The political psyche
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The political psyche
In radical and original form, here is an engagement of depth psychology with politics that fully reflects the discoveries both participants make in analysis and therapy. Andrew Samuels shows that an inner journey and a desire to fashion something practical out of passionate political conviction are linked projects. He brings an acute psychological perspective to bear on public themes such as the distribution of wealth, the market economy, Third World development, environmentalism, nationalism, and anti-semitism. Our conception of ‘the political’ is expanded and enhanced. But, true to his aim of setting in motion a two-way process between depth psychology and politics, Samuels also lays bare the hidden politics of the father, the male body, and of men’s issues generally. Politics and depth psychology are not collapsed together. Nor is Samuels starry-eyed about the troubled relationship of depth psychology to the political events of the century. In the book he presents his acclaimed and cathartic work on Jung, anti-semitism and the Nazis to the wider public. A special and fascinating feature of this extraordinary book is the light shed on clinical work by a political analysis. Samuels conducted a large-scale international survey of analysts and psychotherapists into what they do when their patients/clients bring overtly political material into the clinical setting. The respondents also revealed their own political attitudes and histories. The results of this survey totally destabilize any preconceived notions about the political sensitivity of analysis and psychotherapy. Andrew Samuels is a Training Analyst of the Society of Analytical Psychology, London, and a Scientific Associate of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis. He is the author of Jung and the PostJungians (1985), A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis (1986, with Bani Shorter and Fred Plaut) and The Plural Psyche (1989), as well as the editor of The Father: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives (1985) and Psychopathology: Contemporary Jungian Perspectives (1989).
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‘Andrew Samuels reconstitutes the relations between mind and power, in the wake of the splits in consciousness and society created by our Cartesian heritage. The Political Psyche brings together socially-concerned analytic writing (Fromm, Marcuse, Habermas), radical psychiatry (Lang) and the most recent criticism. ‘As a therapist, Samuels restores to their political roots such clinical processes as countertransference, psychopathology, fantasy and sexuality; as a cultural critic, he speaks of the environment, nuclear war, capitalism, poverty and gender; as an intellectual, he reflects with philosophical precision upon these; and as a Jungian analyst, he introduces—respectfully—his metapsychological father’s nationalism and penchant for National Socialism to “the political psyche”. ‘This is an ambitious, honest, radical and well-informed book written in a style free of jargon and warmly dialogical.’ Peter Homans, Professor of Religion and Psychological Studies (Divinity School) and Professor in the Committee on Human Development, The University of Chicago ‘Few tasks are more necessary, and few more difficult, than finding adequate and useful ways of connecting an understanding of the psyche with political issues and analysis. Attempts to build bridges have always tended to collapse back into a social or, more often, a psychic reductionism. Today, many have abandoned the task altogether, leaving the study of psychic pain firmly within the clinic, and politics to the polemicists. In this book Andrew Samuels adopts a bold new approach to the task, ranging widely across depth psychologies and clinical experience to place them solidly within contemporary political debate. He seeks not just some type of interaction between clinicians and their political and cultural milieu, but real transformation on both sides. The originality of his ideas is most apparent as he keeps on moving in areas where others fear to tread. We find here a complex analysis of masculinity, fathering and paternal engagement, presented in rich detail in terms of their significance for pro- and anti-feminist goals and interests, and progressive and conservative movements generally. The book makes a passionate and compelling case for connecting inner and outer worlds, and for clinicians’ greater political involvement—in their training, with their patients, and above all in the wider world.’ Lynne Segal, Principal Lecturer in Psychology, Middlesex University ‘A splendid bringing together of Jungian, post-Jungian and Freudian thought in an effort to link psychology and politics.
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Samuels has not tried to reduce one field to the other, but instead has seen how they can benefit from each other. He is free of sectarianism, and absolutely up-to-date in the latest literature. It is a stimulating and thoroughly original book that is fully accessible to the general reader.’ Paul Roazen, Professor of Social and Political Science at York University, Toronto, Ontario
The political psyche Andrew Samuels
London and New York
First published 1993 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1993 Andrew Samuels All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Samuels, Andrew. The political psyche/Andrew Samuels. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Psychoanalysis—Political aspects. 2. Political psychology. I. Title. BF175.4.S65S25 1993 150.19′5–dc20 92–39941 CIP ISBN 0-203-35959-3 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-37215-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-08101-7 (Print Edition) 0-415-08102-5 (pbk)
For Joel and Lydia
The author is more modest and less obliging than the title of this piece might lead one to infer. Indeed, I am convinced not only that what I say is wrong, but that what will be said against it will be wrong as well. Nonetheless, a beginning must be made; for the truth is to be found not in the middle of such a subject but around the outside, like a sack which changes shape every time a new opinion is stuffed in, but grows firmer all the while.
(Robert Musil, ‘Helpless Europe: A Digressive Journey’)
Contents
Preface Acknowledgments Part I The political psyche
x xiv 1
1
The mirror and the hammer: The politics of resacralization
2
Subjectivity and political discourse: The contribution of the clinic
23
3
Depth psychology and politics
50
4
The lion and the fox: Morality, Trickster and political transformation
77
5
Against nature
Part II The political person
2
102 121
6
Fathers
122
7
Political readings of paternal imagery
146
8
Reflecting on men
172
9
The political person
197
Part III The political therapist
202
10
Political material in the clinical setting: Replies to an international survey
203
11
Object relations, group process and political change
263
12
Jung, anti-semitism and the Nazis
283
13
Nations, leaders and a psychology of difference
313
14
Ending and beginning
333
ix
Notes
336
Bibliography
359
Name index
370
Subject index
375
Preface
As I understand it, the purposes of a Preface are to tell how the book came to be written, to position it in relation to the writer’s previous work, and to convey the importance of the book to the writer on a personal level. Some explanation of terminology, especially in a discipline-crossing work like this, may also be helpful. In Jung and the Post-Jungians, I used a politicized methodology to draw together an overview of the analytical psychology scene since Jung’s death in 1961. Debate and dispute between the schools of postJungian analytical psychology delineated the field itself. In The Plural Psyche, I refined my approach and called it ‘pluralism’, extending my purview to straddle internal psychological life, theorymaking in psychology, and the psychology of certain moral themes that I thought had social significance. This book takes up the wider issues touched on by The Plural Psyche and foregrounds them in an unambiguous attempt to create linkages between depth psychology and political theory and practice. Why has my writing become ‘political’? It can be seen that this has not been a sudden whim and that the roots of this book lie in the previous books (not forgetting anthologies on the father and on psychopathology, nor a dictionary of analytical psychology, which had as their ‘political’ project the communication of analytical psychology to non-Jungians). As far as I can tell, in answering the question ‘why politics?’, it has been a question of conscience. In simple terms, the worlds I live in, or have experienced on my travels, have disturbed me. Inequality, prejudice, violence and a lack of imaginative vitality have affected me and worried me. I felt I wanted to do something about it and could not contemplate going back to the left-wing splinter group politics of late adolescence. Then it gradually dawned on me that the profession I had ‘chosen’, for whatever reasons, offered a particular way of making the contribution that my conscience was demanding. Once embarked on the work, I found that the movements of mind and heart were in two directions: The planned one was from depth psychology to politics; the unplanned one, that grew and grew in
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power and significance, was from the political to the principles and practices of depth psychology. The book does not follow some single-minded method, though there is method in it. Nor do I adhere to some absolute Truth, though there are truths herein that will survive if they survive healthy competition with other truths. Nor do I have a fixed version of human nature in mind, though I have passionately held ideas of what constitutes human beings. That remark about the absence of a fixed version of human nature leads me to raise the question of the ‘we’ who are ubiquitous in this text. Sometimes, and uncontroversially, this ‘we’ refers to those reading my text in the here-and-now. But at other times, my use of ‘we’ may seem to reflect the usual tendency of a white, Western, Jewish, middle-class, heterosexual male to see himself as representative of everyone. However, I have tried not to fall into this inflation, making it clear when I do mean ‘everyone’, and when I mean ‘people like me’, ‘analysts’, ‘political practitioners’, ‘men’ and so on. This caveat is particularly important because, in these pages, I have tried to address some of the concerns of a wide spectrum of diverse groups of people: Psychologically aware politicos, mainstream politicians, some feminists, gay and lesbian activists, embattled members of ethnic minorities, environmentalists, certain artists, the poor in developing and industrially advanced countries, those living in presently unconventional styles of family organization. Since I do not have the fantasy of formalizing this spectrum into a federation, my text will not flourish (meaning work) unless the components of the spectrum are differentiated. ‘We’ will only be authentic to the extent that ‘we’ has been differentiated. In the Preface to The Plural Psyche I made the point that what looks like new theory is often a description of cutting-edge practice. Based on the experience of writing this book, I can develop the point further. It is a question of raising something that is present in culture but unrecognized therein to the more conscious level of a text. If one does that, then the discourse of which that text is a part will be affected by the (new) text. So I do not now see it as primarily a question of describing untheorized practice, but rather I regard such practice as itself an expression of something worth ‘texting’. My surmise is that the whole idea of factoring the psychological into the political is just such a bubbling-under phenomenon. I will move on to provide the promised notes on terminology. There are three. First, I use the old-fashioned term ‘depth psychology’ because I do not want to use the more cumbersome phrase ‘psychoanalysis and analytical psychology’. However, it is more than a question of saving space. As far as most of the themes touched on in
xii
this book are concerned, I think that the arguments and ideas arise from and are comprehensible to both psychoanalysis and analytical psychology. Moreover, this is certainly not a ‘Jungian’ text and the term ‘depth psychology’ is intended to offer me some protection from sequestration as a ‘Jungian’. Depth psychology, as a tag, has its own imperfections and I discuss these in the book from time to time. Second, I want to say something about my use of the words ‘analyst’, ‘psychotherapist’ and ‘therapist’. Not all psychotherapists and therapists think and work analytically, so at times I have had to corral the analytical folk and refer to ‘analysts’. But, given that clinical practice is mobilized in this book for political purposes, I must add that it is not only analysts who think and work analytically. Many psychotherapists and therapists do as well. That said, I do not have any intention of commenting directly on the vexed question of the similarities and differences between psychoanalysis ‘proper’ and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In Chapter 2 and elsewhere I have used the term ‘political analyst’ because of the polysemous associations such a term inspires and not in spite of them. Third, I have tried to be careful in my use of the words ‘politics’ or ‘the political’, ‘culture’, ‘society’ and the ‘collective’. I attempt a definition of politics in the first chapter (pp. 3–4, below). By ‘culture’, I mean the assembly, limited in time and space, of the social, material, mental, spiritual, artistic, religious and ritual processes of a relatively stable and sizeable community. I use the words ‘society’ or ‘societal’ in the following senses: The means by which relations between individual and community are structured; the institutions that cause differences between individuals to acquire significances beyond those individual differences; whatever promotes learned forms of behavior and communication that excite support and approval or condemnation and punishment; relations between organizations and groups. The ‘collective’ implies what is held in common, ranging from a biological/ phylogenetic use of collective to something like the collective atmosphere in a crowded theater or soccer stadium. To conclude: I acknowledge that the book springs from depth psychology. But, as I confessed, there has been a two-way process. My passionate hope is that my work will also be read outside the depth psychological communities: In the universities, in departments of social science, sociology, politics, psychology, psychiatry, cultural and gender studies, law, and religion; in centers of artistic activity; by psychotherapists and counsellors whose orientation is not depth psychological; by political activists in a wide range of fields of endeavor. My overall perception is that depth psychology (broadly conceived) and politics (broadly conceived) are enriched by contact with each
xiii
other. However, I trust that I have not totally confused the two disciplines by experimenting with a hybrid of them. For that would lead to the unforgivable delusion that simply publishing a text on depth psychology and politics is all that it is necessary to do. London and Ashton, February 1993
Acknowledgments
Responsibility for the ideas expressed in this book is, of course, mine. I would like to thank those patients who have given me permission to write about them. The research project, carried out by means of an international questionnaire, would not have been possible without a generous grant, for which I am most grateful, from the Ann and Erlo van Waveren Foundation in New York. The project is described in Chapter 10. The following professional societies of analysts and psychotherapists helped in a variety of ways with the sending out and return of the questionnaires. I have indicated the various ‘contact persons’. I think I can say that, without exception, each organization helped me to the maximum extent possible for it and I am truly thankful: Society of Analytical Psychology (Jane Knight and Hugh Gee), British Psycho-Analytical Society (Anne-Marie Sandler), Institute of Psychotherapy and Counselling (WPF) (Lesley Murdin and Trevor Dawson), Association of Humanistic Psychology Practitioners (John Rowan), National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (Michael Vannoy Adams and Michael Eigen), San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute (Robert Wallerstein), Chicago Society of Jungian Analysts (Peter Mudd), Society of Jungian Analysts of Northern California—San Francisco (Rick Steele), Society of Jungian Analysts of Southern California—Los Angeles (Allen Koehn), Centro Italiano di Psicologia Analitica (Luigi Zoja), Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia Analitica (Helena Albuquerque), Russian Association of Practical Psychologists—Division of Psychoanalysis (Julia Aloyshina), Israel Association of Analytical Psychology (Eli Weisstub), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Analytische Psychologie (Gustav Bovensiepen and Arvid Erlenmeyer). I am grateful to Luigi Zoja, Gustav Bovensiepen, Simona Panatta, Arvid Erlenmeyer, Helena Albuquerque, A.H.Brafman, Gottfried Heuer, and Julia Aloyshina for translating the questionnaires and/or replies. Most of all, I thank the respondents who took time from their
xv
busy lives and practices to work on a particularly demanding set of questions. I do not think I could have written this book without the stimulus provided by invitations to lecture or conduct workshops and seminars from analytical, cultural, intellectual and academic institutions in Britain, the Republic of Ireland, the United States, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Denmark, Holland, Israel, Brazil and Russia. I appreciate the invitations and continue to learn from such experiences. Writing a book is both a lonely and profoundly social process. I have had support and feedback from so many people that it is almost impossible to list them all. I am thinking of: Henry Abramovitch, Mike Adams, John Allan, Karin Barnaby, Cathie Brettschneider, Sheila Butterworth, Carlos Byington, Andrea Ciecierski, Giles Clark, Coline Covington, Ian Craib, James Croghan, Kendra Crossen, Gustav Dreifuss, Musa Farhi, Nina Farhi, Ian Fenton, Karl Figlio, David Freeman, Paul Gordon, Rosemary Gordon, Jane Haynes, Birgit Heuer, Gottfried Heuer, Bob Hinshelwood, George Hogenson, Peter Homans, Judith Hubback, Raphael Kaplinsky, Jean Kirsch, Tom Kirsch, Jean Knox, Paul Kugler, Bruce Linton, Nancy McKenzie, David Mayers, Kitty Moore, Michael Munchow, Mary Nolan, Renos Papadopoulos, Roderick Peters, Ruthie Petrie, Fred Plaut, Michael Pokorny, Kevin Polley, Val Richards, Paul Roazen, Margaret Ryan, Cesare Sacerdoti, Janet Sayers, Ilene Serlin, Nathan Schwartz-Salant, Ann Scott, Sonu Shamdasani, Joe Smith, Martin Stanton, Averil Stedeford, Tom Steele, Murray Stein, David Stonestreet, Tessa Strickland, David Tacey, Matthias von der Tann, Peter Tatham, Richard Wainwright, Eli Weisstub, Edwina Welham, Richard Wilkinson, Don Williams, Elizabeth Wright, Wendy Wyman, Bob Young, Luigi Zoja, and the members of the Male Psychology Workshop that is under the aegis of the Society of Analytical Psychology. My thanks to all and I apologize if I have inadvertently left anyone off this list. There are three individuals that deserve a special mention: Jo Foster has word processed and re-processed what must seem like countless times. Yet her good humor, accuracy and incredibly speedy responsiveness have never deserted her. She has been a delight to work with and I thank her for it. John Beebe brought his own particular brand of miracle-working editing to over half the book. He didn’t just improve the text—by the depth of his understanding, he gave me confidence to push my ideas further on, and played a full part in the dialectic that developed between us. Rosie Parker continues to be my most stringent critic at the same time as being my most important support. How she pulls this off, I
xvi
shall never know. But I do know how much I owe to her and I am deeply grateful. All of this book was written with the book in mind. However, some chapters or sections have been published in journals as ‘work-inprogress’, as follows: ‘The mirror and the hammer: Depth psychology and political transformation’, Free Associations 28 (1992); ‘Parents as messengers’, British Journal of Psychotherapy 7:4 (1991); ‘Countertransference and politics’, British Journal of Psychotherapy 9: 1 (1992); ‘National psychology, National Socialism, and analytical psychology: Reflections on Jung and anti-semitism, Parts 1 and 2’, Journal of Analytical Psychology 37:1 and 2 (1992); ‘Men under scrutiny’, Psychological Perspectives, Spring 1992; and Winnicott Studies 7 (1993). Permission to quote from the following works is acknowledged: The Homeric Hymns (2nd edn, rev.), translated by Charles Boer. Dallas, Spring Publications (1979). Copyright Charles Boer (1970). Surfacing by Margaret Atwood. London: Virago; New York: Ballantine; Toronto: General Publishing Company (1972). ‘Gerontion’ in Collected Poems 1909–1962 by T.S.Eliot. London: Faber and Faber; Orlando, Florida: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. Against Nature by J.-K.Huysmans. Translated by Robert Baldick. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books (1959).
Part I The political psyche
In Part I, I make some proposals about the relationship between depth psychology and politics. Far from abandoning what has been learned from clinical work, my ideas involve the discovery of new uses for clinical methodology in the making of political and cultural analyses. But, at the same time, the methods and theories of clinical depth psychology cannot remain unaffected by the new uses to which they are being put. I elaborate the idea of ‘the political development of the person’ and other related concepts as showing the viability of my attempt to politicize the clinical project. I explore key contemporary political issues from a depth psychological outlook. These issues include the nature of politics itself, the psychological and political dynamics of the market economy, questions of economic inequality and the distribution of wealth, and an assessment of the cultural impact of environmentalism. To carry out the expansion of what is usually considered to be ‘the political’, I deploy collective, cultural figures such as the Trickster and Hermes.
Chapter 1 The mirror and the hammer The politics of resacralization
DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION This book is about the depth psychology of political processes, focusing on processes of non-violent political change. It is a contribution to the longstanding ambition of depth psychology to develop a form of political and cultural analysis that would, in Freud’s words, ‘understand the riddles of the world’.1 I will be trying to bring depth psychology as a whole, and the particular experience of clinical analysis, to bear on politics. An engagement of depth psychology with politics makes a contribution to social science, social theory and the other human sciences.2 But the book is also oriented in the opposite direction. Bringing an understanding of the political world to bear on the theories of depth psychology and the practices of clinical analysis, leading to a concern for humankind as well as an absorption in one’s personal problems. By ‘politics’ I mean the concerted arrangements and struggles within an institution, or in a single society, or between the countries of the world for the organization and distribution of resources and power, especially economic power. Politics concerns the way in which power is held or deployed by the state, by institutions, and by sectional interests to maintain survival, determine behavior, gain control over others and, more positively perhaps, enhance the quality of human life. Politics implies efforts to change or transform these arrangements and efforts to maintain them. Economic and political power includes control of processes of information and representation to serve the interests of the powerful as well as the use of physical force and possession of vital resources such as land, food, water or oil. On a more personal level, there is a second kind of politics. Here, political power reflects struggles over agency, meaning the ability to choose freely whether to act and what action to take in a given situation. This is a feeling-level politics. But politics also refers to a
THE POLITICS OF RESACRALIZATION 3
crucial interplay between these two dimensions, between the private and public dimensions of power. There are connections between economic power and power as expressed on an intimate, domestic, level. Power is a process or network as much as a stable factor. This version of political power is demonstrated experientially: In family organization, gender and race relations, and in religious and artistic assumptions as they affect the life of individuals. Where the public and the private, the political and the personal, intersect or even meld there is a special role for depth psychology in relation to political change and transformation. The tragicomic crisis of our fin de siècle civilization incites us to challenge the boundaries that are conventionally accepted as existing between the external world and the internal world, between life and reflection, between extraversion and introversion, between doing and being, between politics and psychology, between the political development of the person and the psychological development of the person, between the fantasies of the political world and the politics of the fantasy world. Subjectivity and intersubjectivity have political roots; they are not as ‘internal’ as they seem. The political tasks of modern democracy are similar to the psychological tasks of modern therapy and analysis. In both areas, there is a fight between consciousness, liberation and alterity on the one hand and suppression, repression and omnipotent beliefs in final truths on the other. Psychological and political processes share an uncertain outcome. Hence, the demarcation between the inner world of psychology and the outer world of politics has no permanent existence. The Umwelt is both inside and outside. This congruency of politics and depth psychology is demonstrated by the ubiquity of political metaphors that can depict personality: The ‘government’ signifies the ego, the ‘citizens’ signify constellations of object relations, social problems signify psychopathology. In this book, I do not in fact make use of notions such as ‘the class system inside one’s head’, but I do draw conclusions from the existence of such notions about public referents of private matters. From its beginnings, depth psychology has been interested in the world of politics. In his paper entitled ‘The claims of psycho-analysis to the interest of the non-psychological sciences’, written in 1913, Freud staked a claim for the proactive capacity of psychoanalysis to throw light on the origins of our great cultural institutions— on religion, morality, justice, and philosophy…. Our knowledge of the neurotic illnesses of individuals has been of much assistance to our understanding of the great social institutions.3
4 THE POLITICAL PSYCHE
Jung made a similar point about the relationship of depth psychology and politics in a more reactive vein in 1946 in his preface to a collection of his essays on Nazi Germany: We are living in times of great disruption: political passions are aflame, internal upheavals have brought nations to the brink of chaos…. This critical state of things has such a tremendous influence on the psychic life of the individual that the analyst… feels the violence of its impact even in the quiet of his consulting room…. The psychologist cannot avoid coming to grips with contemporary history, even if his very soul shrinks from the political uproar, the lying propaganda, and the jarring speeches of the demagogues. We need not mention his duties as a citizen, which confront him with a similar task.4 At times, it seems that Freud and Jung were as interested in the broad sweep of cultural evolution and in an engagement with collective psychology as they were in their day-to-day work with patients. Certainly, there is a tension between their cultural and clinical projects and this is a tension that is still with their descendants today. In the last twenty-five years, we have witnessed the growth of psychoanalysis as an academic discipline, whether as a human, social or emancipatory science. The same is now beginning to happen in analytical psychology (inevitably, twenty-five years later). Of course, the origins of this intellectual movement go much further back to ‘Freudian’ writers like Harold Lasswell, Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and Norman O.Brown, or to ‘Jungians’ like Mircea Eliade and Herbert Read. The gulf between depth psychology in the academy and depth psychology in the clinic is at its widest in Britain and in the United States, but even in Europe we can see signs of a similar rift. Academic depth psychology might involve a close textual study of Freud’s writings or comparative work that sets Freud alongside Heidegger or other important thinkers. Literary and film criticism, cultural and gender studies, psychohistory and psychobiography, sectors within anthropology, sociology and political studies—all may quite fairly be reckoned as aligned with academic depth psychology. Research into the outcome of psychotherapeutic treatment and diagnostic studies may also be understood as academic. Though academic depth psychology often seems more at home with an insertion into the political field than clinical depth psychology does, it lacks a vehicle for engaging with political issues in a pragmatic form while retaining a psychological orientation.
