The People's Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance

The People’s Congresses and Governance in China

Two popular interpretations of China persist today. One is that of a decaying Leninist hierarchy and the other of a likely democratizing nation destined for liberal pluralism; this book, on the other hand, provides a balanced assessment of China’s communist rule, its viability as well as its prospect of democracy. The People’s Congresses and Governance in China presents a complex but convincing analysis of the transformation of governance in China. As the first systemic and theoretical study of China’s provincial legislatures, it draws our attention to one of the most promising growth points in China’s changing constitutional order. Through in-depth and first-hand research, the author provides a comprehensive explanation about why the provincial legislatures have acquired institutional maturation and expanded power in the context of Chinese transitional political economy. The book portrays an innovative pattern of legislative development, sums up pragmatic local strategies for market creation, and identifies multiple dynamics for promoting accountability and democracy. Based upon the case study of provincial legislatures, the author reveals the formation of a new mode of governance in China’s national politics: the network structure featuring institutional arrangements and the mohe (co-operation through competition) pattern of interaction abided by the major power players. Adding the biggest legislative system to our understanding of representational institutions, this book will be of interest to parliamentary scholars and parliamentarians who are concerned with the role of parliaments in transitional politics and economies of both post-communist and developing countries. It will also appeal to students and researchers of Chinese politics, governance, and Asian studies. Ming Xia is Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York, USA.

Library of legislative studies Edited by Lord Philip Norton of Louth University of Hull, UK

1 National Parliaments and the European Union Edited by Philip Norton 2 The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe Edited by David M. Olson and Philip Norton 3 Members of Parliament in Western Europe Edited by Wolfgang C. Muller and Thomas Saalfield 4 The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees Edited by Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. Davidson 5 Conscience and Parliament Edited by Philip Cowley 6 Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe Edited by Philip Norton 7 Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe Edited by Philip Norton 8 Parliaments in Asia Edited by Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed 9 The Uneasy Relationship between Parliamentary Members and Leaders Lawrence D. Longley and Reuven Yair Hazan 10 Delegation and Accountability in European Integration Edited by Torbjorn Bergman and Erik Damgaard 11 Second Chambers Edited by Nicholas Baldwin and Donald Shell

12 Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe Edited by Philip Norton 13 The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament Edited by Hilmar Rommetvedt 14 The Unseen Hand Edited by Rinus van Schendelen and Roger Scully 15 The Scottish Parliaments Edited by David Arter 16 From Legislation to Legitimation The role of the Portuguese Parliament Edited by Cristina Leston-Bandeira 17 Cohesion and Discipline in Legislature Edited by Reuven Y. Hazan 18 Southern European Parliaments in Democracy Cristina Leston-Bandeira 19 Executive Leadership and Legislative Assemblies Edited by Nicholas Baldwin 20 The Europeanisation of Parliamentary Democracy Edited by Katrin Auel and Arthur Benz 21 Comparing and Classifying Legislatures Edited by David Arter 22 The People’s Congresses and Governance in China Toward a network mode of governance Ming Xia

The People’s Congresses and Governance in China Toward a network mode of governance

Ming Xia

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Ming Xia All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-69526-7 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10: 0-415-34950-8 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0-203-69526-7 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-34950-5 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-69526-5 (ebk)

For Julia X., My Lovely Daughter 㒭⠅ཇ໣ネ࡯

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface and acknowledgments List of abbreviations Profile of provinces in China (2001)

x xi xiii xvii xix

1

Theme, theory, and the network approach

2

The institutionalization of the Provincial People’s Congresses

25

Institutional linkages of the Provincial People’s Congresses

67

4

Elections and the circulation of the political elite

101

5

Legislative process and consensual politics of local legislation

150

State failure, market failure, and developmental Provincial People’s Congresses

178

7

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

218

8

Legislatures and China’s democracy

247

Appendix 1: list of interviewees

272

Appendix 2: electronic resources for the People’s Congresses

275

References Index

280 296

3

6

1

Figures

2.1 Legislative systems in China 2.2 Size changes of PPC deputies (1954–2003) 2.3 Frequency (times) and duration (days) of the plenary meetings and SC meetings (January 1978–December 1995) in Shanghai 2.4 A typical structure of PPC and standing committee 3.1 Horizontal and vertical relationships among major political actors 3.2 The power net of the PPCs 5.1 Accumulations of local statutes 5.2 Distribution of PPCs based on activities in making local statutes 8.1 Evolution of good governance 8.2 Distributions of developing countries in the coordinate of growth and freedom

36 43 50 55 70 71 154 156 257 260

Tables

2.1 2.2

Size of the PPCs by province (1954–2003) 42 Days of PPC meeting during the decades before and after the Cultural Revolution 45 2.3 Dates of the establishment of PPC standing committees 46 2.4 Frequencies of plenary sessions and SC meetings in the 1980s (since the establishment of these SCs to 1991) 47 2.5 Numbers of SC members, vice chairpersons, and the chairpersons’ group (including secretaries general) 48–9 2.6 The composition of special committees under the Shanghai MPCSC 53 2.7 Expansions of the PPC standing committee staff 58 2.8 Size of staff for local People’s Congresses: 1991 59–60 2.9 Numbers and percentages of local statutes on the self-construction of the PPCs (1979–89) 63 2.10 Numbers and percentages of local statutes on the self-construction of the PPCs (1991–2001) 64 3.1 Number of PPC-sponsored seminars for training local PC leaders in the 1980s 81 3.2 Numbers of initiatives, proposals, and criticisms received by the PPCs from their deputies in the 1980s 86 3.3 Numbers of letters and visits received by the PPCs from ordinary citizens in the 1980s 89 3.4 Numbers of letters and visits received by the PPCs from the ordinary citizens (1980–99) 89 3.5 Magazines and newspapers published by the PPC standing committees for open circulation 94 3.6 Foreign delegations and number of delegates received by Shanghai MPCSC (December 1979–December 1995) 96 4.1 Ranges and numbers of people’s deputies at all levels (1999) 103 4.2 National and sub-national people’s deputies (December 1991) 104 4.3 The profile of people’s deputies of county People’s Congresses 106 4.4 The composition of the thirty PPCs: profile of people’s deputies 109

xii

List of tables

4.5

Backgrounds of the people’s deputies in selected PPCs (6th, 1983–8) 4.6 Backgrounds of the people’s deputies in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hunan (1988–98) 4.7 The composition of the standing committees of the PPCs 4.8 Big personnel turnover during 1983–7 4.9 Age of chairpersons of the PPC standing committee 4.10 PPC vice chairpersons after 1988 and 1993 elections 4.11 A comparison of PPC vice chairpersons of Communist Party and Democratic Parties/non-partisans 4.12 Numbers and percentages of female in the standing committees and vice chairpersons 5.1 Local statutes approved by the PPCs (including those made by MPCs and autonomous prefectures and counties) 5.2 Total numbers of legislation in PPCs by province (1979–99) 6.1 Percentages of economic statutes in total legislation (1979–99) 6.2 Percentages of economic statutes in local legislation (1979–90) 6.3 Percentages of economic statutes in total legislation (1993–9) 6.4 Local statutes concerning economy (November 1979 to July 1990) 6.5 Local statutes concerning externalities and public goods (November 1979–July 1990) 6.6 Survey of law enforcement in the late 1980s 6.7 Local statutes concerning state behaviors (November 1979–July 1990) 6.8 The practice and frequency of review and assessment at the provincial and county levels (30 provinces and 76 counties) 6.9 A list of corrupt PPC leaders (chronological order starting from the most recent date of exposure) 7.1 Rejections of nominations for the provincial governments around 1988 8.1 The correlation between the average GDP annual growth rate (1990–9) and major indicators of governance 8.2 Governance indices of China and average indices of country groups 8.3 The composition of NPC deputies (1983–2003)

111 112 114 116 119 128 129 132–3 155 155 181 181 182 188 194 195 208 210 214 223 258 260 267

Preface and acknowledgments

It has been a long journey from the inception of an idea about the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs) in China to its fruition with this written account. Nevertheless, the two central tasks I initially set out for me have persisted. First, I will present a strong case for the positive evolution of sub-national legislatures resulting from the transition to a market economy and the subsequent economic development over a period of a quarter century (from 1978 to 2003). Second, I will explain why and how the Chinese PPCs have overcome many difficulties – common to local legislatures in a predemocratic regime – to claim the appropriate power and position promised to them by the constitution in Chinese politics but withheld from them by the Party and the executive branch of government. The theory of network analysis plays a central role in helping me to conceptualize my entire research. By applying this theory, I have made some important discoveries. (1) I have found that the PPCs have pursued a network strategy to institutionalize themselves and to expand their power. This, in turn, can be viewed in two ways. First, the PPCs are now characterized by a greater complexity of institutional linkages, which mitigate the tensions between the desires for hierarchical control and democratic pluralism generated within the Chinese state and society. Second, the PPCs have interacted with other power actors (the Party and the executive) by following a strategy of ‘competitive cooperation’ (or ‘cooperative competition’), which I call ‘mohe politics’ (‘co-opetition’ as a result of combining cooperation and competition) in my work. (2) The unique style of the PPCs’ institution and behavior was formed by their leaders’ ingenious improvisation in response to the transformation of governance in the Chinese national political economy. The phenomenon of ‘organizational isomorphism’ is distinctive to the Chinese legislative development. What we find is that the People’s Congresses (PCs) at all levels learn from and emulate one another; they also shape and modify the institutional attributes and behavior of other political actors, namely, the Party organization, governmental system, and judicial organs. (3) Within the constraints of the institutional environment, the political

xiv

Preface and acknowledgments

entrepreneurs of the PPCs have chosen to serve the economy first, only pursuing democracy when the greater institutional environment allowed or tolerated it. Therefore, in addition to the fact that the PPCs have become essential to the transformation and maintenance of governance in China, the change of current governance has pointed to a possible direction for the emerging democracy. To substantiate my major claims, this book is organized into four sections. Chapter 1 highlights the importance of the PPCs in Chinese politics and lays out the theoretical approach of network analysis for my research on the PPCs. Chapter 2 focuses on changes within the internal structure of the PPCs. Chapter 3 focuses on the institutional linkages of the PPCs with its environment, constituency, patrons, and social forces. Chapter 4 focuses on the personnel changes within the PPCs, namely, the rejuvenation, professionalism, and enhancement of the educational level of the leaders, deputies, and staff within the PPCs. While these previous three chapters deal more with the system and institution, the following three chapters are more concerned with the behavior and functional aspects of the PPCs. Chapter 5 focuses on the expanding role of the PPCs in lawmaking and the new style of using power in legislative politics. Chapter 6 focuses on the developmental role of the PPCs, mainly to address both ‘state failure’ and ‘market failure’ in the process of developing a market economy. Chapter 7 focuses on the political conflict among the PPCs, the government, judicial branch, and the party. It shows that legitimated contests and institutional pluralism have emerged in China. My concluding Chapter 8 relates the PPCs to China’s democratic prospects. I argue here that the network probably is a practical means for the Chinese elites to enmesh the disadvantaged population into the new governing system; thus, it may become a strong driving force for China’s democratization. To bring an end to my elongated research, I have chosen 2003 as my cutoff year when all PPCs started a new five-year term. My research relies heavily on a spate of document collections recently published by the NPC Standing Committee (SC), individual PPCSCs, their research groups and inhouse researchers, and the information provided by provincial yearbooks and individual Chinese researchers. In 1998, 1999, and 2001, I conducted interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, Gansu, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Taiwan. In my interviews, I asked open-ended questions, many developed based upon my understanding of the interviewee’s positions and backgrounds. Some interviewees allowed me to tape record our conversation; some allowed me to take notes; but for some, I could only recollect the conversations afterwards and wrote notes. Through these interviews, and by using Richard Fenno’s strategy of ‘soaking and poking – or just hanging around,’ I was able to get a real feeling about the nuts and bolts of the People’s Congresses in China and flesh out the materials and documents I was able to read. In addition, through two cadre-training programs at the College of Staten Island I had the chance to interview visiting officials from Shenzhen and Shanghai. I was also

Preface and acknowledgments xv able to go to these two cities to interview more government officials. My interview notes helped me enormously in interpreting the documents I have collected. Since I promised all my interviewees that I would not reveal their identities, in Appendix 1 I provide a list of coded interviewees. During my decade-long journey I have accumulated too many debts to numerous individuals and institutions. Benedict Stavis, my lifetime mentor, inspired me to work on this subject and suggested me to start with Kevin J. O’Brien’s Reform without Liberalization: China’s National People’s Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change (1990). Professor O’Brien was the first person I contacted for guidance. He encouraged me to conduct a research on the level in between what he has touched – national and village levels. His influence upon this project is visible in every chapter. Meantime, serendipity played a role to introduce me Lord Philip Norton of Louth, editor of the Journal of Legislative Studies and the series editor of Library of Legislative Studies. His personal encouragement and written works have helped me link my work to the literature of legislative studies. I also acknowledge the help I have received from Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Zhiyue Bo, Patrick Cannon, Chien-min Chao, An Chen, Jae-Ho Chung, Richard Deeg, Michael Dowdle, Richard Flanagan, Daniel Kramer, C. L. Kwong, Robin Kolodny, Pak K. Lee, Alvin Magid, Ming Chu-cheng, Robert Osborn, Michaela Richter, Xiaomin Rong, David Shambaugh, Shawn Shieh, Hongjun Su, James Tong, Cathy Walker, Shaoguang Wang, Yan Jiaqi, Dali Yang, Haeseung Yeom, Dingxin Zhao, Suisheng Zhao, and Yang Zhong. In addition, Teresa Hau, Shaohua Hu, Terry Mares, Alan Ponikvar, Martin Rivlin, Yumin Sheng, and Bill Whelan read some of the chapters and provided corrections – both factual and grammatical. They all deserve my sincere and special thanks. All being said, I take sole responsibility for any errors that escaped from my scrutiny. I apologize to my friends if I have not improved my writing to their expectations and standards. I thank the following institutions for their financial and logistical support: the College of Staten Island (the Presidential Office and the Dean’s Office of Humanities and Social Sciences), the PSC–CUNY Research Foundation, the Center for East Asian Studies at Temple University, the East Asian Center at the University of Chicago, the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the George Washington University. This book constitutes a sister volume to my previous book, The Dual Developmental State: Development Strategy and Institutional Arrangements for China’s Transition (2000). Some ideas appeared in that book in a highly condensed form as one chapter (Chapter 6, ‘Developmentalism and the Provincial People’s Congresses’). I acknowledge the generosity of Ashgate Publishers for allowing me to include the contents of that chapter into this book. In addition, Chapter 3 is a revision of my article ‘Informational Efficiency, Organizational Development and the Institutional Linkages of the Provincial People’s Congresses in China,’ published in the

xvi

Preface and acknowledgments

Journal of Legislative Studies (Autumn 1997, vol. 3, no. 3, website: http://www.informaworld.com). Chapter 7 is a revision of my article ‘Political Contestation and the Emergence of the Provincial People’s Congresses as Power Players in Chinese Politics: A Network Explanation,’ published in the Journal of Contemporary China (July 2000, vol. 9, no. 24, website: www.tandf. co.uk). Some contents in Chapter 7 come from my book chapter ‘Government by the People, Chinese Style: the System of Review and Assessment in the Chinese Sub-national People’s Congresses,’ in Chung-Si Ahn (ed.), New Development in Local Democracy and Decentralization in East Asia, Seoul: SNU Press, 2005. Here I express my thanks to Lord Norton, Professor Suisheng Zhao and Professor Ahn as well as the original publishers (Frank Cass, the Taylor & Francis Group, and the SNU Press) for allowing me to incorporate the published materials into my book. This book is dedicated to my lovely daughter Julia, for I want her to taste the joy of learning at her early age. Also I want to say, it was a wonderful time when I worked with her for the past years. MX Staten Island, NY

Abbreviations

ARPC ARPCSC CC CG CPC CPCCC CPPCC DPs DPP FDI FEAC GDP GNP GONGO KMT LMWC LPC LPCPD MDCG MPC NPC NPCPD NPCSC OECD OLV PC PCC PCPD PCSC PD PLA PLAC PPC

Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee of Autonomous Region People’s Congress Central Committee Chairpersons’ Group Communist Party of China CPC Central Committee Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Democratic Parties Democratic Progressive Party foreign direct investment Financial and Economic Affairs Committee gross domestic product gross national product Government Organized Non-governmental Organization Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Law-making Work Committee Local People’s Congress People’s Deputy of Local People’s Congress Municipality Directly under the Central Government Municipal People’s Congress National People’s Congress People’s Deputy of the National People’s Congress National People’s Congress Standing Committee Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Office of Letters and Visits People’s Congress Political Consultative Conference People’s Deputy of People’s Congress Standing Committee of People’s Congress People’s Deputy People’s Liberation Army Political and Legal Affairs Committee Provincial People’s Congress

xviii Abbreviations PPCPD PPCSC PPP PRC PWC RAS SC SEZ SNPC SNL TVE

People’s Deputy of Provincial People’s Congress Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee Purchasing Power Parity People’s Republic of China Prefecture Work Committee Review and Assessment System Standing Committee Special Economic Zone Sub-national People’s Congress Sub-national Legislature Township and Village Enterprise

Profile of provinces in China (2001)

Profile of provinces in China (2001) Name

Capital

Land mass Population (in sq. km) (10,000 persons)

GDP (100 GDP annual million growth yuan) rate (percent)

Household consumption (value: yuan)

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Chongqing Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang National

n.a. 16,808 n.a 11,300 Shijiazhuan 187,700 Taiyuan 156,000 Hohhot 1,200,000

1,383 1,004 6,699 3,272 2,377

2,845.65 1,840.10 5,577.78 1,779.97 1,545.79

11.2 12.0 8.7 8.4 9.6

8,197 6,802 2,785 2,232 2,806

Shenyang 146,000 4,194 Changchun 187,400 2,691 Harbin 469,000 3,811 n.a. 6,340 1,614 Nanjing 102,600 7,355 Hangzhou 101,800 4,613 Hefei 140,000 6,328 Fuzhou 121,700 3,440 Nanchang 166,600 4,186 Jinan 156,700 9,041 Zhengzhou 167,000 9,555 Wuhan 185,900 5,975 Changsha 121,000 6,596 Guangzhou 178,000 7,783 Naning 236,660 4,788 Haikou 33,940 796 n.a. 480,000 3,097 Chengdu 82,400 8,640 Guiyang 174,000 3,799 Kunming 394,000 4,287 Lhasa 1,230,000 263 Xi’an 205,600 3,659 Lanzhou 454,000 2,575 Xining 720,000 523 Yinchuan 66,400 563 Urumqi 1,600,000 1,876 Beijing 9,600,000 127,627

5,033.08 2,032.48 3,561.00 4,950.84 9,511.91 6,748.15 3,290.13 4,253.68 2,175.68 9,438.31 5,640.11 4,662.28 3,983.00 10,647.71 2,231.19 545.96 1,749.71 4,421.76 1,084.90 2,074.71 138.73 1,844.27 1,072.51 300.95 298.38 1,485.48 94,346.4

9.0 9.3 9.3 10.2 10.2 10.5 8.6 9.0 8.8 10.1 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.6 8.2 8.9 9.0 9.2 8.8 6.5 12.8 9.1 9.4 12.0 10.1 8.1 7.3

4,789 3,651 4,029 12,562 4,322 4,772 2,739 4,611 2,500 3,751 2,385 3,183 2,845 5,038 2,247 2,961 2,642 2,466 1,631 2,192 1,939 2,150 1,839 2,443 2,384 2,882 3,611

Notes Values for GDP and household consumption are calculated at current prices. Population, GDP, GDP growth rate, and household consumption are from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002) China Statistical Year Book, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 51–68. The average number of the growth rates of all provinces combined was at least 2 points above the national figure.

1

Theme, theory, and the network approach

Democracy and the market economy are two basic goals of political and economic transitions in developing and post-communist countries. Do legislative institutions and local powers facilitate or dampen democratization and marketization for countries in transition? Or, in other words, are they really relevant to the achievement of these two goals? If some legislative institutions have succeeded in assisting modernization and promoting democratization, we should be curious about the answer to this important question: What kind of strategy accounts for such a success? China’s provincial legislatures – the 31 Provincial People’s Congresses (the PPCs or provincial-level people’s congresses, a usage preferred by some authors) – are excellent institutions to study for the purpose of answering these questions. The PPCs include legislatures in 22 provinces, five autonomous regions, and four municipalities under the direct control of the central government. Even though Taiwan is claimed by China as a province, Hong Kong and Macao after 1997 and 1999, respectively, became special administrative regions, which are given a status roughly comparable (in many aspects higher than) to other 31 provincial units; they are not covered in this study. During the past quarter century of reform, the PPCs have gained both in institutional maturity and in the expansion of their power. In return, through legislation, personnel appointments, supervision, and law-enforcement inspections, they have played a transformative role in the process of creating the Chinese market economy. As yet, the qualitative hallmark of democracy, namely, free and competitive elections for seats in representative institutions, has not yet been reached. In this sense, around the turn of the centuries, China’s legislative development was still characterized by a democratic deficit. However, in the long run, the legislatures as democratic agents are certain to take effect once the electoral connections between the people and parliamentarians are created. Therefore, to assess their current contribution to and their potential impact upon the democratic change in China serves the global goal of promoting democracy. Nobody would deny that China is the next frontier for the new wave of democratic reforms. Given its sheer size, involving the democratic rights of one-fifth of humanity, and its central location in the Eurasian authoritarian bastion, China is also the

2

Theme, theory, and the network approach

largest trophy waiting to be claimed by democrats worldwide. Thus, the Chinese experience of applying legislatures to the transformation both of economics and politics, as having value in its own right, also has a demonstrable value in effecting the democratic prospects for other countries. In this introductory chapter, three main issues will be discussed: the increasing significance of the PPCs in Chinese politics and its changing governance; the theoretical importance of a study of them for comparative politics, legislative studies, and Chinese studies; and the suitability of a network approach to study China’s political governance in general and the PPCs in particular.

Taking the PPC seriously Political scientists have not adequately studied the Chinese Local People’s Congresses (LPCs). In English literature, the studies on Chinese national assembly – National People’s Congress (NPC) – have gradually been covered during the past twenty years or so (Solinger 1982; O’Brien 1990; Dowdle 1997 and 2002; Tanner 1999; Xia 2000b; Jiang 2003). But no systematic work has ever been done on either the collective description of the 31 PPCs or on any single case (some efforts from Lin 1993 and 1992–3; Cho 2002; O’Brien 1994a and 1994b; Chen 1999; Shih 1999; Almen 2005). There has been no attempt to present a structural explanation of their institutionalization and of their expansion of power during the reform era (from the late 1970s to the turn of the new century in China studies). As a result of this inadequacy, political scientists – including many Chinese specialists – have archaic perceptions about the Chinese People’s Congresses (PCs). For example, in his Political Participation in Beijing, a book highly related to the PC system, Tianjian Shi (1997: 34–6)’s interpretation of the PC system is far from being completely accurate. He inadvertently reports PC system as a hierarchic structure that has congresses at the ‘jiedao-level’ (neighborhoodlevel), and nationwide has a four-year term; the candidate to be elected as a mayor has to be a people’s deputy, and so forth. In fact, the PCs do not exist at jiedao-level and only recently the district-level PCs have started to set up liaison offices or work committees at the jiedao-level. A candidate for government post does not have to be a people’s deputy and must not be a member of the SC at the same level. Also, the system of PCs had four-year term for the PPCs and two-year term for the county, city, and township-level PCs only under the 1954 Constitution and related electoral law; since 1975, the term for the PPCs changed to five years, for county, city, and township-level PCs to three years. After 1993, a five-year term has been stipulated for the PPCs as well as county and city PCs; in 2004, it also applies to townshiplevel PCs. Unsatisfied with the inadequate treatment of PCs, senior Sinologist Roderick MacFarquhar (1998) sent out a clarion call to his colleagues in the field: ‘Considerably more research covering a larger number of PPCs would

Theme, theory, and the network approach 3 obviously be needed.’ And since more and more publications on the legislative institutions have appeared in China, time is ripe for conducting a study of the PPCs. However, the choice of PPCs in China as the research focus is not merely due to their absence and therefore the existence of a void in Chinese as well as legislative studies. A number of more important reasons justify a thorough study of the Chinese legislative system. (1) The PPCs have symbolized the most far-reaching point of growth in the current Chinese constitutional order. The PC system in China includes one NPC, 31 PPCs (including five autonomous region PCs – ARPCs and four MPCs – municipal People’s Congresses), and thousands of PCs at the city, county, district, and township levels. The people’s deputies (PDs) totaled 3.2 million in 1999. The PPCs were resumed in 1977 after more than a decade of absence. They have downsized in order to become relatively compact and coherent. At the same time, the staffs have expanded rapidly. Starting from 1979, all PPCs established their Standing Committees (SCs) (the mean number of all 30 provinces was 59 in 1988) to guide their routine operation when they are not in session. From 1982 on, all PPCs had their own special committees to assist in their work. The staff support to the PPCs, in terms of both quantity and quality, has also been rapidly improved. The Chinese legislatures at both the national and sub-national levels have gradually institutionalized and expanded their powers (O’Brien 1990; Tanner 1999). Meanwhile, the stature of PCs in China’s political structure has also been enhanced. Since 1980, the leaders of the PPCs have been entitled to attend the Communist Party SC meeting at the same administrative level. Entering 1992, many powerful leaders became the chairpersons of the PPCs, including several incumbent provincial party secretaries. After the 2003 elections, the practice of having party secretary concurrently serve as the PPCSC chairperson became a national phenomenon. The Chinese parliamentary scholars have arrived at a consensus that, even though the PCs have not fully become ‘steel seals,’ or ‘iron stamps’ (in Chinese politics these metaphors mean hard power and indisputable authority), they are certainly not ‘rubber stamps’ or ‘voting machines.’ At least they are ‘plastic stamps’ or ‘wooden stamps,’ indicating that the authority of PCs is ‘becoming of steel seal’ (Cai and Wang 2001: 2, 86; Cho 2002). The socalled Guangdong Phenomenon in 2000 was quite indicative of this trend (see also Yang 2004: 273–6). Not satisfied with the responses from a government bureau in an inquiry, half of the PPCPDs started a removal process against the deputy bureau director for his ‘weak consciousness of law and the requirements of being a public servant.’ The PPCSC voted down two candidates nominated by the Provincial Government for the bureau director positions. Within seven days, the Guangzhou MPC filed eight inquiries against the municipal government. And the list can go on. One NPCSC vice-chairman was so excited by such ‘fiery attacks’ that he told the Guangdong delegation at the NPC meeting: ‘You Cantonese are too tough!’ (ZGQNB 14/06/00 and 23/02/00; RDZDX 2002: 244–6)

4

Theme, theory, and the network approach

The rising authority of the PPCs is also indicated in the people’s perception of the PCs. According to surveys in 1987 and 1989, the image of the LPCs as a whole has continued to improve. In another survey conducted in 2000, in Zhejiang on the PC system, 68 percent of the respondents believed that the status of PCs had improved during the past two decades (NPC News, 03/01/01). The establishment and development of the PPCs during the last quarter century present a strong case for positive institutional change instead of political decay within China’s political system. (2) The PPCs have become active lawmakers and legislative laboratories in the Chinese lawmaking system. Benefitting from decentralization, an important item in Deng Xiaoping’s reform package, critical changes occurred with respect to the Chinese central– local relationship. A new pattern of ‘federalism, Chinese style’ has emerged as a ‘market-preserving’ mechanism (Montinola et al. 1995; Zheng 1995). At the same time, changes in the Party–state relationship (Hamrin and Zhao 1995, 153–68), cadre transformation (Lee 1991; Manion 1993), and governance at the grassroots level are substantial (O’Brien 1990; Jia and Lin 1994; Ogden 1995 and 2002; Zhong 2002). Local power-holders have become decision-makers. Against this backdrop, the PPCs and their SCs, which were granted lawmaking power in 1979, geared up as legislative working-horses. Legislation had been accelerating since then, changing from five statutes passed in 1977 to 770 in 1994, and even reached 1,371 in 1997 (see Chapter 5). Within a period of 20 years, roughly 8,000 local statutes were passed (some were passed by lower PCs in bigger cities and autonomous prefectures and registered with the PPCs) (Zhou 2000: 106). Meanwhile, the PPCs did not merely rubber-stamp bills from the executive branch. They initiated and sponsored many important bills, many of which later affected national legislation. Given that they are larger than most countries and have acquired regional property (Granick 1990), Chinese provinces have competed with each other as national laboratories in pioneering unprecedented innovations in Chinese governance (Yang 1996). This experimental role is clearly reflected in the activities of the PPCs. For example, the bankruptcy law of foreign companies in Guangdong, the protection of consumers’ rights in Fujian, the protection of women and minors’ rights in Shanghai, the statutes of supervision in several provinces, all preceded national legislation. As a matter of fact, the NPC looked at the experiences of the PPCs to see what lessons might be learned when drawing up national laws. In the post-Mao unprecedented ‘legislative revolution’ (lifa gemin) (Ah 1997; Dong and Shi 1998: 94), the PPCs have played a big part. (3) The PPCs have become an active partner with the central state and local administration in transforming the identity of the Chinese national economy and in promoting a market economic order. When the PPCs resumed and their SCs were established in the late 1970s, the Chinese economic reforms had just started. The evolution of the PPCs intertwined with the economic development, and they had mutual impact

Theme, theory, and the network approach 5 upon one another. Looking at the enormous number of legislative actions, economic development has been the dominant concern addressed by these local statutes. Local economic statutes accounted for 40 percent of all local statutes and 70 percent of all economic laws (national and local) passed before 1996 (Sun and Zhang 1996: 22). ‘Taking the economy as the key link’ is clearly reflected in the large percentage of economic laws. The revolutionary nature of local economic statutes in promoting a market economy can be illustrated by the experimental roles played by both Guangdong and Shanghai. During the 1980s, in response to Deng’s call for more laws, and with some localities acting more quickly and boldly, Guangdong Province took the leading role as a ‘legislative experimental field’ for the market economy. Guangdong, particularly in the special economic zone (SEZ) of Shenzhen, was determined to use forerunning local statutes to lead and guide the creation of a market economy and to safeguard its orderly and smooth functioning (Zhang and Zhou 1999). Entering the 1990s, Shanghai snatched the baton from Guangdong as a legislative forerunner and pushed China’s economic liberalization to new heights. As the ‘trump card’ valued by Deng Xiaoping, Shanghai has been expected highly by the Center to play a demonstrative role for the nation (Xu 1997: 40). On the ‘fast track’ of legislation, Shanghai allowed ‘clashes,’ namely letting new local statutes challenge and replace the old. It also passed a large number of ‘local initiative statutes’ to fill the legal void created by the absence of national laws. For instance, from 1998 to mid-2001 under the 11th MPC, Shanghai passed 28 local statutes, 54 percent of them (15 items) were initiated by Shanghai to cover the issue area where no national laws were available (RMRB 07/20/01). Tian Jiyun (2000: 312–16), the NPCSC Vice Chairman, confirmed that Shanghai has found many new ideas and achieved significant progress in using local legislation to help local development. Meanwhile, Hainan Province, another SEZ, was granted more freedoms to experiment with the concept of ‘small government, big society.’ The central authority directed Hainan only to abide by the ‘general principles’ of national laws, not their ‘concrete clauses,’ in its political and social engineering. As a result, the Hainan PPC created many innovative statutes to adjust the relationship between the state and both the economy and society. These experiments pointed to a novel approach of developing and using civil society to push democratization forward in China (Ru 1998: 85). (4) Located in the middle of both horizontal and vertical relationships, the PPCs provide an opportune window through which to observe the nexuses of legislative–executive, central–local, and local–grassroots relationships. Strongly influenced by Kremlinologists, researchers on Chinese prereform politics tended to be ‘Zhongnanhai Compound watchers,’ who were occupied by ‘the Beijing mentality’ and fascinated by ‘high-level policy,’ as was critically noted by Lynn White. As Chinese politics entered the reform era, White (1998: I–56, II–612) argues, then, the post-revolutionary politics

6

Theme, theory, and the network approach

was ‘largely local,’ because local leaders made policy. Provinces became decision-making centers. The provincial politics also had a significant impact upon the national politics (Goodman 1997; Fitzgerald 2002). The decentralization of the early 1980s made the spatial dimension (the center–periphery perspective) crucial for understanding Chinese politics. In the 1990s, more and more researchers supplemented their works with a provincial angle, or exclusively focussed on provincial politics and its development (Shirk 1993; Goodman and Segal 1994; Goodman 1997; Cheung et al. 1998; Li 1998; Bo 2002). As more power shifts from the central to local levels and from the executive to the legislatures, the PPCs have become a window from which to observe the transformation of political transactions from the Center (party– state) to the legislative and local arenas. Quite logically, the two recent research trends stress that the legislative system and the unit of provinces, respectively, should cross-pollinate. The line (tiao) and the piece (kuai) should dovetail to form a crossroads leading to a deeper understanding of the subtleties in Chinese politics. Murray Scot Tanner (1999) reminds us of the importance of combining the line with the piece in his important work The Politics of Lawmaking in China. Tanner (1999: 57) tries to go beyond the conventional description of ‘a tightly hierarchical, unitary, top-down lawmaking process’ and to take China’s lawmaking system as a ‘multi-arena’ process, with draft laws passing through three major policy-making arenas: the CPC central apparatus, the State Council (China’s cabinet and its ministries); and the NPC system. If we agree that China’s legislative system actually has two levels (the national and the local), by being limited to the horizontal dispersion of legislative power at the national level and leaving out the vertical structure of the Chinese legislative system, Tanner’s (1999: 52–5, 70–1) ‘multi-arena’ perspective, in fact, can only be seen as a ‘de-concentration’ of legislative power, instead of ‘decentralization’ that he intends it to be. So, when the ‘decentralization of legislative power’ was discussed, careful readers would have had the legitimate expectation for some coverage of the sub-national legislatures for a more complete picture of the power configurations in China. As a matter of fact, the PPCs played an explicit role in China’s legislative system. The leaders and the PDs they sent also exerted influence on the legislation and debate within the NPC. Song Rufen (1994), former vice-chairman of the NPC Lawmaking Work Committee, reveals that many national legislative bills were subject to local modification, presented either through the representatives on behalf of local interest within the NPC, or through the LPCs when they were invited to deliberate on those bills (see also White 1998: II–552). In addition, one observer noticed that in the early nineties the PPC chairpersons occupied a higher percentage of the Central Committee (CC) of the 14th Party Congress than did the group of provincial governors or provincial party secretaries (Wang et al. 1996: 152). Furthermore, the PPCs and their members have intervened with some important policy issues. In a milestone study on provincial politics, Jae Ho Chung asks an important ques-

Theme, theory, and the network approach 7 tion, ‘What is the nature of the relationships among the provincial party and government bodies and the provincial people’s congress?’ (Cheung et al. 1998: 439). Presumably, an understanding of these structures and factors may tremendously increase our understanding of power politics in China and affect our ability to gauge its chance of disintegrating or integrating. Some important works have emphasized the importance of the central government in controlling inflation in China (Huang 1996). A case in the Shaanxi PPCSC provided a local angle. In 1989, commodity prices in Shaanxi Province, especially in the provincial capital of Xi’an, exceeded the national average and soon became a hot topic for discussion among ordinary people and PPCPDs. Upon listening to the provincial government’s measures for price control, many PPCSC members were still not satisfied. They informed the provincial government that if the governor could not keep his promise to keep the prices lower than the preceding year, ‘tough measures’ would be imposed. They threatened, ‘If that situation occurs, it will not remain an economic issue. Rather, it will become a political issue.’ Over the next three months, the government cut several projects, and used the money saved to stabilize prices. As a result, the rate of price increases was kept lower than the previous year (see Chapter 6 for more details). (5) The PPCs as representative institutions are a barometer of democratic progress in China. If and when that happens, they surely help us gauge China’s democratization process. The structure and function of legislatures in political systems have always been regarded as an indicator of regime transition. Since the PC system has provided a variety of channels for the Chinese people to participate in politics (Shi 1999), the PPCs are very useful for evaluating whether bottom-up democratization or political decay has crept into the Chinese body politic. Is a ‘creeping democratization’ going on from the bottom up in China? In concluding his preliminary study on the PPCs, Roderik MacFarquhar states: What does all this activity add up to? Are the PPCs beginning to assume an institutional life of their own? And if so, does the development of the PPCs in the reform era amount to ‘democratization’ in any sense? The answer to the second question is almost certainly ‘yes’ and the answer to the third question is almost certainly ‘no.’ (MacFarquhar 1998: 666) In contrast, based on their analysis of grassroots representative assemblies, Melanie Manion, Minxin Pei, and Suzanne Ogden argue that grassroots democratization has been happening in China (Manion 1996: 736–48; Pei 1997: 213–27; Ogden 2002). If we accept their conclusion, the sprouts of democratization certainly should in time eventually spillover to higher-level political institutions. When that happens, it will certainly influence the provincial level before it will influence the national politics. In China’s reform process, the sub-national units have initiated important

8

Theme, theory, and the network approach

reforms and asserted their power, sometimes even in defiance of the central authority (Shirk 1993; Vogel 1989; Jia and Lin 1994; Goodman and Segal 1994). As the PPCs got more institutionalized, legitimated contest and institutional pluralism have emerged in the provincial politics. For example, active legislative oversight cut short the political careers of several provincial governors and vice governors. Cases of political contestation arising from the inquiry and removal processes in Hunan, Sichuan, Zhejiang, and Guizhou indicate that the PPCs have achieved more independence from the executive branch, judicial branch, and the Party organization. Now one effective weapon to check the provincial government and judicial organs (yifu liangyuan: government, court, and procuratorate) is the review and assessment system (RAS) (pinyi zhidu), which was invented by the LPCs themselves and widely used to hold the government accountable (see Chapter 7). Even though direct and competitive elections for the PPC deputies have not been introduced, the elections of themselves and their selection of government officials have, nevertheless, become more competitive by adding multiple candidates and allowing voters and deputies to nominate their own candidates. There have been serious deliberations in a variety of cases as to whether there should be direct elections to the MPCs and the PPCs. A researcher at the Central Party School in Beijing wrote in the June 2001 issue of ‘People’s Congresses Research, ‘We need to expand direct elections as soon as possible. There is absolutely no grounds to say conditions are not ripe for this’ (FEER 11/08/01). If direct and free elections are going to happen in China in the coming one or two decades, they will start on the township and county levels (a realistic goal), and the PPCs will play a crucial role in organizing, coordinating, and supervising them. When they reach the provincial level, it will be time to acknowledge that a democratic revolution has occurred in China (Cai 2002). Moreover, Chinese leadership has defined the PC system as the core of ‘Chinese democracy with socialist characteristics.’ Now both leaders and some intellectuals are promoting this system (‘the people’s congressional government with the NPC model’) as a viable alternative to a Western-style democracy (Cai and Wang 2001; Jiang 2003). It is quite possible that over the long course of promoting democracy, the experience of China will be the basis for a dissenting voice to the discourse about democracy and governance in the West. (6) The PPCs provide a micro-foundation for theory building in comparative politics, legislative studies, and Chinese studies. This proposition needs more elaboration in the next section.

Contextualizing the PPC in theory Comparative politics in general, and legislative studies in particular, have a lot to offer to our understanding of the Chinese PCs. Reciprocally, the Chinese case will enrich our knowledge of political as well as legislative

Theme, theory, and the network approach 9 development. Overall, the legislature is valued mostly for its democratic function with its forms of representation, oversight, decision-making (including lawmaking), and constituency service. For this reason, the empowerment of legislative institutions, and particularly those at local levels, forms the foundation for democracy (Dahl 1971: 226). This observation has been well corroborated by research done on SNLs (sub-national legislatures) in several diverse contexts (Putnam 1993; Downs 1998; Rosenthal 1998). Since legislatures have different roles in different theoretical models regarding a developing and transitional political economy, the legislative development has become a litmus test to evaluate the different approaches in ‘transitology’ (Elster et al. 1998). Specifically, the PPCs enable us to determine if China is following an orthodox liberal strategy, and thus, converging with the West and the new democracies in Eastern Europe and the former USSR; or if, instead, China is following a network mode of governance (such as a developmental state strategy), which promises to shape China into the big dragon in East Asia. The recent history of the West offers two strategies associated with different institutional arrangements for legislatures. Anglo-American experiences gave rise to a liberal model of development. Under the Anglo-American liberal strategy – liberal democracy plus a free-market model – parliamentary democracy and economic development were pursued simultaneously. According to this view, developing sub-national representative governments reflects the core value of representation. The liberal democratic perspective suggests that it is possible to have a symbiotic process of developing legislative and local institutions, on the one hand, and political democracy and a market economy, on the other. This liberal model of development also assumes the compatibility of the major development goals. Political democratization, economic growth, and other social changes are seen as mutually dependent. That ‘all good things go together’ is seen not only as desirable but also attainable. As Karl Polanyi (1975: 139) indicated, to remove restrictions upon the economy and enforce the laissez faire principle in the development of capitalism, England had governed through an exclusively parliamentary legislation. The legislative branch (the Parliament in U.K. and the Congress in U.S., respectively) had played a very crucial role in the modernization process. For the most part, the laws of the Parliament and Congress established a market economy. In contrast, under the Bismarckian–Meiji strategy for a capitalist developmental state, a market economy relied primarily on the administrative decrees and executive orders. Prussian Chancellor Bismarck was notoriously skeptical about the ‘empty talks in the parliament.’ He rather believed in the effectiveness of ‘iron and blood.’ In the mid-twentieth century when a new parliamentary democracy was finally restored in West Germany (which as ‘chancellor democracy’ indicates that a strong executive supremacy was retained), such weariness about the legislative role lingered on. One German scholar (Bracher 1972: 313) wrote, ‘Indeed, the experience of a parliamentary

10

Theme, theory, and the network approach

democracy operating with political and economic successes was something entirely new in the history of German political thought, which had learned from the catastrophes of 1848, 1918 and 1933 to identify parliamentary politics with crisis and collapse.’ During the Meiji Restoration era as well as the post-World War II period, the Japanese restructured their politico-economic system in the image of the Bismarckian model (Johnson 1995: 12). As a result, the legislature deferred to the executive, and democratization was postponed for the sake of economic revival. Because of the influence from Japan, the developmental state theory became the dominant paradigm in East Asia. This model basically assumes that premature empowerment of the legislature means the weakening of state capacity and multiplication of chaos. As for local autonomy, it was as rare as parliamentary power in East Asian nations when they were pursuing economic take-off. In Japan and those countries following the Japanese model in the early stages of development, the legislatures and local power were suppressed while the authority of the central executive and bureaucracy was emphasized. To a large extent, administrative guidance pushed forward economic growth. The role of both the legislature and local government was seen as negligible. Parliamentary democracy was not attempted until the economic prosperity had been achieved. Meaningful local autonomy and democracy did not begin until the 1990s (Johnson 1982 and 1996; Deyo 1987; Haggard 1990; Wade 1990; Kim and Zacek 1993). Scholarly interest in how legislatures relate to development, both politically and economically, evolved through two major periods from the 1960s to the turn of the centuries. At that early period of sixties and seventies, political scientists focused on the role of legislatures in the modernization and nation building in the Third World (Kornberg and Musolf 1970; Smith and Musolf 1979). This batch of literature tended to argue for that in the late developing nations the simultaneous pursuit of legislative development, decentralization, and economic growth might lead to political decay and economic stagnation. The authoritarian development model (such as the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime and the developmental state model) presupposes conflicts arising from pursuing all these goals simultaneously. The so-called conservative legislature hypothesis argued that, because of their responsiveness to provincial and conservative constituency interests, legislatures ‘typically obstructed economic reforms’ in modernizing societies. According to Robert Packenham, ‘Strengthening legislatures in developing countries would, in most cases, probably impede the capacity for change which is often crucial for “modernization” and economic development’ (Kornberg and Musolf 1970). More recently a reversal of fortune has happened to the parliaments worldwide. As the third wave of democracy started, communism collapsed in the European region, and developing countries had to accept political conditionalities in exchange for economic assistance. Part of the conditionalites imposed from the ‘Washington consensus’ was to promote democratic

Theme, theory, and the network approach 11 institutions in the Third World. As a result, the last decade of the twentieth century witnessed ‘an age of parliaments’ (Copeland and Paterson 1994: 1). To some degree, Juan Linz’s twin articles that appeared in 1990–1 – ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’ and ‘The Virtues of Parliamentarism’ – symbolically indicated this change (Diamond and Plattner 1996). In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union region, a liberal line of thought has consequentially underlined their reforms. They have been advised to pursue simultaneously marketization and modernization, and parliamentary democracy and regional autonomy (Kim and Zacek 1993; Remington 1994). Many democracy promotion projects funded by West-based institutions tend to take this ‘simultaneity’ assumption for granted. At the end of 1993, the free elections both at the national and sub-national level had happened in the post-communist countries in Europe (Remington 1994: 13–14). The global revival of democracy and active legislatures in the 1990s rekindled scholarly interest to focus on the role of legislatures in democratic transition and consolidation, and in economic transformation (Copeland and Paterson 1994; Close 1995; Crawford 1995; Hahn 1995; Olson and Norton 1996). Many Third World and post-communist countries, where there was a new surge of legislative development during the last decade of the twentieth century, have actually confronted a dilemma of parliaments. On the one hand, the transitional societies were in a dire need for economic prosperity and wealth; on the other hand, in response to both domestic and international pressure and expectations, the political elite in those societies had to make freedom and democracy a top priority. The impulses of modernization and democratization could not be easily reconciled, because often they generated conflicting demands and responded to diverse dynamics. Generally speaking, the modernization impulse calls for energy and efficiency from the government, which often means a strong executive and a minimal legislature. In contrast, the democratization impulse puts a stress on participation and representation, which implies the empowerment of the legislature and the accountability of the executive to the people as well as to the legislature. Because of an antagonism between the role of the legislature in the emerging democracy and its role in the modernization process, many countries decided to subscribe to the authoritarian development model. China’s reforms initiated by Deng in 1978 were conspicuously characterized by two major policies originating from the CPC leadership – decentralizing power to the localities and to the economic enterprises, and calling on the legislatures out of obscurity to offer help. Although political repression has persisted, the marketization process in China has been marked by the institutionalization of legislatures. The recent pattern of legislative development in China prompted a sharp debate. Talking about the recent developments within the PPCs, some Westerners have simply written them off as the empty rhetoric of authoritarian Chinese leaders and Party propagandists. Regarding the PCs (their elections, institutional arrangements, and operations), Barrett McCormick sees the divergence between public discourse and

12

Theme, theory, and the network approach

private experience as a fundamental hypocrisy within the Leninist state of China. He believes, ‘it is apparent that China’s present electoral and parliamentary arrangements are fairly typical of post-Stalinist Leninist states’ (McCormick 1996: 43). On the one hand, the communist leaders make extravagant claims regarding the PCs as the highest democracy and mostly representative organ; on the other hand, they keep tight control over the public sphere and make elections meaningless and PCs powerless. McCormick believes that the weakness of the Chinese PCs indicates a resemblance between China and the East European socialist countries before their collapse (McCormick 1996: 29–53). For authors such as McCormick, based on the similarities of the power structure of China and other former communist regimes, there seem to have enough reasons for people to believe that ‘China might also follow that path’ (McCormick 1996: 29). Legislative empowerment in China indicates the syndrome evident before the Soviet Union collapsed and thus, indicates a potential development towards parliamentary democracy, but only after an apocalyptic destruction. In stark contrast, many Chinese leaders and propagandists claim that the system of PCs symbolizes a superior type of democracy – the ‘democracy of PCs’ (renda minzhu) – to the Western-style democracy – a parliamentary democracy. Contrary to the Western liberal model, China is also widely believed to be following the developmental state theory. Indeed the Chinese leadership itself openly stated that they were emulating the East Asian countries, where this model was widely practiced. Yet the developmental state theory fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the coexistence of legislative activism and decentralization with the miraculous economic growth and marketization in China. Therefore, within the framework of East Asian developmental state theory, we have to assess whether these two institutional modifications of legislative resurgence and local power are conducted at the price of a diminishing state capacity, therefore, may have disqualify China as a practitioner of East Asian developmental state model. If not, then it is worth our effort to find out how China might have been able to reconcile the tensions between the Meiji strategy and the activism of local legislatures. The pattern of legislative development in China during the last quarter century poses a challenge to both the liberal and the authoritarian model of development. Clearly, the Western liberal strategy and Asian developmental state model diverge on how to conceptualize sub-national legislatures in the process of development. The Chinese reformers took a big gamble when judged by either the Western liberal approach or the Asian developmental state model. It seemed that the Chinese leaders were to prove many Westerners wrong when they predicted that once decentralization and legislative institutionalization proceeded, the demise of communist authoritarian rule would be near. They also defied the taboo in the Asian developmental state model and put it on its head by introducing local legislatures for the purpose of state capacity building. The really amazing point of the Chinese iconoclasm is that China used a Western liberal institutional instrument (repre-

Theme, theory, and the network approach 13 sentational organ) for an Asian developmental policy goal (stability and growth). This warrants an explanation, which I believe is illuminated by a network analysis of China’s governance. The two extreme views by the Western critics and Chinese propagandists have distracted people away from making a serious and objective assessment of the Chinese PCs. Western skeptics refuse to look back to the past to consider certain historical conditions and constraints. Judged according to the current achievements of Western democracies, instead of according to the historical context of China, they tend to underestimate and under-appreciate the political development in China. In contrast, the current Chinese leaders and propagandists stubbornly refuse to look forwards, and refuse to admit the inevitable coming of an authentic democracy to China, hoping that their juggling could provide a defense against an attack of a new wave of democracy. The network perspective I choose for my research on the PCs is located in both China’s past totalistic control and the future democracy. Considering the past authoritarian tradition, the PPCs so far have traveled a long distance away from it. And yet, considering the future democracy to come, the PPCs still have a long way to go. Hopefully, the PPCs can be a feasible bridge, through a network mode of governance leading China from its authoritarian past to its democratic future.

A network mode of governance In his popular textbook on China, John Bryan Starr (2001: 69) notes that ‘consensus, bargaining, networking, and face-saving’ are four characteristics of the political process in this country. Network (guanxi or wangluo in Chinese) has long been a major feature of China’s culture and society (Pye 1968 and 1985). Its depth, pervasiveness, and resilience have been proved repeatedly by its ability to survive from the most radical social revolutions (especially communist social engineering by the state and the Party) in Chinese history. During the past two decades in reform China, a national phenomenon of ‘enormous webs with enormous spiders’ has swept every corner of Chinese society. Private individuals have become more open and willing to participate in networking and gift-exchanges in the countryside and urban centers as well as in the areas in between (Yan 1994; Yang 1994; Kipnis 1997; Wilson 1997). Businesses, especially those from the overseas Chinese and non-state sectors (private, foreign joint ventures as well as township and village enterprises – TVEs), have been relying heavily on personal connections and particularistic favors to get business done (Weidenbaum and Huges 1996; Dickson 2003). Cities, such as Xiamen and Shenzhen, have pursued a development strategy of linking itself with both overseas capital and inland cheap labor (Wank 1999; Xia 2000a). The floating population (the migrant workers) also has relied on primordial ties based on blood lineages and connections based on common natal residence to gain information on employment and to provide mutual assistance

14

Theme, theory, and the network approach

when struggling to move up in a far-away strange land (Solinger 1999). Many political organizations also have been weaving institutional linkages (Zheng 1995). Political elites in China’s central government have reportedly relied on ‘Qinghua Connections’ or ‘The Shanghai Gang’ to distribute power (Fewsmith 2001; Li 2001). The success of the Falun Gong as a national movement could be attributed to its use of network as its organizational form as well as its strategy for organizational development (Xia and Hua 1999; Tong 2002). Even organized crime groups – most notoriously the Fujian smuggling rings – have organized themselves into networks and connected themselves with state agencies, whose officials act as their protective umbrellas and patrons of crime network (Chin 1999). For the past decade or so, significant contributions to studies on China’s networks and networking have come from anthropologists (Yan 1994; Yang 1994; Kipnis 1997), sociologists (Bian 1994; Bian and Ang 1997; Wank 1999), economists (Hamilton 1991) as well as political scientists (Wilson 1997; Xia 2000a). To make a bold generalization, cultural and sociological studies tend to analyze network (guanxi) at the individual level, treating networks more as a personal strategy (as Mayfair Yang puts in her wellrecognized book subtitle, ‘The art of social relationships’) in the institutional environment of hierarchy (either in the family, society, or bureaucracy). In addition to treating guanxi more as an instrument in politics, e.g., a particularistic relationship based on primordial ties such as family, clan lineage, and common experiences, many political scientists also consider guanxi as a pattern of personalized organizational behavior, or personal behavior derived from roles that have an institutional basis. In this sense, guanxi politics is juxtaposed to informal politics, namely, politics that is not legally institutionalized, putting a stress on its fluidity and amorphous character (Dittmer et al. 2000). However, in Yunxian Yan’s (1994) study, social networks are emphasized as ‘quasi-groups.’ As an organizational form, they fulfill the function of reconstructing people’s identity. Nevertheless, only in economics, has a network been treated seriously as an organizational form, a strategy for organizational development, and a mode of governance – as in network capitalism – distinguishing it from both market and bureaucracy modes of governance in organizing economy. As defined by Oliver Williamson (1996: 11, 378), ‘Governance’ is ‘an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternative modes of organization. The objective is to effect good order through the mechanisms of governance.’ A governance structure is thus usefully thought of as ‘an institutional framework in which the integrity of a transaction (or related set of transactions) is decided.’ There are often three different strategies available for consideration: (1) within the hierarchy (the firm, or any other organization), (2) through the market, ‘the arena in which autonomous parties engage in exchange,’ or (3) a third hybrid strategy, such as the networks strategy, offering a middle ground or a third way to the dichotomy of hierarchy versus market (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994: 368–402; Williamson 1996: 378).

Theme, theory, and the network approach 15 With regard to purely theoretical models, a market mode of governance features an arena where rational, autonomous, and atomistic actors engage in an exchange. The actors are numerous and equal; the arena is open and pluralistic; and the relationship among the actors is contractual and based on negotiations, bargains, calculation, and voluntary action. Because of competition among pluralistic actors, the pattern of interaction tends to be more confrontational. The frequent use of a contract sanctioned by a third party – the court – also makes this relationship litigious and easily subject to change in the next round of contractual negotiation. But it has one great advantage: there is an increase in incentive intensity for actors when compared to the other two modes. Under a hierarchical mode of governance, transactions happen under a unified ownership and are subject to administrative control. The actors are unequal and have to follow a power relationship, most likely a superior–subordinate one. The principal or the owner in this hierarchy can act as its own court to solve conflicts. Since this system encourages control and obedience, it has greater stability and predictability and follows a simpler decision-making process. The pattern of interaction tends to be more cooperative and less confrontational. However, it has a big drawback – the actors have less autonomy and lower incentive intensity (Williamson 1975 and 1996). In contrast to the market and the hierarchal modes of governance, the network mode of governance builds strong ties and linkages among actors and organizations. Because of this interdependence (independence with respect to the market mode, dependency with respect to the hierarchy), the network mode encourages consultation and coordination as a way of preempting conflicts, or as a way to solve them once they happen. Also, this mode provides space for the development of social capital such as trust, reciprocity, and personal friendship. As a result, the pattern of interaction under a network mode is best captured by a new term: ‘co-opetition.’ In their book with ‘co-opetition’ as its title, Adam M. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff (1996: 39), two business professors from Harvard and Yale respectively, argue, ‘There is a duality in every relationship – the simultaneous elements of cooperation and competition. War and peace. Co-opetition.’ The concept of a network is applied in my research at three levels. First, it is an organizational form. A social network is a set of relationships, a web of ties, or a collection of linkages among units (Wasserman and Faust 1994). According to Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, A tie between actors has both content (the type of relation) and form (the strength of the relation); indeed any type of social relation can be mapped as a tie. Thus, organizations typically are embedded in multiple, often overlapping networks – resource exchange networks, information networks, board of director interlock networks, and so on. (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994: 377)

16

Theme, theory, and the network approach

Second, it is a mode of governance, which indicates a higher level of abstraction than that of a regular organization. Although it is itself an institution, the network as a mode of governance also constitutes an institutional environment for a multitude of institutions; namely, it imposes itself as a choice-set (providing both opportunities and constraints) or as a matrix upon institutions to define the parameters for their behavior and to structure their incentive for making strategic moves. In this sense, networks are a kind of organizing principle, a way of governing relations among actors involved in political, social and economic transactions. Third, the network perspective is also a method of social analysis in the genre of institutionalism, particularly in its game theoretic school. The actor here is an entity and an organization. The ‘unit of analysis in network analysis is not the individual, but an entity consisting of a collection of individuals and the linkages among them.’ As two authorities on this method point out that ‘network methods focus on dyads (two actors and their ties), triads (three actors and their ties), or larger systems (subgroups of individuals, or entire networks)’ (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 5). One advantage of this analysis is that it can be carried out on multiple levels – from individuals, to organizations and then to nations (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994: 377). To study the origin, evolution, attributes, behaviour, and actors of organizations, a social network analysis looks at ‘webs with spiders.’ Webs are the institutional attributes; spiders are the actors. A network approach therefore can be applied on two levels in my work: at the level of institutional arrangements, I intend to look at relations and linkages among actors and organizations. At the behavioral level, I intend to look at the pattern of interaction among actors. One important assumption in institutionalism is that institutional arrangements impose constraints upon actors (e.g., Knoke 1990; Steinmo et al. 1992). Thus, I also look at how the ‘web system’ shapes the behavior of actors, therefore, producing a different pattern of interaction from those under either a hierarchical or market mode. A network environment tends to generate a mixture of competition and cooperation, in the form of either competition through cooperation, or cooperation through competition. If I argue that a social network analysis has explaining power in China studies, I would expect to encounter pervasive linkages and ties within institutions and the phenomenon of co-opetition in the pattern of interaction among actors. Coincidentally, Chinese scholars and politicians often use ‘mohe’ to characterize the pattern of interaction in Chinese politics. In Chinese, ‘mohe’ combines two words: ‘mo’ means ‘friction’ between two objects or conflict between people; ‘he’ means ‘cooperation’ or ‘congruence.’ ‘Mohe’ is often interpreted as a ‘grinding process,’ which happens in new cars or machines when new parts adjust themselves in order to accommodate each other and work in harmony. ‘Co-opetition’ (a combination of cooperation and competition) accurately connotes the crucial meanings of ‘mohe’: It is a process in a time frame. Friction exists, but it does not grind an entity (a group, a

Theme, theory, and the network approach 17 system, or machinery) apart. Rather it helps each part moderate its jarring quality and form an everlasting coexistence. Since all actors lose part of their original qualities that cause disharmony in this situation, there is no actor with an absolute hegemony to impose its will upon other actors completely; it is hard to argue who is a winner and who is a loser. The more important feature is the reciprocation of cooperation and mutual restraints. Therefore, in my coming chapters, I often use ‘co-opetition’ and ‘mohe’ interchangeably. The network analysis enables us not only to expose the linkages between political actors (individuals and institutions), but also to study the impact of these linkages upon the organizational behavior of these actors. Its conceptual versatility allows us to change the focus of analytical lens from individual actors, to institutions at all levels, and finally, to the fundamental domestic order in China. At the highest level, it can also help us understand the global nexus between China’s development and the world system. In terms of issue areas, it better explains the institutional as well as behavioral patterns within and between the political realm, the economy, and society. It has become an effective analytical tool helping us to understand the form, development strategy and behavioral patterns of China’s most important institutions. Its superiority over many other competing models in China studies comes from its theoretical versatility, its inclusiveness and comprehensiveness. The PPCs are to be presented as a clear case that shows the correspondence between the theoretical propositions in a network analysis and the actual function of Chinese institutions.

Changing political governance in China Reviewing the evolution of official thinking from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin, we can clearly see the full manifestation of the central logic in postMao’s governance taking the form of a network mode. As Mao’s rigid and total hierarchical control was discredited, Deng accepted the failure of the old system and tried hard to rebuild a new mode of governance for the Communist Party. Looking over Deng’s shoulder as the transition was just initiated, we might not be able to see a linear pathway ahead; however, now with hindsight, what Deng’s pragmatic idea of ‘crossing river by groping the stone’ has left behind a sensible trail of transformation, leading China to a network mode of governance. This was Deng’s instinct choice, also partially due to China’s traditional culture and the influence of strategies and capital from its East Asian neighbors (see Orru et al. 1991; Evans 1995; King 1995; Castells 1996; Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997; Woo-Cumings 1999; Xia 2000a: 61–5, 196–201). Clearly, for the past quarter century, the transformation of governance has been a process of weaving networks. Eventually, a network mode of governance was formed. First and foremost, to ensure the centrality of the Party in China’s political, social, and economic life, Deng was deeply concerned of transformation costs (inefficiency) in economic production, transaction costs in bureaucracy,

18

Theme, theory, and the network approach

and transition costs in reform when he guided China to a new direction. Deng wanted the Party to retreat from the micromanagement of daily social and economic affairs in order to create more institutional autonomy. He cautiously introduced the market mechanism into the Chinese economy. He strenuously tried to husband the power resources, since some of them were grounded in the traditional Maoist system, he did not want to tear down the communist colossus. At the same time, bargaining and exchange, as a new form of power use in Chinese politics, was given more legitimacy in the power game. But this does not mean that he wanted to give up the ‘advantages and strong points of the traditional system’ – namely, the general efficiency in control and transformation. To guarantee that the system maintenance has been better taken care of, the autonomy of the Party must be coupled with the Party’s embeddedness within the economy, society, and other power organs (such as the government, the PCs, and the judicial branch). Thus, during the past three decades the Center (from Deng to his successor Jiang Zemin) allowed other actors to enjoy more autonomy and to play independent power games. But, all smaller games (in the different systems or regions) had to be nested in the giant national endgame (Tsebelis 1990). The Party Center has been the biggest spider occupying the central place of the biggest web, which is also connected with so many smaller webs with many lesser spiders (see B. Cumings in Woo-Cumings 1999). All in all, through occupying the strategic nodes intersecting many games and increasing its betweenness through which other actors and activities had to pass, the Party has strengthened its centrality in this transformation of governance. Any concessions from the Party Center in the power game were handsomely compensated in the form of relational and structural power – one important source of influence. More importantly, this new positioning has enabled the Party to direct itself to focus on these select roles: the core leader of the entire country, the chief designer for China’s transition, the guarantor of the entire system, the coordinator of power relationships, the integrator of the entire society, and finally, the supervisor and umpire aloof above all power players and social entities. Looking from the perspective of power, the Party Center played fewer power games involving the direct use of force, violence, and control through fear. The game evolved and power came to be exercised in a variety of ways. Coercion and violence were retained, but in the spirit of a selective targeting strategy (Xia 2000a: 218–21), they are often used as a last resort in times of crises (for example, to safeguard the centrality of the Party Center in governance in the 1989 crackdown) or limited to a narrowly and clearly defined issue (the Falun Gong challenge) or regional areas (the 1989 martial law in Tibet and the intensifying crackdown on separatists in the disguise of an anti-terror war in the Xinjiang Muslim areas). Manipulation and persuasion increased their use through ideological reconstruction, nationalism, empowerment of government agencies, the PCs, and government-organized non-

Theme, theory, and the network approach 19 governmental organizations (GONGOs), but most of all, through the centrality of Party power in the power game. By weaving linkages, the Party Center remained the privilege to be kept informed about the developments in any game, and retained the ability to reshuffle the cards to restore the equilibrium if the Party Center thought the equilibrium in the giant national game (in the communist parlance, the general situation – daju) is disturbed. Through the use of institutional autonomy, the Party Center tried to ensure its insulation and maximize its ability to resist the penetration from social forces and safeguarded its cohesion and capacity. Through embeddedness, it extended its tentacles into all aspects of socio-economicpolitical life and improved its information efficiency and ‘the reach of the state’ (Shue 1988). A scholar affiliated with a Shanghai governmental think tank lauded and promoted such a new mode of social control under the Jiang era: Under the old planned economy, social control was one-dimensional control, carried out from top to bottom. As the socialist market economy opened up space for people’s activities and interaction, the economic, political, and ethical relations among the people and the entire social relations of interest have become an interconnected and complex network. The coming of the Internet has further thickened social networks. Facing new social networks, the Party’s control over society has to be all-dimensional and turns to a network mode of control. Nevertheless, the network mode of social control does not mean chaotic and vague control. It could have a clear goal regarding the control over a certain area, sector, or relationship. Only based on the network control as well as the coupling of one-dimensional control and all-dimensional network control, could the CPC be able to exercise thorough and effective social control during the transitional period. (Zhou 2002: 500) But most important of all, Jiang Zemin, the core leader of the Chinese ‘Third Generation Leadership,’ explicitly summarized the fundamental logic for leadership of the Party in Chinese society and revealed its nature of network mode. In an important speech to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the CPC founding on July 1, 2001, Jiang said the following: [We] should abide by the principle of ‘assuming overall responsibility and coordinating all sides’ [zonglan quanju, xietiao gefang]’ to strengthen and perfect the system of Party leadership, to improve the mode of leadership and the way of ruling. We should guarantee party committees the role of the core leadership. At the same time, we should also allow the PCs, government, the PCCs, people’s organizations and other entities fully to undertake their functions. The party committees should consolidate its leadership over the PCs, government, the PCCs, and

20

Theme, theory, and the network approach people’s organizations through scientific, formalized, and institutionalized mechanisms. (Jiang 2001: 171–2)

From the vantage point of Chinese party-state, the new network mode of governance serves its fundamental goal of stability and unity. ‘Stability’ is the ideal state of the people, ‘unity’ the ideal state of the ruling elite. The party-state elites fully understand that their disunity invites instability among the people. The ruling elites also claim a possible harmony of interest and try to co-opt various social forces into becoming part of an organic whole (a ‘harmonious society’ under the current leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao). A core has to be created for the purpose of maintaining unity within the leadership and the society. Under the core, a division of labor (fenggong) and checks and oversight (zhiyue jiandu) are instituted at the administrative level. To preempt conflicts from escalating out of proportion as well as to gather information from the society, the party-state also has to sponsor the creation of ‘mechanisms for democratic consultation and channels for social dialogue.’ The Center allows other institutions to develop institutional linkages, both horizontally and vertically, to facilitate information flow. What has occurred is a differentiation and specialization of functions within the Chinese political system. The distribution of resources and capacities also has become more dispersed. To integrate all actors and institutions into a complex whole, the Party Center reserves to itself the privilege of occupying the strategic apex, from which it can become embedded in other institutions. It is able to interfere with pivotal issues through arbitration, coordination, and supervision. This helps to resolve conflict. Here the goal of stability is not to eradicate conflicts, but to manage them, keeping them at a healthy level. They have to have their issues kept within a limited scope and geographical region, because the Party knows well that social unrest creates cleavage within the leadership that could lead to a power struggle. If the Party leadership is subject to challenge at times, it must use sanction, and occasionally, it must resort to violence. Often, the justification for the partystate to use violence comes from the central argument in the CPC rule: economic development requires stability and unity. Understandably, the network structure of Chinese governance imposes a choice-set upon the actors. As an incentive structure, it encourages or discourages certain behaviors, and rewards and penalizes certain actors. Most likely, horizontal networks provide solidarity while vertical networks provide protection. Both generate loyalty and security for the actors involved in the network. In addition to many already known functions, networks can also distribute resources, deepen trust, and reduce risks and unpredictability. They have been proven the safest and most effective organizational form for social actors to coordinate and cooperate for material and non-material purposes. They fulfill the function of empowerment. Network mode of governance tolerates competition but facilitates compromise. Therefore, it fosters

Theme, theory, and the network approach 21 pluralism in politics and society. More important, it empowers any actor who has resources to engage in an exchange. In today’s Chinese social setting, power resources certainly have given officials the upper hand in the exchange process. The scarcity of capital in the society also has empowered the moneyed class. The importance of technology and information in modern market economy redeems the motto ‘Knowledge is power’ in China. Intellectuals have increasingly gained more power. For the business people and intellectuals this is certainly a process of inclusion, a democratization process. Many workers and peasants do not have enough resources to engage in the exchange process. This does not mean that this process per se is undemocratic. It only means that these people have not equipped themselves with valuable chips. In my concluding chapter I will argue that real votes can be viewed as political currency for including and empowering many Chinese who do not possess other kind of strategically important resources. From the network analysis, we can identify the dynamics of the Chinese democratization process. The network mode of governance has been actually leading China toward this direction. Therefore, we can say, the Chinese system has got a beat. As one Disney cartoon character from Oliver and Company said, ‘Once you hook into it, you can do anything.’ Those who are adept at weaving connections and utilizing multiple channels are bound to thrive under a network mode of governance. This is particularly true for those who occupy strategic positions from which they are able to control scarce power resources, and for those who are willing to reciprocate or compromise in a give-and-take situation. Those who intend to challenge the centrality of the party-state, who resort to confrontational strategy, or who control no strategically valuable resources, are destined to be marginalized and wilt. The changes in Chinese politics during the past quarter century are, for the most part, comparable to the worldwide efforts to bring about good governance. According to the World Bank, good governance is causal factor for economic development and can be measured by constructing six aggregate indicators: ‘political stability,’ ‘government effectiveness,’ ‘rule of law,’ ‘regulatory quality,’ ‘the control of corruption,’ and ‘voice and accountability’ (Kaufmann et al. 1999). Considering the enormity of its demographic and geographic size, mounting pressures generated from a dynamic society, and the simultaneity of a triple transition (social, economic and political), the odds are against China constructing good governance and reaping its positive impact for economic development. However, from 1980 to 1999 China enjoyed the highest average annual GDP growth rate in the world. It took only 17 years under Deng Xiaoping’s stewardship to see its GNP per capita triple. Nobody would deny that this great achievement was the result of multiple causes. Nevertheless, the Chinese leaders should not be denied credit for their meticulous attention to the issue of governance, their ceaseless efforts to juggle its competing factors (sometimes this competition ran out of control), and the relatively skillful management of the tensions arising from this competition.

22

Theme, theory, and the network approach

Interestingly enough, Chinese top leadership called on the PCs to focus on and to serve the Chinese economic development through their active involvement in improving the six major indicators of governance. Qiao Shi, Chairman of the NPCSC (1993–7), accurately articulated what the Chinese political leaders had expected from the PCs: The PCs and their standing committees (SCs) at all levels should persistently concentrate on the central task of economic construction. By diligently fulfilling their responsibilities authorized by the constitution and other laws, they should steadfastly treat the strengthening of socialist democracy and legal construction as their most important work. Also, they should guarantee that the people are the master of the country. They should promote reform and openness and facilitate the development of modernization. The process of developing a socialist market economy is parallel to the process of building up socialist democratic politics. These two should work together and be well coordinated. By doing these, we can better develop the force of production and demonstrate the superiority of a socialist democracy. However, to build a socialist democracy must proceed from with our reality. It must be orderly and gradual and along the track of socialism. . . . The pursuit of democratic politics must obey and serve the fundamental themes of reform, development, and stability. . . . The work of the PCs and their SCs should be judged by whether they serve the development of productive force, increase the overall state capacity, and improve the people’s living standard in our socialist country. (Qiao 1994) The PCs have responded to these and other calls from the leadership with strong enthusiasm and activism. There have been five distinctive periods within which the emphases of the PCs varied. Before the early 1980s, the PCs focused on ‘legislating economic laws and regulations;’ entered the mid1980s, ‘political stability’ took a prominent position; before and after 1989, ‘anti-corruption’ became the top priority; during the mid-1980s, ‘creating a market economy’ took precedence; in the late-1990s, ‘rule of law’ and ‘creating a state under the rule of law’ was at the top agenda for the PCs. In this long evolutionary process, one thing has been constant: The pursuit of political democracy was always carefully orchestrated to serve, instead of disturb, economic development and growth. From the perspective of governance, during the past two decades, China has focused on political stability and government effectiveness, avoiding the ways taken by Russia and the former Soviet republics. China has chosen a road less traveled by post-communist transitional nations as well as by developing nations. Therefore, this transformation of governance, although significant, has been at variance with American mentality and expectation, and it has run into difficulty to be

Theme, theory, and the network approach 23 recognized by Western observers. The Western general public’s unfamiliarity with the network mode of governance is partially responsible for their lack of sympathy for and confidence in China’s strategy.

Conclusion According to the structural analysis, which Avery Goldstein (1991) aptly applies to the analysis of Chinese politics, the behavior of actors cannot fully be understood by using a reductionist approach that solely relies on explanations at the levels of actors, their attributes, and the relations among them. In particular, when we observe that a huge number of heterogeneous or dissimilar actors converge on similar behavior (both institutional and individual), a structural explanation is warranted. At the highest level of Chinese institutions, the party-state has resorted to a network mode of governance to restructure its relationships with society, the economy, and local agencies. This explains China’s relative success in transforming its mode of governance. In this restructuring process, as interactions occurred, institutions and actors in Chinese society also responded accordingly to the change of the party-state governance and converged to its central logic institutionally and behaviorally. China specialists have long paid attention to the role of relationships and networks in China’s social, economic, and political life. However, in most of these studies, a relationship is primarily treated as a cultural value associated with China’s historical background and traditional value system. Even if some scholars treat a relationship as an institution, it is more society-based than state-based. As some scholars discuss a relation within the context of Chinese body politic, it still retains an informal nature, namely, it is still parasitic upon a formal bureaucratic order – as is a vine subsisting upon a trellis. Some scholars have noted that linkages have become important attributes of Chinese institutions after two decades of transition, but most of their accounts have failed on two points. First, they have not used the institutional attributes of linkages to examine and explain the changed behavior of actors in Chinese society and politics. Second, they have not explicitly related the explosion of ties and linkages to the structural change in their environment, namely, the transformation of CPC governance which has created a new incentive matrix and choice-set for the actors in China’s polity. In my study, I take a network mode of governance as the new political order that the CPC has built up for maintaining its centrality and hegemonic rule in China’s political economy. In terms of institutional attributes, institutional linkages characterize the Chinese body politic; and complex linkages are woven into webs. As the fundamental mode of governance has experienced a fundamental transformation since 1978, the old Leninist hierarchic regime is already gone in China – replaced by a network mode of governance. Accordingly, the lesser actors in Chinese society have developed

24

Theme, theory, and the network approach

new strategies for adaptation. Thus, the party-state governance can explain the homogenization of institutions regarding the adoption of networks as an institutional strategy and as an institutional form. With the institutional constraints from linkages, the behavior of actors within the institutions has been following the pattern of co-opetition (mohe): cooperation through competition or competition with cooperation. Joseph Fewsmith’s (in Dittmer et al. 2000: 153) wonderful expression – ‘opponents within cooperation’ – about the relationship between Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun accurately captured the behavioral pattern of reciprocity and restraints under the network mode of governance. Thus, I propose that a full understanding of the PPCs and their evolution for the past decades has to be put in the context of another master game – the changing order of China’s political governance. Deng Xiaoping’s reform program introduced around 1979 resuscitated the PPCs. As already mentioned, the PPCs have played an important role in this transformation of governance. There has been a co-evolution between the institutionalization of the PPCs and the transformation of the overall political governance in China. The latter has defined the parameters for and imposed constraints upon how the PPCs acquired dynamics, identified resources, and chose strategy for its development. The former has been part and parcel of the grand transformation of China’s governance. Given the structural choice-set from the overall governance, the PPCs have first proactively conformed to the calls from the Party-Center, and then they have also tried to be active and innovative to fit in with the strategic and long-term needs of the changing governance and become an integral building block to the governing order in China (see also Yang 2004). As for why the PPCs have so far succeeded in offering their utilities, shaping the emerging governance and expanding their own power, one crucial factor at work has been the application of a network strategy, which its strength being its adaptability. Nevertheless, the transformation of China’s governance actually is not a pure result of Chinese local conditions. Due to the institutional characteristics of China’s political order, we can trace China’s institutional adaptation way back to the changing global context of interdependence over the past half-century. By pinpointing the nexus between the pursuit of hegemonic role by the CPC in the domestic domain, and by the U.S. in the global arena, we can see the limit of China’s state autonomy and the incentives offered by the global environment for China’s unwilling but inevitable enmeshment in the U.S.-dominated world order. From this perspective, we have reason to expect the increasing pluralism in China. Finally, by looking at the exchange relationships for scarce resources among China’s different strata, we can find that a network node of governance has also been generating a dynamic for political democratization in China. That is, political votes are the last scarce resource that the Chinese ordinary people can cash in as political currency in the exchange process of resources (see Chapter 8).

2

The institutionalization of the Provincial People’s Congresses

In China, legislative development has been intertwined with the grand transformation of governance, which includes the two processes of marketization and democratization. The institutional impact of the introduction and construction of a market economy upon the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs) has been tremendous. The development of the PPCs was expected to assist the institutionalization of the communist rule in the process of creating a market economy, and therefore, the PPCs tried to serve the national strategy for economic development. In addition to the force of market, the force of democracy has increasingly become strong in Chinese society and generated new pressure upon the emerging governance. Has the PPC system been flexible enough to change in response to these two strong challenges, or too rigid to adapt to the new environment? Has it suffered from institutional decay or experienced institutional maturation? In this chapter I discuss the institutional changes and arrangements of the PPCs since their re-establishment in the late 1970s. Samuel Huntington argues, ‘The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures’ (Huntington 1968: 12). In his study of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nelson Polsby (1968: 144–68) defines institutionalization by referring to the following three factors: ‘differentiation from other institutions,’ ‘complex organization,’ and ‘development of internal rules.’ Autonomy refers to the external relations with other institutions and social forces. The autonomy of the PPCs can be better evaluated in terms of its differentiation from other institutions, which includes its structural separation, functional differentiation, and personnel separation. To understand this, we shall discuss the place of the PPCs in the whole political structure, and their relationships with some key actors, especially the Party and the governments at the central and provincial levels. Personnel separation will also be discussed in Chapter 4; the relationship between the Party and the PPCs will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 7; the relationships between the PPCs, the governments, and the judicial branch will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Thus, to some extent, the autonomy issue will be revisited in the later chapters. Complexity refers to the internal structures

26

The institutionalization of the PPCs

of an institution itself. The issues of ‘a complex organization’ and ‘the development of internal rules’ are treated more as an issue of complexity after the discussion of autonomy. This chapter will show us that, in response to the functional requirement of marketization and decentralization, the PPCs and their Standing Committees (SCs) were re-established. And then many new institutions, for example the Chairpersons’ Groups (CGs) and the special committees, were created. The staff and other supporting institutions also followed. At the same time, the working procedures and relations were clarified and routinized. All kinds of laws and rules guiding the operation of the PPCs and their internal institutions were written and announced. It will be my contention that the institutionalization of the PPCs has turned the old ‘rubber stamps’ into mature organizations and has provided an organizational possibility for them to assert power. Also, the organizational development in the area of the PPCs has demonstrated an important change and achievement in China’s transformation of governance over the past quarter century.

The market impulse for expanding legislative power Over the institutional change of the PPCs, three different explanations have been offered to explain the driving forces behind the institutionalization of the PPCs: it is viewed as (1) a result of democratic construction, either out of intentional efforts or spontaneous democratic impulse; (2) a by-product of tactical maneuvers by the Chinese leadership in the power struggle; (3) a derivative of market reforms, namely an accommodative institutional adjustment to serve the demands of marketization. Chinese scholars and officials have argued that the institutionalization of the PPCs has been an integral part of China’s democratization and legalization and is serving people’s democratic rights. Deng Xiaoping specified that developing a political democracy and carrying on economic reform were the two most important internal policies for China. The CPC leadership has tried to convince people that to develop and perfect the PC system at all levels fulfills the goal of a highly democratic republic. The PC system is the most fundamental structure of China’s democracy, because it provides a forum for people to participate in politics, to exercise their rights as ‘the masters of a people’s republic,’ to supervise the government, to control corruption, and to prevent the ‘dynastic cycle’ from reoccurring (Liu et al. 1992: 286–300; Quanguo 1994). Some scholars outside of China acknowledge some elements of a democratic dimension to the PPC development. For example, Suzanne Ogden (1993: 237–56) argues that the existing institutions including the LPCs (Local People’s Congresses) have increasingly acquired democratic content. Even ‘the spread of democratic procedures in the 1980s was not a response to popular demands but the result of the reform leadership’s conclusion that greater democratization would serve well its own purposes of political reform and economic modernization,’ real

The institutionalization of the PPCs

27

democratization has been reflected in local elections and PC institutions is becoming an on-going process. Sen Lin (1993: 37) believes, ‘Since the PC consisted of elected deputies and is deemed as the institution that embodies popular sovereignty, increasing its authority and power indicates the enhancement of democracy in democratic centralism.’ However, some scholars have suspected that ‘democracy’ was actually used by Deng to build his coalition for winning power from Hua Guofeng, and was in reality hollow. For example, in her discussion about China’s reform politics, Susan Shirk argues that China’s leaders, ‘by playing to the provinces,’ had chosen ‘the strategy of achieving market reform by devolving authority and resources to local officials (and thereby allowing them to build up local political machines)’ (Shirk 1993: 149 and 1994). Reform policies characterized by decentralization were a well-elaborated, often-used strategy by China’s leaders to attack their political opponents and realize their policy goals. In her opinion, this strategy was nothing new. Deng learned from Mao who ‘pioneered’ it with the launch of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. ‘(T)he essence of the strategy was the same,’ she continues. ‘By playing to the provinces, pro-reform Party leaders were able to change the direction of China’s economic policies without altering its fundamental political institutions’ (Shirk 1993: 150–1). In this logic, the development of sub-national PCs was almost like a ‘top-down’ expedient, if not conspiracy. Arthur Ding (1994: 33) also expresses his doubts that the changes to the PCs in the early 1990s would ‘bring about qualitative changes.’ He states: ‘The CPC attitude toward the PCs, particularly the NPC, has been consistent since the implementation of the reform policy. . . . These powers (given to the deputies), however, can only be implemented through the system of hierarchic bureaucratic control.’ Besides, although the PCs were expanding their activities in making economic laws, Ding saw their other powers such as supervision and foreign affairs as having become routine formalities. Actually, the PCs were less powerful and certainly were not truly representative organizations of the people. Undoubtedly, some similarities exist between the two stages of establishing the PCs in 1950s and their reestablishment in 1977. Both Mao and Deng regarded this system as an effective way of establishing political mobilization and legitimacy, realized its importance for economic and legal construction, and used it in power struggles against their political competitors inside and outside the Party under the pretext of building democracy. In the power struggle of the 1940s between the Communists and Nationalists, Mao advocated establishing the PC system in order to protect people’s rights and replace Chiang Kai-shek’s one-party dictatorship. Since it is always the case that democracy is more valuable for the opposition party or minorities, when Deng challenged Hua, democracy served Deng’s political goal. Through his advocacy for democracy, decentralization, and the rule of law, Deng mobilized support at the grassroots level and among a wide spectrum of political forces. Through a policy of legalization and decentralization, Deng built his

28

The institutionalization of the PPCs

political coalition and put his supporters (many old cadres who lost positions during the previous political movements) into these newly reestablished organizations (the PCs at various levels are an example) and allied him with officials at the local level. However, after Mao consolidated his power in the late 1950s, efforts to make more laws and to help the LPCs institutionalize were stalled immediately by the Anti-Rightists Campaign and the Cultural Revolution. The PCs were cast into oblivion for more than ten years (Quanguo 1992b: 67–9). If a political power struggle was the only reason for establishing and expanding the role of the PCs, then the re-institutionalization process after 1979 would have been expected to lose momentum as Deng ascended to dominance in Chinese politics. But the development of the PCs did not follow the same pattern as their predecessors in 1960s. The important reason for this divergence is explained by the fact that Mao and Deng adopted two different economic development strategies. The market impulse carried on the institutionalization and power expansion of the PPCs further in the case of Deng. By following the Stalinist model, Mao overemphasized the importance of centralization in the industrialization process. When Mao centralized the Party, government, and the military and governed as a political patriarch by personal instructions, there was no reason for a legislature. But Deng pursued a different goal and applied a different strategy: a market economy instead of a planned economy, and decentralization instead of centralization. He understood that administrative decentralization would not work in the context of a centrally planned economy; it required separating the state from economic enterprises, giving way to a market economy. It became a consensus among the post-Mao leadership that to avoid repeating the old cycle of ‘streamlining – swelling – re-streamlining – re-swelling,’ under which the bureaucracy kept bloating, a change of governmental functions was needed (Zhao 1987: 39). Thus, my research presents a third perspective, which presupposes a comprehensive transformation of governance in China, with an emphasis on economic interpretation. As China’s development strategy gradually shifted from a mobilization regime to the developmental state model, the development of a market economy required the institutionalization of the PPCs. In the re-establishment and later re-institutionalization of PPCs, the economic impulse became, if not the sole dynamic, the most important agent or catalyst for change. This economic impulse for development placed strong constraints upon other dynamics such as democratization and factional power struggles. The former took precedence over the latter, and also tamed them to serve the major theme of economic development. This context provided an institutional environment for local elites to take advantage of opportunities generated by economic changes. It set the PCs onto a new path of development, different from that under Mao. There has been a clear pattern during the last two decades or so. Every fundamental move in China’s economy has prepared a new stage of evolution

The institutionalization of the PPCs

29

for the PPCs. Early in 1978 Deng gave an important speech that ushered in the policies of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress and later became a guiding document for the development of legislatures and legislative work. Deng stated: To ensure a people’s democracy, we must strengthen our legal system. Democracy has to be institutionalized and written into law, so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes, or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the focus of their attention. The trouble now is that our legal system is incomplete, with many laws yet to be enacted. Very often, what leaders say is taken as the law and anyone who disagrees is called a lawbreaker. These kinds of laws change whenever a leader’s view changes. So we must concentrate on enacting criminal and civil codes, procedural laws and other necessary laws concerning factories, people’s communes, forests, grasslands and environmental protection, as well as labor laws and a law on investment by foreigners. (Deng 1983: 157–8) For meeting the challenges of the economy, Deng argued that ‘the relations between one enterprise and another, between economic enterprises and the state, between enterprises and individuals, and so on should also be defined by law, and many of the contradictions between them should be resolved by law.’ To make all these laws at the same time posed a formidable task for the state. Deng suggested decentralization and local experimentation as solutions: There is a lot of legislative work to do, and we don’t have enough trained people. Therefore, legal provisions will have to be less than perfect to start with, then gradually improved upon. Some laws and statutes can be tried out in particular localities and later enacted nationally after the experience has been evaluated and improvements have been made. Individual legal provisions can be revised or supplemented one at a time, as necessary; there is no need to wait for a comprehensive revision of an entire body of law. In short, it is better to have some laws than none, and better to have them sooner than later. Moreover, we should intensify our study of international law. (Deng 1983: 157–8) The ensuing landmark Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party’s Congress recognized that too much centralization and too little democracy were serious problems haunting the system. It called for improving democracy within the Party and guaranteeing people’s rights in order to motivate people for socialist construction; to decentralize power to local governments and economic enterprises in order to encourage and utilize their incentive for

30

The institutionalization of the PPCs

modernization; to institutionalize and legalize a people’s democracy in order to make this system and law stable, continuous and authoritative. These important policy changes provided a wide possibility for the development of the PCs and necessitated the decentralization of legislative power and the establishment of the PPCSCs in 1979. In 1984, the CPC passed the Resolution on Economic Reforms in which ‘the planned commodity economy’ became the blueprint for economic reforms. The start of urban reforms and a planned economy with market regulation prompted a new round of reforms regarding the PPCs. The following Seventh Five-Year Plan called for more economic laws to construct a ‘relatively sound system of economic law’ and urged the legislative bodies to change from a ‘retirement house for the old cadres’ into a ‘working organ.’ Consequently, the PPCs accelerated their lawmaking activities, especially those for economic laws; the special committees were gradually established; the restrictions upon MPCs (municipal people’s congresses) of provincial capitals and ‘bigger cities’ to make local statutes were further loosened; and a new generation of delegates replaced senile members within the PPCs. In 1987, as the economic reforms moved further toward establishing a ‘socialist commodity economy,’ Deng realized that ‘political reform and economic reform are reciprocal, and depend on each other. They should be well coordinated. There surely will be a dead-end for the economic reform unless the political reform keeps up’ (Hamrin and Zhao 1995: 139–40). Given the green light by Deng, the 13th Party Congress adopted a resolution on political reform. Under the new principle of ‘separating the Party from the government,’ the Party, government, and legislature shall have different powers and functions; the PCs as China’s fundamental political system should be emphasized; the legislative powers of the NPC and LPCs should be respected; they should have more capacity to supervise the government; their functions and the roles of the SCs at all levels shall be perfected; their image of being a rubber stump shall be changed; to widen socialist democracy, elections shall be more democratic; and decentralization of power shall be granted (Zhao 1987: 37). The report stated: The PC system is the fundamental system of government in China. In recent years the PCs at various levels have made much progress in their work. In the years ahead, they and their SCs should continue to improve the way they function and to strengthen their work of legislation and supervision through law. They should maintain closer contact with the people in order to be better able to represent them and be supervised by them. (Zhao 1987: 42) This reform agenda brought many immediate changes to the PPCs. Many provinces introduced some elements of choice in the elections of the vicechairpersons of the PPC by having more than one candidate. As a result,

The institutionalization of the PPCs

31

many candidates nominated by ordinary people’s deputies (PDs) were elected. The PDs were encouraged to investigate corruption more aggressively; several inquiry and removal proceedings were initiated and succeeded (see Chapter 7). The meetings of the PPC became more open and lively, and more laws were passed. But these promising developments were affected, in the short run, by the 1989 crackdown and the following economic retrenchment. The institutionalization process of the PPCs entered into three years of stagnation. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership had only the PC system available for resisting the Western-style democracy; therefore, they emphasized the urgency of improving the PCs upon which ‘Chinese democracy’ hinged. However, the word ‘democracy’ in China is a coded term, under the political retrogression then, it could not provide a clear vision and action plan for the development of the PPCs. A new opportunity came in 1992 when Deng had his Southern Inspection Tour and the Party endorsed a market economy. In 1993, the CPC passed ‘The Decision of the CPCCC on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure’ and wrote the ‘socialist market economy’ into the constitutions of the Party and the country. The PPCs had an unprecedented opportunity for expanding their roles and developing their autonomy, for they were expected by the Party leadership to pass more laws instituting a market economy and to use their supervisory power more aggressively to control corruption. In the years that followed, their expanding role in building a market economy was reflected in the explosion of activities pertaining to supervision and legislation. In some provinces (see Chapter 7), the PPCs even challenged the Party in refusing to rubber-stamp the appointments of a governor. Later, the Chinese leadership soon realized that the creation of a market economy inevitably calls for a legal framework following the principle of ‘the rule of law.’ In 1996, the communist leader Jiang Zemin endorsed the principle of ‘rule by law,’ ‘a law-governed state,’ and ‘a state with legal system.’ Although there are some subtle differences between ‘to rule by law’ and ‘the rule of law,’ Chinese legal scholars and political commentators took this opportunity and stretched Jiang’s idea further to mean ‘the rule of law’ (Liu et al. 1996; Xiao 1997). Indeed in 1999, the constitution was revised by adding to it the aim of ‘a socialist rule-of-law state’ (Liu et al. 1996; Peerenboom 2002). Thus, Cai Dingjian, the leading scholar on China’s legislatures, believes that the two years of 1992–3 divided the 20-year course of legislative development into two distinctive stages. The introduction of a market economy in 1993 served as the milestone for these two stages, according to Cai (2001: 57–74): ‘Before, the legislative activity of the NPC followed the idea of legal instrumentalism, namely, that law is only a regulatory tool based on the planned economy. After that, the construction of a rule-of-law society based on a market economy has become the guiding principle for legislative activities.’ This significant breakthrough in Chinese political thinking created the space needed for the PCs to grow in the new millennium.

