Swedish Naval Administration, 1521-1721: Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities (The Northern World)

Swedish Naval Administration i

1521-1721 Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities

Jan Glete

Swedish Naval Administration, 1521-1721

The Northern Work North Europe and the Baltic c. 400-1700 A.D. Peoples, Economies and Cultures

Editors

Barbara Crawford (St. Andrews) David Kirby (London) Jon-Vidar Sigurdsson (Oslo) Ingvild 0ye (Bergen) Richard W. Unger (Vancouver) Piotr Gorecki (University of California at Riverside)

VOLUME 46

IT

000004201221

3

Swedish Naval Administration, 1521-1721 Resource Flows and Organisational Capabilities

By

Jan Glete

BRILL

LEIDEN . BOSTON 2010

Cover illustration: Tlie Vasa, a Swedish warship, raised f r o m Stockhohn Harbor in 1961, 333 years after her ill-fated maiden voyage in 1628. © Photograph by Ake E:son Lindnian. With kind permission of the Vasa M u s e u m , Stockholm. H i e research for this book has received support f r o m the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. Tliis book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Glete, Jan, 1947Swedish naval administration, 1521-1721 : resource flows and organisational capabilities / by Jan Glete. p. cm, — (The n o r t h e r n world, ISSN 1569-1462 ; v. 46) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17916-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Sweden. Flottan—History. 2. Sweden. Flottan—Management—History. 3. Sweden, Flottan—Appropriations and expenditures—History. 4. Sweden—History, Naval. 5. Naval art and s c i e n c e Sweden—History, 6. State, The. 7. Imperialism—Sweden—History. I. Title. II. Series. VA593.G547 2009 359.009485'0903-dc22 2009032790

ISSN 1569-1462 ISBN 978 90 04 17916 5 Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill N V incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, I D C Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSR All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission f r o m the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill N V provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to TTie Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, M A 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. P R I N T E D IN T H E N E T H E R L A N D S

CONTENTS

Preface List of Tables and Diagrams Maps Abbreviations Terms and Explanations Chapter One Resources, organisational capabilities and control of the sea 1.1 State formation, complex organisation and naval power 1.1.1 Introduction 1.1.2 State formation and protection-selling 1.1.3 Complex organisations in early modern Europe 1.1.4 Early modern navies 1.1.5 Naval administration and entrepreneurship 1.1.6 Technology and organisational capabilities 1.2 Sweden, naval power and the Baltic 1.2.1 The Swedish fiscal-military state and naval power 1.2.2 State formation, international relations and Baltic historiography 1.2.3 Baltic geostrategy 1.2.4 Swedish naval historiography Chapter Two The Swedish dynastic state and its navy 2.1 Naval power and political power 2.2 From Nordic Union to a Swedish dynastic state, 1448-1558 2.2.1 Before 1521: The Oldenburg campaigns for a Baltic empire 2.2.2 The gamble for a new monarchy: The Vasa battle fleet, 1521-1536 2.2.3 Defending a new monarchy: The Vasa galley fleet, 1536-1558 2.2.4 Conclusion: Naval power and a new monarchy

xi xiii XV xix xxi

1 1 1 8 12 14 19 22 25 25 28 39 46 51 51 52 52 61 70 74

VI

CONTENTS

2.3

2.4

Chapter 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9

3.10

The navy and Swedish empire-building, 1558-1660 2.3.1 Control of the Baltic Sea 2.3.2 Success of organisation: The Sv^redish battle fleet, 1558-1570 2.3.3 The navy and Sweden's eastern policy, 1570-1595 2.3.4 Dynastic crisis and increased ambitions, 1595-1617 2.3.5 The amphibious navy and the creation of the Baltic empire, 1617-1645 2.3.6 Western naval power in the Baltic, 1645-1660 2.3.7 Conclusion: The flexible navy Defending a Baltic empire, 1660-1721 2.4.1 The failure of the aristocratic navy, 1660-1679 2.4.2 The rise of the professional navy, 1679-1700 .... 2.4.3 The fall of the empire, 1700-1721 2.4.4 Conclusion: Organisation, dynamics, and inertia Three Naval operations and control of the Baltic Sea Control of the sea as an administrative problem The War against Christian II, 1521-1524 Hie War against Lubeck, 1534-1536 The Nordic Seven Years War, 1563-1570 The Kalmar War, 1611-1613 The Swedish assault on Denmark, 1643-1645 The War of the Baltic Sea, 1655-1660 War and crisis in the Swedish empire, 1675-1679 The Great Northern War at sea, 1700-1721 3.9.1 Introduction 3.9.2 1700: The last Swedish amphibious attack on Sjaelland 3.9.3 1701-1709: Karl XII in Poland and Peter I at Neva 3.9.4 1709-1715: A war in the Baltic Sea 3.9.5 1716-1721: Great Britain, the Baltic powers, and the end of the war 3.9.6 Conclusion Battles, administration and operational achievements

78 78 80 85 90 96 105 112 114 114 119 123 131 135 135 139 142 145 161 165 175 184 197 197 201 203 207 223 232 234

CONTENTS

Chapter Four Swedish naval administration: Scope, complexity, and structm-es 4.1 State, society and naval administration in Em-ope 4.1.1 Resomxe flows, entreprenems, and bm-eaucracy 4.1.2 Medieval and early modern naval administration 4.2 Passing the threshold: The early phase of Vasa naval administration 4.3 The royal entrepreneurs: Vasa naval administration, 1540-1618 4.3.1 Tax-raising, the double contract, and the power of the dynasty 4.3.2 A state administrating material resources 4.3.3 A navy in a functionally organised state 4.3.4 Shipbuilding and resource extraction 4.4 Royal power, aristocratic administrators, and private contractors, 1618-1680 4.4.1 Governance through hierarchy, divisions, and budgets 4.4.2 The navy emerges as an organisation, 1618-1634 4.4.3 Administration, aristocrats, and Amiralitetskollegium 4.5 Absolutism and professionalism: Naval administration, 1680-1721 Chapter Five Warships and naval strength 5.1 Warships, naval strength, and state formation 5.2 Technology, typology, and rating systems 5.2.1 Swedish warship types 5.2.2 Swedish rating systems 5.2.3 Master shipwrights and naval technology 5.3 Shipbuilding and naval strength in a Baltic context, 1521-1617 5.3.1 The new navy, 1521-1539 5.3.2 The galley navy, 1540-1558 5.3.3 Erik XIV's battle fleet, 1559-1570 5.3.4 Johan Ill's shipbuilding programs, 1571-1592 ... 5.3.5 TheCivil War navies, 1593-1599 5.3.6 Administrative overreach, 1600-1617

Vll

241 241 241 246 253 260 260 266 268 280 287 287 292 296 306 313 313 320 320 326 332 346 347 353 357 364 376 385

Vlll

5.4

5.5 5.6

CONTENTS

Shipbuilding and naval strength in a European context, 1618-1721 5.4.1 Gustav II Adolf's navy, 1618-1634 5.4.2 Stability, 1635-1658 5.4.3 The great ships, 1659-1679 5.4.4 Battle fleet, 1680-1699 5.4.5 Battle fleet, cruisers, and shallov^ Vk^ater flotillas, 1700-1721 Armed merchantmen The structure of Swedish naval power in two centuries

Chapter Six Cordage and canvas: Fitting out the navy 6.1 Introduction 6.2 H e m p and sailcloth 6.3 Inventories 6.4 Growing royal administration, 1521-1590 6.5 Expansion and crisis, 1591-1614 6.6 Tackel and tag on contract, 1615-1628 6.7 A more ambitious policy: Aims and reality, 1629-1679 6.8 Absolutism and naval fittings, 1680-1721 Chapter 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

394 395 410 418 424 428 434 443 449 449 452 460 467 475 484 492 501

Seven Bronze and iron: Swedish naval ordnance Introduction Gun technology Gun types and calibres Swedish naval ordnance: Production and organisation Early Vasa naval ordnance, 1521-1557 The great expansion, 1558-1570 Stability and stagnation, 1571-1615 Gustav II Adolf and naval gunnery, 1616-1643 From bronze to cast iron, 1644-1674 A navy with cheap guns, 1675-1721 Armament weight and shipbuilding technology

521 526 532 538 545 554 566 570

Chapter Eight A peasant society at sea: Men, leaders, and provisioning 8.1 The problems and the sources 8.2 Seamen, gunners, and soldiers

575 575 583

7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11

505 505 510 513

CONTENTS

8.3 8.4 8.5

Leaders Provisioning and health A peasant society goes to sea

Chapter Nine Conckision: Power through Organisation 9.1 Interest aggregation and organisational capabilities 9.2 Hie dynamics of complex organisations and changing institutions 9.3 Resource flows and new capabilities for war 9.4 A dynastic enterprise at sea 9.5 Resources and entrepreneurship 9.6 State formation and naval power 9.7 Swedish naval power in a European perspective

IX

609 635 642 645 646 651 654 658 663 666 668

Appendices 1 List of Swedish warships, 1521-1721 2 Swedish naval strength, divided in different sizes of warships, 1520-1721

735

Bibliography Index

745 771

675

PREFACE The studies that have resulted in this book started many years ago, and some results have been published in articles, the earliest in 1976. The book has been possible to write thanks to a grant from Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. Most of the archival research has been undertaken at Riksarkivet and Krigsarkivet, Stockholm, and the staffs of these archives have been most helpful. A special thank to Jan Brunius, Riksarkivet, who some years ago rearranged the important archival series Skeppsgdrdshandlingar (the shipyard accounts) and gave every document an individual number. This has made references to them much easier. Many years of cooperation with the Swedish Maritime Museums (Vasamuseet and Sjdhistoriska Museet in Stockholm and Marinmuseum in Karlskrona) have been important for my work. In later years, especially Dr Fred Hocker of the Vasa museum and Lars Einarsson, head of the Kronan project at Kalmar Ldns Museum, Kalmar, have been very helpful in providing information. Niels M. Probst has provided me with much information about the Danish navy, especially his detailed list of Danish warships. I have also benefited from communication with Dr Martin Bellamy, who has published a major study of the Danish navy in the age of Christian IV. For many years I have discussed early modern Swedish state formation and warfare with several historians. I especially wish to thank Professors Harald Gustafsson (Lund University), Jan Lindegren (Uppsala University), Gunnar Arteus (Swedish Defence College), Nils Erik Villstrand (Abo Academy) and Lars Ericson (Swedish Defence College) and Associate Professor Maria Sjoberg (Gothenburg University). Many colleagues at Stockholm University have helped me with ideas, comments and information. In this preface, I must limit my thanks to those w h o m I have worked with in later years; Associate Professors Jonas Nordin and Mats Hallenberg, Drs Anna Maria Forssberg, Johan Holm and Ulrica Soderlind, MA Ingvar Sjoblom, MA Klas Ostman, MA Dan Johansson and MA Hakan Jakobsson. Dan Johansson has very generously given me access to his detailed notes about the navy in Riksregistraturet (The King's letters).

Xll

PREFACE

Samuel Svard produced the maps with innovative ideas of his own, and Juleen Eichinger made an excellent copy-editing. This book is a combination of several ideas, which have guided my studies since many years. It emphasises technology, the importance of maritime lines of communication in North European strategy and the central role of organisational capabilities in state formation. The book also covers two centuries of dynamic and dramatic history. Tlie result is that it is very long. I have in the past considered writing books about Swedish naval technology, Swedish imperial expansion and the rise of organisational capabilities as the central part of early modern European state formation. Increasing age and declining health makes it unlikely that these books ever will be written. I hope that the present book at least makes some of my ideas comprehensible. My wife Yeo Sang Kum and our daughter Jihi are thanked for being present in my life. Stocldiolm, April 2009 Jan Glete

LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS

Tables 3.1 3.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3

Battleships in commission in the Baltic, 1709-1721 The tactical outcome of major naval battles in the Baltic Sea, 1563-1715 The size of the Swedish, Danish, and English navies, 1520-1720 Sv^^edish warships at the end of 1539 Swedish warships at the end of 1558 New construction of major Swedish warships, 1558-1570 Swedish warships at the end of 1570 Major Swedish warships, launched 1574-1578 MajorSwedish warships, launched 1579-1588 Swedish warships at the end of 1588 Swedish warships, brought to Poland by King Sigismund in 1598 Swedish warships at the end of 1599 Swedish warships at the end of 1610 Swedish warships at the end of 1624 Swedish warships at the end of 1634 Swedish warships at the end of 1654 Swedish warships at the end of 1675 The size structure of the Swedish navy, 1539-1718 Normal Swedish types of bronze guns, 1564-1615 The total inventory of Swedish naval guns, 1624-1700 ... Naval manning 1557-1579: Normative plans Naval manning 1599-1721: Normative plans Seamen and gunner companies, 1634-1680

233 235 314 352 357 359 364 366 371 376 382 384 392 401 410 417 422 443 517 565 586 587 603

Diagrams 5.1 5.2

The Swedish and Danish navies, 1520-1620 Major Navies in Northern and Western Europe, 1620-1720

346 395

MAP 1 The Baltic and Sweden's territorial expansion, 1561-1660

| \ 'Frederiksten A

arlskrona

BALTIC SEA

Ji

C

Bprnholm

6®o Stettin

1.Bornholm 9/6 1535 17. Southern Oland 1/6 1676 2. Svendborgsund 16/6 1535 18. Femern Belt (Femern Straits) 31/5-1/6 1677 3. Bornholm 30/5 1563 19. Koge Bay 1/7 1677 4. North of Gotland 11/9 1563 20. Koge Bay 23-26/9 1710 5. Northern Oland 30-31/5 1564 21. Hango Udd (Hango Point) 26-27/7 1714 6. Oland 11-15/8 1564 22. Femern 13/4 1715 7. Bukow 4/6 1565 23. Riigen 28/7 1715 8. Bornholm 7/7 1565 24. Dynekilen 26/6 1716 9. Northern Oland 26/7 1566 10. Kolberger Helde (Femern) 1/7 1644 11. Femern 13/10 1644 12. Mon 12-13/9 1657 13. The Sound 29/10 1658 14. Between Femern and Lolland (Rodsund) 30/4 1659 15. Aebeltoft23/7 1659 16. Between Riigen, Bornhom and the Sound 25-26/5 1676

MAP 2 Important naval battles in the Baltic, 1521-1721

ABBREVIATIONS AK AOSB AR B Bran BS BU C D Dan dsm E FM FRA FS G GR H HKR HSH HT K KAR KARS KFA KrA LA LAD LM M M MM MR NNS

Amiralitetskollegium Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brewaxling Arldirakningar (KrA) Bought Brandenburg* BIockship=^ Broken up Built under contract Discarded; Deleted from list Danish daler silvermynt Enskilda arkiv (RA) First mentioned Finska Riksarkivet, Aldre rakenskapsserien Converted to fireship"^ Given away Konung Gustaf Is Registratur Hired"^ Hertig Karls Registratur (RA) Handlingar rorande Skandinaviens historia Historisk Tidskrift Kungliga och furstliga arkiv (RA) Krigskollegium, Artilleridepartementet, Rakenskaper (KrA) Krigskollegium, Artilleridepartementet, Rakenskaper, Stockholms slotts arkli (KrA) Karolinska Forbundets Arsbok Krigsarkivet Lost in action"^ Lost in action, through self-inflicted destruction"^ Last mentioned Militara amnessamlingar (RA) Merchantman"^ Mariner's Mirror Militieriikenskaper (KrA) Nya Nummerserien (KrA)

XX

P pdr R RA Ret RR S SBL SH SHMA SHMF Sig. sm SRA SRP SS SST Tp Wr OR

ABBREVIATIONS

Prize taken from or by the enemy pounder, pounders (guns) Riksdagsacta (RA) Riksarkivet Returned from or to a previous owner"*^ Riksregistraturet (RA) Sold Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon Skeppsgardshandlingar (RA) Strodda Militieliandlingar, Armen (RA) Strodda Militiehandlingar, Flottan (RA) Sigismund, King of Poland 1587-1632, King of Sweden 1592-99'*^ silvermynt Svenska Riksdagsakter Svenska RiksrMets Protokoll Sandbergska Samlingen (RA) Stockholms Stads Tankebocker Converted to naval transport"^ Wrecked Orlogsfiottans rakenskaper (KrA)"^

Only used in Appendix 1.

TERMS AND EXPLANATIONS

Calendar Dates in this book are Old Style/Julian Calendar, which dominated in the Baltic until the 18th century. The special Swedish calendar, used 1700-12, where the dates were one day ahead of the Julian Calendar, is not used.

Explanations Amiralitetskollegium Batsman Bosseskytt Holmamiral Krigsarkivet Ldn

Ldrft Lodja Oversteamiral Pram Reduktion Riksamiral Riksarkivet Riksfdrestdndare Riksmarsk Riksrddet Riksregistratur Riksviceamiral Skeppare Skeppshdvitsman Stat Stormstycke Underamiral Vadmal

of Swedish

Words

Admiralty Board Seaman Gunner Admiral in c o m m a n d of the main naval yard War Archives Non-hereditary territory administrated by a member of the aristocracy (until the 16th century) Textiles made of flax Large boat, originally a Russian type Lord High Admiral (16th century) Flat-bottomed transport vessel Return of donated land to the Crown Lord High Admiral (17th century) National Archives Regent Lord High Constable The Council of the Realm The King's out-letters Deputy Lord High Admiral (17th century) Master (mariner) Sea officer (16th century) Budget Short gun firing hailshots Deputy Admiral Textile made of wool

XXll

TERMS A N D EXPLANATIONS

Swedish Weights, Measurements Skeppund Skeppund Lispund Skdlpund

general 170 kilograms metal 136 kilograms 8.5 kilograms 0.425 kilogram

Famn Aln Fot Tum

1,78 meters 594 millimeters 297 millimeters 24.75 millimeters

and

Currency

Dakr silvermynt unit of account: from 1609 2/3 riksdaler, f r o m 1665 8/13 of a riksdaler, from 1681 1/2 riksdaler and from 1716 1/3 riksdaler. Riksdaler a coin of 25.6 grammes silver (from 1540).

Rulers of Sweden,

1521-1721

Christian II, 1520-21; also King of Denmark and Norway, 1513-23. Gustav Eriksson (Vasa), regent 1521-23; King Gustav I, 1523-60. Erik XIV, 1560-68. Johan III, 1568-92. Sigismund, 1592-99; also King of Poland, 1587-1632. Karl, Duke of Sodermanland, regent, 1599-1604: King Karl IX, 1604-11. Gustav II Adolf, 1611-32. Christina, 1632-54; regency government, 1632-44. Karl X Gustav, 1654-60. Karl XI, 1660-97; regency government, 1660-72. Karl XII, 1697-1718; regency government, 1697. Ulrika Eleonora, 1719-20. Fredrik I, 1720-51; also Count of Hessen-Cassel, 1730-51.

The Most Senior Admiral,

1569-1721

Klas Eriksson Fleming, dversteamiral 1569-97. Joakim Scheel, 1599-02. Axel Ryning, riksamiral 1602-1612. Goran Gyllenstierna, riksamiral 1612-18.

TERMS AND EXPLANATIONS

XXlll

Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm, riksamiral 1620-50. Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna, riksamiral 1652-56. Karl Gustav Wrangel, riksamiral 1657-64. Gustav Stenbock, riksamiral 1664-83, suspended 1676-77 and after that not active as leader of the navy. Hans Wachtmeister, amiralgeneralldjtnant 1679-81, amiralgeneral 1681-1713, president of the Amiralitetskollegium 1683-1713. Klas Sparre, overamiral and acting president of the Amiralitetskollegium 1715-1727.

Sweden's Wars,

1521-1721

The War against Christian II, 1521-24. Usually called the "War of the Liberation". In alliance with Liibeck and other Hanse cities from 1522 and with Frederik I of Holstein and Denmark-Norway from 1523. The War against Christian II, 1531-32. In alliance with Frederik I of Holstein and Denmark-Norway. The Count's War, 1534-36. A Danish civil war, where Sweden, Holstein and Prussia were allied against Liibeck. The War against Russia, 1554-57. The Nordic Seven Years' War, 1563-70. Denmark, Liibeck and PolandLithuania (until 1568) in alliance against Sweden. The War against Russia, 1570-95. There were truces 1583-89 and 1593-95. The Civil War, 1597-99. King Sigismund against Duke Karl. The War against Poland-Lithuania, 1600-1660. There was a truce with occasional warfare in 1611-20 and a long truce 1629-55. The War against Russia 1609-17. The Thirty Years War. Sweden was unofficially involved from 1628 and officially f r o m 1630 to 1648. The War against Denmark, 1643-45. The War against the City of Bremen, 1654. The Northern War, 1655-60. Sweden was at war with Poland-Lithuania, Russia, Denmark, Brandenburg, Austria and the Dutch Republic, although there were periods of peace and truces with most of these powers. The War against the City of Bremen, 1666.

XXIV

TERMS A N D EXPLANATIONS

Sweden's participation in the West European War, usually called The Scanian War, 1674-79. Brandenburg, Denmark and the Dutch Republic in war with Sweden, which was allied with France. The Great Northern War, i 7 0 0 - 2 i . Sweden was at war with Russia 170021; with Denmark in 1700 and 1709-20; with Poland-Lithuania and Saxony 1700-06/07 and again from 1709; with Prussia 1715-20; with Hanover 1715-19, and unofficially with Great Britain 1716-19.

CHAPTER ONE

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND CONTROL OF THE SEA

1.1 1.1.1

State formation,

complex organisation

and naval power

Introduction

State formation has been explained by historians and social scientists as a result of the rise of national consciousness, political interaction between rulers and socioeconomic groups, or war and international politics. Most explanations regard competition between states as the driving force behind resource extraction and the development of strong structures that form states. Changing military technology has frequently been used as an explanation for state formation, especially in the early modern period. Such explanations ignore the organisational context, however, particularly a state's capability to make more efficient use of resources. Although many studies have emphasised inefficiency and waste in the use of resources in early modern European warfare, few have used economic theories about resource utilisation and innovation in their exploration of state formation, and fewer still have regarded organisational capability as the most central phenomenon in state formation. This book offers a different perspective on domestic political interaction, warfare, and the growth of early modern European states. The key words are violence, protection, organisation (capability to use resources), and institutions (rules of h u m a n interaction). Violence was often used to settle domestic conflicts, but conflicts, warfare, and violence before the rise of strong states cannot be neatly divided into domestic conflicts and international wars. Military-political alliances frequently crossed political borders, which often were diffuse. Protection from violence was m u c h in demand, but the rules of human interaction strongly favoured local solutions to the protection problem. Political power has its root in the ability to create a tolerable order of life for a majority of the population, and power derived from personal presence has an advantage over more distant power-holders who act through local agents. Distant power-holders had to provide something markedly superior in quality and efficiency to become

2

C H A P T E R ONE

accepted. Consequently, the rise of states as complex organisations, raising resources from wide territories and providing protection to them with permanent armed forces, coincided with a marked change in rules of h u m a n interaction. Society agreed to pay higher taxes if the new type of state, which claimed that it had a monopoly on violence, was able to show that it markedly improved order and predictability in daily life. When such a state was, or seemed to be, threatened by external enemies, taxpayers might be willing to make heavy sacrifices to maintain this stability, as the alternative was highly unpredictable. This makes it important to study the creation of complex organisation for protection and the changes in political institutions which resulted. One of the most often overlooked examples of an early modern European organisation that was essential to state formation is navies.' This book examines the rise of one complex organisation (the Swedish navy) as a new agent of change in early modern Europe and emphasises the importance of control of the sea in early modern state formation. In particular, the book focuses on the growth of naval capabilities as a part of the formation of the dynastic Swedish state and of the rise and fall of the Swedish Baltic empire. Northern Europe is a highly maritime region. It is shaped by the Baltic Sea, its outlets to the Atlantic, and the several large rivers which flow to this sea. Navies were highly complex, and policy-makers must coordinate and administrate several types of capabilities and resources if a navy should have an operational value. If naval power to secure control of the sea was important for state formation, it ought to be visible in the Baltic region in the period when the early modern states developed. A study of naval technology in its organisational context may also provide perspectives on technology in state formation. Studies about Swedish imperial expansion are predominantly focused on military and continental operations, even though the empire was created around a sea. Historians seldom show much interest in how control of the sea was achieved and rarely acknowledge the importance of large-scale amphibious warfare. Surveys of the Swedish impe-

' This chapter is partly based on Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime conflicts and the transformation of Europe, London, 2000, 1 - 1 6 , 60-75, and Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1660, London, 2002, 42-66. A s u m m a r y of m y recent research: Jan Glete, "Warfare, Entrepreneurship and the Fiscal-military State", in Frank Tallett and D. J. B. T r i m (eds), European Warfare, 1350-1750, Cambridge, forthcoming.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

3

rial experience often leave the reader with the impression that it was possible to deploy large military forces around the Baltic Sea and build an empire with small and easily achieved naval capabilities. Actually, the Swedish navy was, until the mid-17th century, one of the largest in Europe, and the absence of any competing strong naval power on the eastern and southern coasts of the Baltic was a precondition for Swedish expansion. Control of the sea gave the Swedish army greater operational freedom in the Baltic region, as many important lines of army operations crossed the sea. The persistent absence of competing navies shows that the development of naval power was difficult and required a long-term policy and capabilities which most Baltic powers lacked. Denmark did have a powerful navy and thus was a particularly dangerous enemy, but the Danish political system prevented Denmark from competing with Sweden for a Baltic empire. The historiography of early modern European state formation has usually left navies out of narrations and explanations. Navies have been regarded as cheap compared to armies and mainly related to wars about trade and European expansion overseas. The leading maritime states in early modern Europe—the Dutch Republic and Great Britain—were until recently seen as classical examples of rather undeveloped state power. This seemed to confirm that navies were unimportant for state formation and that sea power even might be a way to avoid high taxes and centralised states. Naval historians have often emphasised that navies are complex and require long-term policies in order to be efficient, but they have seldom been interested in relating their subject to state formation. Naval power was inherently complex and required states to possess a certain degree of stability and sophistication in order to achieve it. Studies of the growth of navies may improve our understanding of the dynamic process by which European states developed into complex organisations. These states were not only agglomerations of human, financial, and material resources under more centralised control. They were also centres of competencies which transformed resources into structures with new capabilities. That made it possible to develop new forms of social control from the top of a hierarchy. From this top, political decision-makers could enforce centrally determined policies with operational forces, which could act with a certain degree of autonomy from the society in which they existed. They could also project resources and power over long distances and could dominate societies which had weaker state organisations. This was what happened

4

C H A P T E R ONE

during the Swedish imperial expansion, and the break-up of the empire resulted only when other states also developed efficient organisations for warfare. Tliis book outlines how the Swedish state during two centuries wrestled with the problem of developing organisational capabilities which made it possible for a society with scarce maritime and mercantile resources to use the sea to its advantage. Organisational capability is defined as an organisation's ability to transform and integrate external resources with its core competencies and create an advantage in competition with other h u m a n activities, organised as well as improvised.^ Competition between states is in this perspective essentially a competition in efficient use of resources for warfare. The Swedish navy is studied as a complex of core competencies, which handled a flow of external resources; manpower, social authority, food, timber, metals, sailcloth, hemp, etc., and transformed them into sea power. Lack of maritime resources which are easy to transform into naval power may be compensated for by the competence to raise and transform other resources into such power. This book shows that the Swedish dynastic state for two centuries primarily searched for cheap domestic resources to develop strong naval power and used organisational rather than maritime capability to transform the resources. Successful development of organisational capabilities usually results in organisational growth. With an interpretation of corporate growth formulated by Edith Tilton Penrose, such grov^^th typically occurs when the organisation has at least some under-utilised capability which can be used to catch opportunities for expansion.' An organisation which shows good results—a corporation or a state—is also able to raise more resources from financial markets or taxpayers and is able to develop more capabilities, which may be used in turn for further growth. From an economic perspective, the early modern fiscal-military state was a new, large-scale actor in an old market; the market for protection and

^ This definition is inspired by Giovanni Dosi, Richard R. Nelson, a n d Sidney G. Winter, "Introduction: The nature and dynamics of organizational capabilities", and David J. Teece, Gary Pisano, a n d A m y Shuen, "Dynamic Capabilities a n d Strategic Management", b o t h in Giovanni Dosi, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. W i n t e r (eds), The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities, Oxford, 2000, 1 - 2 2 , 334-62. ^ Edith Tilton Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford, 1959 (3rd ed. 1995); Christos Pitelis (ed.). The Growth of the Firm: The legacy of Edith Penrose, Oxford, 2002.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

5

control of violence. It sold protection against violence to society by raising taxes through the fiscal organisation and delivered the service through its armed forces. In a state formation perspective, profit from protection-selling is the same as increased access to resources by efficient control of violence. These resources were often used for expansion, either peaceful extension of protection to new regions or violent wars against competing protection-sellers. Tlie development of European fiscal-military states was an uneven and protracted process, where some states developed and grew early and extended their control of territory and trade, while others caught up with the pioneers in a competitive process. The supply of organised protection was, however, an innovation stimulated by demand. Societies need protection, and the skills and capability to organise it are scarce. Consequently, protection-selling is an effective instrument of power over society, used by m e n with a comparative advantage in violence, who make themselves accepted and even respected as powerholders. In the early modern period it was those innovators who were most efficient in organising protection as a large-scale enterprise who gained power over society. They gained it in competition with both other protection-selling enterprises and with traditional, local forms of protection. The organisation for protecting society, however, first of all protected those who controlled the organisation. Rulers protected their own interests (their share of the market) when they protected a society. The Swedish development of a fiscal-military state and a Baltic empire can be studied in this perspective. The Vasa dynasty in the 16th century developed an enterprise in protection of Sweden in competition with other protectors and old institutions for protection and social order: the Nordic Union monarchy, the aristocracy, the peasant militia, the Cathohc Church. This enterprise was successful and provided the dynasty with domestic resources and organisational capabilities, which could be used on the Baltic market for protection. The creation of a navy allowed the state to intervene at sea and on territories across the sea, which gave it a major advantage in competition with powerholders without naval power. Most of the territorial conquests around the Baltic were made not from local power-holders (they frequently cooperated) but from other large-scale protection-sellers who tried to build empires. A century of wars ended with a Swedish Baltic empire, which the state then had to protect against other states which gradually developed capabilities to resist and counter-attack. The empire

31 C H A P T E R ONE

was destroyed in the early 18th century when several powers developed sufficient capabilities, including naval power, to overpower the Swedish state. Naval power can be decisive in state formation and expansion of states if it can cut strategic lines of communication for competing power-holders and can open them for transfer of resources. The ultimate test of a strong naval power is usually its ability to change the strategic and political situation by deploying a battle fleet to a distant or contested sea and then being able to influence or decide the outcome of a conflict by control of the lines of communication. Another important part of naval power is the ability to cooperate with army forces in combined operations across the sea, or in operations in littoral regions where land and water meet. Both types of operations require warships of suitable design, weapons, outfitting, provisions, men, leadership, and capability to coordinate these widely different resources in a timely fashion. This book explores how naval policy and administration were related to state formation and empire building. It intends to show as concretely as possible how efforts to create and maintain naval power required a continuous inflow of resources in order to maintain a continuous output of hardware, manpower, and competence to sail and fight at sea. The chapters are organised around those resource flows which converted raw material, semi-finished products, manpower, social authority and political and administrative competence into warships, fittings, weapons, men and leadership. The chapters about the material side of naval power are longer than the parts of the book devoted to men. The author's research agenda is concentrated to the material side of naval power, and the chapter about m e n and leaders mainly brings together results f r o m several other studies and interprets them in a long-term perspective. Comparisons with other navies are brief and mainly made with quantitative methods. Quantification is also used to connect the diff"erent administrative efl^orts and make it easier to understand that naval power is shaped by proper and timely combinations of ships, sails, rigging, cables, guns, men, leaders, and provisions. Qualitative aspects of naval power can only be analysed if the quantitative aspects are accounted for. Studies of early modern naval policy and administration frequently cover a broader spectrum than this book. Naval bases, finance, and the acquisition of naval supplie§ from markets are often prominent in such studies. These subjects have either been studied in earlier books about Swedish naval power or require more empirical research before

• T.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

7

they can be placed in the long-term perspective which dominates this study. Earlier studies in Swedish provide adequate information about shipyards, gun production, and the formal structure of naval administration. With the exception of the establishment of Karlskrona as a new naval base from 1680, investments in yard facilities were only a small part of the cost of naval power. Naval finance and the acquisition of naval stores were closely integrated with the Swedish state's extraction of domestic material resources and manpower. This study cannot cover all parts of these questions, but it analyses features in the Swedish system that were unusual in a European perspective. Technical aspects are emphasised, but this is no attempt to write a comprehensive technical history of the Swedish navy. It is a book about an organisation which used technology, not about technology as such. The archival remains of naval administration are probably the most complicated remains of the early modern Swedish state. Most sources about naval administration from the 1520s to the 1620s may be found in many archival series from the early Treasury {Kammaren), which kept and audited the king's accounts. Previous studies on naval history have mainly used series directly connected with the navy, primarily the shipyard accounts (Skeppsgdrdshandlingar). However, much more may be found if all relevant Treasury series are investigated. From the 1630s, the navy emerged as an organisation, administrated by the Amiralitetskollegium. This created more homogeneous archival series, but unfortunately many sources have been lost or are in disarray, especially for the 17th century. This has made studies of resource flows in the naval organisation difficult. The present study shows that if evidence which survives in several series is put together, a more complete picture appears. Earlier studies of the Swedish navy have made much use of the important archival series Riksregistraturet (the King's out-letters) and the Amiralitetskollegium's board minutes and correspondence files. Some naval historians, primarily Axel Zettersten, Hjalmar Borjeson, and Einar Wendt have also left their detailed notes from these series in their manuscript collections deposited at Krigsarkivet, Stoclcholm. These notes, as well as souixe references in earlier literature, have made it less necessary to read these huge archival series in their entirety.'' I have been able to concentrate my attention on a selected number of

I have also, fortunately, been able to use M A Dan Johansson's detailed notes f r o m Riksregistraturet 1561-1630 and f r o m Duke Karl's registratur 1568-98.

33

C H A P T E R ONE

letters and minutes of special importance for this study. I have made an extensive search for information about the navy in archival series which earlier have been little used, at least by historians who have published their results. These series are primarily in the early Treasury archive (1521-1630), the ordnance accounts from 1535 to 1645 {Arklirdkningar, Artillerihuvudhdcker), the naval part of the state's yearly main ledgers (Rikshuvudbocker, containing summaries of the state's accounts) from 1623 to 1677, the detailed naval accounts f r o m 1634 to 1721 (Orlogsflottans rdkenskaper), Krigsarkivet's large collection of provisionally indexed naval papers {Nya nummerserien), and inventories of ships f r o m the 1640s to 1718. The collection of naval documents in the Kings' and the Chancellery's archives {Militara dmnessamlingar and letters from the Amiralitetskollegium) have also been important. The use of several series has provided new results, as many documents scattered in various series can be placed in their relevant context if used together with documents in other series. Chapter 1 surveys the problems, theories and explanations related to state formation, complex organisation, and naval power. It also outlines Swedish geostrategy and historiography. Chapter 2 outlines naval policy, while chapter 3 analyses major naval operations with an emphasis on the importance of administration for success and failure at sea. After that, chapters about central naval administration (4), warships (5), sails, cordage and cables (6), guns (7), and manning and provisioning (8) follow various resource flows through the organisation, and the development of capabilities which together created sea power. For readers without previous knowledge of the wars in which the Swedish navy was involved, it may be difficult to follow the arguments in chapters 4 to 8 without an introduction to what the navy actually was used for. That is provided in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 3 also provides an overview of the administrative eff'orts analysed in chapter 4 to 8, even though the logical place for such an overview might have been after these chapters. 1.1.2

State formation

and

protection-selling

State formation is the growth of authority, resources, and organisational structures connected to a political centre which claims to control a territory.' A state is based on material, financial, and h u m a n

Surveys of studies of early m o d e r n state formation: Charles Tilly,

Coercion,

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

9

resources extracted from the society and brought under control of the central authorities. Hiere is broad agreement that a new type of state developed in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. In various historiographical traditions this has been called the nation state, the absolute state, the pov^er state (German Machtstaat), the fiscal or tax state (German Steuerstaat), the military state (common in Swedish historiography), or the fiscal-military state.*^ The latter term is at present the most useful for generalisations and explanations connected with capabilities and resources. It puts equal emphasis on the income and expenditure parts of the resource flow through the state, and on its two main organisational parts: the fiscal apparatus and the permanent armed forces. It was a crucial part of European state formation that the fiscal and military organisations formed separate chains of control and patronage which were connected at the central, political level of the state. Armed men could not tax society, and fiscal agents could not use taxes for privately controlled armed forces. The central authority gained a new importance with its capability to coordinate and transform large resources through complex organisations. Politically and administratively (not necessarily physically), resources flowed from the local level to the central state before they was distributed to military units spread around the society or waging wars abroad. The divided yet coordinated fiscal and military structures made more efficient use of limited resources than local structures. It was also easier to create loyalty to a political centre when both tax-collectors and armed men were dependent on the authority and legality of the ruler. States which derived their power f r o m permanent and hierarchical fiscal and military organisations were more powerful than medieval states, which were administratively dependent on local power elites with uncertain loyalties. The power of local elites did not disappear, but these groups and the new states developed new rules of interaction. This process took centuries, because rulers and elites often ran

Capital, and European states, A.D. 990-1990, Oxford, 1990, 1-37; Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), Power Elites and State Building, Oxford, 1996, 1-18; l l i o m a s Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe, Cambridge, 1997, 1 - 1 9 . Terminology: Leon Jespersen, A Revolution from Above? The Power state of 16th and 17th century Scandinavia, Odense, 2000, 27-30. Sweden as a military state: Sven A. Nilsson, De stora krigens tid: Om Sverige som militarstat och bondesamhdlle, Uppsala, 1990. The t e r m "fiscal-military state" was first used in John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783, London, 1989.

10

C H A P T E R ONE

into conflicts about control of resources. In some countries, notably those with a maritime economy, elite groups eventually formed constitutional states fashioned to their own interests, rather than to the interests of dynastic rulers. In both dynastic and elite-dominated fiscal-military states, elite groups bargained with the central authority about what it could deliver in terms of better protection and opportunities for careers and business. Politically, this was as a process of interest aggregation between different groups in society and between them and the central state.' The fiscal-military states raised resources f r o m agriculture and trade, activities vulnerable to violence and war. This made landowners, peasants, and merchants willing to pay for protection and make political concessions to those who could provide it. In pre-modern Europe, this protection normally had been provided by local elite groups, who both protected their own property and made others pay for being protected. These local elite groups could raise temporary armed forces for the central political authority, but these forces could equally well be turned against the political centre or be used to settle local conflicts. Tlie new type of state kept the raising of resources and the control of violence in two separate hierarchies. It was careful not to let the armed forces have direct access to taxes or give local elites direct control over the military chain of command. The officers and men were dependent on the central authority's ability to raise taxes to pay and feed them. The taxpayers were dependent on the same authority's ability to control its armed forces and use them for efficient defence. It was mandatory that the central authority convinced those who served in the hierarchies that their social position and possibility to make a career depended on loyalty to the central authority. The central authority in such a state had to be creative and innovative in order for the transformation of resource flows to be successful. In the early modern period, that authority was often controlled by a dynasty. Some dynasties ruling early fiscal-military states were new and had gained power by their ability to combine various interest groups and develop new organisational capabilities. Sweden is prob-

' European state formation as a result of bargaining between rulers a n d elites is central in Tilly 1990. A study emphasising connections between central and local politics is Ertman 1997. Changing rules of h u m a n interaction (institutions) as precondition for growth of complex a n d a n o n y m o u s economic structures: Douglass C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton, 2005.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

11

ably the best example of this. This study covers the two centuries when Sweden was a dynastic fiscal-military state, with the monarchs as political and administrative leaders. The main challenge facing such leaders was control of violence and the use of violence to defend and promote the interest of their own dynasty. While doing so, they also had to protect the territory they ruled, but the territory was also used for resource extraction for dynastic purposes: conquests and dynastic warfare. Nationally oriented historiography has often not observed the difference between the interests of the rulers, who ran an enterprise in protection-selling, and the interests of the taxpayers they protected. State formation and control of violence are intertwined phenomena. Economically, the state can be defined as an organisation with a comparative advantage in violence in a territory whose boundaries are determined by its power to raise taxes.® This definition is useful in an early modern context, where sovereign rulers often did not have a complete monopoly on violence but increasingly showed that states had advantages in violence-control compared to more decentralised systems of protection. An economic definition of the state makes it easier to analyse state formation as an entrepreneurial activity, developing organisational capabilities. The state can be studied as an enterprise in violence-control and protection-selling, where the entrepreneur's aim is to gain power through improved use and control of violence. In this process, new rules of h u m a n interaction (institutions) and organisations may develop and make both resource extraction and violencecontrol more efficient. A theory of protection-selling as an economic and entrepreneurial activity was introduced by the economic historian Frederic C. Lane. States can be analysed as producers of a utility—protection—and as enterprises with interest in profits. In a political and social context, this profit appears as increased power for those who are successful organisers of protection. It may also appear as economic growth as a result of reduced destruction and insecurity. Pre-modern and early modern states might be interpreted as enterprises, as they normally were shaped by groups who gained power f r o m their comparative advantage in the use of violence. Originally they mainly used this for plunder of peasants and merchants, but gradually they found it more rational to make society pay regular tributes for not being plundered.

Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, N e w York, 1981, 21.

12

C H A P T E R ONE

Tliis also gave the wielders of violence an incentive to protect those who paid them from attacks from other violent groups. They became rulers (feudal lords, kings) and the tributes became taxes paid by those who preferred to pay for protection rather than organise it on their own in peasant communities, cities or republics. The relationship that developed between rulers and society could in this perspective be seen as a long-term contract between a protection-selling enterprise and a community of customers.' Early modern Germany and the Nordic-Baltic region were parts of Europe where two or several powers often attempted to sell protection to the same territory and the same trade route. The Swedish dynastic state for a time was the most successful of these protection-selling enterprises. Competition about protection-selling is the same as conflict and war, and success is the same as expansion. This competitive process took place in a maritime region, and the ability to control strategic sea lines of communication was often decisive for success. The Swedish navy was a central part of an ambitious entrepreneurial project in protection-selling and embodied some of the crucial organisational capabilities which gave the Swedish state an advantage. 1.1.3

Complex organisations

in early modern

Europe

The results of early modern state formation, the large and complex fiscal and military organisations, were not only agglomerations of resources. They were articulated actors with a dynamic of their own. Human, financial, and material resources were not only raised and expended when they were used in permanent armed forces. They were combined and developed in a new pattern, which was intended to increase the efficiency of resource utilisation. The general diffusion of the fiscalmilitary state is strong evidence of that the end result of this transformation was a more efficient form of violence control than earlier institutional patterns.'" From an economic point of view, these states can be analysed as early examples of complex organisations and the results of attempts

' Frederic C. Lane, Profits from Power: Readings in protection rent and violencecontrolling enterprises, Albany, 1979, esp. 1 - 3 6 , 5 0 - 6 5 (articles f r o m 1941, 1942, a n d 1958). N e o - W e b e r i a n organisation theory: Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A critical essay, 3rd ed., New York, 1&93. Several theoretical approaches: W . Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis, Organizations and Organizing: Rational, natural and open system perspectives. U p p e r Saddle River, NJ, 2007.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

13

by rulers and various interest groups to use scarce resources in an innovative and more rational way. The economic idea with an organisation is to convert an input of resources into a more efficient output of goods and services. The fact that some medium-sized states became more powerful than states with much greater resource bases shows that the organisational capability to mobilise and transform resources developed unevenly in early modern states. The Dutch Republic's wars against those two powers which after each other were Europe's leading military powers, Spain and France, are perhaps the best example. Sweden's empire-building is another obvious case, as it successfully fought Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and a coalition of German princes led by the Habsburg emperors. The organisation of resources matters more than the fact that resources exist, and different types of organisation may provide widely different results. The anatomy of organisations is therefore important for understanding historical change and the transformation of the international power structure. Complex organisations divide labour, reduce transaction costs, process large volumes of information, and develop monitoring systems and chains of command, which makes it possible for a centre to control the flow of vast resources through hierarchies. Complex organisations with long-term control of resources can also make investments in capital assets and can develop specialised competencies which otherwise would not exist. The capacity of an individual to develop skills and gather information is by necessity limited, and the individuals' rationality is bounded by their experience and the information to which they have access. H u m a n beings create organisations in order to reduce these limitations. Most of the technical, commercial, and administrative competencies that form the base of modern society require complex organisations as a precondition for their very existence. They act as social "containers" of these competencies which otherwise would not exist. A permanent organisation may develop advanced technical and administrative systems, which makes it superior to a temporary organisation. A permanent organisation is usually also a superior form to develop social cohesion and team spirit, which prepare individuals for collective actions under stress, such as combat and extended military and naval operations under adverse conditions. In the early modern period, effective control of the sea through naval forces is an outstanding example of h u m a n efforts that greatly benefited from the development of complex organisation. Hierarchical organisations of the type that became dominant in the European armed forces are also excellent instruments of power

14

C H A P T E R ONE

exercised from the top. They create leverage effects, which make it possible for rulers to control vast resources efficiently. In an environment of fragmented and unorganised resources, a complex organisation has power far beyond the individual resources accreted to it. Efficient leadership of an organisation is, however, a demanding task, and early modern rulers must recruit individuals with a special talent for organisational leadership (ministers, bureaucrats, officers) to take charge of many operational decisions. At each level of the hierarchy, the individuals who exercise power on behalf of the top level must be given authority, social prestige, and access to patronage, which make it possible to exercise power over others. The development of officer corps is a typical result of this process of power delegation. Like individuals, complex organisations are not perfectly rational. They are normally more or less path-dependent, that is, they are better at solving the problems they were created for than they are at solving new problems." To introduce new competencies or reforms that may change the existing power structure in the organisation is difficult and requires firm leadership from above. An organisation might also become so complex that the central authority cannot control it efficiently and maintain its ultimate purpose. In that case, the various parts of the organisation, each in possession of highly developed skills, authority, and patronage, might sub-optimise and might develop in ways that suit them rather than in ways that address the c o m m o n goal of the whole organisation. Typically, the border zones between armies and navies (combined operations, coastal warfare) became organisational problems when the two types of complex organisations became firmly entrenched in the structure of the state. 1.1.4

Early modern

navies

There are several important studies which show that navies were combinations of military, maritime, technical, industrial, and administrative capabilities that welded them into the most complex organisations of their age. Their political and administrative connections to the growth of the fiscal-military states are easy to observe, and naval historians underline these connections in more recent s t u d i e s . T h e r e

" Path-dependence: Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Iheory oj Economic Change, Boston, ,1982. The British navy: John E h r m a n , The Navy in the War of William III,

Evolutionary 1689-1697:

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

15

is, however, a long tradition to primarily relate navies to sea power and competition between states and societies about command of the sea. This puts the focus on the importance of naval power for trade and maritime empires and underlines the special features of navies compared to other organisations, including armies. For an analysis of why navies were created and continued to exist as parts of political processes, it is fruitful to simply regard them as embodiments of power. In that perspective, the driving forces and perspectives are the same as those that guide political behaviour in general: ambitions, opportunities, threats, and interests. It makes it possible to analyse navies as a more general phenomenon: organisations as instruments of power. Historical studies about early modern navies and sea power are rather uneven in their coverage of various regions, periods, and themes. Most studies are concentrated to the Atlantic battle fleet navies in the period 1650 to 1815, and much of the empirical research about them was accomplished in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. This is not surprising, as these navies were important in the struggles between the great powers and key instruments for the spreading of European trade and political power around the world. The American sea officer Alfred Th. Mahan is the best known of several naval historians

Its state and direction, Cambridge, 1953; Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, Princeton, 1965; N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A naval history of Britain, vol 1, 660-1649, London, 1997; N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A naval history of Britain, 1649-1815, London, 2004; James Scott Wheeler, The Making of a World Power: War and the military revolution in seventeenth century England, Phoenix Mill, 1999. The Habsburg-Spanish navy: 1. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620, London, 1976; Carla Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial defense in the early seventeenth century, Baltimore, 1986; David G o o d m a n , Spanish Naval Power, 15891665; Reconstruction and defeat, Cambridge, 1997; Giulio Fenicia, II regno di Napoli e la difesa del Mediterraneo nell'etd di Filippo II (1556-1598): Organizzazione efinanziamento, Bari, 2003. The French nav)': Marline Acerra, Rochefort et la construction navale frangaise, 1661-1815, 4 vols, Paris, 1993; Patrick Villiers, Marine royale, corsaires et trafics dans lAtlantique de Louis XIV a Louis XVI, 2 vols, Dunkirk, 1991; Daniel Dessert, La Royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil, Paris, 1996; Alan James, Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661, Woodbridge, 2004. The Dutch navy: J. R. Bruijn, De admiraliteit van Amsterdam in rustige jaren, 1713-1751: Regenten en financien, schepen en zeevarenden, A m s t e r d a m / H a a r l e m , 1970; J. R. Bruijn, The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Columbia, SC, 1993; Louis Sicking, Zeemacht en onmacht: Maritieme politiek in de Nederlanden, 1488-1558, Amsterdam, 1998. D e n m a r k - N o r w a y : Martin Bellamy, Christian IV and his Navy: A political and administrative history of the Danish navy, 1596-1648, Leiden, 2006. A comparative study: Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, navies and state building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, 2 vols, Stocldiolm, 1993.

16

C H A P T E R ONE

who placed navies in this historical context. Hie analytical framework developed by Mahan and others has its obvious relevance as it places command of the sea in the centre of an important historical process where Europe became the centre of global trans-oceanic empires with maritime lines of communication. It is also natural that Anglo-Saxon historians have dominated in studies of this process, as its outcome was a world in which British and, later, American naval power became the foundation of world power.'' The uneven coverage of early modern navies and the vintage of much of the existing historical scholarship must be observed and understood. Most of what we know about European navies is still formed by studies made in a period when the 19th- and 20th-century national state was seen as the self-evident outcome of historical change. Its army and navy were regarded as instruments of national political interests and policies. Navies were evaluated as efficient if they adhered to 19th- and early 20th-century ideas about operational doctrines, professional officer corps, centralised and state-run administration, and the primacy of the gun-armed battle fleet. With that perspective, the large sailing battle fleets of the period 1650-1815 became classical examples of what the nation state could achieve through a systematic long-term policy. Many historians seem, explicitly or implicitly, to have drawn the conclusion that the importance of sea power rose with the great naval organisations for controlling the sea and that the history of sea power before their appearance is less important for general history. Pre-1650 naval policies and technologies have frequently been evaluated in comparison with what was achieved later. Not surprisingly, they have been found to be short-sighted, primitive, and lacking in theory." Other periods and regions require different interpretative frameworks if the central historical problems should be visible, and compari-

" Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The man and his letters, Annapolis, 1971; John B. HaUendorf (ed.), The Influence of History on Mahan, Newport, 1991; Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The classic works of Alfred Thayer Mahan reconsidered, Baltimore, 1997. The problem with applying an Atlantic perspective on all early m o d e r n naval history: John F. Guilmartin, Jr, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century, Cambridge, 1974, 16-41. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger (eds). War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, Woodbridge, 2003, is a collection of essays about various aspects of control of the sea before 1650. A brief survey of naval history before 1650: Jan Glete, "Naval Power, 1450-1650: The formative age", in Geoff M o r t i m e r (ed.). Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815, London, 2004, 81-100.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

17

sons should be made with both earlier achievements and contemporary concerns. Early modern European history begins around 1500 or even earlier, much of it is not centred on Atlantic history, and the mature early modern state with its fiscal-military apparatus was the outcome rather than the start of the process. The importance of control of the sea for European trade, warfare, and political power did not begin with the development of the great battle fleets and the control over the oceans exercised by European states. It was a pervasive phenomenon in European history long before that. It is a consequence of the fact that Europe is a huge peninsula with smaller peninsulas, inland seas, islands, and important seaways with several narrow passages around its long coasts. Even in an age dominated by agriculture, many Europeans lived close to the sea or inland waterways leading to the sea, and trade in agricultural products depended on seaborne transportation. Control of the sea has often been exercised by those who have had immediate use of it for their living: the coastal communities, merchants, and pirates. Europeans have been seafarers since thousands of years, and the fact that territorial states usually were unimportant as naval powers before the 16th and 17th centuries does not mean that control of the sea was less important than in later centuries. There are problems with bringing in all parts of the Atlantic (or Mahanian) framework in all studies of control of the sea as a political, economic, and naval problem. That framework is based on the existence of mature fiscal-military states with firm organisational structures, professional officer corps, and nationally determined policies implemented by the navies. The long period of formation of such states and their navies, as well as control of the sea in more diffuse struggles about territories and seas, fit less well into this framework. The struggles were frequently not national in a meaningful sense; they were local, mercantile, dynastic, or adventures in plunder. Operational fleets often consisted of temporarily armed merchantmen, warships were smaller than in the age of the battle fleet, and oared galleys were still important. Tactics and strategy were often subordinated to privateering interests of plunder, and naval commanders were usually noblemen or men with mercantile background rather than professional officers. Navies and warfare at sea were much more regional and were often operationally more connected with warfare on land than in Atlantic warfare.'^

Glete2000.

18

C H A P T E R ONE

However, in a late medieval/early modern perspective, even the earliest and comparatively small European forces of specialised warships were important. They could shift the balance of power both in domestic and international struggles by closing or opening an important sea line. Control of various parts of the sea, even shallow and narrow waters, ability to shift military power from one region to another across the sea, and ability to control trade to major ports and through important narrows could be very useful to rulers and local powerholders. In this perspective, the early naval forces were modern and rational solutions to the problems faced by those who developed them. Regional control of the sea and early naval development to achieve that were essential to the transformation of Europe f r o m a continuum of small autonomous cities and societies with power confined to local elites into a continent of territorial states with an effective monopoly of violence controlled from political centres. From this state formation perspective, it is fruitful to see early navies as instruments of ambitious rulers and rising elites rather than of nascent nation states with nationally determined strategies of sea power. Princes and leaders of republican regimes often had to fight for their survival in an age when rebellions and civil wars were common. The future of the rulers was often at stake, and this stimulated the search for innovations and capabilities which strengthened their power and gave them leverage in relation to competitors. With an awareness of the political, financial, organisational, and technical constraints on early modern sea power, historians may see efforts to handle these problems as important. The post-1650 development of navies can also be put in a state formation perspective rather than the sea power perspective that has been prevalent. Navies were parts of the fiscal-military states as much as the armies were. The latter half of the 17th century saw a drastic growth of both armies and navies and a stabilisation of the European states into fairly homogeneous fiscal-military states. Navies and armies rapidly grew in size and operational capabilities because several states had become able to develop complex organisations with a decisive advantage over earlier private and temporary forms of sea power. By the late 17th century, a distinct European model of how an army and a navy should be administrated, trained, and commanded had emerged. The power of states could be measured roughly in number of regiments and ships-of-the-line, and stiates with permanent armed forces had gained a practical monopoly of violence within their territories and in the waters around Europe.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

19

Naval power, based on complex organisation and the fiscal power of the state were part of a broad transformation process in which the central state rather than decentralised structures of violence-control had become fundamental to European perceptions of both domestic and international power on land and on sea. Europeans expected that their state should defend their coasts and protect and promote their maritime interests, and they were willing to pay taxes for that. The few major political entities which had not fully adapted to the new type of state either had to do that in a quick reform process (like Russia) or face the prospect that they would disappear f r o m the European scene of independent political actors (like Poland). European naval history has also largely been written as separate national histories. Comparative studies of naval policy, administration, technology, and operations have been rare. During the formative phase of naval history, various national paradigms about individual navies developed. They were either parts of national historiography or of a more specialised naval history, frequently written by sea officers or historians with a special interest in sea power. It was c o m m o n to find heroes and scapegoats, periods of glory and neglect, and some kind of national identity or mentality, which influenced or determined naval power. Corrupt administrators and parsimonious policymakers were typical scapegoats while certain officers often became heroes. Seamanship under sail was highly regarded while naval architecture often was seen as backward until theory arrived. Various ideas about the early modern societies and their states, which were prevalent among earlier generations of historians, were adapted by naval historians and integrated with naval history. These paradigms of national naval histories, which were shaped until the mid20th century, have proved to be vigorous. Without benchmarks for comparison, various legends and entrenched ideas about pioneering efforts or backwardness, efficiency, or failures, neglect or far-sighted naval policy have became firm parts of naval historiography. Much of it is still visible in historical synthesis. New synthesis must show a critical attitude to these traditions. It is more productive to take a fresh look at naval history as part of general trends in European history of political, economic, and social transformation. 1.1.5

Naval administration

and

entrepreneurship

Early modern rulers had two alternatives when they raised armed forces. They could organise them on their own: build ships, acquire

20

C H A P T E R ONE

weapons, and recruit officers, soldiers, seamen, and the necessary administrative staff to do the job. This normally meant that all organisational capabilities and a considerable part of the resources had to be kept and paid for in peacetime. Alternatively, they could hire private entrepreneurs in warfare who ran the administration on contract and frequently also commanded the operational forces. Combinations of these two systems were common. In a European macro-perspective, armies and navies developed from a predominantly contractual model in 1500 to a predominantly state-administrated model two centuries later. In this process, the states acquired several entrepreneurial skills and combined them into complex organisations. The Swedish armed forces very early became administrated by the ruler. W h e n the Swedish state in the early 17th century increasingly turned to entrepreneurs for the recruitment of foreign soldiers, naval shipbuilding, and weapon procurement it did so with a long experience of military and naval administration. It already had the core competencies and could increase its power by integrating private organisational capabilities with the capabilities of the Swedish state. This created a rapid increase of Swedish military power."' Naval administration is a term for both managerial activities and organisational structures, which transform policy and ambitions into operations at sea. Financial control of naval expenditure, bookkeeping, auditing, and the handling of large amounts of money were major administrative tasks in the early modern navies. Warships, weapons, and naval bases are major investments which require long-term planning, search for and management of advanced technology, and negotiations about large contracts. Recruitment, muster, and payment of naval personnel are major administrative duties. In early modern times, when transmission of information was slow and national registers of population were lacking, navies required extensive paperwork to keep track of seamen living along coasts or serving on ships operating far f r o m the base. The supply of provisions, munitions, and naval stores to operational forces involved purchase, storing, and distribution of m a n y types of products, often in several countries. The preservation

" Hiis section is a s u m m a r y of results in Glete 1993. See also Jan Glete, "Naval Administration", in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, II, N e w York, 2007, 640-48.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

21

of health on ships and the care of sick and wounded required properly preserved food, hospitals, and systematic measures against contagious diseases. Naval administration must be able to meet sudden demands for mobilisation of resources for war by combining state-controlled and civilian-owned resources into a combat-ready fleet. A naval campaign requires rapid and well-coordinated concentration of large resources: ships, weapon, provisions, and competent men. In medieval and early modern societies with strong mercantile and maritime interests, it could be advantageous to leave much of the naval administration to private interests. These groups knew how to equip ships for sea and how to recruit crews and merchants, and they had the professional expertise to buy provisions and naval stores in large quantities. They often also had experience of weapons and fighting, as merchant shipping had to be protected. Until the 16th century, a naval mobilisation in a maritime society was usually a temporary transfer of private resources to the state rather than a mobilisation of resources permanently administrated by the state. Even when these states organised permanent navies, the maritime society was important both for its administration and for supplementing it with additional resources when required. In a society like Sweden, with few private maritime resources and litde private know-how about large-scale shipping, the state faced the challenge of either developing its own resources for naval warfare or depending on foreign maritime interests. The latter was usually possible, as such groups were willing to sell their services. Until the latter half of the 17th century, fleets of armed merchantmen with officers, men, weapons, and provisions could be hired f r o m maritime groups in Europe. Several states did that. This often provided them with good seamen and commanders, without any obligation to pay for them in peacetime. The disadvantages were that they was expensive when they served, that the state became dependent on foreign interests, that ships and men often were unavailable to meet sudden demands, and that there was no close connection between policy, administration, and operational forces. It is often difficult for a state to make its armed forces undertake unusual and dangerous tasks, and it may be even more difficult if the policy-makers and operational forces have no other common interest than a temporary contract. In the long run, large and strongly built warships with many heavy guns also proved

22

C H A P T E R ONE

to be a superior weapon system, and this eliminated armed merchantmen as front-hne warships.'^ An early modern state which chose to create its own navy had to develop a complex organisation with an administrative staff. It had to build and maintain warships, develop logistical systems to equip, provision, and arm ships for war and administrative, and develop legal systems to recruit, discipline, and pay seamen with different skills. Most important, this required financing in peacetime. This was a difficult threshold, as subjects usually were unwilling to pay taxes for armed forces when there was no war. If this threshold was passed and the ruler was able to use the resources effectively, he had gained an instrument of great political power. He, rather than private groups, could control the sea through the ability to pay and feed men and send armed ships to sea. With naval administration under his own control, the ruler could increase his power by developing technology, embodied in ships, weapon, and naval competence. Political leaders who developed efficient naval administration could harness maritime and technical resources to their political ambitions and could promote the growth of these resources in the society. 1.1.6

Technology and organisational

capabilities

Technology is one of the most important factors in the development of the modern world. A m o n g the competencies which mattered in early modern Europe were the abilities to design, build, and maintain warships, produce dependable and cheap guns, create efficient crews out of men with various skills, and navigate and command warships in combat and during expeditions to little-known parts of the world. These abilities were scarce resources, which could be developed only by strong and sustained demands for them. Technical competence is usually little appreciated in state formation studies, and the history of technology is often studied outside its organisational and institutional context. This marginalisation of technology in political history and of politics and organisation in technological history has made the dynamic role of navies in early modern Europe less easy to understand.'®

" Market and hierarchy (organisation) as alternative f o r m s of governance is studied in transaction cost economy: Oliver Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford, 1996. Examples of historians and economists w h o argue that technology m u s t be stud-

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

23

Historians and economists often have an ambiguous attitude toward the role of technology in the transformation of society. It is normally accepted that it is of fundamental importance, but technology is frequently regarded as something which comes from somewhere else other than f r o m the individuals or organisations which the historian or economist is studying. Therefore, explanations including technology have been regarded as deterministic, because they seem to place the origin of change outside of that political or economic sphere which the individuals and organisations can influence. However, technology consists of h u m a n skills in interaction with both nature and society, and as such it is central in h u m a n culture. Technical skills are parts of political and economic processes, and they respond to changes in rules of h u m a n interaction (institutional changes). They may improve as responses to demands f r o m h u m a n beings and as expressions of human instincts to gain profit and power f r o m ingenuity. Technological breakthroughs may create major changes in political and military power, but this does not turn inventors, engineers, and artisans into independent actors. Power-holders who are not immediately identified as technical actors may, on closer investigation, be the real entrepreneurs behind technological change. They demand new solutions to political and economic problems which result in innovations, they create new infrastructures adapted to new technology, and they raise resources to finance major investments in new technology. Technology is part of many political, social, and economic processes studied by historians and economists, and technical skills are often decisive for success and failure in h u m a n activity." One consequence of the prevalent attitudes among historians toward technology is that navies have been given little weight in explanations of state formation. State formation is connected with the development of new competence and new technology, and this is especially visible

ied in a context of political restraints, business corporations, scientific knowledge, and the characteristics of influential persons: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1987; Giovanni Dosi, Renato Giannitti, and Pier Angelo Toninelli (eds). Technology and Enterprise in a Historical Perspective, Oxford, 1992. " Glete 2002, 55-58, 63-66. My own approach to technological development as an interaction process between markets, a complex industrial organisation, a n d longterm networks between producers and customers was developed in Jan Glete, ASEA under hundra ar: En studie i ett storfdretags organisatoriska, tekniska och ekonomiska utveckling, Viisteras, 1983.

24

C H A P T E R ONE

in the naval sector, where technical change often was integrated with changing policies.^" State formation interacted with naval and military transformation, and naval and military transformation interacted with technical change. This created military and naval capabilities embodied in personnel, operational units, weapons, warships, fortifications, and logistics, combined with the competence to plan, direct and finance major military operations. This became essential foundations of a new type of state. In early modern military history, various explanations of the interaction between state formation, war, and technology have appeared, especially in the "Military Revolution Debate", which has been important in Anglo-Saxon historiography. Changes in military (army) tactics and technology have been used as explanations for changes in the size of armed forces, which in their turn explain the growth of states. At the same time, political change and increased cooperation between rulers and social elites have been seen as explanations behind transformations in the military sphere.^' The present author has argued that efl'ective heavy guns gave rulers a window of opportunity to increase their power in the late 15th and early 16th centuries and that this, if put in its organisational and entrepreneurial context, is a part of the explanation of the general stabilisation of European states and Mediterranean empires up to 1560.^^ This was, however, only a temporary stabilisation, and after it there came a long period of crisis in European state formation (around 1560 to 1660). Innovations in organisations and political interest aggregation were more difficult to achieve than technical innovations and taxpayers, local eUtes, and entrenched power structures were often efl:ective obstacles to the growth of complex states." The successful Swedish expansionism in the period 1560 to 1660 shows that the Vasa state had achieved early successes in developing and combining political and organisational innovations. Technical and tactical innovations were available to every European state, but they required organisational capabilities if resources for war should

Glete 1993 emphasised this approach to state formation, ' ' Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe, Boulder, 1995, especially the contributions of Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker, and Jeremy Black, 13-54, 95-114. '' Glete 2002, 19. " This periodisation a n d sequence of driving forces was suggested in Glete 1993, 6 - 9 , and further developed in Glete 2002, 10-41.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

25

be used with efficiency. Because the success of the Swedish expansionistic policy was disproportionate to Swedish resources (population, economy) in relation to the adversaries, a comparative advantage in use of innovations must have existed. The most effective promoters of European state formation in this period may have been those few states which kept major permanent armed forces early and gained in competence to administrate them. These competencies gave them the ability to use resource flows more efficiently than states which raised resources without controlling the core competencies. Their success forced other societies to react and to imitate the pioneers by creating similar states in order to survive. In Northern Europe, Sweden was the power which showed that the fiscal-military state was a superior instrument of power. The navy was the part of this state that bridged the Baltic Sea for expansion on the continent.^"* 1.2 1.2.1

Sweden, naval power and the Baltic

The Swedish fiscal-military state and naval power

Parts of Sweden's early modern history are well integrated with mainstream European history. The 17th-century imperial expansion, the military reforms of Gustav II Adolf, and the administrative reforms connected with the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna are regarded as important in a European perspective. Other parts of early modern Sweden—the long-term development of army, navy, and administration; the 16th and early 17th-century power struggles in Eastern Europe; and an ambitious and innovative 16th-century royal d y n a s t y are usually regarded as unimportant. Frequently, the explanation of military success is sought in Sweden's ability to wage wars with foreign resources. W h y Sweden had an unusually high ability to raise such external resources and hnk them to the state's core competencies is not explained. It must be sought in Sweden's superior ability to occupy foreign territories and extract resources and in the inability of Sweden's neighbours' to occupy Swedish territory. One part of this explanation is that most of these territories were separated by the sea

This idea is developed in Glete 2002, a study of the Spanish monarchy, the D u t c h RepubUc, and Sweden as the three European states which first developed both permanent armies and p e r m a n e n t navies.

26

C H A P T E R ONE

and that Sweden, but not her neighbours, had the capability to control the sea. Swedish and Finnish historians, in many monographs, have studied the operational, organisational, and financial aspects of the early modern army, administrative reforms, the domestic effects of resource extraction for warfare, and the political struggles between king, nobility, and the lower estates. There are few broad syntheses, however, and strong traditions have divided the historiography into 16th- and 17th-century studies.^^ Seventeenth-century studies have dominated in later decades, and it is mainly Swedish 17th-century history that has interested historians in other countries. This has left the impression that there was a major break in the development of the Swedish state in the early 17th century and that it had been backward in a European perspective until then. Actually, few comparisons with organisational achievements in other states have been made. In a comparative European perspective, the timing of Swedish expansion and the scale and tenacity of Swedish 16th-century warfare are proofs of a decisive change in organisational capabilities already by the mid-16th century. Explanations for Sweden's expansionist policy are typically focused on driving forces (economic or political), not on the causes of success. These driving forces ought to have influenced several powers in the Baltic region, and yet Sweden expanded while her neighbours, some with much larger populations, lost territories. How could the rulers of poor and sparsely populated Sweden even dream that they could make conquests around the Baltic—and how could they succeed? Was there anything special about the state created by the Vasa dynasty since the 1520s, which gave it an advantage in ability to concentrate and organise resources in armed conflicts? From an organisational perspective, it is easy to see that there were in fact important features that made this state unusual and that these deviations from the normal European pattern denoted modernity rather than backwardness. Sweden was the only 16th-century state in Northern Europe with both a permanent army and a permanent navy. They were backed up by a tax-raising organisation, which already by

" An i m p o r t a n t exception is G u n n a r Arteus, Till militdrstatens forhistoria: Krig, professionalisering och social forandring under Vasasdnernas regering, Stockliolm, 1986, 72-79.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

27

the mid-16th century had penetrated deep into the local society, where it searched and found cheap resources which were used by the state in an innovative fashion. State formation turned into empire building when the Vasa dynasty began to look to territories outside the medieval Swedish realm for further protection-selling and power penetration. For a long period, capability to control the sea made imperial expansion around the eastern and southern coasts of the Baltic more successful than attempts to defeat Denmark, which had a navy able to defend the country from seaborne invasion. In terms of political interest aggregation, the Swedish fiscal-military state had passed the critical threshold by the mid-16th century, before most European states. The ruler's subjects reluctantly paid taxes and sent soldiers and seamen requested by the king, normally under the pretext that they were necessary for defence. This supply of resources made it possible for the rulers to develop organisational capabilities with numerous officers and bureaucrats loyal to the dynasty that paid them. After the mid-16th century, serious domestic violence (1563, 1568, 1596-99) were generated by conflicts within the ruling dynasty, not by elite or peasant rebellions. Perhaps the most important political feature of the Swedish state was its ability to raise large resources for war without the tax revolts, civil wars, and resistance f r o m local elites, which struck nearly all European states between 1560 and 1660. The Swedish empire was created in this period, when most of Europe was involved in domestic power struggles between state and society. Swedish expansion was checked and finally turned into decline when other states had developed fiscal-military structures similar to those of the Swedish state. In spite of the great interest for war and administration among Swedish historians, the most complex administrative structure of the Swedish armed forces, the navy, has not been given much attention. Its existence has more or less been taken for granted in spite of the fact that, in a Baltic and European perspective, it was unusual to have such an organisation in the 16th century. Its size and administrative complexity has been underestimated and its strategic role for Swedish expansion and defence only partially understood. The lack of maritime competencies has often been regarded as a source of weakness for Swedish naval and imperial policy. The ability of the Swedish state to maintain a large navy in this unfavourable environment has not been seen as the proof of this state's unusual organisational capabilities, which it actually was, in a comparative perspective. The superiority

28

C H A P T E R ONE

of a complex organisation in competition with other forms of sea power became obvious very early in the Baltic Sea. The anatomy of the organisation, which created Swedish power at sea, may have something to say about the anatomy of this state. Swedish naval policy was dynastic. The Vasa dynasty was founded with support by naval power acquired from abroad by its founder, and every new king found that control of the Baltic Sea had to be a cornerstone in their policy. For historians who are interested in how an early modern dynastic state could penetrate deep into a rural society in order to raise and combine a wide variety of resources into a complex organisation, the Swedish navy offers an excellent case to study. The state could not appeal to a society of experienced seafarers and maritime warriors who took control of the sea in their own interest. It could not organise the administration of naval power by contracting with men who had maritime experience unless it decided to turn to cities and regions beyond its territorial control. That would have been expensive, politically dangerous, and difficult to coordinate. The taxpayers would have to pay with cash rather than with local resources of men and material, and large taxes in cash were notoriously difficult to raise in Sweden. What the Swedish rulers could and did do was search for cheap and under-utilised resources (material, men, and know-how) at h o m e and combine them as efficiently as possible into permanent naval power. They did this in a distinctly Swedish pattern in which the lack of powerful local elites to serve as intermediates was turned into an advantage. The Vasa state developed direct links with peasants in local communities and burghers in small towns and used political persuasion and administrative competence to raise the under-utilised resources which were critical for the organisation of an army and a navy. This was combined with the import of key technical and maritime competencies, but transfer of know-how was organised in ways that made them politically safe. This combination of cheap resources and advanced know-how was an entrepreneurial achievement and a central part of the state formation process in Sweden. 1.2.2

State formation,

international

relations and Baltic

historiography

Swedish historians have seen Sweden's early modern wars as results of aggressive neighbours, of an unfavourable geostrategic position, of a policy to control trade between Eastern and Western Europe, or of a

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

29

policy to legitimise transfer of agricultural surplus from peasants to king and aristocracy. No historian has attempted to bring together modern studies of economy, domestic power relations, administration, international power struggles, and military performance in a long-term synthesis. Syntheses about Swedish foreign policy and warfare have often been written by non-Scandinavian historians, usually in a Baltic or North European perspective. Tliey frequently follow old historical traditions and regard Sweden as a peripheral state in the 16th century which, suddenly, appears on the "European" scene as a great power around 1630.^'^ In this tradition, sixteenth-century Sweden is seen as backward, with a primitive administration and armed forces of doubtful quality. The Vasa monarchy is often described as living in the shadows of a powerful Danish state, with aspirations to recreate the Kalmar Union, and the Danish navy is supposed to have dominated the Baltic Sea. Sweden's geostrategic position is described as unfavourable. Unfriendly neighbours—Denmark-Norway, Russia, and Poland-Lithuania—"encircled" Sweden and reduced fts ability to "reach" Europe and the Atlantic. Denmark's control of the entrance to the Baltic is described as a major strategic and economic problem for Sweden. Even Sweden's survival as an independent state is supposed to have been in doubt as late as the early 17th century. Then, in the 1610s and 1620s, something decisive happened, which made Sweden a European great power and a modern state.^'

Historiography: Glete 2002, 174-78. Recent surveys are David Kirby, Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic world, 1492-1772, London, 1990; Stewart P. Oakley, War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790, London, 1992; Robert 1. Frost, The Northern Wars: War, state and society in northeastern Europe, 15581721, Harlow, 2000; and Paul Douglas Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century, Basingstoke, 2004. See, for example, Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611-1632, I, London, 1953, 1 - 5 , 8 - 1 0 , 47-48; and Michael Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience, 1560-1718, Cambridge, 1979, 1-42. Robert's interpretation has been influential in Anglo-Saxon scholarship. There are traces of encirclement, Danish supremacy, Danish plans for a new u n i o n or Sweden as a low-performing military power struggling for survival before the age of Gustav II Adolf in Oakley 1992, 18, 46, and Frost 2000, 7, 102-04. Lockhart 2004, 13-15, 26, 40, 94, 107, emphatically restates the encirclement t h e m e as the explanation of Swedish imperialism and that D e n m a r k Norway's geographical position was an obstacle for Swedish contacts with Western Europe. In contrast, Kirby 1990 avoids generalisations about geostrategy and national policies as causes of war. A critical review of these arguments: Jan Glete, "Varfor flyttade

30

C H A P T E R ONE

Tliis perspective on Swedish history is shaped by historians (including Swedish historians), who regard Western Europe as the centre of European history and the rest of the continent as peripheral. Sixteenthcentury Western Europe was not yet the centre of Europe, however, and Sweden's geographical position made it a part of Eastern and Central European political and economic power struggles rather than of conflicts, alliances, and dynastic strategies in Western Europe. The rise of the Swedish Vasa state in the 16th century did rapidly make it a power player in the Baltic of equal importance as Russia and PolandLithuania, two of Europe's largest states. By the end of this century, Russia's attempt to become a Baltic power was defeated, and PolandLithuania was ruled by the Vasa dynasty after a successful electoral competition with the Habsburgs. In the early 17th century, both the Swedish and Polish branches of the Vasa dynasty were serious contenders for the Russian throne. Denmark was of only marginal importance in these Baltic power struggles, especially after 1570. The following century made Sweden into a continental power player in both Eastern and Western Europe, a position which at that time it shared only with the Austrian Habsburgs. This 17th-century rise to "European great power" status has overshadowed what was achieved by the early Vasa state, especially in comparison to the unimportant position which 15th-century Sweden had in international politics. The early Vasa state and its armed forces had significantly changed the power structures in the Baltic region, and the upstart Vasas had become a major European dynasty. Even if Sweden never had become a Western European great power, these achievements alone would have been regarded as major successes. The present study is focused on administrative and technical capabflities in a state formation perspective, and it evaluates Sweden's degree of modernity by comparing the ability to control the sea with similar abilities in other states. This has resulted in a re-evaluation of important aspects of Swedish and Baltic history. The study emphasises continuity rather than discontinuity in policy and capabilities between the 16th and 17th centuries, and Sweden's 16th-century international position is interpreted as stronger than in earlier syntheses. This is partly inspired by penetrating empirical studies made by Nordic his-

Sverige viisterut?" in Lennart Palm and Maria Sjoberg (eds), Historia: Christer Winberg den 5 juni 2007, Gothenburg, 2007, 105-16.

Vdnbok

till

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

31

torians since the mid-20th century, especially Sven Lundkvist's and Frede P. Jensen's studies of Swedish and Danish 16th-century foreign policy and the Nordic balance of power. Harald Gustafsson's study of the dissolution of the Nordic union, which emphasises that it was a result of state-formation activities f r o m two centres rather than a natural outcome of different national identities, has also been important. My own view of Swedish, Nordic, and Baltic international relations in a state formation perspective is outlined here, as an alternative to more traditional interpretations of Swedish and North European power politics.^® The Kalmar Union was not a Danish imperial project. The tensions which weakened and destroyed it were not between antagonistic nations but between groups with different interests. Two Union kings—Erik of Pomerania in the 1430s and Christian II in 1523—were deposed by rebellions in both Denmark and Sweden. Two other kings—Christian I and Hans—were only deposed in Sweden, but in a Swedish perspective this was the normal fate of medieval rulers. Most Swedish kings from the 12th to the 14th century had been deposed by domestic opponents. Rebellion was a normal Swedish political behaviour. It was similar to that in other medieval kingdoms, although Swedish rebellions were unusually successful in actually dethroning kings. In the 14th century, the Nordic kingdoms became connected by personal unions; first Sweden and Norway, later Norway and Denmark. The final result was a union between all three kingdoms. It was inherently fragile, because Denmark and Sweden remained elective monarchies with separate elections of kings, and it did not resuh in any lasting change of Swedish rules of political interaction. At first, a serious attempt was made to create a strong centralised monarchy, but after the revolts in the 1430s this policy was abandoned in all three countries. Control over castles and taxes from incomes was transferred from royal bailiffs to aristocratic governors {Idntagare) and in Sweden the aristocratic Council became the centre of political power. Kings, German-Danish as well as the Swedish-born Karl

Sven Lundkvist, Gustav Vasa och Europa: Svensk handels- och utrikespolitik, 1534-1557, Uppsala, 1960; Frede P. Jensen, Danmarks konflikt med Sverige, 1563-1570, Copenhagen, 1982; HaraldGustafsson, Gamla riken, nyastater: Statsbildning,politiskkulturoch identitet under Kalmarunionens upplosningsskede, 1512-1541, Stockholm, 2000. See also Jespersen 2000 and Esben Albrectsen, Karl-Erik Frandsen, and G u n n e r Lind, Dansk udenrigspolitiks historic, 1. Konger och krige, 700-1648, Copenhagen, 2002.

32

C H A P T E R ONE

Knutsson Boiide, continued to be opposed and deposed by various coalitions, not because of their nationality but because the power of the state they ran was insufficient to resist strong domestic opponents. From 1470 to 1520, the Swedish aristocracy, in alliance with local peasant communities, almost continuously ruled the country as an aristocratic republic and elected an aristocrat as regent (riksfdrestdndare) to handle the central administration in the absence of effective royal authority. Political actions became more inter-Nordic in character, however. The union was a framework both for dynastic efforts to create a more centralised Nordic monarchy and for aristocratic efforts to keep peace between three decentralised kingdoms without increasing royal power. Conflicts within the union were often clashes not between its three members but between various interests groups with connections across the borders. Danish and Swedish peasants living in the border regions tried to keep local peace when the elite groups feuded, while Danish and Swedish elite families frequently intermarried and established branches in both kingdoms. The regents Sten Sture (the older) and Svante Nilsson, who traditionally have been regarded as leaders of a national Swedish policy against Denmark, were married to Danish noblewomen. Sten Sture (the older) gained much of his power position from his marriage into the powerful Danish Tott family, which was in feud with Christian I and lived in exile in Sweden. The early 16th-century effort to bring Sweden under control of the Oldenburg rulers was a dynastic policy to create a strong monarchic state. It was not the result of national Danish ambitions, and resistance against a powerful monarchy was strong also in Denmark. This policy led in 1521 to a Swedish rebellion with peasants and aristocrats in alliance; in 1523 to an aristocratic rebelUon in Holstein and Denmark, a split within the Oldenburg family, and a series of civil wars in Denmark and Norway (1523-36), where the new Swedish Vasa monarchy supported the junior branch of the Oldenburg family. Interest alliances across the borders continued after 1523, the year the union is normally regarded as dissolved. For a few decades the two new dynasties cooperated in order to create two strong states, a parallel and interdependent series of events that is surprisingly unobserved by historians. The first Vasa king, Gustav I, was neither a national champion for a fledgling independent state nor an arch-enemy of a strong Danish state. He was struggling for the creation of a centralised dynastic state

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

33

under his own control. The resistance came f r o m interior rather than exterior forces and from old political institutions which favoured decentralisation of power and a weak monarchy. The dynasties in the two new states were usurpers who cooperated against enemies within and outside the old union; aristocrats and commoners who rebelled against increased royal power, the senior Oldenburg branch and their Habsburg relatives, Liibeck's mercantile power, and the Catholic Church. It is striking that the two dynasties helped each other rather than tried to destabilise the other regime. This cooperation between two centres may have been decisive for establishing the strong state power, which the Union monarchy had failed to achieve when it tried to create a single state. It is only with the gradual stabilisation of the Vasa and Oldenburg states after the 1530s that it is meaningful to analyse Nordic conflicts as primarily national in character. When the domestic foundation for the new state was secured, the Vasas began a policy of expanding their influence in the Baltic region. They were not the only contenders for Baltic power, but in comparison to Denmark, Poland, and Russia they were the most systematic innovators. They had created a state which could fight long wars in a region where ability to control both the sea and littoral territories mattered. Oldenburg Denmark maintained a powerful navy but lacked financial and military structures to fight long wars on land because it relied on German mercenaries for major military efforts. Poland and Russia did not support their Baltic policy with naval forces and had great political and administrative difficulties in concentrating their potentially huge resources to sustained warfare in the Baltic. After easy successes in dividing the territories of the German Order around 1560, these three states were unable to extend their territories or spheres of power in this region. Their military capabilities were sufficient to fill a power vacuum but it would have required major innovations in their political, fiscal and military structures to achieve Baltic supremacy. Such innovations came only later in Denmark and Russia and never in Poland. In contrast, the Swedish monarchy was already in the 16th century efficient in raising and administrating resources for warfare on both land and at sea, especially long wars of attrition. It participated in the division of the territories of the German Order around 1560, and it almost continuously fought major wars against one or more of the other three powers in order to defend and extend its conquests. It gradually learned to adapt its administrative and military resources to

34

C H A P T E R ONE

offensive warfare, and conquests of territories from much more populous enemies followed. Sweden was up to the mid-17th century one of the few states in Europe which administrated both an army and a navy without the help of private entrepreneurs. Swedish and foreign entrepreneurs recruited soldiers to increase the Swedish army when it fought wars on foreign territories, but the core competence to run the armed forces were firmly retained within the dynastic state. Tliis state also early developed an efficient local administration, which penetrated deep into the society and in a European perspective made the king unusually independent of local elites for control of the society.^' Geostrategy cannot be used to explain why Sweden became expansionistic, and the encirclement of Sweden by its neighbours is a rather bizarre idea.^" Many European countries were encircled by their neighbours, as that is what neighbours do on a continent. Sweden had a wide territory with an unusually rich and varied resource endowment, which made it largely independent, and not reliant on imports. Already the long distances made offensive operations on land against central Sweden difficult. The long land borders to Denmark, Norway, and Russia were also covered by wide forests or mountains, which were difficult to penetrate with army forces. The borders between Finland and Russia and between Norway and Sweden were unsuited to major offensives even in World War II. Sweden also had a long Baltic coast. This made the country vulnerable to superior naval power but also easy to defend with such power. Provided that Sweden organised a proper defence on land and at sea, the country was almost impossible to conquer within its medieval borders. They were ideal for defence of a wide territory with a small population in relation to its size. Economic "encirclement" is an equally flawed explanation to Swedish expansionism. Denmark's control of the entrance to the Baltic was the very opposite of the "stranglehold" on Baltic and Swedish trade it frequently is described as. In contrast to the Hanse's traditional attempt to channel trade between Eastern and Western Europe through Liibeck and use force against those who used the Sound, the Danes kept the Sound open for international trade. Denmark was no predator on international trade; it was its self-interested but efficient

' ' This is argued in Glete 2002, 174-212. A review of tlie encirclement idea: Frede P. Jensen, "Den danske 'inkredsning' af Vasa-tidens Sverige, Svensk historietoltaiing i Karl Xll-renaessancens tegn", (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, 76. 1976, 1-24.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

35

protector. Danish naval control of the southern Baltic Sea made the Baltic into the safest region for long-distance shipping anywhere in Europe. The Sound Toll was a part of a Danish protection-selling policy where incomes to the state made it possible for this state to control violence along the coasts and protect long-distance international shipping against piracy and armed competitors. Baltic trade, not to mention trade between Sweden and Western Europe, benefited from this. Swedish shipping was especially privileged, because it did not pay the Sound Toll before 1720. Furthermore, contrary to a common belief, the Swedish 17th-century conquest of the eastern side of the Sound did not break Danish control of the entrance to the Baltic. Denmark, with its main naval base in the Sound, could still control shipping through the straits. If anything broke this control, it was the rapid mid-17th-century rise of Western European naval power, which made it possible for the Western maritime powers to protect their shipping with battle fleets deployed to the Baltic Sea.'' Politically, the "encirclement" interpretation of Sweden's imperial expansion is also flawed, because none of Sweden's neighbours actually were seriously hostile to Sweden within its pre-1561 borders. Arguments to the contrary are frequently rather uncritical repetitions of the domestic propaganda, which the Swedish dynastic state spread as a legitimisation of its wars and its intense resource extraction for mihtary purposes.'^ The neighbours became seriously hostile only after Sweden had made major conquests from them, and then for obvious reasons. Denmark was not pursuing a long-term policy of restoring the Kalmar Union.'' Russia's interest in Finnish territory was weaker than the longterm Swedish-Finnish drive for colonisation east of the vaguely defined 14th-century border to Russia. Before 1561, Poland-Lithuania had never been in war with Sweden. Liibeck, the German power that had been able to exercise power in Scandinavia, was decisively defeated in the 1530s by the Vasa and the Oldenburg (junior branch) dynasties in cooperation. This cooperation shows that the new dynasties had strong common interests. Alliances or a tacit understanding to direct ambitions to expand in other directions (Denmark to the south and Sweden to

'' Glete2000, 112-30; Glete 1993, 184-87. ^^ Anna Maria Forssberg, Att hdlla folket pa gott humor. Informationsspridning, krigspropaganda och mobilisering i Sverige, 1655-1680, Stockholm, 2005. New light on this problem, Jensen 1982, 34-72.

36

C H A P T E R ONE

the east) were common in Danish-Swedish relations after 1523 and until the early 17th centmy. The conflicts in the 1560s and 1570s were exceptional rather than normal. Sweden was a strong power in the Baltic already from the 1530s, having actively used military and naval power in order to gain diplomatic and economic advantages by threats and pressure. It acted from a position of strength, not weakness. From the 1560s Sweden was openly expansionistic. Not even a coalition of three neighbours—Denmark-Norway, Lubeck, and Poland-Lithuania (replaced by Russia in 1570)—was in the 1560s able to inflict a decisive defeat on the Vasa monarchy. It continued its ambitious territorial and dynastic policy in the eastern Baltic after 1570, while the Oldenburgs gave up their ambitions in this region. After 1523, Denmark never fought a war with Sweden unless the Vasa state had at least one other war to fight. Denmark's ability to wage such a war alone with success is uncertain. Until the early 17th century it had no permanent army. The mercenary forces, which the Oldenburg rulers hired on the continent for warfare against Sweden, were expensive and less suitable in the Nordic environment, where opportunities for battles in the open fields were few. It is also doubtful if skilled military entrepreneurs and numerous soldiers would have been available in times of major wars on the continent. Denmark's offensives against Sweden with German mercenaries in 1520, 1563, and 1611 were launched during brief periods of peace between the major European powers, when many military entrepreneurs were available. After these wars, Denmark formed a permanent army, but it proved too small during the next two wars with Sweden (1643-45 and 1657-60). Danish naval power was strong and well administrated, but the navy was normally not larger than the Swedish. Its main role was to defend the territorial integrity of the Danish state, which was connected with sea lines of communication and, consequently, vulnerable to superior sea power. The geostrategic idea that Sweden was encircled by notoriously hostile neighbours may also be inspired by the mental power of modern Nordic borders and the common European idea of the "natural" borders of a national state. They have created an impression that Sweden, by its mid-17th-century conquests of several Danish and Norwegian provinces, had achieved its natural borders and that the earlier borders

Lundkvist

1960, esp. 197-200, 383-87, 391-96; Jensen

1982.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

37

were an unavoidable cause of instability and war. Historically, however, these borders had developed because they were natural; deep forests at a distance from the centres of the three Nordic realms. Russia and Poland-Lithuania had more problems with "reaching" Western Europe and the Atlantic than Sweden, and their contacts with Western Europe were threatened by Swedish expansion. Sweden, in contrast to Denmark, had a policy of directing and controlling the flow of trade between Eastern and Western Europe.'^ It is more realistic to describe Sweden's neighbours as unfortunate victims of their geostrategic position. They had to live with the aggressive and expansionistic Swedish monarchy, which from an almost impregnable central position around the Lake Malaren with ample natural resources for warfare (iron, copper, timber, naval stores, and provisions) could launch strikes against their weak spots with seaborne forces. Sweden's ability to do that was a result not of geography but of the Vasa dynasty's creation of administrative, military, and naval capabilities. Russia, Poland-Lithuania, and the German powers did not develop substantial naval power, and they were consequently unable to launch offensives against Sweden within its pre-1561 borders. Denmark could pose a threat to Sweden with its navy, but its long borders to Sweden made it vulnerable on land from a power that had a permanent army and good ability to launch a sudden attack on the fertile regions in eastern Denmark; Skane and Halland. Sweden's ability to create a position as a great power was very much a result of that the neighbours had inferior capability to organise resources for war. Their population, agricultural production, and trade were much larger or at least equal to that of Sweden, but they were backward in fiscal-military organisation. The Swedish empire was a result of the uneven European state formation process where Swedish capabilities for warfare for a long period were superior to other powers in the Baltic and to most European states. This superiority culminated from the 1620s to the 1650s, but it had existed since at least the 1560s, when imperial expansion began and prevailed in fierce competition with other powers. Swedish expansion reached an end when other powers began to catch up in formation of fiscal-military organisations. The empire was finally divided when the Swedish superiority

The main study remains A r t u r Attman, The struggle for Baltic nmrkets: Powers in conflict, 1558-1618, Gothenburg, 1979 (Swedish edition, 1944).

38

C H A P T E R TWO

in organisation of resources became too small to compensate for the great inferiority in resources. An interpretation which emphasises that formation of fiscal-military states was decisive for Baltic and European warfare makes it impossible to uphold the vague but persistent idea of Sweden as "backward" or undeveloped in a European context. Hie Swedish economy before the 17th century was less sophisticated than in many other parts of Europe, but the state was unusually modern. It was better able to recruit, pay, feed, arm, and control armed forces on its own than most other European states. Sweden is one of the few 16th-century European states for which it is possible to calculate the real number of soldiers and seamen in the armed forces from detailed lists of men who were paid and provisioned by the king's officers and administrators. From a naval perspective, backwardness is out of the question, as Sweden from the early 16th century was one of the rather few European states which maintained a modern sailing gun-armed navy. Sweden was also open to foreign entrepreneurs and foreign technology, and the state actively searched for new competencies, which might strengthen the state and the economy. Social conditions in Sweden, with a majority of peasants not subordinated to traditional feudal obligations, were not in any meaningful sense backward. One important military effect of this situation was that Swedish rulers were less afraid of arming peasants and using them as soldiers than most European rulers. Another effect was that the aristocracy had less power to resist royal policy than in many other European societies. Some aristocrats became attracted to the idea of a strong centralised state, fighting offensive wars as an alternative outlet for their ambition to rule. Aristocratic support for such a state was much stronger than in Denmark and especially Poland-Lithuania, where the aristocracy blocked state formation. The rise of a Swedish Parliament centralised political interest aggregation and made it possible for the state to raise taxes and conscript soldiers with less resistance from the population. It also channelled protests against the state and the aristocracy into political action rather than desperate revolts. The obstacles against resource flows f r o m the society to the central state were markedly weak in Sweden, and that favoured "modernisation" in the sense that the state became stronger earlier than most other European states. Sixteenth-century Sweden was surrounded by autonomous mercantile and maritime cities, more or less aristocratically dominated territorial

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

39

states and a Russia ruled by despotic tsars, with ambitions but with a low ability to innovate. From the perspective of innovative and entrepreneurial rulers like the Vasas, that meant opportunities at least as much as threats. To the Swedish taxpayers and to the outer world they described their neighbours as political and religious threats, which the monarchy had to guard its subjects from by armed force and preemptive offensive warfare. Historians still often accept much of this analysis and play down the markedly aggressive ambitions of the dynasty itself The Vasa dynasty had from its very beginning consistently sought and usually found the most recent political, administrative and military-technical instruments for power. One of them was a gun-armed permanent navy. The Vasa military and naval policy made it possible for a society with originally less than a million inhabitants to reshape the political geography in a region inhabited by societies with several million inhabitants. From political, organisational and military perspectives, the Swedish society and the centralised Swedish territorial state represented the future rather than an underdeveloped part of Europe. Its expansionistic policy forced other societies in the Baltic to modernise and transform their political institutions and organisations for war. 1.2.3

Baltic geostrategy

The political and strategic usefulness of naval power is that it can change geostrategic preconditions if sea lines of communication are important. Control of the sea is important because heavy objects, large quantities of cargo, and large numbers of men can move easily and cheaply when they are supported by the lifting power of water. Control of the seas around the Nordic countries was important for trade, for political dominance of Nordic territories, for projection of military power to territories around the sea, for defence of territories against invasion, and for enforcing and breaking blockades. Full control of the sea in Northern Europe required both major ships able to operate on the open sea and small craft to control coastal and inshore waters. Baltic strategy is also inherently amphibious and difficult to divide into army and navy strategy. Both parts of the armed forces depended on each other for operational freedom, and they must be able to cooperate both strategically and tactically. A navy requires at least one base to which resources can flow, and an administrative centre, which coordinates the resources. In the

40

C H A P T E R TWO

16th-century geography and poUcy made Stockhohn into the obvious main naval base and administrative centre of the Vasa navy. The city was protected from land attacks by large distances to enemy territories and from seaborne attacks by an archipelago with narrow passages, easy to defend with fortifications and ships. Stockholm was a deep-water port and a communication centre for several regions with men, provisions, timber, tar, iron, and copper. Strategically, Stockholm, together with forward bases in southern Sweden and the Gulf of Finland, was conveniently situated both for anti-invasion defence, protection of trade, blockade of foreign ports in northern and central Baltic Sea, and combined operations with the army to the other side of the sea. With the navy close at hand in Stocldiolm, the kings and the central administration could supervise its maintenance and preparations for campaigns. The navy was always near the political centre. W h e n Sweden had gained an empire, it became strategically important to move the main base to the southern Baltic. This resulted in the foundation of Karlskrona, where the central naval administration also was located. The naval leadership's absence from the political and administrative centre of the state gradually created frictions and increased the risk that the navy and the central state saw politics, strategy, and operational priorities from different perspectives. Distance mattered in poUcy-making and administration. Sweden and Denmark had no major mercantile marines until far into the 17th century. For their navies, trade protection mainly meant keeping ports open to German and Western European ships which carried most of trade to and from the Nordic powers. Trade blockades had to be enforced with awareness of political consequences among neutral powers. It was only from the mid-17th century that Western sea powers were able to protect their trade with their own naval forces sent to the Baltic. The dominance of foreign shipping and the inability of foreign rulers to protect it also made it important and profitable for the Baltic powers to make foreigners pay for protection by custom duties. This required control of important ports and chokepoints in maritime lines of communication. The ideal narrows were the Danish straits, which connected the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. This was exploited by the Danish kings, and the Sound Toll became an important part of their incomes. Baltic river estuaries were also suitable to raise customs and sell licenses. This was exploited by the Swedish monarchy; although duties paid on export and import in Swedish ports were also important f r o m the 17th century onward, when Swedish trade greatly increased.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

41

Control of the sea was important for a ruler's domestic power. Early modern rulers' control of a territory was related to their ability to use superior armed force against domestic competitors. These competitors were often armed or in contact with foreign groups who might support them with armed force. Because the Nordic states consisted of territories intersected by the sea, control of the sea gave the ruler ability to transfer armed forces within his territory and to deny competitors the ability to concentrate their forces or receive help from other countries. Danish-Norwegian 16th-century kings had no permanent army but were, after 1536, in full control of their kingdoms, which were intersected by straits and seas and connected by waterways. Their personal control of the navy was an important part of their ability to convince the local elites that the Oldenburg kings had to be taken seriously. In Sweden, naval power for control of the sea was important in a civil war as late as in 1597-99. Baltic geography and transport systems often dominated army operations. Before the transport revolution of the 19th and 20th century, large-scale wars on land could be waged only in agriculturally rich areas or in areas supplied from the sea or through inland waterways. Whichever power controlled the sea could concentrate superior forces to a decisive place and win by superior logistics. The total size of an army often mattered less than the ability to deploy it continuously to strategically important regions. Early modern military operations were often sieges of cities and fortresses, and such operations required transports of heavy siege guns and continuous provisioning of the army. The sea provided lines of transportation, and because most major Baltic cities were situated at coasts, they could be attacked with amphibious forces but also supplied f r o m the sea if under attack from land. If an army was to be safely supplied with reinforcements, food, and munitions, it ought to be placed at one end of a maritime line of communication controlled by a friendly fleet.^® Grand strategy often aims at solving defensive problems with as small forces as possible in order to concentrate forces on off'ensive operations, which might decide the war. In the Baltic this meant strategic interaction between armies and navies even when they operated in widely different theatres of war. In a region with long coasts, deep

A r m y logistics in Finland: Christer Kuvaja, Porsdrjning av en ockupationsarme: Den ryska armens underhdllssystem i Finland, 1713-1721, Abo, 1999; Martin Hardstedt, Om krigets fdrutsdttningar: Den militdra underhallsproblematiken och det civila samhdllet i norm Sverige och Finland under Finska kriget, 1808-09, Umea, 2002.

42

C H A P T E R TWO

bays, several islands, and territories connected by the sea, a navy may be important because it increases the operational freedom of the army and limits the operational freedom of the enemy's army. Coasts and islands are vulnerable to enemy invasions if the enemy controls the sea. Hiat may tie the army in defensive positions and severely limit its operational freedom, even if it is superior to the enemy's army. The coasts of the Nordic states are very long in proportion to their population, and this required naval control of the nearby seas if the army were to not be left with more or less impossible defensive tasks. The problem was solved if a battle fleet could be maintained in the enemy's home water and could limit his operational freedom on land and sea. Early modern Denmark-Norway and Sweden consisted of territories intersected by seas. It was necessary to keep control of these waters if the regions should not be isolated and rendered incapable of supporting each other. The Swedish empire was separated and connected by the sea, and it could only survive if the navy kept the lines of communication open. Sweden did, however, have a large and resourceful territory in its centre that was not dependent on control of the sea and that made survival possible without strong naval power. In contrast, Denmark-Norway consisted of peninsulas, islands, or territories, with Sweden on one side and the sea on the other. If the Danish monarchy lost control of its home waters, its army could not be concentrated or sent to an area attacked by the enemy, nor could allies send help without support of a fleet. If the army were concentrated in one area, the enemy might strike in another, to which the army could not be transferred by sea. Even worse, the navy could be immobilised by a surprise attack, because the seamen in times of peace were spread around Denmark and Norway while the warships were laid up in Copenhagen. More than any other state in Europe, Denmark depended on her navy for survival. W h e n the navy lost control of the sea (1644-45, 1658, 1700, and again during the Napoleonic wars), Denmark was easily defeated. For Sweden, ability to launch amphibious assaults on the Danish isles became a prime concern for military and naval decision-makers. Baltic naval warfare was an early example of the use of battle fleet strategy. The aim of both Danish and Swedish naval operations was to create a mobile strategic position at sea in order to influence or decide the outcome of a conflict. Early modern navies only gradually gained the technical and logistical ability to stay at sea for several months, and control of distant waters was difficult to achieve. Warships must

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

43

receive fresh provisions and vi'ater on a frequent basis, and repairs of rigs and hulls were easier to make in sheltered waters, hi the Baltic it is, however, possible to control important sea lines of communication with a battle fleet without enforcing a close blockade on the enemy's main base. A fleet was normally strongest near its base, and it could often exercise a considerable control of the sea just by cruising close to the base or even by staying there, keeping ready to sail when its presence at sea was necessary. The Baltic Sea in a strategic analysis may be divided into a northern and southern zone with a border from the island Oland to Courland (today western Latvia). For Denmark, offensive battle fleet operations required a fleet in the northern Baltic. The basic defensive task of the Swedish navy was to make this impossible. The Swedish navy's main offensive task was to place a battle fleet in the southern and especially southwestern Baltic, near or within the Danish straits. That would force the Danish fleet to protect its home waters, thus protecting Swedish coasts and the hnes of communication across the Baltic. A middle-way Swedish strategy was to place the battle fleet in Kalmarsund, between Oland and the Swedish mainland. This made it difficult for the Danish fleet to sail north of Oland without exposing the sea lines in the southern Baltic to attacks. From Kalmarsund the Swedish fleet might also escort convoys to and from German ports. A more offensive Swedish battle fleet strategy was to cruise around the island of Bornholm, where the lines of communication between southern, eastern, and northern Baltic meet. Danish and Swedish fleets both often cruised in these waters, and if both wanted to fight a decisive battle for control of the southern Baltic, this was a logical position for a contest. The most aggressive Swedish strategy was to deploy the fleet to the southern entrance of the Sound or to Koge Bay, south of Copenhagen, where the Danish fleet often anchored to get provisions. This would force to the Danish navy to fight a decisive battle or retreat to Copenhagen and give up control of all parts of the Baltic Sea. If the Swedish fleet were to support an invasion of the Danish isles with an army in Germany or Jutland, it might also cruise in the waters between the island of Riigen and the Danish straits, typically close to the island of Femern. If the fleet defended the communications with Germany, it either had to blockade the Danish fleet at the entrance of the Sound or cruise in the open sea between Skane and Riigen. Continuous operations in these waters required a temporary forward base as long as

44

C H A P T E R TWO

Stockholm remained the main naval. Before Karlskrona was founded in 1680, Landskrona at the Sound and Wismar in Mecklenburg served as such bases in some wars. It is no coincidence that most naval battles in the Bahic are named after Oland, Bornholm, Koge Bay, Femern, or Riigen. The location of major battles in which the Swedish navy was involved from 1521 to 1721 shows that most of them took place when it fought for control of the southern Baltic Sea and the Danish straits. It did so as an instrument first of an expansionistic power and, later, of an imperial power with trans-Baltic territories to defend. The transfer of the navy's main base from Stoclcholm to the newly founded naval city Karlskrona in the 1680s was a logical consequence of the fact that the new Swedish empire had made the southern Baltic into the decisive theatre for naval operations in the Baltic. The third operational area for a Swedish fleet was the Western Sea {Vasterhavet): Kattegatt and Skagerack. Until 1645, Sweden had only a narrow coast in the west. It was situated at the Gota Alv estuary, an excellent base for a fleet as well as an important commercial port. This river estuary is deep enough for large ships but narrow enough to be defended by gunfire. It was situated in the centre of strategic lines of communications on sea and land between Denmark and Norway. Even a small Swedish force operating from this base could cause great problems, and the Danish navy had to defeat it or blockade it with by superior forces. These had to be detached from the Baltic Sea and that reduced Danish operational strength there. The peace of 1645 added Danish Halland to Sweden, and from 1658 the Norwegian province of Bohuslan was also Swedish. These conquests gave Sweden a long western coast but did not change naval strategy. The Danish navy was still in control of the Sound as long as it was not decisively defeated, and Swedish naval commitments in the Western Sea remained limited to a cruising force intended to divert superior Danish forces f r o m the Baltic Sea by posing a threat to internal Danish-Norwegian communications. Swedish ports on the west coast could not replace ports in the Baltic Sea for trade with Western Europe, partly because of Swedish economic geography but also because a Danish naval blockade in the Skagerack could be almost as effective as Danish control of the Sound. But this was no great problem for Swedish trade with Western Europe, because neutral shipping normally went on as usual during Swedish-Danish wars.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

45

The Baltic Sea and the Western Sea have unusual geographic conditions for naval operation and amphibious warfare. Several important coastal and littoral areas v^ere suitable neither for sea-going battle fleets requiring deep water and open seas nor for conventionally operating armies requiring territories uninterrupted by water. Archipelagos with many small islands, shallow water, and narrow passages cover much of the Swedish Baltic coast and the southern coast of Finland. The entrances to several ports, including Stockholm, are narrow and winding and possible to block with fortresses, blockships, and physical obstructions. The coast between the Gota Alv estuary (Gothenburg) and the Osloi^ord is archipelagic but not shallow, and it is suitable for cooperation between sailing and oared warships. Southern Finland and the coast between Gothenburg and Oslo were agriculturally poor but important for major army forces in wars between Sweden, Russia, and Denmark-Norway. These armies had to be supported f r o m the sea, and control of the archipelago was the key to control of the littoral territory. The Sound is narrow enough to be easily crossed by an invasion army. The southern entrances (the Drogden and Flintriinnan passages) were restricted in depth (they have been deepened in modern times), which made them complicated for large sailing warships, especially under combat conditions. Drogden is easy to defend. The northern entrance is deep and, contrary to a c o m m o n misunderstanding, too wide to be controlled by early modern guns at Helsingor and Helsingborg. The coasts along the eastern and southern parts of the Baltic Sea are open but not uncomplicated. The Neva estuary and the inner part of the Gulf of Finland are shaflow, and the coasts of Prussia and Pomerania are covered by sandbanks, islands, and wide river deltas. This creates inland waterways of strategic importance for army operations. Saihng warships might blockade these coasts, but if they were to be attacked or defended in amphibious operations, special shallow-draught vessels were required. The large rivers—Neva, Narova, Diina (Daugava, Dvina), Vistula, and Oder—could also provide an attacker with convenient routes for troops, artillery, and provisions to inland areas of operation. This frequently determined Swedish offensive operations. Similarly, the great lakes in Sweden (Malaren, Hjalmaren, Vanern and Viittern), Finland (Saimen and others), and on the border between Finland, Estonia, and Russia (Ladoga, Peipus) were important for combined operations and army logistics. The lakes

46

C H A P T E R TWO

around the Baltic make this area unique in Europe. The only parallel is in North America, where naval control of the Great Lakes was important in continental warfare.'^ Swedish armed forces penetrated and took control over the littoral areas in the eastern and southern Baltic one after another f r o m the 1550s to the 1630s, when the Baltic empire was created. In that process they developed an unusual competence in combined operations and offensives from the sea into shallow waters and coastal regions with rivers, deltas, and lakes. Operations in shallow waters and littoral regions required both strategic and tactical cooperation and interaction between army and navy forces, especially in archipelagos where oared warfare required large numbers of soldiers as oarsmen. This also made the army more mobile and flexible, because oared vessels were landing craft and troop transports as much as they were fighting vessels. The ability to transport large army forces on conventional sailing ships and to make assault landings against organised resistance was also important. In the Baltic it could be argued that wars were won not by the power which had the best army or the best navy but by the power which was most successful in coordinating them in strategy, organisation, and tactical operations. Such coordination was achieved during the Swedish expansion up to 1660 and during the Russian off"ensives in the early 18th century. 1.2.4

Swedish naval

historiography

There are several general surveys of Swedish naval history. There are also studies of more specialised subjects which will be mentioned in the relevant chapters. The first general Swedish naval history was published in 1788 by the sea officer Karl Gustav Tornquist. It was an operational history covering wars up to the end of the Great Northern War.^** Carl August Gyllengranat, later admiral and minister of the navy, published the next survey in 1840. It took the story of Swedish naval operations

" Sweden h a d naval forces on Lake Bodensee on the German-Swiss border in 1632-34 and 1646-48; Fran Pemern och Jankow till Westfaliska freden, Stockhohn, 1948, 190-93; Jurg Meister, "Svensk sjokrigforing pa Bodensjon u n d e r trettioariga kriget", TiS, 130, 1967, 474-98. Karl Gustaf Tornquist, Utkast till svenska flottans sjdtdg, 2 vols, Stockholm, 1788. Tornquist served in the French navy d u r i n g the American W a r of I n d e p e n d e n c e and pubUshed a b o o k about it in Swedish in 1787. It has been translated into English: Karl Gustaf Tornquist, The Naval Campaigns of Count de Grasse During the American Revolution, 1781-1783, Philadelphia, 1942.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

47

up to 1790. A third general naval history was published in 1884 by Per Olof Backstrom, a senior civilian naval administrator who also was a prolific author of popular history. It emphasised policy and administration more than earlier works, and the chapters about the 18th and 19th centuries gave much new information. These books were based on the historical literature, published sources, and some unpublished narrative sources. Except for Backstrom's survey of the later centuries, the naval archives were little used.'' The next major work was very different. In 1890, Axel Zettersten, a naval administrator, who had begun to organise the Swedish naval archives, published a comprehensive study of Swedish naval history from 1522 to 1634. It covered administration, shipbuilding, warships, guns, personnel, and naval operations, and it had many references to unpublished sources. It showed the navy as an organisation, and the chapter on operations was only about a fifth of the book. W h e n published, this approach was unusual in European naval history. It was also the first historical work that systematically studied a part of the Swedish state as an organisation. Zettersten made extensive use of the rich collections of naval accounts (Skeppsgardshandlingar) in the archive he organised. These accounts were, together with the letters from the king, the main sources for his study. Zettersten was critical of the earUer literature and its uncritical use of narrative sources and old political history. A second volume covering the period 1635 to 1680 was published in 1903.'"' Zettersten's two books have remained standard works in Swedish naval history. They were truly pioneering, and their methodology was modern for this time. Zettersten was not a professional historian, but he was trained in handling accounts and understood their importance as sources better than most historians. It must be remembered, however, that his studies were made more than a century ago. Zettersten's first volume was written in his spare time when he prepared the inventory of naval accounts up to 1634, and he worked with a type of sources for which neither he nor contemporary historians had established methods to rely on. Much of the information it provides is unreliable, actually wrong in important parts. Zettersten often drew too hasty conclusions

' ' Carl August Gyllengranat, Sveriges sjokrigs-historia i sammandrag, 2 vols, Karlskrona, 1840; Per Olof Backstrom, Svenska flottans historia, Stockholm, 1884. Axel L. Zettersten, Svenska flottans historia, 1522-1680, 2 vols, Stockholm, 1890 and Norrtalje, 1903.

48

C H A P T E R TWO

from what he saw in the sources, and many of the relevant sources were difficuh to locate at this time. Important sources for 16th- and early 17th-century Swedish naval history are spread in several archival series which are not predominantly naval, and they were not used by Zettersten. Tlie inevitable result is that many conclusions in Zettersten's first volume cannot be used without checking the sources. It is still a useful starting point for research but is not a reliable standard work. The second volume is more reliable, mainly because the navy allowed Zettersten to work for three years as a full-time historian when he prepared it. The sources for this period are also better structured, because the navy from the 1630s was administrated by a separate department of the state, the Amiralitetskollegium, which has a well-preserved series of minutes and letters. Zettersten also left many notes from the sources, also for the period after 1680, which were used by later naval historians.'" The last general survey of Swedish naval history, Svenska Flottans Historia, 1521-1945, was published in three large volumes f r o m 1942 to 1945. It was written by sea officers and historians and covered foreign policy, warships and weapons, shipyards and bases, personnel, life on warships, and naval operations. Much of the text relies on earlier research, although the chapters on warships and weapons by Hjalmar Borjeson were to a large extent new and based on the author's many years of studies in the naval archives. This work provided a comprehensive survey of existing knowledge of Swedish naval history, and it has a lasting value as a collection of important illustrations, reproduced in high quality printing. The references to the sources are very brief, however.''^ From the early 20th century, surveys of Swedish naval history became more specialised. For some decades, history was important in the education of sea officers, and officers researched naval history using scholarly methods. Their inspiration came from the growing international interest in naval history and from the Swedish General Staff, which (like the

•" Jan GJete, "Axei Zettersten ocli den svenska flottans historia", in Historia, krig och statskonst: Vdnbok till Klaus-Richard Bohme, Stockliolm, 2000, 27-44. Svenska flottans historia, 1521,-1945, 3 vois, Malmo, 1942-45. For tlie period relevant for this study, the work is divided into three chronological parts: 1521-1611 and 1611-1679 in vol. I; and 1680-1721 in vol. II.

RESOURCES, ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES

49

German General Staff) used military history for education of officers."'' Gunnar Unger, a sea officer who made naval history a central part of his career (he became a rear-admiral), wrote a two-volume work on Swedish naval operations until 1814, which he re-wrote as chapters in the three-volume naval history published in the 1940s. Unger's books were partly the result of research in the naval archives by himself and other sea officers but there are no references to the sources."'* A carefully researched and well-documented work by several officers covered naval administration and operations on the Swedish west coast up to 1870."= Civilian historians have dominated in later studies. The central naval administration has been the subject of a five-volume work, in which the period 1634-95 was studied by Einar W e n d t and 1696-1721 by Lars Otto Berg.""^ Swedish naval and mercantile shipbuilding was surveyed by several authors in a work, which was a notable achievement in technological history when it was published in 1963."'^ A study of the Karlskrona naval yard was published in 1993, where the period 16801721 was studied by Lars Ericson and Urve Lepasoon.''® Provisioning during naval operations has been studied by Ulrica Soderlind and the sculptures of Swedish warships by Hans Soop.*" Military and naval operations in 1521-60 have been investigated by the army officer Bertil Barlcman, while the present author has pubUshed

The Swedish navy formaUsed its historical research into a section of the Navy Staff in 1930. It was merged with the army's historical b r a n c h in 1937 as a section in the new Defence Staff. These organisations were i m p o r t a n t centres of early m o d e r n Swedish miUtary and naval history until the 1960s, when the Section of military history had to change pohcy and concentrate on research about the 20th century. G u n n a r Unger, Illustrerad svensk sjokrigshistoria, 2 vols, Stockholm, 1909-23. It was intended as a textbook for naval cadets, with emphasis on strategy. Published studies and notes f r o m the archives m a d e by Axel Zettersten and the sea officers Svante Knutsson Natt och Dag, Arnold M u n t h e , a n d H e r m a n Wrangel were i m p o r tant for Unger's books. Goteborgs eskader och diiogsstation, 1523-1870, Gothenburg, 1949. Einar W e n d t , Amiralitetskollegiets historia, 1634-1695, Stocklrolm, 1950; Amiralitetskollegiets historia, 1696-1968, 4 vols, Malmo, 1974-83. Gustaf Halldin (ed.), Svenskt skeppsbyggeri: En oversikt av utvecklingen genom tiderna, Malmo, 1963. "" Lars Ericson, "Pionjarer och rustningar", in Karlskronavarvets historia (ed. Erik Norberg), Karlskrona, 1993,1, 9 - 6 4 , Urve Lepasoon, "Orlogsvarvets planlaggning och aldre byggnader", in Karlskronavarvets historia, II, 203-42. "" Ulrica Soderlind, Skrovmdl: kosthallning och matlagning i den svenska flottan fran 1500-tal till 1700-tal, Stockholm, 2006; H a n s Soop, Plytande palats: Utsmyckning av aldre svenska orlogsfartyg, Stockholm, 2007.

50

C H A P T E R TWO

a study of Swedish warships and naval policy in the same period.^" Hiere is little Swedish research about the important naval war in the 1560s, and the period 1571-1610 is a "dark age" in Swedish naval historiography. This has created misunderstandings about Swedish naval policy and the balance of power in the Baltic in these decades. There are detailed studies of naval operations in the age of Gustav II Adolf (1611-32) and of the wars of 1643-45 and 1655-60,=' but no detailed and comprehensive studies of Swedish naval operations in the war periods 1675-79 and 1700-21. TTiey remain challenges for studies of policy, strategy, administration, and operations in a maritime region, as many military operations in these wars depended on control of the sea.

» Bertil G s o n Barkman, Kungl. Svea Livgardes historia, I, 1523-1560, Stoclcholm 1937; Jan Glete, Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1521-1560: Flottans grundlaggning under ett tekniskt b r y t n i n g s s k e d e F o r u m navale, 30, 1976, 5 - 7 4 ' 31 1977 2 3 - 1 1 9 Sveriges sjokrig 1611-1632, Stockliolm, 1937 (.also 'Sveriges big ' 1611-1632. Magsband 1 Stockholm, 1937); Arnold M u n t h e , Svenska sjdhjdltar, V- Klas Fleming, Karl GustafWrangel, Martin Jhijsen Anckarhielm: Danska kriget 1643-1645 1-2-1-2 S t o c ^ o m, 1905-10; Finn Askgaard, Kampen om Ostersjon pa Karl X Gustavs tid, Stockho m 1974. M u n t h e has n o detailed references to the sources, but it is often easy to see which soiirces he has used. Askgaard's s t u d y ^ w r i t t e n by a Danish historian in a Swedish research p ' o j e c t s - i s the most useful of all operational histories of Baltic naval history, because the a u t h o r has used archival sources f r o m all participant navies

CHAPTER T W O

THE SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

2.1

Naval power and political

power

Studies about naval policy must avoid making naval power appear to be an end in itself. This has been c o m m o n in Euro-American naval historiography, and Sweden is no exception. In this perspective, a navy is something that exists as a normal part of every maritime nation's life, and politicians and taxpayers are there to support it and understand how it works. Actually, a navy is a costly instrument of political power. Taxpayers must make sacrifices for its existence, and political decision-makers must make choices about how it should be organised and used for political ends. Naval power must be placed in a political and socio-economic context of domestic and international conflicts and compromises. A navy is created and maintained to serve a purpose, and studies of naval policy must try to find and analyse that purpose, how it may have changed over time, and how it may have created operational tasks for the navy. The concrete task of a navy is to achieve or deny control of important sea lines of communication. The connections between political power and naval power are most easy to see by asking why certain lines of communication were politically and economically important. Navies are used to exercise political, military, or economic power. Studies of why a navy exists and why it changes are therefore studies of power in general, not of sea power as an isolated phenomenon. The tasks of a navy are determined by the power-holders, although they act in a context of international politics, domestic interest groups, economic conditions, and public opinion. The rulers' and the ruling elite's ideas about the purpose of their navy are formed by the interests, opportunities, and threats they are able to perceive, not by general and abstract ideas about sea power. Permanent navies are, like other complex organisations, the result of long-term investments in several capabilities and expensive hardware, rather than reliance on short-term solutions to every contingency. However, they are also the results of changes in rules of h u m a n

52

CHAPTER TWO

interaction (institutions), which make it possible to achieve sufficiently broad coalitions of interests behind long-term investments. Rulers and taxpayers must at least tacitly agree about a naval policy that makes it possible to invest in an organisation controlled by the state. This could be based on a perception that organisation is superior to other solutions of the same problem. Naval and military transformation in early modern Europe is, to a large extent, the history of how earlier armed social institutions, such as local militias and fleets of merchantmen armed by trading cities, were replaced by permanent armed forces run by states. This was not possible without a change in those rules of h u m a n interaction which earlier had favoured local and temporary forms of protection. Tliis chapter is a chronological survey of Swedish naval policy, which also serves as an introduction to the development of the Swedish navy up to 1721. The intention is to explain why the navy existed. It did not replace any important armed social institution in Sweden, and it was not an outgrowth of a flourishing maritime and mercantile economy. It appeared suddenly as an instrument of an ambitious power-seeker who founded a dynasty. It continued to exist under various strategic and political conditions, at a time when rather few European states had permanent military and naval organisations. W h y did the Swedish society accept the allocation of large resources to warships, naval ordnance, seamen, and naval provisioning? There are few easy answers in declarations of naval policy or political debates about the navy. In order to find answers, this chapter seeks the reason why the decisionmakers allocated resources to naval power. W h y did control of the sea matter, and which threats and opportunities impelled the creation of the navy? What role did it have in different phases of the dynastic Swedish state: its foundation and stabilisation, its growing ambitions in Baltic power politics, its successful conquest of an empire and its defence of that empire?

2.2 2.2.1

From Nordic Union to a Swedish dynastic state,

1448-1558

Before 1521: The Oldenburg campaigns for a Baltic

empire

The break-up of the Kalmar Union between the kingdoms of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway and its replacement by two early modern monarchies with articulated administrative, fiscal, and military structures was a slow process. The differences in language, culture, religion.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

53

and political institutions were small and did not stimulate conflicts between the countries. Hie final fate of the Union only looks natural afterwards, when various elite groups, who earlier had cooperated or confronted each other within a union framework, had adapted to national political frameworks. These frameworks were, to a considerable extent, created by two new dynastic states, the Oldenburg state and the Vasa state, and the national frameworks have since then also shaped most historical studies of what happened. Their power to create sharp limits and even bitter conflicts between the Nordic societies is an illustration of the potential of the new fiscal-military concept of state formation. It was, however, not an inherently natural and predetermined process that created two, rather than one or three, states out of the three old realms in Northern Europe. That outcome was shaped by the ambitions of rulers and pretenders to power and their ability to achieve organisational innovations and develop alliances with local elites and local communities in the Nordic societies.' The demise of the Union m a y b e dated to 1448, 1471, 1501, 1523, or even the 1530s. The date depends on whether the emphasis is placed on the Union as a political idea and a possible alternative, or as a working political unit in which control of violence was centralised to one political authority. The idea died much later than the reality, and Nordic identity has survived until the present day. Even after the disappearance of the Union, a special relationship existed between the two states that emerged out of it: Sweden (including Finland) and the conglomerate state that usually is called Denmark (Denmark, Norway, Holstein, Iceland). The two Councils of the Realm continued to meet in negotiations until the early 17th century, and the two states agreed that they, and no other state, had a dominium over the Baltic Sea. This present survey of what actually happened is focused on the growth of interest aggregations behind two early fiscal-military states, especially the naval parts of the states. The Kalmar Union of 1397 was the result of political and dynastic circumstances in the late 14th century. These circumstances allowed

' The Nordic Union: Erik L o n n r o t h , Sverige och Kalmarunionen, 1397-1457, Stockholm, 1969 (1st ed. 1934); Aksel E. Christensen, Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik, 1319-1439, Copenhagen, 1980; Esben Albrectsen, Danmark-Norge 1380-1814: I, Faelleskabet bliver til, 1380-1536, Oslo, 1997; Gustafsson 2000; The Cambridge History of Scandinavia, Volume 1: Prehistory to 1520 (ed. K n u t Helle), Cambridge, 2003, esp. 679-770 (by H e r m a n Schuck a n d Jens E. Olsen).

54

CHAPTER TWO

the creation not of a centralised union but of fairly strong monarchical power in all the three Nordic kingdoms simultaneously. These conditions did not last, however. No viable fiscal-military structures controlled by the Union monarch developed. From the 1430s, aristocrats took political control of both Sweden and Denmark. This made the future of the Union dependent on their willingness to cooperate with each other. Both countries were elective monarchies in which aristocrats controlled the elections. It soon turned out to be difficult to run a union with few unifying forces. In Sweden, ambitious aristocrats who wished to become rulers of Sweden, if possible also of Norway, turned up, while other Swedish aristocrats preferred to maintain at least a loose union. The Danish aristocracy preferred to elect kings from junior branches of German princely houses rather than from their own ranks. One effect was that these kings were involved in north German politics and not entirely focused on the Union's problems. As a permanent political unit with one ruler, the Union broke up in 1448 when Denmark and Sweden elected different kings. After that, the three kingdoms were effectively unified only during brief periods: 145764 (under Christian I), 1497-1501 (Hans), and 1520-21 (Christian II). From 1448 on, Denmark, in union with Norway and f r o m 1460 also with the German principality Holstein, was ruled by the Oldenburg kings Christian I (r. 1448-81) and his son Hans (r. 1481-1513). They created a working relationship with the Danish Council, and they gradually gained control of considerable financial resources, especially from the Sound Toll. The Danish Council consisted of the land-owning aristocrats who controlled local communities and armed forces on land. Every new king had to promise to cooperate with the Council and guarantee the dominant position of the landowners. In return, they had to keep domestic peace and support what the Council had agreed to after discussions with the king. As a compromise between traditional and decentralised forms of authority and modern centralisation, it usually worked until the mid-17th century.^ Danish aristocrats were usually satisfied with developing their estates in one of the most fertile regions of Europe. They showed little interest in territorial conquests, and they were not interested in a permanent

' Danish general history: Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie: VI, De fire staender, 1400-1500 (by Troels Dahlerup); VII, Pa Guds og Herskabs ndde, 1500-1600 (by Alex W i t t e n d o r f ) ; VIII, Ved afgrundens rand, 1600-1700 (by Benito Scocozza), Copenhagen 1989.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

55

army and the growth of territorial fiscal structures outside their control. A union with Sweden was not important for them, but peace with their Nordic neighbour was desirable. Until 1523 they supported the Oldenburg policy of creating peace by enforcing a lasting union, but their willingness to support this policy with violent means was limited. The Danish aristocrats were not uninterested in defence, but the Sound Toll, which was raised on foreign shipping, could pay for a defensive pohcy. The feudal levy was of limited importance, except in domestic conflicts. Into the 17th century, major Danish armies were organised by military entrepreneurs who recruited German mercenaries under contracts from the king. They served only in wartime. This system worked, because the kings also were German princes with good contacts with the German market for military entrepreneurs. Junior members of the Oldenburg family frequently worked in that market themselves. Such armies could be formed rapidly, at least at times when there was peace on the continent. Tliey were expensive, however, and tended to rapidly exhaust the accumulated financial resources of the Danish state. The armies had to win quickly as Denmark could not afford long wars of attrition, as Sweden proved able to.' To hire armies run by private entrepreneurs was normal among German princes. The Oldenburg rulers of Denmark were, however, also innovative, and they developed a permanent navy, controlled by them and largely financed by the Sound Toll. Because Denmark was close to northern Germany, whose many towns might have hired ships to the Danish king, the decision to create a permanent royal navy was far from obvious. It was an innovative act by entrepreneurial rulers who wished to have an instrument of power under their own direct administration. At least f r o m the 1480s, they had major gun-armed warships of their own and a growing naval infrastructure: a shipyard at the castle in Copenhagen, guns to arm ships, and a number of men who gained experience in fitting out and commanding ships and fleets for war. Danish kings could also sequester foreign merchantmen in the Sound and use them when they needed additional lifting capacity for power projection against Sweden. Together with ships supplied by towns, the nobility, and the bishops, the Danish kings thus could

' The Danish army: Knud J. V. Jespersen, "Social Change a n d Military Revolution in Early M o d e r n Europe: Some Danish evidence", Historical Journal, 26, 1983, 1-13; Gunner Lind, Haeren ogmagten i Danmark, 1614-1662, Odense, 1994, 21-38, 128-46, 283-90; Michael H. Mortensen, Dansk artilleri indtil 1600, Copenhagen, 1999.

56

CHAPTER TWO

concentrate a considerable naval force under their control. Hiis was essential during their conflicts with the groups which controlled Sweden as their centre of power around the Lake Miilaren, and Stocldiolm was easier to reach from the Baltic Sea than through the deep forests of southern Sweden. Danish sea power was also a challenge to the German Hanse, with Liibeck as the leading city in the Baltic. This protective alliance between trading cities had for centuries been able to dominate the Baltic Sea with armed merchantmen and easy access to the German market for mercenary soldiers. This had also enabled them to interfere with Nordic domestic politics and with shipping from outside the Baltic."* The Baltic and Swedish policy of the early Oldenburg kings was to a large extent a quest for a maritime-orientated empire. Control of Sweden and, with that, the entire western and northern coast of the Baltic Sea would, together with control of the Danish straits, make it possible to dominate the Baltic region and reduce the power of the German cities. At the same time, such domination would make it easier to keep Sweden under political control and easier to form alliances with local elite groups in Swedish society. Sweden had long coasts, with the sea separating the eastern and western parts of the kingdom, Finland and Sweden; and coastal and lake shipping was a major part of the Swedish transport system. Swedish peasant societies were largely self-supporting, but imported salt for food preservation was important. The iron- and copper-mining districts in central Sweden were interested in export trade with Germany. Most Swedish towns and castles could be attacked f r o m the sea but also provisioned f r o m the sea. In brief, Sweden was both vulnerable and accessible to sea power. A ruler who controlled the sea lines of communications to Sweden could use this as a political leverage for control of Swedish territory by making the population weary of regimes that could not protect them on the sea. As events in the early 16th century were to show, full political control of Sweden could only be achieved by rulers who were able to cooperate with local elites and keep control the Baltic Sea at the same time. Political development in Sweden f r o m the 1430s on was more dynamic, or rather chaotic, than in Denmark. Traditionally this has

Pierre Dollinger, The German H^nsa, London, 1970. Sweden and the Hanse: Kjell Kumlien, Sverige och hanseaterna, Lund, 1953.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

57

been interpreted as a conflict between a nationalist party and a union party, but the frequent shifts of political alliances and the fact that Danish and Swedish aristocrats were on both sides in the conflicts with the Oldenburg kings indicate that this traditional explanation is anachronistic. The driving force behind political development in Sweden was the ambition of various aristocrats to control the resources of the state. A union or not was, in that perspective, a matter of expediency, not of principles. By 1470 Sweden in practice became an aristocratic republic under the administration of a regent {riksfdrestdndare) elected by the Swedish Council of the Realm {Riksrddet). The regents also developed close personal contacts with the peasant communities, which had become used to acting with political and military self-confidence. The peasant militia was effective as a defensive infantry and, when fully mobilised, was a more important part of the Swedish military system than the feudal cavalry and the armed retainers organised by the nobility and the Church. The regents were, however, leaders of aristocratic factions, not sovereign rulers, and so they might at any time be removed from office by a majority in the Council. This severely limited their ability to develop fiscal-military structures and invest in expensive naval hardware.^ Sweden was a fairly typical medieval society, with much local power and no monopoly of violence controlled by an organisationally powerful state. Instead, coherence was created by family alliances between aristocrats, the organisational structure of the Church, sohdarity between peasants, and vertical contacts between the local communities and such members of the elite who were trusted by the peasants and could act as their leaders. Apart f r o m the king, the state consisted of the Council of the Realm {Riksrddet), consisting of bishops and aristocrats, and regional and local courts {landsting and hdradsting), which also were political assemblies dominated by the nobility and the peasant elite. This provided a political and judicial framework for peaceful resolution of conflicts, and most Swedes probably regarded this state as a defensive alliance of provincial communities. If strong interest

^ Salomon Kraft, Sveriges historia till vara dagar, 3;II, Senare Medeltiden, 1448-1520, Stockholm, 1944; Sven Ulric Palme, Sten Sture den aldre, 2nd rev. ed., Stockholm, 1968 (1950); Ingrid H a m m a r s t r o m , Finansfdrvaltning och varuhandel, 1504-1540: Studier i deyngre sturarnas och Gustav Vasas statshushdllning, Uppsala, 1956; H e r m a n Schiick, "Sweden as an Aristocratic Republic", Scandinavian Journal of History, 9, 1984, 65-72.

58

CHAPTER TWO

groups resisted this embryonic state, it had little ability to act, however, which meant that violence and feuds were frequent methods of handling conflicts. The Oldenburgs, with littie experience of politically conscious and military capable peasants, usually failed to understand how this system should be managed in their own interest. This was a serious handicap in their quest for political control over Sweden.® The Swedish policy of Christian I, Hans, and the latter's son Christian II (r. 1513-23) was formally based on claims that they were lawful kings of Sweden as well as of Denmark and Norway. They had indeed been elected as kings or heirs to the throne during periods when a majority in the Swedish elite supported the idea of a Nordic union. These elite groups were, however, usually not interested in giving the Oldenburgs the practical possibility to rule Sweden: to raise taxes, to place their men as commanders on the royal castles, or to develop any kind of military forces under royal control. Several Swedish aristocrats favoured the idea of a union between the three kingdoms, but they did not favour a strong monarchy. The lack of an effective Swedish king who held the prestige and prerogatives connected with this title checked the development of central authority and embryonic fiscalmilitary structures of the type that appeared in several other European states in the decades around 1500. One resulting wealcness was that Sweden, in contrast to Denmark, had little effective naval power. From 1448 on, intermittent war flared between the rulers of Denmark and Sweden. It ended with a major defeat of Christian I's army at Brunkeberg outside Stockholm in 1471. It was typical for this war that Christian had been able to land an army outside the walls of Stoclcholm without meeting any resistance at sea. On land the two powers were fairly equal, but at sea the Danish naval forces dominated. The Oldenburgs could attack trade to Sweden, ravage the coasts, and land army forces wherever they wished, and they preferred to take the sea route to Stockholm rather than try to bring an army through forests and unfertile regions that had few roads. Increasingly, the Oldenburg attempts to recreate the Nordic union took on a character of Baltic empire building, with predominately seaborne armed forces. The first

The late medieval state, the nobility, the peasants, and the use of violence: Gabriela Bjarne Larsson, Stadgelagstiftning i senmedeltidens Sverige, Stockholm, 1994; Dick Harrison, Uppror och allianser: Politiskt vdld i 1400-talets svenska bondesamhalle, Lund, 1997; Peter Reinholdsson, Uppror eller resningar? Samhdllsorganisation och konflikt i senmedeltidens Sverige, Uppsala, 1998.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

59

three Oldenburg kings frequently led major campaigns against Sweden from their fleet. Some summers, the fleet with the king and a force of soldiers stayed in the sheltered waters outside Stoclcholm for months, engaging in negotiations, blockade, or amphibious operations/ The ability to enforce a continuous blockade on Swedish ports, however, was limited both by the naval technology of the time and the fact that Sweden's powerful trading partners, the Hanse cities, were able to protect their shipping with armed force. Sweden's own naval forces were small. Karl Knutsson Bonde, who periodically was king from 1448 to 1470, owned ships, including at least one very large ship that he used for trade with Western Europe. Both as an aristocrat and as a king, he was interested in trade, politics, and land in the eastern Baltic, and he waged privateering campaigns against his enemies when he was in exile in Prussia from 1457 to 1464.'^ In spite of this interest in the sea lines of communication, Karl did not develop anything that looks like a consistent naval policy. After 1470, the regents elected by the Swedish Council and their aristocratic allies had few major ships, and they did not try to compete with Oldenburg sea power. They could not defeat major Oldenburg fleets, and it was out of the question to take the war to Danish waters by naval power. There were few major Swedish merchant ships that could be fitted out for war, and there were few opportunities to sequester foreign merchantmen for temporary service like the Oldenburgs did in the Sound. The low degree of private enterprise (privateering) in violence at sea during even a long period of war shows that Swedes were little used to maritime warfare.' In 1497, King Hans took control over Sweden after a campaign in which his navy's ability to land army forces at strategic points on the Swedish coast was important. The main reason for the success.

' Kraft 1944, 29-36, 60-63, 141-57, 272-75, 298-300, 306, 327-34, 364-90; Jorgen H. Barfod, Flddens fodsel, Copenhagen, 1990, 40, 42, 45-46, 83, 86-87, 104, 144-48, 153-54. ' John Fincham, A History of Naval Architecture, London, 1979 (1st ed., 1851), 30, mentions that a ship of nearly 1,000 tons b u r t h e n , belonging to King Charles of Sweden, arrived in England in 1455. If the tonnage is correct, it was larger than any ship owned by the English king at that time. Karl Knutsson Bonde owned one m a j o r ship (a hoik) and five smaller vessels at the time of his death in 1470, see Gottfrid Carlsson, "Karl Knutssons testamente", HT, 63, 1943, esp. 22-28. ' Early Swedish naval forces: Gottfrid Carlsson, "Svante Nilssons finlandsexpedition 1504 och Soren Norby", HT, 69, 1949, 41-50; Kumlien 1953, 393-94; Hammarstrom 1956, 53, 87-88, 169-70, 179-86; Glete 1976, 45-48.

60

CHAPTER TWO

however, was that he enjoyed considerable support from the Swedish elite. This soon evaporated, and in 1501 the Oldenburgs were again thrown out from most of Sweden, partly because they were also preoccupied with rebellions in Ditmarsken (northern Germany) and in Norway. The old regent Sten Sture (regent 1470-97) regained executive power in Sweden. When he died in 1503, he was succeeded by Svante Nilsson (regent 1504-12), an aristocrat, who as late as 1497 had been one of King Hans's supporters. Tlie king retained control over the important fortified port of Kalmar and the Borgholm castle on the island of Oland in southeastern Sweden. His fleet could support his garrisons there, and, in combination with diplomacy, it could also enforce a blockade on trade with Sweden. Occasionally the small Swedish naval forces successfully attacked his cruisers, but normally the Danish fleet and the privateers, among whom were some from Scotland, were able to disrupt trade to Sweden. The Danish fleet was visible as an instrument of power in the northern Baltic Sea and even in the Gulf of Finland. The blockade was unpopular among German merchants, however, and in 1509 Liibeck began to escort its trade to Sweden with a fleet, a policy that soon brought about a war with Denmark. The small Swedish naval forces joined Liibeck's fleet, and together they were able to cut the supply of provisions to Kalmar and Borgholm, which had to capitulate to Swedish forces in 1510 after almost a decade of failed eff'orts to take them. The demonstration of the importance of sea power for keeping the ports open to trade and control of strategic positions on the Swedish coast was obvious.'" A truce was concluded in 1512. It might have been the beginning of a new period of uncertain but non-violent political relations between the Oldenburgs and the Swedish and Danish elites. Europe was in a dynamic period, however, where royal power grew and the Catholic Church was entering a crisis. In Sweden, Svante Nilsson's young son Sten Sture was elected regent against the will of several important aristocrats. He soon showed aspirations to found a royal dynasty, and he ran into a severe conflict with the archbishop, Gustav Trolle, another ambitious young aristocrat." King Hans' son. Christian II (r. 1513-23),

Kraft 1944, 333-34; Barfod 1990, 85-118. " G u n n a r T. Westin, Riksfdrestdndaren och makten: Politiska utvecklingslinjer i Sverige, 1512-1517, Lund 1957. This regent, usually called Sten Sture the younger, was not of the same family as Sten Sture (the older), regent 1470-97 and 1501-03.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

61

continued his father's poHcy and made it into a more pronounced program for an early modern prince with radical ideas. Christian hoped to reconquer Sweden, to create a centralised Nordic monarchy, and to found a trading company in Copenhagen and Stockholm for trade between the Baltic and Western Europe. His economic policy aimed at reducing the economic and political power of the Hanse. A powerful navy with large gun-armed ships and an increased Sound Toll were corner-stones in this policy. Christian married one of the sisters of the young Habsburg prince Charles, soon to become king of Spain (1516) and German emperor (1519). Because Charles was the hereditary ruler of the Netherlands, this dynastic alliance might create bonds of interest between Denmark and the rising mercantile centre in Western Europe. Christian II attempted to conquer Sweden with amphibious attacks against Stockholm in 1517 and 1518, but his army was defeated when it landed. The Swedish regent Sten Sture mainly relied on the effective peasant militia over which he held political control. In comparison, his navy was small, although three ships acquired in the late 1510s did survive in Liibeck and Danzig to provide a nucleus for a post-1520 Swedish navy.'^ During 1520, an Oldenburg army of foreign mercenaries was able to occupy central Sweden while the fleet as usual sailed to Stockholm and cut off foreign trade and supply. The Sture party was shattered when Sten Sture was killed in combat, and Sweden's elite groups more or less willingly accepted Christian II as king. For a brief time it looked as if the Nordic Union had again become a reality. Perhaps the wave of rising 'new monarchies' that swept through Europe in this period had reached Northern Europe, and a new Nordic state with a powerful navy controlled by a naval-minded dynasty might emerge out of the loose Kalmar Union. 2.2.2 The gamble for a new monarchy: The Vasa battle fleet, 1521-1536 Northern Europe had indeed reached a turning point in the formation of state power and naval power connected with the state. Events did not turn out exactly as Christian II had hoped, however. His mercenary army, which had brought him to the Swedish throne, was too

Glete 1976, 45-48; Glete 1977, 33-34. " Kraft 1944, 364-99; Barfod 1990, 139-54; Gustafsson

2000, 41-72.

62

CHAPTER TWO

expensive to be maintained. He remembered how members of the Swedish ehte, who pretended to be loyal when the king was present in strength, had thrown out his father and grandfather from Sweden. This, as well as his radical ideas about political change, may have stimulated Christian II to use the opportunity to do something different, in spite of the amnesty he had promised his earlier enemies as a part of the political settlement. Together with some of his Swedish supporters, he arranged a trial followed by executions of several aristocrats, two bishops, and many Stocldiolm burghers in November 1520. This act must have been intended to pave the way for a strong monarchy by eliminating men able to lead an opposition. In this. Christian II was successful, but ultimately it was not he who would create the strong monarchy in the power vacuum left by the decimation of the Swedish political elite. Christian II's massacre alienated many members of both the Swedish and the Danish elite. His betrayal of an amnesty smelled tyranny and disrespect for aristocrats and bishops alike. One Swedish leader who survived by being absent was the young aristocrat, Gustav Eriksson of the Vasa family, whom Christian had earlier taken prisoner by treacherous means. Gustav had escaped to Liibeck, where he built valuable contacts among the merchants. He returned unnoticed to Sweden in a small vessel in 1520, but he never accepted Christian's amnesty, which he distrusted. Many of those executed by Christian II in November were Gustav's friends and relatives, including his father and his brother-inlaw. In early 1521, peasants in various parts of Sweden rose against Christian II's bailiffs, possibly because the king had ordered the peasants to be disarmed. This attempt to eliminate the peasant militia had the opposite effect, and Gustav Eriksson rapidly became accepted as the military leader of the various militias. He was also appointed as regent by aristocrats and bishops, who saw Christian's power vanish when most of his mercenaries had left. After a short campaign, the militia controlled most of Sweden. Christian could keep Stockholm and some other seaside towns, which could be supplied by his fleet, and with this he could also regain control over Einland." Oldenburg control over Sweden again proved to be

" The wars f r o m 1521 to 1532: Barkman 1937, 1-162, which integrates warfare on land and at sea; Barfod 1990, 154-90; Jonas Hedberg, Kungl. Artilleriet: Medeltid och dldre Vasatid, Stockholm, 1975, 363-68; Mortensen 1999, 349-56. PoHtical history:

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

63

maritime in character. The king could control fortified towns, enforce blockades, and support forces where maritime lines of communication were predominant, but he had little ability to control the rural areas of Sweden without the cooperation of local elites and peasant communities. On the other side, Swedes who wished to throw out the Oldenburgs again faced Danish naval superiority as a severe obstacle. The situation in 1521 was familiar, as it had been essentially the same for seven decades. This military-political stalemate might have continued indefinitely had there been no innovation. But Gustav Eriksson was an innovator and, in addition, a first-rate political manager and negotiator. In winter and spring 1522, he used his contacts in Liibeck to buy a fleet of armed merchantmen. He hired German crews for the ships and mercenary soldiers to serve on the ships mainly as a mobile army. This naval power f r o m Liibeck was supplied on credit, which Gustav Eriksson was expected to pay by taxes and trading privileges when he gained full control over Sweden. It was a power game with high stakes and far beyond the naval ambitions of any of his predecessors in Sweden. The buyer was a group of rebels, led by a young aristocratic landowner who only with the benefit of hindsight can be identified as the founder of a powerful dynasty. Tlie sellers were private merchants with interests in trade with Sweden, but they acted with support from the ruling oligarchy in Liibeck, where apprehension over Christian II's ambitions was growing. From Liibeck's side it was an investment in future control of Swedish trade. In the summer 1522, the city openly joined the Swedish rebels in the war against Christian II, and a joint Swedish-Liibeckian fleet took control of the Baltic Sea. The Swedish part of this fleet was in 1522-23 managed by German shipmasters and mercenary officers. Gustav Eriksson was not always able to make them obey his orders, but its very existence meant a dramatic change in his position: he suddenly had a share in the control of the Baltic Sea.i5

Lars-Ofof Larsson, Gustav Vasa: Landsfader eller tyrann?, Stockholm, 2002; H u g o Yrwing, "Lybeck, de nordiska rikena och konungavalet i Strangnas 1523", Scandia, 24, 1958, 194-254; Sven Lundkvist, "Sverige och Nederlanderna, 1524-1534", Scandia, 27, 1961, 9-52; Gustafsson 2000, 72-202. State finance; Hammarstrom 1956. Glete 1976, 48-49; Glete 1977, 34-41.

64

CHAPTER TWO

Christian II's regime in Denmark had become increasingly insecure, and in early 1523 the nobility sided with Liibeck under the leadership of the king's uncle, Duke Frederik of Holstein. In spring 1523, Christian left Copenhagen with most of his fleet and sailed to the Netherlands. Hie victorious rebels in the Nordic countries immediately elected new kings. Frederik of Holstein became king of Denmark and Norway, while Gustav Eriksson was elected king of Sweden. Frederik I had to accept the new political situation in Sweden and allied himself with Gustav I against Christian II, but he lacked major naval forces. It was the allied Hanse and Swedish fleets which, during 1523, blockaded Stockholm, Copenhagen, and other fortified towns into surrender. The remaining Danish fleet was loyal to Christian II and did its best to resist from its base in Visby on the island of Gotland. From a later perspective, we know that the events of 1521-23 shaped a solution to the Nordic state formation problem, which proved to be durable. From then on, Sweden and Denmark developed as two separate monarchies and, increasingly, as fiscal-military states with Stockholm and Copenhagen as central military and naval arsenals and administrative capitals. Contemporary observers, including the two new kings, had no possibility to know that they had passed a turning point in history. Hie kings were very much occupied with preventing history from turning against them. The political situation was dynamic and uncertain. Norway had not rebelled against Christian II, and Frederik's control over that country was weak. Christian II had sailed to the Netherlands in order to organise a counter-attack on land and at sea with the help of his brother-in-law. Emperor Charles V, who ruled the Netherlands. This failed, but Christian's admiral, Soren Norby, a man equally skilled in fighting and political bargaining, continued the resistance in the Baltic on sea and on land up to 1526.'® In 1524, Gustav I made a major effort to use his new navy and army to retake possession of the island of Gotland (lost to Denmark in 1361), which Norby now controlled. This failed, and Gotland was returned to the Danish crown when Norby left the island. Gustav had to accept

This admiral is a legend in Nordic history: Lars J. Larsson, Soren Norby och Ostersjdpolitiken, 1523-1525, Lund, 1986; Bo Grafiton, Soren Norby: Sjokrigare i Ostersjon pa 1500-taleU Visby, 1995. His account book for 1523-24 includes the accounts for his naval force based on Gotland: Evert Melefors and Tryggve Siltberg (eds), Soren Norbys rakenskapsbok for Gotland 1523-24, Visby, 2003.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

65

this, as he needed the alliance with Frederik I as much as Frederik needed cooperation with Gustav. Christian II might return with armed force, and he had powerful relatives; it was conceivable that several members of the Nordic elites would join him if Frederik I and Gustav I were unable to satisfy their demands. Especially the usurper Gustav, who from a European perspective came f r o m nowhere and became a king, had strong incentives to prepare for a fight for survival. Gustav I had to satisfy his Liibeckian friends with trading privileges and repayment of the debt from the war. This he did for several years. However, he also used the debt to Liibeck as a pretext for increasing the financial base of his new monarchy. Again and again, their king told the Swedes that he (personally, as he used to emphasise) had run up a huge debt to acquire ships, weapons, and men for the liberation war against the tyrannical Christian II. He increased taxes and in 1527, the state took over the property of the Church by a decision of the Parliament, partly under the pretext that the debt must be paid. Lutheranism was a welcome theological motivation for this radical shift of economic and political power, but for the king, the immediate aim was to gain increased resources for military and naval purposes. Actually, Gustav I never fully paid his debt to Liibeck, and he instead used much of the new resources to develop a new type of armed forces. The royal castles, which for centuries had been centres for territorial control and defence under more or less reliable aristocrats, were neglected. A small army of German and Swedish mercenaries was maintained, guns were acquired, and new large warships, able to carry heavy guns, were built. The king also hired shipbuilders, shipmasters, and seamen for his new navy. The armed forces were limited in size but were modern and mobile. Because warships still to a large extent were intended to carry infantry, the armed forces were actually one unit which may bring soldiers and heavy guns on ships to any place in the Baltic that could be reached f r o m the sea.'^ Gustav I in these early years was not the founder of a long-term policy for national defence. He was a usurper in a kingdom where kings normally were dethroned, and he preferred a limited but mobile striking

" General: Gustafsson 2000, 105-32, Larsson 2002, 79-197. The debt to Liibeck; Hammarstrom 1956, 403-25. The a r m y a n d fortresses: Barkman 1937, 163-90; Hammarstrom 1956, 204-08, 352-56. The navy: Glete 1976, 49-51; Glete 1977, 4 1 50.

66

CHAPTER TWO

force under his own control rather than a traditional territorial defence and its problems with uncertain loyalty. He used these forces against domestic enemies almost as much as against foreigners. The armed forces gave him an advantage both in domestic conflicts and as seller of protection to Swedish elite groups and peasants. The military potential in the Swedish society was only gradually brought under his control, but a start was made by the elimination of the Church as a military power. Control of the local communities in order to raise taxes and stabilise the new regime was achieved by political management that kept various opponents to his regime divided, a policy that was supported by occasional shows of force by the new army. The considerable resources used for the new navy in these years show that Gustav I believed that it was necessary to maintain control the sea lines of communication if his power was to last. Invaders might use these lines, but control of them might also be useful against possible enemies within Sweden. The Oldenburgs had shown that control of the Baltic Sea was one of the keys to power in Sweden, and Gustav I acted as if he had understood this lesson. The Vasa navy might also be used for strikes against enemies abroad, something which the king could not have failed to notice after the operations against Copenhagen and Gotland in which his navy had taken part during 1522-24. Christian II did finally return in autumn 1531. He had gathered a fleet and sailed to Norway with a Habsburg-sponsored army. He was met by resistance from Sweden on land and by a Danish-Lubeckian fleet and was taken prisoner by Frederik I in 1532. But the power base of the junior branch of the Oldenburg dynasty was still far from secure. When Frederik I died in 1533, the Councils of Denmark and Norway, which included the Catholic bishops, still had a Catholic majority. Frederik's oldest son, Duke Christian of Holstein, was a firm Lutheran and was unwilling to be elected king of a Catholic state, but the councils had no realistic alternative. In 1534, a civil war started in Denmark. The aristocrats were divided, while peasants and burghers revolted against the aristocrats. Events took a dramatic turn when Liibeck intervened in cooperation with Danish burghers and took control of the cities of Copenhagen and Malmo on the opposite sides of the Sound. Liibeck also gained control over the Danish royal warships. They used their former enemy Christian II as figurehead, but their real intention was to install Liibeck's military commander, Count Christoffer of Oldenburg, as governor of Denmark-Norway and successor to Christian 11. This was part of a

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

67

radical political and mercantile program in which the old Hanse city tried to close the Sound to the Dutch and regain favourable trading privileges in Scandinavia. Liibeck also intended to depose its former Swedish ally from the throne it had helped him to gain in the early 1520s. Gustav I had cancelled Liibeck's privileges in Sweden in 1533, a step in his reorientation of Swedish trade policy. He had also ceased to repay his financial debt to Liibeck, something he could do because he had a navy of his own. Sweden no longer had to rely on an alliance with Liibeck to keep its ports open against blockades.'® The developments in Denmark in 1533-34 and the armed conflict between his two allies from 1523, the junior Oldenburgs and Liibeck, was both a threat and an opportunity for Gustav. He had strong reasons to support Duke Christian, who was his brother-in-law, a Lutheran, and an enemy of Christian II, who he kept imprisoned. If Liibeck's radical policy was successful in Denmark, its next victim was probably himself He had domestic and foreign enemies and could not even trust relatives. Gustav's brother-in-law, the German Count Johan of Hoya, whom he had appointed governor in eastern Finland, sided with Liibeck in 1534 with the motivation that he as negotiator in 1529 had personally guaranteed Liibeck that the king should pay his debt. Many Stoclcholm merchants were Germans with close contacts to Liibeck. The Trave city also had a reputation as a traditional friend of Sweden, which might make it a rallying point for opposition leaders against the Vasa regime. Gustav knew better than anyone how effectively a rebel in Sweden might be supported from the financially powerful merchants in that city. During the early summer of 1534, Gustav began to deploy his new mobile armed forces for an intervention on Duke Christian's side. This included his ships, which now for the first time were mobilised for war and formed into a battle fleet without the technical and professional support of Liibeck. The fleet was first sent to Reval, where it attacked Lubeckian merchantmen. It may have been a demonstration of strength during negotiations with Count Johan of Hoya, who was in Reval but also still in control of the castles of Viborg and Nyslott in eastern Finland. Gustav had heard rumours that Liibeck had promised

Hie war 1533-36: Wittendorff 1989, 166-206; Jorgen H. Barfod, Christian 3.s flade: Den danske flddes historic, 1533-1588, Copenhagen, 1995, 9 - 5 3 ; Mortensen 1999, 356-63; Gustafsson 2000, 203-62. Swedish trade a n d foreign policy: Lundkvist 1960, 97-148. The Swedish war effort, Barktnan 1937, 191-215.

68

CHAPTER TWO

Count Johan the Swedish throne when Gustav was deposed, and Gustav may have suspected that Liibeck's ships in Reval had been sent as a part of that conspiracy. The Count departed for Liibeck and became a commander of its mihtary forces. He was killed in combat in 1535. Hie garrison of Viborg, under its German commander, was persuaded to give up the strong castle in August 1534, apparently without violence. The fleet's appearance in the Gulf of Finland probably made it clear to the garrison that Liibeck could not supply Viborg from the sea. This was the last time that Swedish military forces were used against an aristocrat and garrisons in a feud against the ruler. It was the end of a long era during which such conflicts had been endemic in medieval Sweden." After its return from Reval, the Swedish fleet was sent south in early July to Kalmar, but it undertook no further operations in 1534. Liibeck had gained control over the Danish royal warships and the arsenal in Copenhagen, but the Swedish naval presence in the southern Baltic helped render Liibeck's blockade of Sweden ineffective, by encouraging other German cities to choose neutrality and continue to trade with Sweden in spite of Liibeck's diplomatic attempts to make them join the city's war. Reval and Riga considered supporting Liibeck, but during the autumn of 1534, Swedish threats of a trade blockade forced them to remain neutral. The existence of an operational Swedish fleet as far south as Kalmar made such threats credible and Liibeck's threats of a blockade of Swedish ports rather hollow. Swedish naval control of the northern Baltic Sea began to show political effects.^" During the autumn, Gustav's army marched into eastern Denmark (Skane and Halland), which was brought under his and Christian's control. In spring 1535, Gustav's fleet, with large ships, heavy guns, and a considerable part of his infantry sailed to the southern Baltic in a campaign against Liibeck. It was joined by small ships sent by Christian and his supporters and by a fleet sent by their ally, the duke

" Barkman 1937, 194-95 regards the expedition to Reval as strange and a possible pretext for avoiding sending the fleet to the Sound. The crisis a r o u n d C o u n t Johan can be followed in Gustav's letters May to Aug. 1534, GR 9, 1534, esp. five letters 27/5-34, 119-23, 11/6-34 (instruction to the fleet), 140-41, 20/6-34, 56-157, five letters 7/8-34, 209-17, two letters 4/9-34, 261-63. Lubeck had actually promised Duke Albrecht of Mecklenburg to become king of Sweden but Duke Johan was promised a share of the country, Lundkvist 1960, 112-13. Lundkvist 1960, 111-16; Hammarstrom 1956, 446-49.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

69

of Prussia, but the Swedish fleet had most major warships in the alUed fleet. Christian's little fleet is, in Danish naval history, traditionally described as "Danish", although the royal warships which were in Copenhagen in 1534 actually served on the other side, and a considerable n u m b e r of Danes probably served on the fleet that opposed the Vasa-Oldenburg-Hohenzollern alliance. Had the outcome of the war been different and had another branch of the Oldenburg dynasty gained lasting control of Denmark, it is likely that the naval war would have been described as a Danish victory against the inexperienced Swedes and the Holstein rebels. Actually, the naval campaign of 1535 was a rapid success for the allied fleet. Two enemy fleets were defeated, and the allies secured the lines of communication in the Danish straits. Sjalland was invaded, and Copenhagen was besieged f r o m land and blockaded f r o m the sea. The Swedish fleet spent the winter of 1535-36 in Landskrona, on the eastern side of the Sound. Tlie intervention of Gustav I had tipped the balance of power in favour of Christian, who was able to take control of D e n m a r k and Norway in swift campaigns during 1535-36. As King Christian III, he used the opportunity of victory in a civil war to strengthen royal power by firmly establishing Lutheranism, confiscating Church property, and reducing Norway to a part of the Danish kingdom. He also reorganised the navy, but, in contrast to the new Vasa regime, he did not form a standing army. The Danish kings continued to rely on the alliance with the aristocracy and the control of the sea around D e n m a r k and Norway to rule their state. There remained a special political and mental relationship between the two states, which emerged out of the Kalmar Union. One part of that relationship was that the two states respected one another's right to have a navy and opposed any attempt of any other Baltic power to create such a force. Trade between the countries remained free, and Danish kings exempted Swedish m e r c h a n t m e n f r o m paying the Sound Toll. Foreigners paid the Toll in return for protection by the king of Denmark when they passed through his waters. But because Sweden had its own navy, Swedish m e r c h a n t m e n did not to need this protection. The two Nordic kingdoms, less maritime in their economy than the trading cities on the southern and eastern coasts of the Baltic Sea, claimed that they had an exclusive right to exercise dominium over the Baltic, as well as the right and duty to protect shipping and raise customs on international trade to finance that activity. This claim grew

70

CHAPTER TWO

into a political and naval fact during the 16th century, when the two kingdoms developed powerful navies to exercise their dominium?^ 2.2.3

Defending a new monarchy: The Vasa galley fleet,

1536-1558

Hie events from 1531 to 1536 were the end of the Nordic union as a political idea. Hiey showed that it was unlikely that internal opposition or strong external enemies could destroy the two new regimes, even if these forces acted in concert. Instead, the two new regimes continued to form administrative systems and armed forces, which were distinctly Swedish/Vasa and Danish/Oldenburg in character. There remained the possibility that the two regimes might destroy each other by wars or that very powerful European enemies might attack them. In practice, "powerful European enemies" meant the Habsburg Emperor Charles V, Christian II's brother-in-law, who could act from both Germany and his hereditary provinces in the Netherlands. He was capable of providing naval support by mobilising large fleets of armed merchantmen.^^ This threat existed for a time in 1536 but came to nothing as the two Nordic rulers won a rapid victory which consolidated their power. However, both were usurpers, and both had also taken the fateful step of breaking with the Catholic Church in order to gain control of the economic and political power of the Church. In 1541, Gustav I and Christian III signed a treaty intended to provide long-term security against external threats, internal enemies, and the possibility that the two regimes should destroy each other. The treaty agreed that conflicts between the two kingdoms should be solved peacefully and that both countries should cooperate against external threats. Both kings also allied themselves with anti-Habsburg France and had contacts with the German Protestant princes who opposed the emperor. This

'' Dominium maris Baltici, Fredrik Westling, "Sveriges forhallande till D a n m a r k fran freden i SteUin till Fredrik II.s dod (1571-1588)", HT, 39, 1919, 55-102, 123-54, esp. 151-52; Sven Ulric Palme, Sverige och Danmark, 1596-1611, Uppsala, 1942, 4 0 - 4 ^ 77; Nils A h n l u n d , "Svensk ostersjopolitik u n d e r det tidigare 1600-talet", Forum navale, 7, 1946, 3-15; Leo K. T a n d r u p , Mod triumf eller tragedie: En politisk-diplomatisk studie overforlobet af den dansk-svenske magtkamp fra Kalmarkrigen til Keiserkrigen, 2 vols, Aarhus, 1979, esp. 1:75-78, 296, 302, 406-07, 483-510, and 2:73-74, 224. ' ' Danish-Norwegian history after'1536: Oystein Rian, Danmark-Norge, 1380-1814: 2, Den aristokratiske fyrstestaten, 1536-1648, Oslo, 1997; Wittendorff 1989, 207-25.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

71

was the first time tliat Sweden ever took part in the European alliance system." The following year, Denmark joined France in the war against the emperor, closed the Sound to his shipping, and deployed the Danish fleet to the North Sea. Christian, who recently had seen a powerful Swedish fleet operate in the Baltic Sea, believed that Gustav would be interested in sending it for a joint operation against the Netherlands. Gustav, however, faced a serious peasant rebellion in the province of Smaland in southern Sweden during 1542-43, and he feared that German princes, allied with the emperor might use this to inflhrate Sweden from Mecldenburg. Hie German princes had contacts with the rebels, and Gustav had to think of defence in the Baltic. During 1543— 44, his fleet was used mainly to patrol the sea in order to keep the domestic and foreign enemies separate. As a token naval participation in the continental war, Gustav sent one of his major warships to the Sound in 1543 to help the Danes keep it closed.^'' The emperor was victorious in Germany during 1543, and Gustav turned to further defensive measures. The period of gambling with high stakes, as in 1521-23 and 1534-36, was over for him. Gustav changed his administrative, military, and naval policy to a cautious and defensive but systematic development of that over which he already had gained control. The most important political part of the new policy was the decision by a specially assembled Parliament of 1544 that the Vasas should be the hereditary dynasty in Sweden. There should be no more opportunity for a power game around the succession to the throne. Policymaking became linked to a dynasty, which increased the possibility that longterm policies might be implemented effectively and favour the creation of organisational capabilities. Administratively, Gustav took firm control of his country as a resource base for the new dynasty by appointing many new local bailiffs who raised taxes, registered farms, selected men for the army and navy, kept contacts with the peasants, traded with food raised as taxes, and developed industrial enterprises for the king. This penetration of the local society gave the Vasa monarchy the fiscal apparatus to raise taxes without cooperation from local

" Georg Landberg, De nordiska rikena under Bromsebroforbundet, Uppsala, 1925; Lundkvist 1960, 149-267. Landberg 1925, 72-89; Lundkvist 1960, esp. 192-97, 246. Naval operations in 1542-44: m a n y letters in GR 14-16, 1542-44; defensive war plans for 1544: SRA, 1:1, 325-37, 399-404.