THE POLITICS OF RESACRALIZATION 5
However, something new is rumbling within the clinical world. In 1991, just before the Gulf War, a protest meeting was called in London by the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons and the Study Group on Psychosocial Issues in the Nuclear Age. It was held at the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, a highly significant fact in itself, and psychoanalysts were prominent on the platform. What is more, over a quarter of the members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society have joined a group called Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War.5 In Britain, and all over the world, clinicians and some who have voluntarily given up clinical practice are arguing and writing about politics in a way that they did not just a few years ago. It seems that the existence of a rupture between depth psychology in the consulting room and depth psychology in the political world is being challenged, if not exactly closed. One can tell that something significant is going on by the existence of fierce opposition to it from those who regard the clinical as an untouchable, privileged category, on the basis of its contribution to the alleviation of human suffering.6 Although I abhor that kind of clinical triumphalism, I do not suggest in this book that we should close all the consulting rooms. This is because I can see that clinical practice may be something other than a bastion of possessive individualism and narcissistic introspection. It is right to criticize myopic (and greedy) clinicians who cannot apperceive that their work has a political and cultural location and implication. But it is not right to indulge in simplistic thinking that would do away with the entire clinical project of depth psychology. Without their connection to a clinical core, why should anyone listen to analysts at all? The rejection of the clinical forecloses what is, for me, the central issue: The relations between the private and the public spheres of life. This foreclosure mimics the attitude of the most conservative, dyed-in-the-wool clinicians and mental health professionals. The high-profile apostates of therapy are as terrified of exploring the relations between the personal and the political as are the fanatical professional adherents of therapy.7 The patients who come to see analysts and therapists are playing a part in these debates. In Chapter 10, I give the results of a questionnaire that was sent to analysts and psychotherapists in several countries. The questionnaire concerned political material brought to the consulting room, its prevalence, and how it is handled by the practitioner. From the survey, it seems clear that such material is being brought more frequently than before to the clinical setting, that the range of themes and problems covered is immense, that these do not invariably reflect the social situation or obvious preoccupations of the particular patient, and that practitioners are a bit puzzled as to how to interpret such material. Through this survey,
6 THE POLITICAL PSYCHE
I have found that practitioners are more reluctant than I thought they would be to interpret political material in terms of the internal world of the patient. I can confirm this puzzlement from my own experience. During the Gulf crisis of 1990–1, I was struck, not only by how some patients employed war imagery to express their internal states (predicted by theory), but also by how some patients communicated what looked like inner world material when actually they had a deep desire to talk about the Gulf crisis (not predicted by theory). Depth psychology’s area of inquiry is moving on to make a new connection with the world of politics. However, I do not agree with the conceit that the unconscious itself has moved on and now resides outside the individual in the external world. The unconscious cannot be reified like that—and in any case who could doubt that the unconscious has always already been in the world as well as in the individual. The very idea of unconscious influence on action suggests that the unconscious itself influences the relations between the individual and the world. What has changed is our perception of what depth psychology can, and should do. (I return to the theme of the relations between the unconscious and the social world in Chapter 3.) Maybe it is now the turn of the external world to receive the ministrations of the depth psychologists. Maybe it is the external world that now clamors for our attention, for there is certainly much political pain and dis-ease ‘out there’ (as we say). But first we have to find out whether the political world does want something from depth psychology. (In the next chapter, I will unpack the word ‘world’.) In spite of these developments, it has to be admitted that there is an intense reluctance in the non-psychological community to accept the many and varied ideas and suggestions concerning political matters that have been or are being offered by analysts of every persuasion. I do not believe this reluctance can all be put down to resistance. There is something quite offensive about reductive interpretations of complex sociopolitical problems in exclusively psychological terms. The tendency to pan-psychism on the part of some depth psychologists has led me to wonder if any adequate methodology and ethos actually exist to make an engagement of depth psychology with the public sphere possible.8 Depth psychology concerns a person’s subjective experience of social and cultural structures, and that is valuable in itself. But in this book I want to ask: Is there a special psychology of and for politics and culture? If so, what does the clinical practice of analysis and therapy with individuals or small groups contribute to the forming of such a psychology? And, conversely, I ask: What does a perspective taken from cultural or political analysis contribute to a clinical analysis of an individual or small therapy group? In what way is the personal
THE POLITICS OF RESACRALIZATION 7
political—and in what way is the political personal? Can these questions be answered without recourse to a totalizing politics, in a way that preserves and celebrates difference and diversity? A depth psychological approach to politics needs to be a humble one. Depth psychology can help with these queries. In spite of claims that the age of psychology is over, we may be entering a period of cultural evolution in which it will become easier to work out the possible contribution of depth psychology to social science and politics. Modern social theory is concerned with identity, with difference, and with the relations between identity and difference. How am I wholly and unmistakably myself? How am I part of the mass, similar to or the same as others? These questions, which constitute the cri de cœur of what Anthony Giddens calls ‘late modernity’, shove us in the direction of psychology.9 These are the pressing questions that the analytic patient brings to the consulting room—even in group therapy. And these are the crucial questions about that patient that the analyst has to contend with—to what extent can I encounter this person as a unique human being, to what extent must I react to him or her as a typical patient, to what extent as a combination of these? The political dimension of these psychological questions was summarized by Aristotle: ‘Similars do not constitute a state.’ Nor, we may add, do people with nothing at all in common.10 The characteristic of late modernity to try to make use of knowledge about itself can be recast as a struggle within our culture to become self-conscious; our culture struggles to become psychological. Moreover, the pervasive presence of doubt, even ‘radical doubt’, as a ‘feature of modern critical reason’ and as a ‘general existential dimension of the contemporary social world’, suggests that the psychology that is already being embraced by late modernity is depth psychology, the psychology of not knowing, of unknowing, of interpretation and reinterpretation. The late modern (and, if you like, the post-modern) age has reorganized the categories of time, space and place, using technology to deliteralize and overcome them, permitting the exercise of power-ata-distance. In its overturning of the laws of nature, the age itself more and more resembles the unconscious. The speedy and multilevelled tone of life at the close of the twentieth century means that we often do not know what it is that has hurt or disturbed us though we do know we have been hurt or disturbed. We may only know what it was after the event. Such ‘deferred action’, to use the standard mistranslation of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit, means that we are condemned to afterwardness and retrospection, required to fashion our response to hurtful and disturbing social changes out of a
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backward-looking stance.11 No wonder there has been an explosion of nostalgias. PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM Here is an example of the difficulty with psychological reductionism to which I referred earlier. At a conference, a distinguished psychoanalyst referred to the revolutionary students in Paris in 1968 as ‘functioning as a regressive group’.12 Now, for a large group of students to be said to regress, there must be, in the speaker’s mind, some sort of normative developmental starting point for them to regress to. The social group is supposed to have a babyhood, as it were. Similarly, the speaker must have had in mind the possibility of a healthier, progressive group process—what a more mature group of revolutionary students would have looked like. This ‘regressive group of students’ stunned nearly every intellectual in France and also fatally wounded Marxism. The regressive group was so effective that it forced an intelligentsia already intimately concerned with political issues to throw up its hands and realize the urgent need to retheorize politics. Not bad for a psychologically immature group. (I return to the topic of group and institutional dynamics in Chapter 11.) Be this as it may, my main point here is to emphasize that complex social and political phenomena do not conform to the individualistic, chronological, moralistic, pathologising framework that is often applied in a mechanical way by depth psychological commentators. The problem of reductionism does not stem from having a therapeutic attitude to the pathologies of culture as these are expressed in political issues, Rather, the problem stems from approaching an entire culture, or large chunks of it, as if it were an individual or even as if it were a baby. In this infantalization of culture, depth psychology deploys a version of personality development couched in judgmental terms to understand a collective cultural and political process. If we look in this manner for pathology in the culture, we will surely find it. If we are looking with a particular psychological theory in mind, then, lo and behold, the theory will explain the pathology. But this is a retrospective prophecy (to use a phrase of Freud’s),13 twenty-twenty hindsight. In this psychological tautologizing there is really nothing much to get excited about. Too much depth psychological writing on the culture, my own included, has suffered from this kind of smug correctness when the ‘material’ proves the theoretical point. Of course it does! If we are interested in envy or greed, then we will find envy or greed in capitalistic organization. If we set out to demonstrate the presence of archetypal patterns, such as projection of the shadow, in the geopolitical relations
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of the superpowers, then, without a doubt, they will seem to leap out at us. But so often this is just more of the maddening rectitude of the analyst who has forgotten that we influence what we analyze. Psychological reflection on culture and politics needs to be muted; there is not as much ‘aha!’ as pioneers, such as the Frankfurt School, hoped for. I am sure that the book cannot solve all the problems or answer all the questions I have mentioned. In the 1920s the Russian Futurist poet Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote that ‘Art is not a mirror to reflect the world, but a hammer with which to shape it.’ I think depth psychology might try to reflect and shape the world, doing it as part of a multidisciplinary project, and in a mixture of styles ranging from exegetical sobriety to playfulness to something quite frankly irrational. In these diverse ways, we may find out more about the interplays between (a) personality development and social structure, (b) the private, intrapsychic world of an individual and the public, political system in which he or she is embedded, and (c) psychic reality and sociopolitical reality. The political world is today’s uncanny (Unheimlich); something that was familiar (heimisch) has slipped out of the grasp of consciousness. PSYCHE, CULTURE AND RESACRALIZATION It has never been more difficult to make a psychological analysis of politics for, in our day, every institution and element in culture is undergoing fragmentation and Balkanization. It has become harder and harder to see what political arrangements can hold societies together. Moments at which one apprehends a social unity have become as precious and vulnerable as those revelatory and mystical moments when one experiences a personal unity. Increasingly, the fragility and disunity of our culture provokes a reaction arising out of a sense of the underlying oneness of the world— a holistic response. But, for me, the problem with the re-emergence in our day of cosmic visions of a unified world is that a sense of oneness tends to generate only one particular kind of truth. Moreover, proclaiming the indissoluble unity of a world soul may be little more than a defensive reaction to atomization. Advancing holism as if it were the solution is not an adequate critical response to the drama of cultural diversity. Holism founders on the sea of the discontinuities of life, for holism is secretly highly rational and ordered and cannot abide irrationality or a messiness in which its Truth has to coexist with lots of truths. A unified viewpoint has to find some kind of articulation with a diversity of viewpoints; this, holism finds difficult.
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My approach here is not holistic. I want to take those anxietyprovoking ideas of cultural fragmentation, fracture and complexity, and re-imagine them as the very tools of the trade of psychological analysis of cultural political processes. Let us take our sense of fragmentation, fracture and complexity as healing as well as wounding to a sense of political and social empowerment. It follows that we have to try to engage with a diverse and fragmented culture by means of an analysis that sees through its own fantasy of homogeneity, is already itself diverse and fragmented, and seeks out complexity. Rousseau referred to ‘the language of the heart’ and I suppose that, in our day, we have to begin to speak the languages of the hearts. Amidst the tragic anomie and baffling atomization, amidst the dreadful conformism of ‘international’ architecture, telecommunications and cuisine, amidst the sense of oppression and fear of a horrific future, amidst war itself, there is an equally fragmented, fractured and complex attempt at a resacralization of the culture going on. People have risen to the challenge and there are many diverse surface signs of resacralization: New Age or New Times thought, expressions of concern for the quality of life, green politics, feminism, demands for the rights of ethnic minorities, the human potential movement, liberation theology, gay activism, finding God in the new physics. I would even including trying to engage depth psychology with politics on this deliberately diverse list; I certainly do not want to leave myself out! It is suspicious that depth psychologists concerned with the public sphere have not paid much attention to themselves as a cultural phenomenon. I would go so far as to say that depth psychology itself may be regarded as one of the precursors of late twentieth-century resacralization. A depth psychologist has as a credo that he or she is ‘in’ whatever is being analyzed, whether patient, political problematic, or art work. I can readily understand objections to resacralization that find the linkage of depth psychology and fundamentalist religion difficult to stomach. It was hard for me, at first. But if one’s goal is to track and speak up about such connections, then there is little alternative to leaving such shocking linkages out in the open. Perhaps the objections also have something to do with the differences between depth psychology and philosophy. While some philosophers might pay lip service to the impossibility of maintaining the observer/observed boundary, this often is not reflected in their experience-distant texts. The groups and movements I have listed vary in the degree to which they seek fundamental changes in society as a whole; some of them have quite particular, sectional interests to pursue. Nevertheless, I see this heterogeneous phenomenon—resacralization—as held
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together by aspirational rather than by socioeconomic ties. In fairness, I do not assume that only left-leaning, so-called progressive political and religious movements partake in resacralization. Bornagain Christians, Islamic fundamentalists and the Lubavitch Jews are part of the same trend. In different forms, of course, resacralization is also a way to describe what has been happening in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Across the world, people have risen to the challenge of resacralization. It is the spiritual longings of ordinary people that have fuelled these movements—and perhaps all the more progressive political and cultural projects of the twentieth century. The resacralizing perspective recovers a sense of the religious verities but these are played through a changing world view less dependent on religious organization. The resacralizing ethic may be plebeian in its roots, but it is sublime in its aspirations. Clearly I think that all these developments are extremely important. They may contain elements of a successful resolution of some of our most vexing dilemmas. But I also think that, in their present form, they are at risk of failing and the consequences of failure will be serious even for those who feel out of sympathy with many or all of the facets of resacralization. As I said, I think these spontaneous movements are surface signs that there is something politically transformative going on. I want to suggest that resacralization is our contemporary attempt to shift a sense of holiness into the secular and material world. Let us look at holiness. The roots of holiness do not only lie in God or in a transpersonal realm. They also lie in humanity’s making of holiness. We make holiness by the designation and construction of sacred spaces (which we call temples). We make holiness by the performance of sacred acts (such as sacrifice and repentance). I doubt that contemporary resacralization will ultimately glorify God or lead to a new religion. But, along the way, most aspects of human culture will be touched by this attempt to connect to a feeling level that we sense once existed but we find has vanished from the modern world (hence resacralization). I think that, at the very least, this involves a search for a new ethical basis for society. In its preoccupation with the discovery of meaning, depth psychology has vectored in on the same search. The notion that holiness is located in the material, social world is not a new one. For many, religious and non-religious alike, the world has long held a Chassidic gleam. Since my childhood, I have been fascinated by God’s detailed instructions to the Children of Israel about how to build the Ark of the Covenant (not to mention the Tabernacle, or, earlier, Noah’s Ark). In the divine detail of the
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construction, we see how ineffable holiness depends on every single joint, bevel, dimension, and the material used: And Bezaleel made the ark of shittim wood: two cubits and a half was the length of it, and a cubit and a half the breadth of it, and a cubit and a half the height of it. And he overlaid it with pure gold within and without, and made a crown of gold to it round about. And he cast for it four rings of gold, to be set by the four corners of it; even two rings upon the one side of it, and two rings upon the other side of it. And he made staves of shittim wood, and overlaid them with gold. And he put the staves into the rings by the side of the ark, to bear the ark.14 Bezaleel’s name is hardly ever mentioned, not even in the film Raiders of the Lost Ark! Yet he is the collective image and cultural personification of resacralization, the contemporary drive to render the secular holy as a creative response to the fate of God. This is why, for many, resacralization has indeed taken the form of a return to religion. Sometimes this is established religion, sometimes archaic (or apparently archaic) religion. However, as a depth psychologist, I have to engage with resacralization in a different way. To do so, it is not essential to support or to believe in resacralization, and many do not. What is essential is to try to pick up on the psychology of what is happening in this particular piece of cultural process. I want to make something psychological, but not exclusively or excessively psychological, out of a host of social and political impressions. The idea is to bring something up and out that is already there—so these words of mine about resacralization are intended to be description, chronicle and interpretation, not sermon or advocacy, nor anything beyond an indirect contribution to resacralization itself. The parallel is with clinical analysis, in which the analyst can do no more than foster a process in which potentials within the patient are brought into consciousness. One specific impression is of a growing, collective sense of disgust, in both Western culture and the once-communist states, with the political world in whose making we have participated. Disgust is lurking alongside the shallowness and cruelty of much of modern life; our subjectivity is full of it. As Thomas Mann put it, ‘Our capacity for disgust is in proportion to the intensity of our attachment to the things of this world.’15 Disgust with our present politics leads us to aspire to a resacralized and reformed politics in which political openness and unpredictability lead to faith and hope rather than to fear and disgust. To achieve this, we need a new psychological valuing of the potential of political engagement itself. Involvement in the mess
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and confusion of the external world and passionate political commitment to that world are as psychologically valuable as an interior perspective or an intimate I-thou relationship. Political involvement can certainly be a means of avoiding personal conflicts or acting out such conflicts, leaving others to do the changing. But political involvement can surely also be a means of expressing what is best in humans, acknowledging the fact of our social being, that we are not the isolated, solipsistic monads that some psychological theories might lead us to believe we are. A more evolved and realistic attitude to politics is something to work on in the consulting room, just as we work on more evolved and realistic attitudes to sexuality, spirituality and aggression. In the course of this book, I will propose that analysts (and patients, too) begin to work out models that enable us to refer to a person’s innate political potential, to his or her state of political development, and to a political level of the psyche. In clinical practice, such a model would enable us to generate new readings of personal and collective political imagery. We may even find that there is a politics of imagery and that countertransference and politics are linked. Political imagery will be as fluid and unpredictable in its display of what is (or claims to be) positive and what is (or seems to be) negative as any other kind of imagery. Not all political imagery presents the worst case for humanity. For example, in Chapter 4 I attempt a psychological analysis of the imagery in Machiavelli’s political thought, to find out how an engagement with the political level of the psyche affects depth psychology and how depth psychology affects political theorizing. Here, I want once more to emphasize that the core of my project is to move toward an end of the isolation of the consulting room, though not toward the end of clinical analysis itself, and to work out the detail of a serious relationship between depth psychology and politics rather than huff and puff at the absence of such a relationship. (I will discuss the role of the clinical project throughout the book.) Our culture (and not just our culture) is longing to atone for its social injustices and the sense of disgust it feels for them, longing to be able to think good thoughts about itself and rid itself of depressive preoccupation with its own destructiveness, longing for a resacralized politics. When depression infects a political system, the first victim is any capacity to find imaginative solutions to political problems. This is because depression leads to an awful literalism in which fantasy and actuality are hopelessly muddled. Collective fantasies of hate and aggression are taken literally, leading to depressive guilt (for example, over the possession of nuclear weapons) and mass delusional self-reproach. The problem is how to contain and integrate disgust on this scale without either repressing it or acting it out.16
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On the political level, many are full of guilty contempt for capitalism (and for what passed for socialism in the East). But there is a lack of any cultural ritual by which reparation and repentance can be made. Lacking ritual and a symbolic language with which to express this unease and disgust, and the desire to atone, many resacralizers tend to make a split between the constructive and the cheating sides of capitalism and the market economy, preferring to see only the negative side. Perhaps in response, a group with a totally opposite ideology of support for capitalism and the market has emerged. If we do not do something about this split in our political culture, then, hard though it is to face, resacralization, so ardently sought by so many, will not take place; it will not work. To be specific: Resacralization seems to be characterized by an attempt to construct a shadow-free politics in which the dark side is located somewhere else—in men, in whites, in the market, and so forth. Even when resacralizers do get involved with politics, it is a half-hearted involvement, distinguished, psychologically speaking, by a fear of getting dirty hands. I want to explore the damaging contents of this split. On the negative side, there are fantasies of an apocalyptic end, whether by nuclear conflagration, AIDS pandemic, or the greenhouse effect. All these are blamed on capitalism and the market economy. Certainly, these anxieties are rooted in reality and resacralizers are right to point this out. But taken as fantasies, they are the deepest signs of a self-punishing contempt for ourselves. Perhaps many people think we deserve to perish like this. On the positive side, there are other voices, not at all persuaded by the arguments of resacralizers, claiming to be ‘realistic’, extolling the virtues of capitalism and the workings of the market as the source of the material benefits that ‘we’ enjoy today and as the only economic system that seems to work. Sometimes it seems that those involved in resacralization try to manage their disgust and guilt at the excesses of capitalism and the market economy by attempting to make reparation and repentance over-literally —by making it up to the entire planet. There will be many good things to come out of the environmental movement but a prudish and facile environmentalism may not have enough psychological depth, enough connection to the dirt it seeks to cleanse, to ease the unease and even the disease in the culture. In Chapter 5, I consider whether there is a way to transform the dreams of environmentalists into pragmatic politics and hence make social realities out of them.
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THE MARKET This form of negative/positive split can be very clearly seen in relation to the market economy. Is the market economy a socially divisive rich man’s charter, as even erstwhile supporters of it are beginning to say in Britain or the United States? Or is the market economy the road to freedom and dignity as many now seem to think in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? Or is it the best available synthesis, a good compromise? Or—and this is the line I intend to take—is it both a negative and a positive phenomenon at the same time, with the negative and positive verdicts each having a distinct psychology of its own that resists synthesis and compromise? In this way of looking at the market economy, our negative and positive images of it are not split off from each other; indeed, they each guarantee the existence of the other for there will be no chance of realizing the positive features of the market economy without accepting the simultaneous presence of the negative features of the market economy. It is relatively easy for a cultural critic to reject the Manichean, crude, psychologically primitive, split approach in which the market must be good or bad. But the approach that attempts a balanced view of the market is almost as problematic, psychologically speaking. In the so-called ‘balanced’ approach, which is supposed to ‘heal’ the split, there is a difficulty in integrating the undoubtedly unfair and ruthless features of free market economics, seeing how they have to be present for the benefits of the market to be available. Resacralizers need to come to terms with this. We are not talking of unfortunate byproducts of the market; according to this psychological analysis, they are its sine qua non and cannot be ameliorated. We need to know more about the psychology of the market as a negative phenomenon and about the psychology of the market as a positive phenomenon. Both psychologies are relevant for resacralization. Resacralizers cannot stay pure, above, or outside the economic world. Disgust cannot be transcended to order; there is no shadow-free politics. Resacralization will have defeated itself as much as having been defeated by patriarchal exploitation and other reactionary forces. Many sensitive and intelligent commentators have pointed out that the apparent triumph of capitalism is a moment for self-reflection. This is because market forces have already invaded or colonized most aspects of life. There is a need now to work on the development of a sense of community: Caring, compassionate, reaching-out to the less well-off. But a sense of community that does not address the shadow of community—the totalitarian shadow of community—will be thin, dessicated, morally elevated classroom civics, and socially useless. We will not be able to limit or tame market forces unless we comprehend
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their psychological nature and the powerful imagery involved in such forces. To understand the market requires political imagination and imagination about politics. There is no either/or about politics; nor is there an average. Politics is certainly the art of speculating, calculating, secret agreements and pragmatic maneuvering. But politics is also the art of making the world and the people in it better. There are some connections between these two distinct and separate images of politics that we should not ignore. Our inability to stay in emotional contact with the psychologically distinct and separate images of the market makes it difficult to concentrate on the psychological issues of resacralization that are central to notions of economic and political change. Here, I am sure that economics can be a psychological focus. Later, in Chapter 4, in order to concentrate on splits within the image of the market economy, I will enlist the aid of the myth of Hermes to help us to hold onto both sides, positive and negative, enthusiasm and disgust, of our evaluation of the market economy. A political reworking of the myth of Hermes can provide a base for an approach that avoids the dangers of splitting and of trying to reach a supposedly balanced view. To the extent that there are opposite feelings in the air about the market, it is very hard, emotionally, to hold on to these as necessarily existing opposites without having recourse to either a schizoid, judgmental retreat or to glib sloganizing about accepting the bad with the good. As I said, we do need to know more about the psychology of the market as a positive phenomenon and about the psychology of the market as a negative phenomenon. Then, perhaps, we could move on to try to work out the psychology of the market without the introduction of the categories ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. For the moment, we do have to let ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ structure our psychological response to market economics. But there is a hidden gain in this. For maintaining an attitude of evaluation and judgment enables us to see to what extent the preceding ideas about attitudes to and images of the market are relevant outside Western, capitalistic culture. It sometimes seems that the Zeitgeist in what was the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe is quite different from that of the West. In the West, criticisms of the excesses of free market economics are beginning to surface in circles that had, hitherto, been gung ho for the market. For example, it seems that the long sentence passed on Michael Milken, the ‘junk bond king’, was ‘widely seen as public retribution for the excesses of the ‘80s’, resulting from ‘public anger over the ethics of the age’.17 Kevin Phillips, a one-time senior aide of President Reagan, published a bestselling book in 1990 entitled The Politics of Rich and Poor in which he prophesied the end of an ethical
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and political climate that permitted ‘the triumph of upper America— an ostentatious celebration of wealth, the political ascendancy of the richest third of the population and a glorification of capitalism, free markets and finance’.18 In the East (and in many parts of the Third World), things seem to be going the other way. In progressive circles, the free market is hailed, not only as the sole means to revive moribund economies, but also as a means to political and spiritual revival. However, I wonder if the two completely different political situations do not share some psychological features in common. Both kinds of society are fascinated, even obsessed by the market; the one eager now to condemn it, the other to praise and implement it. Both have the same difficulty in getting beyond a verdict that is either good or bad. Both seem to sense the limitations of the ‘balanced’ view. We see this in the former Soviet Union in the popular rejection of Gorbachev’s idea of a ‘third way’ incorporating what was best in communism and capitalism. We see it in the United States in the almost total disagreement about what can be done to ease the plight of the so-called underclass (including intense argument over whether such a grouping actually exists).19 Crucially, in both West and East, modes of economic and political organization are seen nowadays as inseparable from psychological, ethical and spiritual themes. One Russian commentator had this to say: ‘The main thing is for people to learn to be human. If we have bread and still become beasts, there will be no reason for us to live.’20 Surface differences between Western and Eastern attitudes to the market mask a deeper, psychological similarity. Of course, we shall have to wait to see what, if anything, the psychosocial impact of a new Russian middle class will be.21 But the psychological dimension is demonstrated in a comment made by a Russian political commentator in 1991: ‘Our people are fed up with the free market without having lived in it for a single day.’22 I have not merely been proposing that our epoch needs resacralizing and encouraging people to do it. I am arguing that resacralization is already going on, and has a life of its own running underneath the development of technology and a hyper-rational way of life. As I said, I am trying to bring something to consciousness—to cultural consciousness —that is already there in culture. It is an analyst’s way of making politics. And it is as an analyst that I have found myself thinking that, from a psychological point of view in which depth common denominators are given more weight than surface discrepancies, everything I have written about ‘our’ culture (meaning Western culture) is, paradoxically, exemplified by what has been happening in Eastern Europe since the late 1980s. The imagery from two differing contexts is not disconnected.
