's view, an empty secondary extension; but that fact alone must not guarantee the falsehood of any negative existential claim. Second, Goodman warns that compounds of the predicate 'unicorn', such as 'a picture of a unicorn' or 'a description of a unicorn', must not be construed as relational predicates. Something can be a picture of a uni-

EXEMPLIFICATION A N D T H E C O G N I T I V E VALUE O F ART

395

corn without there being a unicorn that the picture is a picture of. These predicates are to be construed as one-place predicates, and he adopts the convention of hyphenated predicates to emphasize this point: e.g., rather than talk about a picture of a unicorn he talks about a 'unicorn-picture' [PP, 2261. Now it looks as though Goodman is here treating the meaning of a predicate as at least partly syncategormatic. That is, the meaning of a predicate is partly a matter of the systematic influence it has on the mean. ~ rest of ing of linguistic environments into which it can be i n ~ e r t e dThe the predicate's meaning is straightforwardly a matter of its primary extension. But this cannot be, contrary to appearances, exactly what Goodman means. Not every expression into which a predicate can be syntactically inserted can have a bearing on the secondary extension of that predicate: If extensions of both 'a unicorn-description' and 'a non-unicorn-description' contribute to the secondary extension of the term 'unicorn', then the secondary extension of 'unicorn' will include all descriptions. And the secondary extension of 'centaur', by the exact same reasoning, will prove also to include all descriptions. And this point can be readily generalized. Thus, the difference in meaning between the predicates 'unicorn' and 'centaur' would be reflected neither in their primary nor secondary extensions so long as all compounds of those predicates are regarded as semantically relevant. The semantic problem for Goodman is to find some expression or expressions whose denotation can serve to fix the secondary extension of a fictive predicate. By showing the predicates stand in some semantic relation to the extension of other expressions he hopes to provide a nominalistic basis for distinguishing the meaning of different fictive predicates. But if not just any compound has a bearing on the secondary extension of an included predicate - and thus on its meaning -then which of a predicate's many possible compounds are semantically relevant? Goodman offers no solution - no principled solution, anyway - to this problem. He offers examples. His favorite illustration of an expression that determines the secondary extension of a predicate F is the expression 'F-description'. That expression is interesting because ( I ) it denotes, among other things, the predicate F itself, and ( 2 ) it guarantees, Goodman thinks, that for any two (lexically distinct) predicates F and G, their secondary extensions will differ. He says

For a much more systematic development of syncategormatic meaning see Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).

Clearly the predicate "centaur-description" applies while the predicate "unicorn-description" does not apply to an inscription of "a centaur that is not a unicorn." [PP, p. 2281

And that difference of denotation, on his view, accounts for the difference of meaning between the predicates 'centaur' and 'unicorn'. This example suggests the following principle: a difference in meaning between two fictive predicates can be captured by the difference of extension of all the expressions that denote the two fictive predicates. But this is clearly too strong. Not every difference between two predicates is a semantic difference; differences of spelling, for example, are semantically irrelevant. The foregoing principle, however, would make every describable difference between two predicates a semantic difference: 'unicorn' is a seven letter predicate denoted by the expression 'a seven-letter-description'. 'Single-horned horse' is a seventeen letter predicate denoted by the expression 'seventeen-letter-description'. These two expr,essions have very different extensions; consequently, if their extensions are semantically relevant to the fictive predicates, then the secondary extensions of 'unicorn' and 'single-horned horse' will also be different secondary extensions. It would follow then that merely on the basis of a difference of spelling, 'unicorn' and 'single-horned horse' will have very different meanings. And that does not seem right. Clearly some, but not all, of the expressions that denote some predicate should determine the secondary extension of that predicate, and thus semantically differentiate that predicate from others. But which of all those expressions that denote some predicate play that semantic role? In his early discussions of fictive predicates, Nelson Goodman offers no generalizations on this matter. Goodman faces a similar problem, I think, in his widely discussed account of pictorial representation. Common usage of the expression 'a picture of x', he thinks, is ambiguous with respect to the difference between what a picture represents, a referential relation, and what it represents something as, which he construes not triadically but monadically. In order to reform common usage, Goodman once again adopts the hyphenation convention in order to distinguish the relational predicate 'x is a picture of y' from the one-place predicate 'x is an F-picture', and these two predicates, he claims, are logically independent of one another. The problem for this distinction arises when we ask the following: which of the many possible descriptions of a picture constitute semantic characterizations (i.e., characterizations of the picture's "representing as" function) as opposed, say, to mere material or formal characterizations of the picture? A blue picture, for example, does not necessarily represent its