72

CHAPTER TWO

elites and gave them a good grasp of the potential for resource extraction. Agricultural Sweden was to supply most of the resources for the future Swedish fiscal-military state: men and provisions for the army and navy, oak for warships, saltpetre for gunpowder, iron for weapons and shipbuilding, labour for fortress building and for cutting and transporting timber for shipbuilding. The information base and the extraction apparatus for this project of organisation of resources from above were developed after 1536, especially during the 1540s.2' The king also integrated the military power of the local communities with the forces under his own control. The great rebellion in Smaland in 1542-43 had given food for thought. For almost a year, a peasant republic based on the power of an improvised militia had existed in Gustav's kingdom, and his professional German and Swedish soldiers had proved rather inefficient in their attempts to retake a region dominated by forests. The army was drastically changed. The old peasant militia, organised and controlled by the local communities and led by local elites, was reorganised as a royal militia, led by royal officers, paid by the king, and armed with modern gunpowder weapons supplied by the king. It was a part-time army only, but because it was much cheaper than professional soldiers, it could be expanded to a considerable size: around 17,000 soldiers in 1560. It also meant that the king took control over the mobilisation and organisation of young members of the peasant society for violence-based political actions, a major transfer of political power to the state. Legally, the base of the new army was the free peasants' traditional duty to defend the country under the leadership of the king. Seamen could be recruited to the navy under the same legal obligation.^'^ The new policy and the development of an army strong in manpower made it possible to reshape the navy. Sixteenth-century naval

'' Lundkvist 1960, 271-322; Larsson 2002, 210-362; Mats Hallenberg, Kungen.fogdarna och riket: Lokalforvaltning och statsbyggande under tidig Vasatid, Stockholm, 2001. Barkman 1937; Arvo Viljanti, Gustav Vasas ryska krig, 1554-1557, 2 vols, Stockholm, 1957; Lars-Olof Larsson, "Gustav Vasa och 'den nationella haren'", Scandia, 33, 1967, 250-69; Sven A. Nilsson, Pa vdg mot militdrstaten: Krigsbefcilets etablering i den dldre Vasatidens Sverige, Uppsala, 1989, 3 - 9 ; Sven A. Nilsson, De stora krigens tid: Om Sverige som militdrstat och bondesamhdlle, Uppsala, 1990, 9 - 1 4 , 10716; Mats Hallenberg, "Militar eller civil? Kungatjanare och valdsverkare fore professionaliseringen", Militdrhistorisk Titiskrift, 2002, 145-172; Mats Hallenberg, "Bonder i vapen: Mobilisering, makt och m o t s t a n d i 1500-talets Sverige", MilMrhistorisk tidskrift, 2005, 13-37.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

73

forces were still very much manned by infantry, and it is therefore misleading to equal infantry with land power and ships with sea power. In 1540, Gustav I introduced Mediterranean-style oared galleys as a new type of warship in the Baltic. He was personally interested in galley design, and he systematically developed a galley force. By the time of his death in 1560, it had 23 units requiring at least 2,000 oarsmen. Soldiers manned the oars, and one of the tasks of the galleys was to make the infantry mobile at sea. Oared galleys armed with heavy guns were in 1540 a modern weapon system, which in the Mediterranean had practically ousted sailing warships in that sea. French galleys proved useful in wars against England in the 1510s and 1540s when they did much of the active fighting at sea. Sailing warships were still rather immature, and the rather few and expensive heavy guns could be usefully deployed on warships which could manoeuvre with precision and independent of the wind. For Sweden, the archipelagic coasts were suitable for galleys but Gustav I also used them as a seagoing force that could shelter in the archipelago in heavy weather.^' Hie Swedish galley fleet was in the 1540s and 1550s a modern and powerful force, and several galleys were kept in service even during peace. They patrolled the coasts and border zones and transported the king, his court, and important cargo, such as silver.^® Galleys could also dominate the great Swedish lakes. In plans for defensive war, they were intended to attack sailing ships passing through the archipelago to Stocldiolm with gunfire f r o m positions which sailing ships could not reach. An invading fleet at that time would largely have consisted of armed merchantmen with wealdy built hulls, vulnerable to the few but well-aimed heavy guns on galleys. This galley fleet was unique in the Baltic at this time. There was one obvious reason for that: Gustav I was the only ruler in Northern Europe who had the cheap manpower of peasant-soldiers to use as oarsmen. The galleys made these men useful in amphibious warfare, and they were also a new technical solution to bring the powerful but still scarce heavy artillery to sea. In confined

" Galleys in Europe: Glete 2000, 25-32, 93-111, 137-44; N. A. M. Rodger, "The Development of Broadside Gunnery, 1450-1650", M M , 82, 1996, 301-24. Swedish galleys: Glete 1976, 38-43, 55-60; Glete 1977, 58-63; Jan Glete, "Vasatidens galarflottor", in Hans N o r m a n , Skargardsflottan: Uppbyggnad, militar anvdndning och forankring i det svenska samhciUet, 1700-1824, Lund, 2000, 37-49. Galley operations in 1550, a typical year of peace, GR 21, 1550, 121-22, 160, 193, 208, 252.

74

CHAPTER TWO

waters, such as the Gulf of Finland and the Sound, they could be used for offensive amphibious warfare. During the 1550s, Sweden gradually turned its interest eastward: to the security problems along the border with Russia, the increasing trade passing through the Gulf of Finland, and the growing political crisis in the eastern Baltic, which for centuries had been ruled by the German Order of Knights. In the 13th and early 14th centuries it had also been a region of Swedish expansion, with oared fleets projecting power to the coast of Finland and the Neva estuary. Gustav I now began to make his power visible in the gulf with patrolling warships. He used them to favour Western trade with Russia through his ports, Viborg and Helsingfors (Helsinki). The latter was founded in 1550 as a rival to the old German-dominated port Reval (Tallinn) in Estonia. Gustav also used naval power to put pressure on Reval, and in the 1550s this city gradually adapted to a new role as a client to Sweden.^' Russia under Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible) had ambitions to expand westward. During 1554/55, Gustav faced a crisis along the FinnishRussian border, and in 1555 he mobilised the army and the galleys and sent them to Finland. After a failed attempt to take the Russian fortress Noteborg at the river Neva with an amphibious attack, the Swedish forces were used defensively until peace was concluded in 1557.^" In addition to their amphibious lift capability, the galleys also could control both shallow coastal waters and the open sea close to coasts against naval forces of small vessels which the Russians might improvise. The war was inconclusive, but Sweden's new armed forces had shown mobility and a degree of readiness that may have encouraged the young Vasa princes Erik and Johan (both future kings) to think in terms of expansion in the east, even against opponents with inherently larger resources. At least that was the policy they would follow with determination after their father's death in 1560. 2.2.4

Conclusion: Naval power and a new

monarchy

The role of Gustav Eriksson (Vasa) as an innovative fiscal-military entrepreneur is evident from this survey of sea power and political power in Sweden f r o m the mid-15th to the mid-16th century. He gained control over Sweden when he bought a considerable fleet with

'' Lundkvist 1960, 333-41; Glete 1976, 52. Viljanti 1957.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

/b

a large loan, the classical behaviour of an innovative entrepreneur who creates a new combination in hope that future profits will repay the loan. His most original military achievements were the creation of a substantial sailing navy, the conversion of the peasant militia into a royal infantry militia, and the introduction of a galley force. Gustav I established a dynasty by his ability to organise permanent armed forces under his own direct control, in combination with his ability as political leader and economic administrator. In Swedish historiography he is usually remembered for his latter two roles, while his military and naval achievements are overshadowed by those of his grandson, Gustav II Adolf (r. 1611-32). The latter, however, merely reformed the military, naval and administrative system that his grandfather had founded. The 16th-century armed forces of Sweden are often regarded as rather backward in an international perspective. In a comparative perspective this is not correct. As instruments of dynastic power in a Europe where permanent armed forces were still scarce and based on fragile political and financial bases, Gustav I's armed forces were strikingly modern rather than backward. They gave the ruler good ability to control violence in his own territory, to defend it against competitors, and to use threats in international negotiations. On the European scene in 1560, only France and Sweden had a complete array of permanent armed forces: an army, a sailing navy, and a galley navy. And the French armed forces, especially the navy, were soon to be disorganised in a long civil war. The armed forces of the new Swedish monarchy were shaped by the experiences of a long conflict with Denmark. This conflict had taught the Swedish elite that control of the infantry forces which the peasants might field, and control of the sea lines of communication to Swedish ports, were necessary in order to rule Sweden effectively. The member of the elite who converted these lessons into a coherent and rational program of innovation was Gustav Eriksson. His success as administrative, military, and naval innovator made him the founder of a dynasty. His most important political achievement was that he made these military and naval innovations acceptable to the power base, with which a successful ruler in Sweden must cooperate: his fellow aristocrats and the free peasants. Gustav was able to show that his new system worked, that it provided better protection and security than earlier systems, and that it was worth its cost. The unpleasant alternative he could point to was the experience of long, destructive.

76

CHAPTER TWO

and frustrating wars with an earlier decentralised system of defence. It must be appreciated that many of the resources that Gustav gained control of and developed were used to support his new armed forces. He established the main components of a modern fiscal-military state as he both created a new fiscal system and permanent armed forces. In Sweden, as earlier in Denmark, the rise of organised sea power was a part of a rise of a new type of state. It was a state in which the kings controlled armed forces of their own in order to protect the country and enforce a monopoly of violence. Navies gave them political leverage against both domestic and foreign enemies and combinations of these two groups. The medieval Baltic had been politically fragmented, and political factions—aristocrats, bishops, cities, merchants, military orders, semi-piratical seafarers, and local communities—had frequently made alliances across national borders and across the sea. This political scene was definitely changed with the civil war in Denmark 1534-36 and Gustav I's successful isolation and repression of various rebellions against his regime up to 1543. From then, two dynasties were in control of clearly defined territories and of the sea lines of communication to the rest of the Baltic. In other regions in the Baltic, political fragmentation continued and made them open to seaborne power projection and protection-selling from the new Northern states. Strategically, both states were almost islands, except for the long borders they had with each other. They could therefore be protected by naval power, which also could secure their trade with neutral ports. Royal control of territory could also be exercised from the sea lines of communication, most effectively in Denmark and Norway but also with considerable effect in Sweden-Finland, if sea power was combined with cooperation with local elite groups. In a period when armies were still small, it was usually more efficient to send them by sea to the capital of the enemy rather than across wide forests with few roads and little food for men and horses. The repeated attacks f r o m the sea on Stockholm and Copenhagen show this. The Oldenburg kings and, later, Gustav I drew the rational conclusion f r o m these experiences and invested in naval power. The Oldenburgs had an early advantage in that control of the Sound gave them income, while Gustav had to found his navy first on credit, later on taxes on land and confiscated Church property. The rise of efficient gunpowder weapons cannot be ignored. The Nordic Union monarchy from around 1390 to 1435 had been strong

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

77

a n d a m b i t i o u s , n o t t h e least at sea. B u t it liad n o t d e v e l o p e d a n y t h i n g w h i c h m i g h t b e d e s c r i b e d as a p e r m a n e n t n a v y o r a c o m p a r a tive a d v a n t a g e in specialised w a r s h i p s . T h e r e a r e n o s i g n s t h a t s u c h a n a d v a n t a g e existed, a n d t e m p o r a r y sea p o w e r f r o m p o w e r f u l t r a d ing cities w i t h m a n y large m e r c h a n t m e n w a s effective. T h a t p o w e r rapidly e v a p o r a t e d b e t w e e n t h e 1520s a n d t h e 1560s. By t h e n , specialised g u n - a r m e d w a r s h i p s , b u i l t a n d m a i n t a i n e d b y

permanent

navies, h a d b e c o m e so s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n w e r e severely h a n d i c a p p e d in c o m b a t . G u s t a v I i n v e s t e d m u c h of his r e s o u r c e s in specialised w a r s h i p s a n d d e v e l o p e d t h e d o m e s t i c skills a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n a p e r m a n e n t n a v y a n d d e p l o y it as a n o p e r a t i o n a l f o r c e . T h e i m p o r t a n c e of h e a v y g u n s i n t h e state f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s is best u n d e r s t o o d in a c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e rise of a n u m b e r of relatively s t r o n g m o n a r c h i e s in E u r o p e d u r i n g t h e late 15th a n d early 16th c e n t u r y is well k n o w n . F r a n c e , t h e S p a n i s h m o n a r c h y , t h e O t t o m a n Empire, England, Portugal, D e n m a r k , a n d Sweden are the best e x a m p l e s of t h i s t r e n d . E x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h i s a l m o s t s i m u l t a n e o u s d e v e l o p m e n t in large p a r t s of E u r o p e a r e n u m e r o u s : e c o n o m i c growth, military innovations, technology, or dynastic accidents. The similarities a r e so m a n y t h a t it is p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e r e w e r e c o m m o n factors, w h i c h gave c e n t r a l r u l e r s a m o r e m a r k e d c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n tage in t h e exercise of v i o l e n c e - c o n t r o l . It is p o s s i b l e t o a r g u e t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of heavy^ g u n s w a s o n e of t h e s e f a c t o r s , a l t h o u g h it c o u l d only b e i n f l u e n t i a l if r u l e r s u s e d t h e n e w t e c h n o l o g y i n n o v a t i v e l y . A t sea, h e a v y g u n s i n c r e a s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of specialised w a r s h i p s , a n d rulers w h o i n v e s t e d in s u c h s h i p s a n d t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t g a i n e d a n advantage. Sixteenth-century Vasa naval p o w e r was, to a large extent, f o r m e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n of m o d e r n g u n s a n d specialised g u n - c a r r y ing warships.^' G u s t a v E r i k s s o n ' s revolt a g a i n s t C h r i s t i a n II w a s t h e last s u c c e s s f u l action of its k i n d in S w e d e n , b u t h i s a w a r e n e s s t h a t e n e m i e s c o m ing f r o m a b r o a d c o u l d s t a r t r e b e l l i o n s c a n b e o b s e r v e d in his letters until his d e a t h . H e f r e q u e n t l y o r d e r e d h i s p a t r o l l i n g w a r s h i p s t o b e o n g u a r d a g a i n s t real o r i m a g i n e d e n e m i e s a n d a n t a g o n i s t s . C o n t r o l of t h e Baltic Sea w i t h r o y a l w a r s h i p s w a s t h u s a p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r u n d i s t u r b e d state f o r m a t i o n a n d c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of p o w e r in D e n m a r k -

Glete2002,

16-21.

78

CHAPTER TWO

N o r w a y a n d S w e d e n . T h e c e n t r a l political role of t h e t w o r o y a l n a v i e s is visible i n t h e fact t h a t t h e ships, t h e g u n s , a n d t h e s h i p y a r d facilities w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d t o t h e capital cities a n d l o c a t e d as close t o t h e royal castles as possible. T h e y w e r e m o b i l e i n s t r u m e n t s of p o w e r t h a t w e r e easy t o k e e p u n d e r close c o n t r o l b y t h e r u l e r s a n d t h e i r m o s t loyal servants.

2.3 2.3.1

The navy and Swedish empire-building,

1558-1660

Control of the Baltic Sea

T h e w a r w i t h R u s s i a of 1 5 5 5 - 5 7 w a s n o i s o l a t e d e p i s o d e . It w a s t h e first sign t h a t S w e d e n m i g h t b e i n v o l v e d in a p o w e r s t r u g g l e in t h e east. T h e i n v o l v e m e n t w a s n o t u n a v o i d a b l e . A strictly d e f e n s i v e f o r e i g n policy was an option. The Russian war h a d showed that the Swedish a r m e d f o r c e s w e r e a d e q u a t e f o r d e f e n c e in this r e g i o n , a n d t h e agric u l t u r a l l y p o o r F i n l a n d w a s h a r d l y a t t r a c t i v e f o r f o r e i g n aggressors. The long Swedish-Danish borders, with few roads a n d m a n y forests, could be adequately d e f e n d e d by the n u m e r o u s Swedish militia army, a n d S w e d e n ' s fleet c o u l d d e f e n d t h e sea lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n to o t h e r Baltic p o r t s . D e n m a r k , Liibeck, a n d , especially, P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a were rather unlikely enemies unless they were threatened by Sweden. S w e d i s h i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n c a n b e s e e n partially as a r e s u l t of several d e c a d e s of a r m y a n d n a v y d e v e l o p m e n t h a v i n g c r e a t e d a s u r p l u s of p r o t e c t i v e capacity. It w a s t e m p t i n g t o u s e t h i s c a p a c i t y in a s i t u a t i o n w h e n t h e e s t a b l i s h e d s t r u c t u r e f o r p r o t e c t i o n in t h e e a s t e r n Baltic s u d d e n l y fell t o p i e c e s a n d a m a r k e t f o r p r o t e c t i o n - s e l l i n g a p p e a r e d . T h e e x p a n s i o n b e g a n w i t h a n i n v i t a t i o n f r o m t h e elite g r o u p s in n o r t h e r n Estonia, which asked the Swedish king for protection. They saw that he h a d the military and naval m e a n s to protect them; otherwise they w o u l d h a v e a s k e d s o m e o n e else. P r o t e c t i o n w o u l d r e m a i n t h e official p r e t e x t f o r m a n y of S w e d e n ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e future.^^

Sweden d u r i n g the century of empire-building; foreign policy: Wilhelm Tham, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 1:2, 1560-1648, Stockholm, 1960. The Parliament: H e r m a n Schtick, "Sweden's Early Parliamentary Institutions f r o m the Thirteenth Century to 1611", a n d Goran Rystad, "The Estates of the Realm, the Monarchy, and Empire, 1611-1718", in Michael F. Metcalf (ed.), The Riksdag: A history of the Swedish parliament, Stockholm, 1987, 5 - 6 0 a n d 61-108. The dynasty: Lars-Olof Larsson, Arvet efter Gustav Vasa: En berattelse omfyra kungar och ett rike, Stockholm, 2005. The economy: Janken Myrdal and Johan Soderberg, The Agrarian

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

79

O n e p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e c e n t u r y of e m p i r e b u i l d i n g t h a t f o l l o w e d t h e w a r w i t h Russia w a s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e S w e d i s h a r m y as a n increasingly efficient f o r c e f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s in e n e m y t e r r i t o ries. A n o t h e r a n d a r g u a b l y e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w a s that t h e S w e d i s h society w a s a d a p t e d t o a p o l i c y of c o n t i n u o u s w a r fare a n d large-scale e x t r a c t i o n of r e s o u r c e s f o r w a r . I n this p r e s e n t study, it is i m p o r t a n t t o e m p h a s i s e t h a t t h e e m p i r e w a s largely c r e a t e d a r o u n d t h e Baltic Sea. Its c o n q u e s t r e q u i r e d n a v a l p o w e r a n d t h e ability to use t h e sea f o r logistical s u p p o r t a n d c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n s . T h e e m p i r e was also f o r m e d in r e g i o n s w i t h m u c h m a r i t i m e t r a d e a n d cities t h a t lived o n t h a t t r a d e . N a v a l p o w e r c o u l d c o n t r o l t h e sea lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n u p o n w h i c h the Swedish imperial efforts were based a n d c o u l d c o n t r o l t h e t r a d e t h a t f l o w e d t h r o u g h t h e Baltic Sea a n d its ports. H i e S w e d i s h k i n g w a s o n e of t h e v e r y f e w p o w e r - h o l d e r s in t h e Baltic w h o actually h a d w a r s h i p s of h i s o w n . H o w w a s t h i s o r g a n i s e d naval p o w e r d e v e l o p e d as a p a r t of a m b i t i o u s policies, w h i c h e x t e n d e d Swedish p o w e r f a r b e y o n d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b o r d e r s of t h e k i n g d o m ? A b a t d e fleet m a y b e u s e d t o c r e a t e a m o b i l e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n in a n area w i t h i m p o r t a n t sea l i n e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . G i v e n t h e Baltic g e o g raphy, a S w e d i s h fleet s t r o n g e n o u g h t o c o n t r o l t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic Sea f r o m bases in c e n t r a l S w e d e n d i d n o t o n l y p r o t e c t t h e S w e d i s h - F i n n i s h coasts a n d t r a d e t o S w e d e n . It also c r e a t e d a b r i d g e f o r S w e d i s h p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n a c r o s s t h e Baltic t o E s t o n i a a n d L i v o n i a a n d t h e p o r t s in t h a t

Economy of Sixteenth-Century Sweden, Stockliolm, 2002; Ake Saiidstrom, Mellan Tornea och Amsterdam: En undersokning av Stockholms roll som fbrmedlare av varor i regional- och utrikeshandel, Stocldiolm, 1990. The Baltic trade: A r t u r Attman, Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik, 1558-1595, Lund, 1944; Artur Attman, The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade, 1500-1650, Gothenburg, 1973; Attman 1979; Stefan Troebst, "Debating the Mercantile Background to Early M o d e r n Swedish Empire-building: Michael Roberts versus A r t u r Attman", European History Quarterly, 24, 1994, 485-509. State finance: Birgitta Oden, Kronohandel och finanspolitik, 1560-1595, Lund, 1966. The military state: Sven A. Nilsson, Krona och frdlse i Sverige, 1523-1594: Rusttjdnst, Idnsvdsende, godspolitik, Lund, 1947; G u n n a r Arteus, Till militdrstatens forhistoria: Krig, professionalisering och social fordndring under Vasasdnernas regering, Stockholm, 1986; Nilsson 1989; Nilsson 1990; Jan Lindegren, Maktstatens resurser: Danmark och Sverige under 1600-talet, unpubl. Nordic state formation: Harald Gustafsson, "Hie Conglomerate State: A perspective on state formation in early m o d e r n Europe", Scandinavian Journal of History, 23, 1998, 189-213; Jespersen 2000. Finland: Rainer Fagerlund, Kurt Jern, Nils-Erik Villstrand, Finlands historia, II, 1523-1809, Esbo, 1993. Swedish expansion f r o m an East European perspective: Robert 1. Frost, The Northern Wars: War, state and society in northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, Harlow, 2000. Broad surveys in English: Michael Roberts, The Early Vasas: A history of Sweden, 1523-1611, Cambridge, 1968; Roberts 1979.

80

CHAPTER TWO

r e g i o n . Similarly, a m o r e a m b i t i o u s a n d o f f e n s i v e S w e d i s h n a v a l p o l i c y t h a t m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o d e p l o y a b a t t l e fleet t o t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic Sea f o r b l o c k a d e - b r e a k i n g a n d a t t a c k i n g e n e m y t r a d e also c r e a t e d a b r i d g e t o t h e G e r m a n c o a s t a n d t h e p o r t s o n t h a t coast. O a r e d v^rarships, suitable f o r d e f e n c e of t h e a r c h i p e l a g i c S w e d i s h coast, c o u l d e q u a l l y well b e u s e d f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s in s h a l l o w a n d p r o t e c t e d w a t e r s . T h e c r e a t i o n of a p e r m a n e n t S w e d i s h n a v y t h u s f o r m e d a d y n a m i c e l e m e n t in S w e d i s h Baltic policy. Its o r i g i n w a s w i t h o u t d o u b t to s e c u r e t h e coasts, t h e t r a d e , a n d t h e survival of t h e n e w d y n a s t y , b u t its v e r y exist e n c e c r e a t e d a n i n s t r u m e n t of p o w e r t h a t a n a m b i t i o u s r u l e r m i g h t u s e f o r o f f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s at a n y o p p o r t u n e m o m e n t .

2.3.2

Success of organisation:

The Swedish battle fleet,

1558-1570

H i e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e S w e d i s h n a v y u n d e r G u s t a v I h a d m a d e t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d i n t o a z o n e d o m i n a t e d b y S w e d i s h p o w e r . O t h e r p o w ers c o u l d n o t b r i n g n a v a l p o w e r t o this a r e a w i t h o u t r i s k i n g a c o n f l i c t w i t h a fleet s e n t o u t f r o m Stoclcholm, a n d t h i s a l l o w e d t h e S w e d i s h m o n a r c h y t o p r o m o t e its i n t e r e s t s in t h i s r e g i o n . T h e m o n a r c h y c o u l d have r e n o u n c e d territorial ambitions, developed Swedish

economic

activities i n t h e area, a n d b o l s t e r e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of S w e d i s h m e r c h a n t s a n d s h i p p i n g in t h e t r a d e b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e b y u s i n g t h e S w e d i s h n a v y t o p r o t e c t s u c h t r a d e . It w o u l d h a v e t a k e n t i m e to a c c u m u l a t e capital, c o n t a c t s , a n d c o m p e t e n c i e s b u t it w o u l d probably have attracted foreign m e r c h a n t s with capital a n d c o m p e t e n c e . F o r e i g n b u s i n e s s m e n w e r e , in fact, p r e s e n t in S w e d e n , a n d s o m e d e c a d e s later t h e y w o u l d b e c o m e i m p o r t a n t f o r d e v e l o p i n g t h e S w e d i s h e c o n o m y . I n t h e 18th c e n t u r y , w h e n t h e e m p i r e w a s lost, S w e d e n w a s i m p o r t a n t in E u r o p e a n s h i p p i n g . I n t h e 16th c e n t u r y , h o w e v e r , t h e V a s a s w e r e m e r c a n t i l e in t h e i r o u t l o o k b u t t h e y w e r e p r i m a r i l y t e r r i t o r i a l r u l e r s a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r s in p r o t e c t i o n - s e l l i n g . W h a t l o o k e d p r o m i s i n g to t h e m , g i v e n t h e i r existi n g o r g a n i s a t i o n a l capabilities, w a s t o sell p r o t e c t i o n t o t h o s e w h o t r a d e d in t h e area. P a y m e n t c o u l d c o m e t h r o u g h c u s t o m s o n t h e g o o d s w h i c h p a s s e d t h e Gulf, a p o l i c y i n s p i r e d b y t h e S o u n d Toll. T h e n a v y c o u l d p r o t e c t s h i p p i n g in t h e area, a n d t h e u p h e a v a l t h a t b e g a n i n t h e e a s t e r n Baltic a r e a in 1558 c r e a t e d a s u d d e n d e m a n d f o r p r o t e c t i o n . Significantly, t h e S w e d i s h n a v y w a s s t r e n g t h e n e d f r o m 1 5 5 8 - 5 9 w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of several n e w large sailing w a r s h i p s . B u t t h i s p r o t e c t i v e policy b e c a m e interwoven with territorial ambitions and ambitions to

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

81

c o n t r o l cities a n d river e s t u a r i e s of s t r a t e g i c a n d e c o n o m i c i m p o r t a n c e in t h e e a s t e r n Baltic. It w a s realised t h a t t r a d e s h o u l d n o t o n l y b e p r o tected b u t also c o n t r o l l e d a n d m o n o p o l i s e d w i t h a r m e d f o r c e . " The e a s t e r n Baltic r e g i o n o f f e r e d i n t e r e s t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s w h i c h could b e t u r n e d i n t o t h r e a t s if o t h e r p o w e r s u s e d t h e m w i t h success. The G e r m a n ( T e u t o n i c ) O r d e r h a d f o r c e n t u r i e s r u l e d t h e t e r r i t o r i e s t h a t t o d a y are E s t o n i a a n d Latvia in c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e r e g i o n a l m e r c a n t i l e cities, w h i c h w e r e d o m i n a t e d b y G e r m a n s . I n 1558, Russia, u n d e r its a m b i t i o u s tsar I v a n IV, t o o k t h e city of N a r v a in t h e G u l f of Finland, an i m p o r t a n t port for Russian trade with W e s t e r n Europe. In a f e w years, t h e O r d e r d i s a p p e a r e d as a t e r r i t o r i a l r u l e r , a n d t h e t o w n s a n d n o b i l i t y of t h e e a s t e r n Baltic f r e n e t i c a l l y b e g a n t o l o o k f o r p r o t e c tors against R u s s i a n e x p a n s i o n . A large m a r k e t f o r classical p r o t e c t i o n selling s u d d e n l y e m e r g e d . T h e island of Osel ( S a a r e m a a ) b e c a m e a D a n i s h p r o t e c t o r a t e in 1559, a n d Livonia a n d C o u r l a n d s u b m i t t e d t o P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a in 1561. I n t h e s a m e y e a r , t h e S w e d i s h k i n g a c c e p t e d t h e i n v i t a t i o n t o b e c o m e p r o t e c t o r of Reval ( T a l l i n n ) a n d m o s t of n o r t h e r n E s t o n i a . Reval h o p e d t h a t S w e d e n w o u l d u s e its n a v a l p o w e r in t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d to c h a n n e l t h e R u s s i a n t r a d e t h r o u g h t h a t city in e x c h a n g e f o r t h e r i g h t t o raise c u s t o m s . T h e t h r e e p r o t e c t i n g p o w e r s — P o l a n d , D e n m a r k a n d S w e d e n — s o o n r a n i n t o a c o n f l i c t a b o u t t h e i r s p h e r e s of interest, a n d P o l a n d b e c a m e i n v o l v e d i n c o n f l i c t w i t h R u s s i a as well. F r o m a m a r i t i m e p o i n t of view, t h e c o n t r o l of t h e v a l u a b l e t r a d e t o Narva, Reval, P e r n a u , a n d Riga w a s at stake. S w e d e n b e g a n t o c l a i m a d o m i n i o n o v e r t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d , a n d its fleet b e g a n t o c a p t u r e s h i p s f r o m Liibeck a n d o t h e r t o w n s , w h i c h d i d n o t f o l l o w S w e d i s h d e c r e e s that their R u s s i a n t r a d e m u s t b e d i r e c t e d t o S w e d i s h - h e l d Reval a n d that t h e p r o f i t a b l e N a r v a t r a d e s h o u l d b e left t o t h e s u b j e c t s of t h e Swedish k i n g . These conflicts a b o u t p o w e r a n d t r a d e in t h e e a s t e r n Baltic w e r e added to other conflicts between Sweden a n d D e n m a r k , which b e c a m e intense w h e n G u s t a v I a n d C h r i s t i a n III d i e d i n 1560 a n d 1559 r e s p e c tively. T h e y h a d b o t h a v o i d e d e s c a l a t i n g m i n o r c o n f l i c t s i n t o crises, t h e y had fought wars against c o m m o n enemies, a n d they h a d gained their politically i m p o r t a n t l a u r e l s as s u c c e s s f u l w a r l e a d e r s w h e n t h e y w e r e y o u n g . O n e r e s u l t w a s t h a t t h e y h a d a v o i d e d costly c o m p e t i t i o n s at sea

Attman

1944, 119-62; Glete 1976, 60-63.

82

CHAPTER TWO

a n d h a d k e p t t h e i r s a i h n g n a v i e s at a stable level. By 1560, t w o y o u n g a n d a m b i t i o u s kings, E r i k X I V (r. 1 5 6 0 - 6 8 ) in S w e d e n a n d F r e d e r i k II (r. 1 5 5 9 - 8 8 ) in D e n m a r k , w e r e in c o n t r o l . T h e y h a d n o c o m m o n e n e m y , a n d t h e Baltic political s c e n e w a s in t u r m o i l . N o w , t h e p o w e r that gained m o s t might b e c o m e superior to the other. Older N o r d i c h i s t o r i o g r a p h y o f t e n d e s c r i b e s a crisis c a u s e d b y a D a n i s h a t t e m p t t o recreate the Kalmar U n i o n , but that question was not on the agenda of e i t h e r y o u n g k i n g . I n fact, s u c h a n a t t e m p t w o u l d m o s t likely h a v e c r e a t e d a n a n t i - D a n i s h alliance b e t w e e n several p o w e r s . I n s t e a d , t h e r e is m o r e e v i d e n c e t h a t E r i k X I V h a d a m b i t i o n s t o m a k e S w e d e n t h e l e a d i n g p o w e r in N o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n d t h a t F r e d e r i k II w a s d e t e r m i n e d to prevent that. Both kings were apparently too inexperienced t o realise h o w difficult it w a s t o w i n a w a r , b u t F r e d e r i k at least t o o k t h e p r e c a u t i o n of f o r m i n g alliances w i t h Liibeck a n d P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a as a p a r t of h i s p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e war.^"* E r i k ' s a m b i t i o n s a r e visible in several s p h e r e s at t h e s a m e t i m e . H e u s e d t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e silver t r e a s u r y g a t h e r e d b y h i s f a t h e r t o r a p i d l y i n c r e a s e t h e a r m y a n d navy. H e w a s a firm believer in t h e i m p o r t a n c e of h i e r a r c h i c o r g a n i s a t i o n led b y h i m s e l f , a n d in t h a t spirit h e t r i e d t o f o r m m o r e specialised c o r p s of p r o f e s s i o n a l officers a n d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s loyal t o t h e k i n g . T h e n a v a l p a r t of his a m b i t i o n s w a s a l a r g e b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m of sailing w a r s h i p s , a n i n t e n s e p r o d u c t i o n of h e a v y c o p p e r g u n s , a n d a firmer o r g a n i s a t i o n of n a v a l p e r s o n n e l . O n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene, E r i k t r i e d t o a r r a n g e a m a r r i a g e alliance w i t h

Queen

E l i z a b e t h of E n g l a n d . This p l a n w a s c o n n e c t e d w i t h r a t h e r n e b u l o u s idea of m a k i n g S w e d e n a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e r m e d i a r y f o r t r a d e b e t w e e n Eastern a n d W e s t e r n Europe, an idea that m a y have impelled Erik's i n v o l v e m e n t in t h e e a s t e r n Baltic. I n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h i s p l a n , h e n e e d e d a b a t t l e fleet, w h i c h c o u l d n o t o n l y d e f e n d t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic b u t also act o f f e n s i v e l y a n d fight f o r t h e c o n t r o l of t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic, t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o t h e W e s t p a s s e d . It w a s a m a r k e d i n c r e a s e of S w e d i s h n a v a l ambitions.^^

" Sture Arnell, Die Aufldsung des livldndischen Ordensstates: Das schwedischen Eingreifen und die Heirat Herzog Johans von Finnland, 1558-1562, Lund 1937; Walther Kirchner, The Rise of the Baltic Question, Newark, D e l , 1954; Tham 1960, 12-36; Jensen 1982, 34-72. T r a d e and foreign policy, Ingvar Andersson, Erik XIV:s engelska underhandlingar: Studier i svensk diplomati och handelspolitik, Lund 1935. Tlie army: Bertil C:son Barkman, Kungl. Svea Livgardes historia, IL 1560-1611, Stockholm 1938-39, 1-47.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

83

F r o m 1559/60 t o 1562, E r i k X I V ' s g r o w i n g fleet of sailing w a r s h i p s w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d in t h e o n l y S w e d i s h p o r t i n t h e west, A l v s b o r g ( G o t h e n b u r g ) . E r i k p l a n n e d to travel t o E n g l a n d in g r a n d style, w i t h a m a j o r fleet, a l t h o u g h t h a t v o y a g e n e v e r t o o k place, f o r v a r i o u s r e a sons. This f o u r - y e a r g r a d u a l b u i l d - u p of a n o p e r a t i o n a l sailing b a t t l e fleet gave t h e c r e w s t r a i n i n g a n d e x p e r i e n c e at sea. B u t F r e d e r i k II b e c a m e s u s p i c i o u s w h e n h e s a w h i s rival c o n c e n t r a t e so m u c h n a v a l p o w e r in w e s t e r n S c a n d i n a v i a , in t h e v e r y c e n t r e of his o w n t e r r i t o r i e s . A l v s b o r g w a s strategically well s i t u a t e d f o r a s u d d e n S w e d i s h a t t a c k o n C o p e n h a g e n o r o t h e r p a r t s of D e n m a r k a n d N o r w a y , w h i c h in combination with the p e r m a n e n t Swedish a r m y forces m i g h t be dang e r o u s f o r t h e D a n i s h state, w h i c h k e p t n o a r m y in p e a c e t i m e . Erik's d i p l o m a t i c activities, i n c l u d i n g d e m a n d s of G o t l a n d a n d h i n t s of f u r ther Swedish territorial d e m a n d s o n D e n m a r k , did n o t h i n g to reduce D a n i s h suspicions.^'' Several s m a l l e r S w e d i s h w a r s h i p s w e r e d e p l o y e d to t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d t o raise toll a n d " g u i d e " f o r e i g n m e r c h a n t m e n to p o r t s c o n t r o l l e d b y S w e d e n . D u r i n g 1562, t h i s c a u s e d a c o n f l i c t w i t h Liibeck, w h e n several s h i p s f r o m t h a t city w e r e c a p t u r e d . While diplomatic negotiations a n d preparations for war intensified, an i n t e r m e z z o at sea at t h e e n d of M a y 1563 s t a r t e d t h e w a r . E r i k XIV h a d given u p h i s E n g l i s h m a r r i a g e p l a n s a n d h a d s e n t a fleet to R o s t o c k t o b r i n g a H e s s i a n p r i n c e s s t o S w e d e n as h i s b r i d e (she n e v e r t u r n e d u p ) . F r e d e r i k II s e n t o u t a fleet t h a t , a p p a r e n t l y at t h e initiative of its a d m i r a l , d e m a n d e d t h a t t h e S w e d i s h a d m i r a l s h o u l d p a y r e s p e c t to D a n i s h s o v e r e i g n t y in t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic Sea. T h a t w a s d e n i e d a n d in t h e f o l l o w i n g b a t t l e t h e D a n i s h fleet w a s d e f e a t e d , t h e first of a series of D a n i s h u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n s of S w e d i s h n a v a l p o w e r . T h e t w o p o w e r s n o w m o b f l i s e d f o r a full-scale w a r . O n l a n d it w a s f o u g h t b e t w e e n the S w e d i s h m i l i t i a a r m y a n d a D a n i s h m e r c e n a r y a r m y r e c r u i t e d in G e r m a n y . T h e latter h a d its first a n d , as it t u r n e d o u t , o n l y l a s t i n g success w h e n at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e w a r it t o o k c o n t r o l of A l v s b o r g , S w e d e n ' s o n l y p o r t t o t h e west. A t sea, t h e w a r w a s f o u g h t b y t h e Swedish n a v y a n d t h e c o m b i n e d D a n i s h - L i i b e c k i a n navies. A t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e w a r , t h e latter t w o p r e d o m i n a n t l y c o n s i s t e d of a r m e d merchantmen."

'' Jensen 1982, 47-60. " The latest study of this war is Jensen 1982. Swedish a r m y operations: Barkman 1938-39, 48-270. The war in the Eastern Baltic: Sture Arnell, Bidrag till helysning av den baltiska fronten under det nordiska sjudrskriget, 1563-1570, Stockholm 1977.

84

CHAPTER TWO

T h e w a r , u s u a l l y called t h e N o r d i c Seven Years W a r

(1563-70),

actually w e n t o n d u r i n g e i g h t c a m p a i g n s e a s o n s , w i t h a r m i e s a n d fleets t h a t w e r e f a r larger t h a n in earlier w a r s b e t w e e n S w e d e n , D e n m a r k , a n d Liibeck. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of n a v a l p o w e r is s h o w n b y t h e fact t h a t the navies were m u c h increased d u r i n g the war, while the armies did n o t g r o w b e y o n d t h e i r level in 1 5 6 3 - 6 4 . S w e d e n also h a d t o k e e p a n a r m y in E s t o n i a t o fight t h e Poles. W i t h i n S w e d e n t h e r e w e r e t w o brief civil wars: first b e t w e e n E r i k X I V a n d his b r o t h e r D u k e J o h a n in 1563; a n d s e c o n d b e t w e e n E r i k a n d h i s b r o t h e r s , t h e d u k e s J o h a n a n d Karl, in 1568. T h e d o m e s t i c conflict e n d e d w h e n E r i k w a s d e p o s e d b y his o l d e s t b r o t h e r , w h o s u c c e e d e d h i m as J o h a n III (r. 1 5 6 8 - 9 2 ) . T h e c h a n g e of r u l e r in S w e d e n led t o a c h a n g e of alliance p a r t n e r s , as J o h a n w a s m a r r i e d t o a sister of t h e P o l i s h k i n g a n d p r e f e r r e d c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h P o l a n d r a t h e r t h a n w i t h Russia. I n r e t a l i a t i o n , Russia a t t a c k e d S w e d i s h - c o n t r o l l e d E s t o n i a in 1570, giving S w e d e n a m o r e aggressive e n e m y i n t h e east t h a n P o l a n d h a d b e e n . T h e scale a n d l e n g t h of t h e w a r w a s in itself p r o o f of t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d rise of p o w e r t h a t h a d t a k e n p l a c e in b o t h N o r d i c m o n a r c h i e s d u r i n g t h e last d e c a d e s . C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t S w e d e n w a s f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t a n alliance t h a t p o s s e s s e d i n h e r e n t l y l a r g e r r e s o u r c e s , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e n e w p e r m a n e n t a r m e d f o r c e s w a s c r e d i t a b l e . T h e S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleet g r a d u a l l y g a i n e d c o n t r o l of t h e Baltic Sea, a n a s t o n i s h i n g p e r f o r m a n c e against two powers with strong naval and m a r i t i m e traditions. D u e to Erik XIV's d e t e r m i n e d effort to channel physical resources, m e n , a n d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l capabilities t o h i s n a v y , S w e d e n w a s f r o m 1565 able t o d e p l o y a b a t t l e fleet t o t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic, t h u s g a i n i n g c o n t r o l of t h e sea lines t h r o u g h t h e Baltic a n d w i t h i n D a n i s h - L i i b e c l d a n h o m e w a t e r s . T h e fleet w o n t h r e e of t h e s e v e n m a j o r b a t t l e s it f o u g h t f r o m 1563 t o 1566 a n d lost o n l y o n e (in M a y 1564). Its s u p e r i o r i t y w a s p r i m a r i l y g a i n e d b y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , logistics, i m p r o v e d discipline, a n d a d v a n c e d t e c h n o l o g y c o m b i n e d w i t h allied wealcness in g u n p o w e r . This i n c r e a s i n g l y f a v o u r a b l e s i t u a t i o n w a s u s e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e b l o c k a d e of N a r v a , t o p r o t e c t t r a d e b e t w e e n S w e d e n a n d n e u t r a l G e r m a n p o r t s , a n d t o m o r e o r less f o r c i b l y i n d u c e W e s t e r n s h i p p i n g t o safl t o Sweden. C o n t r a r y t o earlier a n d later w a r s i n t h e Baltic, c o n t r o l of sea w a s not used to s u p p o r t m a j o r a m p h i b i o u s operations. The Swedish and D a n i s h a r m i e s h a d g r o w n in size t o t e n s of t h o u s a n d s , a n d t o lift o n e of t h e m a c r o s s t h e sea w o u l d Jiave r e q u i r e d a n a m p h i b i o u s c a p a c i t y t h a t w a s n o t p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t r e q u i s i t i o n of a large n u m b e r of f o r e i g n

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

85

m e r c h a n t m e n . T h e S w e d i s h a r m y w a s n e v e r able t o r e a c h t h e S o u n d region, w h e r e a s h o r t c r o s s i n g w i t h s m a l l vessels w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e if t h e n a v y p r o t e c t e d it. N o r d i d t h e S w e d i s h n a v y h a v e e n o u g h soldiers t o c o n s i d e r a n a t t a c k o n C o p e n h a g e n w h e n it o p e r a t e d close t o t h a t city. N o n e t h e l e s s , S w e d i s h n a v a l p o w e r w a s decisive f o r a v o i d ing a d e f e a t b y a b l o c k a d e , f o r b l o c k a d i n g L u b e c k ' s t r a d e in t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d , a n d f o r p r e v e n t i n g S w e d e n ' s t h r e e e n e m i e s f r o m i s o l a t i n g Swedish f o r c e s in E s t o n i a .

2.3.3

The navy and Sweden's eastern policy,

1570-1595

Peace a m o n g S w e d e n , D e n m a r k , a n d Liibeck w a s c o n c l u d e d at Stettin in late 1570. N o m i n a l l y , t h e latter t w o p o w e r s a p p e a r e d as v i c t o r s , b u t t h e t r e a t y d i d n o t reflect t h e real p o w e r s i t u a t i o n in N o r t h e r n E u r o p e . J o h a n III h a d b e e n a n x i o u s t o c o n c l u d e t h e p e a c e in o r d e r t o c o n c e n trate all e f f o r t s o n t h e n e w w a r w i t h Russia, a n d S w e d e n still c o n t r o l l e d t h e sea. This b e c a m e clear in t h e y e a r s a f t e r 1570. L u b e c k ' s d e m a n d for f u l f i l m e n t of w h a t t h e city h a d g o t in t h e t r e a t y — f r e e t r a d e w i t h N a r v a , 75,000 daler in r e p a r a t i o n s f o r c a p t u r e d g o o d s , a n d b e t t e r t r a d ing privileges in S w e d e n — w a s s i m p l y i g n o r e d . D e n m a r k c h o s e n o t t o s u p p o r t t h e s e claims, a n d L u b e c k c o u l d d o little a l o n e . A t t e m p t s t o sail t o N a r v a in d e f i a n c e of t h e S w e d i s h b l o c k a d e e n d e d in large-scale c a p t u r e s of ships, especially i n 1574.'*' D e n m a r k h a d in 1570 b e e n p r o m i s e d t e r r i t o r i e s in E s t o n i a in a c o m plicated s c h e m e t h a t s h o u l d h a v e i n v o l v e d t h e e m p e r o r , b u t in p r a c tice, c o n t r o l o v e r E s t o n i a w a s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e fierce w a r b e t w e e n S w e d e n a n d Russia. F r e d e r i k II h a d n o d e s i r e t o j o i n e i t h e r side in t h a t war, a n d D a n i s h t e r r i t o r i a l a m b i t i o n s in t h i s r e g i o n e v a p o r a t e d d u r ing t h e 1570s. This r e m o v e d o n e m a j o r c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n S w e d e n a n d D e n m a r k , as F r e d e r i k II b y d e f a u l t h a d a c c e p t e d S w e d i s h (or R u s s i a n ) p r i m a c y in this r e g i o n , s o m e t h i n g h e h a d n o t b e e n p r e p a r e d t o d o in t h e early 1560s. I n spite of t h i s p e a c e f u l D a n i s h policy, D e n m a r k is n o r m a l l y d e s c r i b e d as t h e s t r o n g e r p o w e r of t h e t w o , a n d at sea t h e D a n i s h n a v y is s u p p o s e d t o h a v e e n j o y e d s u p r e m a c y a f t e r 1570.^'

Attman 1944, 229-96, esp. 263-67; Oden 1966, 195-96. '' Tham 1960, 51-73; Westling 1919. The war in the east 1570-95; Barkman 193839, Supposed Danish naval supremacy after 1570: Tandrup 1979, I, 74, Frede P. Jensen, "Frederik II og truslen fra de katolske magter: Linjer i dansk udenrigsoch sikkerhedspolitik 1571-88", (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, 93, 1993, 233-78, esp. 253-54; Barfod 1995, 223-74.

86

CHAPTER TWO

S w e d i s h n a v a l p o l i c y f r o m 1570 t o t h e early 17th c e n t u r y h a s o f t e n been seriously misinterpreted. Naval historiography has

tradition-

ally d e s c r i b e d t h e r e i g n of J o h a n III as a n age of d e c l i n e a n d n e g l e c t c o m p a r e d t o t h e g r e a t d a y s of E r i k X I V a n d e v e n c o m p a r e d t o t h e s m a l l e r n a v y m a i n t a i n e d b y G u s t a v I. This p i c t u r e w a s b a s e d o n o l d e r h i s t o r i a n s ' v i e w of J o h a n as a b a d a d m i n i s t r a t o r a n d a n i n c o n s i s t e n t policy-maker, and naval sources were interpreted within that framew o r k . Political h i s t o r i a n s h a v e a c c e p t e d t h i s w i t h o u t i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e a c t u a l size of t h e n a v y , b u t 2 0 t h - c e n t u r y h i s t o r i a n s h a v e given J o h a n a p o s i t i v e r e - e v a l u a t i o n a n d e v e n h a v e d e s c r i b e d h i m as t h e a r c h i t e c t of t h e S w e d i s h i m p e r i a l p o l i c y in t h e Baltic. T h e p i c t u r e left b y S w e d i s h h i s t o r i o g r a p h y is t h a t this e m p i r e w a s f o u n d e d b y a c o n s i s t e n t a n d t e n a c i o u s p o l i c y a b o u t e i t h e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o r c o n t r o l of m a r i t i m e t r a d e ( o r b o t h ) b u t w i t h o u t a l o n g - t e r m n a v a l policy. W h i l e E r i k X I V a n d G u s t a v II A d o l f a r e n o r m a l l y d e s c r i b e d as r u l e r s w h o b u i l t large n a v i e s t o s u p p o r t i m p e r i a l policies, J o h a n III is s u p p o s e d t o h a v e foll o w e d a n i m p e r i a l p o l i c y b u t n e g l e c t e d t h e navy.'"' This p i c t u r e is i n c o r r e c t . J o h a n III w a s a c t u a l l y a n a v a l i s t w h o s e n a v a l p o l i c y c a n o n l y b e e x p l a i n e d b y a c o n v i c t i o n t h a t c o n t r o l of t h e e a s t e r n Baltic a n d t r a d e t h r o u g h t h a t area w a s d e p e n d e n t o n c o n t r o l of t h e sea lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic Sea. This c o n t r o l h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e n a v a l p o l i c y of J o h a n ' s f a t h e r a n d b r o t h e r , a n d h e h a d n o i n t e n t i o n of l e t t i n g it slip a w a y b y n e g l e c t i n g t h e n a v y . H i s C o u n c i l a d v i s e d h i m t o save m o n e y b y selling ships,"*' b u t , a l t h o u g h h e f r e q u e n t l y d i d so, h e a c t u a l l y s p e n t m u c h m o r e o n c o n s t r u c t i o n of n e w w a r s h i p s . It is t r u e t h a t t h e g r e a t n a v y h e t o o k o v e r f r o m E r i k X I V w a s c u t d o w n d u r i n g t h e first y e a r s a f t e r 1570, b u t m u c h of t h e l a r g e i n v e n t o r y of n a v a l g u n s f r o m E r i k ' s d a y s w a s r e t a i n e d . F r o m 1574 t o 1578, a large s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m r e c r e a t e d a s t r o n g navy. I n five years, J o h a n b u i l t a b o u t as m a n y m a j o r w a r s h i p s

Johan III in Swedish naval historiography: Backstrom 1884, 53-64; Zettersten 1890, esp. 365-67; Arnold M u n t h e , Sjdmaktens inflytande pa Sveriges historia, I: Fran dldsta tid till omkring 1640, Stockliolm, 1921, 250-51; Sveriges sjokrig, 4, 31; Svenska flottans historia, I, 53-54, 192-93; Jan Glete, "Johan Ills Stora Skepp: Att finna ett skepp i 1500-talets skeppsgardsrakenskaper", Forum navale, 49, 1993, 5 - 1 7 . Johan III and the historians: Birgitta Lager, "Johan III", SBL 20. A r t u r A t t m a n ' s view of Johan III:s imperial policy: Artur Attman, "Den svenska Ostersjopolitikens arkitekt", in Vetenskap och omvdrdering: Till Curt Weibull pa hundradrsdagen 19 augusti 1986, Gothenburg, 1986. Oden 1966, 191, 387, 390-91, 395, 399.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

87

as his f a t h e r h a d d u r i n g 30 y e a r s ( 1 5 3 0 - 6 0 ) . Tliis w a s a c h i e v e d at a t i m e w h e n t h e w h o l e S w e d i s h w a r e f f o r t in E s t o n i a w a s t h r e a t e n e d b y a f i n a n c i a l disaster a n d t h e a r m y f o r c e s i n t h a t a r e a w e r e f r o m 1575 t o 1577 r e d u c e d t o t h e a b s o l u t e m i n i m u m f o r d e f e n c e . The a i m of J o h a n I l l ' s n a v a l p o l i c y m u s t h a v e b e e n t o k e e p a b a t t l e fleet f o r a n e w c o n t e s t w i t h D e n m a r k . This fleet w a s of n o u s e in t h e w a r w i t h Russia t h a t h e actually f o u g h t , b u t t h e r e w e r e several c o n flicts w i t h D e n m a r k in t h e 1570s, a n d J o h a n f r e q u e n t l y f e a r e d a w a r . F r e d e r i k II's a n d his C o u n c i l ' s p e a c e f u l p o l i c y a g a i n s t S w e d e n w a s w i t h o u t d o u b t sincere, b u t it m u s t h a v e b e e n s h a p e d w i t h a n a w a r e ness t h a t J o h a n h a d n o i n t e n t i o n of g i v i n g u p n a v a l c o n t r o l of t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic. A n y D a n i s h a t t e m p t t o m a k e a n i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t S w e d e n in this r e g i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n m e t b y n a v a l f o r c e j u s t as s t r o n g as D e n m a r k ' s . D u r i n g t h e 1570s, J o h a n III m a d e c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t s t o c r e a t e a n alliance w i t h a m a j o r E u r o p e a n p o w e r , p r i m a r i l y S p a i n . H e d i d this for religious, political, a n d financial r e a s o n s a n d in o r d e r t o solve o n e c o n c r e t e p r o b l e m : t h e release of p r o p e r t y i n Italy w h i c h J o h a n ' s w i f e h a d i n h e r i t e d f r o m h e r I t a l i a n m o t h e r . B o n a Sforza. F r o m t h e S p a n i s h p o i n t of view, a n alliance w i t h S w e d e n w o u l d b r i n g a sailing n a v y , s o m e t h i n g P h i l i p II b a d l y n e e d e d a g a i n s t t h e D u t c h rebels. B e f o r e t h e c o n q u e s t of P o r t u g a l in 1580, P h i l i p a l m o s t t o t a l l y l a c k e d a p e r m a n e n t sailing n a v y a n d h a d t o rely o n h i r e d m e r c h a n t m e n f o r every e f f o r t at sea o u t s i d e t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n . S w e d e n w a s also a p o t e n t i a l s u p p l i e r of n a v a l s t o r e s a n d g u n s t o S p a i n . J o h a n ' s y o u n g e r b r o t h e r , D u k e Karl (later Karl IX), m a d e s e r i o u s e f f o r t s t o b e c o m e a n a v a l e n t r e p r e n e u r for K i n g P h i l i p II. I n 1578, t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n J o h a n III a n d P h i l i p II b e c a m e m o r e s e r i o u s w h e n P h i l i p s e n t a n officer t o S t o c k h o l m t o n e g o t i a t e a n d gain i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e S w e d i s h n a v a l r e s o u r c e s . H e p r o p o s e d t h a t S p a i n s h o u l d lease 30 o r 40 w a r s h i p s a n d t h a t J o h a n III s h o u l d b e c o m e a n e n t r e p r e n e u r in n a v a l w a r f a r e u n d e r S p a n i s h

control.

This w a s typical f o r t h e S p a n i s h a n d M e d i t e r r a n e a n t r a d i t i o n of raising n a v a l f o r c e s t h r o u g h c o n t r a c t r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t administration.''^ Spain also w i s h e d t o u s e A l v s b o r g o n S w e d e n ' s w e s t c o a s t as a n o p e r a tional base a g a i n s t t h e D u t c h rebels. N o t h i n g c a m e o u t of t h e s e n e g o tiations, a n d t h e p l a n m a y l o o k e s o t e r i c . J o h a n c o u l d h a r d l y s e n d his

Thompson

1976, esp. 163-205, 256-73; Glete 1993, 139-52.

CHAPTER TWO

fleet o u t s i d e t h e Baltic t o serve Spain, b e c a u s e d o i n g so w o u l d e n d a n ger S w e d i s h s e c u r i t y a n d h i s Baltic policy. T h e d i s c u s s i o n s w e r e a p a r t of d i p l o m a t i c m o v e s in 1 5 7 7 - 8 0 , h o w e v e r , w h e n E n g l a n d , D e n m a r k , s o m e G e r m a n princes, and the D u t c h rebels discussed a Protestant alliance a g a i n s t P h i l i p II. S p a i n h a d t o c o u n t e r t h i s w i t h d i p l o m a c y of its o w n , a n d f o r a t i m e J o h a n III t o o k t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s seriously. H e probably h o p e d that Philip would supply f u n d s to complete Johan's large s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m . If S w e d e n p o s e d a s e r i o u s n a v a l t h r e a t a g a i n s t D e n m a r k , it c o u l d d e t e r F r e d e r i k II f r o m s u p p o r t i n g t h e D u t c h rebels. J o h a n ' s d e c i s i o n t o b r e a k off n e g o t i a t i o n s a b o u t a S p a n i s h n a v a l c o n t r a c t in late 1578 c a m e a f t e r h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h D e n m a r k h a d m a r k edly i m p r o v e d a n d t h e i m m e d i a t e n e e d f o r m o r e m o n e y f o r t h e n a v y h a d disappeared."*^ A f t e r 1578, J o h a n III c o n t i n u e d t h e w a r a g a i n s t R u s s i a in E s t o n i a and

Finland, with

i n c r e a s i n g success. H e b l o c k a d e d

Narva

until

S w e d e n t o o k t h a t p o r t i n 1581. T h e b l o c k a d e w a s n o t total ( J o h a n sold licenses t o t r a d e ) , b u t t h e n a v y h a d t o e n f o r c e it a g a i n s t m a n y active a n d f r e q u e n t l y b e l l i g e r e n t b l o c k a d e - b r e a k e r s f r o m Baltic p o r t s a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e . P r o t e s t s c a m e f r o m several f o r e i g n p o w e r s , i n c l u d i n g E n g l a n d , b u t o n l y D e n m a r k w a s in a p o s i t i o n t o e n f o r c e c o n c e s s i o n s . T h e s e D a n i s h e f f o r t s w e r e l i m i t e d , h o w e v e r , as F r e d e r i k II f o r r e a s o n s of his o w n w i s h e d t o r e s t r a i n t r a d e w i t h Russia. Especially in 1574, large i n c o m e s f r o m c a p t u r e d s h i p s a n d g o o d s w e r e essential in o r d e r t o p r e v e n t a f i n a n c i a l collapse of t h e S w e d i s h a r m y in Estonia."" T h e fleet w a s also active in s u p p o r t i n g t h e a r m y in its w a r , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h

"Depescher fran det spanska sandebudet till Sverige, kapten Francisco de Eraso, 1578-1579", HT, 6, 1886, 1-50; Karl Hildebrand, lohan III och Europas katohka makter, 1568-1580: Studier i 1500-talets politiska historia, Uppsala, 1898, esp. 2 0 9 12; Jham 1960, 73-78; Magdalena de Pazzis Pi Corrales, "La comision' del capitan Francisco de Eraso a Suecia: U n a posible alternativa al conflicto con Flandes", Jose Martinez Millan (ed.), Felipe II (1527-1598): Europa y la Monarqma Catolica, I, Madrid, 1998, 617-30; Concepcion Saenz-Cambra, "Una a r m a d a sueca para Felipe II", Revista Historia Naval, 23, 2005, 71-84. Connections with Johan's Danish policy: Oden 1966, 191-92. The Protestant alliance: Paul Douglas Lockhart, Frederik II and the Protestant Cause: Denmark's role in the Wars of Religion, 1559-1596, Leiden, 2004. D e n m a r k ' s attitude to the Spanish-Swedish negotiations: Jensen 1993. The naval situation in Western Europe in the 1570s: Glete 2000, 151-57. It is possible that a plan f r o m 1578 for how 31 warships should be m a n n e d and provisioned for three m o n t h s is connected to the Spanish negotiations: Ett fdrslag pa mantalet till Kongl Maittz orligz skip anno 1578, S M H F 4:8, RA. Tliirty ships was the n u m b e r usually m e n t i o n e d in the Spanish negotiations. Westling

1919; Attman

1944, 251-96; Oden 1966, 194-97.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

89

attacks o n N a r v a . D u r i n g t h e decisive c a m p a i g n in 1581, it b r o u g h t in soldiers, p r o v i s i o n s , a n d artillery i n a w e l l - t i m e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s f o r t h e siege of N a r v a . N a v a l f o r c e s also s u p p o r t e d t h e a r m y a r o u n d t h e lakes L a d o g a a n d Peipus.'*' W i t h s h a l l o w coastal w a t e r s , a r c h i p e l a g o s , rivers, a n d lakes, t h e t h e atre of o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t R u s s i a w a s ideal f o r o a r e d w a r s h i p s . I n t h e early 1580s, J o h a n b e g a n t o b u i l d a series of galleys, a t y p e of w a r ship f e w of w h i c h h a d b e e n b u i l t s i n c e 1560. By 1590, S w e d e n h a d a r o u n d 30 galleys, at t h a t t i m e t h e f o u r t h largest galley fleet in E u r o p e , after V e n i c e , t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d P h i l i p II's S p a n i s h - I t a l i a n galley force."*® F r o m 1586, a r e d u c t i o n of t h e sailing fleet b e g a n . Several w a r s h i p s w e r e s o l d to r e d u c e d e b t s a n d p a y f o r w a r e f f o r t s in t h e east. The d e c i s i o n t o r e d u c e t h e sailing fleet w a s t a k e n w h e n p e a c e w i t h D e n m a r k s e e m e d s e c u r e a n d a f t e r t h e d e a t h of t h e

naval-minded

F r e d e r i k II i n 1588. H i e r e g e n c y g o v e r n m e n t f o r h i s s o n C h r i s t i a n IV u n t i l 1596 w a s c a u t i o u s in its f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d m a d e s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n s in t h e D a n i s h navy. T h e r e w a s little risk of a D a n i s h n a v a l i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic i n t h e y e a r s a r o u n d 1590, a n d t h a t m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o r e d u c e t h e S w e d i s h sailing fleet. H o w e v e r , a l r e a d y in 1 5 9 1 - 9 2 a m a j o r p r o g r a m of s h i p b u i l d i n g s t a r t e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e Swedish sailing fleet a g a i n . W h e n t h e w a r w i t h R u s s i a s t a r t e d a g a i n i n 1590, t h e galley fleet was t h e m a i n o p e r a t i o n a l n a v a l f o r c e . It t r a n s p o r t e d t r o o p s , g u n s , a n d s u p p h e s a n d c o n t r o l l e d t h e sea a g a i n s t i m p r o v i s e d R u s s i a n forces, b u t it w a s n o t u s e d w i t h m u c h strategic v i s i o n . A r m y off'ensives w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d in a r e a s w h e r e S w e d e n ' s n a v a l s u p e r i o r i t y a n d ability t o s u p p l y t h e a r m y h a d little i m p o r t a n c e . T h e w a r e n d e d w f t h a t r u c e in 1593 a n d a p e a c e in 1595 w h e r e i n R u s s i a a c c e p t e d S w e d e n ' s c o n quests in E s t o n i a a n d t h e F i n n i s h c o l o n i s a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i e s f a r b e y o n d t h e old ( a n d f o r g o t t e n ) b o r d e r of 1323. T h e b o r d e r b e t w e e n S w e d e n a n d Russia w a s e s t a b l i s h e d i n a n o r t h - s o u t h d i r e c t i o n f r o m V i b o r g t o t h e A r c t i c O c e a n , w h e r e S w e d e n also g a i n e d a n i l l - d e f i n e d c l a i m o n a n o r t h e r n coast. R u s s i a also a g r e e d t h a t its t r a d e t h r o u g h t h e G u l f

Ian Glete, "Amphibious W a r f a r e in the Baltic, 1550-1700", in M a r k Charles Fissel and D. J. B. T r i m (eds), Amphibious Warfare, 1000-1700: Commerce, state formation and European expansion, Leiden, 2006, 123-47, esp. 129-30. Zettersten 1890, 324, 336, 366, has, due to misreading of the sources, described lohan Ill's galleys as small vessels intended for an extravagant court life. See Glete 2000b, 43-45. The strength of the galley fleets: Glete 1993, 501-21.

90

CHAPTER TWO

of F i n l a n d s h o u l d b e c h a n n e l l e d t h r o u g h S w e d i s h - c o n t r o l l e d p o r t s . This w a s a n a c c e p t a n c e of t h e fact t h a t S w e d e n c o n t r o l l e d t h e sea a n d c o u l d b l o c k R u s s i a n a t t e m p t s t o t r a d e at t h e N e v a e s t u a r y , w h e r e St P e t e r s b u r g w o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e d m o r e t h a n a c e n t u r y later. S w e d e n ' s p l a n s t o gain c o n t r o l of t h e b u l k of t h e R u s s i a n t r a d e w i t h t h e W e s t w e r e f a r f r o m realised, h o w e v e r . S w e d i s h n a v a l r e a r m a m e n t w a s in full swing, b u t b y 1595 its i m p e t u s w a s a d o m e s t i c crisis r a t h e r t h a n e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s o r a n a m b i t i o u s i m p e r i a l policy.

2.3.4

Dynastic crisis and increased ambitions,

1595-1617

I n o n e r e s p e c t , J o h a n III w a s u n i q u e a m o n g t h e Vasas: h e m a d e a s u c c e s s f u l d y n a s t i c alliance. H i s m a r r i a g e in

1562 w i t h

Katarina,

sister t o S i g i s m u n d A u g u s t , t h e last r u l e r of t h e Jagiello d y n a s t y in P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a , m a d e J o h a n a n d his m a l e d e s c e n d a n t s likely c a n d i d a t e s t o t h e t h r o n e of t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l s t a t e in E a s t e r n E u r o p e . J o h a n ' s P o l i s h r e l a t i o n s m a d e it p o s s i b l e f o r h i m t o s t o p t h e w a r w i t h P o l a n d in 1568 a n d shelve t h e c o n f l i c t a b o u t E s t o n i a . I n 1587, J o h a n ' s a n d K a t a r i n a ' s s o n S i g i s m u n d w a s elected K i n g of P o l a n d a n d G r a n d D u k e of L i t h u a n i a , in c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h a H a b s b u r g c a n d i d a t e . B e c a u s e S i g i s m u n d also w a s h e i r t o t h e S w e d i s h t h r o n e , a p o t e n t i a l l y v e r y p o w e r f u l c o m b i n a t i o n of t e r r i t o r i e s f r o m t h e Black Sea t o t h e A r c t i c s e e m e d possible. O n e of S i g i s m u n d ' s assets as a c a n d i d a t e w a s t h a t m a n y P o l e s b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s S w e d i s h fleet w o u l d p r o v i d e n a v a l s u p p o r t t o P o l a n d in t h e Baltic Sea."*^ There were complications, however. Sigismund had chosen m o t h e r ' s C a t h o l i c religion, o u t of c o n v i c t i o n , n o t as a n

his

opportune

m o v e t o s e c u r e t h e t h r o n e in C a t h o l i c P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a . W h e n h e i n h e r i t e d t h e S w e d i s h t h r o n e in 1592, h i s u n c l e D u k e K a r l m a d e t h e t h r e a t f r o m t h e k i n g ' s r e l i g i o n t o P r o t e s t a n t S w e d e n a n i m p o r t a n t issue in t h e p o w e r s t r u g g l e t h a t f o l l o w e d . Karl, w h o c o n t r o l l e d a d u k e d o m w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s o u r c e s in c e n t r a l S w e d e n , i n t e n d e d t o b e r e g e n t w i t h r o y a l a u t h o r i t y in S w e d e n in S i g i s m u n d ' s a b s e n c e . S i g i s m u n d h a d o t h e r ideas. H e t r i e d t o c o n t r o l S w e d e n f r o m P o l a n d b y a p p o i n t i n g provincial governors a n d military c o m m a n d e r s w h o took their orders f r o m h i m a n d n o t f r o m Karl. I n this way, S i g i s m u n d g a i n e d full c o n t r o l of F i n l a n d a n d t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e m i l i t a r y a n d n a v a l f o r c e s w h i c h h a d

Iham

I960, 46-68. SBL 32, biography of Sigismund by Stefan Ostergren.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

91

b e e n g a t h e r e d t h e r e d u r i n g t h e w a r a g a i n s t Russia. T h e s e f o r c e s w e r e c o m m a n d e d b y t h e dversteamiral

( L o r d H i g h A d m i r a l ) , Klas E r i k s s o n

Fleming. Several s h i p s w e r e b u i l t o r a c q u i r e d in F i n l a n d b e y o n d t h e c o n t r o l of D u k e Karl. U n t i l F l e m i n g ' s d e a t h in 1597, m a n y sea officers m a y h a v e b e e n m o r e loyal t o h i m t h a n t o t h e duke."*® As a d u k e , Karl h a d i n v e s t e d m u c h in s h i p p i n g , t r a d e , a n d i n d u s t r y . H e o w n e d several a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n , w h i c h h e u s e d f o r t r a d e in t h e Baltic Sea a n d t o W e s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d a s h i p y a r d at h i s castle in N y k o p i n g , s o u t h of Stockholm."" F r o m 1593, h e f r e n e t i c a l l y w o r k e d to gain c o n t r o l o v e r t h e r o y a l n a v a l forces, a n d h e t o o k a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l of s h i p b u i l d i n g in t h e w e s t e r n p a r t of t h e r e a l m ( p r e s e n t - d a y Sweden). H e also r e c r u i t e d sea officers willing t o fight f o r h i m a g a i n s t t h e k i n g if n e c e s s a r y . D u r i n g 1597, Karl b e g a n t o u s e his n a v a l f o r c e in a c t i o n s a g a i n s t S i g i s m u n d ' s loyal c o m m a n d e r s in K a l m a r a n d A b o , a l t h o u g h t h e s e i m p o r t a n t castles s o o n r e t u r n e d t o S i g i s m u n d w h e n Karl's l i m i t e d f o r c e s w e r e s o m e w h e r e else. h i 1598, K i n g S i g i s m u n d m a d e a m a j o r e f f o r t t o o u s t Karl f r o m h i s p o s i t i o n s in S w e d e n . H e sailed f r o m D a n z i g w i t h a fleet of h i r e d ships, of w h i c h o n l y a f e w w e r e w a r s h i p s , c a r r y i n g a s m a l l a r m y to b o l s t e r his loyal f o r c e s in S w e d e n . H i s a t t e m p t t o o r d e r t h e m a i n S w e d i s h fleet in S t o c k h o l m t o P o l a n d h a d b e e n politically a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y d e f e a t e d b y D u k e Karl. Several s h i p s i n S t o c k h o l m w e r e s i o n e d in s p r i n g 1598. It is u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h o s e w h o

commisfitted

out

a n d c o m m a n d e d t h e s h i p s b e h e v e d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d sail t o P o l a n d to b r i n g S i g i s m u n d t o S w e d e n o r resist h i m w i t h a r m e d f o r c e , b u t in late J u n e t h e d u k e p e r s u a d e d t h e P a r l i a m e n t t o f o r b i d t h e fleet t o sail

The naval aspects of the political power struggle f r o m 1592 to 1599: Hugo Sommarstrom, Finland under striderna mellan Sigismund och hertig Karl: I, Klas Flemings tid, Stocldiolm, 1935, 118-19, 132-43, 171-78, 184, 187-93, 201-03, 111, 252, 258-60, 264; Pentti Renvall, Klaus Fleming und der Finnische Adel in den Anfangsphasen der Krise der neunziger Jahre des 16. Jahrhunderts, T u r k u , 1939, 2 9 0 99, 343-52, 356-60; Sven Tunberg, Sigismund och Sverige, 1597-1598: Fore andra resan. Samuel Laskis beskickningar, Uppsala, 1917, 3, 9, 25-29, 91-95, 106, 111, 121; Sven Tunberg, Sigismund och Sverige, 1597-1598: 2. Andra resan till Sverige, Uppsala, 1918, 25-31, 47-49, 65, 90; Daniel Toijer, Sverige och Sigismund, 1598-1600: Fordraget i Linkoping - Riksdagen i Linkoping, Stockliolm, 1930, 7, 62-63, 72-83, 87-88, 119-25, 130, 136-37; Sven Ulric Palme, " K o n u n g Sigismunds flotta i Ostersjon 1599", Skrifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska Samfundet, 3, 1943, 3 - 1 9 . Christer O h m a n , Nykoping och hertigdomet, Uppsala, 1973; Lennart Hedberg, Foretagarfursten och framvdxten av den starka staten: Hertig Karls resursexploatering i Ndrke, 1581-1602, Orebro 1995. There is n o study of D u k e Karl's shipping and international trade activities.

92

CHAPTER TWO

t o Poland.^" I n s t e a d , t h e S t o c k h o l m s h i p s w e r e b r o u g h t u n d e r Karl's c o n t r o l a n d j o i n e d his o w n s h i p s f r o m N y k o p i n g . S i g i s m u n d i s s u e d a p r o c l a m a t i o n t o h i s p e o p l e t h a t it w a s t h e d u k e ' s r e f u s a l to s e n d the king's o w n ships and m e n to Poland which h a d forced h i m to c o m e t o h i s c o u n t r y w i t h f o r e i g n s h i p s a n d m e n . ^ ' C o n t r o l of S w e d e n was, as usual, d e p e n d e n t o n b o t h c o n t r o l of t h e sea a n d s u p p o r t f r o m local g r o u p s , i n c l u d i n g local a r m y u n i t s . D u k e Karl u s e d h i s p r i v a t e r e s o u r c e s as a d u k e , his political skill, a n d his l o n g e x p e r i e n c e of t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of t h e S w e d i s h state t o w i n b o t h . It was, h o w e v e r , a p o w e r g a m e w h o s e o u t c o m e w a s f a r f r o m c e r t a i n . N e i t h e r of t h e t w o c o n t e n d e r s w a s w i d e l y p o p u l a r a m o n g t h e elite g r o u p s . I n s u m m e r 1598, a f o r c e of s h i p s c o n t r o l l e d b y S i g i s m u n d ' s a d h e r e n t s w a s in F i n l a n d . It w a s u s e d in a n a t t e m p t t o l a n d a n a r m y f r o m F i n l a n d n o r t h of S t o c k h o l m . This w a s d e f e a t e d b y a n i m p r o v i s e d a r m y a n d b y Karl's fleet, b u t in t h e m e a n t i m e , S i g i s m u n d m a d e a n u n o p p o s e d l a n d i n g at S t e g e b o r g in O s t e r g o t l a n d . P a r t of h i s h i r e d fleet w a s s c a t t e r e d b y b a d w e a t h e r a n d a r r i v e d i n S t o c l d i o l m . This e n a b l e d S i g i s m u n d ' s s u p p o r t e r s t h e r e t o t a k e c o n t r o l of t h e city, b u t n o t t h e fleet. H i s w e a k l y a r m e d fleet w a s n e u t r a l i s e d , h o w e v e r , a f t e r a f e w w e e k s b y Karl's m a i n fleet w h e n it a r r i v e d at t h e c o a s t of O s t e r g o t l a n d . S i g i s m u n d w a s n o w in a p o s i t i o n w h e r e h e m u s t give u p o r fight a decisive b a t t l e o n l a n d t o gain p r o v i s i o n s a n d s h o w u n c o m m i t t e d milit a r y c o m m a n d e r s t h a t he, a n d n o t t h e d u k e , w a s in c o n t r o l of t h e situa t i o n . H e t r i e d a n d lost in t h e b a t t l e of S t a n g e b r o . Sigismund negotiated a truce with the duke and was allowed to use several w a r s h i p s t o sail t o S t o c l d i o l m , w h e r e h e w a s s u p p o s e d t o stay d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r a n d call a P a r l i a m e n t f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e d u k e . I n s t e a d , h e sailed t o P o l a n d , w h e r e s o m e of t h e s h i p s n e x t year were used for an unsuccessful attempt to take Alvsborg f r o m the sea. Karl h a d o n l y c o n t r o l l e d a m i n o r p a r t of t h e S w e d i s h a r m y w h e n t h e c a m p a i g n s t a r t e d , b u t his b e t t e r access t o t h e n a v a l o r g a n i s a t i o n w a s a g r e a t a d v a n t a g e , e n a b l i n g h i m t o k e e p his o p p o n e n t s a p a r t a n d d e f e a t t h e m p i e c e m e a l . W h e n K a r l d u r i n g 1599 c o u l d b r i n g all S w e d i s h naval forces u n d e r his control, he h a d a larger navy t h a n any Swedish

™ SRA, 1:1:4, 709-15, 731. A later pamphlet against D u k e Karl accused h i m of having used physical violence against noblemen w h o in the Parliament opposed his request to deny Sigismund the use of the royal warships: Nils A h n l u n d , Sveriges Riksdag, III; Stdndsriksdagens utdaning 1592-1672, Stockholm, 1933, 63-64. RR 2/8 1598, RA.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

93

ruler b e f o r e h i m . H i s r e g i m e w a s safe f r o m f u r t h e r n a v a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s f r o m Sigismund.®^ In Sigismund's

absence, the Swedish

Parliament

declared

him

d e t h r o n e d , a n d d u r i n g 1 5 9 9 - 1 6 0 0 K a r l t o o k c o n t r o l of F i n l a n d a n d Estonia. T h e P a r l i a m e n t of P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a d e c l a r e d t h a t it d i d n o t give a n y m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t o S i g i s m u n d ' s a s p i r a t i o n s t o r e t u r n

to

Sweden, a n d t h e conflict m i g h t h a v e b e e n s h e l v e d f o r a n i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d . B u t Karl w a s n o t i n t e r e s t e d in t h a t . H i s d o m e s t i c s i t u a t i o n was still i n s e c u r e , a n d it is p o s s i b l e t h a t h e s a w a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a n easy c o n q u e s t if h e r a p i d l y u s e d t h e g r e a t f o r c e s h e h a d g a t h e r e d d u r ing t h e civil w a r . H e d e c i d e d t o l a u n c h a m a j o r o f f e n s i v e i n t o P o l i s h Livonia w i t h t h e largest a r m y S w e d e n h a d ever s e n t a b r o a d . T h e a i m was a m b i t i o u s : t o r e a c h t h e r i v e r D i i n a ( D a u g a v a , D v i n a ) a n d t h e g r e a t t r a d i n g city Riga at its e s t u a r y a n d t o b r i n g all L i v o n i a u n d e r S w e d i s h rule. T h e s m a l l b u t efficient P o l i s h a r m y c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d . T h e w a r in Livonia w e n t o n u n t i l 1609, b u t , in spite of g r e a t efforts, S w e d e n g a i n e d n o t h i n g . S w e d e n ' s n a v a l s u p e r i o r i t y m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o k e e p the w a r o u t s i d e S w e d i s h t e r r i t o r y , t o t r a n s p o r t a r m y f o r c e s a n d p r o v i sions t o Livonia, a n d t o e n f o r c e b l o c k a d e s of Riga a n d o t h e r L i v o n i a n ports, b u t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n of m i l i t a r y a n d n a v a l f o r c e s was u n i n s p i r e d . R e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s to t a k e c o n t r o l of t h e D i i n a e s t u a r y f r o m t h e sea h a d n o l a s t i n g results, a n d t h e S w e d i s h s h i p s a n d a r m y u n i t s w e r e o f t e n n o t able t o m a k e efficient u s e of t h e S w e d i s h c o n t r o l of t h e sea at t h e tactical level. T h e m a i n S w e d i s h a r m y o p e r a t i o n s w e r e l a u n c h e d f r o m E s t o n i a , a t o o s m a l l p r o v i n c e t o serve as a logistical base f o r a m a j o r a r m y , r a t h e r t h a n w i t h f u l l - s c a l e logistical s u p p o r t f r o m S w e d e n a c r o s s t h e sea, w h i c h m i g h t h a v e m a d e it easier t o k e e p up sustained offensives." T h e n a v y of K i n g Karl IX (as t h e d u k e b e c a m e i n 1604) w a s i m p r e s sive in t o n n a g e , b u t it h a d severe s t r u c t u r a l w e a k n e s s e s . Karl d i d n o t acquire g u n s , sail-cloth a n d h e m p in s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s , a n d

he

left several s h i p s i n c o m p l e t e o r u n - r e p a i r e d f o r several years. T h e s e w e a k n e s s e s w e r e r u t h l e s s l y r e v e a l e d w h e n D e n m a r k , u n d e r its n a v a l m i n d e d k i n g C h r i s t i a n IV (r. 1 5 8 8 / 9 6 - 1 6 4 8 ) , a t t a c k e d S w e d e n in 1611. C h r i s t i a n h a d , s i n c e t h e late 1590s, b e e n t e m p t e d t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e volatile political s i t u a t i o n i n S w e d e n , a n d he, a l t h o u g h n o t t h e

" Tlie civil war: Zettersten 1890, 440-46; Barkman 1938-39, 353-87. ' ' The war 1600-10; Zettersten 1890, 44-68; Barkman 1938-39, 439-552.

94

CHAPTER TWO

D a n i s h C o u n c i l , m a y h a v e h a r b o u r e d d r e a m s of a n O l d e n b u r g c o m e b a c k in this c o u n t r y . H i s n a v a l policy, w h i c h r e s u l t e d in a n i n c r e a s e of t h e D a n i s h n a v y a n d a d r a s t i c i n c r e a s e of its artillery d u r i n g t h e first d e c a d e of t h e 17th c e n t u r y , m u s t h o w e v e r also b e seen as a r e s u l t of t h e large e x p a n s i o n of t h e S w e d i s h n a v y s i n c e t h e early 1590s. It s t a r t e d earlier t h a n C h r i s t i a n ' s i n v e s t m e n t s in w a r s h i p s a n d g u n s . B e c a u s e this Swedish naval expansion has n o t been studied by historians, D a n i s h n a v a l p o l i c y h a s b e e n r e g a r d e d as o f f e n s i v e l y o r i e n t a t e d t o w a r d s Baltic s u p r e m a c y , w h i l e it a c t u a l l y w a s n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r n o t t o b e o v e r w h e l m e d b y s h e e r S w e d i s h q u a n t i t a t i v e superiority.'"' C h r i s t i a n w a s also p r o v o k e d b y Karl's o p e n a s p i r a t i o n of s h a r e d c o n t r o l o v e r a p a r t of t h e c o a s t in n o r t h e a s t e r n N o r w a y , w h i c h S w e d e n c l a i m e d t h a t R u s s i a h a d c e d e d in t h e p e a c e of 1595. C h r i s t i a n w a s (or p r e t e n d e d to be) f u r t h e r p r o v o k e d b y t h e S w e d i s h b l o c k a d e of Riga, a p o r t l o c a t e d i n t h e p a r t of t h e Baltic Sea w h e r e D e n m a r k c l a i m e d dominium,

d u e t o t h e D a n i s h p o s s e s s i o n of t h e i s l a n d of O s e l a n d its

s u r r o u n d i n g w a t e r s . A l r e a d y in 1610 h e b r o k e this b l o c k a d e w i t h his fleet. W h e n a p a r t of t h e S w e d i s h a r m y f r o m 1609 w a s s e n t t o Russia, i n v o l v e d in t h e R u s s i a n civil w a r . C h r i s t i a n I V s a w a c h a n c e t o m a k e a s u c c e s s f u l s u r p r i s e a t t a c k . It w a s m a d e easier b y t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y e r r a t i c b e h a v i o u r of t h e ailing K a r l IX, w h o u n d e r e s t i m a t e d D e n m a r k a n d t r i e d t o k e e p all a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e i n s in h i s o w n h a n d s . " T h e D a n i s h - S w e d i s h W a r of 1 6 1 1 - 1 3 ( t h e K a l m a r W a r ) w a s d o m i n a t e d b y t h e S w e d i s h inability t o m a k e u s e of n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y o n l a n d a n d sea e v e n i n a d e f e n s i v e w a r . D a n i s h m i l i t a r y a n d n a v a l f o r c e s w e r e well a r m e d , efficiently c o o r d i n a t e d , a n d d e p l o y e d i n a c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r m t h a t d e f e a t e d t h e S w e d i s h efforts. C h r i s t i a n also w a s able t o e x p l o i t s u r p r i s e a n d Karl's u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o realise t h e s i t u a t i o n . C h r i s t i a n c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s first o f f e n s i v e in s p r i n g 1611 o n K a l m a r , w h i c h w a s t a k e n a f t e r a siege f r o m l a n d a n d a b l o c k a d e f r o m sea c u t off s u p p l i e s t o t h e g a r r i s o n . T h e D a n i s h fleet also w a s u s e d t o t r a n s port m o r e a r m y forces to Kalmar w h e n Swedish a r m y counterattacks b e c a m e t h r e a t e n i n g . A r o u n d 30 p e r c e n t of t h e S w e d i s h fleet h a d b e e n laid u p in t h a t p o r t a n d h a d t o b e s c u t t l e d in o r d e r t o a v o i d c a p t u r e . T h e n a v a l f o r c e s in S t o c k h o l m a n d N y k o p i n g w e r e m o b i l i s e d in a p i e c e m e a l f a s h i o n a n d w e r e u n a b l e t o k e e p t h e lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n

Bellamy 2006, 135-61, 275-79.>Danish ordnance: Mortensen Background to the war; Palme 1942.

1999, 285-87.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

95

w i t h K a l m a r o p e n . Several S w e d i s h s h i p s w e r e n e v e r s e n t t o sea d u r ing 1611 b e c a u s e t h e y l a c k e d sails, rigging, a n d cables. In 1612, C h r i s t i a n l a u n c h e d a m a j o r a m p h i b i o u s a t t a c k o n

spring

Alvsborg

( G o t h e n b u r g ) at t h e S w e d i s h w e s t coast, w h i c h w a s t a k e n w i t h f u r t h e r loss of S w e d i s h w a r s h i p s in t h e p o r t . N o relief a r m y a r r i v e d in t i m e , possibly b e c a u s e t h e a t t a c k f r o m t h e sea h a d b e e n easy to c o n c e a l u n t i l t h e last m i n u t e . T h e S w e d i s h n a v y t h r o u g h o u t 1611 a n d 1612 w a s u n a b l e to f o r m a c o n c e n t r a t e d b a t t l e fleet s t r o n g e n o u g h t o l a u n c h a c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e in D a n i s h w a t e r s o r e v e n fight t h e D a n i s h fleet w h e n it a p p e a r e d in t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic. T h e i r s u p p l y of e q u i p m e n t , g u n s , a n d m e n w a s insufficient. I n a c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , t h i s s h o w s t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l a c h i e v e m e n t b e h i n d t h e s u c c e s s f u l S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleet p o l i c y of t h e 1560s. P e a c e w a s c o n c l u d e d in 1613, a n d S w e d e n h a d t o p a y a large r a n s o m t o r e g a i n A l v s b o r g a n d h a d t o r e n o u n c e its c l a i m s o n a n Arctic coast in n o r t h e r n N o r w a y . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e D a n i s h w a r effort h a d b e e n h a l t e d as s o o n as c e r t a i n a d v a n t a g e s h a d b e e n g a i n e d , a policy t h a t h a d b e e n d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c a u t i o u s D a n i s h C o u n c i l a n d rising f i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e m e r c e n a r y soldiers. D e n m a r k m a d e n o a t t e m p t t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h S w e d i s h p o s i t i o n s in t h e e a s t e r n Baltic, a n d S w e d e n d i d n o t recall its e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e in Russia, w h i c h d u r ing 1611 h a d m a j o r successes, p r i m a r i l y t h e c o n q u e s t s of t h e K e x h o l m fortress a n d t h e large city of Novgorod.'® Peace w i t h D e n m a r k a n d a t r u c e w i t h P o l a n d e n a b l e d t h e

new

Swedish k i n g , Karl's s o n G u s t a v II A d o l f (r. 1 6 1 1 - 3 2 ) , t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e R u s s i a n w a r . It w a s a c o n t i n e n t a l w a r , a l t h o u g h t h e n a v y s e c u r e d t h e Gulf of F i n l a n d , t h e rivers a n d t h e lakes i n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l area, a n d m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o s u p p l y t h e a r m y d e e p i n t o R u s s i a n t e r r i t o r y . Peace w a s c o n c l u d e d in 1617 w h e n R u s s i a h a d t o c e d e I n g r i a a n d t h e K e x h o l m p r o v i n c e , t h u s l o s i n g c o n t a c t w i t h t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d a n d c o n t r o l of t h e river N e v a . " T h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r s w i t h R u s s i a s i n c e 1570, S w e d e n h a d b e e n able t o c o n t r o l all sea lines of o p e r a t i o n in t h e area, a strategic, logistical, a n d tactical a d v a n t a g e w h i c h gave t h e

Sveriges krig 1611-1632, I, Stockholm, 1936; Sveriges Sjokrig, 63-122; Niels M. Probst, Christian 4.s fldde: Den danske flddes historic, 1588-1660, Copenhagen, 1996, 107-22. " Helge Almqvist, Sverige och Ryssland, 1595-1611: Tvisten om Estland, Forbundet mot Polen, de ryska grdnslandens erofring och den stora dynastiska planen, Stockholm, 1907; Sveriges krig, I, 360, 380, 385, 479, 504-5, 514; Sveriges sjokrig, 1611-1632, 122-30.

96

CHAPTER TWO

a r m y leverage in fights a g a i n s t larger R u s s i a n forces. R u s s i a d e v e l o p e d n o n a v a l p o l i c y o r n a v a l f o r c e s of its o w n , a fact w h i c h s h o w s t h a t n a v a l f o r c e s w e r e f a r f r o m s e l f - e v i d e n t . P o l a n d h a d also, u n t i l t h e n , f o l l o w e d t h e s a m e passive p o l i c y o n t h e sea. F o r S w e d e n , w i t h g r e a t a m b i t i o n s b u t l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s , it r e m a i n e d t o d e v e l o p o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y t h a t m a d e full u s e of t h e a d v a n t a g e at sea t h a t e n e m i e s w i t h f a r s u p e r i o r p o t e n t i a l r e s o u r c e s left t o S w e d e n . C h r i s t i a n I V ' s o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t K a l m a r a n d A l v s b o r g in 1 6 1 1 - 1 2 h a d b e e n i n t e r e s t i n g d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of h o w l i m i t e d b u t skilled a r m y a n d n a v a l forces, u n d e r t h e d i r e c t c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e k i n g , c o u l d s u c c e e d in c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n s . A n u n i n t e n d e d result of this m a y h a v e b e e n t h a t it gave t h e y o u n g a n d i n n o v a t i v e G u s t a v II A d o l f f o o d f o r t h o u g h t a b o u t h o w h e s h o u l d c o n q u e r t h e Baltic.

2.3.5 The amphibious 1617-1645

navy and the creation of the Baltic

empire,

G u s t a v II A d o l f is k n o w n p r i m a r i l y as a n a r m y r e f o r m e r of E u r o p e a n i m p o r t a n c e a n d a n a r m y c o m m a n d e r w i t h g r e a t strategic, o p e r a t i o n a l , a n d tactical capability. I n E u r o p e a n h i s t o r y h e is r e m e m b e r e d f o r h i s brief p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e T h i r t y Years W a r , f r o m 1630 t o 1632. I n t h e Baltic, w h e r e h e a c t u a l l y s p e n t n e a r l y all his active life as a r u l e r a n d c o m m a n d e r , h e o u g h t t o b e r e m e m b e r e d as t h e i n n o v a t i v e o r g a n i s e r of g r e a t a m p h i b i o u s e x p e d i t i o n s a n d a t y p e of w a r f a r e in w h i c h t h e s m a l l e r p o w e r s u c c e s s f u l l y u s e d t h e a d v a n t a g e of c o n t r o l l i n g t h e sea lines of o p e r a t i o n s . H e d i d n o t o v e r l o o k t h e fact t h a t t h e n a v y m u s t b e able t o act as a c o n c e n t r a t e d b a t t l e fleet. G u s t a v A d o l f r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e g u n p o w e r of his n a v y h a d t o b e s t r e n g t h e n e d a n d t h a t it r e q u i r e d m o r e sea officers a n d s e a m e n if it s h o u l d b e able t o fight t h e D a n i s h n a v y , t h e s m a l l b u t g r o w i n g n a v y of S i g i s m u n d i n D a n z i g , o r t h e S p a n i s h I m p e r i a l H a b s b u r g fleet, w h i c h a p p e a r e d in t h e Baltic in t h e 1620s. B u t t h e c o n c r e t e w a r e f f o r t s h e o r g a n i s e d w e r e of a d i f f e r e n t type.'®

^^ The literature about the wars and military reforms of Gustav II Adolf is vast. Sveriges krig, 1611-1632, 6 vols and 2 supplementary vols (including Sveriges sjokrig, 1611-1632), Stockholm, 1936-39 is still essential. A classical synthesis in English, Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A history of Sweden, 1611-1632, 2 vols, London, 1953-58. A m o d e r n biography, Sverker Oredsson, Gustav II Adolf, Stockholm, 2007, Tlie power struggle f r o m a Danish point of view: Tandrup 1979; Paul Douglas Lockhart, Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648: King Christian IV and the decline of the Oldenburg state, Selinsgrove, 1996. The Polish perspective: Frost 2000, 102-55. Sweden's foreign policy: Tham 1960, Axel Norberg, Polen i svensk politik, 1617-26,

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

97

G u s t a v A d o l f i n t e n d e d t o fight in P o l a n d ' s m a r i t i m e f r i n g e s in t h e Baltic: Livonia, C o u r l a n d , a n d P r u s s i a , r e g i o n s d o m i n a t e d b y G e r m a n a n d L u t h e r a n elite g r o u p s . It w a s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p o w e r - p r o j e c t i o n policy a g a i n s t t e r r i t o r i e s in t h e e a s t e r n Baltic, w h i c h h i s p r e d e c e s sors h a d f o l l o w e d , b u t t h e r e w a s a n e w o p e r a t i o n a l d o c t r i n e . I n s t e a d of u s i n g t h e n a v y o n l y as a t r a n s p o r t a n d logistical f o r c e , sailing w i t h men, munitions, and provisions f r o m one Swedish-controlled port to a n o t h e r , h e also u s e d it as a n a m p h i b i o u s assault f o r c e a g a i n s t m a j o r e n e m y t a r g e t s of g r e a t strategic i m p o r t a n c e . S u c c e s s f u l

combined

o p e r a t i o n s w e r e to b e decisive f o r S w e d i s h ability t o gain c o n t r o l o v e r t h e Baltic. A r m y e x p a n s i o n a n d r e f o r m s h a d p r i o r i t y , a n d t h e results w e r e s o o n impressive. T h e a r m y h a d b e e n p e r m a n e n t s i n c e t h e r e i g n of G u s t a v I, b u t it w a s n o w given a p e r m a n e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of c o m p a n i e s a n d r e g i m e n t s . Its r e g i o n a l r e c r u i t m e n t w a s o r g a n i s e d

more

systematically, p r i m a r i l y b y giving t h e n e w r e g i m e n t s a d i s t i n c t p r o vincial identity. T h e

flexibility,

firepower,

a n d o f f e n s i v e c a p a c i t y of its

tactical u n i t s w a s m a r k e d l y i n c r e a s e d . R e f o r m s of t h e n a v y p r i m a r i l y a i m e d at m a k i n g it m o r e efficient as a c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r c e at sea f r o m s p r i n g t o a u t u m n a n d as a n a m p h i b i o u s assault force. S m a l l galleys a n d o t h e r light c r a f t w e r e b u i l t in series t o p r o v i d e t h e s o l d i e r s w i t h tactical m o b i l i t y a n d fire s u p p o r t in t h e s h a l l o w w a t e r s , rivers, deltas, a n d s h e l t e r e d w a t e r s w h i c h a r e typical f o r t h e e a s t e r n a n d s o u t h e r n coasts of t h e Baltic Sea. A n early o p e r a t i o n of t h i s t y p e w a s l a u n c h e d already in 1617, w h e n t h e fleet a n d a n a r m y f o r c e t o o k P e r n a u a n d D i i n a m i i n d e b y s u r p r i s e . O n l y P e r n a u c o u l d b e k e p t , b u t this w a s a successful o p e r a t i o n w i t h l i m i t e d m e a n s . ' ' The

first

of G u s t a v A d o l f ' s m a j o r a m p h i b i o u s

operations

was

l a u n c h e d i n 1621 w i t h 11,000 s o l d i e r s a n d t h e e n t i r e navy. T h e t a r g e t

Stockholm, 1974. The Swedish peasants and the state during the period of increased resource extraction for war: Johan Holm, Konstruktionen av en stormakt: Kungamakt, skattebdnder och statsbildning, 1595-1640, Stockholm, 2007. Conscription a n d its socioeconomic consequences: Jan Lindegren, Utskrivning och utsugning: Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdea, 1620-1640, Uppsala, 1980; Nils Erik Villstrand, Anpassning eller protest: Lokalsamhdllet infor utskrivningarna avfotfolk till den svenska krigsmakten, 1620-1679, Abo, 1992. Army reforms: Bertil C:son Barkman, Gustav II Adolfs regementsorganisation vid det inhemska infanteriet: En studie over organisationens tillkomst och huvuddra^ gen av dess utveckling mot bakgrunden av kontinental organisation, Stockholm, 1931. Amphibious warfare 1617-30: Glete 2006, 132-37, 140-41. The operation in 1617: Sveriges krig, II, 29-45, Sveriges sjokrig, 131-37.

98

CHAPTER TWO

w a s Riga, a city f a r l a r g e r t h a n S t o c k h o l m . It c a p i t u l a t e d a f t e r a siege of six weeks. N e x t y e a r t h e o p e r a t i o n c o n t i n u e d w i t h a n o f f e n s i v e a l o n g t h e D i i n a River. H i e Riga o p e r a t i o n w a s t h e largest c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n u n d e r t a k e n in t h e Baltic u p to t h e n , a n d it s t a r t e d a d e c a d e of m a j o r S w e d i s h p o w e r - p r o j e c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s b a s e d o n t h e n e w ability of t h e a r m y a n d n a v y t o c o o p e r a t e o p e r a t i o n a l l y b o t h o n t h e strategic a n d t h e tactical level. P a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n m a y h a v e b e e n a u n i f i e d c o m m a n d , b e c a u s e G u s t a v II A d o l f p e r s o n a l l y led all m a j o r c o m b i n e d operations.® The n e w confidence in Sweden's a m p h i b i o u s c a p a b i l i t y w a s s h o w n in 1624 w h e n a s e r i o u s political crisis d e v e l o p e d between D e n m a r k and Sweden. D e n m a r k was u n p r e p a r e d for war, w h i l e S w e d e n h a d a large a r m y (38,500 m e n ) a n d t h e w h o l e n a v y in r e a d i n e s s f o r a n assault. A s G u s t a v A d o l f e m b a r k e d t h e m a i n fleet a n d h e l d 13,000 s o l d i e r s r e a d y t o sail w i t h it, t h e t a r g e t f o r t h e p l a n n e d offensive m u s t have been the S o u n d a n d C o p e n h a g e n . Christian IV realised t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d m a d e concessions.''' T h e n e w S w e d i s h a m p h i b i o u s c a p a b i l i t y w a s a m a j o r political a n d s t r a t e g i c asset. If Riga c o u l d b e t a k e n a n d D e n m a r k f o r c e d t o m a k e c o n c e s s i o n s u n d e r t h r e a t , a n y city o r r e g i o n o n t h e Baltic Sea w a s o p e n to threats or protective efforts f r o m Sweden. In a b r o a d e r perspective, t h e S w e d i s h c a p a b i l i t y m a d e it n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e Baltic p o w e r s t o either s u b m i t to Swedish imperial ambitions or create strong

fiscal-

m i l i t a r y states of t h e i r o w n in o r d e r to resist t h e S w e d i s h a m b i t i o n s . B o t h policies w e r e u s e d d u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g c e n t u r y , w h i c h s a w t h e rise a n d fall of S w e d i s h Baltic i m p e r i a l i s m . Its rise w a s d e p e n d e n t o n t h e ability t o l a u n c h c o n c e n t r a t e d a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n s f o r o f f e n c e a n d d e f e n c e ; its l i m i t s d e p e n d e d o n t h e n e i g h b o u r s ' ability t o resist s u c h o p e r a t i o n s w i t h m i l i t a r y a n d n a v a l m e a n s of t h e i r o w n . T h e e n d of t h e S w e d i s h Baltic e m p i r e w a s t h e rise of R u s s i a n s u p e r i o r i t y in archipelagic a m p h i b i o u s operations. The next m a j o r Swedish c o m b i n e d operations were directed against Polish-controlled Prussia a n d the Vistula estuary. The intention was to gain control over the economically i m p o r t a n t Polish grain export a n d t o b l o c k a d e t h e n a s c e n t P o l i s h fleet. A n a r m y of a r o u n d 14,000 m e n a n d t h e m a j o r p a r t of t h e fleet w i t h m o r e s o l d i e r s t o f o l l o w w e r e i n v o l v e d . A f t e r t h e initial p h a s e of S w e d i s h success, t h e P o l i s h r e s i s t a n c e

"

Sveriges krig, II, 68-95; Sveriges sjokrig, 137-42. Sveriges krig, II, 157-65; Sveriges sjokrig, 152-54; Tandrup,

II, 265-360.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

99

m a r k e d l y i n c r e a s e d . F r o m 1626 t o 1629, S w e d e n a n d P o l a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d t h e i r r e s o u r c e s t o a w a r of a t t r i t i o n in P r u s s i a . O n t h e S w e d i s h side t h e c a m p a i g n r e t a i n e d m u c h of its a m p h i b i o u s c h a r a c t e r , i n v o l v ing m a j o r p a r t s of t h e navy.®^ D u r i n g 1628, t h e g r e a t w a r in G e r m a n y s p r e a d t o t h e Baltic Sea. The I m p e r i a l a n d C a t h o l i c a r m y , w h i c h h a d d e f e a t e d t h e D a n i s h a n d German Protestant armies and occupied Jutland, began to organise a S p a n i s h - f u n d e d fleet in W i s m a r a n d s t a r t e d a siege o n P r o t e s t a n t Stralsund.*^^ D a n i s h a n d S w e d i s h t r o o p s a n d w a r s h i p s w e r e s e n t t o d e f e n d t h a t city, a n d a large-scale I m p e r i a l siege o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t it failed. S w e d e n w a s n o w i n v o l v e d in t h e G e r m a n w a r , a n d G u s t a v II Adolf s a w t h e rise of a H a b s b u r g fleet in t h e Baltic Sea as a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t h a t m u s t b e e l i m i n a t e d . I n w i n t e r 1629, P o l a n d s e n t its fleet f r o m D a n z i g t o W i s m a r , w h e r e it w a s p l a c e d u n d e r H a b s b u r g c o n t r o l ; a n d d u r i n g 1629, P o l a n d r e c e i v e d h e l p f r o m t h e I m p e r i a l a r m y a g a i n s t S w e d e n in P r u s s i a . This h e l p h a d n o effect, a n d w i t h little h o p e of further help f r o m the Habsburgs, the Polish-Lithuanian nobility was n o l o n g e r willing t o s u p p o r t S i g i s m u n d ' s w a r e f f o r t s a g a i n s t his old c o u n t r y . D u r i n g 1629, D e n m a r k c o n c l u d e d p e a c e w i t h t h e e m p e r o r while S w e d e n a n d P o l a n d c o n c l u d e d a t r u c e , w h i c h left S w e d e n i n c o n t r o l of Livonia a n d , f o r six years, also in c o n t r o l of p a r t of P r u s s i a a n d t h e s u b s t a n t i a l i n c o m e s f r o m tolls o n P o l i s h g r a i n exports.'^"' This released t h e S w e d i s h a r m y a n d n a v y f o r a p o s s i b l e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e German W a r without any interference f r o m Poland. The m o s t s u i t a b l e a r e a f o r a m a j o r a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n w a s t h e O d e r estuary. O d e r w a s t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f o r a p e n e t r a t i o n of G e r m a n y f r o m t h e Baltic Sea a n d g e o g r a p h i c a l c o n d i t i o n s in its e s t u a r y w e r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e i n P r u s s i a t o w h i c h t h e S w e d i s h forces w e r e u s e d . T h e e n e m y h a d ( n o m i n a l l y ) m o r e t h a n 50,000 m e n , a n d G u s t a v A d o l f p l a n n e d t o l a u n c h a n i n v a s i o n w i t h a r o u n d 38,000 soldiers. It w a s n e c e s s a r y t o l a n d w i t h a s t r o n g c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r c e ,

® Sveriges krig, II, 236--301; Sveriges sjokrig, 159-98. " Jonathan I. Israel, "The Pohtics of International T r a d e Rivalry d u r i n g the Thirty Years War: Gabriel de Roy and Olivares' mercantilist projects, 1621 -1645", International History Review, 8, 1986, 517-49; Michal W a n n e r , "Albrecht of Wallenstein as 'General of the Oceans and the Baltic Seas' a n d the N o r t h e r n Maritime Plan", Forum Navale, 64, 2008, 8 - 3 3 . Danish naval operations in 1628-29: Probst 1996, 173-84, Einar W e n d t , Det svenska licentvasendet i Preussen, 1627-1635, Uppsala, 1933; Klaus-Richard Bohme, Die schwedische Besetzung des Weichseldeltas, 1626-1636, Wiirzburg, 1963.

100

C H A P T E R THREE

almost 14,000 and build up strength in the bridgehead by faster concentration of resources by the sea than the enemy could achieve on land. This operation, which involved the entire Swedish navy and a large number of hired transports, was successfully executed during the summer 1630. By September 1630, the Swedish army in Germany was strong enough to start offensive operations against the Imperial and Catholic forces. Hie last and most important of Gustav Adolf's combined operations and one of the largest ever undertaken in early modern Europe had been concluded.®® Swedish offensive warfare in the Baltic f r o m 1621 to 1630 thus had been highly amphibious. Strategically, the ability to make amphibious assaults resulted in that Gustav Adolf could choose areas of operation that suited his political intentions and military resources. Riga and the Diina line proved superior to Estonia for the conquest of Livonia; the Weichsel (Vistula) estuary and the Polish grain export provided Sweden with incomes and was important enough for the PoUsh nobility to force them to mobilise major resources for expensive counteroffensives. Sweden's ability to remain in Prussia with support from the sea—at a heavy cost in soldiers' lives—made the grain-exporting Polish nobility impatient with their Swedish king Sigismund and his dynastic quarrels, and he was forced to sign a truce with territorial losses. Finally, the ability to land and concentrate a large army on the open coast of Germany made it possible to intervene in the German War without any German ally who might have provided ports and a sufficient base area. Since 1628, Sweden had a bridgehead in Germany in Stralsund, but a landing of the whole army in that city was not reaUstic because of logistical problems. Operationally, the Swedish armed forces could use their long experience of amphibious and riverine warfare. The navy had developed suitable shallow-draught vessels and know-how about troop transport; the army knew the conditions on board ships and how to land large forces and quicldy gather the soldiers back into coherent fighting units. Cooperation between light naval craft and army units became routine. Logistically, the Swedish military administration had learnt how large

^^ The strength of the first force that landed has in the literature often been erroneously quoted as the entire Swedish invasion force, for example in Richard Bonney, The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660, Oxford, 1991, 195; Lockhart 2004, 50. Tlie figures are real strength during musters of regiments m a d e in May a n d June 1630. ® Sveriges krig, III, esp. 340-48, 380-444; Sveriges sjokrig, 206-21,

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

101

forces (close to 20,000 men, including the crews of the ship) should be concentrated to Stockholm during springs and be ready to sail with enough provisions to feed the troops during the early phase of the landing. Before the 1610s, this had often proved to be impossible even with smaller forces, and amphibious operations had been cancelled or delayed until late summer when the operational season was close to an end. The challenging administrative task was to concentrate a large number of ships (expensive to keep in service), conscripted Swedish soldiers (likely to desert), foreign mercenaries (unwilling to fight when not regularly paid), and provisions for a large force in the months of May and June, when the agriculturally poor Sweden often had little food left. The army and navy had then to sail across the Baltic as a coherent force, able to carry out offensive operations immediately after landing. In an international perspective, these amphibious operations were not unique. Sixteenth—and 17th-century Medfterranean warfare was often amphibious, and the Iberian powers, the English, and the Dutch frequently made amphibious assaults in their wars in America, Asia, and Africa. The Spanish-Portuguese reconquest of Bahia in 1625 was an operation involving about the same number of soldiers as the Swedish conquest of Riga in 1621. Most of these operations, however, were directed against islands or cities without much military support from the surrounding territory. The Swedish operations were unusual because it was the main army that was lifted to a new area of operation by the sea. They were also sustained for years by supply and reinforcements sent by sea. In spite of the fact that the Polish and German enemies could concentrate men and munitions f r o m wide territories for counterattacks, supply from the sea proved able to sustain the Swedish army in the invaded area.®^ In September 1631, Gustav Adolf won the battle of Breftenfeld, and his operations in Germany became successful beyond the most optimistic dreams. In early 1632 Wismar fell, and with that port the entire Habsburg fleet in the Baltic Sea was captured. It might have been natural if the king's interest in the navy had lessened when its control of the Baltic was secured and his campaign in central and southern Germany reached its climax. Instead, his naval ambitions markedly increased. During 1630 to 1632, he ordered m a n y new ships to be built, that the

Glete 2000, 93-111, 157-64, 169-77.

102

C H A P T E R THREE

oak forests in occupied Livonia and Prussia should be exploited for that purpose, and that new construction should be concentrated on large ships for a naval war with Spain, which he began planning. The latter idea seems to have been based on his (not unfounded) belief that Spain was the origin of Habsburg power in Germany and that a Swedish-Spanish conflict was probable in the near future. Possibly he thought that new resources extracted from Germany would be available for this very ambitious naval policy. He hoped to start a smallscale naval war against Spain in 1633. The Swedish Council, which was more worried than enthusiastic about the Spanish project, was in fact discussing it at the time they received the news that Gustav Adolf had been killed in combat at Lixtzen in November 1632. The change in naval policy was immediate. Most new ships on order that were not yet begun were cancelled, as were the plans for a naval war against Spain.^'' For several years, new construction for the navy was at a low level. This does not mean that the regency government for Queen Christina, which ruled Sweden f r o m 1632 to 1644, neglected the navy. The Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna was personally interested in naval organisation and in the development of Swedish maritime trade, and in this he seems to have been representative of several aristocrats. In 1637, Sweden even started a colonial adventure in Delaware as a concrete example of its increased mercantile ambitions outside the Baltic.® During the regency years the Council expressed no opinion that the navy should be reduced. After 1632, the recruitment of seamen, still a weak point in the Swedish naval organisation, was a top priority. The regency government even decided that the army had to give up certain areas of soldier recruitment in favour of the navy, an interesting policy in a period when the army but not the navy was engaged in a great war on the continent. Dutch sea officers were recruited for employment in the Swedish navy f r o m the mid-1630s, even though they were not needed for any immediate war. Naval operations before 1644 mainly consisted of troop transport and routine sea control operations in the Baltic and naval support to the Swedish army in northern Germany. Any hngering possibility that Spanish naval forces might penetrate the

Gustav II A d o l f s naval policy in 1631-32: see chapter 5. The Council's discussion of a naval war against Spain 6/12 a n d 7/12 1632: SRP 2, 243-51. "" Stellan Dahlgren and H a n s N o r m a n , The Rise and Fall of New Sweden, Stockholm, 1988.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

103

Baltic to support the Catholic side in the German War vanished when the Dutch won a crushing naval victory over Spain in 1639/° Tliat did not influence Swedish naval policy at all. The navy was in fact kept strong for another possible war, a showdown with Christian IV's Denmark. Even when Sweden and Denmark were not at war with each other, they competed for supremacy in the southern Baltic. If one power gained control over territories in the eastern Baltic or northern Germany its power position increased in relation to the other." Sweden had by the early 1640s achieved a military position that made it probable that it would control parts of the southern coast of the Baltic Sea in any future German peace treaty. For Christian IV, this was worrying, because any such Swedish military and naval bases would be a constant threat to Denmark.^^ He oriented his policy closer to Sweden's Habsburg enemies. In order to finance increased armed forces, he enforced his Sound Toll policy more aggressively, which made him disliked in both Sweden and the Dutch Republic. These two powers formed a defensive alliance in 1640 primarily as a reaction to this policy. For the Swedish government, the possibility of creating an empire in the southern Baltic stimulated ideas about a Swedish conquest of eastern Denmark in order to reach the Sound and forge a closer contact with the new territories in Germany. Sweden had controlled Skane, Halland, and Blekinge (eastern Denmark) for a short period in the 14th century (1332-60), and their "reconquest" had been on the agenda of some later Swedish rulers. Denmark and Christian IV also had a bitter personal enemy in Axel Oxenstierna, and the Chancellor probably hoped to defeat Denmark before he had to hand over power to Queen Christina in late 1644. Unlike Gustav Adolf in 1624, he did not use war as a threat in his negotiations with Christian, who after all once had yielded to such a threat. Oxenstierna did not strive for a

™ Glete 2000, 180-85. " This aspect of Swedish-Danish relations is central in Tandrup 1979. For a survey in English concentrating on the 1620s: K n u d J. V. Jespersen, "Riva ry W i t h o u t Victory: Denmark, Sweden and the struggle for the Baltic, 1500-1720", in Goran Rystad, KlausR. Bohme, and Wilhehn M. Carlgren, (eds), In Quest of Trade and Security: The Baltic in power politics, 1500-1990, I; 1500-1890, Stockliolm, 1994, 132-76. In a discussion in the Council on 16/5 1643 about a Danish war and the Swedish conditions for a peace in Germany, Axel Oxenstierna stated that the most i m p o r t a n t argument for keeping Pomerania was that Swedish bases there m a d e it easy to reach the Danish isles with a seaborne invasion. He stressed the difficulties of achieving that from bases in Sweden, SRP 10, 154.

104

C H A P T E R THREE

diplomatic triumph; he desired a war of conquest. The final decision for an offensive war was taken in autumn 1643." Hie main features of the operation were that the Swedish field army in Germany should move northward and attack Jutland; the Swedish home army should attack Skane and Halland; while the Swedish navy and an auxiliary fleet of armed merchantmen hired by the arms merchant Louis De Geer in IHfolland should take control of the Danish straits. The total Swedish occupation of Denmark would then be possible and Christian IV would be forced to make major territorial concessions. It was the concept of amphibious power projection once again, but because the Swedish attack on Jutland started in late 1643, the Danes had time to mobilise their fleet before the Swedish fleet arrived in Danish waters. The naval operations of summer 1644 showed that the Swedish fleet, although superior in size to the Danish, could not gain undisputed control of the Danish straits. The problems were tactical as well as logistical. Tlie battle with the Danish main fleet ended in a draw, and it was followed by a period during which the appearance of the Imperial army in Holstein and the lack of provisions made offensive Swedish operations impossible. The fleet returned to Stockholm, but in the autumn 1644 a selected part of it, combined with the hired Dutch merchantmen, inflicted a crushing defeat on a m u c h reduced Danish operational fleet. By that time, the Swedish army in Germany had turned south to fight the Imperial forces, and there was no immediate possibility of inflicting a total defeat of Denmark. Denmark had lost control of the straits, however, and was open to both invasion and naval aggression, which in 1645 also came from the Dutch navy, which forced the defeated Danes to reduce the Sound Toll. Denmark was partially occupied, the incomes from the Sound Toll were much reduced, and the Danish navy had lost control of the home waters. In order to get peace. Christian IV had to concede substantial territories to Sweden: the islands of Gotland and Osel, Halland (for 30 years), and the inland Norwegian provinces Jamtland and Hiirjedalen. The traditional Swedish freedom from the Sound Toll was extended to ships from

" There are no m a j o r works on a r m y operations d u r i n g the Swedish-Danish W a r of 1643-45, but the broad survey of the pohtical, naval, and military history of the war in Munthe 1905-10 is still useful. The latest Danish studies of this war; Lind 1994, 76-82, 197-207, 331-37; Probst 1996, 227-56.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

105

all Baltic and German provinces conquered by Sweden; a sign that Sweden had a maritime policy for its new Baltic empire. 2.3-6

Western naval power in the Baltic,

1645-1660

The peace of Westphalia in 1648 formalised Sweden's control over most of Pomerania including Stettin and Stralsund, the island of Riigen, the important port Wismar in Mecldenburg, and the Duchies of Bremen and Verden, the latter taken f r o m the Oldenburgs in 1645. Sweden had become a great power with permanent commitments on the European continent. Sweden now had good bases against Denmark in the southern Baltic but also scattered territories, which required control of the sea to defend. The navy needed to control the southern Baltic if this empire was to survive and if Sweden was to remain a power on the European continent. Sweden had also acquired several German and eastern Baltic ports with considerable shipping and maritime trade, and Stockholm had grown into an important centre for large-scale Swedish export and import.^"* This Baltic Sea was also a part of the new Dutch economic empire, however. Dutch shipping had been important in the late medieval Baltic, and during the 16th century the rise of Nordic sea power and the elimination of the Hanse as an armed trade cartel had made it safe, cheap, and easy for the Dutch to sail in the Baltic. Both Nordic states were, on the whole, positive about the rise of the Dutch, a Protestant power with no territorial ambitions in the Baltic. By the end of the 16th century, Dutch merchants dominated trade through this sea, and Sweden began to benefit f r o m Dutch investments and competence in industry and trade. At the same time, Swedish mercantile shipping reached a nadir. It could not compete with the cheap and efficient Dutch shipping services, even though it was exempt from the Sound

''' Swedish foreign policy: Georg Landberg, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 1:3, 1648-1697, Stockliolm, 1952, 49-80; Sven Ingemar Olofsson, Efter Westfaliska freden: Sveriges yttre politik, 1650-1654, Stockholm, 1957; Bertil Rimborg, Magnus Durell och Danmark: Studier i information, Gothenburg, 1997. " Aksel E. Christensen, Dutch Trade to the Baltic about 1600: Studies in the Sound Toll Register and Dutch shipping records, Copenhagen, 1941; Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740, Oxford, 1989; Anja Tjaden, "The D u t c h in the Baltic, 1560-1720"; in Rystad et al. 1994, 61-136.

106

C H A P T E R THREE

Sweden and Denmark had from time to time attempted to remedy this inferiority by discriminating custom duties and privileged companies, to promote domestic shipping. Both states hoped to create fleets of armed merchantmen useful for long-distance trade, which in wartime might strengthen the navy. Up to 1645, these efforts were failures in Sweden. Therefore, when suitable Swedish ships did not exist in 1644, Sweden had to turn to the Dutch to hire auxiliary warships. From 1645, a more efficient system of protection of shipping was instituted. Swedish-owned ships, able to carry a substantial armament, got reductions in tariffs. This resulted in a major wave of investments in such ships. The origin of the capital behind these investments is obscure. It was partly aristocrats and officers who invested their gains from the Thirty Years War in ships, but Dutch capital may also have been involved.^*^ In 1651, the Swedish government founded a Board of Commerce {Kommerskollegium), which was instructed to promote Swedish mercantile and shipping interests and to exploit Sweden's new power position for economic purposes.^' The reality became less impressive than the intentions, but in Holland it was perceived as a threat and a parallel to the English Navigation Laws of 1651, which soon became an important cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54). Especially in Amsterdam, Sweden began to be regarded as a hostile rather than friendly power, and the traditional friendship with Sweden waned. These English and Swedish initiatives were part of a more general phen o m e n o n wherein rulers and elites in Northern and Western Europe looked with a mix of envy, admiration, and fear upon the phenomenal rise of the Dutch entrepot for world trade and Dutch commercial and technological superiority in industry and trade. Sweden, England, and (from the 1660s) France began to use political and naval power to compete with the Dutch. Brandenburg and, in a later generation, Tsar

Hjalmar Borjeson, Stockholms segelsjdfart: Anteckningar om huvudstadens kofferdiflotta och dess man med en overblick av stadens och rikets sjofartsforhdllanden jran dldsta tid intill vara dagar, Stockholm, 1932, 124-257; Birger Fahlborg, "Ett blad ur den svenska handelsfloUans historia (1660-1675)", HT, 43, 1923, 205-81; Eli F: Heckscher, "Den svenska handelssjofartens ekonomiska historia sedan Gustaf Vasa", Skrifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska samfundet, 1, 1940, 5 - 3 1 ; Sven Gerentz, Kommerskollegium och ndringslivet, 1651-1951, Stockliolm, 1951, 91-166. A survey in Laos Miiller, "Sjomakten och den civila sjofarten, 1650-1809", Norman 2000, 342-52. The Danish mercantile marine: Ole Degn and Erik Gobel, Dansk sofarts historic: 2, Skuder og kompagnier, 1588-1720, Copenhagen, 1997. " Gerentz 1951, 15-35.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

107

Peter in Russia, were continental rulers who became very interested in developing maritime policies and navies to imitate the Dutch. One effect of the new power struggle about maritime trade and the sea was the rapid rise of the English, Dutch, and French battle fleets in the 1650s and 1660s. Hiese forces also influenced the power struggle in the Baltic, one of most important regions for international maritime trade in Europe.^® Swedish naval policy from 1645 to 1655 gave no indication that a new contest for supremacy in the Baltic Sea was contemplated. Queen Christina (r. 1632/44-54) was interested in the navy but favoured a steady replacement program rather than expansion. Dutch sea officers continued to be recruited to gain foreign experience, but the ageing fleet declined in size. There was obviously no immediate preparation for another offensive war against Denmark for the purpose of gaining even more territory. State finance was a major problem in these years, but the financial condition in the territorially reduced Denmark was similar, and as long as the Danish navy was smaller than the Swedish, the power position looked fairly satisfactory for Sweden in a purely Baltic perspective.^' The Danes were strong enough to defend themselves but too weak to seriously threaten Sweden's sea lines of communication. The problem of Sweden's future Baltic policy in a new European economic and naval situation where the Dutch were free from the long war with Spain and prepared to defend their economic empire with violence seems not to have been perceived in Sweden before 1656. When Christina abdicated in favour of her cousin Karl X Gustav (r. 1654-60), Swedish foreign policy immediately changed. The new king intended to continue imperial expansion in any direction that looked feasible. His brief period of rule made Swedish imperial policy in the Baltic and Eastern Europe a central question in European power politics. It involved Poland-Lithuania, Russia, Brandenburg, Austria, Denmark, and the Dutch Republic in war against Sweden while England was interested in limiting Dutch influence in the region and

™ Glete 1993, 178-206. " Danish political, financial and military development u p to 1660; Erling Ladewig Petersen, The Crisis of the Danish Nobility. 1580-1660, Odense, 1967; Erling Ladewig Petersen, "From D o m a i n State to Tax State", Scandinavian Economic History Review, 23, 1975, 116-48; Erling Ladewig Petersen, "Defence, W a r and Finance: Christian IV and the Council of Realm, 1596-1629", Scandinavian Journal of History, 7, 1982, 277-313; Lind 1994.

108

C H A P T E R THREE

France interested in maintaining Sweden as an ally against Habsburg. It was Karl X Gustav's great ambitions that mobilised so many enemies against him. The aim of these ambitions changed more than once, when opportunities and problems arose, but the centre of the struggle was the Baltic region; control of the sea, the littoral territories, and trade flowing through the region. Karl Gustav started the war without any review of Swedish military and naval policy, and the excellent army developed since Gustav II Adolf's time became his main instrument, while the navy was regarded as sufficient for control of the sea against Baltic opponents. When operations at sea gradually became important, he showed much interest in naval administration and new construction of warships. In 1658-59, he was primarily the commander-in-chief of a naval and amphibious war, and he seriously contemplated commanding the fleet personally. It was too late to build a navy that had a chance to gain the superiority at sea, however, which Karl Gustav's vast ambitions actually required. To do so would have required a firm alliance with a western naval power. Karl Gustav tried to induce Oliver Cromwell to join him against Denmark and the Dutch, but English policy in the area was too cautious to be anything more than limited help.®" In early 1655, Karl X Gustav chose to attack Poland, which already was in serious trouble due to a revolt in Ukraine and threats f r o m Russia. He used the navy to ship the army across the sea, an operation that was achieved without problems. The attack caused a political breakdown in Poland and Lithuania and, for a short time, influential groups in these countries cooperated with Karl Gustav as their saviour from Russia and chaos.®' The Swedish army could for a time take control of large territories, and the fleet began to blockade Danzig and raise custom duties on trade f r o m Prussia, except on English ships, which Karl Gustav favoured for political reasons. Suddenly the navy had to prove that it was capable of controlling the sea in southern

™ The wars f r o m 1655 to 1660: Carl X Gustav-studier (several authors and titles), 8 vols, Stockholm, 1965-79. Central naval administration: Wendt 1950, 152-90. Foreign policy: Landberg 1952, 81-122. The Danish army: Lind 1994, 92-106, 223-48, 348-71. A broad survey of the war: Peter Englund, Den odvervinnelige: Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt, Stockholm, 2000. Swedish domestic war propaganda: Forssberg 2005. Andrej Kotljarchuk, In the Shadows of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European crisis of the mid-17th century, H u d d i n g e , 2006.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

109

Baltic, which Sweden's new empire required for its survival. It was no longer a question of only containing a possible naval threat from Denmark. Tlie Dutch looked upon their Baltic trade as one of the pillars of their position in the world economy, and they were prepared to fight for it. They became worried that Sweden intended to take control over Danzig and other Baltic ports of importance for their trade. This would create a Swedish monopoly on the outlets for Baltic trade, which, in combination with a tariff policy that favoured Swedish subjects and friends, might undermine the Dutch economic position. With the new large battle fleet they had built during the war with England (1652-54), the Dutch had a new powerful instrument for influencing Baltic politics. The Danish king and elite groups feared that Sweden would become even more powerful and place the Danish state in an isolated and vulnerable situation, so Denmark looked to the Dutch Republic for help. During 1656, the Dutch sent a large fleet to Baltic. It was joined by a Danish squadron and sailed to Danzig. Karl X Gustav avoided a naval conflict and signed an agreement (the treaty of Elbing) with the Dutch, which guaranteed that the Dutch would be treated as the most favoured nation in all Baltic ports controlled by Sweden now or in the future. The treaty was so vague, however, that it allowed Sweden to protect its own shipping and trade against competition, and further negotiations were soon necessary. Denmark was disappointed; it had hoped that the Dutch would be involved in war with Sweden, especially because Sweden's new provinces in Germany had seriously weakened the Danish ability to defend Jutland and the isles. The Danish king and Council hoped that a great (if loose) coalition with the Dutch, the Austrian Habsburgs, Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Brandenburg could be formed in order to divide Sweden's gains in the last wars. The Danes now took the initiative and declared war on Sweden on 1 June 1657. This gave Sweden a diplomatic advantage, as the Danish-Dutch alliance was purely defensive. Denmark, in contrast, gained the advantage by mobilising its fleet before war was declared, which prevented a rapid Swedish combination of army and navy for an attack on Copenhagen. Karl X Gustav had in fact decided already in May 1657 to leave Poland with his main army and attack Denmark f r o m Germany. To the surprise of the Danish leadership, he did exactly that in response to their declaration of war, and he quickly overran Jutland. The Swedish fleet arrived in Danish waters in September and met the smaller Danish

110

C H A P T E R THREE

fleet in a battle, which ended in a tactical draw. Fate, in the shape of a cold winter, intervened and created a bridge of ice upon which the Swedish army could march from Jutland to Sjalland and dictate a peace in early 1658. Denmark had to cede to Sweden important territories: Skane, Blekinge, Bornholm, Bohuslan, and the Trondheim province in mid-Norway. They further had to agree that they together should block attempts from foreign fleets to enter the Baltic Sea. Karl X Gustav had also asked that the Danish navy, or part of it, be delivered to Sweden, but he did not press that demand hard in the peace negotiations. In his enthusiasm about his great victory, he seems to have seriously believed that the Danes would help him seal off the Baltic from the West. That would have given his armies great advantages for decisive operations in the coastal territories in North Germany and the eastern Baltic where he now had his remaining enemies. Negotiations between the two powers about how the closure of the Baltic should be implemented led to nothing. Karl X Gustav saw that the Danes were unprepared for a renewed war, but he also feared that Denmark might become the base for future Dutch and Danish naval operations against his Baltic empire building. Tlie military situation in Poland, Prussia, and Brandenburg did not look promising for a Swedish offensive. Karl Gustav probably also saw the possibility that a conquest of Denmark and the Danish straits would make it unnecessary to conquer more Baltic ports because control of the straits would give Sweden customs on all trade passing in and out of the Baltic Sea.®^ A maritime rather than continental end to Swedish empire building seemed possible. Karl Gustav decided that he should take the chance and destroy Denmark as a state. In August 1658 he launched a surprise attack f r o m Kiel. The fleet was able to land an army on Sjalland without any Danish naval resistance. For once, everything worked according to the Swedish ideal of an amphibious assault directed at the heart of the enemy's power. Denmark was saved by the rapidly organised intervention of the Dutch Republic, which under no circumstances wished to see a unified Scandinavian state in control of the Sound and most Baltic ports. A strong Dutch fleet broke the Swedish blockade of Copenhagen and provided the Danish capital with soldiers and

Birgitta Oden, "Karl X Gustav och det andra danska kriget", Scandia, 53-156.

27, 1961,

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

111

munitions, which made it possible to resist the Swedish army during the winter 1658-59. Karl X Gustav was determined to use his fleet for a tenacious defence of his control of most of Denmark. The strategic situation was unique as it was the Swedish king who had to defend the Danish isles against superior naval power. The Swedish navy could now take advantage of the transfer of Skane to Sweden and made Landskrona at the eastern side of the Sound its base. This made it possible for Karl Gustav to take the strategic initiative and invade the smaller Danish isles in spring 1659, which would have been impossible if the fleet had returned to Stoclcholm for the winter. During the summer 1659, the Dutch fleet was largely passive, because a truce had been negotiated together with England and France, which attempted to mediate. In spring 1659, England also sent a large fleet to Danish waters to observe the Dutch, who in their turn sent more ships. Sweden also recruited English sea officers, partly because the Dutch officers in Swedish service were regarded with suspicion. In September, the Dutch resumed their participation in the war. With overwhelming naval strength at their disposal, they could invade Fyn and defeat the Swedish army forces on the island. In a long perspective, the appearance of strong Dutch and English fleets in the Baltic meant that naval policies determined by mercantfle and non-territorial interests had returned to the region after having been absent since the decline of the Hanse and Liibeck's last efforts as a naval power in the 1530s and 1560s. After more than a century of Nordic dominance of the Baltic Sea, the great entrepots for Baltic trade were back on the naval scene. In the Middle Ages, Liibeck had been the great entrepot and also the leading sea power in the region. After 1650, Amsterdam could use the Dutch navy to protect its trading interests, and later the English merchants could also trust that the English navy would keep the Baltic open for their trade. At its peak, from June to October 1659, the Dutch Republic had around 70 warships in Danish waters, the largest naval force ever seen in the Baltic until then. Just like Liibeck, these western maritime powers could influence Nordic power politics through control of the sea lines of communication. This was mainly due to a new type of state formation in Western Europe wherein territorial power and merchant capital had joined forces in a way that the North German cities and territories never managed to do. Nordic naval power, based on efficient organisation of territorial resources and protection-selling to foreign shipping, had dominated

112

C H A P T E R THREE

the Baltic Sea f r o m the early 16th century to the mid-17th century. After that, the Baltic was integrated into the European state system in which control of the European seas belonged to the strongest battle fleet or combination of battle fleets. Sweden's policymakers had to adjust to a new Europe in which their regional naval power was part of an interregional balance of power. Tlie sudden death of Karl X Gustav in early 1660 made it at least possible to conclude a rapid series of peace treaties between Sweden and her several enemies. Apart from the Trondheim province in Norway and the island of Bornholm, Sweden retained all conquests from Denmark, which was the great loser in the Baltic wars of 1655 to 1660. John Kasimir, the last Polish king of the Vasa dynasty, had to give up his claim to the Swedish throne, and Poland formally accepted the transfer of Livonia to Sweden, a conquest actually made in the early 1620s. The Swedish ambitions of conquest in Prussia and Courland were dropped, and with that a central part of the traditional Swedish aims in the east. An extensive Swedish empire had been created, however, and it was to a large extent connected with Sweden by the sea or, in the case of the ex-Danish provinces, separated from potential enemies by the sea. Sweden now even had a long west coast to defend. Control of the sea would remain essential for its future defence. 2.3.7

Conclusion: The flexible navy

For a century, the Swedish navy had been an instrument of imperial conquest in the Baltic. Using the navy thus allowed Sweden to deploy limited but well organised resources against several countries of which three—Poland-Lithuania, Russia, and Habsburg Austria—had much larger populations and more lucrative potential tax bases. North German principalities and trading cities also would have been superior to Sweden had they acted with some degree of unity. However, they did not participate in the contest against Sweden, except Liibeck in the 1560s and Brandenburg in the late 1630s and late 1650s. Denmark, a state with about the same population as Sweden, was the most dangerous enemy, because it controlled an effective naval force that could threaten Sweden's control of the Baltic Sea and hinder Sweden from launching amphibious assaults on the centre of Danish power in the Sound. The development of the Swedish navy from around 1560 to 1660 reflects its use as an instrument for offensive operations in pursuit

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

113

of empire building. Operations in different periods were different in character, and in order to be successful as an instrument for expansion, the navy had to be flexible. The navy did show ability to adapt to changing political and strategic circumstances. The galley navy of the 1550s was rapidly changed to a successful sailing battle fleet in the 1560s. This was again changed to a predominately oared fleet in the 1580s and back to a sailing navy in the following decade. This force was used to support major army operations in Livonia. It failed as a battle fleet in the war with Denmark in 1611-13, mainly because the king had believed that a naval war was unlikely and had neglected to prepare for one. The navy was changed into an amphibious striking force with improved battle fleet capability in the 1610s and 1620s. From the 1630s to 1660, its main task was to protect the southern Baltic against Danish interference with Swedish imperial ambitions. This meant that the Swedish navy needed to be able to support an invasion on the Danish isles, a task that could be achieved only under favourable circumstances. The navy did not develop excellence and undisputed superiority in any type of operation, but it certainly was able to change and adapt to new strategic doctrines. The navy was not the main instrument of royal policy. The army clearly had priority, simply because it had to be the cutting edge against several powerful continental enemies. The navy typically faced enemies who had inferior naval forces, if any. Its task in war against these powers was to make full use of Sweden's control of the sea. It should hinder the enemy from using the sea to support his army, blockade ports against armed merchantmen, send the army ashore in strategically important areas, supply it with provisions, munitions, and reinforcements, and blockade or destroy any naval forces an enemy might improvise. These requirements were to a considerable extent determined by the requirements of operations on land. The navy needed an organisational infrastructure that allowed it to be rapidly mobilised and sent to sea at the right m o m e n t to give Sweden the initiative. The navy had to be able to sail early each spring and return back in late autumn, demanding requirements for 16th- and early 17th-century sailing warships, which were a far cry f r o m the advanced ships used in later phases of European warfare under sail. Amphibious warfare also meant that the navy had to build oared warships and other small craft for inshore and riverine service in close cooperation with the army. As a battle fleet navy, the Swedish navy was also tasked with fighting for control of the sea. It had to be able to fight an enemy battle

114

C H A P T E R THREE

fleet and, in offensive operations, had to be able to win. During the century of Swedish imperial expansion, the Danish navy was the only in the Baltic which had the strength to meet the Swedish navy in battle fleet contests. It was only during the Seven Years War of 1563-70 that Denmark, together with Liibeck, seriously attempted to interfere with Sweden's expansion in the eastern Baltic. This was a failure, and the attempt was not repeated, except when Denmark in 1610 showed that it regarded a purely naval blockade of Riga as an infringement on their dominium of the waters close to Osel, a Danish territory. The Danish navy was successful in 1611 and 1612, but, apart from the Riga trade, it did not use its superiority to interfere with Swedish activities in the eastern Baltic. The wars of 1643-45, 1657-58, and 1658-60 were, f r o m a Danish point of view, all defensive wars against an aggressive Sweden. The battle fleet was Denmark's ultimate weapon of defence, but as such it had to be used cautiously and kept in home waters. There was no question of offensive Danish naval operations in the Baltic, and the Swedish fleet could normally control the sea by keeping the Danes occupied at home. This was of great strategic importance; it secured the Swedish coasts and gave the Swedish home army freedom to concentrate on operations against Danish territories. But Sweden had spent much on its battle fleet in the hope that it might defeat the Danes and clear the sea for an invasion. W h e n the two fleets met in combat (summer 1644 and autumn 1657), the battles ended in draws. Sweden was twice (autumn 1644, summer 1658) able to gain control of the Danish straits by strategic surprise and once (winter 1658) by the intervention of cold weather. The limit of Swedish imperial expansion against Denmark was reached when the Dutch battle fleet intervened.

2.4 2.4.1

Defending a Baltic empire,

The failure of the aristocratic navy,

1660-1721

1660-1679

The death of Karl X Gustav left Sweden with a small boy, Karl XI (r. 1660-97), as king. An aristocratic regency government ruled for almost 13 years (1660-72). They had to face the political, social, and financial problems and contradictions which Swedish state formation and empire building had created or left unsolved. During the long wars, the Parliament had been willing to pay high taxes and postpone major discussions about domestic political problems. The peace period

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

115

1648-55 and the long peace after 1660 saw increased economic problems for the state and more articulated conflicts between social groups and the parliamentary estates. The three non-noble estates and many recently ennobled officers and civil servants thought that the aristocracy since the early 17th century had appropriated too much political power and control over the incomes f r o m the state's landed wealth.®^ Tlie rise of aristocratic power within the Swedish state may have been a necessary step in the state formation process in order to bring the traditional landed elite with their social networks, authority, and political leverage into the core of the fiscal-military state. In contrast to many other European aristocracies in this period, the Swedish aristocracy favoured centralisation and the development of complex organisation and attempted to combine hierarchical solutions to organisational problems with their vision of an aristocratic society containing a firm social hierarchy. This made the Swedish state work efficiently in a transitional period, and unlike for example Poland, Denmark, or France, it was not troubled by active resistance from the elite. But the mid17th-century Swedish state was increasingly run by career bureaucrats and officers who saw the aristocracy less as patrons and more as an established and conspicuously rich interest group blocking the way to the centre of power for aspiring new men. Like other part of the Swedish state, the navy had since the early 17th century been administered by the aristocracy, f r o m 1634 formally in the Amiralitetskollegium, one of the colleges which ran the various branches of the Swedish state. From the time of Gustav II Adolf, the navy can no longer be seen as only a project run by the Vasa dynasty. It was also supported by the aristocratic elite and, increasingly, by its officers and civil servants who, when they were ennobled, gained a voice in the Parliament. Until the 1650s, the most important leaders of the navy had been men associated with royal power rather than with aristocratic group interests. They also had experience from service at sea, as admirals and as administrators of shipbuilding, recruitment

Foreign policy 1660-72: Birger Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik, 1660-1664, Stockholm, 1932; Birger Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik, 1664-1668, 2 vols, Stocldiolm, 1949; Birger Fahlborg, Sveriges yttre politik, 1668-1672, 2 vols, Stockliolm, 1961. Financial policy 1660-72: Georg Wittrock, Karl Xl:s formyndares finanspolitik, 2 vols, Uppsala, 1914-17. Domestic political power struggle: Goran Rystad, Johan Gyllenstierna, rddet och kungamakten: Studier i Sveriges inre politik, 1660-1680, Lund, 1955; Sven A, Nilsson, Pa vag mot reduktionen: Studier i svenskt 1600-tal, Stockholm, 1964.

116

C H A P T E R THREE

of seamen, and naval mobilisation. From the 1660$, the senior positions in the Amiralitetskollegium were entrusted to aristocrats without naval experience. Family connections and support of the political and economic interests of the aristocracy determined these appointments, which also blocked the way to the top for admirals who had made a long career in the navy. The sea officers were usually men of non-noble origin or members of the poorer noble families who had to work for the state to support their status. During the regency years, they found that their and the seamen's wages were in arrears, often for a year or more, while the aristocrats at the top increasingly used the navy as their bank to get loans.®"* The aristocrats were not uninterested in naval power or maritime and commercial questions. Some of them invested in shipping as well as industry and, as a group, they had strong vested interests in the Swedish state raising large customs f r o m a flourishing trade through Swedish-controlled Baltic ports. Commercial success would reduce the strain on state finances, secure their own freedom from taxation, and lessen demands f r o m the lower estates of a policy that aimed at returning as much as possible of the incomes from land, which the aristocracy had appropriated for various services in the past (a reduktion). The problem with these ideas was that—apart from mining and industries related to iron, copper, and arms manufacturing—the new more mercantile and dynamic Swedish economy developed slowly. In the short term it required tax exemptions and privileges from the state to grow. Customs on Swedish trade were important but far f r o m sufficient to cover the deficit in the state finances.*' Customs from Baltic trade and taxes from the provinces were to a large extent absorbed by local expenditures in the war-stricken provinces."'

administratipn and the aristocratic leadership: Wendt 1950 191300. U e aristocratic elite: Kurt Agren, "Rise and decline of an aristocracy: The Swedish social a i ^ political elite in the 17th century", Scandinavian Journal of History, 1, 1976 55-80. The n a v y s debts and claims 1660-72, N N S II, 147-58, KrA lor/oi^' ekonomiska historiafran Gust'av Vasa, 1:2, Stockholm, 1956, 284-88; Sven A. Nilsson, Reduktion eller kontribution: Alternativ i n o m 1600talets svenska finanspolitik", Scandia, 24, 1958, 68-114; Peter Englund, Det hotade huset: Adhga forestallningar om samhallet under stormaktstiden, Stocldiolm, 1989 esp 128-52; Maj-Britt Nergard, Mellan krona och marknad: Utidndska och svenska entreprenorer mom svensk jdrnhanteringfrdn ca 1580 till 1700, Uppsala, 2001 H e l m u t Piirimae, "Die finanziellen Beziehungen Livlands und Estlands zum schwedischen Staat im 17. Jahrhundert", in A n u Mai K61I (ed.), Time of Change in

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

117

Tlie regency government was determined to preserve Sweden's position as a European great power. It was important for their prestige. Tliey wished to promote Sweden as a powerful state able to take a leading part in international alliances, although one important motive was actually the hope of getting foreign subsidises. Hiese had never before been important in Sweden's foreign policy, but in the regency years they began to be seen as convenient substitutes for increased taxes. The regents were not interested in offensive warfare and had no plans for further expansion. They tried to preserve peace and to keep the expenditure of the state as low as possible, not the least to counter the threat of increased taxation on their own property or a reduktion. This contradictory policy ended in failures for the foreign policy, the financial policy, and the naval policy during the war from 1675 to 1679. The naval part of that disaster was especially severe and led to sweeping reforms. The problem was not that the aristocratic regime failed to build warships. During the regency period, several new large ships were built while the size of the army was left unchanged. In 1664, the Parliament even voted an extraordinary supply for shipbuilding {skeppshjdlpen) in order to rapidly strengthen the navy, which resulted in the construction of three large warships. The Parliament decided that the extra tax for shipbuilding should be sent directly to the Amiralitetskollegium instead of to the Treasury. It was suspected that the funds might otherwise be diverted to more urgent financial needs than investments in warships. Such suspicions were well founded, as it later turned out; a similar extra supply to naval shipbuilding voted by the estates in Livonia had been used for local garrisons due to acute financial problems.®^ In terms of tonnage, the navy which the regency left to Karl XI in 1672 was larger than ever before and around 50 per cent larger than the navy that Karl X Gustav had left in 1660. This was visible strength, and it was important to have it. Guns, sails, and cables necessary to send ships to sea were less visible, and by 1672 the navy had great

the Baltic Countries: Essays in honour of Aleksander Loit, Stockliolm, 2000, 31-56. It was only in the 1680s and 1690s that the provinces of Estonia and Livonia p r o d u c e d considerable net incomes for the Swedish state. Wittrock 1914, 254-58; Ahnlund 1933, 352-53. The Livonian supply: Wittrock 1917, 163.

118

C H A P T E R THREE

deficiencies in material readiness. Frenetic efforts to remedy these deficiencies were made up to 1675, but when the fleet should have been mobilised for war in that year, the mobilisation was delayed because of remaining material deficiencies. Officers and seamen could be found to man the enlarged fleet, but 15 years of peace had reduced their competence. The navy had, up to 1660, maintained the personnel's competence mainly because it had been at least partially in commission for war service for an entire century. Peacetime training was unknown, and the few ships that served as troop transports or convoy escorts during the 15 years of peace were insufficient to keep competence alive. Recruitment of foreign officers had ceased after 1660, and few Swedish officers had served in foreign navies. Finally, no naval base had been established in the southern Baltic Sea, although it had long been obvious that this was the most important area of naval operations and that the use of Wismar in 1644-45 and of Landskrona in 1658-60 had been successes. The regency government's search for subsidises had finally been successful in 1672, when Louis XIV was eager to secure allies for his attack against the Dutch Republic. Sweden undertook to keep a subsidised army in northern Germany as a threat against the Republic's potential allies. W h e n this alliance dragged the reluctant Nordic great power into war against Brandenburg, Denmark, and the Dutch RepubUc in 1675, the navy performed miserably. During 1675, it was not able to sail to the southern Baltic. The next year it was out early to fight the Danes and the Dutch, but this operation ended in a largely self-inflicted disaster during combat. Officers were too inexperienced to maintain formation and understand orders, and senior officers had difficulty implementing any kind of tactics that took advantage of the firepower of the many new and great ships. By 1677, discipline and order had improved, but that only led to an even greater disaster in a combat against the Danes. The fleet fought with determination but insufficient skill and lost several ships. Denmark now had a vast superiority at sea and could, for the first time since 1612, control the Baltic. This was used to isolate and attack Sweden's German provinces, which all were lost by 1678. Even more disastrously, the Danish army invaded Skane in 1676 and then used it as the main theatre of military operations. In the end, the competence of the Swedish army and the success of Sweden's ally Louis XIV restored Sweden's invaded territories. The navy had been the weakest part of the Swedish defence system, and the defeats of the navy had also revealed that defence of Sweden's empire

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

119

was dependent on control of the sea. Sweden had a maritime empire which was nearly lost due to deficient naval policy.®'' The naval disasters and other problems revealed by the war had provided the king and the critics of the aristocrats with telling arguments. In 1675, the king suspended or dismissed aristocratic admirals and forced them to answer for the shortcomings before a special commission. By 1680, the Parliament was ready to definitely reduce the political and economic power of the established elite. Karl XI became a king with absolute power in relation to the Council, although the Parliament still controlled taxation. Land, which had been turned over to the nobility as payment for loans and services in the past, were to a large extent taken back by the state. State finances were brought into order, the army's recruitment and maintenance system was improved, officers and men could be paid regularly, and means were available for a large investment in and reorganisation of the navy. The navy's dependence on the organisational and financial power of the state had become obvious, and the king as well as the new bureaucratic elite was willing to make great efforts for its restoration. 2.4.2

The rise of the professional navy,

1679-1700

From 1678 to 1713, the leading m a n in the Swedish navy was Hans Wachtmeister, from 1681 with the new title admiral-general. His long period as leader of the navy was unique in its history, and it gave him time to implement reforms and create strong personal power. Wachtmeister was a leading architect of a new strategy; he was the leader of the navy's shipbuilding, administration, and economy; and he acted as its operational commander during major campaigns. Wachtmeister was one of the new men in the Swedish leadership who had reached their position during the war when Karl XI had placed his confidence in energetic and ambitious men who advised and helped him with the war efforts. It was ultimately the king who made the decisions about naval policy, on Wachtmeister's advice.®'

The war of 1675-79: Landberg 1952, 175-212; Finn Askgaard and A r n e Stade (eds), Kampen om Skane, Copenhagen 1983; G o r a n Rystad, Karl XI: En biografi, Lund, 2001, 40-119. Swedish domestic war propaganda: Forssberg 2005. General; Rystad 2001; A n t h o n y F. U p t o n , Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, Cambridge, 1998. Foreign pohcy: Landberg 1952, 213-61. Naval pohcy and administration; Sven Grauers, Atten Wachtmeistergenom tiderna, II: Grevliga dtten Wachtmeister

120

C H A P T E R THREE

Tlie king's relation with Wachtmeister and the navy is typical for the new power structure in which the monarch could develop absolute rule with broad support from oliicers and civil bureaucrats who preferred a strong state with high taxes and few privileges for the aristocracy. They were primarily interested in regular salaries and an efficient state organisation that was not continuously starved of funds. At the important session with the Parliament in 1680, Admiral Wachtmeister acted as the king's leading spokesman in the House of Nobles when he argued for a break with the privileged position of the aristocrats. He made it clear that the reconstruction of the navy and its future maintenance in a high degree of readiness required much money. In order to get them quickly, he asked for an investigation into the conduct of the regency government that would levy heavy fines on those who were found to have neglected their duties. He also supported the demand for a reduktion of crown land donated to the nobility since the beginning of the 17th century. This would increase the regular flow of income to the state. These demands received support from many members of the nobility who primarily lived from their incomes and who also preferred that promotions should be according to merits rather than to social origin.'" A central part of Wachtmeister's reform program was that it represented the definite breakthrough of a professional navy in which officers and administrators who had devoted their careers to the navy were given control of administration and access to the top career positions in the hierarchy. Future sea officers, even those of aristocratic origin, had, at least formally, to start their careers at the bottom to learn the profession as a seaman. No future admirals were transferred f r o m the army or the civil service, as frequently had been the case in the aristocratic navy. Increasingly, this officer corps was recruited from sons of sea officers and naval administrators. In the 18th century, the navy was to a considerable extent run by a number of "naval families" whose networks and professional careers interacted. Both the

av Johannishus, Stockholm, 1946; Wendt 1950, 301-462; Amiralitetskollegiets II, 1696-1803, Malmo, 1974, 9 - 5 0 (by Einar W e n d t and Lars Otto Berg). Grauers 1946, 98-125; Rune Blomdahl, Formyndarrafstens huvudskede: i Stora Kommissionens historia, Stockholm, 1963, 23-102.

historia, En studie

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

121

army and the navy developed into economic-political interest groups for officers.'' Tlie Dutch interventions in the wars in the 1650s and 1670s had shown that Sweden must have a navy ready to meet the threat f r o m the new Western sea powers. In the war of 1675-79 it had become obvious that Sweden had a new problem because two neighbours, D e n m a r k and Brandenburg, had successfully followed Sweden's own fiscal-military policy. Both had t u r n e d to absolutism, they had created strong p e r m a n e n t armed forces, and the Danish navy had chosen a better balance between quantity and professional competence. Both powers now had the ability to strike quickly at an enemy, an advantage that in earlier wars usually had belonged to Sweden, with its combination of p e r m a n e n t armed forces and aggressive expansionism. Other German powers were developing similar armies. U n d e r certain political conditions these might be combined against Sweden, which since the Thirty Years W a r had been a G e r m a n power. After 1679, Sweden as far as possible avoided military c o m m i t m e n t s in Germany, but defence of her possessions m a d e it necessary to conclude various defensive alliances with G e r m a n princes. The duchies of HolsteinGottorp and Mecklenburg-Giistrow, located between Pomerania and Bremen-Verden, were m o r e or less permanently protected by formal alliances with Sweden, which required Sweden to send army forces to their aid. The protection of Holstein-Gottorp against Danish attempts to enforce sovereignty was a cornerstone in Swedish foreign policy in the 1680s and 1690s. Sweden would not only need strong armed forces to counter this threat. It required a new strategy for a defensive foreign policy in a new world with well-armed enemies. N e w types of operations were more important than the earlier offensive strikes, planned and prepared in advance by Sweden. The navy must be ready to sail to any threatened area of the empire at short notice with reinforcements for the army and it must be able to fight an e n e m y battle fleet to reach its destination. A r m y units might also have to be transferred across the sea f r o m one Baltic province to another at short notice in order to achieve concentration at the right spot. Otherwise they would be

" James Cavallie, De hoga officemrna: Studier i den svenska militdra hierarkien under 1600-talets senare del, Stockholm, 1981; Bjorn Asker, Officerarna och det svenska samhdllet, 1650-1700, Uppsala, 1983. H i e 18th century: G u n n a r Arteus, Krigsmakt och samhdlle i frihetstidens Sverige, Stockholm, 1982.

122

C H A P T E R THREE

defeated in detail by more mobile enemy forces. The same type of mobility was necessary for Sweden to fulfil obligations toward allies and clients, primarily Holstein-Gottorp. Hie navy must also be able to reduce the operational freedom of enemy armies in order to help the Swedish army defend the vast empire. The most important requirement was that the navy must pose a serious threat of seaborne invasion against Denmark and Copenhagen in order to keep the Danish army in defensive positions at home and deter it from launching invasions against Sweden and its German provinces. When most neighbours had strong armies, the Swedish army could no longer depend on its traditional ability to quickly occupy foreign territories and live on them. It might be more dependent on supply from home, and the navy must secure this supply. Sweden did need armed forces that could act as a fire brigade. It should quickly respond to threats to the periphery of the empire and counter them with resources from within the empire itself. Control of the maritime lines of communication was necessary to make the army mobile within the Baltic empire. It meant a high degree of material and personal readiness in the navy and a naval base close to the main operational area, the southern Baltic. Already from 1678 the fleet was deployed to Kalmar as a forward winter base. In 1679, development of an entirely new base on an island in the Blekinge archipelago was initiated. Named Karlskrona, it rapidly developed into a new city with a large naval yard. By 1689, the fleet, the main naval yard, and the central naval administration had been concentrated to Karlskrona.'^ The number of permanently employed seamen had increased, and many of them lived in regions close to Karlskrona, which made mobilisation rapid. The fleet was much increased in size, guns were acquired in sufficient number already in peacetime, ships were kept in good condition by systematic repairs, and enough sails, cables, and anchors were kept in store to quickly bring the fleet to sea. Three mobilisations of the whole navy in 1683, 1689, and 1700 showed that the new system worked. The final part of Wachtmeister's new system, a strong squadron of cruisers based in Gothenburg to protect Swedish westward trade and disturb communications between Denmark and Norway, was realised from 1700 to 1702.

Gustaf Clemensson, Flottans fdrldggning till Karlskrona: frdganfore dr 1683, Stockholm, 1938; Ericson 1993.

En studie i

flottstations-

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

2.4.3

The fall of the empire,

123

1700-1721

The new system was put to the test with the outbreak of the Great Northern War in 1700.'' It worked smoothly during the initial phase. Sweden and its dient Holstein-Gottorp were attacked by a coalition consisting of Denmark, Poland-Saxony, and Russia. Hie navy was mobilised at full strength, and together with an Anglo-Dutch fleet it secured the passage across the Sound for the main Swedish army. The landing on Sjalland in July 1700 was the only entirely successful major Swedish amphibious operation in this war. It was achieved on an open beach with deep water close to the shore where battleship guns could cover the landing and it was not necessary to use specially built amphibious craft. It may have given the young Karl XII (r. 16971718), who was present, the impression that amphibious operations were fairly easy and something his army and navy could achieve without any reorganisation. Copenhagen came under threat from the Swedish army, and Denmark quickly left the anti-Swedish coalition.

" The literature about the Great N o r t h e r n W a r is vast. A recent synthesis, concentrated to the continental campaigns f r o m 1700 to 1709: Frost 2000, 226-329. Swedish foreign policy: Jerker Rosen, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 11:1, 1697-1721, StocUiolm, 1952; Gustaf Jonasson, Karl XII och hans radgivare: Den utrikespolitiska maktkampen i Sverige, 1697-1702, Uppsala, 1960; Gustaf Jonasson, Karl XILs polskapolitik, 1702-1703, Stockholm, 1968; G o r a n Rystad, "Ryssland eller Polen? Karl XII:s planer efter Diinaovergangen, Nagra synpunkter", Scandia, 27, 1961, 298-336. Swedish military history: Karl XII pa slagfaltet: Karolinsk slagledning sedd mot bakgrunden av taktikens utvecklingfran dldsta tider, 4 vols, Stockholm, 1918-19, a study concentrated on tactics and operations led by Karl XII f r o m 1700 to 1709; G u n n a r Arteus, Krigsteori och historisk fdrklaring: I. Kring Karl XILs ryska falttag; II. Karolinsk och europeisk stridstaktik, 1700-1712, Gothenburg, 1970-72; Jan Lindegren, "Karl XII", Kungar och krigare, Stockholm, 1992, 149-225. Swedish strategy and warfare against Russia f r o m a naval perspective: Arnold M u n t h e , Karl XII och den ryska sjdmakten, 3 vols, Stockliolm, 1924-27. Historiography: Karl-Gustaf Hildebrand, "Till Karl Xll-uppfattningens historia, I-II", HT, 74, 1954, 353-92, 75, 1955, 1-46; Sverker Oredsson, "Livskraften hos Karl Xll-forskningens 'nya skola'", in Historia, krig och statskonst: Vdnbok till Klaus-Richard Bohme, Stockholm, Probus, 2000, 45-70. Central naval administration: Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 51-157, 2 8 3 - 9 8 (Lars Otto Berg and M a g n u s H a m m a r ) . Danish military a n d naval history: Bidrag till den Store Nordiske Krigs Historie, 10 vols, Copenhagen, 1899-1934. Russian political, military and administrative history: Paul Bushkovitch, Peter the Great: The struggle for power, 1671-1725, Cambridge, 2001; Evgenij I. Porfiriev, Peter I: Grundldggare av den ryska reguljdra armens och flottans krigskonst, Stocl<Jiolm, 1958 (Russian ed. 1952); Ljubomir G. Beskrovnyj, Russkaja armija iflot v XVIII veke (Ocerki), Moscow, 1958; Claes Peterson, Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish antecedents and the process of reception, Stockholm, 1979. Biographies: Ragnhild M. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden, London, 1968; M. S. Anderson, Peter the Great, London, 1995 (1st ed. 1978).

124

C H A P T E R THREE

Karl XII then sailed with an army to the eastern Baltic, where local forces held up the enemies at Riga and Narva. After a crushing defeat of the Russians at Narva in late 1700, Karl turned south and became step by step involved in a new continental war of the old type, iirst in Poland and Saxony and then, from 1707, in Russia and Ukraine. The policy that evolved was to bring Poland under the control of aristocratic groups allied with Karl XII and secure this vast territory as a huge base for the Swedish army's operations. In Eastern Europe, it was still possible for the Swedish army to take control of large territories and live on them for years. This did not solve the problem of how to defend Sweden's Baltic provinces, however. That required concentration of military strength and logistical supply at places that were attacked by the Russians, and it required close cooperation between army and navy. Tsar Peter I had already in the 1690s built a considerable fleet for use on the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.'"* He thus started the Baltic war, not only with dreams of reaching the open sea but also with an embryo of a naval organisation with shipbuilders, sea officers, and seamen as well as ideas of how to use rivers and the sea to gain operational advantages. The tsar at an early stage began to organise naval forces and naval bases in the Baltic, efforts which he often directed personally. He did not have the best army and certainly not the best navy in this war, but the armed forces he organised—the army, the galley fleet, and the battle fleet—were more flexible and integrated than other European armed forces. The fact that the navy was new and the army was drastically reorganised in these years probably made these organisations open and responsive to new combinations and unorthodox behaviour. This was an asset in an amphibious environment, where seamless cooperation between different armed forces is important. In a Baltic perspective, the struggle between Sweden and Russia was fought between two eccentric rulers who both deviated from the traditional policies of their states. The Swedish empire had been created by kings who were deeply interested in naval development and amphibious operations. Gustav I, Johan III, and Gustav II Adolf had, without any bureaucratic delays, created galley forces when they wished to control narrow and shallow waters. Gustav II Adolf had spent most

Edward J. Phillips, The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet, 1688-1714, Westport, Conn., 1995.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

125

of his military career leading campaigns in which the army and navy closely cooperated, and the army made much use of the navy's ability to supply it from the sea and on rivers. Karl X Gustav had spent his last years in personal command of highly amphibious operations. Russia had for centuries been a purely continental power without even improvised naval forces. In contrast, Tsar Peter was very much navalminded and focused on gaining control of ports and developing a navy which could work in close coordination with the army. He showed this by his personal presence during campaigns in the Baltic, a presence which probably also made it easier to carry out combined operations, as the ruler was there to make operational decisions and limit the scope for inter-service conflicts. In this he behaved like a normal Baltic Sea ruler who frequently commanded combined operations.'® From 1701 to 1704, Russian forces took control of the lakes Ladoga and Peipus, the province of Ingria with the Neva River, Narva and the innermost shallow-water part of the Gulf of Finland. Having thus gained a foothold in the Baltic Sea, Peter quicldy founded St Petersburg and the naval base Kronstadt"' and built a fleet of light sailing vessels and galleys. He was very interested in developing a Baltic naval policy. Karl XII did not see this as a serious challenge to Swedish control of the Bahic Sea. Until 1707 he was engaged in a struggle to establish a Polish king dependent on him, so he did not return to the Swedish Baltic provinces to see for himself. He was not interested in coordination of army and navy for littoral warfare and from the autumn of 1700 to 1715, he never participated in naval or amphibious operations. Karl XII had an excellent army, up to 1709 possibly the best in Europe, and his navy was more competent as a conventional sailing batde fleet than it had ever been before. The problem was that the professionalism and the allocation of funds and resources were closely connected with two separate organisations: army and navy. They required firm control and guidance from above if new competencies should be developed and resources reallocated to create something new, such as warfare on rivers, in archipelagos and in shallow water, and combined operations. Regional commanders of field armies had no resources or

Most m a j o r Baltic amphibious operations in the 17th century were personally directed by rulers; Christian IV, Gustav II Adolf, Karl X Gustav, and Christian V: Glete 2006. Kronstadt was built on the island of Retusaari (Russian Kotlin) outside St Petersburg. It got its n a m e in 1723 but for simplicity "Kronstadt" is used here.

126

C H A P T E R THREE

authority to build flotillas of minor warships to cross water, and Hans Wachtmeister in Karlskrona was focused on battleship strength. He even obstructed suggestions from local commanders to create shallowwater forces, probably because he suspected that funds for the battle fleet would be reallocated. Tliis had the positive effect that the batde fleet was ready for a long defensive war in 1709, but it left the king without any pressure or inspiration from the navy about an alternative strategy for the defeat of Russia. Karlskrona sent battleships and frigates to blockade the Russians in the Gulf of Finland, but there was no solution to the problem of how to control the shallow and narrow waters or how to roll back the Russian conquest of littoral territories. Karl XII's plans for a decisive campaign against Russia were not revealed until 1707-08, when he brought his main army from Saxony across Poland and into central Russia. The operation aimed to force the tsar to fight a decisive battle for Moscow and the traditional centre of Russian power. As Tsar Peter was fighting his war with Sweden with the intention of gaining and keeping a foothold in the Baltic Sea, it might have been politically and strategically possible for Karl to force his opponent to fight a decisive battle for St Petersburg or give up access to the Baltic Sea. It has often been noted that such a strategy would have caused logistical problems, but it was such problems that blocked the march to Moscow. The choice was fateful and meant that Karl, for his main campaign against Russia, did not use the comparative advantage he had in the Baltic: command of the sea, local bases, and a safe retreat route for his army if something went wrong. Operations in the Baltic might have been logistically supported from various parts of the Swedish empire by sea. The army could have been considerably smaller (with less food consumption) and yet able to concentrate in strength at the decisive m o m e n t and the decisive spot, especially if a major flotilla of oared craft had been built for such operations. Because the Swedish army was of a high quality, limited units with less need for food than the Russians might have been successful. There are no signs that Karl ever contemplated such operations or that Swedish command of the sea entered his strategic thinking as an asset which could be used for an offensive. He deployed large army units to Finland and the eastern Baltic but did not instruct the government in Stockholm or the navy in Karlskrona to build the large number of oared vessels that would make this army seaborne. No preparation for large-scale logistical support of army forces f r o m the sea was made, and Karl XII never asked his generals and admirals for

T H E S W E D I S H D Y N A S T I C S T A T E A N D ITS NAVY

127

advice about alternative strategies and operational plans. When faced with great logistical problems due to Peter's scorched earth strategy, Karl XII turned south into Ukraine. For a time, his army even posed a serious threat to Peter's Black Sea fleet at Voronezh at the upper Don River, and Peter hastily evacuated his warships downriver.'^ It was a remarkable development of a campaign, which was fought for defence of Sweden's positions in the eastern Baltic and to destroy Russian naval power in the Baltic Sea. The Swedish main army was finally defeated at Poltava and capitulated at Perevolochna in July 1709, only about 300 Idlometres from the Black Sea but about 1,500 kilometres f r o m the Baltic Sea. The destruction of the main field army and the subsequent Russian conquest of Estonia in Livonia in 1710 forced Sweden to fight a war in the Baltic. The war turned maritime, and operations became dependent on the sea lines across the Baltic and along archipelago coasts in Finland, Pomerania, and western Sweden (Bohuslan). It is often not appreciated that this phase of the war lasted 12 years and that this reflects both the remaining strength in Sweden, including the battle fleet, and the advantages Sweden had in a defensive maritime war in the Baltic. The long war is even more remarkable when it is realised that Sweden between 1709 and 1715 gained numerous new enemies, which on paper had army forces of overwhelming strength. Denmark, Saxony-Poland, Prussia-Brandenburg, and Hanover joined Russia in a growing anti-Swedish coalition; and Great Britain, where the elector of Hanover became king in 1714, was an unofficial but powerful naval enemy from 1715 to 1719.'" The problem for the allies, however, was to concentrate their armies for a decisive attack on Sweden in a maritime region such as the Baltic, where control of the sea rather than quantitative army strength decided operations. A major complication for Swedish policy-making and administration was that Karl XII stayed in the Ottoman Empire from 1709 to 1714 and pursued an increasingly unrealistic policy of re-establishing Sweden as a great power on the European continent. Large army forces, which would have been useful for defence of the remaining Swedish territories and possibly for a seaborne counter-offensive against St

" Phillips 1995, 106-07. " Sweden a n d H a n o v e r in British p o l i c y - m a k i n g 1714-21: Jeremy Black, Continental Commitment: Britain, Hanover and interventionism, 1714-1793, L o n d o n , 2005, 48-58.