32

The institutionalization of the PPCs

In summary, the re-establishment of the PPCs was due to several factors. Obviously, the pattern of economic development, namely the economic liberalization and marketization, has been the most important agent for the institutional changes of the PPCs over the last two decades or so. Shirk and Ding emphasized political opportunism as a reason for decentralization. Thus, they doubted the sincerity of the Chinese leadership’s interest in establishing and sustaining real substantial changes. In contrast, Lin and Ogden did not question the democratic impulse behind China’s political moves. Instead of making a judgment about the motives of the Chinese leadership, I think that, due to the simple economic reality and political possibilities, the economic logic and market impulse far more than any political initiatives have been the decisive factors in explaining the changes of China’s political institutions. With recognition of the secondary – and sometimes sporadic – role played by the pursuit of democracy and political opportunism, my study will put more stress on the pursuit of economic development as having provided a sustainable dynamic for the institutionalization of the PPCs. This basic and persistent logic has determined the fate of PPC institutionalization, shaped the way they institutionalize, and defined the foci of their work. Certainly, it has also created a serious challenge to China’s democratization process.

Legislative empowerment, structural separation, and functional differentiation The evolution of the PC system as a whole and the PPCs in particular can be divided into three stages (Yuan 1994): First, the early development of ideas and the experimental practice of the PC system. Inspired by the Russian Soviet system, the Chinese communists developed their own ideas for the people’s conventions of delegates and practiced them in their ‘liberated regions,’ e.g., the first China National Soviet Congress in Ruijin, Jiangxi, in 1931. Later the communists supported the principle of having conventions of elected delegates and took advantage of the National Political Consultative Conference allowed by Chiang Kai-shek to open a second, legal battlefield against the Nationalist government of one-party rule. Because of the contributions of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to the establishment of a Communist coalition against the Nationalists, after the Communists took power in 1949, they transformed this body into a transitional highest organ of power that ushered in the PC system. The second stage was the establishment and suspension of the PC system. The ‘Common Program’ passed by the CPPCC served as a temporary constitution for the newly founded PRC. It announced that once conditions were ripe, elections should be conducted to produce the PCs at all levels. The PC system should be ‘the fundamental political system.’ In December 1952, the CPC suggested to the CPPCC that the PCs should be elected and a new constitution should be drafted. In January 1953, the central government

The institutionalization of the PPCs

33

decided first to hold elections for the PCs at the village, county and provincial levels and then hold their first NPC. In September 1954, after the PCs at all sub-national levels were elected, the NPC convened in Beijing. At this conference, a new constitution, the Organic Law of the NPC of the PRC, and the Organic Law of LPCs and Local People’s Governments of the PRC were passed, and the PC system was established in China. At that time, the legislative authority of the NPC was relatively respected. A division of labor among the Party, the State Council, and the transitional legislature (i.e., the CPPCC) existed. One document stipulated, ‘All the laws, regulations, decrees, and legal codes concerning state and government affairs should be initiated and drafted by the CPCCC (CPC Central Committee). Then the National Committee or the SC of the CPPCC will pass them on for discussion. They will be ratified and implemented by the people’s government or the State Council’ (Hamrin and Zhao 1995: 154). But two years later, the CPCCC started centralizing power and put governmental affairs under its direct control. The legislative branch was ignored. Under the 1954 constitution, the NPC was the sole legislative organ making laws in China, with the only exception that the autonomous regions of the nationalities retained the power to pass decrees for self-government. This legislative monopoly lasted for a quarter of century. But even as the sole legislative organ the NPC did not pass many laws. For example, from 1957 to 1976, the NPC only passed the 1975 constitution and one resolution on agricultural development. As for the autonomous regions of the nationalities, they made few autonomous statutes. Meantime, even administrative regulations from the State Council and ministries decreased; China was ruled mostly by Party policies and personal instructions (ZGFLS 1989: 93). During this second stage, the PPCs did not have SCs and had sessions twice a year. These sessions usually were very short (no longer than a week). The local governments took responsibility for conducting elections and preparing meetings for the PCs. In practice, the governments were both the executive organs and the SCs for the PCs. On June 18, 1958, the CPC announced the Instruction on Establishing Groups of Financing and Economy, Political and Legal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, Culture and Education, in which the principle of ‘no distinction between the Party and the government’ was endorsed. The Party directly dictated to and commanded the government, and turned it into an executive organ for the Party instead of for the PC. This leadership system was copied at all levels (Wu and Liu 1991: 44). The PPCs lost autonomy, power, and independent identity. They were excluded from the legislative process. From the time of the Cultural Revolution, the NPC did not have meetings for the nine years 1966–75; the PPCs did not resume meetings until 1977. In 1968, even the governments at the sub-national level were suspended and replaced by the ‘Revolutionary Committees’ that merged all powers of the Party, government, army, economic enterprises, services, and mass organizations. The Party Committees and Revolutionary Committees at all

34

The institutionalization of the PPCs

levels kept two names but shared the same personnel. In the later years that ‘all important documents concerning government affairs at the national level were to be issued to the country under the name of both the CPCCC and the State Council, or sometimes just under the name of the Center. The same practices were used at the provincial, municipal, and county levels’ (Wu and Liu 1991: 47). The 1975 Constitution clearly stated that the Revolutionary Committees at all levels were both the executive organs and the PCSCs, this practice was even retained in the 1978 Constitution. Under it a quadruple transmutation of the power structure was completed: excessive emphasis on centralization directed legislative power to the Center and created a legislative monopoly by the Center; then, the lethargic NPC was sidelined and an administrative dictatorship emerged; third, the integration of the Party and the government transferred power to the Party Center and created a partocracy. Finally, within the party-state, the Party leader monopolized the power and governed in a patrimonial manner. Mao’s personal dictatorship superseded all the state authorities. The final stage in the evolution of the PC system came after Mao’s death and at the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1977, the NPC and the PPCs were re-institutionalized. On October 15, 1977, the CPCCC decided to hold the Fifth NPC in the spring of 1978 and asked all provinces first to hold their PPC’s meetings in order to select PDs for the NPC. Because other LPCs did not exist, the PPCs were not elected by the PDs at the lower level, but produced by the Revolutionary Committees with consultation with other organizations. From December 9 to 16, 1977, Hunan was the first province to have its PPC meeting. Jiangxi, the last province, held its PPC meeting from February 14 to 18, 1978. After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party’s Congress, the CPC decided to create SCs within the PCs at and above the county level. The Revolutionary Committees were abolished. On July 1, 1979, the Fifth NPC passed a resolution on revising the constitution. In accordance with this resolution, Electoral Laws of the NPC and LPCs of the PRC (hereafter referred as the Electoral Law), The Organic Law of LPCs and Local People’s Governments of the PRC (hereafter referred as the Local Organic Law) were passed and the PCs were re-established at all levels from the nation to the townships. These landmark laws marked a new stage for the LPCs. In contrast to the Electoral Law and the Local Organic Law passed in 1954, the new laws pointed to four important developments. First, SCs within the PCs at the county level or above were established; second, the PPCs and their SCs were given legislative powers; third, the past election of nominating as many candidates as seats was replaced by the method of nominating more candidates than seats; fourth, direct election of the PDs was extended from the district level to the county level. In 1982, the NPC passed a new constitution. Even though the Constitution Drafting Committee ruled out the principle of separation of power, bicameralism for legislatures, and federalism, it introduced a major change by strengthening the role and status of the PCs in China’s political structure

The institutionalization of the PPCs

35

(Quanguo 1996b: 48, 52–3). The constitution did adopt the statement that the NPC is the supreme power organ for the nation and the LPCs are power organs for their own territorial units. Since then, the PC system has been regarded as the fundamental political system in China. The status of PCs was enhanced and strengthened; and their power over lawmaking, supervision, and decision-making was expanded and substantiated through the creation of SCs within the LPCs at and above the county levels. However, to restore PPCs and their SCs as truly independent power organs, the old Chinese political arrangements had to be overhauled, and many relationships had to be clarified. For example, there were the relations between the Party and the government, the Party and various legislatures, legislatures and governments, legislatures and the courts and procuratorates, and the Center and localities. Among them, the reform of the Party leadership was crucial. The role of the Party in the power structure determined all other changes. In 1987, The General Program for Political Reform started or continued several reform policies. First, the separation of the Party and the government was introduced. At all levels, the Party officials gave up their positions in the government. The practice of the concurrent holding of top government positions by Party leaders was abolished (Harmin and Zhao 1995: 154). (Later under Jiang Zemin, this reform was discontinued.) Second, the CPC rule by decrees and directives opened the door to personal dictatorship, to rule by men should gradually be replaced by to rule by law. Third, as an effort to construct a legal system, a variety of powers were given to the PCs at all levels. Many Party officials working in the PCs gave up their positions in the government and the Party and became more devoted to their work within the PCs. In addition, the PCs were expected to supervise the governments, the courts and procuratorates as they had become relatively independent from the Party and had gained enormous power along with the opportunity to abuse it. Fourth, as the Party devolved power down to the local levels and the economic enterprises, the horizontal delineation among the Party, the government, the legislature, the court, and the procuratorate, and the vertical reorganization between the Center and the localities were carried out. The Party saw the need to withdraw from the routine administration and decision-making activities of the government and from the legislative work of the PCs as well. It concentrated more on political leadership and the most important issues, such as personnel, political principles, and policy guidelines. The PPCs easily found their distinctive structures and functions, and strengthened their identities. Direct elections at the county level to some degree further strengthened the position of the PCs in relation to other organizations. When granting more powers to the provinces, the Center decided to give special privileges to some selected localities. First Guangdong and Fujian Provinces established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to experiment with some bolder reform policies. The NPC passed authorization laws to allow

36

The institutionalization of the PPCs

these zones to have special powers to initiate and innovate with some new economic laws. Besides, the 1982 Constitution gave to the PCs of the provincial capital municipalities and some larger cities (the State Council designated a total of 13 in 1984) the power to draft laws. In 1984 the Resolution on Economic Reforms created a new standard to assess the success or failure of the economic reforms by looking at their contribution to the forces of production and economic growth. It emphasized that: ‘Economic reforms and the development of the national economy require that more and more economic relationships and rules for economic activities need to be stabilized in the form of law. The state legislatures should speed up their economic legislation.’ In 1986, the Seventh Five-Year Plan proposed to ‘establish a relatively sound economic legal system and gradually conduct all economic activities in accordance with law.’ Under these circumstances, the NPC further expanded the legislative power of ‘bigger cities’ in 1986 to draft and pass local statutes by themselves. After reporting to and being ratified by their PPCSCs, they could then implement these statutes. On April 5, 1989, the NPC passed another resolution authorizing Shenzhen to make statutes for the city; the same authorization was granted to the city of Xiamen in 1994. After more than two decades of development, the Chinese political system had become more differentiated. Just as the PPCs and their SCs were able to The NPC The Standing Committee (Laws)

PPCs Standing Committees (Local Regulations)

Provincial Capital Cities/Bigger Cities (Local Regulations)

Special Economic Zones (Local Regulations)

The State Council (Administrative Regulations)

Ministries and Provincial Governments (Normative Rules)

Autonomous Regions (Autonomous and Specific Regulations)

Autonomous Prefectures (Autonomous and Specific Regulations)

Autonomous Counties (Autonomous and Specific Regulations)

Figure 2.1 Legislative systems in China (source: the author based on Liu 1989; Wu and Liu 1991: 57; RDZXW 04/25/04).

The institutionalization of the PPCs

37

make local statutes, some MPCs were also authorized to make local statutes. The legislative system in China has changed from a system of legislative monopoly by the NPC to a unified but plural and multi-tier system. While all laws and statutes have to obey the national laws passed by the NPC and are subject to its interpretation, lawmaking organs work at four different levels (the national, provincial, municipal, and autonomous areas – counties as well as prefectures). The legislative system includes several actors. The NPC and its SC that pass most important laws (falü) for the nation as a whole. The State Council can pass administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui). The 31 PPCs and their SCs, 27 MPCs of the provincial capital municipalities, and more than a dozen of the bigger cities and some SEZs can make local statutes and regulations (difangxing fagui). Thirty autonomous prefectures and 123 autonomous counties can pass autonomous regulations (zizhi tiaoli) and specific regulations (danxiang tiaoli), which have to be approved by the NPC before their implementation. The provincial capital cities and some bigger cities have only ‘a semi-legislative power,’ because the local statutes they pass must be confirmed by the PPCSCs. In addition, all local statutes must be reported to the NPC and the State Council so that they can be put on record.

Development of internal structure Each PPC consists of these several parts: the plenary session, the SC, the chairperson and vice-chairpersons, the Chairpersons’ Group (CG), the Special Committees (both permanent and temporary), the Prefecture Work Committees (PWCs), and the working staff. The plenary session of the PPC The unicameral PPCs have their members elected for a term of five years, coincident with the NPC, but longer than the three-year terms for members of the PCs at the township level until 2004. Direct election only applies to the county level and below. Above the county level, all members of PCs are elected by the PDs of their immediate lower level who constitute a kind of Electoral College for the higher-level PCs. The PDs to the PPCs are not directly elected by voters, but are selected by the PCPDs at the county and city levels. From 1954 to the time of the Cultural Revolution, most PPCs already had three terms (at that time it was four years). On October 10, 1977, at a meeting of provincial officials sponsored by the CPCCC, it was decided that the years under the Revolutionary Committees were to count as one term. Most of the PPCs have had six congresses since the Cultural Revolution: 1978–82 (5th), 1983–8 (6th), 1988–93 (7th), 1993–8 (8th), 1998– 2003 (9th), and the 10th Congresses from 2003 to the present (but there are some exceptions to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Ningxia, Tibet, and Hainan for changes in their administrative status).

38

The institutionalization of the PPCs

While it is well known that the NPC is the largest legislature in the world, the PPCs are also very large. Among the thirty PPCs in 1991, 25 of them were larger than the two houses of the U.S. Congress combined. If we rank the 50 largest legislatures in the world (national legislatures or lower houses when bicameralism applies), all the PPCs are on the list. Actually, the NPC and the eight PPCs claimed the top nine spots – leaving Libya (with 760 seats) with the tenth spot. Based on the data provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (www.ipu.org, accessed on 10/20/2003), if we use Hainan (392 deputies in 2003) and Qinghai (391) as a dividing line, all over the world, there are only 19 national legislatures (China not included) bigger than the two smallest PPCs in China. But immediately after their reestablishment in 1977, the Chinese leadership wanted to include almost everyone in these organizations, they were even larger. For example, Sichuan had 1,990 PDs, Henan 1,552, Shaanxi 1,186, Hubei 1,132, Shanghai 1,200, Yunnan 1,016, and Neimenggu 976. It is no surprise that the total number of PDs at all levels once exceeded six million (Wu and Liu 1991: 85). The major reasons for such huge numbers were statistically explained by the size of the population (the correlation of the PPCs’ size and population is 0.72) and the economy (the correlation rate is 0.68), while the territorial size of the provinces had a negative impact upon the PPCs’ size (the correlation is – 0.36) (Calculation based on Hsueh et al. 1993; Benewick and Donald 1999.) However, they were also rooted in the historical context. First, the Chinese leadership needed a show to energize and mobilize the demoralized population. Second, the post-Mao regime being in a transition needed a forum to legitimize its power and endorse its policies; the conventions of PCs at all levels were used to show the solidarity of the leadership and of the whole nation. Third, after hundreds of thousands of veteran leaders lost power in the Cultural Revolution only to be rehabilitated later, the system needed a place to co-opt them. The first PCs after the end of the Cultural Revolution exactly fulfilled their expected functions for representation, mobilization, co-optation, regime legitimation, and propaganda. But once these goals were achieved, the leadership found new roles for the PCs. In 1979, the PC system started experiencing one of its most significant reshufflings in history. This change was initiated from the top of the NPC and was prompted by a NPC leadership change in which four new vice-chairmen were elected to the NPCSC. Peng Zhen was the most prominent. Drawing from his ‘painful reflections’ during the Cultural Revolution when he was thrown in jail, Peng later became the most devoted and energetic political entrepreneur in promoting the development and shaping the course of the PCs (You et al. 1998; Zhu 1999; Potter 2003; Int. CDJ-9806; Int. WHD-9806). The following year, six old vice-chairmen resigned and another five new vice-chairmen were added, among them were Peng Chong, Xi Zhongxun, and Yang Shangkun. These powerful figures added weight to this institution, making it one of the most powerful NPCSCs (only the 9th and the 10th NPCSCs are compa-

The institutionalization of the PPCs

39

rable), and these powerful figures eventually made a significant contribution to the revitalization and had a fundamental impact upon the development of the PPCs. In the first four years after the establishment of the PPCSCs, the PPCs as a whole did not generate the momentum needed to institutionalize spontaneously. Instead, they found themselves facing some serious difficulties. Since the PCs became a way of kicking rehabilitated old cadres upstairs, the PCs became inflated with a large number of senile leaders, many of whom were unable to attend meetings on a regular basis or had to rely on assistance from nurses and aides. Meantime, the PCs also became a reward mechanism for hard-working peasants, model workers, and loyal party functionaries. Some were illiterate and unable to discuss issues. As a result, the PDs, as a whole, lacked political savvy. Under such circumstances, the PPCs (and all other PCs at different levels) became a subject for ridicule and of dozens of new nicknames such as ‘rubber stamp,’ ‘empty talk house,’ ‘nursing home for the retired cadres,’ ‘two-hands conference’ (to raise and clap hands), ‘the ears of a deaf man – a facade,’ ‘a big plate and mere skeleton with old men,’ and ‘a sinecure,’ and so on. Sun Zhifu, the deputy secretary-general of Sichuan PPCSC, described this mood in 1985: Some comrades think that the power organs actually do not have power. Power is concentrated in the Party Committee. The so-called ‘decision power’ and ‘appointment and removal power’ are a formality. The PCs are voting machines. The supervision over the government actually is targeting the Party Committee, therefore, it is impossible to implement. They also believe that the respect toward the PCs is not based upon the respect to the state organ, but on the ‘residual authority’ of old comrades. In this way, it is better not to have the PCSCs. Eventually it will be necessary to have them, but today, the SCs are ‘a premature baby,’ time is still not ripe for the establishment of the SCs within the PCs . . . Some people have regarded the SCs of LPCs as institutions for placing retiring old cadres, not power organs and working organizations. Influenced by the old traditional views, they believe that the Party Committee decides important issues and the government takes care of concrete issues. Without the PCSC, the work still can be done. Having the PCSCs as new ‘mothers-in-law’ (popo) is formalistic and troublesome. (Sichuan 1986: 10–11) A widely circulated doggerel summarized the basic power relationship then: ‘The Party waves hands to order, the government uses hands to work, the PC raises hands to pass, and the CPPCC claps hands to praise.’ As an organization, the PPCs lacked internal efficiency, their members lacked confidence and faith in themselves and their organization. In the eyes of the people, they lacked external legitimacy. In this unfavorable environment, they were vulnerable to being hindered by the Party and the government in

40

The institutionalization of the PPCs

their efforts to institutionalize themselves. Due to the neglect of the Party, resistance from the government, low morale of the personnel within the PCs, and the people’s cynicism, the PPCs had severe crises of identity and efficacy. At the age of a preschooler, they already had been paralyzed by a senile atrophy. The institutionalization was under threat of being undone. At this critical moment, the leadership at the central level, especially Peng Zhen, then a vice-chairman of the NPCSC and a CPCCC Politburo member, decided to intervene. He wanted to salvage them by overhauling the personnel. Of course, he would also be saving the whole PC system as well as his own power base. In April 1984, the CPCCC circulated Central Documents No. 8 (1984) and No. 9 (1984) to reemphasize the importance of the PCs and the necessity to respect their authority (Quanguo 1990a: 588–91; 412–13; Sichuan 1991: 36, 46–7). Central Document No. 8 (1984) included two speeches by Peng. In his first Speech to the Comrades in Charge of the PPCSCs (March 13, 1984), Peng pointed out: ‘The work of the PCSCs is still in a great transition.’ To fulfill this transition, Peng called on the leaders to change their work method from relying on policies to relying on both policies and laws, in other words, to change to relying on the rule of law. The Party rule also should change from the old direct control to new practices of organizing the state through the laws, obeying the laws, and conducting its activities within the limits set by the constitution. He suggested that more old cadres should retire. This would open positions for the younger, revolutionary, better-educated, and professional cadres. For these old comrades recently transferred from the Party and government to the PCs, their work habits and style should also change and be guided by the principle of using power collectively. In his second speech, On the Work of the NPCSC (January 24, 1984), Peng emphasized, ‘The powers of the PDs and members of the PCSCs are enormous. They include participation in decisions on important state affairs and the use of the supreme power of the state.’ The CPCCC ordered its members and leaders to study these two speeches carefully and to understand their spirit. It gave these instructions: The CC believes that it is a key issue to strengthen the work and construction of the PCs at all levels for building our PC system as a fundamental political system. It is important for developing a socialist democracy and legal system. The Party Committees at all levels should strengthen their leadership over the PCSCs, pay attention to their work, encourage them to use their power in accordance to law, and fully play the role of a state power organ. (Sichuan 1986: 36) One week later, Central Document No. 9 emphasized that the authority of appointment and removal by the PCs must be respected. The party committees and governments at all levels must strictly follow the constitution and laws in the process of changing cadres.

The institutionalization of the PPCs

41

Documents No. 8 and No. 9 started a fundamental change in the structure and personnel of PPCs: their organizational structures were streamlined and their personnel were replaced (see Chapter 4). The most important structural change on the Plenary Sessions of the PPCs was to reduce the number of PDs. For the central leadership, it was critical to improve the effectiveness of the PCs. Leaders of the PCs were instructed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the PCs. When they were too large, they were too costly, and the PPCs were unable to have sessions as frequently or for as extended a period of time. It was impossible for the PDs to have a thorough discussion and meaningfully participate in the PPC activities. Since according to the 1979 Electoral Law, the power to decide the number of PDs was reserved to each PPC, the NPC with approval from the CPCCC suggested to the PPCs that they cut their PDs by a substantial number. In 1986 the NPC provided the PPCs a baseline of 300 deputies. In provinces and autonomous regions, as the population increases by 150,000, one PD is added; in the MDCGs, as the population increase by 25,000, one PD is added. Thus, under this guideline, the new PPCs elected in 1987 downsized themselves. Within their first ten years (1977–87), the total number of PPCPDs decreased by 36.4 percent, from 32,142 to 20,438, and the mean size of the PPCs’ changed from 1,108 PDs to 704. The size of the PPCs in 1977 had been one factor in deciding how far their reduction went. After this reform, the size of the PPCs basically has remained stable. In 1995, the revised Electoral Law affirmed the 1986 guideline and clearly states in its 9th Clause that the baseline for the PPCPDs is 350. One more PD can be added as the population increases by 150,000 in provinces or by 25,000 in MDCGs. For a mega-province with 100 million people, a ceiling of 1,000 deputies is set. The new rule also stipulates, once the quota is set, it cannot be changed (Liu et al. 1999: 87–90). The tendency to grow again in the early 1990s was curtailed. Today’s PPCs are still huge and far from the optimal size, but this downsizing was a step in the right direction (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2). It is also worth noting that the actual sizes of the PPCs elected in 2003 were predicted by the size of the population and the GDP in each province (the correlation between PPC size and population is 0.74, that between PPC size and GDP size is 0.69). Actually, they were also smaller than the allowed quota by almost 2 percent (a total 390 seats), which means that by their own choice, on average, each province does not fill 12 to 13 seats in the PPCs. This may indicate the local willingness to optimize the number of PDs. A large number of PDs makes a meeting expensive. A NPC senior official revealed that one NPC Plenary Session cost 40 to 50 million yuan in the early 1990s and reached about 100 million yuan in the middle of the 1990s (Int. CDJ-9806). In Shanghai, a Plenary Session in the 1990s also cost at least half a million yuan (Int. WZY-9807). Financial constraints force the Plenary Sessions of the PPC to be infrequent and brief. When the PPCs are in full session, it is a big problem to coordinate these sessions. For symbolic reasons, the PPCs have a full meeting of the Plenary Session only at the

Table 2.1 Size of the PPCs by province (1954–2003) Province Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi In.Mongolia Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Chongqing Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang Total

1954

1957–8

1963–5

1977–8

1984

1987

1991

1995

2003

1997 Quota

564 519 581 314 391 530 234 684 800 445 451 448 283 404 583 535 365 552 530 450 n.a. 678 n.a. 295 392 n.a. 386 530 300 n.a. 340

619 n.a. 684 320 436 453 314 390 800 555 475 496 294 500 585 568 499 552 570 420 n.a. 738 n.a. 331 395 n.a. 400 359 303 208 289

751 n.a. 686 470 511 707 342 459 900 650 495 495 411 613 776 711 582 662 741 589 n.a. 1,200 n.a. 419 495 301 520 485 355 107 380

1,195 960 1,351 1,999 976 1,164 971 1,000 1,260 1,505 986 998 1,016 1,200 1,500 1,497 1,130 1,252 1,538 1,218 n.a. 1,990 n.a. 1,018 1,016 703 1,114 785 715 698 800

992 779 1,161 921 801 900 588 947 995 1,296 882 813 577 959 1,601 1,204 976 997 1,182 983 n.a. 1,475 n.a. 730 885 529 728 510 450 461 667

20,885 (–11%) 20,719 (–10%) 20,850 (–27%) 20,750 (–19%) 20,589 (–27%) 20,725 (–19%) 20,525 (–11%) 20,595 (–37%) 20,910 (–9%) 20,996 (–23%) 20,750 (–15%) 20,750 (–8%) 20,572 (–1%) 20,535 (–44%) 20,900 (–11%) 20,950 (–27%) 20,881 (–9%) 20,895 (–10%) 20,850 (–28%) 20,650 (–33%) 20,291 (1988) 20,980 (–34%) 20,n.a. 20,680 (–7%) 20,616 (–30%) 20,445 (–16%) 20,620 (–15%) 20,440 (–24%) 20,390 (–13%) 20,440 (–5%) 20,550 (–18%)

871 709 927 750 584 725 536 625 889 990 737 729 572 592 937 941 881 874 807 644 292 970 n.a. 658 616 465 616 520 399 441 550

883 718 926 749 510 752 524 645 888 902 778 729 550 628 927 930 870 810 809 715 389 1,000 870 638 650 450 575 546 378 432 540

762 703 762 549 536 619 511 546 860 802 627 732 546 604 909 949 729 762 780 679 392 880 838 595 621 440 565 505 391 411 549

781 710 779 552 544 619 520 589 870 808 641 750 561 613 930 957 732 774 803 703 397 890 870 607 638 445 579 509 399 423 547

12,584

12,553

15,813

33,555

25,453

20,438 (–20%)

20,847

21,711

20,154

20,544

Sources: D. Cai 1998: 153; Quanguo 1997a: 127–8; Liu et al. 1992b: 292–391; Wang and Yuan 1990: 49–50; ZGFLNJ 1992: 853; Shou and Li 1990; most of the 1995 and 2003 numbers are from the yearbooks, encyclopedias, various websites, and www.google.com search.

The institutionalization of the PPCs

43

40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

1954

59–58

63–65

77–78

1984

1987

1991

2003

Quota

Figure 2.2 Size changes of PPC deputies (1954–2003) (source: the author).

ceremonies at the beginning and end. Normally, in the Plenary Session the PDs are not allowed to speak. For the PDs, the most important function at the Plenary Session is still to raise their hands to approve the work reports and resolutions from the Presidium, the SC, the government, the court, and the procuratorate. One political scientist compared the PCs’ plenary meetings to that of the CPPCC conference where speeches by deputies to the plenary session are allowed, but no voting is needed, and said: ‘The CPPCC consists of gentlemen (junzi) who use their mouths not their hands. The PCs consist of mean men (xiaoren) who use their hands but not their mouths.’ By referring the CPPCC members as ‘gentlemen’ and the PDs as ‘mean men,’ this comment also reveals that the CPPCC members tend to be social dignitaries and intellectual elites; in contrast, more PDs have come from modest background, such as model workers and peasants, and the representatives of all trades (Int. LJ-9806). Most of the time, the PDs are divided into delegations for group discussion, and the PDs are scattered in different hotels or meeting rooms, in order to guarantee them some time and opportunity to discuss issues of common interest. A delegation consists of the PDs from the same electoral district, which can be a municipality, a county, an autonomous prefecture, or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It has its own head, often the party secretary or administrative head from that region, with several deputy heads. Most activities during the session of the PCs are conducted within the delegations. In addition to the full meeting, a delegation also divides itself into several groups. Therefore, the PDs spend a lot of their time at group meetings (xiaozhu huiyi) and, sometimes, joint meetings of several groups (lianzhu huiyi). According to Yan Jiaqi, a prominent Chinese political scientist, each delegation is like a cell and forms a ‘honey-comb structure’ with other delegations. A PD has most of his/her activities in the cell and is for the most part isolated from 90 percent of the other PDs. No wonder a Hong Kong NPCPD once joked, ‘The big gathering of the PDs is really a lot of small

44

The institutionalization of the PPCs

talk.’ Yan argues that the unicameral PCs, from the NPC to the LPCs, actually has three parts: The first part is the Plenary Session which only accounts for one-third of the time; the second is ‘honey-comb meetings’ of the delegations which accounts for two-thirds of the time; the third part is the SC. Yan argues: The first part has three major functions: listening to the work report, voting for appointments, and passing resolutions and laws. This is a ‘dumb meeting’ at which only ears and hands are useful, talk and speech are not allowed. In the second part, delegates can neither raise their hands, nor press their buttons; it is a meeting that allows speaking of opinions without voting. For a parliament, the main purpose of ‘parler’ (to speak) is to influence voting; but for the Chinese ‘People’s Congresses,’ no matter how a ‘people’s deputy’ speaks in the group meeting of his delegation, more than 90 percent of the ‘people’s deputies’ are unable to hear him. The different groups have to depend on the conference bulletin for communication. The conference bulletin is published one day later and ‘radical words’ are often omitted. (Yan 1994–5) Ironically, the large size of the PPCs makes it difficult for the PDs to affect decision-making but easier for the leaders to exert control. And yet, to downsize, the PPCs may have to sacrifice their representation. The dilemma of how to balance representation and efficiency has been reflected in the two distinct developmental patterns of the PPCs before and after the Cultural Revolution. If we use as a watershed the Cultural Revolution, when the PPCs were abolished, we can identify a bi-modal curve (see Table 2.2). Before this period, the size of the PPCs had expanded steadily. Afterwards, the size of PPCs has steadily shrunk. Clearly, these two patterns demonstrate a negative relationship between the size and political effectiveness of the PPCs. Before the Cultural Revolution, as the size of the PPCs became inflated, they lost their coherence and efficiency, and eventually lost their political effectiveness and efficacy. At the end, the PPCs were marginalized in Chinese politics and completely abolished around 1966. This historical lesson helped the Chinese leaders to start downsizing the PPCs after the Cultural Revolution. In the second period, when the leaders wanted the PPCs to be politically efficient, they cut the number of the PPCPDs. As the number of the PDs decreased, the efficiency and effectiveness of the PPCs increased. However, if we compare the two periods of the PPCs before and after the Cultural Revolution, we can identify two unexpected phenomena. First, the size of PPCs has never returned to the level of their first term; and second, the number of days that the PPCs were in session did not substantially increase after the Cultural Revolution. Actually, in many provinces, the number of days of the PPC meeting decreased after the CR. For example, based on statistics from sixteen available provinces, ten PPCs had fewer days

The institutionalization of the PPCs

45

Table 2.2 Days of PPC meeting during the decades before and after the Cultural Revolution Liaoning Jiangxi Shanghai Hunan

80/65 97/73 95/67 73/87

Jilin Shandong Fujian Guangdong

87/77 110/82 72/83 108/81

Henan Jiangsu Guangxi Gansu

76/91 92/66 87/80 82/81

Hubei Anhui Sichuan Xinjiang

77/77 52/77 102/71 88/101

Total 1,374/1,259 (decreased by 115 days) Sources: Shou and Li 1990; Liu et al. 1992. Note The decade before the Cultural Revolution is from 1954 to 1964; the decade after the Cultural Revolution is from 1977 to 1987, except for Jiangxi, Xinjiang, and Anhui, where it is from 1978 to 1988.

of full session meetings in the first decade after the Cultural Revolution than before. Taking together all 16 PPCs, the trend is that there was a decrease of days of meetings from 1,374 days to 1,259 days (see Table 2.2). In Shanghai, the five congresses (1954–65) before the Cultural Revolution had a total of 139 days in session; the four congresses (1977–95, the 10th Congress would finish its term in 1998) after the CR had a total of 175 days in session. In other words, during the first period, the PPCs met an average of 12 to 13 days per year, but nine to seven days per year during the later period (data from B. Cai 1998). To use their own history as a benchmark, the PPCs still have the potential to increase their activity. The size of the legislature often has allegedly correlated negatively and the length of a meeting often correlated positively to its efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, if the Chinese leaders wanted to achieve efficiency and effectiveness, why did they not cut the size of the PPCs further to, let’s say, around three hundred, or even to the level of the first PPCs? Why did they stop the process of downsizing the PPCs after 1990? Also, why didn’t they prolong the meetings of the PPCs? One reason for keeping the enormous size of the PPCs is that some leaders and members did not want to cut the size too much as this would sacrifice their representation. Given that they could not resort to downsizing the PPCs or prolonging their meetings for achieving effectiveness, what alternatives have been found for strengthening the PPCs? To answer this question, we have to discuss the SCs, the CGs, and the special committees, and their role in the function of the PPCs. In reality, these three smaller institutions have become real powerhouses within the power organs. They have seen their powers expanded more than the PPC Plenary Sessions. This explains one puzzling observation: the correlation between the size of the PPCs and the total local statutes passed by the PPCs from 1979 to 1999 (see Chapter 5) is 0.43, which does not support the conventional wisdom that the size of a legislature has a negative impact upon its efficiency. Since the real legislative work is done more in the SCs that tend to be small, the size of the PPCs does not make a great difference in the lawmaking productivity of the provinces.

46

The institutionalization of the PPCs

The standing committees of the PPCs It took a long time for the LPCs at and above the county level to establish their SCs. The Chinese congressional scholars characterize this difficult process of ‘four pregnancies and three miscarriages’ (Quanguo 2000b: 64). Early before the Cultural Revolution, the issue as to whether to establish SCs for the LPCs was put on the agenda three times (1954, 1957, and 1965), but it never materialized. The fundamental obstacle to it was that the LPCs did not have the power to make laws. The top leadership thought that if they met twice a year, it was unnecessary to have SCs. The political reality was that the lack of money and the practice of PDs taking multiple positions made it impossible for the PCs to meet twice a year. Consequently, when the PCs were not in session, their functions were taken over by the governments. Meanwhile, political movements (e.g., the Anti-rightists Movement and the Cultural Revolution) intervened and doomed the creation of SCs within the LPCs. In February 1979, this issue popped up again. On May 17, 1979, Peng Zhen, then Chairman of the NPC Lawmaking Work Committee (LMWC), wrote a report to the CPCCC, suggesting three alternatives for the PCs’ reforms and recommending a plan for establishing the SCs for all the PCs at the county level and above. This scheme would separate the state power organ from the administration, and provide a remedy to the political vacuum created by the fact that the Plenary Sessions were not taking place. This recommendation was accepted by the central leadership (Deng Xiaoping liked it) and then approved by the NPCSC in June. The Organic Law passed in July 1979 carried the provision that the PCs at and above the county level shall establish their SCs. In August, Tibet and Qinghai, two remote areas with a large number of minorities, first established their Table 2.3 Dates of the establishment of PPC standing committees 1979 August: Tibet (08/14/79), Qinghai (08/79) September: Xinjiang (09/05/79), Henan (09/13/79) December: Neimenggu (12/79), Zhejiang (12/79), Gansu (12/06/79), Shandong (12/22/79), Fujian (12/22/79), Sichuan (12/25/79), Shanxi (12/25/79), Heilongjiang (12/26/79), Guangxi (12/26/79), Guangdong (12/26/79), Jiangxi (12/27/79), Hunan (12/28/79), Shanghai (12/29/79), Shaanxi (12/29/79), Jiangsu (12/30/79), Beijing (12/31/79), Anhui (12/31/79), Yunnan (12/31/79) 1980 Hubei (01/16/80), Ningxia (01/15/80), Guizhou (01/19/80), Liaoning (01/29/80), Hebei (02/06/80), Jilin (04/04/80), Tianjin (06/80) 1988 Hainan (08/23/88) 1997 Chongqing (06/08/1997) Sources: Shou and Li 1990; Liu et al. 1992; Y. Zhang 1993; Quanguo 2000b.

The institutionalization of the PPCs

47

PPCSCs. On September 13, the NPCSC passed the resolution establishing the SCs within the PPCs. In 1979 another 19 provinces (and autonomous regions, and MDCGs) followed suit (Yang 1991: 70–1). In 1980 another eight provinces established their PPCSCs. According to the Organic Law, the PPCSCs consist of the chairpersons, vice-chairpersons, secretaries general, and some members. The size is to range from 35 to 65 members. Some provinces with an extremely large population can have a larger SC, but is not to exceed the limit of 85 members (Article 36). In 1988 the average size of the PPCSC was 59 members. Compared with the previous two terms of the PPCs, it had declined slightly. But none of them tried to be more compact and closer to the bottom line. The average size obviously inclined towards the ceiling (see Table 2.5). Given the vast diversity in population and geographic size of the provinces, the sizes of the PPCs tended to be similar, the PPCSCs even more so. The factors of population and geographic size had a positive but not proportionally an enormous impact upon the size of SCs. This observation supports George Stigler (1976)’s conclusion concerning the ‘size of legislatures’: the legislature of the states are remarkably similar in size. But they have not been stable over the past decade of change. This similarity of the sizes of the PPCSCs laid down an institutional foundation allowing the SCs of the different PPCs to emulate each other’s policy and make them look similar to each other in many of their functional aspects. Compared to the Plenary Sessions, the PPCSCs were small enough to allow meetings to be frequent and effective. Usually, they meet at least once every two months in accordance with the Organic Law. According to my own incomplete statistics from 16 provinces between the years of 1983 and 1995, the average frequency of a Plenary Session was once a year, and the average duration of a meeting was nine days. For the SC meetings, the average frequency was 6.5 times a year, and the average duration of a meeting was five and a half days. Only one PPC had any extra plenary Table 2.4 Frequencies of plenary sessions and SC meetings in the 1980s (since the establishment of these SCs to 1991) PPC

Plenary session

Standing committee

Neimenggu Jiangxi Hubei Hainan (since 1988) Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Ningxia Xinjiang

13 times 13 13 5 13 12 12 12 12

68 times 67 77 20 72 63 76 71 67

Source: Y. Zhang 1993.

Table 2.5 Numbers of SC members, vice chairpersons, and the chairpersons’ group (including secretaries general) 1979 (5th) SC Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Shanghai Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan

62 43 79 56 63 62 61 71 71 74 77 65 51 55 79 75

1983 (6th) VC

CG

14 11 18 9 13 15 14 10 12 9 11 10 13 9 13 13

16 13 20 11 15 17 16 12 14 11 13 12 15 11 15 15

SC

1988 (7th)

VC 66 58 87 54 54 61 61 61 74 55 64 64 46 53 66 66

15 12 15 10 11 11 11 10 10 11 12 11 9 7 14 11

C 17 14 17 12 13 13 13 12 12 13 14 13 11 9 16 13

SC

1993 (8th)

VC 64 57 84 61 60 59 59 64 67 48 58 61 44 50 79 61

9 10 8 9 9 8 8 8 7 7 9 10 8 4 10 7

C 11 12 10 11 11 10 10 10 9 9 11 12 10 6 12 9

SC

VC 63 55 69 58 57 65 60 77 49 49 65 67 58 55 90 86

9 10 10 8 10 8 10 9 7 7 9 10 8 5 12 12

1998 (9th) C 11 12 12 10 12 10 13 11 9 9 11 12 10 6 14 14

SC 62 55 65 60 59 65 60 64 59 46 61 65 51 55 74 71

VC

CG

8 9 8 10 9 8 9 8 7 7 8 9 9 9 10 8

10 11 10 11 11 10 11 10 9 9 10 11 11 11 12 10

Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Chongqing Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xingjiang Total Average

59 72 73 67 n.a. 79 n.a. 61 60 48 65 60 50 49 57

15 14 16 14 n.a. 10 n.a. 13 12 11 16 18 16 7 14

17 16 18 16 n.a. 12 n.a. 15 14 13 18 20 18 9 16

1,844 370 428 63.59 12.8 15.3

Sources: Liu et al. 1990: 294–5; Y. Zhang 1993.

64 69 82 59 n.a. 88 n.a. 65 61 53 60 50 42 41 51

12 14 13 10 n.a. 13 n.a. 15 12 10 10 14 10 8 14

14 16 15 12 n.a. 15 n.a. 17 14 12 12 16 12 10 16

67 65 78 66 34 78 n.a. 58 63 43 55 52 47 44 51

12 9 11 10 7 10 n.a. 9 7 9 10 12 8 7 12

14 11 13 12 9 12 n.a. 11 9 11 12 14 10 9 14

77 65 63 62 45 80 n.a. 59 60 48 56 48 45 45 54

12 9 8 9 8 10 n.a. 10 8 13 9 7 8 8 9

10 11 9 10 10 12 n.a. 12 10 15 11 9 10 10 11

65 64 70 61 41 81 63 54 62 43 51 60 45 43 55

1,775 335 393 1,777 264 324 1,380 272 326 1,830 61.2 11.6 13.6 59.2 8.8 10.8 61 9.1 10.9 59

9 8 6 8 8 10 7 11 8 14 8 8 8 8 9

11 10 8 9 10 12 9 13 10 15 10 10 10 10 11

266 325 8.58 10.5

50

The institutionalization of the PPCs

meetings beyond the one required each year by the Organic Law. One important reason for this was that their large size was a financial drain on the PPCs, which depended upon government budgets for their money. But most of the PPCs could afford to have one or two more PPCSC meetings each year. For a PPC, a typical Plenary Session lasts for a week. A typical PPCSC meeting lasts from one day to a week and has more flexibility in terms of meeting days and frequency. In one year, the total number of days of a PPCSC typically has been about three to six weeks. The complete data from Shanghai (1978–95) reveal that the MPC there had a total of 22 Plenary Sessions. Among the five years with two meetings, only one took place in 1993, all others took place in the 1980s. The total number of days of the Plenary Sessions was 175, an average of nine to ten days for each session. From 1980 (the first SC meeting was conducted) to 1995, there were 127 SC meetings, with a total of 313 days. Each SC meeting lasted on average two and a half days. From Figure 2.3, we can see that in terms of meeting frequency, the curve is relatively flat for both the Plenary Sessions and SC meetings. But the total number of days seemed to indicate that the heydays for the Plenary Sessions were in the 1980s. In contrast, the 1990s were the golden years for the SC. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the expansion of legislative power and the enhancement of legislative activism did not have to happen evenly in these two bodies. The SCs, as shown in the Shanghai case, have been the major beneficiary of institutional change. This pattern has been corroborated by information available from other provinces. To make it easier for the PPCSCs to convene meetings to handle some unexpected and urgent issues, the full-time members and members who live in the provincial capital cities have also increased gradually. For example, in Guangdong, the 5th Congress had 23 full-time members out of 71, accounting for 33 percent; the 6th Congress had 34 out of 68, accounting for 50 35 30 25

P–Frequency P–Days SC–Frequency SC–Days

20 15 10 5 0 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Figure 2.3 frequency (times) and duration (days) of the plenary meetings and SC meetings (January 1978–December 1995) in Shanghai (source: the author based on B. Cai 1998: 28–80).

The institutionalization of the PPCs

51

percent; and under the 7th Congress, it was 32 out of 68, accounting for 47 percent. In Liaoning, the 5th Congress had 17 percent of full-time members within the SC. Under the 6th Congress, the percentage increased to 45 percent, and under the 7th Congress, it increased to 55 percent. In Fujian, the 6th Congress had eight full-timers among 34 SC members, accounting for 24 percent. The 7th Congress had 15 full-timers among 43 SC members, a percentage increase to 35 percent. In Shandong, the 7th Congress had 83 SC members. Among them, there were 52 full- time members, plus the chairman, vice-chairpersons, and the secretary general (11 people). The fulltime members accounted for 76 percent of the SC. In Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia), the full-timers increased from a mere three in the 5th Congress to 12 under the 6th Congress, to 18 under the 9th (Quanguo 2000b: 152). Meanwhile, more and more PPCSC members and vice-chairpersons were living in the provincial capitals. Take Shandong as an example: in 1983, among nine chairpersons and vice-chairpersons, five lived in the provincial capital. In 1989, six out of ten lived there. In Sichuan’s 7th PPCSC, 11 out of 78 members were residents (Int. ZW-0304). In Shanghai, the number and percentage of full-time and residential SC members showed steady growth: three (5 percent) under the 7th Congress (1979–83), 25 (39 percent) under the 8th (1983–8), 27 (44 percent) under the 9th (1988–93) and 31 (47 percent) under the 10th (1993–8) (Cai 1998: 249–52). Because of these developments, the PPCSCs increasingly became the place where important discussions as well as other important activities took place. According to the Local Organic Law, the PPCSCs have many powers and roles that give them enough space to exert their authority. Peng Zhen divided these powers into four categories: (1) Legislative power. They can make and promulgate local statutes and regulations in accordance with each province’s own situations and practical needs. One limitation on this power is that these local statutes and regulations cannot contravene the general guidelines and policies of the Center. (2) The power of decision-making. They have the power to discuss and decide important issues concerning politics, the economy, culture, education, health, civil administration, and the nationalities in their regions. They are also able to confirm the partial change of the economic plan and government budgets. (3) The personnel power. They have the power to decide and confirm appointments. (4) The supervisory power. They can exercise power to supervise the government, the court and the procuratorate. The chairpersons’ group (CG) The cores of the PPCSCs are the CGs that supervise their routine operation and deal with important issues. Despite variations in different provinces, the CG conducts its regular meetings at least once a month, sometimes once a fortnight. It consists of the chairperson and all other vice-chairpersons. The 1979 original and 1982 revised version of the Local Organic Law did not

52

The institutionalization of the PPCs

clearly state whether the secretaries general (mishuzhang) of the SCs were included in the CGs. In most provinces, the secretaries general were included in this body, as they were, for example, in Hubei, Shanghai, Qinghai, and Neimenggu. But some other provinces, for example, Shanxi, Hebei, and Tianjin, excluded their secretaries general. The 1986 revision unified the practices in different provinces and stipulated that the secretaries general were members of the Chairpersons’ Group. The CG meeting is presided over by the chairperson. He/she can also authorize a vice-chairperson to coordinate the meeting in case he/she is unable to do so. To call a CG meeting requires the attendance of at least 50 percent of CG members. To pass a resolution and make decisions, it also must meet this simple majority. The deputy secretary general, chairpersons of special committees, the director of the general office and the heads of the work committees are invited to attend meetings as non-voting members. The chairperson or the authorized vice-chairperson can also decide to invite leaders from the government, court and the procuratorate to attend the meeting as non-voting members. In some provinces, because some vicechairpersons do not reside in the provincial capitals, the chairperson can call a Chairpersons’ Work Conference that includes all vice-chairpersons residing in the provincial capitals and, thus, meet more frequently, usually once a week, to discuss important issues. According to the law, the CG has a variety of powers, but the most important power is to set the agenda for the PPCSC and the Plenary Session. It can decide what, when, and how some issues shall be discussed. For example, it can decide whether to submit for discussion to the SC a bill, an inquiry, or a motion for removal. To some extent, the CG is the steering committee for the PPC. Because the size of the CG is small, all members are full-timers, and most reside in the provincial capitals. They can meet easily and solve problems effectively. In comparison to the SC meetings, the CG meetings are more frequent but shorter. For example, in Shanghai, within five years (1988–92), there were more than 82 CG meetings (B. Cai 1998: 49). In 1989, the PPC of Shandong had five SC meetings, totaling 32 days. During the same period, there were 18 meetings of the Chairpersons’ Group, totaling 20 and a half days. Therefore, the core leadership of the Chinese provincial legislatures is very compact. The PPCs have escaped from the problem of the atomistic character evident in the U.S. Congress (Hertzke and Peters 1992), and, therefore, it is easier for the CGs and SCs to fulfill the function of collective action. The special committees and work committees The LPCs did not have special committees before the establishment of the SC in 1979. As the SCs were established within the PPCs, some provinces (for example, Shanghai) established a few work committees or offices at the same time. After 1982, when the new constitution stipulated that the NPC

The institutionalization of the PPCs

53

might establish special committees, some PPCs (for example, in Hunan and Jiangxi) emulated the NPC and started establishing their own special committees. Because there was no clear law stipulating the establishment of special committees, their status was very unstable, and different provinces had different practices. For example, in 1986, following the central policy of ‘simplifying the administrative structure,’ some PPCs abolished the rudimentary special committees or work committees. In 1987, six PPCs had special committees, some other provinces had work committees and offices, while in some provinces, special committees and work committees coexisted. To clarify their status, power, and composition, in December 1986, the NPCSC added a new provision to the Local Organic Law stating that the PPCs may establish special committees, such as the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC), Financial and Economic Committees, Education, Science, and Cultural Committee, and so forth, in accordance with their needs. The special committees are under the leadership of the PPC when they are in session, and when they are not in session they are supervised by the SC. Each special committee has a chairperson, one to three vice-chairpersons, and several members (As Shanghai’s practice indicates, most of them are SC members, see Table 2.6.) They are nominated by the Presidium from the PPCPDs and confirmed by the Plenary Session. Special committees are an integral part of the power organ of the state, having authority to initiate, Table 2.6 The composition of special committees under the Shanghai MPCSC Committees

Size

SC members

Legislation Work Financial & Economic Education/Science/Culture/Health Municipal Construction Total

10 17 13 14 54

6 16 12 12 46

4 1 1 2 8

3 10 4 7 24

9th Legislation Work (1988–93) Financial and Economic Education/Science/Culture/Health Municipal Construction Overseas Chinese, Nationalities, and Religious Affairs Total

14 20 15 13

10 16 13 7

4 4 2 6

7 11 4 5

10 72

4 50

6 22

2 29

12 19 13 8

11 19 12 8

1 0 1 0

6 11 5 6

8 60

7 57

1 3

2 30

8th (1983–8)

10th (1993–8)

Legislation Work Financial and Economic Education/Science/Culture/Health Municipal Construction Overseas Chinese, Nationalities, and Religious Affairs Total

Source: B. Cai 1998: 416.

Ordinary deputies

Fulltimers

54

The institutionalization of the PPCs

evaluate, draft, and review bills. They report on their work and explain the making of laws to the SC as well as to the Plenary Session. And they process the proposals and legislative initiations from the Presidium and SC. After the 1989 elections, the PPCs in Hubei, Guizhou, Shandong, Shaanxi, and Heilongjiang established their own special committees. Liaoning and Jilin soon followed suit in 1989 and 1990. Anhui province illustrates well the cumulative build-up of special or work committees. In 1979, the PPC started with a General Bureau that had a Secretariat, an Investigation and Research Department, and an Administrative Department, and four Work Committees (Elections; Political and Legal Affairs; Financial and Economic Affairs; and Science and Education). In 1981, the General Bureau added the Personnel Department, and the Bills, Letters and Visits Office, while all Work Committees added offices. In 1985, the Investigation and Research Office was changed to a Research Office, and was upgraded to a SC Research Office three years later. An Urban and Rural Construction Committee and a Rural Economy Committee were created in 1985 and 1990, respectively. In 1999, after two decades of evolution, the Anhui PPCSC had support from a General Bureau (including nine departments), a Research Office (including three departments), a Law and Statutes Work Office (including one office and department), and seven work committees (Personnel, Elections and Deputies; Legislation Work; Financial and Economic Affairs; Education, Science, Technology, Culture and Health; Urban and Rural Construction and Environment/Resources Preservation; the Rural Economy; and Nationalities, Religious, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Affairs). Despite the change of the Local Organic Law, some PPCs still have not established special committees. Instead, their SCs have established work committees to assist with lawmaking and other issues. The differences between a special committee and a work committee mainly are these: the former is accountable to the Plenary Session and its members are PDs. It is a part of the power organ of the state. The latter is under the leadership of the CG and the SC. Its members are appointed by the SC and may not be the PDs. It may include some professionals and staff members. It is a staff agency for the SC and Chairpersons’ Group and does not directly answer to the Plenary Session. Because a work committee gives more leeway to the Chairpersons’ Group and the SC, many PPCs have preferred this format. For example, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Ningxia had work committees. Up to the early 1990s, among the 30 PPCs, 20 established special committees. Among them seven had work committees at the same time. Another ten PPCs maintained work committees (Quanguo 1992c: 297; Quanguo 1991: 264–5). In addition, 23 PPCs had agencies at the prefecture level, namely, the Prefecture Work Committees for Liaison (Cai 1992: 412). By the end of the century, 27 PPCs and their SCs had already created special committees, the number ranging from three to eight. For example, the Hebei PPC now has a

PPC Plenary Session Presidium The Lawmaking Committee Special Committees

Interior and Legal Affairs

Research Office

Financial and Economic Affairs

Work Committees

Education, Science and Cultural Affairs

Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Environment Protection

Chairpersons Work Meeting Chairpersons Group

Standing Committee Standing Committee Meeting

CPC Party Committee

Urban and Rural Construction

Chairperson, Vice Chairpersons

Secretary General Deputy Secretaries General

General Office Director, Deputy Directors Comprehensive Section Secretariat

Personnel Lawmaking Work Electoral Work

Administrative Section Accounting

Information Letters and Visits

Reception

Retired Cadre Deputy Credentials Review Committee Deputies Liaison Prefecture Work Committees

News and Propaganda Magazine/Paper Editorial Office

Service Center Printing/Copying Accommodation

Figure 2.4 A typical structure of PPC and standing committee (source: the author, based on the structures of the PPCs in Hebei, Jiangsu, and Liaoning).

56

The institutionalization of the PPCs

General Bureau, a Research Office, and eight Special Committees (LMWC; Interior and Legal Affairs; Financial and Economic Affairs; Agricultural and Economic Affairs; City Construction and Environmental Protection; Education, Science, Culture and Health; Elections and Appointments; and Nationality, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Affairs). Four provinces (Anhui, Henan, Hainan, and Gansu) only have work committees, but no special committees (Quanguo 2000b: 110). The prefecture work committees According to the constitution, the Chinese state is administratively divided into three levels: the central government, provinces, and counties. The complexity of governing such a country of enormous size and uneven development makes it necessary for provinces to combine several counties into a prefecture and to station agencies there to manage local affairs. As part of a long tradition, the provincial governments have always set up agencies at the prefecture level. An administrative commissioner and his/her administrative office (which supervises many bureaus) represent the provincial authorities. Later, the court and procuratorate systems established their own agencies at this level. These agencies exercised tremendous power over counties and greatly affected the people’s lives there. In 1979, as the PC system was gradually institutionalized, some PPCs also started setting up the Congressional Liaison Offices to represent the PPCs and also tried to supervise the administrative and judicial branches at the prefecture level. Because the Local Organic Law did not mention the status and authority of the Congressional Liaison Offices, some provinces put them under the leadership of the prefecture party committees; some others gave them a very low ranking. Essentially, the administrative and judicial agencies faced no supervision from the PCs at all. Many LPC members complained that a ‘fracture’ or ‘loophole’ existed in the Chinese power structure. In 1986, as we discussed before, Peng Zhen’s two speeches encouraged the PPCs to upgrade their Congressional Liaison Offices making them independent work bodies unaffiliated with the party committees. In 1995, the Local Organic Law was revised to allow the PPCSCs to set up the Prefecture Work Committees (PWCs) as their agencies. At the prefecture level, the presence of the PPCs was formally recognized. The PWCs often consist of a director, one to five deputy directors, and several members (ranging from one to a dozen). The PPCSCs appoint all of them. In Yunnan Province, it is mandatory that the full-timers in the PWCs account for no less than one-third of the total. The committees have been given the following functions: to maintain contact between the PPCs and their PDs and county PCs; to inspect and review law enforcement; to supervise the administrative and judicial agencies; to coordinate the elections at the county and village levels; and to work on assignments from the PPCSCs, such as collecting information, conducting investigations, and responding to

The institutionalization of the PPCs

57

people’s complaints, and so forth. Lu Gongxun, the Shanxi PPCSC Chairman (1993–8) gave this summary: Based upon ten years of experience in my province, the PWCs are a ‘joint’ connecting the PCs at different levels, an ‘information station’ transmitting the popular will and mood; a ‘general staff’ guiding the work of the PCs at the grassroots level; a ‘construction team’ pushing forward the pace of democracy and the legal system. (Yuan 1998: 16) But it should also be noted that the PWCs have not been given legislative power, or the personnel power regarding appointment and removal, nor the power to make resolutions as found within the PPCs and MPCs in larger cities. Therefore, their power is limited to oversight – a power not backed up by other mechanisms. Thus, they are pretty much toothless tigers. Also, due to the uneven development in China’s rural and border regions, the role and status of the PWCs vary greatly from region to region. In 1983, the central government introduced ‘the city-administering-counties system’ (shiguanxian) in order to create regional economic centers, facilitate horizontal integration, and speed up the urbanization process. As a result, more and more municipalities consolidated them by incorporating surrounding counties into their jurisdiction. They have increasingly become a de facto administrative level, replacing the old prefectures. However, many remote and rural regions lack an urban center for clustering. Thus, the prefectures, although declining in number, have remained. For example, in 1990, there were 151 prefectures (including Leagues in Neimenggu). At the end of 1996, the prefectures decreased to 91. In 2001, only 67 prefectures survived in 14 provinces (M. Zhang 1993: 227; Yuan 1998: 504–16; ZGDTC 2002: 3). In the near future, we will see more MPCs replacing the PWCs, as the latter now are serving as a preparatory body for the former. The staff As Milton Esman points out, Perhaps the most important resource to an organization is its staff. Staff development is a continuing function of institution builders because personnel are rarely available in the labor market with the precise skills, knowledge, and programmatic commitment that effective performance requires in an innovative organization. (Esman in Eaton 1972: 31) In the past two decades, lack of competent staff has been one serious challenge to the PPCs’ institutionalization. The PPCs also have fought hard to get more new members in contrast to the authorized move to streamline the

58

The institutionalization of the PPCs

size of government. In 1980, Peng Zhen suggested that the staff should be built into a ‘coolie team,’ and young, energetic, efficient, and hard-working people should be recruited. Later a 1987 report on the construction of a staff system required that the staff should be both a ‘coolie team’ and an ‘intellectual team.’ Age and education were emphasized (Sichuan 1991: 31; Quanguo 1990a: 470–3). Under these guidelines, a staff system developed rapidly and the quality of staff members also improved. From 1979 to 1983, the staff members in 29 PPCs increased to 2,054; in five PPCs, the number of staff members exceeded 100; one PPC had 120 staff members. From 1983 to 1987, the authorized number of staff members increased with the addition of another 1,600. All PPCs had more than 100 authorized staff members, 11 PPCs exceeded 120, and one had 206. After 1988, the staff members of all PPCs exceeded 4,700, more than doubling the 1983 numbers (Cai 1992: 411). Compared to their low starting-point, the increase of staff members has been encouraging (see Table 2.7). Even when compared to many developing countries, staff support in China is strong. The major responsibility of the staff is to assist and serve three meetings: the Plenary Sessions, the SC meetings, and the CG meetings. They are responsible for preparing these meetings, drafting relevant documents, editing conference bulletins, and contacting and coordinating the different delegations. Since Plenary Sessions last only about a week and most PDs and many SC members do not live in the provincial capital, in reality, the core leadership of the Chairpersons’ Group and some resident SC members have been the predominant users of staff support. After these meetings, the activities of the staff also include assisting the PDs, and especially, the SCs and Table 2.7 Expansions of the PPC standing committee staff PPC

1980

1991

1999

Tianjin Hebei Neimenggu Liaoning Jiangsu Fujian Hubei Henan Guangdong Shaanxi Jiangxi Shandong Anhui Gansu

63 60 59 40 45 20 n.a. n.a. 80 80 60 129** 40 n.a.

159 200 122* 130 188 163 n.a. 200 160 158 189 225 n.a. n.a.

168+ n.a. 155 186 n.a. n.a. 159 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 182 255

Sources: Liu et al. 1990b: 303;: Y. Zhang 1993; Quanguo 2000b. Notes * This is the 1990 number. + This is the 1996 number. ** This is the 1988 number.

Table 2.8 Size of staff for Local People’s Congresses: 1991 Unit

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimengu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan

Provincial real size

178 141 173 186 192 181 178 209 191 140 112 168 152 152 221 176

Municipality and autonomous prefecture

County

Authorized

Average

Authorized

n.a. n.a. 668 301 216 1,164 457 n.a. n.a. 623 288 448 338 277 729 726

n.a. n.a. 66.8 50.2 54.0 83.1 65.3 n.a. n.a. 56.6 32.0 49.9 56.3 46.2 72.9 60.5

532 503 5,019 753 2,595 2,449 1,652 n.a. 370 2,416 953 1,420 1,626 2,036 3,967 3,651

Prefecture Average 29.6 27.9 29.0 15.7 26.0 24.5 28.0 n.a. 17.6 22.8 11.1 13.5 20.3 20.6 29.8 23.1

Authorized n.a. n.a. 63 98 33 n.a. 22 85 n.a. n.a. 10 27 45 49 183 27

Average n.a. n.a. 7.9 16.3 4.1 n.a. 22.0 21.3 n.a. n.a. 5.0 3.9 15.0 8.9 36.6 5.4 continued

Table 2.8 Continued Unit

Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan Xizang Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang Total

Provincial real size

Municipality and autonomous prefecture

County

Authorized

Authorized

Average

Prefecture Average

Authorized

Average

127 179 138 145 83 202 138 151 115 142 175 100 138 185

460 539 707 285 n.a. 902 233 350 25 253 309 206 99 265

51.1 59.9 44.2 57.0 n.a. 64.4 46.6 38.9 25.0 63.5 44.1 29.4 49.5 44.2

n.a. 3,576 n.a. 2,219 n.a. 4,394 1,812 2,271 n.a. 2,167 1,809 671 550 804

n.a. 28.6 n.a. 20.9 n.a. 20.5 21.1 17.7 n.a. 20.3 21.3 15.6 22.9 22.3

69 107 n.a. 50 n.a. 109 118 123 32 54 36 7 10 43

11.5 21.4 n.a. 6.3 n.a. 18.2 29.5 17.6 5.3 9.0 5.1 7.0 5.0 5.4

4,768

10,142

51.2

50,215

18.6

1,400

11.7

Source: Cai 1992: 414–15.

The institutionalization of the PPCs

61

special committees to write and examine bills and laws; communicating with the PDs and lower PCs and the NPC; receiving visits and letters from ordinary people; writing books and handbooks, doing theoretical research, and publishing magazines, and so forth. Undoubtedly, both the quantity and quality of the staff are laudable achievements. However, one fact has not been fundamentally changed: the PCs’ staff members have much less chance than those in the government and Party branches to be promoted to higher positions. Coupled with a less desirable working environment and less access to tangible resources, the PPCs’ offices not only have more trouble attracting talented and ambitious future leaders, but also have been losing many talented people to other institutions. The instability of the staff has been a problem for the further development of the PPCs (Quanguo 2000b: 73). One staff member, who was the first Ph.D. to work for a PPC in China and eventually left his job as a department director, complained that he hit the wall regarding career advancement. He observed that only a small number of staff members, those who had worked directly for the PPCSC chairpersons for many years, can get recommendations from the chairpersons to be placed in government or Party jobs when they finally retire. For other staff members, there is no way to move up either to the NPC positions or to the government and Party jobs at the provincial level (Int. ZW-0306). One provincial government department director labeled the jobs in the PPCs as ‘Sanjiu Weita’ (‘999 Upset Stomach Reliever,’ a very popular brand name that even once put its advertisement in Times Square in New York), which means that the PPCs’ staff members go to work at 9 o’clock in the morning and leave at 3 in the afternoon. Thus, they are able to take good care of their stomachs and health. He said that if offered a choice, he would not want to work for the PPC (Int. HWJ-9807). It is quite understandable that the PPCs have appealed to the Party and government not to treat them as the final destination for officials, but, instead, to treat them as a ‘training ground for cadre,’ so that there can be opportunities for the PPC officials to move up in the communist apparatus (this point will be further discussed in Chapter 4). Unlike almost all legislatures in Western democracies, China’s PPCs’ system has three unequal organizations that differ in their size, in the duration of their meetings, and in their prestige, accesses to power resources (such as information), staff support, and distance from the decision-making center. These differences, (particularly regarding the proximity or remoteness to the decision-making process), create an inequality of status among the different parts of the PPCs. In theory, the Plenary Session is the most important organization within the PPC and the highest local power organ within that province. The PPCs are not directly elected and do not have their own constituency. Therefore, the PPCPDs do not represent homogeneous interests and provide no consistent input for the system. Because the elections are indirect, the mass media are tightly controlled, and competitive parties and interest groups do not

62

The institutionalization of the PPCs

exist, there are few legal mechanisms for political representation and interest articulation. In China’s political system, the PPCs are essentially a place for interest articulation. They bring in all kinds of ideas in currency in the society. In other words, the PPCs are citizens’ forums enabling the leaders to get in touch with the pulse of society and to gather information for interest aggregation and decision-making. However, if this is the case, then the Plenary Session faces the difficulty of reconciling the competing roles of interest circulation and interest aggregation. These roles cannot be carried out at the same time. Another way has to be found to fulfill the functions of interest aggregation and decision-making. To deal with this problem, the internal relationships of the PPCs have gradually evolved into a hierarchical structure: The Plenary Session is for legitimizing the regime and representing demands from the masses, gathering information, testing the impulse of the society, and serving as a safety valve, and so on. Its functional value is measured by how well it accurately reflects the mood of the entire society. The SC is between the Plenary Session and the CG and is the efficient part of the PPC. It is more responsible for interest aggregation, acting as a funnel and a filter to bring together and extract political inputs for the decision makers such as the CG meetings. As for the decision-making function, it is often reserved to the chairperson and the CG. Because the chairperson always is a member of the Provincial Party SC, or is sitting in the Party SC meeting when he or she is not its member, the decision-making core is connected to the Party decision-making mechanism. In general, each PPC is internally a hierarchical structure (but this is different from what I have argued that the PC system is not a hierarchy in terms of the relationships among themselves). The ‘iron law of oligarchy’ has not spared these so-called ‘people’s organizations for representation.’

Development of internal rules Rules provide stability, regularity, and predictability to the operation of the PPCs and their improvement is an indication of the institutional maturity of the PPCs. In the past 20 years or so, especially in the 1980s, the PPCs paid great attention to rules and norms. The total number of local statutes regarding the self-construction of the PPCs and the percentage of these statutes among the total statutes passed from 1979 to 1989 is impressive (see Table 2.9). By the end of the 1980s, almost every province had established a system of rules and norms regulating their own behaviors and their relations with other organizations and actors. Among these enacted local statutes, most are concerned with the legislative process and the institutional building of the PPCs; regulations for the convening of Plenary Sessions, SC meetings, and Chairpersons’ Group meetings; the relationship with and supervision over the government, courts and the procuratorates; regulations for local elections, the operation of the LPCs and their relationship with the PPCs; rules for the PDs’ inspections, people’s

The institutionalization of the PPCs

63

Table 2.9 Numbers and percentages of local statutes on the self-construction of the PPCs (1979–89) PPC Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimenggu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan Xizang Shaanxi Gansu Qinhai Ningxia Xinjiang Total

Total local statutes

Statutes on the PPCs

Percentage

36 39 45 37 26 59 64 50 32 50 46 37 45 32 47 46 36 33 54 33 8 51 54 54 20 27 35 47 31 30

5 8 8 9 6 5 9 10 5 10 7 10 10 7 9 10 8 6 5 7 5 7 15 11 6 6 10 7 7 8

14 21 18 24 23 8 14 20 16 20 15 27 22 22 19 22 22 18 9 21 63 14 28 20 30 22 29 15 23 27

1,204

236

20

Source: Huang Yuncheng 1991. Note This book collects all valid local statutes passed from 1979 to 1989.

letters and visits, the PDs’ responsibility and rights; and regulations for confirming appointments, and so forth. Almost in every aspect, the PPCs have their self-imposed rules and processes to follow. In 1990, there were 360 local statutes concerning the self-construction of the LPCs and their SCs, accounting for 20 percent of the total number of local statutes passed. In all 30 PPCs, 28 local statutes were passed concerning the legislative procedures; 21 concerning supervisions over the government, the court and the procuratorate; 23 concerning personnel appointments; 17 concerning the work rules of the PCSCs; 16 concerning the procedural rules of the Plenary Sessions, 27 concerning the rules of procedure in SC meetings; and 17 concerning

64

The institutionalization of the PPCs

maintaining the channels for contacting the PDs (Quanguo 1992c: 276–7). From 1992 to 1994, 115 local statutes concerning the operation of the PCs were adopted, accounting for 8 percent of all local statutes passed in this period (Data from ZHRMG 1995). In the 1990s, the PPCs continued to improve their working norms and procedures even though a decade of institutionalization, and a shift of focus to assist the creation of a market economy, had caused a decline in the percentage of local statutes concerning the construction of PPCs (see Table 2.10). Table 2.10 Numbers and percentages of local statutes on the self-construction of the PPCs (1991–2001) PPCs Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimenggu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Chongqing Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang Total

Total local statues

Rules on PC

Percentage

161 158 342 262 264 403 359 162 151 359 260 190 271 220 385 239 229 226 471 200 110 332 142 182 248 89 182 149 191 120 124

17 23 32 31 34 31 25 9 18 34 19 27 31 21 19 28 19 20 27 16 17 23 11 17 19 17 21 8 24 12 11

11 15 9 12 13 8 7 6 12 9 7 14 11 10 5 12 8 9 6 8 15 7 8 9 8 19 12 5 13 10 9

7,181

661

9

Source: Made by the author based upon the lists of local statutes in ZGFLNJ 1992–2002.

The institutionalization of the PPCs

65

Conclusion This chapter demonstrates that there has been an institutionalization of the provincial legislatures in China, shows how this institutionalization process has proceeded, and suggests that there has been a link between the dynamics and rationale for an organizational development of the PPCs and the impulse for an economic policy change. My basic conclusion is that institutionalization is obvious in the system of the PPCs over the past quarter century. Considering the large number of PDs and the increasing number of staff, we can say that the legislative branch has become an important component in China’s political system. But it is important to note that a PPC should not be treated as a single entity. In its operation, it has at least three distinctive parts that have different statuses, powers and functions. As we move from the Plenary Session, to the SC, and then to the Chairpersons’ Group and the chairperson, we come to see these bodies get more institutionalized and more powerful. The powers of the Chairpersons’ Group and the SC have been enhanced enormously. As for the ordinary PDs in the Plenary Session, they have gained less power. Most of the time, they have been little more than a sounding board, unless a rebellion occurred on the congressional floor. Because of this uneven development of political power, the PPCs themselves have turned into a hierarchical structure (but not the PC system) in which few core leaders are part of the inner circle of decision-making. The SC shares some decision-making power, but its major function is to aggregate interests for the Chairpersons’ Group – the real decision-making core. The Plenary Session and the ordinary PDs are chosen as a sample group to circulate diverse interests in the rapidly changing Chinese society. Because of the internal hierarchical nature, the PPCs are still a good system for political control. In the following chapters, we will see that the SCs and the CGs are more active and visible in exerting their power. The reasons for the institutionalization of PPCs and the uneven pattern of empowerment for different parts of the PPCs can be traced to the dynamics of this institutionalization. Comparing the two periods of institutionalization of the PC system before and after the Cultural Revolution, there are some similarities between the two stages of first establishing the PCs in the 1950s and then reestablishing them in 1979. In each case, the PC system was used – first by Mao and then by Deng – as an instrument against their political opponents without and within the Party under the pretext of building democracy. Both Mao and Deng regarded this system as an effective way to politically mobilize and legitimize the Party; both of them realized the importance of the PCs for economic and legal construction. After Mao consolidated his power, the PCs came into disuse and were pushed into oblivion for more than ten years. If the political power struggle was the only reason for establishing and expanding the role of the PCs, then the re-institutionalization process after 1979 would have lost momentum as Deng finally came

66

The institutionalization of the PPCs

to dominate Chinese politics. But the development of the PCs has not followed the same pattern as their predecessors in the 1960s. This is not because Deng was a true democrat any more than was Mao. The important reason for this divergence is explained by the fact that Mao and Deng adopted two different economic development strategies. In the re-establishment and later re-institutionalization of the PPCs, the economic impulse became, if not the sole dynamic, the most important agent or catalyst for change. Pressures for economic growth provided opportunities to expand the institutional and power basis for the PC system as a whole, and the PPCs in particular. By following a Stalinist model, Mao Zedong overemphasized the importance of centralization. Naturally, the industrialization process resulted in Mao’s centralization of political power. But Deng pursued a different goal and followed a different strategy: a market economy, instead of a centrally planned economy, was brought into being through decentralization instead of centralization. The post-Mao leadership realized that administrative decentralization has a natural tendency to lose its dynamic character and return to being overly centralized, unless it is based upon the separation of the state and economic enterprises under a market economy. This difference has provided a sustaining justification for the institutionalization of the PCs, and therefore set them on a path of development quite different from those PCs under Mao. There has been a clear pattern during the past quarter century that every fundamental move in China’s economy has prepared a new stage for the evolution of the PPCs. The marketization process has provided an important opportunity for the PPCs to expand power and an impetus to institutionalize them. Because of the necessity for marketization, the PPCs were given enough power and latitude by the central government. After years of institutionalization, the PPCs began to consolidate and routinize their power. The newly expanded powers of the PPCs stemmed from China’s economic marketization and the PPCs’ own institutional adaptations, as well as the interaction between these two processes. In pursuing a market economy, however, Deng did not choose a strategy of liberal capitalism for his marketization. Rather, the trial and error process of China’s development has revealed a pattern of the developmental state, which the state capacity is the most important political precondition for the maintenance and success of this model (Xia 2000a). Therefore, the institutionalization of the PPCs has been shaped to serve this goal. In other words, its development has been limited so as not to weaken the state capacity for political control. Because of this limitation, the institutionalization of China’s PPCs has not been accompanied by an obvious democratization. In the long run, democratization would become inevitable once the PPCs have achieved a high degree of institutionalization. For this reason, I agree with Shirk and Ding’s descriptions of a manipulative political leadership and a strong bureaucratic control during China’s reform era. However, I attribute these phenomena to different causal factors.

3

Institutional linkages of the Provincial People’s Congresses

The pressures for economic development have mainly been responsible for the institutional changes within the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs). But to fully understand their institutional changes, one must also consider the external environment of the PPCs. The PPCs and their affiliated bodies have pursued the goal of institutionalization in a very challenging environment: on the one hand, the pre-existing power matrix was still dominated by the Party and government, who, although openly pledging their support to the pursuit of People’s Congresses (PCs), have set up certain limits. On the other hand, the political environment has been in flux reflecting the quick pace of change in the economy and society, but not rapid enough to allow free elections – the fundamental mechanism for empowering any representative body. Therefore, the internal structures of the PPCs have not moved toward a form of political market that is characterized by political pluralism with less hierarchical control, just as the Chinese politics has not moved in the direction of liberal democracy or embraced a free-market style politics. For any political actor in any country, to exact more powers from the dominant apparatus in such a volatile environment is no easy job. As a weak latecomer to power politics, the PPCs have relied on building up their internal coherence and solidarity with other PCs at different levels to maximize their power resources; meanwhile, they have also developed stratagems to win sympathy and support from the Party and government in order to create more space for their growth. Nie Biechu, the Standing Committee (SC) chairman (1993–8) of the Tianjin Municipal People’s Congress (MPC), once summed up three key points for strengthening the role of PCs and gaining more respect: ‘First, to closely rely on and actively seek the support of the Party; second, to handle well the relationships with the government, the courts, and the procuratorate; third, to build self-strength and play more roles’ (Tianjin 1999: 290). Based upon the concepts of consensus, compatibility, complement, consonance, and convergence, the political entrepreneurs relied on the method of coordination to steer the development of Chinese local people’s congresses (LPCs). To realize its tremendous impact gives us a key to understanding institutional change in China’s transition (Liu 1996: 599–601).

68

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

This chapter intends to argue that the institutionalization of the PPCs has featured a network strategy. By weaving institutional linkages among themselves, with other major political actors and with major social forces, the PPCs have built up a complex network for their institutional development and power expansion. This network has many functions, but the most important one is informational. Because it reaches the central leadership in Beijing and penetrates deep into the grassroots of society, this network has equipped the PPCs with an efficient information network and also helped the NPC and the central leadership to improve their informational efficiency. Ultimately, the political position of the PPCs has been strengthened. For the PPCs, one significant achievement during the last quarter century is that the whole of PCs is greater than the combination of their parts, due to their alliances and linkages with other power players.

The power net of Chinese politics Structural constraints for Chinese legislative development arose from the polity itself, namely, the power matrix woven and centered by the partystate. To illustrate the differentiation of major Chinese state institutions and their functional specialization, it is necessary to delineate their current relationships in theory, which will therefore help us understand their operational relations in real politics. The constitution and the Local Organic Law define a variety of horizontal and vertical relationships of the Chinese power structure. These complex linkages set up fertile ground for nurturing networks. This complex power grid consists of ‘lines’ (tiaotiao) and ‘pieces’ (kuaikuai). Kenneth Lieberthal (1995: 169) calls this ‘cross-hatching’ of horizontal and vertical lines of authority a ‘matrix problem’ and a ‘matrix muddle.’ From the horizontal perspective, the Party, the NPC, the State Council, the court, and the procuratorate are important political actors. The CPC plays the leading role for the nation, providing political leadership to all state and non-state institutions. However, the Party does not command the NPC. The leadership of the Party is realized through the Party Group and Party members within the NPC and its SC. As the highest power organ in the nation, the NPC appoints the head of government and its major officials (cabinet members), the chief justice and judges of the court, the chief procurator and procurators. It also has the power to remove all of these appointees. All of them are accountable to the NPC and its SC. The NPCSC members are not permitted to take positions in all these organizations. From the vertical perspective, under democratic centralism, the Party Central Committee (CC) and its Secretariat lead the work of the party committees and organizations at all lower levels. The central government (the State Council) also leads the governments at the local level. Local governments have the responsibility of enforcing the central policy and obeying orders from the State Council. To guarantee a unified judicial supervision,

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

69

the procuratorates at the sub-national level must follow the leadership from the High Procuratorate and the Supreme Procuratorate. But in the court system, out of a respect for judicial independence, the higher court does not lead the lower courts, but it can supervise their judicial work. In the system of PCs, the vertical relationship between different levels is much looser; it is a kind of work contact and communication. On the issue of constitutionality, the NPC can have legal supervision over the LPCs. For example, the NPC has the authority to void unconstitutional enactments by the PPCs, but the PCs at the higher level do not provide leadership to the lower ones. There are two characteristics in this system worth emphasizing. First, although the hierarchical command relationship exists within the systems of the Party, the government, and the procuratorate, the governments and procuratorates at the sub-national levels are bound by a dual leadership and control – the organizations at the higher levels and the PCs and their SCs at the same level. This system is different from the old Soviet practice (which is also retained in the 1993 Russian constitution) that provincial governors, mayors, other local executives, and their administrations subordinate to the national executive, all of which form a distinct administrative pyramid apart from all the legislative bodies involved. Second, the PC system does not apply the hierarchical command line to its organization structure. Neither the president of the state nor the premier of State Council has the constitutional right to dissolve the NPC or the LPCs. Neither does the NPC have such authority over the PCs at the lower level. This again distinguishes the Chinese legislative system from the old Soviet system and even the new Russian system. Against the backdrop of both new institutionalism and Chinese structural arrangements, the relationships of the PCs with each other and other power players are not simple and clear-cut. They can be better explained by the network approach, as well as the value net developed by two economists – Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff – in their Co-opetition. According to the New Institutional Economics, three modes of governance are most often used to organize social exchange (including economic and political transactions): market (a horizontal relationship in which ‘autonomous parties engage in exchange’), hierarchy (in which transactions are put under administrative controls by vertical integration), and a hybrid (a mixture of market and hierarchical relations, including networks that combine horizontal and vertical relationships through linkages) (Williamson 1975 and 1996; Nohria and Eccles 1992; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). Because networks provide connectedness and embeddedness among organizations, they encourage learning and emulation among organizations, increase responsiveness of organizations to each other, and they also reduce transaction costs for organizations. For example, they can avoid the disconnection and barriers among actors found in the horizontal relationship, and also reduce the dependency in a rigid vertical structure. Coordination and monitoring become easier. Diffusion of information becomes more efficient.

CPC Politburo Standing Committee Central Committee

CPC General Secretary Secretariat

NPC Chairman Standing Committee

President Premier State Council

Supreme Court

Supreme Procuratorate

Commissions Ministries Provincial Party Committee Secretary

PPC Standing Committee Chairman

Governor Provincial Government

High Court

Provincial Procuratorate

Bureaus

Municipal Party Committee Secretary

County Party Committee Secretary

Township Party Committee Secretary

People s Congresses of Mayor or Prefect Municipality and Municipal and Autonomous Prefecture Prefecture Government Chairman

County People s Congress Standing Committee Chairman

Township People s Congress

County Head County Government

Intermediate Court

Municipal and Prefecture Procuratorate

County Court

County Procuratorate

Township Head Township Government

A Relationship of Leading and Being Led A Relationship of Appointment, Removal and Supervision A Relationship of Supervision A Relationship of Supervision and Work Contact A Relationship of Providing Political Leadership

Figure 3.1 Horizontal and vertical relationships among major political actors (source: the author).

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

71

These merits existing within the networks have encouraged the development of networks in political and economic governance. According to Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), any game (from the game of life to the game of business, and the game of power) consists of five key elements (PARTS) for consideration: Players, Added value (what each player brings to the game), Rules (structure of the game imposing constraints upon players), Tactics (how other players perceive the game and how you want to play the game), and Scope (the boundaries of game). To apply the complete set of strategies prescribed by PARTS, one crucial lever is ‘understanding, playing off, and changing the links between games.’ By bringing in new players, added values, and new rules; or expanding the scope of a game; or linking one game with another or a bigger game, people can create new opportunities and change their power positions, even in the context of a ‘win-win’ situation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996: 39). In our power net for the PPCs, they also have to deal with four important players: customers, suppliers, competitors, and complementors. As in the value net, these four players have multiple roles, and more importantly, these roles often overlap. For example, if the PPCs act as a company to maximize their resources and values, their chief customers are, on the one hand, the Chinese people, and on the other, the CPC. At the same time, the people and the Party can be valuable suppliers for the PPCs in terms of supplying information and support. Naturally, the government often poses as the major competitor to legislative expansion. Because the PCs also have constitutional power over the courts and procuratorates, and often target them, these bodies provide less competition for the PCs. However, to win legitimacy among the people and the sympathy from the Party, the PCs have to collaborate with the government, the courts, and procuratorates to deliver tangible services to both the Party and the people. How to juggle all of these relationships effectively and maintain a good balance in this power net has become an essential art of Customers

Competitors

PPCs

Complementors

Suppliers

Figure 3.2 The power net of the PPCs (source: adapted with modifications from Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996).

72

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

success for the PPCs. As Kwang-Kuo Hwang emphasizes, ‘face,’ ‘favor,’ and ‘particularistic ties’ have played important role in the Chinese power game: When it comes to estimating how much social power an individual wields or controls, we can rely solely on the yardstick of personal qualities or visible resources. We also must consider the social network to which that individual belongs. The larger (or smaller) one’s social network is – and more or less powerful the people connected with it are – the more (or less) impressive will be that individual’s power image as perceived by others. (Hwang 1987: 961) These observations certainly apply to institutions. That these practices have been followed by the PPCs in networking and strategizing will validate the major theme of my book: institutional linkages caused a behavioral pattern of co-opetition. The creation of complex institutional linkages has changed power net in Chinese politics, and therefore, the nature and rules of the game. Accordingly, the behavioral patterns of actors (both organizations and individuals) have also adjusted to this situation.