E X E M P L I F I C A T I O N A N D T H E C O G N I T I V E VALUE O F ART

397

subject as blue anymore than a miniature need represent its subject as small. And where two pictures have fictive subjects, there can be no recourse to differences in extension to capture some intuitive difference in representational content. But beyond some perspicuous illustrations, Goodman offers no very complete picture of his semantic theory of picturing. Goodman does suggest -without working out the suggestion -that a nominalist solution to the problem of fictive predicates and fictive pictures is to be found in the relation of exemplification.' Goodman construes exemplification as a form of reference distinct from denotation. Though a predicate such as 'unicorn' denotes nothing, it still exemplifies unicorndescriptions, of which there are many, and it does not exemplify centaurdescriptions, of which there are many others. What is more, not every property possessed by a predicate or picture is exemplified by it; so this suggestion would seem to offer a solution to our problem. If we take this proposal seriously, then the secondary extension of predicates and pictures will be determined by what a predicate or picture exemplifies. What I have accomplished so far is simply to show that Goodman's account of exemplification is important not only to his proposed unification of the arts and sciences, his claims about the cognitive value of art and his solution to the puzzle of expressiveness in art, but it also seems to play an important role in completing his nominalist accounts of synonymy and pictorial representation. That makes exemplification worth thinking about.

(ii) In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman presents a "systematic inquiry into the varieties and functions of symbols . . ." [p. xi]. Symbols are, for Goodman, things that "stand for," "pick out," "apply to," or "refer to'' other things, or are the right sort of things in a system of such relations. A symbol is a functional kind of thing: so long as some entity satisfies the proper position in the referriilg relation, it is a symbol. O n Goodman's view, reference comes in at least two fundamentally distinct varieties: denotation and e ~ e m ~ l i f i c a t i oAccordingly, n.~ symbols

' From

LA, p. 66: "[Flictive description and fictive representation reduce to exemplification of a special kind. 'Centaur' or a picture of a centaur exemplifies being a cen. taur-description or a centaur-picture, or more generally, being a centaur-label. Description-as and representation-as, though pertaining to labels, are likewise matters of exemplification rather than of denotation." And in MOM, p. 88: "Representation, representation-as, and fictive representation can all be explained in terms of, rather than as, species of reference." See LA, pp. 65 and gz. Goodman suggests some odd things about exemplification and

..

come in two parallel varieties: denoting symbols or "labels," and exemplifying symbols or "samples." Among labels Goodman groups pictures, diagrams, scores, descriptions, models, maps, scripts, and texts. Samples are taxonomically less tractable, including, among other things, tailors' swatches, color chips, specimens, demonstrations, and, presumably, artistic expressions. What exactly, on Goodman's view, are depotational and exemplificational reference, or alternately, what are labels and samples, and what are the differences between them? Goodman says: Consider a tailor's booklet of small swatches of cloth. These function as samples, as symbols exemplifying certain properties. But a swatch does not exemplify all its properties. . Exemplification is possession plus reference. To have without symbolizing is merely to possess, while to symbolize without having is to refer in some other way than by exemplifying. The swatch exemplifies only those properties that it both has and refers to. [LA, p. 531

. .

Consistent with nominalist strictures, Goodman construes all talk of the possession of properties as talk of individuals being denoted by or complying with labels: Exemplification relates the symbol to a label that denotes it, and hence indirectly to the things (including the symbol itself) in the range of that label. [LA, p. 921

A sample is just any thing that satisfies the functional relation of exemplifying something. What is exemplified is not a property, but a label, and labels are clearly not abstract entities on Goodman's view. A sample that exemplifies some label is "indirectly related," he says, to the denotata of that label.9 Presumably, this "indirect relation" is a semantic relation that, among other things, fixes the secondary extension of a fictive label, predicate, or representation. To put this more precisely, Goodman holds that denotation. On the one hand, he says that they are species or varieties of reference. But then he immediately qualifies this remark by saying that "an element may come to serve as a symbol for an element related to it in almost any way," as if to say that rather than being species of reference, denotation and exemplification are two different ways symbols "come to refer" to something. He also says, in the same passage, that not every case of symbolization is referential. Thus, in this passage at least, Goodman suggests that exemplification and denotation are non-exhaustive species (though perhaps exclu~ive)of reference, which is in turn a non-exhaustive species of symbolization. In LA, Goodman is concerned solely with referential symbols, and he commonly uses 'symbol' to stand for referring symbols. I shall follow his usage. We should wonder in what sense the sample and the extension of its referent are "indirectly related"? Are they referentially related? Does a sample s refer to something x in virtue of referring to 'x'? If so, exemplification would be an odd sort of symbol, one that managed to refer to the referents of anything it referred to.