128

C H A P T E R THREE

Petersburg and the tsar's navy, were, from 1711 to 1715, spent on vain efforts to regain the initiative in Poland and northern Germany. The king and the home government had different ideas about strategy and foreign policy, with the consequence that the king became suspicious and gave Stocldiohn and Karlskrona httle scope for initiative. Tlie decisive struggle for the sea Hnes of communication was divided into a battle fleet contest about the open sea and several separate contests with light forces for strategically important sheltered waters. On the open sea, the Swedish battle fleet showed good ability to protect both the communications to the continent and the Swedish coast, in spite of an increasing quantitative inferiority compared to the allies. The Danish battle fleet limited Sweden's operational freedom, but it normally operated with caution and only in the Southern Baltic Sea, and it was loath to risk a defeat that might open the Danish isles to Swedish invasion. The two battles fought between the Danish and Swedish main fleets in 1710 and 1715 ended in tactical draws despite Danish quantitative superiority. This was a marked improvement in Swedish battle-fleet performance compared to the earlier war, and it may have contributed to the fact that the Danish king refused to hsten to Tsar Peter's demand that a Danish fleet be sent to the northern Baltic to support a Russian landing near Stockholm or that they mount a joint Danish-Russian strike against Karlskrona. The tsar created his own battle fleet in the 1710s, but he had realised that it was too immature to launch an offensive on its own. It was not until a British fleet began to cooperate with the alUed powers in 1716 that they gained command of the Baltic Sea. Even then, plans for a decisive invasion of Sweden came to nothing. Swedish investments in a large battle fleet, a large organisation of officers and seamen, and the Karlskrona base paid off in these years. Arguably, they made it impossible to enforce a decisive defeat on Sweden for several years after Poltava.'' Contests in narrow and shallow Russia had created a large oared decisive for the Russian conquest considerable shallow-water force,

waters went less well for Sweden. flotilla, which in 1713-14 proved of Finland. Denmark also built a which proved to be decisive in

" The interaction between diplomacy and military and naval operations in the Baltic, including the failures to achieve naval cooperation between Russia and D e n m a r k : Vv'alther Mediger, Mecklenburg, Russland and England-Hannover, 17061721: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Nordischen Krieges, Hildesheim, 1967, 186-89, 234-48, 297-98, 303-12, 328-29, 381-82.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

129

Pomerania in 1712 and 1715 and during the Swedish invasion of Norway in 1716. If Sweden in 1709-14 had imitated the tsar and the Danish king and had allocated the resources which were spent on warfare in Germany on an oared flotilla manned by the army, it might not only have defended Finland but also threatened the centre of Russian sea power: St Petersburg-Kronstadt. It was only in 1715-16 that Karl XII began to invest in major shallow-water forces to gain control of strategically important archipelagos. This investment paid off in a few years, and during Karl's second invasion of Norway in 1718, the oared force could protect the army's flank and its seaborne logistics. Early that year Karl also began to prepare a large amphibious force in the Baltic Sea, and these preparations continued during 1718. Provisions were also to be stored in Stockholm at a time when the army was being concentrated against Norway. Ships with a total capacity of 17,000 soldiers and 4,000 horses were prepared in Stockholm, while ships for 4,600 men and 700 horses were available in Karlskrona.'"" In addition, Swedish warships had the capacity to transport several thousand soldiers, especially the 25 galleys in Stocldiolm and Gothenburg. If combined, the Swedish naval and amphibious forces would have given Karl XII a formidable capacity to project power to any point accessible from the sea. It was a far larger transport capacity than Gustav II Adolf ever had during his amphibious campaigns in the Baltic from 1621 to 1630, when 14,000 soldiers had been the upper level. As usual, Karl's ultimate aims are not known for certain. He might have been considering an invasion of Sjalland if Denmark was not willing to make peace after a partial occupation of Norway. He might also have been preparing an instrument for a campaign in the east when Denmark had left the war. A combination of his main army, his batde fleet, his shallow-water flotillas in Gothenburg and Stockholm, and the large number of transport ships kept in readiness would have been sufficient for a campaign in Finland or Estonia or a strike against St Petersburg and the centre of Russian naval power. The outcome of such operations cannot be predicted, because Tsar Peter also had large forces available. It is evident, however, that Karl XII, in his last years, understood the strategic possibilities of combined operations and no

Lindegren 1992, 210-16; list of transport ships and vessels in Stockholm 25/1 1718 and their capacity, M 1720, RA; hst of transport vessels available in Karlskrona 21/2 1718 and their capacity, M 1741, RA.

130

C H A P T E R THREE

longer intended to be a victim of enemy superiority in the archipelagos. It was a bit late in the day to try this strategy, which would have been much easier when Sweden still controlled large territories in the east. Karl XII was killed on 30 November 1718, during the siege of Frederiksten on the border between Sweden and Norway. This immediately ended the Swedish offensive against Denmark-Norway as well as Swedish absolutism, and with that royal control of the army and navy. From 1719 Swedish policy was controlled by the Parliament, not by the ruling monarch, Karl XII's sister Ulrika Eleonora (r. 1719-20) and her husband Fredrik I of Hessen-Cassel (r. 1720-51). During the turmoil in 1719, there was litde coordination of policy, strategy, and administration, and this proved fatal during the summer months, when Denmark and Russia launched simultaneous offensives from the sea on Sweden's western and eastern coasts. The Swedish naval forces did not receive adequate supplies of money and provisions to be mobilised for effective defence until it was too late."" The extraordinarily high taxes, which Karl XII had enforced to keep up the Swedish war efforts, were reduced, and no attempt was made to keep the army up to the strength it had had in 1718, around 60,000 men. Tlie peace treaties concluded with Hanover, Prussia, and Denmark in 1719-20 were intended to give Sweden the potential to concentrate its war efforts against Russia and to make the British battle fleet in the Baltic an ally rather than an enemy. The war in 1719-21 was largely naval f r o m all sides, and Sweden became dependent on Great Britain's willingness to send a battle fleet to the Baltic in order to force Russia to make peace, which suited British interests. The Swedish army was now too small for offensive operations across the Baltic, and the Russians retained their superiority in amphibious warfare. Sweden was, at least for the time being, unable to control anything really important in the Baltic on her own. Her age as a great power was at an end, and with Russia's new ability to use naval power, one of the major advantages against Sweden's great continental neighbours in the Baltic region was lost.

"" H e r m a n Wrangel, Kriget i Ostersjon, 1719-1721, 2 vols, Stockholm, 1906-07 (new edition 2007) remains the best study of the war in these years.

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE AND ITS NAVY

2.4.4

Conclusion: Organisation,

131

dynamics, and inertia

After 1660, Sweden fought two wars in order to defend the empire that had been created in the preceding century. Both wars were faih ures, but the causes of the failures were different. Tlie main reason for defeat in the war from 1675 to 1679 was that Sweden was unprepared for a major defensive war. Hiis was obviously not the case in 1700. In the 1670s, Sweden was initially defeated at sea and on land in North Germany but was saved by the political alliance with France, which was the origin of the war. In the Great Northern War, Sweden fought without allies but with remarkable military capacity against several enemies and showed great ability to mobilise resources for a long war. These assets were not used with sufficient political shrewdness, however, and potential allies against Russia were turned into enemies by Karl XII's unwillingness to make compromises. These general circumstances are well known. In a study of naval policy and administration it is more important to see if there was something in the Swedish military and naval organisation that contributed to the failures. By 1660, Sweden had built an empire that strategically was maritime and amphibious at least as much as it was continental. Swedish territories and spheres of influence (HolsteinGottorp, Mecklenburg) were spread out from the North Sea to the northern Baltic Sea. It required both a strong army and a^strong navy to defend them, and it was necessary to control the sea that connected them with Sweden. A look at the most likely areas of operations shows that shallow water, archipelagos, and river estuaries were key areas because they formed important routes for logistical support and provided access to important ports and fortresses. The ability to operate in such areas was important when the empire was created, and it remained important for its defence. Swedish naval policy became gradually less amphibious in character during the 17th century. The rise of the West European battle fleets, the Dutch interventions in the Baltic in 1656-60 and 1675-77, and peace with Russia and Poland after 1660 moved the focus of Swedish naval policy from amphibious warfare to battle-fleet strength. The main task of the navy became to defend the sea lines against the Danish battle fleet and any Western battle fleet that might intervene in the Baltic. This required large ships and competence to handle a battle fleet. The main amphibious tasks of the navy became to transport army forces to Baltic ports already under Swedish control and to achieve a landing

132

C H A P T E R THREE

on Sjalland, an island with open coasts and deep-water ports. Such operations could succeed without any oared craft and without any reallocation of soldiers to man such craft. Sweden's naval doctrine became centred on the sailing battle fleet and its ability to fight the best battie fleets in Europe, a task that naturally was a challenge to the organisation. Hie main lesson of the war of 1675-79 was that the navy's ability to control the southern Baltic with a battle fleet must be secured at any cost, and that determined much of the reforms of the following decades. The navy markedly increased its professional competence f r o m the low mark it had reached in 1675-77. In the Great Northern War, sea officers knew how to handle individual ships and how to manoeuvre in a formal battle line; the crews could handle the sails and were good gunners. Swedish warships sailed in the Baltic Sea under adverse climatic conditions in almost every m o n t h of the year and blockaded Russian controlled coast as far as it was possible for sailing warships. The battle fleet's performance against the Danish fleet in major battles was the best since the 1560s, and the Danish fleet strategy became markedly cautious. A successful Swedish battle fleet doctrine for control of the open sea had been established. The Swedish army had already from the early 17th century developed a battle doctrine, which emphasised coherent companies and regiments of infantry and cavalry and close cooperation between them and the field artillery. The key to success was to drill the soldiers into units, which worked as machines on the battlefield. This doctrine was very successful. Service on warships, especially smafl oared craft, was not part of it, however. It gave little scope for drill and maintenance of formation in combat. This development of separate naval and army doctrines of warfare is easy to understand. The armed forces met difl'erent challenges and opportunities, and both central decision-makers and officers charged with implementing doctrines in the organisations had to make choices. The transformation was also a part of a contemporary European development of more professionalised and specialised army and navy officer corps and bureaucratic organisations for war on land and at sea. This development also created inertia, however. The organisations jealously guarded the resources they had and saw changes and reallocations of funds as threats. When the Great Northern War posed new challenges, the organisations were slow to react on their own. The only decision-maker who had power to change priorities, reallocate resources, and demand a war-winning and task-orientated amphibi-

T H E SWEDISH DYNASTIC STATE A N D ITS NAVY

133

ous doctrine was the king. Karl XII was not interested in the problem. He did not delegate the right to make changes, and it had to wait until 1715, when he finally got personal experience of warfare in shallow waters. The Russian army and navy were less experienced than their Swedish counterparts, but they were rationally combined when required, and the tsar frequently personally commanded amphibious operations. After the catastrophe at Narva in 1700, he soon found that the weak spot in Sweden's defence was in shallow waters, and he began to exploit it. Later, even the Danes had an important^ advantage in shallow-water operations. Late in the war, Sweden finally created a substantial oared flotilla. During the 18th century it grew in size and maturity, and by the end of the century it was the most successful part of the Swedish armed forces. In the Swedish-Russian war of 1788-90, Swedish superiority in archipelagic warfare saved the country from defeat. The fact that it took decades to reallocate resources, however, is an indicator that strong organisation creates not only efficient use of resources. Strong organisation may also create inertia, which make it difficult to use resources in radically different ways. The resources channelled through an organisation are closely tied to competence, prestige, and vested interests within the organisation. Once a competitor found the weak spots in the defence of the empire, the organisations proved unable to change with sufficient speed to meet the challenge.'"^

Swedish naval policy, administration, strategy and operations after 1721 is discussed in Jan Glete, "Den svenska linjeflottan, 1721-1860: En oversikt av dess struktur och storlek samt nagra synpunkter pa behovet av ytterligare forskning", Forum navale, 45, 1990, 9-68; Jan Glete, "En styrka mest pa papperet? Historiografiska synpunkter pa 1700-talets svenska linjeflotta", in Studier i modern historia tilldgnade Jarl Torbacke den 18 augusti 1990, Stocldiolm, 1990, 97-112; Jan Glete, "1700-talets svenska linjeflotta—en offentlig institution m e d omstallningsproblem", Historieldrarnas Forenings Arsskriji, 1990-1991, 41-51; Jan Glete, "Kriget till sjoss", in G u n n a r Arteus (ed.), Gustav IILs ryska krig, Stockliolm, 1992, 110-74; Jan Glete, "Beredskap och vidmakthallande, Varvet och linjeflottan, 1772-1866", in Karkkronavarvets historia, I, 145-252; Jan Glete, "Sheldon, af C h a p m a n och de svenska linjeskeppen, 1750-1800", in E m m a Having (ed.), Marinmuseum. Modellkammaren 250 dr—ett marinmuseums fodehe, Karlskrona, 2002, 18-31.

1

CHAPTER THREE

NAVAL OPERATIONS AND CONTROL OF THE B A L t i C SEA

3.1

Control of the sea as an administrative

problem

Tlie strategic concepts of command of the sea and control of the sea have been defined in various ways. C o m m o n definitions associate command of the sea with power exercised by concentrated battle fleets deployed to strategically important waters where they limit or eliminate the enemy's freedom of operation at sea and even on land. Control of the sea is associated with dispersed naval forces protecting important sea lines of communication for shipping and military logistics. In oceanic warfare, the differences are ol^en important, because a battle fleet may fight or blockade the enemy main force in one part of the ocean and control important sea lines of communication in another. In the Baltic Sea, a rather narrow inland sea with intense maritime commerce and long vulnerable coasts, the difference is less relevant. In major naval wars, the battle fleet and a limited number of cruising vessels could effectively defend one part of the sea if the fleet was placed in a strategically advantageous position, between the enemy base and the part of the sea that should be protected. Fleet commanders on both sides were normally unwifling, or forbidden, to expose their home waters by allowing the enemy fleet to stay between them and their base. This usually created strategic situations in which most available warships were concentrated in the battle fleets and rather few ships were escorting merchantmen and transports. These could sail behind the protective shield created by the battle fleet. In this chapter, the expression "control of the sea lines of communication" will be used to focus the reader's attention on the importance of the sea for movements of military logistics and commercial trade. The reader must be aware, however, that the chapter concentrates on battle fleet operations, not convoys. C o n t r o l o r c o m m a n d of t h e sea u s u a l l y h a s b e e n s t u d i e d as a strategic p r o b l e m , w i t h q u e s t i o n s of h o w a n d w h e r e n a v a l f o r c e s s h o u l d

136

C H A P T E R THREE

be deployed with the best effect and why battles are fought. Battles often are seen as very important for achieving strategic goals, and the term "decisive battle" has an almost mythical importance in traditional battle-oriented analysis of warfare on land and at sea. To achieve control of the sea, however, is also an administrative problem, a question of sending ships to sea in sufficient number and of maintaining them as an operational force as long as necessary. Studies of how it was possible to achieve control of the Baltic Sea must be concentrated on how resources were used in administrative processes rather than on decision-making about strategy. There were few narrow passages, strategic positions, and lines of operation to choose between for achieving control, and strategic decision-making was primarily determined by available resources. Naval operations required the ability to concentrate and coordinate officers, men, provisions, naval stores, guns, and ships into operational units (fleets), which could be sent to fight at a considerable distance from the base. The administrative task of making one large warship into an effiicient and well-provisioned fighting unit was challenging. Tlie task of repeating this in many ships at the same time was often overwhelming. Frequently it failed. Sometimes fleets were delayed so long that they could no longer achieve the operational goal; sometimes they sailed too unprepared to succeed. Permanent organisation creates routines, patterns of behaviour, and professional competence that help to overcome such obstacles. It can also keep resources ready for use whenever required. This explains why rulers and elite groups became increasingly eager to organise navies as permanent organisations. The most demanding task for a Baltic naval organisation was to send out all available warships in a concentrated and combat-ready battle fleet, deploy it at a strategically important position, and maintain it there f r o m spring to autumn. This posed major problems of timing, as men, ships, provisions, guns, munitions, and various kinds of equipment had to be ready to send to sea at the same time. It also required the administration to organise a steady supply of provisions and water and to continuously find men to replace losses caused by illness. A reserve of masts and spars, sails, cables, and anchors had to be kept to replace damaged and lost equipment. In order to maintain control of the sea, the fleet had to be ready to fight a major battle at any time, and the administration had to be able to repair damages. If the fleet was to support a major amphibious operation, there were

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

137

additional administrative problems, as the army also required provisions and transport ships. Available resources and organisational capabilities normally decided the strategy. If these were sufficient, the fleet could be used for an offensive strategy. If not, it was best to keep the fleet in home waters and conserve the resources as much as possible. But this meant that control of most of the sea was left to the enemy. In practice, battle fleets in the Baltic often achieved only partial control of the sea, by taking a position somewhere between their own base and the enemy's base. If full control were to be achieved, the enemy fleet would need to be defeated or effectively blockaded, and this would require a fleet strong enough to fight the enemy under unfavourable conditions, close to the enemy base, and after a long period at sea. This required a marked superiority in resources or in quality, and such superiority required large administrative efforts. This chapter is an analysis of the result of Swedish naval administration in terms of sea control achieved by operations with the fleet. It may also fill a need for a modern survey of the more important naval operations in the Baltic.' The political context and its connection with grand strategy and army operations are discussed in chapter 2. The central theme in this chapter is to find to which extent in terms of time and geography the participating navies were able to control the sea during major wars and how that influenced the wars. It is limited to periods of battle-fleet warfare, when the Swedish fleet faced one or more major enemy fleets at sea. The long periods of power-projection warfare, when the fleet supported army operations ashore, are briefly outlined in chapter 2. The decades f r o m the late 1590s to 1630 also saw major naval operations, frequently with afl available warships. Several warships were also mobilised in the 1550s, the 1570s, and from 1631 to 1648 to support Swedish army operations and control trade on enemy ports. These operations must be kept in mind if Swedish naval policy is to be understood, but to include them in this chapter is beyond its scope.

' Until replaced by a new authoritative standard work, R. C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522-1850, London, 1910 (repr. 1969) remains useful. It is dated and it does not cover policy, strategy, or administration, but it is reliable on operations and the only book written f r o m first-hand knowledge of literature in the Scandinavian, German, Russian, and English languages.

138

CHAPTER THREE

A comprehensive study of the administrative efforts to control the sea should include information about the number and size of warships and guns at sea as well as the number of seamen and how they were provisioned and cared for when they fell ill. This chapter only gives brief information about the forces that were at sea, simply in order to show the magnitude of the administrative tasks and how it changed during two centuries. Hie strength of the operational Baltic fleets is measured with the approximate total displacement (the weight of the ship and its load) of their ships in metric tonnes. Contemporary administrators did not use this measurement.^ If only one measurement must be used for simplicity, the displacement is the most useful, because fighting power, cost, capacity to carry guns and provisions, and manning requirements were closely related to the displacement. This relationship, however, were not constant. During the 16th and 17th centuries there were changes in the number of men and a successive increase of the weight of the guns in proportion to the displacement. These questions are discussed in chapters 8 and 7, respectively. Warships and guns differed enormously in size and weight. The number of ships and guns, consequently, are often misleading in calculations of the strength of a fleet, especially in comparisons across two centuries. Warships could be anything from small craft of a few tens of tonnes to large ships of 3,000 tonnes. Guns could be anything from light swivel guns to heavy pieces of ordnance weighing three to four tonnes. In the 16th century, a large number of "guns" mounted on ships were actually heavy anti-personnel weapons, largely replaced by infantry muskets by the end of the century. The crew of one combatant unit could vary from a handful of m e n to 1,000 men or more. The smallest units were cheap and of little importance in major fleet operations, and information about them is often incomplete. A minim u m size of ships included in the calculations of fleet strength is therefore necessary. In the 16th and early 17th centuries, the number of warships in the size range of 100 to 300 tonnes were considerable, and it is relevant

^ The displacement figures in this chapter are estimated by the author a n d are mainly the same as those in Glete 1993. The composition and size of the Danish navy up to 1660 is n o w better known, however, thanks to research undertaken in the 1990s by Niels Probst, w h o has permitted m e to use his unpublished information about Danish warships f r o m 1523 to 1660.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S AND C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

139

to include combatants of about 100 tonnes and larger in wars up to 1613. However, in analysis of naval battles during the war of 1563-70, only ships of around 300 tonnes and larger are included. Smaller units were of little importance in main battles, and the sources often are silent about whether they actually participated in battles or were somewhere else in the Baltic Sea. From the 1620s, the number of combatants smaller than 300 tonnes was unimportant, and 300 tonnes has been used as the minimum size for warships included in estimates of fleet strength. In 17th-century battles, in which the composition of the fleets normally is known, ships smaller than 300 tonnes seldom participated in battle-fleet contests, except as auxiliaries. They are only mentioned when the total size of an operational fleet is important. For the Great Northern War of 1720-21, the estimates of fleet size are concentrated on the battleship force. Battleships or ships-of-the-line were by then a well defined category of ships in aU navies. Frigates and minor vessels are mentioned when they were important in naval operations. The geography of Stockholm as a naval base was of importance for Swedish naval operations until the 1670s. The passage through the archipelago from the Baltic Sea to the city of Stockholm is long, narrow, and winding (but deep), and it often took a ship several days to sail from the city to the open sea or back. From the 1560s, operational fleets actually used Dalaro in the southern part of the Stockholm archipelago as a port from spring to autumn. Only ships requiring major repairs were sent back to the shipyard in the city. Seamen and provisions sent by sea from various parts of the country were more conveniently assembled in the archipelago than in the city, and this made Dalaro the place where ships usually received their complete crews and supply of provisions. A sheltered port for provisioning and minor repairs developed here, and it was lightly fortified f r o m 1623. Slightly to the south of Dalaro, the waters around the small island of Alvsnabben, close to the 20th-century naval base at Musko, were often used as an anchorage for fleets preparing to go to sea. The date when a fleet left or arrived at Stockholm is in this chapter normally the same as its departure from or arrival at Dalaro or Alvsnabben.

3.2

The War against Christian II,

1521-1524

The first naval war of the Vasa dynasty was in one respect the most important. It is highly uncertain if the young aristocrat Gustav Eriksson

140

CHAPTER THREE

(Vasa) would have founded a royal dynasty if he had not been able to organise a navy. The peasant militia, which he led, gained control of most of Sweden during 1521, but King Christian II's fleet controlled the Baltic Sea. With control of the sea, the king could retain control of Stocldiolm, Kalmar, and Finland and could blockade Sweden. During 1521, the Swedish rebels could only muster small vessels for local guerrilla warfare. A larger ship, fitted out as a Swedish privateer by merchants in Danzig, was captured by the Danes. Three ships owned by the former Swedish regent Sten Sture (killed in combat in 1520) were inactive in Liibeck and Danzig due to lack of funds.^ Tlie financial means and the administrative competence to organise a Swedish navy were provided by a private group of Liibeck merchants, primarily those interested in trade with Sweden and Russia. They were worried by King Christian's plans for reorganising trade between the Baltic and Western Europe. These men were resourceful ship-owners, they knew how to arm, equip and provision major ships, they could raise money, and they had a well-established network to ship-masters and experienced seamen who were willing to undertake a dangerous expedition if they were paid for it. In spring 1522, they sold a fully equipped and manned fleet of eight ships to Gustav and sent it to Sweden, together with two of Sten Sture's ships in Lubeck. The fleet also carried weapons and mercenary soldiers for operations in Sweden. Almost simultaneously, the city of Liibeck fitted out a fleet of its own for war against Christian IL Gustav Eriksson had only nominal control of his Liibeck-administrated fleet, and during the summer 1522 it served together with ships from Lubeck, Stralsund and Danzig in attacks against the Danish isles and for gaining control of the Sound. In early October, the new Swedish fleet had grown to 13 major ships, including two bought from Stralsund and a new flagship, Lybske Svan, bought in Liibeck in September. The fleet was now sent forth in a decisive campaign for control of Sweden. It had been refitted and provisioned in Liibeck and now sailed northward, together with eight additional ships hired from Liibeck. Defying an autumn gale, it arrived in the northern Baltic Sea and took control of the entrance to Stockholm. The size of the fleet is uncertain, but the Swedish-owned part of it had

^ Naval and military operations 1521-24: Barkman 1937, 1-156; Barfod 1990, 154-69. Warships and naval policy: Glete 1976, 45-49; Glete 1977, 33-41, 83-84.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S AND C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

141

a total displacement between 3,000 to 4,000 tonnes. The Danish fleet was first unaware of the new situation, allowing the Swedish fleet to capture a Danish supply convoy on its way to Stockholm, although the Danish warships escaped. In late November, a Danish fleet of nine warships and four or five provision ships under command of Admiral Soren Norby tried to break the blockade. It reached the vicinity of Vaxholm in the archipelago, but came no further. There was no battle, but the Swedish fleet blocked the way to Stockholm and landed guns on islands from which the Danish fleet could be reached by gunfire. On 10 December, Norby was forced to leave the archipelago. Considering the time of the year—ice was beginning to cover the archipelago—this failure was a heroic last effort of the Christian II's fleet. The king's garrison in Stockholm was cut off from supplies but held out until midsummer 1523, when the newly elected king, Gustav I, could enter his capital. Liibeck had in 1522 proved that it still had the administrative and financial resources to organise sea power for control of the Baltic. The new Swedish regime had contributed practically nothing directly to the efforts at sea and was left with a debt of around 120,000 Liibeck mark for the naval and mihtary help it had received. In exchange, it had obtained several ships which stayed in Sweden during the winter 1522/23 and began to be administered with resources raised by taxation in Sweden."* Liibeck's fleet was now in control of the southern Baltic Sea, while the Swedish fleet controlled the northern part of this sea. Holstein and Jutland rose in rebellion against Christian II, who fled on a part of his fleet to the Netherlands in spring 1523. His energetic admiral Soren Norby continued to harass trade from Visby on Gotland. He was unable to support Christian's forces in Stocldiolm, Kalmar, and Finland, however, and these parts of Sweden were taken by Gustav's forces during the summer 1523. In the autumn, at least one Swedish ship participated in the blockade and siege of Copenhagen, which ended with the city's capitulation. Next year the Swedish navy lifted the army to Gotland in an attempt to take the island from Norby and incorporate it with Sweden. This failed, but Norby was forced to pay allegiance to the new Danish king, Frederik I. During 1525-26, the

•* Accounts f r o m the naval expedition of 1522: Hanserecesse, 3: 1477-1530, 1910, esp. 570-83; Strodda kamerala handlingar, 62, RA.

8, Leipzig,

142

CHAPTER THREE

new Swedish navy continued to operate at sea in order to protect the new order in the Nordic countries. Among the Swedish naval forces at sea in these years were small vessels {jakter) fitted out by the noblemen who administrated the royal castles in the provinces, especially Finland. This was the traditional Swedish naval power in the late medieval period. The king, however, quickly took administrative control of the new navy with major ships {holkar, kraveller), with the help of burghers in Stoclcholm who had maritime experience. These administrative efforts were effective, and the naval accounts of the Stockliolm naval shipyard, which have been preserved for the years 1526 to 1531, reveal a working naval administration. The active fleet was smaller than in 1522-24, however, and the ability of the new administration to send a major fleet to sea without technical and administrative help from Liibeck, or from the merchants and seafarers of German origin who dominated Stocldiolm's economy, remained unproven.

3.3

The War against Lubeck,

1534-1536

From 1534 to 1536, both Sweden and Lubeck intervened with mihtary and naval forces in a politically and socially complex conflict in Denmark-Norway, known as The Counts' War {Grevefejden)} Gustav I and Lubeck were already in conflict with each other from summer 1533, but they were not in open war. Then, in spring 1534, Gustav mobilised about ten warships with a total displacement of around 2,000 to 2,500 tonnes, with three major units of 300 to 600 tones. In June this fleet was sent to the Gulf of Finland and attacked Lubeckian merchantmen in Reval with gunfire. After that, the fleet was ordered to Kalmar, to join naval forces organised by Gustav's ally and brotherin-law, Duke Christian of Holstein. The rapid and dramatic progress

^ Naval operations: Barkman 1937, 191-216; Barfod 1995, 16-53. Swedish warships: Gkte 1976, 49-55; Glete 1977, 41-50, 84-87. Gustav I's out letters f r o m 1534-36 are to a large extent about the political, military, naval, and administrative sides of this war and they provide insights in the king's ambitions a n d worries when he took decisions, OR 9 - 1 1 . The most important naval accounts that remain f r o m the war are the payrolls for the crews f r o m 1535-36, which give detailed information about the composition of the crew (excluding soldiers) of every Swedish warship, S M H F 1.1-3, RA. Rantekammarbocker, vols 7 - 9 , 1534-36, RA, provide some additional information.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S AND C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

143

of Liibeck's intervention in Denmark, however, made it impossible to start offensive operations in Danish waters in 1534. Duke Christian was elected king as Christian III in July, but he was only supported by the nobility on Jutland and on Fyn, while most of Denmark was beyond his control. Liibeck sent an invasion force, which in July gained control of Copenhagen, the Danish royal warships, and the royal arsenal. Especially important was the capture of Michel and Samson, the two great ships in the Danish navy. This drastically increased Liibeck's naval power, and Gustav ordered his fleet to stay at Kalmar until autumn 1534. As mentioned in chapter 2, its very existence in the southern Baltic Sea helped to stabilise the uncertain political and mihtary situation in Sweden itself The castle of Viborg returned to Gustav's control, and the Hanse cities choose to remain neutral and ignore the trade blockade that Liibeck had declared on Sweden. The next year, a considerably larger fleet of ten ships of 4,000 to 4,500 tonnes displacement was ready to sail f r o m Stockholm as early as April. The main additions were two great ships, Gustav's Store Kravelen and the Kamperman, a Dutch carvel-built merchantman, which had been sequestered in 1534 and fitted out as warship. The fleet joined a fleet of small vessels sent by Christian III f r o m the territories he controlled: Holstein, Jutland, and Gotland. A somewhat larger force was sent by the duke of Prussia. King Gustav was anxious that the three fleets should join forces before they sailed for the southern Baltic, where Liibeck's fleet was in control. However, it was his own fleet which formed the bulk of the allied fleet with most of its major warships. Sweden also supplied the fleet with most of its infantry (around 1,800 men), which was still regarded as the major fighting component of a fleet. The allied fleets rapidly defeated the naval forces of Liibeck and their Danish allies. The battle of Bornholm on 9 June 1535 forced their main fleet to seek protection in Copenhagen. One week later the allied attacked the Lubeckian fleet guarding the Danish straits in Svendborgsund. It was captured and divided between the three aUied fleets. At least the Bornholm battle was fought and decided by gunfire, partly because the winds were too fresh for boarding. It was mainly the two largest Swedish ships. Store Kravelen and Kamperman, which took part in that battle, because their sailing abilities left most of the fleet behind during the chase of the Lubeckian fleet. The allied fleet had now secured control of the southern Baltic Sea, and Christian Ill's

144

CHAPTER THREE

army could invade the Danish isles and start a siege of Copenhagen from land and a blockade from the sea. The fleet controlled by Christian III had been increased with captured ships and ships which became available when he conquered Danish territories, but it was still smaller than Liibeck's naval forces. The Swedish fleet spent the autumn outside Copenhagen, because Tiibeck still had a fleet in the city and organised a new fleet for the relief of their forces in the Danish capital. By this time, the Swedish fleet had been increased with new and captured ships to around 7,000 tonnes, including eight major warships of around 300 to 1,800 tonnes. When it became clear that the enemy would try to hold Copenhagen during the winter, Christian III and the Danish Council asked Gustav to let the Swedish fleet stay in the Sound during the winter. In September, Christian III even left Denmark and made a brief visit to Gustav in Stockholm to negotiate about help during the winter, the only time in the early modern period when a Danish king visited Stocldrolm. Gustav I expressed serious objections, as he feared that the fleet might be lost due to sneak attacks from Liibeck's supporters in Denmark or to treason from the allies. He described the loss of the fleet as the loss of "half Sweden", but at the same time he admitted that Liibeck's fleet might break the blockade of Copenhagen if his fleet left the southern Baltic. Reluctantly, Gustav allowed it to spend the winter of 1535-36 in Landskrona, where a provisional Swedish naval base was established. Liibeck admitted defeat and left the war during the winter, leaving Copenhagen and the captured Danish warships to Christian III. The Swedish fleet returned to Stockholm on 10 June 1536 after an absence of about 14 months.*^ The expedition against a major naval enemy, Liibeck, which also had gained control over the bulk of the Danish navy, had been surprisingly successful. The Swedish king had been able to drastically enlarge his active fleet from 2,000/2,500 tonnes in 1534 to 7,000 tonnes in 1535 when the war eff"ort required that. He could find men, guns, equipment, and provisions to keep this force in service far f r o m its base, and he was no longer dependent on Liibeck for naval administration. That outcome was far f r o m certain and was probably a surprise for m a n y contemporary observers. Liibeck clearly underestimated the strength

The fleet's winter station in the Sound: Gustav I's letters in GR 10, 247 (2/9 1535), 262 (13/9 1535), 263-64 (13/9 1535) and 285-86 (31/10 1535); the quotation is in the last letter.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S AND C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

145

Gustav was able to gather, and they had based their bold strategy—an attempt to install clients as rulers in all three Nordic kingdoms—on a b e l i e f that they had naval superiority in Northern Europe. This proved false, but the mistake is understandable, given that Sweden never before had sent a major fleet to sea without Liibeck's administrative support. Gustav I in 1535-36 had proved that his new regime had enough naval power to control the northern Baltic and launch offensives in the southern Baltic Sea against major enemies. This created a new balance of power in the Baltic and placed his regime on a more secure footing. It was unlikely that it should fall to a seaborne intervention f r o m the Baltic trading cities in cooperation with domestic opposition groups. Unlike the pre-1520 Swedish regimes, it was not seriously vulnerable to Danish sea power. The sailing fleet was never again fully mobilised during Gustav's reign, but he maintained it as a permanent deterrent. The war had made that deterrent credible. 3.4

The Nordic Seven Years War,

1563-1570

From 1563, Sweden fought a war against Denmark-Norway, Liibeck, and Poland-Lithuania. It was the first of several wars between the two new Nordic monarchic states. It was also the first of Sweden's conflicts about power in the eastern Baltic and the only conflict before the 18th century in which other naval powers tried to intervene in the northern Baltic and the Gulf of Finland. Poland ceased to be an enemy from 1569, but from 1570 Russia became a more determined enemy. Sweden had to fight three enemies during eight campaign seasons and could not concentrate all its forces on any one enemy. The outcome showed that Sweden was the strongest power in Northern Europe, although this superiority was not sufficient to defeat a coalition.^

' Tlie Swedish literature about naval operations the Nordic Seven Years is incomplete and dated. Fredrik W^estling, Det nordiska sjudrsbigets historia, Stocldiolm, 1879-80, provides a chronological f r a m e w o r k to Swedish diplomacy a n d military a n d naval operations with references to the sources; Zettersten 1890, 412-30, and Svenska flottans historia, I, esp. 155-57, 168-92, 5 0 8 - 1 5 (text by Carl E k m a n and G u n n a r Unger), provide general surveys but lack detailed references to m a n y of the sources. Carl Ekman, "Nagra data o m Erik XIV;s sjokrigskonst", TiS, 109, 1946, 50-83, is an analysis of the first years of the war. Of the Danish studies, H a n s D. Lind, Fra kong Frederik den andens tid: Bidrag til den dansk-norske somagts historie, 1559-1588, Copenhagen, 1902, 1-162 has detailed quotations f r o m narrative and administrative Danish sources;

146

CHAPTER THREE

Sweden's enemies had different and sometimes conflicting goals for their operations, and that weakened their alliance. The war at sea was fought with Denmark and Liibeck, although Poland participated with privateers from Danzig. Liibeck was the junior partner in the naval alliance, and a Danish admiral commanded the allied main fleet, which normally operated as a single unit. Liibeck was the only one of the three contending powers that had a large merchant fleet and an important stake in trade throughout the Baltic Sea to protect. Its main aim in the war was to eliminate Sweden's interference with Liibeck's profitable trade with Russia through ports in the Gulf of Finland. Liibeck also hoped to regain at least some of its old trading privileges in Sweden. Lubeck was to be the great loser in this war; none of its goals were achieved, and it suffered severe losses in shipping. The Danish king Fredrik II went to war partly because he had ambitions of his own and partly because Swedish policy under the new king, Erik XIV, looked threatening. Denmark had no army in peacetime and was vulnerable to a sudden attack from the partly mobilised Swedish army and navy. W h e n Frederik began to organise a mercenary army, he was almost forced to use it quickly, as it was very expensive to maintain. The naval part of this war is interesting from technical, tactical, strategic, and logistical points of view. A detailed study of it would reveal the limitations and capabilities of early gun-armed sailing fleets in a period which offers few other battles and major operations with such fleets to study. However, the well-preserved Swedish naval accounts about armament, provisions, and ships are largely unused for studies of the administrative efforts behind the naval operations.® On the

E. Briand de Crevecoeur, Herluf Trolle: Kongens Admiral och Herlujsholms Skoles stifter, Copenhagen, 1959, 69-138 is detailed about letters f r o m the Danish commander-in-chief d u r i n g 1564^65; while Barfod 1995, 163-227, is a survey based on this literature and additional sources. Herbert Kloth, "Liibecks Seekriegswesen in der Zeit des nordischen Siebenjahrige Krieges, 1563-1570: Bin Beitrag zur deutschen Seekriegsgeschichte im 16. Jahrhundert", Zeitschrift des Vereins fur Lubeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 21, 1923, 1-51, 185-256; 22, 1925, 121-52, 325-79, is a t h o r o u g h study of administrative sources in Lubeck. ® These sources are here mainly used for information about the size and a r m a m e n t of the operational fleets. Administrative archival series f r o m the naval war 1563-70, Militara amnessamlingar (M), M 1272, M 1761, M 1848; SH, vols 9 - 2 5 (shipyard accounts, inventories of ships, register of guns and m u n i t i o n s on ships, payrolls, provision accounts); SMHF, vols 1 - 3 ( s u p p l e m e n t a r y to Skeppsgardshandlingar); P r o v i a n t r a k e n s k a p e r 1563-70 for Stockholm, Kalmar and other ports; Kaperirakenskaper, vols 1 - 6 (accounts of goods captured by royal warships); Sandbergska samlingen (SS), littera Z, all in RA; o r d n a n c e accounts, primarily AR 1563/9, 1563/20, 1564/14, 1564/15, 1566/2, 1566/13,

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

147

Danish and Lubeckian side, there are few accounts but several narrative sources, primarily letters f r o m admirals. Danish historians have used these, while Swedish historians have relied much more on the letters from the king to his admirals and his administrators.® There are also Swedish narrative sources based on now lost letters and reports from participants in the operations. These can be used, but only after an analysis of their origin.'" The definite history of the war at sea must be based on combinations and comparisons of sources from all three contending powers, and on sources which show how the war affected Baltic trade, an undertaking not yet achieved. Tliis section is focused on to which extent the contending fleets were able to control various parts of the Baltic Sea. Denmark and Liibeck desired first of all to keep control of the southern Baltic Sea, their own home water. The offensive aim of the Danish-Lubeckian naval operations was to gain control of the northern Baltic Sea, blockade the Swedish ports, and open the Gulf of Finland for trade unhindered by Swedish warships. If Danish army operations were successful, the fleet might support a decisive war effort in the Lake Miilaren valley with transports of soldiers, heavy guns, and provisions. If the allied fleet was successful in taking control of the Gulf of Finland, it might cut Swedish communications in the region, isolate Estonia, Finland and Sweden from each other, and support a Polish conquest of Estonia. Tlie first aim of Swedish naval operations was twofold: to keep the trade routes between Sweden and Germany open and to maintain naval control over the Gulf of Finland in order to cut off vital enemy trade and protect internal communication. The second and more ambitious aim was also multi-fold: to gain control over the southern Baltic Sea, raise custom duties at the Sound, attack Liibeck's trade in its home water, and threaten the Danish isles with invasion or destruction. If the Swedish army was able to march through Skane and the navy able to enter the Sound, a final operation against Copenhagen

1567/1,1567/3,1568/2, 1568/12,1569/lc, 1570/16, KrA. The provisioning of the Swedish fleet in 1563-70, Soderlind, 150-59. ' The copies of the king's outgoing letters in Riksregistraturet, RA, is a central source for Swedish 16th-century history. I have benefitted f r o m the copies of letters about naval questions in Riksregistraturet m a d e by M.A. Dan Johansson, Historiska institutionen, Stockholm University. Hasse Petrini, Kdlhtudier till Erik XIV: s och Nordiska sjuarskrigets historia, Lund, 1942, provides a critical discussion of the origin of Swedish narrative sources about this war, see esp. 54-71. It has not yet been used for studies of the naval operations.

148

CHAPTER THREE

would be possible, with the navy bringing in soldiers, heavy guns, and provisions. Tlie war started with an incident at sea that led to a naval battle at Bornholm between Sweden and Denmark on 30 May 1563. Both Frederik II of Denmark and Erik XIV of Sweden were willing to provoke a war, but Frederik had underestimated the strength of the fleet Erik had sent out. The Danes had ten ships of around 3,000 tonnes, half of them major warships of around 300 to 800 tonnes. Hie size of the Swedish fleet is uncertain, but it had at least 16 warships of around 5,000 tonnes, five of them of 300 to 1,200 tonnes, and it had a much heavier armament." Both fleets were large enough to be commanded by senior admirals, the Danish by Jakob Brockenhus and the Swedish by Jakob Bagge. The Danish admiral demanded that the Swedes offer marks of respect to the Danish king in the waters under his dominium. This was denied, and in the battle that followed the Swedes captured the Danish flagship Hercules and two other major warships and damaged the other two major Danish warships. Danish attempts to engage in close combat were answered with Swedish gunfire, which dismasted the flagship. This difference in tactics was repeated in the four following battles and reflects the Swedish fleet's considerable superiority in gunfire. This victory gave Sweden control of the Baltic Sea for a time. But during the summer of 1563, Denmark and Liibeck mobilised a large joint fleet, which in early August, under command by the veteran Danish admiral Peder Skram, sailed into the southern Baltic Sea. One m o n t h later it reached Gotland, which was to be the base for its operations in the northern Baltic Sea. The Danish part of the fleet consisted

" A list of 12 warships (total size a r o u n d 5,500 tonnes) is provided in an early 17thcentury work, Erik Joransson Tegel, Konung Erics den XIV: des historia (ed. Anders A n t o n von Stiernman), Stocldiolm, 1751, 85. Tegel had access to sources in the royal archives that now are lost. The list is accepted by Zettersten 1890, 414, but it cannot be correct, because one of the listed ships, St Christopher, was not ready for service until 1564 while another, Hector, is not m e n t i o n e d in the o r d n a n c e accounts a m o n g ships fitted out for sea before 30/5 1563, AR 1563/20, KrA. Carl Ekman, who m a d e extensive research in the administrative sources f r o m 1563-64 estimated its strength to nine large and medium-sized warships, six barks (small sailing warships built for speed), two boyers (small two-masted vessels), and two galleys, Svenska flottans historia, I. 171. This agrees with a list of ships provisioned at Stockholm 2 1 / 5 - 6 3 in U p p l a n d s handlingar, 1563:32:1, RA and also with ships fitted with o r d n a n c e in the spring 1563, AR 1563/20, KrA. The total displacement of this fleet was a r o u n d 5,000 tonnes, but a few a r m e d Swedish m e r c h a n t m e n may also have sailed with the fleet and participated in the battle.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

149

of a r o u n d 20 m a j o r warships of a r o u n d 300 to 1,500 tonnes, while Liibeck had five major warships. Tlie total size of the fleet was at least 12,000 tonnes, but most of the ships were large m e r c h a n t m e n , which had been bought or hired during the s u m m e r , and most of these were probably only lightly armed with guns. In the a u t u m n of 1563, Sweden had mobilised 40 sailing warships and 11 galleys of a r o u n d 12,000 tonnes, but most of these ships were small, and several served in the Gulf of Finland or patrolled along the coast. The main Swedish fleet had stayed in a defensive position in the northern Baltic Sea since the s u m m e r and had m a d e only a raid on Gotland. U n d e r its cover, the Swedish blockade force in the Gulf of Finland captured a large n u m b e r of m e r c h a n t m e n , mainly f r o m Liibeck, including four m a j o r ships, which became Swedish warships. On 11 September, the two m a i n fleets met in a battle between Gotland and the Stockholm archipelago. The Swedish fleet may have had as many as 27 units, but of these, only 12 of a r o u n d 7,500 tonnes were major warships of 300 to 1,200 tonnes. The allies thus had a great superiority in m a j o r ships. But the Swedish fleet mainly consisted of purpose-built warships, and several of the smaller Swedish ships m a y have had a stronger gun a r m a m e n t than the larger allied ships. The Danish admiral, Skram, attempted to achieve a decisive victory and gain control over the n o r t h e r n Baltic Sea, while the Swedish admiral, Bagge, probably fought because Erik XIV d e m a n d e d a battle. Bagge may have hoped to inflict so m u c h damage o n the enemy fleet that it would be forced to return to its base for repair. The allies tried to come to close combat while the Swedish fleet avoided that, and the battle ended without losses of ships o n any side. The Swedish fleet retreated to the archipelago whfle the aflies cruised in the open sea close to Gotland until late October. For about two autumn months, beset by gales and cold weather, they had exercised control of the n o r t h e r n Baltic Sea, a creditable performance with a largely improvised fleet. King Fredrik complained, however, that merchantmen were stfll sailing f r o m Stralsund to Sweden. It was in fact impossible to achieve a blockade of the entire Swedish coast with its

" Information about the n u m b e r of Swedish warships in active service is in this section primarily derived f r o m the yearly o r d n a n c e accounts in SH, RA and AR, KrA, h i f o r m a t i o n about D a n i s h warships in active service is f r o m Niels Probst's list of Danish warships 1523-1660 and lists of ships in service in Unci 1902 and Barfod 1995. Information about Liibeck's warships, Kloth 1923-25, esp. 1923, 208-09.

150

CHAPTER THREE

many ports and with an archipelago as a protected route for small ships, but the allied fleet had forced the Swedish fleet into a fleet-in-being strategy." If the allied fleet could return to the northern Baltic Sea next year and stay there, it might both open the Gulf of Finland for Liibeck and make it hazardous for neutral shipping to sail on Stockliolm and Finland during the normal season for shipping. Tliat would have been what most contemporary observers might have expected of a combination of the Danish royal navy with the largest shipping city in the Baltic. Actually, events were to take a different turn. Both fleets were at sea early the next year. Jakob Bagge now had a main fleet of 34 sailing warships and three galleys of around 13,000 tonnes. Of these, 16 were major warships of 300 to 1,800 tonnes, a total of around 10,000 tonnes." The allied fleet under the Danish admiral Herluf Trolle had at least 15 Danish and ten Lubeckian major warships of around 14,000 tonnes and some smaller vessels.'^ The fleets met in battle off northern Oland on 30 and 31 May. Bagge initially held the windward position and was able to fight with guns and avoid boarding. Some allied ships were damaged, and a Lubeckian ship was sunk, but during the night the Swedish fleet lost cohesion, and only five or six major ships seem to have participated on the second day of the battle. The allies were able to damage the rudder of the large Swedish flagship, Mars, which was abandoned by the remaining Swedish ships. The allies boarded the flagship, but it caught fire and blew up when one of its guns exploded. Probably around 550-600 men were killed, while Jakob Bagge and around 100 men were taken prisoners. This was the first and last allied victory at sea in the war. It did not result from forcing the Swedish fleet into a decisive action. Except for Mars, Swedish losses were actually light, reportedly 101 dead and wounded,'® and the fleet soon proved able to sail again. Fighting morale

" A detailed account of Danish naval operations u n d e r Peder Skram in 1563 is in E. Briand de Crevecoeur, Peder Skram: Danmarks Vovehals, C o p e n h a g e n , 1950, 132-61. The n a m e s of ships and olficers are listed in the minutes f r o m the investigation about the conduct of the officers which took place after the battle of 30-31 May, "Ett bidrag till flottans historia u n d e r Erik XIV", HT, 13, 1893, 69-71. Danish naval logistics in 1564: Jesper Christiansen, "Den danske flades forsyningssituation i den Nordiske Syvarskrigs forste ar", Marinehistorisk Tidsskrift, 15, 1982, 3-17. Westling 1879-80, 60.

N A V A L O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E B A L T I C SEA

151

rather than damaged ships seems to have been the main problem on the Swedish side. Bagge appears to have been determined to fight a decisive battle with superior firepower, but several of his captains proved unwilling or unable to bring their ships within effective fighting range. Hie allied fleet sailed to Gotland for repair, but it soon had to return to the southern Baltic, due to lack of equipment, munitions, provisions, and increasing illness among the crews. Lubeck's naval commanders even insisted that the fleet stay as far west as off Rostock until it had been provisioned, a policy that would have left even the southern Baltic open to the Swedes. Liibeck had reached a nadir in its ability to administrate a naval war. The Danes were less willing to give up the southern Baltic. The allied fleet sailed on 24 June from Godand, but only to Bornholm. Logistical limits had made it impossible to use the victory at Oland to gain control of the northern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. The opportunity would not return in this war. However, around 20 Lubeckian merchantmen used what they believed was a good opportunity to sail from Narva with a rich cargo of Russian products, including naval stores such as flax, hemp, and cordage. The Swedish blockade force in the Gulf of Finland arrived too late to stop this convoy, but its departure must have been observed, and the main Swedish fleet may have been informed about it. The main fleet had returned to the Stockholm archipelago after the battle of Oland but left again for the southern Baftic on 4 July under command of the young aristocrat Klas Fleming. Aflied scouting vessels observed this departure, and aflied commanders made the fatal decision to leave Bornholm and safl to the German coast, believing that the Swedish fleet intended to escort troop transports f r o m Germany. Actually, the Swedish main fleet anchored oft' Bornholm on 14 July and attacked the convoy from Nai-va when it arrived the next day. The convoy lost nearly afl its ships and their cargoes, a severe economic loss for Liibeck and a great gain for Sweden. The allies seem to have been unaware that the convoy was approaching Bornholm when it did. It is unknown whether the Swedish fleet's timely appearance at Bornholm was a pure accident or if ft had received reports about the convoy from scouting vessels or merchantmen. Several prizes were fitted out as warships, and naval stores f r o m these and other captured merchantmen went straight to the Swedish fleet, making it easier to prepare the enlarged fleet, which went to sea in 1565. The loss of naval

152

C H A P T E R THREE

stores probably made the preparation of the allied fleets more difficult the next year and may explain some of the delays they encountered. Tlie capture of the convoy, more than any of the other battles, may have been the decisive turning point in this naval war.'^ Hie Swedish fleet sailed back to northern Kalmarsund with its booty but Erik XIV urged Fleming to go to sea again. He did so but soon returned after having sighted the enemy fleet between Oland and Bornholm on 4 and 5 August. Gunfire was heard on land, but there are no reports from any of the fleets about a real battle. It is possible that the weather was foggy and that the two fleets could not locate each other. Erik became dissatisfied with Fleming and replaced him with one of his best army commanders and administrators, the aristocrat Klas Horn. At this moment, both field armies operated in the southeastern border zone between Sweden and Denmark, and control of the coast of Danish Blekinge and Swedish Smaland influenced their operations. The allied fleet had been provisioned, and Herluf Trolle, who eagerly sought for a decisive action, brought it northwards to the waters between Oland and Gotland. He may have had 17 Danish and nine Lubeckian major warships of around 15,000 tonnes against 19 major Swedish ships of around 10,000 tonnes, but it is uncertain how many ships actually participated on both sides. From 11 to 15 August, a series of actions took place between Oland and Gotland. The events and even their dating are uncertain, as the sources are partly contradictory. Action seems to have started with an allied attack from a north-easterly windward position on the Swedish fleet in the northern part of Kalmarsund on 11 and 12 August. It was foHowed on 13 August by an allied landing on Oland, where they burned farms. Early on 14 August the Swedish fleet returned to action f r o m a windward position, but it fought only with guns and avoided close action. The allied fleet first met it at anchor. What then happened is uncertain, but both fleets went to sea. Trolle claimed that he sent some of his best sailers to sea, that Horn chased them, and that this gave the allies the possibility to gain the windward position and follow the Swedish fleet. It is equally possible, however, that Horn deliberately left the windward position to the allied fleet in order to

" The captured goods: Bjorn Sandahl, "De svenska kaperierna i Ostersjon 15621566", Forum navale, 56, 2001, 20-34. Danish problems with lack of cordage and cables in early 1565: Lind 1902, 76.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

153

draw it to sea so that they would stop ravaging Oland. In any case, this is what the alUed fleet did. Horn probably also hoped to inflict as much damage as possible with gunfire in order to force the enemies to return to their home waters. Nothing indicates that he intended to fight a decisive action of the type Jakob Bagge had attempted ten weeks earlier. We are left to speculate, however, because no reports from Horn have survived. In his letter to Frederik 11, Trolle described the action as a chase of an enemy who consistently avoided close-range action and used his superiority in speed and ability to sail close to the wind to keep the distance, engage and disengage at will, and finally regain the lost windward position. The difference between a fleet mainly consisting of purpose-built warships and a fleet with many armed merchantmen is obvious. Trolle claimed, however, that he had been able to split the Swedish fleet and that one Swedish warship had run aground, although he admitted that this was not a large ship. Other Danish reports, however, claimed that more Swedish ships, including large ones, ran aground and were lost and that one of these ships had been the Swedish flagship, Elefanten. Trolle hardly claimed that he had won a victory, but Frederik II did, and Danish historians have into the 21st century often believed him. The Swedish avoidance of close action has frequently been described as flight, even though fighting at a distance with guns was the Swedish tactic explicitly ordered by Erik XIV. Actually, it was a split in the allied fleet that had serious consequences. The action ended with three Danish warships—B^en^ Love, David and Morian—being captured east of Oland on 15 August by the Swedish fleet and 500 to 600 m e n being taken prisoners. Horn had disengaged his fleet f r o m Trolie's during the night of 15 August, when Trolle sailed east to a pre-arranged meeting for the fleet at Gotland. Horn sailed back to Oland without being pursued by Trolle, and causing the loss of the isolated Danish ships. The Swedish fleet lost no ships in this battle. Elefanten did indeed run aground somewhere in Kalmarsund at some date after the battle (probably 16 August), but the ship was salvaged and brought to the naval yard at Bjorkenas, north of Kalmar, for repair. It accidentally sank there in shallow water

The battle is described as a victory for Trolle as late as in Dansk Udenrigspolitiks historic, 1, Konger och krige, 700-1648, Copenhagen, 2002, 311-12. Crevecoeur 1959, 109-18 extensively quotes Danish reports. Swedish tactics: Ekman 1946, Svenska flottans historia, I, 512-15.

154

C H A P T E R THREE

sometime in September 1564, while under repair. Danish reports seem to have mixed up rumours about this event with earlier report about Swedish ships running aground during the battle on 14 and 15 August. Attempts to raise Elefanten in 1564-65 failed, and in the 20th century the wreck became an important object for underwater archaeology." After the batde, the Swedish fleet sailed to Kalmar while the allied fleet returned to Bornholm. Without an enemy fleet cruising along the Swedish coast, Erik XIV could launch an army offensive in late August into Blekinge, the eastern province of Denmark, which he devastated. Trolle made no further attempt to cruise in the northern Baltic Sea but stayed at Bornholm until early October. The allied fleet burnt southern Oland f r o m 22 to 27 September, with no attempt by the Swedish fleet to stop it. It was a revenge for Swedish behaviour in Blekinge but also a strike against the fertile Oland as a source of provisioning for the Swedish fleet. Erik XIV had already on 18 September ordered the main part of the fleet back to Stockholm, because it lacked provisions and its crew suffered f r o m severe diseases. It left Kalmar on 27 September. A small Danish fleet cruised in the southern Baltic until the end of the sailing season to cut off the trade between Sweden and Germany. Naval operations in 1564 ended in a stalemate that left the Swedish fleet in control of the northern Baltic and the allied fleet in control of the southern Baltic. The Swedish fleet had not opened trade with Germany, and the aflies had sufl^ered severe losses when they tried to open the trade with Russia. Both sides experienced great logistical problems when they attempted to place their fleet in a forward position far f r o m their main bases. Danish-Lubeckian efforts to bring the fleet to the northern Baltic were repeatedly frustrated by lack of provisions, epidemic illness, and various damages, which especially made the Lubeckian commanders unwilling to risk operating far f r o m the main base. The Swedish fleet showed the same behaviour after

" Carl E k m a n , "Stora Kravein Elefanten", Svenska Flottans Historia, I, 8 9 - 9 8 ; Jonathan Adams, Ships Innovation and Social Change: Aspecs of carvel shipbuilding in Northern Europe, 1450-1850, Stockholm, 2003, 87-93. Swedish narrative sources m e n t i o n that the ship ran aground on 16 August, but this is uncertain. Elefanten is mentioned as a damaged ship which should be repaired and sent back to fleet in a letter f r o m Erik XIV to Kalmar, RR 31/8 1564, RA. It is first m e n t i o n e d as sunk at Bjorkenas in a letter f r o m Erik XIV to Klas H o r n , RR 18/9 1564, RA. Erik was close to Kalmar in this period a n d must have been well i n f o r m e d about the fleet's largest ship.

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S AND C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

155

the defeat in late May, but after late July it began to use the sound between Oland and the mainland as a base f r o m which it made forays to disturb allied operations. The effect was that the allies preferred to stay at Bornholm, making it impossible to interfere with Swedish operations in the northern Baltic and protect allied trade in this part of the sea. The next year, the Swedish fleet was increased in size, and the logistical preparations for a long offensive campaign proved adequate. The main fleet under Klas H o r n had 25 m a j o r warships of around 12,000 tonnes. It left the Stoclcliolm archipelago on 15 May 1565 and sailed to the coast of Pomerania to release merchant ships blockaded in Stralsund. A m u c h smaller allied squadron was at sea blockading the German ports for Swedish shipping. O n 21 May, four allied ships were burnt to avoid capture by the Swedish fleet, while five took protection in neutral Pomerania, where they were interned until the end of the war. The losses in warships were serious for the allies, who were surprised by the early appearance of the main Swedish fleet in the southern Baltic. The blockade of Sweden was broken, and Horn began to exercise control of the sea in southern Baltic, capturing enemy merchantmen, raising toll at the southern entrance of the Sound, and attacking Liibeck's outport Travemunde. The allies had been slow to mobilise their fleets, and when Herluf Trolle on 4 June attacked the Swedish fleet near the town Bukow in Mecklenburg, he had only 11 Danish and ten Lubeckian m a j o r warships of around 13,000 tonnes. It was another battle in which the allies tried to board the Swedish ships and in which the Swedish ships avoided this and fought with guns. No ships were lost on either side, but Trolle was mortally wounded. In spite of battle damages, the Swedish fleet continued to control the southern Baltic while the allied fleet, now under command of Otto Rud, was strengthened with more ships. On 7 July it made a new attempt to force the Swedish fleet out of the southern Baltic by attacking it at Bornholm. H o r n may at this time have had as many as 27 major warships of at least 12,000 tonnes, whfle the allied fleet had 15 Danish and 12 Lubeckian major warships of around 16,000 tonnes. The allied fleet attacked from a windward position and, for once, the Swedish fleet did not avoid close-range action. As the Swedish fleet successfully had avoided that in four earlier battles we must assume that the change of tactics was deliberate. It is known that the number

156

CHAPTER THREE

of soldiers on the ships had been much increased since 1564, from around 2,000 to around 4,000, and this may reflect that Horn, an army commander turned admiral, thought that the time was ready to meet the allies in a close combat.^" A fierce battle developed and lasted from morning to evening. A small Swedish ship was sunk by collision, one of around 300 tonnes was taken by boarding, and a third ship of around 450 tonnes was destroyed by fire towards the end of the battle. According to the Danish account, the burning ship drifted into the allied fleet and caused a panic, which forced the whole fleet to retreat. It left the fleet flagship, the Danish Jaegermesteren (1,100 tonnes) as a Swedish prize with Rud as a prisoner, while another Danish ship of around 400 tonnes was sunk by gunfire. The losses in life were heavy on both sides, although the figures quoted in the literature must be taken with caution.^' It is very unlikely that the allied fleet would have retreated and abandoned its admiral only because one enemy ship had caught fire. The allies must have been exhausted and felt that the battle was not going their way. The Swedish fleet was apparently too exhausted to pursue the enemy. ^^ The net result was an allied defeat, and they lacked resources to try to gain the initiative at sea this year. The battle had been intense, however, and the Swedish fleet did safl back to Stockholm for repair and provisioning. It had been at sea continuously for two months, during which it had fought two major and two minor battles and had exercised full control of the Baltic Sea. The allies were only able to send limited forces to sea, and they returned to port when the Swedish fleet returned to the southern Baltic in early September. Horn remained there untfl 25 October, when his fleet left Kalmar for Stockholm. He used Kalmar

A r m y units and n u m b e r of soldiers on the fleet in 1563-70: Axtorna: En studie i organisation och taktik, Stocldiolm, 1926, 116-17. " Swedish losses are stated as 362 killed and 523 wounded: Zettersten 1890, 419; but it is not clear if these figures include losses on the three lost ships. Losses in m e n on both sides require a critical analysis, as there are widely different figures in the literature. ^^ Danish, Lubeckian, and Swedish reports of the battle overstate e n e m y losses of warships and, somewhat mysteriously, naval historians in b o t h countries have repeated these overstatements even though the real losses are well k n o w n in the literature f r o m each side; see for example Barfod 1995, 206, a n d Svenska flottans historia, I, 185-86. Swedish reports claimed that Lubeck's ship David a n d an u n n a m e d Danish ship sank and that another Danish ship was captured, while Danish reports claim that Swedish Hector a n d Vasterviks Barken sank. These losses are all u n c o n f i r m e d , a n d the two Swedish ships existed until 1589 and 1578 respectively.

N A V A L O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E B A L T I C SEA

157

as a base but sent out squadrons to protect trade; one squadron held a forward position at Bornholm. During 1565 the Swedish fleet had been able to keep trade between Sweden and Germany open, and for most of the year it had been able to seriously disturb allied trade in the whole Baltic Sea and raise toll on neutral trade. In 1566, the Swedish fleet again started early, taking control of the southern Baltic in June. Again tolls were levied on foreign merchantmen, and 52 Dutch sah-carrying ships were forced to sail to Sweden to sell their cargo at unfavourable prices. This radically improved the Swedish supply of salt, one of the few commodities which Sweden must import.^' The fleet arrived back at the Stockholm archipelago for provisioning on 6 July but sailed south again already on 15 July. The organisation for provisioning was obviously up to its task this year, and the fleet could return to operational duties without delays.^"' The allies had made great efforts to gather a large fleet, and on 26 July it met the Swedish fleet in an intense but indecisive action off Oland. Interestingly, both sides adhered to gunnery tactics in this battle. The allies probably had 18 major Danish and 11 Lubeckian warships of around 18,000 tonnes, while the Swedish fleet may have had up to 30 major warships of 14,000 tonnes.^^ Detailed information about the armament of the allied ships is not avaflable. After the battle the allied fleet sailed to Gotland, where it was caught at anchor on a lee shore when a severe gale arose. About half of the fleet, nine Danish and three Lubeckian major warships and maybe five smaller (a total of around 9,000 tonnes), were wrecked off the town of Visby on the night between 28 and 29 July. Several thousand m e n died. It was the greatest catastrophe of its kind in early modern Bahic warfare, and it was at least partly caused by the fact that severe gales are unusual in the Baltic in July. The roadstead was open, however, the anchorage was not good, and the Danish admiral, Hans Lauridsen (who were a m o n g the victims), had acted against the advice of experienced seamen and the governor of Gotland when he

Karl-Gustaf H i l d e b r a n d , "Salt a n d Cloth in Swedish E c o n o m i c History", Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2, 1954, 9 6 - 9 7 ; Oden 1966, 167-73. A paper dated 14/6 1566 with a brief list of h u g e quantities of beer, butter, cheese, meat, fish, etc. required for provisioning 8,653 m e n in t w o m o n t h s was obviously a preparation for this logistical operation, S M H F 3:2, RA. ^^ The Swedish fleet had 27 m a j o r warships in spring 1566 a n d three m o r e , Tantheijer, Halvmanen, a n d Prydsen, were a d d e d to the Swedish fleet d u r i n g the s u m m e r . Their participation in the battle is uncertain.

158

CHAPTER THREE

ordered the fleet to stay there. The Swedish fleet stayed at sea and lost no ships in this gale, but it had to return to the Stoclcholm archipelago on 6 August. Several major ships were sent to the Stockholm shipyard for repair, indicating that the gale must have been extreme. Tliroughout 1566, smaller squadrons were sent out to protect trade with Germany. From 1567, plague, financial problems, and a deep political crisis that resulted in a brief civil war in 1568 increasingly handicapped Swedish war efTorts. The main fleet was usually kept in the Stoclcholm archipelago while squadrons of medium and small warships based at Stocldiolm, Kalmar, and in Finland were sent to sea to protect trade and control trade with ports in the eastern Baltic. During 1567, the main fleet cruised in the southern Baltic Sea only during about two weeks in late July and early August. The allied main fleet also was slow to gather and did not sail far from the Sound during this year, but the allies were able to protect their own trade in the southern Baltic with smaller squadrons. During 1568, the allied fleet made brief cruises in the southern Baltic, while Swedish squadrons cruised in the northern Baltic with occasional appearances in the southern part of the sea. In July and August, a Swedish squadron supported an amphibious expedition to the Danish-controlled island of Osel, resulting in the conquest of Sonnenburg castle. The two main fleets were unable to sail in full strength, mainly due to lack of men. This situation continued on the Swedish side during 1569, while the allies were able to make an expedition to Reval, which was blockaded during two or three weeks in July. In 1570, Sweden made a final major effort at sea and sent the main fleet to the southern Baltic, where it arrived in mid-July. It captured a number of merchantmen and a Danish warship, after which it attempted to conquer Gotland. A surprise attack failed, and the fleet was back in the Stockliolm archipelago by mid-August. Preparations for a more systematic conquest of Gotland started but were not carried out. The war had shown that administration and the ability to mobilise resources for naval operations determined naval strategy. The c o m m a n d e r s on both sides knew what they wished to achieve, but their ambitious aims required a large fleet. It proved difficult to keep a large fleet at sea, far f r o m it base, and ready to meet an enemy that came straight f r o m its base with fresh forces. Smaller squadrons could be kept at sea for extended periods, but operations with

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

159

the main fleets tested the administrations to their hmits. The most important problems for all three fleets t h r o u g h o u t the war were food and epidemic illness. The fleets needed provisioning at least every second m o n t h , and food was often difficult to find and bring to the fleets. At least up to 1566, the problem of finding sufficient crews at the start of every campaign seem moderate, but widespread disease usually soon reduced the n u m b e r of m e n w h o could serve. Repairs of ships and rigs after gales and battles were increasingly d o n e at sea, which probably reflects improved competence. Swedish warships were mainly acquired by new construction and capture of enemy warships and armed merchantmen, while the allies initially relied heavily on requisitioned or purchased armed merchantmen. Sweden had an advantage in its ability to mass-produce copper guns with domestic resources. During the 1560s, Swedish gun foundries produced guns that kept the navy well armed for several decades ahead. Newly built warships were almost exclusively armed with copper guns, and the several captured ships, which predominantly were armed with wrought-iron guns of limited efficiency, were rearmed with copper guns. The allies were initially m u c h inferior in m o d ern gunnery and had to acquire cast-iron guns f r o m abroad. These were more powerful against ships t h a n wrought-iron guns, but, as Denmark later replaced t h e m with copper guns, they must have been regarded as inferior to Swedish gunnery. In a longer perspective, the administrative achievements of both the Swedish and the Danish navies are impressive. They operated at sea with much greater strength than ever before, they made great efforts to stay at sea from spring to autumn, and they repeatedly tried to change the strategic situation with major battles. They also built several large gun-armed warships during the war, some of them the largest in the world. Liibeck's naval effort was not smaller than in earlier wars, but it was overshadowed by the two larger royal fleets. Compared to earlier wars, when naval operations often had been concentrated in confined waters such as the Danish straits and the Swedish archipelago where the strain from the weather was less intense, the fleets were now in the open sea for long periods. This new type of naval operations required

Danish artillery: Mortensen 1999, esp. 273-&7. Swedish gun production: Theodor Jakobsson, Lantmilitar bevdpning och bekladnad under dldre Vasatiden och Gustav II Adolfs tid, Sveriges Krig 1611-1632: Bilagsband II, Stockhohn, 1938, 25-48.

160

CHAPTER THREE

intense preparations during the winter and a well-planned supply of food, sails, cables, anchors, munitions, and equipment during the operations. Swedish naval administration had f r o m 1563 to 1566 been able to expand the fleet to the largest sailing fleet in Europe. The efforts of keeping a fleet at sea did not begin f r o m nothing in 1563. Since 1559, Erik XIV had kept an increasing n u m b e r of ships in commission for his marriage expeditions to the British Isles and for control of the Gulf of Finland. Already during 1562, ships (of a r o u n d 100 tonnes displacement and larger) with a total displacement of a r o u n d 8,000 tonnes had been in service, fully armed (but not all fully m a n n e d ) for war, the largest fleet Sweden ever had kept in commission. In the a u t u m n 1563, fully m a n n e d warships with a total displacement of a r o u n d 12,000 tonnes were at sea. The next spring, ships of about 15,000 tonnes were sent to sea, and a year later, in spring 1565, the active fleet had a total strength of a r o u n d 17,000 tonnes. It remained at that level the next year. The strength of the fleet sent out in 1570 was even slightly larger, primarily due to the commissioning of three new large ships, although the operations were shorter and less intense. Behind this was a large new officer corps of men who were generalists and administratively skilled rather than specialised as seamen officers. Together with the administrative staff at the shipyards, the ordnance depots, the gun foundries, and the provisioning organisation these men channelled men, food, and material resources to a large operational fleet during eight years of war. It was an administrative effort of a much greater magnitude than ever before in Swedish naval history, and it shows the major steps towards a fiscal-military state, which had been taken in a few decades. The effects on the war of these efforts were also considerable. The navy had been able to break the blockade of neutral trade with Sweden, it had controlled communications at sea between Sweden, Finland and Estonia, and it had periodically taken control of enemy h o m e waters in the southern Baltic Sea. The first two achievements kept Sweden f r o m being defeated; the effect on D e n m a r k and Liibeck of periodical Swedish control of the southern Baltic is less clear. Liibeck likely suffered the most, because its trade could be taken over by neutrals, and that may have been one reason why this was the last time that the old capital of the Hanse tried to exercise sea

NAVAL O P E R A T I O N S A N D C O N T R O L OF T H E BALTIC SEA

161

power. Liibeck was the one obvious loser in this war, and the defeat had taken place at sea. 3.5

The Kalmar War,

1611-1613

The Danish attack on Sweden in spring 1611 came as a surprise for Karl IX, even though his own policy against D e n m a r k had been provocative. The Danish fleet in 1610 had already been mobilised to a large extent for a possible war. In that year it broke the Swedish naval blockade of Polish Riga, as Christian IV saw it as an infringement of his dominium over the waters south of Danish Osel. The Danish readiness for a naval war was obvious to the Swedish naval commanders who avoided combat in 1610, but Karl choose to ignore the warning and failed to keep his forces prepared for a Danish attack. Karl had for a long time been confident in his belief that the aristocratic Danish Council would hinder Christian IV f r o m starting a war, and he shaped his strategy and the administrative efforts for his armed forces to this belief Sweden's war efforts for 1611 were directed against Russia, where Karl hoped to make one of his sons tsar with the support of a faction in the civil war. The army m a d e rapid advances during the winter and s u m m e r of 1611, culminating in the conquest of the large city of Novgorod. Swedish domestic politics, however, were in crisis by 1611, dominated the ailing Karl IX's increasingly erratic efforts to control his realm. Karl had seldom been a good strategist, and the great resources he had been able to raise for his army and navy often had not been efficiently used. His illness and declining strength m a d e this problem worse, because the central administration was still very much dependent on the king's personal efforts. The aristocrats in the Swedish Council had a m o r e realistic view of Danish intentions, but they had no direct influence over h o w the armed forces were deployed, administered, or commanded.^^

" Naval o p e r a t i o n s in this war: Sveriges sjokrig, 6 3 - 1 2 2 ; Probst 1996, 107-22. Important Swedish sources are Riksregistraturet 1611-12; M 1761, M 1848; SH, vols 63-64 (shipyard accounts for Stockholm 1611, inventories of ships 1611, registers of guns and munitions on ships 1611-12, payrolls 1611-12); SMHF, vol. 7 (supplementary to Skeppsgardshandlingar); Proviantrakenskaper, Stockholms slott 1611-12, all RA; AR 1611/1 and 1612/1 (ordnance accounts), KrA.

162

chapter

three

Hie main task of the Swedish fleet in spring 1611 was to deUver provisions and equipment to the army in the east and blocicade ports. Small squadrons were sent already in April to Livonia and the Gulf of Finland. It soon became apparent that the fleet was ill prepared to m o u n t a full-scale mobilisation for a major naval war against another battle fleet. During the long war with Poland, a considerable part of the fleet had been based in Kalmar so as to be able to sail early in spring and return late in autumn without being hindered by ice. During the winter 1610-11, 16 warships of around 7,300 tonnes were in Kalmar. Five ships of around 1,800 tonnes were in Alvsborg, while the rest of the fleet—43 ships of around 16,500 tonnes—was in Stocldiolm and Nykoping, south of Stocldiolm. These figures include warships of around 100 tonnes displacement and larger. There were also numerous smaller vessels, mainly useful for amphibious and archipelagic warfare. Except for a few galleys, these craft were armed only with light guns, however. Christian IV initially sent two squadrons to blockade Kalmar and Alvsborg, and these had already arrived at their stations when he declared war on 4 Aprfl 1611. The main Danish fleet was mobilised in April and May and sent out into the Baltic in three squadrons to control the sea, part of it cruising between Oland, Gotland, and the Swedish coast. The Danish main army advanced to Kalmar and started a siege under the king's c o m m a n d . The Swedish Kalmar squadron was only partially armed, and the ships were in such an exposed position that they had to be sunk in shallow water to avoid destruction. By mid-June, a Swedish army under Karl IX arrived to relieve Kalmar, but only oared craft and small safling vessels for shallow-water operations were available at sea. In Stoclcholm and Nykoping, the mobilisations of the main fleet had proved to be a slow process, and far f r o m all ships were made ready for sea. On 8 July, 11 ships of around 5,000 tonnes arrived at Kalmarsund (the sound between Oland and the mainland) and broke the blockade of Kalmar. It was closed again on 21 July, when the Danish blockading squadron was strengthened with ships f r o m the main fleet and the Swedish squadron (with one ship f r o m the Kalmar squadron) had to make a nightly escape through the Danish fleet, losing one ship. The squadron sailed to Barosund in the Ostergotland archipelago, well north of Kalmarsund, where it repaired and awaited reinforcements f r o m Stoclcholm and Nykoping. In these ports, several

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

163

ships in otherwise seagoing condition were waiting to receive sails and other equipment before they could sail. Before any reinforcements could arrive, a superior Danish fleet forced the Swedish squadron to retreat to the Stockliolm archipelago in early August. At the same time, the strong castle in Kalmar capitulated. Fifteen warships of almost 7,000 tonnes, m o r e t h a n one fourth of the entire Swedish fleet, were sunk and lost at the castle. Tlie Danes could only raise three of the smallest vessels, but the Swedish loss had changed the balance of power in the Baltic Sea. Lack of essential naval stores for the fleet had caused a m a j o r disaster. H i e capture of one Danish ship by a flotilla of m i n o r vessels on the night of 30 July was only a small consolation. The m a i n Swedish fleet m a d e a new attempt to reach Kalmarsund in early September but returned when it faced superior Danish forces, which captured one ship. Karl IX died on 30 October 1611, and a period of intense negotiations between the 16-year-old Gustav II Adolf and the aristocratic Council followed. It ended with a political agreement about future cooperation, but this had little effect on the naval war of 1612. On the west coast, the Swedish Alvsborg squadron had not left port during 1611, partly due to deficient outfitting. The Danish forces were superior in strength but did not always keep a close blockade, so merchantmen were able to sail to the port. Danish operations in 1612 started with a large-scale attack on Alvsborg with around 10,000 soldiers. The operation was lead by Christian IV, and a part of the army came with the fleet. The fortress with the naval squadron, five ships, and one small vessel of around 1,800 tonnes capitulated on 24 May, another m a j o r disaster for Sweden. At the same time, a Danish squadron landed army forces with siege guns on Oland. The fortress on the island, Borgholm, capitulated on 11 June. Christian IV had shown that he was able to undertake two amphibious operations simultaneously. In the 1560s, the Swedish navy had been able to arrive in great strength in the southern Baltic Sea as early as in May. But in 1612, only 11 ships of around 4,000 tonnes were ready in Stockholm by late May, followed by eight more (around 4,000 tonnes) by mid-June. A brief cruise around Gotland was made in June, followed by a serious attempt to find the Danish fleet with a cruise between Stockholm and Danzig f r o m 24 July to 10 August. The attempt failed, however, because the Danish fleet was forced by a severe epidemic disease to return to Copenhagen at the end of July.

164

chapter

three

Christian IV now decided to send all the naval forces he could assemble on a major sweep through the Baltic Sea in order to find and defeat the Swedish main fleet. His offensive war on land had stagnated, but an offensive at sea was possible. Seamen were freshly recruited and 36 ships were ready to sail from Copenhagen on 13 August, only two weeks after the fleet had been forced to return to port. This was an impressive demonstration that Denmark-Norway had manpower reserves for its navy. The king took command of this fleet himself, and the search for the enemy took him to the Stockliolm archipelago and the Vaxholm fortress, which together with the Swedish fleet blocked the entrance to the capital. This last visit by an Oldenburg king to the Stockholm archipelago was brief, only around ten days, and he had no army with which he could attack Stockholm. He returned with the fleet to Copenhagen on 17 September. The two fleets were reduced to squadron strength and cruised in the Baltic Sea during the autumn mainly in order to protect and attack trade. The Swedish fleet lost one ship, which was captured by the Danes under unknown circumstances.^® The Swedish navy was defeated both by lack of strategic imagination and large administrative deficiencies. On paper, the war started with a considerable Swedish superiority at sea in terms of ships: 64 with a total displacement of around 26,000 tonnes against 31 Danish ships of around 15,000 tonnes (warships of 100 tonnes and larger). In actuality, the effective Swedish navy was much smaller than this in size. In 1611, only 25 of 43 available ships (of 100 tonnes or more) in Stockholm and Nykoping went to sea. The next year, 14 of 38 available ships remained in port throughout the year, even though there had been more than a year to make them ready for sea.^' The ships left in port were not generally old and obsolete; several of them were at sea after 1612. Many were incomplete or in need of repair or lacked masts and spars, sails and cables, and the gun inventory was not sufficient

^^ There are no reports f r o m the two fleets f r o m the a u t u m n 1612, a n d it has been unclear whether or not the Swedish s q u a d r o n was at sea: Sveriges sjokrig, 121. The gun inventory of 1612, SH, 64:1, RA, shows that the guns of the Swedish ship Gula Lejonet were captured in 1612. This ship is last m e n t i o n e d in Proviantrakenskaper, Stockholm, August 1612, RA. Niels Probst's unpublished list of Danish warships has a Swedish prize with the n a m e Loven (Lejonet), taken in 1612, which m u s t be this ship. Consequently, some Swedish ships m u s t have been at sea in the a u t u m n 1612. The total n u m b e r of hulls (100 tonnes and larger) available at Stockholm and Nykoping at the beginning of 1612 was 44, but six of t h e m were old a n d discarded during 1612,

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c s e a

165

to provide all ships with their full armament. The loss of the Kalmar squadron was especially disastrous, because nearly all its ships were serviceable. The political crisis in Sweden and lack of administrative coordination made the system for mobilisation of resources much too slow in a war with a well-prepared enemy. Seamen and provisions were not major problems in this war, although this must be related to the limited number of ships in service. Sweden was obviously not yet ready to fight a successful two-front war with one eastern power and Denmark. The success of the initial Danish surprise attack, which caused the loss of Kalmar and almost one fourth of the fleet, was largely the result of a political and strategic misjudgement by Karl IX. Even if he could not have known if and where Christian IV would start a war, the risk for such a war was obvious, as the situation at sea was tense already in 1610. In such a situation, a naval squadron in an exposed border port like Kalmar should either be kept in a high degree of readiness or it should be somewhere else. With a well-prepared fleet, Christian IV gained the initiative at sea right f r o m the beginning and kept it throughout the war. His fleet controlled the southern Baltic during the whole war. This caused serious difficulties for Swedish foreign trade, although the fact that many merchantmen were captured in 1611 indicates that neutral ships continued to sail to Swedish ports. Furthermore, the war did show that Denmark, even with Kalmar under its control and with a superior fleet, only briefly could control the northern Baltic Sea. 3.6

The Swedish assault on Denmark,

1643-1645

This war was planned by the Swedish government as a surprise attack on an unprepared Denmark, with the use of the forces already organised for the great war in Germany.^" The intended enemy had only a

The main Swedish study of this war is still Munthe 1905-10. It is dated and lacks detailed references to sources but it has a broad discussion of the operations on both sea and land and a good sense for logistical and practical problems connected with naval warfare. See also Zettersten 1903, 357-79, and Slaget vid Femern, 1644-1944: Minnesskrift utarbetad av Forsvarsstabens krigshistoriska avdelning, Uppsala, 1944. Olav Bergersen, Fra Henrik Bi'elke til Iver Huitfeldt: Utsyn over den dansk-norske fellesfldtes historie i perioden 1630 til 1710, I, T r o n d h e i m , 1953, 29-293, is detailed, especially about hired merchantmen. Tlie most recent work about Danish naval operations is Probst 1996, 227-56, with m u c h new information. I have also received valuable personal information from Niels M. Probst. Swedish provisioning: Sdderlind 2006, 159-68.

166

chapter

three

small permanent army and was cut off from the market for German mercenaries by Swedish control of northern Germany. The Swedish main army in Germany under Field-marshal Lennart Torstensson invaded Jutland in December 1643, while the Swedish home army under Field-marshal Gustav Horn invaded the Danish provinces east of the Sound in early February 1644. The second stage of the plan was an invasion of the Danish isles, primarily Fyn and Sjaelland. It was initially optimistically hoped that this might be achieved during the winter 1644 by the army alone, with transport vessels gathered from Danish and German ports. The Dutch-Swedish merchant Louis de Geer went to Holland and hired a fleet of Dutch armed merchantmen and transports, which were intended to protect and support this invasion. It left Dutch ports in April and early May.^' Tlie Danish navy, however, at an early stage of the war sent out light forces, which patrolled the Danish straits and destroyed vessels that the Swedish army might use for an amphibious operation. Furthermore, the Imperial army began to move its main force to northern Germany, making it difficult for Torstensson to detach a sufficiently strong force from his army for an invasion of the Danish isles. Christian IV also mobilised considerable parts of his fleet during early spring. In April and early May, a squadron under his personal command blockaded

Naval diaries and letters to and f r o m naval Swedish c o m m a n d e r s have been extensively used a n d quoted in Munthe 1905-1910. I m p o r t a n t Swedish sources about naval operations and the strength of operational fleets in terms of ships, m e n , a n d guns are in AK till Kunglig Majestat, vol. 1 (letters f r o m the Admiralty to the queen); Militara amnessamlingar, M 1761, M 1848; Skoldostersamlingen, E 8560 (Karl Gustav Wrangels papers as c o m m a n d e r of the Swedish fleet in the southern Baltic f r o m September 1644 to the s u m m e r 1645); Kammarkollegiet, Handlingar angaende statsverket, vol. 1 (the distribution of soldiers on warships in 1644); P o m m e r n - W i s m a r , Reviderade rakenskaper I, 1629-1805, vol. 1645:42-45 (wages and provision to the W i s m a r squadron in 1645), all in RA; Krigskollegiet, Artilleridepartementet, Artillerihuvudbok 1644-45 (artillery inventory for several ships); Krigskollegiet, Stocldiolm slotts arkli, Arklirakningar 1644-45 (inventory of the navy's artillery); AK, K a m m a r k o n t o r e t , Rakenskaper, Rakningar over proviantleveranser, 1642-1645, vols 1 - 2 (provisioning of the fleet f r o m Stockholm 1642-45); N N S II, 12a, (several ship-lists 1644-45), all KrA; Nordinska samlingen, vol. 134, 5 (Order of sailing 22/5 1645), UUB. The a r m y origin of the hired fleet is reflected in that its costs, 735,835 daler, 29 ore, were paid by the a r m y {Krigskollegium), not the navy (Amiralitetskollegium), Kammarkollegiet, Rikshuvudbocker, vol. 70 (1644), fol. 657. De Geer a n d the war: Erik Wilhelm Dahlgren, Louis De Geer, 1587-1652: Hans lifoch verk, 2, Uppsala, 1923, (2nd ed., Stockholm, 2002), 439-505. There are accounts for the hired fleet in Louis de Geer's papers, Leufstaarkivet, vols 45-49, RA.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

167

Gothenburg, the only Swedish port on the western coast. He ordered the Norwegian army to attack the city and hoped that this would force the Swedish home army northward and out of eastern Denmark. Information about the approach of de Geer's hired fleet from Holland forced him to break the blockade of Gothenburg, however, and sail to the North Sea. Christian IV found most of the hired fleet at Listerdyb on Jutland's west coast and attacked it. Two engagements revealed the vulnerability of armed merchantmen to the heavy artillery of purposebuilt warships, and the hired fleet returned to Holland at the beginning of June with its crews in a state of mutiny. It was reorganised, however, and ready to sail again one m o n t h later.'^ During spring 1644, the main Swedish fleet was fully mobilised. It left the Stocldiolm archipelago on 1 June 1644, arriving in the southern Baltic just two days later. This fleet was the largest ever mobilised by any Baltic power up to then. Including ships on detached service, it had 36 major warships (300 to 1,700 tonnes) with a total displacement of around 25,000 tonnes." Its task was to take control of the southern Baltic Sea and the Danish straits, but how that control should be used was dependent on the military situation on land. Ideally the fleet should protect the main Swedish army's invasion of the Danish isles and cut communication between Sjaelland and the fortified city Malmo in Skane, the main remaining Danish position in the province east of the Sound. The war zone was wide, however; information about both the Danish and Imperial enemies and the various Swedish forces were incomplete; and the Swedish government under Axel Oxenstierna had given the commanding admiral, Klas Fleming, wide latitude to take decisions in cooperation with the commanders of the two Swedish armies. The fleet made a brief visit to the southern entrance of the Sound in the hope of forcing the Danish fleet into battle. It found Drogden fortified and found only a part of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen,

The sources for the battles between the Danish fleet and the hired fleet: Ian Magnus Fahlstrom, "Kring den politiska och militara b a k g r u n d e n till slagen i Listerdyb den 16 och 25 maj 1644", Shifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska Samfundet, 6, 1945, 79-109. " Of 43 warships of 300 to 1,700 t o n n e s which existed in early 1644, St Jakob, Jungfrun, Wismarske Delfin, and Wismarske Meerman were commissioned as fireships, Konung David was listed a m o n g ships to be commissioned but is not k n o w n to have been at sea, Fama was on an expedition to N e w Sweden (Delaware), and the large Applet was not commissioned until 1645.

168

chapter

three

as parts of it were still operating in the North Sea against the hired Dutch fleet. This left the possibility open for a Swedish operation into the Sound, but Fleming hoped that the absence of part of the Danish fleet might give Torstensson's main army the opportunity to launch an invasion of the Danish isles f r o m Jutland. This required the transport capacity of the warships to be used, and Fleming sailed west into the straits between Germany and the Danish isles to gain contact with Torstensson in Holstein. He found that the field-marshal was expecting the arrival of the main Imperial army. This made it difficult to launch an immediate attack on the Danish isles, and made the collection of more transport vessels imperative. It was known that the hired fleet was preparing for a new attempt to sail f r o m Holland to the Baltic, and Torstensson hoped to launch an invasion later in the s u m m e r when it had arrived. With available forces, only a limited amphibious operation, an invasion of the island of Femern, was achieved in late June. Meanwhile, the two Danish North Sea squadrons had returned to Copenhagen, and practically all serviceable Danish warships left the city on 29 June for an operation against the Swedish fleet. Tlie fleet consisted of 25 major warships (300 tonnes and larger) of around 16,000 tonnes, seven small warships, and eight hired merchantmen of maybe 3,000 tonnes. The Swedish fleet had 34 major warships of at least 24,000 tonnes, two minor vessels, and seven fireships, the latter a French-inspired innovation, which appears not to have been introduced in the Danish navy at this time. The three largest ships— Kronan, Gota Ark, and Scepter (1,350 to 1,700 tonnes)—were larger than the two largest Danish units, Trefoldighed and St Sophie, both around 1,300 tonnes. The two fleets met on 1 July in combat west of Femern (the battle of Kolberger Heide). The engagement lasted f r o m n o o n to darkness. The Swedish fleet had the windward position, and Fleming initiated no fewer than four attacks on the Danish fleet but fafled to bring about the intense general action he had desired. Swedish losses are reported as 101 killed and wounded, and Danish looses as 210, of which no fewer than 112 were on two flagships.'"' A m o n g the wounded on these ships were the Danish Lord High Admiral Jorgen Vind, who later died, and Christian IV, who lost the

List of Danish losses: Bergersen, I, 95-96.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

169

sight of one eye. Both Fleming and Christian were critical of many of their captains, and the small losses in a long battle indeed do not show much willingness to fight on any side. The battle was a strategic setback for the Swedish fleet, however, which had failed to exploit its considerable quantitative superiority and the windward position to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy. Fleming sailed to the Bay of Kiel for repair and provisioning. In this improvised base, the fleet could keep contact with the main army for an invasion if the opportunity arose. It did not. Instead, the provisioning question became critical. In spite of the Swedish military control of Jutland and the G e r m a n coast, there was no organisation ready to find food for up to two m o n t h s for almost 6,000 m e n on the fleet. A large Swedish army had been on Jutland for more than six months, and food was becoming scarce in the region. The nearest fortified Swedish-controlled port was Wismar, but it was too far away for close cooperation with the army. The Danish fleet waited outside the bay, the Imperial army had arrived in the vicinity of Kiel, and the situation began to look critical. The Swedes stifl waited for de Geer's hired fleet, but it became increasingly clear that the military situation in Germany made it unlikely that the main Swedish army could invade the Danish isles this year. The Danish fleet landed guns on the southeastern side of the bay in order to fire on the Swedish ships. The Swedish army eliminated the battery, but not until a shot had killed Admiral Fleming. He was replaced by Major General Karl Gustav Wrangel f r o m Torstensson's army, who earlier had been in charge of the preparations for an amphibious operation. By late July, the Swedish fleet intended to leave the southern Baltic as soon as it had received sufficient provisions. Its fighting potential was declining due to illness a m o n g the crew, and the invasion must in any case be postponed due to the situation on land. Wrangel expected that the Danish fleet, which had waited outside the Bay of Kiel, would offer battle, but when the Swedish fleet sailed out of the bay for a cruise f r o m 29 July to 1 August, the adversary did not fight. Strategically, this behaviour was justified: a Danish defeat would have been a catastrophe and a victory over the larger Swedish fleet would have been unlikely. After receiving additional provisions, the Swedish fleet finally left the waters a r o u n d Kiel and Femern on the night of 2 August. A favourable wind carried it into the Stockholm archipelago on 5 August. The w o u n d e d Christian IV had been on

170

chapter

three

his fleet during the operation but not in formal c o m m a n d of it. He had spread the impression that his fleet had blockaded the enemy fleet, and he was emotionally upset when the Swedish fleet had left Danish waters unhindered, even though its departure improved D e n m a r k ' s strategic situation. He chose to make Admiral Peder Gait a scapegoat. Gait was put on trial and executed on 31 August, the only admiral ever to meet this fate for having avoided a fight with a Swedish fleet. Meanwhile, the hired Swedish fleet had left Holland and passed the Sound on 9 and 10 August. It was sighted by parts of the Danish fleet when it left the Sound, but the armed merchantmen were faster than the Danish warships and continued unharmed to Kalmar. Its arrival encouraged the Swedish government to make a new attempt to gain control over the southern Baltic during 1644. The cost of the hired fleet was very high, it was reasoned, and it might be worthwhile to make use of it quicldy while it was available. The plan was to select a number of Swedish warships, place the best oflicers in charge, and concentrate on them as many guns, soldiers, and seasoned seamen as possible. This squadron would join the hired fleet and operate with it until the Dutch ships returned to Holland late in the autumn. W h a t the fleet should achieve was left open to circumstances: the strength and behaviour of the Danish fleet and the strength of the Swedish army forces. From an administrative and strategic point of view, the plan had one entirely new feature: the Swedish ships would not return to Stockholm but would spend the winter in a Swedish-controlled German port in order to resume operations at an early date in the spring. This would limft the freedom of operations for the Danish armed forces, which normally held control of the southern Baftic untfl at least the end of May during every operational season. The Swedish squadron and the hired fleet joined forces and sailed f r o m Kalmar on 5 October under command of Karl Gustav Wrangel. After being strengthened with ships f r o m Wismar, the whole fleet consisted of 14 major warships of about 8,500 tonnes and 19 armed merchantmen of about the same displacement (only ships of 300 tonnes or more included).^^ There were also three flreships and five small vessels. At this time, only 15 major Danish warships of around 8,000 tonnes

The displacements of the hired ships have been estimated f r o m their dimensions, Leufstaarkivet, vol. 47, RA.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

171

remained in service. They had about 1,870 men against 4,300 (planned strength, probably largely achieved) on the Swedish side. The Danish fleet had guns that could fire around 5,000 pounds of shots; the Swedish warships had around the same gun power, while the hired Dutch ships could fire around 3,300 pounds. The purpose-built warships in the two royal fleets, especially the Danish fleet, had firepower concentrated in large-calibre guns of 24 to 30 pounds, while the hired merchantmen had most of their firepower in 8- and 6-pounders.^'' The Swedish fleet thus had a great superiority in men but a less marked superiority in firepower. The earlier battle of Listerdyb had shown that the lightly built and weakly armed Dutch merchantmen were no match for the more heavily armed Danish warships, which, in turn, were markedly slower than the Dutch ships. The reduction of the Danish fleet was a result of the expectation that its tasks were to guard the straits against minor Swedish forces and the hired Dutch ships if they attempted to sail back to Holland. Christian IV concentrated his resources for a counteroffensive in Skane, and for that he had also deprived the fleet of its soldiers, making it highly vulnerable to a close combat. Mentally, the king lived in an older strategic situation in which Sweden had no ports in the southern Baltic and was unable to deploy a battle fleet in this part of the sea during late autumn. When the reduced Danish fleet met Wrangel's fleet close to Femern on 11 October, it faced a m u c h superior force. Its commander, Admiral Pros Mund, chose to accept battle. He was killed in the battle, so never had the opportunity to explain his decision. He may have believed that he had met a fleet with a sizeable army force and that a fight was necessary to prevent an invasion of the isles, but he must also have considered the recent execution of Peder Gait. Christian IV had shown that he expected his admirals to fight.

^^ A r m a m e n t on Swedish warships: Kort Fdrslagh opa Efterschrefne Skepps Utredning in September Anno 1644, M 1848, (12 ships) a n d a r m a m e n t on three ships based in Wismar, E 8560. A r m a m e n t on hired D u t c h ships: Leufstaarkivet, vol. 47, (17 ships). A r m a m e n t on Danish ships: Leufstaarkivet, vol. 47 (detailed list of every captured Danish gun, its calibre, weight, and age); E 8560, (inventory of ten captured ships), all RA; Krigskollegiet, Artilleridepartementet, Artillerihuvudbok 1644, KrA ( a r m a m e n t of ten captured ships); OR 1645:3 (artillery inventory for captured Danish ships), KrA. Hie calculations do not take into account that guns of the same calibre had widely different weights and that their effect was proportional to their weights rather than their calibres. Weights are k n o w n only for Danish guns.

172

chapter

three

Tlie battle of Femern was fought on 13 October after a delay of one day caused by severe winds. The larger Swedish warships concentrated their efforts on the largest Danish ships, while the Dutch chased the smaller enemy ships when they tried to escape. Hie result was the capture of ten Danish ships and the destruction of two by fireships. Hie Swedish side only lost a hired Dutch armed merchantman, which had been exposed to a broadside from one of the largest Danish ships and had quickly sunk. The contrast to the earlier battles at Listerdyb and Kolberger Heide was marked, with the Swedes and Dutch acting aggressively. Their quantitative superiority cannot explain the entire difference, as it had existed already in summer 1644. But this time the Swedish officers and crew had been selected among the best; the purpose-built Swedish warships could overwhelm the largest Danish ships; and the Dutch, with their more vulnerable ships, could use speed and seamanship to catch the smaller Danish ships. The battle radically changed the balance of power in the Baltic. At the beginning of 1644 the Swedish navy had 43 major warships (300 tonnes or more) with a total displacement of around 28,000 tonnes, while Denmark had 37 of around 23,000 tonnes. After 13 October, Sweden had 53 ships of 36,500 tonnes against 26 Danish ships of around 16,000 tonnes (all figures excluding hired merchantmen). The Swedish fleet was suddenly more than twice as large as its adversary. The Danish army had to break off its offensive in Skane in order to strengthen the defence of Copenhagen and the isles. The Swedish army forces in the region were actually not strong enough for an invasion of the isles. But Christian could not know that, and because Sweden had about 45,000 soldiers in Germany at the time, it seemed obvious that a powerful invasion army could be formed if the Swedish government decided to temporarily give up parts of Germany in order to occupy the Danish isles.^^ Wrangel could now release the expensive hired fleet, which returned to the Netherlands. He divided his Swedish and ex-Danish ships between Wismar and Gothenburg for the winter. Four warships arrived f r o m Stockholm to Wismar, loaded with naval stores for a provisional shipyard in that port. At the end of 1644 there were 25 major

The strength of the Swedish army in G e r m a n y at the beginning of 1645: Julius Mankell, Uppgifter rorande svenska krigsmagtens styrka, sammansdttning och fdrdelning sedan slutet av femtonhundratalet jemte ofversigt af svenska krigshistoriens vigtigaste hdndelser under samma tid, 2 vols, Stockholm, 186!5, 278-81.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

173

warships (300 tonnes or more) in Stockholm, 21 at Wismar, and five at Gothenbm-g, while two ships, sailing back from the Swedish colony in Delaware, were in Holland. Five ships were sent from Wismar to Gothenburg in March 1645. For the first time ever in a Danish-Swedish war, Sweden could move naval forces freely between the Baltic Sea and the Western Sea and could start operations from ports close to Copenhagen. The Swedish fleet was thus in a position to fight for the control of both the waters between Denmark and Norway and the southern Baltic Sea in the spring of 1645. Christian IV had not lost his offensive spirit, however, and chose to make a new attack on Gothenburg as his first operation in 1645, before the fleet from Stoclcholm arrived in the southern Baltic Sea. Most of his remaining fleet, as well as army forces f r o m Norway and Denmark, tried to lay siege to the city in May 1645 in an attempt to repeat the successes of 1563 and 1612 when Denmark had conquered Sweden's only west-coast port. This operation ended, however, when a gale struck the Danish fleet and the flagship St Sophie was wrecked. The fleet returned to Copenhagen at the end of May and stayed there through the summer months. It had to guard against a new threat: a Dutch fleet of 49 warships, mainly hired armed merchantmen convoying 300 Dutch merchantmen, arrived in the Sound in June. The Dutch Republic was formally neutral and acted as mediator between Sweden and Denmark, but the Republic had decided to use Denmark's suddenly weak naval position to negotiate for a reduced Sound Toll with a fleet in the Sound as a threat. They intended to use Danish resistance as a pretext for joining Sweden, but the Danes carefully refused to be provoked.^** Meanwhile, the Swedish fleet in Wismar had begun to operate in the southern Baltic Sea. Army forces for an invasion of the larger Danish isles were stiU lacking, but the fleet occupied Bornholm on 8 June, partly in order to gain provisions. The intention was to start an operation in the Sound as soon as the main fleet under Admiral Erik Ryning had arrived from Stockholm. Malmo would be isolated from Copenhagen and placed under siege in order to clear Skane of Danish forces. If this operation was successful, the next step would be to bring together available army forces for an attack on the Danish isles, or at

G. W. Kernkamp, De sleutels van de Sont: Het aandeel van de Republiek Deensch-Zweedschen oorlog van 1644-1645, The Hague, 1890.

in den

174

chapter

three

least make that into a credible threat during the peace negotiations, which already had started. The main fleet began its voyage from the Stockl-iolm archipelago on 22 May. It arrived at Bornholm on 5 July, after more than six weeks. When it finally arrived, provisions began to run short, and the search for food delayed offensive operations. This surprising, indeed unique, setback was the result of extremely unfavourable winds and severe gales. As a comparison, the same fleet had twice sailed the same distance in about two days during 1644. The problems with Stockholm as a main base for control of the southern Baltic Sea were again demonstrated. The unexpected absence of the main fleet delayed the planned offensive in the Sound. The Danes had also sunk ships and built batteries in order to make the passage through Drogden impossible to pass. The alternative passage into the Sound f r o m south, the Flintrannan east of Saltholm, was unknown to foreigners, and the Swedes had to survey these waters in order to find a passage navigable for warships. The operation against Malmo was thus only about to begin when the Peace of Bromsebro was concluded on 13 August 1645. It was a major victory for Sweden, and it is possible that it might have been even more favourable if the weather in the Baltic Sea had not been abnormal in the first half of the s u m m e r of 1645. The unusually tempestuous s u m m e r of 1645 might have saved Skane for Denmark for another 13 years, just at the province was lost by unusually cold weather in winter 1658.^' There were two reasons why the early Swedish successes on land and the crushing naval victory at Femern in October 1644 did not result in a total occupation of Denmark. First, the main Swedish army in Germany was only briefly available in great strength against Denmark. Its main task was to fight the Imperial army, and its operations during 1644-45 indeed did result in an almost decisive victory at Jankow in Bohemia, which eliminated the Imperial army as an offensive force for the remainder of the Thirty Years War. W h e n the army was free to operate against the Danish isles, in winter and spring 1644, the

' ' Evidence that the s u m m e r had unusual weather are, apart f r o m the extreme delay of the Swedish m a i n fleet to reach the southern Baltic, the severe gale that wrecked the large Danish ship St Sophia off G o t h e n b u r g on May 24 and another gale in the end of June that wrecked three m a j o r and one m i n o r Swedish warships off B o r n h o l m and Pomerania. Gales of such severity that warships cannot be controlled at sea are very unusual in Baltic summers.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

175

Swedish fleet was unavailable in the southern Baltic. W h e n the fleet from October 1644 controlled the entire Baltic Sea, the main army was far away in Central Europe. Naval operations in 1644 and 1645 had shown that the Swedish fleet was in fairly good administrative condition. Ships, guns, men, and equipment were ready, and practically all the fleet's ships were mobilised for service at sea as early as May in both years. The main obstacle for continuous operations in the southern Baltic Sea during 1644 was not the fleet's inability to defeat the concentrated Danish fleet (as Christian IV believed and, with him, m a n y later historians) but the lack of organised provisioning f r o m local resources. Kalmar was no longer used as a forward base, possibly a lesson f r o m 1611, and no preparations for provisioning the fleet in Germany had been made. In 1644 the idea appears to have been that the fleet should rely on provisions raised locally by the army, which was accustomed to provision itself during the German War. This was overly optimistic, however, given the fact that the army was barely able to find enough food for itself in Jutland and Holstein after several m o n t h s of occupation. Further, the army and the navy had different provisioning systems; m e n operating on land required local provisioning on a day-to-day basis, while a fleet required that provisions for m o n t h s be concentrated in one place before the fleet could set sail. The organisation of a naval base in Wismar in late 1644 was important. If a major fleet had not been based there during the winter, Sweden would have been powerless in the southern Baltic Sea for a long period during the tempestuous summer of 1645. Wismar, which had been taken from the Imperial forces in 1632, was formally ceded to Sweden at the Westphalian peace in 1648. The Swedish territorial gains in northern Germany in that year meant that Denmark would remain under a constant threat from the south, where Sweden might concentrate both army and navy forces for an attack or at least forces strong enough to radically reduce Danish freedom of operation in future wars. Denmark found itself in a situation where it urgently needed allies who might be interested in reversing the Swedish expansion.

3.7

The War of the Baltic Sea,

1655-1660

Karl X Gustav of Sweden started his invasion of Poland-Lithuania in 1655. Thirty-four warships of around 22,000 tonnes, almost the entire

176

chapter

three

fleet, were mobilised, primarily for troop transport duties.'"' The fleet also raised the toll off Danzig, the most important port in the Baltic, a policy that elicited Dutch antagonism toward Karl Gustav's expansionism. In 1656, a large Dutch fleet of 42 warships of around 27,000 tonnes, together with nine Danish warships of around 5,500 tonnes, were sent to Danzig to ensure that the Swedish fleet did not blockade it again. Karl X Gustav avoided a war with the Dutch through diplomacy, concluding a treaty that, on paper, gave the Dutch guarantees against discrimination while the Danish gained nothing. Karl Gustav mobilised most of his fleet, 24 major warships of 16,000 tonnes, but left its main force in the Stoclcholm archipelago in order not to provoke the Dutch. The visit of the Dutch fleet to the Baltic had caused considerable anxiety in Sweden. It became obvious that the Swedish coasts, and especially the islands, were vulnerable to the great fleets that England and the Dutch Republic had created in the last few years, as long as they could use Copenhagen as a base. The Danes now took the initiative and declared war on Sweden on 1 June 1657. Because they were the aggressor, they received no help from the Dutch, but they also had the advantage of mobilising their fleet before war was declared. The Swedish fleet was only partially in service for the wars against Poland and Russia. From June to September, Denmark controlled the southern Baltic Sea, but the hope that their fleet could capture the Swedish king when he returned from Poland to defend his country turned to nothing. He had other ideas about how to wage a war against Denmark. Karl X Gustav rapidly moved his main army f r o m Poland to Jutland, occupied the peninsula, and waited for his fleet to bring his army to the Danish isles. The Swedish main fleet was gradually made ready for sea during June and July; it was a rather slow process that shows that it was caught unprepared by the new war. It consisted of 24 major warships of 17,000 tonnes together with eight hired armed merchant-

Askgaard 1974 is the m a j o r work on naval operations in this war, and most of this section is based on it. A later work of importance is Probst 1996, 285-324. Operations a r o u n d G o t h e n b u r g 1657-58: Ernst Bergman, "Kompaniskeppen i Goteborg och den danska blockaden", in Arne Stade (ed.), Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Kallkritik och krigshistoria, Stocldiolm, 197-219. For archival sources I have used AK till Kunglig Majestat, vol. 1 (letters from the Admiralty to the king); M 1761, M 1850 (mainly reports f r o m the fleet and list of ships, their a r m a m e n t a n d their crews), RA a n d scattered but i m p o r t a n t accounts and reports about ships and m a n n i n g questions in N N S II, 12a, 141-47, KrA. Most of the naval accounts f r o m this war are lost.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

177

men of around 4,000 tonnes.*" It left the Stocldiolm archipelago on 27 August under command of Admiral Klas Bielkenstierna. He met the Danish fleet of 17 major warships of 14,000 tonnes and seven armed merchantmen of around 4,000 tonnes under command of Admiral Henrik Bielke on 12 September between Riigen and the Danish isles. A two-day battle, called the battle of Mon, followed in which the Swedish fleet, despite a quantitative superiority, was unable to defeat the Danish fleet and gain control of Danish waters. Bielkenstierna complained about his captains' unwillingness to attack at close range and keep formation, a battle performance that was similar to Kolberger Heide in 1644. The Danes seems to have concentrated their fire on the rig of the Swedish ships, while the Swedes fired on the hulls. The net effect of this was that the Swedes had only 40 killed and wounded against Danish losses of around 100 men, while the rigs of several Swedish ships were much damaged. The efl:ect of two days of Swedish gunfire must be regarded as unsatisfactory. The battle ended when the Danish fleet retreated into Drogden in good order, covered by the largest ships, which made it impossible for the Swedes to follow into these narrow waters. The deployment of the Swedish fleet to the southern Baltic Sea had forced the Danes to concentrate their fleet to their h o m e water and leave the rest of the sea open for Swedish operations. The failure to gain control of the Danish straits was, however, a serious setback for Karl Gustav's plan to bring the war to a rapid end. The situation f r o m the last war repeated itself, although this time the Swedish fleet sailed to its own well-protected port of Wismar for repair and provisioning. Obviously, both Karl Gustav and the admirals considered it unlikely that another battle would give a better result, and they believed that the Danish fleet had been strengthened with more ships. In reality, the fighting potential of that fleet gradually deteriorated, due to serious problems with provisioning, sickness, severe a u t u m n gales, and disciplinary problems with crews of hired ships. But it stayed at sea in order to prevent the Swedish fleet f r o m combining with the army, first by a brief stay

Displacement figures for Swedish a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n are m o r e a p p r o x i m a t e than for warships, because d i m e n s i o n s usually are unavailable a n d the t o n n a g e in Idster given in ship-lists often are contradictory. The displacement has primarily been calculated f r o m the m e r c h a n t m e n ' s a r m a m e n t a n d crew when they served as warships. During 1657, there were also two warships a n d eight hired a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n in Gothenburg, but they were only partially a r m e d a n d m a n n e d .

178

chapter

three

outside Wismar and then by cruising between the German coast and the Danish isles. On 24 October, the Swedish army took Frederiksodde, the Danish main fortress on Jutland, and destroyed large parts of Denmark's field army. Even if the decisive Swedish operation against Sjaelland and Copenhagen had to wait until next year, Karl Gustav believed that it now was possible to take the island of Fyn and use it for provisioning of the army during the winter. He ordered three major warships from Wismar to the narrow strait between Jutland and Fyn (Lillebaelt) in order to secure the passage of his army on small craft. They passed the Danish fleet unhindered and unnoticed, but the Danes quickly sent seven major ships to the strait as a countermeasure. The Swedish king then ordered six more major ships from Wismar to the strait, but only two arrived due to the unusually early ice formation in December 1657. The exhausted Danish main fleet did not interfere with these movements, and it seems as if the Swedish ships were in a better condition to sail after their rest in Wismar. This illustrates the difficult choice between staying at sea or in port in a period of severe weather. A long period at sea under adverse conditions reduced the ability to control the sea against an enemy fleet that could rest in a port and sail when it suited its operational requirements. The main Swedish fleet was regularly provisioned in Wismar, a better administrative performance than in 1644. It finally left Wismar for Stockholm on 9 December, and it seemed as if further operations had to wait until next spring. On the Swedish side, the king prepared plans for a major fleet with many additional hired ships which next year would force the Danish fleet to leave the open sea and would give him total freedom to move army units within the Baltic.''^ In December, it looked as if the Danes had won the race for naval control of the strait between Jutland and Fyn. But then the ice, which had made it impossible for some Swedish ships to reach the strait, soon turned the tables and gave the Swedes a decisive advantage. The water between Jutland and all the Danish isles froze into a bridge that in January and February 1658 allowed Karl Gustav to take his army to the vicinity of Copenhagen. He could then dictate a peace that

The plans are discussed in Ernst Bergman, "Carl X Gustaf och flottan 1657-1658", in Stade 1965, 221-51. The king hoped to form a fleet of 36 m a j o r warships (two of t h e m blockships in the Stockholm archipelago), 34 a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n , 22 small warships, and five fireships.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

179

mutilated Denmark-Norway and gave him control of the eastern side of the Sound. The Swedish king began to prepare for his next move in the power game about the Baltic and, unexpectedly, chose to try to annihilate Denmark as a state with a surprise assault. D e n m a r k did not mobilise its fleet during spring and s u m m e r 1658. The Swedish fleet was partially mobilised for troop transports and support of military operations on the continent. It was therefore easy for Karl Gustav to conceal his intentions and launch a totally surprising invasion on Sjaelland on 7 August, supported by a naval squadron. The next day, another Swedish squadron appeared off Copenhagen and started a blockade. With the capital under siege f r o m land and blockaded f r o m the sea, the Danes had no possibility bringing in seamen for a largescale mobilisation of their fleet. The situation was the same as it had been in 1523 and 1535-36, when the power that controlled the straits could isolate Copenhagen and gain D e n m a r k and Norway. This time, however, it was not an Oldenburg pretender to the Danish throne, supported by a Swedish fleet, but a Swedish king who was in control of the straits. Denmark was saved because its ally, the Dutch Republic, since the times of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-54) had possessed a large navy, which quickly could be mobihsed and deployed to the Baltic."'' Thirty-three major warships and two armed merchantmen of around 20,000 tonnes and transport ships carrying 2,000 soldiers and supplies for Copenhagen were sent to the Sound. Karl Gustav had foreseen this, although he may have underestimated the rapidity with which the Dutch could organise a strong fleet. He ordered as many warships and hired merchantmen as possible to be fitted out in Stockholm and sent to the Sound. On 29 October, the Dutch fleet safled into the Sound. It was met by a Swedish fleet of 28 major warships of 20,000 tonnes, 2 minor warships, and 13 armed merchantmen of around 8,000 tonnes, almost all Swedish ships in commission at that time. The two fleets were under command of their most senior naval commanders, the Dutch Ueutenant-admiraal** Jacob van Wassenaer-Obdam and the Swedish riksamiral Karl Gustav Wrangel, both primarily army officers. The Dutch had waited for a northwesterly wind that made it easy

This revolutionary change of the strategic situation at sea is studied in Glete 1993, 178-206. Displacement figures of D u t c h a n d English fleets in this chapter are calculated by the author. " The title was used for the commander-in-chief of the D u t c h navy.

180

chapter

three

to sail into the Sound and follow its eastern coast. Hie Swedish fleet first attempted to meet the Dutch on a northeasterly course and then turned to south-southeast, following the Dutch. This manoeuvre was complicated during a fierce battle and caused disorder in the Swedish battle formation. In the battle that followed, the Dutch were better at keeping a tight formation and better at supporting each other. The battle continued from the morning to the afternoon and ended close to the island of Ven when the Swedish fleet found that seven Danish warships (total around 5,500 tonnes) from Copenhagen were approaching. By then, both contending fleets were severely mauled. The Dutch fleet had a crew of around 4,000 seamen and probably around 1,000 soldiers, not including the 2,000 soldiers on transport ships of which at least some took part in the battle. There were 439 men killed (including two of the three admirals), 269 men were taken prisoner, and around 650 were wounded—a loss of more than 25 per cent of the crews. The second largest ship in the fleet, the flagship of Admiral Witte de With's {Brederode, 850 tonnes), was sunk. Another Dutch ship was captured and its crew was taken prisoner, but it was abandoned when the Swedes believed that a fire on board was beyond control. The ship was, in fact, retaken and brought to port by other Dutch ships. On the Swedish side, an armed merchantman sank and another was captured, while one warship was run aground and burnt and two were captured. The total loss of ships was around 3,000 tonnes. Wrangel reported a loss of around 500 dead and wounded on the surviving ships. To that should be added dead, wounded, and prisoners from the five ships that had been lost, which brings up the total close to 1,150 to 1,200 men. The Swedish fleet had around 6,500 men, so their losses were close to 20 per cent. On the Dutch side, several ships were much damaged in their hulls, while Swedish damages were more concentrated to the rigs. It was again a battle where the Swedish fleet had aimed on the hufls and their adversaries on the rigs."*' Strategically, the battle was a major Dutch-Danish victory; the reinforcements were safely brought into Copenhagen and were in large measure responsible for that city surviving the Swedish siege during the coming winter. Tactically, the outcome of the battle was more even. The Dutch lost slightly more men than the Swedes, and the markedly

Tlie losses in the battle are discussed in Askgaard

1974, 249-56.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

181

larger total losses of Swedish warships were partly balanced by the damage to several Dutch ships. That made it difficult for the allied side to gain control of the sea next spring. The Dutch had, as could be expected, shown a better ability to manoeuvre in formation, but Swedish gunfire had been effective, and the Swedish captains had been much more willing to come to close action than in 1657. The presence of the king on Kronborg may have put pressure on the captains to do their utmost. After the batde, the fleet sailed to Landskrona, the best port on the eastern coast of the Sound, which had been Swedish for less than one year. Karl Gustav decided that the fleet should stay there during the winter, the first time since the winter of 1535-36 that the whole Swedish fleet spent a winter in the southern Baltic. Landskrona lacked storehouses and yard facilities, but with the king in the vicinity, administrative eflforts to keep the fleet operational were fairly effective. From now on, the king was deeply engaged in the operations and administration of his navy. The Dutch expedition to Copenhagen had made it clear that the Danish capital would not capitulate, and more help from the Dutch was expected next spring. On the night of 11 February 1659, Karl Gustav attempted to take Copenhagen by storm. This failed, forcing him to fight a long war in Denmark. The decision to base the fleet in Landskrona made it possible for him to take the initiative at sea in early spring. Ships began to sail already in early February, and by the end of April the Danish islands of Langeland, Falster, and Lolland had been occupied with amphibious expeditions, one of them commanded by the king. The Dutch and the Danes in Copenhagen had difficulty bringing their much larger forces of warships to sea from the still-isolated capital, partly because of the Dutch losses of personnel and damage to their ships in the battle of the Sound. W h e n they appeared at sea, much below their full strength of ships, they engaged the Swedish fleet in battle between Femern and Lolland on 30 April 1659 (also called the battle of Rodsund). Unfortunately, the composition of both fleets is only partly known. The Swedish fleet had 20 major ships, while the allies had three Danish and between 12 and 19 Dutch ships. The wind was fresh, and the side that had the windward position, first the allies and later the Swedes, had difficulty in using their lower battery. The battle ended in a draw, when the wind increased, with small losses on both sides. The Swedish fleet retreated to Landskrona when the allied fleet was reinforced.

182

chapter

three

England and France, both friendly to Sweden, now forced the Dutch Republic to engage in peace negotiations. From May 29 to late August, the Dutch fleet could not participate in the war because the Republic had declared a truce with Sweden. A large English fleet, 40 major warships of around 37,000 tonnes, arrived in the Sound on 6 April and stayed in Danish water during the summer, in order to counter-balance the Dutch fleet. Another Dutch fleet, 39 ships of around 30,000 tonnes, arrived in Danish water in early June, and a formidable fleet of 72 Dutch warships of roughly 50,000 tonnes spent the summer in the Baltic. The English had deployed around half their battle fleet to this operation, while the Dutch had sent most of their battle fleet. Sailing battle fleets of this size had never before operated in the Baltic, nor anywhere else, except during the 1652-53 Anglo-Dutch War. The two largest navies in Europe had deployed huge operational forces to the Baltic in a demonstration of their new abiUty to act as great powers at sea anywhere in Europe. The highly visible appearance of two battle fleets entirely composed of specialised warships, most of them fewer than ten years old and, in the English case, larger than the average Nordic warships, presented the Swedish (and Danish) political and naval leadership with food for thought about the future. It was evident that Nordic naval poUcy had to adapt to a new standard of naval power in Europe.""^ The truce was not uninterrupted and complete; Dutch warships did, in fact, participate in certain aUied operations, and the Dutch fleet positioned itself so as to intimidate Swedish squadrons at sea. However, the truce gave the Swedish fleet the possibility to operate with considerable freedom, because Denmark—still to a large extent an occupied country—could not send more than seven or eight ships to sea at the same time. Sweden had 30 major warships of around 22,000 tonnes and 14 armed merchantmen of around 9,000 tonnes in service during 1659, although they were not fully manned and at sea at the same time. Karl Gustav became critical of how his admirals used this opportunity. He was satisfied, however, when a squadron of his fleet under Major (Rear-admiral) Owen Coxe, an English officer in Swedish service, attacked three Dutch and two Danish warships at Aebeltoft on 23 July. One Dutch warship exploded and the others were captured. They had

Mary Elizabeth Ailes, "Ships, Sailors and Mediators: England's naval aid to Sweden, 1658-1659", The Historian, 67, 2005, 275-98.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

183

protected a transport fleet, which was preparing for an amphibious assault on Fyn from Jutland by Brandenburg's army under command of the Elector Friederich Wilhelm. Around 100 transport vessels were burnt, temporarily eliminating enemy amphibious capacity."*^ In terms of warships, the net result of various operations in 1659 was favourable for Sweden. The fleet lost two major warships captured by the allies, one before and one after the truce, and one was run ashore and lost when chased by Danish warships. However, during the truce the fleet captured five major warships and destroyed three more. In addition, the Swedish army took four armed merchantmen f r o m the Duke of Courland in 1659. These successes did not matter much when the truce with the Dutch ended. From September 1659, the Dutch battle fleet under Michiel de Ruyter was in firm control of Danish waters. It used this for a successful invasion of Fyn in November, a serious setback for Karl Gustav. But de Ruyter did not agree to Danish demands for further amphibious operations this year, because he lacked provisions for the crews and believed that it was too late to keep the fleet at sea. The Swedish fleet was laid up for a second winter at Landskrona, and Karl Gustav prepared for new operations, including an ambitious program of new construction of amphibious vessels. However, the Swedish king died on 13 February 1660 after a brief illness, the Dutch renewed the truce, and the new Swedish government decided to negotiate peace treaties with its several enemies. Peace with Denmark and the Dutch was concluded on 27 May 1660, and the naval part of the war was over. For the Swedish navy, the war had begun as a major troop transport expedition for a continental war. The war soon became maritime, and increasingly it was the navy's ability to provide battle-fleet strength that determined Swedish army operations. The fleet was smaller and older than in the former war (1643-45). Great efforts were made to keep the veterans f r o m the 1620s and 1630s serviceable, but the total force of major warships at sea never exceeded 22,000 tonnes, and this only for brief periods. The stocks of sails, cables, equipment, and guns were strained but proved sufhcient to keep these ships at sea. A major difference f r o m the earlier war was that a considerable fleet of large

Archaeological remains f r o m this battle: Miklcel H. Tliomsen, "En sadan nasestyver; O m en slem overraskelse for den dansk-hollandske flade—eg for arkaeologen", Maritim Kontakt, 28, Copenhagen, 2006, 69-93.

184

chapter

three

Swedish merchantmen suitable to be armed for war had been built since 1645. In 1658, 24 merchantmen with a total displacement of around 12,000 tonnes were armed for war. They represented a major part of the operational fleet. Most of them were new and, in contrast to some of the old warships, in good condition. Officers and men could be found to m a n this fleet when it reached its peak strength in the autumn 1658, even if many of the ships were manned at less than their full complement during the battle in the Sound. This was a remarkable achievement, because Swedish manpower resources were severely strained by the army's demand for more soldiers. The improvised base at Landskrona also worked quite well and gave the fleet major operational advantages compared to previous years when it had been sent back to Stockholm during winters. Even winter operations in December and January were achieved in 1657 and 1658-59, although the crews suffered terribly from the weather. The performance of the fleet against the battle-experienced Dutch fleet in the Sound in 1658 was not brilliant but was fairly creditable, especially the effective gunnery. In terms of tactical efficiency, it was the peak of the Swedish fleet's performance in the 17th century.

3.8

War and crisis in the Swedish empire,

1675-1679

After fifteen years of peace, Sweden became involved in a new war in 1675. It was the first defensive war Sweden had fought after its rise as an imperial power in the Baltic, and the main naval enemy, Denmark, was out for revenge and reconquest of lost territories. The war had actually started with a reluctant and unsuccessful Swedish involvement in the great continental war, which had begun when France invaded the Dutch Republic in 1672. Sweden was allied with France, which paid for a Swedish army in northern Germany. Brandenburg was allied with the Dutch, while Denmark was uncommitted but interested in joining an anti-Swedish alliance at an opportune moment. Brandenburg proved to have become an efficient military power, and in summer 1675, the Swedish army had been forced to retreat to Pomerania after a defeat.''®

A survey of this war: Finn Askgaard and Arne Stade (eds), Kampen om Skdne, Copenhagen, 1983. The m a i n Swedish worfc on navaf operations in this war is still Zettersten 1903, 458-512, although Clemensson 1938, 36-117, supplements it with an

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

185

Tlie fact that a major Swedish army was in northern Germany when the war began determined m u c h of the naval operations. But the Baltic operations were also a part of a European naval war, although this has generally been forgotten, both in studies of the AtlanticMediterranean war in the 1670s and in studies of the Baltic war. France and Sweden were allied, so their total naval power ought to have mattered much against the Dutch Republic, Denmark, and Spain, which fought on the other side. On paper, France had a considerably naval superiority over the Dutch, and it might have been expected that the French would have been able to keep their main enemy occupied in the North Sea. It would also have made strategic sense if France had sent a squadron to the Baltic in order to join the Swedish fleet and discourage Denmark f r o m joining the enemy alliance. Even a French North Sea squadron, using Gothenburg as a base, would have given the French and the Swedes considerable leverage against the Danes and the Dutch."*' The recently expanded French navy, however, was still immature and defensively orientated.'" It was actually the quantitatively inferior Dutch who, in 1675, acted offensively. They deployed

analysis of strategy and operations based on m a n y sources not used by Zettersten, and Grauers 1946, 30-98, has made extensive use of original sources in his biography of Hans Wachtmeister. There are several Danish and Norwegian studies, of which Bergersen, 11, 7-454, is the most detailed a n d also makes use of Swedish archival sources. It is controversial in its attitude towards the Danish admiral a n d national hero Niels Juel, whom Olav Bergersen (a Norwegian sea officer) reduced to a not very ambitious naval commander. A n o t h e r attitude prevailed in Jorgen H. Barfod, Niels Jiiels flade: Den danske flades historie, 1660-1720, Copenhagen, 1997, 41-95, where Barfod (a Danish historian) summarises his earlier research about the Danish na\'y in this period and the life of Niels Juel. See also Jorgen H. Barfod, Niels Juel: A Danish admiral of the 17th century, Copenhagen, 1977. A survey of the war at sea with emphasise on operations in 1677 is H a n s Chr. Bjerg (ed.), Slaget i Kdge Bugt 1. Juli 1677, Copenhagen, 1977. For archival sources of importance for naval operations and the strength of the fleet I have consulted AK till Kunglig Majestat, vols 2 - 3 (letters f r o m the Admiralty to the king); M 1853-1854 (papers related to naval operations sent to the king), RA and scattered but i m p o r t a n t accounts and reports about ships and m a n n i n g in NNS II, 12a, 160-69, KrA. Nearly all naval accounts f r o m the war years are lost. I have calculated the total displacement of the two navies at the end of 1675 to 138,000 tonnes for France and 89,000 tonnes for the Dutch Republic. At the end of 1680, these figures were 135,000 and 66,000 t o n n e s respectively. Tlie figures are approximate, and the Dutch navy is slightly underestimated, as information about some ships is incomplete. The rough relation in warships between the two navies, however, was 3 to 2 in 1675 and 2 to 1 in 1680. Tlie D u t c h were allied with Spain, which h a d a navy of 20,000 to 25,000 tonnes, but it was ditficult to m a n even this limited force. Glete 1993, 195. Dessert 1996, 239-48, 2 8 0 - 8 1 discusses the limitations of the French navy in the 1670s.

186

chapter

three

one naval squadron to the Mediterranean to protect Dutch trade and help Spain keep connection to Habsburg territories in Italy, and another squadron to the Baltic to support Brandenburg and stimulate the Danes to join the war. The Dutch, rather than the French, acted as a great power at sea and that had great importance for the war in the Baltic. Nine Dutch warships of around 6,000 tonnes arrived in Sound in June 1675, and the Danish navy was partly mobilised as well. The Dutch fleet intended to influence the balance of power in the Baltic, not protect Dutch trade. Sweden and the Dutch Republic had concluded an agreement according to which they should leave their mutual trade and shipping relations outside the war.'' W h e n Denmark declared war against Sweden on 2 September, a Danish-Dutch battle fleet of 17 major warships (300 tonnes and larger) of around 15,000 tonnes was already cruising in the southern Baltic Sea. It should cut off Sweden f r o m Germany and protect the Danish army's lines of communication when it attacked Swedish positions in Germany. A Danish-Dutch squadron of seven major warships (around 5,000 tonnes) sailed to Kattegatt to protect these waters from the squadron Sweden began to organise in Gothenburg.'^ Even though the Swedish government had seen the crisis coming since 1674, it had been slow to mobilise a force to protect communications with Germany." Financial problems were the immediate cause, but their roots were political, a part of the conflict between the aristocracy and the lower estates. The whole summer of 1675 was more or less wasted, and only in August did naval mobilisation begin in earnest. The main fleet left the Stockholm archipelago on 9 October under command of the riksamiral Gustav Stenbock and two other admirals who were also members of the Council. These three men had been responsible for the navy's administration since the 1660s, but none were seamen officers. Theirs was an impressive fleet of 28 major warships of around 28,000 tonnes, 11 armed merchantmen of around

Sven Ulric Palme, "Sverige och Holland vid Lundakrigets utbrott 1674-1675", KFA, 29, 1938, 84-172; Oscar Bjurling, "Stockholms forbindelser m e d u d a n d e t under 1670-talets vaxlingar", Forum navale, 10, 1951, 3 - 3 7 . Anderson 1910/1969, 105; Bergersen, II, 55, and Barfod 1997, 41-43, have slighdy different information about the composition of these squadrons. I have attempted to c o m b i n e them. " A special commission was appointed 12/11 1674 to support the mobilisation of the navy, AK 213, RA.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

187

5,500 tonnes, eight fireships, 17 minor warships, and two armed transports—the largest fleet sent out from Stockholm up to then.^'' It met a u t u m n gales and suffered considerable damage, and already on 17 October its flag officers (including several professional seamen) decided to return to Stocldiolm. The reasons stated were damaged and lost ships, lack of provisions, illness a m o n g the crew, and the late season when gales were inevitable. The provisioning problem had been k n o w n when the fleet sailed, gales are normal in October, no important ships had been lost, and even after the damaged ships had been sent h o m e the fleet still had a considerable quantitative superiority over the Danish-Dutch fleet cruising in the southern Baltic. It is striking that realistic preparations had not been made before the war to have a part of the fleet in a high degree of readiness even if resources for a total mobilisation were lacking. The king in 1673 and 1674 had instructed the Amiralitetskollegium to prepare such plans, and before the fleet sailed he had urged his admirals to sail with what was available.'^ The enemy fleet also suffered much f r o m illness (its c o m m a n d e r , Cort Adeler, died), it also had to endure a u t u m n gales, and the Danes were far f r o m ready to send their entire fleet to sea in 1675. Nonetheless, it stayed at sea until its mission was accomplished. The performance of the Swedish fleet is probably best explained by its large n u m b e r of inexperienced officers and men, especially compared to the very war-experienced Dutch. The leaders must have been painfully aware of that and must have tried to compensate by forming a fleet of superficially overwhelming strength. This took time, however, and time gave the enemy the opportunity to isolate the Swedish army in Germany and provide the Danish army with undisturbed communications. The fact that the Swedish fleet never arrived in the southern Baltic had disastrous results. Wismar, the best Swedish naval base in the southern Baltic Sea, capitulated on 14 December 1675, together with one warship, Falken. Wolgast in Pomerania was lost in November, and most of Bremen-Verden was overrun. Karl XI had intended for the fleet to supply the garrisons for the winter and also bring back the cavalry regiments f r o m Pomerania

The composition of the main Swedish fleet in 1675-78 is f r o m Zettersten 1903, 461-503. He has classified all boyers as transports (L), however, when in reality they served as m i n o r warships in these years. Some of the hired a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n served periodically as naval transports. '' Wendt 1950, 244-48, 259-60.

188

chapter

three

SO that he could use them in the invasion of Sjaelland f r o m Skane, which he hoped to achieve as soon as possible. Now, the cavalry had to stay in Pomerania, where it consumed resources without being useful for the offensive operations for which it was best suited.'® The lack of control of the sea also made it impossible to transfer more Swedish soldiers to the continent for an attack on Denmark f r o m Germany, the strategy that had worked so well in 1644 and 1657. Financially, that meant that Sweden lost the possibility of feeding the main army f r o m enemy territory. For the first time since 1611-13, Sweden had to fight Denmark defensively with mainly domestic resources." Without control of the sea, the Swedish army could not be deployed where resources and strategy made it optimal to use it. Karl XI lost confidence in the men who had led the navy. He suspended Stenbock and started an investigation of the conduct of the navy. The naval failure confirmed the financial and administrative misconduct of which the aristocratic leadership of the Swedish state had been accused by its many critics during the session with the Swedish Parliament, which took place at the same time. The investigation of the navy was the first of a series of political and judicial actions against the aristocratic regents who had ruled Sweden during the minority of Karl XI (1660-72). These actions brought the fall of aristocratic power in Swedish politics in 1680.'® At the express order of the king, a part of the fleet was kept in commission during the winter 1675-76, and repeated attempts were made to bring it to sea from Stockholm in spite of gales and ice. These desperate measures to send some relief to the army failed, however. Karl XI appointed an experienced and energetic civilian administrator, Lorentz Creutz, to reorganise the navy. Creutz was also appointed as its commander-in-chief, even though he totally lacked naval or military experience.

Nils Wimarson, "Amiral Ugglas expedition vinteni 1676", HT, 20, 1900, 341-69. " Berndt Fredriksson, Forsvarets finansiering: Svensk krigsekonomi under skanska kriget, 1675-79, Uppsala, 1976. Strategy and war finance, esp. 15-16. Kommission for rannsakxiing angaende flottans hastiga aterkomst och for paskynd a n d e av dess utlopande, 1675-76, AK 63, RA; Koniniissorialratt over amiralitetet, 1676-77, AK 64, RA. Stenbock was sentenced to pay a fine of 209,341 daler sm for his conduct d u r i n g the campaign of 1675. Early in 1677 this was reduced to 100,000 daler sm, provided that he paid it immediately to s u p p o r t the war effort. As a comparison, the yearly expenses for fitting out the navy in 1676-79 varied between 400,000 to 550,000 daler sm, Fredriksson 1976, 58, 69.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

189

In April 1676, a Danish squadron made an early spring cruise in the Baltic, resulting in the loss of two Swedish armed merchantmen and a surprise capture of Gotland on 1 May. Hie Swedish main fleet this year was prepared for an early operational start, however, and on 19 May, 30 major warships of around 29,000 tonnes, nine armed merchantmen of around 4,500 tonnes, eight fireships, and 13 minor warships left the Stockholm archipelago. Its material condition was good, but it still suffered from deficiencies in seamanship and ship-handling, and its admirals and captains were not accustomed to sail and fight in a large formation. This was revealed in a battle against an inferior fleet of 18 Danish and nine Dutch major warships of around 21,000 tonnes between Riigen, Bornholm and the entrance to the Sound on 25 and 26 May. Confusion about how to attack the enemy prevailed, and although the Swedish demonstrated some good gunnery, the dominant impression of accounts f r o m the battle is that the officers did not master the art of bringing broadside guns to point in the direction of the enemy at suitable moments. The fleet failed to profit from its quantitative superiority, and the allies could retreat to the Sound, where they were strengthened with five Danish and three Dutch ships. It had now a total strength of 35 major warships of 28,000 tonnes, but it was still smaller than the Swedish fleet. Surprisingly, Karl XI ordered (or allowed) his fleet to retreat to the northern Baltic Sea in the hope that the allied fleet would foHow it and give battle close to the Swedish archipelago, somewhere between the north cape of Oland and Landsort (south of present-day Nynashamn). Strategically this gave the enemy the option to control the southern Baltic even without a battle. Tactically, it left the question open if the fleet would be able to sail this long distance without being forced to fight a battle in the open sea. The fleet left the Trelleborg roadstead east of the entrance to the Sound on 30 May. The allied fleet, under c o m m a n d of Cornells Tromp, a very experienced Dutch admiral serving as Danish admiral-general, followed it and on 1 June forced the Swedish fleet to give battle off southern Oland. From what followed, it is evident that the Swedish naval leadership had not prepared for the eventuality that the enemy would follow in hot pursuit and seek battle in the open sea. The battle started with confusion over whether the fleet should fight on a northerly course or turn south, and when at the start of the battle the fleet flagship Kronan (2,300 tonnes) began to turn, it capsized and blew

190

chapter

three

up. Creutz was killed, and the fleet lost whatever cohesion it had possessed. The second largest ship Svdrdet (1,700 tonnes), with the experienced admiral Klas Uggla, was left to fight a long action that ended only when the Svdrdet was destroyed by a fireship. The losses of m e n on these two ships were probably close to 1,400. The deaths of these m e n were especially disastrous, because the best gunners and seamen had been selected to serve on the flagships. Two small ships were captured, a total loss of four ships of a r o u n d 5,000 tonnes. The fleet fled to the Stocldiolm archipelago, where it spent the rest of the operational season guarding the capital and the n o r t h e r n Baltic. Applet (1,400 tonnes), another of the fleet's largest ships, was lost in the archipelago due to bad ship-handling during a gale, another incident that showed that the fleet lacked basic professional skills. A new investigation into the conduct of several officers during this campaign began and lasted about a year.'' After the campaigns of 1675 and 1676, the two commanders-in-chiefs and all five admirals w h o had comm a n d e d squadrons were either dead or dismissed f r o m sea service. Tiiis at least opened the door for a new generation of naval leaders. Tlie allies were left free to launch an invasion of Skane, followed by an attack on Blekinge f r o m the fleet. O n e m a j o r and one m i n o r Swedish warship were captured incomplete at the yard in Karlshamn in Blekinge. The Swedish army in the end was able to contain and defeat the Danish army at the battle of Lund in December 1676, but they could not force the Danish army out f r o m Skane where it held important fortresses, because the Danes controlled the sea. The Danish army was reorganised for a new campaign and in spring 1677 was stronger than the Swedish army. For Karl XI, w h o personally comm a n d e d the Swedish army in Skane, naval control of the Sound was essential, while the Council in Stockholm seems to have been more concerned about helping the army in Pomerania. As a part of the preparations for a decisive campaign in 1677, the king ordered the G o t h e n b u r g squadron to sail to the southern Baltic Sea in the spring and join the m a i n fleet f r o m Stockholm in an operation in the Sound before the Dutch arrived. H e hoped that the main fleet would arrive

Kommissorialratt angaende sjostridenia 25 och 26 m a j samt 1 juni, 1676-77, AK 65, RA. The records f r o m this committee are published in Kurt Lundgren (ed.), Sjdslaget vid Oland: Vittnesmdl, Dokument 1676-1677, Borghohn, 2001.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

191

already in May, and he seems to have acted on erroneous information that the Danes were slow to mobilise their warships.®" To sail a small force through waters where the Danes could easily detect it and where the Danish main fleet was close at hand was a highrisk operation. Distance and the unpredictability of winds also made coordination of operations from Stockholm and Gothenburg very challenging. Hie order was also questionable because a Gothenburg squadron usually tied a superior Danish force to Kattegatt, and reduced the Danish fleet in the Baltic. Karl XI may have regarded the squadron mainly as useful for communications with Bremen-Verden and may have believed that it had lost its relevance when these provinces were lost in mid-1676; and he also may have hoped to rapidly end the war with an invasion of Sjaelland. After considerable difficulty finding men for the squadron, two warships and six armed merchantmen, a force of around 5,500 tonnes, finally left Gothenburg on May 1677, together with three minor warships and two fireships. Unfavourable winds made progress slow, and when the Gothenburg squadron used the delay for a raid on Fyn, its presence was revealed. A much superior Danish force, 13 warships of 11,000 tonnes, was sent out f r o m Copenhagen and met the squadron when it tried to enter the Baltic through the Femern Belt. In a battle on 31 May and 1 June, four Swedish ships were captured and one was destroyed to avoid capture. Two ships escaped to join the Swedish main fleet, while another, together with a small vessel, hoisted English flags and passed in disguise through the Sound back to Gothenburg. The Swedish main fleet, under c o m m a n d of Field-marshal (temporary Admiral-general) Henrik Horn, did not leave the Stoclcholm archipelago until 11 June. A total of 27 major warships of 24,000 tonnes, nine armed merchantmen of 5,000 tonnes, six fireships, and 11 minor warships were commissioned, although some were detached on various missions. Karl XI still hoped that the fleet could take control of the Sound by defeating the smaller Danish fleet before the delayed Dutch fleet arrived. Members of the Council in Stockholm still preferred that the fleet protect reinforcements to Pomerania rather than try to enter the Sound, a difftcuft operation with the deep-draughted ships which now dominated the fleet. Horn and the admirals probably thought

Bergersen, II, 157-59, discusses this operation with the use of Swedish and Danish sources.

192

chapter

three

the same, but they intended to fight the enemy fleet if it was in the Baltic Sea.®' In spite of the urgency to fight before the Dutch arrived, the Swedish fleet spent a few weeks cruising in the southern Baltic to give the officers and crew training, which experience had shown that they needed. Horn must have believed that he had a chance to achieve something useful by a battle, a normal attitude for a Swedish fieldmarshal who had been trained in a battle-oriented army. Without express order from the king, the Danish commander, Admiral Niels Juel, accepted the challenge and did not retreat into the Sound until the Dutch fleet arrived. The result was the battle of Koge Bay on 1 July, the most decisive defeat ever sufli"ered by a Swedish battle fleet. The Danish fleet had 24 major warships of around 21,000 tonnes, including one armed merchantman, while the Swedish fleet had 22 major warships of 21,000 tonnes and eight armed merchantmen of 4,000 tonnes. What actually happened during the battle has been interpreted in widely diff'erent ways in the Danish-Norwegian naval historiography." From Horn's report, it seems clear that the Swedish fleet initially attempted to use its windward position to come close to the Danish ships and decide the battle by boarding, supported by a fireship attack. This failed, apparently because the Danish were able to keep a close formation in line ahead and expose the Swedes to devastating broadside fire. The rest of the battle is obscure, except that Juel evidently was able to split the Swedish fleet and concentrate his fire on some ships." Draken ran aground on the Danish coast and was captured, Mars struck its colour when it became unmanoeuvrable, Caesar was taken by boarding, three ships fled into the Sound, and

" In Radsprotokoll, vol. 69, RA, fol. 117, there is a discussion about the aim with the fleet's operation. A detailed study of decision-making a r o u n d strategy and resource allocations to the armies in Skane and Pomerania and to the fleet in 1677 would be interesting. The king and the central administration in Stockholm m a y have followed divergent ideas, possibly because they had diflferent information. ^^ H a n s Chr. Bjerg, in Bjerg 1977, 67-93, summarises the historiography of the battle u p to 1977. Later contributions to the debate are Jorgen H. Barfod, "Slaget i Koge Bugt den 1. juli 1677", (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, 80, 1980, 287-324; lb Gram-Jensen, "Vind og taktik i Koge Bugt 1. juli 1677", Tidsskrift for Sovaesen, 158, 1987, 149-227; a n d 11 articles by Mogen Haerning, lb Gram-Jensen, Jorgen H. Barfod, E m a n u e l Bassols, and Niels M, Probst in Marinehistorisk Tidsskrift, 24-26, 1991-93; Barfod 1997, 65-77. The line-of-battle tactic was developed during the Anglo-Dutch W a r s f r o m 1652 to 1674, but it was often squadrons rather than whole fleet that m a n o e u v r e d in line: Brian Tunstall, Warfare in the Age of Sail: The evolution of fighting tactics, 1650-1815 (ed. Nicholas Tracy), London, 1990, 16-47; Frank L. Fox, A Distant Storm: The Four Days'Battle of 1666, Rotherfield, 1996.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

193

Flygande Vargen ran aground on the southwestern tip of Skane and was taken. Svenska Lejonet was taken during the retreat, but otherwise the Danes soon gave up pursuit of the retreating Swedish fleet, which sailed faster. The next day, a Dutch squadron arrived in the Sound and took Mercurius and St Hieronymus, two of the Swedish ships there while the third, Kalmar, was burnt to avoid this fate. The total Swedish losses were eight ships of around 7,500 tonnes, of which seven were added to the Danish navy. Total losses of men may have been as high as 3,000, most of them prisoners on captured ships. Danish losses were 76 dead and 211 wounded, but these figures do not include losses on three of the most damaged ships, so a total of between 350 to 400 men is probable. Tliis time the Swedish fleet had fought a hard battle for around ten hours, and in contrast to 1675 and 1676, there were no investigations about misconduct or unwillingness to fight. Most of the fleet returned to Stockliolm, but Admiral Hans Wachtmeister sailed with a squadron to Kalmarsund. He decided to stay there when he was recalled to Stoclcholm by Horn, who had no ambitions beyond defending Stoclcholm. Wachtmeister actively defended Kalmarsund on land and at sea when the Danish fleet attacked the region in August 1677. He could not prevent the Danes from burning part of Oland and the town of Vastervik, but his conduct was approved by Karl XI, who appointed him commander-inchief of the fleet for 1678, a post he held for 36 years.'^" From 1 July 1677 until the end of the war in August 1679, the Swedish fleet had to use strictly defensive tactics in order to limit the efl^ects of Danish command of the Baltic Sea. In round numbers the fleet had major ships of 21,000 to 22,000 tonnes in service against an active Danish fleet of 35,000 tonnes, although the strength and deployment of the Danish fleet in these years are only incompletely known f r o m the literature."^' The Dutch fleet did not appear in the Baltic after 1677. Yet at the same time, Brandenburg began to create a small navy and had several smaU vessels and privateers in action during the sieges

" Wachtmeister's initiative and its consequences, Grauers 1946, 41-50. " Tlie estimate of the size of the active Danish fleet is based on R. C. Anderson's reconstruction of a list of the operational Danish fleet in 1678, Anderson 1910/1969, 124, and a list of officers on active Danish ships on 13 May 1679 in Bergersen, II, 313-22, Danish a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n are not included, but they appear to have operated only in the waters between D e n m a r k and Norway, n o t in the Baltic Sea. Tlie n u m b e r of Swedish a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n commissioned as warships declined: seven to nine ships in 1678 and probably four in 1679.

194

chapter

three

of Stettin, Greifswald, and Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania in 1676-78. Sweden also had a squadron of minor warships in Pomerania in these years. On 7 September 1677, the Danes landed an army unopposed on Riigen, but the island was retaken by the Swedish Pomeranian army in January 1678 when the Danish fleet was laid up for the winter. Wachtmeister started his first campaign on 6 June 1678 by sailing from the Stocldiolm archipelago to a position at the southern entrance of Kalmarsund. He stayed in this region during the summer, and the Danish fleet found it impossible to attack it successfully. In practice, the much inferior Swedish fleet could control the northern Baltic Sea from its position in Kalmarsund. It could do nothing to support the army in Pomerania, however, which until then had been strikingly successful in resisting superior enemy forces during more than three years of war. The Danes and the Brandenburgers decided to made a final effort in this region where they could concentrate their forces undisturbed. In September 1678, the Danish fleet protected the landing of 15,000 Brandenburg soldiers on Riigen, and during the next two months Stralsund, Greifswald, and the rest of Pomerania capitulated. The importance of the sea lines of communication is obvious in this case, when one realises that the Brandenburg army had failed to overrun Pomerania from land since 1675.®'^ The Swedish fleet did not return to Stocldiolm for the winter. It stayed in Kalmar and began an active search for a new deep-water naval base in the Blekinge archipelago; partly because a large French fleet was anticipated in the Baltic in 1679 to help Sweden. France had concluded peace with the Dutch Republic and Spain in 1678. Denmark was now the only remaining naval enemy for France and Sweden, which together had a vast naval superiority. Actually, no French fleet did appear in the Baltic, but the threat of doing so was used as a diplomatic tool to force Denmark to conclude peace. During 1679, naval operations were again concentrated in the Kalmarsund area, where the Danish fleet tried unsuccessfully to bring the Swedish fleet to action or to destroy it in its base. Although the Swedish fleet lost two ships; Nyckeln, which blew up in action, and Laxen, which was captured, when it twice sent squadrons to sea, its fleet-in-being tactic worked fairly well. The Danes had hoped to make attacks on various parts

A t h o r o u g h study of the war in Germany, including local naval operations is Nils W i m a r s o n , Sveriges krig i Tyskland, 1675-1679, 3 vols, Lund, 1897-1912.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

195

of the Swedish coasts, but the presence of the Swedish fleet close to the southern Baltic kept it occupied and limited its offensive capability. This lesson was not lost on Karl XI and Wachtmeister. The main Swedish battle fleet never returned to Stockholm after the experiences of 1678-79. The Swedish empire in Germany was lost, however, and only restored because Louis XIV h o n o u r e d his obligations as an ally and forced D e n m a r k and Brandenburg to give back practically everything they had occupied. The importance of not only a large but also a combat-ready battle fleet for the preservation of the empire was obvious. The navy had not only been unable to supply the threatened garrisons and reinforce the field army in Germany but also, possibly even m o r e important, had been unable to prevent the enemy f r o m transferring men, material, and provisions to the Swedish territories in Germany by sea. Swedish political leaders had been well aware that their empire was dependent on the sea lines of communication, but since 1660 they had not sufficiently understood how m u c h progress the other navies had made in tactical performance and ability to operate at sea. The result of the war was a fundamental reorganisation of the navy, including the foundation of a new city and naval base, Karlskrona, in the Blekinge archipelago. In the future, the Swedish empire would be defended with a fleet based in the centre of the southern Baltic Sea.®^ Much has been written about the failures of the Swedish fleet in this war, partly because these failures shaped m u c h of the course of the war and partly because they decisively discredited the role of the aristocracy in the centre of the Swedish state. These failures have normally been attributed to material deficiencies, inexperienced officers and crew, and the appointment of three successive commanders-inchief who had no naval experience. O n a m o r e general level, the failures have been attributed to the m i s m a n a g e m e n t of state finances and administration by the regency of Karl XT'"* Little has been said about the strategic decision-making behind the disastrous naval operations. This silence began already in the 1670s, obviously because the king was involved in this decision-making, but it has continued in the historical literature. The failure in 1675 cannot be blamed on Karl XI, who had inherited the problems and who in fact for two years had

Clemensson 1938: Grauers 1946, 61-77, 84-5 Blomdahl 1963.

196

chapter

three

instructed the admiralty to keep a limited number of ships in readiness for emergencies. His later direction of the naval war is more questionable, however. Tlie decision to send the fleet back to the northern Baltic Sea after the battle on 26 and 27 May 1676 was unique in Swedish naval history until the disastrous operations against Russia in the Gulf of Finland in 1742. An undefeated, well provisioned fleet in good material condition and of superior quantitative strength in ships and men left the decisive area of operation to the enemy in a rather naive attempt to lure this enemy to combat at a time and place determined by the Swedish fleet. A more conventional decision would have been to stay in the southern Baltic, pose a threat to enemy operations and lines of communication, and as far as possible protect the Swedish lines of communication to Pomerania. The fleet could have sailed to Karlshamn (where the navy had a shipyard), to the sheltered waters in eastern Blekinge,*^' or to Kalmar; or it could have cruised in the open sea in a formation suited for a defensive combat. The fleet was evidently not ready for complicated manoeuvres in combat, but its sheer size should have made it possible to at least maintain a simple defensive formation or a defensive position at anchor and leave the problems of attacking to the enemy. How the admirals reached the decision to sail northwards and how they intended to implement it tactically has never been studied, and because Karl XI approved of the strategic retreat, it has not in itself been regarded as controversial. If the king appears as a rather timid strategic decisionmaker in mid-1676, his decisions about naval strategy in spring 1677 show an abundance of aggressiveness and confidence in the Swedish navy. These decisions were taken after the king had gained self-confidence and prestige f r o m his victory in the battle of Lund in December 1676. They show over-optimism about the possibility to coordinate fleets f r o m Gothenburg and Stockholm and underestimation of Danish naval readiness and of the navigational problems with bringing in a fleet of large warships into the Sound from the south.

® The possibility to use the deep waters behind the islands Hasslo, Aspo, Tjurko, and Sturko in eastern Blekinge as a temporary naval base for a fleet-in-being strategy was evidently not understood at that time. These waters were, even 18 years after Blekinge had become Swedish, practically u n k n o w n to the Swedish navy. It was only the operations in 1677-79 that m a d e their importance obvious and that led to the f o u n d a t i o n of Karlskrona as the m a i n naval base, Clemensson 1938, 36-103.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

197

These decisions show that the young Karl XI (20 years old in 1675) lacked insight into naval strategy and the realities of naval operations and that he lacked an experienced naval advisor on whom he could trust. The rise of the young admiral Hans Wachtmeister to the position of commander-in-chief was not the least explained by his ability to formulate and implement a strategically sensible plan for how the much-reduced fleet could contribute to the defence of Sweden. Wachtmeister had been one of the king's close friends ah'eady before the war, and this explains why he was appointed to high naval command with only limited experience of the sea. In the early days of the war, Wachtmeister showed no special skill in understanding how geography, operational problems and opportunities, and the strength and limitations of the Swedish navy should be combined into successful strategy. However, he did show good ability to learn his profession, and by 1677 he was the mature naval commander and advisor that the king needed.^" 3.9 3.9.1

The Great Northern

War at sea,

1700-1721

Introduction

The Swedish navy was rebuilt and reorganised in the 1680$ under the direction of Karl XI and Hans Wachtmeister. The reorganisation was centred on the need for a battle fleet in the southern Baltic that could be mobilised at least as quicldy as the Danish fleet in Copenhagen in order to control the sea lines of communication to Germany or cover an invasion of the Danish isles. The development of Karlskrona as a full-scale naval yard and base and the organisation of corps of officers and seamen living close to the base were essential parts of this program. The navy's ability to mobflise a batde fleet quickly was successfully tested in 1683 and 1689 when Sweden was on the brink of war with Denmark. The location of the base also meant that the Danish fleet would have to expose the Danish isles to the Swedish fleet if it attempted to sail east and north of Karlskrona. As the experience of the war would show, the Danish king did not allow his fleet to do that, because it was indispensable for communications within his kingdom.

™ The operations in 1678 and 1679 are discussed f r o m the perspective of the conimander-in-chief, Grauers 1946, 51-60, 77-84.

198

chapter

three

Finally, a Gothenburg squadron of large cruisers was being formed at the time of the outbreak of the w a r / ' Tlie Great Northern War has been much studied and analysed as a continental war between armies. Most studies are concentrated on the period up to 1709, when the war indeed was continental. In 1700 and again from 1709 to 1721, however, it was a Baltic war in which control of sea lines of communication determined the operations. The fact that the war continued 12 years after the battle of Poltava in 1709, which usually is regarded as decisive, shows that the outcome of the Baltic phase of the war was far from decided. The naval, amphibious, and joint operations in the Baltic Sea and the waters west of Sweden were important for its outcome, and they were large-scale operations involving several armies and navies. Control of the Baltic region was also the cause of the war and its longevity. Tsar Peter was determined to gain a Baltic coast where he could develop a navy and trade directly with Western Europe, and Karl XII was equally determined to keep all territories he had inherited from Sweden's long war efforts to control the Baltic coasts. Much of the great contest between Sweden and Russia can therefore be analysed in terms of their ability to control the sea, the archipelagos, and the littoral territories in the Baltic. In that perspective, Karl XII's long and successful campaigns in Poland-Lithuania until 1707, about which much has been written, look peripheral compared to Tsar Peter's equally successful but more lasting effort to gain a foothold in the Baltic in the same period. W i t h the exception of the Danish General Staff's study of the Danish part of the war, the literature usually fails to combine its continental and maritime aspects. The close interaction between army and navy operations and the armies' great dependence on seaborne transports and logistics in the Baltic are often underlined in special studies about individual operations, but it is not studied as the pervasive p h e n o m e n o n it actually was. O n e effect of this omission is that the highly innovative character of Peter I's naval policy and the problems he faced in its implementation are underestimated, while the neglect of Karl XII to reorganise his armed forces for the new situation in the Baltic is given little attention. A n o t h e r effect is that we lack a study focused on the problem h o w the control of the sea lines

The f o u n d a t i o n of Karlskrona and the yard during the war: Ericson 1993. M 1762, RA has reports to the king about the navy's readiness in the 1680s.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

199

of communication f r o m 1709 determined the deployment of the increasingly superior military forces which Sweden's enemies had. A third effect is that the Swedish strategic alternatives are little u n d e r stood. Was a counteroffensive against the root of Russian naval and amphibious power in the Gulf of Finland really impossible? W a s it not in fact the best alternative to bring Tsar Peter to a decisive battle, even after Poltava? Were the counteroffensives on the continent up to 1713, the tenacious defence of the G e r m a n provinces up to 1716, and the offensives against Norway 1716-18 the only options? Both Swedish and allied war efforts deserve to be m o r e studied, not as a series of more or less r a n d o m events (battles, operations) but as results of strategies, administration and resource allocation, choices of technology, and conflicts between policy-makers. Because this book is a study of the importance of organisation, special emphasis will be placed on h o w the established Swedish military organisations reacted to new operational demands.^^ Like other navies, the Baltic navies had by 1700 introduced the battle-line concept, and the strength of the battle fleets was measured by the number of ships-of-the-line or battleships." The average size

Swedish naval operations f r o m 1700 to 1721: Munthe 1924-27; Svenska flottans historia, II, 120-62 (by G u n n a r Unger); Grauers 1946, 2 2 5 - 8 5 ; Goteborgs eskader, 59-179. Except for operations in the Western Sea, there is no standard work on Swedish naval operations in this war. Detailed knowledge of t h e m m u s t be based on articles and books covering individual operations. Danish naval operations: Bidrag 1899-1934; Barfod 1997. Russian naval operations: Anderson 1910/1969, which retains its value because of the author's unusual ability to read b o t h Russian a n d the Nordic languages. The Danish General Staff's Bidrag m a d e m u c h use of Swedish archival sources, and it often provides m o r e detailed information about Swedish naval operations than the Swedish literature. The sources f r o m this war are e n o r m o u s c o m p a r e d to earlier wars, especially in the archival series of Amiralitetskollegium, Karlskrona station, Stockholms station, Goteborgs station, Orlogsflottans rakenskaper, Marinens Rullor, a n d Nya n u m m e r s erien, all KrA. I have primarily consulted the letters f r o m the Admiralty to the king and home government 1700-21, AK till Kunglig Majestat, vols 21-39; Militara amnessamlingar, mainly letters to the king and the h o m e g o v e r n m e n t f r o m fleets and squadrons and f r o m the naval bases in Karlskrona, G o t h e n b u r g and Stockholm, M 1689, M 1720-1721, M 1728-1730, M 1740-1741 a n d M 1858-1866, all in RA. Enclosures with lists of ships, the condition of the crews, a n d economic estimates with the planned disposition of the ships and the projected strength of the crews have been of special interest. " The w o r d ship-of-the-line (Swedish linjeskepp) was n o t m u c h used before the latter half of the 18th century. Rangskepp Ijecame the c o m m o n Swedish term, the Danish usually called such ships orlogsskibe, and in Russia the w o r d korabel was used. In this book, the w o r d battleship is used for ships that the navies intended to use in the battle line.

200

chapter

three

of warships had continued to increase compared to earlier wars. In this section, the strength of the major operational forces will normally be measured as the total displacement of the participating battleships. The m i n i m u m size of such ships by 1700 was around 700 tonnes, although the Danes and Russians did have a few even smaller ships that formally (but often not in practice) were counted as battleships. Such ships had at least 12-pounders in their main (lower) battery, although most battleships were larger (usually 900 to 2,300 tonnes) and had 18- or 24-pounders in the main battery. Smaller three-masted ships were classified as frigates in the three Baltic navies. In this war they were usually of around 250 to 500 tonnes and typically armed with 4-, 6-, or 8-pounders in their main battery, although Sweden built some larger frigates with 12- and even 18-pounders. Denmark and Sweden also built frigate-size ships of shallow draught with full lines and a battery of 12- or 18-pounders, primarily intended for shallow waters. Even smaller warships (up to 250/300 tonnes) were usually twomasters and were classified as snows or brigantines, typically with 3- and 4-pounder batteries. The Swedish navy preferred to have threemast rigs even on vessels of 170 to 250 tonnes, and they called such vessels frigates. There were a number of bomb-vessels in the Baltic, a new type of small warship armed with mortars (usually two) which could fire shells against immobile targets ashore. Galleys were built in various sizes, and most Baltic galleys in this war were m u c h smaller than the typical Mediterranean galleys of around 300 tonnes displacement. Information about the size of Russian galleys is often incomplete, while Danish and Swedish inshore flotillas were composed of both broadside-armed sailing ships and oared craft with the main armament in the bow. The differences and the incomplete information make it impossible to measure the strength of inshore forces in simple terms such as displacement. In this section, which cannot discuss the force level in detail, the strength of inshore flotillas is normally only expressed in relative terms. Shallow-draught warships with broadside batteries had various designations: frigate, pram, floating battery, or blockship. The latter word is normally used in this section.^''

Information about warships in Swedish operational forces 1700-21 is f r o m a 19thcentury manuscript hsting every warship commissioned in Karlskrona 1700-87, copy in Axel Zetterstens arbetspapper, vol. 10, KrA; warships commissioned in Gothenburg: Goteborgs eskader, 112-67 (incomplete); warships commissioned in Stocldiolm: Gunnar

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

3.9.2

1700: The last Swedish amphibious

201

attack on Sjaelland

The ultimate test of the reorganised Swedish battle fleet's mobilisation system came in 1700.^' A secret coalition formed against Sweden by Denmark, Russia, and August (king of Poland-Lithuania and Elector of Saxony) began a series of coordinated operations. August started a siege of Riga in February, Frederik IV of Denmark invaded Sweden's ally Holstein-Gottorp in March, and Tsar Peter declared war and started a siege of Narva in August 1700. The Danish attack on Holstein-Gottorp was not unexpected. The dukedom had been reinforced with Swedish troops in 1699, and both Denmark and Sweden had sent 12 battleships each to sea in the autumn of 1699 as demonstrations. Frederik IV had hoped that Karl XII would be forced to commit his main army to defence in the east, but Karl decided to make his first counter-strike against Denmark. One reason was that he had allies in this conflict, and that would make it possible to defeat Denmark rapidly. Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, and the Elector of Hanover were—like Sweden—interested in the preservation of HolsteinGottorp's autonomy, and the two sea powers decided to send a joint fleet to the Baltic.^"^ Thirteen Dutch and ten British battleships of 15,000 and 11,000 tonnes respectively arrived off Gothenburg on 8 June. Denmark had mobilised practically the entire fleet—29 shipsof-the-line of about 36,000 tonnes—and 21 of these left Copenhagen on 11 May in order to blockade Karlskrona. Sweden, however, was mobilising no fewer than 38 ships-of-the-line of around 46,000 tonnes in its new base. This fleet, by a wide margin the largest Sweden had sent to sea up to then, was ready to sail on 16 June. As a test of the

lingers arkiv. 1 (unpublished list of warships based in Stockholm since 1715), KrA. Studies about individual operations usually provide i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t warships in commission and their deployment to various parts of the Baltic. I n f o r m a t i o n about the operational strength of Danish fleet is mainly f r o m Bidrag and Barfod 1997, while Anderson 1910/1969 provides information about the Russian, British, and D u t c h fleets in the Baltic 1700-21. Calculations of displacements are m a d e by the author. " Financial and administrative aspects of the naval mobilisation in 1700: l a m e s Cavallie, Fran fred till krig: De finansiella problemen kring krigsutbrottet ar 1700, Uppsala, 1975, 195-212. ™ Baltic naval operations in 1700: Bidrag, I, 374-458, 468-81; Karl XII pd slagfaltet, 2, 245-97, which uncritically follows Karl XII's ideas about naval operations a n d believes that they were realistic; Grauers 1946, 225-45; Bergersen, III, 696-768; Bergersen, IV, 7-156; Gustaf Jonasson, "Kriget m o t D a n m a r k ar 1700: Forberedelserna for landstigningen pa Sjalland och b a k g r u n d e n till fredsslutet", KFA, 43, 1962, 129-72, which analyses sources not used by earlier authors; Barfod 1997, 117-26.