Different solutions to the problem of hierarchy The old socialist legislatures could be viewed as a hegemonic system or a hierarchical control model, which is characterized by the dependency of the legislative branch on the executive branch, of the various sub-national legislatures (SNLs) on the national ones. Legislatures served as transmission belts for the central political machinery and formed a hierarchy with ‘the exclusive relationship of sub- and super-ordination’ between the legislatures at local and national levels. In such a dependent patron–client relationship, the former accepted the absolute leadership and paternalistic protection from the latter (Bihari 1970: 152; Zhang 1988: 297–8). The pluralist system of Western liberal democracies can be viewed as a market competition model characterized by the independence of political actors, in which national and SNLs compete with each other for political resources – popular votes from the same pool of people. Under the market mode, the system maintenance and institutionalization of a SNL depend on popular support and constituency loyalty. In contrast, under the mode of hierarchy with its concern with political patronage and proximity and political connection with high-level leaders, sometimes the dependency on the national legislature is more important for the SNLs. The communist Russian and Chinese legislatures shared many common characteristics and faced the same challenge of transforming from rubber stamps to real organs of representation. In their recent development, Russian legislatures gained their true constituencies and popular mandate through direct elections. Because of legitimacy arising from competitive elections,

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

73

the Russian legislative development followed a pluralist model characterized by liberalization and independence from the executive branch, and political autonomy of legislatures preceding institutional development. Russian legislatures were overwhelmed by an anti-regime and anti-executive mood. As Jerry Hough (1994: 75) observes, the revolutionary impulse in Russian society found a good place in the freely elected legislatures: ‘Many deputies, both radical and conservative, are concerned not so much with the resolution of mundane economic questions . . . but with changing or defining the fundamental political structure.’ However, within the system of Russian soviets, the old Leninist structure, a unified system of authority in which the National Parliament provided leadership to the local ones remained. Timothy Colton notes that the Russian legislators preferred roles of lawmaking and control over the government to the roles of casework, advocacy, and information. He observes that the informational role of keeping in touch with voters’ opinions ranked at or near the bottom of the legislators’ preferential roles (Remington 1994: 68). Consequently, in Russia, the horizontal relationships between the legislative and executive branches were antagonistic; the vertical relationships between the national and local legislatures were hierarchical (Remington 1994: 112). This structure made the Russian legislators behave differently from their Chinese counterparts who have strong incentives to build linkages with the executive and to possess information emanating from the society. Kevin J. O’Brien (1994b) identifies the Chinese pattern of legislative development as ‘legislative embeddedness.’ This was characterized by expanded capacity and jurisdiction through cooperation with and subordination to the strong executive branch. Sharing the concepts of ‘embeddedness’ and ‘connectedness’ with O’Brien’s approach, my research diverges from his on three points. First, when the Chinese legislatures and the executive were treated as having a dyadic relationship by O’Brien, my study deconstructs the legislatures, the Party, and the executive branch and treats them as plural actors in a system of relationships, namely a network. Second, as a result, the legislative development strategy is not limited to an either-or choice-set: conflict or cooperation, autonomy or embeddedness. Instead, the legislatures have a variety of combinations: for example, aligning with the NPC to challenge the provincial governments and party committees (e.g., Hunan’s removal of a vice governor, see Chapter 7) and even the central government (in a case in Heilongjiang, a central ministry was forced to obey the local statute) (Difang 1986: 71; Lin 1993: 139–40); seeking support from the central Party leadership to challenge the provincial governors (the cases in Sichuan where two governors were targeted, involved Jiang Zemin and Qiao Shi; see Chapter 7); aligning with some government officials against the ‘favorite sons’ by the Central Party Committee (e.g., the case of rejecting the Party-nominated candidates and electing vice governors to the gubernatorial positions in Zhejiang and Guizhou); and finally, mobilizing their own deputies and people’s support to gain the upper hand in dealing with the

74

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

government, the courts, and the procuratorate (see Chapter 7). Because of possible alignment in the network, their legislative development strategy has not been immune to conflicts with the executive branch and the Party. Third, a fair amount of conflict and autonomy does not have to distance the legislatures from the power center; it might make them more valuable to the system as a whole. Since the development of SNLs is greatly affected by national policies, the choice-set for the Chinese PPCs was defined by national politics. A structural perspective from the central leadership will help us understand that independent-mindedness is one of the important raisons d’être for the PPCs. The resumption of the PPCs and the establishment of their SCs were prompted by a policy change that resulted when the Chinese leadership decided to address problems arising from the Stalinist system in both politics and the economy. The late Mancur Olsen pointed out that every communist bureaucratic system had one problem in common: information losses. The communist bureaucracy itself generated ‘forces of slowdown’ for several reasons: the limit of the ability of leaders to gather and process information; the limitation of leaders’ rationality; the difficulty in transmitting information arising from the huge size of the bureaucracy based on the command economy; the misunderstandings of officials at each level; and finally, the collusion of local officials to give false information (incomplete and misleading) to their superiors in their own interests (Olson 1993). The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could be attributed to the ‘forces of slowdown,’ or the ‘hidden action and hidden information problem’ arising from the principal–agents relations with the center and local governments, especially the resistance from and collusion among the intermediate-level bureaucrats and party functionaries (Winiecki in Alston et al. 1996: 63–91; Solnick 1996). In Deng Xiaoping’s reform program, decentralization and legalization were two major policies for dealing with the chronic problems associated with a Stalinist system, such as bureaucratism, over-centralization, low incentive, an inefficient information system, and personal political dictatorship. But as the CPC regime began to loosen up, local officials acquired more freedom as a result of decentralization, and the ‘forces of slowdown’ could grow out of control if no new mechanism was found to keep them in check. As China’s economic system moved to a hybrid mode with more emphasis on the market (Lyons and Nee 1994; Chen 1995), the CPC reformers also tried to find a commensurate mode of political governance. The mechanism of competition among officials and local institutions was introduced to reduce their collusive behaviors, to improve the quality of information, and to revitalize the whole system. The legislatures at the sub-national levels were expected to play a series of roles, especially in dealing with the information impactedness problem of the whole communist system. As Oliver Williamson explains, the ‘information impactedness’ problem ‘exists in circumstances in which one of the parties to an exchange is much

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

75

better informed than is the other regarding underlying conditions germane to the trade, and the second cannot achieve information parity except at great cost – because he cannot rely on the first party to disclose the information in a fully candid manner’ (Williamson 1975: 14). In a Stalinist model, the central leadership unavoidably faced this problem when the local leaders possessed more information but did not accurately report to the Center. The Chinese central leadership expected that by increasing competition and decreasing dependency, the weakness of informational efficiency for the changing Stalinist system could be compensated for. The national leadership designed a competitive relationship between the LPCs and the government bureaucracies, and the ‘contractual relationship’ between the NPC and the PPCs for their own interests, not for those of the local leaders. Many local leaders expressed enthusiasm for strengthening their attachment to the NPC in a hierarchical relationship. They wanted to seek benefits from the association with and subordination to the powerful organs. However, the NPC leaders did not want to establish another hierarchical bureaucracy, or a compulsory relationship in addition to the existing Party apparatus and government bureaucracy to further centralize political power. They rather preferred a kind of ‘contractual relationship’ between itself and the sub-national PCs. It was Peng Zhen, the NPCSC Chairman in the early 1980s, who repeatedly emphasized that ‘autonomy,’ ‘legality,’ and ‘democracy’ should be the major features of PCs (Int. CDJ-9806), and the relationship between the NPC and LPCs is one of ‘work contact’ and ‘work communication’ for exchanging information and experiences, not of ‘leading and being led’ (Quangguo 1990a: 392, 580). A new bureaucratic hierarchy in the PC system was not set up. The Chinese leadership did not intend to go too far to adopt the market strategy characterized by an emphasis on democratization and liberalization, as the development in the Russian legislative–executive relationship had been. It worried that liberalization could dramatically challenge the fundamental nature of CPC authoritarianism and possibly increase the friction among the state organizations and weaken the state capacity for steering political-economic transition. The Chinese leadership made it clear at the beginning that the reason for strengthening the role of PCs is not to ‘put on a rival show;’ the legislative–executive relationship is only a ‘division of labor’ instead of ‘a separation of powers’ (Quanguo 1990a: 592–603). The denial of a hierarchical control model and a pluralist market model by the central leadership posed an immediate structural problem to the early development of the PPCs. On the one hand, the people did not directly elect them. The PPC delegates were elected by the PDs of the PCs at the lower level (county and municipality). Then the PPC people’s deputies (PDs) elected their own members of the SC from themselves. In contrast to the democratic pattern, the PPCs lack political roots created by elections. On the other hand, the PPCs were not led by the NPC, the Chinese legislature at the national level. Considering the provincial party committees and

76

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

provincial governments, the two most powerful competitors against the PPCs in the Party and the executive-centered structure were under the direct leadership of the CPCCC and the State Council, respectively, and have benefited from their political patronage; the PPCs were in a ‘political orphanage.’ Because of this political rootlessness and political orphanage, the PPCs have gained relative autonomy but not constituency support and popular mandate; they have been relieved of hierarchical control, at the price of losing certainty, belonging, and connections. This structural detachment from both the popular mandate and political patronage resulted in the lack of important power resources of both democratic and hegemonic types. This structural position exacerbated the problem of cognitive knowledge for the PPCs’ decision-making. Under the Chinese system of document politics, crucial political information is disseminated step by step in the form of documents from the top to the intermediate level, and finally to the bottom, from the inner circle of high-ranking Party officials to ordinary Party members and finally to non-Party member officials and citizens. Various documents reach different audiences. Some highly important documents may not be publicized for many years and only a limited number of highranking officials have access to them (Hamrin and Zhao 1995: 24–38; Yan 1993: 71–85). Because the officials at the same level have access to the same kind of political information, for example the NPCSC vice-chairpersons who are CPC members have the same access to documents as the Politburo members of the CPCCC, for officials at the sub-national level it is an effective way to gather information by receiving instructions from their leaders, listening to their speeches, and asking for guidance from them. The local Party and government organizations that are agencies of the superior organizations at the higher level enjoy the benefits of paternalistic protection and condescension. Political patronage guarantees proximity to the power center and benefits local officials. The structural detachment of PPCs from the NPC posed an inherent information impactedness problem to the PPCs that could further worsen their disadvantageous position in relation to their chief power rivals (provincial party committees and governments). The information asymmetry between the PPCs and their power rivals was obvious. As latecomers to an already crowded political arena, the PPCs were extremely vulnerable to resistance and attack from other established power institutions. Irrational decisions and wrong judgments could be politically fatal. The expected role of supervising the bureaucracy, if attempted, certainly would alienate the existing bureaucracy and make their fight for their own survival less optimistic. Presumably, the PPCs had embarked upon a very precarious path to their institutional development. How have they, then, overcome their structural disadvantage in acquiring needed information, survived the first two decades of adolescence, and finally achieved institutional maturity and become political players in the decision-making process?

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

77

Network strategy: building up institutional linkages In the current era where information is power, both parliamentary scholars and parliamentarians have recognized the impact of information to legislative power and organizational arrangement. The development of their own information systems in order to have access to information and to control the internal and external distribution of information could become one important reason for legislatures to institutionalize (Kornberg and Musolf 1970; Ferejohn and Kuklinski 1990; Krehbiel 1992). Because the PPCs were blocked from seeking either the pluralist or the hierarchical strategy, they had to pay great attention to the construction of a complex web of institutional linkages to maximize informational efficiency and to use network strategy to expand their political base. As Milton J. Esman argues: Every organization is engaged in a network of interactions with other institutions, at a minimum to exchange goods and services. Aside from these business-like transactions, an innovative organization is concerned with gaining support and overcoming resistance, and in bringing about changes in other organizations with which it interacts. This network of inter-organizational relationships is designated as linkages. (Esman in Eaton 1972: 32) With regard to the institutional linkages of PPCs, there are four different categories: (1) enabling linkages provide the authority and protect the PPCs from attack (for example, the relationships with the Party and the NPC, two superior organizations for the PPCs, belong to this category); (2) functional linkages provide inputs and take outputs, are the relationships with their PDs, voters, lower-level PCs, and social forces; (3) normative linkages provide moral support and create a favorable environmental image (for example, how the PPCs influence the mass media, public opinion; how the PPCs coordinate their policies with each other); and (4) diffuse linkages indirectly help the PPCs innovate policies and create new resources, such as the contacts with foreign parliaments, communication with outside scholars and professionals, and so forth (Eaton 1972: 21–39). Jack Gray characterizes Chinese politics before 1980 as like ‘the British Army’s oldest Catch 22: if one man complains, that’s a complaint; but if two men complain, it’s mutiny.’ He observes: In imperial China, the individual official who remonstrated with the Emperor was a hero, but the official who sought support among his fellows for his remonstrations was a traitor. The sentiment lives on. In China now (and it is understandable enough) factionalism is the great fear. (Gray and White 1982: 304)

78

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

However, in the 1980s, three important policy changes by the CPC provided a powerful justification for the PPCs’ innovations in weaving institutional linkages with other institutions and social forces. First, reforms were a completely new venture for the Chinese leaders. To minimize risk, they encouraged the provinces to experiment with new ideas and to learn from each other. Second, the Chinese leaders started the market economy reforms (at that time, it was still called the commodity economy). The nature of division of labor promoted horizontal coordination and institutional linkages among different economic enterprises, organizations, and government institutions in various areas. Third, after two waves of student demonstrations and various riots among workers and peasants within three years (1986–9), the CPC leadership finally realized the urgency of establishing a ‘socialist, democratic consultation and dialogue mechanism’ to make the situation at the lower level known to the higher authorities, and the policies at the central level known to the masses. The development of institutional linkages by the PPCs could fit in with these important policies. However, to do so requires political entrepreneurs who have entrepreneurial spirit, political sophistication, power gamesmanship, and the knowledge of CPC operations in order to steer the PPCs through their formative years. Since government leaders are limited to two terms, the PPCs, especially their SCs, have recruited a large number of veteran leaders. In the 1990s, several provincial party secretaries exited into the PPCs. Their political statures, old connections, and experiences brought power resources to the PPCs, which distinguished them from the Russian local legislatures characterized by amateurism (Hahn 1996: 190), and helped the PPCs use their power in a more sophisticated but assertive way in the past a quarter century. As a larger number of communist veterans exited to the PCs at various levels, their experiences and connections within the Party and government helped the PPCs achieve their institutional maturity without violating the communist taboo of ‘bourgeois liberalization’ and ‘American-style pluralism’ on the one hand, and by providing benefits and utilities to the central leadership on the other.

Work contact system (gongzuo lianxi zhidu) The 1982 Chinese Constitution does not define a clear-cut relationship between the NPC and its sub-national counterparts. Officials working for the LPCs wanted the NPC to clarify a ‘relationship of leading and being led,’ and to provide a clear leadership to the PPCs as other state institutions had done to their subordinates. They argued that ‘China as a unitary state emphasizes uniformity of the Center and localities; the phenomenon of institutional disjoint (between the NPC and PPCs) shall not be tolerated.’ The PC system should be constructed into a ‘hierarchical subsystem’ within the hierarchical state system. Otherwise, the PPCs would become ‘headless and legless,’ they will be isolated from the crucial support of the NPC and would have more difficulties in conducting their work (Zhang 1988: 300; Jiang

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

79

and Xie 1989: 10–12). But Peng Zhen insisted that the relationships between the NPC and PPCs, between the PPCs and LPCs, are a system of ‘work contact’ and ‘work communication.’ He gave a definitive speech, ‘On the Relationships between the NPCSC and the LPCSCs’ (1984) that said: in general, between the NPCSC and the PPCSC there is a relationship of legal supervision, not a relationship of leading and being led. In some aspects, the NPCSC can provide guidance; on others, it is a relationship of work contact (Liu et al. 1999: 1018). He believed that this design could give more freedom and autonomy to the PPCs to conduct their work in a more active and creative manner, and also contribute to the democratization process by preventing centralization. Qin Ruijie and Yang Yicheng, two parliamentary scholars, explain the importance of work contact: The activity of work exchange means that through a variety of mechanisms the LPCSCs exchange their work experiences with each other and learn lessons from each other. Due to the fact that the PCs with their SCs at different levels do not maintain a relationship of leading and being led, the PCs at the higher level normally do not assign work to those at the lower level, and rarely summon them for work conferences. To link together the work of PCs at different levels, to learn the achievements of the others and to redress the shortcomings of our own, and to perfect the PC system, the LPCSCs have actively sought links with each other. For example, they conduct regular or unscheduled meetings for the leaders to meet, or to conduct investigative trips in each other’s areas, or to exchange information and learn and borrow from positive experiences. These many years have proven the inestimable value of these exchanges and links for advancing and perfecting the PC system. (Qin and Yang 2001: 139) Under the ‘work contact system,’ a variety of practices and mechanisms have been developed. But these five as follows are most common. System of attending meetings as invited guests (liexi huiyi zhidu) First, the leaders and PCPDs at the lower level attend the PCSC meetings at the higher level as non-voting delegates. Since April 1980, the NPCSC has invited the leaders of the PPCs to attend its meetings, participate in discussions and express their opinions (Y. Zhang 1993: 170). Following suit, some PPCs (for example, Shanxi and Jiangxi Provinces) started inviting the leaders of PCs at the city and county levels to attend their SC meetings in the same year and later this practice was popularized and regularized. In the late 1980s, ordinary PDs were also invited to attend the SC meetings. The selection of outsiders to attend the SC meeting depends on their relevance to the subject under discussion and is often kept to a quota of about 20 percent of SC members.

80

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

Work conference system (gongzuo huiyi zhidu) The SCs and special committees of both the NPC and PPCs have sponsored specialized work conferences. Since 1980, every year the NPCSC has held conferences with the PPC leaders after they attend the NPCSC meetings. In these conferences, the PPC leaders can ask for help from the NPC to solve various problems (for example, staff support, office space, and budgets for their activities, and so forth), and more significantly, get the recent important information with regard to policy changes. In the mid-1980s, several speeches by Peng Zhen on these conferences were so important for the development of the sub-national PCs, some local legislative officials even relied on what had been said in ‘the official newspapers and Peng Zhen’s speeches’ to guide their work (Jilin 1989: 90). To focus on specific problems and exchange ideas, almost every year, the NPC special committees conduct their own work conferences from one region (including several provinces) to another that provide another forum for LPCs’ leaders to meet with each other and the NPC leaders (Y. Zhang 1993: 199). In addition, individual PPCSCs often convene work conferences and forums to facilitate and coordinate the work of PCs at the local level and to exchange information and ideas among the PCs from different areas and levels. For example, in their first decade after establishment, the Hebei PPCSC had held three such conferences; in Liaoning, eight; in Fujian, six; and the Anhui PPC has had its annual forum or conference since 1986. By about 1991, almost all PPCs had large-scale forums to reflect upon their ten-year development. Legal and work guidance system (falü gongzuo zhidao zhidu) The PCSCs at the higher level provide legal and work guidance to the PCs at the lower levels. Although the NPC has refused to provide formal leadership to the PPCs, when the latter encounter problems and ambiguities in implementing laws and handling policies, they could write to the NPC for guidance and clarification. Usually, the Lawmaking Work Committee (LMWC) of the NPCSC is responsible for answering these questions. From 1983 to 1991, it answered 1,759 legal questions (Y. Zhang 1993: 248). Periodically, these answers are compiled into handbooks for the LPCs as reference materials. In this process, the PPCs occupy the gate-keeping position in which they receive questions from PCs at the local level and decide whether to solve them by themselves or send them to the NPC. During the last 20 years, through this channel the NPCSC has backed up the LPCSCs and their PDs at various levels to assert their power in contesting the government and judicial branch. One important method for the NPCSC to guide and assist the work of the PPCs is to organize and coordinate ‘law enforcement inspections’ (zhifa jiancha). Every year the NPCSC can choose a few (about four to six) passed laws and send inspection groups to go to relevant central agencies and prov-

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

81

inces to review law enforcement and identify possible problems, such as lax enforcement, abuse, or negligence. When the NPC groups go to provinces, they often invite PPC leaders to join in and also visit their NPCPDs, or, hold information-gathering meetings with them and PDs from LPCs. Sometimes, the NPCSC will delegate power and entrust the PPCs to carry out law-enforcement inspections. To prepare for this, the NPC starts by training the PPC leaders to better understand the spirit of relevant laws under consideration as well as recent policies and guidelines from the Center. Then, the PPCSCs will organize leaders from LPCs into study seminars and instruct them with legal interpretation and policy guidelines. The leaders in the LPCs then go to their PDs and organize visits to carry out inspection. Serious problems uncovered in inspections are presented to the PPCSCs, and finally to the NPCSC. The NPC can finish a report and send it to relevant government or law-enforcement agencies for correction and feedback. For the NPC, as Li Peng, the NPCSC Chairman (1999–2003) puts it, lawenforcement inspections are ‘good opportunities for us to learn the work experiences and lessons from LPCs’ (Quanguo 2001: 7). For PPCs, inspections create opportunities for them to become familiar with laws and policies and to pass or revise local statutes to complement the national laws. Cadre training system (ganbu peixun zhidu) The PCSCs provide training to the leaders of PCs at the lower level. To facilitate communication and strengthen the institutional coherence of PCs, one important step is to socialize the new members into the political culture that leaders hold. The LMWC of the NPCSC had three national training seminars for legislative officials and one for SC leaders of county PCs in the 1980s (Quanguo 2001: 7). The NPCSC also established two Training Centers for Cadres of the PCs at Beidaihe (the famous summer beach resort) and Table 3.1 Number of PPC-sponsored seminars for training local PC leaders in the 1980s Province

Frequency

Leaders involved

Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Heilongjiang Jiangsu Fujian Jiangxi Shangdong Hubei Yunnan Xizang Shaanxi

3 (1989–90, lasting 6–7 weeks) 4 (1986–8) 3 (lasting 20 days) 8 9 (1988–91) 14 (1985–91) 12 (1986–91) 3 10 (1983–91) 10 4 (1985–91) 9 (1985–91)

1,113 1,547 1,n.a. 1,400 1,426 1,700 1,600 1,450 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,560

Source: Y. Zhang 1993.

82

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

Shenzhen. They provide training services, including short-term seminars and classes for those who have occupied the positions at the county and department levels (Sun 1997: 282). Since 1998, the NPC regularly held lectures on the rule of law. It inspired the PPCs to hold the same kind of seminars or lectures. For example, in 1998 the Shanxi PPCSC organized three training seminars for 256 responsible leaders in the PCs of counties, municipalities, and municipal districts (Quanguo 2000b: 109). The PPCs have also aggressively provided all kinds of training programs to the local congressional leaders, especially after local elections. Document exchange system (wenjian jiaoliu zhidu) The PCSCs exchange their official documents at all levels. The NPC has its own document system and circulates several internal publications among the PCs nationwide. To add weight to its documents and to draw attention from the executive branch, sometimes the NPC asks the CPCCC to endorse them and have them circulated as Central Documents of CPCCC. The LPCs also have their own magazines and newspapers for discussing important problems and disseminating work experiences (see the Propaganda System for the PCs below).

Request and report system (qinshi huibao zhidu) In a party-state, the Party is obviously the most important part of the environment in which the PPCs evolve. Therefore, to have proximity to and to get support from the party committees is crucial for their institutional development. During the first several years, because most PPC chairpersons were not members of the provincial party SCs that were the nerve centers in the provinces, the PPC leaders had a marginal position in the power structure. After the PPCs complained of their obscure power position, the CPCCC decided in 1984 that the chairpersons of the PCs at all levels, even if they are not members of the party SC at the same level, are entitled to attend the party SC meetings (Sichuan 1991: 36). Although the 1982 Chinese Constitution stipulates the leadership of the CPC, the PCs are not subordinate to the Party and the Party cannot give orders to them. The Party’s leadership is interpreted as a ‘political leadership,’ which deals with fundamental policies and guidelines. In practice, the party committees also have their own party secretaries in charge of the PC affairs. This party secretary has direct authority over the leader of the party group within the PC and controls the PPCs through the Party Groups within the PPCs that consist of all communist PDs. Because up to now all PPCSC chairpersons have been CPC members, the relationship between the party committee and party group is actually the relationship between the party committee and the PPC. These two institutions are mutually embedded into each other and possess direct channels for communication and coor-

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

83

dination. The party groups have formed a ‘request and report system’ in their relationship with the party committees, namely to request instructions beforehand from and to submit reports afterward to the Party. This system works in the following ways: the chairpersons of the PPCSCs report on PPC work once or twice a year to the provincial party committees. Before discussing and passing important bills and resolutions or convening important meetings, they always request for instructions from the Party. After the meetings, they also report the results and developments to the party committees. In addition, they report important findings of their investigations to the Party and sometimes give constructive suggestions. In discussing personnel appointments, they are responsible for submitting feedback from the PPCSC members and PDs to the Party. If they sense that one candidate will meet with possible resistance, the PPCSC chairperson should suggest that the Party withdraw the nomination or postpone the appointment. When asked about how they conducted their work, most PPCSC chairpersons agreed to this principle as a precondition: to stick to and rely on the leadership of the Party (Yang 1997). Yu Hualong, Vice-Chairman of the Neimenggu ARPCSC (Standing Committee of Autonomous Region People’s Congress), sums up his experiences: As the deputy party secretary of the party group within the ARPCSC and its executive vice-chairperson, I stick closely to one point in my work: When I have thorny issues, I go more frequently to the party committee. I often report the ideas and perceptions among the party group to the leaders of the party committee and I do much communication work. At the same time, I can also grapple with the intentions of the party committee and its expectations of the PCs. Based on this, when I encounter critical problems, I can find timely and sound solutions with concrete direction from the Party. (Yang 1997: 89) By following the ‘request and report system,’ the PPCs are able to keep themselves well informed about the change and intent of important policies, conduct their own work by focusing on the issues that most concern the top decision makers, and provide indispensable contributions to the whole regime. As it is continually informed by the PPCs about their activities, the Party becomes less suspicious and defensive, and more relaxed and supportive. Under these circumstances, the PPCs have more capacity in which to pursue and assert their powers, especially in their power struggle with the governments and the judicial branch.

The joint conference system (lianxi huiyi zhidu) Similar to their relationship with the Party, the PPCs also follow a cautious strategy to deal with the governments and judicial branch. If there are two

84

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

ways to solve conflict, either by ‘court ordering’ or by ‘private ordering,’ the network strategy used by Chinese politicians often tends to build consensus and privatize conflict, in contrast to American ‘RIP’ (‘Revelation, Investigation, and Prosecution’) politics in a pluralist model. Only if the executive and judicial branches are too uncooperative and make compromise impossible, may legislatures, when confident of getting moral support from the Party and public opinion, try to resort to a conflict strategy. In order to minimize misunderstandings and smooth away potential conflicts, the PPCs have, since the mid-1980s, created the ‘joint conference systems’ with the governments and judicial organizations. Regularly, the PPCSC chairpersons hold conferences with the governors, the chief judges (presidents of high court), and the provincial procurators general twice a year. Some PPCs have established agreements with them to institutionalize this practice. In 1998, in Guangdong, then Party Secretary Li Changchun promised to open up a direct route (‘through train’ – zhitongche) for the PDs to send their remonstrations, suggestions, and complaints on behalf of people directly to the major leaders in the Party, government, and PPC. Within nine months after the direct route was opened, NPCPDs and PPCPDs sent 141 suggestions and demands to the PPCSC, an increase of five times the number during the same period of the previous year. And in 1999, Hainan Province adopted the ‘through train’ practice to facilitate the two-way meetings between leading leaders in the Party and government with the PDs (Quanguo 2001: 274, 292). So far, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate has sent out several circulars, instructing its agencies to intensify their contacts with PDs, both from the NPC and PPCs, and to regularize their links. The Supreme Procuratorate also made concrete efforts to reach out the PDs, to pay more attention to their criticisms and complaints, and to attach more importance to regular visits with PDs (Liu et al. 1999: 292–4). The joint conference system serves at least three functions. First, because the PPCs have the power to supervise the governments and judicial organizations, they are able to find a forum in which to manage their conflicts; second, the governments and judicial organizations are able to report their work to the PPCs; and third, the PPCs are able to know the legislative plans of the governments and judicial organizations in advance, and involve themselves in the bill-drafting stage, changing the old pattern of waiting until bills arrive and passing them routinely.

The liaison network of deputies (daibiao lianxi wangluo zhidu) There are more than three million PCPDs at all levels (3.5 million in 1991, including 2,978 NPCPDs; 3,498,833 PDs at the sub-national level; 3.2 million in 1999). There is one PD for every 340 Chinese citizens (RMRB 02/13/95). If organized and used well, they could be an enormous pool of

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

85

power resources and an important organized force in addition to the Party, government bureaucracy, and the army in Chinese politics. However, for the first several years, this power resource was untapped and the PDs were not organized. After they listened to reports in the Plenary Sessions and once the Plenary Sessions were over, they had no role to play. Contacts between the PCSCs and ordinary PDs were rare. But as China’s reforms continued to deepen, the PPCs gradually realized the importance of contacting PDs. As the Sichuan PPCSC Chairman Du Xinyuan said in 1981: People’s deputies represent the people. They are scattered in all walks of life and all posts of work; they understand people’s mood and demands the most. By strengthening the contact with the PDs in order to hear people’s feedback and voices – their reactions to and opinions on the Party policy, government work, and state officials – it will enable the PCSCs to keep in close touch with the masses and to provide a very strong basis for the work of the PCSCs. (Sichuan 1991: 226) The realization that people could serve as PDs’ and their own power base became an incentive for the PPCSCs to organize PDs. In the mid-1980s, the NPC also started to pay special attention to organizing PDs and to emphasizing its importance for Chinese democratization and legalization, for the ‘system of social consultation and dialogue.’ Especially after the two waves of student demonstrations, the CPC leadership adopted a series of policies to strengthen the political consultation system and social dialogue system. Because the contacts with the PDs fit in nicely with these policies and reflected the spirit of the Party’s ‘mass line,’ around 1990, many PPCs convened meetings to explore new ideas and practices for strengthening this work. First, PDs have been organized into ‘deputy groups’ by geographic area or profession. Each group has an elected group chief and a deputy chief responsible for organizing and coordinating group activities. Every province has about 100 deputy groups (for example, Zhejiang Province has 11 NPC deputy groups and 90 PPC deputy groups, Shandong Province has 16 NPC deputy groups and 112 PPC deputy groups, and LPCs also have their own deputy groups), their size ranges from three to more than a dozen members. For example, in Jiangsu, the PPC group members meet two to three times annually to conduct inspection and investigation activities, or to study recent important documents (Zhang and Cao 1990: 87). In the mid-1990s, in the municipality of Jiaozuo, Henan Province, one NPCPD, one PPCPD, and five MPCPDs organized a ‘Group of Seven Deputies.’ They formed as a core for another two to three dozen PDs and played an active role in representing ordinary people in their fight against abusive government and law-enforcement officials. For a period of seven years, this group received more than 20,000 letters/visits, inspected more than 1,000

86

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

legal cases, and initiated more than 400 proposals and suggestions. They caused political rumblings in local communities and encouraged PDs from other provinces to learn from their experiences. Their high profile also incurred retaliation. One core member (Yao Xiurong, also see Chapters 4 and 8) was not supported by the PPC in her efforts to continue serving as the NPC deputy; other members felt the chill and adopted a lower profile. They realized: ‘No matter how well you have done, if some people think you are causing them trouble, they will not send you back to the PCs’ (NFC 06/16/03). This case reveals a fundamental dilemma of the PDs: without a popular mandate, they try to win support from the people by providing service, but their overachievement can easily disturb the establishment that controls their political fate. Another important lesson from this case is that the ‘populist’ deputies’ brash and confrontational political style on behalf of disadvantaged class in Chinese society has difficulty winning concessions from the establishment. Second, the PCSCs at all levels have established their specific organizations responsible for organizing deputies. For example, the NPC has the Bureau of Liaison; the PPCs have Work Committees for Deputies. The latter are responsible for contacting and organizing their own PDs as well as deputies of the NPC in their provinces and the LPCs and their SCs. Many PPCSCs have opened special reception rooms for deputies to walk in and submit their suggestions or complaints. The Hunan PPCSC has maintained a ‘Chairpersons Mailbox’ for the PDs. Some have fixed dates for the PPCSC chairpersons and vice-chairpersons to meet with the visiting PDs and listen to their suggestions, remonstrations, and complaints. Sometimes, the officials of the PPCSCs also go out to personally meet and visit the PDs. Third, the Prefecture Work Committees for Liaison have been widely established at the Prefecture level as agencies of the PPCSCs (see Chapter 2). They take the chief responsibility for communication between the PPCSCs and the PCs at the county and township levels. Fourth, the PPCSCs have kept up correspondence with their PDs. They keep the PDs informed about important events and decisions in the SCs by sending circulars and documents, and sometimes, by convening a face-toface conference for circulating information. In Beijing, the MPCPDs received The News of NPC Work, The News of the Beijing PCs and Information of PCs. They were also granted the privilege to read the internal documents only accessible to those leaders at/above the county/regiment level; for the PPCSC Table 3.2 Numbers of initiatives, proposals, and criticisms received by the PPCs from their deputies in the 1980s Tianjin 11,581 Neimenggu 4,381 Fujian 4,504 Shandong 12,300 Shaanxi 2,352 Hunan 15,079 Hubei 6,777 Zhejiang 4,425 (since 1983) Yunnan 7,439 Ningxia 2,352 Xinjiang 11,591 Source: Y. Zhang 1993.

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

87

members, they could read more sensitive documents restricted to the prefecture/division level leaders (Li 2002: 202–3). On the other hand, the MPCPDs can also write to the MPCSC. To encourage the PDs to write letters, many provinces have provided specific stationery and paid envelopes to the PDs. This has been the strategy used by the Tibet ARPCSC to overcome the adversities created by its vast territory, nomadic agricultural economy, and primitive communication and transportation systems. In every plenary session, the SC gave envelopes, letterhead stationery, and stamps to its deputies and encouraged them to write directly to the SC (Zhang and Cao 1990: 85). Fifth, the PPCSCs have conducted regular work conferences with the PDs. For example, since 1983, the Tianjin MPC has had an annual deputy’s conference in the last quarter of the year in which the mayor and deputy mayors have always been invited to answer questions and solve problems submitted by the PDs on spot. When the PPCSC leaders have their inspection or investigation trips, they also like to meet other PDs in order to listen to their opinions. For example, within one year of 1990–1, the Hebei PPCSC members and their staff visited 1,400 PDs and held 600 meetings with them. Sixth, the PPCs have issued ‘deputy I.D. cards’ and made visits by the deputies more convenient and frequent. With this card, a PD can conduct an investigation any time into any organization subject under the supervision of the LPCs. In addition, the PPCs have provided financial compensation to the PD. For example, in 1990, the Jiangxi PPC gave 130–160 yuan (Chinese currency unit, equivalent to one month’s salary for an assistant professor in China at that time) to each of the PDs of the provincial and municipal PCs, 80 to 100 yuan to those of the county-level and urban district-level PCs, 50–60 yuan to those of the township-level PCs, and 4,000–5,000 yuan to the Prefecture Work Committee for Liaison. In Xinjiang, 300 yuan were given to the provincial-level PDs, 200 yuans to the municipal and countylevel PD, and 30 yuan to village-level PDs. In Beijing since 1993, the MPCPDs received 500 yuan compensating their expenses in transportation, telephone and postage, and 100 yuans for subscribing to magazines and newspapers. For those who are PDs from peasants, self-employed, and PDs without stable income, the Beijing MPCSC also gives stipend (Li 2002: 202–3). Shanghai is an exemplary case where the PDs have been well woven into networks through a series of channels. The chairperson and vice-chairpersons of the MPCSC have used regular meetings to keep in close touch with the PDs. During the five years from 1998 to 2002, they had met or visited 505 deputies/times (counting both the number of PDs and the frequency of meetings). Meantime, 44 MPCSC members established regular contacts with 194 deputies for acquiring information and learning about the popular mood. The MPCSC also opened a ‘Hotline for PDs.’ Roughly 80 percent of the PDs were organized into 180 Groups of PDs with those from

88

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

district-level and county-level PCs. Another 167 MPCPDs were appointed by a variety of government agencies as ‘special inspectors’ to monitor the quality of their work and service to the people (Shanghai 2003: 323–31). According to O’Brien (1994a), the Chinese PCPDs had accumulated two important roles: ‘agents’ and ‘remonstrators.’ On the one hand, they served as agents of the regime to transmit the central policies, to explain them to the citizenry, and also to act as links from the leadership to the citizenry; on the other hand, through their regular work, contact with voters, and inspection visits, they collected information, brought problems to the state, confronted the leaders in order to rectify wrongs and redress injustice, and to ‘help the government police itself.’ O’Brien (1994a: 373–4) also has found, ‘Remonstrators/agents are most successful in the capacity of mediators, pointing to both state and society’s interests. . . . Their successes mediate relations within the ruling establishment and with society more than they redistribute power between state and society.’ The network strategy certainly can give some explanations for the enthusiasm of Chinese PDs for gathering information from society and their reluctance to challenge the whole regime.

The letters and visits system (renmin xinfang zhidu) Although the PPCs are not staffed by direct election, people’s loyalties can enhance their political legitimacy and strengthen their authority. As they help to solve people’s problems, this will certainly prove their worth to the Party leadership, and ultimately strengthen their position in the power structure. Besides, the ordinary people can provide useful information for decision-making. For example, in all exposed serious crimes committed by Party and government officials, 75 percent were reported by the citizens in letters to the authority (Quanguo 1990a: 620). As Tian Jiyun, the vicechairman of the NPCSC (1993–2003), puts it, ‘The work of letters and visits is a channel for our Party and state to understand, link with, and show our concerns for the popular masses’ (Tian 2000: 215). A Hubei PPCSC official characterized it as ‘a channel linking with people,’ ‘a barometer of popular mood,’ and ‘a window of democracy’ (HBRB 02/18/03). It also has been a long tradition under the CPC system that ordinary people have the right to express their complaints, remonstrate of their wrongs, and report misconduct and crimes of state officials by writing to or personally visit the state authorities. For all these reasons, the PPCs as well as the NPC and central Party have paid special attention to the letters and visits by the people. In every PPCSC, an ‘Office of Letters and Visits’ (OLV) is responsible for handling these activities. Ordinary Chinese people are able to walk into this office or buy a stamp and send a letter to ask for assistance, even if they lack social connections with and backdoors to powerful officials. Therefore, as seen by reported cases (also see Chapters 6 and 7), this system has been a common way for the ordinary people to approach the state, and more of a weapon of the weak and powerless (RMRB 12/05/96). To make this weapon

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

89

more effective, many PPCSCs set up ‘PPCSC Chairpersons’ Reception Days.’ In Hubei, members of the Chairpersons’ Group (CG) took turns showing up on the first Monday of every month. In Hainan, since 1997, at least two members of the CG attended the ‘CG Members’ Reception Days’ on the 20th of each month. Within five years, the CG members personally received 560 persons/visits, handled 136 cases, and closed 103 of them. Since the PPCSC Chair Du Qinglin was the former party secretary, his involvement did speed up the process of solving many knotty cases (NPC News 02/24/03). In addition to the services that the OLVs provided to their constituents, the PCs have also linked their system horizontally with the system of letters and visits within the government and law-enforcement agencies. In Hunan Province, the PPCSC General Bureau created regular joint conferences with the government and its bureaus, and the courts and procuratorate, and formed a system to process letters and visits, which is multi-dimensional, linking multiple levels, and communicating among components at the same level. One case reveals that this system also becomes an early warning system for the Party and government to prevent unexpected collective visits: once it had received urgent warnings through its own channels and it alerted the government and pressured it to release delayed funds which triggered the protest. A massive crisis was avoided (HNRB 07/10/03). In Hainan, the PPCSC also compiled representative cases into internal reports and briefed the Party’s and government top leaders about the emerging problems and possible trends (NPC News 02/24/03). The OLV under the Shanghai MPCSC also uses ‘Periodical Concerning Letters and Visits’ to report urgent and abnormal cases to the relevant responsible leaders and superior leading organs within the same day after receiving letters/visits. For three straight Table 3.3 Numbers of letters and visits received by the PPCs from ordinary citizens in the 1980s Tianjin Anhui Shandong Yunnan

26,376 43,721 78,000 25,900

Hebei Fujian Hunan Ningxia

41,529 (1983–91) 50,835 30,688 3,235

Neimenggu Jiangxi Sichuan Xinjiang

13,486 31,375 64,142 21,148

Source: Y. Zhang 1993.

Table 3.4 Numbers of letters and visits received by the PPCs from the ordinary citizens (1980–99) Tianjin 83,002 Shanghai 192,100* Jiangxi 56,000

Henan 100,000 Hubei 51,097** Hunan 76,700

Source: Quanguo 2000b. Notes *The Shanghai number includes letters from the people’s deputies. **The Hubei number starts from 1990.

Gansu Qinghai Xinjiang

65,867 35,552 50,214

90

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

years (1999, 2001, and 2002), this office had sent out 50 issues every year. The PPC officials believe this is one example that demonstrates that the PPCs have been serving the goal of maintaining political stability (Shanghai 2003: 342). It is important to notice that during the past two decades, the number of letters and visits has increased quickly. For example, in Hebei, the total number of the last four years had increased 33 percent more than the first five years in the 1980s. In Sichuan, the number jumped from several hundred in 1980 to the tens of thousands in 1990. In Guangdong, the cases against state officials remonstrated by the citizens to the PPC had increased from 5,800 in 1993, to 6,900 in 1994, and then to 8,921 in 1995 (RMRB 01/11/96). In Hubei from 1998 to 2003, the PPCSC received 22,292 letters, 13,125 visits (among them, 1,515 were collective petitions). The caseload in 1999 increased 9.1 percent compared to that of 1998; the caseloads in 2000 increased by 4.2 percent compared to the previous year (HBRB 02/18/03). In Zhejiang Province, during the 9th PPC (1998–2003), its SC received 37,926 letters and 4,555 visits. Comparing to those of the previous PPC (1993–8), the letters increased by 60 percent and the visits by 186 percent (ZJRD 09/2002). In Hunan PPC, over the past several years, the amount of workloads often increased by 15 percent annually (HNRB 07/10/03). This trend indicates that the PPCs have received more inputs from society, their legitimacy has been strengthened, and the citizens have taken their authority more seriously. The image of the LPCs as a whole has been improved in the eyes of people. For example, when asked to evaluate the role of LPCs in Chinese politics, a 1987 survey revealed that 15 percent of more than two thousand respondents believed that the LPCs had played a very important role, 46 percent believed a fair average role, 23 percent thought they played no role at all. In addition, 39 percent of respondents expected LPCs to play a great role in the process of democratization; 39 percent had reservations; and 14 percent did not expect them to play a role in democratization. The PCs received higher scores than the Party, the government, and the administrative institutions in an evaluation of the performances of major political institutions (Min 1989: 64–7, 85–94). A 1989 survey found, among several alternatives to influence the government, 14 percent of Chinese citizens chose to go to the PDs, the third most frequently used channel. Comparing it with the findings of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba during the 1960s, this number is lower than the percentages in the U.S. and England, but higher than those of Germany, Italy, and Mexico (Zhang 1994: 100–1).

The exchange of work experience and information system (gongzuo jingyan he xinxi jiaoliu zhidu) China’s provinces could be differentiated into information-rich and information-poor ones. Because different provinces have different political importance, some local leaders (e.g., party secretaries in Beijing, Guangdong, and

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

91

Shanghai tend to sit in the CPC Politburo), different provinces have different political connections to Beijing. For example, during the late 1990s Shanghai and Shandong could count on the ‘Gang of Shanghai’ and the ‘Shandong Network’ in Beijing. In the early 1980s, both Peng Zhen and Zhang Youyu (Deputy Director of the LMWC of the NPCSC) were from Shanxi and gave the Shanxi PPC more opportunities to get in touch with them. Besides, some provinces are chosen by the top leaders as ‘experimental zones’ to have more leeway to try new policies. For example, when Zhao Ziyang was the party secretary in Sichuan Province before he moved to the post of premier in the central government, Sichuan led the nation in some areas of economic reform. Later, Guangdong and Fujian were chosen to establish their ‘special economic zones’ (SEZs) and many innovative policies have come from there. As a result, some provinces have more access to information than others. The existence of the information gap between the information-rich provinces and information-poor provinces generates dynamics that the latter have to observe and emulate the former closely in order to improve their information efficiency and policy rationality. The PPCs have regional coordination and cooperation with each other. In addition to the exchange of documents, the provinces with the same characteristics try to learn from each other. For the provinces located in the same area, it always means that they have many problems in common and it is also easier for them to have horizontal linkages in various forms. For example, two neighboring provinces, Shanxi and Hebei, concluded an agreement in 1990 for regular contacts; Shanxi, Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong formed their horizontal linkages. One Prefecture Work Committee for Liaison in Guizhou Province initiated a ‘joint forum’ among seven Prefecture Work Committees for Liaison from three neighboring provinces. Later it further extended to nine Prefecture Work Committees for Liaison from five provinces. To improve its legislative work, in 1991, remote Tibet invited the other five PPCSCs in adjacent areas to attend a legislative work conference. Four other provinces that, like Tibet, have the same number of minority groups also attended. According to my interviews in Gansu, in 1985, Li Denglei, the PPCSC Chairman, initiated an annual joint conference attended by PPCSC chairpersons, secretaries general, some department directors and committee chairpersons from five Northwestern provinces and autonomous regions. This practice lasted for five years and was ended for the sake of saving money. The central leadership was concerned that this practice could easily turn into sightseeing tours on public fund. At the next lower level, a joint conference has been held among PPC secretaries general from the neighboring provinces. At an even much lower level, Gansu has coordinated a joint conference for editors of PC magazines and newspapers nationwide to help improve the PR work for the PCs. In addition, special joint conferences existed among special committees from different PPCs, the medium-size cities on the EuroAsia Continental Bridge, and prefecture work committees (Int. ZTX-9806).

92

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

The information-poor provinces, such as Gansu, always pay close attention to the policies in the information-rich provinces and send ‘investigation and study delegations’ to the latter. For example, in the 1980s, Guangdong and Fujian led the nation in creating new economic laws. After the Fujian PPCSC passed the ‘Regulation for Protecting the Legal Rights and Interests of Consumers’ in 1987, it received delegations from 24 provinces who came to learn from its experience (Quanguo 1992c: 7). Because of the existence of such mechanisms, a new policy initiative could be emulated immediately by the other provinces and disseminated quickly to the whole country. Jumping on the bandwagon (the ‘contagion effect’) has been an effective way for many PPCs to speed up their legislation because, if punishment is not likely imposed upon the majority, it reduces the political risk for both the initiator of one new policy and its emulators.

The consultation with experts system (zhuanjia zixun zhidu) There are at least two reasons for the PPCs to consult outside experts: they can compensate for the inadequacy of staff support and add ‘an aura of rationality’ to their decisions (Pfeffer 1981: 142). Since 1987 the NPCSC Chairman Wan Li advocated for the principle ‘to make decisions in a more democratic and scientific manner,’ but the development of the ‘consultation with experts system’ is made possible by the Party’s own emphasis on the political consultation and social dialogue system. Some PPCs (for example, Beijing, Jiangxi, Shandong, Hubei, Guangxi, and Shanghai) have hired legal advisors from outside to exploit their talents. Early in 1984, the Beijing MPCSC started appointing ten ‘advisors of legal construction’ to help its lawmaking capabilities. In 1988, the number of advisors expanded to 13, and in 1993, to 15 (Quanguo 1995: 204). Enjoying the benefits of a rich talent pool, the Beijing MPCSC appointed 18 legal advisors, who are prestigious law professors, law-school deans, lawyers, lawmakers from the NPC, and judges, for its LMWC in 2003. To reinforce its supervision over budgetary issues, the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee (FEAC) appointed eighteen advisors of its own, most of whom were professors of finance, economists, and former government officials in charge of finance and budget as well as business people. The Tianjin MPCSC also appointed seven professors, former auditors, and judges, as its advisors for the FEAC. In 1988, the Shanghai MPC allowed the Special Committees to appoint not more than seven consultants (B. Cai 1998: 417). In Anhui, the PPCSC appointed seven legal advisors in 1996 and institutionalized them into a ‘Legislation Advisory Committee’ in 1998 by expanding the membership to fourteen under the leadership of one director. In Hebei, they called such a practice ‘actively borrowing external brains’ (Quanguo 2000b: 209, 138). Experts are always incorporated into the drafting team or are consulted for important bills and decisions. Sometimes a bill is completely assigned to

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

93

experts and professors for drafting. Once a bill is drafted, the PPCSCs always convene a discussion meeting for soliciting suggestions from scholars and experts. Recently, many PPCs have paid more attention to the budgetary issues and invited finance and economics professors and experts to help them examine and scrutinize proposed budgets and the execution of budgets. Many PPCs have organized professional associations for the study of the work of PCs; for example, the Center for Taiwanese Law Studies is affiliated with the Fujian PPC to help it assimilate economic laws in Taiwan. One law professor, whom I interviewed in Shanghai, was often invited by the offices of the MPCSC to attend the discussion meetings, or was sent drafts for comment. He was paid each time (200 yuans for ‘transportation fees’). ‘Generally speaking, I would write all kinds of comments,’ he said. ‘However, if I wrote too many opposing opinions, they would invite another reviewer. If I posed too many dissenting opinions for too long, they may not want to have me again.’ Although he was invited to review drafts, his university opposed the idea of formally appointing him as the Legal Advisor for the MPCSC due to his activism in the 1989 pro-democracy movement (Int. YXY-9806).

The propaganda system for people’s congresses (renda xuanchuan zhidu) Propaganda work is an important part of public relation (PR) strategy for the PPCs to enhance their standing both in the eyes of the people and the officials of the Party, government, and law-enforcement agencies. To make it less self-promoting and therefore more palatable to the Party and government, the PPCs have not forgotten to point out that to publicize the work of the PCs is to serve the long-term and overall interest of the Party and the country, since it demonstrates to the world the ‘great superiority of Chinese democracy – the PC system at its core, which also helps to polish China’s international image’ (Qin and Yang 2001: 2–3). In October 1988, with support from then NPCSC Chairman Peng Zhen, the Shanxi PPCSC openly published the first newspaper in the country completely devoted to the propagation of the work of PCs, Gazette of PDs [Renmin Daibiaobao] (Qin and Yang 2001: 11). In 1994, all 30 PPCs had official magazines, and nine had official newspapers. Their total circulation passed 622,850 (RMZY 1994 and 1995). The PDs Gazette of the Shanxi PPC had circulated 86,000 copies in 1992, and in 1999, 100,000 copies were circulated (Quanguo 2000b: 145). The PC Work in Hunan had 82,000 copies in 1993, The PC Work in Jiangxi had 36,000 copies in 1992, and The PCs in Jiangsu had 50,000 copies. In Guangdong, the PPCSC first published Work Journal [Gongzuo Tongxun] for internal consumption. In 1991, this journal evolved into a more formal magazine, The Work of PCs in Guangdong [Guangdong Renda Gongzuo] and was publicly circulated nationwide in October 1992. In the first year of open circulation, the level of circulation reached

94

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

Table 3.5 Magazines and newspapers published by the PPC standing committees for open circulation Province

Name of publication

Frequency

Initiation date

Jilin Shandong

Jilin Renda [PCs in Jilin] Shandong Renda Gongzuo [Work of the PCs in Shandong] Xinjiang Renda [PCs in Xinjiang] Renmin yu Quanli [People and Power] Shidai Zhuren [Masters of Times] Liaoning Renda [PCs in Liaoning] Guangxi Renda [PCs in Guangxi] Renmin Zhiyou [Friends of the People] Renmin Zhengtan [Political Forum of the People] Renmin Daibiaobao [Gazette of PDs]

Monthly Monthly

1980 1981

Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Bimonthly Monthly

1984 1985 1985 1986 1986 1988

Xinjiang Jiangsu Jiangxi Liaoning Guangxi Hunan Fujian Shanxi

Difang Renda Jianshe [Construction of the LPCs] Tibet Renmin Xizang [People’s Tibet] Shanghai Renda [PCs in Shanghai] Shanghai Sichuan Minzhu Fazhi Jianshe [Construction of Democracy and the Legal System] Renda Yanjiu [The Studies on PCs] Gansu Guangdong Renmin Zhisheng [Voice of the People] Henan Renda Jianshe [Construction of the PCs] Hubei Chutian Zhuren [Masters of Hubei] Heilongjiang Fazhi [Rule of Law] Chongqing Gongmin Daokan [Citizens’ Herald] Hebei

Monthly 1990 2 issues per 1990 week, 8 pages Monthly 1991 Bimonthly Monthly

1991 1991

Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly

1991 1992 1992 1992 1993 1994 1999

Source: Sun 1997: 261; Quanguo 2000b and 1995: 378.

62,000 copies; in 1994, it reached 80,000; and in 1995, the circulation reached 100,000 copies (Quanguo 1995: 378). Because of the large number of magazines and newspapers on the work of PCs, the Shangdong PPCSC has published a Digest of PC Work. In addition, the PPCs also have published a variety of handbooks, collections of cases and laws, reports on their previous work, and so forth. They are exchanged among the PCs in different regions and at different levels. Since 1995, the PPCs gradually established offices or designated staff members to coordinate propaganda work. To emulate the ‘correspondents system’ created by the NPC that requested the PPCSCs to assign correspondents for covering its activities, the PPCs also recruited their own correspondent teams in 1995 dispatched to the special committees and the PCSCs at the lower levels. The correspondents of PCs have the responsibility of writing or supplying reports for the Party and congressional newspapers and other outlets on the work and activities of the PCs, to make suggestions and recommendations to the PCSCs, to assist the circulation of congressional publications (Qin and Yang 2001: 172–3). In order to motivate the corre-

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

95

spondents to work harder, every year, the NPCSC and PPCSCs organize contests to reward ‘exemplary correspondents’ and ‘good quality works.’ Recently, propaganda work has also utilized multimedia approach for speedier, more interesting, and farther-reaching outlets. For example, the Shanghai Eastern TV Station presented a new program, Window of PC, in July 2000. In two years, 28 episodes were broadcast (Shanghai 2003: 358). The PCs at various levels have produced pictorials, CDs, and also opened up websites. On March 1, 2000, ‘China’s PCs Newsnet’ (Zhongguo Renda Xinwen) went online. It has become a major information exchange site because of its voluminous coverage of PCs, their PDs, and the creation and enforcement of laws and local statutes. By providing links with other sites maintained by LPCs (see Appendix 2), it has really created a network among PCs as well as among ordinary readers. Since ordinary people are given access to email in order to contact the webmasters and express their ideas, the Chinese parliamentary officials believe that ‘The China’s PCs Newsnet has built a bridge connecting to the people and opening a new door of democracy’ (Qin and Yang 2001: 163–7). On the forefront of high-tech application, the Shanghai MPCSC created the ‘Online PC’ to simultaneously report the procession of the plenary meetings, to collect people’s suggestions and complaints, and to host chat-room discussions. In 2000–2, about 17,000 citizens participated in these activities and generated 1,150 suggestions and initiatives to MPC meetings (Shanghai 2003: 388). Finally, as part of their propaganda dissemination to foreign countries, as well as a way to learn, the PPCs have conducted their own foreign affairs by receiving legislative delegations from other countries or sending their leaders to visit foreign legislatures. In three years during the mid-1990s, the Yunnan PPCSC sent out 12 delegations to Asian and European countries. In the meantime, its chairman also joined the NPC delegations to visit five countries in Europe, North and South Americas. The PPCSC also received 24 foreign delegations (Yang 1997: 436). Utilizing its strategic location, the Shanghai MPCSC has maintained active contacts with foreign parliaments, both national and local. It sends out delegations, mostly to Japan where many cities are ‘sister cities’ with Shanghai. It also receives even more (Table 3.6 gives us information) than it sends out. The strategic and tactical importance of ‘linking together’ is deeply appreciated by the movers and shakers of PPC institutional development. In one of my interviews with three researchers housed in a PPCSC, they told me that ‘mutual linkages and contacts’ are a major method for conducting the work of PCs. Compared to the government, PCs are ‘poor brothers’: no money, no car. ‘But the weak have sympathy for each other. We can go out; we can also invite people from other PCs to come.’ One of them quoted the following doggerel: ‘All PCs under the sky are one family. All that we can count on is the help of our brothers. No dad, no mom; but with one jeep, wherever we go, we can still eat and sleep’ (Int. ZWQ-9806; Int. ZTX9806).

96

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

Table 3.6 Foreign delegations and number of delegates received by Shanghai MPCSC (December 1979–December 1995) Region Asia Africa Europe Americas Oceania Total

Number of countries

Visits

Speaker-level visits

Number of people

24 25 25 22 8

99 31 86 79 20

45 27 33 40 11

1,165 3,246 1,090 3,874 3,180

104

315

156

3,555

Source: B. Cai 1998: 405.

A note on the legislative development in Russia and China ‘China’s rise, Russia’s fall’ as a post-Cold War phenomenon has prompted a reexamination of reform strategies for transforming a gigantic communist state. Some scholars have agreed that the Chinese gradual strategy of creating a market economy is more sensible and practicable than the liberal ‘bigbang’ strategy in Russia (Pei 1994; Naughton 1995). Meanwhile, many scholars tend to think that a miraculous economic achievement was made under a dysfunctional political system. Politically, China is pitted as a decaying authoritarian system against Russia, which had been regarded as an ‘emerging democracy’ until President Putin later alienated his American admirers. It is still too early to judge the generic merits of the two different strategies for political and economic development in Russia and China; it is even harder to say whether the Chinese strategy would work better in Russia, or vice versa. However, Russia and China have followed different strategies in legislative development resulting in different achievements; it is worthwhile to draw attention to the new pattern of legislative development in China’s transition process. By 1994, it became clear that the different strategies pursued by China and Russia for their political and economic reforms produced contrasting consequences in legislative development. The Russian soviets were transformed from ‘rubber stamps’ into assertive political actors by the 1988 election reforms sponsored by Mr. Gorbachev. Over the next two years, competitive elections were implemented first at the national level, and then at the regional and local soviets. As Boris Yeltsin was elected chairman, and the parliament members owed their positions to popular mandate instead of the party, the Russian Parliament turned into a ‘dominant institution of the Russian political system’ (Hahn 1995: 15). Some parliamentary scholars optimistically predicted, ‘In the former Soviet Union, parliaments have taken on much greater importance and show signs of evolving into more democratic

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

97

bodies’ (Patterson and Copeland 1994: 1). But soon the Russian Parliament turned against President Yeltsin and became a stronghold for the conservatives to resist his more radical market reforms. The legislatures at various levels were accused of not only being economically obstructive, but also politically conservative (Mezey in Hahn 1995: 228). Yeltsin claimed, ‘Soviets are incompatible with democracy’ (Remington in Hahn 1995: 107). The legislative– executive conflicts ended with the killing of parliamentary members, the burning of the parliamentary building, and Yeltsin’s order to abolish all national and local soviets. Another long-term consequence was the 1993 constitution that gave the president unprecedented power to dissolve both parliament and the government, but restricted parliament’s ability to remove the president. Considering that the nominal supremacy of legislatures in all Soviettype systems might be the most important legacy for future democratization, the loss of this legacy in Russia is certainly a serious setback for the Russian democratization. The achievements of legislative development in the past five years were taken away. As Jeffrey Hahn has observes, ‘Perhaps the main trend in Russian politics since 1990, nationally and locally, has been the steady tendency toward unlimited executive rule. . . . Conversely, the new local legislatures came increasingly to resemble the old soviets’ (Hahn 1995: 252–9). The legitimacy and authority of these parliaments were eroded and endangered by the backlash from the executive branches (Pei 1994: 30–1). Later under President Putin, the trend of executive centralization has kept going on, even with an accelerating pace. Meanwhile, the Chinese legislative development lacked theatrics and had never achieved a level of liberalization comparable to its Russian counterpart; but neither had it suffered Russian-style setback. Generally speaking, in the past quarter century, by following a low-profile strategy, the PCs in China have cumulatively acquired substantial achievements: higher institutional maturity, stronger legitimacy and efficiency, and increased importance in the Chinese political economy than their predecessors. The PCs have been recognized as the fundamental political system and become an important part of the governing process. It is difficult to imagine that the Chinese central Party and executive are able to abolish the PCs nationwide without destroying their own legitimacy and rule. In sum, although the Chinese PPCs are still far away from a parliamentary democracy, their achievements are considerable. Even though they have not attracted attention from Western observers as the Russian soviets have, they actually have secured stronger moorings in Chinese political system and society, and have positioned themselves well for further organizational development.

Conclusion Constrained by the policies from the national leadership, the Chinese legislatures were staved off from the market and hierarchical modes for guiding their development, and had to develop a network strategy for institutional

98

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

maintenance and development. Yuan Ruiliang, a NPC researcher, sums up a valuable lesson in his careful examination of the historical evolution of the PC system: After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th National Party Congress, the PC system achieved significant breakthroughs. One important reason for this is that the adoption and operation of the PC system were guaranteed by a healthy and comprehensive system: From the NPC to LPCs, a sound and comprehensive organizational system has been created and turned into a complex network with horizontal and vertical linkages. For the PC system, this network is its concrete embodiment and important guarantor. Under this network, on the one hand, any attempt to damage the PC system would be stopped immediately; on the other hand, any imperfections and shortcomings within the system can be easily detected. And feedback can be quickly sent to the NPC and prompted this supreme organ of power to take appropriate remedies for improvement and perfection. (Yuan 1994: 537) From the perspective of the NPC, the network of contacts serves the function of integrating the PC system, penetrating into the LPCs, mobilizing local support and extracting information resources from LPCs, and delegating power to LPCs to experiment with new initiatives. Cai Dingjian, the NPCSC in-house researcher, makes the following comments echoing our later discussion on ‘kite-flying’ politics (see Chapter 8): The nature of the deputies’ liaison system is to link SCs with the PDs, SCs at the higher level with those at the lower level, PDs with PDs and the people. It enables public opinion and popular mood to reach the PCs and their SCs; at the same time, it facilitates the laws, decisions, resolutions, activities of PDs, and relevant information to reach the people. Therefore, it guarantees that the people’s will is realized within the representative organs, as well as that the people use their power to supervise the representative organs and their deputies. The system of deputies’ liaison system is like the string of a flying kite: holding the string tightly can let the kite (namely, the work of PCs) fly high but not lose control. On this string, there are two important ends: One is that the SCs provide guidance, help, and support to PDs; another is that PDs must contact and submerge into the people to understand the popular mood, have courage to represent it, and be willing to accept oversight from the people. (Cai 1998: 473–4) From the perspective of the PPCs, by building up networks, they have connected themselves with the power center in Beijing, turned potential

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

99

competitors into complementors, embedded into society, and created a favorable environment for their institutionalization and power expansion. More importantly, institutional linkages developed by the PPCs have provided channels of communication and mechanisms of policy emulation within the system of PPCs. The PPCs have significantly improved their position in the power net that they share with other powerful players. For acquiring, processing, assessing, and disseminating information the network is so complex that it is embedded into the NPCSC and reaches down the deputies and ordinary citizens. Although its formation was not solely attributed to the PPCs, some are the legacies from the CPC (e.g., the letters and visits system), some were initiated by the NPC leaders (e.g., the work contact system), some benefited from Deng’s reforms (e.g., horizontal linkages and political consultation and social dialogue system); the PPCs deliberately took advantage of the changes in political environment to weave their own information network for institutional survival and development. Therefore, we can easily understand why Shanghai MPCSC Chairwoman Chen Tiedi (1998–2003) summed up her successful work experiences into 16 Chinese characters: ‘To learn and to innovate; to stress on democratic principle and maintain solidarity; to conduct investigation and research; to coordinate and to communicate’ (xuexi chuangxin, minzhu tuanjie, diaocha yanjiu, xietiao goutong) (Shanghai 2003: 1–47). In relation to the NPC and central decision makers in Beijing, the PPCs have raw information for decision-making, which is knowledge about public opinion and social demands. In relation to the LPCs, PDs, and ordinary citizens, they have access to the power center and are able to disseminate key information about the policy changes and Party guidelines to local leaders, and to deliver services to the people. Taking advantage of their complex networks, the PPCs have the freedom to act as an information broker or information exchange center between the central and local levels. On the one hand, they are spokespersons for the NPC; on the other hand, they are remonstrators on behalf of the local interests. By sending more accurate information to the central leadership and passing central directives to the grassroots, this position turned the structural disadvantage of the PPCs in the system of information flow into a great advantage. The problem of information impactedness for the PPCs has been alleviated; their rationality in choosing policy alternatives has been greatly improved. Many scholars have credited the weak resistance against reforms from the intermediate levels in China to the central administrative capabilities or regional property rights (Blecher and Shue 1996; Huang 1996; Solnick 1996). As a matter of fact, the PPCs also have made a significant contribution to policymaking and implementation, and the maintenance of the whole Chinese system by improving its information flows. My study here implies that the policing and informational roles of PPCs shall be credited (if not solely) for the success in effectively monitoring the provincial governments, making the national administrative hierarchies more accountable (therefore,

100

Institutional linkages of the PPCs

more viable) and alleviating the information impactedness problem of the central government. As a result, the PPCs are organically integrated into the process of governing, and their institutionalization will be justified. A more institutionalized legislature certainly exposes itself less to the danger of abolition and executive dictatorship. Stimulated by different strategies and fates of legislative development in China and Russia, this chapter sheds light on this difference: Russian legislatures, with more resources (especially the people’s mandate by direct elections), have alienated both the executive branch and ordinary voters, and have not realized their full potentiality; the Chinese legislatures, with less favorable conditions, have overcome their initial structural disadvantages, secured solid moorings in the regime and society, and achieved a higher degree of institutionalization than before. Some parliamentary scholars have suggested that a subordinate role to the executive by the new legislatures may contribute more to legislative development and long-term democratization (O’Brien 1994b; Hahn 1995: 237). However, the Chinese experience has gone beyond the binary choices between a subordinate and an unruly role. Relying on networks, the legislatures are able to align with some political actors to challenge others. With political sophistication and tactics, political entrepreneurs within the legislatures, even the local ones, are able to be assertive in using and expanding their power. Besides, as the conventional strategy of ‘staffing the legislature’ is often limited by budget constraint, the development of institutional linkages and the use of outside resources might be a less expensive way for many legislatures to achieve the goals of legitimacy, institutionalization, and power expansion. In the next chapter, I will shift to the personnel changes within the PPCs and the change in power allocation among political elites. The study of their connections will give further explanation to why and how hierarchical structures within the PPCs, and a network relationship of the PPCs with other political actors, have been able to emerge.

4

Elections and the circulation of the political elite

Institutionalization and the quality of institution are both dependent on those people who staff the institution and those who design it. In Douglass North’s words, The agent of change is the entrepreneur – the decision maker in organizations. The subjective perceptions (mental models) of entrepreneurs determine the choices they make. The sources of change are the opportunities perceived by entrepreneurs. . . . In any case, it is the perceptions of the entrepreneur – correct or incorrect – that are the sources of action. (North in Sjostrand 1993: 37) As he started reform, Deng Xiaoping realized that to reform China’s institutions, the first challenge was to handle the problem of man. He believed that reforming the institutions and overhauling the aged cadre team constituted a revolution. He warned, ‘If the aged and sick continue to block the road for the younger, more energetic and competent, not only the Four Modernizations are doomed, but it could also cause the death of the Party and the state’ (Zhonggong 1982: 1036). Under this guideline, the Party, the government, and the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs), especially with respect to their leadership and the members of the Standing Committees (SCs), have experienced significant personnel changes beginning in the early 1980s. This chapter will discuss how the personnel changes have affected the institutionalization of the PPCs and shaped their institutional features and ethos. By discussing the electoral system for the people’s deputies (PDs) and leaders of the PPCs, I will show that there is a minimal electoral connection between the elected and those who elect them. Also, because of a lack of real elections in Western democratic sense, Chinese political leaders are able to consolidate the link between economic development and personnel change, or the economic connection in institution building. The emphasis on economic development over democratization has pre-determined the orientation of political inclusion within the PPCs, especially their leadership. In the past quarter century, the leadership of the PPCs has continually improved with

102

Elections and circulation of political elite

regard to a younger age, higher educational level, and enhanced political stature. However, the composition of the elite continues to discriminate against women, peasants, workers, and youth, who are under-represented, while communist cadre and current leaders are likely to be over-represented. A democratic tendency seems weak, whereas a pattern of elitist politics run by male, communist leaders in their sixties is evident. The inclusion of some non-communist professionals and the massive embeddedness of the major communist leaders into PPC leadership indicate that the PPCs are expected by the central leadership to fulfill two important goals – to assist economic development, and to penetrate into society through a political control over the PDs and institutions of the PCs. Nevertheless, an encouraging phenomenon has occurred within the rank and file PDs. For the past decade or so, increasingly more PDs have rid the traditional mold upon them and have taken new roles to push for a real democracy. The role changes for many PDs augur the coming of a more fundamental democratic revolution, pushed by the political entrepreneurs within the system, but on behalf of the interest of the general public.

Election of deputies through manipulation The Chinese electoral system has direct and indirect elements. All PCs at the county level and below (township, municipal district, and villagers’ committees) are filled through direct elections; all other PCs (the NPC, PPCs, and MPCs) are produced by indirect elections. The PPCs are elected by the PCs at the immediate lower level. In other words, the PCs of counties and municipalities are the electoral units for the PPCs. The military stationed in the area send their deputies to the PPCs through their own elections within the Soldiers’ Congresses. The quota for the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) soldier deputies is decided through a consultation between the army and the PPCs. The PPCPDs are produced within the PCs of cities with districts, autonomous counties, and counties directly under the provincial leadership. All the PDs at the county level are directly elected, but the PDs at the municipal level (cities with districts) are indirectly elected by the PCPDs at the county and district levels. A look at who is within the electoral units for the PPCs will help us understand what kind of PPCPDs will be chosen, and how the electoral process is often manipulated and does not fully reflect the free choice of the electors. The PCs at the county level are elected once every five years (before the revision of the Electoral Law in 1995, their terms were three years) preceding the PPC elections. Campaigning is not allowed, so elections are dominated by the power of nomination of candidate. The PPCs are responsible for conducting elections at the county and township levels. While these are direct elections, the PPCSC, Party, and government leaders at the provincial

Elections and circulation of political elite

103

Table 4.1 Ranges and numbers of people’s deputies at all levels (1999) Type

Number of units

Range

Number

National (NPC) Provincial (PPCs) Municipal/Prefecture County Township

1 31 333 2,074 47,136*

Below 3,000 350–1,000 240–650 120–450 40–130

2,978 20,544 98,000 580,000 2,530,000

Total

49,575

–

3,230,000

Sources: D. Cai 1998: 151–3; Pu 1999: 173; ZGDTC 2000: 1; Du 1998: 92. Note * This is 1998 number.

level have enormous power to determine who ultimately will be elected by producing a list of names of candidates. Voters are also allowed to sponsor candidates by acquiring a minimum of ten joint signatures (prior to 1982 it was three). But because there is no effective channel for them to communicate with each other, their sponsorship is widely dispersed among a large number of individuals who are unrecognized outside of their own small communities. For example, in the 1986–7 county and district elections of Tianjin, voters submitted 63,916 individuals for nomination, 14.5 times more than number of the elected posts (Tang 1989: 69). These uncoordinated, disorganized nominations seldom generate quality candidates with wide popular appeal and most are eventually dropped out in the process of consultation for a final candidate list, since the Electoral Law requires that the number of candidates should be more than the number of elected posts with a margin from one-fifth to one-half of the total available seats (‘three ups and three downs’ process in Shih 1999). Because official candidates are often local leaders and dignitaries, with greater name recognition, they enjoy a better chance at being elected. Even when select candidates sponsored by the voters survive the consultation process and are put on the ballot, their success rate is much lower than those from the Party nomination. The process of voters-nominating-candidates most of the time only becomes a facade for the election manipulated by officials. Because of the manipulation of elections by the government and Party organizations at different levels, a true representation is always elusive. On the one hand, the central leadership is concerned with achieving a ‘democratic’ result – a more balanced composition of the PCs with deputies from all walks of life – so they often give local leaders quota to meet. The zealous Party functionaries then have to orchestrate the electoral process in order to fulfill the quota. As a result, voters lose interest in the rituals. Even though a PC is produced with an expected composition of PDs, their representation is cast in doubt. On the other hand, when the central leaders recognize the problem with tightly controlled elections and instruct cadres to give more respect to the democratic electoral process and loosen control, usually the

104

Elections and circulation of political elite

Table 4.2 National and sub-national people’s deputies (December 1991) Provincial unit

NPC

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimenggu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Guizou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang Taiwan PLA

64 51 109 70 63 144 87 127 73 138 120 103 70 83 178 151 113 112 150 88 15 202 74 87 19 71 43 17 17 59 13 267 2,978

Total

PPCs

Municipality

County

Village/ township

Total

871 709 927 750 584 725 536 625 889 990 737 729 572 592 937 941 881 874 807 644 292 970 658 616 465 616 520 399 441 550 0 0

0 0 3,769 1,964 1,360 5,082 2,759 2,914 0 6,046 4,290 3,594 2,401 2,099 5,107 5,012 3,169 3,576 5,111 1,828 0 5,718 2,048 3,290 225 1,479 2,023 1,750 507 1,884 0 0

4,891 4,406 37,506 20,825 18,143 21,770 10,920 24,835 6,043 30,270 25,106 26,594 22,019 24,749 37,690 43,845 25,885 32,420 32,504 25,004 4,208 42,726 18,533 29,582 6,331 20,872 15,180 4,597 4,340 14,502 0 0

11,922 10,504 184,296 91,251 87,513 65,412 39,808 66,180 15,660 126,822 196,713 180,020 71,994 113,339 171,471 137,881 105,591 189,569 109,673 87,548 13,516 322,403 134,967 100,404 29,042 103,722 67,990 14,590 13,606 44,630 0 0

17,748 15,670 226,607 114,860 107,663 93,133 54,110 94,681 22,665 164,266 226,966 211,040 97,056 140,862 215,383 187,830 135,639 226,551 148,245 115,112 18,031 372,019 156,280 133,979 36,082 126,760 85,756 21,353 18,911 61,625 13 267

20,847

79,005

636,296

2,908,037

3,647,163

Source: ZGFLNJ 1992: 853.

result is unexpectedly disastrous. More communist cadres are elected, female, non-partisan candidates, and candidates from non-communist parties lose out. The PCs become ‘the second party’s congresses’ or ‘the cadres’ congresses’ and are not worth their names. For example, in the 1987 elections, the central leadership instructed local leaders not to give rigid quotas to each electoral district. But the result was that communist cadres were overrepresented in the PCs at the county level. The PCs of counties and municipalities (cities with districts) are predominantly filled with communist cadres. For most of them, the percentage of communist PDs ranges from 65 percent to 70 percent, some even as high as 90 percent. The percentage of cadres

Elections and circulation of political elite

105

ranges from 25 percent to 45 percent, but in not a quite few areas, it reaches 50 percent. For example, in the 1993 election, 56 percent of PDs at the county and district level in Chongqing, Sichuan Province were cadres (CQNJ 1993: 46–7). In two counties of Zhejiang Province, 84 percent and 86 percent of their deputies were communist members; 55 percent and 50 percent were cadres respectively. In one of these two counties, all 49 township chiefs were elected into the county PCs; in the other, 87 township chiefs out of 89 were elected (Wang and Yuan 1990: 62). In a county of Sichuan, more than 90 percent of the deputies were communist members. In the SCs, the situations were even worse. Among 124 counties in Hunan, 38 PCs had no non-communist vice-chairpersons. The elections made a veritable mockery of the whole system and thus the PCs lost even more representativeness. Facing such a dilemma, the central authority became very concerned and sent instructions asking local leaders to increase the percentage of non-communist PDs in the later by-elections (Quanguo 1992a: 105–10). According to a survey conducted in 1987, when asked who shall be the PDs, among 2,144 respondents, 81.82 percent (not mutually exclusive) favored ‘any honest citizens with the courage to make critical opinions, political knowledge and competency,’ while 17.06 percent chose ‘communist members,’ and 9.97 percent favored ‘the leading cadres’ (Zhao 1990: 305–7). Clearly, Chinese citizens disliked the PCs filled with communist cadres on leading positions. Nevertheless, the percentage of communist leaders soared when central control over elections loosened up, resulting in widespread alienation among voters from the current electoral system (Zhao 1990). Obviously, the bias in the composition of PDs simply reflected the tight control over the electoral process by the CPC. But when the central leadership loosened its control the electoral process and voters failed to respond, it reflects the anemia of Chinese civil society – a result of communist tight control over the entire society. Communist control over the electoral process and society fundamentally shapes the PC system at the county and municipal levels. Like the PCs at lower levels, candidates for the PPCPDs are nominated by the CPC, the Democratic Parties (DPs) (controlled by the CPC United Front Department), and the people’s organizations (for example, the workers’ union, women’s federation, and the Communist Youth League, and so forth) jointly or separately. In practice, the CPC often produces a list of names of candidates in a joint manner through consultation with other DPs and people’s organizations. Many provinces (Beijing, for example) have made it clear that nominees sponsored by the parties and people’s organizations cannot exceed the number of elected deputies with an extra 20 percent of the total. In Shanghai, this ceiling is 15 percent. Some provinces have tighter restrictions that the parties cannot nominate candidates of a number more than the number of elected deputies (Tang 1989: 68–9; Zhang 1988: 131). In addition, the Electoral Law also stipulates that the PDs can jointly sponsor their own nominations. The 1979 Electoral Law allowed three PDs or more to put

Table 4.3 The profile of people’s deputies of county People’s Congresses Term

Total number

Average age

Below age 35

CPC member

Nationality minorities

Female

College education

1988–93 1993–8

19,987 20,340

44.28 43.61

3,676* (18.78%) 3,793 (18.65%)

13,960 (69.85%) 14,266 (70.14%)

2,729 (13.65%) 2,869 (14.11%)

4,107 (20.55%) 4,383 (21.55%)

3,002 (15.02%) 3,992 (19.63%)

Source: Quanguo 1995: 325. Note This survey was based upon responses from 69 sample counties. The figures with * had a sample of 67 counties.

Elections and circulation of political elite

107

forward a joint nomination. Since 1986, however, after changes to the Electoral Law, ten or more PDs are now required. The PDs can also seek a nomination for themselves if they can get an endorsement from ten PDs or more. The nominees can be either from the PDs or from outside. These stipulations gave voters and the PDs more choices, and caused concerns among some government officials who believed these measures encourage ‘unqualified candidates’ to ‘contest with the Party.’ Fortunately, top NPC leaders – such as Tian Jiyun – were strong supporters to these measures and recognized them as ‘important democratic progress’ that should be continued and encouraged (Tian 2002: 150). In addition, many officials working at the provincial level who are not the PDs at the county or municipal levels are also listed as candidates for the PPCs. To guarantee their elections, a quota is assigned to the lower LPCs exclusively under their names and cannot be used for electing other people into the PPCs. If they are not elected, the provincial government will withdraw the quota. All these nominations are sent to the Presidium of the Plenary Session of a county or municipal PC. Since the Electoral Law requires that the number of final candidates is 20 percent to 50 percent more than the number of elected deputies, the nomination list from the parties and people’s organizations can be equal to or higher than this number, so the nominees received by the Presidium are much higher than the number of final candidates. The Presidium consults with various delegations and PDs to decide on a formal, final list. The Presidium is a steering committee that selects the PDs for the new PC, prepares for the Plenary Session, and submits the candidate list to the Plenary Session. It is tightly controlled by the CPC leadership and dominated by Party and government officials, since selection of the members of the Presidium follows four guidelines set forth by the Party leadership. These guidelines include: (1) to highlight the role of core leadership by the CPC, all party secretaries and deputy secretaries elected into the PC should be included into the Presidium; (2) to stress the continuity, all chairpersons, vice-chairpersons of the last PC should be included into the Presidium; (3) to reflect the representativeness of diverse members, leaders of the Democratic Parties (DPs) and people’s organizations are included; and (4) to reflect regional diversity, all heads of the delegations are included into the Presidium (Jie 1995: 32). Therefore, the democratic consultation process maneuvered by the Presidium often looks like a black-box, where the Presidium can thrash out nominees from ordinary PDs and keep Party-sponsored candidates on the final lists (Cai 2002: 55–6). The manipulation occurs in the process of democratic consultation with delegations and PDs. The Plenary Session often lasts for less than a week and nominees to be delegates at the higher level are not allowed to campaign, thus the nominees have little chance to expose their viewpoints to the PCs. The nominees sponsored by the PDs suffer the most, because most of them are much less recognized than the nominees on the CPC-sponsored list.

108

Elections and circulation of political elite

Party organizations pressure their communist deputies to vote for their nominees, and at the same time, the Presidium uses persuasive coercion to induce the PD-sponsored nominees to refuse the nomination, or directly urge the PDs to withdraw their nominations. To guarantee a balanced representation, some county or municipal PCs are required to elect specific numbers of PDs of a particular gender, religion, nationality, or profession. The quota for these often crowds out nominees sponsored by ordinary PDs. In the end, candidates sponsored by the PDs are few. The final voting on the candidates is also manipulated by the Presidium to ensure a high rate of election for candidates sponsored by the Party. For example, the Presidium may give a more detailed, favorable recommendation to the candidates sponsored by the Party. In contrast, an abstract, partial recommendation is often given to candidates sponsored by the PDs, and sometimes, their weaknesses are highlighted. Their names also tend to appear after the candidates sponsored by the Party on the ballot. Because the PCs at the county and municipal levels often have about 100 to 300 PDs and most are communist cadres, the leaders are able to control their voting behavior. As a result, among the elected PDs, those nominated by the ordinary voters or PDs are few. In the 1988 indirect elections for the PPCPDs, only 6.3 percent of candidates were jointly sponsored by the PCPDs at county and municipal levels (Gansu 1992: 133, 185). The whole process from preparing a list of candidates to the final voting shows that the Chinese-style election is through manipulative consultation rather than competition. Through this process, the elected PPCPDs are also predominately communist cadres (see Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6). In the 1988 elections of Shanxi Province, all 118 county PCs except one elected their own chairpersons to the PPC (SXNJ 1988: 87). Yao Lifa, a Qianjiang MPCPD who tried but failed to win the nomination for the PPC in Hubei (whose stories will be discussed again at the end of this chapter), offered his personal experiences. In December 2002, he was popular enough to garner 17 sponsors within the MPC to support his candidacy for the PPC. To stop him, the Presidium might pressure some PDs to abandon their previous nominees, so both the sponsors and the nominees could ask to withdraw their candidacies when the Presidium was finalizing the list of candidates on the official ballot. This practice is not stipulated in the Electoral Law and Cai Dingjian, a renowned NPC in-house authority, proposed to ban this practice. But the MPC wrote this practice into its election procedure. Therefore, when the Municipal Party Committee recommended 17 candidates for the 13 quotas of the PPC – three were designated by the Provincial Party Committee; six were officials from the Party, government and PCSC; five general managers from state-owned enterprises, one former head of a state-owned farm, one teacher, and one party secretary of a village. To guarantee that the Party’s list would not be challenged, the Presidium was reluctant to accept new candidates sponsored by the ordinary PDs. Among the three names sponsored by the PDs, one – who was the

Table 4.4 The composition of the thirty PPCs: profile of people’s deputies Term

Total number

Average age

Below age 35

Above age 60

CPC member

Nationality minorities

Female

College education

1988–93 1993–8

20,585 21,041

49.85 49.01

1,903 (9.25%) 1,382 (6.57%)

3,261 (16.44%) 2,261 (11.14%)

14,088 (68.44%) 14,781 (70.25%)

3,192 (15.51%) 3,318 (15.77%)

4,253 (20.66%) 4,528 (21.52%)

8,983 (43.64%) 11,968 (56.88%)

Source: Quanguo 1995: 325.

110

Elections and circulation of political elite

president of a court – refused to accept the nomination, while another failed to get more than ten sponsors and was therefore dismissed. However, while Yao got 16 endorsements, the Presidium refused to put his name on the official ballot under the absurd reasoning that those supported him before the electoral procedure was adopted did not exceed ten. Surprisingly, despite his name not on the ballot, Yao still got more than 20 votes – not a small victory under the difficult circumstances (Yao 2003). The PDs are sent to the provincial capitals to constitute the PPCs. When the PPCPDs meet, that is the PPC Plenary Session. The major task of the first Plenary Session every five years is to elect the SC and its chairperson and vice-chairpersons. At the same time, it elects governor and vice governors and other major leaders of the government and judicial branch. Here again communist control over the nomination process was almost absolute; only after 1988 was this tight control starting to lose hold. Several factors have made the manipulation easier. The first and most important reason is still the dominance of communist cadres within the PPCs. Party discipline and administrative affiliation guarantee obedience to the leaders. Second, as the level of the PCs moves higher, the PDs tend to be more dependent on the leadership than the voters. Political leaders nominate and control candidates; the candidates and later PDs are dependent upon the patronage of the leaders. The PDs at the lower level elect PDs at the immediate higher level; the PDs then elect their leaders. Political interdependency within the PC system produced the circularity of power. Third, since the PPCPDs often meet as delegations in different places (or hotels) after the preliminary Plenary Session, they lack knowledge about each other and are unable to sponsor some appealing alternative candidates. In 1988, the CPC nominated 98 percent (479) of 491 elected provincial leaders (governors, vice governors, PPC chairpersons and vice-chairpersons, chief judges, and procurators general). Among the 99 candidates sponsored by the PPCPDs, 12 were elected (four PPC chairpersons of Hebei, Jiangxi, Hunan and Gansu; two PPC vice-chairpersons of Jiangxi and Ningxia; five vice governors or deputy mayors of Tianjin, Shanghai, Anhui, Zhejiang and Henan; one chief judge in Jiangsu). In the 1993 elections, the Party nominated 99 percent of the elected provincial leaders (Han 1989: 39–41; RMRB 06/29/93; Cai 1998: 359). This nature of Chinese-style elections can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the manipulation of the electoral process has shaped the makeup of the PPCs and their leadership, and has definitively disqualified China as a democracy. On the other hand, any crack in such a tightly controlled process has a potential to open up the entire process and start tearing down autocracy. This is why the successes of candidates without official sponsorship and Party backing in elections – even they are low at this moment – are encouraging for China’s democracy.

Table 4.5 Backgrounds of the people’s deputies in selected PPCs (6th, 1983–8)

Sichuan Jiangsu Hubei Heilongjiang Shanxi Neimenggu Qinghai

Total

Worker/ peasant (%)

Intellectual (%)

Cadre (%)

Army (%)

Democratic parties,* non-partisan (%)

Overseas Chinese and Taiwanese+ (%)

Minority nationalities (%)

Woman (%)

1,476 1,296 1,976 1,947 1,921 1,801 1,450

30.50 29.70 31.86 31.30 31.10 39.32 30.00

22.7 21.2 21.2 20.6 22.8 22.1 20.2

27.00 22.60 26.94 28.90 20.20 24.35 25.60

4.00 4.60 5.00 4.20 5.70 4.12 8.00

14.00 20.50 14.00 13.00 20.20 9.49 14.70

1.80 1.40 1.00 1.20 1.00 0.62 n.a.

10.30 2.20 5.94 12.80 2.40 48.66 40.40

22.70 23.00 22.64 23.80 23.50 21.72 21.60

Sources: Diao et al. 1989: 98; NMGDCD 1991: 145. Notes * ’Democratic Parties and Groups’ (minzhu dangpai) include China Association for Promoting Democracy, China Democratic League, China National Construction Association, Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party, the Guomindang Revolutionary Committee, Jiusan Society, Zhigong (China Public Interest) Party, and the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. + Overseas Chinese and Taiwanese include returned compatriots from overseas and Taiwan.

Table 4.6 Backgrounds of the people’s deputies in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Hunan (1988–98) Beijing

Total Average Age Worker/Peasant Cadre Intellectual PLA/Armed Police DPs/Non-partisan* CPC Member Woman College Education

Tianjin

Shanghai

Hunan

Shandong

88 (9th) 93 (10th) 98 (11th) 88 (11th) 93 (12th) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%)

88 (9th) 93 (10th) 98 (11th) 88 (7th) 93 (8th) 98 (9th) 88 (7th) 93 (8th) 98 (9th) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%) N. (%)

880 53 85 (10) 292 (33) 257 (29) 30 (3) 261 (30) 619 (70) 217 (25) 502 (57)

887 n.a. 267 (30) 182 (21) 235 (27) 21 (2) 168 (19) 574 (65) 214 (24) 613 (69)

885 53 45 (5) 301 (34) 267 (30) 30 (3) 272 (31) 613 (69) 223 (25) 609 (69)

762 51 38 (5) 294 (39) 214 (28) 27 (4) 250 (33) 512 (67) 197 (26) 553 (73)

719 53 293 (27) 160 (22) 164 (23) 23 (3) 148 (21) 515 (72) 134 (19) 397 (55)

718 53 209** (29) 169 (24) 136 (19) 23 (3) 218 (30) 500 (70) 130 (18) 506 (71)

890 n.a. 304 (34) 218 (25) 196 (22) 21 (2) 133 (15) 580 (65) 201 (23) 681 (77)

863 51 n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 (2) 289 (34) 567 (66) 199 (23) 759 (88)

874 n.a. 315 (36) 228 (29) 166 (19) 35 (4) 127 (15) n.a. n.a. 335 (38)

870 n.a. 207 (24) 278 (32) 322 (37) 34 (4) 68 (8) n.a. n.a. 470 (54)

763 n.a. 240 (32) 296 (39) 119 (16) 38 (5) 60 (8) n.a. n.a. 535 (70)

926 51 279 (30) 312 (34) 169 (18) 35 (4) 108 (12) 705 (76) 188 (20) n.a.