EXEMPLIFICATION A N D T H E COGNITIVE VALUE O F ART

399

'x exemplifies y' is true if and only if

(i) y denotes x and (ii) x refers to y. [LA, pp. 52-53]

He goes on to say that there is a "difference in direction" of symbolization by labels as opposed to samples, in denotation as opposed to exemplification [LA, pp. 52,65,92]. Labels are symbols for what they denote; samples are symbols for what denotes them. The tailor's swatch may be denoted by the labels 'seersucker', 'light weight', and 'made in the U.S.A.' And depending upon how it is functioning (i.e., what sort of exemplificational symbol scheme is employed), it will exemplify some of these labels only if it is both denoted by those labels and refers back to them. There are two serious difficulties for Goodman's view: I.

Condition (i) entails that a necessary condition on an exemplificational symbol, a sample, is that it be denoted by the relevant labels. But for many samples there seem to be no such relevant labels or descriptions. In fact, it is exactly those cases where no appropriate label or description is available that we are most in need of the often clumsy device of samples, examples, and illustrations. If there are such cases, or if such cases are the norm, then they present straightforward counterexamples to Goodman's analysis. Goodman has given this objection a good deal of worry.

2.

Goodman's speciation of the forms of symbolization turns back on itself in an unilluminating manner. What was wanted was a distinction between de'notational symbolization (i.e., reference) and exemplificational symbolization (i.e., reference). What is offered is a characterization of exemplification in terms of denotation and reference. But this account both fails to differentiate denotation from exemplification and threatens circularity.

I shall consider each of these objections in greater detail. First, many samples, though denoted by many labels or predicates, are not readily described or denoted by any label sufficiently precise or appropriate to satisfy Goodman's conditions on exemplificational reference. For instance, if I hope to match an old pair of seersucker pants to a new seersucker coat, I shall use a portion of the old fabric to match against the new for the very reason that just being seersucker is not enough. The old fabric is sure enough seersucker, just as it is fabric, just as it is light weight; both

the labels 'seersucker' and 'a fabric' denote my coat. But the property that the old fabric exemplifies, at least for my purposes, is no more simply that it is seersucker than that it is a fabric. Just any old seersucker, just any old fabric, will not do. The relevant property seems unlabelled in English, or at least in my dialect it is unlabelled. Perhaps a haberdasher would have the words to describe the old fabric. Nonetheless, I would say that in spite of being imprecisely labelled - indeed, precisely because it is unlabelled -the piece of fabric from my old seersucker pants has to turn the trick of exemplifying just the properties I mean to find in some new fabric. What this example suggests is that it is a mistake to think of samples as exemplifying labels or as being samples of predicates. In other words, it suggests that there are real difficulties with Goodman's nominalist account of sampling and exemplification. A swatch of seersucker fabric may be denoted by 'seersucker', but the swatch, if it is a sample of anything, is a sample of the relevant properties possessed by my old suit, whether or not such properties are labelled in my dialect. Or, at one remove from Platonic havens, it is a sample of all the members of a set of fabrics that would pass some matching test were it performed. The swatch is not a sample of the label 'seersucker' or any other label that in this case does, as a matter of fact, denote the swatch. And why should we have thought Goodman's account plausible in the first place? If anything were to exempliQ a description of seersucker fabric, it would surely be something like the expressions 'seersucker' or ' x is a seersucker fabric', but it would not be a piece of seersucker fabric. And when not wrapped up in Goodman's theory, we would surely say that a particular piece of seersucker fabric, if it exemplifies anything, exemplifies other seersuckers or the property of seersuckerness, but not any descriptions of those things. Richard Peltz modifies Goodman's account of exemplification in light of the forgoing considerations.'" He analyzes exemplification as follows: "A exemplifies B" can mean '"B' denotes A ( A possesses B ) and 'A' denotes what 'B' denotes. . . ." That this redchip exemplifies "red" can be taken to mean that "red" denotes this chip and that this chip refers to "red," i.e., this chip denotes whatever "red" denotes. Again, Churchill exemplifies "man" in that "man" denotes Churchill and Churchill refers to "man," i.e., Churchill denotes whatever "man" denotes including Churchill. Churchill then both denotes and exemplifies."