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NUMINOUS EXPERIENCE AND SOCIOPOLITICAL CRITICISM I feel that split-inducing collective disgust would be moderated by a sense that culture can be transformed through a resacralized politics. The psychic energy locked up in disgust and cultural depression would be employed in a less masochistic way—in a more practical way, like Bezaleel’s, with his sacred box. When considering such a political commitment, it is unavoidable that religious language and imagery, if not religion itself, will have a part to play. Here, the role played by the churches in the political changes of Eastern Europe should be borne in mind. One cannot imagine an expression of the more caring and compassionate side of liberal democracy without religious terms. We need to look again, more psychologically and more generously, at what we regard as sacred. Beneath and within the fractured surface of contemporary Western culture lies a protoreligious culture (and this is also shown clearly by events in Eastern Europe and in the emergence of liberation theology in Latin America). We can see the culture’s attempts to resacralize itself in its extreme openness to numinous experience—not always along decorous lines, and including the ritually pagan: Sexual experimentation, rock music, sports, food, fashion, money, collectible things. Maybe the best way to find the sacred today would be to submit and surrender to the apparently pagan. However, political resacralization is not identical with religion or religious revival. In the latter case, there is usually or often a program to be followed, a prescription, a recipe. What I perceive in resacralization is the marking out and making of a place—a social temple—in which something politically transformative can be born. The resacralizing place is also designed for self-reflection and the recovery of personal dignity. In religious, mystical or holistic experiences, the individual is seized and controlled by something outside himself or herself that is possessed of a fascinating and awe-inspiring power. Such a power, in Jung’s words, makes one feel ‘its victim rather than its creator’.23 This kind of experience was described by Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy in 1917 as numinous experience. Otto was at pains to stress the paradox that, though the numinous experience was irrational, it could be analyzed rationally; an important point to remember concerning depth psychological analysis of politics. We can be rational about the irrational and honor both dimensions while so doing; we can be secular and social about the holy and the sacred. Nevertheless, the irrational is irrational. Otto, in fine German academic style, lists his criteria for the irrational:
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Pure fact in contrast to law, the empirical in contrast to reason, the contingent in contrast to the necessary, the psychological in contrast to transcendental fact, that which is known a posteriori in contrast to that which is determinable a priori; power, will, and arbitrary choice in contrast to reason, knowledge, and determination by value; impulse, instinct, and the obscure forces of the subconscious in contrast to insight, reflection, and intelligible plan; mystical depths and stirrings in the soul, surmise, presentiment, intuition, prophecy and finally the ‘occult’ powers also; or, in general, the uneasy stress and universal fermentation of the time, with its groping after the thing never yet heard or seen in poetry or the plastic arts—all these and many more may claim the names ‘non-rational’, ‘irrational’.24 It is remarkable that Otto, the author of one of the most influential works on religious psychology and the psychology of religion, publishing in the revolutionary year of 1917, should perceive in the ‘uneasy stress and universal fermentation of the time’ a groping, not for a rational system as a form of panacea (such as Marxism) but for the nub of the irrational itself —the numen. I want to take this statement of Otto’s as an account, not only of the raw material of a psychological analysis of political process, but also of the orientation of the political analyst. It is a kind of clarion call to pay attention to what seems absurd and trivial, as well as to what seems dignified and profound. What is ‘deep’ (as in ‘depth’ psychology) may be on the surface. Reacting to Otto has led me to muse on the styles or, perhaps more accurately, the tropes of depth psychology in its attempt to do cultural and political analysis. We need to introduce the irrational into our discourse on politics: Measures of exaggeration, grotesquerie, vulgarity and broad comedy, making a social critique out of these just as the unconscious itself sometimes manages to. For example, the wild and compelling imagery of aggressive fantasy eventually promotes concern for other people. The hidden social telos of aggressive fantasy, the covert function it serves, the thing that it is secretly for, is the fostering of an emergence of concern. Without my base and sordid aggressive fantasies in the direction of another, there would be less need for concern about him or her on my part. Similarly, the seductive and shifting fantasies of sexual selfhood that I call ‘gender confusions’ respond to a political and prospective reading, leading to a far more positive and welcoming evaluation than the one usually given by analysts. In the future, we will all become even more confused about gender. Provided we stay close to the confusion and the confused experience, and do not try for an instant
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escape by ‘androgyny’ or flee into ‘gender certainty’, and provided we keep our judgmental tendencies under control, then the earthy challenge to the established order represented by gender confusions may move onto an ever-more practical, collective, political level. (See Chapter 7 for a further discussion of gender confusion.25) As I see it, the tasks of depth psychologists who seek to engage with the political are to locate the enormous psychic energy that is presently locked up in collective and subjective self-disgust, and to try to release the energy so that it becomes available for political renewal. If depth psychology is to make a contribution on a political level to the processes of resacralization of which it is already an unconscious part, it must surely continue to engage with the irrational and numinous aspects of life. Depth psychology can attempt to work these into a social and political analysis of culture. But this fantastic and original project cannot always be carried on within a rational or moral framework. A politics of transformation can hardly be totally rational. However, working with the irrational and the amoral is the forte of depth psychology. In Donald Williams’s words: ‘The greatest possibilities for wisdom in the psyche come from its immediate aliveness to new, current and contemporary sources that take advantage of its innate adaptability and resourcefulness.’ 26 To be sure, as I mentioned, this brings up matters of style and, at the same time, something more than style is involved. For what looks like a matter of style is also relevant to the concrete contribution depth psychology can make to the social sciences, especially politics. It may be that it is the general areas of interest that depth psychology covers that earn it the right to be taken seriously by social scientists, as Ian Craib has suggested. He saw the central features of depth psychology as (a) its concern with the irrational, (b) its focus on emotions, (c) its apprehension of the complexity of personality, and (d) its concern for creativity (including, in Craib’s listing, religion and artistic production) and for morality.27 Depth psychology reaches the parts of human nature other disciplines, such as sociology, do not reach: ‘The complexity and conflict of people’s emotional lives,…the profound ambiguities of motivation and meaning,…the strange and often difficult relationships we have with our bodies.’28 I want to take this clarion call of Ian Craib’s and rotate it through 180 degrees. The central features of depth psychology, meaning the areas it has staked a claim for in the knowledge-battle, may also be the ways and styles in which it should make its contribution to social science. Not only saying something about irrationality, emotion, personality, creativity, morality—but saying something with and through these thematics, and with and through dream, fantasy and passion. The style of a depth psychological contribution to an
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understanding of political process should be congruent with what depth psychology has habitually done, while not reducing one field to the other. We should focus on a particular political problem in terms of its irrational aspects, the emotions (and hence the images) it engenders in our subjective experience of the problem, the complexity of the issue as it impacts on people’s evolving personal lives, and the ways in which what is going on speak of the fostering or negating of human creativity and moral sensibility. This idea is strengthened by noting that many of the criticisms of attempts to link depth psychology to social and political issues have settled on the oversystematized, hyper-rational, mechanical nature of these ‘applications’. In particular, the project of combining Freud and Marx to create a politics of the subject(ive) has degenerated into an obsession with Freud—the man and his texts—and a preoccupation with the work of Jacques Lacan that, for many, has cut psychoanalysis off from those very features of itself that could make a distinctive contribution to social science (as listed, for example, by Craib, above). While these failings are not going to be totally absent from my book, I have tried to be aware of them. Hopefully, this enables me to ask: Can social theory truly respond to the challenge of telling us who we are as subjects and what our place in cultural process might be without its taking account of a realm of interiority? This, in turn, leads to exploration of the various criticisms of depth psychological accounts of subjectivity that have been mounted. Before concluding the chapter, I want briefly to make some distinctions about the ways I am using the overlapping terms ‘subjectivity’ and ‘the personal’ and how these relate to ‘the irrational’. Subjectivity is a perspective on things that tends toward direct experience of them and an evaluative response fashioned out of direct experience, however illusory that might be from a philosophical standpoint. (I return to the philosophical problems with the idea of subjectivity in the next chapter.) The sensation of direct experience remains even when the intellect is aware that one experiences things through ideological filters and that subjective experience is itself culturally and politically constructed. In addition, I see the body as a prime source (and recipient) of subjective experience and of subjectivity. I regard the personal as being implicated in the identity/difference theme that I referred to earlier in the chapter. This implies a sense of boundary, however permeable (‘skin-ego’), and hence a potential for relationship. The narrative and mythology of people’s lives contribute to their sense of what is personal of and for them. The irrational can scarcely be comprehended without reference to its spouse: rationality. Moreover, what is and is not considered
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irrational is highly variable according to personal, historical and cultural features. However, when attempting to factor subjectivity and the personal into political discourse, there is little doubt that a sense of irrationality will (and ought to be) generated from time to time. These distinctions are the background to the 180-degree turn I proposed earlier in which the central concerns of depth psychology are revisioned as the tools with which to make an analysis of a political problem: Irrationality, subjectivity, the personal dimension, and a focus on creativity and morality. As I said, the way in which depth psychology engages with political themes is both a matter of style and, at the same time, something more. On the stylistic and on other levels, I will return to the topic at many moments throughout the book—a sign that I find myself unable to reach a conclusion about the balance between rational and irrational elements in my text. Perhaps what is needed at the present time is a more generous conception of what is ‘serious’ and ‘scholarly’ in writing. Maybe we are on the verge of a revolution in our understanding of what constitutes scholarly, academic and intellectual writing, based on the realization that many apparently discursive texts in the human sciences are full of rhetoric. An antithesis between scholarly and imaginative writing can itself be an obstacle to the success of a text in either mode. (The question of how literally I intend to be taken is addressed in Chapter 7.) Sometimes depth psychologists will seek to accomplish their political tasks irrationally, making use of the least rational psychological function: intuition. Intuition provides a person with a subjective sense of where something is going, of what the possibilities are, without depending on conscious knowledge or empirical proof (though, hopefully, without downgrading these). Hence, intuition moderates the vicissitudes of Nachträglichkeit, the deferring of action that, in social terms, condemns us to study the impact of political change only retrospectively, only when it is too late. Though intuition may tend toward prophetic or oracular pronouncement, intuition also has the capacity to weave empathy, compassion and imagination into social theorizing. Crucially, intuition is required for the conversion of subjective response into sociopolitical criticism—and this is the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 2 Subjectivity and political discourse The contribution of the clinic
THE COUNTERTRANSFERENCE REVOLUTION People who have never been analysts or therapists are often surprised to find that clinical practice is a red-hot emotional activity. It is not usually the case that a patient quietly reports a problem to an analyst who then explains its origins by reference to specialized knowledge about such matters as childhood or the significance of chains of association. In particular, the analyst’s state of mind often shows signs of altered levels of consciousness and the presence of intense fantasy and aroused emotion. These may lead to disturbed bodily and behavioral functioning on the analyst’s part. These central features of the analyst’s experience, which are the regular currency of discussion among clinicians have, rightly or wrongly, been tagged as ‘countertransference’.1 They are not usually referred to by those who seek to illumine political and social process by means of a depth psychological analysis. I want to remedy this huge omission by supplying a political focus on countertransference. By so doing, I think I can give a novel and practical twist to the contribution depth psychology can make to an analysis of political and social processes. Some years ago, I carried out a research project into countertransference to see how analysts and therapists conceptualized the strange mental states into which they enter while doing their work. I garnered thirty-two respondents who told me of seventy-six examples of what they saw as countertransference. (I allowed them to define the term in their own way.) These practicing clinicians had had the most extraordinary range of experiences in their work and these could be divided into three groupings: Bodily and behavioral responses, feeling responses and fantasy responses. Some bodily and behavioral responses were: Wearing the same clothes as the patient, walking into lamp-posts after sessions with a particular patient, forgetting to discuss something important, strange sensations in the solar plexus, pain, sexual arousal, sleep.
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Some feeling responses were: Anger, impatience, powerfulness, powerlessness, envy, irritation, depression, manipulation, redundancy, being flooded, bored. Some fantasy responses were: This is the wrong patient, there’s something wrong with my feet, a large black pot, I killed her mother, I’m a prostitute, I feel reverence for her serious, private place, he has God on his side, all color has gone out of the room, I’m going to be involved in an automobile crash after the session, the patient will rummage through my books and papers if I leave the room, the patient is getting bigger and bigger and filling the room.2 Those of my readers who are in clinical practice will know something of the revolution in clinical theorizing that has taken place. This revolution has made it possible to review the analyst’s subjective experience in a calm and considered way, underscoring its utility and resisting, but certainly not forgetting, the tendency to conclude that analysts are prone to mad responses to their patients. Because many readers will not be familiar with this revolution, I want to give a brief history of it. Although no hard-and-fast consensus exists about the use of the countertransference, something which need not dismay us (as we will see), a definite historical trend in theorizing about it can be observed. In this trend, the countertransference experiences of the analyst are retheorized as communications from the patient and hence as being of clinical utility. Analysis and therapy result from an interplay of subjectivities—they are intersubjective phenomena; there is no subjectivity (no subject) without an Other.3 For Freud, it was apparently, but by no means exclusively, a problem that analysts reacted to their patients in ways that suggested neurosis or even psychosis on the analyst’s part Freud regarded these kinds of responses as undesirable and as something the analyst should overcome by more analysis or self-analysis. In the way Freud himself worked, it is clear that he did not function as a ‘blank screen’, as he seems to have had a strong personal presence in relation to his patients; this is apparent in his case histories. But it is also clear that, quite deliberately, from time to time he functioned as if he were a blank screen, a person without emotion or subjective life when seen from the patient’s point of view. In this way, he argued, the patient’s projections of problematic figures from the past could be more freely transferred onto the person of the analyst—hence, transference (which was also considered a phenomenon that interfered with treatment right at the very start of psychoanalytic endeavor). By the 1950s, some analysts were, controversially, regarding countertransference as other than inevitably neurotic, seeing it as an informative phenomenon with distinct clinical value. Nowadays there are numerous analysts who see their subjectivity, carried by the
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countertransference, as a central feature of the clinical encounter. Such analysts conceive of themselves as ‘ready’ for the experience of countertransference.4 There have been parallel debates in analytical psychology but there has been less of a sense of overturning the applecart because Jung constantly asserted that the analyst was ‘in’ the treatment just as much as the patient. Jung regarded countertransference as a ‘highly important organ of information’ about the patient and felt that analysts who could not let themselves be influenced by their patients’ psychological emissions would be ineffective clinicians.5 There are many strands of post-Freudian theorizing about countertransference. One strand lays emphasis on the analyst’s emotions and emotionality, meaning his or her total involvement in the analytical process. The idea is that the analyst’s unconscious somehow ‘understands’ that of the patient in an empathic, feeling manner.6 This view is claimed, with justification, to stem from Freud who, in spite of warning against the possibility of neurosis in the analyst, also referred to the analyst’s unconscious as a ‘receptive organ’ in relation to the ‘transmitting unconscious of the patient’.7 Psychoanalysts (and analytical psychologists) who have theorized treatment as an emotional encounter do not, on the whole, advocate simple disclosure of or sharing their emotional states with their patients. Another strand of post-Freudian thinking about countertransference makes use of a form of communication theory. Everything that happens between the analyst and patient, whether originating in analyst or patient, may be regarded as a symbolic communication. This permits a further revision—in this instance, it is a revision of the role of the patient. The patient is regarded as a person who helps the analyst conduct the treatment, pointing out errors and misjudgments either directly or by communication with the analyst’s unconscious. In the latter case, it is countertransference that provides the means by which the patient can communicate his or her corrections of the analyst’s attempts.8 A third way in which contemporary psychoanalysis has modified Freud’s views of countertransference also makes use of a notion of communication. But in this approach communication is understood as the interplay of projective and introjective processes, the movement of psychological material between people, out of one and into the other and, maybe, back again. These processes are understood as special variants of generally occurring psychosocial phenomena and so countertransference theorizing can be understood as part of a wider apprehension of how people communicate. The advantage of this theory is that it is possible to see how parts of the patient’s psyche
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crop up in the analyst’s subjectivity, and vice versa.9 Post-Jungian theorizing about countertransference has made use of similar thinking about projection and introjection. The concern and preoccupation with countertransference has reached a peak in Britain and Latin America, where it sometimes seems that analysis consists of nothing but an exploration of the countertransference. But the United States, Germany and Italy are rapidly catching up, as a review of the literature demonstrates.10 The situation in France is different. Jacques Lacan criticized (quite correctly, in my view) tendencies to fashion ego to ego communication out of the countertransference.11 However, Lacan’s view of what happens dramatically oversimplifies the experience and practices of those who pioneered a revision of Freud’s methodological suggestions. Though the question of disclosure remains a pressing one, Lacan overlooks the issues of the level of the analyst’s disclosure and the work he or she might do on what is to be disclosed prior to communicating it. The purpose of this opening section has been to familiarize nonclinical readers with the background. I will indicate my own position later in the chapter. COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND POLITICS The title of this section is a little enigmatic, so I will give my main argument in a nutshell. Psychotherapists and analysts have in their possession a precious attribute of which they are themselves unaware, something that would deepen and enhance our idea of the political. I am referring to the evolving body of clinical knowledge and practice that I described in the previous section concerning the countertransference. I mean especially the clinical valuing of a practitioner’s subjectivity as a royal road to the patient’s psychic reality. I am going to detach the countertransference and theorizing about it from its clinical moorings and insert this professional jewel in a different setting: In the world of politics. I am going to politicize countertransference. By so doing, I will reframe and revision clinical practice: As a potential link between depth psychology and society and not as the source of an isolation of depth psychology from society (which is how critics of depth psychology usually depict its clinical project). The clinical can be a bridge to a new way to express and theorize political dissent. It will be a radical version of the clinical. Deconstruction of the opposition between the disciplines of depth psychology and politics leads to the advocacy of their occasional hybridization.
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I hope to indicate a practical contribution that depth psychology can make to working through, in a positive but critical spirit, the insight of contemporary feminism that the personal is also political. That insight supports a political valuing of a citizen’s subjectivity as a royal road to the culture’s social reality. I want to underscore the analogy I have made: In the world of the consulting room, the move is from the analyst’s subjectivity to an understanding of the patient’s psychic reality; in the world of politics, the move is from the citizen’s subjectivity to an understanding of the culture’s social reality. We can take a sentence from a clinical text like this one of Christopher Bollas’s and rewrite it in more political terms: ‘It is essential to find some way to put forward for analytic investigation that which is occurring in the analyst as a purely subjective and private experience.’12 ‘Analytic’ becomes ‘political’, ‘analyst’ becomes ‘citizen’ and the analogy I want to draw is demonstrated. Judith Hubback defined an analogy as ‘a likeness in certain respects between things which are otherwise different’. As a ‘device’ or ‘tool’, an analogy can be used or abused and ‘analogy is the basis or substructure from which image-making develops…a most powerful help in the constant effort to make sense of life’.13 According to Martin Stanton, Sandor Ferenczi’s idea about analogies was that they ‘negotiate the inability of any philosophy to rid itself of the subjective and erect a purely objective view of the world’.14 An excursion into the complexities of countertransference means that we can find out more about, or ‘negotiate’, the linkage between psychic reality and social reality and even do this in a way that would satisfy Robert Musil’s complaint that ‘we do not have too much intellect and too little soul, but too little precision in matters of the soul’.15 Precision and soul—two faces of psychotherapy and two faces of politics. Modern clinical practice in analytical psychotherapy can be dreamt onward as a template for a form of political analysis. And, as we will see, a political analysis illuminates the clinical encounter. I do not think that depth psychology can make a whole new politics. But, true to its functional role, depth psychology shows up problems in our habitual styles of making politics. This is more than an attempt to demystify the practices of depth psychology and to show that the clinicalization of depth psychology is not ‘natural’—in the sense that no other form of practice is possible. It is also an attempt to challenge wider power structures, showing that hyper-rational modes of making politics and policy are not ‘natural’ either —in the sense that no other ways of theorizing politics are possible. Perhaps this implies a fresh, depth psychological epistemology less wedded to Enlightenment values.
