Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation (Euricur Series)

EMPOWERING METROPOLITAN REGIONS THROUGH NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION

The European Institute for Comparative Urban Research, EURICUR, was founded in 1988 and has its seat with Erasmus University Rotterdam. EURICUR is the heart and pulse of an extensive network of European cities and universities. EURICUR’s principal objective is to stimulate fundamental international comparative research into matters that are of interest to cities. To that end, EURICUR coordinates, initiates and carries out studies of subjects of strategic value for urban management today and in the future. Through its network EURICUR has privileged access to crucial information regarding urban development in Europe and North America and to key persons at all levels, working in different public and private organizations active in metropolitan areas. EURICUR closely cooperates with the Eurocities Association, representing more than 100 large European cities. As a scientific institution, one of EURICUR’s core activities is to respond to the increasing need for information that broadens and deepens the insight into the complex process of urban development, among others by disseminating the results of its investigations by international book publications. These publications are especially valuable for city governments, supranational, national and regional authorities, chambers of commerce, real estate developers and investors, academics and students, and others with an interest in urban affairs EURICUR website: http://www.euricur.nl This book is one of a series to be published by Ashgate under the auspices of EURICUR, the European Institute for Comparative Urban Research, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Titles in the series are: Growth Clusters in European Metropolitan Cities Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Willem van Winden Information and Communications Technology as Potential Catalyst for Sustainable Urban Development Leo van den Berg and Willem van Winden Sports and City Marketing in European Cities Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Alexander H.J. Otgaar Social Challenges and Organising Capacity in Cities Leo van den Berg, Jan van der Meer and Peter M.J. Pol City and Enterprise Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Alexander H.J. Otgaar The Student City Leo van den Berg and Antonio P. Russo European Cities in the Knowledge Economy Leo van den Berg, Peter M.J. Pol, Willem van Winden and Paulus Woets The Safe City Leo van den Berg, Peter M.J. Pol, Guiliano Mingardo and Carolien J.M. Spellier. E-Governance in European and South African Cities Leo van den Berg, Andre van der Meer, Willem van Winden and Paulus Woets National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Jan van der Meer

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

ALEXANDER OTGAAR LEO VAN DEN BERG JAN VAN DER MEER CAROLIEN SPELLER

European Institute for Comparative Urban Research Erasmus University Rotterdam The Netherlands www.euricur.nl

© Alexander Otgaar, Leo van den Berg, Jan van der Meer, Carolien Speller 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Alexander Otgaar, Leo van den Berg, Jan van der Meer, Carolien Speller have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Empowering metropolitan regions through new forms of cooperation. - (EURICUR series) 1. Metropolitan areas - Europe - Case studies 2. Cities and towns - Europe - Growth - Case studies I. Otgaar, Alexander H. J. II. European Institute for Comparative Urban Research 307.7 ' 64 ' 094 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Empowering metropolitan regions through new forms of cooperation / by Alexander Otgaar ... [et al.]. p. cm. -- (EURICUR series (European Institute for Comparative Urban Research)) Includes index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7241-8 1. Regional planning--Europe. 2. Regional planning--Europe--Case studies. 3. Metropolitan areas--Europe. 4. Intergovernmental cooperation--Europe. 5. Publicprivate sector cooperation--Europe. I. Otgaar, Alexander H. J. II. European Institute for Comparative Urban Research. HT395.E85E67 2007 307.1’2094--dc22 2007020231 ISBN: 978-0-7546-7241-8

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents List of Figures List of Tables List of Boxes Preface

vii ix xi xiii

1

Introduction

2

Brainport Eindhoven

13

3

Centrope: A Cross-Border Alliance in the Central European Region

39

4

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

65

5

The Networks of Wonderful Copenhagen

97

6

Planning for Sustainable Development in the Munich Region

119

7

Integrated Public Transport Policies in the Budapest Metropolitan Area

141

8

Noordrand Project: Cooperation in the Rotterdam Region

165

9

The Better Districts Programme of Catalonia: Serra d’en Mena

189

10

Porto’s Experience with the Serralves Foundation

215

11

Synthesis

235

Index

1

259

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List of Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.2

Determinants of success in the creation of new governance structures Eindhoven and the cross-border region The Brainport organization Centrope in central Europe Centrope’s proposed organizational structure The Helsinki Metropolitan Area and Helsinki Region Expanding travel-to-work area 1980–2002 Map of the Copenhagen region Copenhagen’s bid strategy The Freestate of Bavaria The Planning Region of Munich The division of population (=P) and jobs (=J) in the Munich region Organization of RPV Organization of Planungsverband Aüβerer Wirtschaftsraum München BKSZ operational area Internal oganization BKSZ Urban networks in the Netherlands Planning map Noordrand area Catalonia, Spain The seven neighbourhoods of Serra d’en Mena Impression of urban structure and quality, Serra d’en Mena Current and future situation accessibility and urban structure The Serralves Museum Casa de Serralves

9 15 26 40 60 67 70 99 113 121 121 123 127 130 153 156 166 176 190 192 193 203 216 216

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List of Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1

Phases of development in the knowledge-intensive industry Overview of Horizon projects The four domains of the Brainport programme Examples of actions in the Brainport programme Work packages and objectives of the ELAt project Population of the Centrope region Economic structure Centrope region (employment shares) GDP per capita in Centrope sub-regions (EU 25 = 100) Centrope pilot projects Area, population and density in the Helsinki Region Population dynamics in the Helsinki Region Jobs in the Helsinki Region Employment structure in Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, 2003 Initiatives in the HMA to improve inter-municipal co-operation Action plan for the cooperation agreement in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area The Urban Programme for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area 2005–2007 Area, population and density in the Copenhagen Region Budgets of the four core networks (in thousands of Dkr) Bed nights in the Copenhagen region (in thousands) Bed nights in the Copenhagen region (index 1998=100) Conferences and participants A selection of municipalities in the Munich region Districts in the Munich region Population development in Hungary and Budapest Millions of passenger-kilometres by modal type in Hungary, 1980–2004 Passengers carried on urban public transport in Budapest (in thousands of passengers) Network length (km), rolling stock/buses, seat numbers in Budapest Employment Rotterdam (municipality, 2005) Demographic data (Rotterdam, City Region, Netherlands) Demographic figures Catalonia, Barcelona, Serra d’en Mena Economic indicators of Catalonia, Badalona, Santa Coloma de Gramenet and the Serra d’en Mena area Indicators for the assessment in aid of the Better District Program Municipalities of the Porto Greater Metropolitan Area (PGMA)

18 21 24 25 28 42 43 43 51 67 68 69 71 86 89 90 101 105 112 112 112 122 122 142 148 149 150 167 168 191 194 196 217

x

10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Corporation

Population and employment trends in the Porto Metropolitan Area (PMA) Gross Domestic Product at market prices per capita (in thousands) Unemployment (%) in Porto, Lisbon, Norte and Portugal Sector distribution (%) in Porto, Lisbon, Norte and Portugal Level of education in Porto, Lisbon, Norte and Portugal (%) The 10 most visited museums in Portugal (2004) Visitors of Serralves, 1999–2005 Some examples of international websites that refer to Serralves

218 218 219 219 220 228 228 228

List of Boxes 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 8.1 10.1

Centrope pilot projects Inter-municipal partnerships in Finland Forum Virium Helsinki Basic education for international families in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area The Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR) The new Serralves Museum (1999)

52 74 80 91 173 229

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Preface This book analyses the development of cross-border and cross-sector partnerships in nine European cities and regions. It provides insight into the factors of failure and success of the coalition-forming process by comparing various attempts in European regions. It is the result of an international comparative study into partnership development in nine European cities/regions: Budapest, Catalonia, Centrope (Vienna), Copenhagen, Eindhoven, Helsinki, Munich, Porto and Rotterdam. In addition to desk research, information on the various initiatives has been collected by means of more than one hundred interviews with local experts and stakeholders. The researchers wish to thank all the interviewees for their contribution to this project. The case studies have been organized in cooperation with representatives of the participating cities and regions. We thank the following people for their valuable contributions: Mr Ivan Tosics (Budapest), Ms Laura Capel and Mr Oriol Nel·lo (Catalonia), Mr Christian Wurm and Mr Eugen Antalovski (Centrope/Vienna), Ms Lykke Leonardsen, Mr Lars Jørgenson and Mr Marc Jørgensen (Copenhagen), Mr Ton van Lier and Mr Erik van Merriënboer (Eindhoven), Ms Asta Manninen (Helsinki), Mr Stephan Schott (Munich), Ms Isabel Martins (Porto), and Mr Paul Meijer, Mr Chris de Lange and Mr Richard Kouprie (Rotterdam). We also thank our secretary, Ms Ankimon Vernède, for her general support, and our colleagues Dr Willem van Winden, for his comments on the research framework and his contribution to the case of Eindhoven, and Drs Robert Offermans, for his contribution to the case of Budapest. Finally, we are very grateful to the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS) for their generous financial contribution to the realization of the Budapest case study. Alexander Otgaar Leo van den Berg Jan van der Meer Carolien Speller Rotterdam, March 2007

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Chapter 1

Introduction 1 Challenges for European Cities and Regions The need for competitiveness European cities and metropolitan regions operate in an increasingly complex and competitive environment. Today, cities and their regions are challenged to become and remain attractive towards citizens, business companies, visitors and investors, who put ever higher demands on the quality of the living and location environment. Local governments make an all-out effort to find a balance between economic growth, preservation of the environment and social inclusion. Being aware of the transition to a knowledge and information economy, cities are eagerly trying to become hubs of importance in the new European hierarchy. To that end, governments stimulate the development of high-potential clusters such as tourism, leisure, health, ict and the media (also see Van den Berg et al. 2001). The development of these clusters is expected to depend on the attractiveness of cities in the broadest sense of the word. To become or remain competitive in the knowledge and information economy, cities need to invest in their quality of life (including security and the environment), their internal and external accessibility, the quality of public services (including education and health) and their image and identity (place marketing). Competitive metropolitan regions are increasingly considered to be of great importance for the future of Europe. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) argues that well-organized metropolitan regions can make valuable contributions to the realization of the Lisbon Strategy, which aims to make Europe the most competitive and dynamic region of the world, finding a balance between economic growth, social and environmental renewal, and sustainability. Considering the fact that many challenges cross the borders of administrative units, it is advised to exchange knowledge between European regions on how coalitions between public and private bodies can tackle these challenges (EESC 2004). Although the abovementioned phenomena are characteristic of metropolitan areas, there are substantial differences in the way individual regions handle them. There are outstanding examples in which the regional government, as a rule supported by the national government, together with the private sector and organized civil society, are changing the course of events and are creating a new pattern for the future. In realizing such policies the social and economic conditions are improving and such regions are visibly becoming more competitive. The European Union should capitalize on such examples by setting up consultation rounds to identify best practices and discuss how the Union can use the means at its disposal for improvement (EESC 2004).

2

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

The need for a regional approach Many agree that most issues related to competitiveness cross the borders of cities. A lack of coordination between municipalities in a region is considered to result in sub-optimal outcomes, such as unwanted competition between local governments trying to attract inward investment, or contradictory policies in the development of infrastructure and business locations. In general, policy efforts in Europe are highly fragmented within urban regions (Van Winden and Van den Berg 2004). Furthermore, it is obvious that the competitiveness and attractiveness of locations (municipalities) within one metropolitan region are strongly interrelated. The city needs the region and the other way around. The need for a regional approach is even more apparent in so-called polycentric urban regions: regions with several cores of economic importance. Such polycentric structures evolve in at least two ways. First, it appears that many city agglomerations are developing into multi-core metropolitan areas as a consequence of urban sprawl (a deconcentration of population and economic activities). This type of polycentric region includes the city centre of the core city, the city centres of surrounding municipalities, and newly developed business locations (for instance near important train stations and airports). In the literature, these polycentric structures are referred to as ‘intra-regional polycentric’. Second, we observe the development of so-called inter-regional polycentric structures, where two or more large cities constitute one conurbation that more or less acts as one economic area. Well-known examples are the Dutch Randstad (Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) and the German Ruhr Area. Thanks to European integration, we now also see inter-regional polycentric structures (and in fact, also intra-regional polycentric structures) that cross the boundaries of the member states. A good example is the conglomeration of Copenhagen and Malmö. Internal accessibility is of great importance in polycentric regions. Good infrastructure is needed to facilitate the interactions between locations (e.g. home-work traffic, business-to-business relations, etc.). The new bridge that connects Copenhagen and Malmö can even be considered an essential precondition for the actual creation of a polycentric conurbation in this cross-border region. The development of inter- and intra-regional polycentric structures goes together with an increasing need for regional coordination. As economic cores become more dependent on one another (for instance because of improved accessibility), coordination between policies seems desirable. This particularly applies to situations in which the various cores are complementary to one another (instead of being substitutes). The need for cross-sector partnerships The competitiveness of cities and regions is not only a concern of local governments. First of all, also national governments and the European Union are beginning to recognize the importance of cities as engines of economic growth. The national and European urban policies that result from this awareness could have a considerable impact on the development of cities and metropolitan regions in the member states. Several cities in transition (particularly cities with an industrial heritage) have already

Introduction

3

benefited from the financial support of higher-level governments. Secondly, also the private sector and the non-profit sector (non-governmental organizations) have an interest in competitive urban areas. Business companies have a stake an in attractive and well-organized environment, as they benefit from good access to production factors (labour, capital, land, information). Furthermore, firms are able to affect the development of cities through their spatial behaviour (location and investment decisions). Non-profit or non-governmental organizations usually have an interest in a specific part of the city or the region, or a specific aspect of competitiveness. Their spatial behaviour also affects the development of cities and regions. As the private and non-profit sectors are important stakeholders in city development, coordination between the sectors seems wise: successful regional economies are ‘associational economies’ (Cooke and Morgan 1998). Several scholars emphasize the importance of cross-sector collaboration: public-private partnerships and institutional flexibility are important strategic determinants of city competitiveness (Kresl 1995); the knowledge economy is a network economy (Van Winden and Van den Berg 2004); governance relations are no longer structured through bureaucratic hierarchies but through a series of overlapping networks (La Galès 2002; Amin and Hausner 1997; Jessop 1997); and metropolitan regions need to invest in their ‘social capital’ (Putnam 1993; 2000) or their ‘metropolitan organizing capacity’ (Van den Berg et al 1997) in order to become or remain competitive. The need for new forms of cooperation The three challenges identified above (the need for competitiveness, the need for a regional approach, and the need for cross-sector partnerships) have important consequences for the governance of metropolitan regions. European cities and their regions are looking for adequate organizational models that are able to cope with the three challenges. Moreover, it can be argued that, from a European Union point of view, effective governance at the metropolitan level is needed to stick to the principle of subsidiarity. Without effective metropolitan governance the populations of metropolitan areas are unable to influence some of the key issues affecting their future and its sustainability.1 One option is to set up formal metropolitan governments like the communautés urbaines in France. However, in several other European countries (including the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands) similar attempts have been less successful for various reasons. One of the problems has been the lack of social and political support in particular on behalf of the surrounding municipalities, and the fear of more bureaucracy with the creation of an extra government level. As a consequence, European cities and regions are looking for new forms of cooperation. These new forms are not necessarily restricted to collaboration between municipalities, but may also include involvement of the private and non-profit sectors. They are looking for adequate models of metropolitan governance rather than metropolitan government. Governance encompasses more than city or county governments; it includes voluntary, not-for-profit, and private organizations as well as intergovernmental linkages (Feiock 2004). The growing 1

See .

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

4

attention to new governance structures is often associated with the development of the ‘new regionalism’ (Savitch and Vogel 2000), which recognizes that metropolitan areas are able to create governance structures not tied to a single, dominant unit of metropolitan government. 2 Research Questions Objective of the research and research questions As metropolitan regions in Europe clearly need new governance structures, the question is how to create them in a successful way. The objective of this book is to gain insight into the factors of failure and success of the coalition-forming process by comparing various attempts in European regions. Some relevant questions to answer are: 1) What forms of metropolitan and/or regional partnerships (local cooperation, regional-local cooperation) can be found?; 2) What are motives for establishing such partnerships?; 3) What factors contribute to or obstruct cooperation on the metropolitan level? 4) How to measure the performance of partnership models?; and 5) How to explain success and failure? Forms of metropolitan and/or regional partnerships We expect to find different forms of partnerships (partnership models). In order to make a good comparison and to assess their effectiveness, a categorization of governance structures is needed. Criteria that will be used are: Scope of the partnership The scope of a partnership can range from very broad to very narrow. The scope can be defined from two points of view: the aims (mission) and the role of the partnership. The aims can range from sustainable urban/regional development (economic, social, environmental, etc.) via economic development to sector-specific development (like tourism or manufacturing industry). The role of the partnership (its tasks) can range from investor, initiator and coordinator (broad) to one role only (like only coordinating the activities of others). Geographic scale In general, consensus about the borders of ‘a relevant metropolitan region’ is lacking; this is quite logical, taking into account the assumption that ‘functional urban regions’ depend on the function in question (e.g. compare a commuter region with a shopping region); no surprise then, that also regional structures use different definitions of the metropolitan region. The relevant geographic scale can be defined by looking at the aims of the partnership, the actual work area of the partnership or the actors involved. Actors in the partnership A distinction has to be made between bodies or institutions that are mainly public (governments, quangos2), mainly private (private limited 2

Quasi non-governmental organizations.

Introduction

5

companies), a mix between public and private (public private partnerships), or socalled triple helix constructions (public, private, knowledge institutions). Degree of formality Structures can range from highly formal (e.g. an official body with written agreements on desired outcomes and task divisions) to highly informal (e.g. people meet each other occasionally). As a rule, a high degree of formality can be found in (administrative) entities with legal decision-making power or publicinvestment making power. In practice, we might also find examples of structures with a moderate degree of formality (like formal organizations with limited legal power). To summarize: the degree of formality can be assessed by looking at the organizational structure (institutionalization, governance) and the legal decisionmaking and public-investment making power. Degree of political influence Another aspect to take into account is the degree to which politicians (e.g. councillors) are able to control governance structures and the degree to which governance structures are able to influence political decision-making processes. Arms-length bodies (at some distance of political powers) might have more room to move, but sometimes at the expense of democracy (see democratic content). The degree to which a partnership is able to influence political decisionmaking depends on its formal and legal status. Democratic content This dimension particularly applies to legal/formal arrangements. The democratic content depends on the distance between the voters and the partnership in question. To what extent are the voters (the people) able to steer the partnership, directly or indirectly (e.g. via the councillors they voted for)? For less formal arrangements, the democratic content has more to do with the accessibility and intelligibility to citizens, which can be assessed by looking at the transparency of the organization, its openness to society, its assignment of responsibility, and so on. Financial power The financial power is a very relevant dimension. It depends on the budget of an organization, but also on its freedom of spending and the ability to attract or mobilize other financial sources (leverage). Presumably, the financial power of a partnership depends on the financial power of the actors involved, the legal public-investment power, the financial dependence on other entities (e.g. a higherlevel government) and the ability to mobilize other public investment sources. Leading stakeholder Previous studies on organizing capacity revealed that leadership is needed to build successful coalitions; in the case of regional governance structures, the initiative can be taken by one or more cities, a regional body, the chamber of commerce, or any other institution or individual. Internal organization Another very important factor to consider, is the internal organization of a governance structure (e.g. in business units or divisions); it is particularly interesting to see how actors get involved in the process for instance through panels, task groups, boards, etc.

6

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Motives for establishing partnerships The principle motive to create regional partnerships is the assumption that cooperation and coordination produce added value to the region, and the participating actors. This added value can result from economies of scale (critical mass), economies of scope (synergies between complementary functions), or economies of skill (the exchange of knowledge and expertise). Furthermore it can be argued that cooperation and coordination help to prevent (undesired) intraregional competition. In addition, partnerships can generate external resources (for instance subsidies from national governments or the European Union) which otherwise might not have been made available to any individual partner, partners can learn from one another about the nature of the problems and their potential role in that respect, and consider new ways to solve them (Miller 1998). In our introduction, we have already touched upon the various challenges for European cities and regions, leading to the assumption that new forms of cooperation are needed to survive in the world-wide battle between metropolitan regions. The underlying idea is that knowledge and power need to be shared because no single organization (public or private) can identify and solve all social and economic problems in a metropolitan region. The idea of ‘power sharing’ corresponds with Clarence Stone’s regime theory, according to which individual actors lack sufficient levels of power to generate and implement an overarching agenda for the urban system (Harding 1994, 359-360). Regime theorists accept that liberal democracies have two interdependent systems of authority: one based on popular control (i.e. the various organs of representative government) and the other based on ownership of private productive assets (i.e. largely on the business community). To generate and implement a vision and strategy for the metropolitan region, powerful actors must co-operate and pool their individual resources. Stone (1986; 1989; 1993) identifies several co-ordinating mechanisms ranging from formal contracts and institutions to informal social networks. In summary, the regime theory is based on three principles: 1) differentiation (actors have different levels of power); 2) interdependency (actors depend on one another, and therefore have to co-operate); and 3) secondary ties (formal and informal mechanisms are needed to integrate these actors in a collective action). Although it can be argued that public and private actors in a metropolitan region have common interests, additional incentives might be necessary to develop joint initiatives (see Van den Berg et al. 2004). It is important to realize that joint goals and common interests may be inadequate to motivate collective action (coordination and cooperation). For one thing, conflicts between powerful actors can hamper the process towards partnership. According to Mann (1986) conflicts over who dominates as well as the distribution of benefits necessarily arise from organized collective action, as power bears both co-operative elements (power to) and distributive elements (power over) (also see Nicholls 2005). Obviously the competition between European metropolitan regions is probably the most important stimulus that applies to all cities. More specific incentives, however, can be generated by common opportunities such as a major events (like the Olympic Games or the Cultural Capital of Europe) or threats such as massive unemployment after the collapse of a leading local industry or the bankruptcy of a leading firm. Hence, internal and external forces

Introduction

7

help determine the benefits and transaction costs of institutional change (Alston et al. 1996). Factors of failure and success in the coalition-forming process Probably the most important factor of success in the development of new governance structures is the degree to which cooperation produces added value for the region (prosperity and well-being) and the participating organizations (municipalities, regional bodies, business companies, etc.). The benefits of participation have to outweigh the costs for all actors (Nicholls 2005). The added value depends on local barriers and incentives to co-operation such as tax incentives and matching programmes, prosperity in a region (too much wealth can be a barrier!) or differences between cultures (usually considered a barrier). In addition, partnerships require that the participants recognize their mutual dependence (Stone 1989): they should need each other to accomplish their objectives. Stakeholders stick to participation if they cannot achieve their goals any other way (Nicholls 2005). Individuals join groups for a variety of reasons, but the two most dominant motivations are (1) to receive benefits they could not otherwise receive (Olson 1965), and (2) to advance common policy goals and preferences (Rothenberg 1992). Considering the complexity of urban environments and the ongoing transition into a network economy, (institutionalized) interaction between stakeholders seems to become increasingly important in order to make and a metropolitan region competitive. The question that remains, however, is if the actors involved recognize their interest in collective action, taking into account the various internal and external incentives as discussed above. Other factors of importance are leadership, vision and strategy. Group formation is often facilitated by the presence of a strong leader and/or an entrepreneur who is willing to overcome the costs of collective action (Salisbury 1969; Wilson 1995; Schneider, Teske and Mintrom 1995). Leadership is needed to ensure the maintenance of (unstable) governance regimes and coalitions (see Baraize and Négrier 2001, pp. 3–29; Borraz and John 2004). Strong leaders have two important roles to play: 1) to focus the attention of individual stakeholders on long-term benefits of co-operation rather than short-time losses; and, 2) where short-term losses of an individual are perceived to outweigh long-term benefits, to ensure co-operation through the distribution of “selective material incentives” (Stone 1989, pp. 186–187). Entrepreneurs have an incentive to form groups when they receive a disproportionate benefit from the group. The benefit may be in the form of a job with the organization, access to institutional powers and resources of the group, economic gain, or the satisfaction of a specific issue addressed (Post 2004). In metropolitan regions, the need for leadership grows as the number of stakeholders increases and the competences needed are more distributed among the envisaged partners (Van den Berg, Braun and Van Winden 2001, pp.10). Already in 1982, research by Fosler and Berger (1982) revealed that civic leadership is a critical factor of success for cross-sector partnerships. In our research, we assume that the type of leadership needed very much depends on the local political, economic and cultural context. One important tasks of the leader could be to develop (in consultation with others) a

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

8

vision and strategy for the partnership. The assumption is that a successful partnership needs some coherence between actions. A clear vision (including the objectives of a partnership) helps to prevent fragmentation in the actions. How to measure the performance of partnership models? In our research, we expect to find examples of successful partnership models, as well as examples of models with a relatively low performance. Moreover, we assume that both positive and negative experiences produce valuable lessons for European metropolitan regions. Before discussing possible explanations for success or failure, we first need to agree on how to measure the performance, that is the effectiveness of a partnership model. This performance can be measured in at least three ways: •

•

•

Looking at the outcome of a partnership by analysing changes in the competitiveness in the region comparing the situation before and after the new partnership came into effect; the outcome is related to the ‘general’ socioeconomic development, being the combined effect of the context, the influences of internal and external policies and influences of the behaviour of families, companies and governments; a disadvantage of this method is the hard-to-prove causality because of other changes (in the context, policies an the behaviour) during the period between ‘before’ and ‘after’. Assessing the actual outputs of a partnership model: so what has been achieved (projects, additional visitors, better co-ordination between plans, etc.) thanks to the new organizational model; an advantage of this method is that it is more specifically oriented towards the direct results of the model; a disadvantage is that the outputs are often hard to measure and sometimes subjective; moreover, the causality problem still remains; this method is easier to use if output objectives (including measurable criteria) have been defined in advance. Looking at the opinions of the stakeholders themselves: how do they assess the outcomes of the partnership?; an advantage of this method is that stakeholder opinions are easier to ‘measure’ and to compare among cities; a disadvantage is that opinions are subjective by definition.

In this book we use the three methods simultaneously in order to gain as much insight into the performance of models as possible. We try to identify the impacts (especially economic impacts) of joining forces on a ‘functional’ level; and the advantages and disadvantages (pros and cons) of a partnership approach. How to explain success and failure? A priori, we could give several explanations for the failure or success of partnership models. In our view, the good or bad performance of a model can be the result of the context in which a model functions, as well as the qualities of the model itself. Therefore, we suggest using the following framework (see Figure 1.1) to study the factors of failure and success. This framework makes a distinction between the

Introduction

9

actual study domain and some factors outside this domain, such as the context and other external and internal policies that affect the socio-economic development of a metropolitan region. We only analyse a factor outside the study if it relates to a factor inside the study domain. This research framework recognizes three context factors that constitute the profile of a metropolitan region: 1) the administrative, political and legal context in which the model functions (e.g. the division of tasks and responsibilities among various levels of governments); 2) the economic context in which the model functions (e.g. strong incentives from local problems or benefits from the economic tide); and 3) the cultural and historical context (local attitudes towards co-operation, for instance regarding partnerships between the public and private sectors). These context factors produce factors that stimulate or obstruct (the development of) a partnership and affect the motives for stakeholders to initiate or join a partnership. An example of a factor that stimulates or obstructs the development of a partnership is the willingness of relevant actors to participate, which also depends on the motives. Moreover, the factors that stimulate or obstruct (the development) of partnerships also influence the motives. The next step in our framework builds on the assumption that the motives determine the objectives of a partnership. The objectives as well as the stimulating/obstructing factors are supposed to affect the partnership model itself, which comprehends the organizational structure and the other characteristics as identified above: the scope of the organization, the degree of formality, actors in the partnership, the degree of political influence, democratic content, financial power, the leading stakeholder, geographic scale, and the internal organization.

Figure 1.1

Determinants of success in the creation of new governance structures

10

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

The framework shows that the partnership produces output that should be compared with the objectives of the partnership. The output has a two-way relation with the outcome (the general socioeconomic development), as a partnership can contribute to a more competitive region, while changes in competitiveness may also affect the results of the partnership itself. As discussed earlier, it is important to recognize that the outcome of a partnership also depends on (changes in) the context, influence of external and internal factors and policies, and the behaviour of actors outside the partnership. 3 Research Methodology Case studies In order to answer the research questions formulated above, in-depth case studies have been carried out in nine European metropolitan regions: 1) the cross-border region of Eindhoven, Leuven and Aachen (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany); 2) the cross-border region of Centrope (Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary); 3) the Helsinki region (Finland); 4) the Copenhagen region (Denmark); 5) the Munich region (Germany); 6) the Budapest region; 7) the Rotterdam region (Netherlands); 8) Catalonia (Spain); and 9) the Porto region (Portugal). Each case study deals with one or several initiatives to promote cross-border and cross-sector cooperation. Experts from the regions played a key role in selecting the initiatives to be analysed, although we gave them some criteria that the selected projects or partnerships had to meet preferably: 1) a regional or cross-border scale; 2) a clearly defined scope (dealing with a limited number of concrete issues); and 3) some degree of private-sector involvement. Apart from these criteria the regional experts had the freedom to select partnerships in different stages of development (partnerships to be developed, running programmes, etc.), and with different outcomes (success, failure), as long as they expected interesting, transferable findings. The case studies are based on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (representatives of local and regional governments, the private sector, public-private partnerships, educational institutions, etc.). For all case studies discussion partners have been selected in consultation with the regional experts. After the interviews all discussion partners received a meeting report, enabling them to make comments and add information if necessary. Scope of this book This book does not intend to give a complete overview of all metropolitan governance structures in the nine regions. Instead, it concentrates on a limited number of partnerships or institutions, for instance around a particular policy issue, such as tourism development, transport, inward investment, etc. As stated above, it was up to the experts from the regions to bring up a policy issue or partnership from which interesting findings (in terms of both failure and success) could be expected as far as metropolitan governance is concerned. We assume that these lessons on metropolitan

Introduction

11

governance are to some extent transferable to other policy areas, although differences between policy areas should not be neglected (being one determinant of success in our model). 4 Structure of this Report The structure of this report is as follows. After this introduction (Chapter 1), the nine case studies come across in Chapters 2 until 9. Chapter 10 comprehends a comparison between the findings in the various cities and regions, resulting in conclusions. The nine case studies have been ordered by their scope and scale, from large to small. Each case study consists of the following elements. The first section introduces the case (the city/region and project/partnership). Next, in section 2, we present a profile of the metropolitan region, discussing the relevant context factors (politicaladministrative, cultural and economic). After that, section 3 introduces the project or partnership to be analysed, looking at its objectives, the actors involved and their motives, and the partnership model that has been chosen (discussing the various characteristics as indicated in the research framework). Section 4 analyses the (desired) output and outcome of the partnership/project and identifies challenges for the future. Case-study specific conclusions are drawn in section 5. References Alston, L.J., Eggertsson, T. and North, D.C. (eds) (1996), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Amin, A.and Hausner, J. (eds) (1997), Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity, EAEPE conference (Cheltenham: Elgar). Baraize, F. and Négrier, E. (eds) (2001), L’Invention Politique de L’Agglomération (Paris: L’Harmattan). Berg, L. van den, Braun, E. and Winden, W. van (2001), ‘Growth Clusters In European Cities: An Integral Approach’, Urban Studies 38:1, 185–205. Berg, L. van den, Meer, J. van der and Braun, E. (1997), ‘The Organising Capacity of Metropolitan Regions’, Environment & Planning C: Government & Policy 15:3, 253–72. Borraz, O. and John, P. (2004), ‘Introduction: Symposium on the Transformation of Urban Leadership in Western Europe’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28:1, 107–20. Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1998), The Associational Economy : Firms, Regions, and Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) (2004), Opinion on European Metropolitan Areas:Socio-Economic Implications for Europe’s Future (Brussels). Feiock, R.C. (2004), Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press). Fosler R.S. and Berger, R.A. (1982), Public-Private Partnership in American Cities: Seven Case Studies (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Book).

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Harding, A. (1994), ‘Urban Regimes and Growth Machines: Towards a CrossNational Research Agenda’, Urban Affairs Quarterly 29, 356–82. Jessop, B. (1997), ‘The Governance of Complexity and the Complexity of Governance’, in Amin and Hausner (eds), pp. 111-47. Kresl, P. K. (1995), ‘The Determinants of Urban Competitiveness: A Survey’, in Kresl and Gappert (eds), pp. 45-68. Kresl, P.K. and Gappert, G. (eds) (1995), North American Cities and the Global Economy : Challenges and Opportunities (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Le Galès, P. (1998), European Cities: Social Conflicts and Governance (Cornwall: Oxford University Press). Mann, M. (1986), The Resources of Social Power I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Nicholls, W. (2005), ‘Power and Governance: Metropolitan Governance in France’, Urban Studies, 42:4, 783–800. Olsen, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Post, S. (2004), ‘Metropolitan Area Governance and Institutional Collective Action’, in Feicok (ed.), pp. 67–92. Putnam P.D. (1993), ‘The Prosperous Community’, Current 356, 4–9. —— (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster). Rothenberg, L.S. (1992), Linking Citizens to Government : Interest Group Politics at Common Cause (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Salisbury, R.H. (1969), ‘An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups’, Midwest Journal of Political Science 13:1, 1–32. Savitch, H.V. and Vogel, R. (2000), ‘Paths to New Regionalism’, State and Local Government Review 32:3, 158–68. Schneider, M., Teske, P. and Mintrom, M. (1995), Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Stone, C.N. (1986), Power and Social Complexity, in Waste (ed.), pp. 77–113. —— (1989), Regime politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). —— (1993), ‘Urban Regimes: A Political Economy Approach’, Journal of Urban Affairs 15:1, 1–28. Waste, D. (ed.) (1986), Community Power: Directions for Future Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage). Wilson, J. Q. (1995), Political Organizations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press). Winden, W. van, and Berg, L. van den (2004), Cities in the Knowledge Economy: New Governance Challenges (Rotterdam: Euricur)

Chapter 2

Brainport Eindhoven1 1 Introduction The Eindhoven region is considered one of the most innovative regions in Europe. It is one of the few regions that meet the Barcelona standard (expenses on R&D exceed three per cent of the gross regional product), which has been formulated to reach the Lisbon aims (turning Europe into world’s number one economy). The region owes this position to the presence of innovative companies – like Philips, ASML and FEI Company – and renowned knowledge institutions – like the Technical University of Eindhoven (TU/e) and TNO. In the Eindhoven region, leaders of the administrations, business companies and knowledge institutions (the so-called Triple Helix) are aware of the possible temporality of success. Joint efforts are needed to secure the competitiveness of the region, particularly in view of the increasing competition from other upcoming locations (like in China and India). Moreover, history has taught the lesson that the Eindhoven region is very vulnerable to global downswings. After the problems with Philips and car manufacturer Daf in the early 1990s – hitting the regional economy severely – several initiatives were launched to strengthen the economic structure. The EU-subsidized Stimulus Programme (effective in the 1990s) was succeeded in 2001 by the so-called Horizon Programme. And more recently, the Eindhoven region introduced the Brainport Navigator, which can be considered the follow-up of the Horizon Programme. One of the distinctive features of the Navigator is the geographic scale. The Navigator pays explicit attention to the role of Eindhoven in a global context, and identifies opportunities to develop the cross-border region (often referred to as ELAt: the Eindhoven-Leuven-Aachen triangle) into one of the main centres of innovation in the world. In this case study, we concentrate on the most recent initiatives of the Eindhoven region to stimulate innovation. We are particularly interested in the governance implications of the Brainport Navigator and the ambitions of ELAt, although we also pay attention to the Horizon Programme (as Brainport and ELAt are more or less logical follow-ups of Horizon). Our aim is to increase understanding of the relevant context factors and the factors of failure and success in the process of getting actors together. It should be mentioned here that both initiatives have only just started (in 2004/2005), and for that reason their performance cannot be fully measured yet. Therefore, we also consider insight into Horizon helpful to formulate expectations regarding Brainport and ELAt. Our analysis is based on interviews with relevant stakeholders, including representatives from Leuven and Aachen. The case study 1

This case study was carried out in January 2006.

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14

report is structured as follows. Section two introduces the relevant context factors by giving a general profile of the metropolitan region. In section three, we discuss and analyse the Brainport Navigator and the ambitions of ELAt. Section four deals with the performance of the governance models and identifies its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, we confront our observations with the research framework and draw some conclusions in section five. 2 The Eindhoven Region Demography and geography Eindhoven is the fifth city of the Netherlands, being the residence of almost 210,000 people. The city is located in the south of the Netherlands, near the borderline with Belgium. The city and its region is strategically located in the core of Western Europe, at short distance of major economic and political centres like the Randstad (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague), Brussels, Paris, and the Ruhr conurbation (Dortmund, Cologne, Essen, etc.). The Eindhoven region can be defined in many ways, but the most common and logical definition is the area of the cityregion Eindhoven2 (SRE), counting 725,000 inhabitants. The city of Eindhoven is by far the largest city in the region, the second largest city being Helmond (86,000 inhabitants). In view of the Brainport strategy and the ELAt initiative, it is necessary to understand the position of Eindhoven in the wider region (see Figure 2.1). First of all, Eindhoven and Helmond are two of the five large cities in the province of Brabant;3 the other cities are Breda (170,000 inhabitants), province capital’s-Hertogenbosch (135,000 inhabitants), and Tilburg (200,000 inhabitants). The western part of the province (and the city of Breda in particular) has a strong economic relation with the south-western part of the Netherlands (notably the Mainport Rotterdam), thus being somewhat less relevant for the Eindhoven region. The eastern part of the province has stronger ties with the provinces of Limburg and Gelderland, notably with the city of Maastricht (population: 120,000) which is located within the triangle that connects Eindhoven with Leuven (university town, population of about 90,000) and Aachen (approximately 257,000 inhabitants). Figure 2.1 also shows that the Eindhoven region provides good access to Brussels and Antwerp, and to the Ruhr area. Economy The Eindhoven region is acknowledged as the ‘Brainport’ of the Netherlands, as the counterpart of the two Dutch mainports: Port of Rotterdam and Amsterdam Airport. This claim is based on the high position of Eindhoven in various rankings and the large share of Eindhoven in the Dutch economy. As said in the introduction, the Eindhoven region is one of the few in Europe – and the only one in The Netherlands

2 3

In Dutch: Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven (SRE) Website: <www.sre.nl>. In Dutch: ‘Noord Brabant’ (North Brabant).

Brainport Eindhoven

Figure 2.1

15

Eindhoven and the cross-border region

– that meet the Barcelona standard (expenses on R&D are at least three percent of the gross regional product). About 45 per cent of all private expenses on R&D are made in the Brainport. In addition, the Southeast of the Netherlands (that is the eastern part of Brabant and the province of Limburg) has a higher contribution to the Dutch economy (14.5 per cent) than Greater Amsterdam (11.2) and Greater Rotterdam (8.6). Looking at the economic structure, the share of industry is relatively high with about 20 per cent of employment (which is one of the highest in The Netherlands). The development of Eindhoven into a hot spot for innovation is closely related to the growth of electronics concern Philips. Already in 1914, the company recognized the need to invest in research. The firm created Natlab, a research laboratory, and built strategic relations with universities and polytechnics. The presence of this laboratory, and Philips in general, helped the city to acquire a Technical University (TU), one of the three TUs in the Netherlands. In 2006, this university celebrated its 60th anniversary. The relation between the TU/e (Technical University of Eindhoven)

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

16

and Philips has always been very strong, for instance coming into effect through sponsored professorships and PhDs. The cross-border region For global companies like Philips national borders hardly exist. No wonder then that Philips is one of the promoters of cross-border thinking. The company has a long tradition of strategic relations with Aachen and Leuven. Philips has strong interests in Aachen (they have a research lab over there), particularly due to the presence of Germany’s largest technical university (RWTH). For insiders, the importance of Leuven needs no explanation, as they know the role of IMEC, a world-leading independent research centre in micro- and nano- electronics and technology. Its research focuses on the next generations of chips and systems, and on the enabling technologies for ambient intelligence. IMEC is headquartered in Leuven, and has representatives in the US, China and Japan. Its staff of about 1400 people includes close to 500 industrial residents and guest researchers. In 2005, its revenues are estimated to be close to €200 million.4 Philips has been involved in IMEC from the very start, and has a team of about 100 researchers in the centre. Furthermore, the University of Leuven has for a long time maintained strong connections with the TU/e. Philips has for many years been a promoter of cross-border thinking. The company can be considered one of the ‘founders’ of the Eindhoven Leuven Aachen triangle, which was originally referred to as the Digital Eindhoven Leuven Triangle Aachen (DELTA). The company has identified the three axes that together make up the triangle. The axis Leuven-Eindhoven concentrates on micro-electronics, LeuvenAachen deals with medical equipment, and Eindhoven-Maastricht-Aachen focuses on biomedical equipment. Economic development The last decades, the regional economy of Eindhoven has been very sensitive to the economic tide, because of the strong dependence on international industrial trade. In the early 1990s the Eindhoven region was severely hit because of the recession, which led to lay-offs at Philips and the bankruptcy of lorry manufacturer Daf. Between the early 1980s and 1993, employment at Philips dropped from 35,000 to 21,000, and the collapse of Daf resulted in a direct loss of about 2,500 jobs, and an indirect loss of many more jobs at Daf’s suppliers. The severe economic problems made people in the Eindhoven region aware of the economy’s vulnerability, and particularly its strong dependence on one or two firms. Therefore, local actors – with the help of the national government and the EU – joined forces to invest in the diversity and strength of the regional economy in the so-called Stimulus Programme (see Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 1997). During the 1990s, spin-offs of Philips (like ASML) developed into strong stand alone firms, generating much employment for the region. In the beginning of the new century, the Eindhoven region was confronted with another recession. This time, however, the problem is by many perceived as more ‘structural’ (rather than cyclical) in view of the fact that many industrial (manufacturing) activities are being relocated. As an industrial and innovative region, 4

Source: <www.imec.be>.

Brainport Eindhoven

17

Eindhoven was – and still is – facing fierce competition from upcoming regions in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. Many industrial activities have already left or are about to leave the region, in favour of locations where labour is much cheaper. This irreversible consequence of globalization raised the question what kind of industrial activities can be retained in the Eindhoven region. The impact of globalization on cities and regions can be understood by looking at the impacts on firm behaviour, notably that of Philips. Currently, Philips employs about 15,000 people in the region. As a global high-tech company, Philips has to deal with some major trends like the increasing complexity of technical applications, the (potential) globalization of application development (production on several locations) and the development of global and local inter-firm networks (de-verticalization). Global industrial companies are forced to specialize themselves in order to serve the whole world. The number of vertically integrated companies is decreasing, as more and more value chains are turned into value chain networks. Globalization and the need for specialization have stimulated companies to adopt new (notably American) management philosophies, like six sigma (sometimes referred to as the successor of total quality management), world-class manufacturing (WCM, which is about becoming number one in your branch), and lean manufacturing (eliminating losses, increasing quality, etc.). Today, multinationals use the motto ‘excel or exit’, referring to the need to become ‘best in class’. Paradoxically, globalization goes hand in hand with an increasing importance of location. In their location behaviour, firms are looking for an optimal eco system, which particularly applies to innovative and high-tech settlements (like R&D). There is no reason to expect Philips to move away its research activities, as long as the Eindhoven region offers a good location environment, giving the company access to well-qualified labour. In general, the difference between wages in Europe and Asia tend to be much smaller for knowledge workers. The changes in business behaviour are considered a highly relevant context factor that might explain the recent developments in the region of Eindhoven’s metropolitan governance, to be discussed later on. One of the leading concepts is the awareness that the Eindhoven region cannot retain all industrial activities, but instead should focus on particular (more complex and knowledge-intensive) phases in the production process (see Table 2.1; phases 1 to 5 are anchored in centres of excellence). Many stakeholders agree that the region should try to retain some parts in the production phase of development, notably complex and very complex forms of (mass) production. The political-administrative context In the Netherlands, the administrative system consists of three tiers: the national government, 12 provinces (including Brabant, Gelderland and Limburg) and more than 450 municipalities. Provinces take care of environmental matters and issues concerning spatial planning, energy supply, social works, sports and cultural affairs. Municipal authorities are responsible for water supply, traffic, housing, public-

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Table 2.1

Phases of development in the knowledge-intensive industry

Phase 1

Invention

An idea is born at a public or private centre of excellence

Phase 2

Demonstrator

The operation is demonstrated and is reproducable

Phase 3

Applications

The knowledge is applied in a product concept such as a prototype

Phase 4

Product ready for production

The production process (installations and machines) are developed so that the product may actually be reproduced

Phase 5

Process ready for production

The production process (installations and machines) are developed so that the product may actually be reproduced

Phase 6

Production

a. (mass) production – very complex b. (mass) production – complex c. (mass) production – simple

Source: ‘Brainport Eindhoven; Crossing borders, moving frontiers’ (2004), adapted by the authors.

sector schools, local social services and health care, sport, recreation and culture.5 As a result of municipal mergers, the number of municipalities declined from 1,121 (1900) to 483 (in 2004).6 The largest decline could be observed in the province of Brabant where the number of municipalities dropped from 184 to 68. The logical consequence is that the average size of a municipality has increased in the last century. Large cities in the Netherlands, like so many in Europe, are struggling with the lack of a governmental tier on the level of their metropolitan region. Many ideas have been launched to set up metropolitan governments, but until now this call for regionalism has only resulted in mergers (and annexations) of municipalities. Up to now, proposals to introduce so-called ‘city provinces’ (for the metropolitan regions of Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Arnhem-Nijmegen, Twente and Eindhoven) have been rejected (by politicians and/or the population). Nevertheless, the national government tries to stimulate regional co-ordination, for instance by introducing so-called ‘plus regions’, of which the SRE is an example. These regional bodies are responsible for (among others) transport policy, safety, infrastructure and location policy. However, it is important to realize that the power of these bodies is

5 Source: <www.eu2004.nl>. 6 Source: <www.cbs.nl> (‘Ontwikkeling van het aantal gemeenten sinds 1900’, Trudy Lisci-Wessels).

Brainport Eindhoven

19

limited because they always have to cooperate with other governments (local and national). Relevant policies For a thorough analysis of the Eindhoven region case, insight into the most relevant policies of higher-level governments is needed. First of all, Brainport Eindhoven has been designated in the latest national spatial plan (Nota Ruimte) as one of the economic key (or core) areas in the Netherlands. This implies that the Eindhoven region has more or less the same economic status as the two Dutch mainports: Schiphol Airport (Amsterdam) and the Port of Rotterdam. Another relevant policy document is entitled ‘Peaks in the Delta’ (in Dutch: Pieken in de Delta), which is considered an important turnaround in regional economic policies on the national level. With this document, the national government recognizes the need to build on strong economic regions (making use of their advantages), instead of (only) trying to make weak economic regions stronger. In general, it can be said that the objective of equalization (reducing regional differences) has lost some weight (not all!) in favour of the aim to excel (creating strong regions that are able to compete against other regions in the world). The policy report ‘Peaks in the Delta’ (which falls under the responsibility of the ministry of Economic Affairs) identifies several strong economic regions in the Netherlands that are expected to be able to excel in global competition. One of these regions is the southeast of the Netherlands, which is considered to have the potential to become one of the top technology regions in Europe. Brainport Eindhoven is designated as one of the innovation hot spots in the Netherlands. Cross-border cooperation (with Leuven and Aachen) is seen as a necessary condition to excel in the competition with other regions that aspire to become top regions in technology. The Dutch ministry of Economic Affairs wants to create the right conditions (a welleducated workforce, a better match between supply and demand on the labour market, good quality of life for knowledge workers) to further stimulate the development of the southeast as technology region. To develop an economic vision and strategy for the southeast of the Netherlands, the ministry of Economic Affairs, the provinces of Brabant and Limburg, the City of Eindhoven (and SRE), and various firms (like Philips and DSM) and knowledge institutions (including the TU/e, the University of Maastricht) have formed a platform called Regiegroep Toptechnologieregio Zuidoost Nederland. One of the main objectives of this platform has been to formulate an innovation agenda for the region, which not only comprehends an economic vision and strategy, but also guidelines for implementation. The platform is very clear about the division of responsibilities: firms and knowledge institutions have the responsibility to take action (to make the combinations), the platform itself assumes the role of mediator, catalyst and bridge builder. The platform has considerable, though indirect financial power, as it advises the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the spending of the €27 million budget that has been reserved for the southeast of the Netherlands, as well as on the distribution of an addition €86 million without a regional label (hence, part of this budget is expected be allocated to the southeast of the Netherlands). As partners in the platform for the southeast of the Netherlands, the provinces of Brabant and Limburg have embraced the innovation agenda. They have both

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

developed policies to implement the innovation agenda. The province of Brabant has an action programme on innovation, while the province of Limburg works with the so-called ‘acceleration agenda’ (versnellingsagenda). Another initiative on the level of the province (of Brabant) is the Innovation Council (innovatieraad). This council wants to stimulate innovation in the private sector, working closely together with the national innovation platform, which has more or less the same ambition, though on another geographic level. One of the projects of the national innovation platform deals with the identification of ‘key areas’ in the Dutch economy and possible strategies to strengthen innovation in these areas. The notion ‘area’ does not refer to a particular region but instead to a particular cluster of related activities. Another initiative on the level of the province is BrabantStad (Brabant City), which is a joint effort of the province and the five major cities: Breda, Eindhoven, Helmond, ’s-Hertogenbosch and Tilburg. The main aim of this partnership is to strengthen the international position of the province and its cities as knowledge region. The initiators of BrabantStad seem to recognize, however, the fact that the province of Brabant can hardly be seen as an economic entity, also in view of Peaks in the Delta which divides the province into a western and eastern part. Instead, BrabantStad can be seen as another marketing tool to create critical mass in the European and global competition between regions. 3 Brainport and the Eindhoven Leuven Aachen Triangle In this section we introduce the Brainport strategy and the Eindhoven Leuven Aachen triangle (ELAt). However, to understand the Brainport strategy, we first analyse its predecessor: the Horizon Programme. The Horizon Programme The Brainport Strategy can be considered the follow-up of the Horizon Programme that was launched in 2001/2002 in reaction to the structural problems the regional economy was facing. The programme was developed by the commission ‘Regional Opportunities’ (Regionale Kansen), installed by the former president of the SRE (the former mayor of Eindhoven). The commission was composed of representatives of the private sector and the knowledge institutions. Aims The main aim of the Horizon Programme is to strengthen the economic structure by transforming the region from an industrial mainport to top technology region. To reach that goal, four sub-objectives have been formulated: 1) to reduce and solve structural shortages in the labour market; 2) to increase the return on knowledge by strengthening innovation and market competencies; 3) to reduce sensitivity to market fluctuations through diversification; and 4) to improve the international profile. These four objectives have been translated into three fields of action (programme themes): people, technology and environment. To make things concrete several projects have been defined covering the three programme themes (see Table 2.2 for a selection of these projects). One of the concrete projects that

Brainport Eindhoven

Table 2.2

21

Overview of Horizon projects

Competence Development Point

Design Connection Eindhoven

Knowledge Roadmap Region Eindhoven Incubator 3+ Technific Engineer in the Classroom Technique Days Top4Tech Youth and Metal

High Tech Campus Eindhoven International Community Eindhoven Business and Technology Communities Bèta Technique Eindhoven Healthcare & Technology Knowledge Network

Embedded House

Biomedical Technology Knowledge Network NewTrition Connection Centre Evoluon Design in Brainport Eindhoven (Programme 2005-2010) Region of Excellence

Facility Sharing Automotive Metal House Sports and Technology Be_linked

Source: Horizon Programme Website: Projects <www.programmahorizon.nl>, accessed 5 March 2007

have been identified considers the development of the Philips High Tech Campus into an international R&D site (a project under the heading ‘environment’). Another concrete project aims to promote Eindhoven and the southeast of the Netherlands internationally as a top technology region. The Horizon Programme has a timeframe of three to five years. For each project, objectives have been defined, including a specification of the year to reach the objectives. Evaluation years vary between 2004 and 2006. The idea is that projects launched under the umbrella of Horizon can be continued, also without the support of Horizon. Organization The organization of the Horizon Programme includes a Programme Agency that facilitates and supports project owners and their teams, and advises the Steering Group on new initiatives. Most project owners are experienced representatives of the three helices who are able to activate their large networks and have enough time to do so. Furthermore, the Programme Agency takes care of communication. The Programme Agency is a relatively small organization with about five staff members. The Steering Group is responsible for the quality (and outcome) of the programme and gives the Programme Agency strategic guidelines to follow. The Steering Group takes decisions and assigns financial contributions from the available funds. The Steering Group consists of 15 representatives from the private sector, knowledge

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institutions and the government. In addition, there is an independent Monitoring Commission that advises the actors involved on programme and project level. The Monitoring Commission is also responsible for writing an annual (public) report on the programme’s performance. One of the interesting elements of the Horizon programme is the division of roles and tasks between the government, business and knowledge institutions. Local authorities (the City of Eindhoven, surrounding municipalities, and the city region) seem to acknowledge their limited power to actually influence economic development. Their role is mainly limited to facilitator, stimulating firms and knowledge institutions to develop partnerships that produce added value, also for the region. Therefore, most project owners are representatives from the private sector (knowledge institutions included). The Brainport strategy While the Horizon Programme was being carried out, the actors involved developed the Brainport concept. The main motive to develop the Brainport concept was to secure the competitiveness of the Eindhoven region. In national economic and spatial policies (Nota Ruimte, Peaks in the Delta, etc.) the southeast of the Netherlands became known as the Brainport of the Netherlands. It is important to emphasize that the Brainport concept was not developed by national policy makers, but by local policy makers together with knowledge institutions and firms (the triple helix). They together succeeded to put the Brainport on the national agenda, and in the mental maps of national policy makers. To make the Brainport concept more concrete, a new strategic programme was formulated. In 2005, a special task force was set up to coordinate the development of such a strategic programme. Members of this task force were the leaders of the triple helix: the mayor of Eindhoven, who is also chair of the SRE, the chairman of Philips Electronics Netherlands, the president of the Technical University’s executive board, and the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce for the eastern part of Brabant. The so-called Task Force Brainport invited a commission of external experts to advise them on the strategic programme. This commission was headed by the president of the Dutch government’s Advisory Board for Science and Technology Policy, who was also member of the Innovation Platform. In the autumn of 2005, this commission presented its advice – the Brainport Navigator 2013 – to the task force. The advice is based on extensive desk research (relevant studies and policy reports) and interviews with about 50 representatives of 36 organizations, representing business, knowledge institutions and government. The ambition of the Brainport programme is expressed by the subtitle of the report: ‘Beyond Lisbon’, which means doubling the expenses on R&D from three (the Lisbon standard) to six per cent. With the Brainport programme, the Eindhoven region wants to become the most innovative region of Europe (currently the region ranks third or fourth). Aims The programme formulates priorities and actions to reach that ambition, building on the region’s experience with cross-sector co-operation in the Horizon

Brainport Eindhoven

23

Programme. The main objective is ‘the creation of a continuum for economic and social development’, which is made concrete by the following sub-goals: 1) creating balance on the labour market; 2) innovation through the valorization of applied knowledge; 3) reducing the sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations through diversification; 4) strengthening international visibility and reputation; and 5) the creation of a stimulating location climate. The mission of Brainport is to compete successfully on a worldwide scale by means of an innovative knowledge industry. Cross-sector and cross-border networks are considered essential in the implementation of the Brainport Programme. Although the programme concentrates on the Eindhoven region (that is the southeast of Brabant), its ambition is to enlarge the relevant geographic scale. The idea is that the Brainport should develop strategic relations with other cities and regions with complementary knowledge institutions and firms. The Eindhoven Leuven Aachen triangle is one of the (but not the only!) strategic partnerships that can be used to create the critical mass that is (apparently) needed to survive in global competition. The Brainport programme identifies three sectors that fit in the profile and mission: high tech systems & materials, the creative industry, and food & flowers. ICT and the chemical industry are also considered important, but they are seen as ‘enabling sectors’ (enabling the development of other sectors). The selection of sectors is based on the list of ‘key areas’ as identified by the national Innovation Platform,7 the presence of critical mass in terms of business and knowledge, and the degree of support among business, knowledge institutions and government. This selection method is based on the assumption that sector stimulating policies should build on existing strengths, rather than trying to develop sectors from scratch. Therefore the involvement of the business and knowledge sector (they have the knowledge, they invest) is crucial. The objectives (‘key factors’) of the Brainport Programme have been categorized in four domains: people, technology, business and basics (see Tabel 2.3). One of the distinctive features of Brainport is the explicit attention to basic conditions, like quality of life, accessibility and ICT infrastructure. The Brainport Programme is well connected to the innovation agenda of the Regiegroep Toptechnologieregio Zuidoost Nederland, which recognizes three high-potential sectors in the relevant region: 1) high-tech systems, machines and materials; 2) medical technology and life sciences; and 3) food and nutrition. Companies and knowledge institutions in these sectors are clustered along three socalled ‘knowledge axes’. Two of the three axes (the first two) run across the national borders, also to Aachen (medical technology and life sciences) and Leuven (hightech systems, machines and materials). Thus, the agenda emphasizes the value of cross-border and cross-sector collaboration for strengthening the three high-potential sectors. New combinations are needed to stimulate knowledge development, and to turn knowledge into (more practical) know how and to turn know how into cash (‘from knowledge to skill to the till’).

7 The key areas that have been identified by the Innovation Platform are Flowers and Food, High-tech Systems and Materials, Water, the Creative Industry, ICT and the Chemical Industry.

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Table 2.3

The four domains of the Brainport programme People

Technology

Entrepreneurship (mentality) Centres of Excellence (open innovation) Labour market (match supply and demand) Education (‘Brainport-fit’) Brainport pride

Knowledge transfer (notably to SMEs) Key areas (design, food)

Business

Basics

Stimulating start-ups) International community, (financial support quality of life Acquisition (‘Brainport-fit’) Accessibility, image Information/communication (to SMeS) ICT, business locations Business development (open innovation) Co-operation (Triple Helix, ELAt, etc.) Source: ‘Brainport Navigator 2013; Lissabonvoorbij’ (Brainport Eindhoven, 2005)

The Brainport Navigator defines actions for each key factor. Furthermore, actions are prioritized (one, two, three) and their costs are estimated, thus making the programme very concrete. Examples of actions that have been discussed during our interviews with key stakeholders and actions that are part of ELAt are listed in the table below. The (expected) outcomes of these actions are discussed in section four. The costs of the entire programme are estimated at €1.5 billion, from which €400 million should be covered by private investments. The remaining €1.1 billion has to be financed by the public sector (EU, national government, region, local government). Organization To implement the actions in the Brainport Programme, a Brainport Office has been set up. In practice this meant that the Horizon Programme Agency – the office that was responsible for carrying out the Horizon Programme – has changed its name, scope and scale. Distinctive features of the Brainport Programme are 1) its timeframe (2005-2013) which is longer than the Horizon Programme, 2) its scope (not only economic as in Horizon, but also social and environmental; not only project management but also the coordination and execution of programmes and projects), 3) the role of the government (not only facilitating, but also initiating and executing), and 4) its geographic scale (cross-border). The Brainport organization is presented in Figure 2.2. The Brainport Office is the executive body of the foundation Brainport Eindhoven. The managing director of the Horizon Bureau has become the managing director of the Brainport Office. The Horizon programme and projects will be continued under the flag of Brainport. The

Brainport Eindhoven

Table 2.4

25

Examples of actions in the Brainport programme People

Technology

International School

Brabant Medical School

Holst centre, Molecular Medicine Institute Dutch Polymere Institute, TNO Automotive Connected Patient (Care & Technology)

Business

Basics

Stimulus Venture Capital Fund Investor’s platform, starters exchange (ELAt) DSP Valley

Participation in ELAt Eindhoven Airport, HST connection

Eindhoven Inc. (ELAt)

High Tech Campus Eindhoven

Virtual entrepreneurship centre (ELAt)

Image campaign (ELAt)

Source: ‘Brainport Navigator 2013; Lissabon voorbij’ (Brainport Eindhoven, 2005)

bureau’s staff is a well-balanced mix of representatives from the three sectors of the triple helix. Large companies in the Eindhoven region are expected to send one or two of their employees on secondment. As a consequence the Programme Agency has become a real public-private partnership, the private-sector recognizing its interest in strategic involvement in regional economic development. A board of directors with representatives of the triple helix, headed by the Mayor of Eindhoven who is also the president of the SRE, manages the foundation. Broad political support (also among the various political parties) is considered important, and from that point of view it is helpful to have mayors in the board. Furthermore, we emphasize that all actors involved are represented by their leaders, assuming that corporate CEOs and the heads of universities expect to meet mayors. Like in Horizon, projects are led by project owners or leaders who represent one of the three helices. This means that private-sector leaders are expected to contribute some of their time to the project management. ELAt: the Eindhoven Leuven Aachen triangle One of the elements in the Brainport Programme is the Eindhoven Leuven Aachen triangle (ELAt). ELAt is a cross-border project – partly subsidized through EU funds (Interreg) – that aims to stimulate interaction between the three helices to make the region more innovative and creative, and to become one of the European hot spots in the knowledge economy. The mayors of the three cities that are involved have signed

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation


 

  

 

 


        

 "  



      ! 


 #  

Figure 2.2

The Brainport organization

a letter of intent to express their commitment to this joint ambition. In addition, the project can be related to a letter of intent that was signed by the Dutch Minister of Economics and the Flanders Minister of Finance, Budgets, Spatial Planning, Science and Technological Innovation. In this letter, the two ministers express their intention to stimulate and facilitate cross-border coordination and to intensify cooperation. A similar letter of intent has been signed by the Dutch government and the government of North Rhine Westphalia. On the website of ELAt, the initiators refer to the foundations of the knowledge economy as identified by Euricur in a previous study.8 They argue that ‘because it is hard for one region to score well on all seven foundations knowledge economy, regional cooperation is the key to success’. The most relevant argument to co-operate is the need for critical mass (‘urban scale’). Not only Eindhoven, but also Leuven and Aachen seem to recognize that their own metropolitan regions lack sufficient mass to become one of the top-class knowledge regions in Europe. For the City of Aachen, participation in ELAt is (only) one element in a long-term strategy to regenerate the local economy, which has been confronted with economic 8 These foundations are: Knowledge base, Economic base, Quality of Life, Accessibility, Urban diversity, Urban scale and Social equity (Pol, Van den Berg, Van Winden and Woets 2005)

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27

restructuring (and several ups and downs) for 25 years. Aachen’s relation with Leuven and Eindhoven is strong, though mainly based on the presence of Philips in the three cities. Moreover, the city participates in other networks as well. Although the cross-border region is very relevant in terms of economic cohesion, many policy makers tend to look at the Aachen-Bonn-Cologne-Dortmund (ABCD) region, also referred to as Bio River region. This ABCD region fits in the vision of North Rhine Westphalia to promote the development of north-south corridor, as a complement to the already existing east-west corridor. Hence, thinking on ELAt level is not (yet) common in the Aachen region, although European funds could certainly stimulate the awareness of cross-border economic cohesion. The selection of Aachen’s university (RWTH) as one of the spearheads in the national policy to stimulate the knowledge economy could also be seen as a stimulus to promote the development of Aachen as ‘city of science’, whether or not together with Eindhoven and Leuven. To understand the interest of Leuven in ELAt, insight into the (past) development of Leuven is needed. Already in the fourteenth century, Leuven was home to a biotech company avant la lettre. In the fifteenth century, the Catholic University of Leuven (KU Leuven) was founded, an important producer of knowledge. However, it took centuries before the idea came up to use the production of knowledge to earn money, resulting in the foundation of KU Leuven R&D in 1972. The aim of this foundation was to strengthen the ties between the university and the regional economy, by means of contract research, laying down intellectual property rights and stimulating start-ups. Until 1998, the foundation had been not very successful, with only 22 spin-offs being realized. At that time, the catholic rector magnificus and the socialistic mayor of Leuven decided to put their difference in political views aside, and to take action. Together, they agreed on the foundation of Gemma Frisius: a joint seed capital funding organization, with a budget of €12.5 million, for one fifth funded by the university, and for four fifths by two banks/insurance companies. A special IP (Intellectual Property) fund has been set up as well. Since 1998, the number of spin-offs has grown considerably, to 65, while the number of patents has reached 85. Leuven’s success is based on the presence of ingredients that are needed for the development of value chains: knowledge, seed capital, venture capital, growth capital, entrepreneurs (role models), business parks, networks (horizontal networks such as Leuven Inc and vertical networks such as DSP Valley) and quality of life. To preserve the quality of life, the City of Leuven aims for sustainable growth, trying to keep the number of inhabitants below a critical maximum. In order to develop critical mass, cooperation with other regions is necessary. Leuven maintains good relationships with other cities not only in Belgium, but also elsewhere in the world (e.g. Cambridge, Tampere, Oulu, Tel Aviv, etc.). Furthermore, the functional region of Leuven is growing in eastward direction, as a result of partnerships with the cities of Tienen and Genk, allowing the KU Leuven to develop new R&D locations. Cooperation on ELAt level is regarded as an opportunity to develop a knowledge region on a higher geographic level, able to compete with other knowledge regions in the world. Although the initiators emphasize that ELAt’s work area is the cross-border region (which is larger than the triangle), the partners involved represent the three corners of the triangle. On behalf of Eindhoven, the City of Eindhoven and the SRE are represented;

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Table 2.5

Work packages and objectives of the ELAt project

Joint innovation strategy

Benchmarking, promotion, evaluation

Definition of requirements, demands, outputs Evaluation of implementation (indicators) Policies to create conditions for growth

Collecting data on the cross border region Inventory of clusters

Technology & business communities

Coaching entrepreneurs

Supporting open innovation

Pre-seed, seed and early stage financing

Events

Stimulating business development Strengthening cross-sector/border relations Identification of business communities Source: ELAt: Objectives <www.elat.org>, accessed 5 March 2007

. the City of Leuven and the Catholic University of Leuven (KU Leuven) are the partners from Belgium in this project, while the German city of Aachen is represented by the City of Aachen and the Regional Development Agency (AGIT). Together they have formulated four work packages that contain several objectives. One of the objectives is to collect data on the cross-border region, which might contribute to the promotion of the region as one of the leading knowledge regions in Europe. Data collection is needed to communicate the critical mass that is already in place.9 The partners have also reached consensus on a selection of business communities to be stimulated (more or less in line with the key areas of the Innovation Platform). These communities are the automotive industry, embedded systems & DSP (Digital Signal Processing), mechatronics & precision technology, and medical technology & life tech. The organization of ELAt comprehends a steering committee with six representatives of the partners and a programme manager who is in charge of the formal relations with the Interreg secretariat. The Horizon Programme Agency (Brainport 9 The ELAt website includes a list of publications that present data on (parts of) the cross-border region. However, only one publication has a cross-border focus: Crossing Borders, Moving Frontiers (by Programme Agency Horizon).