"Nelson Goodman on Picturing, Describing, and Exemplifying," Journal of Aesthetic Education 6 ( 1 9 7 2 ) :71-86. " Peltz, pp. 81-82. lo

E X E M P L I F I C A T I O N A N D T H E C O G N I T I V E VALUE O F ART

401

For reasons that will become clear shortly, Peltz interprets a sample's returned reference as denotational reference, thus construing exemplification as a "conjunction of denotations." But for the moment, what is important is that his analysis seems to require that a sample refer not to the label that denotes it, but to those things denoted by the label, including the sample itself." Peltz's view, unfortunately, is confused by a use-mention muddle. There are three terms in his analysis: A, 'A', and 'By.1n brder to avoid confusion, where he uses a symbol to refer to its referent(s) I shall speak of the referent(s) of the symbol (e.g., the referent(s) of the symbol 'A'). Where he uses the quoted symbol to refer to the symbol itself, I shall speak of the symbol itself (e.g., the symbol 'A'). Replacing terminology, his analysis of exemplification is as follows:. "The referent(s) of the symbol 'A' exemplifies the referent(s) of the symbol 'B"' means that (i) the symbol 'B' denotes the referent(s) of the symbol 'A' and (ii) the symbol 'A' denotes the referent(s) of the symbol
'" This analysis of exemplification, and thus artistic expressiveness, captures what Peltz calls the "immediacy" of art, an aestheticism scorned by Goodman. Henning Jensen ["Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory," ]ournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 32 (1973): 47-51] bases his criticism of Goodman's "semiotic theory of aesthetics" on a similar fundamental misinterpretation of Goodman's view: "The most serious objection to be directed against semiotic theories has always been that it is implausible to claim that the work of art refers to something other than itself" (p. ,48); "If, as I have argued, Goodman is in error in admitting into his theory reference by the work of art to properties distinct and separable from itself, then, since reference is a central part of exemplification, it may be concluded that he is in error in maintaining that exemplificationality is a symptom of the aesthetic" (p. 49). But Jensen has, contrary to his claim, provided no argument for supposing that a work of art must not refer to anything outside of itself except to quote the authority of Santayana. Nor does he give any reason to suppose that Goodman should, by the implicit commitments of his own theory, be moved by such an objection.

If read carefully, Peltz's analysis clearly does not capture the form of his examples. Modified to suit his examples, the analysis would read as follows: "Something A exemplifies the symbol 'B"' means that (i) A denotes everything denoted by the symbol 'By (and perhaps more) and (ii) the symbol 'B' denotes A.13 Put more generally: For all x and all y, x exemplifies y just in case (i) y is a symbol that denotes x and (ii) x is a symbol that denotes whatever y denotes. These two conditions clearly entail that the exemplifying symbol is selfreferential. A red chip exemplifies in virtue of denoting all the things that 'red' denotes including the red chip itself. But Peltz's explication of the exemplification relation has its own difficulties. First, every self-referring symbol will satisfy Peltz's account in a trivial fashion wherever the two symbols 'A' and 'B' in the analysis are identical. On this view, any usage of an expression such as 'a linguistic expression', in any linguistic environment or pragmatic context, will exemplify itself. Goodman makes a similar claim: Matters are further complicated by symbols that refer to themselves. A symbol that denotes itself also exemplifies itself, is both denoted and exemplified by itself. [LA, p. 591

Though every exemplifying symbol, every sample, might be self-referential, not every self-referential symbol is plausibly a sample. I shall return to this claim shortly. Second, where Goodman's analysis required an unspecified referential relation between an exemplifying symbol and the label it exemplifies, Peltz's account requires a denotational relation between the exemplifying symbol and the referents of the label exemplified. Peltz's view has the attraction of making exemplification more nearly a relation between a sample and the class of which it is part, rather than a relation between the sample and some label for that class. Goodman, however, contemplated this possibility, but rejected it for the following reason:14 if the philosopher Socrates is both among those things that are rational and a symbol

I4

Three changes have been made to Peltz's original analysis: First, and most important, the symbol 'B' must denote A as well as the referent(s) of the symbol A; second, the exemplification relation requires that what is exemplified must be a symbol; third, on this analysis, the extension of the symbol 'B' must be a subset of the extension of A, but need not be, strictly speaking, coextensive. LA, p. 55; cf. C. Elgin, With Reference to Reference (Cambridge: Hackett, 1983), p. 76 for the same argument.