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In the previous chapter, I argued that a new, politically sensitive spirit is abroad in depth psychology. This makes it easier to work out a political psychology and a psychology of politics. What therapists and analysts think about and do with countertransference gives us a fresh way of introducing the subjective factor into political discourse, of making the personal political. THERAPY AND/FOR THE WORLD I want to go on to explore a fantasy that I sense as moving depth psychology just now, to analyze the fantasy within which depth psychologists are functioning, to study what symbols and images inform their particular contribution to resacralization. When I speak of ‘fantasy’ I do not mean to bring in a pathological construct. Rather, I intend to refer to something that evokes the flavor, shape, direction, purpose—and shadow —of an enterprise. The fantasy is of providing therapy for the world. I mean providing therapy for what is sensed as the external world, conceived of very broadly. Helping that world to resolve its conflicts, understand itself better, enjoy a healthier psychological trajectory. The fantasy is of giving therapy to the world. Yes, this is inflated, even oracular stuff. But it is also imaginative, creative and, most important, right now the fantasy of treating the world is empathic with, in tune with the world’s desire to be treated, the clamor of the world for therapeutic attention that I referred to earlier. What distinguishes a depth psychological analysis of the political world from any other kind of analysis is this fantasy of providing therapy. In the clinical context, though we know that ‘analysis’ and ‘therapy’ are not synonymous, we tend not to regard them as totally separate activities. Providing therapy for the world does not mean converting the world into a patient in the sense of a reduction of the world or an aggrandizement of the therapist. Anyway, that would not be true therapy. As we saw, it is still less helpful to treat the world as if the world were a baby requiring only good-enough mothering to flourish. But providing therapy for the world, which I am seeing as the fantasy that drives depth psychology today, does involve our taking up a certain attitude—a therapeutic attitude —toward the world. Therapists of the world might bring therapy into the world. A therapeutic attitude toward the world is most appropriate when we come to politics because politics is the dimension of social reality that contains the social world’s pathology: Palpable injustices, such as an unfair distribution of wealth, skewed gender relations, racism, poverty, disease and a wrecked ecology. What connects depth psychology and politics is a preoccupation with therapy. The analyst
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of complexes is preoccupied with the therapy of the individual; the analyst of politics is preoccupied with the therapy of the nation or society or the world—hence the imagistic links that can often be observed between ‘personal growth’ and environmental concerns. Neither side of the private/public divide can flourish without affection for the other side. Marxism failed to take account of this. Several art and literary critics refer explicitly to providing therapy for an art work or text.16 Some historians also seem to regard themselves as offering therapy to their topics of interest.17 As I noted, the imagery of psychotherapy permeates the entire environmental movement. So it is not absolutely necessary to have a patient in human form in order to do psychotherapy and analysis. It seems clear that one cannot simply evacuate the clinical element from so-called academic depth psychology. The clinical is the distinguishing feature of depth psychology. As John Forrester puts it, ‘the conceptual system of transference-countertransference is built around the questions: What is an analyst? What is his or her desire?’18 So—here are the depth psychologists: Ready, willing and able to treat the world. Ready to be therapists of politics, political therapists, even political analysts (with all the ambiguity of the term ‘political analyst’). They are pretty sure that the world has asked for therapy or analysis. But, having issued them with a request for therapy, the world has not shown up for its first session. The world is ambivalent about its therapy, suspicious of its political therapists, reluctant to be a patient (or a baby). We can see just how suspicious the world is when we reflect on the limited role depth psychologists have played, or have been allowed to play, in the political happenings of our century. As I suggested in the previous chapter, it is quite reasonable that exclusively psychological understandings of the external world will be found unacceptable. If depth psychology wants to treat the world, then it had better do so as part of a multidisciplinary project. Where is this leading? Should we give up on the idea, the fantasy, that depth psychologists might be of use to the world in a therapeutic way? Is their utility to be restricted to the positive impact made on the lives of their individual patients? Is there anything in that psychological medicine chest that has not been tried so far? I think that the answer to this last question—Is there anything depth psychologists have not tried so far?—is ‘yes’. There is something that has not been tried so far in an attempt to treat the world. I want to suggest that it is not in metapsychology, nor in models of the psyche or the unconscious, nor in schemas of personality development, and not even in the analytic attitude itself, that our usefulness to the political world might be found. Rather, it may be analytical and psychotherapeutic methods —modes and techniques of therapy—that
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we should be exploring as the means to move the fantasy of treating the world onto the level of a concrete and practical political engagement. In particular, those aspects of clinical practice clustering around the concept of countertransference may be the most liminal with politics—that is, lie on the threshold between depth psychology and politics. As Nietzsche put it, ‘the most valuable insights are methods’.19 Let us consider the parallels between the typical clinical set-up and a depth psychological engagement with a political problem; what I have been calling ‘political analysis’. As in clinical analysis and psychotherapy, the political analyst gets into a transferencecountertransference relationship with the problem she or he is trying to treat. As in clinical analysis, fostering this relationship means allowing himself or herself to be influenced by that which it is hoped to treat—accepting both transference and the experience of countertransference. Acknowledging the value of countertransference does not mean denying that it is in countertransference that we find the political analyst’s own unresolved cultural and political problems and prejudices, evidence of unfinished political development on her or his part (the analyst’s ‘political neurosis’). Continuing the parallel, the political analyst can try to understand the behavior of a political problem in terms of its antecedents. Such an understanding means trying to find out the history of whatever problem is being treated, including the collective fantasies or myths that have become attached to the problem. The political analyst would then try to raise the level of the problem’s consciousness so as to allow the problem to gain a degree of knowledge and control regarding itself. This task is accomplished to some extent, and as is usual in clinical analysis, by interpretation. Political and social problems, like human patients, will respond to therapy in differing ways. But accepting that the political analyst has a countertransference to the problem she or he seeks to treat avoids the well-known self-deception that a so-called ‘objective’ analysis of politics is possible. An objective analysis of a political problem would, following the analogy I am working out, be equivalent to the worst kind of high-tech or highminded psychiatric approach. A similar failure to grasp the unconscious dimension of the treatment relationship between political analyst and political process marred much Marxist analysis of politics. Employing the techniques and methods of clinical analysis, especially techniques and methods that foreground the experience and use of countertransference, provides a model for a political analysis that makes use of the political analyst’s affective, subjective involvement rather than merely pointing it out. In such a way, the
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personal and the political are brought closer together. Looked at like this, maybe all social and political inquiry could be therapy. When I write of the use of a countertransference by the political analyst or therapist, I do not mean to advocate reliance on an instant response—any more than I would advocate such a thing in clinical analysis. I am not in favor of ‘that makes me feel’ statements on the part of clinicians. I do mean that, as I will detail later, someone attempting to bring depth psychology to bear on political problems accepts that her or his experiences embody, or reflect, or are relevant to aspects of the ‘patient’s’ experience. The relevance is based on the joint immersion of the political analyst and the political problem in a shared world that transcends the boundaries of private and public, subjective and objective. There is no clinical imperialism in this. I am not trying to tell politicians what to do. The point is that depth psychologists have acquired power and legitimation to operate out of a feeling state, to ‘use’ feelings. Groups that are relatively powerless could also be granted access to this kind of power and legitimation. My conception of depth psychological political analysis is that its clinical element is not something to be restricted to the ‘official’ clinicians. Clinically inspired political analysis is, potentially, open to all to practice. It could provide an access route to political process for those who, currently, are effectively disenfranchised: Blacks, women, the poor, homosexuals, the disabled. It may seem curious that I use the term countertransference to indicate this particular take on politics and I would like to explain why I do so. There is certainly more to therapeutic interaction than countertransference or transference-countertransference. And, to be sure, we should not merely equate countertransference and subjectivity. But the notion of countertransference focuses on what is happening in the analyst’s subjectivity—the part of that subjectivity that is somehow connected or relevant to the patient. If clinical method is to provide the inspiration for a novel form of politics outside of the clinical setting, then it is experience and theorizing of countertransference that is the area of clinical method on which we must concentrate. The idea of countertransference brings with it a penumbra or residue of neuroticism in the analyst—his or her unresolved neurotic conflicts and so forth. This, too, is important for my theme. Whenever there is an experience of countertransference, there is uncertainty about whose ‘stuff’ it is—the analyst’s (the citizen’s), the patient’s (the political problem’s), or a mixture of the two. This uncertainty is not in itself a handicap. Quite the opposite is the case. The uncertainty is an inevitable outcrop of the impossibility of uttering a statement in terms
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of ‘this is subjective’ or ‘this is objective’ whether the field is psychology or politics. By using the term ‘countertransference’ in relation to what a citizen might do with his or her subjective response to a political problem, I am quite deliberately putting that citizen in the analyst’s seat, in full consciousness of the authority and power that often attaches to the role of analyst. While the patient certainly does have power over the analyst to some extent, and patients undoubtedly influence the growth of their analysts, there is an unavoidable asymmetry in analysis. I want to place the experiencing citizen in the analyst’s place and not in the patient’s place, where the citizen would have to be regarded as having a transference to society. If the citizen is to participate in social transformation, then this is to be on the basis of being analyst not patient. Most psychoanalytic approaches to politics cast the citizen solely in the role of patient (or baby) with a transference to society. By locating the political referents of the clinical process within the analyst and not within the patient, I have problematized the analyst. Hopefully, this will help to reduce the possibility of an arrogant, fromon-high, experience-distant psychologizing of politics—which has tended to mar some previous attempts to link depth psychology and politics. I want to relocate the very idea of countertransference so that it lies between clinical analysis and political analysis. For instance, I would say that, just as in clinical analysis, in political analysis the analyst’s bodily reactions are an important part of the picture: The body is an organ of information. Bodily reactions to the surface of modern life, its sounds, smells, textures and shapes; bodily reactions to the demands of modern life, its crush, bustle, hassle and artery-blocking stresses. Bodily reactions, worked on and distilled in ways familiar to the clinical analyst, lead the political analyst to the heart of the culture and its political problems. The body of the political analyst leads in a spontaneous political analysis. Bodily reactions and an understanding of them are starting to figure in the clinical literature on countertransference. Can the body be an instrument of political analysis? If so, then it is to the wisdom of the body that we must turn as one way of politicizing what we know about countertransference. In existing political discourse, there is no psychologically valid account of how we can take fear, disgust, a sense of contamination, anger and all the rest of the somatic lexicon as indicators of our political judgments. It is up to depth psychologists to provide such an account, an account of the body as a discourse of power, even a record of power (especially in the case of the female body).
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Though a body-based analysis of political themes and problems will take place spontaneously, it is nevertheless possible to sketch out three stages or rather levels of a somatic analysis of the political. First, a thorough exploration of the bodily state, both the body as a whole and its constituent parts. I think this requires practice and training, and an atmosphere and setting that is friendly to the enterprise. Second, we have to learn the particular language of the body when it engages in political discourse. We need to focus, clarify, differentiate and describe the somatic vocabulary and the bodily imagery. Third, we would make explicit the implicit meanings of such imagery in an act of interpretation. (I believe a start has been made on each of these three stages or levels within the relatively new discipline of dance movement therapy, in which I have recently become interested.)20 I am arguing that analytic and psychotherapeutic methods serve as a base for a form of political analysis, or approach to political problems, that goes far beyond the rationalistic limitations of much political theory. Political analysis that is infused with depth psychology is a way to make the personal political, highlighting the relationship between individual and society. Affect, bodily sensations, wild fantasy, are all reframed and re-evaluated as the tools of political analysis—just as, via our theorizing about countertransference, they have been reframed and re-evaluated as the tools of clinical analysis. Up to now, having empathy with a political problem has been seen from the standpoint of conventional politics as having an ‘emotional’ reaction to the problem (and nothing kind is meant by the word emotional in this context). Being emotional about politics is too often seen as being biased, unreliable, ‘unsound’, and sometimes even as having a ‘feminine’ attitude to politics (again, nothing kind meant by feminine here). My position is that, by accepting the parallels with countertransference in clinical analysis, the realism and utility of a politics that incorporates a subjective (and maybe an irrational) inquiry is established. There are many implications in the advocacy of a subjective politics, a politics over which hovers that charged word ‘feminine’. A subjective politics is available to both sexes—as is an ‘objective’ politics—but this recognition needs to be coupled with a sense that one of the features of a subjective politics is to back up the necessity for women to find a collective voice in relation to a male-dominated social reality. A subjective politics, in which women may have a significant role, must surely mount its challenge to injustice and oppression in diverse ways according to personal, socioeconomic and other circumstances. This diversity lessens the chances of replacing one hegemony by another. Making a subjective politics enables us to look at how women are
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denied access to political power as well as working out how to marry subjectivity to political discourse. To paraphrase Juliet Mitchell, if femininity in politics is by definition subjective, feminism is the demand for the right to be subjective in politics.21 The ‘masculine’ cast of so-called objective political analysis may have its roots in the psychological need of children to move away from a dependent relationship with either mother or father or both. To help themselves achieve personal boundaries, some individuals tip over into a rather rigid attitude to the world with an accent on distance and precision. This comes through as political ‘objectivity’ and is experienced as incontrovertibly objective even when its objectivity is exposed by others as being a disguised subjectivity. There are many in politics with such an outlook which I see as having been adopted for identity-saving reasons and not as a rejection of the mother or of femininity (though it can look and has been theorized like that). The feeling of being politically objective imparts a bleak political strength. But those who continue to maintain their political objectivity are uncomfortable with feeling deeply involved in social and political problematics. They fear that muddled feelings will inevitably lead to a return to the parental corral. So politics can only be approached from outside, as it were, because staying outside avoids a merger with the parent/political problematic—a merger that is experienced as identitythreatening. Subjective politics will or will not come into practical being depending on whether the psychological seductions of political objectivity can be overcome. A question is bound to be raised concerning the untrammelled use of subjectivity in political discourse. Does this not lead to undesirable mass hysterias, such as Nazism or racism, or to markedly populist leaders such as Mrs Thatcher? And you want more of this? As far as mass movements go, I think the exact opposite argument can be made: That they destroy rather than foster the space for subjectivity in politics, in that mass movements are hostile to whatever is peculiar to an individual subject and his or her psychological functioning. Thinking of populist leaders, if one sees them as therapists of the world, then they resemble those guru-like therapists who approach their patients with assumptions as to what constitutes wellbeing and how to achieve it. We know that those kinds of therapists are not working out of alterity and empathy at all, nor are populist leaders like Mrs Thatcher. They are not responding to the patient; they’re imposing something upon the patient out of their own systems of belief. Just as guru-therapists often get good results in the very short term, so, too, populist leaders seem to offer quick solutions to political problems. But, in both instances, before very long the complexity and incorrigibility of psychological or political problems defeats these
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magical cures. You could say that the problem starts to resist a solution that does not arise from itself—its history, its distinguishing features, its needs, its goals and so forth. A NOTE ON SUBJECTIVITY I am aware that there are problems with my (or anyone’s) use of the term ‘subjectivity’. However, I argue that the need to retain the idea of subjectivity is pressing when we consider the political dimensions of life. To continue to refer to subjectivity is not as naive as it seems. It does not bring with it a belief in an innate, autonomous, single viewpoint arising from the heart of a person, independent of social institutions and relations. However, it must be admitted that some psychoanalytic usages of the notion of subjectivity do seem to imply just that. In contrast, my usage of the idea of subjectivity involves the recognition that subjectivity is indeed constructed, polyvalent and heterogeneous. Else why bring the idea into politics at all? Nevertheless, we can do much more with the idea of subjectivity in politics than remain on this rather dull definitional level. We certainly have to take on board the notion of the decentered subject and the ideological coloring of subjectivity. We can do this but, at the same time, could we not explore what other versions of the subject and of subjectivity might be possible? I cannot accept that it is somehow unprofessional to refer to ‘the subject’ or to ‘subjectivity’—as if it were some kind of intellectual sin.22 We should not forget that all discourses are fictional (i.e. imaginative) discourses. I concede that it can be difficult to write about subjectivity without a collapse into liberal humanism taking place. Nevertheless, the subjectivity of the countertransference is not an autonomous, ‘authentic’ subjectivity—quite the opposite when we recognize that the source of such a subjectivity (politics) lies outside the subject (the analyst). The subjectivity of the countertransference is part of an interrogation of subjectivity, part, in a sense, of a performance, of an act. The links between imaginative acting and political action are strong. I feel that there are two aspects of subjectivity that have been relatively neglected. First, subjectivity has a monitoring function, scanning social and political reality, as well as having been fashioned by such realities. Of course, subjective monitoring of politics is influenced by the politics being monitored but this does not mean that the function of monitoring is not taking place. The deconstruction of the subject is not the same as a deconstruction of the political—and the political subsumes the subject who monitors it.
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The second neglected aspect of subjectivity concerns its wounded and grieving nature. In late modernity there is scarcely the possibility of subjectivity divorced from a sense of marginality, woundedness and an accompanying grief—that is, subjection. Hence, the ubiquity of depth psychology, characterized by its fantasies of healing. The wounded and grieving subject behaves affectively, emoting from below, calling out from the psychological and also from the social depths. Such a subject is bound to be critical of its leaders. In sum, subjectivity in the political area does not mean more of what we already have and don’t want; it may mean less. It cannot be denied that subjective political analysis involves risk, nor that it is often essential to make rational political choices. However, I feel that there is always a creative element of danger or risk in the making of choices, especially moral choices. Every encounter with politics is a moral encounter, underscoring the central experience of choice. Before long, given that politics is a collective activity, any one person’s subjective politics will have to rub up against the subjective politics of others. And what starts off as a subjective politics, a personal confession, will soon acquire an extraverted life of its own—just as psychological theories, rooted in the personal circumstances of their authors, move beyond what we regard as the usual limits of subjectivity (hopefully without sundering themselves from their subjective origins).23 Then the subject may become an agent, capable of acting in the world just as the analyst ‘acts’ in the countertransference script provided by the patient. I am suggesting that there is a powerful fantasy abroad of providing therapy for the world, and that this is a response to the ills of late modernity that I discussed earlier. The notion of therapy and the clinical dimension distinguish depth psychological analyses of cultural process from all other kinds. The fantasy of providing therapy highlights the role of countertransference. Building on the clinical experience of countertransference, we are able to address the question of subjectivity in politics and political discourse. Then we might be more able to translate the Utopian politics of passion, dream and desire into the pragmatic politics that gets things done. Here it is a question of ‘translate’ rather than ‘transform’ because it gradually dawns that Utopian politics and pragmatic politics resemble each other. SUBJECTIVITY AND POLITICS I will be returning to the idea of countertransference as a tool of subjective political analysis. But now I want to give some examples of what I am getting at and discuss them.
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I was on the subway. It was crowded and hot. I had a sudden fantasy of staying all day with the people who were in the carriage. We would go to lunch as a group and become friends. I wanted to call out and suggest this plan. I really felt in love! I wanted to embrace everyone. I had an erection. I don’t think this was just polymorphous sexuality or a manic response to underground miseries. For, if we take my bodily reactions and my fantasies as a kind of countertransference to the social issue of transport, then perhaps this was one way of embodying my need and desire for movement with my need and desire for stasis and continuity. During the Gulf War, there were images on TV of military aircraft, filmed through a heat haze. In spite of her conscious anti-war attitudes, a patient found that there was a kind of beauty locked up in these martial images. I suspected that this was her personal reflection of the prevalent collective war fever, an inner world fascination with our own capacity to be deadly and destructive, a syntonic excitement spawned by the facile victories of the bully. This would be rather a different understanding from one that relied on an interpretation of the patient’s projection of her own aggression. Watching the regular TV report of parliament one evening, I screamed at the parliamentarians ‘Shut up!’. This total response was concordant with what I now see as their desire that we, who are outside the charmed circles of power, should stay shut up. Certainly, this could be taken as an example of my own authoritarian tendencies. Or I could have been merely expressing a general unease with the nightly spectacle. But my reaction gave some unthought but known specificity to the unease: Parliament as tending to silence and marginalize other fora for debate—for instance, at the workplace or within groups defined by common interests—not to mention other styles of debate, more modular and conversational and less adversarial. The fourth example is interactive and I will give it in some detail. During the writing of this chapter, I discussed its contents with a friend and colleague.24 What follows is taken from a recording of our conversation and discussions that she and I have had since. My colleague talked about a group of young, single mothers on the dole in the northeast of England in the 1980s, described by Beatrix Campbell in her book Wigan Pier Revisited.25 Beatrix Campbell represented the tendency for young unemployed women to have babies without a permanent relationship with a man as providing a partial and admittedly ambiguous source of strength for the women. My colleague had had a set of equally ambiguous reactions to this idea. Somewhat to her surprise, and mixed in with a sympathetic appreciation of the women’s situation, she found herself having an
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anxious and super-egoic reaction toward what came across to her as their psychic defiance. I suggested to her that, as well as super-ego, she might use one of the many modern theories of countertransference. What would these theories say about her response, in the most general terms? Maybe that her apparently super-egoic reaction arose in her via communication from the social problem of which she was an unwitting therapist. Moreover, as is usually the case in such situations in clinical analysis, never mind political analysis, there was probably a hook on which the communication could hang itself. If my colleague can be regarded imaginatively as a therapist of the cultural and social phenomenon known as young, unemployed motherhood, then her reaction could be seen as a countertransference. This would not be a countertransference of the neurotic or selfdefensive kind, but a politically useful countertransference, a communication from the so-called patient—in this instance, young, unemployed mothers. (It is not really important for my purposes here which theory of countertransference a reader finds most useful—as long as it is acknowledged that the countertransference is a much theorized phenomenon.) Would a therapist of politics/political analyst engaged with the problematic of young unemployed mothers (or with transport, or war, or parliament) say to the patient ‘You worry me’ (or ‘let’s stay together in this carriage’, ‘war is beautiful’, ‘shut up’)? No, of course she or he would not because, by analogy with clinical practice, those responses, apparently the therapist’s, have, to some extent, been placed in the therapist by the various ‘patients’. Young, unemployed mothers who have their child in the absence of a man give off a sense of defiance. My colleague developed a complementary countertransference to young, unemployed mothers— one that embodied the culture’s attitude to them that young, unemployed mothers will certainly have internalized. The parallel is with the way a clinician understands her or his reactions to an individual patient as in tune with, fitting in with the patient’s inner world. In my colleague’s ‘case’, an intersubjective interaction arose between the inner world defiance of the social problematic known as young, unemployed motherhood and her apparently private response. She had to decode the response in herself in terms of the defiance to which it was complementary. (And, incidentally, she may have strengthened Beatrix Campbell’s thesis by this total response of hers.) Her subjectivity—maybe like all subjectivity—was constructed as countertransference within her in part by what lay outside her. In the four examples, I managed to work in references to six distinct theories of the analyst’s use of her or his countertransference:
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complementary and concordant countertransference (Racker), syntonic countertransference (Fordham), fitting in with the patient’s inner world (Winnicott), intersubjective interaction (Atwood and Stolorow), total response (Little) and embodied and reflective countertransference (which are my own ideas).26 The fact that political and social problems do not have an unconscious in the same way that humans do does not stop them communicating with our unconscious and being illumined and hence analyzed by what we make of our unconscious reaction. Moreover, who is to say that political and social problems do not have an unconscious? On the tape of our conversation my colleague went on to make two remarks that I want to take as further highly usable and relevant diagnostic countertransferences to my whole thesis. (‘Diagnostic countertransference’ is Casement’s term,27 so I have actually incorporated seven different theories here.) First, she commented on the absence of a historical or class perspective in depth psychological writing about mothering, leading to a somewhat normative and, hence, potentially moralistic attitude to social practices. This would be neurotic countertransference on the part of depth psychology to subversive ideas about family organization in general and tendencies like young, unemployed motherhood in particular. The second remark linked my project with that of feminism because one of the aims of feminism is to create a vocabulary for phenomena that had not previously been named. I am sure that my particular goal of deploying countertransference theorizing as the means of inserting subjectivity into political discourse also suffers—and enjoys —the consequences of there not seeming to be a ready-made language in which to do it. I could have given numerous other examples of the use of the political analyst’s subjectivity in political discourse. I want to explain why I have chosen to give this particular example of interaction between two people who know each other quite well. Is this not unnecessarily messy and confusing and foreign to social science? I would reply to this by saying that the messiness and many-layered nature of this intersubjective example is its whole strength. It is an advantage and not a disadvantage that the example is clouded in so many ways. Isn’t this what the worlds of both clinical and political analysis are like? Isn’t contamination the norm? Why invoke neutrality at all, in clinical analysis or even in social science, if there isn’t constant pressure toward partisanship? Both clinical and political analysis are messy, confused, partisan, struggling to keep the boundaries, suffused and yet somehow also terrified by the strength and energy of the imagination. We cannot be ideologically pure. The
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society that we criticize is the source of the material out of which we seek to fashion that critique. There are bound to be some who will react to what I have been saying with a ‘so what?’ or a ‘big deal’ or with a ‘what’s new?’ or with ‘don’t we know that already?’. Precisely! What I have been doing in this chapter can eventually be related to concepts and language that are familiar to us all. What I have been doing is bringing up and out— we say bringing to consciousness—something that is already present in the professional unconscious of depth psychology as a potential contribution to political and social analysis; something clinicians have been doing without knowing that they have been doing it; something hidden in the open. I am referring to the as-yet-unrealized potential of clinical experience and theories of countertransference to validate and legitimatize a style of political engagement that lacks validation and legitimation in our political system. I mean much more than the recognition that objectivity in politics is impossible. I mean the affirmation of a personal, subjective, emotional, irrational, bodily, fantastic style of making politics. I am not saying that there have never been politics of this kind, for there have been: May ’68, happenings, the Yippies, Situationists, Rock Against Racism, the Greenham women’s protest against the stationing of US cruise missiles in Britain, just to give a few scattered and unrelated examples from the past twenty-five years. As with resacralization, it is hard for depth psychology to distinguish itself from those movements without, at the same time, recalling that, at times in its past, depth psychology has also tried to make a politics of the non-rational kind. There is a line stretching from Otto Gross to Wilhelm Reich to Herbert Marcuse that has not considered itself bound by the tenets of rational discourse. Otto Fenichel was dismayed at the possibility that psychoanalysis would ignore social reality and define itself as exclusively a science of infantile fantasies.28 This line—broken as it is, and repressed by the psychoanalytic establishment—demonstrates that the support of depth psychology for non-rational political discourse would also be a support for its own project. But what has the greater part of depth psychology done, what has psychoanalysis done, what has psychotherapy done, in relation to these non-rational political manifestations? Depth psychology has colluded with the dominant political culture when we condemn such politics as primitive or regressive, as not being in accord with the reality principle, as not having achieved genitality or the depressive position, as foreign to the spirit of individuation, as the politics of the negative Trickster. Our collusion may have contributed to the failure of these movements. Maybe we indulged in this collusion because of our own conservatism, or to protect our own avenues of access to power
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and resources, or in a kind of cowardice. But, in their ordinary clinical method, depth psychologists have their own ecstatic equivalent of this devalued politics of subjectivity, their own claim for the humaneness and generosity of subjectivity and a personal response to someone or something other. Recently, I have had the opportunity to lecture in St Petersburg and Moscow. I tried to communicate some up-to-date clinical thinking to Russian psychologists and therapists. Let me say immediately that, for Russian therapists, depth psychology, in the absence of anything else to trust or believe in, is a tool of political analysis and social criticism at the same time as inspiring methods of treatment. These Russian professionals just did not feel the academic-clinical divide in the way that Westerners do, nor, of course, the divide between the personal and the political. Moreover, I found that the more irrational the kind of psychological thinking I introduced, the more seriously they tended to take it. They seemed to know that depth psychology is a discipline of excess and transgression and hence they responded to a tricksterish blend of the vulgar and the numinous, the grotesque and the divine, the sexual and the spiritual, the tragic and the comic, the rational and the irrational. In Russia in the long term, in contrast to Britain and the United States, affect and emotion have been seen as the prime sources of progress whereas reason was seen more as a source of destruction. Russian writers had, for two hundred years prior to the Revolution, inveighed against Western rationalism, whether in the form of British industrialism, German orderliness, French logic, or American money. Maybe the Russian nineteenth-century rejection of reason went too far, creating a space for the disastrous reversal (or enantiodromia) into the crazy rationality of twentieth-century communism. The point I want to make is that, by supporting our own system’s official espousal of rationality in politics, depth psychological clinicians may have sold their souls. After all, rationality is only a special case of fantasy! As I suggested in the previous chapter, our discourse on politics may, with advantage, reek of hyperbole, blemish, crudity and farce, making a social critique out of their very irrationality. We need a more plural approach to rationality and we need to rethink our epistemic values when it comes to the political, social and even the academic fields, as shown in this comment by the historian Ludmilla Jordanova: ‘Historians have little occasion to allow their subjective selves to take part in their work, yet to do so would open up vast new territories.’29 Vast new territories! Opened up by subjectivity! How exciting it is to hear from someone in the world of the liberal humanities about such a prospect. But depth psychologists already
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‘allow their subjective selves to take part in their work’. Moreover, depth psychologists already have an ethos, ideology and method which specifically allow their subjective selves to take part in our work. It is the ethos, ideology and method of the countertransference that should be shared with colleagues in other disciplines, rather than models of the psyche, lists of defense mechanisms or schemas of personality development. Then we can engage with modernity’s totalization of reason, the oppressive, transcendental privileging of the rational. Factoring subjectivity (back) into discourse transforms depth psychology’s habitual concentration on the roots and even the causes of subjectivity into a deliberate project of setting subjectivity free in the political world—subjectivity terminable and interminable. To do this we have first to work out texts that can serve as the deepening vehicle for such a sharing with colleagues in other disciplines. Without texts and their liberating and legitimizing influence, the countertransference treasure will remain very private property. Moreover, depth psychologists of all persuasions will remain in a complicit relation with oppressive, hegemonistic and marginalizing political tendencies. I suggest that these ideas about forming a political text out of countertransference practices are likely to benefit those marginalized and dispossessed groups whose most urgent need is to translate their subjective misery into pragmatic and effective political terms. In addition, if these ideas influence social theory and the processes of policy formation, there would be a ‘trickleup’ effect. We certainly need countertransference theory as well. The Greek word theoria means ‘looking about the world’, ‘contemplation’, ‘speculation’. But we might also gain something by considering the meaning of an adjacent word in Greek: theoros. Theoroi (in the plural) were emissaries sent by the Greek city-states to consult distant oracles or participate, on behalf of their own city, in important far-off religious rituals. That is, theoroi travel, and, on their travels, they relate to and work with people from outside their own community; it’s their job. If depth psychology is going to engage with politics, it needs the kind of theoria, the kind of texts, that theoroi can take with them. The culture of the Enlightenment bequeathed to us deterministic, rational, objective theoretical systems. We have to try to create psychologically grounded political theories that are not only functional but also satisfying to us on the subjective level. In this chapter, I have been continuing to look at what depth psychology can contribute to an understanding of politics, working the field between the personal and the political. I hope I have shown that depth psychology has always been interested in the world of politics and that the interest has burst into bloom in recent years as part of a
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more general attempt to resacralize culture. The underlying fantasy is of providing a therapy for the world, and, if this is not taken too ponderously or concretely, the apparently inflated fantasy has considerable social utility. However, it is not in models of the psyche nor theories of development that the utility is found. Rather, it is clinical method in general, and the use of countertransference in particular, that depth psychology has to contribute to political discourse and to share with other disciplines. Countertransference theory is a validation of the subjective element when engaging with a particular political problem or theme. We need to pay attention to the countertransference communications given off by any particular political problem or theme for, as with individual patients, the communications given off will vary. Depth psychology can contribute toward a politics that has made a new place for the irrational and, in so doing, depth psychology is true to its own roots and its knowledge that there are differing modes of consciousness. Russell Jacoby points out that the potential of depth psychology to frighten the institutions of an oppressive society has leeched away: ‘Over the years the ghost has become a ghost of itself.’30 CULTURAL, CLINICAL AND POLITICAL DEBATES I want now to take this whole argument a step further. I have been suggesting that experience and theorizing of countertransference, derived from the clinical set-up, can be a template for a rather unusual kind of politics and also contribute to the techniques of other disciplines such as history. I have been proposing that we take something from one area (the clinical) and make use of it in another area that is apparently different (the political). But an awkward question arises. Are these two areas as different as they seem? And, if they are not as different as they seem, what are the connections that already exist between them? By exploring some connections between the clinic and the political world, I want to return at a more profound level of political theory to the problematic of the countertransference. This return to the topic of countertransference is going to be more demanding of the concept. Up to now, I have been celebrating countertransference as if it were a gift from ‘us’ in the clinical world to ‘them’ in the political world. The new demand I will make of the idea of countertransference is that it start to function more and more as a link or bridge between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between clinical analysis and political analysis.31 Scanning the literature and talking to people in the field, I sense five main areas of anxiety about countertransference, and debates
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about the clinical utility of countertransference have tended to be located within these areas of anxiety. 1 Anxiety about the analyst’s or therapist’s neurosis. How do you tell that the countertransference is a communication from the patient and not part of an unresolved issue for yourself? Indeed, and this may be the most anxiety-producing point of all, can the two ever be separated? Can the practitioner ever see the patient save through her or his own needs, wounds, desires and gratifications? about the legitimacy of understanding 2 Anxiety countertransference as communication. I think this is truly a political anxiety because the analyst’s actual power is highlighted. Is there not a risk—runs this anxiety—of shoving everything back into the patient, of making the patient responsible for everything, even for the analyst’s subjective life? 3 Anxiety about the accuracy of depending solely on the countertransference without historical collateral. Isn’t working out of the countertransference alone merely indulging the patient’s fantasy of the analyst’s magical omniscience, or, conversely, persecuting the patient with his or her penetrative mind? 4 Anxiety about breaking the frame of analysis and psychotherapy. This is an ethical anxiety. No matter how disciplined the practitioner intends to be, employing countertransference in the ways that modern clinical theory suggests are possible raises the specter of disclosure of the countertransference state to the patient. It is felt by many that this is unethical in that the clinical frame will be broken. Yet the idea of disclosure of the countertransference has had a long and respectable history within depth psychology. 5 There is anxiety about getting confused. This anxiety can be expressed in a logical format: If you value countertransference as communication, and if the experience of countertransference means getting confused about yourself or accepting confusion between you and your patient, then are you not valuing confusion? And, if you value confusion so much, is it not the case that, in advocating the use of countertransference, you are advocating confusion? And is not this completely contrary to the overall accepted aims of psychotherapy and analysis to make things clearer? I have myself recently been a victim of this particular anxiety on the part of others. I had written in an earlier book of the ways in which the countertransference experience resembles mystical experience, drawing the parallels between the analyst’s
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working things out and the mystic’s working things out. In a review of the book, it was stated that I was advocating analysts entering into mystical states during the session.32 So there are these five anxieties about countertransference: Anxiety about the analyst’s neurosis, anxiety about the political legitimacy of using countertransference, anxiety about the ethical consequences of breaking the frame, anxiety about the accuracy of depending solely on countertransference which could also feed patients’ fantasies about the analyst’s magical powers, or persecute the patient, anxiety about getting confused. Yet, in spite of the existence of these anxieties, many if not all of the clinicians that I know continue to understand their subjective reactions to the patient as if they were, in the broadest possible metaphorical terms, communications from the patient’s unconscious. In other words, in spite of the anxiety and the shadow issues, we go on working with countertransference, no matter what terms we use to define this process or what caveats we enter about it. What I would like to do now is to see what happens if we recast all these professional worries that clinical analysts and therapists have about the countertransference into political terms. This will show up the objections to a subjective, personal kind of politics. Please remember that the overall idea is that struggles with issues in the world of the consulting room speak to, are relevant to, and link up with issues out there, in the political world. An imaginative recasting of the five clinical worries in political terms goes something like this: 1 The worry about neurosis becomes: Look, your viewpoint about equal opportunities and reverse discrimination simply reflects your own experiences and problems in this area—you’re just not being objective. 2 The worry about legitimacy becomes: Look, you’re putting too much onto the existence of capital markets and other financial institutions in our system. These are not inherently repressive or evil—there’s no plot. You’re simply shoving the blame for a complex socioeconomic problem like unemployment onto one thing. 3 The worry about accuracy and magic becomes: You can’t make a policy for the environment on the basis of feelings—it is all too emotional, anecdotal, esthetic. That would be fine for poetry but not for practical politics. What we need are facts and detailed proposals. 4 The worry about ethics becomes: Look, it isn’t sound to make policy about resource allocation in the National Health Service without due process. There have to be rules and conventions about
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how we do it or there will be a bear garden in which some groups will lose out. We have to do things properly. 5 The worry about confusion becomes: Look, what you’re saying about the Gulf War is too subjective, too shapeless and too formless—it will only lead to confusion when what we want is clarity and a clear head. These are the only possible bases for action. Getting emotional won’t help; it isn’t even political at all. When I re-read this attempt to shift the worries about the use of subjectivity in analysis over into a political context I was a bit shocked at how well the parallel worked. I was alarmed at how powerful and confident the objections to the political analyst’s use of countertransference sounded. Do the political worries, which I derived from clinical worries and debates, mean that the personal can never be political, that the nature of the political necessarily excludes subjectivity? Or, just as clinical analysts manage to work through their worries about countertransference and make use of it for the furtherance of the analysis or therapy, is there a way to make space for, acknowledge and even integrate these worried concerns about the subjective factor in political discourse? We may begin to answer these questions by exploring what factors make countertransference communication possible at all. The way I look at countertransference phenomena is to see that there is a shared imaginal world constellated in psychotherapy and analysis. The imaginal world is a world of images with human and social properties. The imaginal world both creates and is created by relationship; therapeutic and, indeed, all social relationships have a potential to bring an imaginal world to life. The therapeutic relationship between political analyst and world is no exception. Though the idea of the imaginal world originates in religion and mysticism, it is not hard to see the parallel with the social and political world in which people share, being both creators and creatures of it. Image is primal; feeding into, and back from, clinical and political practices. I am arguing that clinicians can suggest how to accommodate political worries over subjectivity by stating what it is that they actually do with their subjective countertransference reactions. This means that everyone in clinical practice is bound to have a different point of view, deriving from their own way of working! My own idea is that there is a need to make a general distinction between two kinds of countertransference communication. One of these I call reflective countertransference. The analyst’s countertransference reaction reflects the patient’s here-and-now psychological state of which the patient is currently unaware. This might also include aspects of the patient’s transference to the analyst. Reflective countertransference
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suggests that I may be feeling depressed in my work with this particular patient because this particular patient is currently depressed. The second kind of countertransference communication I call embodied countertransference. The analyst embodies someone or something in the patient’s internal world that has been active therein over time. I feel depressed, in this second kind of countertransference understanding, as an embodiment of the patient’s mother’s depression, or as a hint that the patient has a longstanding fear that being depressed is unacceptable. Sometimes, embodied countertransferences do not conform to the patient’s history and have a mythopoetic cast. My depression leads to thinking about the archetypal constituents of depression and how these might be relevant to my patient: Delusional guilt, unmanageable destructive aggression, and interference with thought and action. I try not to be too rigid about this distinction between reflective and embodied countertransference because many countertransference reactions respond to both kinds of understanding. When I have identified the kind of countertransference that might be going on, and always allowing for my own neurotic wounds, I begin a process of association to the reactions I am aware of in my thoughts, fantasies and bodily sensations. This process, which can often be playful as well as totally irrational, I have come to call the process of distillation. Associations to refining, purifying, something valuable dribbling down drop by drop are intended. So, too, are associations to the typical moves in distillation from liquid to vapor to liquid. The base liquid is my countertransference reaction, the vapor is what I do with that reaction in a disciplined and professional way, the new liquid is the use to which I may put the outcome of my work on my subjectivity, whether silently and in a contained way, or actively, as an ingredient in interpretation. As I said, this is a (brief) description of my own ideas and practices and every clinician will have her or his own equivalents to offer to political analysts who hope to make use of their own subjectivity in political discourse. Such an ambition may have got discouraged by the strength of the objections to this thrown up by the existing political order, such as those that I sketched out above.33 The countertransference experience of depth psychologists should be deployed to state that people are not as cut off from each other as they seem to be. (I return to this point in detail in Chapter 11.) The profound, pre-existing link between people in a social context, to which depth psychologists can attest, sheds a completely new light on those five anxieties or worries that I listed earlier. If there is a primary mutuality between people, on the political level as well as on the personal level, then one person’s neurotic preoccupations are no
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less (or more) reliable than another person’s apparently objective study of a problem. Similarly, the objective test of whether or not political subjectivity is dangerous (for example, racism) will be in people’s reactions to it, especially their negative reactions and refutations; subjectivity assesses subjectivity. The legitimacy of a subjective politics is not affected by tendencies to shove blame onto institutions, for each person is implicated in those institutions, no matter how powerless they are in relation to them. This means they have a right to shove blame onto institutions and whatever is blamed has the right to defend itself. Nor is it unethical to try to subvert the system, to try to out-smart or out-negotiate other people or other groups. Negotiation and bargaining are profound and passionate forms of relating. Finally, the worry about confusion can be utterly reframed. No clarity exists save in relation to confusion; confusion is the bedrock of clarity, instability leading to temporary stability (as chaos theory suggests). What belongs to whom is gradually being established. Our daily experience shows us that making use of subjectivity is neither mad nor impossible—though it is very hard to do in a disciplined way, very hard to integrate precision and soul. Even Karl Popper argued in favor of retaining some undefined and hence confusing terms! Just as worries about countertransference can be read politically, so, too, we can make a political theory and practice out of what clinical analysts have done with those worries. Worried objections to the role of subjectivity in political discourse can be integrated into political discourse. I have tried to do this in a way that resembles the manner in which clinicians try to integrate worried objections to the use of countertransference into their practice with individual patients. Depth psychology and the wider culture are linked in a two-way process, and this is exemplified by the unresolved and unresolvable debates within depth psychology and within cultural process generally. If what depth psychologists think is relevant in a wider setting, then it is worth noting what worries depth psychologists have had to overcome while continuing to make use of their own subjectivity in the countertransference. The anxieties about countertransference in the clinical context and the anxieties about countertransference in the political context are very similar anxieties. And there really are some serious objections to be heard to making the personal political. These are analogous to the worries among clinicians over countertransference. But these objections to the role of subjectivity in political analysis can be integrated in the same way that clinical analysts have integrated their worries about the role of subjectivity in political discourse.
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS I will end the chapter by completely reversing its poles. Instead of merely suggesting that depth psychology offer its work on countertransference to the political world, let us also explicitly entertain the possibility that it is joint membership of and participation in a political order that makes the psychological experience of a countertransference reaction to the patient possible in the first place. This is a political analysis that is intended to illumine the clinical process. Analyst and patient are subject to the same repressive forces. There is no personal outside of the political; the political is itself a precondition for subjectivity. That is perhaps why there is so much politics in depth psychology, the profession of the subjective. The work I have done on a pluralistic approach to depth psychology has convinced me that there is a benign form of the politics and practices of the profession. So often, the opponent contains or represents the missing bit of oneself or what is needed to round out one’s own idea. But what of possibly malign aspects of the politics and practices of depth psychology? If it is felt that the institutions and practices of depth psychology are technocratic and apolitical, how can they promote and contribute to a libertarian and progressive politics? I am not sure and so I intend to explore the matter in the following chapter.34
Chapter 3 Depth psychology and politics
INTRODUCTION There would be little point in our having worked on the orientation of depth psychology to the world if its own basic theories and practices remained completely unaltered. I support the continuing practice of analysis with individuals and small groups. This is because I do not agree that therapy inevitably syphons off rage that might more constructively be deployed in relation to social injustices. In fact, I think that it is the reverse that often happens: Experiences in therapy act to fine down generalized rage into a more specific format, hence rendering emotion more accessible for social action. Even when this is not what happens, the potential remains for a move from private therapy to public action within the institution of therapy—and I propose to discuss that potential in this chapter. The key question concerns whether analysts and therapists are going to change their theory and practice, or not. Have the many analysts who have written on politics and culture been able to change what they think and do as clinical analysts? Does a politically aware analyst work differently from one whose perspective is confined to the inner world? In what ways, if any, is my work affected by my ideas about depth psychology and politics? Have the one-quarter of the members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society who have joined Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War changed the way they think about and practice with their patients? Or is it possible to divorce a political interest from analytical theory and clinical practice? Maybe some would argue that such a divorce is desirable. In this chapter I focus on the political development of the person and on public implications of private imagery. Elsewhere I have written about the politics of the analytical encounter and the politics of the discipline of depth psychology itself.1 These are still concerns of mine but they are not the focus of this particular chapter.
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The idea is to continue my portrayal of the clinical setting as a bridge between depth psychology and politics rather than as the source of an isolation of depth psychology from politics. As I said, critics of the clinical project of depth psychology have noted the isolation—and this is not a totally wrong observation. But I want us also to see the potential links and to take further the radical revisioning of clinical work begun in the previous chapter. For me, there certainly is a pressing need to reflect on what I do clinically and to consider what changes, if any, I might make. It seems that I am not alone in reaching this position. The editors of a remarkable book entitled Psychoanalysis and the Nuclear Threat: Clinical and Theoretical Studies, all of them members of the American Psychoanalytic Association, write: In the best of circumstances, analysts may assume that considerations of politics are irrelevant to the analytic space. We raise the possibility here that the potential of nuclear weapons for destroying the world intrudes into the safety of that space. We no longer live in the best of circumstances. Thus, the construct of a socially, culturally, and politically neutral analytic setting may be a fantasy, one that embodies the wish that the outside can be ignored, denied, or wished away.2 In a major review of the book, Alexander Gralnick noted that Unfortunately, few of the contributors to the theoretical part of the book deal with the many important assumptions and unsettled issues in psychoanalytic thought and clinical practice that the editors hoped consideration of the nuclear threat would prompt them to discuss. A bit of a challenge is raised, however, in that two of the authors advocate encouraging patients to think about the nuclear threat and to relate it to their own problems. They also favor an ‘active’ political role for themselves in the analytic process—which is, of course, contrary to traditional practice…. Some authors…call for new techniques to deal with the subject under discussion, but would favor maintaining their ‘neutrality’. Thus, though bound by traditional concepts, they seem to recognize that psychoanalysts may not be as neutral as they believe themselves to be These psychoanalysts are plagued by their own resistances and anxieties about the further changes they face and how creative they dare be; they are naturally limited by being at the earliest stages of changes that we all face and, like the rest of us, are handicapped by lack of a needed new language.