Brainport Eindhoven

29

Office) is responsible for overall coordination, while the regional coordination (in each city region) is taken care of by Horizon, AGIT and KU Leuven. Partnership models The partnerships identified above (Horizon, Brainport, ELAt) can be analysed in a systematic way by looking at the criteria of the partnership model we introduced in our research framework (see Chapter 1). Before we do so, however, we need to understand the relation between the three partnerships. First of all, although many view Brainport as the successor of the Horizon Programme, the organizational structure of Brainport shows that both ELAt (as a project) and Horizon (as a method applied to various projects) can be considered part of the Brainport strategy. Second, it is important to be aware of the gradual evaluation in scale, from the regionally oriented Horizon Programme (which already recognized the context of the crossborder region but mainly concentrated on South-east Netherlands), via the crossborder region oriented ELAt project, to the Brainport Programme which aims to connect the cross-border region with other knowledge and innovation centres in the world (and Europe in particular). Comparing Horizon, Brainport and ELAt Although Horizon and Brainport share some similarities, they are also different in some aspects. The scope of the Horizon Programme is rather broad compared with sectoral partnerships (economic restructuring, from industrial mainport to top technology region), but smaller than the scope of Brainport, which more explicitly takes into account social and environmental issues that are considered relevant for economic development. Hence, the Brainport philosophy is more comprehensive, although still with a clear focus on economic issues. The scope of the ELAt project is smaller than Brainport, and comparable with Horizon, being mainly an economic initiative. The three projects work on different geographic scales, considering their ambitions and the actors involved. Horizon’s main work area is the region of South-east Netherlands (with a clear focus on the Eindhoven region), although the programme also recognizes the context of a cross-border region. ELAt clearly targets the cross-border region, which is considerable larger than the triangle. Although the ELAt organization is currently restricted to the three cities that represent the corners of the triangle, the ambition is to promote cooperation between actors in the whole cross-border region (not only the between the three cities). Brainport operates in a European or global context, aiming to promote cooperation between Brainport (Eindhoven region) and other centres of knowledge and innovation, not only in the cross-border region, but also outside that region. The organizational structure of Brainport, however, is mainly restricted to the Eindhoven region. Institutionalized co-operation on the level of Southeast Netherlands turns out to be very difficult because of competition between the provinces and different ways of working. Cross-border governance structures are even more difficult to realize because of all kinds of administrative, political and cultural barriers. When we consider the actors involved the three projects are quite similar, as they are all based on the triple helix principle. ELAt is different from Horizon and

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Brainport, as this project is really cross-border, working with a ‘triple triple helix’. The degree of formality is somewhat lower in the Horizon Programme (which is more a way of working) and ELAt (particularly considering its organizational structure, with many informal contacts between the leading stakeholders) than in Brainport (which is a legal entity: a foundation). However, all projects have an official status and a professional governance structure (including boards, steering groups and so on). The degree of political influence is fairly high for Horizon and Brainport. Political leaders are involved in the programmes, although the projects operate at some distance of the local administrations. Our impression is that political influence in ELAt is somewhat lower, although the mayors of the three cities have signed a letter of intent. The democratic content is fairly high for the three projects, because the organizations are very transparent, and they have to give account of their results (since they spend public money). The distance to voters might seem somewhat longer for ELAt than for Horizon and Brainport, which has to do with its scope and scale. The financial power of Horizon and Brainport is considerable, as both programmes have their own budgets that can be used to get things done. Moreover, the involvement of knowledge institutions and firms (being investors in the regional economy) gives the programmes additional financial strength. The financial power of ELAt (as a project) is currently somewhat weaker as it partly depends on EU money. Nevertheless, ELAt has the potential to become financially stronger, if the actors involved would commit themselves on a more structural basis. Looking at the organizational structure, the leading stakeholders of Horizon are the City of Eindhoven, the region (SRE), the TU/e, Philips and SMEs (represented by the Chamber of Commerce). In ELAt, the leading stakeholders are the six official partners: the Eindhoven region, the City of Eindhoven, the City of Leuven, the University of Leuven (KU R&D), the regional development organization for the region of Aachen (AGIT) and the City of Aachen. In comparison with Horizon, Brainport has even more leading stakeholders: the region of Eindhoven (SRE), various mayors representing local governments, the Chamber of Commerce, the Employer’s association for the provinces of Brabant and Zeeland (BZW), the TU/e and Philips. The internal organizations of Horizon and Brainport are to a large extent the same, both having a steering group or board, an executive programme agency and project leaders/owners. One important difference is that in the Brainport programme agency will be staffed by the three helices, while the Horizon agency is mainly a public affair. ELAt has a much smaller internal organization, with only one person responsible for managing relations with the EU. The execution of the project is taken care of by other organizations, including Horizon/Brainport. 4 Performance, Output and Outcome It is not the aim of this case study to give a full evaluation of the Brainport strategy. Nevertheless, insight into the outputs and outcomes of the Horizon and Brainport programmes, and the ELAt project, can help us to identify the factors of failure

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31

and success in the coalition-forming process. Moreover, interviews with relevant stakeholders have provided us with insight into some expectations regarding the new elements of the Brainport strategy, with a particular focus on the Eindhoven-LeuvenAachen triangle. Therefore, the first part of this section describes what has been achieved so far, identifying the factors of success. In the second part of this section we discuss the expectations with regard to ELAt and challenges that remain, based on the interviews with stakeholders. Achievements so far In general, we could say that the Brainport strategy is already considered very successful, although that conclusion is mainly based on achievements of the Horizon Programme. In practice, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the two programmes (Horizon and Brainport), as they are both part of the same strategy. The outcome of the Brainport strategy – its impact on competitiveness – is more difficult to assess. The last years, Eindhoven has been very successful (showing high growth rates), but that can to a large extent be ascribed to external developments like a growing international market. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Brainport strategy gives actors in the region self confidence, thus making the strategy a ‘selffulfilling prophecy’. From the interviews we learned that individual leadership is considered very important for the development of networks. Discussion partners identify the mayor of Eindhoven, the president of the university’s executive board and the president of Philips as key players. One of the most important achievements of the Horizon/Brainport strategy is the recognition in national and regional policies like Peaks in the Delta, Nota Ruimte (the national spatial plan), and the Acceleration Agenda (Province of Limburg). Regional key-players (notably the City of Eindhoven together with representatives from business and knowledge institutions) have succeeded to put Brainport on the national agenda, responding to the increasing awareness among national policy makers that economic policies should build on strengths (strong areas, strong sectors) with ‘more focus and more critical mass’. This is a clear example of how empowerment of metropolitan regions can work in practice. The Brainport concept nicely fits in the visions of higher-level governments, not because the Eindhoven region responded to these visions, but because the Eindhoven region helped to create these visions. It turns out to be a great advantage that the actors in the region of Eindhoven agree on a common vision, which is reflected in the Brainport strategy (and various other strategies). This strong ‘organising capacity’ is often ascribed to the regional ‘tradition to cooperate’ which is rooted in the society (a legacy of an era in which churches and sports clubs were meeting platforms). As this is a typical context factor, many discussion partners claim that the success story of Eindhoven is hard to copy to other regions. Moreover, it can be argued that there is little need to discuss the direction in which the Eindhoven region should develop, as it is obvious that high technology and innovativeness are key ingredients of the regional economy, Philips being such a dominant firm. Besides the recognition in national policies, we observe various positive developments in the cross-border region that may contribute to the Brainport

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

strategy and have helped to acquire recognition, but that can also be considered results of that strategy. For one thing, we can mention that some projects (worth about €70 million) have already been realized.10 More in particular, we will briefly discuss three important developments: 1) the opening-up of the High Tech Campus in Eindhoven; 2) the opening of the Holst centre; and 3) the relocation of TNO Automotive from Delft to Eindhoven. The opening-up of the High Tech Campus in Eindhoven Many discussion partners refer to the opening-up of the High Tech Campus as an important development in view of the Brainport strategy. The decision to open up research sites at this former Philips campus11 can be considered an achievement of the Horizon programme. The initiative to build the campus was taken by Philips. In 1997, Philips decided to move its headquarters to Amsterdam, the financial centre of the Netherlands. Proximity to the stock exchange and marketing experts were considered important motives to relocate. For many, the relocation of Philips – a company with an impressive track record of community involvement – was an event that proved that globalization had indeed reduced the local embeddedness of firms. Nevertheless, we conclude that the relation between Philips and Eindhoven is still very strong. Philips’ decision to relocate the headquarters was accompanied by the decision to invest in a high technology research centre near Natlab in Eindhoven. The latter decision resulted from a strategic choice of the global company to concentrate researchrelated activities in the Eindhoven region. And although alternative locations (notably in Asia) are developing rapidly, Philips still has no plans to relocate research activities. The original idea was to develop a Philips High Tech Campus, but during the years that followed, the management of Philips came to realize that the dynamic knowledge economy (shorter product life cycles, new technologies, new applications, global competition, etc.) requires ‘open innovation’. For that reason, Philips decided to open up the campus, turning it into a platform for knowledge exchange between researchers from various firms. Under the heading of ‘open innovation’ technological breakthroughs are stimulated by sharing facilities, services and knowledge. Logos of Philips were literally removed from the campus, which was quite a shock for many employees. Although not everybody was ready for ‘open innovation’ (which requires a change in business culture), it is generally considered a necessary ingredient in view of the Brainport strategy. In competition with other regions, Eindhoven and ELAt are expected to benefit from the strong ties between firms and knowledge institutions, which are needed for ongoing innovation. The Holst Centre Another achievement of the Brainport strategy, in the perception of our discussion partners, is the opening of the Holst Centre in 2005. The Holst 10 Data from January 2006. 11 The campus covers an area of 220 acres (100 hectare) with about 25 buildings. Total investments mount to €600 million. The campus comprehends over 8,000 m2 clean rooms, 50,000 m2 lab, 100,000 m2 office space and 75,000 – 80,000 m2 additional development space. In the near future, it will provide employment to not less than 8,000 people.

Brainport Eindhoven

33

Centre is an independent R&D institute that develops generic technologies and technology platforms for autonomous wireless transducer solutions and systemsin-foil. A key feature of the Centre is interaction and cooperation with industry and knowledge institutions.12 Important institutions and firms in this field can be found in Leuven, Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The founders of the institute are the IMEC institute from Belgium (Leuven) and TNO from The Netherlands. To get financial support from the Dutch government, IMEC had to set up a legal entity called IMEC Nederland (Netherlands), as state subsidies are seldom given to foreign actors. This example shows that formal administrative and political systems are not yet optimal for cross-border cooperation. Setting up a separate legal entity costs a lot of energy and money. Nevertheless, it is a truly cross-border initiative, supported by the two national governments (the government of Flanders and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs). In its role as the ‘launching customer’, Philips is a strategic partner in the Centre. It should be emphasized that the opening of the Holst Centre is not a direct outcome of the Horizon Programme, Brainport or ELAt, but it does fit in the overall strategy to promote cross-sector collaboration and to transfer successful forms of cooperation across national borders (in this case from Leuven to Eindhoven). The relocation of TNO Automotive from Delft to Eindhoven One of the major achievements of the Brainport strategy is the national government’s decision to relocate TNO Automotive (a research centre) from Delft to Eindhoven. TNO was founded by the national government in 1932 to strengthen the relation between fundamental research and industrial application. The institute has the legal task to improve innovativeness on a national level. TNO receives a lump sum from the national government (to carry out a research programme), making the institute an interesting partner for business companies (‘full knowledge for half the price’). The institute’s activities concentrate on five areas, one of which is Industry & Technique (I&T). In addition, there are twelve themes that run across the five areas. Automotive is one of the twelve themes, and has a strong link with TNO I&T, which has two major facilities in Delft and Eindhoven. The government’s decision to relocate automotive from Delft to Eindhoven is based on the concentration of knowledge in this field in the southeast of the Netherlands. A strong lobby from the Eindhoven region, a joint effort of the triple helix to promote the Brainport philosophy, has surely helped the government to make that decision. We could conclude that Brainport has already worked as a sort of ‘brand’ for the Eindhoven region. Expectations and challenges that remain From the interviews we can conclude that expectations regarding ELAt are, in general, lower than the expectations regarding Brainport. The Brainport programme is broadly supported by many actors, and comprehends concrete actions to be implemented. However, its geographic scale is (still) mainly restricted to the Eindhoven region, despite its ambitions to activate (cross-border) networks with 12 Source: <www.holstcentre.com>.

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

other cities. Although ELAt works with a triple-triple-helix model, some discussion partners consider ELAt as being mainly a public affair, with to date little private sector participation. However, this is no surprise as it is exactly the aim of ELAt to promote more private-sector involvement in cross-sector collaboration. Most discussion partners in the Eindhoven region recognize the economic cohesion with Leuven and Aachen, although this cohesion is largely based on the presence of Philips. There is general agreement that the value chains identified in the Brainport strategy, reach across the boundaries of the Eindhoven region. The cohesion within the triangle is estimated higher than the economic relations with other urban networks such as the Randstad. Moreover, cross-border cooperation is by many considered necessary to create a sufficient level of critical mass. However, some discussion partners wonder if Aachen and Leuven share the sense of urgency, and recognize ELAt as the right ‘level of cooperation’. Political leaders have committed themselves by signing an agreement, but to what extent are companies and knowledge institutions in Aachen and Leuven aware of ELAt? From the interviews in Leuven and Aachen, we have the impression that the awareness of ELAt among policy makers and political leaders is estimated somewhat higher in Leuven than it is in Aachen. Leuven seems very much aware of the potential synergies that can be realized through cooperation on ELAt level, also if that would imply the relocation of particular activities to Eindhoven (in exchange for other activities). Furthermore, it is obvious that the Eindhoven-Leuven axis is the most developed one, particularly because of Philips. It can be observed that strategic networks on ELAt level are – to date – relatively weak in comparison with strategic networks in the Eindhoven region, which is to some extent understandable considering the (development) stage in which the ELAt project finds itself. Although the ELAt project is a good attempt to organize the ‘triple triple helix’, cross-sector-cross-border networks are underdeveloped, and tend to be dominated by Philips as the leading firm that connects the three cities. Many discussion partners identify the poor internal accessibility in the ELAt region as a potential factor that obstructs partnership development. Good connections between the three cities (and other cities in the triangle) can also make the region more attractive for knowledge workers from elsewhere. Moreover, it seems very difficult to translate successful concepts developed in one city to another city. For example, it is considered problematic to copy Leuven’s venture capital funding model and Eindhoven’s public-private network model to the Aachen situation. Aachen and Leuven also participate in other networks, and it remains to be seen if there is sufficient support for more concrete forms of strategic cooperation on ELAt level. In addition, it is very difficult to make strategic choices on ELAt level, as other entities (like the Regiegroep Zuidoost Nederland) are more powerful (financially and politically). For that reason, expectations are that concrete projects on ELAt level will remain rare. It is maybe more realistic to see ELAt as an umbrella for projects on lower levels of scale. One of the barriers that obstruct cross-border partnership development is the lack of cross-border policies, on the level of formal administrations. Although national and regional policy makers recognize to some extent the international scale of Brainport Eindhoven, most policies of the State and the provinces are mainly

Brainport Eindhoven

35

oriented to their own work area. On the geographic level of ELAt, few policies can be identified, and it is to be questioned if such policies will ever develop. It is probably more realistic to strive for more coordination between policies. The letters of intent that have been signed by the three mayors and the two ministers might help to that end. Coordination is not only needed to improve the ‘hard’ physical infrastructure (accessibility by road), but also to enhance ‘soft’ infrastructures, like research programmes and other stimulating policies (referring to the example of the Holst Centre). Political support is essential to empower the relatively informal crosssector network (triple helix) that manages the Brainport strategy. Another problem that might frustrate co-operation is internal competition. In view of Brainport’s geographic scale (not only the cross-border region, but other networks as well), Eindhoven wants to cooperate with cities and regions that have something to offer, and that are well organized (cross-sector collaboration is a pre-condition). However, although many actors in the (cross-border) region agree on the common interests (critical mass, joint promotion), cities are still expected to optimize their own situation first. Actors will only collaborate in case of win-win situations. The provinces of Brabant and Limburg, for instance, seem to share a common vision (the Innovation Agenda), but that does not guarantee smooth co-operation, particularly in situations of conflicting interests. When it comes to attracting knowledge centres and firms, there are few mechanisms to avoid internal competition (besides the Innovation Agenda). One of the challenges that remain is to define the unique selling points (USPs) of the ELAt region, and more specific sectors to concentrate on. The actors involved could for instance agree to select a specific niche within medical technology such as molecular imaging, in view of the knowledge institutions and business activities already present in the region. The assumption is that if ELAt succeeds to become number one in a specific area, other activities will be attracted as well. Also health tourism has been mentioned as an interesting sector to focus on, considering the presence of health resorts such as Aachen, Valkenburg and Spa. The identification of USPs would also be a concrete step toward a joint marketing strategy for ELAt. 5 Applying the Research Framework In this final section we confront the findings in the Eindhoven region with the research framework that we introduced in Chapter 1. This framework can be used to understand the success of the Horizon programme and the Brainport strategy, but also to identify some obstacles toward partnership development at ELAt level. The framework comprehends the following elements: profile of the metropolitan region (political, economic, cultural context), factors that stimulate or obstruct partnership development, motives for partnerships, objectives of the partnership, partnership model, output of partnership, outcome of partnership (competitiveness of the region) and the influence of external and internal factors and policies. Most of these elements have already been discussed in the sections above. In this section, we discuss the relations between the various elements.

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In general, we conclude that the Horizon Programme and the Brainport Strategy are positively evaluated by the discussion partners. The partnerships have produced several concrete outputs including projects that link business with knowledge institutions, facilities that enable ‘open innovation’ such as the High Tech Campus and the Holst Centre), and influence on national policies (such as the relocation of TNO Automotive, and the recognition of Brainport in various policy documents). Although other external developments have played a role as well (e.g. growth of the world market), many are convinced that the Horizon Programme and the Brainport Strategy have contributed to enhancing the region’s competitiveness, in line with the motives for partnership development and the objectives that have been formulated. Many discussion partners in the Eindhoven region agree that (local and global) context factors have been decisive in the coalition-forming process. Important factors are: 1) the economic crisis in the early 1990s caused by problems at two of the region’s largest employers (also related to economic recession in general); 2) the more structural problems that appeared in beginning of the new century, with increasing competition from developing countries, raising the importance of restructuring the Eindhoven economy (requiring innovativeness); 3) the tradition to co-operate in the Eindhoven region, deeply rooted in the society; 4) the presence of a big leader firm like Philips, which is able to activate and organize networks; and 5) national policies that facilitated partnership development (notably the recognition of Brainport). The dominant presence of a ‘leader firm’ like Philips is an asset that helped to develop a common vision and strategy that are so desperately needed in metropolitan governance. The unanimous choice to invest in innovation and to create an attractive location and living environment results from a situation in which interests of nearly all actors seem to be converging. As far as national policies are concerned, we need to emphasize that the Brainport strategy should not be seen as the result of national policies, but rather the other way around. Actors in the Eindhoven have succeeded to put the Brainport philosophy (including the need for cross-border cooperation) high on the political agenda of national policy makers, thus gaining political and financial support which has helped to make the coalitions even stronger. This way of working is an interesting example of bottom-up empowerment of metropolitan regions. Apart from the context factors, success can be explained by looking at the partnership model itself. From experiences with the Horizon Programme, the following factors of success have been identified by discussion partners: 1) the high involvement of business and knowledge institutions, not only in programme development but also in implementation (many project owners are representatives from the private sector); 2) the strong leadership of the Mayor of Eindhoven (president of the regional administration), the CEO of Philips Electronics Nederland and the President of the University’s executive board; 3) concrete projects with concrete and measurable outputs (which helps to gain support). Other positive elements of the partnership model are the clearly defined scope, the high involvement of politicians in combination with some distance to everyday politics, the high transparency of the organization, and the strong financial power (partly based on external funds).

Brainport Eindhoven

37

One of the new elements of the Brainport strategy is the geographic scale. The ambition is to develop strategic networks with other knowledge and innovation centres, and the ELAt project is a first attempt in that direction. The main motive to develop this cross-border partnership is the need for critical mass in view of globalization (which is, of course, an external factor) and the already present economic coherence within the triangle. From the interviews we have been able to identify some factors that obstruct partnership development on ELAt level. Actors involved are challenged to take away these barriers. First, it remains to be seen if economic coherence within the triangle is strong enough to stimulate partnership development on ELAt level. It is true that the three cities are connected through value chains, but they also have connections with other cities and urban networks (including relations with cities ‘far away’). In addition, the awareness of cohesion on ELAt level is relatively low, particularly in Aachen. Second, higher-level governments (national, provincial, state) still find it difficult to look across their boundaries, despite their intentions to facilitate cross-border cooperation. Their policies try to optimize national or regional urban networks, instead of cross-border networks. A more facilitating role can be played by the European Union, being a promoter of cooperation in border regions. Third, there are important cultural, legal and administrative differences between the three cities, making it difficult to set up concrete projects that can be implemented everywhere. It is often not considered possible to copy successful models of cooperation from one city to another, because of specific local context factors. Fourth, many discussion partners refer to the weak internal accessibility (connections between the three cities) as an obstructing factor in partnership development. Better connections could help to create more opportunities for crossborder partnerships, but to realize these connections, support from higher-level governments is needed. Of course, the actors involved could try to reduce these barriers, for instance by increasing awareness of cohesion on ELAt level and lobbying for the construction of infrastructure. Some discussion partners, however, emphasized that the triangle should not be seen as a blueprint for regional cooperation. From Eindhoven’s point of view, it is just one of the networks that should be stimulated in order to promote the development of Brainport (the Eindhoven region). After all, the two other cities participate in other networks as well. In addition, many consider it important to improve the involvement of other cities within or just outside the triangle.

References Berg, L. van den, Braun, E. and Meer, J. van der (1997), Metropolitan Organising Capacity (Aldershot: Ashgate). Brainport Eindhoven (2005), Brainport Navigator 2013; Lissabon voorbij. Horizon (2004), Crossing borders, moving frontiers. Ministery of Economic Affairs (2004), Pieken in de delta. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (2004), Nota Ruimte.

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Discussion partners Mr Guy S.M. Kerpen, Philips Mr Thomas Fiedler, City of Aachen Mr H. Jan Mengelers, TNO Industrie & Techniek Mr Jacques G.H. Joosten, Dutch Polymere Institutite/DSM Mr Ton van Lier, Programme Bureau Horizon Mr Amandus H. Lundqvist, TU/e Mr Alexander Sakkers, Mayor of Eindhoven Mr Rick Harwig, Philips Research Mr Jacques H.M. van de Vall, Chamber of Commerce Oost Brabant Mr Roelof Jonkers, Catharina Ziekenhuis (Hospital) Mr Marc Hendrikse, Te Strake Mr Joop F. Sistermans, The Dutch government’s Advisory Board for Science and Technology Policy/Innovation Platform Mr Martin Hinoul, KU Leuven/Leuven Inc.

Chapter 3

Centrope: A Cross-Border Alliance in the Central European Region1 1 Introduction After more than 40 years of closed borders the gradual political turnaround since 1989 brought about new opportunities for collaboration and integration in the crossborder region formed by the Vienna metropolitan region, the southern part of the Czech Republic, western Slovakia and western Hungary. The accession of these countries to the EU (Austria in 1995 and the other three countries in 2004) was another impulse to intensify cross-border cooperation. The new conditions have led to all kind of cross-border initiatives, but the expectations are that many challenges are still waiting. Especially the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration provides a setting with a considerable development potential. In this case study we look at a region crossing five borders with around 6.5 million inhabitants living on a surface of around 54,000 km2. The region has more inhabitants than Denmark, Ireland or Slovakia and spreads over a larger surface than Belgium, Switzerland or the Netherlands. Within this region there are marked differences with respect to among others GDP, productivity, wages, unemployment, knowledge levels. A central question for the region is how to come to a common vision and to formulate and manage a strategy for cross-border cooperation in such a way that it enhances the competitiveness of the entire region as well as its constituting parts, with benefits for all, including a gradual levelling out of the steep economic and social differences. The idea of creating a cross-border ‘Central European Region’ partnership made up by the regions and major cities on the four sides of the borders got momentum when, on the initiative of the provinces2 of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland regional and local political decision-makers met for the first time in 2003 and agreed to start cooperation. This meeting marked the launch of the ‘Centrope’ partnership. The basic idea of Centrope is to offer a framework and platform for cross-border cooperation and coordination and to market this region internationally as a prime investment location. The political support is considered a necessary step on the way to cross border-exchange and integration. The period 2003–2006 was a phase of getting to know each other and exchanging information and ideas. The ‘summit meeting’ of 2006 in Vienna marked the kickoff of a second phase in which the partnership should come to work. Against the 1 2

This case study was carried out in June 2006. Länder

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background of the “Vision Centrope 2015” objectives have been formulated for a number of thematic areas for the years to come. In this Chapter the Centrope partnership, its achievements until now, the barriers for cooperation and the expectations and requirements for future results are discussed. First, however, we sketch the regional profile. 2 Profile of the Central European Region Composition of the region Eight regions and eight cities participate in Centrope: the Austrian provinces of Vienna (which is at the same time the federal capital of Austria, so city and region coincide), Lower Austria and Burgenland, the Slovak regions of Bratislava and Trnava (both formed after the administrative reform of 2001), the Czech region of South Moravia (dating from an administrative reform in 2000) and the Hungarian regions of Györ-Moson-Sopron and Vas. Next to these eight regions, eight cities (the City of Vienna not included) participate. Seven cities participate because they are the capital of the participating regions: the Austrian cities of Sankt Pölten (capital of Lower Austria) and Eisenstadt (capital of Burgenland), the Slovak cities of Bratislava (capital since 1993 of Slovakia and the Bratislava Region) and Trnava (capital of the Trnava Region), the Czech city of Brno (capital of South Moravia) and the Hungarian cities of Györ (the capital of the Györ-Moson-Sopron Region) and Szombathely (the capital of the Vas Region). The city of Sopron is the only partner city without a status of regional or national capital. Apart from these eight cities there are no other major cities of a considerable size or economic importance

Figure 3.1

Centrope in central Europe

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41

situated in this region. Analyses on Centrope (such as studies by WIFO and ÖIR3) normally include the Czech province of Southern Bohemia, although this region is no formal partner. Within the Centrope region most emphasis is obviously put on the development of its central area, the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration. The Vienna Region is the undisputed engine of the whole Centrope region. Most opportunities are expected to arise from a better cooperation between Vienna and Bratislava, the fast growing capital of Slovakia. The distance between the two cities is only 60 km, but adequate traffic connections are still missing. Demography The Centrope region counts around 6.5 million inhabitants (Table 3.1). With 53 per cent of the population, Austria has by far the largest share and Vienna is by far the largest city (with 1.6 million inhabitants), followed at quite some distance by Bratislava with 430,000 inhabitants. Apart from Brno (370,000, the second Czech city) and Györ (130,000), there are no cities that exceed 100,000 inhabitants. The two core cities together cover one third of the total population. The Austrian parts of Centrope cover 42 per cent of the total Austrian population, while the Slovak parts cover 21 per cent of their national population (OECD 2003). The population growth is slow in the Austrian part (2.04 per cent between 1991 and 2001) and even slower on the Slovak side (0.14 per cent over the same period). Since the late 1980s the percentage of residents without an Austrian citizenship in Vienna’s population rose from 7 to 16.4 per cent. The city of Bratislava had 6.6 per cent foreigners in 2001. Since the early 1980s suburbanization has been the dominant force throughout the region, according the OECD study attributed to a combination of low land rents in peripheral areas and their increased accessibility. Urban sprawl has lead to an ageing population in peripheral parts, as well as low economic activity (young people migrate to the cities) and difficulties to maintain the level of public services (OECD 2003). Economy Centrope is a region characterized by significant disparities in terms of economic structure and development which is a common situation in all cross-border regions connecting old and new EU member states. A clear advantage with respect to economic development is the presence of a strong urban core comprising the cities of Vienna and Bratislava and their surroundings. In contrast to other ‘east-west’ crossborder regions, Centrope has no lagging regions with a high share of agricultural employment (Huber and Mayerhofer 2006). The eastern part4 is more service and 3 Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschafstforschung and Österreichisches Institut für Raumplanung. 4 It is custom to refer to the Austrian part as the ‘western’ part and to the new member states part as the ‘eastern’ part, although some Centrope regions in the new member states are located more to the west than the Austrian part.

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Table 3.1

Population of the Centrope region

Country

Region

Pop. region

Pop. country

Share Centrope

Austria

Vienna Lower Austria Burgenland

1,600,000 1,500,000 280,000

3,380,000

53%

Slovakia

Bratislava region Trnava region

600,000 550,000

1,150,000

18%

Hungary

Györ-Moson-Sopron region Vas region

435,000

705,000

11%

1,100,000

17%

6,335,000

100%

Czech Republic South Moravia

270,000 1,100,000

Centrope region Source: ‘Vision 2015’ (Consortium Centrope 2006)

manufacturing oriented (56 and 38 per cent respectively) than the new member states are on average (38 and 31 per cent respectively). This indicates that the share of agriculture is relatively low (6 per cent) compared to that of the total figure for new member states (18 per cent). For the Austrian part it appears that the share of the service sector (75 per cent) is higher than the average of the old member states (70 per cent) while the share of manufacturing is lower (21 per cent for the Austrian Centrope regions versus 26 per cent for the old member states). The largest differences between the eastern and western part with respect to employment are in manufacturing (28.4 per cent in east against 13.3 per cent in west), in business services (7.8 per cent in east versus 13.7 per cent in west) and in public services (28.6 per cent in the western part versus 21.9 per cent in the eastern part). Huber and Mayerhofer (2006) conclude that, compared to the average of the new member states, the eastern part of Centrope comprises a set of ‘modern’ (more service and less agricultural oriented), diversified regions without problems of mono-industrialization. This, however, cannot mask the substantial heterogeneity among the Centrope regions. An analysis of the economic well-being for Centrope shows that GDP in the metropolitan city of Vienna is 73 per cent above the EU-25 average. Bratislava is also above this average. The other Austrian regions are just below the average, while the remaining eastern regions remain far behind (see Table 3.3). Looking at productivity, it follows that the Austrian part has a high level, while the level in the eastern regions is still low (Palme and Feldkircher 2006). Unemployment is only very high in West Slovakia. Structural change in the Centrope region is considerable and oriented towards more skill- and technology-intensive industries. Export data provide evidence of a rapid catching up process of the new member states that are represented in Centrope.

Centrope: A Cross-Border Alliance in the Central European Region

Table 3.2

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Economic structure Centrope region (employment shares)

Agriculture Mining, quarrying Manufacturing Electricity, gas, water Construction Trade Hotels, restaurants Transport Financial intermediation Real estate, renting, business activities Public administration, defence Education Health, social work Other community, social, personal service activities Activities of households

Centrope total

Austrian regions

New member regions

4.9 0.3 21.0 1.3 7.1 15.4 4.0 7.3 2.6 10.7 7.1 6.0 7.5 4.5

4.0 0.2 13.3 0.9 6.8 16.2 4.4 8.0 3.6 13.7 8.0 5.5 9.5 5.6

5.8 0.5 28.4 1.7 7.3 14.6 3.6 6.8 1.6 7.8 6.3 6.5 5.6 3.5

0.1

0.2

0.0

Source: Eurostat data, in Huber and Mayerhofer (2006)

Table 3.3 GDP per capita in Centrope sub-regions (EU 25 = 100) GDP per capita Vienna Bratislava Lower Austria Burgenland South Morovia South Bohemia, West Slovakia and West Hungaria

4.9 0.3 21.0 1.3 7.1 15.4

Source: Eurostat, WIFO-calculations, in Palme and Feldkircher (2006)

In the three countries export shares to the EU increased dramatically, the balance of trade improved and the structure of trade moved rapidly to more technology- and skill-intensive activities (Huber and Mayerhofer 2006). An important competitive advantage is the relatively low unit labour costs, particularly in technology-intensive industries that employ many blue-collar workers. Multinational companies are responsible for a high share of business investments. The eastern part of Centrope does have a location advantage for products or components that are in demand in western markets (with their sophisticated preferences) as well

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as in dynamic eastern markets (Palme and Feldkircher 2006). Prototypical for this advantage are the automobile and electronics industry that have developed strongly in the last ten to fifteen years, mostly as a result of foreign direct investment. An automotive cluster has developed in West Slovakia and West Hungary. Foreign manufacturing companies have attained a level of production that is 60 per cent higher than that of local business (Hunya and Geisheker 2005). However labour costs might be increasing in the eastern part because the transition countries are quickly catching up in productivity. Palme and Feldkircher (2006) consider this location advantage to be relatively permanent. The location advantage has probably just about been exhausted. Large investments and take-offs in development are therefore no longer to be expected. Another location advantage worth mentioning concerns the low taxes on business activity. These taxes have in part been significantly lowered recently in Slovakia (effective tax 16.7 per cent) and Hungary (18.4 per cent) and partially as a reaction also in Austria (23.1 per cent). Effective business taxes in the Czech Republic are 25.5 per cent (Palme and Feldkircher 2005; 2006). Labour market The transition of the former socialist countries to a new economic structure had dramatic effects on the labour market, resulting in huge unemployment. But nowadays labour market conditions are not any more adverse than in the EU-25. Labour participation is comparable to the EU-25 average. Unemployment is relatively low, with the exception of West Slovakia (15.9 per cent). Remarkably, the Vienna region follows with 7.7 per cent in 2003. The lowest figures are for Lower Austria (3.5 per cent, Burgenland (4.3 per cent) and the Hungarian regions (4.6 per cent) (Huber et al. 2006). Wage and productivity levels differ considerably between Austria and the rest. In Austria wage levels are six to seven times higher than in the neighbouring countries. Like in several other ‘old’ member states, the Austrian labour market is not yet open to workers of the new member states. This obviously influences the mutual relations, because eastern countries feel it as an offence. The fear on the Austrian side is a strong increase of migration, job seekers and wage dumping. The three Austrian regions involved in Centrope have a different opinion on how to deal with this issue, with the final decision to be taken the national government. The expectation is that the restrictions will last till at least 2009. Spatial-economic situation Centrope claims that the Central European Region is situated in the centre of Europe. However, Palme and Feldkircher argue that from a geographical point of view as well as from a spatial economic point of view Centrope is not in the centre of Europe. That does not mean that the region is on the European periphery. The spatial economic position can be considered as an intermediary region between the core and a part of the periphery, on the intersection of western and eastern markets, which both easy to access.

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45

The region is characterized by enormous spatial and functional divergences, which influence the development opportunities (DIANE 2003). Basically there are three types of space in the region: • • •

the urban agglomeration axis of Vienna-Bratislava (with an offshoot to Györ) comprising the political, administrative and economic centres; the medium-sized and small cities that function as regional centres and that usually are the driving forces behind regional economic development; the poorly accessible rural periphery that suffers from structural problems and out-migration.

There is a gap with regard to the transportation and communication infrastructures. Until now the transport structure suffers from scant investments, capacity bottle necks and decades of interrupted cross-border traffic. The number of border crossings is limited and does not correspond to that of a densely populated region striving for integration (Palme and Feldkircher 2006). Administrative organization There are considerable differences between the administrative organizations in Austria and the other states. In the Federal Republic of Austria the provinces and municipalities are quite independent in policymaking (Purschke 1998). They autonomously decide about matters that fall under their competencies (e.g. transport and spatial planning, environment) (OECD 2003). No formal coordinating institutions exist to coordinate the policies of the three provinces that together make up the Vienna metropolitan region (Vienna Region). In the eastern countries the administrative structure is rather recent and not yet quite stable. The Bratislava and Trnava regions in Slovakia were created in 1996. Since 2001 they have been undergoing a process of re-organization. They have specific competences but lack financial resources. The Czech regions were created in 2000. In Hungary the administrative structure will soon be revised. Seven new regions will replace the current counties. Institutionalized cooperation between the regions is almost non-existent. Thus, policy coordination depends on ad hoc meetings or on national policy initiatives (OECD 2003). Apart from for the lack of regional coordination, the situation in the eastern part of Centrope is quite different. After decades of central guidance by the state in almost every aspect of life, the transition to a market driven economy changed the administrative organization completely. There has been a move to a regime in which market forces take the lead to some extent. In most cases local authorities have become rather independent in policymaking, but they lack adequate funding to implement. Money always seems to be problematic, which forces regional and local authorities into short-term thinking to solve acute problems. There is no time, capacity or money to think about more long-term and structural policies and solutions. Cooperation with the private sector has become an alternative for state funding (Van Kempen and Vermeulen 2004).

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3 The Centrope Partnership Introduction cross-border cooperation Border regions typically suffer from handicaps in economic development. Even open borders usually constitute a significant barrier, by missing infrastructure links and fragmentation of markets, institutional arrangements and many other split systems and functions, let alone a situation with closed borders, as in the Centrope situation. Differences in language and culture increase the psychological distance between both sides of the border. Resistance towards integration (fearing a negative influence on existing prosperity and well-being levels) could have repercussions on the removal of barriers. To prevent such effects, policies and institutional adjustments are required that allow full exploitation of growth opportunities and an even spread of benefits. However, formulating and implementing a coherent strategy to arrive at a higher integration level is extremely complex. It requires institutional cooperation, joint decision-making, resource sharing; matters that are even difficult to achieve within the same country. Such a process will inevitably be gradual and piecemeal (OECD 2003). The OECD Territorial Review for the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration concluded in 2003 that since the mid-1990s a flurry of cross-border projects and initiatives has been introduced within the scope of various programmes and initiatives, but that a clear strategy for the development of a cross-border region was lacking. EU programmes have created incentives to cooperate but assessing policy priorities or setting-up cross border institutions require more active engagement. The initiative The Kittsee5 Conference of 2003 marked the official start of the Centrope partnership. At this meeting regional and local leaders signed a declaration “to build a common Central European Region”, using the name Centrope6 as a trademark. Since 2002 the Regional Business Agencies of Vienna, Lower Austria, Burgenland, South Bohemia, South Moravia, West Slovakia and West Hungary were working together in the DIANE-network7 to market the region. A municipal department8 of the City of Vienna together with some advisory institutions formed a consortium and started preparations to formulate a framework for supra-regional cross-border cooperation and coordination, based on the wish to initiate a process of regional integration. Before the launch of Centrope, various cross-border partnerships had already been active in the region, such as the business-led ‘Vienna-Bratislava Twin-City’ project. Most of these partnerships are dedicated to the interests of a specific segment of

5 Kittsee is situated in between Vienna and Bratislava. 6 Combination of Central and Europe, resulting from a contest among schoolchildren. 7 DIANE (Direct Investment Agency Net) is an EU-supported network aiming at the repositioning of the Centrope region in the international market for business locations. 8 Magistratsabteilung 27 (EU-Strategie und Wirtschaftsentwicklung).

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47

society, to a specific theme or to a part of the region. Some of them are mentioned in sub-section ‘vision and themes’. The initiators favoured a comprehensive approach, covering more regions than the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration only. The philosophy was to build a strong European growth region outside the ‘Banana’.9 The Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration alone has approximately 3 million inhabitants. That was considered too small to become a strong region. With the current 6.5 million inhabitants Centrope should have enough critical mass. It was clear to the initiators that first and foremost political commitment was required to get things in motion. That step was achieved in 2003 when (at that time) 14 regional and local leaders agreed to support measures that help to establish a ‘common region of growth and prosperity’, to create an attractive quality location, to improve the frame conditions for cross-border cooperation, to intensify networking and communication and to strengthen public and private commitment (Consortium Centrope, 2006). Later, two other regions decided to join. Motives Central motive is to contribute to the sustainable development of a competitive region by setting up a comprehensive cooperation strategy and establishing a form of cooperation management. All partners expect to benefit from the new regional growth opportunities. For the Vienna Region to start a supra-regional development was to constitute a new frame for competition and cooperation and to gain benefits (from a.o. Vienna’s role as hub for Central and Eastern Europe). The motives for the eastern side were to become informed about development perspectives and to get more connected with the Austrian driving forces. The fact that cross-border projects qualify for EU-funding was another motive. Centrope covers three bilateral Interreg IIIa programmes. All three have as partners the Vienna metropolitan region (comprising the provinces of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland) and the border regions of one of the three new member states. The fact that there are three programmes is a technical formality, due to the required EU format. Centrope has always been multilateral. The impression from the interviews is that availability of European money is not the only driver of Centrope. The common historical and cultural background of the region and the many border-crossing family ties are significant motives too. Role and objectives Several notions are used to describe the role and function of Centrope (Consortium Centrope 2006). Here is a selection: •

A political process that enables the partners to agree on the shape and content of the partnership;

9 The banana-shaped European core area running from the London region over the Randstad, Belgium, the Rhein-Rhur, Rhein-Main and the Alps to Northern Italy.

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• • • •

A strategic network bringing public and private experts together to draft and develop common strategies and activities; A framework for stimulating and initiating processes of cooperation and coordination leading to integration; A platform that informs interested parties, promotes cross-border projects and provides impetus for the development of the Central European Region; A marketing tool to promote the central European region in the countries itself and abroad.

Centrope’s role is primarily strategic and coordinative and less operational in terms of sectoral cross-border projects. It initiates activities to be carried out by others and supports initiatives that contribute to the prime objective. It acts as a booster and a broker for common interests. It is not a substitute or competitor for existing initiatives or new initiatives that also contribute to the common objective of sustainable integration. Centrope’s objective is to contribute to the creation of an integrated cross-border region. To realize this objective a number of sub-goals have been formulated, such as: • • • • •

To generate long standing economic, cultural and political relations; To seize opportunities that arise from structural changes; To generate synergies for mutual benefits by working together; To support sustainable integration on the basis of diversity; To implement a professional cross-border cooperation management.

Despite political agreements and common interests it should not be ignored that there do exist clear conflicts of interest and intra-regional competition too. The significant differences between the partner regions (production costs, qualification, productivity, innovation potential, standards, policies, etc.) must be considered ‘competition potentials’ (DIANE 2003). Another important objective (in which the DIANE partner project is most active) is ‘selling’ the ‘Central European Region’ to potential investors, visitors and other parties that could contribute to the positive development of the region. Centrope functions as the one-stop-shop providing specific information about economic sectors and business conditions, site selection support, contacts with public officials and assistance in recruiting potential partners for joint ventures. Sub-goals for this objective are: • •

To enhance the attractiveness of the region for investors; To promote the region on a global scale.

Actors Centrope is a public partnership of eight regions and eight cities. Initiator and leading actor is the Vienna Region. The other partners hold followers positions.

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49

Before Centrope started, the Austrian regions asked Bratislava to cooperate with them with respect to – among others – regional marketing and economic development. The Slovak capital refused, as it would be under the flag of Vienna region. Things changed with the set up of Centrope. In the Centrope setting, Bratislava is happy to participate. It appears that especially the cities of Vienna and Bratislava are most active within Centrope. The Austrian federal government is only indirectly involved in Centrope, as most things are decided on the regional level. The national governments of the new member states are stronger involved although not formally represented. In the new EU period (2007-2013) the position of the lead partners (the financing regions) might change. At the moment Centrope is financed only by the Vienna Region. The aim is that all participating regions and cities will become financing partners for Centrope in the new EU period. Private partners can participate in Centrope projects and programmes but they do not have a formal position or say. Organization The work of Centrope draws on political declarations adopted at the ‘Summit Meetings’. These political conferences (held in 2003, 2004 and 2006) have enabled the political leaders of the regions and cities to agree on the shape and content of their future cooperation. On top of the organization is the Steering Committee. This body is responsible for the performance of the project. Only the three Austrian regions are member of this Committee, the reason being that they finance the project (through EU funding and co-financing). Until now the eastern partners are not financially involved, which gives them no position in the Steering Committee. As soon as this situation changes, they can join. They are dependent on their national governments for co-financing. Until now there have been no resources available for full participation, neither financially or in terms of human capacity. The Advisory Board is a forum for discussions among official representatives of the partners on the form and substance of the Central European Region. All partners have representatives (mostly public officers) in this Board. The Centrope Consortium organizes all activities, guides the process and prepares implementations. They are responsible for concrete actions. The Consortium consists of five Austrian institutions (three regional business agencies, a consulting company and Europaforum Wien10). It is conducting the project in accordance with the Steering Committee and the Advisory Board. At the project level, expert working groups as well as business agencies draft and develop strategies, measures and pilot projects. The organizational structure depends partly on differences in administrative and financial structures in the countries and regions involved. Centrope is first and foremost a public organization but it is not a new political and/or administrative 10 Public-private consulting company set up in 1995 by the City of Vienna, acting as project secretariat.

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50

entity. Private partners are not represented in the summit meetings, the Steering Committee or the Advisory Board. The private sector has only been involved in the preparatory meetings before the actual start of Centrope and is currently involved on the project level. The major source of income is EU funding and co-financing by the Austrian regions. The Centrope initiative – as a typical cross-border project – qualifies for EU-funding through the Interreg IIIa and Phare CBC programmes.11 For the 20002006 period, the Interreg contributions increased considerably, in line with the political importance of cross-border integration. For the period 2007-2013, the EU financial assistance to cross-border regions will increase through the new “European Territorial Cooperation” objective (Schuster 2006). Vision and themes Two and a half year after the launch of the Centrope partnership the results of the first phase are laid down in the publication “Centrope Vision 2015: We grow together, together we grow”. Over 200 experts added their know-how and ideas, resulting in detailed analyses and strategy recommendations for future cooperation. This vision was supported and encouraged by all partners during the political Conference in 2006 and defines aims that could be achieved in the coming ten years for selected thematic areas. For each theme the current situation in 2005/2006 has been compared to the desired situation in 2015. To achieve this future situation development perspectives and an agenda of activities have drawn up for each of the thematic areas, which are: • • • • • •

Economy & Innovation Education, Science & Research Labour Market & Qualification Transport, Infrastructure, Environment & Regional Development Culture & Cultural Tourism Communication & Co-operation

The status of the Vision is described by the authors as “a kind of snapshot to inform about findings and to provide suggestions”. It does not cover all aspects that come up for cooperation. Due to the time schedule and the Interreg frame conditions, the work had to focus on a few central issues that were approached with varying degrees of intensity. As a consequence the Vision 2015 is not an exhaustive one. Still a wide variety of topics are dealt with, including the set up of a number of multilateral institutions in various policy fields.

11 Interreg III is a EU Community Initiative which aims to stimulate interregional cooperation in the EU between 2000-06. The Phare Cross Border Cooperation programme was one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the European Union to assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their preparations for joining the European Union.

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Examples of themes and pilot projects It is beyond the scope of our study to describe all themes, pilot projects and partner projects in this case study. In the Vision 2015 some pilot projects are summed up (Table 3.4). In all projects the most relevant actors in the region were invited to take part. In addition to these Centrope pilot projects, a selection of cross-border topics is presented below, for an important part based on expert interviews and documentation made available. Many cross-border initiatives have been set up since the opening of the borders. Some of them have come under the umbrella of Centrope, others have decided not to take part in this organization. However, most projects contribute to realize the perspectives that are adapted in the Centrope Vision 2015. The private business-led ‘Twin-City’ project (Box 3.1) is an example of a project for which the initiators don’t want it to be linked to Centrope, a major reason being that the partners (business agencies and big companies) prefer not to be involved in administrative, procedural or political debates. Moreover, Centrope has only public partners, which makes it in the eyes of the business representatives a bureaucratic enterprise without a distinct focus. Centrope and Twin-City are working in the same direction, but in different ways. Although they exchange information about each other’s activities, the Twin-City initiative up to now refuses to use the name Centrope in their promotional activities. The Raiffeisenbank, however, does use the Centrope ‘brand’ in its documentation and promotion. Theme transport and infrastructure Centrope’s visions for this theme call for among others more efficient road, rail and waterway links (as part of the EU Trans European Networks), upgrading of

Table 3.4

Centrope pilot projects

Projects

Objectives

Bio-Substance High-tech Recycling Centre Centrope Labour

Finding out potential regional competence in biogenics Finding out opportunities for utilization recycling technological Bringing labour market institutions together to think and talk about future perspectives To lay foundation for cross border geo-data pool To prepare for new EU programming period 2007– 2013 For digital art students to discover a common cultural identity Organizing life music events To create a sailing network

Centrope Map Regional Management Enter Centrope Centrope Sound Centrope Sailing

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Box 3.1: Centrope pilot projects This project is set up by the Industrial Associations of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland. The representatives of the (Austrian) business society established in 2005 the Twin-City Industrial Platform, bringing together reputed industrial companies from Austria and Slovakia. The objective of the cooperation is to jointly developing, preparing and implementing projects that contribute to realize the Twin-City Region Vienna-Bratislava. The Twin-City project focuses on infrastructure projects in the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration. The opinion is that you should start where most of the potentials are, e.g. in Vienna and Bratislava. It is not until the Twin-City has fully grown before regions and cities in the wider region should participate as well. This process takes time. The Business Associations work as a pressure group towards the (national) authorities who decide about infrastructure investments. Some projects will be realized through public private partnerships (like the train that will connect the airports and the city centres), in which industries are willing to invest. The Industrial Associations claim that the Twin-City approach offers excellent potentials of developing into a dynamic economic region. Source: Europa Region Mitte, IV-Landesgruppen Wien, Niederösterreich, Burgenland (2006)

the airports, construction of new border crossings at local levels and cross border coordination of public transport. Public transport A project of major importance is the rail link that will connect the city centres of Vienna and Bratislava and their respective airports. The newly opened CAT-line (City Airport Train), connecting Vienna Airport and Vienna city centre, will be prolonged to Bratislava and Bratislava Airport. The CAT is a public-private cooperation between the operator Vienna Airport (51 per cent) and the Austrian national railway company (ÖBB, 49 per cent). This project fits in the Centrope vision. The project FIRST initiated by the VOR12 (Transport Association of Eastern Austria) has been operational since 2005. FIRST is a transport information system for Vienna and Bratislava. Cross-border travellers can inform themselves how to plan their door-to-door route using public transport. Another pilot is the possibility to buy one ticket to use public transport from Vienna to Brno and within both cities, without the need to change money to buy a local ticket. VOR’s priorities have been incorporated in Centrope’s Vision, but VOR is only indirectly involved in Centrope. Airport cooperation Cooperation between the airports of Vienna and Bratislava was already in discussion during the pre-phase of Centrope, within the context of Interreg IIIa, when the Czech and Hungarian regions were not yet involved. The Centrope objective to promote and stimulate an integrated region is considered as 12 VOR: Verkehrsverbund Ost-Region.

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important by the airports, because in such a region the demand for air traffic is expected to increase. The privatized Airport of Vienna13 has plans to take over the airport of Bratislava. The expectation is that without this strategic ‘cooperation’ both airports will lose part of their competitive position to the airports of Prague and Budapest. Upgrading of all airports in the region to a coordinated airport system is among Centrope’s visions for 2015. Twin-liner The first direct link between Vienna and Bratislava is by water. The Twin-Liner is a fast ferry that started operations in 2006. The initiator is a private, profit based company (Central Danube), set up by the City of Vienna and the commercial Raiffeisenbank. Central Danube’s major focus is on organizing private investment especially in cross-border infrastructure. It intervenes in public-private partnerships as a broker between companies, banks and the public sector. It is not an initiative from Centrope. Theme labour market Some projects have been started up, but a comprehensive approach is still missing and cross-border cooperation between the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary does not exist. Despite high unemployment figures in some regions, programmes that try to cope with that situation have not yet been developed. Most policy attention is going to attracting foreign investors, not to local SMEs. Some projects have been developed in the frame of the EU Interreg programmes, like the Expert Academies (ExpertInnen Akademien), joint initiatives concerning employment and labour market policy. They started in 2003 as an initiative of the Austrian federal government.14 The (bilateral) Austrian-Hungarian and Austrian-Czech Expert Academies are forums where regional actors in labour market policy meet. These forums serve the exchange of information, the set up and implementation of joint activities and cross-border cooperation concerning labour market policy themes. The supra-regional Employment Strategy Vienna-Bratislava has comparable goals. This project was initiated by the City of Vienna and the Viennese Employees Promotion Fund (WAFF15). The objective is to contribute to the positive development of the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration through the exchange of information (seminars, publications, pilot projects), the set up of a joint knowledge and information system and through contributing to improve qualification levels. Some experts claim that these projects should be multilateral in stead of bilateral and that they should preferably be integrated in Centrope.

13 The shares are distributed as follows: City of Vienna 20 per cent, Lower Austria 20 per cent, employees’ trust 10 per cent and stock exchange 50 per cent. 14 These projects are in the frame of the respective Interreg IIIa programmes. The Austrian federal ministry of economic affairs and employment is co-financier of these programmes. 15 Wiener ArbeitnehmerInnen Förderungsfonds.

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4 Performance General findings Many cross-border projects and programmes have been initiated since the Iron Curtain collapsed. The OECD concluded in 2003 that the institutional framework between regional actors on both sides of the border was relatively thin and unstable. Crossborder agreements were piecemeal and ad hoc and political institution building had not kept pace with the functional integration. It was recommended that, to improve cross-border relations, local and regional governments on both sides of the border should establish a committee with the explicit objective to facilitate and stimulate cross-border activities (OECD 2003). Centrope must be considered an answer to this recommendation for better cross-border management. It was established from the conviction that a more integrated approach is needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the variety of cooperation initiatives. Centrope tries to keep an eye on the many initiatives and to prevent proliferation. This ‘umbrella’ function can be considered the value added, although the Centrope organization prefers to use the notion ‘broker’ above that of ‘umbrella’, as the latter might give an impression of overpowering or controlling, in stead of coordinating or bringing people together to achieve the common objective of regional integration. In the next paragraphs we will deal with achievements so far, as well as with barriers for further integration. Achievements so far Centrope is broadly considered a valuable instrument to give a positive impulse to cross-border cooperation on the way to regional integration. Centrope succeeded in bringing people together to discuss regional matters through regular meetings. The political support acquired must be considered as a major achievement, because it offers the indispensable basis for further development. Next to achieving political support, Centrope claims that a common understanding of the benefits of integration has been established and that public awareness has been initiated. Through the Vision 2015, agreed upon by the partners in 2006, development perspectives for a number of themes have been brought together in an integrated management setting. Sectoral agendas have been set that contain important suggestions how to proceed in the years to come. Another successful activity is international marketing, on which 30 per cent of the budget is spent. The partner regions present themselves internationally as Centrope region. Centrope is being invited anywhere in Europe, not only by potential investors, but also by other regions, like Berlin, to exchange experiences of cross-border cooperation. The Centrope ‘brand’ acquired a lot of international media attention and ‘googling’ Centrope gives almost 70,000 hits (in July 2006). The interest for a (relative small) partner like Burgenland is that Centrope has helped to make this region internationally more visible, thanks to the Centrope trademark.

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Barriers for further cooperation Despite these achievements, there are some drawbacks as well. These drawbacks are partly inherent in the partnership model and partly dependent on external factors. The ‘internal barriers’ have to do with commitment by regional stakeholders and scope and scale, while the ‘external barriers’ are about national decision making (such as labour market protection, infrastructure investments, administrative structures and policy priorities) and the sharp differences in development, culture and language. Public commitment Despite political agreements, there is some doubt about the genuine commitment of the public partners to actively cooperate. A major reason is the unequal position of the partners. The Austrian side is initiator, leader, organizer and (co-)financier of all cross-border projects and programmes, including Centrope. The eastern partners are not yet represented in the Centrope Steering Committee, the reason being that until now it has been difficult for them to organize co-financing and to have human capacity available. In this sense, the partners within Centrope are formally equal, but materially and psychologically they aren’t. However, the impression from the interviews is that commitment – especially in the Bratislava region – is growing but is still rather low. Through the Interreg subsidies Bratislava hopes to create (human) capacity and contribute financially to Centrope as well, in order to strengthen its position in the network. The impression is that on the Viennese side too not everybody is in favour of the partnership. Private commitment The Austrian regional industry associations and several large companies on both sides of the border are committed to the ‘Central Europa Region Twin-City’ project, while they’re not involved in Centrope. The fact that Centrope has only public partners and is subject to EU programme rules and regulations makes it in the eyes of the industry representatives a bureaucratic organization. They fear to be linked to, as they say, bureaucracy. Centrope and Twin-City have an open relationship and inform each other about their activities, but until now the business project does not want to use the name Centrope. The impression is that this lack of concerted public private action might hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of the cooperation. Scale A factor that might influence the effectiveness of the partnership is its scale. To the opinion of some discussion partners, the region is rather large. Given the degree of commitment (for example, the commitment to Centrope of Brno, at 125 km from Vienna, is obviously lower than that of Bratislava) and the high disparities (prosperity, wages), they recommend to concentrate on the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration, being a better geographical level to set up and improve cooperation. If this cooperation proves successful, other regions could join. Not everybody agrees with this view. They argue that the right level has been chosen. They consider the region big enough to cooperation that goes beyond the local level and small enough to allow decision making. Meth-Cohn (2005) concludes that the Centrope region is just too small to be an internationally relevant region. Given changing business realities, she argues that the real opportunity for Vienna is not in servicing a narrowly defined

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Centrope region, but in providing high-level support for a much wider region. Palme and Feldkircher (2006) think that in order to reach critical mass, cities like Budapest and Prague should be included in the network. Labour market restrictions The enthusiasm to cooperate is not positively influenced by the Austrian labour market restrictions. These restrictions are incomprehensible for the new member states; they feel it as an offence. For Bratislava this is probably not a real problem, as the region has relatively low unemployment rates, but for other regions this is more problematic. The Austrian labour market will not be opened for inhabitants of the new member states until 2009. This matter raises mixed feelings in Austria as well. Trade unions, employers’ organizations and some right wing political parties are against an early opening, as are some regional parliaments. Infrastructures Lacking infrastructures are a barrier for further integration. Above all the business society (although most discussion partners agree) considers adequate transport and communication infrastructures as a prerequisite for future development of the region. This development is seriously obstructed by the delay in investments in transport and communication networks. On the Austrian side several links are missing up till now, partly as a consequence of long lasting (environmental) procedures, partly as a consequence of political prioritizing of projects on regional and national levels. Only recently cross-border connections have arrived on the priority list. Several projects have started up recently or will start up soon, like the rail link (the extended CAT-line) and the missing short last part of the highway between Vienna and Bratislava. Political stability In Hungary the administrative structure will be revised. This could affect participation in Centrope. The results of elections can change political priorities and the position attributed to Centrope. There is some fear that after the government change in Slovakia priorities could shift from the relatively prosperous western part (Bratislava) to the stagnating eastern part. The Budapest region can be considered a competitor to Vienna for the role as centre of Central Europe. Prague is another competitor. How will national authorities in these countries make a weighoff who to support? This could be a serious threat to the continuity of Centrope. Differences in socio-economic situation, culture, language Between the Austrian and the eastern parts sharp socio-economic differences can be observed. Although, in the eyes of some discussion partners, these differences do not really appear on the Centrope agenda, they definitely influence the particular interests of the partners for cooperation. The Vienna Region, aware of competition and the threat to its powerful economic position, favours a concerted, smooth transition to more integration, while the other regions do have to overcome enormous arrears in almost every aspect of life. Differences in knowledge of foreign languages obviously work as a barrier to cooperation. Positive is that the young generation speaks English. Administrative differences Differences in administrative and political systems, tasks and competences, budgets, legal frameworks, systems (like the health system)

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and standards (e.g. environmental), decision making procedures, educational and qualification levels, tax regimes, etc. do certainly not contribute to smooth cooperation. They form an important barrier. Some remarks to Centrope’s achievements Centrope started less than three years ago, so, given its ambitious long term objectives, it is still in its infancy. Centrope has set an agenda, developed content and marketed the region at the same time. The OECD report stated in 2003 that formulating and implementing a coherent strategy is extremely complex. Some discussion partners fear that the high expectations among so many partners with such diverging interests are impossible to be fulfilled by a partnership like Centrope. The criticism of the business world (“no concrete results, no focus”) is understandable, but not quite fair. Centrope is in the first place a strategic and not an operational instrument. The fact that there are other partnerships active in the region seems normal. These more targeted partnerships might be better equipped to strive for specific goals than Centrope, which tries to keep an eye on all partnerships in search for synergies, assistance if requested, etc. Centrope does not seem to have a lot of influence on levelling out some of the external barriers discussed above. The chances for Centrope to lobby in a specific direction seem restricted, because it is politically dependent. Furthermore, Centrope works within the framework of Interreg. The effectiveness of Interreg as a means of developing coherent strategies and delivering outputs is limited by some factors, such as the project-based earmarked contributions (not always leading to using resources for regional development) and the need of co-financing (which sets back poor regions that can not provide sufficient funding) (OECD 2003). Finally, Centrope’s budget is considered too small to justify so many different actors with so many different interests. Challenges that remain ‘The phase of diplomacy is over. The next step is to bring the network to work’ were the words of one discussion partner. In this section some results of the interviews with respect to opinions about the future challenges of Centrope are brought together. Reduce discrepancies The greatest challenge when Centrope started was to reduce the discrepancy in the levels of prosperity and development, with all the positive and negative consequences for future integration (DIANE 2003). Although important progress in catching up has been achieved, discrepancies do still exist. Therefore reducing differences will remain the first challenge (although this challenge can only indirectly be touched upon by Centrope). Convince national governments Centrope will not be able to decide about factors that seem to obstruct more intensive cooperation, such as labour market policy and investments in infrastructure. What Centrope could do, as a respected political and societal force in the region, is to make more pressure versus the national governments

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involved with respect to situations that are generally considered as barriers to regional integration. Societal support To acquire more societal support, Centrope should try to convince people that integration is in their favour. The impression of some discussion partners is that until now communication has been on a rather high and academic level. For more societal support down-to-earth communication seems advisable. Balanced network To acquire more political commitment the balance in the network should be improved. This is now dependent on financial contributions. If all is going well, some partners will be able to contribute with the help of EU subsidies in the near future. This could lead to a situation in which other regions could take up more responsibility as leader of a specific commission, programme or project. This seems crucial for the Centrope’s future, although it is not in the hands of the Centrope partners. Thematic and/or spatial focus Most discussion partners stress that Centrope should have more thematic and/or spatial focus, although opinions differ considerably. Opening up of the labour market is often mentioned as priority, because it works as a source of distrust among the partners. However, this is beyond Centrope’s influence. Stimulating the preparation of a cross-border labour market institution is considered as very important. In line with the expected phase of economic consolidation (rather then a continued boom-phase) intensive economic integration through SMEs should be stimulated. Up to now, only large international companies have been the focus of policy attention. Another focus could be culture (in combination with tourism), because it is a common and binding factor. It can also be used to stress a common identity. The business society claims infrastructure as priority number one because adequate transport networks are a prerequisite for regional development. Moreover they argue that the focus should be on the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration first. Multilateral cooperation Centrope’s assignment is multilateral cooperation. The problem however remains that mutual relations between the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian regions do not yet exist. This prevents common institution building, like a Centrope labour market institution. Relation with private sector Some business representatives do not seem to be positive about Centrope’s public status. For a successful integration, it seems advisable to strive for intensified cooperation with private sector parties, not only with the business sector but also with universities. Centrope could assume a role as broker between the business sector and university research in the Centrope region. Requirements for success From the preceding paragraphs it can be concluded that some requirements for future success present themselves:

Centrope: A Cross-Border Alliance in the Central European Region

•

•

•

• •

•

59

A cooperative attitude of national (and regional) governments, especially the Austrian one, as regards the opening of the labour market and the improvement of cross border transportation and communication networks. More commitment by the eastern partners through a more balanced partnership in which partners are formally and materially equal. Much depends on how national governments will organize the financial capacity of the eastern partners. More focus on achieving concrete results that show that Centrope is a valuable instrument to strive for integration. Much depends on the political leaders: will they reach agreement about prioritizing? Better relations with the business society and universities by offering them a position within the network. More attention to SME’s: “SME development is vital to the economic future of Centrope, but it is the missing piece of the transition puzzle” (Meth-Cohn, 2005). Adapted organizational structure: given Centrope’s position and competence, prioritizing seems a delicate problem. When partners in the network don’t want to or cannot cooperate on certain issues, there are no instruments to intervene. Prioritizing of themes is dependent on political interests and who is going to pay. A solution to this problem could be that, if an agreement about overall prioritizing cannot be reached, priorities are set within each (national) region. This will have consequences for Centrope’s organizational structure.

Ideal partnership model Decentralized coordination seems a prerequisite for viable transregional cooperation. In the eyes of Centrope, an ideal situation would arise if there are four units of Centrope, one in each country (Centrope 2006). Each unit would be responsible for their (national) part of the region, check the possibilities for cooperation, motivate private and public actors for cooperation, etc. These four units would act independently, but interact regularly. Each partner region should assume certain tasks on behalf of the region as a whole. One ‘head unit’ would oversee all activities of the four independent units and guard the overall vision and developments. Although commitment of politicians is preferred, Centrope should have the competence and responsibility to perform its tasks as an independent institution. Centrope’s structure should be designed to enable public and private parties to participate in an active, supportive manner. A General Board should determine the two to three year visions/programmes and a project bureau should have to work out these programmes. 5 Applying the Research Framework The research framework (see Chapter 1) can be helpful to identify the factors of failure and success in the development of Centrope cross-border partnership.

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Figure 3.2

Centrope’s proposed organizational structure

Source: Consortium Centrope (2006)

The context factors are highly relevant, because they both facilitate and hamper cooperation. The political context can be considered as decisive for setting up the partnership. The political transition in the eastern countries and the EU membership (1995, 2004) are major reasons to start cross-border cooperation. In Austria political opinions differ about the opening of the labour market to people from the new EU member states. The opening is not expected to take place before 2009. This situation works as an obstacle for more committed cooperation. The administrative context is extremely complex, given the diverging administrative settings and the very different tasks, competences and budgets of the various partners. In some parts administrative structures are recent or still in motion, as are political opinions about stimulating the Centrope region above other (national) regions. As to the economic context, the Centrope region is very inhomogeneous. This offers opportunities as well as complications. If compared with other cross-border regions with old and new EU member states, the Centrope region is relatively wealthy and dynamic. The high share of foreign direct investment and the economic growth figures are an indication of the region’s competitiveness. However, the booming phase with large investments and privatizations seems to have come to an end. The Vienna Region aims at maintaining its favourable economic position, whereas the eastern regions have to catch up their arrears in many directions. The partners are convinced that in the long run integration will be beneficial to all, but the process to arrive at sustainable development of the whole region should be carefully guided to

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prevent unwanted situations. Despite all good intentions to cooperate, everybody is convinced that there will remain fierce competition for investments too. The spatial context is relevant too. The basic idea behind the creation of Centrope is to form a European region with enough critical mass to compete with other strong European regions. Not everybody agrees with this view. The business society prefers to start with focusing on the most promising part, the Vienna-Bratislava agglomeration, before turning to more peripheral parts. Others argue that the partnership should be extended to Prague and Budapest as well. The lack of cross-border transport links, as element of the spatial context, is considered a barrier for cooperation. Only recently, initiatives (partly public-private) have been started to improve train, road and public transport links between Vienna and Bratislava mainly. On the local level transport links are still inadequate. The Centrope partnership is an innovative partnership, given its multinational scale and bringing together very different partners. Nevertheless, its major task as a broker for cross-border initiatives doesn’t make it a very powerful partnership. It owes its basis of existence to the expectations and good intentions of the political leaders in the region and the financial support from the EU and (up to now) the Austrian provinces. The scope is not clearly defined or focused, the scale is wide (and dynamic) and non-public partners are not involved. For the future, much depends on the financial abilities of the partners to claim an equal position in the partnership. Now it is first and foremost a Vienna Region driven project. This is understandable during the start up of the process, because Vienna is the undisputed leader in the region. For the future it seems vital that the other partners become more committed and assume leadership tasks and that cooperation will develop not only with Austrian partners but also among the regions of the eastern partners. Although the Centrope partnership is still in its infancy, the output is obvious: political support has been achieved, pilot projects have been started up or carried out in the frame of Interreg, the joint region promotion is considered successful and a vision on the future development has been agreed upon. Yet, some factors obstruct the implementation of more substantial cross-border projects, like for instance a common labour market service institution. Major obstacles referred to are the labour market protection, the inadequate infrastructures and the huge socio-economic disparities. Other complicating factors are the unequal position of the partners, the rather formal structure caused by the regulations of the Interreg programme and the absence of private sector involvement. A part of the business society, namely the association of industry, has set up its own partnership. Both partnerships keep each other informed, but stay apart. This situation seems not very productive to comprehensive cooperation. From the interviews we conclude that the expectations to achieve significant concrete results, to share a common vision on setting priorities and to assume leadership are not very high. But most of the discussion partners are realistic enough to understand the restrictions of a voluntary cross-border facilitating, coordinating and promoting institution. Such an institution lacks power, instruments and budget to turn visions into reality. The idea to adapt the organization into a ‘four-leave clover’ structure might bring a solution to make Centrope more operational. Within such a new structure, sub-partnerships (with fewer actors, sharing a common focus,

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operating result-oriented on a lower scale level) could function as catalysts for the higher-scale supra-partnership. Showing concrete results usually works as a source of inspiration. In a more implementation oriented phase, participation of private parties (business society, universities) seems vital. Moreover, more private involvement could boost political and societal support and it could help to turn the partnership into a more flexible, more balanced and more efficient organization.