EXEMPLIFICATION A N D T H E C O G N I T I V E VALUE O F ART

403

coextensive with the predicate or label 'is rational', then Socrates exemplifies the set of beings denoted by the predicate 'is rational'.Is But if Socrates satisfies the necessary conditions for exemplification of the predicate 'is rational', then he will also satisfy those conditions for any label coextensive with 'is rational'. So if the set of rational entities is identical to the set of risible entities, then Socrates will equally well exemplify the set of beings denoted by the predicate 'is risible'. But as Goodman rightly, I think, insists, Socrates simply does not exemplify every property or label coextensive with 'is rational'. Or to put the matter another way, it ought to be possible that Socrates might exemplify the set of rational beings but not the set of risible beings. But this is impossible so long as extensions of predicates are what a sample exemplifies and two extensions are even contingently identical. This gives a reductio against the thesis that samples exemplify the extensions of labels. Finally, Peltz's account is, in spite of all its modifications, still subject to the objection that, on the face of it, presented difficulty for Goodman's analysis: it precludes commonplace instances of exemplification in which there are no sufficiently precise or appropriate labels that can be plausibly said to denote the sample. n ' ~ to the Unlike Peltz, both Goodman and Catherine ~ l ~ i have'held view that it is labels that are exemplified rather than properties or classes. And they have answered the charge that exemplification often occurs, as I have observed, without a reciprocating label by denying that fact. For Elgin, as for Goodman, exemplification requires that the exemplifying sample be denoted by an appropriate label. The problem then is finding an appropriate label that can be plausibly claimed to denote the relevant sample in every case of exemplification. Elgin suggests both that not all labels need be verbal labels and that where there is no appropriate label, the sample itself can serve as its own label. Take first the case of linguistic samples:

IS

16

Note that Goodman has given a theory of exemplificationality without revealing any criteria that might allow us to determine exactly what any symbol exemplifies when it is, as a matter of fact, exemplificational. He says only that what referent, or label, any particular sample exemplifies will be determined by the specificsymbol system in which the sample functions or in which it is employed (LA, pp. 53-54). He gives essentially the same response to the question of how one is to discover or determine the extension of a label; one is in some vague sense obligated to consult the entrenched linguistic practices of some linguistic community (except, I suppose, when one thinks common sense and ordinary language a "repository of ancient error"). But he gives no criteria for identifying or individuating linguistic communities or entrenched as opposed to non-entrenched practices. Goodman's theories stop, in short, where epistemological considerations begin. Elgin, pp. 72-87,

4 0 4 DOUGLAS J . DEMPSTER

Consider, for example, 'onomatopoetic'. This term applies to words like 'hiss', 'meow', and 'bobwhite' because there pronounciation reproduces sounds associated with their referents. It is clear then that an appropriate replica of 'meow' might exemplify 'onomatopoetic', given that there is such a term in the language. But what should we say of the interpretation of that replica in a sublanguage that differs from English only in that it lacks the term 'onamatopoetic'? Obviou$ly, the replica doesn't exemplify 'onomatopoetic', for that term simply isn't there to be exemplified. Are we forced to conclude that it doesn't exemplify at all? I think not. Instead, let us say that it exemplifies the makeshift predicate 'meow-predicate'."

The uncharitable reading of this claim is that where there is no appropriate label for some sample we can, and should, simply introduce a "makeshift" label. If that were the case, one could just as readily introduce into the sublanguage the label 'onomatopoetic' as the label 'meow-predicate'. Rather, the suggestion seems to be that as long as the label 'predicate' is available, we must grant that there exists for every sample a verbal label constructed by combining a token of the verbal sample (viz., 'meow') with the label 'predicate'. This seems to work neatly in this example because the relevant sample is itself a linguistic element and can be combined in a syntactically plausible, albeit unfamiliar, makeshift hyphenation in order to denote itself. But what guarantees that an expression we shiftily make in this way will have the relevant extension, that is, one that includes both the expression 'meow' as well as other onomatopoetic expressions? Makeshift labels such as 'meow-predicate' have determinate extension only in virtue of the relevant sample (viz., 'meow') having a determinate exemplificational relation to some other items. In other words, the denotational function of the new expression 'meow-predicate' is semantically parasitic upon the exemplificational function of 'meow'. The makeshift label 'meow-predicate' denotes 'meow' and other onomatopoetic expressions (rather than, say, just 'meow') only if 'meow' exemplifies onomatopoetic expressions quite generally. These difficulties become yet more difficult when non-linguistic samples are in question. If, for example, a Lichtenstein painting expresses or exemplifies a certain property-we-can-say-not-what, where will we find a makeshift label that denotes it in an appropriate, sufficiently precise way? Elgin suggests that "we might introduce hieroglyphic elements into our written language in an effort to create labels to denote and be exemplified by symbols in the visual arts."18 And one is, I suppose, to imagine a small "hieroglyphic" of Lichtenstein's work, or the relevant property of his