934 911 52 49 279 (30) 281 (31) 335 (36) 324 (36) 169 (18) 150 (17) 34 (4) 35 (4) 98 (11) 105 (12) 734 (79) 709 (78) 191 (21) 187 (21) n.a. 708 (78)

Source: SDNJ 1990: 73–4, 1995: 60, 1999: 63; B. Cai 1998: 134–5; Tianjin 1999: 186, 190, 258; Li 2002: 24–8, 184–8; Shanghai 2003: 320–5. Notes * I suspect that the number of deputies from the democratic parties and non-partisans includes Communist Youth League members in Beijing and Tijian, but Shanghai and Hunan do not; therefore a discrepancy in statistics between Beijing and other provinces on this item exists. The percentages have been rounded, so the combinations may not add up perfectly to 100%. ** In this number, Tianjin also includes management cadres from state-owned enterprises and service-oriented units.

Elections and circulation of political elite

113

Circulation of ruling elite Institutionalization and expansion of power have occurred primarily at the power core of PPCs, namely the Chairpersons’ Groups and PPCSCs. The Plenary Sessions and ordinary PDs are not sharing proportionately in the expansion of power of the PPCs. Because the top elites of the PPCs fuse with the decision-making centers in the Chinese provinces and the NPC system, the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons occupy a crucial place in the development of PPCs. Their backgrounds not only indicate the change of PPCs, but also reveal the direction of institutional evolution of the entire Chinese political system. The chairpersons The leadership of PPCs has experienced five major stages of transformation in the past quarter century. (1) Veteran cadres rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution returned to politics and filled the newly resumed PPCs in the late 1970s. In this period, major concerns of the political leadership included economic development, political legitimacy (improving the competence of the system), political democratization (ending the life-term tenure, retirement system), and the power struggle. However, Deng’s major concern was to build a coalition to support his political position and economic reforms. He stressed inclusion, unity, and empowerment of the PPCs. (2) Around 1982 when the retired cadres stepped down from their positions in the Party and government organizations, a large number of them were transferred to the PPCs, which were turned into a reservoir for the retirement campaign. (3) After 1984, as the retirement system became institutionalized, many relatively younger cadres in the government and Party branches, especially those of the second-in-authority, exited to the PPCs. Thus, the PPCs also became a place to kick semi-retired cadres upstairs. (4) Many party and government leaders were transferred to the PPCs to strengthen the role and the Party’s control over the PPCs in the late 1980s. (5) In 1993 and 1998, the overall political stature and quality of PPC chairpersons continued to improve. One important change occurred in 1998 when almost a dozen of PPC chairpersons concurrently also occupied the secretary positions of provincial party committees. This development continued into 2003 and in 23 provinces the same person simultaneously held the two positions of PPC chairperson and party secretary. Because of some personnel changes, there were 33 PPC chairpersons in the 5th Congress (from 1979 to 1983) in 29 provinces. Among them, all except Li Jianzheng of Guangdong were male; only seven had a college-level education (including the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yan’an), while others had only a high-school or middle-school education and many only a primary-school experience. All of them except one had work experience in more than one province; half had worked in the

Table 4.7 The composition of the standing committees of the PPCs Term

Total number

Average age

Below age 50

Above age 60

CPC member

Nationality minorities

Female

College education

1988–93 1993–8

1,662 1,726

59.71 57.44

174 (10.47%) 206 (11.94%)

972 (58.48%) 775 (44.90%)

1,193 (71.78%) 1,233 (71.44%)

260 (15.64%) 282 (16.34%)

208 (12.52%) 208 (12.05%)

819 (49.28%) 1,133 (65.64%)

Source: Quanguo 1995: 327.

Elections and circulation of political elite

115

departments or ministries at the Central Government level. Almost all of them (except the chairpersons in Tibet and Xinjiang) joined the CPC during the 1930s or earlier. Some of them joined the army, took part in the Long March, or worked as underground Party workers. Because in the late 1970s, the Party and government were fused, in most provinces, the party secretaries held the chairperson positions in the PPCs. In some provinces, the party secretaries held positions in the government and the PPC at the same time. In 1982, when the central leadership decided to enforce a retirement policy for cadres and asked the provincial first party secretaries and governors to retire at age 65, significant personnel changes took place. Before 1983, 60 percent of China’s first party secretaries and governors were removed; from 1984 to 1985, another 86 percent were removed. The newly appointed provincial leaders (party secretaries and governors) were younger and better educated. The average age was around the mid-fifties, and 71 percent had a college education (Harding 1987: 206–7). Although rigorous, the retirement policy left some flexibility. For example, those cadres in good health could postpone their retirement. As a result, the PPCs became the last escapes for leaders exited from the Party or government branches. The 1983 elections did not extend the generational shift of personnel; the average age of chairpersons became higher. Second, as party secretaries gave up their positions in the PPCs, many retired government and Party officials – mostly those of second-in-authority – exited to the PPCs. Actually, the political stature of PPC leaders degenerated. Third, as a result of the aged leadership, the sixth PPCs had to change their leaders in the middle of their term. Fourth, even considering the mid-term changes, among 46 chairpersons there was still only one woman (Li Guiying of Yunnan), only seven had a college education, and fewer leaders than in the last group of chairpersons had experience in more than one province (ten out of 46) or in the agencies at the central government level (37out of 46). The collective image of the PPC chairpersons during this term tended to be older CPC veterans, less educated, less experienced in Beijing and central ministries, more parochial, rich in local politics and Party politics, more generalists, and possessing lower political stature in the power structure. The image of the ‘Old Men House’ was formed during this period. In 1984, the 6th PPCs had a severe crisis in leadership and personnel. They were filled with senile leaders and PDs to such extent that announcement of eulogies became one of their major activities. Noticing that health consideration left loopholes for some old leaders to exit into the PCs and to avoid a complete retirement, the CPC Central Committee (CPCCC) issued a new document around 1984, reiterating that ‘no organization was to be used as a substitute for full retirement for cadres who were too old or unwell actually to do any work – even if these cadres were leaders.’ The decision stipulated that cadres at age 70 and above had to retire from the PPCs (Manion 1993: 67). In 1985 rejuvenation of the PPC leadership began, marking a turning point for the re-institutionalization of the

116

Elections and circulation of political elite

PPCs (for a comparison with its structural change during the same period, see Chapter 2). Sixteen PPC chairpersons among 29 were replaced, and a large number of vice chairpersons and SC members also stepped down (see Table 4.8). In 1986 before the new elections, the No. 36 CPCCC Document set the guideline that potential candidates for positions in the PCs should be able to stay on for at least one term prior to the retirement age. To preserve the continuity of personnel, some leaders should be able to fulfil two terms (Sichuan 1991: 319). The 7th PPCs produced in 1988 continued the efforts seen in the 1985–6 big turnovers. Among 30 chairpersons, 14 were re-elected, six were promoted from the positions of vice chairpersons, and ten were newly elected (including Hainan, a new province established in 1988). It is important to note that among these ten newly elected chairpersons, five were re-elected in their next terms. Almost all of them were still active and able to fulfill their terms. In Heilongjiang and Jiangsu, the PPC chairpersons were also their Table 4.8 Big personnel turnover during 1983–7 Chair replaced Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimenggu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Guangdong Guangxi Sichuan Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Ningxia Xinjiang

No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes

Number of vice-chairpersons

Standing committee members

Resigned Deceased

By-elected

Resigned Deceased

By-elected

4 3 – 6 – 5 2 1 6 4 2 1 4 1 3 3 3 – 3 – – 2 2 – 2 –

6 1 2 4 – 4 4 3 1 – 2 2 3 5 3 4 4 – 3 – 3 2 4 – 1 3

7 13 – 13 8 16 7 4 16 4 8 5 8 – 12 9 9 1 19 – – 1 2 – 9 –

5 12 – 12 – 16 9 8 18 – 15 5 10 18 15 23 – – 13 – 12 1 3 – 11 9

– – – 2 – 2 1 1 – 2 – 1 – – 2 – 1 – 3 4 – – 1 – 1 –

Sources: Y. Zhang 1993; Quanguo 2000b.

– – – 1 8 1 – 1 3 2 – – – – – – – – 8 4 – – 1 – 1 –

Elections and circulation of political elite

117

respective party secretaries. But the background of this group in terms of their educational level and past career patterns did not change substantially. The 1993 PPCs’ elections brought dramatic change to the group of PPC chairpersons. Among the 30 chairpersons, eight were re-elected, one was promoted from the vice-chairperson position, and 21 were newly elected. The only woman dropped out, and no new female was promoted to the chairperson position. Among these 21 new leaders, ten had a college education, four were once senior engineers or university professors, and 15 had experience as party secretary or (and) governor, four as deputy party secretary, and only one as deputy mayor. Actually, eight and four chairpersons respectively retained their positions as party secretaries and deputy party secretaries at the same time. In comparison with the previous groups, this group had improved in terms of their education and political status in the system. They were also younger. Almost all of them were born in the 1930s and joined the Party after 1949. They lacked experiences in the army, but moved up through administrative and Party bureaucracies. Both in the government and PPCs, personnel shifted from the revolutionary cadre to the party technocrat (Li and White 1988; Lee 1991; Zang 1991). Finally, the CPC changed its policy of separation of the Party from the PPCs, and started embedding their major leaders into the PPC institutions. Clearly, in the process of transition, the PPCs became important vehicles for the Party to influence and control Chinese society. Also another important difference was that among the 21 newly elected PPC chairpersons, ten had no experience beyond their home provinces, and 19 had no experience in the central government. This indicates that while the group of chairpersons was becoming younger and better educated, it also became more localized. How this localization affected the central–local relationship and to what extent it was responsible for localism deserves a careful assessment. In 1998, the class of 8th PPC chairpersons had some of the same changes found in the 1993 class and also developed some new patterns of their own. The age continued to drop slightly. Education levels improved. Twentythree of them had a college level education; two had a post-graduate education; five held senior professional titles (such as associate professor, senior engineer, associate research fellow, and senior economist), and three were engineers. Sixteen had no work experience beyond their home provinces; only one served in the central government agency in Beijing. Provincialism as seen in the previous group continued to deepen. One significant pattern emerged for the promotional route of PPCSC chairpersons: ‘from deputy party secretary, to governor (or minister), then to party secretary and the PPCSC chairperson.’ Among the 16 newly elected PPCSC chairpersons, 13 (in Tianjin, Hebei, Jilin, Helongjiang, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Ningxia) followed this pattern. In Shandong, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Hainan, four PPCSC chairpersons, who were re-elected, served as party secretaries before their transfer to the PPCs in 1993 and therefore heralded this new trend. Two other PPC leaders (a

118

Elections and circulation of political elite

chairwoman in Shanghai and a chairperson in Guangdong) were municipal CPPCC chairwoman and governor before moving to the PPCs. All other ten re-elected PPCSC chairpersons (in Beijing, Neimenggu, Liaoning, Shanxi, Anhui, Fujian, Yunnan, Tibet, Gansu, and Xinjiang) served as deputy party secretary or deputy mayor (only Beijing’s Zhang Jianmin came from this pattern) before their transfer to the PPCs. Only one (in Henan) PPCSC chairperson elected in 1998 was transferred from the position of deputy party secretary, which used to be a predominant pattern in the 1980s. Chongqing was a special case here, since it became a MDCG in 1997 and its MPC was upgraded that year. Its MPCSC Chairman Wang Yunlong also served as deputy party secretary before he took the MPC job. Therefore, in 1998, Chongqing did not have an election. In the 1998 class, 11 occupied both the PPCSC chairmanship and party secretary position simultaneously. All these changes show: first, that the PPCSC chairmanship was no longer an honorary position to kick retired elders upstairs but a position for the most powerful provincial elite; second, to serve in this post had begun to mean a real and increasingly harder-to-get promotion for those of the second-in-authority either in the Party line or government line; third, the re-election rate indicated the increased continuity and maturity of the PPC leadership. At this moment, it had become evident that the PPCSC chairpersons were integrated into the core provincial elite in China. In 2003, the Chinese political structure at the provincial level seemed to have experienced a fundamental change, which reflected in the personnel arrangements. Around March, when the NPC convened its first Plenary Session of the 10th NPC, all 31 PPCSC chairpersons were elected – 28 were newly elected, and three (Jilin, Hunan, and Shaanxi) re-elected. The age dropped again. Twenty-nine had a college-level education; seven of them pursued post-graduate studies, resulting in three doctoral degree holders. Five had senior professional titles and two were engineers. Twenty-three had worked in different provinces; only eight were homegrown and parochial politicians. Six once held posts in the central government. These developments differed from what we have seen in the previous two classes of PPCSC chairpersons, due to the efforts that the Chinese government had increased the ‘horizontal exchanges of cadre’ among its local elites and had paid attention to grooming national leaders by sending them to provinces. Another noteworthy change regards educational background. We have heard of the rise of technocracy in Chinese politics. Interestingly, 15 of those PPCSC chairpersons with a higher education actually had trainings in social sciences, business management, and humanities – seven in economics, five in Chinese language and journalism, two in law, one in political science, and one in history (Li Yuanchao of Jiangsu is counted twice here for his MBA and Doctorate of Law. Li Keqiang of Henan and Xi Jinping of Zhejiang also held doctorates in economics and law, respectively. As a matter of fact, all three leaders have great potential to move up into the very top echelon of the Chinese political structure in the coming decade).

Elections and circulation of political elite

119

Table 4.9 Age of chairpersons of the PPC standing committee 1979

1983

1985

1988

1993

1998

2003

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimenggu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Jiangsu Shanghai Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Sichuan Chongqing Guizhou Yunnan Tibet Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xingjiang

67 67 64 63 65 75 79 66 63 67 63 69 62 74 73 66 63 62 72 68 n.a. 72 n.a. 67 62 68 67 69 65 62 52

63 65 68 67 60 65 70 70 66 70 71 68 65 69 70 70 68 66 63 72 n.a 76 n.a. 70 68 72 70 69 66 66 56

65 67 68 69 62 67 64 67 68 72 73 66 66 62 61 63 65 68 65 61 n.a 63 n.a. 63 58 74 72 64 68 68 53

68 66 63 65 65 67 67 60 67 59 66 69 71 60 66 68 68 57 68 64 68 66 n.a. 66 61 79 65 67 59 57 56

62 65 61 60 67 63 61 65 65 64 59 60 60 64 69 49 62 62 69 57 47 65 n.a. 63 61 55 63 61 64 62 59

67 59 65 65 62 60 52 59 64 63 64 65 66 50 67 62 67 57 68 66 52 64 53 62 66 60 52 66 52 60 66

62 62 60 58 59 63 61 63 53 61 50 58 57 56 57 48 59 62 63 62 55 60 62 59 57 59 57 62 55 58 61

Average

66.62

67.55

65.59

64.93

61.47

61.32

58.68

Source: This table was made by the author based on Y. Zhang 1993: 381–1406; Who’s Who in China (1988 and 1994); ZGYJ 1993: Vol. 27 (2–7); Difang Lingdaoren Ziliaoku [Profile of Local Leaders] (at www.peopledaily.com.cn), accessed on 06/23/00 and 08/19/03.

The most important change in the 2003 election was that 23 PPC chairpersons also concurrently served as the party secretaries of their respective provinces (they were Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia). Not surprisingly, 24 PPCSC chairpersons were elected into the most powerful decision-making organ – the Central Committee of the 16th CPC Party Congress (all the previous 23 plus Tibet). Among those seven PPCSC chairmen who neither occupied the post of party secretary nor sit in the CPCCC, four were promoted from the posts of

120

Elections and circulation of political elite

vice-chairperson of the previous PPCSCs (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Xinjiang), two transferred from the chairmanships of the provincial CPPCC (Tianjin and Hubei), and one from the governorship (Hainan). The increased number of PPCSC vice-chairpersons to become chairpersons was an encouraging sign for the cadre in the PPCs. Increasingly more chances to move to the very top were opened up for them. As for the massive phenomenon of holding two posts concurrently, it deserves a full discussion here. The first question is: why did it happen? The answer comes from the interaction of two developments. On the one hand, the increased importance and assertiveness of the PPCs had caused more friction between the PPCs and the government, the court and the procuratorate. The Party had increasingly felt that some PDs did not ‘listen to the words from the top’ and it lost control over the PPCs. To deal with this challenge, some provinces started in the 1990s a practice in which the party secretary took charge of the PPC. After Li Peng became the NPCSC Chairman, he made a call for ‘strengthening the Party’s leadership over the PCs.’ Although there were no central documents issued for a uniform response, many provinces did believe that the party secretary simultaneously holding the PPCSC chairmanship was a practical way to strengthen the Party’s leadership over the PCs (Int. WYL-0308 and ZW-0308). In the meantime, Jiang Zemin put forth his ‘ruling party’ theory, which means that the CPC should transform itself from a ‘revolutionary party’ into a ‘ruling party’ and learn how to govern. Under the call for the ‘rule of law,’ the Party’s intervention into daily government affairs continued to lose legitimacy, and the PCs continued to substantiate its role as the supreme power organ. For the Party, the PPCs have become a great channel to embed the real power center (the Party) into the legal power center (the PC), and to exercise its control over Chinese society. Therefore, it became apparent that the CPC has positioned itself as a ruling party to govern through the PCs. With regards to taking both the party secretary and PPCSC chairmanship posts concurrently, the second question is: what does this mean for Chinese politics in general and the PPCs in particular? To answer this question, let’s first listen to what those leaders who have simultaneously held the two posts have to say. Sun Weiben in Heilongjiang makes the following comments: According to my personal experience, the party secretary and PPCSC chairman have different authorities and responsibilities, but they are not in conflict. Not because I am the party secretary, we could stop reporting to the Party concerning important statutes, resolutions, and decisions passed by the PPCSC and other activities sponsored by the PPCSC. Not because I am the PPCSC Chairman, we could make decision directly through the Party Committee without going through the PPCSC on those important issues that should be decided by the PPCSC through legal procedures. We should take advantage of occupying the two posts

Elections and circulation of political elite

121

to transmit Party’s intentions and policies more quickly to the PPCSC through organizational channels, and to transform them into the state’s will through legal procedures; at the same time, to transmit timely the opinions, demands, and concerns from the PPCSC, the PDs and ordinary people to the Party; to coordinate the relationships between the Party Committee, the PC, government, and the court and procuratorate; and to provide timely help to the difficulty and solutions to the problems that the PC has encountered. (Yang 1997: 152) Guan Guangfu, Hubei Party Secretary and PPCSC Chairman, makes the following comments: The double roles of party secretary and PPCSC chairman enabled me to think from the Party’s perspective about how to strengthen and improve the Party’s leadership over the PC; it also helped me to think from the PCs’ perspective about how to insist on and perfect the PC system. Of course, strengthening and improving the Party’s leadership over the PCs while insisting on and perfecting the PC system are consistent and mutually reinforcing. Frankly speaking, during the one-and-a-half year of taking the two posts, most of my time and energy was devoted to the work in the Party Committee. Although I also personally paid attention to the important issues in the PC work, the daily routine work was delegated to the executive vice-chairperson to take care. For the PC work, I put stress on giving support when I was both the party secretary and PPCSC chairman. (Yang 1997: 314–15) Lin Ruo in Guangdong has his personal experiences to share: Whether the leaders in the state power organs with CPC memberships have positions in the Party or not, to a great extent, determines the authority of local state power organs. If the leaders of local state power organs have no positions in the Party, in a system that is under the unified leadership of the Party, the PCs would be treated as an insignificant organ, sometimes, as one of the mass organizations, and therefore, they have difficulty in supervising over the leading government officials who have positions in the Party. In recent years, some party secretaries in municipalities and counties take the chairmanships of MPCSCs and county PCSCs. But ‘their butts have not really sat on the chairs of PCs’ and they have not devoted energy and time to the PC work. The cadre of the PCs generally have complained, ‘This practice strengthens the PC work in surface, but weakens it in reality.’ I have had the same kind of deep feeling. (Yang 1997: 364)

122

Elections and circulation of political elite

Zhang Lichang, the Tianjin Party Secretary who was elected MPCSC chairman in 1998, says that to do the two jobs well requires a good coordination of two relationships: The first is to coordinate well the relationship between the work of Party Committee and that of the PC. In handling work details, as I take a good care of the Party Committee work, I also regard the PC work as my top priority and try to do it hard and well. I take time to participate in and preside over the meetings of the SC, Chairpersons’ Group, and the Party Group, and other important activities. Regarding how to fully use all authorities given by law under the circumstances of ‘that to rule the state and the city by following law,’ I often conduct deep discussions and consultations with the members of the Party Group and Chairpersons’ Group, and clearly layout my expectation. The second is to coordinate well the relationship of two roles of the municipal party secretary and MPCSC chairman. The PC work pays more attention to legality and procedure. The SC members collectively exercise their authority and make decision. I have pointed out several times at a variety of PC meetings, that I work here, not to act as a party secretary to give out instructions and make demands, but to act like all of you as a member of the SC and the Chairpersons’ Group to conduct collective discussion and consultation, and to cast one vote in making decision. In presiding over the meetings of the SC and Chairpersons’ Group, I always make efforts to fully respect democracy – letting everyone open up their minds and speak out what they want. After having heard and deliberated all kinds of opinions, then, we collectively use our decision-making power. (Quanguo 2000a: 473–4) From the above comments with divergent views regarding how the practice of taking two posts has affected the PC (Lin Ruo has a more negative view), we can tease out three points. First, the party secretaries cum PPC chairpersons have tried to coordinate the two roles through increased communication and coordination. In this process, the two roles affect each other. Given the nature of ‘mutual adjustment,’ the party secretaries have to accommodate and respect the work style of the PCs, namely, more emphases on collectivism, deliberation, legality, and procedure. Second, one leader assuming two posts provides a conduit for the PC to exchange power resources with the Party Committee – the de facto decision-making center in Chinese politics. Three interviewees working for the NPC and PPC respectively confirmed what Lin Ruo said, namely, the positions of the PPC leaders in the Party hierarchy determine the authority of the PCs. Generally speaking, the presence of the party secretary in the PPC strengthens, rather than weakens, the standing of PPCs in the entire power structure (Int. WYL-0308, ZW0308 and CDJ-9806). Third, the party secretaries have tried to put the

Elections and circulation of political elite

123

issues concerning the PCs on their top agenda, and to give concrete help to the cadres working in the PCs regarding housing, office conditions, promotion, and other logistical support. Therefore, one NPC staff member said, ‘It is absolutely positive for the PCs to see Party leaders take the PPCSC chairmanships’ (Int. WYL-0308). Since the practice of Party Secretary concurrently occupying the PC Chairmanship came out first at the local levels below province, discussions on its advantages and disadvantages were conducted in the 1980s. The consensus tended to be that advantages prevailed disadvantages (Wei 1994: 53–5; Cai and Wang 2001: 410–12). Another PPCSC staffer in a Northwestern province put it this way: The LPCs had a prenatal deficiency and suffered from malnutrition. The combination of the party secretary post and PPCSC chairmanship certainly facilitates the process of turning the Party’s will into a law; it also helps transform people’s will into the Party’s will. (Int. ZTX-9806) As for the long-term impact upon Chinese political development, this practice may indicate the convergence of the de facto power center and the de jure power center. In this process, we may see that the Party structure will gradually shrink in Chinese society but become more visible in the PCs. Theoretically it is possible to see that one day the party secretary as the PPC chairman may lose an election or face questions in the PCs. The practice of taking two posts exposes the Party to a new risk of scrutiny and supervision from the PCs – a price the CPC has to pay for embedding into the PCs.

The vice-chairpersons The PCs follow a principle of collective decision and responsibility that differs from the chief responsibility system in the executive branch. Under this principle, the PPCs, their SCs, and Chairpersons’ Groups must vote on their decisions and approve them by a majority. No leader or PD is allowed to use individual power to handle issues and solve problems by him/herself. Because important decisions are always initiated in the Chairpersons’ Group meetings, the fact that vice-chairpersons are a majority in the Chairpersons’ Group gives them more say in the decision-making process relative to the chairpersons than those second-ranking officials under the executive hierarchy of the government. But in discussing the group of vice-chairpersons, it is important to distinguish the vice-chairpersons of CPC members from the one or two non-communist vice-chairpersons each PPC has. Usually before informing non-communist vice-chairpersons of important decisions, the PPC chairperson summons all vice-chairpersons of CPC member and the general secretary of the PPCSC, and holds a party group meeting where a consensus is first achieved among them. In fact, the non-communist vice-chairpersons are often consulted only after an important decision has already been made

124

Elections and circulation of political elite

in the party group meeting. Their decision-making role is obviously inferior to the communist vice-chairpersons. It is important to notice that the communist elite within the PPCs coordinate their major activities and use their power through the party groups. The PPCSCs have their party groups (renda dangzhu) that are the leading core of the SCs. They consist of the chairperson, all communist vice-chairpersons, the general secretaries of the SC (this position is always occupied by a communist member), and directors of the offices. The chairpersons of the PPCs are always the chairpersons of the SC Party Group. The PPC staff members organize their own party groups (jiguan dangzhu), which are often headed by the general secretaries of the PPCSCs. When the PPCs are in session, the party groups are established within the PPCs, as well as their delegations. After the session, the PDs with communist membership are organized into small temporary party branches (Liu et al. 1992: 272–83). Like the chairperson, vice-chairpersons as a whole have experienced important changes in the past two decades. In the early 1980s, there were more vice-chairpersons for each PPC. Most of them were vice governors or of an equivalent rank in the bureaucracy, and were concurrently the members of the SC of the provincial party committee. According to an unpublished Party document, to transfer into the PCs could not be a promotion, namely only the members of the Party SC of the same level (usually including governor, vice governors, and deputy party secretaries) could be placed on the posts of PPC chairperson and vice-chairpersons) (Wei 1994: 15). Therefore, most leaders in the PPC were those who were giving up their jobs in the Party and the government. There were only a few vice governors to become vice-chairpersons. Since most of the chairpersons were former vice governors who stayed in the PPCs as their last stop before full retirement, the vicechairperson position did not have much attractiveness to the vice governors aging toward their retirement deadline. After 1986, the situations changed. The Central Party and NPC leadership assigned to the PPCs many younger, more physically energetic and intellectually competent leaders who were in their heydays in terms of political importance. Judged by the background of vice-chairpersons elected in 1988, 114 (46.91 percent) were reelected. This high retention rate reflected the effort of 1984–6 reshuffles (see Table 4.7). In addition, before taking the positions in the PPCs, 58 of them were vice governors, seven deputy party secretaries, and 11 party secretaries for political and legal affairs. After the 1993 elections, this trend was continued. Among the 1993 class of 241 vice-chairpersons, 47 were former vice governors, nine deputy party secretaries, and 12 party secretaries for political and legal affairs. All of them often became the first vice-chairpersons of the PPCSCs and took major responsibility for running the PPC system. To some extent, the chairpersons are more like foreign secretaries who have to spend more time to deal with other institutional actors. These executive vice-chairpersons are more like home secretaries; they are political entrepreneurs knowledgeable about the affairs of PPCs and more committed to their insti-

Elections and circulation of political elite

125

tutional maintenance and expansion. At the national level, the NPC had had such partnerships: Peng Zhen under Ye Jianying; Chen Pixian under Peng Zhen; Peng Chong under Wan Li; and Tian Jiyun under Qiao Shi. At the provincial level, Vice-Chairpersons Bai Shangwu of Sichuan, Zhang Zhigang of Hebei, Xie Yong of Heilongjiang, and Yuan Qitong (who later was promoted to the chairmanship) of Fujian were such crucial figures. Because of large-scale entry by ambitious political leaders into the PPCs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PPCs have been driven by political activism, evolving from ‘the houses for the retired’ to ‘the power houses’ in subnational politics. Since the 1988 elections, leaders in the PPCs have gradually been incorporated into the group of provincial elite. Although Zang (1991) and Bo (2002) excluded the leaders of PPCs from the provincial elite, my study shows that they are no longer ‘non-elite’ provincial leaders. That the PPC system has become a part of the mechanism of elite circulation in China is illustrated by the increasing two-way exchange of cadres between the PPCs and Party-government organizations. For the Party, because the cadre is becoming younger, the two-term limitation of elected officials has increased the need to expand the circulation system in order to consolidate the internal relations among the political elite. A survey conducted by the General Office of the NPCSC reported that from 1988 to 1994, 439 cadres were transferred from the Party and government organizations to the 30 PPCSCs; 188 cadres were transferred from the latter to the former – a practice of ‘first serving as parliamentarian, then going to the government’ (RMZY 12/94: 7). Although still largely an uneven exchange – more cadres shifted from the Party and government organizations to the PPCs instead of the other way around – the NPCSC has aimed to level the two-way flow by emphasizing that the cadres in the PC system can be helpful for the government and Party work, because they are more familiar with laws and more concerned with matters of overall importance (Tian 2002: 152). During a 1997 visit to the Shanghai MPCSC, Tian Jiyun, the First Vice-Chairman of the NPCSC, commented, ‘Some outstanding cadres who have worked for a while in the PCs should be more than qualified to work in the government, if I cannot say that this also applies to the party committee’ (Xu 2000: 218). Beginning in 1991, the Party Committee of Shanghai sent young promising cadres to work in the PCs at various levels for several years and then assigned or promoted them to posts in the Party and government organizations. After having worked as a vice-chairwoman in the Shanghai MPC for three years, Mrs. Chen Tiedi was then transferred to the post of deputy party secretary, and later promoted to the chairwomanship of the Shanghai CPPCC, and finally to the chairwomanship of the MPCSC (JXRDGZ 10/92: 38). The Shanghai Party Committee believed that the PCs are important channels for training and finding cadres and this practice should be institutionalized. The PCs at various levels have gradually established their own reward and promotion mechanisms, and they have also become more

126

Elections and circulation of political elite

aggressive to pressure and recommend their cadres to the Party for some important positions (Wei 1994: 73). After the 2003 election, for example, Sun Chao, a member of the MPCSC, became the head of Xuhui district – one of the most important districts in Shanghai (Int. SYC-0310). Elsewhere in Hunan, Sun Zhaifu was promoted from the PPC staff to the post of party secretary in the municipality of Shaoyang, then moved up to the Bureau Director of Inspection in the provincial government, and finally became a member of the Provincial Party SC and the secretary of Party’s Discipline Committee. Another Hunan PPC staffer was also transferred out to hold the party secretary post in a prefecture (Xu 2000: 218). To some extent, when the major leaders change their positions from Party organizations to governmental ones, and then to the PCs or vice versa, it is like a game of musical chairs to energize without shaking up the ruling class. Comparing the two classes of vice-chairpersons in 1988 and 1993, we can find some important achievements and interesting trends with regard to PPCs’ institutionalization (see Table 4.10). First, the class of 1993 was younger than all the previous classes. Its average age was 62, more than three years younger than that of the previous PPCs (which averaged 66). Since the deadline for retirement is often 65 years of age, it means that all of them could fulfill at least one term before meeting the retirement age. Second, better-educated people had been recruited into the leadership of the PPCs. Now more than half of the vice-chairpersons had a college-level education. Among them, many had a post-graduate education; some even studied abroad, got their doctoral degrees there, and held senior professional titles. Third, a fair number of vice-chairpersons had been promoted through the internal PC system and an independent system for promotion has emerged in the PPCs. The PCs no longer meant a dead alley for a political career. According to an old policy in the early 1980s, leaders in the Party and government organizations could not be promoted to the PPCs. In other words, bureau-level leaders had no opportunity to be promoted into the positions of PPC vice-chairperson; the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons had to come from the pool of the party secretary, deputy party secretaries, members of the Provincial Party SC, governor, and vice governors at the same level (Wei 1994: 15). After 1986, the central leadership changed its policy, and a large number of younger leaders at the bureau-level were promoted into the posts of vice-chairperson of the PPCs. They were able to fulfill at least two terms. Because of the entry of younger leaders into the PPCs, many of them were able to move up from the lower positions within the PPCs to the SC and the posts of vice-chairperson; some even ultimately became the chairpersons. For example, Xu Binzhong, the Vice-Chairman of Beijing MPC, was transferred from the Party Propaganda Department to the post of deputy-director of the Research Office, and later to the Financial and Economic Committee of the MPC where he moved to the post of director. Then, from the post of the deputy secretary general of the SC, he finally became a vice-chairperson. Qi

Elections and circulation of political elite

127

Zheng of Liaoning, Yang Bin of Zhejiang, and Song Jun of Fujian had also followed the same promotion pathways. Ning Quanfu of Hebei, Cui Weiyu of Neimemggu, and Yang Wengui of Hainan were promoted from the positions of the chairpersons of the MPC to the PPCs. Fourth, the percentage of communist vice-chairpersons increased. In contrast, the non-communist vice-chairpersons became less than the previous PPCs. Comparing the years of 1988 and 1993, the non-communist vicechairpersons dropped from 80 (33 percent) to 62 (26 percent). This significant and surprising (considering the official rhetoric of widening the representativeness of the PCs) change indicates the efforts of the CPC to deepen its embeddedness into the PCs and also reveals the deep crisis with the DPs in the Chinese political life. The problems with the CPC ruling elite and their non-communist junior partners can be illustrated through a comparative analysis of vice-chairpersons with communist membership with those who were non-communist (see Table 4.8). First, let’s look at the communist vice-chairpersons group. Despite an encouraging development regarding the overall improvement in educational backgrounds in the past two decades, the percentage (42.46 percent) of college educated communist vice-chairpersons remained much lower than the overall percentage (53.94 percent) of all vice-chairpersons in 1993. In contrast, the percentage of college educated non-communist vicechairpersons was 87.1 percent. Also, in terms of the percentage of senior professional titleholders, the communist group suffered from the same unfavorable gap as compared to the non-communist group. Clearly, the CPC leadership still needs more efforts to continue the current trend in order to improve the quality of their cadres. While the communist elite is catching up with non-communist leaders, the non-communist vice-chairpersons group was falling into a different kind of trouble. First, non-communist vice-chairpersons were aging and losing influence in the PPCs. Among the 1988 class, the average age of noncommunist vice-chairpersons was 72, nine years older than their communist colleagues (average 63). Among the 1993 class, the average age for noncommunist members was 67, still seven years older than their communist colleagues. Second, the age problem for the non-communist vicechairpersons indicated that when the DPs were losing their leaders to the natural law (most of them became the friends of the CPC before 1949) and the competition of the CPC (many non-communist officials joined the CPC), they had difficulty in bringing in new members. Even though the CPC does not want to lose this fig leaf that symbolically implies a multiparty condition and meritocracy and has instructed its members not to let the percentage of non-communist members decline below the previous PCs, the DPs still cannot overcome the adversities against their development. This explains why the non-communist vice-chairpersons tend to sit in the PPCs for several terms. Their retention rate has been higher than their communist colleagues. The DPs have not appealed to the youth, women, and rural

Table 4.10 PPC vice chairpersons after 1988 and 1993 elections

1988 (7th) 1993 (8th)

Total

CPC member

Non-CPC

Female

Average age

College education

Senior title holder

Retention rate

243 241

163 (67.08%) 179 (74.27%)

80 (32.92%) 62 (25.73%)

20 (8.23%) 22 (9.13%)

65.49 62.15

85 (34.98%) 130 (53.94%)

63 (25.51%) 86 (35.69%)

114 (46.91%) 96 (39.83%)

Source: Who’s Who in China (1989 and 1994). Note Non-CPC category includes members of several democratic parties and non-partisan members; senior title includes professorship, senior engineer, and senior economist.

Table 4.11 A comparison of PPC vice chairpersons of Communist Party and democratic parties/non-partisans Total number

Female

Average age

College education

Retention rate

Senior professional title

CPC member

CPC member

CPC member

Non-CPC

CPC member

CPC member

CPC member

1988 (7th) 163 80 14 6 (67.08%) (32.92%) (8.59%) (7.5%)

62.45

71.68

22 63 (13.5%) (78.75%)

66 48 (40.49%) (60%)

16 47 (9.82%) (58.75%)

1993 (8th) 179 62 (74.27%) (25.73%)

60.39

67.24

76 54 (42.46%) (87.1%)

63 33 (35.2%) (53.23%)

38 48 (21.23%) (77.42%)

Non-CPC

Non-CPC

16 7 (8.94%) (11.29%)

Non-CPC

Non-CPC

Non-CPC

Source: Who’s Who in China (1989 and 1994). Note Non-CPC category includes vice-chairmen from several democratic parties or with no party affiliation. The senior professional title includes professorship, senior engineer, and senior economists.

130

Elections and circulation of political elite

residents, the three largest under-represented social groups in China, so there is no new generation of DP leaders to phase in. If their utility lies more in adding some aura of meritocracy to the communist rule; as the CPC recruits better-educated and younger members, the DPs will probably continue to lose political relevancy in the future. Entering the twenty-first century, the group of PPC vice-chairpersons continued to recruit more powerful figures with better education and lower age. According to an incomplete list of vice-chairpersons elected in 2003 from ten provinces and one MDCG (they are Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangdong, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Shaanxi), there were 88 total vice-chairpersons. The average age of this group dropped to 59, compared with the average of 62 ten years ago. Among them, 83 (94 percent) had a college-level education (both three-year and four-year colleges), ten (11 percent) had post-graduate experiences, 25 (28 percent) held professional titles (engineer, architect, medical doctor, and agricultural engineer), and 12 (14 percent) were professors. This is a continued improvement against the previous classes. Apart from two vice-chairpersons who were members of DPs but also joined the CPC, 73 (85 percent) were communist in contrast to 13 (15 percent) non-communist vice-chairpersons. Comparing this to the ratio of communists versus non-communists ten years ago, the communists continue to edge out the non-communists. Talking about the 75 vice-chairpersons with a communist background, 32 joined the Party in the 1960s before 1966 when the Cultural Revolution broke out, 27 joined during the Cultural Revolution, and 16 joined after 1977. Assuming that these 88 vice-chairpersons account for one-third of the entire group and therefore may reflect the general pattern, the following observations are interesting and illuminating for our understanding of the Chinese politics in general. First, the recruitment system of PPC vicechairpersons consists of two channels – the Party-bureaucratic hierarchy and non-bureaucratic institutions (some people crossed the boundary). In the first category, party secretaries at the city (most likely the provincial capital cities and bigger cities that enjoy the vice provincial level treatment) and prefect level supplied most PPC vice-chairpersons (22 had such background, and half of them concurrently served as the MPCSC chairpersons); 21 were former vice governors which continued to be a big pool of supply; the provincial party committees also sent many (12 had such a background) of their party committee secretaries general, work committee party secretaries (e.g., education, financial work, Party discipline, political and legal affairs) to the PPC to serve as vice-chairpersons. Interestingly, there was no more former deputy party secretary of the provincial party committee to exit into the vice-chairperson group. Nine vice-chairpersons were bureau directors in the provincial government (also including one government secretary general) immediately before their entrance into the PPCs; three came from the provincial high court (two presidents) and people’s procuratorate (one procurator general). In the non-bureaucratic channel, many (21 had this background)

Elections and circulation of political elite

131

non-communist luminaries (such as university president, hospital president, research institute director, chairs of the provincial committees of DPs, presidents for women federation and labor union, and so forth) or vicechairpersons from the CPPCC committees sometimes jumped over the hierarchical ladder to serve as the PPC vice-chairpersons. Second, many vice-chairpersons were elected into the PPCs not through the regular five-year election cycle but before it. The reason is that the Party often wants the officials it intends to transfer into PCs to work there first in order to establish contacts and gain recognition for winning their coming elections. Therefore, before the elections, we can see some officials who will constitute the core leadership of the PPCSC have already transferred into the PPCs for one or two years before the regular term change. Third, the PC system has become an important training ground for the PPC leadership. A huge number of vice-chairpersons had served as MPSC chairpersons or PPCSC members and gained rich working experiences in the PCs. Also, because the age structure of vice-chairpersons has become more diversified, in every PPC, three to four vice-chairpersons often are in their fifties, which mean they can serve for two terms before retirement. The PPCSCs have developed a better institutional memory. Fourth, engineers continue to pose as a conspicuous presence in the group of PPC vice-chairpersons. This is consistent with the overall pattern of evolution toward technocracy within the Chinese bureaucracy (Cheng 2001). Meantime, some Chinese officials have increasingly acquired new titles such as economist and ‘engineer of political work’ (zhenggongshi). More PPC leaders also have experiences in law, business, and foreign economy, and trainings in political management through China’s Party school system. No wonder, under the new technocracy, ‘project politics’ that uses social engineering to reconstruct China has featured in today’s China, replacing Mao’s ‘movement politics.’ In analyzing the background of the PPCPDs and their leaders, the female representation sticks out as another case against the official propaganda that the development of the PCs symbolizes a great achievement of the Chinese socialist democracy (this is why my book sometimes does not use genderneutral nouns for the PPC chairman). According to the guidelines from the central leadership for local elections, the seats for women should not be below 20 percent to 22 percent of the total PDs. Actually, the PCPDs of all levels has met this percentage. However, in the recent elections, women representation has suffered a decline. Both the total numbers of female vicechairpersons and SC members as well as their percentages have declined since the 1980s (see Table 4.10). It has been a pattern that women are underrepresented in the LPCs. As we move closer to the real places of power, women further lose their representation and influence. Since feminine issues have not been prioritized in the Chinese policy agenda (except the kidnapping of women and selling them into marriage or prostitution) and no woman liberalization movement is within sight, the under-representation of

Table 4.12 Numbers and percentages of female in the standing committees and vice chairpersons 5th PPCs

Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanxi Neimenggu Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Anhui Fujian Jiangxi Shandong Henan Hubei

6th PPCs

SC

VCs

SC

No. %

No.

% No.

%

21 9 6 0 8 7 7 10 10 0 11 9 8 11 8 0 7

20 9 8 22 13 16 15 7 12.5 8 13 9 13 19 12 12 8

9 3 10 15 9 12 6 8 11 11 8 5 10 11 10 11 4

15 7 13 27 14 19 10 11 16.9 15 11 6 20 20 13 15 7

3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1

13 5 7 12 7 10 9 4 8 6 7 6 6 10 8 8 5

7th PPCs VCs No. 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

SC % 13 8 0 10 0 9 9 10 9.1 0 9 8 11 0 7 0 8

No. 11 6 7 10 5 3 3 5 8 8 6 7 6 3 11 9 5

% 17 11 8 16 8 5 5 8 13.1 12 13 12 14 6 14 15 7

8th PPCs VCs

SC

No.

% No. 11 0 13 11 11 0 0 13 20 0 14 11 13 0 10 0 8

1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

16 6 5 4 4 3 4 10 12 3 6 5 5 2 7 7 7

9th PPCs VCs

SC

%

No. %

No.

25.8 10.9 7.7 6.7 6.8 4.6 6.67 15.6 18.5 6.1 12.2 7.7 8.6 3.6 7.8 8.1 9.1

2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

22 10 10 0 10 12.5 0 0 10 14.3 14.3 11 12.5 0 8.3 0 8.3

17 6 6 6 5 4 5 7 9 5 8 8 3 4 10 11 4

VCs % 27.4 10.9 9.2 10 8.5 6.2 8.3 10.9 13.9 8.5 17.4 13.1 5.9 7.3 13.5 15.5 6.2

No. 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0

% 13 11 12.5 10 11 0 0 0 22.2 14.3 0 12.5 11 11 0 0 0

Hunan 9 13 1 Guangdong 10 14 1 Guangxi 9 13 1 Hainan n.a. n.a. n.a. Chongqing n.a. n.a. n.a. Sichuan 7 9 1 Guizhou 8 13 1 Yunnan 6 10 1 Tibet 8 17 1 Shaanxi 8 12 1 Gansu 0 0 0 Qinghai 4 8 0 Ningxia 8 16 0 Xingjiang 5 9 1 Total Average

7 5 6 6 7 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10 7 8 8 8 4 9 9 6 9 0 0 0 6 0 7 7 3

7 1 7 0 12 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8 1 12 1 7 1 17 0 15 1 0 0 14 0 17 0 6 1

7 6 0 4 10 10 n.a. 2 n.a. n.a. 8 8 7 7 8 6 0 10 10 7 0 0 0 5 0 7 7 6

9 1 5 1 15 1 6 0 n.a. n.a. 10 0 12 0 10 0 23 1 13 1 0 0 11 1 16 0 12 0

11 2 9 5 10 6 0 5 n.a. n.a. 0 8 0 6 0 8 11 7 10 7 0 5 13 6 0 7 0 0

3.1 7.9 9.7 11.1 n.a. 10 10.2 13.3 14.6 12.5 10.4 13.3 15.6 0

1 1 1 0 n.a. 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 0

11 12.5 11 0 n.a. 10 10 0 7.7 0 14.3 12.5 25 0

1 6 4 8 8 9 8 9 0 8 4 7 7 0

1.6 8.6 6.6 19.5 12.7 11 14.8 14.5 0 15.7 6.7 15.6 16.3 0

1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 0

12.5 33.3 12.5 12.5 0 10 9.1 12.5 7.1 0 25 0 12.5 0

224 n.a. 24 n.a. 194 n.a. 19 n.a. 183 n.a. 16 n.a. 178 n.a. 23 n.a. 197 n.a. 23 n.a. 8 13 0.86 7 6.93 11 0.68 6 6.3 11 0.55 6 5.93 9.94 0.77 8.57 6.35 10.85 0.74 8.89

Sources: This table was made by the author based on the information from Y. Zhang 1993: 1407–54; Quanguo 2000b.

134

Elections and circulation of political elite

women in Chinese politics will probably continue. If we look at both the percentage of woman representation among the communist and noncommunist vice-chairpersons, we can see clearly that the DPs have not done better than the CPC in representing women. The problem with woman representation is likely rooted more in the patriarchal nature of Chinese society than in the communist one-party rule.

The rise of independent-minded deputies The function of Chinese PPCs mainly depends on the role of the political elites, particularly those in the Chairpersons’ Groups and the SCs, as we have discussed before. However, the assertive role of PPCs in Chinese political life has also been pushed forward by a new breed of PDs within the PCs at all levels. Not abandoning, but retaining, their old role of being a role model among the citizens they represent, the PDs have started taking new roles. An important role change has been going on. At the national level, Hu Jiwei, former NPCSC member and editor of The People’s Daily, created a big embarrassment to the Chinese government during the 1989 crisis by sponsoring a signature-campaign for impeaching then Premier Li Peng – who was nicknamed ‘the Butcher of Beijing’ (Hu 1993; Hu 1996). Huang Shunxin, a Taiwan repatriate who served as the 7th NPC member after his return from Taiwan in 1985 and a NPCSC member from 1988 to 1993, also made several ‘first records.’ For example, he stood up to cast a negative vote (the first in NPC history) in 1988. In the same year, he successfully pushed for allowing reporters to interview the NPC meetings on floor. He proposed to add PDs’ right to address the entire session into the Regulation on NPC Procedures in 1989. In 1992, he angrily left the NPC meeting in protest of the Three Gorges Project, so on and so forth (Xie 1989; Dai 2000). Yao Xiurong, a populist two-term NPC member, as we will discuss later, created a ‘Jiaozuo phenomenon.’ Here I will paint several vignettes of PPCPDs to show how a quiet revolution has reached the ordinary PDs who have been pushing hard, first to cash in the promises for rights and democracy in the Chinese constitution and various laws, and then, to seek fundamental changes within the PC system. The traditional roles defined and expected by the Chinese ruling party offer us a baseline to better understand the radical nature of the new emerging type of PDs. We can easily find them in a variety of ‘handbooks’ or ‘reference books’ written by both the NPCSC and some PPCSCs for their PDs. In one, ABCs for People’s Deputies, the main roles of the PDs were summarized into three points. They include, to participate in decision-making through attending meetings, partaking deliberation, and casting votes; to provide legislative oversight over and assistance to the government, the court and procuratorate; and to serve as a bridge and a connecting tie between the decision-making organs, the Party, and the people (Yang 1991: 128–9). In another encyclopedic handbook, added was the role of assisting the enforce-

Elections and circulation of political elite

135

ment of the constitution and laws (Sun 1997: 44). Wang Yijing summarizes five roles of the PDs in his book People’s Deputies in China. They include obligations to contact the people and reflect their will, to participate in formulating the state will, to supervise and guarantee the enforcement of the constitution and laws, to assist the government to conduct its work, and finally, to play an exemplary model (Wang 1996: 56–7). Overall, the PDs are expected to serve as ‘state agents’ (O’Brien 1994a). Even though the constitution and many laws regarding the PCs have prescribed lofty roles for the PDs, both the institutional constraints and the lack of motivation on the PDs’ part have dampened this potential. Therefore, among the PDs, we can find many ‘inactive deputies’ (O’Brien 1994a) who have two subgroups. Many ‘leadership deputies’ who occupy important leading positions in the Party, government, law-enforcement and adjudication agencies, and the army often treat the membership of PCs merely as one more privilege and divert little attention from their hectic schedules to the work of deputies. Even when they are at the meeting, their vested interest, which may be in tension with the expansion of legislative power, dictates them to ‘speak official language.’ Since one-third of the deputies are cadres, and two-thirds of them are communist members,; the dominance of the congressional meetings by powerful Party and government officials gives a reason for people to call these meetings ‘the second party congresses.’ The second group of ‘inactives’ includes model workers and peasants and those whose unique attributes can fulfill particular quotas to make the PCs ‘as representative as possible.’ Chinese informants jokingly say that ‘ignorant girls’ (wuzhishaonü) – non-partisans (wudangpai), intellectuals (zhishifengzi), ethnic minorities (shaoshuminzhu), and women (nü) – have been particularly wooed by the CPC to fill the PCs (Int. YJ-0205). Not surprisingly, the name lists of PPCPDs and SC members always include several women of ethnic minorities. Their multiple attributes can help PPC electoral committees meet the mandatory quotas and give them more leeway in the consultation and negotiation phase of the nomination process (Shih 1999: 173–201). Because of this deliberate composition of model representatives from every walk of life and every trade, the gathering of the PCs often garners another nickname – ‘the flowers show’ (qunyinghui). Most of these PDs feel like they have won the lottery when the work unit or organizational department designates them. They take the role of PDs with political honor and pride, and tend to express their gratitude to the Party and the government when they speak at the occasions of congressional meetings. They attend the PCs more for a show than for decision-making. People referred to these PDs ‘dumb deputies,’ ‘two hands deputies’ (‘raising hands and clapping hands’), or ‘deputies of raising hands and eating steamed buns’ (jüjü shuangshou, chichi mantou). It is important to notice that the second group of inactives is often dependent upon the will of the first group, the presence of a large number of officials easily robs away the speaking opportunity from ‘window-dressing’ PDs. Chinese PDs have complained that the discussions at PCs often turn into the

136

Elections and circulation of political elite

‘tingzhang and zhuanyuan meetings’ – which literally mean ‘meetings of bureau directors and prefects,’ but by playing on phonetic part of these two words, they also mean that ordinary PDs are merely ‘officials of listening’ and ‘prefects of accompanying dignitaries’ (Li 2002: 27). To be fair to the Chinese authority, the ruling Party has also been dismayed by the inactives and has taken steps to promote ‘active deputies’ who can creatively fulfill their responsibilities. As discussed in Kevin J. O’Brien’s study, the Party and the leadership within the PC system have endorsed ‘the regime agents’ as their ideal PDs. According to O’Brien, they serve as ‘leadership proxies’ and ‘transmit the spirit, regulations and decisions’ of higher levels; they deem themselves ‘helpers’ of the government and engage in activities such as ‘explaining why unpopular policies (such as increasing urban grain prices, the one-child policy) are in the nation’s long-term interests,’ and work to make people of similar background ‘understand the national interest’ (O’Brien 1994a: 366). In addition to the role of ‘bridge and tie’ expected from the ruling establishment, many PDs also take roles as lawmakers, the watchdogs of legislative oversight, and caseworkers for constituency service. In a collection of personal accounts written by a hundred PDs at all five levels (NPC, PPCs, MPCs, county and urban district PCs, and township PCs) under the aegis of the Liaison Bureau of the General Office of the NPCSC, a picture of tireless, selfless, politically correct, and morally upright helpmates to the system is depicted. They are trouble-shooters in crisis on behalf of the regime and ideal role models for the entire society to emulate. Most important of all, these active PDs have the political consciousness and skill to reconcile the conflict between citizens and the government, and to serve both the Party and the people at the same time (Quanguo 2000a). O’Brien also has found that through ‘blending roles’ and ‘role accumulation,’ some PDs developed another sub-role within the institutional constraints – the role of remonstrator. O’Brien (1994a: 368) states, ‘They are quasi-insiders who seek attention and transmit information that may help rectify administration. Like upright officials in imperial China, they assert a right to recognize injustices and mistakes, and to confront leaders.’ Most interesting is that some capable PDs have become ‘remonstrators/agents’ who can skillfully and subtly reconcile the possible tensions between these two sub-roles. However, O’Brien (1994a: 374) believes that these developments still stay within the institutional limit of communist authoritarianism and only call for ‘benevolent rule rather than institutionalized and responsive government.’ Building upon O’Brien’s observations, I would like to delineate a new trend that has been in the making since the early 1990s. Increasingly, some PDs have shed off their state-centric straitjackets, grounded their political survival in the congressional elections into the people’s support, and resorted to societal forces to target leading state officials. If the remonstrators/agents tend to use their role of agent to camouflage and legitimize their role of remonstrator, these new advocates are using the lofty public transcript of

Elections and circulation of political elite

137

Chinese official ideology against the hidden transcript of power politics. Although they still want to be regarded as ‘within the system,’ or have not bluntly challenged the current political order, they have taken social support as their political base to fight for social power and become more independent-minded and non-compromising. They have been making strenuous efforts to change the state–society boundary and hold the government to be more responsive and accountable to the people. In the following spectrum of active PDs, we can see this transformation in Chinese politics. Fu Xuejian: a red remonstrator Fu Xuejian, a three-term (1988–2003) PPCPD, PPCSC member and its Deputy Secretary General in Hunan, is one energetic representative on behalf of the marginalized common people. As a communist member and the Chairman of the Rural and Agricultural Affairs Committee of PPCSC (1998–2003), he followed a motto ‘to present suggestions to the Party and state, and to represent the will of the people.’ Over two decades, he devoted his time mostly to three things – making suggestions to higher-level leadership (including the Center), doing investigations in the countryside, and giving lectures on anti-corruption and a clean government. From 1988 to 2001, he led four bill proposals, sponsored two inquiries, and wrote almost a hundred pieces of suggestions, criticism, and opinions to the PPC (Fu 2001: 395; Yang 2001). His 60-plus writings were compiled into a book with more than 200,000 Chinese characters. Its title, Shenshi Zhenyan [True Words under Prosperous Times] accurately reveals his role of red remonstrator. For his services to ordinary people in redressing the wrongs in criminal justice and fighting against corrupt officials, he won the title of ‘Bao Gong’ – a legendary magistrate of impartiality who ‘treated the prince and commoner equally.’ He was also called ‘Fu Qingtian’ – literally means the blue sky after the dark clouds clear up – a metaphor for the restoration of justice (Fu 2001: 382–9). However, his loyalty to the Party did not prevent him from upsetting some powerful officials. He played a leading role in two highly controversial events of inquiry and removal. In 1989, the Hunan PPCPDs removed Vice Governor Yang Huiquan from his position for misconducts and incompetence (see Chapter 7 for details). Again on May 27, 1998, with 20-plus PPCPDs, Fu lodged another inquiry to question the provincial government and the Bureau of Immigrant Affairs (yiminju) for using relief funds (a total of 26 million yuan earmarked for needy immigrants) to build luxury hotels. In this abuse, 12 million yuan were swindled away by corrupt officials and contractors. Under the scrutiny of the PPC inquiry, the provincial government dealt the responsible officials all kinds of censures. The Bureau Director was given censure of party discipline, the deputy bureau director was removed and received serious reprimands, and two department directors were fired and formally charged (Fu 2001: 395; Yang 2001). These two

138

Elections and circulation of political elite

events were unprecedented in the history of Chinese PPCs and indicative of the mounting courage of some PDs. Fu shows that the role of a remonstrator can become more detached from the role of regime agent. Chen Shirong: an anti-corruption warrior Another ‘stubborn and persistent’ Hunan PPCPD, Chen Shirong, was born in 1917 and has only a primary-school education. As a member of Min’ge (Democratic Revolutionary Committee of the Nationalist Party) and a retiree, he was elected into the Hunan PPC in 1993. At the age of 83 in 2000, he had tried more than 300 times to present suggestions to top Chinese leaders – including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Zhu Rongji – with a total of more than four thousand pieces and one million Chinese characters. According to one report, during the 20 years of his retirement, he contributed to the dismissal of more than 20 corrupt officials. In revenge, a hired hatchet man on a motorcycle hit him deliberately. Another hitter bludgeoned him with a nailed club. Chen luckily escaped three other attempts for his life. The epitome of his hard work was a ten-year effort to send a powerful rising political star to her execution. In 1988, Chen received letters from insiders of a labor service company affiliated to the Sixth Provincial Construction Corporation reporting that its general manager embezzled 50,000 yuan of public funds. Jiang Yanping, the General Manager, was a ‘strong woman’ who had won many honors and titles. Through the use of money and sex, she wove a huge network of connections and won favors from her superiors (her captives included a deputy mayor, a bureau director, and a party secretary. The deputy director of the Detention Station and several police officers could not resist her captivating sexual power, either, when Jiang was in their custody). Consequently, she received quick promotions year after year, and at age 38 she easily became the Deputy General Manager of the Hunan Provincial Construction Group. Facing such a powerful figure, Chen was determined to battle her head on. In 1989, he wrote to The Hunan Daily that published his charges in its internal issue. But this did not dent Jiang’s fortune. Later, several employees, including the accountant and section heads, collectively brought their charges to the office of the District Procuratorate. Again through money and sex, Jiang bought off the procurator in charge of the case, who later forced the employees to change their accounts and provide false testimony. In retaliation, Jiang fired all ten employees who had reported her. In December 1990, Chen was again contacted by the former distressed employees and collected more evidence. The next year, he wrote a letter to the Procurator General in Beijing. In September 1991, he went to Beijing to deliver a package of evidence and charges to the Procurator General. Meanwhile, Jiang did not lose a moment to mobilize her web of connections to secure her footings. It was not until 1998 that Chen’s long-publicized repu-

Elections and circulation of political elite

139

tation of battling Jiang paid off. Someone sent Chen a letter providing new and shocking details of how Jiang used tens of millions of yuan to bribe an official in the provincial government to get a 600 million yuan high-rise building project, which was never finished. Chen followed these leads and conducted his own investigation. Later he mailed all his materials to the Supreme Procuratorate and other offices in Beijing. This time, Chen’s efforts caught the attention of top leaders, and a powerful woman met her downfall. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Chen engaged in more than 300 case works for ordinary people needing help. For his efforts, he received more than 40 honorary banners and a popular title: ‘Police Officer of the Pacific Ocean’ – an overextended, conscientious peace officer (Chen and Liu 1997). Once a reporter asked Chen whether he feared death or not. Chen answered him with this motto: Hold a sword in hand to fight corrupt officials; hold up my shoulders high and stride forward; never give up if I do not win; fear no hardship, no physical fatigue, no death, and no ghosts; dare to take on the powerful, and be ready for a long-term struggle. (Tang 2000) Luo Shiying: an advocate for rule of law Luo Shiying served in the Fujian PPCSC during the late 1980s and in the Sichuan PPCSC from 1993 to 1998. His business card in the late 1990s read as follows: Arbitrator and member of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, Special Advisor for Sichuan Sub-Council of China’s Council for Promoting International Trade (CCPIT), Vice-Chairman for Sichuan Conciliation Center of CCPIT, Guest Professor of Law at Sichuan University and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Honorary Director and Special Research Fellow at the Law Research Institute of Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences, and a specialist who enjoyed a financial stipend from the State Council for prominent people in social sciences. He once served as a law-faculty member at Xiamen University in Fujian and the Southwestern Institute of Political Science and Law in Chongqing. With his strong background in law and strong connections in the field, he was the irreplaceable lawmaker to guarantee the quality of local statutes in the Fujian PPCSC. Due to his pressure and efforts, two vice governors in Fujian in charge of foreign trade lost their positions for incompetence, misconducts, and inflicting losses upon the state. In one of these cases, the Fujian Party Committee initially tried to conceal the true stories behind the dismissal, but he tipped the Xinhua News Agency that reported the scandal. The next day, the local newspapers followed suit. However, he worked hard to promote talented people. For example, he was instrumental in promoting Chen Guangyi from a college lecturer to professor. And later with his recommendation and support, Chen became a

140

Elections and circulation of political elite

bureau director, then a vice governor, then governor, and eventually the provincial party secretary. This party secretary in return created a climate respecting knowledge and intellectuals in Fujian. Under this climate, Professor Luo became the ‘soul of the PPCSC,’ a compliment given by the Party Secretary Chen and the PPCSC when he left Fujian for Sichuan. When he served in the Sichuan PPCSC as a member of the LMWC, as one of the four notorious ‘big canons’ (dapao), Luo would not hesitate to stand up and thunder out ideas (Int. ZW-0306). When talking about his work in the PPCSC, he often shook his head and said, ‘Many government officials have no sense of law. They just want to do whatever they like’ (Int. LSY-9806). He seemed to take it as his mission to harness the arbitrary administrators with the strap of rule of law. Besides his contribution to the lawmaking work in the PPCSC, his two big accomplishments included a leading role in questioning and investigating one vice governor and one governor, which eventually brought their political careers to an end (see Chapter 7 for details). When asked whether he feared anything, he answered, ‘I feel no pressure. I fear nothing’ (Int. LSY-9806). Feng Youwei: a real people’s deputy Feng Youwei – ‘Deputy Feng’ – is a real PD, because he was first elected to the Shenhe District PC in 1986 through the nomination of more than 1,800 voters in the Metallurgical Research Institute of China Academy of Sciences in Shenyang, Liaoning. Later in 1993, he was elected into the Shenyang MPC through the nomination of the district PDs, and again into the Liaoning PPC in 1998, when the delegation he belonged to allied with another delegation in the MPC to nominate him for a PPC seat. Among the 143 PPCPDs from Shenyang, he was the only one who literally won elections without official backing. He is one of the few PDs to serve in PCs of three levels (NFZM 03/03/01). ‘Deputy Feng,’ 62 years old in 2002, was a professor of physics and the editor of the Metallurgical Journal. Nevertheless, his unique business card did not list these titles, but instead these words: ‘Keep people’s trust in mind at every moment, take the duties and responsibilities of PDs faithfully, do more down-to-earth things through participation and deliberation, and represent people’s will with unreserved energy. For business please contact: PD Feng Youwei.’ His popularity was so high in Shenyang, people called him ‘The First Deputy in Shenyang,’ ‘Qingtian (Blue Sky) Feng,’ and ‘Modern Bao Gong’ – the latter two nicknames were also given to Fu Xuejian in Hunan (SYRB 03/05/03). Deputy Feng established his reputation for several reasons. First, his understanding of the role of PD differs radically from most of his colleagues. He took the role of PD more as a position and a job, rather than an honor or a title. A PD should use his or her power ‘well, independently and sufficiently.’ He believed that if a PD is given power but does not use it, it is a

Elections and circulation of political elite

141

negligence of his duty and responsibility. He often did this calculation: 42 million people in Liaoning Province had a total of 600 PPCPDs, one representing 60,000 to 70,000 people; the municipality of Shenyang had a total of 7.2 million people and 500 MPCPDs, one representing 14,000 people; his Shenhe District had a total of 600,000 people with 200 district PDs, one for 2,000 to 3,000 people. He said, If you do not fulfill your responsibility, it means that those two to three thousand people, 14 thousand people, and those sixty to seventy thousand people elected you for nothing. If you are not aware of this, don’t take the PD job. (MZYFZSB 11/26/02) Second, due to his strong awareness of a PD’s responsibility, Deputy Feng dared to speak what other deputies did not and to fight for what other deputies would not. He developed images of ‘trouble-maker’ and ‘lone ranger’ on the PC floors. He pushed for the secret ballot and an electronic voting system, he objected to the membership of the Mayor in the Presidium of the MPC, and he led a hunger strike taken part by 20 deputies in 1995 to protest a court decision and help a wronged person free. At a meeting he openly requested Mayor Mu Shuixin not to allow his wife and daughter to engage in business. Also through an inquiry in the MPC, he stopped Mayor Mu from selling a huge public land with ancient trees to Hong Kong commercial developers. In 2000, he delivered a fiery speech targeting the pervasive corruption within the Shenyang court system and preceded a milestone event in the coming year. In 2001, in the history of the PCs at and above the level of bigger cities, the court work report was voted down for the first time. Later, Mayor Mu and his entire leadership were brought down for corruption and abuse of power. Deputy Feng was proven prescient and his popularity soared even higher (ZGQNB 10/30/02; RDJS 10/2002; XHS 01/21/03; WXB 08/07/03; Dong and Chen 2002). Third, Deputy Feng was not merely an isolated phenomenon. His strength had been supported and sustained by an organized force that was increasingly awakening and rising up. He once said, ‘I am not alone. Surrounding me there is a group of outspoken, practical, and high-quality deputies who are famous writers, professors, lawyers, and senior engineers.’ One of Feng’s colleagues in the PPC made these comments: We, people’s deputies, have said earlier that we resolutely support Feng. If anyone tries to touch him, we will fight with him to the end. . . . Feng Youwei is not standing high and lonely like an electric pole. Beneath him, there is a pyramid to support him and to push him to the acme. (ZGQNB 10/30/02) This explains why Feng Youwei became a phenomenon, and continued to inspire desire for democracy in China.

142

Elections and circulation of political elite

Wu Qing: a fighter for democracy and freedom Wu Qing, an English professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University, was elected into the Haidian District PC in 1984 when she was 46 years old. It was serendipity that played a major role in changing Wu’s life. The University where she was teaching was assigned a PD as an electoral district. The requirements for this PD were clearly specified: a female, middle-aged, and non-partisan professor with an outstanding teaching record. Only Wu and another teacher fitted the profile. As the first teacher to teach English on TV in China and also as the daughter of Bing Xin (the most respected, officially certified female Chinese writer in the twentieth century), Wu had better name recognition and won the seat. Once elected, she told the university party secretary that she would take this job seriously and behave differently from her predecessor. The next day, she started her ‘PD’s Reception Day.’ Usually on Tuesday afternoon from 4:00 to 5:30 p.m., she would listen to the complaints from her constituents. She was so popular among her voters that in the next election she did not need the nomination of the Party organization department, but was nominated by voter signatures. In 1988, through the nomination from the Haidian District PCPDs, she was again elected into the Beijing MPC. Since then, she served in the two levels of PCs (NPC News 04/04/02; NFZM 03/10/00; and Int. WQ-9806). Despite having her gall bladder removed, her courage to speak out on behalf of her voters won her praises. She was said to ‘have the gall to fight for democracy like crazy’ (NFZM 03/10/00). Although for her the Chinese constitution was not perfect (for example, a constitutional court is needed, no leadership should be allowed above the PCs, and so forth), Wu Qing thought that the rule of law should start with the faithful abidance to the constitution. She got her first copy of the constitution from her mother and always had one with her. She took her role of PD so seriously that some who did not like her said that she was ‘acting crazy as a PD.’ Her mother, who was a NPCPD, once made this comment, ‘You are busier than me.’ At another time, her mother, who could not see her busy daughter around, made this comment: ‘Go to take care of the people! I am not one of the people.’ But this in no way means that her mother did not support her. After Wu Qing attended her first meeting at the Beijing MPC, where she shattered the long record of uniformity by casting two negative votes and two abstention votes, her mother wrote these words to her: ‘If it benefits the country, our own life and death can be forgotten. We cannot endorse or reject it merely considering its benefit or its negative consequences for us. This is to my beloved daughter who is a MPCPD.’ No wonder Wu Qing likes to say that she had a good mom. Actually, she had a good father, too. Her father Wu Wenzhao was a pioneer in the discipline of sociology in China. Inspired by her parents, who were ‘May Fourth Movement’ activists advocating for ‘Mr. Democracy’ and ‘Mr. Science’ in China, Wu Qing developed

Elections and circulation of political elite

143

her strong and unique personality – short-tempered, independent-minded, selfless, public-spirited, and idealistic. She liked to say: ‘I have a good mom. I have taken great advantage of my mother’s reputation for democracy and freedom in China. Why not? There are so many people using their parents to seek personal gains.’ She also once stated, ‘I am neither an official nor a Party member. I represent no party – including non-communist parties. I only represent people.’ She said, ‘My strength comes from my voters. Because I was truly elected by the people, therefore, I should serve and work for them.’ Besides loads of case work she achieved for her district, Wu Qing also initiated to train new PDs with legal knowledge, and pushed for restricting government officials from sitting in the PCs as deputies. She once requested Premier Li Peng to listen to the opinions from the PDs of Beijing MPC that elected Li into the NPC. After the Chen Xitong-Wang Baosen scandal, she introduced new procedures to supervise the budget and spending. She played the leading role to question and to inquire the High Court of Beijing. Besides all these, she worked tirelessly to educate women of their rights and to fight for education rights for immigrant children in Beijing, so on and so forth. Regarding who should serve as PDs, Wu Qing had her insight: ‘Although it is important that a PD should have a higher education, more importantly this person should have the guts to take risk, since democracy and freedom concern people’s interest.’ Understandably, she has been a controversial figure who invited attacks on Beijing local politics. After the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the political climate in Beijing as well as in the entire country turned cold. One deputy party secretary at her university commented that Wu Qing was ambitiously trying to ‘grab power,’ and tried to stop her from being re-elected in 1990. One voter was so supportive of Wu Qing that he said, ‘Even if I am under gunpoint I am still going to vote for Wu Qing.’ That year, she won her seat by a wide margin of 70 percent votes. However, despite her strong desire for serving in the NPC, Wu Qing still has not realized her political dream due to a conservative filter system in the indirect Chinese electoral process. Because local officials tend to serve as PCPDs of higher level, it is getting more challenging for Wu Qing to win support from those people of vested interest within the Beijing MPC. ‘Jiaozuo PDs group’: the populist representatives The ‘Jiaozuo Phenomenon’ can further confirm that the emergence of independent-minded and defiant PDs was not isolated but spontaneous (NPC News 06/15/01; NFC 06/16/03). In Jiaozuo, a Henan city with 3.2 million people, there were half a dozen PDs at three levels (NPC, PPC and MPC), so-called the Group of Six Deputies (sometimes it was ‘Group of Seven Deputies,’ playing a leading role for more than 20 PDs) active from 1995 to 2002. Among them, NPCPD Yao Xiurong and PPCPD Li Chaoyi were two bellwethers and won the titles of ‘Bao Gong for Commoners’ (pingmin baogong).

144

Elections and circulation of political elite

Born in 1952, Yao Xiurong, a blue-collar model worker of Jiaozuo Weight-lifting Machinery and Equipment Factory, was informed in 1993 that she should immediately pack and attend the NPC meeting in Beijing. Without her knowledge, she became a NPCPD, simply because she was a female model worker. During the first three years, she was a ‘dumb deputy,’ who respectfully listened to the leaders and automatically raised her hands on any item given by the Presidium. But in the last year of her first term, she realized that her opportunity was near an end. This anxiety and her learning experiences gave her courage, so that she started to enthusiastically use her right to speak straightforwardly on behalf of the people at the low stratum of society, and challenged corrupt officials and courts. This ‘dumb deputy’ won the name of ‘big canon deputy.’ Li Chaoyi was born in 1946 and served as a PPCPD since 1993. He was also a model worker in a porcelain factory for over 30 years and had won medals and awards from the city, the province, and the central government. He had this motto: ‘As long as I am a PD for one minute, I will serve the people for sixty seconds.’ He actively conducted investigations, inspection and supervision and took every opportunity at the PPC to speak out and bring wronged legal cases to the table. He requested law-enforcement agencies and courts to take care of, or review almost a hundred cases and saw 90 of them solved. He won the title ‘Li Qingtian’ (‘Blue Sky Li’). Behind Yao and Li, there were five MPCPDs. Lu Jinzi was a senior editor for a local newspaper and served as the ‘brain-trust’ for this group. Li Shunxin was a surgeon who used his knowledge in autopsy to help their investigations on criminal justice cases. Ma Xifang was a self-employed entrepreneur who used his minivan to provide transportation support to the group. Dong Shikun, another medical doctor, and Zhao Qiqun, an engineer, were two quick decision makers and eloquent negotiators. Their talents and resources created a ‘golden partnership.’ In addition, these seven PDs were also linked with other 20-plus PDs of different levels to conduct their activities. During the seven years of their heyday, they received more than 20,000 visits and letters, supervised over more than 1,000 cases, and proposed more than 400 bills and suggestions. In one review meeting on the work of judicial system, Yao Xiurong boldly exposed pervasive corruption in the criminal justice system and caused five procurators and two anti-corruption bureau directors to lose their positions. To take advantage of Yao as a NPCPD and Li as a PPCPD, their reach went beyond the city of Jiaozuo and radiated to other places of Henan and several other provinces of the country. Her opponents disapproved of Yao for she ‘did the PD work madly and pulled out her hand too long.’ After her first tirade against corrupt government officials on the NPC group meeting, Yao Xiurong got support from Li Changchun, then party secretary of Henan. Li told the PPC general secretary that more deputies like Yao were needed and under Yao’s request he called the party secretary of Jiaozuo to make sure that Yao would be nominated for the next term. So

Elections and circulation of political elite

145

Yao was reelected in 1998. Some top leaders (for example, the president of the Supreme Court) gave their endorsement to Yao. The national news network reported their activities and invited them to talk to the national audience. However, in the 2003 election, the objection from local leaders prevented Yao from being nominated as a candidate for the NPC, and she lost her seat in the NPC. Although he was elected into the PPC again, Li Chaoyi sharply trimmed down his activities. He realized, ‘Yao Xiurong’s scalp is hard enough; her titles are not few. However, she was hammered down. Who does not have concerns?’ Other five PDs also became pessimistic about their political future. But Yao Xiurong continued to appeal to the NPC. To prevent her from making trouble to the NPC meeting in Beijing, she was forced out on sightseeing ‘vacation’ escorted by several procurators. She said that she would run for the NPC seat in the future. The simultaneous rise of independent-minded PDs whose roles have deviated from the old mold expected by the ruling party elites can be attributed to many factors. First, almost all these PDs (except Fu Xuejian) discussed above fall into at least one of the specific requirements that the CPC wants to promote in composing the PCs to showcase and consolidate its regime legitimacy. Because those PDs were either intellectuals (Feng Youwei and Luo Shiying, a law professor, who was desperately needed by the PCs of any level), or non-partisans (for example, Wu Qing), or members from the eight DPs (for example, Chen Rongjie), or female (e.g., Yao Xiurong), or all of the above (e.g., Wu Qing), or representing a unique but politically important constituency (such as Yao, who represented the working class that has been building up its frustration and anger in the process of rapid transition and massive layoffs), they possessed more political resources in the Chinese politics. This superiority gave them more protection and leeway in the system. If the ruling elites did not handle them carefully, the price to pay could be high. Also, these individuals, especially the intellectual group, have leisure time, leadership skills (speaking, writing, and so forth), the courage to stand up and stand alone, and self-sacrifice for the public interest. Their power, influence, and particularly their moral authority were recognized and respected. Despite their diverse background, all of them had one characteristic in common – tenacity, sometimes to the extent of ‘foolhardiness.’ It was reported that Wu Qing’s tactics was ‘holding persistently and striking hard.’ She would make 40 to 50 phone calls to get one issue solved, and these calls might go to the office, home, mobile phone and beeper of one responsible official, his wife, and driver until he had no place to hide and avoid her (NFZM 03/10/00). Second, as the Chinese political and legal system continues to adapt to new changes in society, some reform-minded leaders at different levels had lent their support to, or remained tolerant of, those ‘unorthodox’ PDs. For example, during his tenure as party secretary, Wang Maoling of Hunan showed his great appreciation of the work done by Chen Rongjie, and met him 28 times. Wang’s successor, Party Secretary Yang Zhenwu, also received

146

Elections and circulation of political elite

him several times (Tang 2000). In Wu Qing’s difficult year of 1990 when a university deputy party secretary suspected her political motivation, the Haidian District party secretary held two talks with her and continued to support her candidacy for the District PC (NFZM 03/10/00; Int. WQ9806). Sometimes, the NPC also stepped in to provide institutional support to its NPCPDs or PCPDs of lower levels. For example, in Hunan’s removal of a vice governor, the NPC sided with the PDs and made this removal possible. In Luo Shiying’s crusade against two crooked governors, the Supreme Procuratorate and the top leader Jiang Zemin himself added their weight. At many times, this support from top leaders was a quid pro quo, for all these PDs had offered their irreplaceable service to the government to solve many crises. Local authorities called upon Yao Xiurong, Li Chaoyi, and Fu Xuejian to intercept between the authority and angry mobs in heated confrontations. They utilized their reputation to persuade rioters to use rational method and helped defuse serious crises. In addition to these services, these PCs often followed the mohe strategy to keep their confrontational efforts to a point where cooperation was carefully maintained. For example, Feng Youwei always treated Mayor Mu Shuixin respectfully at the personal level and even visited him when he was a politically demoted patient dying of lung cancer in hospital ward. Feng also withdrew his request to make a public speech on the judicial veniality after the key Party and government officials agreed to listen to his speech at an internal meeting. Wu Qing stopped her push for questioning the appropriateness of handling the 1989 student demonstrations by the Beijing municipal government once the central government took over the event. Third, most importantly, the Chinese people’s increasing consciousness of democracy provided a popular basis for those PDs, who had lived up to the real meaning of their titles. When asked about what was the most important change in the Chinese politics, Wu Qing’s answer was that the people had developed their demands for democracy and it had become impossible for the leadership to ignore their rights (Int. WQ-9806). Because of this authentic desire of Chinese people for democracy, a group of new PDs were created. Thanks to the strategy of creating linkages and networks, these PDs were not isolated in their endeavors. Immediately around them in the PCs they had colleagues to support them. Luo Shiying was one of the ‘four big canons’ in the PPCSC. Wu Qing was lucky to be elected by her university district and to work with many other PDs who shared the same background with her in Haidian, a university town in Beijing. Feng Youwei could always count on several of his colleagues for support. The Jiaozuo PDs Group further illustrates this national trend of longing for a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Recently, another two names received international recognition. Yao Lifa represented the other case illustrating the boldness and persistence of some PDs (NYT 03/08/02, A3). In Qianjiang, a small city near Wuhan in Hubei, Yao Lifa spent more than a decade to run for a seat in the MPC. In 1994, as

Elections and circulation of political elite

147

a functionary working for the local education bureau, he became a PD of township PC without government backing. After three failed attempts, he finally won a seat of the MPC in 1998 through the nomination of voters. He became a ‘PD jumping out of ballot box,’ instead of internal arrangement. At this moment, he already lost his job and made many losses in his pursuit of new business ventures. In 2002, he tried again to seek nomination for a seat in the Hubei PPC and sent his campaigning materials to the 300-plus MPCPDs, appealing for their support. Due to the mobilization of resistance and manipulation of electoral process, he hit the wall, even though he received more than 20 votes without his name on the ballot. Some local officials were extremely scared by his efforts. One of them said that Yao Lifa was ‘a lunatic’ and worthy of no attention. Another said that he was ‘a noodge,’ ‘a hooligan,’ and a ‘fly that goes to wherever there is garbage.’ He attacked Yao that he had ‘political ambition for a seat in the MPCSC, to become a popularly-elected deputy mayor, and a PPCPD.’ But his admirers viewed him as one of the three exemplary PDs in China (the other two are Feng Youwei and Wu Qing), who created ‘Yao Lifa phenomenon’ and had ‘made us feel the awakening and rise up of democratic thinking and the spirit of rule of law’ (Yao 2003a). This is what Yao Lifa has to say: In many places the development of democracy is still at ground zero, people often feel depressed. My attitude is that, even though you are starting from ground zero, you still have to start. Do not only feel depressed. When I was elected into a township PC, many people told me that it would have no impact. I knew that I alone could not make a huge wave. At that time, from the center to the local level, all elections produced unanimous one hundred percent support rate. However, if I took part in it, at least I would cast dissenting votes on some candidates. I could prevent him from winning a unanimous endorsement. Even though he could still get elected with only one vote less, here we can see the embodiment of democratic spirit. I am just determined to change the situation of no opposing voice. (Yao 2003b) In Shanghai, another ‘troublemaker’ took Chinese electoral law literally and plunged himself into an unsuccessful campaign for a seat in the Shanghai MPC in 2003. Hu Dezai, a law teacher in a Shanghai Party School, brought together 110 people to nominate and to put his name on the ballot – an adventure his wife described as ‘using an egg to hit a rock.’ Not being disheartened by his failure, Hu Dezai said, Officials are afraid of small things. I am just one person who cannot even get on the ballot and has much less chance to get elected. Even if I made in into the legislature, what could one person do? But still they are afraid.

148

Elections and circulation of political elite

Referring to his distribution of 2,000 name cards to voters, asking them to tell ten others to vote for him, he said if the authorities ‘get 20,000 wasted ballots with my name, it would have a big impact. It won’t be enough to get me elected, but they will have to start taking democracy seriously’ (NYT 03/02/03). Indeed, the CPC and its elites are facing a serious challenge. Now it is urgent for them to learn how to manage the democratic impulse generated by the popular demand and promoted by their PDs. Some leaders were afraid that the above-mentioned PDs were going to start a cracking process, so they took every measure – sometimes even bending the laws they passed – to contain this development. However, as all these PDs have demonstrated, they had developed more and more new channels to get resources and can become more independent from the regime. Since at this moment we do not see a chance of reversal at the national level, although setbacks might occur to some localities, the current trend probably will continue. In addition to being regime agents, more PDs would acquire a new role, namely, the agents for democratic change.

Conclusion The personnel of the PPCs, including both the PDs and leaders have experienced important changes in the past quarter century. Although leaders in the PPCs still have a lower education level and are older in age in comparison with leaders in the Party and government organizations (Zang 1991; Bo 2002), as a whole, they have been moving toward the direction of becoming younger and better educated. Also they had acquired more political importance and higher political stature. Consequently, the PPCs as institutions gained more respect and power as their personnel improved. The most important change was that the PPC leadership has been incorporated into the provincial elite and the PPCs have become an important part of the elite circulation mechanism through mutual exchange of cadres with the Party and government organizations. The PPCs have been fully dominated by the communist members within them, so the PPCs cannot challenge the fundamental leadership of the CPC. As a result, the relationship between the Party and PPCs was overall harmonious and easily coordinated; the PPC leaders had more interest in supervising over and challenging the government branch instead of the Party. To nurture a favorable environment had helped the PPCs for their organization development and power expansion. They formed a mutually embedded relationship between the Party-government organizations, which strengthened the coherence of the provincial ruling elite and served the needs for a state with strong capacity. As the CPC officials penetrated into the PPCs in droves, and the positions and influence of women and the various DPs in the top ruling apparatus of the PPCs deteriorated, the CPC has turned the PPC system into a new support system for controlling the society and maintaining its one-party

Elections and circulation of political elite

149

rule. If power dispersion had occurred, it was mainly restricted to the top political elites instead of sharing substantial power with the social forces. Overall, the PPCs have not yet turned into a place where social forces and ruling elite could interact directly. They were not yet a bridge connecting the civil society and the state. No viable independent political forces emerged in society to articulate the demands from the populace; and it was difficult to expect well-organized political organization to pose any substantial challenge to the ruling CPC. However, the personnel change within the PPCs, particularly the systematic recruitment of intellectuals and nonpartisan members into the PCs at all levels, had brought new dynamics for democratization in China. The popularity of numerous PDs and PDs groups indicated a new direction that the Chinese politics may turn to. Although some of them were hammered down or marginalized, the general trend toward more democracy for the system and more independence for the PDs was clear and unstoppable. In the near future, more likely we will see that more candidates will bypass the Party- and government-controlled nomination process and appeal directly to the people for support. As more PDs identify their power source with the ordinary people (just like what Wu Qing, Feng Youwei, and Yao Lifa did), the pressure for free elections will continue to build up. After the discussion on the institutional and personnel aspects of the PPCs and their SCs, the next three chapters will examine the legislative process and functional issues of the PPCs. The above-mentioned structural and personnel changes affected the way that the PPCs operated, interacted with other political actors, and expanded their powers.

5

Legislative process and consensual politics of local legislation

As noted above, Western scholarship on China has long overlooked the institutions and roles of legislatures, especially the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs). This neglect of legislatures at the sub-national levels and their activities makes it impossible for us to have a complete picture of China’s governance. Because of the complex linkages of the PPCs with the CPC, government and other state institutions (both at the central and sub-national levels), and economic institutions (see Chapters 2 and 3), legislative processes enable us to examine these relationships that have long intrigued many political scientists. As one Chinese legislative scholar puts it: Overall, as weaving a huge net, legislation regulates every aspect of social life. Only as the nodes of this net of legislation are in the right place can our huge and complex society maintain stability and order. Local legislation is an important part of this huge net. If local legislation is not adequate, the net of the law will have holes. Law will fail to play an effective role of regulation over society. The reason that we pay much attention to local legislation is because the construction of local legal system will directly affect the progress of constructing a legal system in the entire country. (Xu 1997: 4) By concentrating on legislative politics at the provincial level in China, this chapter first will discuss the fragmented authoritarianism model, a quite recently developed model of Chinese legislative politics, and point out its inadequacy in explaining both Chinese provincial legislative politics and ultimately Chinese politics as a whole. Second, by following the thread of how a bill becomes a law in PPCs, this chapter will examine the interactions of PPCs as a hub with the Party Committees, the government, the legal branch at the same level and the National People’s Congress (NPC), in the hope of identifying a pattern of interaction in Chinese legislative politics. Third, based on the analysis of the legislative process at the provincial level, it will present a consensual model to organize our conceptions of Chinese legislative politics in which the political elites are able to transcend their

Legislative process and consensual politics

151

conflicts and build a consensus (Lijphart 1969, 1984, 1996). Fourth, it will link the consensual aspect of legislative politics to the changing political governance during China’s reform era and make some general arguments in order to shed light on our further deliberation of political economy in China.

From totalitarianism to the fragmented authoritarianism Studies on Chinese legislative institutions and politics during the reform era at both the national level and local level have just started recently. In contrast to the previous studies on communist legislatures (including China), recent studies have indicated a shift from the old stereotypical totalitarian model to the fragmented authoritarianism model. For a long time, in communist studies dominated by Sovietology, the communist system was characterized as a party-state (‘partocracy’), which is ‘a hierarchical system of absolute political, economic and ideological power and the wielding of that power by one party. . . . In this one party system legislative, controlling and administrative-proprietary functions are merged,’ as one noted Soviet scholar argues, ‘[T]he prerogatives of legislative power rest solely in the Party Central Committee’ (Avtorkhanov 1966: 376, 231). Under this totalitarian model, the legislatures in China as well as in other communist countries were described as a ‘transmission belt’ or ‘rubber stamp’ under Party tight control. The legislative process followed a one-dimensional flow chart from the Party Center top-down to the legislature. It was almost monolithic, more often competition-free, in which the legislature always rubber-stamped Party decisions (Nelson and White 1982: 1–2). Although some scholars still insisted on the totalitarian model or a rigid authoritarianism model for the Chinese political system when entering into the 1980s (Lichtenstein 1991; Ruan 1994; Hamrin and Zhao 1995), many China specialists have started arguing that China has evolved into a ‘fragmented authoritarianism.’ According to Kenneth Lieberthal, The fragmented authoritarianism model argues that authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures. The fragmentation, moreover, grew increasingly pronounced under the reform beginning in the late 1970s. (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992: 8) The fragmented authoritarianism model has been applied to the studies of both horizontal power structures as well as vertical ones, and to deconcentration as well as decentralization (Zhao 1992; Jia and Lin 1994). For this group of scholars, competition, bargaining, and negotiation have characterized power relationships, either looking from a horizontal or vertical perspective. The old command system has collapsed.