References Consortium Centrope (2006), Centrope Vision 2015. DIANE, (2003) Regional Analysis of the Centrope region (Vienna). Huber and Mayerhofer (2006), Structural Change in the Centrope Regions, ÖNB. Hunya and Geisheker (2005), Employment Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, WIWW Research Reports, 321 (Wien). IV Landesgruppen Wien (2006), Niederösterreich und Burgenland, Europa Region Mitte. Twin City Wien – Bratislava, Wien. L&R Sozialforschung und ÖSB Consulting GmbH (2004), ÖsterreichischTschechische ExpertInnen Akademie, Konzept und Aktivitäten (Wien). Meth-Cohn, Vienna and the Centrope Region (2006), An International Business Perspective (London: Economist Intelligence Unit). OECD (2003), Territorial Review (Vienna-Bratislava, Paris). Palme and Feldkircher (2005), Wirtschaftsregion Centrope Europaregion Mitte. Ein Bestandsaufnahme (WIFO), Dezember. Palme and Feldkircher (2006), Economic Challenges in the Centrope Region, ÖNB. Purschke (1998), Austria, chapter 2, in van den Berg, Braun and van der Meer, National Urban Policies the European Union (Aldershot:Ashgate). Reiter und Willsberger (2005), Österreichisch-Ungarische ExpertInnen Akademie (Wien). Schuster (2006), Report Panel Discussion, ÖNB Workshops no. 9. Stadt Wien und WAFF, (undated), Überregionale Beschäftigungsstrategie (Wien). Van Kempen and Vermeulen (2004), Urban Issues and Urban Policies in the New EU Countries (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Discussion partners Mr Eugen Antalovsky, Europaforum Wien Mr Michael Fazekas, Flughafen Wien AG Mr Andreas Hopf, Central Danube Region Marketing & Development GmbH Mr Peter Huber, Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) Mr Peter Mayerhofer, Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (WIFO) Mr Manfred Novy, Verkehrsverbund Ost-Region GmbH (VOR) Mr Thomas Oliva, Industriellen Vereinigung (IV) Mr Kurt Puchinger, City of Vienna

Centrope: A Cross-Border Alliance in the Central European Region

Mr Walter Reiter, L&R Sozialforschung Mrs Michaela Roither, Industriellen Vereinigung (IV) Mr Frantisek Stano, City of Bratislava Mr Walther Stöckl, City of Vienna Mr Heinrich Wedral, Bürgenlandischen Landesregierung

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Chapter 4

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region1 1 Introduction Regional cooperation is not a new phenomenon in the Helsinki Region; long lasting forms of cooperation between municipalities have already been in operation for decades. Up to now, these regional partnerships have focused on the common provision of public services such as regional transport, health care and (waste-) water management. However, the ongoing process of globalization and internationalization is increasing the need for regional cooperation and coordination in the fields of economic development and joint promotion. To maintain Helsinki’s good international competitive position, sufficient critical mass is considered increasingly important. Politicians and officials on both the local and national level seem to be well aware of the need for critical mass. Over the past few years, several initiatives for regional economic cooperation have been undertaken, including new forms of governance as well as concrete projects. In the field of metropolitan governance, two new forms of cooperation have been set up: the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board (2004) and the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly (2005). Both partnerships aim to improve the competitive position of the region nationally and internationally. Several municipalities, including the relatively large cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, committed themselves to these voluntary agreements. In this Chapter we analyse the two regional bodies that have been set up, using our research framework, thus trying to identify potential factors of failure and success toward cooperation. The analysis is based on desk research of available written information on Helsinki and the regional cooperation. Additionally, a number of semi-structured interviews were held with key actors involved in regional cooperation within the Helsinki Region (see the list of discussion partners at the end of this Chapter). We emphasize that our analysis should not be seen as an evaluation of the two partnerships. Because they have only just started (this particularly applies to the Cooperation Assembly), it is probably too early to expect concrete outputs and outcomes. In order to analyse the two initiatives, good understanding of the context in which these partnerships are operating, is essential. Therefore, we start with a description of the economic, geographic, demographic and administrative circumstances in the Helsinki region (section 2). After that, section 3 discusses the various forms 1

This case study was carried out in November 2005.

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

of regional cooperation in the Helsinki region, focusing on the two most recently developed bodies. In section 4 we give some indications of the performance (output and outcome) of both partnerships, and identify some challenges that remain. We conclude this Chapter with a systematic confrontation of our findings with the research framework. 2 The Metropolitan Region of Helsinki Demography and economy Helsinki is the capital and by far the largest city of Finland, with a population of 561,000. The city is located in the south of the country, on the shore of the Gulf of Finland. From a European perspective, its location is somewhat peripheral, although the extension of the EU with among others the Baltic States has improved Helsinki’s geographic situation to some extent. The city forms a conurbation with the municipalities of Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen. About one fifth of the Finnish population (1 million people) live in this conurbation, referred to as the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA). The Greater Helsinki Area (GHA), which more or less corresponds with Helsinki’s commuter area, covers ten more municipalities, as is depicted in Figure 4.1.2 This wider area has a population of more than 1.27 million. Uusimaa, the administrative region to which Helsinki belongs (see the politicaladministrative context), covers 24 municipalities. The Helsinki Metropolitan Area covers a surface of 745 square kilometres. Helsinki is the most densely populated municipality, with more than 3,000 inhabitants per square kilometre. Espoo is the second city of Finland, with a population of almost 225.000. Vantaa is the fourth city of Finland (Tampere being third) with a population of more than 184.000. Kauniainen is a municipality located within Espoo; it is a very small town (only six square kilometres) with less than 9,000 inhabitants. Table 4.1 shows that the other municipalities in the Helsinki region are relatively small, in terms of population, Hyvinkää being the largest with less than 44,000 people. From the statistics we may conclude that the Helsinki region is centre-oriented, with a population density that declines as you move further away from the centre. Looking at demographic changes in the last decade, it appears that the population of the Helsinki Region has grown considerably (Helsingin Seudun Aluesarjat 2005). The growth rates as listed in Table 4.2 show that population numbers increased not only in the suburban municipalities, but in the City of Helsinki as well. However, it turns out that strongest growth rate (17.3 per cent) can be observed in the first ring, which corresponds with the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (notably Espoo and Vantaa), the City of Helsinki not included. The population growth in the second ring (the Greater Helsinki Area outside the Helsinki Metropolitan Area) is 14.1 per cent, which is significantly larger than the 8.3 percent of the City of Helsinki. In 2 The boundaries of the functional urban region now extend some 50 to 100 kilometers from Helsinki. Commuter proportions (the share of commuters to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area) range from 24.7 per cent (Hyvinkäa) to 56.8 per cent (Kikkonummi) (Source: Statistics Finland, Employment Statistics in Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council 2006, <www.ytv.fi>).

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

67

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+HOVLQNL (VSRR 9DQWDD .DXQLDLQHQ

5HVWRI+HOVLQNL5HJLRQ         

Figure 4.1

+\YLQNll -lUYHQSll .HUDYD .LUNNRQXPPL 0lQWVlOl 3RUQDLQHQ 6LSRR 7XXVDOD 9LKWL

The Helsinki Metropolitan Area and Helsinki Region

Source: Helsinki Urban Facts

Table 4.1

Area, population and density in the Helsinki Region

Municipality

Area (km2)

Population (2005) Population density (/km2)

Espoo (Esbo) Helsinki (Helsingfors) Kauniainen (Grankulla) Vantaa (Vanda) Metropolitan Area Hyvinkää (Hyvinge) Järvenpää (Träskända) Kerava (Kervo) Kirkkonummi (Kyrkslätt) Mäntsälä Nurmijärvi Pornainen Sipoo (Sibbo) Tuusula (Tusby) Vihti (Vichtis) Outer suburban municipalities

311.9 184.5 5.9 240.8 743.1 323.2 37.5 30.8 365 581 362.5 146.6 364.1 219.7 522 3054.7

227472 559046 8465 185429 980412 43523 37328 31361 32772 17899 36568 4569 18444 34513 25561 282538

729.31 3030.06 1433.22 770.05 1319.35 134.66 995.41 1018.21 89.77 30.81 100.88 31.17 50.66 157.09 48.97 92.49

Helsinki Region, Total

3818.7

1262950

330.73

Source: Helsingin Seudun Aluesarjat, City of Helsinki Urban Facts, Uusimaa Regional Council

68

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Table 4.2

Population dynamics in the Helsinki Region

Population 1995 Population 2005 Population increase (%)

City Helsinki

First ring HMA

Second ring GHA

516,000 559,000 8.3%

359,000 421,000 17.3%

248,000 283,000 14.1%

Source: Helsingin Seudun Aluesarjat, 2005 (adapted by the authors)

other words: there are clear of signs of suburbanization, which is also reflected in population forecasts3 that foresee an increase of the city’s population until 2030 with only 34,000 people, in sharp contrast with an increase of the region’s population with 250,000 inhabitants. Interesting details about demographic changes can be found in the population projection for Helsinki by Seppo Laakso and Pekka Vuori (2006). The migration balance makes clear that the City of Helsinki has a positive, but declining migration balance with the ‘rest of Finland’ and a negative, increasing migration balance with the Helsinki Region.4 The migration balance between Helsinki and foreign countries is positive and slightly on the wax. All together, the migration balance is positive, with a surplus between 2,000 and 2,500 people in 2003. These data are line with the observation that Helsinki finds itself in a stage of suburbanization. The trend of suburbanization has a strong link with housing: low loan interest rates have resulted in an increasing demand for owner-occupied homes, especially in terraced and detached houses. As a consequence, housing prices have increased tremendously. Many families with children have moved from small and medium-sized (and often rented) flats in the city to terraced or detached houses outside the city. One of the challenges that the Helsinki region is facing, has to do with demographics. Like many other European regions, Helsinki will be confronted with an ageing population in the years to come, despite the expectation that young people from all over Finland will remain attracted by the economic opportunities of the Helsinki Region. To avoid a decline of the working population, immigration of foreign workers is needed. In order to stimulate immigration, the region has to reduce possible barriers, and to make the region attractive as a place to live and work. Employment With about 600,000 jobs, the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA) has the highest concentration of workplaces in Finland. Almost one third of the total number of working places in Finland is concentrated in the Helsinki Region, of which half is located in the city of Helsinki (Office of Research and Statistics 2006). The area generates approximately one third of Finland’s GVA (Gross Value Added), 3 Source: The population forecast 2007–2040, Statistics 2006:17, City of Helsinki Urban Facts. 4 Recently, however, the migration balance has become more positive again, as a result of stronger economic growth.

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

69

and therefore can be regarded the ‘motor of the Finnish economy’. The GVA per capita in the Helsinki Region is 50 per cent higher than the national average (City of Helsinki Urban Facts 2005a). The spatial distribution of jobs across the region (Table 4.3) shows that more than half of the work places can be found in the city of Helsinki. However, Espoo and Vantaa (the first ring) are clearly also important centres of employment, with more than 200,000 jobs (2003 data). The employment/population ratio ranges from 0.66 in Helsinki to 0.49 in the first ring. The number of jobs in the second ring is considerably lower: about 90,000 jobs and an employment/population ratio of 0.32. However, with an increase of jobs between 1999 and 2003 with more than 12 per cent, the second ring has shown the highest growth rate, in comparison with the first ring (more than 8 per cent) and the city (less than 3 per cent). These data suggest that also from an economic point of view, the Helsinki region finds itself in a stage of suburbanization (or at least deconcentration). The process of suburbanization is also visible in Figure 4.2 which shows the expanding travel-to-work area of the Helsinki region since 1980. Over the past two decades, travelling distances have increased due to improved mobility and accessibility. Many people working in the Helsinki Region live in the area itself, but there are also people living outside the area and both number and distance are increasing. Up to more than 40 per cent of the working population living in the first and second ring commute to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Improved transport facilities has enabled the commuting distance to increase to even more than 200 kilometres from the Helsinki city centre, so even beyond the borders of the Greater Helsinki Area (YTV 2006). Despite the deconcentration of jobs, it is fair to say that the economic core of the region consists of three cities: Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa. Within this core, each city has its own profile. Helsinki has a strong public sector: more than 35 per cent of the jobs are provided by administration and defence, health and social work. The second largest sector is financial and business services. In comparison with Helsinki, the cities of Espoo and Vantaa have a higher share of manufacturing industry (about 14 per cent instead of eight per cent). Espoo has a very dominant ICT sector, being the home town of Nokia and the Helsinki University of Technology. The share of financial and business services in the sectoral job distribution is even higher than in the city. Vantaa can be seen as the transport and logistics centre of the region, accommodating the international Helsinki-Vantaa Airport. The importance Table 4.3

Jobs in the Helsinki Region

Jobs 1999 Jobs 2003 Jobs increase (%)

City Helsinki

First ring HMA

Second ring GHA

357,160 367,705 2.95%

187,514 202,760 8.13%

80,087 89,997 12.37%

Source: Helsingin Seudun Aluesarjat, 2005 (adapted by the authors)

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Figure 4.2

Expanding travel-to-work area 1980–2002

Source: YTV (2006), translated by authors

of transport and logistics is reflected in the high shares of transport, storage and communication, and wholesale trade. The share of business and financial services is significantly lower than in Espoo and Helsinki. Currently, unemployment rates are relatively low, with 6.2 per cent for the region and 7.1 per cent for the city of Helsinki (City of Helsinki Urban Facts 2006). The situation on the labour market has clearly improved since the economic depression in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when unemployment rose up to 17 per cent (OECD 2005). However, despite the recent positive developments, (structural) unemployment is still considered a problem, particularly because unemployment rates used to be lower before the economic crisis (only 2 or 3 per cent). One of the explanations for the problem of structural (long-term) unemployment is the inability of older people to adapt their labour supply to the demands of the knowledgeeconomy based labour market. Competitive position Comparing the Helsinki Metropolitan Area with other metropolitan regions in Europe, Helsinki is doing quite well. From research done by Helsinki’s Urban Facts Office drawing on ERECO and Cambridge Econometrics, we know that the region’s unemployment is below average, that its GVA per capita is among the top five in Europe, that Helsinki is second in terms of employment growth (after Dublin), and that its GVA growth is the third largest. A survey among Europe’s 15,000 largest companies shows that Helsinki belongs to the top-30 of ‘the best cities to locate a business’ (Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker 2005). Helsinki was number 27 in 2004, one ranking higher than the year before (while they were not in the top-30 early 1990s) and considering the sharp improvements in position for several indicators, the international competitive position of Helsinki seems to be

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

71

Table 4.4 Employment structure in Helsinki, data under ‘Espoo’ and Vantaa, 2003 Helsinki

%

Espoo

%

Vantaa

%

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

312

0.08

211

0.2

481

0.51

Mining and quarrying

113

0.03

15

0.01

22

0.02

30003

8.16

13.4

14044

Electricity, gas and water supply

2058

0.56

573

0.54

442

0.47

Construction

16658

4.53

4389

4.16

6857

7.27

Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants

61370

16.6 9

2426 2

22.9 8

25190

26.7

Transport, storage and communication

33393

9.08

5333

5.05

13671

24.1

2681

25.4

Manufacturing

Financial intermediation, real estate, renting and business

1414 1

14.88 8

14.4

88958

9 Public administration and defence, 35.4 education health and social 130503 work and others 9

9

1

2843

26.9 19921 3

0

9 13.5

12772

4 21.1 1

Source: Helsingin Seudun Aluesarjat, 2005 (adapted by the authors)

steadily increasing. Helsinki is internationally especially known as ICT and R&D city. Based on its private and public R&D activities, Helsinki even ranked number one in the European Competitiveness Index 2004. In addition, the economic future of the region looks bright, with employment and GVA growth forecasts in the top-three of European metropolitan regions. The positive economic prospects are partly based on growth expectations in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (City of Helsinki Urban Facts 2005a). Only in terms of size (population and GVA), the position of Helsinki is lower down the list. With 560,000 inhabitants, Helsinki is considerably smaller than some of its competitors like Stockholm, Berlin, Copenhagen and Barcelona (cities with more than one million inhabitants). Therefore, regional co-operation and coordination is needed to profile the region (with 1.5 million inhabitants, nine universities, and eight polytechnics) in international competition. On the one hand, the Helsinki region can be called one of the most successful regions of Europe with a high expenditure on R&D (exceeding the Barcelona standard), a large R&D sector, and a high educated population.5 One third of the population of 15 years and over has a university degree (City of Helsinki Urban 5 Also see ‘Brainport Navigator 2013; Beyond Lisbon!’ (Brainport Eindhoven 2005), with references to ESPON data.

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Facts 2005b; Sitra 2005). On the other hand, the city suffers from what is called Finland’s paradox: “the fact that a very competitive and skilful nation does not attract investments, is not in the pole position in the race for a high standard of living, and is not able to eliminate large-scale unemployment” (Sitra 2005). The link with Nokia The economic development of Helsinki has a clear link with the growth of mobile phone manufacturer Nokia, and the ICT cluster around this global firm. Nokia employs around 22,000 people in Finland, including 7,000 people who work in the Helsinki region. The domestic unit for R&D is located in the centre of Helsinki (Ruoholahti) and the employees represent 50 different nationalities. The firm plays a very important role in the information industry, as the majority of the production processes has been outsourced to subcontractors. Moreover, Nokia maintains a close relationship with the local universities and the local governments, which is by many considered an asset in the present knowledge economy. Nokia’s dominance can also be a threat. In the most recent territorial review of Finland, the OECD says that “heavy reliance of the economy on a single firm and sector in the context of globalization is not without risk”, referring to the possible impact of reductions in Nokia’s market share (OECD 2005). To reduce the strong dependence, diversification of the economic base through the development of strong economic clusters is considered important (City of Helsinki Urban Facts 2004): “In general terms, Helsinki should become more dynamic and more innovative in order to attract not only new industries but also more domestic and foreign investments. In more practical terms, the infrastructure, transport system, education and local services need to be further developed, and the labour markets and housing markets need to function more flexibly”. In other words: the Helsinki region is challenged to remain competitive. The administrative context Finland has a political system with local governments and the state as the two governmental layers with elected representatives. The administrative systems works on three levels, as the national administration has several regional offices, like Provincial State Offices, Regional Environment Centres, Road Districts, Employment & Economic Development Centres (T&E Centres) and Regional Councils. In Finland, municipalities operate with a high degree of autonomy; local selfgovernment is anchored in the society. Municipalities have the right to levy various taxes (and have the power to set the rates), including tax on income and corporate tax. They also have planning autonomy, implying a high degree of freedom in decisions concerning the locations of housing and business. In return, municipalities are responsible for the deliverance of many community services, like education, health care, social welfare, culture, environmental and technical infrastructure, and water supply. However, highway maintenance, legislation and police forces fall under the responsibility of the central government. Municipalities are governed by elected councils that answer to the voters only. Total expenditures of local governments mount up to 30 per cent of all public spending in Finland.

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

73

An essential element of the Finnish administrative system is the tax equalization system. The strong fiscal autonomy of municipalities could lead to an unbalanced society. Therefore, the national government redistributes tax income from municipalities with above-average revenues to municipalities with below-average revenues. In 2002, the system was adapted by removing the capping limit for municipalities with above-average revenues, thus further stimulating balance in income. For the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, the system implies an outflow of tax income to other regions in the country (up north and east). As a consequence, the Helsinki region is not only the motor of the national economy, but also of the social welfare state. Inter-municipal co-operation and amalgamations An important element of the administrative context is the debate on the municipal structure in Finland. This structure has been topic of debate because the provision of local public services (notably in peripheral areas) has come under pressure. There is a national project that surveys how to restructure municipalities and services in the regions of Finland. The Helsinki Metropolitan Area has been appointed as a ‘special region’ in this project. The aim of this project is to secure a sound structural and financial basis for the services that currently fall under the responsibility of municipalities. It includes an assessment of local service delivery, considering factors such as quality, effectiveness, availability, efficiency and technological advancement. The project considers both organization and production of services. One way to make service delivery more effective is a merger between municipalities. Some argue that the amount of municipalities (432) is too large and should be reduced in some kind of way. Others are in favour of a system with two types of municipalities. An alternative for restructuring the municipalities is strengthening inter-municipal co-operation in so-called joint municipal boards (see Box 4.1). The national debate on the municipal structure also comprehended the administrative future of the Helsinki region. In 2003, the central government (the Ministry of Interior) suggested some propositions to renew the government organizations in the Helsinki region. The option to amalgamate the four central municipalities was considered a serious option at some point, and some political groups in Helsinki expressed their sympathy for that idea in the media.6 The argument in favour of an amalgamation was not really the financial situation of the municipalities involved, but rather the belief that a merger could generate economies of scale to the benefit of the region’s vitality. At the time, various surveys and polls made clear that at least a considerable part of the population from Vantaa and Helsinki were in favour of one big municipality. Most people living in the relatively wealthy municipalities of Espoo and Kauniainen, however, were against, which is in line with the positions taken by the local authorities. The main argument for Espoo people to be against the merger was the expectation (or fear) that this rich municipality will have to share its wealth with less affluent municipalities. However, so far the suggestions have not yet resulted in changes of the administrative system. 6 Source: Helsingin Sanomat International Edition – Metro, ‘Helsinki politicians endorse merger with Vantaa, Espoo, and Kauniainen’, 12–1–2006 (<www.hs.fi>).

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Box 4.1: Inter-municipal partnerships in Finland Inter-municipal partnerships in Finland In Finland, partnerships between municipalities are already quite common, particularly in areas with low population densities. The majority of the 240 municipal boards in Finland have been set up to provide health care (about one third) or education (about one quarter). Other boards deal with social services and community services. Inter-municipal co-operation in business promotion is rare. Co-operation can be compulsory (to guarantee a minimum level of public good provision) or voluntary (to benefit from economies of scale, like in business promotion). To stimulate inter-municipal co-operation in sub-regions (functional urban regions, commuter areas), the State (the Ministry of the Interior) has launched the SEUTU project, which promotes voluntary sub-regional co-operation. One of the participating regions is Kuuma, a partnership of five municipalities located to the north of Helsinki. Furthermore, the Finnish State allows municipalities to create joint regional development companies, but so far only one sub-region (Jyväskylä) has used this possibility. Moreover, municipalities that decide to amalgamate, can be granted a subsidy; but again, the number of local authorities that have made use of this arrangement is low. The central government, however, expects the number of mergers between municipalities to increase as it will become more difficult to finance public services (because of the ageing population). Instead, pressure from the national government seems to have helped to develop voluntary forms of cooperation between municipalities. Because of these initiatives the law making process was halted in 2004 and 2005 (Karvinen 2005). In May 2006, the four cities of the HMA agreed to further elaborate the (voluntary) cooperation both in scope and depth, signing a cooperation agreement. As a consequence, the merger discussion has been postponed to 2008. State policies on economic development In Finland, policies of the national government are highly relevant context factors for regional co-operation. Above, we already mentioned two relevant policy tools: the tax equalization system and incentives for inter-municipal co-operation. In addition to these fiscal and financial tools, the state influences regional governance processes through economic development policies. One of the main aims of the national government is (and has for long been) to promote a balanced development of the country (‘a balanced regional structure’), which is also reflected in the tax system. Urban policy has been oriented toward the development of a polycentric system, sustaining a large network of cities. Two policy programmes should be mentioned here: the Centres of Expertise programme (launched in 1994) and the Regional Centres Programme (2001).

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

75

The Centres of Expertise programme was set up in the mid 1990s in reaction to the great economic depression. It promotes innovation through co-operation between universities, business and public authorities, in line with the Triple Helix model. The programme is based on the conviction that cities are the engines of the national economy, thus reducing (at least to some extent) the attention to spatial balance. The Centres of Expertise programme is by many considered a success (Ministry of the Interior 2003), also in view of the employment growth in Finland’s largest cities: Helsinki, Tampere and Oulu (Holstila 2004). In the Helsinki region, the Centres of Expertise programme is managed by development company Culminatum, which is owned by 33 shareholders including the Uusimaa Regional Council, the cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, and the universities, polytechnics, research institutes and business community of Helsinki region.7 Culminatum is by many considered a key actor in the cross-sector and cross-border co-operation, as far as economic development is concerned (OECD 2003). From 2000 onward, the national government reoriented its regional development policies by increasing attention to spatial balance and polycentrism. The Regional Centres Programme was introduced, aiming to secure the competitiveness of nearly all regional centres in the country. The region of Helsinki was explicitly not included in these regional development policies. Moreover, the national government decided to extend the Centres of Expertise Programme, of which the Helsinki has been a part from the very beginning, with several other regions. As the Helsinki region is now only one of the 20 participating regions, the conclusion can be drawn that the Helsinki region is currently receiving less financial support from the state in comparison with the 1990s. However, it should be said that most innovation funds end up in the Helsinki region anyway (indirectly), as so many high-tech companies are located there.8 The cultural context Insight into the Finnish culture might help to understand the barriers toward regional co-operation. Without trying to give a complete analysis, we would like to emphasize two important elements that we retrieved from the interviews. First, many say that Finnish people are consensus seekers, trying to take away problems and turning them into opportunities. On the one hand, the ability to make compromises is crucial for partnership development; on the other hand, it can sometimes obstruct firm decision taking. Second, equality is an important value in the Finnish society, which is not only reflected in the tax equalization system, but also in the nearly absence of hierarchy in many relations. Again, there are two sides of the coin: on the one hand, equality (or balance) is a valuable asset in interhuman relations; on the other hand, it often implies aversion to forms of leadership that are too dominant. Third, we could 7 For businesses Culminatum primarily provides services through six sectoral Centres of Expertise. These centres are specialized in providing support services for the sectors that they represent (see <www.culminatum.fi>). 8 Furthermore Helsinki has received €1 million funding for its urban policy programme (see initiatives to enhance regional co-operation).

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

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say that there is a ‘tradition to cooperate’, especially when it comes to cooperation in the Triple Helix. 3 Regional Cooperation Before we analyse the recently undertaken initiatives to develop new forms of cooperation in the Helsinki region, we first need to describe existing forms of cooperation in order to define the point of departure. Point of departure: existing forms of cooperation As stated in the introduction, inter-municipal co-operation and co-ordination is not something new for the Helsinki region. Already in the 1950s, municipalities in the metropolitan area agreed on the joint delivery of particular services. One of the most important partnerships that deal with joint service delivery is the Helsinki Metropolitan Council. Another interesting initiative is Helsinki Region Marketing, which aims to promote the region. An example of statutory cooperation: The Helsinki Metropolitan Council In the 1970s, the four cities decided to establish a joint body: the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council (abbreviated as YTV in Finnish). The principal duties of this council comprise transport system planning, regional public transport provision, waste management and air quality management for its four member municipalities (Helsinki, Espoo, Kauniainen and Vantaa). The council is an example of statutory co-operation. Another example is the health service district of Helsinki and the Uusimaa region, abbreviated as HUS and responsible for the joint delivery of health services. The YTV started with a rather broad scope and limited authority. In 1985, however, it was decided to restrict the council’s field of action to waste collection, public transport, air pollution control and co-operation on recreational areas.9 In 1997, a new act on YTV was signed, resulting in a clear focus on transport, waste management and air quality (see <www.ytv.fi>). The council consists of a regional assembly and an executive board, both with representatives of the participating cities. Important tasks of YTV are joint transport system planning for the region and the organization of regional public transport services. Transport infrastructure development is not a primary task of YTV, but YTV is an active participant in the decision-making process for land use, housing and transport issues in the metropolitan area. Officially, however, the role of YTV is limited to service production. Therefore, other – more strategic instead of service-delivering oriented – partnerships are needed to improve regional transport.

9

Source: EU Capital Cities Study 2003 (Greater London Enterprise 2003).

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

77

Helsinki Region Marketing In 1994, the City of Helsinki, neighbouring municipalities, the Helsinki Region Chamber of Commerce and the Uusimaa Regional Council jointly created a marketing organization for the Helsinki region: Helsinki Region Marketing (see www.helsinkiregion.com). The aim of this voluntary partnership is to attract international firms to the Helsinki Region, promoting the region as a major business centre for northern Europe. The City of Helsinki holds the majority of the shares (52 per cent). Considering the organization’s activities, region marketing is mainly restricted to joint promotion and communication. Presumably, joint product development and acquisition are much more difficult to realize, as the inter-municipal competition is still fierce. Mainly because of the tax system, municipalities tend to maximize their own well-being rather than the well-being of the region. Although the municipalities have a share in the regional marketing organization, they also develop their own marketing activities. Particularly Espoo has been very successful in the competition with Helsinki to attract foreign direct investment. Again, the conclusion is that new forms of co-operation are needed, in this case to improve the effectiveness of regional marketing. Motives to enhance regional co-operation Despite the various partnerships that exist, many actors in the Helsinki region agree that regional co-operation should be further enhanced. In general, there is concern about the region’s future competitiveness, raising the importance of better coordination in spatial and economic development of the region (including region marketing and infrastructure development), and the delivery of public services. The degree of cross-sector co-operation is high, partly as a result of the Centres of Expertise programme. However, within this triple helix model, the cross-border co-operation between municipalities is a weak point. To remain competitive in the international arena, the region needs critical mass, which can be realized through better coordination and cooperation on a regional level (1.5 million inhabitants instead of 560,000 inhabitants). Regional co-operation can produce economies of scale, giving the region a competitive advantage internationally, and reduce unwanted internal competition. Moreover, better inter-municipal coordination can help to maintain and enhance the quantity and quality of public services in the region. Regional co-operation is particularly needed in the fields of housing, infrastructure and services. There is a clear shortage of housing in the region, but in the current situation municipalities are reluctant to develop new projects, as they are afraid that the additional population will increase pressure on public service delivery budgets. The Helsinki region faces the challenge to take away this kind of deadlocks. Investments in housing and infrastructure – not only in the city, but particularly also in the region – are required to attract knowledge workers, and to keep the city growing in a sustainable way, also in view of the ageing population. The municipalities in the Helsinki region also need to cooperate if they want to prevent uncontrolled urban sprawl and the spatial concentration of social problems (OECD 2003). A good example is the relatively high concentration of homeless people in Helsinki; the

78

Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

City of Helsinki would like to share the costs caused by groups dependent on social allowences and other support with other municipalities. Besides the economic motives to cooperate (‘the need to cooperate’), we should not neglect the pressure from the national government, in view of the ongoing debate on municipal restructuring. Most municipalities in the Helsinki region consider voluntary regional cooperation a better option than structural changes in the administrative system (such as a merger or a regional tax equalization system). Also the current Mayor of Helsinki is in favour of voluntary cooperation, preferring to keep the administrative structure unchanged. He wants to make the Helsinki Metropolitan Area function as one entity while keeping the four municipalities independent. The Mayors of the four central municipalities are against a third administrative level, wanting to avoid an increase in bureaucracy. They want to cooperate on an equal basis, and to that end, there is not one leader in the initiatives to enhance regional cooperation, although it could be said that Helsinki takes a leading part. The political leaders of the four cities acknowledge that new innovative forms and models of cooperation are needed to enable regional cooperation on a voluntary basis. Initiatives to enhance regional co-operation In view of the motives mentioned above, various initiatives have been undertaken to enhance regional co-operation in the Helsinki region. An interesting example is the joint presentation by the four municipalities of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area of a policy programme entitled ‘A competent and cohesive city – urban policy programme for Helsinki metropolitan area 2002-2004’.10 This policy programme, which anticipated the policy shift of the national government in favour of other regions, received €1 million additional funding from the Ministry of Interior. Implementation is based on partnerships between local governments, national governments and notfor-profit organizations. Soon after this initiative, two regional partnerships started to develop: the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board and the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly, both to be described hereafter. The Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board In 2003, the Mayor of Helsinki invited key stakeholders in the region (with a focus on the Metropolitan Area) for a second meeting of the Helsinki Club: a think tank for strategic thinking on a regional level. The first meeting, held in 1996, had already raised the issue of regional cooperation (cross-border, cross-sector), though with limited success as far as intermunicipal co-operation is concerned. One of the results of the first meeting was a strategy document (‘Success Strategies and Partnership Projects’) that identified opportunities for co-operation, particularly to benefit from growth opportunities in the ICT sector. In 2002, when the ICT boom had come to an end, the Mayor of Helsinki thought it was the right moment to develop a new vision for the region. This common vision and four strategic lines were developed in co-operation with all relevant actors.

10 Which has been followed-up by a plan for 2005–2007, to be discussed hereafter.

New Forms of Regional Cooperation in the Helsinki Region

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The four municipalities of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area decided to strengthen co-operation by setting up a new body in 2004: the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board. It was the first time that the political leaders of the four municipalities met each other face-to-face. Together they formulated a vision for the region, which was based on the vision formulated by the second Helsinki Club: The Helsinki Metropolitan Area is a dynamic world-class centre for business and innovation. Its high-quality services, arts and science, creativity and adaptability promote the prosperity of its citizens and bring benefits to all of Finland. The Metropolitan Area is being developed as a unified region close to nature where it is good to live, learn, work and do business.

This vision stresses the importance of the capital region for the entire nation, thus anticipating the shift in national urban policies. It illustrates the (envisaged) empowerment of the region. The vision has been translated in three strategic goals: joint measures to develop welfare and services, improving competitiveness and developing the urban structure and housing (good housing and an equal housing distribution to avoid segregation, enhanced accessibility and new residential areas). To realize these objectives, several concrete strategies have been identified, such as a joint land-use development strategy, international business marketing, regional business development and an innovation strategy (see below). Furthermore, the actors involved have agreed on some shared principles (or values): international attractiveness, a balanced economy, safety, good governance, inclusiveness, sustainable development and multiculturalism. In May 2006, the four cities (Contract Cities) signed a cooperation agreement which can be considered one of the first concrete results (to be discussed in the next section). This agreement specifies the role of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board. The four cities have expressed their intention to provide sufficient resources for the cooperation, notably for preparing the implementation of the projects and measures that have been defined in an action plan. Agreements on more structural forms of funding have not been made yet, however. For each project or measure, the cities involved (read: their city councils) have to decide on their funding. The Advisory Board itself has no staff of its own, but the municipalities have agreed to make staff available to provide guidance, coordination and monitoring for the continued preparation of the cooperation projects and measures. A so-called Coordination Group assists the Board, while the Assembly of the Lord Mayors of the Contract Cities is responsible for preparing the cooperation. The preparation work is carried out by groups consisting of the Deputy Mayors and Sector Managers of the Contract Cities, and by work groups appointed by the Assembly of the Lord Mayors (some working groups have already been established). Furthermore, the four cities have expressed their wish to cooperate with the State, trying to reach agreements on common measures to make the metropolitan area more attractive (and hence, more competitive). The Innovation Strategy One of the strategies that had to be developed to improve the region’s competitiveness is the innovation strategy (Culminatum 2005). The

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development of this strategy was handed over to development company Culminatum; a logical choice in view of its role as the regional platform for public-private corporation. Considering the need for involvement from all sectors, the company invited key stakeholders in the area to take seat in its board, like representatives from the national technology agency, the University of Helsinki, Nokia and a regional trade & industry organization. In addition, six so-called champions were invited: profiled persons (like the director of Nokia Research Centre) who led six workshops for the representatives of Culminatum’s shareholders and stakeholders. It was deliberately decided to also involve stakeholders from a national level, in order to gain broad support. The workshops not only helped to acquire support for the innovation strategy, but also resulted in bilateral contacts between the various stakeholders, resulting in new partnerships. In the strategy document concrete actions have been formulated, many of which emphasize the importance of cross-sector cooperation, but also the need for inter-municipal coordination. Four pillars (sub-objectives) have been identified: 1) improving the international appeal of research and expertise; 2) reinforcing knowledge-based clusters and creating common development platforms; 3) reform and innovations in public services; and 4) support for innovative activities. Most of the projects that are carried out under the umbrella of the innovation strategy take place within the boundaries of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. Business firms and knowledge institutions play a key role in the implementation of the strategy, like for instance in Forum Virium Helsinki.

Box 4.2: Forum Virium Helsinki Forum Virium Helsinki to push innovative ideas into business. Led by the City of Helsinki, a number of prominent Finnish and Finlandbased companies that produce or utilize digital products or services have joined forces to create Forum Virium Helsinki, a business development forum to produce innovative digital products and services for real, everyday needs. The objective is to develop a ‘knowledge cluster’ that incubates innovative ideas into successful businesses, for both domestic and international markets. Forum Virium Helsinki will focus on delivering contents through multiple channels. The contents will range from information to entertainment and embrace applications for online shopping, distance learning, healthcare and transportation. The idea is to create an innovative environment in Finland, and in particular the Pasila district of Helsinki, to develop digital content and services to meet actual customer needs and authentic operational situations. The City of Helsinki plays an important role in the project. The aim is to utilize the opportunities arising from the establishment of a second centre of Helsinki in the Pasila district to create a new kind of work and leisure time environment.

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As decisions are actually taken by city councils, the Advisory Board recognizes the importance of effective communication toward politicians and the population, one of the examples being a seminar on globalization in 2005. Furthermore, it is considered important to produce concrete, visible results (see next section). Cooperation between universities and municipalities Typical for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area is the strong cooperation between the local authorities and the universities, which is part of the Triple Helix philosophy. The University of Helsinki has agreed on joint strategies together with polytechnics in the metropolitan area, municipalities, provinces, companies and intermediary bodies. Universities and polytechnics cooperate in the promotion of the science-related business development, in urban and traffic planning regarding campus areas, in attracting international students and in urban research in general. Through this cooperation the actors involved intend to create synergies to their own benefit and to the benefit of Helsinki’s development in general. To implement the vision of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, formulated above, authorities and universities defined a joint project entitled Helsinki Education and Research Area (HERA). This project is a consortium of nine universities from the Helsinki Research Area covering the whole academic spectrum from natural sciences to technology and business and from humanities to design, music and fine arts.11 Furthermore, seven institutions participate in a joint research programme for the metropolitan area called ‘Cities in transition’: the Ministry of Education, two universities (University of Helsinki and Helsinki University of Technology) and four municipalities (Espoo, Helsinki, Lahti and Vantaa). The aim of the co-operation is to consolidate urban studies that support the development of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area as a university discipline of research and education, and to strengthen the innovation system of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and its cities.12 An important element of this project is the appointment of nine professors in different aspects of urban research (European metropolitan planning, urban history, social (urban) policy, urban sociology, urban economics, urban ecology, urban ecosystem studies, urban technological systems and urban geography). Through this research programme, the universities intend to support municipalities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area with the provision of applied knowledge on urban development, while the municipalities support the university with both the financial means and the input. Not only the common strategic needs and research priorities have been drafted in the research program, but also the specific research interests of the participating municipalities have been taken into account. The Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly As indicated above, the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board (and the Innovation Strategy) mainly concentrates on governing the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. On the level of the Greater Helsinki

11 . 12 .

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Area, another partnership has come into effect: the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly. This is a platform where leading decision makers come together. In 2003, an Advisory Commission on the Helsinki Region (with representatives of various ministries and local authorities) was set up to identify opportunities for stronger regional governance. The proposal for new legislation opened a public debate on inter-municipal collaboration. As a result, the fourteen municipalities of the Greater Helsinki Area agreed to co-operate, though on a voluntary basis, to avoid unwanted statutory co-operation. Awaiting the results of this agreement, the state has (at least for the moment) put away its plans to enforce regional co-operation. The first concrete result is the foundation of the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly, in the autumn of 2005. This assembly aims to secure the international competitiveness of the region by means of better coordination in housing, land-use and transportation policies. One of the first concrete projects is the preparation of a common land-use strategy for the region, for which a committee (Land Use, Housing and Transport Committee) has been set up. The members of the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly (HRCA) are the 14 municipalities of the Greater Helsinki Area, which can be divided into three municipality groups: the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board (Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen), KUUMA (Järvenpäa, Nurmijärvi, Tuusula, Kerava, Mäntsälä and Pornainen) and Neloset (Hyvinkää, Kirkkonummi, Vihti and Sipoo). The national government is not (yet) a partner in the assembly, although cooperation with (and support from) the national government is regarded important. It is possible that in the future other municipalities will join the HRCA.13 The assembly consists of 28 delegates: the chairmen of the 14 city councils and the chairmen of the 14 local governments.14 For each council term, one Chairman and two Vice Chairmen are to be elected. The members of the assembly, including the mayors, have a meeting two or three times a year. Other actors that are involved are representatives of the Uusimaa Regional Council and the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council. The assembly has no budget of its own. Costs incurred by the Cooperation Assembly are to be paid by the arranger.15

13 In October 2006, another municipality became member of the HRCA: the City of Lohja (36,000 inhabitants) located 55 kilometers west of Helsinki. This extension demonstrates one of the advantages of voluntary cooperation: its flexibility. 14 The assembly can decide that an additional four to six members be elected for the ongoing term of office of the municipal councils. Of these additional members between two and four are to represent the Metropolitan Area Advisory Board, one the KUUMA municipalities and one the municipality group Nesolet, in such a way that all main political groups are duly represented (Agreement of cooperation between the municipalities of the Helsinki Region, 6–4–2005). 15 Source: Agreement of cooperation between the municipalities of the Helsinki Region, 6–4–2005.

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Partnership models The two new forms of co-operation that we introduced in the previous section (the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board and the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly) can be characterized by using the partnership model (see Chapter 1). Taking their objectives into consideration, both partnerships have a rather broad scope, trying to make the region more competitive and stimulating sustainable development. The broadness of the Advisory Board’s scope is reflected in the vision and the three strategic objectives that were defined (competitiveness, housing and urban structure, services). Although it could be argued that the Cooperation Assembly implicitly works with the same vision and strategy, its actual scope is somewhat narrower, aiming primarily at better coordination in housing, land-use and transportation policies. The scope of both partnerships’ roles is relatively limited. The Advisory Board and the Cooperation Assembly are both coordinating platform. Initiatives and investments are to be expected from the participating stakeholders. There is obviously a difference in geographic scale when we compare the two partnerships. The Advisory Board’s work area is largely restricted to the metropolitan area (the four municipalities), while the activities of the Cooperation Assembly cover the Greater Helsinki Area (the fourteen municipalities). The Advisory Board can be compared with a municipality group like KUUMA and Nesolet, while the Cooperation Assembly is in fact a group of municipality groups. Looking at the actors involved in both forms of co-operation (mayors, chairs of city councils and city boards, representatives of the regional council), we observe that both partnerships can be characterized as public-public. However, there is one important difference: the Advisory Board has already succeeded to activate the triple helix (involving business companies and knowledge institutions) to develop and implement concrete strategies (the Innovation Strategy). This difference could be ascribed to the fact that the Cooperation Assembly has only just started, but maybe also to the fact that the Cooperation Assembly’s scope is somewhat more focused on (traditionally) public affairs, like housing, transportation and land-use. An important stakeholder (though not a participant) in both partnerships is the national government. State support is expected to secure the region’s international competitiveness. Both collaborations are formal as far as their organizational structure is concerned. The degree of formality is best illustrated by the agreement of cooperation between the municipalities of the Helsinki Region (the memorandum of the assembly’s foundation) in which ‘the rules of the game’ are defined. The formal character is also expressed in the important role of mayors in both partnerships. However, when it comes to formal power, we come to the conclusion that the two bodies lack legal instruments to enforce co-operation (which is common for voluntary partnerships). As both forms of cooperation are governed by high-level representatives of the local governments, it seems fair to conclude that the influence of politicians on the partnerships is rather high. The Advisory Board and the Cooperation Assembly can be seen as platforms for the coordination of public policy decision-making. And although both bodies lack the formal power to enforce co-operation, they both have the potential to influence political decisions in the participating municipalities by means of voluntary arrangements.

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Another element of our partnership model is the democratic content of a partnership. On the one hand, you could argue that the partnerships are platforms where democratically elected (directly or indirectly) city representatives come to arrangements that are in the interest of the region’s population. On the other hand, one could have the opinion that the voters have no direct influence on these bodies, which could result in agreements that are not in the interest of a particular group of people.16 However, because actual decisions can only be taken by city councils, it seems that the democratic content is warranted, also because both organizations are transparent, intelligible and accessible for citizens. The financial power of both bodies has everything to do with the absence of formal legal power and the influence on political decisions. Despite the fact that the municipalities joining both partnerships have high budgets and strong political influence on how to spend it, the partnerships themselves (that is: the organizations) have no or little financial means, which is for instance reflected in the agreement of cooperation which states that the municipalities should pay the costs incurred by the Cooperation Assembly. However, it is obvious that both platforms are able to influence the distribution of financial resources indirectly, through its influence on decision-making in local governments. In view of the aversion to dominant forms of leadership in the Finnish culture, it is difficult to indicate a leading stakeholder in coalition-forming processes. The Advisory Board and the Cooperation Assembly are both examples of partnerships in which all participants have equal rights, and in which they are all nearly equally represented. However, despite this equality, it is obvious that the City of Helsinki takes a leading role in coalition-forming processes. After all, it was the mayor of Helsinki who took the initiative to organize a second Helsinki Club meeting, which was clearly a first step toward more intensified regional cooperation. The internal organization of the two bodies can be characterized as a simple meeting platform where representatives from the municipalities meet each other on a regular basis. In the absence of an office, implementation is delegated to other organizations (like Culminatum in case of the Innovation Strategy) or to special committees with representatives of the stakeholders (like the Land Use, Housing and Transport Committee). 4 Performance, output and outcome Because both regional partnerships have only just started, it is too early to make a complete evaluation of their performance. This particularly applies to the Cooperation Assembly which actually started on 1 October 2005, only one month before our case study visit. The initiatives to promote regional cooperation on a voluntary basis will be evaluated in 2008. If it turns out that co-operation on a voluntary basis does not produce the desired results, it is likely that more institutionalized and structural forms of co-operation (including a merger) come up as serious alternatives to consider. 16 The argument being that voters elect politicians to defend their interests on a local level, not on a regional level, which could be a problem in case of conflicting local and regional interests.

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Awaiting this evaluation, the aim of this section is to describe and analyse the results so far. The Innovation Strategy One of the most visible results of the regional cooperation so far, is the development of the Innovation Strategy. The Advisory Board has played a key role in the development of the Innovation Strategy, with 26 Action Proposals to realize four strategic objectives. The strategy has stimulated the partner municipalities to take joint initiatives to the benefit of the region’s location climate. The municipalities are working on a common industrial policy for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, and plans are made to set up a new joint marketing organization for the region.17 Furthermore, the municipalities are developing a joint labour strategy (including immigration policy). One of the most concrete and visible outcomes is the Science Line, a bus line that connects the university campuses of the metropolitan area. Also in other policy areas initiatives are taken (see Table 4.5). However, not all initiatives are the merit of the Advisory Board. Many projects have been embraced by the cooperation as showcases of success. One of the first, most visible results is an agreement enabling children to visit comprehensive schools in neighbouring cities. Table 4.5 makes clear that many joint initiatives in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area are based on possibilities to benefit from economies of scale, like cooperation in education and the concentration of services for special groups. These projects aim for more effective use of public facilities in border areas and common quality standards for service production and purchasing. Most projects have in common that they are in the interest of all municipalities (win-win situations): they all want to reduce their expenses.18 The cooperation agreement of May 2006 Another important concrete result of the attempts to strengthen regional cooperation is the cooperation agreement that was signed in May 2006 (after the Advisory Board had approved it in April 2006). In that month the City Councils of Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen approved a cooperation agreement which expresses the aim to intensify and extend cooperation between the four municipalities, as well as to promote cooperation with the State. By signing this agreement, the municipalities have committed themselves to an action plan that was approved by the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board. This action plan is based on the answer of the Advisory Board, in its function as representative of the four cities, on some questions from the national government in view of the national project to restructure municipalities and services. This answer formulated some guidelines and prospects

17 It is uncertain what this means for Helsinki Region Marketing. 18 Some projects might not necessarily be in the interest of all citizens, as some of them are confronted with increasing distances to services. However, as long as decisions are taken by democratically elected city councils, the democratic content is not in danger.

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Table 4.5

Initiatives in the HMA to improve inter-municipal co-operation

Social welfare and health services Innovative environment, helping the elderly to cope on their own The SAKOTA research project on returning home from hospital (efficiency and quality of care) Swedish-language mental health services and drug abuser rehabilitation Education Cooperation in secondary vocational training (shared teachers, cooperation in enrolment, etc.) Cooperation in adult education Survey on the (post-elementary) education for young and adult immigrations Cooperation between libraries (acquisition of material, common collection) Construction and environment Cooperation in (tendering for) street and road maintenance Survey on real estate management and common use of premises Cooperation between fire and rescue departments Close cooperation in environmental and foodstuff monitoring Shared use of services Concentration of services for special groups to benefit from economies of scale Joint population forecasts Informing residents about the common use of services Harmonized ICT solutions and data bases Competitiveness Regional policy for business development (common industrial policy) International marketing of the region Joint labour strategy Urban structure and housing Housing policy with shared responsibility Joint strategy on urban structure and housing in the metropolitan area Source: Helsinki Metropolitan Advisory Board

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for the future development of the metropolitan area. The action plan that builds on this answer specifies eight aims: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

To strengthen inter-municipal cooperation and to extend political representation (in the Metropolitan Area Advisory Board). The municipalities have agreed to reconsider the governance structure of the Advisory Board (autumn 2006). After an analysis of the existing cross-municipal organizations (by the end of 2006), a proposal for a new ownership and management structure will be drawn up (by the end of 2007). To improve the competitiveness of the region. The municipalities have agreed to cooperate in the field of business development and innovation, carrying out the measures mentioned in the 2005 Business Development Strategy19 and the Innovation Strategy, as well as in the field of labour supply (through education, attracting skilled labour from abroad and improving services for higher-educated immigrants). To improve coordination in land use, housing and transport in the Helsinki region (14 municipalities). The municipalities have agreed to develop joint policies in these fields. To rearrange public transport. The municipalities have agreed to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the current public transport system (and the way it is managed), which should result in a reform of the system by the end of 2007. To improve welfare and health services and secure more efficiency in their production and provision. The municipalities have agreed to analyse the possibilities of joint use of services (allowing citizens to use services outside their home municipality), and to enhance services for the Swedish-speaking population. To improve educational services and secure more efficiency in their production and provision. Also for these services, the municipalities have agreed to analyse the possibilities of joint use of services (allowing citizens to use services outside their home municipality), and to enhance services for the Swedish-speaking population. To make public work services more efficient. The municipalities have agreed to analyse the possibilities to organize some public works on a regional level (the level of the 14 municipalities). To enhance cooperation in services. The municipalities have agreed to investigate possibilities to establish a joint purchasing organization, the possibilities to reach common standards and technical solutions in information management, and the possibilities to further improve services in Swedish.

The action plan can be seen as a first, historical step toward more concrete forms of cooperation in the Helsinki region. However, we emphasize that most actions 19 The aim of the 2005 Business Development Strategy is to attract firms and stimulate growth by improving the location climate, promoting cluster cooperation and attracting foreign direct investment.

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that have been defined, express the need to reconsider present structures (carrying out research, investigating the possibilities, etc.) without specifying the details of the new structures. Therefore, it still remains to be seen if the municipalities will agree on these details. If the actors involved succeed to agree on a new governance structure for the Advisory Board (the first aim in the list above), that might help to reach agreement on the other topics as well. Looking at the time schedule (Table 4.6), it indeed appears that the governance issue has the highest priority. Expectations are that the Advisory Board’s political mandate will be extended in 2006, provided that the city councils agree on this. A common land-use strategy One of the most interesting aims is the ambition to develop a common land-use strategy. It will present a general, joint view on spatial developments in the region, combining the master plans of all municipalities involved. Such a strategy could be an instrument to make the region more attractive by means of better coordination in the development of housing, business parks and transport infrastructure. The plan will also give guidelines for investments that are needed to improve the region’s competitiveness, nationally and internationally. The land use programme will be drawn based on the joint vision (‘2050’) for the region. It will formulate general guidelines, and the municipalities are expected to follow these guidelines although they are not obliged to do so. In view of its voluntary nature and the lack of legal status, some discussion partners were somewhat sceptical about the effectiveness of the land-use strategy. Others, however, emphasize that it could be a first step toward more cooperation and coordination in regional planning issues, notably because of the fact that leading politicians are involved (and maybe will become even more involved).20 A very concrete result that has already been accomplished on a land use issue considers an agreement between the City of Helsinki and the City of Vantaa, which includes a transfer of strategically positioned land from Vantaa to Helsinki, in exchange for something of added value for Vantaa. The City of Helsinki has also proposed to the State to exchange two pieces of land with neighbouring Sipoo (one piece of land in exchange for another piece of land). Through these land exchanges Helsinki is able to acquire new strategically located areas for housing and economic functions. Expectations were that the City of Helsinki would be willing to compensate neighbouring municipalities by an extension of the metro line both in eastward (Sipoo) and westward (Espoo) direction. And indeed, in September 2006, the City Councils of Espoo and Helsinki and the State agreed to construct a new metro line connecting the south of Espoo with the city centre of Helsinki (the State covering 30 per cent of the costs). This metro line offers the student community and high-tech workers of Otaniemi an improved connection to Helsinki down town, to the campuses of the Helsinki University located in Helsinki, thus improving the science corridor.

20 A first concrete result was accomplished in the autumn of 2006 when the municipalities of the Helsinki Region agreed to organize an international competition “Greater Helsinki Vision 2007” in cooperation with the State, aiming to get new ideas for land use and development.

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Table 4.6

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Action plan for the cooperation agreement in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area

Category 1 Develop regional cooperation and owner management

Action

Planned result

Proposals concerning the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board Orientation and proposed cooperative bodies Proposed owner management system

August 2006 December 2006 December 2007

2 Competitiveness Continued implementation of business projects development and innovative strategies (proposals influencing the 2008 budget) Plan for securing the availability of labour

March 2007

3 Develop land use, housing and transport

Analysis of the organization of housing construction commissioning Land use programme, housing programme and other projects and measures

December 2006

4 Arrange public transport

Evaluation survey conducted so as to form a basis for a rearrangement of public transport Survey on joint use of services

5 Social and health care

December 2006

December 2007

December 2007

March 2007

Proposals for improved services in Swedish March 2007 Continuous developing of basic health care March 2007 Proposals for improved special health care December 2006

6 Education policy, Survey on joint use of services March 2007 arranging the Proposals for improved services in Swedish March 2007 teaching Other orientations and surveys October 2006 7 Make public works services more efficient

Survey on the water supply and sewer functions Other surveys and proposals Survey on organizing purchasing

December 2007

8 Service cooperation

Investigation and development work in information management to achieve common standards and practices Proposals for improving services in Swedish

August 2007

December 2007 October 2006

May 2007

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Table 4.7

The Urban Programme for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area 2005–2007

Line of action

Project

Manager

Improving wellbeing and upgrading service

Selma, the regional multi-cultural information service centre

City of Helsinki

The innovation environment project to promote autonomy among the elderly

City of Espoo

The ILO project for innovative child protection

YTV

HUP – Developing the Swedish-language services

The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities

Basic education for international families

City of Helsinki

Cooperation in vocational training

City of Vantaa

Helsinki School of Creative Entrepreneurship (HSCE)

Culminatum Culminatum

Common entrepreneur services for Immigrants

Culminatum

Future development platforms and upgraded innovation finance

Culminatium

Services designed for foreign experts

Culminatum

Improving competiteness

Twin cities for science and arts: Helsinki – Tallinn Culminatum Developing urban structure and housing

Citizen channel – Regional cooperation

HELKA

Knowledge cluster in housing

Culminatum

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The Urban Programme 2005–2007 Another output of regional cooperation is the Urban Programme 2005–2007 for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (the follow-up of the 2002–2004 programme). The 2005– 2007 programme aims to improve the international competitiveness of the Helsinki Region, functioning as an umbrella for 15 projects and mainly including projects that have been defined within the Innovation Strategy. Funds for these projects (a total of €1.9 million) are provided by the State (50%) – channelled through the Uusimaa Regional Council – and the cities of the Metropolitan Area (50%). A Steering Group appointed by the mayors controls the implementation of the programme, while the coordination is in the hands of Helsinki City Urban Facts. Via the Urban Programme, the State supports initiatives which require intermunicipal cooperation (on the four-cities level). For each project, a Project Manager or Project Coordinator has been appointed. Table 4.7 shows that nearly all competitiveness-related projects are managed by Culminatum, while some other projects are managed by a representative from one of the three big cities. Particularly interesting are the projects that aim to make Helsinki more attractive for highereducated immigrants (see Box 4.3). One of these projects is the Helsinki School of Creative Entrepreneurship: a multi-disciplinary expertise-based and enterpriseoriented education programme project between the Helsinki School of Economics, the University of Art and Design Helsinki and the Helsinki University of Technology.

Box 4.3: Basic education for international families in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Basic education for international families in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area The international appeal of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area can be promoted by providing high-class, special-needs-adapted and well coordinated basic education services to an important element on the labour market, namely families with children coming to Finland. The special needs of such families, IMFs (Internationally Mobile Families) may be dictated by their staying in the country for just a few years (due to term of work assignments). Also, children of families returning to Finland may have gone to school abroad. Families with an immigrant background need other kinds of support, etc. The project looks into the possibilities of these families to apply to schools through coordinated application, into the unification of enrolment processes, the sufficiency of schools’ capacities and the sufficiency of current language education at schools with a foreign language. The project charts the educational arrangements and support measures for children and adolescents of immigrant families. It also assesses the possibility to foresee the needs of education of work-mobile international families and their children. In addition, the project is planning centralized targeted information and counselling for IMFs in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area.

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The aim of the HSCE is to increase academic entrepreneurship and mobility across university and campus borders, and to attract foreign students interested in entrepreneurship to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area. The Urban Programme 2005-2007 is clearly a step ahead in the development of (voluntary) partnerships in the Helsinki region. It presents very concrete measures to improve the delivery of services (in terms of quality and efficiency) and to enhance the competitiveness of the Metropolitan Area, which is in the interest of all actors involved. Obviously, the four municipalities and the regional council have been able to set up a joint agenda for the region, and to secure financial support from the State. Challenges that remain Voluntary co-operation has worked until now, but it remains to be seen to what extent the advisory board can produce results in the years to come (Karvinen 2005). How will be dealt with conflicts? How to solve situations without win-win possibilities? Most agreements that have been accomplished so far are typical examples of winwin situations, and have more to do with public-service delivery than economic development. Moreover, many forms of cooperation are not yet in the stage of implementation (real actions). As a rule, it is easier to reach agreement on a vision or strategy and to define shared values and aims, than to solve conflicts in concrete matters. On the one hand, it could be argued that it is a good strategy to first ‘pick lowhanging fruit’ before entering into more complex decision-making processes. In such a way, partners can gradually learn how to cooperate, building mutual trust and confidence (‘creating the right spirit’). On the other hand, actors involved seem to be somewhat sceptical, expecting that the process of coalition-forming on a voluntary basis will come to a halt, as soon as difficult, strategic choices have to be made. From that moment on, more institutionalized forms of cooperation seem to be unavoidable. Besides mergers, one could also think of a regional tax equalization system. Another option is to create an additional governmental tier, but that option is not considered desirable as it will probably cause an increase in bureaucracy (many prefer the current two-tier system). 5 Applying the Research Framework Our research framework can be helpful to identify the factors of failure and success in the development of cross-border partnerships in the Helsinki region. The analysis of the two regional partnerships (the Advisory Board and the Cooperation Assembly) has confirmed the relevance of various local context factors in metropolitan governance. It turns out that many situation-specific circumstances facilitate or hamper partnership creation. Political-administrative context factors that obstruct, or at least complicate, partnership development are the autonomy of municipalities and their dependence on local taxes. Facilitating factors can be found in the (financial) incentives (or even pressure) from the State toward municipalities that stimulate regional co-operation.

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The tax redistribution system and the shift in urban/regional economic policies on a national level are both examples of context factors that create common interests on a regional level. Municipalities are triggered to co-operate (for instance in the urban policy programme 2002–2004/2005–2007) when they receive less policy attention (read: money) from the national government. It is generally known that a common threat (or opportunity) stimulates coalition forming processes. The impact of economic circumstances on the partnership development process is less clear. On the one side, it is true that the Helsinki region is facing some challenges that are expected to affect all municipalities, like the growing competition from other (notably Eastern European) cities, structural unemployment, low levels of foreign direct investment, an ageing society, an undersupply of (affordable) housing and the threat of uncontrolled urban sprawl. These developments create a regional agenda in which all municipalities are considered to have a stake. On the other side, international comparisons put Helsinki in the top of many rankings, making the sense of urgency less obvious. Considering the motives to co-operate it seems that the balance between the core communities (and Helsinki in particular) and the border communities is somewhat fragile. At the moment, core communities have an interest in better housing, while border communities have an interest in better accessibility. But for how long will these two motives be equally strong? Relevant cultural context factors are the tradition to co-operate (cross-sector and cross-border) and to seek consensus (most often facilitators of partnership development), equality in inter-human relations (stimulus) and an aversion to dominant forms of leadership (possible obstruction in specific situations). We can observe that these cultural context factors have influenced the choice of partnership models, all municipalities being equally powerful despite differences in population and employment. The City of Helsinki, and the Mayor of Helsinki, have to take a somewhat modest position to secure sufficient political (and societal) support in the surrounding municipalities. It remains to be seen whether or not the lack of formal hierarchy will become a problem when more strategic and difficult choices (in socalled win-loss situations) have to be made. For both regional platforms, the motives to co-operate (and the related objectives) are clear. First of all, most municipalities want to avoid top-down enforced changes in the administrative organization. Second, all municipalities have an interest in a more competitive region, and this very general motive that is shared by all actors involved is a sort of umbrella for various sub-motives, such as improving accessibility, increasing the supply of housing, attracting foreign knowledge workers, creating critical mass, etc. However, although all municipalities would probably agree with all these aims, it remains to be seen if they also share a common vision on the priorities to be set. One of the problems with voluntary partnerships is that they often lack a mechanism to solve situations with conflicting priorities. From the interviews we conclude that expectations are not very high, many actors involved being realistic about the possibilities – and limits! – of voluntary partnerships. It will be difficult to reach agreement in concrete situations in which one municipality suffers and another one benefits from a policy action, even if that action contributes to the competitiveness of the region. In the end, decisions are taken by city councils, not by the regional platforms. Some discussion partners state that at some point

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changes in the administrative structure are needed to bring regional governance to a higher level. Despite the scepticism among some actors involved concerning the two regional bodies, some more positive signals should not be neglected. For one thing, we may conclude that regional co-operation in the Helsinki region has already reached a higher level in the last years. Since the second Helsinki Club meeting – when key stakeholders in the region put regional co-operation high on the agenda – many initiatives have been undertaken to strengthen regional coordination in many areas. Particularly when it comes to joint service delivery or coordination in public services, significant enhancements can be noticed. However, it should be said that most results have been realized in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, while co-operation in the Greater Helsinki Area has still a long way to go. The experiences in Helsinki confirm that the road to regional co-operation is long and winding, as municipalities need to learn how to co-operate, building trust and confidence. In the Helsinki region, one of the key players in the coalition-forming process is the national government. The state can stimulate partnership development by reducing policy attention (creating a joint threat), but probably even more so by acknowledging that regional co-operation in the Helsinki region is in the interest of the entire nation. Commitment of the national government is believed to be a decisive factor of failure and success in the attempts to enhance regional co-operation. Moreover, the future of the Helsinki region depends on the outcome of the current debate on possible reforms in local administration (with mergers being one option). It remains to be seen if the state is able and willing to enforce changes (top-down) instead of awaiting initiatives from the municipalities (bottom-up). References City of Helsinki Urban Facts (2004), The Regional Economy of Helsinki from a European Perspective, in Helsinki City Urban Facts Office: Webpublications 2004/31. City of Helsinki Urban Facts (2005a), Helsinki Regional Economy. A dynamic city in the European Urban Network. Webpublications 2005, nr. 41 http:// www.hel2.fi/tietokeskus/julkaisut/pdf/06_01_05_suokas_vj41.pdf (Accessed December 2005). City of Helsinki Urban Facts (2005b), Statistical Yearbook of the City of Helsinki 2004. Web publications 2005:9 http://www.hel2.fi/tietokeskus/julkaisut/ pdf/05_02_16_askelo_vj9_stat_yerbook.pdf (Accessed January 2006). City of Helsinki Urban Facts (2006), Facts about Helsinki 2006. Helsinki: Erweko Painotuote Oy. Culminatum (2005), Innovation Strategy. Helsinki: Culminatum. Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker (2005) European Cities Monitor. http://www.cushmanwakefield.com/cwglobal/docviewer/European%20Cities%2 0Monitor.pdf?id=ca1500006&repositoryKey=CoreRepository&itemDesc=docu ment (Accessed August 2006).

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Helsingin Seudun Aluesarjat (2005) Helsinki Region Statistics, http:// www.aluesarjat.fi/ (Accessed November 2005). Holstila, E. (2004), ‘Finland: towards urban innovation policy’, in L. van den Berg, E. Braun and J. van der Meer (2004), National Urban Policies in the European Union (Rotterdam: Euricur). Karvinen, M. (2005), Innovation and creativity strategies in Helsinki. 41st ISoCaRP Congress 2005. Laasko, S. and P. Vuori (2004), ‘Population projection for Helsinki’, in Quarterly, Urban Facts, Helsinki. Ministry of the Interior (2003), Huippusoaamisesta alueille kilpakilukykyä, Osaamiskekusten väliarvionti 1999–2000 (Evalation of the Centres of Expertise Programme). Office of Research and Statistics (2006), Nordic Major City Statistics. Data on 16 major cities and their regions. From the NORDSTAT database. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab. OECD (2003), OECD Territorial Reviews: Helsinki (Finland. Paris: OECD Publications). OECD (2005), OECD Territorial Reviews: Finland (Paris: OECD Publications). Sitra (2005), ‘Making Finland a leading country in innovation’ Final report of the Competitive Innovation Environment Development Programme (Helsinki: Edita Prima Ltd.). YTV (2006), Sukkulointi pääkaupunkiseudun työssäkäyntialueella, PLJ 2007 – tiedote 4, Elokuu 2006. Discussion partners Mr Olli Alho, Ministry of Interior, Department for Development of Regions and Public Administration Ms Rakel Hiltunen, Helsinki City Council/Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board; also Member of Parliament Mr Eero Holstila, City of Helsinki Urban Facts/Culminatum Ltd Mr Tuula Joronen, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Ms Jonna Kangasoja, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Mr Marko Karvinen, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Ms Paula Kokkonen, City of Helsinki Mr Tapio Korhonen, City of Helsinki Mr Tatu Laurila, Culminatum Ltd Mr Otto Lehtipuu, Helsinki City Board/Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board Ms Asta Manninen, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Mr Matti Ollinkari, City of Helsinki Mr Juhani Paajanen, Mayor of the City of Vantaa Mr Jussi Pajunen, Lord Mayor of the City of Helsinki Mr Teuvo Savikko, City of Espoo Mr Sampsa Saralehto, Helsinki Region Chamber of Commerce

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Mr Harry Schulman, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Ms Tanja Sippola-Alho, City of Helsinki Ms Ilkka Susiluoto, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Mr Antti Valle, Ministry of Interior, Department for Development of Regions and Public Administration Ms Anja Vallittu, City of Helsinki Mr Jan Vapaavuori, Helsinki City Board/Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board, also Member of Parliament Mr Olli Voutilainen, Ministry of Interior, Department for Development of Regions and Public Administration Mr Pekka Vuori, City of Helsinki Urban Facts Mr Torsten Widén, Mayor of the City of Kauniainen

Chapter 5

The Networks of Wonderful Copenhagen1 1 Introduction In 1992, the City of Copenhagen and the surrounding municipalities decided to set up a new organization to take care of destination marketing: Wonderful Copenhagen, named after one of the tourism organizations that already existed. The main argument for the creation of this ‘official convention and visitors bureau of Greater Copenhagen’ was the high degree of fragmentation in tourism promotion. Until then, several organizations (including Copenhagen Tourist Organization, Wonderful Copenhagen, Copenhagen City Centre and the Danish Convention Bureau) had tried to attract visitors, however with little coordination and much internal competition (Van den Berg et al. 1995; PA Consulting Group 1992). Wonderful Copenhagen, hereafter abbreviated as WoCo, is a public-private partnership, drawing half of its funds from public actors (the state and regional authorities) and the other half from private actors (the tourist industry). To reach its goals (‘to strengthen and extend knowledge of the city’s international networks and identity’) WoCo manages various networks, such as the Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance, the Wonderful Copenhagen Cruise Network, Wonderful Copenhagen Meetingplace and Wonderful Copenhagen Mødecentrum (‘meeting centre’). In the present case study, we focus our attention on WoCo’s ‘network model’, aiming to answer the following questions: 1) what have been the motives to set up these networks? 2) how are these networks actually functioning? (what have been the results?); 3) have they contributed to the performance of Copenhagen as a destination? 4) to what extent can the network model be transferred to other cities, and what is the relevance of specific context factors?; and 5) what are the future challenges for WoCo? The structure of our report is as follows. In section 2, we first introduce Copenhagen and its region, describing the relevant context factors that should be taken into account. Section 3 analyzes WoCo and the motives to co-operate, and confronts the network model with our partnership model (see Chapter 1). Section 4 discusses the outputs and outcomes of WoCo’s networks, and identifies challenges that remain. Finally, we confront our observations with the research framework and draw some conclusions in section 5.