work - perhaps a postcard reproduction of the work with the word 'predicate' taped to it. But this is a hopeless suggestion given the loss of information inevitable in the miniaturized reproduction of a Lichtenstein. And this suggestion is positively unworkable when applied to cases of musical expressiveness (i.e., metaphorical exemplification): what sort of hieroglyphic label might be adopted to denote the peculiar properties exemplified in a Mendelssohn's string quartet? Elgin recognizes that hieroglyphic contrivances are "inadequate to account for all but the coarsest exemplification by nonverbal symbol^."'^ She admits that the syntax and semantics of natural languages are simply not "sensitive enough to capture all the nuances exemplified by musical and pictorial symbols."'" Both Elgin and Goodman [LA. pp. 61,63,65] insist, ultimately, that a sample must function as its own label where there is no alternative label sufficiently precise for the task. Elgin says: I suggest that the labels are typically to be found in the exemplifying symbols themselves. In exemplifying, a symbol in such a system functions as a label that denotes itself and the other things that match it. A painting, then, not only points up some of its own features but also heightens our sensitivity to other instances of the forms, patterns, colors, etc., that it exemplifies. We come to see things differently, reordering our visual experience in terms of the categories referred to by the work."'

At least two considerations suggest that this response to the difficulty is inadequate. First, failing the availability of labels, the account drifts toward the Platonic heavens of "features," "forms," and "categories." Where appropriate labels are absent, it is not at all clear how a strict nominalist could disinfect the account of such Platonisms. Second, in the imagined case, perhaps the most common case of exemplification, something must both denote itself and exemplify itself, be both a label for itself and a sample of itself. But the account imposes an additional semantic relation, namely denotation, on cases of samples where there is no very good reason, beyond the demands of the theory, to suppose that such a relation exists. What is more, I think this demand leaves the differences between denotation and exemplification very unclear. I shall turn to that question in the next section. To summarize my objection, because of nominalist scruples, Goodman and Elgin explicate the concept of exemplification, and thus expressiveness, in terms of a relation between labels and samples and not in terms of a relation between properties and exemplary instances of those properties. But these scruples lead to the unhappy consequence that for every

406

DOUGLAS J . D E M P S T E R

sample there must be a label that denotes the sample in a manner sufficiently precise to render that sample practically superfluous. They trade an ontology full of abstract and fictional entities for one full of hidden and "makeshift" labels. If the former ontology pays no respect to Occam's Razor, the latter runs afoul of "Occam's Eraser," which dictates that we not multiply linguistic entities beyond credibility. At any rate, the ontological costs of their account of exemplification are not negligible. (iii) I turn now to the second difficulty in Goodman's account of exemplification. O n Goodman's analysis, a symbol x exemplifies a label y (i.e., x is a sample of y) just in case (i) y denotes x and (ii) x refers to y. How shall we interpret the second condition (I shall call it the referential condition) that x must "refer to" y? Reference is a generic concept that is divided and speciated in Goodman's general theory of symbols. It comes in many different varieties; descriptions, representations, expressive symbols, demonstrations, exemplifications, allusions, quotations, and notations are all forms of reference in his system." Presumably, any of these would satisfy the referential conditions in his account of exemplification. But all of these forms of reference reduce to qualified forms of either denotation (i.e., reference by labels) or exemplification (i.e., reference by samples), and Goodman counts these two as "elementary species of reference."13 (And earlier, I tried to argue that Goodman needs at least these two forms of reference in order to guarantee his solutions to the problems of fictive description and fictive representation.) Therefore, the referential condition can be specified, ultimately, in terms of either of these two elementary forms of reference. But the analysis of exemplification is circular if we interpret 'reference' in the referential condition to mean exemplify: x exemplifies y just in case y denotes x and x exemplifies y. And that is a roundabout way of getting nowhere. That leaves the option of interpreting the referential condition in terms of denotation: x exemplifies y just in case y denotes x and x denotes Y.'~ This is consistent and non-vacuous, but consider the consequences. " See "Routes of References," in MOM.

''

l4

MOM, p. 70. This may be too strong. Goodman seems to hold only that compound denotation is sufficient for exemplification, indeed sufficient for compound exemplification. See the theorems itemized in note 9 on p. 59 of LA.

First, this account confuses the distinction between exemplification and denotation and thus the distinction between samples and labels. It is misleading to claim, on this analysis, that reference comes in two distinct primitive varieties. One would less misleadingly say that reference is always denotational and comes in simple (i.e., x denotes y) or compound forms (i.e., x denotes y, and y denotes x). Exemplification is just compound denotation. Second, compound denotation does not seem sufficient for an exemplificational relation. Consider the following two expressions: I.