202

chapter

three

mobilisation system, this shows major differences compared to 1675, especially because the Swedish army made a full-scale mobilisation at the same time. The Danish fleet was caught between two forces and returned to the Sound in order to defend Drogden, the deeper of the two channels leading into the Sound f r o m the south. Drogden was also, as usual, protected by batteries on the islands Amager and Saltholm and by the removal of navigation marks. Hie Swedish plan for this campaign originally had been that the fleet should protect the transfer of more troops to Germany to fight the main Danish army in Holstein. The potential to gain control of the Sound together with the Anglo-Dutch fleet stimulated Karl XII to alter this into an attack on the Danish fleet, which he hoped to destroy. Admiral-general Hans Wachtmeister, who commanded the Swedish fleet, was ordered to enter the Sound and attack the enemy, although it remains a mystery how the young king imagined that the Danish fleet would allow itself to be destroyed at sea in the immediate vicinity of its well-fortified base in Copenhagen. With Drogden blocked, there remained only the eastern passage into the Sound— Flintrannan, between Saltholm and the Skane coast—for the Swedish fleet. In contrast to earlier wars, this passage had now been surveyed by the Swedish navy, and a passage for the fleet was known. It was too shallow for the five largest Swedish ships, however, which drew more than 20 (Swedish) feet. They returned to Karlskrona, and three other battleships were detached for various reasons. The fleet passed through Flintrannan on 2 and 3 July. In the Sound, 30 Swedish battleships joined the 23 Anglo-Dutch ships. The Danish fleet returned to Copenhagen, which twice was bombarded by the allied fleets without much effect. The next step was to land a Swedish army on Sjaelland, in order to attack Copenhagen and destroy the fleet. Sjaelland was isolated from the main Danish army by Swedish warships in the Great Belt, and there were only 4,500 soldiers avaflable for the defence of the capital. In addition, the Danish fleet had several thousand seamen in Copenhagen, which would have been available for the defence. An amphibious force was rapidly organised, and 4,900 Swedish soldiers were landed at Humlebaek between Copenhagen and Helsingor on 24 July, under the protection of a naval bombardment. A bridgehead was established, and after two weeks more than 10,000 m e n could march against Copenhagen. About 6,000 more were avaflable in

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

203

Skane. Frederik IV was now under great military and diplomatic pres5yj-e_-and without help f r o m his two allies. He quicldy signed a treaty in which he promised to give no further support to the anti-Swedish coalition and guaranteed continued autonomy for Holstein-Gottorp. Karl XII was dissatisfied, because he still hoped to achieve a drastic reduction of the Danish fleet, but the British and the Dutch did not see a total defeat of Denmark as in their interest, and they were unwilling to support continued operations. The Swedish fleet in the Sound had been reduced by detachments of four more battleships, and it was not strong enough to both guarantee communications with Sweden and continue to isolate Sjaelland from the main Danish army. Karl had to sign the treaty and ship his main army to Livonia and Estonia, where it had to face both a Polish-Saxonian and a Russian army. For several years, the Swedish fleet was partly mobilised for the transportation of Swedish army forces across the Baltic.^^ 3.9.3

1701-1709: Karl XII in Poland and Peter I at Neva

After Swedish victories against Russia and Saxony-Poland in the east between 1700 and 1702, Karl XII marched into central PolandLithuania and waged a war to depose August of Saxony as Polish Icing. Just like in his Danish campaign, Karl XII wanted to gain more than an advantageous position for peace negotiations; he hoped for some kind of total victory. Baltic warfare and control of the sea faded into the background for him, although large resources were used to keep his battle fleet up to strength and in parity with Denmark. Karl did not take the naval ambitions of Tsar Peter seriously, even though the tsar in the 1690s had built a substantial navy for operations in the Sea of Azov. Russia followed an entirely new policy, which also meant that the tsar had naval competence to transfer to the Baltic. With great determination, Peter concentrated his war efforts against Sweden on gaining a foothold for his navy in the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland. In 1702, Russian small craft forced the Swedish flotilla on Ladoga to evacuate this lake. The tsar immediately founded a naval yard at the lake and began to produce smaU frigates, minor

' ' Sven Grauers, "De militara t r a n s p o r t e r n a over Ostersjon under stora nordiska krigets forsta skede, 1700-1708", Historiska studier tillagnade Folke Lindberg, Stockholm, 1963, 79-95.

204

chapter

three

sailing crait, and galleys. The Russians continued with an offensive in Ingria and took Nyen, the Swedish town at the mouth of the river Neva, in May 1703. During 1703-04, Peter rapidly fortified his positions in what was to become St Petersburg in Neva's delta estuary and the naval base Kronstadt on the island Retusaari (Russian: Kotlin) outside this city. The narrow deep-water passage to Neva was heavily protected by fortifications at Retusaari, and it became impractical for an enemy fleet to reach St Petersburg except with shallow-water vessels. During 1702-04, a Swedish flotilla also operated on Lake Peipus until Russian forces annihilated it. Most surprisingly, the strongly fortified city of Narva, a cornerstone in the Swedish empire since 1581, fell to the Russians in 1704, partly because the Russians were able to supply their siege army from the sea.'® Initially only small Swedish forces were sent to Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland to counter the Russian threat. In 1703, four frigates and ten new brigantines were sent, but it was only in 1704 that the navy began to deploy substantial forces to the Gulf of Finland: two small battleships, eight frigates, six brigantines, one bomb-vessel, and one small galley. This fleet attacked Retusaari in June, without success, and it could not reach the Neva estuary. A Swedish army from Finland attempted to attack St Petersburg but failed to come across Neva, which was controlled by Russian light craft. It was obvious that a Swedish counteroffensive in Ingria and a conquest of St Petersburg would require control of Neva and Ladoga.'' In 1705, a larger Swedish fleet with a landing force from the army made repeated attacks on Retusaari but was beaten back by Russian naval forces and batteries on land. The Swedish "Nyen squadron" this year consisted of seven battleships, nine frigates, three brigantines, and two bomb-vessels. It was vastly superior to the Russian naval forces, but the Russian superiority in oared, shallow-draught vessels in combination with batteries on land made it impossible for the Swedish fleet to gain control of the shallow waters in the innermost parts of the Gulf of Finland. Sailing warships could blockade the Russian f r o m entering the open sea but

Tlie Russian offensives in 1702-04: Munthe 1924-27, I, 70-77, 115-30, 152-59. Lake Peipus: Lars Otto Berg, "Peipuseskadern 1701-1704: Dorptska skeppsflottan", Aastaraamat. Annates societatis littemrum Estonicae in Svecia, 11, 1988-90, Stocldiolm, 1992, 27-38. ™ Munthe 1924-27, I, 238-56.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

205

could not launch a counterofFensive into shallow and narrow water. The small brigantines were no solution, because they only were armed with 3-pounders and were vulnerable to galleys with one large-calibre gun in the bow.^" The obvious countermeasure of creating a Swedish oared flotilla was not seriously attempted. When Karl XII in August 1705 authorised the building of 40 to 50 armed landing craft for a landing on Retusaari, Wachtmeister expressed his doubts about the plan, apparently because he feared that the navy would be charged with the cost of defending the island against Russian counterattacks.®' The cost of building a large number of oared craft was not prohibitive, especially not compared to the cost of the large battleships, which actually were built from increasingly scarce oak timber of great dimensions. Cheap timber of small dimensions and local private yards could be used to build oared craft. Sweden later proved able to rapidly mass-produce such craft during crises or wars with Russia (1720-21, 1748-49, 1789-90, and 1808-09) without seriously reducing other naval and military efforts."^ An oared flotilla was expensive only because it required a large number of oarsmen, but that was not a problem if an army, requiring seaborne transportation, was available. To such an army, the oared flotilla was an opportunity, not a problem. An oared flotilla was in fact primarily an amphibious force, which would have made Swedish infantry, siege artillery, and logistics mobile on the waters around Retusaari and St Petersburg and could have allowed them to annihilate the Russian foothold in the Baltic. The technical means to integrate the army and the navy, however, so that these two organisations could combine firepower and mobility in shallow and narrow water, were not addressed. The root of the problem was that the two organisations had developed a professional thinking and a firm division of responsibilities that made a shallow-water operation an inconvenient problem rather than a tempting opportunity to gain advantages over the enemy. It is obvious that Karl XII had to take the necessary decisions if resources were to be re-allocated, but he had no experience of

" Munthe 1924-27, II, 293-306. " Lars Otto Berg, "Karolinsk flotta: Studier och tabeller", Forum navale, 25, 1970, 21-25. Later Swedish construction of oared craft: Oscar Nikula, Svenska skargardsflottan 1756-1791, Stocldiolm, 1933, esp. 163-87; Glete 1993, 707-08.

206

chapter

three

shallow-water operations. In contrast, Peter I saw such operations as opportunities, and he frequently took personal command over them. Hie Swedish army did not lack men for oared craft. It had large forces in Finland, Estonia, and Livonia, which from 1704 to 1709 were strong enough to resist further Russian offensives. It also had considerable reserves of soldiers in Sweden. At its peak in 1707-08, Karl XII's army had a total effective strength of around 100,000 men.®^ With the exception of a few years in the Thirty Years War (1631-34), the Swedish army was larger than ever before and its quality was good. At the same time, the Swedish navy had grown (at the end of 1708) to 43 battleships, 20 frigates, 21 minor cruising vessels (mainly brigantines), four bomb vessels, five galleys, and numerous transports of various sizes. The galleys were based in Gothenburg for service in the Bohuslan archipelago, a region where no hostilities occurred before 1709. It was the largest navy Sweden ever had during the two centuries studied in this book, but its structure was almost entirely related to control of the southern Baltic in a confrontation with DenmarkNorway. This army and this navy were sufficient to control the open sea in the Baltic and vast continental territories in Eastern Europe. At the same time, these huge organisations had proved unable to retake the small Swedish province of Ingria and the very limited waters in the innermost part of the Gulf of Finland, a region in which combined operations and control of shallow waters, a large river, and a lake were decisive. From 1706 to 1709, the navy continued to blockade the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland with a squadron of sailing warships: five to eight small battleships, seven to ten frigates, and five to seven brigantines.®'' Meanwhile, the main army under Karl XII forced King August to give up the Polish throne by a campaign in Saxony. In 1707, this army marched through Poland into Russia at such a distance from the Baltic that logistical support from the sea and operational cooperation with the navy was out of the question. Karl XII evidently hoped to achieve a decision by a battle for control of Moscow and central Russia, rather than for St Petersburg and Tsar Peter's new positions in the Baltic,

Carl OUo N o r d e n s v a n , "Svenska a r m e n aren 1700-1709", KFA, 7, 1916, 12080.

Munthe 1924-27, II, 309, 380-85, 398-413. Naval operations in the Gulf of Finland in 1707: Fredrik Hjelmqvist, Kriget i Finland och Ingermanland 1707 och 1708, Lund, 1909, 40-57.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

207

even though they evidently were the tsar's main war aim. When Karl during 1708 was met by a Russian scorched-earth strategy and had to give up the direct route to Moscow, he choose to march to the south and Ukraine rather than to the north and his own Baltic territories. The Swedish army was not inactive in the Gulf of Finland region. In August 1708, 11,600 soldiers of the army in Finland attacked Ingria while the fleet supplied it from the sea outside the innermost part of the Gulf The army was able to cross Neva by a feint, which lured away the Russian oared flotilla, but the operation ended in failure. The fleet had to evacuate the entire army f r o m the southern side of the Gulf of Finland in October. The fiasco was partly caused by uninspired leadership, but its outcome obviously would have been different had it been possible to send provisions and heavy guns across the sea to the Neva estuary for a determined siege of St Petersburg.®® It is also obvious that a greater part of the Swedish army could have been deployed to such an assault and supported from the sea had a large oared flotilla been available. Tlie naval forces used in 1708 were only a minor part of the navy. Several thousand seamen as well as many sailing warships would have been available to support army logistics in the Gulf of Finland, if the last part of the line of operation to St Petersburg had been controlled with a shallow-water force. It would have required careful planning and major administrative efforts, but the Swedish armed forces and the state bureaucracy had m u c h experience of organising largescale operations. 3.9.4

1709-1715: A war in the Baltic Sea

After the defeat of his main army at Poltava in July 1709, Karl XII escaped to the Ottoman Empire. He stayed there until 1714 and tried to direct Swedish politics and strategy f r o m a great distance. Sweden's situation was in no way hopeless. The resources for a defensive war against Russia, Denmark, and Saxony-Poland (August quicldy regained his Polish kingdom after Poltava) were considerable; and if used with political, strategic, and administrative skill, they were sufficient for a counter-off'ensive in at least one direction. Karl XII's choice was to recreate a continental army for operations in Poland and Saxony. He

Hjelmqvist 1909, 166-213; Munthe 1924-27, II, 398-413; Einar W e n d t , "Med Nyeneskadern i osterled 1708", Forum navale, 17, 1960, 3 - 3 8 .

208

chapter

three

seems to have never considered an alternative: an amphibious force for defensive and counter-offensive operations against Russia in the Gulf of Finland. To this end, he vetoed the neutralisation of the Swedish and Danish provinces in Germany, which Sweden's enemies had agreed to in March 1710 in a treaty between Prussia, Hanover, Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, and the Emperor.'^® The treaty would have given August and Peter free hands in Poland and would have protected Denmark from Swedish assaults from Germany, but it would also have left Sweden free to make seaborne assaults on Denmark-Norway and the Russian-occupied Swedish provinces in the east. Operational planning in these directions would inevitably have focused the interest on a major oared flotilla, but that question was again shelved for some years. The first phase of the new Baltic war was a Danish invasion across the Sound in early November 1709. It continued with an army offensive against Karlskrona in the hope of annihilating the Swedish fleet. Tliis threat was eliminated by a counteroffensive f r o m the Swedish home army, which inflicted a serious defeat on the Danish army at Helsingborg on 28 February 1710. The Danish fleet had to evacuate the remnants of the army. The naval aspect of this winter campaign was small, although a Swedish squadron of 12 battleships of 15,000 tonnes was mobilised in late 1709 and the navy made defensive preparations against the threat of a Danish siege of Karlskrona.®^ Tsar Peter used his sudden superiority on land after Poltava to launch a series of campaigns, which in 1710 led to the conquest of Livonia and Estonia and also of Viborg, the fortified town in southeastern Finland that, since the late 13th century, had been a Swedish bulwark against Russia. In spite of the new war with Denmark, Sweden as usual deployed a naval squadron to the Gulf of Finland and the eastern Baltic: seven small battleships, eight frigates, two brigantines, and one bomb-vessel. It came just too late to stop the Russian fleet f r o m bringing in supply and heavy artillery to the siege of Viborg in April and early May, immediately after the ice had begun to break up in these waters. The lack of a Swedish oared flotilla made it, as

Jorg Philipp Lengeler, Das Ringen urn die Ruhe des Nordens: Grossbritanniens Nordeuropa-Politik und Ddnemark zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, 168-95. Bidrag, II; J. A. Lagermark, "Forsvaret av det egentliga Sveriges ostersjokust 1709", KFA, 14, 1923, 87-119, esp. 114-19; Bergersen, IV, 446-89.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

209

usual, impossible to think of a counter-offensive f r o m the sea in these waters, and Viborg was lost. Tliree of the frigates and one bombvessel were initially sent to Riga with reinforcements, but it proved impossible to pass the Russian batteries at the Diina estuary, and the largest Swedish city in the east capitulated in July 1710. Pernau also fell, and the Swedish squadron was left with the tasks of containing the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland and evacuating the garrison in Reval. There were not sufficient naval forces to defend the island of Osel, which was conquered by the Russians in 1710.®® Meanwhile, the Danish fleet made a very large mobilisation in order to achieve something decisive together with Russia, after the failure of the invasion of Skane.*' From March to June 1710, no fewer than 37 Danish battleships of 51,000 tonnes, as well as many frigates and smaller vessels, were commissioned. It was the largest Danish battle fleet mobilisation in this war and, in fact, ever. An agreement with Russia called for the Russian army to supply 10,000 (later reduced to 6,000) soldiers at Danzig. They would be used for a new invasion of Sweden's mainland, protected by the great Danish fleet. In May, Sweden had sent 16 battleships and four frigates to sea in the southern Baltic, to supplement the Gulf of Finland squadron; and the Gothenburg squadron of three small battleships, seven frigates, six brigantines, and five galleys was at least partially commissioned. The latter squadron posed such a threat to Danish-Norwegian communications that six Danish battleships were sent to Kattegatt in early July, thus weakening the Baltic Sea fleet. The threat f r o m the Gothenburg squadron was partly a Swedish deception: it actually was much undermanned, but the Danes could not know this. Regardless, it was easy to send seamen from Karlskrona to bring the squadron up to strength and, thereby, change deception to reality. The Swedish main fleet during the summer was concentrated at Karlskrona. Manning and provisioning were difficult challenges, but the fleet was kept ready to sail at short notice if the Danish-Russian invasion began to materialise. In Copenhagen, wildly optimistic plans of a raid against Stockholm circulated. The Danish naval leaders, who

" Munthe 1924-27, II, 4 4 6 - 5 7 ; J. A. L a g e r m a r k , " F o r s v a r e t av det egentliga Sveriges ostersjokust 1710", KFA, 15, 1924, 127-207; Fredrik Arfwidsson, Forsvaret av Ostersjoprovinserna, 1708-1710, Giivle, 1936, esp. 304-33. " Swedish a n d Danish naval operations in 1710: Bidrag, III, 80-138; Lagermark 1924- Goteborgs eskader, 119-21; Bergersen, IV, 490-767.

210

chapter

three

experienced problems with both ships and crews, were much less optimistic and had no great confidence in their ability to defeat the Swedish main fleet. Tlie Danish fleet and the transport ships for the Russian soldiers finally sailed to Danzig on 3 September. Tlie fleet was struck by a gale and had to return to Koge Bay, although about 40 transports continued to Danzig. Many battleships were damaged, and four dismasted battleships had to be sent to Copenhagen. The Swedish main fleet, commanded by Admiral-general Hans Wachtmeister, left Karlskrona on 20 September and sailed to the Koge Bay three days later. The Danish fleet under Admiral-general Ulrik Christian Gyldenlove had 26 battleships of 41,000 tonnes against 21 Swedish of 31,000 tonnes; the Danish superiority in firepower was about 20 per cent.®" The Danish ships and seamen were not in good condition, however, because the fleet had been at sea during most of the summer. Furthermore, the Danes allowed themselves to be surprised: their battleships were anchored deep in the bay, partly in disorder, and no scouting vessels were searching for the Swedish fleet at sea. Wachtmeister attacked from a windward position, and several Danish battleships were not able to beat out of the bay and join the battle-line before increasing winds forced both fleets to break off the action and anchor. The losses on both sides were small except for two dramatic events. The Danish battleship Dannebrog (2,200 tonnes) caught fire and exploded with the loss of 550 men, and the Swedish battleships Tre Kronor (2,000 tonnes) and Prinsessan Ulrika Eleonora (1,600 tonnes) ran aground south of Amager and had to be burnt by their own crews. The Swedish material losses were thus larger, but the Danish suffered a greater loss of men. After the loss of the two ships, Wachtmeister made no further attempt to fight close to the Danish coast. A fireship attack on the Danish fleet had no effect. Two days after the battle, 39 ships of the transport fleet from Danzig, returning without Russian soldiers, were captured or destroyed by the Swedish fleet without any interference from the Danish fleet. Wachtmeister sailed to the east and waited briefly for the Danish fleet to renew the action in the open sea. It did not follow him, and both fleets returned to their bases.

The gun a r m a m e n t of the Swedish ships: Ship-list 1/12 1713, R 4878, RA and N N S II, 12b, " R e m o n s t r a t i o n " (a s u m m a r y of naval g u n s in K a r l s k r o n a 1699 to 1727) 13/7 1728, KrA. Danish ships: yearly lists of a r m a m e n t in Soetaten after 1655, Sokrigskancelliet, SK 924, Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

211

The campaign of 1710 had revealed that the Danish battle fleet, even when fully mobilised, was in no condition to support offensive allied operations against Sweden, not even when the latter had to deploy part of its strength to the Gulf of Finland. Furthermore, the leaders of the Danish fleet lacked confidence in its ability to defeat the Swedish battle fleet and did not seriously try to fight it when they were offered an opportunity. Tlie Danish fleet was indispensable for Denmark's own defence and consequently was used with great caution, but this reduced its value as an offensive force. Central and southern Sweden could not be threatened by a seaborne invasion unless the Russian fleet was drastically increased or another major naval power joined Sweden's enemy. It was another question if the Swedish naval forces were strong enough to support operations in Germany or protect Finland from an invasion with an amphibious galley fleet, or both at the same time. During 1711, Swedish and probably also Danish naval operations were restrained by a severe plague that struck Northern Europe." No fewer than 6,000 to 7,000 persons died in Karlskrona alone. The Russians were occupied with a war against the Ottoman Empire, in which they were defeated and lost access to the Sea of Azov. That left them free to concentrate their naval efforts on the Baltic, however. The first Russian battleships appeared in the Gulf of Finland in these years. The Swedish blockade force in the northern Baltic Sea (seven small battleships, six frigates, two brigantines, and one bomb-vessel) could only contain the Russian fleet, not blockade all ports under Russian control in Livonia and Estonia. Western merchantmen began to arrive in Russian-occupied Swedish ports. Sweden prohibited trade with these ports and began to attack merchant vessels with privateers. Privateers were also active against vessels sailing between Denmark and Norway. In 1711, the Danes commissioned ten battleships for the Kattegatt and North Sea, an indication of the threat that the Swedish Gothenburg squadron and the increasing Swedish privateering activity posed in these waters.'^

" Naval operations in 1711: Bidrag, III, 154-73, 220-22, 229-60, 294-307, 31-320, 335-54, 393-95, 405-23; J. A. Lagermark, "Forsvaret av det egentliga Sveriges ostersjokust, vastra Sverige och Finland 1711", KFA, 19, 1928, 10-96. ® This war is the only one in which Swedish privateering was important: Olof Traung, Lars Gathenhielm: Kaperiverksamheten under Karl XILs tid 1710-1719, Gothenburg, 1952; Lars Ericson, Lasse i Gatan: Kaparkriget och det svenska stormaktsvaldets fall, Lund, 1997.

212

chapter

three

In the southern Bahic, 22 Danish battleships cruised in order to cut off Swedish communications with Pomerania and Wismar, which were under attack by Russian and Polish-Saxonian forces. Hiis fleet also planned to invade Riigen and bring heavy siege guns to Stralsund, but these operations were delayed and finally cancelled due to autumn gales. It was a major failure, considering that it probably saved the Swedish German provinces for four years. The Swedish fleet, 24 battleships of 33,000 tonnes, in December could escort a convoy with 4,000 soldiers to Pomerania after the Danish fleet had been laid up. After this fleet returned, a smaller force shipped one regiment to Wismar, although one small battleship and a frigate were lost in severe gales. With this, these Swedish possessions in Germany were safe for the time being. In 1712, the main Swedish effort was to transfer a major army across the Baltic in order to start the ofl?'ensive into Poland, which Karl XII demanded.'^ Around 10,000 soldiers and much equipment were gathered for an expedition to Pomerania that would raise the Swedish forces in Germany to a level where they could start the offensive. The wisdom of this operation was widely doubted in Sweden, especially because the Ottomans had concluded peace with Russia in 1711 and no longer threatened Russia. The safety of Sweden and Finland was uppermost in the mind of the decision-makers in Stocldiolm, but the command of the absent but absolute king was still powerful enough to overcome political and administrative problems. Russia did in fact launch a major invasion in Finland during 1712 but made only limited progress, and Sweden's four small battleships, four frigates, and two brigantines deployed to the Gulf of Finland could still contain the Russian fleet in the open sea, although not in the Finnish archipelago. The Russian oared forces could support the army's oflJ'ensive before the Swedish squadron arrived on the open coast at Bjorko (northwest of Retusaari/Kronstadt) to cut off communications between St Petersburg and Finland. W h e n the squadron was there, a small Russian oared force was able to pass it wfth the help of a feint and period of calm weather. This was not sufficient to turn the flank of the Swedish army, however, and the Russian army retreated.''' The Swedish Gothenburg

" Naval o p e r a t i o n s in 1712: Bidrag, IV, 1 - 8 8 ; Munthe 1924-27, III, appendix, 3-118. D a n i e l Almqvist, " D e n ryska offensiven i F i n l a n d ar 1712", KFA, 34, 1943, 149-235.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

213

squadron was active early and tied five to six Danish battleships and six frigates, with an additional three Russian frigates, to Kattegatt and the North Sea. Danish naval efforts showed a new and ingenious pattern when a force of shallow-draught ships and small craft arrived to the New Deep, the relatively shallow eastern entrance to Stralsund in July 1712. The Swedish naval force in this region was inferior in strength, and after repeated counterattacks it had to give up the attempt to control the New Deep. Hie Danes were now in control of the entrance to the port of Stralsund just when Sweden was gathering strength for the transfer of the army to Pomerania. This meant that the Swedish army had to be landed on the open coast of Riigen, where it could be vulnerable to the Danish main battle fleet. The Danish fleet brought in siege artillery to Stralsund in August, and the allies, now commanded by Tsar Peter, also attempted to land Saxonian troops on Riigen with the Danish fleet in August. This plan failed when the Swedish battle fleet under Hans Wachtmeister appeared at sea on 23 August with 24 battleships. The Danish fleet of 16 battleships retreated to a defensive position in Drogden. They recalled part of their Kattegatt squadron when they found that the Swedish Gothenburg squadron had been laid up and the crews had been transferred to m a n the Swedish main fleet in Karlskrona. The Swedish fleet did not remain outside the Sound. Wachtmeister became worried for the safety of the army convoy when reports came about Danish cruisers at sea. Wachtmeister worried that the Danes might send their Kattegatt squadron into the Baltic Sea through the Great Belt and Femern Bek and, thus, attack the convoy behind his back. When General Magnus Stenbock, the commander-in-chief of the army, demanded six more ships as escort, Wachtmeister decided to use the whole Swedish battle fleet as escort force to the convoy. In reality, the cautious Danish Admiral-general Gyldenlove had no plans to split his fleet or take the risk of sailing through Drogden to break Wachtmeister's blockade. Wachtmeister had a fleet of 24 battleships of about 35,000 tonnes, while the Danes, after having concentrated their forces, appeared at sea with 22 battleships of around 37,000 tonnes. The Swedish fleet had a small superiority in firepower.'^ From 16 to

' ' The a r m a m e n t of tlie Swedish ships; ship-list 1/12 1713, R 4878, RA and N N S n , 12b, "Remonstration" 17/7 1728, KrA. Danish ships: yearly lists of a r m a m e n t in Soetaten efter 1655, Sokrigskancelliet, SK 924, Rigsarldvet, Copenhagen.

214

chapter

three

18 September, the two fleets manoeuvred off Riigen while the Swedish army disembarked. The Danish fleet was not interested in a battle but aimed at attacking the transport vessels. On 18 September, a shift of the wind allowed the Danish frigates to attack the Swedish transports. Many of these failed to use the wind to sail into safety, and about 60 to 70 were destroyed or captured. The soldiers were ashore by then, but part of the army's equipment and provisions were lost. The two batde fleets separated and returned to their bases after a brief exchange of broadsides on long distance on 19 September. Hans Wachtmeister has been almost unanimously criticised for his decision to leave Drogden and allow the Danish battle fleet to appear at sea without a fight.^® Wachtmeister, whose health had deteriorated after a stroke in early 1711, may have been overcautious; a few fast ships sent for reconnaissance in the Femern Belt could have warned him if a Danish squadron really had been sent f r o m Kattegatt. Ironically, his critics indirectly credit him for the respect the Swedish navy (which he had led since 1678) had instilled in its traditional adversary. They take it for granted, correctly, that a Swedish fleet could blockade a Danish fleet of equal strength and that the Danes would not risk sending a limited striking force into the Baltic for the destruction of an important convoy. Compared to the war of 1675-79, it is remarkable that Sweden could send an army across the Baltic in the presence of a Danish battle fleet of the same strength as the Swedish fleet. The final part of the operation in 1712 was a setback, although the importance of the losses for the army's operations has never been properly investigated. The possibility of re-occupying Poland was small when the size of the Russian, Saxonian, Pohsh, and Danish army forces in northern Germany is considered. The Swedish army under Magnus Stenbock won a victory against a Danish-Saxonian army at Gadebusch on 9 December 1712, the last Swedish victory on the continent ever, but provisioning problems forced it to capitulate at Tonning in Holstein

H a n s Wachtmeister's only staunch defender has been G u n n a r Unger: G u n n a r Unger, "Sj5histoiiska vrangbilder", TiS, 88, 1925, 511-35; H u g o Larsson, "Var flotta u n d e r det stora nordiska kriget", TiS, 89, 1926, 5 7 - 7 5 (inckiding reply by G. Unger); H u g o Larsson, "Flottoperationerna i sodra Ostersjon 1712", TiS, 89, 1926, 191-95; G u n n a r Unger, "Flottoperationerna i sodra Ostersjon 1712. Slutreplik", TiS, 89, 1926, 251-64. Critique against W a c h t m e i s t e r f r o m authors w h o are sympathetic to him: Munthe 1924-27, III, appendix, 45-71; Grauers 1946, 263-76.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

215

on 5 May 1713.'" The last Swedish offensive operation on the European continent was over. The large resources gathered for a counter-offensive were spent in an attempt to re-establish Sweden as a continental power rather than being sent to the Gulf of Finland to eliminate the Russian naval threat to Sweden as a Baltic power and to the eastern part of the old kingdom, Finland. It was a fateful choice. Tsar Peter had wasted little time after Poltava to begin to build a Baltic battle fleet. Five small 50-gun battleships had been laid down in 1708-09 (before Poltava) and launched in 1710-12. Six medium-sized battleships were laid down in St Petersburg in 1711-12, and seven small battleships in Archangelsk (White Sea) in 1712-14. Eleven more large and medium-sized battleships (66 to 96 guns) were laid down in St Petersburg in 1714-16. This was a large battle fleet, but it took several years to build, and most of the St Petersburg-built ships were not launched until 1717-21. In the meantime, the tsar used the opportunity offered by the end of the Spanish war of Succession: both shipping and manpower resources had been freed up for use elsewhere. Officers and seamen were recruited in Western Europe; 16 battleships were purchased second-hand between 1712 and 1714, from Britain, the Dutch Republic, France, and Hamburg; and three battleships were built in the Netherlands to Russian specifications. Most of these purchased battleships were actually armed merchantmen, small and weak compared to most Swedish and Danish battleships, but together they formed a powerful force that could influence Baltic strategy.'" During 1713, military and naval operations in and around Pomerania and Riigen continued, but they were not intense, and a local truce was concluded in the autumn. The Danish fleet had severe problems finding seamen, and only in August was the main fleet brought up to its intended strength of 18 battleships. It stayed close to its base, and in September it failed to intercept a Swedish supply and reinforcement convoy to Stralsund, protected by 15 battleships. In the autumn, Denmark had to commission three of its oldest battleships for escort duties in the North Sea, where Swedish privateers, some of

" The most recent study of diplomacy and politics a r o u n d this operation is Lengeler, 196-271. The creation of a Russian battle fleet can be followed in the historical ship-lists in Feodor. F. Veselago, Spisok russkich voennych sudov, 1668-1860, St Petersburg, 1872, 8-19, 74-79. The purchase of ships: R. C. A n d e r s o n , "Second-hand M e n - o f - w a r in 1712-14", M M , 17, 1931, 321-26.

216

chapter

three

them foreigners with privateering experience from the Spanish War of Succession, had become increasingly active.'' With large Swedish forces deployed to the continent, Tsar Peter in 1713 took the opportunity to concentrate his offensive efforts to that part of Sweden where control of the open sea was not decisive: Finland.'™ For the first time, his galley flotilla showed its full potential. In early May, a squadron of Russian sailing warships took up a position at Bjorko between Retusaari/Kronstadt and Viborg, where the open coast might give Swedish sailing warships an opportunity to block the Russian galleys. With that position under control, around 200 galleys and small craft rapidly brought a Russian army into the Finnish archipelago, landing it at Borga. The galleys could use the archipelago as a protected transport route for both soldiers and their provisions, and with this amphibious force, southern Finland was rapidly overrun by the Russian army during the summer of 1713. Once west of Bjorko, the Russian galley fleet could not be stopped until it reached the Hango peninsula in southwestern Finland, where land projects out into the sea without a covering archipelago of islands. The Swedish Gulf of Finland squadron, a total of nine battleships this year, was still in control of the open sea and took its position off Hango. There it cut off seaborne supply for the Russian army forces occupying southwestern Finland and Abo. The Russian army had to retreat to the east, a sign of how dependent the army was on seaborne logistics."" During 1713, the Russians increased their battleship strength to 12, but one ship was lost by grounding and one purchased ship was captured by the Swedish fleet on its way from England. The presence of the Russian battleship force made naval operations more complicated for the Swedish squadron making it impossible to keep a tight blockade of all Russian-controlled ports in the Baltic. Trade between Western Europe and Russia's new Baltic ports revived, although it remained at a lower than normal level until 1722.'"^

" Bidrag, V, 197-244. The planned commissioning of three m o r e battleships was not fulfilled. Naval operations against Russia in 1713: H u g o Uddgren, Kriget i Finland 1713, Stockholm, 1906, 72-85. "" Russian logistics in Finland: Kuvaja 1999. G5sta Lindeberg, Svensk ekonomisk politik under den gortzka perioden, Lund, 1941, 34-48.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

217

In 1714, Swedish naval efforts were concentrated in the Gulf of Finland.'" Denmark intended to commission 19 battleships but actually manned only 15. Of these, only iive to six battleships were continuously at sea in the Baltic Sea, while three were in Kattegatt and Skagerack. Swedish convoys to Stralsund passed practically unhindered. Financial problems severely restrained further Danish war efforts, and Tsar Peter's plans in late 1713 and early 1714 that the Danes and Russians should join their army and navy forces for an invasion of central Sweden or a destruction of Karlskrona and the Swedish fleet lacked realism. Sweden commissioned 11 battleships for the southern Baltic, but Danish inactivity made it possible to send three of them to the Gulf of Finland. There, a force of 16 battleships, six frigates, three brigantines, three bomb-vessels, two shallow-draught blockships, and 11 galleys was concentrated during May and June in order to continue to prevent the Russians galleys from passing Hango and in order to contain the growing Russian batde fleet. The blockships and galleys were built in 1713 as a belated answer to the Russian galleys, but it was a minor force compared to the 118 galleys, with 17,000 soldiers, which the Russians commissioned this year. The Russian battle fleet was concentrated in Reval and commanded by the tsar, officially as rear admiral, his present rank in the Russian navy. It consisted of 16 battleships, five frigates, and three small vessels, but its battleships were small, half of them only armed merchantmen, and the entire fleet was undermanned. After a brief counterattack against a Swedish squadron on 17-18 July, it returned to Reval and acted as a fleet-in-being. It did not support the galley fleet, which waited east of Hango at a suitable m o m e n t to pass this point. The tsar ordered that an attempt should be made to transport galleys on land across the narrow Hango peninsula. The Swedish fleet had detached half of the archipelago flotilla to the archipelago in southwestern Finland. W h e n reports about Russian preparations for bringing small galleys across the peninsula reached the fleet, the other half of the flotilla was detached on 25 July to the archipelago west of Hango, where it was charged with stopping this activity. The next day was totally calm, allowing the Russian galley fleet to use its oars and

Naval operations in 1714: Bidrag, VI, 252-84; H u g o Uddgren, Kriget i Finland 1714, Stockholm, 1909, 2 6 - 2 9 , 5 1 - 5 9 , 1 1 1 - 4 4 ; a Russian a c c o u n t : P. A. Krotov, Gangutskaia bataliia 1714 goda, St Petersburg, 1996.

218

chapter

three

pass unharmed around the Swedish battle fleet. It then re-entered the archipelago, captured the Swedish flotilla (one blockship, six galleys, and three swivel-armed boats) in an intensely fought battle west of Hango on 27 July (called the battle of Hango Udd), and continued to take control of the Abo and Aland archipelagos. Tliis made it possible for the Russian army to operate in southeastern Finland, and the occupation of the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom was completed. The actions around Hango on 26-27 July (the battle of Gangut in Russian) have remained a great event in Russian naval historiography and have frequently been misinterpreted as a decisive battle for control of the Baltic Sea.'""' It was actually a part of the conquest of Finland, and its importance for future naval operations was that the operational base of the Russian galleys came closer to the Swedish east coast. The strategic lessons of the operations in 1713-14 were that substantial forces of oared vessels were necessary in warfare in Finland and that an army operating there must control the archipelago. These lessons were to determine a century of Swedish strategy. In late 1714, Karl XII suddenly arrived on horseback in Stralsund after five years in the Ottoman Empire. He made the city his headquarters and took personal control of Swedish foreign, military, and naval policy. He made clear that he did not respect the sequester which Hanover had placed on Bremen-Verden and Prussia on Stettin and the Oder estuary since 1712-13. Karl even forced the Prussian troops to leave the island of Usedom. As a result, both German states joined the anti-Swedish alliance. The Elector of Hanover, George I, was since 1714 also the king of Great Britain, so Sweden saw a new major enemy at sea. A conflict between Britain and Sweden had been growing since Russia had occupied the Swedish Baltic provinces. Swedish policy was that trade in occupied Swedish ports was forbidden and that Swedish privateers and warships had the right to capture neutral ships sailing in them. Many English and Dutch merchantmen were captured, although until 1714 the maritime powers were unwilling to break their traditionally friendly relations with Sweden. George I's accession to the British throne changed this, and the British and Dutch governments

For example in Phillips 1995, 124; Richard Harding, "Sea Power: The struggle for dominance, 1650-1815", in Geoff M o r t i m e r (ed.), Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815, Hoimdsmills, 2004, 182-83.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

219

decided to organise convoys and send fleets to the Baltic. Eighteen British and eight Dutch battleships arrived in the Sound in late May 1715. Hie Dutch only intended to protect their trade, but George I and some of his British ministers hoped that this fleet could be used to support the allies and gain Bremen-Verden for Hanover. That would require provoking Karl XII to attack British warships, however, and for once he was cautious and ordered his navy to avoid clashes with the western sea powers.'"^ In Karlskrona, an early spring squadron of four battleships and two frigates was organised.'"® It left port on 24 March with orders from the Amiralitetskollegium to cruise south of the entrance of the Sound, catch enemy vessels, and guard communications between Sweden and Pomerania. On 30 March, Karl XII sent a strange dispatch to the young Schoutbynacht (Rear-admiral) Count Karl Hans Wachtmeister (the late admiral-general's son), who commanded this squadron. He was ordered into the Femern Belt, where he was to join the Gothenburg squadron, which the king had ordered to sail southwards. Wachtmeister did so and for two weeks made his presence known to the Danish by capturing some merchantmen. Not unexpectedly, a much superior Danish squadron of eight battleships and three frigates was sent from Copenhagen and cut off Wachtmeister's retreat. But Wachtmeister had Karl XII's order to fight the enemy regardless of the relative strength, and he did so on 13 April east of Femern. After a fiercely fought battle lasting five or seven hours (the reports differ), the Swedish squadron was too much damaged to continue the fight or escape. The Danish losses were 65 dead and 224 wounded, while

The British-Dutch naval expeditions to the Baltic in 1715-16 and their background in trade and diplomacy are studied by John J. Murray, "Sjomakternas expedition till Ostersjon 1715", KFA, 44, 1953, 134^96; John J. Murray, "The United Provinces and the Anglo-Dutch Squadron of 1715", Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nedeiianden, 8, 1953/54, 20-45; John J, Murray, George I, the Baltic and the Whig Split of 1717: A study in diplomacy and propaganda, London, 1969. The British expeditions in 1715-21 are studied by David D. Aldridge, Admiral Sir John Norris and the British Naval Expeditions to the Baltic Sea, 1715-1727, Lund, f o r t h c o m i n g (PhD thesis, London, 1971). M u r r a y has mainly used British and D u t c h sources, while Aldridge mainly has used British and Swedish sources. The most recent study of George I's decision to intervene in the Nordic W a r is Lengeler, 273-85. Naval operations in 1715: Bidrag, VII, 9 - 3 4 , 64-240; G u n n a r Unger, Karl XII och ostersjokriget 1715: En sjdhistorisk strategist studie, Stockholm, 1928. The Stockliolm squadron: Sven Grauers, Atten Wachtmeister genom seklerna, 1, Stockholm, 1941, 312-19. The battle of Femern: Sven Grauers, Atten Wachtmeister genom seklerna, 3:1, Stockholm, 1953, 18-23.

220

chapter

three

the Swedish squadron had 353 dead and wounded. At least 1,875 men were taken prisoners. All Swedish ships except one battleship, which was destroyed, were captured and most of the ships served for many years in the Danish navy. The rationale behind Karl XII's order is impossible to understand. The squadron was by the Amiralitetskollegium sent to cruise where it at the same time could blockade small Danish forces from Copenhagen, catch Russian warships sailing from Western Europe, protect the communications between Sweden and Pomerania, and easily retreat to Karlskrona if superior forces appeared. The king sent it to a place where it could achieve none of these tasks, only disturb Danish communication lines for a very brief period. It was a useless sacrifice of one sixth of his battle fleet and 2,200 m e n at a time when they were badly needed for the operations which Karl had in m i n d for 1715, a decisive fight for Pomerania and Wismar supported with supplies from Sweden. It is also obvious that Karl XII knew or understood little of rather recent operational history. He placed the squadron in exactly the same unfavourable position as his father had when he had sent the Gothenburg squadron through the Danish straits in May 1677, only to be defeated by the Danish fleet. Karl XI had at least had the rational strategic purpose of trying to unite his fleet for a decisive attack on Denmark; his son deliberately split his fleet as a prelude to a decisive operation. Now the Swedish navy had to counter the activities of both the Russian and the Danish fleet with reduced strength. To guard against the Russian threat to Stockholm, two—later three—small battleships, five frigates, two brigantines, one blockship, and six galleys were based in the capital. This Stockholm squadron became permanent, and after 35 years the capital partially revived as a naval base. Thirteen Swedish battleships paid a brief visit to the Gulf of Finland in late May and early June and made a fruitless attack on a Russian squadron in the port of Reval. This fleet was soon recalled to the southern Baltic and was back in Karlskrona around 15 June. Tlie Russians commissioned 17 battleships and four frigates, which for a while cruised close to Stockholm and Gotland but soon returned to the Gulf of Finland. They made the open sea unsafe for Swedish shipping and privateers, but the invasion of Gotland, which the Council in Stocldiolm feared, did not materialise. The Russians seemed to be interested primarily in training, and the tsar still lacked seamen for all his new warships. The presence of

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

221

the Russians did, however, tie a Swedish squadron to Stocldiohii, just when its shallow-water component would have been of great strategic importance in the Pomeranian campaign. The fight for Pomerania and Riigen was the main campaign this year, and while several allies gathered large army forces, it was the Danish navy that had to fight for control of the sea. The Danes repeated their earlier successful strategy of deploying a powerful shallow-draught flotilla to the inshore Pomeranian waters. These waters gave access to the ports of Stralsund, Greifswald, and Stettin and could be used to transport heavy guns and provisions for the alhed armies. Since 1712, Sweden had built a local flotilla for Pomerania, and in 1715, 12 frigates, two bomb-vessels, and one brigantine fought here. From 8 July until mid-November, a series of naval actions took place when the allied armies occupied the island of Usedom and gradually closed the siege and blockade of Stralsund. The Danes were reinforced, partly with galleys f r o m the Norwegian flotilla. Finally their flotilla could protect the landing of a large army, possibly as large as 17,000 men and 5,000 horses, on the southeastern (inshore) side of Riigen on 5 November. This proved decisive for the Pomeranian campaign. Tlie campaign was over for the Swedish flotilla, which had lost four frigates, and the survivors sailed to Sweden. However, for the first time in this war, the Swedish navy had proved able to fight an important campaign for control of narrow and shallow waters. The Pomeranian flotilla delayed quantitatively superior enemy army forces in their operations on land for several months. The maritime character of the Swedish territories in Pomerania and the decisive importance of the sea were demonstrated in this campaign.'"^ The campaign for control of the open sea was fought between the Danish and Swedish battle fleets. In July, Sweden had gathered 20 battleships of around 26,000 tonnes under c o m m a n d of Admiral Klas Sparre, to protect a convoy to Riigen. The convoy encountered a Danish fleet of 16 battleships under Admiral Peter Raben, This force retreated westward, for a time cutting off the Danish shallow-water flotilla in Pomerania f r o m supply of water and provisions. The Swedes attempted to attack the Danish flotilla f r o m the sea with their smallest

Erik Spens, "Sjomaktens inflytande pa strideii o m V o r p o m m e r n 1715", TiS, 102, 1939, 288-311,

222

chapter

three

battleships (Karl XII was on board one of them) and f r o m shore batteries, but the flotilla could take protection in shallow water. Hie flotilla's importance was so great that both Frederick William I of Prussia and Frederik IV of Denmark visited it to encourage the crews, but it clearly needed help. Hie Danish government asked for help f r o m the British Baltic fleet, but the political situation had not developed far enough for its active participation. The Danish government decided, uncharacteristically, to risk a major battle-fleet action with Sweden. They strengthened the fleet with five more battleships and formed a Danish battle line of 21 units of around 33,000 tonnes. Danish superiority in firepower was less marked, around 12 per cent.'"® The Danish fleet sailed to Riigen. The Swedish fleet formed a battle line and met the Danish fleet on an east-north-easterly course on 28 July. The ensuring battle followed strict battle-line tactics. It was the last of the many battles between the two Nordic battle fleets, and it ended in a tactical draw. The losses in men were higher on the Danish side: 127 dead and 485 wounded against 145 dead and 333 wounded on the Swedish ships.'"' Some Swedish ships were severely damaged and had several hits below the waterline, probably because the Swedish line had the leeward position, which in the fresh wind meant that part of the bottoms were exposed to gunfire. The Danish ships must have received most of their hits higher in the hulls, which explains the larger losses in personnel. Both fleets were exhausted and suffered f r o m lack of ammunition, and after a few days, they sailed to Karlskrona and Koge Bay respectively for repair. In the following months neither fleet was much at sea, although the Danish fleet escorted an important convoy with soldiers to Pomerania in late August. In early September, most of the British fleet left the Baltic Sea with homebound merchantmen, but eight battleships remained and joined the Danish fleet. In exchange, Denmark turned over Bremen-Verden to Hanover, but it is doubtful if they got much out of this transaction. It was still highly uncertain whether British warships, unprovoked, would attack Swedish ships in cooperation with the Danes. The Swedish fleet

The a r m a m e n t of the Swedish ships: ship-hst 1/12 1713, R 4878, RA; N N S II, 12b, "Remonstration" 13/7 1728, KrA. Danish ships: yearly lists of a r m a m e n t in Soetaten efter 1655, Sokrigskancelliet, SK 924, Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Danish losses f r o m Bidrag, VII, 114-16. Swedish losses f r o m a detailed list of 3/8 1715, M 1860, RA. Anderson 1910/1969, 167, has slightly different figures for both fleets.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

223

was not repaired up to full strength until early October, when it began a series of attempts to send in reinforcements to Pomerania. Tliey were hindered by severe autumn gales rather than the Danish-British fleet, which usually stayed in Koge Bay, but because only 700 soldiers could be sent, it is doubtful whether these convoys could have changed the increasingly hopeless situation in Stralsund."" Karl XII escaped in a small warship and returned to the Swedish mainland on 13 December 1715 after 15 years of absence. Stralsund had surrendered one day earlier. The convoy with supply from Karlskrona, which finally arrived at the same time, evacuated parts of the garrisons and continued to Wismar, which received these last Swedish reinforcements to its forces on the continent. This town had to capitulate on 9 April 1716, but its resistance kept 10,000 Danish soldiers occupied for several months when they were needed elsewhere. 3.9.5 1716-1721: Great Britain, the Baltic powers, and the end of the war Karl XII immediately started a new campaign."' In late February 1716, he invaded Norway. He soon took Christiania (Oslo), but the lack of siege guns made it impossible for him to take the Akershus fortress in Christiania or the fortress Frederikssten (at Halden) at the SwedishNorwegian border. The Danish sent seven battleships and six frigates with soldiers who landed and forced the Swedish army to a partial retreat in April. The campaign continued, however, and the Swedish west coast archipelago flotilla supplied the army as it controlled the

"" Murray 1969, 187-89, and Hatton 1968, 404-07, argue that the presence of eight British battleships markedly strengthened the Danish fleet and m a d e the Swedish fleet unwilling to escort convoys to Pomerania. Aldridge forthcoming, ch. 2, has f o u n d n o evidence of that in the Swedish sources and concludes that it was inclement weather that delayed the convoys. A log-book of w i n d a n d weather conditions as recorded on the Swedish fleet flagship Gota Lejon f r o m 16/9 to 25/11 1715 is in M 1860, RA. Murray's argument that it m u s t have been possible for Swedish transports to sail to Pomerania when the allied a r m y could invade Rugen in N o v e m b e r does not take into account that the invasion force only sailed a short distance f r o m Greifswald to Rugen, mainly in sheltered waters. Naval operations in 1716; Bidrag, VIII; Grauers 1941, 319-28; Goteborgs eskader, 133-39. Allied policy, operations, and diplomacy: Edvard H o l m , "Studier til den Store Nordiske Krigs historie: I. Frederik IV och Czar Peter i Aaret 1716", (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, 5:3, 1881-82, 1-160; Mediger 1967, esp. 303-12, 328-29, 381-82. British naval participation: Murray 1969, 216-84, Aldridge forthcoming, ch. 3.

224

chapter

three

route through the Bohuslan archipelago between G o t h e n b u r g

and

N o r w a y . T h e d e p l o y m e n t of several D a n i s h w a r s h i p s t o N o r w a y a n d D a n i s h difficulties w i t h b r i n g i n g a m a j o r fleet t o sea f o r a t i m e gave t h e S w e d i s h fleet c o n t r o l of t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic Sea. This y e a r , S w e d e n h a d r e d u c e d t h e active battle fleet to 14 b a t t l e s h i p s a n d six frigates b u t m a n a g e d t o k e e p t h e fleet m a n n e d f r o m early s p r i n g t o a u t u m n . It w a s u n d e r c o m m a n d of A d m i r a l B a r o n Karl H a n s W a c h t m e i s t e r , a n e p h e w of t h e d e c e a s e d a d m i r a l - g e n e r a l ( n o t t o b e c o n f u s e d w i t h h i s y o u n g e r c o u s i n w i t h t h e s a m e n a m e ) . I n late A p r i l h e c h a s e d an i n f e r i o r D a n i s h s q u a d r o n t o K o g e Bay b u t m a d e n o a t t e m p t t o e x e c u t e t h e a t t a c k o n t h e fleet in C o p e n h a g e n , w h i c h Karl XII h a d o r d e r e d h i m t o try. T h e t e m p o r a r y S w e d i s h s u p e r i o r i t y at sea d e l a y e d t h e D a n i s h shallow-draught

flotilla,

w h i c h w a s to b e t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m

Pomerania

t o B o h u s l a n a n d c u t ofl: S w e d i s h a r m y s u p p l i e s . It also d e l a y e d t h e R u s s i a n Reval s q u a d r o n of s e v e n b a t t l e s h i p s , w h i c h w a s t o j o i n t h e D a n i s h fleet. T h e t w o fleets w e r e t o p r o t e c t t h e t r a n s p o r t of R u s s i a n f o r c e s f r o m t h e c o n t i n e n t to Sjaelland, w h e r e a large a r m y of 20,000 D a n e s a n d 33,000 R u s s i a n s w a s t o b e c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r a decisive invas i o n of S k a n e . W a c h t m e i s t e r r e t u r n e d t o K a r l s k r o n a in late M a y w h e n a British fleet of 17 b a t t l e s h i p s a r r i v e d in t h e S o u n d . Its t a s k w a s to give A n g l o - H a n o v e r i a n d i p l o m a c y m u s c l e s a g a i n s t K a r l XII. F o r t h e rest of this year, t h e S w e d i s h fleet stayed at o r n e a r K a r l s k r o n a a n d p l a y e d t h e role of a

fleet-in-being.

It l i m i t e d t h e e n e m i e s ' f r e e d o m of

o p e r a t i o n b y f o r c i n g t h e m t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r fleets a n d b y t h r e a t e n ing A n g l o - D u t c h shipping f r o m Russian-held ports. Tlie D a n i s h s h a l l o w - w a t e r flotilla sailed n o r t h f r o m P o m e r a n i a a n d , o n 2 7 J u n e 1716, s t r u c k a b l o w t h a t e n d e d Karl X I I ' s N o r w e g i a n c a m p a i g n . It a t t a c k e d a n d t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t d e s t r o y e d o r c a p t u r e d t h e S w e d i s h i n s h o r e flotilla at D y n e k i l e n in t h e B o h u s l a n a r c h i p e l a g o a n d c a p t u r e d t h e siege t r a i n f o r t h e S w e d i s h siege of F r e d e r i k s s t e n . I n J u n e , t h e q u e s t i o n of w h o c o n t r o l l e d t h e o p e n sea in t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic Sea w a s still u n d e c i d e d , b e c a u s e t h e S w e d i s h fleet in K a r l s k r o n a c o u l d strike at t h e R u s s i a n s o r t h e D a n e s b e f o r e t h e y h a d u n i t e d t h e i r forces. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e R u s s i a n Reval s q u a d r o n w a s d e l a y e d a n d d i d n o t arrive at C o p e n h a g e n u n t i l 17 July, w h e n it j o i n e d t e n o t h e r R u s s i a n battleships that h a d arrived f r o m Archangelsk and W e s t e r n Europe. By t h e n t h e British a n d t o s o m e e x t e n t also t h e D u t c h w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e i n v a s i o n , b e c a u s e Karl XII h a d s h o w n n o i n t e r e s t in

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

225

peace n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e D u t c h h a d f o u r b a t t l e s h i p s in t h e Baltic, a n d t h e D a n i s h fleet w a s g r a d u a l l y able t o c o m m i s s i o n 18 b a t t l e s h i p s , t h r e e fewer t h a n p l a n n e d . T o g e t h e r t h e a n t i - S w e d i s h c o a l i t i o n n o w h a d a m i g h t y fleet of 56 b a t d e s h i p s , a l t h o u g h s o m e of t h e R u s s i a n b a t t l e s h i p s were actually of t h e s a m e size as large D u t c h a n d British f r i g a t e s of 4 0 - 4 4 g u n s . E v e n if t h e t h r e e s m a l l S w e d i s h b a t t l e s h i p s in S t o c k h o l m , the t h r e e s m a l l b a t t l e s h i p s in G o t h e n b u r g , a n d t h e a d d i t i o n a l b a t d e ships t h a t m i g h t h a v e b e e n c o m m i s s i o n e d i n K a r l s k r o n a a r e c o u n t e d , t h e allied s u p e r i o r i t y w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g : 56 a g a i n s t 28 b a t t l e s h i p s . Tlie Russians h a d also s e n t a large galley flotilla t o t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic, t o act as an a m p h i b i o u s f o r c e . The tsar h a d originally p l a n n e d t o d i v i d e t h e o p e r a t i o n i n t o a n allied i n v a s i o n of s o u t h e r n S w e d e n a n d a R u s s i a n i n v a s i o n of c e n t r a l S w e d e n . For t h a t h e d e m a n d e d t h a t D a n i s h b a t t l e s h i p s b e s e n t t o t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic Sea t o p r o t e c t his galleys w h e n t h e y c r o s s e d t h e sea f r o m t h e A l a n d i s l a n d s t o t h e S w e d i s h coast, b e c a u s e h e d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t h i s i n e x p e r i e n c e d battle fleet c o u l d d o t h a t . B u t t h e D a n i s h k i n g w a s n o t i n t e r e s t e d in t h i s o p e r a t i o n . Actually, t h e R u s s i a n a r m y c o n c e n t r a t e d o n A l a n d w a s s t r u c k b y a logistical d i s a s t e r d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r , w h i c h d e m o n s t r a t e d b o t h t h e l i m i t s of F i n l a n d as a b a s e f o r a n a r m y a n d t h e limits of R u s s i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e capability. Tliey w e r e o n l y able t o organise o n e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n at t h e s a m e t i m e , a n d t h e p r e s e n c e of the tsar w a s e v i d e n t l y v e r y i m p o r t a n t f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e success."^ The large allied b a t t l e fleet d i d n o t leave K o g e Bay u n t i l 7 A u g u s t , t h e D a n i s h a n d R u s s i a n fleets b o t h u n d e r p e r s o n a l c o m m a n d of T s a r Peter. T h e fleet safled t o w a r d s K a r l s k r o n a b u t t o o k n o o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n against t h e S w e d i s h base, a n d t h e 14 S w e d i s h b a t t l e s h i p s i n c o m m i s sion n a t u r a l l y s t a y e d in p o r t . D i s t r u s t b e t w e e n t h e allies w a s g r o w ing, o p e r a t i o n s w e r e d e l a y e d , a n d o n 8 S e p t e m b e r , t h e t s a r s u d d e n l y declared t h a t it w a s t o o late t o s t a r t t h e g r e a t i n v a s i o n . H i s r e a s o n s f o r cancelling t h e o p e r a t i o n h a v e b e e n m u c h d i s c u s s e d . T h e m o s t likely e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t h e b e l i e v e d t h a t a n o c c u p a t i o n of s o u t h e r n S w e d e n w o u l d n o t b e decisive e n o u g h f o r K a r l XII t o s u e f o r peace, a n d t h e failure of t h e a t t e m p t e d R u s s i a n i n v a s i o n of c e n t r a l S w e d e n m a y h a v e

Paul Bushkovitch, Peter the Great: The struggle for power, 1671-1725, Cambridge, 2001, 352-56; H a n s Bagger, "En begivenhed der ildce f a n d t sted. Den dansk-russiske landgang i Skane 1716", (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, 103, 2003, 118-60.

226

chapter

three

p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t in h i s d e c i s i o n . H e o v e r e s t i m a t e d t h e size of t h e S w e d i s h a r m y , h e h a d a l o w o p i n i o n of t h e D a n i s h a r m y , a n d h e m a y h a v e felt u n e a s y a b o u t d e p l o y i n g a large R u s s i a n a r m y a c r o s s a sea w h e r e c o n t r o l d e p e n d e d o n fleets c o n t r o l l e d b y h i s allies. In disc u s s i o n s a b o u t w h a t t h e a r m y s h o u l d d o w h e n it h a d l a n d e d in Skane, t h e D a n e s s h o w e d a n u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o t a k e p a r t in a r a p i d offensive a g a i n s t K a r l s k r o n a in o r d e r t o e l i m i n a t e t h e S w e d i s h fleet, a n object t h a t P e t e r s a w as i m p o r t a n t . " ^ T h e d e l a y of t h e o p e r a t i o n c a u s e d b y t h e S w e d i s h n a v a l activities in t h e s p r i n g a n d t h e t h r e a t a g a i n s t D a n i s h R u s s i a n lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m t h e K a r l s k r o n a fleet u p to July h e l p e d t o p r o v i d e t h e tsar w i t h a n excuse. H i e e v e n t s of 1716 c a u s e d d i s t r u s t b e t w e e n D e n m a r k a n d Russia, a n d all c o - o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s ceased. D u r i n g 1 7 1 7 - 1 8 , Karl XII a n d P e t e r I n e g o t i a t e d a b o u t a s e p a r a t e p e a c e , a n d t h e r e w e r e few hostilities b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . T h e m a i n fleet in K a r l s k r o n a was p a r t i a l l y c o m m i s s i o n e d , b u t lack of m o n e y a n d p r o v i s i o n s l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s t o c r u i s i n g w i t h s m a l l f o r c e s . ' " Tlie British g o v e r n m e n t u p h e l d a trade e m b a r g o against Sweden, but trade continued with neutral shipping and through various middlemen, including the Prussian port of K o n i g s b e r g . " ' T h e British c o n t i n u e d t o s e n d a fleet t o t h e Baltic Sea a n d c o n t r o l l e d t h e sea t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e D a n i s h a n d R u s s i a n fleets, b u t t h e British w e r e n o t i n t e r e s t e d in o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S w e d e n . The Danes were too exhausted by the war to undertake such operat i o n s o n t h e i r o w n , a n d t h e D u t c h s e n t a fleet f o r strictly d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s o n l y in 1718. I n 1718 r u m o u r s , f e d b y S w e d i s h d i s i n f o r m a t i o n , a b o u t a S w e d i s h - R u s s i a n p e a c e t r e a t y a n d a n o f f e n s i v e alliance a g a i n s t D e n m a r k k e p t t h e British a n d D a n i s h fleets o c c u p i e d in t h e s o u t h e r n Baltic a g a i n s t a n i m a g i n e d t h r e a t f r o m a c o m b i n e d R u s s i a n S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleet. T h e R u s s i a n s , p r o b a b l y u n w i t t i n g l y , p l a y e d t h e i r p a r t in t h e r u s e b y m o b i l i s i n g t h e i r fleet a n d k e e p i n g it at t h e e n t r a n c e t o t h e G u l f of F i n l a n d . T h e i n t e n t i o n w a s p r o b a b l y t o p u t p r e s s u r e o n t h e S w e d i s h p e a c e n e g o t i a t o r s , b u t t o t h e British a n d D a n i s h it l o o k e d like a t h r e a t t o them.'"^

Bagger 2003. Naval o p e r a t i o n s in 1 7 1 7 - 1 8 : Bidrag, Goteborgs eskader, 139-48; AmiralitetskoHegiets Lindeberg 1941, 307-70, 385-94. Aldridge forthcoming, ch 5.

IX, 3 6 - 4 3 , 6 0 - 1 7 9 , 2 2 3 - 3 5 , 2 6 8 - 7 4 ; historia, II, 120-22.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

111

P r o t e c t e d b y e n e m y inactivity, active d i p l o m a c y , a n d s u c c e s s f u l d e c e p t i o n , Karl XII c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e h i s f o r c e s f o r a c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t N o r w a y w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of k n o c k i n g t h e e x h a u s t e d D e n m a r k o u t of t h e w a r . H e i n t e n d e d t o u s e a n e w s t r a t e g y in w h i c h a large a r m y o p e r ating in t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l l y p o o r N o r w a y w o u l d b e s u p p o r t e d w i t h large p r o v i s i o n s c o n t i n u o u s l y d e l i v e r e d f r o m S w e d e n . " ^ This r e q u i r e d c o n trol of t h e s u p p l y lines, a n d t o s e c u r e t h e a r c h i p e l a g o c o a s t in B o h u s l a n he o r d e r e d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a c o n s i d e r a b l e flotilla of heavily a r m e d s h a l l o w - d r a u g h t w a r s h i p s . D u r i n g 1 7 1 7 - 1 8 , t h i s flotilla b e c a m e able to p r o t e c t t h e S w e d i s h a r m y ' s s e a b o r n e logistics d u r i n g a N o r w e g i a n c a m p a i g n . H i e S t o c k h o l m s q u a d r o n w a s also s t r e n g t h e n e d w i t h shall o w - d r a u g h t w a r s h i p s , p r i m a r i l y f o r d e f e n c e of t h e n a r r o w e n t r a n c e s to t h e capital. Karl XII n o w s h o w e d a p o s i t i v e i n t e r e s t in s u c h vessels, w h i c h in e n e m y h a n d s h a d t h w a r t e d h i s a m b i t i o n s in several decisive areas of o p e r a t i o n s : t h e N e v a e s t u a r y , t h e F i n n i s h a r c h i p e l a g o , P o m e r a n i a , a n d t h e c o a s t of B o h u s l a n . A s m e n t i o n e d in c h a p t e r 2, his u l t i m a t e a i m w i t h t h e s e p r e p a r a t i o n s m a y h a v e b e e n a n o f f e n s i v e against Russia, o n c e D e n m a r k w a s f o r c e d o u t of t h e w a r . A f t e r Karl XII w a s killed o n N o v e m b e r 30. 1718, d u r i n g t h e siege of F r e d e r i k s s t e n , t h e p o w e r s t r u c t u r e of t h e S w e d i s h a b s o l u t i s t state r a p idly d i s i n t e g r a t e d . T h e r u h n g d y n a s t y was, b y t h e m a r r i a g e s of Karl's two sisters, s p h t in a H e s s i a n a n d a H o l s t e i n i a n f a c t i o n , t h e s u c c e s sion t o t h e t h r o n e w a s u n c e r t a i n , a n d t h a t left t h e political initiative t o p o w e r s o u t s i d e t h e d y n a s t y . T h e Estates a n d t h e C o u n c i l , b o t h d o m i n a t e d b y t h e state b u r e a u c r a c y , t o o k p o w e r . T h e y w e r e u n w i l l i n g t o c o n t i n u e w i t h t h e deficit s p e n d i n g a n d h i g h t a x e s o n elite g r o u p s t h a t h a d f u n d e d Karl X I I ' s last w a r efforts. T h e r e s u l t w a s s e e n i m m e d i a t e l y in 1719, w h e n S w e d e n visibly s h r a n k as a m i l i t a r y a n d n a v a l p o w e r . The a r m y r a p i d l y d e c l i n e d i n s t r e n g t h , a n d t h e n a v a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d a c u t e difficulties i n

finding

provisions for bringing warships to

sea. A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t t a k e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h i s

financial

p o l i c y b y d e c l a r i n g its w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t

territorial losses a n d ask f o r a t r u c e , at least w i t h t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l enemy; Russia. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h i s m i s m a t c h of foreign p o l i c y w e r e serious.

Lindegren

1992, 2 1 0 - 1 6 .

financial

and

228

chapter

three

W a r f a r e in 1719 b e c a m e p r e d o m i n a n t l y n a v a l a n d a m p h i b i o u s . " ® The D a n i s h organised a counterattack against Bohuslan f r o m N o r w a y a n d f r o m t h e sea, w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e i n t e n t i o n of t a k i n g G o t h e n b u r g . H i e m o s t s u c c e s s f u l D a n i s h o p e r a t i o n s w e r e a m p h i b i o u s a n d led b y t h e y o u n g N o r w e g i a n a d m i r a l P e d e r T o r d e n s k j o l d . T h e S w e d i s h westcoast s q u a d r o n of t h r e e s m a l l b a t t l e s h i p s a n d t h r e e frigates, as well as m a n y of t h e galleys a n d b l o c k s h i p s , w e r e u n m a n n e d o r severely u n d e r m a n n e d . M o s t were s u n k by their o w n crews to avoid capture, mainly at t h e f o r t r e s s of M a r s t r a n d . T h e lack of m e n w a s p a r t l y , o r p e r h a p s m a i n l y , d u e t o t h e fact t h a t s e a m e n a v o i d e d t h e service w h e n they s u s p e c t e d t h a t t h e r e w a s little m o n e y a n d f o o d available f o r t h e m . The c a p t u r e of M a r s t r a n d a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e S w e d i s h n a v a l forces o n t h e w e s t e r n c o a s t w e r e t h e m a i n results of t h e D a n i s h offensive. T h e i r n a v a l a t t a c k o n G o t h e n b u r g failed. C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t S w e d i s h r e s i s t a n c e w a s r a t h e r feeble, this s h o w s t h a t D e n m a r k also w a s m u c h e x h a u s t e d b y t h e w a r a n d n o t able t o s t a r t a n i n v a s i o n . I n t h e Baltic Sea, t h e R u s s i a n fleet w a s at sea early. A s q u a d r o n of six b a t t l e s h i p s s u r p r i s e d a n d c a p t u r e d a S w e d i s h f o r c e of o n e s m a l l battleship, o n e frigate, a n d o n e b r i g a n t i n e o n 24 M a y n e a r G o t s k a S a n d o n . T h e S w e d i s h m a i n fleet i n K a r l s k r o n a h a d g r e a t difficulties finding p r o visions, a n d t h e n a v a l l e a d e r s w e r e u n c e r t a i n a b o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e British a n d D a n i s h fleets. T h e S w e d i s h fleet in 1 7 1 7 - 1 8 h a d a c t e d as a

fleet-in-being

in o r n e a r K a r l s k r o n a , w i t h l i m i t e d d e m a n d s o n

p r o v i s i o n i n g , a n d it n o w s t a y e d i n p o r t d u r i n g m o s t of t h e s u m m e r of 1719 t o h u s b a n d its r e m a i n i n g s t r e n g t h . It t u r n e d o u t t h a t it h a d b e e n w a i t i n g at t h e w r o n g place. T s a r P e t e r h a d d e c i d e d t o m a k e a m a j o r eff'ort t o f o r c e t h e n e w S w e d i s h r e g i m e t o m a k e p e a c e . H e o r d e r e d 130 galleys a n d 21 b a t t l e s h i p s of 25,000 t o n n e s t o b e c o n c e n t r a t e d at A l a n d islands between Sweden and Finland. The battleships were there to p r o t e c t t h e i s l a n d s as a b a s e a n d t o c o v e r t h e l i n e s b e t w e e n t h e m a n d t h e S w e d i s h coast. T h e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n w a s m a d e w i t h t h e galleys, c a r r y i n g 26,000 soldiers. F r o m 11 July t o 18 A u g u s t t h e galley flotilla s y s t e m a t i c a l l y b u r n t t o w n s a n d smaller places along the Swedish coast f r o m N o r r k o p i n g in t h e s o u t h t o Giivle in t h e n o r t h , a n d it w a s o n l y at Giivle t h a t a r m y

Naval operations in 1719: Wrangel 1906-07, 1-147; AmiralitetskoUegiets historia, II, 122-25; operations on Sweden's west coast: Bidmg, X, 25-28, 87-117, 145-52; Goteborgs eskader, 148-59; Grauers 1953, 25-30.

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

111

forces w e r e able to d e f e n d t h e t o w n . T h e S t o c k h o h n s q u a d r o n — t h r e e battleships, t e n frigates, five b l o c k s h i p s , 11 galleys, a n d six m i n o r vessels—could o n l y p r o t e c t t h e c a p i t a l city b y b l o c k i n g t h e

nar-

r o w e n t r a n c e s t o it. T h e R u s s i a n galleys w e r e a f l o a t i n g a r m y , w h i c h m o v e d faster t h a n S w e d i s h a r m y f o r c e s o n l a n d . ' " T h e g r e a t R u s s i a n m o b i l i s a t i o n a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of n a v a l a n d a r m y f o r c e s close t o t h e Swedish c o a s t d i d n o t pass u n n o t i c e d in S w e d e n , b u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t was slow t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e t h r e a t . M e n t a l l y , R u s s i a was n o t still seen as a n a v a l p o w e r t h a t c o u l d act o n its o w n w i t h o u t allies. T w o y e a r s of R u s s i a n i n a c t i v i t y m a y also h a v e lulled S t o c k h o l m i n t o a false s e n s e of security, a n d t h u s t h e S w e d e s m a d e n o s e r i o u s attempt to organise naval protection a n d send m o n e y and provisions to K a r l s k r o n a u n t i l it w a s t o o late. O n l y a f t e r t h e galley r a i d b e g a n w a s t h e first o r d e r s e n t f r o m S t o c k h o l m t o K a r l s k r o n a , o r d e r i n g t h e b a t t l e fleet n o r t h w a r d .

It

arrived at t h e n a v a l b a s e o n 21 July. It w a s a s s u m e d in S t o c k h o l m t h a t t h e K a r l s k r o n a fleet w o u l d j o i n t h e British fleet b e f o r e it sailed n o r t h w a r d s , b u t t h a t fleet w a s i n t h e S o u n d . B e c a u s e t h e S w e d i s h fleet still w a s s h o r t of p r o v i s i o n s , it w a i t e d u n t i l 2 A u g u s t , w h e n t w o b a t tleships a n d t h r e e f r i g a t e s finally sailed n o r t h w a r d s . C o n t r a r y w i n d s delayed t h e fleet u n t i l 12 A u g u s t , w h e n e i g h t b a t t l e s h i p s f o l l o w e d . T h e Russian s c o u t i n g vessels w a r n e d t h e galley fleet of t h e i r a p p r o a c h a n d t h e R u s s i a n fleet r e t u r n e d t o A l a n d . T h e r e w a s in fact little left f o r it to devastate, e x c e p t Stoclcholm, w h i c h m i g h t h a v e b e e n e x p o s e d t o a large-scale a m p h i b i o u s assault if t h e R u s s i a n s h a d b e e n left in c o n t r o l of t h e sea f o r a l o n g e r p e r i o d . S w e d e n d i d n o t lack w a r s h i p s t o h i n d e r t h e R u s s i a n o p e r a t i o n . I n t h e latter half of A u g u s t t h e S w e d i s h fleet h a d 13 b a t t l e s h i p s , i n c l u d ing t h r e e in t h e S t o c k h o l m s q u a d r o n , of 16,000 t o n n e s at sea. F o u r or five b a t t l e s h i p s of a r o u n d 9,000 t o n n e s w e r e serviceable a n d c o u l d have b e e n c o m m i s s i o n e d in K a r l s k r o n a h a d t h e r e b e e n f u n d s f o r t h e i r p r o v i s i o n i n g . " " T h a t w o u l d h a v e b a l a n c e d t h e R u s s i a n b a t t l e fleet of 21 battleships in c o m m i s s i o n a n d m a d e t h e r a i d i m p o s s i b l e . T h e i m p o r tance of w e l l - t i m e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a s u c c e s s f u l n a v a l strategy is o b v i o u s . Lack of i m a g i n a t i o n a b o u t e n e m y i n t e n t i o n s a n d

Erik Jonson, Skdrgdrdskriget 1719: En bok om rysshdrjningarna invid Stockholm, Stockliolm, 196L There are m a n y articles a n d local studies about the events in 1719. The condition of the warships in Karlskrona: Report by Klas Sparre 21/11 1719, M 1689, RA.

230

chapter

three

passive d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a b o u t h o w available f o r c e s s h o u l d b e used w a s also i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r . E v e n a s m a l l e r b a t t l e fleet d e p l o y e d to t h e n o r t h e r n Baltic Sea b y early July, b e f o r e t h e galley r a i d s b e g a n , m i g h t h a v e b e e n a n effective d e t e r r e n t . T h e R u s s i a n s a v o i d e d c o m b a t w i t h S w e d i s h n a v a l f o r c e s of less s t r e n g t h t h a n t h e i r o w n , a n d P e t e r I w o u l d p r o b a b l y n e v e r h a v e r i s k e d s e n d i n g a large p a r t of t h e R u s s i a n a r m y a c r o s s t h e sea w i t h o u t full (if t e m p o r a r y ) c o n t r o l of it. The Swedish g o v e r n m e n t had looked elsewhere t h a n to Karlskrona f o r n a v a l p r o t e c t i o n , h o w e v e r . D u r i n g t h e d r a m a t i c m o n t h of R u s s i a n devastation,

Sweden

had

hastily c o n c l u d e d

peace with

Hanover,

finally c e d i n g B r e m e n - V e r d e n t o t h e E l e c t o r G e o r g e , a n d c o n c l u d e d a t r e a t y w i t h B r i t a i n ( w h e r e G e o r g e w a s k i n g ) a b o u t n a v a l assistance. Tlie British fleet u n d e r Sir J o h n N o r r i s left C o p e n h a g e n o n 15 A u g u s t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h e l p S w e d e n , b u t it w a s t o o late t o i n f l u e n c e this y e a r ' s c a m p a i g n . W h e n t h e S w e d i s h a n d British fleet j o i n e d forces, t h e R u s s i a n b a t t l e fleet r e t r e a t e d t o safety in Reval a n d K r o n s t a d t , l o o s i n g two battleships, w h i c h ran a g r o u n d . The catastrophe that struck the S w e d i s h c o a s t in 1719 is o f t e n e x p l a i n e d b y S w e d i s h i n f e r i o r i t y i n galley s t r e n g t h , b u t t h a t is h a r d l y r e l e v a n t . In 1719, t h e r e w e r e n o l o n g e r s u f f i c i e n t a r m y f o r c e s t o m a n a large galley flotilla e v e n h a d S w e d e n p o s s e s s e d o n e . P r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t galleys c r o s s i n g t h e o p e n sea c o u l d b e a c h i e v e d w i t h a sailing fleet, b u t s u c h a f o r c e h a d t o b e m a n n e d a n d p r o v i s i o n e d in early s p r i n g a n d d e p l o y e d w h e r e it c o u l d n e u t r a l i s e t h e e n e m y b e f o r e it r e a c h e d t h e S w e d i s h coast. T h e large o a r e d flotilla, w h i c h S w e d e n c r e a t e d a f t e r 1721, w a s m a i n l y i n t e n d e d f o r off'ensive a n d d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a r m y a l o n g F i n l a n d ' s s o u t h e r n coast, n o t f o r d e f e n c e of S w e d e n ' s l o n g e a s t e r n coast. Finally, a n d u s u a l l y f o r g o t t e n , t h e R u s s i a n o p e r a t i o n s in 1 7 1 9 - 2 1 w e r e p o s sible o n l y b e c a u s e S w e d e n w a s politically u n a b l e t o retaliate b y b u r n i n g R u s s i a n coastal t o w n s a n d villages; all of t h e R u s s i a n - h e l d Baltic c o a s t w a s f o r m a l l y still S w e d i s h t e r r i t o r y . I n 1720, S w e d e n c o n c l u d e d p e a c e w i t h D e n m a r k a n d

Prussia,

a n d o n l y R u s s i a r e m a i n e d as a n e n e m y . ' ^ ' T h e w a r e f f o r t s i n 1720 a n d 1721 w e r e a l m o s t e n t i r e l y n a v a l a n d f a i r l y u n i f o r m i n c h a r a c t e r . A B r i t i s h fleet of 20 a n d 22 b a t t l e s h i p s r e s p e c t i v e l y a r r i v e d i n t h e B a l t i c i n M a y a n d j o i n e d w i t h a s m a l l e r S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleet, t o g e t h e r

Naval operations in 1720-21: Wrangel 1906-07, Grauers 1953, 30-38.

151-466; Gmuers 1941, 343-53;

n a v a l operations a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

c o n t r o l l i n g t h e o p e n sea a g a i n s t t h e R u s s i a n b a t t l e fleet. H i a t

111

fleet

w a s t o a l a r g e e x t e n t in p o r t , a n d i n 1720 o n l y 13 R u s s i a n b a t t l e ships were c o m m i s s i o n e d . The next year, 27 battleships w e r e c o m m i s s i o n e d , b u t m o s t of t h e m w e r e o n l y u s e d f o r a l a r g e - s c a l e

fleet

exercise c l o s e t o K r o n s t a d t t h e u n d e r T s a r P e t e r ' s c o m m a n d . Tlie S w e d i s h a r c h i p e l a g o flotilla a n d a s q u a d r o n of s a i l i n g w a r s h i p s w e r e b a s e d at S t o c k h o l m a n d p r o t e c t e d t h e c o a s t a g a i n s t n e w R u s s i a n raids, especially b y k e e p i n g u p t h e g u a r d a g a i n s t e n e m y f o r c e s i n t h e A l a n d i s l a n d s . I t c o u l d n o t p r e v e n t R u s s i a n galleys f r o m m a k i n g r a i d s a g a i n s t n o r t h e r n S w e d e n d u r i n g i n s p r i n g of 1720 a n d 1721, h o w e v e r , a n d t h e r a i d i n M a y 1721 w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y devastating.'^^ T h e c o m b i n e d A n g l o - S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleet w a s b o t h m u c h l a r g e r a n d of h i g h e r q u a l i t y t h a n its R u s s i a n c o u n t e r p a r t , b u t w i t h o u t a s t r o n g army and a strong oared

flotilla

it c o u l d n o t t a k e t o t h e o f f e n s i v e

a l o n g t h e F i n n i s h c o a s t o r a g a i n s t St P e t e r s b u r g a n d K r o n s t a d t . T s a r Peter t h u s could d e f e n d w h a t h e h a d c o n q u e r e d , a n d Sweden h a d to c o n c l u d e p e a c e i n 1721 o n c o n d i t i o n s t h a t h e h a d o f f e r e d s i n c e t h e years after Poltava. The o n l y c o n t e s t b e t w e e n w a r s h i p s in t h e s e y e a r s w a s a n u n u s u a l fight b e t w e e n sailing w a r s h i p s a n d galleys o n 2 7 July 1720 at L e d s u n d in t h e A l a n d islands. A S w e d i s h f o r c e of o n e b a t t l e s h i p a n d seven frigates d e t e c t e d 61 R u s s i a n galleys a n d c h a s e d t h e m i n t o t h e a r c h i p e l a g o . D u r i n g t h e chase, f o u r of t h e frigates r a n a g r o u n d a n d w e r e f o r c e d t o s u r r e n d e r b y t h e galleys, w h i c h t o o k t h e f r i g a t e s b y b o a r d i n g a n d s u p e rior i n f a n t r y s t r e n g t h . T h e a c t i o n m u s t h a v e b e e n i n t e n s e . A c c o r d i n g to R u s s i a n s o u r c e s , n o f e w e r t h a n 43 of t h e galleys w e r e d e s t r o y e d o r so d a m a g e d t h a t t h e y h a d t o b e b u r n t . N o r m a l l y t h e battle is r e g a r d e d as a R u s s i a n v i c t o r y ( R u s s i a n : t h e b a t t l e of G r e n g a m n ) , a l t h o u g h t h e i r large m a t e r i a l losses m a k e s it m o r e l o o k like a m u t u a l l y d e s t r u c t i v e battle of a n u n u s u a l c h a r a c t e r in t h e b o r d e r z o n e b e t w e e n t h e o p e n sea a n d t h e a r c h i p e l a g o . T h e b a t f l e d e m o n s t r a t e d b o t h t h a t galleys w e r e e x t r e m e l y v u l n e r a b l e t o sailing w a r s h i p s in t h e o p e n sea a n d t h a t sailing w a r s h i p s w e r e u n a b l e t o m a n o e u v r e u n d e r c o m b a t c o n d i t i o n s i n Baltic a r c h i p e l a g o s . ' ^ '

Nils-Gustav Hildeman, "Ryssarnas h a r j n i n g a r i Gastrildand och Halsingland ar 1721", KFA, 41, 1950, 147-216. Eirik Hornborg, "Karl Sioblad och slaget vid Fliso", Skrifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska samfundet, 4, 1944, 41-68.

232

3.9.6

chapter

three

Conclusion

F r o m 1709 t o 1721, t h e G r e a t N o r t h e r n W a r w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e Baltic a r e a a n d t h e sea Hnes of c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e c a m e decisive. T h e m a i n strategic question was the extent to which Sweden's enemies m i g h t c o o p e r a t e t o t a k e c o n t r o l of t h e s e l i n e s a n d u s e t h e m f o r decisive o p e r a t i o n s , w h i c h m i g h t f o r c e S w e d e n o u t of t h e w a r . T h e l o n g p o s t - P o l t a v a p h a s e of t h e w a r s h o w s t h a t t h i s w a s d i f f i c u l t t o achieve. T a b l e 3:1 s h o w s h o w l a r g e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l b a t t l e fleets w e r e d u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s . It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t t h e S w e d i s h a n d , especially, t h e D a n i s h fleets h a d m o r e s e r v i c e a b l e b a t t l e s h i p s t h a n t h e y c o u l d c o m m i s s i o n , w h i l e t h e R u s s i a n s in t h e e a r l y y e a r s c o m m i s s i o n e d

more

battleships t h a n t h e y could p r o v i d e with effective crews. U p t o 1715, t h e S w e d i s h n a v y c o u l d o p e r a t e in t w o d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of t h e Baltic Sea a g a i n s t t w o e n e m y fleets w i t h o u t b e i n g f o r c e d t o p u r e l y d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . T h e t w o a d v e r s a r i e s w e r e i n e f f e c t i v e in c o m b i n i n g t h e i r b a t t l e fleets, a l t h o u g h t h e i r e f f o r t s in t w o d i f f e r e n t t h e a t r e s r e s t r a i n e d S w e d i s h o p e r a t i o n a l f r e e d o m . It w a s o n l y t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a British Baltic fleet as a h o s t i l e f o r c e i n 1716 t h a t t i p p e d t h e b a l a n c e in allied f a v o u r , b u t t h e y still p r o v e d u n a b l e t o u s e t h e i r c o n t r o l of t h e Baltic Sea f o r a n effective o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t S w e d e n . S w e d i s h battle-fleet p e r f o r m a n c e in t h e s e y e a r s i m p r e s s e d t h e t w o Baltic a d v e r s a r i e s , w h o b o t h typically a v o i d e d fighting S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleets a n d b a t t l e s q u a d r o n s , e v e n w h e n t h e y w e r e s u p e r i o r in s t r e n g t h . T h e R u s s i a n offensive in 1719 w a s effective b u t brief a n d o n l y p o s s i b l e d u e t o political a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s o r d e r in S w e d e n a f t e r t h e d e a t h of K a r l XII. This diso r d e r k e p t m o s t of t h e S w e d i s h b a t t l e fleet in p o r t w i t h u n d e r m a n n e d a n d u n - p r o v i s i o n e d ships. C o n t r o l of s h a l l o w a n d n a r r o w w a t e r s w a s a n o t h e r

question.

T h e R u s s i a n s g a i n e d it e a r l y i n t h e w a r a n d t h e D a n e s s o m e w h a t later; o n l y a f t e r 1 7 1 5 - 1 6 d i d S w e d e n s e r i o u s l y b e g i n t o r e o r g a n ise its a r m e d f o r c e s f o r c o n t r o l of s u c h o p e r a t i o n a l a r e a s . By 1718, S w e d e n h a d gained the initiative in archipelagic w a r f a r e against D e n m a r k b u t t h e n l o s t it t h e n e x t y e a r b e c a u s e of t h e s a m e d i s o r d e r t h a t p a r a l y s e d t h e b a t t l e fleet. T h e s l o w n e s s t o a d a p t t o a n e w s t r a tegic situation seriously h a m p e r e d Swedish w a r efforts t h r o u g h o u t t h e G r e a t N o r t h e r n W a r , while t h e Russian ability to i n n o v a t e in a m p h i b i o u s w a r f a r e was very i m p o r t a n t for their victory in this war. O r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d ability to achieve n e w

combination

m a t t e r e d m o r e t h a n q u a n t i t y a n d t h e q u a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t s of the organisation.

17,000

19,000

23,000

1719 14

16

1720

1721 17

-

-

16

17

17

21

23

15

23

27

32

37

7

_

D

13

- 27

-

21,000

26,000

25,000

32,000

35,000

23,000

33,000

41,000

45,000

51,000

8,000

N

Denmark

18

12

39,000

-

_

22

20

25,000

26,000

18,000

20,000

23,000

17,000

_

-

-

D

10,000

2,400

1,600

17,000

21

23

17

18

24

3

2

_ -

N

Russia

16

10

25

17

18

-

-

_

30,000

27,000

-

-

-

N

-

-

-

-

-

_ _

_

21,000

13,000

31,000

20,000

21,000

-

-

_ -

D

-

-

-

-

4

30 35

_

_

59

_

_

58,000

61

46,000 53,000

36 39

46,000

D

30

76,000

75,000

74,000

60

47

40,000

11,000 - 37

-

4,000

N

38,000

Against Russia

Total, allied forces Against Sweden

51,000

43,000

43,000

47,000

9,000

- 33

-

D

- 3?

8,000

N

Dutch Rep.

34

11

-

8

7

Great Britain

Battleships in commission in the Baltic, 1709-1721

Sources: Sweden: List of warships commissioned at Karlskrona 1700-1787, copy in Axel Zettersten's samling, vol. 10, KrA; warships commissioned in Gothenburg: Goteborgs eskader, 112-167 (incomplete); warships commissioned in Stockholm: Gunnar Unger's samling, vol. 1, KrA. Denmark: Bidrag, vols 3-8, Anderson 1910/1969. Russia, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic: Anderson 1910/1969; with correction about the Dutch participation in 1717-18 in Aldridge, forthcoming, ch. 5, note 122. N: number of battleships; D: total displacement in tonnes. The table includes all battleships in commission during a year. All ships were not necessarily in commission at the same time. Ships commissioned during one year and decommissioned early next year are only included in thefirstyear. A few Swedish and Danish and several Russian battleships were smaller and weaker than ships rated as suitable for the battie line in Great Britain and the Dutch Republic. Denmark and Russia were allies from 1709 to 1719 while the British and the Dutch are counted as part of this alliance in 1716-18, although the Dutch Republic did not participate in offensive operations against Sweden, only in protection of trade against Swedish attacks. Calculations of displacement are made by the author.

15,000

23,000

1716 19

22,000

34,000

1715 29

1718 16

30,000

1714 24

1717 14

41,000

38,000

1713 26

36,000

1711 28

1712 32

21,000

41,000

D

1710 33

N

Sweden

1709 19

Year

Table 3.1

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l o f t h e b a l t i c s e a 111

234

chapter

3.10

Battles, administration

three

and operational

achievements

H i e c o n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n of this c h a p t e r d i s c u s s e s t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s in t h e Baltic w e r e d e c i d e d b y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , geostrategic p r e c o n d i t i o n s , o r strategic a n d tactical a c h i e v e m e n t s at sea. I n strategic ideals a n d in t h e official r h e t o r i c , b a t t l e s w e r e f o u g h t in o r d e r t o inflict decisive d e f e a t s o n t h e e n e m y . If t h e e n e m y lost a c o n s i d e r a b l e n u m b e r of s h i p s a n d m e n , h i s ability t o c o n t i n u e o p e r a t i o n s w o u l d b e r e d u c e d o r e l i m i n a t e d . M o s t n a v a l b a t t l e s e n d e d as tactical d r a w s , h o w e v e r , w i t h b o t h sides typically c l a i m i n g t h e m as victories, c l a i m s t h a t s u r p r i s i n g l y o f t e n a r e r e p e a t e d b y t h o s e w h o w r i t e naval history.'^"* I n f e r i o r fleets c o u l d t r y t o fight w i t h a c a u t i o u s tactic in o r d e r t o inflict so m u c h d a m a g e o n t h e e n e m y fleet t h a t it m u s t b r e a k off its o p e r a t i o n a n d r e t u r n t o a b a s e f o r r e p a i r . This also explains w h y o n e fleet, o r s o m e t i m e s b o t h , a v o i d e d battle. Fleet c o m m a n d e r s k n e w that a h a r d - f o u g h t battle m i g h t temporarily reduce their opera t i o n a l f r e e d o m , a n d if t h e r e w e r e n o r e s o u r c e s available t o r e s t o r e it quicldy, t h e y m i g h t p r e f e r t o a v o i d battle. W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e t h r e e A n g l o - D u t c h W a r s ( 1 6 5 2 - 7 4 ) , Baltic n a v a l w a r f a r e w a s t h e m o s t b a t t l e - i n t e n s e n a v a l w a r s in E u r o p e in t h e 16th a n d 17th c e n t u ries. T a b l e 3:2 s h o w s t h e o u t c o m e of t h e 17 m a j o r n a v a l b a t t l e s w h i c h S w e d e n f o u g h t w i t h o u t n a v a l allies. T h e i r r e s u l t s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d o n l y in t e r m s of losses of s h i p s a n d m e n .

The results of naval battles in the Baltic Sea are interpreted diflferently in the nonScandinavian literature. Anderson 1910/1969 has the same opinion about their results as the present author. Robert I. Frost m e n t i o n s six battles in 1563-65 a n d has found three Swedish victories, two allied victories, and one draw. H e considers the battle of Oland in August 1564 as an allied victory, in spite of the fact that the Danish fleet lost three ships, while he considers the battle on 4 June 1565 as a Swedish victory, although n o side lost any ships a n d the strategic situation was unchanged. The battles in 1644 are considered as one Danish and one Swedish victory, the two battles in 1657-58 as one draw a n d one D u t c h victory, while he reports four battles in 1675-77, all Swedish losses. An additional battle, not f o u n d in other studies (or sources) is said to have taken place in October 1675. Frost also places the Danish capture of Gotland between the first and second battle in 1676, while it actually took place before the Swedish fleet was at sea, Frost 2000, 25, 35, 138, 180, 182, 212. The battle of Kolberger Heide on 1 July 1644 has been especially difficult to evaluate. Oakley 1993, 76, claims that it was a f a m o u s Danish victory; Frost 2000, 138, also describes it as a Danish victory; while Lockhart 2004, 65, regards it as a Swedish victory.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

Table 3.2

The tactical

outcome

of major

naval

battles

111

in the Baltic

Sea,

1563-1715

Swedish victory

Draw

Enemy victory

Total

1563-66

3

3

1644 1657-59 1675-79

1 -

1 2 1

_ 1 2

1

2 3 3

7

1710-15

-

2

-

2

Total

4

9

4

17

Warfare at sea between 1521 and 1524 was decided by political alliancemaking, strategic decision-making, and (partly private) administrative efforts, not by battles. When Liibeck and the Swedish rebels against Christian II joined their war efforts, superior naval strength could be concentrated in important narrows, such as the Sound and the Stockholm archipelago. Decisive results thus were achieved without much fighting at sea. The war at sea during the Danish civil war (1534-36) saw three battles in 1535, of which the Swedish fleet participated in two. Both were victories for the allies and gave them control of the Danish straits. This made it possible to encircle Copenhagen from land and sea, which decided the war and markedly strengthened both the Oldenburg and Vasa monarchies. The administrative efforts of the early Vasa monarchy to bring a battle fleet to the southern Baltic had a large political pay-off, fully comparable to that of much greater efforts made in later wars. The Nordic War from 1563 to 1570 saw seven battles, all of which were the result of deliberate choices by both sides. This shows that battles between concentrated fleets for control of the sea lines of communication was a central part of their doctrine of naval warfare. The first battle on 30 May 1563 was a victory for the Swedish fleet, but Swedish control of the southern Baltic Sea was brief and eliminated by a large Danish-Liibeckian naval mobilisation. The next battle that followed (11 September) was a draw and did not change the strategic situation. The next year, the first battle of Oland on 30-31 May 1564 was an allied victory but was followed by their loss of control of the sea due to provisioning problems. The next battle in mid-August 1564 ended in Swedish victory. It was soon followed by a decline of Swedish strength at sea and a withdrawal f r o m the southern Baltic in late September, due to disease and provisioning problems. The strategic results of the two battles in 1564 were almost the opposite of their

236

chapter

three

tactical outcomes. Administration was more important for operational achievements than battles. In 1565, the Swedish battle fleet took control of the southern Baltic Sea through administrative efforts to bring large forces to sea and keep them operational. The two batdes in 1565 were the resuh of Danish-Liibeckian attempts to force the Swedish fleet out of the southern Baltic Sea. The first (4 June) ended in a draw, and the Swedish fleet continued to cruise in the southern Baltic Sea, while the second (7 July) was a Swedish victory but resulted in a temporary Swedish withdrawal f r o m the southern Baltic Sea for repair and provisioning. The Swedish fleet soon returned to the southern Baltic, however, and in early summer 1566 it was again deployed there in greater strength than the allied fleet. Administration was decisive for this performance. W h e n the allies had built up their strength, they made another attempt to gain control by battle (26 July) that ended in a draw. Its sequence was a major aUied disaster, as most of their larger warships and thousands of m e n were lost in a gale off Visby. Administration and resource mobilisation were clearly more important than battles in determining the strategic development of the war at sea in these years. Repeated Danish-Lubeckian mistakes also helped to give Sweden control of the sea. The war at sea in 1611 - 1 2 was decided by the sieges of Kalmar and Alvsborg, not by naval batdes. Both sieges were partly amphibious, and Christian IV's ability to lead and administer such operations was important. The war was also decided by the two rulers' ability to take strategic decisions and lead operations and administration. The old Karl IX, w h o had never been an efficient operational leader, was a disaster in this war. He also failed as an administrative coordinator, an activity which he earlier had mastered well. The dynastic state's dependence on its leader was obvious. Karl IX was the only Swedish king w h o led a m a j o r war when he was dying and probably no longer in touch with realities; most Swedish warrior kings died rather young. In the next Swedish-Danish war, 1643-45, Karl's adversary Christian IV had become an old man. He showed moral leadership in a crisis, but his decision-making was partly out of touch with the strategic realities. The war to a large extent was decided at sea, and battles were important. The first contest, on 1 July 1644, was a draw that brought the Swedish offensive to a stalemate. The second battle, on 13 October, was a decisive victory that gave Sweden control of the Danish straits.

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

111

Operations in 1644 and 1645 were, however, to a large extent also shaped by the degree to which Sweden could deploy and provision operational fleets to the southern Baltic, and the new Swedish access to German ports was very important. Tlie next naval war began with a contest between the Swedish and Danish battle fleets on 12-13 September 1657. It ended in a draw that favoured Denmark, because it delayed a Swedish invasion of the Danish isles. The next year, Denmark was surprised by a Swedish attack in August 1658, after peace had been concluded and only a minor part of the navy could be mobilised. Sweden's real naval enemy soon became the Dutch Republic, as it allied itself with the Danes. The battle in the Sound on 29 October 1658 was a Dutch-Danish strategic victory; it possibly saved Denmark f r o m extinction. Tactically, however, the losses and damages were more evenly distributed between the Swedish and Dutch fleets. This was important in early 1659 when the Swedish fleet for a period controlled the Danish straits while the Dutch suffered from the effects of the earlier battle. The only major batde in 1659 (30 April) between a Swedish and a Dutch-Danish fleet was a draw with little strategic importance. The last phase of the war was decided by the fact that the Dutch navy had much greater total strength than the Swedish; once the Dutch sent a sufficient number of ships to the Danish straits, they were in full control of these waters. Political and administrative efforts in the Netherlands decided the war. The war of 1675-79 began with Swedish administrative problems in mobilisation, but the real problem turned out to be inferiority in ship-handling and inexperienced officers and crew compared to the Danes and the Dutch. This war was the only of the eight wars in this study where this was an important cause of Swedish defeats. The first major battle in this war, 26-27 May 1676, was a draw in spite of a major Swedish quantitative superiority, and the next (1 June 1676) was a Swedish defeat that gave the allies control of the southern Baltic. On 1 July of the following year, the Swedish fleet was even more decisively defeated; a defeat that had serious material consequences: Denmark secured control of the southern Baltic for several years. During the Great Northern War, Sweden had a considerable superiority over Denmark in the ability to mobilise the main battle fleet for service year after year. That was essential, as the battle fleet increasingly had to be divided between the southern and northern Baltic Sea in order to contain threats f r o m both Denmark and Russia. The war was intensely fought at sea, but there were only two conventional battles

238

chapter

three

between concentrated battle fleets: between Sweden and Denmark. In both battles, the Danes had a quantitative superiority, but both ended in draws. The first, on 23 September 1710, had no importance for control of the sea; the second, on 28 July 1715, gave Denmark and its allies a temporary advantage. Already next spring, however, the operational Swedish battle fleet was superior to the Danish fleet, and the summer 1716 saw a combined Danish-Russian-British battle fleet of enormous strength tasked with ensuring that the Swedish fleet did not interfere with an invasion that eventually never took place. By 1716, Sweden's enemies evidently had a high opinion of the Swedish navy's ability to send warships to sea when required, and they shaped their operations with great caution. Hiis opinion was founded on several years of war experience when the Swedish fleet had been able to simultaneously counter the Danes and the Russians in the open sea. It was evidently primarily administrative efforts, including the foundation of an efficient base at Karlskrona, which had created respect for Swedish battle fleet strength. Swedish performance in two battles fought to a draw against a superior enemy may have contributed, as the Danish fleet avoided battle on even terms and the inexperienced Russians avoided battle even when they were superior. The major challenge to Swedish efforts to control the sea in this war was policy-making, primarily inability to reorganise the armed forces for inshore amphibious warfare. Absolutism was evidently no guarantee for rapid decision-making and adaptation of policy and administration to changing circumstances. Of the naval victories in these two centuries, the two gained by the Swedish fleet and its allies in 1535 may have been the most important of all, as they were decisive parts of the war that stabilised the two new Nordic monarchies. Otherwise, only the Swedish victory at Femern in 1644, the Dutch in the Sound in 1658, and the Danish at Koge Bay in 1677 were decisive strategic victories that greatly influenced the outcome of the war. The battles in 1644 and 1677 resulted in one side losing a large number of ships to the other side, and this determined operations to the end of the war. The battle in the Sound was decisive because the Dutch probably saved the Danish capital f r o m surrender and may have saved Denmark as an independent state. The Swedish victory at Bornholm in 1565 and the Danish-Dutch victory at Oland in 1676 were important because they gave the winner a decisive advantage for a period. The three victories in 1563-64 (two Swedish and

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o n t r o l of t h e b a l t i c sea

111

one Danish-Llibeckian) were only of brief strategic importance, and they too were the result of accidents rather than any decisive qualitative or quantitative advantage for one side. The draws of 1644, 1657, and 1715 created short-term advantages for Denmark, while the battles fought without tactical victories in 1563, 1565, 1566, 1659, 1676, and 1710 did not change the strategic situation. Finally, the outcome of minor actions might have important results. The Swedish destruction of enemy squadrons in 1565 and 1659 and the Danish elimination of Swedish squadrons in Femern Belt in 1677 and 1715 markedly changed the balance of power at sea in the short run, while Russian and Danish successes in minor inshore combats in 1712, 1714, 1715, and 1716 had major consequences for warfare on land. The aim of administrative efforts and of commanders making strategic and tactical decisions is the same: to achieve operational goals. Strategy and performance in battle cannot be understood without knowledge of the administration behind the armed forces, but studies of naval administration are pointless if they are not related to its goal: operational efficiency. Studies of naval warfai'e, which intend to describe what actually happened and analyse why it happened, are best centred on the extent to which in time and space a navy could achieve control of the sea in order to fulfil operational goals. Such control is primarily determined by the ability to send combat-ready and properly structured naval forces to sea and the ability to logistically support operations until the operational goals are achieved. Battles and strategic decision-making only occasionally decide wars and campaigns alone. Battles are very important to study, however, because navies were organised with the aim of fighting battles when it was required. Frequently, it was not even necessary to start a war; the very existence of a combat-ready navy provided policy-makers with the instrument they needed to achieve political aims. A major war was, to a considerable extent, a test of the endurance and strength of the administrative, political, and fiscal systems behind the war efforts. Historical studies of naval warfare are usually dominated by strategic decisions about how to deploy fleet and squadrons, tactical decisions before and during battles, and the performance of the contesting fleets in combat. Brief accounts of naval warfare often give the impression that it mainly was a question of fighting battles and that control of the sea was determined by the results of battles. Control of the Baltic Sea is also frequently discussed in terms of

240

chapter

three

control of the whole sea, despite the fact that even m a j o r victories were seldom sufficient for achieving such control. Battles are usually seen as tests of seamanship and the ability to fight. W h e n administration is mentioned, it is often cited as an explanation for failure. Good administration, adequate finances, and, implicitly, unlimited resources are tacitly taken for granted as the normal precondition for war. Wars are usually not seen as contests between political and administrative systems, and victories in battle are seldom seen as the result of those administrative efforts which m a d e it possible to send the fleet to sea. Strategy, seamanship, and the ability to fight were certainly important. Strategic decisions about cooperation between military and naval forces; the deployment of warships, squadrons, and fleets; and whether, where, and when battles should be fought could sometimes be decisive for the outcome of a campaign or even a war. Seamanship could often influence the extent to which ships and men were exposed to wear and fatigue, and it could sometimes decide whether a ship could survive in heavy weather. Ability to fight and defeat the enemy is always important in offensive operations, although a defensive strategy might achieve its goals without battles if the geostrategic conditions are favourable. But no fleet, however well trained its crews were, could win a war without adequate long-term provisioning, without ships with sufficient firepower and staying power, and without ships which were technically suitable for bringing the men and the weapons in contact with the enemy.

CHAPTER FOUR

SWEDISH NAVAL ADMINISTRATION: SCOPE, COMPLEXITY AND STRUCTURES

4.1 4.1.1

State, society and naval administration

Resource flows, entrepreneurs,

and

in Europe

bureaucracy

Navies are organisations maintained by states as instruments of policy. They control and protect sea lines of communication, project power across the sea, or deny enemies the free use of the sea. Naval administration involves managerial activities and organisational capabilities that channel and transform resources into naval power and operations at sea in order to implement a policy. Like other organisations, a navy must have the ability to transform and integrate external resources with its core competencies in order to create an advantage in competition with other activities—organised as well as improvised. Resources are raised from society, and the core competence for resource handling provided by the naval administration is therefore the critical connection between state, society, and naval organisation. Naval organisations have been large, complex, and centralised in comparison to the society, and resource flows f r o m society to the organisation have often been a serious political and administrative chaUenge. That also makes early modern navies interesting as pioneering examples of how problems were solved by a complex organisation.' The rise of the complex organisations, replacing local society (the manor, the guild, the town, and the village) as the central building blocks of society, is one of the fundamental changes in the modernisation of Europe f r o m the late medieval period to the 20th century.^ In the early modern period (the 16th to 18th centuries), complex organisations were primarily parts of the rising fiscal-military states. Before the 19th century, the large navies were the most complex organisations

' Fiscal-military states as organisation: Glete 2002, esp. 42-66. Naval administration: Glete Naval administration 2007. Definition of organisational capabilities, see section 1.1.1. ^ James S. Coleman, Power and Structure of Society, N e w York, 1974.

242

chapter

three

in existence. Warships, naval weapons, operations, and bases required advanced technology, large-scale investments, long-term planning, and an unusual degree of centralisation of many skills and vast resources. Recruitment of naval personnel, acquisitions of naval stores, and financial control required administrative competence and networks of contact in society. A state had to pass a certain threshold of long-term policy-making, centralisation of resources, and administrative sophistication before it could maintain an efficient navy. Complex organisations do not develop spontaneously or merely by centralising resources. They are the result of h u m a n efforts to combine different competencies and resources into a new structure in which several individuals cooperate in order to achieve more, with lower transaction costs.^ Creation of new combinations or innovations is, with the theoretical approach introduced by Joseph Schumpeter, the central role of the entrepreneur. The creation of a naval organisation is an act of entrepreneurship: identification and combination of those scarce technical and administrative capabilities, which are critical to form successful operational fleets. As warfare by its nature is a competitive process, navies also need entrepreneurial efforts for modernisation and expansion. Entrepreneurial efforts are also necessary to create the new political, fiscal, and administrative combinations, which provide the navy with external resources from society."* The word entrepreneur has more than one meaning in the English language. This frequently leads to confusion in historical investigations. In medieval and early modern military history, entrepreneur is the usual word used to describe men who organise military and naval forces as private business undertakings and lease them to states. In Schumpeterian-inspired economic theory, the word is often associated with the practical realisation of technical, commercial, and organisational innovations. In economy, the word entrepreneur has also the more general meaning of an individual who controls a commercial undertaking while acting in a milieu of uncertainty and risk.^ Initiatives supporting growth and diversification are also normally regarded as entrepreneurial activities, often stimulated by ambitions to take advantage

3 Scott and Davis 2007, esp. 124-50, 221-33. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, Cambridge, Mass., 1934. ^ M a r k Casson, The Entrepreneur: An economic theory, 2nd ed., Cheltenham, 2003, esp. 215-32.

swedish n a v a l administration "

243

of under-utilised resources, which the organisation controls.® The theoretical Schumpeterian entrepreneur is an individual who introduces change in an otherwise stable and unchanging economic process, normally by creating a new enterprise, which exploits the innovation. In dynamic societies, where change is normal, the distinction between entrepreneurs who create new corporations and those who develop existing corporations is less important. Long-term survival of an enterprise requires the ability to innovate, and entrepreneurial behaviour is primarily the ability to take advantage of changing circumstances, opportunities as well as threats, by introducing innovations and updating organisational capabilities. Schumpeter's view of the entrepreneurial function in society was not limited to the economic sphere. All types of organisations require innovative entrepreneurs.' Rulers of early modern states can be analysed as entrepreneurs. The fiscal-military state, with its fiscal system and military organisation and the resource flows between them, was an innovation. It also had a propensity for growth and diversification and acted under uncertainty and risk, responding to both threats and opportunities. Early modern rulers were exposed to fierce competition, both from other rulers and f r o m earlier, more decentralised systems of protection and violence-control. Several rulers lost territories, tax incomes, or control of the entire state if they failed in political and military efficiency. Navies were based on technical innovations, which required entrepreneurship if they were to be of any practical use for political ambitions. Permanent navies also had an industrial component: shipyards and arsenals for weapons. These characteristics make it fruitful to analyse states and navies as enterprises, although it must be understood that they were created not for financial profit but in order to increase the ruler-entrepreneur's political power. The differences between the dynastic early modern state and the private military entrepreneurs of that age are also rather difl^use. The main task of a prince was to protect society. Early modern states often collected taxes, tolls, and fines as more or less explicit fees for the services they delivered, primarily protection and the maintenance of law and order. Some military entrepreneurs were ruling princes, and some military entrepreneurs had ambitions to become territorial

' Penrose 1959. ' Schumpeter 1934, 74-94.

244

chapter

three

rulers. Even permanent armed forces were frequently hired to other states, with the ruling prince acting as military entrepreneur. Hie difference in mentality between an early modern prince and financial and industrial magnates in the 19th and 20th centuries should also not be overemphasised. Modern business entrepreneurs have often acted as if they were creating autonomous spheres of family power rather than strictly profit-making organisations. In historical sociology, bureaucracy is a term for decision-making according to legitimate rules, professionalism, and the ability to handle large resources and a vast amount of information in an orderly fashion. Early modern armed forces have frequently been identified as bureaucracies with administrators and professional officers acting in hierarchies, with a formalised chain of command and a decisionmaking process that involves paperwork and adherence to legal rules.® Innovative entrepreneurs and bureaucrats may look as two widely different species, and there are undoubtedly differences. Entrepreneurial and bureaucratic behaviour are not incompatible, however. One of the major innovative achievements of entrepreneurs—early modern organisers of states as well as modern creators of large private corporations—was actually the formation of hierarchical bureaucracies which can make complex organisations work.' Such organisations require a bureaucratic stafi?', and the fiscal-military state concept with two different chains of control and separate hierarchies handling resources would hardly have worked without bureaucratic decision-making. Organisations with a long life often pass through stages when they are dominated by entrepreneurial or bureaucratic behaviour—dynamic change as well as efficient resource utilisation.'® Mobilisation for war requires coordination of state-controlled resources with other resources in society. This poses timing problems and requires administrative ability to meet sudden demands and channel resources where needed. It can be achieved by either keeping

' Organisations and bureaucracy: Perrow 1993, Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, symbolic and postmodern perspectives, Oxford, 1997, 161-240. ' Alfred D. Chandler Jr, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial revolution. N e w York, 1962; Alfred D. Chandler Jr, The Visible Hand: The managerial revolution in American business, Cambridge, Mass., 1977. Jan Glete, Agande och industriell omvandling: Agargrupper, skogsindustri, verkstadsindustri, 1850-1950, Stocldiolm, 1987, esp. 283-88; Jan Glete, Ndtverk i ndringslivet: Agande och industriell omvandling i det mogna industrisamhdllet, 1920-1990, Stockholm, 1994.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

245

resources in permanent readiness or by developing organisational and legal institutions for emergency transfer of personnel, ships, and stores from the civilian society to the state. Some civilian resources such as ports, shipping, private shipyards, and seamen are very useful for naval warfare. Warfare at sea is more dependent on centralised administration of resources than warfare on land does, and naval administration has been less easy to improvise than army administration, which often can rely on requisitions or purchase of local resources. This creates a threshold effect, as naval policymakers and administrators must both centralise resources and develop several competencies before they can create an efficient navy. Lack of maritime resources and capabilities in the society may also stimulate ambitious states to create permanent naval organisations as a substitute, however. In the early modern period, this sometimes led to rulers in less developed maritime societies to initiate the development of specialised warships and naval weapons. To channel resources in that direction required entrepreneurial behaviour and the creation of administrative structures controlled by the ruler. Naval administration interacts with operational naval forces, policy makers, and markets. Operational forces are formed by ships, weapons, and men; and for the men, the ships are their homes when they are at sea. Warfare at sea takes place in an element where h u m a n beings must rely on technology and carefully planned logistics to survive. In particular, naval operations far f r o m the centre of power and resources require well-managed logistics. The supply of provisions, munitions, and equipment to operational forces involves purchase, storage, and distribution of many types of products. In the early modern period, the demands of provisions and naval stores for operational fleets often went far beyond what the market was used to supply under normal circumstances. The maintenance of health and the caring of sick and wounded personnel require properly selected and stored food and drink, medical personnel, and measures against contagious diseases. In the early modern period, these were difficult administrative tasks, and failure to keep the crews at good health was probably the most common cause of operational failures in all navies. Ambitious policy makers have a strong interest in the administration of armed forces. Naval administration is partly an extension of political ambitions to direct efforts for war and exercise control over armed forces. Administrative power in a state is a source of political power. The ability to pay, feed, and arm warriors is also an instrument

246

chapter

three

for controlling men who have the potential to intimidate or subjugate state and society. Rulers who are able to keep fund-raising institutions and armed forces separate, and who are able to control the resource flow between them with administrative means, may create strong states. The political and administrative ability to mobilise resources f r o m a society for naval efforts may also extend the power of the state and interest groups to distant seas and territories. Political leaders who develop efficient naval administration may thus harness maritime and technological resources to their ambitions or they may develop these resources in non-maritime societies. Naval administrators have usually had close contact with market forces: merchants and private entrepreneurs and the resources they control. Their relationships depend on the parties' relative degrees of sophistication. An unsophisticated naval administration in a developed market or maritime economy must rely on private entrepreneurs. An ambitious naval administration in an undeveloped maritime economy must create essential components of naval power on their own. A sophisticated administration working in a developed economy can buy much of what it requires on the market and concentrate on its core competencies, usually major investments in ships and weapons, key naval pei'sonnel, and planning of logistical support of operations. Consequently, it is not accurate to equate a strong state with the existence of a large administrative bureaucracy and a weak state with the reliance on private entrepreneurs for administrative tasks. Tliis has often been done, especially in studies of early modern European state formation. The strength of a state is best measured by its ability to mobilise resources and efficiently channel them to organisations under its own control. Even a limited naval administration may be powerful if it can select and monitor qualified private entrepreneurs, who sell their products and services to it. 4.1.2

Medieval and early modern naval

administration

From ancient to early modern times, the naval efforts and policies of maritime cities and coastal regions in Europe and around the Mediterranean were more permanent than those of the territorial states. Those who lived close to the sea and those who were involved in maritime trade had an interest in protection of shipping, fishing, and coastal settlements with naval means. In contrast, centralised territorial states and empires in Europe and the Mediterranean region have

swedish n a v a l administration

"

247

had rather short hves and have only periodically been able to organise power at sea. The Roman-Byzantine Empire is the major exception in Europe before the early modern period, but even its sphere of dominance was limited to the eastern Mediterranean for most of its existence. Powerful maritime interests have been concentrated in port cities, many of which developed ability to control the sea with naval forces for protection of trade and maritime empire building. Even on a more modest level, ancient and medieval regional elites along coasts had to organise some sea power for defence and the enforcement of maritime laws, often without support of a central state." Medieval Western Europe was feudal, decentralised, and non-maritime in character. In the western Mediterranean, Italian, French, and Hispanic rulers and provinces f r o m the 11th to the 11th century began to appoint admirals (the word is derived from the Arabic title emir) for organisation of naval forces and for maritime jurisdiction. The title and the function became common in Western Europe, but its practical implications for naval administration were often limited. Like other powerful men of their time, medieval rulers had naval resources of their own and might keep a nucleus of a state navy with an administrative apparatus of clerks, shipwrights, and shipmasters, but even powerful kings relied primarily on private shipping and manpower for major mobilisations. Rulers in the western Mediterranean frequently maintained a galley arsenal and its administration, but wartime efforts were often organised by private entrepreneurs in galley warfare. The three Scandinavian kingdoms that emerged from the 10th century were, in spite a very low degree of urbanisation, unusually maritime in their character and capable of large-scale maritime enterprises in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. The administrative structure behind 12th- and 13th century-Scandinavian sea power was an obligation for local communities to fit out ships and their crews for amphibious expeditions or protection of coasts and trade along the coasts (the ledung system). In the 14th century, it turned into a tax system for support of territorial power, and the administrative skills to organise sea power declined, especially in Sweden. The dominating sea powers in high and late medieval Europe were the large maritime cities, like Liibeck in the north and Genoa and Venice in the Mediterranean. In

" This section is based on Glete 1993, 101-252; Glete 2000, 17-75, and literature about early m o d e r n naval policy and administration m e n t i o n e d in chapter 1.

248

chapter

three

the North Sea and Baltic Sea, the German Hanse cities hired soldiers and fitted out their merchantmen for naval wars under the administration of the city officials. From the 13th to the early 16th century, the Hanse, with Liibeck as its informal capital, was the leading sea power in Northern Europe. The main line in the development of European naval administration from the 15th to the 18th century was the rise of centralised organisations. The organisational capabilities to build, man, arm, and provision warships and fleets came under control of states, while regional and private maritime skills served the navies with special skills in business enterprises, shipyards, and trade with naval stores. Rulers who in an entrepreneurial fashion took control of the resource flows and administrated their own navies (and armies) gained power in relation to other groups in the competition for political control over European societies. Early modern navies were centralised, industrial, and technically advanced organisations in societies dominated by decentralised production, agricuhure, and simple technology with few specialised skills. The success of permanent navies can be explained by the superiority of advanced administration in timely mobilisation of resources and long-term investments in technology. Improvised navies, more or less illegal piracy, private protection of trade, and finally even stateauthorised privateering gradually declined and disappeared. This growth of centralised and permanent naval administration had two main sources. One was the development of fiscal systems or organisations to raise resources, which were transformed into military and naval organisations sufficiently autonomous from local power to form power structures under central political control. This was normally achieved when a state was able to finance armed forces strong enough to overawe domestic competitors for power and to enforce a practical monopoly of violence. The other source was the increasing political integration of some maritime cities and regions with other parts of territorial states, especially Spain, France, the Northern Netherlands (the Dutch Republic), and Venice with parts of northern Italy (Terrafirma). Political alliances and combinations of interests could be formed within these states, and the maritime skills and resources controlled by regional groups became useful for more ambitious naval policies developed by rulers and states. However, several important maritime cities were not integrated with territorial states but remained autonomous and increasingly powerless

swedish n a v a l administration

"

249

at sea. This development was particularly marked in Germany and the regions where the German Hanse had been strong. The German Empire, its coastal principalities, and Poland-Lithuania never developed sea power of any importance, and the maritime skills in cities such as Hamburg, Liibeck, Danzig, Riga, Rostock, Stralsund, or Bremen was not used in any state formation process. Centralised administration for major sailing n&vi&s began to develop in the late 15th and early 16th centuries in Portugal, England, DenmarkNorway, and Sweden. Tliey were closely connected with the ruling dynasties of Aviz, Tudor, Oldenburg, and Vasa, which had several members who were deeply involved in naval administration and maritime enterprises. These navies were royal enterprises, administrated in the capital city and developed in societies with maritime experience but originally without powerful trading interests with many large ships. The Portuguese navy was created as an integrated part of the rulers' entrepreneurial activities as merchants and protection-sellers at sea in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The other three navies were all developed by new and more or less usurping dynasties, which for their survival needed to control the sea lines to their territories and prevent competitors abroad from encroaching. In the English case, with repeated political crisis around the central political power, this remained a motive for a strong navy until the 18nth century. France had a sailing navy in the Atlantic from the late 15th century, but its administration was regional and located in Brittany, Normandy, and Guienne. The connection to regional interests may initially have been an advantage but also an important cause for the total disappearance of French royal power at sea in the long civil wars from the 1560s. When a navy was recreated in the 1620s, it was more centralised and initially a part of the monarchy's program for regaining a monopoly of violence in France. The 15th- and 16th-century empire-building Ottoman sultans were also the entrepreneurs behind the creation of a large galley navy, based in Constantinople but with regionally administrated forces in various parts of the empire. Administratively this followed the earlier pattern of Byzantine sea power. Mediterranean France and Spain (CastileAragon) created galley navies. That of Spain was dynastically combined with the galley forces of Sicily and Naples. The Spanish monarchy also relied on Italian entrepreneurs, mostly from Genoa, for administration and command of their galley forces. The decentralised administration

250

chapter

three

of both the Ottoman and Spanish Mediterranean empires reflects that galleys were inherently short-range vessels, best suited for regional warfare. In the Atlantic, the Habsburg rulers relied on the strong maritime interests in the Netherlands and northern Spain for naval efforts. This system proved to be a wealmess in the 1560s and 1570s, when the Dutch revolted and left the ruler with insufficient sea power to control the sea close to Holland, Zeeland, and Flanders. The development of a Spanish sailing navy did not start on a large scale until the 1580s. Its administration developed into a combination of centralised state administration and a system of long-term contracts with private entrepreneurs who owned and administrated warships and leased them to the Spanish king. Organisational capability was a critical but scarce resource for sea power in this early stage of centralised states. The most centrally administrated element of naval forces was normally a new weapon system, the artillery. That weapon favoured the development of specialised gun-carrying warships, which in turn required specialised administrators. The heavy gun and the gun-carrying warship became for a time a high-technology combination over which a limited number of enterprising rulers had a strong grasp. Provisioning of ships was not in itself something for which central rulers had any special competence, but the problems of finding food for large fleets with several thousand m e n at the same time was often beyond what the local markets could handle. It required centralisation and coordination from above, although private merchants were often used as entrepreneurs. One of the least centralised components of naval forces was the recruitment of seamen, which often was dependent on market forces and the ability of commanding officers or local maritime groups to find crews. Private maritime interests soon developed competence to build and arm ships with heavy guns and to organise crews to fight. Gunarmed merchantmen remained useful in fleets armed for war until the 1660s and 1670s, and this made private entrepreneurs in naval warfare important. Beginning in the late 16th century, Dutch and English shipowners became suppliers of gun-armed merchantmen and even entire fleets—ships, guns, officers, and crew—to European rulers with limited naval administration. The Spanish monarchy leased warships on long-term contracts (asientos) from private entrepreneurs in Southern Europe throughout the 1600s. The new Dutch Republic, which was formed in the late 16th century in the most dynamic maritime region

swedish n a v a l administration

"

251

in Europe, developed a regional administrative system. Five provincial admiralties raised custom duties within the whole Republic and used the funds to maintain a permanent federal navy with specialised warships, shipyards, and arsenals of guns. The Dutch state could thus integrate the competence and networks of contacts in the local maritime communities to marshal resources for a navy that operationally was a centralised force. Contrary to a c o m m o n belief, the Dutch navy did not normally hire its warships from private ship-owners but, instead, relied on the world's leading maritime economy for the supply of shipbuilding competence, naval stores, weapons, and men. Tlie challenge of administrating a major navy f r o m a centre was primarily control and coordination of resources. Naval warfare required, in large numbers and huge quantities, widely different and unevenly localised resources: warships, timber, masts and spars, sails and rigs, cables and anchors, naval stores, guns and munitions, various kinds of provisions, and officers and crew. It also required a degree of political interest aggregation in order to make large resource flows f r o m society to the state accepted. Elite groups who disagreed with central authority were often able to resist resource extraction. Finally, naval warfare required competence and information, and here local elite groups might profit from state formation. Private entrepreneurs, who were familiar with regional conditions and had networks to both international markets and local societies, could often find such resources more quickly and with lower transaction costs. The integration of state power, naval administration, and maritime interests became especially close in states whose capital city was also the centre of maritime trade and the main naval base. The geographic combination of administrative and maritime resources facilitated centralisation, and major ports such as Lisbon, London, Constantinople, Copenhagen, and Stocldiolm became naval bases and central ordnance depots under control of rulers. In the early 18th century, the Russian political centre was even moved from inland Moscow to the new naval and maritime centre of St Petersburg. If the capital also was a centre for trade and shipping, the central political power-holders (kings, ministers, parliaments) and their administrative staffs could gain close contacts with maritime skills. The naval bases supported central political power because a navy could project armed force against foreign powers and domestic opposition and make it difficult for external and internal enemies to cooperate. France and Spain lacked such maritime centres of political and

252

chapter

three

administrative power and relied more on private entrepreneurs or provincial maritime interests. During the 17th century, the French state made great efforts to gain centralised control over the navy, which resulted in a double hierarchical system with civilian administrators (intendants) working in parallel with officers. It has frequently been criticised as an overcomplicated control system, but it may have been a result of the fact that the rulers and the central administration lacked direct and personal contacts with the navy. By the late 17th century, a relatively homogeneous European system of naval administration of resources had emerged. Typically, a central administration controlled the design and construction of warships, kept one or more naval yards for maintenance of a permanent fleet, purchased naval stores, guns, and provisions in large quantities, and maintained corps of commissioned and warrant officers as a cadre of naval leaders. Seamen were usually hired only when ships were commissioned for active service, but some states kept registers of seamen in order to call them into naval service when required. Private entrepreneurs could supply various goods to the navies, but administrators became increasingly skilled at using market forces for control of cost and quality through contracts. Increased bureaucratisation of naval architecture made it possible to centralise even warship design and supply shipbuilders with detailed drawings and design specifications. That made it possible for private yards to participate in naval construction without any decentralisation of design. These systems of resource handling enabled European powers to fight long and intense naval wars, project European power to other parts of the world, and protect increasingly global European mercantile activity. Sweden in the 15th and 16th century was a society with few large merchant ships and little private competence in administrating naval efforts. If a Swedish ruler wished to have naval power, he had to hire it from foreign merchants or develop the necessary skills himself The first alternative required the ability to raise large financial resources at short notice. It was also politically dangerous because it meant reliance on foreign resources. Timing and availability are critical in a mobilisation process, and hired ships from abroad might arrive too late. Commanders and administrators of a hired fleet also would be less reliable, because they were not dependent on the ruler for their future careers. The alternative, to organise a permanent state-administrated navy, however, was also challenging, because it required the ruler to continuously find resources for a naval organisation and men with the

swedish n a v a l administration

"

253

necessary skills to run it. If successful, it gave the ruler greater ability to protect his subjects and also a better ability to control them. The remaining chapters (4 to 8) in this study are surveys of how the Swedish state interacted with society and market when it developed central administration (chapter 4), acquired warships (5), sails, rigging and cables (6), guns (7), and organised manpower and leadership (8) for operational fleets. It is not a comprehensive study of all aspects of naval administration in two centuries. It intends to show that the state acted in an entrepreneurial and innovative fashion when it mobilised limited and largely non-maritime resources for a large-scale naval enterprise. The Swedish naval administration was an outgrowth of state power and dynastic ambitions, not an integration of powerful maritime interests with a territorial state. In a later phase, however, it did develop relationships with private entrepreneurs, who appeared when the Swedish society became more economically sophisticated. Tlie state was successful in mobilising resources for an active naval policy aiming at control of the Baltic Sea, as a part of an increasingly imperial program of expansion. In that process it integrated peasants, burghers, the lower nobility, aristocrats, and the new (often foreign born) industrial entrepreneurs who, under the direction of the state, contributed to the efforts of maintaining a Swedish navy.

4.2 Passing the threshold: The early phase of Vasa naval administration Swedish late medieval sea power had been administrated by aristocrats as an outgrowth of their control of the crown's castles and territories attached to these castles (slottsldn). The rudimentary central administration run by the elected regents (Sten Sture the older, Svante Nilsson, and Sten Sture the younger) from 1470 to 1520 was financially supported by a larger territory in central Sweden and western Finland ifatbursldn), with the castle in Stocldiolm as the centre. Formally, the regents were only the largest holder of Idn f r o m the crown. The possession of a Idn meant that its holder should exercise the authority and responsibility of the crown in the territory, defend it, and maintain law and order in cooperation with the local communities. In exchange, he received all or most of the royal revenues f r o m it. These incomes were often mixed with the aristocrat's incomes f r o m his own land, and they could easily be used for struggles about power in Sweden.

254

chapter

three

Tlie Ian-holders' tasks were to maintain the castle in a defensible state and to keep small forces of soldiers for local defence and control of the territory. Hie castle and the armed retainers were usually their most important resource during domestic power struggles. A Idn was not a hereditary or even life-long fief, and the shifting political alliances made life as a holder of the incomes from a Icin uncertain. That probably discouraged aristocrats from developing any long-term policy about sea power.'^ Aristocrats who controlled castles at the coast (Alvsborg, Kalmar, Borgholm, Stegeborg, Kastelholm, Abo, Raseborg, and Viborg) usually had one or a few small vessels (typically jakter) for local patrols and their own voyages at sea. They must have had vessels for transport and fishing and must have employed some seamen and fishers. Medieval Nordic aristocrats were not unfamiliar with the idea to enrich themselves by capturing merchantmen or forcing them to pay for protection, but it was usually only the holder of Visby and Gotland as a Ian who could do that on a larger scale. The regents at Stocldiolm had a few ships, which they used for both trade and warfare, although the only two major ships owned by the regent Sten Sture in 1519-20 were in Liibeck and Danzig, built or administrated by German merchants.'^ Medieval Sweden had seven dioceses with considerable economic resources, and usually a fortified castle. Many bishops were noblemen; they often owned ships and small vessels and participated with them in both wars and domestic power struggles. In the early 1520s, Hans Brask, bishop of Linkoping (a son of a commoner), even had a small squadron, a ship, a bark, and a jakt, which he provided with his own guns and loaned to Gustav Eriksson for the war efforts against Christian II.''' It is probable that most seaside castles—royal as well

Erik Lonnroth, Statsmakt och statsfinans i det medeltida Sverige, 46, 1940, Gothenburg, 1940; Hammarstrom 1956, 39-101. " Hammarstrom 1956, 53, 86, 88, 169, 182-86; Glete 1976, 45-48; Glete 1977, 3 3 41; Hedberg 1975, esp. 76-77, 123-29. " GR 1, 4 3 - 4 4 (10/2 1523); Glete 1977, 36 (Hans Brask's ship); HSH 17, 165-66 (letter f r o m H a n s Brask to Berend von Melen 8/9 1523); Barkman m7, 89-97. Glete 1977, 34 suggested that the "Swedish Bark" which was wrecked at Oland in October 1522 probably was Jasper Bruns Bark, but f r o m Brask's letter to von Melen it is evident that it belonged to Brask and that he also h a d lent a small jakt to van Melen, the c o m m a n d e r of the Swedish fleet in 1522. H a n s Brask's relation to the Swedish state: H e r m a n Schiick, Ecclesia Lincopensis: Studier om Linkopingskyrkan under Medeltiden och Gustav Vasa, Stockholm, 1959, 134-56. 357-73.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

255

as those belonging to bishops—had facihties to build, maintain, and arm at least small vessels. Little is known about that before the 1540s, when local accounts show that such facilities existed. There were few merchant-owned ships of any military importance. Only two such ships armed with guns are mentioned in the late 1510s.'= In spite of the long Swedish coasts, total resources used in naval warfare before 1520 were small. Tlie largest source of armed force, the local peasant militia, was irrelevant for any kind of naval policy. As outlined in chapters 2 and 3, Gustav Eriksson (Vasa) made a radical break with this system when in 1522 he bought a fleet of armed ships from Liibeck and Stralsund. In 1522-23, and to some extent also during the Gotland expedition in 1524, he was dependent on Liibeck's financial and administrative support for this new venture in naval power. The political control of the men leading these ships was uncertain. In 1525, the new Idng had to take up arms against the German knight Berend von Melen, who held the important castle in Kalmar and who had commanded the fleet in 1522 and 1524."" The Swedish power position at sea would have been only a short episode if naval policy had not been supported by radically increased funding and new administrative structures for a permanent navy. Both questions were on the agenda of the new king. During the 1520s, he used much of the resources raised by taxes and the appropriation of church property to his naval forces. Major warships were maintained at the Stockholm castle in larger number than before 1520, heavy bronze guns were cast with metal from confiscated church bells, seamen and shipwrights were hired, and a shipbuilding program was started. One of the first ships in that program, Store Kfuvelcn, a carvel-hulled warship built c. 1527-30, was one of the great European ship of this age and an indication of the new ruler's ambitions.'^ Gustav I very soon turned to Swedish administrators with experience of ships and seafaring to run the Stockliolm naval yard, shipbuilding, and outfitting of ships for mercantile and military expeditions. Thie

Hedberg 1975, 77. Accounts f r o m the naval expeditions in 1522: Hanserecesse, 3: 1477-1530, 8, Leipzig, 1910, esp. 570-83; Strodda kanierala handlingar, 62, RA; see also Hammarstrom 1956, 410-11, 425-31, Berend von Melen: Emil Hildebrand, "Gustaf Vasa ocli Berend von Melen", HT, 21, 1901, 245-316. " Accounts for the Stockholm shipyard f r o m a u t u m n 1526 to 1/3 1531, Foughternes Rekenskaper 1529-1533, fols 789-859, RA. Payrolls for naval personnel, Rantekammarbocker f r o m 1527 on, RA.

256

chapter

three

earliest known administrators were shipmasters {skeppare). Master Olof (Eriksson), who eariier had served the regent Sten Sture (the younger) as shipmaster, held a senior position from at least 1525 until 1531. Another shipmaster, Master Erik, was from the autumn 1526 until February 1531 responsible for shipbuilding material and the ships' equipment. In 1531, Erik also took over Olof's responsibility to pay seamen and shipyard personnel. Master Olof returned to the shipyard as its senior administrator in 1537, when Erik died, and remained there until 1543. Olof Eriksson was also a burgher in Stockholm and one of the representatives of the city at the meeting with the Parliament in 1529. In 1535 he was master of Store Kravelen, and both he and Master Erik served at Landskrona in the winter 153536, when the fleet was laid up there during the war with Liibeck. Erik also had a command at sea in 1534. Both men presumably had experience with ship-handling and the outfitting of ships when they entered royal service. Until the early 17th century, a senior shipmaster was in charge of the daily administration of the Stockholm naval yard.'® The accounts f r o m Master Erik's period as administrator of naval stores and equipment are preserved and provide insights in the early years of Vasa naval administration. Warships could be built with domestic resources, large anchors could be made by the king's blacksmiths, while sails, hemp and yarns for cables at least partly were bought from abroad—in Holland (1528), Reval (1528), and Danzig (1532)." Little is known about the production of guns and gunpowder in these years, but the king evidently acquired a number of modern copper guns, probably with the help of gun-founders f r o m the continent. Gunpowder was produced domestically, although sulphur had to be imported.^" It is possible, however, that Liibeck still supplied essential products for the naval administration through Stockholm merchants, who traditionally had strong connections to the large Hanse city. It is also possible that contacts with that and other German cities

" MA Dan Johansson, Stockholm University has provided information about skeppar Olof and skeppar Erik. Olof and the Parliament of 1529: SRA, 1:1, 148: Hiey are m e n t i o n e d in the king's letters GR 2, 197 (17/8 1525); GR 4, 374-75 (22/11 1527); GR 8, 6 5 - 6 7 (7/4 1532); GR 10, 315 (5/12 1535); GR 12, 6 0 - 6 1 (10/6 1538), 104 (28/9 1538); GR 13, 4 8 - 4 9 (31/5 1540). Skeppar Olof in Sten Sture's service: HSH 2, 57-60. Senior masters: Zettersten 1890, 236-37. " Foughternes Rekenskaper 1529-1533, fols 789-859, RA; GR 8, 6 5 - 6 7 (7/4 1532); Hammarstrom 1956, 440-41. Hedberg 1975, 287-90, 301^08.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

257

made it easier to find foreign specialists with the necessary skills to produce ships and gunpowder weapon. The Swedish aristocracy had been m u c h decimated by the war and Christian II's mass execution of former enemies, but they were still the traditional Swedish source of administrative competence in military matters. In the early period of Gustav I's rule, aristocrats administered Ian in parts of the country, and after 1527 the territory controlled by Ian-holder markedly increased. In the 1520s and 1530s, at least the Finnish castles still maintained several small armed vessels (jakter), which were used both in the Gulf of Finland and together with the king's naval force. Johan of Hoya, a G e r m a n count and married to the king's sister, held the important castle Viborg in the east and also maintained major ships, a hoik and a kravell?^ The king's naval forces, however, were larger and probably better armed than the forces controlled by aristocrats, and there was litde doubt about who controlled the sea around Sweden. This was not unimportant, as it increased the king's ability to divide potential rebels against his rule. There were repeated rebellions against him in these years, but after the recapture of Kalmar in 1525, these were concentrated in the inland provinces of Dalarna and Vastergotland. The last classical attempt to start a feud and depose the king by a confederation of local aristocrats took place in the latter province in 1529. Swedish naval administration during the 1530s is only fragmentarily known from accounts of payments of seamen and shipyard personnel. No accounts f r o m the Stocldiolm shipyard have been preserved, and the ordnance accounts provide no inventories.^^ Several letters f r o m the king during 1532-35 do, however, show that he was working with the problem of finding more warships, cables, sails and other equipment for ships, shipmasters, pilots, skilled seamen, and experienced naval leaders. He did this without asking his traditional friends in Lubeck for help. It would not have come, for his naval efforts were directed against that city. The sudden flow of letters f r o m the king about naval administration partly reflects that he was looking for alternatives and additions to the network of contacts in Liibeck and Stocl<Jiolm with which he had administrated his navy since the early 1520s. Gustav

Glete 1977, 3 4 - 5 0 with detailed references. ^^ Naval accounts which remains f r o m the 1530s are mainly payrolls for naval personnel, yearly in Rantekammarbocker, RA, a n d 1535-36 in SMHF, 1.1-1-3, RA.

258

chapter

three

sent out his men, even aristocrats, to recruit seamen and to buy naval equipment in Danzig, Livonia, Prussia, and Pomerania, and he negotiated about ships, commanders, and seamen from Holland, Scotland, and Denmark. The city of Reval was threatened that it would not be allowed to trade with Finland if it did not send seamen to the Swedish fleet. During the mobilisation against Liibeck in 1534-35, the king's fleet was also ordered to strengthen itself by pressing suitable foreign ships and seamen found at sea into Swedish service.^^ Especially seamen were much in demand, and in July 1534 the king declared that he must have many additional seamen if his largest ship. Store Kravelen should be sent to sea. He even suggested that his allies in Denmark and Holstein should man this ship. A few years earlier, when Liibeck and Holland prepared for a naval war with each other, Gustav had offered to sell this ship to Holland and its ruler. Emperor Charles V, in exchange for smaller vessels. He must have regarded the administrative problems with this giant as difficult, but in 1535-36 he was, perhaps to his own surprise, able to send that ship to sea in a campaign where it proved very useful in combat.^"* The achievement of organising an operational fleet, which in 153536 turned out to be the most powerful in the Baltic Sea, was to a large extent administrative and was proof that Gustav had made a successful break with Liibeck. He was no longer dependent on that or any other city for naval administration. Gustav's letters f r o m 1534-35 show that he was far f r o m certain that the fleet would be successful and he evidently had great respect for the old Hanse city. He had to improvise much of the administrative efforts, and the difficulties of raising resources in a country still only precariously controlled by royal power probably explain why he choose to stay in Stocldiolm and central Sweden during the war rather than departing to the operational theatre in Denmark.

" The king's letter about foreign resources and m e n for his navy: GR 8, 6 5 - 6 7 (7/4 1532), 240 (6/7 1533), 241-42 (6/7 1533), 2 5 0 - 5 1 (14/7 1533), 266 (10/8 1533), 279-80 (11/9 1533), 326 (11/11 1 533); GR 9, 2 4 8 - 5 1 (18/6 1534), 157-59 (6/7 1534), 171-74 (21/7, 22/7 1534), 208-09 (7/8 1534), 2 1 7 - 1 8 (7/8 1534), 2 5 3 - 5 4 (2/8 1534), 269-71 (24/9 1534, threat to forbid Reval's trade with Finland), 275-76 (24/9 1534), 2 8 7 - 8 8 (12/10-34), 3 0 1 - 0 3 (19/10 1534), 331 (19/12 1534); GR 10, 9 6 - 9 7 (24/3-35), 9 8 - 9 9 (29/3 1535), 110-11 (4/4 1535), 145-47 (13/5 1535). GR 8, 171-73 (21/7 1534), Gustav I's asks for Danish ship-masters, pilots and seamen to Store Kravelen. Negotiations about Store Kravelen: Lundkvist 1961, esp. 36-41.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

259

In these years, the king also tried to develop the traditional form of resource mobilisation for his navy. From 1534, he asked the aristocratic members of the Council of the Realm and the c o m m o n nobility to help raise ships and seamen. The nobility at this time did still organise most of the Swedish cavalry, and they also largely administrated this force themselves. Hiey were, by a long tradition, leaders and administrators of the Swedish armed forces, with knowledge of how to recruit, arm, and provision men. Some of them still had large incomes from Idn, provided by the king. Until 1537, Gustav made serious efforts to make the nobility participate in his increased naval efforts with major ships. He asked not only for resources but also for the administrative capabilities required to build, maintain, arm, and equip warships and to find men and provisions when they should be sent to sea. At a meeting in Arboga in February 1536, the nobility agreed to the king's plan for their participation in naval administration. The nobility was divided in three groups: central Sweden, western and southern Sweden (Vastergotland and SmMand), and Finland, each of which should maintain, arm, and man one major warship and one jakt or bark (small warships). The decision may have been regarded as a temporary war effort, which the nobility was willing to support, but when the war with Liibeck ended, they became suspicious about what looked like a new permanent burden. The nobility in Vastergotland and Smaland protested that the king had sent them too large a ship (Nye Holken) to maintain. Even the Finnish aristocrat Erik Fleming, usually a supporter of the king and sometimes his senior admiral, revolted against his obligation to build and maintain one ship (Flemingen) from his Idn when that was reduced in size. The money for one new ship {Riksens Rdds skepp), which the nobility had promised to supply in 1534-35, was not fully paid even in 1542.^® Gustav's effort to make the nobility participate in his naval administration is interesting because it shows that his creation of a modern centralised navy was not a foregone conclusion. He was, after all, not only raising new taxes on the nobility but also offering them power over administration, which would give them leverage over future policy-making. Hie king tried to modernise the traditional Idn system,

Glete 1976, 52-54, with detailed references to the sources. Tlie importance of that the nobility helped the king to find seamen is underlined in the king's letter to Erik Fleming 24/9 1534, GR 9, 269-71. Erik Fleming, SBL 16, biography by Eric Anthoni.

260

chapter

three

and the nobility's duty to serve with armed force and make it useful in a new naval system, but the king met little response once the war was over. This may have contributed to his markedly weakened interest in providing the aristocracy with traditional Idn. They had shown that they were unable or unwilling to provide administrative support to a modern navy, and they were not interested in participating in the administration of a modern army, except as paid royal officers. The large Idn were practically abolished in the 1540s, and the aristocrats lost their traditional right to administrate the resources of the crown on their own. In combination with the equally innovative replacement of the peasant militia with a state-administrated royal militia in the early 1540s, the king rapidly fulfilled the development of a fiscal-military state where the fiscal (resource-raising) organisation was kept separate from the military and naval (resource-consuming) organisations.^®

4.3 4.3.1

The royal entrepreneurs: Tax-raising,

Vasa naval administration,

1540-1618

the double contract, and the power of the dynasty

As a king, Gustav I had a political contract to protect Sweden and its people. This was an obligation which every European ruler had and for which they raised taxes and demanded loyalty. Most late medieval and many 16th-century rulers, however, chose to organise their protective eflrorts through contracts with military and naval entrepreneurs who recruited, administrated, and often commanded army and naval forces. This was the way Gustav had organised the great effort f r o m Liibeck in 1522-23, although it is interesting that he already then bought, rather than leased, the ships. After that, he was determined to become a military and naval entrepreneur himself, rather than maintaining an alliance with Hanse cities or minor German princes to supply him with soldiers, ships, seamen, and administrative services if he had to go to war again. The king, and after him all later Vasa rulers, undertook the task to organise naval and military forces on their own. W h e n they went to war outside Sweden's borders they also hired foreign entrepreneurs to raise Scottish, French, and German mercenary soldiers, but before 1630 these were only a minor part of the army, and they relied

General about Ian-. Nilsson 1947; Hammarstrom of the army: Larsson 1967; Sveriges krig, I, 64-101.

1956, 363-72. The reorganisation

swedish n a v a l administration

"

261

on the king's administration of provision and transportation. With the single exception of the hired Dutch fleet in 1644, the navy did not use entrepreneurs to administrate operational fleets. In a sense this was a contract of military and naval entrepreneurship that the kings made with themselves in their capacity as rulers of the kingdom. The Vasa dynasty developed a double contractual relationship, one with the society (as protectors) and one with the crown (as military entrepreneurs). This has been little remarked upon, because it has been taken for granted that early modern rulers behaved like that and that the Vasas simply followed a general European trend. Most contemporary rulers, however, did mainly mobilise financial resources for war and used them to pay private, often foreign, entrepreneurs who administrated the armed forces. In the 16th-century Baltic region, only Denmark had a permanent navy and only Russia a permanent, although hardly modern, army. The dynasty's entrepreneurial behaviour was of crucial importance for the formation of the Swedish state and the Vasa monarchy. Gradually the kings and their administrative staff accumulated the core competencies to raise and administrate armed forces under long wars, at long distances, and in combined operations. Consequently, it is important to study their resource mobilisation for warfare not only f r o m the perspective that they were political rulers who raised resources for war but also from the perspective that they administrated the military and naval resources as entrepreneurs. As entrepreneurs, the Vasas searched for cheap and under-utilised resources, tried to achieve new combinations, and looked for political, economic, and military opportunities to exploit. They could use their position as kings to gain information about h u m a n and material resources in the realm, they could use political leverage to mobilise them, and they could coordinate the development of military and naval personnel, hardware, and know-how with their political ambitions. But the dynasty also developed the Swedish political institutions from earlier informal and often decentralised negotiations between the ruler, the elite, and the c o m m o n people to formalised and centralised meetings, the four-estate Parliament (the Riksdag). The most important role of the Parliament was to take decisions about resource extraction in a form that made that process legitimate and rapid. Such decisions could only be taken if the kings were politically skilled. They must be able to take advantage of their position as administrative leaders of the state and their position as arbiters between conflicting interests and

262

chapter

three

upholders of a political and social order that at least was better than conceivable alternatives.^^ Hiis kind of political entrepreneurship only developed gradually, and it was only from the 17th century that the Parliament could be used to support considerably increased and practically permanent offensive war efforts. Studies of 17th-century Sweden frequently give the impression (or explicitly state) that parliamentary consent to large war efforts was a mere formality and that the four estates, especially the peasants, were more or less without real power. That was not the experience of 16th-century kings, however. They asked the estates for extra taxes only with hesitation, and they seldom got what they needed for waging effective large-scale and offensive warfare. The power to raise large resources for war was a political skill, developed over generations. Two important parts of that skill were ability to use opportunities and threats as motives for increased taxes and the ability to show that the taxes were used for well-administrated armed forces and warfare which protected the Swedish taxpayers. The 17th-century Parliament's apparent inability to resist royal demands for conscription and taxes was a result of the rulers' ability to determine the political agenda by first pointing to threats and then pointing to the armed forces, administrated by the dynasty, as the salvation f r o m these threats.^® It had not always been so. Gustav I (r. 1523-60) called the first "modern" parliament in 1527 to drastically increase the financial strength of the crown by taking over the Catholic Church's property. He did it with the explicit motivation that the king's armed forces must be strengthened for modern warfare and protection against invasions. A long period of crisis, wars, and uncertainty about the future had made it possible for him to make a radical innovation. IHie asked for resources to create stability, with threats of abdication and probable chaos as the alternative.^' Gustav became almost independent of parliamentary financial grants for his military and naval expansion in the later period of his reign, which largely was peaceful. The increased armed forces were financed by incomes f r o m crown (mainly ex-church) land, the new royal militia with cheap peasant-soldiers, improved tax

"

Schiick 1987; Rystad 1987. Holm 2007; Forssberg 2005. ' ' SiM, 1:1, 56-75, esp. 56, 73-75.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

263

administration, royal control of silver mines, and a flourishing economy, promoted by the long peace.'" Erik XIV (r. 1560-68) financed much of his war efforts up to 1566 with his father's saved silver, with locally raised taxes in food for soldiers and seamen {kostgard, skeppsgard), and his usually undisputed right to conscript soldiers and seamen for a war that could be described as defensive. W h y taxes in food at least in the 1560s were pohtically easier to raise than taxes in money has not been studied. The transaction costs may have been lower because soldiers and seamen were conscripted and the crown could claim that those who stayed at home had a moral obligation to feed the men who fought the enemy. The traditional peasant militia, which was in living memory of the society, had probably been provisioned in a similar way. In that tradition, the king's administration was careful to keep the provisions raised through extra taxes separate from other tax incomes, in order to show that it was used to feed soldiers and seamen. W h e n Erik in 1567 faced the necessity to demand increased war taxes in money f r o m the estates, his regime began to break down, as did his mental strength. Erik's entrepreneurial talent to organise armed forces, especially a modern navy, was greater than his ability to handle a Parliament.^' Johan III (r. 1568-92) lived with chronic financial problems caused by the long wars. He frequently asked for extra taxes, both in food and money, which he could elicit by arguing that the war with Russia was defensive. Such taxes were granted, more often by local negotiations than through general meetings with all four estates, but the transaction cost of raising extra taxes was considerable. The tax policy during the Russian War of 1570-95 has been more studied in Finland than in Sweden. Finland, close to the war zone and agriculturally poor, was hit by a disproportionate burden of conscription and the feeding and quartering (borgldger) of the armed forces. It was mainly the army that imposed this burden, but the operational part of the navy was also in Finland and consumed resources. The peasant revolt in northern Finland in 1596-97 can at least partly be explained by these burdens.'^

™ Hammarstrom 1956, esp. 274-341; Birgitta Oden, Kronohandel och finanspolitik, 1560-1595, Lund, 1966, 43-44, Oden 1966, 43-45, 61-87. ^^ Taxes and state finances: Oden 1966, 188-222. Peasants and taxes: Eva Osterberg, Grdnsbygd under krig: Ekonomiska, demogmfiska och administrativa forhdllanden i

264

chapter

three

Whether this was the result of reluctance to ask for higher taxes throughout the Swedish realm (fear of tax revolts) or the result of an inability to make peasants in the western part of the realm (presentday Sweden) actually pay the extra taxes they granted is not clear from existing studies. Johan could wage a long war against an enemy with a vastly larger population, but he was never able to pay for an operational army and navy of the size Erik maintained in the 1560s or which later Swedish kings could raise with increased taxation and conscription. It is unlikely that he did not understand that higher taxes and larger armed forces could have decided the war earlier. The limit must have been his ability to raise taxes. W h e n Johan died, he was also financially indebted to his younger brother, Duke Karl. Karl used his position as administrator of, and creditor to, the Vasa state to the utmost in order to limit the power of his normally absent nephew, Sigismund (r. 1592-99), who in 1587 had been elected king of Poland." From the late 1590s, the revolutionary regime of Duke Karl (regent from 1599 and king from 1604) repeatedly called the Parliament and asked for extra taxation. By creating a situation of permanent crisis and war against the deposed Sigismund, Karl was able to raise the tax level, a policy that was successfully continued by Gustav II Adolf The conclusion is that the limit on taxes which Erik and Johan had met was political, rather than demographic or economic. The position as usurpers against a king who also was ruler of another, m u c h larger, power gave Karl and Gustav Adolf the possibility to markedly increase the burden of armed forces with parliamentary consent. The threat of the return of a Catholic and possibly vengeful Sigismund worked as leverage against a Parliament which hardly desired offensive warfare but feared a new civil war even more. One result was a considerable increase of the navy in terms of ships; another was an increase in the number of soldiers raised for the army and more intense, although initially unsuccessful offensive warfare in the eastern Baltic.^''

sydvdstra Sverige under och efter nordiska sjudrskriget, Lund, 1971, esp. 46-49, 218-19. The b u r d e n of war in Finland; Heikki Ylikangas, Klubbekriget: Det blodiga bondekriget i Finland 1596-97, Stocldiolm, 1999 (1st Finnish ed. 1977); Rainer Fagerhuid, Bonder, krigsfolk och borgldger: Den militdra tungan i egentliga Finland under dldre Vasatid, Abo, 2003; Eljas O r r m a n , "Militar resursmobilisering u n d e r aldre Vasatid", Historisk Tidskriftfor Finland, 88, 2003, 444-49. " Karl's loans to the crown: Oden 1966, 221. ''' There is no synthesis about taxes and war policy in these years, although Holm 2007 (and earlier articles by the same author) provides a political f r a m e w o r k for it. The

swedish n a v a l administration

"

265

Before 1523, Swedish kings had for centuries normally been deposed by aristocrats, sometimes in alliance with peasant communities or rival kings. In the 16th century, two Vasa kings were also dethroned, but only by other members of the dynasty. Hie political contract between the dynasty and the Swedish society was not broken by these conflicts, and no serious political alternative—another dynasty or a new aristocratic regency government—ever appeared. A major difference from earlier periods was that the Vasa dynasty firmly controlled the administration of another contract; the king's position as monopolistic military and naval entrepreneur to the Swedish crown. This complex fiscal and military administration was powerful but subordinated to the dynasty, not to the state in a more abstract sense. As long as members of the Vasa dynasty appeared in the centre of this administration and used its vast power of patronage, information, and specialised skills, the dynasty's power was very difficult to challenge. Politically, the Swedish fiscal-military state was a power system of mutual dependency between fiscal and military administrators, the dynasty, and the society, represented by the four estates. The king's administrators depended on his ability to legitimise resource extraction through negotiations with the estates as much as he relied on their ability to raise and use the resources. The society became dependent on the king and his administration of armed forces for both external security and domestic political stability. The traditional alternative—aristocratic administration of Idn, infantry raised by the peasants, cavalry raised by the nobility, and a navy run by nobody—was by long experience known to be politically unstable and unsuited for modern intense wars. The contemporary European alternative of hiring large armed forces through private entrepreneurs was financially prohibitive for long wars. State-administrated armed forces using domestic resources were, once the Vasa dynasty had proved their military efficiency and higher degree of political predictability, the only viable alternative, and that increased the legitimacy of the dynasty's rule. Everybody was dependent on other parts of this system, but as the entrepreneur who could initiate and change policy, negotiate with all interest groups in

parliament and taxes: Ahnlund 1933, 35-104, 530-38. Tlie scale of warfare: Barkman 1938-39, 327-552; Zettersten 1890, 439-68. Taxes: Nilsson 1990, 31-55, 107-17; Sven Lundkvist, "Resurser, skattetryck och fattigdom i 1610-talets Sverige", in Margareta Revera and Rolf Torstendalil (eds), Bdrdor, bonder, bord i 1600-talets Sverige, Motala, 1979, 133-62.

266

chapter

three

the society, and control all parts of the administration, the king had much more political leverage in this system than anyone else. 4.3.2

A state administrating

material

resources

In the years after the war of 1534-36, Gustav I intensified his efforts to gain administrative control of the h u m a n and material resources in the Swredish society. Around 1540, a new structure for resource extraction and state administration of resources emerged. Its main features remained stable for around 80 years. One feature was a detailed system of booldceeping of how the resources were handled. Fortunately, most of these accounts are preserved and provide insights in how the state worked. They have been used to study Swedish demography, the agrarian society, land ownership, the tax system, production, trade, and the financial and military activities of the state. If read as the remains of how a family of fiscal, military, and economic entrepreneurs raised and transformed material and h u m a n resources for a great enterprise in protection-selling, they may provide some new insights. Tlie administration and the accounts it left were shaped by the fact that the state handled material resources. The Vasa state built ships with timber and labour raised as taxes, and it fed men in its service with food sent by tax-paying peasants. It raised more resources in kind than in money, and it often used them without caring to set a price on them. Before the 1620s, ft is impossible to express the cost of the navy in money, both because much of the accounts were in non-monetary terms and because there was no booldceeping system to separate naval expenses from other expenses. The Vasa system of raising taxes in kind was earlier regarded as primitive and a sign of economic backwardness. Eli F. Heckscher interpreted it as a conservative systematisation of medieval economic ideas. In 1956, Ingrid Hammarstrom showed that the early 16th-century Swedish state to a considerable extent had used a financial system with money and armed force paid by cash. Taxes in kind were an innovation introduced by Gustav I around 1540, not an unbroken medieval tradition.^' The king must have had strong incentives for this radical change. It was contemporary with other innovations, which intensified the state's contacts with local society and increased its information

Hammarstrom

1956.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

267

about resources in that society.''^ Taxes in food, iron, forest products, and labour by the taxpayers were inflation-proof in a time of rising prices. The administration of these products and services gave the state the possibihty to make profits on trade and to channel major resourceflows in the interest of state policy.^^ Birgitta Oden has studied how the system worked in the period 1560-95, and in 1967 she presented an important synthesis of her own and other historians' research. Oden showed that Heckscher's dichotomy between a modern financial system based on money and a primitive system based on payments with concrete products and services was of limited value in an analysis of a state involved in war. Ultimately, the early modern Swedish state needed products and services, not money for its imperial policy. The problem was how to get the relevant resources as cheaply as possible. The dynastic state, throughout its history, had in a flexible way experimented with various economic, administrative, and political solutions to the problem of how to mobilise such resources in the most convenient way. The reforms around 1540, as well as the reforms of Gustav II Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna 80 years later, were only two of several transformations to adjust to opportunities and urgent demands. Money had been more used than Heckscher believed, but access to money was of limited importance compared to access to essential resources for war at low cost.'® Oden mentioned Schumpeter's famous article from 1918 about the decline of the domain state and the rise of the tax state as an inspiration, but she cautioned the reader by underlining that Sweden had been rather much of a tax state since the 13th century. Actually, Oden's thinking was shaped by transaction cost analysis, although that concept was largely unknown, even among economists in the 1960s. It also placed the focus on the state as an innovative entrepreneur, which in a flexible way attempts to improve resource utilisation. The 16th-century Vasa kings believed that they could reduce transaction costs by eliminating various middlemen and transactions and, as far

Hallenberg 2001, 133-270. " Gustav Is administration of his inherited property as a part of the state: Ulf Soderberg, Gustav I:s arv och eget i Uppland: En godsmassas framvdxt, organisation och fdrvaltning, Stockholm, 1977. Oden 1966; Birgitta Oden, "Naturaskatter och finanspolitik—ett finansieUt dilemma", Scandia, 33, 1967, 1-19.

268

chapter

three

as possible, raising the normally cheap material and h u m a n resources available in the Swedish society to use for warfare. The kings not only organised military and naval forces but also organised the production of warships, weapons, and naval fittings as state enterprises. They also closely connected the conscription of soldiers and seamen to their fiscal administration, which had detailed information about the number of farms in each part of the country.'' 4.3.3

A navy in a functionally

organised state

Before the reforms in the 1620s, the navy (or the army) did not exist as an articulated organisation. Tlie Swedish state was one single organisation, with a central staff and a large number of local organisational units, which were supposed to handle civilian as well as military or naval tasks. Like many other parts of the state, the navy existed because the king wished to have it. Its size, structure, and readiness depended on the rulers' policy and ability to administrate the resources under his control. The fact that the monarchy became hereditary in 1544 strengthened the dynastic character of Swedish policy-making and administration, as information about resources was limited to the ruler and his personal staff. The king was ultimately the only individual who had the power and practical ability to channel resources f r o m the fiscal system to naval purposes. He was responsible for assuring that relevant resources (men, ships, guns, provisions, and competence) were available at the proper time and place for bringing an operational fleet to sea. He was also responsible for appointing men who administrated and commanded the navy. The central functions of the state were run by the Chancellery {Kansliet), which handled in- and out-letters, and the Treasury (Kammaren), which handled accounts and money. They also provided the king with a small staff of diplomatic, political, and financial expertise. The Chancellery and the Treasury were mainly run by educated commoners, who depended on the king as employer and patron. The aristocratic council had no control over them and often disliked the secretaries, who, especially under Erik XIV and Karl IX, in some cases appeared as powerful men close to the ruler. The local administration was run by bailiffs {fogdar) who were commoners or member of the

Glete 2002, 189-91.

SWEDISH NAVAL A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

269

lower nobility. They were normally dependent on the king for their careers, but they were men with sufficient authority to negotiate with the local communities about extra taxes and to use political judgement when they enforced decisions about taxes. Local military and naval administration was run by officers {hovitsmdn, skeppshdvitsmdn), speciahsts such as shipmasters and master gunners and civilian administrators {skrivare), who kept order on money, muster rolls, provisions, weapons, and equipment for ships and rendered account of that to the Treasury." The four main administrative parts of the armed forces were the cavalry (organised in fanor), the infantry (organised in fdnikor), the gunners (bdsseskyttar), and the seamen (batsman). Of these, only the cavalry did not serve at sea. It is seldom possible to determine which men of the infantry served on ships, because soldiers were paid through the administrative unit {fdnika) they served in and not by the naval paymasters.*" The main material assets of the armed forces were warships, guns, and fortified castles. The guns could be used on ships and fortresses, by field armies, and in siege operations. The main part of the royal ordnance (arkliet) was intended for the navy, but no separate accounts were kept for naval artillery, except when the guns actually were mounted on ships.''' Operational naval forces were created by combining warships, guns and gunners, seamen, and infantry into

The classic study of Swedish central administration f r o m 1523 to 1634: Nils Eden, Om centralregeringens organisation under den aldre Vasatiden (1523-1594), Uppsala,' 1899; Nils Eden, "Den svenska riksstyrelsens organisation, 1594-1602", HT, 21, 1901, 191-226; Nils Eden, Den svenska centralregeringens utveckling till kollegial organisation I borjan af sjuttonde arhundradet (1602-1634), Uppsala, 1902. The structure of the 16th-century Swedish administration: Birgitta Oden, Rikets uppbord och utgift: Statsfinanser och finansfdrvaltning under senare 1500-talet, Lund, 1955. The local administration: Hallenberg 2001. The state, the bailiffs and the peasants: Osterberg 1971. The Treasury: Kammarkollegiets historia, Stockholm, 1941 (the period 15391718 by Nils Eden, 1-194). The Chancellery: Ivan Svalenius, Rikskansliet i Sverige, 1560-1592, Stockholm, 1991. The army: Birger Steckzen, Krigskollegii historia, I, 16301697, Stockholm, 1930, 1-18. •" The army until a r o u n d 1618: Sveriges krig, I, 60-111. The m a i n account series for the mfantry a n d the cavalry are Militierakenskaper, KrA, supplemented by Strodda mihtiehandlingar fore 1631, 1. Handlingar angaende armen, RA. The m a i n account series for the artillery is Arklirakningar, KrA, supplemented by Strodda mihtiehandlingar fore 1631, 1. Handlingar angaende armen, series D, RA. Account of wages to seamen, shipwrights and other personnel at the shipyards are in Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA, but also in Rantekammarbocker, Loningsregister a n d Landskapshandlinear RA and Fogderakenskaper, ERA, " Yearly accounts of o r d n a n c e on ships are in Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA.