1

This case study was carried out in May 2006.

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2 The Copenhagen Region Introduction In this section we describe the context factors that are relevant for the development of Wonderful Copenhagen and its networks. In contrast with other case studies, our description starts with the political-administrative context, in view of some important changes that took place in 2007. After that, we present some general demographic and economic figures concerning Copenhagen and its region, including some data on tourism. The last sub-section analyses the cultural context. The political-administrative context Copenhagen is the capital and the largest city of Denmark with a population of more than 1.1 million (in the agglomeration). The city is located on the island of Zealand which is connected with Sweden (the region of Skåne and the city of Malmö) through the bridge across the Øresund.2 The Øresund is the strait of water between Sweden and Denmark, connecting the North Sea with the Baltic Sea. Copenhagen belongs to the Øresund region, which comprises the Danish islands of Zealand, Lolland-Falster, Møn and Bornholm, and the Swedish Skåne region.3 This region has a population of about 3.6 million. Since the opening of the bridge (in 2000), the number of commuters that cross the Øresund has increased drastically (with growth rates of about 100 per cent!). Nevertheless, many would agree that the cross-border region is not yet an integrated region; it will take years or even decades to accomplish that. On the 1st of January 2007, the political-administrative context changed radically because of a nation-wide reorganization of local and regional government. This reorganization implied a reduction in the number of local and regional governments and a renewed distribution of tasks and responsibilities. The main argument for the reform was the observation that many municipalities were too small (less than 10,000 inhabitants) to take care of delivering all public services in a professional way. Denmark had always had a strongly decentralized public sector, but it seemed that some municipalities were no longer able to provide all (welfare) services in an adequate way. Insight into this reorganization is needed because it is expected to affect the functioning of WoCo. The situation until 31 December 2006 Before 2007, Denmark was divided into 13 counties and 270 municipalities. The city of Copenhagen was one of the three municipalities that were not part of a county, the others being the city of Frederiksberg (an enclave in the city of Copenhagen) and the island of Bornholm located to the south of Sweden (which has a regional municipality since 2003). The municipality of Copenhagen was fully embraced by the county of Copenhagen which is made up by 18 municipalities. The two bordering counties were Frederiksborg (with 19 2 Please notice that the Danish use the Ø, while the Swedish use the Ö in the name of the sound. 3 Source: <www.oresundregion.org>.

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Figure 5.1

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Map of the Copenhagen region

Source: Copenhagen Capacity (2004)

municipalities including the City of Helsingør, which is located near the Swedish city of Helsingborg) and Roskilde (with 11 municipalities including the cities of Roskilde and Køge). To take care of matters that cross the borders of municipalities, a regional development council for the capital region was created in 2000. This organization called ‘Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd’ (abbreviated as HUR) dealt with issues in the field of public transport, regional and traffic planning, Øresund co-ordination and development, industrial policy, tourism and culture. WoCo used to be for about 50 per cent funded by this regional body (and hence, indirectly by the municipalities and counties). The HUR council comprised 11 representatives from the five public bodies: two from Roskilde County, three from Copenhagen County, two from Frederiksborg County, three from the City of Copenhagen, and one from the City of Frederiksberg. HUR used to be fully funded by these five authorities. The new situation since 1 January 2007 In the new situation Denmark counties have been replaced by five regions: North Jutland, Central Jutland, South Denmark, Zealand and the Capital Region (in Danish: Region Hovestaden). The main task of the regions is to deliver health services, and for that reason, their delimitation is strongly based on the service areas of hospitals. The Capital Region includes the

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municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, the current counties of Copenhagen and Frederiksborg, and the regional municipality of Bornholm. The Roskilde County has become part of the Zealand Region, although (a part of) this county is considered part of Copenhagen’s functional urban region. This has primarily to do with the service areas of hospitals, although an additional argument could be the State’s wish to limit the power of the Copenhagen region by making it smaller. According to the new administrative model, municipalities should have more than 20,000 inhabitants. All municipalities in Denmark have been asked to make clear which neighbouring municipalities they would like to merge with. However, because the average size of municipalities in the Capital Region is relatively large (in comparison with municipalities elsewhere in Denmark), the number of mergers between municipalities is relatively low in this region. On 1 January 2007, the number of municipalities in the Capital Region declined from 40 to 29.4 Furthermore, tasks and responsibilities have been redistributed. Municipalities have taken over some activities from the counties (e.g. environmental control, adult education, employment policies), while other activities have been handed over to the State (e.g. tax administration). The reform has important consequences for HUR. The development council has been transformed into a new organization, with a more limited scope, being mainly responsible for bus services and local trains in the Eastern part of Denmark. The new transport authority is owned by the municipalities and the regions. Other activities including business and tourism development have been transferred to the new regional council. As a consequence, public funding for WoCo (as well as for Copenhagen Capacity, the business development organization) is expected to come from this regional organization. It remains to be seen what the implications of the reform will be. Many discussion partners fear that there will be less money for economic and tourism development, as the State favours equalization policies (investing money in underperforming regions such as Jutland) and the newly developed regions’ main task is delivering health services. Demographic and economic figures Currently, the municipality of Copenhagen has a population of about 500,000. In the nineteenth century the city’s population grew rapidly from about 100,000 to 400,000. After a peak in the 1950s of almost 770,000 citizens, the city faced a decline in population to about 460,000 in the 1990s. Since then, the number of inhabitants has been slowly increasing. The metropolitan region of Copenhagen as defined by Danmarks Statistic has a population of approximately 1.1 million. In the old situation (as described above) the Capital Region counted more than 1.8 million inhabitants, but this number has declined to 1.6 million, because of its new definition (leaving out the Roskilde County). About 30 per cent of the Danish population (5.4 million people) 4 Old situation: Copenhagen (1) + Frederiksberg (1) + Copenhagen County (18) + Frederiksborg County (19) + Bornholm (1). Also see: <www.im.dk/publikationer/government_ reform_in_brief/kap08.htm>.

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live in the Copenhagen region. To put things in perspective: the second largest city of Denmark is the City of Århus with about 300,000 inhabitants in the municipality, and 700,000 in the region. Copenhagen is of course also an important centre of employment, with about 323,000 jobs in the city, and almost 979,000 in the capital region (old definition). In comparison with the rest of Denmark, relatively large shares of Copenhagen’s working population can be found in financial and business services, public services and leisure. Unemployment is 7.1 per cent. With approximately 25,000 (direct) jobs, tourism is (and has always been) an important source of income in the Copenhagen region. The tourism industry creates a turnover of 16 billion Dkr, which is about €2.15 billion. The Copenhagen region has a share of more than one third in the national tourism industry. The number of commercial bed nights is about 6.5 million, of which 4.6 million are spent in hotels. In comparison with other European cities, however, the bed night volume is modest. In 2004, according to European Cities Tourism statistics, Copenhagen ranked 20th in the list of tourism destinations based on bed night data. London (1st) and Paris (2nd) are obviously by far the largest tourist destinations in Europe with 48 million and 30 million bed nights respectively. However, differences become much smaller when we look at number three in the list: Rome, with about 15 million bed nights. Thus, Copenhagen finds itself in competition with many other European cities that aim to attract leisure and business tourists. Nearby located competitors are Berlin (4th), Amsterdam (10th), Hamburg (15th), Stockholm (19th), Gothenburg (27th) and Oslo (28th). Cultural context We consider local/national norms and values (culture) a highly important context factor in the coalition forming process. Considering the cultural context of Copenhagen, it is well known that consensus is very important in the Danish society. Many Danish Table 5.1

Area, population and density in the Copenhagen Region

Municipality

Area

Copenhagen municipality 91 km2 Frederiksberg municipality 9 km2 Copenhagen county 526 km2 Metropolitan region 455 km² Frederiksborg county 1,347 km2 Capital region (new) 2,561 km² Roskilde county 891 km2 Capital region (old) 2,864 km² Source: Wikipedia

Population

501,158 (2006) 91,886 (2005) 618,529 (2006) 1,116,979 (2004) 378,686 (2006) 1,631,635 (2005) 241,523 (2006) 1,827,239 (2005)

Population density 5,489/km2 10,562/km2 1,176/km2 2,452/km² 281/km2 637/km2 271/km2 638/km²

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media outlets and politicians traditionally describe the political climate in Denmark as a konsensussamfund (society of consensus).5 The quest for consensus cannot only be identified in political matters, resulting in agreements between political parties, but also in economic matters, resulting in agreements between employer’s organizations and labour unions. Therefore, we could speak of a ‘tradition to cooperate’ which could be a factor of importance in the development of Wonderful Copenhagen and its networks. 3 Wonderful Copenhagen and its Networks Wonderful Copenhagen Wonderful Copenhagen (WoCo) is the official city tourism organization of Copenhagen. It was founded in 1992, after a plea from the Ministry of Industry to entrust the marketing of the tourist product Copenhagen to a single tourist organization (Van den Berg et al. 1995). As stated in the introduction, WoCo is a public-private partnership, drawing 45 per cent of its funds from the municipalities and counties (currently through HUR, in the future through the new regional council), and 55 per cent from private actors (representatives from the tourist industry). In the first three years of its existence WoCo also received funds from the State (the Ministry of Industry), giving the organization time to find private sponsors. Initially, the annual budget was about 20 million Dkr (Danish Crones), including a 10 million Dkr grant from the State. Since its foundation the annual budget has grown to about 102 million Dkr in 2005, while the number of employees has increased from 15 to about 80. In 2003, WoCo merged with the tourist organizations of Roskilde and Frederiksborg, causing an increase of the work area from the metropolitan region (‘Storkøbenhavn’) to the capital region (‘Hovestadsregionen’). WoCo’s mission is to improve the capital region’s competitive position in the experience economy and to create employment in the tourist industry. This mission has been translated into several concrete objectives such as becoming (or remaining) Scandinavia’s number one experience location, Northern Europe’s strongest cruise destination, one of the ten largest convention cities in the World, and an airport hub in Europe. To reach these aims, WoCo has four key competences: 1) international marketing and PR; 2) the attraction of events; 3) tourist services; and 4) strategy and innovation. The business model can be characterized as a combination of stable public funding and (private-sector) participation through networks (see next subsection). Furthermore, WoCo wants to be a professional organization with engaged employees. The City of Copenhagen considers WoCo the organization that is responsible for the development and implementation of the tourism strategy. WoCo is positioned at arms length of the local administration, a position which helps the organization to act in a flexible and entrepreneurial way. The municipality recognizes the importance of tourism in its business development strategy, which falls under the responsibility of 5

.

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the financial department (managing the budgets for all other departments). Also when it comes to business development (attracting inward investment) the municipality has entrusted strategy development and implementation to a private organization: Copenhagen Capacity (which is nearly 100 per cent publicly funded). Consequently, WoCo and Copenhagen Capacity have relatively much freedom. Private-sector involvement in tourism development and promotion is not something new for Copenhagen. Already in the 1920s, companies in the tourist industry recognized their interest in tourism promotion. In contrast with many other cities (also in Denmark), the City of Copenhagen has never had any problems with placing tourism promotion and business development in the hands of private organizations. As a consequence, political control is limited. The municipality is represented on the Board of Directors, but actions of WoCo do not have to be approved by the City Council. A network managing organization After its foundation WoCo developed into a network managing organization: the executive body for tourism in Copenhagen. As WoCo doesn’t own any tourist products, it is fully dependent on other organizations in the tourism network (the only way to grow is to organize the networks in a better way). As in many other cities, it is difficult to involve the private sector in tourism promotion because of free-rider behaviour and the fact that stakeholders have very different interests. Moreover, globalization has reduced the local embeddedness of some actors in the tourism industry: hotels have been taken over by international chains, and strategic decisions are taken elsewhere now. The network model – creating networks of stakeholders (customers) who have more or less common interests – is seen as a means to overcome (or at least reduce) the problems described above. WoCo’s strategy is to create networks of actors that are involved in the same cluster (sub-clusters within tourism) or value chain (activities around a particular target group of urban tourism, such as conference participants and cruise passengers). The tourism organization considers networks as instruments to organize its customers (that is: stakeholders in Copenhagen’s tourist product), and to be less dependent on one or two big customers. Network membership provides selected customers clear and specific advantages. In general, the aim of these networks is to generate concrete operational payoffs, and to promote coordination (sharing knowledge) instead of (too much) competition. At least four arguments can be given in favour of these networks: 1) they stimulate innovation in the tourist industry; 2) they promote active participation in WoCo’s activities; 3) they help to create critical mass in marketing (notably in promotional campaigns); and 4) they make it easier for WoCo to influence political decisions on various levels. Currently, WoCo manages four core networks: Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance, Wonderful Copenhagen Cruise Network, Wonderful Copenhagen Meetingplace and Wonderful Copenhagen Mødecentrum Sjæland (Meeting Centre Zealand). More than 100 organizations are involved in these networks, thus making a considerable contribution to the private funding of WoCo. Besides these core networks, WoCo is

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also involved in the International Marketing Øresund project and the Cruise Baltic network. Moreover, WoCo is continuously in search of opportunities to develop new networks, as long as their development and management fits in the mission (and competences) of WoCo. In general, the initiative to develop a network is taken by WoCo, as a response to a situation in which Copenhagen fails to seize opportunities. To identify new opportunities, WoCo carries out comparative research (benchmarking studies), also to learn from ‘winners’ in a particular area. When an opportunity is identified, WoCo gets in contact with actors who have an interest in the development of a particular value chain, presenting a clear vision and strategy with respect to the (expected) added value of cooperation. After that, initiatives are developed to make this added value visible, notably by first picking ‘low hanging fruit’ (results that can be achieved with relatively few efforts, and on a relatively short notice), thus showing the benefits of cooperation. Obviously, it takes time and patience to develop these networks. As a network manager, communication with stakeholders is one of the main challenges for WoCo. This requires a good internal and external communication strategy. The various stakeholder groups (customers, politicians, the media, etc.) speak different languages and have different interests. Therefore, good stakeholder management is considered a prerequisite to secure the organization’s legitimacy (license to operate). This requires a good internal and external communication strategy, sending consistent and coherent messages, though in different packages. For instance, business managers tend to talk in terms of ‘financial revenues’ while politicians need to win the sympathy of voters by showing the positive impact of their decisions on society. In view of its role of intermediary, WoCo aims to avoid being called (or perceived as) ‘public’ or ‘private’ (choosing one side). If, for instance, WoCo becomes too commercial, it would run the risk of reputation damage among non-commercial stakeholders (e.g. museums and other cultural institutions), causing negative publicity.6 The Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance and Wonderful Copenhagen Eventures The Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance is the most recently established network. Since its foundation in 2005 it aims to attract and develop international events. The initiative to develop this network was taken by WoCo for several reasons. First of all, it is broadly acknowledged that in a globalizing economy, Western European cities like Copenhagen have to find new activities to replace the old activities that are relocated to Eastern European and non-European countries. Copenhagen is believed to have great potential in what is called the ‘experience economy’ and (international) events can help the city to attract more visitors. In comparison with other cities, including Scandinavian competitors such as Stockholm and Helsinki, Copenhagen attracts relatively few international (sports) events. Moreover, benchmarking studies (done by WoCo) show that other Scandinavian cities (notably the City of Gothenburg in Sweden) have been very successful in using events as instruments of place marketing (also see Braun, Otgaar and Van den Berg 2003). A second reason to set up the 6 In fact, this happened some years ago, making WoCo aware of the need for keeping a balance between commercial and non-commercial interests.

The Networks of Wonderful Copenhagen

Table 5.2

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Budgets of the four core networks (in thousands of Dkr)

Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance Wonderful Copenhagen Cruise Network Wonderful Copenhagen Meetingplace Wonderful Copenhagen Mødecentrum

1998

2001

N/A 1,761 3,958 496

1,500 1,351 3,755 494

Source: ‘Copenhagen Statistics 1998–2004’ (Wonderful Copenhagen, 2005)

alliance is the wish to promote civic pride among the relatively modest inhabitants of Copenhagen. And a third reason is the conclusion from research that Copenhagen attracts relatively ‘experienced’ tourists, who have seen many other cities already, and are in search of something new (non-traditional); events can be helpful to attract this target group. One of the occasions to create the Copenhagen Alliance was the experienced need to optimize the benefits from international events (such as the Eurovision Songcontest in 2001) but also to become better in attracting international events (such as EURO 2008, in a joint (lost) bid with the other Scandinavian countries). An additional occasion is the intention on national level to put Copenhagen forward as candidate host for the Olympic Games in 2020 or 2024 (something only few people could think of before). The Copenhagen Alliance is a partnership of six organizations: Carlsberg, Danske Bank, Konica Minolta, the City of Copenhagen, NHG (an event bureau), and SAS. The goal is to expand the number of members to 20 by 2009. The partners each contribute 250,000 Dkr. The fact that the partners contribute an equal amount is also reflected in the organizational structure of the network, which is relatively flat. In contrast with the other networks, the benefits are less direct, at least for some partners. One of the partners in the alliance is Carlsberg, which is for 51 per cent owned by the Carlsberg Foundation, and therefore hard to take over by other (foreign) breweries. Carlsberg has always been involved in tourism development, as the company is one of the founding members of Wonderful Copenhagen. The brewery is a tourist attraction of its own, and in the early 1990s – when WoCo was founded – Carlsberg was the owner of Tivoli, thus having a very direct interest in tourism. Moreover, Carlsberg has a stake in tourism because the firm attracts business visitors from all over the world. Carlsberg considers its contribution to the Alliance as one of its many sponsorships, and a relatively modest one in comparison with its involvement in major sports events (like the World Cup football). Please notice, however, that in this case (the Alliance), it is the company, and the not one of its many brands, that is sponsoring (a subtle difference). The company views its involvement in the Alliance as a form of good citizenship (people expecting Carlsberg to be involved in the city, just like the AP Möller-Maersk Group is), but also recognizes its (commercial, though somewhat indirect) interest in connecting its own brands to the image of the city (notably the

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Little Mermaid, which was a gift of Carlsberg’s founder).7 Investments in sport events (notably football, golf and skiing) fit in the brewery’s sponsoring strategy. Moreover, the company confirms to have an interest in the city’s (perceived) attractiveness, to attract and retain (higher-educated) employees, and events can play a (minor) role in that respect. In addition, the company receives some minor direct benefits such as free tickets for events. The situation is somewhat different for the event bureau and SAS. They both have more direct interests as international events are clearly linked to their core business. Of course one could say that Carlsberg might also be able to benefit directly, by being in a somewhat more favourable position to get contracts to supply beer during international events. The aims of the Copenhagen Alliance are strongly linked with the activities of the WoCo Eventures department. This department was created in 2000 to attract and develop cultural and sporting events (with a clear emphasis on international events). This department (co-) arranges the organization of events, and provides additional funding to events that are considered to support the city’s and region’s economy and image. The main funder of this department is the City of Copenhagen with an annual grant of 3.5 million Dkr.; Wonderful Copenhagen provides the remaining 1.5 million Dkr. The City of Copenhagen finds it very important to attract events, recognizing three objectives on three geographic levels: 1) entertaining the local population; 2) to profile Copenhagen as Denmark’s capital (showing the capabilities of the biggest city); and 3) to present the city as an international metropolis. Publicprivate cooperation – through WoCo – is considered very important to implement this strategy. In comparison with other networks, the municipal influence on the Eventures department is relatively large, in view of its considerable share in the budget. Wonderful Copenhagen Cruise Network The Wonderful Copenhagen Cruise Network was created in 1992 with the aim to attract more cruise passengers to Copenhagen. To realize that goal, the network has helped to improve the infrastructure and facilities of the port, and to enhance the promotion of Copenhagen as cruise destination. Members of this network (more than 45) are organizations that have a stake in the value chain created by the cruise business, including accommodation, transportation, harbours, shopping facilities, attractions, and (local) authorities. One of the leading actors is this network is the Copenhagen Cruise Terminal. The Terminal’s CEO is president of the network’s board, in which also the Lord Mayor of Copenhagen has a seat. Wonderful Copenhagen Meetingplace The network with the largest budget and the largest number of members is Wonderful Copenhagen Meetingplace. More than 80 companies are involved in this network which aims to promote the development of Copenhagen as a destination for meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions (MICE). Obviously, the members all have an interest in the development of Copenhagen as a meeting place.

7

Other brand values are ‘premium’ and ‘royal’.

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One of the members in the WoCo Meetingplace network is SAS, the airline company which also participates in several other networks. SAS has always recognized its interest in regional (business) tourism development. Until some years ago, the company had its own destination marketing department. In fact, you could say that SAS has outsourced these activities to Wonderful Copenhagen (and IMO, see under that heading). Besides financial contributions to these networks, SAS also provides support through arranging discounted flights and accommodation (notably for the Cruise Baltic network). In contrast with other members, the airline company is not really interested in where and how long people stay (the number of bed nights), but rather in the mode of transport they use (the number of passengers). WoCo Meetingplace is governed by a board of seven members who represent the MICE industry. Although they have their own interests, they are considered to act in the interest of the organization. The president of the network is responsible for organizing the stakeholder dialogue; there are four board meetings a year. The secretariat of WoCo provides the documentation needed for these conventions, thus securing professionalism. Wonderful Copenhagen Mødecentrum Sjæland Wonderful Copenhagen Mødecentrum is to some extent comparable with Wonderful Copenhagen Meetingplace. This network also targets business visitors, but most of its members are SMEs with a more regional orientation (focusing on Denmark, Sweden and Norway). Mødecentrum Sjæland is probably the most regional network, promoting the development of meeting places outside the city of Copenhagen. Another important difference between Mødecentrum and Meetingplace is the membership fee. Members of the regional network pay a fixed amount of 15,000 Dkr a year, while the annual contribution of the Meetingplace network depends on the size of a member. Hotels pay 156.25 Dkr per room, conference centres 6.25 Dkr per square metre, the airport 250,000 Dkr and incoming bureaus (conference arrangers) 100,000 Dkr. International Marketing Øresund (IMO) WoCo (and Meeting Place network in particular) is one of the partners in the International Marketing Øresund (IMO) network, which also comprehends the VisitÖrsund.info project. Other partners are SAS, Copenhagen Airport, the Danish Tourist Board (Visit Denmark), the Danish State, Malmö Turism, Skånes Tourist Board, East Danish Turisme, Destination Bornholm and HUR. Unofficially, the leading partner in this network is SAS; the Scandinavian airline company pays the network manager and is perceived by the other partners as a neutral mediator. SAS has a clear interest in regional tourism development (Øresund level), whereas the other partners (except Copenhagen Airport) have a much smaller geographic focus. In contrast with the other networks, IMO is a project with a limited duration. The project is currently in the second stage (2002-2004), referred to as IMO2. The first stage (1999-2001, IMO1) concentrated on the development of a strategy for the marketing of the Øresund region, identifying opportunities for joint product development and branding. IMO1 was co-financed by the EU (Interreg, which aims to promote cross-border projects). After its completion, the partners agreed to continue cooperation in the second stage, which focuses on the implementation of the strategy

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through concrete actions. Without EU funding, short-term results are needed to gain support of the tourist industry. To promote the Øresund as destination, IMO uses the tagline ‘one destination, two countries’, emphasizing the two-sided (dualistic) character of the region in many aspects (like city and countryside, traditional and modern, etc.). This tagline is accompanied by the brand ‘Copenhagen’ enriched with ‘Øresund’. Malmö is not included as a brand, but the Swedish city doesn’t seem to worry about that, as long as they are able to benefit from the two other brands. The strategy of IMO is to coordinate the efforts of agencies of the partners abroad, targeting a limited number of regions: the US, the UK and Ireland, Germany and Switzerland, Italy, France and Brussels, Finland, and the Fareast. For these regions, special ‘local market groups’ have been set up, using the offices of the participating actors abroad. Cruise Baltic Cruise Baltic is a network of 17 harbours in the Baltic Sea. The initiative to set up this network was taken by WoCo, the main argument being the increasing competition between the Baltic Sea and other cruise destinations such as the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. Being the starting and/or ending point (‘port of call’) of many cruises to the Baltic Sea (‘a butterfly destination’), Copenhagen has a more than average interest in organizing efforts to enhance the Baltic cruise network’s competitiveness. Copenhagen (WoCo) recognizes its interest in partnership development, as the quality offered by other ports (and the one of major attraction St Petersburg in particular) co-determines the quality of the joint product. Although cruise tourism has relatively few spin-offs to the local economy, the city may benefit indirectly. As port of call, Copenhagen has more opportunities than other cruise cities to benefit from extended stays (e.g. one week before or after the cruise). Moreover, the city might profit from ‘return visits’ of cruise passengers wanting to see the city for a second time. Besides these effects on the tourism industry, the ‘port of call’ status also generates income in the catering industry (provisioning of the cruise ships). Partnership models Our partnership model – presented in Chapter 1 – is helpful to analyse WoCo and its networks in a systematic way. The partnership model can be applied to WoCo as well as to each individual network. However, we choose to focus our analysis on WoCo, seeing the networks as instruments of WoCo. The first element of the partnership model is scope which can be divided into the scope of the aims and the scope of the role. Looking at the aims of WoCo (stimulating tourism development and promoting Copenhagen as a meeting place), it is fair to say that its scope is well defined, and relatively narrow. The organization is ‘selective’ in its activities, trying to stick to its core competences. Although it is recognized that the attractiveness towards visitors cannot be completely isolated from the attractiveness towards other target groups, WoCo uses a strongly targeted approach. It is realistic, however, to expect WoCo’s scope to be somewhat broadened in the years to come, particularly in view of the organization’s most recent strategy in which the ambition to develop new networks (e.g. shopping, architecture,

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design, entertainment) is expressed. The scope could also be broadened by stronger cooperation with Copenhagen Capacity. The scope of WoCo’s role is well defined: WoCo is considered responsible for developing strategies in tourism (including MICE) and to that end, the organization manages networks and carries out research (and evaluation). Within tourism, WoCo assumes all three roles that we identified in our research framework: initiator, coordinator and, although to a limited extent, investor (in marketing and promotion). The second element is the geographic scale, which can be defined by looking at the participating partners and the aims of a partnership. Using these criteria, the most logical definition of WoCo’s geographic scale would be the Copenhagen region (the Capital region). This definition is strongly linked to the administrative structure that changed in 2007. However, looking at the aims of the partnership and its involvement in IMO, it might also be possible to use a somewhat larger definition of the relevant scale, extending it to the Øresund region, or even to the Baltic Sea (the Cruise Baltic network). Nevertheless we emphasize that, despite the regional scale, many of WoCo’s activities concentrate on the Copenhagen metropolitan area, Copenhagen being the only brand in the region that really matters in global tourism. Considering the third element – the actors involved – we already said that WoCo is a public-private partnership. The organization is funded by local and regional governments as well as by companies in the tourist and MICE industry. The (financial) involvement of governments is needed to deal with the collective action and free rider problems successfully, also because governments take into account strategic long-term objectives (such as attracting events on the long run). The tourist industry tends to be much more short-term oriented. Also involvement of the State is considered important, particularly when it comes to financing investments in events and new infrastructure (of national interest). The degree of formality (the fourth element) is high as WoCo is seen as the official tourist and convention bureau for the Copenhagen region, which is reflected in the organizational structure (board of directors). The political influence (the fifth element) is moderate, as WoCo is able to operate at arms length distance of day-today politics, which allows the organization to operate in a flexible and businesslike manner. The other way around, WoCo has considerable indirect influence on political decisions, through lobbying and media pressure, being one of the most powerful representatives of the tourist and MICE industry. For instance, WoCo is lobbying for public sector investments (local government and State) in infrastructure, such as a multifunctional arena, a cruise terminal and a congress centre. Currently, both the public and private sector expect the other sector to take the lead in developing and financing these amenities. WoCo is trying to solve this stalemate by showing the added value of the investments, and making concrete proposals for public-private financing constructions. The democratic content of WoCo (the sixth element) is fairly high. WoCo is expected to act in the interests of the communities represented by the participating governments. The organization is transparent. The financial power (the seventh element) is rather high, taking into account the size of the budget. However, we emphasize that WoCo is financially dependent on the willingness of the participating

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members (and the new regional council in particular), making it very important to show results. It is difficult to identify one leading stakeholder (the eighth element) because each network has its own leaders. Looking at the participating governments, one would expect the City of Copenhagen to assume the leading part. But instead, one could also argue that WoCo itself has become a leading stakeholder, with its managing director being an important leader in the region. Many responsibilities and tasks are decentralized to the networks and the boards (to give partners sense of ownership), but WoCo itself takes care of securing the overall brand identity. Networks are expected to respect this brand identity: they should not come loose from the brand ‘Wonderful Copenhagen’. In this way, WoCo aims to find a balance between centralization and decentralization. Looking at the internal organization, WoCo consists of some executive (service delivering) departments and the networks that we described above. Each network has a steering group to secure the partners’ involvement and sense of ownership. Networks have a more limited scope, and the actors involved are all stakeholders in a particular value chain. In this way, WoCo intends to anticipate the problem of freeridership. 4 Output and Outcome Performance indicators WoCo pays much attention to the evaluation of its activities. The argument is that the customers (the tourist industry and other partners in the networks) want to be sure that their contributions make a difference, as the network approach is used to generate substantial value for the members. The business case is most essential, as concrete economic results are needed to justify public and private investments, and therefore, also to secure broad (political) support. Research and evaluation are considered highly important, not only to assess the performance of existing networks, but also to identify opportunities for developing new networks. Every year, WoCo asks a consulting firm to analyse the organization’s perception by market actors. Moreover, in January 2005, an international Peer Review Panel was invited to evaluate the performance of WoCo, in which particular attention was paid to stakeholder satisfaction. In the interviews during our case study visit it was confirmed that the customers appreciate the fact that WoCo’s performance (or to be more precise: the performance of the networks) is evaluated. In general, evaluations are positive, as Copenhagen is doing quite well in tourism (including cruise tourism and the MICE sector). Without giving a full evaluation of WoCo’s results, we will now briefly discuss the output and outcome of the networks. First of all, it is interesting to have a look at changes in the number of bed nights spent in the Copenhagen region. Table 5.3 shows that the number of bed nights increased from 3.8 million in 1998 to 4.9 million in 2004, which is an increase of more than 27 per cent. In the same period, Frederiksborg faced a decline of about nine

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per cent to less than one million visitors, while Roskilde received five per cent more visitors in 2004 than in 1998. Comparing these figures with the change of bed nights spent in Denmark (a four per cent increase), our conclusion is that the Copenhagen region has outperformed other parts of the country. However, this particularly applies to Greater Copenhagen, and not so much to Frederiksborg and Roskilde (both cofinancers of WoCo). WoCo’s International Benchmark Report shows that also in comparison with other European cities, Copenhagen has experienced a relatively strong (above-average) growth in bed nights (Wonderful Copenhagen for European Cities Tourism, 2005).8 Other performance indicators are the number of cruise calls at Copenhagen Harbour (particularly relevant for the cruise networks), the number of passengers arriving at and departing from Copenhagen Airport (Kastrup), hotel occupancy rates, and the number of congress visitors. Between 2000 and 2004 the number of cruise passengers almost doubled from 192,700 to 355,300. Moreover, Copenhagen was awarded ‘World’s Leading Cruise Port’ in 2005. The number of airport passengers also increased, but only slightly from 18.4 to 19.0 million.9 The occupancy rate of hotels remained rather stable, with a decline from 58.6 per cent to 54.7 per cent; between 2000 and 2004, hotel capacity increased from 14,525 to 17,177. Between 2000 and 2005, the number of congresses declined from 133 to 78, though with a peak in 2002 with 158 congresses. ICCA statistics show that Copenhagen was the world’s second largest conference city in 2002; in 2004, the city reached the sixth position. As shown in Table 5.6, the number of congress participants fluctuated with peaks in 2002 and 2005 (more than 85,000 participants). The number of overnight stays of congress visitors increased from 148,000 (2000) to 194,000 (2004). The conclusion could be that Copenhagen has succeeded to attract larger conferences. Another performance indicator is the number of international events. WoCo has succeeded to attract some major events. In 2006, Copenhagen hosted the MTV Music Awards. In 2007, the European Championships Triathlon came to the city. In 2009, Copenhagen will be presented as ‘capital of sports’ by hosting the World Outgames (‘Gay Games’) and a congress of the International Olympic Committee. More examples of successful bids can be found in Figure 5.2 which also shows prebids and potential bids for the future. The cascaded line represents the ambition of WoCo to attract more (sporting) events, which could eventually result in hosting the Olympic Games in 2020 or 2024 (as suggested by the Danish Minister of Culture).

8 Copenhagen is ranked 12th on the list of 40 cities (measuring change and not absolute numbers). Better performing cities are for instance Tallinn (1st), Valencia (2nd) and Berlin (3rd). Other Scandinavian cities have been less successful with Göteborg ranking 15th, Stockholm 21st and Oslo 36th. 9 This is an increase of 3.3 per cent, which is slightly less than the growth rates of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (7.3 per cent), London Heathrow (4.2 per cent), and Frankfurt (3.7 per cent) (source: ACI Annual Traffic Statistics Collection, <www.airports.org>).

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Table 5.3

Bed nights in the Copenhagen region (in thousands)

Greater Copenhagen (metropolitan) Frederiksborg county Roskilde county Capital region (old) Denmark

1998

2001

2004

3,863 1,082 399 5,344 26,566

4,440 1,089 414 5,943 26,701

4,938 992 419 6,349 27,634

Source: ‘Copenhagen Statistics 1998-2004’ (Wonderful Copenhagen, 2005).

Table 5.4

Bed nights in the Copenhagen region (index 1998=100)

Greater Copenhagen (metropolitan) Frederiksborg county Roskilde county Capital region (old) Denmark

1998

2001

2004

100 100 100 100 100

114.9 100.6 103.8 111.2 100.5

127.8 91.7 105.0 119.6 104.0

Source: ‘Copenhagen Statistics 1998-2004’ (Wonderful Copenhagen 2005).

Table 5.5

Conferences and participants 2000

International conferences Participants at international conferences

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

133 104 158 94 112 78 38,810 41,446 85,647 63,568 47,295 87,568

Source: International Association Congress Statistics – Greater Copenhagen Area (Wonderful Copenhagen, 2006).

From output to outcome and remaining challenges From the figures above, we could conclude that particularly the two meeting place networks and the cruise network have done quite a good job, although causality (the influence of external factors) is sometimes hard to prove. In the end, customers are not really interested in bed night statistics or the number of events, but rather in the business benefits. For instance, SAS is interested in more passengers, rather than more tourists, as visitors might also use low cost carriers (such as Sterling). In tourism marketing, it is often very hard to measure this kind of effects, although

The Networks of Wonderful Copenhagen

Figure 5.2

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Copenhagen’s bid strategy

online booking (measuring from what page visitors enter a booking page) and the use of ‘action codes’ in brochures provide some help in that respect. It is probably too early to assess the performance of the Copenhagen Alliance, as this partnership is relatively young. However, there are clear signals that the partnership has already helped to attract some major events (output). The main challenge now is to actually benefit from these events in terms of visitors and employment (output). Since the number of (sporting) events in Copenhagen is still relatively low, expectations are that the benefits of attracting international events will outweigh the costs (including negative externalities such as noise). Obviously, the carrying capacity of the city with respect to hosting events has not been reached yet. If the city succeeds to attract more events, the need for a more focussed event strategy will probably rise (an event strategy is currently being developed). For most partners, however, causality is not really an issue. They are expected to support the network(s) as long as they believe in their added value. For instance, the success of IMO can be illustrated by the fact that the partners want the project to continue, also without EU support. Moreover, there are also results that cannot be measured (quantitatively), but that are important to get support from the private sector (such as network development and branding). Nevertheless, we have the impression (based on the interviews) that direct, measurable results are a conditio sine qua non to keep WoCo’s customers satisfied. The consequence could be that WoCo (and its networks) put more efforts in concrete activities with short-term results than in more strategic activities with long-term results. One of the challenges WoCo might be confronted with, is to promote more strategic involvement of its customers, which, admittedly, is very difficult in the relatively short-term oriented tourist industry. Another challenge WoCo seems to be confronted with, is to keep the region satisfied. Obviously, the City of Copenhagen plays a very dominant role in tourism (development and promotion). However, the region offers attractive tourist products

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as well, with a rich supply of culture and nature, such as the Kronborg Castle (from Shakespeare’s Hamlet) in the county of Frederiksborg. Helsingør and Helsingborg are both important cruise destinations, together receiving about 20 cruise ships a year. Currently, both Frederiksborg (north) and Roskilde (south) are (financially) involved in WoCo, but there seems to be an ongoing political discussion in these two counties on the usefulness of this involvement, although contributions are relatively modest in comparison with the (large) share in regional tourism. Some politicians in the region are against (too much) regional cooperation because they fear identity loss (read: too much dominance by Copenhagen). An additional problem is the high fragmentation of (mainly publicly financed) tourism organizations in the northern part of Zealand, which makes Frederiksborg somewhat weaker in the relation with Copenhagen. This high fragmentation makes it difficult to reach consensus, notably on the quality level of tourist services. There is little coordination between the tourism organizations in this part of Zealand. An exception is the city of Helsingør which has joined forces with Helsingborg in a cross-border business development organization (including tourism and retail), with 450 members and four tourist offices. There is some cooperation between this organization and WoCo, although different levels of scale (notably the fact that a Swedish city is involved) make it difficult to reach consensus. One discussion partner indicated that more cooperation between Copenhagen and this cross-border area, particularly in the field of cruise tourism, could be beneficial for all actors involved. The situation in the southern part of the region (Roskilde County), with mediumsized cities such as Roskilde and Kohe, is also complex because the county will have to quit membership of WoCo after the administrative reform of January 2007. From then on, Roskilde and Kohe will no longer be seen as part of the Capital Region. However, WoCo has intentions to continue cooperation with a tourism organization to be set up for the southern part of Zealand. Such cooperation would be particularly important to keep the Mødecentrum network running, in which Roskilde and Kohe are important partners. Another issue that leaves room for discussion is cooperation on Øresund level. As said above, WoCo mainly operates on the level of the Capital Region, although the organization does participate in cross-border networks such as IMO and Cruise Baltic. Moreover, there is some cooperation with the business development organization of Helsingør and Helsingborg. Discussion partners seem to have different views on Øresund integration, and the need for better coordination in tourism promotion. Some argue that Copenhagen is a much stronger brand than Malmö or Øresund, and as a consequence, they expect the distribution of cooperation benefits to be unequal, in favour of the Swedish side. And indeed, there are some signals that Malmö gets more benefits from the Øresund integration than Copenhagen. Particularly, the connection with Copenhagen Airport has improved the international competitiveness of the Swedish city. Interesting detail: in 2008, Malmö will open its own multifunctional arena, while Copenhagen has not yet found investors to build such a stadium. Other discussion partners emphasize the circumstances that both sides of the sound can strengthen another, and cooperation is needed to survive in global competition (notably, to create critical mass, for instance in attracting and organizing big conferences). The fact that the IMO project has continued also without EU support

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could be interpreted as a proof of its success and some degree of support, at least among some actors, for improving cross-border coordination. However, if further integration (in tourism promotion) is desired, external and internal communication is needed to further strengthen the development of a joint identity. 5 Applying the Research Framework In this section we apply the research framework that we developed in Chapter 1 to the findings in Copenhagen. This framework can be used to identify the factors of failure and success in the development of WoCo and its networks. Elements that are included in the frame of analysis are the profile of the metropolitan region (political, economic, cultural context), factors that stimulate or obstruct partnership development, motives for partnerships, objectives of the partnership, partnership model, output of partnership, outcome of partnership (competitiveness of the region) and the influence of external and internal factors and policies. Most of these elements have already been discussed in the sections above. In this section, we discuss the relations between the various elements. When we consider the output, we should make a distinction between the output of WoCo and the output of the networks. Actually, the main output of WoCo – presenting itself as network manager – is exactly the development and maintenance of networks. Of course, one could argue that, indirectly, the outputs of the networks can be considered the output of WoCo as well. In general, the outputs of the networks – more visitors, more events, more cruise calls and more conferences – are positively evaluated by most stakeholders (customers). WoCo puts much effort in measuring the performance of the networks, in order to secure support. Hence, evaluation (including comparative research) is considered an important factor of success in the development and maintenance of the various networks. Clear results (particularly in the start-up stage of a network) can help to get and keep actors committed. Obviously, the outputs of WoCo and its networks are much easier to identify than the results of place marketing organizations that concentrate on activities such as branding (that produce more indirect effects). In view of WoCo’s apparent success, one could raise the question if this model can be copied (or translated) to other cities or regions. To answer that question, we first need to address the specific context factors that could have played a role. In our analysis we made clear that there are, indeed, some specific circumstances such as: 1) the high fragmentation of tourism promotion until the early 1990s, and the underperformance of Copenhagen as a tourist destination (opportunities and threats); 2) the fact that the City of Copenhagen has never had any problems with putting business and tourism development at arms length distance of political control (already since the 1920s private-sector involvement is very common in tourism development); 3) the Danish tradition to cooperate, in which seeking consensus plays a dominant role; 4) the fact that Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark and, in line with that, the awareness, at least among some national politicians, that Copenhagen’s development is of national interest (please notice, however that other politicians tend to favour balance-promoting policies, in favour of under performing regions

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such as Jutland); 5) the administrative structure which facilitates coordination and cooperation at the level of the capital region, which reasonably corresponds with the functional urban region (although the administrative reform could change this advantage to some extent). In the case of WoCo, the context factors are considered important, but presumably not as important as in other case studies of this comparative research. Many discussion partners emphasize the role of the organizational model and related philosophy itself in explaining WoCo’s success. As a consequence, they suggest that the model could be exported to other cities and regions in Europe.10 As discussed above, the main feature of the model is the use of networks to organize customers (stakeholders) with similar interests, in order to avoid free-riding behaviour. This network approach also helps to produce concrete outputs for a selected group of customers. WoCo plays an important role in the development of these networks by identifying opportunities (based on research) and bringing together actors who have an interest in seizing an opportunity. Factors of success in this coalition-forming process are a good vision and strategy (notably on how to achieve clear results) and a well thought-out communication strategy (recognizing the different interests of stakeholders, and ‘languages’ they speak). Other factors in the partnership that are considered important are: the relatively narrow, targeted approach (the work area of WoCo is well defined) and the relatively low degree of political influence on the organization (its arms length position). For most networks, it can be said that the actors involved have clear interests in the activities of the networks. For instance, stakeholders in the MICE industry (hotels, restaurants, conference facilities, etc.) benefit from investments of the two meeting place networks that help to attract more conferences. The Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance takes a somewhat exceptional position, as some actors in this network have less clear (read: direct) motives to participate. From one of the participants (Carlsberg) we know that they consider their contribution to the Alliance as a sponsorship. Their motives to sponsor this network are good citizenship, brand enrichment (with Copenhagen and the Little Mermaid), and a more general interest in an attractive living and location environment (for their employees). One of the main issues in the development of WoCo is its geographic scale. In view of its mission, you would expect an organization like WoCo to act on the level of the functional urban region, which is a dynamic (in time) and functiondependent concept. In reality, however, WoCo mainly operates on the level of the Capital Region, which is a rather static, administrative concept. Although the Capital Region corresponds to some extent with the functional urban region (as defined by commuter traffic), relations with organizations and communities outside this region have to be developed as well. Obviously, WoCo has recognized the need for such relations, as witness the partnership with the joint business development organization of Helsingør and Helsingborg, as well as the participation in IMO (Øresund level) 10 One of the discussion partners referred to the City of Stockholm, which would have used WoCo as an example for its own tourism development organization. Please notice, however, that other cities in Europe (notably Gothenburg and Birmingham) also use similar network approaches.

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and Cruise Baltic (Baltic Sea level). Also when Roskilde will no longer belong to the Capital Region (after the reform of January 2007), WoCo intends to maintain the good relations, notably through the Mødecentrum network. The problem, however, is that cities such as Roskilde and Kohe fear to loose their own identity, just like the city of Helsingør up north. It will be a big challenge for WoCo is to keep the region satisfied, particularly because of Copenhagen’s dominant position in the region. References Berg, L. van den, Borg, J. van der, Meer, J. van der (1997), Urban Tourism (Aldershot: Ashgate). Braun, E., Otgaar, A.H.J, and Berg, L. van den (2003), Op weg naar een geïntegreerde aanpak van citymarketing (Rotterdam: Euricur). PA Consulting Group (1992), Den fremtidige organisering af turistfremmearbejdet I København, Delrapport 1, 2 og 3, The Banker (Copenhagen). Wonderful Copenhagen (2005), Copenhagen Statistics 1998–2004 (Copenhagen). Wonderful Copenhagen for European Cities Tourism (2005), European Cities Benchmark Report (Copenhagen). Wonderful Copenhagen (2006), International Association Congress Statistics – Greater Copenhagen Area (Copenhagen). Discussion partners Mr Lars Bernhard Jørgensen, Wonderful Copenhagen Mr Jesper Buch Jacobsen, City of Copenhagen Mr Peter Slaatorn, Business Development Helsingor / Helsingbor Mr Martin Gertsen, City of Copenhagen Ms Signe Adamsen, Öresund Marketing/Cruise Baltic Mr Terje Thoesen, SAS Mr Christopher Stern, SAS Mr Christian Grandjean, Carlsberg Mr Lars Ramme Nielsen, Wonderful Copenhagen

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Chapter 6

Planning for Sustainable Development in the Munich Region1 1 Introduction Munich has a long tradition of municipal cooperation in regional planning. Two organizations play a major role in this. Already in the 1950s a voluntary partnership was set up to coordinate local plans in the Munich region: the Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München (in English: the Planning Association for the Wider Economic Region of Munich). And since the 1970s there has been a legal planning organization for the region, responsible for developing a regional plan. Both organizations aim to secure the sustainable economic development of the region, looking for a good (spatial) balance between accessibility, housing development, preservation of the environment, and economic development. In practice, however, the ability of both organizations to actually coordinate regional development is limited, mainly because of the planning and financial autonomy of municipalities. The City of Munich recognizes the need for regional co-operation as a prerequisite to secure its international competitiveness in the future. Regional coordination is considered necessary to deal with cross-border issues such as housing, accessibility, and the preservation of the environment. Without such coordination, uncontrolled urban sprawl might pose a threat to the sustainable development of the region, and hence, the international competitiveness of Munich. An example in this respect is the ongoing discussion about retail development. Currently, many municipalities are developing new retail centres, particularly in order to raise their tax income. As a consequence, internal competition (between municipalities) is fierce, resulting in pressure on free areas outside town centres. From a planning point of view, this development is undesired, as it might lead to an economic downfall of town centres in the region (not the city centre of Munich, but the centres of surrounding municipalities). In this case study we have a closer look at the economic and planning challenges of the Munich region. We analyse the current roles of the regional planning organizations, describe the context in which they act, and identify elements (or directions) in which regional coordination could be improved. It is important to acknowledge that both organizations cannot be considered ‘new forms of co-operation’, so that in fact, this Chapter aims to identify the possibilities to develop new kinds of partnerships (or changing the missions of existing ones), rather than analysing an existing new partnership. Nevertheless, the two planning bodies have been selected as objects of 1

This case study was carried out in December 2005.

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the Munich case study, because understanding the context in which they function as well as their role in regional planning and their performance helps to identify the need and possibilities for improvement. In section 2, we give a general profile of the metropolitan region, discussing the most relevant context-specific factors. Section 3 introduces the existing regional partnerships, analysing the motives of the participating actors. The performance of the partnership (its output and outcome) and the challenges that remain come across in section 4. Section 5 confronts the observations with the research framework, and draws some conclusions. 2 The Metropolitan Region of Munich Demography and economy Munich is the capital (Landeshauptstadt) of the Freestate of Bavaria (Freistaat Bayern), and the third city of Germany with a population of approximately 1.2 million. The city is located in the southeast of Germany, on the banks of the Isar River (which is a tributary of the Donau River). The planning region of Munich (one of the 18 planning regions in Bavaria) is located right in the centre of the district of Upper Bavaria and has a population of 2.5 million people. Besides the ‘districtfree’ Landeshauptstadt München, this region consists of eight so-called Landkreise (districts): Dachau, Ebersberg, Erding, Freising, Fürstenfeldbruck, Landsberg am Lech, München and Starnberg. The Munich region counts 186 municipalities, with an average population of about 13,500. The Landeshauptstadt München is by far the largest municipality in the region. The second city is Freising, which is located to the northeast of Munich, with a population of less than 43,000 (see Table 6.1). Other relatively large municipalities are Dachau and Erding. In this case study we also pay attention to some smaller municipalities, whose mayors have been interviewed. Unterschleißheim and Oberschleißheim are located in the Landkreis München, in the northern part. Oberhaching and Haar belong to the same district, but they are located in the southern and the south-eastern part respectively. Krailling is a rather small town (in population), and belongs to the district of Starnberg, to the southwest of Munich. Please notice, however, that many other municipalities are much smaller with populations of just one or two thousand. The dominance of Munich becomes also clear when we have a look at the district populations. The largest district (the Landeshauptstadt being ‘district-free’) is the Landkreis München, which is more or less an incomplete ‘first’ ring (north, east and south) around the Landeshauptstadt, with a population just over 300,000. In the second ring we observe lower population densities, confirming the monocentric (or at least centre-oriented) character of the Munich region. This centre-oriented character is also reflected in the public-transport system, all S-Bahn lines coming together at the central station (Hauptbahnhof). Population statistics indicate that Munich is in stage of (modest) suburbanization, with an increase in the regional population of about 13 per cent between 1993 and

Planning for Sustainable Development in the Munich Region

Figure 6.1

The Freestate of Bavaria

Figure 6.2

The Planning Region of Munich

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122

Table 6.1

A selection of municipalities in the Munich region

Municipality

Landeshauptstadt München Freising Dachau Erding Unterschleißheim Oberhaching Haar Oberschleißheim Krailling

Area (sq km)

Population (2005)

Density (Inhab/sq km)

310 88,45 34,77 54,64 14,92 26,60 12,90 30,60 16,00

1,273,459 42,549 39,922 33,000 25,951 13,071 17,860 11,467 7,569

4108 481 1148 604 1739 491 1384 375 473

Source: various websites of districts and municipalities

Table 6.2

Districts in the Munich region

Districts

Landeshauptstadt München Dachau Ebersberg Erding Freising Fürstenfeldbruck Landsberg am Lech München Starnberg Total

Area (sq km) (sq km)

Population (2003)

Density (Inhab/sq km)

310 579 549 870 800 435 804 667 488 5502

1,273,459 132,990 122,136 120,568 158,140 197,995 110,303 303,604 127,723 2,546,918

4107.9 229.7 222.5 138.6 197.7 455.2 137.2 455.2 261.7 462.9

Source: Regionsdaten 2004 (Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München, 2005) and

2003, and a slight decrease of population in the central city (Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München 20052). In terms of jobs the Landeshauptstadt München is even more dominant, with 62 per cent of the employment. If we divide the region around the City of Munich into four quarters, only the north-eastern quarter has a larger share in jobs than in population. This is mainly because of the strong economic development in the area between the City and the airport (Flughafenachse).

2

Data from the Bayerische Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung.

Planning for Sustainable Development in the Munich Region

Figure 6.3

123

The division of population (=P) and jobs (=J) in the Munich region

Also in terms of jobs, the Munich region is confronted with signs of suburbanization. Between 1993 and 2003 the number of jobs in the region (Umland) increased with about 20 per cent, while employment in the City reduced with one or two per cent (Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München 20053). Urban sprawl (the deconcentration of population and jobs) is stimulated by the increasing land price levels in the region’s centre. This (uncontrolled) deconcentration is by many considered a threat to the region’s quality of life, as the average commuting distance tends to increase, and pressure on green areas is on the wax. The economic position of Munich Looking at the city and its region as a whole, Munich has a very strong economic position, not only in Germany but in Europe as well. Its location is very central, also in view of the European Union’s eastward expansion. The economic structure is relatively balanced, with high-tech industries from the productive sector and a modern service structure. Munich is headquartering many leading international companies. Strong clusters are car manufacturing, IT, media, finance, and insurance. International accessibility is good, Munich’s airport being the second home-country hub of Lufthansa.

3

Data from the Bayerische Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung.

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The political-administrative context Germany’s administrative system is quite complex, responsibilities being divided among four or five tiers of government: the national (federal) government, the state, the district (Bezirk), the county (Landkreis), and the municipality (Gemeinde). Bavaria’s planning regions operate between the district and county level. In Germany, municipalities are relatively autonomous, particularly when it comes to planning and delivering public services. Local authorities are keen on their “right to regulate on their own responsibility all the affairs of the local community within the limits set by law”, as stipulated in Article 28(2) of the federal Basic Law. A crucial element of the German planning system is the so-called kommunale Planungshoheit (municipal planning authority) which comprehends the legal right of local public bodies to take their own responsibility in spatial planning, as long as they comply with the basic principles set by higher governmental bodies. Municipalities have the obligation to develop two types of land use plans: the Flächennutzungsplan which indicates the intended development of the community and the more detailed Bebauungsplan which defines function and intensity of use, basic urban design principles and the allocation of public infrastructure.4 The Planungshoheit gives municipalities relatively much freedom to develop their own economic infrastructure like industrial parks and retail centres. Nevertheless, local authorities have to take into account the plans of higher authorities. In Bavaria, it means that municipalities should obey the planning guidelines defined by the regional planning authorities (Regional Plans), the state’s development programme and plans, and the federal government’s spatial principles. Furthermore, municipalities, like regional planning authorities and the State, sometimes need to change their plans because of pressure from public interest groups or (groups of) private companies. The tax system Another highly relevant aspect of the political-administrative context is the German tax system. German municipalities are rather self-sufficient as they are entitled to levy trade tax and property tax, with a collection rate of their own choice. In addition, they have a share in income tax and sales tax. The tax system gives municipalities a strong incentive to develop commercial and industrial areas, particularly because of the trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) which is generally considered a unique element of the German tax system. The rate of this trade tax – which is levied on profit – depends on the municipality and varies in practice between 15 and 25.75 per cent. For municipalities in Germany, the trade tax is a highly important source of income and policy instrument, which falls under the protection of Article 28(2) that regulates the autonomy of municipalities. One of the cities that are highly dependent on trade cities is the City of Munich.5 It is obvious that the trade-tax dependence of local authorities stimulates competition between adjacent and nonadjacent municipalities. 4 Source: ‘Spatial Planning in Germany’ (Institute for Urban Design and Housing), website: <www.isw.de>. 5 .

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The City of Munich’s strategy In the introduction we already mentioned that the City of Munich recognizes the need for regional co-operation as a prerequisite to secure its international competitiveness in the future. The quality of the living environment is considered a great asset of the region. In the near future this asset might be (further) threatened by uncontrolled urban sprawl causing more traffic and putting more pressure on green areas, as a consequence of increasing land prices in the centre. Another threat is the out migration of manufacturing industries. Lowerincome groups can no longer afford to live in the city and move away. The city is aware that regional coordination and cooperation is needed to secure its international competitiveness. The city’s development programme Perspective Munich aims to improve cooperation in the region in order to reinforce the region’s competitiveness. A coordinated location policy in the region and regional area management are both considered crucial to competing effectively as an international business location. It is planned that cooperation on the Regionaler Planungsverband (Regional Planning Association), the Münchner Verkehrsverbund MVV (Munich Transport Association), with clubs and associations, with towns, local authorities and administrative districts will be developed further in an efficient, truly collaborative manner.6 How this should be done, is not clear yet, however. The vision document Munich 2030 – developed within the framework of the national competition Stadt 2030 (City 2030) – suggests that a regional organization should take the lead in this. It says that ‘a coordinating office is necessary which is – in the sense of regional management – in charge of delivering reports and decision-making papers, providing information, preparing public relation activities, initiating and coordinating cooperation and working groups as well as developing project ideas and accompanying their realization’. 3 Planning in the Munich Region Regionaler Planungsverband München In the Munich region, various actors are involved in planning, ranging from the Ministry of State Development and Environmental Questions (Freestate of Bavaria) via the district governments to the counties’ administrations. In addition sector planning authorities develop independent planning schemes for special issues like transportation and energy supply. The regional planning authority, the Regionaler Planungsverband München7 (RPV), has the difficult task to coordinate and harmonize the planning activities of all these bodies, to the benefit of the region. The RPV came into existence in 1973, when the State of Bavaria was divided into planning regions. The Bavarian Law assigns the following tasks to the RPV: 1) regional planning in its territory; 2) taking decisions on the regional plan and possible amendments, incorporating and attuning the interests of all members within the framework of

6 7

Source: <www.muenchen.de>. In English: Regional Planning Association Munich.

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regional planning; 3) formulating and working out objectives for spatial development and planning; 4) giving its opinion on zoning schemes and development plans, and examining if they are in line with the objectives of the regional plan; 5) attuning separately developed spatial plans; 6) organizing and executing spatial planning; and 7) developing solutions for regional development problems. In practice, however, the power of the RPV is limited as in the end, other public and private bodies take the actual decisions. In a comparison between the regional planning associations of Munich and Stockholm, it is stated that ‘since the regional planning associations (in Munich) are only vested with spatial planning and harmonizing tasks, they are (…) in a number of ways “toothless tigers”, making consultations and regional management by persuasion and co-operation ever more important’.8 Recently, the State of Bavaria even suggested abolishing the regional planning committees, but Munich was against that, as the city recognizes its interest in dealing with some major regional issues. Organizational structure The RPV consists of a General Assembly (Verbandsversammlung), a Planning Committee (Planungsausschuβ), a Chairman, a secretariat, and a region’s appointee with the district government (see Figure 6.3). The Assembly comprehends 194 councillors, representing the City of Munich (one), the surrounding municipalities (185) and the counties (eight), hence one representative for each local authority. The distribution of votes, however, is subject to the local authorities’ population size, with a maximum of 40 per cent (for the City of Munich). In contrast with the Assembly, the Executive Committee reflects the demographic and economic dominance of the City of Munich, with 12 representatives from the Landeshauptstadt, nine from the surrounding counties, and nine from the surrounding municipalities. An advisory board (Beirat) with representatives of the region’s non-public institutions (like the Chamber of Commerce) was recently abolished. The position of chairman rotates among the mayor (Oberbürgermeister) of the State Capital of Munich, a representative of a district council, and a mayor of a rural municipality. The chairman chairs both the assembly and the committee. The financial power of the RPV is relatively limited, its budget being restricted to an annual lump sum of the Bavarian State of about €120,000, only in some specific cases enlarged by project-related funds of the State. The regional plan The RPV has drawn up a regional plan that comprehends all aspects of regional planning (the environment, residential areas, commercial areas, leisure areas, etc.). Its main goal is a balanced and sustainable development of the region (nachhaltige entwicklung), which is translated into the following general principles for planning: •

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concentration; settlements and infrastructure need to respect the system of central places. A well-balanced mix between housing, jobs and (public) services should be strived for. The local conditions and potentials for sustainable economic development should be optimized. To that end, the (economic) infrastructure needs to be improved and land has to become available in suitable places. The entire region needs an integral system for securing and developing ‘open space’ (Freiraum), to benefit from (and further strengthen) the region’s ecological stability, also as an economic location factor. Long-term aims in area development should create freedom of movement for the development of settlements (residential, commercial), infrastructure and free spaces. With respect for ecological structures, (central) locations should be further improved, stimulating ‘inward development’ (Innenentwicklung). The accessibility of the region and its sub-areas should be improved in an ecologically and socially sound way, in particular through enhancements in public (commuter) transport. In case of cross-regional issues the Munich Region should benefit from the possibilities of interregional coordination, even across the boundaries of Bavaria. Cooperation between cities, such as between Munich, Augsburg, Ingolstadt (MAI), should be further developed and intensified.

In Germany, general guidelines for spatial planning are formulated in the Spatial Planning Law (Raumordungsgesetz). In this Law, a distinction is made between aims (Ziele) and basic principles (Grundsätze). An aim is a binding (‘hard’) rule concerning the development of an area. A basic principle is a (‘soft’) guideline. Also in the regional plan for Munich, objectives are divided into these two categories (indicated with a Z for Ziel and a G for Grundsatz). The difference is quite important,

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taking the limited power of the regional planning bodies into consideration. Binding rules have to be obeyed, while soft guidelines cannot be enforced. Rules that appoint particular areas as central places and green zones or that reserve space for water and infrastructure are examples of hard rules, while the principles listed above are treated as soft rules. In general, economic and demographic guidelines tend to be soft, leaving relatively much freedom to municipalities. Retail planning When it comes to retail development, the first principle in the list above is particularly interesting. The Munich Region is essentially monocentric, the City of Munich being so dominant in terms of residents and jobs. What we can observe, however, is a Christaller-like urban system with secondary and tertiary centres that serve their own market area. In line with the State of Bavaria’s development plan, the regional plan recognizes primary centres (Oberzentren) like the City of Munich and possibly the City of Freising, secondary centres (Mittelzentren) and various types of tertiary centres (Unterzentren, Siedlungsswerpunkte and Kleinzentren). Because of their limited size, secondary and tertiary centres can hardly compete with the City of Munich (at least in retail), but they do compete with one another. To avoid uncontrolled urban sprawl (with all its consequences for the environment), the Regional Plan recognizes about thirty central places (zentrale Orte). The selection of these centres is based on criteria such as the retail turnover, number of jobs in industry and services, the presence of typical centre functions, and, of course, the size of the local consumer market. The retail section of the regional plan comprehends basic guidelines (Grundsätze) as well as objectives (Ziele). For example, one of the guidelines says that “unhealthy competition between service centres integrated in the built-up area and peripheral locations should be avoided”. In general, the basic guidelines promote sustainable development of the region, saving ‘free space’ as much as possible (flächensparsam) and promoting the development of retail centres in the built-up area, with good public-transport access. Supra-local coordination plans are considered necessary to take care of sustainable development. In addition to the basic guidelines, objectives have been formulated concerning the development of central places, following the principles of Christaller’s hierarchy of centres. Furthermore, the retail plan includes objectives regarding the development of large retail projects. One objective says that “for large retail projects with centre-relevant assortments, locations in the built-up area are to be preferred instead of issuing new (peripheral) areas”, which is in line with the philosophy of sustainable development. The plan also aims to avoid large retail projects with negative effects for the centres. The airport Another important regional issue is the development of the airport, which is located next to the City of Freising. Currently, a debate is going on, concerning the construction of a third runway, allowing the number of passengers to grow to 57 million people. The current number of passengers is 27 million, and without a third runway, that number might grow to 41 million. Munich’s airport has been awarded the ‘second home country hub’ status by Lufthansa, which means that a large share of the turnover will be generated by transfer passengers (currently about 50 per cent). One of the regional plan’s guidelines says that the airport of

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Munich should develop into a major hub for national and international air traffic. A problem, however, is that the positive and negative externalities of the airport are not equally distributed among the region. Until recently, most of the benefits went to the axis between the City of Munich and the airport. Here we find settlements of many international firms. The negative externalities (noise and congestion) mainly affect the municipalities near the airport. Also the fast growth in population in these municipalities is by some considered a disadvantage, because investments in publicservice delivery are needed to keep up pace with population growth. Moreover, the massive inflow of people can pose a threat to the identity of rural communities, losing their ‘village’ character. Individual municipalities like Freising have little to say, however, as they have only one vote in the region. In the current regions plans, there are no limits to the growth of the airport. The Planning Association for the Wider Economic Region of Munich Another important stakeholder in regional planning is the Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München (PV). This so-called kommunaler Zweckverband (a partnership of municipalities that share a particular aim) was created already in 1950, thus having a longer history than the RPV. The occasion for its creation at that time was the fact that the need for planning was growing while smaller municipalities lacked the skills needed. The PV has been set up to help them with planning. In contrast with the RPV, the PV is a voluntary partnership of municipalities and districts. It has a close cooperation with the RPV, its director being the manager of the RPV. The list of members includes 141 cities and municipalities and 8 districts, most of them located in the Munich planning region.9 The organization is financed through membership contributions (subsidies) and income from projects on demand of its members (services). Municipalities and districts pay an annual fee per inhabitant, while the Landeshauptstadt München pays a lump sum. The members have decided to reduce the membership fees in the years to come, changing the subsidies-services ratio from 1:1 to 1:2 in the year 2008. In other words: the PV has to earn more money on its own. The PV’s organizational structure (depicted in Figure 6.5) is comparable with that of the RPV, consisting of an assembly (150 members, representing the municipalities and districts), a committee (of Mayors and district councillors (Landräte)), and a chairman. In the assembly, the distribution of votes is based on population (one vote for one thousand inhabitants). The City of Munich has a fixed share of 36⅓ per cent of the votes. The main task of this association is to carry out projects on demand of its members, advising local authorities with questions concerning planning and development. In addition, the PV wants to make agreements between local and supra-local interests, realizing, however, that these agreements can only be made on a voluntary basis. The PV also has the ambition to strengthen the identity and image of the region (putting the region on the ‘mental map’). One of the concrete projects in this field is a 170 kilometre bicycle ring road (RadlRing) around the City of Munich connecting 9 Member statistics: 1–1–2006. For the actual number of members, see www.pvmuenchen.de.

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cultural and natural highlights in the region. This project has been undertaken on the occasion of the Bundesgartenschau (the German Flower Show), together with various municipalities and regional associations like the Heideflächeverein Münchener Norden (the Heathland Association for the region North of Munich). However, because the PV has to earn its own money, its strategic and political role has come under pressure. Other examples of inter-municipal co-operation Besides the two regional planning organizations many other inter-municipal partnerships can be identified. Public service delivery First of all, we see that many municipalities have set up kommunale Zweckverbande to coordinate public service delivery, for instance in the field of education, care, water supply, traffic planning, etc. For example, already since 1926, the small municipality of Krailling is co-operating with its neighbouring communities Gauting, Gräfelfing and Planegg in the Würmtal Zweckverband to take care of water supply. The municipalities have also made various other agreements, for instance on the locations of a high school. The population seems to understand that it is not realistic to have all public services within the borders of their own municipality. For example, many people in Krailling have no problem with having no stop of the S-Bahn in the municipality, because two stops in neighbouring communities are easily accessible. In fact, the four municipalities have more or less

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grown into one area, where the boundaries are nearly invisible for the population. However, when it comes to more economic discussions – like the development of a new business park – inter-municipal cooperation is rare, mainly because of the tax system (Gewerbesteuer), but also because the benefits of co-operation are seldom balanced. A merger between the municipalities seems to make sense from an economic point of view, but as long as they are able to be financially independent, a merger is not realistic, because social support is lacking. Transport Public transport (the S-Bahn in particular) is relatively well organized in the Munich Region. The City of Munich, the Freestate of Bavaria and the eight (rural) districts are shareholders of the Münchner Verkehrs- und Tarifverbund10 (MVV). The task of this association is, on the one hand, to look after the needs of all the transport companies with regard to transport planning and finances and, on the other hand, to ensure an on-going and economic optimization of the transport authorities’ funds that are used. It coordinates and optimizes the cooperation of all those involved. Its tasks include, among other things, timetable planning, tariff management, transport research, providing customer information and the complaints management system.11 Joint marketing and promotion Various inter-municipal partnerships have been set up to organize joint marketing and promotion. The City of Munich has for some time been involved in a partnership with the cities of Augsburg and Ingolstadt. This organization was called ‘Economic region South Bavaria. München. Augsburg. Ingolstadt’, abbreviated as MAI. In 2005, the partnership changed its name into Greater Munich Area. Among its members are the three above-mentioned cities, surrounding municipalities and districts, Chambers of Commerce, and regional planning bodies. The aim of this organization is to develop and promote the Greater Munich brand, providing one desk for interested investors and firms from all over the world. Another example concerns the Nordallianz (Northern Alliance), which is a partnership of eight municipalities located to the north of Munich, including Oberschleißheim and Unterschleißheim (whose mayors were interviewed for this case study). The alliance was set up in 1982 to bring a halt to the ongoing placement of so-called negative facilities (Negativ-einrichtungen), like rubbish dumps, in the area. The municipalities joined forces in their struggle against the City of Munich. Recently, however, the Nordallianz has changed its mission, concentrating on the joint promotion of the region, for example by means of a website (www.nordallianz. de). The northern alliance region is located in the so-called airport axis, thus providing an attractive location climate for international firms. Also two municipalities around the airport (Freising and Erding) have joined forces in place marketing, together with three districts and the airport itself. The airport takes a financial share of 25 percent, and provides manpower and services for the organization. The airport’s involvement is a clear example of corporate social 10 In English: Munich Transport and Tariff Association. 11 Source: <www.mvv-muenchen.de>.