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This chapter represents a start on the creation of that needed new language and this will—hopefully—lead to the evolution of research techniques, literature, training and monitoring that are informed by the new language. (My emphases.)3
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON I am not so omnipotent nor so optimistic as to expect major breakthroughs or new paradigm shifts within the field of depth psychology. The golden age of theorizing is surely past. But every now and then one perceives gaps in the theory, lacunae in the practice of depth psychology, and then one is obliged to plunge into the void to see what lies therein. One such gap, lacuna, void concerns what I have come to call the political development of the person. Although I have been working on this idea since the beginning of the 1980s, I have not felt confident enough to publish before now. I am sure that this is going to turn into a vast area of research and theorizing and I am very much aware that what I am sharing here is only a small start. I expect many would agree that the analytic patient’s material cannot remain linked only to his or her personal situation, or to the working through of innate, instinctually based fantasies. Links have to be made with the patient’s culture, its traditions and history, and to the patient’s social, racial, ethnic, religious and national origins. But how might this be done, and what changes in theory and practice will be necessary? What happens if we factor the political into our narratives of the psychological development of the person? An individual person leads not only his or her own life but also the life of the times. Jung was supposed to have said that ‘when you treat the individual, you treat the culture’, meaning that persons cannot be seen in isolation from the cultural matrices that played a part in forming them.4 Acknowledging that there is such a thing as political development makes us build into our apperception of the person the impact of the political events of his or her life—the political history of the person. These will have contributed, over time, to the state of political development that has been arrived at. Taking a historical, hermeneutical, or even an old-fashioned etiological approach helps to give the analyst confidence in moving into an area fraught with worries about bias, suggestion and disagreement. Although I shall argue that such worries are, to a great extent, delusive, the need for the relative safety of historical, hermeneutic and etiological approaches to political development is something to acknowledge. For
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example, when confronted with a patient whose views are repulsive, an analyst’s best bet might be to focus on the emergence, effects and origins of such views. Of course, such explorations will take a variety of different forms. We have to consider the politics an individual has ‘inherited’ by reason of family, class, ethnic, religious and national background, not forgetting accidental, constitutional, typological, fateful and inexplicable influences; the non-rational element. As we will see in Chapter 13, where I discuss the psychology of cultural difference in greater detail, caution is needed when assessing the part played by the cultural background in the political development of the person. Analysts need to be careful not to rely on pre-existing generalized conclusions. These are usually based on what is supposed to be empirical evidence about the ‘typical’ psychology of this or that grouping. But an analyst’s concern should be with the experience of difference, not with the defining of difference; each patient has his or her own difference. I think that I am after a kind of Foucauldian archeology of politics, but on a personal level.5 Certainly, I recognize that there is unlikely to be one single, total explanation for a person’s politics. Each patient may be seen as struggling toward a recognition, expression and celebration of his or her own difference. If we do not bear this caveat about predefinitions in mind, then sets of delusive complementarities may come into play. For example, Jewish psychology will be contrasted with German psychology, black psychology with white psychology, Catholic psychology with Calvinist psychology, homosexual psychology with heterosexual psychology, female psychology with male psychology. This will be done without paying sufficient critical attention to the processes by which terms such as ‘Jewish psychology’ and the others arise. The important point is that groupings like these are not homogeneous. Though members of the group will have some political experiences in common, the exact nature of the impact of such experiences on political development cannot be predicted. Moreover, there are going to be some ways in which everyone is like everyone else and some ways in which everyone is different—again, it is impossible to say in advance which set or combination of conditions will hold. There is a second implication of that gnomic utterance of Jung’s ‘when you treat the individual, you treat the culture’. He is saying that treating an individual indirectly, and maybe inadvertently, provides some therapy for the culture of which that individual is a part. Perhaps this is because of the impact the analyzed individual will have on his or her culture, as a sort of ‘change agent’. Now I do believe it is possible, in partnership with others, especially social
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scientists, to treat the culture, to offer therapy to the political and social systems. But I do not believe that clinical analysis produces ‘special’ individuals who will then go out into the world and heal it. What analysis can do is to assist a person to achieve a degree of agency on the private and personal level, and, as I suggested in the previous chapter, this cannot be cut off from emancipation on the public and political level. But I find it hard to accept that every analysand acquires special political powers or prowess or that, as a group, people who have been in analysis constitute the vanguard of a politically transformative movement. The idea that those who have become individuated will have a decisive effect on the world scene does seem to have been in Jung’s mind, and one can also detect the same kind of notion cropping up throughout the evolution of psychoanalysis.6 The person who, via analysis, conforms to the reality principle, has achieved ego mastery, become genital, or reached the depressive position, is often represented as belonging to an élite that is not susceptible, or is less susceptible to the group psychological pressures of the social and political world that they inhabit. If there is élitism in my way of thinking, then it is not an élitism based on the special properties of clinical analysis to produce more politically developed individuals. My élitism involves a belief that depth psychology (that is, my own discipline) itself has something unusual to offer a multidisciplinary attempt to make an analysis of culture. For example, one interesting implication of these thoughts is that political organizations should pay more attention to the psychological development of their members, for reasons of effectiveness as much as for humanitarian reasons. To refer to the political development of the person is to challenge the boundary that is conventionally accepted to exist between public and private. If we follow the challenge through, then we will have to consider how psychopathology, usually a discipline confined to the private and interior realms (though often measured by visible behavior) also refers to the public and political realms. If there is a psychopathology of politics, then, as I suggested, it is valid to think in terms of providing a therapy for politics—but without getting too excited at the mere discovery that there is psychopathology in politics. In many respects, the ground has been prepared for the challenge to the boundary between public and private by what has happened in depth psychology as well as in sociopolitical movements such as feminism. As far as depth psychology is concerned, our notion of the intrapsychic, internal world includes the part played by relations with other people. At the same time, relations with other people are enriched and expanded by internal processes and images. Internal imagery links people and fosters their relationships. It follows that to
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divorce work on the apparently internal and work on the apparently interpersonal is false and limiting. Offering this formulation in terms of there being a political level of the psyche, we reframe political processes in terms of psyche speaking, and internal processes in terms of politics. The field of reference is seamless and continuous. Of course, the field is also partial and divided in that differences between these realms will always exist and require acknowledgment rather than being permanently submerged in a cosmic holism. Even the unconscious itself may be understood as having some origins outside the individual person, not only of an archaic, phylogenetic kind, but also resulting from the internalization of social institutions and political processes. Language plays a special role in the making of the unconscious; at once, direct and indirect. Unconscious perceptions of the world will not find consciousness without language and language will influence what is perceived and how it is perceived. But even language cannot claim permanent primacy, for language is itself affected by social and political institutions and relations. There is an interplay between language, social and political institutions, and phylogeny. But all lie outside the individual human person and all constitute a kind of contingency for the unconscious of an individual. It follows that any conception of the unconscious or the psyche that omits to refer to social institutions and political processes will be inadequate. The individual develops on the terrain of social and political relations and hence there is a political level of the unconscious. One consequence of the internalization of political and social factors from the environment is that the full flowering of an individual’s political potential may be repressed so that his or her contribution to political process is stunted and distorted. Here, there is a similarity to what internalization of moral prohibitions stemming from parents and society does to the innate drives such as sexuality or aggression. In addition to a similar stunting and distorting of political potential, internalization of political and social factors influences parent-child interaction and, hence, the development of object relations. For example, the political climate concerning the balance between self-reliance and state provision may influence the duration and quality of the period of dependence enjoyed by a child. The parallel is with the way in which, on the family level, parental psychology and values form a moral climate in which intense relationships acquire a particular moral tone. The ideas of political development and a political level of the psyche have implications for other areas of psychological theorizing. We may come to see aggression as a politically reparative drive, understanding that aggression often incorporates not only intense wishes for
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relatedness, but equally intense wishes for participation, in a more cooperative or communal mode, in political or social activity. To be authentically aggressive, angry in the belly, and still be able to be part of social and political processes, is a psychological and ethical goal of the highest order. Moreover, the idea of the political development of the individual will influence our ideas about sexuality. I am thinking of the politically destabilizing functions of the polymorphous Trickster, and the politically creative functions of the pluralistic father’s erotic playback (discussed in Chapters 4 and 9 respectively). I have to admit that it has been very tempting to refer to a ‘political drive’, meaning that there is something innately political in human beings and that the political is not a derivative of something else—and hence not inevitably some kind of sublimation. Should we talk of a ‘political drive’? I am not sure. On the one hand, the last statement of Freud’s about the life and death instincts need not be regarded as written in stone. Moreover, object relations theorists do not refer much to drives anyway. Hence, there is no hard and fast intellectual reason to desist from calling the innately political ‘something’ a drive. On the other hand, a theoretical innovation of that magnitude might distract attention from the overall implications of my theorizing on the role of the political. Perhaps what is necessary is to protest any premature attempt to displace the political as a category in depth psychology by translating it into other ‘languages’. It may be useful here to recall that social psychologists have asserted that there are up to twelve basic instincts and that some of these are social in nature.7 A regularly occurring criticism of depth psychology is that it makes little place for the social dimension as a primary factor. This is certainly true of analytical psychology and maybe Jungian theory could be expanded so that a political channel could be postulated for the flow of libido, alongside biological, moral and spiritual channels.8 Anyway, for the moment I should like to refer to an individual’s innate political potential. If political potential is innate, then it may be expressed as a quantum, regarded as having been inborn in the person. (This is one way of expressing the constitutional, accidental, fateful factor in the patient’s political history that I mentioned earlier.) If we take as a starting point the idea of an inborn quantum of political potential— meaning, in simple terms, an amount of energy of a political kind— then there are fascinating byproducts of the idea. To begin with, not all individuals would have the same quantum of political potential or political energy. Then one could ask: What happens if a person of innately high political potential/energy has parents with a low level of it? Or vice versa? What is the fate of the political potential born into an age that does not value a high level of that kind of energy? What
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will be the consequences if an individual’s innate level of politicalness is not in tune with that of the society into which he or she is born? I think that situations of this kind are as likely to produce problems in political development as are specifics such as infantile traumas, maternal and paternal insufficiency, and so forth. There are numerous other questions which now become askable: Did your parents foster or hinder the flowering of your political potential? If they hindered it, what was the destiny of that repressed political energy? Could we say that some people sublimate their political energy in ways that invest the sexual or aggressive areas of their psychology (turning the usual formulation on its head)? The important result of this kind of inquiry is that it becomes ever more difficult to render the political into other terms such as those of conventional drive theory or object relations—which does not deny the many articulations between political development and sexuality, aggression or object relations. But a partial, limited, focused approach has its advantages. Moreover, working on the political history and the political development of a person might open out into a wider discovery of unconscious material and processes. If a culture does not allow a flowering of political potential to occur and express itself and the political self to flourish, then that culture loses one of the most productive avenues for personal growth and individuation. The individual loses out as well as the prospects for transformation and healing of psychopathology within the political system. We may find our private selves in the public sphere, just as we find psychopathology, hitherto thought the province of the individual, on the collective scene. If making politics is innate in humans, then we cannot speak in terms of deciding whether or not to join in; we are ethically involved as part of the human condition. I would go further to say that there is an innate desire in humans to change social and political reality. The argument builds up like this: Social and political institutions constitute a form of reality. We know that desires can never be fully realized in reality. Therefore, social and political institutions are not exclusively constituted by desire. Hence, the relation between desire and existing social and political institutions is most likely to be an inimical one. This dissonance is expressed in humanity’s recurrent attempts to change its social and political institutions. There is a sting in the tail here for political activists: At times of rapid social and political transformation, the desire for change can take the form of opposing and obstructing whatever political activity is going on. Taking ‘desire’ very loosely, perhaps that is why, during periods of political and social upheaval, sexual relationships become more urgent than ever, and are often experienced as a contradiction of the call to political action. This is
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shown quite beautifully in Alexandra Kollontai’s novel Love of Worker Bees set just after the Russian Revolution. The heroines are torn between their sexual and emotional needs on the one hand and, on the other, their political commitment. Kollontai, writing in the period 1917–21, concluded that this problem can never be resolved unless and until there is a transformation of the family and the sexual and emotional relations between women and men.9 An individual can be said to suffer from repression of political potential if he or she cannot engage with a political theme that, consciously or unconsciously, is exercising that individual. My clinical experience is that people are already much more engaged politically than they think they are. Does such engagement have to be active, or would excitement and sympathy be enough? Or, paradoxically, might not good-enough political development mean withdrawal from political engagement for a period of time? Why do I refer to political development? Might this not be rather conservative, from an intellectual standpoint? There are now numerous books on ‘moral development’, ‘spiritual development’, ‘religious development’, and ‘the development of personality’ is a wellresearched and much argued-over field. So the general idea of development seems to be in the Zeitgeist.10 The idea of development is obviously intended to be applied as non-normatively and nonjudgmentally as possible, though it will be as well for me to admit immediately that my own personal political beliefs and values will enter the picture and help to bring a kind of hierarchy into play. This is absolutely unavoidable but I do not believe that my having beliefs and values of my own makes me any less neutral than or different from theorists in the fields of moral, spiritual, religious and personality development who undoubtedly have moral, spiritual, religious and psychological positions of their own to defend and privilege. Nevertheless, my interest is not in what might be called ‘political maturity’. No such universal exists. My interest is in how people got to where they are politically and, above all, in how they themselves think, feel, explain and communicate about how they got to where they are politically; a subjective narrative of political development. Moreover, they may turn out not to be where they thought they were politically, or to have got to where they are by a route that they did not know about. We ask how, in the British political scene, a person became a Hampstead liberal not whether being a Hampstead liberal is a good thing in itself—but not denying that we have a viewpoint about Hampstead liberals. Moreover, not all Hampstead liberals became Hampstead liberals in the same way. We want to know how Hampstead liberals have experienced their becoming Hampstead liberals.
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When a patient describes his or her political experiences, in the sense of formative or crucial political experiences, an analyst would listen with the same mix of literal and metaphorical understanding with which he or she would listen to any kind of clinical material—but with the idea of political development in mind as a permanent heuristic presence. Sometimes, the most productive path to follow would be to accept the patient’s account of his or her political history; at other times, what the patient has to say may be understood as image, symbol and metaphor; at other times, as defensive and/or distorted; sometimes, it will be a melange of these ways of understanding; sometimes, a competition between them. The idea of development does not have to be used as if it were an exclusively linear, personalistic, causal-deterministic idea, characterized by regularity or predictability. (I wrote at length about this elsewhere.11) Development is a creative fantasy with extraordinary utility—and, by fantasy, I (once again) do not mean anything pathological or lacking connection to reality. Rather the reverse. Political development is a fantasy that enables us to look at an area of the psyche and at an aspect of the person that have been relatively neglected. The fantasy of political development helps us to access the politics of the person in the here-and-now, as the warring elements in personality clash and conciliate. For phases of development do not just fade away. Each phase remains active in the psyche in competitive relation to phases which only seem to us to be successive. Therefore, to the concepts of the political history of the person and the political development of the person we should add the concept of the political here-and-now of the person. The implications for depth psychology of taking in these ideas about political development could be profound. In 1984 I suggested to my fellow members of the training committee of a psychotherapy organization that we should start to explore with candidates something about their political development—its history, roots, antecedents, patterns, vicissitudes and current situation. Just as we looked into sexuality, aggression and spiritual or moral development. At that time, the idea was regarded as slightly way out but more recently it has evoked a favorable response. Similarly, if political and social factors are part of personality and psychological development, should analysts and therapists not explore those areas in initial interviews with prospective patients? In throwing out these ideas on the political development of the person, I am aware that I have done no more than sketch out ways of engaging with what promises to be a fruitful—and vast—area of research. As with ‘subjectivity’ I am aware that there are problems with my (or anyone’s) use of the term ‘person’. I think that the need to retain
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some idea of the person is necessary when we consider the political dimensions of life. Paradoxically, this speculation about the political development of the person is part of, not in opposition to, attempts to ‘decenter’ the ‘habitual focus of psychoanalysis on an individual’ by ‘evoking the place of the between, thus dissolving the logic of inner and outer’.12 Nor am I forgetting the wounded and grieving nature of the late modern or post-modern person that I mentioned in the previous chapter. I conclude this section on the political development of the person by saying that we need to envision a new relationship in clinical practice as well as in theory between the private and the public, the intimate and the crowded, the secret and the open, the vulgar and the numinous—analysis as a kind of theater. In the theater of analysis, we need a crowd on the stage and a crowd in the audience. On that crowded stage are individuals who offer their most secret truths to individuals within that crowded audience, sharing a collective experience with them. Workshops on ‘the political development of the person’ facilitate such sharing and, with the help of workshop participants, I have developed a set of experiential exercises that illuminate political development. THE POLITICS OF IMAGERY It has often been suggested that our political culture has reached the point where the politics of imagery is the only politics there is. This is an important psychological point about politics. My sense is that a constructive response to the debasement of politics should take the form of making a political point about psychology in general and about imagery in particular. Concerning a political analysis of imagery, I have a suggestion to make: That we try to revise notions of imagery so that imagery is given a primary and not a secondary status. All too often, we tend to regard images as products—whether of relationship, or of instinct, or of conflict, or of emotions or of institutions. This view accords with common sense. Harder to see is that imagery runs relationships, evokes the goal of the instinct, promotes conflict, engenders emotion and infects institutions. I think the difficulty with keeping imagery as a first-order concept reflects a stultifying preoccupation with a substructure/ superstructure dichotomy in thinking, that insists on the very notion of underlying structure. From an experiential point of view, images are the things we experience most directly; this given-ness of experience in terms of images is as true of our bodily sensations, as pain studies show, as it is of our political experiences. If there are structures, scaffolds on which images hang, then it may be that images, the contents of those
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structures, have created them in the first place. Certainly, without the image, we would not be able to hypothesize the existence of the scaffold in the first place. There are implications of this crash course in phenomenological psychology for cultural and political analysis. Let me give an example. An Italian patient dreamt of a beautiful lake with clear deep water. He said this represented his soul and then immediately associated to the pollution on the Italian Adriatic coast. The image of the lake, and the association to coastal pollution, suggested, in the form of one symbol, the patient’s unconscious capacity for depth and his present state of which he was all too conscious—a state of being clogged up by ‘algae’, like the coastal waters of the Adriatic. When disparate psychological themes are thrown together like this, the symbolic image makes a powerful impact on the individual, who cannot ignore it. If he or she can hold on to the symbol that has emerged from the unconscious, keeping it available to consciousness and without idealizing the image, then the ego is itself strengthened or enhanced. But the capacity to retain a hold on symbolic images depends on ego strength and, if the ego is weak, the symbol remains unavailable to consciousness. Then the newly emerging interpretive synthesis, and the patient’s new self experience, quickly fades from the picture. In this particular instance, the notion that there was possibly a ‘solution’ for the clogging up of his lake-soul potential, and the idea that being clogged was a state he had gradually got into over time and was not a witch’s curse, together with the vision that depth and clarity and beauty were options open to him, were powerful and liberating thoughts for the patient to entertain. He made a choice to return to Italy, to tell his father that he was homosexual, and, in his words, to ‘get more involved’—perhaps in environmental politics, it was not absolutely clear. It was Jung who discovered the crucial property of imagery to face in two or more directions at the same time. In 1916, he termed this property ‘the transcendent function’, meaning that apparent opposites could be linked by images, provided these transcending images were understood symbolically: ‘Opposites’ such as the real and the imaginary, rationality and irrationality, consciousness and the unconscious, spirituality and sensuality, could be linked in this manner. According to Jung, the one-sidedness of many conscious attitudes could be transcended by new psychic products generated from the unconscious. This idea, termed ‘compensation’, meant that opposites could dialogue and engage in mutual influence. For instance, someone may have a preoccupation with sensual and material things. But the absolute opposite of this attitude—that is, spirituality—will probably be present as a potential in the unconscious and, given a
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facilitating environment, may become available to consciousness. What is involved is more than reaction formation or a crude combining of two possible attitudes. In individual analysis, the transcendent function mediates between a person as he or she is formed and the possibility of change. We see, not so much an answer, but the presentation of a choice or series of choices with all the attendant risks. The ‘opposites’ (sensuality and spirituality) were never as ‘opposite’ as they seemed.13 Returning to the dream of the lake, I would like to suggest an alternative reading, couched in more political terms. I think that this re-reading constitutes a further transcendent function, a further statement about another crucial property of imagery. The images of the dream can be approached via their individual presence, or via their political presence, or via the movement and tension between the two. In the dream of the lake, the tension between the individual and the political presences of the image was prominent and insistent; after all, the patient was Italian. What, the patient and I asked together, is the role of pollution in the soul, or even in the world? What is the role of pollution in the achievement of psychological depth? Can the soul remain deep and clear while there is pollution in the world, in one’s home waters? Did the lake, with intimations of mystery and isolation, clash with the popular, extraverted tourism of the Adriatic? Eventually, the patient’s concern moved onto the social level: Who owned the lake? Who should have access to such a scarce resource? Who would protect the lake from pollution? These were his associations. From wholly personal issues, such as the way his problems interfered with the flowering of his potential, we moved to political issues, such as the pollution of natural beauty, not only by industry but also by the mass extraversion of tourism. And we also moved back again from the political level to the personal level, including transference analysis. I do not mean to foreclose on other interpretations, but to add in a more ‘political’ one so that the patient’s unconsciously taken up political commitments can become clearer. I think imagery can be understood as performing this further transcendent function: Bridging the gap between the apparently individual, private, subjective and the apparently collective, social, political. Much of this book argues for the general thesis that there is a constant relationship and articulation between the personal/ subjective and the public/political dimensions of life. Can we discriminate these separate dimensions in such a way that this newly transcendent function can, on a more conscious level, better bring them together? I think that we are finding that private, interior imagery carries a political charge. Moreover, we need to be better
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placed to make practical, clinical use of the by-now conventional observation that the external world, particularly its social and power relations, has an effect on our subjective experience. Applying this approach to imagery to a psychological analysis of politics, we would try to discriminate the individual and the cultural aspects of an image and see whether, by means of a kind of transcendent function, they can be brought to an equal level of consciousness. This process would increase the range of choices available, rather than collapsing them into a solution. In the example, the question of ownership of the lake at first seemed a distant ‘political’ concern. But gradually the patient’s social sensitivity came to the fore: He asserted that the lake, like his soul, was not a commodity to be owned by anyone. Then a celebration of his social conscience came to the fore. He addressed the fate of his ‘Italian-ness’ on a personal, individual level. Finally, as the transcendent function in his imagery continued to pulse, he discovered more collective, cultural and political associations to pollution on the Adriatic. I hope it is clear that the public/political and private/subjective dimensions were both thoroughly alive. I have noticed that the choice of imagery in the language of political theory sometimes shows the operation of a transcendent function of this kind, as it moves between the individual and the collective dimensions, trying to connect them. The language of politics, like the language of depth psychology, is often treated with extreme suspicion as if it were somehow fundamentally negative. I feel this depreciation besmirches and represses political process. When we think about themes such as political obligation, negotiation and bargaining, we see that an additional positive connotation of the imagery in political language cannot be avoided, just as it is not possible to deny the positive side of the unconscious and its creative productivity. This reworking of the transcendent function onto a sociopolitical level provides the beginnings of a model for tracking moves between individual and collective realms and a means of studying conflicts and harmonies between culture and individual. For individual and culture are not the crude opposites that many, including Freud, have taken them to be. Both terms enjoy the complex interaction produced by their dynamic relationship; the relationship changes the nature of the original ‘opposites’. The more deep and personal the experience, the more political and public it may turn out to be. The politics of imagery now operates, in the external world, at a pace that often precludes rational debate. If we are to avoid being permanently after-the-event—the unending social Nachträglichkeit— then we have to try to engage, not only with the politics of
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psychological imagery but also with the politics of depth psychology itself. ON CHANGING PRACTICE As I said at the start of the chapter, changes in the orientation of depth psychology to the world lead to a consideration of changes in the basic practices of clinical analysis. One extreme position would be to drop the practice of analysis altogether in favor of large-scale group psychological teaching.14 I feel, in contrast, that, if we accept the human subject as located between so-called inner and so-called outer worlds, then the political necessity of continuing to meet him or her in the consulting room remains. It is true that the individual human subject is not the alpha and omega of political action. Nevertheless, giving up analysis on the (incorrect) grounds that it operates only in a solipsistic frame is, as I suggested in the previous chapters, just a different inflation from the one that forces psychotherapy in a hyperprofessional direction, following slavishly an absolutist clinical path. Where depth psychology is deployed in non-clinical analysis, as in film, art or literary criticism, there is simply no problem. Such critics are lucky, perhaps. But how are ordinary clinical analysts to change their practice? It may be useful here to offer an amplification from another field of intense praxis, in which political consciousness deeply affected a worker. I think we can learn a great deal from Bertolt Brecht’s struggle to evolve the kind of theatrical practice that would really embody his politics. Brecht’s ideology is most acutely expressed, not in his extratheatrical activities or in his ‘message’—but in his practice itself. Of course, Brecht did not invent the idea of drama with a social conscience, but it is mainly to him that we owe the notion of theater as an arena for social and political debate. Above all, Brecht’s goal was to change the status and role of the audience. The paradox is the creation of the active spectator, participating in an argument rather than identifying with a heroic character. In the old theater, the heroic, individual human being was taken for granted, but in Brecht’s epic theater that notion is under the microscope. As Galileo says, ‘unhappy is the country that needs a hero’. For Brecht, the characters in a play are not heroic individuals, frozen in time, but ordinary persons in a social context, engaged in an episodic narrative. They are part, as we would say nowadays, of a larger text. In analysis, as in the theater that Brecht encountered, we are much caught up with heroisms. We see this in Jung’s heroic version of mother-infant separation or in Freud’s heroic version of
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father-son rivalry. But heroism is also present in analysis itself, as when the patient is required to ‘overcome’ something, ‘achieve’ something, ‘sacrifice’ something, ‘integrate’ (that is, take possession of) something, even ‘work’ through something. The imagery of analysis is all about struggle within the patient and I would not say, from my experience, that this is always a wrong conclusion to draw. But the idea of struggle has resonances and relevances that are political, reflecting the collective’s accurate fantasies about the nature of politics. Can they be amplified and picked up? Can, for instance, the changing nature of the patient’s parental imagery be interpreted on an appropriate political level? (I attempt this in Chapters 6 and 7.) Such shifts might involve questions of concern for the environment or other political topics. Similarly, can analysts alter their own interpretive thrust, their own heroism, away from ‘you, the patient’, away from ‘we the analyzing couple’, so that the patient’s conflicts are more rigorously connected to the political world? This would be a modulation of feelings outward as well as inward toward ego absorption. ‘Ex-volvement’ as well as involvement? To answer such questions, it helps to be able to envision the patient as undergoing political development alongside his or her sexual or aggressive development, as I discussed earlier. This makes practical clinical use of the idea that any image brought to analysis can be approached via its cultural and public presence as well as via its individual and private presence. Sometimes, it is the movement and tension—the articulation—between the individual and the cultural perspectives that is important. Let us recall the patient who dreamt of that beautiful lake with clear, deep water and interpreted it as referring to his soul, further associations being to coastal pollution in his home country. The articulation between the individual and the cultural associations was marked. The key question concerned the role of pollution in his soul. We asked how his soul could remain clear while there is pollution on the Adriatic coast. With thoughts of this further transcendent function in mind, Brecht’s ‘alienation effect’ and his idea of ‘distanciation’ can help us here. The analyst might, in some circumstances, completely reverse the poles of what he or she ordinarily does and work also to distance the patient from the emotions engendered by the patient’s personal situation. In a sense, the patient is not to identify with himself or herself as hero, not to be self-empathic, not even to aim for insight or self-understanding. The patient tries to locate what is public about his or her private conflicts, anxieties, relationship problems. This would be a radical course to take and implies the deprivileging and reframing of the personal dimension in analytical ideology. Feelings would not only be important on the personal level. Just as the
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Brechtian actor is both Hamlet and Hamlet’s critic, so a Brechtian mode of analyzing would disassemble the falsely unitary nature of the analytical project, moving away from catharsis and self-knowledge as the highest goals. I cited the patient’s dream of the lake as illustrative of the problem, showing why this work has to be done rather than as a model solution. When discussing these ideas with colleagues, a worry has often been expressed that one might be influencing the patient or, dreaded word, using ‘suggestion’. Sometimes I have been accused of wanting to foist my own political prejudices onto the patient. These arguments are advanced as if suggestion was completely out of the question, and hence absent from an average, normal, good-enough analysis and as if topics like sex and aggression never excited an analyst’s prejudiced responses—whereas politics does. Of course, there is always a risk of discipleship in the analytical situation as those who have had training analyses know. But I feel confident in saying that there is a huge amount of uncritically accepted suggestion in analytical practice already and that, from a certain point of view, the more ‘professional’, ‘bounded’, ‘contained’ and ‘disciplined’ the behavior of the practitioner, the more suggestion is taking place in his or her practice. I think this is inevitable. The technical rules of analysis are not politically or culturally neutral; they do more than facilitate the unfolding of the self. They have themselves cultured (or facilitated) depth psychology in a permanent way, and they have themselves done it to a certain extent by suggestion. On the basis of the replies received to my questionnaire on political material that is brought to the consulting room, it is clear that a good deal of discussion goes on in ordinary analysis—probably more than is revealed in supervision, wherein ‘discussion’ can be a dirty word. (The survey itself is reported in Chapter 10.) If analysts are already discussing politics with the patient, this would be to bring ‘the political’ into the consulting room as well as to stimulate an interchange on one particular political topic. It is clear that, in the words of a colleague of mine, ‘the hygienic sealing of the consulting room from politics is a virginal fantasy’ on the part of analysts and therapists.15 Following Brecht’s project, perhaps we need to think about how to engage some of our patients in political, social and cultural discussion and argument. Sometimes, we have to take a frankly educative model for our work (often, assuredly, the patient is educating the analyst). Sometimes, we may even argue with the patient (usually regarded as a grave technical error). We should not go on as if all our ideas about the internalization of the culture, the disunity of the human subject, the meaningfulness of symptoms, were all a new kind of metaphysics
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and hence not of immediate practical relevance. Like Brecht, we have to interrupt a smoothly running narrative—in our case, by disputing the claim of the inner world for a disproportionate level of analytical attentiveness. Like Brecht, we have to discourage identification with the hero—in our case, to discourage identification with ego, self, depressive position, the symbolic order, individuation. The worries about excessive suggestion expressed by those who have argued with these ideas of mine are actually very important and I do not seek to minimize them—for instance, by pointing out that Freud could cope with the idea that suggestion played a part in the talking cure, provided the patient was, in fact, disposed to be suggestible.16 Above all, these worries do highlight our lack of a map or model by which to approach whatever individuals sense their political development to have been, or whatever their present political state might be. We have such maps and models to guide us in the fields of sexuality, aggression and object relations. But are we not by nature political animals, as Aristotle thought—and, hence, as I have been hinting, is not politics a drive, just as sex or aggression are? By maps or models of political development, I do not mean something expressed in the language of the issues of the day, though that might form the raw material for political development. One particular question that I would like to discuss concerns the impact of these ideas upon what clinical analysts actually say to patients, on interpretation. I like to work in terms of plural interpretation, of saying to the patient: ‘I think this material refers to such and such and also to such and such, but I am not sure which path we should explore.’ The giving and receiving of plural interpretations is a highly problematic technical issue. But there are critical political issues as well. As far as technique is concerned, it may be that the differing interpretive views would have to be spaced out over time so as to make their assimilation easier. On the other hand, the impact of interpretation is on an inner world level and not through intellectual understanding and it is difficult to see how such impact would be interfered with if an interpretation were plural in nature—unless we are going to say that the unconscious can only deal with clear-cut messages. The difficulty that may exist with plural interpretation could be more to do with adherence to what are felt to be the technical rules of analysis. Here, we might recall E. H.Carr’s comment that, even for a historian, whatever he offers as an interpretation of events is always the outcome of the establishment of a hierarchy of interpretations. Note that Carr did not go on to say that all interpretations save the main one are discarded.17 So, to an extent, all interpretation is plural interpretation.