270

chapter

three

combat units. Provisions to the armed forces came f r o m the provision depots {provianthus), where local taxes raised in kind were stored. Food was also fetched by ships directly from the local bailiffs."'^ Ships were built, maintained, and fitted out for operational service at the king's shipyards (skeppsgdrdar), usually connected with a royal castle, which also served as an ordnance depot. Hie commander {slottsfogde or stdthdllare) and administrators of such castles also had responsibility for naval forces. Men in charge of the castle in Stockholm were deeply involved in naval administration because the main naval base was located at this castle, although the Stocldiolm shipyard appears as a separate administrative unit with its own accounts already in the 1520s. Some other shipyards at castles have separate accounts f r o m the 1560s. However, until around 1620, local naval forces were usually administrated from the castle, and accounts of shipbuilding, repair, payment, provisions, and guns are frequently integrated with the accounts of the local administration. From the 1560s, several countryside shipbuilding yards were administrated by a sea officer {skeppshdvitsman), a master (skeppare), or the local bailiff, who reported to the Treasury about how resources were used.''"' For individual ships, the master (skeppare) was the key administrative person. He normally served several years on the same ship, both when it was laid up and when it served at sea, and his name usually appears in accounts connected with ships. Hie preserved accounts are not written by the masters, however, who may have had rather rudimentary Imowledge of accounts or even of how to read and write. Instead, they are kept by skrivare (literally: writers) who delivered ship's gears to the masters of the ships and held them accountable for how it was used."*' Every master had a small caretaker crew for his ship when it was laid up, and he was responsible for its sails, rig, cables, anchors, and other equipment. He must also have been responsible

The navy's provision accounts are divided between Skeppsgardshandlingar and Proviantrakenskaper, RA. Ships also received provisions f r o m castles and local bailiffs, transactions recorded in Landskapshandlingar, RA. Accounts f r o m shipyards with separate administration are in Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA, while accounts f r o m yards integrated with the local administration are in Landskapshandlingar, RA and Fogderakenskaper, FRA. Accounts of wages paid to the shipyard personnel are also sometimes in R a n t e k a m m a r b o c k e r and Loningsregister, RA. This division is not strict however. Tliere are for example m a n y naval accounts f r o m Kalmar in both Landskapshandlingar, Smaland and Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA. The navy's skrivare, Zettersten 1890, 242-43.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

271

for the daily maintenance of the ship (pumping, for example) and for reporting to the shipyard if the ship was in need of careening or repair, although this has left few traces in the sources. When the ship was commissioned, it was normally placed under the c o m m a n d of an officer who ultimately was responsible for it, but the master served under him at sea and did represent continuity in the administration of the ship. The ship's inventory of guns, ammunition, and equipment connected with the artillery were not part of the master's responsibility. Warships had not permanent inventories of ordnance until the late 17th century. When commissioned, ships were fitted with guns from the Stockholm ordnance depot {Stora Arkliet) or a local castle, and a master gunner {arklimastare) was appointed on each ship as responsible for the ordnance inventory and as leader of the ship's gunners. The king was the leader of the administration, and his letters (preserved in Riksregistraturet) give detailed instructions about naval questions to local administrators, admirals, and captains. Unfortunately, the bulk of the letters he received are lost, which gives a one-sided view of how the administration worked. The king's letters are a mixture of orders, enquiries, admonitions, and formal power of authority for individuals to raise men, collect resources for shipbuilding, or send ships to sea. There is no trace of a minister or secretary of the navy or a naval treasurer, and the king appears as the sole originator of naval policy. The aristocrats in the Council had little influence and apparently little interest in naval policy. Their opinions about various policy matters, not the least about how the state's resources should be administrated, are preserved in numerous written counsels to the king, but naval (or army) policy or administration is seldom mentioned in these, except in passing.''® It is obvious that many administrative questions must have been prepared by secretaries and treasury officials before the king issued orders. In the Treasury, certain officials who audited naval accounts must have developed experience of the administration of shipbuilding, timber, masts and spars, ironworks, hemp, sailcloth, tar, cables, anchors, guns, shots and gunpowder, recruitment and payment of shipwrights and seamen, and provisioning of ships and fleets. Royal letters

The Council's written advices on policy f r o m this period are printed in SRA. The few statements of importance about naval policy have been used in chapter 2. The Council and fiscal administration: Oden 1966, 386-410.

Til

chapter

three

and treasury papers about where various resources were and how they could be used, however, are not signed by those who may have prepared them, and continuity is difficult to prove. Civilian administrators at the Stockholm shipyard and the central ordnance depot {^tora Arkliet) at Stoclcholm in practice must have fulfilled many duties of central administrators, as most of the ships and their guns were there when they not were at sea. The Treasury and its officials were specialists in control of that the king's resources were used in a proper way and not embezzled or destroyed by carelessness. They were auditors, reporting what had happened, not administrators with authority to take decisions on their own about how resources should be channelled through the Vasa state machinery. The administration of a navy, an operational fleet, or a major warship requires long-term planning, decisions about when, how and where resources should be raised and used, and ability to coordinate different types of resources. The warships, their equipment, guns, munitions, men, and provisions must be available at the same place and at the same time, otherwise even the best administrative efforts of individual components of naval power are wasted. This requires a combination of personal authority to make other m e n obey orders and entrepreneurial ability to find and combine various resources with a proper timing. The king was the ultimate source of this authority, and Gustav I and Erik XIV appear as determined chief administrators of their navy. Naturally they could not do everything themselves. A key function in the naval administration, especially up to the early 1570s, was the men in charge of the Stockholm castle, where most of the ships normally were laid up when not in service.^^ They were usually noblemen and experienced military, naval, and administrative leaders, and because Stockholm and the castle were a nexus for the flow of resources controlled by the state, they could use their authority to direct them to the navy. They were often given orders to lead and coordinate the administrative tasks at the navy's main shipyard and the mobilisation

The structure of central naval administration and biographical information is mainly based on Zettersten 1890, 4 - 3 3 , 234-41; Eden 1899, 251-57; Wendt 1950, 1-17. The main correspondence series for naval administration is Riksregistraturet, RA (for 1521-60 printed in GR). I have m a d e m u c h use of M A Dan Johansson's extracts f r o m Riksregistraturet for the period 1561-1630. The reflections about naval administration and political loyalty are my ovifn.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

273

of active fleets when the king was absent. Their authority might even include the appointment of officers to warships when they were commissioned."'® In the period 1559-70, when a large fleet was in commission every year, the detailed supervision and coordination to ensure that the ships were properly equipped, refitted, armed, manned, led, and provisioned must have been exercised by its admirals and officers (skeppshdvitsmdn). The almost total absence of correspondence and administrative papers signed by these men make this difficult to prove, but the number of sea officers drastically increased in these years, while the number of civilian clerks (skrivare) was rather constant. At least some new sea officers had experience f r o m the local administration and knew how to handle material resources, men, and accounts. At his accession to the throne in 1568, Johan III appointed Klas Eriksson Fleming as the most senior admiral [oversteamiral or riksamiral),*'^ a position he retained until his death in 1597. Fleming was an aristocrat and a member of the Council but also a firm supporter of Johan and, later, Sigismund in their conflicts with both aristocrats and Duke Karl. He usually lived in Finland, where he was the largest landowner, but because the war efforts in this period were directed against Russia, he was close to the operational fleet and its requirements: food and maintenance. From 1591, Fleming was commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the war against Russia, and he also held the office of riksmarsk (Lord High Constable), the head of the army. As oversteamiral, Fleming commanded the main fleet against Denmark and Liibeck in 1570. He also commanded fleets that participated in the conquest of Narva in 1581, brought Sigismund to his Polish kingdom in 1587, to Sweden in 1593, and back to Poland in 1594. He only sporadically exercised the routine administrative leadership of the navy, mainly in the early 1580s.='' The absence of administrative coordination had been felt soon after the great fleet, which had fought the Nordic Seven Years War, was decommissioned in 1570. Practically all sea officers were assigned to

The role of the c o m m a n d e r in Stockholm is discussed by Ingvar Sjoblom in his unpublished studies of 16th century Swedish sea officers. The exact title of this and others charges in this chapter varied in c o n t e m p o r a r y texts. Titles, which appear to have been the m o s t c o m m o n are used in a modernised Swedish spelling. Riksamiral in 16th and early 17th Swedish was usually written as Riksens amiral. ™ SBL 16, biography of Klas Eriksson Fleming by Berndt Federley.

274

chapter

three

Other tasks or to the active fleet in the Gulf of Finland. From 1571, the old admiral Jakob Bagge was intended to fill this vacuum v^hen he served as one of the joint commanders of the Stocldiolm castle, but his health soon declined. In 1573, the king appointed a deputy admiral {underamiral) to Fleming, originally as coordinator of his large shipbuilding program at several shipyards (chapter 5), but from 1575 as general supervisor of the navy; men, ship, and equipment. The first deputy admiral was Henrik Arvedsson, an experienced naval commander who also commanded the operational fleet in the Gulf of Finland during most summer campaigns. It is probably no coincidence that it is from 1573 that the accounts and inventories of rigs, cables, and equipment of all ships in the navy begin to appear in a more systematic way in yearly lists of the ships (Skeppsrullan).^^ These papers, however, were prepared by the Treasury, and the names of the deputy admirals appear nowhere. After Arvedsson's death in 1578, the office was temporarily given to the sea officer (skeppshovitsman) Bengt Soffringsson, but he was soon sent to Finland to command and administrate the operational fleet against Russia. He also supervised shipbuilding in Finland and was a leading naval administrators until he was appointed Master of Ordnance in 1591.'^ From 1580 to 1583 (or early 1584), the oversteamiral Klas Fleming personally administrated the navy. From 1584, the administration was again assigned to a deputy admiral, who also in practice administrated the shipyard in Stockholm. Johan Bagge, son of Admiral Jakob Bagge, served in this office from 1584 to 1594. It is possible that Duke Karl dismissed him because he was too loyal to King Sigismund. Bengt Larsson, who was loyal to the duke, succeeded Bagge in 1595. Johan Bagge's absence may in the following years have given the duke better opportunities to control the warships in Stockholm. After Johan Ill's death in late 1592, naval administration and control of the warships became involved in a political conflict, which continued until the full-scale civil war in 1597-99. The new king, Sigismund, was in Poland; Klas Fleming was in Finland as commander-in-chief in

U p to 1594, this series is preserved in Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA, a n d f o r m s the best c o n t e m p o r a r y yearly survey of the navy's ships for the entire period u n d e r study (1521-1721). The guns, a m m u n i t i o n , and e q u i p m e n t issued by the o r d n a n c e to the warships h a d been systematically surveyed in yearly inventories since the early 1560s. Most of these are in Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA and a few in Arklirakningar, KrA. " See for example SH 39:10, 40:11, 46:3 and 47:6, RA.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

275

the war against Russia with part of the fleet; and Duke Karl assumed control over the naval forces in the western part of the realm. Karl repeatedly demanded that Fleming should place all warships under the duke's control and send back as many as possible to Stocldiolm. Fleming ignored this and only obeyed orders f r o m Sigismund. Fleming administrated the king's naval forces in Finland without leaving any accounts to the central administration," while Karl tried to induce the admiral's seamen to bring ships f r o m Finland to Stockholm in defiance of his orders. In April 1595, Karl ordered Axel Ryning as commander of the Stocldiolm castle to find out what Fleming wrote to the naval personnel at Stockliolm and to prevent Fleming from gaining control over more ships and bringing them to Finland." Ultimately, the conflict about control of Sweden's warships was not between Karl and Fleming. It was part of the power struggle within the dynasty, where control of the sea between Sweden and Poland was important. Sigismund had no Polish navy, and without ships under his control, the king was dependent on the administrative structures in Sweden if he wanted to travel safely between his two countries. Karl's and Fleming's administrative struggle over ships already in 1593 was actually about Sigismund's practical access to Sweden and his ability to move resources between his two kingdoms. Sigismund could not simply order Swedish warships to sail to him in Poland. He knew from

" This is shown in the yearly prepared Ship Roll (Skeppsrullan), where one warship after another disappear with the note that it is in Finland, controlled by Klas Fleming, SH 48-51, RA. Examples of the power struggle over ships in Duke Karl's out-letters (HKR): in 1593, 19/3, 7/4, 15/6 (Duke Karl orders seamen in Finland to disobey Klas Fleming and bring ships to Sweden), 15/6 (order to Fleming to sail to Stockliolm), 13/8 (instruction to bring shipwrights f r o m Finland to the shipbuildings in Sweden when Fleming has sailed to Poland and cannot block their transfer); 1594, 14/6 (Karl accuses Fleming of misconduct of the navy), 17/8 (Karl suggests to the Council that Fleming should not be allowed to control the navy), 10/9 a n d 21/9 (Karl d e m a n d s that Fleming should send the ship he have in Finland to Stockliolm); 1595, 6/4 (order to Axel Ryning to control communication between the Stockholm shipyard and Fleming), 22/5 (Bengt Larsson appointed underamiraT), 26/5 (order to Klas Fleming to send ships to Stockholm); 1596, 3/1 (ship u n d e r construction in Alvsborg to be taken over by the duke in exchange for his loans to the crown), 12/5 (the duke cancels an order f r o m Fleming that ships in Stocldiolm should be transferred to Finland and order that those who reportedly fiave transmitted it should be arrested), 8/7 (warning f r o m D u k e Karl that the crown's ships should be on guard against Fleming's ships who m a y capture them at sea), 2/8 (a ship built at Alvsborg should not sail to Danzig if ordered there by the king); 1597, 6/7, 16/7 (order to sequester ships in Alvsborg owned by aristocrats loyal to Sigismund and to place the crown's ship under Duke Karl's control), all RA.

276

chapter

three

the negotiations in 1587, when a future personal union was discussed, that the Council was apprehensive about transfers of Swedish resources to Polish control. The aristocrats and Karl could easily turn the Estates against him by accusing him of removing warships and guns paid for by Swedish taxpayer to a foreign country. To place ships under the dverstemiral Fleming's control in Finland was constitutional, and in the rules of government (regeringsform) which Sigismund issued in 1594, he explicitly mentioned that the main shipyard might be located in Stockliolm or Finland and that it should be placed under Fleming's control.®' The Council in 1594 was working for a radical reform of the Swedish administration, with permanent officials administrating various parts of the state. The aristocrats were tired of a situation where they were supposed to advise the king but had little influence over how decisions were implemented, especially because they had to rely on the king's administration when they served as military commanders. For the navy, they asked that it should be placed under the effective control of an admiral (a member of the Council), supported by a permanent deputy admiral. Their main motive was to give the aristocrats in the Council direct control of state administration, limiting the power of both the king and the duke and m e n mainly loyal to them. They expressed their deep distrust in Klas Fleming and asked for his dismissal, but they also intended to put limits on the duke's arbitrary administration of resources by creating a firm structure of civil and military administrators. This time the aristocrats' reform ideas were ignored by the Vasas, but they foreshadowed the reform period from 1612 to 1634.5® During Duke Karl's open rebellion against King Sigismund from 1597 to 1599, his naval forces were led by the Pomeranian nobleman Joakim Scheel, who for several years had been a Swedish sea officer. Tlie archival records are incomplete, but it seems evident that it primarily was the duke who led and administrated the great shipbuilding program around Sweden in these years. He worked hard to bring the royal warships under his control, to build new ships with resources under his administrative control, and to find men and provisions to

^^ The negotiations in 1587: Kerstin Stromberg-Back, Kalmare stadgar 1587, Umea, 1989. Sigismund's proposal to rules of government 30/4 1594, SRA, 1:3, 469. Sigismund's rules of government, July 1594, SRA, 1:3, 482. The Council's proposal 1594, SRA, 1:3, 453-62.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

302

send them to sea. The duke's letters give a strong impression that he did much of the planning and administrative tasks on his own, assisted by Scheel" and members of the administration who chose to be loyal to him. His illegitimate son Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm (1574-1650) served in the navy and for a brief time as administrator at Stockholm shipyard before he was transferred to the army in Livonia in 1600. This improvised administration showed an impressive result in terms of ships built and sent to sea, and Karl may have felt that the traditional administrative forms worked and that no reforms were necessary. The success was achieved when he was at the zenith of his personal capacity, however: in good health, determined to win a civil war, and with three decades of personal experience as administrator of a dukedom with a considerable fleet of his own. Joakim Scheel in 1601 was given the title Sveriges rikes amiral (Admiral of the Swedish Realm), which reflects his real authority and the duke's confidence in him. Scheel was of foreign origin, however, and could not legally be given the position of riksamiral when the duke reconstituted the aristocratic Council in 1602 and assigned permanent offices to some of its members. That title was given to Axel Ryning (1552-1620), who for decades had been in Duke Karl's service. He had not served in the navy but must have gained experience of naval administration when he was in charge of the castle in Stockholm in the 1590s and kept the ships away f r o m Fleming. Ryning was given other tasks too, and he only intermittently administrated the navy.'® From 1600, an administrating admiral was appointed with the responsibility to supervise the Stocldiolm shipyard, f r o m 1606 called holmamiral. The title meant that he was in c o m m a n d of the naval base Holmen, a short name for Skeppsholmen. A yard captain {gdrdskapten) was permanently assigned to the shipyard to assist the holmamiral. The office of gdrdskapten replaced the senior master {overskeppare), who had been in charge of the daily administration of the Stocldholm yard since the 1520s.

" Especially the survey of the ships of the navy written by Scheel in G e r m a n in spring 1599, undated letter, M 1848, RA. Scheel took control of the ships in Stockliolm in June 1598, but it is uncertain h o w they were m a n n e d , provisioned and sent to sea and the loyalties of the officers and m e n are little k n o w n . SBL 31, biography of Axel Ryning by Bjorn Asker. H i e limited importance of the office riksamiral and the uncertain dating of Ryning's a p p o i n t m e n t , Eden 1901, 207-21.

278

chapter

three

In the first decade of the 17th century, the turnover of men employed as administrating admirals was rapid. The experienced but elderly Joakim Scheel (1531-1606) temporarily held the office twice between 1603 and 1605, which shows that Karl desperately lacked a suitable administrating officer. Stocldiolm also was not the dominating centre of naval administration it had been up to the 1590s. Many ships were permanently based at Nykoping, Kalmar, and Alvsborg, and several admirals were appointed to command various fleets and squadrons.^' Continuity in high command was low, and it is difficult to identify any firm administrative coordination of the navy as a whole in this period. The ruler sent streams of letters about details of naval administration to local authorities. Timber for shipbuilding should be cut and transported during winters, ships should be built at several places at the same time, bread and beer should be produced for the navy at various royal manors, a merchant in royal service should be sent to buy various naval stores. It is doubtful if the short-term admirals or any administrator (or the king) had a firm grasp of how all these details should be coordinated or where bottlenecks existed. The administrators involved usually had other tasks as well. It is unlikely that they always gave the navy the highest priority when resources were scarce and the ruler overwhelmed them with the demands of his wars. The individuals appointed as dversteamiral/riksamiral, underamiral, and holmamiral had no administrative staff connected to the office, and they left no written records. They were supposed to supervise naval administrators and officers with the help of the king's Treasury and Chancellery, but as far as it is known, no secretary or Treasury official was ever formally appointed to serve them. They were not given a naval budget, defining which resources they might control and take responsibility for, and there are no traces of formal reports of the results they achieved, except the Treasury's normal auditing of naval accounts. The administrative centralisation to the ruler had a political origin. The dynasty had established the navy as an instrument of their power, and the civil war in the 1590s had been a traumatic clash between many aristocratic families and Karl. Several members of the Council were executed, others fled to Sigismund in Poland, and Karl was deeply suspicious of most aristocrats. His experience convinced him that administrative control of ships meant power over communi-

'' Zettersten

1890, 52-60, 76-79, 446-68.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

279

cations and transportation of resources, and he was well aware of how handicapped Sigismund had been when he must delegate authority over administration. Hie administrative process was increasingly choked, however, by the ageing ruler's attempt to control hundreds of small administrative and military units with a central staff but with few senior officer and bureaucrats in intermediate positions. The navy was far from ready for a total mobilisation when Denmark attacked in 1611, and the administrative problems were not solved even in 1612. W h o was responsible for this fiasco? After Karl's death in 1611, no individual was charged with that responsibility. The formal head of the navy, the riksamiral Axel Ryning, was given the more prestigious title of riksmarsk (constable), and his deputy admiral since 1610, Goran Gyllenstierna, a cousin to the new chancellor (rikskansler) Axel Oxenstierna, was appointed his successor. The absence of scapegoats is conspicuous and reflects the fact that both Gustav II Adolf and the Council were well aware of that Karl IX had kept too many administrative threads in his own hands. It was his inability to control everything in his last years of growing illness that was the problem. One of Gustav Adolf's earliest decisions as king was to appoint new, young, and hopefully energetic leaders for his crisis-stricken navy. In early 1612, Goran Gyllenstierna became riksamiral, and his brotherin-law Hans Bielkenstierna became his deputy as riksviceamiral. The latter's brother. Nils Bielkenstierna, had been appointed holmamiral in November 1611. All three were experienced sea officers but they were also connected with each other with family ties. This was typical for the new Swedish regime, in which a small number of aristocratic families, usually related to each other, ran the central administration. Ryning and Gyllenstierna belonged, together with Axel Oxenstierna, to a family constellation with a strong position in the Council. In the appointments of offices of 1612 they were given three of the five high offices of the state: constable, chancellor, and admiral. The Bielkenstierna brothers were not aristocrats, but they were nephews to Axel Ryning, and Hans Bielkenstierna's wife was Goran Gyllenstierna's sister.®" Together the three senior admirals formed an embryo of a permanent administrative admiralty, although it was reduced to two members

" SBL 4, Bielkenstierna; SBL 17, Gyllenstierna; Gustaf Elgenstierna, Svenska dttartavlor. Aristocratic family groups: Agren 1976.

adelns

280

chapter

three

in 1615 when Hans Bielkenstierna took over his brother's office as holmamiral. The administrative tasks connected with that office were reduced in February 1615 when the king began a new pohcy: administration through contracts with private entrepreneurs. Tlie Scottishborn sea officer Rickard Clerck was given a contract to provide the ships with sails, rigs, cables, and flags for a fixed yearly sum of money. It was one of the first contracts of its kind in the Swedish state and represented a new concept: the king refrained from administration of material resources and instead paid a fixed sum for a service defined in a business agreement."^' 4.3.4

Shipbuilding

and resource

extraction

Stocldiolm held an undisputed position as the navy's administrative centre. It was also the centre for the king's artillery, which to a large extent was intended for the navy. These two branches of the king's administration were located together. From a modest origin in the 1520s inside and on the quay outside the medieval castle, the naval and the ordnance establishments had one century later grown over a large area across the water (Strommen) north and east of the castle. This was with a wide margin Sweden's largest industrial complex of this age, with berths for ships, forges, ropewalks (at present-day Stureplan), workshops for sailmakers, carpenters, bloclcmakers {svarvare), painters, sculptors, and makers of gun carriages and loading gears for guns. There was a gun foundry for copper guns (at present-day Gustav Adolfs Torg), a water-powered machine for boring gun barrels, along with a bakery, a brewery, flour mills, and store-houses for provisions and equipment for ships. Personnel employed at the yard, the ordnance, and in the navy often lived around these establishments in the northern suburbs of Stockholm, Norre Forstaden, and Ladugardslandet, the southern parts of present-day Norrmalm and Ostermalm. From the 1540s, the navy began to use the island Kapplingeholmen (present-day Blasieholmen), northeast of the castle. It became known as Skeppsholmen (the ships' island), and it gradually became the naval centre where warships were built, repaired, and laid up. Fortunately for the navy, the waters in

RR 17/2, 23/2 1615. Administration through contracts with private entrepreneurs: Mats Hallenberg, Statsmakt till salu. Arrendesystemet och privatiseringen av skatteuppbdrden i det svenska riket, 1620-1635, Lund, 2008.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

281

central Stockholm are deep, and it was easy to moor even the largest ships close to land.®^ Stockholm was only one of several places in which the early Vasa state administrated naval activities, however. There were yards {skeppsgardar) at the castles of Alvsborg, Kalmar, Abo, and Viborg, and also at Helsingfors, where there was no castle. These towns were for geostrategic reasons operational bases for the navy, and the personnel on the yards could build ships when they were not employed with repair work. But the king also built ships, even very large ships, at several other places around the coasts and in Lake Malaren. In fact, the Stockholm shipyard practically ceased to operate as a new construction yard after the death of Gustav I in 1560. The yard was the technical centre of naval shipbuilding, which often supplied other yards with expertise and special equipment, but nearly all hulls were built somewhere else, and often sent to Stockholm for completion. Decentralised shipbuilding was characteristic for the period up to the 1610s after which the system was radically changed. Earlier literature has observed this decentralisation but has not explained it.®^ Gustav I built all his major carvel-hulled warships and galleys at Stocldiolm, while minor warships often were built at the smaller shipyards connected with castles. The large royal merchantmen, which normally were built with traditional clinker hull technology, were all built outside Stockholm.®" This indicates that the skills to build large carvel-hulled warships and Mediterranean-style galleys were scarce and concentrated in Stocldiolm, while traditional Baltic

ttere is little published research about the Stockholm naval yard. Carl Olof Cederlund, Stockholms skeppsgdrd, 1605-1640: Personalens struktur och ormnisatwn Stoclcholni, 1966 (mimeo) is a study of the personnel. MA D a n Johansson, Stockholm University, is working with a study of the yard up to a r o u n d 1630 A survey, with emphasis on biographies: Zettersten 1890, 222-66. The earliest use of , ®PP''"g®'^°'™^"/Skeppsholmen for the navy: Nils G. Wollin, Skeppsholmen under iOO anSkeppsholmens, Kastdlholmens och Galdrvarvets bebyggelsehistoria, Stockholm, iy71, 9-12. The o r d n a n c e at Stockholm: Hedberg 1975, 233-38, 308-11. An inventory neui" shipyard 12/1 1621, w h e n the yard was t u r n e d over to entrepre" The first systematic study of these local yards is in Zettersten 1890 266-322 It remains important about the location of the yards, but the information about n u m b e r and names of ships built at the yards are often erroneous, mainly because the n a m e s ot the ships seldom appear in the local sources. Halldin 1963, 5 7 - 6 5 presents a new survey ot the yards with some i m p r o v e m e n t s but the information about ships built at them IS again frequently inaccurate. '' Glete 1977.

282

chapter

three

technology was available around the country. From 1556, a series warships was built at Abo {Hoken, Falken, Svanen, Bjornen), where Prince Johan (III) resided as Duke of Finland until 1563. This yard was used to build major warships until 1567. The period of Erik (XIV) in Kalmar as Duke of Smaland (1558-60) coincided with a period during which large warships began to be built in that province, first at Bjorkenas (the two famous fleet flagships St Erik and Mars, 1558-63), then at Vastervik from 1561 to 1567 {St Christopher, Tantheijen and the huge Neptunus/Draken). W h e n the main fleet, and often also Erik XIV, was at Alvsborg, in the early 1560s, two major warships were laid down there. Erik was motivated to do this by the fact that a large number of his seamen were at Alvsborg during the winter 1561-62 and could be usefully employed with shipbuilding and (presumably) timber acquisition.'^' Lack of labour probably made it impossible to build several large ships at Stockholm at the same time, and the great ships built in Smaland may be explained by the fact that this province was unusually rich in oak. Finland was poor in oak but had a good local supply of skilled carpenters, who were much in demand for shipbuilding for the navy. The sequence of events in 1556-62, however, indicates that the spread of administrative resources connected with Johan and Erik and their ducal courts, as well as the main fleet's temporary location on the west coast were decisive for where ships were built. Both dukes were determined to have major ships and shipyards of their own, a behaviour later repeated by their younger brother Karl, as Duke of Sodermanland. The great shipbuilding program of the 1570s represented a new departure, which cannot be explained by the fact that administrative management determined the location of the yards. From 1573 to 1578, six major warships were built at six places, all except one of which (Vastervik) were countryside yards at a distance f r o m towns or royal castles (Kalvo,®'' Haliko, Harbovik, Haringe, and Alvkarleby). From the late 1570s and for the next decade, eight more major ships were built at seven different yards, all except one (at Alvsborg) in the countryside or at very small towns (near the future town of Harnosand

RR 16/11 1561, RA. Kalvo, in the Sjundea parish in Finland, was near Klas Fleming's home, and the oversteamiral was given the task of supervising it, Zettersten 1890, 317-18.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

283

in Angermanlaiid, Rogstad in Halsingland, Raumo, Bjorneborg, Alvkarleby, Drakenas/Monsteras). Some of these yards and other local yards also built smaller warships. Around 25 galleys were added from 1583 to 1590, built at about 20 different yards which frequently also built small craft (lodjor). In this period, Duke Karl built his own ships in his dukedom. Many were built at Nykoping, his administrative centre, but also at the town Strangnas and at the Gripsholm castle in Lake Malaren. This lake could be used because even large ships built there could be transferred to the open sea at Stoclcholm, and the region had a good supply of oak. The decentralised shipbuilding continued in the 1590s, when several more yards were founded. Some ships were built in Finland where Klas Fleming led the administration, and most of them were under Sigismund's control until 1599-1600, when Duke Karl conquered Finland and Estonia where the ships were. In the western part of the realm, major warships were built at Monsteras (Drakenas) and Vastervik in Smaland, at Alvsborg, at Stockholm, at Haringe in Sodermanland,''^ at Bergshammar and Avkarleby in Uppland, on the Aland islands, at Gavle, Hudiksvall, and Iggesund in northern Sweden, at the duke's yard in Nykoping, and at several yards in Lake Malaren: Kungsor, Skokloster, and Aspo (Strangnas). These ships came under the control of Duke Karl before the civil war was decided in 1598-99, and most or all of them were built at his initiative in regions where he had control of the local administration. In Smaland, where that control was doubtful, shipbuilding in 1595 was brought under control of Joakim Scheel, the duke's future naval commander.'^® The period 1599-1615 saw the culmination of this decentralised shipbuilding system. A large number of warships was built at several yards in Lake Malaren, at Alvsborg in the west, in Smaland, Ostergotland, Sodermanland, Uppland, and Aland, while many minor yards in Norrland and Finland were used for the construction of unarmed transports, pramar and lodjor, which probably normally were built of fir. Shipbuilding was spread around all coastal parts of Sweden. Some

" The ship built at Haringe cannot be identified with a name. It is probably one of the ships which appear in 1598-99 with n o k n o w n place of building, HKR 30/11, 4/12 1597, RA. ® Correspondence about administration of shipbuilding in Sweden 1593-98 (except Finland) is f o u n d in abundance in D u k e Karl's out-letters: HKR, RA; authorisation of loakim Scheel's control of shipbuilding: HKR 4/3 1595, RA.

284

chapter

three

ships were built at small towns or at royal manors, others at temporary yards on the countryside. From 1616/17, this system disappeared and naval shipbuilding was concentrated in a few places. The only exception was lodjor, which continued to be built locally, used for transportation of seamen between their homes and Stoclcholm. Decentralised shipbuilding at several local yards re-appeared at times when Sweden urgently required a large number of oared warships (1713-14, 172021, 1748-49, 1789-90, 1808-09), but these were built at private yards as a mobilisation of civilian shipbuilding capacity in emergencies. The decentralised shipbuilding up to 1617 had, with only one known exception (a ship built on contract at Iggesund in the late 1590s) nothing to do with utilisation of private shipbuilding competence or with any emergency mobilisation of resources. It was administrated by the Vasa state, it was continuous, and it required that scarce technical competence (master shipwrights and skilled shipwrights) was spread thin around the country. In an international perspective it was unusual, as decentraUsed building of warship normally indicates that private resources are used.® W h y was it used by a state, administrating its own resources? It seems evident that it must have had something to do with a deliberate policy of resource utilisation, but it is not obvious which resources were critical. Oak is a possible candidate, but several ships were built in northern Sweden and on the west coast of Finland, where no oak was available. Timber is not very difficult to transport once it is brought to the sea, and after 1617 the navy transported large amounts of oak to a few centralised yards. There were, however, two more local resources which could be used: food and labour. Swedish taxes were raised in kind rather than in money, and garder in food to the king's servants were politically easier to raise than monetary taxes. Farming is also a markedly seasonal occupation, and periodically the peasant society had a supply of unused labour, which might be used at low cost if the men were not required to move far f r o m their homes to find employment. Shipbuilding was labour-consuming, and the acquisition of timber required m u c h local labour. Peasants (farm-owners, their sons, or hired farm-hands) could cut local timber and transport it to the shipyards with the help of their draught animals in winters, when snow made such transport

There are however similarities with the royal organisation for shipbuilding in D e n m a r k - N o r w a y ; Bellamy 2006, 99-134.

swedish n a v a l administration

"

285

easier and when men and animals were not required for agriculture. Numerous letters f r o m the king show that timber normally was cut and transported during winters by local peasants/" They could also work at the yards with sawing and simpler kinds of shipwright works, typically between sowing and harvest. Taxes paid in food could also conveniently be used locally, provided that the crown had men to be fed working around the country. Shipbuilding was such an activity. The crown had already under Gustav f s rule used local labour in this way, normally by agreeing with peasants that they could pay their ordinary taxes by cutting and transporting timber and by working a specified number of days. It was normal in the Vasa state that local bailiffs agreed with peasants about how taxes should be paid, and if there was under-utilised labour in a region, both sides might profit from such tax negotiations. The state also frequently hired peasants as a low-paid temporary work force for various types of local activities, including shipbuilding. Erik XIV continued this policy, but it was during Johan Ill's time, when extra taxation became almost permanent, that it became c o m m o n for some peasants to pay their taxes by transporting timber to shipyards. From around 1600, it became more common to use paid local labour as addition to the work force at the shipyard.^' The decentralised but state-administrated shipbuilding system reflects one of the unusual features of the 16th-century Vasa state. It had concentrated much of its administrative resources on the local level of the society and administrated resource extraction on its own, rather than through local elites or tax-farmers as most European rulers did.'^ By the mid-16th century, local bailiffs with good knowledge of where resources might be found in the peasant society existed in all parts of Sweden, and this made it possible to administrate undertakings which otherwise would have to be done at the central level or contracted out to private groups in local society. As this local administration existed and must exist to uphold a strong state, it was possibly rational to give it additional tasks which might be handled with limited additional

™ The earliest is f r o m 22/11 1527, GR 4, 374, possibly for timber to be cut for the construction of Store Kravelen. It states that the peasant's taxes should be paid by work with timber. " Tliese are preliminary conclusions of M A D a n Johansson, Stockliolni University, who kindly has i n f o r m e d about them. '' Hallenberg 2001; Tilly 1990, 25.

286

chapter

three

costs. Erik XIV, Johan III, and Karl IX attempted to systematically use cheap resources by exploiting local labour in regions where the peasants had a surplus of labour to sell, either through tax-paying or as part-time work. The state acted as an entrepreneur looking for cheap resources for production. In the 16th century, there were few private entrepreneurs who could offer peasants alternative employment, for example timber-cutting, charcoal making, or tar burning for export or commercial shipbuilding. Peasants with special skills in carpentry, for example, could temporarily migrate to towns to earn incomes, but towns were few and small. Behind this Vasa shipbuilding policy was also the general policy for resource mobilisation and resource utilisation in the new fiscal-military state. Rulers believed that direct administrative control of material resources and labour meant lower transaction costs than if they first asked for taxes in money and then bought resources from their own taxpayers. The long period when the dynasty did not use private contractors might be a result of the fact that no private entrepreneurs of sufficient strength and imagination yet had appeared in Sweden. Sweden had an advantage in advanced local state administration, but a disadvantage in its lack of private entrepreneurs. Hie Vasa dynasty raised and organised both material resources and men in partially the same way as tax-farmers and mihtary entrepreneurs did for the states in other parts of Europe. It could do that with low transaction costs because the state used regal rights and political means of persuasion and because the fiscal administration accumulated much information about the resource base. The state also acted as a merchant in several products, both in Sweden and in foreign markets, where products raised as taxes were sold in exchange for other products which were useful for the armed forces. It is, of course, not certain that the Vasa rulers always were right in their calculation of transaction cost for different types of resource administration. The radical change after 1617 shows that Gustav II Adolf was convinced that a better alternative existed. The cost of the decentralised shipbuilding system may partly have been hidden in quality problems and lagging technical development. Many local yards did not build ships continuously. This made it difficult to create stable forces of skilled men and take advantage of the economy of series production, which had existed at Stockholm up to the early 1560s. Warships built in the decentralised system had, on average, shorter lives than earlier and later ships, and in Johan Ill's time shipbuilding

swedish n a v a l administration

"

287

was also slow. In that respect, the small yards worked markedly better from the 1590s, possibly because a larger part of the labour force was paid with wages. From the early 1600s, the bottleneck was rather the Stocldiolm yard, where unfinished and unrigged ships from local yards sometimes lay for several years. The technical stagnation of Swedish naval shipbuilding after 1570 had more than one cause, but the lack of a centre where new construction, policy, and operational experience could meet might have been one of them. 4.4

4.4.1

Royal power, aristocratic administrators, contractors, 1618-1680

and private

Governance through hierarchy, divisions, and budgets

Rising fiscal-military organisations were often regarded as competitors by traditional power-holders, in early modern Europe normally the aristocracy. If aristocrats with power and prestige in the local societies mobilised resistance against them, the innovations might fail or might not even be attempted by the rulers. As a navy is more dependent on centralised resources than an army, it is also more vulnerable to such resistance. If traditional elite groups were offered opportunities to share in the power of the fiscal-military organisation, obstacles to state formation could be reduced. Fiscal-military organisations could be substantially strengthened if such elite groups used their prestige and networks in local society to support them rather than to resist them. The early Vasa state and its navy hardly suffered f r o m active resistance from the aristocracy after 1529. The aristocracy had been weakened by earlier power struggles, and Gustav I could rely on his family relations with some aristocrats w h o m he also favoured. Another reason why the aristocrats allowed the dynastic state to grow was that they would have been isolated if they had tried to resist. The lower, and rather poor, nobility usually saw the new state as valuable because it provided regular incomes and social status to those who served the king. But the aristocrats were passive observers rather than active supporters of the state, and by the late 16th century, several members of the Council were dissatisfied with how policy-making and administration were handled by the rulers and their lowborn servants. They felt especially hurt if they, as senior military commanders, became scapegoats for failures, which might be the result of administrative

288

chapter

four

inadequacies. That problem had been acute in the crisis between Johan III and the Council in 1589-92, but Karl IX almost habitually blamed subordinates of all social groups for military and administrative failures/' The aristocrats understood that the key to power was in the administration of resources. They were increasingly eager to participate in it, just as their ancestors had administrated regional Idn in the late medieval period. They did not, however, wish to return to a decentralised state. The Vasas had convinced them of the superiority of centralisation, permanent armed forces, and a monopoly of violence controlled f r o m above. The Swedish aristocrats were not interested in a German, Polish, or even Danish solution in which the aristocrats tried to limit the power of the state. They wished to run a powerful state themselves, and impose constitutional rules on the kings. During the civil war 1597-99, this had led to a catastrophe and a frontal clash with Duke Karl, who executed a number of aristocrats in 1600 and forced others to flee to Sigismund in Poland. Karl's rule was a classic example of management by fear, and it required a ruthless personality to uphold it. The accession to the throne of Karl's son Gustav II Adolf (r. 1611-32) and the rise of a new generation of aristocrats made it possible to make a fresh start. Axel Oxenstierna became the chief architect of a new administrative structure, and the king became a successful developer of new dynamic leadership. He preferred delegation of authority, combined with hierarchical control and positive incentives (promotion, social rise) to subordinates. It began in 1611-12, under the cloud of defeats against Denmark and undecided wars with Russia and Poland, when the crown could not afford a long political crisis. The nobility demanded and got concessions: a monopoly on senior offices in the administration, a commitment that the rule of law should be better observed by the state in its relations to individuals (especially the nobility and its privileges), and a promise f r o m the king not to start offensive wars and raise extra taxes without consulting the Council and the Parliament. It soon became obvious that the constitutional restraints on the king also could be used to legitimise an unusually ambitious royal policy. Gustav Adolf showed that privileges were given in exchange for duties, and he demanded hard work in exchange for rewards. The aristocracy

Oden 1966, 401-10.

swedish n a v a l administration

289

and the Parliament became co-responsible for the wars they authorised and had few excuses for not doing their utmost for supporting the state. Gustav Adolf turned out to be a political master in making offensive wars look like the inevitable outcome of a prudent and defensive policy. He also soon showed great ability as a military reorganiser and innovator, and he made offensive warfare work. The result was that he gained authority to increase the armed forces and give the whole state a new organisation, optimised for offensive warfare. Large territories were conquered, and the aristocrats were rewarded with the spoils of war and with increased international reputation. Tliis eliminated them as potential leaders of an opposition against a strong state. It was a second Vasa success in innovative political and military entrepreneurship, almost a century after the foundation of the fiscal-military state. Organisational reforms, formalised in the constitution of 1634, reshaped the administration and the armed forces. Local administration was brought under control of civilian provincial governors [landshovdingar), who supervised tax-collection, transmitted information of the official policy, and represented the king in negotiations with local society about the practical enforcement of resource extraction. The many company-sized army units (cavalry/anor and i n f a n t r y / a « ikor) were, from the late 1610s to the late 1620s, formed into permanent provincial regiments of a standardised structure. They got fixed regions of recruitment and a firm hierarchy of officers, headed by a colonel who was responsible for the regiment's training and performance.^"' Two permanent hierarchies were created, where the governors and colonels were the link between royal power and the state's activities in local society. The civilian and military administrations were kept strictly separate, and resources were not allowed to pass from the tax-raising part of the administration to the military forces without decisions and rules enforced from the central authorities. It was the classical Vasa policy of ruling a fiscal-military state which now was formalised, and it eliminated any practical possibility that powerful men should use armed force against the state. The hierarchies were also paths of professional careers, and the king and upper ranks in the

Provincial governors: Alexander Jonsson, De norrldndska landshdvdingarna och statsbildningen 1634-1769, Umea, 2005. Tlie regiments: Barkman 1931, and chapters on organisation in Sveriges trig. The army's central administration: Steckzen 1930.

290

chapter

four

hierarchies could control men by their power over promotion. The nobility was favoured but the number of positions to fill was far larger than the old nobility could provide for, so many commoners and immigrants got a career path upwards to the social elite. Eventually they were ennobled, and in a few decades they totally changed the composition of the Swedish nobility. Hie central administration was from 1618 to 1634 successively divided into five (later more) departments, each headed by a board {kollegium) led by members of the Council: the Chancellery, the Treasury, the Court of Appeal (Hovratten), the Army, and the Navy. Compared to the earlier functional organisation, the state got a divisional structure, with the aristocracy in a new role as the most senior bureaucrats. Each department was assigned resources for specific purposes according to a yearly budget {stat), it had its own administrative staff, and the members of the board were collectively responsible to see that the resources they received were used with efficiency. The boards took over the detailed administration earlier handled by the king, his secretaries, and treasury official, and they were supposed to take operational and administrative decisions on their own initiative to a higher degree than officials in the earlier functional system. The king retained control over policy-making through his right to decide about budgets, his control over the armed forces as commander-in-chief, and his power to appoint senior bureaucrats and officers. Much of the real power of the king still depended on his personal ability as political and military leader. The difference was that the efficiency of state was less dependent on the age, ability, health, or presence of the king. The new system proved successful in royal minorities and when the ruler was absent on military campaigns on the continent. This was an improvement over the previous system of personal administration, which had been in crisis when Erik XIV suffered a mental breakdown, when Sigismund was in Poland, and when the old Karl IX suffered from illness. Before Gustav Adolf, no ruler had been able to stay abroad for years on military campaigns and rely on the administration to work without his personal direction. This was especially relevant for the navy, the most complex of the state's organisations. The introduction of budgets went hand in hand with reforms in booldieeping and financial control of state activities. The accounts were kept no longer mainly in terms of material resources (food, weapons, equipment for ships, etc.) but in money. In principle, every-

swedish n a v a l administration

291

thing handled by the state administration was given a vahie expressed in money. This made it possible to give every board a yearly sum of money to use to the best of their ability. In practice, the transfer of resources (money, food, etc.) from the financial administration to the resource-consuming parts of the state was still a complicated propess. Every board was assigned a number of specific tax or custom incomes which were administrated by the Treasury, customs officers, or provincial governors. If these were delayed or smaller than expected (as they frequently were), the board ran into debts to its employees and contractors." In the early concept of the new state, Gustav Adolf had intended that the state should get rid of much of the detailed administration of resources by contracting out resource raising to tax-farmers and production to industrial entrepreneurs. The contractual system was introduced in a large scale from 1618 and gave the king and the aristocracy the organisational means to administrate the state without getting enmeshed in a lot of details. At the same time, it made use of the talents of the private entrepreneurs, often foreigners, who appeared in Sweden at this time. After a full-scale experiment which totally reshaped tax administration, the navy, and the war industry, much of the contractual system was abolished from 1628 to the mid-1630s.^® The transaction costs had not been reduced to the extent that it was worth to develop it. The state's role as an industrial entrepreneur, however, had been permanently reduced, in favour of private enterprises in shipbuilding, iron-making, and arms manufacturing. Some private enterprises became large exporters, primarily of guns and weapons. State administration of material resources all over Sweden for the navy through the fiscal organisation was increasingly a thing of the past. The dynamic effect of the new organisational structure may have been important and similar to that in 20th-century private enterprises, which changed from a functional to a divisional system when they grew larger and more diversified. The Swedish state now had systematically structured hierarchies in which every level had the practical possibility to control, coordinate, and support the lower levels, as well as

" Rolf Torstendahl, "Mellan normalstat och fasta anordningar: Den medellanga finansplaneringen villkor i Sverige 1620-1680", in Revera and Torstendahl 1979, 253-85; Fredrik Lagerroth, Statsreglering och finansfdrvaltning i Sverige till och med Frihetstidens ingang, Malmo, 1928. '' Hallenberg 2008.

292

chapter

four

the authority to make decisions about how resources should be used. Decision-making could be delegated f r o m the top to a level where a board, an officer, or a civil servant could observe realities closely and take appropriate action. The most dramatic result was visible in the army, where generals and colonels got and used the opportunity to train permanent regiments into elite units. Both the elimination of aristocrats as potential opposition and the new organisational structure of the state substantially reduced the transaction costs for achieving an efficient fiscal-military state. 4.4.2

The navy emerges as an organisation,

1618-1634

Formally, the navy did not get a board {Amiralitetskollegium) until the constitution of 1634.'' Actually, it was a part of the state where experiments with radical change began. Already in 1615, the administration of sails, rigs, cables, and flags was turned over to the Scottish-born admiral Rickard Clerck. After his death in 1625, it was taken over by captain Johan (Hans) Clerck, who possibly was his brother. By 1617, the navy's construction of major warships, earlier spread around at several yards, had been concentrated to two yards: Vastervik in Smaland and Harbovik in Uppland. Harbovik was the last countryside yard building large warships, and it was closed in 1623.'® In 1618, the Vastervik yard was leased to two Dutch-born merchants, Paridon van Horn and Kristian Welshuisen, who at the same time became tax-farmers for the Vastervik region. They were given a contract to build warships, and more such contracts were given to them (later Welshuisen alone) in 1620, 1625, 1630, and 1631." In the late 1610s, the navy also began to build major warships at Stockholm. From 1621, the Stocl-diolm navy yard, new construction of warships, and the maintenance of all ships were turned over to two entrepreneurs of Dutch origin, the deputy Master of Ordnance Anthonie de Monier and the Master shipwright Henrik Hybertsson. Both already served the Swedish state, Monier since 1616®° and Hybertsson since 1603. W h e n the contract was renewed in 1625,

" Naval administration f r o m 1618 to 1634: Zettersten 1890, esp. 16-33, 193-220; Sveriges Sjokrig, 9 - 4 6 ; Wendt 1950, 13-25. ™ RR 7/9 1623, RA. " Kammarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter 92-93, b u n t 9, Paridon van H o r n , RA; Hallenberg 2008. ™ Jonas Hedberg (ed.), Kungl Artilleriet: Yngre Vasatiden, Stockholm, 1985, 21.

swedish n a v a l administration

293

Monier was replaced by Hybertsson's brother, the merchant Arent Hybertsson de Groote, and when Henrik Hybertsson died in 1627, his widow Margareta Nilsdotter replaced him as contractor. In 1623-24, the navy also bought nine warships, built in the Netherlands, through Anthonie de Monier. Eight of them were at Gothenburg in 1624-26 and maintained by a contract with a local entrepreneur. Similar contracts were made with sea officers for the maintenance of small craft in Riga and Prussia.®' TTie effect of this was that naval administration for the state was radically simplified. The main remaining administrative task for sea officers was naval personnel. Copper guns were produced under the direction of the Master of Ordnance, and iron guns by private entrepreneurs.^^ Provisioning was administrated by the Treasury. In practice, there must have been many administrative problems to solve when ships, their equipment, guns, ammunition, and provisions needed to be brought together for a seagoing fleet, but the navy had no responsibility to acquire these resources on its own. There were others who were responsible to see that everything was available at Stockholm when officers and men turned up to make the ships ready for sea. These radical reforms were parts of the early reforms of the whole state administration, led by the king and Axel Oxenstierna. At the same time, naval leadership changed unexpectedly, as the two rather young men appointed in 1612 died prematurely: the riksamiral Goran Gyllenstierna (b. 1575) in 1618, and his deputy, riksviceamiralen Hans Bielkenstierna (b. 1574) in early 1620. In July 1620, Gustav A d o l f s half-brother Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm (1574-1650) was appointed riksamiral, an office he held until his death. Gyllenhielm had gained naval experience in the 1590s, but his recent experiences were army commands against Russia. In the 1620s and early 1630s, Gyllenhielm often served as commander of the active fleet, usually supporting

The Stockholm naval yard: Cedeiiund 1966. Originally only M o n i e r was entrepreneur, but Hybertsson appears as his partner in a supplementary contract of 25/2 1622. The contracts of 12/9 1620, 25/2 1622, a n d 10/1 1625, RR a n d Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vols 1 - 3 . Papers relating to the contracts in SH; M 1779, M 1793, RA and AR 1621/5, 1624/17, KrA. Accounts relating to the contracts in the yearly General Ledger of the state {Rikshuvudbok) f r o m 1623 and on, Rikshuvudbocker. Contracts for Riga and Elbing: Zettersten 1890, 385-86; for Gothenburg: Zettersten 1890, 358. Hedberg 1985, 121^43 (by Sten Claeson).

294

chapter

four

amphibious operations while the king was the real leader of both fleet and army.''^ Gyllenhielm does not appear as an energetic administrator or naval policy-maker, but it is possible that Gustav Adolf did not expect that of him. Admirals and other sea officers were now supposed to be leaders of men and operations rather than being engulfed in administration. Compared to the performance in 1611-12, the navy in the period 1621-31 was highly efficient in terms of ships sent to sea to support offensive warfare. In the 1630s, when the entrepreneurial system had been abolished and the administration fell upon the naval leaders, Gyllenhielm was interested in creating a large Admiralty Board with a considerable civilian staff to administrate the navy. He was less interested in actively leading it or in observing the formalities of administration and control through a kollegium. He frequently appears as a suspicious controller of the board's accounts and judicial activities rather than as its leader. He also was often in conflict with the dominating Oxenstiernas in the Council, while Axel Oxenstierna in his turn was a firm supporter of the navy and its real administrators, especially Admirals Klas Fleming and Erik Ryning.®"* Immediately after Gyllenhielm's appointment on I I July 1620, the king held a general muster of the navy's officers and men at Stockholm on 24 July. The ships and personnel were divided into five "fleets", each under a vice admiral and with one of the navy's five largest ships as flagship. Each fleet had a similar composition of saihng warships of various sizes, galleys, and transport ships, and every officer and seam a n (even those who are listed as absent) was assigned to one of the fleets. On paper (there are unusually many papers from this day) this looks like an attempt to give the navy a permanent organisational and hierarchical structure and give five groups of officers responsibility for around 320 men each. It has a striking resemblance to the early organisation of the army into permanent regiments, which had begun a few years earlier.®^

SBL 17, biography of Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm by Erik Granstedt. Wendt 1950, esp. 105-26. Papers f r o m the muster of 24 July 1620 and subsequent updatings to the five fleet plan in 1620-21 in SH 69. Fragments of these papers in SS, Z 2891, Z 2952, RA. A muster list of crews divided into five fleets in Westinska samlingen, 318, UUB. The army: Barkman 1931.

swedish n a v a l administration

295

Tlie division into five fleets was an experiment which disappears after 1621, but from this time on there are numerous lists of ships with detailed plans of personnel and armament for each ship. A few years later the seamen were organised into companies with defined recruiting areas, a system that became lasting after several years of political and administrative struggles. There are no papers left which show if the king, Gyllenhielm, or (a possible suspect) Axel Oxenstierna, initiated these changes. They were in line with the general development of the Swedish administration with more pronounced military and administrative hierarchies and administrative planning through the use of stater (budget) which permanently determined normal expenditures {ordinarie stat) and yearly prepared extra stat to meet temporary demands, usually connected with war.**® Only one of the five vice admirals appointed in 1620, Klas Larsson Fleming (1594-1644), served continuously in the navy after that year. Fleming belonged to a junior branch of the same aristocratic family from Finland as his namesake in the 16th century. During the 1620s he rose to a position as the most senior admiral, next to Gyllenhielm. His correspondence with the king shows that he was deeply involved in administration, especially of shipbuilding, from around 1625.®^ When the king became dissatisfied with the entrepreneurial system at Stockholm in 1628, Fleming was charged with the task of winding up the contracts and taking over the administration of the shipyard and the naval base from 1629. In late 1629 he was also appointed to a leading position in the Treasury, and it was in fact f r o m the Treasury rather than from Skeppsholmen that he ran much of the navy's administration in 1629-30. The Treasury's key position in the resource flow was obviously important for supplying the navy, and Fleming's two roles may have been a necessary combination for administrating the large-scale amphibious operations which took place in 1630, viz., the invasion of Germany.®® Fleming was assisted by the former contractor for rigging, sails, and cables, Johan (Hans) Clerck, who in 1631 was appointed holmamiral. The administration of the Stockholm yard became dominated until

Early stater in A n o r d n i n g a r , esp. vol. 3 ( 1 6 2 2 - 2 3 ) ; S H 7 0 - 7 1 ; S M H F 8:1, 8:4; Kammarkollegiet, H a n d l i n g a r a n g a e n d e statsverket, vol. 1; R i k s h u v u d b o c k e r , vol 32 (1629) vol. 34 (1630); SS, Z 2 8 0 4 - 2 8 3 0 ( 1 6 3 3 - 4 0 ) , all RA; AR 1624/7, 1625/9, KrA. Sknvelser till K o n u n g e n , G u s t a v II Adolfs tid, vol. 10, Klas Fleming, RA. Wendt 1950, 18-20.

296

chapter

four

1679 by sea officers with this family name and the Christian names Rickard and Johan/Hans, although their exact relationship is uncertain.® The senior subordinates of the holmamiral were the deputy commander [gdrdskapten or holmkapten, from 1638 holmmajor), the Master shipwright {skeppsbyggmdstare, in this period always a foreigner), the Master of equipment {ekipagemdstare), and the Master of ordnance {tygmdstare). The latter three positions remained as the backbone of leadership of Swedish naval yards until the 20th century.'" 4.4.3

Administration,

aristocrats, and Amiralitetskollegium

Tlie beginning of a separate administrative staff for the navy appears in Gyllenhielm's early years in office. During the early 1620s, a secretary and a bookkeeper were appointed to assist him and other admirals handling administrative matters, especially wages to the personnel. The earliest central accounts for the whole navy were made for the year 1624, but no others are known until 1630, although none of these early accounts are preserved. From 1630, copies of letters from the admiralty are preserved. The administrative staff appears as rudimentary, but up to 1634 much of the routine administration was still handled by the Chancellery and the Treasury."

Admiral Rickard Clerck was contractor for rigging and cables f r o m 1615 until his death in 1625. The contract was taken over by (his brother?) Johan (Hans) Clerck (dead 1644), holmamiral 1631-44, Zettersten 1890, 258; SBL 4, Rickard Clerck jr (1604-68), probably (SBL 4) Johan Clerck's son (SBL 4, but see Zettersten 1903, 598), was appointed holmkapten 1630, holmmajor 1638 and holmamiral in 1655. H e died in that office in 1668. His son Johan Clerck was holmmajor 1677-79. H a n s (Vilhelmsson) Clerck (1607-79) was the son of William Clerck, a Scottish infantry officer in Swedish service (according to Zettersten 1903, 598, Rickard jr was also a son to William). He became a naval artillery officer, was in 1650 (or earlier) appointed Master of ordnance (tygmdstare) at the Stockliolm yard a n d served as holmamiral f r o m 1668 to his death in 1679. His son H a n s (Hansson) Clerck jr (1639-1711), was holmmajor in 1671-76, later admiral and provincial governor. The two latter Clerck's relationship to the others is not known, b u t they are believed to be descendants of the same Scottish family (SBL 4). There were practically always two Clercks in the three most senior officer charges at the Stockholm yard f r o m a r o u n d 1630 until 1679, SBL 4; Johan Kleberg, Amiralitetskollegium-Marinfdrvaltningen: Biografiska anteckningar, 1634-1934, Stockholm, 1934. See also Zettersten 1903, 552 and the index of persons to Wendt 1950, 465. Zettersten 1903, 552-53; the continued use of this division of the navy's main yard, Glete 1993b, 155-60. " Tlie early staff of the 1620s: Wendt 1950, 15-17. Most facts about the central administration in this section are f r o m Wendt 1950, 13-300. Biographical information f r o m Kleberg 1934. Amiralitetskollegium's archives are at KrA; the naval accounts f r o m 1634 and on in Orlogsflottans rakenskaper 1634-1800, KrA. Lists of naval accounts

SWEDISH NAVAL ADMINISTRATION

297

The establishment of the Amiralitetskollegium (Admiralty Board) as the administrative board of the navy in 1634 was the logical conclusion of the transformation of the Swedish state. Its first members were Gyllenhielm and two admirals who were also members of the Council, Klas Fleming and Erik Ryning. The latter was a nephew of the former riksamiral Axel Ryning and related to the Oxenstierna family. Fleming continued to have other administrative responsibilities; he became Governor of Stocldiolm {dverstathallare) and was given various tasks connected with shipping and trade. More junior members, sea officers, and (normally) one senior civilian administrator gradually joined the Board, but the riksamiral and admirals who also were members of the Council (with the title amiralitetsrdd) were an exclusive elite. As Councillors, they were on a higher political and social level than the career admirals and civilian administrator who at the Board were titled bisittare (assessors). Amiralitetsrdd were, before 1674, always members of aristocratic families, but up to 1660 none were appointed who not had earlier experience as sea officer. The Amiralitetskollegium had wide authority and responsibilities, inherited from the Treasury, the Chancellery, the private entrepreneurs, and the admirals who earlier had administrated the navy as individuals. It administrated shipbuilding, maintenance and repair of warships and their equipment, naval guns,'^ naval shipyards and bases, sea officers, non-commissioned officers and the regional system of part-time seamen (bdtsmanshdllet), naval provisioning, naval jurisdiction, contracts with private entrepreneurs, and the navy's accounting system. It began a program of surveying the Baltic Sea in order to produce navigational manuals and charts, and it took responsibility for pilotage and beacons throughout Sweden.®' The ideal administration outlined in the board's instruction was far from achieved in the early decades, but the board gradually developed an institutional memory of

before the large-scale destruction in the 19th century, K a m m a r a r k i v e t s ambetsarkiv till och m e d 1921, Generalregister, Civila o c h militara, huvudsakligen centrala, r a k e n skaper, vol. 2, RA, w h e r e Amiralitetskollegium's a c c o u n t s begin in 1624. Guns, g u n s h o t s a n d g u n p o w d e r was p r o d u c e d u n d e r the direction by the A r m y (Krigskollegium) but the Amiralitetskollegium t o o k control of all existing naval guns, formally in 1645 a n d the navy had its o w n staff of artillery officers. The navy a n d the p r o d u c t i o n of charts: Per D a h l g r e n a n d H e r m a n Richter, Sveriges sjokarta, Stockholm, 1944, esp. 17-65, 149-210; Bertil A h l u n d , Historia kring vara sjokort, Stockholm, 2002. Pilotage: Ulf B e r g m a n , Fran bondelots till yrkesman: Lotsning i Ostergotland, 1537-1914, Lund, 1995.

298

chapter

four

its own by its correspondence files, accounts, and the board minutes, which were kept f r o m 1649. Accounts were prepared but usually long after the actual transactions had taken place, a problem that seems to have been greater than in the earlier functional organisation when the Treasury supervised all accounts directly. Swedish state accounts also became more detailed, although booldceeping had been rationalised by the introduction of the double Italian system in the 1620s. After Gustav II Adolf s death in 1632, it was the board and its senior members in the Council who ensured continuity in naval policy. This was obvious during the regency for Queen Christina, but Christina as ruling queen was dependent on the leading admirals for advice on naval policy. It was the board which ultimately guaranteed that long-term planning made it possible for Sweden to send a strong fleet to sea whenever required. It had to channel resources to all essential parts of naval power—ships, guns, men, and provisions—in a way that ensured that this could be achieved both in the short run and in a longer perspective. Karl X Gustav also left policy-making to the board until the last years (1658-60) of his rule, when the main fleet was in the southern Baltic and its officers and administration were closely tied to operations under his command. At that time, the king began to take independent decisions about naval policy and administration. W h e n Klas Fleming was killed in combat in 1644, Admiral Erik Ryning was hastily recalled from Livonia where he had been appointed governor-general earlier in the year. He was the administrative leader of the navy until 1650, and it was expected that he should become riksamiral after Gyllenhielm's death in that year. In 1648, Admiral Ake Ulfsparre (1597-1657) was appointed member of the Council and amiralitetsrad, and in 1650 Herman Fleming (1619-1673) received the same promotion. Herman Fleming was Klas Fleming's son. He had been carefully trained as a sea officer and naval administrator, partly in the Dutch navy, and he rapidly gained the special confidence of both the old Gyllenhielm and the young Queen during his years as holmamiral in 1645-50. Fleming was obviously energetic and resourceful like his father, and Erik Ryning saw his real influence diminish. He chose to retire in 1650.'"'

Wendt 1950, esp. 123-31. T w o m e m o r a n d a to the Queen by H e r m a n Fleming about the role of the holmamiral f r o m 1647 in M 1789, RA and a detailed plan of the f u t u r e navy f r o m 1649, M 1753, RA, show b o t h his influence in relation to Christina

swedish n a v a l administration

299

In 1652, the Queen appointed the Lord High Treasurer {riksskattmdstare), Gabriel Bengtsson Oxenstierna (1586-1656), to riksamiral, primarily to make space for her favourite Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie to lead the Treasury. Oxenstierna had for many years been a central person in the Council and in Swedish administration, and he had been Master of Ordnance from 1617 to 1634. He was now an old m a n and had no naval experience, but he was superior to Gyllenhielm in his understanding of practical administration. Herman Fleming remained the central person in the board but, like his father, he was soon given other central administrative duties. From 1653 he was acting president of the Treasury. De la Gardie had fallen from the Queen's favour and was, in any case, hardly competent for the position. Christina did not intend to leave the navy without strong leadership when she transferred Fleming to the Treasury in 1653. In that year. Field-marshal Karl Gustav Wrangel (1613-76) was appointed riksvkeamiral, formally Oxenstierna's deputy, but with the intention that he should provide professional leadership. Wrangel was an army officer and the last Swedish commander-in-chief in Germany during the Thirty Years War, but he also had studied shipbuilding and maritime matters in Holland in his youth and had been a successful admiral in the war against Denmark in 1644-45. His leadership of the navy became only intermittent, however, as most of his time and energy was absorbed by warfare on land f r o m 1655. He was Sweden's most able field commander and could not be left to preside at a board in Stockholm when Karl X Gustav fought a war about hegemony in Northern Europe. In 1653, two young aristocratic admiral-lieutenants (vice admirals), Sten Bielke (1624-84) and Gustav Wrangel (1630-88), were appointed amiralitetsrad, without being members of the Council, although Bielke was appointed to it in 1657. Gustav Wrangel was a distant relative to Karl Gustav Wrangel, while Bielke belonged to a leading aristocratic family. In 1655 he also became Herman Fleming's brother-in-law. At Kari X Gustav's accession to the throne in 1654, the king's friend. Admiral Klas Bielkenstierna (1615-62), son of riksvkeamiral Hans Bielkenstierna, was appointed to the Council and to amiralitetsrad. Bielkenstierna had a long naval experience and became the real leader of the navy during the war period 1655-60.

and his ability to outline and explain naval administration a n d technology in a way that probably satisfied this inquisitive a n d intellectual ruler.

300

chapter

four

Karl Gustav Wrangel was appointed riksamiral in 1657, as reward for a victory against Denmark on land. He took command of the fleet in the battle against the Dutch in October 1658, but had no time for naval administration. Sten Bielke was soon absorbed in diplomatic missions and was transferred to the Chancellery in 1660. During the regency for Karl XI he became a leading opponent of Magnus Gabriel de la Cardie's foreign policy. He eventually became riksskattmdstare (Lord High Treasurer) in 1672.'= In 1659, Admiral Custav Wrangel was accused by Karl X Gustav of disobeying an operational order and was dismissed from naval service. He later served as a general in the army. Bielkenstierna was seriously wounded in combat in 1659 and died in 1662. The navy was in need of new leadership. Herman Fleming had briefly returned as administrator to the Amiralitetskollegium in 1658-59, when most admirals were absent from Stockholm due to the war. He was, however also the central person in the financial administration and the leader of Karl Gustav's attempt to recover a part of the crown land transferred to the aristocracy {reduktion). Fleming was concerned about the long-term effects on the state if the aristocracy did not give up a part of their profits from participation in state formation and empire building. His experience must have taught him that the navy required large resources under central control. The reduktion, however, made Fleming a hated person among the aristocrats. On his deathbed, Karl X Gustav appointed him Lord High Treasurer and member of the regency government for Karl XL This would ensure that the reduktion policy got a leading spokesman in that regency and that the navy and the Treasury were closely connected. However, after the king's death, the House of Nobles voted against Fleming's appointment and the other estates in the end also accepted that veto. The reduktion was also brought to a halt after the king's death."^ In late 1660, the Council appointed two aristocrats. Nils Brahe (1633-99) and Klas Stiernskold (1617-76), to admirals and amiralitetsrdd. Neither m a n had any naval experience, their experience of warfare was very limited, and only Stiernskold was a proven administrator. Brahe was Karl Gustav Wrangel's son-in-law and the nephew

' ' Biography of Sten Bielke by Georg Wittrock, SBL 4. Stellan Dahlgren, Karl X Gustav och reduktionen, Stocldiolm, 1964; SBL 16, biography of H e r m a n Fleming by Stellan Dahlgren.

swedish n a v a l administration

301

of the riksdrots^'' Per Brahe. In 1664, Wrangel was elected riksmarsk. Herman Fleming put up his candidature as his successor as riksamiral, but Field-marshal Gustav Stenbock (1614-85) was appointed instead. Fleming was probably still distrusted by his fellow aristocrats, but Stenbock had lost the election as riksmarsk to Wrangel and threatened to withdraw from public service if he lost another election. Tliis was a serious threat from a member of the high aristocracy, who might be a centre of opposition. Fleming was appointed governor-general in Finland as compensation, but his health was now deteriorating, and it is doubtful that he could have exercised the strong leadership the navy needed. Stenbock was a proven military leader but had never served in the navy. During the 1660s, all flag officers who had been junior members of the Amiralitetskollegium disappeared from it, with the exception of the holmamiral, f r o m 1668 Hans Clerck. The navy's three most senior admirals and administrators—Stenbock, Brahe, and Stiernskold—lacked practical experience of the sea and of mobilisation of a large fleet. Naval policy and administration in these years were decided in discussions about the yearly budget (stat) between the Councfl and the Amiralitetskollegium. The three admirals, who also were members of the Council, did their best to show that there were problems and that the incomes allocated to the navy often were delayed. Similar problems, however existed in all parts of the state. It is possible, ahhough difficult to prove, that the three aristocratic admirals actually saved the navy from even more financial savings by their social and political position. Counts Stenbock and Brahe belonged to families which were an aristocracy even among the Swedish aristocrats.'® In the regency period, however, conflicts about financial policy were not primarily about how existing incomes should be used. In the House of Nobles, tensions were rising between the aristocracy, which had been able to enrich itself by crown land for loans and various services during the long wars, and the many noblemen who depended on the state for their incomes. The three non-noble estates supported the latter, and most opponents of the regency thought that a few rich

" The Brahe family was one of the richest in Sweden and the position as riksdrots (in charge of judicial question) was formally the highest in the Council. " Naval finance: Wittrock 1914, 182-86, 208, 254-59, 369-72, 396; Wittrock 1917, 160-66, 183, 256, 324, 344, 368; Wendt 1950, 209-31. Tlie aristocracy: Agren 1976; Asker 1983, 163-65.

302

chapter

four

families had appropriated more than they deserved and that this now seriously undermined the fiscal stability of the state. A naval leadership primarily interested in securing financial support for a better prepared navy might have used such an opinion to suggest financial reform. An Amiralitetskollegium dominated by the richest families in Sweden was unlikely to fight for higher taxes on the aristocracy or any kind of reduktion?'^ In 1675, the shortcomings of 15 years of naval administration were revealed. The fleet sent to sea was larger than ever before, but its mobilisation was slow and its inexperienced leadership—Stenbock, Brahe, and Stiernskold went to sea as the most senior admirals—appears as shocked by problems that experienced seamen would have expected as normal in an autumn cruise. Stenbock was suspended by Karl XI and had to pay a large indemnity. After that, the king rehabilitated him and gave him the important command of the army operating against Norway. He retained the title riksamiral. Brahe resigned f r o m the navy in 1677, while Stiernskold died in 1676. In early 1676, Karl XI appointed Lorentz Creutz, at that time the leading man at the Treasury, as Stenbock's temporary replacement. He combined this with his Treasury office, a new example of that a Treasury-Navy connection was necessary in times of crisis. In late 1674, the king had also appointed the non-aristocratic but professional Admirals Hans Clerck Sr, Klas Uggla and Johan Bar, and Admirallieutenant Hans Clerck Jr to amiralitetsrdd. Together with Creutz, they were able to send out a large fleet early in 1676. Creutz was appointed its commander-in-chief in spite of his total lack of naval or mihtary experience. Creutz and Uggla were killed in combat, and Bar was (on dubious grounds) accused for bad conduct in combat and had to leave the kollegium. A series of new appointments was made in 1676-77, the most important of which was the new strongman at the Treasury, Goran Gyllenstierna, who was appointed amiralitetsrdd in January 1677. The command of the fleet and the temporary presidency of the Amiralitetskollegium were in 1677 given to Field-marshal Henrik Horn, but it was Gyllenstierna who led the administration. He left the Amiralitetskollegium already in August 1678, but continued to work with naval administration in the Treasury. His brother Johan

Rystad 1955; Nilsson

1964.

swedish n a v a l administration

303

Gyllenstierna was at this time Karl XI's most influential advisor.""' In reality, the king had ceased to use the Amiralitetskollegium as the centre of naval policy-making and administration. He left that to individuals he trusted. From 1678, Admiral Hans Wachtmeister was his man as the operational leader of the navy. Wachtmeister ran his administration from the fleet in Kalmar, f r o m 1679/80 Karlskrona, not from Stockholm.'"' Johan Gyllenstierna suddenly died in 1680, and in his absence Hans Wachtmeister (1641-1714) became the leading spokesman for the king in the Parliament of 1680. He also acted as spokesman for the navy and presented a large bill for its reconstruction. The central political questions were the king's demand of three sources of increased incomes: a radical reduktion, increased taxation on the nobility, and an investigation about how much the state could demand in indemnity for misconduct from the members of the regency government. The king got the decisions he desired, which meant a crushing defeat for the aristocracy, large incomes for the state (and the navy), and regularly paid wages to officers and civil servants. Several rich aristocrats saw large parts of their fortune disappear. The Parliament also took decisions that formalised royal absolutism and the abandonment of aristocratic participation in central administration, which had been a central part of the division of power in the Swedish state since 1612. Wachtmeister's behaviour shows that he was determined to secure a strong financial base for the new naval kingdom of his own. He, and practically all professional sea officers, who rarely had been given land by the crown, belonged to the winners. Absolutism, the elimination of aristocratic power in the state, and the rise of bureaucratic and professional power in service of the king went hand in hand.'® The admiral who in 1678-79 had opposed Wachtmeister's rising dominance in the navy was not a defender of aristocratic pre-eminence in central administration. It was Hans Clerck Jr (1639-1711), at this time a much more experienced sea officer and naval administrator than Wachtmeister and a member of the family that had supplied

Rystad 1955-, SBL 17, biographies of G o r a n and Johan Gyllenstierna by Goran Rystad. Goran and Johan Gyllenstierna were sons of admiral Goran Gyllenstierna (1601-46) and grandsons of G o r a n Gyllenstierna, riksamiral 1612-18. The formal head of the Treasury [riksskattmastare) since 1672 was the former admiral Sten Bielke, but he spent m u c h of his time in the Chancellery. Grauers 1946, esp. 61-77, 84-98. Grauers 1946, 98-126.

304

chapter

four

the navy with more professional flag officers than any other family in the 17th century. The most central question was his opposition to the fleet's permanent deployment to southern Sweden, but there was probably more behind it. Clerck had reason to think that a new navy with professionalism, rather than ancestry, as the main merit for promotion would favour him, not the less experienced Wachtmeister. Like the Scottish Clercks, the Livonian Wachtmeister family had risen socially from obscurity by successful service in the Swedish armed forces, and Hans Wachtmeister's father was made a baron and member of the Council. Clerck had made a long naval career, while Wachtmeister had served as a volunteer in the English navy in 1665-66, but otherwise served in the army and at the court until 1675, when he was given a junior flag rank {major) in the navy. Wachtmeister's rapid rise was connected with his friendship with Karl XI, but he had also formulated a new strategy, of which the king approved. Clerck's protests were to no avail, and in January 1680, the king appointed him governor in Vasterbotten, Sweden's northernmost province, as far away from the navy as possible. The period of strong aristocratic power in the Swedish fiscal-military state came to an end in the war f r o m 1675 to 1679. From 1612, this aristocracy had supplied the navy with a number of competent admirals and administrators from the Gyllenstierna, Bielkenstierna, Fleming, Ryning, Ulfsparre, and Wrangel families.'"' Aristocrats serving the state normally followed a strategy where they made themselves useful for the state's expansionistic policy in order to enrich themselves and their descendants. Tliis strategy is still visible around Sweden in the aristocratic palaces that were built in this period. A successful aristocrat in these years had to be an entrepreneur who achieved something important both for the state he served and for the family he belonged to. The aristocrats paid high taxes during wars, but the bulk of resources for the army came as conscripted m e n f r o m the peasant society. For the aristocracy, taxes to warfare were investments; for the peasants, it was a drain of h u m a n blood.

The composition of the aristocracy: Agren 1976. Bielkenstierna was not an aristocratic family, b u t riksviceamiral H a n s Bielkenstierna's m o t h e r was Kerstin Rynmg a n d he was married to Elisabet Gyllenstierna. Their son, admiral Klas Bielkenstierna, was married to Barbro Natt och Dag. The Ryning, Gyllenstierna and Natt och Dag families belonged to the old aristocracy.

swedish n a v a l administration

305

While most aristocrats served the state with the uhimate aim of creating family fortunes, some aristocratic naval administrators, especially Klas and Herman Fleming, were primarily servants of the ruling dynasty. Their administrative talents were used to ensure a timely flow of scarce resources f r o m the fiscal to the naval organisation. The nobility's treatment of Herman Fleming in 1660 shows that this policy was controversial and that many families were unwilling to sacrifice anything of their gains from state formation and empire building for defence of the state and the empire. It is hardly a coincidence that it was the navy's new strongman, Hans Wachtmeister, who held the axe when the aristocracy politically fell f r o m power in the state in 1680. If the organisation he led should be successful and give him prestige and power, then aristocratic power must go. Wachtmeister was an entrepreneur who had to destroy part of the earlier generation's entrepreneurial achievements in order to achieve the new combination of resources he saw as important for the future. The early 17th-century reforms with a division of the state administration into separate departments under the supervision of the king and the Council, and with the local civil and military administration divided into provinces and provincial regiments, had as a whole been successful. Its basic principles remained unchanged for centuries. For the navy, however, there was a tension between the decentralised fiscal organisation in a still rather backward economy and the naval organisation's need of large incomes for investment in material resources in peace and for rapid concentration of resources when the fleet was mobilised for war. The staff with the best knowledge of how to concentrate the state's various resources and how to find temporary financial solutions was in the Treasury. In critical periods—1629-30, 1658-59, and 1676-78—the naval administration and the Treasury were led by the same men: Klas Fleming, H e r m a n Fleming, Lorentz Creutz, and Goran Gyllenstierna. This Treasury-Navy axis would be less easy to improvise when the navy moved to southern Sweden.

Wachtmeister's descendants: Sven Grauers, Atten 3:1-2, Stockliolm, 1953-56.

Wachtmeistergenom

seklerna,

306

chapter

four

4.5 Absolutism and professionalism: Naval administration, 1680-1721 Tlie political decisions in 1680 were followed by a reorganisation of both the army and the navy. It was most important for the latter as a drastically increased flow of incomes for centrally administrated purposes became available. A large shipbuilding program was started, a new naval city, Karlskrona, was built in Blekinge in southeastern Sweden, and the number of peasant-seamen in the bdtsmanshdll was increased. The naval organisation became focused on readiness to control the sea between Sweden, Germany, and Denmark at a short notice in order to keep it open for the flow of military resources between the various parts of the Swedish empire. The whole idea of the Karlskrona base was to place the navy in a favourable strategic position for achieving that control.'"' By 1680, the Amiralitetskollegium in Stockholm had ceased to be important. Wachtmeister ruled the navy in an absolute fashion, just as the king ruled Sweden without formally consulting a Council. Karl XI did, however, have strong bureaucratic tendencies, and he was not an enemy of the by-now-traditional principle of administration through a kollegium. By 1683 he had found that his navy required a more formalised leadership. A new Amiralitetskollegium was constituted, with Admiral-general (his title since 1681) Hans Wachtmeister as president and Admirals Hans Clerck Jr and Erik Sioblad as members. Clerck was recalled from northern Sweden and was also appointed governor in the province of Kalmar, while Sioblad was appointed governor in the province of Blekinge, of which Karlskrona was the capital. Wachtmeister had been governor-general in these two provinces since 1680. The coordination of naval and regional administration was close when the navy's three most senior admirals were in charge of both. Until 1689, the fleet was based in both Karlskrona and Kalmar, where most warships also were built with the rich oak resources in Smaland and Blekinge. The organisation of the bdtsmanshdll and the cutting and transportation of oak could be organised without friction between

The central naval administration 1680 to 1695: Wendt 1950, 301-462; the period 1696-1700: Einar W e n d t and Lars O. Berg in Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 16961803, 11-50; Grauers 1946, 126-224, esp. 163-87, 213-24. Biographical information: Kleberg 1934. The Karlskrona naval yard until 1700: Ericson 1993, 9 - 4 2 .

swedish n a v a l administration

307

civil and naval authorities, when admirals also were in charge as governors. Tlrere were conflicts, however. Hans Clerck Jr was still skeptical about a concentration of the navy to Karlskrona, and he was a frequent opponent to Wachtmeister in various questions, including shipbuilding, about which both men held strong opinions. By 1688, the base question was settled by the king in favour of Karlskrona, and the warships, shipbuilding, and naval administration were concentrated in that town in a few years. Clerck apparently lost interest and left the navy in 1693. He became governor in the province of Sodermanland, south of Stocldiolm. Like other parts of the Swedish state, the navy rapidly developed strict bureaucratic procedures and became dominated by officers who were professional, full-time employees of the state. The amount of paperwork in the naval administration rapidly increased, and much more information about ships and m e n were put on paper than in earlier decades. In 1691-92, the separate parts of the naval administration were given a more formalised structure, with detailed instructions for several officeholders and increased authority for civilian administrators. The economic administration was, on the initiative of both Hans Wachtmeister and the Treasury, removed f r o m the Amiralitetskollegium's control and placed under the admiral-general and a civilian chief commissioner (dverkommissarie). The motivation was that the navy had become more complex than any other part of the state and that the same board could not be experts on both naval and economic questions. In comparison to the Army Board {Krigskollegium), which in 1680 had seen its power over the army's economic administration transferred to the Treasury {Kammarkollegium), this was a reform within the navy. It shows that Hans Wachtmeister still was one of the most powerful m e n in Karl XI's absolutist regime.""^ There are few indications of that the flag officers desired to supervise the economy in detail or that they saw it as an instrument of power, which they could handle. C o m m a n d of ships and fleets were more important for most of them. Recruitment to the sea officer corps was now formally professionalised, and training as a seaman or naval gunner became a requirement for a commission as sea officer. Political and social connections outside the navy were no longer decisive for reaching senior positions, and admirals were no longer recruited from other

Wendt 1950, 362-99. H i e army: Steckzen

1930, 455-74,

308

chapter

four

organisations in the state, as they frequently had been up to 1680. That meant that sea officers Imew less about other parts of the state and of the economic aspects of naval administration. The admiral-general and his continued supervision of the navy as a whole were, in a sense, left over from an earlier period, when an aristocrat was supposed to be able to administrate and command every part of the state. Networks, contacts, and patronage were still important, however, and sea officers now often came f r o m sea-offlicer families, just like army officers usually came f r o m army-officer families. Tiie professional competence was often gained by access to service at sea or through family connections. New naval dynasties with an origin in the nobility—Wachtmeister, Sioblad, and Sparre—produced several flag officers, but so too did the Psilanders (von Psilander, Psilanderhielm, Psilanderskjold), who up to the late 17th century were low and middlerank civil servants. Several important naval families had their origin in the ranks of senior civil servants in the navy in the decades around 1700: Ehrenskold, Lagercrantz, von Otter, and Lagerbielke. They were ennobled and sent their sons to the officer corps. The handling of naval accounts and large-scale acquisitions for the navy had become a road to the social elite. The new naval elite was partly regional in southeastern Sweden, where most sea officers and naval administrators lived f r o m the late 17th century. W h e n a separate naval squadron was established in Gothenburg around 1700, Admiral Erik Sioblad, number two in the Karlskrona hierarchy, was appointed governor-general in the border region to Norway, and the squadron was placed under his command. The Stockholm squadron, which was established against Russia around 1714, developed closer contacts with the central administration in the capital than with Karlskrona. By 1721, the naval administration had in practice become divided into three regional administrations, a development that would continue with several complications until the late 19th century. Eighteenth-century polftical power-holders became increasingly suspicious of the naval establishment in Karlskrona. They believed that naval power was very important for Sweden but often

Hiese reflections are largely m y own. Tlie social composition a n d career paths of Swedish officers in the latter half of the 17th century: Asker 1983 (army officers); Cavallie 1983 (senior a r m y and navy officers). "" Kleberg 1934; H j a l m a r Borjeson, Biogafiska anteckningar om orlogsflottans officerare, 1700-1799 (ed. by Karl Wester), Stocldiolm, 1942; Arteus 1982, 262, 279.

swedish n a v a l administration

309

wondered whether the existing naval administration and leadership were fully competent.'"'^ Hie decades around 1700 actually saw the beginning of a long-term rift between the navy and the political and administrative centre of the fiscal-military state. The transfer of the whole navy and its central administration from Stocldiolm to Karlskrona meant that personal and informal contacts between sea officers and the central state bureaucracy were much reduced. Instead, a tendency to bureaucratic infighting in order to preserve positions and avoid changes with uncertain results prevailed. The change began to be visible after the accession to the throne of Karl XII (r. 1697-1718), the first member of the dynasty who had grown up without daily contact with the navy, its ships, and its men. During the Great Northern War (1700-21), the king, the various army commands, the central administration in Stocldiolm, and the navy in Karlskrona developed in separate directions and began to show signs of sub-optimisation and myopic behaviour. The main problem turned out to be that there was no central authority with the ability and authority to enforce radical changes, reallocate resources, and adapt to a new strategic situation. The absolute king ought to have been that authority, but he was absent f r o m Sweden from 1700 to 1715. The home government which ran the administration often opposed his policy but had too limfted authority to decide about and enforce a radically different political and strategic alternative."" The end of Wachtmeister's rule over the navy came in 1713-14, when the old admiral-general resigned and died shortly thereafter.'" He had not raised any admiral who was able to take over his responsibilities as both commander-in-chief and administrative leader of the navy. In fact, his resignation came at a time when several experienced flag officers resigned or died, so his resignation left a marked gap in

"" The separation of the naval administration into regions and conflicts between Stockholm and Karlskrona after 1721: Jean H a g g m a n , Studier i Frihetstidens forsvarspolitik: ett bidrag till Sveriges inre historia, 1721-1727, Stockholm, 1922, 34-42, 8 7 112, 148-57, 220-45, 269-94. Brief surveys of the problem in Glete 1990-1991-, Jan Glete, "Bridge and Bulwark. The Swedish navy and the Baltic, 1500-1809", in Rystad etal. 1994, 9-59, esp. 51-55. The central naval administration 1700-1721: Lars O. Berg in Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 51-157; Grauers 1946, 225-86. Biographical information: Kleberg 1934. The Karlskrona naval yard 1700-1721, Ericson 1993, 42-64. The reflections about policy, strategy and organisation are my own. "' Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II (Lars O. Berg), 72-78, 95-115.

310

chapter

four

the naval leadership."^ The economic administration within the navy was rapidly becoming an intractable problem: the accounts were several years in arrears, and the civilian administrators were increasingly involved in business transactions and attempts to buy on credit. The senior officers understood less and less of what was going on and were, in any case, occupied with fighting a war at sea. In 1711, when Wachtmeister suffered a stroke, he had declared that General Magnus Stenbock, son of the last riksamiral, Gustav Stenbock, and leader of the home army, was the only man suitable as his successor. Stenbock, however, was sent to the continent with an army and was taken prisoner in 1713. The most senior admiral in the navy by 1715 was Klas Sparre (16731733), whose position was strengthened when Karl XII appointed him dveramiral (senior admiral) in that year, typically for this king as a reward for Sparre's performance during the battle of Riigen. Sparre had progressive ideas about shipbuilding and was suited to c o m m a n d the fleet, but he was notoriously uninterested in bureaucratic procedures and was increasingly distrusted as an administrator by other admirals.'" In 1714, after Wachtmeister's resignation, the Royal Council appointed one of its members. Lieutenant-general Johan August Meijerfeldt, director of naval administration. Karl XII, who was in the Ottoman Empire, appointed Lieutenant-general Hans Henrik von Liewen to the same position, which was not known in Sweden until after several months. No new admiral-general was appointed. Von Liewen was a very senior officer, and he refrained f r o m interfering with operational questions. He was, on the whole, well received by the admirals, who needed help with administration. Karl XII, however, was dissatisfied with his navy and wished to have an observer who should find out what went on in Karlskrona. He soon found that von Liewen had become too closely allied with the admirals to serve that purpose. In 1716, the king sent the young Colonel Gustaf Friederich von Rosen (born 1688) to the navy, with the task of sending

Of flag officers in the highest rank (admiral), Erik Sioblad in G o t h e n b u r g was discharged for economic crimes in 1712, C o r n e h u s Anckarstierna resigned in 1712 and died in 1714, Verner von Rosenfeldt resigned and died in 1710, and Jacob de Prou died in 1711. Tlieir successors soon resigned: Karl R u u t h in 1712, Gustav W a t t r a n g and Olof Wernfeldt in 1715. Erik Lillie a n d Mikael H e n c k were killed in the battle of Riigen in 1715, a few m o n t h s after they had received their p r o m o t i o n s to admirals: 1934-, Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II. AmiralitetskoUegiets historia, II, 74-75, 161-66.

swedish n a v a l administration

311

confidential reports to the king. The next year, von Rosen was also appointed as von Liewen's deputy director in administrative questions. As von Rosen was much junior to Klas Sparre, Admiral Baron Karl Hans Wachtmeister (the admiral-general's nephew), and other admirals this aroused open opposition. Karl XII even had to send instructions about in which chair every member in the AmiralitetskoUegium should sit."^ Naval administration in the last years of absolutism was run under the influence of Karl XII's extraordinary administrative and financial measures with one goal: to mobilise the remaining resources in a country which had lost a large part of its territory and population through enemy occupation. Much was bought on credit, and the navy had to try to distribute provisions through private entrepreneurs who were reluctant or unable to deliver without payment in cash. Much of the state's financial administration was run by an extraordinary commission, Upphandlingskommissionen. This was led by the Holsteinian minister Georg Heinrich von Gortz, who acted as Karl XII's foreign minister and minister of finance in 1716-18. One of its members was Salomon von Otter, who f r o m 1693 to 1711 had been the navy's senior economic administrator (dverkommissarie). He was assigned to handle acquisitions to the navy and was periodically in Karlskrona in order to supervise the outfitting and provisioning of the fleet. As in previous periods of crisis, a special one-man "Treasury-Navy axis" had been established."' After Karl XII's death in November 1718, von Liewen and von Rosen left Karlskrona, and the admirals took control of administration. This was part of a larger upheaval. The new non-absolutist and softly revolutionary regime that now controlled Sweden was mainly formed by the established bureaucracy. In its own interest, it returned the administration of the state to the structures which had prevailed before Karl XII's last years of far-reaching reforms. The bureaucracy was widely represented in the Parliament and could claim that its power was legftimately based on professionalism and career advancement based on

Not all m e m b e r s of the Wachtmeister family disliked the young colonel, however. In 1718, von Rosen married Sofia Lovisa Wachtmeister, daughter of the late Admiral-general H a n s Wachtmeister. Lindeberg 1941, 97-98, 102-05; AmiralitetskoUegiets historia, II, 110-12, 120-22. Admiral Karl H a n s Wachtmeister (1682-1731) and naval administration in 1716-19: Grauers 1941, 328-42.

312

chapter

four

merit. The peasants, who normally supported strong royal power, were partly taken by surprise, partly disillusioned by the policy of Karl XII. How the bureaucratic and partly parliamentary state administrated the navy it inherited from the dynastic state is an interesting question, but not a part of this study.

Lennart Thanner, Revolutionen i Sverige efter Karl XILs dod: Den inrikespolitiska maktkampen under tidigare delen av drottning Ulrika Eleonora d y:s regering, Stockholm, 1953; W e r n e r Buchholz, Staat und Stcindegesellschaft in Schweden zur Zeit des Ubergangs vom Absolutismus zum Stdndeparlamentarismus, 1718-1720, Stockliolm, 1979.

C H A P T E R FIVE

WARSHIPS AND NAVAL STRENGTH

5.1

Warships, naval strength, and state

formation

The Swedish dynastic state was a large shipowner and shipbuilder. Shipbuilding and maintenance of a navy was integrated with the formation and growth of the dynastic state. The state was founded in interaction with sea power, developed a Baltic empire with support of sea power, and lost this empire when it lost the initiative in the exercise of sea power in the special Baltic environment. The number and size of the ships built by this state and the structure of the force of warships it maintained reflect ambitions as well as strategy. The possession of warships as instruments of policy was a part of the Swedish kings' image of themselves as powerful rulers in a maritime part of Europe. They were unusual in this persistent policy of administrating their own sailing warships. In the two centuries from 1521 to 1721, only a minority of power-holders made administration of warships and innovations in warship technology parts of state policy. Apart from Sweden, only in England, Denmark, and Portugal was such a policy followed without interruption. France had no sailing navy from the 1560s to the 1620s, Spain and the Dutch Republic did not begin to create such navies until the 1580s, and permanent sailing navies did not exist in the Mediterranean until far into the 17th century. Many Mediterranean states had galley navies, but galley technology was static, galley hulls were cheap, and provisions and personnel rather than warships dominated administration.' The naval part of the European state formation process can roughly be measured with the size of state-owned naval forces. The quantitative development of three of the earliest state-administrated sailing navies is shown in table 5:1. Most European powers used sailing ships for war long before the 16th century, but these forces were temporary and often administrated by merchants and local maritime elites, sometimes from regions not controlled by the power which organised

Glete 1993, esp. 123-72.

314 Table

c h a p t e r four 5.1

The size of the Swedish,

End of

Sweden

1520 1530 1540 1550 1560 1570 1580 1590 1600 1610 1620 1630 1640 1650 1660 1670 1680 1690 1700 1710 1720

1,000 4,000 7,000 7,000 9,000 20,000 18,000 15,000 26,000 26,000 16,000 17,000 28,000 29,000 23,000 35,000 22,000 38,000 53,000 58,000 38,000

Danish,

and English

Denmark 7,000 3,000 5,000 7,000 8,000 15,000 15,000 17,000 10,000 15,000 18,000 19,000 18,000 23,000 15,000 30,000 40,000 34,000 45,000 59,000 48,000

navies,

1520-1720

England 14,000 7,000 7,000 17,000 13,000 14,000 15,000 25,000 27,000 25,000 25,000 31,000 38,000 49,000 88,000 84,000 132,000 124,000 196,000 201,000 174,000

Sources: The English a n d Danish navies: Glete 1993, 549-51, 596-97, with additional information f r o m Bellamy 2006, 275-79, Niels Probst's list of Danish warships, 15231660 a n d Appendices 1 and 2. Total displacements in tonnes. The table includes sailing warships and galleys of 100 tonnes and larger, f r o m 1690 onward, 300 tonnes a n d larger. In the Swedish navy, purpose-built warships belonging to m e m b e r s of the royal family other than the Idng are included in the figures for 1560, 1580, and 1590. Fireships a n d other n o n - c o m b a t ants are excluded, as are several Danish and Swedish blockships a n d floating batteries which existed in 1720. For the total size of the Swedish navy, including small and inshore combatants, see Appendix 2.

the naval operations. Large sailing warships with heavy guns or light warships built for speed and good sailing qualities were complex, and their development in the early modern period was a part of a dynamic process which improved h u m a n ability to control the sea and use it for mercantile and military purposes. States which owned and built such ships and initiated their development made advanced technology a part of the state formation process. Naval technology developed more rapidly if states favoured and demanded improvements and if they were willing to initiate and support experiments and innovations. This

warships and naval strength

315

chapter outlines the Swedish state's acquisition of warships during two centuries. It only briefly discusses technological change, a subject that could be a book of its own. Modern naval policy can often be studied with the established or planned strength of the navy and shipbuilding programs to achieve that strength. If the desired number of ships of various types and sizes is settled, it is possible to make plans for shipbuilding, how many officers and men they require, and which armament they could carry. Such plans are intended to create predictability in a complex organisation. Costs can be calculated and rulers can give administrators resources to achieve the goal. Such long-term planning was common already in the Mediterranean galley navies. Since the 15th century, Venice had a formally established peace-time number of galleys in service and in reserve. Other Mediterranean naval organisations maintained galley squadrons on long-term contract with entrepreneurs. These contracts fixed the number of galleys and the cost to operate them for a number of years.^ In contrast, the long-term strength of sailing navies was rarely guided by policy documents, until the latter half of the 17th century. The English navy is a partial exception. Its future size and structure was outlined in a plan prepared by Queen Elizabeth's naval administrators in 1559, after her accession to the throne. It was maintained according to this plan until the mid-1580s, when war with Spain caused an increase. A new higher level was established then, and in 1618 a plan for the established strength of the navy and a five-year program of new construction to achieve it was outhned by a committee. That program was strictly followed. Tlie later growth of the English navy was determined by wars and domestic power struggles, but also by political developments which made the parliament central for raising resources to the navy. Money voted for one war effort tended to result in a higher permanent level of naval strength, as warships once voted by the Parliament were regarded as parts of an established force. The government could, without m u c h further debate, maintain that force with new construction to replace old or lost ships. English state

Glete 1993, 139-46, 501^21.

316

c h a p t e r four

formation was partly shaped by political consensus about the importance of a strong navy.^ No similar plans or ideas about an established naval strength are known in Sweden until the early 17th century. Naval policy-making was a royal prerogative, which the king had no compelling reason to put on paper as long as he personally took the decisions about when ships should be built or disposed of, the size of new ships, and the structure of the navy. The Vasa rulers did not issue general guidelines about naval strength and shipbuilding to their administrators because they were not supposed to take initiatives on such questions. Danish kings followed a similar policy, as they saw the administration of navy as a royal prerogative with which the Council should not interfere. Absolutism and an increasingly bureaucratic naval administration were introduced in Denmark in 1660, but naval policy expressed in formal plans had to wait until the 18th century.'' The earliest traces of an established strength of the Swedish navy are from the 1610s and the 1620s, when also the strength of the nationally recruited army was formalised into a fixed number of regiments. Plans of naval strength were also connected with the contracts for maintenance of fittings and warships, which f r o m 1615 were concluded with private entrepreneurs.^ In 1633, at a time when no dynastic ruler was in charge of the Swedish state, Axel Oxenstierna outlined the permanent strength and structure of the navy in a m e m o r a n d u m . The principles of this plan remained in use until the 1650s. New and more ambitious plans were put on paper and discussed from the late 1650s until 1664, but they were far from achieved in practical naval policy. Naval policy after 1679 was guided by a long-term goal to achieve a fleet of 45 ships strong enough for the batde-line. Formal naval plans decided by the highest political authority in the state had to wait until the introduction of parliamentary rule after 1718, when the politi-

' T o m Glasgow, Jr, "Maturing of Naval Administration, 1556-1564", MM, 56, 1970, 3-26; A. P. M c G o w a n (ed.), The Jacobean Commissions of Enquiry, 1608 and 1618, Navy Records Society, 116, London, 1971, esp. 286-90; Brian Lavery, "The Rebuilding of British Warships, 1690-1740", MM, 63, 1977, 335-50. ^ Bellamy 2006; Ole L. Frantzen, Truslen Fra ost: Dansk-norsk flddepolitik, 17691807, Copenhagen, 1980. 5 Contract with Rickard Clerck 17/2 1615, RR; contracts with Rickard Clerck 6/11 1618 a n d 5/12 1622, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol, 1, fols 152-54, 174-76; two versions of a draft agreements 23/12 1624 with H e n r i k Hybertsson about the maintenance of the navy 1626-29, SH 71:1 and M 1779. See also Sveriges Sjokrig, 24-25.

warships and naval strength

317

cal system required more parliamentary legitimisation of goals than under dynastic rule. The first of several such plans was decided by the Parliament in 1722/' This chapter is an investigation of quantitative, administrative, and technical aspects of the Swedish navy's procurement of warships and their relation to naval policy and operational requirements. It has its focus on when, how, and where warships were built, bought, or captured for sea service; the size and types of warships; and the total size of the navy, expressed in number of warships and their approximate total displacement. Tosses, sales, and deletions of warships f r o m the effective strength of the navy are also discussed, because they usually determined the timing and volume of new construction. Because most Swedish warships were purpose-built for the navy, usually on yards administrated by the state, the state's shipbuilding activities are also a part of this chapter. The supply of material for building and repairing the ships (oak, fir and pine, tar and pitch, and iron for bolts and nails) is not a part of this chapter or of this study. The supply of material resources for the Swedish navy was a part of general problem of mobilising domestic resources through taxes and labour. It was not a problem of actually finding these resources, because they were readily available in Sweden. Several navies were dependent on imported timber, iron, and tar for shipbuilding, and the supply of these strategic products may have been a major problem for them. But the Swedish navy could rely on domestic resources and some products for shipbuilding; tar, high-quality iron for fastenings, and timber for mast and spars became important Swedish export products. Domestic oak existed in sufficient amount for naval construction until the 18th century, although at increasing cost, and partly because several provinces with a good supply of oak were conquered. Equipment and fittings, as well as guns that were interchangeable between ships, are treated in the next two chapters. This chapter depends primarily u p o n sources that provide information about where and when warships were built, their size, and their final fate. Basic information about all known warships of the Swedish navy is presented in a historical ship-list in Appendix 1, while the structure and total size of the navy f r o m 1520 to 1721 are summarised in Appendix 2. This information is not easily available in the

Naval plans after 1721: Svenska Flottans Historia,

II, 183-91; Glete

1993b.

318

c h a p t e r four

sources, and it has required a broad investigation of several archival series to find it. Before the 1620s, there was no central naval administration which kept track of its ships. When that administration was established with the Amiralitetskollegium, more centralised records were kept. Unfortunately, the accounts from the 17th-century naval administration have suffered large-scale destruction in later centuries. Consequently, it is necessary to study several sources f r o m many years to find out what actually happened to a particular ship f r o m the time it was laid down until it left the effective strength of the navy. Administrative sources which explicitly provide such information only exist for the period 1568 to the early 1590s in the yearly account of fittings (Skeppsrullan), and for the main fleet at Karlskrona from 1691 to 1721, in a document prepared by the administration of the Karlslcrona navy yard in the early 1720s.^ The historical ship-list used in this study has for the period up to 1610 been prepared by the present author from a detailed study of naval, ordnance, provisioning, and local accounts, the king's out-going letters, and other relevant sources at Riksarkivet and Krigsarkivet in Stocldiolm and Riksarkivet in Helsingfors.® It is not final in all details, but it is unlikely that future research may add much important information. For the years 1611-32, the ship-list published in the Navy Stafl^s study from 1937 (mainly written by Georg Hafstrom) about the navy in the reign of Gustav II Adolf has been useful, but the list for these years is prepared by the author from the sources. They have provided new information, especially about warships in the 1610s and the galleys.' For 1633-60, the list is prepared from original sources, ahhough notes from these sources made by Axel Zettersten in the 1890s and Hjalmar Borjeson from the 1920s until his death in 1945 have been useful for finding relevant information. I have frequently come to other conclusions than these two authors, but their published

' Skeppsrullan in SH, RA. Orlogsflottans till- och avtagande ifran Anno 1691 (until 1721), prepared by naval yard commissioner Fetter Elding, AK, Varvskontoret, Ovriga handlingar, KrA. ® Halldin 1963 provides information about naval shipbuilding f r o m a register of warships prepared by Statens Sjohistoriska M u s e u m d u r i n g the 1940s a n d 1950s. Hie 16th- and early 17th-century parts of this register (not prepared by Gustaf Halldin) are not reliable. The present author is indebted to Gustaf Halldin, w h o opened new methodical perspectives by his use of displacement in analysis of early m o d e r n shipbuilding, ' Sveriges Sjokrig, 31-38, 231-54. The (incomplete) card index, with sources for this ship-list is in Forsvarsstaben, Krigshistoriska avdelningen, Arbetsarkiv, Sjohistoriska detaljen, vols 9 - 1 3 , KrA.

warships and naval strength

319

and unpublished ship-lists for this period remain valuable pioneering efforts. For the period 1660 to 1699, my list relies on Borjeson's historical ship-list from 1936, which for the period up to 1680 is much dependent on Zettersten's list from 1903. I have checked these lists with the relevant sources and made a number of corrections and additions.'" For the years 1700-21, the lists prepared by Lars Otto Berg (the main fleet at Karlskrona and the Peipus flotilla), Ernst Bergman (the Gothenburg squadron), and Gunnar Unger (the Stockliolm squadron) provide the bulk of the information for the list in this book." The calculation of displacements for the historical ship-list has been made by the present author. Displacements are not mentioned in contemporary sources, although the displacement of some ships built 1694-1721 were calculated by naval architects later in the 18th century. A complete study with references to all sources used for Appendix 1 would fill a book of its own. In 1977 I published a detailed list with references for the period 1521-60.1 have treated the period 1561-1610 in working papers, which at present are available on the Internet.'^ The period 1611-60 also requires a more detailed list with sources, which I hope to be able to prepare in the future. In this chapter, only a selection of the sources are mentioned in the notes, mainly if they are important for naval policy-making. Because most of the information about naval shipbuilding and the strength of the navy up to 1610 is based on my own research and because shipbuilding policy up to the 1660s has been little studied, the chapter treats these years at some length. The period 1660 to 1721 is treated briefly, not because it is less important but because the basic facts are known from earlier studies.

Zettersten 1903, 305-21, 563-88; H j a l m a r Borjeson, Lists of Men-of-War, 16501700, Part III: Swedish ships, 1650-1699, London, 1936. A m o r e detailed version of Zettersten's ship-list for 1635 to 1680 is in Axel Ludvig Zetterstens arbetspapper, vol. 7, KrA, while his notes f r o m m i n u t e s of the Council and the Amimlitetskollegium, the king's out-going letters (Riksregistraturet), a n d the Amiralitetskollegium's in- a n d outletters are in vols 2 - 4 . H j a l m a r Borjeson's notes about Swedish warships f r o m the same sources and f r o m naval accounts are in H j a l m a r Borjesons samling, vols 2 (galleys) and 4 2 - 4 8 (saiUng ships), KrA. Zettersten's unpublished ship-list for the period 1522-1634 is in Axel Ludvig Zetterstens arbetspapper, vol. 7, KrA. The information he published f r o m it in Zettersten 1890 is often erroneous and cannot be used. " Berg 1970, 66-85; Lars Otto Berg, "Peipuseskaderns fartyg, 1701-1704": En tabellarisk framstallning", Forum navale, 22, 1965, 129-33; Ernst Bergman, Gamla Varvet vid Goteborg, 1660-1825, Goteborg, 1954, 227-34; G u n n a r l i n g e r s arkiv, vol. 1, KrA. Glete 1977; Ian Glete, Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1561-1570: Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1571-1590: Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1591-1599; Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1599-1610, http:// www2.historia.su.se/personal/jan_glete/.

320

c h a p t e r four

5.2 5.2.1

Technology, typology, and rating systems

Swedish warship types

Early modern warships were built in different sizes and to different designs for different tasks. Gradually, various systems of classification or rating of warships according to size and type developed in the European navies. These type names and rating systems cannot be used without knowledge of the historical and technical context. Type names and rating systems may be helpful to organise our understanding of the size and structure of the navies, but they have also been sources of much confusion. They were rarely the same in different navies, and some type names were used for widely different types of ships. Consequently, the correspondence between warship types and type names is often confusing. This phenomenon is well known also in modern navies, but today we have an abundance of sources which provide detailed information about the size, appearance, and capabilities of various ships. In contrast, a type name like galley, bark, or boyer may be the only surviving indication of the size, capability, and technical characteristics of a 16th-century warship. W e must use them, but we must also understand how they were used when the sources were produced.'^ Type names are used because we wish to briefly communicate differences and similarities, which we believe are important under certain circumstances. These circumstances may be technical, administrative, or operational, and the same ship may be given different designations by a shipbuilder, an administrator, or a sea officer. Type names are therefore not absolute categories and cannot be used schematically. They reflect the importance of technical development, the influence of bureaucracy, and the role of naval doctrine and operational requirements, and they must be used with an understanding of their context. Several type names from this period are derived from some special technical feature, usually the hull or the rig. These features were often not related to the naval function of the ship, and the same designation was frequently used for both warships and merchantmen. A technical innovation often stimulates interest to such an extent that it determines the type name, until the innovation has become so widespread

Glete 1993, 60-62.

warships and naval strength

321

that the type name no longer characterises a certain type of ship. In the early 16th century, the word carvel (Nordic and German kravel or kravell) became in Northern Europe a type name for heavily built, gun-armed warships, as the spread of carvel-building technology made it easier to build such ships. W h e n carvel building became normal for all larger warships and merchantmen, the type designation disappeared by the late 16th century. In Southern Europe, where carvelbuilding had been normal since antiquity, the word galleon (galion, galeao, galeon) became c o m m o n in the 16th century for large purposebuilt warships. It was possibly derived from the word galley {galea), the traditional purpose-built warship in the Mediterranean. Type names derived from the administrative process often concentrate on the size of the ship, as size determines the cost of construction, maintenance, and armament as well as the number of men it requires in active service. Classifications according to size are usually expressed in hierarchical rating systems: Great, Medium, Small; or 1st, 2nd, 3rd Rates, etc. Such systems may be useful for historians because they normally separate warships f r o m non-combatant vessels and emphasise the widely different sizes to which ships were built. They are, however, often schematical and potentially misleading if used uncritically. Classification of warships according to a naval doctrine is focused on the strategic and tactical role of different types of ships during operations. The most important of such classifications in this period was the formal separation of warships into major combatants, suitable for the battle-line, and smaller warships, primarily intended for reconnaissance, patrol, and escort duties and the carrying of dispatches. It was in reality nothing new, because large warships had been built for fighting other large ships and smaller units for various cruiser tasks since at least the 15th century. The formal introduction of the lineof-battle as the main tactical formation in the latter half of the 17th century meant, however, that the number of ships large enough to fight in that line became a c o m m o n European measurement of naval strength, often used in contemporary assessments of a state's power at sea. It has survived as such in modern naval historiography, often hiding the fact that there were great differences in size between small and large ships-of-the-line and that the m i n i m u m size radically increased from the 17th to the mid-19th century."

Glete 1993, appendix 2.

322

c h a p t e r four

In the Swedish navy, major gun-armed, three-masted (in a few cases four-masted) warships were from the 1520s to the 1720s normally simply called skepp (ship). Until the 1560s and occasionally later, the word kravell was used to specify that the warship was a carvel-built ship, that is, a ship with the strong hull associated with the carvel-hull technology. The word hoik was used until the 1550s to emphasise that the ship was built according to the traditional North European clinker technology or that the hull was short and had full lines, making it more suitable as a cargo carrier than as a warship. In the 1520s, most major Swedish warships were holkar, but after the war experiences of 1534-36, carvels were preferred as warships and no more holkar were built as warships. Several were built for the king from 1548 to 1555, but they were large merchantmen, not purpose-built warships. Hie type name hoik and probably also the type of ship disappear in the Swedish navy after 1560.'^ The word skepp (ship) is problematical as a classification because in the Swedish language it also was used as a general term for vessels of most sizes and types, except boats. This is visible f r o m the 1560s, when Swedish naval sources frequently refer to orlogsskepp (warships) as a general word for combatant vessels in order to distinguish them f r o m non-combatants (transports, storeships, and small craft) owned by the king. Orlogsskepp in this sense included small armed vessels, which otherwise were called bark, pinke, jakt, and bojort and it even included galleys. In the 17th century, orlogsskepp and skepp were practically synonymous. Both words were used for the three-masted warships of the navy, sometimes with exception of the smallest (see below). The word skeppsflotta (ship fleet) was also the normal word for the entire naval force, normally used in headings of list of all vessels belonging to the navy. From the late 17th century it is usually replaced with the word orlogsflotta (literarily "war fleet", but "navy" is a proper English translation). In the early decades of the 18th century, the type name frigate spread in several navies, including the Swedish, as the common designation

The English w o r d hulk has the same origin as Swedish hoik and Low G e r m a n hollick, but since at least the 17th century has meant an old, no longer seagoing ship. Consequently, it cannot be used as a translation. " English ship and G e r m a n Schiff are similarly used. In m o d e r n Swedish, the word fartyg is convenient as a general for all kind of h u m a n - m a d e mobile, floating objects. Tliere is no exact English equivalent.

warships and naval strength

323

for three-masted warships, too small to serve in the battle-line. After a few decades of uncertainty during which warships with two battery-decks but too small for the battle-line were called both ships and frigates, a formalisation took place in Sweden around 1720. Warships strong enough for the battle-line were called rangskepp or skepp, while smaller three-masted ships were called fregatter. Tlie word linjeskepp (ship-of-the-line) became c o m m o n only in the latter half of the 18th century. Smaller Swedish sailing warships (less than around 200 tonnes displacement) were in the 16th century usually called bark (bark), pinke (pink), bojort (boyer), and jakt (yacht). All terms are used in several European languages and have had widely different meanings in different periods of time. A bark (not to be confused with the 19th-century barque, a large sailing merchant ship) was a specialised warship, usually of around 100-150 tonnes displacement and heavily armed in relation to its size. It was built for speed, with a long and low hull, and several Swedish barks were explicitly called "long". Some were also occasionally called galleys, which probably mean that they had auxiliary oars. Galley hulls could be transformed into bark-shaped vessels, probably by being heightened."" Some barks had one gun of markedly larger calibre than the other guns, probably a bow centre-line gun firing forward like a galley. The type name bark was also used in England and France (barque) in the 16th century, as far as it is known for similar warships, although a few English barks were large ships. A pinke was usually smaller than a bark (normally less than 100 tonnes displacement) and had two or three masts. It is not known if they had the same narrow stern which was typical for cargo-carriers called pinks in the 17th and 18th centuries. Many Swedish warships with that type designation were small blockade-runners captured during the blockade of Narva between 1562 and 1581. Rich men frequently owned pinkor to travel with and this, as well as their use for blockaderunning and cruiser tasks show that they were swift and good sailers. Jakt was a traditional Nordic and German name for a small vessel with sharp lines built for speed rather than for carrying capacity. The difference between bark and jakt was fluent, although most jakter were small vessels of 10-50 tonnes displacement. Bojort was a Dutch

" In RR 12/1 1588, RA, l o h a n III stated that he did not wish to have some recently built galleys transformed (forbyggda) to barks.

324

c h a p t e r four

two-masted type of ship introduced in the Swedish navy in the 1530s. Its rig, with a large fore and aft sail on the mainmast, made it more suitable for sailing high in the wind than normal square-rigged ships.'® Around 1600, the type designations bark and pinke disappeared from the Swedish navy. Hie type numejakt was still in use, but mainly for small vessels for the court and the custom and postal services. Rich persons, who could afford to own a swift and comfortable vessel for travels, often acquired a ja/ct, which in 17th-century Sweden probably were of the Dutch jacht (yacht) type. In the early years of the 17th century, pinass (pinnace) was introduced as a new small type of warship, replacing barkar, pinkor, and jakter. The type name had existed in at least England in the 16th century and had its origin in a large oared craft. The first pinnaces were built by the foreign master shipwrights who came to Sweden around 1600, and it is likely that the type and the name were introduced by them. Early pinnaces had two or three masts, but the type name later was only used for small three-masted warships of around 100-300 tonnes displacement. It disappeared from the Swedish navy in the mid-17th century. The type name fregatt (frigate) appeared f r o m 1644 for a few small, long-hulled, three-masted ships of the same size as the pinnaces. It did not became a common Swedish type designation before 1700, however. Instead, small threemasted ships built for high speed were from the mid-17th century often called jaktskepp. From the mid-1620 until the late 1640s, a large number of small (usually 50-100 tonnes), shallow-draught craft, called struss(ar) were built for service in Prussia and Pomerania in support of the Swedish army operations. The type name was originally Slavic. Most of these were unarmed and intended for transport duties, although they could be armed with small guns or swivel-guns, when necessary. By the mid-17th century, the Dutch type designation bojort reappeared for a considerable number of minor two-masted warships, usually smaller than 100 tonnes. Another type designation for two-masted warships of that size was galliot, apparently due to differences in the rig. The type names struss, bojort, and galliot were frequently used to describe the same craft, depending on if ft was classified according to the shape of the hull or the rig. By the 1670s, bojort had become a general admin-

The introduction of bojorter in the Swedish navy and the initial difficulties in finding seamen who could handle their unusual rig, Glete 1976, 35.

warships and naval strength

325

istrative type-name for larger two-masted vessels. Warships with these type names were not built after 1680, although the word galliot survived into the 18th century navy as a type name for two-masted, lightly armed naval transports. In the late 1690s, a new two-masted warship, brigantin, with square sails on two masts and a large mizzen sail on the after mast, was introduced in Sweden, where it became the common minor sailing warship. A special type of minor warship appeared in Sweden f r o m 1698: the bomb ketch, called bombkits in Swedish. It was armed with two large-calibre mortars intended for bombarding towns and fortresses with shells (French bombe). The Swedish bombkits was similar in size and function to the type of vessel which was designed in France in 1680s. This type rapidly spread to other European navies, although in small numbers. The Swedish navy used numerous vessels more or less specialised for warfare in archipelagos and shallow waters. Skdrbdt (in the 16th century, skarjebdt, "archipelago boat") was a large boat or small jakt, undecked or decked, which was c o m m o n among the population in the Swedish and Finnish archipelagos. It might be armed with light guns. Skarbdtar were used by the 16th-century local administration, and the type name reappeared in the early 18th-century archipelago flotillas, usually for privately owned boats temporarily armed as warships. Lodja (from Russian lodka, boat) was a large boat for rivers, lakes, and inshore waters inspired by Russian river craft. They were built in large numbers from the 1580s and until the late 17th century, but most of them had no names and do not appear as individual vessels in naval accounts and lists of warships. At least from the 1630s, they were built (or supposed to be built) by the local communities to standardised naval design. They were supposed to be kept ready to transport the navy's batsman (seamen) f r o m their local homes (typically 25 men in one lodja) to Stockholm, after which the navy could use them for inshore or amphibious operations. This system ceased to operate after the transfer of the main naval base from Stockholm to Karlskrona, possibly earlier." Galej (galley, Italian galea) was the normal Swedish name for the main type of oared warship, until it was replaced by galdr (French galere) in the 18th century. A real Mediterranean galley was a long.

Zettersten

1903, 78-79.

326

c h a p t e r four

narrow, low-hulled, and lightly built vessel, primarily designed to be easy to row. In order to achieve speed with a large number of oarsmen, the deck and the benches for the oarsmen were extended outside of the narrow hull. Galleys always had sails, and if oarsmen were unavailable, small crews of seamen could operate them as sailing vessels. Galleys had their main armament in the bow, typically one heavy centre-line gun flanked by two or four lighter guns. There were numerous swivelguns along the sides of the hull. Because of their manoeuvrability and shallow draught, galleys were superior to sailing warships in narrow and shallow waters, such as Swedish and Finnish archipelagos. Until the mid-16th century, galleys with heavy guns were dangerous opponents to sailing warship in the open sea, but they gradually became vulnerable to sailing warships when these became heavier armed and easier to handle. Galleys in the Baltic were usually manned with soldiers as oarsmen, which made them useful in amphibious warfare until the late 18th century, when they were replaced by gunboats. In the early 18th century, Sweden and Denmark built shallowdraught ships with heavy armament for archipelago warfare and harbour defence, called skottprdm, blockskepp or floating battery. These navies also built a few ships and frigates with shallow draught and heavy guns, which were optimised for coastal warfare. Some type names were exclusively used for transport vessels: krejare (crayer), skuta (a small cargo vessel), pram (pram, barge), katt (cat-ship), flojt (fleut), or the functionally descriptive lastdragare (transport). Many such vessels existed in the navy and in the civilian administration but they are not included in this study. 5.2.2

Swedish rating systems

Before 1611, classifications of Swedish warship according to type were very rare in ship-lists and naval accounts. A separation of warships into sailing ships and galleys exists in a few accounts and ship-lists from the 1550s and 1560s, when the galleys were numerous.^" A separation of warships (orlogsskepp) and non-combatant vessels became normal in the accounts and ship-lists from the 1560s. At the same time, most of the accounts connected with the navy were separated

Inventory 8/11 1552, S M H F 1:10; a plan for m a n n i n g and provisioning of the fleet in 1557, S M H F 1:16; two undated lists f r o m a r o u n d 1560, M 1761; a ship-list f r o m early 1565, S M H F 2:6, all RA.

warships and naval strength

327

from accounts for castles and royal manors {Landskapshandlingar) into separate accounts for the shipyards {Skeppsgdrdshandlingar). Hiis separated most small transports and miscellaneous craft, normally unarmed and used by the local administration, f r o m the navy, "the King's warships". Even if there was no rating system to divide warships into size categories, most 16th-century ship-lists and naval accounts (expenditure of material, inventories of equipment and guns on warships, provision accounts, and wage accounts) are arranged in a fairly strict order. They start with the largest ships and continue down to minor craft, usually keeping the galleys together in a group between larger warships and minor craft. Those who prepared the accounts must have good personal knowledge of the size and type of the ships. Before the 1620s, only one ship-list, f r o m early 1565, has been found where the size of the warships is given in Idster, apparently based on a careful if approximate estimate of the size of each individual ship. This list may have resulted from the dramatic expansion of the navy in the first half of the 1560s, which necessitated more systematic information about the size of the ships.^' Ldster is, like tons, actually a measurement of a merchant ship's capacity to carry cargo. Its use to measure warships must be seen as a bureaucratic form of handling a difficuft subject, the size of warships. This rudimentary system of organising lists and accounts did not survive the upheavals in the 1590s, which caused a breakdown of regular naval accounting. When naval accounts from 1599 once more were prepared in a more systematic fashion, much of the earlier order is lost. Sailing warships of various sizes—galleys, small craft, and transport ships—are mixed in the same account without any headings and frequently with little attention to their size. The task of keeping order on the many ships in Karl IX's navy was apparently beyond what the non-naval fiscal administrators who prepared these accounts could achieve. Because at least some accounts were reviewed by the king, we may suspect that he was uninterested in analysing his ships in a hierarchical fashion.^^

Ship-list 1565, draft in M 1272, final version, S M H F 2:6, all RA. ^^ For example SH 55:3, RA, the Stockholm shipyard account of 1604, were according to a note on t h e m reviewed by Karl IX on 27/9 1608. Note the long delay in preparing these accounts, which indicates that the king was served with outdated information f r o m his over-strained administrators.

328

c h a p t e r four

This suddenly changed in 1611. In spring that year, a m e m o r a n d u m was prepared with a list of ships available in Stocldiolm and the repair or additional work they required to make them ready for active service. It continued with a calculation of how much manpower, material, provisions, and money the Stoclcholm shipyard required to make them ready for sea. This was obviously a response to the Danish attack on Kalmar at this time. In this paper, ships were divided into orlogsskepp (warships), pinasser (pinnaces), proviantskepp (storeships), gallejor (galleys), and pramar (prams)." In an (undated) list of ships f r o m the autumn of 1613, which has belonged to Axel Oxenstierna's papers (the Tid5 collection), the same division into orlogsskepp, pinasser, and galejor is used, and transports and small craft are placed under various headings according to their type names (jakt, pram, krejare, skuta, lodja). The same system may be found in manning plans for 1614 and 1615, except that the heading "pinnaces" is replaced by "small ships" in the latter.^'' From this time, ships were again normally listed according to their size, as they had been until the 1590s. In a plan of the future permanent army and navy, written around 1615-16 by Axel Oxenstierna, a further separation of the warships into royalskepp, lagom^^ orlogsskepp, and pinasser appeared for the first time.^'^ The three size groups are the same as in the contracts about rigging concluded in 1618 and 1622."' A further division into size groups was made in a detailed naval budget, prepared for 1621, with a list of the entire navy and estimates of how much it would cost to man and provision it. In that, the ships are divided into eight realskepp, ten orlogsskepp, ten mindre (smaller) orlogsskepp, six pinasser, and 23 farkoster (miscellaneous smaller vessels, including galleys, jakter, and prams). The same rating system (but differently applied) was used in

Ett kortfdrslag, SMHF 7:6, RA. The paper is not dated but it can be dated by the ships listed in it. Kort besked, M 1761; Kort fdrslag... 1614, S M H F 7:10; Kortfdrslag. . till 1615, S M H F 7:8, all RA. " It is almost proverbial that the Swedish w o r d lagom cannot be properly translated into English. In this case its nearest m e a n i n g is "normal" or "middle-sized". It was apparently only used in this paper and m a y reflect Axel Oxenstierna's personal thinking. AOSB 1:1,366-69. According to Zeftersten 1890,329 this division exists in accounts f r o m 1617, SH 67, RA. Unfortunately, they are n o w too damaged to be consulted. " RR 23/10 1618, RA, where the six largest ships are called "stora skepp", and Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 174-76, 5/12 1622, RA, where the ten largest are called "regalskepp".

warships and naval strength

a revised stat f o r 1622.^'^ Royalskepp

a n d realskepp

329

are n o t p o s s i b l e

to t r a n s l a t e i n t o E n g l i s h o r m o d e r n S w e d i s h , b u t t h e m e a n i n g is t h e largest s h i p s in t h e navy.^' I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e t e r m " S h i p s R o y a l " f o r t h e largest s h i p s a p p e a r e d i n t h e E n g l i s h n a v y in t h e r a t i n g s y s t e m u s e d b y t h e C o m m i s s i o n of E n q u i r y , led b y t h e civilian a d m i n i s t r a tor Sir Lionel C r a n f i e l d in 1618 as a p a r t of t h e r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h a t navy.^" A f t e r 1622, lists of S w e d i s h w a r s h i p s n o l o n g e r d i v i d e d t h r e e - m a s t e d w a r s h i p s i n t o d i f f e r e n t size categories. O n l y galleys, strussar,

and other

small vessels a r e listed u n d e r s e p a r a t e h e a d i n g s . F r o m t h e 1620s a n d the early 1630s, a f e w lists e s t i m a t e t h e size of t h e sailing w a r s h i p s in leister. T h e o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n of t h i s w a s p r o b a b l y t o q u a n t i f y t h e n a v y a n d its costs in t h e p e r i o d w h e n it w a s m a i n t a i n e d b y e n t r e p r e n e u r s . This m a y t o s o m e e x t e n t h a v e m a d e t h e size of t h e s h i p s " n e g o t i a b l e " , a n d t h e size in Idster in t h e s e lists is n o t always c o n s i s t e n t w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h f i g u r e s a b o u t d i m e n s i o n s , crew, a n d a r m a m e n t . ^ ' The i n t r o d u c t i o n of a s y s t e m a t i c classification of t h e n a v y ' s s h i p s m a y b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of G o r a n G y l l e n s t i e r n a t o d e p u t y a d m i r a l in 1610 a n d t o riksamiml

in 1612. B u t it c o n t i n u e s

after his d e a t h in 1618 a n d , as s o m e early lists a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h h i s cousin, t h e C h a n c e l l o r Axel O x e n s t i e r n a , it is p r o b a b l e t h a t it w a s h e w h o asked f o r s o m e o r d e r in t h e ship-lists. H i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s r e q u i r e classification s y s t e m s , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a c o m p l e x o r g a n i sation like t h e n a v y r e q u i r e s t o o l s t o a n a l y s e size. O x e n s t i e r n a was, already in t h e 1610s, c o m m i t t e d to a p o l i c y of m a k i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e of the state m o r e a r t i c u l a t e d a n d t r a n s p a r e n t a n d easier t o e v a l u a t e a n d

SH 69:6; S M H F 8:2, RA. ® I h e words real, royal, and regal could, in early m o d e r n Swedish (and n o d o u b t in other languages too), be used as a synonym ior great or large, see Svenska Akademiens Ordbok. Zettersten 1890, 329 listed royalskepp, realskepp, and regalskepp as possible spellings but chose to use the latter. In Sveriges Sjokrig, 24-25, the spelling realskepp is used, but otherwise regalskepp has been n o r m a l in m o d e r n Swedish, often used in connection with the Vasa and Kronan projects. In 17th-century documents, the spelling regalskepp hardly ever appears. Realskepp is the most c o m m o n form. McGowan 1971, 287. O n p. xxii, the editor m e n t i o n s that the term "Ship Royal" for ship of the 1st rank is confusing and believes that it was so already to c o n t e m p o rary Englishmen. " List of warships in contract with Rickard Clerck, RR 12/8 1626; comparative lists of the nav)f in c.1622 and in 1626 prepared in connection with Clerck's contract f r o m August 1626, placed in SH 70:8; undated list (without d o u b t f r o m 1632) of the navy and an undated list of part of the navy f r o m c.1634, both f r o m Tidosamlingen (probably Axel Oxenstierna's working papers), n o w in M 1761, all RA.

330

c h a p t e r four

g o v e r n . S t r u c t u r e d ship-lists, w h i c h w i t h a q u i c k g l a n c e m a d e t h e size a n d s t r u c t u r e of t h e n a v y easy t o g r a s p f o r l a y m e n a n d civilian a d m i n i s t r a t o r s like h i m , a r e u s e f u l in s u c h efforts. It is p o s s i b l e t h a t G u s t a v 11 A d o l f f o u n d classifications less i m p o r t a n t a n d c e a s e d t o ask f o r t h e m . If t h e k i n g h a d f o u n d t h e m i m p o r t a n t , t h e y w o u l d c e r t a i n l y h a v e b e e n u s e d r e g u l a r l y t h r o u g h o u t h i s reign. O n 8 O c t o b e r 1633, Axel O x e n s t i e r n a , n o w t h e l e a d i n g m e m b e r of a r e g e n c y g o v e r n m e n t f o r Q u e e n C h r i s t i n a , s e n t a l o n g letter f r o m F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n a b o u t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d political q u e s t i o n s to t h e C o u n c i l in S t o c k h o l m . It i n c l u d e d a p l a n f o r t h e f u t u r e n a v y in w h i c h h e r e i n t r o d u c e d a d e t a i l e d classification s c h e m e t h a t d e f i n e d t h e size a n d s t r u c t u r e of t h e navy. T h e t h r e e - m a s t e d w a r s h i p s w e r e d i v i d e d i n t o six g r o u p s called realskepp,

stora (large), orlogsskepp,

orlogsskepp,

minsta

mindre

a n d pinasser?^

(small), orlogsskepp,

(smallest),

rdtta

orlogsskepp,

A c o r r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n of t h e S w e d i s h w o r d rdtta in this

s c h e m e is h a r d l y possible; " p r o p e r " o r " n o r m a l " m a y c o m e close. It m a y h a v e b e e n O x e n s t i e r n a ' s p e r s o n a l w a y of e x p r e s s i n g h i m s e l f , a n d it w a s n o t u s e d in p r a c t i c e . A slightly s i m p l i f i e d r a t i n g s y s t e m was, f r o m at least t h e 1640s, u s e d in t h e n a v a l a c c o u n t s , w h e r e m a j o r w a r s h i p s w e r e listed as realskepp,

stora

sized), a n d smd

w h i l e s m a l l e r vessels a n d t r a n s p o r t s

(small) skepp,

(large), medelmdttiga

(middle-

w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r several d i f f e r e n t h e a d i n g s , a c c o r d i n g t o type. I n t h e n a v a l a c c o u n t s , this s y s t e m w a s u s e d i n t o t h e 1670s, a l t h o u g h i n p r a c t i c e it b e c a m e s o m e w h a t i m p r e c i s e b e c a u s e t w o o r t h r e e cate g o r i e s of s h i p s w e r e o f t e n listed u n d e r a c o m m o n h e a d i n g . O t h e r w i s e it is o n l y k n o w n f r o m t h r e e lists f r o m 1640 a n d 1 6 4 2 , " a list f r o m 1647 w i t h a d d i t i o n s f r o m 1648, a list f r o m 7 F e b r u a r y 1649,^'' a n d a n u n d a t e d list f r o m O x e n s t i e r n a ' s collection. It t h e n d i s a p p e a r s a n d is n o t u s e d in n a v a l p l a n s p r e p a r e d i n 1649, c.1660, a n d 1664. It w a s r e v i v e d ( p r o b a b l y f r o m t h e a c c o u n t s ) in t h e r e p o r t a b o u t n a v a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f r o m 1660 t o 1672, w h i c h t h e Amiralitetskollegium,

domi-

n a t e d b y m e n of n o n - n a v a l b a c k g r o u n d , p r e p a r e d i n late 1672 w h e n it d e s c r i b e d its activities d u r i n g t h e r e g e n c y f o r K a r l X I . F r o m

the

" HSH 26, 23135, also in AOSB 1:1, 462-65. " List 1/1 1640, M 1761; SS Z 2829, Z 2833, all RA. ^^ NNS II, 12a, KrA. Plan of 1649, M 1753, RA; u n d a t e d plan, 1659/60 in M 1761, RA; plan presented to the Parliament in 1664, AK, protokoll 29/7 1664, KiA; Wendt 1950, 215; AK till Kunglig Majestat, vol. 1, 14/12 1672, RA.

warships and naval strength

331

1640s, it b e c a m e c o m m o n t o d e s c r i b e large s h i p s as "capital s h i p s " (kapitalskepp),

a Latin f o r m of t h e o l d N o r d i c t e r m f o r large w a r s h i p s ,

huvudskepp?'' A n o t h e r r a t i n g s y s t e m w a s i n t r o d u c e d in t h e late 17th c e n t u r y , w h e n t h r e e - m a s t e d s h i p s w e r e d i v i d e d i n t o six r a t e s {rang), w i t h t h e first f o u r rates b e i n g s h i p s i n t e n d e d f o r t h e b a t t l e line. A r a t i n g s y s t e m a l r e a d y existed at t h i s t i m e in t h e English, F r e n c h , a n d D u t c h navies, a l t h o u g h they are n o t exactly c o m p a r a b l e . T h e first k n o w n S w e d i s h ship-list w i t h six rates w a s p r e p a r e d in 1697 in K a r l s k r o n a , f o r t h e y o u n g Karl XII, the P a r l i a m e n t , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n S t o c k h o l m . It w a s i n c l u d e d in a r e p o r t w h i c h w a s i n t e n d e d t o s h o w t h e g r e a t i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e n a v y since 1680. I n S w e d e n , t h i s r a t i n g s y s t e m d i d n o t last long.^^ Instead, t h e n a v y g r a d u a l l y b e g a n t o u s e a s y s t e m t h a t d i v i d e d t h r e e m a s t e d w a r s h i p s i n t o s h i p s s u i t a b l e f o r t h e b a t t l e line {skepp, skepp, later linjeskepp)

a n d fregatter.

their type n a m e s : brigantin,

bombkits,

rang-

S m a l l e r u n i t s w e r e classified b y galej, etc. Like in o t h e r navies,

b a t d e s h i p s ( s h i p s - o f - t h e - l i n e ) w e r e , f r o m t h e early 18th c e n t u r y , u s u ally classified b y t h e i r n u m b e r s of g u n s . T h a t s y s t e m w a s o f t e n m i s leading, as t h e calibre of t h e g u n s o f t e n v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y w i t h i n t h e s a m e "rate", b u t it s e e m s t o h a v e s e r v e d t h e p u r p o s e of c o m m u n i c a t ing t h e size a n d s t r u c t u r e of t h e n a v y to n o n - n a v a l p o l i c y - m a k e r s a n d administrators. Swedish rating systems were either used by m e n w h o administrated t h e n a v y w i t h o u t b e i n g sea officers (Axel O x e n s t i e r n a , n a v a l a c c o u n tants) o r b y sea officers w h o a d d r e s s e d n o n - n a v a l p o l i c y - m a k e r s . Sea officers, a p p a r e n t l y also k i n g s , u n d e r s t o o d t h e size of t h e s h i p s w h e n they s a w t h e i r a r m a m e n t , m a n p o w e r r e q u i r e m e n t s , a n d d i m e n s i o n s in a list, o r t h e y s i m p l y k n e w t h e i n d i v i d u a l size of t h e 3 0 - 4 0 m a j o r w a r ships w h i c h t h e n a v y n o r m a l l y h a d . T h e D a n i s h n a v y , w h i c h w a s of t h e s a m e size, h a d n o f o r m a l r a t i n g s y s t e m , b u t b y t h e e a r l y 18th c e n t u r y t h e a r m a m e n t w a s sufficiently s t a n d a r d i s e d t o m a k e n u m b e r of g u n s into a c o n v e n i e n t r a t i n g s y s t e m . T h e d e t a i l e d r a t i n g s y s t e m s w i t h six

Kapitalskepp a n d realskepp were practically s y n o n y m o u s in Swedish; see two ship lists dated 25/11 1645, where the draft has kapitalskepp a n d the final version realskepp for the same ships, N N S II, 12a, KrA, ' ' Several lists in M 1762, RA, N N S II, 12a, KrA, a n d Nordinska samlingen, 893, UUB. The 1697 report, R 4871, RA. In this report there are also lists of the navy in 1675 and 1680, divided into six rates, but this rating m u s t have been m a d e in 1697. N o rating system is used in the next report f r o m Amiralitetskollegium to the Parliament, that of 1713, R 4878, RA.

332

c h a p t e r four

rates in E n g l a n d , seven charters {and fregates

in t h e D u t c h RepubUc, a n d five ranges

legeres as a sixth) in F r a n c e w e r e i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g t h e

g r o w t h of g r e a t b a t t l e fleets f r o m 1650 t o 1680 a n d r e m a i n e d in u s e f o r l o n g p e r i o d s of t i m e . Tliey w e r e p r o b a b l y u s e f u l t o k e e p o r d e r o n m u c h l a r g e r n u m b e r of ships, b u t t h e y also b e c a m e p a r t of a d m i n i s t r a tive a n d political d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . Tliat n e v e r h a p p e n e d in Sweden.^®

5.2.3

Master shipwrights and naval

technology

H i e t e c h n i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t of S w e d i s h w a r s h i p d e s i g n u n t i l 1721 c a n b e s t u d i e d f r o m m a n y w r i t t e n s o u r c e s , several m o d e l s , s o m e d r a w i n g s , a n d t h e results of a r c h a e o l o g i c a l e x c a v a t i o n s . C e n t r a l o b j e c t s i n s u c h s t u d i e s a r e t h e r e c r u i t m e n t a n d t r a i n i n g of s h i p b u i l d e r s , t h e d i m e n s i o n s of w a r s h i p s , a r m a m e n t w e i g h t in p r o p o r t i o n t o d i s p l a c e m e n t , a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s (king, a d m i r a l s , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ) a n d t h e s h i p w r i g h t s w h o b u i l t t h e ships. W i t h m o r e k n o w l e d g e of s u c h facts, w e c a n s t u d y t h e d e s i g n p r o c e s s , t h e develo p m e n t of n e w m e t h o d s f o r b u i l d i n g w a r s h i p s w i t h s t r o n g e r hulls, g r e a t e r s e a w o r t h i n e s s , a n d b e t t e r sailing qualities, a n d t h e i n f l u e n c e of timber supply on shipbuilding. This s e c t i o n is o n l y a b r i e f o v e r v i e w of o n e i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of naval technology: the master shipwrights w h o were responsible for the c o n s t r u c t i o n of m a j o r w a r s h i p s . T h e i r o r i g i n a n d b a c k g r o u n d a r e of special i m p o r t a n c e as s h i p w r i g h t s f r o m d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of E u r o p e w e r e t r a i n e d i n d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s of h o w t o d e s i g n s h i p s a n d b u i l d hulls. It is o b v i o u s f r o m t h e s o u r c e s t h a t m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s w e r e t h e k e y p e r s o n s in n a v a l t e c h n o l o g y a n d t h a t t h e y , i n s p i t e of t h e i r n o t v e r y h i g h social p o s i t i o n , o f t e n w e r e i n close c o n t a c t w i t h d e c i s i o n - m a k ers o n t h e h i g h e s t level. B i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e i r f a m i lies is i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e t h e t r a n s f e r of t e c h n i c a l k n o w - h o w b e t w e e n g e n e r a t i o n s o f t e n w a s a p a r t of f a m i l y strategies f o r p r o v i d i n g c a r e e r opportunities Rather m u c h has been written about a few Dutch- and English-born m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s of t h e 17th c e n t u r y , a b o u t t h e S h e l d o n f a m i l y a n d Fredrik H e n r i k (af) C h a p m a n . M o s t master shipwrights d u r i n g these t w o c e n t u r i e s , h o w e v e r , a r e little k n o w n . Several 1 6 t h - c e n t u r y m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s a r e k n o w n o n l y b y t h e i r first n a m e ( M a s t e r H a n s , M a s t e r

European rating system: Glete 1993, 80-86, 189-91, 208-10, 225, 260-61, 2 6 8 70, 278.

warships and naval strength

333

Jakob, etc.)> a n d it is difficult t o b e c e r t a i n a b o u t t h e i r i d e n t i t y a n d origin. H i e r e is n o lack of s o u r c e s f o r f u r t h e r s t u d i e s , f o r w a g e lists of s h i p w r i g h t s w o r k i n g f o r t h e k i n g a r e p r e s e r v e d s i n c e t h e 1520s. D e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of s u c h lists w o u l d p r o b a b l y reveal t h e c a r e e r p a t h s of m a n y senior and junior master shipwrights. Until detailed biographical i n f o r m a t i o n is available, o n l y s o m e p r e l i m i n a r y c o n c l u s i o n s c a n be m a d e . ' ' K i n g G u s t a v I's first k n o w n m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t w a s M a s t e r H a n s , w h o w o r k e d at t h e Stoclcholm y a r d u n t i l 1532.'*" H e w a s in c h a r g e of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Store Kravelen,

o n e of t h e largest w a r s h i p s in

E u r o p e at t h a t t i m e . I n 1533, M a s t e r H a n s w a s s u c c e e d e d b y J a k o b O l s s o n , w h o a r o u n d 1540 w a s r e p l a c e d b y J a k o b H e n r i k s s o n , p r o b a b l y identical w i t h t h e s h i p w r i g h t called J a k o b L a i c h o o r F i n s k e Jakob."" Jakob H e n r i k s s o n h a d b e e n a j u n i o r m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t f o r several years b e f o r e 1540 a n d m a y h a v e b e e n o n e of t h e m a n y s h i p w r i g h t s w h o w e r e r e c r u i t e d t o t h e y a r d f r o m F i n l a n d . H e c o n t i n u e d as t h e leading shipbuilder in S t o c k h o l m until a r o u n d

1557, w i t h

Master

H o l l i n g e r ( H o l g e r ) O l s s o n as his deputy."*^ A r o u n d 1 5 5 7 - 5 8 , c h a n g e s t o o k place. A n e w D u t c h m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t . M a s t e r A d r i a n o r A d r i a n H o l l a n d e r , b e c a m e t h e t e c h n i c a l l e a d e r at t h e S t o c k h o l m s h i p y a r d . M a s t e r H o l l i n g e r w e n t t o t h e n e w y a r d at B j o r k e n a s , n o r t h of K a l m a r , w h e r e h e b e c a m e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t w o m a j o r ships, i n c l u d i n g t h e g r e a t Mars,

b u i l t 1 5 6 1 - 6 3 . H e m u s t h a v e b e e n a n old

m a n b y t h e n , a n d h e is n o t m e n t i o n e d a f t e r 1564. A M a s t e r J a k o b a p p e a r e d at t h e s h i p y a r d at A b o in 1558, w h e r e u n t i l at least 1565 he was in c h a r g e of t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of several l a r g e warships."'' It is n o t k n o w n if h e is J a k o b H e n r i k s s o n , w h o h a d w o r k e d at Stoclcholm until 1557, b u t t h e t i m i n g of h i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d his p r o b a b l e f a m i l y

' ' Biographical information about master shipwrights up to 1634: Zettersten 1890, 243-319. It has been used in this section, although s o m e of it is erroneous. Hjalmar Borjesons samling, vol. 25, KrA, has a useful collection of notes about 17th- and 18thcentury master shipwrights. Master shipwrights 1527-1560: Gkte 1977, 105. '' GR 17, 4 6 3 - 6 4 (26/7 1545), where Gustav I donates a house in Stockliolm to the shipbuilder Jakob Laicho for his services. The n a m e Laicho is Finnish and he had a brother Erik Laicho in Abo in Finland. Hollinger or Holger Olsson was paid as one of the senior shipwrights f r o m at least 1533, Rantekammarbocker, RA. In 1540 the king gave h i m a house in Stockholm, GR 13, 50 (31/5-5/6 1540). H e sold it in 1564 SST, 11:3, 264. Accounts f r o m Abo castie, including the shipyard in K 340-41, RA; FRA 710 (1558), FRA 897, foL 64 (1561), FRA 991, fol. 45 (1564), FRA 1016, fols 51, 61 (1565).

334

c h a p t e r four

connections in Abo makes this plausible. A Master Jakob was also in charge of the construction of two large ships at Alvsborg in 1562-63. He is probably the same m a n who normally was at the Abo yard, considering that he is not k n o w n to have been in charge of any major s h i p b u i l d i n g t h e r e b e t w e e n m i d - 1 5 6 2 a n d 1564."''' Tlie c o n s t r u c t i o n of large w a r s h i p s ceased at Stocldiolm after 1562. F r o m 1563 until 1571, H e n r i k M a t s s o n was in c h a r g e of t h e m a i n s h i p y a r d , w h e r e h e led m a i n t e n a n c e a n d r e p a i r of t h e rapidly g r o w i n g force of w a r s h i p s . M a s t e r A d r i a n , w h o p r i m a r i l y was u s e d for i m p o r t a n t n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k s , m o v e d in 1562"*^ to the n e w y a r d at Vastervik, w h e r e until 1567 h e built t h r e e m a j o r w a r s h i p , c u l m i n a t i n g w i t h t h e great Neptunus ( r e n a m e d Rode Draken), l a u n c h e d in 1566. H e p r o b a b l y d i e d s o o n afterwards."*® A M a s t e r Sigfrid is m e n t i o n e d at t h e H e l s i n g f o r s y a r d in 1564 a n d was p r o b a b l y in c h a r g e of t h e t h r e e w a r s h i p s built t h e r e f r o m 1563 to 1566. M a s t e r Sigfrid, m e n t i o n e d at K a l m a r f r o m 1567 to 1575, is likely to have b e e n t h e s a m e m a n , b e c a u s e n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n at H e l s i n g f o r s ceased after 1566."'^ W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of M a s t e r A d r i a n , t h e n a t i o n a l i t y of t h e first gene r a t i o n s of Swedish m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s is n o t k n o w n f o r certain. Their n a m e s m a y be Swedish, N o r d i c , or G e r m a n . A G e r m a n s h i p b u i l d e r d o e s n o t necessarily m e a n a n i m m i g r a n t , b e c a u s e t h e r e h a d b e e n G e r m a n families c o n n e c t e d w i t h t r a d e a n d s h i p p i n g living in S w e d e n for g e n e r a t i o n s . G u s t a v I's policy s e e m s to h a v e b e e n t h a t skilled shipw r i g h t s w e r e t r a i n e d at his Stocldiolm y a r d to b e c o m e m a s t e r shipwrights. B o t h Jakob H e n r i k s s o n a n d H o l l i n g e r O l s s o n h a d served as d e p u t y m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s at S t o c k h o l m b e f o r e t h e y b e c a m e m a s t e r s . The large s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m s of t h e 1560s m u s t h a v e given several s h i p w r i g h t s o p p o r t u n i t i e s to l e a r n t h e t r a d e of a j u n i o r m a s t e r , a n d it is p r o b a b l e t h a t it was f r o m t h e m t h a t a n e w g e n e r a t i o n of m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s a p p e a r e d in t h e 1570s.

SH 8:8 (1562). Zettersten 1890, 269, suggests that Jakob at Alvsborg was Jakob Richter, but this was a well-kiiown builder of royal castles, who is unlikely to have been involved in shipbuilding. Adrian is listed as the most senior m e m b e r of the staff of the Stockholm yard in 1564, but he did not receive any salary there, SH 11:1, RA. His presence in Vastervik in 1562, Smalands handlingar 1562:2, RA. Adrian is m e n t i o n e d as dead in a list f r o m 1564 of senior office-holders, but that note is added later, Bestallningsregister 1564, RA. FRA 3245, fol. 6 (1564); Loningsregister, vols 14-15 (1567-70), vol. 16 (157475), RA; SH 26:4 (1571), RA.

warships and naval strength

335

W h e n t h e d e c e n t r a h s e d s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m s t a r t e d in 1572, a lack of m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s w a s r e p o r t e d , b u t b e c a u s e several s h i p s w e r e i n d e e d built, m e n w i t h t h e r e q u i r e d skills m u s t h a v e b e e n found.'*® N o r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m a b r o a d o r o u t s i d e t h e n a v y is visible in J o h a n I l l ' s m a n y letters a b o u t s h i p b u i l d i n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y , it is p r o b a b l e t h a t m o s t n e w m a s t e r s h a d w o r k e d u n d e r t h e o l d m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s in t h e 1550s a n d 1560s a n d l e a r n t t h e i r m e t h o d s of b u i l d i n g large, g u n - a r m e d , carvel-hulled w a r s h i p s . T h e r e is n o t r a c e of t h a t a n y of t h e m h a d b e e n sent a b r o a d t o s t u d y f o r e i g n t e c h n o l o g y . O u r p r e l i m i n a r y c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t t h e y c o n t i n u e d t o b u i l d in t h e t r a d i t i o n t h a t h a d d e v e l o p e d in S w e d e n u n d e r G u s t a v I a n d E r i k X I V a n d t h a t t h e y k n e w r a t h e r little a b o u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of w a r s h i p d e s i g n a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n o u t s i d e t h e Baltic r e g i o n . Bertil H e n r i k s s o n ,

Eskil J a k o b s s o n , M a t s

Roland,

and

Markus

M a t s s o n b e c a m e t h e l e a d i n g m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s in t h e 1570s. Bertil H e n r i k s s o n ( s o n of H e n r i k M a t s s o n ? ) b u i l t t h e largest s h i p of t h e 1570s, Smalands

Lejonet,

at V a s t e r v i k i n S m a l a n d . I n 1578 h e m o v e d

with t h e s h i p b u i l d e r s t o t h e n e w y a r d at D r a k e n a s in S m a l a n d , w h e r e he laid d o w n a g r e a t ship, later n a m e d Julius Caesar. H e d i e d in 1581."''' The o t h e r t h r e e s h i p w r i g h t s also led c o n s t r u c t i o n of large ships, a n d they w e r e m a s t e r s at Stoclcholm d u r i n g v a r i o u s years. M a r k u s M a t s s o n is m a i n l y k n o w n f r o m v a r i o u s y a r d s in F i n l a n d f r o m 1576 u n t i l 1604. Eskil J a k o b s s o n , p e r h a p s t h e s o n of o n e of t h e earlier m a s t e r s w i t h t h e n a m e Jakob, in 1 5 8 1 - 8 4 w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e great s h i p at D r a k e n a s (Julius

Caesar),

w h i c h f r o m 1585 t o 1589 w a s

c o m p l e t e d b y J a k o b E r i k s s o n . M a t s R o l a n d ' s s e c o n d n a m e is u n u s u a l a n d m a y i n d i c a t e a f o r e i g n o r i g i n , b u t t h i s is u n c e r t a i n . ' " D u k e Karl e m p l o y e d Jens o r J o n s T o m m e s s o n as m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t at S t r a n g n a s f r o m at least 1575 t o 1577, w h e n t w o large w a r s h i p s

RR 10/4 1573, RA. In early 1574, Johan ordered a recruitment drive of both master shipwright and shipwrights in Finland, traditionally a region where the navy had recruited shipbuilders, RR 12/3 1574, RA. Bertil Henriksson's period at Vastervik and the year of his death, Kommenddrkapten L. L. von Horns biografiska anteckningar: 1. Officerare som tjenat vid orlogsflottan fore ar 1721, Orebro, 1927. Zettersten 1890, 243, 252 m e n t i o n s Mats Roland f r o m 1575 to 1585, and he appears as the only master shipwright at Stockholm a r o u n d 1579-80 (SH 37:4). However, he is also m e n t i o n e d as master shipwright at Bergshammarsvik 31/5 1594 in Proviantrakenskaper, Stockholm 1593-95, RA. Mats Roland m a y be identical with Mats Jonsson or perhaps Mats Persson, w h o were paid as master shipwrights in the 1590s,

336

c h a p t e r four

w e r e built. T h e spelling of this n a m e is D a n i s h . ' ' M a t s S i g f r i d s s o n w a s e m p l o y e d as m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t f r o m at least 1580. H e w a s in S t o c k h o l m f r o m 1588 a n d s e r v e d t h e r e u n t i l his d e a t h in 1601, a p p a r e n t l y as t h e s e n i o r m a s t e r in t h e 1590s. A n o t h e r m a s t e r at S t o c l d i o l m a n d S k o l d o s t e r f r o m 1588 t o 1599 w a s M a t s P e r s s o n . " E r i k A n d e r s s o n w a s m a s t e r at A l v k a r l e b y f r o m 1584 u n t i l 1589, f r o m 1 5 9 0 - 9 1 u n t i l 1594 at A l v s b o r g , a n d in 1595 at S t o c k h o l m . ' ^ T o m a s S i g f r i d s s o n w o r k e d m a i n l y in F i n l a n d f r o m 1588 u n t i l at least 1598, a n d h e m a y h a v e b e e n M a s t e r T o m a s , e m p l o y e d b y D u k e Karl at t h e N y k o p i n g y a r d f r o m 1581 t o 1587.^'' T h e n a m e S i g f r i d s s o n m a k e s it p o s s i b l e t h a t h e w a s a b r o t h e r t o M a t s S i g f r i d s s o n a n d t h a t t h e y (or o n e of t h e m ) w e r e s o n s of M a s t e r Sigfrid, k n o w n f r o m 1564 t o 1575. Tlie i n t e n s e s h i p b u i l d i n g , w h i c h s t a r t e d in 1592, r e q u i r e d several n e w m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s , a n d s o m e n e w n a m e s d o a p p e a r . O f these, E r i k M M e n s s o n s e r v e d as m a s t e r f r o m at least 1592 t o 1603.®' E r i k E s k i l s s o n (a s o n t o Eskil J a k o b s s o n ? ) is m e n t i o n e d f r o m 1595 a n d w a s m a s t e r at K a l m a r a n d B j o r k e n a s a r o u n d 1600. T h e s e m a s t e r s w e r e , as f a r as it is Icnown, of S w e d i s h o r i g i n , w i t h o n e i n t e r e s t i n g e x c e p t i o n : J o h a n C l a e s s o n f r o m E d a m in H o l l a n d , w h o w o r k e d at A l v s b o r g in t h e 1590s.'® A l r e a d y i n 1591, D u k e Karl h a d r e c r u i t e d a n E n g l i s h m a s t e r s h i p b u i l d e r , T h o m a s W a l t e r , w h o p r o b a b l y is t h e m a n later called M a s t e r T o m a s W o l l t e r in S w e d i s h s o u r c e s . M a s t e r T h o m a s w o r k e d f o r t h e d u k e , a n d it w a s h e w h o in 1 5 9 5 - 9 9 b u i l t t h e large Vasen

at

A s p o , n e a r Strangniis. H e c o n t i n u e d as m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t u n t i l his d e a t h in 1613 o r 1614, a f t e r 1600 u s u a l l y l e a d i n g s h i p b u i l d i n g n e a r

Sodermanlands handlingar 1575:3:1, fol. 194, 1577:13, RA. " Zettersten 1890, 243, 252, 262. " SH 41:7 (1584); SH 44:5 (1585-87); Loningsregister, vol. 5 (1589), all RA. Zettersten 1890, 270. Zettersten 1890, 252, but the career of Master T o m a s Sigfridsson f r o m 1596 to 1604 in Zettersten's biography is partly that of Master T o m a s Walter (Wollter). T o m a s skeppsbyggare, later Master Tomas, is m e n t i o n e d as D u k e Karl's master shipwright at Nykoping in V a r u h u s och handling, Nykoping, 1581, a n d in accounts for Nykoping Castle in Sodermanlands handlingar 1582, 1585:3, fol. 13, 1587:11.1, all RA. T o m a s Sigfridsson is last m e n t i o n e d as paid in Abo in 1598, SH 52:12, RA. " Zettersten 1890, 292, 288; SH 51:5, 52:2, RA. First m e n t i o n e d 29/9 1595, when he h a d built a ship for the king, Vastergotlands handlingar 1594:16 (kvittensregister 1594-97), RA. Johan Hollender, employed at Alvsborg in 1600-01, Vastergotlands handlingar 1600:1, 1600:3, 1601:3:1, RA, m a y b e the same m a n as Johan Claesson van Edam, because it is m e n t i o n e d that he earlier had buik the ship Svanen at Alvsborg, RR 22/4 1600, RA.

warships and naval strength

337

Vasteras.^^ T h e d u k e also h a d a j u n i o r s h i p w r i g h t w i t h t h e s a m e first n a m e , T o m a s N i l s s o n (also called Y o u n g M a s t e r T o m a s ) , w h o f r o m at l e a s t 1 5 9 9 is c a l l e d m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t . H e l e d s h i p b u i l d i n g o n

Aland,

at S t o c l d i o l m , a n d at V a s t e r v i k u n t i l 1618, b u t h e w a s t h e last S w e d i s h b o r n m a s t e r f o r several decades.'® In

1600, t h e D u t c h m a n

Isbrand

Johansson

and

the

Englishman

Robert Siwers (Robert Engelsman) were a p p o i n t e d master shipwrights, a n d in 1603 t h e D u t c h M a s t e r H e n r i k H y b e r t s s o n a p p e a r e d f o r t h e first t i m e . ' ' A l l t h r e e w e r e c h a r g e d w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m a j o r w a r ships. F r o m

1602 until 1627, M a s t e r s I s b r a n d a n d H e n r i k

as s e n i o r m a s t e r a t t h e S t o c k h o l m y a r d , w h i c h

alternated

must have

become

a c c u s t o m e d to D u t c h s h i p b u i l d i n g m e t h o d s in these years. B o t h also s e r v e d at K a l m a r w h e n t h a t p o r t ( u n t i l 1 6 1 1 ) w a s a n i m p o r t a n t

naval

base, a n d I s b r a n d built several m a j o r s h i p s at A r n o a n d H a r b o v i k f r o m 1 6 1 2 u n t i l h i s d e a t h i n 1622.®° R o b e r t S i w e r s s e r v e d u n t i l 1614.®' T w o other m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s w e r e of Scottish origin: W i l l i a m R u t h v e n (in Swedish W e l l a m Rodvin), w h o served at v a r i o u s yards f r o m 1605 to

" Cederlund 1966, 45, 48. Master T o m a s (without a family name) is m e n t i o n e d at the duke's yards in Nykoping and at Aspo f r o m 1591 to 1598 in Sodernianlands h a n dhngar, Nykoping, V a r u h u s och handUng, Nykoping, and HKR, all RA. His later work at Stockholm, Vasteras, and Kungsor is recorded in the accounts for the Stockliolm yard from 1600 to 1608 (occasionally as T o m a s Wollter), SH, RA, in Vastmanlands handling 1605;4, fol. 46, RA, and in several letters in RR, for example RR 31/7 1605, RA. Master T o m a s was 28/11 1609 (RR, RA) ordered to build a ship at Rido, and Master T o m a s Wollter was master shipwright at Rido in 1612, V a s t m a n l a n d s h a n dlingar, 1611:17, RA and. This makes the identification of Master T o m a s and T o m a s Wollter almost certain. M A Hakan Jakobsson has f o u n d the information about Tomas Walter's arrival in Sweden and has m a d e the identification of h i m with T o m a s Wollter. Zettersten 1890, 253-54. Zettersten m e n t i o n s that he died in January 1614. T o m a s Nilsson has made an account for the Rido yard in 1614-15, SH 65:3, RA; in which a "Master T o m a s " is m e n t i o n e d as dead when it was reviewed in 1617. Master T o m a s Nilsson was however master shipwright at Vastervik f r o m 1615 to 1618, SH 64:4, 68:1, RA, and the accounts for Vastervik f r o m 1615 leave n o d o u b t that he was the same man who earlier had worked at Rido. The dead Master T o m a s was Master T o m a s Wollter. A Master T o m a s is m e n t i o n e d at Rido f r o m 1 September to 31 December 1614 in Vastmanlands handlingar, 1614:3, fol. 13, RA, but this m u s t be T o m a s Nilsson. Cf Cederlund 1966, 45-46. ® RR 30/7 and 3/8 1600, RA state that Robert a n d Isbrand were newly appointed master shipwrights. ™ Zettersten 1890, 243, 25354, 263, m u c h about H e n r i k Hybertsson in Cederlund 1966. " Zettersten 1890, 277, 289, 301, 307. Robert Sivers a n d Robert Engelsman is the same person, see SH 54:1, RA, where the master shipwright at Kungsor/Ulvsund, called Robert Siwers by Zettersten, is called Robert Engelsman.

338

c h a p t e r four

1613, a n d J a k o b Clerck, w h o b u i l t t w o s h i p s at S t e g e b o r g a n d K v a r s e b o in 1 6 0 6 - 1 6 0 8 . H e m a y h a v e b e e n r e l a t e d t o t h e C l e r c k f a m i l y , w h i c h later b e c a m e v e r y i m p o r t a n t in S w e d i s h n a v a l administration.*^^ By 1618, o n l y M a s t e r s I s b r a n d J o h a n s s o n a n d H e n r i k H y b e r t s s o n w e r e e m p l o y e d b y t h e n a v y f o r n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n , at H a r b o v i k a n d S t o c k l i o l m , respectively. T h e D u t c h - b o r n p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r s w h o f r o m 1618 t o 1634 b u i l t several w a r s h i p s f o r t h e n a v y at V a s t e r v i k and Gothenburg most probably employed Dutch master shipwrights, b u t n o n a m e s a r e k n o w n . I n less t h a n t w o d e c a d e s , t h e d o m i n a n c e of Swedish-born and navy-trained master shipwrights had been changed i n t o a d o m i n a n c e of D u t c h m a s t e r s , w h o u s u a l l y c a m e t o S w e d e n as e x p e r i e n c e d specialists. This D u t c h d o m i n a n c e w a s t o c o n t i n u e f o r several d e c a d e s , a n d several D u t c h s h i p w r i g h t s w e r e also e m p l o y e d as a q u a l i f i e d w o r k f o r c e at S w e d i s h n a v a l y a r d s . This s h i f t c a n n o t be explained by a few foreigners w h o were unusually competent or by a s u d d e n lack of S w e d i s h - t r a i n e d m a s t e r s . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t w a s s i m i l a r in D e n m a r k , w h e r e t h e n a v y h a d b e g u n t o r e c r u i t E n g l i s h a n d Scottish s h i p b u i l d e r s in t h e 1570s. F r o m a r o u n d 1600, t h e y — e s p e c i a l l y t h e Scots—totally d o m i n a t e d naval construction. T h e s e parallel d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e t w o N o r d i c n a v i e s c a n h a r d l y be a coincidence. The foreigners were recruited because they b r o u g h t in n e w t e c h n o l o g y . W e s t E u r o p e a n (British a n d D u t c h ) s h i p b u i l d i n g h a d d e v e l o p e d r a p i d l y in t h e later d e c a d e s of t h e 16th c e n t u r y a n d h a d left B a l t i c - N o r d i c (as well as S o u t h E u r o p e a n ) t e c h n o l o g y b e h i n d . O n e p a r t of t h a t s u p e r i o r i t y w a s a b e t t e r ability t o c o m b i n e a h e a v y l o a d of g u n s , c a r r i e d h i g h in t h e hull, w i t h g o o d sailing qualities. T h e fact t h a t t h e t w o w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d N o r d i c n a v i e s w i t h several n a t i v e m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s b e c a m e d o m i n a t e d b y w e s t e r n m a s t e r s is s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t h a t W e s t e r n E u r o p e h a d m u c h t o offer t o a m b i t i o u s r u l e r s w i t h a navy. I n S w e d e n , t h e D u t c h t a k e o v e r of n a v a l s h i p b u i l d i n g w a s p a r t of a n i n f l o w of D u t c h t e c h n o l o g y , e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p , a n d c a p i t a l t h a t , in c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e S w e d i s h state, t r a n s f o r m e d i m p o r t a n t p a r t of S w e d e n ' s e c o n o m y . S w e d e n ' s n e w r u l e r f r o m 1598, D u k e K a r l / K a r l IX,

® Zettersten 1890, 255-57. William Robertsson Ruthveii was, according to Zettersten, a former cavalry captain, a n d he appears to have served as a shipyard supervisor rather than a master shipwright. In 1610-11, he was "admiral" in Gustav A d o l f s d u k e d o m in Viistmanland. However, he is explicitly called master shipwright in RR 20/10 1609, RA. lakob Clerck is, according to Zettersten, identical with the later admiral Rickard Clerck (dead in 1625), a surprising change of both n a m e and profession.

warships and naval strength

339

h a d m a n y e c o n o m i c c o n t a c t s w i t h W e s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d his p e r s o n a l role in b r i n g i n g in D u t c h a n d British m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s m u s t h a v e been i m p o r t a n t . " At his d e a t h in 1627, H e n r i k H y b e r t s s o n w a s f o r m a l l y n o l o n ger a royal m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t . H e w a s a p r i v a t e e n t r e p r e n e u r w h o , together with his half-brother, the m e r c h a n t A r e n t Hybetsson, ran the Stocldiolm s h i p y a r d a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e e n t i r e n a v y u n d e r a c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e king.®"* H i s d e p u t y H e i n ( H e n r i k ) J a k o b s s o n s u c c e e d e d h i m as m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , b u t n o t as a n e n t r e p r e n e u r . T h e late I s b r a n d J o h a n s s o n ' s s o n , J o h a n I s b r a n d s s o n , also s e r v e d as a j u n i o r m a s t e r u n t i l at least 1628. W h e n t h e n a v y f r o m 1629 c a n c e l l e d t h e contract, H e i n Jakobsson c o n t i n u e d to supervise n e w construction a n d m a i n t e n a n c e . H e r e t i r e d in 1638 a n d w a s s u c c e e d e d b y t h e

masterknekt

( m a s t e r k n i g h t o r assistant m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t ) at t h e Stocl-diolm y a r d . Evert (Sivert) H e i n s s o n o r H e n r i k s s o n , w h o m a y h a v e b e e n h i s son.*^' H e n r i k s s o n ' s s u c c e s s o r , J a k o b F l o r i s s o n , w a s r e c r u i t e d in 1643 d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , as w a s t h e n e x t m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t in S t o c k h o l m , Jakob d e V o s s , w h o c a m e in 1647 a n d s e r v e d at S t o c k h o l m u n t i l his d e a t h in 1665.® A n o t h e r D u t c h m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , G e r d t C r o o n , w a s recruited a r o u n d the same time, probably to increase the capacity for n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n of w a r s h i p s . H e first b u i l t s h i p s in W i s m a r a n d f r o m the early 1650s at t h e Stocl
was launched. A third

D u t c h m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , J a k o b J a k o b s s o n P r u n c k , w h o h a d m a d e his

Glete 1993, 158-72; Jan Glete (ed.), "Introduction", Naval History, 1500-1680, Aldershot, 2005, xiv-xvi. Tlie relation between a r m a m e n t a n d displacement in British warships: Geoffrey Parker, "The Dreadnought Revolution of T u d o r England", MM, 82, 269-300; for Dutch warships: Michiel de Jong, 'Staat van oorlog: Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621, Hilversum, 2005, 76-84. Tlie Danish navy: Niels Probst, "Nordeuropeisk spanteopslagning i 1500- og 1600-tallet: Belyst u d fra danske kilder", Maritim kontakt, 16, 1993, 7 - 4 2 ; Bellamy 2006, 99-134. " Master shipwrights f r o m 1611 to 1721: brief biographies by H j a l m a r Borjeson in Svenska flottans historia, I, 272-82; II, 46-49. Tliere are also information about them in Wendt 1950, see index. For 1605-40: Cederlund 1966, 4 4 - 4 8 a n d for 1635-80: Zettersten 1903, 589-636. Recruitment of foreign master shipwrights is studied in an unpublished manuscript by MA H a k a n Jakobsson. ® Wendt 1950, 84, believes that the two were related, while Cederlund 1966, 48, has not f o u n d any relationship. Borjeson's notes in H j a l m a r Borjeson's samling, vol. 25, KrA, do not show any family relationship. It is possible that he earlier had worked in France. A list of French warships in 1671 mentions the ship Le Soleil, completed in 1642 at Indret a n d built by "Jac Voss", Marine, GIbis, Etat abrege de la marine, 1671, Archives nationales, Paris.

