Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory Henning Jensen The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Autumn, 1973), pp. 47-51. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8529%28197323%2932%3A1%3C47%3AEINGAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism is currently published by The American Society for Aesthetics.
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HENNING JENSEN
Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory
C R I T I C S of semiotic theories in aestheticstheories which maintain that the work of art is a symbol-have tended to share a deep-seated conviction that such theories must sooner or later require reference by the work of art to something other than itself. And these critics have tended to share an equally deep-seated conviction that any view which requires this sort of reference is untenable. There are two ways in which defenders of semiotic theories have tried to develop their theories so as to allow for the conviction that the work of art must not be required to refer to something other than itself. The first consists in maintaining that the work of art is an iconic symbol, a symbol which has important properties similar to or in common with that which it denotes. The second consists in maintaining that the work of art is a symbol which exemplifies certain properties it itself possesses. These two developments within semiotic theory may therefore be viewed as trying to do justice to two claims frequently made concerning works of art: (1) a work of art must be attended to for its own sake, for what it is in itself; (2) a work of art has meaning and is capable of being interpreted. In this paper I shall examine the second of the above developments within semiotic
HENNING JENSEN is associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Motivation and the Moral Sense i n Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory.
theory as it appears in that part of Nelson Goodman's aesthetic theory devoted to the topic of exemplification. Other topics, admittedly of great importance for a full understanding of his theory, will be treated in passing or omitted. Two preliminary observations concerning the place of exemplification in Goodman's theory will help to establish perspective. First, exempiification, according to Goodman, is a symptom of the aesthetic. A symptom, Goodman informs us, "is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for, but merely tends in conjunction with other symptoms to be present in, aesthetic experience" (252).l Second, exemplificationality is central to Goodman's analysis of expression, which he finds to be metaphorical exemplification. Two kinds of reference are treated in detail by Goodman in connection with his aesthetic theory. The first, denotation, is the more familiar. A predicate which denotes something refers to it. It is the second kind of reference, exemplification, to which I shall restrict my attention. According to Goodman, denotation and exemplification differ in direction (50). In denotation a label is being applied to something; in exemplification there is something to which a label applies. If a exemplifies b then: (1) a possesses or is denoted by b and (2) a refers to b , a is a concrete object functioning as a symbol. b, strictly speaking, is a label. According to Goodman, "predicates are labels from linguistic systems," and where others
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might speak of properties, Goodman prefers to regard predicates and labels as elementary (55). A symbol may but does not usually function as a sample of itself. Normally, a symbol which functions as a sample exemplifies only some of its properties. "The tailor's sample does not normally function as a sample of a tailor's sample; it normally exemplifies certain properties of a material, but not the property of exemplifying such properties" (54). Only by knowing what system of symbolization is operative can we know which properties are being exemplified (53). We may now consider, in brief outline, the position which results when Goodman, in the course of his book, applies the foregoing account of symbols which exemplify to one particular kind of a symbol, the work of art. When a, a work of art, exemplifies b, a property or, strictly speaking, a label, a is a concrete physical object which functions as a symbol. In exemplifying b, a both possesses and refers to b. Normally, the work of art does not exemplify all of its properties, but only a selection from them. The most serious objection to be directed against semiotic theories has always been that it is implausible to claim that the work of art refers to something other than itself. I now want to show that Goodman's theory becomes wide open to this objection because his theory does in fact require that the work of art should refer to properties distinct and separable from itself. Let me begin with the rather obvious comment that exemplification is a curious and double-minded sort of affair. When we take account of a as simply possessing b, there is no reference to b as distinct from a, nor is anything said or implied concerning b's being possessed by other objects. However, when a is said to exemplify b, we are led to take account, not just of a's possession of a property b, but of b as a property which might be and normally is possessed by other objects. The properties possessed by a sample are representative; the function of samples is normally to direct us to other cases of the possession of a given property. Using Goodman's terminology, I should