152

Legislative process and consensual politics

Despite the fact that some scholars have observed the rise of the NPC and LPCs (local People’s Congresses) as ‘an arena for bargaining’ (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992: 54), generally speaking, most scholars of the fragmented authoritarianism model have ignored the PC system as an institution. Even though it had more than 3.5 million people’s deputies (PDs, 2,978 at the national level and 3,498,833 at the sub-national levels), 70,000 staff members (more than 900 for the NPC; 66,565 for the sub-national PCs) in 1995 (RMRB 02/13/95), this huge system was not included into the six clusters of Chinese bureaucracy (xitongs, or groupings of functionally related bureaucracies) by Lieberthal in his highly acclaimed textbook on China’s governance (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Lieberthal 1995: 192–208 and 2004). However, a student of Lieberthal applied the fragmented authoritarianism model to Chinese legislative politics. In his study on Chinese national law making institutions and processes, Murray Scot Tanner (1994: 381–403) argues that the image of a ‘top-down’ lawmaking process, highly centralized and integrated, should give way to one of a ‘multi-arena’ process, full of bargains and struggles. The most important feature in the current lawmaking process is the decline of the Party control, or the ‘erosion of communist Party control over lawmaking.’ The power relationships among the Party, government, and NPC were basically a zero-sum game, and nowadays the latter two actors are trying to maximize their powers, and even monopolize the lawmaking power when a bill comes into its own arena. The government and the NPC have strengthened their power positions in the lawmaking process at the expense of the Party. Under such circumstances, the lawmaking process is competition-dominated and struggle-oriented. Tanner states: Power within the lawmaking system, just as in the rest of the Chinese policy-making system, is fragmented among numerous individuals and organizations. The result is a legislative system whose various parts are evolving and in which consensus decision-making has become increasingly difficult. (Tanner in Porter 1994: 87) For Tanner (in Porter 1994: 89), this evolution of power fragmentation is driven by forces beyond the control of the Party leadership – traditions, past inertia, and factional struggles, and so on. Fragmentation is basically spontaneous, unexpected, and unwelcome to the Party. As his choice of words indicates, it is a process of ‘erosion;’ in other words, it is the political decay of the political system in China. To a large extent, the fragmented authoritarianism model in the analysis of general Chinese politics and its application to legislative politics share these two arguments. (1) The fragmentation of power and the emergence of bargaining, competition, and struggle have been the major feature of political development during the last two decades under reform. (2) This institu-

Legislative process and consensual politics

153

tional change is spontaneous, resulting in political erosion of CPC control and political decay of the whole system. The reason why a communist political regime still hangs on is due to the remnant authority of an eroding communist system. Because this process is erosive, the odds are against it laying down a foundation for a desirable social state, such as democratic pluralism. In the fragmented authoritarianism model, if authoritarianism is usually regarded as a ‘mechanic solidarity’ (to borrow from Emile Durkheim 1964), the fragmentation of a brittle ‘mechanic solidarity’ often leads to dissolution and disintegration. But in the Chinese political system, some institutions and rules are emerging and integrating the system. In other words, some institutions for ‘organic solidarity’ have emerged in the process of division of labor among major political institutions. Therefore, structural fragmentation and functional differentiation do not necessarily mean a loss of coherence and solidarity. This aspect is what the fragmented authoritarianism model has often overlooked. For example, lawmaking activities at the provincial level have been providing some new processes of integration. This chapter examines the institutions, actors, and patterns of interaction, such as legislative planning, bill initiation, and drafting, reviewing of provincial legislation to assess their contribution towards organic solidarity of China’s new governance, and to explain why the CPC has felt secure with this rearrangement of power.

Institutional setting for legislation at the provincial level When the PPCs were reestablished after 1977, legislative power was highly centralized in the central government (NPC and the State Council), and Party resolutions and instructions preempted the law. Essentially, the PPCs were excluded from legislative power and were outside the decision-making circles. LPCs as well as the NPC were filled with old, rehabilitated cadres, and model workers and peasants. They were basically a forum for mobilization and a symbol of national unity at Party’s disposal. After he started his comprehensive reform program, which was characterized by de-concentration, decentralization, marketization, and legalization, Deng Xiaoping urged the PPCs to play a larger role in the reform process. In a speech to the preparatory conference for the Third Plenum, Deng stated: ‘The relations between one enterprise and another, between enterprises and the state, between enterprises and individuals, and so on should . . . be defined by law. . . . In short, it is better to have some laws than none, and better to have them sooner than later’ (Deng 1983: 158) (also see Chapter 2). Inspired by Deng’s ideas, the 1979 ‘Organic Law of LPCs and Local People’s Governments of the PRC’ (the Local Organic Law) had two important institutional breakthroughs that provided a strong possibility for effective provincial legislation. (1) The SCs were established within the PPCs. (2) It gave legislative power to the PPCs and their SCs. As this Local Organic Law was promulgated, the PPCs and their SCs started making some local statutes. But in the first four years (from 1979 to 1983), both the quantity

154

Legislative process and consensual politics

and quality of local statutes were low. For many Chinese lawmakers, this was a period of exploration, experiment, and accumulation of experiences. In 1984, the PPCs stepped into a new stage of development because of some institutional changes to the PPC. First, in 1983, the NPC established its six special committees; this enabled some PPCs to establish their own special committees or working committees (the difference is that the former is elected and the latter appointed by the PPCSC). For example, the Beijing MPC and Hebei PPC established special committees before the NPC. In the following years, all PPCs did the same. Second, Peng Zhen’s two speeches to the conference with PPCSC leaders in 1984 were circulated as two CPCCC central documents and brought a broad series of changes. Many old leaders stepped down and relatively younger members were recruited (see Chapter 4); the Party thus tended to give more respect to the PCs at all levels. Third, the staffs for the PPCs and their SCs were expanded. As Peng emphasized, the staffs are a ‘coolie team’ that takes a lot of responsibility, so that many young ambitious college graduates were recruited. Most importantly, the Lawmaking Work Committees (LMWCs) or Lawmaking Offices were added to the SCs in 1984. Fourth, after the CPC’s resolution on economic structural reform was passed and urban reform was started at the end of 1984, the Center decided to give more power to the cities. In 1986, the Local Organic Law was revised in order to give lawmaking power to the provincial cities and some bigger municipalities, subject to the approval by their PPCSCs. 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

0

Figure 5.1 Accumulations of local statutes. Note The years in bold type are years of changing terms, which caused wave-like fluctuatin in lawmaking volume.

Legislative process and consensual politics

155

Table 5.1 Local statutes approved by the PPCs (including those made by MPCs and autonomous prefectures and counties) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 5

104

152

147

95

117

83

142

193

239

308

363

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 277

355

425

770

818

608

1,371 700

689

648

762

Sources: Huang 1991; Quanguo 1994: 79–80; ZGFLNJ 1994: 753–60, 1995: 645–63, 1996: 477–97, 1997: 487–502, 1998: 508–47, 1999: 431–49, 2000: 526–43, 2001: 573–90, 2002: 553–73; Zhonghua 1995.

Fifth, almost all provinces passed procedural laws regarding lawmaking. Before 1984, only five PPCs had passed regulations on making local statutes. By 1986, another 20 PPCs had the same regulations (Guo 1991: 171). Comparing and contrasting lawmaking activities before and after 1984, we can find the change in the number of statutes passed (see Table 5.1) and improvement in statute quality. Of the 616 statutes passed before 1984, 215 (35 percent) were promulgated in the form of ‘temporary regulations’ and ‘experimental rules’ (Guo 1991: 170–1). Because they were very rough, they were revised or annulled later. Many later lawmaking activities were only revisions to the old statutes. For example, from 1979 to the end of 1989, about 1,585 local statutes were made, but in A Compilation of Local Statutes published in 1991 (Huang 1991), 1,186 local statutes (75 percent of the total passed) were still valid and included. In other words, one quarter of them had been either revised or invalidated in 1991. Of the local statutes passed before 1984 (including 1984), half were revised or invalidated. Entering the 1990s, many local statutes were already on the books; as the market economy was introduced by the CPC at its Fourth Plenary Session of the 14th CPC National Party Congress in 1993, many of them needed further revisions or abolition. ‘Making new laws, revising the existing ones, and Table 5.2 Total numbers of legislation in PPCs by province (1979–99) Chongqing Ningxia Hainan Shanghai Tianjin

118 118 136 141 147

Guangdong 307 Henan 322 Average 259.68 Total 8,050 Source: Quanguo 2000b.

Shaanxi Qinghai Beijing Heilongjiang Anhui Shanxi

200 212 218 222 222 223

Xingjiang Guizou Hubei Guangxi Hunan Tibet

225 233 238 239 244 246

Yunnan Hebei

330 335

Zhejiang 407 Sichuan 415

Gansu 250 Neimenggu 261 Jiangxi 266 Fujian 277 Jilin 281 Jiangsu 288 Shandong Liaoning

445 484

156

Legislative process and consensual politics

600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 5.2 Distribution of PPCs based on activities in making local statutes.

annulling outdated ones’ (li, gai, fei) were pursued simultaneously by the PPCs in the 1990s. As a result of this rapidly changing nature of legal environment, the total volume of legislation dramatically increased (particularly in 1997). If we use the number of local statutes in the PPCs as an index of legislative activism, by analyzing Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2, although the size of GDP in each province and the population size of provincial units are major factors affecting how many local statutes have been made by the PPCs (according to the 1999 numbers, their correlations with the number of legislation were 0.63 and 0.59 respectively), we can say that all PPCs have been converging on the center. It confirms our observation in Chapter 2 that the PPCs are very homogeneous in terms of their institutional arrangements and activism. The average number of local statutes made by the PPCs is 259.68; 18 PPCs (e.g., 58 percent) fall in the range of 200. Five PPCs that are below 200 are exceptions that prove the rule. Hainan and Chongqing were recognized as provincial units respectively in 1988 and 1997; their low number in making local statutes is understandable. Shanghai and Tianjin are two municipalities directly under the central government (MDCG). Unlike provinces that have provincial capitals, bigger cities and autonomous regions enjoy legislative power for regulations and statutes, the MDCGs have only one lawmaking machine, therefore, their lower number does not indicate their low legislative activism. Eight PPCs falling into the range of 300–400 are from the biggest provinces (Sichuan, Henan, Liaoning, Shangdong, and Hebei), or the province that has the most nationalities (Yunnan), or the most developed (Guangdong and Zhejiang). Another development was the change of PPCs’ role in the lawmaking process. Before 1984, because of lack of expertise, staff support, and regular-

Legislative process and consensual politics

157

ized process for making laws, the PPCs and their SCs simply passively confirmed whatever governments submitted. Usually local bills were drafted, revised, and announced by the provincial governments. The PPCs or their SCs only discussed them once and passed them in the same session. In nine provinces, 18 bills were approved ‘in principle’ and the final right for revision and elaboration was granted to the governments; in nineteen provinces, 60 bills were ‘confirmed’ by the PPCs or their SCs instead of reviewing and deliberating them (Guo 1991: 170; Shandong 1991: 2). The PPCs to some degree fell into the ‘rubber-stamp’ description. However, from 1984 to the early 1990s, things changed dramatically. One change was the accelerating speed of local lawmaking activities as indicated before. In the 1990s, the speed doubled in comparison to the previous decade. Another change was to the guiding principle of lawmaking. For the first decade of local lawmaking, the guideline of ‘making laws based upon experiences’ from Peng Zhen produced a cautious strategy and caused lawmaking activities to lag far behind social and economic development (Zhu 1999: 156– 9; Han 2002: 62–3). After 1993, reforms in lawmaking, particularly the guiding principle changed to ‘pioneering lawmaking’ (or ‘advanced lawmaking’) – i.e., laws can precede social and economic developments – that gave more local leeway in lawmaking (Liu 1996: 10–11; Cai and Wang 2001: 57– 74). After more than 20 years of legislation, there is enough data available to researchers to take a look the inside of Chinese legislative politics at the provincial level. In the following section, these changes will be discussed in detail.

Legislative processes and the pattern of interaction Lawmaking is an integral part of the political decision-making process. Although overall government agencies have been responsible for drafting 80 percent of the laws (Liu 1996: 10–12), the PPCs have taken active steps to respond to the call from the CPC that ‘the reform decision must work consistently and tightly with legislative decision,’ put forth in the political resolution at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress in 1993 (Xu 1997: 13). For example, among 38 local statutes passed by the Shanghai MPC and its SC from 1998 to July 2002, 32 (accounting for 84 percent) were drafted by the government branch; while but six (16 percent) were drafted by the MPCSC committees (Shanghai 2003: 141). Under the new circumstances, the Shanghai MPCSC sought to ‘play a leading role in making law,’ which meant to control the legislative agenda, to be selective of initiatives from the government side, and to be more aggressive to return some bills to the government for more work, and so forth. One Jiangsu PPC senior staffer confidently declared, ‘After twenty years, the LPCs and their SCs have gained tremendous development in self-construction, accumulated rich work experiences in lawmaking and recruited a huge number of talented law drafters. They are ready to take the major responsibility in making local statutes’ (Huang 2003). Because the lawmaking process at the provincial

158

Legislative process and consensual politics

level has higher transparency than at the national level, it is more practicable to follow the course from how a bill is initiated to how it is passed as a new law. To understand how the Chinese system works and political institutions and actors interact at the provincial level may shed light on the understanding of the decision-making process at the national level. Legislative planning Since China was a planned society and even today the state has been trying to define reforms as top-down social engineering, so the PPCSCs have made plans for legislation. Even those PPCSCs that lack a plan for legislation do include legislative planning in their work plan for the PPCs. Basically three kinds of legislative plans exist. (1) The one-year plans that can be further divided into two categories: calendar year plans and plans from the last session to the next. For example, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Guangdong, Fujian, Yunnan, Jilin, Hainan, Zhejiang, Shanghai, and Henan have had their legislative plans. (2) Two- to three-year plans. For example, Hebei made a legislative plan for 1986–7; Jiangsu and Guangdong for 1987–8; Jiangxi for 1991–2 (Y. Zhang 1993: 1105). (3) The five-year plan. For example, Heilongjiang and Ningxia made legislative plans for the whole 7th-Five-Year-Plan period (Li and Li 1991: 162–3). In 1988, Guangdong, Neimenggu, and Tibet (Xizang) passed their Five-Year Legislative Plans and they included 130, 122 and forty legislation proposals respectively (Y. Zhang 1993: 1217). In 1993, Jilin, Hebei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Ningxia, and Gansu had five-year plans. In some provinces, there are both long-term and short-term plans. Heilongjiang has both a one-year plan and a five-year plan. The five-year plan is a rolling-plan; it can adjust itself in accordance to its one-year plan (Y. Zhang 1993: 1056). Legislative plans are necessitated by heavier load of lawmaking activities, but the more important reason is that the PPCSCs want to control their own agenda and to be involved in bill-initiation and drafting processes in advance. Usually, before a SC starts making its own legislative plan, its special committees and research offices will contact the Party, government, court, and procuratorate first and ask about their possible initiatives. Then according to the laws for the legislative process, the government, judicial branch, and the MPCSCs of the provincial capital city and some bigger cities are required to send their legislative plans to the PPCSC in advance. After receiving their suggestions, the PPCSC conducts its preliminary review and evaluation. Then, a draft for a legislative plan is sent to the relevant government departments, the Party, judicial organizations, experts in universities and research institutes to solicit comments and suggestions. They may conduct several conferences for this purpose. Based on the feedback, the PPC staffs finish a final draft and submit it to the Chairpersons’ Group meeting for approval. Once approved, the plan is sent to relevant organizations and government departments for their record and reference (Tang et al. 1992: 73;

Legislative process and consensual politics

159

Li and Li 1991: 164; Quanguo 1996: 9). For example, the Five-Year Legislative Plan of Jiangsu PPC (1993–7) went through three stages. First, the Jiangsu PPCSC organized more than ten forums with 203 officials from 87 provincial government organizations and 389 officials from 170 departments in 11 cities. It collected 342 potential items for legislation. Second, after analysis and aggregation, the PPCSC organized two delegations consisting of government officials and officials from the PPC and some MPCs. One was sent to Guangdong Province for learning experience, and another was dispatched to Beijing to listen to guidelines and comments from the leaders in the NPCSC, the Lawmaking Bureau of the State Council. Third, based on the information collected in the first two stages, the Chairpersons’ Group and PPCSC discussed and finally approved the Legislative Plan (Quanguo 1996: 34–5). The departments responsible for a bill are always instructed to finish the draft before a deadline. In a legislative plan, there are two categories of goals. Some legislative items are to be finished before the end of the plan, while some legislative preparations for some issues are started and may be considered for legislation in the next plan. For example, in Yunnan’s PPC 1987 plan, there were 32 legislative items; 13 would be submitted to the PPCSC for approval; eight were expected to be discussed; as for another 11, the preparatory work was expected to be conducted as for the next year’s legislative plan (Li and Li 1991: 162). In making a legislative plan, the PPCSC pays special attention to the Party guideline for recent work, the national and provincial five-year-plans, NPC legislative plan, and the plan of the provincial government. Because most bills are from the government – for example, 95 percent during the 1979 to 1986 period (Li and Li 1991: 162) – the two legislative plans in the government and the PPC are always coordinated and the former is ultimately incorporated into the latter. The making of legislative plans has served several functions. First, it generates inputs earlier and keeps some ‘immature’ (usually it means ‘controversial’) items out of the agenda. Second, it gives opportunity to the PPCSC to coordinate the whole legislation process, instead of only the last half. Third, an earlier involvement by the PPCSC could prevent or postpone some unsatisfactory bills from being presented for approval in the PPC or its SC meetings. Fourth, coordination by the PPCSC and its LMWC can reduce legal departmentalism in which the government department tries to ‘grab power through writing law’ and evades duties corresponding with rights. Thus, haggles over jurisdiction among different government departments and direct confrontation between the PPC and the government, especially its Lawmaking Bureau, could be preempted and reduced; misunderstanding and conflict could be managed at a minimum level and solved in a compromising manner. In Shanghai’s Two-Year Legislative Plan (1995–7), a total of 67 initiatives were enlisted. At the end of the plan, 35 (52.2 percent) initiatives were taken care of. In preparing for its five-year Legislative Plan (1998–2002), the MPCSC received 213 proposals from 65 departments and institutions. Among those proposals, 87.7 percent originated from the government, 7.7

160

Legislative process and consensual politics

percent from the PCs, and 4.6 percent from social organizations. Among the final 66 items included in the legislative plan, the government and its departments accounted for 90 percent of them – an imbalance that the PPCs have realized and tried to address. At the end of this five-year plan, roughly 42 items (64 percent) were accomplished. The accomplishment rate, which is not very high, was hurt by unexpected adjustments to the plan – which included adding new items and removing proposed ones. The change rate (unplanned added items plus removed items divided by the total number of planned legislative items) for Shanghai was 15.4 percent in 1998, 46.2 percent in 1999, 30.4 percent in 2000, and 78.6 percent in 2001 (NPC News 02/09/03). These high change rates in legislative plans reflected, on the one hand, that real life in China was changing very rapidly; on the other that the PPCs needed to make more efforts to win respect for their plans. Increasingly, legislative forecasting has become an essential part to legislative planning. Prior to making a legislative plan, a department either in a legislature or government (such as the LMWC or the Lawmaking Bureau in the government) collects information regarding needs for legislation and trends for future development to help with the legislative planning. This information can come from suggestion of PDs, letters from ordinary people, ideas from legal scholars, and the demands generated by practical government work. For example, Shanghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan all have resorted to popular participation to collect ideas and clues for their legislative plans. Yin Jun, the Yunnan PPCSC Chairman, thought this an effective way to add diversity to the bill initiation process – an antidote to administrative departmentalism to expand discretionary power. It is also intended ‘to represent the popular will and to pull together people’s wisdom’ (CNN 08/03/02). Many PDs have been very active in collecting clues and proposing new laws and therefore won the titles of ‘big-shots of filing proposals’ (li’an dahu). For example, Luo Ronghan, a professor of Chinese traditional medicine who was a deputy to the Sichuan PPC and later the Chongqing MPC as this city became a MDCG, actively visited and received citizens, set up a table to listen to them on the street and read their letters. Based upon these raw materials, he combed out about 300 suggestions and proposals to a variety of governmental agencies. He also proposed 57 bills and had 34 accepted by the PPC (a success rate of 59.5 percent). He got the champion’s title for being the most productive individual in initiating bills (Quanguo 2000a: 29, 31). Lin Puyan was another committed deputy. As a female model accountant working in a rural village and with only a junior high school education, she was a PD to the Zhejiang PPC for two terms as well as a PD to the NPC, a county PC, and a MPC. The following are her own accounts about how she took her responsibility of a PD seriously: During my youth, due to excessive hard work and exhaustion, I fainted twice in my accounting office and once on my way home. The monster of disease continuously attacked me: appendicitis that later caused peri-

Legislative process and consensual politics

161

tonitis, gall bladder infection, colitis, and big surgeries. Blood clots in my brain paralyzed me and made me unable to speak for three years. All these made me value more every minute and every second in my life. I took out hundreds of yuan from my own pocket to subscribe more than twenty newspapers and magazines and read carefully every issue of Science of Law, Jurisprudence in China and Abroad, Forum of Politics and Law, Jurisprudence in China, Administration and Law, and so forth. I did my best to find time to study, study and re-study. During the meetings of various PCs, I utilized my time fully to read and review reports, write proposals, suggestions and opinions. I always wrote again and again to give more supporting reasons, evidence and feasibility on behalf of my proposals, in order to present a bill satisfactory for the people before the deadline. On 9 March 1996, I wrote until five o’clock in the early morning and finished all eight proposals. As I washed my face, I suddenly felt dizzy. My nose started bleeding and it kept bleeding (Quanguo 2000a: 19–20) Now in China, due to the participation of many active deputies and the involvement of a variety of organizations, a huge system in the form of a network has been formed, as described by Xu Junlun, a Chinese legislative scholar: In the practice of lawmaking in our country, legislative forecasting often relies on two methods: ‘collecting information through the organizational system’ and ‘information networking.’ The former is when a legislature of higher level (or a non-legislative organ) requests suggestions and comments on legislative work through the vertical organizational system of provinces, autonomous regions and the MDCGs; or through the horizontal system of ministries and councils of the government. Based upon these systems, collected information are aggregated and analyzed for legislative forecasting. The latter is when a legislature (or a non-legislative organ) maintains a center for legislative forecasting and information feedback that can reach down to cities and counties of the country. In every city or county, an information center is created for collecting every bit of information regarding legislative forecasting and feedback and for providing the necessary materials and data for legislative forecasting. (Xu 1997: 106) Drafting a bill After a legislative plan is passed, the next step is to assign one specific item to one organization. During the past several years, the bill-drafting process has experienced important reforms. Many LMWCs in PPCs started to once emphasize that, ‘The situation wherein government solely drafts bill should be changed. Some laws should be sponsored by the PPC and some should be assigned to universities, research institutes, social organizations, even individual experts and scholars’ (JXRDJZ 12/94: 18). The PPCs have also

162

Legislative process and consensual politics

initiated and sponsored many important bills. For example, regarding the laws passed by the Henan PPC and its SC in 1994, the provincial government submitted 12 and the PPC and its committees 13 (ZGFLNJ 1995: 846). Many of the PPC initiatives later affected national legislation (Lin 1993: 213–16; O’Brien 1994b: 96–7; Quanguo 1992c). A draft group could then be associated with one government agency, or an independent, intergovernmental temporary organization was established. No matter which, it always includes members from more than one government agency and social organization. In Gansu, the PPC and the provincial government created a ‘joint statute-drafting group’ to allow the PPC committees and staff members to have early involvement. In Tianjin, the MPC and government followed a practice of ‘mutual embedding’ that no matter who is in charge of the drafting bill, they allow each other to participate. In Guangdong, the General Office of the PPC and the Secretariat of the provincial government have used the joint document system to coordinate and carry out efforts together in drafting bills. Also there, the PPC has started to use the bidding process to select a drafting group from competing universities and institutes in the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences. For example, in 1985 the Shanghai MPC established a drafting group for ‘Regulations for Minors Protection’ which included members from its own LMWC, Municipal Committee of the Communist Youth League, Propaganda Department of the Municipal CPC Committee, Office for Education and Health of the Municipal Government, the Public Security Bureau, Municipal High People’s Court, Municipal High People’s Procuratorate, the Bureau of Justice, the Reform-through-Labor Bureau, the East China College of Politics and Law, the Law Department of Fudan University, and mass organizations (Quanguo 1992c: 37; Chen 1993: 83–4). For a similar statute in Beijing, several professors in the Law Department of Beijing University took the major responsibility for drafting (Y. Zhang 1993: 983). To draft a regulation banning drugs in Yunnan, the LMWC in the PPCSC led a drafting group that included officials from the courts, the Office for Banning Drugs, and the Custom House (Quanguo 1992c: 53). In 1986 in Gansu, a deputy party secretary headed a drafting group with a vice governor and vice-chairperson of the PPC as its deputy directors for drafting ‘Some Regulations for Implementing the Nationality Autonomy Law’ (Quanguo 1992c: 33). The first task for the drafting group was to formalize guidelines and then send them to the PPCSC and sometimes the Party for approval in principle. Then they start collecting data and conducting investigations. Based on reports on the issue they want to solve, the problems they face, and on experiences from other provinces and countries, they draw up their first draft. During this process, they may send an investigation group to other provinces where similar laws had been passed previously. For example, in the investigation stage for the ‘Regulations for Minors Protection’ in Shanghai, 70 reports were generated, and seven problem areas and 103 problems were identified and addressed in the regulation (Quanguo

Legislative process and consensual politics

163

1992c: 37). In drafting the ‘Temporary Regulations on the Popularization of Compulsory Primary Education’ in 1984, the Special Committee of Science, Education, and Culture of Ningxia PPC wrote more than ten investigative reports (Quanguo 1992c: 9). In 1979, Liaoning decided to draft ‘The River Course Administration Regulation’ regarding river management and flood control. The government Bureau of Water and Electricity was responsible for the preliminary work. It sent investigative groups to localities for collecting data and identifying problems. At the same time, they consulted and collected documents that included the past practices on this issue, and foreign experiences, including Japan’s laws regarding river management and U.S. laws regarding flood control and insurance (Quanguo 1992c: 19). In drafting its ‘Regulations on Prohibiting Mentally-retarded People from Reproduction,’ the Gansu PPCSC required the Bureau of Heath and the Council for Family Planning in the government to conduct surveys among medical and eugenic experts, and to consult documents in Western countries regarding abortion, sterilization, and genetic illnesses. These investigations were later presented to the PPCSC as a background appendix to the bill (Quanguo 1992c: 40–1). The heightened activism of the PPCs in the lawmaking process is also illustrated by the increase of changes made by PPCSC members to proposed bills from the government. According to research conducted by staffers in the Shanghai MPCSC, under the 7th MPC (1978–83), some bills were passed through the MPCSC without any changes to the original bills – literally the MPCSC rubber-stamped the government-initiated bills. Under the 10th MPC (1993–8), this practice of accepting and stamping without question ceased to exist. From the 8th MPC to the 10th, the average word changes per bill increased from 948 Chinese characters per bill to 1,093. For example, in 1986, ‘The Regulation Regarding Applications and Granting Permissions for Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, Co-operatives and ForeignOwned Enterprises’ had 22 articles of which seven were changed. Merely one year later, ‘The Regulation of Personnel Management in Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures and Cooperatives’ and ‘Regulations on Applications and Granting Permissions,’ among a total of 43 articles, 40 were changed. The ‘Regulations of Road Transportation Management’ under the 10th MPC, which had 72 articles, 62 were changed. Not only has the MPC become increasingly pickier on wording, but it also made changes to substantive matters and the power of the administrative agencies (Cai and Wang 2001: 86–108). Among provinces, customs and mechanisms for policy diffusion and emulation in the lawmaking process have been developed. During the last 20plus years, the provinces with SEZs (Guangdong and Fujian) have established many precedent-breaking laws in economic areas for other provinces to emulate. Provinces thus have paid close attention to each other and are willing to follow each other’s legislative lead (Lin 1993). In the case of Gansu’s nationality autonomy regulation, the drafting group conducted investigative visits to Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Qinghai where they

164

Legislative process and consensual politics

have similar nationality issues (Quanguo 1992c: 34). In making regulations for protecting consumer rights, after Fujian first passed such regulations in the nation, 24 provinces and municipalities sent investigative groups to Fujian for learning from its experiences (Quanguo 1992c: 7–8). After Shanghai passed the first local statute protecting minors in 1987, in the following four years another 16 provinces followed suit. Because of emulation from each other, one legal scholar concluded: ‘Comparing all these regulations, there is an impression that there are too many similarities, they are like each other with only insignificant distinctions. There are few clauses reflecting the local characteristics of each province or city’ (ZGFX 04/90: 67; ZGFX 06/91: 49–53). This policy diffusion and emulation phenomenon (or ‘legislative bandwagon effect’) on the one hand has strengthened the legislative capacity of PPCs to make more statutes; on the other hand, it is also a selfimposed constraint upon their bold innovations to keep themselves in line with the Party guideline and national policy. To a degree, it helps homogenize China’s local legislation and reduce contradiction and conflict among provinces. Soliciting comments and suggestions After a first draft is prepared, instead of being sent directly to the PPCSC for approval, it is channeled into a consultation process for comments and suggestions. There are several different organizations to be consulted in order to improve the first draft, of which many of these practices have been explicitly stipulated in The Lawmaking Statute (Lifa fa) passed on March 15, 2000. The party For example, after the Fujian PPCSC finished the first draft for a ‘Regulation over PC Supervisory Work,’ it reported to the party committee asking for their comments. The party committee thought it immature and the draft was bogged down. It took another two years for the PPC to listen to comments and suggestions from a variety of organizations and they had to revise the draft several times. Then a later draft was reported again to the party committee and was endorsed by it in principle. It was finally sent to the PPCSC for final review and approval (Y. Zhang 1993: 1100). The central government and the NPC For those provinces that are pioneering in drafting the first local statute on an issue, support and information from the central government are essential for breakthroughs. For example, when the first draft of ‘The Regulations for SEZs in Guangdong’ was finished in 1979, the drafting group reported the legislative work to the Office for SEZs of the State Council and got its agreement in principle (Chen and Cen 1991: 192). In making its ‘Temporary

Legislative process and consensual politics

165

Regulations for Importing Technologies in Shenzhen SEZ’ in 1983, Guangdong again sent its first draft to the Research Center for Economic Legislation of the State Council for review. This Center convened a review conference attended by the responsible leaders from the State Planning Commission, State Economic Commission, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, China General Bureau for Patent, State Industrial and Commercial Administration, State Foreign Currency Administration, China’s Council for Promoting International Trade (CCPIT), General Custom House, Office for Hong Kong and Macao Affairs of the State Council, the SEZ Group of the State Council, and legal experts from Beijing. After the drafting group got favorable feedback on the first draft and incorporated the suggestions from the officials and experts, they sent the bill to the PPCSC for review and approval (Chen and Cen 1992: 200). In the case of Gansu’s ‘Some Regulations for Implementing the Nationality Autonomy Statute,’ the drafting group asked for help from the Nationalities Committee in the NPCSC and the State Commission for Nationalities in the central government (Quanguo 1992c: 34). In 1988, Shanxi passed ‘Temporary Regulations for Education of National Defense,’ the first local statute of its kind. With the absence of reference from other provinces and national legislation on this issue, Shanxi sent its members of the drafting group to Beijing, consulting the Central Military Commission, the LMWC of NPCSC, CPC Department of Propaganda and other organizations. Once this law was passed, Liaoning, Tianjin, Fujian and other provinces sent their investigation groups for learning experiences (ZGXFX 1993: 178–82). Because of its location, when it has difficulties in determining policy and jurisdiction, the Beijing MPC often asks for help from the central government. For example, in the one year of 1989, it consulted the LMWC of NPCSC regarding ‘Regulations on Strict Prohibition of Prostitution and Visiting Prostitutes,’ the CPC Central Research Office for Rural Policy for making ‘Regulations on Rural Production and Contract,’ and the State Bureau of Price for ‘Regulations of Price Control and Inspection’ (Y. Zhang 1993: 980–1). Government agencies and PCs at lower levels Consultations with the government and government agencies are the most common practice in comparison with other forms. Almost every drafting group has included government officials. At the same time, the PPCs also like to listen to the suggestions from PCs at lower levels which are crucial for law enforcement and policy implementation. In addition to the practice that LPC leaders are invited to attend PPCSC meetings and give their inputs and feedback, drafts of legislation are often sent to PCs at local levels in order to solicit suggestions from other officials and the PDs. Since PCs at county and municipal levels (except MDCGs, bigger cities, provincial capitals, and autonomous prefectures) have no lawmaking power, they

166

Legislative process and consensual politics

usually take this involvement seriously as a way to influence the lawmaking process. Experts Involving external academic experts in the lawmaking process was a development of the 1980s. After Guangdong Province finished its ‘Regulations for SEZs in Guangdong,’ the provincial party committee invited experts from the Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences, the Party School of Provincial Party Committee, Zhongshan University and Jinan University for evaluation (Chen and Cen 1991: 192). In Beijing and Shanghai, the two MPCs have invited scholars as their legal advisors and institutionalized consultation with experts. In 1984, 12 prestigious legal experts and professors from universities and research institutes became legal advisors for Beijing. Every time when one law or important decision needs to be passed, these legal advisors are indeed consulted (Y. Zhang 1993: 980). Generally speaking, the experts and scholars have been able to contribute independent, critical, high-quality suggestions. Sometimes, their opinions will be able to shape public opinion and therefore the drafting group, the PC and the government have increasingly paid close attention to their opinions (also see Chapter 4). The public This is the continuation of Mao Zedong’s mass line (‘from the masses, to the masses’) and under the new circumstances it has been further strengthened in the name of ‘a system of consultation and dialogue,’ something like hearings in the U.S. The PC leaders and deputies reach out to the masses at the grassroots to sample public opinion. For example, in the making of ‘The Regulation of Minors Protection’ for Beijing, 13 different drafts and more than 1,000 copies were sent out, more than 50 organizations were consulted, and 17 conferences were held (Y. Zhang 1993: 983). In Guangxi, on ‘The Regulation over Family Planning,’ the PPCSC and its special committees conducted opinion-soliciting conferences with more than 10,000 people during the two-year period and collected 800 pieces of suggestions and opinions (Y. Zhang 1993: 1171). In drafting its ‘Organic Regulations of Villagers’ Committees,’ Hebei PPC organized more than forty conferences for discussion (Y. Zhang 1993: 998). In deliberating on the ‘Regulations for the Burden of Peasants,’ the LMWC of Jiangxi PPC along with the government officials visited eight cities, counties, and districts; four townships and villages; and held ten conferences to solicit comments from rural residents (ZGFLNJ 1992: 681). Sometime, a draft can even be published in a newspaper to solicit suggestions from the public. Zhejiang’s ‘Regulations of Gambling Ban,’ ‘Regulations for Taxation of Urban and Rural Industrial and Commercial Self-employers;’ Henan’s ‘Temporary Regulation for the Fines

Legislative process and consensual politics

167

and Confiscation by Law-enforcement Departments,’ went through this process (Y. Zhang 1993: 1080; ZGFLNJ 1992: 676, 1994: 235; Quanguo 1992c: 19–20). Now in several PPCs, the practices of public hearings and publishing drafts for comments have been institutionalized. On September 9, 1999, the Guangdong PPCSC held the first legislative hearing in PRC history. As of the year 2003, more than 20 PPCs have held hearings and some (for example, Shaanxi, Hebei, Jilin, Anhui, and Shandong) passed local statutes for institutionalizing this practice (RMRB 02/26/03). Since the 1990s, Shanghai has taken these two steps as routine (Shanghai 2003: 34). On November 6, 1998, the Shanghai MPCSC publicized its pending bill, ‘Shanghai Regulations on Fuel Gas,’ for popular comment and input. At the end of the month, it received 50 letters from ordinary citizens. On July 7, 1999, its Chairpersons’ Group meeting passed ‘The Temporary Procedures to Solicit Open Comments from Citizens on Local Statute Drafts’ and allowed citizens to comment on pending bills through participating in forums, writing letters, making phone calls, and engaging in discussions on radio program and newspapers. In 1999, 987 letters and phone calls were sent to the MPCSC regarding the drafting of regulations on housing rentals; in 2000, 62 items were sent from people regarding implementation procedure on the organic law of villagers’ committees; in 2001, 696 letters and phone calls were sent on the regulation of city appearance and environmental hygiene as well as 1,134 on a regulation of labor contracts; in 2002, three regulations regarding tracked transportation, preservation of historic sites, and protection of consumers’ rights received 25, 50, and 250 pieces of letters and phone calls respectively. On May 18, 2001, the Committee of Education, Science, Culture, and Health introduced the hearing system into the deliberation of pending bills. In the same month, this practice was institutionalized through a temporary procedural regulation passed by the Chairpersons’ Group meeting. Since then, every year the MPCSC has had hearings on drafted bills. It also has indicated a willingness to change the format of hearings from sponsorship by the MPCSC to sponsorship by social interest groups – social organizations and people involved will be able to request a hearing process on a specific bill concerning their interest (Shanghai 2003: 148–64). After a draft has gone through the above-mentioned process, it will be finally sent to a vote in the PPC or its SC. Deliberation and approval According to the Local Organic Law, a bill can be passed either by a PPC plenary session or its SC. It is required that bills concerning significant issues shall be passed in plenary session. However, in practice, the boundary between a statute concerning significant issues and ordinary issues is often blurred. Because the annual plenary session usually lasts one week, it has a

168

Legislative process and consensual politics

large number of deputies (the mean size of PPCs has 650 members, ranging from 392 of Hainan PPC to 949 of Jiangsu PPC in 2003). The PPC leaders always bypass the plenary session and almost exclusively use the PPCSCs for passing statutes. For example, among 55 local statutes passed in Tianjin between 1980 and 1991, only five were passed by the plenary session, while 50 by the MPCSC. During the same period in Liaoning, among 103 statutes, only one was passed by the plenary session; all others were made or passed by the PPCSC. In Jiangxi, all 61 statutes were passed by the PPCSC; none went through the plenary session. In Shanxi, among 37 local statutes passed from 1980 to 1988, only two were ratified in the plenary session (ZGFLNJ 1988: 882). Among 1,672 local statutes reported to the NPCSC, only 36 (or 2 percent) were passed by the PPC plenary sessions. These statutes were not limited to ‘significant’ or ‘fundamental’ issues. For example, of three laws approved by the Beijing MPC plenary sessions, two were respectively concerned with urban public sanitation and tree planting. In Sichuan, the only two laws that went through the plenary session were that one dealing with tree planting and another with compulsory education (The calculation was based on the listed local laws in Quanguo 1990a: 962–1032.) Therefore, the plenary sessions do not play a substantive role in lawmaking process. Basically, they are an assembly for interest circulation. In contrast, the PPCSCs are the venue for legislation and the power organ for interest aggregation and decision-making. This two-tier structure of the PPCs (see also Chapter 2) is unique in China’s lawmaking process in comparison with that of other countries (Zhu 1997: 488). The review process of a bill in the PPCSC has changed from ‘rubberstamping’ formality into two hearings. After a bill draft is sent to the SC, the Chairpersons’ Group first reviews and discusses it in the Chairpersons’ Group meeting, then decides whether to submit it to the SC for review. The SC meets once in two months. When it receives a bill draft, it will not vote on it immediately. After this first hearing, the SC, along with its special committees (which one depends on the nature of the bill), work committees (especially the LMWC or Lawmaking Work Office), and staff, will conduct their own research and feedback meetings. During this period, suggestions for revision and change may be sent to the drafting group. Based on the feedback from the SC, the Chairpersons’ Group will decide whether to submit the bill to the SC for a vote. Sometimes, it will postpone the vote until it thinks time is ripe for doing so. After the Chairpersons’ Group decides to submit a bill for a vote, the SC will have a second hearing on the bill and vote on it. At this time, although it happens rarely, a bill may be rejected and returned to the drafting group for further improvement. Now in practice, the ‘two hearings in four months’ process has applied to most bills. Sometimes, ‘three hearings in half a year,’ and even ‘three hearings in one year,’ have become regular in reviewing and passing a bill in the PPCSC. For example, in Shanxi from 1985 to 1988, ten bills on economic legislation were submitted to the SC; only one was passed in the first

Legislative process and consensual politics

169

hearing, while the others were returned to the drafting groups and the special committees responsible for the bill. Some were passed in the second hearing, and some in the third hearing. In Sichuan, throughout 1981 to 1989, the PPCSC only passed two economic bills in its first hearings and refused to pass eleven government bills at their first submission for a vote (Lin 1993: 213–16). In deliberating the ‘Regulations for Family Planning of Jiangxi,’ the PPCSC took three hearings and required seven revised drafts. The revisions totaled 120 thousand Chinese characters (ZGFLNJ 1992: 681). In 2002, the making and ratification of ‘The Regulations Concerning City Appearance and Environmental Hygiene in Beijing’ offers us an important case to peek into the complex lawmaking process at the sub-national level (CNW 11/15/02). From the very beginning, the municipal government and the MPC had close collaboration and consultation. The Department of Lawmaking Work in the Council of City Appearance Management in the municipal government (hereafter referred as the Department) and the Urban Construction and Environmental Protection Affairs Committee in the Beijing MPC (hereafter referred as the Committee) took major responsibility for chaperoning the bill into law. They first had to agree upon a guiding principle of whether they intended to make a ‘small law’ or a ‘big law.’ The former refers to the strategy of narrowly focusing on environmental hygiene, whose improvement will automatically make a better city appearance; the latter chooses a wider angle to tackle both environmental hygiene and city appearance considering the need for preparing Beijing for the Olympic Games in 2008 as a first-rate international metropolis. Once the ‘big law’ was chosen as the guideline, the Department systematically reviewed its past governmental regulations and statutes. It drew lessons from more than ten provinces and municipalities (including Shanghai, Chongqing, and Guangdong), consulted relevant government agencies, invited nationally renowned law scholars and law drafters for comments, and finally formulated a final draft. On May 8, 2002, the draft was sent to the Working Meeting of Mayors for approval. Then, it was sent to the MPCSC. The Committee sent the draft to the county and district PCSCs, requesting comments from them, also asking them to organize selected PDs and citizens to offer comments at a variety of forums. Mr. Meng Qiao, the Deputy Director of the Committee, revealed that, ‘This is a tremendous volume of work, including the revision on contents and wording – 70 percent of words were changed.’ He continued, ‘the legislative proposal from the government has a tendency to administer others but not themselves. The emphasis of the MPC is to adjust and balance this. We must create a checks and balance mechanism for the rights and obligations between the administrator and the administered, the supervisor and the supervised.’ On July 26, 2002, the Beijing MPCSC held its first hearing to review and deliberate on the draft. One week later, it published the entire draft in Beijing Daily for the public to comment on in two weeks. Three phone lines

170

Legislative process and consensual politics

were opened up for the public: two for the LMWC of the MPCSC, and one for the Department. To their surprise, Beijing citizens showed strong interest in participating. To use their words, ‘Phone calls came one after another. They exploded.’ Consequently, the MPCSC received a total of 2,600 persons/ visits, 4,400 items of comments and proposals. Among them were 1,717 phone calls, 460 letters, 414 e-mail messages, and 20 persons/visits. One controversial topic attracting people’s attention was the raising of pigeons in the city. A total of 1,123 persons/proposals (accounting for 25 percent of all comments) addressed this issue. Among the people who had interest in this issue, 76 percent were supporters for banning pigeons, in contrast to 24 percent of those who were against the ban. Another focal point was on the rampancy of posters and advertisements on electricity poles and walls, which attracted 482 persons/times (accounting for 11 percent of total comments). The controversy of raising pigeons in the city caused deep concerns among the pigeon-lovers, particularly after a news report in a local newspaper, the Jinghua Times, misinformed the public that the pending bill in the MPCSC would ban pigeons in the city. The Beijing Messenger Pigeons Association received inquiries from its members and contacted the MPCSC and the newspaper to express its concern. The Office Director of this Association also finished a memo summarizing the sensitive issues involved in this debate. The Association with 23,000 members was lawfully registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In addition to its contribution to leisure activities and civic education among citizens, the State General Bureau of Sports had also recognized messenger-pigeon competition as a sport. More important, it is also a politically sensitive issue. Not only in 1997 had the Chinese Association of Messenger Pigeons replaced Taiwan’s organization as the legitimate representative in the International Pigeon Association after making hard efforts, but raising pigeon had also become a vital economy for many laid-off workers. Banning pigeons would create political troubles. The Beijing Messenger Pigeons Associations coordinated its efforts and had a forum with the MPCSC. Meantime, the National Working Conference of Messenger Pigeons was being held in Qingdao, Shangdong. This meeting also appealed to the Beijing MPCSC to consider the impact upon social stability and therefore to handle the issue carefully. As a compromise, to raise pigeons on balconies was allowed, but not for constructing pigeon coops outside window or on top of buildings. Another thorny issue was the ban of small advertisements on walls and electricity poles. One controversial issue was whether the government could request communication companies to suspend the phone service of these advertisers by tracing their numbers left on ads. Popular opinion (among more than 600 phone calls, 90 percent callers were in this camp) and the majority opinion on the floor of Beijing MPC were to support disconnecting these phone services. But several legal advisors for the MPCSC were against this popular demand. Zhu Weijiu, professor of law at the Chinese University of Political Science and Law and a legal advisor, made it clear: ‘I have been

Legislative process and consensual politics

171

consistently against the idea of disconnecting phone service, because it violates the freedom of communication stipulated by the constitution. There is no room for discussion.’ It was reported that the meetings of legal advisors were divided; ‘several old men quarreled fervently – their faces turned red and necks grew larger.’ The LMWC of the Beijing MPCSC was caught in the middle. It looked at the experiences in Chongqing and Shanghai where the same issue caused the same divisions, but they did not write the disconnecting measure into their passed statutes. It also contacted the LMWC of the NPC and was told that the NPCSC was not inclined to support the action of disconnecting communication service. At this moment, the Haidian District mentioned its successful experiences in handling the advertisers. Without disconnecting the phone service, it was still able to trace advertisers by following the phone numbers and addresses provided by the ads and to stop them. As a result, the Statute was passed in the MPCSC without stipulating disconnecting phone service as a punishment. The Chinese media called this a good example of ‘open, democratic and scientific lawmaking’ that indicated progress towards democracy. The compromises over messenger pigeons and disconnecting phone services are significant because they took consideration of the interests of a minority group into account and provided legal protection against majority opinion. Eventually instead of division, moderation featured in the passed statute. Another point is that under the circumstances of emphasizing collectivism and collective interest, the minority group (here the Messenger Pigeon Association) could win support by appealing to a higher level of public interest – national interest, political stability and constitutional rights in this case. As Chih-Yu Shih has discussed in his research: All kinds of interests obviously compete to influence public policy in China and no one is not self-interested to some degree. But this has nothing to do with the people’s readiness to make self-sacrifice, for in Chinese politics it is always possible to find a higher-level public interest. However, since public interests in their highest form are intangible, the competition for policy resources and the debate over their allocation invariably centers around which policy embraces more and higher public interest. (Shih 1999: 322) Through resorting to a higher public interest, conflicts can become easier to resolve and compromises easier to achieve. To speed up legislation without sacrificing the quality of law, the PPCs have developed a variety of new rules and institutions for the legislative process. The most important can be summed up in four points: (1) The PPCSCs or their special committees and staff involve themselves in the earlier stage of drafting a bill; (2) bills are drafted jointly by the government and the PPCs; (3) democratic consultation and discussion are conducted for soliciting opinions; and (4) in

172

Legislative process and consensual politics

the lawmaking process, scientific methods (for example, scientific proofs from scholars and scientists) were introduced and made some tangible impact. The most conspicuous characteristic of this process is the close collaboration between the PPCSC, Special Committees and the government with its departments in all stages of lawmaking from bill-drafting, to review, revision, deliberation, and finally approval. The Chinese call this process ‘a democracy of consultation plus voting’ (Zhang 1992a: 228–31). Because of extensive consultations among a large number of political actors and institutions and close scrutiny from the SC, the lawmaking process has become protracted, however. For example, after three hearings and 12 revisions on the bill, the Hebei PPCSC passed the ‘Organic Regulations of Villagers’ Committees.’ The entire lawmaking process took almost two years (Y. Zhang 1993: 998). Ningxia’s ‘Regulations of Popularization of Primary Compulsory Education’ and ‘Regulations of Mineral Resources Management,’ Liaoning’s ‘The River Course Administration Regulation,’ Shanghai’s ‘Regulations of Minors Protection,’ and Shandong’s ‘Regulations of Family Planning’ have all taken 20 months for drafting, revision, and adoption. Gansu’s ‘Regulations of Implementing the Law of Nationalities Autonomy’ took two years and eight months for finishing the entire process. The ‘Regulations of Family Planning’ of Jiangxi took almost five years and had three hearings in the SC before they were passed (Y. Zhang 1993: 1105; Quanguo 1992c: 44). Fujian’s ‘Regulations of the Management of Donations from Overseas Chinese for Public Welfare’ took six years from its first being listed on the 1985 legislation plan to its final adoption in 1990 (Quanguo 1992c: 29). Moreover, the number of actors involved in the legislative process has also proliferated. With this development, the PPCs, especially their SCs and special committees, have expanded their power in lawmaking activities through their early involvement in the preparatory investigation and billdrafting stages, coordination of different institutions and actors, participation in revision, extensive scrutiny in reviews and voting on bills. However, this expansion of power has not reflected aggressive challenges to and open conflict with other actors, but rather self-denial on the part of the PPCs. Some Chinese leaders and scholars have also expressed concerns over the legislative empowerment of the PPCs. They fear the PPCs might use their legislative power to invalidate the laws from the NPC, resulting in ‘legal decentralism’ (falü fenshan zhuyi). Once the laws come from numerous locales (fachu duomeng), confusion and chaos could destroy the integrity of law. This happened in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, as power was increasingly decentralized to the Republics. Second, the legislative branch might try to grab more power from the government and sacrifice government efficiency and weaken state capacity. Third, the PPCs might rely on their mandate from the people to challenge the legitimacy of the CPC. In reality, all these three concerns have not materialized yet for several reasons. Self-restraint has been reflected in the relationship between the

Legislative process and consensual politics

173

PPCs and the NPC. In theory, the relationship between the PPC and NPC is not a leadership relationship (‘leading and be led’) between superior and subordinate. The NPC established all kinds of linkages with the PCs at the subnational level and reviews the legality of local statutes, but it does not provide leadership to the sub-national PCs. But despite more autonomy and less control, relationship between the NPC and the PPCs has not been as tense as the relationship between the provincial governments and the State Council and central bureaucracies. As our cases show, the PPCs always voluntarily ask for help from the NPC when they have uncertainties on policies. Some officials in the PPCs do not appreciate autonomy and independence in their relationship with the NPC and want the NPC to provide leadership. In terms of legal review, the NPC has never overturned a single local statute during the 20 years after local legislation was activated, even though some local statutes were in conflict with some provisions in national laws. These conflicts have been mainly solved through self-annulment and self-revision by the PPCs (Lin 1993: 178–80). For example, in 1993 Hebei reviewed its 81 laws and annulled four, revised 23; among 69 laws subject to review, Jiangxi annulled 12 and revised 20 (ZGFLNJ 1994: 214–28). Peng Zhen once gave a guideline for the relationship between a PC and the government: the bilateral relationship is not a power struggle, not to ‘put on a rival show’ (Quanguo 1990a: 602). It is rather a division of labor in the pursuit of a common goal, which An Chen (1999) called a system of ‘checks and balances without separation of power.’ In handling their relations with the governments at the central and provincial levels, the PPCs have developed a variety of joint conference systems and consultation mechanisms to facilitate mutual understanding and adjustment in order to reduce conflict (see Chapter 3). Because of these institutionalized self-constraints, the people’s mandate has not become an important kind of power resource for the PPCs to challenge the legitimacy of the CPC and the central government. There is one case in Sichuan that illustrates that the PPCSC prefers the integrity of national policy to its own constituency interest. At the 4th Plenary Session of the 6th PPC, some PDs put forward a motion for price control. It was approved by the Presidium and sent to the government department for drafting a bill. But the PPCSC thought that such a bill would contravene against the ongoing economic reforms and aborted the efforts (Lin 1993: 215). Clearly in current Chinese legislative politics, the interest of local constituencies has not yet become a major concern for the PPC leaders. To summarize our discussion of Chinese legislative politics at the provincial level, we have reached the following insights: (1) Power fragmentation, in the forms of decentralization and de-concentration, indeed has taken place in legislative institutions and processes at the provincial level. This observation supports the major findings and arguments of the fragmentary authoritarianism model. (2) However, the legislative process at the provincial level does not challenge either the CPC or the NPC. Rather, the legislative

174

Legislative process and consensual politics

process is like a shuttle, in which a bill or a guideline for a bill travels back and forth among the Party, the government and the PPC and its SC. At each stop, we can identify almost the same group of actors. Representatives from the Party, the PPC or its SC and special committee and the related government department are always involved. (3) In this shuttle process, bargains, contestations, and struggles have frequently occurred; but the dominant pattern has been active consultation, voluntary cooperation, and the intentional preemption of conflict. One PPCSC researcher in a Northwestern province told the author, ‘the concept of mohe applies perfectly to our legislative process. Even before a draft is formally introduced into the PPCSC, the most likely differences have been smoothed out’ (Int. ZWQ-9806). Furthermore, such consensual behavior is not a continuation of coerced obedience under the old communist command system, but rather reflects new institutional arrangements of norms and rules for interaction. (4) In terms of institutional arrangements, a large number of new mechanisms and rules have been developed by the political leaders to institutionalize consensual behavior. Linkages have been established to reduce friction of the system operation, such as misunderstandings, struggles, and conflict among various actors and institutions. (5) Considering the development of institutional arrangements for cooperation among various institutions and actors, the political development is not mainly a spontaneous process. Instead it is a wellplanned and intentioned one with two simultaneous developments in play. On the one hand, fragmentation produced differentiation, autonomy, and contestation; on the other, linkages have produced reciprocal coordination, mutual embeddedness, and localization of conflict. The fragmented authoritarianism model has neglected one of these two processes, namely the development of conflict-reducing mechanisms. Because of this absence, commentators on Chinese politics have over-stressed the centrifugal forces and institutional decay. However, it is necessary to pay attention to some newly developed institutional linkages within the political system and to understand how the integration of the Chinese governance system as a whole has been strengthened in some important ways under the reforms.

Consensual politics and a new mode of political governance Chinese legislative politics at the provincial level has changed a great deal away from the totalitarianism model, but it has not developed into a stage of pluralism that is characterized by open competition, conflict, dissent, and opposition. What, then is the current state of Chinese provincial legislative politics? Because provincial legislative politics involve major institutions and power players in Chinese politics at both the national and sub-national levels, to a large extent, the answer to this question is certainly applicable to Chinese politics in its entirety. In our discussion of the legislative process, we have exposed the pattern of

Legislative process and consensual politics

175

interactions among major political institutions. The self-restraints revealed from the behaviors of all major actors for reducing conflicts have highlighted the consensual characteristics of Chinese politics. In his studies, Arend Lijphart has identified ‘consociational democracy’ as an ingenious pattern of democratic government distinct from pluralist democracy. Although China is not in any sense a democracy, the state–society relationship in China is not comparable to a democratic one in a consociational democracy; China’s elites interact more among themselves than with an autonomous society; therefore, Chinese politics is close to the ‘politics of smoothness’ found in a consociational model. China has evolved into a government by elite cartel (although not democratic elite) designed to turn political friction into consensus. Second, the political elites in China have been able to accommodate newcomers into the power game and build up consensus among them in the process of dramatic political and economic transformation. Third, the political elites have also been able to provide substantial political stability and cohesion to the society, especially regarding economic development. Fourth, the entire group of political elites has a strong awareness of the importance of political stability for the society, state, and their own future. They realize that broad popular movements may often rise up when there is elite dissonance (Lijphart 1969). As long as there is large-scale rigorous economic growth, potential competitions within the elite, within society and between them stay dormant. In Lijphart’s study, consociational politics is used by democratic political elites to organize democratic politics based upon people’s participation and competitive elections. In China, consensual politics can be viewed as a kind of consensual politics without democratic content, more restricted to interactions among undemocratic elites and used as a means to regulate their conflicts. For Lijphart’s consociational democracy, social cleavages make such a pattern of government necessary. For Chinese elites, two dilemmas led them to follow the politics of smoothness. First, the pursuit of modernization in China has generated and will continue to generate more and more cleavages and conflicts; and at the same time, the success of modernization depends on the maintenance of political stability and cohesion. Second, the pursuit of a market economy has dismantled and will continue to dismantle the Stalinist system (and its inherent bureaucratism and low incentive structure); at the same time, the transformation from a command to a market economy requires a capable and effective state. To overcome these two dilemmas, the Chinese political leadership has developed a new mode of political governance in the last quarter century. Along with economic changes, the mode of political governance also has followed – changing from the old bureaucratic hierarchy into a hybrid. Legislative decentralization is like sub-contracting – the PPCs have been given more autonomy in order to have stronger incentive and innovation toward two goals: to experiment and find new institutions and policies for the application at the national level; and to supervise bureaucracies in order to control bureaucratism. These two

176

Legislative process and consensual politics

measures serve to reduce the transaction costs of the system: the first can avoid reckless policies at the national level and the latter can reduce corruption and rent-seeking behavior from government officials, which are new types of transaction costs that have exploded in the marketization process (see Chapters 6 and 7). However, the introduction of these new policies (of market mode) may produce more friction and conflicts among political institution and actors, which they will weaken state capacity and possibly encourage popular uprisings, thus increasing the transaction costs in political governing. To avoid that, the Chinese political elites have established all kinds of mechanisms to manage intra-elite conflicts without letting them spill down to society. Besides, the Chinese leadership also has gradually realized that a coordinated adaptation of China’s economy to the market mode is more effective than waiting for a spontaneous and autonomous adaptation. Coordinated marketization also will reduce the social costs in the dramatic transition process. To keep its capacity for facilitating institutional adaptability, the Chinese government has refused to give up some kind of administrative control and bureaucratic hierarchy as well. Smooth legislative politics has become an integral part of a larger design for building consensus and economizing on transaction costs in the whole process of transforming political governance. Competitions from the legislative branch and cooperation among the elite have formed the two sides of the same coin under the network mode of governance.

Conclusion The study of the lawmaking procedures and institutions at the provincial level has demonstrated that significant changes occurred in Chinese subnational politics as well as national ones. It is clearly unfounded to insist on a totalitarianism model for current Chinese politics. It is also untrue to argue that Chinese political institutions and practices have been ossified and not experienced fundamental change. This chapter shares the argument with the fragmented authoritarianism model on this point that the pattern of Chinese political interactions has changed dramatically during the reform era. However, it does not agree with this model on how the pattern of Chinese politics has changed. This study of provincial legislative politics demonstrates that the fragmented authoritarianism model has not provided us a complete picture of Chinese political development in the last two decades. Its major weakness is its one-sided emphasis on conflict and competition within the old authoritarian framework and its neglect of the emergence of consensus building, integrating institutions, and rules. This chapter has identified that many new institutions and practices have been deliberately and systematically developed by the Chinese political elite for increasing cooperation and reducing friction. Self-denial, self-restraint, preemptive consultation and coordination, and voluntary power sharing have become con-

Legislative process and consensual politics

177

spicuous characteristics of Chinese provincial legislative politics under reform. Here I concur with An Chen on his observations of ‘interlocking systems’ and on the non-zero-sum, consensual nature of power game among the party committee, government, and the PCs. Chen (1999) argues, in explaining local political processes, particularly the preparation, deliberation, and ratification of legislative bills, the ‘who-controls-whom’ pattern of dominance by one institution was inadequate. He states that the triangular relationships of power among the party committee, the government, and the LPC ‘operated within a framework of general agreement on major principles as well as on a consensus-building and cooperative basis.’ He continues: Any substantial confrontation between the Party Committee and the government at the drafting phase or between the Party Committee-government and the legislature at the ratification period is highly unlikely, as both sides recognize that any failure to achieve compromise would result only in the paralysis of government and eventually, perhaps, penalty for either or both sides. (Chen 1999: 215) The Chinese political elites have adopted a consensual political pattern, which is encouraged by the collectivism in communist ideology, to regulate their behavior and interactions. Because it shares some similarities with Lijphart’s ‘consociationalism,’ Chinese consensual politics can be view as a kind of elite consociationalism without democratic content. This change is necessitated by Chinese leadership’s concerns for transaction costs of economic and political systems, and their need to build and stabilize new elites and the need for elite consensus. As China’s economy shifted from a hierarchical command economy into a network mode that has mixed a lot of components of market governance, the Chinese political system has also evolved into a hybrid mode of governance in which both hierarchical administrative control and market-like competition coexist. To avoid the side effect of friction resulting from political competition and conflict, and therefore to sustain state capacity and government efficiency, the politics of smoothness has been introduced. Consensual politics in today’s China has become a strategy to maintain the existence of a network mode of governance both in economic and political systems. The emergence of new governance most likely will decrease the chance of a USSR-type regime collapse in China and provide a middle ground for further development toward a market mode of governance both in economies and politics. In the following chapter, I will move to the role of the PPCs in economic development, especially how the local legislative power has been used to facilitate the process of marketization in China.

6

State failure, market failure, and developmental Provincial People’s Congresses

For a quarter century, China’s miraculous economic development has been accompanied by active and energetic People’s Congresses (PCs) at both the national and sub-national levels. This development indicates that the subordination of legislatures to the dominant executive and the absence of energetic, active legislatures have not necessarily become preconditions for Chinese economic development. Considering the lag of political democratization behind economic achievement in China, is it possible that legislatures, often regarded as democratizing agents, can be shaped to such an extent that they can play a transformative role in economic development, but at the same time, their democratic impact is suppressed or at least kept contained? The basic questions explored in this chapter are: How the Chinese local PCs (LPCs) have been actively involved in market creation? In the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping finally consolidated his power and launched his ‘second revolution’ in Chinese communist history, he faced a typical problem of state failure. As he pointed out, ‘Bureaucracy remains a major and widespread problem in the political life of our Party and the state’ (Deng 1983: 310). To solve these problems, Deng’s solution was simple as well as virtually inevitable: to introduce market mechanism of competition. But by introducing the market to counter-balance state failure, China has encountered problems arising from market failure. For example, to resort to market mechanisms after 30 years of communist rule, the immediate question is how to create a market. However, a market system can take decades or centuries to evolve via spontaneous order. As a result, the state is expected to play a facilitating and developmental role in assisting market creation. Besides, a market economy does not necessarily reduce corruption and rentseeking behaviors by officials. On the contrary, it may create more opportunities for official corruption to seek rents. Third, a market economy creates externalities (e.g., pollution and environmental degradation) that the market itself often cannot solve. Finally, a market economy always favors those with endowments of intelligence, wealth, and natural resources in different areas, and creates a series of problems of social justice. All these problems have to be addressed, most likely by the state. Ultimately, by starting China’s reforms, Deng embroiled China in a classical dilemma, or an orthodox paradox: the

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 179 solution (market mechanism) for state failure has side effects; and the problem (the state) is expected to be a solution for these side effects (market failure). To find a way out, Deng and other Chinese top leaders called on the PCs to make a contribution by playing two important roles. First, they would make laws pertaining to market creation and economic development. Second, they should diligently supervise the government and the judicial system in order to keep the state competent and prevent it from degenerating into a predatory monster. For Deng, ‘to improve the multi-level PC system was regarded as a way to prevent the over-concentration of power’ (Deng 1983: 322). Their power to supervise the government, the court system, and the procuratorate system is a safeguard against irrational behavior and policies (e.g., the Cultural Revolution) in politics. Since 1992 the Party has wholeheartedly endorsed the ‘socialist market economy,’ the transformative role of PCs in the economy has gained new momentum. As Qiao Shi, Chairman of NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC, 1993–8), stated: The establishment and improvement of a socialist market economy requires guidance, regulation and safeguard from a well-operated legal system. To achieve this goal, the first thing is to speed up legislation, to speed up the lawmaking concerning the market economy. The LPCs and their SCs that enjoy the authority to make local statutes shall facilitate their local legislation in accordance with their own specific situations and demands arising from reform and construction, in order to complement the legal system of the socialist market economy. (Qiao 1994: 3) One top official of the NPC related the two major functions of the PCs – legislation and supervision – to the economic transformation in China: the pace of legislation should speed up to help establish a legal framework for the market economy. Laws shall be used to ‘guide, facilitate, and safeguard’ the smooth progress of a market economy. Legislative oversight is also needed in a market economy for supervising the implementation of laws that directly affects economic development. To control corruption and to maintain a clean government is also necessary conditions and important safeguards for a market economy (Quanguo 1994: 3–4). To capitalize on the new opportunity of developing a market economy, the PCs (at both the national and provincial levels) organized conferences to explore the best way to involve them in the economic transition. For example, on August 16–19, 1993, the Hebei PPC organized a seminar concerning the relationship between market economy and legislative work to explore new strategies for local legislation to ‘adapt to, obey, and serve the market economy’ (ZGFLNJ 1994: 218). One month later, the NPC and the Guangdong PPCSC also organized a five-day-long conference with the central theme of the relationship between the market economy and PC work. To a large extent, over the last quarter century, the legislatures in China have followed the guidelines

180

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

above to serve the economy as their central task and tried to involve themselves in economic transformation; in return, their relevance to a market economy has provided opportunities for their own organizational development and the expansion of power. The major functions of the PCs in economic transition can be categorized into two types: compensating for market failure and for state failure respectively. In the former, the PCs have taken responsibility to create markets, control externalities, and maintain public goods; in the latter, they have taken responsibility to prod the executive and judicial branches to develop property rights and enforce contracts, to supervise them in order to keep an efficient government and legal system, to prevent over-centralization of power, to minimize transaction costs, and to improve the informational efficiency of the whole system (also see Chapter 3).

Countervailing market failure The necessity for involving PCs in the marketization process has been rooted in the Chinese leaders’ perception of the weakness and negative impact of the market economy. While recognizing the merits of the market economy, the Chinese leaders and parliamentary scholars believe that it has several inherent weaknesses. For example, markets cannot occur spontaneously; a market economy is an economy ruled by law and has to rely on a legal framework to survive. Therefore, if there are no legal statutes to guide, regulate, safeguard, and restrict the actors and their behavior in a market and to maintain its normal order, there will be no real market economy (Quanguo 1994: 41). Also, a market economy inevitably brings a series of negative consequences, such as ‘monopoly by one industry, local and regional protectionism, production decline for public goods, fake products and cheating behavior in trade, waste of public resources, environmental pollution and ecological deterioration, and a widening income gap, etc.’ (Quanguo 1994: 60) If these problems get out of control, the construction of a market economy is going to be harmed and the fundamental legitimacy of CPC rule is going to be threatened. Therefore, the state has to step in. The PCs have a special role in counter-acting potential market failures for four reasons. First, to make laws is their major function. Second, because they do not directly control one specific sector of the economy, the PCs can be a guardian of the general interest and, therefore, are suitable for safeguarding the integrity of fairness in a market economy. Third, market failures undermine public goods, so the victims are usually the general population. As representative organs, the PCs are believed to be more concerned for the maintenance of public goods. Fourth, the PCs have a large number of people’s deputies (PDs, more than three million) and a complex system of communication (see Chapter 3), which can be easily turned into a monitoring network; therefore, they are well equipped to provide access to ordinary consumers and shadow illegal activities in a market economy.

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 181 Market creation With uncertainties, the Chinese leaders restricted their earliest experiment with a market economy to special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces and some carefully selected economic sectors. In the mid1980s, once the Chinese leadership was impressed by these experiments, the market economy then was gradually introduced to other areas, and finally was adopted as a fundamental policy in the constitution. This process determined that localities had played a pioneering role in marketization and a large number of laws regarding marketization were first introduced at the provincial level. By 1995, local economic statutes surpassed one thousand, accounting for 40 percent of all local statutes and 70 percent of economic laws passed by the NPC and LPCs combined (Sun and Zhang 1996: 22). Chinese lawmakers have identified four categories of laws in their legislative plan for establishing a legal framework for a market economy: those regulating actors (producers and consumers, and others), those regulating the market economic order, those for macro-regulation over the market economy, and those protecting labor. During the 20-year period after the reform, the PPCs had passed hundreds of statutes, for example, 317 (accounting for 19 percent of all statutes passed in the same period) from November 1979 to July 1990, falling in these four categories (see Table 6.1). If the statistics of the PPCs themselves is used, the percentage of economic statutes in total number is even higher (see Table 6.2). After entering the 1990s, the percentage of economic laws promulgated by both the NPC and PPCs has accelerated (RMRB 09/19/94, 10/17/95, 03/19/94, 03/13/96). By 1995, more than 3,000 local statutes had been made. In other words, the local statutes passed in the first five years in the 1990s are almost equivalent to the total local statutes passed during the entire 1980s. Among the increasing new local statutes, most deal with economics. From 1992 to 1994, passed were 74 statutes regulating markets, 53 concerning developmental zones and duty-free zones, 53 managing Table 6.1 Percentages of economic statutes in total legislation (1979–99) Tianjin 38.1 Shanghai 21.3 Guizhou 38.5

Hebei 42.7 Fujian 45.0 Ningxia 50.0

Liaoning 50.2 Hunan 50.0 Qinghai 41.0

Jilin 62.2 Hubei 47.5 Xinjiang 50.0

Source: Quanguo 2000b.

Table 6.2 Percentages of economic statutes in local legislation (1979–90) Beijing Jilin Hubei Shaanxi

36.0 56.0 27.6 38.0

Tianjin Zhejiang Guangdong Gansu

Source: Y. Zhang 1993.

22.0 52.2 38.6 26.6

Hebei 35.0 Anhui 41.0 Hainan 36.8

Shanxi 45.2 Fujian 34.1 Sichuan 40.4

Liaoning 41.0 Jiangxi 48.0 Guizhou 29.3

182

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

commercial and industrial enterprises, 34 concerning financing and taxation (Zhonghua 1995). Lü Chuanzan, chairman of the Hebei PPCSC, described that in his province, ‘Economic statutes have been highlighted as a priority in legislation. Not only the speed of legislation has been accelerated, its quality has also been improved.’ For example, in 1994, of the fifteen local statutes passed by the Hebei PPCSC, nine were economic statutes, accounting for 60 percent. In its Five Years Legislative Plan (1993–7), 130 bills were waiting in the pipeline; two-thirds of them would be economic statutes (RMRB 03/14/95). In Guangdong, 31 local statutes were passed in 1993, of which 60 percent were economic. Also in Heilongjiang, from 1979 to 1993, 60 percent of 98 local statutes were related to economic affairs in nature (RMRB 08/04/94, 03/19/94). In 1993, the Eighth NPC took economic legislation as its central work and aimed at creating a basic legal framework for the emerging market economy in its five-year term. As of 1998, the NPC and its SC passed more than 40 laws concerning the market economy, which, coupled with the previous 30-plus economic laws, offered a legal framework for the economy (Quanguo 1998: 150). Under such influence, the PPCs also accelerated their pace in creating new legal norms for a market economy, which is illustrated by comparing Table 6.3 with Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Laws regulating actors These laws are intended to define the nature and status of economic actors in a market economy. The provinces pioneered in laying down a legal framework for economic actors and ushered in some important breakthroughs in the Chinese economic system. Three famous examples are the ‘Regulations for Corporations in the SEZs,’ ‘Shenzhen SEZ Land Administration Act’ of Guangdong Province, and the ‘Regulation for Protecting the Legal Rights of Consumers’ in Fujian Province. On September 28, 1986, when the national law regarding corporations was still in the stage of exploration and discussion, the Guangdong PPCSC passed the ‘Regulations for Corporation in the SEZs,’ the first legislation concerning corporations in China. Not until two years later did the ‘Law of the PRC concerning Enterprises Owned by the Whole People’ and the ‘Law of the PRC concerning Sino-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises’ pass at the national level. Four years later the ‘Law of the PRC concerning Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures’ was passed by the NPC. On December 29, 1987, the Guangdong PPCSC passed the ‘Shenzhen SEZ Land Table 6.3 Percentages of economic statutes in total legislation (1993–9) Heilongjiang 69 Jiangxi 50 Guangxi 60 Source: Quanguo 2000b.

Shanxi 67.0 Fujian 50.4 Gansu 58.0

Anhui 53.3 Hubei 58.4 Qinghai 56.0

Jiangsu 55.0 Chongqing 54.2

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 183 Administration Act,’ which allows the commercial transaction of land-users’ rights. At that moment, the sale of land users’ rights was not allowed in the ‘National Land Administration Law.’ But after the Guangdong’s local statute was passed, the central government did not contest it as unconstitutional. Rather, the constitution was revised four months later to accommodate this new development (Lin 1993: 172–3). The first law for consumers’ rights was also initiated by provincial legislation. On September 4, 1987, the Fujian PPCSC passed the ‘Regulations for Protecting the Legal Rights and Interests of Consumers,’ which was drafted and sponsored by its own Financial and Economic Committee. Once this statute was passed, fundamental changes followed: to implement this statute in the following four years, 4,587 inspections were conducted by government agencies at all levels; 55,000 inquiries by consumers were answered; hundreds of exhibitions of fake and inferior products were held; and 13,599 complaints from consumers were handled. According to incomplete statistics, these actions recovered or avoided a loss of at least one million yuan for consumers (Quanguo 1992c: 8). The positive results invited emulation of the statute from other provinces: 24 provinces and cities sent their investigation delegations to Fujian to study its experiences. Within two years, 21 PPCs and MPCs passed the same type of statutes; after two more years, by 1991, 24 PPCs and four MPCs also had the same type of statutes. They had the same impressive impact upon consumer rights protection in all these provinces. For example, in the first two years of enacting the statute in Hebei, 200,000 complaints from consumers were handled; and a total of 30 million yuan were recovered for them (Y. Zhang 1993: 998). More important, local statutes also affected the making of a similar law at the national level. In 1993, after summing up local practices and experiences, the NPC finally passed a counterpart law for the whole nation (Quanguo 1992c: 5–8). Laws regulating the market economic order When an economic system is in transition to a new one, old rules fall into disuse, new rules have not been established or respected, and anomalies are often produced. Examples include unfair competition, cheating, adulteration, inadequate sanitation, and so forth. In the Chinese economic transition process, the PPCs have played a role in alleviating these problems and in some issue areas they have even acted one step ahead of the national legislation. At the same time, they have also demonstrated flexibility to adapt to more mature and comprehensive laws once they are enacted at the national level. In the early 1980s, as peasants were allowed to sell their surplus grain, markets boomed in Chinese cities and rural areas. To manage the burgeoning markets, the PPCs in Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Hebei passed statutes for the management of rural and urban markets for agricultural products. After 1983 when the State Council enacted the ‘Measures for Managing Urban and

184

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

Rural Markets and Trade,’ all the three PPCs annulled their local statutes; later Shaanxi passed a new statute that had adapted to new developments in national laws and market reforms (Y. Zhang 1993: 1224–43; Quanguo 1990a: 966–7). In the early development of a market economy, one of the biggest problems is adulteration, because some business people have not realized the importance of reputation and trust. Inevitably, fake, defective, or adulterated products flow into the market and some merchants use gimmicks to cheat customers. In Beijing, the legislation has been used to target such unfair behavior and has achieved obvious results. In the first two years after the ‘Temporary Regulation on the Quality of Seeds of Farm Plants’ was enacted in 1987, 400,000 kilograms of unqualified food seeds were kept from flowing into the seed market and sold as ordinary food and 110,000 kilograms of low-quality vegetable seeds were discarded. The regulation prevented more false or inferior seeds from flowing into agricultural production and helped restore the order of the seed market. In the ensuing four years after the ‘Act of Commercial Instruments of Weights and Measures in Beijing’ was passed in 1983, government agencies citywide launched a campaign against gimmicks in the instruments of weights and measures. Ultimately, 15,749 cases of violating laws were found, fines of 168,000 yuan were collected, and 5,454 inaccurate balances and steelyards were confiscated. As a result, the qualification rate of instruments of weights and measures changed from 50 percent to 89 percent in the state and collective-owned stores, from 30 percent to 72 percent in the markets of agricultural products. 37,000 instruments used by individual industry and commerce households were registered and their qualification rate passed 80 percent (Y. Zhang 1993: 984–5). Technology was first recognized as a commodity by the local legislation that revolutionized the people’s concept of property rights in China. In July 1986, the Guangdong PPCSC passed the ‘Act for Technology Market Management,’ another ‘first local legislation’ in China protecting technologies as a commodity and the transfer of technology into production. It recognized technology as a commodity, intellectual property rights, and the rights of professionals and engineers to have part-time work with other enterprises. As a result, it gave more incentive to inventors, encouraged the popularization of technology in production, and boosted the research and development programs in Guangdong. Once it was passed, this new act attracted the attention of the central government and other provinces, and affected legislation both at the national level and in other provinces (Quanguo 1992c: 3–5). Laws for macro-regulation over a market economy The PPCs have involved themselves in macro-economic regulation by passing acts in the areas of price, budget, and special policies for one geographic area or industrial sector. In the 1980s, many PPCs were enthusiastic

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 185 about making laws to control runaway prices. These acts alleviated the concerns of and resistance from ordinary consumers against marketization reforms. As reforms continued to deepen, people became used to price changes; some PPCs suspended their acts or improved them in accordance with economic changes. Some PPCs, concerned with inflation, blamed the provincial governments for spending more than their budgets permitted. They decided to intensify their control over budget and extra-budgetary spending. Shandong, Liaoning and other provinces passed statutes supervising the formation and implementation of the budget. After the corruption scandal in Beijing (implicating Chen Xitong, the former mayor, party secretary and a Politburo member; and Wang Baosen, deputy mayor, who committed suicide) was exposed, the outraged PDs of Beijing MPC believed that the loopholes in the budgetary system were partially to blame. With the PDs from Haidian District (Wu Qing also played an important role; see Chapter 4) being most active, in 1996 they initiated and passed a new statute, ‘Regulations of Budgetary Supervision in Beijing,’ to intensify congressional scrutiny over budgetary issues, particularly supervision over extrabudgetary spending (Liu et al. 1999: 1187–9). This statute also stipulates that the Financial and Economic Committee of the MPC listens to the report regarding the budget from the Finance Bureau Director of the Municipal Government every quarter, the MPCSC does the same once every half a year. Before hearing and deciding on the budget enforcement and plan, the MPCSC should first hear and review the auditing report. It also mandated to create an advisory group consisting of financial and budgetary specialists to work for the MPCSC. Last but not least, disciplinary, administrative and criminal penalties were specified for government officials violating budgetary procedures (Quanguo 2000b: 118; RMRB 12/26/96; Int.WQ-9806). In Tianjin, the same efforts to supervise the budgetary plan and enforcement were also made. Some PPCs have shared partial power with the government with regard to economic policy and also have increased their say in how the government should spend the allocated money (Wang 1998). The Shanghai MPC passed the ‘Temporary Act for Developing New Technologies and Industries’ on August 14, 1987. It provided for a local industrial policy to encourage investment and development in some targeted industries. Industrial policies are one of the important characteristics of developmental states, and selective industrial policies were in fact first introduced by the localities in China. To develop the local economy, the PPCs have actively passed statutes to establish ‘development zones’ or ‘new technology development zones’ where tax breaks, favorable investment policies, and special land prices were granted in order to attract foreign investment. In the 1980s, the coastal provinces and municipalities exclusively made the laws regarding SEZs or developmental zones; their pioneering role in developing the Chinese market economy was obvious (as shown in the Table 6.4). But here is a caveat: some provinces had not publicly recorded and issued their passed statutes. Nor did

186

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

the NPC and the State Council seem to be fully informed. In the 1980s, only two of five local statutes regarding developmental zones in Shandong were listed in the collection of recorded local statutes. There is no way to estimate the number of passed statutes, especially those more radical, when judged by the circumstances at that moment. However, entering the 1990s, the political environment turned more favorable to the establishment of special zones. To take advantage of the more relaxed political situation, in 1993 the Chairpersons’ Group of Tianjin MPC decided to make five statutes for its duty-free zone. From the initiative of these proposals to the drafting and its adoption by the SC, it took only three months (Quanguo 1996: 5–6). At the same time, inland provinces started to catch up with coastal provinces and produced a ‘fever of developmental zones.’ In July 1993, developmental zones all over the country had increased to more than 6,000 (JSND 08/93: 46–7). Even though these development zones in inland provinces were mainly established through executive decrees, many PPCs passed statutes to encourage investment from overseas and create a favorable environment for local development. For example, the ARPCSC (Autonomous Region PCSC) in Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia) believed that the Mongolian traditional Nadam Fair was a good opportunity to attract tourists and investors. To capitalize on it, the Standing Committee worked very hard to pass the ‘Act for Encouraging Foreign Investment’ on June 29, 1991, just before the Fair started (Y. Zhang 1993: 1009). This kind of developmentalism demonstrated by the Neimenggu ARPCSC represented many other counterparts in the relatively underdeveloped, interior provinces. Laws for protecting labor The gradualism of the Chinese economic transition has been reflected in the fact that labor laws have been keeping abreast of marketization. Lawmaking regarding labor protection has changed its focus in the last 20-plus years as well. At first, more laws addressed the problem of safety and health of workers; as more and more joint ventures were established, the issue of worker unions in these joint ventures became urgent. Entering the 1990s, once the Chinese economy continued to liberalize itself and the ‘iron ricebowl’ employment system was abandoned, more laws were introduced to establish a social-welfare system. Laws were needed to deal with issues like medical issuance, minimum wage, unemployment aid, retirement pension, and so forth. In the realm of social security, Hainan PPC once again led the nation. Early in 1991, the government enacted three temporary statutes concerning old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and on-duty injury insurance. But their enforcement met strong resistance. Until 1993, still 42 percent of enterprises (and 67 percent of foreign-invested enterprises) that were required to join these plans refused to do so. To enhance the authority of social security statutes, in the late 1993, the Hainan PPCSC passed three statutes to protect old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and on-duty

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 187 injury insurance. Thanks to these three statutes, the government had a legal instrument to force enterprises to comply with the social security system and after one year, 77 percent of the enterprises joined these insurance programs. To further increase this percentage, in 1995, in accordance with these statutes Hainan High Court established a tribunal for social security and made it more difficult for employers to evade their responsibility for employees’ social security (RMRB 05/30/95). In addition to lawmaking power, the PPCs have two other ways to help market creation: they can pass resolutions on some important issues to pressure provincial governments and judicial organizations to give more attention to this issue area; and they can select some important laws and conduct their inspections on implementation of the law and assist their enforcement. They are often used in the PPCs’ activities to assure the provision of public goods and control the negative externalities, and countervailing state failures. Externalities control Externality refers to the consequences of economic transaction imposed upon the non-participant third party, and most of the time, they are negative (Caporaso and Levine 1992: 90–1). For example, residents living near a factory are affected by pollution (dust, noise, smell, smoke, radiation, and so forth) and cannot get any benefit from it. They are absorbing costs for the producer and consumers and make the latter two enjoy more profit at lower cost. To eliminate pollution is costly and a factory has no incentive to do so and most likely will increase the release of externalities as it always tries to minimize its cost. Since the market mechanism cannot solve this problem efficiently, the state has to take actions to curb the externalities. For the state, there are several ways to deal with this problem: imposing fees and fines, regulation, filing lawsuit in the court against the producer of externalities (Caporaso and Levine 1992: 92). The Chinese PPCs have actively passed statutes to legitimize the authority of governments to impose fees and fines upon, and to regulate over, polluters. This is reflected in the number of statutes regarding these issues passed by the PPCs in the decade of 1980s (see Table 6.5). By 1995, 17 PPCs had passed comprehensive local statutes for environmental protection; 13 PPCSCs had established Special or Work Committees for the Environment and Resources Protection (RMRB 06/02/95, 09/14/94). Hainan Province has been a good example in protecting the environment by laws. In the first Plenary Session of the Hainan PPC a guideline was provided to the construction of Hainan: ‘Development and construction must proceed simultaneously with the environmental protection.’ In its first seven years, the Hainan PPC passed eight local statutes concerning environmental protection. At the same time, the provincial government also passed more than twenty statutes on the environmental issue (RMRB 07/22/96, 06/10/95).

Table 6.4 Local statutes concerning economy (November 1979 to July 1990) Statute type

Total number 317

Regulating actors 78 items Enterprise Registration 1 Rural and Household Mines Management 27 Urban and Rural Collective-owned Enterprises 8 Rights and Duties of Individual Industry-Commerce Households 3 Protecting Rural Households of Specialized Trade 6 Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures (including Taiwan-invested Enterprises) 8 Consumer Rights Protection 25 Regulating market order Urban and Rural Trade Markets Construction Market Technology Market Propagating Agricultural Technology Seeds of Farm Plants Breeding Stock Agricultural Products Cultural Markets Economic Contract Rural Contract for Household Responsibility Punishing Illegal Commodity Transactions and Profiteering Anti-Economic Crimes Economic Dispute (House and Land) Product Quality Control Food Hygiene Instruments for Measures and Weights Trade Mark Protection Management of Fishery

132 items 16 1 9 4 10 1 6 10 6 3 4 5 2 8 22 3 1 21

Macro-economic regulation Price Supervision Budget Management Extra-budget Spending Accounting and Financing Supervision Township Finance Inspecting and Supervising Economic Statistics Development and Special Economic Zones Industry Policy

75 items 13 3 3 4 2 7 40 3

Labor protection Labor Protection and Safety Compensation for on-duty Incident Labor Union in Joint Ventures

32 items 25 1 6

Source: Huang 1991.