340

c h a p t e r four

c a r e e r at t h e S t o c k h o l m y a r d , w a s s e n t t o G o t h e n b u r g in 1654 to b u i l d s h i p s t h e r e . H e r e m a i n e d in service u n t i l It is o b v i o u s t h a t t h e Amiralitetskollegium

1665." h a d c o m e t o rely o n t h e

D u t c h m a r k e t t o s u p p l y t h e m o s t q u a l i f i e d t e c h n i c a l staff f o r t h e navy. I n t h e s a m e p e r i o d (1630s t o 1650s), m a n y sea officers, s h i p - m a s t e r s , a n d j u n i o r s h i p w r i g h t s w e r e also h i r e d in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s . T h e n a v y in t h i s w a y c o u l d select m e n of p r o v e n ability a n d b r i n g in t h e m o s t r e c e n t a d v a n c e m e n t s in E u r o p e a n s h i p b u i l d i n g . A n o t h e r sign of t h e p r e s t i g e of D u t c h s h i p b u i l d i n g is t h a t y o u n g S w e d i s h a r i s t o c r a t s , s u c h as t h e f u t u r e a d m i r a l s Karl G u s t a v W r a n g e l a n d H e r m a n

Fleming,

s t u d i e d t h e c r a f t in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s . T h e s y s t e m w o r k e d as l o n g as S w e d e n a n d t h e D u t c h R e p u b l i c h a d g o o d political r e l a t i o n s . By 1658, h o w e v e r , t h e y w e r e at w a r w i t h e a c h o t h e r . T h a t w a s t h e political b a c k g r o u n d t o t h e r e c r u i t m e n t of t h r e e E n g l i s h s h i p b u i l d e r s : t h e M a s t e r s T h o m a s D a y a n d F r a n c i s S h e l d o n a n d t h e l a t t e r ' s assistant, R o b e r t T u r n e r . It w a s p a r t of K a r l X G u s t a v ' s a m b i t i o n to i n c r e a s e h i s n a v y w i t h n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n , especially of l a r g e w a r s h i p s , w h i c h t h e E n g l i s h m a s t e r s w e r e r e g a r d e d as especially q u a l i f i e d t o build.*^® T h o m a s D a y was sent to Bodekull (Karlshamn), where he built t h r e e large s h i p s u n t i l h e r e t u r n e d h o m e in 1668.® F r a n c i s S h e l d o n w o r k e d at G o t h e n b u r g u n t i l 1665, w h e n h e s u c c e e d e d J a k o b V o s s at Stockholm. Sheldon was an educated m a n a n d a strong personality. Privately, h e b e c a m e i n v o l v e d in e x p o r t of n a v a l s t o r e s t o E n g l a n d a n d taught y o u n g Swedish gentlemen shipbuilding theory, including h o w d r a w i n g s s h o u l d b e made.^" H i s a s s i s t a n t R o b e r t T u r n e r r e p l a c e d h i m w h e n h e r e t u r n e d t o E n g l a n d in 1672. T u r n e r w a s in c h a r g e of t h e

" P r u n c k has m a d e the first preserved Swedish drawing of a warship. Ironically, that ship h a d the unusual fate of being dismantled on stocks in favour of a ship built by Francis Sheldon, Bergman 1954, 13-22. ™ The change f r o m D u t c h to English technology: H a k a n Jakobsson, "The W a r s h i p in Swedish Seventeenth-century Society—A cultural construction?" Scandinavian Journal of History, 24, 1999, 225-43. Biographies of the three English masters: Kurt Lundgren, Sheldon, Day, Turner: Tre engelska skeppsbyggmdstare i Sverige under stormaktstiden, Farjestaden, 2000. Francis Sheldon a n d his descendants: G. Holmberg, "Skeppsbyggarslakten Sheldon: Sex generationers verksamhet i svenska flottans tjiinst", Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1957-1958, 3-63; Jan Glete, biographies of the Sheldon family. SBL 32. ® Kurt Lundgren, De stora orlogsskeppen frdn Carlshamn, 1659-1676: En mikrohistorisk studie om skeppsbyggnad, teknik och livsvillkor under stormaktstiden, Karlshamn, 1999. ™ Ake C:son Ralamb, Skeps byggerij eller Adelig dfnings tionde torn, Stockholm, 1695 (repr. 1943), is an unusual shipbuilding m a n u a l in which the author, a Swedish

warships and naval strength

341

Stockliolm y a r d u n t i l it closed in 1680, a n d t h e n h e w e n t t o K a r l s k r o n a to take c h a r g e of t h e n e w y a r d t h e r e . H e d i e d in 1686. T u r n e r ' s l o n g service in t h e n a v y w a s decisive f o r its c h a n g e to E n g l i s h m e t h o d s of w a r s h i p d e s i g n a n d b u i l d i n g m e t h o d s . T h e k e y e l e m e n t w a s n o t a p a r t i c u l a r s h a p e of t h e h u l l b u t t h e u s e of d r a w i n g s . English w a r s h i p s also h a d a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e i n g b u i l t s t r o n g e r t h a n D u t c h s h i p s , b u t it is n o t c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s w a s a n i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e in S w e d e n . T h e D u t c h m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s at Stoclcholm h a d , at least s i n c e t h e 1620s, d e v e l o p e d a t r a d i t i o n of b u i l d i n g s t r o n g h u l l s w i t h a l o n g life. N o n e w E n g l i s h m a s t e r s h i p b u i l d e r s w e r e r e c r u i t e d a f t e r 1659. Instead, t h e D u t c h m a n P i e t e r G e r d t s s o n C r o o n , v e r y p r o b a b l y a s o n to G e r d t C r o o n , s e r v e d as a m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t at S t o c l d i o l m after 1664. F r o m 1667 t o 1680, h e led s h i p b u i l d i n g at t h e n a v y ' s y a r d in M e d e l p a d . Klas J a k o b s s o n Voss, s o n t o J a k o b V o s s , s e r v e d at G o t h e n b u r g 1 6 7 0 76. M o r e r e m a r k a b l y , t h e S w e d i s h - b o r n G u n n a r O l o f s s o n R o t h w a s r e c r u i t e d as D a y ' s s u c c e s s o r at K a r l s h a m n in 1668, t h e first S w e d i s h m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t in 50 y e a r s t o b u i l d w a r s h i p s . R o t h c a m e f r o m a private s h i p y a r d in G o t h e n b u r g , b u t h e h a d l e a r n t h i s t r a d e in Algiers, w h e r e h e h a d b e e n a slave. F r o m 1668 t o 1688, h e b u i l t n o f e w e r t h a n 12 m a j o r s h i p s a n d seven s m a l l f r i g a t e s (Jaktskepp),

f r o m 1677 at

Kalmar. Especially h i s s m a l l e r s h i p s w e r e r e p u t e d t o b e excellent sailers, a n d b u i l t i n t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n t r a d i t i o n of fast ships, s u i t a b l e f o r p r i v a t e e r i n g . H i s m a n n e r of b u i l d i n g h u l l s w a s d e s c r i b e d as S p a n i s h and "Turkish", not English or D u t c h . ' ' In 1677, F r a n c i s S h e l d o n a s k e d t o b e r e - e m p l o y e d b y t h e S w e d i s h navy. Because a large s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m t o r e p l a c e t h e losses of 1 6 7 6 - 7 7 w a s p l a n n e d , h i s services w e r e w e l c o m e , a n d h e w a s s e n t to organise a n e w n a v a l y a r d at Riga. H e b u i l t t h r e e ships, b u t b y 1682 h e was i n v o l v e d in a d e e p c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s s u p e r i o r officer. It e n d e d w i t h his arrest, a n d h e a g a i n left S w e d i s h service in 1683. S h e l d o n w a s a m a n with a h i g h r e p u t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , a n d f r o m 1 6 8 5 / 8 6 t o 1690 t h e D a n i s h navy e m p l o y e d h i m as s e n i o r m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t in C o p e n h a g e n . T h e b a c k g r o u n d w a s t h a t t h e s e n i o r D a n i s h s h i p b u i l d e r , t h e D u t c h Thijs (Mathias) H e r m a n s s o n v a n d e r B u r g h , in 1682 h a d b e e n d i s m i s s e d f r o m t h a t n a v y b e c a u s e h i s latest s h i p h a d d e v i a t e d f r o m t h e b u i l d i n g

nobleman, m e n t i o n e d that he h a d been taught shipbuilding in his youth by Francis Sheldon. 71 Rooth's recruitment and building m e t h o d : Lundgren 1999, 50-53.

342

c h a p t e r four

s p e c i f i c a t i o n s (for t h e b e t t e r , h e c l a i m e d ) . H e w a s i m m e d i a t e l y h i r e d b y t h e S w e d i s h n a v y a n d s e n t t o Riga. H e c o m p l e t e d S h e l d o n ' s s h i p s a n d b u i h t w o m o r e , b u t h e s e e m s t o h a v e d i e d a f t e r a f e w years. B o t h N o r d i c n a v i e s w e r e o b v i o u s l y l i m i t i n g t h e f r e e d o m , w h i c h t h e y earlier h a d allowed, of t h e i r f o r e i g n m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s t o t a k e d e c i s i o n s o n their own. B o t h n a v i e s w e r e also d e v e l o p i n g policies t o m a k e t h e m i n d e p e n d e n t of f o r e i g n s h i p b u i l d e r s . I n D e n m a r k , f r o m t h e late 17th c e n t u r y , a s m a l l n u m b e r of y o u n g sea officers w e r e t r a i n e d as c o n s t r u c t i o n officers. T h e y d e s i g n e d w a r s h i p s a n d s u p e r v i s e d t h e C o p e n h a g e n n a v a l yard.^2 I n S w e d e n , t h e n a v a l r e f o r m s of t h e 1680s i n c l u d e d a n active d e v e l o p m e n t of d o m e s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . T w o s o n s of F r a n c i s S h e l d o n , F r a n c i s Jr ( 1 6 6 0 - 9 2 ) a n d C h a r l e s ( 1 6 6 5 - 1 7 3 9 ) , c o n t i n u e d t h e t r a d i t i o n c r e a t e d b y t h e i r f a t h e r a n d R o b e r t T u r n e r . T h e y also f o u n d e d a S w e d i s h s h i p b u i l d i n g d y n a s t y , e v e n t h o u g h t h e i r f a t h e r d i d h i s b e s t to d i s c o u r a g e t h e m f r o m s t a y i n g in S w e d e n . T h e y h a d b e e n b o r n i n t h e country, however, and Admiral-general H a n s Wachtmeister offered t h e m s t r o n g i n d u c e m e n t s t o stay. F r a n c i s S h e l d o n Jr w a s a p p o i n t e d m a s t e r l o i i g h t i n K a r l s k r o n a in 1683, a n d a f t e r W a c h t m e i s t e r i n t e r v e n e d o n h i s b e h a l f w i t h Karl XI, h e s u c c e e d e d T u r n e r as m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t at t h e latter's d e a t h i n 1686.^' C h a r l e s S h e l d o n w a s later a p p o i n t e d m a s t e r k n i g h t a n d , as G u n n a r R o t h d i e d in 1691 h e w a s t h e o n l y realistic a l t e r n a t i v e w h e n F r a n c i s S h e l d o n Jr s u d d e n l y d i e d in 1692. It is o b v i o u s t h a t b o t h m e n r e a c h e d s e n i o r p o s i t i o n s f a r earlier in S w e d e n t h a n if t h e y h a d t r i e d a c a r e e r i n E n g l a n d , w h e r e e v e n t h e i r f a t h e r failed t o r e a c h t h e t o p p o s i t i o n s h e h a d h o p e d t o g a i n w h e n h e r e t u r n e d in 1672. F r o m 1693 u n t i l his d e a t h in 1739, C h a r l e s S h e l d o n b u i l t 21 s h i p s - o f - t h e - l i n e a n d 14 frigates, n e a r l y all b e f o r e 1709. M a n y of t h e s e s h i p s h a d a l o n g life, a n d s h i p s a n d f r i g a t e s w e r e still b u i f t t o h i s d e s i g n s i n t h e 1740s a n d 1750s. T h e 7 0 - g u n s h i p Gota

Lejon,

b u i l t t o h i s d r a w i n g s in 1 7 4 5 - 4 6 , w a s

b r o k e n u p in 1816. S h i p s of his d e s i g n s e r v e d f o r 123 years, p r o b a b l y a r e c o r d f o r m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s in all E u r o p e a n navies. H e w a s also

H a n s C. Bjerg a n d John Ericksen, Danske miogsskibe, 1690-1860: Konstruktion og dekomtion, Copenhagen, 1980. " Wachtmeister argued that the young Francis was the most suitable candidate, because he could m a k e drawings of warships and because T u r n e r for m a n y years had trained the shipwrights how to build ships f r o m drawings.

warships and naval strength

343

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a n d r e p a i r of t h e n a v y a n d f o r t e c h nical i m p r o v e m e n t s at t h e K a r l s k r o n a y a r d , i n c l u d i n g t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e first d r y - d o c k in t h e Baltic in 17247"' C h a r l e s S h e l d o n t r a i n e d f o u r of his s o n s t o b e c o m e s h i p w r i g h t s , a n d h i s y o u n g e s t s u r v i v i n g son, G i l b e r t ( 1 7 1 0 - 9 4 ) , s u c c e e d e d h i m at K a r l s k r o n a . O n e of G i l b e r t S h e l d o n ' s s o n s , as well as o n e of h i s g r a n d s o n s , r e a c h e d t o p r a n k in t h e navy's C o r p s of C o n s t r u c t o r s , as it w a s called f r o m 1793. T h e f a m i l y remained i m p o r t a n t in Swedish naval shipbuilding until 1841." The S h e l d o n f a m i l y ' s d o m i n a n c e in S w e d i s h n a v a l s h i p b u i l d i n g w a s n o t d u e t o lack of alternatives. H a n s W a c h t m e i s t e r ' s r e c r u i t m e n t a n d p a t r o n a g e of t h e t w o y o u n g S h e l d o n b r o t h e r s in t h e 1680s w e r e p a r t of a p r o g r a m t o m a k e t h e n a v y i n d e p e n d e n t of i m p o r t e d m a s t e r s h i p wrights. I n 1684, t h e n a v y gave t h e y o u n g a n d p r o m i s i n g J o h a n Falck the o p p o r t u n i t y to b e c o m e a paid apprentice to Master Robert T u r n e r . After T u r n e r ' s d e a t h , F r a n c i s S h e l d o n Jr t o o k o v e r t h e role as t u t o r , a n d Falck b e c a m e a fully t r a i n e d s h i p b u i l d e r . I n t h e late 1690s, h e b u i l t t h r e e s m a l l s h i p s - o f - t h e - l i n e t o h i s o w n d r a w i n g . H e later b u i l t s m a l l craft, t r a n s p o r t s , a n d f r i g a t e s in S w e d e n ' s Baltic a n d G e r m a n p r o v i n c e s until h e d i e d in

G u n n a r R o t h ' s t w o s o n s , Rollof a n d H a n s , w e r e

t r a i n e d b y t h e i r f a t h e r a n d r e a c h e d s e n i o r p o s i t i o n s at G o t h e n b u r g a n d K a r l s k r o n a , respectively. W i l l i a m S m i t h , b o r n in S t o c k h o l m in t h e 1670s, a n d p r o b a b l y w i t h British a n c e s t o r s , b e c a m e a n a p p r e n tice t o C h a r l e s S h e l d o n , p r o b a b l y f r o m 1698 t o 1704. T h e n a v y t h e n sent h i m f o r a l o n g p e r i o d of s t u d y a n d r e s e a r c h in W e s t e r n E u r o p e , after w h i c h (in t h e 1710s) h e d e s i g n e d a n d b u i l t several frigates. S m i t h was a p p o i n t e d m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t in 1715 a n d w a s r e g a r d e d as equally c o m p e t e n t as C h a r l e s S h e l d o n . " The n a v y ' s d e m a n d f o r m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s i n c r e a s e d in t h e 1710s d u e to d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of n a v a l s h i p b u i l d i n g t o several n a v y y a r d s a n d to p r i v a t e s h i p b u i l d e r s . T h e d e m a n d c o u l d b e m e t w i t h a n e w g e n eration trained f r o m Karlskrona. The master knight Erik Swahn was sent to S t o c k h o l m w h e n t h e y a r d r e - o p e n e d in 1714. C a r l J o h a n Falck, p r o b a b l y J o h a n Falck's s o n , w a s t r a i n e d in t h e n a v y , as w a s J a k o b

Daniel G. Harris, "Charles Sheldon a n d the Baltic's First Dry dock", MM, 1999, 396-404. " Holmberg 1957-1958; Jan Glete, "Sheldon" (family), SBL 32. ™ Halldin 1963, 181; Holmberg 1957-1958, 13. " Biography by Jan Glete, SBL 32.

85,

344

c h a p t e r four

S h e l d o n , s o n of C h a r l e s S h e l d o n . B o t h b e c a m e m a s t e r k n i g h t s in t h e 1710s, b u t o n l y Falck b e c a m e a n i n d e p e n d e n t d e s i g n e r of s h i p s - o f - t h e line a n d frigates. F r o m 1716, W i l l i a m S m i t h t r a i n e d t h e y o u n g D a n i e l Fries a n d A r n o l d d u Rees, w h o later b e c a m e m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s at S t o c k h o l m a n d G o t h e n b u r g respectively, a l t h o u g h t h e y n e v e r d e s i g n e d any i m p o r t a n t warships on their own. Galley t e c h n o l o g y r e p r e s e n t e d a challenge, b e c a u s e S w e d e n h a d lost t h e k n o w - h o w t o b u i l d galleys. Rollof G u n n a r s s o n R o t h , w h o r a n t h e G o t h e n b u r g n a v y y a r d f r o m 1700 t o 1712, b u i l t several s m a l l vessels, i n c l u d i n g five galleys. It is p o s s i b l e t h a t h e h a d l e a r n t s o m e t h i n g a b o u t galley d e s i g n f r o m h i s M e d i t e r r a n e a n - t r a i n e d f a t h e r , G u n n a r R o t h . H i s s u c c e s s o r w a s F r a n s W a l t e r s , s o n of a ( p r o b a b l y British) m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , m a r r i e d t o a d a u g h t e r of F r a n c i s S h e l d o n Sr. W a l t e r s was i n f o r m e d a b o u t galley t e c h n o l o g y b y t h e c o m m a n d e r of t h e G o t h e n b u r g s q u a d r o n . Axel L e w e n h a u p t , w h o h a d s e r v e d o n M e d i t e r r a n e a n galleys in t h e 1690s. H e l e a r n e d q u i c k l y a n d d e s i g n e d a n d b u i l t several large, m e d i u m , a n d s m a l l galleys, as well as o t h e r w a r s h i p s , m a i n l y in p r i v a t e s h i p y a r d s . W a l t e r s w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o S t o c k h o l m in 1720/21, n o w t h e c e n t r e of t h e S w e d i s h galley flotilla.^® H e d i e d in 1722, h o w e v e r , a n d t h e n a v y h a d t o s e n d C a r l J o h a n Falck t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t o l e a r n t h e t e c h n o l o g y . O n c e t r a n s f e r r e d , it r e m a i n e d static, a n d S w e d e n r a n o n e of E u r o p e ' s t w o last large galley flotillas ( t h e o t h e r w a s Russia) w i t h o u t a n y f u r t h e r i m p o r t of t e c h n o l o g y . S c h e m a t i c a l l y , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of early m o d e r n E u r o p e a n n a v a l t e c h n o l o g y w a s a p r o c e s s in w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s a n d f a m i l i e s of s h i p w r i g h t s g r a d u a l l y w e r e r e p l a c e d b y a m o r e h i e r a r c h i c a l a n d bureaucratic system, where competence to build complex warships belonged to the organisation rather t h a n individuals.^' There are t r a c e s of this d e v e l o p m e n t in S w e d e n , b u t t h e m a i n line of c h a n g e differs c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m t h i s p a t t e r n . M o s t of t h e 1 6 t h - c e n t u r y m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s w e r e p r o b a b l y t r a i n e d in t h e p r o f e s s i o n t o b u i l d w a r s h i p s i n t h e k i n g ' s s h i p y a r d , a n d t h e i r c o m p e t e n c e w o u l d h a r d l y h a v e existed if t h e V a s a k i n g s h a d n o t b u i l t a l a r g e n u m b e r of m a j o r w a r s h i p s . W i t h o u t t h i s r o y a l d e m a n d , m a n y of t h e m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s w o u l d n o t h a v e b e c o m e m a s t e r s of t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n . F r o m a r o u n d 1600, t h e state

™ Goteborgs eskader, 90, 102-05; Halldin 1963, 156, 188. " Glete 1993, 16-19, 48-51; Larrie D. Ferreiro, Ships and Science: The birth of naval architecture and the Scientific Revolution, 1600-1800, Cambridge, Mass., 2007, 279-305.

warships and naval strength

345

b e g a n t o actively s e a r c h f o r c o m p e t e n c e in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a r k e t . In o n e way, S w e d e n b e c a m e d e p e n d e n t o n f o r e i g n t e c h n o l o g y , b u t t h a t t e c h n o l o g y c o u l d b e f o u n d w i t h o u t m u c h difficulty o n a n o p e n m a r ket. T h e t e c h n o l o g y w a s e m b o d i e d in f o r e i g n - b o r n a n d f o r e i g n - t r a i n e d m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s w h o w e r e i n t e r e s t e d t o sell t h e i r k n o w - h o w . In t h e t h i r d p h a s e of d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e n a v y o r g a n i s e d t h e e d u c a tion of its f u t u r e m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s , j u s t as it p a i d m o r e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e t r a i n i n g of its f u t u r e officers. T h e b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n of t e c h n o l ogy is n o t i c e a b l e in t h a t m u c h m o r e p a p e r w o r k w a s i n v o l v e d in s h i p b u i l d i n g a n d r e p a i r a n d in d r a w i n g s of ships, w h i c h f r o m t h e 1720s were p r e s e r v e d in t h e n a v a l archives. T h e i n c r e a s e d f o r m a l i s a t i o n of r e c r u i t m e n t a n d t r a i n i n g of m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s d i d n o t m i n i m i s e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I n fact, t h e y b e c a m e more

impor-

t a n t t h a n earlier, a n d n o t o n l y w i t h t h e rise of t h e S h e l d o n d y n a s t y . Carl J o h a n Falck w a s p r o b a b l y a s o n t o J o h a n F a l c k (or at least of t h e s a m e f a m i l y ) , a n d h e a n d D a n i e l Fries b o t h m a r r i e d d a u g h t e r s of W i l l i a m S m i t h . O n e of Falck's s o n s b e c a m e a s h i p b u i l d e r . A r n o l d d u Rees m a r r i e d o n e of C h a r l e s S h e l d o n ' s d a u g h t e r s . By 1721, t h e n a v y ' s leading s h i p b u i l d e r s , C h a r l e s a n d J a k o b S h e l d o n , W i l l i a m S m i t h , a n d Frans W a l t e r s w e r e r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r b y f a m i l y c o n n e c t i o n s o r l o n g p e r i o d s of p e r s o n a l a p p r e n t i c e s h i p s . T h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n — C a r l J o h a n Falck, Fries, a n d d u R e e s — w e r e b r o u g h t i n t o this n e t w o r k b y t h e i r m a r r i a g e s . T h e n a v y w a s r u n b y a n e t w o r k of officer f a m i l i e s w h e r e sons, n e p h e w s , a n d s o n s - i n - l a w to s e n i o r officers o f t e n w e r e p r o m o t e d to h i g h r a n k s . T h e m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s ' s m a l l n e t w o r k of f a m i l y relations f o l l o w e d t h e s a m e p a t t e r n , a n d t h e a d m i r a l s w h o a p p o i n t e d t h e m had not m u c h to complain about, because they usually followed the same family strategy themselves. B o t h officers a n d s h i p b u i l d e r s , h o w e v e r , w e r e n o w given f o r m a l training. T h e y h a d t o p a s s a n e x a m i n a t i o n b e f o r e t h e y w e r e a p p o i n t e d , and they were supposed to s u b m i t to discipline a n d follow b u r e a u cratic rules in o r d e r t o m a k e a s u c c e s s f u l c a r e e r . T h e t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m for S w e d i s h s h i p b u i l d e r s , d e v e l o p e d i n t h e late 17th c e n t u r y , t u r n e d out to b e successful; it e n s u r e d t h a t t h e n a v y always h a d t w o o r t h r e e highly q u a l i f i e d m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s a n d a n u m b e r of y o u n g e r assistant masters w h o could lead shipbuilding with drawings provided by the s e n i o r m a s t e r s . It r e m a i n e d s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g u n t i l t h e e n d of t h e era of w o o d e n s h i p b u i l d i n g . In t h e 18th c e n t u r y , F r e d r i k H e n r i k ( a f ) C h a p m a n ( 1 7 2 1 - 1 8 0 8 ) , t h e s o n of a British sea officer w h o s e r v e d in the S w e d i s h n a v y f r o m 1715, b e c a m e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y f a m o u s f o r h i s

346

C H A P T E R Four Diagram

5.1

The Swedish

and Danish

navies,

1520-1620

30

25

20

s c

s

•

15

§

Sweden

H Denmark 10

0

MM 1520

1530

1540

1550

1560

1570

1580

1590

£

1600

1610

1620

Sailing warships and galleys of 100 tonnes displacement and larger. Sources: Appendix 2; Bellamy 2006, 275-79; Niels Probst's list of Danish warships, 1523-1660.

combination of shipbuilding theory with innovative mercantile and naval shipbuilding.®" Organised competence transfer and increasingly bureaucratic technical development worked as long as they took place within the established lines: wooden hulls, sails and oars for propulsion, and smooth-bore guns.

5.3

Shipbuilding

and naval strength in u Baltic context,

1521-1617

During the 16th and into the early 17th century, naval power in Europe was largely regional. Navies were too small to be deployed in strength outside their home waters, and naval administration was too undeveloped to support such operations. The Baltic Sea was dominated by regional naval powers, and no outside navy was strong enough to influence strategy and operations. In practice, Denmark and Sweden were the only powers that continuously had naval forces in the Baltic. The long-term balance of power in this region is shown in diagram 5.1.

Ferreiro 2007, pp. 275-78.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

5.3.1

The new navy,

347

1521-1539

The Swedish naval forces before 1521 had consisted of ships belonging to the regent {riksfdrestdndaren) Sten Sture, to aristocrats administrating castles and provinces {Idn) for the Crown, and to bishops in control of the Church's resources. Tliese forces were small but still existed in autumn 1520 when the union king Christian II gained control of Sweden. In Liibeck, two ships belonging to Sten Sture's remained under command of the German Staffan Sasse: Carsten Todes hoik and Jasper Brum bark. Sasse had operated the ships (never fully paid by Sten Sture) as privateers. In Danzig there was a ship, Svanen, built for Sten Sture in 1519, apparently not fitted out for sea service and without a crew. We know little about vessels belonging to aristocrats and bishops, except that Hans Brask, bishop of Linkoping owned a ship, probably that of almost 100 Idster he had built at Kalmar in 1516, a bark, and a jakt. The fact that Sten Sture's ships were bought or built on credit in Germany indicates that he either had no administrative resources to build such ships in Sweden or that financial problems forced him to acquire ships from those who could wait for payment.®' When the rebellion against Christian II began in early 1521, it soon acquired a naval dimension. Again, merchants in Danzig and Liibeck proved to be willing to supply the Swedes with ships on credit. A carvel, Bartuneren, and jakt were bought in Liibeck by Danzig merchants and used by Staffan Sasse for cruises in the Baltic until they were captured by the Danish fleet in late summer 1521. Bishop Arvid Kurck in Abo, who had joined the rebels, bought a ship in Lubeck in the autumn of 1521, but it was wrecked the next year and Kurck lost his life. Several small vessels {jakter) were bought or taken by the rebels or fitted out as privateers in 1521-22. At least two were fitted out in Lubeck and one in Reval. Other small craft operated in the Stockholm and Finnish archipelagos. Such activities were nuisances for Christian II's naval forces, which had to organise convoys to protect the supply to his garrisons in Sweden and Finland, but they did not challenge his control of the sea. Such a challenge was organised by a group of Lubeck merchants, however, who in early 1522 sold eight merchantmen to the regent Gustav

" The Swedish navy and its warships in the period 1521-60: Glete 1976-77, including a ship-list with detailed references to the sources. This section is mainly based on inat study. Brask's ships, ch. 4, note 14.

348

C H A P T E R Four

Eriksson on credit. Tliey left Travemiinde on 30 May for Sweden. With them sailed Carsten Todes hoik and Jasper Bruns bark, forming a fleet of ten units and probably with two more small craft. In June 1522, the regent bought two more ships in Stralsund, probably named Ugglan and Samson. In September 1522 a large carvel, (Lybske) Svanen, was bought from Hans Tideman in Liibeck as flagship for the new Swedish fleet. Hie politically influential Bishop Hans Brask also joined the rebellion and made his three vessels available for the regent's service. Danziger or Pryske Svanen, built for Sten Sture in 1519, was brought to Sweden from Danzig by Gustav Eriksson's men in 1523. In 1523 or 1524, a carvel was bought f r o m Kort Konig and other Liibeck merchants. The size of these ships and the total size of the new fleet can only be roughly estimated. What we have are prices for several ships and (since 1990) the partly excavated remains of one of them, a carvel, wrecked at Franska Stenarna in the Stocldiolm archipelago in 1525. The ships which were bought in 1522, including equipment and provisions for one voyage, cost between 1,700 and 3,700 Lubeckian marks each, except Lybske Svanen, which cost 7,600 marks. The carvel purchased f r o m Kort Konig and others in 1523-24 cost 4,000 marks. If this is the ship lost in the archipelago in 1525, it had a displacement of (roughly) 250 tonnes. A comparison of prices would indicate that the smaller ships bought in 1522 were of 150-250 tonnes. Nine of them and a smaller bark, however, are known to have brought 733 soldiers and a considerable amount of weapons to Sweden in June 1522. This make it probable that they were somewhat larger; possibly from 200 to 300/350 tonnes. Lybske Svanen is frequently called a great ship and was considerably larger. The total displacement of the 13 ships, which arrived f r o m Germany to Sweden in 1522, was between 3,000 and 4,000 tonnes.®' Gustav Eriksson, elected king in June 1523, had rapidly built up a navy of a size unknown in Sweden. He used it for several major operations in 1522-24, which secured his power and contributed to the

The purchased ships are Usted and the identity problems are discussed in Glete 1977, 34-37. The fleet and the n u m b e r of soldiers in June 1522: Barkman 1937, 82-84. Tlie size of the wreck at Franska Stenarna: Adams 2003, 85. Tlie r o u g h calculation of its displacement f r o m uncertain dimension figures is m y own. Accounts f r o m the expeditions in 1522: Hanserecesse, 3: 1477-1530, 8, esp. 570-83, and Strodda kamerala handlingar, vol. 62, RA. Some of these accounts are analysed in Hammarstrom 1956, 425-31. The cost of the carvel bought f r o m Kort Konig is in Karsten Konigs account, Strodda kamerala handlingar, vol. 62, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

349

allied war effort against Christian II. Tliese operations were costly in terms of lost ships, however. Carsten Todes hoik was sunk to blockade the entrance to Copenhagen in 1523, two more ships were wrecked in late 1523 or early 1524, and one ship was taken by surprise by Norby's force at Visby in 1524. Returning from the failed Gotland expedition, the fleet flagship Lybske Svanen became leaky in an autumn gale in 1524 and had to be run ashore on northern Oland, where it became a wreck.®' A smaller carvel, loaded with large guns, struck an unchartered rock in the Stocldiolm archipelago around 1 August 1525. It rapidly sank in deep water, where it still remains as an interesting object for maritime archaeology. Other ships may have been discarded after only a few years service. King Gustav I later claimed that they had been old and not worth the price the Lubeckians demanded for them, but these arguments were raised when he no longer required help from Liibeck.®"' In the autumn of 1526, the centrally controlled Swedish navy had only three major warships: Store Svanen (buih in Danzig in 1519), Ugglan (bought in Stralsund in 1522), and Bjdrnen, possibly the only survivor of the eight ships bought in Lubeck in spring 1522. There were also two small warships, Lille Svan and Lange Barken, which probably were recently built, because they remained in service until around 1540. There were also at least eight jakter, most of them controlled by /flM-holders in Finland, who had fought with the new king against Christian II. The king's brother-in-law, the German Count Johan of Hoya, who now was a powerful /an-holder in eastern Finland, owned a carvel. He also owned a hoik (perhaps another of the ships bought from Lubeck in 1522) which the king permitted him to sell in 1526. In the same year the king negotiated about the sale of another ship, Lumper, to merchants in Lodose (Gothenburg). These two ships were apparently sold, because they are not mentioned later. It looks like the scaling-down from a wartime to a peace-time navy, larger and better

" The historiography of this ship-wreck, which has been confused with the loss of a smaller carvel in the Stockholm archipelago in 1525, is clarified in Bertil Daggfeldt, Lybska Svan", TiS, 126, 1963, 3 - 2 7 . See also Carl Olof Cederlund, "Svanen s o m blev ™^^"ka:^Vrakidentifiering och m a r k n a d s f o r i n g av nationella myter", Tvdrsnitt, 17, Operations, see ch. 3. Ships: Glete 1977, 33-41. The wreck at Franska Stenarna: Jonathan Adams and Johan Ronnby, Furstens fartyg: Marinarkeologiska undersokningar av en renassanskravell, Stockliolm, 1996; Adams 2003, 74-86.

350

C H A P T E R Four

organised than that controlled by the regents before 1520 but smaller than the navy had been in 1522-24.®= Gustav I had already started new construction to maintain the strength of his navy. Hie first major ship known to have been built for it was a large hoik of 200 leister (around 600 tonnes displacement), laid down at the Gota Alv estuary (Alvsborg castle/town of Lodose). The king mentioned in a letter on 12 April 1526 that he sent shipbuilders to Alvsborg, and on 27 April 1527, he authorised that one lust of iron was used for the ship under construction at Alvsborg. It is not known when Holken or Bryntan was ready, but it sailed to Liibeck on a trading voyage in 1 5 3 0 . T h e next new ship was a far more ambitious project: the Store Kravelen (the Great Carvel, around 1,800 tonnes), built in Stocldiolm some time between 1526 and 1531. It is probable that construction of this powerful ship started after the meeting with the Parliament in June 1527, when the king gained control of the Church's property. The apparently important cutting of timber by the shipyard administrator Skeppar (Master) Olof in Ostergotland (Stegeholm) in winter 1527-28 may have been for this ship.**^ During 1530-31, a

I n f o r m a t i o n about ships f r o m a u t u m n 1526 to 1 March 1531 are available in the earliest preserved accounts f r o m the Stocldiolm shipyard, Fogdarnas rakenskaper 1529-1533, RA, fols 789-859. Johan of Hoya's carvel in Finland is first m e n t i o n e d in a letter of 1/9 1525 f r o m Gustav I to his sister Margareta, C o u n t Johan's wife, who was in charge of eastern Finland in her husband's absence, GR 2, 202. The sale of two ships, GR 3, 135 (9/5 1526), 197 (11/7 1526). GR 3, 104-05 (12/4 1526); GR 4, 153 (27/4 1527); Hammarstrom 1956, 440-41; Fogdarnas rakenskaper 1529-1533, RA, fols 233-39. Timber cutting, GR 4, 374-75 (22/11 1527). TTiere is a unique d o c u m e n t , "Die massze v o m grosszen Kraueel", about the size of this ship, S M H F 1:4, RA, printed in GR 9, 344-45; for a possible dating: Glete 1976, 33-34. It is not clear in all details but the length of the keel is recorded as 130 feet, the length f r o m (probably) stem to sternpost was 174 feet, the beam 40 feet and the draught 22 feet. Tlie depth in the hold is not recorded. The circumference of the main cable was 25 inches. There were, however, several feet in use in Sweden until it was standardised as 297 m m in 1604, David Hannerberg, "Fod", Kulturhistoriskt Lexikon for Nordisk Medeltid, 4. The calculation of 1,800 tonnes is based on the assumption that the feet in use was 297 m m or a little less and that the ship was built with relatively sharp lines. Tliis is probable, because it proved to be a fast ship in the battle of Bornholm on 10 June 1535. The cable of 25 inches, at the same time, makes it unlikely that it was smaller than 1,800 tonnes. Ships of 1,000-1,100 tonnes had cables of 18 inches in the inventories of 1556-58 and 1566, SH 4:4, 4:8; S M H F 1:17; SH 15:2, RA. H j a l m a r Borjeson, "The Swedish Ship Stora Krafwelen of 1532", MM, 14, 1928, 149-57, has information about the ship's rig and equipment, but there are several errors about its career. The most i m p o r t a n t is that Borjeson confused the ship with another of the same name, launched in 1555. It represents an early stage of Borjeson's research about Swedish naval history.

W A R S H I P S A N D NAVAL S T R E N G T H

351

smaller carvel, Lille Kravelen or Falken (around 300 tonnes), was built at Stockholm. In the next years another hoik, first called Nye Holken (around 500 tonnes) was built, probably at Stockholm, and completed by 1534. Tlie small ship Algen or Kalmar Barken was also added to the navy sometime between 1526 and 1531. The new ships were partly replacements for old ships, however. Store Svanen was sold in 1529, Ugglan was discarded around 1530, and Bjdrnen disappears from the active force sometime between 1531 and 1534. In 1534, Gustav I faced the prospect of going to war with Liibeck and the major ships of the Danish navy, which were controlled by Liibeck. He had only four major warships: Store Kravelen, Bryntan, Nye Holken, and Lille Kravelen, a rather limited force to face what for centuries had been the leading sea power in the Baltic. He had to act quicldy to strengthen this force. In spring 1534, the aristocrats in the Council and the nobility in the province of Uppland agreed to provide the king with a new ship. It was completed in 1535, and its size is reported as 150 or 200 Idster, indicating a displacement between 400 to 600 tonnes. Another welcome addition was a large carvel-built ship from Kampen in the Netherlands of 250 Idster (700/800 tonnes), which was sequestered by the fleet at sea in 1534. Kamperman, as it was called in Sweden, was an important part of the fleet at the battle of Bornholm in June 1535, when Liibeck's fleet was defeated. In that summer, two major ships were taken from Liibeck; Galeonen (400/600 tonnes) and Peter Hollender, renamed Svanen (600/700 tonnes). Between 1534 and 1536, at least 12 minor warships were also built, bought, or captured, including two barkar built in Finland, at least five bojorter probably of Dutch origin, and at least two "seidenskepp", a sailing ship with a low hull."® After the war ended in 1536, Kamperman and the Coundflors' ship disappear f r o m the sources, probably because they were returned to their owners. A large carvel was built in the late 1530s: Lejonet (Leonen) of around 1,000 tonnes. Rumours circulated that it was another giant. A Dane who visited Sweden for diplomacy and information-gathering reported in November 1539 that the new carvel was not entirely ready and not as large as had been said. He also reported that there were 16

The size of the ships existing in the 1530s is often uncertain, but the wage-Usts for the crews in 1535-36 are helpful, as the n u m b e r of m e n usually is roughly p r o p o r tional to the displacement, S M H F 1:1, 1:2, RA.

352

C H A P T E R Four

to 18 ships {kraveller and holkar) with two topmasts {mdrsar) each in Stockliohn, one bojort, and two jakter as well as two more jakter in Kalmar and several more in Finland. The number of ships with two topmasts must include merchantmen in Stocldiolm, which the observer believed was available for the king. Gustav I in the late 1530s had a navy of 6,000-7,000 tonnes (table 5:2). It was at least as powerful as the Danish navy and larger than any other naval force in the Baltic.®' It may partly have been with a view to what was going on in Sweden that Christian III in the early 1540s added four major warships to the six he had, although his main concern at this time was a conflict and a maritime war with the Habsburg emperor and ruler of the Netherlands, Charles V. In round figures, the Danish navy increased from 5,000 tonnes in 1539 to 7,000 tonnes in 1542."' Table

5.2

Name

Store Kravelen Lejonet Svanen Bryntan Kilen (ex Nye Holken) Galeonen Falken/Lille Kravelen 7 vv^arships I 0 0 - < 3 0 0 t o n n e s >2 small craft <100 t o n n e s

Swedish

warships

Launched

Type

1528/30 1537/9 T a k e n 1535 1527/8 1532/3? T a k e n 1535 1531

Carvel Carvel Carvel Hoik Hoik Galeon Carvel

-

-

-

-

at the end of Displacement, Tonnes 1,800 1,000 600/700 600 500 400/600 300 c.1,000

1539 Final fate

B r o k e n u p 1553/54 D i s c a r d e d 1562 W r e c k e d 1546/7 D i s c a r d e d 1543, BU 1549 Sold 1546 Last m e n t i o n e d 1546 D i s c a r d e d 1560

Barfod 1995, 69-70. A c o m m e n t in Larsson 1986, 77, about three-masted ships as something unusual in the N o r d i c navies in the 1540s is a result of a misreading or a 16th-century misquotation; two masts instead of two mdrsar (top-masts), in a copy of this report sent by Christian III to the Duke of Prussia 8/1 1540. In the Swedish navy's inventory of 1544, SH 1:6, RA, there are three ships with three topmasts, five with two (including the damaged Galeomn for which the source is SH 1:4, RA), a n d three with one topmast. Even small vessels in the Swedish navy had three masts already in the 1520s. Niels Probst's unpublished list of Danish warships.

W A R S H I P S A N D NAVAL S T R E N G T H

5.3.2

The galley navy,

353

1540-1558

Sometime in the late 1530s, Gustav I decided to try an old type of warship that was new to the Baltic; the Mediterranean galley (Swedish: galej). One contemporary observer, the exiled Swedish Catholic churchman Olaus Magnus, who lived in Italy, later wrote that Gustav around 1540 had invited galley-builders f r o m Venice in order to build galleys with two, three, and four oarsmen on each bench. No references to these Venetians have been found in Swedish sources, but the first two galleys, Ulven and Siangan were in service in 1540. Two more, Draken and Igeln, were built in Stocldiolm in 1541. Special terms f r o m the Mediterranean, corsia (a gangway between the oarsmen's benches) mdfusta (small galley type), appear in Swedish sources in the 1540s, and the galleys were originally not rigged with the normal north European square sail. They were probably first given the triangular South European lateen sails." Olaus Magnus was well informed when he stated that the galleys were built in different sizes. The first four galleys were of four distinct size categories, corresponding to the typology of oared warships in the Mediterranean. The largest, Draken, was called a "great galley". It was from the 1550s regarded as a sailing warship, not a galley, and its heavy armament makes it certain that it was considerable larger than normal Mediterranean galleys.'^ It was probably built as a galea grossa, a hybrid type of sailing and oared warship, originally designed as merchant galleys. It had been abandoned by the early 16th century but survived in Venice as a potential warship and was developed into the galleass type which became famous at the battle of Lepanto in 1571. The smallest galley of 1540-41, Igeln (also called Liljan), was in Swedish called fust, an Italian word {fusta) for a small galley. The two first galleys had markedly different weights of armament, indicating a difference in size. Ulven (renamed Lindormen in 1541) was probably close to a normal Mediterranean ^a/ea. The smaller Siangan, which was larger than the fust, might be &galeota, a Mediterranean type between

" The galley fleet 1540-60: Glete 1976, 38-43; Glete 1977, 58-63, 97-100; Olaus Magnus, Historia om de nordiska folken, II, Uppsala, 1912 (orig ed. 1555), 182. N u m b e r of oarsmen in the Mediterranean: Guilmartin 1974, 194, 197, 293. In the inventory of 1556, Angeln (600 tonnes) had a cable of 14 turn, Draken one of 12 and Falken, a r o u n d 300 tonnes one of 10 turn. Tliis indicates that Draken had a displacement of at least 400 tonnes, SH 4:4, RA.

354

C H A P T E R Four

galea and fust in size. Most Swedish galleys built before 1560 had 15 to 20 pairs of benches and two or three oarsmen on each bench. They were smaller than the normal galea, which in the mid-16th century had 24 pairs of benches with three oarsmen on each.'' The galley program continued with one more fusta built in 1542, five more galejer built in 1542-43, one in 1544, one in 1545, and one built on Lake Vattern in 1545-46 as a supplement to the new fortress at Vadstena. Six more were built in 1546-48. Nine or ten galleys were built from 1549 to 1558, approximately one each year. Two were also built for service on Lake Vanern in 1558-59. Of a total of probably 31 galleys built f r o m 1540 to 1559,24 were with certainty—or a high degree of probability—built at the king's central shipyard in Stockholm. Three were built at the two great inland lakes for local service, one at Abo in Finland, two (perhaps only one) at Alvsborg, and one small galley was in 1554-55 built at the royal manor Ekolsund, near Stoclcholm. The special technical ability to build galleys was concentrated in the main shipyard. One of the galleys built at Alvsborg was named Lose Klinkan, which means that it was built with traditional clinker technology, not with the Mediterranean carvel technology, which probably was used for Stockholm-built galleys.'"' The continuity in the program is striking. Until the reforms in the 1610s, such a long series of generally similar warships was never built at a royal yard. New construction was, until the late 1550s, intended to increase the strength of the oared force, not to replace old units. Twenty-six of the 31 galleys built still existed by 1559. The systematic increase of the galley force shows that Gustav I came to regard this as an important part of his armed forces. He had oarsmen in large numbers in his new army of peasant-soldiers. In Denmark, a galley force of this size could not be manned in peace-time, due to lack

" The n u m b e r of o a r s m e n on Swedish galleys was probably close to the n u m b e r of soldiers. The only m a n n i n g plan for Gustav I's galleys is for 1557, which lists 20 galleys. They were scheduled to have 56 to 124 soldiers each, S M H F 1:16, RA, printed, with m i n o r errors in Viljanti 1957, 752. In the inventory for 1556, SH 4:4, RA, the galleys had cables of 6 to 8 inches, indicating a size between 60/80 and 150 tonnes, which agrees fairly well with the total crews of 8 0 - 1 6 1 m e n in the plan for 1557. A ratio of one m a n / t o n n e s displacement was typical for Swedish galleys and gunboats in the 18th century when the displacements are known. T w o m o r e galley-size vessels were built at Alvsborg, a galeon in 1553 and a galley in 1556-57. The latter is probably identical with Alvsborgs Barken, first m e n t i o n e d in 1560. It is probable that these vessels were of a hybrid type of sailing and oared warships but details are lacking.

W A R S H I P S A N D NAVAL S T R E N G T H

355

of oarsmen. For Gustav, the galleys gave his army mobility at sea, which was demonstrated in 1555 when they were commissioned for transferring the army to Finland for the war against Russia. Tlie king showed a marked personal interest in galley technology. H e often returned to the problem of improving their sea-keeping abilities, something about which he probably often heard complaints of f r o m his seamen. In the 1540s and 1550s, galleys were still used in Western Europe for operations in the open sea, and especially the French galleys were successful in operations against England in the 154Gs. Both in England and France, attempts were in these years m a d e to build hybrid types (galleasses, roberges) with n a r r o w sailing-ship hulls and auxiliary oars. In Sweden, the galley type was modified rather than replaced by hybrid warships. Its ability to make both heavy guns and soldiers mobile in the archipelagos m a d e it attractive. The fact that the galley fleet was abandoned soon after Gustav I's death makes it also probable that a personal element was involved. Gustav had introduced the galley type in the Baltic, and his m a n y letters about their i m p r o v e m e n t show that he regarded t h e m as a personal project to develop.'' The fleet of m a j o r sailing warships was reduced in the 1540s. A new medium-sized carvel, Angeln (600 tonnes), was built at Stockholm in 1544-47, possibly laid down as a response to the uncertain political conditions in 1542-45 when a war with the E m p e r o r seemed possible. W h e n that crisis was over, reductions became possible. Kilen (very probably the f o r m e r Nye Holken) was sold to merchants in February 1546, Svanen was wrecked in the Gota Alv estuary a r o u n d a year later, after a mercantile voyage to Holland, and Galeonen was last m e n t i o n e d in 1546. Including An^eZn, there were four carvel-built m a j o r warships from 1547, a moderate but m o d e r n and heavily armed force of warships. Store Kravelen was broken up in 1553/54, and a new but smaller ship (1,200 tonnes) with the same n a m e was launched in Stockholm in 1555 as a replacement. It was r e n a m e d Elefanten when fitted out for sea in 1559.'® The force of m i n o r sailing warships was kept u p to strength by continuous new construction. Twelve units of a r o u n d

" The use of galleys a n d the development of oared vessels in Western Europe in this period: Rodger 1997, 164-75, 204-20, 272-96; Glete 2000, 139-44. " The vvfreck of that ship is at Bjorkenas, n o r t h of Kalmar. It was partly excavated in the 1930s: Carl E k m a n in Svenska flottans historia, I, 89-98; Adams 2003, 87-90. Its rig is described in Sam Svensson, "The Swedish Ship Stora Kraveln, 1559", MM, 24, 1938, 293-301. See also Halldin 1963, 98, 99, 112.

356

C H A P T E R Four

100-175 tonnes, mainly barkar and bojorter, were laid down between 1540 and 1558, five at Stocldiolm and the others at yards around the country. New construction outside Stockholm took place mainly after 1552. This is probably a sign of that the carvel technology had begun to spread outside the main yard. Approximately 14 even smaller units (less than 100 tonnes, mainly pinkor SLiidjakter) were also added, most of them for service in Finland. King Gustav had not lost interest in larger types of sailing ships, but most of the larger ships (of around 300-600 tonnes) built in these years were not front-line warships. They were merchantmen, defensively armed when they sailed to Western Europe but of limited value as major combatants in a naval war. Primarily they were a part of the king's active commercial policy. From 1547 to 1555, he built seven or eight large cargo carriers and in 1551 bought one from merchants in Ekenas in Finland, who were unable to finance its construction. He also inherited a large cargo carrier from a merchant. None of these ships were built at Stockholm. Instead they were launched at Vastervik, Abo, Kastelholm (Aland), Alvsborg (one or two), Kalmar (two), and Viborg. Most of them are explicitly called holkar in the sources, and in a few cases it is mentioned that they were clinker-built. At least five were built of fir, and none of them had a long life. Two were wrecked, one was discarded in 1558/59, and at least two were sold, the last in 1560. It is probable that the other four or five ships, which only are mentioned during a few years in the early 1550s, also were sold to merchants.'^ The decentralised construction policy shows that the ability to build large ships with traditional North European clinker technology was widespread in Sweden. The construction program may have spread competence in managing decentralised shipbuilding in order to build several ships simultaneously. This competence was soon to become essential for the navy. By the end of 1558, Gustav I's navy was of around 8,000 tonnes (table 5.3). It had a different structure compared to the Danish navy, which at this time had one great ship, Fortuna, of around 1,500 tonnes, three of 700-800 tonnes, seven of 300-500 tonnes, and around ten of 100-200 tonnes. Some of these were merchantmen rather than warships, the Danish inventory of large-calibre guns was markedly smaller than in Sweden, and there were no galleys. The total size is less easy to

Glete 1976, 59-60; Glete 1977, 51-53.

WARSHIPS AND NAVAL STRENGTH

Table

5.3

Swedish

warships

Launched

Name

at the end of Type

357

1558 Displacement, Final fate tonnes

Store lejonet

Kravelen/Elefanten

Angeln Draken falken/Lille Viborgs

Kravelen Holken

1555

Carvel

1,200

1537/9

Carvel

1,000

W r 1564 D 1562

1545 1541

Carvel

600 400

S 1572 L M 1563

1531

Carvel Hoik ( m e r c h a n t )

300

D 1560

1554/5

Carvel, ex great galley ?

S 1560

c.1,500

10 w a r s h i p s 1 0 0 - < 3 0 0 t o n n e s 10 s m a l l c r a f t < 1 0 0 t o n n e s

C.500

23 galleys

2,000/2,500

estimate than for the Swedish navy, but both navies were of approximately the same size. The Danish navy was adequate for defence of the southern Baltic Sea, while the Swedish navy was well suited for defence of the northern Baltic, especially the Swedish-Finnish archipelago coasts. The many galleys were also suitable for offensive amphibious operations in any direction. Both Nordic navies could dominate the sea in conflicts with other powers, but neither was strong enough to sustain a major battle fleet offensive against the other in enemy home waters. 5.3.3

Erik XIV's battle fleet,

1559-1570

Sometime in mid-1558, a new shipbuilding policy was initiated which, in a few years would radically change the capability of the Swedish navy. The first indication is a letter f r o m Duke Erik on 16 August 1558, which shows that he was preparing the construction of a new ship in Kalmar, the capital of his new dukedom in Smaland.'® The ship was actually built at the new yard Bjorkenas, north of Kalmar. It was completed in 1560 and named Sankt Erik (1,100 tonnes), after the 12th-century Swedish king who had become the national saint. Erik's younger brother, Duke Johan of Finland, built another ship, Finske Svanen (750 tonnes), at his yard in Abo in 1559-60. A smaller ship, Troilus (300 tonnes), was built at Stocldiolm at the same time. Sometime before March 1560 a large ship. Hector (900 tonnes), was

GR 28, 577 (16/8 1558).

358

C H A P T E R Four

laid down at Stockholm, and in summer that year another large ship for Duke Johan, Finske Bjdrnen, was laid down at Abo. These two ships were completed in 1562. The veterans from the 1530s, Falken (around 300 tonnes) and Lejonet (around 1,000 tonnes), were discarded in 1560 and 1562 respectively, but the new construction program initiated before the death of Gustav I on 29 September 1560 was clearly intended to expand the navy, not only to replace old ships.'' Gustav's heir, Erik XIV, was an important force behind this expansion but also Duke Johan channelled large resources from his dukedom to warships and seamen. He also took over two small warships and three galleys from his father and formed a navy of his own as part of his ambitious program to become a prince with prestigious European connections. In 1562, Johan sailed with his new flagship Finske Bjdrnen to Danzig to marry Katarina Jagellonica.'"" She was sister to the childless Polish king Sigismund August, and the marriage showed that Johan hoped for a future for himself or his descendants in East-Central Europe. At the same time, Erik waited in vain for an opportunity to sail with his fleet to England or Scotland to marry Elizabeth Tudor or Mary Stuart. In 1561, a very large ship, Mars (around 1,800 tonnes), was laid down at Bjorkenas. It was an expression of the new ruler's naval ambitions in the Baltic, but considering that it was the largest and most heavily armed warship in Europe, Erik probably also hoped to make an impression in Western Europe. In that he was successful. Although Mars' career was to be very brief, it has remained one of the most well-known warships in 16th-century Europe, overshadowing the larger ships Sweden built later in the century.""

'' Glete 1976, 60-63; Glete 1977, 51, 57-58. Johan's naval activities as a duke in Finland have left several traces in accounts f r o m Abo castle a n d shipyard 1556-62: FRA 598, 642, 709, 713, 776, 779, 838, 845, 891, 897 a n d 939, Finska Riksarkivet; K 338, 340 and 341; SH 7:15; Finska Cameralia, vol. 34. 36, all RA, and in Nils koksskrivares rakenskap pa Finske Bjdrnen a n n o 62, Handlingar r o r a n d e furstliga hov 1559-1621, Hertig Johan av Finland, Slottsarkivet, Stocldiolm. F r o m the latter it is k n o w n that Finske Bjdrnen in 1562 had 297 persons on board. The size of this ship is otherwise not k n o w n except that it is referred to as "the great cai-vel" before it got a p r o p e r name. "" The size and a r m a m e n t of Mars (and of Elefanten of 1555) are discussed in Carl Ekman, "The Swedish Ship Mars or Makalds, MM, 25, 1939, 1-10; R. C. Anderson, "The Mars and the Adler", MM, 25, 1939, 296-99. Frank Howard, Sailing Ships of War, 1400-1860, London, 1979, 50 gives dimensions for Mars, which actually are for Liibeck's Adler of 1566, almost certainly taken f r o m Anderson's article of 1939.

Laid down

Launched

Built at

Master Displacement, Final fate Shipwright tonnes

New construction of major Swedish warships, 1558-1570

St Erik Autumn 1558 1559 Bjorkeniis HoUinger 1,100 BU 1584 Finske Svanen 1559 1559/60 Abo Jakob 750 D 1571/3 Troilus Early? 1559 1559/60 Stockholm Adrian 300 G 1571 Hector Winter 1560 1562 Stockholm Adrian 900 BU 1589 Finske Bjdrnen Summer 1560 1561/2 Abo Jakob ? Lost? 1563 Mars 1561 1563 Bjorkeniis Hollinger 1,800 Lost 1564 St Christoffer Early? 1562 1562/3 Vastervik Adrian 600 Sold 1588 Krabaten (?) 1562 1563 Alvsborg Jakob 900 P Danish 1563 Jungfrun (?) 1562 1563 Alvsborg Jakob 1,000 P Danish 1563 Tantheijen 1563/4 1565 Vastervik Adrian 700 Sold 1574 Brommaren 1563 1564 Helsingfors Sigfrid 300 D 1571 Memnon 1563/4 1564 Abo Jakob 300 Sunk 1574 Neptunus Oct? 1564 Sep 1566 Vastervik Adrian 2,000 BU 1591 Valen 1564/5 1566 Abo Jakob 1,400? BU 1577 Renen 1564/5 1565 Helsingfors Sigfrid 400 Given 1571 Kdmpen 1565? 1568/9 Alvkarleby ? 900 BU 1586

Name

Table 5.4

W A R S H I P S A N D NAVAL S T R E N G T H 359

360

C H A P T E R Four

Hie intense new construction program of major warships continued during the 1560s (table 5:4). In 1561, two more yards for construction of major warships were brought into use when Erik ordered two ships to be laid down at Alvsborg and one, St Christojfer, at V a s t e r v i k . " ' ^ Erik and Duke Johan also bought major ships. Hamburg Kravelen (Morianen) was bought in 1561 by the king and given to Johan, apparently in exchange for Finske Svanen, while Fdrgyllda Lejonet (450 tonnes) was bought for the king in 1562, possibly in London.'"^ Hie Nordic War, which would last until late 1570, began in early summer 1563. At the same time, Erik and Johan fought a brief civil war. Sweden began the Nordic War with nine major warships of 3001,200 tonnes, and the very start of the war, the battle of Bornholm in May, provided the navy with three Danish warships as prizes. The early months of the war also brought heavy losses in ships for Sweden, although not in naval battles. The two large ships under construction at Alvsborg were captured by the Danes with the fortress in September, and Duke Johan's Finske Bjdrnen and Hamburg Kravelen are not mentioned after 1562-63. Their disappearance is not explained in any known source, but it seems as if they were lost during the civil war in August 1563, when Johan was defeated and imprisoned by Erik. Three of Sweden's largest merchantmen, all of about 450 tonnes, were added to the navy in 1563: Pelikanen (usually called Baggen), bought from Admiral Jakob Bagge; Hjorten, bought f r o m Stockholm merchants; and Bjdrnen, apparently a gift to the king by the town of Gavle. In 1563-64, another large ship, Tantheijen (700 tonnes), was laid down at the Vastervik yard; Rdbocken (250 tonnes) and Memnon (300 tonnes) were started at Abo; and Brommaren (300 tonnes) and Enhdrningen (175 tonnes) at Helsingfors. Of the new ships. Mars, St Christoffer, and Rdbocken entered service in 1564; Memnon, Brommaren, and Enhdrningen in 1565; and Tantheijen in 1566. Mars was destroyed in its first battle, at Oland on 31 May 1564, but only after two days of action, which convinced all three participants—Swedes, Danes, and Lubeckians—of the value of great and heavily armed warships. Denmark and Liibeck built two sister ships of 2,100 tonnes at Liibeck, which were completed in 1567: the Danish

RR 16/11, 18/11, 1561, RA. The identity o{ Hamburg Kravelen and Morianen, AR 1561/6b, 1561/8, 1562/18, KrA. Fdrgyllda Lejonet's master was 15/8 1562 paid for a voyage with the ship from L o n d o n to Sweden, Rantekamniarbocker 40;2, RA.

W A R S H I P S A N D NAVAL S T R E N G T H

361

Fortuna and Liibeck's Grosse Adler. Denmark also built Wol Her (2,200 tonnes), completed in 1570, and St OZw/(around 3,500 tonnes), completed by 1573. Erik XIV's replacement for Mars was, according to his instruction, built somewhat larger than the lost ship. It was laid down at Vastervik in October or early November 1564, launched as Neptunus in September 1566 (2,000 tonnes), and renamed Rode Draken in 1569."'^ In September 1564, the now largest ship in the navy, Elefanten, sank at the Bjorkenas yard during repair, after having run aground. Attempts to raise the hull failed. In 1564-65, Erik ordered no fewer than three ships of the same size as Elefanten to be built in Finland—at Abo, Helsingfors, and Ekenas.'"' Only the Abo ship, Valen, was actually built and completed in 1567. Its short operational life has left few quantitative sources to estimate its size, but it was probably of around 1,400 tonnes, somewhat larger than Elefanten. A smaller ship, Renen (400 tonnes), was built at Helsingfors in 1565-66. In 1565, another ship of around 900 tonnes was laid down at the new yard at Alvkarleby and delivered in 1569 as Kdmpen. No major ships were built at Stoclcholm after the completion of Hector in 1562/63, but from 1561 to 1566, major carvel-built warships were always under construction at four different yards at the same time. It was a marked spread of advanced shipbuilding competence, which shows that several master shipwrights had been trained in the reign of Gustav I. The Swedish mercantile marine was not large, but it had some ships useful for naval service. Algen (500 tonnes) and Samson (300 tonnes) were bought in 1565, and the large Fortuna (also called Greken, 800 tonnes), belonging to the merchant Jakob Grek in Helsingfors, was loaned in 1569, a transaction that had been discussed since 1567. Two foreign merchantmen, Jonas von Emden and Hollands Morianen (both around 500 tonnes), were also in service f r o m spring 1567. They were probably requisitioned from the Dutch salt ships, which had been forced to sail to Sweden with their cargo in 1566, but they were returned to their owners in 1569 and 1568 respectively. During the war, another major source of new combatants for the navy had emerged: captured enemy warships and merchantmen suitable

RR 2/11, 8/11, 1564, 28/3 1565, 29/9 1566, 7/1 1567, RA. "" Orders for Helsingfors, RR 28/4 1565, for Ekeniis, RR 9/5 1565, RA. The new ships were to have the same main dimensions as Elefanten, but with less draught of water.

362

C H A P T E R Four

to be armed. A large number of ships were captured when they tried to break the blockade of Narva, which Sweden established in 1562. Most of them were small, and several were released, sold, or used as naval transports and storeships. Captured ships of larger size, however, were a decisive part of the great increase of the navy in the period 1563-65. The battle of Bornholm in 1563 resulted in the capture of Hercules (800 tonnes), one of Denmark's three largest warships, and of the Danish warships (Danske) Hector and (Danske) Hjorten, both of 300 tonnes. Four ships from Liiheck—Brune Lejonet, Rode Gripen, Rode Lejonet, and St Goran, of 300 tonnes each—were captured in the Gulf of Finland in 1563 and armed by the navy in 1564. On 15 July 1564, the Narva convoy of around 20 Liibeck merchantmen captured at Bornholm added four ships of around 275-350 tonnes, which next year were armed as Swedish warships: Fdrgyllda Duvan, Lybske Christoffer, Lybske Hjorten, and Lybske Svanen. In August 1564, the battle with the allied fleet ended with the Swedish capture of the Danish Bose Lejonet (600 tonnes), David (450 tonnes), and (Danske) Morianen (300 tonnes). A large German (Lubeckian?) merchantman, Wendekdpan (600 tonnes), was captured in the southern Baltic. It was armed as a warship, although it served more as a carrier of soldiers than of heavy guns. Another ship, (Finska) Ugglan, which appeared as a warship in 1565, may have been a captured ship f r o m 1564, but its origin is mysterious. On 7 July 1565, the navy lost three warships—Fdrgyllde Lejonet (450 tonnes), St Goran (300 tonnes), and (Gamle) Gripen (175 tonnes)— in the battle of Bornholm, but captured the new and heavily armed Danish fleet flagship Jaegermesteren (1,100 tonnes, renamed Jdgaren), the most valuable prize of the entire war. During 1565, two merchantmen of around 400/450 tonnes were also taken: a Konigsberg ship named Pryssen (meaning "the Prussian") and Mdnen, probably from Liibeck. Prussia was nominally under the Polish crown, and its ships were regarded as legal prey when Sweden was at war with Poland. Several minor ships were added to the navy by capture until 1570, but only one more major unit, the Danish warship Bjdrnen (400 tonnes), was taken, in 1570. From 1563 to 1565, 17 or 18 major warships of around 8,000 tonnes were added to the navy by capture. Because they were losses for the enemy, these captures radically changed the balance of power in the Baltic Sea. In these years, nine major Swedish warships of around 5,000 tonnes were delivered f r o m the royal shipyards or bought. Captured ships were the navy's most important source of

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

363

additional strength in these eventful years. Of a total strength of major warships of around 15,000 tonnes by the end of 1565, close to half had been captured. Captured guns were less important, because most captured ships were wealdy armed and had to be rearmed with Swedish bronze guns. The importance of captured ships was even larger for minor warships. From 1561 to 1570, around 35 smaller ships (less than 300 tonnes) of at least 3,000 tonnes total were captured or requisitioned and used as warships. Most of these were armed merchantmen, but several had been used as privateers or blockade-runners so they were presumably fast and useful as cruisers in the navy. After the early 1560s, new construction of small warships and transports practically ceased, because captured ships were sufficient for naval requirements. Apart from the losses of four major warships at Alvsborg and (probably) Abo in 1563, of Mars and Elefanten in 1564, and of two major warships in the battle of Bornholm in 1565, the navy had few serious losses. No major warship other than Elefanten was lost to accidents in the war. This was exceptional in comparison to both the DanishLubeckian navy in this war and with the Swedish navy (or any navy) in later wars. Several minor warships and galleys were lost accidentally, however, and several were discarded or disarmed for use as storeships. Five ships of 1,400 tonnes were given away in 1569-70, mainly to aristocrats as rewards for supporting Johan III in the brief civil war, which ended the reign of Erik XIV. Because the owners belonged to the political elite, the ships remained available for the navy for some years, if required. In the last years of the war, three new great ships—Neptunus (renamed Rode Draken), Valen, and Kdmpen—with a total displacement of more than 4,000 tonnes were added to the eff'ective force. When the war against Denmark and Liibeck came to an end in late 1570, the Swedish navy was still at its peak strength, with 53 units of around 21,000 tonnes, the largest sailing navy in Europe (table 5:5). The large galley fleet of 1560 was no more. Only two galleys had been built in the 1560s (in 1562 and 1569), and there were now only two royal galleys and two belonging to Duke Karl. By the end of 1570, the Danish navy had been increased to around 30 major and minor warships of around 15,000 tonnes, one or two galleys, and an uncertain number of small units. This was the result of a determined policy to replace losses, but in spite of that and the Danish alliance with Liibeck, the totally mobilised Swedish navy could still control the Baltic Sea in the last campaign of the war.

C H A P T E R Four

364 Table

5.5

Swedish

warships

Launched

Name

Rode Draken Valen St Erik Jdgaren Svenske Hector Kdmpen Hercules Greken/Fortuna Finske Svanen Tantheijer Base Lejonet Wendekdpan St Christopher Angeln

1566 1566 1559 Taken 1565 1561/2 1568/9 Taken 1563 Loan 1569 1559/60 1565 Taken 1564 Taken 1564 1562/3 1545

1570

Built at

Displacement, tonnes

Final fate

Vastervik Abo Bjorkeniis Ex Danish Stocldiolm Alvkarleby ex Danish Helsingfors? Abo Vastervik ex Danish ex German Vastervik Stocldiolm

2,000 1,400? 1,100 1,100 900 900 800 800 750 700 600 600 600 600 5,300 1,800 c. 450 c. 400

BU 1591 BU 1577 BU 1559 Returned 1571 BU 1589 BU 1586 Returned 1571 Returned 1572 D 1571/3 Sold 1574 Returned 1571 Returned 1571 S 1588 S 1572

15 warships 300-500 tonnes 11 warships 100-250 tonnes 9 small craft <100 tonnes 4 galleys

5.3.4

at the end of

Johan Ill's shipbuilding programs,

1571-1592

The peace of 1570 did not bring an end to Swedish war efforts. An intense war with Russia went on until a truce in 1583. The larger units of the navy, however, were decommissioned. Until Narva was taken in 1581, the navy's main operational tasks were to blockade that port and support army activities to take it. That mainly required small warships. Because the state's financial situation was in permanent crisis in the 1570s, it is hardly surprising that the large navy was radically diminished after 1570. The ships were major capital assets that could be used to pay off political and financial debts and most of them were not immediately necessary. In the peace treaty of Stettin of 1570, it was agreed that Denmark should get back the eight royal warships taken by the Swedish navy between 1563 and 1570. They were returned in 1571, except for the Danske Hector, which was no longer seaworthy. This return resulted in a reduction of the Swedish navy of around 4,000 tonnes and a corresponding increase in Danish naval strength. From 1571 to 1574, 14 other major warships (300-800 tonnes) of around 6,500 tonnes were returned to their owners, sold, given away, discarded, or wrecked.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

365

Eight minor warships (100-250 tonnes) of around 1,200 tonnes, one galley, and several small units (including some captured after 1570) were similarly removed from the naval force in this massive reduction: at least 12,000 tonnes in four years. Most of these ships, as well as those disposed of already in 156970, were old or of mercantile origin, and their disappearance did not seriously reduce the long-term strength of the navy. The main exception was Tantheijen of 700 tonnes, launched in 1565 and given to a merchant in 1574 as payment for debts. New construction in 1571-74 added only six units of around 1,100 tonnes, of which only Svanen (300 tonnes) and Bjdrnen (250 tonnes) were of any importance. Many more warships—18 of a total displacement of 1,500-2,000 tonnes— were added through capture, especially in 1574 when a convoy from Liibeck tried to force the Narva blockade with armed force. Denmark had also disposed of old units after 1570, but new construction more than compensated for that. In the mid-1570s, the Danish navy was of around 18,000 tonnes and superior to the Swedish of around 11,000 tonnes. This reduction in Swedish tonnage was not the result of a change in Swedish naval policy; Johan III was already planning a major program of new construction in 1571-72. In January 1572, he informed his brother, Duke Karl, who also was planning to build major warships, that he had ordered seven or eight warships to be laid down. On 16 February 1572, the king outlined a program of eight or nine ships of the size of Finske Svanen and Tantheijen (700/750 tonnes), which should be built of oak or fir at various places in Sweden and Finland. The commanders of the Stockholm castle were told to find shipbuilders and masters (skeppare) to supervise this program.""^ Already when Johan was a young duke of Finland (1556-63), had he spent much on shipbuilding. His program of 1572 shows that his naval ambitions were far larger than his father's had ever been. In the midst of full-scale war with Russia and in a deep financial crisis, he intended to begin major warships of the same total size as all the major warships his father had built in almost four decades of rule. During his eight years as king, Erik XIV had started the construction of an even larger program, but he had lived on his father's savings and had not tried to build all ships at once. Johan had to write m a n y letters in 1572-75 urging his administrators on various levels to get his new warships

RR 28/1 1572, 16/2 1572, RA.

366

C H A P T E R Four

Started; to get timbers cut, shipbuilders sent out to various places, and provisions sent to the new yards. The appointment of Admiral Henrik Arvedsson in 1573 to supervise the new construction program shows that the king was ready to make administrative reforms to get it underway, but a stream of royal letters about shipbuilding also shows that the king had to intervene to make it work.'"^ From 1572 to 1575, six major warships were laid down (table 5:6). They were launched from 1574 to 1578, when also four small warships of 100/150 tonnes were launched at four different yards. In addition, the king bought two large ships, both of 800 tonnes: Gyllenstjernan from the aristocrat Goran Gyllenstierna in 1575, and Morianen from burghers in Viborg in 1578. A total of 12 warships of around 6,500 tonnes were acquired in a five-year period when Sweden was involved in a desperate war with Russia, a power without any seagoing naval forces. It is obvious that this effort was determined by a long-term naval policy intended to secure Swedish control over the northern Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. By 1578, the navy had regained strength and could muster 16 major (300-2,000 tonnes) and 11 minor (100-250 tonnes) warships as well as six small units. The total force was of around 14,000 tonnes, approximately the same strength as the Danish navy. Table

5.6

Name

Laid down

Algen Hjorten Renen Smdlands Angeln Uppland

1572 1574 1575/6 Leionet Lejonet

1573/4

1575 1575

Major

Swedish

warships,

Launched Displacement. tonnes 1574 1576 1576/7 1577 1577/8 1578

700 700 300 1,100 700 900

launched

1574-1578

Built at

Final fate

Kalvo, near Helsingfors BU 1583 Sold 1583 Haliko, Abo province BU 1591 Sold 1591 Vastervik, Smaland Haringe, Sodermanland Sold 1590 Harbovik, Uppland BU 1590

Alvkarleby, Uppland

"" RR 7/3, 10/4, 23/10, 27/12 1572, 21/1, 9/3, 3/4, 8/4, 9/4, 15/4, 1/8, 26/9 1573, 15/1 and 16/1 1574 (several letters of attorneys to shipbuilding administrators), 12/3 1574, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

367

Hiis was not all. In 1568, the king's younger brother, Duke Karl, as soon as he could rule his dukedom—Sodermanland and Narke in central Sweden—had begun to acquire ships, initially from the king's navy. Already in 1571, Karl intended to build his own ships, and from at least 1574 he built ships at Strangnas and at his main castle at Nykoping.""* The young duke in 1574 had ambitions to become a naval entrepreneur to Philip II, who at this time fought his Dutch rebels with a great army but with only small naval forces. By 1574, the Habsburgs and the Dutch who were loyal to him had lost control of the sea around the Netherlands. An attempt in spring 1574 to send a major, but improvised, fleet from Spain to regain control failed, due to widespread illness. On 22 September 1574, Karl sent a letter and messenger to the Habsburg administration in the Netherlands offering his services along with eight ships of 300-500 laster. They could be ready and fully manned in spring 1575 and sent from Lodose (Gothenburg) to fight the Dutch rebels. Karl mentioned that his brother, King Johan, could send more warships if they were required. He also offered to sell naval stores and munitions to the Habsburgs.'"' Karl's plan was not an unrealistic fantasy, and he in fact had made major investments in new warships before he made the offer."" It may be seen as one of the several entrepreneurial projects he launched during his 30 years as a duke.'" In this case, it was an attempt to capitalise on the fact that Sweden had proven competence to send a battle fleet of purpose-built warships to sea. Around eight ships were available to Karl at this time, if ships under construction are included, and some had served as warships until 1570."^ Administratively, Sweden

™ HKR 30/11 1571, 6/1, 8/1 1572, RA, Duke Karl's contacts with the Habsburgs in 1574: Hildebrand 1898, 209-12. The early phase of the D u t c h Revolt: Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 1990 (1977), 118-68; naval aspects: Glete 2000, 151-57. The failed naval expedition f r o m Spain in 1574: Magdalena Pi Corrales, Espana y las potencias nordicas: "La otra invencible", 1574, Madrid. 1983. Hildebrand 1898, 211 finds the offer unreahstic a n d believes that the messenger made an overstatement. Some of these are studied in Hedherg 1995. Karl's activities as shipbuilder, shipowner and international m e r c h a n t have not been investigated. In 1574, Duke Karl owned Lybske Christoffer, Brum Lejonet, Angeln, and Rode Lejonet, while Elefanten and probably Lejonet were u n d e r construction. Ldrkan would have been available for service in 1575, and one of the ships first m e n t i o n e d in the sources in 1576 may have been u n d e r construction in a u t u m n 1574. Because several royal warships had been given or sold to aristocrats and m e r c h a n t s in 1569-74, Karl

368

C H A P T E R Four

had sent out much larger fleets for war in the 1560s. With the naval operations of 1563-70 only a few years behind, experienced men who could m a n and lead a much smaller fleet were available, if money was provided. Politically, Karl's project was in accordance with Johan Ill's policy of forming good relations with the Habsburgs. Four years later, Philip II sent a negotiator to Sweden in order to hire the entire Swedish navy with Johan III as entrepreneur. In 1574, Karl received a friendly answer, but nothing came out of it, in all probability because Habsburg's efforts against the Dutch rebels had to be drastically reduced due to a financial crisis. Philip II may have been interested in hiring military and naval entrepreneurs but only if they could provide him with credits as parts of the contract. In 1574, however, Karl had started the construction of a great ship, Elefanten, which probably was launched in 1575. It was followed by Lejonet, possibly also laid down in 1574 (Karl wrote in March 1574 that ships were under construction) but not ready until 1577."' The information about their size is uncertain, but both were frequently referred to as the duke's "great ships" {stora skepp)}^* In 1578, when Philip II's representative was in Stocldiolm for negotiations about a naval contract, Karl offered to sell the two great ships to Johan III, emphasising that his economic situation made it necessary to sell them. He was not satisfied with the price his brother oflfered, however, and in 1579-80

would have had no difficulty in finding m o r e ships in Sweden. A list of his ships is in Appendix 1, part 3. HKR 7/3 1574, 2/1 1575, RA. Accounts f r o m the shipyard in Strangnas in S o d e m i a n l a n d s handlingar 1574:3, 1575:10, 1577:13, RA. I h e r e is n o t h i n g about shipbuilding in the accounts for Strangnas f r o m 1573, which shows that it started in 1574. A m e m o r a n d u m f r o m 31/10 1574 about the cost of "the new ship at Strangnas", M 1754, RA, was probably prepared in connection with Karl's offer to lease his ships to Philip II. Cost calculations for Swedish 16th-century warships are otherwise almost non-existent. Most references to t h e m are f o u n d in accounts for the shipyard at the Nykoping castle, Sodermanlands handlingar, RA, f r o m 1575 to 1591. In HKR 29/9 1579, RA, it is m e n t i o n e d that Elefanten requires cables of 16 or 17 inches circumferences. In 1586, Duke Karl ordered large a m o u n t s of yarn and sail-cloth for Elefanten and Lejonet, S M H F 5:8, RA, a n d in 1588 he ordered anchors for Elefanten in Danzig, Rantekammarbocker, f u r s t e n d o m e n a , hertig Karl, 1588-92, RA. At that time it was stated that the anchors were for a ship of 450 leister a n d that the ship required cables of 16 and 12 inches circumference. There were m o r e than one last in use in Sweden, and the size of the cables indicates a ship of not m o r e than 1,000 tonnes. Ships in the navy were normally measured by the last of 18 tunnor, which equalled a weight load of a r o u n d 2 tonnes. A ship with a carrying capacity of 900 tonnes would, fully loaded, have had a displacement of 1,300-1,400 tonnes. This last is therefore probably of only 12 tunnor.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

369

negotiated in vain with the Copenhagen merchant Markus Hess about a sale or a joint ownership."^ In 1586-88, Elefanten and Lejonet were finally fitted out for service at sea. In October 1587, Karl saw an opportunity in Spain's preparations for an attack on England and offered the ships to Queen Elizabeth. She did not buy them (she never bought any foreign-built ships for her navy), and in 1590 Karl sent them on a mercantile voyage to Spain with a load of timber and masts. The m o m e n t was opportune, as Philip II was rebuilding his navy after the catastrophe in 1588. In July 1590, the ships were in England, and Lord Burghley ordered that they and their load should be evaluated for a possible purchase by the Queen or some of her subjects in order to hinder their passage to Spain. They were eventually allowed to sail, but Elefanten suffered shipwreck near Dartmouth in October 1590. The ship may have been salvaged, because there is mention of repair on the "great ships" in the account for the Nykoping shipyard for 1591, but neither ship is mentioned later. In assessments of Sweden's naval strength from the mid-1570s until 1591, these two ships, with a total displacement of somewhere between 1,500 and 2,500 tonnes, must be included."® As discussed in chapter 4, Johan III decentralised new construction of warships as an integrated part of the resource extraction from peasant society. Ships were built at several yards at the same time, with the intention of making use of local labour, provisions, and timber delivered as taxes. In 1578-79, Johan initiated a second shipbuilding program. Originally it was intended to build eight ships at eight different yards, where 220 shipbuilders paid by the king should work together with 970 men supplied by the local peasant communities. One (undated) document also outlined a larger shipbuilding program in which 32 towns were to build 12 ships of a total of 2,500 Idster (7,500 tonnes) at the king's expense, although presumably also with

HKR 23/8 (2 letters), 12/9, 4/10 1578; RR 5/9 1578; H K R 29/5, 29/9, 29/10 1579, 29/1 1580, all RA. Soffring Jonsson's account for his voyage to England 1590-91, Diplomatrakenskaper, vol. 5, RA; u n d a t e d letter f r o m Theophilus H o m o d e i , Diplomatica, Anglica, vol. 531, RA; Richard Bruce W e r n h a m (ed.). List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign Series, Elizabeth I, 1, 420-21, 2, 437, London, 1964-69; Erik Wikland, Elizabethan Players in Sweden 1591-92: Facts and problems, Stockliolm, 1962, 15, 147-50 (who erroneously believes that the ships actually were sold to the Queen in 1587 and that Elefanten was wrecked in early 1590); This information was given to m e by M A Hakan Jakobsson. The ships are last m e n t i o n e d in Sodermanlands handlingar 1591:10:1, fol. 66, Nykoping, RA.

370

C H A P T E R Four

resources provided by the towns."' In practice, eight major warships were begun in 1578-84 at seven different yards, none of which had been used in the earher program (table 5:7). The intention cannot have been to develop yards with continuous shipbuilding but must instead have been to raise labour, provisions, and timber as widely as possible. The largest of the new ships, Monsterds Skeppet or Drakenas Skeppet of around 2,400 tonnes, was not launched until 1587/88 and did not arrive at Stoclcholm until 1589—11 years after the king wrote the first letter which initiated its construction. It was built at a new yard in Smaland called Drakenas but frequently also Monsteras after a nearby village. The ship, which from 1594 to 1599 was called Stora Skeppet (the Great Ship), was in 1599 briefly named Mars; later in the same year its name was changed to Julius Caesar. It was frequently also called Makalds {The Matchless). It was never fully rigged and fitted out for seagoing service, and its very existence has until recently been forgotten."® From 1579 to the early 1590s, on average, one minor warship, normally a bark of around 100/150 tonnes, was built each year. Eleven small warships were also built for the Ladoga flotilla f r o m 1581 to 1590, most of them at Kexholm at Lake Ladoga, which had been taken

U n d a t e d list of ships to be built at several yards, placed together with letters f r o m Johan III f r o m 1579, S M H F 4:11; undated list of several planned ships, SMHF 10:4, RA. "" Its existence vi'as shown in Jan Glete, "Johan III:s Stora Skepp: Att finna ett skepp i 1500-talets Skeppsgardsrakenskaper", Forum navale, 49, 1993, 5-17. Its approximately size can be calculated f r o m three sources: a m a n n i n g plan of the navy f r o m late 1599 (undated), S M H F 10:4, RA, lists 200 seamen c o m p a r e d to 80 seamen for ships of 800-900 tonnes; a report of 13/1 1602, S M H F 6:15, RA, states that it required cables of 24, 20, 18 a n d 14 turns (inches) circumference a n d 200 skeppund (34 tonnes) of h e m p for its rig; and a report f r o m Johan de F r e n n d e in Spain m e n tions that he had offered "the great ship at Skeppsholmen" in Stockholm of "1200 lasten gross" for sale, Diplomatica, Hispanica, vol. 62, RA (brought to m y attention by M A H a k a n Jakobsson). M a n p o w e r requirements, the size of the largest cable, and the requirement of h e m p for the rig all indicate a displacement between 2,000 and 2,500 tonnes, most likely a r o u n d 2,300-2,500 tonnes. The figure of 1,200 lasten may indicate a displacement of 3,600 tonnes, if it was the n o r m a l last of 2 tonnes a n d if the weight of the ship's hull is supposed to be a r o u n d half the m a x i m u m a m o u n t of cargo it can carry. However, a last equivalent to 2/3 of the larger last was also in use. If that is m e a n t in the report a displacement of 2/3 of 3,600 tonnes, that is a r o u n d 2,400 tonnes is probable, and confirm the estimates based on m a n n i n g , cables a n d weight of the rig. The ship h a d at least nine hinges for the rudder, which indicate a ship of unusual size, SH 62:3, RA; cf Brian Lavery, The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War. 1600-1815, London, 1987, 11.

371

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

Table

5.7

Major

Laid down

Name Angermanne Skeppet Raumo Kravelen Bjormborgs Kravelen Alvsborgs Skeppet Angermanne Kravelen mlsinge Lejonet

Skeppet Alvkarleby

Skeppet

1578 1579 1579 1577

Swedish

warships,

launched

Launched Displacement, tonnes

1579

1579 1581 1581 1581/2 1583/4 1584

1579/8

1587/8

2,400

1584

1587/8

1,000?

?

300 600? 600? 600 300 900

1579-1588

Built in/at

Angermanland Raumo Bjorneborg Alvsborg Angermanland Rogstad, H^singland Monsteras, Smaland Alvkarleby, Uppland

Final fate

Sold 1582 BU 1593 BU 1594 Sold 1598 Sold 1586/7 LM 1589/94 D 1609/10 Given 1590

from the Russians in 1580. Otherwise, the construction of sailing warships was reduced after the early 1580s, most probably as a result of a marked improvement of political relations with D e n m a r k in 1580. Both Nordic navies could reduce their new construction progranis, and Johan III could restructure his navy for the war he actually fought, that with Russia. The Swedish blockade of Narva, which started on 1562 to raise toll on trade through the Gulf of Finland, continued after 1570 as a n o r m a l blockade of an enemy port. It lasted until Narva was conquered f r o m the Russians in 1581. The blockade was rewarding, n o t only in terms of captured goods and incomes f r o m hcences for allowing ships to pass the blockade. It was also an i m p o r t a n t source of ships for the navy, although far f r o m all captured ships were added to the navy's force of warships. From 1571 to 1581, eight ships of (probably) 300-500 tonnes, 11 of 100-200 tonnes, and 19 units smaller than 100 tonnes served as warships after having been captured. The largest captured ships were three f r o m Liibeck taken in 1574 and 1581 and one English and four French ships taken f r o m 1577 to 1581. Several captured ships were soon sold or given away as rewards and p a y m e n t to military leaders in the war with Russia, but some remained in the navy. They were frequently used in the blockading force, which indicates that they had been fast blockade-runners, also suitable as cruisers. The war against Russia in the 1570s showed that Sweden had an advantage in its control of the sea lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , but the sailing warships were not optimised for warfare in confined archipelagos

372

C H A P T E R Four

and on rivers and lakes. In his youth, during his father's war with Russia in 1555-56, Johan had seen Swedish galleys used for offensive and defensive operations against Russia in the Gulf of Finland and on the river Neva. This galley force had been abolished in the 1560s when all efforts had become concentrated in sailing warships. In 1580, Johan initiated a decentralised building program for galleys, according to some (not preserved) design which the dversteamiral Klas Fleming was to distribute to the yards.'" Already by 1583, 43 lodjor (large boats of Russian type) had been built in local yards, mainly in Finland. The start of the galley program was slower, although some work was underway already in 1581 at Braviken (Ostkind) and Alvkarleby. The first galleys did not appear as completed in the central naval accounts (Skeppsrullan) until 1584, but from that year onward, a steady stream of new galleys is listed each year. Ambitions were high. A plan to build 12 galleys is found in a financial estimate for 1585, and an undated plan, probably fr om 1585-86, outlined a program for 12 galleys built at various places on the countryside and five more built by the towns, all to be ready by May 1587.'^' In reality, 14 galleys were completed between 1584 and 1587 at (probably) ten different yards in Sweden and Finland. Ten or eleven more were completed between 1588 and 1590. With the exception of one built at Alvsborg, all the latter were built in the eastern part of the realm, at various yards in Nyland, F i n l a n d , S a t a k u n t a , and Osterbotten. At the same time, several small craft (lodjor) were built at these yards, which underlines the fact that it was an effort to prepare for a war with Russia, even after the truce that had been concluded in 1583.'" There are problems with the compilation of a reliable list of these galleys, because most of those built in 1588-90 first appear with the name of their building place and then after one or two years are given a proper name. The total number of galleys when the war with Russia resumed in 1590 was at least 23.

119

RR 26/8 1580, RA. Accounts in SH 40:11, RA. ''' Oden 1955, 349; Westinska samlingen, 314, UUB. "Finland" is here the province a r o u n d Abo, Egenthga Finland (Swedish)/ Varsinais-Suomi (Finnish). Various accounts in SH 46:1, 46:2, 46:3, 46:5, 47:2, 47:6, 48:3, 48:8, 49:9, 49:11, 50:1, 50:2, 50:10, 51:3; S M H F 5:18, RA, 120

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

373

Tlie sailing fleet was, up to the mid-1580s, kept up to strength, although several ships grew old or were sold to reduce the state's debts. Of the large ships from the Seven Years War, Valen (1566) was broken up already in 1577, St Erik (1559) in 1584, Kdmpen (1568/9) in 1586, and Hector (1561/2) in 1589. Of the ships added in Johan's reign, Algen (1574) was broken up already in 1583 and Gyllenstiernan (bought in 1575) in 1586. Lybska Duvan (captured 1574), Franske Ormen (captured 1577), Angermanneskeppet (1579), Hjorten (1576), and Viborgs Skeppet (bought 1578) were turned over to creditors as payment of debts in 1582-83. Six more major warships, at least four of which had been captured in 1579-81, were soon sold or given away—in one case, Engelske Angeln, to Gustav I's Dowager Queen, Katarina Stenbock. To sell out warships to pay for debts was a policy repeatedly recommended by the Council. On 9 April 1586, Johan wrote a letter to two of his councillors, Klas Fleming and Erik Sparre, in which he outlined a program to pay off the state's debts by giving away most major warships to the creditors, who mainly were foreigners. He also wished to stimulate active Swedish foreign trade, including trade organised by the royal family.'^'' This program was implemented only to a limited extent. Angermanne Kravelen (1583/84) was probably sold in 1587 to a group of Stockholm burghers, who intended to trade with Spain; the old St Christoffer (1562/3) was given to Tideman Corneliusson, a Dutch merchant in Stocldiolm as payment for debts in 1588; and Angeln (1577) was sold to Danish merchants in 1590. Finally, the large Smalands Lejonet (1577) was sold to Tideman Corneliusson in 1591. This sale of the navy's largest effective warship was negotiated by Duke Karl, and the contract stated that the crown had the right to repurchase the ship.'^' Corneliusson, who f r o m 1581 to 1587 also took over four of the prizes from Narva in exchange for debts, appears as a specialist in dealing with Johan Ill's warships. At least St Christoffer was soon resold to another foreign merchant. Johan III had, early in his reign, given away ships to aristocrats as rewards for political loyalty, and he continued throughout his reign to give away small ships to his sisters and the German princes they had married as parts of their dowry. After 1585, this policy took a

The Council's recommendations: Oden 1966, 191, 387, 390f, 395, 399. Johan's program, RR 9/4 1586, RA. HKR 4/7 1591, RA.

374

C H A P T E R Four

new dimension when he transferred a large new fir-built ship, Hdlsinge Lejonet (1584, 900 tonnes), to Duke Sigismund, the heir to the throne. Sigismund immediately sent it to Lisbon for trade in 1585-86, and he continued to use it for trade with Western Europe after he was elected king of Poland in 1587. It was last mentioned at Alvsborg in 1589, but it may be Alvsborgs Lejonet mentioned in 1594.'^® In 1590, Johan gave away the large Alvkarleby Skeppet (1587/8, at least 1,000 tonnes) to his loyal dversteamiral Klas Fleming and the Dutch merchant Marten Simonsson. Its fate is uncertain, but it may have been one of the ships Fleming had in Finland in the 1590s, possibly Finske Lejonet used by Sigismund as his flagship when he travelled to Sweden in 1593 and back to Poland in 1594. Finally, Johan's wife. Queen Gunilla Bielke, received Alvsborgs Skeppet (1581/2, 600 tonnes) in 1591. It was probably used for mercantile purposes but was maintained at the Stockholm yard until 1598, when Queen Gunilla was dead and the ship was used to pay debts. In the early 1590s, the sailing fleet was further reduced. Upplands Lejonet (1578) was broken up in 1590, the great Rode Draken (1566) in 1591-92, and Renen (1576/7) in 1591. When Johan III died in November 1592, his navy was much smaller than it had been. Its major units were the unfinished Drakenas Skeppet (2,400 tonnes), Bjdrneborgs Kravelen and Raumo Kravelen of 600 tonnes each, Svanen (300 tonnes), and Bjdrnen (250 tonnes). There were around 25 small (c.50-150 tonnes) sailing warships, barkar, pinkor, and jakter, including eight on Lake Ladoga. Finally, there were about 20 galleys (100/200 tonnes). Two new warships of unknown size were under construction at Alvsborg and Raumo. That was not the entire force of armed ships. Duke Karl had at least 13 merchantmen in service, most of them built for long-distance trade and able to carry guns. Queen Gunilla's ship was available, possibly also Sigismund's Hdlsinge (Alvsborgs?) Lejonet. As events in 1593 were to show, the dversteamiral Klas Fleming could mobilise several ships in Finland. The reduction of the navy in the last years of Johan Ill's reign has, in the naval historiography, given him a reputation of having neglected

126 Hdlsinge Lejonet, SH 43:7; Vastergotlands liandlingar 1588:4:1, fol. 8, 1589:7, fol. 52; Alvsborgs Lejonet, or rather its captain M a r t h e n Crok, is only m e n t i o n e d once, 24/7 1594, Vastergotlands liandlingar 1594:16, all RA. In Appendix 1, Hdlsinge Lejonet and Alvsborgs Skeppet are listed as parts of the navy.

W A R S H I P S A N D NAVAL S T R E N G T H

375

the navy.'^"^ Tliis criticism of Johan's naval policy started fewer than two weeks after his death, when Duke Karl stated that the navy {"Riksens Armada") almost totally lacked ships and that several new ships must be built. Also in March 1594, the Council criticised naval shipbuilding under Johan and claimed that ships were half rotten even before they were completed. Part of this criticism was probably aimed at Klas Fleming, whom both Karl and the majority in the Council deeply disliked.'^' In reality, Johan was a great shipbuilder who built many large warships even though they were not required for immediate active service. This shows that he had a long-term policy to maintain naval strength, primarily against Denmark. At its peak around 1580, Johan's sailing battle fleet was the largest of its kind in the world. The reduction of the sailing navy took place when relations with Denmark were calm, but a considerable battle fleet was maintained in the 1580s (table 5:8). W h e n Frederik II died in 1588, a regency government for Christian IV took control until 1596. Its naval and foreign policy were low-profiled, and the threat from Denmark was minimal. The two great ships St Oluf and Wol Her were discarded without replacements in the early 1590s, and the Danish navy, which since the 1570s had been at a level of 15,000-18,000 tonnes, was reduced to around 12,000 tonnes. The quantitative relationship between the Nordic navies in these years is difficult to assess, because m u c h of the Swedish force consisted of galleys, small warships, and armed merchantmen belonging to the Vasa family rather than to the king. The combat value and size of Duke Karl's armed merchantmen is little known, as is the material condition of the Danish navy, due to loss of sources. Some recently built Danish warships were of a modern design and probably able to carry heavier armament in relation to their size than earlier Nordic warships, but the Swedish ordnance inventory was still superior to the Danish. Sweden was able to bring more firepower to sea, although probably in ships of inferior quality.

Zettersten 1890, 365-67, claims that the navy in 1592 was reduced to the same level as in 1530. Actually, the navy of 1530 had a total displacement of a r o u n d 4,000/4,500 tonnes, while in 1592 its displacement was a r o u n d 9,000-10,000 tonnes, excluding Duke Karl's ships. HKR 29/11 1592, RA; SRP 1:3, 456 (20/3 1594). As late as 1591 Karl had himself negotiated the sale of Smalands Lejonet, the navy's largest effective ship.

376

C H A P T E R Four Table

5.8

Swedish

warships

Name

Launched

Monsteras Skeppet Rode Draken Elefanten ( D u k e Karl) Smalands Lejonet Alvkarleby Skeppet Hector

1587/8 1566 1575 1577 1587/8 1561/2 1578 1584

Monsteras Viistervik Strangnas Vastervik Alvkarleby Stocldiohn Harbovik Rogstad

1575/7 1577/8 1581 1581 1581/2

Strangnas Haringe Raumo Bjorneborg Alvsborg

Upplands Lejonet Hdlsinge Lejonet (Sigismund) Lejonet ( D u k e Karl) Angeln Raumo Kravelen Bjdrneborgs Kravelen Alvsborgs Skeppet 2 w a r s h i p s , 300 t o n n e s 8 warships, 100-250 tonnes 8 small craft 17 galleys

Built at

at the end of Displacement, tonnes 2,400 2,000 1,000/1,500 1,100 1,000? 900 900 900 500/1,000 700 600 600 600 600 1,100 c. 400

1588 Final fate

D i s c a r d e d 1609/10 B r o k e n u p 1591 Last m e n t i o n e d 1591 Sold 1591 G i v e n a w a y 1590 B r o k e n u p 1589 B r o k e n u p 1590 Last m e n t i o n e d 1589/94 Last m e n t i o n e d 1591 Sold 1590 B r o k e n u p 1593 B r o k e n u p 1594 Sold 1598

2,000/2,500

Hie reduction of the Swedish battle fleet, however, appears as a temporary measure during the war with Russia and the expected inactivity of the Danish regency government. The navy had the warships it required for the Russian War, and a new large construction program was in preparation in 1591/92 by Duke Karl, the real ruler of Sweden as King Johan's health decHned. It was undertaken at the same time as large administrative efforts were made to make galleys, lodjor, prdmar, and many small craft available for the war against Russia, which was fought from 1590 until a new truce was concluded in 1593. 5.3.5

The Civil War navies,

1593-1599

W h e n Johan III died, a ship had been under construction at Raumo since 1591 and one at Alvsborg since at least 1592. They were completed by 1593 and 1594, but little is known about them, except that the Alvsborg Skeppet sailed with Fleming's fleet to Finland in 1594 and may (with a proper name) be one of the ships in Finland which came under Duke Karl's control in 1599-1600. Raumo Skeppet is last mentioned in 1597. It is likely that it then got a proper name and was one of the several ships which appear in 1598-99 with unknown origin.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

377

A number of letters and papers f r o m 1591-93 show how a large shipbuilding program took shape under the decentralised system."" Ten ships were planned to be built at nine different yards from Smaland in the south to Halsingland in northern Sweden. All were to be built in the western part of the realm. Finland was probably too heavily burdened by the war against Russia to support additional efforts, but it was important for the future that the ships had been built in regions controlled by Duke Karl and not by the Klas Fleming, the oversteamiral, marsk, and commander-in-chief of the forces fighting Russia. The new construction program underwent changes during the planning process. One undated paper about the requirement of personnel and wages mentions two larger ships with a length of the keel of 50 ulnar, requiring 36 shipbuilders each, and eight somewhat smaller ships, requiring 27 shipbuilders each.'^' These numbers of shipbuilders only include the senior staff and the skilled workers, not the parttime working force of peasants at each yard. Another paper, about the requirement of anchors, cables, sails, iron, etc., lists nine building yards where ten ships were to be laid down in 1592. Two ships of 50 ulnars keel were built at Monsteras and Vastervik in SmMand, six of 35 ulnurs keel at Kungsor, Skokloster (both in Take Malaren), Alvkarleby, Gavle, Halsingland, and the Stockholm shipyard, while two of 43 ulnars keel were to be built at Bergshammar (today Bergshamra), between Stockholm and Norrtalje.'^^ A third undated paper about the mining districts from which iron was to be delivered to the various yards lists the same yards but describes the program as one ship of 200 leister, one of 150, one of 120, and seven of 60 and 70 luster.A paper dated 4 July 1592 lists how 131 shipbuilders had been distributed to six different yards. An instruction from Duke Karl in April 1593 gives

RR 30/8 (power of attorney for shipbuilders), 13/10 (sliipbuilding at Gavle), 14/11 (ship to be built at Bergshammarsvik), 24/11 (ship to be built at Kungsor) 1591, 15/2-92 (iron to shipbuilding) 6/3 (lodging for shipwrights at Alvkarleby), 5/10 (provisions to shipbuilding at Drakenas) 1592; HKR 29/11 1592 (ships of 100-120 Idster to be built to next spring), 9/2 1593 (iron to ship u n d e r construction at Alvsborg), all RA. Several other sources are m e n t i o n e d in the text. Draft in SH 48:1, final version in S M H F 5:18, RA. O n e Swedish aln was two feet (594 m m ) . SMHF 5:20, RA. Since 1585, the Stockholm yard had had a water-powered sawmill at Bergshamra, and in the 1590s ships were also built here. SMHF 5:22, RA. The list of yards starts with Monsteras and Drakenas a n d does not mention Vastervik, but because the Drakenas yard was located to Monsteras, the latter must be a mistake for Vastervik.

378

C H A P T E R Four

detailed lists of personnel at seven yards, their provisioning requirements, and the bailiff districts from which each yard should be supplied with provisions, iron, and tar. Finally, a paper from 1594 gives a list of equipment to be ordered for another ship under construction at Alvshorg.'^"* Evidence from Duke Karl's letters, the shipyard accounts in Stocldiolm, and local accounts show that at least six ships were under construction from 1592 to 1593 and that four more were laid down in 1593-94. This includes one ship started at Alvsborg in 1594 but not listed in the plans from 1591-93. Of the early ships launched in 1593/94, (Halsinge) Lejonet, (Gdvle) Svanen, and (Gdvle) Bjdrnen were of around 400 tonnes and built at Iggesund, Gavle, and Alvkarleby respectively, while (Svenske) Angeln (700 tonnes) was built at Bergshammar. Troilus (700 tonnes) may be the ship that was built at Stockholm, and Ulven (size uncertain) may have been built at Kungsor (Ulvesund), although one of them may have been built at Skokloster."' Pelikanen and Draken of 700 tonnes were launched at Vastervik and Drakenas respectively, in 1594/95. A ship launched sometime from 1595 to 1597 at Alvsborg, and named Scipio from 1599, was apparently of the same size. Svarte Ryttaren and Elefanten of 600 tonnes were probably built at Vastervik and Kungsor and launched in 1596/97, while the name of Alands Ndktergalen (size uncertain), first mentioned in 1596, indicates that it was built on the Aland islands. Finske Angeln (500 tonnes), mentioned in Stockholm from 1597, must have had an origin in Finland. It may have been a ship which Duke Karl gained during his armed expedition to gain control of Abo in 1597 after the death of Klas Fleming. Rutenkrans (700 tonnes) was built at Skokloster and launched sometime f r o m 1597 to 1599. These new ships, 14 of at least 8,000 tonnes, recreated a powerful Swedish battle fleet, even if Troilus was sold already in 1597 to pay debts. This was not the total shipbuilding effort under Duke Karl's control, however. He also continued to acquire ships of his own in his dukedom, primarily at his main shipyard at Nykoping but also on Lake Miilaren. In 1592, he had 13 ships, mainly engaged in trade with Western Europe, Spain, and Portugal and in the transportation of pro-

S M H F 5:22; HKR, April 1593, RA; SH 51:6, RA. These six ships are probably the six new ships for which a list of e q u i p m e n t was prepared a r o u n d 1593/94, S M H F 6:7, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

379

visions and soldiers to the war against Russia. Only one survived as a warship in the crown's navy after 1598: Gripen (400 tonnes), launched at the Gripsholm castle in 1590/91. Most of the Duke's ships only appear a few years in the records. Tliey were probably sold, indicating that he also traded in ships built with cheap Swedish timber, iron, and labour. In 1593, no fewer than six new ducal ships appear in the sources, three more in 1594, two in 1595, and two in 1596, including St Erik (500 tonnes), which probably was built as a warship. The power struggle with Sigismund, the Council, and the military commanders in Finland caused intensified shipbuilding in the duke's yards in 1596/97. A large warship of 900 tonnes, named Vasen upon completion in 1599, was started on Aspo, close to Strangnas in Lake Malaren. Eight other ships were added to the duke's navy in 1597 and two in 1598. Among these were Bid Falken (600 tonnes) and Vita Falken (300 tonnes), which served as warships from 1598.'^® The sources about new construction are fragmentary for the latter half of the 1590s. Many accounts were not properly prepared and reviewed during the civil war years. It is clear that Duke Karl continued to lay down several more ships up to 1598-99, although nearly all were completed too late for the decisive year 1598. The largest of these ships was Samson (700 tonnes), a unique case because it was built under contract by a private shipbuilder, Anders Pedersson in Holm, and launched in 1599 or 1600 at a countryside yard at Enanger in Halsingland.'" This fir-built ship was listed as a warship in 1599, but it was apparently never armed and served as a cargo carrier. Alvsborgs Svanen (size uncertain), Hdlsinge Morianen (400 tonnes), and Gdvle Angeln (Mikael Angel) (200 tonnes) were launched in 1598-99 within the normal decentralised shipbuilding system. Enhdrningen (300 tonnes) was first mentioned in 1598. Its origin is unknown, as is that

Information about Duke Karl's ships in the 1590s is mainly f r o m the yearly accounts of Nykoping castle, Sodermanlands handlingar, RA, and f r o m his outgoing letters in HKR, RA. There are also sources of interest in V a r u h u s och handling, Nykoping and Alvsborg, Proviantrakenskaper, Stockholm a n d Alvsborg, the Gripsholm castle 1590-91, Sodermanlands handlingar 1590:12, 1591:12; SH 48:4, 49:10, 50:9, 51:6, 52:9, 52:10; S M H F 5:21, 6:6. 6:8; Kammarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter, 91:20; Rott N r 235, all in RA, and AR 1592/6, AR 1593/7, KrA. There is probably m o r e information in Duke Karl's papers in Kungliga arkiv, Prinsars och prinsessors arkiv, Hertig Karls arkiv, and Furstendomenas rantekammare, Hertig Karls rantekammare, RA. Because the ship was built u n d e r contract, its m a i n dimensions were specified in the letter authorising its construction: keel 46 ulnar, beam 17 ulnar (bredd pu segelbalkurnu eller kobryggun), and depth in hold 6V2 ulnar, H K R 28/2 1598, RA.

380

C H A P T E R Four

of four ships which first appear in 1599: Nykopings Morianen, Duvan, and Leoparden of 400 tonnes, and Unge Ryttaren of 300 tonnes. One of them was probably the ship built at Vastervik at this time. Eight even smaller vessels first mentioned in 1598-99 have an equally uncertain origin. A few of these ships were probably existing ships without proper names which disappear from the sources, but most must have been recent additions to the navy, either by new construction, purchase, or capture. Hannibal (500 tonnes) is known to have been launched at the duke's yard at Nykoping in 1599, while Strutsen (300 tonnes), built at the same yard in 1599-1600, possibly was a rebuilding of one of the duke's merchantmen. Hercules (size uncertain) was launched at Alvsborg in 1599 or 1600. Eight or nine galleys were also added to the navy in 1598-99. King Sigismund had no Pohsh fleet. Since his accession to the Swedish throne in 1592, his control of the warships and new construction in the western part of the realm was precarious, as Duke Karl controlled much of the central administration. The king controlled ships in Finland, where men loyal to him ran the administration. When Sigismund should travel to Sweden in 1593, the dversteamiral Klas Fleming organised a sizeable fleet in Finland. It included several galleys, which had been sent to the east in 1590-91 to fight the Russians, but the fleet's main part was privately owned sailing ships. Among the largest of these was Finske Lejonet, owned by Fleming and used as flagship in the fleets that carried Sigismund to Sweden in 1593 and back to Poland in 1594. Fleming also owned Hjorten and Hinden. One of these ships (most likely Finske Lejonet) was probably the large Alvkarleby Skeppet of 1587/8, which Fleming had received f r o m Johan III in 1590. Other private ships f r o m Finland in 1593 were Innamma Skepp, Duvan, and JosefEfforts were probably made to increase the force of ships under Sigismund's and Fleming's control by new construction in Finland, but little is known about it. One ship, probably Morianen, was built at Viborg in 1596-98, one ship was building at Abo in 1598,

Sources about ships that brought Sigismund to Sweden in 1593 and back to Poland are a list of 23 ships sent by Klas Fleming f r o m Finland to Danzig in 1593, S M H F 5:22; provision accounts, Finska Cameralia, vol. 47; accounts for Abo shipyard, SH 50:1; wage hsts, SH 50:10; ship-list 12/7 1594, Sigismunds resa till Sverige 1593-94, Strodda historiska handUngar, all RA; provision account for ships returning to Finland in 1594, FRA 1544, 1545.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

381

a n d a large l a b o u r f o r c e of p e a s a n t s w o r k i n g at t h e H e l s i n g f o r s s h i p y a r d in 1599 m a y i n d i c a t e n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n . ' ' ' T h e o r i g i n s of m o s t of t h e eight o r n i n e F i n n i s h ships, w h i c h i n 1 5 9 9 - 1 6 0 0 w e r e t a k e n o v e r by D u k e Karl, r e m a i n u n k n o w n , h o w e v e r . Several of t h e p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r s in t h e w e s t e r n p a r t of t h e r e a l m were loyal t o S i g i s m u n d u n t i l 1598, b u t t h e y m a d e f e w e f f o r t s t o a c q u i r e w a r s h i p s o u t s i d e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r u n b y t h e d e t e r m i n e d D u k e Karl. The e x c e p t i o n m a y b e A l v s b o r g , w h e r e Karl's c o n t r o l w a s d o u b t f u l . W h e n a full-scale civil w a r e r u p t e d i n s u m m e r 1598, Karl h a d at least 18 ships in h i s d u c a l n a v y , w h i c h gave h i m a n initial a d v a n t a g e . H e also g a i n e d c o n t r o l of t h e w a r s h i p s laid u p at S t o c k h o l m a n d w a s able t o c o m m i s s i o n m o s t of t h e s e w i t h h i s m e n . S i g i s m u n d sailed t o Sweden f r o m Danzig with a small m e r c e n a r y a r m y carried by hired m e r c h a n t m e n , p a r t l y English. T h e F i n n i s h m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r s w e r e able to o r g a n i s e a fleet, w i t h w h i c h t h e y t r i e d b u t failed t o s e n d a n a r m y to c e n t r a l S w e d e n t o s u p p o r t S i g i s m u n d ' s a r m y . H i s fleet w a s m u c h i n f e r i o r t o t h e d u k e ' s , a n d m o s t of h i s h i r e d s h i p s w e r e s i m ply told t o leave S w e d e n b y t h e d u k e ' s n a v a l c o m m a n d e r s . Five of the k i n g ' s s h i p s m a y h a v e b e e n c a p t u r e d b y t h e d u k e in 1598, b u t only o n e , Weisse Adler

(700 t o n n e s ) , w a s a m a j o r w a r s h i p . D u k e Karl

r e n a m e d it Tre Kronor,

a n d it s e r v e d as o n e of t h e larger s h i p s in t h e

Swedish n a v y f o r 25 years. A f t e r S i g i s m u n d ' s d e f e a t at S t a n g e b r o , a p r o v i s i o n a l

agreement

b e t w e e n t h e k i n g a n d t h e d u k e w a s c o n c l u d e d in L i n k o p i n g o n 28 September

1598. B e c a u s e S i g i s m u n d h a d lost his h i r e d s h i p s ,

he

was p r o v i d e d w i t h a fleet b y t h e d u k e , w i t h w h i c h h e s h o u l d sail t o S t o c k h o l m . I n s t e a d h e sailed t o P o l a n d , a n d 11 u n i t s , m a i n l y small, were lost f o r D u k e Karl's n a v y (table 5:9). It is n o t i c e a b l e t h a t t h e crews o b e y e d S i g i s m u n d ' s o r d e r t o c h a n g e c o u r s e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e ships h a d b e e n c o n t r o l l e d b y D u k e Karl. M a n y officers a n d s e a m e n m u s t h a v e b e e n u n c e r t a i n o r c o n f u s e d a b o u t t h e i r loyalty t o t h e t w o

' ' ' In addition to the incomplete accounts f r o m Finnish shipyards in SkeppsgardshandUngar, RA, the accounts for Abo, Bjorneborg, Haliko, Nyland, and Viborg 1594-99 in FRA have been searched for information about shipbuilding. Renvcdl 1939, 347, claims that there were intense shipbuilding actives in 1594 at least at Abo, Raumo, Manniiinen, Helsingfors, a n d Osterbotten. However, only a small transport ship, built at Abo, has been f o u n d in the sources which Renvall gives as references.

382 Table

C H A P T E R Four 5.9

Swedish

Name Svanen Ndktergalen Ulven Hjorten Hinden Ormen Store Barken Lille Barken Stora Galdren Stjdrnan Ndktergalen

warships, Added

L 1593/4 F M 1596 L 1593/4 F M 1598 F M 1598 F M 1591 L 1580 L 1588/9 F M 1598 H i r e d 1598 H i r e d 1598

brought

to Poland

by King Sigismund

Displacement, tonnes 400

in

1598

Origin Built at G a v l e Built o n A l a n d (?) Built at K u n g s o r ? ? ?

D u k e K a r i ' s s h i p (?) Royal court ship Royal court ship Q u e e n G u n i l l a ' s galley? Stockholm ship Stockholm boat

Vasa princes, who fought over the same k i n g d o m with agendas that m a y have been difficult to understand.'""' Victory in the civil war gave Karl additional warships. A ship belonging to C o u n t Arvid Gustavsson Stenbock was sequestered at Alvsborg in 1598 and n a m e d Achilles (400 tonnes?), while another was bought there in the same year and n a m e d (Alvsborgs) Hector (400 tonnes). In 1599, the duke's army and navy launched an offensive against Finland, which was brought u n d e r his control. O n e new ship built at Abo was sunk there, b u t six ships controlled by Sigismund's adherents in Finland were added to the duke's navy: Finske Svanen (800 tonnes), Viborgs Rosen and Viborgs Hector of 600 tonnes, Viborgs Liljan (300 tonnes), Vildmannen (250 tonnes), and Attuna Angeln (200 tonnes). Two m o r e ships, Finske Bjdrnen (500 tonnes) and Finske Morianen (300 tones), fled to Reval. Sigismund ordered t h e m to sail to Poland, but their c o m m a n d e r s saw this as a sign of that he was giving up the

List of guns on 11 ships 10/10 1598, SMHA, D 3, 123, RA. A list of captains of ships sailing with the king dated 25/10 1598, SH 52:8, RA, has 15 ship-names, of which eight are the same as in the list of guns. Six or seven ships may not have obeyed Sigismund or returned to Sweden. The ship Himmelsfart, m e n t i o n e d first in the latter list is otherwise u n k n o w n . Because Weisse Adler (later Tre Kronor), captured by Karl's fleet at Stegeborg on 21/9 1598, was returned to Sigismund but ran aground in October (later captured by the duke once more), it is possible that Himmelsfart was another n a m e for that ship.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

383

fight in his native country. Having no desire to become exiles, they turned the ships over to Duke Karl in 1600. Naval operations in 1599 brought a harvest of prizes, primarily because Liibeck made the mistake of supporting Sigismund and, in 1597/98, established a trade blockade against ports controlled by Duke Karl. The captured ships which were added to the navy were armed merchantmen, not warships. They were consequently rather lightly armed, but Lybske Hjorten and Lybske Fdrgyllde Lejonet were sizeable ships of probably 500 tonnes. Four more were of around 300 tonnes, while three were minor vessels. Duke Karl was more careful to maintain good relations with Danzig, the great autonomous Prussian city, which had Sigismund as its nominal sovereign. A ship from Danzig, Salvator (400 tonnes), was sequestered at Alvsborg in late 1599, but the next year, Karl agreed to pay the owner for it."^ Salvator was rebuilt at Kalmar in 1604-05 and became a well-armed warship. By the end of 1599, Duke Karl had full control of the Swedish kingdom, except Estonia. He also controlled a larger force of ships than had any previous Swedish ruler (table 5:10). His navy had 54 or 55 warships from 100-2,400 tonnes, four minor craft, and around ten galleys. The total size was around 25,000 tonnes, although there is a considerable degree of uncertainty, due to the scarcity of sources which indicate size. This expansion was the result of an intense program of new construction since 1591-92 and a rich harvest of prizes in 1598-99. All was not in good order with this hastily assembled force of warships, though. Possibly around half of the ships were built as merchantmen rather than real warships, and several new ships were built of fir, so had a short life expectancy. Many of the ships built in the 1590s were probably of the same technical level as the warships built in the 1550s and 1560s, while the Danish navy by 1600 had been modernised by recent advances in British shipbuilding technology. Another problem was that the gunnery inventory was insufficient for this great navy. It is also doubtful if Karl ever increased the administrative resources to maintain such a great force of ships in good condition. They turned out to be inadequate for sending the ships to sea in 1611.

Eric Anthoni, Till avvecklingen av konflikten mellan hertig Carl och Finland: Konfliktens uppkomst och hertigens seger, Helsingfors, 1935, 61, 175; Eric A n t h o n i , Konflikten mellan hertig Carl och Finland: Avvecklingen och forsoningen, Helsingfors, 1937, 95-97. RR 10/12 1599, 28/7 1600, RA.

384

C H A P T E R Four Table

5.10

Swedish

warships

Name

Launched

Julius Caesar/Makalds Vasen

1587/8 1598

Monsteras Aspo

Finske

Svanen

at the end of

Built at

P 1599

Finland?

Svenske Angeln Pelikanen Draken Scipio Rutenkrans

1593/4 1594/5 1594/5 1595/7 1597/9

Bergshammar Vastervik Monsteras Alvsborg Skokloster ?

Tre Kronor

P 1598

Samson Svarte Ryttaren Elefanten Bla Falken

1599/1600 E n a n g e r 1596/7 Vastervik or 1596/7 Kungsor 1596/7 Nykoping?

Viborgs Viborgs

P 1599 P 1599

Rosen Hektor

26 warships, 300-500 t. 14 warships, 100-<300 t. >4 small craft <100 t. c.lO galleys

Finland? Finland?

1599

Displacement, tonnes 2,400 900 800 700 700 700 700? 700 700 700 600 600 600 600 600 10,000 2,300

Final fate Discarded 1609/10 Burnt 1623 Broken up 1610/1 Broken up 1609/10 Discarded 1612 Wrecked 1605 Wrecked 1602 Sunk at Kalmar 1611 Discarded 1624 Last mentioned 1607 Broken up 1607 Burnt in action 1608 Broken up 1610/1 Wrecked 1601 Discarded 1609/10

The large carrying capacity of this navy and its ability to deploy sizeable forces for blockades of Polish-controlled ports were important for the war against Sigismund that Karl intended to fight in Polish Livonia. It started in 1600 with a Swedish army of 12,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, the largest force Sweden had deployed overseas up to then. Karl's navy was formidable, not only in comparison to what Sigismund or Liibeck had but also compared to the young Christian IVs navy. At the end of 1599, Denmark's navy consisted of 26 warships and two galleys of around 12,000 tonnes, but its two largest ships, Fortuna (2,100 tonnes) and Samson (1,200 tonnes), were near the end of their service life. This navy consisted almost entirely of purpose-built warships, and Christian's resources to maintain it were adequate. However, reports of the large number of ships at Stockholm, Nykoping, and Alvsborg reached Copenhagen and caused concern. It looked like a navy that might dominate the Baltic Sea with quantity, if not quaUty."^

W h e n asked by Christian IV in 1604 for their opinion about a war with Sweden, the Danish Councillors declared that Sweden had a larger navy than D e n m a r k : Axel Larsen, Kalmarkrigen: Et bidragtildenordiskeRigersKrigshistorie, Copenhagen, 1889,59.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

385

Finally, what happened to Johan Ill's galley fleet? Tlie answer is that it disappeared as rapidly as it was created. Many, possibly most, of the galleys were built of fir, which meant a short life. One was burnt by the Russians in action in 1590, two were wrecked in 1591 and 1593, and the remaining galleys were gradually discarded or broken up. Many of them are last mentioned in the mid-1590s, when they were in Finland under control of Klas Fleming. The records f r o m his naval administration are scarce, but the ships must have disappeared from the effective force at a rapid rate after peace was concluded with Russia in 1595. None are mentioned after 1598. Duke Karl had a small galley force of his own when the civil war started: one large and one small galley and three vessels called "frigates". At this time, this word (with a great future in the next four centuries of naval history) was a Mediterranean term for a very small oared warship. The duke ordered four new large galleys to be built in 1599, but his interest for this type of warship was limited. 5.3.6

Administrative

overreach,

1600-1617

The dominating naval policy of Karl as regent and (from 1604) king was to maintain the impressive size of his navy, rather than provide it with sufficient equipment and increased firepower (see chapters 6 and 7). He was, however, interested in modern Dutch and British technology, and it was during his reign that foreign shipbuilders became preeminent in warship construction. Karl had administrated a large mercantile fleet since the 1570s, he had sent it to Western Europe for trade, and he had developed contacts with this dynamic part of Europe, which now began to reshape Swedish industry and trade. Karl continued the intense shipbuilding program in 1599 and 1600, in spite of the great navy he already had. Two major ships were started at Kalmar and Bjorkeniis in 1599/1600, two were laid down at Kungsor and Vasteras (Bjornon) in Lake Malaren in 1600, and two major ships were started at Stegeborg and on the Aland islands in 1600.'"''' One ship was also built at Stockholm around 1600, but information about it is scarce. There was also continuous shipbuilding at the former ducal

Letters 2/2 (four ships to be built in Lake Malaren), 25/3 (the hull of a n e w ship buih at Stockliolm almost ready), 30/6 (iron to several ships u n d e r construction), 18/7 and 30/7 (ship to be built by Master Robert Engelsman o n Bjornon at Vasteras), 3/8 (ship to be built by Master Isbrand Johansson at Stegeborg) and 6/8 (ship to be built on Aland by Young Master T o m a s (Nilsson), all in RR 1601, RA.

386

C H A P T E R Four

shipyard at Nykoping, now an important naval base, and on the west coast. The latter was administrated from the Alvsborg castle, but ships were built at various places along the river Gota Alv. These efforts resulted in the launch of several major warships: Smdlands Lejonet (1601, Bjorkenas, 800 tonnes), Forgyllda Applet (1601, Aland, 800 t o n n e s ) , S c e p t e r (1601/2, Stegeborg, 700 tonnes). Rode Lejonet (600 tonnes), and Gule Lejonet (500 tonnes), launched in 1601/2 at Viisteras and Kungsor (correspondence between yard and ship-name is uncertain). Mercurius (400 tonnes) was built at Gamla Lodose at Gota Alv and launched in 1601/2. Rode Hanen (400 tonnes), Kalmar Valen (300 tonnes), and (probably) Obekant (400 tonnes) were also built in this period, as were several minor warships and probably four galleys. The force of large ships must have been regarded as adequate after the program of 1599/1600 had been fulfilled. The navy's "dormant giant", Julius Caesar (also called Makalds and Stora Skeppet), launched in 1587/8, had been extensively repaired in 1599. The hull was probably in serviceable condition several years after that, but the ship lacked sails, rig, anchors, and cables, all costly to acquire for a ship of this size. At the Stocldiolm yard, priorfties were determined by urgent operational requirements connected with the war against Poland. That mainly required transport tonnage, a blockading force of cruisers, and many small ships for army cooperation in shallow waters, for which the great ship was not suitable. Instead, from around 1603, ft was used by the Stoclcholm shipyard, probably as a magazine. It seems to have been finally stripped of fts equipment and inventory in 1609/10, but ft was still mentioned as existing in 1611."''

An undated letter to the duke in M 1754, RA, signed T o m a s Byggmastare, states that the ship built on Aland had been launched on 5 August, probably 1601; see also three letters to and about Master T o m a s in RR 9/12 1601, RA, It had a keel of 48 Swedish ulnar, a rake of the stem of 18 alnar, a b o t t o m breadth of 12 alnar, and a beam of 19 alnar, VA feet (that is, 39'/2 feet). The proportions of these dimensions of a ship built by the last Swedish-born master shipwright of the "old school" are very different f r o m those built by D u t c h master shipwrights in the 1620s and later. The rake and beam are very large in proportion to the keel c o m p a r e d with later ships. RR 29/11-01, RA; list of cables, etc. necessary for ships in Stocldiolm 13/1 1602, S M H F 6:15, RA. In the wage lists for ships at Stockholm, m e n on Stora Skeppet are listed separately, apparently because they were employed by the yard a n d lived on the ship. Stripping of e q u i p m e n t 1609/10, SH 62:3, RA (inventory to 1610). Last mentioned in the Stockholm yard account 1611 when some insignificant expenditure was m a d e on the ship, SH 63:1, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

387

Building of major ships did not entirely cease after 1601-02. A "great ship" called Samson (size uncertain) was launched at Alvsborg in 1602/3 and elicited much attention f r o m Karl, but it was intended for commercial purposes. It was ready for sea in 1605 but disappears in the sources after 1608, probably sold to foreign merchants. One large ship that undoubtedly was a warship, Svdrdet (900 tonnes), was launched at Vasteras (Bjornon) in 1604/05 and arrived at Stockholm for completion in 1605. That process became extremely slow, and it was not ready until 1617. Alands Hjorten of 500 tonnes, launched at Aland in 1603/04, was equally neglected. It was left unfinished with a provisional rig at Stocldiolm until ft was completed in 1612 and renamed Elefanten. Orpheus of 500 tonnes, launched at Kungsor in 1605/06, was completed in normal time. The naval organisation had, a few years after 1600, been focused on acquiring smaller warships suitable for coastal and river warfare and transport ships. This was a result of Karl's large war eff'orts in Livonia. His campaigns were generally failures, but they absorbed large resources, which required transportation. The first order for ten to twelve pramar, shallow-draught unarmed transports, to be built at Stoclcholm, Nykoping, Gripsholm, and other places, was issued on 12 December 1600.'"'^ One year later, in November and December 1601, Karl oudined a gigantic program of pram construction. All seaside towns should build a few ships of that type and they were promised to use them for mercantile purposes, when the king did not need them. The peasants in the various provinces in Finland were divided into groups, which should deliver timber and labour for the construction of not less than 53 pramar. Eleven more were to be buift in northern Sweden and two on Aland with timber not used for the ship recently launched there."® The construction of transports in Finland, northern Sweden, and the towns corresponds with the fact that most warships were built on countryside yards in central and southern Sweden where oak was available, lipramar were built in other regions, the tax burden to shipbuilding could be more evenly distributed and the large resources of fir in Finland and northern Sweden utilised. This great program was

"" RR12/121600, RA, where Master T o m a s is ordered to direct this building program. RR 22/11, 1/12, 9/12 (two letters about two pramar on Aland), 12/12 (construction of 53 pramar in Finland), 23/12 (construction of 11 pramar in n o r t h e r n Sweden), 1601; RR 23/3, 11/5, 29/6, 4/9, 21/9 1602, RA.

388

C H A P T E R Four

far from fulfilled, but a large number of prdmar appear in the naval accounts in the following years. Instructions to build more ships of that type were issued f r o m time to time. In 1602, Karl started another major shipbuilding program. On 21 September 1602, he ordered 11 warships of 100 laster (equal to around 300 tonnes displacement) to be built during the winter at 11 different places, five of them in the Lake Miilaren.'''® Separately, he also started the construction of four warships, called pinnaces, in the Kalmar r e g i o n . I t is not easy to identify these orders with named ships, and not all were built. Jupiter, launched at Alvsborg in 1603, was with certainty part of the program, while Kalmar Angeln, Leoparden, Mars, Tigern, Bid Ormen, Kronte Svan, and Josua of 250-400 tonnes, built or first mentioned in 1603-04, are probable results of it. Other warships launched in 1603-04 at Nykoping {Ulven, 300 tonnes and Rosen, 150 tonnes) and at Enanger in Halsingland {Hdlsinge Lejonet, 200 tonnes) were not part of this program. The latter ship was the last warship built of fir for the navy in almost 70 years. Some of the ships of 200-300 tonnes buih around 1603-04 were called pinnaces, a new type of minor warship probably introduced by the new Dutch and English master shipwrights.'®' Most pinnaces were smaller, 100 tonnes or less. In November and December 1606, the construction of no fewer than 16 pinnaces of a standardised design was ordered at 11 different yards. These vessels were small, probably 50-60 tonnes d i s p l a c e m e n t . T h e construction of pinnaces and other small

RR 21/9-02, RA, orders for ships to be built at Tynnelso, Gripsholm, Strangiias, Torshalla, Vasteras (all in Lake Miilaren), Alvsborg, Norrkoping, Stegeborg, Harbovik, Haringe, a n d Vastervik. RR 3/3 1603, RA m e n t i o n s two pinnaces u n d e r construction close to the Danish border and two m o r e u n d e r construction at Bjorkenas. The construction of several pinnaces is m e n t i o n e d in RR 2/2, 3/3 (four in and near Kalmar), 10/11 (one being built by the English Master Robert at Nykoping), 1603, RA. Pinnaces, however, had been built since at least 1602, as evidenced by the listing of two u n n a m e d pinnaces {pennase) in the inventory of ships at Stockholm 31/1 1603, SH 54:5, RA. Four u n n a m e d pinnaces are m e n t i o n e d in the accounts for the Stockholm shipyard in 1603, one being built by Master Isbrand Johansson and one by Master H e n r i k Hybertsson, and a Kalmar Pinassen was also at Stockholm in 1603, SH 54:4, RA. Orders to build pinnaces similar to Weiers Falken, with a draught not exceeding 3 ulnar at Alvsborg (two), Vasteras, Torshalla, Gavle (two), Gripsholm, Strangnas, Skedenas (two), Stegeborg, Vastervik, Kalmar (two), and Aland (two), RR 21/11, 26/11, 9/12 1606, RA. In RR 22/1 1607, RA it is m e n t i o n e d that a pinnace laid down at Skedenas had a keel of 22 alnar.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

389

craft is difficult to follow in the accounts and letters, but around 25 units, most of them of 100 tonnes or less, were added from 1606 to 1610, during which time also at least three galleys were built. In late 1607, Karl ordered mass production of unarmed small craft, lodjor, for operations on rivers and lakes. He ordered that 120 vessels, able to carry 100 men each (and a number of even smaller lodjor) were to be built, half of them in Finland. They should have a draught of not more than one and a half aln (three feet) and should be designed so that they could be hauled over land at difficult passages on a river. Five bojorter (boyers) with a draught of two and half to three ulnar (five to six feet) were to be built to a design (skamplun) prepared by Master Isbrand Johansson, and their construction was to be supervised by Dutch shipbuilders sent from Stockholm. The size of all these vessels was expressed in troop-carrying capacity, and they evidently were intended as army transports.'" The number of lodjor actually built in these and the following years is not possible to estimate, because most of them were not named, but the navy had a large number of them in use during the wars with Russia and Poland. They gave the army ability to move soldiers, stores, and guns on shallow water and on rivers. One important reason why few major warships were ordered after 1602 was that the navy captured large merchantmen at an increasing rate during the blockade of Riga. The number of ships, mainly from Holland, which were captured f r o m 1602 to 1610 is amazing. Lack of accounts about captures makes it difficult to find out details, and it is possible that a few of the ships of foreign origin, which appear in the naval accounts in these years, were bought. The Dutch Apelbom (500 tonnes?) was with certainty bought in 1604, and so probably was Emder Morianen (400 tonnes) in the same year. Eleven other ships of foreign origin appear as new warships f r o m 1602 to 1605, nearly all of 300-500 tonnes. The total displacement of these 13 ships was around 4,000-4,500 tonnes. But most foreign ships, all with certainty captured, were added to the navy in 1607-10. A total of 20 ships is

Order to build five bojorter able to carry 200-300 m e n at Vasteras, Strangnas, Torshalla, Ulvesund, and Harbovik, RR 15/10 1607; order to build 60 lodjor of fir in Finland, all able to carry 100 m e n , 14 of t h e m large enough to carry a heavy gun, Vi kartog, intended for service on Lake Peipus, RR 25/11, 28/11 1607; order to build 60 lodjor in Sweden, all able to carry 100 m e n , under the direction of Master Isbrand lohansson f r o m Stockholm, RR 25/11 1607; order to built lodjor able to carry 40 m e n in Smaland, under direction of Master H e n r i k Hybertsson in Kalmar, RR 1/12 1607, all RA.

390

C H A P T E R Four

recorded, nearly all f r o m Holland, and all except two or three captured in 1608-09. The haul included major ships such as Lejoninnan (1608) and Fdrgyllda Rosen (1609, renamed Blomman 1610) of 600 tonnes, Svarta Hunden (1608), Spegeln, Oranibom, Mjolkpigan, Samson, and Concordia (all 1609) of 500 tonnes, Obekant Fortuna (a probable prize of 1608), Hollands Rode Lejon and Hollands Josua (both 1608) of 400 tonnes, and Hollands Svanen (1608?), Meerman, and Hollands Draken (both 1609) of 300 tonnes. The total displacement of the ships captured in 1607-10 was around 8,000 tonnes. As far as it Imown (the question is not studied), these captures did not cause diplomatic conflicts between Sweden and the Dutch Republic. Because the Republic enforced a similar blockade on Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch were hardly in a strong position to raise complaints. W h a t is amazing is the optimism of Dutch ship-owners in trying to run a blockade when so many ships were captured. Several of these prizes served as front-line warships in the Swedish navy for many years and must have proved well designed and sturdily built. Mjolkpigan was taken by the Danish navy in 1611 and served in that navy (renamed Elefanten in 1618) until 1624. That service included a voyage as flagship of the first Danish expedition to the East Indies in 1618-22. It is possible that this ship and other Dutch prizes originally had been built for long-distance expeditions outside Europe. The captured ships were (to judge from the Swedish inventories of captured guns) typical Dutch armed merchantmen with a substantial defensive armament of medium-calibre cast iron guns. Their often long and active service shows that they were well built and had qualities which were appreciated in Sweden. Together with the increasing number of Swedish warships built by Dutch and British master shipwrights, they hastened the "westernisation" of Swedish naval technology.'''' In 1606-07, the construction of four medium-sized warships was initiated. Nyckeln (400 tonnes) was launched at Kalmar in 1607/08, Kolmdrds Bjornen (300 tonnes) at Kvarsebo on Braviken's northern side in 1608, and Riddar St Goran and Jonas (both 400 tonnes) at Stockholm and Stegeborg in 1607/8. The new dominance of foreign technology is evident in that the Dutch master shipwright Henrik Hybertsson directed the shipbuilding at Kalmar, the Dutch Isbrand

Inventories of guns on captured D u t c h ships in AR 1608/1, AR 1609/1, KrA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

391

Johansson at Stocldiolm, and the Scottish Jakob Clerck built the two ships at Stegeborg and Kvarsebo. A larger ship, Hector (700 tonnes), was started at Alvsborg in 1608 and launched in 1609/10 u n d e r the direction of Cornelius Corneliusson, a Dutch m e r c h a n t and shipbuilder who had supervised Karl's maritime activities in Alvsborg since the late 1590s. He employed different master shipwrights of probably Dutch origin.'^' In Nykoping, the construction of another ship, Stjarnan (500 tonnes), was initiated in late 1608, u n d e r the direction of William Robertsson Ruthven (Wellam Rodvin), of Scottish origin, and launched in 1610. Ruthven in late 1609 was ordered to start a new ship construction at Ulvesund (Kungsor), and in 1610 he was also appointed "admiral" over the shipyards at Ulvesund and Ridon (near Vasteras) in the young Crown Prince Gustav Adolf s new d u k e d o m of Vastmanland. A ship was ordered to be built at Ridon/Vasteras in late 1609 u n d e r the direction of Master Thomas Wollter, of English origin. The two ships built in this short-lived d u k e d o m (Gustav Adolf became king in late 1611) were launched in 1611 and sent to Stockholm for completion. However, Orpheus (Kungsor, 500 tonnes) and Hannibal (Vasteras, 400 tonnes) were n o t completed until 1615-16. A ship launched in 1610/1 by Gustav Adolf's cousin, Duke Johan of Ostergotland, at his shipyard at Stegeborg was taken over by the king and sent to Stockholm in 1611. It was not completed until 1617, when it was n a m e d Ostgota Lejonet (400 tonnes). The accumulated results of these new construction programs and captures were somewhat less impressive than might have been expected. The navy grew f r o m 25,000 tonnes in 1599 to 28,000 tonnes in 1602. It peaked at 33,000 tonnes in 1604-05 and declined to 26,000 tonnes in 1610 (table 5:11). The figures for each year are somewhat uncertain, but the trends are certain. M a n y ships built or captured u p to 1599 had a short effective life, and warships of at least 6,000 tonnes were wrecked f r o m 1600 to 1610. They were often lost in early spring and a u t u m n , when they were at sea in inclement weather to support the war in Livonia. Karl's impressive p r o g r a m of new construction of major warships f r o m a r o u n d 1592 to 1602 had n o t created a navy

Accounts f r o m shipbuilding at the west coast f r o m 1594 to 1611 are mainly the

accounts for Alvsborg castle, Vastergotlands handlingar, RA. In RR 6/5 1610, RA, it is mentioned that Lorentz Johansson was master shipwright at Alvsborg.

392

C H A P T E R Four Table

Name

5.11

Swedish

Launched

Svdrdet Vasen Snmlands Pdrgyllda Alvsborgs Scepter

Lejonet Applet Hector

Rutenkrans Tre Kronor Pelikanen Blomman Lejoninnan Rode Lejonet 32 w a r s h i p s 3 0 0 - 5 0 0 t. 21 w a r s h i p s 1 0 0 - < 3 0 0 t. >6 m i n o r craft <100 t. 7 galleys

1604/05 1598 1601 1601 1609/10 1601/2 1597/9 T a k e n 1598 1594/5 T a k e n 1609 T a k e n 1608 1601/2

warships

Displacement, tonnes 900 900 800 800 700 700 700 700 700 600 600 600 13,000 3,500

at the end of

1610

C o n d i t i o n 1610/11

I n c o m p l e t e until 1617 U n d e r r e p a i r u n t i l 1617 U n d e r r e p a i r until 1612 U n d e r r e p a i r at K a l m a r I n c o m p l e t e at A l v s b o r g Serviceable, at K a l m a r Serviceable, at K a l m a r Serviceable Unseaworthy N o cables u n t i l 1612 Serviceable, at K a l m a r Serviceable

Final fate

Discarded l63o Burnt 1623 Discarded 1622 Sunk 1611 Danish 1612 Sunk 1611 Sunk 1611 Discarded 1624 Discarded 1612 Discarded 1627 Sunk 1611 Danish 1611

that lasted long, and from 1605 new construction did not suffice to maintain naval strength. If several Dutch ships had not been captured in 1608-09, the navy would have been around 6,000 tonnes smaller in 1610. The Danish navy at the same time had a size of around 15,000 tonnes, practically all its ships were ready for war, and large investments in guns had in one decade eliminated the Swedish advantage in firepower. The real situation in the Swedish navy was revealed when war broke out with Denmark in spring 1611 with a surprise attack on Kalmar. A considerable number of Swedish warships were laid up there during the winter. Most of the navy's largest units, which would have been of decisive importance in a battle fleet contest, were either unready or at Kalmar, where they could not be made ready during the siege and had to be sunk in the harbour (table 5:11). Of the 12 largest ships, only Tre Kronor and Rode Lejonet were able to go to sea in 1611, and Smalands Lejonet, Tre Kronor, and Blomman in 1612. Only five survived the war, including the two largest, Vasen and Svdrdet, which never were at sea during the war. During 1611 and 1612, the Swedish navy was reduced f r o m 26,000 to 14,000 tonnes of warships. It was the most drastic reduction in a short period that it ever suff'ered. The largest losses occurred at Kalmar

.J

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

393

in 1611 and at Alvsborg in 1612, when the squadrons based there were sunk in the ports and lost 20 ships of around 8,500 tonnes. Three major warships were taken by the Danes at sea; three more suffered ship-wreck; and at least four were discarded. New construction did not help, as there were bottle-necks in the end of the production-line where hulls were completed and fitted out for sea. Tlie great navy of Karl IX was partly an illusion; it suffered from serious administrative overreach. There were too many hulls, too few sails, cables, and other equipment to bring them to sea, and too few guns to arm them. There was no central administration with responsibility and sufficient authority to keep the navy ready for full-scale war and maintain a rational balance among ships, cables, rigging, and armament. The ruler had become obsessed with number of warships and had lost interest in their combat readiness. Karl had never been a man who listened to warnings and objections to his policy. He had gained power in the 1590s by his advantage in personal control of much of the resources of the state, not the least its warships. He could do this at a time when he was at his peak as a player for power, with much experience and much personal energy. As a revolutionary leader, he may have believed it dangerous to delegate administrative power over the warships, which after all were the instruments of power that prevented the dethroned Sigismund from returning to Sweden. W h e n increasing age and illness rendered Karl unable to administrate anything efficiently, a power vacuum developed in the navy, where administrative coordination was imperative for operational efficiency. Administrative reforms after Karl's death (chapter 4), with the appointment of Goran Gyllenstierna to riksamiral and the Bielkenstierna brothers to senior administrative positions, gave the navy a fresh start, but it was too late to turn the tide in the war with Denmark. Apart from several orders to minor yards for lodjor and prdmar for the Russian War, which ended in 1617, only four new ships were initiated before 1617. They were started in 1612-13 in the traditional decentralised manner by four different master shipwrights at Arno (Isbrand Johansson) and Rido (Tomas Wollter) in Lake Malaren, at Harbovik (Robert Siwers) and at Vastervik (probably Tomas Nilsson). The English masters, Tomas and Robert, both died before their ships were ready, probably during 1614. This ended the first period of English influence in Swedish naval construction. Their work was continued by Tomas Nilsson and Isbrand Johansson respectively, and this may have caused a concentration of shipbuilding. W h e n the two ships built in

394

C H A P T E R Four

Malaren, Scepter (Arno, 800 tonnes) and (probably) Jupiter (Rido, 400 tonnes), were launched in 1614/15, they were brought to Harbovik and Vastervik, respectively, for completion. Isbrand and Tomas Nilsson also launched the two ships under construction there in 1616, Nyckeln (800 tonnes, Vastervik) and Harbo Lejonet (500 tonnes, Harbovik). The four ships were completed by 1617. In the same year, Svdrdet of 900 tonnes was finally completed, as was the repair of the equally large Vasen. In 1617, the navy had 30 warships of 100-900 tonnes, five galleys, and a large force of small transport vessels for the Russian War that ended in that year. Its warships totalled around 14,500 tonnes, practically the same as in 1612. It was now in a better condition, however, because all ships were ready for sea service. It was smaller than the Danish navy, which had been fed by the ransom Sweden was paying for Alvsborg and grown to around 19,000 tonnes, its largest size ever up to then. That navy, however, had now reached its peak strength under the traditional regime. It did not increase until after the introduction of absolutism in 1660. Gustav II Adolf had no desire to restart the conflict with Denmark after peace was concluded with Russia; the conflict with Poland had priority. That did not mean that the navy got a low priority, however. On the contrary, a major expansion was about to begin.

5.4

Shipbuilding

and naval strength in a European 1618-1721

context,

Until the 1620s, Swedish naval policy was shaped in relation to other Baltic powers. After that decade, naval powers in Western Europe began to influence it, and from the 1650s, Northern and Western Europe were increasingly integrated as a theatre for contests at sea. Habsburg-Spanish sea power was a potential threat in the Baltic during the Thirty Years War, and the Dutch were interested in Baltic policy. Denmark and the Dutch Republic were normally allied from around 1650 until 1678, Sweden and the Dutch fought each other in naval wars in 1658-60 and 1675-78, and Western European navies were frequently deployed to the Baltic to protect trade interests and influence the balance of power in this region. Increasingly, naval policy and shipbuilding in the Baltic were influenced by what happened outside the Baltic. Diagram 5:2 shows the shifting balance of naval power in Northern and Western Europe from 1620 to 1720.

WARSHIPS AND NAVAL STRENGTH

Diagram

5.2

The major

navies

in Northern

and

Western

395

Europe,

1620-1720

250 -

• III 0 S • e

1700

Sweden Denmark Dutch Rep. England France Russia

1720

Sources: Glete 1993, 5 5 0 - 5 1 , 5 7 5 - 7 6 , 5 9 6 - 9 7 , 654, with a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m Bellamy 2006, 2 7 5 - 7 9 ; Niels P r o b s t ' s list of D a n i s h w a r s h i p s , 1523-1660; A p p e n d i x 2. Sailing w a r s h i p s of 100 t o n n e s d i s p l a c e m e n t a n d larger 1620-80, sailing w a r s h i p s of 300 t o n n e s d i s p l a c e m e n t a n d larger 1700 a n d 1720. Galleys a n d blockships are n o t included.

5.4.1

Gustav II Adolf's navy,

1618-1634

Around 1616, the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna prepared a plan for the strength of a future peacetime army and navy and the regions from which soldiers and seamen should be recruited. It is of special interest as a first outline of how the army could be divided into permanent provincial regiments, a cornerstone of its reorganisation in the 1620s.'''^ It was a tentative plan, which in the case of the army soon was surpassed by Gustav II Adolf's ambitious policy, but the idea to set a long-term goal was in itself something new. As in many other cases, it is impossible to say whether Oxenstierna prepared it on his own initiative or as a result of discussions with the king. The future development shows that their ideas about naval and military organisation were rather similar, but not identical. In this plan, the navy should consist of 40 warships, divided into eight large ships (royalskepp) (200 seamen on each), 20 middle-sized warships {lagom orlogsskepp) (60 men), and 12 pinnaces (30 men). There should also be a transport force of 50 pramar (12 seamen on each) and 100 lodjor (3 seamen). It is unlikely that Oxenstierna meant

A r m y r e f o r m s in the 1610s: Barkman

1931,

121-31.

396

C H A P T E R Four

that all warships should be built to three standard designs. The manning plan was only schematic and was prepared as an approximate estimate of how many officers and seamen the navy required. Essentially the plan was about manpower requirements and the permanent peacetime cost of the future army and navy. Compared to the navy of 1617, it called for an increase of around 10 warships, which shows ambition to regain parity with the Danish navy. Hie large transport force shows that the navy also still was intended for war against Poland and Russia.'" The years 1618 to 1620 saw sweeping reforms in the administration of shipbuilding and maintenance of warships. New construction was turned over to private entrepreneurs of Dutch origin, and even the main shipyard at Stockholm and the maintenance of all warships were put on contract. Decentralised production of warships at several yards was abandoned, as was the use of part-time local labour. Instead, shipbuilding was concentrated in a few "production lines" where major ships were built continuously by a team of professional shipwrights, assisted by more or less skilled native workers who were conscripted or recruited to the central shipyard in Stockholm. The average time to build even very large ships was markedly reduced, and the productivity of the labour force was probably increased. It is difficult to make an economic comparison of the old and new systems, as the production cost of ships in the old system never was calculated in monetary terms. Gustav Adolf and his advisors, however, must have been convinced that centralisation and contracts were superior to decentralised shipbuilding under royal administration. The first of these reforms was the transfer of the Vastervik yard to two Dutch entrepreneurs. Christian Welshuisen (or Wilshuisen) and Paridon van Horn, who also became tax-farmers in the region. Taxfarming, the lease of tax incomes to entrepreneurs who paid a fixed yearly sum to the king for the right to raise taxes, was a major part of Gustav Adolf's and Axel Oxenstierna's reform program. In practice, Welshuisen and van Horn got a package of contracts, which allowed them to raise taxes and pay them to the state by yearly deliveries of warships f r o m their yard. The yard was located in a region with a good

AOSB I.l, 366-69.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

397

supply of oak and in a place where several of the largest warships had been built in the past.'^'^ The first shipbuilding contract of 27 October 1618 comprised three warships of different sizes and one transport vessel, a bojort, for a total sum of 39,000 daler. On 10 May 1619, the dimensions of the warships were increased in a supplementary contract, signed by the king. The ships became even larger. Perseus, delivered in 1620, was of 500 tonnes, Vdstervik, built a year later of 300 tones, while the largest ship, named Applet and delivered in 1622, was of around 1,300 tonnes. Hieir dimensions were measured under control of riksamiral Gyllenhielm, and an additional 12,000 daler were paid to the entrepreneurs. Gustav Adolf was evidently not dissatisfied if a contract was not followed, provided that the ships were larger. On 6 October 1620, a new contract was signed with Welshuisen and van Horn. This contract called for three ships of the same dimensions as the middle-sized ship in the earlier contract to be built, together with five galleys. Actually, Hector, delivered in 1623, was of around 500 tonnes, while Caesar and Achilles, delivered in 1624 and 1625, were of around 600 tonnes.'®' The other major state-controlled yard in 1618 was Harbovik, in northern Uppland. It was directed by Isbrand Johansson, the Dutch master shipwright who had built warships in Sweden since 1600. In 1618, Kronan (1,050 tonnes), the largest warship built for the navy in 30 years, was launched at this yard. It was followed by Angeln (300 tonnes), launched in 1621, and Apollo (600 tonnes), in 1622. Master Isbrand died in that year, and in 1623 the yard was closed and the personnel transferred to Stockholm. The main naval shipyard at Stockholm since the early 1560s had only occasionally built warships. Its role was to fit out ships for active service, maintain ships laid up at the yard, and complete hulls built at local yards. After 1618, this changed drastically. One major ship, Andromeda (600 tonnes), was launched in 1620 and another, even larger ship was laid down. On 12 October 1620, a contract was signed with the Dutch-born Deputy Master of Ordnance, Anthonie de Monier. For the period 1621-25, the yard was turned over to Monier as entrepreneur. In exchange for a fixed sum of money, he was to maintain

The tax contracts: Hallenberg 2008. Kammarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter, 92-93:9, RA, and Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fol. 42, RA. Likvidationsakter provides dimensions of the ships built under the contracts of 1618 and 1620.

398

C H A P T E R Four

existing ships and the yard and build new ships. Monier continued to use the Dutch-born Henrik Hybertsson as master shipwright, and he soon became Monier's co-entrepreneur.'®" According to the contract, one new ship of the size of Andromeda or Perseus should be built in 1621-22 and two of the same size in 1623-25. One galley should be built every year. Tlie ship Stockholm (800 tonnes, originally called Hector), which was launched at the yard in 1621 was not a part of this contract. The first ship built under it was Maria (600 tonnes), launched in 1622. On 25 February 1622, an additional contract provided for the construction of a fourth ship within the original period. This resulted in the delivery of Gustavus (800 tonnes) in 1624, Mercurius (700 tonnes) in 1625, and Tre Kronor (launched in October 1625, 800 tonnes) in 1626. The size of the ships to be built under the contract was vague. Andromeda was actually larger than Perseus, and the three later ships were even larger than Andromeda. The entrepreneurs must have been told informally that the king demanded larger ships, and much was left to be regulated when the contract had been fulfilled."^' The Dutch entrepreneurs sold warships to the king in addition to their contracts. Hybertsson and Monier sold Jonas (125 tonnes) in 1623. In spring 1623, Jungfrun (300 tonnes) was bought from Paridon van Horn, impelled by the king's urgent need for the 50 foreign seamen on the ship to replace great losses of Swedish seamen.'®^ The ship itself was also apparently useful; it served until 1647, when it was sold for service as a merchantman. On 31 October 1623, Anthonie de Monier was instructed to negotiate the purchase in Holland of one large warship with 30 gunports and eight smaller ships with 16 to 18 gunports. Louis de Geer should help him with financial questions. The transaction took place very quickly, and the ships arrived at Gothenburg in early May 1624. The background was the political crisis with Denmark, which began in 1623. It culminated in mid-1624, when Christian IV, who faced a fully mobilised Swedish army and navy with only small forces, had to make concessions. The purchased Dutch ships conve-

Hybertsson and Monier were co-entrepreneurs in a supplementary contract of 25/2 1622, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fol. 152, RA. "" Contracts 12/10 1620 and 25/2 1622, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 93-96, 152-53, RA; AR 1623/9, KrA. AR 1623/9, KrA; RR 25/4, 29/4 1623, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

399

niently provided Sweden with a new Gothenburg squadron, just at the right time to put more pressure on D e n m a r k . ' " The large ship was named Kristina (700 tonnes) and the smaller ships were named Tigern, Solen, Mdnen (all of 450 tonnes), Regnbdgen (400 tonnes), Enhdrningen (350 tonnes), Pelikanen (300 tonnes), Papegojan, and Storken (the latter two both of 250 tonnes). Four of these ships were lost between 1627 and 1635, and one disappears f r o m the sources in 1632, but the other four served as late as 1651. Most of them must have been new when they were bought. Their owners are not known, but it was not the Dutch Republic. They cannot have been built on order from the Swedish navy during the short period between order and delivery, and their high armament/displacement ratio makes it unlikely that they were armed merchantmen. It is possible that they had been built for Dutch privateering during the war with Spain. It was a demonstration that the growing Dutch market for ships and weapons could be used to rapidly increase the fighting power of a Nordic state that could pay for it. Monier's and de Geer's private contacts in this market may have been decisive for arranging this transaction quickly. Up to around 1610, a large number of small warships, ranging from jakter and pinnaces of 50 tonnes and less to ships of 250 tonnes, had always been in use in the navy. After the Kalmar War, the number of armed vessels of these size categories was drastically reduced, although a large number of small lodjor was maintained. These are normally not on record as armed vessels, although they could carry swivelguns if required. The number of galleys was also small: four at the end of 1618. From 1619-20, Gustav Adolf recreated a numerous galley force to provide fire-power close to shores and in shallow waters. In September 1619, he instructed the Italian Hieronymus Strossi to supervise the construction of four galleys at Abo. These were delivered in 1620 and were the first of probably 28 galleys built until 1624. Several renamings and incomplete sources make it impossible to give an exact number and location of the building yard of each galley. Five were built by the entrepreneurs at Vastervik, at least four at Stegeborg, at least two each at Harbovik and Viborg, and the remaining 11 probably were built by the entrepreneurs in Stocldiolm. The construction

RR 31/10, 5/11,6/12,1623, KrA; Sveriges krig, II, 157-65; Sveriges sjokrig, 152-54; Tandrup, II, 265-360.

400

C H A P T E R Four

of one galley each year from 1621 to 1625 was included in the original contract with Monier in September 1620, and six more were to be built in 1623, according to a supplementary contract."^'' Tliese galleys were used in the amphibious and coastal operations which the Swedish army and navy carried out in Livonia, Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecldenburg from 1621 to 1631. Hiey could be described as armed landing craft rather than galleys. Most of them were small (dimensions indicate a size of 40-50 tonnes), and they were normally armed with two light guns; 1-, 2-, or 3-pounders. However, they were designed to carry two very short and light 24-pounder guns firing hailshots (stormstycken), in order to provide close-range fire support to soldiers during amphibious operations. At least four—Stjdrnan, Vdsterviks Makrillen, Vasterviks Draken, and Justitia—were of a larger type (possibly around 100 tonnes) and were also called pinnaces. The two survivors, Makrillen and Draken, were classified as such in shiplists from 1629. Seventeen galleys remained in 1628, 12 in 1632, and three in 1640."^= By the end of 1624, Gustav Adolf had a powerful navy in terms of warships (table 5:12). If ships possibly not yet launched are included, the total size of this navy was around 23,000 tonnes, an increase of at least 50 per cent since 1617. Compared to the even greater navy of the early 1600s, the number of sailing warships had decreased, but the average size had considerably increased and the navy had a new structure. No sailing ship smaller than about 125 tonnes was now armed as a warship, but close-range firepower in shallow water could be provided by the new galley flotilla. The Danish navy at this time was around 16,000 tonnes, smaller than in the 1610s.

Galleys to be built at Abo, RR 3/9 1619; contract with Paridon van H o r n and Christian Welshuisen with dimensions and description of galleys, RR 6/10 1620; instruction to Axel Oxenstierna to make contracts about construction of ten galleys, dimensions mentioned, RR 8/10 1621, all in RA; contract about six galleys to be built at the yard in Stockliolm in 1623, AR 1623/9, part no 2. KrA; list of five galleys built at Vastervik, Kanimarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter, 92-93: 9, RA, I n f o r m a t i o n about the galleys a r m a m e n t f r o m lists in SH 70:5, 70:6, 71:7 and M 1761, RA, a n d in o r d n a n c e accounts, for example AR 1624/20 and AR 1625/1, KrA. A list 8/5 1626 with the a r m a m e n t of 26 galleys in Strodda militiehandlingar fore 1631: A r m e n , D 4, 172-173, RA. 2 stormstycken on each galleys are listed in the plans in AR 1625/12, KrA a n d Fordelningpa stycken... anno 1625, SH 70:6, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

Table 5.12

Swedish warships at the end of 1624

Name

Launched

Applet Kronan Svdrdet Scepter ]\[yckeln Stockholm Gustavus

1621 1618 1604/5 1615 1616 1621 1623/4 B 1624 1624/5 P 1609 1620 1622 1622 1623/4 1624/5

Kristina Mercurius Blomman Andromeda Maria Apollo Caesar Achilles

21 warships, 300-500 tonnes 6 warships, 125-250 tonnes 28 galleys

401

Built at

Vastervik Harbovik Vasteras Arno Vastervik Stocldiolm Stocldiolm ex Dutch Stockholm ex Dutch Stockliolm Stockholm Harbovik Vastervik Vastervik

Displacement tonnes 1,300 1,050 900 800 800 800 800 700 700 600 600 600 600 600 600 8,700 1,300 c 2,000

Final fate

Sold 1625 Discarded 1643 Discarded 1630 Discarded 1639 Wrecked 1628 Discarded 1652/3 Wrecked 1625 Wrecked 1628 Discarded 1649/50 Discarded 1627 Sunk 1648 Wrecked 1625 Sunk 1648 Wrecked 1627 Sold 1647

It was also a very m o d e r n navy, with a r o u n d half of the sailing warships and all galleys having been launched or bought since 1620. In contrast to the navy of 1611, all ships were able to serve at sea. There had been losses: four ships had been wrecked between 1621 and 1624, and Vasen (1598, 900 tonnes) had been destroyed by fire in 1623. Fortunately, these ships were old and their loss had n o serious long-term effect. In late 1624, the riksamiral Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm and Admiral Klas Fleming negotiated a new four-year contract for the Stockholm shipyard with Henrik Hybertsson as entrepreneur. It was signed by the king on 10 January 1625 with Henrik and his half-brother, the merchant Arent Hybertsson de Groot, as joint entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs agreed to build two great ships, to be launched in 1626 and 1628 respectively, followed by two smaller (same size as Gustavus, 800 tonnes) in 1629. Gustav Adolf was increasing his ambitions to own large warships. The first two ships became Vasen (1,250 tonnes) probably launched in 1627, and the great Applet (III) probably launched 1628 (1,600 tonnes), the largest ship built for the navy since the 1580s. The navy had a serious problem with its largest ship. Applet (II), delivered f r o m Viistervik in 1622. It had already in 1623 become leaky

402

C H A P T E R Four

and required a major repair to become fully serviceable. This ship was, as a result of the changes in the design in 1619, unusually long and narrow. In spite of its great length (a keel of 144 feet), it had only two through-going decks, hardly sufficient to provide longitudinal strength to carry a heavy armament. The design had probably become seriously flawed by the effort to make it larger without modifying the basic twodeck design. The Vastervik entrepreneurs had failed to repair the ship, and in 1625 the Stocldiolm entrepreneurs got a contract to carry out the repair. They soon gave up the attempt, however, and in 1625 the ship was returned to Welshuisen and van Horn. The latter used it as a merchantman and sold it to a Dutch group of businessmen engaged in Mediterranean trade in 1629. In exchange, the entrepreneurs built two smaller ships: Svdrdet (800 tonnes) launched in 1625 and Vastervik (700 tonnes), launched in 1626/7.'«« Worse was to come. On 20 September 1625, the homebound fleet from Riga was struck by a severe autumn gale, and 12 warships stranded at Domesnas, the northern cape of Courland. Fortunately, it was possible to salvage two ships and most of the guns from the others. The loss of life appears to have been small, but the hulls of Gustavus, Maria, Hector, Perseus, Harbo Lejonet, Orpheus, Elefanten, Hannibal, Angeln, and Mars were lost. Their total displacement was 4,000 tonnes, and five of them were only a few years old. Later in the autumn, Vastervik (1620/1, 300 tonnes) was also wrecked. In 1626, five galleys were lost in action with the Polish navy at Putzig in Prussia, and Jdgaren (1601/2, 200 tonnes) was wrecked in Lake Malaren.'®' In late 1627, the navy lost Caesar (1623/4, 600 tonnes), wrecked at Gotland, and Tigern and Solen (both bought 1624, 450 tonnes) in a carelessly fought minor action with the Polish fleet off Danzig. Finally, in 1628, Nyckeln (1616, 800 tonnes) was lost in a gale, Kristina (bought 1624,

Contract about repair of Applet, 10/2 1625, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 2, fols 112-14, RA. Applet returned to the builders, Kammarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter, 92-93:9, RA. Applet as a m e r c h a n t ship: Peter W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e Eeuw: Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de hollandse stapelmarkt, Assen, 1965 (new edition 1999), 304-05. A list of ships lost and the places of loss f r o m 1625 to 1628 m e n t i o n s several ships under 1626 for which n o place of loss is given, including Oraniebom, Stjdrnan, Salvator, Svarta Hunden, Ostgota Lejonet, and Tre Kronor, SH 71:2, RA. There is no information about these losses in other sources: Sveriges Sjokrig, 159-68. Most likely the list actually includes ships that h a d become unsei-viceable due to their age d u r m g 1626, although Oraniebom was probably repaired and was again in service f r o m 1628 to 1636.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

403

700 tonnes) lost in a collision, and the new Vasen (1627, 1,250 tonnes) was lost under unusual circumstances at Stocldiolm. Tlie loss of 18 warships of almost 10,000 tonnes from 1625 to 1628, most of them rather new and expected to serve until the 1640s and 1650s, was a serious setback for Gustav Adolf s naval policy. In these years, five old ships {Tre Kronor (I), Blomman, Stjarnan, Ostgota Lejonet, and Salvator) of 2,400 tonnes had to be discarded and Applet (II) (1621, 1,300 tonnes) returned to the builders, a total reduction of around 13,500 tonnes. From 1624 to 1628, the king had added Tre Kronor (II), Svdrdet, Vdstervik, the ill-fated Vasen, and the even larger Applet (III) to his navy, although the latter ship was not ready for sea service until 1630. The invasion of Prussia in 1626 had resulted in the capture of four armed merchantmen of around 400 tonnes each from Brandenburg, and a privateer of the same size, St Jakob, was captured in 1627 or 1628. That meant total additions of around 7,000 tonnes, but the decline of the navy to around 15,000 tonnes in late 1628 (excluding Applet III), compared to 23,000 tonnes at the end of 1624, was marked. Tliis decline was serious, particularly because the political and naval situation in the Baltic Sea had reached a crisis. Sigismund had created a Polish navy from the early 1620s, largely manned by Germans and also with exiled Swedes as administrators. Several ships were added in 1626-27, and by early 1628 it had reached a strength of 15 or 16 ships of possibly around 5,000 tonnes. There were problems with its manning and a shortage of guns, but the growth in a few years was impresgjyg 168 PQJ. several years there had been plans and even more rumours of plans that Spain should send warships f r o m Spanish Netherlands to support Sigismund and use Baltic ports for attacks on Dutch trade. Nothing had actually happened, but the defeat of Christian TV's army by the Imperial and Catholic armies in 1626-27 opened the German Baltic coast for the Habsburgs. Plans to create an Imperial Habsburg navy by hiring ships from H a m b u r g and Liibeck were formed, and Wismar fell to Wallenstein's army in October 1627. Spanish money began to be channelled into the organisation of a Habsburg, nominally

168 ji^g Polish navy: Sveriges sjokrig, 55-59, 111. Inventory of guns a n d lack of guns on 13 Polish warships, dated 11/4, no year but evidently 1628, M 1761, RA. A source publication, Wiktor Fenrych, (ed.), Akta i Diariusz Krdlewskiej Komisji Okretowej Zygmunta III z lat 1627-1628 (Acts and Diary of the Royal Naval Commission of Sigismund III in the Period 1627-1628), Gdynia, 2001.