Expression

2.

Expression ( I )

(2)

( I )denotes (2),that is, in Goodman's terminology, ( I )is a label for (2). ( 2 ) also denotes (I),and is a label for it. So we have here a case of compound denotation. But does this compound denotation implicate some form of exemplification between ( I ) and (2)?I would say not, though my intuitions and clouded somewhat by the fact that both expressions are being displayed as examples of compound denotation. But they could have easily denoted one another in a context where they were not displayed as examples of anything. The counterexample is more compelling in the case of self-reference. Consider expression (3):

3.

Expression (3)

Expression (3) denotes itself, and thereby satisfies Goodman's analysis of exemplification for the case that x is identical to y. But there seems to be no reason to say that (3) exemplifies itself above and beyond denoting itself. Goodman cautiously insists that something more than mere possession of a property or satisfaction of a predicate is required for exemplification [LA, p. 531. An object does not exemplify or express all the properties it possesses. But this simple counterexample illustrates a further precaution: simple possession (i.e., denotation) cannot be elevated to exemplification simply by being compounded. Third, the account also makes exemplification a symmetrical relation: wherever the conditions on x exemplifying y are satisfied, y will also exemplify x.'~But surely we do not want to say that a sample exemplifies 'I

If we assume that the above formulation is not sufficient but merely necessary, then we could assume that some further condition would render the exemplification relation asymmetrical. On p. 95 of LA Goodman disclaims that his analysis of expressiveness (i.e., metaphorical exemplification) is logically sufficient. But this caveat is responsive to

4 0 8 D O U G L A S J . DEMBSTER

everything that exemplifies it. If I demonstrate how to play a few measures of Beethoven's "Moonlight" Sonata, I do not commit myself to every performance of those measures being a demonstration of my demonstration. Nor, as follows even more absurdly from Goodman's view, is every mention of those measures a demonstration of my demon~tration.'~ There is a third possible construal of the referential condition in the analysis of exemplification. Goodman may construe the necessary reference as involving neither exemplification nor denotation nor any of their referential species. Goodman may have in mind here some third elemental species of reference. But any such intention is utterly unarticulated in any of his many writings on this issue. Goodman frequently claims that exemplification is distinguished from denotation by the "direction" of reference. The symbolization or reference [in exemplification] runs, as we have seen, in the opposite direction from denotation - runs up from rather than down to what is denoted. An object that is literally or metaphorically denoted by a predicate, and refers to that predicate or the corresponding property, may be said to exemplify that predicate or property. [LA, p. 521

In cases of simple denotation, there is only a label and its denotata; thus, Goodman insists, there can be no confusion about whether the symbol is a label or a sample. But the symmetry of Goodman's analysis of exemplification confuses this distinction. Given any case of compound denotation, which of the two symbols involved is the label and which the sample? In exemplification, denotation moves in both directions and there is no "opposite direction" left over to distinguish exemplificational reference from denotational reference. Clearly, the label is not distinguished from the sample by being a denoting symbol; both symbols denote. In order to deal with this difficulty, Goodman must resort to something other than the mere logic of the symmetrical exemplification relation for determining which of the two relata is the sample, that is, the exemplifying symbol. Which of the two denoting symbols in an exemplificational apparent counterexamples of metaphorical exemplification that are not expressive. Nowhere does he express reservations about the sufficiency of his account of exemplification itself. 16

Peltz argues that if exemplification entails compound denotation, then if, for example, (4)'a four word expression' is exemplified by (5) 'a no word expression', then 4 denotes 5 and 5 denotes 4. Or each is a label for the other. This, of course, seems an absurd consequence because it entails that 4 is in the extension of 5 when we can be pretty certain that 5 denotes nothing. Peltz's example constitutes a reductio only if we construe compound denotation as both sufficient for exemplification - Goodman clearly agrees here - but also as necessary for exemplification. But Goodman nowhere, as far as I can find, commits himself on this latter point. At most, Goodman commits himself to the "theorem" that compound exemplification entails compound denotation (LA, p. 59).