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 189 In addition, some PPCs, for example the Heilongjiang PPCSC, also had pressured local courts to hear cases in accordance with local statutes against factories releasing pollution. However, the most important achievement for the PPCs is their flexible, ubiquitous inspection over legal implementation and their political pressure upon the executive branch to take serious action against enterprises that do not abide by law. Reviewing the practices of the last 20-plus years, the PPCs and their SCs have been able to keep themselves relevant to the problem of externalities by playing numerous roles as follows. First, the PPCs provide a forum for the PDs to complain about the problems. It is not unusual that the SC members and ordinary PDs to act like ‘muckrakers’ in identifying problems on their inspection visits and exposing them in plenary sessions, SC meetings, or to the mass media. For example, in November 1986, the Jiangsu PPCSC dispatched its members to localities to inspect the implementation of the ‘Environmental Protection Law’ and the ‘Law of Water-Pollution Prevention.’ When the inspection group traveled to the city of Changsu, some PDs and ordinary citizens reported to them that a chemical factory under construction violated environmental laws, and the factory, which would produce flammable, explosive, and poisonous products, was located in an area of heavy population. Besides, the emission of pollution would destroy the scenic area and its tourism and hurt local development in the long run. The inspection group reported their findings back to the SC. The SC responded seriously by sending another special group, which consisted of members with expertise in chemical industry and some outside experts, to conduct field investigations. Based on the findings by the two inspection groups, the SC made two decisions: to propose to the government that the chemical factory change to manufacture other products, and to persuade the Changsu municipal government to accept the proposal. The provincial government and the municipal government later adopted the proposal from the PPC (Y. Zhang 1993: 1068; Quanguo 1992c: 157–8). In 1994 and 1995, the Committee of Environmental and Resources Protection of NPCSC and the Environmental Commission of the State Council organized two nationwide inspections over environmental issues. The central government dispatched inspection groups to the provinces, and the PPCs also participated in these actions or were urged by the NPC to conduct selfinspections. In 1994, ten provinces found and handled more than 3,000 cases of violating environmental laws and statutes, and 100,000 cases of violating laws protecting wild animals, forestry resources, grassland, and mineral resources. The Shandong PPC and Qingdao MPC jointly inspected law enforcement in Qingdao. Following the inspections, three oil refineries were closed down, more than 200 polluters were identified, and nine factories were ordered either to close down or change products and locations (RMRB 01/04/95). Second, to highlight the urgency and importance of some problems, the PPCs and their SCs often passed resolutions on individual issue areas and

190

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

drew the attention of the Party, the government, and the public, and put them on the government agenda. The PPCs and their SCs act as ‘pressure groups’ (there is little environmentalist lobbying in China) and prod the governments to take actions on these issues. For example, in 1989 and 1990, the Qinghai PPCSC became very concerned with the heavy pollution in the area of Huangshui River and Qinghai Lake. After conducting its own inspections, the PPCSC suggested the provincial government sponsor a bill for controlling pollution along the Huangshui River and send it to the SC for approval. The SC also passed the ‘Resolution on Strengthening the Ecological and Environmental Protection.’ These actions prompted the government to take appropriate measures quickly (Quanguo 1992c: 69–70). In some PPCs, there is a work committee or special committee of environmental protection that institutionalizes the function of the PPC in the issue area of pollution control. For example, as a base for China’s energy (coal), heavy and chemical industries, Shanxi Province has a serious problem of pollution. So the Shanxi PPCSC has paid special attention to this problem. Its first local statute was a regulation concerning imposing fees and fines on work units that released pollution beyond the quota. To identify more problems, in 1984 it organized an investigation committee on environmental protection and conducted a nine-month inspection in 77 work units of four cities and numerous counties. Its determination to protect the environment was reflected in an encounter with the central government: one large mine was found not to have appropriate measures for environment protection. The SC did not allow it to start production, even though its operation on time was required by the central government in order to supply coal to the large Baoshan Steel Mill in Shanghai. The ribbon-cutting date had been already scheduled, and important leaders had been invited. Insisting on the appropriate measures for environmental protection, the Shanxi PPCSC and the Taiyuan MPCSC reported the case to the NPC and got support from the latter. To resolve the stalemate, the Ministry of Coal Industry had to send a director to Shanxi to find remedies for environmental protection, meeting the requirement of ‘three simultaneities’ (‘santongshi’: the project of pollution prevention must be designed, constructed, and completed simultaneously with the principal project). After pollution control measures were in place, the coal mine was allowed to start its production. Next year, a permanent committee, the Work Committee of Environmental Protection, was added to the PPCSC and the work on environmental protection was further strengthened (Y. Zhang 1993: 1023–8; Jilin 1989: 191–2). Third, the PPCs and their SCs also could be policy initiators and provide policy options to the government; and at the same time, they could be moderators and facilitators to coordinate various agencies of the government at different levels to achieve some policy goals. In 1985, some PDs in Guangdong submitted a motion to the Plenary Session concerning the problem of soil erosion in the upstream areas of the Bei and Han Rivers. According to this motion, the provincial government submitted a project plan to the SC

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 191 and got quick approval. In the following ten years, the government promised to spend eight million yuan each year on the prevention of soil erosion in these two areas (Y. Zhang 1993: 1154). In a Shandong case, to strengthen the work of environmental protection, the PPCSC conducted an inspection over the enforcement of the ‘Environmental Protection Law of the PRC’ and passed a resolution in 1987 to highlight the issue of heavy pollution in the Xiaoqing River and a lake. Next year, the SC further passed a specific resolution on strengthening the prevention and elimination of environmental pollution in the Xiaoqing River and prioritized the pollution-reducing project therein. In this resolution, the SC ordered the provincial government to control pollution, to solve the problem of drinking water for local residents, and to construct a project diverting water from the Yellow River to improve the water quality of Xiaoqing River in five years. Because the SC not only pointed out the direction but also suggested solutions to achieve a move in this direction, the provincial government followed the resolution and pledged a series of projects to control the pollution. In the following two years, the Shandong PPCSC continued their oversight and at the same time helped solve problems for achieving these goals. For example, in the following inspections, as it found that a five million appropriation was not enough for drilling deeper wells for drinking water, the SC proposed in its review of the government budget that additional appropriations should continue for the future five years. The government accepted this proposal. When it learned that the US$12 million loan from Austria for constructing a sewage-treatment plant was delayed for a lack of sponsorship, the SC immediately contacted the vice governor in charge of the issue and persuaded the Provincial Planning Committee to take the sponsorship. When the provincial government failed to allot the 30 million yuan it pledged for the two sewage-treatment plants, the SC took the initiative to have meetings with the vice governor and other government leaders, prodding them to fulfill their pledge. When the agencies of water projects and environmental protections were in disagreement over diversion projects and caused a stalemate, the SC intervened and helped the two agencies to work out a preliminary work plan (Quanguo 1992c: 66–8). Finally, the PPCs and their SCs could play a watchdog role and keep watching over the identified problem until it was solved. Long-term followup is made possible by the institutionalization of staff and continued accumulation of institutional memory. For instance, because the drinking water of more than ten million Shanghai residents is from the Huangpu River, in the past quarter century, the pollution along Huangpu has been continuously a major concern for the Shanghai MPCSC. To protect the water quality, it passed the ‘Regulation for Protecting Upstream Water of the Huangpu River in Shanghai’ early in 1985. However, many enterprises still did not abide by this statute. The SC decided to have inspections every year in order to push the enforcement of the ‘Regulation.’ In September 1987,

192

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

the Shanghai MPCSC dispatched its members to investigate the situation of pollution control. The investigation group identified some big polluters and passed a report on to the municipal government demanding more action. Later, Mayor Zhu Rongji ordered the twelve enterprises whose emissions accounted for 85 percent of the pollution to meet the standard for pollution control before 1990. To ensure these enterprises do take measures for controlling pollution, during August and September of 1990, the SC organized several groups to conduct unannounced inspections at these plants. They also videotaped the sordid situation of pollution, released it on local TV program, and put the heat on the leaders of these enterprises. Half a month later, the PDs and SC members revisited these enterprises. All the SC had done caused a shock to the enterprises and their superior leaders, mobilized public opinion, and prompted more actions from the government (Quanguo 1992c: 158–60). After 1992, a new round of economic development started. Many enterprises expanded their production and invested in new projects without paying enough attention to environmental protection. The Shanghai MPCSC decided to organize two inspection groups to review the situation of law enforcement in July 1995. The chairman and all vice-chairpersons of the SC participated in the inspection. The actions from the MPC once again drew the attention of the government and public to environmental issues (XMWB 07/4/95). Since Shanghai passed its local statute regarding the protection of the environment in 1985, the MPCSC organized an inspection visit every year – at least once and sometimes two to three times a year. This practice persisted for more than ten years. According to one interviewee who was deeply involved in the protection of Dianshan Lake case, many controversies mainly arose from the tensions between local development and environmental protection. Local government and people with interests in developing this area for vacation resorts or industrial production had big influence on the municipal government as well as in the MPC. This interviewee put it that ‘butts command the head – what you stand for depends on where you sit.’ He provided the following insights about how conflicts were solved in his work: First, we tend to achieve consensus through investigation – this is our dialectic method. Second, through coordination and exchange of ideas, we try to strike a balance. For example, environmental protection after all is an issue of money. We have hundreds of problems that need attention and solutions. The leaders within the congress had informal contacts with leaders in the government – this is our traditional method of ‘yanjiu yanjiu’ (discussion and deliberation). Since the work focus of the PCs conforms to the central work of the municipal government, our disagreement was over methods instead of the goal. The communist leadership has one advantage: we do not have fundamental partisan and factional conflicts. The issue is over the balance between the whole and the parts. Always at the end, the short-term concern yields to the

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 193 long-term one, the partial interest to the general interest. However, if we have serious disagreements with the government over principles, we go to the Party for coordination. (Int. CJT-9806) Maintenance of public goods In contrast to the externalities, economists believe that public goods are always under-produced, if without proper effort of collective action. Projects such as roads, water dams, irrigation systems, and so forth, once completed, will benefit all residents; but it is extremely difficult to exclude those people who did not pay their share from getting access. The combined characteristics of jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion invite ‘free-riding’ behaviors (Mancur Olsen’s ideas) and justify state intervention. In China, for centuries, on the one hand, the risk of floods has posed an extreme challenge to the society in terms of maintaining public projects; on the other hand, the abject poverty of the Chinese people has made their participation in maintaining those public projects very difficult. The state has long taken primary responsibility for these public goods. Karl Wittfogel (1957) argued that in Chinese society, hydraulic management was the most important factor providing legitimacy for oriental despotism. This tradition that the state maintains public goods with little involvement of social organizations persists today. However, the characteristics have changed during the reform era. As the old mobilization regime collapsed, the state’s traditional capacity of maintaining public goods was weakened by the reforms. To compensate for this loss, the state gradually has shifted its reliance on mobilization to legal instruments. For this change, the PPCs have found their niche to expand their role in the realm of public goods. As discussed under externalities control, the PPCs have the same power instruments to make their voice heard: certainly they can pass a lot of statutes with regard to public goods. They have really done so in the past 15 years (see Table 6.5). Then, they can pass resolutions intermittently and publicize the issue of public goods. But most importantly, they are able to conduct flexible, frequent inspection of law enforcement, and make sure that passed laws are respected and enforced strictly. Many local statutes regarding the public goods were initiated and passed by the PPCs when there was no corresponding national legislation. Jiangxi’s ‘Act of Ferry Management,’ Liaoning’s ‘The River Course Administration Regulation,’ and Beijing’s ‘Act of Irrigation Works Protection’ are some examples. In Jiangxi Province, which had 2,246 ferries and 2,569 ferry boats transporting almost one million people a day, because of chaotic management, incidents occurred frequently and produced a death toll of an average of one hundred or more every year before 1980. To stop the chaos and reduce incidents arising from it, the Jiangxi PPCSC enacted the ‘Regulation over the Ferry Management’ on August 22, 1981 that clearly defined the rules for

194

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

Table 6.5 Local statutes concerning externalities and public goods (November 1979– July 1990) Statute type

Total number 237

Negative externalities control Pollution Smoke and Dust Control Noise Control Air Pollution Saving Energy

44 items 25 4 11 3 1

Public goods Environmental Protection Road Maintenance Watercourse Management Land Protection Water Protection Irrigation Project Management Forestry Protection Grassland Protection Wild-life and Aquatic Resources Conservation Wild Herb Medicine Conservation Mineral and Stone Resources Protection Infrastructure Protection

193 items 15 17 13 55 17 8 23 14 15 1 8 7

Source: Huang 1991.

safety, training requirement for ferry operators, and responsibility for ferry maintenance. In the following years, the provincial government added new contents to the regulation in accordance with the new documents from the State Council. After the LMWC of the Jiangxi PPCSC further revised and improved the old regulation, the SC passed a new ‘Act of Ferry Management’ to replace the old regulation. Because of the enforcement of this act, from 1986 to 1989, 72 percent of old ferry boats were replaced by new ones, and more than 70 percent of ferry-boat operators had been licensed after going through training and passing examinations. In consequence, accidents and death toll declined. During the eight years of ‘Regulation,’ the average death toll declined to 50; after the new ‘Act’ was passed, it further declined to 16 and 35 in 1989 and 1990 respectively (Quanguo 1992c: 22–3). Liaoning’s ‘The River Course Administration Statute’ of 1981 (revised in 1984) and Beijing’s ‘Act of Irrigation Works Protection’ of 1986 have also had positive impacts upon the maintenance of public projects. During the ten years of enforcing ‘The River Course Administration Statute,’ water dams and riverbanks of 6,000 kilometers were repaired; and 5,000 projects of river course maintenance were completed (Quanguo 1992c: 20). In Beijing, during the first three years of enforcing the ‘Act of Irrigation Works Protection,’ 658 cases of violating the act had been handled. Fines accumulated to 103,147 yuan, 26 cases of illegally occupying land were solved, hundreds of illegal constructions were removed, and 16,420 cubic meters of

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 195 trash were cleared out (Y. Zhang 1993: 984). These efforts effectively reduced the damage of flooding; especially in 1985 and 1986, the irrigation system in Liaoning survived two serious floods. Despite the increased activism of the PPCs in controlling externalities and maintaining public goods, in China today, deterioration of the environment and fewer public projects still pose a serious crisis. This problem is partly created by the fact that the new system has not been able to completely fill the void left by the old mobilization regime for three key reasons. First, the PPCs are short of members with legal expertise, the expectation for more laws having gone beyond the capacity of PPCs to legislate; as a result, many enacted laws are ambiguous, contradictory, and without clear penalties. Often they cause confusion and are difficult to follow. Second, the explosion of local legislation in the past decade has gone far beyond the capacity of law enforcement agencies to implement them. For example, in the late 1980s, there had been 193 laws and decrees regarding industrial and commercial administration in place; the number of personnel in the industrial and commercial administrations nationwide was 335,746. Although a law for preservation of cultural relics was passed in 1982, some provincial agencies of the cultural relic preservation offices had only three to five employees; many counties had no agency and personnel in charge of this work. Following the passage of the ‘Food Hygiene Law of the PRC (trial implementation)’ in 1983, 700 local acts and statutes were enacted; but in the whole nation, there were 16,558 supervisors (not including Tibet) and 9,740 inspectors; although many new economic laws have been passed, there were about 400,000 tax collectors for the whole nation (Shi 1991: 19). Third, many law-enforcement officials and ordinary citizens are unaware of the most enacted laws. Their legal ignorance has retarded the effective enforcement of valid laws. For example, a legal inspection in the late 1980s showed that in many areas, only 20 percent, some even as low as 10 percent of laws were rigorously enforced. The old problem of no laws to follow has been replaced by two new problems: low quality of some laws and lax law enforcement, which all fall in the category of state failure. To address these two problems, the PPCs have made efforts to recruit better-educated members and staff (see Chapter 4), to heighten their supervision over the executive branch and inspection of law Table 6.6 Survey of law enforcement in the late 1980s Area

Zhejiang Province Shanghai Municipality Heilongjiang Province Source: Shi T. (1991): 15.

Law enforcement Good (%)

Average (%)

Poor (%)

30 34 30

50 59 50

20 7 20

196

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

enforcement, and to popularize legal education regarding existing laws (see Chapter 7). In the following section, I will focus on how the PPCs supervise the executive and judicial branches and inspect law enforcement.

Countervailing state failure When confronted by market failures, decision-makers always try to remedy them by seeking solutions from non-market institutions, especially the state. But these non-market institutions are not free from their own failures, either. The non-market failures are often called ‘state failures,’ ‘bureaucracy failures,’ or ‘organization failures’ (Wolf 1988; Williamson 1996). To counteract these failures, decision-makers often resort to the market mechanism. This is exactly the case in China. During the past quarter century, the Chinese reformers have relied on increasing competition among organizations to solve their problems of bureaucratic incompetence, rent-seeking behaviors of officials, and the structural deficiency of over-centralization and information impactedness (see Chapters 2 and 3). As a result, the PPCs as well as the PCs at other levels have been given a larger role in political economy. Assisting the enforcement of property rights The clarification of property rights is the first step for a market economy. Not only does it enable legal entities to enter into markets and contracts, and therefore, makes exchange possible; it also provides incentives for them to pursue profits within the legal framework, and ultimately to enrich the economy as well as themselves. Without a clear definition of property rights by the state and an effective control of infringements upon property rights (e.g., from officials, other individuals, and bandits and of violations of contract arising from shirking, defection, and cheating), the cost and risk of doing business could be excessively high, and the incentives for businesspeople could be dampened. However, the transitional process from state ownership to a diversity of ownership, from a hierarchical social relationship to a contractual one is a fundamental social, economic, and political revolution, and proves difficult and painstaking. The simple logic for protecting property rights was stated by John Locke. According to him, property rights started with labor, man’s toil, pains and sweat that are part of the human body; therefore, the property rights are inviolable as the human body itself (Locke 1960: 327–44). But for centuries in China human dignity itself has been despised, and the intrinsic relationship between property rights and human dignity has not been recognized (the CPC is not solely, even though it is most responsible for this inadequacy in Chinese history). The authority of property rights and contracts defining property rights has not been respected. Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese state confronted an overwhelming issue of violation of property rights and

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 197 breach of contracts (Lyons and Nee 1994: 141–68). To clear out these obstacles to the market economy, government at various levels is needed to institutionalize markets and play a chief role as a ‘transaction cost minimizer’ (Pitelis 1993: 189). But because of the limitations of government and the extent of violations of property rights, the PCs at various levels have also involved themselves in this process in order to minimize transaction costs in both the economy and politics. Marketization is an educational process for the idea of property rights that enhances people’s awareness of their rights over assets, such as land, house, crops, capital, and cash. As a result, people have become more courageous in asserting their property rights and disputes over property rights between individuals and between the state and individuals have multiplied. The government agencies and courts at various levels are the first to deal with these disputes, but so many cases could not be solved by these organizations that they were sent to the PCs. For example, a dispute between the owner and a government agency over a house was finally resolved under the auspices of the Tianjin MPC. In 1985, Mr. Li Zhuojiu, a surrendered KMT lower officer, appealed to the Housing Bureau of the Tianjin municipal government to claim back his ownership over a house currently under government custody. The Housing Bureau replied, unless he brought his case to the Municipal High Court and secured a court order, it would not return the house. In a decision by the High Court in 1987, his ownership was confirmed and the Housing Bureau was ordered to return the house. But the Housing Bureau refused to follow the court order, insisting that he was unable to present the title deed for the house. Mr. Li had to appeal to the Tianjin MPCSC for help. The Political and Legal Committee of the SC deemed this case important for the implementation of policies for surrendered KMT personnel as well as some legal issues were involved, and decided to first establish a joint investigation group with the Urban Construction Committee and the Lawmaking Work Office of the SC, and then required the High Court to send a detailed report, in order to find out the facts. Convinced by the reliable testimonies and witnesses offered by the report, the Investigation Group suggested that the Chairpersons’ Group of the SC support the decision by the High Court. Consequently, the SC passed a decision to order the Housing Bureau to enforce the court order. On May 10, 1989, the Housing Bureau sent a report to the SC, restating its rejection of the court order. After an additional investigation by the Joint Group was finished, the SC reconfirmed its decision and once again ordered the Housing Bureau to follow the court decision, along with instructions from the leader of the SC: ‘It will be a violation of law, if it is not solved immediately according to the court decision.’ Under the supervision and pressure of the MPC, the Housing Bureau finally returned the house to Mr. Li (Zhang 1992b: 87–92). Like the surrendered KMT officers, the peasants in China have long been victimized in terms of private property rights and few dared to speak out

198

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

against property infringement. The contracting system brought by Deng’s reforms justified peasants’ claim over private property and the PCs have also actively provided assistance to the establishment of property rights in the countryside, for example, helping to solve conflicts over land surrounding the house. One case happened in Hebei Province, courts at four levels could not resolve the conflict over land and house. After a series of judicial actions were brought at several levels and the conflict remained unsolved, the Hebei PPC had to intervene. The SC required the High Court to review the case and to report its opinion. When this did not work, the SC decided to conduct an on-site investigation, joined by the judges from the High Court. Based on the new findings by the SC, eventually, the High Court had a second decision that overthrew the previous decisions and solved a marathon dispute (Zhang 1992b: 78–80). Entering the 1990s, as the wind of the market economy swept inland provinces, some entrepreneurs and intellectuals made money by selling their services. But many of them were sent to jail by the courts for their earnings. In several cases in Qinghai, Tibet, and Yunnan, the PPCs had to intervene and ordered the courts to review their decisions. Under supervision from the PPCs, several publicized cases were overthrown and the innocent entrepreneurs were set free (Quanguo 1992c: 190–8). These cases seem to be disputes over trivialities. But when put together, actually they reflect one of the most exciting transitional processes taking place in today’s China. The PCs have realized the importance of this transition regarding property rights and, therefore, have tried to highlight some cases and arouse people’s awareness of property rights. Assisting the enforcement of contracts To protect property rights, contracts must be respected. But this has been another daunting challenge for Chinese society. Due to a lack of tradition of respecting contracts, defecting, cheating, and shirking behaviors have occurred quite often; and because of local protectionism, some local governments and courts have been unwilling or unable to help enforce them. A corollary to the creation of property rights is that contract procedures and the enforcement of contracts naturally have attracted the attention of the PCs. For example, in 1988, the PPCs nationwide conducted inspections on the enforcement of the ‘Law of Economic Contracts’ and the ‘Law of Foreign Economic Contracts.’ The Guangdong PPCSC dispatched nine groups respectively headed by the chairman, seven vice-chairpersons, and one vice governor. Under their leadership were 580 sub-groups, consisting of 1,000 municipal and county officials, 785 cadres, and 2,891 PDs at various levels. They went to 1,500 departments and units, 3,300 economic enterprises, inspected more than 140,000 economic contracts, corrected some law-breaking activities, recovered some economic losses, and popularized the idea of economic contracts. In Zhejiang Province, the inspections organized by the PPCSC helped

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 199 recover 270 million yuan in overdue payments and about 13 million yuan in overdue foreign loans (Y. Zhang 1993: 1080–1, 1154–5). A case in the late 1980s in Hebei Province was representative of the work done by the PPCs. In July 1988, Mr. Zhang Jutang, director of the Seeds Supply Center of Nankaihe Village, Chi County, signed a contract to purchase seeds of 5,018 yuan from Mr. Liu Chunjing, Chief of the Vegetable Seeds Department in the Center of Agricultural Technology Propagation of Dingzhou Municipality. But Mr. Zhang received rotten seeds. After several fruitless contacts with Mr. Liu, requesting him to replace them with good quality seeds, Mr. Zhang decided to use a small trick and signed another contract with Mr. Liu for some other seeds of 10,568 yuan. After delivery, Mr. Zhang only paid 3,000 yuan to Mr. Liu in order to force him to replace the rotten seeds. Mr. Liu went to the Municipal Procuratorate of Dingzhou, accusing Mr. Zhang of swindling. The Municipal Procurator summoned Mr. Zhang to Dingzhou by lying that the Procurator was investigating Mr. Liu’s crime of bribery and needed Mr. Zhang’s cooperation. Upon Mr. Zhang’s arrival, the Procurator arrested and detained him in Mr. Liu’s residence for 13 days, beating and humiliating him. Not until his accountant paid the remaining amount of money was Mr. Zhang released. On December 6, 1988, Mr. Zhang reported his complaints to the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC) of the Hebei PPCSC. The PLAC took it seriously and immediately ordered the Provincial Procuratorate to review and verify the case. After five months, the Provincial Procuratorate forwarded a report concerning ‘the crime of swindling by Mr. Zhang’ written by the Municipal Procurator of Dingzhou, in which it admitted some negligence but denied most charges. To avoid delay and red tape, the PLAC convened a conference participated by the relevant officials from the Procuratorates of the provincial, municipal and county levels. On this conference, the Provincial Procuratorate was ordered to investigate the case again. After another five months, it finished a new report that still failed to give convincing reasons for its decisions. Finally, the PLAC decided to send its own officials to Mr. Zhang’s county for investigation. After several meetings, the PLAC concluded that this was a case of abusing power, practicing local protectionism, and violating human rights. The Municipal Procuratorate had damaged the reputation of the Party and the judicial organizations. The PPCSC requested the Provincial Procuratorate to punish the involved officials for this behavior. Later these instructions were followed, and the officials of the Municipal Procuratorate of Dingzhou were dealt with severely (Zhang 1992b: 25–9). As this case illustrated, in disputes over economic contracts, some local governments and judicial organizations support local interests and make biased decisions; because of the same local protectionism, sometimes, even a correct decision is made, but is not enforced. In July 1986, the High Court of Shanxi abrogated a contract between two companies from Shanxi and Shandong as a fraud and awarded a return of the payment to the company in

200

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

Shandong. But an Agricultural Bank branch in Taiyuan, Shanxi diverted the payment to write off the debt that the company in Shanxi owned to it. The company in Shandong could not get back its money. The High Court sought support from the PPCSC for the enforcement of the decision. The General Bureau of the Shanxi PPCSC invited the responsible leaders from the Taiyuan MPCSC, provincial and municipal courts, and the Agricultural Banks at the provincial, municipal, and branch levels to hold a work conference. Coordination and mediation by the PPC officials helped achieve a consensus among the participants: the contract dispute between two companies and the unpaid debt between the Shanxi company and the Agricultural Bank were two different issues. As a victim of an invalid contract, the company in Shandong should get a full refund. Within one week, the Bank released all 450,000 yuan to the company (Zhang 1992b: 93–4). Because of a lack of systematic information, it is difficult to gauge exactly the extent to which the PCs have assisted the enforcement of contracts. But according to statistics from Guangzhou municipality, the impact of PCs is herein enormous. Two years after ‘The Contract Law’ was implemented in December 1981, a survey was conducted in one district of Guangzhou on 2,400 contracts. Only six of them met the criteria of ‘The Contract Law.’ In that year, 4,200 disputes broke out over illegitimate contracts and caused more than 46 million yuan of economic losses. In 1986, the Guangzhou MPCSC drafted the first local statute of economic contracts and the Guangdong PPCSC passed it. This local contract statute has provided guidance to contracting activities. After several years of contract law propagation, in 1989, Guangzhou had another survey. Among 4,200 contracts selected for examination, there was only one invalid contract (Zhou 1991: 101–3). Guangzhou has moved ahead of many other provinces, so we cannot generalize that these provinces have had the same achievement as Guangzhou. But it is safe to say, during the 1980s, the use of contracts to guide economic activities had become an important characteristic of the Chinese economy. This great achievement to a large extent could be attributed to the activities of PCs at all levels. Supervision over government China, both traditional and under communist rule, has been regarded as a typical rent-seeking society by public choice economists (Buchanan et al. 1980; Tullock 1987 and 1989). A rent-seeking society is characterized by ‘resource-wasting activities of individuals in seeking transfers of wealth through the aegis of the state’ (Buchanan et al. 1980: IX). The institutional reason for rent-seeking activities lies in the interference with the economy by the state. State intervention (including regulation, monopoly, and so forth) creates monopoly profits, opening the door to rent-seeking behavior. As the proportion of the state-controlled economy is larger, most likely its rent-seeking activities are more widespread. As China started its

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 201 economic marketization, despite the theory that the competitive forces of a mature market economy often decrease rent-seeking activities, in China’s transition from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented one, rentseeking activities have flourished. Actually, as the CPC is the major obstacle to the further empowerment of Chinese PCs, another set of ‘CPC issues’ (Corruption, Pollution and Crime) is a major problem in today’s Chinese society. There are several key factors that explain this sudden surge of rent-seeking activities. Under the Maoist planned economy, the state had a monopoly over most important economic transactions. Although the state bureaucracy as a whole had unlimited access to collecting monopoly rent from state-controlled economic sectors, it left little opportunity for individual officials to transfer wealth into their own pockets. The tough political control deterred officials from such behavior. As a result, a powerful rent-seeking state was characterized by the relative absence of rent-seeking officials. However, marketization resulted in looser government control over society as well as its own bureaucracy. As the old norm of ‘serving the people’ is replaced by new rule of ‘to get rich is glorious,’ rules and laws were at best vague. Developing a market economy also offered more new opportunities to government officials to seek rent. When privatizing and transferring state ownership to the private sector, marketization generates many new issues, such as who should first get franchises, licenses, and special concessions from the government to establish business, to import and export, and to take over state-owned enterprises, and so forth. Officials have lesser punishments to fear and more loopholes to exploit. Exploiting these new opportunities, more Chinese officials have engaged in rent-seeking activities, such as taking bribes; accepting gifts; soliciting kickbacks; imposing arbitrary fees upon business-people, economic enterprises, and peasants; and transferring state property and capital to overseas, and registering them under the names of their children (Lu 1999; Manion 2004; Sun 2004). Rampant rent-seeking behavior by state officials could produce two serious consequences. First, the incentive of entrepreneurs to do business could be stifled. Second, people’s discontent with the government could mount up and a crisis of political legitimacy could break out. In the 1989 political crisis, the theme of anti-corruption and cleaning up ‘official profiteering’ rather than the slogan for democracy mobilized the Chinese masses nationwide. Because the current communist regime in China has based its legitimacy upon the performance of economic development, to effectively minimize rent-seeking behaviors is not only a consideration of the reduction on transaction costs for business people; it is also a political imperative for reducing the risk of governing. Therefore, the PPCs with support and encouragement from the Party have asserted their powers actively in the supervision of government. Liu Zheng, Deputy General Secretary of the NPCSC, relates the supervisory role of PCs to the market economy and anticorruption:

202

State failure, market failure, and PPCs In the process of developing a socialist market economy, supervision, especially by the organs of state power, should be further strengthened. This is because the old system has not completely receded from the historical stage, the new system has not been fully completed, the government function has not finished its transformation (from directly commanding economy to an indirect macro-management); under such circumstances, the freedoms arising from the development of a market economy could be abused by some people in power and enable them to seek colossal profits under the aegis of power. If supervision is forceful, law enforcement is rigorous, a variety of illegal behaviors, for example, embezzlement and corruption, could be deterred. For these reasons, the work of supervision by the PCSCs shall be further strengthened. We shall thoroughly comprehend and rigorously enforce the idea of Comrade Deng Xiaoping that clean government depends on the rule of law, in order to improve the mechanisms for supervision, we need to use laws to promote honesty and to punish corruption. (Quanguo 1994: 12)

In the mid-1980s, the economic transition from a command to a commodity economy came to a crossroads; two economic systems coexisted and engaged in a seesaw battle. The friction of the two systems produced severe problems, for example, two parallel prices (state-controlled and market prices) and two sets of employment systems (life employment and contract employment). Taking advantage of the crises of this dual-track system, many state agencies established their own companies and engaged in commercial activities. These ‘bubble companies’ or ‘brief-case companies’ were not involved in production, rather in the process of transaction for state officials to solicit illegal economic profits. Political power, which controlled opportunities, licenses, franchises, and cheap materials under the state-controlled prices, immediately became a gold-touch for government officials to get rich overnight. To clean up official corruption and to calm down popular resentment, in the 1980s the PPCs nationwide started their drives against rent-seeking companies and imposed great pressure upon the governments. For example, in 1985, the Zhejiang PPCSC devoted one whole year to the rectification of companies. It prodded the provincial government to adopt tough policies to discipline government agencies and eliminate illegal companies in the process of economic transactions. As a result, among all 21,272 companies in the whole province, only 7,604 survived the rectification, accounting for 36 percent of the total. However, after two years, the ‘fever of companies’ came back, another 4,737 companies were established. The PPCSC had to pass two resolutions, ordering the provincial government to rectify the companies owned by the provincial government and its bureaus as a starting point and to continue punishing the illegal activities in the economy. Consequently, 3,518 companies were merged or eliminated, accounting for 30 percent of the total (Y. Zhang 1993: 1078–9).

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 203 In Guangdong Province, the PPCSC also emphasized that the rectification of companies should target those companies sponsored by the provincial government and its subordinate bureaus, and those government officials who took positions in such a company. A company sponsored by the Provincial Agricultural Commission was singled out by some SC members in their inquiry for its illegal operations in 1989. Later, this company was abolished and the manager and deputy-manager were removed. The victory over this typical case removed a stumbling block to the efforts of rectifying companies and deepened the campaign against illegal economic enterprises. After one year, among 42,033 companies subject to examination, 13,486 (accounting for one-eighth of the total number) were merged or closed (Y. Zhang 1993: 1157). In 1988, the Xinjiang ARPCSC also kept the pressure on the regional government through conducting investigations, organizing inspections and listening reports from the government. Prodded by the ARPCSC, the regional government systematically evaluated 1,170 companies established after 1986. As a result, 551 (47 percent) companies were closed, and most of 173 companies sponsored by the Party, government organizations were closed, too (Quanguo 1992c: 184–5). In Hunan, the rectification campaign had gone further – a special investigation commission was established, removal proceedings were started, and a vice governor was dismissed by the PPCPDs for his incompetence (see Chapter 7). In the first two decades of reform, ‘company rectification drives’ were one of the major achievements of the PPCs. However, as the Chinese economy has gradually moved to a market economy, this phenomenon has gradually faded out and lost its notoriety. There has been another issue so tenacious that it has remained one of the predominant priorities for the PPCs’ agenda for a long time, namely their engagement in the control of ‘three arbitraries’ (‘sanluan’ including ‘arbitrary fines, arbitrary fees, and arbitrary apportionment’) and the ‘four excessives’ (‘siduo’ including ‘excessive fund-raising and apportionment, excessive fees in exchange for exempting from labor, excessive extra fees, and excessive village management fees’). Undoubtedly Deng Xiaoping’s reforms of the contract system in rural areas and marketization in urban areas greatly benefited thousands and millions of peasants and entrepreneurs. But at the same time, many government officials also have tried to use all kinds of pretext to steal away their incomes. Although the central government has reiterated for a long time that all kinds of fees imposed on peasants should not exceed 5 percent of the last year’s per capita net income, and the burden placed on enterprises should be controlled, the problem of excessive fees upon peasants, entrepreneurs, and economic enterprises has never been effectively controlled. For example, in Jiangxi Province, to get a marriage license, a couple had to pay the following fees: registration fee, license fee, fee for the cost of registration forms, physical examination fee, pre-marriage education fee, insurance for the unborn child, fund for a children park, insurance fee for gold marriage, deposit for family-planning, health fee for the mother and child,

204

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

deposit for marital fidelity, fee for planting trees, and so forth, the total ranging from 100 to 300 yuan. According to the government statistics in Jiangxi, from 1983 to 1989, the per capita net income of peasants increased 127 percent; in contrast, the increase rate of collective deduction allowed by the contracts was 338.1 percent, which far exceeded the increase rate in peasants’ income (Jiangxi Renda 10/1992: 4–5). Peasants complained that after one year’s hard work and sale of grain, ‘you still have a money-losing deal’ (JXRD 10/1992: 6). In Hunan, another big agricultural province in China, the situation was even worse and the old tragedy that ‘exorbitant taxes and levies are fiercer than tiger’ was repeated during the early 1990s. One peasant in a village expressed his complaints to the work team that had come to collect money; he was fined a 100-yuan fee for ‘shooting off his mouth.’ Pan Qunying, a peasant woman in Xiangxiang, could not bear the heavy taxes and levies, thought life was worthless, and committed suicide by jumping into a pond (HNRD, 06/1993: 8–12). For constructing a new office building a district Public Security Bureau in Qiyang County raised funds by forcing peasants to pay fees in all forms, but it still had a shortage of 100,000 yuan. At the year end of 1992, the district party committee and government decided to launch a ‘comprehensive’ drive for public order, intending to collect money by imposing fines upon those people who had violated regulations of public order, such as gambling, fighting, and practicing superstitious activities. Based on false information, a female villager was chosen as a target. On New Year’s day of 1993, the township head and the secretary of party discipline inspection committee led a group of more than 20 people to villager Peng Manxiu’s house to collect fines, including an extra 100 yuan for ‘calling her house.’ Peng refused to pay for the ungrounded charges and the government officials decided to confiscate her windmill and chicken coops she had woven for sale. They also took her pig away as fines. Peng’s husband Gao Xianming was so angry and frustrated, on January 5, he drank poisonous farm chemicals and killed himself. There can be no more tragic cases than what happened in China’s countryside to illustrate how local states have become so predatory and local state officials have become bandits who rob ordinary powerless peasants (Bernstein and Lü 2003). State-sponsored banditry at the local level is an example of localized state failure. If it cannot be effectively controlled to a reasonable level, a market economy and contractual society could not be established. Even worse, because not all peasants are as passive as Pan Qunying and Gao Xianming who killed themselves quietly, many peasants, when they have the opportunity, tend to rebel. In Renshou County, Sichuan Province in the early 1990s, the peasants rebelled against excessive taxes and levies, looting and burning official buildings. These types of threats pose a severe challenge to the maintenance and operation of a developmental state. Because of these reasons, both the central state and provincial authorities are concerned with the behavior of local state officials.

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 205 To prevent the abuse of power at the local level, the PPCs have actively involved themselves in the issue of peasants’ and enterprises’ burdens and played a role of remonstrator on behalf of peasants and entrepreneurs. As the Chairman of Fujian PPCSC Chen Xu argues that the problem of setting up inspection stations and of arbitrarily fining is obstructing the development of a market economy. To resolve this problem, Chen Xu believed that ‘[w]e should increase the transparency of law and strengthen public oversight. If the relevant laws and regulations are the monopoly of a few people, they do not make for observance of the law by the public and permit the abuse of law for the private benefit of the few’ (Lyons and Nee 1994: 163). The Jiangxi PPCSC adopted a local statute in 1990 to regulate the fees peasants should pay. But the most common practice for the PPCs was the supervision of law enforcement at the local level. For example, in May 1987, six municipalities in Hunan (Changsha, Hengyang, Zhuzhou, Xiangtan, Yueyang, and Shaoyang) jointly adopted a regulation concerned with imposing new fees for the construction of public facilities. Once this regulation was enforced, within less than two months, more than seven million yuan were collected. Eleven universities wrote a report to the PPCSC, asking for a repeal of the regulation. The Financial and Economic Committee of the PPCSC investigated the issue; the SC conducted several discussion meetings, found it in conflict with some central provisions and ordered the provincial government to invalidate the regulation. Under the supervision of the PPCSC, the provincial government summoned the mayors of the six cities and made a decision to repeal the regulation for new fees. All collected fees were returned to the enterprises (Jilin 1989: 192–3). After several tragic cases were exposed, the Hunan PPCSC was pushed by its own members and PDs to take more aggressive measures. It convened a special meeting to discuss this problem. The SC also dispatched its members to conduct an investigation and tightened its supervision over the enforcement of central and provincial laws, regulations, and policies at the local level. From October 18 to 28, 1994, the Hunan PPCSC organized an inspection delegation, drawing members from the PPCSC, the NPCPDs, the PPC staff members, and the provincial government and its agencies. The delegation sent groups to 14 regions and cities to listen to people’s complaints and to prod local governments to follow the law. In responding to the widespread complaints from the masses about arbitrary fees, fines, and apportionment from the governments at all levels, in December 1990, the Shandong PPCSC passed a resolution on resolutely stopping arbitrary fees and fines and ordered the provincial government to clean up existing items. Following the resolution, the provincial government established a leading group, made a clean-up plan, and started another across-the-board examination of all items of fees, fines, and apportionment. To keep pushing on the government, the SC later conducted its own inspection in May 1991. After one year’s work, the provincial government suspended 117 items of arbitrary fees, fines, and apportionment; other local

206

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

governments abolished 456 items of their own. Overall, a total of 600 million yuan was cut for the enterprises and individuals. To emphasize their effort in the rural areas, the SC further passed the ‘Act of Lessening the Burden of Peasants in Shandong’ (Y. Zhang 1993: 1120–1). These actions protected the interests of economic enterprises, peasants, individual industry, and household commerce and promoted the local economy. In Heilongjiang Province, in the late 1980s, the PPCSCe passed ‘Regulations Concerning the Burden of Peasants,’ ‘Regulations Concerning Imposing Fees and Raising Funds,’ and ‘Regulations of Urban and Rural Trade Management’ to solve the problem of ‘three arbitraries.’ By following these laws, the provincial government abolished many programs and fees imposed upon enterprises and peasants, saving at least 123 million yuan for the enterprises and 153 million yuan for peasants (Y. Zhang 1993: 1062). In Guangdong Province, starting in 1985 when some PDs submitted motions for solving the problem of ‘three arbitraries,’ the PPC chose the control of excessive fees as its work priority. The PPCSC sent investigative groups to seven municipalities, regions and provincial government agencies to inspect the problem, and at the same time, encouraged the PCs at local levels to conduct their own investigations and inspections. Under the pressure from PCs at all levels, the governments abolished many fee items. For example, the provincial government established its ‘Office for Controlling Three Arbitraries’ and examined 10,381 items of fees. As a result, 3,081 inappropriate fees were abolished, 2,301 fees were lowered down. With regard only to walking-tractors, 13 kinds of fees were abolished, lowering the fees for a walking tractor from 700 yuan to 200 yuan. Because Guangdong had 200,000 walking tractors, it annually saved 110 million yuan for the peasants (Y. Zhang 1993: 1154). Despite these efforts, it is difficult to say that the phenomenon of a predatory state at local levels has been totally controlled. The PPCs have limited human and financial resources to monitor every village and activity. But actions and legislation from the PPCs at least have two important impacts. First, they have demonstrated for the LPCs how to supervise government agencies and control their predatory behavior and rent-seeking activities. Second, they have provided support and justification to popular resistance to the government for excessive fees and taxes. Only when the LPCs have become assertive enough to supervise governmental behavior, and when the public is politically competent enough to fight for their interests and rights, can the predatory state be stopped at the local levels, and can a developmental state be maintained. For China, it still has a long and rocky way to go. Supervision over judicial organizations If an efficient market economy has to be created and maintained, an efficient legal system is needed, too. When the legal system is efficient, it means that the legal system knows when and how to be involved or not involved in

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 207 which issues. To overcome these obstacles to a market economy, state intervention, especially from the legal system, is needed to provide assistance to the development of a market economy. However, this does not mesh with traditional Chinese legal theory. Historically, the legal system has always recognized the need to pursue criminal cases and to protect the interest of the state and officials, but has been lax in civil and economic cases concerning the economic interests and property rights of common people. It has been a relatively efficient ‘sitting-tiger’ for the state office (yamen), but a bad ‘watch-dog’ for people’s rights and liberties. This tradition still remains and is reflected in the following cases in which the legal system failed badly to respond to conflicts arising from the new situation of creating a market economy (Lubman 1999; Peerenboom 2002). To a large degree, the PPCs have had to develop new legal responsibilities and to educate officials in the legal system to new requirements. In the process of marketization, the Chinese legal system was inadequate in three areas. First, the judicial organizations in the legal system were ill equipped to deal with economic crimes and contract conflicts. They were unwilling to take these cases and tried to kick them back to each other. As a result, it was difficult to file a lawsuit. For example, a farmer from Hebei invested in Tianjin to open a factory, after he put in 20,000 yuan but when he got a truck of scrap iron and waste product, he realized that he had been taken in. He decided to seek help from the legal system. In the following 97 days (from June 16 to September 19, 1987), he went to the public security bureaus, procuratorates, and courts at the municipal and district levels more than 20 times, and no organization was willing to handle his case. At last, he decided to write letters to the Tianjin MPCSC and the Party newspaper, The Tianjin Daily. Ma’s letter caught the attention of the leaders of the Tianjin MPCSC. They ordered the Municipal High Court to examine and handle the case, and report the results to them. Later, The Tianjin Daily wrote an internal report based on Mr. Ma’s letter and circulated it among the leaders. The SC Chairman read the report and ordered the PLAC of the SC to solve the problem immediately. The PLAC contacted the Municipal High Court and ordered it to handle the case and report the results to the MPCSC. The High Court ordered a district C court to take the case. The problem of how and where to file a lawsuit for a peasant was finally solved (Zhang 1992b: 117–23). From this typical case, we can see to what extent the legal system has failed to adjust itself to the new situation of a market economy. It has not provided clear and adequate channels to resolve economic disputes, the officials within were unable to deal with these new types of conflicts and decide their own jurisdiction. If such evasion of responsibility and bureaucratism are allowed to continue, the development of a market economy could be bogged down. The leaders of PPCs have realized this danger. Because their legitimacy is associated with public support, they have been more responsive to popular demands and take more consideration of the general efficiency of

208

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

the system instead of parochial departmentalism. Therefore, they were able to prod the judicial organizations to change in accordance with new economic developments. Judged by this point, the PPCs have helped the whole system find some remedies for its failures. Second, even when a lawsuit is accepted and heard, conflict between the court, procuratorate, and the public security bureau often produces delays. It is difficult to make a decision and many cases have been pigeonholed for many years. For example, also in Tianjin, a case happened in 1980 and was delayed for more than three years without judicial decision. The party committee and the Tianjin MPCSC suggested that the PLAC of the SC intervene in order to facilitate the legal process. The PLAC organized its own investigations, held hearings on much evidence, and listened to reports from the court and procuratorate. Under the judicial supervision of the PLAC, the court at last made its decision and announced its verdicts in May 1984. Seven cadres and businessmen involved in bribing and embezzlement were sentenced to jail, with terms ranging from two to 15 years (Zhang 1992b: 67–77). Third, after a judicial decision is made, the executive branch often refuses to enforce it or enforces it in a sloppy way. Justice is still difficult to achieve. Sometimes the courts could not enforce their decisions and had to resort to help from the PPCs. Our previous case in Shanxi Province illustrates that even the High Court sometimes lacks power to enforce its court order. The case of ‘review and assessment system’ The ‘review and assessment system’ (RAS, pingyi zhidu) enables the PDs to supervise the comprehensive and various specific works of the government, the court, and the procuratorate (yifu liangyuan), and the individual performance of those officials appointed by the PCs. Depending upon who the reviewers are, who is reviewed, and how the review is conducted, there are ‘two reviews’ (liangping): conducted by the PCSC members and PDs, the ‘review of work’ (gongzuo pingyi) focuses upon the overall work of one organ or a special topic related to several government offices and law enforcement agencies. The Table 6.7 Local statutes concerning state behaviors (November 1979–July 1990) Statute type

49 items

General Supervision Supervising the Government Supervising the Judiciary and Procuratorate Regulation on Imposing Fines and Fees Lessening Peasants’ Burden Protecting People’s Complaints and Written Accusations

12 3 3 22 3 6

Source: Huang 1991.

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 209 ‘review of report’ (shuzhi pingyi), conducted exclusively by the members of the PCSC at various levels, may meet face-to-face for an oral presentation by those under review or simply consider a written presentation. The RAS is an excellent example of how the PPCs utilize their central position between the NPC and LPCs to pick and choose innovations from below, then to apply to their own work, and finally to impact the national politics. In 1986, the revised Local Organic Law gave new authority for the township PCs to supervise their appointed officials by practicing review and assessment. The LPCs improvised the RAS. In Shandong and Liaoning, the RAS stayed out of the spotlight but evolved after 1986. In 1988, China’s most productive year of political reform, 28 PPCs or their SCs passed local statutes providing for legislative supervision, specifically calling for the RAS. Thus the new institutional practice received legitimacy from local statutes. Meanwhile, as the system spread to more locations, its review targets initially included the government and judiciary at the county and provincial levels and later trickled down to township governments and village committees. Interestingly, the RAS achieved growing legitimacy during the tumultuous year of 1989. The CCP realized that it could not survive another 1989style challenge, concessions had to be made, if not to its people, at least to the PDs. This gesture was indicated in the March 1990 Party Resolution, which ‘brought a spring weather to the work of legislative supervision’ (Quanguo 2000b: 85). The Internal and Judicial Committee of the NPC convened meetings in Henan in 1991 and in Liaoning in 1992 to summarize local experiences and to popularize the RAS nationwide (Zhang 1996: 48). In a speech to a national work conference on PCs in July 1992, Peng Chong, then First Vice-Chairman and Secretary General of the NPCSC, announced its official endorsement and acceptance of this system. He said: In recent years, LPCs have conducted their work very actively, accumulated many experiences and lessons, and created some fine institutions. For example, numerous provinces and cities organized their people’s deputies to review the government, the court, and the procuratorate and have achieved positive effects. Practices have proved that this institution is a good format created by the people for constructing a socialist democracy, a good channel for deputies to do their jobs and to exercise their supervision, and an important mechanism to strengthen ties with the masses and to maintain a clean government. (Cited in Du 1998: 59–60) During the 1990s, while Qiao Shi and Li Peng, two NPCSC chairmen, intensified the legislative supervision over the executive branch, the PPCs started to institutionalize the practice of review and assessment by writing it into local statutes and passing specific statutes. From 1989 on, explicit clauses about ‘review and assessment’ appeared in the statutes of legislative

210

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

Table 6.8 The practice and frequency of review and assessment at the provincial and county levels (30 provinces and 76 counties) Year

Provincial level Gov’t

B. 91* 4 1991 28 1992 25 1993 21 1994** 7

County level

Court

Procu.

Total Parti. Gov’t

Court

Procu.

Total Parti.

5 9 4 5 2

4 6 4 4 2

13 43 33 30 11

55 16 30 20 12

44 14 30 13 9

237 97 338 122 93

6,432 138 6,019 67 5,642 278 5,120 89 2,350 72

9,243 8,285 34,949 10,250 12,915

Source: Quanguo 1995: 332. Notes * Before 1991. ** For the first half of 1994. Gov’t = Government; Procu. = Procuratorate; Parti. = Number of participants (including ordinary PDs as well as the members of PCSCs). This is a survey conducted by the News Bureau of the General Bureau, NPC in June–August 1994.

supervision for sixteen provinces. Meantime, the PPCs in Shaanxi, Shanxi, Anhui (all in 1995), Guangdong, Liaoning, Hunan, Sichuan (all in 1996), Chongqing, Jiangxi (both in 1998), Guangxi (1999), Xinjiang (2000), and Hainan (2001) all passed specific statutes of review and assessment (Ying 2003: 356–8). In 1996, the PPCSCs conducted reviews of work reports in more than twenty provinces (Quanguo 1997b: 207–8). By 2002, all the PPCSCs in China except Tibet’s had applied the RAS to supervise the work and the officials of the government, court, and the procuratorate at the provincial level. The RAS often runs through four stages: preparation, investigation and information gathering, review and assessment meeting, and rectification and reform. Oftentimes, the officials could not easily breeze through them. In a preparation meeting for the review of a bureau director of justice in Jiangsu Province, Huang Mengfu, Vice-Chairman of the PPCSC (1999–2003), set the tone: The review and assessment by the PPC should be in-depth as cutting three inches into the wood. We should not stay on, speaking palatable words. We should make the reviewed feel as if they have had a hot shower. Let them sweat. Let their faces turn red. We have no intention to negate their achievements; but we want them to realize their shortcomings and to discover their problems in the process of review. We want to help them improve their work style and enhance the level of quality. To make every individual and every department feel shocked does not hurt. The PCs should be ready to take some risks in their review. (JSRD 05/04/02)

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 211 In describing one review of two bureau directors in the Hunan PPCSC in 1994, the reporter wrote about the responsible leaders of the provincial government sitting in a row: ‘Today they seem to have gone back to their student years: sitting up properly, listening with respectful attention, and only occasionally exchanging whispered comments’ (RMZY 02/1995: 12). Another report about a review session in the Shanghai PPCSC in 2001 wrote about the director of the Council of Economy and Trade as follows: ‘He carefully opens his 24-page work report to sum up his work during the past three years, to deliver an answer sheet to the SC members, and to accept their review and assessment’ (NPC News 08/20/01). Sometimes the officials have to run the gauntlet in the review process. After reading the written work report and listening to the oral presentation, the SC members and deputies ask questions, make comments, and look for solutions and promises about how the work will be improved. One Shanghai bureau director talked about his experience as ‘real and authentic:’ ‘I as if felt muscle and bone were hurt; I sweated’ (Shanghai 2001). For some, ‘their faces blushed, and palpitations accelerated’ (Cao et al. 1996: 225). In his study, An Chen (1999: 208– 10) viewed the RAS as one of many methods that the LPCs have improvised to ‘torture’ the governments during the past decade. When going through these ‘ordeals,’ some officials were found to ‘tremble out of fear’ before the ‘review and assessment’ sessions. Review sessions often conclude with a vote of confidence. In final judgment, the reviewers respond to officials’ performances to give appropriate grades such as ‘highly satisfied (or qualified),’ ‘satisfied,’ ‘not satisfied,’ and ‘extremely unsatisfied.’ In some places, the results are placed into the dossiers of the reviewed for consideration regarding future reappointment or promotion. Some PCs openly publish the results as a way to literally ‘issue yellow cards,’ warning and bringing pressure upon the officials that rank low on the list. Later the staffers of the PCs often sort out all criticisms and suggestions and give a laundry list to the reviewed leaders from government and law-enforcement organs. They are required to bring these criticisms back to their units and, within three months, submit a report detailing how they carried out their solutions. In many such dramatic developments, reviews opened the floodgate of frustration and anger from the people’s deputies. Many have resulted in actions of removal. Having made this a clear connection between review and removal, many people in China now expect answers to the questions raised by review and assessment: ‘How many are unqualified? How many are fired?’ (RMRB 10/10/01) The NPC has lent its support to the local PCs for their experiments in legislative supervision and oversight. Early in 1995, Tian Jiyun, First Vice Chairman of the NPCSC and a CPCCC Politburo member, endorsed this bold practice in that year’s NPCSC work report and encouraged LPCs to bring together their experiences and make it better. He said, ‘The reviews reflect people’s voices; they produce more impact than when the disciplinary committee or organization department conducts individual talks.

212

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

Additionally, these reviews provide more information to the Party Committee on how to use the cadres properly’ (Tian 2000: 153). Several top leaders (including Qiao Shi and Li Peng, two past NPCSC Chairmen) have concluded that the NPC should learn from and apply this ‘good innovation’ by the LPCs to national politics (Du 1998: 60; RMRB 04/13/01, 01/17/02, 03/19/01). However, no PC leader is more ardent than Tian Jiyun in advocating the RAS. He made these remarks in 1998: (The Eighth) NPC has made great achievements in legislative supervision, especially in the ‘two reviews’ – the review of the work of the government, court, and the procuratorate as well as the review of law enforcement. In some provinces, vice governors were reviewed; some areas reviewed the courts and the procuratorates. Even some deputy procurators were removed. These actions caused huge shocks and positive effects. In retrospect, they were all accurate, and we have not yet found anywhere where the reviews went awry and ran out of control. To judge it now, the institution of review is a success. If the NPCSC can review one or two ministers of the State Council every year – to review your accomplishments and weaknesses, to give suggestions and criticisms – the impact can be stronger. So I will say, ‘Two reviews’ are very important. We should encourage, popularize, and strengthen them. If we can remove one or two central government officials every year on a national basis, even though they are only a few out of tens of thousands, the shock and impact would be invaluable. (Tian 2000: 315–16; also Xu 2000: 154–5) From Tian’s remarks, we can see a mimetic institutional isomorphism, which means organizations tend to emulate each other when they face the same environmental uncertainty (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 63–9). In this case, the local PCs experimented with an unconventional practice. As it took root in the Chinese political environment and gained legitimacy in political life, the NPC allowed it to nationalize, to expand or socialize into other fields or levels. One encouraging sign is that in the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC National Congress in October 2003, Hu Jintao – the Secretary General – delivered a ‘report of work’ on behalf of the Politburo to the Central Committee, asking for review. The PPCs have actively involved themselves in the activities of legislative oversight and corruption control. The system of PCs has introduced new mechanisms to hold the leaders and government officials more accountable and has allowed political contestations to play a legitimate role in political life. By means of the RAS, the governments at the local level are increasingly accountable to the PCs and therefore, many executives have lost their privileges. In short, this system of legislative oversight, a defining characteristic of legislative bodies globally, has been institutionalized in Chinese politics during the past two decades.

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 213 To compare the PPCs with the government and Party branches, the PPCs are less corrupt in Chinese politics, simply because they are not in control of concrete economic transactions and resources, and there are no lobbying activities by the interest groups to influence lawmakers. But it does not mean that the PPCs are immune from the ‘CPC syndrome.’ In the 1980s, Hu Lijiao, the Chairman of the Shanghai MPCSC was implicated in a scandal after the mass media exposed that his son raped several young women (including some famous actresses). In the 1990s, the Guizhou PPC Chairman, Liu Zhenwei, was forced to step down from the position and was transferred to Beijing after his wife was arrested and executed for embezzlement. Roughly ten years later, another PPCSC Chairman Liu Fangren (who was party secretary too) in Guizhou fell off his position. In August 2003, the former Hebei PPCSC Chairman Cheng Weigao was ousted from the Party and deprived of the privileges for a governor-rank official after eight months of his retirement from the position. Since the 1980s, eight vice-chairpersons were removed from their positions and ousted from the Party for accepting bribes. Most of them were removed from their posts or sentenced to long jail terms (see Table 6.9). All these corruption cases share several characteristics in common. First, the crimes (most commonly accepting bribes) were often committed when they were holding posts in the Party or government offices. Second, as they were nearing the age of retirement and phasing out of the Party and government organizations and were transferred to the PPCs, they wanted to cash in their power before they completely lost it. As one report described the mentality of Han of Qinghai, ‘If you do not use power when you have it, it will be invalid after its tenure. As he grew close to retirement, such a feeling became stronger’ (FLYSH 05/1992: 7). Third, when Party and government officials went to the PPCs, they had fewer resources to block the investigations over their past years and were easier to be targeted. Because anticorruption activities are often intertwined with power struggles, it is hard to say to what extent these activities resulted from democratization. In China, when the PPCs are rather developmental and have good cooperative relationships with the government, the local economy often performs well; usually in poor provinces, a power struggle is more frequent. This is why, when examining the PPCs from the criterion of local developmentalism, the coastal provinces have been pioneers, but in terms of power struggle and political conflict, many inland PPCs have been active (for example, in Guizhou, Qinghai, Hunan, and Sichuan) (see Chapter 7) (Int. WYL-9806). Fourth, almost all of the exposed corruption cases involving PPC leaders were part of the ‘den cases’ (wo’an), which means several ‘beasts’ were found in one case. Tie Yin fell off with Chen Xitong, the Party Secretary and Mayor of Beijing and his half of the leadership. Liu Fangren had decadent predecessors; corrupt colleagues and sycophantic subordinates surrounding him. Qin Changdian was ousted from the Party and brought to court trial with another leader – a vice-chairman of the CPPCC Chongqing committee.

Table 6.9 A list of corrupt PPC leaders (chronological order starting from the most recent date of exposure) Name (date)

Province

Position

Crime and punishment

Cheng Weigao (08/2003)

Hebei

Chairman

Abuse of power, causing economic loss to the state, family corruption and cronyism. Expulsion from the Party.

Liu Fangren (05/2003)

Guizhou

Chairman

Taking bribes (one amounted to 5 million yuan), awarding contracts to his adulteress and her other adulterer, and family corruption. Expulsion from the Party and court trial pending.

Qin Changdian (12/2000)

Chongqing

Vice Chair

Taking bribes, malpractice and negligence causing a total loss of 80 million yuan to the state. Expulsion from the Party and six-month jail term with one-year reprieve.

Yu Fei (10/1998)

Guangdong Vice Chair

Illegally transferring land to a company owned by his children, helping his children speculate land and earn 28 million yuan. Expulsion from the Party.

Xin Yejiang (01/1998)

Hainan

Vice Chair

Taking bribes and stocks. Expulsion from the Party and five-year jail term.

Jiang Dianwu (10/1997)

Hebei

Vice Chair

Taking bribes (amounted 170,000 yuan), protecting gambling, misusing public fund (250,000 yuan) for family members to travel to Hong Kong. Expulsion from the Party and ten-year jail term.

Wei Zefang (06/1996)

Hainan

Vice Chair

Taking bribes (amounted 60,000 yuan). Expulsion from the Party and five-year jail term.

Tie Ying (female) (02/1996)

Beijing

Vice Chair

Taking bribes (amounted 434,300 yuan) and accepting gifts from Hong Kong businesspeople. Expulsion from the Party and 15-year jail term.

Ouyang De (02/1995)

Guangdong Vice Chair

Taking bribes (amounted 512,036 yuan and 16,200 Hong Kong dollars), accepting free house renovation, and awarding contracts based upon personal favor. Expulsion from the Party and five-year jail term.

Han Fucai (01/1991)

Qinghai

Taking bribes (amounted 35,473 yuan and other valuables). Expulsion from the Party and eight-year jail term.

Vice Chair

Sources: Tanguan Dang’an [Profiles of Corrupt Officials] at Zhengyiwang [Net of Justice] (www.jcrb.com), accessed 10/08/2003; FLYSH 05/1992: 2–7; CJ 07/03; RMRI 08/22/03; XHS 07/10/03; RMRB 02/06/96, 02/09/96, 04/20/96, 01/07/97; FLYSH 05/92: 2–7; FZRB 04/29/02.

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 215 Hebei, Guangdong, and Hainan all had double claims in a row in the hall of shame. However, these four points are not presented here to mean that the PPCs have fewer crises than the government; rather, they directly reflect a fundamental crisis of legitimacy to the PPCs. First, the arrangement of PPC personnel has still been a privilege privy to the CPC approval and oftentimes faces little scrutiny from ordinary PDs. Unavoidably, corrupt government and Party officials could easily secure spots in the PPCs. Second, elections within the PCs lack openness and competition and easily turn into manipulations by leaders. For ordinary PDs, the elections that sent them into the congresses are no better than those within PPC meetings; institutionally speaking, they face no pressure from the constituencies to actively exercise their supervisory power in the confirming process of PPC leadership. Cheng Weigao was such a typical example. To make sure that he was going to be elected to the PPCSC chairmanship with a high approval rate, in person he approached the PDs and pressured them to vote for him. In addition, he divided the congress votes into smaller districts and counted the votes based upon each delegation. This made it easier to find out who did not vote for him and made the local party secretaries – often the delegation heads – very nervous. The delegation heads had to work harder to make sure that voting results would not run out of control. The PDs were also deterred and acted more cautiously. This explains why Cheng Weigao’s personal tyranny could not be stopped earlier (CJ 08/22/03). Those failures coming from the PPC side constitute part of the general state failure in China and raise doubts about the possibility that the PPCs could effectively supervise the government and government agencies if the current electoral system does not change and better congressional–electoral connections are not created.

Conclusion A market economy is built upon contractual relationships and property rights, and state actions are needed to ensure these. Otherwise, high transaction costs will undermine growth. To effectively reduce transaction costs and provide better incentives to entrepreneurs, a change in state behavior is a primary factor. First, the state has to have effective control over its officials and agencies, especially at the local level, in order to prevent a predatory state from happening and to maintain a developmental state. Second, the developmental state has to intervene aggressively into the process of market creation, in order to establish laws, rules, and norms for the operation of a market economy and more importantly to socialize them into the whole society. The state must demonstrate its determination through tough action to maintain the market order and protect property rights. Once some high-profile cases have been handled in a proper way, their demonstration effect could be enormous upon the whole society. As these laws and norms become a part of people’s habit and the public unconsciously follows them,

216

State failure, market failure, and PPCs

the cost for the state to maintain a market economy could decrease dramatically. The Chinese PPCs have been engaged in these two sets of activities: they have tried hard to supervise and control the behavior of the state and state officials, especially at local levels, in order to help maintain an effective developmental state, which is an indispensable precondition for a successful economic transition in China. They have also worked hard to pass a variety of laws, some directly related to the creation of a market and by providing a favorable environment for serving the market economy. After many statutes have been passed, they have shifted their focus of work to law’s effective enforcement. In their investigation and inspection of law enforcement, the PPCs, especially their SCs and special committees, have demonstrated their determination to make these laws well known by state officials and the whole society. The PPCs have chosen some very typical cases. By focusing on these very thorny and highly publicized cases, they sought breakthroughs and created ripple effects in the hope of encouraging the LPCs to follow suit and assert their supervisory roles, and educate the public to abide by law. We cannot say that the active involvement of the PPCs in preventing both market and state failures has turned the transaction costs in the process of creating a market economy into zero, but at least, they have been effectively controlled in most places to such an extent that rewards for economic actors have been much greater than the costs they have to pay because of state and market failure. The successful and sustaining economic performance in China and widespread local developmentalism support this argument. Therefore, it is imaginable that if the PPCs had been absent from the economic and regime transition process, the Chinese state might have already degenerated into a predatory state and the market economy would have stagnated. The PPCs have been developmental, but they have not gone to the extent of being directly involved in economic transactions. In contrast, the provincial governments have played the role of entrepreneurs in local development (Zheng 1995). Parliamentary scholars have often agreed that legislatures in Third World countries tend to have more impact on the process of policy deliberation and holding the government accountable to policy, but are more limited in initiating and enforcing policy or rejecting policy from the government. For example, as in India, the parliament has performed a more active role as ‘policy influencer’ than either as ‘policy maker’ or as ‘policy transformer’ (Olson and Mezey 1991: 176). In contrast, the PPCs in China have played a far more significant role in the Chinese political economy, especially in the affairs of local development. We have found that some of the most fundamental breakthroughs for the development of a market economy were first initiated and experimented with by the PPCs, especially when the central government did not have a clear version on one policy area and the innovations by the PPCs did not contradict the general direction of Party policy. Because the Local Organic Law clearly gives the power of decision-making

State failure, market failure, and PPCs 217 on important issues to the PPCs and their SCs, they have been able to involve themselves in the process of policy implementation and law enforcement by conducting inspections, listening to reports, submitting inquiries, and making recommendations to government. In addition, the PPCs and their SCs are able to publicize some issues, mobilize support, and put them on the top priority of government agendas. On some concrete policies, if the PPCs do not agree with the government, the PPCs have been able to prod the government to cease or modify such policies. If the PPCs are certain that their positions are closer to national policy and Party guidelines, their influence upon the provincial governments could be endorsed by the leaders at the central level and become enormous. In the cases we have discussed, the explicit functions of the PPCs are dominantly developmental and market-oriented. However, ordinary citizens have not been very satisfied with them; in particular, people expect the PCs to be more assertive in legislative oversight over the government. According to an online survey conducted by the Chinese NPC News website in 2003 (accessed on 12/10/03), among the 12,880 respondents to its question: ‘At present, what is the most urgent area that the PCs should strengthen their work?’ 63 percent of the respondents thought it should be the work of supervision, in comparison to 29 percent of the answers for legislation and 8 percent for the work of PDs. Therefore, it is important for us to look beneath the explicit developmental functions of the PPCs and to identify some implicit functions that might be indicative of democratization. During the past quarter century, the democratic impact of the PPCs has already become more explicit (as I have already discussed in Chapter 4 on independentminded PDs); this is what we are turning to in the following chapters.

7

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

The system of Chinese People’s Congresses has increasingly attracted scholarly attention and the coverage of mass media in the West mainly for two reasons. Some people have noticed that the PCs have used their power in a more assertive manner and have contested with the government, the judicial branch, and the Party. In contrast, some other people have been more impressed by their achievements in terms of institution building. Consequently, in order to measure how much power the PCs really have, the scholarly studies have clustered into either a power-centered or an institution-centered approach. The former approach attempts to assess the power of China’s PCs by examining their relations over time with other traditionally more powerful institutions – looking for changes, if any. According to Robert Dahl, by allowing for political contestation, competition, rivalry, and opposition, a hegemonic regime can turn itself into a polyarchy (Dahl 1971 and 1973; McLennan 1973). Contestation between China’s PCs and other power institutions within the society, namely, the elite contestation within a power establishment, is significant so that outsiders may grasp the changing nature of Chinese political system, especially as this may impact the issue of democratization. However, some studies have attempted to estimate the power of the PCs by assessing their institutional maturity, the extent of their institutionalization, their legislative activities, access to power resources and staff support, the qualifications of PDs and legislative leaders, their standing among ordinary citizens, and so forth (Lin 1992–3 and 1993; O’Brien and Li 1993–4; Ding 1994; O’Brien 1994a; MacFarquhar 1998). Tensions between these two approaches, which I here summarize as contestation-first versus institutionalization-first, seem to have already been developed among the Chinese legislative studies. For example, in the contestation-first approach, a line of thought goes like this: the primary political resources for the PCs come from popular support, or mandate from the people. Without contested elections and political oppositions, there will be no parliament, a real institution of representation commonly understood by the West. The independence of the PCs gives them more credibility in the eyes of the people and therefore the PCs gain more respect from the Party and other political institutions. The breakthrough for

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 219 the empowerment and the ‘parlimentarization’ of the Chinese PCs most likely will come from their courage, or ‘martyr’s spirit,’ to seek autonomy from and contest the policies with the Party and other political institutions (mainly the executive branch) (Hu 1993; McCormick and Unger 1996: 29– 53; Ding 1998). But in the institutionalization-first approach, another line of thought has been developed as follows. The legislative development mainly depends on two factors: the internal institution building and the external environment. Although popular support constitutes a part of this external environment for legislative development, but it has long been suppressed and cannot be a sufficient, or even the most important part of the external environment. Instead, the long-established powerful institutions (the Party, the executive, the army, and many others) have constituted the most formidable constraint upon the institutional development of the PCs. Provided with this choice-set, the Chinese legislatures may have to realistically accept the ‘trade-offs between autonomy and capacity.’ In other words, a preferable strategy for the organizational development of the Chinese PCs is first to foster rapport with and win attention from the Party and the executive; then, by exploiting the subordination to gain acceptance, the PCs will become fully and deeply embedded into the governing process, and this legislative embeddedness will eventually lead to a really mature parliament in the democratic sense (O’Brien 1994b and 1998). My research question in this chapter derives from the idea that in reality Chinese legislative development seems to have defied a strategy of ‘sequencing’ (either prioritize institutionalization or contestation) and has been characterized by the simultaneity of its institutionalization and legislative contestation, which has been perceived by many parliamentary scholars on the PCs as almost irreconcilable in the early stage of legislative development vis-à-vis a strong party-state. In the very early years, ‘institutionalization’ and ‘legalization’ were taken as guiding principles and urgent tasks in which to conduct legislative development (O’Brien 1990; Dowdle 1997; Tanner 1999). After 1987 when the 13th National Party Congress adopted a program for political reform and the PCs had also become better institutionalized, the PCs started to embrace these new guidelines: ‘If the work of the PCs expects to gain status, it must attempt something worthwhile’ (Renda gongzuo yao you diwei, shouxian jiude you zuowei); ‘Influence is gained as you attempt something, status is improved as you contribute something’ (You zuowei zaiyou zuoyong, you gongxian zaiyou diwei) (Yang 1997: 91, 191, and 150). Reviewing the entire process of Chinese legislative development, institutional development and assertion of power have been intertwined. Then, how do we explain the possibility of this simultaneity? How have the Chinese PCs solved the dilemma of autonomy versus institutional development? Another closely related question is: if legislative institutionalization and contestation have occurred to the PCs simultaneously, why can we not claim that this development amounts to ‘democratization’ or ‘liberalization’ in any sense? (MacFarquhar 1998: 666–7)

220

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

By applying the network approach, which focuses on institutional embeddedness and connectedness, and reciprocity in interactions, I intend to argue for the following two point. First, by weaving institutional linkages among the long or recently established institutions within the system of PCs and with other political institutions, the leadership of the PCs has dramatically increased its political resources; as the cliché goes, the whole is bigger than the sum of the parts. Second, by applying a reciprocal strategy to contestation, which is made possible by these institutional linkages, and as a result of them created the ample channels for communication, the leadership of the PCs at all levels has been able to expand its influence in the decision-making process without turning other political institutions into stumbling blocks to legislative development. Since the issues of institution-building and institutional linkages have been addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, I would like to concentrate here on how the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs) (the analysis could be extended to PCs at other levels) have interacted with other major political institutions under the circumstances of contestation.

Political contestation and its origin Under China’s era of reform, the PPCs have struggled to acquire real power in political life. They have had to contend with resistance from established power institutions, principally, the Party and the government at various levels. If and when dormant and subordinated institutions in the current Chinese political system become emancipated from the CPC monopoly of power and are allowed to assert their full power, then the PPCs will probably not be the first to fully achieve that goal. For this reason, it is important to note that the PPCs have become more independent-minded and rebellious, challenging the Party, the government, and other powerful institutions. Accordingly, there is reason to believe that some fundamental changes are taking place in Chinese politics, mostly unnoticed by outsiders. The focus of this chapter is on the institution-based contestation within the current state structure, which, although it is still a kind of political opposition, is different from other various forms of political opposition, such as fractional opposition, line struggle, popular rebellion, the dissident movement, pressure groups, and opposition parties (Moody 1977). According to the recent studies on Chinese politics, contestation has emerged within the Chinese political system and decision-making process. For example, a group of China specialists have argued that the country’s bureaucratic system and decision-making process (especially in economic affairs) have been characterized by fragmentation in the reform era of Deng’s ascendancy. Communist rule in China is no longer totalitarian; it is, rather, more like ‘fragmentary authoritarianism’ based on bargaining and negotiation, on ‘institutional pluralism’ characterized by ‘competitive persuasion,’ instead of the old coercion in decision-making (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Hamrin and Zhao 1995). Mutual consent and bargaining have come increasingly to characterize the

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 221 relationship between the central authorities and local governments (Zhao 1992; Goodman and Segal 1994). Power in the Chinese political system has been dispersed, if not to the societal organizations and ordinary citizens, at least within the governmental structure. In this chapter I will draw on a body of data that has only recently become available to China scholars to examine the relationship between the PPCs and other power institutions, and to argue that this relationship has gone far beyond bargaining and negotiation. Direct challenge, confrontation, and opposition have begun to appear in the relationship between the PPCs and other power institutions in China, which sets the stage for even more radical changes in the Chinese political system. Generally speaking, there are several factors responsible for the legislative contestation in China. First, according to the 1982 Constitution, the PC system is the most fundamental structure in the Chinese political system. In theory, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest power organ of state power and the LPCs are power organs in their respective administrative units. Executive or government activity is nominally subordinated to PCs at all levels of society. Government is said to be elected by and accountable to the PCs. The ‘communist leadership’ and the PCs as ‘the supreme state organ’ both defined by the constitution – a juxtaposition of PCs as the ‘symbol of law’ in theory and the executive as the ‘symbol of power’ in reality – have created built-in tensions between the PCs and the party-state. Second, under Deng Xiaoping’s reform plan, the PCs at both the national and sub-national levels were increasingly expected by the top leaders (especially Deng himself) to fulfill more functions in order to sustain some of Deng’s major reform policies (e.g., decentralization, marketization, legalization, and integration, and so forth). The Chinese leadership faced a challenge in choosing a specific mode of governance for organizing its national economy. The leadership could persist with the hierarchical control (‘hegemonic regime’ in Dahl’s terminology), for example a Stalinist command economy, or it could adopt a market order (‘polyarchical system’ in Dahl’s terminology) under which more autonomy could be granted to enterprises and individuals (Williamson 1975 and 1996). But China’s Stalinist legacy put Deng in this dilemma: a Stalinist government had been proven a failure (e.g., state failure or bureaucracy failure) in organizing the economy; to salvage the Chinese economy from the failed Stalinist model, a market economy is the only sensible path. But, in order to transform a Stalinist economic system into a market economy, a transformative and developmental state is needed. The state that constituted the part of China’s problem was expected to be a solution. Deng found that more autonomous and independent PCs could help solve this dilemma by facilitating the marketization process through creatively making more laws to regulate the economy. They could also prevent state failure by actively supervising the governments and other state agencies (see Chapter 6). Fitting into the context of Deng’s larger reform agenda, the PCs at the national and sub-national levels have adapted to the new political and economic environment accordingly.

222

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

Third, once the constitution and Deng’s reforms gave the first push to the PCs, they quickly acquired their own lives. Beginning in 1984, some important events helped the PCs at all levels to become institutionalized and expand their power bases. In that year, Peng Zhen, the most powerful dynamo behind legislative development in its early stage, gave speeches to emphasize the importance of LPCs in the construction of Chinese democracy and legal system (Quanguo 1990: 588–91). Old veterans were forced to retire in order to give positions to younger, better-educated leaders; special committees were established within the SCs; staff members were recruited from new graduates out of college. The institutionalization of PCs laid down a foundation for their future power expansion (see Chapters 3 and 5). These changes boosted the morale of people’s deputies (PDs) in the PCs, encouraged their participation and independent thinking, and transformed the working style of the institution. Under these circumstances, the PPCs elected in 1987–8 started attaching real content to the dead letters in the constitution and exercising the power granted to them on paper. The PPCs started a ‘process of re-institutionalization,’ that is ‘the attempt to activate and develop structures that were in place but never achieved or lost value and stability’ (White 1991: 249). Conflict quickly developed between the PPCs and other political institutions. The most high-profile cases of conflict involve the process of selecting major provincial governmental officials. By following Leninist and Stalinist principles, the Party nominated candidates for positions in the government, court, and procuratorate; the PC always ‘rubber-stamped’ the Party’s nominations. However, the Party’s monopoly over personnel (nomenclatura system) began to undergo a change in the 1988 elections as a consequence of the Local Organic Law and Electoral Law laying down two important principles in 1986: ‘one position has more than one candidate’ and ‘the right of voters and PDs (meeting a minimum number of ten) to nominate candidates.’ That the PPCs have vetoed important nominations indicates strong defiance to these governmental officials (see Table 7.1). Because the Party controls the list of nominees, this kind of defiance also rubs the nose of the Party (Chen 1999: 97–124). Around 1988, elections were conducted in China. In 18 provinces, nominees for provincial governmental posts were denied by the PPCs. In Hubei, among 37 nominees, seven were denied; in Hebei and Shanxi, five were denied among 41 and 38 nominees respectively; in Heilongjiang, three nominees for provincial bureau director were rejected by the PPCSC and it caused quite a fuss (Y. Zhang 1993: 1062). Among these provinces, on average, four percent of the nominees were not elected by their PPCs. In Hebei, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai, six candidates sponsored by the Party for vice governors failed to win the support of the PPCs. The Party-sponsored candidate for chief justice in Guangdong and candidates for chief procurator in Henan and Shaanxi lost their elections. In 1993, the Party-sponsored candidates for governor in Guizhou and Zhejiang failed to win the approval from the PPCs. In 1998, the Party-sponsored candidates

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 223 Table 7.1 Rejections of nominations for the provincial governments around 1988 Province Hebei Shanxi Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang Jiangsu Anhui Jiangxi Shandong Hunan Hubei Guangdong Hainan Guangxi Sichuan Yunnan Shaanxi Qinghai Total

Number of candidates 41 38 39 52 43 42 36 33 45 39 37 43 27 35 48 40 41 33 712

PPC rejections (percentage) 5 (12) 5 (13) 2 (5) 2 (4) 3 (7) 4 (1) 1 (3) 2 (6) 2 (4) 3 (8) 7 (19) 2 (5) 1 (4) 1 (3) 2 (4) 4 (10) 2 (5) 1 (3) 49 (4)

Source: Cai 1998: 360. Note These statistics were from 27 provinces; nine of them (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Henan, Guizhou, Gansu, and Xinjiang) did not have rejections.

for vice governor in Hunan, Hubei, Zhejiang, and Anhui could not win the support of their PPCs (Cai 1998: 358–60). In Hunan, in 1998, one candidate for the PPC vice-chairperson and one for vice governor, who were sponsored by ordinary PDs, were successfully elected (Li 2002: 34). Since many Party-sponsored candidates were rejected, among 28 provincial units in 1988 elections, 12 candidates nominated by PDs were elected into important positions: four PPC chairmen, two vice-chairpersons, five vice governors and deputy mayors, and one chief judge of the Provincial High Court (Quanguo 1992b: 289; Cai 1998: 359). In Shanghai, in another case, the MPC had eight nominees for seven deputy mayor positions from the Party. The PDs did not find the composition of candidates satisfactory in terms of their expertise (rural work was not considered) and suggested 16 more candidates. Many delegations from suburbs supported Ni Hongfu, then the director of the agricultural work committee in the municipal government, to be the candidate. In total all 24 names were presented to the PDs for discussion and consultation. The final official candidate list had ten names: eight from Party nominations and two from the PDs’ nominations. In the election, Ni was elected deputy mayor for his rich experience in Shanghai suburban counties and solid work style, and one candidate designated by the Party lost election (Quanguo 1992c: 265–6; Int. CJT-9806). In Anhui, one candidate

224

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

nominated by PDs for vice governor was elected (Y. Zhang 1993: 1090). In Jiangsu, the PPCPDs nominated their own candidate for Chief Judge of the High Court in opposition to the Party-designated nominee. The PPC decided to present both candidates to the PDs for discussion. After hearing the majority opinion, the deputy-nominated candidate was chosen as the final candidate and became the chief judge (Y. Zhang 1993: 1073). Although successful nominations by ordinary PDs and voters (at the county and township levels) have accounted for only a tiny part of all elected officials (for example, in 1988, the PDs sponsored 105 nominees for vice governor-level positions, and only 12 were elected. The elected officials sponsored by PDs accounted for only 2.5 percent of the total positions elected) (Cai 1998: 359), and the deputy-supported candidates largely have been from the Party ranks; the psychological impact of these nominations upon the office holders and the Party bosses at all levels have been enormous. Referring to the unprecedented competitive elections in 1988, one government official commented, ‘The election of a post with more than one candidate made my whole body wet with sweat’ (Han et al. 1989). The Party has certainly paid more attention to screening candidates; the elected officials have to worry about losing an election, and become more attentive to public opinion and more accountable to the PDs. Another important Chinese political tradition has been reshaped: the safe old days are over when the office holders were solely dependent upon their superiors; now they have been held more accountable to the people, although at an unsatisfactory level. The cases involving vice governor and governor in Sichuan and Hunan, which are discussed later, exemplify that today’s Chinese officials sometimes have to pay dearly for their misconduct. The challenges and scrutiny from the PPCPDs could prove fatal to their political as well as physical lives, as two Sichuan leaders tragically discovered. Scholars seem have no trouble agreeing to the fact that contestation has emerged from the more assertive PPCs. What is intriguing and controversial is how to make sense of the empirical data on legislative contestation and to grapple with its theoretical implications. There have been two types of conventional interpretations on the assertive role of the Chinese PCs: the ‘political decay’ thesis treats it as an accidental exposure of the tension between the public discourse and the hidden script of a Leninist party-state and/or as a part of the political decay syndrome, which indicates the deep and total crises of the Chinese Leninist regime (Ding 1994; McCormick 1996). The ‘political democratization’ thesis treats it as the barometer of a ‘mundane revolution,’ or ‘a silent revolution’ toward democracy (Hu 1993; Manion 1996). Instead of choosing any of them, here I would like to present a network interpretation: the legislative contestation should be taken into consideration within the network strategy pursued by Deng’s reforms, which sought to transform the Chinese regime, and by the congressional political entrepreneurs’ attempts to achieve organizational development, and within the network society that emerged in the process of China’s transition.

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 225

The network strategy and mohe society In its political and economic transition, China has shunned away from both the hierarchical and market modes of governance, adopting a hybrid, or the network strategy to organize its political and economic transactions (Castells 1996: 172–90; Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996; Hsing 1998; White 1998; Wank 1999). The network mode of governance is characterized by a complex set of ties among the actors. It can accommodate both hierarchical structures and autonomous actors by linking them together. Since it does not exclude hierarchical control, it retains the strength of a hierarchy to be efficient at integrating different actors and reducing transaction costs to coordinate collective efforts. Because networks can interpenetrate the boundaries of hierarchical organizations, the network mode also provides organizations with channels for learning and communication, and flexibility for adjustment and change. Due to its concern with the rigidities under a Stalinist model (which weaken incentive and innovation), and the autonomy under a market system (which makes coordination for economic development from the state more difficult), as well as its concerns for the transition costs of switching from the former to the latter, coupled with its traditional culture of guanxi (connections), the Chinese leadership pursued a strategy of network capitalism (Xia 2000a). Against this big backdrop of network strategy, the legislative leadership applied this same strategy to legislative development. As a result, the PC system has been conspicuously defined by the ties among the PCs and their multiple linkages with the Party, government, the court, their PDs, the ordinary people, and other social organizations (see Chapter 3). These ties as a whole then define the structural properties of the environment in which the PCs interact with other actors. Therefore, the pattern of this interaction should be understood and interpreted by examining the structural properties formed by the linkages and ties between the PCs and other political actors. Particularly, their interdependent relationship, on the one hand, makes friction and conflict unavoidable; on the other hand, it forces the actors in conflict to keep it within a manageable level. For example, the legislative leaders have constitutional weapons (personnel appointment, legislation, oversight, and decision-making power) to make their will count. In addition, the PCs have developed the review and assessment system (daibiao pinyi zhidu, ‘officials report, the deputies review’) beyond the constitution to evaluate the performances of the officials and to decide their suitability for their jobs. They have developed inspection on law enforcement (zhifa jiandu), scrutiny of individual legal case (ge’an jiandu), and a law enforcement responsibility system (zhifa zherenzhi) to put a check on the government and judicial organs (as we have discussed in Chapter 6). The PCs have also threatened to withhold budgets to make the executive branch blink. But they are also very clear about the fact that most of them have to get their paychecks from their previous governmental departments. Their housing, cars, welfare benefits,

226

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

and many services depend on them, too. Last but not least, they are still living with other Party and government leaders within the same compound and indulge in social activities (such as dancing, practicing taichi every morning) together (Int. CJT-9806). From the perspectives of Party and government officials, the PCs are indispensable for legitimizing their power and integrating the nation. Even though the key leaders within the Party and government have the influence to decide whether some leaders within the PCs will continue to be nominated for the next term, they also know that many of them may want to work there someday when they step down from their current positions within the Party and the executive branch. Their support to the legislative work someday will be their political capital to claim a good spot within the PCs. Besides, the veteran cadres in the PCs may be the political patrons for the younger leaders sitting in the Party and the government under the current selection process. Considering the complexity of these relationships, collegiality is desirable and encouraged. If some actors have not been well socialized into this norm, conflict becomes necessary to establish credibility and deterrence, still, self-restraint, instead of an abrasive manner, most likely features the conflict. The ties and linkages as institutional properties of relationships in Chinese legislative politics determine that the interactions between the PCs and other political actors have been more a process of seeking cooperation through competition, which is conducive to ‘cooperation and harmony’ (hehe, hezuo, and hexie), which the Chinese culture values highly. In other words, although contestation and competition do occur within Chinese legislative development, they are tolerated and sometimes encouraged because of their instrumental value in creating cooperation and harmony, and finally equilibrium. This idea is best reflected in the widely circulated word in China: ‘mohe.’ The word mohe first caught my attention when three Chinese scholars in different places used it to describe the legislative contestation. They especially stressed that after a new round of elections, when new leaders are elected for the Party, the executive branch and the PCs, a mohe period always follows (Int. PXZ-9806, JCR-9806, and QSJ-9806). In contrast to the immediate ‘honeymoon’ between the legislative and executive branches after elections in American politics, which is followed by fist fights and divorce, Chinese leaders start bickering when they are newly wedded. The honeymoon then follows once the storm peters out. If we keep in mind that elections were held in every five years (the recent ones were 1985, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003), it is interesting to notice that the many cases I outline in this book happened immediately after these years when the learning curve for newly appointed officials and newly elected PC members just started. Once I started paying attention to the mohe phenomenon, I have further realized that this term is used by the Chinese to explain the physical world, conjugal relationships (mohe fuqi), family ties (mohe jiating), social interactions (mohe shehui), and even the universe (mohe yuzhou). As one Chinese

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 227 writer puts it, ‘Everything has a process of mohe’ (MHSH 1998: 36). With this point in mind, two statements with regard to legislative contestation can be inferred. First, legislative contestation is the tip of iceberg of the interaction between the PCs and other political actors. Since it is mainly used to achieve harmony, the precedents established by the previous contestation have a deterring effect to convince the other party in imminent conflict to choose a high road and pre-empt new actions. For example, in Fujian Province, within five years (1983–8), the PPC denied or delayed 50 nominees for irregularities in the process of nomination. Under the new PPC (1988–93), the Party Committee actively consulted with Party members within the PPC for opinions even before the nominees were submitted; as a result, friction over personnel nominations declined dramatically (Yang 1997: 265). We have seen fewer conflicts during the latter period, but the PCs did really exercise their power. Second, if the PCs have to choose a low road in order to win respect and to deter future carelessness or arrogance from the Party and the executive branch, they are deliberately paying great attention to the subtleties of how contestation should be dealt with.