404

C H A P T E R Four

Imperial, navy with Wismar as its main base. Spain was a major naval power, and it had a well-administrated naval squadron in the southern Netherlands. If Spanish Habsburg funds and technical and maritime know-how were allocated to the Bahic, a new navy might be a threat to the established balance of power in the region. Control of the Baltic Sea had become a question in European-wide power politics."'' Actually, the North German cities declined to lease any ships to the emperor, and Spain had other pressing commitments in these years. Imperial ships were built at Wismar, but as far as it is known, only six of around 3,500 tonnes were added up to 1632. Most of them were not ready for service. Poland could not afford to maintain its new navy, and in winter 1629, 12 of Sigismund's ships sailed to Wismar to be turned over to the emperor. Three were lost in winter gales before they arrived. The largely ex-Polish fleet maintained in Wismar in 1629-32 suffered from lack of men and fittings, but because it was a Spanishfinanced project and Spain was the strongest power in Europe, Gustav Adolf saw it as a serious threat.'^" Christian IV, who was at war with the emperor until 1629, naturally felt at least as threatened and increased his navy to around 21,000 tonnes in 1630, against 18,000 tonnes for the Swedish navy. Sweden and Denmark were, for the moment, on the same side in the European political system, but the strengthening of the Danish navy was also a potential threat against the ambitious Swedish Baltic policy which required control of the sea. In 1630, Gustav Adolf had to launch a major amphibious operation against Germany with the hope that Christian IV and the Danish Council were not ready to change sides and cut his lines of communication. He would have lost control of the southern Baltic Sea if the Danish fleet had joined the ImperialSpanish-Polish fleet in Wismar. As a short-term remedy, in 1629 the Swedish towns were induced by the king to create a ship company and build or buy armed merchantmen, which the navy could use when necessary.

Israel 1986; Wanner 2008. "" Nils A h n l u n d , Gustav Adolf infor tyska kriget, Stockliolm, 1918, 402-04; see also SRP 1, 219. Tlie Imperial navy, Sveriges sjokrig, 59-62, 273. Inventory of seven Polish warships v^hich arrived at W i s m a r 6/2 1629, Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnoj, 15, 1967, 304-20. The Swedish inventory of the Imperial ships m a d e after they were captured in 1632 show great deficiencies in cables, Inventory of the W^ismar fleet in 1632, M 1848, RA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

405

Various problems, of which the loss of Vasen in August 1628 was only one, caused the premature cancellation of the Stocldiolm shipyard contract in the autumn of 1628. There had been rising financial problems around the contract, because the entrepreneurs did not have much capital of their own and the state's slow payment made it difficult for them to buy timber and other materials for shipbuilding. Hie drastic decline in the value of the Swedish copper daler between 1625 and 1628 also caused problems.'^' Master Henrik Hybertsson died in 1627, and his brother hastily left Sweden in the autumn of 1628. The central naval yard was taken over by the state, and shipbuilding administration as well as much of the new construction policy was left to Admiral Klas Fleming. Two new ships were laid down at Stockholm in 1629: Jagaren (1629/30, 450 tonnes) and Nyckeln (1630, 900 tonnes). One ship was contracted with the Dutch merchant Albrekt van Velden in Gothenburg, Vdstgota Lejonet (1629, 700 tonnes), and another with Count Klas Horn, Fortuna (1629/30, 500 t o n n e s ) . F a l k e n of 500 tonnes was laid down at Stocldiolm in 1630 and launched in 1631. Gamla Svardet (1604/5, 900 tonnes) was discarded (possibly sold) in 1630, while Jupiter (1614/5, 400 tonnes) and Lilla Nyckeln (1607/8, 400 tonnes) were wrecked while they ferried soldiers f r o m Prussia to Pomerania as a part of the Swedish invasion of northern Germany in 1630.1"

This invasion has been preceded by the construction of a new type of small vessel for support of the army in shallow coastal waters and river estuaries. The struss was a transport craft of probably PolishPrussian origin, which the Swedish forces had begun to use locally in Livonia and Prussia during the operations there in the 1620s. At least 22 units were built in Sweden in 1629-30. Production of such vessels continued at Elbing in Prussia until 1635, when Prussia was returned to Poland. Struss production was then transferred to Pomerania and continued there until the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, from 1639 under contract with the sea officer commanding the local naval

From 1625 to 1628, the value of silver rose 42.5 per cent in relation to the daler kopparmynt, calculation by Rodney Edvinsson, Sveriges Riksbank, http://www.historia .se/indexprisjamforelse.html. Rakenskaper for skeppsbyggningen vid H o r n i n g s h o l m , 1629-30, Tidosamlingen, vol. 46, RA; Ingrid Rosell, " H o r n i n g s h o l m s skeppsgard och skeppet Fortuna: Presentation av ett arkiv, 1629-30", Forum Navale, 49, 1993, 18-19. Klas Fleming's letters to the king 1629-1632 are an i m p o r t a n t source about shipbuilding in these years, Skrivelser till K o n u n g e n , Gustav II Adolf, RA.

406

C H A P T E R Four

forces, Lars Mattsson. Around 50 strussar are known to have been built from the early 1630s until 1647.'^" Most vessels of this type were of less than 100 tonnes displacement, and they were usually unarmed, although some vessels originally built as strussar are listed as armed warships in 1648. They replaced the galleys as the most important craft for amphibious warfare in shallow waters.'" In April 1630, shortly before he left Sweden for Germany, Gustav II Adolf signed a contract with Christian Welshuisen to build two new ships of 900 tonnes at Vastervik. Welshuisen already had a contract with the city of Stockholm to build two ships for the Ship Company (Skeppskompaniet), but the city was slow to pay for it. The king took over the contract and ordered two larger ships. Their dimensions and scantlings were specified in detail in a new type of contract, probably a result of earlier problems with contract-built ships. Samson was launched in 1631 or 1632 and Mars in 1632.''« In 1631, a great ship was laid down in Stoclcholm: Kronan, of 1,700 tonnes, launched in September 1632, the largest ship built for the navy between Julius Caesar (2,400 tonnes) of 1587/8 and Kronan (2,300 tonnes) of 1668. In October 1631, Fleming ordered two ships of 1,600 and 900 tonnes to be built in Riga. In November he signed a new contract with Albrekt van Velden about the construction of three ships of 1,600, 900, and 550 tonnes at Gothenburg; and in December he signed another contract with Welshuisen about the construction of two ships of 900 and two of 550 tonnes. It may be no coincidence that these very large orders for nine new ships came immediately after the Swedish victory at Breitenfeld on 7 September 1631. That event dramatically improved Sweden's position in Germany and made it possible to support the army with

Zettersten 1903, 292-95. Strussar built until 1632 are listed in Sveriges sjokrig, 233-54. Accounts f r o m the Swedish squadrons in Prussia and Pomerania are in SH 71:4, 71:6, 72:1, 72:2, 74:3-5; SS Z 2819; P o m m e r n - W i s m a r , Reviderade rakenskaper, huvudserien, 1642:21, 1643:24, all RA. Sveriges sjdiirig, 30, 225, m e n t i o n s a r m e d strussar in attacks on coastal fortresses in 1631. In a plan for the squadron in Prussia for 1629, the 18 strussar are listed with one gun each, SMHF, 8:7, RA, and in an a r m a m e n t plan for 1628 30 strussar are listed with one 6 - p o u n d e r each, SS Z 2850, RA. Small vessels originally built in Pomerania as strussar were often called bojorter when they sei-ved as a r m e d vessels: see, for example, Borjeson 1936, 4 - 5 , and the a r m a m e n t plan for warships of 1648, M 1761, RA. "" Contract 15/4 1630, Westinska samlingen, vol. 318, U U B and Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 5, fol. 54, RA; SRP 2, 14, 17, 20-21, 26-27. Contracts of 1631, AK, registratur 10/10, 11/10, 5/11, 13/12 1631, KrA.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

407

German resources, thereby releasing Swedish resources for the navy. The instructions to Riga and the detailed contracts were practically standardised, and together with the contract given to Welshuisen in 1630, Fleming had established three standard designs of which two of 1,600, six of 900, and three of 550 tonnes were on order with entrepreneurs in late 1631. In a letter to Gustav II Adolf on 20 December 1631, he claimed that these three types were similar to Applet, Nyckeln, and Jagaren, launched at Stocldiolm in 1628-30. Actually, they were not exactly similar, and there were variations in how the ships finally were built, but a more centralised control of new construction had been established.'^® In January 1632, Wismar fell after a siege by the Swedish army and a blockade by the navy. The capitulation included the Imperial fleet, 13 warships of around 4,700 tonnes, including the surviving ex-PoHsh ships. Two of the ships were still on stocks.'^' Most ships were small, and some were of doubtful value as combatants, but the brand-new Hans von Wismar (700 tonnes?), Recompens (600 tonnes), and Salvator (500 tonnes) were valuable additions; the latter two would have long lives in Swedish service. The smaller Meerman, Delfin, Noe Ark, and St Mikael also served for several years, while six of the prizes were sold or otherwise disposed of between 1632 and 1636. The Swedish occupation of the German Baltic coast and the elimination of the Imperial fleet meant a drastic reduction of immediate Swedish naval commitments, especially because continued Dutch successes in the war with Spain made a Habsburg intei-vention f r o m the West unlikely. Gustav II Adolf did not see the future in that perspective. In an unusually revealing letter about his naval policy, dated Frankfurt am Main 28 February 1632 and written as an answer to Fleming's report of 20 December 1631 about the great shipbuilding program, the king expressed a certain dissatisfaction that so m a n y "small" ships had been

™ Klas Fleming to Gustav II Adolf 20/12 1631, Skrivelser till Konimgen. Gustav II Adolf, vol. 10, RA, The largest ships contracted in 1631 were of the same size as Applet but longer and with less beam, while the smallest were somewhat larger than Jagaren. The medium-sized ships h a d practically the same length of keel and beam as that recorded for Nyckeln. Two Imperial ships had been lost earlier. In December 1630, the Swedish navy chased the ex-Polish Konig David (600 tonnes) into the Trave estuary, where it was placed under sequester by Liibeck, a n d in,August 1631, a surprise attack, apparently by small vessels (strussar), recaptured the ex-Swedish Tigern (450 tonnes), lost to the Poles at the battle of Oliva in 1627: Sveriges Sjokrig, 59-62, 219-29.

408

C H A P T E R Four

ordered. He did not wish to have any more ships of the size (600/800 tonnes), several of which had been buih in the 1620s. Instead, he desired ten to twelve more ships of large size. He ordered two more such ships to be laid down in Stocldiolm, directing Fleming to negotiate a contract with van Velden to build one or two at Gothenburg. Gustav Adolf was aware of that oak of suitable dimensions began to be scarce in Sweden, but he pointed to the possibility of exploiting the forests of occupied Livonia and Prussia.'®" Throughout his reign, Gustav II Adolf had been interested in large warships, and his ambitions gradually increased. In the 1620s, he had repeatedly increased the size of warships to be built, either by changing contracts or informally encouraging entrepreneurs to increase the size of contracted ships. The fleet of great ships, which the letter of February 1632 outlined, was intended for his plans to launch a naval war with Spain. If ten to twelve new ships of the large type had been built, the navy would have grown to around 50,000 tonnes, probably the largest navy in Europe in the 1630s. Gustav Adolf s letter was written at a time when he controlled large German resources and when a future confrontation with Habsburg Spain was very much in his mind. He may have assumed that Sweden's new position in Germany was intolerable for Habsburg Spain and that a confrontation was inevitable. His preference for very large ships was unusual at this time, when ships of more moderate sizes dominated the European navies. The exception was the English navy, where ships of 1,200-1,400 tonnes were the most c o m m o n type in the early 1630s.''" The death of Gustav Adolf at Liitzen on 6 November 1632 ended this grandiose naval policy. Two of the four ships contracted with Welshuisen in 1631 were never built, nor was the larger of the two ships ordered in Riga. Already before the report about the king's death had arrived, the Council had begun to discuss limiting the shipbuilding program. They had to face the financial consequences of the king's various demands, naval superiority in the Baltic had already been secured, and Swedish resources were strained after a decade of intense wars. W h e n they knew that the king was dead, naval shipbuilding became

Gustav II Adolf to Klas Fleming 28/2 1632, Julius Mankell (ed.), Arkiv till upplysning om svenska krigens och krigsinrdttningarnas historia, I, Stockholm, 1860, 562-65. "" The structure of the European navies: Glete 1993, esp. 201 and appendix 2.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

409

an important topic in their discussions about how to handle the new situation. The great ship contracted with van Velden in Gothenburg became a particular point of criticism. Fears were expressed that it might be a new Makalds {Julius Caesar), the great ship built by Johan III which had never been completed for service. Interestingly, Admiral Fleming, the leader of naval shipbuilding, preferred smaller ships. In early 1633, the Council tried to re-negotiate the contract with van Velden and substitute the great ship with two smaller ship of Nyckeln's size (900 tonnes). Eventually the great ship was built. In 1632-34, van Velden launched Hannibal (probably 550 tonnes), Jupiter (900 tonnes), and Gota Ark (1,600 tonnes) in Gothenburg, Welshuisen and his heirs (he died in 1633) built Smdlands Lejonet (800 tonnes) and Svarta Hunden (probably 500 tonnes) at Vastervik, and Draken (900 tonnes) was built in Riga. Goteborg (900 tonnes) was bought from van Velden, who originally had built it for private owners. A large ship. Scepter (1,350 tonnes), the result of the king's order to start two large ships at Stockholm in 1632, was launched in 1634. That was the end of major new construction for several years. The total size of the navy at the end of 1634, when the new construction program was finished, was impressive, even though some old, small, or less useful ships had been disposed of in 1632-34 (table 5:13). There were four new great ships of 1,350-1,700 tonnes, all among the largest warships of their time but regarded as too large for anything but summer operations. There were 12 ships of 800-1,050 tonnes, able to carry 24-pounders in their main battery, which formed the core of a battle fleet, able to operate in most periods of the year. There were 40 more sailing warships, eight galleys, and a large number of minor craft {strussar and others). The 64 warships had a total displacement of around 33,000 tonnes. It was the largest navy Sweden had had until then.

SRP 2, 253-54, 256 (11/12, 13/12 1632); SRP 3, 3 - 4 (3/2 1633); HSH 24, 238 (Axel Oxenstierna to the Council, 14/11 1632), 252 (Axel Oxenstierna to the Council, 5/12 1632), 288 (the Council to Axel Oxenstierna, 15/12 1632), 2 9 7 - 9 8 (the Council to Axel Oxenstierna, 7/1 1633), 347 (Axel Oxenstierna to the Council, 3/2 1633), 381 (Axel Oxenstierna to the Council, 13/2 1633).

C H A P T E R SEVEN

410 Table

5.13

Swedish Launched

Name

Nya Kronan Applet Gota Ark Nya Scepter Gamla Kronan Nyckeln Samson Mars Draken Jupiter Goteborg Gamla Scepter Stockholm Tre Kronor Svdrdet Smalands Lejonet

warships

at the end of

B u i k at

1632 1628/9 1634 1634 1618 1630 1631/2 1632 1632 1632 B 1633

Stockholm Stocldiolm Gothenburg Stockholm Harbovik Stockhohn Vastervik Vastervik Riga Gothenburg Gothenburg

1615 1621

Arno Stockholm Stockliolm Vastervik Vastervik

1625 1625 1633/4

9 warships, 550-700 tonnes 21 warsiiips, 3 0 0 - 5 0 0 t o n n e s 10 w a r s h i p s , 1 0 0 - 2 5 0 t o n n e s 8 galleys

1634

Displacement, tonnes 1,700 1,600 1,600 1,350 1,050 900 900 900 900 900 900 800 800 800 800 800 5,750 8,400 2,000

Final fate

D 1671, S i m k 1675 S u n k 1659 D 1650, BU 1658 D 1671, S u n k 1675 D 1643, S u n k 1648 D i s c a r d e d 1659 W r e c k e d 1659 H u l k e d 1660 D i s c a r d e d 1652/3 Sold to France 1647 D i s c a r d e d 1652/3 D i s c a r d e d 1639 D i s c a r d e d 1652/3 D i s c a r d e d 1650 W r e c k e d 1658 Sold to France 1647

A comparison with the Danish navy shows that it had four great ships of 1,100-1,300 tonnes: Argo (1601), Recompens (1612), Patientia (1616), and Stora Sophia (1627); but the two oldest were discarded in 1635 and 1636. There were also St Anna (1608), Spes (1612), and Oldenborg (1628) of 900 tonnes, Justitia (1609) of 800 tonnes, and five ships of around 700 tonnes dating from 1582 to 1634. There were 15 ships of 300-500 tonnes, 15 ships and galleys of 100-200 tonnes, and eight smaller galleys and yachts. The total size of this fleet was around 20,000 tonnes. It was a smaller and older navy than the Swedish, and the latter now had a vast superiority in the largest size categories. 5.4.2

Stability,

1635-1658

On 8 January 1631, when Axel Oxenstierna was governor of Prussia and occupied with war finance and the transfer of several Swedish regiments to Germany, the Chancellor found time to write a long memor a n d u m to Gustav Adolf It was about the threat f r o m Denmark to Sweden's new position in the Southern Bahic. He feared that Denmark

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

411

sooner or later would side with Sweden's enemies in the German war and would use their naval power to try to cut communications between Sweden and Germany. Oxenstierna suggested that the navy should be increased from 30-32 ships to 48-50. Of these, 12 capital ships {huvudskepp) should be kept in readiness at Stoclcholm as a strategic deterrence, 20-24 ships should cruise off the coasts of Mecklenburg and Pomerania (that is, Germany's Baltic coast), and 14-16 ships should be kept in Prussian waters. Hie latter could be maintained from the large Prussian custom incomes which Sweden had gained in the truce with Poland in 1629. Oxenstierna suggested that the navy could be strengthened rapidly if 8 - 1 6 ships were bought in Holland for 5,000 to 8,000 riksdaler per ship. That price range shows that he was thinking about moderately sized warships of about 300-600 tonnes.'" The king was less concerned about Denmark, and—at least after Breitenfeld in September 1631—his naval policy went in another direction. The Prussian custom incomes were reserved for the army, but major Swedish resources were channelled to the construction of large warships. The m e m o r a n d u m reveals, however, that Oxenstierna, the leader of Swedish foreign policy and grand strategy f r o m 1632 to 1644, saw a future war with Denmark as inevitable and the navy as a cornerstone in control of the Baltic and northern Germany. He preferred smaller ships, probably because they were suitable as cruisers in shallow waters and cheap enough to be risked during autumns, conditions which had been typical for Swedish naval operations for several decades. When the king was killed, the regency government for Queen Christina and the Council became responsible for naval policy and the strength and structure of the navy. On 8 October 1633, Axel Oxenstierna sent a long m e m o r a n d u m about several policy questions from Frankfurt am Main to the Council in Stocldiolm. It included a plan for the future navy. It should consist of three realskepp (400-450 Idster), three large ships (300-350), nine m e d i u m ships (200-250), 15 small ships (150-200), 12 "smallest" ships (100-150), six pinnaces (60-100), six transports (fleuts) (120-200), and a flotilla of 24 galleys

HSH 2, 200-30; Sveriges sjokrig, 223. It is possible that Havfrun, 400 tonnes, which is first m e n t i o n e d in 1631 and not k n o w n to be built anywhere in Sweden, was bought f r o m Holland, Sveriges Sjokrig, 36. It may also have been bought by Oxenstierna in Prussia.

412

C H A P T E R SEVEN

or small pinnaces, 32 stvussuT, and 192 lodjor}^'^ Oxenstienia's program was different from that outlined by the king fr om the same city 19 months earlier. It emphasised medium and small ships rather than large ships, and it was thus in accordance with the ideas expressed in the Council in early 1633. Hie total size of this navy would be between 25,000-30,000 tonnes. Tliis plan in all its detail is not mentioned later, but both the size and the structure of the navy remained remarkably close to it for at least 25 years. In the 1630s, the new system for naval manning was developed to suit a navy of this size. It must have contributed to this stability that Sweden until late 1644 was run by a regency government, led by Oxenstierna, that Christina fr om 1644 to 1654 followed a policy of stabilising the existing state rather than changing it, and that the navy f r o m 1634 was administrated by the Amiralitetskollegium. There was no longer a dynamic king with continuously growing ambitions, but there were a number of influential power-holders who had firm intentions to maintain a navy able to dominate a Baltic Sea which had become surrounded by Swedish provinces.'®' The navy at the beginning of 1635 was dominated by rather new ships. Ten of the 16 largest ships were less than five years old. One consequence was that the average age of the navy's ships gradually increased, finally creating a block obsolescence problem in the 1650s. For a long time, the naval leadership was markedly uninterested in building new really large ships. The great ships, dating from Gustav II Adolf's last years, were regarded as prestige ships with only limited usefulness. Repeated attempts were made in 1636, 1639, and 1641 to sell two of the three largest ships to France or Portugal and use the money to build smaller ships. Great ships were evidently a personal project of the late king, not a widely supported naval doctrine. Not even the admirals supported them."'' By 1640, a modest program of replacement began. From 1640 to 1643; one ship was bought each year from Vdsterviks skeppskompani, a

HSH 26, 230-35; AOSB I, 462-65. Shipbuilding 1634-44: Wendt 1950, 80-87. W e n d t states that it is not possible to say if Oxenstienia's plan contradicted Gustav II A d o l f s plans to increase the n u m b e r of large ships, but it is clear that Oxenstierna's plan was concentrated on ships which Gustav Adolf regarded as too small for his naval policy. Applet and Gota Ark offered to France, SRP 6, 51, 167 (17/2, 7/4, 1636); Applet, Gota Ark, and other ships offered to France. SRP 1, 503-04, 574, 597 (14/5 1639); Y^ronan and Applet offered to Portugal, SRP 8, 586 (4/5 1641).

warships and naval strength

413

shipping and shipbuilding company which owned the yard earher run by Welshuisen and van Horn at Vastervik. Tlie ships were apparently all new; and a few of them may have been built on speculation that the navy would buy them. Two ships, Jdgaren (500 tonnes) and Regina (700 tonnes, originally named Christina), were built at the Stocldiolm yard in the same period. Three more ships were bought at uncertain dates from 1642 to 1645 (probably 1643-44). Two of them, Fama and Kalmar Nyckel, had probably belonged to Skeppskompaniet of 1629. Because they were owned by the New Sweden Company, which had established a colony in Delaware, they were already controlled by the government. From 1637 to 1644, these ships had made two and four expeditions respectively to North America.'®^ The war with Denmark in 1643-45 brought sudden gains to the Swedish navy, primarily ships captured at the battle of Femern on 13 October 1644. Danish Patientia (1616, 1,100 tonnes), Oldenborg (1628, 900 tonnes), Tre Lejon (1642, 900 tonnes), Stormaren, Ornen, Fides, Nellebladet, Tvd Lejon, Kronfisken, Havhdsten, and Neptunus of 350700 tonnes, three small vessels, and three armed merchantmen were captured. W h e n peace was signed on 13 August 1645, the Swedish navy had a total size of 37,000 tonnes, compared to 14,000 tonnes for Denmark. The Swedish navy was obviously too large for the immediate future, and ships could be sold to provide incomes. An unsigned paper from 5 September 1645 listed 38 major and five minor warships which were to be kept. Fourteen major and two minor warships, along with six transports, were listed as superfluous and available for sale. This list and the size of the navy were discussed by the Queen and the Council on 11 September, when Oxenstierna presented a plan which appears to be identical with the unsigned paper. Further discussions about disposing of warships as payment to the state's creditors took place in the Council during a u t u m n 1645.'®'^ The ships listed as superfluous were mainly warships from the 1620s or armed merchantmen. Several of them, the old Achilles, Vdstgota Lejonet, Jungfrun, Enhdrningen, and Lammet as well as the recently added merchantmen Konung David, Nya Goteborg, and St Peder, were sold to private owners in 1645-47. Another transaction took

Dahlgren and Norman 1988, esp. 126. SRP 11, 189-90 (11/9 1645), 2 0 1 - 0 3 (20/9 1645), 213 (9/10 1645), 257 (2/12 1645). The list of 5/9 1645, M 1761, RA; a slightly revised hst of 25/11 1645, N N S II, 12a, KrA.

414

c h a p t e r SEveN

place in 1647 when the French navy bought Jupiter (1632), Smdlands Lejonet (1633/4), Regina (1643/4), and Jdgaren (1642/3) with a total displacement of around 3,000 tonnes. Hiese ships were not obsolete or deficient. They were sold because the price was attractive and the money could be used to build new ships. France was an ally which was partly dependent on imported warships and had asked Sweden for such ships in both 1636 and 1639 for the war against Spain. Sweden had only offered two of the great ships at high prices and France was not interested. When a surplus of smaller ships was available, negotiations restarted in early 1646 between Axel Oxenstierna and the French ambassador and ended with a sale early the next year. Queen Christina also used her ability to build warships in diplomacy. In 1648 and 1650 she gave the brand-new Julius (700 tonnes) and St Anna (850 tonnes) as personal gifts to Cardinal Mazarin and the Dowager Queen Anna, the rulers of France during Louis XIV's minority. The ships served in the French navy and were valuable additions when political chaos in France from 1648 to 1653 practically stopped new construction for that navy."' In contrast to the situation after Gustav II Adolf s death, the government did not see the large navy of 1645 as a cause for postponing new construction. Instead, it tried to follow a systematic new construction program that called for a few ships to be built every year to replace obsolete ships.''" From 1645 to 1650, six major warships were launched at Stoclcholm, four were built on contract in Wismar with the governor. Colonel Erik Ulfsparre (brother to Admiral Ake Ulfsparre) as entrepreneur, and one ship was bought from Vastervik's Ship Company. This added Caesar, St Anna (to France in 1650), Carolus and Hercules of 850 tonnes, Julius (to France in 1648), Vastervik, Wismar, Maria, Apollo, and Andromeda of 550-700 tonnes and Hjorten of 450 tonnes to the navy. Naval shipbuilding was frequently discussed in the Council, reports about the size and age structure of the Danish navy

"" SRP 6, 51, 167; SRP 7, 503; SRP 11, 271 (6/1 1646), 288-90 (21/1 1646), 297-98 (27/1, 30/1 1646); SRP 12, 33 (29/1 1647), 37 (3/2 1647), 108 (9/4 1647). D o c u m e n t s about the transaction in M 1761, RA. Augusta Jal, Abraham Du Quesne et la marine de son temps, I, Paris, 1873, 157-62; ]ames 2004, 121, 123, 150. The total size of the six ships transferred to France in 1647-50 was 4,500 tonnes, a considerable addition to a navy, which in the period 1645-60 was of a r o u n d 20,000 tonnes: Glete 1993, 575. "" Brief text about new construction 1645-54 in Wendt 1950, 143-46, although the use of the ship-hst in Zettersten 1903 has reproduced some misunderstandings about where a n d when ships were buih.

warships and naval strength

415

were received, and plans for a yard at Riga to increase construction capacity were made, although no decision was taken.'" In late 1649, Admiral Herman Fleming prepared a plan according to which the navy should consist of 40 warships, two large transports, and 11 small armed vessels. Tlie 40 ships were divided into six sizes: one of 160 feet, four of 144, 12 of 132, 16 of 120, four of 100, and three frigates of 80 feet. In approximate displacement figures, the six types equalled ships of 1,600, 1,200, 900, 600, 400, and 250 tonnes, and the total size of the navy equalled 29,000 tonnes. The existing navy at the end of 1649 had 48 ships of 30,000 tonnes. Compared to the plan, it had more ships of the smallest types, most of them captured and bought, but since the 1620s, the navy had built few ships smaller than 500 tonnes."^ This plan was approved by the Queen at a meeting with the Council on 31 January 1650, and detailed specifications for ships of the second, third, and fourth rank were prepared by Herman Fleming and signed by the Q u e e n . ' " The plan was a formalisation of existing policy rather than a new departure. The third and fourth rank were roughly similar to nearly all ships built for the navy since 1640 (two and nine respectively), and two of the third and six of the fourth rank were added in the 1650s. Three ships—Mercurius (650 tonnes), Phoenix (400), and Jdgaren (250)—were launched at Stockliolm in 1651, built to dimensions of the fourth, fifth, and sixth rank in Fleming's plan. Three more ships of the fourth rank—Amarant, Falken, and Mdnen—were launched in 1653-54, the latter at Vastervik. It was bought from the Vastervik's Ship Company in 1654 when it was completed, but the navy had followed its construction since 1652, apparently with the intention to

SRP 11, i n (7/1 1646), 2 8 8 - 8 9 ((21/1 1646), 433 (13/8 1646); SRP 12, 2 6 1 - 6 7 (13-14/1 1648), with discussion about m e m o r a n d u m f r o m the Admiralty 2/12 1647, now in M 1754, RA; SRP 12, 274 (18/1 1648), where Axel Oxenstierna presents information f r o m the Swedish minister in Copenhagen, M a g n u s Durell, about the Danish navy, almost certainly a report 12/12 1647 with a ship-hst, M 1848, RA. Several shiphsts f r o m 1645 to 1649 in N N S II, 12a, KrA were probably prepared as naval pohcy documents for the Council and the Queen. A m e m o r a n d u m about planned expenditure on shipbuilding, fittings and guns in 1647, M 1779, RA. M 1753, RA. SRP 14, 28; hestick of three sizes of warships, M 1753, RA. An instruction to admiral H e r m a n Fleming 26/2 1650, signed by Christina, about negotiations with Erik Ulfsparre in W i s m a r to build one ship of 142 feet a n d one of 120 feet on contract were a part of the implementation of this program, M 1789, RA. N o m o r e ships were b u i h at Wismar, however, possibly because Ulfsparre died.

416

c h a p t e r SEveN

buy it when funds became available. Like most other ships bought from this company, it was armed as a purpose-built warship, not as an armed merchantman. It seems as if these ships were built on speculation that the navy eventually would buy them. Because the major shareholders in the company were members of the political elite (Axel and Gabriel Oxenstierna, Erik Ryning, etc.) they were in a position to influence such transactions."'' This program was not sufficient to replace the ageing veterans. Gota Ark (1,600 tonnes), Patientia (1,100 tonnes), Andromeda, Stockholm, Apollo, Mercurius, Tre Kronor, Goteborg and Draken of 600-900 tonnes, and Tigern and Mdnen of 450 tonnes were discarded between 1648 and 1653. In 1651, Falken (500 tonnes) was wrecked and Oxen and Kalmar Nyckel (300 tonnes) were sold. In 1654, the navy took over the yard in Gothenburg, which until the mid-1630s had been used by Albrekt van Velden (later called Gamla Varvet). Delfin (200 tonnes) was launched at this yard in 1655, Goteborg (700 tonnes) in 1656, while Andromeda (600 tonnes), laid down in 1656, was delayed by the war and not launched until 1659."^ By then, ships of that size were no longer of interest for series production. The war with Denmark in 1644-45 had not vindicated Gustav II Adolf s behef in the value of the great ships. The question was discussed repeatedly in the Council in 1645-46, and there was a broad agreement that such ships were too large to risk in autumn gales and that medium-sized ships were more useful. It may have been important that the decisive victory in the battle of Femern in 1644 was gained without the great ships and that the unusual summer gales in 1645 made their usefulness even in summer look doubtful."® In contrast. Christian IV concentrated the Danish navy's rebuilding program on five great ships of 1,200-2,000 tonnes, launched in 1647 to 1650. In Sweden, Gota Ark (1,600 tonnes) was discarded in late 1650 without any discussion about a replacement. The naval plan approved in that year only included one ship of the first rank (1,600 tonnes) while there actually were two, Kronan (1,700 tonnes) and Applet (1,600 tonnes), as

"" AK, protokoll 26/2 1650; AK to Cornelius Jakobsson 10/7 1652, AK to Rickard Clerck 7/8 1652, AK to Cornelius Jakobsson 28/5 1653, AK, registratur, KrA. The Vastervik Ship C o m p a n y and its owners: Borjeson 1932, 203-10. Shipbuilding in G o t h e n b u r g 1655-62: Bergman 1954, 12-17, with a few errors in dates. Delfin was launched 24/10 1655 and Andromeda 10/6 1659 or briefly before that date, AK, i n k o m n a handlingar 2/11 1655 a n d 10/6 1659, KrA. SRP 11, 99 (1/7 1645), 153 (11/8 1645), 433 (3/8 1646).

warships and naval Table 5.14

Swedish Launched

Name

Kronan Applet Scepter Draken Uyckeln Samson Mars Oldenborg (prize 1644) Tre Lejon (prize 1644) Caesar Hercules Carolus Svdrdet 13 warships, 5 5 0 - 6 5 0 t. 12 warships, 300-500 t. 6 warships, 1 2 5 - 2 5 0 t o n n e s

1632 1628/9 1634 u n d e r constr. 1630 1631/2 1632 1628 1642 1647/8 1650 1650 1625

warships

strength at the end of

Built at

Stocldiohn Stockhohn Stockholm Stoclcholm Stockholm Vastervik Vastervik Copenhagen Norway Wismar Wismar Stocldiolm Vastervik

417 1654

Displacement, tonnes 1,700 1,600 1,350 1,150 900 900 900 900 900 850 850 850 800 8,000 5,100 1,000

Final fate

D 1671, s u n k 1675 S u n k 1659 D 1671, s u n k 1675 P D e n m a r k 1677 D i s c a r d e d 1659 W r e c k e d 1659 H u l k e d 1660 D i s c a r d e d 1667/8 D i s c a r d e d 1659 P D e n m a r k 1677 S u n k 1710 D i s c a r d e d 1684 W r e c k e d 1658

8 small craft, < 100 t o n n e s

well as Scepter (1,350 tonnes). In 1650, plans were prepared for building one ship of the next largest rank in Wismar, apparently as replacement for the ageing Patientia, which had to be discarded in 1652/53. The ship was delayed until 1653, when it was laid down in Stockliolm. It was launched as Draken (1,150 tonnes) in 1655 and inaugurated a new era of naval shipbuilding. Karl X Gustav went to war with Poland in 1655 with an ageing navy, but at a total size of 27,000 tonnes it could secure his lines of communication against interference from Denmark, which had a navy of 21,000 tonnes (table 5:14). Already the next year, Karl X Gustav found that the recently vastly increased Dutch navy, with ships of around 60,000 tonnes in 1655-56, posed a severe threat to his control of the Baltic Sea. In March 1656, the Amiralitetskollegium sent a detailed survey of the material condition of the navy to the king in Poland: 24 warships were ready for service, although two of them {Mars and Samson) were old; 13 ships required major repairs or were irreparable, including the three largest ships in the navy, Kronan, Applet, and Scepter. It might be possible to repair these ships, but the board expressed serious doubts whether doing so would be worth the money. One 150-foot ship (actually 151) of around 1,500 tonnes {Victoria) was laid down at

418

c h a p t e r SEveN

Stocldiolm ill 1656, a n d in N o v e m b e r t h a t year t h e b o a r d sent a letter to Karl X G u s t a v u r g i n g t h a t t w o m o r e , of 155 a n d 160 feet, s h o u l d be laid d o w n . " ^ H i e k i n g a p p r o v e d this in J a n u a r y 1657. W h e n in late 1657 he m e t t h e holmamiral R i c k a r d Clerck, he s p o k e w i t h e n t h u s i a s m a b o u t b u i l d i n g "large a n d capital ships". H o w e v e r , in 1 6 5 7 - 5 8 , m o n e y a n d s h i p w r i g h t s w e r e u r g e n t l y r e q u i r e d for total m o b i l i s a t i o n of t h e navy, a n d t h e a u t h o r i s e d n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n of t w o great ships was delayed."® I n s t e a d , t h e v e t e r a n s Kronan (1632), Scepter (1634), Oldenborg {1628), Svdrdet (1625), Salvator (1631?), a n d Fides (1615) w e r e r e p a i r e d a n d sent o u t to fight a w a r against D e n m a r k a n d t h e D u t c h Republic. Svdrdet s a n k in L a n d s k r o n a a f e w days after t h e b a t d e in t h e S o u n d in 1658, possibly b e c a u s e t h e old ship h a d b e e n t o o m u c h stressed by its o w n gunfire. Samson (1631/2) s a n k in t h e s a m e h a r b o u r d u r i n g the w i n t e r 1659 b e c a u s e t h e hull c o u l d n o t resist t h e ice, a n d Mars (1632) h a d to b e left as a h a r b o u r m a g a z i n e in G o t h e n b u r g in 1660, because it was t o o u n s e a w o r t h y to r e t u r n to Stocldiolm. Several old ships, including Applet, Nyckeln, a n d Tre Lejon, w e r e d i s c a r d e d d u r i n g t h e w a r or u s e d as fireships."' The w a r b r o u g h t several w a r s h i p s as prizes: eight D a n i s h , t w o D u t c h , a n d f o u r f r o m C o u r l a n d ( a r o u n d 6,500 tonnes); b u t f o u r w a r s h i p s a n d f o u r h i r e d m e r c h a n t m e n w e r e lost in action. By t h e e n d of t h e war, t h e n a v y was d o w n t o 24,000 t o n n e s , its lowest level in 30 years. It was n o great c o n s o l a t i o n t h a t t h e D a n i s h n a v y was even w o r s e off a n d h a d b e e n r e d u c e d to 15,000 t o n n e s . In t h e f u t u r e , S w e d e n n e e d e d t o h a v e a n a v y r e a d y to fight b o t h t h e D a n i s h n a v y a n d large f o r c e s sent b y a W e s t e r n p o w e r . 5.4.3

The great ships,

1659-1679

W i t h t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e D u t c h i n t e r v e n t i o n t h a t saved D e n m a r k in 1658, Karl X G u s t a v finally gave n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n for t h e n a v y a h i g h e r p r i o r i t y t h a n it h a d h a d since t h e last years of his u n c l e G u s t a v A d o l f ' s reign. The English m a s t e r s h i p b u i l d e r s Francis S h e l d o n a n d T h o m a s

AK, registraUir 14/3 1656, 21/11 1656, KrA; Wendt 1950, 166-68. RR 30/1 1657, RA; Rickard Clerck till Kammarkollegium 18/2 1658, AK, registratur 18/2 1658, KrA; Wendt 1950, 168-70. Before Applet was finally discarded, a detailed survey of its condition was made in December 1658, probably to convince Karl X Gustav that the great ship could not be sent to sea, M 1754, RA. The paper is the most detailed of its Idnd in the Swedish naval archives before the 18th century.

warships and naval strength

419

Day and the master knight Robert Turner who arrived in Sweden in 1659 were urgently required for the implementation of this program. In 1659-60, three great ships were laid down: one in Stoclcholm by Jakob de Voss {Svdrdet, 1662, 1,700 tonnes), one in Gothenburg by Francis Sheldon {Applet, 1661, 1,400 tonnes), and one at Bodekull (Karlshamn) by Thomas Day {Nyckeln, later Saturnus, 1662, 1,150 tonnes). Karl Gustav was also determined to continue amphibious warfare around the Danish isles, however. For that purpose he ordered that a large number, around 50, shallow-draught craft, strussar should be built at the naval yards at Stocldiolm, Gothenburg, and Bodekull and on contract at private yards during the winter 1659-60. This program was cancelled immediately after his death in February 1660. Only nine small craft were completed in 1660-61, four of them modified during construction to light warships. This cancellation occurred because the Council had no intention to continue the war with offensive operations.^"" Karl X Gustav's more long-term program for building large capital ships was not cancelled. Unlike in the decade after 1632, the value of such ships was not questioned, and the regency government made them the backbone of their naval policy. In 1660, an undated, unsigned and unfinished draft to a new naval program was prepared. It must have had its origin in the naval administration, because it was based on intimate technical knowledge of the relation between size and armament of warships and of the current state of the Swedish navy. It proposed a navy of 50 ships: two of 160 feet, six of 150, ten of 140, 12 of 132, 16 of 120, and four of 110 feet. The existing navy had 29 ships of (approximately) these size groups. The plan required 21 new ships: five of 150, nine of 140, and seven of 132 feet, while the number of ships of the largest and the two smallest sizes were exactly as in the existing navy. The length from stem to sternpost gives only a rough indication of the size of the ships, which actually were built with various proportions between length, beam, and draught. In round figures, this was a plan for a 45,000-tonnes navy, twice the size of the existing navy. The drastic increase of the average size of the warships compared to the program of 1650 and the size structure of the navy since the 1630s is the most important feature of the plan. It included eight ships of

™ The struss program: Wendt 1950, 187-98; Bergman 433-34; Lundgren 1999, 8 - 1 7 .

1954, 15-17; Askgaard

1974,

420

c h a p t e r SEveN

1,500-1,700 tonnes, ships of a size which had been regarded as more or less unnecessary since the death of Gustav Adolf The ten 140foot ships were of the size of the new Draken of about 1,150 tonnes. Tlie number of ships in these three size groups was to be increased f r o m four to 18. It was an entirely new idea about the structure of the Swedish navy. It was not inspired by any dramatic rise of the size of European warships in the 1650s, although it was in accordance with what other navies actually built in the 1660s. Something had happened that convinced not only the late king but also Swedish admirals and the aristocratic elite of the value of great ships. The battle in the Sound on 29 October 1658, in which the only important Swedish success was Draken's sinking of the second largest Dutch ship, Brederode, after an intense gunnery duel, might have been important. The general experience of the several battles in the First Anglo-Dutch War in 1652-54 was that ships with many heavy guns and good ability to resist gunfire were decisive in fleet contests. In battles fought as long gun duels, gunfire and staying power became more important than the manoeuvrability and cruiser qualities of smaller warships. From the 1660s, the English, Dutch, French, Swedish, and Danish navies all concentrated shipbuilding on ships of considerably larger size than earlier.^"' In 1663, two new large ships were started at Bodekull and Stockholm: Nyckeln (1,450 tonnes) and Wrangel (1,250 tonnes). Both were launched in 1664. A smaller ship, Spes (650 tonnes), was ordered to be built at Stockholm but was not launched until 1666. Svenska Lejonet (750 tonnes), Sweden's largest armed merchantman, was bought in 1662 from Vastervik's Ship Company. In 1664 the Parliament held a session at which the regency government for Karl XI asked for extra funds for new warships. It outlined a future navy of 61 major warships: one new fleet flagship {riksamiralskepp) of 175 feet, 12 ships of 139-165 feet (seven existed), 21 of 115-139 feet (14 existed), and 27 of 100-115 feet (12 existed). This program required 28 new ships and aimed for a navy of 45,000-50,000 tonnes. The Parliament voted a special tax for new construction (Skeppshjdlpen), which financed three ships: Mars and Jupiter (1665, 1,250 tonnes) and Solen (1667, 1,400 t o n n e s ) . T h e y were built by private entrepreneurs in Lixbeck, an

Glete 1993, 178-206. 202 wittrock 1914, 254-58; Wendt 1950, 215-16; AK, protokoll, 1663-65, fol. 155 (24/7 1664). There is also an undated naval plan, Ofdrgripligt projekt.. An M 1761, RA, with 50 ships in three classes: five first class (one of 180 feet, tv^fo of 170, and two

warships and naval strength

421

unusual decision motivated by the fact that no private Swedish shipbuilder was sufficiently interested.^"' This was probably a result of a boom in Swedish shipbuilding caused by the Second Anglo-Dutch war in 1664-67. The naval yard in Stoclcholm was occupied with the construction of the fleet flagship, Kronan, of 2,300 tonnes, laid down in 1665 and launched in 1668, while Venus (1,250 tonnes) was launched at Karlshamn (the new name of Bodekull) in 1667.^°"' These efl'orts increased the navy to 31,000 tonnes by the end of 1668, even though seven ships of 4,000 tonnes were discarded or sold in 1666-68. From 1666, the Stoclcholm yard concentrated on repair of older ships, in some cases virtual rebuildings.^"^ New construction at this yard almost ceased until 1677; only Fredrika Amalia (300 tonnes) was launched in 1674. It continued at a slow pace at Karlshamn, where Mercurius (1,200 tonnes) was launched in 1671 and Neptunus (550 tonnes) in 1673. In 1666, a new naval yard for fir-built ships was established in Medelpad in northern Sweden. Eight ships were built there until 1678, but four of them were transports. Uttern (1672, 250 tonnes) and Laxen (1675, 700 tonnes) were warships, while Nordstjarnan (1670, 600 tonnes) and Sundsvall (1674, 650 tonnes) were armed transports, which were fully armed as warships from 1675. Fir-built warships were an emergency solution. Normally, the navy required that even armed merchantmen should be built of oak in order to be acceptable as hired

of 160 feet), 12 second class (three of 150, three of 145, and six of 140 feet), a n d 33 third class (eight of 136, eight of 130, ten of 125, and seven of 100-120 feet), which undoubtedly belong to the regency period 1660-72, possibly prepared in connection with the Parliament of 1664. Hakan Jakobsson, "Tekniska influenser och centrala n o r m e r i svensk skeppsbyggnation—Lubeck 1664-1667", Forum navale, 55, 1999, 26-43. Shipbuilding 1660-1672: Wendt 1950, 212-31. The accounts f r o m the Stockholm yard are lost, a n d reports of yard activities are scarce. According to the report f r o m Amiralitetskollegium of its administration under the regency, 11 warships, built before 1660 (Hercules, Caesar, Svenska Lejonet, Andromeda, Goteborg, Vdstervik, Danska Phoenix, Amarant, Ornen, Fortuna, a n d Jagaren) were repaired by the end of 1672, five m o r e [Draken, Carolus, Wismar, Hjorten, and Falken, tx-Mercurius) were u n d e r repair at the end of 1672, and Victoria, Manen, Maria, Apollo, Svenska Phoenix, and Hoken required repair. Of the latter, Victoria, Manen, a n d Svenska Phoenix were repaired by 1676, while the other three were discarded in the mid-1670s. From various sources it is k n o w n that Mercurius (launched 1651) was extensively repaired a n d r e n a m e d Falken in 1671-72, Postiljon (1662) was lengthened in 1674, Phoenix (1651) was repaired in 1675 and later sometimes listed as built in that year, while Manen (1653/4) was extensively repaired in 1675-76. Amarant (1653) u n d e r w e n t a great repair at G o t h e n b u r g in 1674, Wismar, launched 1647/8 and serviceable when given away as a m e r c h a n t m a n in 1692, must have received a m a j o r mid-life repair.

422

c h a p t e r SEveN

warships. A new naval yard for construction of transports of fir was established in Kronoby in Osterbotten (Finland) in 1673. At the end of the regency government in 1672, the navy was of 33,000 tonnes. It was only slightly larger when the war began in 1675 (table 5:15). Of its ships, no fewer than 13 were from 1,150 to 2,300 tonnes, even though Gustav II A d o l f s Kronan and Scepter had finally been discarded in 1671, after several years of life extension. The restructuring of the navy towards large ships had been achieved, but its total size was far below the plans of 1660 and 1664. These plans had been ambitious but not unrealistic, evidenced by the fact that Sweden created an even larger navy after 1680. After the peace treaties concluded from 1645 to 1660, Sweden also had a much larger territory and population than earlier, and consequently more income f r o m taxes and customs. The new empire had longer coasts and was strategically more dependent on sea lines of communication than it had been before the expansion started, and Karl X Gustav's wars had shown that the navy had to face new challenges from the west. If the regency had followed a more radical financial policy, it might have come closer to fulfilling its naval plans, especially considering that it had been at peace since 1660. Table

5.15

Name

Kronan Svdrdet Victoria Nyckeln Applet Solen Wrangel Mars Jupiter Venus Mercurius Draken Saturnus St Hieronymus

17 warships, >500-1,000 t. 5 warships, 300-500 t. 10 warships, 100-<300 t. 14 small craft 3 galleys

Swedish

warships

at the end of

Launched

Built at

1668 1662 1658 1664 1661 1667 1664 1665 1665 1667 1671 1655 1662 B 1675

Stockholm Stockholm Stockholm Karlshamn Gothenburg Liibeck Stockholm Liibeck Liibeck Karlshamn Karlshamn Stockholm Karlshamn Slite

1675

Displacement, tonnes 2,300 1,700 1,500 1,450 1,400 1,400 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,200 1,150 1,150 1,100 11,650 1,950 1,525

Final fate

Lost in action 1676 Lost in action 1676 Discarded 1686 Lost in action 1679 Wrecked 1676 Sunk 1694 Discarded 1713 P Denmark 1677 Sunk 1710 Sunk 1706 P Denmark 1677 P D e n m a r k 1677 Sunk 1707 P D e n m a r k 1677

warships and naval strength

423

In comparison to the English, Dutch, and French navies, which in the 1670s were of 100,000 tonnes or even more, Sweden was now far behind in naval strength. Furthermore, the Danish navy was, at the outbreak of the war in 1675, of 28,000 tonnes, almost as large as the Swedish. This navy, which never before had been much larger than 20,000 tonnes, had markedly expanded under the absolutist regime introduced in 1660, despite the fact that Denmark-Norway had lost much territory, population, and tax incomes to Sweden. The seriousness of this determined Danish challenge was not fully appreciated by the regency government in their financial and naval policy. The naval war with Denmark and the Dutch Republic from 1675 to 1679 was a disaster for the restructured Swedish navy. It must be seriously questioned if the officers fully understood how to handle a fleet of great ships in combat in order to get optimal effects out of their firepower and staying power. The navy lost 23 warships (100 tonnes and more) of about 17,500 tonnes and several minor vessels to enemy action, shipwrecks, or accidents. The losses included the two largest ships, Kronan (2,300 tonnes) and Svdrdet (1,700 tonnes), as well as Applet (1,400), Nyckeln (1,450), and Mars, Jupiter, Draken, and St Hieronymus of 1,100-1,250 tonnes. Eight merchantmen, hired as warships, were also lost. Swedish warships and hired merchantmen of around 13,000 tonnes were added to the Danish navy, which grew to almost 40,000 tonnes with little new construction efforts during the war. New production during the war years could not replace losses. In Stockholm, where major repairs had dominated since the late 1660s, new construction was finally resumed in 1677 when Delfin (300 tonnes) was launched. It was followed by a new fleet flagship, Carolus XI (1,700 tonnes), in 1678 and Stenbock (550 tonnes) in 1679. A ship of 550 tonnes and one of 100 tonnes were under construction in Karlshamn when the town was taken by the Danish in 1676. The ships were completed for the Danish navy. The Karlshamn yard was not reopened, and its personnel were transferred to fortified Kalmar, where a new naval yard started production from 1677. It built only three small scouting ships ijaktskepp) before the end of the war. The yard in Kronoby (Osterbotten, Finland) produced 18 fir-hulled bojorter of probably 60-80 tonnes from 1675-79. They were primarily intended as transports but at least some of them were armed. The Swedish navy bought four newly built armed merchantmen in 1675-76: St Hieronymus (1,100 tonnes), Abraham (300), Riga (700), and Kalmar (650). Their combat value was regarded a low, however, and an agreement made

424

c h a p t e r SEveN

in 1678 by Amiralitetskollegium to buy another new merchantman Cronstier na (600 tonnes), was cancelled by Karl XL His distrust of armed merchantmen was probably inspired by Hans Wachtmeister the new naval commander-in-chief. The total size of the Swedish navy at the end of the war in 1679 was 20,000 tonnes, half the size of the Danish navy. It had seven ships larger than 1,000 tonnes compared to Denmark's 12. Hie Swedish strategic situation was extremely vulnerable until naval balance could be restored in the Baltic Sea. The experiences of the period 1660-75 showed that a navy of even around 30,000 tonnes could not be adequately supported at the level of incomes and expenditures established by the regency government. A radical reconstruction and expansion of the navy was central to the political and financial reforms introduced in 1680. Larger resources than ever before were channelled to naval shipbuilding and maintenance of a large navy. 5.4.4

Battle fleet,

1680-1699

Swedish absolutism was not established by royal dictates. It was introduced step by step as a result of Parliament taking decisions which looked logical and inevitable to secure the state and the empire against foreign threats. At the meeting of the Parliament in autumn 1680, which decided to make a radical reduktion and increase taxation on the nobility, the Parliament's secret committee was given more detailed information about state incomes and expenditure than earlier Parliaments had received. For the navy, which would consume much of the increased income, a detailed plan had been prepared by Hans Wachtmeister. Parts of it were included in the letter of request for funds which the king sent to the Parliament, most probably to emphasise that the funds were urgently required for defence. According to that plan, the future navy should consist of nine ships of 90 guns, 18 of 64 guns, and 18 of 44 guns; six boyers, 12 large transports, six fireships, and six yachts. The transports were to be shallow-draught ships of around 500 tonnes, suitable to transport timber to the naval yards but also for amphibious operations. The total size of this navy (excluding the transports) would be 60,000 tonnes, three times its present

Shipbuilding policy and administration 1679-1700: Gratters 1946, 126-62; the period 1696-1700: Einar W e n d t and Lars O. Berg in Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II,

warships and naval strength

425

Hie three types of major warships were of around 1,900/2,000, 1,400, and 900 tonnes respectively, and they were armed according to three distinct armament plans. The largest type carried 24-pounders on the lower deck, 18-pounders on the second battery, and 8-pounders on the third, either on a complete deck (on the three-decker Carolus XI of 1683) or on the forecastle and quarterdeck (the large two-deckers Sverige and Gota Rike of 1684). The intermediate type was able to carry 24-, 12-, and 6-pounders, and the smaller ships were capable of carrying 18- and 8-pounders.^''^ The initiative to build several ships of a very large size came from Wachtmeister and was approved by Karl XI, who even increased the number of guns f r o m 72 to 90. The Amzra/zfeti/coZte^mm—particularly Wachtmeister's rival. Admiral Hans Clerck—had in 1679 argued for that only ships of the two smaller types should be built in order to create a fleet where all ships could use shallow waters and shallow ports. It was the beginning of more than a century of discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of ships with various draughts for the Swedish navy. Ships with a draught of 5.5 to 6 meters and more were difficult to use in strategic important waters, such as the southern entrance to the Sound and the waters between Oland and the Swedish mainland.^"® Hans Wachtmeister had already, before the Parliament met in 1680, established four "production lines" to achieve the great program. In 1680, two ships of 1,400 tonnes were launched at Stockholm and Kalmar, and one of 700 tonnes at the new yard at Riga. Private yards in Osterbotten (northern Finland) were used for construction of the fir-built transports, and they continued to build such ships into the early 18th century. The Stoclcholm navy yard was closed in 1680, and the personnel and as much as possible of the inventory were transferred to Karlskrona, where the first ships were laid down in 1681. From 1681 to 1684, the new resources for shipbuilding were used to launch three ships of 1,950 tonnes, two of 1,400, seven of 900, one of 500 (shallow-draught design), and one of 350 tonnes. Of these, six were built in Kalmar, three in Karlskrona, four in Riga, and one (built with Pomeranian funds) in Stralsund. Five old warships and four of

11-50. Naval estimates for 1681 and the cost of mobilising a 45 ship fleet in R 4844, RA, A r m a m e n t plans f r o m the 1680s in M 1762, RA; papers about the three types of ships in M 1754, RA. ™ Wendt 1950, 291-93; Grauers 1946, 133.

426

c h a p t e r SEveN

inferior quality (with fir-hulls or built as merchantmen) were deleted from the force of effective warships between 1680 and 1683. By the end of 1684, a new navy of 27 battleships (ships-of-the-line), six major, and six minor cruising ships of 34,000 tonnes was created. It was the largest navy Sweden had ever had, except for in the years 1644-46, when many captured ships had made the navy larger than the policymakers had intended to maintain. The financial reforms of 1680 had given rapid results.^"' In 1684, Karl XI ordered a reduction of the new construction program, and the Riga yard was closed. The balance of power in the Baltic was almost restored, and much money was required to make Karlskrona into a well-defended base for support a large battle fleet. In 1683, Admiral Hans Clerck had regained an influential position in the Amiralitetskollegium, and he still argued for ships with moderate draught of water. Consequently, no ships of the largest type were laid down for several years. Between 1684 and 1690, six old ships were repaired or rebuilt at Karlskrona and became almost as durable as new ships. This practice, which was c o m m o n in the English navy, was introduced by the English master shipwrights Francis Sheldon and Robert Turner at Stocldiolm in the late 1660s. It was successful, even though Sweden until 1724 had no dock in which large ships could be placed when they were rebuilt. New construction did not entirely cease. Two ships of 1,400 tonnes were launched at Kalmar and Karlskrona in 1686 and one at Kalmar in 1688, while a shaUow-draught ship of 500 tonnes was launched in Stralsund in 1687. After that, the Kalmar yard was closed, and shipbuilding activities as well as ships were concentrated in Karlskrona. At the end of 1690, the navy had 29 battleships and 13 cruising warships of 38,000 tonnes. It was slightly larger than the Danish navy, because new construction for that navy had not been sufficient to maintain the strength it had had in the late 1670s. The material readiness of the new Swedish navy was tested with success during the Holstein crisis in 1689, when it was totally mobilised for a possible war with Denmark. At this time, a general increase in the three types of warships established in 1680 took place. Hans Clerck's influence with Karl XI was declining, and he finally left the navy in 1693 for the civilian admin-

The names of the m a j o r ships built f r o m 1678 to 1692 were frequently changed f r o m 1683 to 1694, see Appendix 1.

warships and naval strength

427

istration. From the late 1680s, Hans Wachtmeister and the two young master shipwrights he had patronised, Francis Sheldon Jr (dead 1692) and Charles Sheldon, were in control of naval technology. A period of experiments and gradual increase of existing designs created a navy in which armament was standardised to four patterns but dimensions within each size group varied. From 1690 to 1699, the Karlskrona yard launched two three-deckers: Konung Karl of 2,650 tonnes (1694) and Enigheten of 2,300 tonnes (1696). They were partially armed with prestigious and non-standard bronze guns. W h e n later re-armed with only iron guns they had homogeneous batteries of 24-, 18-, 8-, and 4-pounders, the smallest intended for the quarterdeck and forecastle. Two two-decked ships of 1,600 and 1,650 tonnes (1690 and 1692) had batteries of 24-, 12-, and 6-pounders; two of 1,050 tonnes (1692-93) and three of 1,150 tonnes (1696-98) were armed with 18-, 8-, and 4-pounders; and seven of 625-750 tonnes launched in 1694-99 were intended for 12-, 6-, and 3-pounders.^'° The guns of these ships were practically all of iron, heavier than earlier bronze guns of the same calibres but much cheaper. New construction of major and minor cruising warships, which had been a very low priority since 1679, was resumed by the end of the period. Three frigates, one snow (brigantine), and one bomb-vessel were launched in 1698-99. At the beginning of the Great Northern War in early 1700, the Swedish navy had 39 battleships totalling 48,000 tonnes. There were eight major and six minor cruising warships and one bomb-vessel of 4,500 tonnes. The battle fleet had five very large ships (in contemporary lists 1st Rates) of 1,950-2,650 tonnes, able to carry 24-, 18-, and 8-pounders. There were ten ships of 1,400-1,700 tonnes (2nd Rates) with 24- and 12-pounders, twelve of 1,050-1,250 tonnes (3rd and 4th Rates) with 18- and 8- or 12-pounders, eight of around 900 tonnes (4th Rates) able to carry 18- and 6- or 8-pounders, and eight of 625750 tonnes (4th Rates), most of them able to carry 12- and 6-pounders. TKe Danish navy had 32 battleships totalling 41,000 tonnes, 26 cruising warships (100 tonnes and larger) of 7,000 tonnes, six bomb-vessels, six blockships, and seven galleys. The two navies were approximately equal in size, with Swedish superiority in battle fleet strength and Danish superiority in cruisers and shallow-draught warships.

Wismar and Stettin, the two earliest a n d smallest ships of this group h a d to be given a lighter a r m a m e n t .

428

5.4.5

c h a p t e r SEveN

Battle fleet, cruisers, and shallow water flotillas,

1700-1721

When the navy was mobilised for war in 1700, every ship was sent to sea. The material readiness was obviously excellent, and it was also the type of war for which the dynasty and its naval administration had prepared the navy. For the next 20 years, naval policy had to be adjusted to the changing demands of a large and increasingly complex war in which different types of operations required batde fleet strength, large cruising forces, and a drastic increase of amphibious and shallow-water fighting capacity.^" In terms of total displacement, the strength of the navy did not decline between the late 1690s and the time of Karl XII's death in late 1718. Hie total displacement was around 50,000 tonnes, and Karl XII did, in fact, leave a slightly larger navy than he had inherited f r o m Karl XL It had changed, however, from a navy almost entirely composed of battleships to a force with many cruisers and a sizeable inshore flotilla. It had also expanded to almost 70,000 tonnes around 1707-09, although it then gradually declined (Appendix 2, part 2). Until 1709, naval administration continued to give the battle fleet high priority. Nine more battleships were launched f r o m 1702 to 1708, and two more were laid down in 1709. One problem had become obvious during the operation in the Sound in 1700. The five largest ships built in the 1680s and 1690s had too much draught to enter the Sound from south under war conditions and had to be sent back to Karlskrona. Admiral Hans Clerck's scepticism towards such ships was vindicated, but rather than abandon great ships, their design was changed. Of the nine new battleships, Gota Lejon (1702) of 2,300 tonnes and Tre Kronor (1706) of 2,000 tonnes, were three-deckers armed with 24-, 18", and 8-pounders, and the quarterdeck of Gota Lejon was fitted with 4-pounders. Charles Sheldon designed the ships with more beam and less draught, only 20 feet (5.9 meters), than his two earlier threedeckers of the 1690s. The intermediate type—armed with 24-, 12-, and 6-pounders—was reduced in size after 1704: Nordstjarnan (1703) and Prins Karl Fredrik (1704) were of around 1,600 tonnes, while Bremen (1705), Stockholm (1708) and a ship laid down in 1709 were of 1,350 tonnes. As might be expected, the smaller type was less able to fight

Shipbuilding 1700-21: Berg 1970. M u c h information in this section is f r o m the author's collection of notes about 18th-century Swedish warships, partly used in Glete, Den svenska linjeflottan 1990 a n d Glete 1993b.

warships and naval strength

429

with the lower battery in fresh winds than the larger, but the cost was markedly lower?'^ The smallest type of battleship, also regarded as a large cruiser, was now the ships armed with 18-, 8-, and 4-pounders. Four ships of 1,050-1,100 tonnes were built: Oland (1705), Verden (1706), Riga (1707), and one more laid down in 1709. From 1701 to 1708, three small battleships were wrecked and three were discarded in 1706-07. In 1705-09, the battle fleet strength peaked at a level of 43 ships of around 56,000 tonnes. Denmark, which could compete with Sweden without being at war, achieved in these years a slightly larger battle fleet, 41 ships of 58,000 tonnes. After 1709, the development of the Swedish battie fleet is a story of how a large accumulated capital gradually was reduced due to arduous war service, losses in combat and accidents, and the normal deterioration of ageing ships. This deterioration was, in an international perspective, rather slow, and some of the ships from the 1680s were still serviceable in 1721.^" For several years, no new battleships were built and none were required, because manpower until 1719-20 was not sufficient to keep aU serviceable ships in commission at the same time. The threat of block obsolescence was obvious, but Karl XII believed that this could be helped with repairs of existing hulls. The construction of a dock to facilitate repairs of old ships was begun at Karlskrona in 1716. The work had high priority as a part of the king's efforts to take the initiative in the war, and it was near completion at the time of his death in 1718. W o r k then slowed down, and the dock was only completed in 1724.^"' Two old ships were discarded in 1710, and two large ships ran aground and had to be burnt during the battle of Koge Bay in that year. Two small ships suffered shipwreck in 1711 and 1712, and five ships were discarded in 1712-14. The remaining 33 ships were in fairly good condition and were sufficient for sending a powerful battle fleet to sea, but four of them were sacrificed by Karl XII to the Danes in 1715 in a strange suicide operation. One ship blew up accidentally

Most of these ships were rebuih and h a d a long career in the Swedish navy. In the evaluation of existing ships m a d e by the navy in the 1760s, Prins Karl Fredrik was equal to m o d e r n ships in carrying the lower battery, while Bremen a n d Stockholm were too small to be satisfactory: Glete 1993b, 161-66. The condition of the battle fleet is k n o w n f r o m reports f r o m AmiralitetskoUegium and the master shipwright Charles Sheldon, AK, Overskeppsbyggmastarna, Sheldoniana, vol. 1; N N S II, 12b, b o t h KrA, report of Klas Sparre 21/11 1719, M 1689, RA. Lepasoon 1993, 218-20; Harris 1999.

430

c h a p t e r SEveN

in 1717, and one was broken up in 1718. The four smallest battleships were lost in 1719, three sunk to avoid capture by the Danes at Marstrand in 1719 and one lost to a Russian squadron. In 1719, the 84-gun three-decker Drottning Ulrika Eleonora (2,100 tonnes) was launched in Karlskrona, partly built with timber from an unfinished 60-gun ship of 1,350 tonnes, laid down in 1709. The unusual decision to change a partly built ship into a much larger ship shows that Karl XII in his last years must have considered the renewal of the battle fleet an urgent matter. Another sign of this is the attempt to repair the old large battleship Prins Karl (1684, 1,950 tonnes), which began in 1718 but ultimately had to be cancelled as impossible. As usual, Karl XII's intentions are shrouded in secrecy, but scarce resources would not have been spent on the new dock and large battleships unless the king intended to use the battle fleet for some important purpose after his Norwegian campaign in 1718. No more battleships were started after his death, and repairs of existing ships were postponed until the dock was ready in 1724. By 1721 there remained 23 battleships of 32,000 tonnes, of which two were beyond repair, however, and several were near the end of their career. Within five years after 1721, eight of the 23 ships were discarded or sold and three were rebuilt. The post-dynastic Swedish state started with a battle fleet in crisis, and it took more than a decade until it was restored, not to a larger force than in 1721 but to a force of new or extensively repaired ships in good condition. The Swedish cruising fleet was much increased in the early years of the war, when several frigates and brigantines were built in order to chase privateers in the Baltic, to defend Ladoga and Peipus against the Russians and to create a powerful cruising squadron in Gothenburg against Denmark-Norway. Nine major and 29 minor cruising warships and three bomb-vessels were built, bought, or converted from 1700 to 1703. After that, production of frigates and minor vessels was intended to replace losses and discarded units. The largest cruising ships, of 500-600 tonnes, were built as small two-deckers and were in contemporary lists ambiguously classified as both "frigates" and "ships". An auxiliary type of frigate was created by conversion of shallow-draught naval transports (two in 1700, one in 1712) and new construction of six ships 1705-08. These were built to the normal naval transport ship design but with hulls of oak instead of fir and armed as auxiliary frigates in wartime. They were slow and unsuited for scouting and offensive cruiser operations, but they had a powerful armament

warships and naval strength

431

and were useful in shallow waters, especially the Gulf of Finland and Pomerania. In contrast to the battle fleet, new construction of cruising warships continued after 1709. Six medium-sized and four small ships were built in Pomerania in 1713-15 for operations in the strategically important narrow waters from the western estuary to Riigen. Only four survived the intense fighting in 1715, but they were important for delaying enemy army operations. Large cruisers were also built to innovative designs which combined sailing qualities with a powerful battery carried on one deck, not two as in earlier designs of that size. The first was Vita Orn (525 tonnes, launched 1711), designed by William Smith with a battery of 12-pounders, which showed excellent sailing and fighting capabilities. ]arramas (600 tonnes, 1716), designed by Charles Sheldon, and Svarta Orn (700 tonnes, 1717), designed by Smith, were enlarged frigates of this type with a mixed battery of 18- and 12-pounders. The latter was converted in 1726 to a 44-gun two-decker. Illerim, laid down as a 54-gun ship in 1709, was launched in 1716 as a 34-gun single-deck frigate with a main battery of 18-pounders. With a displacement of about 1,050 tonnes, it was the largest frigate in any navy at this time and a forerunner of designs that would be common in Europe in the late 18th century. The ship had a very brief career in the Swedish navy; it was taken by a British squadron in 1717 and turned over to the Danish navy. A Swedish frigate buih to the same design and with the same name was launched in 1754 and was, even at that date, one of the most powerful single-deckers in Europe. It was Karl XII who personally ordered the building of large frigates. He even suggested that the 60-gun ship on stocks since 1709 should be completed as a 24-pounder single-deck frigate, an idea that was turned down by the Amiralitetskollegium. By 1721, the cruiser force consisted of six frigates, four transports armed as frigates, 11 minor cruising vessels (mainly brigantines), and five bomb-vessels. It was sufficient for peacetime service and the immediate need for cruisers in a mobilised battle fleet. As in most European navies, the number of frigates and minor cruising vessels were not much increased until the 1750s. Swedish galley construction started in Gothenburg, where five vessels were built from 1701 to 1707 for operations on the west coast and against Norway. This was probably the result of the Gothenburg squadron being administrated by Admiral Erik Sioblad, who also was governor-general in the region and had the authority to allocate funds

432

c h a p t e r SEveN

for regional operations with a certain freedom. A shallow-water flotilla created on Lake Peipus, between Russia and Livonia, was destroyed in action with the Russians in 1704. The massive Russian threat against Finland in 1713-14 impelled the construction of two blockships, six medium, and five small galleys for defence, but half of this little force was lost in the battle of Hango already in 1714. A few more galleys were built and captured from the Russians in 1714-15. After his return to Sweden at the end of 1715, and after his personal experience of shallow-water fighting in Pomerania, Karl XII became seriously interested in creating a shallowwater flotilla for offensive operations against Norway and for defence of Stoclcholm. He may have intended to combine the west- and eastcoast flotillas in an offensive against Russia if he succeeded in forcing Denmark out of the war. Nine broadside armed blockships, four very large galleys, and six small galleys were built in 1717-18. At the time of the king's death in late 1718, a shallow-water flotilla of ten blockships, four super-galleys, and 25 medium-sized and small galleys existed. In firepower it may have been equal to the Russian galley fleet, although the blockships were less mobile than galleys and better suited for defence than offensive operations. The Swedish flotilla was divided between the east and west coasts, however, and could not be concentrated as long as the Anglo-Danish fleet controlled the straits. The shallow-water force on the west coast was strong enough in 1718 to secure the archipelago lines of communication for Karl XII's last ofl'ensive into Norway. The next year, when the Swedish war efforts to a large extent collapsed and the flotilla lacked crew, most of the west-coast fleet was lost in port during the Danish attack on Bohuslan. Surviving vessels were transferred to the Baltic Sea in 1720-21. In the Baltic Sea, the flotilla in 1719 could defend the entrances to Stockholm but not the long eastern coast against the Russian galley fleet. Ten medium and ten small galleys were ordered to be built in 1721, but six of the latter were destroyed on stocks by the Russians in a raid on SundsvaU in spring 1721. At the end of the war, the shallow-water flotilla consisted of eight blockships, two mortar floats, 16 galleys, and 12 small galleys. It was given high priority in the following decades. The Danish navy had undergone much the same development as the Swedish after 1709. The construction of large ships for the battle line practically ceased, while frigates, snows (brigantines), blockships, and

warships and naval strength

433

galleys were acquired in considerable number. Several of these were disposed of as soon as the war was over for Denmark in 1720. At the end of 1721 a navy of 25 battleships of 38,000 tonnes, a cruiser force of 29 frigates, snows, and large yachts of 9,000 tonnes, and a shallowwater flotilla of nine blockships, three super-galleys (ex Swedish), six galleys, and two small galleys remained. The battle fleet was now larger than the Swedish, and the remaining ships were on the average in a better material condition. The Danish battle fleet was to remain larger than the Swedish throughout the 18th century. It was never more fully mobilised for war, and the experiences of the war of 1709-19 make it doubtful whether the manning system made it possible to mobilise it to full strength except for brief periods. The possession of a large battle fleet remained a centre-piece of Danish-Norwegian defence policy, however. When that fleet was lost to the British in 1807, the twin monarchy fell to pieces as it lost control of sea lines between its different parts. The great change on the Baltic naval scene was the dramatic growth of Russian sea power. From nothing in 1700 and with a minor frigate and galley force in 1709, by 1721 it had grown to 37 battleships, nine frigates, and two bomb vessels of around 55,000 tonnes. It was still an inexperienced batde fleet, which had operated with great caution during the war, but its sheer size made it a major force in Baltic politics. It was very much a result of one man's will, however, and after Peter I's death in 1725, expansion ceased. During the 1730s, the Russian navy's strength rapidly declined, but it was revived in the 1740s. Until the 1780s, the Russian fleet remained at least as strong as the Swedish battle fleet, although smaller than the Danish. From the 1780s, it began to grow again, and by the early 19th century, Russia was Europe's third largest naval power. During the 1710s, the Russian development of a large galley fleet was of great strategic importance in the Baltic, because it gave the Russian army much increased freedom of operations. Karl XII, and the sub-optimising Swedish military and naval authorities failed to understand the consequences of this threat until it was too late. In contrast to Tsar Peter, they did not see oared craft as an opportunity, as an inexpensive and efflcient means to make the army mobfle in a maritime theatre of war. Because no detailed lists of Russian galleys built up to 1721 exist, and because the life of the gafley-hulls was short, the size of the oared flotilla in 1721 can only be estimated. A force of around

434

c h a p t e r SEveN

50 major galleys and 120 small oared craft is probable. Eighteenthcentury experience was to show that this flotilla frequently declined but that it also could be recreated very rapidly when required.

5.5

Armed

merchantmen

In the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century, several European states relied on temporarily armed merchantmen and privately owned warships to create sea power. Even states which had a force of purpose-built warships frequently strengthened it with hired or requisitioned mercantile shipping. In the Baltic, the German Hanse had traditionally relied on its member cities' merchantmen to create sea power when required. Rulers frequently turned to major shipowners, merchants, and naval-minded aristocrats and asked them to act as a naval entrepreneur by fitting out ships for warfare. The original Vasa navy of 1521-23 was organised from Liibeck, Stralsund, and Danzig in this fashion, with German merchants handling the administrative effort to fit out ships for war. Liibeck went to war with improvised fleets of large merchantmen in 1522, 1534, and 1563. The Danish navy, with a strong tradition of building its own warships, still went to war in 1563 with a fleet which, to a considerable extent, consisted of armed merchantmen, although they were bought, not hired, mainly f r o m German cities. In the late 1620s, the Habsburgs attempted to create a Baltic navy by hiring merchantmen f r o m the North German cities. The Vasa monarchy had f r o m its beginning regarded the possession of warships as a cornerstone of its power. The very absence of large Swedish merchantmen suitable as warships gave it few alternatives if it wished to have a naval force in readiness. Purpose-built warships were more important than armed merchantmen when the Vasa state went to war in 1534 and 1563. In both these wars, the number of armed merchantmen in Swedish service grew considerably, but mainly because several such ships were captured and armed for naval service. In Denmark, the armed merchantmen f r o m 1563 to 1570 were replaced by purpose-built warships, and even Liibeck invested in a few, but large, warships in the 1560s. The Vasa policy of investing in purpose-built warships was vindicated in the war of 1563—70, and the alternative of relying on armed merchantmen and naval entrepreneurs was never discussed after that war. On the contrary, in the 1570s,

warships and naval strength

435

both Duke Karl and Johan III tried to become naval entrepreneurs to Philip II, by leasing warships with guns and crew to the powerful Habsburg ruler who lacked a sailing battle fleet. This policy was not the result of a total lack of large Swedish merchantmen in the 16th century. A mercantile marine of some importance had developed between 1520 and 1560, and Gustav I had himself invested in large cargo carriers, but after the 1530s with litde attention to making them suitable as warships. Members of the aristocracy are known to have owned merchantmen, which sailed in Western Europe, and some merchants in Stockholm and a few other towns owned large ships. From 1569, royal warships (often captured merchantmen) were given away to aristocrats in exchange for political debts or to merchants in exchange for financial debts. The largest ship-owner in Sweden f r o m 1570 to 1598 was Duke Karl. In 1575 and 1578, large Swedish-owned merchantmen were bought by the king to strengthen the navy, and several of the ships captured during the Narva blockade until 1581 were used by the navy. From the 1580s, however, it was the great shipbuilder Johan III who sold warships to merchants rather than the reverse. Traditionally, armed merchantmen had been useful as carriers of infantry and light fire-weapons, while the purpose-built 16th-century warship had increasingly become designed as a gun-carrier. The separation between cargo-carriers and warships had grown during this century, but towards its end that development was partly reversed. The rapid progress of maritime and naval technology in Northwestern Europe from the late 16th century included the development of merchantmen which combined good sailing qualities with a substantial battery of medium-sized guns. They were intended for trade in dangerous waters, such as the East and West Indies and the Mediterranean, where merchants had to defend their ships and cargoes with armed force and, if circumstances were favourable, use aggression against competitors. Gun-armed merchantmen often proved superior in combat to more traditionally designed merchantmen, and in the East Indies they even successfully fought Portuguese warships.^'^ This development was especially marked in the Dutch Republic and England, where many modern armed merchantmen were built.

Glete 1993, 51-55; Glete 2000, 19, 23-24,

31-32.

436

c h a p t e r SEveN

Outside home waters, English and Dutch sea power often consisted of armed merchantmen handled by crews with fighting skills. If fitted with additional guns and larger crews instead of cargo, these ships could be made into fairly efiicient warships, at least in combat with medium and small purpose-built warships. Tliey could not fight the large warships, but these were few in number before the 1650s and 1660s. Dutch and English merchantmen armed as warships were, from time to time, hired by several states, especially Venice, but also by France, Portugal, Denmark, and Sweden. England and the Dutch Republic also hired their own merchantmen in times of major mobilisation, but primarily in the wars they fought against each other. The importance of the armed merchantmen was so marked in this period that it has even created a persistent myth that the Dutch navy mainly consisted of such ships before 1652. That navy was actually a stateadministrated organisation, usually as large or larger than the English or Swedish navy. In England and the Dutch RepubUc, however, armed merchantmen did constitute a valuable reserve fleet in emergencies, as long as most warships were rather small.^'® The Swedish navy as late as 1599 had captured a number of Lubeclcian merchantmen which were added to the navy. Most of them were lightly armed in relation to their size and did not serve as warships more than a few years. The navy's first experience of the new western type of armed merchantmen was the many captured Dutch ships which were added to the navy between 1604 and 1609, especially in 1608-09. Several of them were retained for many years in the navy, and their armament was hardly inferior in strength to earlier Swedish-designed purpose-built warships. In 1623-24, nine warships were bought on the open market in the Dutch Repubhc with Anthonie de Monier and Louis de Geer as middlemen, although these may have been privateowned warships (privateers) rather than armed merchantmen. Gustav II Adolf was mainly interested in large warships, but he was aware of that armed merchantmen might be a useful addition to the navy. He faced a situation where Sweden hardly had any major merchantmen for long-distance trade, however. Rather than relying on the market and private enterprise to compensate for weak state power, the strong Swedish state had to organise the weak Swedish towns and merchants in order to establish a mercantile marine of major, defensible

Glete 1993, 152-58, 161-67, 180-84, 204-06; Glete 2000, 107, 110, 169-78.

W A R S H I P S AND NAVAL S T R E N G T H

437

ships. At a session with the Pariiament in early 1629, the burghers were asked to form a ship-owning and trading company, Skeppskompaniet (the Ship Company). It should build or buy 16 armed merchantmen, which should reinforce the navy when required and otherwise sail on long-distance trade. Formally, it was not a new burden, but the towns had to find resources for major investments beyond their normal ambitions. The towns were divided into groups which would share the cost of one ship, a method which looks more like a taxation measure than a way to stimulate private entrepreneurship. Around 16 ships were bought or built, several f r o m Holland, and 11 of them served in the navy in 1630-31, mainly as transports for the army during the invasion of Germany. It is uncertain to what extent the company was paid for these services, and the whole question of the financial relations among the company, the towns, and the state remains unexplored. What is obvious is that the state and the navy were deeply involved in the administration of the company. Rather than mobilising maritime and mercantile communities to support the state with know-how, the state had to support inexperienced private ship-owners.^'^ From 1631, the ships were used for trade with Western Europe, but the result was not a success. Already in spring 1632, four ships were sequestered by Spain at San Lucar (Cadiz Bay). This was a result of the rising confrontation between Sweden and Spain after the Swedish intervention in Germany and the conquest of Wismar with the Spanish-sponsored Imperial fleet in early 1632. Gustav II Adolf instructed the Council to start a naval war against Spain as revenge, a problem which was discussed in the Council in the days before it became known in Stoclcholm that the king was dead. The councillors were uncertain whether they should prepare for an open regular war or if they should start privateering warfare with the Ship Company as a cloak for the Swedish state. The company was unable to do this with sufficient force, and eight warships, administrated by the state, were regarded as necessary to provide some strength to the enterprise. The Council was unhappy with the situation, and it is revealing of

Borjeson 1932, 164-84; Sveriges Sjokrig, 35; Per G o r a n Norenstedt, Bildandet av detforsta seglande kompaniet: Skeppskompaniet 1629-1637, unpublished seminar paper, 1984, Historiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet. M u c h of the political and administrative problems a r o u n d the Ship C o m p a n y can be followed in the Council's minutes, SRP esp. vols 2 and 3. A s u m m a r y of transactions with Skeppskompaniet, SMHF 9:1.

438

c h a p t e r SEveN

the relative power between the state and the maritime communities in Sweden that it was the former which had to organise "privateering", normally a way for states to make use of the financial resources and seafaring competence among private groups.^'® The king's death put an end to the plans. Instead of attacking Spain, the Council decided to attack the directors of the Ship Company, who were accused of mismanagement when they sent ships to Spain. The company continued to lose money and was dissolved in 1636-37 after a debate in the Parliament of 1636. It was typical of the low level of interest in shipping that it was the navy, not any Swedish merchants or major cities, which took over the management of the ships. Hiey were formally kept separate from the navy's ships, and at least six of them were sold in 1639-41 to foreign, mainly Dutch, owners.^" The cities continued to raise complaints in the Parliament about their losses in this venture until at least 1642. Some company ships were used in the colonial project New Sweden in Delaware, which started in 1637. The remains of the Ship Company, the New Sweden Company (also called the South Company), the first Board of Commerce (established in 1637), and the Amiralitetskollegium were closely integrated on the administrative level. The spider in this web was Admiral Klas Fleming, who was president of the Board of Commerce and the most active member of the naval administration. There were also high-ranking private investors in the New Sweden project, but they may have invested out of duty more than in the hope of quick profits.^^" The integration of naval and mercantile activities is noticeable in the naval accounts (or rather the scattered fragments of these accounts) from the period 1634-44.^^' A number of merchantmen are mentioned in the accounts as maintained at the naval yard in Stockholm, and at least three merchantmen were also built there and sold to German

SRP 2, 2 4 3 - 5 1 (6/12 and 7/12 1632); Axel Oxenstierna to the Council 13/2 1633, HSH24, 381. S u m m a r y of transactions with Skeppskompaniet, S M H F 9:1. A survey with references to the literature and non-naval archives in Dahlgren & Norman 1988, 3 - 1 2 . My obsei-vations are mainly based on discussions about the Ship C o m p a n y in the Council and between the Council a n d the Parliament in SRP. The relations between the navy and m e r c h a n t m e n owned by Skeppskompaniet and the state were difficult to u n d e r s t a n d even for contemporaries. O n 5 October 1646, the Amiralitetskollegium issued a certificate stating that the hull of Svarta Hunden belonged to Skeppskompaniet but that its sails, rig, and cables belonged to the navy, while Kalmar Nyckel, Fama and the fleut Caritas had belonged to the c o m p a n y but recently been taken over by the navy, AK, registratur 5/8 1646, KrA.

warships and naval strength

439

merchants, to whom the state had become indebted during the war in Germany.^^^ These activities took place in the years 1635 to 1640 when shipbuilding for the navy was at a very low level, but the pause was not used by private Swedish investors to build ships at the navy yard. Even the few Swedish merchant ships that might be armed for war were apparently bought by the state f r o m 1640 to 1644. When Sweden attacked Denmark in late 1643, there were hardly any private-owned Swedish merchantmen, suitable to be armed, available. The exceptions were a few belonging to Louis de Geer (who now was a Swedish citizen), but they were in the Netherlands. In contrast, Denmark-Norway in the 1640s had a considerable number of merchantmen built for service as auxiliary warships, a result of a decision in 1630 by Christian IV to support owners of such ships (defensjonsskip) with privileges.^" De Geer, who personally was deeply involved in quarrels about the Sound Toll with Christian IV, went to the Netherlands to organise an auxiliary fleet of Dutch merchantmen. In spring 1644 he hired 22 ships of 350-600 tonnes and a small frigate. This fleet played an important role in the defeat of the Danish navy in that year, although batde experiences in 1644 revealed the merchantmen's great vulnerability to major warships. It is of technical interest that these Dutchbuilt merchantmen proved to be markedly faster than purpose-built Danish warships. That superiority made it possible for the hired fleet to escape from the first encounter with Danish warships in May 1644, to sail through the Sound in August and escape the pursuing warships, and to pursue and capture the smaller Danish warships which tried to escape during the battle of Femern in October. Armed merchantmen were usually built with long and narrow hulls that made them less useful when fighting offensively f r o m a windward position, but this gave them an advantage in speed. Louis de Geer had acted as financier as well as entrepreneur when the auxiliary fleet was hired, but he had to be paid. He was partly paid

Hoken and Jupiter, two large cargo carriers of 300 laster each, were apparently built at the Stockholm yard. They were at least rigged there in 1636, account in SH 72:3, RA, a n d sold to Johan von Schewen, Stralsund, in October 1636, AK, registratur 19/10 1636, KrA. The state's debt to von Schewen, SRP 6, 164-65, 199, 283, 365-66, 625. The ship Lilla Jupiter was built at the Stockholm yard in 1640 and sold in that year to Daniel Schlegel, as was the ship Svarta Hunden, belonging to the Ship Company, SRP 8, 102, 243, 283. Ole H e n d r i k Gjeruldsen, Defensjonsskipsordningen i Norge, 1630-1704, Oslo, 2002.

440

c h a p t e r SEveN

with ships, and the cost was staggering. For service from spring to autumn 1644, the lease of around 20 armed merchantmen with guns and crews, paid and fed according to Dutch standard, cost 735,835 daler silvermynt. The total naval estimate for the state-administrated Swedish navy was in 1644, a year of full mobilisation, 608,619 daler silvermynt. This navy was at least three times as large as the hired fleet and had more heavily armed warships. The figures are not exactly comparable, but they show that Sweden could not afford to lease naval power during long wars. The state-administrated naval system was actually cheap in an international perspective.^^"* The success of the auxiliary Dutch fleet in the autumn 1644, however, did immediately inspire Axel Oxenstierna to launch the idea of promoting Swedish long-distance shipping with reduced custom rates for Swedish-built ships. At a meeting with the Council on 15 January 1645, he remarked that such ships might be hired by the navy when required. This would make it possible to reduce the number of warships and would keep the money for leasing merchantmen in the country.^^^ The defensjonskip system had worked in Denmark-Norway, and the recent Swedish experience of hiring such ships from the Netherlands had been positive but expensive. A new custom policy, outlined by Oxenstierna, was introduced in late 1645. It favoured Swedish-owned and Swedish-built armed merchantmen if they were suitable as auxiliary warships with at least 14 guns. This led to a rapid increase in the number of such ships f r o m almost nothing in 1645 to around 50 in 1656. The capital came from aristocrats, from generals such as Karl Gustav Wrangel and Gustav Horn, who invested profits f r o m the Thirty Years War in shipping, and from merchants. It is probable that Dutch capital was involved, considering that many Swedish merchants were first- or second-generation Dutch immigrants. The largest shipowner was Viistervik's Ship Company, mainly owned by aristocratic families.^^*^

Kammarkollegiet, Rikshuvudboclcer, vol. 70 (1644), fol. 657. De Geer a n d the war: Dahlgren 1923, II, 439-505. There are accounts for the hired fleet, including information about dimensions, a r m a m e n t and crews of the hired ships in Louis de Geer's paper, Leufstaarkivet, vols 45-49, RA. List of hired ships: Appendix 1. part 3. SRP I I , 2 (15/1 1645). Shipping and shipowners: Borjeson 1932, 124-257; customs pohcy and shipping: Gerentz 1951, 91-166; shipbuilding: unpublished manuscript by M A Hakan Jakobsson. The n u m b e r of ships in 1656-57: Bergman, Kompaniskeppen 1965.

warships and naval strength

441

When the new auxiliary fleet was mobilised to fight its first war, the Dutch soon became the main enemy at sea. During the mobilisation against Denmark in 1657, eight ships were hired for the main fleet in Stockholm while eight ships, hired at Gothenburg, formed the bulk of the Gothenburg squadron. During 1658, 12 additional ships were hired, and 13 hired merchantmen took part in the batde in the Sound against the Dutch in October 1658. Twenty-one of the hired ships were of around 500-750 tonnes, about the same size as most purpose-built Swedish warships. Nearly all Dutch ships participating in this war were purpose-built warships, but most of them were of the same size as the hired Swedish ships. They were more useful as warships than the latter, but the difference was not dramatic. The hired ships also were usually new and in good condition, while several Swedish warships were old and not suited for the autumn and winter operations which took place in the war years 1657-60. Consequently, the armed merchantmen were an important part of the navy in this war. The experiences must have shown, however, that only the larger ships were really useful, and in 1661 the rules were made stricter. Only ships of at least 110 feet, with a beam of at least 25 feet and a height between decks of at least six feet, were to receive full reduction of the custom duties. The Swedish mercantile marine flourished in the 1660s and early 1670s, not the least when England and the Dutch Republic were at war and neutral shipping was much in demand.^^® W h e n Sweden mobilised against the Danes and the Dutch in 1675, 16 merchantmen were hired and three were bought by the navy. In the foUowing years, seven more ships were hired and two more were bought, but the number of armed merchantmen in service declined markedly. Nine hired and two purchased ships were destroyed in action or captured in 1676-77. A few ships were larger than earlier armed merchantmen, but most of them were still of 500-750 tonnes, while a large number of Swedish, Danish, and Dutch warships now exceeded 1,000 tonnes. Even the largest Swedish merchant-built ships, St Hteronymus of 1,100 tonnes, bought by the navy in 1675, carried only 12-pounders in her main

The use of a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n can be followed in Askgaard 1974. List of hired ships in Appendix 1, part 3. The revised rules of 1661: Borjeson 1932, 128-29; Gerentz 1951, 98. Fahlborg 1923.

442

c h a p t e r SEveN

battery, while purpose-built warships of that size carried a combination of 24- and 18-pounders.^^' Armed merchantmen had become marginalised as warships, but the custom privileges were regarded as important to promote Swedish shipping. This led to a somewhat heated debate between the Amiralitetskollegium and the Kommerskollegium (Board of Commerce). The new leader of the navy, Hans Wachtmeister, was negative about hiring such ships, and he even demanded that the custom privileges be abolished and the increased custom incomes be used for the navy's shipbuilding program. The privileges remained, partly with the motivation that a mercantile marine made it easier to train seamen for the navy.^'" After the end of the war in 1679, the navy disposed of its two surviving ships of mercantile: Abraham was sold in 1680, and Riga was given to Admiral-general Hans Wachtmeister in 1683. A few of the largest Swedish armed merchantmen were listed in mobilisation plans from 1683-84, but after that they were of no interest for the navy.^" During the Great Northern War, the only major private ships hired were four privateer frigates (1719-20), but they had been designed as warships, not as cargo carriers. An armed merchantman, Prins Fredrik Wilhelm (800 tonnes), captured from Courland, after some hesitation was classified as a ship suitable for the battle-line. It was only armed with 8- and 6-pounders and was mainly used as a transport. Two ships of around 800 tonnes were captured in 1713 and 1714, but one of them, the armed merchantman Bolingbroke, intended as battleship in the Russian navy, was regarded as of no interest for the Swedish navy and was not formally added to it. The other, Le Beau Parterre, a privateer of obscure origin, was used for local defence at Stockholm. It was never given a proper name (it was called Kronskeppet), and after the war, in 1722, it was turned over to the Stockholm merchant Hans Lenman, as partial payment for a contract of building two new battleships and two frigates at his shipyard. The navy's interest in using merchantmen as auxiliary warships was gone. The dift'erence between

The a r m a m e n t plan for the navy in 1675 is printed in Svenska Plottans Historia, I, 504-05. The debate about custom privileges: Gerentz 1951, 130-45. The Danish navy retained some ex-Swedish m e r c h a n t m e n captured in 1676-77 for several years, Engel Gabriel even until 1716. Gustavus and Gripen are listed in a m a n n i n g plan of 1683, and (Kompani-) Solen in a r m a m e n t plans of 1683-84, M 1762, RA.

warships and naval strength Table

5.16

> 1,000 End of 1539 1558 1569 1581 1592 1605 1624 1634 1655 1675 1699 1718

The size structure

501-1,000

of the Swedish

300-500

< 300

443

navy,

1539-1718

Insliore vessels

D

%

D

%

D

%

D

%

1,800 1,200 5,600 5,450 2,400 2,400 2,350 7,300 5,800 19,400 36,000 28,225

28 15 25 27 24 7 11 22 21 54 68 55

2,250 1,600 7,250 8,950 3,450 12,100 7,800 15,150 15,250 11,650 13,650 8,875

35 21 32 44 35 37 36 45 56 33 26 17

1,300 700 6,750 2,850 300 15,000 8,700 8,400 4,700 1,950 1,950 4,250

20 9 30 14 3 46 40 25 17 5 4 8

1,125 1,975 2,500 3,100 1,500 3,050 1,275 2,175 1,550 2,325 1,000 2,510

17 25 11 15 15 9 6 7 6 7 2 5

D

%

_

_

2,300 600

30 2

-

2,250 400 1,600 400 -

-

23 1 7 1 -

300 -

7,650

1 -

15

Total D

%

6,475 7,775 22,700 20,350 9,900 32,950 21,725 33,425 27,300 35,625 52,600 51,510

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Sources: Appendices 1 and 2, D: Displacement in tones. Blockships are included in Inshore vessels in 1718.

naval and mercantile technology had finally, after two centuries of change, become too great to allow useful compromises.

5.6

The structure of Swedish naval power in two centuries

This chapter has been a rather detailed and mainly chronological study of how the navy was maintained and restructured by several changes in naval policy and by shipbuilding programs which implemented this policy. As a conclusion, a bird's-eye perspective on the long-term changes to the navy's structure and a few words about that structure in comparison to other European navies may be of interest.^'^ Table 5:16 shows the structure of the navy, divided into sailing warships of different size and inshore combatant craft in 12 different years. The years are not selected at random. Instead, they are the years which this chapter has shown to be representative for a period of shipbuilding which gave the navy a structure that answered to current naval policy.

For international comparisons: Glete 1993, esp. 161-67, 196-206, 241-44.

444

c h a p t e r SEveN

The relation between the sailing navy and the oared flotilla was repeatedly changed because the latter was never permanent. The galley forces created by Gustav I in the 1540s and 1550s and by Johan III in the 1580s were an important part of the total naval strength, especially when they reached their peaks in the late 1550s and early 1590s, respectively. In comparison, Gustav II Adolf s numerous but small galleys in 1624 were only a minor part of the navy, but they were a major part of the smallest size of warships, those under 100 tonnes. By the end of his reign, Karl XII had created an inshore flotilla of blockships and galleys which was 15 per cent of the total navy, a considerable if belated restructuring achieved in only a few years. In other periods, the oared flotilla was very small or non-existent: the amphibious and inshore role of this flotilla in the first half of the 17th century was partly filled by numerous unarmed transport vessels used in the wars in Russia, Poland, and northern Germany. It was only in the early 18th century that Sweden for a long period attempted to fight a war in shallow waters without a large force of vessels specially built for that purpose. It turned out to be disastrous, because the enemy used such vessels in a large scale. Until the 1660s, sailing warships of 1,000-2,000 tonnes displacement or more were exceptional in Sweden as well as in most other navies. They were intended as flagships and as especially powerful units during battle fleet contests dominated by duels between ships and groups of ships, rather than between battle lines. They were also regarded as difficult to handle in severe gales and in confined waters. Actually, few very large European warships were wrecked in this period, but that may reflect the fact that they were used cautiously. In the 16th century, great ships were nevertheless a considerable part of the total Swedish naval strength, usually around a quarter of its total displacement. These ships were only commissioned for active service in times of major battle fleet wars. After the 1580s, their importance declined until Gustav II Adolf in his last years built several very large ships, of which the smallest, Vasen, still exists. This policy was much criticised after his death, and no new large units were built until the 1650s. Then followed a size revolution, and the bulk of the navy's strength came to be concentrated in large ships. From the operations studied in chapter 3, it is also evident that ships of this size, even the largest units of 2,000 tonnes and more, were used at sea in late autumn, especially in the 1710s. None of them were lost due to heavy weather.

warships and naval strength

445

Tlie development was largely the same in other European navies. Spain built many large ships in the decade after 1588, and the English building efforts in the 1620s and 1630s were concentrated in large ships. In both navies, this policy was reversed after a time, and instead a long series of medium-sized ships was built. The size revolution in European navies, when the battle fleet strength became concentrated in ships of more than 1,000 tonnes, took place in the 1660s and 1670s. Important improvements must have been made by then in European shipbuilding, rigging, and ship-handling, making it possible to use such large ships in seasons and waters with rough weather without causing repeated disasters. The growth of the average size of the European battleships continued until the end of the sailing-ship period and into the age of steel and steam power. With the exception of the 1550s and the early 1590s, when the sailing fleet was rather small, the bulk of the Swedish navy's fighting power until the 1660s was concentrated in ships of 300-1,000 tonnes. Usually three fifths to four fifths of the navy were ships of this size category. During the 16th century, the total displacement of ships larger than 500 tonnes and up to 1,000 tonnes was larger than that of ships of 300-500 tonnes. The shipbuilding policy of Karl IX and the young Gustav II Adolf changed that, and for a few decades, ships of 300500 tonnes became the most important part of the navy. This policy was again reversed, and f r o m the 1620s the navy's core consisted of medium-sized ships, mainly of 600-900 tonnes, which from the 1660s were replaced by the large battleships. After the size revolution, ships of 600-900 tonnes were minor battleships, also intended as heavy cruisers, while ships of 300-500 tonnes were few and only intended as cruisers. During the Great Northern War, a large number of frigates of 300-700 tonnes were built, but as the smallest types of battleship (600-900 tonnes) declined in number, the importance of warships of 300-1,000 tonnes continued to diminish. Why were medium-sized and rather small warships dominant for most of these two centuries, and why was there no lasting growth in size until the 1660s? The picture was largely the same in other major European navies. The battle fleet and the cruiser force were not distinctly separate until the latter half of the 17th century. Ships of 600/700 to 900/1,000 tonnes could carry a number of the heavier types of guns and were primarily intended for fighting important enemy fleets. Ships of 300-400 tonnes (and smaller) were intended as cruisers.

446

c h a p t e r SEveN

while those of 400-600 tonnes were intermediate multi-purpose warships. However, even small ships of around 300 tonnes were usually included in the battle orders of main fleets in the Baltic up to the mid17th century. Most navies had too few ships to be able to specialise too much. Heavy bronze guns were expensive and scarce (see chapter 7), and a limited force of mmoderately sized ships could carry most of or the entire inventory of such guns. In the Swedish navy, a long series of ships of around 600-900 tonnes were built from the late 1550s to the 1580s, together with several even larger ships. They were the bulk of Erik XIV's and Johan Ill's battle fleet, and they were seldom commissioned unless a major enemy fleet was the adversary. The navy also had a large number of ships of 300500 tonnes in this period, but few of them were built for battle (see Appendix 1). Most of them were merchantmen, captured or bought during the Seven Years' War and the Narva blockade (1563-81). They served both in the battle fleet and as cruisers, but they were often sold when not required for active service. From the 1590s, shipbuilding policy was markedly changed. No more very large ships were built, a small number of ships of 800-900 tonnes were built as flagships, and a large number of ships ranging between 300 and 700 tonnes were built and also much used in active service. That service was normally the blockade of enemy ports from spring to a u t u m n and protection of troop transports across the Baltic, and a large number of moderately sized warships were preferable to larger units. They were large enough to overpower armed merchantmen, small enough to sail in early springs and late autumns, numerous enough to be spread out in the Baltic Sea on several missions at the same time, and shallow enough to sail near coasts. It may also have been important that they were cheap enough to be expendable, as many were indeed lost due to severe autumn gales, in operations close to enemy coasts, because of navigational errors in darkness or even to ice if they stayed at sea for too long. Until the mid-1620s, Gustav II Adolf generally followed the same shipbuilding policy, which was natural, because he fought the same type of wars as his father did, only with more success. Wars of conquest across the Baltic were costly in terms of lost ships because the navy was subordinated to the operational requirements of the army and the blockade policy. From the mid-1620s, however, new construction was concentrated in larger ships, most of them of 800-900 tonnes. Together with the

warships and naval strength

447

very large ships of more than 1,000 tonnes, they constituted the bulk of the Swedish battle fleet until the 1660s. It was not a definite change of policy, however, and the number of ships of 800 tonnes and larger tended to decline. New construction in the 1640s and early 1650s was concentrated in ships of 600-700 tonnes. They were an intermediate type, strong enough for battle fleet service—some of these ships vifere intended for the battle line until the 1690s—but small enough to be sent out on several types of secondary missions. In this period, Swedish policy-makers also favoured the use of armed merchantmen of this size as auxiliary warships. In a long-term perspective, we may thus observe that Swedish naval policy during a century, f r o m the 1550s to the 1650s, first favoured rather large ships (1550s to 1580s), after which the interest was concentrated in smaller ships (1590s to mid-1620s). Gustav II Adolf's later years were dominated by the construction of very large and large warships (800-1,700 tonnes), which shaped the structure of the navy for a few decades. After that, naval policy-makers (Axel Oxenstierna, Klas Fleming, and other admirals) favoured somewhat smaller ships. These changes of policy were made in a period when the navy was almost permanently in service for support of continental warfare but when it also had to be formed for possible use as a concentrated battle fleet in wars against Denmark. The first type of war favoured sailing qualities and moderate draught for service close to foreign coasts in adverse weather conditions, while the latter type of war favoured larger ships. Policy-makers could make compromises, however, because the potential battle fleet adversary, Oldenburg Denmark, faced the same problem and also built many ships of moderate size for service as cruisers, shallow-water warships, and battleships. Minor warships, smaller than 300 tonnes, comprised a quantitatively significant part of the Swedish navy in the 16th and early 17th centuries. In peacetime and during the blockade of Narva until 1581, ships of this size dominated the active fleet. They were cheap, they could combine shallow draught and good sailing qualities, and even a small warship was a powerful adversary for most merchantmen. SmaU warships were built in large numbers by Karl IX, who preferred them to galleys for coastal warfare, but after his death they were of marginal importance. The navy continued to acquire a limited number of such ships, especially in wartime, because they were useful for scouting, dispatch-carrying, assistance behind the battle-line, and patrols in

448

c h a p t e r SEveN

regions of secondary importance. Hiey were not of much importance for major combats, however, and in narrow waters they might be overpowered by galleys mounting one or a few large-calibre guns. Tliis chapter has emphasised quantity and structure rather than qualitative development and technological analysis of warship design and construction. In a period of few drawings and little technical information in the sources, such aspects must be studied with indirect methods, mainly from how the ships were armed and used in actual service. The type, size, armament, and operational use of the warships in a navy may provide much evidence of technological constraints and how they gradually were lessened by innovations. The chapter is intended to contribute to a better understanding of how policy, operations, and technology influenced the size and structure of an early modern navy. Further studies may be focused on how experience and demand improved technology and made it possible to build warships with better ability to use the sea for defence and power projection.

CHAPTER SIX

CORDAGE AND CANVAS: FITTING OUT THE NAVY 6.1

Introduction

A ship is not only a hull, built and maintained by shipbuilders. It also requires a mean of propulsion—in the early modern period, sails and oars. The rig—masts, spars, sails, and the standing and running rigging with its many ropes and blocks—was complex and expensive. Any sailing ship must also be safely fixed in its position when it is not moving. Its ground taclde—anchors and their long and thick c a b l e s are important for its safety. A warship also requires many other cables for various purposes.' For an early modern warship to show its identity and communicate with signals, it needed coloured flags and large lights. Navigation required compasses, lode lines (measuring depth), and lead lines (measuring speed). A ship must also be habitable for its crew. To prepare food for many men, the early modern saihng ship needed large kettles of iron or (preferably but more expensive) copper. Finally, such ships needed at least one boat, which for major warships often was rigged and lightly armed. An early modern navy had to keep a large inventory of sails, cordage, cables, anchors, flags, kettles, and a multitude of equipment in readiness in order to be able to fight for control of the sea. Because much of this was exposed to wear and tear and to damage in combat, reserves of finished and semi-finished products and raw material were necessary. Sufilcient or insufficient supply of masts, spars, anchors, sailcloth and h e m p for cordage and cables could determine the outcome of wars. Inventories of ships and of reserves of naval stores reflect naval policy. They show how many ships were ready for service and their anticipated length of period at sea. In the 16th and 17th centuries, which produced few formal reports stating whether or

' In early modern Swedish, anchor cables were called high (modern Swedish tag). The word cabel (modern Swedish kabel) came into use during the 17th century, when it refers to thinner (and usually shorter) cables than the heavy anchor cables. Riggmg, anchor cables, lighter cables, and also sails were often referred to in Swedish as tackling or tackel och tugh.

450

c h a p t e r sEVEN

not a ship was serviceable, inventories are important sources for the navy's material condition. Masts, spars, sails, and rigging were usually tailor-made for individual ships. They were interchangeable between ships, however, and it was the navy's total inventory of sails, cables, rigging, and anchors that mattered—not that of individual ships. Administrative control of the inventory of fittings and equipment, quality control of raw material acquired to make them, and technical skills to make and repair them were important competencies in a navy. On the micro-level, the individual seaman's and sail-maker's ability to repair the rig of a damaged ship could determine if it was operational or not. On the macro-level, the administrators' ability to make use of scarce resources to fit out as many ships as possible at short notice could determine the achievements of the operational fleet. Hiis chapter is focused on how the Swedish state managed this important component of naval power over two centuries. It is, in a sense, the political and strategic history of sails, cables, and rigging, and because there is no similar long-term study of other navies, it is more explorative than comparative. The chapter explores what the inventories and accounts of the Swedish navy tell us about its readiness for operation, and it intends to show that the number of hulls was not the only factor which determined material naval strength. Special emphasis is given to the period 1570-1615, during which naval fittings cast new light on both Swedish foreign and naval policy. The period of contractual management of naval fittings (1615-28) is also of considerable interest. New technology was introduced in this period, and a comparison with the earlier period illustrates the differences in managerial style between the regimes of Karl IX and Gustav II Adolf. The subject is large, and the chapter is limited in scope. More information about h e m p and sailcloth until 1620 can be found by studying the kings' trading activities {Varuhus, Handling). For the next century, naval requests for funds in the financial administration {Kammarkollegiet; from 1680, Statskontoret) may reveal more about political and financial decision-making about the navy's inventories.^

^ The royal administration of trade has left 108 volumes of accounts f r o m 1538 to 1621; V a r u h u s och handling, RA. There is also m u c h about trade in the king's letters: Riksregistraturet. Odin 1966 has studied royal trade in 1560-95, but naval stores are seldom mentioned. Hammarstrom 1956 has information about naval stores in 1521-40.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

451

This chapter is not an economic and technical history of how the state bought and manufactured fittings for the navy, or the quality of different types of sailcloth. The history of naval stores has also much to say about the relations between state, local taxpayers, international merchants, and entrepreneurs in manufacturing. It is, however, too early to write a synthesis of largely non-existing research.^ Hemp and flax from Eastern Europe was important for the production of cables, rigging, and sailcloth in Western Europe, at least from the 16th century. Tlie literature about the European naval acquisitions of hemp, cables, and sailcloth before the mid-17th century is very limited, however. Martha Morris has studied the English navy's acquisition of sailcloth and cordage f r o m the mid-16th to the early 17th century. This navy made a radical change f r o m imported to domestic sailcloth in the 1580s, and it bought cordage—to a considerable extent imported—from private merchants until the 1610s, when entrepreneurs began to produce cordage at the navy's yard, an enterprise taken over by the crown in 1618. Much more is known about 18th-century conditions in several European navies, but they are less relevant for comparisons with this chapter. No attempt of systematic comparison will be made."*

' Brief studies of Swedish sail production: Gertrud Greiiander Nyberg, Segelduksvavning pa 1600-talet, Stockliolm, 1960; Yngve Rollof, "Segelduk och segeldukstillverkning i Sverige", Fran Gastrikland 1981, Giivle, 1982, 84-103. Cable-making: Yngve Rollof, "Tagvirke och repslagarbanor", Aktuellt, Karlskrona, 1994, 167-80. Vasen's sails and rig: Sam Svensson, "Wasas segel och nagot o m aldre segelmakeri", Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1963-1964 (1965), 39-82; Eva-Marie Stolt, "Ron o m Vasa rigg", Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1994-1995 (1994), 35-50; a n d Katarina Schoerner (ed.), Det seglande skeppet: Uppsatser kring en utstallning, Stockholm, 1997. Rope-making a n d sailmaking in Stockholm 1605-40: Cederlund 1966.1 have benefited f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i o n with Dr Klas Nyberg, Uppsala University, about Swedish textile history. Martha Morris, "The Rise of the English Sailcloth Industry, 1565-1643: Coastal trade records as an indicator of i m p o r t substitution", M M , 84, 1998, 139-51; Martha Morris, "Naval Cordage P r o c u r e m e n t in Early M o d e r n England", International Journal of Maritime History, 11, 1999, 81-99. Purchase of naval stores to the British navy: Bernard Pool, Naval Board Contracts, 1660-1832: Contract administration under the Navy Board, London, 1966, esp. 28-33, 65-73. Studies of fittings in the British navy: James Lees, The Masting and Rigging of English Ships of War, 1625-1860, London, 1979 (2nd ed. 1990); Brian Lavery, The Arming and Pitting of English Ships of War, 1600-1815, London, 1987. The French navy: Rene M e m a i n , Le materiel de la Marine de guerre sous Louis XIV: Rochefort, arsenal modele de Colbert, Paris, 1937, 733-82; Sylviane Llinares, Marine propulsion et technique: L'evolution du systeme technologique du navires de guerre au XVIIP siecle, Paris, 1994, 2 vols; Spanish acquisitions of naval stores in the 18th century: Jose P. M e r i n o Navarro, La Armada Espanola en el siglo XVIII, Madrid, 1981, 267-303.

452

CHAPTER SEVEN

In this chapter, the Swedish weight measurement skeppund (in this case 170 kilograms) is used for h e m p and cables and rigging made of hemp. It was divided into 20 lispund (8.5 kilograms). The length of sailcloth is measured in ulnar (594 m m ) . The circumferences of anchor cables are measured in Swedish turn (24.75 mm). One aln was two feet, and one foot (297 m m ) was 12 turn. There were small variations in these measurements until an official standard aln was introduced in 1604.

6.2

Hemp and sailcloth

This chapter focuses on anchor cables, sails, and rigging and the two products which the navy had to acquire to produce them: h e m p and sailcloth. They were costly and, to a large extent, imported. Masts and spars were administratively and technically parts of the ship-builders' responsibility, and their costs were often hidden in the cost of shipbuilding and repair. Few 16th- and 17th-century sources exist about how m a n y masts and spars the navy had. This reflects the fact that timber for masts and spars were easily available in Sweden. The navy did not need a policy of how it should be acquired or kept in store. Anchors do not appear to have been m u c h of a problem. They were made domestically f r o m Swedish iron and had a long life, although they were frequently lost at sea. The navy produced its own anchors, 'but in the 17th century, privately owned ironworks also produced a considerable number of anchors. Coloured cloth to make flags was expensive and an important item in the accounts and inventories. It was often bought together with sailcloth and was normally imported. Hemp, the raw material for ropes and cables, was imported f r o m Eastern Europe, particularly Russia. It was also grown in Sweden, but domestic production was small in relation to the navy's great demand. East European h e m p was also especially suited for making strong cables and rigging, compared to h e m p produced in Sweden and other parts of Europe. Its dominating position on the European market for naval stores over the centuries is difficult to explain otherwise. Geography made Swedish access to the Russian and Polish markets easy, and in the 17th century, m u c h of the h e m p export between Eastern and Western Europe passed through Swedish-controlled ports. This trade flowed even when Sweden was at war with Russia and Poland. The navy normally manufactured cordage and cables f r o m imported h e m p

CORDAGE A N D CANVAS: FITTING OUT THE NAVY

453

at its own ropewalk at the main naval yard, first at Stockholm and f r o m 1691 at Karlskrona. Private ropewalks were sometimes used to increase capacity, and both semi-finished product (yarn) and cables were occasionally imported. The policy, however, was that the navy should produce its own yarn and cables. Sails were made by the navy's own sail-makers at the shipyards. Their skills were important, but the quality of the sails was, to a large extent, dependent on the sailcloth f r o m which they were made. For the Swedish navy, sailcloth was—together with cast-iron guns—the most important product not produced under state administration. Sailcloth had long been made in Sweden, although not in great quantities. The establishment of a navy must have markedly increased Swedish demand for sailcloth, and its import became important, especially in the 17th century. It was the navy's need for large, strong, high-quality sails which determined this choice, because Swedish textile manufacture during these two centuries was inferior to Europe's best. The following brief survey of sailcloth is made with help of accounts, inventories, and other sources used in this chapter. In the 16th century, the navy used m u c h domestically produced woollen sailcloth, vadmal, and domestic sailcloth made of flax, Idrft. Vadmal was a traditional Nordic textile, made of the coarse-fibred wool f r o m Nordic sheep. Ldrft was often called hdlsingeldrft after the flax-producing province of Halsingland in northern Sweden. Ldrft was also produced in other parts of Sweden and Finland and imported f r o m Russia. Vadmal and ldrft were produced in the peasant strata of society and were often raised by the state through taxation or bought by the king's bailiffs on local markets. From the 1520s to at least the 1560s, sailcloth was also imported f r o m Germany, Prussia (Danzig), and Holland. The quality difference between imported and domestic sailcloth is seldom possible to study in naval accounts. The accounts rarely give prices and say little about how different types of cloth were used.^

' An exception is an estimate f r o m 1574, w h e n (probably) i m p o r t e d sailcloth {buldagel) was calculated to cost 7.5 ore per aln (14 daler of 32 ore for 60 ulnar), vadmal 5 ore per aln a n d ldrft 2.5 ore per aln. Vadmal was for m a i n a n d fore sails a n d ldrft for topsails a n d the mizzen sail, while the use for buldagel is n o t stated. F r o m the quantities in the estimate—933 ulnar buldagel, 1,923 alnur vadmal a n d 5,016 alnur ldrft—it seems as if the m a i n a n d fore sails were m a d e of a m i x t u r e of buldagel a n d woollen sailcloth, A R 1574/13, KrA.

454

CHAPTER SEVEN

Import of sailcloth is seldom mentioned f r o m the 1560s to the 1590s. It then rapidly grew in importance and, f r o m the late 1610s, the bulk of the navy's sailcloth was imported f r o m Holland and Germany. Liibeck cloth seems to have dominated for topsails f r o m the 1620s to the 1680s. Import f r o m Holland, at least the 1610s and 1620s, may have been partly re-export of French sailcloth, although it is uncertain whether French buldan or canifas (canvas) were trademarks for certain types of Dutch sailcloth or whether it actually was made in France. In the latter half of the 17th century, Holland cloth totally dominated for the lower sails: main sail, fore sail, and mizzen sail. Woollen vadmal disappeared after around 1600, although cheap domestic hdlsingeduk continued to be used throughout the 17th century, mainly for smaller sails (topgallant sails and sails on small craft and boats). The timing of this change may have more than one explanation. It is possible that the quality of foreign sailcloth had markedly improved in the late 16th century and that the import was a response to this. The beginning of the long wars against Poland in 1600, however, also caused much more wear and tear on sails and rigs, because many warships had to stay at sea during the autumn gales in order to blockade ports and protect army lines of communication. Earlier operations of this type in the Gulf of Finland took place in more sheltered waters and with small vessels. As a result, the navy searched for the best sailcloth available on the European market and paid little attention to domestic production. Early Swedish industriahsation was dominated by iron and weapon production, and high quality textiles became the most important import goods. There were attempts to start domestic production of sailcloth (buldan) of higher qualities at Stockholm, first at the city's orphan house (from 1637) and f r o m 1665 at the navy yard. These initiatives had no lasting success and were eventually abandoned. However, f r o m 1678 sailcloth production was started near Norrkoping by the Dutch-born entrepreneur Johan Pieter Hellweg (Hellwigh). He imported raw material and sold mainly to the navy. Hellweg's weavers were able to make sailcloth that satisfied naval quality demands.® From the late 17th century, Norrkoping cloth (norrkopingdsuk) was predominant on smaller battleships, cruisers, and transports. Holland cloth remained dominant on larger Swedish battleships and must have

Grenander

1971, 90-97.

Nyberg 1960, 6; Bjorn Helmfrid, Norrkopings

historia, III, Norrkoping,

CORDAGE A N D CANVAS: FITTING OUT THE NAVY

455

been regarded as somewhat better. Interestingly, the development in the Danish navy was very similar. Import of sail-cloth dominated in the 17th century until it was replaced by domestic production f r o m the 1680s.^ Anchor cables were one of the most expensive fittings on a sailing warship. They required m u c h h e m p because they were both long and thick. Sixteenth- and 17th-century anchor cables for larger Swedish warships were of 100-140 fathoms (600 to 840 feet); small ships had shorter cables. The weight of the anchors for individual ships is seldom on record before the mid-17th century, but it must have been roughly proportional to the displacement of the ship if it was to be effective.® Anchor cables must have a thickness proportional to the weight of the anchor and, indirectly, to the size of the ship.' Because the size of the expensive cables was of economic importance, it was normally recorded in accounts and inventories. This makes the circumference of the thickest cable a useful indicator of the ship's displacement, sometimes the only evidence that has survived. Comparisons with other indicators of ship size show that Swedish anchor cables became markedly thinner during the late 16th century, probably a result of improved production methods. For example, anchor cables of 14 to 16 turn circumferences were, in the 1560s, the largest for ships between 400 to 600 tonnes, but around 1600, they were normal for ships of around 700 to 900 tonnes. There is little information about cables f r o m the 1620s to the 1660s. Lists of anchor cables for warships f r o m the 1670s and later show little change compared to the early 17th century. The largest ships (2,000 tonnes and more) never had thicker cables than 22 turn, perhaps because such cables were too difficult to handle. Instead they had more than one cable of the largest size.'"

' E r i k G 6 b e l , " S e j l d u g s m a n u f a k t u r e t i K 6 g e , 1687-1735", Maritimkontakt, 12,1988, 59-83. ' Anchors a n d cables in the British navy: Lavery 1987, 30-36, 44-45. ' A n c h o r weights for individual ships (1578) in SH 34:6 a n d S M H F 4:8, RA. A n undated (late 1570s) list in SH 34:6 shows the correspondence between weight of anchors in skeppund (for iron 136 kilograms) a n d the thickness of the cable in turn (24.75 m m ) . A n anchor of o n e skeppund required a cable of five turn; an anchor of 15 skeppund required a cable of 21 turn. The latter was the thickest cable in Swedish navy in the 1570s, used o n the navy's largest ship, Rode Draken (1566). In a d o c u m e n t about fittings for 18 ships (c.1624/5) considerably t h i n n e r cables are listed: SH 70:6, RA. Finds f r o m Vasen (1628) d o n o t c o n f i r m that they were used: personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n , Dr. Fred Hocker, Vasamuseet.

456

CHAPTER SEVEN

Some 16th- and 17th-century sources reveal that practical seamen and administrators had a good grasp of how m u c h sailcloth and hemp were required for cables and rigging a ship of a certain size and how m u c h it would cost. Unfortunately, they seldom put that knowledge on paper that has been preserved in the archives. Much of it belonged to the world of tacit knowledge and rules-of-thumb, which only gradually became formalised in the naval bureaucracy." Because the size and weight of sails, rigs, and cables of ships fitted out around the same time and in the same technical tradition were roughly proportional to the size of the ship, it is important to use the few examples which are available. It must be remembered that figures of displacement are approximate estimates made by the author with several indicators—in the latter half of the 17th century mainly dimensions, and then 18thcentury calculations of displacements for ships built around 1700. In 1574, a ship {Kdmpen) of around 300 Idster or around 900 tonnes displacement was estimated to require 72 skeppund of h e m p for all its cables (4 heavy anchor cables and 5 lighter cables) and 31 skeppund for its rigging. The total of 103 skeppund is around 17.5 tonnes or about 2 per cent of the displacement of the ship.'^ Thus the figure of 2 per cent of the displacement may be used to calculate the ideal requirement of h e m p for the 16th-century navy, although ships often had somewhat thinner and shorter anchor cables than those listed for Kdmpen. Because cables became markedly thinner and lighter by the end of the century a lower figure, 1.75 per cent may be more realistic for the period f r o m the 1590s until the mid-17th century. From sometime in the mid-17th century, the navy increased the (ideal) number of anchor cables on each ship, which markedly increased h e m p requirement. In 1680 a ship of the new mediumsized standard type of 1,400 tonnes was, in round figures, estimated to require 136 skeppund h e m p for six anchor cables and seven lighter cables and 80 skeppund for its rigging.'^ This figure of 216 skeppund is 36.7 tonnes or 2.62 per cent of the displacement. In 1686, a new

" The weight of cables a n d different parts of the rig for a ship of the size of Karnpen in AR 1574/13, KrA; weight of anchors for several ships a n d weight of cables of different sizes in SH 34:6, RA (a m e m o r a n d u m written in connection with the extra tax of h e m p raised in 1578); weights of anchors a n d sizes of cables for ships of different sizes, early 1590s in S M H F 5:20 a n d SH 51:6, RA; weight of rigging for s o m e ships in SST, II, 1596-1599, 27-28, 19/4 1596 ( f o u n d by M A H a k a n Jakobsson). AR 1574/13, KrA. " AK, Varvskontoret, DII, vol. 1, KrA.

CORDAGE A N D CANVAS: FITTING OUT THE NAVY

457

ship of the same size was estimated to require 72 skeppund h e m p for its rigging, 10 per cent less than in 1680. If the weight of the cables is assumed to be the same as in 1680, the total weight is 208 skeppund or 2.53 per cent of the displacement." In 1684, a ship of the smallest type then being built (around 900 tonnes) was estimated to require 120 skeppund (20.4 tonnes) or 2.26 per cent of the displacement.'" In 1689/90, a ship of 1,550/1,600 tonnes was, after detailed calculations, estimated to require 138 skeppund for its cables and 84 skeppund 17 lispund for its rig, a total weight of around 38 tonnes.'® This is around 2.4 per cent of the ship's displacement. For rough calculations of h e m p requirements f r o m the mid-17th century, a figure of 2.5 per cent of the displacement is realistic. These figures also give an idea of the total amount of h e m p the navy required if it should have its full outfit of cables and rigging. Gustav I's navy, usually of around 6,000 to 7,000 tonnes, required around 120 to 150 tonnes (around 700 to 900 skeppund) of hemp. The m u c h larger navy after 1560, around 15,000 to 20,000 tonnes, required 300 and 400 tonnes (1,800 to 2,400 skeppund). In the first half of the 17th century, a navy of between 20,000 to 30,000 tonnes required 350 to 500 tonnes (2,000 to 3,000 skeppund). In the latter half of the 17th century, a Swedish navy of between 25,000 to 60,000 tonnes required 625 to 1,500 tonnes (3,700 to 9,000 skeppund) of hemp. Sail requirements are only fragmentarily known for the 16th century. Reliable information is available primarily f r o m the latter half of the 17th century, when dimensions of most sails are known. One problem is that sailcloth usually was measured as its length in ulnar without any specification of its width. That was apparently normally 21/2 feet (1-1/4 aln) in the 17th century, and at least some sources indicate that it may have been the same in the 16th century.'^ There is evidence, however, that narrower sailcloth also was used, and it is far f r o m certain if the same width was used for domestically produced sailcloth and for sailcloth bought on the international market.'" Sailcloth was

' ' NNS, II, 177:1, KrA. '' Pdrslag pd K Majt orlogsflottas equipering... 1684, M 1762, RA. AK, Varvskontoret, DII, vol. 1, KrA. " Svensson 1938, 293. Vasen, rigged in 1627/8 h a d sails m a d e of sailcloth with a width of 70 c m (slightly less t h a n 21/2 foot) a n d 90 cm, Sven Benetsson in Schoerner 1997, 35-36. " In an estimate f r o m 1574 of h o w a ship of Kdmpen's size ( a r o u n d 900 tonnes) should be fitted out, 7,872 alnar of sailcloth are listed, predominantly larji and vadmal.

458

CHAPTER SEVEN

also measured in pieces (rullar), but the length in ulnar of each piece is only rarely stated. W h e n stated, it varied between 40 to 60 ulnar, and no typical length has been found. In 1680, a ship of 1,400 tonnes was estimated to require 3,450 ulnar of sailcloth for one set of sail: ten for the ship and two for its boats. This does not include sailcloth for spare sails. In 1689/90, a ship of 1,550/1,600 tonnes was estimated to require 5,870 ulnar for all its sail (excluding boat sails), including spares of 2,474 ulnur for the five largest sails." For approximate calculations, it may be assumed that a 16th- and early 17th-century warship required 2 to 21/2 ulnur of sailcloth (width 1-1/4 uln) per tonnes without spare sails. For a navy of 20,000 tonnes, that meant 40,000 to 50,000 ulnur. W e are on safer ground if we assume that warships in the latter half of the 17th century and the early 18th century required around 4 ulnur of sailcloth per tonnes, if they should have spares for the five main sails. For a 50,000tonne navy, it meant 200,000 ulnur of sailcloth. Products made of h e m p and sailcloth were important parts of naval expenditures. Textile products normally had shorter lives than wooden hulls, and serviceable hulls might be immobile due to lack of sails, rigging, and cables. The relation between cost to build and maintain ships and cost to outfit them are rather easy to measure in the 1620s, when shipbuilding and ship-repair as well as the supply of fittings {tuckel och tug) were put on contract. From 1621 to 1625, the contract to maintain all existing warships and to build ships at Stockholm cost the state 60,000 duler yearly. For the period 1626 to 1629 (actually to 1628), it rose to 66,160 duler?" Most warships in these years were built on contract with entrepreneurs at Vastervik. From 1618 to 1627, they received 101,000 duler for various contracts, on average 10,000 duler every year.^' More had to be paid to the entrepreneurs in Stockholm

AR 1574/13, KrA. This m a y indicate a width of perhaps one foot (Vi aln), maybe used in Swedish peasant p r o d u c t i o n of sailcloth, which primarily was for small craft. " AK, Varvskontoret, DII, vol. 1, KrA. Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 94-96, contract with Anthonie M o n i e r 12/9 1620; vol. 2, fols 112-14, contract with H e n r i k Hybertsson a n d Arent de Groot 10/1 1625, RA. The purchase of nine warships a n d their e q u i p m e n t in Holland 1624 is n o t included in these figures. " Kammarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter, 92-93:9, RA.

CORDAGE A N D CANVAS: FITTING OUT THE NAVY

459

for various additions in the contract, but the total sum for building and repair of warships was around 70,000 to 80,000 daler every year.^^ In the same period, cables, sails, rigging, and flags were supplied under contract with Rickard Clerck, f r o m 1625 with Johan (Hans) Clerck. From 1619, the yearly maintenance cost 2 daler per last in contemporary measurement, or approximately 2/3 daler per tonne of displacement." In the 1620s, the navy's total displacement was rather constant, around 18,000 tonnes. This meant 12,000 daler to maintain its fittings, with an additional 1,000 daler for wages to sail-makers and rope-makers. According to several contracts, the cost of providing new ships with their first outfits of cables, sails, rigging, and flags in the 1620s was 5 to 6 daler per tonne of displacement.^^ The average yearly production of warships in 1619-28 was around 1,500 tonnes, which meant a cost for new cables, cordage, and sails of 7,500 to 9,000 daler per year. The total yearly cost for providing the ships with their full outfits would be 20,500 to 22,000 daler. This is slightly more than one quarter of the cost of building and maintaining the hulls in the same period. If a ship could be provided with a new outfit for 5 to 6 daler per tonne and the outfit could be maintained for 2/3 daler per tonne per year, the fittings had an average lifespan of T h to 9 years. These

^^ Additional contracts with A n t h o n i e M o n i e r a n d H e n r i k Hybertsson in Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fol. 152 (25/2 1622), RA; for 1623, AR 1623/9, KrA; final account for 1626-28, M 1793, RA. Contracts with Rickard Clerck, RR 23/10, 5/11 1618, RA; Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fol. 174, 5/12 1622, RA. Contract with Johan (Hans) Clerck, RR 12/8 1626, RA. O n e last in these contracts (see that with Johan Clerck a n d two lists in SH 70:8, RA) is roughly equal to three tonnes displacement. This relation is verified by Vasen of 1627, 400 luster in the contract of 1626 a n d a r o u n d 1,250 t o n n e s as measured after being raised in 1961. The correspondence is even closer, because 400 laster m u s t have been calculated on the original design (bestick) of the ship, which was a r o u n d 42 c m (1 fot 5 turn) narrower t h a n t h e ship as built. ^^ Contract of 9,400 daler for fitting out Vasen a n d Scepter, total displacement 1,700 tonnes (5,5 daler/tonnes), RR 29/9 1616; contract of 16,400 daler for fitting out Applet, Andromeda, Harboviks Lejon, Vasterviks Pinass (Vastervik), Vasterviks Bojort, and sbc galleys, total size a r o u n d 3,200 t o n n e s (c.5,1 daler/tonnes), Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 50-51, 16/2 1621; contract of 20,000 daler for fitting out Apollo, Maria, Hector, Caesar, Achilles, a n d eight galleys, total size a r o u n d 3,300 tonnes (c.6 daler/tonnes), Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fol. 176, 6/12 1622; cost of fitting out Gustavus (1623/4, 800 tonnes), 4,052 daler 8 ore (c.5 daler/tonnes), SH 70:6; cost of fitting out App/et (1,300 tonnes, 1621): 6,500 daler, of Vasen (1,250 tonnes, 1627), 6,000 daler (c.5 daler/tonnes), Kammarkollegiet, Likvidationsakter, 92-93:9, Paridon van H o r n , RA. 6,000 daler is what the navy offered to pay for Vasen, while the entrepreneurs asked for 6,500 daler in a complicated transaction which involved Paridon van H o r n a n d Christian Wilshuisen.

460

CHAPTER SEVEN

are only rough estimates, but the costs recorded in accounts f r o m the 1620s correspond fairly well with them.^'

6.3

Inventories

Ideally, the readiness of a ship or a fleet should be analysed by comparing a list of how the navy intended that it should be fitted with sails, rigging, cables, anchors, etc., to an inventory of what it actually had. Before 1615, when the contracts with entrepreneurs began to formalise how warships should be fitted, there are no preserved rules for how Swedish ships were to fitted with rigs, cables, and sails. Detailed inventories and even printed forms of inventory lists appear only at the end of the 17th century. Fortunately, the m a n y inventories f r o m the 16thcentury naval administration make it possible to see h o w warships were supposed to be fitted out when they were sent to sea. The number of sails, anchors, and cables on record for a ship when it is known to have been equipped for war service can be used as the "normal" fittings of that ship. Its inventory f r o m other years can be compared to that norm. It is impossible in a brief study to give details of all parts of the complicated rigging which are recorded in the inventories. It is, however, rather easy to count the number of anchors (their weights are seldom on record), the number of sails, and the n u m b e r and size (circumference and length) of the anchor cables. ^ The fittings and the equipment were connected with the administration of individual ships already in the earliest accounts f r o m the 1520s. Sails, rigs, anchors, cables, compasses, along with the kettles and other cooking utensils, were listed in each ship's inventory, frequently with notes about their condition (new, good, used, old, damaged, unusable). The master of a ship was responsible for them, even when the ship was laid up at a yard. W h e n a ship was discarded, serviceable fittings were turned over by the master to the yard administration, which distributed them to other ships. Parts of the inventories were also transferred between ships every year, apparently in order to keep some of them in a higher degree of readiness. The yard also kept a strategic reserve of hemp, sailcloth, and various equipment. The inventories of ships and yards are good indicators of the navy's readiness for operations and

Kammarkollegiet, Rikshuvudbocker, RA.

CORDAGE A N D CANVAS: FITTING OUT THE NAVY

461

show which ships the administrators gave priority to when they had to distribute scarce resources. Major Swedish warships in these two centuries were normally rigged with three masts. Even small 16th-century ships had three masts, frequently with no topsails (mdrssegel) on any of them or only on the mainmast. The exceptions were boyers, which had two masts and a different rig of probably Dutch origin, which combined square sails with fore and aft sails. That type of rig became c o m m o n for small vessels (boyers and galliots) in the 17th century. Four-mast warships, with two small mizzen masts aft, were built in Sweden in the 1590s and the early 1600s. Like in other navies, that type of rig was abandoned in the early 17th century.^® Swedish galleys built in the 1540s and 1550s usually had three masts, while those built in the 1580s had two or three masts. Early galleys were apparently rigged with Medfterranean-style triangular sails, but they were soon replaced by conventional North European square sails on the main- and foremasts. Inventories f r o m the 1520s to the late 1550s show that most Swedish ships only had topmasts (marsmast) on their mainmast and foremast. Only the largest ships also had a topmast on the mizzen mast. Most ships had six sails: storskdnval (mainsail), fockskdnval (foresail), stormarssegel (main topsail), fockmdrssegel (foretopsail), mesan (mizzen sail), and a blinda (spritsail) under the bowsprit. The few ships with a mizzen topmast also had mesanmdrssegel. A topgallant mast (called bvermdrs in 16th-century Swedish) with a third sail {dvermdrssegel; topgallant sail) on the mainmast and foremast was introduced on St Erik, built and rigged at Duke Erik's (XIV) shipyard at Bjorkenas (Kalmar) 1559-60.^^ This rig became c o m m o n in the 1560s, when it was fitted on most major ships, although some of them lacked fore topgallant masts. Medium-sized and even small ships also had a mizzen topmast in the inventory for 1566. Several captured Danish and Lubeckian ships had topgallant masts in the inventory for 1566. The

The Danish ship Hercules (800 tonnes), taken in 1563, h a d two mizzen masts when captured but only one by 1570, probably after being re-rigged in Sweden, SH A tonnes), launched 1577/8 h a d f o u r masts until sold in 1590. Draken (1594/5, 700 tonnes) was originally rigged with one large a n d one small mizzen mast, SH 52:11, RA. In the inventory of 1603, Vasen (1598, 900 tonnes) a n d Applet (1601, 800 tonnes) h a d two mizzen masts, while Draken, Pelikanen (1594/5 700 tonnes), a n d Angeln (1593/4, 700 tonnes) h a d o n e "large" mizzen mast, probably because they earlier also h a d h a d one "small" mizzen mast, SH 54:5, RA " SH 5:6, 6:3, RA. > . .

462

c h a p t e r sEVEN

original rig for most of them is not recorded. It is known that a large captured ship, the Danish four-master Hercules (800 tonnes), had no topgallant masts when captured in 1563 but two such masts and two mizzen topmasts in 1566. It seems as if the Swedish navy regarded topgallant masts as standard on larger ships and added them to captured ships. Tliis change was an episode, however. From 1570 to the 1610s, no new ships were rigged with topgallant masts, although a few ships in active service had them for brief periods, perhaps on the initiative of their captains. Even the mizzen topmast, which some large ships had already in the mid-16th century, disappeared. The topgallant masts came back with some of the Dutch prizes taken in 1608-09, significantly with the Dutch-inspired names brammast and bramsegel, which since then have been the Swedish words for this part of the rig. In the 1610s and 1620s, a total change took place. All large and mediumsized ships now had topgallant masts on the main- and topmasts. A mizzen topmast with a sail (now called kryssegel) was added on the larger ships in the 1620s and was normal on three-mast ships (except the smallest) by the mid-17th century. A small mast with a small square-sail (the sprit topsail, in Swedish bovenblinda) was added to the bowsprit, apparently starting with large ships in the 1620s. By the 1650s (probably earher), a sprit topsail was standard on three-mast Swedish warships.^^ These changes in the 1610s and 1620s were part of the rising Dutch influence on Swedish naval technology; warships in these years were rigged according to the Dutch naval standard. The episode in the 1560s is different. The first ship with topgallant masts was built by Erik when he was a duke, and he may have tested new ideas on it. The rapid spread of topgallant masts in the 1560s and their sudden disappearance after the end of Erik XIV's reign in 1568 make it probable that they were one of his personal initiatives in naval technology. They can hardly have been failures—they were not removed on the ships which had them—but they apparently did not convince practical seamen and

SH 9:6, 15:2, RA. SH 62: 5, 63:2, 70:6, RA. In an undated m e m o r a n d u m f r o m 1624/5, the largest ships were listed with four or three bramsegel, which m u s t include kryssegel or bovenblinda or both, SH 70:6, RA. Vosen, rigged in 1627/8, had a sprit topsail: Sven Bengtsson in Schoerner 1997, 39. The spritsail in the 17th-century Swedish navy was variously called blinda, storblinda (great blinda), and vattublinda (water blinda).

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

463

cost-conscious administrators that they were necessary. Maybe they were seldom used in practice. Until at least the 1620s, Swedish warships had no spare sails. None are listed in the inventories until 1611; the contracts about rigging from 1615-28 do not mention spare sails; and none were found on Vasen, rigged in 1627/8.^" The first sign of a changed policy is an instruction from February 1647 in which a ship on a long voyage (meaning apparently outside the Baltic) should have two foresails, two main topsails, and two fore topsails, that is, three spare sails.'' In 1649, "double sails" are mentioned on some ships, and in a tabulated inventory of sails from 1656, it is obvious that the ships are intended to have two main and fore sails, two main and fore topsails, and two mizzen sails; that is, one spare sail for each of the five largest and most important sails. In a summary of inventories for cables and sails from 1664, this is an established practice. No spares were required for topgallant sails, the mizzen topsail, the spritsail, and the sprit topsail. Sometime in the 1670s, the ambition to have a spare mainsail was abandoned, but it reappeared in 1687 and became standard. After 1700, even more spare sails were introduced. The ambition was now to have spares for every sail, although that was not fully achieved before 1721. From the 1680s, the rig plan underwent further changes. At least from the 167Gs, stay-sails (sails fitted on the stays between the masts) began to appear in the inventories, first on small cruising warships. They were gradually also fitted on larger ships, and in the early 18th century, all ships had several stay-sails fitted on the stays between bowsprit and foremast and on the stays forward of the mainmast. Swedish sail plans also underwent a somewhat surprising change in the late 17th century, when the main and fore topgallant masts and their sails disappeared from practically all ships, only to be reintroduced as standard early in the 18th century. By 1720, all three-mast ships, except the largest (three-deckers) and the smallest cruisers, had them. W h y they were deleted f r o m the inventories in a period when the navy could afford to spend lavishly on its rigging is not known. It shows that topgallant

Vasen had six sails u n d e r deck when it sank. It has been f o u n d that they were the sails which was not in use when the ship sank: Sven Bengtsson in Schoerner 1997, 39. " AK registratur 9/3 1647, KrA, for the captain of Jdgaren, a ship about to be sold to France. The detailed inventory is listed in Zettersten 1903, 309, although erroneously dated to 9/2 1647.

464

c h a p t e r sEVEN

sails had not proven important in practice, while stay-sails were seen as useful. In the early 18th century, the sprit topsail and its little mast disappeared. The new stay-sails probably made them unnecessary for manoeuvrability, which had been the main purpose of setting a square sail as far forward as possible. Already in the early 16th century, most major warships had four anchors and four anchor cables.'^ Smaller ships had three anchors and the smallest ships had two. Galleys normally had two anchors, and small craft often had only one anchor. This remained unchanged until at least the 1620s. In 1647, a ship of a size which earher would have had three anchors and three anchor cables was provided with four anchors and five cables." In 1664, a markedly increased outfit of anchor cables is listed in a summary of what the ships had and what they ought to have. The largest ships (over 1,000 tonnes) should have six cables; other major warships five or four; and the smallest ships and minor vessels three cables. Four heavy anchors were regarded as sufficient for large ships in the latter half of the 17th century, but they should now have five or six heavy anchor cables. The simultaneous increase in the number of anchor cables and the introduction of spare sails must be part of the same policy. Its aim must have been to keep ships operational during longer periods at a distance from their base. Spares for the three, four, or five largest sails gave increased safety and mobility. A lost or damaged sail could be replaced at sea, and sails could continuously be taken down to deck and repaired if there were spares. Similarly, more anchors and cables increased safety and made the fleet less dependent on its base. The new policy seems to be the result of experience of extended operations in the southern Baltic, far from the Stocldrolm yard. These experiences were gained in the 1620s and 1630s, when naval squadrons were deployed to the German coast f r o m spring to autumn. If that was not enough, the war with Denmark in 1643-45, especially battle damages in 1644 and damage to rigs during the intense summer gales in 1645, must have provided lessons. Spare parts were now regarded

An exception is the great ship Store Kravelen (1528/30, 1,800 tonnes), which had seven anchors in 1531, Fogdarnas rakenskaper 1529-1533, f o l 799, RA; six in 1544, SH 1:5, RA; but only four in 1552, SMHF 1:10, RA. AK registratur 9/3 1647, KrA. ^^ M 1762, RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

465

to be worth their cost. It was an expensive policy, however, and it colHded with other urgent requirements. Hie sources for this chapter's survey of Swedish sail, cordage, and cable policy are primarily inventories of ships and accounts from naval yards. Accounts must have been prepared every year, but far from all are preserved. For the Stocldiolm yards, accounts are preserved for 1526-31, 1541, 1543-47, and for most years from 1555 to the 1610s.'® In the following century, increasingly detailed and voluminous accounts have survived, but only from 18 years.'® The many 16th-century accounts are less detailed, but they show how much raw material, semi-finished products, and fittings the yard had in store at the beginning and end of the year, how much material the yard received during the year, how it was used to produce cables, sails, etc., and which fittings were distributed to each ship. It is possible, especially for the 16th century, that reserves of h e m p and sailcloth also existed at minor shipyards and within the king's trading organisation. The Stocldiolm shipyard accounts only show a m i n i m u m level of what was available. It is not likely that detailed inventories of every ship were prepared every year. More or less complete inventories exist from 1526, 1531, 1544 and 1552, 1556 to 1558, 1566 (updated in 1567), and 1568. The naval accounts are well preserved f r o m 1526-31, the 1540s, and after 1554, so it is unlikely that many inventories have been lost. Staring in 1573, an inventory of the entire navy was prepared every year (Skeppsrullan), which probably reflects a more ambitious administration connected with the new office of deputy admiral {underamiral). In the early 1590s, these centrally prepared inventories become thinner, as several warships were in Finland, under the control of the overamiral Klas Fleming but beyond the central administration controlled by Duke Karl. The inventories (and their absence) are visible evidence of

Shipyard accounts for 1526^31, Fogdarnas rakenskaper 1529-1533, fols 789-858, RA; later accounts until 1640 in Skeppsgardshandlingar, RA, supplemented by Strodda Militiehandlingar fore 1631, Flottan, RA. Tackelrakningar in OR 1634:2, 1650:4, 1651:4, 1656:4, 1657:4, 1658:4, 1659:5, 1663:4, 1670:4, 1679:6, 1693:11, 1707:17, 1708:19, 1709:19, 1710:24, 1716:14, 1719:23, 1720:20-21. They gradually grow f r o m a few h u n d r e d to thousands of pages. Surviving draft accounts for several years f r o m 1655 to 1673 are in AK, Varvskontoret, GVIa, vols 1 - 2 , KrA, although some are incomplete.

466

c h a p t e r sEVEN

how central administration weakened under the pressure of the rising internal conflict in the state." Duke Karl, from 1604 King Karl IX, did not re-introduce yearly inventories, and only a few, normally incomplete inventories of ships are preserved from his reign (1598-1600, 1603, 1610-11). Inventories were probably not made by the navy in the period 1615 to 1628, when the outfitting of warships was contracted to members of the Clerck family. The contracts did not state that such inventories should be kept, and none are preserved, although the contracts themselves provide new information about rigging. For later years, most of the central naval accounts were destroyed in the 19th century. Fortunately, very detailed inventories of ships from 1677 and later years have survived in the archives of the Karlskrona naval yard, although with gaps for several years."* For several years in the 17th century (1647-50, 1654-56, 1664, 1666, 1670, 1671, 1674, 1678, 1683-87), sources exist which were prepared to estimate lack of fittings rather than the total inventories, often in connection with preparation of stater (budgets) for the navy. They are useful both because they have information about the condition of the navy's fittings, and also because they are vestiges of a decision-making process wherein lack of sails, cables, and cordage were sufficiently important to be discussed at the highest political level.^'

" Inventories f r o m a u t u m n 1526 and 1/3 1531, Fogdarnas rakenskaper 1529-1533, fols 850-858, 797-804; inventory 1544, SH 1:5, with a reference to an earlier, n o w lost, inventory, gatnla rullan; inventory 8/11 1552, SMHF 1:10; inventory 1556, SH 4:4; inventory 1557, SH 4:8; inventory 1558, S M H F 1:17; inventory for ships at Kalmar a n d Bjorkeniis in 1560, SH 6:3; inventory of Duke Johan's ships at Abo in 1561, K 341; inventory of captured Danish ships 1563, SH 9:8; inventory 1566 Stockholm (updated to 1567), SH 15:2; accounts for Kalmar 1566, SH 15:5; for 1568, SH 22:3; accounts of inventories for 1568 to 18/5 1573, SH 28:1; inventories f r o m 1573 to 1593 in SH, almost every year, most of the 1578 inventory is lost and that for 1588 is severely damaged, all RA. There are separate inventories for ships at Kalmar/Bjorkeniis in the accounts for that yard f r o m 1579 until 1594 in SH, RA. AK, Varvskontoret, Inventarieforteckningar for fartyg, DVIa, 1677-1767, KrA. ' ' Summaries of yearly surveys of ships in AK, Varvskontoret, F VI, vol. 1 (1647, 1648, 1650, 1654-56); inventory book of sails and cables for 1670, with dimensions of most sails, AK, Varvskontoret, D VIb; list of deficiencies, NNS, II, 12a ( s u m m a r y of yearly survey of ships 1/12 1649), 157 (21/12 1671), 160 (23/11 1674), 168:1 (16/10 1678), all KrA; sail inventory, December 1654; Extrakt over tag, kablar, segel ochflaggor... 1664; list of deficiencies 1666, all in M 1761, RA. Inventories f r o m 1683-87, AK, Varvskontoret, JIV, vol. 7, KrA and M 1762, RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

6.4

Growing royal administration,

467

1521-1590

Tlie earliest sails, cables, rigs, and equipment for the new royal navy were bought with the ships f r o m Lubeck, Stralsund, and Danzig. From 1523, the new ruler, Gustav I, began to develop an infrastructure to support his ships. He did not start entirely from scratch. Earlier regents and /«n-holders had owned some ships and had maintained them at the castles. There were a few ship-owners in Stocldiolm, and the city was a major Baltic port where visiting cargo carriers must have developed at least a small market for repair and supply of sails, anchors, cordage, and other equipment essential for shipping. Gustav's much-increased naval ambitions, however, were a challenge to his early shipyard administrators, who had little experience of rigging and equipping the large ships which the new king began to build. The earliest yard accounts from 1526-31 show that the king's blacksmiths could produce anchors but that h e m p was imported for the ships' running and standing rigging and cables. Ropes and cables could be made at the Stockholm yard, although at least one anchor cable was imported from Lubeck and yarn {kabelgarn) was imported from Reval. Sailcloth {Idrft) was available from domestic resources, but sailcloth of higher quality was imported from Holland. The king's own ships transported many of these imported goods, and at least once (Bjornen's voyage to Lubeck in 1530), a visit to a major foreign port was also used to buy a new sail and other fittings to the ship. Part of the rigging to the great Store Kravelen, built at Stockholm in the late 1520s, was ready at the yard by March 1531, but this ambitious project could not be completed with domestic resources.''" In 1531-32, a major crisis arose, when Christian II returned with a fleet and an army to Norway and an intervention f r o m Habsburg Netherlands looked possible. In spring 1532, Frederik I of Denmark asked Gustav to send his fleet with his new great ship to the Sound to fulfil his alliance obligations. Gustav had to admit that the great ship could not come because it lacked sails and cables."*' In April 1532, the king sent the Stockholm burgher Olof Eriksson and the German-born Clement Renszel, two of his earliest naval administrators, to Danzig

40

Fogdarnas rakenskaper 1529-1533, fols 793-819, 834-840, 850-858, RA; marstrom 1956, 440-41. GR 8, 71-72 (1/5 1532).

Ham-

468

c h a p t e r sEVEN

with a list of what should be bought for Store Kravelen: sails, cables, parts of the rig, and 50 or 60 skeppund (8,5 to 10,2 tonnes) of yarn. It should be paid for with exported Swedish butter, silver sent with Eriksson and Renszel, and, if necessary, a loan from the Danzig burghers. The king's navy was evidently not yet self-sufficient in essential products."*^ There are no accounts preserved for the Stockholm shipyard from 1532 to 1540. It is evident, however, that the king's ability to produce sails, cables, and cordage for his increasing navy must have improved rapidly, as these products do not appear as bottlenecks during the war with Liibeck in 1534-36. It is possible that captures of naval store on enemy merchant ships made the supply easier, but cables, cordage, and sails must have been made by the king's administration.''^ In the accounts from the Stoclcholm yard from 1541 and 1543-47, a more mature administration is obvious. Russian hemp was still imported, mainly through Viborg and Reval, but semi-finished yarn as well cables and ropes were made by the navy's ropewalk. Sails were made at the yard from domestic and imported semi-finished products, sailcloth, and pack-thread (segelgarn). Domestic production of sailcloth was concentrated in the northern flax-producing province of Halsingland {hdlsingeldrft), but sailcloth of higher quality was imported from Holland and Baltic cities."" This basic structure changed little for many decades. The 1530s appear as the decisive period during which the king made his naval policy sufficiently independent of foreign competencies. He was now able to support a major navy during a major war, and he had turned Stockholm into a new centre of naval power and power projection in the Baltic. The only preserved inventory from the 1540s, that of 1544, shows a navy with few deficiencies, and the yard accounts from the 1540s show a fairly good reserve of sailcloth and hemp. The next inventory, of 8 November 1552, shows that the navy's largest ship. Store Kravelen (1,800 tonnes), lacked all sails and most of its cables. It

GR 8, 6 4 - 6 7 (6/4, 7/4 1532). Hammarstrom 1956, 450-64, The evidence that sails, cables, and rigging was no bottle-neck is that all Swedish warships were at sea in 1535-36 and that the king's letters in the years 1534-36 have m u c h to say about lack of m e n but not of naval stores. R a n t e k a m m a r b o c k e r f r o m the 1530s may provide m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n about the development of the infrastructure at the Stockholm yard in the 1530s. These questions are studied by MA Dan Johansson, Stockholm University. « SH 1:1 (1541), 1:4 (1543), 1:5 (1544), 2:2 (1545), 2:4 (1546), 2:6-7 (1547), RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

469

was now near the end of its life and was probably broken up by 1554. Otherwise, most ships had more or less complete inventories, except the old Falken (300 tonnes) of 1531. In the inventories from 1556-58, it is striking that the navy's largest ship, the new Store Kravelen (1,200 tonnes, launched 1555) is not even mentioned, while the second largest ship, Lejonet (c. 1,000 tonnes), had serious deficiencies, even though it had inherited a large cable from the old Store Kravelen. Otherwise, the ships and the many galleys had more or less complete inventories, and Falken had been refitted. The war with Russia (1555-57) had resulted in a low priority for large ships but the smaller were required for operational service and kept in good order."*^ There are no further complete inventories until 1566 but the yearly shipyard accounts show that major efforts were made from 1559 to bring the largest ships into operational condition. Lejonet and Angeln sailed to England in 1559, the new Elefanten (ex Store Kravelen 11) went to sea in 1560, as did Duke Erik's St Erik f r o m Kalmar and Duke Johan's Finske Svanen from Abo. From 1559, an intense production of cables started at the Stockholm yard, and many ships received new cables.'*'^ The production of sails, cables, rigging, anchors, and other equipment dimensioned for large ships was evidently no bottleneck for a rapid expansion of the number of such ships or for intense war efforts. From 1560, most ships of the navy were in active service, and from 1563, all warships and many transports and storeships were commissioned for war service. All ships that could float were at sea, and it was provisions and the health of the crew that limited operations. In a few years, Europe's largest sailing navy was created with Stocldiolm as its centre for outfitting.''^ The source of all this material is far f r o m obvious. Domestic resources of production of sailcloth, perhaps especially in Finland, was mobilised; much hemp and some sailcloth was bought from Russia; and

« SH 1:5 (1544), S M H F 1:10 (1552), SH 4:4 (1556), 4:8 (1557), 1:17 (1558), RA, Cable p r o d u c t i o n and rigging at Stockholm in 1559, SH 5:6; at Kalmar in 1560, SH 6:3; at Abo in 1560-62, K 341, RA. The shipyard clerk {skeppsgardsskrivare) T o m a s Ravalsson's accounts of material and equipment at the Stockholm yard and its distribution to ships maintained at the yard, SH 6:1-2 (1560), 7:1-2 (1561), 8:1-4 (1562), SH 9:1 (fragment, 1563), 9:2 (damaged, 1563), S M H F 1:21-22 (1563), S M H F 2:2 (fragment, 1564), SH 12:2 (1565), SH 15:1 (1566), SH 18:2 (1567), SH 20:1 (1568), SH 23:2 (1569), SH 24:1 and 24:11 (1570), SH 28:1-3 (1569-73). Similar accounts for Kalmar, SH 6:3 (1560), SH 8:7 (1562), 15:7 (1566), SH 23:5 (1569), all RA. Tliere are m o r e in local accounts for Finland up to a r o u n d 1565 in K 341, RA, and in Aldre riikenskapsserien, FRA,

470

c h a p t e r sEVEN

many naval stores were captured from enemy merchantmen that tried to break the Swedish blockade in the Gulf of Finland. The importance of German and West European sailcloth for the Swedish navy in this war has not been investigated, but in any case it is clear that its operational performance, at least after 1564, was not limited by lack of such products due to enemy blockade."*^ This picture is confirmed by the inventories made in 1566 (updated during 1567) and October 1568 (updated until 1573). The muchincreased navy had a fairly complete inventory of anchor, cables, sails, and rigging. Fittings that were lost, damaged, and worn out must have been replaced quicWy. After 1566, the increasing financial difficulties began to create problems, but they were solved."'' In 1570, nearly all ships served at sea, and until the end of the war with Denmark and Liibeck, even old warships retained their cables, rigs, sails, and anchors until the hulls were no longer sea-going. A navy of around 20,000 tonnes of warships and a few thousand tonnes of storeships was kept operational until the end of the war. The capacity to produce anchors, cables, sails, and various parts of the rigging must have been much expanded, because the navy been much smaller before 1560. The end of the great naval war in late 1570 abruptly ended the flow of resources to the navy.'° The major warships were laid up, and several ships were sold, given away, or discarded. Much of the rigging of the larger ships was worn out and had to be discarded in the 1570s. The inventory prepared in May 1573 shows a mixed picture. Some

Accounts of capUired goods 1562-70, Kaperirakenskaper, RA, vols 1 - 6 . Examples of Erik XIV's efforts to raise resources in his letters in RR, RA: 2/2 1564, buy as m u c h larft (sailcloth) in Finland a possible to replace buldan and kanfas (imported high-quality sailcloth); 4/11 1564 (2 letters), the local administration in Finland is ordered to buy 8,000 alnar vadmal and 12,000 alnar larft; c.20/11 1564, order to Jakob Henriksson to buy all h e m p there are at Narva; 29/3 1565, 200 skeppund h e m p bought by Jakob Henriksson; c.28/4 1565, buy sailcloth f r o m Russian merchants; 18/7 1565, buy high-quality sailcloth on an English m e r c h a n t m a n at Stockholm; 19/8 1566, tax in h e m p to be raised in Finland. Inventories, SH 15:2 (Stockliolm 1566), 15:5 (Kalmar 1566), 22:3 (Kalmar 1568), 24:9 (Viborg 1570), 28:1 (Stockholm 1568 to 18/5 1573), all RA. A m e m o r a n d u m f r o m 1569 shows that the three large ships Neptunus (later Rode Draken), Valen, and Tantheijen, completed in 1566-67, still required 250 skeppund h e m p for new cables. Kampen, completed in 1569, required m u c h h e m p , tar, and sailcloth, but the requirem e n t listed for that ship is too large and m u s t refer to requirements for several ships, SH 28:2, RA. Uiese ships were at sea in 1570. The yearly inventories (Skeppsrullan) f r o m 1568-73 to 1593 in SH, RA, provide information about rigging, cables, sails, etc. for individual ships.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

471

large ships (Rode Draken, Hector, St Christoffer) had a fairly complete inventory in good condition while others [Valen, St Erik, Kdmpen, Tantheijen) had serious deficiencies or much old and worn out rigging.^' Medium-sized and small warships were generally better fitted, and most of them were in service. In 1574, when the international situation was threatening, the cost to commission five of the largest ships (except the two largest, Rode Draken and Valen) was investigated. The Stockliolm shipyard could report numerous deficiencies in rigging, sails, and cables for the five ships. A total refit would require 362 skeppund hemp (including 11 new anchor cables) and 10,700 alnar sailcloth.^^ Eventually only the smallest, St Christoffer was refitted and commissioned for active service. The decline in effective naval strength over just a few years after 1570 was dramatic, obviously a result of several years of intense operations during the war. Because the major ships were laid up at Skeppsholmen, probably with most of their rigs dismantled, deficiencies were not visible to observers, and the navy's nominal strength was demonstrated in the number of large hulls. From 1570, Sweden fought a long war with Russia where only ships of 300 tonnes and less were used to blockade Narva and support the army. They required constant refits and re-equipment, and in this situation, sails and cordage to major warships did not receive much priority. From 1573 to 1577, the deterioration of the existing large ships continued, but the navy in these years also was increased by a large new construction program. From 1575 to 1579, nine newly built or purchased major warships, seven of them of 700 to 1,100 tonnes, arrived at Stocldiolm with provisional lower mast rigs and a few (often old) cables. The yard was to provide them with a complete outfit of cables, sails, and rigging. Efforts were also made to refit a few of the five surviving older large warships (600 to 2,000 tonnes). Much h e m p was captured during the Narva blockade until 1581 and was used both to maintain the blockading fleet and to fit out new ships." It was far f r o m sufficient, however. The king had already built the new ships by taxing

S H 2 8 : 1 and 29:3, RA. ^^ AR 1574/13, KrA. The total cost of anchors, cables, rigging, and sails of one ship, Kampen (900 tonnes), was calculated to 3,781 daler or a r o u n d 4 daler/toimes. ^^ Kaperirakenskaper, vols 6 - 7 , RA; accounts of h o w c.295 skeppund h e m p captured in 1579 was used by the navy in SH 36:11, RA; the king orders that 100 skeppund captured h e m p should be used by the navy, RR 15/1 1575, RA.