EXEMPLIFICATION A N D T H E COGNITIVE VALUE O F ART 409

relation is the sample is determined by some intrinsic and non-relational criterion [LA, pp. 57-58]. Goodman never says what property it is that makes a symbol involved in compound denotation a sample and not a label. He provides only that linguistic or verbal symbols are paradigmatic labels, and these are sufficient, by comparison and analogy, to allow recognition of non-verbal labels and samples: Yet the orientation that distinguishes exemplification from denotation does seem to derive from the organization of language even where nonverbal symbols are involved. In ordinary language, the reference of "man" to Churchill, and of "word" to "man", is unequivocally denotation; while Churchill symbolizes "man," and "man" symbolizes "word," the reference is unequivocally exemplification. With pictures, although they are nonverbal, orientation of referential relationships is provided by established correlations with language. A picture that represents Churchill, like a predicate that applies to him, denotes him. And reference by a picture to one of its colors often amounts to exemplification of a predicate of ordinary language. Such parallels and points of contact with language are enough to set the direction. [LA, pp. 57-58; italics added]

But this is an especially unsatisfactory solution to the puzzles hidden in Goodman's analysis of exemplification: a sample or an exemplifying symbol is just a symbol that denotes another symbol in a sample-ish way. But he cryptically defers to entrenched linguistic practices to determine what counts as sample-ish as opposed to label-ish denotation. The thrust of my criticism is that Goodman has failed to distinguish with any precision the differences between the referential relations of denotations and exemplification. At best, his account suggests that the latter is a compounded case of the former, and that seems clearly insufficient. But more importantly he leaves uncertain what counts, within his own theory, as a sample or an exemplifying symbol; consequently, his insistence that works of art are symptomatically samples, or exemplifying symbols, remains equally unclear.

I am attracted to Goodman's claims for the cognitive value of art, and I am also convinced that exemplification is the key to understanding this value. But my arguments encourage, I think, serious doubts about the possibility of providing a semantic account of exemplification within the constraints of nominalism. Either the semantic account of exemplification, or nominalist strictures, or both will have to be jettisoned if we are to salvage Goodman's explanation of the cognitive value of art in terms of exemplification. I would like to preserve at least the possibility of a nominalist metaphysics; thus I propose to abandon the semantic account of exemplification. I do not claim that my proposals are fair compensation for the

loss of Goodman's elaborate and more systematic theory, but they at least point in new directions. Works of art need not be about anything or refer to anything in order to teach us something interesting and worth knowing. Both Raphael and Mondrain show us that with only the use of line and pigment it is possible to create an impression of depth and motion on a canvas. Debussy and Bartok show us that it is possible to preserve tonality, development, and resolution in music without employing diatonic pitch collections. James Joyce shows that it is possible to maintain the narrative unity and coherence of a novel without indicating clear boundaries between the mental life of a character and his external world. To learn from such works of art, all we need do is notice the incongruities between the properties possessed by the work and those we thought it possible to obtain by manipulating the medium in which the work is created. Nelson Goodman fondly quotes Gombrich fondly quoting Constable: "Painting is a science . . . of which pictures are but the experiments." (LA, p. 33) But this seems to me at best misleading. The creative efforts of artists, writers, or composers only in very rare periods fall under the discipline of a well-defined research program where basic problems and methods are clearly delineated and widely accepted. (Some clear exceptions to that generalization may be found in Renaissance studies of perspective technique or compositional activities of contemporary serialist composers.) Works of art, when they are most illuminating, are more like challenging anomalies that deviate from and shock our expectations than they are like experiments designed to confirm some hypothesis deduced from a theory. And like anomalies, works of art reveal unforseen possibilities without explaining how such possibilities are to be realized. Joyce shows us that narrative unity is possible without respecting traditional Cartesian dualisms, but his work does not, strictly speaking, show or explain how exactly that narrative unity is achieved in the absence of such dualisms. If fiction were a science, even in some metaphorical sense, we could expect something like explanations of various literary phenomena from its practitioners. But explanations are exactly what we do not get from most works of art. But what does it mean to say that a work "shows us" such things. Well, maybe it means that the work exemplifies or exhibits its properties in a certain way. But rather than attempt to construe exemplification as a semantic relation of some kind, I propose we understand it more pragmatically. A work of art exemplifies certain of its properties and not others, I would say, when it is used or displayed in the right sort of way. Viewed or

EXEMPLIFICATION A N D T H E COGNITIVE VALUE O F ART 41 I

heard in the right cultural context, by the right person, some properties of a work of art will be more salient and important than others, and perhaps they will attract comment and description. But we need not insist that the work itself has some symbolic function in addition to possessing those properties and attracting the critical attention of viewers and hearers.

412

D O U G L A S J . DEMPSTER

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS - Page 1 of 1 -

You have printed the following article: Exemplification and the Cognitive Value of Art Douglas J. Dempster Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Mar., 1989), pp. 393-412. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28198903%2949%3A3%3C393%3AEATCVO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

[Footnotes] 12

Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory Henning Jensen The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Autumn, 1973), pp. 47-51. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8529%28197323%2932%3A1%3C47%3AEINGAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.