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responsibility, doing something back for the communities in which it is located. The airport management seems to understand that they have to do something in return, to compensate for the negative external effects, particularly by stimulating positive external effects (attracting firms, and hence, tax income, through better promotion). We emphasize, however, that the airport itself has no clear self-interest in the partnership, as the airport company tries to attract companies to the airport itself, and the City of Munich – a competitor of the airport area – is one the shareholders. The partnership’s scope is restricted to joint promotion, as joint development turns out to be very difficult (a proposal to share trade taxes was not accepted). Sustainable planning models Besides the formal co-operation and co-ordination in spatial panning through the RPV, some municipalities also work together in the field of spatial planning on a voluntary basis. Lately, the City of Munich and some surrounding municipalities have been participating in a national competition for spatial planning models: the Bundeswettberb Modellvorhaven der Raumordnung (MORO). In their contribution to this competition for federal funds, the municipalities work together to develop spatial planning concepts that respond to the need for sustainable development (e.g. concentrated spatial development around or close to the stops of the S-Bahn). Partnership models The Regionaler Planungsverband (RPV) and the Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirstschaftsraum (PV) are two important – though not the only – partnerships in the coordination of regional development and planning. For a good analysis of their role in metropolitan governance, we will now use our partnership model to summarize their characteristics. Regionaler Planungsverband (RPV) The scope of the RPV is quite broad, covering all aspects of regional planning and development, though mainly from a spatial planning point of view. Preservation of the environment seems to have a relatively high priority. The Planning Committee is not a decision-making body, but has – at least in theory – influence on decisions. The geographic scale is the planning region, which is an administrative entity that does not necessarily correspond with the functional urban region of Munich. The actors involved are local authorities, like municipalities and districts, as well as the State government (the Freestate of Bavaria). Non-public institutions (like the private sector and knowledge institutions) play a minor role since the advisory board (Beirat) was abolished. As a legal organization, the degree of formality is high by definition. This particularly applies to the meetings of the planning committee (Planungsausschuβ) where local authorities present their plans to their fellow authorities. Political influence is moderate. The RPV is a political arena where different authorities with different interests meet each other regularly. However, the actual influence of the RPV on policies and decisions is low, as it lacks the power and instruments. The democratic content is fairly high because the distribution of votes is based on population. The transparency of RPV’s activities is high, although it might be difficult for the population to understand the exact role of

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the organization (the distance to voters is relatively long). The financial power is low, being dependent on financial support from the State. There is no budget available for giving incentives to municipalities or investing money in regional projects. The leading stakeholder is probably the City of Munich, although the role of the State should not be underestimated either. The internal organization consists of a chairman, a planning committee and a general assembly (both with representatives of the authorities). The day-to-day management is a task of the manager (who is also director of the PV) and a secretariat (that is shared with the PV). The Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum (PV) The PV has more or less the same scope as the RPV, with a clear focus on spatial planning. The main difference is that the RPV is a legal and political platform, while the PV’s main task is to deliver services to its members. With respect to regional governance, the PV is not a decisionmaking body. The geographic scale is regional, but its work area is not necessarily restricted to an administrative region (like with the RPV). The actors involved are its members: municipalities and districts. The degree of formality is somewhat lower than that of RPV, though it is, of course, a formal partnership with formal structures (an assembly, a committee, etc.). The political influence is much lower because of its tasks (delivering planning services instead of coordinating planning). The democratic content is high, as the distribution of votes in the assembly is based on population. The organization is transparent, although the distance to voters is long. Looking at its financial power, it is important to realize that the organization increasingly has to earn its own money, leaving little space for a more strategic role. For that reason, its financial power is limited. As main financer, the City of Munich can be considered the leading stakeholder, although the other members are not less important. The internal organization is more or less comparable with RPV’s organizational structure. However, an important difference is the organization’s size, with about 50 people working for the PV. 4 Performance, Output and Outcome In this section, we discuss the performance, output and outcome of the regional planning bodies in the Munich region. However, it is not our intention (nor does it make any sense) to assess the outcome of the activities that both organizations undertake. Both organizations have a specific set of tasks, and there is no need to question their efforts in carrying out these tasks in an efficient and effective manner. We think it is much more interesting to see how regional planning is implemented in practice, and what role both organizations play in actual planning matters. As it soon appears that their role is in fact rather limited, we raise the question how to deal with that. Regional planning in practice The high degree of autonomy of local authorities and the relatively weak position of the regional planning bodies often lead to uncontrolled (at least from the regional

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point of view) developments. In practice, many local authorities are rather shortterm oriented, aiming to increase income from (trade) tax. Their first aim seems to be the attraction of commercial activities to their communities, sometimes paying less attention to the sustainable development of their town centres and town centres of surrounding communities. Mayors can hardly be blamed for this strategy as they are responsible for the financial health of the town administrations (which is a shortterm objective). Of course, there are some municipalities (they belong to a minority) that pay more attention to the sustainable development of their communities, for instance the ones that are involved in the MORO competition. They also try to attract investment, but they stimulate or even oblige investors to invest in their town centres rather than in new out-of-town locations. An example of a municipality that aims for sustainable development is Oberhaching, which is located to the south of Munich. Already some decades ago, the leaders of this community developed a spatial plan that aimed for a much slower, more organic growth, also trying to secure a social balance through the identity of place. Objectives of the spatial plan are to save green areas and to concentrate retail in the town centre, which functions as a meeting place for the inhabitants. High-rise buildings are not allowed. In the 1960s and 1970s, other municipalities in the Munich region criticized Oberhaching’s strategy, arguing that the town would fail to benefit from the trend of suburbanization. Today, however, more and more municipalities seem to acknowledge that Oberhaching has succeeded to keep its identity and to remain attractive, making it in fact a very popular place to live. The Regionaler Planungsverband has few instruments to enforce developments that are in line with the general guidelines. As a consequence, the implementation of the regional plan is mainly limited to the execution of local plans. The reality is that municipalities have limited possibilities to change or prevent development plans in neighbouring communities. As long as these plans are in line with the hard rules (Ziele) local authorities have the right to invest in industrial parks and retail centres. Neighbouring communities that want to challenge a particular decision, have to go to court. In struggles between municipalities, the RPV can act as mediator or advisor, but without (legal) force. The difference between regional planning in theory and regional planning in practice can be illustrated by looking at one of the most topical issues in the Munich region: retail development. In theory (that is the regional plan and the State law), one of the relevant hard rules says that shops outside town centres should not compete too much with the shops in the town centres. In concrete terms, this rule means that the assortment of an out-of-town shop should not include more than a particular percentage of basic goods (so-called centre-relevant assortments). As a consequence, furniture malls and do-it-yourself markets can be relatively easily allowed outside town centres, which is not a problem as long as they do not compete with town centres. In practice, however, these retail concepts do compete with town centres, because after they have been permitted, they often step-by-step change their assortment (more diversification). Moreover, their development does not only affect the town centre of the municipality in question, but also the town centres of surrounding communities. In addition, they attract traffic that affects the internal accessibility of neighbouring municipalities. In other words: the benefits

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are collected by the tax-levying municipality, while a large share of the negative externalities flow to the surrounding areas. Opportunities to strengthen regional co-operation The RPV and the PV play an important role in regional planning in the Munich region. However, it has become clear that their actual power to promote regional cooperation and co-ordination in planning and development is very limited. What can be done to strengthen regional co-operation? We discuss some possibilities. Legal and fiscal changes The first option is to change the legal and administrative framework. However, if one thing has become clear from the Munich case study, it is the inviolability of the municipal planning autonomy. It is unrealistic to expect or suggest large reductions in the autonomy of municipalities, although it could be in the interest of the region to transfer some planning responsibilities to a higher level. Social and political support for such changes are simply too low. One element of the administrative and legal framework that can be discussed is the tax system. There seems to be an increasing awareness of the disadvantages that result from the current trade tax system, causing (too much) internal competition, which is not in the interest of the municipalities and the region as a whole. But of course, we have to realize that this is a national discussion. The City of Munich and other municipalities in the Munich region have little influence on this debate, although a joint lobbying strategy could be effective to some extent. However, we doubt if there is sufficient support among municipalities in the Munich region to set up such a strategy. Another element that could be changed to some extent is the degree of regulation from regional and state authorities. Some municipalities (and their mayors) are in favour of more regulation (for instance in retail development), while others are not. Supporters of regulation argue that the competition between municipalities results in unsustainable growth. It might result in a situation of excess supply of retail and commercial space. Those who are against regulation claim that internal competition is good for municipal entrepreneurship, local authorities doing their best to attract companies and people, which is also in the interest of the region. Although both arguments are valid, we doubt if the Freestate of Bavaria will increase regulation on retail development, particularly because of the liberal political climate that leaves little space for market regulation. A new regional body or making the existing regional bodies stronger An option that is closely related to changes in the legal and administrative context is the creation of a new (stronger) regional body (or the empowerment of an existing regional body). However, support to create another regional body is lacking. In addition, without changes in the legal and administrative context, such an organization will have limited power to govern the metropolitan region. From the interviews with stakeholders we get the impression that there is no need for more formal organizations, but rather a need for another way of working.

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Promoting the identity of the region: ‘regional thinking’ A realistic possibility is to keep structures as they are, but instead try to change the minds or mentality of people. This can be done by creating visible examples of successful regional co-operation, like for instance the RadlRing, that bring the region under the residents’ attention. The PV already plays a role in this, and that role might be further developed. However, the fact that the PV increasingly has to earn its own money, limits the freedom of the PV (making the organization more dependent on its members). Maybe other organizations, like the Greater Munich Area and the RPV, could also assume some tasks and responsibilities in this respect. Furthermore, some municipalities (particularly the ones that are involved in the MORO competition) could take the lead in promoting regional thinking, particularly when it comes to making mayors and their administrations aware of the need for sustainable development. Some municipalities like Oberhaching and Haar already seem to play the role of making their neighbour towns more aware of this need. Setting up partnerships Another realistic alternative is to promote the development of partnerships between a limited number of municipalities that share common interests. The Nordallianz and the partnership of the two airport-related authorities are two good examples of authorities that have recognized their interest to cooperate. Of course, these co-operations are limited in scope (promotion rather than development) and scale (not the whole region), but they might be first steps toward better coordination. Promoting the development of this kind of partnerships can be done by creating awareness (regional thinking) and by giving (financial) incentives to co-operate. Stronger regional leadership Furthermore, we conclude that regional leadership could be improved. Without changing any formal structures, the leadership of an individual can be instrumental to promote regional thinking, to increase the ‘sense of urgency’ and to stimulate partnership development. Many discussion partners consider the mayor of Munich (being a powerful and well-respected individual) as the best candidate to assume the role of regional leader, although it is also mentioned that it is very difficult for the mayor to take up that role as several rural municipalities fear the Capital’s dominance. Furthermore, we would like to add that a pre-condition for effective leadership is that the person in question feels the ‘sense of urgency’. Developing and implementing a regional vision and comprehensive strategy It can be argued that the Munich Region is in need of an explicit economic vision. The regional plan cannot be considered an economic vision. The regional plan is mainly ‘restrictive’, as it says where developments should not take place. This particularly applies to the hard rules that define restrictions related to preservation of the environment. The plan contains few elements that are ‘development-oriented’, identifying (economic or spatial) development opportunities.12 In addition, we are inclined to call the regional plan a spatial and environmental plan, rather than an 12 In a more development-oriented plan, environmental interests could be secured by means of nature compensation projects.

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economic plan or vision. The earlier mentioned plan Munich Region 2030 does acknowledge the need to develop a regional vision, but so far, the planning bodies have not taken the initiative to actually respond to that need. 5 Applying the Research Framework Our research framework can be helpful to analyse and understand the factors of failure and success in the attempts to co-ordinate planning and development in the Munich Region. It has become clear that the political-administrative context creates many factors that obstruct partnership development: 1) the (planning) autonomy of municipalities, 2) their financial dependence on income from local taxes, and 3) the limited legal power of the regional planning authorities. The first two variables are relevant for all German cities, while the third one is more specific for the Munich region. The influence of the economic context is less negative. On the one hand the (ongoing) economic prosperity in the Munich region makes it difficult to raise the sense of urgency among stakeholders. On the other hand, it is obvious that one of Munich’s strengths (its quality of life) – and hence, its international competitiveness – is getting under pressure, because of uncontrolled urban sprawl. This common threat stimulates actors to get together and discuss ways to secure sustainable urban development. Many actors seem to recognize the need to coordinate planning on a regional level, like for instance (out-of-town) retail and airport development. The motives for partnership development in regional planning and development are obvious. All actors have an interest in the sustainable development of the region, in a well-balanced spatial distribution of residential, commercial and industrial functions, and in a well-coordinated promotion of the region, building on its strengths and creating a regional identity. However, on the other end, it is obvious that the municipalities have their own short-term objectives, trying to attract business in order to collect (trade) tax. Political and more in particular electoral motives explain why many municipalities (mayors) give priority to financial health at the end of the year instead of long-term sustainable development. Our impression is that plans that cross the borders of municipalities can only be implemented in case of winwin situations, that is, when all actors involved have a clear interest in a particular development. Strategic choices are much more difficult to make, because they are rarely in the interest of all actors. From our analysis we conclude that the context variables are to a large extent responsible for the low degree of partnership development in regional planning and development. The two organizations that we have analysed in detail – the RPV and the PV – cannot be considered the ‘new forms of co-operation’ that we are looking for in this book. First of all, they are not new, looking at their year of foundation. Second, they seem to lack the power to actually influence regional planning and development. Both organizations aim for sustainable development of the region, but they lack the instruments and power to turn that vision into reality. Of course, both organizations do try to influence regional development in a more indirect way. The RPV acts as a platform for consensus building and promoter of sustainable development through

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its regional plan, while the PV can make its member municipalities more aware of the need for sustainable urban development. However, in the end, both regional planning bodies are restricted in their freedom of action (their scope) because of their legal tasks and the fact that many planning objectives are ‘soft’ (RPV), and their (increasing) dependence on income from delivering planning services to municipalities (PV). Third, non-public involvement in both organizations is very low (or even absent). An advisory board of the RPV with representatives of non-public actors has been abolished. Fourth, both organizations are very formal, and include (too) many actors, making it very difficult to be flexible and anticipate economic opportunities. In view of the administrative context and the limited role of the two planning bodies (two context factors that could be changed, but only with help of higher governments), alternative partnership models to realize the common objectives (sustainable development) have to be found. From the City of Munich’s strategy we learn that the State’s capital would like to play a leading role in this. The City of Munich has an interest in new kinds of strategic partnerships that aim for sustainable regional development, because it is important for the future (international) competitiveness of the city. However, because other stakeholders tend to fear dominance of the central city, the City of Munich is advised to deal with its leadership role in a very subtle and intelligent way. Looking at possibilities for new kinds of partnerships in planning and development, it seems that the relevant scale should be smaller than the whole region. Various ‘new’ partnerships in the region (like the Nordallianz, the Airport cities, and MORO) include less actors (who share a common view and have a more obvious common interest) and operate on a lower scale level. An exception to that rule might be the Greater Munich Area, which operates on an even higher level of scale. However, from the history of the Greater Munich Area, one could draw the conclusion that it is sometimes better just to start with a limited group of actors (the three cities of Munich, Augsburg and Ingolstadt), because as soon as you are able to show success, other interested actors will follow. Lower-scale partnerships might also help to make the existing higher-scale partnerships more flexible and efficient, as groups of municipalities with similar interests might be represented by one person, thus reducing the size of platforms like the General Assembly. Finally, we have the impression that on top level the ‘sense of urgency’ of regional cooperation is too low. Leadership is needed to get actors in the region together. Leadership is needed to increase regional thinking, to strengthen the sense of urgency and to make stakeholders (municipalities) more aware of the need for sustainable development. Mayors of municipalities that recognize the importance of sustainable regional development are expected to take the lead in this process. References Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München (2005), Regionsdaten 2004 Region München. Regionaler Planungsverband München (RPV) and Regionplane- och trafikkontoret

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Stockholm (2003), Munich – Stockholm; Comparison of the two regions’ planning systems and contents, Promemoria nr.3. Discussion partners Mr Christian Breu, Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München/Regionaler Planungsverband München (RPV) Mr Helmut Dworzak, Mayor of Haar Mr Dieter Hager, Mayor of Krailling/RPV Dr Robert W. Obermeier, IHK München und Oberbayern (Chamber of Commerce) Mr Manfred Pointner, Landrat of Freising county/RPV Mr Stephan Reiss-Schmidt, City of Munich Mr Stefan Schelle, Mayor of Oberhaching Mr Hans-Dieter Schulz, Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum Mr Rolf Zeitler, Mayor of Unterschleißheim and Deputy of the Landrat Mrs Elisabeth Ziegler, Mayor of Oberschleißheim

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Chapter 7

Integrated Public Transport Policies in the Budapest Metropolitan Area1 1 Introduction Budapest is by far the largest city of Hungary. Since the 1990s, however, this capital city has lost about 300,000 inhabitants to its surrounding suburbs. Physically, the metropolitan area is growing in an, largely, unplanned way. At the same time, the majority of jobs are still located in the central city. Consequently, commuter flows have increased drastically over the past decades and accessibility – both by private and public transport – is under pressure. Since the decentralization of government responsibilities, accessibility has become a responsibility of the cities involved. The Budapest region favours a high share of public transport use if compared to most other European metropolitan regions. This favourable situation is however gradually changing as a consequence of degrading public transport services and a growing pressure of private car use, a consequence of increasing prosperity and related suburbanization. Although both the national and Budapest authorities have defined sound sustainable and integrated transport policies, a major weakness is that until now the implementation of projects and programmes has been lacking, making the congestion problems in the central city growing worse every day. Especially parking policies (a shared responsibility of the 23 city districts and the municipality) and P&R policies are just starting to be implemented. Another weakness is that urban travel and land use plans stop at the borders of the city, making any spatial and transport planning incomplete (ECMT 2004). In order to keep up the favourable modal split there is an urgent need to make public transport more efficient and attractive, and to start implementing projects and programmes in a comprehensive way. In this case study we analyse the partnership of the BKSZ2 (Budapest Regional Transport Association) which can be seen as a first step towards integration in public transport delivery. In section 2 we draw the context of the case by describing the demographic, geographic, socio-economic and administrative characteristics of the region. Subsequently, in section 3, the features of regional transport in the Budapest Metropolitan Area are described. In section 4, the partnership model of Chapter 1 will be applied to the organization of the BKSZ followed by an analysis of performance,

1 This case study was carried out in August 2006. It has been realized with a financial contribution of the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS). 2 In Hungarian: Budapesti Közlekedési Svövetség.

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barriers and challenges of this form of cooperation. And last, we draw conclusions on this case in section 6. 2 The Context In this section, we describe the demographic, economic, social and administrative context of Hungary and the city of Budapest. Demographic context Hungary has a population of just over 10 million people on an area of 93,030 km2, which corresponds with a density of 108 inhabitants per km2. Although the urban population in Hungary has increased, still a rather high 35 percent of all Hungarians live in rural villages. The population of Budapest is dropping at a much higher rate than nationally and than in other cities. In the capital city, however, suburbanization is the major contributing factor (especially during the 1990s). The population of the urban area surrounding Budapest has grown by approximately 9 percent over the last ten years while the capital’s population has decreased by 8.8 percent over the same period (ECMT 2004). Set into motion by the desire to get away from the crowded, noisy and polluted inner-city, a large number of former residents of Budapest have found a new home (just) outside of Budapest’s administrative territory. This process was facilitated by improved conditions in rural areas (water, sewage, and other services) and the fact that a portion of the population enjoyed increased wealth and (individual) mobility. The main enabler of this migration, however, was the rather abrupt replacement of the central planning system by more local autonomy, resulting in much more freedom in spatial planning. Although well over its peak in 1980, Budapest is still the nation’s largest city by far with more than eight times the number of residents of Debrecen, the second largest city with 205,100 inhabitants. This concentration is even more evident on a county level where Pest County (in which Budapest lies) houses 28 percent of the national population. Of the 19 counties only Pest County has a high level of urbanization (ECMT 2004). Table 7.1

Population development in Hungary and Budapest

Year

Hungary

Budapest

1980 1990 2001 2003

10.709.463 10.374.823 10.200.298 10.142.362

2.059.226 2.016.681 1.777.921 1.719.342

Source: Magyarország statisztikai évkönyve 2002 (Statistical Yearbook of Hungary, 2002)

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2

The city of Budapest covers 525 km , while the entire metropolitan area including suburbs spans 2,250 km2 and locates nearly 2.5 million residents. The rapid suburbanization process is having a pronounced effect on the way the city functions. The fact that most employment opportunities remain within the traditional city limits means that massive amounts of commuters further increase traffic problems. This ongoing process not only causes congestion on the main and local roads, it also increases pressure on parking space, which is very limited due to public policy and urban planning/design. Economic context Hungarian cities are clearly the focal point of the economy, Budapest being the clearest example. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is a multiple of the GDP of most other cities, let alone the less urbanized areas. Budapest did however encounter a sharp economic downturn in the second half of the 1980s due to restructuring. The traditionally strong industry went from 347,000 to 128,000 jobs between 1983 and 1993. From 1989 on, the new parliament pushed for a market-oriented model but was saddled with an enormous external debt and non-competitive export sectors. The sudden and radical opening of the country and the abolition of state subsidies led to further economic decline. Traditional industries such as mining, metallurgy and engineering, which under the central planning system grew rapidly, clearly could not compete on the international market and production was cut in half. Agricultural output declined by half and the country’s GDP decreased by 25 percent. Foreign investment, the driving force behind economic change, however contributed to a rapid recovery. In the 1990s, Hungary received more than half of all the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) in Central and Eastern Europe (twice the amount per capita as the Czech Republic and nine times that of Poland). Budapest was the main beneficiary, receiving over 50 percent of this: $20.5 billion up to 1999 (ECMT 2004). The chemical and automotive industry enjoyed large financial injections. Another important contributor to economic growth was a flourishing tourist industry, as the number of foreign tourists reached more than 20 million by the mid-1990s. A major factor in these foreign investments was the massive privatization taking place; three-fourths of all former state-owned companies were privatized (public transport firms were not included). Since 2001 a steady decline of FDI inflow is observed if compared to the growth of FDI in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Magyar Nemzetti Bank 2005). The private sector now accounts for over 85 percent of GDP (ECMT 2004), which is very high compared to other (eastern as well as western!) EU countries. An explanation for this situation is possibly of historical nature: unlike other Eastern European countries Hungary adopted a ‘market socialism’ system in 1968 in which enterprises were to a large degree free to determine their own production programme, as opposed to obligatory production targets set by central planners. While not the same as a free market, a foundation was laid for a kind of semi-private enterprises. Hungary’s foreign trade historically constituted a larger share of Hungary’s gross national product (GNP) than that of any other Eastern Block country. The drawback of this policy manifested itself with the energy crisis of the late 1970s, in combination with the persistently refusal to abandon costly mega projects, unwillingness to

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drastically reduce subsidies to inefficient enterprises and artificially low priced services. Hungary’s hard currency debt reached $18 billion by the end of the 1980s, representing the highest per capita indebtedness of any country in Eastern Europe. As a consequence the government has for a long time underinvested in for example the public transport system. Not only Budapest benefited from restructuring and ensuing investments; after a spike in unemployment rates throughout the country (an unprecedented 14 percent) in the early 1990s, a strong recovery followed. Though not as low as in 1990 (the pre-1990 rates can likely be attributed to hidden unemployment), unemployment is steadily dropping, having a positive effect on the economy. GDP is also still on the rise; for 2006 the estimated GDP in Budapest is €13,388 per capita. Social context Between the First and Second World War Hungary witnessed considerable cultural and economic progress. This however did little to change the social structure with its sharp divide between the gentry and the rural population. There was a large imbalance in wealth, power, privilege, and opportunity; four percent of the population owned more than half the country’s wealth. The communist period levelled out these differences to a certain degree, followed by the introduction of democracy, which increased segregation again. In Budapest many skilled and educated native Hungarians became wealthy and moved out of the city, while ethnic minorities remained, concentrated in specific neighbourhoods leading to further exclusion. In 2002 one third of all Hungarians lived on a subsistence level. On average however one can say the population is better off than in the communist period. Some groups have benefited greatly from recent developments, living in newly built attractive houses on the outskirts of the city and enjoying all necessary facilities. Budapest has severe problems concerning the quality of some of its real estate. Although putting in much effort it still has a very large stock of outdated housing in need of renovation. Mass privatization of the housing stock has in some neighbourhoods led to severe deterioration. In other districts this leads to strong physical improvements and related gentrification processes. Consequently, social segregation within the metropolitan area is growing. In the 1970s and 1980s the communist government spent large sums of money on arts and culture, making Budapest a major cultural centre in Eastern Europe, with many universities, libraries, theatres, and museums. In the transition to the market economy the government was hard strapped to keep on funding these amenities. A comparable, but more severe problem was scaling down the broad range of costly social services provided by the communist government (extensive child support, maternity leave, pensions, etc.). A constant twenty plus percent inflation in the first half of the 1990s forced the government to drastically cut back on spending, eliminating many welfare institutions. Economic transformation was more painful and lasted longer than anybody had thought it would. Between 1989 and 1995 unemployment peaked dramatically, inflation increased to 20 to 35 percent, and the living standards of more than one third of the populace declined to below subsistence level. Income disparities increased and corruption became more widespread and visible.

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Administrative context Hungary’s history shows profound changes in its overall administrative organization. In 1948 a communist regime assumed power, only to be removed 41 years later by Constitutional amendment in 1989 as a result of the Wende. The newly established Republic of Hungary held multiparty elections in 1990, opening the door to its ongoing economic transition. Today, there are two basic levels of government administration in Hungary: the central government and the local or communal ‘self-governments’. On a central level the National Assembly (Országgyűlés) is the highest state authority which is elected for four year terms. It initiates and approves legislation sponsored by the prime minister. The President of the Republic is elected by parliament every five years, but has a largely formal role. On a municipal level, things changed radically when local self-governments were created in 1990 to replace local organs of state authority from the Communist regime. As in most Eastern European countries during the state-socialist period, political, economic, and social life were controlled top-down by the communist party, the central state and industry. Local self-government was nonexistent. Now towns and cities acquired a great deal of independence and autonomy, bringing power in balance with that of the national government. Since then cities are responsible for the creation, execution and enforcement of policy regarding for instance housing, environment, public space, local roads and public transport. Decentralization also meant they have the authority to have independent income and to levy additional taxes. In practice still two thirds of local income come from central funding because they are reluctant to levy local taxes (with the exception of the local business tax) (ECMT 2004). At the intermediate level of administration, the 19 counties saw their status diminished in 1990, now only having a formal status with little real authority and virtually no budget. These directly elected County General Assemblies are responsible for public services and institutions that cannot be managed at the local level. Central government interests at the county level are assured by prefects, who are appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Prime Minister (ECMT 2004). All landuse and spatial planning issues are handled by the County Development Councils (CDC), which prepare and approve long-term regional development concepts and programmes for the county. Subject to approval by the County General Assembly, these plans are binding for municipal self-governments. Budapest has a special status among Hungary’s cities and towns, enjoying county rights. It comprises a ‘central’ municipal government, which shares authority and responsibilities with 23 self-government districts. The municipal council is made up of 66 directly elected representatives. In practice this can lead to awkward situations where individual district interests take precedence over those of the municipality. Such a setting has profound effects on the ability to reach a co-ordinated policy for the entire agglomeration, most notably regarding land use and transport issues. Driven by the prospect of accession to the European Union, an Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning was adopted in 1996, which proposes the creation of administrative regions designed to bring Hungary’s administrative

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structure into line with that of the EU regional policy and specifically the European Regional and Spatial Planning Charter. At present, seven regional entities have been created. They function primarily as Regional Development Councils (RDCs) coordinating development across counties (ECMT 2004).

3 Regional Transport Around Budapest This section discusses the current situation as well as the developments of Hungary’s transport and related spatial planning system, with special attention to Budapest and its agglomeration. Institutions Nationally, the Ministry of Economy and Transport is responsible for setting out and implementing transport policy. This includes building and maintenance of national and interurban railways and highways and the provision of interurban public transport. In practice however, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for Internal Affairs (new name since summer 2006: Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development) also play a decisive role. The former is responsible for the reimbursement of social discounts applied to ticket fares (e.g. for students and pensioners) towards public transport operators. Through this concessionary fare compensation scheme, the Ministry has oversight on public transport use on a local and an interurban level. The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development holds overall responsibility for the regulatory framework structure for municipalities. Indirectly, the National Regional Development Office, a separate entity set up in 2002 which is responsible for overall land-use and spatial planning, also influences transport decisions. Responsible for the National Territorial Master Plan, in which goals for territorial development are established in line with socio-economic objectives, it independently articulates general plans for transport infrastructure development (ECMT 2004). In accordance with EU requirements, the national government completed its second ‘National Development Plan’ in 2006, in which strategic decisions for land-use and transport policy are expounded for the next seven years (2007-2013). On a lower spatial scale all land-use and spatial planning issues are handled by the County Development Councils (CDC). Municipalities that possess a county status (such as Budapest) are expected to coordinate with the surrounding county in order to come up with integrated spatial plans. Since 1996 CDCs may set up Regional Development Councils (RDCs) in order to integrate development across several counties. Since 1999 the borders of the seven RDCs have been fixed. One of them is the Central Hungarian Region comprising Budapest and the surrounding Pest County. Transport issues on a regional scale are handled by several institutions. The (centrally controlled) regional road and rail directorates are responsible for infrastructure operations and maintenance as well as traffic management (with the exception of four tolled motorways).

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On a municipal level the building and maintenance of roads (other than national roads) are in the hands of the municipalities. Budapest being the exception, for it is also responsible for the national roads within its boundaries and roads used by public transport, while the districts manage all other local roads. Depending on the type of road, financing comes from either the central or municipal budget, or (for a few motorways, like the M5 constructed in the 1990s) from the private sector. Municipalities are also responsible for the provision of public transport (including infrastructure) within its boundaries, as specified in the 1990 Act on Local Self Government. Local authorities handle questions related to transport network and operations, fare levels, and selection of operators. Traffic management and parking policy are also determined and implemented by municipal authorities. Municipalities create limited liability companies for maintaining parking facilities and enforcing the payment and collection of fees, or tender these services competitively as is the case in central Budapest (ECMT 2004). Spatial planning on a municipal level lacks an integral regional development vision. In the Budapest region matters are further complicating by the large degree of autonomy of its 23 districts. Development priorities and zoning regulations reside with the individual districts, while a very difficult relationship between the municipality of Budapest and its districts regarding spatial planning and land use. The allocation of responsibilities over several institutions on different levels also affects issues such as parking policy and public transport. In practice, mobility related issues are tackled in a fragmented manner. There is no clear ‘problem owner’ who is capable of developing a clear vision on a regional scale which encompasses related mobility issues such as public transport, parking, land development, et cetera. Transport system characteristics The economic and political change since the late 1980s has had a profound impact on mobility and land-use in Hungary. In line with the contracting economy, passenger and freight transport declined for several years. Economic growth later triggered increased transport. A separate development is the strong shift in modal preference towards private mobility and air transport at the expense of public transport use, as illustrated in Table 7.2. The number of passenger cars in Hungary has gone up dramatically the past 15 years. In contrast to car ownership, car use has not increased at the same high rate due to economic contraction in the early 1990s and increased cost of usage as fuel taxes, parking charges, local taxes and motorway tolls. The ongoing economic recovery starting in the late 1990s has resulted in an overall upward trend in car use. Rail is losing out on a national and regional level to private cars and coaches (which has also had to cope with a sharp dip in ridership). Hungary has a very high railway density; the quality of the infrastructure and trains, however, is low. Not only Hungary’s railway infrastructure has had to cope with insufficient investment and maintenance over a prolonged period of time, other transport infrastructure networks have also been distressed. Urban public transport has been structurally under funded for many decades. As a result, ridership of local public transport systems such as suburban rail, trams, trolleybus and bus is showing an ongoing decline, even in the

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Table 7.2

Millions of passenger-kilometres by modal type in Hungary, 1980–2004 1980

Private cars 36,000 Air 1,076 Rail (MÁV) 13,714 Suburban rail 942 (BKV) Metro 1,617 Tramway and trolleybus 2,409 of which Budapest 2,009 Long-distance 13,505 bus/coach Local bus 8,390 of which Budapest 4,166

1990

1995

2000

2004

Change 1980–2000

47,000 1,695 11,403 790

44,100 2,383 8,336 614

43,540 3,539 9,693 565

n.a. 4,999 10,544 525

+21% +229% –29% –40%

1,232

1,299

1,358

1,251

–16%

1,816 1,443 10,601

1,586 1,266 9,556

1,502 1,243 12,115

1,468 1,183 12,096

–38% –38% –10%

8,660 3,975

6,741 3,076

6,327 2,923

6,312 2,802

–25% –30%

Source: based on ECMT, 2004; Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

period of strong economic growth between 1995 and 2000. Because Budapest is the hub of the country’s trunk roads and main railway lines, and since a large share of all public transport is located there, many transport related problems culminate in the capital region. Budapest’s transport system Hungary’s National Transport Policy specifies several priorities for Budapest: the renovation and building of bridges, the introduction of (more) parking regulations, the development of a ring road around Budapest and the enhancement of links between the rail and metro system. Budapest itself strives to improve the attractiveness of its public transport system as one of the main drivers of its urban development concept. Recognizing that the use of cars is likely to increase, the city aims to reduce the growth of motorization as much as possible. For that, it utilizes seven-year transport strategy plans. In the follow-up of the 2000-2007 transport development plan, the main goals are to reduce demand for transport by improved land use management, to improve traffic management, to mitigate the environmental impacts of transport activity, and to minimize costs and improve the efficiency of the transport system. The aim is not only to increase the quality and reliability of the public transport system itself, but also to optimize the city structure and land use in order to stimulate more effective use. Because of the lack of sufficient financing possibilities, investments proposed in this transport strategy couldn’t be realized at all. Much work is to be done if the stated ambitions are to be reached. Like many cities in the new Member States, Budapest is confronted with massive suburbanization and

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increased ownership and use of cars. Although the modal split in Budapest is still favourable compared to many other European cities (60 per cent public, 40 per cent private transport), it is down from the previous 80-20 percent share. Furthermore, on the borders of the city this share is just the opposite: 60 per cent private, 40 per cent public transport. One of the reasons for the massive suburbanization over the last 15 years is the nuisance in the city, caused by noise, dirt, lack of greenery and mounting traffic. The resulting increased rush hour traffic further amplifies the problems. Car use and ownership has gone up considerably, but is not yet high compared to other European cities. The main reasons that many people still choose not to travel by car, besides congestion, are the fact that there are very few parking spaces in the city (due to the structural design of the city centre and a historical lack of an integrated policy on parking) and the fact that by law roughly 80 percent of the cost of suburban public transport passes are compensated by employers. Budapest’s public transport system is extensive, comprising of buses, tramways and trolleybuses, an underground metro (among which the first underground line in continental Europe), two metro lines from the 1970s and 1980s and suburban railways. Services are provided by three publicly owned organizations: MÁV, Volánbusz, and BKV. MÁV is the national railway company with a special department for the Budapest region. Volánbusz is a state-owned regional bus company, which operates in the suburban areas of Budapest. And the third operator involved is the BKV, the municipal public transport operator of Budapest. It is important to realize that the three public transport operators do not work on the same geographical level. Hungarian urban public transport is relatively inexpensive compared with other European countries. Furthermore, Hungarian law obligates employers to reimburse 86 percent (railway) and 80 percent (bus) of the costs of their employees’ interurban travel passes (there is no law concerning urban public transport however). Fare increases in recent years have however been very large relative to average Hungarian income. Combined with the fact that many users have not been compensated by their employer, public transport, public transport has become extremely expensive for these groups. This is one of the main reasons for the decrease of public transport use. Table 7.3 shows the evolution in the numbers of passengers carried on urban public transport systems in Budapest. All modes have experienced decreases in passenger numbers both over the transition period of the 1990s and the decade preceding transition, but since 1998 numbers are slowly going up. Table 7.3

Passengers carried on urban public transport in Budapest (in thousands of passengers)

Local bus Tram / Trolleybus Metro / underground Suburban rail (MÁV lines not included)

1980

1990

1998

2000

2005

615 526 348 102

779 517 302 86

568 448 311 64

582 457 323 65

543 424 289 58

Source: based on ECMT, 2004; Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

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Table 7.4

Network length (km), rolling stock/buses, seat numbers in Budapest

Length of bus lines (BKV) Number of local buses Local bus seat numbers Length of metro rail lines Number of metro cars Metro seat numbers Length of tramway lines Number of tramway cars Tramway seat numbers Length of trolleybus lines Number of trolleybuses Trolleybus seat numbers

1980

1990

2000

2005

635 1,759 162,400 26 236 42,300 173 1,221 132,500 55 247 24,100

761 1,802 166,900 35 400 72,700 157 929 107,500 68 234 23,400

736 1,423 125,300 35 403 73,200 158 801 94,000 65 168 17,000

795 1,425 127,400 35 392 71,600 154 725 93,000 66 166 16,500

Source: based on ECMT, 2004; Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

Although urban public transport fare discounts are compensated by the Ministry of Finance, still operators lose more money with each additional passenger because the costs coverage – the share of costs covered by fares, subsidies and other revenues – is insufficient (varying between 80 and 90 percent for the different companies). In practice it is the municipally, the owner of the urban transport operators, which is forced to provide a cost subsidy of 10 to 20 percent in order to cover the deficit the company makes. The municipality tries to exert pressure on the operator to reduce costs through financial incentives, depending on the type of service contract. Also (necessary) large capital investments have been delayed or abandoned due to funding problems. Table 7.4 shows the evolution in urban transport networks and rolling stock over the period 1980-2005 in Budapest. The number of rolling stock has decreased for all modalities, with the exception of metro rail, which was granted funding for a long overdue investment in a new line (the fourth line). Suburbanization has led to an increase in daily commuter traffic in Budapest’s agglomeration by more than 25 percent since 1992. About 60 to 65 per cent of the approximately 300,000 commuters (students included) daily cross the city boundary by private car. From the public transport users, 22 percent travel by suburban bus services provided by Volánbusz, 30 percent commute by train (MÁV) and 40 percent by BKV suburban rail (HÉV) and bus services. Influence of EU regulation Next to the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning, the accession to the European Union required harmonization of the operations of the service providers as well. Public transport service operators are obliged to tender to be allowed to provide the services in order to create more competition and with the expectation to

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increase the service level. Not only causes the accession to the European Union more regulation, it also brings additional financial subsidies. To get these subsidies, projects have been formulated by BKV and the municipality of Budapest. For the 2007-2013 EU-programming period €7.8 billion will go to transport (public transport, road infrastructure, etc.). Unlike the original financing structure (EIB loans + national and local sources), a considerable share of that EU transport budget will be spent on the fourth line of the Budapest underground, which will impede improvements of the train transport in the Budapest region. 4 The BKSZ Partnership As the previous section explained, the association of public transport in the metropolitan region of Budapest is quite dispersed. This is not a typical problem for Budapest; other European urban regions are dealing with such issues as well. Following the positive experiences of some other European cities, the awareness of the necessity to establish some form of ‘umbrella’ organization for regional (or ‘suburban’) public transport rose in the early 1990s. However, the actual initiative for setting up a transport association was taken at the end of 2004 by the Mayor of Budapest and the Minister of Transport and Economy, resulting in the foundation of the Budapest Regional Transport Association Co. (BKSZ ) at the 1st of September 2005. In this section, we analyse the form of regional cooperation with help of the criteria we identified in Chapter 1. We focus on the regional partnership BKSZ: the Budapest Regional Transport Association. Scope of the partnership The BKSZ was founded in 2004. It can still be seen as part of the World Bank’s Budapest Urban Transport Project, which was held at the end of the 1990s. At that moment already, all involved actors desired the installation of a general transport association. The BKSZ was founded because the three public transport operators in the region use different networks, fares, concessions, ticketing systems and service levels. Harmonization of the transport services as well as more effective and efficient use of the passenger transport capacities are considered necessary, since the three public transport operators in the region use different networks, fares, concessions, ticketing systems and service levels (EMCT 2004). The ultimate aim is to maintain the high modal split for public transport in the city (60 per cent public transport, 40 per cent private car use) by investing in public transport. Public transportation should become cheaper, easier and more comfortable. Therewith, ‘unfavourable effects of motorization’, such as congestion, decreased accessibility, but also environmental problems related to car use, will be reduced. In short, three measures are planned to be taken from 2006 onwards: (1) the introduction of ‘combined passes’ enabling the common use of services of BKV, MÁV and Volánbusz; (2) the realization of a unified tariff system among all service providers by launching an electronically controlled ticket-validation system; and (3) the realization of a real Transport Association. The first measure, to introduce a ‘combined pass’ was already implemented on 1 September 2005. The next step

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of the partnership (a tariff union and an electronic ticketing system) is scheduled to be realized by 2010, followed by the third and final step – the creation of one integrated transport association for the Budapest region – that is foreseen after 2010. The impression is that it will be very difficult to fulfil the expectations, unless some barriers can be removed. Actors involved The BKSZ is a purely public-public partnership. The ‘founding fathers’ of the association are the Ministry of Transport, the Municipality of Budapest (the mayor) and the Pest County: they took the initiative for the establishment. The main partners in the association are the three (publicly-owned) transport operators: MÁV, Volánbusz, and BKV. MÁV is the national railway company with a special department for the Budapest region. For over ten years MÁV has been working on plans to improve the suburban transport system. Funding problems have however prevented the implementation of plans developed for the 11 railway lines ending in the city. The transport association could be of their interest in this respect. Volánbusz is a national operator of inter-urban and suburban bus services in Pest County. Suburban transport around Budapest is one of the activities of this company. In this region, it faces competition from MÁV (with improving railway connections for suburban transport). In order to maintain its position in the future, Volánbusz is involved in several other regional partnerships as well, focusing on improving bus stations and connections. Harmonizing the connections and timetables could help diminish competition and make the operations more efficient. The third operator involved is the BKV, the municipal public transport operator of Budapest. BKV is a very large operator with more than 13,000 employees (2001). BKV operates more than 250 tramway, bus, trolleybus and metro lines within Budapest and some suburban rail lines (called HÉV – local interest railways) separated from MÁV lines and a few bus services giving service from the city of Budapest to the first settlements in the agglomeration. They have a powerful position and a strong influence on the municipal transport policy. Geographic scale The working area of the three public transport operators is the wider region of Budapest. Figure 7.1 shows the area. This spatial level does not exactly correspond with the metropolitan region of Budapest. The level is a ‘dedicated’ functional region, tuned on commuting flows. It is important to realize that the three public transport operators do not work on the same geographical level. BKV is officially operating on the local level of the City of Budapest (though some bus lines traditionally operated extend these administrative borders). MÁV actually is a national company and therefore has to deal with decisions made in headquarters that are not always in favour of the

Figure 7.1

BKSZ operational area

Source: BKSZ, 2006

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regional needs of Budapest. There are plans to re-organize this association into a more region-based operator. Volánbusz is a regional unit of the national Volán bus company. Volánbusz operates in the Central-Hungarian region (Pest County) as a suburban service provider. The Volánbusz unit could be faced with decisions by Volán interfering with regional interests. Degree of formality BKSZ’s degree of formality is moderate. The foundation is formalized through written agreements and linked desired outcomes and tasks. However, BKSZ has in practice limited decision-making power and authority over the operators is limited. Cooperation between MÁV, BKV and Volánbusz is voluntary and on basis of consensus. For example, initially, an association office was established to proceed with planning and organization of the planning project. However, lack of agreement among the three operators of compensation of revenue losses put a halt to progress at that point (ECMT 2004). BKSZ did not have the authority to prevent this to happen. Degree of political influence Though theoretically, BKSZ would have a rather strong indirect political influence, having the full commitment of the minister of Transport and the mayor of Budapest, in reality this is different. Political priorities have changed since 2004 and the public transport topic was not high on that list. The political decisions some see as prerequisite for further implementation of the tasks of the BKSZ (i.e. harmonization timetables, tariff union) are not being made. Democratic content Because the BKSZ is a less formal institution, democratic content has more to do with accessibility and intelligibility to citizens (transparency of the association, openness to society, assignment of responsibility, etc.) The foundation of the association and, one year later, the introduction of the reduced ticket for regional transport, were well spread by (local) media. One can expect that most citizens, at least the ones travelling with public transport regularly, of whom there are many in and around Budapest, have heard about the BKSZ. Organization and responsibilities of the transport association seem to be quite clear, but the instruments for achieving these goals are less well known. The operators, the main ‘clients’ of the BKSZ, have a vote in the association through their membership of the Supervising Board. Financial power The BKSZ is financially fully dependent on its founders; the national government, and the councils of the Pest County and the City of Budapest. The annual budget of the association for 2007 is about €1.2 million of which 50 per cent is financed by the Municipality of Budapest and 50 per cent by the Ministry of Economy and Transport

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that also compensates for the loss of revenues for the three companies, because of the unified traveller’s pass within the city boundaries. BKSZ functions as intermediary between the three public transport operators and in this position they are confronted with the problematic financial situations of the three public transport operators.3 MÁV, BKV and Volánbusz are partly subsidized by the (national or municipal) government; other financial sources should be derived from fares or products. A local public transport company like BKV is almost entirely funded from local funds, but the municipality has limited tax raising power. Moreover, fares have to be approved by the Ministry of Finance. In the absence of a contractual agreement, BKV and the city negotiate the level of municipal subsidy on an annual basis. Main concern is to preserve a balanced municipal budget, leaving little regard for the quality of public transport services (ECMT 2004). The MÁV is only funded for its (substantial) ‘legitimate’ losses by central government and Volánbusz does not receive any operating subsidy from the State, except concessionary fare compensation and some limited financial support from local authorities for providing local bus services (ECMT 2004). In general, about 60 percent of the costs of the transport companies are covered by revenues. The rest has to be paid be either subsidies or loans. In 2007, BKV and the passenger transport section of MÁV will be modernized and partly restructured, so these transport companies will have to function more efficiently. Leadership From the early 1990s onwards, the foundation of a regional public transport association has been discussed on several levels (both political and professional). The decision in 2004 to actually set up such an association was initiated by both the mayor of Budapest and the minister of Transport. They took the lead in the formation of the association. After the foundation, however, they became only indirectly (and hence, less) involved in the BKSZ. Though officially not leading, the BKV does have an influencing role in the organization of local public transport. Theoretically, the municipality is responsible for formulating transport policy, but in practice, most professional knowledge is only available at BKV. The service provider is, in practice, taking over municipal responsibilities. The intended reform of the BKV aims at changing this contradictory situation between the Municipality and the BKV. Internal organization Two managing directors lead the BKSZ: one originating from the municipality of Budapest, the other from the Ministry of Economy and Transport. They work under the General Assembly, which is being controlled by the Supervising Board (see also Figure 7.2). The Supervising Board has seven members: one representative from BKV, MÁV, Volánbusz, GKM (national government), PMÖ (Pest County) and two

3

See also section three, part ‘Budapest’s transport system’ for financial information.

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Figure 7.2

Internal organization BKSZ

Source: BKSZ

members from BFÖ (City of Budapest). The BKSZ office further consists of four project leaders – experts in public transport – and two secretaries. 5 Performance, Barriers and Challenges that Remain Because the BKSZ partnership was only established two years ago (in 2004) it is not yet possible to make a thorough evaluation of its performance. From the interviews with relevant stakeholders4 and documentation provided by the more than once quoted national peer review by ECMT (see footnote in section one of this chapter), we will discuss the achievements so far and some barriers that appear to obstruct the cooperation. Although it is not the focus of this overview, we will pay some extra attention to financial aspects and implications of decentralization, because these factors appear to have a decisive influence on the organization of public transport in the region. Finally we will put forward some requirements for further development, again predominantly based on the outcome of the interviews and the findings of ECMT (2004). Achievements so far According to the ECMT (2004) the establishment of the BKSZ must be considered an “indisputable breakthrough” in a situation of three service providers that have no tradition of cooperation at all. They are working with different tariffs, different 4

In October 2006.

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systems, different information systems and different service levels. Under these circumstances it is an achievement to get all actors involved around the table. The first ideas for a regional partnership originate from the World Bank’s Budapest Urban Transport Project (that lasted from 1995 till 2001). Several difficulties (such as lack of agreement about who should pay for compensations and about the distribution of costs and benefits) blocked the implementation of the cooperation for about ten years. Most discussion partners state that the decision to finally establish the partnership came ‘far too late’. The delays caused by disagreements did not contribute to the good image of the new association. The first achievement of the partnership itself is the introduction of a unified reduced-price pass for all means of public transport within the boundary of Budapest. Since September 2005, vehicles of all transport providers can be used within the limits of the city for a price of only 10 per cent more than the price of a BKV pass. It is also favourable for commuters. They have to buy a unified pass for Budapest and a pass for the given MÁV (train) or Volánbusz (suburban bus) line from their settlement to the boundary of Budapest. Given the problematic coalition forming process, this pass is undoubtedly an achievement. However, it can not yet be considered a great success, because the sale of tickets appeared to be considerably lower then the expectations. According to the BKSZ, the estimations of the selling rates were unrealistic as they were based on figures of the three transport companies that are used to bet high to receive enough compensation subsidies for expected loss of income. Moreover, the pass seems especially of interest for those who commute daily from a suburban destination to the central city and vice versa. For them the pass makes travelling cheaper. For Budapest residents the current BKV pass is 9 per cent cheaper than the new BKSZ pass, but the BKSZ pass is valid for all three transport companies. The impression is that the operators are not unequivocally happy with the pass. The operators fear loss of income, because the price covers only 40 per cent of the costs and only the company that sells a pass gets the income. The companies do not really promote the pass; only prior to its introduction there was a marketing campaign. Barriers obstructing cooperation From the performance analysis it appears that the coalition-forming process is obstructed by a number of barriers. In this section we will discuss some of the most important ones. Political-administrative Decentralization has resulted in more power for local governments regarding service delivery and infrastructure. However, local governments have limited tax raising power and no control over resources to finance services and infrastructure. This situation seems a major reason for not assuming (or not accepting) the leadership role by the State or by the Municipality of Budapest. This obstructs the development of an integrated metropolitan public transport system. The operating companies, former monopolists, are waiting for decisions to be taken by their owners (City and State) before taking initiatives themselves. As

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part of the decentralization process, responsibilities for urban public transport policy and delivery were decentralized to local authorities. This transfer of competence has neither been coupled with a reinforcement of the municipal staff to handle complex transport issues, nor with an adequate transfer of resources (ECMT 2004). Most discussion partners argue that in the Budapest region a transport authority for the functional urban region is urgently missing. The result is the current political vacuum in the authority over the public transport services in the Budapest region. In such a situation it is extremely difficult for the BKSZ (that has no authority) to function properly. Resources Lack of financial resources is another critical barrier. The uncertain and inadequate funding, along with an inconsistent system of concessions, has its repercussions on the progress to establish a public transport authority for the Budapest region. Public money available for implementing urban policies is very scarce. As a result of the inadequate local resource base, investments in public transport have been drastically reduced, except for some projects with high political significance, like the fourth line of the underground (ECMT 2004). There is no consistent basis for financing the operators. In the absence of a contractual agreement, BKV and the city negotiate the level of municipal subsidy on an annual basis. Main concern is to preserve a balanced municipal budget, leaving little regard for the quality of public transport services (ECMT 2004). The MÁV is only funded for its (substantial) ‘legitimate’ losses by central government and Volánbusz does not receive any operating subsidy from the State, except concessionary fare compensation and some limited financial support from local authorities for providing local bus services (ECMT 2004). Some discussion partners claim, that the transport companies are bureaucratic organizations that could gain a lot by more efficiency if they would be better organized. Organizational The BKSZ organization model is not a barrier for cooperation. It is the organization of the transport companies and their dependence on the authorities that contributes to the marginal functioning of the partnership. There is a lack of capacity, knowledge and information at the municipal level: “public transport service definition is virtually left over to the operators” (ECMT 2004). Only a few persons at the municipality are assigned to work on public transport issues. In practice, BKV acts as the public transport authority for the city. Strategic planning and service planning are defined by the operator rather then by the public authorities. Strategic issues (sometimes very complicated) are prepared for the local politicians by BKV. This could lead to a confusion and lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities. On the one hand this complicates the efficient management of the transport company, while on the other there is danger that unelected officials assume responsibilities in the political domain. Most discussion partners consider this situation as counter-productive as their impression is that BKV lacks critical observation. The feeling is that technicians are most powerful within the organization, which could have its repercussions for strategic management.

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The ECMT fears, and some discussion partners agree, that the solution of the BKSZ is a “potential stopgap” in the absence of municipal initiative, because “in some ways the BKSZ could reinforce the confusion between roles of the public authority and that of the operators” (ECMT 2004). The ECMT supposes that it may later be difficult for the municipality to recover the responsibilities assumed by the BKSZ, when it comes to the introduction of privatization of the delivery of public transport services and integrated transport policy, which ultimately is a legitimacy of public authorities. Following the new EU regulations (since 2005), the service provider and the commissioner of transport services have to be separate bodies. The current tender with BKV ends in 2012. Theoretically there will be a new tendering procedure in which a competitor might show up. BKSZ would welcome privatization in the public transport sector. However, given the problematic public transport development, privatization seems highly unlikely, as the system doesn’t seem attractive enough for private operators. Partnership culture From the interviews we learned that a long period of a stringent hierarchical system has left its traces. In the old situation people and organizations were used to top down orders. In such a situation voluntary partnerships were less common. Nowadays it still appears to be very difficult for most organizations to cooperate. The mentality created during the socialist regime still seems to dominate: to wait for decisions to be taken by the authorities. Most discussion partners argue that lack of experience with cooperation is a principal barrier. The city of Budapest does neither cooperate with the State, nor with the County. Even cooperation between the municipality and the 23 city districts is problematic (or fictional). Political colours appear to play a dominant role in the absence of cooperation between the City and the County, but even in a situation of similar coalitions nothing happened. Only the service providers have shown some intention to cooperate. The impression is that on the management level the need for cooperation and coordination is realized, albeit to acquire EU funding. It is however questionable whether the awareness of this need is shared at operational levels as well. Initiatives have been taken to bring the companies together on annual conferences to share knowledge and information. But good intentions are not enough. The situation regarding cooperation has somewhat improved over the past few years due to EU influence. The EU requires harmonization and regional cooperation in return for subsidies. This works as an incentive for cooperative actions. Nevertheless lack of cooperation remains a huge barrier for improving the public transport system, let alone the entire metropolitan traffic and transport system. To get EU subsidies, projects have been formulated by BKV and the municipality. For the 2007-2013 EU-programming period €7.8 billion (EU funds plus national co-financing) will go to transport (public transport, road infrastructure, etc.). Commitment partners From the interviews it appeared that the commitment of the companies and the city of Budapest to the BKSZ is variable. The interests of the companies are much divided. Development plans are not integrated, information is

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not shared and some services are duplicated, leading to competition for each others passengers. Moreover, as long as the principals (City, Ministry and County, as owners) don’t want to cooperate it is problematic for them to do so. What’s more, the actions by BKSZ (pass, tariff union) will lower the revenues of the companies. Especially the differences in funding and organizational arrangements make coordination and cooperation difficult (ECMT 2004). Especially BKV is not in favour of the BKSZ partnership. The company has a strong position within Budapest which it won’t give up easily. BKV waits for the municipality to decide and doesn’t take initiatives on its own. Like BKV, the municipality considers BKSZ a paper tiger. It only exists on paper and plays a marginal role. The municipality sees the current BKSZ not as the necessary solution for regional transport. Besides, the fact that the city is underrepresented in the board of BKSZ could play a role too. The state-owned companies MÁV and Volánbusz (providing suburban transport) show more interest in the role of BKSZ. Suburban transport is a growth sector for MÁV. However this potential can only be tapped through regional cooperation and partnerships with the other service providers. Currently, MÁV has problems to increase its capacity in the Budapest region. The trains are already exploited at full capacity. Resources to invest in new equipment were missing. However, up to 2010, 40 to 70 new suburban train sets will be established and the major part of the existing fleet will be modernized. Given its problematic financial position, MÁV’s strategy is not in the first place oriented to increase the number of passengers, but to lower the debts by cutting the costs. Requirements for further development To achieve the objective of an integrated, efficient and effective transport system in the Budapest region some challenges have to be met, to be discussed in this subsection. Administrative context The political-administrative context appears to be the main barrier for regional cooperation. ECMT argues in its report in favour of a stronger national role to set up a national regulatory, legal and financial framework in which local authorities and transport operators can function. Most discussion partners argue that in the Budapest region a transport authority for the entire region is urgently missing. The national government has developed plans to establish regional transport authorities for the newly formed Central Hungarian region. This could result in a new transport umbrella organization for the Budapest region. According to the BKSZ however, the County level is a more realistic spatial scale than the scale of the Central Hungarian Region (CHR). The County coincides with the functional transport region, while the CHR is considerably larger than the functional urban region, while including rural areas as well. Some discussion partners claim that the Budapest Agglomeration Council would be a good level because it goes beyond City and County. Currently this Agglomeration Council has no power. By making the Agglomeration Council the (transport) authority for the Budapest region one could provide a new impulse for the organization of metropolitan transport.

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Financing Central government should compensate local administrations for the losses on public transport. The responsibility for the organization of local public transport should be coupled with sufficient resources. Several discussion partners argue that the system of financing of public transport could be an incentive for better cooperation, e.g. to subsidize performance or to give a budget for regional cooperation. Organization change Several discussion partners argue that the way in which the transport companies are organized obstruct regional cooperation. This relates to both MÁV and BKV. For MÁV the Budapest region is only one part of their national operations. However, suburban transport is a growth market. It seems a good solution to set up a regional (or suburban) transport company. Such a unit could be better able to cooperate on the regional level with the other regional and local operators than the national railway company. Several discussion partners support the idea of splitting up the transport companies in a management-and-organizational part and an operational part. One of the ideas that has been raised in Budapest is to split up BKV in a management company (responsible for organizing the transport system, planning the network, organizing the turnover, representing the transportation assets of Budapest, etc.) and a company that operates the transportation network.5 The management company (‘BKT’ in the draft proposal) prepares what kind of performance is expected from the operator (‘BKV’). An important goal of such a splitting up is to make BKV more open regarding strategic corporate information, to make exchange of information easier and to work more efficient. The management company should, following the proposal, participate in the BKSZ (like the State, the City and the County). It is argued that BKT should be the basis of BKSZ. This would give Budapest a stronger position within the partnership. Both BKT and BKV should have their own managers who are under municipal policy control. Within the organizations of MÁV and Volán, discussions about possible re-organizations are being held as well. Comprehensive approach Some discussion partners argue that the BKSZ assignment is too narrowly formulated. The policy approach regarding the organization of traffic and transport, combined with land use policy, should be better integrated and include private car traffic, parking and freight transport. Currently, parking policy is for an important part the competence of the 23 city districts. One parking company for the city seems urgently requested. Lobbying Experts and professionals in transport, together with the customers of public transport products (including an organization like VEKE6 but also employee organizations of large companies and employers organizations), should join forces and become more aggressive in attacking the current problems to make public 5 According to a draft proposal, of which no reference is available. 6 Volunteer’s organization looking after the interests of public transport passengers in the Budapest region.

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transport a political priority.7 Media attention is an important factor to get more publicity and political support. A problem is that the average passenger is not really interested in a partnership like BKSZ. Commitment In the current circumstances (political vacuum, way of financing) it seems extremely difficult to improve the commitment of all partners. Yet, a regional management of transport will have to be developed, like in most other European cities. The BKSZ should focus on showing the advantages of cooperation and the disadvantages of competition. Moreover, it should stress its intention to increase the number of passengers for all companies, by showing that they should not compete which each other but jointly compete with private car use. 6 Conclusions: Confrontation with the Research Framework We found that most stakeholders have serious doubts whether the BKSZ partnership will be able to accomplish its purpose: a more coordinated, efficient and effective public transport delivery in the Budapest region. The findings of ECMT in 2004, which for an important part have been confirmed in the interviews for this study, show that there are some major barriers that make it difficult to arrive at the desired level of regional coordination and cooperation. In this situation the output (the direct effects) and the outcome (the impact on Budapest’s competitive position) of the partnership are still minor. The BKSZ introduced a unified pass to all means of public transport. This improved accessibility of public transport for regional commuters, but it appeared to be less popular than expected (the selling rates were considerably lower than estimated) because this pass doesn’t mean a real tariff unity for the whole region. The impression is however that it will be problematic to achieve the remaining, much more challenging objectives. Some stakeholders, especially the Budapest partners (City and BKV) even seem to trivialize the existence of the BKSZ. The commitment among the (State-owned) partners MÁV and Volánbusz seems to be somewhat higher, albeit that the uncertain and inadequate funding arrangements are repeatedly mentioned by all partners as an important ground for lack of serious progress of the partnership. For all discussion partners and parties involved it is obvious that several context factors obstruct partnership development. The absence of one authority responsible for regional public transport (or even better: responsible for integrated spatial and transport planning, public transport included) is mentioned as most important obstacle. Other political-administrative obstacles are: lack of adequate financing of the municipalities and service operators; limited knowledge and information capacity on the local political level; confusion about the division of roles and responsibilities between local authorities and service providers. Under such circumstances a partnership like the BKSZ, having limited power, can only try to convince partners to participate in the coordination and cooperation process. Another factor, linked to the political-administrative context, is what is indicated in the research framework as the ‘socio-cultural context’. During the communist 7

Which it wasn’t at the time of writing this case study, in December 2006.

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regime cooperation or partnerships were alien phenomena. Lack of experience with coordination and cooperation appears to be another major barrier. It is obvious that the actors have to practice the advantages of working together and hence be able to realize surplus value in this way. Unfortunately, the impression from the interviews is that there is little evidence that the learning process is developing well until now. The impression is that on the management level the companies are convinced that they have to join forces, but administrative, financial and organizational factors have obstructed real progress until now. Another socio-cultural factor is the attitude versus leadership. The true leaders are the owners of the transport companies (the Minister of Economy and Transport and the City of Budapest) and Pest County (being responsible for suburban public transport). These bodies have equal powers and primarily safeguard their autonomy in their respective territory or policy domains. A status quo or political vacuum is the result. Under these circumstances none of the three transport companies is assuming or accepting leadership. They claim to be dependent on political decisions and do not take initiatives themselves. In a situation of lacking leadership a national lead seems to be requested to make progress. The role of the national government is significant in this case because the Ministry of Economy and Transport is represented in the board of the partnership. Moreover, two of the three service operators are stateowned. However, the State has no say with regard to local public transport policy and delivery, but decides about several policy tools, while the transfer of responsibility did not keep up with a transfer of the necessary funding. This complicates the organization and delivery of public transport in the Budapest region, and hence influences the chances of developing a successful partnership. With respect to organizational factors, some basic criteria like scope and scale of the partnership are not really in discussion. All relevant stakeholders are involved although some discussion partners argue that the consumers of transport services (employers’ organizations and trade unions included) should have been involved too. The current spatial scale seems all right, although some discussion partners think that the agglomeration level would be a better level because it goes beyond city and county, thus surpassing the authority of both. Moreover, all three companies work on a different spatial scale (national, suburban or local), which might influence their commitment to this regional partnership. The set up of a regional railway company, as a branch of MÁV, could make cooperation easier. In Budapest a proposal circulates to split up the BKV in a management part and an operational part. In this proposal the management part should be represented in the BKSZ board. Such a splitting up is not only recommended by the ECMT, but also seems to be a precondition for the situation in which competition is introduced, following EU regulations. This splitting up could not only strengthen the position of the municipality with respect to the public transport organization, but could also be a step forward to better coordination and cooperation in the region. This case study analysed the organization of the BKSZ, the Budapest Transport Association. In order to improve the accessibility of the region by public transport and to improve the quality of the transport services for customers, tuning the services of the different involved operators is very important and cooperation between all partners is required. The BKSZ is an attempt to bring the operators together.

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However, the expectations of future results of this partnership are moderate, mainly due to a number of institutional, financial and organizational factors. In order to create a successful partnership between the operators and to improve the regional public transport services, either a regional transport organization should have authority and the (financial) measures at its disposal or the government should break through the impasse regarding responsibilities and financial means. References A Budapesti közlekedésszervezö társaság létrehozása (Koncepció), no references available. ECMT (2004), Implementing Sustainable Urban Travel Policies. National Peer Review: (Hungary. Paris: OECD). Magyar Nemzetti Bank (2005), Foreign Direct Investment Hungary 1995–2003. Magyarország statisztikai évkönyve (Statistical Yearbook of Hungary, several years). Szemző, Hanna and Tosics, Iván (2005), ‘Chapter on Hungary’, in Ronald van Kempen, Marcel Vermeulen and Ad Baan (eds), Urban Issues and Urban Policies in the New EU Countries, EURICUR Series (European Institute for Comparative Urban Research) (Aldershot: Ashgate). Discussion partners Ms S. Bordas, Assistant, Preparation of Investment Office, BKV Mr G. Dancs, Deputy Head Clerk, Lord Mayor’s Office, City of Budapest Mr Z. Denke, Managing Director, Budapest Transport Association Public co. (BKSZ) Mr A. Ekés, Landscape Architect, Metropolitan Research Institute Mr T. Fleischer, Academic Senior Member, Hungarian Academy of Science World Economy Research Institute Ms E. Gerőházi, Staff Member, Metropolitan Research Institute Mr A. Horváth, Leader, Preparation of Investments Office, BKV Mr L. Köller, Head of Section, Hungarian State Railways Company (MÁV) Mr J. Kéthelyi, Managing Director, Budapest Transport Association Public co. (BKSZ) Ms M. Laukó, Strategic Director, Volánbusz Mr L. Molnár, President Director, Főmterv Mr L. Nagy, Consultant, Urban and Suburban Transit Organization (VEKE) Mr I. Tosics, Managing Director, Metropolitan Research Institute Mr D. Vitézy, Member of Board, Urban and Suburban Transit Organization (VEKE)

Chapter 8

Noordrand Project: Cooperation in the Rotterdam Region1 1 Introduction The Rotterdam case considers some new forms of cooperation that have one thing in common: they influence – directly or indirectly – the development of the northern part (in Dutch: ‘Noordrand’) of the Rotterdam territory. This area is strategically located between the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague, along the inner flank of the Randstad (the conurbation of the four largest cities in The Netherlands). The last decades this area has hardly been developed because of a status quo that resulted from the cancellation of an ambitious revitalization project in the mid 1980s. This rejected project intended to develop residential and economic functions, using the Rotterdam airport as catalyst. At that time, the discussion concentrated on the tension between environmental protection and economic development. Much resistance stemmed from the expected rise in noise. After the project was cancelled by the national government, nothing at all happened in the area in the years after. Recently, however, a new situation is emerging. Some projects are being developed, aiming to strengthen the region’s competitive position. In this Rotterdam chapter, we pay attention to new forms of cooperation in the field of ‘governance’ as well as to cooperation in concrete projects. The governance part comprehends the Administrative Platform South Wing Region (BPZ),2 set up in 2000 to organize cooperation in the southern part of the Randstad, usually addressed as ‘South Wing region’. The aim of the BPZ is to promote coordination and cooperation between provincial and municipal governments. Moreover, we discuss collaboration between the province of South Holland and the City Region3 of Rotterdam (joint spatial plan) and a partnership between the municipalities of Rotterdam and Delft, the two universities in both cities and the province of South Holland. The latter partnership aims to develop and implement the ‘A13 Knowledge Boulevard’ project, in the meantime for promotional reasons renamed to ‘Science Port Holland’. As far as cooperation in concrete projects is concerned, our analysis focuses on the ‘Noordrand’ (northern rim) project, an initiative of the city of Rotterdam. For most parts of this project, green lights have been signalled for the start of their implementation. The Noordrand project includes the combination of a Science and 1 2 3

This case study was carried out in October 2005. BPZ Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel. Stadsregio Rotterdam.