Strategies for legislative contestation Since the PCs were latecomers to an already crowded political arena, fighting for respect from the party-state and claiming their own turf are highly risky undertakings that have to be handled with care. Fortunately, for the PCs, during their early stage of organizational development, leadership skill was provided by a large number of veteran CPC leaders who had suffered the spectrum of complex political situations (in particular the Cultural Revolution) and held positions in the Party and government branches, and intellectuals and non-communist party leaders who had learned better how to deal with an authoritarian party-state. More effectively, a variety of strategies have been developed to guide legislative contestation. Creating demonstration effect The PCs tend to impose higher expectations upon themselves in terms of abiding by the constitution and other laws. This has several useful effects. It can establish positive examples for the people and other state organizations. It also strengthens the moral authority of the PCs, allowing them to point out problems within other political actors. For this reason, the PC leaders like to quote an old Chinese saying to their members, ‘To strike iron, first you have to be strong.’ Here is a case where the legislative leaders were highly sensitive to their own behavior and had the courage to redress their own mistakes. In the entire history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the first governor to be removed by the PPC was Ni Xiance, the governor of Jiangxi Province in 1986. The Jiangxi PPCSC made a decision to remove Ni without consulting

228

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

the Plenary Session, after listening to the report on his corruption from the Provincial Party Committee. But, this decision went beyond the authority of the PPCSC and violated the constitution. The NPC pointed out its unconstitutionality, and the Jiangxi PPCSC withdrew its decision and decided to convene the Plenary Session, which has the power to remove a governor. On December 23, 1986, fully supported by the Party Committee of Jiangxi Province and the Central Government, the Fifth Plenary Session of Sixth Jiangxi PPC voted to remove Governor Ni due to corruption and moral degeneracy (Y. Zhang 1993: 1107). This action had symbolic political significance: the Party had to go through the PPC, not the PPCSC to remove a governor (Jilin 1989: 231). Procedural legality has to be respected, even by the Party. Applying selectivity The PC leaders are highly selective in choosing the targets. Peng Zhen once advised the leaders who worked for the PCs, ‘As for the matter regarding the principle of right or wrong, you should be more aggressive in exercising your power. It’s better for the PCs to intervene more than less. As for trivial issues, it is unnecessary to deal with them. It’s better to get involved less than more’ (Sun 1997: 600–2). Because executive officials (provincial governors, mayors, county heads) have been, then and now, nominated by the Party, they have always been the deputy party secretaries in their administrative units. In contrast, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, most chairpersons of the PCs often were not deputy party secretaries, and sometimes not even members of the Party Standing Committee of their administrative units. It was much too easy to view the supervision of the government as supervision over the Party. Hence the PCs tend to be wary of challenging the government but stick to the principle of ‘embedding supervision into support,’ under which support of the government became the best way to supervise it. Peng also once clearly instructed the leaders of the PPCs that whenever the PPCSCs deal with the governments, they should follow this guideline: they are not putting on a rival show. But they are not a ‘rubber stamp in view of the above,’ either (Sun 1997: 601). If the PCs are certain that something is a matter of principle, law, and the national interest, and they have enough reason to intervene, they should use all their efforts and resources to do it, even when their target may be the Party branch. In 1986, Zhang Youyu, an instrumental jurist for the 1982 Constitution and the Local Organic Law, and a vice-chairman of the Lawmaking Work Committee (LMWC) of the NPCSC, once told leaders in the PCs how they should handle their relationship with the Party: As for incorrect policies and guidelines from the Party, should we accept them? Here are two solutions: one is to report your opinion to the party committee. If you are a member of the party committee, you may debate

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 229 and contest at its meeting. If the party committee still insists, what should we do? If the issues involved are not urgent, you may report to the party committee of the higher level and let the superior consider it. If they are urgent, you implement them but keep your opinion, then raise them for debate and contestation. This is allowed. Another solution is to be a ‘hard-bone’ (dauntless and unyielding). If the party committee hurts the interests of the Party and the revolution, you can say, ‘I shall not obey. I do not fear a contest in front of the superior party committee and an expulsion from the Party.’ In this case, you have a confrontation with the party committee. If the disagreement is too important, and the execution of one policy will damage the interest of the Party and the people, you should be a hard-bone. Didn’t Comrade Mao Zedong once say, ‘Don’t fear an expulsion from the Party, don’t fear a divorce!’ But, this measure is too extreme and should not be used casually. (Zhang 1988: 7) But the PPC leaders know that their security margin is wider if they choose fundamental issues as their target. One vice-chairman of the Beijing MPCSC once said, ‘It is worth taking a little risk on the issue concerning principle’ (Yang 1997: 15). Safeguarding the ‘big situation’ The legislative leaders or members can insist on principles, and at the same time be ready to make compromises, if the political situation turns against them. By paying close attention to changes in the situation in order to exploit the law and Party lines, the PPCs can effect oversight over highprofile leaders. Two cases in Sichuan reveal that even in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, political contestation had continued, because, with great courage and political skill, the PPC members could turn the June 4th legacy into a political justification for fighting against corruption, and sustain the development of political contestation. These cases also demonstrate how an individual PD could provide leadership to the collective action against the high-ranking government officials. In 1989, the accountant for the Sichuan Sino-Japanese Taxi Company, a subsidiary of Changjiang Trade Corporation, found that a large amount of money was missing from the account and about US$200,000 were siphoned into the pockets of the general manager of the company, Zheng Liuyi, and his deputy office director, Jin Cheng. Because Manager Zheng used to be the secretary working for the party secretary of Chengdu, the provincial capital, he had a powerful social connection with some important leaders in the provincial and central governments. Jin Cheng was a son of Sichuan Vice Governor Jin Hongsheng, who used to be the Director of the Provincial Foreign Trade Bureau and was still in charge of foreign economic affairs. As

230

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

a subordinate unit to the provincial government, Changjiang Trade Corporation was unable to handle this case, when it faced pressure and resistance from some provincial leaders. In September 1989, Professor Luo Shiying, a member of the Sichuan PPCSC and its Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC), and the legal advisor to the Sichuan Provincial Association of Foreign Trade Promotion (which shares office buildings with the Bureau of Foreign Trade; therefore, Vice Governor Jin and legal advisor Luo used to work under the same roof), started to intervene by bringing the case to the attention of the PPCSC. Before he came to work in Sichuan, Luo once worked in the Fujian PPCSC and was a law professor at Xiamen University (see Chapter 4). To overcome the strong resistance from the government and to get political support from the Center in Beijing, Luo sent a letter to Liu Fuzhi, the Procurator General of the PRC in Beijing, on September 27. Upon returning from his short visit to Australia, Luo collected signatures from some other PPCSC members and filed an inquiry in late November 1989. Meanwhile, Luo’s letter was transferred to Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin and Qiao Shi, the SC member of CPCCC in charge of political and legal affairs. They summoned the Sichuan Party Secretary, Yang Rudai, criticizing the work of Sichuan leaders and prodding him to solve the problem. Under all this pressure, the judicial branch acted immediately, arresting Manager Zheng and Jin Cheng in February 1990, later sentencing them to the death penalty with a two-year reprieve and eight years in jail respectively. At the same time, the PPCSC members were discussing the establishment of a special committee to investigate the misconduct of some government officials. Probably because of stress, humiliation, and anger, three days before the announcement of the verdict, Vice Governor Jin suddenly broke down at a meeting and died unexpectedly in the hospital. As the cliché goes, death pays all debts. The plan for a special investigation committee was dropped (Quanguo 1992c: 201–3; Int. LSY-9605 and LSY-9806). Only three years later, Luo again involved himself into another shocking case of economic crime. This time, it implicated the governor of Sichuan, Xiao Yang. On January 3, 1993, 27 PPCPDs headed by Luo initiated a motion to the Sichuan PPC Fifth Plenary Session, asking for an investigation into the economic crimes and malfeasance of Wei Wenlie, Director of the Board of Chongqing Yufeng International Corporation. Wei had engaged in speculation in foreign exchange, stock, and gold and silver in Hong Kong, incurring a loss of US$18 million to the state. Although Wei’s corporation was located in Chongqing, the Chongqing MPC dared not touch this case, for some officials in the Party and government warned that such an action was a tendency of ‘bourgeois liberalization.’ The major underlying obstacle arose from the fact that these crimes implicated the Sichuan Governor Xiao Yang, who used to be the party secretary and mayor of Chongqing. However, the Sichuan PPCSC decided to submit the motion to the Presidium, and its PLAC also required the Provincial Procuratorate to investigate the case. In

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 231 February after the Spring Festival of 1994, Wei was arrested. In April 1994, the Procuratorate filed a formal charge against him in court. Almost one year passed, and the court still could not decide the case. The delay caused popular resentment and drove the PDs of the new PPC to file an inquiry (at that moment, Luo had left the Sichuan PPCSC for legal practice). On February 18, 1995, the inquiry against the Provincial High People’s Court was carried out in Sichuan PPC, lasting for two hours. The chief judge of the High Court, as well as his assistants and subordinate officials attended the inquiry and gave a detailed explanation. In the end, the PPCSC told the High Court officials to consider the criticisms of the PDs and speed up its procedure. It also indicated its resolve to intensify supervision until this case was adjudicated. After one year passed, no substantive progress had been achieved. In December 1995, some PPCPDs started to target the cover-up by Governor Xiao and attempted to impeach him. In February 1996, even though the case was still pigeonholed, it had its major victim: Governor Xiao was forced to resign and was assigned to the post of Fifth Deputy Director of Sanxia (Three Gorges) Project Commission. But before he took office, he was hospitalized for lung cancer in Beijing and died two years later (Zhu 1995: 21; RMQLB 02/21/95; RMRB 10/20/98; Int. LSY-9605 and LSY-9806). Playing alliance politics The PCs are very conscious of the power net they are entangled in. To establish alliances with other actors in order to garner support has been an oftenused tactic by the PPCs. They have often tried to ally with the Party, the NPC, the government, and the social forces, depending on different targets. A surprising case in Hunan in 1989 – the first removal case against a vice governor in PRC history – typified contestation with the government during the last two decades. On May 12, 1989, when the Hunan PPC was in plenary session, 31 PPCPDs filed an inquiry on the issue of company rectification. At that time, many ‘briefcase companies’ (‘bubbles’) were proliferating in Hunan Province, not unlike other places over the country. Many of these companies, controlled by the governmental agencies, were marked by official corruption. The phenomenon of ‘official profiteering’ (guandao) stimulated popular complaints that hurt the image of government. To rectify this problem, Hunan Province (as all other provinces in China) established the Leading Group for Rectification of Companies, which was headed by Vice Governor Yang Huiquan. The PPCPDs were not satisfied with the progress under Yang’s aegis and asked for an inquiry. Yang and the directors of the Provincial Planning Commission, Foreign Trade Bureau, Auditing Bureau, and the Bureau of Industrial and Commercial Administration attended the inquiry time. Facing critical questions from the PPCPDs, Yang stammered and failed to answer many of them. Meanwhile, it was revealed that when he attended the Spring Trade Fair in Guangzhou, Yang and his

232

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

daughter and son-in-law spent a large sum – RMB 4,437.1 yuan – in official funds on a single dinner. His corruption and incompetence angered many PPCPDs and prompted a series of new actions. The nationwide anti-corruption, pro-democracy student demonstrations (Changsha, the provincial capital of Hunan, was swept over) and the ephemeral spring of liberalization in China made them unstoppable. The next day, 177 PPCPDs initiated removal proceedings against Yang. The Presidium was not prepared for such a development and decided to send the case to each delegation for discussion. The delegation is the basic unit in the PPC plenary session, which consists of deputies from the same municipality or prefecture, and the army is an independent delegation. The session was also prolonged for one more day to give top leaders time for consultation with the Party and to attempt damage control. At first, they wanted to delay the removal proceedings by insisting that the deadline for initiating a motion had been passed. On 14 May, the Presidium decided to ask for legal direction from the LMWC of the NPCSC. Although the relationship between the NPC and LPCs is one of ‘work contact’ instead of ‘leading and being led,’ as the only institution for judicial interpretation, the NPC does frequently answer questions from the LPCs and gives them guidance on specific constitutional issues. The LMWC gave a reply, stating that ‘the deadline for initiating a bill shall not become a reason for the Presidium to not submit the removal to the plenary session.’ In this reply it also said that onetenth or more of the PDs on a PC have the legal right to initiate removal proceedings, and that the plenary session has the authority to decide by vote whether to go directly to removal proceedings or first to establish an investigation commission to look into the matter (Y. Zhang 1993: 796). In its intervention, the NPCSC sided with ordinary PDs, stating that the PDs have the right and authority to remove any officials accountable to them; and besides the political wills of PDs, there is no specific criterion for justifying such action. This is another important breakthrough in Chinese political development. Under pressure from the NPCSC, the Presidium convened the Plenary Session and informed the PPCPDs of the guidance and ruling of the LMWC of the NPCSC. The Plenary Session voted on the motion of removal. Of the 766 PPCPDs present, 506 voted to remove the vice governor, 162 cast negative votes, and 98 abstained. The Plenary Session affirmed the decision for removal, causing Vice Governor Yang to be dismissed (Y. Zhang 1993: 796; Zhang 1992a: 227–8; Quanguo 1992c: 223–4; HNNJ 1990: 89). Later Yang appealed to the NPCSC for fairness and the NPCSC affirmed its original point of view that the removal was ‘legal and valid’ (Li 2002: 52). In addition to the successful removal, the Plenary Session of the Hunan PPC also passed a resolution to establish a special investigation commission on the company issue. The investigation commission consisted of 20 members drawn from the PPCSC and ordinary PPCPDs, and it consisted of five investigation groups. They established a ‘tip hotline’ and a ‘tip box’ to

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 233 gather information from ordinary people, interviewed many work units, and closely scrutinized the five most notorious companies. The investigation proceeded over a two-year period, from May 1989 to April 1991, and included reports made to the Plenary Session, to the SC and Chairpersons’ Group meeting of the PPC. As a result, 4,098 companies were abolished or merged, affecting 31 percent of total number of companies. The phenomenon of official profiteering was thereby basically controlled and the incidence of government officials holding positions in the companies was reduced to a manageable level (Quanguo 1992c: 223–4). Almost at the same time as the Hunan events were transpiring, the Shaanxi PPC had a similar case involving Wei Mingsheng, a deputy director of the Provincial Economic Council, a PD to the 7th NPC, and a PPCPD. He became notorious for accepting bribes and attending numerous lavish banquets. In the first week of May 1989, the Plenary Session was convened and some PPCPDs initiated the process to recall Wei from the NPC against the backdrop of nationwide student demonstrations. Wei was elected to the NPC by the Shaanxi PPC, and to the Shaanxi PPC by the Ziyang County PC through indirect elections. The Shaanxi PPC Presidium decided to have an anonymous vote on this initiative. Of the 495 PPCPDs present, 286 supported a recall, 77 voted against, and 126 abstained; six votes were voided. Because more than one hundred PDs failed to attend the meeting; the yeas, although issued by the majority number of the PPCPDs present, did not constitute a majority of all PPCPDs and the recall initiative was rejected for lacking a quorum. Meanwhile, the Ziyang County PC, which elected Wei to the PPC, successfully recalled him; the Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government also dismissed him from all positions. Finally, the Shaanxi PPCSC decided to pursue their recall action against Wei in a SC meeting. After consulting with the LMWC of the NPCSC for jurisdiction issue, the Shaanxi PPCSC later recalled Wei from the NPC (Y. Zhang 1993: 765; Zhang 1992a: 227). Comparing these two cases in Hunan and Shaanxi, actions to remove high-ranking government officials received different reactions from the SCs and ordinary PDs. In Hunan, ordinary PDs could not tolerate corruption and incompetence, and started removal actions. The Hunan PPC Presidium initially hesitated and tried to block it. In Shaanxi, many ordinary PDs thought that a recall was an excessive punishment for Wei’s misconduct and did not use their authority. As a result, many PDs refused to attend the vote or cast void and absentee votes. Their absence from the voting aborted the recall in the PPC Plenary Session. However, the SC was more enthusiastic and persistent until Wei was recalled from the NPC. In Hunan, there was a reversed situation: many leaders in the PPC Presidium thought that Vice Governor Yang’s problem was a matter of everyday mistakes to which removal did not apply. But most ordinary PDs did not buy it and determined to punish him severely. In most cases, the SCs are much more aggressive in asserting their power than the ordinary PDs. Rebellions from PDs are even fewer. In these

234

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

two cases, in accordance with the constitution, the NPC backed far more aggressive actions and its crucial support helped clear away major hurdles obstructing the legislative challenges. The NPC support was crucial to yet another case, this one involving the PPC in Heilongjiang Province in which a challenge was made to the authority of a central government ministry. In the early 1980s, Heilongjiang instituted a regulation on toxic pollutants, imposing fees and fines on economic enterprises releasing them. Some enterprises directly owned by central government ministries chose to ignore the regulation; one ministry advised its enterprises in Heilongjiang to do so. The Heilongjiang PPCSC reported on the matter to the NPCSC and asked for its support in enforcing the local law. When the NPCSC decided to back up the PPCSC, that central government ministry withdrew its directive. All enterprises owned by the central government had henceforth to abide by the local laws in Heilongjiang Province (Difang 1986: 71; Lin 1993: 139–40). Targeting the ‘hot button’ issues Many issues concern ordinary people but to which other political institutions have failed to respond. If the PPCs can succeed in dealing with them, its impact upon the society and other political actors can be tremendous, which can publicize the heightened status of the PPCs. Because many legal cases affect ordinary people and easily become inflamed, the PPCs are beginning to try to strengthen their own authority and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In the past quarter century, the LPCs have intensified their scrutiny of the judicial branch, which, in China, includes the Court, the Procuratorate, and the Public Security Bureau. Some judges and procurators have been impeached by the PCs. Many legal decisions were reviewed by the PCs and overturned as a result of intervention by the PCs. Many instances of misconduct in the legal process were reported and exposed by ordinary citizens or victims in their letters to newspapers, to the Offices of Letters and Visits (OLVs) of the PC, or to the leaders of PCs or other authorities at a higher level. These complaints caught the attention of the delegates of PCs. In the 1980s, the Tianjin MPCSC was quite ‘interventionist’ in legal affairs (see also Chapter 7). A case in point illustrates the power relationship among different institutions at the sub-national level in China: in November 1979, the judge of the Tianjin Intermediate People’s Court and deputy chief judge of the Third Criminal Adjudication Division, Zhang Wenju, reversed a criminal accusation against a man who had also been a former preliminary interrogator in a district public security bureau at the time. This interrogator had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to seven years in jail for violating due process of law, for raping relatives of defendants, and for covering up evil deeds of various criminals. The father of the interrogator used his good connections with Judge Zhang, who then was a group leader of the Review Office of the Municipal Court, to help his son.

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 235 Judge Zhang then conducted his own individual interview with the key witness and coerced her into changing her mind. The testimony was rewritten and ‘rape’ was converted to ‘adultery.’ Zhang ‘reviewed’ the case, ‘redressed’ the verdict, and set the former interrogator free. The trial judge who first decided the case believed this was a wrongful reversal and wrote a letter to the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CPC. The Tianjin People’s Procuratorate, which informed the Tianjin High People’s Court by official letter of it, also disagreed with the verdict. The OLV of the Municipal Government also urged the High Court to reconsider the reversal, but all these efforts proved fruitless. In May 1982, after a year and a half had passed, the OLV of the Municipal Government decided to pass this case to the MPCSC for help. The MPCSC Chairman immediately wrote an instruction to the PLAC of the SC to start its own investigation. After several months, the PLAC produced a report that contained two principal conclusions. First, the former interrogator had indeed violated the law, the reversal of the verdict had been wrongful, and a correction should be made. Second, the misconduct of Judge Zhang and other officials involved in reversing the verdict should be investigated and they should be punished. These conclusions, with endorsements from the SC leaders, were passed on to the Municipal High Court. In November 1982, the High Court reviewed the case. The reversal was subsequently rescinded, sending the freed criminal back to jail, but the issue of misconduct by the judge and other officials was not addressed. Despite repeated prodding by the SC, the High Court took no further action to address the problems with its subordinate court. However, by March 1983, the Third Adjudication Division of the People’s Intermediate Court, where Zhang worked, gave a self-criticism on its role. Zhang still refused to admit his wrong doings and undertake self-criticism. A month later, the MPCSC completed its term and a new one was elected. After the new MPC leaders took office, they decided to focus on several cases to strengthen their supervision over the government and legal branch in order to demonstrate their determination and authority. At this time, the PLAC of the Tianjin MPC again mentioned the unsolved problems of this case to the new leaders and suggested that another investigation be conducted. With the enthusiastic support of the MPC leaders, the PLAC organized another investigation group, which also recruited officials from the Party Discipline Inspection Committee and the High Court. The investigation group examined the files, interviewed witnesses, and finally confronted Zhang. After one year’s work, on March 31, 1984, the PLAC presented its findings and suggestions: (1) the People’s Procuratorate should start legal proceedings against Zhang, and (2) the MPCSC should remove Zhang from his positions. Two months later, Zhang was relieved of his posts, arrested, and then sentenced to three years in jail (Quanguo 1992c: 204–5; Zhang 1992b: 8–16). Meanwhile, the Tianjin MPCSC carried out a series of other actions targeting the judicial branch (Zhang 1992b). Most of these cases had one thing

236

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

in common: they had been appealed through various channels to the Party, government, and judicial branch but ended up being stalled in the bureaucratic maze for months and even years. Finally, the MPCSC decided to step in and take decisive action (also see Chapter 6). The legislative activism in the supervision of the judicial branch in Tianjin was not isolated. During the 1980s, the PPCSCs in various provinces intervened in many high-profile cases, prodding the courts to undertake retrials and to overturn many old verdicts (Zhang 1992b). This trend was not curtailed by the June 4th crackdown in 1989 and a pattern of legislative activism in supervising the judiciary has emerged. For example, in Hunan Province in 1993, there was a case involving a conflict between the Taojiang County Public Security Bureau and an accountant in another city, Lianyuan. A factory in Taojiang refused to pay a factory in Lianyuan after a delivery, the accountant who worked for the factory in Lianyuan decided to seize a truck borrowed from the factory in Taojiang until it paid the money back. To protect its local interests, the public security bureau in Taojiang dispatched policemen to arrest the accountant and illegally detained her for 218 days, during which she engaged in two hunger strikes. Despite two orders from the court, various instructions from the provincial party secretary, several directives from the Provincial Public Security Bureau, and numerous appeals by her relatives to the Central and local governments and mass media, the Taojiang County Public Security Bureau still refused to execute the court order to release her. The jailed accountant then sent a suicide note to her family and initiated a 19-day hunger strike. Desperate, her husband and son appealed to the Hunan PPC, which decided to intervene by sending a joint work group consisting of officials from other Party and government agencies to conduct field work to resolve the problem and save the woman’s life. After many meetings and discussions, the county public security bureau had to yield to the pressure from the PPC: it freed the accountant and had to pay damages to the accountant as well as other legal fees (RMZY 07/1994). During the past decades, China has moved substantially in the direction of codifying into law both informal practices and new policies. As more and more new laws have been passed, the implementation of laws has become a major challenge. Not only have many individuals and enterprises ignored them, but also even the judicial branch sometimes does not give appropriate respect to them. For example, after the Heilongjiang PPC had passed a regulation for pollution control, a paper mill refused to pay the required fee. The Provincial Finance Bureau acquiesced in the refusal. The Heilongjiang PPCSC pressured the Bureau to implement the law strictly. The provincial government expressed its support to the PPC, and the Bureau undertook a self-criticism. Notwithstanding, the paper mill still refused to pay the fee. Later the case was brought to the court, but the court refused to hear it, arguing that it had no authority in cases involving local statutes. The PPCSC responded by stressing that the court must strictly implement all laws,

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 237 including local statutes. The court later obeyed and adjudicated the case (Difang 1986: 75; Lin 1993: 140–1). One reason that the judicial branch has heeded warnings from the PCs and their SCs is because they have the power of removal. Like an arrow on the tense bow, the power of removal strengthens the position of the PDs. There have been several removal cases involving officials in the legal branch. For example, in January 1988, 86 PPCPDs in Shaanxi initiated impeachment proceedings against the Provincial Procurator General, Ji Yushuo. An investigation commission was established, but because the PPC was in transition into a new term, after the new PPC was elected, the new SC decided not to proceed with the case, for two reasons: Ji was no longer nominated as a candidate for the Procurator General, and the two cases that the PDs had complained were improperly handled were decided by Ji in accordance with the instructions of the Provincial Party Committee (Y. Zhang 1993: 796). The two SCs in Shaanxi and Tianjin (in Judge Zhang case) responded to the problem of term expiration in different ways: in Shaanxi, it was an excuse to avoid the impeachment power; in Tianjin, in contrast, it was an opportunity to demonstrate its persistent determination to supervise the judicial branch until the problem was solved. This difference was affected by two factors. (1) The political will of major leaders of the SC. When they took office, the new leaders in Tianjin were eager to find several ‘big, thorny cases’ as breakthrough in order to boost the work and prestige of the MPC. (2) The Party’s attitude, supportive or obstructive, also affects the SC in selecting cases to pursue. In 1980s Tianjin, Li Ruihuan, then the mayor and party secretary, conducted his work in a much more democratic style than his counterparts and energized the work of Tianjin MPC by providing a relatively tolerant and democratic environment. But in Shaanxi case, the intervention from the Party rendered more difficult the legislative supervision over the procuratorate. Under the policy of separating the Party from the government, the Party has become less involved in routine operations and less willing to intervene in non-policy matters of the executive branch. However, the Party has not loosened its control over legal work and continues the practice of a party secretary of legal and political affairs who supervises the judicial branch. Most of our legal cases involved the Party and ordinary individuals, the powerful and the powerless. For the common people in China, dealing with the legal branch is always full of risks and frustrations. Their constitutional rights could be violated at any time, even when they had done nothing wrong. Despite the fact that the Party sometimes tries to intervene, only in a few of our collected cases did it intervene effectively in favor of the victims. The local judicial organizations can also repeatedly ignore the Party’s instruction. In fact, in several cases, the Party became the protector of the powerful officials (in the Shaanxi case and in the Hunan case, after Vice Governor Yang was dismissed, he was transferred to Hainan Province and continued to maintain his vice governor rank) (Int. XSS-9606). As the Chinese political

238

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

system continues to loosen up, the command link of the Party over the judicial branch will further become disjointed. For the poor Chinese common people who are ceaselessly looking for an ‘upright official’ – their role model is Bao Gong – to redress their wrongs, the poor legal system could become worse. Realizing this danger, the PCs have tried to provide a remedy. Realizing its limited resources and dependence on new means for old problems, the Party has in general become more tolerant of, and sometimes supportive of, the supervisory work of the PCs over the judicial branch. Since the Party still has enormous influence over legal affairs, the PPCs and their SCs have to align with the Party in many important cases. In conducting their investigations, the SCs always report to the Party first to solicit support. The investigation team is always a joint one, including Party officials. In this way, any investigation does not look like an action against the Party. The accomplishment can be naturally credited under the name of the great Party. If this is not properly done, the Party might become defensive and suspicious, and therefore could create more obstacles to the work of the PCs. To some extent, whether the PC dares to challenge the Party is the litmus test for the authority of PCs. Turning force against itself For example, the PPCs often use their own favorite, better-qualified communist leaders to knock out the Party-sponsored candidates for top positions. In defying the Party nomination, the PPCs did not nominate political dissidents but other committed communist leaders with better qualifications (such as better-educated, younger, and so forth) to coax the Party to accept the fait accompli. The close scrutiny by the PCs over Party-designated candidates caused concern in the Party. In 1990, the CPCCC issued No. 2 (1990) Central Document, Instruction of the CPC Committee Concerning the Regulations over the Local Party Committee Recommending Leaders to State Organs, and restated the principle that the Party controls cadres, despite the legal processes that must be followed. The document was critical of the meticulous way that some LPCs scrutinized the Party’s nominees, acting as the Party’s organization and personnel departments to conduct a thorough review (Y. Zhang 1993: 1160, 1263). However, this document did not stop the tendency of the PCs for paying more attention to personnel nominations. In 1991, another significant event happened with regard to the Hunan PPC: in its fourth Plenary Session, Hunan PPC had two vice governor vacancies to fill. The Party designated two candidates after discussions with major Party leaders and consulting other governmental and social organizations. When the PDs were asked to discuss this candidate list, they added ten candidates for vice governor. Among them, six wrote reports to the Presidium refusing to be nominated. Therefore, there were six candidates that still had to be discussed by the PDs. Finally, three of them were included in the final list to be voted

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 239 upon: one candidate designated by the Party, and two nominated by the PDs. One original Party-designated candidate was dropped in this selection process. After the votes were cast, one candidate nominated by the PDs was elected vice governor; he received 51 more votes than another elected vice governor who was designated by the Party (Quanguo 1992c: 266–8). In the 1993 nationwide elections, the Party’s monopoly control over gubernatorial elections continued to weaken. In Guizhou Province, the Party Center recommended incumbent Governor Wang Chaowen for re-election. The PPCPDs considered him old and incompetent and nominated another candidate, Chen Shineng, a 55-year-old Qinghua-trained engineer and vice governor. As a result, two candidates were voted upon. Chen was elected governor. This was the first time in PRC history that more than one candidate was listed as a candidate for the governorship; it was also the first time that a candidate nominated by PDs was elected governor (LW 07/93; GZNJ 1993: 19; Zheng 1995: 107). Ironically, later the Guizhou PPC accepted Wang as the Chairman of the SC. It reflects the PPC’s own ambivalent perception of its identity: on the one hand, the PPC is eager to assert its power; on the other hand, it self-degraded its political standing by electing a ‘loser’ to its top position. In a long run, however, Wang’s exit to the PPC strengthened its power position vis-à-vis other power rivals, because Wang, as former party secretary and governor, was well connected and powerful. Several days after the Guizhou incident, a similar event occurred involving the PPC of Zhejiang Province, whose root was traceable back to 1992, when the Zhejiang Governor, Shen Zulun, ‘resigned.’ Because he did not follow the hard line closely in handling student demonstrations and because he sent a telegraph to the NPC in the capacity of NPC deputy appealing for a democratic and rational method to solve the crisis in 1989, Shen was later forced to step down from the governorship and was replaced by Ge Hongsheng, a deputy party secretary who did not have enough knowledge in managing economy but was significantly left to be politically correct. The resignation of a respected governor and promotion of a leftist politician disappointed many local officials and ordinary people (CM 01/91). After serving as acting governor for one year, Ge was designated the only official candidate for governor in the 1993 PPC plenary session. However, many PPCPDs supported a new man, Wan Xueyuan, for the candidacy. Wan was formerly secretary general of the Shanghai municipal government and had recently been transferred to Zhejiang to take a position of vice governor. Ultimately, Wan was elected governor instead of the Party-designated candidate and acting governor (LW 07/93; Fewsmith 1994: 250). In 1993, two other Party-designated candidates for governor in Sichuan and Anhui Provinces encountered almost the same trouble, but thanks to the Party’s manipulative technology of power, they survived the crises. In Sichuan, former Chongqing Party Secretary Xiao Yang was designated internally by the Party Center in Beijing to be the party secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee. However, deputies of the Sichuan Party

240

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

Congress rejected his internal appointment and Xiao failed to be elected into the Central Party Committee; in a later election for candidate members, he was among the last of those elected. Instead, Xiao was later appointed deputy party secretary, in preparation for his promotion to the governorship. To avoid obstacles to the promotion, the Party reshuffled the Provincial Party Committee and spent the unusual time and energy on pressuring the PPC to endorse Xiao for governor. The day before the vote in the Sichuan PPC, the People’s Daily editorialized on the need for Party discipline and ‘democratic centralism,’ lashing out against ‘separatism’ and ‘groupism.’ In this case, Xiao won 88 percent of the votes and became the governor. In this situation, the Party Center anticipated the potential trouble and managed to head it off with the use of intense pressure. The PPC also became a crucial arena for the power struggle among different factions in Sichuan Province. In Anhui Province, the Party had difficulties in steering its candidate through the PPC’s electoral process. The Party-designated candidate, the incumbent Governor Fu Xishou, failed to receive a majority vote for his reelection. The PPC session was therefore prolonged until he gathered enough votes in the follow-up voting rounds (CM 03/93: 53–6). These two cases in Sichuan and Anhui underlie the fact that the Party still has powerful resources in which to influence politically restless PPCs, and the PPCs are also ready for compromise if the situation turns against them. In contrast to their contestation with the government and judicial branch, the PPCs handle their relationships with the Party in two different ways. First, the PPCSCs have always refused to take a lead and occupied an awkward position between the Party and ordinary PDs. The cleavages between the Party and ordinary PDs denote a more radical direction for today’s political contestation, namely, public contestation, and eventually will result in the empowerment of ordinary PDs (see Chapter 4). Second, the rebellions of ordinary PDs against the Party have been spontaneous, but the process of building a support coalition has been nonexistent. On the other hand, the Party and PPC leaders are not prepared for such an exigency. So far two sides have preferred to find solutions quickly. Appeasement is the Party’s often-used strategy. For the PDs challenging the Party on a personnel appointment, the best strategy has been to boycott the Party-nominated candidate and to find another popular Party cadre to knock him or her out. For example, in both Guizhou and Zhejiang, the vice governors were favored by the PDs. Judging by this, up to now the challenge from PCPDs has not violated the fundamental rule of adherence to the Party’s leadership. In addition, in order to explain the successful spontaneous collective actions by the ordinary PDs, additional factors seem relevant. First, the quality of the PDs matters. If the level of legal and democratic consciousness of the PDs is low, they will be less enthusiastic and courageous about asserting the constitutional rights of the PCs aggressively (i.e., the Shaanxi Wei Mingsheng removal case). Second, the leading role provided by some respected PDs is important. The model peasants, workers, and soldiers in the

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 241 PCs are not likely to initiate a motion against officials, nor are the official deputies willing to act against their superiors. Relative autonomy and meritbased recognition have emboldened the intellectuals and professionals (i.e., university professors, medical doctors) to provide leadership for actions challenging the Party and PPC leaders. For example, in the investigations of two economic criminal cases in Sichuan, Prof. Luo Shiying, a legal scholar, and his colleagues, played a crucial role. Most supporters to Luo’s motions were also respected scholars, university professors, senior engineers, and medical doctors (also see Chapter 4). Third, the political environment, which is mainly determined by the policies of Beijing and popular mood, is also crucial. The Hunan PPC’s removal of the vice-governor was successful because of the crucial support from the NPCSC and the 1989 student demonstrations. It happened one week before the declaration of martial law in Beijing, when the anti-corruption and pro-democracy movement had brought a short period of political liberalization to China. Although the June 4th crackdown did not suppress political contestation at the subnational levels, Deng’s 1992 ‘Southern Inspection Tour’ did bring a new wave of legislative assertiveness. Because it controls the nomenclatura system in China, most nominations of PC leaders, and Party members within the PCs, the Party is the most crucial factor in the institutional environment in which the PCs operate. It is very important for the PCs to maintain a favorable relationship with the Party in order to get institutional support, and to foster a friendly environment for the PCs’ institutional development. In the past decade, many PPCs have elected the party secretaries to the positions of PPC Chairperson (see Chapter 4). In the late 1980s, Party Secretary Sun Weiben of Heilongjiang was also the PPC chairman. In the 1993 elections, provincial party secretaries in Liaoning, Henan, Guizhou, Zhejiang, and Fujian were elected to head the PPCSCs respectively. Kevin J. O’Brien (1994b: 80–107) argues, the ‘legislative embeddedness,’ for example, in the form of the PCs’ association with powerful political figures, proximity to the existing power center, and acceptance and exploitation of subordination, will benefit their organizational development. Instead, conflict and independence will only marginalize the PCs in politics. Contrary to the ‘legislative embeddedness’ prescription for organizational development, many PCs contested against Party power, especially its power over personnel. The confrontational gestures of the PCs toward the government and the judicial branch have also enhanced their power. This works a little bit differently in the PC–Party relationship, however. We have pointed out the distinction between the PC Plenary Session and the SC. The challenges to the Party have generally arisen from the PDs in the Plenary Session. The Plenary Session is always huge and very inclusive; it serves as a well-chosen control group in the statistical sense to articulate and represent interests. Therefore, it is closest to the people’s mandate. Having a restless Plenary Session, the SC is able to play the ‘hand tying strategy’ to draw attention and support from the Party. This was

242

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

exactly what had happened in the aftermath of the rebellions both on the PCs’ floors and streets in 1989. Saving face At the crucial moment when the victory was within grasp, the PCs were willing to offer a compromise to show their generosity and concern for the ‘overall situation’ (daju), and also to save face for the targeted actor and make him or her indebted to the PCs. As the Hunan removal case points up, arrogant attitudes and unsatisfactory answers often precipitate inquiries, may intensify confrontation, and lead to impeachment. In contrast, when government officials replied to the PC with self-criticism and responsive, cooperative attitudes, their confrontations with the PCs tend to de-escalate. In 1987, three PPCPDs in Sichuan Province received a letter from some teachers and students from four colleges that train administrative, legal, economic, financial and commercial, and family planning cadres; the letter criticized the extravagant investment practices of the four government bureaus in Sichuan. In response, the Educational, Scientific, Cultural, and Health Committee of the PPCSC started an investigation and eventually found the criticisms well grounded. In April, some delegations filed an inquiry with the Provincial Planning and Economic Council. The government bureaus involved contested the criticism in the inquiry and refused to admit that their investments were wasteful. Under pressure from the PPCSC, the provincial government organized two investigation groups. The Sichuan PPCSC also had its own investigation group and conducted a weeklong field investigation. Three vice-chairpersons, seven SC members, and seven ordinary PDs participated in these activities, assisted by three experts. After twice listening to reports from the provincial government, the PPCSC was not satisfied with the solution they proposed. The provincial government was ordered to consult experts and to adjust its construction plans. Henceforth, adjustment plans would have to be approved before the PPC appropriated money for them. Finally, in November 1988, the provincial government presented a third report in which five measures were proposed for saving money. The PPCSC reviewed the adjustment plan and approved it. The power struggle was over (Quanguo 1992c: 253–5). In addition to removal power, the power to control the purse strings has increasingly become another effective means for the PCs to influence government behavior (also see Chapter 6). As this Sichuan case demonstrates, if and when the PCs, especially their SCs, are aware of and are tempted to use the power of the purse, the legislative–executive relationship in China will enter a stage of further conflicts. If the PCs can wrest the budgetary power from the government, the power center will certainly become more dispersed, as all Western nations had witnessed long time ago. In 1994, a political confrontation between the PPCSC in Guangdong

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 243 Province and the Bureau of State Land was also defused by a concession from the latter. That year, the PPCSC passed The Registration Regulation Concerning Urban Homes and Land in Guangdong Province, with the intention of ending the practice in which homes and the land on which homes were located were to be registered with and regulated by two separate agencies. The new regulation put them under the same agency, making it simpler for owners. After this regulation was promulgated, the Provincial Bureau of State Land sent two telegrams to its local bureaus ordering them not to follow the new regulation if they had not already done so. This effectively blocked implementation of this regulation. Consequently, 21 PPCSC members filed an inquiry and asked Yuan Zhen, the Bureau Director, to answer various questions. Facing fierce criticism in the PPCSC, Yuan had to back off a little bit and told the SC that his decision was ‘imprudent and inappropriate.’ The members were angered. They thought the refusal to follow the PPC law was far more serious than ‘imprudent and inappropriate,’ and insisted that he should admit it was completely wrong, a mistake, a violation of law, and an act of using a departmental decision to invalidate a PPC law. The members believed that this incorrect decision had undermined the sacredness of the law and damaged the PPC’s authority. The PPCSC Chairman, Lin Ruo, who had been party secretary in Guangdong Province before taking up the PPC position, delivered a sharp attack against the Bureau Director. Subsequently, the PPCSC passed a resolution expressing its dissatisfaction and sent this warning: ‘Comrade Yuan Zhen must re-study the constitution and Local Organic Law seriously, enhance his own level of legal knowledge and consciousness of doing work in accordance with the law, reflect on himself, and give a new answer to the inquiry in the next SC meeting. We give him two months to rectify his mistake. We will listen to his words and watch his actions.’ Soon after this resolution was passed, Director Yuan apologized to the PPCSC for his mistake, promised to accept its criticisms, and withdrew his directive (RDGZWZ 02/95: 24–5; YCWB/11/13/94, 11/16/94, 11/18/94). This case exemplifies the fact that when a resolution passed by the PPC is accompanied by serious warnings and a tacit threat, the supervisory power of PPCs gains strength. This is further corroborated by a case in the Shaanxi PPCSC. In 1989, commodity prices in Shaanxi Province, especially in the provincial capital Xi’an, exceeded the national average and soon became a hot topic for discussion among ordinary people and PCPDs. Upon listening to the provincial government articulate the measures for price control, many members of the Shaanxi PPCSC were still not satisfied. They informed the provincial government that if it could not achieve the provincial governor’s promise that the 1989 price would be lower than the preceding year, the SC would impose ‘tough measures.’ They warned, ‘If that situation occurs, it will not remain an economic issue. Rather, it will be a political issue’ (Quanguo 1992c: 191). Over the next three months, the government cut several projects, and used the money saved to stabilize prices; the rate of

244

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

price increases was kept lower than that of the previous year. In most cases like this, the government officials accepted the criticism in the inquiry, offered workable remedies, and appeased the PDs’ anger (RDGZWZ 02/95: 16–18; RDJS 12/94). The acceptance of self-criticisms with good attitudes always saves the positions of officials who were guilty of misconduct and helps them escape from any legal responsibility.

Conclusion Careful examination of Chinese politics at the provincial level has revealed many significant developments during the last quarter century under reform. The PPCs have become more mature and independent-minded and more disposed to assert their power vis-à-vis the government, court, procuratorate, and even the Party, all of which are traditionally more powerful than the PCs in ‘real politics.’ A large number of cases indicate that the PPCs’ meekness can never again be taken for granted. Based on the cases we have discussed, their achievements in the past two decades have been significant and encouraging. Today, they are trying to force other key political actors to recognize and respect their power positions, and are competing with the Party for one of the most valuable power resources – the people’s loyalty and mandate – by playing the role of last redress for their problems. In both the Tianjin and Hunan court cases, when the Party, government, and other channels had failed, ultimately, the PPCs stepped in and restored justice. The PDs have tried to stretch the margin of the Party’s tolerance further. If this tendency continues, once societal demands become a driving force behind the PDs (as was temporarily the case in 1989), the institution-based contestation among political elites could be ushered into public contestation. One Chinese dissident believes that ultimate success will be attained by the PCs (i.e., that they will become real parliaments) when they display the ‘martyr’s spirit,’ namely, that they are ready to fight and die for their power (BJZC 05/95). Now, some PDs have demonstrated this spirit in their contests with the government, court, procuratorate, and the Party (also see Chapter 4). As more well-educated PDs and seasoned politicians, after finishing their terms in the Party and other government branches, have entered the PPCs, the PPCs’ assertiveness will continue to build. The power position of the PPCs will be further consolidated and institutionalized. The decisionmaking process in China will become more complicated. In the process of expanding their political power, the PPCs have benefited from the tactics they used to build enabling linkages or support coalitions for their activities. First, in dealing with the government and the judicial branch, they have paid special attention to winning support from the Party and the NPCSC. Their support has always helped the LPCs triumph over their rivals for power. NPC support is more predictable for the PPCs than Party support, for the NPC also can strengthen its own position in helping the PPCs to become institutionalized. If the Party tries to block the PPCs

Political contestation and the PPC as power player 245 from asserting power, it always makes it difficult for the latter to pursue that objective. In many instances, the Party has built insurmountable obstacles. Second, in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the Party, the PPCs have carefully selected their targets based upon the state of public opinion. They have exploited many high-profile issues (‘hot spots’), since popular attention and public pressure make these cases difficult for the Party to cover up or evade. At the same time, the PPCs can demonstrate their potential utility by solving and preventing problems from exploding and causing further damage to the whole system. Third, to avoid a ‘trouble maker’ image, the PPCs have pursued a cautious contestation strategy with the Party, government, court, and procuratorate to facilitate mutual understanding and preempt a final showdown as far as possible. For example, once the SC senses the trouble with one Party-designated nominee, it is able to suggest that the Party withdraw the name before it is sent forward for a vote. The Party often listens to these suggestions and thereby avoids a face-losing confrontation. The PPCs and their SCs have actually achieved their goals principally by institutionalized consultations with other power institutions. However, the possible escalation to public confrontation strengthens the hands of the PPCs. Fortunately, the PPCs have attracted many former leaders in the Party, government, and legal branch and enhanced their political standing. In the early 1980s, most positions of PPCSC chairpersons were taken by the vice governors, the second-in-authority in the communist executive hierarchy, who retired to the second-front work. In the mid-1980s, more and more of these ‘first-in-authority’ men in the executive branch entered the PPCs. In the early 1990s, many party secretaries and young rising government leaders have taken leading positions in the PPCs. For example, in the Guangdong case, including the inquiry of the Bureau of State Land, the PPCSC Chairman Lin Ruo was the former party secretary; it is the same in Guizhou. In the Sichuan case, including the inquiry into the High Court, the chairman of the PLAC of the PPCSC who presided over the inquiry of the chief judge was himself a former chief judge. These seasoned politicians were able to take advantage of their good connections and long-term experience within the Party, government, or legal branch and were skilled in balancing the use of consultation and confrontation to strengthen instead of weaken each other’s effects. The mixture of consultation and confrontation in the interactions among major political institutions indicates a change in the mode of political governance in China. Obviously, China’s reform leaders wanted to reduce bureaucratism and increase incentive, especially local incentive, while at the same time maintaining central state capacity (or ‘general efficiency’ in Deng’s terms). Because of this dilemma, the Chinese leadership has followed the network strategy (a ‘mixed regime’ in Dahl’s terminology). This network mode of governance provides a baseline for us to discuss and evaluate political contestation in Chinese politics. With such contests that are character-

246

Political contestation and the PPC as power player

ized by mohe (cooperation through competition), they serve the goal of increasing local incentive and reducing bureaucratism and corruption, without, however, threatening the central state capacity and obstructing institutional transformation (economic marketization takes precedence over political democratization for Chinese leadership). The nature of these contestations discussed above clearly demonstrates that the PPCs have been edging around pluralism and fermenting for more liberalization and democratization. Since sub-national legislative contestation is less threatening to the state capacity than political opposition at the national level, and also serves the goal of controlling bureaucratism and promoting local incentive, the central leadership has allowed more political contestation at sub-national levels than at the national level. The Party Center could not tolerate Hu Jiwei, a NPCSC member, who organized a signature collection drive among his colleagues in 1989 for the purpose of impeaching Premier Li Peng and ending the martial law. Hu was expelled from the NPC (Hu 1993). In contrast, the Chinese leadership in Beijing has shown restraint in handling the same actions at the sub-national level. Predictably, political contestation at the sub-national level may someday spill over into the national-level politics, because the NPC and the LPCs have formed an institutional isomorphism (e.g., the PPC leaders attending the NPC meetings, the NPC providing guidance to the LPCs, and so forth) and have emulated policies and structures from each other. If this continues, the process is apt to mirror a scenario prescribed by Robert Dahl (1971): developing sub-national representative institutions and allowing contestation to exist initially at lower levels constitute a prudent strategy for democratization. Without knowing it, China may have already been fixed on that course. But a caveat should be noticed: the mohe society in China may find more affinity for a deliberative democracy (which pays more attention to the deliberation process as an important component for democracy) rather than a pluralist democracy (which more favors pluralism and autonomy).

8

Legislatures and China’s democracy

The basic theme of this book is twofold. First, it explains the institutionalization of the Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs) in China, as well as its contextual causes and institutional triggers over the past quarter century. Here the PPCs are treated as a dependent variable. The dynamic and farreaching changes in the economy, the carefully chosen developmental state strategy, and the political context of a single dominant party constituted both the necessity and the possibility for change of the PPCs. These factors also defined the course and style of institutional evolution within the PPCs. Induced by the above-mentioned changes and encouraged by the visionary political entrepreneurs of the NPC (National People’s Congress) system, the local leaders within the PPCs as well as other sub-national PCs have carefully crafted institutional and personnel changes within the PC system. The secret for their successful accumulation of respect and expansion of power lies primarily in a resourceful repertoire of strategies for institution building and tactics for waging power. Second, this book explains the role of the PPCs in the grand transformation of China’s political and economic order. The PPCs are treated as an independent variable for explaining the ongoing economic changes – particularly the relatively successful transition to a market-oriented economy, and the political developments – mainly the transformation of the mode of governance in China. This research shows that the PPCs have been developmental. This sheds the image of ‘obstructive parliaments’ we have seen in many other countries. The successful adoption of the market-nurturing development strategy was achieved with the assistance from a developmental political system, in which the developmental PPCs are crucial to its creation and maintenance, and also an indispensable part of it. In addition, through a case study of the PPCs, this research illuminates the ongoing transformation of governance in China and its emerging form. It demonstrates that the overall method of leadership by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the mode of governance in China have been transformed into a network mode – away from the old hierarchical LeninistStalinist system, but not yet embracing the democratic market mode of pluralist competition. In contrast to their economic implications, the impact

248

Legislatures and China’s democracy

of PPCs upon China’s democratization is more subtle, incremental, and long term. Many of the ramifications are dubious and can be interpreted either way, if we continue to resort to the traditional binary thinking of China as either an intransigent autocracy or a liberalizing democratic hopeful. For example, this contrast can be found from Yang (2004) and Pei (2006). But there is no doubt these many, albeit some small, changes in so many aspects have been substantiating the ‘socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics’ as promised by the CPC to its people. However, the most important message from my research is that the network mode of governance provides a new key for us to solve the seemingly contradictory and confusing jigsaw puzzle of Chinese political economy. This last chapter will sum up many empirical findings and their theoretical implications. Here I will also elaborate on the prognosis of Chinese democratization and the possible role that the PPCs and the entire PC system might play.

Developmental legislatures and market creation An empirical study of the PPCs in China constitutes the cornerstone of this project and lays down a foundation for all subsequent empirical findings and theoretical inferences. The discussion of the study starts with two empirical arguments. First, the PPCs have become more institutionalized and assertive during the past quarter century. Second, the PPCs have been instrumental in fostering a market economy. The most amazing achievement of Chinese legislative development is the synchronization of this process and the process whereby a market economy is created. In regard to institutional development and maturity, four aspects of the PPCs have been probed: the formal structures, the rules and norms (Chapter 2), the institutional linkages (Chapter 3), and the personnel changes (Chapter 4). My data demonstrate that since the start of China’s reforms, Chinese PPCs have built up their own structures, expanded accessory institutions, established rules and norms for their operation and interaction with other institutions, and created institutional linkages with the environment and other political actors. They have also improved the quality of their personnel. The People’s Deputies (PDs) – especially those of members and chairpersons of the Standing Committees (SCs) – have become better educated and better connected in the regime. Increasingly, the PPCs have achieved a relative autonomy and identity – distinguishing themselves from other institutions of the state and the Party. This achievement has laid down an institutional foundation for their emergence as new actors in sub-national politics and even playing a liberalizing role in national politics. Case studies of local statutes clearly demonstrate that the PPCs have been a pioneer in exploring unknown territories and a laboratory in experimenting with new policies. In particular, cases regarding the review and assessment system (RAS) reveal these new roles the PPCs have played in Chinese governance.

Legislatures and China’s democracy 249 They have served as an incubator for bold and liberalizing ideas and as a laboratory for rudimentary ideas to be tried out and improved on. The removal motions lodged and pushed by some PPC members even indicate that the PPCs have stretched legislative activism near the limit of CPC tolerance, and a more fundamental change is within sight. In regard to the functions of the PPCs, this book has discussed their increasing importance in legislation (Chapter 5), supervision over the executive and judicial branches, and oversight of law enforcement (Chapters 6 and 7). I have illustrated the important role of the PPCs in China’s process of market creation. One of their most important functions was the creation of a legal environment necessary for a market economy. I have also demonstrated their developmental role in the process of economic transition in China by showing how they have tried to prevent and remedy both market and state failures, therefore consolidating the development and sustainability of the market economy. Thus, one conspicuous strategy for legislative development in China is to follow economic developmentalism. As Tian Jiyun (2000: 1), the NPC Vice-Chairman (1993–2003) who was known for his association with the purged reform-minded leader Zhao Ziyang and his own brand of liberalism, instructed the parliamentarians: ‘To take economic construction as our primary concern is the prerequisite for doing better job for the PCs.’ To be developmental is the first step for the legislative development of the Chinese representative institutions under a communist rule. To place the PPCs in Michael Mezey’s comparative framework on the level of activism of legislatures (Mezey 1973), we can positively say that the PPCs are no longer minimal legislatures. If we cannot conclude that all of them have uniformly shed the image of marginal legislatures, we have enough confidence to argue that a majority of PPCs have become at least reactive legislatures in sub-national politics. We have seen that the PPCs have received more support from the existing power structure, particularly from the Party as well as the people. Their legitimacy in the structure of China’s governance and in the eyes of ordinary Chinese citizens has strengthened. Most of them have pursued an active agenda in legislation and legislative oversight. Some have used their power actively to influence and initiate decisions. More important, some independent-spirited deputies (as we have seen in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) have strived to hold the government accountable for every right and liberty promised by the Chinese constitution and national law, and have consequently pushed for a rule of law and democratic governance. Not merely restricted to the sphere of government, the PPCs have also had broad impact upon the overall governance in socio-economic affairs. The PPCs’ quarter-century long evolution has presented a strong case of creative and positive institutionalization during China’s reform era. The findings in my study regarding the institutionalization of the PPCs and their constructive roles in the overall governance contest the prevalent argument that the Chinese political system as a whole is in an accelerating decay and

250

Legislatures and China’s democracy

breakdown (e.g., Chang 2001; Pei 2006). Indeed, the Chinese communist state has been plagued by permissive and endemic political corruption. The party cells at the grassroots have also been threatened by an institutional atrophy. However, the overall Chinese system of governance has managed to adapt to the new environment by creating alternative institutions and adding new functions to the existing institutions. In addition, the PPCs have also exerted a positive impact upon the regime as a whole and ameliorated the crises of the system. The functions of the PPCs include passing new laws to meet the demands of a market economy, supervising state agencies to prevent state failures, collecting and passing information to improve the efficiency of decision-making process, integrating state institutions – horizontally and vertically, and providing access to political participation for the masses and various organizations. The PPCs have acted as buffers to absorb political repercussions and as conduits to facilitate political transactions in the Chinese political system. Ultimately, all these factors will facilitate political institutionalization of the Chinese system as a whole. Since the PC system has become such an integral part of this governance, it is not unimaginable that if someday the CPC collapses, the PC system, which commands a total of 3.2 million PDs, might provide the last democratic resort to maintain the unity of China as a state and as a nation. Roderik MacFarquhar (1998) once asked whether the important changes within the NPC also occurred in the LPCs. My answer is positive. In fact, the institutional changes at the local level have far exceeded the changes at the national level, as identified by Kevin J. O’Brien, Murray Scot Tanner, and Michael W. Dowdle. These changes also help to answer MacFarquhar’s other question of whether the changes occurring in the PPCs amount in any sense to democratization. If we focus on the concept of accountability, the answer can be yes. My research shows that the resurrection of the PPCs is a preliminary but major step toward democratic politics. The PPCs have provided additional channels for the Chinese people to pursue and protect their basic rights. Activities of the PPCs and their PDs have increased the horizontal accountability that the government and judicial organizations have for the legislature, as well as the vertical accountability that state organs owe the ordinary people. But if we focus on the crucial matter of elections (free national elections) as the basic requirement for democracy, the answer is absolutely no. However, even if democratization has not yet moved that far, we can still believe that changes such as the RAS, supervision and law inspection, removal, and elections with multiple candidates to compete for one seat constitute a first step toward electoral connections between government officials and the people in today’s China. However, the ruling party has artificially held the great potential impact of the PPCs upon democratization back. A democratic deficit remains a severe flaw of the PPCs. The PPCs are not directly elected by citizen voters and therefore lack constituency and certain legitimacy. Their structures are derived from a power monopoly that political elites have used for control.

Legislatures and China’s democracy 251 Although more PDs have started to address the people’s concerns and support their use of democratic rights, most of them are still too dependent upon the Party. Even in terms of some independent-minded PDs, more are like traditional ‘remonstrators’ on behalf of the people under the old dynasties. They are more concerned with the survival of the whole regime and the interest of the ruling elite than the people’s interest. It is clear that Chinese legislatures have not yet evolved into a well-institutionalized link where societal forces are able to find effective institutional avenues to affect the nature of Chinese politics. The encouraging sign is that some noncompliant PDs have taken great courage to push for a systematic change and to transform the PC system into a forum where the people can find their voices and protect their interests. All institutions and practices developed within the PPCs and even in the PC system will continue to increase the pressure for change and movement toward democracy. This contribution will help the Chinese people prepare for the day when China adopts free elections nationwide. It seems irreconcilable for the PPCs to pursue their own institutional building and power expansion, to keep other power players as complementors instead of competitors, and at the same time, to provide active service to economic development. However, the political entrepreneurs within the PPCs formulated and applied ingenious strategies. The Chinese legislative development followed a Fabian strategy with a conservative pace at the beginning but a cumulative achievement in the long term. Pu Xinzhu – an authority on the PC system – says that due to a variety of constraints, the development of the PC system ‘could not be rapid and radical, but steady and gradual. Gradual change is not stopover or regression; instead, it is edging forward. It takes a small step in a year, after several years small steps cumulate into a giant gallop’ (Cai and Wang 2001: 23). To use the words from the NPC researchers, this conservative strategy is to ‘take small steps but never stop’ (xiaobu bu ting bu) (Quanguo 2000b: 66). The interactions among the PPCs and other political actors in the lawmaking process, legislative supervision, and inspection of law enforcement have demonstrated two intertwining patterns – the PPCs have been very prudent of and cautious in employing their power to challenge other branches of the state; selfconstraint has been followed at all times. At the same time, the PPCs do not hesitate to exert their powers to challenge the government, judicial branch, and even the Party when they think that the larger interests of national development could justify their actions. The secret for their successful maneuvering includes several practical techniques – seeking solid patron support, facilitating communication, building linkages, consolidating internal structures, and focusing on consequential issues. This strategy is doing well, because it complements the bigger political context in which a network mode of governance has taken shape, namely, institutions featuring linkages and interactions featuring co-opetition (mohe). The PPCs have flourished, for they have played the game of mohe politics very well. The Chinese may

252

Legislatures and China’s democracy

experience a smoother transition to democratic rule if political players in managing the turbulent transition can abide by this game of etiquette. For many post-communist countries, linkage politics and the co-opetition strategy are models for legislative development. As Ostrow (2000) shows, linkage strategy makes a difference for post-Soviet legislatures in managing conflict and consolidating legitimacy as well. The relative lack of significant breakthrough toward democracy does not deny the validity of Chinese legislative development. The Chinese legislative system has achieved remarkable progress. Even in a comparative context, legislatures both at the central and sub-national levels in China have acquired some degree of legitimacy and autonomy in the political system, and their contestation with other political actors has sown the seeds of liberalization among the ruling elite, which might further facilitate China’s democratization. The tragic setbacks in Russian legislative development and democratization in the 1990s led some parliamentary scholars to conclude that a subordinate role by the new legislatures to the executive may contribute more to legislative development and long-term democratization (O’Brien 1994b; Hahn 1995: 237). However, the Chinese experience shows that the PPCs have transcended the two conventionally double bind of a subordinate role vis-à-vis an unruly role that most legislatures fall into during their early development. Sophisticated political entrepreneurs within the PCs, even the local ones, are able to expand their power, and at the same time, to convince the executive and the whole ruling elite that they are also helpful in policymaking and implementation, and sometimes indispensable to the maintenance of the whole system by serving the goals of political integration and control. Once the legislatures are organically integrated into the process of governing, their institutionalization will be justified. A more institutionalized legislature will certainly expose itself less to danger of abolition and executive dictatorship. For developing countries and transitional societies, the easiest way to pursue this strategy is to resort to economic developmentalism, as the Chinese experience has demonstrated.

Building a democratic developmental state The institutional evolution of the PPCs occurred within the context of transforming governance sponsored by the CPC. Partially due to the assistance from the PPCs, the party-state has formulated and followed a new ordering principle for its mode of leadership, that is, ‘assuming overall responsibility and coordinating all sides’ (as I previously quoted Jiang Zeming in Chapter 1). The essence of this principle is that the centrality of the CPC matters most. In terms of the network analysis, the CPC wants to be the biggest spider occupying the central place in the web of power. It does allow smaller spiders room to weave their own small webs, provided they are nested within the national game. But the Party does not tolerate anyone who tries to challenge its centrality and tries to move to the center. Under this guiding prin-

Legislatures and China’s democracy 253 ciple, the CPC has developed a systematic technology of power for prolonging its rule. Here I would like to present four imageries to capture the ethos of China’s emerging new governance: ‘kite-flying politics,’ ‘bird-in-a-cage economics,’ ‘net-casting law,’ and a ‘tethered-deer society.’ In this sophisticated network mode of governance, the PPCs have played an important role to create, maintain, sustain, and legitimize it. (1) Regarding political management, a Chinese party official informed me that managing subordinates is like flying a kite. If you have a short string, the kite would not fly. If the string is too long, the kite may become so powerful that it breaks the string and flies away, you risk losing control. The skill lies somewhere in between the two extremes. You assume a clear control while the kite has enough freedom to fly high. If it is flagging, you pull the string; if it starts spinning, you loosen it a bit (Chapter 3 also cites Cai Dingjian on kite-flying technique of political management) (Int. WBJ0105). In politics, the CPC is playing the game of flying a kite – it holds the string and let other actors dance. (2) Regarding economic regulation, Chen Yun proposed bird-in-a-cage economics as a way of managing the Chinese economy. He likened the economy to a bird. If you do not have a cage to keep it, it will fly away. However, if the cage is too small, the bird will die (Naughton 1995: 59– 136). So the art of managing an economy is to make a cage to keep the bird, and to make it big enough to allow the bird to thrive. To apply bird-in-acage economics to its economy, China has successfully built a state-guided capitalism. (3) In his studies on Chinese legal control, Stanley B. Lubman (1999: 2) borrowed Chen Yun’s phrase for the title of his book Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao. He explains, ‘[The] legal bird remains in its own cage, although it is stirring and the dimensions of the cage may be changing.’ To convey the same message without adding confusion with respect to CPC control in the economic realm, I would say rather that the CPC has been casting a net of laws (referring to the ‘weaving a huge net’ metaphor in Chapter 5) and trying to pull the pole. In the realm of law and lawmaking, the CPC has been weaving and casting a net of laws for a law-based state. Under the rule of law with Chinese characteristics, ‘the net of law is enormous; it has flexibility but not holes’ (fawang huihui, shu’er bulou). The message of this metaphor is while the CPC is willing to give some freedom to the people, but it is not willing to let any one escape its control. (4) Regarding social management, the CPC has resorted to the tethereddeer method, such as the way that social organizations being treated as ‘state-led NGOs’ (or GONGOs – government organized NGOs) (Shambaugh 2000: 184; Saich 2001: 174, 206). On this account, Blecher and Shue’s (1996) study on the relationship between the Chinese county government of Shulu and its local economic development is illustrative. In Chinese, Shulu means ‘the tethered deer,’ which nicely captures their central

254

Legislatures and China’s democracy

argument for the state-society relationship under the reform and therefore became the title of their book. The word tethered (versus bound) conveys ‘definite latitudes’ and ‘flexibility’ in the relationships of the Chinese government with the society. The relationships of the county government with its superiors as well as with the society have been ‘enabled to stretch its political and economic tether a little further’ (Blecher and Shue 1996: 2–3). Under these often partially conflicting vertical and horizontal responsibilities, good governance depends on ‘mastering the management of the vertical and horizontal cross-pressures’ (Blecher and Shue 1996: 34). Under these four imageries, we can better see that, on the one hand, the Party Center has delegated more discretion, flexibility, and power to other actors in the grid of both vertical and horizontal ties. On the other hand, the Center’s overall control is non-negotiable, and the parameters for freedom are clearly laid out. These parameters are also supposed to be respected by all power players. Being characterized by an emphasis on developmentalism, legislative development in China is nicely woven into the overall governance of a developmental state. However, according to conventional wisdom, legislatures are long on expanding democracy, but short on assisting economic development. Then, we have to face another challenge, namely, how will China’s PPCs play an important role to democratize China? In other words, given that China has been a successful developmental state (Xia 2000a), how will the PPCs be able to affect the process of turning China into a democratic developmental state? In 1996, Henry Rowen held great hope for the role that LPCs might play in China’s democratization. He said: No one can know precisely how democracy in China will evolve, but its record over the past fifteen years and the experiences of other countries in East Asia suggest more competition in local and provincial politics, ultimately reaching the National Congress – although organized political opposition on the national level might be banned for a long time. (Rowen 1996) In my study, the future course of China is preferably conceptualized within a coordinate with democracy and development as its two axes. Among four types of possibilities (predatory dictatorship, non-democratic developmental state, non-developmental democracy, and democratic developmental state), a democratic developmental state should be the desired destination for tomorrow’s China. According to Adrian Leftwich and his associates, a developmental democracy is both democratic and developmental. The former definitive quality means sustainable competitive elections, as well as the protection of basic rights and liberties; the latter requires a minimum 4 percent average annual growth rate of GNP per capita over the last 25 to 30 years (Robinson and White 1998: 52–83). To understand the proper role legislatures have in the democratization process of a developmen-

Legislatures and China’s democracy 255 tal state, Taiwan and Hong Kong provide valuable lessons. For a long time Taiwan and Hong Kong witnessed subservient legislatures under the thumbs of strong and autonomous executives – authoritarian dictatorship in Taiwan and colonial governor in Hong Kong. However, during the past two decades, their legislative bodies have significantly changed due to two different types of dynamics – the end of military rule in Taiwan and the end of colonial rule in Hong Kong. Taiwan has to some extent successfully transformed itself into a democratic developmental state; and Hong Kong has been struggling hard to democratize its political structure against the pressure from Mainland China. After Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT (Nationalist Party) lost the civil war to the CPC and retreated to Taiwan in 1949, a military dictatorship maintained for four decades. However, from 1950 on, elections at the county and municipal level ensued and laid down the foundations for future democratization. On the one hand, people received civic training through grassroots elections and local self-government. On the other hand, the opposition party (it first called itself Tangwai – out of the Party, and later evolved into the Democratic Progressive Party – DPP, the ruling party in Taiwan after 2001) first started competing against the KMT in county and municipal elections and gained its footing in local assemblies. Since the victories at local elections did not seem too threatening, the KMT tolerated them. But soon a quiet revolution crept in. Arising out of rapid economic change, inter-party competition, and increasing social diversity drove Taiwan in the direction of democracy, and the legislatures – although not the dynamo for democratization – adapted quickly to the changing political environment. Later the legislatures gradually provided a platform for the ruling Party – the KMT and the opposition party – the DPP to engage with each other. They were able to keep their conflicts within the current structure of the constitution and managed a peaceful transition to democracy. After the democratic transition, the legislatures further expanded their roles and elevated their status. But as a matter of fact, after democratic consolidation in Taiwan the legislatures still lack an ability to transform the presidential system that gives more power to the executive, not the legislature (Xia 2000c: 28–51). In Hong Kong, the twists around the Legislative Council (Legco) during the past two decades remind us of the same lessons drawn from Taiwan’s experiences. In the last several years before their departure in 1997, the British colonial authority tried to reinvent the Legco from a minimal legislature dominated by the Executive to an active organ of representation able to defend democracy in the face of an overbearing executive. Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, also expected that the democratically elected Legco would become the decision-making center, and thus, a protector of autonomy and democracy in Hong Kong after this metropolis was returned back to the Chinese. This last-minute radical change eventually failed, because a legislature, especially a sub-national one, has difficulty being the first mover or the central driving force for national

256

Legislatures and China’s democracy

democratization. One interesting point worth noting is that the British government did not want to get rid of the ‘government that was of consultation and consensus,’ and ‘run the risk of a swift introduction of adversarial politics . . . introducing an element of instability’ when Hong Kong was under the rule of her majesty (Cheek-Milby 1995: 73). The Hong Kong business community most likely did not want to see a legislature-centered government that might challenge the executive, who had stronger ties with Beijing. The two stories of Taiwan and Hong Kong remind us what a legislature, particularly a sub-national one, can and cannot do. Based upon Taiwan’s experience, we can expect that Chinese PCs at sub-national levels, including the PPCs of this study, can provide for people civic training of participation and representation, prepare them for elections and free national elections in the future, and open up more space for dissenting voices, and even offer institutional accommodation for organized opposition forces. The PPCs are a suitable place to provide an entrance with low threshold for new social and political forces to establish a first footing in the established political structure. They are also well suited to provide an institutional structure for political contestation and pluralism. We can also expect that PCs at all level will someday become important stages for political forces, particularly new parties, to negotiate with the ruling CPC for a democratic transition. Once the democratic transition starts, we can expect that the legislatures will further strengthen their viscosity in the system and play a bigger role in a democracy. But we have to realize that the supremacy of legislatures in the polity has become passé. The Russian-style combative strategy from the Parliament in the 1990s did not work well to consolidate the status and expand the roles of parliament in a polity, particularly vis-à-vis a powerful executive branch. Even though the PC system has real potential to be omnipotent if all their constitutional powers are cashed in and methodically followed, it remains impractical to count on it being in the driver seat to usher in China’s democracy (Xia 2000b). The PCs have difficulty in being the primary driving force, or the primary mover, to enact democracy in China, but they can be good vehicles for assisting democratization. They will be first a beneficiary of democratization, then, a benefactor to democratic consolidation. The leading role in democratizing China has to come from the parties and social forces, which the PCs will interact with both as an autonomous institution and a political stage for them in order to ferment a systemic transformation. The experiences of Taiwan also serve optimism for the emergence of a democratic developmental state in China. In pursuing security, prosperity, liberty, and equality – the four most fundamental values a state tries to fulfill – China has worked out its own logic different from the hegemonic American way. American historian Henry Steele Commager described Americans priority among these four values as follows: ‘Freedom is not a luxury that we can indulge when at last we have security and prosperity and enlightenment; it

Legislatures and China’s democracy 257 is, rather, antecedent to all of these, for without it we can have neither security nor prosperity nor enlightenment’ (Rather 2001: 2). In contrast, for a long time, China put its stress on security and equality under Mao Zedong’s egalitarian utopian socialism. Its hierarchic governance was also tailored to serve these two values. As the reforms started in 1979, China shifted focus to prosperity, while abandoning equality and downplaying security. The relatively strong governance favors developmental goals over the value of political freedom. The good news is that this arrangement between democracy and growth makes sense under Chinese circumstances, and has also shown positive results in terms of China’s pursuit of developmental and democratic governance. The bad news is that the assumption of universal American way does not stand in front of my empirical studies on the PPCs and the transformation of governance into a network mode in China. If we take developmental democracy as an ideal type of governance, which most mature democracies with developed economies endorse, there are different pathways to achieve it (see Figure 8.1). Opposite the ideal governance, we find the worst scenario, the non-developmental dictatorship. Since, over the long run, modern states cannot consolidate legitimacy without maintaining a satisfactory economic performance, to be able to deliver economic prosperity and social welfare has become an important part of good governance. In other words, to be developmental is fundamental, as well as instrumental, to the achievement and maintenance of democracy. However, freedom does not necessarily improve a country’s economic performance. The major factors of governance have different impact upon a country’s economy as the country moves up on the ladder of economic development. Therefore, what matters most in good governance is not the embracement of one particular value, but the skillful sequencing of several values in governance. A statistical analysis of the data by the World Bank supports the major inferences from my research. The relationship between governance and economic development can be identified through a statistical analysis of the Governance Database from the World Bank. This database includes 133 countries, with all mini-states Developmental democracy

Developmental dictatorship

Non-developmental democracy

Non-developmental dictatorship

Figure 8.1 Evolution of good governance.

258

Legislatures and China’s democracy

excluded (World Bank 2001, 2002). While taking all 133 countries together, the freedom index (which is from the Freedom House database) and the GNP per capita based on the PPP have a moderately strong relationship (r = –0.64, keep in mind that in ‘freedom index’ a smaller number means higher degree of freedom). However, when the average annual GDP growth rate is tested with the freedom index, the correlation is very weak (r = –0.03). As we look at all factors of governance, the correlation ranges from moderate to very weak. As a matter of fact, the freedom index is least relevant to the growth rate. A general trend does emerge from the statistical analysis: from the freedom index, to voice and accountability, political stability, control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, and finally to regulatory quality, the correlation between each factor to economic growth intensifies. This general tendency clearly demonstrates a priority order for countries to address the issue of governance. As the West is treated separately, governance matters less for the economic growth in the West than in other developing countries. Two factors that have the strongest correlation with economic growth are freedom and political stability. Freedom is most relevant to economic development, in terms of its comparison to other factors as well as to itself in other developing countries. This confirms the neo-liberal argument that liberalization is important for economic growth, but only more valid in the West. It loses validity and relevancy in the context of developing/transition economies. If we group countries based on their GNP per capita (measured by PPP) above $5,000, in between $2,000–5,000, and below $2,000, it even becomes Table 8.1 The correlation of the average GDP annual growth rate (1990–9) and major indicators of governance

All 133 countries The West (24) Developing/Transitional (109) Above $5K (36) Below $5K (71) $2–5K (31) Below $3K (46) Below $2K (40)

FI

VA

PS

CC

RL

GE

RQ

r average*

–0.05 –0.26 –0.03 –0.08 –0.04 –0.02 –0.10 –0.12

0.10 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.18

–0.17 –0.26 –0.20 –0.24 –0.23 –0.07 –0.31 –0.55

–0.2 –0.06 –0.26 –0.44 –0.25 –0.33 –0.23 –0.25

0.21 0.01 0.28 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.44

0.28 0.12 0.36 0.52 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.48

0.39 0.24 0.43 0.57 0.38 0.45 0.38 0.48

0.20 0.15 0.24 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.36

Source: Calculated by the author. Notes FI: Freedom Index VA: Voice & Accountability PS: Political Stability CC: Control of Corruption RL: Rule of Law GE: Government Effectiveness RQ: Regulatory Quality * r average considers the FI values as positive since a bigger number means a low score on freedom.

Legislatures and China’s democracy 259 clearer that governance matters in different degree for economic growth in different countries, and also, its core factors matter differently under different circumstances. For all developing and transitional countries, regulatory quality is the most important factor in governance for economic growth, with government effectiveness following in second, followed by rule of law, control of corruption, and political stability. For countries with GNP per capita above $5,000 or below $2,000, governance matters most for economic growth. For the first richer group, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption have moderately strong correlation with the indicator of GDP annual growth; but regulatory quality and government effectiveness matter most. For poor countries with GNP per capita below $2,000, although regulatory quality and government effectiveness matter very much, political stability stands out as the most important factor for economic growth. As for countries with a GNP per capita in between $2,000–5,000, government effectiveness becomes the most important indicator for growth rate, followed by regulatory quality, political stability, and rule of law. For all 107 countries, under the freedom index there are three categories: ‘free’ (indices ranging from 1.5 to 2.5; total number of countries is 30, 28 percent), ‘partly free’ (3–5.5; 57; 53 percent), and ‘not free’ (6–7; 20, 19 percent). Under the GDP average annul growth rate (1990–9), these countries can be divided into five groups: ‘fast growing’ (growth rates are above 5 percent, totally 18 countries, accounting for 17 percent), ‘moderate growing’ (growth rates 4–4.9 percent, 26, 24 percent), ‘low growing’ (growth rate 2– 3.8 percent, 26, 24 percent), ‘stagnant’ (0–1.9 percent, 15, 14 percent), and ‘shrinking’ (negative growth rate, 22, 21 percent). Cross-examining these two sets of data, four poles of development patterns emerge: ‘free and fast growing’ (Chile, India, Dominican Republic, and South Korea), ‘free and shrinking’ (Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), ‘not free but fast growing’ (China, Vietnam, Syria, Laos, Myanmar, and Eritrea), and ‘not free and shrinking’ (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). In between these four poles there are the majority of countries that are not extreme in terms of indicators either of freedom or of growth rate (see Figure 8.2). Among all the fast-growing economies, 33.33 percent (six countries) were not free. This percentage is much higher than the percentage (19 percent) of not free countries out of the total of 107. Four fast-growing countries were free, accounting for 22 percent, which is lower than the percentage of free countries out of 107. Among 22 shrinking economies, five countries (23 percent) were free; this percentage is lower than the percentage of free countries out of 107. In contrast, seven countries with a shrinking economy were not free, accounting for 32 percent, which is higher than the percentage of not free countries vis-à-vis the total of 107. Putting all these together, it suggests that ‘not free’ countries face a paradox in economic development: on the one hand, they enjoy a higher chance to achieve fast growth; on the other

260

Legislatures and China’s democracy

5

4

3

2

0

1

1

2

3

4

5

1

6

7

Group FFG

Group FSH 2

Freedom

3 Group PFLG

4

Group PFMG

5

Group NFSH

Group NFFG

6 7

FSH: NFSH: FFG: NFFG: PFLG: PFMG:

Free with Shrinking Economy Not Free with Shrinking Economy Free with Fastest Growth Not Free with Fastest Growth Partially Free with Low Growth Partially Free with Moderate Growth

Figure 8.2 Distributions of developing countries in the coordinate of growth and freedom.

hand, they have a higher chance to suffer from economic collapse (see Przeworski et al. 2000). To compare China’s scores on all factors of governance with all other countries based on different levels of economic development (see Table 8.2), the Chinese characteristics stand out: regarding freedom and voice and accountability, China falls in a clear disfavor. China’s scores are lower than the averages of countries within its own economic level ($2K–5K), with Table 8.2 Governance indices of China and average indices of country groups

China ($3,940) >$5,000 $2K–5K <$5,000 <$2,000

FI

VA

PS

CC

RL

GE

RQ

–6.5 –3.11 –4.08 –4.52 –4.85

–1.11 –0.34 –0.27 –0.48 –0.65

–0.39 –0.31 –0.41 –0.57 –0.69

–0.3 –0.14 –0.57 –0.61 –0.65

–0.19 –0.19 –0.47 –0.62 –0.73

–0.14 –0.19 –0.54 –0.62 –0.69

–0.13 –0.24 –0.22 –0.33 –0.42

Source: Calculated by the author based upon the World Bank and Freedom House data.

Legislatures and China’s democracy 261 lower as well as higher level of development. Regarding political stability, China trumps the average scores of all developing/transition countries in all groups. As for government effectiveness, China scores a little bit lower than the average of countries with higher economic level (GNP per capita more than $5,000), but higher than the average scores of countries that are at the same or lower development level. On rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality, China scores lower than the average developing countries richer than China; but China enjoys advantage over the average countries within the same economic group with China or poorer. Even though China was not democratic, but China did not fall into the company with Rwanda, Burundi, and former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Political stability and government effectiveness seem to explain this significant difference. Referring to Figure 8.2, China has tried to stay away from the leftward roadways, but tried very hard to move up; Singapore was set as China’s next stop. Via Singapore, China hopes to join the rank of Chile or South Korea – both have become a developmental democracy via developmental dictatorship. In summary, in pursuing of effective governance for economic growth, there is no uniform formula for every country in the world. No magic will work in a country without taking into consideration of its economic development level. Since governance has less relevance to economic growth in the West than in developing and transitional countries, the West relies less on the role of government. But for developing and transitional countries, the role and quality of government and policy are more needed for economic growth. Overall, the sensible sequential order for developing and transitional nations to build good governance is from regulatory quality and government effectiveness, to rule of law and control of corruption, then to political stability, and finally to voice and accountability and freedom. But, for poorest countries, the most urgent issue in building governance for growth is to maintain political stability; once these countries upgrade their economy to one level up (in between $2,000–5,000 GNP per capita), government effectiveness becomes most relevant for economic growth. As these countries continue to enter the higher development level (GNP per capita passes $5,000), regulatory quality becomes the strongest factor affecting economic growth. Thus, when circumstances allow, good governance emanates when its seven factors are simultaneously well taken care of. However, since ‘politics is the art of the possible’ (Bismarck), which is always constrained by the scarcity of resources, wise leadership lies in the ability of politicians to detect a sequential order and to prioritize the factors of governance. China’s relatively successful and smooth transformation of governance in both the economy and politics is attributable to the successful sequencing of the major values in governance and the supportive role provided by the PPCs. This can be another good lesson for post-communist transitional societies and other developing countries.

262

Legislatures and China’s democracy

Ballots as the last candy It is said that the Chinese reform process started with the easiest part, and gradually stepped into the thorniest areas as it proceeded. After 20 years of decentralizing power and giving out benefits, entering the twenty-first century the Chinese state hit a bottleneck crisis – problems are jamming the system but the state holds fewer and fewer trump cards. When the CPC has no more candy to give out, the frustrated and angry individuals and groups are bound to make trouble. Based upon this analysis, He Qinglian (2003) believes that the Chinese leadership is sitting on top of a volcano. Gordon Chang (2001) predicts the coming collapse of China, probably in the coming decade. With no intention to understate the festering crises in Chinese society and polity, I still believe here that the CPC leadership has not completely painted itself into the corner. To avoid the fate of extinction, which has already happened to other ruling communist parties, and to prolong its own staying power, the CPC has to go along with the tide of human progresses – the global wave of democratization is part of it – as China continues to move up the ladder of GDP per capita. Instead of pretending that the ‘people’s democracy’ can be an authentic surrogate for a pluralist representative democracy, what the CPC should do is to continue the changes that have been going on within the PCs and manage a peaceful transition to real democracy – judged by the common criteria, namely, free and competitive election and political accountability, that have been endorsed widely by the global community. To do this, sooner or later the CPC has to allow free elections to produce its PCs. Only free elections will put meaningful ballots in the hands of people, and most importantly, these ballots are the last candies that the CPC can distribute to the disfranchised workers and peasants who have been increasingly alienated by many policies of the current system. By giving ballots instead of material rewards – which the CPC has not too many now – the ruling elite in China can really hope to co-opt the proletariat – the real proletariat in the sense of ‘outsiders’ in Chinese wealth production and distribution process – into the system. To make this point clearer, I would like to relate the network mode of governance to the social stratification and free elections. Under the old centrally planned economic system, or the economy of shortage, workers and peasants certainly occupied vantage points in the process of exchange over the business class (actually it was non-existent) and intellectuals. They controlled resources (most in the form of materials and commodities in shortage) and the minuscule processes of distributing them. In a barter economy, they could easily maximize their interests. But the intellectuals and entrepreneurs had no market for their talents and resources. As the introduction of a market economy into China deepened, a market economy devalued or deprived the workers and peasants of their valuable resources. Now their most important resources are labor to offer, which is not so much valued in a country with an over supply of it. Accordingly, the gift exchange economy and guanxixue (the art of guanxi) have made some

Legislatures and China’s democracy 263 important changes during the past decade (see also Yan 1994; Yang 1994). As the contents of gift, offering free labor and service and giving homemade food have gradually lost its prominence, commodities and cash have become more important. In guanxi practice as well as in a network society, ordinary workers (such as construction workers, drivers, and department store clerks) who used to have access to scarce commodities have most likely lost their value in the guanxi exchange after the Chinese market was liberalized in the late 1980s. Later those people (such as procuring and marketing agents) who controlled scarce raw materials also saw them devalued in guangxi networks as marketization eroded their monopoly over scarce materials. If we carefully examine the changes of the guanxixue during the past decade, we can clearly see the tendency of increasing importance of elites in contrast to the devaluation of workers and low-level clerical employees. The explanation for this lies in the co-existence of a process of marketization for commodities and raw materials and the continued state control over capital, human resources, and opportunities (such as license, land-leasing, and so forth). However, state control itself does not have to privilege the state functionaries to get better positions in guanxi networks. The privileged position of state employees was created by another development with the state. As the state bureaucracy gradually softened its hierarchical control over its officials, it resorted more and more to bargaining and reciprocity to elicit cooperation from the officials and achieve the administrative control. The network strategy used by the state loosened its control over its own officials and encouraged the societal forces to pull guanxi to the state bureaucracy. This radical change created winners and losers who can be easily differentiated from each other merely by looking at what resources they control in Chinese society. The officials control power (political and organizational resources), the business people control capital (financial and economic resources), and the intellectuals control knowledge and technology (cultural resources). All these resources are scarce in a developing country such as China, and therefore give the holders of them strategic superiority in social exchange over other people. The holders of strategically valuable resources can naturally claim more from the social exchange process. In contrast, due to the oversupply of manpower in Chinese economy, the adoption of a competitive market economy and the improvement of economic efficiency have driven more and more workers out of workshops and peasants out of fields. Millions who have lost their jobs have been deprived of access to valuable resources and denied opportunities to claim rewards through exchange mechanism. This real proletariat is turning against the vanguard party that has claimed to represent them – riots in both the countryside and cities have increased rapidly. This problem was worsened by the fact that the Chinese government has diminishing luxury to throw money at the problem. Consequently, we have seen such a disjointing phenomenon in Chinese politics. At the level of elite politics, stability, solidarity, and compromise have become the overarching values; mohe politics is the game of

264

Legislatures and China’s democracy

meeting rooms. But at the level of interactions between elites and disadvantaged peasants and workers – an underclass is forming from them, violence in a variety of forms (repression, crackdown, and execution meted out by the ruling establishment; sabotage, confrontation, riot, and crime done by the people at the lower social strata) has featured in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Conflict and crackdown is the game on the street. To use a metaphor here, when the elite groups (Party and government officials, business people, professionals, and intellectuals – the main body of the emerging upper and middle class in China) have been entitled through the transition to a market economy to play their card game at the table, too many laid-off workers and floating peasants in cities have no cards in their hands and therefore are kept off the game to win their lottery. These desperate and angry people are lurking around and seeking opportunity to steal cards or overthrow the card table for a new reshuffle. The Chinese system is facing a danger of having too many losers who do not care about the game and want to destroy the rules of the game. According to a survey conducted by Chinese sociologists, the Chinese social stratum is like a pyramid that consists of an elite class (accounting for 9.3 percent of the entire population and mainly including cadre, business managers, professionals, and some private-business owners), a middle class (roughly 20 percent), and a lower class (if we include manufacturing workers, peasants, and those working in service sectors, and the unemployed, the total number of this group can account for 70 percent of the entire population) in 1999 (Lu 2001). In contrast to this pyramid, the huge bottom of the Chinese population is least represented in the ‘people’s congresses.’ The Electoral Law has a straightforward clause (12 and 13) discriminating against peasants. The ratio for the electorate of PDs is 4:1 between rural and urban areas. For example, if it needs 10,000 urban dwellers to elect a PD, it often takes 40,000 peasants to have one. The loss of Yao Xiurong (see Chapter 4) is indicative of how the weak groups are further marginalized under the current system. In the election of NPC deputies in 2003 when Yao was denied a chance, among 165 NPCPDs elected from Henan Province only one was a worker. Among those from the city of Jiaozuo, there was no worker (the quota for a worker was used by a general manager of a stateowned enterprise) or peasant. In the elections for the PPCPDs from Jiaozuo, 38 were chosen from 47 candidates. Among the nine losers were four worker candidates (out of eight), four peasant candidates (out of nine), and one intellectual candidate. Li Chaoyi, the popular PPCPD, commented: The people’s deputies represent the people. Workers and peasants are the majority of the people, therefore, they should account for certain percentage in the PDs. The current situation is that workers and peasants have fewer representatives. They have less chance to represent themselves than to be represented (by others). (NFC 06/16/03)

Legislatures and China’s democracy 265 In explaining why this happened, Yao posed a rhetorical question: ‘The deputies from officials have power, business people have money. What does Yao Xiurong have?’ (NFC 06/16/03) In light of a network approach, Yao’s downfall was inevitable. First, she was not as well connected to the system as those who have survived longer in the system, such as Wu Qing, Luo Shiying, and Feng Youwei. One crucial difference is that Yao did not have strategically important resources as the latter group does. Second, related to the lack of connections and resources, Yao did not apply the mohe strategy as well as the long-term survivors – most from the group of intellectuals. As one Shanghai MPC deputy categorized his strategy of getting things done as a marathon process of ‘clashes, seesaws, and grindings (mohe)’ (Quanguo 2000a: 102), Yao was clearly discriminated against by the mohe-style power game, for she was less refined – a blue-collar working-class style. If we have heard loud complaining words from a popular model worker who served as people’s deputy for two terms in the NPC, the Chinese ruling elite should reflect upon the problems – particularly those mechanisms inhibiting the popular mood from being represented – in order to ameliorate them. The only way out for Chinese elite groups is through enfranchising this angry population to defuse the crisis. It is feasible, because it costs little (certainly spending for elections should be considered separately), if the CPC elite learns how to manage and win elections, they can maintain their vitality. For the proletariat, because they hold ballots, certainly they will be able to use their new political clout – ballots – to reengage with the ruling Party; if not, then to attract anti-regime political elites to represent them and build up an alliance between some members of elite and lower class. And eventually they can shape the public policy agenda for their benefits. Measures that follow such as progressive policies (e.g., more accessible welfare, education and loans, and so forth) will give the proletariat a stake in the system. Their ballots will draw them into the table of exchange – to cash in for representation in a political market – to claim their rewards within the system. Considering that the marginalized populace is losing out in the PCs, to continue improving the deputy quality through increasing cultural level and educational background will produce unexpected consequences upon the entire PC system. One of the most serious is the weakening of the legitimacy of the PCs and jeopardizing China’s democratization. To take the composition of NPC deputies as an example, it is encouraging to see that the educational level of NPC deputies continued to rise (93 percent deputies in the 10th NPC had a college level education, in comparison to 45 percent 20 years ago). But the other side of the coin is disturbing. Workers and peasants continue to lose ground in the NPC with their percentage shrinking from 27 percent 20 years ago to the current 19 percent (see Table 8.3). For radical theorists of participatory democracy, people’s background and experiences are often tacit knowledge; it is impossible for someone to fully represent the true interest for those with different background and experiences.