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The political issues are highlighted when the analyst makes his or her uncertainty concerning a multiplicity of viewpoints the central plank of an interpretation. Politically speaking, this is far more democratic and likely to lead to dialogue and negotiation than crudely offering the patient several options and letting him or her tick the preferred one. Many single-strand interpretations of psychological material are themselves concerned with conflict and dissent; in such cases, plural interpretation may be stylistically closer to many-layered political reality. The risk of intellectualizing need be no greater than with single-strand interpretation, and could even be less. The weakness of plural interpretation is undoubtedly that it could degenerate into infinite and unreal tolerance and acceptance of any viewpoint whatsoever. But it is as possible to experience a change from the plural (tolerant) as it is from the singular (incisive). In any case, we would hardly want all interpretation to be plural. (See Chapter 9 for a fuller discussion of pluralism.) We can speculate as to the effect on the transference of making plural interpretations. Negatively, the analyst may be seen as woolly, hedging his or her bets, not providing value for money and so forth. More positively, the idea of analysis as a partnership or corporate activity would be promoted, without its acquiring a radiance of spurious equality or becoming a two-person discussion group. It may well not be necessary for the analyst to do very much (or anything) more than provide a safe place for the political aspects of the patient’s psychological potentialities to unfold. This would be a con- firmation of what we already know about holding, containment and the temenos. I would like to bring in a final cautionary note about changing practice, gleaned from another cultural area—this time, feminist art practice. Women artists quickly found that it was not possible to make art out of women’s experience and challenge the patriarchal ways in which the idea of ‘art’ has been constructed without considering changes in art practice as well. However, tracking the debates within feminism over the past twenty years underscores the near impossibility of producing a definitive statement of feminist art practice.18 The same will undoubtedly be true for depth psychological analysis of politics. And this ambiguity should be the case. It would be tragic if ‘political’ depth psychologists deluded themselves that there’s only one way to go, for this would simply give ammunition to those who want depth psychology to stay politically ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’.
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POLITICS AND THE CASE HISTORY I am trying to make a psychology which operates on a political level so that something extrapolated from the individual situation would refer to the more collective aspects of a patient’s material. I am thinking of the presence of cultural influences on the unconscious (or the corollary: The driving power of mythopoetic imagery in relation to cultural performance). However, the typical feature of depth psychology is its case-by-case approach, exemplified by the case history, nowadays referred to by many writers as the case ‘illustration’. We need to discuss whether the case history genre is relevant to cultural and social analysis or not. At the outset, I must say that, for me, the issue is not at all connected with the truth or objectivity of the case history. For I never doubted that they were fictions, and that apparently radical notion was widely accepted even in my rather conservative training as an analyst. To critique clinical narratives as if, these days, ‘scientific’ claims were being made of their incontrovertibility is to tilt at windmills. Feminism has engaged in a similar debate. That the personal is political is a central tenet of radical feminism. Such feminist theory may be said to have come to terms with the case history approach, for all the inadequacies of that. Theorists such as Martha Rosler have addressed the question ‘Is the personal political?’ in terms which scarcely require any translation into the language of depth psychology and analysis.19 There is another sense in which the retention of some kind of case history approach is valid and this concerns the use of psychopathology. When discussing psychopathology, there is a spectrum that stretches from what might be called a professional approach to a poetic approach. Making diagnoses such as ‘narcissistic personality disorder’ or ‘anal character’, or discussing normality and abnormality, represents the well-known, professional pole. However, there is also a poetic style of pathologizing to consider. Before doing that, I would like to make a few comments about this spectrum, which is itself a creative falsehood, offered by me for its heuristic value. There is no reason for the poles of the spectrum to be in opposition. No one analyst will occupy one pole exclusively; indeed, many will claim that they make explicit use of the whole spectrum in their work. There may even be a level on which the two poles turn out to be identical: The poesy of consummate professionalism, and the professional cutting edge of an acute poetic imagination. What represents the poetic end of the spectrum? Provided we do not get seduced by cheap professionalism, and provided we do not attempt an artificial division between normal and abnormal, then the study
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of psychopathology acquires a poetic cast: The individual case, or even symptom, contains a microscopic version of the culture, including its power relations. The smallest part (symptom) contains the greatest whole (politics). The clinical situation is not to be regarded as finite and the political milieu as infinite, for the opposite is also the case. Therefore we need not abandon the familiar jargon of case-by-case psychopathology. But we have to try to use it imaginatively so that it starts to function once again as psyche’s language, psyche’s words, psycheology. I suggest that there is a sense in which this kind of psychopathologizing may have an effect on social and political analysis. Judicious argument on the basis of what is found with the individual patient may lead to something that is generally true for society.20 Yet, in spite of the potential helpfulness of the case history approach, there are also major problems with it. I have already mentioned one of the more obvious: That case history is a form of creative writing. What is more, much case history is propaganda for one theoretical view or another and the presence of that kind of reductionism has proved a serious obstacle for psychobiography and psychohistory to overcome. From a more philosophical angle, there are certain objections to the case history approach which, parodying Wittgenstein, I would call the ‘second-person illusion’. Wittgenstein’s ‘first-person illusion’ is the claim that one knows one’s own mental states better than one knows other people’s mental states because one observes one’s own directly. The second-person illusion would be that one (an analyst) can be more certain about another’s (patient’s) mental states than that second person can be because one does not suffer from that second person’ s repression, denial, or lack of training. But neither the first-person nor the second-person case gives us certainty. According to Wittgenstein, they have no meaning at all without reference to the fact that ‘there are people in the world besides oneself and [that] one has a nature and form of life in common with them’.21 Wittgenstein stands, then, as an unlikely starting point for moves into political psychology which do not retain features of the case history approach. PSYCHOID ASPECTS OF POLITICAL PROCESS Most Jungian essays in collective psychology, while acknowledging cultural diversity on the surface, end by stressing the universal impact of ‘archetypal’ patterns on group processes.22 Certain themes figure prominently in such psycho-anthropological analyses: The role of religion, the ritual significance of politics, the mythical functions of the offices and officers of state, the presence or absence of fulfilling
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initiatory experiences, and where these are absent, perverse searches for such experiences, such as drug addiction. In this kind of archetypal analysis, the gods and goddesses often emerge as providing a fundamental hermeneutic framework. For example: ‘The massive technologizing of contemporary culture, far from moving without purpose or form, is playing itself out according to the stories of Prometheus, Hephaestus, and Asclepius’, ‘the military-industrial complex is Hera-Heracles-Hephaestus’.23 Such an approach works best when accompanied by as scrupulous as possible a recovery of the particularity of the god or goddess (something I will myself attempt in Chapter 4 with regard to Hermes). Sometimes the employment of collective psychology follows a different path. In this alternative appreciation of what ‘collective’ means, psychology is seen as an analog of the instincts, as something akin to biology.24 The focus is not only on what is universal but on those psychological events and processes deemed to lie closest to the biological realm of the instincts. So the ground covered is that of early infancy—though the mother is often the Great Mother and the child the Divine Child. The idea is that psychology at the start of life is somehow more instinctually determined, hence more collective, than at any other time. (I’ll dispute this viewpoint in Chapter 11.) There is a possible third way in which the notion of the collective unconscious could be deployed in political and cultural debate. I would like to explore this new idea in detail here. I start from Jung’s concept of the psychoid level of the unconscious. This concerns a level of the psyche that is so submerged and yet so fundamental that it would be an error to regard it as deriving solely from a biological base. Jung’s psychoid category represents a complete interpenetration of matter and psyche to the point where they may be regarded as two sides of a coin: Psyche-in-matter, matter-in-psyche. Jung cautions, no doubt correctly, that at this level, the psychoid level, things are ‘unfathomable’.25 However, the search in modern physics for a force that would unite the four forces known to operate in the physical universe may also be seen as a search for a kind of ‘psychology’ in matter (as in action-at-a-distance). The existence of the scientific parallel suggests that Jung’s concept of the psychoid has possibilities beyond those he himself saw in it, leading to approaches to political and social theory that are more pragmatic than those that a mere revival of the medieval doctrine of the unus mundus would offer. The more I have reflected on the idea of the psychoid, the more I have become aware that the concept can be extended to invoke a set of profound political, social and cultural issues. The psychoid is also political, social and cultural in nature. We are not only talking of the psyche’s influence on the political, social and cultural worlds, but also
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of the political, social and cultural worlds’ influence on the psyche. All these worlds show a degree of identity as well as difference. The psychoid level, by definition collective, but, equally by definition, neither exclusively psychological nor exclusively social, can be seen as a (or the) vehicle for the transmission of cultural and social practices. We flesh out the adage that ‘when you treat the patient, you treat the culture’. If this idea holds water, it could be of use in depth psychology’s project of providing therapy for the political culture. For, up to now, we have only the concept of internalization to account for such transmissions; this operates exclusively on the individual level: A person takes in the received social and relational order and it becomes part of that person’s mental set. Positing a psychoid level, and doing this in a social language, could obviate the difficulties of an individualistic approach to cultural transmission. The problem remains: How to develop a social or political language that reflects the psychoid factor—that is, accepting the unity of the psychic and political realms while at the same time maintaining their separateness and diversity. For I would be unconvinced if my introduction of the psychoid factor led to an untrammelled holism, a claim that there are no differences between the three differing realms of human, cultural and material existence. The paradox of holism is that, if the realms are identical, then it becomes ever more necessary to disentangle them in order to permit any kind of discourse at all. Holism is a provocation to analytical thinking! The psychoid interpenetration of society and psychology is a perspective that helps us to see personal pain as a statement about social conditions—pain as a spur to analyze those conditions, and pain as the motive force in changing those conditions. TELEOLOGY AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS The teleological viewpoint (from telos, meaning goal) is based on Aristotle’s idea of causae finales (final causes). Sometimes it is referred to as the prospective approach. In psychology, this approach means considering a phenomenon from the standpoint of what it is for, where it is leading, for the ‘sake’ of what it is happening. All these dimensions were more interesting to Jung than the effects of the situation of causes located in the chronological past (Aristotle’s causae efficientes). Jung’s emphasis on teleology led him to propose that symptoms, and indeed mental illness itself, may often signify something of great potential value for the individual. For example, Jung saw depression as a damming up of energy, which, when released, may take on a more positive direction. Energy is trapped because of a neurotic or psychotic problem but, if freed, actually helps
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in the overcoming of the problem. A state of depression is, according to this view, one which should be entered into as fully as possible, so that the feelings involved may be clarified. Seen teleologically, depression may have a regenerative and enriching aspect. It may take the form of ‘the empty stillness which precedes creative work’.26 Jung pointed out that in everyday life the teleological viewpoint is taken for granted alongside the strictly causal factor. For example, if a person has an opinion and expresses it, we usually want to know what he or she means, what is being got at, rather than the historical origins of the remark alone. According to Jung, psychological phenomena ought to be approached as if they had intention and purpose—i.e. considered in terms of goal-orientedness or teleology. Jung grants the unconscious a kind of knowledge or even foreknowledge. If we are not to descend into fortune- telling, we must be careful how we adapt the idea of teleology to cultural and political processes. We must try not to make teleology an instrument of closure, denying the modern predicament in which there seems to be no telos. The idea that there is a ‘knowledge of the unconscious’ makes it possible to think that there may be a ‘knowledge of the political and social collective’. Obviously, mass consciousness is not remarkable for its good taste and political sophistication. But it is possible to determine occasions in mass movements and movements of the mass when a goal seems to be functioning as a cause, dragging or leading the situation in a certain direction. I have in mind the events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s. Teleology cultivates a certain kind of question: What’s this for? Where’s it going? What does it mean? Not, What are its roots? What made it happen? The question ‘who benefits?’ is a teleological question that is absolutely crucial for political analysis. The adoption of a teleological attitude is particularly useful in the kind of political and cultural analysis I am describing. Ever more teleological questions will be asked of disciplines already directly engaged with problems in the human sciences. For example: What is moral philosophy for, socially speaking? Where is literary criticism going, from a cultural perspective? What is the economic significance of modern theology? PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS Clinical and political analysts are equally the victims of their own hypotheses. It is very hard to get it completely wrong in depth psychology and the risk is of ending up with a tautological display of correctness. I want to suggest that, rather than looking for
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psychopathology in culture, which is so easy to find, we try to look with psychopathology, with a psychopathological eye. We should not only search for hidden depression in the culture, or for paranoid projections between nation states, or for the sado-masochistic patterns in pornography. Rather, let us see how our own depression makes us regard things in a certain way, through a lens preoccupied with our own destructiveness. Let us see how an envious eye makes us see envy everywhere, making us accept that what is good in modern culture can be rubbished by a weary intelligentsia. Let us see how our own paraphilias make us, as analysts, probe and pry into areas of life that used to be sacred, profoundly fetishizing their contents. This is more than self-reflection or self-analysis; it is using the psychopathological part of our selfhood as a way of seeing, and then as a way of analyzing. It is a new use of the project of depth psychology—to move outward armed with the tools of the trade, which are not methods, theories and interpretations alone, but also the very symptoms, syndromes, illnesses and problems without which depth psychology would have no social function. Can we develop the kind of eye for psychopathology that would enable us to enter more deeply into political and social illnesses? An ‘eye of understanding’? This would be imaginative understanding and making use of imagination in psychological analysis of culture demands an esthetic approach to political and social illnesses. New terms such as ‘social esthetics’ or ‘political esthetics’ would approximate to what I have in mind. Political esthetics would not be an esthetics of connoisseurship, though an apprehension of beauty would still reside at its core. In the orthodox Jewish and other religious traditions, repentance of sin is often expressed as an esthetic reaction to the revulsion caused by one’s own corrupt behavior. Sin is not only wrong, but also disgustingly ugly. If sin looks beautiful to you, you will be a sinner. If you cannot discover the often-hidden beauty of virtue, you will never be virtuous. There is a marvellous cartoon in Gary Larson’s ‘Far Side’ series which is apt here. There are two pictures. In the top picture, a man arrives in heaven to meet St Peter. In the bottom picture, a man arrives in hell to meet the Devil. St Peter says ‘Welcome to heaven— here’s your harp’. The Devil says ‘Welcome to hell—here’s your accordion’. I say that we should play the harp when we can but we should not be afraid to play the accordion when we must. A political esthetics is going to be more convoluted than an esthetics of art.
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THE LIMITS OF PSYCHOLOGY Should we be attempting a psychological analysis of politics? My answer is: Not directly. Direct application of depth psychology to cultural themes is clearly not the best way of going about things. I am sure that depth psychologists should not try to be historians, anthropologists, philosophers, political theorists, biographers or scientists. What a depth psychologist can do is offer a psychological partnership to all these disciplines, respecting the ways of working already developed therein. Such an indirect role means a fresh engagement with a corpus of knowledge and practice that already has made a direct engagement with culture with its own specific tools. When I first thought about this particular idea, it depressed me. I think I was fond of the notion of an activist analyst, prominent on barricade and in newspaper column. Then I perceived that to be indirect is a particular contribution of depth psychology—a grasp on reflection and the ability to deepen any issue that it touches. To insert depth psychology sensitively into a discourse where it has not been present is by no means the same as to try to operate within that discourse or to take over that discourse. Surely it is desirable for depth psychologists to stick to what they do well, but do it in a different manner and in different settings? This seems more realistic than depth psychologists becoming amateur members of other disciplines. Of course, this would not stop those who are already competent in other disciplines from making use of depth psychology. But I think it would be a more effective realization of the subversive potential of depth psychology to suggest that, in distinction to direct action in the political and cultural spheres, there might be this more reflective modality. In any event, a depth psychologist is as free to be as politically active as he or she likes, or as is possible given the constraints of belonging to a somewhat conservative profession. As I suggested in Chapter 1, it is crucial to avoid a reductionism which perceives everything as psychological. I will give two brief examples of this danger becoming manifest. First, Jung’s insistence on ‘the nation’ as an exclusively psychological fact trapped him in an uncritical acceptance that there were really such things as ‘German psychology’ and ‘Jewish psychology’. These he presented as mutually antipathetic and this led him to make statements, beyond his conscious intention, of a fundamentally anti-semitic kind. In his references to the German or the Jewish psyche, rather than to the psychological experience of being a German or a Jew, Jung sought too much living-space for depth psychology. (Questions of Jung’s antisemitism are discussed in detail in Chapters 12 and 13.)
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Similarly, some of Freud’s remarks in The Future of an Illusion concerning the ‘suppressed’ members of a culture demonstrate the same tendency to misjudgment of cultural and religious phenomena based on a hypertrophy of psychology. Freud argues that politically and economically suppressed people do not, and cannot, internalize ‘cultural prohibitions’ (i.e. the cultural super-ego) because they are so irrevocably hostile to the culture as a whole.27 The illogicality of this position seems obvious to us now; it is the suppressed people who have internalized the largest dose of cultural prohibition. Above all, suppressed people accept (internalize) the idea that there have to be suppressed people. I want to end this section on the limits of psychology with a comment on doing and saying nothing as a means of cultural and political analysis. Generally speaking, such political analysis would avoid a quiet acceptance of things as they are, or meditative emptiness, or ‘Eastern’ ways to cure the madness of ‘Western’ society. But even these tropes should not be ruled out. ‘Sometimes I sits and thinks and sometimes I just sits’, was the rural sage’s solution. Drawing on clinical experience, an analyst can offer the men and women of action—though the most brilliant of them know it already— a trained sense of timing: When to speak and act and when to keep silent and do nothing.