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Business Park and a nature park (in the Schieveen polder) which will be realized in a cooperative effort of the City of Rotterdam and a nature conservation organization. The Science & Business Park is part of the ‘Science Port Holland’ partnership. 2 Profile of the Rotterdam Region Spatial-economic situation The Rotterdam region belongs to two overlapping networks that both determine to a large extent the spatial-economic development of the Netherlands: Randstad Holland and the Rhine Scheldt Delta. The Randstad is mainly oriented toward knowledgeintensive business services, while the Rhine-Scheldt Delta can be seen as a logistics and industrial network made up by the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp and the areas in between. In the Rotterdam economy the port and petrochemical complex has always been dominant. The port provides employment to approximately 60,000 people in Rotterdam, and some additional 250,000 in the rest of the country. The gross added value of the port and industrial area is about €6.2 billion (2000 data). That is 7 per cent of Netherlands’ GDP (Port of Rotterdam). The port and industrial complex covers an area of about forty kilometres in length, from the city of Rotterdam to the North Sea. In terms of goods transhipment, the port is by far the largest of Europe, while the chemical complex belongs to Europe’s largest. Because of the dominant transport function, Rotterdam is an important international trade centre. As economic growth mainly takes place in more knowledge intensive

Figure 8.1

Urban networks in the Netherlands

Source: Nota Ruimte, 2006

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and creative sectors, Rotterdam’s economic policy has been aiming for diversification of the economic structure since the 1980s. Particularly business services related to the port and industrial complex, as well as knowledge intensive activities (notably connecting to the academic medical complex that produces little economic spin-off) are stimulated. The plan for the northern rim area responds to this strategy. Thanks to its strategic location along the inner flank of the Randstad and the direct vicinity of a regional airport, this area is considered a potential top-class location in the Randstad for the before-mentioned knowledge intensive activities. The economic performance of the South Wing region of the Randstad (which covers the regions around Leiden, Den Haag, Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Gouda, with a population of about 3.5 million) has been seriously lagging behind in comparison with the North Wing region (covering the regions around Haarlem, Zaandstad, Amsterdam, Hilversum and Almere) and the eastern part (the Utrecht region). In national policies, these three areas have been designated as ‘economic core areas’ in the urban network of the Randstad. All public actors (state, provinces and municipalities) cooperate on Randstad level, however with only few results in practice until now (Teisman et al. 2005). Most of the time, the major cities operate independently, often competing against one another. From a national perspective, investments in the potentials of the mainport are considered urgent, with promising perspectives in port-related services. In addition, the State has the opinion that the economic structure of the South Wing region needs improvement. To that end, the region should become more attractive for knowledgeintensive firms and knowledge workers. Thus, the most challenging aim for this region seems to be an enhancement of quality of life, convincing the higher educated to stay, to settle or to work there. Table 8.1

Employment Rotterdam (municipality, 2005) Sector Agriculture Industry Construction Trade & Repair Hotel and catering industry Transport Financial services Business services Administration and government Education Health and welfare services Other services Total

Jobs

Percentage

410 26,900 17,010 36,400 8,220 33,880 17,140 55,390 18,110 23,420 47,110

0.1 9.1 5.7 12.2 2.5 11.4 5.5 18.6 6.1 7.9 15.8

13,340 297,380

4.5 100.0

Source: Rotterdam Development Corporation, 2005

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Demographic context Rotterdam has approximately 600,000 inhabitants. Halfway the 1960s, the highest population level was reached, with 730,000 people. Suburbanization and a declining average dwelling occupation resulted in a decline to a population of about 580,000 in the early 1980s. Since then, the size of the city’s population has remained rather stable around 600,000. Rotterdam’s demographic composition is considered subject of concern. In comparison with other major Dutch cities, Rotterdam’s population includes relatively large shares of lower-income and lower-educated groups, and ethnic minorities. Young affluent families of Dutch origin leave the city, while mainly underprivileged people, like starters on the housing market, asylum seekers, jobless people and immigrants move to the city. Prognoses indicate that the share of ethnic minorities (45 per cent in 2002) will increase considerably in the years to come (City of Rotterdam 2001). The integration of ethnic minorities and the interrelated topic of social cohesion are issues of high concern in many Dutch municipalities, but particularly in Rotterdam. The composition of the Rotterdam region’s population (1.2 million people) is more balanced, but on this level too the relative one-sidedness of the demographic composition is considered as problematic (Province South Holland/Stadsregio Rotterdam 2005). Administrative context Although the budgets of Dutch municipalities depend for more than 80 per cent on State subsidies, a process of ongoing policy deconcentration can be observed. Twelve provinces operate between the national and regional level, their most important tasks being in the field of spatial zoning, environment and regional public transport. Their role is limited to intermediary between the local and national level. Various post-war attempts to reform the administrative structure have failed, with the intended creation of seven regional governments around the largest cities as the most recent failure (mid 1990s). Currently, these seven metropolitan regions have regional boards with limited tasks and responsibilities. The regional administration Table 8.2

Demographic data (Rotterdam, City Region, Netherlands) Rotterdam

Population 2004 599,075 Growth 1989–2005 4% Number of foreigners 262,156 Share of foreigners 44% Share of knowledge workers 2003 22% Growth share of knowledge 15% workers 1996–2003 Source: RR2020, 2005 and CBS, 2004.

Rest of City region 594,241 12% 112,779 19% 18% 32%

City region

Netherlands

1,193,316 16,254,933 8% 10% 374,935 3,038,758 31% 19% 20% 21% 24% 24%

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is a cooperative arrangement between the municipalities in a region. Cooperation is compulsory, but actors are free to select a specific form. To give an example: in the Rotterdam region, the mayor of Rotterdam is chairman of the regional board, but in the Arnhem-Nijmegen region (in the eastern part of the Netherlands) an independent person is appointed chairman. Besides their role in coordination on supra-local level, the regions are mainly relevant when it comes to internal distributions of State funds for among others public transport and housing construction. This form of regional cooperation proofs to be reasonably successful. Apart from these formal and legal bodies, there are various other platforms that try to coordinate policies. Rotterdam participates on a voluntary basis in among others the Randstad Council (Randstadraad) and the BPZ. Recently, the leaders of the four Randstad provinces and the mayors of the four largest municipalities (named ‘Holland Eight’, referring to a successful Dutch Olympic rowing team) plead for a Randstad authority. The occasion for this is the declining competitive position of the Randstad amidst other European metropoles. The fragmented administrative structure, the lack of decisiveness and the lengthy procedures preceding the implementation of projects are considered serious handicaps for economic growth. The national government has promised to develop proposals for a new administrative structure. Accessibility Rotterdam owes its position as entrance to Europe to its geographic situation. The accessibility of Rotterdam is generally considered excellent. Good hinterland connections by water, road, rail and pipeline make Rotterdam a logistical node of distinction. The third airport of Europe (Schiphol) can be reached by train within 45 minutes from the city centre, and within 20 minutes with the high-speed-train service. Furthermore, Rotterdam has a small, efficient regional airport and a (small) metro system. A hybrid light-rail system (RandstadRail) is under construction. This system will connect the Rotterdam region with the region of The Hague, also using parts of the existing rail, metro and tram system. A major problem is the congested road infrastructure around Rotterdam, but that is not an exceptional situation for one of Europe’s most densely populated regions. Various large infrastructure projects are about to take off, intending to reduce this problem. Regional and local policies On a regional level, as well as in Rotterdam, the policy challenges that are considered most important are improving the quality of the living and location environment, the strengthening and diversification of the economic structure, and the promotion of social cohesion. The region particularly needs more variety and more quality: a broader economic basis (to generate more economic growth and to reduce the dependency on the port complex), a more heterogeneous housing supply and a more attractive environment (to attract and retain more knowledge workers and higher-income groups). In these aspects of regional development, the region should catch up in order not to remain behind, in relation to the rest of the Randstad, the

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Netherlands and Europe. The Noordrand project, to be analysed in this Chapter, aims to incorporate all these aspects, thus being a priority for Rotterdam’s city government (Uitvoeringsplan Stedelijke Projecten Rotterdam 2003).

3 Partnerships: Actors, Motives, Objectives, Models In this section various forms of cooperation in the Rotterdam region are presented. Several aspects of the theoretical framework come across, like the actors involved, the motives to collaborate, the aims of the partnership and the partnership model. We make a distinction between partnerships in the field of governance and partnerships concerning a concrete project. Partnerships in the field of governance Administrative Platform South Wing In terms of economic performance, the regions of Rotterdam and The Hague have for a long time lagged behind the regions of Amsterdam and Utrecht. This deadlock in economic development of the South Wing of the Randstad has stimulated co-operation on this geographic level. In 1999, the Dutch prime minister installed an advisory board for the South Wing region (Adviescommissie Zuidvleugel). This board outlined the problems and indicated programmes that could contribute to a more vital South Wing region. The advisory board suggested far-reaching administrative co-operation and a more decisive implementation of projects. On the basis of that advice, the public partnership Administrative Platform South Wing (Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel, BPZ) started to work, its main aim being to develop a vision on the socio-economic and spatial future of the South Wing region. The object is to improve cooperation and coordination of activities and projects between municipalities, city regions and the province of South Holland. As a non-statutory body, the BPZ cannot take decisions like for instance a province does. Although the South Wing region covers almost the entire province of South Holland, the distinction between the two geographic entities is relevant. The BPZ constitutes the framework for cooperation between all public actors that jointly address the national government. In that sense, you could call the BPZ a sort of lobby organization, as the parties involved have a common interest in more (effective) State contributions to the implementation of the desired projects. The BPZ is chaired by the leader of the province of South Holland (the Royal Commissioner), and is composed of representatives from the province, the municipalities of The Hague and Rotterdam, the city regions of Haaglanden (The Hague region) and Rotterdam, and the voluntary partnerships of municipalities around Leiden, Dordrecht and Gouda. Moreover, four (State) ministries are represented in the BPZ by observers. The minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment has been appointed as the one who is directly approachable in matters of coordination with the State. This minister functions as programme minister for the State Programme South Wing that falls under the National Spatial Strategy (Nota Ruimte), in which the future spatial development of the Netherlands is outlined.

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Besides various consultative meetings, the programme minister and the BPZ get together several times a year to coordinate activities and projects. The BPZ is supported by a small bureau (Zuidvleugelbureau). Every year, a major conference (Bestuursconferentie) takes place where governors and civil servants (notably policy officers) can give their opinion on agreements made between the partners of the BPZ and agreements between the BPZ and the State, resulting in an actualization of priorities, adjustments in projects and new tasks to assume. In 2005, for the first time private actors (representatives of nature and environmental groups, the business sector, and societal organizations) were invited to give their opinion on plans and priorities. Many actors made use of that opportunity. The vision supported by the public actors has been translated into projects and programmes that cannot be implemented on a local or provincial level, in view of their kind, size and/or importance. The stakeholders of the BPZ have agreed on a priority ranking of projects, involving the State and the province as (financial) partners. Examples of such projects are the redevelopment of Rotterdam’s and The Hague’s central station areas, the mainport development in Rotterdam, and major infrastructure projects (notably railway projects). The programmes aim to strengthen knowledge infrastructure, city economies, and urban renewal. In 2004, the sum of the investments in the ten highest-ranked projects (the Noordrand project included) and three policy programmes was estimated at €13.1 billion, with €10 billion to be invested before 2014. In the proposal, the State (including European funds) takes the largest share in the funding, with €5.8 billion. The public partners in the South Wing region have to invest €2.5 billion and the private actors about €1.2 billion. The funding of the required amount of €3.7 billion after 2014 has not been determined yet (BPZ 2004). Investments in real estate are not included in these amounts. These investments are mainly private investments, mounting up to billions of euros as well. In the course of years, the number of projects proposed by the BPZ gradually increased to more than 30. To keep overview, this number was limited to 22. In December 2005, these 22 projects were categorized in three groups, according to their stage of development: four projects were being implemented and nine were being made ready for implementation (including the Noordrand project, which has been defined as one project together with investments in the A13/A16 highway). The partners involved agree on these nine projects, and have made general agreements on their funding and organization. Finally, there are nine projects in a stage of preparation or study. For these projects, no concrete agreements have been made. The Science Port Holland project is only partly included in the list of projects that have been agreed upon. Some of these 22 projects were already mentioned in earlier policy documents like the South Wing region’s Top Ten (1999), the State Programme South Wing region, and the long-range programme Infrastructure and Transport of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Each project has its own dynamics and its own set of relevant partners which are not always involved in the same way (in terms of funding and organization).

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Cooperation province-city region Before we discuss the cooperation between the province and the city region, let us first give a brief overview of governance in the region. Already since the 1960s municipalities in the Rotterdam region work together. Initially within an experimental form of regional governance: the public body Rijnmond. This administration, created by the State, was abolished in 1985, due to lack of results and competence problems. After its abolishment, the municipalities decided to continue cooperation, though on a voluntary basis. In the situation that resulted in the early 1990s, Rotterdam and its border municipalities agreed on the foundation of a further reaching form of cooperation. The State, the province, Rotterdam’s city districts and the Chamber of Commerce supported this initiative. However, the radical plans for establishing a City Province Rotterdam (with far reaching local and provincial competences) were not implemented after a convincing ‘no’ of the Rotterdam population in a referendum on this issue in 1995. The 18 municipalities involved decided despite this failure to continue cooperation in Rotterdam’s city region, though with an adjusted level of ambition. The law that would regulate the preparations needed to develop the city provinces offered opportunities to that end. Moreover, some ministries had already anticipated the creation of regional governments by appointing the region as partner for particular target payments (Doeluitkeringen). This implies that within the region agreement had to be reached on how to allocate particular funds. The city region of Rotterdam and the province of South Holland have made agreements on the division tasks, to avoid doing things twice. In cases of interregional cohesion, the City Region takes the provincial frames as points of departure. That means that the city region has the responsibility for regional policies in the fields of traffic and transport, spatial planning, housing, economy, green space, the environment and youth care. Direct flows of money from the State to the city region with regard to traffic and transport, agreements on urbanization and youth care are distributed within the regional administration. The city region spends approximately €415 million a year, which exceeds the budgets of most provinces. The current form of (compulsory) cooperation within the city region seems to work satisfactory. On the basis of the Spatial Plan Rotterdam 2010 (developed by the city of Rotterdam), a spatial vision on the region’s future has been developed within the frame of the city region. In principle, the spatial planning on regional level is a legal competence of both the province and the city region. The city region’s plan (Structuurplan) deals with more details than the provincial plan (Streekplan). The Spatial Plan Region Rotterdam 2020 (RR2020) is a joint product of the province and the city region. In the Dutch context, this is a unique form of cooperation in spatial planning. The RR2020 replaces the provincial Region Plan of 1996. The city region and the province are making more detailed agreements on the distribution of tasks and the implementation. In 2005, the RR2020 was formally accepted by both the Provincial Council and the City Region Council. Since then, implementation programmes are being prepared. In the stage of implementation, a key role is to be played by new coalitions with organizations that invest in the development or are relevant otherwise. Relevant actors are housing corporations, intermediary organizations representing business, the Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR, see Box 8.1) and some municipal departments.

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Box 8.1: The Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR) The Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR) is a public-private partnership that was set up in 2003 by the City Council of Rotterdam. It is a platform of about thirty opinion leaders from business, education, science and culture, and the directors of the two most important economic departments of the municipality: Rotterdam Development Corporation and the Port of Rotterdam. The EDBR is a response to the growing need of the local government to involve private actors more intensely in policymaking. It is acknowledged that sharing networks, knowledge, experience and expertise can generate great benefits for the city. The EDBR advises the City Council, particularly on the areas or themes to invest in the coming years. The members have been split up in task forces, one of them being the taskforce ‘A13 Knowledge Boulevard’ (renamed Science Port Holland), which is headed by the director of Rotterdam Airport. As yet, the EDBR is an initiative on the local level, although participation in the regional project Science Port Holland is apparently not ruled out. The RR2020 comprises five area-oriented programmes that need to be implemented in the coming 10 or 20 years. These programmes are brought in line with the objectives of the BPZ. The cross-regional BPZ approach has repercussions on the RR2020. One RR2020 programme deals with the Noordas,4 which covers a larger area than the Noordrand project. Within this Noordas area, many projects are being developed or implemented. Besides the Noordrand project (a BPZ project), the programme includes a project concerning the construction of a highway A4North between Delft and Schiedam (a BPZ project top ten as well), a plan for the restructuring of an agricultural area between Rotterdam and Gouda into a housing and business district (Zuidplaspolder, a new BPZ project), and some small scale projects, such as a 80 hectares business park in the municipality of Berkel and Rodenrijs. The reason to formulate the Noordas programme is that the city region and the province fear that all these strategic projects will be realized without sufficient coordination, resulting in undesired outcomes such as for example too many space for the same kind of (knowledge intensive) activities. To strengthen the coordination, it has been decided to use a larger geographic area than the Noordrand (used in the BPZ) as frame of reference. Science Port Holland The Science & Business Park Schieveen is part of the Science Port Holland project. This project also includes the RTM Airpark (to be developed on the land of Rotterdam Airport) and the Technopolis Innovation Park (mainly located on the land of the Technical University of Delft). These three business parks are situated near one another along the A13 highway (Rotterdam- The Hague). This area between Rotterdam and Delft is one of the few spots left in the region where attractive (in terms of quality) and well-accessible space can be found to reduce the 4

North Axis.

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shortage of business locations. All three together we are talking about 140 hectares of business locations. Cooperation between the cities of Delft and Rotterdam, the universities in both cities (Technical University Delft and Erasmus University Rotterdam) and the province of South Holland, has resulted in the bundling of the three initiatives. For Science Port Holland, a joint policy for marketing, acquisition and land issues is aimed for. Coordination in marketing and acquisition is already on its way, in cooperation with the EDBR’s taskforce ‘A13 Knowledge Boulevard’ which supports the concept. A steering group, of which, besides the five mentioned actors, also the EDBR and Rotterdam Airport are members, is coordinating the further development and implementation of the partnership agreement. The aim of Science Port Holland is to create a more competitive product by combining initiatives instead of developing three business parks in internal competition. In the end, employment will have to be created for 24,000 knowledge workers. The actors involved expect to reach that number in 20 years time. Currently, only Technopolis is ready for take-off, but considering the kind of users that are aimed for, the pace in which land will be sold off is expected to remain slow. The three parks will be developed in such a way that they complement each other. The Science & Business Park Schieveen aims at innovative services, medical research and business, and airport-related activities. Technopolis Innovation Park focuses on R&D companies and institutions, high-technology industry and research institutions that have a relation with the Technical University Delft. The business park at Rotterdam Airport (RTM Airpark) will mainly offer space to airport-related companies. Besides the two universities, Science Holland also benefits from other parts of the region’s knowledge infrastructure, such as the (Academic) Erasmus Medical Centre (EMC), the three regional polytechnics and various knowledge institutions, including TNO, WL Delft Hydraulics, IHE, the Institute for Maritime Research, et cetera. The partners hope to improve the connection of education with business and to turn scientific research outcomes into commercial benefits. The BPZ has selected Science Port Holland as one of the top ten projects in the South Wing region. In the policy document ‘Peaks in the Delta; Area-oriented Economic Perspectives’ issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Science Port Holland has been included as part of the – broader defined – ‘Knowledge Corridor’ (which also includes the University of Leiden), one of the four innovative hotspot regions in the Netherlands. These regions receive extra funds to live up to that status. Cooperation within the Noordrand project The forms of cooperation discussed in the last section are active in the field of governance. In this section we focus on cooperation in the more concrete Noordrand project, which consists of various sub-projects. Our analysis focuses on the subproject Schieveen. Although other sub-projects do not distinguish themselves through innovative forms of cooperation, they are introduced briefly as they are all part of the Noordrand project.

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Background, motives, aims and actors The Noordrand project comprises investments in infrastructure, real estate and the environment. The aim is to contribute to the economic vitality and sustainability of the South Wing region in general and to the Rotterdam region in particular. Currently, the Noordrand area, located near the airport, is a largely unzoned piece of land which has great development potential. According to the RR2020, the future layout of the area should be connected with the knowledge and service economy of the Randstad. For the Rotterdam economy and the economy of the entire South Wing region it is of great importance that these sectors, in which the region has not excelled until now, are strengthened. The knowledge economy places great demands on the location climate in its broadest sense (e.g. the quality of the living and working environment, the quality of amenities, the knowledge infrastructure, international accessibility, et cetera). The Noordrand project is regarded as a perfect opportunity to enhance the location climate. The Noordrand project comprehends a number of elements that will be separately implemented, although they are coherent and complementary from a strategic point of view. This way of working has deliberately been opted for, because past experiences have taught that it is extremely difficult to manage a large comprehensive project in which various actors with different interest participate. It was in particular the tension between economics and environment that obstructed the acquisition of political and societal support in the 1980s. In the end, the ‘Integral Plan Northern Rim Rotterdam’ (IPNR) was cancelled by the State, because plans to allow the project’s key element Rotterdam Airport to grow to two million passengers a year were rejected. As the various parts of the project were ‘mutually fixed’ (also considering funding models) this rejection meant the end of the entire project. What resulted was a status quo situation with few developments in the years that followed. In the late 1990s, the Rotterdam city council decided to adopt a new approach, according to which the same elements could be realized anyway, though on an individual basis, without a coordinating master plan. This approach aimed to make projects easier to manage and to reduce complexity in cooperation. For each subproject, powerful coalitions had to be created, making it easier to set things in motion than in a large-scale comprehensive project. The following actors are involved in the Noordrand project: the city of Rotterdam as initiator, the province of South Holland, the city regions of Rotterdam and The Hague, the neighbouring municipalities (among others Bleiswijk, Berkel and Rodenrijs, Delft, Schiedam), the State (A16/A13 and other infrastructure) and a private nature conservation organization (Vereniging Natuurmonumenten, VN). The elements of the Noordrand project are: •

• •

The Schieveen polder in which the Science & Business Park Schieveen (for knowledge-intensive high added value business) in combination with a nature park (nature and recreation) will be developed. The Science & Business Park participates in the Science Port Holland. Rotterdam Airport, where the RTM Airpark will be developed as part of Science Port Holland as well. The Zestienhoven polder: a new residential area in an attractive green and watery setting for moderate to high income groups.

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•

The A13/A16 highway that will run right through the Noordrand area, playing an important role in releasing the pressure on the congested highway network around and within Rotterdam.

In addition, a stop of the newly constructed RandstadRail (a hybrid light rail system that will improve the connection between the regions of Rotterdam and The Hague) will be created in the eastern part of the area. Furthermore, the area accommodates a part of the High-Speed-Rail track between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, enabling new urban development in the future by means of a high-speed shuttle service. The required investments in the Noordrand project are estimated at €1,490 million, of which €627 million is expected from the State, of which only €82 million has been granted yet. However, the contributions of the South Wing region partners (€94 million) and the private sector (€263 million) have already been completely provided for.

Figure 8.2

Planning map Noordrand area

Source: Province South Holland and City Region Rotterdam, 2005 Legend:

Infrastructure: e3/e5: e2: e7: e6: b3: c1: c2:

highway A13/A16 (construction not yet decided) highway A4-North (construction certain) highway A20 (Hook of Holland-Gouda, existing) highway A13 (The Hague-Rotterdam, existing) node Rotterdam Airport (future development) Knowledge clusters: Technopolis/Technical University Delft Science & Business Park Schieveen (north of airport) and RTB Airpark (south of airport)

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Part Science & Business Park and Nature Park Schieveen In the Schieveen polder, Rotterdam will develop a combination of a high-quality business park and a nature park, thus contributing to the quality of both the living environment and the location climate. Currently, the area might be green, but with very little high-quality nature and few leisure possibilities. To safeguard the area’s natural quality in the future, the nature conservation organization (VN) is one of the partners in the planning process. VN is a private, independent association (more than 900,000 members/contributors) that wants to save nature, landscape and cultural history by buying, managing and protecting land. VN will manage the nature park. Internally, some of VN’s members (the more fundamental environmentalists) heavily criticized the involvement of the organization in a partnership based on a compromise between economic growth and preservation of the environment, as they are against any form of economic development. However, VN’s board recognizes that it is sometimes better to look for a compromise than to be against by definition. VN prefers to speak about ‘development planning’ instead of the more rigid ‘restrictive planning’. It seems that other environmental organization are about to adopt this more pragmatic approach too. In order not to bother nature, the newly developed business park is only open to companies that deliver high added value and environment-friendly products and services, like ICT companies, research institutes and service companies. The current cluttered land will be redeveloped into a varied and watery area where nature can go its way. The area will become more accessible for recreation. The total area covers approximately 300 hectares, of which more than 90 hectares will be used for the business park (75 hectares net) and more than 200 hectares for nature. The city of Rotterdam will take care of land exploitation, while the VN will have managerial control. According to planning, construction activities will begin from 2008 onward. The revenues of the business park will be used to finance nature development. The revenues are estimated at €5 million, while the costs of the park’s development and maintenance are about €30 million, leaving a deficit of €25 million. Because the province has agreed on a combined approach to economy and ecology, Rotterdam decided to continue development in this way, despite the deficit. Rotterdam has assumed the risks involved. In cooperation with the VN, possibilities to reduce or to take away the deficit are being looked after. Part Rotterdam Airport Rotterdam Airport operates as 100 per cent daughter of the Schiphol Group. In the last decades this regional airport has been subject of political discussion several times, its closure being one option considered. After the cancellation of the earlier project,5 in which the airport would function as catalyst, the future seemed gloomy once again. However, things have changed since then, and today, the presence of an airport is increasingly regarded a valuable element of the location climate. Partly as a result of the rise of budget carriers, the number of passengers increased to about 1.2 million in 2004, reaching the limits of growth that had been defined by the State in 2001 by means of noise quota (noise contours and opening hours). To optimize its contribution to the regional economy (business 5

IPNR (Integraal Project Noordrand Rotterdam).

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and tourism), Rotterdam wants the airport to focus on business travel. This strategy is in line with the agreement6 signed in 1998 at the transfer of Rotterdam Airport’s exploitation to the Schiphol Group. In a study into the potential relevance of the airport for the region, the researchers observe that the current supply of destinations and the flight schedule of Rotterdam Airport can not at all be qualified as ‘business-oriented’ (Stratagem, Ecorys and ADECS 2005). According to the study, the city of Rotterdam’s ambition to turn Rotterdam Airport into a business airport is incompatible with the mainport strategy of Schiphol and KLM-Air France. In the meantime, the city of Rotterdam and the Schiphol Group reached an agreement (in 2006), confirming the original agreements. Instead of an operating base for holiday charters, which would be in conflict with the existing agreements, the coming years Rotterdam Airport can be developed into a business airport with 25 European destinations in 2020. Holiday charters will be relocated to other regional airports. This agreement is acceptable for all public actors involved as long as the noise limits are not exceeded. However, in view of the demands of the business travel market (increasing demand for ‘edge-of-day connections’), opening hours will probably be brought up for discussion again. The question is what position the neighbouring municipalities will take in this debate. In cooperation with Rotterdam Airport, Schiphol Real Estate is developing a location for office and business space at the airport’s ground. The plans for this RTM Airpark will be shaped in consultation with the city of Rotterdam. This high-quality office park will offer about 200,000 square meters of office and business space, including shops, hotels, restaurants, conference rooms and meeting facilities. Via this park, Rotterdam Airport participates in the Science Port Holland concept. Part Zestienhoven Polder In the Zestienhoven Polder sub-project, no special form of cooperation can be observed, except for the usual partnerships in the construction of a residential and business district. Nevertheless, we do introduce this element briefly, as it is part of the Noordrand project. This area is located between the airport and the city, and consists of three parts. The west part (Laag Zestienhoven) which is the largest part, will become a park like, watery residential district with 600 dwellings for higher-income groups. The southeast part will become a mixed area where people work and live, with 1200 houses to be constructed in higher densities for moderate-income groups. Here is also space for business (43,000m²) and local services. The third (northeast) part will be made ready in the future (after 2015) for the development of offices, businesses, houses and large-scale facilities, all linked with a the stop of RandstadRail. Part Highway A13/A16 The highways A13 (The Hague-Rotterdam) and the A20 (Gouda-Rotterdam-Schiedam) are heavily congested, and therefore no longer able – without extra measures – to offer the required basic quality for reliable and acceptable travelling times. Because both highways run through the city, they both have a negative effect on the quality of the living environment, the air quality in particular. The construction of a link between the A13 and the A16/A20 (“the 6

In Dutch: Onderhandelaarsakkoord 1998.

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A13/A16”) is considered of crucial importance to tackle the road capacity and environmental problems. To realize this project, city region Rotterdam, the province South Holland and city region The Hague (the legal traffic & transport authorities), and the city of Rotterdam lobby together for State support. Although the necessity of this road is recognized by all actors, the State has not yet decided to advance its construction. One of the reasons is the fact that many large infrastructure projects in the region are currently implemented with high priority. The State has expressed its willingness to bring forward its implementation in case of windfalls. 4 Performance, Output and Outcome of the Partnerships General findings Most partnerships introduced in this case study are in the stage of planning, making it impossible to indicate concrete outputs, let alone contributions to the reinforcement of the city’s and region’s competitiveness (the outcome). Nevertheless, sustainable enhancement of the regional competitiveness is the central goal behind all partnerships discussed. The targets of the individual projects have been concretized to some extent, by an indication of how much space will become available for economic activities and how many houses will be constructed. Moreover, it is specified what kind of economic activities one aims for when it comes to filling this space, and what income groups the houses are intended for. Given the observed deficits in the economic structure, demographic structure, and the quality of the living environment, realization of the projects has to contribute to the improvement of the current situation. Some projects have come into being by means of partnerships (e.g. Schieveen), while other projects benefit from economies of scale through cooperation, and better coordination (e.g. Science Port Holland, Administrative Platform South Wing). It is hoped for that these projects help to improve the region’s competitiveness, but it is unknown to what degree they are able to do so. Direct results from cooperation that are looked after, are mainly qualitative in nature, such as: • • • • •

Prioritizing large scale supra-local and regional projects to qualify for State funding (BPZ partnership); Striving for a stronger market position and avoiding intra-regional competition by coupling similar initiatives (Science Port Holland partnership); Aiming for better coordination to avoid doing things twice (joint plan province and city region); Looking for a win-win situation for economy and nature (Schieveen partnership); Creating conditions for the (supposedly) required economic development and improvement of quality-of-life (elements of the Noordrand project).

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The partnerships introduced will now be assessed according to their (expected) merits. This assessment is mainly based on discussions with relevant stakeholders. South Wing region partnership (BPZ) Most actors involved consider the BPZ partnership as valuable, although smaller municipalities that are not at the table themselves are less enthusiastic. The BPZ indeed reaches its goal to realize coordination and priority setting of projects and programmes at a higher geographic level than it used to be. Particularly in comparison with the lack of results of the partnership for the entire Randstad (Teisman et al. 2005), cooperation seems to be working at South Wing region level. The sense of urgency appears to play a stimulating role in the South Wing region: the lagging economic performance has increased the willingness to cooperate. Moreover, some discussion partners have the opinion that the South Wing region level is more adequate to deal with problems (with respect to the content) than the Randstad (too large) or city region level (too small). The direct link between the programme minister and the representatives of the provinces and municipalities is also appreciated. However, the big test of the partnership’s actual power is yet to come. The coordinating minister for the South Wing region is expecting a more clear-cut choice, not only in terms of timing but in terms of content as well. Meanwhile, the BPZ programme has become larger than those for the three other programme areas, and external advisors have been called in to assist in making clear choices. With a more clear-cut selection of projects, some local governors have to take a step down in favour of the South Wing region, which is often hard to explain to voters. Some discussion partners think that private actors (NGOs included) are insufficiently involved in the strategy development process, although they have been consulted at the annual administrative conference.7 Others argue that governors should first agree on priorities regarding projects, before private actors are called in to assist in the development of more detailed strategies and their implementation. The ‘institutional congestion’ in the Netherlands and the Randstad in particular, is by many considered an unwanted phenomenon. The fragmentation of tasks and responsibilities and the fact that procedures are too involved, slow down decisionmaking and implementation processes. Some discussion partners reason that the BPZ has created another tier (besides the municipality, the city region, the province, and the Randstad), making the administrative system even more congested. Hence, views are clearly differing. A relevant question, also in view of the recently taken initiative to set up a Randstad authority, is whether the ‘sub-regional approach’ (the Randstad being divided into two or three sub-regions) should be continued, or has to be replaced by a Randstad approach. In a European perspective, the Randstad option (despite its failure until now) seems inevitable. Another issue raised by a discussion partner representing the State is the potential threat that BPZ will become victim of its own success. The better BPZ works as 7

In Dutch: Bestuursconferentie.

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the organization to be addressed, the longer the list of priorities will become. The impression is that various local programmes are being incorporated in the State Programme (Zuidvleugel) in order to make them eligible for state support. This way of working could cause disappointments (expectations not being met) and reduce the pace in which ‘real’ high-priority projects are being implemented. Others oppose that and say that BPZ’s goal is just to set priorities, and that it’s up to the State to determine the degree to which the national government is willing and able to cofinance their realization. The question if the competitiveness of the South Wing region or its individual components has increased thanks to BPZ cannot be answered. Competitiveness is, however, the central motive for the partnership. Most projects in the BPZ priority list are still to be implemented. However, the joint agreement on priorities does imply more clearness and reliability concerning the implementation of the investments that are supposed to be needed. Cooperation Province and City Region Rotterdam The two public actors involved in the development of the Spatial Plan Rotterdam Region 2020 are satisfied with their new form of cooperation, which is innovative in the Dutch context. Its success can be partly ascribed to the decision to let the provincial Region Plan areas correspond with city regions. The RR2020 goes one step further than drawing a desired future perspective, as it also includes the drafting of a development strategy. To implement this strategy, coalitions need to be formed, with all kinds of public and private actors. The added value of cooperation is that region and province are jointly backing the plans, and speak with one voice toward the State and municipalities. This form of cooperation helps to avoid doing things twice and promotes better coordination. Some discussion partners noticed that it took quite some time (three years) before the two parties reached an agreement. There had been quite some hurdles to take, but in the end they succeeded to the satisfaction of all actors involved. The effect of this partnership on competitiveness is difficult to assess as well. The aim of this plan is to safeguard the region’s competitiveness, though with a relatively strong emphasis on sustainability. Science Port Holland partnership The Science Port Holland partnership is a bundling of three different plans for the development of business parks. This bundling concerns acquisition, marketing and the issue of land rights. Because the participating actors complement one another in terms of expertise, competence and networks, mutual coordination is stimulated, and economies of scale are realized. There could have been cutthroat competition between the three different initiators (Rotterdam, Delft/TUD and Rotterdam Airport). The State and the actors directly involved are positive about this collaboration, which is broadly supported. However, up to now cooperation has been restricted to acquisition and marketing. With regard to the strategically important issue of land rights, only intentions

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to cooperate exist. These intentions are good, but time will tell if the actors are actually willing to comply with their intentions. A complicating factor could be the circumstance that Delft and Rotterdam belong to different city regions, within which agreements to coordinate development have been made as well. The question is what agreements will get priority. Some discussion partners criticize the level of commitment, which would be too low. To put something really special on the market, they are in favour of going one step further by transferring the management and land development of the three business parks to one organization. To overcome the complicating factor of different city regions and municipalities, such an organization could be led by the province. However, it seems that not all actors support this idea (yet), making it not a realistic option for the moment. Although Science Port Holland aims to strengthen the competitiveness of Rotterdam and its region, little can be said about its performance, as the implementation of the projects has still to begin. Science & Business and Nature Park Schieveen partnership The aim of the Schieveen project is to create a win-win situation for economy and ecology by cooperation between the municipality and a private nature conservation organization (VN). This new form of cooperation demanded a change of mentality from both actors. While in the past, nature and environmental organizations protested against urbanization plans in this, in terms of nature, poorly endowed region, they have now been looking for the most suitable alternative for both functions. After the VN and the municipality had come to an agreement, after some time the province agreed as well, and the required adjustments in the Regional Plan were made. Initially, the partners’ opinions about the zoning of the area were conflicting. Rotterdam wanted to develop the business locations as ‘islands’ in the area, which could have resulted in a very attractive profile. However, the VN only wanted to agree with a strict separation between nature and the business function. Clear conditions for the development were formulated by VN, and Rotterdam agreed with them. This implies that the business park will be designed in a ‘traditional’ way, also functioning as buffer between the infrastructure (the airport included) and the nature park. Some discussion partners argue that the exclusiveness of Rotterdam’s idea has been harmed by the compromise, making competition with other locations heavier. After all, Rotterdam has a limited reputation when it comes to knowledge-intensive activities. A strong formula could have compensated this weakness. For the city of Rotterdam, the combined approach implies a substantial budget deficit on the land’s development. However, Schieveen is the only potential topclass location that can be developed on own land. The city argues that the direct and indirect benefits of this high-grade project will counterbalance the costs. What are the benefits of the cooperation in Schieveen for the actors involved? As far as we know, a cost-benefit analysis that proofs the usefulness is not available. As for the benefits for nature, the VN expects that other species of birds will go there to brood or stay, other types of plants will grow there, and nature will become easier to experience. The economic benefits will become measurable in the future. Much will

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depend on the demand for high-grade locations for knowledge-intensive activities, the availability of competing locations in the Randstad, the pace in which land-issue rights will be sold off, the realization of infrastructure (A13/A16), cooperation in Science Port Holland, and, of course, economic growth. Some doubt if the ambition level can be realized. Some discussion partners have the opinion that the city of Rotterdam finds it difficult to cooperate. The Rotterdam government has the reputation that it prefers to determine and carry out things on its own, while it has to think in completely different concepts in the development of Schieveen. Project developers probably have more know-how in this field. According to some discussion partners, there are signs that Rotterdam is starting to get used to this idea, for instance because of the new approach that the EDBR has adopted. Cooperation Rotterdam Airport The City of Rotterdam and Rotterdam Airport’s management aim to give Rotterdam Airport a business profile. To that end, cooperation with Schiphol, KLM-Air France and possibly also other airlines is required. Meanwhile, the agreement of 1998 in which is stated that Rotterdam Airport will get a business profile has been confirmed. It remains to be seen how RTM Airpark will be developed, considering that Schiphol Real Estate is the developer. Can the interests of Schiphol Real Estate and Rotterdam Airport be harmonized with the interests of Science Port Holland? Anyway, Rotterdam Airport is represented in the steering group that guides the further development and implementation of the cooperation agreement. With regard to Rotterdam Airport there is a need for firm agreements with the State, Rotterdam Airport, Schiphol Real Estate, the airlines, and the neighbouring communities, concerning the airport’s future profile and the development of the business park Challenges that remain with respect to the Noordrand project The province and the city region are worried about the possible lack of coherence between the planning of projects in the area to the north of Rotterdam (Province South-Holland/City Region Rotterdam 2005b). They not only fear that accessibility for certain projects cannot be guaranteed on time because of a delayed realization of infrastructure projects (the A13/A16 highway), but they also foresee internal competition between the various business locations in the South Wing region. According to the RR2020, Schieveen, RTM Airpark and Technopolis all target the same segment of high-grade businesses and offices. Another competitor that will arrive is the business park Oudeland (80 hectares) in the municipality of Berkel and Rodenrijs (very close to Schieveen) which also (partly) targets high-grade activities. The city region and the province are wondering if the planned supply doesn’t exceed demand considerably. Currently, there is an acute shortage of space for economic activities in the region, but this particularly applies to space-consuming port-related activities that are mainly located to the south of Rotterdam. The demand for highgrade locations is lower, and competition is fiercer. To accomplish good profiles and enhance coordination with other projects to be developed in the direct surroundings, the municipalities involved have to take part in a debate on city-region level.

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The province and the city region also state that various actors implement projects that are related to several policy areas. This requires strong programmatic guidance. The city region wants to take the lead in this respect, among others by organizing an ‘administrative round table’ to jointly discuss affairs such as Science Port Holland, the lobby for external investors and developers, and the marketing and preparation of long-term development. One also aims for binding agreements regarding differentiation, priority setting and the phasing of projects in the Noordas (the ‘extended’ Noordrand). Together, the actors have to make a case (within the BPZ and elsewhere) for realizing the infrastructure works as soon as possible. 5 Applying the Research Framework General findings In the present case study, various forms of cooperation have been discussed. Particularly the ones in the field of governance are fairly successful. The BPZ appears to function well in view of its aim: the coordination and priority setting of large-scale supra-local projects and programmes by means of a strategic vision. The actors involved are positive about this new form of cooperation. Comments on this partnership concern the low degree of private-sector involvement and the fact that a new tier (South Wing region level) has been created, with a further increase of consultative structures as consequence. •

•

•

Cooperation between the province and the city region is useful, though not very innovative. Outputs are better coordination, avoidance of doing things twice, and mutual support in relations with the State. Within the Science Port Holland partnership public actors and universities have agreed to cooperate in the development of three business parks. We have observed that the agreements made up to now are appreciated, but that cooperation would have to go some steps further, in order to speak of a really innovative partnership. Furthermore, we should mention the successful partnership in the Noordrand project, where the City of Rotterdam and a nature conservation association work together in a combined nature-and-economy project.

Public-private While cooperation between public actors is increasing, private actors (business and social organizations) are often not involved when it comes to formulating plans and projects. Their involvement is usually only demanded when implementation starts. The various discussion partners have different opinions on the participation of private actors. All of them confirm that private actors hardly take part in the discussions on the projects that we dealt with in this case study, and that things have to change in that respect. The problem is that they do not agree on the question in what phase of the project it would be useful to start cross-sector collaboration. Some of them do

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not see the need to involve private actors already in the phase of preparing plans. Only in the stage of implementation one becomes dependent on private partners, resulting in various coalitions. Many acknowledge that the Rotterdam mentality has for a long time been based on the belief that the city could take care of its own. This mentality is changing currently. Some initiatives of the EDBR, the platform where opinion leaders follow the city’s economic policy critically, are valuable attempts in that direction. Outputs Most of the projects discussed are in an early stage of development, or in the stage of preparing plans. They aim to strengthen the competitiveness of the South Wing region in general and the Rotterdam region in particular by enhancing the location climate and living environment. Most of them have not formulated concrete outputs, some parts of the Noordrand project being an exception. In the latter project, actors strive for concrete goals like more space for businesses and houses, but this project is still in the planning phase. Results to be accomplished by partnerships tend to be strategic, hence qualitative in nature, such as: • • • • • • •

•

•

• •

The priority setting of supra-local projects (BPZ partnership); Striving for an increase in scale, and avoiding intra-regional competition by joint marketing (Science Port Holland partnership); Better coordination to avoid doing things twice (province and city region) Aiming for win-win situations (Schieveen partnership). Context variables The following context variables have contributed to the realization of some partnerships: The relatively weak economic performance of the Rotterdam region and the South Wing region has created a sense of urgency in the region, particularly among representatives of the larger municipalities and the province. This sense of urgency has increased the propensity to cooperate. Rotterdam’s governors consider the skewed population composition a source of serious worry. There is a need for more quality in housing and living, thus making knowledge workers more inclined to opt for this region. If the city becomes more attractive for knowledge workers, more companies are expected to consider the Rotterdam region as potential location. The Noordrand project intends to make a contribution to both elements (the quality of the living and working environment). The changing attitude of the board of a leading environmental organization, which moved from unconditional green space protection to cooperation based on win-win opportunities, was a decisive condition for acquiring political and societal support (sub-project Schieveen). The more or less simultaneous initiatives of three actors wishing to create more space for high-grade business (Science Port Holland). The satisfactory functioning of regional administrations that owe their right to exist to cooperation between municipalities (province and city region).

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Stimulating/obstructing factors Among the factors that stimulated cooperation are some context variables. In addition, the financial incentives from the State have promoted cooperation, not only within the South Wing region, but also between municipalities in the city region administration. In both cases, it is about the distribution of State funds. A potential obstructing factor are the administrative boundaries that can complicate cooperation in cross-border issues (like between Rotterdam and Delft). This aspect can however not be evaluated, because cooperation does not (yet) extend to really strategic matters. The fear to give up autonomy can be an obstruction to coalition forming. Governors have to give account to their voters, and if they think that cooperation can have a negative effect on their own municipality (in whatever way), cooperation to the benefit of a larger entity will be frustrated. This applies to any municipality. An example is the city of Rotterdam that is often accused of patronizing behaviour and having a strong preference to do things on its own, which obstructs partnership development as well. Rotterdam seems only reluctantly willing to work together with other actors. Another example is the development of a business park in the municipality of Berkel and Rodenrijs, on which regional agreement had been reached already, but recently, should preferably be seen in relation to other initiatives such as Science Port Holland. Final remark One discussion partner states that “the strong hostility” between actors (large versus small cities, large cities versus the province, economy versus the environment, etc.) is gone, but that is too early to speak of companionship. Actors increasingly realize that they depend on one another, and therefore have an interest in cooperation. This new way of looking at each other has resulted in good intentions, but not yet in real breakthroughs, such as one management for Science Port Holland, which is only potentially an innovative form of cooperation. References Adviescommissie Zuidvleugel (2000), De Zuidvleugel, van visie naar uitvoering 2000-2010. Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel (1999), Staat van de Zuidvleugel. Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel (2001), De Zuidvleugel in 2001 (Plan van aanpak). Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel (2004), De Zuidvleugel van de Randstad (Conferentie 2003). CBS (2004), Kennis en economie 2003. Onderzoek en innovatie in Nederland. CBS (2005), Grootstedelijke agglomeraties en stadsgewesten afgebakend. EDBR (2005), Rotterdam: Stad van de toekomst. Gemeente Rotterdam (2001), Ruimtelijk Plan Rotterdam 2010.

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Gemeentebestuur Rotterdam (2002), Collegeprogramma 2002–2006. Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2004), Pieken in de Delta. Ministerie van VROM en Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel (2005), Projectenbundel Zuidvleugel. Ministerie van VROM (2006), Nota Ruimte. OBR (2005), Economische Verkenning Rotterdam 2005. Provincie South Holland/Stadsregio Rotterdam (2005a), Ruimtelijk Plan Regio Rotterdam 2020 (Ontwerp). Provincie South Holland/Stadsregio Rotterdam (2005b), Ruimtelijk Plan Regio Rotterdam 2020 (Uitvoeringsprogramma). Provincie South Holland, Gemeente Den Haag, Gemeente Rotterdam (1999), Naar een vitale Zuidvleugel. Stratagem Strategic Research BV, Ecorys Nederland BV en ADECS Airinfra BV (2005), Ontwikkelingsperspectieven Rotterdam Airport. Teisman, van Twist, Schulz en Puma (2005), Stagnatie of transitie. Evaluatie van de Bestuurlijke Samenwerking Randstad. Websites www.dsv.rotterdam.nl www.obr.rotterdam.nl www.stadsregio.nl www.zuidvleugel.nl www.minvrom.nl Discussion partners Ms I. Berger, Rotterdam Development Corporation (OBR) Mr T. den Boer, Vereniging Natuurmonumenten Ms T. Cnossen, Alderman Berkel en Rodenrijs Mr J. Dura, DuraVermeer Group NV Mr N. da Graça, Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR) Mr F.D. van Heijningen, Deputy Province South-Holland Ms T.P. Kools, Ministry of Traffic and Transport Mr I.W. Opstelten, Chairman Stadsregio Rotterdam, Core member BPZ, Mayor of Rotterdam Mr J. Quist, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment Mr V.J.M Roozen, DSV Rotterdam Mr J. Schrijnen, Province South-Holland Mr J.W.J. Wolf, Vice Chairman Stadsregio Rotterdam, Board member BPZ, Mayor of Bleiswijk Mr R.H. J. Wondolleck, Rotterdam Airport

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Chapter 9

The Better Districts Programme of Catalonia: Serra d’en Mena1 1 Introduction Regional cooperation is a rather new topic in Catalonia. Until recently, few initiatives had been taken in this respect. However, the ongoing process of globalization and internationalization has increased the need for regional forms of cooperation in Catalonia as well. Especially urban planning and territorial policies seem to be under pressure due to increasing social segregation. The Catalan Government did not have specific urban policies to address such issues. In 2004 however, the Ministry of Spatial Policies and Public Works (Departament de Política Territorial I Obres Públiques – DPTOP) launched a new act: the District Act. For the first time, the socio-economic development of urban areas in Catalonia received explicit attention. Connected to this new District Act is the foundation of the Better District Program: a subsidy program aimed at motivating municipalities to find local solutions for their socio-economic problems. In this case study, we focus on one of the projects of the Better District Program: Serra d’en Mena. This project is regarded one of the best examples for inter-municipal cooperation in Catalonia. It aims to address socio-economic problems and improve the living conditions and general attractiveness of the area. This project contains the rehabilitation of a border area between the municipalities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet. In total, seven neighbourhoods, covering an area of two square kilometres and inhabiting 90,000 persons, are involved. Commonly, Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet are working on the implementation of the rehabilitation project. We start this case with describing the context in which the District Program and the Serra d’en Mena project are performing (Section 2). Subsequently, the District Program and the Serra d’en Mena project are described in Section 3. Section 4 analyses the output and outcomes of the District Program according to our partnership model. We conclude this case with a confrontation of the program with the research framework. 2 The Context In this chapter, we describe the demographic, socio-economic and administrative context of the region of Catalonia and the cities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de

1

This case study was carried out in May 2006.

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Figure 9.1

Catalonia, Spain

Source: <www.gencat.net> accessed June 2006

Gramenet. This helps us interpret the ongoing developments and cooperation in the Serra d’en Mena project. Geography and demography Catalonia is an autonomous region in the north-eastern corner of Spain, bordered by France and Andorra in the north, Aragon in the west, Valencia in the south and the Mediterranean Sea in the east. The region has almost seven million inhabitants, a number which has been constantly growing over the past decades. The towns along the Mediterranean coast have dominated the development of Catalonia, resulting in a depopulation of the hinterland and a strong concentration of the population along the coastline. Municipalities along the shore have grown into one dense urban area. The strongest population concentration can be found in the capital city of Barcelona, which inhabits 1.5 million people. The wider metropolitan area of Barcelona populates 4.4 million people, meaning that two-third of the total Catalonian population is concentrated in this area (Idescat 2006). The demographic composition shows a balanced population regarding age structure. There are no striking high shares of young or old people. Over the last decade, these shares have stayed more or less on the same level. It has been

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immigration and not a natural increase that has contributed to the population growth of Catalonia. Currently, the share of foreign population in the total population is 8.9 per cent (2005 data), which is slightly higher than the national average of 6.4 per cent. The share of foreigners in the total population of Catalonia has increased strongly over the past few years, coming from 3.5 per cent in 2000 (Idescat 2006). Most immigrants have come from Northern Africa and Southern America. In this Chapter we focus on an area called Serra d’en Mena. This area consists of seven neighbourhoods in the adjacent cities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet: La Pau, La Salut, Sant Joan de Llefià, Sant Antoni the Llefià, Fondo, Santa Rosa, and Raval Safareigs. In total, almost 90,000 people live in this area with a surface of slightly more than two square kilometres. With an average of around 44,000 inhabitants per square kilometre, the area’s population density is very high (Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès 2006a). A typical feature of the area is the hilly environment. Before urbanization started in the 1950s, this region had been an attractive leisure destination for the citizens of Barcelona. During the 1950s and 1960s both cities went through a strong urbanization phase. The population grew tremendously due to the immigration of workers from the southern regions of Spain being attracted by the economic opportunities. From the 1970s until the late 1990s, the cities were in a phase of population decline. Consistent with the demographic developments in Barcelona, the number of citizens in both Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet was decreasing, or at least stagnating. With the entrance to a new century, this trend of decline seemed to be broken and replaced by a new phase of urbanization. Population numbers are increasing again, mainly due to the area’s attractiveness towards immigrant groups from Asia and Northern-Africa. As a consequence, the share of foreigners in the population of Serra d’en Mena increased to about 18 per cent in 2004 (Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès 2006a), which is relatively high in comparsion with the average of 9 per cent in Catalonia and the average of 8 per cent in the province of Barcelona. At the beginning of the urbanization phase in the 1950s and 1960s there was little or no regulation on urban development. This resulted in a chaotic urban pattern in which some houses are built half on the pathways. Moreover, because many Table 9.1

Demographic figures Catalonia, Barcelona, Serra d’en Mena

Population (2005) Population growth (1996–2005) Population/km2 (2005) Share of foreigners (2005) Share of foreigners (2001) Share of 0–16 years old (2004) Share of 65+ years old (2004)

Catalonia

Barcelona (Provence)

Serra d’en Mena

6,995,000 14.8% 217 8.9% 4.6% 14.3% 16.6%

5,226,354 12.9% 677 7.9% 4.3% n.a. n.a.

90,000 n.a. 44,000 18.0% n.a. n.a. n.a.

Source: Idescat, 2006 & Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès, 2006a/2006c

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Figure 9.2

The seven neighbourhoods of Serra d’en Mena

Source: Consell Comarcal del Barcelonés, 2006b

immigrants built their own houses in this period, the quality of the contruction work is relatively low as well. Now, after four to five decades, many of these buildings are ready for deconstruction. Socio-economic context As many other regions in Europe, the Barcelona Metropolitan Region had been struggling with strong (socio-) economic problems related to de-industrialization in the period after the 1960s. High unemployment rates and low economic perspectives led to social problems and deprivation. An intensive urban regeneration process, among others linked to the large spatial investments for the Olympic Games 1992, led to an incredible transformation of Barcelona. The urban economy took an upswing, which affected the wider region positively as well. Currently, the Catalan economy is strongly dependent on the performance of the metropolitan area of Barcelona. Nationally as well, Barcelona has become an important pillar of the economy. The two main cities of Spain, Madrid and Barcelona, add up to one third of the total national gross domestic product. The tertiary sector has become by far the largest sector in the region. Currently, about 60 per cent of the total Catalan economic activity is dedicated to services; especially tourism, transport services and information and communication services contribute to economic growth, generating new jobs. The share of agricultural

The Better Districts Programme of Catalonia: Serra d’en Mena

Figure 9.3

193

Impression of urban structure and quality, Serra d’en Mena

Source: Oficina Tècnica Comarcal del Programa de Barris, 2006

activities has dropped significantly in the last decades, nowadays contributing only 3 per cent to the gross domestic product. Industry, however, is still important for the Catalan econom: the manufacturing, automotive, chemical and food industries employ more than 30 per cent of the labour force. Unemployment rates are currently on a relatively low level. In the last years, unemployment in Catalonia decreased from 10 per cent in 2003 to 7 percent in 2005. Despite this positive development, the unemployment rate among young people (16–24 years) is still very high: almost 16 per cent (in 2005, Idescat 2006). Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet The economy of the cities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet is dominated by industry and manufacturing. However, both cities are typical commuting cities. The majority of the inhabitants work in the city of Barcelona. In both cities unemployment is roughly on the same level as in the city of Barcelona. Despite the decrementing unemployment levels in the Barcelona Metropolitan Region, the Serra d’en Mena area still has relatively high unemployment rates: almost 14 per cent in 2005 (Idescat 2006). In addition to the economic problems related to unemployment, the population of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet has lower economic perspectives due to their relatively low education levels. The service sectors dominating the Catalan

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Table 9.2

Economic indicators of Catalonia, Badalona, Santa Coloma de Gramenet and the Serra d’en Mena area

Unemployment, % of labour force (2005) Unemployment, % 16–24 years old (2005) University degree, % (2001)

Catalonia

Badolona

St Coloma Serra d’en de Gramenet Mena

7.0%

6.7%

6.4%

13.9%

15.9%

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

12.8%

7.5%

6.4%

n.a.

Source: Idescat, 2006

economy require higher education levels. The share of citizens with a university degree is 7.5 per cent in Badalona, and 6.4 per cent in Santa Coloma de Gramenet (2003 data). Compared to the Catalan average of 12.8 per cent, this is relatively low (Idescat 2006). Returning problems and deprived areas Despite the positive economic situation and prospects, Catalonia faces an increase of certain socio-economic problems that had been under control for some decades but now seem to recur. According to Nel·lo (2006), the three main issues in this respect are a low quality of the housing supply, overcrowding and a deficit of social services. These problems especially occur in some deprived areas, increasing the segregation between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ districts in Catalonia. The Serra d’en Mena area is generally considered to be among the most deprived areas of Catalonia. Here, the unemployment rates are high, without considerate expectations for improvement on the short term. Additionally, the population composition is very diverse with a high share of foreigners, while the share of higher-educated people is relatively low and the quality of the housing supply, urban structure and accessibility are relatively low as well. All these factors combined constitute a source for socio-economic problems. Table 9.3 gives an overview of a number of indicators for the degree of deprivation of both the Badalona part and the Santa Coloma de Gramenet part of the Serra d’en Mena area. Causes mentioned are, for example, the unstructured urbanization during the extreme rapid population growth of the 1950s and 1960s resulting in a low quality of urban environment and housing supply. Another factor influencing the return of socio-economic problems is the tight real estate market. Despite the high number of newly built residences, there is still a shortage of housing, leading to very high prices. Additionally, the market is dominated by privately owned housing – only a small part is social housing – which hinders the circulation. Some of these privately owned apartments are not even bought as living residences, but as investment objects. It is said that approximately one third of the total housing stock in the city of Barcelona is not used as a ‘first house’.

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The circumstances described above have resulted in a situation in which low quality places are most attractive as these places are relatively cheap. Lower income groups, and economic immigrants in particular, are attracted to these areas. The logical result is a higher concentration of unemployed people and inhabitants with personal and social problems, which appears to be the case in the Serra d’en Mena area. Administration The administrative structure of Spain and Catalonia is relatively complex, with high autonomy for regional communities and municipalities. This structure originates from the Spanish Constitution of 6 December 1978. This section describes the context of the Catalan administrative structure relevant for urban policies and regional cooperation. Catalan government, province and municipalities The Spanish Constitution of 1978 re-formulated the territorial administrative system into 17 regional communities. Each community has its own autonomous government. Catalonia is one of these autonomous regions and is governed by the Catalan government (Generalitat de Catalunya). This administrative body is responsible for the design, implementation and maintenance of all legislation in Catalonia. The Catalan government is thematically organized into 14 ministries covering among others the areas of agriculture, economy and finance, employment and industry, environment and housing, spatial policies and public works. Two lower administrative levels concern the provinces and municipalities. The municipalities – 946 in Catalonia (2005 data, Generalitat de Catalunya 2006) – are the basic entities of the administrative structure. They represent the citizens politically. Municipalities are responsible for public matters and services and are entitled to draw and implement their own local plans. However, any local plan designed by the municipality has to be finally approved by the regional community, which is the Catalan Government in the case of Catalonia. In the end, the regional government remains responsible. Another local administrative level concerns the provinces of which Catalonia has four: Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Taragona. Provinces are local administrative levels that have been created to group municipalities. They also function as some sort of controlling mechanism, since municipal governors are accountable to the provincial deputies (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006). Each province is subdivided in counties (comarcas). The municipalities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet are situated in the county of Barcelonès, which is part of the province of Barcelona. Other municipalities in the county of Barcelonès are Barcelona, l’Hospitalet de Llobregat, and Sant Adrià de Besòs. The counties do not have any autonomy regarding legislation of drawing plans; their main task is to offer services for the municipalities. Each administrative level has the autonomy over the policy fields that relate best to their interest, with most power for the Catalan Government (as they have legislative power) and the municipalities.

Table 9.3

Indicators for the assessment in aid of the Better District Program Indicators

Badalona

Serra d’en Mena St.Coloma

Processes of urban deprivation and a deficit of services

rental value % housing low quality/ total housing % housing without water/ total housing % housing without sewerage/ total housing % housing higher than 4 plants without elevator/total housing

81.3 6.44% 0.35% 0.39% 65.20%

82.9 6.52% 0.22% 0.43% 76.69%

n.a. 2.60% 0.73% 1.47% 54.90%

Demographic problems

housing per hectare population growth (1998-2003) % social dependence % foreign population/total population

168 1.46% 32.08% n.a.

158 3.16% 28.31% 17.73%

30 9.1% 30.9% 7.0%

Social, economic and environmental problems

(people receiving pension and not contributing/ population) *100 % unemployment of total labour force protected green zones not being executed % population >10y without secondary education

1.80% 13.94% 37.81% 78.11%

1.83% 13.37% 41.66% 76.71%

1.00% 10.2%

non-active population person in risk of social exclusion public transport * less than average supply of public transport * average frequency of lines at least once every 30 min. parking space * shortage of public parking places * less than 50% of households have a private parking place

37.22% 23.19%

33.95% 24.92%

24.0% n.a.

yes no/yes

yes yes

n.a. n.a.

yes yes

yes yes

n.a. n.a.

Deficiency in public/social services

Source: Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès, 2004 (edited)

Catalonia

65,5%

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Cautious change of approach In Catalonia, all administrative levels have always been organized in a sector-oriented way. Recently, however, we can observe a shift to a more integrative and territorial approach. The District Act initiated by the Department of Spatial Politics and Public Works is an example of this new integrative approach as it is aimed at addressing a range of problems that some districts are facing – in both large and smaller municipalities. An integrative approach is increasingly important because many of the issues that municipalities are currently dealing with tend to cross the domains of the sectors that limit the administrative levels. Socio-economic problems such as increasing petty crime are often related not only to ‘inapproriate behaviour of youngsters’, but also to the unemployment levels, the schooling system, social services, and even the quality of the urban environment. Moreover, as the population in Catalonia is strongly concentrated along the shores of the Mediterranean, urban areas are increasingly sliding into each other. Functional urban regions are growing in scale, now covering more than one administrative region. As a consequence, the present urban structure crosses original municipal borders, which requires more cooperation between the involved municipalities and an integrative approach based on functional territorial units instead of a rigid administrative structure based on sectors. Metropolitan cooperation Already in 1974 a metropolitan administrative entity was created: the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation. However, soon after the creation of the autonomous communities, the existing bodies in charge with the government and coordination of Spain’s metropolitan areas were abolished, leading to the dissolution of the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation. The tasks of the Corporation have partially been taken over by new agencies, relying on voluntary cooperation between municipalities, with the Metropolitan Transport Authority and the Metropolitan Water and Waste Treatment Authority as examples. As a counter reaction to the abolishment of the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation, 26 municipalities agreed to cooperate on matters of mutual interest in the newly formed Association of Municipalities of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Oriol Nel·lo explains that “despite the efforts made by these new bodies to coordinate their activities, it is generally admitted that the system of metropolitan administration in Barcelona is inefficient and should be subjected to a far reaching reform” (Nel·lo, forthcoming). Urban policy Regarding town planning, the municipalities are the basic planning entities. They are entitled to draw and implement their own local policies, although regarding land ownership the State retains the authority. However, neither the national authority nor the community authorities (Catalan government) have a general vision for urban planning. The District Act is an attempt to draw attention to urban planning, trying to improve urban planning, to enhance urban quality and to tackle the increasing segregation and spatial disparity.

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Concluding Summarizing, the Catalan community can be seen as a prosperous region. The economic development is flourishing thanks to a good performance of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. However, the residents of Catalonia are also facing a return of ‘old’ socio-economic problems related to housing and social services. Changing demographic structures, relatively high unemployment figures and a deteriorating housing supply have been identified as the causes of these socio-economic problems. Since the problems tend to concentrate in certain areas, segregation between the better off and deprived areas is increasing, which is perceived to be a potential source for social unrest, and which undermines the future attractiveness of Catalonia as a living and working place. The focus of the present Chapter is the Serra d’en Mena project in which seven bordering neighbourhoods in the cities Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet receive subsidy for large-scale urban rehabilitation. This area can be seen as a suburban area of Barcelona and is a typical commuting area. It grew strongly during the 1950s and 1960s, due to the suburbanization of Barcelona. Because of a lack of regulation and urban planning in this period, the arisen districts are of inferior urban quality, suffering from a combination of socio-economic problems. The Serra d’en Mena area is regarded one of the most deprived neighbourhoods of Catalonia. In order to address the socio-economic problems in such deprived areas as Serra d’en Mena and to stop increasing segregation within Catalonia, the Department of Spatial Policies and Public Works of the Catalan government came up with the District Act. Part of this act is the Better District Program which provides subsidies to the deprived areas. The next section describes the Serra d’en Mena project and Better District Program in detail. 3 Serra d’en Mena – The Project The present case study focuses on the Serra d’en Mena project because it is considered one of the best examples of cooperation within the Better District Program. Since the project provides insight into the subsidy programme (they are clearly interrelated), this section describes the motives, objectives and form of cooperation of both the program (Better District) and the project (Serra d’en Mena). Better District Program In order to address the new, or better, returned socio-economic problems several Catalan areas are dealing with, the Catalan Government introduced some new policy instruments. One of those new instruments is the Housing Act, aimed to regulate the real-estate market and to improve the housing supply both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Housing Act intends to introduce preventive measures against socio-economic deterioration on the medium and long term. However, more immediate measures are required as well, in order to ‘correct situations that could

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lead to neighbourhoods into a difficult-to-reverse spiral of physical and social degradation’ (Nel·lo 2006:3). To that end the District Act was introduced in 2004. The most important action resulting from the District Act has been the creation of a fund to support rehabilitation projects for the deprived areas. For a period of four years (2005–2008) the Catalan Government reserved €400 million – €100 million a year – for rehabilitation projects and specific promotion of deprived neighbourhoods. The Catalan Government argues that socio-economic problem can be best addressed at the local level, as municipalities are considered to know better what their citizens need than regional authorities do. Nevertheless, regional commitment and support are still essential for the performance of the municipalities. This idea is well phrased in the motto ‘regional commitment, local leadership and community involvement’. Motives As stated, the Catalan Government would like to improve the socioeconomic balance in the region in order to address spatial segregation and related social unrest. Another motive for the District Act and related subsidy program is to invest in the maintenance of the attractive living and working environment. This will contribute positively to the competitive position of Catalonia in a national and international perspective. By investing in the problem areas of the region, the Catalan Government would like to send out a three-fold message. First, a message to the citizens saying that the government will not allow living conditions to deteriorate in Catalonia. Second, a message to the city councils making clear that the government understands that many of the problems the councils face have a regional, national or even international origin, emphasizing that they don’t stand alone in dealing with the consequences. The last message is to the market, especially to the real-estate market. The Catalan government wants to warn the economic agents who benefit from strong value increases of private real estate. Investing in real estate will become less profitable in order to loosen the current tight real estate market (Nel·lo forthcoming). Selection criteria Each Catalan municipality is allowed to apply for the subsidy provided by the District Act. They can do so by presenting a project proposal. This proposal is assessed by the technical office of the DPTOP on two criteria: (1) the average score on a set of statistical indicators; and (2) the quality and the feasibility of the proposal. Concerning the first requirement, a selection of indicators is formulated by the DPTOP. These are indicators for the degree of deprivation, demographic problems, socio-economic problems and deficiencies in public/social services. If the outcome of this first assessment is positive (implying that the area has sufficient problems), the proposal is also assessed on the second criterion, the quality and feasibility of the plans proposed. The quality of the project is defined by its financial and practical feasibility. Moreover, the DPTOP wants to encourage an integrative approach of the complex socio-economic problems. In this respect, eight themes have been selected which have to be implemented in the project proposal. These themes are: •

Improving public space and green areas;

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Rehabilitation and provision of better facilities and services in buildings (specifically housing) as well as the provision of facilities for common use; Incorporation of information technologies; Promotion of energy efficiency, water consumption and waste management; Equality and emancipation; Accessibility and suppression of architectural barriers; Improving social, urban and economic development; Promoting sustainable urban development

If selected for funding, the municipality receives half of its total investment budget for rehabilitation from the Catalan Government. The remaining half of the investment budget has to be financed by the municipality itself. They may attract other specific subsidies, for example from counties or private investors, as long as these subsidies are not related to other public subsidy programmes. The project period lasts four years (with a maximum delay of two years). The first two stages in the bidding process were held in 2004 and 2005 respectively, honouring grants to 30 projects. Expectations are that another 30 projects will be granted in 2006 and 2007. The projects target areas scattered all over Catalonia, although we can observe a clear concentration of projects along the coastline, as this is the most densely populated area and consequently, the area with the most deprived neighbourhoods. Except for the city of Barcelona, which is allowed to submit two projects a year, each municipality can bring in one project a year only. The size of a project area is not limited by administrative borders and can therefore include several neighbourhoods. Objectives The objective of the District Act fund for renovation and promotion of deteriorated urban areas is twofold. First, the government wants to improve the economic, social and environmental situation and diminish spatial segregation, thus enhancing spatial (territorial) balance in the province of Catalonia. Such a balance is expected to lead to increasing attractiveness for both residents and investors, improving the competitive position at regional, national and European level. Second, the Catalan government wants to foster cooperation and participation between public authorities by giving preference to project proposals that aim to implement their plans in cooperation with neighbouring municipalities or other public authorities such as a county. Moreover, the program stimulates cooperation between departments of the Government of Catalonia, which can be observed in practice. Gradually, other departments – besides the initiator, DPTOP – are gradually linking up their policies and actions to the Better District Programme. A seminar on the program, held in May 2006, was attended by the departments of Environment and Housing, Health, Presidency, Employment and Industry, Culture, Welfare and Family Affairs, Institutional Relations and Participation. Some of these departments have become actively involved in the District Program, for example with the programmes for housing, health, women, employment, culture, immigration, and community vitalization. When not yet actively involved, they showed interest and were enthusiastic to intervene in the program in the future.