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maintain that, normally, labels exemplified by samples have multiple denotation. All of this is, if not explicitly included in, certainly consistent with Goodman's theory according to which when a exemplifies b, (1) a possesses b and (2) a refers to b. But it is absolutely crucial to dwell on what is involved in the reference of a to b. Surely, on any plausible theory concerning the nature of reference, what must be insisted upon and what Goodman appears at this point to neglect is the fact that when a refers to b, a does not refer to b-as-possessed-by-a, that is, to b characterized as being possessed by a. When a refers to b, b is a property which is taken account of as distinct and separable from a. It is not self-contradictory to maintain both that a possesses b and that the same property, b, may be referred to apart from its being possessed by a. This is in fact what occurs in exemplification: we take account of b both as possessed by a and, because referred to, as distinct and separable from a. With these comments in mind, we may consider the following passage: "The properties that anything exemplifies or expresses, far from lying outside of it, are properties it possesses. Talk about those properties is talk about what the work is." 2 In this passage Goodman argues cogently that exemplification concerns what the work is. What he neglects to consider is that exemplification also concerns a taking account of properties referred to and distinct from the work. Talk about properties exemplified and expressed is, strictly speaking, not just talk about what the work is, but is also talk about what it refers to, namely, properties distinct from it, even if these are among the properties which it itself possesses. It follows, therefore, that Goodman's theory must be included among those semiotic theories which hold that the work of art refers to properties distinct and separable from itself. His claim that the work of art refers to properties which it also possesses is not able to save his theory from inclusion in this group. What is so implausible, then, about allowing the work of art to refer to something
Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory distinct and separable from itself? I will not enter upon a full exposition of the history and nature of the answers which have been given to this question, but will content myself with a very few remainders of basic themes. One of the most cherished supports of the non-semiotic approach is a much quoted passage from Santayana. I n this passage Santayana, after distinguishing, in expression, two terms, an object actually presented and a further object suggested, goes on to maintain that these "lie together in the mind." 3 In other words, in attending to the work of art, we are not aware of its properties as distinct and separable, but only of their being bound up with the work. Now Goodman insists as strongly as anyone that the properties exemplified and expressed by a work of art are indeed its own properties, but, as I have argued, his theory also requires reference by the work of art to properties as distinct from itself. In the case of a work of art Santayana would maintain that we simply hear joyful music, whereas Goodman must maintain that when we hear joyful music, joy is both possessed by the music and referred to as a distinct and separable property. For Goodman, a work of art, like any sample, directs our attention not only to itself but to prop erties which are representative, which are normally possessed by other objects. If, as I have argued, Goodman is in error in admitting into his theory reference by the work of art to properties distinct and separable from itself, then, since reference is a central part of exemplification, it may be concluded that he is in error in maintaining that exemplificationality is a symptom of something's being a work of art and in maintaining, more broadly, that exemplificationality is a symptom of the aesthetic. In view of the central role which he assigns to exemplification, this conclusion is nothing short of disastrous. At this point we might consider a question raised by Goodman: "Why not, then, speak simply of properties possessed rather than of properties exemplified and expressed?" "Because," he answers, "not all the properties the object possesses, but only
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those it exemplifies or expresses when functioning as a symbol of a certain kind, are relevant to it as a work of art." 4 I n this important part of his theory, then, Goodman is directing attention to the problem of how one decides which properties are relevant to a work of art. But does Goodman solve, or even attempt to solve, this problem? The answer to this question hangs on the answer to another, namely, how do we identify the "certain kind" of symbol which, above, Goodman maintains to be that kind which exemplifies and expresses properties relevant to the work of art? Or, how do we know, in the case of works of art, what system of symbolization is in effect? Consider, for example, what Goodman says of pictures. Pictures, as works of art, literally exemplify only pictorial properties, properties provided by a pictorial characterization which "says more or less completely and more or less specifically what colors the picture has at what places" (42). I should suppose that this is the sort of pictorial characterization we might obtain from those kits, s d d in many stores, which supply directions for making pictures with the aid of numbered colors to be applied to designated spaces. Are such pictures works of art? Surely not all need be. How would we tell which, if any, are? We need more than Goodman's pictorial characterization in order to know what is relevant to a picture as a work of art. Without subscribing to formalism, one might suppose that one aspect which might be relevant is the apprehension of formal relationships within a picture. And such formal relationships are surely literally rather than metaphorically exemplified. But, again, Goodman's pictorial characterization cannot tell us which of the indefinitely large number of formal relationships within a picture are relevant to it as a work of art. Later in Languages of Art we are told that discovering what properties are exemplified by a work of art is like the application of "a versatile and complicated gauge, or a battery of them" or like the application of an "ungraduated meter" (235). This is nightmarishly like being told to measure