266

Legislatures and China’s democracy

Undoubtedly, this decline is against the democratic principle. Even for moderate theorists who believe in the effectiveness of representation (either through an authorization of trusteeship or mandate), given the weak existence of electoral connections between the Chinese people and their PDs (particularly so for the NPCPDs and PPCPDs), the weakening presence of workers’ and peasants’ deputies are eroding the fair protection of the interests of the marginalized population. As Yao complained, ‘The government has really been detached from the common people of one hundred surnames. Not to let it go, you have to grapple with it tightly. The PDs are kind of rope connecting the government and common people’ (NFC 06/16/03). Therefore, without fully implementing free and competitive elections, the rhetoric of improving deputy quality would only mean the continued phasing out of popular representatives from the lower strata of Chinese society. To solve this paradox between efficiency (a desirable goal achieved through the improvement of deputy quality) and democratic representation, the final solution is the introduction of true, free, and competitive elections (O’Brien and Li 1993–4; Cai 1998: 220–1). To continue thinking in the line of network analysis, the entire PC system – the PPCs included – has to thicken their ties with their most important constituency – the people. To secure their power stature as the supreme power organs in the system, the PCs need people’s mandate authorized through genuinely democratic electoral processes. The thickening of these electoral connections will, on the one hand, bring voters and the deputies closer to each other and produce a process of mutual empowerment for them in a party-state; on the other hand, it will embolden more deputies to fight for people’s rights and interests with greater courage. Once China has entered this stage, the state-based network mode of governance will shift toward a more society-centered network mode of governance, a new and democratic state–society relationship will be created. Democratization will become an inevitable option for the CPC elite to reconcile its conflict with the populace as well as with its largest opposition party – the government of the United States. The Taiwan lesson in moving to democracy is that democracy lends legitimacy to a system that was abandoned by the global community in the 1970s and justifies the support from the U.S. in a possible showdown between the mainland and Taiwan. Since China is embedded in a global network dominated by the only superpower – the United States, the political elite in China has to heed the constraints arising from the U.S. hegemony. An interesting parallel runs in Chinese domestic politics and American foreign policy: as the CPC has tried to maintain its centrality, hegemony and primacy in the power net in China, the United States has just tried to do the same on the global arena. In this global context, certainly China is like a small (although rapidly growing) spider vis-à-vis the United States as the big spider. To maintain space for maneuvering and avoid inviting intervention from the spider occupying the central position, China has to attune itself to the drumbeat of the United States –

Table 8.3 The composition of NPC deputies (1983–2003)

Total no. CPC member Non-partisans/DPs Workers/Peasants Cadres PLA Intellectuals Returned overseas Chinese Minority nationalities Women College education

6th (83–8)

7th (88–93)

8th (93–8)

9th (98–03)

10th (03–)

2,978 1,861 (62.5%) 1,543 (18.2%) 1,791 (26.6%) 1,636 (21.4%) 1,267 (8.97%) 1,701 (23.5%) 1, 40 (1.3%) 1,404 (13.6%) 1,632 (21.2%) 1, 45%

2,970 1,986 (66.8%) 1,540 (18.2%) 1,684 (23%) 1,733 (24.7%) 1,267 (9%) 1,697 (23.4%) 1, 49 (1.6%) 1,445 (15%) 1,634 (21.3%) 1, 56%

2,978 2,037 (68.4%) 1,572 (19.2%) 1,612 (20.6%) 1,842 (28.3%) 1,267 (9%) 1,649 (21.8%) 1, 36 (1.2%) 1,439 (14.8%) 1,626 (21%) 1, 69%

2,979 2,130 (71.5%) 1,460 (15.4%) 1,563 (18.8%) 1,988 (33.2%) 1,268 (9%) 1,628 (21.1%) 1, 37 (1.31%) 1,428 (14.4%) 1,650 (21.8%) 1, 81.2%

2,985 2,178 (72.99%) 1,480 (16.09%) 1,551 (18.46%) 1,968 (32.44%) 1,268 (8.98%) 1,631 (21.14%) 1, 38 (1.27%) 1,415 (13.91%) 1,604 (20.24%) 1, 92.46%

Source: O’Brien and Li 1993–4: 25; Liu et al. 1999: 1420–1; Cai and Wang 2001: 126; XHS (posted at www.rednet.com.cn), accessed on 03/02/03.

268

Legislatures and China’s democracy

here the most important issue is whether China would wholeheartedly embrace the only viable ideology of liberal democracy. If the United States uses this structural leverage wisely, the hegemon of the world will be able to offer more contextual incentive for China to make the move to democracy. Here another important factor is the Taiwan issue. For China to pursue a reunification with Taiwan and at the same time not to provoke the U.S. to intervene, democracy is the last and best card that China can play in its foreign policy. Therefore, we have reason to believe, the contextual factors from global power network and the triggering factors from the internal power net combined will generate strong incentives for Chinese power elite not to resist the fourth wave of democracy that is bound to come. The defining feature of democracy is free elections. Even though I have argued in this book that China has pursued a unique legislative development featured institutional linkages and co-opetition strategy, it does not mean that China can permanently remain as an exception to the fundamental principle of a representative government: the union of representation and participation. The concept of representation produces representatives as leaders; people get political education and initiative through participation and they elect the representatives (Dehaven-Smith 1999: 68). As J. S. Mill argues for the representative government in his classic work, Considerations on Representative Government: There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general. (Mill 1958: 42) The Chinese elite and the PC system need to establish much stronger linkages between the PCs and their voters in order to make the former more meaningful and prestigious, as well as, to provide the latter more channels for participation and more incentives for inclusion. One Chinese legislative scholar told me in the interview, ‘The PCs in China have had engine or motor installed. But they need fuel for producing power’ (Int. LJL-9806). This fuel is the will of the people expressed through elections and votes. Since elections are complex and costly, if the CPC likes to seriously think about this option, it has to keep this timetable in mind. There are only 20 years or less for the CPC to engineer this process. Henry Rowen predicted that China would become democratic around 2015. Considering the remarkable economic development in China, this destination most likely will come, whether the CPC elite likes it or not. Besides, it is worth pointing out, the CPC has defaulted its social compact with the Chinese people for over 60 years. Mao Zedong promised the

Legislatures and China’s democracy 269 Chinese people free elections and a real people’s democracy way back to 1940. In an article entitled ‘On New Democracy,’ Mao (1965: 352) claimed: ‘China may now adopt a system of people’s congress, from the national people’s congress down to the provincial, county, district and township people’s congresses, with all levels electing their respective governmental bodies.’ Unfortunately, after winning power in 1949, the CPC immediately abandoned this lofty ideal. In an address to Beijing MPC meeting, Liu Shaoqi, Vice-Chairman of the new national government, stated this policy change: Talking about elections, some people often relate them to this old slogan: ‘universal, equal, direct and anonymous.’ Undoubtedly, under Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary autocracy it had progressive intention to use this propaganda slogan against Chiang Kai-shek’s autocratic regime. But if someone asks for an immediate implementation of this slogan under today’s new democracy, it is not appropriate for the current situation of Chinese people, and therefore, cannot be adopted. The majority of Chinese masses – mainly the laboring people – still do not read, have no experiences in elections, and their enthusiasm for and interest in elections are still not sufficient. . . . The elections based upon the principle of ‘universal, equal, direct, and anonymous vote’ cannot be and should not be adopted under the current circumstances. Only if the preparatory work has been done well, the majority of Chinese people have received long enough training in elections, and they can read; we can finally and fully adopt them. (Liu et al. 1999: 977) Although almost 60 years have passed, the communist promise for preparing China for free elections has never been kept. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping again cautioned the Chinese that they had to wait 20 to 30 years for free elections, and before that, he had to first turn around the economy and lead China into the category of a well-off country. In 1987 at a meeting with former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Deng said again, ‘Direct elections for the nation’s leaders cannot be held right now, but can be held in twenty or thirty years’ (Des Forges et al. 1993: 141). That means, even according to Deng’s own timetable, the year 2015 should be the watershed for free elections. In the same year, Deng told a group of members of the Drafting Committee for Hong Kong Basic Law that China will not adopt ‘elections with multiparty competition’ and popular elections could be implemented in the middle of the twenty-first century. Deng backtracked on his promises and postponed free elections by half a century (Deng 1994: 220). If we take this time frame, it means that the CPC must allow free elections before 2040. But unfortunately, even today the Chinese ruling elite has not unambiguously made any statement to envision a democratically elected system. In 2002, Cai Dingjian (2002), a renowned NPC in-house researcher, released a research report that gives his assessment on the current state and

270

Legislatures and China’s democracy

future choice of elections in China. Based upon large-scale surveys, Cai has found that, due to distortion and manipulation in Chinese elections, the people with higher education (e.g., college students, researchers in cultural and scientific institutions) do not demonstrate stronger interest in voting than peasants with less education but who have been allowed to conduct relatively free and competitive elections at village level. From this empirical finding, he infers two conclusions. First, the popular pretext that Chinese people are not ready for free elections is groundless. Second, ‘If democracy concerns people’s material interest, people have an interest to participate.’ Democracy should be a ‘method for people’s to get material interest.’ In addition, Cai also pointed out that elections have become an effective mechanism for managing thorny issues and solving crises. Contradicting the common perception, he concluded, ‘Elections did not turn society into chaos. Rather, they turned society from chaos into good rule’ (DWN 03/20/02). By the way, his words got him into so much trouble that the NPC executive vice-chairman subsequently silenced him and forced him out of the NPC (Int.WYL-0308). To achieve the goal of implementing free elections between 2015 and 2040, the CPC has to first allow free elections at the local level (at least city level) or some restricted regions and repeat these for at least two terms in order to be prepared for nationwide free elections. If that is what should be done, after the year 2015, the CPC must introduce free elections in order to accumulate experiences and knowledge in electoral politics. Then, the ruling party now has to deliberate a schedule about when and how to mentally prepare the Chinese – both officials and ordinary citizens – for this historical change. From now on to the year 2015, the Chinese elite has only two rounds of elections at and above the township level (2008 and 2013), and three to four rounds of elections at the village level. The window of opportunity for the CPC to manage a well-planned, orderly, and gradual democratization under its leadership (this is what the CPC wants) is not going to keep wide open for too long. If the CPC does not make comprehensive plans to grab it now, it may miss it forever. Even worse, if the CPC cannot manage the democratic transition, the force for democratization will manage the CPC. If that is the case, the CPC may miss the opportunity to survive and evolve. Given the inevitability of democratization in China, the concern for us is whether Chinese will get it sooner or later, at a lower or higher prize. Without full deliberation, elaborate coordination, and elite consensus, the chance to see a democratic chaos will increase. Nevertheless, the happy ending of transition will be made possible by the presence of patience from the people and the vision from the elite to accept gradual change: gradualism has to be accepted by the former; change to be initiated by the latter. Shaohua Hu (2000) reminds Chinese democrats to take into consideration the following five factors: historical legacies, local forces, the world system, social values, and economic development. To implement smooth democratic elections, the Chinese – both elite and populace – also have to overcome

Legislatures and China’s democracy 271 three syndromes: the early Republican syndrome of corrupt elections and its ensuing warlordism (Young 1977; Chang and Nathan 1978; Zhao 2000), the syndrome of 1979–80 university campus elections (Min and Li 1995: 483–552; Chen 1999: 66; Cai 2002: 10–20), and the 1989 Tiananmen syndrome. From the experiences of previous short-lived campaigns and elections, the Chinese democrats can learn a lot about what could go wrong. More than a decade ago, Benjamin R. Barber had prescient insights for the movers and shakers of democratization: Democrats need to seek out indigenous democratic impulses. There is always a desire for self-government, always some expression of participation, accountability, consent, and representation, even in traditional hierarchical societies. These need to be identified, tapped, modified, and incorporated into new democratic practices with an indigenous flavor. The tortoises among the democratizers may ultimately outlive or outpace the hares, for they have the time and patience to explore conditions along the way, and to adapt to their gait to changing circumstances. Tragically, democracy in a hurry often looks something like France in 1794 or China in 1989. (Barber 1992: 63) Partially in response to the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, many Chinese intellectuals turned their attention to the creation of concrete institutions at the grassroots. In a research project on the institutions and operations of the PCs in counties and villages, Professor Rong Jingben and his colleagues designed a gradual pattern for China’s democratization. Elections would be opened first in villages, then in townships and then in counties, generating free competition to pave the way for a ‘cooperative democracy’ in China. Rong expects a ‘butterfly effect’ in Chinese democratization. A butterfly that flutters its wings in the Chinese countryside will create a twister in Beijing (Rong et al. 1998). Maybe the PC system and dozens of new institutions and rules accompanying it are precisely these kinds of small changes that will be amplified a thousand times and eventually cause a democratic twister in China.

Appendix 1

List of interviewees CBR-9807, Staff Member of the Lawmaking Work Office, MPC (MDCG). CDJ-9806, 9906, 0205, Professor, Deputy Bureau Director, NPC General Office. CGQ-9906, Vice Chairman, Municipal (Bigger City) CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). CGY-9906, Director of Department of Bills, the Municipal (Bigger City) CPPCC. CJT-9806, former Deputy Bureau Director of Environmental Protection and Vice Chairman of the Urban Construction and Environmental Protection Work Committee, and MPC Standing Committee Member in a MDCG. CXS-9806, Deputy Director, the General Office of Standing Committee, District People’s Congress in a Bigger City. DG-9806, Professor of Political Science, Institute Director of Political Science, Provincial Academy of Social Sciences. DMY-9806, Professor of Business Law, University Law School. GX-9806, NPC Standing Committee Member, former Vice Minister of State Planning Committee. GXW-9805, Staff Member of the Lawmaking Work Committee, Municipal (Bigger City) People’s Congress. HDC-9806, Professor of Political Science, Provincial Police Academy. HG-9906, Director of Cadre Training, Organization Department of the Party Committee (A Bigger City). HJN-9906, Director of the Office, Lawmaking Work Committee, Municipal (Bigger City) People’s Congress. HSG-0305, Judge and Deputy Director of Economic Division, High People’s Court. HWJ-9807, Deputy Director of the Policy Research Office, Provincial Government. HXD-9805, 9906, Township Mayor and Chairman of Township People’s Congress.

Appendix 1

273

JCR-9806, 0208, Professor of Political Science, Deputy Dean of School of International Relations, Senior Advisor for the NPC Research Office. LCD-9905, Deputy General Secretary, Legislative Yuan, Taiwan. LHM-9806, County People’s Deputy and Director of the General Office, County People’s Congress Standing Committee. LJ-9806, 0304; Professor of Political Science, Research Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, Member of Municipal CPPCC (Political Consultative Conference) (MDCG). LJL-9806, Professor and Department Chair of Political Education, University in Northwest. LM-9806, Associate Senior Fellow, Academy of Social Science. LNL-9806, Senior Researcher of Law Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science. LQ-0306, Township Mayor, Shanghai. LSG-9906, Senior Law Drafter, Municipal (a Bigger City) Legislative Bureau. LSY-9605, 9806, Law Professor, Member of PPC Standing Committee and Committee of Political and Legal Affairs. PLX-9906, President of Academy of Social Sciences (in a Bigger City). PXZ-9806, University Professor of Political Science, Leading Scholar on the System of People’s Congresses. QSJ-9806, Senior Research Fellow, Professor of Literature, Academy of Social Sciences, Member of CPPCC at the National and Municipal Levels. QYT-0109, University Vice-President, Law Professor, People’s Deputy of the PPC. SGH-9806, University Professor of Political Science. SYC-0301, Professor of Political Science, Director of the Department of Marxism and Leninism Education at a Leading University. TSR-9806, Senior Teacher at High School, People’s Deputy to the Municipal (Bigger City) People’s Congress. WBJ-0105, Associate Professor of Political Science, Executive Deputy Director of the Department of Propaganda, District Government in a MDCG. WBZ-9806, Professor of Political Science, University President, Party Secretary for the Union of Social Science, and PPC member. WHD-9806, Deputy Secretary General, NPC Standing Committee. WKP-9806, Deputy Director of Personnel Department, NPC General Office. WMG-9806, Deputy Bureau Director of Education (District Government), Principal Senior Teacher, MPC Member (MDCG). WQ-9806, University Professor of English, People’s Deputy of the MPC (MDCG) and District People’s Congress. WQT-9806, Professor of Engineering Science, Director of Science, Education, Cultural and Health Affairs Work Committee, PPC Standing Committee member.

274

Appencix 1

WYL-9806, 9906, 0205, 0208, 0308, NPC Staff member, Department Head for Women and Children, Interior and Legal Affairs Committee. WYS-9896, Professor of Engineering Science, Academician of the China’s Academy of Engineering Sciences, NPC and PPC People’s Deputy. WZY-9806, Department Director of Lawmaking Work Committee, MPC Standing Committee (MDCG). XH-9806, Director of the Neighborhood Agency (a Bigger City). XJY-9906, Section Director for State Capital Management, District Government in a Bigger City. XSS-9606, former official in Hunan Provincial Government. XWG-9806, Director of General Office, County Party Committee in Sichuan. YAM-9807, Director of Budgetary Committee, Municipal (a Bigger City) People’s Congress. YB-9806, NPC Standing Committee member, former Minister and Governor. YJ-0205, Vice-Chairwoman for District Women Federation and District CPPCC Standing Committee Member. YLC-9806, Deputy Director of Financial and Economic Affairs Work Committee, PPC Standing Committee Member. YXY-9806, Professor of Law, Legal Consultant for the MPC (MDCG). ZJX-9806, Deputy Editor and Director for the Editorial Department, Municipal Newspaper. ZSK-9807, University Vice President, MPC Vice Chairman (MDCG). ZTX-9806, Deputy Director of the Secretariat, Research Office of PPC Standing Committee, Deputy Editor for a leading journal on the system of people’s congresses. ZW-9806, 0304, 0306, 0308, Professor of Law, Deputy Director of PPC Lawmaking Work Committee. ZWQ-9806, Deputy Director, Research Office of the PPC Standing Committee, Editor-in-Chief for a journal of the System of People’s Congresses. ZXM-9806, Director of Office, the Lawmaking Work Committee, Municipal (Bigger City) People’s Congress. ZYF-9907, Municipal (Bigger City) People’s Deputy, Branch President, the China’s Industrial and Commercial Bank in a District of a Bigger City.

Appendix 2

Electronic resources for the People’s Congresses Ё೑Ҏ໻㔥 (Website of China’s People’s Congresses): www.npc.gov.cn/ Ё೑Ҏ໻ᮄ䯏 (NPC News): npc.people.com.cn Ё೑Ҏ໻ᮄ䯏ഄᮍ㔥キ (Local Websites for the People’s Congress News in China) npc.people.com.cn/GB/57334/index.html ग़ሞҎ໻ᬓण䌘᭭∛㓪 (NPC): peopledaily.com.cn/item/lianghui/zlhb/ zlhb.htm/ ഄᮍゟ⊩㔥 (Local Law Network): www.locallaw.com.cn/ Ё೑⊩ᕟ⊩㾘䌘䆃㔥 (Local Statutes in China Laws and Regulations Information): www.chinalaw114.com/difang ࣫Ҁ໻ᄺЁ೑ഄᮍᬓᑰϢഄᮍ⊏⧚ⷨおЁᖗ (Center for Local Governments and Governance, Beijing University): www.chinaelections. com ࣫ҀᏖҎ໻㔥ഔ (Beijing): www.bjrd.gov.cn 噝 ࣫Ҁϰජऎ (East City District, Beijing): renda.bjdch.gov.cn/ • ࣫Ҁᳱ䰇ऎҎ໻ (Chaoyang District) chyrd.bjchy.gov.cn/ ໽⋹ᏖҎ໻ (Tianjin) www.tjrd.gov.cn/ www.tj.xinhua.org/tjzw/ rdcwhzcry.htm Ϟ⍋ᏖҎ໻㔥ഔ (Shanghai): www.spcsc.sh.cn Ϟ⍋Ҏ໻ֵᙃに (Shanghai): www.spcsc.sh.cn/home/index.asp • 噝 • •

Ϟ⍋ᅱቅওҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Baoshan): renda.jsol.net/renda.html/ ᕤ∛ऎҎ໻ (Xuhui District, Shanghai): www.xh.sh.cn/43/ 䞥ቅऎҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻Ӯ (Jingshan District, Shanghai): renda.jsol.net/ and 61.129.67.24/link/renda/default.asp 䭓ᅕҎ໻㱍ḹҷ㸼㒘 (Hongqiao Group of People’s Deputies, Changning District): www.hongqiao.sh.cn/hqdb/

䞡ᑚᏖҎ໻ (Chongqing): www.rd.cq.gov.cn/ 䖑ᅕⳕҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Liaoning): www.lnrd.gov.cn/

276 • • • •

Appencix 2 ≜䰇 (Shenyang): www.syrd.gov.cn ≜䰇Ꮦ㢣ᆊቃऎҎ໻ (Sujiatun District, Shenyang): www.sjtrd.com/ ໻䖲 (Dalian): rddl.runsky.com/ 㧹ষᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ Yingkou): rdinfo.yingkou.gov.cn/

ঢ়ᵫⳕҎ໻ (Jilin): www.ccrd.cn/index.jsp and www.chinajilin.com.cn/ renda/index.htm • •

䭓᯹ (Changchun): www.ccrd.cn/index.jsp ∾⏙ওҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Wangqing County): www.wqrd.gov.cn/

咥啭∳ⳕҎ໻ (Heilongjiang): www.hljrd.gov.cn/ •

જᇨⒼᏖ (Harbin): www.hrbsrd.gov.cn/

‫ݙ‬㩭স (Inner Mongolia): www.nmg.gov.cn/zf/rd/ld7.htm • •

੐੠⌽⡍Ꮦ (Huhehot): www.hhhtrd.gov.cn/ ࣙ༈Ꮦ (Baotou): www.btrd.gov.cn/

⊇࣫ⳕҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Hebei): 210.73.40.65/ ⊇࣫ⳕҎ໻ (Hebei): www.hbrd.net/ and www.hbrd.gov.cn/ • •

⷇ᆊᑘᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ Shijiazhuang): www.rd.sjz.net.cn/ ૤ቅᏖ (Tangshan): swdw.tsee.net/enterprise/tsrdcwh/index.htm

ቅ㽓ⳕҎ໻ (Shanxi): www.sxgov.cn/sxrd/zlk/jyjd/ and www.shanxi-china. com/sxrd/rendajianjie.htm • • •

ljҎ⇥ҷ㸼᡹NJ (Newspaper of People’s Deputies): www.huanghenet. com.cn/rmdbb/ ቅ㽓໻ৠᏖҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻Ӯ (Datong, Shanxi): www.dtsrdcwh.gov.cn/ Ј≒Ꮦ (Linfen): www.linfen.gov.cn

⊇फⳕ (Henan Province): www.henanrd.gov.cn/ • • • • •

⊇फⳕҎ໻ljҎ໻ᓎ䆒NJ (Construction of People’s Congresses): www.rdjs.com.cn/ ⋯䰇Ҏ໻ (Luoyang): www.ly.gov.cn/rd/rd.htm/ ⊇फଚϬᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Shangqiu Municipla PCSC): www.shangqiu. gov.cn/rd/ 䚥ᎲᏖ䞥∈ऎҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻Ӯ (Jinshui District, Zhengzhou): www. zzjsqrd.gov.cn/ 䭓㨯ᏖҎ໻ (Changge): www.cgrd.org/

Appendix 2

277

ቅϰⳕҎ໻ (Shandong): www.sdrd.gov.cn/ • • • •

䴦ቯᏖҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻Ӯ (Qingdao, Shandong): www.gov.qd.sd.cn/lhzj. htm 䴦ቯᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Qingdao): rdcwh.qingdao.gov.cn/renda/fazhiju/ dl.htm/ ቅϰⳕ⎘मᏖ (Zibo): zb-www.sd.cninfo.net/renda/default.htm/ ┡ഞᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Weifang): www.wfrenda.gov.cn/

∳㢣Ҏ໻ (Jiangsu): www.jsrd.gov.cn/ • • • • •

∳㢣ᡀᎲᏖҎ໻ (Yangzhou, Jiangsu): www.yzrd.gov.cn/ फҀᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Nanjing): s-rd-t.nj.gov.cn/ ᡀᎲҎ໻ (Yangzhou): www.yzrd.gov.cn/ ∳㢣ⳕᅱᑨওҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Baoyin, Jiangsu): www.byxw.yz.jsinfo. net/rd/ 催䚂 (Gaoyou): www.gyrd.gov.cn/

⌭∳ⳕҎ໻ (Zhejiang): www.zjrd.gov.cn/portal/Desktop. aspx?PATH=cnzjrd/sy ⌭∳Ҏ໻ᴖᖫ (Zhejiang PC Magazine): www.zjrd.net/ • • • •

ᅕ⊶ᏖҎ໻ (Ningbo): www.nbrd.gov.cn/nbrd/index.asp ௝݈ᏖҎ໻ֵ݀݅ᙃ㔥 (Jiaxin): www.jxrenda.gov.cn/ 㟳ቅᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Zhoushan): www.zjzsrd.gov.cn/ 䭓݈ওҎ໻ (Changxin County): rd.cx001.com/

ᅝᖑⳕ (Anhui Province): www.ahrd.gov.cn/web/Desktop. aspx?PATH=ahrd/sy •

ᅝᑚᏖ (Anqing): china-anqing.org/maindoc/gov/shirenda.htm/

∳㽓ⳕҎ໻ (Jiangxi): www.jxrd.gov.cn/index.htm ␪फҎ໻ (Hunan): www.hunan.gov.cn/shrd/index.htm/ ␪फⳕҎ໻ (Hunan): www.hunan.gov.cn/hnrd/index.php • •

␬╁ᏖҎ໻ (Xiangtan, Hunan): www.xiangtan.gov.cn/renda/renda. htm ␪फⳕঠዄওҎ໻ (Shuangfeng County): www.sfrd.cn/

␪࣫ⳕҎ໻ (Hubei): www.hppc.gov.cn/index.asp •

℺∝ᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Wuhan): www.whtv.com.cn/rd.index.htm/

ᑓϰҎ໻ֵᙃに (Guangdong): www.rd.gd.cn/

278 • • • • • • • • • •

Appencix 2 ⏅ഇᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Shenzhen): www.sz.gov.cn/rdcwh/ ⏅ഇᏖҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻ӮᐌࡵྨਬӮ (Shenzhen, Guangdong): rdcwh. sz.gov.cn/ ᑓϰⳕᑓᎲᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Guangzhou): www.gz.gov.cn/gz/rd/ rd.htm/ ᑓϰⳕ∩༈ᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Shantou): www.strd.gov.cn/) and www. shantou.gov.cn/ldjj/renda.htm/ ᑓϰⳕफ⍋ᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Nanhai): www.nanhai.gov.cn/nhnj/ nhzhzh/nhrd.html/ ᑓᎲ໽⊇ऎҎ໻ (Tianhe District, Guangzhou): renda.thnet.gov.cn/ ⏅ഇᅱᅝऎ (Bao’an District): www.baoan.gov.cn/title3/sub_t3_2_ 0.htm ЁቅᏖҎ໻ (Zhongshan): www.zsrd.gov.cn/ ԯቅᏖҎ໻ (Foshan): www.fsrd.gov.cn/ ᚴᎲᏖҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻Ӯ (Huizhou): rd.huizhou.gov.cn/

ᑓ㽓Ҏ໻ (Guangxi): www.gxrd.gov.cn/ •

᷇ᎲҎ໻ (Liuzhou): www.lzrd.gov.cn/

⽣ᓎҎ໻ (Fujian Province): www.fjrd.gov.cn/home/DesktopDefault.aspx • ljҎ⇥ᬓയNJ᳜ߞ (People’s Forum): www.fujian-window.com. cn/Fujian_w/news/rmzt/index.html • ॺ䮼Ҏ໻ (Xiamen): www.china-xiamen.org/xmzy.htm/ • ⽣ᓎⳕॺ䮼Ꮦ䲚㕢ऎҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Jimei, Xiamen): www.xm.cei.gov/ xmjm/dzjg/rd.htm/ • ⽣ᓎⳕῳᎲᏖҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Zhangzhou): www.zhangzhou.net/zfzc/zf/ renda.html/ • ⽣ᎲᏖৄ∳ऎҎ໻ (Taijiang District, Fuzhou): www.fztjrd. gov.cn/ ⍋फⳕҎ໻ (Hainan): www.hainanpc.net/ •

⍋ষᏖҎ໻ (Haikou): www.haikou.gov.cn/

ಯᎱⳕҎ໻ᐌྨӮ (Sichuan): www.scsti.ac.cn/ch/gov/rdh.html/ ಯᎱⳕҎ໻ (Sichuan): www.rd.sc.cn/ •

៤䛑Ꮦ (Chengdu): www.rd.chengdu.gov.cn/

ѥफⳕҎ໻ (Yunnan): www.ynpcsc.gov.cn/ •

ढᅕওҎ໻ (Huaning County): www.huaning.com.cn/hnrd/xynews/ index.asp

Appendix 2

279

䌉ᎲⳕҎ໻ (Guizhou): www.gzrd.gov.cn/ 䰩㽓Ҏ໻ (Shaanxi): www.sxrd.gov.cn/ 䰩㽓Ҏ໻ᮄ䯏㔥 (Shaanxi): www.sxrdxw.com/ ⫬㙗ⳕljҎ໻ⷨおNJѦ㘨㔥 (Gansu): www.rdyj.com.cn •

⫬㙗໽∈ᏖҎ⇥ҷ㸼໻Ӯ (Tianshui, Gansu): www.tianshui.gov.cn/ lhzt/renda.htm

ᅕ໣ಲᮣ㞾⊏ऎ (Ningxia): www.nxrd.gov.cn/ 䴦⍋ⳕҎ໻ (Qinghai): www.qhrd.gov.cn/qhrd/DesktopDefault.aspx ᮄ⭚㓈਒ᇨ㞾⊏ऎҎ໻ (Xinjiang): www.xj.cei.gov.cn/xjzf/xjrd.htm/ •

Р剕᳼唤ᏖҎ໻ (Urumqi): srd.urumqi.gov.cn/

References

English Note: press omitted. Almen, O. (2005) ‘Authoritarianism Constrained,’ Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University, Sweden. Alston, L., T. Eggertsson, and D. North (eds) (1996) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, New York: Cambridge University. Avtorkhanov, A. (1966) The Communist Party Apparatus, Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery. Bachman, D. (1985) Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Bachman, D. and L. Cheng (1989) ‘Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao China,’ World Politics 41: 64–91. Barber, B. (1992) ‘Jihad vs. McWorld,’ Atlantic Monthly 269(3): 53–64. Benewick, R. and S. Donald (1999) The State of China Atlas, New York: Penguin USA. Bernstein, T. and X. Lü (2003) Taxation without Representation in Rural China, New York: Cambridge University. Bian, Y. (1994) ‘Guanxi and the Allocation of Urban Jobs in China,’ China Quarterly 140: 971–1000. Bian, Y. and S. Ang (1997) ‘Guanxi Networks and Job Mobility in China and Singapore,’ Social Forces 75(3): 981–1006. Bihari, O. (1970) Socialist Representative Institutions, Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. Blecher, M. and V. Shue (1996) Tethered Deer, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Bo, Z. (2002) Chinese Provincial Leaders, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Bracher, K. (1972) ‘The Crisis of Modern Parliaments,’ in R. Macridis and B. Brown (eds), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, Homewood, IL: Dorsey. Brandenburger, A. and B. Nalebuff (1996) Co-opetition, New York: Doubleday. Buchanan, J., R. Tollison, and G. Tullock (1980) Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A & M University. Caporaso, J. and D. Levine (1992) Theories of Political Economy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University. Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society, Malden, MA: Blackwell. Chang, G. (2001) The Coming Collapse of China, New York: Random House. Chang, P. and A. Nathan (1978) ‘Political Participation and Political Elites in Early Republican China: The Parliament of 1913–1914,’ Journal of Asian Studies 37(2): 293–313.

References

281

Cheek-Milby, K. (1995) A Legislature Comes of Age, Hong Kong: Oxford University. Chen, A. (1999) Restructuring Political Power in China, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chen, D. (1995) Chinese Firms between Hierarchy and Market, New York: St. Martin’s. Cheung, P., J. Chung, and Z. Lin (eds) (1998) Provincial Strategies of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Chin, K. (1999) Smuggled Chinese, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University. Cho, Y. (2002) ‘From “Rubber Stamps” to “Iron Stamps”: The Emergence of Chinese Local People’s Congresses as Supervisory Powerhouses,’ China Quarterly Sept. 171: 724–40. Close, D. (ed.) (1995) Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Copeland, G. and S. Patterson (eds) (1984) Parliaments in the Modern World, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Crawford, B. (1995) Markets, States, and Democracy, Boulder, CO: Westview. Dahl, R. (1971) Polyarchy, New Haven, CT: Yale University. —— (ed.) (1973) Regimes and Oppositions, New Haven, CT: Yale University. Dehaven-Smith, L. (1999) Foundations of Representative Democracy, New York: Peter Lang. Deng, X. (1983) The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing: Foreign Language. Des Forges, R., N. Luo, and Y. Wu (eds) (1993) Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989, Albany, NY: State University of New York. Deyo, F. (ed.) (1987) The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Diamond, L. and M. Plattner (eds) (1996) The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University. Dickson, B. (2003) Red Capitalists in China, New York: Cambridge University. Ding, A. (1994) ‘The Reform of the People’s Congresses in Mainland China,’ Issues and Studies 30(4): 14–35. Dittmer, L., H. Fukui, and P. Lee (eds) (2000) Informal Politics in East Asia, New York: Cambridge University. Dowdle, M. (1997) ‘The Constitutional Development and Operation of the National People’s Congress,’ Columbia Journal of Asian Law l (11): 1–125. —— (2002) ‘Transformative Development of Constitutional Institutions: the Role of Parliament – a Chinese Case Study,’ in M. Goldman and E. Perry (eds), Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Downs, W. (1998) Coalition Government, Sub-national Style, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University. Durkheim, E. (1964) The Division of Labor in Society, New York: Free. Eaton, J. (ed.) (1972) Institution Building and Development, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Elster, J., C. Offe, and U. Preuss (1998) Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies, New York: Cambridge University. Evans, P. (1995) Embedded Autonomy, Princeton: Princeton University. Fenno, Jr., R. (1978) Home Style, New York: HarperCollins. Ferejohn, J. and J. Huklinski (1990) Information and Democratic Processes, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois. Fewsmith, J. (1994) Dilemma of Reform in China, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. —— (2001) Elite Politics in Contemporary China, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Fitzgerald, J. (ed.) (2002) Rethinking China’s Provinces, London: Routledge.

282

References

Goldstein, A. (1991) From Bandwagon to Balance of Power Politics, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Goodman, D. (1997) China’s Provinces in Reform, London: Routledge. Goodman, D. and G. Segal (eds) (1994) China Deconstructs, London: Routledge. Granick, D. (1990) Chinese State Enterprises, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. Granovetter, M. (1994) ‘Business Groups,’ in Smelser and Swedberg, 453–75. Gray, J. and G. White (eds) (1982) China’s New Development Strategy, London: Academic. Haggard, S. (1990) Pathways from the Periphery, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Hahn, J. (ed.) (1995) Democratization in Russia, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe. Hamilton, G. (ed.) (1991) Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia, Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong. Harding, H. (1987) China’s Second Revolution, Washington DC: Brookings Institution. Harmin, C. and S. Zhao (eds) (1995) Decision-making in Deng’s China, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hertzke, A. and R. Peters (eds) (1992) The Atomistic Congress, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Hsing, Y. (1998) Making Capitalism in China, New York: Oxford University. Hsueh, T., Li, Q., and Liu S. (1993) China’s Provincial Statistics (1949–1989), Boulder, CO: Westview. Hu, S. H. (2000) Explaining Chinese Democratization, Westport, CT: Praeger. Hu, S. K. (1993) ‘Representation without democratization: the ‘Signature Incident’ and China’s National People’s Congress,’ Journal of Contemporary China 2(1): 3–34. Huang, Y. (1996) Inflation and Investment Control in China, New York: Cambridge University. Huntington, S. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University. Hwang, K. (1987) ‘Face and Favor: the Chinese Power Game,’ American Journal of Sociology 92(4): 944–74. Jia, H. and Z. Lin (1994) Changing Central-Local Relations in China, Boulder, CO: Westview. Jiang, J. (2002) The National People’s Congress in China, Beijing: Foreign Language. Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. —— (1995) Japan: Who Governs? New York: W. W. Norton. Katzenstein, P. and T. Shiraishi (1997) Network Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobatón (1999) ‘Governance Matters,’ The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Oct., no. 2196. Keith, R. (1994) China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law, New York: St. Martin’s. Kim, I. and J. Zacek (eds) (1993) Establishing Democratic Rule, Washington, DC: Paragon. King, A. (1995) ‘Kuan-hsi and Network Building: a Sociological Interpretation,’ in W. Tu (ed.), The Living Tree, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Kipnis, A. (1997) Producing Guanxi, Durham, NC: Duke University. Knoke, D. (1990) Political Networks, New York: Cambridge University. Kornberg, A. and L. Musolf (eds) (1970) Legislatures in Developmental Perspective, Durham, NC: Duke University.

References

283

Krehbiel, K. (1992) Information and Legislative Organization, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Lampton, D. (1987) ‘Chinese Politics: the Bargaining Treadmill,’ Issues & Studies 23(3): 11–41. Lee, H. (1991) From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Li, C. (2001) China’s Leaders, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Li, C. and L. White (1988), ‘The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: from Mobilizers to Managers,’ Asian Survey 28: 371–99. Li, L. (1998) Centre and Province, New York: Oxford University. Lieberthal, K. (1995 and 2004) Governing China, 1st and 2nd edns, New York: W.W. Norton. Lieberthal, K. and D. Lampton (eds) (1992) Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Lijphart, A. (1969) ‘Consociational Democracy,’ World Politics 21(2). —— (1984) Democracies, New Haven, CT: Yale University. —— (1996) ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: a Consociational Interpretation,’ American Political Science Review 90(2): 258–68. Lin, S. (1992–3) ‘A New Pattern of Decentralization in China: the Increase of Provincial Powers in Economic Legislation,’ China Information 7(34): 27–38. —— (1993) ‘China’s Decentralization and Provincial Legislation, 1980–1989,’ Ph.D. Diss., Department of Political Science, University of Calgary. Locke, J. (1960) Two Treatises of Government, New York: Cambridge University. Lü, X. (2000) Cadres and Corruption, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Lubman, S. (1999) Bird in a Cage, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Lyons, T. and V. Nee (eds) (1994) The Economic Transformation of South China, Ithaca, NY: East Asian Program, Cornell University. MacFarquhar, R. (1998) ‘Reports from the Field: Provincial People’s Congresses,’ China Quarterly 155: 656–67. Manion, M. (1993) Retirement of Revolutionaries in China, Princeton, NY: Princeton University. —— (1996) ‘The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside,’ American Political Science Review 90(4): 736–48. —— (2004) Corruption by Design, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Mao Zedong (1960) The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Beijing: Foreign Language. McCormick, B. and J. Unger (ed.) (1996) China after Socialism, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. McLennan, B. (ed.) (1973) Political Opposition and Dissent, New York: Dunellen. Mezey, M. (1973) Comparative Legislatures, Durham, NC: Duke University. Mill, J. S. (1958) Considerations on Representative Government, Indianapolis, IN: BobbsMerrill. Montinola, G., Y. Qian, and B. Weingast (1995) ‘Federalism, Chinese Style: the Political Basis for Economic Success in China,’ World Politics 48: 50–87. Moody, P. (1977) Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute. —— (1988) Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society, New York: Praeger. Naughton, B. (1995) Growing Out of the Plan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Nelson, D. and S. White (eds) (1982) Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, London: Macmillan.

284

References

Nohria, N. and R. Eccles (eds) (1992) Networks and Organizations, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School. O’Brien, K. (1990) Reform Without Liberalization, New York: Cambridge University. —— (1994a) ‘Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People’s Congress Deputies,’ China Quarterly 138: 357–80. —— (1994b) ‘Chinese People’s Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early Organizational Development,’ Comparative Political Studies 27(1): 80–109. O’Brien, K. and L. Li (1993–4) ‘Chinese Political Reform and the Question of Deputy Quality,’ China Information 8(3): 20–31. Ogden, S. (1993) ‘The Changing Content of China’s Democratic Socialist Institutions,’ In Depth 3(1): 237–56. —— (1995) China’s Unresolved Issues, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. —— (2002) Inklings of Democracy in China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center. Olsen, Jr., M. (1993) ‘From Communism to Market Democracy,’ in H. Siebert (ed.), Overcoming the Transformation Crisis, Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 3–31. Olson, D. and M. Mezey (eds), Legislatures in the Policy Process, New York: Cambridge University. Olson, D. and P. Norton (eds) (1996) The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, London: Frank Cass. Orru, M., N. W. Woolsey, and G. Hamilton (1991) ‘Organizational Isomorphism in East Asia,’ in Powell and DiMaggio, 361–89. Ostrow, J. (2000) Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University. Pearson, M. (1997) China’s New Business Elite, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Peerenboom, R. (2002) China’s Long March toward Rule of Law, New York: Cambridge University. Pei, M. (1994) From Reform to Revolution, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1994. —— (1997) ‘ “Creeping Democratization” in China,’ in L. Diamond, M. Plattner, Y. Chu, and H. Tien (eds), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 213–27. —— (2006) China’s Trapped Transition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Pfeffer, J. (1981) Power in Organizations, London: Pitman Books. Pitelis, C. (ed.) (1993) Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Polanyi, K. (1975 [1944]) The Great Transformation, New York: Octagon Books. Polsby, N. (1968) ‘The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,’ American Political Science Review March 144–68. Potter, P. (2003) From Leninist Discipline to Socialist Legalism, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Powell, W. and P. DiMaggio (eds) (1991) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. Powell, W. and L. Smith-Doerr (1994) ‘Networks and Economic Life,’ in Smelser and Swedberg, 453–75. Przeworski, A. et al. (2000) Democracy and Development, New York: Cambridge University.

References

285

Putnam, R., with R. Leonardi and R. Nanetti (1993) Making Democracy Work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Pye, L. (1968) The Spirit of Chinese Politics, Cambridge, MA: MIT. —— (1985) Asian Power and Politics, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. Rather, D. (2001) The American Dream, New York: William Morrow. Remington, T. (ed.) (1994) Parliaments in Transition, Boulder, CO: Westview. Robinson, M. and G. White (eds) (1998) The Democratic Developmental State, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Rowen, H. (1996) ‘The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy,’ National Interest 45: 61–71. Saich, T. (2001) Governance and Politics of China, New York: Palgrave. Scalapino, R. (1998) ‘Will China Democratize?’ Journal of Democracy, Jan., 35–40. Segal, G. (1994) ‘China’s Changing Shape,’ Foreign Affairs, May/June, 73(3). Shambaugh, D. (ed.) (2000) Is China Unstable? Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Shi, T. (1997) Political Participation in Beijing, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Shih, C. (1999) Collective Democracy, Hong Kong: Chinese University. Shirk, S. (1993) The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, Berkeley, CA: University of California. —— (1994) ‘Playing to the Province–Deng Xiaoping’s Political Strategy of Economic Reform,’ in Z. Lin and T. Robinson (eds), The Chinese and Their Future, Washington, DC: AEI, 23–57. Shue, V. (1988), The Reach of the State, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Sjostrand, S. (1993) Institutional Change, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Smelser, N. and R. Swedberg (eds) (1994) Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Smith, J. and L. Musolf (eds) (1979) Legislatures in Development, Durham, NC: Duke University. Solinger, D. (1982) ‘The Fifth National People’s Congress and the Process of PolicyMaking,’ Asian Survey 22: 1238–75. —— (1999) Contesting Citizenship in Urban China, Berkeley, CA: University of California. Solnick, S. (1996) ‘The Breakdown of hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China,’ World Politics 48: 209–38. Starr, J. (2001) Understanding China, New York: Hill and Wang. Steinmo, S., K. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (1992) Structuring Politics, New York: Cambridge University. Stigler, G. (1976) ‘The Size of Legislatures,’ Journal of Legal Studies 1: 17–34. Sun, Y. (2004) Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Tanner, M. (1994) ‘The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Law-making in China,’ China Quarterly 138: 281–403. —— (1995) ‘How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stage and Processes in Lawmaking,’ China Quarterly, March, 141: 39–64. —— (1999) The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China, Oxford, UK: Clarendon. Tong, J. (2002) ‘An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing,’ China Quarterly 171: 636–60. Tsebelis, G. (1990) Nested Games, Berkeley, CA: University of California.

286

References

Tullock, G. (1980) ‘Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game,’ in Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock. —— (1987) Autocracy, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic. —— (1989) The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic. Unger, J. (ed.) (2002) The Nature of Chinese Politics, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Vogel, E. (1989) One Step Ahead in China, Cambridge: Harvard University. Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Wank, D. (1999) Commodifying Communism, New York: Cambridge University. Wasserman, S. and K. Faust (1994) Social Network Analysis, New York: Cambridge University. Weidenbaum, M. and S. Hughes (1996) The Bamboo Network, New York: Free. Who’s Who in China: Current Leaders (1989 and 1994), Beijing: Foreign Lan-

guages. Winiecki, J. (1996) ‘Why Economic Reforms Fail in the Soviet System: a Property Rights-based Approach,’ in Lee J. Alston et al., 63–91. White, G. (ed.) (1991) The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. White, L. (1998) Unstately Power, Vols I and II, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. White, L. and C. Li (1990) ‘Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan,’ China Quarterly 121: 1–35. Williamson, O. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free. —— (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance, New York: Oxford University. Wilson, S. (1997) ‘The Cash Nexus and Social Networks: Mutual Aid and Gifts in Contemporary Shanghai Villages,’ China Journal 37: 91–112. Wittfogel, K. (1957) Oriental Despotism, New Haven, CT: Yale University. Wolf, Jr., C. (1988) Markets or Governments, Cambridge, MA: MIT. Woo-Cumings, M. (1999) The Developmental State, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. World Bank (2001) World Development Report, New York: Oxford University. —— (2002) World Development Report, New York: Oxford University. Wu G. (1993) ‘The Dilemmas of Participation in the Political Reform of China: 1986–88,’ in Des Forges et al. Xia, M. (2000a) The Dual Developmental State, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. —— (2000b) ‘China’s National People’s Congress: Institutional Transformation in the Process of Regime Transition (1978–98),’ in P. Norton and N. Ahmed (eds), Parliaments in Asia, London, UK: Frank Cass, 103–30. Xia, Ming and Shiping Hua (eds) (1999) ‘The Battle between the Chinese Government and the Falun Gong’ and ‘The Falun Gong: Qigong, Code of Ethics, and Religion’), Chinese Law and Government Sept–ct. and Nov.–Dec., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Yan, Y. (1994) The Flow of Gifts, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Yang, D. (1996) ‘The Dynamics and Progress of Competitive Liberalization in China,’ Issues & Studies 32(8): 1–27. —— (2004) Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Yang, M. (1994) Gifts, Favors, and Banquets, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Young, E. (1977) The Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Zang X. (1991) ‘Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China,’ Asian Survey 31: 512–25. Zhao, S. (1992) ‘From Coercion to Negotiation,’ Issues & Studies 28(10): 1–22.

References

287

—— (ed.) (2000) China and Democracy, New York: Routledge. Zhao Z. (1987) ‘Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: Report Delivered at the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 25, 1987,’ Beijing Review, Nov. 9–15, 23–49. Zheng, Y. (1995) ‘Institutional Change, Local Developmentalism and Economic Growth,’ Ph.D. Diss., University of Princeton. Zhong, Y. (2002) Local Government and Politics in China, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Chinese Note: Family name precedes given name and Chubanshe (press) omitted Ah J. (1997) Da Lifa [Great Law-making], Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin. Cai B. (ed.) (1998) Shanghai Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhi [Almanac of Shanghai PC], Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Cai D. (1992) Zhongguo Renda Zhidu [The System of PCs in China], Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian. —— (1998) Zhongguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu [The System of PCs in China], Beijing: Falü. —— (2002) Zhongguo Xuanju Zhuangkuang de Baogao [A Report on China’s Elections], Beijing: Falü. Cai D. and Wang C. (eds) (2001) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Ershinian Fazhan yu Gaige [The Twenty Years of PCs: Development and Reform], Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancha. Cao Q., Huang S., and Guo D. (eds) (1996) Difang Renda Daibiao Shi Zhenyang Kaizhang Gongzuo de [How LPDs Conduct Their Work], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Chen P. (ed.) (1993) Shanghai Fazhi Fazhan Zhanlue Yanjiu [A Study of the Development Strategy of Shanghai Legal System], Shanghai: Fudan University. Chen Y. (ed.) (1997) Ruiyi Jinqu de Xianji Renda Gongzuo [Vigorous Progresses of the Work of PCs in Counties], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Chen Y. and Liu D. (1997) ‘Ershisi ci woshou’ [Twenty-four handshakes], Tide of Times [Shidaichao, a magazine of People’s Daily], 1 Oct. Chen Z. and Cen X. (1991) Gaige Kaifang de Guiji [The Course of Reforms and Opening-Up], Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin. Dai Q. (2000), ‘Ruici minzhu juece’ [Such a democratic decision-making process], accessed at http://lyg1999.126.com on 05/04/2000. Deng X. (1994) Deng Xiaoping Wenxua, disanjuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3], Beijing: Renmin. Diao T., Chen J. and Zhang, H. (eds) (1989) Zhongguo Difang Guojia Jigou Gaiyao [An Outline of Local State Institutions in China], Beijing: Falü. Difang Zhengquan Yanjiu Bianjizhu [Editorial Committee for Studies on Local Government] (1986) Difang Zhengquan Yanjiu [Studies on Local Authorities], Beijing: Qunzhong. Dong X. and Chen W. (2002) ‘Huikan Shenyang shijian biaozhixin yiyi’ [Reflecting upon the symbolic significance of the Shenyang incident], Shidaichao [Tide of Times], no. 24. Dong Y. and Shi B. (eds) (1998) Zhengzhi Zhongguo [Political China], Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo. Du G. (ed.) (1998) Jinyibu Wanshan Difang Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Ruogan

288

References

Wenti Yanjiu [A Study of Several Issues Concerning the Further Perfection of the System of LPCs], Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin. Fu X. (2001) Shengshi Zhenyan [Remonstrance in Prosperous Times], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Gansu sheng Renda Changweihui [The Gansu PPCSC] (1992) Zhongguo de Minzhu Xuanju [China’s Democratic Elections], Lanzhou, Gansu: Lanzhou University. Guo D. H. (1988) Zhongguo Lifa Zhidu [The Legislative System in China], Beijing: Renmin. —— (ed.) (1991) Shinian Fazhi Luncong [Papers on the Legal System in the Past Ten Years], Beijing: Falu. Han L. (2002) ‘Zhongguo Lifa de Feizhengshixin Jiqi Zhengzhi Gongneng’ [The Informal Aspects Of Chinese Legislation and Their Political Implications], Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiu [Modern China Studies], 77(2): 49–70. Han M., Xian Y., and Zou H. (1998) Xuanju Zhishi [Knowledge of Elections], Chengdu: Sichuan Minzhu. He Q. (1997) Xiandaihua de Xianjing [The Pitfalls of Modernization], Beijing: Jiri Zhongguo. —— (2003) Zhongguo Xiandaihua de Xianjing [China’s Descent into a Quagmire], Hong Kong: Broad. Huang L. (2003) ‘Luetan Gaijin Difang Lifa de Tichu Jizhi he Qichao Jizhi’ [A Discussion on Improving the Initiating and Drafting Mechanisms in Local Lawmaking], Renda Yanjiu [Studies of PCs, Gansu], 136(4). Huang S., Wang Y., and Wang Y. (eds) (1997) Difang Renda Changweihui Zhucheng Renyuan Bidu [Essential Readings for the Members of LPCSC], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Huang Y. (ed.) (1991) Difang xin Fagui Xuanbian [A Compilation of Local Statutes], Beijing: Zhongguo Jingji. Huang X. (1998) Renda Gongzuo Yanjiu [A Study of the Work of PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Jiang Z. (2001) Lun ‘Sange Daibiao’ [On ‘Three Represents’], Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian. Jie M. (1995) Difang Renda Huiwu Chaozuo Shouce [Handbook for Running the Meetings of LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Jilin sheng Renda Changweihui Yanjiushi [Research Office of the Jilin PPCSC] (1989) Difang Renda Xingshi Jianduquan Jicui [Cases of Using Supervisory Power by LPCs], Changchun: Jilin Renmin. Jin Y., Han Z., and Zhang W. (1991) Xianjieduan de Difang Renda [The Current State of LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzgu Fazhi. Kang Y. (2001) Jiedu Shanghai [Interpreting Shanghai], Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin. Li B. (2002) Difang Renda Daibiao Zhidu Yanjiu [Studies of the LPDs and Representational System], Changsha, Hunan: Hunan University. Li B. and Wang Y. (eds) (1998) Zhongguo Lifa de Jiben Lilun he Zhidu [Theories and Institutions of Law-making in China], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Li P. (ed.) (1991) Zhongguo Shehui Zhuyi Lifa de Lilun yu Shijian [Theory and Practice of Socialist Law-making in China], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Li S. (ed.) (1997) Qianjing Zhongde Shirenda [The MPCs in Progress], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1998) Zhuanxin Shiqi de Difang Renda Gongzuo [The Work of LPCs in Transition], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi.

References

289

Li C. and Li C. (1991) Zhongguo Difang Fagui Shiyong Shouce [A Practical Handbook for Local Legislation], Kunming: Yunnan Renmin. Lin S. (2000) Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengzhi Xintai Yanjiu [A Study of the Political Formations in Contemporary China], Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin. Liu H. (1996) Zhongguo Difang Fazhi Jianshe [The Construction of Local Legal System in China], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Liu H., Li B., and Li L. (eds) (1996) Yifa Zhiguo [Rule by Law], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Liu S. (1989) ‘Lun woguo shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan de lifa tizhi’ [On our legislative system in the socialist primary stage], Zhengfa Luntan [Forum of Politics and Law] (1). Liu Z. and Cheng X. (1992a) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Jianghua [Lectures on the System of PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Liu Z. et al. (eds) (1992b) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Cidian [Dictionary of the System of the People’s Congresses], Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancha. Liu Z., Yu Y., and Cheng X. (eds) (1999) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Gongzuo Quanshu [A Comprehensive Collection on the Work of PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Lu X. (ed.) (2001) Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Jieceng Yanjiu Baogao [A Research Report on the Social Strata of Contemporary China], Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian. Ma L. and Lin Z. (1998) Jiaofeng [The Crossing of Swords], Beijing: Jingri Zhongguo. Min Q. (1989) Zhongguo Zhengzhi Wenhua [The Chinese Political Culture], Kunming: Yunnan Renmin. Min Q. and Li Y. (1995) Zhuangxinqi de Zhongguo [China in Transition], Taipei: China Times. National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) (2002) China Statistical Yearbook (2002), Beijing: China Statistics. Pu X. (ed.) (1990) Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengzhi Zhidu [The Political System in Contemporary China], Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin. —— (ed.) (1999) Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengzhi Zhidu [The Political System of the PRC], Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin. Qiao S. (1994) ‘Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Sishi Zhounian Dahui shang de Jianghua’ [Speech to the Commemoration Meeting by All Circles in Beijing for the Forty Years Anniversary of the Establishment of PCs], RMRB, Sept. 16, 3. Qin R. and Yang Y. (2001) Difang Renda Xuanchuan Gongzuo Gailun [General Introduction to the Propaganda Work of LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongting Lianluoju [The Bureau of Liaison, the General Office of the NPCSC] (1992a) Xuanju Gongzuo Shouce [Handbook for Electoral Work], Beijing: Kaiming. —— (1997a) Difang Renda Huanjie Xuanju Gongzuo Shouce [Handbook for the Elections of Changing Terms for LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (2000a) Wo Zhenyang Dang Renda Daibiao [How I Work as A People’s Deputy], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongting Mishuju [Bureau of Secretaries of NPCSC] (ed.) (1993) Renmin Dabiao Dahui Jiqi Changweihui Yishi Guize Huibian [Collection of Procedural Rules of the PCs and Their SCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (2001a) Quangguo Renda Changweihui 2000 Nian Zhifa Jiancha Ziliao Huibian

290

References

[Collection of Documents and Files of the 2000 Inspection by the NPCSC upon Law Enforcement], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongting Xinwenjun [The News Bureau of the General Office of the NPCSC] and Zhongguo Renda Zhidu Xinwen Xiehui [The News Association of the System of PCs in China] (2001b) Renda Zhidu Hao Xinwen Xuanping [Commentary on the Selected News Reports regarding the System of PCs], Vol. 2, Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (2002) Renda Zhidu Hao Xinwen Xuanping [Selected News Reports on the PCs], Vol. 3, Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongting Yanjiushi [The Research Office of the General Office, the NPCSC], Lun Renda Jiqi Cangweihui de Jianduquan [On the Supervisory Power of PCs and Their SCs], Beijing: Falü, 1988. —— (1990a) Zhonghua Renmin Gonghuoguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhiliao Huibian [A Compilation of Documents and Files of the PCs of the PRC], Beijing: Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1990b) Lun Wuoguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Jianshe [On the Construction of Our System of PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1991) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Jianshe Sishi Nian [Forty-Year Construction of the System of PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1992b) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Lunchong (Diyiji) [Series on the System of PCs, Vol. 1], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1992c) Difang Renda Shi Zhengyang Xinshi Zhiquan de [How LPCs Use their Authority], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1995) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Chengli Sishi Zhounian Jinian Wenji [A Collection of Papers Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the PCs], Beijing: Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1996a) Difang Renda Xinshi Zhiquan Shili Xuanbian [Selected Cases on the Use of Authority by the LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1997b) Difang Renda Jiandu Gongzuo Tansuo [Explorations in the Work of Supervision by LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (1998a) Xuexi Jiujie Quanguo Renda Yici Huiyi Wenjian Fudao [Study Aids to the Documents of the First Plenary Session of the 9th NPC], Beijing: Central Party School. —— (1998b) Renda Jiqi Changweihui Gongzuo Shouce [Work Handbook for PCs and Their SCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. —— (2000b) Difang Renda Ershi Nian [The Twenty Years of LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongting Yanjiushi and Guangdongsheng Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Yanjiuhui [Research Association of PCs in Guangdong] (1994) Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji yu Renda Gongzuo [Socialist Market Economy and the Work of PCs], Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Zhengzhizhu [The Political Group of the General Bureau, the NPCSC] (1996b) Zhongguo Xianfa Jinshi [Interpretations of Chinese Constitution], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Ru X. (ed.) (1998) Xiaozhengfu, Dashehui de Lilun yu Shijian [‘Small Government, Big Society’: Theory and Practice], Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian. Shandong Sheng Renda Cangweihui Fazhishi [The Legislation Work Office of the Shandong PPCSC] (1991) Difang Lifa Yanjiu [A Study of Local Legislation], Jinan: Shandong Renmin.

References

291

Shanghai Shi Renda Changweihui Yanjiushi [The Research Office of Shanghai MPCSC] (2003a) Sijian yu Tansuo [Practices and Explorations] vol. 4, Shanghai: Fudan University. —— (2003b) Renda Daibiao Gongzuo Shouce [Work Handbook for PDs], Shanghai: Fudan University. Shi T. (1991) ‘Shehui xuqiu yu lifa fazhan: jianxi youfa buyi de lifa yuanying’ [Social demands and legislative development: an explanation of violating laws from the perspective of legislation’], Zhongguo Faxue [China Jurisprudence] (1). Shou X. and Li X. (eds) (1990) Zhongguo Shenshi Zhizhiqu Zhiliao Souce [Reference Handbook of Provinces, Municipalities and Autonomous Regions in China], Beijing: Shehui Kexu Wenxian. Sichuan Sheng Renda Changweihui Yanjiushi [Research Office of the Sichuan PPCSC] (1986) Difang Renda Jiangshe Yangjiu [Studies on the Construction of LPCs], Sichuan: Sichuan Political Science Association, Research Office of the Sichuan PPCSC, Institute of Political Science of Sichuan Social Science Academy. —— (1991) Difang Renda Gongzuo Wenjian Xuanbian [Selected Documents Concerning the Work of LPCs], Chengdu: Sichuansheng Renda Changweihui. Song R. (1994) Canjia Lifa Gongzuo Suoji [Notes on My Participation in Legislative Work], two volumes, Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Sun Q. and Zhang Q. (1996) Zhongguo Shichang Jingji yu Difang Lifa [China’s Market Economy and Local Legislation], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Sun W. (ed.) (1997) Renda Gongzuo Shouce [Handbook for the Work of the PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Tang G. (1989) Xuanju Gongzuo Gailun [General Introduction to Elections], Chongqing, Sichuan: Chongqing. —— (2000) ‘Xiang Zhongnanhai jinjian de fanfu doushi’ [The anti-corruption fighter who made suggestions to the Zhongnanhai Compound’] (http://dailynews. sina.com.cn/china/2000–09–20/128810.html), accessed 02/21/2007. Tang X., Ouyang Z., and Huang X. (1992) Difang Lifa Bijiao Yanjiu [A Comparative Study of Local Legislation], Beijing, Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Tian J. (2000) Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang yu Minzhu Fazhi Jianshe [Reform and Opening-up, and the Construction of Democracy and Legal system in China], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Tianjin Shi Renda [Tianjin MPC] (1999) Tianjin Shi Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhi [Almanac of the Tianjin MPC] (http://www.tjrd.gov.cn). Wang C. and Yuan R. (1990) Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xuanju Zhidu [The Electoral System in the PRC], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Wang M. (1993) Guojia Quanli Jiguan de Guomin Jingji Jihua he Yushuan Jiandu Zhidu [The Supervision over the National Economic Plan and Budget by the State Power Organ], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Wang S., Ho P., Wu G., Gao X., and Qin Q. (1996) Jiang Zemin Mianlin de Tiaozhan [Challenges Faced By Jiang Zemin], Hong Kong: Mirror Books. Wang Q. (1998) Renda Caijinxue [Finance of the People’s Congresses], Beijjing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Wang Y. (1996) Renda Daibiao Lun [On People’s Deputies], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Wei N. (1994) Zai Renda Zhuren Gongzuo Gangwei Shang de Sikao yu Shijian [Reflections and Experiences on the Post of Chairman of PC], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi.

292

References

Wu D. and Liu. (eds) (1991) Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige yu Fazhi Jianshe [Reform of Political Structure and Legal Construction], Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian. Xia M. (2000c) ‘Zhuanxin zhong de Taiwan Yihui Xitong’ [The Legislative System of Taiwan in Transition] in Lin G. and Chen W. (eds), Prospects for Cross-Taiwan Strait Development (Hong Kong: Yazhou Kexue), 28–51. Xia Y. (ed.) (2000) Zouxiang Quanli de Shidai [Toward the Times of Rights], Beijing: Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue. Xiao Y. (ed.) (1997) Yifa Zhiguo Lun [On Rule of Law], Beijing: Falü. Xie P. (1994) Shichang Jingji yu Fazhi Jianshe [Market Economy and the Construction of Legal Sysytem], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Xie R. (1989) ‘Quanguo renda changwei huan shunxin tan lifa’ [Mr. Huan Shunxin, NPCSC member, talks about legislation], Falu Zixun [Legal Advice] (Shanghai), April. Wu D. and Liu H. (1991) Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige yu Fazhi Jianshe [The Reform of Political Structure and Legal Construction], Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian. Xu Junlun (1997) Difang Lifalun [On Local Legislation], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Xu Yijun (2000) Zoujin Renda [Go inside PC], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Yan H. (1993) ‘Zhonggong Mimi Wenjian Yanjiu’ [A Study of the Secret Documents of the Chinese Communist Party], Zhonggong Yanjiu [Problem of Chinese Communism] (Aug.) 27(8): 71–85. Yan J. (1994–5) ‘Xinxiangzheng Yundong’[New Constitutional Movement], Cheng Ming, Dec. 1994, no. 12 and Jan. 1995, no. 1. Yang F. (ed.) (1991) Renda Daibiao Jiben Zhishi [Basic Knowledge for PDs], Beijing: Jingji Kexue. —— (1997) Zai Shengji Renda Gongzuo Gangwei Shang [On the Posts of PPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Yang Z. (2001) ‘Zhuanfang: He Canyu bamian Hunan fushengzhang de renda daibiao duihua’ [A Special Interview: a dialogue with a PD who was involved in impeaching a vice governor], March 10 (http://member.netease.com/~ysxs/fzhm/ fzhm435.htm/). Yao L. (2003a) ‘Yao Lifa Daibiao Gongzuo Huibao’ [The Work Report of PD Yao Lifa], July 4 (http://www.house2008.com/articles.asp?articleid=4205). —— (2003b) ‘Jiceng Minzhu de Lu Buhui Pingtan Dan Chongman Xiwang’ [The Road to Grassroots Democracy Would Not Be Smooth but Full of Hopes], Zhongguo Gaige, Nongcunban [Reform in China, Rural Edition], March 5. Yin Z., Li Q., and Zhou G. (eds) (2003) Sifa Pingyi de Shijian yu Tansuo [Practices and Explorations in the Reviews of Judicial Branch], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. You L., Fu M., and Wang H. (1998) ‘Peng Zhen Tongzhi shi Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu Jianshe de Kaituozhe he Daitouren’ [Comrade Pen Zhen was the pioneer and leader for the institutional building of the NPC], unpublished manuscript. Yuan Q. (1996) Qiushuo Ji [Search and Exploration], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Yuan R. (1994) Renmin Daibiao dahui Zhidu Xincheng Fazhanshi [Formation and Development of the System of PCs: A History], Beijing: Renmin. Yuan X. (ed.) (1998) Shijian Zhongde Diqu Renda Gongzuo [The Work of District PCs in Practice], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi.

References

293

Zhang B. (1992a) Renda Gongzuo de Lilun yu Shijian [The Theory and Practice of the Work of People’s Congresses], Beijing: Falü. —— (1992b) Renda Falu Jiandu Anli Xuanbian [Selected Cases on Judicial Supervision of the PCs], Beijing: Falü. Zhang J. and Zhou C. (eds) (1999) Shenzhen Shichang Jingji Lifa Lilun yu Shijian [The Theory and Practice of Legislation for Market Economy in Shenzhen], Beijing: Qunzhong. Zhang L. (2001) Zhongguo Liusi Zhengxiang [June Fourth: The True Story], Hong Kong: Mirror Books. Zhang M. (1993) Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengzhi Zhidu Gaiyao [Profile about Political Order of PRC], Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin. —— (1994) Zhongguo Zhengzhiren [The Political Man in China], Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue. Zhang S. (ed.) (1988) Difang Renda Gongzuo Yanjiu [A Study of the Work of LPCs], Changsha: Hunan Renmin. Zhang W. (1996) Renmin Daibiao Dahui Jiandu Zhineng Yanjiu [A Study of the Supervisory Function of PCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhi. Zhang Y. (1986) Xianzheng Luncong [Essays on Constitutionalism], vols 1 and 2, Beijing: Qunzhong. —— (ed.) (1993) Renda Licheng [The Milestones of the People’s Congresses], Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin. —— (1997) Difang Renda Gongzuo Gailun [Introduction to the Work of LPCs], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Zhang Z. and Cao Y. (eds) (1990) Zuohao Difang Renda Gongzuo [Doing the Work of LPCs Well], Beijing: Qunzhong. Zhao B. (ed.) (1990) Minzhu Zhenzhi yu Difang Renda [Democratic Politics and LPCs], Xi’an: Shaanxi Renmin. Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxianshi [The Archive Department of the CPC Central Committee] (1982) Sanzhong Quanhui yilai Zhongyao Wenxian Xuanbian [Selected Important Documents since the Third Plenum], Beijing: Renmin. Zhongguo Dituce (ZGDTC) [The Atlas of China] (2000) Beijing: Xinqiu Ditu. Zhongguo Falü Nianjian (ZGFLN): 1988–2003 [Law Yearbook of China, volumes from 1988 to 2003], Beijing: Zhongguo Falü Nianjianshe. Zhongguo Falü Sishinian (ZGFLS)[Forty Years of Chinese Law] (1989) Beijing: Beijing Daxue. Zhongguo Xianfaxue Yanjiuhui (ZGXFX) [Association of Chinese Constitution] (1993) Xianfa de Quanwei yu Difang Lifa [The Authority of the Constitution and Local Legislation], Jinan: Shangdongsheng Xinwen Chubanju. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghehuo Difangxin Fagui Huibian (ZHRMG) [A Collection of Local Statutes of the People’s Republic of China (1992–1994)], Beijing: Zhongguo Falü Nianjianshe, 1995. Zhou D. (ed.) (1997) Minzhu Jiandu Xinxingshi [The New Forms of Democratic Supervision], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi. Zhou H. (ed.) (2002) Jiedu Kunhuo [Interpreting Puzzles], Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University. Zhou L. (ed.) (1991) Difang Renda Gongzuo yu Minzhu Fazhi [The Work of LPCs, Democracy and Legal System], Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng Jiaoyu. Zhou W. (ed.) (2000) Difang Renda Gongzuo Lilun yu Shiwu [The Work of LPCs: Theory and Practice], Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi.

294

References

Zhu G. (1997) Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengfu Guocheng [The Governmental Processes of Contemporary China], Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin. Zhu L. (1999) Peng Zhen Minzhu Fazhi Sixiang Yanjiu [A Study of Peng Zhen’s Ideas on Democracy and Legal system], Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue.

Newspapers, magazines, journals, yearbooks, and news agencies BJZC CJ CM CNN CNW CQNJ DWN FEER FLYSH FZRB GZNJ HBRB HNRB HNRD JSND JSRD JXRD JXRDGZ LW MHSH MZYFZSB NFC NFZM NMGDCD NYT RDWZ RDJS RDZXW RMQLB RMRB RMZY SDNJ SXNJ SYRB WXB XHS XMWB YCWB ZGFLNJ

Beijing Zhichun [Beijing Spring, USA] Caijing [The Finance Magazine] Chengming [Contend, Hon Kong] China News Net (Sina.com) China News Week [Xinwen Zhoukan] (http://www.chinanewsweek. com.cn) Chongqing Nianjian [Yearbook of Chongqing] Duowei News [www.Chinesenewsnet.com] Far Eastern Economic Review Falü yu Shenhuo [Law and Life] Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily] Guizhou Nianjian [Guizhou Yearbook] Hubei Ribao [Hubei Daily] Hunan Ribao [Hunan Daily] Hunan Renda [People’s Congresses in Hunan] Jiushi Niandai [The Nineties] Jiangsu Renda [People’s Congresses in Jiangsu] Jiangxi Renda [People’s Congresses in Jiangxi] Jiangxi Renda Gongzuo [The Work of People’s Congress in Jiangxi] Liaowang [Outlook Weekly, Beijing] Meihua Shenghuo [Better Life, Shanghai] Minzhu yu Fazhi Shibao [Times of Democracy and Legal System] Nanfengchuang [The Window of Southern Wind] (Guangzhou) Nanfang Zhoumo [The Southern Weekend] Neimenggu Da Cidian [Encyclopaedia of Neimenggu] New York Times Renda Wenzhai [Digest of PCs’ Work] Renda Jianshe [The Construction of People’s Congresses, Liaoning] Renda Zhidu Xinwen [NPC News] Renmin Quanli Bao [Newspaper of People’s Power, Sichuan] Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (overseas edition) Renmin Zhiyou [Friends of the People] Shandong Nianjian [The Yearbook of Shandong] Shanxi Nianjian [The Yearbook of Shanxi] Shenyang Ribao [Shenyang Daily] Wenxuebao [Literary Gazette] Xinhua She [New China News Agency] (www.xinhuanet.com) Xinmin Wanbao [New People Evening Daily, Shanghai] Yangcheng Wanbao [Yangcheng Evening Daily, Guangzhou] Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [The Law Yearbook of China]

References ZGFX ZGQNB ZGYJ ZJRD

Zhongguo Faxue [Jurisprudence of China] (Beijing) Zhongguo Qingnianbao [China’s Youth Daily] Zhonggong Yanjiu [Problem of Chinese Communism, Taiwan] Zhejiang Renda [People’s Congresses in Zhejiang]

295

Index

Ah, J. 4 alliance politics 231–4 Almen, O. 2 Alston, L. 74 Ang, S. 14 authoritarianism 151–3 Avtorkhanov, A. 151 ballots 262–71 Barber, B. 271 Benewick, R. 38 Bernstein, T. 204 Bian, Y. 14 Bihari, O. 72 bill-drafting process 161–4 Blecher, M. 99, 254 Bo, Z. 6, 125, 148 Bracher, K. 9–10 Brandenburger, A. M. 15, 69, 71 Buchanan, J. 200 budgetary power 242–4 cadre training system 81–2 Cai, B. 42, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 92, 96, 103, 112, 223, 224, 266 Cai, D. 3, 8, 31, 54, 58, 60, 98, 107, 157, 163, 251, 267, 269–70, 271 Cao, Q. 85, 211 Cao, Y. 85, 87 Caporaso, J. 187 career advancement 61, 117–18, 125–7, 136 Castells, M. 17, 225 Cen, X. 164, 165, 166 chairpersons as ruling elite 113–23 chairpersons’ group (CG) 51–2 Chang, P. 250, 271 Cheek-Milby, K. 256 Chen Guangyi 139–40 Chen Shirong 138–9 Chen, Tiedi 99 Chen, A. 2, 173, 177, 211, 222, 271 Chen, D. 74 Chen, P. 162 Chen, Y. 139, 253

Chen, Z. 164, 165, 166 Cheung, P. 6, 7 Chin, K. 14 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), transformation of 32–3 Cho, Y. 2, 3 Chung, J. 6, 7 citizen complaints system 88–90 citizens, role in bill drafting 166–7, 169–71 Close, D. 11 Communist Party of China (CPC): candidates sponsored by 222–4, 238–42; Central Committee (CPCCC) 40–1; centrality of 17–19; control of electoral process 104–6; members as chairpersons 123–4, 127–31; relationships with PPCs 240–2; role in bill drafting 164; secretaries 119–23 companies, rectification of 202–3, 231–4 consensual politics 174–6 Constitution: (1975) 34; (1982) 34–5, 36, 52–3, 221, 222 consultation process, legislation 164–7 consultation with experts system 92–3 consumers’ rights laws 183 contracts, enforcement of 198–200 Copeland, G. 11, 97 Crawford, B. 11 Dahl, Robert 9, 218, 246 Dai, Q. 134 Dehaven-Smith, L. 268 democratic developmental state, creation of 252–61 democratic progress, PPCs as barometer of 7–8 Deng Xiaoping 17–18, 21, 26–9, 101, 113, 153, 178–9, 203, 221, 269 Des Forges, R. 269 developmental legislatures and market creation 248–52 Deyo, F. 10 Diamond, L. 11

Index 297 Dickson, B. 13 DiMaggio 212 Ding, A. 27, 218, 219, 224 Dittmer, L. 14, 24 document exchange system 82 Donald, S. 38 Dong, Y. 4 Dowdle, M. 2, 219 Downs, W. 9 Du, G. 103, 209, 212 Durkheim, E. 153 Eaton, J. 57, 77 Eccles, R. 69 economic actors, laws regulating 182–3, 188 economic statutes 180–96 Eggertsson, T. 74 Electoral Law (1995) 102–3, 105–6, 107, 222, 264 electoral process 8, 30–1, 37, 102–12, 222–4, 266–71 Elster, J. 9 environmental protection laws 187–96 Esmen, Milton J. 77 Evans, P. 17 exchange of work experience and information system 90–2 externalities control 187–93, 194 Faust, K. 15, 16 female representation 131–4 Feng Youwei 140–1, 146 Ferejohn, J. 77 Fewsmith, J. 14, 24, 239 Fitzgerald, J. 6 foreign countries, propaganda dissemination 95–6 fragmented authoritarianism 151–3 freedom index (Freedom House) 258–61 Fu, M. 38 Fu Xuejian 137–8 Fukui, H. 14, 24 functional differentiation 32–7 Gao, X. 6 GDP growth rate 258–9 Goldstein, A. 23 Goodman, D. 6, 8, 221 Governance Database (World Bank) 257–8, 260 governance, network mode of 13–17 government: review and assessment system 208–15; role in bill drafting 165–6; selective challenges to 228–9; separation from Party 35; supervision of 200–6 Granick, D. 4 Gray, J. 77 Guan Guangfu 121 guanxi 13–17, 262–3

Haggard, S. 10 Hahn, J. 11, 78, 96, 97, 100, 252 Hamilton, G. 14, 17 Han, L. 157 Han, M. 224 Harding, H. 115 Harmin, C. 4, 30, 33, 35, 76, 151, 220 He, Q. 262 hierarchy, solutions to problem of 72–6 Ho, P. 6 Hong Kong 255–6 horizontal relationships 68–72 Hough, J. 73 Hsing, Y. 225 Hsueh, T. 38 Hu, D. 147–8 Hu, S. H. 270–1 Hu, S. K. 134, 219, 224, 246 Hua Guofeng 27 Hua, S. 14 Huang, L. 157 Huang, M. 210 Huang, S. 134 Huang, X. 158 Huang, Y. 7, 63, 99, 155, 188, 194, 208 Hughes, S. 13, 225 Huklinski, J. 77 Huntington, S. 25 Hwang, K. 72 independent-minded deputies, rise of 134–48 information efficiency 90–2 ‘information impactedness’ problem 74–5 inspections, legal implementation 189–93, 195–6 institutional linkages, building up 77–8 institutional setting for provincial level legislation 153–7 interaction patterns and legislative processes 157–74 internal rules, development of 62–4 internal structure, development of 37–62 Jia, H. 4, 8, 151 Jiang, J. 2, 8, 78–9 Jiang, Y. 138–9 Jiang, Z. 19–20, 31 ‘Jiaozuo Phenomenon’ 143–8 Jie, M. 107 Jin, H. 229–30 Johnson, C. 10 joint conference system 83–4 judicial branch, scrutiny of 234–8 judicial organizations, supervision of 206–8 Katzenstein, P. 17 Kaufmann, D. 21 Kim, I. 10, 11 King, A. 17

298

Index

Kipnis, A. 13, 14 Knoke, D. 16 Kornberg, A. 10, 77 Kraay, A. 21 Krehbiel, K. 77 labor, laws protecting 186–7, 188 Lampton, D. 151, 152, 220 law enforcement inspections 80–1 leaders, oversight of 229–31 Lee, H. 4, 117 Lee, P. 14, 24 legal and work guidance system 80–1 legal experts 92–3 legal implementation inspections 189–93, 195–6 legal process, misconduct in 234–8 legal regulation: economic actors 182–3; labor 186–7; market economic order 183–4; market economy 184–6 legal system, inadequacy of 206–8 legislation, institutional setting for 153–7 legislative contestation strategies: applying selectivity 228–9; creating demonstration effect 227–8; playing alliance politics 231–4; safeguarding the ‘big situation’ 229–31; saving face 242–4; targeting ‘hot button’ issues 234–8; turning force against itself 238–42 legislative development 11–13, 96–7 legislative embeddedness 73–4 legislative empowerment 32–7 legislative planning 158–61 legislative power, market impulse for expanding 26–32 legislative processes and interaction patterns 157–74 Leonardi, R. 9 letters and visits system 88–90 Levine, D. 187 Li, B. 87, 112 Li, C. 6, 14, 117, 143–8, 158, 159, 264 Li, G. 115 Li, L. 218, 266, 267 Li, Q. 38 Li, X. 42, 45, 46 liaison network of deputies 84–8 Lieberthal, K. 68, 151, 152, 220 Lijphart, A. 175, 177 Lin, Puyan 160–1 Lin, Ruo 121, 122 Lin, S. 2, 27, 73, 162, 163, 169, 173, 183, 218, 234, 237 Lin, Z. 4, 6, 7, 8, 151 Linz, Juan 11 Liu, D. 139 Liu, H. 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 67, 157 Liu, S. 38, 269 Liu, Z. 26, 41, 42, 45, 46, 79, 84, 124, 185, 201–2, 267, 269

local protectionism 198–200 Locke, J. 196 Longstreth, F. 16 Lu Gongxun 57 Lu, X. 264 Lü, X. 204 Lubman, Stanley B. 207, 253 Luo Ronghan 160 Luo Shiying 139–40, 146, 230–1, 241 Luo, N. 269 Lyons, T. 74, 197, 205 McCormick, B. 11–12, 219, 224 MacFarquhar, R. 2–3, 7, 218, 219, 250 McLennan, B. 218 Macro-economic regulation, laws for 184–6, 188 Manion, M. 4, 7, 115, 201, 224 manipulation, election of deputies 102–12 Mao Zedong 27–8, 268–9 market creation 181–2; and developmental legislatures 248–52 market economic order, legal regulation of 183–4 market economy: endorsement of 31; macro-regulation laws 184–6, 188 market failure, countervailing 180–96 market impulse for expanding legislative power 26–32 market mode of governance 15 media 93–5 meetings, system of attending as invited guests 79 Mezey, M. 97, 216, 249 Mill, J. S. 268 Min, Q. 90, 271 mohe society 16–17, 225–7 Montinola, G. 4 Moody, P. 220 Musolf, L. 10, 77 Nalebuff, B. J. 15, 69, 71 Nanetti, R. 9 Nathan, A. 271 National People’s Congress (NPC): relationships with PPCs 172–3; role in bill drafting 164–5 Naughton, B. 96, 253 Nee, V. 74, 197, 205 Nelson, D. 151, 265 network mode of governance 13–17, 19–21 network strategy 77–8; and mohe society 225–7 Ni Xiance 227–8 Nohria, N. 69 North, D. 74 Norton, P. 11 O’Brien, K. 2, 3, 4, 73, 88, 100, 135, 136, 162, 218, 219, 241, 252, 266, 267

Index 299 Offe, C. 9 Office of Letters and Visits (OLV) 88–90, 234–5 Ogden, S. 4, 7, 26, 32 Olson, D. 11, 74, 216 Organic Laws 33, 46–7, 51–2, 53, 56, 153–4, 167, 209, 222 Orru, M. 17 Ostrow, J. 252 Ouyang, Z. 158 Pakenham, Robert 10 Party Committees 33–4 Patten, Chris 255 Patterson, S. 11, 97 Peerenboom, R. 31, 207 Pei, M. 7, 96, 97, 250 Peng Zhen 38, 40, 46, 56, 58, 75, 79, 91, 93, 154, 157, 173, 228 People’s Congress (PC): evolution of 32–7; role in bill drafting 165–6 people’s deputies (PDs): election of 31, 102–12; functions of 43–4; independent-mindedness of 134–48; liaison network 84–8; numbers of 41–3, 44–5; performance of 39–41 Pfeffer, J. 92 Pitelis, C. 197 Plattner, M. 11 Plenary Sessions 37–45; role in bill drafting 167–74; role in elections 107–10; staffing of 58–62 Polanyi, K. 9 political contestation, and origin of 220–4 political governance: changes in 17–23; new mode of 174–6 politics, power net of 68–72 Polsby, N. 25 Potter, P. 38 Powell, Walter 14, 15, 16, 69, 212 power net of politics 68–72 prefecture work committees (PWCs) 56–7, 86, 91 Preuss, U. 9 procedural legality 227–8 propaganda system for people’s congresses 93–6 property rights, enforcement of 196–8 provincial level legislation, institutional setting for 153–7 Provincial People’s Congresses (PPCs): contextualizing in theory 8–13; evolution of 32–7; overview of 1–2; rising authority of 2–8 provincial politics, influence of 5–7 Przeworski, A. 260 Pu, X. 103, 251 public goods, maintenance of 193–6 Putnam, R. 9 Pye, L. 13

Qian, Y. 4 Qiao, S. 22, 179 Qin, Q. 6 Qin, R. 79, 93, 94–5 Remington, T. 11, 73, 97 rent-seeking 200–6 request and report system 82–3 retirement system 113, 115–16 review and assessment system 8, 208–15 review process, legislation 167–74 Revolutionary Committees 33–4, 37 Robinson, M. 254 Rowen, H. 254 Ru, X. 5 ruling elite, circulation of 113–34 Russia 72–3, 96–7 Saich, T. 253 Segal, G. 6, 8, 221 Shambaugh, D. 253 Shen Zulun 239 Shi, T. 4, 7, 195 Shih, C. 2, 103, 171, 135 Shiraishi, T. 17 Shirk, S. 6, 8, 27 Shou, X. 42, 45, 46 Shue, V. 19, 99, 254 Sjostrand, S. 101 Smith, J. 10 Smith-Doerr, L. 14, 15, 16, 69 social stratum 263–5 Solinger, D. 2, 14 Solnick, S. 74, 99 Song Rufen 6 special committees 52–6, 154 special economic zones (SEZs) 5, 35–6, 91, 163–4, 181, 182–3, 185–6 staff 57–62 standing committees (SCs): creation of 34–5; overview of 46–51; ratification of bills 167–74 Starr, J. B. 13 state failure, countervailing 196–215 Steinmo, S. 16 Stigler, G. 47 structural separation 32–7 Sun, Q. 5, 181 Sun, W. 82, 94, 120–1, 135, 228 Sun, Y. 201 Taiwan 255–6 Tang, G. 103, 105, 139, 146 Tang, X. 158 Tanner, M. S. 2, 3, 152, 219 taxes 203–6 Thelen, K. 16 Tian, J. 5, 88, 107, 125, 211–12, 249 Tollison, R. 200 Tong, J. 14

300

Index

totalitarianism 151–3 Tsebelis, G. 18 Tullock, G. 200 Unger, J. 219 vertical relationships 68–72 vice-chairpersons: elections for 30–1; as ruling elite 123–34 Vogel, E. 8 Wade, R. 10 Wan Li 92 Wang, C. 3, 8, 31, 42, 105, 157, 163, 239, 251, 267 Wang, Q. 185 Wang, S. 6 Wang, Y. 135 Wank, D. 13, 14, 225 Washington consensus 10–11 Wasserman, S. 15, 16 Wei, M. 233–4 Wei, N. 123, 124, 126 Weidenbaum, M. 13, 225 Weingast, B. 4 White, G. 77, 222, 254 White, L. 6, 117, 225 White, S. 151 Williamson, O. 14, 15, 74–5, 196, 221 Wilson, S. 13, 14 Wittfogel, K. 193 Wolf, Jr. C. 196 Woo-Cummings, M. 17, 18 Woolsey, N. W. 17 work committees 52–6 work conference system 80 work contact system 78–82 World Bank 21, 257–8, 260 Wu, D. 38 Wu, G. 6, 33–4, 36 Wu, Qing 142–3, 145–6, 265 Wu, Y. 269 Xia, M. 17, 18, 225, 254, 255, 256 Xia, Y. 13 Xian, Y. 224 Xiao Yang 230–1, 239–40 Xie, R. 134

Xu Junlun 5, 150, 157, 161 Xu Yijun 125, 126, 212 Yan, H. 76 Yan, J. 44 Yan, Y. 13, 14, 263 Yang, D. 3, 4, 24 Yang, F. 47, 83, 120–1, 134, 227, 229 Yang Huiquan 231–4 Yang, M. 13, 14, 263 Yang, Y. 79, 93, 94–5, 137 Yao Lifa 108–9, 146–7 Yao Xiurong 86, 134, 143–8, 264–5 You, L. 38 Young, E. 271 Yu Hualong 83 Yuan, R. 32, 42, 98, 105 Yuan, X. 57 Zacek, J. 10, 11 Zang, X. 117, 148 Zhang, B. 172, 197, 198, 199, 200, 207, 208, 232, 233, 235, 236 Zhang, J. 5 Zhang, Lichang 122 Zhang, M. 57, 90 Zhang, Q. 181 Zhang, S. 72, 78–9, 105, 228–9 Zhang, W. 209, 234–5 Zhang, Y. 46, 47, 49, 58, 80, 81, 86, 89, 91, 116, 119, 133, 158, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 183, 184, 186, 190, 191, 195, 199, 202, 203, 206, 222, 224, 228–9, 232, 233, 237, 238 Zhang, Z. 85, 87 Zhao, B. 105 Zhao, S. 4, 30, 33, 35, 76, 151, 220–1, 271 Zhao, Z. 28, 91 Zheng, Y. 4, 14, 216, 239 Zhong, Y. 4 Zhou, C. 5 Zhou, H. 19 Zhou, W. 4 Zhu, G. 168 Zhu, L. 38, 157 Zoido-Lobatón, P. 21 Zou, H. 224