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Outcome Though the Better District Program was initiated only recently (in 2004), 30 neighbourhoods have already been selected for funding. As said above, another 30 will be granted subsidy in 2006 and 2007. The first projects are about to be implemented in 2006 and 2007 and actual results are underway. What the impact will be on the general socio-economic climate in Catalonia, in other words whether or not the goals of stopping the ongoing segregation will be met, remains to be seen. The DPTOP is controlling the outcome and performance of the projects of the Better District Program. With help of its own technical office and of INCASOL (the Catalan Institute for Land), the quality of the physical measures taken is inspected. Moreover, the department checks whether the projects keep their promises and spend the subsidies as agreed. Serra d’en Mena One of the projects granted by a subsidy of the Better District Program is Serra d’en Mena. As stated, this area – consisting of seven neighbourhoods covering the municipalities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet – is suffering a combination of interrelated socio-economic problems (see Section 2). On 4 May 2005, a cooperation agreement for rehabilitation of the Serra d’en Mena area was signed between the Catalan Government, both municipalities and the county council. Serra d’en Mena is the first (and so far only) project within the Better District Program that involves a partnership between two municipalities and the county of Barcelonès. As stated, the area involved covers a border zone and the problems tormenting this area cross this border. In order to effectively address these problems, the municipalities found cooperation indispensable. Serra d’en Mena is granted with a subsidy of €18 million. This is half of the total budget, meaning that the municipalities commonly had to add another €18 million bringing the total investment budget on €36 million. The project period is 2005– 2008 (with a possibility of delay of two years maximum) Objectives The main objective of both municipalities is to change the Serra d’en Mena areas from a peripheral location into a new local centre for the neighbourhoods of both municipalities. They want to achieve this by renovating and rehabilitating the physical area, but also by investing in social issues and economic development. The main issues to be addressed are: the improvement of accessibility; social cohesion; environmental quality; and socio-economic dynamics (Consell Comarcal the Barcelonès 2004). As some of the problems are interrelated, a package deal of actions has been programmed concerning the following issues: • • •

Strengthening the connection between the neighbourhoods and NorthBarcelona; Improving the road system by opening new roads; Improving the sections of the side streets of the Circumval·lacio;

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Improving the mobility of pedestrians and abolish architectural barriers; Creating and improving public spaces and renovating public facilities; Taking actions for the demolishment of houses without a minimum of living conditions; Rehabilitating common areas in buildings; Promoting sustainability in urban development; Giving an impulse to social cohesion; Promoting community involvement and giving help and financial means to the various associations in the neighbourhoods, and Stimulating economic activity.

Concrete project plan The main action defined by the project is the rehabilitation of the Passeig de Circumval·lacio, which is the central street – the ‘backbone’ – in the area and the border between both municipalities. As both municipalities have always been faced backwards, local governments have for long neglected this border area. As a consequence, problems have accumulated, raising the need for an integrative approach. Several side streets of the Circumval·lacio have been included in the rehabilitation project as well. Measures that have been defined focus on the improvement of the urban structure, aiming to improve the quality of the housing stock. First, by demolishing the most deteriorated premises and replacing them by new apartment blocks. And second, by renovating and refurbishing common areas in existing housing blocks. The DPTOP demands that a certain share of the newly built housing stock is social housing, in order to restore the balance at the real estate market. Many attention is also given to the improvement of the accessibility of this hilly area. The project intends to improve street patterns and to reduce the number of parking places in order to create space and order in the streets. Figure 9.4 gives an example of the current and the future situation in two streets. Architectural barriers (houses at the side walks, stairways, etc.) will be overcome by the demolishment of some buildings and the installation of escalators. Accessibility will also be improved by strengthening the supply of public transport. Serra d’en Mena wants to increase the connection with the northern districts of Barcelona. Next to these physical measures, social and economic issues are addressed as well. The project promotes sustainability, social cohesion and the development of the community. A small part of the initiatives of this type remain somehow linked to urban and physical improvement. For instance, it is planned to rehabilitate the Civic Centre of the neighbourhood (where courses, events and meetings for the citizens are organized) and to create a new space to promote cooperation between social groups of the neighbourhood through socio-cultural activities. The more specific social interventions include very innovative actions as the “Genre use of urban space” that tries to stimulate the women (and specifically immigrant women) to be more present in the public space by organizing itineraries in the neighbourhood. Interventions that are more traditional include support to infants and youngsters, promotion of participation of citizens in the Neighbourhood Councils, or to create an Observatory for the Social Exclusion. However, it must be said that these are proposals of the project and it is not still clear how are they going

The Better Districts Programme of Catalonia: Serra d’en Mena

Fiture 9.4

203

Current and future situation accessibility and urban structure

Source: Oficina Tècnica Comarcal del Programa de Barris, 2006

to be implemented. In Santa Coloma social and economic initiatives account for €311,000, while in Badalona €1 million were budgeted for these kind of activities. (Consell Comarcal de Barcelonès 2006a) Currently, the planning phase is finalized and the project management is about to start the first stages of implementation. Form of cooperation As stated, the Serra d’en Mena is the first project within the Better District Program where several public actors work together on the improvement of an area. Involved are: the DPTOP (as part of the Government of Catalonia), the city councils of both Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet and the county council of Barcelonès. The cooperation is on a voluntary basis. Both municipalities wanted to cooperate in the project in order to improve the effectiveness of the rehabilitation. However, despite the promotion of the DPTOP for increasing cooperation among public authorities, it seemed impossible to hand in one project proposal for both municipalities. Consequently, each city council had to hand in their own version of the project proposal, which, obviously, was similar to the one of the partner municipality. Regarding project management, this implies that each municipality has to have its own project manager.

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As the actor giving the subsidies, the DPTOP is the not involved in the planning or the implementation of the Serra d’en Mena project. They are controlling (with help of their Technical Office and INCASOL – the Catalan Institute for Land) the process, outputs and outcomes of the project. The county council of Barcelonès has a double role in this partnership. They are functioning as an intermediary between the interests of Badalona and Santa Coloma. Besides, they contribute financially with an amount of €3 million for the physical renovation of the Circumval.lació, reducing the total contribution of both municipalities to €15 million. The county council is not responsible for the planning or the implementation. As turned out from the interviews, Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet already have a history in cooperation: in the early 1990s they opted for a subsidy which they did not obtain. However, this cooperation turned out to be a good basis for a partnership in the URBAN I programme, a fund they were granted. This URBAN project was mainly based on improving the quality of housing and public space. Indeed some parts of the neighbourhoods have improved, but for structural (and more effective) improvements, more investments were required. Some interview partners see this the Serra d’en Mena project as a follow-up for the URBAN project. Promotion of cooperation One of the aims of the District Act is to promote and foster cooperation between public authorities. In order to increase the attractiveness for city councils to form a partnership with other (public) authorities, the DPTOP granted a commonly developed project proposal in the Better District Program with extra credits, thus increasing the chances for subsidy. In practice, it appears that until now, only the Serra d’en Mena project is actually formed based on a partnership between public authorities. Whether or not this partnership between Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet is the result of the active promotion by the DPTOP is doubtful, as both cities have a history in cooperation. Another issue in this respect is that the administrative organization of the Better District Programme seems insufficient to deal with partnerships. Public authorities that want to cooperate, still have to hand in individual project proposals, which are separately assessed on the quantitative indicators for deprivation. This has already led to the situation where one of the actors in a partnership was granted the subsidy, while the other actor was not2, despite the fact that the expected effectiveness and outcome of the commonly proposed project would have been higher than when implemented in one municipality only.

2 The municipalities Canovelles and Granollers wanted to cooperate in regenerating a deprived area. However, Granollers scored too high in the assessment of the quantitative indicators for deprivation and therefore could not attend the second round (the assessment of the quality and feasibility of the proposal). Canovelles was eventually granted with the subsidy.

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Partnership model In this section we analyse the Serra d’en Mena project with help of our partnership model. Although we focus on the project (a concrete example of regional cooperation), we take into account the fact that it is part of a larger programme. Scope of the partnership The first element is the scope of the partnership, which can relate to both the aims of the partnership and the role of the partnership. In both aspects, we could say that the Serra d’en Mena partnership has a broad scope. The partnership aims to manage the rehabilitation of the Serra d’en Mena area in the field of accessibility, social cohesion, environment and economics. The partnership itself is voluntary and project based. Its role in the project is broad. The municipalities have commonly taken the initiative for the rehabilitation of the area and are commonly responsible for half of the total investment budget, the project design and the project implementation. Geographic scale The second element is the geographic scale. This can be defined by either looking at the participating partners or at the aims of a partnership. In this case, the partnership is constituted with the aim to improve the situation in the Serra d’en Mena, an area consisting of seven neighbourhoods within two cities just north of Barcelona. The area covers approximately two square kilometres. In view of regional cooperation, this scale is rather local. However, the Serra d’en Mena project is explicitly part of the Better District Program, which aims to improve and promote deteriorated districts anywhere in Catalonia. The ultimate goal is to stop ongoing segregation and improve the socioeconomic balance in the whole community of Catalonia. Thus, for the program the geographic scale is broader. The choice for the relevant geographical scale is important, especially concerning the rehabilitation of deprived areas. If the scale gets too large it is difficult to tackle the local problems in an efficient way. A scale that is too small limits the influence of the measures taken and increases the chances of relocating rather than solving socioeconomic problems. Besides, deprived areas could benefit from positive spill-over of nearby located attractive neighbourhoods, which influences the size of a project area as well. Actors involved Concerning the third element – the actors involved – we already said that the main actors are the municipalities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet, the Government of Catalonia presented by the Department of Spatial Policies and Public Works (DPTOP), and the county council of Barcelonès. The DPTOP is involved as co-funder, being responsible for half of the investment budget. The county council is involved as investor, but also as intermediate concerning the interests of both municipalities. Both municipalities are commonly responsible for the implementation of the project. The partnership is therefore an example of a publicpublic cooperation. No private actors are involved (except for the enforcement of the physical adjustments).

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The DPTOP, the initiator of the Better District Program, aims to increase the involvement of other departments of the Catalan Government. Until recently the DPTOP was the only department in this integral territorial approach against deterioration. Lately other departments such as health and the presidential department have committed themselves to the project as well. Degree of formality Looking at the organizational structure (institutionalization, governance) and the legal decision-making power, we can assess the degree of formality (the fourth element of the partnership model). All actors in the partnership have committed themselves to the project on a voluntary basis. The organizational structure is formal, with written agreements on desired outputs and outcomes. Every six months, the actors meet to discuss the results achieved and project’s progress. It is clear that this partnership is project-based and it is therefore not a decision-making body. Legal decision-making power is limited. Degree of political influence The degree of political influence (the fifth element) concerns the degree to which the partnership can influence political decision-making. Legally, this partnership has no decision making power and has no influence on political decision-making either. Indirectly however, it could be that the personal contacts between all involved actors (DPTOP, the county and both municipalities) lead to better understanding of each other’s interests and needs, resulting in better fine tuning between local and regional policies. As all administrative levels are involved in the Serra d’en Mena project and as the project is by many considered an example for cooperation between public authorities, some indirect and bottom-up influence on the future content of the District Act might be apparent. However, it is the government of Catalonia that sets the framework for rehabilitation and cooperation, and municipalities can only adapt to this framework. Democratic content Although the partnership is rather formal, the democratic content does not fully apply here. Representatives of the involved public authorities form the partnership. These representatives are appointed and have not been voted for this function by the population. The democratic content is therefore low. However, citizens have been involved in the planning of the rehabilitation project, as the outcomes of the plans were presented at informal information meetings. During these meetings, citizens could comment on the plans. For instance they criticized the strong decrease in the number of parking lots. Partly due to this involvement it can be said that the social support for the project is high. Financial power The dimension of financial power related to the budget of the organization, but also on its freedom of spending and the ability to attract or mobilize other financial resources. In this case, the financial power is moderate. The budget of the organization is high: in total €36 million is available for a project period of four years. However, the partnership is depending on the subsidy of Catalonia and the spending of this budget is appointed to the project plan. Whether or not this money

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is spent as calculated, and whether or not the projects are being implemented as promised, is being controlled by special institutions. There is little freedom to change the expenditure during the project period. Nevertheless, as long as not directly linked to another funding program (on regional, national or EU-level), the organization is free to acquire other financial resources. In fact, it has done so by attracting an extra subsidy from the county council of Barcelonès. Leader In the partnership of Serra d’en Mena, the municipalities of Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet have commonly taken the initiative to bid on the subsidy program related to the District Act. We could say that they share leadership in this form of cooperation. The county council has an intermediary role, being an advisor for both municipalities in case of issues of conflicting interest. Some interviewed persons state that the role of the county council in the initial phase was larger as they put the topic on the local agenda, brought the mayors of both municipalities together and created interest with the promise of a €3 million subsidy. Regarding the formulation of the District Act and the Better District Program, the leading role is at the DPTOP. Internal organization The organization of Serra d’en Mena is non-hierarchical. Two project leaders are commonly leading the project: one from Badalona, one from Santa Coloma de Gramenet. They have to report their progress to both municipalities, to the county council and twice a year to the DPTOP/ Better District Programme office.

4 Performance, Output, Outcome In this section, we discuss the performance, output and outcome of both the Serra d’en Mena Project and the Better District Program. Because of the recent enacting of the District Act (2004), it is too early to make a complete evaluation. Therefore, this section mainly assesses the expected performance, output and outcome of the program and the project. Serra d’en Mena Looking at the fact that the Serra d’en Mena project is granted with a subsidy of 50 per cent of the total investment budget, the performance of the cooperation between Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet during the preparation of the project proposal appears to be good. Despite the official individual proposals, both Badalona and Santa Coloma made successful efforts to come to one vision for the area’s development and design one project proposal. The county council had helped with the cooperation process as an intermediary actor. The performance of this form of cooperation in the next phase, the implementation phase, remains to be seen. The project is running for too short a period to make any valuable analysis.

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Some discussion partners stated that this form of cooperation already contributed to an improvement of mutual understanding between the two municipalities, the county council and the Catalan government. We therefore argue that a concrete cooperation project on a low geographical scale such as Serra d’en Mena can contribute positively to further cooperation and mutual understanding on a broader spatial level. One concrete project could act as a catalyst for future regional cooperation. At the time of the visit of this case study, the first measures of the project proposal were about to be implemented: the first housing blocks were soon to be renovated and the inhabitants of houses on the ‘demolishment-list’ were being informed about the plans. However, the first concrete outputs are expected in 2007. The full impact of these measures will take more years to observe. Additionally, discussion partners state that it is not realistic to expect all problems to be solved at the end of the project term (2008). The scale and scope of the problems are considered too large to address in such a short period of time and with a budget of ‘only’ €36 million. The Serra d’en Mena project focuses on the most urgent matters in the area. It is likely to expect more investments to be required on the long term in order to fully tackle the problems in this deprived area. For the Serra d’en Mena project, expectations are that the most urgent problems will be successfully addressed in the coming period. However, some problems have an origin on a higher level than the local level. For example, the tight (regional) housing market is limiting the housing possibilities for lower- en middle-income classes. Another issue is the high concentration of immigrants in certain neighbourhoods (often the lower quality areas where housing prices are relatively low) causing social frictions. A dedicated regional, national and in some cases even European policy may be necessary for a more sustainable solution. Formally, the project proposal is based on eight themes that range from the improvement of public space and public facilities to the improvement of gender equality and the promotion of energy efficiency. However, discussion partners criticize the strong focus of the actual project implementation on the physical aspects of rehabilitation. Most actions planned relate to the rehabilitation of existing housing blocks, breaking up urban patterns and improving accessibility. Fewer measures are scheduled to tackle the problems of, for example, immigration without integration, unemployment, lack of social safety, and gender equality. Obviously, these problems are more difficult to address and the output is less easy to assess, let alone the outcome. But, although the objectives are ambitious, the Better District Programme stresses the importance of an integral approach, in order to come to a sustainable solution for the current socio-economic problems. It is therefore important that these social and economic aspects are being elaborated in a more concrete project proposal as well. Better District Program For Catalonia, a new element of the Better District Program is the integrative approach. Since the subsidy program is organized by the DPTOP, the spatial aspects of socio-economic problems in deprived areas are well covered. Economic, social,

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and health issues, however, are still less enclosed in the programme. Nevertheless, some initiatives to involve other departments of the Catalan government have been taken and some departments have already committed themselves to the programme. Additional subsidies have become available for the projects that have already been granted by the Better District Program. This can be considered a good step in the right direction. However, a fully integrative approach with the cooperation of all relevant departments would be desirable. This would help increase the quality of the project plans and guarantee a truly integrative approach to problems in the deprived areas. A following step in stimulating cooperation among all relevant actors, would be the involvement of private actors in the partnerships. Currently, the encouragements of the Catalan government for more partnerships are limited to cooperation among public authorities. Especially in the process of urban rehabilitation, many private actors have valuable knowledge and experience as well, for example project developers or housing corporations. They could contribute positively to not only the implementation of the projects, but also to planning and creation of a vision for development. Another issue regards the spatial level of the rehabilitation projects. As stated before, the discussion partners mentioned the case of Canovelles and Granollers, where both municipalities commonly proposed a project plan but where only one of them was granted the subsidy, due to the strict assessment on quantitative indicators for deprivation. The reason was that one of the municipalities was not ‘deprived’ enough (their average score on the statistical indicators was too good). This is understandable, as the DPTOP needs some objective selection criteria for granting the subsidies. However, quantitative selection criteria do not take into account the fact that deprived areas could gain from the cooperation with ‘better’ neighbourhoods and vice versa. A deprived area could be helped by the success and the positive image of a well-performing neighbouring district. On the other hand, the improvement of the deprived district can lead to a positive spill-over and have a synergy effect on the development of a broader area than the district alone. Instead of refusing the ‘better half’ of the partnership the subsidy (which in fact could also be seen as a hindrance of regional cooperation), it would be advisable to take this into account in the selection procedure of future project proposals. Concerning the selection procedure, there was some mild criticism on this aspect among some discussion partners. All agree that it is unrealistic and undesirable to give the subsidy to all neighbourhoods that score high on the deprivation ‘index’. A wellfounded project plan, explaining the municipal strategy, is essential. Simultaneously, some argue that smaller municipalities are put at a disadvantage because of this system. Smaller municipalities generally do not have the financial means, the human capacity and experience to design a project proposal integrating all aspects of the complex socio-economic problems. Consequently, they are believed to have less chance to be granted with a subsidy. However, we argue that a lack of financial means and/or human capacity by smaller municipalities could also be an incentive to form new partnerships and make use of each other’s knowledge and experience.

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5 Applying the Research Framework Our research framework helps us to identify the stimulating and obstructing factors for regional partnerships in Catalonia. Economic context The District Act and the related Better District Program can be seen as a first attempt of the Catalan government to stop the growing social segregation and generate spatial balance within the region. This is believed to be necessary in order to sustain attractive and competitive for both citizens and economic activities. Despite generally good economic growth perspectives for the whole region, re-emerging socio-economic problems in certain deprived neighbourhoods throughout Catalonia have created a sense of urgency for cooperation both within and between public authorities. Due the complexity of these problems, an integral approach and the commitment of all involved actors is required. Moreover, the need for a regional instead of local approach of problems and opportunities has enlarged, due to the growing functional urban regions as a result of the urbanization process and the related trespassing of existing municipal borders of the functional urban region. Political administrative context The growth of functional urban regions has political and administrative consequences as well. Politically, there never used to be much interest for regional or urban development in Catalonia. Most issues related to spatial development were dealt with at the local level, some by the Catalan government. However, as stated, the process of urbanization and the growth of functional urban regions have led to a situation in which many developments and issues cross existing administrative borders, which increases the need for regional politics. Forming new types of cooperation between public authorities are one way of dealing with this new situation. Motives The main aim of the Better District Program is to stop ongoing spatial segregation by investing in deprived areas. The District Act provides the Catalan government with an instrument (subsidies) that encourages municipalities with deprived areas to actively address the complex problems they are facing. The subsidies related to this program can be used for investments in social, economic and physical measures. The Catalan government tries to stimulate the formation of partnerships among public authorities by giving the project proposal extra credits (and thus higher chances for receiving the subsidy) when the project plans will be implemented in cooperation between two or more public authorities. In practice however, it appears difficult for two (or more) municipalities to bring in a joint proposal. The proposals have to be handed in individually and are assessed individually as well. The Serra d’en Mena project is the first example where both municipalities have been granted the subsidy, but other examples show that only one of the two municipalities in the partnership

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has been granted the subsidy. This may have negative impacts on the outcomes of the project, as part of the planned measures will not be implemented. Partnership among public authorities can bring extra value and increase the outcomes of the project, as long as the problems are tackled at the right spatial level. Objectives The main objective of the Better District Program is to stop and diminish the growing spatial segregation by investing in most deprived areas. The complexity of the problems requires an integral approach. In order to stimulate this integral approach, the DPTOP (Catalan department for spatial development and public works) has selected eight themes (a.o. quality public space, accessibility, facilities, emancipation, social and economic development), which must all be covered in the project proposal of the municipality. As the DPTOP has the lead in the program, the spatial and physical elements are well represented in the program. However, the integral approach they aim for requires the involvement of other departments as well. Recently, several departments (health, economic development, etc.) have committed themselves to the program. This is a good start for a better integral approach in the future. Moreover, this development helps to overcome the psychological barriers between all departments (they are considered highly autonomous and are not used to cooperation with each other). The deficiency of an integral approach of the socio-economic problems in the deprived areas can also be seen in the Serra d’en Mena project. Here, all eight themes are being covered in the project proposal. In practice however, the focus is on the physical improvements of houses, public places and accessibility. In order to achieve the expected outcomes of the project, social and economic issues require more attention as well. Partnership model As stated, the Serra d’en Mena project is currently the only project within the Better District Program where public authorities formed a partnership in order to rehabilitate the deprived area. In this case, it concerns two municipalities who get support from the county council as well. The need for cooperation was initiated by the context, as both municipalities faced the same kind of problems in an area at their shared border containing seven neighbourhoods. Besides, cooperation was a logical step for the two municipalities as they already had a history in cooperation with the European URBAN I program. Because of the recent start of the Better District Program (2004) and the Serra d’en Mena project (2005), it is not possible to assess any concrete outputs or outcomes yet. The implementation of the first measures has only just started. However, if this partnership between Badalona and Santa Coloma de Gramenet in the Serra d’en Mena project turns out to create successful outputs and outcomes, it could function as an example for other municipalities.

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Finally The Catalan government acknowledges the importance of a balanced spatial socioeconomic development. The District Act and Better District Program provide the government with new instruments to support such developments. This explicit urban policy is quite new and innovative for Catalonia. The special attention for urban development on a regional level can be seen as breeding ground for future regional cooperation, which is indirectly already incorporated in the Better District Program (the promotion of cooperation both within and between public authorities). However, from the perspective of ‘new forms of regional cooperation’, we observe that at this moment there is only one concrete example of regional cooperation with respect urban regeneration: the Serra d’en Mena project. We can be critical about the regional scale of the partnerships (two municipalities are involved; the actual project area covers two square kilometres) and about the extent to which the success of this partnership is dependent on subsidies from the Catalan government (being the main incentive for cooperation). However, any positive outcomes of the Serra d’en Mena project could be used as example and encouragement for other municipalities to start looking across traditional administrative borders and look for opportunities and synergies through cooperation. The Catalan government could help this process by better facilitating the possibilities for regional cooperation and by promoting the involvement of private actors in the future as well.

References Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès, Ajuntament de Badalona & Ajuntament de Santa Coloma de Gramenet (2004), Projecte d’Intervenció Integral dels 7 Barris Fronterers de la Serra d’en Mena. Barcelona: Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès (in Catalan). Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès (2006a), Observatori dels 7 barris de la Serra d’en Mena. Informe 1. Barcelona: Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès (in Catalan). Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès (2006b), Presentation held at the Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès at 9 May 2006 by Mister J. de la Varga. Consell Comarcal del Barcelonès (2006c), Informe 2. Zones Altes de la Serra d’en Mena. Generalitat de Catalonia (2006), Organización administrativa del territorio (accessed May 2006). Idescat (2006), Statistical Institute of Catalonia. Municipal files < http://www.idescat. net/territ/BasicTerr?TC=1&V0=1&V1=MUNICIPI> (accessed May 2006). Nel·lo, O. (1998), ‘Spain. Chapter 14’, in: L. van den Berg, E. Braun and J. van der Meer (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Region. Responses to urban issues in the fifteen member states (Aldershot: Ashgate). Nel·lo, O. (forthcoming), ‘Changing century, changing cycle? Large Spanish cities on the threshold of the XXI century’, in L. van den. Berg, , E. Braun and J. van der Meer (eds) (forthcoming) National Urban Policies.

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Nel·lo, O. (2006), Against urban segregation and for social cohesion: Catalan urban district act. Seminar ‘Periferie come banlieues?’ 30-31 March 2006, Ca’Tron. Instituto Universitario di Architectura di Venezia. Oficina Tècnica Comarcal del Programa de Barris (2006), La Revista de la Serra d’en Mena. Comença la transformació de Circumval.lacio. Barcelona: Oficina Tècnica Comarcal del Programa de Barris.

Discussion Partners Mr R. Botey, Technical Office of the DPTOP/Better District Program Management Office Ms D. Fibla, Badalona, project leader Serra d’en Mena Mr E. Garcia, INCASOL - Catalan Institute for Land Mr O. Nel·lo, Department of Spatial Policies and Public Works (DPTOP) Mr P. Picorelli, INCASOL - Catalan Institute for Land Mr J. de la Varga, County Council Barcelonès

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Chapter 10

Porto’s Experience with the Serralves Foundation1 1 Introduction The Serralves Foundation owns and manages the Serralves Museum of Contemporary Art, the largest cultural centre in the north of Portugal. Designed by Álvaro Siza Vieira, Porto’s most renowned architect, the museum includes an auditorium, a library, a bookshop and leisure areas. The foundation is also owner of the Serralves Park, a twentieth century modernist park with architecturally designed gardens, and the Casa de Serralves, an art deco house designed by Cahrles Siclis and José Marques da Silva. Along with the many programmes aimed at promoting the park as an artistic place, there is a gardening workshop/school. The museum is the second largest (in terms of visitors) of Portugal, just behind the Coach Museum (Museu Nacional dos Coches) in Lisbon. The Serralves Foundation has been selected as case study of our research because of its ownership structure. The owners are the Portuguese State and a group of about 130 companies (the founders). It is considered Portugal’s first experience with a public-private partnership of this kind. One of the aims of the foundation is to promote the interest for contemporary art and environmental issues among the local population. In our analysis that follows we will try to put the experiences with Serralves in a broader perspective. The main aim is to discuss the role of the foundation in the governance and development of the metropolitan region, with a clear focus on (cultural) tourism and the creative industry. In section 2, we present a general profile of the metropolitan region, discussing the most relevant context-specific factors. Section 3 introduces the partnership model of Serralves, and analyses the motives of the participating actors. The performance of the partnership (its output and outcome) and the challenges that remain come across in section 4. Section 5 confronts the observations with the research framework, and draws some conclusions.

1

This case study was carried out in August 2005.

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Figure 10.1 The Serralves Museum

Figure 10.2 Casa de Serralves

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2 The Metropolitan Region of Porto Demography and economy Porto (also referred to as Oporto) is the second largest city of Portugal, with a population of 1.5 million in the metropolitan area. The city is located in the north of Portugal, on the northern bank of the Douro River, just in the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. Porto is sometimes nicknamed ‘Capital of the North’, being the largest city in the relatively highly industrial northern part of Portugal, which counts approximately 3.5 million inhabitants. The greater metropolitan area consists of 14 municipalities (see Table 10.1). With a population of 263,131 and a surface of 41.66 square kilometres the municipality of Porto is relatively small. Five other municipalities (Gondomar, Maia, Matoshinos, Vila Nova de Gaia and Santa Maria da Feira) count more than 100,000 citizens, Vila Nova de Gaia being even (somewhat) larger than Porto. Population and employment statistics show that Porto finds itself in a stage of suburbanization. In a ten-year period (1991–2001), the municipality of Porto has lost more than 13 per cent of its population and almost 10 per cent of its jobs. Nevertheless, the municipality of Porto is still an important centre of employment in the region (with a share of 35 per cent), particularly considering its small size. Although the other municipalities have their own labour market, they are still

Table 10.1

Municipalities of the Porto Greater Metropolitan Area (PGMA)

Municipality

Porto Espinho Gondomar Maia Matosinhos Póvoa do Varzim Valongo Vila do Conde Vila Nova de Gaia Santo Tirso Trofa Arouca Santa Maria da Feira São João da Madeira Total (PGMA) Source: INE (2001)

Area (sq km)

Population (2001)

Density (Inhab/sq km)

41.5 21.1 131.4 83.2 61.9 82.1 75.8 149.00 168.7 135.6 72.5 328.2 215.2 8.00

263,131 33,701 164,096 120,111 167,026 63,47 86,005 74,391 288,749 72,396 37,581 24,227 135,964 21,102

6340.51 1597.20 1248.83 1443.64 2698.32 773.08 1134.63 499.27 1711.61 533.89 518.36 73.82 631.80 2637.75

1574.20

1,551,950

985.87

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Table 10.2

Population and employment trends in the Porto Metropolitan Area (PMA)1 Population (inhabitants) Change 1991– 2001

Share in the PMA

263,131 –13.0% 997,549 15.3%

2001

Porto (core) Other municipalities (ring) Total

1,260,680 8.0%

Employment (employees) Change 1991– 2001

Share in the PMA

20.9% 79.1%

218,464 –1.5% 392,304 20.5%

35.8% 64.2%

100.0%

610,768

100.0%

2001

11.6%

Source: INE, 1991 and 2001 (census) 1 The Porto Metropolitan Area consists of 9 municipalities, while the Porto Greater Metropolitan Area consists of 14 municipalities.

Table 10.3

Gross Domestic Product at market prices per capita (in thousands)

Portugal Norte Lisboa e Vale do Tejo

1995

2003

Change 1995–2003

8.06 6.84 10.4

12.5 9.88 16.4

52.4% 41.1% 53.3%

Source: INE (2004)

functionally dependent on Porto in terms of employment, with a significant number of commuting movements (Da Costa Monteiro de Carvalho 2005). In economic terms, the northern region (‘Norte’) is lagging behind the rest of the country. Table 10.3 demonstrates that the region’s Gross Domestic Product at market prices per capita is below the national average. The Lisbon region, on the contrary, has a much better performance. And when we look at the increase of the GDP between 1995 and 2003, it turns out that the northern region is again outperformed by the Lisbon region, and the country as a whole. The economic problems of Porto can also be illustrated by looking at the unemployment figures (see Table 10.4). In the greater metropolitan area of Porto (PGMA), 7.51 per cent of the labour force is unemployed (2001 data), which is considerably larger than the national percentage (6.8), though slightly lower than the number for the Greater Lisbon area (LGMA: 7.1 per cent). The northern region has a somewhat better performance with an unemployment percentage of 6.7. However,

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Table 10.4

219

Unemployment (%) in Porto, Lisbon, Norte and Portugal

Portugal Norte PGMA LGMA

1991

2001

6.09 4.96 5.53 7.74

6.8 6.7 7.51 7.57

Change 1991–2001 11.66% 35.08% 35.80% –2.2%

Source: INE, Census (2001)

Table 10.5

Sector distribution (%) in Porto, Lisbon, Norte and Portugal

Portugal Norte PGMA LGMA

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

5.00 4.80 1.74 1.14

35.1 45.80 40.24 24.07

59.9 49.50 58.01 74.79

Source: INE, Census (2001)

the situation becomes more worrisome by looking at the changes between 1991 and 2001. It appears that the unemployment percentages increased with more than one third for both Greater Porto and the northern region, which is significantly more than the average increase in Portugal, while unemployment in Greater Lisbon even declined. A logical explanation for the economic problems in Porto and the northern region is the (former) dominance of industry in this area (particularly textile and shoes industries). Table 10.5 makes clear that the secondary sector (industry) is considerably larger in the northern part of the country, with a share of more than 45 per cent. Even in the metropolitan area of Porto, the secondary sector makes up more than 40 per cent of the local economy. As Portugal is slowly loosing its competitive advantage of low labour costs, many industrial activities move to cheaper locations. Moreover, it appears that many headquarters of industrial companies move away from Porto to Lisbon, or even to Madrid. Porto and the northern region are clearly facing the problem of industrial decline, and the challenge of meeting the requirements of the service and knowledge economy. An important condition for cities and regions to be successful in the knowledge economy is the presence of skilled labour. Greater Porto (PGMA) is doing quite well, with more than 13 per cent of the population having a tertiary level of education (university, college). With several universities within its borders, Porto has good opportunities in the knowledge economy. However, again Lisbon is outperforming Porto with a share of almost 18 per cent. The average level of education in the

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Table 10.6

Level of education1 in Porto, Lisbon, Norte and Portugal (%)

ISCED 0 No level

Portugal Norte PGMA LGMA

6.3 5.81 4.76 5.56

ISCED 1 Primary (4 + 2 years)

47.4 55.4 48.13 33.14

ISCED 2 Lower secondary (3 years0 17.7 15.99 17.87 21.48

ISCED 3 Upper Secondary (3 years) 15.9 12.91 16.2 21.83

ISCED 4, 5, 6 Tertiary

12.8 9.89 13.04 17.98

Source: GEP, 2005 1 Using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Data for some technical courses (“Ensino Médio”, equivalent to ISCED 2 in terms of years of attendance) are not included.

northern region is relatively low with less than 10 per cent higher-educated people, although the share of non-educated people is just below the national average. The political-administrative context As indicated above, the municipality of Porto is relatively small (in size and population). Consequently, many problems and challenges manifest themselves on a larger scale, that is, on a metropolitan or regional level. However, the Portuguese administrative system lacks elected regional bodies. It consists of two levels only: the national and the local level. The autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores (the Portuguese islands in the Atlantic Ocean) are the only regional authorities with autonomous political power. On the mainland, regional and metropolitan bodies have less power. Regional commissions Portugal is divided into seven planning regions that correspond with NUTS II regions, the northern region being one of them. In each of these regions the central administration – to be more precise: the Ministry of the Environment, Territory and Regional Development – has installed a Commission of Coordination and Regional Development (Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional; CCDR). These commissions are endowed with financial and administrative autonomy, and are responsible for regional planning and development (including environmental issues). CCDRs create a sort of virtual third government tier on the regional level (Da Costa Monteiro de Carvalho 2005). It is difficult to assess their importance. On the one hand they are important as they manage and distribute EU regional policy funds (financing at most 75 per cent of an investment in the region) and participate in European platforms. On the other hand, they have relatively little power because they are not elected, and financially dependent on the central government. Figueiredo (2004) even calls CCDRs ‘weak planning institutions’ considering the low level of

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coordination and enforcement achieved in projects and investments. An attempt to create elected regional authorities in the late 1990s failed, as the Portuguese people rejected such a proposal by a referendum. Metropolitan areas The national government recognizes the need for intermunicipal cooperation. A national law in the early 1990s created ‘metropolitan areas’ for Lisbon and Porto. Porto’s metropolitan area was made up by nine municipalities. One of its main achievements is probably the construction of a metro system. However, because the actual transfer of responsibilities from the local and national level failed to become effective, the central government more recently (in 2003) introduced ‘greater metropolitan areas’ and ‘urban communities’ for municipalities with the intention to cooperate in certain areas. The idea behind this new law is that local municipalities can agree to cooperate on a voluntary basis as long as they comply with some general rules set by the national authorities (e.g. greater metropolitan areas are required to include at least nine municipalities with a total of at least 350,000 inhabitants). Porto belongs to a Greater Metropolitan Area that consists of 14 municipalities (see Table 10.1). Although the Greater Metropolitan Area has a broader financial base, it lacks direct political legitimacy, with limited power as logical consequence. Regional cooperation in culture and tourism In addition to purely political bodies, several other public/private entities play a role in the development of the Porto region. In the field of culture and tourism (the scope of this case study), one of the key actors is Adeturn: a private, non-profit making organization that relies on partnerships with central, regional and local administrations. Adeturn collaborates with private organizations and businesses which have an interest in the tourism sector. It has been set up to organize regional tourism, being largely financed through EU subsidies. Another relevant actor is The Porto Convention Bureau: a non-profit-making private association specialized in Tourist Marketing of Porto and Northern Portugal as a destination for Business Tourism (Conferences, Seminars, Events and Incentives). The founding members are the Municipal Councils of the Porto Metropolitan Area, the Portuguese Business Association, The Porto Trade Association, The Porto Traders Association, the University of Porto, the Portuguese Association of Travel Agents and the National Union of Hotel and Similar industries of the North. Barriers towards cooperation Although the Portuguese government recognizes the importance of regional cooperation, it turns out very hard to build coalitions, not only between municipalities, but also between public and private actors. As far as public-public partnerships are concerned, it appears that differences in political colour (left versus right) are major obstacles in the coalition-forming process. In general, surrounding municipalities tend to be afraid of losing their autonomy to central cities. In the Porto region, this leads to a situation in which all municipalities have their own strategies, without paying much attention to possible synergies of regional cooperation and coordination. In the field of culture and tourism, municipalities are competing with one another, organizing the same kind of events and investing in similar facilities. The impression is that better coordination

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could produce synergies that benefit all, but political (and individual) conflicts highly complicate interaction between the actors involved. Public-private partnerships are always difficult to realize, but maybe even more so in the Portuguese context. Especially in the early 1980s there was quite some resistance against private-sector involvement in public issues. At that time, many people associated private-sector involvement with the political situation before 1974, when Portugal was governed by an authoritarian regime. Today, this kind of resistance is much more limited, though still relevant in the coalition-forming process. 3 The Serralves Foundation The organization The Serralves Foundation was established in 1989 by the State of Portugal, the City of Porto, two universities, several associations and a group of companies. It is the first experience in Portugal with a public-private partnership of this kind in the cultural sector. One of the initiators at that time was the minister of culture. In the mid 1980s, she was in search for an appropriate location to establish a national museum for contemporary art. When she heard that the private owners of the Serralves land were about to sell their property, she convinced the national government to buy this land, as the future location of the museum. One of the motives of the State to buy the land was the preservation of cultural heritage by avoiding its division into numerous parts owned by several actors. At that time the minister of culture had the idea to introduce a new type of management and financing for the museum. One of the occasions was the fact that changes in tax laws allowed companies to deduct investments in culture from tax. Moreover, Portugal was ready for a reprivatization movement after a period of nationalization (which started after Portugal became a democracy in 1974). The main barrier to private involvement was to regain confidence between the State and the private sector, people being somewhat afraid of too much private-sector involvement (see previous section). The changes in tax laws acted as bridge between the public and private sector. Furthermore, it appeared that Porto was probably a better place for this new formula than Lisbon, because of the historically strong role of the local business sector and the broadly shared desire for autonomy and an own identity. From the very beginning, the private sector has been involved in the discussion about the organizational structure and mission of Serralves, giving them a sense of ownership. The State succeeded to make 59 organizations and individuals (companies, associations, universities, the City of Porto, the president of Portugal) enthusiastic for investing in the new museum. In the years after, several other organizations and individuals became member of the board of founders too. These founders made an initial contribution of €100,000, sometimes followed by annual contributions of about €15,000. Among the founders are not only regional companies, but firms from other parts of Portugal and the north of Spain too. Today, the board of founders counts about 130 members, who meet

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once a year to discuss the plans for the year(s) to come. To some extent, the board of founders is comparable to the general assembly of a firm, although its power is rather limited. Formally, the founders have the right to comment on plans, but in practice they always agree. Much more important is the board of directors, which is responsible for taking strategic (long-term) decisions. The board is made up by volunteers who meet once every month. The first board of directors was appointed by the government, with representatives of the public and private sector (including representatives of the founders). Since then, new members of the board are elected by the board members themselves (through co-option). The board of directors has nine members, of whom at least five represent the founders (in other words: the majority of the board members have to represent the founders). Two members represent the State. The Portuguese State, although being an important financier, has no special status in the board of directors, except for its right to veto decisions that involve the disposal of land. Furthermore, the State has accepted the obligation to cover the running costs of the foundation, which is about 42.8 per cent of the annual budget. The rest of the budget should be generated by the foundation itself, through fund raising (membership fees, strategic partnerships with the private sector, sponsorships), commercial initiatives (renting of spaces, selling services, merchandizing) and ticket sales. All executive tasks are delegated to the executive team. This team consists of a general director (Odete Patrício) and three directors who manage the museum, the park and the administration/logistics respectively. The museum director (João Fernandes) is responsible for the content of the expositions, and has full artistic autonomy. The board of directors’ role is limited to giving qualitative guidelines, setting targets for the number of exhibitions and determining the available budget. As a consequence, the business sector (whether or not through the board of directors) is not involved in choices regarding the cultural content, which is by many Portuguese considered an important condition for private-sector involvement in the cultural sector. The museum director does listen to the committee of international advisors, which includes directors of famous international museums like Tate Modern and the White Chapel Art Gallery (both in London). The City of Porto is just one of the founders. The municipality plays a minor role as financier of the foundation. Together with the Portuguese State, the municipality transfers money to the investment budget, which is designated to the acquisition of new works of art. Both public actors have committed themselves to a five-year investment programme, worth €4.9 million. Acquisition is financed by the State (50 per cent), the City (20 per cent) and the Foundation itself (30 per cent). It means that the town hall invests less than €1 million in five years (so, less than €200,000 a year) in Serralves. Additional investments are financed from other sources, including EU programmes. In 1999, the museum could make a good start because of an earlier deposit of the State collection (in 1990) and various deposits of the private sector in the 1990s. Aims and motives The foundation’s website (www.serralves.com) tells us that the aim of the Serralves foundation is to stimulate and increase the public’s interest and awareness in contemporary art and the environment. More in particular, the main

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objective of the museum is to create a collection of contemporary art and to present a programme of exhibitions, establishing a dialogue between Portuguese art and foreign art. The owners clearly have the ambition to get the museum listed among the most renowned cultural centres in the world, which suggest that the foundation has a global work area. At the same time, however, the foundation is aware of its relation with the local environment. The organization aims to develop educational programmes that strengthen the relation with the local community and increase the audience for contemporary art. In addition, the foundation uses the unique setting of the museum (the Serralves Park) to reinforce the relationship between art and nature. The educational programmes target children and students of all ages, aiming to make them more aware of contemporary art. It might stimulate young people to take an interest in art and creative professions like design and architecture. As a consequence, universities (and particularly schools of art) and companies in the creative industry might be motivated to become and remain involved in the activities of Serralves. The foundation has already developed good relations with communities and schools, particularly in the northern region. Although Serralves obviously attracts a specific target group (those who are interested in contemporary art), the foundation intends and succeeds to reach a broad audience. Most popular among the local population is the historical park: a green 18 hectares oasis in the midst of the urban hectic, frequently visited by parents with young children, school classes (also because of the farm with numerous animals), students looking for an outdoor place to read, and others who look for a quiet place in a beautiful piece of nature in a crowded city. Serralves’ educational programmes fit in a policy to get the local community involved in modern art. This policy is also reflected in the entrance fees, which are rather convenient: €5.00 to enter the park and museum and €2.50 to enter the park only. People under 18 and university students have free access, while other students and the elderly get a 50 per cent discount. On Sundays the museum, house and park are free for all, from 10 AM to 2 PM. In addition, once every year, Serralves organizes a 40 hours event, opening its doors for all people. This event has become a major success, attracting thousands of people from various neighbourhoods and various income groups. Another tool to involve the local community is the membership programme. Companies, benefactors, individuals and families can become member of Serralves by paying an annual fee (companies: €2,500; benefactors: €600; families: €75; individuals: €50; non-residents: €40; over 65: €25; students: €25; teachers: free). In return, members get various discounts, and in many cases free access to the museum and park. Furthermore, the foundation assumes itself an important actor in a local creative cluster. The development of this cluster is considered interesting due to the presence of educational institutions in this field like the Porto School for Architecture. Serralves has developed a schematic picture of this cluster, which consists of a core, a first ring and a second ring. Places of art (dance, photography, cinema, video, music, architecture, performance) constitute the core of a creative cluster. This core is strongly connected with the first ring: the more commercial area of communication, including media, education, museums, and public spaces. Around this area of communication a second ring can be identified: the area of production, including restaurants, fashion, informatics, art galleries, design, cultural tourism,

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entertainment and advertising. The idea behind this picture is that Serralves can act as a catalyst for the creative cluster, for instance by providing accommodation for young entrepreneurs whose activities are somehow related to the foundation’s core business (contemporary art). Such a strategy builds on the assumption that culture can be a catalyst of economic development without sacrificing the autonomy of the artist. In order to act as a catalyst for the creative industries, Serralves wants to further strengthen its relation with universities. Although Serralves’ location is Porto, the foundation is also involved in activities outside the region. The museum has developed several exhibitions that travel across the country, and the foundation sells know how (on how to manage a museum) to other museums. Moreover, Serralves works together with other (international) museums in co-productions. The strategic relation between Serralves and Invest in Portugal The main argument for companies to become founder of Serralves is prestige. Serralves has become a meeting platform for the private sector, and membership of the board of founders has become a sort of status symbol. In addition, membership gives all kinds of privileges and discounts, like a 25 per cent discount on the rent of meeting space. Companies like to be associated with Serralves as the museum has become a symbol for the modern Portugal. The importance of Serralves for the private sector can be illustrated by looking at the strategic relation between the foundation and the Agência Portuguesa para o Investimento (API), also referred to as Invest in Portugal. This agency, headquartered in Porto, aims to attract and maintain major investors in Portugal. It does so by arranging investment contracts between the State and investors, as well as by trying to reduce ‘hassle costs’. Hassle costs are defined as costs caused by the contextual environment, such as bureaucracy and (a poor) quality of the location environment. API considers culture a good promotional tool to build and maintain relations with investors. For that reason it has set up a strategic alliance with Serralves, arguing that contemporary art helps to promote Portugal as a modern country. Both organizations have signed a protocol: an agreement in which API and Serralves promise to help each other. Thanks to this agreement, API can use events in Serralves to invite investors, and in return, API stimulates investors to become member of Serralves. One of the concrete results of the alliance is a brochure in which major investors are associated with works of art at Serralves. API assumes that investors appreciate the association with modern art, for one reason because it can be linked to the modern design of their products. API’s commitment to Serralves is also based on the conviction that culture plays an important role in developing high-quality tourism in the North of Portugal. Tourism and culture are considered growth sectors of major importance. According to API there are two ways to attract investment: 1) by convincing companies that invest all around the world to come to Portugal; and 2) by stimulating endogenous growth through what they call ‘special investment opportunities’. The second way is becoming more and more interesting, as the competition between countries to attract global firms is very fierce. One of the special investment opportunities that have been recognized so far is quality tourism in the Douro River Valley. This valley has

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serious tourism potential because of the Port vineyards. The area has been designated as UNESCO world heritage. API wants to attract investors who are willing to build so-called ‘open resorts’ with a four or five star hotel with on the one hand highquality facilities for its visitors, and on the other hand interesting things to visit in the surroundings. API considers Serralves as part of an attractive high-quality tourism package for the region, just like the vine guards and the historical heritage of Porto. Besides the vine guards, the region lacks tourist attractions of international fame, but it owes its attractiveness to the diversity of tourist products. Porto provides tourists a good start for tours around the attractive northern part of the country. In general, one could say that tourists are rather mobile, moving from one place to another. The building of resorts could change this situation somewhat. Besides an attractive supply of cultural amenities, API attaches much value to good international accessibility. For that reason, the organization applauds the recent investments in the international airport of Porto, and the expected increase in direct connections. Many new services will be carried by Ryanair, one of Europe’s most successful low-cost carriers. API is confident that low-cost carriers also help to bring high-quality tourists to the Porto region, rather than backpackers only. The partnership model The partnership model is a helpful tool to summarize the characteristics of the Serralves Foundation. First of all, the scope of the foundation is limited: its objectives make clear that the foundation’s role in the regional economy is confined to the field of culture. However, it has also become clear that the foundation can act as a catalyst for tourism and the creative industry, making its scope somewhat larger. The geographic scale is difficult to assess. Serralves is a national museum with the State and national and international companies and associations as owners. Its objectives have an international component (becoming a museum of international fame), but a regional component as well (particularly regarding education, tourism and the creative industries). The actors involved are the State, the City of Porto, universities, associations and companies. The degree of formality is rather high, considering its formal status as a foundation with a company-like organizational structure. Nevertheless, we emphasize that informal relations also exist between the actors involved. The degree of political influence is rather low. As indicated above, the State has a limited say in the partnership, (national and local) politicians having little influence on the Foundation’s management. Despite the low political influence, the democratic content is fairly high, given the transparency of the organization, and the platforms that allow founders to participate. Obviously, the distance to the citizens (the voters) is somewhat longer, but that is understandable given the foundation’s scope. From a financial point of view, the foundation is in good shape, with so many actors willing to invest money. However, it goes without saying that the financial power should be considered in view of the scope: the foundation cannot be expected to invest large amounts of money in the regional economy. Obviously, the State has assumed a leading role (leadership) in the development of the foundation, and the State is still one of the main owners of the partnership. Today, however, the national government is only one of the partners (as said above: political influence is low). The

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internal organization is private-sector like with a board of founders comparable to a general assembly, a board of directors for strategic decisions and an executive team for day-to-day management. 4 Output and Outcome of the Partnership The success of Serralves The Serralves Foundation is considered to be very successful, not only in terms of its output but also considering its organizational structure. The output of the partnership can be measured by looking at the visitor statistics. It turns out that the Serralves Museum, with 174,678 visitors in 2004, is the second most visited museum of Portugal, just behind the Coach Museum (Museu Nacional dos Coches) in Belèm (see Table 10.7). However, the actual number of visitors is considerably larger if educational services, visitors to the auditorium and other visitors are included (see Table 10.8).2 In 2004, more than 25 per cent of the visitors arrived in a group. About 69 per cent of the visitors got free entrance (including members), while 5 per cent got a discount (notably students and senior citizens). These numbers suggest that the amount of international visitors is modest. The direct contribution of the Serralves Foundation to regional tourism should not be exaggerated. The museum is just one element in the package of tourist attractions in the region, like many other museums, the vine guards and the historical centre of Porto. Nevertheless, the museum does attract a small group of people (a niche) from abroad who are interested in contemporary art, including many professionals (like museum directors) from other cultural centres in the world. Many of these visitors stay in Porto and spend their money in local hotels, shops and restaurants. Furthermore, the museum’s international status is reflected in international media attention and the eagerness of other museums to host its exhibitions (see Box 10.1 for an example, in which the author compares the Serralves Museum with Bilbao’s Guggenheim). Although the direct contribution to tourism is moderate, its indirect contribution is considerable. The museum is an important image builder for the region, functioning as a symbol for the modern Portugal and contemporary Porto. Serralves has made a substantial though modest contribution to the attractiveness of the Porto region towards (international) companies, particularly those operating in the upscale business segment that like to be connected with modern art, design, et cetera. Moreover, Serralves creates pride in the region owing to its precious reputation. Furthermore, together with other image builders (like FC Porto), Serralves has the potential to act as a catalyst (‘a shining star’) for regional tourism. Another potential image builder of the Porto region is the Casa Da Musica (‘The Music House’). This state-of-the-art building was designed by the well-known Dutch architect Koolhaas. Casa Da Musica gets a lot of international attention, already being compared with the world’s most famous music halls. 2

Apparently these visitors are not counted in the ranking of museums.

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Table 10.7

The 10 most visited museums in Portugal (2004)1 Number of visitors

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Museu Nacional dos Coches Museu de Arte Contemporânea de Serralves Museu Monográfico de Conímbriga Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga Museu Nacional do Azulejo Museu Nacional de Arqueologia Museu Nacional do Traje Museu Grão Vasco Museu Alberto Sampaio Museu do Chiado

190,564 174,678 110,250 75,696 70,571 70,266 41,455 36,225 35,455 33,445

City Lisbon Porto Coimbra Lisbon Lisbon Lisbon Lisbon Viseu Guimarães Lisbon

1 There are no figures for fully private museums, such as Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Museum.

Table 10.8

Visitors of Serralves, 1999–2005 Total

Museum and Park

Educational Services

Auditorium

Other

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

103,463 229,315 303,477 211,924 265,118 337,068

69,725 151,307 202,548 134,854 153,328 174,678

13,769 55,611 79,851 57,750 91,184 98,032

6,176 4,928 9,136 8,082 5,734

19,969 16,221 16,150 10,184 12,524 58,624

Table 10.9

Some examples of international websites that refer to Serralves

Website

Target group

www.galinsky.com www.tripadvisor.com www.artfacts.net www.0lll.com www.arcspace.com www.world66.com

People interested in modern architecture Tourists People interested in modern art (galleries) People interested in photographs of architecture People interested in modern architecture Tourists

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Box 10.1: The new Serralves Museum (1999) The new Serralves Museum “This past summer marked the opening of the new Serralves Museum for Modern Art – a facility that seems set to outdo Bilbao’s Guggenheim Museum. Like an urban submarine, the massive new building designed by Portugal’s star architect Siza Vieira emerges from the green grounds of Serralves Park, deep in the heart of the city. Siza’s construction forms a contrast to the public garden’s brilliant Art Decó architecture from the 1930s, and to the SerralvesMasón from the same era. But the gleaming white building also sets itself off from the eccentrically designed Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. It captivates the viewer with strong, simple lines, but does tend to appear more like the back side of a building, no matter which angle you view it from. Siza, who always manages to infuse his buildings with a trace of melancholy, planned this building in such a way that it enables the creation of flexible spaces that successfully meet the space requirements of modern art – especially of post1960 modern art. The permanent collection is well worth seeing: it includes works by Portuguese and international artists from the late 1960s right up into the present. Andy Warhol’s “Silverclouds” can be found here as well as Gerhard Richter’s “Schattenbild” (Shadowgraph) . Many agree that Serralves owes part of its success to the innovative organizational and ownership structure, which is considered unique in Portugal. The business-like way of managing the museum and park – without compromising the autonomy of the museum director – has given the museum a competitive advantage. No wonder then that other cultural institutions in Portugal have tried, or are still trying, to copy the Serralves model3; however, without success so far. A logical explanation for these failures would be the fact that the context has changed since the late 1980s. For one thing, competition for private sponsoring has become very fierce, and the private sector has little interest in another platform in the cultural sector. The circumstances in the late 1980s (the reprivatization movement and the new tax laws allowing companies to deduct investments in culture from tax) provided a momentum to get actors together and do something uncommon in the cultural sector (at least according to Portuguese standards).

3 An example is the recent decision concerning the organizational model of the Casa da Musica. It will be adopted a model that is very similar to that of Serralves. The partners of the new foundation are the Ministry of Culture, the City of Porto, the Porto Greater Metropolitan Area and 38 companies (including one Spanish firm). An interesting fact is that the executive director of the Casa da Musica is a current member of the board of directors of Serralves.

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Challenges that remain The Serralves Foundation has been very successful in developing the museum into a renowned cultural centre. But how is this success story related to the problems of the Porto region? •

•

•

Serralves attracts a lot of visitors, but the contribution of Serralves to the regional economy is modest. It functions as a platform for the public and private stakeholders in the region, but it cannot be considered a form of regional governance, given its limited scope. Serralves cannot be expected to take the lead in tackling the economic problems the region is facing, like unemployment and below-average economic growth. The idea to use Serralves as a catalyst of a creative cluster, however, needs further attention. A regional strategy could help to promote interaction between actors (universities, municipalities, companies, cultural facilities) thus increasing synergies between facilities and municipalities, avoiding unwanted internal competition. Serralves might also a play a minor role in connecting state-of-the-art educations (particularly in the field of life and health sciences) with related industries, providing Porto with a more modern image. In addition it can be argued that the Serralves model, though not a form of regional governance itself, is an inspiring example for the governance of the Porto region. This model shows how public and private actors can effectively share common interests and develop joint initiatives to produce added value for the region.

Obviously, other actors have to take the initiative to get actors together and develop a joint strategy. Although the position of the Commission for Coordination and Regional Development of the North is relatively weak, it has considerable financial power because of its responsibility to distribute EU money. The regional commission might act as a co-ordinator and a negotiator in the struggle between Porto and the surrounding municipalities. Of course, the City of Porto itself might also assume the leadership role, but the question is if surrounding municipalities are willing to accept that. Until the elections in October 2005, the mayor found itself in a difficult position as the municipal assembly (the local government) consisted of social democrats (right wing) and socialists (left wing) who have about the same share, and some representatives of the communist party. The composition of the assembly led to a policy that aims at consensus building, the representatives of the communist party often being decisive in voting. As a consequence, the municipality had devoted most of its attention to reducing problems, and more in particular to improve the living conditions in the (low-income) city centre districts through investments in housing and other basic needs (primary conditions). Relatively little attention had been paid to seizing (economic) opportunities, for instance in the field of culture and tourism. Culture had been low on the priority list because effects on the economy are mostly indirect, and, in general, not to the benefit of all.

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At the time of our visit (September 2005), the impression was that the City of Porto could do a better job in utilizing Serralves. The local government had not formulated any official objectives focusing at the role of Serralves in the competitive position of Porto. Neither had Serralves been used in promotional campaigns. Furthermore, it was remarkable that signs to Serralves could not be found in the centre of the city (they were not allowed there). We concluded that the Porto region urgently needs an independent leader who is accepted by all important stakeholders. In view of the political culture – read: the problematic relation between authorities – leadership from the business sector was considered a good alternative. The elections in October 2005 have changed the political situation, possibly enabling a different type of leadership. The social democrats have been given a majority in the municipal executive and assembly. The mayor of Porto has also been elected president of the Porto Greater Metropolitan Area. One of his first actions is the preparation of a development strategy for the metropolitan territory, involving all relevant stakeholders. 5 Applying the Research Framework The framework of our study can help us to analyse and understand: 1) the successful development of Serralves; and 2) (the lack of) regional cooperation in culture and tourism. One important observation is that context variables are highly important factors of failure and success in the development of new types of partnerships. The creation of a public-private partnership was enabled by the following context factors: 1) the availability of a unique location (the Serralves park); 2) the availability of a national collection in search of an accommodation (a museum); 3) the beginning of a period of reprivatization in Portugal; 4) new tax legislation enabling tax deductible investments in culture; 5) the lack of competition from other demands for private sponsoring; 6) the absence of a cultural meeting platform for companies; 7) the strong role of the business sector in Porto; and 8) the desire in Porto for local identity and autonomy. Some of these factors (1,7,8) are related to the local circumstances, while others (2,3,4,6) have more to do with national circumstances. The context-specific circumstances created a special momentum to do something uncommon in the cultural sector, at least in the Portuguese context. The factors mentioned above stimulated the development of a public-private partnership in the cultural sector. The State’s motive to join forces with the private sector was to develop and manage a museum in a more business-like manner, increasing the distance between national politics and the museum’s management, and reducing all kinds of bureaucratic barriers. The new formula fitted nicely in the area of reprivatization that Portugal just entered. The private sector’s motives to get involved were mainly status and reputation related. Companies associate the museum (both its collection and its organizational model) with the modern face of Portugal. The little competition for private sponsoring at that time helped a lot. All actors involved (public and private) agree on the objectives of the Serralves Foundation. The main aim could be defined

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as developing a collection of contemporary art that is able to give the museum and the park an international profile. The partnership model that resulted out of this process can be described as follows. Its scope is limited to contemporary art and culture, but it can be broadened by making links with the creative industry and (high-quality) tourism. The Serralves Foundation might take some initiatives to broaden its scope, particularly as a catalyst of the creative sector. The actors involved are the State and private companies from Portugal and Spain. The City of Porto has a very modest role, which could be strengthened, according to some discussion partners. Being a foundation, Serralves is a formal type of cooperation, in which key stakeholders get involved through the board of founders and the board of directors. The international advisory board (with representatives of other European museums) plays an important role in the creation of international networks. The political influence is very low, which is considered a major factor of success. The State has little to say about the cultural activities of the foundation, just like the other owners (the firms) (the museum director has great autonomy). Consequently, the democratic content is low. Its financial power is limited, which has also to do with the limited scope. The State took the lead to develop the foundation (buying the land, bringing in the national collection), but immediately involved the private sector. Early involvement of the private sector has helped to give firms a sense of ownership, making Serralves private-led rather than something public-led. It is difficult to determine the scale of the organization. With the State as one of the main stakeholders and private founders coming from all around Portugal and even Spain, the national level is probably the most appropriate geographic scale. Serralves is considered a national museum, organizing expositions in cultural centres all around the country. The output of the partnership is easy to measure. The foundation has succeeded to turn the museum into the second most visited museum of the country, and a museum that attracts international attention (particularly from professionals and specialized media). Visitor numbers are increasing, and the foundation makes modest contributions to the occupancy rates of hotels in the city. Its direct contribution to regional tourism (in terms of visitors) is limited, but in terms of image and identity its contribution is considerable. Serralves is a proof of the modern and cosmopolitan image of the region. The fact that the Invest in Portugal agency uses Serralves to attract and maintain investors, illustrates the importance of the foundation. Moreover, one could argue that Serralves has helped to bring the public and private sectors together, maybe acting as an inspiration for other partnerships in the region. Serralves might be a success, but how is this related to the governance of the Porto region? The research framework can be used to understand the lack of regional cooperation in culture and tourism, to identify challenges for the actors involved, and the role of Serralves in this process. Again, it is important to be aware of the location-specific circumstances. First of all, many agree that the Porto region (the north region) finds itself in a difficult situation, because of the transition to a knowledge and service economy, and the trends of globalization (headquarters moving to Lisbon and Madrid, industry moving to the new low-labour cost countries). Porto and its region are challenged to identify (new) economic opportunities, and culture and tourism are definitely among them.

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The clear presence of economic problems provides an incentive to cooperate. From an economic point of view, collaboration between municipalities and between the public and private sectors makes sense. The tourist industry, cultural institutions, universities, the City of Porto, surrounding municipalities: all these stakeholders have specific interests in the development of culture and tourism in the Porto region. In some cases these interests are converging, but they can also be diverging, raising conflicts between actors. The current political and cultural situation is less favourable. The political relation between Porto and its surrounding municipalities is problematic, like elsewhere in Portugal. Political differences and conflicts between individuals seem to get more attention than shared economic interests. In addition, the role of the private sector is rather limited, mainly because some people are still afraid of too much private involvement in public affairs, a fear that is deeply rooted in Portuguese history, and therefore part of the national culture. The local context generates motives for partnerships and factors that stimulate partnership development. At the same time, however, the local circumstances produce barriers toward the successful development of coalitions. Therefore, regional coordination in the development of culture and tourism is still weak. Regional authorities (the Regional Co-ordination Commission) lack the power (mainly because of a lack of democratic content) to enforce inter-municipal cooperation. Supplementary to top-down initiatives of regional authorities, bottom-up initiatives have to be taken. Serralves, being a regional platform of the private sector, could play a role in this, but not as orchestrator. Rather, it is the City of Porto that could take the initiative to bring actors together and take action. References Da Costa Monteiro de Carvalho, L.M. (2005), Governance challenges towards a knowledge economy: The case of the Metropolitan Area of Porto, Master Thesis, (Rotterdam: MEMR, EURICUR/Erasmus University). Figueiredo, A. (2004), The learning by evaluating process of regional policy in Portugal: a special case of strong municipalities and weak planning regions (online), paper presented on the conference – Europe at the margins: EU regional policy peripherality and rurality – 15–16 May 2004, University of Angers, France. Discussion partners Dr Fernando da Costa Lima, Invest in Portugal Agency (API) Dr Rui Terraseca, ADETURN Professor Alberto Castro, Porto School of Economics and Management/Portuguese Catholic University Professor Carvalho Guerra, Regional Centre of Porto/Portuguese Catholic University Dra Odete Patrício, Serralves Foundation

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Mr Manuel de Novaes Cabral, Director Municipal, Porto Câmara Municipal, Direcçao Municipal dos Serviços da Presidência Mr Raul Matos Fernandes, Porto Câmara Municipal Mrs Teresa Patrício Gouveia, Board of Directors of Gulbenkian Foundation, Former President of Serralves Foundation, Former Minister of Culture Eng. Luis Braga da Cruz, Board of Directors of Serralves Foundation, Member of the Portuguese Parliament, Former Minister of Economy, Former President of the North Region Planning and Coordination Commission

Chapter 11

Synthesis 1 Introduction After having analysed the experiences of nine European regions with developing new forms of partnerships, we are now about to draw conclusions. What can be learned from the case studies, and to what extent are these lessons transferable to other cities and regions? In section 2 we analyse the various forms of partnerships in the nine metropolitan regions. After that section 3 looks at the performance of the initiatives so far, followed by section 4 which discusses the relevance of context factors and organizational factors in the coalition-forming process. The final section comprehends some final remarks. 2 Forms of Partnerships In the nine case studies of this research we have analysed a variety of programmes and projects. Besides the many differences, they have in common the involvement of various public and/or private actors who work together to accomplish a common goal with respect to urban and economic development. In this section, we discuss the various forms of partnerships, looking at (1) the object of study, (2) scale and scope, (3) actors involved, and (4) innovativeness. Object of study In cooperation with the partners of the project, the following projecs and programmes have been selected as object of study: •

•

•

•

Eindhoven: Brainport/ELAt Brainport is a programme that promotes innovation in the (wider) Eindhoven region. ELAt is a partnership of Eindhoven, Leuven and Aachen that stimulates innovation in the cross-border region. Vienna: Centrope An EU sponsored cross-border programme (with many programmes and projects) which promotes and coordinates cross-border initiatives in South Moravia, West Slovakia, West Hungary and East Austria. Helsinki: Regional Cooperation Analyses two relatively recent initiatives: the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board (four municipalities) and the Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly (fourteen municipalities). Both aim to make the region more competitive and attractive. Copenhagen: Wonderful Copenhagen Public-private partnership that facilitates cooperation in the tourism industry, aiming to attract more visitors

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to the region. Several networks have been analysed. Munich: Regional Planning Analyses two existing bodies that promote cooperation and coordination in regional planning: the Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München and the Regionaler Planungsverband München. The case concentrates on the planning of retail facilities. Budapest: Transport Association (BKSZ) Analyses the organization of public transport in the Budapest region; a partnership of the national railway company, the regional bus company and the municipal public transport company. Rotterdam: “Noordrand” Analyses various initiatives to promote coordination (through new forms of governance) as well as concrete project-based partnerships along the northern rim (noordrand) of Rotterdam, with a clear focus on the development of science parks. Catalonia: Better District Programme Regeneration programme that stimulates cross-border cooperation as well as cooperation between various levels of government. Focus on Serra d’en Mena, one of the few examples of a partnership between two municipalities. Porto: Serralves Foundation A public-private foundation that owns and manages the Serralves museum and park, one of the main cultural attractions in the Porto region.