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without being given any indication as to what to measure or what to measure with. After all, a picture might exemplify an indefinitely large number of properties and no matter how many gauges or meters we apply, we are no nearer to discovering which of these properties is relevant to it as a work of art. There is a fundamental issue here which concerns the nature of exemplification. The normal employment of examples requires the existence of rules and conventions controlling the selection of those properties of the sample which are to be regarded as exemplified. It is of no value to be told that something is a sample and then to be left without the slightest clue as to what it might exemplify. At times, Goodman seems to disclaim responsibility for providing any account to rules and conventions which would tell us which of the properties exemplified by a work of art are relevant to it as a work of art. But I should maintain that any theory which disclaims this responsibility is seriously defective. The main point of a theory like Goodman's, which claims that a work of art is to be interpreted, is surely to help us toward the actual task of interpreting and understanding the work of art. However, without rules and conventions governing the employment of works of art as exemplificational symbols, the cognitive purposes which Goodman ascribes to works of art cannot be fulfilled. In summary, then, I should maintain that Goodman's claim that the work of art is exemplificational and his more general claim that exemplificationality is a symptom of the aesthetic are to be rejected for two main reasons: (1) his view requires reference by the work of art to properties distinct and separable from itself; (2) he does not provide an account of how we decide which properties of an object are relevant to it as a work of art. In wider perspective, what are the implications of the foregoing discussion for a choice between treating works of art as physical or phenomenal? Although Goodman expresses a preference for treating works of art as physical, he believes that the physicalist system, according to which the
work of art is a concrete object exemplifying or expressing certain properties, is in principle interchangeable rather than incompatible with the phenomenalist system, according to which a work of art is "the abstract complex consisting of the properties (which the concrete object) thus symbolizes." Now I entirely agree that, as regards the treatment of works of art, some physicalist approaches are not incompatible and may even be interchangeable with some phenomenalist approaches. But I should suppose that Goodman's physicalist theory is incompatible with a phenomenalist theory because of the fact that exemplification, which is pivotal for his theory, requires reference by the work of art to properties distinct and separable from itself. A phenomenalist may well allow that a work of art might be treated as consisting of qualities manifested by a physical object, but he would not be able to incorporate within his theory a capacity of the work of art for the latter sort of reference. At the beginning of this paper I indicated that Goodman's employment of exemplification within his aesthetic theory was one of two ways in which defenders of semiotic theories have tried to do justice to the conviction, often voiced by their opponents, that any view is implausible which claims that the work of art refers to something other than itself. The other of these two ways consists in maintaining that the work of art is an iconic symbol, a symbol which has important properties similar to or in common with that which it denotes. Because of the restrictions of my topic, I do not propose to discuss the iconic theory. However, I should like to suggest that the logical characteristics of Goodman's theory and of the iconic theory are, where not identical, at least remarkably parallel. On the interpretation of Goodman's theory for which I have argued, both theories involve reference by the work of art to properties which it possesses and to these same properties as distinct and separable from it. Furthermore, the two main reasons which I gave for rejecting Goodman's position apply equally to the iconic theory. That is, it too is open to criticism because of its
Exemplification in Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Theory
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inclusion of reference by the work of art to In a jocular passage, Goodman warns us properties distinct and separable from itself of the dangers of adopting the Immanuel and because it includes no convention or Tingle-Joseph Immersion Theory. There rule enabling us to decide which of the are very real dangers also, I should mainproperties denoted by the work of art and tain, in adopting the Will de Cipher similar to or in common with properties it Theory. possesses are relevant to it as a work of art. The most obvious difference between the two theories concerns the difference in direcPage references in parentheses are to Nelson tion, as Goodman calls it, between his exGoodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis and New emplificational theory and the iconic York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968). theory, which has usually been set forth as a Nelson Goodman, "Some Notes on Languages of denotational. It should be added that the Art," Journal of Philosophy 67 (August 20, 1970): parallels are drawn only with respect to 567. 'George Santayana, T h e Sense of Beauty (New that part of Goodman's theory having to do York: Scribners, 1936), p. 147. with exemplification and cannot be applied "Some Notes on Languages of Art," p. 567. to his views on representation in art. Ibid.