Chapter 4 The lion and the fox Morality, Trickster and political transformation
MORALITY AND MACHIAVELLI In Chapter 1 I mentioned the importance of paying attention to political imagery. After the opening chapters about resacralization, politics and the market economy, I now want to move on to a psychological analysis of the imagery in the political thought of Niccolò Machiavelli. The idea is to explore what an engagement with politics does to psychology and at what psychology can bring to political theorizing. Machiavelli is important for us precisely because he does not look like a modern resacralizer. There is no deep ecology in Machiavelli’s Prince, no upbeat spiritual optimism, not a lot of femininity or feminine consciousness. He’s a meat-eater, isn’t he? He can be dishonest, unreliable, impure, worldly—and, perhaps because of these things, he is very effective in the worlds of psychology and politics alike. What we find in Machiavelli is the kind of bleak realism and sense of civic duty that sees things through. If only resacralization could tap into Machiavellian energies…. In Machiavelli’s short book The Prince, written in 1513–14, we find a psychological analysis of the political process. Machiavelli blends wanton subversiveness, subtly buried morality, and relentless imagination. It is possible for us to encounter his encounter with the political culture of his time, seeing ‘the Prince’ as a metaphor for a certain kind of political psychology, or psychological approach to politics. We can make psychology in a Machiavellian way, think Machiavellian thoughts, see with a Machiavellian eye. The opprobrium heaped on Machiavelli’s head for nearly five hundred years is also something to muse about. Depth psychologists, such as Freud or Jung, also stir up similar reactions when they bring their psychological theories to bear on the political and social scene. As with Machiavelli’s writings, what depth psychologists have to say often appears to subvert every generally held decency. But it is the peculiar
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quality of the subversiveness found in an apparently reactionary thinker that is the compelling quality in Machiavelli’s writings. The subversiveness is not contrived or adolescent but argued out rather logically. The prince is a person who is subject to history and, above all, to Fortune. His job is to make sure that Fortune does not mar his attempts to write his own script, be a successful ruler, and achieve glory. So, at the same time as noting that the prince is a contingent and constrained person, Machiavelli emphasizes that the prince also has creative autonomy. His future, and that of his people, is bound up with how comprehensively he can create his own Fortune. In classical political theory and also in the new Renaissance humanism, the prince’s task was to develop in himself the four cardinal virtues: Wisdom, justice, courage and moderation. In addition, there were many other virtues which the prince was also supposed to possess. The phrase ‘honesty is the best policy’ summarizes the tenor of this way of thinking about politics. In The Prince, Machiavelli completely rejects these virtues. His virtù is that the prince should follow the dictates of necessity. The rejection of humanistic political morality is given dramatic and precise imagistic form: The prince should follow the fox and the lion. Not God, not the inner voice; the prince should learn from animals: A prince is forced to know how to act like a beast. He should learn from the fox and the lion; because the lion is defenseless against traps and a fox is defenseless against wolves. Therefore one must be a fox in order to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten off wolves. Those who simply act like lions are stupid…. Those who have known best how to imitate the fox have come off best. But one must know how to color one’s actions and to be a great liar and deceiver.1 Machiavelli is not content simply to ignore humanism; he does not seem much troubled by Christian morality either. The prince is never admonished to take care lest he be judged in the afterlife and the usual Christian virtues of forgiveness and gentleness are explicitly ruled out: The prince should punish his enemies instantly and with public ruthlessness. The ideology to be found here is the deliberate rejection of ideology. I mean that there is a rejection of ideology as a rational system, a reliable and predictable way of getting through the chanciness of the world. However, Machiavelli is not advocating a patternless mode of behavior for the prince. Nor is a conception and recognition of human moral capacity missing from Machiavelli’s
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outlook: The prince’s morality should, above all, be of a flexible nature; he is required to choose to be evil, to be evil in spite of himself: And so he should have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and circumstance dictate…. He should not deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to do evil, if that is necessary. The act of choice, of temporarily suppressing the dove in favor of the hawk, takes us onto a subtle moral plane. Problems of choice lie at the heart of political and moral philosophies. Being ‘Machiavellian’ means more than being ruthless or always allowing ends to justify means. In modern psychological language, what Machiavelli is doing is to make an ideology and a morality out of the shadow, out of those aspects of human psychology that we would rather disown. Most political theory seeks to combat and deal with the shadow.2 Machiavelli’s approach is to embrace the shadow and go with its energies rather than against them. This is what we today find so difficult—to accept that even resacralizers have motives such as greed and the desire for power: One can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well, they are yours… when you are in danger they turn against you. A prince who has come to depend entirely on promises and has taken no other precautions ensures his own ruin…. The bond of love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective. To adopt this as a conscious base for government was truly revolutionary, at least in the West. For Machiavelli, political actions are enclosed in a conception of human psychology. The message for cultural and political analysis is clear: A perception of what people are like precedes a conception of political change. Perhaps we cannot follow Machiavelli in his bleak generalization as to what human nature is. Maybe he is wrong, or his view is one-sided and incomplete in leaving out the positive side of human potential. But Machiavelli is right to place psychology at the heart of the political process. One reason why I have been drawn to Machiavelli is his eschewal of easy answers. Nowhere in his work is there anything that resembles a modern psychodynamic medicine, such as genitality or individuation or the depressive position, which is claimed to ‘cure’ the political
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system of its psychopathology. Machiavelli’s stand here is to take no stand, to go with the flow of what we usually reject or cannot face, to stay with the dirt rather than try to make gold out of it. Remaining disillusioned about the possibility of political and cultural transformation is a hard path to take. But the point for political and cultural analysis is that Machiavelli is dealing with what is possible and also with what is the case —that is, politics—and doing this from a psychologically realistic point of view. Hence, he has a realistic chance of changing things. Paradoxically, Machiavelli’s realistic angle on political morality leads us to the legendary figure of the Trickster. When we explored Machiavelli’s morality, we noted that ‘if a prince wants to maintain his role he must learn how not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or not according to need’. The prince, it seems, must overcome his innate virtue. However, at the same time as being bad, he must not appear to be bad: A prince should be so prudent that he knows how to escape the evil reputation attached to those vices which could lose him his state… To those seeing and hearing him, he should appear a man of compassion, a man of good faith, a man of integrity, a kind and religious man…. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are. It’s a trick, you see. Perhaps it needs to be made clear that this is not Satanic, nor perverse, not Machiavelli taking evil as his good, nor foul as fair. For this unavoidable tricksterism lies at the heart of the political. By exploring the psychology of Trickster, I intend to test the insight about links between the Trickster and political processes. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the depth psychology of political process in general and the depth psychology of political change in particular. What have we done to ourselves by evacuating the shadow from accounts of political motivation and by shunning the Trickster in politics? POLITICS AND THE TRICKSTER Trickster figures and stories appear in many cultures, as has only quite recently become accepted. For the Greeks, the arch-Trickster was Hermes, with his tendency to play jokes, to lie, to cheat, to steal, to deny reality, and to engage in grandiose fantasy. (We will be turning to Hermes in the next section of the chapter.) Genuine Tricksters, from Coyote in North America to Ananse or Eshu in West Africa, follow that pattern, undermining the prevailing organization of power and
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even the perceived structure of reality itself. Tricksters can certainly be seen as personifications of primary process activity, challenging and disregarding the laws of time, space and place. Rather, let us speculate about why Trickster mounts this challenge. He does it precisely to test the limits of those laws, the bounds of their applicability, and, hence, the possibility of altering them. At the moment we say this, the political referents of the Trickster are revealed. Challenging the limits of laws, their applicability and the possibility of altering them—and doing this in an ideological climate that is hostile to such a challenge—is the classic progressive political project. Claiming the Trickster for politics might seem like the most crass over-interpretation. But if Trickster’s political theorizing can retain his own capacity for shock and irony then no more than a little damage will have been done to him. Later in the chapter, when I try to imagine what the female Trickster looks like, I think I play a trick on Trickster, which should make him happier (see pp. 95–6, below).3 In the Middle Ages, carnivals began to take their present form and there would usually be a portrayal of some disturbance in the hierarchy. For example, an unsuitable person, such as a child or the village idiot, would be dressed up as the bishop. In fairy tales, we find figures like Tom Thumb parodying our usual conception of the hero. Tyl Eulenspiegel and Pulcinella have similar attributes. Parapsychology is full of tricky poltergeists who strain the boundaries of what we take for reality by living out the dramas of the unconscious itself. Sometimes, animals represent the Trickster (Machiavelli’s fox is a good example). According to Jung, many aspects of God’s behavior in the Old Testament show Tricksterish features, as does Zeus’s behavior in Greek mythology.4 When the world doesn’t conform to expectations, when Sod’s or Murphy’s law prevails, when things get jinxed, when the Emperor, though not the small boy, is deceived by his own vanity, when tummy rumbles uncomfortably punctuate a silence, when we laugh at the clown—Trickster is present. The question of Trickster’s sex radiates undecidability. His representations are not conventionally male in either an anatomical or a behavioral sense. But he is not a straightforward hermaphrodite either. Moreover, to refer to Trickster as bisexual is already to make far too definite a statement, while the term ‘polymorphous perversion’ leads us to regard Trickster either as a baby or a damaged grown-up. The one thing that can be said about most, if not all, traditional images of Trickster is that they are not usually presented as female and that there is an emphasis on phallic prowess in Trickster stories. One common theme involves Trickster cuckolding an earnest, respectable husband. For example, the West African Trickster Ananse
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manages to trick Akwasi so that Akwasi ends up actually ordering Ananse to make love to his wife Aso. I find myself wondering where the images of the female or protofemale Trickster are to be found. I do not think that Trickster as a ‘he’ is irrelevant to women’s issues (in fact, I think the opposite), and feminist scholarship has demonstrated that the absence of things female from a discourse is rarely of no significance. So, throughout this chapter and the next, I weave into my text a search for the figure that I will continue to refer to as the ‘female Trickster’ even though I am aware that she will be no more an ordinary woman than the male (or proto-male) Trickster is an ordinary man. One of the most studied Trickster stories is the Trickster Cycle of the North American Winnebago Native Americans, brought together by Paul Radin in 1956 at a time when the ubiquity of the Trickster figure was first being recognized.5 The Winnebago Trickster lacks even rudimentary body unity: His intestines are outside his body, his penis is autonomous, enormously long, sometimes kept in a box, sometimes wrapped round his abdomen, each hand regards the other as a mortal enemy (like Dr Strangelove in Kubrick’s film). Trickster’s odyssey is a picaresque one—organized episodically, full of fortunes, misfortunes, violent attempts at punishment and surprisingly resilient opportunism on the part of the protagonist who survives his mishaps. In picaresque fiction, all the characters suffer greatly as they play out the tensions between unaccommodated man and a hostile society and the fact that the picaroon is usually a scoundrel of low birth adds to that tension. Trickster’s suffering is itself an occasion for new Tricksterism, and further resourcefulness. One episode of the Winnebago Trickster Cycle will illustrate the kind of thing that happens. Trickster has sent his penis into a tree to punish a chipmunk who has been teasing him. When he withdraws, he finds that only a small piece of the penis is left. He gets hold of the chipmunk and tears him open… There, to his horror, he discovered his penis all gnawed up. ‘Oh, my, of what a wonderful organ he has deprived me! But why do I speak thus? I will make objects out of the pieces for human beings to use.’ Then he took the end of his penis, the part that has no foreskin, and declared, ‘This is what human beings will call the lily-of-the-lake.’ This he threw into a lake near by. Then he took the other pieces declaring in turn: ‘This the people will call potatoes; this the people will call turnips; this the people will call artichokes; this the people will call ground-beans; …this the people will call rice.’ All these pieces he threw into the water. Finally he took the end of his penis and declared, ‘This the
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people will call the pond-lily.’ He was referring to the square part of the end of his penis. What was left of his penis was not very long. When, at last, he started off again, he left behind the box in which he had until then kept his penis coiled up. And this is the reason our penis has its present shape. It is because of these happenings that the penis is short. Had the chipmunk not gnawed off Trickster’s penis our penis would have the appearance that Trickster’s first had. It was so large that he had to carry it on his back. Now it would not have been good had our penis remained like that and the chipmunk was created for the precise purposes of performing this particular act. Thus it is said. Well—is Trickster really the creator of lilies, potatoes and so on? Or is he the creator only of an illusion that he is? Is he a kind of Adam, an original man, whose morphology determined ours? Or is he the prototype of the infant, who has to work out a fantastic explanation of the origins and limitations of the body which he or she inhabits? The passage certainly supports Jung’s view that during a cycle of such stories ‘the marks of deepest unconsciousness fall away from [Trickster]; instead of acting in a brutal, savage, stupid and senseless fashion the Trickster’s behavior…becomes quite useful and sensible. The devaluation of his earlier unconsciousness is apparent even in the myth.’6 It would seem that involving the Trickster in political discourse does not injure the Trickster. What does it do to our conception of politics? Given the conventionally moralistic nature of most depth psychological analysis of politics, the Trickster, like Machiavelli, often gets a bad press as symbolizing the antisocial personality. Trickster’s mendaciousness and self-deception are placed in the foreground, obscuring his transformative and generative aspects and, in particular, masking the way in which Trickster acts as a sort of yardstick and spur to consciousness. Sometimes people take a rather patronizing attitude, one that is full of knowing laughter at Trickster’s antics, evacuating their political pointedness. Of course, a sense of humor is necessary when relating to Trickster but not for the purpose of depotentiating him. If we try to interpret the Winnebago Trickster Cycle from a conventional psychodynamic angle, the main themes are the absence of a coherent body schema (the mobile penis), projection and splitting (for example, of aggression into the chipmunk), and pathological grandiosity (Trickster as Creator). However, if we recover our sense of irony and suspend judgment for the moment, then these themes lead
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to certain psychological questions which can be seen to have a political flavor—such as the following: Do the erotogenic zones ever constitute a fixed body schema? Human sexual attraction seems to rest on the interdependence and even interchangeability of the zones: A kiss on the mouth, a cute bottom of either sex, big breasts, a well-stuffed wallet. Similarly, is a split object always so pathological? I wonder whether it is always as necessary or desirable for splits to be healed, for loving and aggressive impulses to be brought together, as psychodynamic theory usually suggests? Or is Trickster’s so-called primitive fantasy of a split-off object worthy of positive consideration? Finally, what about Trickster’s grandiosity? After Kohut’s revaluing of grandiosity, how can grandiosity be omitted from any account of human creativity?7 These questions are of interest to analysts and therapists for they contribute to a revision of what constitutes developmental maturity. But, as I suggested earlier, there is a political reading to be made of these psychological questions. For, in revaluing the psychology of Trickster, we revalue the politics of Trickster, maybe even revalue politics itself. Those boring psychodynamic questions about body schema, projection and splitting, and grandiosity have themselves had fascinating political consequences in our own time. If the bodily zones can be quite healthily muddled, then no established order is safe, anything can be muddled: The personal can be political, the fixity of gender roles probed, tyranny challenged (if not always overthrown). If love and hate do not always have to be linked in so-called normal ambivalence, then there is a place for both community spirit and ruthless selfishness. They do not have to be seen as cancelling each other out. If grandiosity is respected and taken seriously, then what is condemned by the wise old man (senex) as immature (puer-like) fantasies of global solutions to the world’s problems can be reframed as an excursion into practical politics.8 We can see that it is not really the grandiosity of such solutions that is the problem, as is so often thought; it is lack of grandiosity that makes for political compliance. Watching the Rumanian revolution on TV in December 1989 (which is when I wrote the first draft of this chapter), watching unarmed workers and students refuse to leave the streets, getting shot while the army fought the Securitate (security police), drove the point home: That grandiosity of aim can be the healthy ground of realizable ambition. Unhappily, the Rumanian people will have further need of their grandiose courage. Trickster’s denial of mortality is a political statement, for the fear of death plays a part in maintaining the political status quo; it is feared that any change will lead to the elimination of life itself. The need to accept the inevitability of death makes one think of the corollary need to
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celebrate life when one has it. This means a passionate yet socially responsible engagement with the erotic and sensual dimensions of life, art, religion, tradition, the life of the intellect, and play. Gray is not the only color. I am arguing that the genuine Trickster should not be omitted from a psychology of the political. I want us to stop accusing others of being Tricksters, using the term only in a derogatory sense when applied to politics. The Trickster is compatible with order and organization on the one hand, and with chaos and fluidity on the other. Trickster’s order is created through chaos; his stabilizing influence on human culture (lilies, potatoes) is an outcrop of his destabilizing influence. Is Trickster the first chaos theorist? Recently, the Trickster has even been given a role in management—the need for ambiguity and paradox, for dissonance in place of coherence, decentralization in place of coordination, have all been recognized. What is more, as John Beebe has pointed out, we should be very careful about not trusting Trickster. If, as usual, we don’t trust him, then he will trick and betray us in an unexpected way and turn out to be absolutely worthy of confidence and trust.9 This facet of Trickster maybe explains why so many fathers, in myth and family, are trustworthy/untrustworthy Tricksters. (We will encounter the politics of the Trickster father in Chapters 6 and 7.) We should not look to the Trickster for signs of individuation, achievement of the depressive position, maintenance of firm boundaries, or consistency. I am all too well aware of what he cannot do. But I am trying to develop a depth psychology of politics in which we are not hamstrung by rigid orthodoxies. We tend to accept without question that what seems the most psychologically mature will turn out to be the most socially useful and true, and to assume that this kind of balanced insight is what constitutes a psychological contribution to politics. Trickster challenges this assumption. Nevertheless, many may want to know whether a political apprehension of Trickster means that anything goes in politics, that every view, no matter how irrational, should be given equal weight, that political tolerance of subjective responses should be infinite, that there is no political morality. I think that political morality incorporates a ceaseless dynamic between a passionately expressed, codified, legally sanctioned set of principles and certitudes (original morality)—and a more open, flexible, improvised, tolerant kind of morality that is basically codefree (moral imagination). These two aspects of political morality are both present in varying degrees in any political system and it is important to resist the temptation to see one of them as somehow more advanced, rising from the ashes of the other. Certitude and
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improvisation are equally valuable and, even assessed from a conventional psychodynamic perspective, they are equally mature. It is easy to see that a political morality based exclusively on improvisation would be too slippery by far and would contribute to a climate in which anything goes. But a political morality based exclusively on principle, law and certitude would be equally problematic (in psychological language, equally ‘primitive’). To begin with, laws are not politically effective on their own; legal codes reflect and depend on the distribution of wealth and power. Moreover, political principle easily becomes ossified and used to gain control over others. Finally, codified political and moral prohibitions do not always work, as the prevalence of theft or adultery demonstrates. Trickster is aware of the existence of moral and political certitudes but they do not constitute his particular trajectory. If you think about it, in moral process exceptions are the rule. There is a Taoist saying: ‘The reason why one does not wear a leather coat in summer is not to spare the coat but because it is too warm. The reason one does not use a fan in winter is not disdain for fans but because it is too cool.’10 Yes, there are fundamental truths (even Truths with a capital letter T), but for each diverse context there is a separate and diverse fundamental truth. Trickster’s political morality is anything but phallogocentric. Even if orthodox political and moral principles are the windmills against which Trickster tilts, he does not deny them their existence as he tries to undermine them. Can the serious, respectable world of economic, political, and psychological theory and organization extend the same emotionally-complex generosity toward the Trickster? I accept that Trickster’s discourse may seem like garbage to some readers. Yet his refusal to say definitively that this is the only reality (for example, an unjust social and economic system) and this is Utopian fantasy (for example, reform or revolution) is in itself a profound, political statement. During the Gulf War in 1991, the image of Trickster kept cropping up, usually in relation to Saddam Hussein.11 While I think it is significant that people are sensitive to the Trickster’s presence when things are changing or transforming, I want to say that Saddam Hussein was not a Trickster. And, in keeping with my overall thesis, I would add that the leaders of the coalition were not Tricksters. For tricksters do not cheat and lie as part of a program; they are not tricky to advance policies; they do not have goals as such. They just lie and cheat because that is how they are and who they are. Citizens in most countries are faced with leaders who lie and cheat as part of a program and to advance policy. Here in the West, we have to learn from the experiences of the dissidents of Eastern Europe and
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the former Soviet Union who developed a profound cynicism that enabled them to read between the lines. We need to acquire this skill urgently. The Trickster exists in political culture but he or she is not acknowledged therein and hence is not theorized about. Hence, instead of Trickster’s admixture of fantasy, practical ingenuity and transformation, we get a kind of repressed and distorted trickster (that’s Saddam Hussein as Trickster, bribery and corruption, dirty tricks). It certainly is not a question of needing more Trickster if more Trickster means more violence, more bribery and corruption, more dirty tricks. It is a question of an integration of a more complete—less repressed and distorted—version of Trickster, and at a deeper level. This would be an integration of the irregular psychology of Trickster into the regular psychology of political theorizing. Just as I have tried to revalue subjectivity in political discourse, I do not want to leave the Trickster on the level of unlicensed stalls selling rural produce by the side of the road in city centers, to use an image familiar in countries as disparate as Russia and Brazil. I do not want to sideline the Trickster like that. After all, the ‘black economy’ or ‘parallel economy’ plays a huge part in the socioeconomic life of developing countries. On the basis of official figures, everyone in a country like Somalia should have starved to death during the 1980s, so low was the official per capita income. Yet at the same time, new taxis regularly appeared on the streets of Mogadishu, and sales of petrol increased every year. Somalia’s measured and stagnating official economy could be seen as an appendage of an unmeasured and dynamic informal economy. The success of informal economies all over the world requires a new kind of psychological explanation or interpretation of economic behavior, one that is informed by the experience of functioning in a black or parallel economy. This is where Trickster comes in, so different from conventional, psychodynamic explanations or interpretations of economic behavior. Psychodynamic understandings are, perhaps, the equivalent of the economic literature on the Third World written ‘from above’ by the World Bank and similar institutions. If we are to integrate the Trickster into political discourse, then we have to explore why he is on the scene in the first place—what is Trickster’s telos, Trickster’s goal? Surely this is more than the promotion of devious and corrupt political practices? Anyway, I am going to try to show that it is.
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HERMES AND THE MARKET ECONOMY Hermes is a Trickster of a different order than the Winnebago Trickster and we grasp something more specific about power politics from his myth. We grasp something about capitalism, the market economy and relations between capitalism and the market because, in a sense, Hermes helps us to rescue the idea of the market from capitalism. Hermes is certainly deceitful and criminal, but, as we will see in the myth, the accent is equally on his constructive and transformative nature. After all, Hermes is a god: Guide of souls to the underworld, the divinity of olive cultivation, athletics, boundaries, commerce, and messenger of the gods. Hermes stands as a liminal presence, on the threshold or boundary of depth psychology and politics, of psychic reality and social reality, of the personal and the political. Hermes also articulates a relationship between the Trickster and the market economy—that particular political phenomenon causing confusion, idealization and splitting across the late twentiethcentury world. In Chapter 1, struggling to get a depth psychological angle on resacralization, we saw that a split in the image of the market economy lessened the chances of converting dream into pragmatic politics. Most resacralizing movements are too one-sided in their evaluation of the market economy and this one-sidedness is also to be found in the enthusiasms of the gung-ho free marketeers. In short, there is a psychological problem with our politics and it is a problem to do with opposites—opposite evaluations of the market. Nobody actually advocates a one-sided view but, as we saw, taking an average does not help us because we miss out on the quite specific and suggestive psychologies of the market as negative and the market as positive. Merely holding those opposites in mind strikes me as far too passive, which is why I want to work out a means of developing each side separately, thus permitting ongoing interplay between them. The tale of Hermes is, in many ways, the pattern of our particular socioeconomic epoch which, like him, is a shape-shifter with numerous names to match its myriad presentations: Late capitalism, late-late capitalism, post-capitalism, post-Fordism, the information culture (Hermes as messenger), post-industrialism, post-modernism, late modernity and so forth. In the myth, we hear of the deceit and lying of Hermes. This inspires associations to the ruthlessness of economic inequality, stock market fraud and insider trading. We also hear of the capacity of Hermes to bargain and negotiate in a compassionate and related style. That inspires associations to the need of any political culture to avoid oligarchic hegemony and gross injustice. Let’s consider each of these in turn, trying to hold on to them in imagination. Then we can
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let the two sides of Hermes come together. This is the first step in an approach to those crude splits in our image of the market economy that could ruin the prospects for resacralization. As I suggested earlier, there is a necessity to overcome both schizoid tendencies to make an either/or split between positive and negative assessments and the temptation to reach an uncritical synthesis. If we can manage that, then we can establish a credible psychological analysis of economic themes that are not usually approached by depth psychologists. This is a tragic lack when one considers the colonial and neocolonial connections between economics, economic inequality and war. We have to try to address the underlying psychology, the depth psychology, of our political compulsions. Can we introduce a depth psychological dimension into a questioning of our dependence on existing levels of consumption, personal mobility and comfort? Difficulties with images of the market economy are of central concern in both West and East as both struggle with their confused reactions to the market economy. In the rich countries of the West, we have to face that, in spite of growing disgust, we are still caught in a collective love affair with a rotten social order and an unfeeling culture. We made our commitment to this order of things a long time ago, and however much we may know intellectually that it does not work for us on the ethical level, however much we may know about the psychodynamics of greed and envy, we cannot seem to break our tie to our lover: economic inequality.12 It is a deep guilt over the undeniable fact of our love of economic inequality that takes us to the cheating heart of global capitalism, the partner we refuse to leave, having never really chosen, remaining locked in an enigmatic relationship whose tensions drive us crazy. Perhaps we should now take a closer look at the mythic patterns of this dilemma. Myths open issues up when they are understood as expressive of mutable external and social forces rather than of immutable internal patterns. Joseph Campbell regarded this aspect of myths as ‘social dreams’ 13 and I would add that myths may also be cultivated as political fantasies that have, over time, shown themselves capable of surviving the inevitable violence done to them by appropriating them for all kinds of purposes. Their ambiguity is their strength. Nevertheless, those who adopt a hyper-kosher academic approach to myth—for example, one that insisted on knowing the precise social origin of a myth on grounds of cultural relativity, or constituting a refusal to listen to a source fatally flawed by its patriarchal roots—are not going to be well pleased with what follows. But, even if myths depend on ideology they are not the same as ideology. Myths alter and new ones come into being; as the historian Ludmilla Jordanova puts it, ‘as stories about human doings
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they are overtly powerful and emotionally dense. In this respect they differ from ideologies…. Hence, to speak in terms of myth need not imply an ahistoricity of any kind, because myths are perpetually put to work in different, historically shifting ways.’ Jordanova argues against the suspicion that exists in academic circles of ‘anything not rooted in particular circumstances [and] historical specificity’.14 As far as interpretation is concerned, myths do not normally admit of an unchallenged reading. They are characterized by ‘density and complexity, imaginative depth and universal appeal…. Myths are on the one hand good stories, on the other hand bearers of important messages about life in general and life-within-society in particular.’15 In The Homeric Hymn to Hermes, on the first day of his life, Hermes leaps up to look for meat. Pausing only to kill a turtle and fashion a lyre from its shell, he steals fifty head of cattle from the