The list shows that in many cases we analysed several, interrelated initiatives. For instance, in Catalonia, we looked at the Better District Programme, but with a clear focus on one concrete form of cooperation between two municipalities. In Copenhagen, we analysed Wonderful Copenhagen, but also considered the performance of the various networks that are related to this organization. In Rotterdam, we discussed the development of various partnerships that come under the heading of ‘Noordrand’ without being part of the same programme. For the Vienna region we investigated the ambitions of Centrope, an EU-sponsored programme that facilitates many cross-border programmes and projects. For the Budapest region we considered the cooperation between three public transport companies to improve public transport delivery. The cases of Eindhoven, Helsinki and Munich have in common that they looked at the initiatives of exactly two organizations, although also in these cities smaller projects could be identified as well. Only in Porto, we concentrated on one very specific initiative: the Serralves Foundation. As the aim of this synthesis is to make a comparison between the case studies, it is important to define the objects of study in a more precise way. To that end, we need to go back to the introduction to this report (Chapter 1). In this introduction, we argued that cities and regions are challenged to develop forms of cross-border and crosssector partnerships to anticipate the increasing competition between metropolitan regions on a European and global scale. Now it is important to realize that the case studies have in common that they all discuss the attempts of metropolitan regions in Europe by promoting the development of voluntary cross-border and/or cross-sector partnerships. Therefore, this synthesis should compare the strategies to promote the development of partnerships, treating the concrete projects as examples of how to

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1

implement these strategies. If we define the object of study in the cases as strategies to promote partnership development, we come to the following descriptions: • •

•

• • •

•

• •

Eindhoven Translating general objectives into concrete projects in which stakeholders from various sectors though with similar interests participate. Vienna Using an EU sponsored programme to coordinate and initiate various projects that promote cross-sector cooperation and regional integration based on common interests in sustainable regional competitiveness. Helsinki Looking for consensus between municipalities based on common interests in sustainable regional competitiveness, and translating a joint vision into concrete initiatives. Copenhagen Developing public-private networks in which stakeholders with similar interests participate. Munich Looking for consensus between municipalities based on common interests in sustainable regional competitiveness. Budapest To promote sustainable transport and to maintain the relative favourable modal split by aiming at a more efficient and effective public transport delivery by stimulating cooperation between three public transport operators Rotterdam Looking for consensus between municipalities and higherlevel governments based on common interests in sustainable regional competitiveness, by means of several new governance structures (platforms) and concrete partnership projects. Catalonia Giving incentives to cooperate through a higher-level government programme. Porto Stimulating cooperation in tourism and culture by showing the results of a concrete partnership.

The list above makes clear that for instance in Barcelona, the Better District Programme should be seen as the main object of our study, since this programme fits in the strategy, and the partnership of Serra d’en Mena should be seen as a concrete project to implement the strategy (and an example for other projects). In Copenhagen, our study targets Wonderful Copenhagen, as this organization is responsible for developing and implementing the strategy to create networks. In Eindhoven, Helsinki, Munich, Rotterdam and the Vienna region, we look at the strategies to develop a common vision and to translate that vision into concrete forms of partnerships. The organizations mentioned in the first list of objects of study are only means to that end,2 although in the case of Eindhoven, Brainport could also be seen as a common ‘brand’ for the projects, and the same could be said of Centrope in the case of the Vienna region. The case of Budapest concentrates on cooperation 1 Please note that from hereon, we refer to the strategies of the cities and regions as we defined them. When we talk about the strategy of a city/region, it should not be interpreted as the official strategy of a city or region. In some cases, such a strategy is even non-existing. 2 For Rotterdam, no organizations are mentioned in this list, but they have been identified in the case study.

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between the three public transport companies that are active in the region. The Budapest Transport Association (BKSZ) is a first initiative in this direction. The case of Porto is somewhat peculiar as it concentrates on a specific partnership which has only limited impact on the competitiveness of the region. Therefore, we consider this partnership as a potential example and catalyst for the development of other partnerships in the Porto region, particularly in the field of culture and tourism. Scope and scale Having redefined the objects of our case studies, we are now able to (re)identify their scope and scale. Although all strategies can be related to the general aim of making the region more attractive and competitive, some of them clearly have a more narrow focus, in terms of aims (scope) and in terms of geography (scale). Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the borders of the relevant ‘region’ are subject to discussion. For the nine case studies, the scope and scale can be defined as follows: •

•

• • •

• •

•

•

Eindhoven Competitiveness, though with an emphasis on economic development in the dynamic, cross-border region (Netherlands, Belgium, Germany); Vienna Regional integration and competitiveness through cooperation in many areas (following the EU framework of an integrated approach) in the cross border region (South Moravia, West Slovakia, West Hungary, East Austria); Helsinki Competitiveness, though with emphasis on infrastructure, housing and land use in the Helsinki Region (14 municipalities); Copenhagen Tourism and MICE development and promotion in the Copenhagen Region (Capital region, 29 municipalities); Munich Competitiveness, though with emphasis on sustainable, balanced development (notably in retail planning) in the Munich Region (186 municipalities); Budapest Sustainable transport and a favourable modal split in the Budapest region and Pest County (121 municipalities); Rotterdam Competitiveness, though with focus on coordination in the development of science parks in the region between Rotterdam and The Hague; Catalonia Competitiveness, though with emphasis on regeneration (economic, social, physical) and sustainable/ balanced development in Catalonia (946 municipalities); Porto Tourism and cultural development and promotion in the Porto region (14 municipalities).

Looking at the definitions of scale and scope we conclude that six out of the nine case studies concern very broadly defined strategies to make the region more competitive. In the cases of Porto, Copenhagen and Budapest, we analysed more narrowly defined strategies, with the first two cases concentrating on the attractiveness of the region as a tourist destination, and more in particular on the role of culture (Porto) and the Meetings, Incentives, Conventions, and Events (MICE) industry (Copenhagen). The

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Budapest case clearly focuses on public transport. However, it should be said that most other strategies also tend to concentrate on a limited number of specific subaims that are in line with the overall aim of making the region more competitive. The Catalonia strategy (as we defined it3) focuses on social and physical regeneration, the Helsinki strategy mainly targets issues in the field of transport, housing and land use, the Munich strategy particularly deals with a balanced and sustainable development of the region and the role of retail planning to that end, and the Rotterdam strategy concerns the coordinated development of science parks. The Centrope strategy (Vienna region) is addressing all issues that could contribute to a better integration of the very different sub-parts of the region, with emphasis on economic development, labour market, transport, culture and education. In terms of scale, most case studies have a regional focus. Somewhat exceptional is the case of Rotterdam which not only concerns the Rotterdam-The Hague region (south wing of the Randstad), but also a project in the northern part of the city. Also exceptional is the case of Catalonia as the strategy concentrates on the autonomous region of Catalonia, which is larger than the metropolitan (and functional) region of Barcelona.4 The strategies of Copenhagen, Helsinki, Munich, Budapest and Porto mainly target the more or less officially defined metropolitan region (which to some extent corresponds with the functional urban region), although relations with other regions are paid attention to as well. For instance, both Copenhagen and Helsinki recognize their interest in developing relations with parts of Russia (St. Petersburg), Eastern Europe and the Baltic states (also in concrete projects such as Cruise Baltic in the case of Copenhagen). In Budapest recent administrative reforms have had some influence on the delimitation of the functional public transport region. Eindhoven and the Vienna region both have strategies on a cross-border scale, which is considerably larger than these cities’ functional urban regions. On the one hand, the conclusion from this analysis is that the nine case studies are very different in terms of scope and scale. These differences need to be taken into account when drawing conclusions about the factors of failure and success in the coalition-forming process, as we will see later on. On the other hand, we emphasize that all initiatives are somehow related to the more general aims of promoting sustainable urban development, economic growth and international competitiveness. Actors involved Another aspect that should be paid attention to if we want to compare the various cases, concerns the actors that are involved in the strategies. Here is an overview of actors involved in the strategies mentioned above:

3 See footnote 1. 4 The scale of the project that has been analysed in detail (Serra d’en Mena) is, of course, considerably smaller, with only two municipalities being involved.

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Eindhoven Local and regional authorities, business firms, knowledge institutions (triple helix); Vienna Regional and local authorities; Helsinki Municipalities (non-public actors are involved in implementation only); Copenhagen Municipalities, regional authorities, business firms (tourist and MICE industry); Munich Local and regional authorities (advisory board abolished); Budapest National, regional (county) and local authorities (as “founding fathers”); and public transport companies as operators; Rotterdam Local and regional authorities; Catalonia Departments of the regional authority, municipalities; Porto State, municipality, universities, associations, companies (as far as the project is concerned!).

In three regions, the partnerships that we analysed are clear examples of publicprivate partnerships (Wonderful Copenhagen, Brainport Eindhoven and Porto’s Serralves Foundation), whereas in initiatives in three other regions are mainly public-public (Munich’s regional planning bodies, Catalonia’s Serra d’en Mena project and Budapest’s public transport association BKSZ5). In the three remaining regions (Centrope, Helsinki, and Rotterdam) the initiatives are mainly public-public, but in the (foreseen) implementation the private sector is expected to play a key role. In Helsinki, for instance, the business sector has been highly involved in the development and implementation of the Innovation Strategy (via Culminatum Centre of Expertise); in the two regional platforms, however, non-public actors play a very limited role. Both Eindhoven and Helsinki have adopted the principle of Triple Helix: cooperation between business, knowledge institutions and local government. In Rotterdam two universities and a nature conservation organization (NGO) are involved in the planning of two science parks. From the overview of actors involved we conclude that in six of the nine case studies private-sector involvement in strategy development (as far as the object of study is concerned!) can be rated as ‘non-existent’, ‘low’ or ‘moderate’, as business firms and project developers are only involved in the implementation stage. The case of Porto is, again, somewhat exceptional because the project analysed is considered an example that might help to raise attention to metropolitan governance, rather than being an example of metropolitan governance itself. Therefore, only the strategies of Copenhagen and Eindhoven can be labelled as forms of metropolitan governance with a high degree of private-sector involvement. In both partnerships (Wonderful Copenhagen and Brainport), the private sector plays an active role in the development and implementation of strategies that aim to enhance the competitiveness of the region.

5 Private involvement in public transport is not yet an issue in Budapest, following EU rules; however, privatization can be expected in the future.

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Innovativeness As the title of our project indicates this study intends to explore “new forms of cooperation”. This raises a very important question: are the strategies (and projects/ programmes) that we identified innovative? And what then, is the innovative element? Another overview: • • • • •

•

• •

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Eindhoven Innovative because of the dynamic, cross-border, cross-sector stakeholder concept; Centrope Innovative because of multilateral cross-border cooperation; Helsinki Innovative because of voluntary cooperation between municipalities; Munich Not innovative at all; Budapest Innovative but in the national and local context only since partnerships are new phenomena in a society without a tradition of cooperation (used to top down decision making); Rotterdam Innovative because of coordination and cooperation between municipalities and higher-level governments and cooperation between municipality and nature conservation organization, though in the local context only; Copenhagen Innovative because of the use of networks as instruments to organize value chains in the tourist industry; Catalonia Innovative because of urban policy on the level of the autonomous region of Catalonia, cooperation between departments, between municipalities, and between public authorities on different levels, though in the local context only; Porto Innovative because of private-sector involvement in tourism and culture, though in the local context only.

Only one case study does not include innovative elements, which is the case of Munich. In Munich we analysed two planning bodies that have been there for quite some time, but are insufficiently able to realize inter-municipal coordination in planning issues on a voluntary basis. In fact, this case study is a search for innovative approaches, rather than an analysis of an existing innovative strategy. For some other regions, we conclude that the strategy is innovative, although mainly in the local or regional context. For instance, Catalonia’s Better District Programme could be seen as the first attempt ever in Spain to develop a ‘national’ urban policy. In other countries (e.g. the Netherlands), however, one wouldn’t qualify a national urban policy as ‘innovative’. Another example: in the Netherlands, cooperation between municipalities and the province is considered innovative, while this is very common in other countries. Also the strategy of Porto can be labelled as ‘innovative in the local context’. In the Centrope region cooperation is new as a consequence of a long period of closed borders. The Budapest case cannot be qualified as very innovative, because public transport partnerships do function in several cities. However, innovation has another meaning here than in most of the other cases. The politicaladministrative context changed completely from top-down to equal power for State

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and capital city. Organizations are not used to cooperation or to start initiatives by themselves (compared to awaiting orders). Only four case studies can be qualified as ‘innovative’ irrespective of the local context: Copenhagen, Eindhoven, Helsinki and Vienna. 3 Performance In this section we discuss the performance of the nine strategies that we analysed. First, we look at the stage of development in which the various strategies are, which is considered highly relevant to determine if an initiative can already be evaluated. Second, we discuss the output and outcome of the strategies, identifying some performance indicators and resulting in a performance-based categorization of the case studies. Stage of development The strategies that we analysed in the participating regions are in various stages of development. It is particularly important to be aware of the stage of development when it comes to performance measurement. In some regions (Helsinki being a good example) the strategies that we analysed are still being developed or about to be implemented. Below you find an overview of the stage of development for each case study: • •

• • •

•

•

•

•

Eindhoven Brainport is a recent initiative (2004), but a logical follow-up of Horizon (2001), which has produced measurable results. Vienna In 2006 Centrope, initiated in 2003, entered the second stage of the programme in which the vision has to be turned into concrete projects and results. Helsinki Regional partnerships were set up in 2004 and 2005 resulting in a vision that has to be implemented through various concrete projects. Copenhagen Wonderful Copenhagen was set up in 1992, and since then, several networks have been set up, with measurable performances. Munich Regional planning bodies, set up in the 1950s and 1970s respectively, are now being discussed; are they effective or should they be reorganized in some kind of way? Budapest The BKSZ, initiated in 2004–2005, introduced a unified pass for the three public transport operators involved, but it is not considered a great success. Rotterdam Since the late 1990s, several coordination bodies and joint projects have been created, but concrete results are scarce as implementation of projects still has to be started. Catalonia Better District Programme started in 2004, followed by implementation in the years that followed, though with only one project in which two municipalities are involved. Porto Serralves (founded in the 1980s) is successful, and considered an example and potential catalyst for partnership development.

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From the list above, it appears that some initiatives that we analysed (notably Catalonia, Helsinki, Rotterdam, Budapest and the Vienna region) are relatively young, and therefore results cannot yet be expected. In these case studies, our analysis of performance was in fact an analysis of expected performance, often based on stakeholders’ previous experiences with similar initiatives. For instance, in the case of Eindhoven discussion partners used their experiences with Horizon (initiated in 2001) to formulate expectations with regard to the relatively young initiatives of Brainport and ELAt. In other cases we analysed initiatives or programmes that have been in place for quite some time, such as Wonderful Copenhagen (set up in 1992), the planning bodies in Munich (set up in the 1950s and 1970s) and the Serralves Foundation (set up in the 1980s). Again, the Porto case is somewhat exceptional because the Serralves Foundation cannot be seen as an example of metropolitan governance. If we look at the development of partnerships in tourism and culture, this process is clearly in a preliminary stage. Output and outcome In the case studies we discussed the performance of the initiatives and strategies by looking at the results that had been accomplished. In our research framework we made a distinction between the output (the direct result of a partnership) and the outcome (the contributions to the development of the region). A priori, we assumed that it would very difficult to measure outcome because causality is by definition hard to prove (other external developments cannot be filtered out). Moreover, to prove a change of competitive positions – a prime motive for most partnerships – not only requires a definition of regional competitiveness but also an extensive analysis of comparable data over time. A posteriori, we have to conclude that it is also difficult to measure the output of partnerships, for the very simple reason that outputs can often not be observed yet. As we discussed above, many initiatives that we analysed are still in the stage of development and implementation, which seriously complicates attempts to evaluate. As a consequence, we often had to consider expected outputs instead of actual outputs, thus being partly dependent on subjective judgements of our discussion partners. Another problem that we found ourselves confronted with has to do with the fact that there are different kinds of outputs, ranging from good intentions to concrete results. In general, one output leads to another output. Typically, a partnership starts with a situation in which actors recognize their mutual dependence. After that, they develop a common vision and strategy to benefit from potential synergies, not only in terms of what kind of actions need to be taken, but also in terms of the required governance structure. Consecutively they reach agreement on concrete actions and the way these actions are financed and managed (organized). One step further, these actions are implemented and, hopefully, produce the desired results. Considering the process of partnership development and the fact that many projects are still in early stage, we argue that output should not only be defined in terms of results, but also in terms of agreements or intentions that could lead to results. Particularly from a metropolitan governance point of view, it is interesting to see what initiatives

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have succeeded to bring actors together and create common ground for the region’s future. Rotterdam In the northern part of the Rotterdam region the partnerships that we analysed (Science Port Holland and Schieveen) are not yet in the stage of concrete results and concrete agreements, making it difficult to measure their success or failure. As these projects are still in the stage of planning, our performance analysis mainly considered the aims of the projects (the ambitions, the expected outputs) paying particular attention to the added value of cooperation. On the scale of the Southern Randstad a major result is the assessment of a priority order for national investments in a number of projects that have to be implemented in the future. In general, discussion partners are positive about the initiatives to promote cooperation and coordination, although it remains to be seen if good intentions will actually result in concrete agreements. Copenhagen Wonderful Copenhagen is one of the few models of which the performance can be measured in some kind of way. By involving the tourist industry in attracting visitors, the Copenhagen region has been able to attract more visitors, more conferences, more sporting events and more cruise ships. All discussion partners confirm that the Wonderful Copenhagen model is successful, which is also illustrated by the fact that other cities are trying to copy the model. The success of the partnership model is often ascribed to the fact that it produces concrete, tangible or visible results. Especially private actors only participate if they have the feeling that their participation pays off. They should be able to experience the benefits of cooperation, which not necessarily implies that they have to be convinced by figures. Good communication of the results (also in a qualitative way) is considered essential in the case of Wonderful Copenhagen. Eindhoven and Helsinki The cases of Eindhoven and Helsinki are to some extent comparable when it comes to measuring outputs. Both regions have only recently started a new initiative to further strengthen the metropolitan governance structures. Although these new initiatives cannot be evaluated yet, something can be said about the existing structures. Both Eindhoven and Helsinki have a strong reputation in triple helix partnerships: cooperation between universities, municipalities and the private sector. The performance of these partnerships can easily be measured by looking at the very concrete projects and their results. For the new governance structures, expectations are strongly based on experiences with existing governance structures. Some discussion partners were very optimistic about the new structure, while others were somewhat more sceptical, mainly because of barriers in the institutional context. Nevertheless, in both regions we observe progress in the new partnerships, only leaving the question if and when this progress will come to a halt. Porto In the case of Porto we concluded that the Serralves foundation has been very successful in involving the private sector. The foundation has been able to produce very concrete results (visitors, media attention), but more importantly, many people say that Serralves has made a valuable contribution to the image of the

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city (and region), which can benefit economic development (not only tourism, but other sectors as well). However, it is important to recognize that Serralves itself is not a form of metropolitan governance, but rather a potential catalyst and example for new forms of partnerships in the region. Although the results of Serralves can be measured, the development of new governance structures (notably in the field of tourism and culture) is still in the very early stage of creating awareness and getting people together. Centrope The performance of Centrope is difficult to assess. Those who are involved in the project emphasize the strategic role of the Centrope partnership as a catalyst and broker for cross-border partnerships in many domains, and by promoting the region internationally and securing political support. That regional and local leaders in the border regions of four countries agreed to develop a common vision on the region is considered a valuable result. At the same time it is only a first step to regional integration. Some representatives of the business sector argue that Centrope fails to produce concrete results as a consequence of a lack of focus and an oversized scale. The project’s added value is clearly topic of debate, which is however quite common for this kind of strategic projects. It must be emphasized that by accepting the joint vision in 2006 a new stage has entered in which all partners are expected to contribute to reach concrete results. Catalonia In the case of Catalonia we discussed the performance of the Better District Programme and the Serra d’en Mena project. Although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the programme and the project, something can be said about the results of the strategy to promote cooperation (notably between public actors). On the one hand, we conclude that the Better District Programme has only resulted in one concrete project in which two municipalities cooperate, which is the Serra d’en Mena project. From that point of view, the performance of the Better District Programme is somewhat disappointing, at least from a metropolitan governance point of view. On the other hand, one could take a somewhat more optimistic view, claiming that the Serra d’en Mena project is a concrete project on a low geographic scale that can act as an example (or pilot project) for cooperation on a broader spatial level (comparable with the case of Porto). Moreover, it should be said that the Better District Programme’s principle aim is not to stimulate cooperation, but rather to create better districts. Cooperation (not only between municipalities but also between departments) is a means to that end. Budapest The establishment alone of the BKSZ partnership must be considered a breakthrough in a situation of three service providers that have no tradition of cooperation at all, that are partly in competition with each other and that are working with quite different systems. Several difficulties blocked the implementation of the cooperation for about ten years. The first achievement (in 2005) was the introduction of a unified reduced-price pass for all means of public transport within Budapest. Given the problematic coalition forming process, this pass is undoubtedly an achievement. The pass appeared to be less popular than expected. Besides, the impression is that the operators are not unequivocally happy with the pass. They fear

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loss of income. They not really promote the pass. Most stakeholders have serious doubts whether the BKSZ partnership will be able to accomplish its main objective: a more coordinated, efficient and effective public transport delivery in the Budapest region. There are various context factors (political, lack of resources, organizational) that obstruct partnership development. Munich In the case of Munich we analysed the degree to which the two regional planning bodies have been able to promote (voluntary) cooperation between municipalities. Our analysis makes clear that both bodies are bothered by the institutional context in their attempts to stimulate coordination in planning. From that point of view, their performance is disappointing, which is however not surprising since both organizations are not considered the ‘new forms of cooperation’ that we looked for in this study. Taking a somewhat broader perspective, however, we have been able to identify some more successful attempts to create inter-municipal partnerships (like the Nordallianz, an alliance of cities to the north of Munich) in a more bottom-up way. A performance-based categorization of the case studies To conclude this section we can say that for nearly all strategies in the cities that we analysed the performance is to some extent topic of discussion. It is tempting to talk in terms of success and failure, but in practice, results are hard to measure, particularly when it comes to the ability to create partnerships. As the initiatives have different scopes and scales and find themselves in different stages of development, it is somewhat ‘dangerous’ to compare the strategies. That is why we prefer to look at performance as the final outcome of a process: this process begins with recognizing a problem, and runs via creating the partnerships to tackle the problem, to concrete results (and solving the problem). Using this approach, we think it is fair to claim that the successful Wonderful Copenhagen model finds itself in the last stage in the process6. The partnerships that we investigated in Helsinki and Eindhoven are both in a stage in which signs of success can be identified, and also in the Centrope region some results have been achieved. The partnerships in Catalonia and Rotterdam are both relatively young, and results are underway. Munich, Budapest and Porto find themselves in the stage of problem recognition which might result in partnership development. 4 Factors of Failure and Success in the Coalition-Forming Process In the two previous sections we introduced the partnerships, projects and programmes that we analysed, and discussed their performance, resulting in a performance-based categorization of the case studies. In this section we discuss the factors that have played, or are expected to play, a role in the development of cross-sector and crossborder partnerships. This analysis is largely based on the interviews with stakeholders in the nine metropolitan regions. In line with our research framework, we have

6 This applies to Wonderful Copenhagen, but not necessarily for all of its networks. For instance, the Wonderful Copenhagen Alliance has only just been started.

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been able to identify four types of factors: political-administrative factors, spatialeconomic context factors, socio-cultural factors, and the organizational design of the partnerships, projects and programmes. In general, our findings demonstrate that all four factors determine the presence of ‘clear incentives’ (motives) to cooperate. However, in nearly all case studies, the context factors were considered more important than the organizational factors. In Eindhoven, for instance, many discussion partners said that the Brainport model cannot be copied to other regions because of the unique institutional environment (notably the tradition to cooperate). For the Budapest case the institutional environment is relative new and people need time to get used to these new circumstances. The case of Copenhagen is probably the only case study in which the context factors are considered less important (though still very relevant!) than the organizational factors, since many discussion partners agreed that the Wonderful Copenhagen model can be exported to other regions (mentioning Stockholm as an example). Political-administrative context factors The political-administrative context comprehends factors such as the number of tiers/layers, the number of administrations, and the (financial) autonomy of administrations. In most case studies the innovative element of the initiatives (see section 2) is determined by the political-administrative context: most projects and programmes try to break with traditional forms of governance (the existing administrative structure). Hence, political-administrative context factors not only explain why actors involved take the initiative to set up an innovative partnership, but they also explain possible resistance against change. In general, discussion partners consider a high autonomy of administrations as a barrier in the coalition-forming process: municipalities are often afraid of losing (parts of) their autonomy. For instance, in the case of Rotterdam it is said that the administrative boundaries complicate cooperation in cross-border issues, while in Munich coordination in regional planning is complicated by the Planungshoheit (planning autonomy) of municipalities, and the limited legal power of regional planning bodies. Inter-municipal cooperation on economic matters (attracting business for instance) is particularly hard to realize if the municipalities are strongly dependent on income from local tax (like in Helsinki and Munich). In many countries (particularly Finland and Germany), the autonomy of municipalities is considered an achievement and a given fact. In general initiatives to develop new partnerships have to take the autonomy of municipalities for granted, although they could play a role in reducing the autonomy to some extent. In the case of Helsinki, for instance, we have observed that the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board is looking for new governance mechanisms, which might imply a limited reduction of autonomy on the local level (if the city councils agree!). The Budapest case is obviously the most extreme case as regards the fear of losing autonomy. The decentralization of power (without decentralization of adequate resources) has resulted in a kind of status quo situation with respect to not assuming or accepting the leadership role by the State or by the City of Budapest. This obstructs a successful development

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of an integrated regional transport system. In this situation the absence of a clear, responsible authority is seen as an important obstacle. Another relevant factor in the coalition-forming process is the complexity of the administrative structure and (internal) differences in laws and regulations. In the case of Centrope (Vienna region) we talked about the extremely complex administrative context, given the diverging administrative settings and the very different tasks, competences and budgets of the various partners in the four countries. These big differences complicate the partnership development process. Similar problems can be expected in the Eindhoven-Leuven-Aachen triangle, although the administrative structures of three West European countries are probably more alike than the administrative structures of three former socialist countries that still are in a process of deciding about the appropriate administrative setting. The administrative structure also causes problems in the Munich region which counts more than 180 municipalities, which is quite a lot in comparison with most of the other case studies. Only in Catalonia the number of municipalities is even larger with almost 1,000 administrations! In addition the German administrative system is very complex since responsibilities are divided among four of five tiers, while, for instance, the Finnish system has only two tiers, which is a great advantage in the coalition forming process. In the Netherlands and Finland, inter-municipal cooperation is stimulated by the threat of mergers, but in Germany this is not really an issue (at least not on the short run). In Helsinki, many discussion partners agree that the pressure from the national government to reorganize local public administration has been important incentive to cooperate on a voluntary basis. In Hungary the administrative system has recently been revised. Driven by the prospect of accession to the European Union, seven regional entities have been created (including the Central Hungarian Region) to replace the 19 Counties. One of the effects is that the new CHR does not coincide with the functional transport region made up by the City of Budapest (possessing County rights) and Pest County. The case studies demonstrate that higher-level governments (national and regional authorities) play a key role in changing the political-administrative context. Not only by exerting pressure on local authorities (as in Finland), but also by their investments in the region, for instance in events and infrastructure. Particularly in the case of Rotterdam, partnerships have been developed because the State is mainly responsible for the development of infrastructure. In other cases (Eindhoven, Helsinki, Copenhagen, Centrope), actors cooperate to lobby the State(s) for investments in the region. In Copenhagen and Helsinki, national regional policy (promoting balanced development) provides an additional occasion to join forces. Moreover, national governments can create or reduce barriers to cooperate, the Better District Programme of the Catalan government being an example. In the case of Centrope, the Austrian policy to restrict access to the labour market is considered a major obstacle in cross-border integration. And, although the Dutch government has signed letters of intent together with the governments of Flanders and North Rhine Westphalia, there are still obstacles that complicate cross-border cooperation. In the Budapest case the State (through the Ministry of Economy and Transport) is involved in the BKSZ partnership as owner of two of the three transport companies. The decentralization of public transport policy to the municipalities appears to

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be a barrier for the organization of regional transport. Neither the State nor the Municipalities will give up their autonomy until now. More information on the role of the national government can be found in the sub-section ‘organizational factors’. Spatial-economic context factors The second group of context factors that influences the coalition-forming process comprehends the spatial-economic context factors. In general, it can be said that the spatial-economic problems are the main suppliers of motives to cooperate. In all case studies we identified problems or challenges that (might) stimulate actors to join forces. A spatial-economic factor that plays a role in all metropolitan regions is the international competition between regions, creating a sense of urgency to enhance competitiveness. This particularly applies to the cases of Helsinki, Eindhoven, Rotterdam and Centrope, where the initiatives that we analysed explicitly deal with competitiveness, aiming to create critical mass by scale enlargement. In Helsinki and Eindhoven, partnerships have been developed to make the regions more innovative, to anticipate the increasing competition from upcoming countries such as China and India. To that end, these regions want to become more attractive for knowledge workers, which is also one of the issues in Rotterdam. Furthermore, both crossborder partnerships that we analysed (Eindhoven, Centrope) pay much attention to the lack of infrastructure between the regions involved and the challenge of European integration (which also plays a role in the cases of Helsinki and Copenhagen). Also in Rotterdam, Helsinki, and particularly in Budapest cooperation has been initiated to tackle problems that are related to internal accessibility. Budapest witnessed strong urban sprawl since the upswing of the economy leading to more car use and hence severe traffic problems in the city where most jobs are located and where parking policies are still in its infancy. Better public transport services could be part of the solution. In the case of Centrope, large differences in incomes and prosperity have provided additional motives to cooperate (not necessarily to reduce these differences, but also to benefit from the complementarities). To secure competitiveness in the long run, metropolitan regions need to (be) develop(ed) in a sustainable and balanced way. The need for sustainable development is a dominant motive to cooperate in the regions of Munich and Catalonia, where social and environmental problems respectively – both related to urban sprawl – put the issue of a more balanced and sustainable development on the (political) agenda. In two other cases it is just one aspect of the region’s competitiveness that provides incentives to cooperate. For instance in the case of Copenhagen, the development of Wonderful Copenhagen and its networks can be explained by the initial underperformance in particular segments of the tourist and business visitor market. In Porto, many people become increasingly aware of the need to develop new growth clusters (culture and tourism), in view of globalization and industrial decline. Hence, we conclude that problems and challenges often produce the reasons to develop partnerships. It should be said, however, that in some cases the ‘sense of urgency’ is much clearer than in other cases. It seems that the socio-economic problems in Catalonia, Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Budapest and Porto (in view of the

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scope and scale of the case study in question) are more obvious than in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Munich and the Vienna region (at least in the Austrian part). In the second group of cities and regions, we noticed that initiators of partnerships, projects or programmes often try to make other stakeholder aware of the problem’s seriousness. Although an economic situation cannot be made ‘more problematic’ artificially, communication can be a helpful instrument to raise awareness and create sense of urgency. A spatial context factor that deserves attention is the internal cohesion within a region. It can be argued that physical infrastructure is needed to enable integration (like Eindhoven, Helsinki, Rotterdam and Centrope claim). In the Öresund region (Copenhagen – Malmö), The Öresund Bridge has definitely contributed to the cross-border integration process although there is still a long way to go, particularly because of all kinds of legal and cultural barriers. The bridge, however, played only a very limited role in the development of Wonderful Copenhagen and its networks. In general, internal cohesion and functional (economic) relations are important to realize partnerships. Socio-cultural context factors The third group of context factors comprises the socio-cultural factors. An important factor within this group is the so-called ‘tradition to cooperate’. Particularly in Copenhagen, Eindhoven and Helsinki, discussion partners think that these cities (and their regions) have been able to benefit from such a tradition. In the case of Eindhoven, this is very much a local context factor, with leader firm Philips playing a key role in the economic, physical and social development of the region. In Copenhagen and Helsinki, the tradition to cooperate is not only a local, but partly also a national institutional context factor. In other regions, the tradition to cooperate is less obvious. Although the Rotterdam region could benefit from the Dutch ‘polder model’, the relation between Rotterdam and the surrounding municipalities has always been somewhat problematic, as the neighbouring communities distrust the intentions of their big brother Rotterdam. This classical centre-periphery struggle can also be observed in the regions of Barcelona and Porto. The case of Munich is interesting because here we see that the traditional clash between central city and neighbouring communities has been (partly) replaced by clashes between the neighbouring communities. In the Centrope region historical cultural links were cut off for more than forty years. Since the collapse of the Iron Curtain cooperation has to start here from scratch. In Hungary, the former communist system has left its traces. Lack of experience with coordination and cooperation is by many considered as a major barrier for a successful public transport partnership in the Budapest region. We conclude that the tradition to cooperate is a very relevant explaining variable in the development of regional partnerships. Regions without such a tradition are challenged to build one, but that obviously takes some time. Many initiatives that we analysed in the regions without a clear tradition to cooperate can be considered attempts to build such a tradition. Particularly in the case of Porto, the Serralves Foundation is seen as a showcase for public-private partnerships in (cultural) tourism development. In Catalonia, the Serra d’en Mena project has a similar function, when

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it comes to promoting cross-border cooperation in urban regeneration (although the main aim of the Better District Programme is to regenerate districts, not to promote partnership development). The case studies also suggest that a tradition to cooperate has to be built step by step. In general, actors need to learn how to cooperate, building mutual trust and confidence. For instance, in the Helsinki region the municipalities are learning how to cooperate in projects with obvious win-win opportunities. ‘Picking low hanging fruit first’ seems a strategy that can be implemented in many institutional contexts (also see Copenhagen). In Budapest the learning process obviously needs more time. Much depends on the piticians of the State and the Capital City to give the good example. Furthermore, it appears that new partnerships often (directly or indirectly) result from ‘old’ partnerships, like in Copenhagen (where Wonderful Copenhagen generates new partnerships) and Eindhoven (the development of Brainport should be seen as a logical next step after Stimulus and Horizon). Another relevant socio-cultural factor is the attitude towards leadership and hierarchy. In general, these attitudes are national rather than local context factors. It is well known that some European countries tend to favour hierarchical organizations (e.g. Germany, United Kingdom and France), while other European countries (e.g. Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands) are much more consensus-oriented, equality being the dominant value. As exception, Hungary changed from a sheer top-down system to a society where equality reigns and where hierarchy is despised. In this situation it appears very difficult to exert leadership (or to accept leadership by others). Organizational factors While the context factors discussed above are mainly exogenous (they play a role in the process but cannot be changed by local actors, or only in an indirect way), the organizational factors are clearly endogenous. After all, partners can choose the design of a partnership, and change this design if needed. The case studies demonstrate that the following organizational factors play a crucial rule in the coalition-forming process: 1) involving the relevant public and private stakeholders; 2) the right scale and scope; 3) intelligent leadership; 4) monitoring and communication. Involving the relevant public and private stakeholders Besides the support from participating actors, support from other relevant public and private stakeholders is needed to develop successful partnerships. Although we explicitly invited the cities and regions to select a partnership with private-sector involvement, only half of the case studies (Copenhagen, Eindhoven, Helsinki, and Porto) explicitly deal with private-sector involvement. Remarkably, these four cases deal with quite successful partnerships, while the other five cases are considered less successful. This brings us to the assumption that private-sector involvement is a key determinant in the coalition-forming process. The importance of business participation is illustrated by the case of the Vienna region, where representatives of the business community are not very positive about the Centrope partnership, accusing it of being too bureaucratic and lacking a clear focus. The cases of Copenhagen and Porto show that particularly

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in tourism development companies can be expected to take an active part in regional partnerships. Wonderful Copenhagen developed networks for stakeholders with similar interests, thus anticipating the classical free rider problems. Despite the ongoing globalization, locally embedded business firms seem to recognize their interests in an attractive location and living environment, particularly because they make use of common labour pools. Not only in tourism, but also in knowledge-intensive sectors (innovation, research and development, etc.), companies can be expected to have an interest in joining regional public-private partnerships. In Eindhoven, Philips could even be seen as one of the initiators of the Brainport programme, while other companies also play a key role in the development and implementation of this programme. Both Eindhoven and Helsinki use triple helix cooperation (knowledge institutions, businesses and administrations) to develop and implement economic policies. Through their participation, companies make a valuable contribution, not only by financial contributions, but also in terms of (market) knowledge and human resources. Another (potential) key stakeholder in regional partnerships is the national government, playing a substantial role in each of the case studies: • • •

•

•

•

• • •

Eindhoven The Dutch government provides help by stimulating policies and intentions to reduce barriers (notably in the cross-border region); Centrope The Austrian Federal State is indirectly involved; the other national governments are stronger involved, though not formally represented; Helsinki The Finnish government is responsible for national urban and regional policies, municipal reform (a potential threat), and can act as coinvestor in the region; Copenhagen The Danish government was co-financer of Wonderful Copenhagen in the first three years, and is still co-investor in infrastructure and (international) events; Munich The Federal State is responsible for federal laws (Planungshoheit, tax system) and the State of Bavaria for defining the legal tasks of the regional planning associations (RPV); Budapest The Ministry of Economy and Transport is partner in the BKSZ partnership through the ownership of the railway and bus companies that provide public transport services in the Budapest region; Rotterdam The Dutch State is observer in the South Wing partnership and main investor in infrastructure (key stakeholder); Catalonia The Spanish Government has a limited role, but the Catalan Government is initiator and key stakeholder (as developer of urban policy); Porto The Portuguese State is co-founder and co-financer of Serralves.

This overview makes clear that the State is (partly) responsible for the institutional environment in which the other stakeholders operate. For instance, in Munich we noticed that the Federal State and the State of Bavaria are mainly responsible for the institutional environment and the related barriers to cooperate (municipal autonomy, tax system). On the contrary, in the case of Eindhoven, we saw that the Dutch government wants to reduce barriers to cooperate in the ELAt region by signing

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two ‘letters of intent’ together with the governments of Flanders and Nord Rhine Westphalia respectively. Lobbyists from the Eindhoven region have made the Dutch government aware of the economic importance of Brainport, as a pillar of the national economy comparable with the two mainports (Port of Rotterdam, and Amsterdam Schiphol Airport). In Copenhagen and Helsinki, regional stakeholders also want to involve the national government (notably to invest in infrastructure), but both the Danish and Finnish government seem to have opted for a policy that promotes equality (a balanced development nationwide) instead of a policy that favours the major contributors to the national economy. Furthermore, national governments can also provide incentives to cooperate, not only by means of national urban policies that award partnerships (like Catalonia is trying to do: municipalities that cooperate have a bigger chance of getting subsidies for regeneration than municipalities that don’t), but also by the threat to enforce changes in local and regional administrations (e.g. mergers between municipalities, like we observed in the Helsinki region). The underfinancing of public transport in Hungary is another condition making operating companies reluctant to actively participate in a partnership. National governments are also relevant because they invest in infrastructure. For instance, in the case of Copenhagen we mentioned that the State plays a key role in the (intended) development of new infrastructure such as a multifunctional arena, a cruise terminal and a congress centre. This also applies to the Rotterdam region, where local and regional stakeholders expect the State to invest in new roads. And also in cross-border projects of Centrope and ELAt (Eindhoven), national governments are needed to improve accessibility. We conclude that in many cases, (direct or indirect) involvement of the national government is needed to realize the aims of regional partnerships. From the cases of Helsinki, Rotterdam and Eindhoven we know that frequent formal or informal interaction with the State can be helpful to get national governments ‘on board’ of regional partnerships. The role of the Portuguese State in Porto needs some explanation. In this case, the national government is one of the leading actors, but only in the Serralves foundation. As far as metropolitan governance (for instance in the field of tourism development) is concerned, the role of the State is very limited. The right scale and scope In section 2 we discussed the scope and scale of the various partnerships, projects and programmes that we analysed. Scope and scale are clear examples of organizational factors that can be changed by the members of a partnership. But what is the right scale and scope? In general, we observe a growing need to create partnerships on a higher geographic level in order to create sufficient critical mass (to survive in global competition, to organize services in a more efficient manner) and to coordinate development. In the Helsinki region, partnerships are now developed on the level of 14 municipalities (the region), instead of four municipalities (the metropolitan area). In Eindhoven, there is a gradual shift from partnerships on the level of the Eindhoven region (SRE) to partnerships on the level of the cross-border region (ELAt). Centrope (Vienna region) is the most obvious example of a partnership that has ensued from the wish to coordinate development on a higher geographic level. Although Wonderful Copenhagen operates on the level of the administrative region,

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partnerships with other regions are developed as well (Baltic Cruise being a good example). Simultaneously, also the need for a broader scope is increasing, since many aspects of sustainable economic growth and elements of urban attractiveness (housing, accessibility, quality of the living environment, quality of public services, etc.) are interrelated. For instance, this can be observed in Helsinki, where intermunicipal partnerships used to be focused on service delivery only, but now also comprehend agreements (or at least, intentions to reach agreements) on land use, infrastructure, housing and international marketing. A similar trend has been noticed in the region of Eindhoven, since the Brainport programme also includes social and environmental aims, whereas its predecessor Horizon didn’t. The Better Districts Programme of Catalonia is clearly also an attempt to develop communities in a more integrated way (promoting cooperation between departments). In the Budapest region there is a plea to combine public transport planning and spatial planning. Until now these are done separately, although the ultimate objective of the BKSZ partnership is to reduce the unfavourable effects of motorization. While the need for scope and scale enlargement is increasing, we also found some arguments to reduce scope and scale. The main argument is that an increase of scale and scope generally implies a growing complexity. Not only because the number of partners and stakeholders rises, but also because of internal differences in the (institutional and spatial-economic) context. As a consequence, it often becomes more difficult to make cooperation concrete, and to produce clear, measurable (or at least tangible) outputs. Internal competition (between sub-regions) and free-rider problems complicate the partnership development process. A good example is the Centrope project (Vienna region) which is criticized by some discussion partners for having a scope and scale that are both too large (the scale is clearly larger than that of a functional urban region). This could have adverse effects on the expected output and on the commitment of partners. Also in the ELAt region (Eindhoven) some discussion partners expressed their scepticism considering the attempts to develop cross-border partnerships and projects. In the case of Rotterdam, it is exactly the resistance against large complex projects (having learned from failure in the past) that explains the deliberate lack of an umbrella organization that comprehends all concrete projects that are being developed now. In general, a small scale and scope can be helpful to produce concrete outputs on a relatively short notice, as we have learned from the successes of Porto and Copenhagen. From the discussion above, we conclude that many metropolitan regions face a so-called ‘scope and scale dilemma’. In regional governance they have to find an optimum scope and scale, looking for a balance between the need for an integrated approach on the level of the functional urban region (or even wider) on the one hand, and the need for concrete outputs and a pragmatic approach on the other. The case studies provide some options (that can be combined!) to deal with the scope and scale dilemma. •

The first option is to increase the level of scale and scope gradually. First, start with the partners with whom concrete results can be achieved on a short notice, and add other partners step by step. A gradual increase of scale and

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scope can be observed in Helsinki, Eindhoven and Rotterdam. In Porto and Catalonia we talked about the use of a concrete project with limited scope and scale as an example and catalyst for the development of partnerships with a larger scope and scale. The second option is a layered structure, in which strategies are coordinated on a higher level, while lower levels are used for the coordination of tactics and implementation. This layered structure (decentralized coordination) seems particularly applicable to cross-border cooperation, and has been suggested for Centrope (Vienna region). The third option is a layered structure in which the second layer is organized by scope (instead of scale, as in the second option). This implies that special networks are developed for particular elements of the overall strategy. A good example is Wonderful Copenhagen which manages several networks that contribute to the overall aim of making the region more attractive as a destination.

Intelligent leadership Leadership is a delicate issue in partnership development. On the one hand, strong leadership is needed to gain support and commitment from the participating actors. On the other hand, strong leadership of one actor might also reduce support and commitment from other actors, like we saw in the cases of Centrope (the Vienna region being the leader – and financer in practice, the other regions being less committed) and ELAt (Eindhoven being the leader in practice, Aachen being somewhat less committed). In all metropolitan regions, we tried to find out who took the lead in coalitionforming processes: in bringing actors together, developing a joint vision and strategy, and turning vision into action. However, many discussion partners emphasized the importance of equality in partnerships, suggesting absence of leadership. In reality, though, there are leading actors, but they have to be careful with claiming that role explicitly. This particularly applies to the largest municipality in a region, since neighbouring communities often distrust (the intentions of) central cities. For instance, the neighbours of Rotterdam often accuse the City of Rotterdam of patronizing behaviour, and having strong preference to do things on its own. For the Mayor of Munich it is difficult to assume the role of regional leader as many rural communities fear the Capital’s dominance. Intelligent leadership is needed to cope with these perceptions. A good example is the Mayor of Helsinki, who emphasizes equality in the relationship with Vantaa, Espoo and Kauniainen, and who prefers to develop partnership on a voluntary basis instead of a merger between the four cities. The case studies also demonstrate that partnerships are sometimes not led by one, but by several actors. Many discussion partners in the region of Eindhoven mentioned the same three people (the mayor of Eindhoven, the CEO of Philips Netherlands, and the president of the Technical University), when we asked them about leadership, although officially the three organizations they represent are not the only leading organizations. In Centrope the three provinces together forming the Vienna Region are the leading partners, although the City of Vienna must be considered initiator. Budapest’s public transport partnership has three public leaders

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with equal power: the Ministry of Economy and Transport, the City of Budapest and the County of Pest. The service operators wait for decisions to be made by the authorities. Without their decisions nothing happens. Moreover, we should make a distinction between strategic leadership and leadership in implementation. In view of the scope-and-scale dilemma, it is important to have people or organizations that are responsible for implementation. In the case of Copenhagen, each network is led by the organization that is generally accepted as the most important stakeholder in the value chain (example: the Cruise Terminal’s CEO is president of the Cruise Network). Also in Eindhoven, we noticed that projects are led by representatives from the private sector and knowledge institutions. In general, these ‘leaders of implementation’ are experienced men or women who have access to a large network that covers several sectors (public, private, etc.). Monitoring and communication The fourth organizational factor comprises monitoring and communication. In various case studies we observe attention to performance measurement. Many discussion partners agree that good monitoring and communication of the results (or expected results) is needed to gain sufficient levels of support. A good example is Wonderful Copenhagen for which evaluation is definitely a key ingredient of the network model. By showing results – increases in visitors, conferences, events, etc. – the organization has been able to show the (public and private) partners the benefits of their investments. Other examples of good performance measurement can be found in Eindhoven (systematic evaluation of the Horizon and Brainport programme and related projects), Helsinki (overview of concrete partnerships in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area), Centrope (evaluation of the EU project), Porto (results of Serralves are available). Obviously, local media play an important role in disseminating the results, making them important stakeholders in the partnerships. Besides the communication of results, also other aspects of communication have been discussed in the case studies. From the cases of Eindhoven, Helsinki and Rotterdam we learned that frequent interaction with national governments and local authorities is needed to secure political support, particularly if the new partnership can be considered a potential threat to existing administrative structures. Furthermore, communication can be instrument to raise awareness, particularly if the sense of urgency is low (like in Munich). 5 To Conclude Although the case studies that we carried out are very different, we have been able to formulate some general lessons for the development of partnerships in metropolitan regions. First of all, policy makers and coalition builders need to be aware of the institutional and spatial-economic context. Successful organizational concepts cannot be just simply copied, but need to be translated to fit in another environment. Second, they should involve the right stakeholders, and more specifically the private sector and the national government. The private sector is needed to make cooperation more concrete (adopting the Triple Helix philosophy), and the national government

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can help to create the right conditions. Third, they have to choose the right scope and scale, using a layered structure and/or developing partnerships gradually, in order to generate concrete outputs, needed to gain and maintain support. Fourth, they should deal with leadership in an intelligent way, avoiding resistance against leadership and paying particular attention to leadership in the stage of implementation.

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Index A13/A16 Highway (Netherlands) 171, 175, 176, 178–9, 183 Aachen 13, 14, 16, 19, 23, 35, 235 City of 26, 28, 30 see also ELAt ABCD (Aachen-Bonn-Cologne-Dortmund) region (Bio River region) 27 Adeturn 221 Administrative Platform South Wing Region (Netherlands), see BPZ Agência Portuguesa para o Investimento (API) 225–6 AGIT (Regional Development Agency, Aachen) 28, 29, 30 Almere 167 Amsterdam 2, 14, 15, 18, 32, 167, 170, 176 Antwerp 14, 166 AP Möller-Maersk Group 105 API, see Agência Portuguesa para o Investimento Århus 101 Arnhem-Nijmegen 18, 169 ASML 13, 16 Augsburg 127, 131, 138 Austria 44, 45, 49, 53, 60, 235, 238, 248 see also Central European Region, Centrope Badalona 189, 191, 195, 196, 198, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207, 211, 237 socio-economic context of 193–5, 196 Barcelona (city) 190, 195, 197, 198, 200, 202, 239, 250 Barcelona (province) 191, 195 Barcelona standard 13, 15, 71 Barcelonès 195, 201, 203, 205, 207 Bavaria 120, 121, 124, 125–6, 128, 131, 132, 135, 252 Ministry of State Development and Environmental Questions 125 Berkel and Rodenrijs 173, 175, 183, 186 Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel, see BPZ

Better District Programme (Catalonia) 189, 196, 198–201, 205, 206, 207 actors involved in 240 assessment of 210–12 defined/redefined 236–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 performance, output and outcome of 208–9, 245 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 see also Serra d’en Mena Bio River region, see ABCD region BKSZ 141, 151 achievements of 156–7 actors involved in 240 analysis of 152–6 challenges for 160–64 defined/redefined 236–8 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 obstacles for 157–60, 162–4 output and outcome of 245–6 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 BKV 149, 150, 151–63 passim Bleiswijk 175 Bornholm 98, 100 BPZ 165, 169, 179, 184, 185 analysis of 170–74 performance, output and outcome of 180–81 successes and failures of 184 Brabant 14, 15, 18, 19–20, 23, 30, 35 BrabantStad 20 Brainport Navigator/strategy 13, 22, 28–9 actors involved in 240 aims of 22–4 compared with ELAt and Horizon 29–30

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defined/redefined 235–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 organization of 24–5 performance, output and outcome of 30–35, 37, 244 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 success of 35–6 Bratislava (city) 40, 41, 42, 49, 52, 53, 55, 56, 61 see also Vienna-Bratislava Bratislava (region) 40, 45, 55, 56 Breda 14, 20 Brno 40, 41, 52, 55 Brussels 14 Budapest 53, 56, 61, 141–2, 236–56 passim administrative context of 145–6 City of 153, 154, 156, 159, 160, 162, 163, 247, 248, 256 demography of 142–3 economy of 143–4 Municipality of 152, 155, 157 transport system in 141, 148–50, 236 administration of 146–7 influence of EU regulations on 150–51, 159 social structure of 144 see also BKSZ Budapest Regional Transport Association, see BKSZ Budapesti Közlekedési Svövetség, see BKSZ Bundesgartenschau (German Flower Show) 130 Bundeswettberb Modellvorhaven der Raumordnung (MORO) 132, 134, 136, 138 Burgenland 39, 40, 44, 46, 47, 54 Capital Region (Denmark) 99, 100, 102, 112, 114, 116, 117 see also Copenhagen Carlsberg 105, 106, 116 Casa da Musica, Porto 227 Casa de Serralves 215, 216 Catalonia 236–56 passim administration of 195–8 Catalan Institute for Land (INCASOL) 201, 204

District Act 189, 197, 198, 199–201, 204, 206, 207, 210, 212 geography and demography of 190–92 Ministry/Department of Spatial Policies and Public Works (DPTOP) 189, 197–211 passim socio-economic context of 192–5 see also Better Districts Programme, Serra d’en Mena Catholic University of Leuven, see KU Leuven Central Danube 53 Central European Region 39 administrative organization of 45 composition of 40–41 demography of 41 economy of 41–4 labour market of 44 spatial-economic situation of 44–5 see also Centrope Central Hungarian Region 146, 154, 160, 248 Central Jutland 99 Centrope 39–40 actors involved in 48–9, 240 defined/redefined 235–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim initiative for 46–7 innovativeness of 241 motives of 47 organization of 49–50 performance of 54–9, 245, 246 achievements 54, 57 challenges 57–8 obstacles 55–7 role and objectives of 47–8 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 successes and failures of 60–61 vision and themes of 50–53 competitiveness and cross-sector partnerships 2–3 need for 1–2 and regional approach 2 cooperation, see partnerships Copenhagen (city) 98, 99, 100 City of 97, 99, 102, 103, 105, 106, 110, 113, 115 Copenhagen (county) 98, 99, 100, 114

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Copenhagen (region) 2, 97, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 235–56 passim cultural context 101–2 demography and economy 100–101 political-administrative context 98–100 see also Wonderful Copenhagen Copenhagen Capacity 100, 103, 109 Copenhagen Cruise Terminal 106 Cruise Baltic 104, 107, 108, 109, 114, 117, 239, 254 Culminatum 75, 80, 84, 91, 240 Cultural Capital of Europe 6 Czech Republic (southern) 39, 44, 45, 53, 58 see also Central European Region, Centrope

innovativeness of 241 obstacles to 37 performance, output and outcome of 30–35, 244 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 Erasmus Medical Centre (EMC) 174 Erasmus University Rotterdam 174 Erding 120, 122, 131 Espoo 65–70 passim, 73, 75, 76, 77, 81, 85, 88, 255 City of 85, 88 European and Economic Social Committee (EESC) 1 European Territorial Cooperation objective 50

Dachau 120, 122 Daf 13, 16 Danske Bank 105 Debrecen 142 Delft 33, 165, 173, 174, 175, 181, 182, 186 Den Haag, see Hague, The Denmark 98–100, 107, 111, 112 Ministry of Industry 102 DIANE-network 46, 48 Dordrecht 167, 170 Douro River Valley 225–6 DSM 19 DSP Valley 27

FEI Company 13 Finland 68, 72–3, 74–5, 248 Centres of Expertise Programme 75, 77 Ministry of Education 81 Ministry of Interior 73, 78 Regional Centres Programme 75 Flanders 26, 33, 248, 253 Fondo 191 Forum Virium Helsinki 80 Frederiksborg (city) 98, 99, 100 Frederiksborg (county) 99, 100, 102, 110, 111, 112, 114 Freising 120, 122, 128, 129, 131 Fürstenfeldbruck 120, 122

Ebersberg 120, 122 Eindhoven (region) 13, 235–56 passim demography and geography of 14 economy of 14–17 cross-border 16 development of 16–17 politics and administration of 17–20 policies 19–20 see also Brainport Navigator/strategy, ELAt, Horizon Programme Eindhoven, City of 19, 22, 27, 30, 31 Eisenstadt 40 ELAt (Eindhoven-Leuven-Aachen triangle) 13, 16, 23, 24, 25–9 actors involved in 240 compared with Brainport and Horizon 29–30 defined/redefined 235–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim

Gauting 130 Gelderland 14 Genk 27 Germany 123, 124, 248 Spatial Planning Law 127 Girona 195 Gondomar 217 Gouda 167, 170, 173, 178 Gräfelfing 130 Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao 229 Györ 40, 41, 45 Györ-Moson-Sopron 40 Haaglanden 170 Haar 120, 122, 136 Haarlem 167 Hague, The 2, 18, 165, 167, 169, 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 178, 179, 238, 239 Heideflächerverein Münchener Norden 130

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Helmond 14, 20 Helsingborg 99, 114, 116 Helsingør 99, 114, 116, 117 Helsinki (city) 65–71 passim, 75, 76, 77, 80, 84, 85, 88, 93 City of 66, 68, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 88, 93 Helsinki (region) 65–6, 235–56 passim administrative context of 72–5 Chamber of Commerce 77 cultural context of 75–6 demography and economy of 66–72 regional cooperation in actors involved in 240 challenges 92 defined/redefined 235–7 existing forms of 76 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim initiatives to enhance 78–82 innovativeness of 241 motives to enhance 77–8 performance, output and outcome of 84–92, 244, 246 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 successes and failures of 92–4 Helsinki Club 78, 79, 84, 94 Helsinki Education and Research Area (HERA) 81 Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board 65, 78–9, 82, 235, 247 compared with Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly 83–4 performance, output and outcome of 85–9 successes and failures of 92–4 Helsinki Metropolitan Council (YTV) 76 Helsinki Region Cooperation Assembly 65, 78, 81–2, 235 compared with Helsinki Metropolitan Area Advisory Board 83–4 performance, output and outcome of 84 successes and failures of 92–4 Helsinki Region Marketing 77 Helsinki School of Creative Entrepreneurship 91 Helsinki School of Economics 91 Helsinki University of Technology 69, 81, 91 Hertogenbosch 14, 20 High Tech Campus (Eindhoven) 32, 36

Hilversum 167 Holland, see Netherlands Holst Centre 32–3, 35, 36 Horizon Programme 13, 20, 24, 25, 28–9, 242, 243, 250, 254, 256 aims of 20–21 compared with Brainport and ELAt 29–30 organization of 21–2 performance, output and outcome of 30–35 success of 35–6 Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd (HUR) 99, 100, 102, 107 Hungary 39, 44, 45, 46, 53, 56, 58, 235, 238, 248, 250 administrative context of 145–6 demography of 142–3 economy of 143–4 Ministry of Economy and Transport 146, 151, 152, 155, 160, 163, 248, 252, 256 Ministry of Finance 146, 150, 155 Ministry of Internal Affairs 146 Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 146 National Regional Development Office 146 National Transport Policy 148 social structure of 144 transport system in 147–8, 149 administration of 146–7 influence of EU regulations on 150–51 see also Central European Region, Centrope HUR, see Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd Hyvinkää 66, 67 IMEC 16, 33 Ingolstadt 127, 131, 138 Innovation Strategy (Helsinki) 79–81, 83, 87, 91, 240 performance, output and outcome of 85 International Marketing Øresund (IMO) 104, 107–8, 109, 113, 114, 116 Interreg 25, 28, 47, 50, 52, 53, 55, 57, 61, 107 Invest in Portugal, see Agência Portuguesa para o Investimento (API) Jyväskylä 74

Index Kauniainen 66, 67, 73, 76, 85, 255 Kittsee Conference (2003) 46 KLM-Air France 178, 183 Kohe 114, 117 Konica Minolta 105 Krailling 120, 122, 130 KU Leuven 27, 28, 29 R&D 27, 30 Kuuma 74, 82, 83 La Pau 191 La Salut 191 Lahti 81 Landeshauptstadt Müchen, see Munich (city) Landkreis München 120 Landsberg am Lech 120, 122 Leiden 167, 170 Leuven 13, 14, 16, 19, 23, 235 City of 28, 30 see also ELAt Leuven Inc 27 Limburg 14, 15, 19–20, 31, 35 Lisbon 218–20, 221, 222, 232 Lisbon Strategy/standard 1, 13, 22 Lleida 195 Lolland-Falster 98 Lower Austria 39, 40, 44, 46, 47 Lufthansa 123, 128 Maastricht 14 Madrid 192, 219, 232 MAI (München, Augsberg, Ingolstadt) 127, 131, 138 Maia 217 Malmö 2, 98, 108, 114, 250 Matoshinos 217 MÁV 149, 150, 151–63 passim Møn 98 MORO, see Bundeswettberb Modellvorhaven der Raumordnung München (city), see Munich (city) München (district) 120, 122 München (region), see Munich (region) Münchner Verkehrsverbund (MVV) 125, 131 Munich (city) 120–22, 126, 127 City of 119, 122, 124, 125, 128–33 passim, 135, 138 Munich (region) 119–20, 235–56 passim demography and economy of 120–23

263

regional planning in 125–32 actors involved in 240 analysis of 132–3 defined/redefined 236–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 performance, output and outcome of 133–7, 246 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 successes and failures of 137–8 Munich Transport Association, see Münchner Verkehrsverbund MVV, see Münchner Verkehrsverbund Natlab 15, 32 Nature Park Schieveen 177, 182–3 Neloset 82, 83 Netherlands 165, 248 administrative system of 17–18, 168–9 Chamber of Commerce 30 Ministry of Economic Affairs 19, 33, 174 Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 170 NHG 105, 106 Nokia 69, 72, 80 Noordas programme 173, 184 Noordrand project 165–6, 170, 171, 173, 179, 185 actors involved in 240 analysis of 174–9 challenges for 183–4 defined/redefined 235–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 Nordallianz 131, 136, 138, 246 Norte (Portugal) 218, 219, 220 North Jutland 99 North Rhine Westphalia 26, 27, 248, 253 Norway 107 Nota Ruimte 19, 31, 170 Oberhaching 120, 122, 134, 136 Oberschleiβheim 120, 122, 131 Øresund (region) 98, 107–8, 109, 114, 116, 250

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Empowering Metropolitan Regions Through New Forms of Cooperation

Øresund (river) 98, 99 Oulu 75 Paris 14 partnerships contextual factors affecting 9 administrative 9, 247–9 cultural 9, 250–51 economic 9, 249–50 historical 9 political 9, 247–9 and competitiveness 2–3 criteria for comparison of 4–5 cross-sector 2–3 failure and success of factors of 7–8, 246–56 explaining 8–9 forms of 235–42 and governance structures 3–5 motives for establishing 6–7 need for new forms of 3–4 performance of 8, 243–6 public–private 3, 251–3 ‘Peaks in the Delta’ 19, 20, 31, 174 Perspective Munich 125 Pest 142, 146, 152, 154, 155, 159, 160, 163, 238, 248, 256 Phare CBC 50 Philips 13, 15–17, 19, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 250, 252, 255 Planegg 130 Planning Association for the Wider Economic Region of Munich, see Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München (PV) 119, 129–30, 135, 136, 236 analysis of 133 successes and failures of 137–8 Porto 222, 227, 230–31, 232, 233, 236–56 passim City of 222, 223, 226, 230–31, 232, 233 demography of 217–18 economy of 218–20 political-administrative context of 220–22 Porto Convention Bureau 221 Porto School for Architecture 224 Porto Trade Association 221 Porto Traders Association 221

Portugal 215, 219, 220–22, 231 Commission for Coordination and Regional Development of the North 230 Ministry of Environment, Territory and Regional Development 220 CCDR (Commission of Coordination and Regional Development) 220–21 State of 215, 222–6 passim, 231, 232 Portuguese Association of Travel Agents 221 Portuguese Business Association 221 Prague 53, 56, 61 PV, see Planungsverband Äuβerer Wirtschaftsraum München Raiffeisenbank 51, 53 Randstad 2, 14, 34, 165, 166, 167, 169, 175, 180 North Wing 167 South Wing 167, 175, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 239, 244 see also BPZ RandstadRail 176, 178 Raval Safareigs 191 Regiegroep Toptechnologieregio Zuidoost Nederland 19–20, 23, 34 Regional Planning Association, Munich, see Regionaler Planungsverband München Regionaler Planungsverband München (RPV) 125–9, 134, 135, 136, 236 analysis of 132–3 successes and failures of 137–8 Rhine Scheldt Delta 166 Roskilde 99, 100, 102, 111, 112, 114, 117 Rotterdam 2, 14, 15, 18, 165, 236–56 passim accessibility of 169 administrative context of 168–9 City of 165, 166, 173, 175, 177, 179, 182, 183, 184, 186, 255 demographic context of 168 Development Corporation 173 Economic Development Board (EDBR) 172–3, 174, 183, 185 partnerships in 170 actors involved in 240 analysis of 170–79 defined/redefined 236–7

Index factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 performance, output and outcome of 179–84, 244, 246 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 successes and failures of 184–6 Port of 173, 253 regional and local policies 169–70 spatial-economic situation of 166–7 Rotterdam Airport 173, 174, 175, 177–8, 181, 183 RPV, see Regionaler Planungsverband München RTM Airpark 173, 174, 175, 178, 183 Ruhr 14 RWTH 16, 27 Sankt Pölten 40 SAS 105, 106, 107, 112 Sant Antoni de Llefià 191 Sant Joan de Llefià 191 Santa Coloma de Gramenet 189, 191, 195, 196, 198, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207, 211 socio-economic context of 193–5, 196 Santa Maria de Feira 217 Santa Rosa 191 Schiedam 173, 175, 178 Schieveen Polder 166, 173–4, 175, 177, 179, 185 performance, output and outcome of 182–3, 244 Schiphol Group 177–8, 183 Science and Business Park Schieveen 166, 173–4, 175, 177, 182–3 Science Port Holland 165–6, 171, 173–4, 175, 178, 179, 183–6 passim performance, output and outcome of 181–2, 244 Serra d’en Mena 189, 198 administration of 198 Better District Programme project 196, 198, 201–4, 211, 212 actors involved in 240 analysis of 205–7 defined/redefined 236–7 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241

265

performance, output and outcome of 207–8, 245 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 geography and demography of 191–2 socio-economic context of 193–5 Serralves Foundation 215 actors involved in 240 aims and motives of 223–5 analysis of 226–7 assessment of 231–3 defined/redefined 236–8 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 organization of 222–3 output and outcome of 244–5 challenges 230–31 success 227–9 relationship with API 225–6 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 Serralves Museum of Contemporary Art 215, 216, 222–5, 227–9, 231, 232, 236 Serralves Park 215, 224, 229, 231, 232, 236 SEUTU 74 Sipoo 88 Siza Vieira, Álvaro 215, 229 Skåne 98 Slovakia (West) 39, 42, 44, 45, 46, 53, 56, 58, 235, 238 see also Central European Region, Centrope Sopron 40 South Denmark 99 South Holland 165, 170–74 passim, 175, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185 South Moravia 40, 46, 235, 238 Southern Bohemia 41, 46 Spa 35 Spain 195 Spatial Plan Region Rotterdam (2020) 172–3, 175, 181, 183 Spatial Plan Rotterdam (2010) 172 SRE (Eindhoven cityregion) 14, 18, 19, 27, 30, 253 see also Eindhoven Starnberg 120, 122 Stimulus Programme 13, 16, 250 Sweden 98, 107

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Szombathely 40 Tampere 75 Taragona 195 Technical University of Delft 173, 174, 181 Technical University of Eindhoven (TU/e) 13, 15–16, 19, 30, 255 Technopolis Innovation Park 173, 174, 183 Tienen 27 Tilburg 14, 20 TNO 13, 33 Automotive 33 Triple Helix 5, 256 and Eindhoven (region) 13, 21, 22, 25, 29–30, 33, 34–5, 240, 244, 252 and Helsinki (region) 75, 76, 77, 81, 83, 240, 244, 252 Trnava (city) 40 Trnava (region) 40, 45 TU/e, see Technical University of Eindhoven Twente 18 University of Art and Design Helsinki 91 University of Helsinki 80, 81, 88 University of Leiden 174 University of Leuven 16 University of Maastricht 19 University of Porto 221 Unterschleiβheim 120, 122, 131 Upper Bavaria 120 Urban Programme (2005–2007) 90–92 Utrecht 2, 18, 167, 170 Uusimaa 66, 76 Regional Council 75, 77, 82, 91 Valkenburg 35 Vantaa 65–9 passim, 73, 75, 76, 81, 85, 88, 255 City of 85, 88 Vas 40 Vereniging Natuurmonumenten (VN) 175, 177, 182 Vienna (city) 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 49, 52, 53, 56, 61 City of 40, 46, 53, 255

Vienna (province) 39, 40, 46, 47 Vienna (region) 41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 55–6, 60, 61, 235–56 passim Vienna-Bratislava 39, 41, 45, 46, 47, 53, 55, 58, 61 Twin City project 46, 51, 52, 55 Viennese Employees Promotion Fund (WAFF) 53 Vila Nova de Gaia 217 VN, see Vereniging Natuurmonumenten Volánbusz 149, 150, 151–62 passim WoCo, see Wonderful Copenhagen Wonderful Copenhagen (WoCo) 97, 100, 102–4 actors involved in 240 Alliance 97, 103, 113, 116 analysis of 108–10 Cruise Network 97, 103, 106 defined/redefined 235–7 Eventures 106 factors of failure and success in 246–56 passim innovativeness of 241 Meetingplace 97, 103, 106–7 Mødecentrum 97, 107, 117 Sjæland 103, 107, 114 output and outcome of 244, 246 challenges 112–15 performance 110–13 scope and scale of 238–9 stage of development of 242–3 success and failures of 115–17 see also Cruise Baltic, International Marketing Øresund World Bank Budapest Urban Transport Project 152, 157 Würmtal Zweckverband 130 YTV, see Helsinki Metropolitan Council Zaandstad 167 Zealand 98, 99, 100, 114 Zeeland 30 Zestienhoven Polder 175, 178