472

c h a p t e r sEVEN

the peasants, who supplied timber, provisions, and unskilled labour, and he now asked them to supply stores for outfitting the ships. In 1576 and 1577, extra taxes of hemp and sailcloth {liirft and vadmal) were raised, with the explicit purpose of outfitting the king's warships. The 1577 tax was large and was intended to bring in 76 skeppund hemp from the towns and 353 skeppund of hemp, 16,970 ulnar vadmal, and 9,040 alnar Idrft from the countryside.^"' Hiis tax was probably intended to be paid throughout more than one year, and it was not fully paid by September 1578. The inventory at the Stocldiolm yard at the beginning of 1578 was nevertheless large: 222 skeppund hemp and yarn and more than 26,000 alnar sailcloth, all domestic Idrji and vadmal. One year later there were 173 skeppund hemp and more than 30,000 alnar sailcloth, and at the end of 1579 there were 698 skeppund of h e m p and 7,450 alnar sailcloth.®' This inflow of material was sufficient to provide several large ships with their rigs, sails and cables, and the output from the rope-makers and sail-makers in these years was impressive. By 1580, the new large ships Smdlands Lejonet, Angeln, Algen,^^ and Hjorten and the two new medium-sized ships Renen and Angermannen were outfitted with more or less complete inventories, as had the old large ships Hector and (probably) Kdmpen. The medium-sized Duvan, Svanen, and Bjdrnen and most of the smaller warships were in good condition, many of them in active war service. In contrast. Rode Draken, the navy's largest ship, had serious deficiencies, as had St Kristoffer. The navy's oldest ship, St Erik (1559), now lacked most of its fittings, except the sails. The new large ship Upplands Lejonet and the two purchased large ships Stjdrnan and Viborgs Morianen had only their lower mast riggings and were still not serviceable. The two former were never made ready for service at sea, and the latter only when it was sold in 1583. Duke Karl's two large warships Elefanten and Lejonet, built at Strangniis in 1574-77, had by 1579 not received their rigging or cables.®^ Johan Ill's effort to fit out warships in the late 1570s was impressive and compares well with what was achieved in the first half of

RR 30/1 and 8/2 1576, 3/2, 13/2 and 29/3 1577, 23/9 1578, RA. " SH 34:3, 35:3, 37:6, 38:8, 40:6, RA, show large inflow and c o n s u m p t i o n of hemp, larft and vadmal 1577-83. Algen was loaned to m e r c h a n t s in 1579 for a voyage to Western Europe. It suffered damage d u r i n g that voyage a n d in 1580 had an incomplete rig, SH 37:8, RA. " HKR 29/5, 29/9 1579, RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

473

the 1560s under more favourable financial conditions. From 1580, detente with Denmark made further increases in the effective force of large ships less urgent. The large inventory of hemp was used up in the production of cables and rigging and was kept at a low level after 1582. The new Alvsborg Skeppet was made ready for sea in the early 1580s, to a large extent by stripping Kampen and Algen of their rigging and cables. The new Raumo Kravelen and Bjdrneborgs Kravelen had received more or less complete fittings by 1582, but already from the mid-1580s they were gradually stripped of parts of their rigging and all their cables. The fittings of several large ships were again gradually aging, and serviceable cordage, cables, and sails were often transferred to other ships. Several major ships were also sold or broken up in the 1580s. The reduction of the inventory of cables, sails, and rigging for large ships was a part of a general reduction and restructuring of the navy. By 1590, the navy's force of major warships ready for sea service was down to Smdlands Lejonet (1,100 tonnes) and Angeln (700 tonnes), which were sold to merchants in 1591 and 1590 respectively, and Svanen (300 tonnes). Rode Draken, Upplands Lejonet, and Renen were being stripped of their remaining rigs preliminary to their being broken up, while Alvsborgs Skeppet, Raumo Kravelen, and Bjdrneborgs Kravelen had great deficiencies in their inventories, especially cables. Two new ships, the giant Drakends (or Monsterds) Skeppet and the large Alvkarlehy Skeppet, arrived at Stockholm in 1589 with provisional lower rigs and cables inherited f r o m old ships but far f r o m fully fitted for service. A few ships could have been made serviceable quickly by stripping the others of their fittings, but the navy's readiness to fight a battle fleet war had declined dramatically. In 1588, an extra tax for hemp and sailcloth was raised for the reason that the king's daughter Anna was to make a voyage to her brother Sigismund in Poland, which required that the ships be fitted out with rigging and sails. This reason was in accord with traditional conventions between the ruler and his subjects, who were supposed to provide gifts to the royal family on special occasions.^'

Instructions to local bailiffs in Sweden (not including Finland) to raise an extra tax for the purchase of h e m p and sailcloth for the navy motivated by the requirements for a voyage by the king's sister to Poland, RR 5/3 1588, RA; the extra tax had provided m o n e y for the purchase of 80 skeppund h e m p , RR 11/3 1589, RA, The tax

474

c h a p t e r sEVEN

The other side of this picture is that the force of m i n o r warships was m u c h increased in the 1580s and that a generally satisfactory inventory of sails, cables, and rigging was maintained. The n u m b e r of m i n o r warships (less than 300 tonnes) was kept at a r o u n d 20 units in this decade, and a r o u n d 25 galleys and a large n u m b e r of small craft {lodjor) were built. These vessels were fitted out when completed, partly by extra taxes which also were used to build them. Nearly all were ready when the war with Russia started again in 1590.^' The reduction of the force of serviceable m a j o r warships and the increase of the n u m b e r of m i n o r vessels reflected Johan Ill's political priorities: friendly relations with D e n m a r k and offensive operations in the Gulf of Finland and the great lakes and rivers on the borders to Russia. The centrally kept naval inventories do not give the whole picture, however. They did not include warships owned by m e m b e r s of the royal family other than the king, and as a consequence they underestimated the n u m b e r of large Swedish warships in serviceable condition. From the mid-1580s, an increasing n u m b e r of the largest Swedish warships were fitted out as armed m e r c h a n t m e n for trade with Western Europe. W h e n the Halsinge Lejonet was completed in 1585, it was taken over by Duke Sigismund for mercantile ventures, and in 1586-88, Duke Karl finally fitted out his two "great ships" Elefanten and Lejonet and sent t h e m out to trade.*^" Queen Gunilla Bielke took over Alvsborgs Skeppet in 1591 and refitted it for mercantile purposes. In 1590, the dveramiral Klas Fleming and the D u t c h m e r c h a n t Marten Simonsson received the new Alvkarleby Skeppet. It is probable that this was one of the three m a j o r ships, Finske Lejonet, Hjorten, and Hinden, which were owned by Fleming and served in the fleet that brought Sigismund f r o m Poland to Sweden in 1593. These warships, with fittings probably suited for long-distance voyages, would have been available if a mobihsation for a battle fleet war had been necessary.

was probably not raised in Finland because that part of the k i n g d o m paid extra taxes to build galleys and lodjor. Taxes for the construction of galleys and lodjor in Finland and their sails and rigging has not been studied here, but there are sources in SMHF 5:12, SH 40:11, 46:1, 46:3, 47:2, 47:6 a n d 48:6, RA, and probably in Aldre Rakenskapsserien, FRA. ® Cordage and sailcloth for Elefanten and Lejonet ordered in 1586, S M H F 5:8, RA.

cordage and canvas: f i t t i n g o u t t h e navy

6.5

Expansion and crisis,

475

1591-1614

From around 1590, Duke Karl began to take control of the administration of the navy as well as other parts of the Swedish state. Johan Ill's health was declining, and the heir to the throne, Sigismund, was king of Poland. A plan for material to fit out the navy in 1591—and the regions in which they should be raised, possibly by extra taxes—was approved by Duke Karl on 17 December, 1590. It included 300 skeppund hemp and 50,000 alnar sailcloth of unspecified quality.®' nhe large new construction program initiated in 1591-92 was also the start of an intense program of producing cables; sails, rigging, and anchors. The sources are incomplete, but they leave no doubt that the new ships built in the 1590s were equipped for service at sea soon after they were completed.® Part of their rigging was imported.®^ The mobilisations of the navy for the civil war in 1598 and 1599 were, by a wide margin, the largest since 1570. The inventories of most of the navy prepared in late 1599 show a new reality in the Baltic Sea, where a much-increased Swedish navy had a fairly satisfactory inventory of anchors, cables, rigs, and sails. Some sails were damaged by weather, the number of thick cables was at the m i n i m u m level, and four of the seven ships taken in Finland in 1599 by Duke Karl's forces were incompletely fitted. That may reflect difficulties that Sigismund's adherents had experienced when they had to maintain ships without support from Stockholm. The navy's largest ship, Julius Caesar (ex Drakends/Monster as Skeppet), had been extensively repaired in 1599 but had still not received a complete rig, sails or cables.'^'* The total force of warships fit for sea service, however, was at least as large as in the peak years in the 1560s. The 1590s had obviously been a period of intense work for navy's rope-makers, sail-makers, and rig-makers, even if that is only fragmentarily reflected in the accounts.

" SMHF 5:18, RA, Shipyard accounts f r o m Stockholm a n d Kahnar 1593-1614 and f r o m several other yards in SH, RA, accounts f r o m the shipyard at Nykoping in Sodermanlands handlingar, accounts f r o m the shipyard in Vastergotlands handlingar, Alvsborg, RA. An undated (c.l594) list of e q u i p m e n t required for six new ships, including 400 skeppund h e m p , S M H F 6:7, RA, is one of the few surviving d o c u m e n t s of planning f r o m the years 1594-98. HKR 4/2 1595, RA. " SH 53:6, RA.

476

c h a p t e r sEVEN

After 1593, the system for control of the every ship's cables, sails, rig, anchors, and cooking utensils, which had been introduced in the early 1570s, broke down u n d e r the pressure of conflicts between Duke Karl and the dveramiral Klas Fleming. Fleming did not send accounts of ships u n d e r his control to a Treasury controlled by Karl, and the central accounting lost track of them. Karl's naval administrators often were probably too busy bringing resources to sea to keep detailed accounts of what they did. The legality of their actions would, in any case, depend on the political outcome of the civil war, not on wellprepared accounts with full documentation about h o w they raised and spent resources. N o m o r e inventories are k n o w n until November 1598 (for ships in Nykoping), November and December 1599 (for ships in Stockholm and at Alvsnabben), and November 1600 (for ships at Alvsborg). They were m a d e briefly after Duke Karl took control of the entire navy, probably as the result of the administration's attempts to bring order in the naval accounts after the civil war.'"' Only one m o r e inventory is preserved f r o m the following decade: for ships at Stockholm, dated 31 January (with all probability 1603), but it omits m a n y ships which were at that time at Nykoping and Alvsborg. The last preserved inventories in the style developed since the 1520s are of ships in Stocldiolm in 1610 and 1611, w h e n the lack of sails, cables, and rigs was critical, due to the war with D e n m a r k . The several ships at Kalmar, Nykoping, and Gothenburg/Alvsborg are not included, and the well-preserved accounts f r o m these yards only occasionally provide some information o n inventories.® It is striking that there is n o single inventory for the entire navy of the type that had been prepared f r o m 1573 to the early 1590s, when the central administration m a d e considerable effort to get information about ships in service outside Stockholm. The naval accounts f r o m 1600-11 are well preserved, and it is not likely that several inventories have been lost.

® Inventory for ships at Nykoping 23/11 1598, SH 52:8; inventory for ships at S t o d d i o h n in N o v e m b e r 1599 and at Alvsnabben 10-11/12 1599, SH 53:6; inventory for ships at Alvsborg 24/11 1600, SH 53:4, all RA. Two letters f r o m Duke Karl about lack of rigging and cables when the fleet was fitted out in spring 1598 gives the impression that these problems were small a n d affected only a few ships, H K R 14/5, 2/6 1598, RA. Inventory for ships at Stockholm 31/1 (no year but evidently 1603), SH 54:5; inventory for ships at Stockholm in 1610, SH 62:5; inventory for ships at Stockliolm in 1611, SH 63:2, RA. The inventory of 1611 is a compilation f r o m various dates, as it includes Danske Stjarnan, captured in s u m m e r 1611, as well as Rode Lejonet and Mjolkpigan, lost at about the same time.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

477

Tliese accounts show in detail how much was spent on every ship, but they do not give any information about what the ships or the entire navy lacked. The inventory made in 1610 may have been the result of Karl IX's order on 6 December 1609 that the administration must find out how many ships in Stockliolm were ready to serve and what they lacked.*^^ It is possible that no individual, not even the king, had systematic information about the navy's sails, cables, and rigs in the years before 1610-11, when it was revealed that the inventory was far below what was needed to bring the whole navy to sea. New construction of major and minor warships continued in a large scale after 1599, and many ships were commissioned as troop transports to Livonia and blockade of ports f r o m spring to autumn. Wear and tear was unavoidable, and already in 1601 this began to cause operational problems. On 29 November 1601, Karl ordered three admirals to make a survey of rigs, sails, and cables for the whole navy. He also asked for a special survey of the great ship Julius Caesar (2,400 tonnes) in order to find out how much it required to be completed. Karl stated that large cables for the navy should be produced in Stockholm, although he intended to import much other material for the ship's refit.'"'* An unsigned report, dated 13 January 1602, about all warships at Stockholm, including six newly built hulls (500 to 800 tonnes), has survived, but no reports for ships at other ports exist. The 13 January report shows that existing ships lacked 40 cables, of which 16 were from 12 to 24 turn. To complete the six unfinished ships, 600 skeppund hemp and 900 pieces (40,000 to 50,000 ulnar) of sailcloth from Holland were required. The giant Julius Caesar would require 80 more pieces of sailcloth, not less than 200 skeppund hemp for its rig and lighter cables and four 120 fathoms anchors cables of 24, 20, 18, and 14 turn, which would require another 90 skeppund of hemp. The Stockholm yard had, at the beginning of 1602, only 80 skeppund of hemp.'^®

" RR 6/12 1609, RA. ® Zettersten 1890, 448; RR 29/11 1601, RA, e m p o w e r s Admirals H a n s Claesson Bielkenstierna, Lorentz Cleiton, and Johan Martensson de Finne to investigate rigs and cables. ® S M H F 6:15, RA. The six new but incomplete ships were Samson and the yet u n n a m e d hulls of Smdlands Lejonet, Applet, Scepter, Rode Lejonet, a n d Gule Lejonet. The estimate of the weight of the four cables is m y own, based on comparisons with a d o c u m e n t f r o m the 1620, SH 70:6, RA.

478

c h a p t e r sEVEN

Hiis may finally have killed the idea of ever fitting out Julius Caesar, probably the world's largest warship at this time. It was obvious that smaller ships would be m o r e useful in the near future, when blockade of Polish ports was the navy's most urgent task. H i e extremely heavy fittings required for this ship would not even be useful as spare parts for the smaller ships in the operational fleet. The ship, launched a r o u n d 1587/88, was n o w also growing old. The hull's remaining life was too short to justify investments in heavy cables, large sails, and rigging that would have little alternative use when the ship was discarded. The great hull was used by the Stockholm yard f r o m a r o u n d 1603, apparently to lodge m e n working at the yard, possibly also as a magazine, and it was finally stripped of its e q u i p m e n t in 1609/10. An inventory of 20 warships and ten transports at Stockholm m a d e on 31 January 1603 shows that some ships had received the heavy cables which they lacked a year earlier, but four warships were far f r o m ready for sea. Only one of the seven incomplete ships at Stockholm in the report of January 1602, Applet, was listed as r e a d y . T h e naval accounts for the following years show that large efforts were m a d e to keep a growing n u m b e r of transports and small craft {prdmar, bojorter, lodjor) as well as medium-sized and small warships with rigging, cables, and sails. Several new warships u p to 400 tonnes, including m a n y small pinnaces, were built and fitted out for operations in Livonian waters, while larger ships for battle fleet operations were less necessary. The seven large ships of 500 to 800 tonnes, launched a r o u n d 1600-02, were slowly completed by 1604-05, but Svdrdet (900 tonnes) and Alands Hjorten (500 tonnes), launched a r o u n d 1604 were left incomplete for several years. The older Pelikanen and Angeln (both of 700 tonnes) were stripped of their rigs and cables before 1610, as were the newer Vasen (900 tonnes) and Smdlands Lejonet (800 tonnes). The direction of the supply of cables, rigging, and sails had by 1611 reorientated the navy f r o m a battle fleet to p r e d o m i n a n t l y a cruiser and transport fleet with shallow-water capability. A considerable n u m b e r of large hulls suitable for a battle fleet existed, but they lacked the fittings necessary to make t h e m mobile. The inventories of hemp, yarn and sailcloth at the Stocldiolm yard in the period 1604-12 show that the resources were strained. Normally

™ SH 54:5, RA. The year has disappeared f r o m the heading of this inventory but it can be dated f r o m the ships listed in it.

cordage and canvas: f i t t i n g o u t t h e navy

479

there were only a few tonnes of h e m p and yarn at the end of every year, except in 1608 when there were 60 skeppund (10 tonnes) h e m p and 29 skeppund of cables. The inventories of sailcloth were insignificant: a few h u n d r e d or a few thousand ulnar. There was n o strategic reserve to quicldy fit out even one m a j o r warship or refit several ships after a severe gale or a m a j o r battle. At the beginning of 1611, the year D e n m a r k attacked Sweden, the Stoclcholm yard had an inventory of 1 skeppund, 17 lispund, and 10 skalpund (297.5 kilogram) of h e m p . The shipyard at Nykoping, where several ships were based, had only a very small inventory of h e m p and n o sailcloth. The navy's magazines were empty at the start of a m a j o r naval war. To p u t these figures in perspective, the expenditure at the Stockholm yard in 1611 was 109 skeppund (18.5 tonnes) of h e m p and yarn and 13,0315/2 ulnar of sailcloth, mainly cheap Swedish IdrftJ^ Even that expenditure was insufficient to increase the n u m b e r of ships available for sea service, and m u c h of it was probably not available in early spring when the navy was mobilised. It was barely sufficient to maintain existing ships that suffered wear and tear during one year of war. Only the n u m b e r of anchors appears as fairly sufficient.'^ It is evident that the acquisition of h e m p and sailcloth and the production of cables, rigging, and sails after 1599 had been insufficient for long-term maintenance of the great navy which Karl IX had built. H e m p and sailcloth were acquired in large quantities, probably m o r e than in earlier decades, except possibly the 1560s. Not only warships but also a large n u m b e r of naval transports had been supplied with cordage, cables, and sails. But an increasing gap developed between the n u m b e r of hulls to fit out and the inventory of cables, sails, and rigging. Nevertheless, Karl did not cease his shipbuilding. Instead, his shipbuilding efforts appear to have been directed by a balanced naval policy, aiming at both maintaining m i n o r units for wars with Poland and Russia and m a j o r units to deter D e n m a r k , while the policy of acquiring fittings was directed by immediate operational requirement. It was not a new p h e n o m e n o n ; it had also appeared in the 1550s, 1570s, and 1580s, when war in the east gave priority to cruising warships and galleys. Gustav I had held large financial reserves to fit out his navy

" SH 62:3, 63:1; Sodermanlands handlingar 1610:10 and 1610:14, RA. A comparison of the inventories of 1610 and 1611 shows h o w various deficiencies had developed, probably d u r i n g the campaign of 1611, SH 62:5, 63:2, RA.

480

c h a p t e r sEVEN

quickly, however, and Johan III had shown an impressive abihty to increase his inventory of h e m p and sailcloth when his foreign policy required it, even when he was in deep financial troubles. Karl was not indifferent to the acquisition of h e m p and sailcloth. He probably wrote m o r e letters about naval stores in one decade than his father and two brothers had done in 70 years. This m a y show that his naval administration suffered f r o m over-centralisation to his own person. Karl had a long experience as a mercantile importer, exporter, and ship-owner f r o m his years as duke, and his letters sometimes give the impression that he regarded himself as Sweden's leading authority in international business. He undoubtedly had a wide network of contacts in G e r m a n y and Western Europe, and his position as ruler gave him m a n y direct contacts with Swedish society and its resources. These experiences and contacts may partially explain why he was successful in rapidly expanding and fitting out the navy f r o m 1592 to 1599. But as a king he had m u c h wider responsibilities, and his unwillingness to delegate power and administrative control over resources was a rising problem. The d e m a n d for timely resources grew, while his health and capacity for planning declined. Karl frequently issued orders for importing large quantities of h e m p . " O n 9 February 1602, as a response to the report of 13 January about the navy's requirement for at least 800 skeppund hemp, he issued orders according to which 500 skeppund was to be bought f r o m a Russian m e r c h a n t at Narva while 510 skeppund should be bought f r o m G e r m a n y through Swedish merchants in seven towns. Karl specified h o w m u c h each town should buy. Even m o r e h e m p (no quantity was stated) should be bought directly by the crown f r o m Liibeck, Danzig, and other ports, and sailcloth should be ordered f r o m Holland.^"* The idea behind this plan was probably that division of purchases to several ports and through different channels would make the d e m a n d less visible and prevent a rise in prices. This strategy m a y have been fairly successful: the inventory of h e m p and yarn at the Stockholm yard rose f r o m 25 to 201 skeppund during 1602, p r o d u c t i o n of cables and cordage at the yard c o n s u m e d 1451/2 skeppund h e m p in 1602 and almost

" Early examples f r o m his first years as ruler: purchase 30 skeppund yarn to be bought f r o m burghers in Flensborg, RR 26/5 1599; 200 skeppund h e m p for new ships to be bought at Reval, RR 22/5 1600; m o r e h e m p to be bought at Reval, RR 1/11 1600, RA. RR 9/2 1602, two letters, RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

481

179 skeppund in 1603, and most of the recently built ships were fitted out by 1604. By the end of 1603, the h e m p inventory was as low as 25 skeppund, however, and in early 1604 the shortage of h e m p was critical." In June, Karl ordered the purchase of 300 skeppund h e m p f r o m Narva, too late to prevent delay in bringing the fleet to sea in 1604. Hiis was a year of crisis with Denmark, when a war was possible. A gap between Karl's u n c o m p r o m i s i n g foreign policy and his policy of acquiring naval stores was apparent.'® In early 1605, Karl was upset when he received a report f r o m Kalmar about deficiencies in 13 warships laid u p there during the winter. They required 16 anchors, 10,730 alnar of sailcloth, and 144 skeppund of hemp. He declared that it m e a n t almost new rigs for the ships and d e m a n d e d a new report.'^ This response probably did not encourage administrators and officers to send timely reports about what their ships actually required to be serviceable. It is possible that Karl did not understand that his new policy of keeping ships at sea f r o m spring to a u t u m n for troop transports, army logistics, and blockade duties during the war in Livonia caused m o r e wear and tear on rigging and cables than earlier naval operations in the Gulf of Finland. By 1607/08, a critical situation had developed, reflected in the navy's increasing inability to provide its large ships with cables, sails, and rigging. Karl issued repeated instructions for large-scale buying of h e m p at Narva, starting with an order for 1,000 skeppund in January 1607. Several m o r e letters about the same subject were sent in 1607-09, while increasingly desperate measures were taken to get control of h e m p and products m a d e of h e m p for the navy.'® In spring 1608, it was f o u n d that the fleet to be sent to Livonia lacked n o fewer than 25 cables. Karl ordered that

" SH 53:2, 54:1, 54:4-5, 55:3, RA. ' ' Lack of h e m p and sailcloth, RR 15/1 1604; some ships should be stripped of their fittings to bring others to sea, RR 27/3 1604; buy 300 skeppund hemp, RR 15/6 1604, RA. The crisis with D e n m a r k : Palme 1942, 468-98; naval operations: Zettersten 1890, 453-55, " SH 59:1, R R c . 1 2 / 2 1605, RA, ™ Buy 1,000 skeppund h e m p in Narva, RR 21/1 1607 (supplement); buy 200 skeppund h e m p , RR 6/5 1607; buy 300 skeppund h e m p in Narva, RR 10/5 1607; buy 400 to 500 skeppund h e m p at Narva, RR 21/3 1608; buy 300 skeppund h e m p at Narva, buy 200 skeppund later, RR 25/6 1608; bring all h e m p there are in Narva to Stockholm, RR 23/7 1608; buy 100 to 200 skeppund h e m p in Reval to the Stocldiolni shipyard, RR 21/11-08; buy all available h e m p f r o m the burghers and Russian m e r c h a n t s in Viborg, and bring 300 to 400 skeppund to the Stockholm shipyard as soon as possible, RR 3/10 1609, all RA.

482

c h a p t e r sEVEN

foreign m e r c h a n t m e n in Stockholm should be ransacked and forced to sell their cables. In December the same year, the king heard that a m e r c h a n t in Nykoping had h e m p in store and ordered an investigation if there were other merchants who had hemp. In June 1609, Karl ordered ships to be sent to Abo, Viborg, and Nyen (present-day St Petersburg) to search for hemp.^' There are n o sign of that there was a general lack of h e m p in the Baltic in these years, and it may seem strange that Karl's stream of orders to b u y thousands of tonnes of h e m p had so litde effect. His administrators in Narva, Reval, and Viborg had easy access to the m a j o r export region for h e m p in Europe: western Russia.®" It is obvious that they cannot have acquired the very large quantities they were ordered to buy, because that would either have created a large stock of h e m p in the navy or several m o r e ships would have been provided with cables and rigs. The total size of the navy at the end of 1610 was a r o u n d 26,000 tonnes of warships, for which (in r o u n d figures) 2,500 skeppund of h e m p would have provided a sufficient outfit of cables and cordage. There were also several transports and m a n y small craft to provide for, but their requirements were counted in hundreds, not thousands, of skeppund h e m p . In the absence of investigations into h o w Karl IX's system for royal trade actually worked, the most probable explanation is that he was unable to pay for the large quantities he asked for. His local administrators in Finland and Estonia were probably overwhelmed with other urgent d e m a n d s sent by the king for supporting the wars in Livonia and (from 1609) also in Russia. In September 1610, he asked for an extra tax (gdrd) f r o m the peasants for the navy to be paid in hemp, a traditional measure during a crisis. It seems to have been a failure in that the h e m p it p r o d u c e d was of inferior quality. In December 1611 (two m o n t h s after Karl's death), another tax for h e m p was levied, but this time in money, because the last tax had brought in h e m p unsuitable for use in rigging." Karl i m p o r t e d sailcloth f r o m Western Europe, and it seems to be f r o m this period that such cloth was used in large a m o u n t s in the navy. The naval administrators at Alvsborg and Kalmar were frequently

™ RR 2/6, 19/12 1608, 21/6 1609, RA. "" Production regions and prices for hemp: Attman R R 3 0 / 9 1610, 13/12 1611, RA.

1944, appendices 2 a n d 15.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

483

instructed to find sailcloth and e q u i p m e n t for ships in the Netherlands and G e r m a n y respectively, and ships were sent out to bring in such products.''^ Karl also ofl:en ordered that domestically p r o d u c e d sailcloth should be bought, usually on the local markets a r o u n d Lake Malaren. These purchases were d o m i n a t e d by sailcloth of low and cheap quality, vadmal and IdrftP An order to weave 12,000 ulnar buldan in Sweden may be one of Karl's m a n y attempts to introduce foreign technology, attempts which were m o r e successful in metallurgy and shipbuilding than in textile production.®"* W h e n war with D e n m a r k began in 1611, the Swedish navy had far too m a n y hulls in proportion to the inventory of sails, rigging, and cables, and the stores of sailcloth and h e m p were practically nonexistent. Karl's most serious mistake was strategic. He left a large force of warships at Kalmar without the m e a n s to make it operational. The m a n y i n s u f h d e n t l y fitted ships at Stocldiolm and Nykoping and the non-existing reserve of h e m p and sailcloth m a d e it impossible to send out a fleet strong enough to maintain c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with Kalmar or regain the initiative at sea after the loss of that port. The size of the operational fleet in 1611 and 1612 was determined n o t by the n u m ber of hulls (it was large), hardly by the n u m b e r of men, and not by provisions, which was n o great problem for a state used to send large a m o u n t of food to the army every year. It was h e m p and sailcloth that mattered. The navy could n o t bring sufficient firepower and m a n power to sea because it lacked the m e a n s of propulsion. The problems were far f r o m solved when the war with D e n m a r k was over in 1613. A plan for 1614 showed that refits of existing ships and outfitting of new ships would require 574 skeppund h e m p and 18,000 ulnar sailcloth. Two plans for 1615 show that 440 or 504 skeppund h e m p and 11,300 or 9,900 ulnar sailcloth were required.®^ It was a heavy administrative task to keep track of what all ships required, buy large a m o u n t of naval stores on the market, manage rope-making and sail-making in an economic way, and make rational use of existing fittings on m a n y ships of various sizes. These tasks required

For example RR 31/5, 29/10 1603, RR 21/12 1604, RR 28/9 1606, RR 16/11 1608, RA. For example RR 21/12 1604, 1/2, 25/2 1605, 12/3 1606, 1/3 1609, RA. RR 29/11 1607, RA. Kort besked (undated but evidently f r o m 1613), Vill behdvas... till anno 1615, M 1761, RA; Kortforslag... 1614, S M H F 7:10, RA.

484

c h a p t e r sEVEN

dose and timely coordination, and the experience of the last decade of centralised royal administration was disappointing. Gustav II Adolf also lacked personal interest in acting as a merchant, as his father and grand-father had done with enthusiasm. It was no coincidence that one of the first parts of the whole Swedish administration that underwent a profound change in the early years of Gustav II Adolf's regime was the procurement of sails, cordage, and cables, those gears that made ships mobile.

6.6

Tackel and tag on contract,

1615-1628

In February 1615, the king concluded a four-year contract with the Scottish-born sea officer Rickard Clerck. During 1615-18, Clerck was to maintain cables, sails, and rigging (tackel and tag) for 12 major warships and 11 minor warships, galleys, and transports. For this he would receive 7,500 daler for 1615, 7,000 for 1616, 6,000 for 1617, and 4,000 for 1618. If the contract was extended, he would receive 4,000 yearly. The money was to be paid from the custom office in Stockholm. That was a safe source of income, easily accessible for Clerck when he paid importing merchants who supplied him with naval stores. This was important, because inexpensive and timely supply of naval stores must have been dependent on regular payment to the merchants. The four-year plan of payment shows that the navy required extraordinary refits in 1615-17, after which it was supposed that a normal level of refits could be maintained for 4,000 daler yearly. The king would continue to pay wages to rope-makers and sail-makers in Stocldiolm, and the ships' crews would still fit them with rigs and sails. Clerck's responsibility was primarily to buy the right type and quality of raw material and semi-finished products at the right time in order to keep all ships operational f r o m spring to autumn. It required a combination of business and seaman competencies. In practice, Clerck took over a function that the arch-centralizer Karl IX had taken upon himself for several years, with mediocre results. The ships in the contract (all named) did not include the several major ships under construction or repair in 1615, including the five largest ships in the navy. The king would pay for the complete outfitting of new ships, while Clerck would receive one additional daler per year for every additional last of shipping he had to maintain. The contract specified how many cables each ship of three different size

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

485

groups should have (four, three, and two), but it otherwise had no details about the quality and quantity of the products and services with which Clerck was to provide to the navy. Tlie yard captain Sotfring Hansson was given the task of checking that the contract was fulfilled, but m u c h was left to tradition and trust.®*® In June 1615, the king ordered the Treasury to buy rigging, sails and cables for 15,000 dalerior new and un-rigged ships. Three m o n t h s later, the Treasury had to report that it was impossible to buy on credit f r o m the merchants because these already had provided large loans. The king and his naval administrators began to negotiate with Rickard Clerck to handle the question, but he (or his m e r c h a n t relations) did not have any credits to supply. It was only gradually that he got the contract to fit out the navy's four largest ships: Svdrdet (1604/05), Vasen (1598), Scepter (1615), and Nyckeln (1616), with a total displacement of 3,400 tonnes. The cost for two of t h e m {Vasen and Scepter) was 9,400 daler, while the cost for the other two is uncertain but possibly the same. Payment was partly in copper, a p r o d u c t that the crown increasingly used as payment at this time. Clerck could probably easily sell copper to international merchants in Stockholm, w h o in t u r n could sell him h e m p and sailcloth, but he also became d e p e n d e n t on the copper prices. The contracts to fit out the four large ships were m o r e specific about the sails than the earlier contract to m a i n t a i n the navy. They state that the lower sails should be m a d e of French canvas (canifas), the topsails of Danzig cloth and the topgallant sails of w u r m s cloth {wurmsduk)}'' Several other new shi^s—Orpheus, Hannibal, Ostgota Lejonet, Jupiter, and Kronan—vfere apparently fitted out by the navy f r o m 1615 to 1619 without Clerk's direct involvement. The new system must have worked to the king's and Rickard Clerck's satisfaction. W h e n the four-year contract ended, another for the years 1619-22 was signed with Clerck o n 23 October 1618. This time it covered 25 m a j o r warships and 18 small warships and transports and was m o r e detailed than the contract of 1615. It stated that the m a j o r warships should have "Dutch" (hoUdndsk) rigging, that the

The text of the contract in RR 17/2, 23/2 1615; power of attorney to Soffring Hansson: RR 11/7 1615, RA. " RR 27/6, 20/9, 26/10, 1615, 6/4, 29/9, 30/9, 5/11, 1616, 8/4 and 31/5 1617, RA. According to Zettersten 1890, 354, wurmsduk is the same as vadmal. Tliis is unlikely. Hcilsingelarft was c o m m o n for topgallant sails later in the 17th century. O n Vasen, rigged in 1627/28 a topgallant foresail, probably m a d e of h e m p and flax (not wool) has been found: Sven Bengtsson in Schoerner 1997, 35.

486

c h a p t e r sEVEN

lower sails should be of good French sailcloth (buldan), the topsails of best Danzig cloth and the topgallant sails of wurms cloth. Hie smaller vessels should have sails of Liibeck cloth. Cables for the major ships should be made in Holland, Vi^hile the smaller should have cables made of hemp exported from Konigsberg. Riga hemp, which otherwise was common, may have been shunned due to the conflict with Poland. Clerck was given 8,500 daler per year for this contract, and increases and decreases in the force of ships to be maintained should be evaluated with 2 daler per last. Tliat was twice as much as in the first contract, perhaps because the actual costs had been found to be higher, but probably also because the cost increased with higher quality demands. Hie contract also stated that Clerck always should have in store 1/3 of what was necessary to fit out the ships. This cannot have meant that he should be ready to provide one third of the entire fleet with new rigs, sails, and cables, because that would have meant an enormous inventory, never achieved earlier or later. Instead, it probably meant that he always should be ready to replace one third of what normally was lost or worn out during one operational season. It is unlikely that the contract meant that production of large anchor cables at Stockholm should cease and that the navy in the future should rely on imported cables from Holland. The competence to make cables was a strategic asset, and without it Stockholm would have been less useful as a base for the navy. This text does not reappear in later contracts, and cable-making increased at Stockholm in the 1620s. It seems, however, as if the king and the entrepreneur had agreed that some import was necessary, for capacity and quality reasons or both.®' In a separate contract f r o m the same day (23 October 1618), Clerck undertook to import 11 cables from Holland, 6 of 12 turn and 5 of 11 turn, for a total weight of 120 skeppund for around 5,000 daler?° These contracts were a part of the "Dutchification" of Swedish naval technology, which took place in 1618-20 when Dutch master shipwrights and Dutch entrepreneurs took over the production of warships for the navy.

RR 23/10, 5/11 1618, RA, also in Kammarlcollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 94-96, 154-56, RA. The contract of 16/2 1621 for outfitting several new ships is m o r e vague: it states that "Holland yarn" should be used in the cables, but the contract of 8/3 1622 for fitting out Stockholm again m e n t i o n s that cables should be m a d e ("slagen") in Holland, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 50-51, 125, RA. RR 23/10 1618, RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

487

It is doubtful that Rickard Clerck also served formally as holmamiral (commander of the Stoclcholm naval yard), but from around 1618/19 he was usually the senior sea officer present at the yard." He had evidently made himself trusted and indispensable; he was superior in rank to the shipyard captain {gdrdskapten) who was to assure that the contract was fulfilled. From 1621, Clerck received an additional contract to pay and feed the rope-makers and sail-makers, who were placed under his command.'^ During 1621-22, he was also given three contracts to handle the outfitting of all new units added to the navy in 1621-23: ten major warships, one transport, 26 galleys, and 60 lodjor, for a total cost of 46,400 dcdev?^ Rickard Clerck had now become one of the most important entrepreneurs in the new system of administration through contract, which the Swedish state had introduced f r o m around 1618. His own contracts of 1615 must have been regarded as a success and possibly a model for other parts of the navy and the Swedish state. In December 1622, Clerck got a new long-term contract which called for him to maintain 37 warships and 30 galleys and other minor craft for 12,000 daler per year. This contact dropped the detailed quality specifications seen in the earlier contract and instead stated that the ships should be fitted out in the best known Dutch manner for warships.''' W h e n Rickard Clerck died in 1625, the contract was taken over by Captain Johan (Hans) Clerck, who had been in Swedish naval service since at least 1617. The name and the fact that he inherited the contract make it obvious that the two Clercks had a family relationship, but its exact nature is not known.'^ The contract was renewed in August 1626. It was once more stated that all ships should be fitted

" See RR 29/7 1619, RA, which Zettersten 1890, 239, regarded as Clerck's appointm e n t to holmamiral. It is actually an instruction in which Clerck is charged with a temporary c o m m a n d of the StoclAolm yard. ' ' Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fol. 50, 7/2 1621, RA. ' ' Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 50-51, 16/2 1621, RA: 16,400 daler for fitting Applet, Andromeda, Harboviks Lejon, Vasterviks Pinass (Vdstervik), Vasterviks Bojort, and six galleys; fol. 125, 8/3 1622: 10,000 daler for fitting out Stockholm, 12 galleys, 60 lodjor, fol. 176, 6/12 1622: 20,000 daler for fitting Apollo, Maria, Hector, Caesar, Achilles, a n d eight galleys. Contract with Rickard Clerck 5/12 1622, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 1, fols 174-76, RA; two undated papers connected with this contract are a calculation of the costs of fitting out the new ship Gustavus (c.l623) a n d the cost of outfitting of 18 warships (undated, but the ships existed in 1624-25), SH 70:6, RA. Contract with Johan Clerck 6/12 1625, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 2, fols 160-61, RA.

488

c h a p t e r sEVEN

out as the best warships in Holland. Tlie lower sails should be made of broad French cloth; the topsails of good French canvas (canifas) (not Danzig cloth as in earlier contracts), and all cables and taclde should be made with the best hemp from Konigsberg and Riga, the latter now a Swedish port. The navy's strength was in this contract estimated to be 7,090 Idster. At a cost of 2 daler per last, it should be maintained for 14,180 daler, and in addition Clerck should receive 1,035 daler to pay the personnel.'® The Clercks also continued to fit out new ships. The yearly sums paid to Riclcard and Johan Clerck increased from 13,035 daler in 1623 to 30,061 daler in 1627 and 23,761 daler in 1628. From 1623 to 1628, they received 128,293 daler.'' In 1626, the admirals or the Treasury made a review of the earlier contract and found that the Idstetal of the number of ships to maintain had been smaller than contracted. Johan Clerck was in 1626 charged 14,450 daler for that, and he became a debtor to the state. It is possible that this made him less interested in running the enterprise. Business conditions had also probably become unfavourable, due to increased prices for naval stores and the decline of the copper price when the Swedish state sold as much copper as possible to finance its war. In September 1627, Gustav II Adolf told riksamiral Gyllenhielm that Johan Clerck must make up his mind if he wished to continue as entrepreneur. One year later, the king was deeply dissatisfied with both the shipyard entrepreneur Arent de Groot (this was the m o n t h after the catastrophe with Vasen) and with Clerck. They must be replaced with better entrepreneurs.'® In reality, naval shipbuilding and the acquisition of naval stores were taken over by Admiral Klas Fleming from 1629, who at this time worked both for the navy and the

Contract with captain Clerck 1/8 1626, Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 3, fol. 106, RA; contract with H a n s Clerck. RR 12/8 1626, RA. " Contract with Johan Clerck 21/1 1626 for outfitting of two new ships {Svardet and Tre Kronor), Kammarkollegiet, Kontraktsbocker, vol. 3, fol. 6, RA. H i e yearly Rikshuvudbocker show that Rickard and Johan Clerck were paid 13,035 daler in 1623 (vol. 3, fol. 425), 13,035 daler and 4,126 daler for outfitting Gustavus in 1624 (vol. 6, fol. 473), 17,761 daler in 1625, probably including outfitting of Mercurius (vol. 8, fol. 203), 13,035 daler and 13,479 daler for outfitting of new ships {Tre Kronor, Svardet and other new ships) in 1626 (vol. 13, fol. 491), 30,061 daler in 1627, probably including outfitting of Vastervik (vol. 20, fol. 461), 23,761 daler in 1628, probably including outfitting of Applet (vol. 26, fol. 396), all RA. H a n s (Johan) Clerck's current account 1626-27, M 1779; SH 70:8; RR 17/9 1627, 8/9 1628, all RA. From 1626 to 1628 the value of silver rose 35.7 per cent in relation to the daler kopparmynt, calculation by Rodney Edvinsson, Sveriges Riksbank, http:// www.historia.se/indexprisjamforelse.html,

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

489

Treasury. Johan Clerck remained in charge of work at the Stockhohn yard, however, and in 1631 he was appointed as its commander {hoimamiral). Young Rickard Clerck (Jr), probably his son, was holmkapten (yard captain) from 1630, and in the following decade he was active as an international buyer of naval stores for the navy. He could probably rely on networks and experiences gained during the years when the Clercks had been entrepreneurs. Hie Clerck family was to remain dominant at the navy's main yard until the late 1670s.'' The contract system for supplying the navy with rigging, sails, and cables was in force during only 14 years. In a 200-year period, it may look like an episode that ended with a dissatisfied royal customer. These years saw a major transformation in naval administration, however, with lasting results. From the 1520s to the 1610s, the kings, aided by their naval and treasury administrators and the royal merchants, had handled the acquisition of hemp, sailcloth, cables, cordage, and sails. They organised it as part of their tax organisation, the royal organisation for international and domestic trade, and the naval system for control of the Baltic Sea. Naval stores were acquired through largescale purchases of hemp in Eastern Europe and of sailcloth, yarn, and cables in Germany and Western Europe, through extra taxes in kind igdrder), purchase of domestically produced sailcloth on local markets in Sweden, and captures at sea of naval stores, primarily hemp exported from Russia. The quality of the various products the navy acquired is largely unknown. There are no studies of other 16th-century navies that can be used to compare, very few artefacts to study, and the durability of naval fittings has not been studied. East European h e m p was the dominating raw material for cables and cordage, and it was generally regarded as the best in Europe. The quality of rope-making in Sweden in relation to other naval powers is not possible to study, but it is obvious that it was carried out on a large scale and that, as shown by the reduced size of the cables, the quality probably improved during the 16th century. Certain types of foreign sailcloth were regarded as superior to Swedish sailcloth {Idrft and vadmal) already in the 16th century. This difference was not important enough, however, to make

' Rickard Clerck Jr bouglit sail cloth in Holland in 1633, Rikshuvudbocker, vol. 42, Item 4721, RA; he sailed to Riga to buy h e m p in 1638 and 1639, AK registratur 12/5 1638 and 9/4 1639, KrA; and he led a naval s q u a d r o n on a mercantile expedition to A m s t e r d a m in 1640, Zettersten 1903, 353.

490

c h a p t e r sEVEN

it worthwhile to specify in the inventories which type of sailcloth was used. Karl IX was interested in buying sailcloth and other semi-finished products for the navy from Holland and Germany, but during his reign this policy was not pursued systematically. The detailed specifications of qualities of sailcloth, hemp, and rigging in the contract from 1618 must have been the result of a recent policy review of how the navy should be fitted. That review resulted in an imitation of what Swedish naval policymakers, most likely Gustav II Adolf and his senior admirals Goran Gyllenstierna and Hans Bielkenstierna, saw as the best model: the Dutch navy. Both admirals had spent several years at sea commanding fleets and squadrons. They had, as Karl IX's answers to their letters show, personal experience of the difficulties of bringing ships to sea in spring if cables, cordage, and sails were lacking. They had also experienced how deteriorating fittings hampered operations at sea. It is possible that the several Dutch armed merchantmen, which had been captured until 1610 and had since then served in the navy, had shown that Dutch rigging and sailcloth were better than Swedish. The young Gustav II Adolf, more quality-minded than his father, was willing to increase funding if he was convinced that it would result in improvements. Once the change was decided, he was unwilling to make compromises. In 1623, Rickard Clerck suggested that Danzig cloth might replace French sailcloth (canifas) for some ships, as he had little of the latter in store, but Gustav II Adolf said no.'°" Improved quality was not the motivation for the contracts, however, and it might be argued that it would be easier to control quality under direct administration than under contract. Gustav II Adolf and his naval leadership must have had other aims when they gave Rickard Clerck his first contract in 1615. The contract arranged a continuous flow of money to keep essential parts of the navy in good condition, and it gave one individual responsibility to see that these funds were used for their intended purpose. It was not only the contractor who was bound to the contract but also the king and the Treasury. They gave up the possibility to re-allocate funds to other urgent purposes, a policy which had proved disastrous in the war with Denmark. Finally, although the contract in itself did not bring in any new skills to the navy, it did have the potential to stimulate entrepreneurial behaviour

RR 26/8 1623, RA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

491

and give some scope for long-term planning. Rickard Clerck gained the opportunity to profit by planning the refits of the ships and the acquisition of necessary stores over a four-year cycle. These changes were early examples of the type of reforms introduced and implemented by Gustav II Adolf: formally appointed office-holders with defined responsibilities, predictable resource-allocation to give scope for longterm improvements, and armed forces always ready for operations. Rickard and Johan Clerck's work as entrepreneurs is little known from the sources. It is noticeable that two Scottish-born officers were given the task of introducing Dutch naval standards on cables, sails, and rigging in the Swedish navy. At least Rickard Clerck must have been regarded as a man with good knowledge of Dutch naval practice of rigging and cable-making and with useful contacts with international merchants. His career before he came to Sweden is not known, but considering that from his first appearance in 1610 he was given important senior commands at sea, he must have been an experienced sea officer."" It is possible that he had gained this experience in Dutch service, and his Scottish origin may have provided him with contacts to the several Scottish merchants who were active in Baltic ports. It is also probable that he had, or that he soon developed, good connections with Dutch merchants in Stocldiolm and elsewhere, who must have regarded this large-scale buyer of stores for one of Europe's largest navies as an interesting business partner. The tackel and tag contracts are, together with the contemporary entrepreneurial contracts for shipbuilding, examples of how the Swedish state was searching for the best available technology on the international market and how it was interested in using entrepreneurs and market forces for gaining access to it. The main result of the contracts and the king's increased spending on hemp and sailcloth was that the navy was in a much better condition during the several expeditions f r o m 1621 to 1628 than in the war years 1611 and 1612. The navy was totally mobilised in 1621, 1624,

"" Zettersten 1890, 257-58, identifies Rickard Clerck with a master shipwright Jakob Clerck, k n o w n f r o m 1606. There are indeed two letters, RR 7/10 1610 and 5/3 1611, RA (where the officer is addressed as well-born, i.e. as a n o b l e m a n ) where the m a n otherwise k n o w n as Rickard Clerck is called Jakob Clerck. In RR 3/4, 19/4, 24/4 and 31/7 1611, RA, the n a m e Rickard is used. A total change of the Christian n a m e of one individual is most unusual, and because master shipwright a n d sea officer are two different professions, I a m inclined to believe that this is a clerical error. It is not known, however, what happened to the master shipwright Jakob Clerck after 1608.

492

c h a p t e r sEVEN

and 1626-28; and in 1622-23 and 1625, most ships were in service.'"^ Cables, sails, and rigging were no longer a bottle-neck for naval mobilisation, and sustained operations during several years was possible. The navy's fittings had not been in a better condition since the 1560s.

6.7

A more ambitious policy: Aims and reality,

1629-1679

In 1629, the state took over the responsibility for acquiring and processing naval stores to fit out its warships. In the following decades, for which the sources unfortunately are scarce, the navy's policy to keep its warships with sails and cables became more ambitious. Spare sails and more anchor cables became a normal part of the ideal inventory of a Swedish warship. This policy, which markedly increased naval spending, must have been approved on the highest political level, the monarch or the regency governments. It made sense, because the navy was operating no longer primarily in the eastern Baltic but in the southern Baltic, while its stores and production facilities were concentrated in Stockholm. Kalmar, until 1658 close to the Danish border, was little used as a forward base after the experiences of 1611. The distance between the main base and the main operational area markedly increased. At the same time, the state finances were constantly strained by war efforts and war debts, and everything that was not absolutely necessary for immediate efforts might receive a low priority in the yearly allocations of funds. This created a tension between what was regarded as a desirable poHcy for cordage, cables, and sails and what was possible to achieve with scarce resources. During the period 1629-1645, the navy was totally mobilised for war service in 1629-31 and 1644-45. Because practically all ships in the navy were at sea in these years, it is obvious that their fittings were in serviceable condition and that the readiness of the navy was satisfactory. The situation between these years is not possible to study from inventories and reports of deficiencies, because such sources do not exist. Many ships were commissioned as transports and for service in squadrons that should demonstrate Swedish readiness to control the Baltic Sea. However, because anchors, cables, and sails could be

Sveriges sjokrig, 137-202.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

493

transferred between ships, this is not proof that the whole navy was in good condition. Tliere is, however, evidence of that the navy's fittings were kept in fairly good condition between 1631 and 1644. For those years for which accounts are available, it is striking that large amounts were spent on hemp and s a i l c l o t h . T h e r e were also more or less yearly shipments of hemp (together with timber) from Riga with the navy's own ships.'"" Hie navy, primarily Admiral Klas Fleming, who was also governor {overstathdllare) of Stoclcholm, arranged that the new orphan house (Barnhuset) should start weaving sailcloth (1637). This was not a long-term success, but in some years it provided the navy with rather much sailcloth. Nearly all ships built f r o m 1629 to 1634 are known to have been at sea at least once by 1635-36, proof of that they had been fitted out soon after they were launched, in spite of the much-reduced demand for operational ships after 1631.'"=^ Consequently, the navy in the period 1632-43 was in the unusually favourable situation of having a large number of ships with fairly new rigs, while wear and tear was much smaller than in the period 162131. Because few new ships had to be rigged, the continuous inflow of hemp and sailcloth recorded in accounts and letters until 1643 must have been used mainly to replace worn out fittings. Hie large volume of this inflow makes it probable that it was sufficient for that purpose. The conclusion is that Sweden, in a period during which it was deeply

"" The naval budget (sjdstat) for 1629 included 30,000 daler for outfitting of three new ships a n d refits of the other ships, Arkiv, III, 380-81; contract with Johan and Rickard (Jr) Clerck for fitting out Gota Ark and two Viistervik-built ships (Smdlands Lejonet and Svarta Hunden), AK registratur 17/2 1634, KrA; 29,670 alnar sailcloth and a r o u n d 683 skeppund h e m p purchased in 1634, O R 1634:2, KrA; expenses m e n t i o n e d m Rikshuvudbocker, vol. 42 (1633), item 4720, 32,900 daler to fit out the navy, item 4721, h e m p bought for 12,142 daler a n d sail and flag cloth for 3,918 daler, vol 53 (1637), Item 3672, h e m p bought for 8,491 daler and sail and flag d o t h for 1,668 daler, vol. 59 (1639), item 3423, h e m p bought for 6,932 daler, sail a n d flag cloth for 6,659 daler ( m d u d i n g for 1,155 daler f r o m Barnhuset); vol. 64 (1641), item 3539, h e m p bought for 13,636 daler and sail and flag d o t h for c. 12,200 daler, of which 4,242 daler f r o m Barnhuset, all RA. There is only one account of rigging between 1634 and 1650that of 1636, SH 72:3, RA. Zettersten 1903, 349-57. Shipping of h e m p f r o m Riga in AK registratur, 30/8 1636, 200 skeppund; same a m o u n t s in 12/5 1638 and 9/4 1639; 27/8 1639, 260 skeppund; 22/5 1640, 200 skeppund; same a m o u n t in 14/4 1641; 5/7 1641, 500 skeppund; 16/5 1642, 200 skeppund; same a m o u n t s in 23/7 a n d 10/10 1642, KrA. Ships commissioned for service at sea can be traced in Axel Zettersten's notes f r o m the Amiralitetskollegium's correspondence files. Axel Zetterstens arbetspapper vol. 4, KrA. ^ ^^

494

c h a p t e r sEVEN

committed to a major continental war, could maintain the expensive fittings of the largest navy it had ever had until then. The regency government must have seen control of the Baltic Sea as central in its strategy and policy. It was important for contact with Germany, for deterrence of Denmark, Poland, and potential Habsburg naval forces, and for a possible assault on Denmark at a suitable moment. This naval aspect of the Thirty Years War is normally not even mentioned, but it is visible in hemp and sailcloth accounts. After the war with Denmark in 1643-45, the navy was large, but it no longer consisted of rather new ships. Most ships were built between 1621 and 1634, and some of the Danish prizes were even older. The war years had also caused considerable wear and tear on the fittings. It is perhaps not a coincidence that yearly reports of the condition of ships and fittings exist from 1647-50. These reports and the remarks about measures to be taken against the deficiencies are probably working papers left by Herman Fleming, holmamiral from 1645 to 1650. They show a navy with increasing block obsolescence problems: aging hulls, rigs, cables, and sails. New ships were provided with rigs and sails soon after they were launched, but sometimes they had to inherit fittings from old ships. Several ships were growing too old to be worth refitting, but they usually retained a m i n i m u m level of cables and sails until they were discarded.""" From 1650 to 1660, an incomplete series of accounts and reports of the navy's condition makes it possible to follow the main lines of the Amiralitetskollegium's struggle to keep the aging ships in serviceable condition.'"^ The most urgent problem was that the hulls of several ships required major repairs or became irreparable. There was no crippling lack of fittings, and the aging hulls did provide an additional source of fittings; several discarded ships had sails, cables, and cordage which could be re-used.'"® The navy was also increasing its ambitions

Reports of the condition of the warships f r o m 1647, 1648 and 1650, AK, Varvskontoret, FVI, vol. 1; f r o m 1649, NNS, II, 12a, KrA, The inventory of 1650 is unusual as it consists of the signed original reports f r o m the ship's masters. "" Accounts in O R 1650:4, 1651:4, 1656:4, 1657:4, 1658:4 a n d 1659:5, KrA; draft accounts for 1655 (three quarters of the year) a n d 1657 in AK, Varvskontoret, GVIa, vol. 1, KrA; surveys of the conditions of the ships and their fittings in 1655 a n d 1656 in AK, Varvskontoret, FVI, vol. 1, KrA. From 1650 to 1660, 16 m a j o r warships of a r o u n d 13,000 tonnes were discarded, and a few were wrecked under circumstances that m a d e it possible to retrieve their fittings. Surviving yearly accounts show that serviceable fittings were retrieved and reused in a considerable scale.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

495

to keep the ship at sea for longer periods, however, and tried to supply its ships with more cables and spare sails for the five largest and most important sails. Hiis was a challenge in a decade when state finances were strained and all expenditures that were not absolutely necessary had to wait. From the accounts it is known that the navy spent a net amount of around 60,000 daler on naval fittings (excluding wages) in the intense war years 1657-59, including refits of several hired merchantmen. Hiese figures include outfitting of two new ships {Victoria and Andromeda), so the average yearly cost for refits was around 16,000 daler. In proportion to the size of the navy, this is about the same level of expenditure as in the 1620s, when the Clercks had kept the ships in serviceable conditions for 2 daler per last and year.'® Was this level of expenditure enough to keep the navy at sea during the major Baltic war which was fought f r o m 1655 to 1660? As shown in chapter 3, 32 major warships (300 tonnes and larger) were mobilised in 1655, 24 in 1656 and 1657, 27 in 1658 (excluding two prizes), and 26 (excluding prizes) in 1659-60. From 1657 to 1660, the navy also hired a total of 28 merchantmen as warships: 16 in 1657, 24 in 1658, and 18 in 1659. Hiey were hired with their outfits of rig, cables, and sails, but the navy had to maintain them and replace what was lost or worn out. Three main fleet actions were fought in 1657, 1658, and 1659. At least the first two actions caused severe damage to the Swedish rigs because the Danish and Dutch fleets tended to fire high. From 1658 to 1660, the navy used Landskrona as a forward base, far from the production facilities at Stockholm. From 1657 to 1660 the navy also for the first time sent several ships to sea during the winter months. The logistical efforts to keep all these ships seaworthy must have been more demanding than in the 1620s. As for fittings, the level of expenditure seems to be too low to keep the whole navy in good condition, and it is probable that it partly lived on its accumulated capital of fittings. But the bottleneck to bring more ships to sea was serviceable hulls, not a crippling lack of cables or sails. We have some sources about the navy's sails in the 1650s. In January 1654, an inventory of the sails showed that some new ships had a set of new sails and were well supplied with spare sails, but most

O R 1657:4, 1658:4, and 1659:5. The gross figures show that a r o u n d 71,000 daler were spent on warships and that fittings of a r o u n d 10,600 daler were retrieved f r o m them. Wages for sail-makers and rope-makers are not inckided, and spending on small vessels is not included every year. The calculations are approximate.

496

c h a p t e r sEVEN

had a few old sails and only one or a few spare sails. Hie inventory listed only the most urgent requirements, but it nevertheless showed that 39 ships required an additional 30,570 ulnar of sailcloth. Of this, 6,979 ulnar were available from discarded ships. A revised estimate from December 1654 showed a total requirement of 35,161 ulnur for 41 ships, apparently because the ambition to supply them with spare sails had increased."" In 1656, an inventory of the sails of 32 ships (some old ships had been discarded since 1654), prepared as a part of a report which also surveyed hulls, masts and spars, and anchors, showed that the established inventory for all ships now included five spare sails (main, fore, mizzen, main, and fore topsail). If that level had been achieved, the 32 ships should have had 467 sails. They actually had 389, of which 126 were classified as "new", 229 as half-used {halvslitne), and 34 as "old". "Old" did not mean unserviceable but may be seen as a warning that the sail was not to be relied on under severe weather. The navy had 76 per cent of its full requirement of sails in good condition. All ships had sufficient sails to serve at sea, with the exception of the old Applet, which had been stripped of the 11 sails it had in 1654 to keep other ships serviceable. This report showed that the condition of the several old ships was a more serious problem than the sails. Two large ships with serviceable sails {Nyckeln and Tre Lejon) were not commissioned after 1655 due to the bad condition of their hulls.'" The regency government of Karl XI (1660-72) continued with great determination Karl X Gustav's policy to build large warships, and in the 1660s the navy was both increased and restructured. This was done in a decade when naval spending was restricted by the finance policy, and it is interesting to see if savings were made on something less visible for foreign diplomats than the number of hulls at Skeppsholmen in Stockholm. There are several accounts f r o m these years which may be used for detailed investigations, but there are only a few sources which provide surveys of the navy's readiness for service at sea. They

Sail inventory of January 1654 in the collection of Karl Gustav Wrangel (then riksviceamiral), E 8561, RA; two drafts of this inventory dated 25/1 a n d 30/1 1654, AK, Varvskontoret, FVI, vol. 1, KrA; list of lacking sails on several ships, December 1654, M 1761, RA. AK, Varvskontoret, FVI, vol. 1, KrA. In this inventory Omen's two topgallant sails are listed as "eaten by rats".

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

497

are analysed here in order to shed hght on what actually happened under the regency years. A summary of the navy's inventory of cables, sails, and flags was prepared in 1664, probably in order to apprise officials at the highest political level of the situation. It listed 34 warships (excluding two which were unserviceable), 4 transports, and 12 small vessels (boyers). Nearly all ships should ideally have five spare sails, the largest should have six or five heavy cables, and the medium-sized and small ships should have four. The 38 warships and transports should, according to this ideal, have 162 anchor cables, 368 large sails (main, fore, mizzen and two topsails plus one spare for each sail), and 181 small sails (topgallants, mizzen topsail, spritsail, and sprit topsails). They actually had 64 new, IGVi half-used, and nV2 old cables, a total of 108. Not less than 69 new cables were required, a lack of 43 per cent compared to the desired number of 162. There were 109 new, 62 half-used, and 114 old large sails, a total of 285. Again, 146 new large sails or 40 per cent of the desired inventory were required. There were 110 small sails, 43 new, 36 half-used and 31 old and no fewer than 102 new sails were required, 56 per cent of the desired inventory. The numbers show that most but not all cables and sails listed as "old" required immediate replacement. The navy of 1664 was evidently not ready for a long war, but practically all ships had at least sufficient fittings to sail on a brief campaign. The high percentage of old sails and cables make it probable that many of them were inherited f r o m ships which had been discarded in the 1650s and that the wear and tear f r o m the war years had not been remedied. Only the two new large ships Svdrdet (1662) and Applet (1661) were non-seagoing, mainly because they had no anchor cables.'" The next detailed inventory is f r o m 1670. It contains no ideal inventory, but if the same norms as in 1664 is used, the 43 ships (including four transports) had 62 per cent of their cables, 80 per cent of their large sails, and 76 per cent of their small sails. Tliis is rather similar in proportion to the situation in 1664, but because there is no information

A c c o u n t s of fittings {tackeltrdkning), O R 1663:4 a n d 1670:4, KrA; draft accounts for 1663-65, 1667-68, 1667-68, 1670, 1672-73, AK VarvsI
498

c h a p t e r sEVEN

about how many of the cables and sails were old and due for replacement, it is not possible to say if the conditions were better, worse, or unchanged. It is conspicuous, however, that the navy's largest and newest ships suffered from the worst deficiencies. The largest ship, Kronan (2,300 tonnes), launched in 1668 had only four sails and not a single anchor cable. Of the seven ships next in size (1,350 to 1,700 tonnes), the old Kronan and Scepter were only intended to block the entrance to Stockholm and were adequately fitted for that service. But the five newer ships—Svardef, Nyckeln, Applet, Victoria, and Solen had only nine spare sails (of 25) and a total inventory of only 15 anchor cables (instead of 30). In fact, only Victoria and Solen had a sufficient inventory of anchor cables to go to sea. The other three had merely five cables, less than two on each ship. Tlie six ships of 1,150 to 1,250 tonnes {Wrangel, Draken, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, and Saturnus) had 14 instead of 30 spare sails and only 19 of 36 anchor cables. Only Wrangel and Jupiter had a sufficient outfit of cables to be safe at sea.'" Amazingly, only four of the navy's 12 largest units, the backbone of the battle fleet that should fight for control of the Baltic Sea, were actually able to go to sea in 1670. A few more could probably be commissioned if existing cables were redistributed among these ships, but it is also probable that many of the cables in the inventory (like in 1664) actually were too old to be reliable. Because most of these ships were built in the 1660s and because there were few old large ships from which they could inherit their cables and sails, it is probable that the fittings they had were new or little used. There were, however, only 19 cables of 17 turn and more, while 48 would have been required as a safe inventory for the 12 large ships, and 72 was the ideal outfit. The 29 ships of less than 1,000 tonnes (including the four transports, which could use the same sails and cables as the warships) were better off Fifteen of them had their full outfit of five spare sails, and three more had four spares. Eight of them had four anchor cables as they should have, according to standard set in 1664, and five ships even had five cables. Thirteen ships had only one or two cables or lacked cables. The 29 ships had a total 77 cables, and if they were redistributed they could provide 19 ships with four cables or 25 with three. It is unlikely, however, that all these anchor cables were in good condition, even if

AK, Varvskontoret, DVIb, vol. 1, KrA. This is the first inventory which shows the dimensions and type of sailcloth for most of the sails.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

499

it seems as if most cables listed as "old" in 1664 had been discarded, apparently with few replacements. If ships were to be sent to sea with as few cables as three, these must be fully reliable, and those which existed in 1664 were now six years older. Hie development between 1664 and 1670 is revealing for the naval policy of Karl XI's regency government. The navy had grown with an impressive number of large ships, but while it (with some redistribution of cables) had been able to send around 30 of 34 major warships to sea in 1664, in 1670 it could probably send out fewer than 30 of 39 major warships on a short campaign. Even that is a too optimistic calculation if many of the sails and cables in the inventory were old. Several of the largest ships could not be used at sea because cables of the relevant sizes did not exist. It appears as if the resources had been concentrated on providing the new large ships with at least one set of sail to bring them to Stockholm f r o m their building yards in Gothenburg, Ltibeck, and Karlshamn and to keep several smaller ships ready for more limited operations than a major war. As will be shown in chapter 7, the lack of heavy cables for the largest ships did not matter much, because these ships also lacked most of their heavy guns. The regency government was not unaware of the navy's problem. In 1666, a detailed list of what it required for one campaign was prepared. It included 1,100 skeppund of hemp and 586 pieces (probably around 32,000 ulnar) of sailcloth. On 21 December 1671, it was estimated that the navy required 2,000 skeppund of hemp to be brought up to strength. Not surprisingly, 93 anchor cables was the largest item on the list of fittings that was lacking."' Three years later, on 23 November 1674, when a major war had become probable, the Amiralitetskollegium launched what appears as an offensive to get access to the much increased funds that now had to be allocated to the armed forces. They sent a long list of what was necessary to mobilise the navy in which the total need of hemp was given as 3,315 skeppund, 13 lispund (563.7 tonnes), while its sailcloth requirement was 1,283 pieces (around 70,000 alnar)}^^ These enormous figures are surprising compared to those given in 1671. The navy had not grown larger; some of its requirements had been met in the three preceding years, but the lack of hemp had grown

NNS, II, 157, KrA. NNS, II, 160, KrA. This d o c u m e n t , which is unsigned but a fair copy, not a draft, has n o hst of ships, but an undated list in M 1761, RA, Special Fortechning, has exactly the n u m b e r of ships of various categories as in the list of requirements.

500

c h a p t e r sEVEN

around 65 per cent. The list of requirements actually divided the navy's ships in two categories. There were 32 warships, 12 boyers, and three small transports with hulls which could be used without repairs, and they required 1,512 skeppund 13 lispund (257.1 tonnes) of hemp and 385 pieces (around 21,000 alnar) of sailcloth. The other requirements were for five ships which required hull repairs and six whose hulls were in a very bad condition. They did not immediately need sails, rigs, and cables. Actually, the requirements listed for these 11 ships amounted to much more than full normal inventories of new rigs, sails, and cables (four to six cables, four or five reserve sails). Even if these ships had been entirely stripped of their cables, cordage, and sails to provide for the 32 seaworthy ships, the requirements listed for them must be regarded as an overbid from the Amiralitetskollegium, preceding negotiations with the Treasury and in the Council.'" With this list of deficiencies, it may be surprising that the navy less than one year later was able to send 35 warships and several small craft to sea. There must have been considerable remaining deficiencies in their fittings, but the fleet sailed in a stormy autumn campaign in which most ships did not suffer crippling problems with their fittings."® There are few sources that enable us to follow how the situation developed in 1675-76, but f r o m 1677-79, detailed inventories for each ship are available. They show that most warships in early 1677 had a fairly satisfactory outfit of cables and sails, not far below the standard which had been set but not achieved in the 1650s and 1660s. During 1677, considerable deliveries of new sails, cables, and fittings improved conditions even more. From 1678 there is a list of fittings supplied to 48 ships, including all major warships and hired armed merchantmen

H i e 11 ships had a total displacement of a r o u n d 7,500 tonnes. According to the list of N o v e m b e r 1674 they required 1,803 skeppund (306 tonnes) of h e m p (4 per cent of their displacement) and a r o u n d 50,000 alnar sailcloth (6 to 7 alnar per tonnes). Both figures are incredibly high, if compared to calculations f r o m the 1680s. The d e m a n d s for m e n (13,543 for the whole navy) and their provisioning look equally padded, because the ships had smaller crews in the war of 1675-79 without being undermanned. "" H i e two commissions appointed in 1674 and 1675 to investigate the problems with mobilising the fleet were almost solely concerned with m a n p o w e r and provisions and have left no sources about the ships' fittings, AK 213, AK 63, RA. An inventory of Solen, dated 1/12 1675 has survived. It shows that the ship h a d only four of its large sails (it should have five and four or five spares), n o n e of its five smaller sails and only two of its six cables, AK, Varvskontoret, DII, vol. 1, KrA. It is unhkely that this was typical for the situation after the disastrous a u t u m n expedition with the fleet in 1675.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

501

in service. It includes many lighter cables, m u c h cordage to the rigs, 18 anchor cables of 8 to 14 turn, but only around 2,000 ulnar of sailcloth. Tliere is also a list of deficiencies on 20 warships, seven armed merchantmen, and six fireships and minor craft at Kalmar on 16 October 1678, which is near the end of the campaign in that year. It shows surprisingly small requirements: one anchor cable of 10 turn, l,217y2 ulnar sailcloth and several smaller cables and fittings.'" From this it is evident that the navy's crisis in the war of 1675-79 did not have much to do with cables, sails, and rigs. There had been problems before the war and probably in 1675, but the satisfactory situation in early 1677 shows that these problems must have been solved with massive inflows of resources from war spending in 1675-76. The severe losses of ships in 1675-77 and the cautious fleet-in-being strategy which the navy had to follow in 1678-79 also markedly reduced the requirements.

6.8

Absolutism

und naval

fittings,

1680-1721

The last four decades of this study wiU be treated briefly. They were dominated by a great expansion and accumulation of resources in the navy up to 1700, a period of strained financial conditions but only limited naval war efforts in 1701-09, and 12 years of intense naval efforts (1710-21) when much of the accumulated capital was spent. As may be expected, the new naval leadership under Hans Wachtmeister was determined to follow a policy of keeping large inventories of sails, cables, and fittings and never allowed the situation that had prevailed around 1670 to reappear. Some interesting twists resulted from this policy, however.'^" From 1680 to 1684, the navy launched 16 warships of around 18,000 tonnes, a massive expansion without precedent. According to the standard used in the 1680s for fitting out warships, the navy required 450 tonnes (around 2,600 skeppund) of h e m p and around 70,000 alnar of sailcloth to launch these ships, in addition to the requirements

Inventories for warships 1677, 1678 and 1679, AK, Varvskontoret, Inventarieforteckningar for fartyg, DVIa, vols 1 - 2 (5 volumes), KrA; list of deliveries to ships and deficiencies in 1678, NNS, 11, 168:1, KrA; tackelrcikning, OR 1679:6, KrA. The m a i n source for this section are the detailed ship inventories f r o m 1684, 1691, 1694, 1695, 1697, 1699, 1701, 1706-08, a n d 1716-18, AK, Varvskontoret, Inventarieforteckningar for fartyg, DVIa, vols 3-15, KrA.

502

c h a p t e r sEVEN

necessary to refit older ships. The problems of supplying the navy with cables, sails, and fittings became acute in the years 1683-87. It is significant that summaries of the inventories of every ship were sent to Stockliolm, with all probability for personal scrutiny by Karl XI. These inventories show that the situation was strained but under control. In contrast to the 1660s, the largest ships, the fleet and squadron flagships, now had highest priority and were well supplied with cables and sails. All ships were well supplied with anchors, but the number of reserve sails and heavy cables was reduced in 1686-87. Many old sails and cables must have been discarded in these years. Total inventories were barely sufficient to send the serviceable hulls to sea, and had a war occurred, there would have been problems unless sails and cables had been produced quicldy. Summaries of inventories of the riggings also show that several of the older ships, mainly built in the 1660s, had increasingly old and deficient rigs.'^' Detailed inventories are lacking for most of the years after 1687 until 1694, but it is evident that these problems were gradually solved. Old ships were rebuilt and their rigs were refitted, and new ships gradually got their full inventories. By the late 17th century, the navy's fittings were in an optimal condition. Most ships had six anchor cables, typically a variety of new, used, and old cables; they had four or five spare sails; and the fittings were complete and in serviceable condition on all ships except those recently built, which normally were fitted out a few years after they were launched. In 1700, all of the navy's 39 battleships and practically all cruising ships were at sea. After 1700, and until the Baltic war restarted in 1709/10, the navy continued to build battleships at a steady rate. The battle fleet was nominally kept at 40 units or more, in spfte of the large war efforts in Poland and Russia. The inventories reveal, however, that until 1708 only one {Oland, 1705) of the nine battleships built after 1700 had got its complete outfitting, four had incomplete inventories, and four had no fittings at all. The situation looked strildngly similar to that of the early 17th century and the years around 1670, when new ships often remained unrigged for several years after they were launched. Nevertheless, three of these ships were commissioned for war service in late 1709, four more in 1710, and one more in 1712. It is probable that parts of their outfitting came f r o m seven battleships which were

M 1762, RA; AK, Varvskontoret, Diverse handlingar, JIV, vol. 7, KrA.

cordage and canvas: fitting o u t t h e navy

503

discarded between 1710 and 1714 but which had not been at sea since 1700. Tlie ambition to send around 40 battleships to sea had to be given up, but there were at least 34 fully serviceable ships with serviceable fittings by 1710.'^^ Hiis somewhat reduced battle fleet slowly declined, but at least in 1718, the last year in this period for which a detailed inventory exists, ships with serviceable hulls had serviceable fittings. It is probable that more fittings had been transferred from discarded ships to serviceable units. This resulted in a larger than ever number of spare sails: eight or nine on several ships. Most ships had four or five cables in good condition as well as some old and shortened cables. The latter were used in port and saved the newer cables from wear and tear. The rigs of most major ships were listed in the inventories as old or used, and only a minor portion was classified as new or good. There was evidently a growing block obsolescence problem with the rigs, which, just like the aging hulls, would create a severe crisis for the Swedish battle fleet in the 1720s. In the 1710s, these rigs were still serviceable, however. There is no obvious case when lack of fittings reduced the effective naval strength in the 1710s. If ships had to stay in port, it was typically because the huUs were worn out or because of a lack of men and provisions, not lack of cordage, cables, and sails. The largest ship in the navy, the 100gun ship Konung Karl (1694), which not had been at sea since 1712, had fittings in good condition in 1718 and was a floating reserve of spare parts for other ships. There had also been resources to fit out the several cruisers, galleys, and floating batteries that the navy had built in the 1710s. This surprisingly satisfactory status of the naval fittings in a period when the Swedish empire was falling to pieces is interesting, because it shows how the absolutist bureaucracy worked. The king and his Treasury allocated funds to the navy, but the details of naval spending

AK, Varvskontoret, Inventarieforteckningar for fartyg, DVIa, vol. 12, KrA. Of battleships built since 1702, Tre Kronor (1706), Stockholm (1708), Verden (1706), a n d Riga (1707) had no fittings in 1708, while Gota Lejon (1702), Nordstjarnan (1703), Prins Karl Fredrik (1704), and Bremen (1705) had incomplete fittings. Of these, Tre Kronor, Nordstjarnan, and Prins Karl Fredrik were first commissioned in 1709, Gota Lejon, Bremen, Verden, and Riga in 1710, and Stockholm in 1712. The discarded ships were Drottning Hedvig Eleonora (1683), Drottning Ulrika Eleonora (1684), Blekinge (1682), Victoria (1680), Wrangel (1664), Uppland (1665), a n d Hercules (1650).

504

c h a p t e r sEVEN

were now controlled by professional admirals.'" They were usually the same men who would command the fleet and squadrons sent to sea, and they knew that they were dependent on the ships for their life and reputation. The inventories of fittings show that they kept the ships well supplied with what was necessary to keep them at sea for long periods, rather than building new ships and sending them to sea with few sails and cables in reserve. The navy partly lived on capital it had saved during many years of steady investment in its fittings, but it also followed a rational policy of coordinating warship hulls with fittings.

H a n s Wachtmeister's a n d the Amiralitetskollegium's self-willed use funds, see Lars Otto Berg analysis, Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 141-45.

C H A P T E R SEVEN

BRONZE AND IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL ORDNANCE

7.1

Introduction

The combination of the heavy gun and the sailing ship is usually regarded as an innovation of decisive importance for European expansion overseas as well as for naval warfare within Europe. Efficient guns and gunnery were all-important for early modern naval power. Control of ordnance was also important for the power of the early modern fiscal-military states. It was a key component in the comparative advantage in protection-selling, which gradually gave rulers a practical monopoly on violence. Investments in guns and a permanent ordnance organisation was a high-technology venture which some rulers achieved earlier than others, and the use of heavy guns at sea was part of an ambitious strategy of state formation. Early modern guns and their use on land and at sea have been studied by several historians, especially those with an interest in war, technology, and historical transformation. Important historical studies have also been made by artillery officers with theoretical and practical training in gunnery. Historians of technology and archaeologists have been interested in late medieval guns and the development of gunpowder, but there are surprisingly few studies of early modern gun production technology and its importance for metallurgy in general.' Economic historians have showed limited interest in early modern guns as a product of advanced technology, a commodity in international trade, and a part of the equipment of the armed merchantmen

' Volker Schmidtchen, Bombarden, Befestigungen, Buchsenmeister. Von den ersten Mauerbrechern des Mittelalters zur Belagerungsartillerie der Renaissance, Diisseldorf, 1977; Kelly DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, Peterborough, 1992; Brenda Buchanan (ed.), Gunpowder: The history of an international technology, Bath, 1996; Kelly DeVries, Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500: Studies in military history and technology, Aldershot, 2002; Robert Douglas Smith and Kelly DeVries, The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, 1363-1477, Woodbridge, 2005; Brenda J. Buchanan (ed.), Gunpowder, Explosives and the State: A technological history, London, 2006.

506

chapter

seven

which traded in most parts of the world.^ Many early modern guns still exist in museums, and their number increases as maritime archaeologists recover more guns from wrecks. Tliey are under-utilised as objects for studies, especially with modern technology that may reveal much about early modern metallurgy. The use of guns at sea is normally integrated with studies of naval operations and tactics in battle, largely because guns were the predominant naval weapon from the 16th to the 20th century. Naval historians are often interested in naval gunnery, its tactical use, and the discipline it required to deliver rapid and sustained fire under combat. They are seldom interested in the metallurgic development of guns, the chemical development of gunpowder, or the technical challenges of building wooden sailing-ships with heavy armament. There are, however, major recent studies of the administration of naval artillery, especially about the number, types, and sizes of guns, the various fittings and equipment necessary to operate guns at sea, and the armament plans of warships.' The next step for historians interested in naval technology might be to study the development of naval artillery in interaction with warship technology, naval policy and the use of violence by both

Carlo Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 14001700, London, 1965, was a pioneering effort in synthesis. The early m o d e r n weapon trade, with emphasis on Dutch-Swedish connections, has been treated by Klein 1965/1999 a n d Jong 2005. ' A survey, particularly useful about black powder ballistics, is John F. Guilmartin, Jr, "Guns and Gunnery", Robert Gardiner and Richard W . Unger (eds). Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: The sailing ship, 1000-1650, London, 1 9 9 4 , 1 3 9 - 5 0 . ^ 6 English navy; Michael Lewis, Armada Guns: A comparative study of English and Spanish armament, London, 1961 (the information about Spanish naval a r m a m e n t is dated, but the text about English o r d n a n c e is valuable); Adrian B. Caruana, The History of English Sea Ordnance, 1523-1875: I, The Age of evolution, 1523-1715, Rotherfield, 1994; Adrian B. Caruana, The History of English Sea Ordnance, 1523-1875: II, The Age of the System. 1715-1815, Ashley Lodge, 1997; the informative survey in Lavery 1987, 80-150, and the armam e n t appendices in Frank Fox, Great Ships: The battlefleet of King Charles 11, London, 1980, 183-96. The French navy: Jean Boudriot a n d H u b e r t Berti, L'artiUerie de Men Marine francaise, 1650-1850, Paris, 1992. The Danish navy: Egon Eriksen a n d Ole L. Frantzen, Dansk artillerie i Napoleonstiden: Eorudsaetninger og udvikling, 1760-1814, Copenhagen, 1988, 194-378 (by Ole L. Frantzen); Mortensen 1999. There are few studies about the artillery in the early m o d e r n Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese navies. John F. Guilmartin, Jr, "The Early Provision of Artillery A r m a m e n t on Mediterranean W a r Galleys", MM, 59, 1973, 257-80; 1. A. A. T h o m p s o n , "Spanish A r m a d a guns", MM, 61, 1975, 355-71; Thompson 1976, 2 3 4 - 5 5 and David Goodman 1997, 145-51, are brief but informative about Spain, de Jong 2005, 5 4 - 9 2 and Augusto Salgado, "Portuguese Galleons' A r m a m e n t at the End of the Sixteenth Century", IX Reunido Internacional de Historia da Ndutica e da Hidrografia, Cascais, 2000, 277-92 provide important information about D u t c h and Portuguese naval guns during brief periods.

bronze and iron: swedish naval ordnance

507

navies and private interests at sea. A path-breaking study of that type about early modern guns on Mediterranean galleys has been made by John F. Guilmartin. Similar studies of guns and sailing-ship technology are lacking although there are seminal attempts to look on the problem from new perspectives."* The lack of studies about the interaction between metallurgy and shipbuilding reflects a traditional separation between the history of guns and the history of both naval administration and private entrepreneurship at sea. Consequently, important questions are not answered, often because they are not even asked. Historians are left with the impression that the introduction of gun-armed sailing warships was a one-time revolution in naval warfare, after which little happened until the mid-19th century. Actually, warship design, metallurgy, and gunpowder technology underwent major changes between the 15th and 19th centuries. The cost of producing guns was drastically reduced, the weight of armament in relation to the size of the ship was much increased, and the efficiency of gunpowder was improved. Tlie cumulative effects of these improvements radically increased the destructive power of the smooth-bore gun, but the causes, timing, dispersion, and resuh of these innovations are still too little known. The development of the gun-armed warship was, to a considerable extent, the integration of gun technology with maritime technology. Changes in the performance and cost of guns influenced naval architecture as well as naval policy and the use of guns on privately owned merchantmen.' This is a chapter about how much firepower the Swedish state could deploy in struggles about control of the sea. It is focused on the timing of quantitative and qualitative changes in the navy's inventory of ordnance and how the inventory of available guns matched the capacity of ships available to carry guns. The chapter puts special emphasis on changes in the relation between the weight of the armament on warships and their displacement and the price relations between bronze and cast-iron ordnance in the 17th century. These questions are important in a general European context of interaction between innovations in metallurgy and warship technology. The chapter is not a study of Swedish gun production, metallurgy, and gunpowder chemistry or

Guilmartin 1974. Some i m p o r t a n t articles are L. G. Carr Laughton, "Early T u d o r Ship guns", MM, 46, 1960, 242-85; N. A. M. Rodger, "The Development of Broadside Gunnery, 1450-1650", M M , 82, 1995, 301-24; Parker 1996. ^ Brief oudines of the problem in Glete 1993, 35-51, and Glete 2000, 17-32.

508

chapter

seven

how guns were used in combat. It will show that guns were investments with long durability and that the maintenance of a permanent navy also required a long-term ordnance policy, but it also shows the great importance of wars on short-term changes in the navy's inventory of guns. Total firepower (the total weight of round-shots fired from all available guns) in relation to the displacement of the ship will be used as a rough indicator of the development of Swedish naval gunnery and for comparisons with other navies. It would be better to use the total weight of the armament on the warships and relate it to their displacements, but the relevant sources are either not available or would require a detailed critical discussion which cannot be included in this chapter. The chapter is primarily written from administrative sources about guns, munitions, and equipment related to Swedish warships. For the 1540s through the 1620s, the main archival series are gun inventories of ships filed in Skeppsgdrdshandlingar at Riksarkivet and accounts of guns delivered to and received from warships from the ordnance organisation, filed in Arklirdkningar at Krigsarkivet!' From 1630 to 1645, the main sources for naval guns are the yearly ledgers {Artillerihuvudbdcker) of Krigskollegiums ordnance office and the accounts {Arklirdkningar) of the Stocldiolm ordnance depot. None of them have information about how individual ships were armed.^ From 1645, the navy took full administrative control of its ordnance, but unfortunately the naval accounts about guns have suffered much destruction. The naval ordnance ledgers (Sjoartilleribdcker) which were kept from 1637 are lost, as are the inventories of guns and armament stores which were kept by the warships' master gunners.® Only accounts for some years up to 1721 remain in Orlogsflottans Rdkenskaper at Krigsarkivet, and only

The series Skeppsgardshandlingar (SH) is supplemented by Strodda Militiehandligar f5re 1631: 2, Handlingar angaeiide flottan (SMHF) and by several naval ordnance papers f r o m the 1620s and 1630s in SS, section Z, all RA. Arklirakningar (AR), KrA is supplemented by o r d n a n c e accounts in Strodda Militiehandlingar fore 1631: 1, Handlingar angaende a r m e n (SMHA), vols D 1 - 4 , RA. ' Krigskollegium, Artilleridepartementet, Riikenskaper (KAR), Artillerihuvudbdcker, 1634-45 and Krigskollegium, Artilleridepartementet, Rakenskaper, Sveriges och dess besittningar, Stockholms slotts arkli (KARS), Arklirakningar 1630-46, KrA. ® List of Sjoartilleribdcker in Kammararkivets ambetsarkiv till och m e d 1921, Generalregister, Civila och militara, huvudsakligen centrala rakenskaper, vol. 2, RA, fols 70-71. A surviving master gunner's inventory f r o m the ship-of-the-line Pommern in 1722, N N S II, 459, KrA.

bronze and iron: swedish naval o r d n a n c e

509

a few of them show the inventory of naval guns and how individual warships were armed. Scattered but useful 17th-century sources may be found in other archival series. The most important of them are the Militaria series at Riksarkivet, which holds letters and memoranda sent to the king and the central administration, the provisionally filed papers in Nya nummerserien, and Karl Gustav Wrangel's collection of naval papers.' Hie history of the Swedish artillery organisation and the production of guns have primarily been written by artillery officers f r o m the army. Tliey have been interested in artillery as a weapon system on l a n d The only similar study about naval artillery, by C o m m o d o r e Magnus Hammar, is about the 18th century, when army and navy artillery were separated into two organisations. The studies of Colonel-lieutenants Theodor Jakobsson and Jonas Hedberg about the Swedish artillery until the mid-17th century include all guns owned by the state, but they really are focused on guns as an army weapon. Most guns in their studies were actually produced for the navy, however, and it is not possible to understand why they existed without discussing the size and structure of the navy. These studies, which are standard works on the subject, will be used in this chapter for information about production of guns and Swedish gun technology. The chapter intends to explain why most of the guns in the Swedish ordnance inventory were produced and to explore the interaction between naval policy and gun technology.'"

' Especially vols M 1761-1762, M 1779, M 1848 a n d M 1850, RA; N N S II, esp. 12a, 12b, 133,144,145,157,166:1 a n d 4 0 8 , K r A ; Skoklostersamlingen, vols E 8560-8561, RA. Swedish naval artillery: M a g n u s H a m m a r , "Overstyrelsen och vapenutveckling (1696-1803)", Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 281-331. Bertil Ahlund, Historia kring flottans kanoner, Marinlitteraturforeningen, Karlskrona, 1998 is for this period based on an uneven literature. Sv^edish artillery in general a n d a r m y artilllery: Jakobsson 1938; H i e o d o r Jakobsson, Artilleriet under Karl Xll-tiden, Stockliolm, 1943; Hedberg 1975; Hedberg 1985; Jonas Hedberg, Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid, Stockholm, 1982; G u n n a r Grenander, "Artilleriets pjiiser och a m m u n i t i o n " , Jonas Hedberg and Hans Ulfliielm (eds), Kungl. Artilleriet: Karl XI:s och Karl XILs tid, Stockholm, 1993, 65-112. Studies about Swedish g u n p o w d e r p r o d u c t i o n in a socioeconomic context: Thomas Kaiserfeld, "Saltpetre at the Intersection of Military a n d Agricultural Interests in Eighteenth-Century Sweden", in Buchanan 2006, 142-57; H i o m a s Kaiserfeld, "Chemistry in the W a r Machine: Saltpeter p r o d u c t i o n in eighteenth-century Sweden", in Brett D. Steele a n d Tamera Dorland (eds), Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the art of war through the Age of Enlightenment, Cambridge, Mass., 2005, 277-92.

510

C H A P T E R SEVEN

7.2

Gun

technology

Swedish gun technology followed the same pattern of development as in other major European navies from the early 16th to the early 18th century. Early guns in use at sea were small and primarily infantry weapons that could inflict damage on the enemy crew. Such guns remained in use in large number during the 16th century. Guns firing heavy shots were originally developed for siege warfare, but f r o m at least the late 15th century they were also used at sea. From the 17th century, such guns were mass-produced for ships. Early guns were made by blacksmiths from wrought-iron staves formed into a tube fastened by iron hoops shrunk around it. The tube was open at both ends, and the gun was consequently breech-loaded. The loading mechanism consisted of a separate chamber into which the shot and the powder charge were placed. Tliis mechanism, as well as the thin wrought iron, could not withstand very high pressure, and such guns could only be fired with weak charges of powder. The larger guns of this type were originally intended for stone-shots, often of great calibre. Large-calibre stone shots were fairly efficient, even when fired with a small charge of gunpowder, but round stone-shots were expensive to make. Gradually, shots of iron became more common, and stone-shots were largely phased out from military and naval service during the 16th-century. Smaller wrought-iron guns were made until the mid-16th century and remained in use until the early 17th century, but in declining numbers. They had one advantage: breech-loaders could be loaded more quickly than muzzle-loaders, but their effect on hulls of major ships was too limited to motivate their retention. The alternative to wrought-iron guns for a long time was guns cast in bronze; copper mixed with tin, in Sweden often referred to as copper guns." They became more c o m m o n in the mid-15th century and appeared at sea from the late 15th century. The technology to cast bronze had been known since antiquity and required less heat than to cast iron. Cast guns could be made with thicker barrels than wrought-iron guns and without the open rear end of that type of gun. Consequently, they could resist high pressure when fired with large charges of gunpowder. The effect of an iron-shot from such a gun was

" In English, such guns were traditionally called brass guns, but m o d e r n brass is an alloy of copper and zinc.

bronze and iron: swedish naval o r d n a n c e

511

greater than that of a stone-shot from a wrought-iron gun and much greater than an iron-shot from such a gun. Major bronze guns could penetrate the hulls of wooden ships unless these were reinforced to resist gun-shots. Muzzle-loaders had slower loading procedures than open-ended guns with breech-loading, but this was regarded as acceptable because they had more effect. Muzzle-loading became the normal method of loading until the mid-19th century, when mechanical engineering opened new possibilities for breech-loading. Bronze was very expensive, however, and the number of such guns increased only slowly over several decades as a result of long-term policies to build up inventories of heavy ordnance. Bronze guns were an investment with an eternal life; they could be sold for their high metal value or recast as new guns at a low cost in comparison to the value of the metal. The loss of bronze guns with a ship was a major financial loss, because the guns might cost as much as the ship. The third breakthrough in gun technology was the introduction of the cast-iron gun. Iron is much cheaper than copper, but due to the higher temperature and more advanced metallurgy required, reliable cast-iron guns were more difficult to produce. Iron tended to harden before all of it was poured into the mould, and this created weaknesses in the guns. The lower cost of iron was of no value if the production process was unreliable, and a large number of guns failed in tests. If they exploded in action, they could cause serious loss of men and damage to the ship, which made gun-crews reluctant to fire them with large charges of gunpowder. The solutions were the use of iron ore with few impurities, a carefully calculated mix of iron ore and charcoal, and blast-furnaces with capacity to supply sufficient molten iron to the mould before the hardening b e g a n . T h e s e pre-conditions and competencies were difficult to combine, and the development and spread of cast-iron gun technology became a protracted process. Small iron guns were easier to cast than large guns, and it had to wait until the second half of the 17th century until cast-iron was normally used for the heaviest types of guns. From the 1540s, English iron guns were cast in considerable numbers for the navy, for armed merchantmen, and for export. Denmark imported many such guns in the 1560s, when the Danish navy had to

Brief outline of tlie problems with p r o d u c i n g pie-iron for aun-foundinaGrenander 1993, 127-29.

512

chapter

seven

be quicldy rearmed in competition with the Swedish navy's numerous bronze guns. Cast-iron guns, however, in the 16th century were regarded as much inferior to bronze guns for naval service. The EngHsh navy used them only to a limited extent, and the Danish navy in the early 17th century was largely rearmed with bronze guns in a major investment program undertaken by Christian IV before and after the war with Sweden in 1611-13. The English navy's reluctance to use iron guns several decades after the foundation of a viable domestic industry for such guns shows that there must have been unsolved quality problems far into the 17th century. It took a century of development after the 1540s until dependable cast iron guns could be mass-produced at competitive cost. As this chapter will show, the decisive change took place in a brief period f r o m the 1640s to the 1660s. The reduction in the cost of guns was an important precondition for the rapid growth of the European battie fleets which began around 1650, although the explanation for their growth is political rather than technological. The paths of this development is little studied, but the breakthrough occurred in the same period in two technological traditions, the English and the Swedish gun-founding industry. The latter had been initiated in the mid-16th century by the Vasa dynasty, and by around 1600 considerable progress had been made, with skills imported from the English, German, and Walloon iron districts. From the 1620s, this industry rapidly developed as an export business, mainly because Dutch capital and entrepreneurship exploited Sweden's abundant resources of iron ore, forests for firewood and charcoal, and water power to provide forced draught to the furnace process. The export market for Swedish cast-iron guns originally was primarily Dutch armed merchantmen, but the Dutch navy may have been the first of the major navies to radically change its armament pohcy and make cast-iron guns the normal type of gun already before 1650. The French navy imported many Swedish-made cast-iron guns through Dutch merchants, England used a large number of Swedishproduced cast-iron guns captured from the Dutch, and Denmark continued largely to rely on imported Swedish cast-iron guns even after domestic production had started at Norwegian ironworks in the late 17th century. France developed domestic production of cast-iron guns in the latter half of the 17th century, but the navy had problems with the supply of such guns during naval competitions with Britain in the 18th century. Spain developed domestic production capability of cast-

bronze and iron: swedish naval o r d n a n c e

513

iron guns in tlie 1620s, like in Sweden, with gun-founders from Liege. Venice, which began to build a major sailing fleet in the 1670s, started domestic production of cast-iron guns to arm it.'' Sweden's position as a large producer of copper and cast iron provided the navy with unusual opportunities to make choices and led the country to turn mineral resources and the gun-founding industry into strategic assets. In the 16th century, the domestic resources of copper were exploited to give the navy a technical advantage over other Baltic powers. In the 17th century, the large export-oriented gun-foundry resources could very rapidly increase the navy's firepower with highquality guns.

7.3

Gun types and calibres

Naval guns were made in various sizes and types." Like in other European countries, Sweden's 16th-century bronze guns were primarily of two main types. The largest were rather short but had thick metal and a large calibre. This type was, in the Nordic countries and in Germany, called kartaun or kartog (with several spellings), while it was known as cannon {canon) in Latin countries and England. Numerically more important were the long, medium, and small calibre type of guns called schlange in Germany, slanga in Sweden, and culverin (coulebrine) or some similar word in Latin Europe and England.'' The smallest type of artillery in Sweden was called/fl//co«ett. Guns made of wrought iron or cast iron were also called slanga and falkonett, while the wrought-iron equivalent of the large-calibre kartog was called stone-gun {stenbdssa).

France: Boudriot & Berti 1992, 9 - 1 2 ; Rene M e m a i n , Le materiel de la Marine de guerre sous Louis XIV: Rochefort, arsenal modele de Colbert, Paris, 1937, 809-62; James Pritchard, Louis XV's Navy, 1748-1762: A study of organization and administration, Montreal, 1987, 143-59. England: Caruana 1994, 111. D e n m a r k - N o r w a y : Eriksen & Frantzen 1988, 34-37; Ole L. Frantzen, "Svenske stobejernskanoner i dansk tjeneste 1660-1814", in Fred Sandstedt and Tliomas Roth (eds), Athena och Ares, Stockholm, 1999, 147-60. Spain: Goodman 1997, 146-51. Venice, Guido Candiani, "Tiburzio Bailo e i cannoni di Sarezzo. Politica navale e forniture militari nella repubbhca di Venezia durante la Prima guerra di Morea (1684-99)", Societd e storia, 102, 2003, 677-708. The m a i n studies about gun inventories a n d the p r o d u c t i o n of guns, gunpowder, and gun-shots for the Swedish navy and a r m y until the 1650s are Jakobsson 1938, 25-68, 164-85, 208-51, 266-85; Hedberg 1975, esp. 190-^231, 287-330; Hedberg 1985, esp. 45-98, 121-43. In early 16th-century English, the words curtow a n d sling were used but were replaced by cannon and culverin, see Carr Laughton 1960.

514

chapter

seven

Kartoger, slangor and falkonetter were made in different sizes, typically separated by being called whole, three quarter, half, or double and single. Hie degree of standardisation of calibres behind these classifications is rather uncertain, although most 16th-century ordnance organisations attempted to enforce standard calibres on new production. Because many guns had a long life and were frequently captured or bought from other countries, standardisation of calibres was, in practice, a difficult task. Sixteenth-century gunners believed that long guns had greater range. Modern research has shown that a gun length beyond eight to ten feet added little extra muzzle velocity and range as long as black powder was used. Long-range gunnery at sea was of limited use in any case, because the smooth-bore guns seldom hit a moving target further than a few hundred metres away. Long guns had their advantages, however. Guns were usually cast with their muzzles up, and the density and strength at the bottom of a casting increased with the mass above. This made long guns stronger at the breech, where the greatest strains would occur at firing, and such guns could be fired with more powerful powder charges.'® Tliere were also many small gunpowder weapons, called falkoner and hakar in Swedish, which fired shots of less than one pound. Numerically they dominated the inventories of armament on most European warships until the late 16th century. Uncritical reading of the sources has sometimes led to the conclusion that these ships were heavily armed, when in fact they seldom had more than a rather limited number of fire weapons of calibres that later counted as naval guns. These light weapons survived in the 17th century but were mainly used as boat armament and on small armed craft. They were only suited for close range fire on personnel exposed on deck, and their disappearance from the major warships may be interpreted as a change in naval tactics to less emphasis on close-range combat and boarding. This disappearance, however, was contemporary with the appearance of the heavy musket as a normal infantry weapon, replacing the lighter and less powerful arquebus.'' Because musket-armed soldiers (musketeers) were a normal part of the crew in the 17th century and later, warships did in fact retain considerable capacity to engage in close-range fire with light firearms. But muskets were personal weapons administrated

Guilmartin 1974, 277-91. " See, for example, Guilmartin

1974, 145-49, 274-76.

bronze and iron: swedish naval o r d n a n c e

515

by infantry units, while the large number of 16th-century light "guns" had been administrated by the ordnance organisations and issued to the ships. In the early 17th century, radical changes took place in several naval ordnance inventories. Tlie long guns of the slanga (culverin) type were shortened, while heavy-calibre guns often were cast with thinner barrels. The distinction between the two types to a large extent disappeared in new production of guns, although guns of smaller calibres were usually made longer in proportion to their calibre than large calibre guns, probably a result of practical experience with black powder ballistics. The older types of guns usually had a weight of 200 to 300 times the weight of the round-shot they fired, while guns cast in the first half of the 17th century could be as light as around 100 times its shot. Danish naval ordnance, which from around 1600 was directed by Christian IV, became for several decades dominated by such guns, and they were favoured in Swedish gun production under Gustav II Adolf. Tliey were also common in the Dutch Republic, where light-weight guns were called draaken. In the 1620s, that type spread to England, where it was called drake.'® It is probable that practical experience with guns by 1600 had shown that the kartog (cannon) type had unnecessarily thick metal and that the long slanga (culverin) type did not have a much longer range than shorter guns. Shorter and lighter guns were also easier to handle, they could be mounted higher in the hull, and they put less strain on the hull. The high cost of copper made it important to economise on metal, and reform-minded rulers must have wanted to gain more fire-power from their investments in expensive bronze ordnance. In the case of Gustav Adolf, his new light field artillery was successful because light guns were more mobile in land combat and because men and horses were very vulnerable to gunfire, even f r o m small guns. Guns with thin barrels must be fired with lighter powder charges than guns with thicker metal, however, so the velocity and, consequently, effectiveness of the shot was less. Against major warships built to resist gunfire, this was a drawback. Most 17th-century navies combined lighter guns with heavy and long guns. The latter type was particularly useful as bowand stern-chasers. Because few guns could fire straight forward and

Danish o r d n a n c e under Christian IV; Otto Blom, Kristian den jjerdes artilleri, hans toihuse og vaabenforraad, Copenhagen, 1877. Swedish o r d n a n c e under Gustav II Adolf: Jakobsson 1938. English early Stuart ordnance: Caruana 1994, 47-68.

516

chapter

seven

Straight aft from a sailing warship, it was important that the effect and range of these guns was great. During the 17th century, naval guns generally became heavier in relation to their calibre. They were redesigned in order to achieve more effect on warships, which gradually became larger and more resistant to gunfire. The growth of battleship size and the increased weight of guns on such ships became, from the mid-17th century, a competition between offensive and defensive power which dominated batffeship and naval gun development until the 20th century. Naval guns weighing around 175 to 250 times their shots became c o m m o n from the latter half of the 17th century. Because most naval ordnance inventories were composed of a mixture of very heavy 16th-century guns and 17th-century light, medium, and heavy guns, the total weight and effect of the armament of a warship or fleet is complicated to estimate without detailed armament lists stating the weight of individual guns. The calibres of early modern guns are usually expressed in the weight of the round shot which the gun fired. This is a convenient measurement because the effect of a gun is related to the weight of the shot. This effect, however, is also related to the size of the gunpowder charge, and light-weight guns consequently have less effect than heavier guns of the same calibre. There are other problems, too. The weight of the shots was expressed in pounds, and there were several different pounds in use, sometimes even in the same country. There was a considerable difference between the calibre of the gun and the diameter of shot. Guns were classified either by the weight of a nominal shot of the same diameter as their bore or by the weight of the shots which they actually fired. The difference between the gun's nominal calibre and the diameter of the shot was called windage. It was necessary to have such a difference because early modern guns could not be made with perfectly smooth, round, and straight bores, nor could shots be made perfectly round and smooth. If a margin of safety did not exist, shots might get stuck in the barrel when they were loaded or fired. This windage was markedly smaller for bronze guns than for early cast-iron guns, which were less easy to cast with exactness. Production technology improved during the 17th and 18th centuries, however, and the windage was gradually reduced. At least in Sweden, the calibres of the guns remained fixed while the shots grew larger and heavier for the same calibre. W h a t looks like a straightforward system was in reality complicated, and its practical implementation in various states is far from well known.

bronze and iron: swedish naval Table

7.1

Type of gun

Normal

Swedish

Calibre, skalpund

(Hel)

Kartog

3/4

kartog

112

kartog

Notslanga Faltslanga 3/4

slanga

1/2

slanga

Dubbel Enkel

falkonett falkonett

Stormstycke,

short

Stormstycke,

long

Fyrpilstycke Falkon Mickhake Hakar,

smaller

Potthund Mdrsstycken,

types of bronze

small

40 30 20 20 10 7 3 2 1 (3) (3) (2) 1/2 y4 1/5

ordnance guns,

Length, meters 4.15 4.15 3.56 5.35 3.12 3.27 2.97 2.67 2.08

to 4.46 to 3.71 to 4.60 to 3.41 to 3.27

-

1564-1615

Weight, tonnes

3.8 to 4.35 3.3 to 3.5 2.2 3.3 1.36 to 1.63 0.95 0.48 to 0.54 0.34 0.17 0.27 0.20 to 0.27 0.20 to 0.27 0.08 0.04

-

-

-

-

-

517

-

0.04 0.014

Sources: Jakobsson 1938, 35-37; SMHA, D 3, 104, RA, which also Usts variations in length and weight. The calibres of stonnstycken and fyrpilstycken are actually the weights of the charge of the gunpowder they were fired with. Hiere were several types of smaller hakar, n o n e of t h e m in production Sweden in the latter half of the 16th century, although m a n y were captured. Their calibre is only approximate.

The calibres of the guns made in the Swedish ordnance organisation were standardised already in the 16th century, but there are uncertainties about when that happened or what the caUbres were. Production of bronze guns under Gustav I was centralised to the ordnance depot in Stockholm from at least the 1530s, so it is probable that guns were made to standard calibres, but little is known about this. In 1564, when a large program of gun-founding was in progress, the weight, length, and calibre of nine types of guns were established in an agreement between Erik XIV and his master gun-founders. Because most of the guns in use until the early 17th century were cast in the years 1563-70, these calibres became the standard Swedish calibres. The types of guns were the same as those cast at Stockholm since at least the 1530s, and because round-shots that seem to fit to the 1564 establishment were made before that year, these calibres may be the same as those used earlier. For convenience, guns up to 1615 are referred to in this chapter

518

chapter

seven

by their calibres in pound rather than by their name, even though the degree of cahbre standardisation is uncertain." In the 17th century, European ordnance organisations began to classify guns by the weight of the shots they fired or theoretically were bored to fire. In Sweden this occurred in 1616, as part of a broad reform program. The new calibre system was based on the Niirnberg system from 1540, where the pound was 0.51 kilogram.^" Guns became classified as 24-pounders, 12-pounders, 6-pounders, and 3-pounders, the four most common calibres in the new system. Evidence from several surviving bronze guns show that the nominal calibres used in this system (approximately) were those of the Niirnberg system, where a diameter of a 24-pounder gun was 146 m m . The weight of the shot in this system was around 7/8 of the nominal calibre, or 10.7 kilograms for a 24-pounder gun. In the system of 1616, Swedish gun-shots were to be of the same weight as the calibre of the gun, but in Swedish skalpund (425 grams). This meant that a 24-pounder shot had a weight of 10.2 kilograms, a larger windage than in the Niirnberg system. During the 17th century, the windage for Swedish bronze guns was reduced, and it became normal to count it as one pound for every ten pounds of the weight of the shot. It is not entirely clear how this was calculated, but the result was that the weight of a 24-pounder shot grew to 11.1-11.2 kilograms.2' The introduction of cast-iron guns caused further complications. They were more difficult to make perfect than bronze guns, and the bore corroded more rapidly and became more uneven when the gun was used or grew old. Consequently they were made wider than bronze guns that fired shots of the same size. In Swedish 17th-century gun pro-

" Jakobsson 1938, 35-36, 55-56. U i e calibres of 1564 are in the contract expressed in the weight of what the gun should "shoot" (in skdlpund of 425 grams), and one undated list of the types of guns cast in the 1560s states that this is the weight of the gunpowder charge, S M H A D 3, 104, RA. It is possible that the shot a n d the charge h a d the same weight, as this was c o m m o n until the mid-16th century but it is not certain; see Hedberg 1975, 228-29. The diameters of various calibres are not k n o w n for certain, because surviving 16th-century Swedish guns may have been bored to larger calibres in the 1610s. ™ Josef Aim, "Artillerimattstocken", Meddelande, Armemuseum, 15, Stockholm, 1954, 5 - 1 5 , suggests that the Niirnberg system m a y have been used in Sweden already u n d e r Gustav I, but he uses the calibre of a gun m a d e in 1535, five years before the it was introduced, as evidence. It is possible that the gun was re-bored later, because it was used until 1628, when it was lost in a ship-wreck. '' Jakobsson 1938, 272-76; Jakobsson 1943, 230; Hedberg 1985, 76-77. 10/11 of 24 Niirnberg p o u n d s is 11.13 kilograms and 11/10 of 24 skalpund is 11.22 kilograms.

bronze and iron: swedish naval o r d n a n c e

519

duction, cast-iron guns typically had twice the windage of the bronze guns, or two pounds for every ten pounds of the weight of the shot." Furthermore, cast-iron guns meant that new standard calibres appeared, primarily 18- and 8-pounders, which were common for exported cast-iron guns but not used in Gustav II Adolf's calibre system. In the literature about Swedish 17th ordnance, it has not been observed that this originally caused considerable confusion, at least in lists and accounts of naval ordnance. In the 1640s and 1650s, iron gun calibres are variously listed as 20-, 14-, 9-, and 4-pounders or 18-, 12-, 8-, and 3-pounders for what without doubt were the same guns.^^ Hie larger calibres must refer to the nominal bore, measured according to the same method used for bronze guns, while the smaller calibres must be those of the actual shots, measured in the same way as shots made for bronze guns. With all probability, bronze and iron guns used the same shots, which meant that an iron gun required a larger calibre than a bronze gun with the same nominal rating. At least in naval lists of guns from the 1660s, it was normal to classify iron guns with the weight of the shots they fired. An iron 24pounder thus fired the same shot as a bronze 24-pounder, or around 9/10 of 24 Niirnberg pounds of 0.51 kilograms (about 11 kilograms). This was complicated and may have been the origin of the several attempts which, from the 1650s, were made to reform the Swedish calibre system. This took a long time, and a new system was not established until the 1680s. The calibre problems and the introduction of a new Swedish system of measurement have been treated several times by specialists in artillery history, but the results are contradictory. The evidence from naval sources shows that bronze guns in the latter half of the 17th century were classified with the same nominal calibres as in 1616 and that iron guns had the same nominal calibres they had got by the 1660s. In 1705, a new standard system for the army

'' Jakobsson 1943, 230-31. " An a r m a m e n t plan of 1645 lists iron guns as 18-, 14-, 6-, and 3-pdrs, while a plan f r o m 1648 lists t h e m as 20-, 14-, 6-, and 3-pdrs, b o t h M 1848, RA. H i e navy's ordnance accounts {Artillerirdkning) for 1650 lists the c o m m o n types of iron guns at the beginning of the year as 20-, 14-, 6-, and 3-pdrs, but the 3-pdrs are reclassified as 4-pdrs by the end of the year: OR 1650:5, KrA. The same account for 1651 lists the same guns as 20-, 14-, 6-, and 4-pdrs, O R 1651:5, b u t next year the 20-pdrs are listed as 18-pdrs, OR 1652:6, all KrA. A r m a m e n t plans f r o m 1653-54 variously list the calibres for iron guns as 18-, 14-, 9-, 6-, and 3-pdrs or 18-, 12-, 8-, 6-, and 3-pdrs, M 1761 and E 8561, RA. In plans f r o m 1658-59, there are m a n y 14-pdrs but no 12-pdrs. After 1660, a r m a m e n t plans have n o iron 14-pdrs but n u m e r o u s 12-pdrs.

520

C H A P T E R SEVEN

and the navy was introduced, with reduced windage and increased weight of the shot for every calibre. An iron 24-pounder now fired a shot of 11.8 icilograms and had a caUbre of 155 millimetres, a calibre which that size of iron gun indeed may have had when it was introduced several decades earlier with a larger windage. Shots made to this system were probably too large to be fired by the old bronze guns with their Niirnberg calibres, but these older guns were now few in number. No evidence has been found of that they were bored to suit the new system.^"* The conclusion is that the weight of shots in skdlpund (of 425 grams) of the standard calibres from 1564 may be used for calculations of firepower of Swedish guns from the mid-16th century until the reforms of 1616. From then, the weight was at first the nominal rating of the gun in skdlpund, rising to around 9/10 of 510 grams during the 17th century. After 1705, the nominal rating of the gun in pound should be multiplied by 0.5 to get the approximate weight of the shot in kilograms. Tlie size of the navy's artillery will primarily be expressed in this chapter as the total weight of the shots fired of all its guns. From the preceding discussions, it is obvious that this is a very rough measurement and that it does not reflect the fact that the guns were of widely different weights in relation to the weight of the shot they fired. It overestimates the size and effect of the artillery in the first half of the 17th century in comparison to the 16th century and the period after the mid-17th century. It may be less misleading in comparisons between different navies in the same period, however, because there were similarities in European gun development. It would be better to measure the quantitative development of the artillery on warships with the weight of the guns. That measurement is closely related to the cost and effect of the guns and shows the development of ships' ability to carry heavy weights on their decks. Unfortunately, lack of sources and of studies of relevant sources makes it difficult to use weight for comparisons.

Aim 1954 dates the new system to 1662. Jakobsson 1943, 92-93, 230-33, and 341-43, dates it to 1684; Hedberg 1982, 24, gives another version; and Grenander 1993, 70-73, shows a m o r e compUcated picture with m o r e than one system in use at the same time. These authors have not used the naval sources and have not discussed whether the reforms of m e a s u r e m e n t were connected with the compUcations of having different caUbres for bronze a n d iron guns.

BRONZE AND IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL ORDNANCE

521

Swedish sources give very little information about where guns were mounted on warships. It is only f r o m the 1650s that it became usual to make armament plans with guns divided according to the decks {lag) they were mounted on, and there is practically no information about how many (if any) guns normally were mounted as chase guns, firing forward and aft. From other navies (England, Denmark) there is some evidence that the distances between gunports in the 16th and early 17th centuries were considerably wider than later, when the distance was determined by the m i n i m u m space necessary for the guncrews. The number of heavier guns in Swedish armament lists makes it probable that Swedish warships looked very much the same until the early 17th century. By the 1620s, new ideas were prevalent, and Vasen (launched 1627) has around the same distance between the gunports as became normal in the 17th and 18th centuries. From the late 17th century, the number of broadside ports are known from drawings and written sources, often produced after 1721. These make it possible to deduce that guns in excess of the number of broadside gunports were mounted in forward or aft positions. Nothing at all is known about how guns were mounted in the 16th century, when it is possible that tactical ideas made it useful to m o u n t as many guns as possible in forward and aft positions rather than in the broadside. By the 1620s, broadside mounting probably was most prevalent, and on Vasen (1628), few guns were mounted forward and aft. In contrast, the wreck of Kronan (1668, lost 1676) shows that a battery of at least eight unusually long guns were mounted aft, probably four 24-pounders on the lower deck and four 12-pounders on the middle deck. The number of guns in this ship's armament plan shows that it also must have been intended to m o u n t a number of guns in forward ports, perhaps on all three battery decks, but because the fore part of the ship is totally destroyed, no archaeological evidence is available.^'

7.4 Swedish naval ordnance: Production and organisation For more than a century of the period covered by this study there were no separate army and navy organisations for guns and gunners

^^ Jan Glete, Kronans artUleri: Kort genomgdng av arkivmaterial och data om bargade kanoner, 2002, http://www2.historia.su.se/persoiial/jan_glete/, based o n information f r o m Lars Einarsson, Kalmar lans m u s e u m , Kahnar.

522

C H A P T E R SEVEN

in Sweden. For an even longer time, warships had no permanent inventory of guns. Up to the second quarter of the 17th century, the Swedish ordnance was a technology-oriented, centralised organisation which supplied guns, munitions, and gunners to ships, castles, siege operations, and army forces operating in the field. Most guns could serve both on land and at sea, and especially in the early period, large guns were scarce and had to be deployed according to urgent policy requirements. The majority of the guns in the ordnance organisation, however, were an essential part of the rulers' naval policy, and their existence was a decisive part of Swedish sea power.^® The central ordnance depot at Stocldiolm was geographically integrated with the main naval base. W h e n warships were laid up, their guns were normally stored in the ordnance depot and disappear from the accounts of guns serving on ships kept in the naval accounts (Skeppsgdrdshandlingar). In the ordnance accounts {Arklirdkningar), there was no separate listing of guns intended for warships, although by the 1620s, most bronze guns were by their names divided according to type: siege guns, ship guns, and field guns. In practice, the vast majority of the heavier guns in the Swedish ordnance inventory were intended for the king's warships, and even when the army was involved in major wars on the continent, these guns remained at the ordnance depot at Stockholm. The typical naval guns were half kartoger, fdltslangor (or hela slangor), 3/4 slangor, and half slangor, until the 1610 the same as 20-, 10-, 7-, and 3-pounders, and nearly all guns of these types at Stocldiolm were intended for the navy. Fortress guns were listed in the local gun accounts of the fortress. Lighter guns at the Stockholm depot were also used as field artillery, but because the army usually was at war such guns were used on campaigns and most guns remaining in Stockholm were intended for the navy. The specialized light field artillery (regementsstycken) developed by Gustav Adolf in the late 1620s had no use at sea, and from that time, small guns were finally separated into naval and army artillery. The heaviest guns, firing shots of 30 pounds and more {dubbelkartoger, helkartoger, 3/4 kartoger), were siege artillery, but a few of them were used on the largest 16th-century warships.

The standard works on the undivided o r d n a n c e organisation are Jakobsson Hedberg 1975, and Hedberg 1985.

1938,

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL ORDNANCE

523

Stockholm was also the centre for casting of bronze guns, where guns were made under royal administration. Hie exception was the period 1630-50, when most bronze guns were cast at the large copper mine at Falun {Stora Kopparberget). They were made under contract but with the state in control of production and export. The traditional wrought-iron guns were made under royal administration close to the iron districts, but that production ceased around 1560. In the 1560s, state-administrated production of small cast-iron guns began, but it did not continue when the demand for guns was reduced after 1570. The entrepreneurial Duke Karl (Karl IX) continued to cast iron guns as part of his development of the dukedom's industrial potential of minerals, water-power, and forests. From the 1590s, a more regular production of cast-iron guns began, and Karl invited English, German, and French (Walloon) gun-founders to improve the technology. When Karl became regent and later long, his gun-founding enterprise became a state-administrated monopoly. From around 1600, iron guns were cast in larger size than earlier (3/4 slangor), and from the first years of the 17th century, the navy had a considerable n u m ber of cast-iron guns. Duke Karl's ingenious architect and iron-master Willem de Besche, a member of a family of technicians who had immigrated from Liege, turned out to be especially successful in organising iron gun-founding." During the 1610s, Swedish cast-iron guns became attractive on the European market, especially in the Dutch Republic. The young Dutch merchant Louis de Geer, born in Liege, became interested in them. In contrast to Karl IX and his grand-father Gustav I, Gustav II Adolf was uninterested in acting as a business entrepreneur. Instead, he was very interested in using opportunities to develop Swedish industry and trade, and he required an efficient arms industry for his wars. The ambitions of the new Vasa rulers and the Dutch merchant suited each other well. Around 1620, the state launched a new policy of leasing its industrial establishments, especially shipyards and ironworks, to private entrepreneurs rather than running them and the mercantile organisation under royal administration. The state expected to gain

"27 Jakobsson 1938, 28-29, 40-42; Hedberg 1975, 316-22. Biography of Willem de Besche and his brothers by Bertil Boethius, SBL 10.

524

CHAPTER SEVEN

incomes by taxes and export duties rather than through profit f r o m production and trade.^® Tlie new poHcy inchided ironworks producing guns, which were leased to a number of entrepreneurs who were interested in this promising market. By 1627, Louis de Gear, who worked together with Willem de Besche and his brothers, had gained a dominant position in the production and international marketing of Swedish cast-iron guns. De Geer became a Swedish citizen (partly to escape f r o m the Sound Toll) and greatly expanded production of guns and other types of weapons in his Swedish enterprises. For a few decades, he held a unique position in European weapon production, usually exporting around 1,000 guns every year, hi the latter half of the 17th century, ownership of Swedish gun-producing ironworks spread to a few other Swedish and foreign families, and a stable pattern of gun-production, divided between a number of ironworks including de Geer's Finspong, lasted into the 19th century.^^ It is not obvious that de Geer achieved any marked improvements in the quality of cast-iron guns beyond the level achieved by his partner de Besche and others under royal administration. Interestingly, the Swedish navy was not convinced of the quality of these guns, and all existing cast-iron guns in its inventory were transferred to the army and to fortresses around 1633. De Geer's rapidly expanding export of such guns probably resulted from increased demand, competent management and quality-control, financial resources, and successful marketing rather than any dramatic technical break-through in the 1620s. The growth of large-scale domestic production facilities for cast-iron guns was an advantage for the navy, making such guns available if required. It would take some time, however, before the navy made use of this possibility. During the reign of Gustav Adolf, the Swedish ordnance organisation was gradually separated into an army and a navy branch. The army's gunners were organised into a regiment, while navy gunners were placed under the administration of the admiralty, f r o m 1634

28 ^ s u r v e y of t h e early m o d e r n Swedish i r o n industry: K a r l - G u s t a f H i l d e b r a n d , Swedish Iron in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Export industry before the industrialization, Stockliohn, 1992. Dahlgren 1923; Klein 1965, 2 4 4 - 8 3 ; de Jong 2005, esp. 2 1 0 - 1 1 . E x p o r t statistics: Carl H e i j k e n s k j o l d , "Svensk s t y c k e g j u t n i n g o c h l o d s t o p n i n g av j a m u n d e r p e r i o d e n , 1540-1840", Artilleri-Tidskrift, 64, 1935, 5 7 - 8 0 .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

525

the Amiralitetskollegium. The navy also formed its own staff of ordnance officers (tygojfficerare). Tlie guns during the 1620s were formally divided into army and navy guns (fdltstat, skeppsstat); and in 1632, the navy's inventory of munitions, gun carriages, and gunnery equipment was administratively transferred f r o m the Stockholm castle's ordnance depot to the navy. The accounts of 1632 show that it also had been intended to transfer the guns to the navy's administration, but for some reason this was delayed. It had to wait until 12 November 1645, when 948 guns, the bulk of the guns at the Stockholm ordnance depot, were transferred to sjdstaten, that is, to the navy's accounts (now largely lost).'" These changes were probably related to the fact that the Stoclcholm castle was no longer used as an ordnance depot when the court and the bureaucracy required additional space. The army's depot was moved in 1642-43 to new buildings (present-day Army Museum), while the navy probably moved its guns to the new base at (the new) Skeppsholmen in Stockholm, which was established in the 1640s. For several decades, the navy's ordnance officers continued to keep guns not required for ships in commission under central control. Prior to 1691, there are no sources which show that all the navy's ships (or rather their chief gunners) had an inventory of guns when they were laid up. It is possible that this was a result of administrative reforms in 1689-91, although it may also reflect a change of policy in the 1680s, when naval leadership was much concerned to keep every ship in a high degree of readiness. At least f r o m the early 1690s, the warships had a permanent inventory of guns f r o m the time they was built until they were discarded, just like they had a permanent inventory of sails and cables. Changes in this armament became increasingly rare, and a stable pattern for arming warships had been established by the end of the 17th century and lasted until the 1780s, when light-weight guns of large calibres were again introduced in the Swedish navy. For a study of how the navy armed its ships, plans showing the established or intended armament are important, especially if they also include a list of available guns and the lack and surplus of guns in relation to the ideal establishment. Guns had much longer lives than ships, 16th and early 17th-century warships were not designed to carry a specified armament, and they were often armed with available guns rather than with an ideal armament. Sailing warships were flexible;

KARS, A r k l i r a k n i n g a r , 1632, 1645, KrA.

526

CHAPTER SEVEN

gun platforms could be armed with widely different armaments, provided that it was not too heavy for their hulls or too top-heavy for their stability. The earliest lists of armament of Swedish warships, f r o m 1541/42 and 1544, are plans of how existing guns were or should be distributed on existing ships during mobilisations of the entire navy. The first known document which provides an "ideal" armament plan (and a manning plan) and a comparison with available guns is f r o m 1579. It was probably made because several new ships were being completed and it was obvious that the existing inventory of guns was insufficient. No more such plans have survived (if they ever were made) until the 1610s. In the 1620s, almost yearly plans were produced, although many of them are short-term plans for how ships should be armed for the coming operational seasons and suggested ways to fill gaps in their armament. After that, long-term plans for how the navy ought to be armed were made from time to time. They often show a considerable deficit of guns in the inventory compared to the desired armament for the whole navy, and there were many changes in how individual ships were to be armed, even within brief periods of time. After the final break-though for cast-iron guns in the 1670s, the navy normally had as many guns as it required for all its ships. The difference between "ideal" and real armament plans practically ceased to exist, and from the 1690s, armament plans are practically the same as the real inventories of guns on every individual ship. Armament plans and ship designs were also standardised to such an extent that ships were separated into distinct sizes, carrying homogeneous armament, for example large two-deckers with 24-, 12-, and 6-pounders and small two-deckers with 18-, 8-, and 4-pounders. 7.5

Early Vasa naval ordnance,

1521-1557

Gunpowder weapons had existed in Sweden during the 15th century, and the regents who ran central administration had had an ordnance organisation with both bronze and wrought-iron guns. Little is known about the size of its inventory or the extent to which guns were used at sea before 1520. In 1520, Christian II gained control of these guns when he was acknowledged as king of Sweden and gained access to Stockholm. W h e n Gustav Eriksson started his rebellion in 1521, he originally lacked guns. Christian II's navy is known to have been heavily

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

527

armed for its time, and it would require heavy guns as well as ships to fight it.3' Hie ships which Gustav bought from Liibeck in 1522 brought with them heavy guns for siege operations, and at least some such guns must also have been used at sea. Gunfire from heavy guns on ships is mentioned during the action against Danish warships in the Stocldiolm archipelago in 1522, the b o m b a r d m e n t of Visby in 1524, and the attack against Lubeckian merchantmen at Reval in 1534. Several large wrought-iron guns were found in the 1990s on the wreck of one of Gustav's early warships, lost in 1525. These guns were carried as cargo in the hold but are known to have been used on the fleet flagship Lybske Svan during the Gotland expedition in 1524.^^ In the early 1530s, bronze guns must have been cast in considerable number, because Gustav I asked for a "bell tax", according to which every church should send one of its bells to his gun foundry. It led to a peasant rebellion {Klockupproret, "the Bell rebeflion") but apparently also to the founding of new bronze guns. In April 1535, the king could boast that his flagship Store Kravelen was well supplied with "whole and half kartoger, whole and half slangor and other heavy guns" and that other ships were also well armed.^^ At least the kartoger must have been of bronze, but from what is known from the Swedish gun inventories of the 1540s, it is likely that most of the large-calibre guns of the fleet sent out to fight Liibeck in 1534-36 were stone-guns. This armament was efficient enough to decide the battle of Bornholm against Liibeck's fleet (including the major Danish warships) without traditional boarding and combat with infantry. Tlie first inventories of the new royal ordnance are f r o m the early 1540s. There are four important documents: a list of guns at Stocldiolm on 9 March 1542, a list f r o m 1541 or early 1542 of guns on (or intended for) ten sailing warships and four galleys, a list of guns at Stoclcholm on 12 October 1544, and an undated list of guns on (or intended for) ten sailing and ten galleys which probably was made in connection

' ' Medieval Swedish artillery: Hedberg 1975, 7 0 - 1 3 3 . G u n s o n C h r i s t i a n II's w a r ships: Mortensen 1999, 8 5 - 9 3 , 3 2 9 - 3 1 . '' GR 9, 166 (12/7 1534); Adams 2003, 8 0 - 8 5 . " GR 10, 124 (23/4 1535). I n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t naval o p e r a t i o n s in this c h a p t e r is f r o m c h a p t e r 3 unless o t h e r w i s e m e n t i o n e d .

528

CHAPTER SEVEN

with the October 1544 inventory.^'* If the 1542 and 1544 inventories are compared with the two hsts of guns for ships, it is obvious that the bulk of the guns were intended for the navy. The exception is primarily the heaviest bronze guns (two notslangor, three kartoger and five 3/4 kartoger), of which only one notslanga is listed on a ship: on the great galley Draken in 1541/42. Tliese guns, together with some of the half kartoger, were siege guns, probably also intended to defend Stockholm from a seaborne attack. Three of the 12 bronze half kar toger in 1542 are listed on warships in 1541/42, as are ten of 19 half kartoger in 1544. Fifteen of the 16 bronze slangor which are listed were on the four galleys in 1541/42. In 1544, 31 of 35 bronze slangor were on ships and galleys, and lighter bronze guns were also listed in the ships' inventories. The inventory of wrought-iron guns was also largely intended for the navy. Tlie largest were two stone-guns of 18 turn, called "the Devil" and "the Devil's Mother", and twelve stone-guns of 10 turn, called "the Apostles".^' These 14 large guns in 1544 (and probably also in 1541/42) were the main armament of Store Kravelen, which shows that stoneguns still must have been regarded as powerful instruments of warfare.'*^ Of the 73 stone-guns of 5 to 9 turn in the 1542 inventory, 58 were on the ships in 1541/42. In 1544, 52 of 74 were on ships and the larger of them were important parts of the major sailing warships' armament. Of 78 iron slangor, 73 were on ships in 1541/42, as were 54 of 58 in 1544. Skeppskvarterstycken were, as their name indicates, intended for ships, and they as well as most of the skerpentiner were on the ships, especially in 1544. These rather light wrought-iron breechloaders by the 1540s were the old-style naval armament, with little effect on major carvel-built warships, but probably with good effect on small vessels and on m e n in close-range combat.

« S M H F 1:5, S M H A D 1, 10 a n d 12, RA. A c o p y of t h e list of g u n of 12 O c t o b e r 1544 is i n c l u d e d in t h e list of g u n s o n 20 warships. A s u m m a r y of t h e i n v e n t o r y of 9 M a r c h 1542 is p r i n t e d in Hedberg 1975, 457, a n d a t a b u l a t e d s u m m a r y of t h e two lists of g u n s o n ships in Glete 1977, 9 7 - 9 9 . These 12 g u n s are listed as 11 turn in the i n v e n t o r y of 1542, b u t all o t h e r lists a n d a c c o u n t s until t h e late 16th c e n t u r y list t h e m as 10 turn. H i e first sheet in t h e list of g u n s o n w a r s h i p s f r o m 1541/42 in S M H F 1:5, RA is missing. It a l m o s t certainly listed t h e g u n s o n Store Kravelen, a n d b e c a u s e n o n e of the 14 heaviest s t o n e - g u n s are m e n t i o n e d elsewhere in this list, t h e y w e r e p r o b a b l y listed o n that ship.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

529

Tliere must also have been some guns on castles outside Stockholm not recorded in these inventories. However, it is known that Gustav paid little attention to fortifications until the 1540s and that the political situation did not allow him to safely deploy a major part of his ordnance far from his personal control. Even the important border castles Alvsborg, Kalmar, and Viborg had for brief periods between 1525 and 1534 been controlled by men in rebellion against the king. It is therefore probable that the Stocldiolm inventories of 1542 and 1544 show the bulk of the king's ordnance inventory at that time. Despite the lack of sources before 1540, the lists f r o m the early 1540s make it evident that most of the guns had been acquired to arm the warships which the king had built, bought, or captured in the first two decades of his reign. Some pre-1521 Swedish guns and some captured Danish guns f r o m the war of the early 1520s may be parts of the inventory, together with guns bought f r o m Liibeck in the 1520s and captured on that city's ships in 1534-35. The two l8-tum stoneguns with infernal names may have been part of Sweden's pre-1521 inventory.^^ No gun foundry accounts have survived f r o m the 1520s and the first half of the 1530s, but those f r o m 1535 to 1545 show that only a few bronze guns were cast in 1535-40.^® Most of the bronze guns which existed up to 1541 are therefore likely to have been cast in the late 1520s and early 1530s. Because the inventory of 1541 is dominated by 13 heavy guns {kartoger and notslangor), they are likely to have been cast to provide the new king with a m o d e r n siege battery and to arm the new Store Kravelen. The new royal navy was created with the intention of making full use of m o d e r n gun technology, and the Swedish ordnance organisation was mainly created to arm the navy. The two organisations were closely intertwined, and it was the sailing and oared warships that made the bulk of the guns mobile for offensive operations on both ships and fortresses. Heavy guns could be landed when convenient—for example in autumn 1535, when a few heavy guns from the Swedish fleet were used in the siege of Kronborg (Helsingor).^'

Hedberg 1975, 8 5 - 8 6 . H i e earliest g u n f o u n d r y a c c o u n t s are in S M H A D 1, RA. See especially no. 1 for an a c c o u n t of h o w c o p p e r a n d tin w e r e used b y t h e royal g u n f o u n d e r in 1535-45. In a d d i t i o n to guns, h e also m a d e b r o n z e kettles f o r ships a n d b r o n z e wheels for rigs. '' Hedberg 1975, 367.

530

CHAPTER SEVEN

Most of Gustav I's bronze guns in the typical "naval calibres" were cast in the years 1541-45 when 17 half kartoger, six faltslangor, three 3/4 slangor, and 14 half slangor were made. From 1546 until 1557, production was concentrated on lighter types of gun: half slangor, falkonetter, falkoner, and mickhakar of both bronze and wrought iron. Tlie production of heavier bronze guns suited for warships (half kartoger, faltslangor) practically ceased after the mid-1540s.'"' Because the financial situation was good in thus period, this shows that the king thought that by 1545 his navy was well supplied with modern ordnance. No more stone-guns were made, but most of those in existence in the early 1540s remained in 1560 and served on the major warships in the 1560s. This production pattern is consistent with what we know about the size and structure of the navy. The number of major warships increased until the early 1540, but it rather declined after that, while the number of minor sailing warships and galleys increased. The guns which had been acquired by the mid-1540s were sufficient for the navy that King Gustav intended to maintain, and he did not see the need for further modernisation with bronze guns. There was also a lack of competition in modern naval ordnance in the Baftic, which became obvious in the 1560s when the Danish navy went to war with a largely obsolete armament. Gustav may have known that he had established a superiority that was unthreatened until his death. There are no plans or inventories of armament for the major Swedish warships f r o m 1544 to the late 1550s, but because the total inventory of guns of "naval calibres" remained stable f r o m 1544/45 to 1558, the firepower of a mobilised fleet in these years would have been the same as in 1544. Several minor warships, galleys, and armed merchantmen were commissioned in these years, and after 1550, the armament of individual ships can be followed from the ordnance accounts. The galley fleet was mobilised for the Russian war in 1555 and was, in accordance with Gustav I's ideas, provided with a combination of heavy bronze guns and lighter wrought-iron guns with breech-loading. The continued production of small wrought-iron guns until 1560, the year when the old king died, may not be a coincidence.""

^ Jakobsson 1938, 27-29. The a r m i n g of ships f r o m 1550 to 1558 are in AR 1550/2, 1551/3, 1553/2, 1554/3, 1555/1, 1555/2, 1555/6, 1556/2, 1557/1, KrA. The a r m a m e n t o n t h r e e m i n o r w a r s h i p s a n d 16 galleys in 1555: Glete 1977, 100-01. G u s t a v I's o r d e r to use b r e e c h - l o a d i n g g u n s o n galleys in letters 22/1 a n d 23/1 1543, GR 15, 21, 3 8 - 3 9 .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

531

The English navy is the only European sailing navy for which there are sources to make a detailed comparison of Gustav I's inventory of naval guns. These sources have also, to a considerable extent, been published, primarily the gun inventories of 1514 and 1546."'^ Henry VIII had built and bought several large ships armed with large-calibre guns already in the 1510s. From the mid"1530s, he made major investments in warships and guns with the resources confiscated from the Catholic Church. By 1546, Henry had a navy of 53 warships of around 18,000 tonnes displacement compared to the ten sailing warships of around 5,000 tonnes sailing and the ten galleys of around 1,500 tonnes listed in Gustav I's 1544 list of naval guns."*^ The English ships were armed with bronze guns and wrought-iron guns (for stone and iron shots) and a small number of the new cast-iron guns. Tiie total armament was 256 bronze and 1,752 iron guns, although 1,319 of these were light anti-personnel weapons firing shots of a half pound or less."'"' There were 232 bronze guns firing shots of 4 to 64 pounds and 401 iron guns firing shots of 3 to 10 pounds. Most of the latter were stone-guns. In contrast to the Swedish navy, there were no largecalibre wrought-iron stone-guns. Tlie total firepower in pounds f r o m these guns can be approximately calculated, if it is assumed that the guns were of the same calibres as those which became normal later in the 16th century. Hie English navy could fire around 3,500 pounds of shots (of 453 grams) from its bronze guns compared to around 400 pounds (of 425 grams) for the Swedish navy while the later could fire around 1,800 pounds from iron guns to around 3,800 pounds for the English navy. If the comparison is related to the displacement, the Swedish navy could fire 0.33 pound per tonnes while the English could fire 0.39 pound per tonnes. The English navy had a great superiority in heavy bronze ordnance (89 guns of 18 to 64 pounds compared to 10 half kartoger of 20 pounds) but no equivalent to the 25 large-calibre stone-guns (7 to 18 turn firing shots of 14 to over 200 pounds), which apparently was a

" C. S. K n i g h t o n a n d D. M. Loades (eds), The Anthony Roll of Henry VIII's Navy, A l d e r s h o t , 2000, which also has an i n v e n t o r y of 1514. See also Can Laughton 1960 a n d Caruana 1994. M y i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t total n u m b e r of g u n s , their calibres, a n d t h e weights of shots in t h e 1546 list is f r o m Caruana 1994, 6 - 2 1 . This is a slight overestimate, b e c a u s e t h e 1546 roll includes Mary Rose of a r o u n d 1,000 t o n n e s a n d a r m e d with 15 b r o n z e a n d 91 i r o n guns. That ship s a n k in 1545. The Swedish ships h a d 269 light a n t i - p e r s o n n e l g u n s , b u t t h r e e of t h e largest h a d n o n e at all, so t h e i n v e n t o r y of s u c h g u n s c a n n o t be c o m p l e t e .

532

CHAPTER SEVEN

highly regarded weapon in Sweden. Both navies had in recent decades acquired ordnance inventories with the tactical aim of fighting ships with large-calibre guns. 7.6

The great expansion,

1558-1570

New production of larger guns began in 1558, at the same time as the number of major sailing warships began to increase. The ordnance policy closely followed naval policy. The beginning of the war with Denmark and Liibeck in 1563 was also the start of a mass production of Swedish bronze ordnance, which by the end of the decade had resulted in a gun inventory that would shape the structure of Swedish naval ordnance for half a century. Except for the heaviest kartoger, most of these guns were cast for the navy. At the end of 1568, 1,450 of the 2,024 bronze guns in the Swedish ordnance were on warships. Tliis vast program may have cost more than investments in warships in the 1560s—a large part of the increased navy was captured—but it was also a long-term investment in naval power that outlived the many new warships of the 1560s. The great expansion of capacity to cast guns and the several new types of guns introduced in this period were in themselves entrepreneurial achievements. Erik XIV was very interested in military and technical innovations, and for his ordnance he had a highly skilled leader in Gilius Packet, a German who f r o m 1554 to his death in 1575 served as gun-founder, military engineer, and for some years also as Master of Ordnance.''^ If converted into firepower in pounds, calculated according to the standard calibres of 1564, production of bronze guns of the typical "naval calibres" of 3 to 20 pounds was 683 pounds 1558-62 and 3,164 pounds in 1563-70. The total weight of these guns was between 500 to 600 tonnes of bronze, and the most intense years of production were 1563-65. The production of guns of these calibres amounted to 42 half kartoger (20-pounders), 158 fciltslangor (10-pounders), 77 3/4 slangor (7-pounders), and 298 half slangor (3-pounders). Of lighter guns, 152 falkonetter (1- and-2-pounders), 499 falkoner (1/2-pounders), and 69 mickhakar (1/4-pounders) were cast in 1563-65, primarily for the navy. New types of special guns were 256 bronze and 25 cast-iron

H i e n u m b e r of b r o n z e g u n s in 1561 was 621. I n v e n t o r y of 1561 a n d 1568/69: Jakobsson 1938, 3 0 - 3 1 . Gilius Packet: Hedberg 1975, 142-43, 3 1 1 - 1 2 .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

533

stormstycken for hailshots (made in 1563-70), 101 bronze and 21 cast\von fyrpilstycken (for burning arrows, made in 1565-70), and 175 very light mdrsstycken (top-mast guns, made in 1565-69). The hailshotfiring guns were also intended for the field artillery, but they were distributed to most major warships in 1564-65. Thirty-four stone-guns (calibre unknown, but probably small), made for a few new large warships in 1567-68, were the last wrought-iron guns made in Sweden. They were apparently intended to fire hail-shots of small stones."*® Tlie production of wrought-iron guns practically ceased after 1560, and only 86 small cast-iron guns were cast in 1560-68. Nevertheless, the total number of iron guns in the Swedish gun inventory increased from 1,504 in 1560/61 to 2,997 in 1568/69."' This was the result of the capture of a large number of guns f r o m enemies during the war, most of them by the navy. It also reflects that wrought-iron guns were c o m m o n and widespread in the Baltic in the 1560s. It was the Swedish bronze inventory which was unusual, and at sea it gave Swedish warships greater power to damage ships at a distance. Of the 2,997 iron guns which existed in 1568/69, 1,092 were on warships, but only around 100 of these were 3-pounders or larger. Tlie large number of warships in commission f r o m the early 1560s and the large number of valuable guns which they carried made it necessary for the Treasury to prepare detailed special accounts of the navy's armament. From this and later decades we have not only accounts of guns and ammunition delivered f r o m the Ordnance to the ships but also accounts of what happened within the fleet, including the many transfers of guns between ships. This has created a very useful series of sources which makes it possible to study how every ship was armed, changes in the armament, the number of shots for every gun, expenditure of shots, types of gun carriages, equipment for guns, etc. These sources are unusual for the 16th century and can be used for detailed studies of naval gunnery in its formative age. In this chapter they can only be used for a brief survey of how the navy was armed."*®

P r o d u c t i o n : Jakobsson 1938, 2 7 - 2 8 . W e i g h t of g u n s , S M H A . D 3, 104, RA. " Jakobsson 1938, 3 0 - 3 1 . O r d n a n c e a c c o u n t s of i m p o r t a n c e f o r studies of naval a r m a m e n t 1 5 5 8 - 7 0 are p r i m a r i l y t h o s e of t h e Stockliolni o r d n a n c e d e p o t {Stora arkliet, Stockholms slott), AR 1558/3, 1559/3, 1559/4, 1560/5, 1560/6b, 1561/6b ( 1 5 6 1 - 6 3 ) , AR 1561/8, 1562/4, 1563/10, 1564/21, SH 12:6, RA (1565, b y an old m i s t a k e placed in t h e SH series), AR 1565/22, 1566/2, 1567/1, 1568/2, 1 5 6 9 / l c ; t h e K a h n a r o r d n a n c e d e p o t , AR 1563/9 ( 1 5 6 3 - 6 5 ) , AR 1564/20b, 1565/7, 1566/13, 1569/19, 1570/20; t h e Alvsborg o r d n a n c e

534

CHAPTER SEVEN

Old and new major warships were gradually commissioned f r o m 1559 to 1562, and even though they were not immediately intended for war, they were well armed. Compared to the 1540s, they had many more bronze guns (mainly 20-, 10-, and 3-pounders), few wrought-iron guns for iron-shots, but several large calibre stone-guns. No new such guns had been made since at least 1540, but they were still regarded as important. Even the large Mars, which during its brief operational life in 1564 was almost entirely armed with bronze guns, still had four stone-guns."*' They were evidently regarded as useful on a prestige ship with a very modern armament. Mysteriously, there are no more stoneshots in the ordnance accounts and inventories at Stocldiolm or at the ships after 1555, and it is possible that the smaller stone-guns were used to fire hail-shots.^" But it is not clear what happened to the stoneshots which had been in store, and it is possible that they existed and were used but for some reason were not included in the accounts. The use of several large-calibre stone-guns on the largest warships in the early 1560s and the gradual reduction of their number at sea in this decade may be due to the stone-shots being gradually expended and regarded as too expensive to replace. New warships built and armed between 1563 and 1570 were provided with bronze guns and a small number of wrought-iron guns. A few quick-firing breech-loaders were apparently still regarded as useful.

d e p o t , AR 1562/14; the V i b o r g o r d n a n c e d e p o t , AR 1562/17, S M H A D 2, 57 (1567); t h e A b o o r d n a n c e d e p o t , FRA 845 (1560), AR 1562/18; t h e V a r b e r g o r d n a n c e d e p o t , AR 1565/17, all AR at KrA. A c c o i m t s of guns, a m m u n i t i o n , a n d artillery e q u i p m e n t o n ships 1558-70, S M H A D 1, 35 a n d D i p l o m a t r a k e n s k a p e r , vol. 3 ( 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , SH 8:5 (1562), S M H A A 2, (1562), SH 9:3 (1563), S H 12:3 (1563/64), AR 1564/14 a n d AR 1564/15 (by an old m i s t a k e placed in t h e w r o n g series), SH 12:3, 12:5, 12:7 (1565), SH 15:3, 15:4 (1566), SH 18:1, 18:4, SH 19:7, S M H A D 2, 61, M 1272, A R 1567/3, (1567), S H 20:5, 20:12, S M H A D 2, 64), A R 1568/12, KrA (1568), S H 23:1, 23:3, 23:4, AR 1569/15, 1569/16, (1569), SH 24:9, 26:2, S M H A D 3, 70:1, AR 1569/8, 1570/4, 1570/15, 1570/16, (1570), all at RA, except AR at KrA. The a r m a m e n t of t h a t f a m o u s ship has in t h e literature o f t e n e r r o n e o u s l y b e e n given as 173 guns. It was actually 107 g u n s , two hela kartoger (40-pdrs), t w o tre kvarts kartoger (30-pdrs), two notslangor (long 2 0 - p d r s ) , seven halva kartoger ( 2 0 - p d r s ) , 10 fciltslangor (10-pdrs), f o u r tre kvarts slangor (7-pdrs), 20 halva slangor ( 3 - p d r s ) , six dubbla falkonetter (2-pdrs), a n d 50 falkonetter O/2-pdrs) of b r o n z e a n d f o u r s t o n e g u n s , two of 8, o n e of 7, a n d o n e of 5 turn. T e n of the 50 falkonetter w e r e at t h e t i m e of the ship's loss (31 M a y 1564) o n its large b o a t (esping) a n d so w e r e saved, AR 1564/14, 1564/15, KrA, The weight of Mars' g u n s is n o t m e n t i o n e d in t h e a c c o u n t s , b u t if t h e y h a d t h e s a m e w e i g h t as that of t h e g u n s c o n t r a c t e d in 1564, the total w e i g h t was 72 t o n n e s of b r o n z e . ™ Jakobsson 1938, 39.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

535

Firepower was dominated by the long slangor, 10-, 7-, and 3-pounders; the kartoger, mainly 20-pounders, were only used in small numbers on the larger ships. Only the two largest, Mars and Neptunus/Rode Draken, had more than half of their firepower from very heavy guns: 20-, 30-, and 40-pounders. Warships also still had many light antipersonnel guns. Captured warships and armed merchantmen were rearmed as quicldy as possible with new Swedish bronze guns. The change in the composition of firepower was very marked during the 1560s. The firepower of 19 warships in commission 1560-62 was composed of 41.5 per cent bronze guns, 18 per cent wrought-iron guns for iron-shots, and 40.5 per cent wrought-iron guns for stone-shots. In late 1568, the 56 ships which were armed had 79 per cent of their firepower from bronze guns, 12 per cent f r o m iron guns for iron-shots, and 9 per cent from stone-guns, although it is uncertain if the latter still had stone-shots. The navy was armed with two 40-, two 30-, and 36 20-pounders of the kartog type; six long 20-pounders {notslangor), 126 10-, 56 7-, and 256 3-pouncler bronze slangor; 451 light guns and special weapons (2- and 1-pounders, guns for hailshots and burning arrows) of bronze; and 515 anti-personnel weapons of bronze. Tliere were also 1,092 fire weapons of iron, but only 19 of these were 10pounders; 76 were 3-pounders. The spread of heavy bronze guns led to a marked decline in firepower in pounds in relation to the displacement in tonnes, from 0.29 pound per tonnes in 1560-62 to 0.23 in 1569. These figures are deceptive, however, as the effect of shots fired from bronze muzzle-loaders was much higher than from wroughtiron breech-loaders.'' Tlie weight of the armament actually carried by different warships is not on record. It is possible, however, to make a rough calculation based on the normative weight of various types of bronze guns stated in 1564. It is known that these norms were not strictly followed; several bronze guns were older or of foreign origin, and most ships also had a number of wrought-iron guns with weights which only can be guessed. If these limitations are accepted, it is nevertheless of considerable interest to see that seven of eight of the largest Swedishbuilt warships of the 1560s show very similar results. St Erik (1,100 tonnes, 1559), Hector (1561/2, 900 tonnes), Mars (1,800 tonnes, 1563),

A r m a m e n t of ships in service 1560-62: Glete 1977, 102-03; o n 56 w a r s h i p s in late 1568, SH 23:3, RA.

536

CHAPTER SEVEN

Tantheijen (1565, 700 tonnes), Neptunus/Rode Draken (2,000 tonnes, 1566), Valen (probably 1,400 tonnes, 1566), and Kdmpen (900 tonnes, 1568/69) had armaments with a weight of around 4 per cent of the ships total displacement. The exception is the smallest, St Christoffer (1562/3, 600 tonnes), for which the armament was around 3.5 per cent. Hiese displacements have primarily been estimated f r o m other sources than armament lists: Idster, lists of crews and the circumferences of anchor cables. The armaments are those of 1570 except for Mars for which it is that of 1564. Hiere are few opportunities for comparison to other navies. At present there is only one: the weight of the armament of English warships in service in 1595. Ten of these ships, with displacements of 650 to 1,500 tonnes, were built from the mid-1550s to the mid-1560s and are consequently of the same age as the eight ships in the Swedish sample. By the 1590s, they had undergone great repairs or rebuildings, but their size was unchanged. These ten ships in 1595 had a great variation in armament weight, from 2.2 to 5.8 per cent of their displacement. but on average it was 4.1 per cent. The similarity with the eight Swedish ships in the relation between armament weight and displacement is striking.'^ The Danish navy had a markedly different armament in the 1560s, although detailed comparisons are not possible because practically all Danish armament accounts are lost. In fact, the only extant detailed armament inventories for Danish warships in this decade are the Swedish lists of guns on the eight ships which were captured in 1563-65 and 1570, including the two flagships Hercules (1563) and Jagermdsteren (1565). It is obvious that the Danish inventory was very different from the Swedish when the war began and that it had been different since at least the 1530s. A list of the armament on 12 Danish warships from 1555, including the seven largest ships in the navy, has survived. It only lists ten bronze guns of larger calibre: two half kartoger, three 3/4 and five half slangor, and only seven stone-guns {skerbreckor) of larger (but unknown) calibre. Of these 17 guns, 13 were

^^ Parker 1996, 2 8 6 - 8 7 . The ten ships are Antelope, Elizabeth Bonaventure, Elizabeth Jonas, Hope, Lion, Mary Rose, Nonpareil, Triumph, Victory, and White Bear. The d i s p l a c e m e n t calculations in Parker's article are m i n e a n d p r i m a r i l y m a d e f r o m t h e d i m e n s i o n s listed in R. C. A n d e r s o n , "A List of t h e Royal N a v y in 1 5 9 0 - 1 5 9 1 " , MM, 43, 1957, 3 2 2 - 2 3 , a n d Michael O p p e n h e i m , A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, 1509-1660, L o n d o n , 1896, 124,

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

537

on the fleet flagship Fortuna. Otherwise the list is totally dominated by wrought-iron guns of not very large calibres: one slanga, at least 89 half slangor, and 45 1/4 slangor, as well as numerous lighter wroughtiron guns." The Danish ordnance also had a number of heavy bronze guns, many of which must have been intended as siege guns. The continued lack of bronze ordnance for warships is revealed by the seven ships captured in 1563-65. The two flagships had a number of bronze guns, but even they were armed with a large number of wrought-iron slangor. Jdgermesteren, which became Swedish Jdgaren in 1565, had an armament of one whole, six 3/4 and six half kartoger, and three heavy notslangor, that is, 16 guns of the heaviest types on a ship of around 1,100 tonnes displacement. It looks as if the Danish Ordnance had loaded a considerable part of its siege guns on the fleet flagship. As Swedish, the ship was immediately re-armed with a typical Swedish armament of two notslangor, six half kartoger, and 24 3 - to 10-pounder slangor. With that armament, Jdgaren was about as heavily armed in relation to the displacement as contemporary Swedish warships. Five other Danish ships, all of which were rather important to the Danish navy in 1563-64, had only five slangor of bronze but 71 of wrought iron when captured, most of them of the smallest sizes.''' It is obvious that ships with guns which only could be fired with small gunpowder charges were unable to inflict m u c h damage on an enemy which chose to fight at a distance. The Swedish tactical doctrine of fighting at a distance and the Danish doctrine of trying to come into close action is understandable given the widely different armament plans of the two navies. It is somewhat remarkable that this difference had existed since the 1530s and that Denmark had not invested more in bronze ordnance for its warships. Denmark rapidly reacted to the problems the navy met at sea in 1563-65 by importing a large number of cast-iron guns f r o m England. The Danish navy was the first in Europe to be predominantly armed with such guns, most probably because bronze guns were unavailable at short notice in a country without domestic copper mines. The cast-iron

" D a n s k e Kaiicelli, B 46, DII, 124, D a n i s h Rigsarkivet, C o p e n h a g e n . The hst is p r i n t e d in Mortensen 1999, 3 3 3 - 3 4 , b u t with s o m e errors. T h e seven largest ships are Fortuna, Lybske Admiral, Mercurius, Hamborger Galleon, Gabriel, Struds, a n d Lange Grib, Niels P r o b s t ' s u n p u b l i s h e d list of D a n i s h w a r s h i p s . AR 1564/14, KrA; SH 9:3, 12:3, 15:3, RA.

538

CHAPTER SEVEN

guns must have been regarded as inferior emergency weapons, and in the early 17th century they were largely replaced by bronze guns. The Danish warship Bjdrnen, captui'ed in 1570, was well armed for its size with eight 3/4 slangor and four falkonetter of cast iron as the main armament. Its brief service in the Swedish navy was the first time a Swedish warship was armed with cast-iron guns, but there is no sign of that these evoked any interest in Sweden.-'''

7.7

Stability and stagnation,

1571-1615

Tlie end of the war against Denmark and Liibeck in late 1570 was the start of a major reduction of the number of warships. Many were sold, others given away to pay political and financial debts or returned to Denmark as part of the peace treaty. Obsolete wrought-iron guns were discarded, and new production of guns for the navy ceased. Up to 1583, a considerable number of guns were also taken in the Russian war, including guns on ships captured during the blockade of Narva.'*^ There was no total mobilisation of the navy as a battle fleet f r o m 1571 to 1610, except during the civil war in 1598-99, f r o m which only fragments of ordnance accounts remain. Warships were used for blockade and cruising operations, for transport duties in connection with wars against Russia and Poland, and for mercantile trade, so the existing gun inventory was sufficient to arm these ships. Well-preserved accounts for the armament of active ships f r o m 1571 show that ships were armed according to the principles established in the 1560s. The differences are that remaining major calibre wrought-iron guns soon disappeared from active ships, that the number of light anti-personnel weapons was radically reduced by 1600, and that an increasing number of cast-iron guns supplement the bronze ordnance after 1600. Most bronze guns in use throughout the period 1571-1615 were, with all probability, those cast in the 1560s, and this legacy created a stability which may have turned into stagnation." But how were the gun inventory related to the variations in naval strength?

Mortensen 1999, 2 0 7 - 1 5 ; Bjdrnen's a r m a m e n t : AR 1570/4, KrA. G u n p r o d u c t i o n 1 5 7 1 - 8 7 a n d 1600-16: Jakobsson 1938, 2 8 - 2 9 , 2 1 2 - 1 4 , 244. The total n u m b e r of guns, Hedberg 1975, 2 1 0 - 1 3 . Sources a b o u t g u n p r o d u c t i o n 1 5 8 8 - 9 9 are scarce. " S H 26:2 (1571), SH 27:4, 27:6, S M H A D 3, 81 (1572), AR 1574/12 (1574), SH 31:2 (1575), SH 32:3 (1576), S M H F 4:5 (1577), SH 34:4 (1578), S H 35:4 (1579), SH 37:9

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

539

As shown in chapter 5, Johan III was determined to liave a large navy and from 1573/74 several new large warships were laid down. When they were being completed the question if there were guns to arm these ships began to interest Johan and his administrators. In 1577 a plan was formulated for how many guns were required as siege guns (20 heavy guns, of which 15 were at Stocldiolm) and for the field artillery (71 guns, including 12 3- to 10-pounders). Tliere was no plan for what the fortifications required, probably because their existing gun inventories were regarded as sufficient. Remaining guns in Stockholm were listed as intended for outfitting of 20 warships. Together with guns which were on ships in service, the depot held 632 bronze and 464 iron guns for the navy. This list includes 253 3- to 40-pounders but the inventory looks hardly adequate to arm all existing warships to the same standard as they had been armed in the late 1560s. It is however possible that the plan meant to provide for only 20 ships that could be outfitted quickly, as some existing ships lacked cables, rigging and sails. In that case it was adequate.'® Tlie navy in 1577-79 was rapidly being increased with new ships, however, and, as shown in chapter 6, major efforts were also made to fit the ships with cables and sails. This was probably the origin of the detailed armament and manning plan for 30 warships which was prepared in 1579. Its preparation can, to some extent, be followed in the sources. The armament of warships of various sizes in 1570 was retrieved f r o m the accounts and used as n o r m for how ships existing in 1579 should be armed. The plan called for ships which survived from 1570 to be given the armament they had in that year, while the size of new ships was compared with ships which had existed in 1570, including some

(1580), S M H F 5:1 (1581), SH 39:8 (1582), SH 40:5 (1583), SH 41:4 (1584), SH 42:4 (1585), SH 43:3 (1586, t o o d a m a g e d to be used), S H 44:2 (1587), A R 1589/32 (1589), AR 1590/9 (1590), AR 1593/7 ( g u n s s u p p l i e d to ships f r o m Alvsborg 1 5 9 3 - 1 6 0 0 , prim a r i l y 1600), S H 52:8, S M H A D 3, 123 (1598, i n c o m p l e t e ) , S M H F 6:13, u n d a t e d list, at p r e s e n t n o t f o u n d in S M H F , t h e a u t h o r has a p h o t o c o p y , S M H A D 3, 125 ( 1 6 0 0 - 0 1 ) , SH 55:1 ( 1 6 0 2 - 0 4 ) , SH 58:5 (1606, t o o d a m a g e d to be used), SH 59:4 (1607), SH 60:6 (1608), S H 62:1, S M H F 7:6 (1610), SH 63:3 (1611), S H 64:1 (1612). SH 64:5 (1614), SH 65:5 (1615), all RA except AR at KrA. T h e r e is also m u c h i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t g u n s a n d a m m u n i t i o n delivered to a n d received f r o m ships in t h e o r d n a n c e a c c o u n t s (AR) series at KrA, The a c c o u n t s of the S t o c k h o l m o r d n a n c e d e p o t for s o m e years partially fill gaps in t h e series of a c c o u n t s of g u n s o n ships, esp. AR 1573/1, 1586/1, 1605/1, 1606/1, 1609/1, 1610/1, KrA. AR 1577/2, KrA. The list of g u n s o n ships in service in 1577 includes 12 warships, m a i n l y small a n d f o u r vessels serving with the c o u r t , S M H F 4:5, RA. For cables, rigging, a n d sails, see c h a p t e r 6.

540

CHAPTER SEVEN

that no longer existed in the navy. The new ships were then given the same armament as ships of the same size had had in 1570. The total number of guns required to arm 30 ships was then summed up and compared with the existing inventory. Finally, the deficiency and surplus of guns of every type was calculated, although this calculation did not take into account that 15 of the heaviest guns in the list had in 1577 been reserved for siege operations. If that is ignored, there was a deficiency of 112 bronze guns of 3 to 20 pounds and at least 13 wrought-iron guns of a calibre of 3 pounds or more. The latter deficiency, resulting from the fact that 1570 had been used as a norm, was unlikely to be filled with new guns of that obsolete type. There was also a deficiency of 127 small calibre guns (1- and 2pounders), 29 guns for burning arrows (fyrpilstycken), and 51 guns for hailshots {stormstycken). The number of light anti-personnel weapons ifalkoner, hakar) was more than sufficient, although there was a deficit of bronze guns and a large surplus of wrought-iron guns in comparison to the plan.'' In terms of firepower (counting guns firing 1- to 40-pounds shots), the plan had a total armament of around 3,500 pounds, but in reality, around 1,300 pounds was lacking, most seriously in the heavier types of bronze guns. The navy required 24 20-, 24 10-, 10 7-, and 64 3-pounders, weighing around 175 tonnes (according to the n o r m of 1564), in order to fulfil the plan. Actually, even more were required if the navy wanted to avoid using guns intended for siege operations. This was a major investment at a time when the state finances were heavily strained by the war effort against Russia and large investments in ships, hemp, and sail-cloth. Nevertheless, in 1580, eight 20-pounders (hzli kartoger) and two 10-pounders (fdltslangor) were cast, an effort which probably cost around 20 tonnes of bronze. These 20-pounders are the only of their type known to have been made between 1568 and 1602. After 1580 few efforts to increase the naval inventory of guns are known for many years. The detailed armament plan of 1579 and the effort made in 1580 to increase the inventory are interesting. They are further signs of that Johan Ill's naval policy of the 1570s was a serious effort to maintain

SH 35:2, RA, AR 1579/9, KrA. There are s o m e e r r o r s in a r i t h m e t i c a n d s o m e last m i n u t e a d d i t i o n s of g u n s m a d e in 1579 in t h e plan. T h e n u m b e r s in t h e text h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t e d for that.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

541

the strong Swedish power position in the Baltic Sea which had been gained in the 1560s. The fact that no more heavy guns were made for the navy after 1580 is another sign that Sweden's naval policy changed when a political detente had been reached with Denmark in 1580. The sailing battle fleet was gradually reduced while a major effort to build a galley force started in 1581. That force required rather few guns, so the existing inventory became adequate for the navy as it developed in the 1580s and early 1590s. But from around 1594, the number of major sailing warship began to increase rapidly and by 1600 had reached an unprecedented level of 26,000 tonnes. It grew even larger in the early years of the new century. In the 1560s it had not exceeded 20,000 tonnes. Was the gun inventory sufficient to arm this large navy? Tliere are no comprehensive listings of the entire Swedish ordnance between 1594 and the 1620s. Jonas Hedberg has attempted to reconstruct the total inventory in 1592 and 1599 and its distribution to various castles from various sources, which, however, are not exactly from the same year.® The three inventories of 1592, 1594, and 1599 show that the total number of bronze guns relevant for the navy (3- to 20pounders, hailshot guns, and burning arrow guns) had changed rather little between 1568/69 and the 1590s, except the number of 3-pounders, which had declined from 308 in 1568/69 to 229 in 1594. The n u m ber of wrought-iron guns of these calibres had been radically reduced, but by 1599 production of cast-iron slangor (7- and 3-pounders) had started. These "naval" guns were predominantly on the ships or at the Stocldiolm depot, but the number of guns of the "naval calibres" on several fortifications had nevertheless significantly increased f r o m 1569 to the 1590s. Most of them were on seaside castles, and at least the 10- and 20-pounders must have been intended to provide them with firepower against enemy warships. This location made them easy to transfer to ships, but the removal of anti-ship guns from strategically important places like Vaxholm (protecting Stockholm), Kalmar, Alvsborg, Reval, Narva, and Viborg might be a dangerous policy. With a navy 30 to 40 per cent larger than in the 1560s and with fewer guns easily available to arm it, the new regime of Duke Karl (Karl IX) faced a problem of how to arm all warships in case a total mobilisation against Denmark was necessary. As already shown in chapters 5 and 6, the problems with incomplete ships and lack of h e m p and sail-cloth

Hedberg

1975, 4 5 8 - 7 0 ; § see also Jakobsson

1938, 3 0 - 3 1 .

542

CHAPTER SEVEN

made the immediate commissioning of all existing hulls impossible, but Karl might at least be expected to develop some long-term policy for increasing the gun inventory for his many ships. It is known that, as a duke, he had started cast-iron gun production in his dukedom and that he had made serious efforts to improve the quality of such guns with the help of foreign gun-founders since the 1590s. Did these entrepreneurial efforts show any result when he became ruler of the kingdom? From 1600, preserved accounts give a good picture of Karl's gun production and show that it was substantial. From 1600 to 1610, guns were cast in much larger numbers than in the 1570s and 1580s. Production was divided between bronze and cast-iron guns. Eight 20-pounders of bronze were cast, six of them in 1602 and two in 1604. Fourteen 10-, two 7-, and 111 3-pounders were cast in bronze, while 64 7- and 67 3-pounders were cast in iron. From 1607 to 1610, guns made were almost exclusively of cast iron, revealing Karl's increased confidence in the new technology." The large number of new 3-pounders corresponds with the new construction policy, which in the early 1600s increasingly emphasised small warships. The absence of new production of 20-pounders after 1604 appears to be related to the fact that no new large warships which could m o u n t such guns were completed after 1604, until 1616-17. Gun production from 1600 to 1610 had markedly increased the number of guns suitable to arm the navy, but most of the increase had been in the lighter calibres. The warships that were sent to sea against Denmark in 1611 and 1612 were armed more lightly than the larger warships in the 1560s, and it is probable that the Danish navy was more heavily armed than the Swedish. There are no lists of guns on individual Danish ships, but the Danish ordnance had an inventory sufficient to arm several warships with powerful armament.®^ Known Swedish losses of naval guns were large. The total number of guns lost with the Alvsborg squadron in 1612 is not known, but known losses, including guns on two ships at Alvsborg, are two 20-, 18 10-, 30 7-, and 112 3-pounders of bronze, 130 lighter guns of bronze, and 11 bronze "chamber guns" of unloiown calibre (probably slangor). Of the new inventory of cast-iron guns, 40 7- and 34 3-pounders were lost together with 65 lighter guns. The

Jakobsson Mortensen

1938, 2 7 - 2 8 . 1999, 2 8 5 - 8 7 .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

543

majority of these losses, including 166 3- to 20-pounders, were suffered at Kalmar, where guns from 14 warships were taken with the castle in 1611. The total firepower of these guns was around 1,000 pounds, the same firepower as on all warships sent to sea f r o m Stockholm and Nykoping in 1611. In 1612, the sea-going fleet had guns with a total firepower of around 1,100 pounds, of which around one third was from cast-iron guns. Tlie loss of guns as well as of ships at Kalmar was a great disaster, and the successful surprise Danish attack on that town really decided the outcome of the war at sea.^' Obviously the Swdish navy had to replace its losses, and production of new bronze guns in the following years was considerable. In 1611-12 and 1614-16 (accounts for 1613 are lost), three 40-, 10 20-, 43 (or 45) 10-, 24 7-, and 15 3-pounders and 12 lighter guns were cast. Of the 10- and 20-pounders, 40 were cast in 1615-16. There are no sources for production of cast-iron guns in the 1610s, but later inventories show that hardly any were made in these y e a r s . T h e change of policy compared to that of Karl IX is striking. Gun production was now concentrated on bronze guns of larger calibres, and the increased production in 1615-16 was probably related to Gustav Adolf's efforts to restore battle fleet strength by completing a number of ships of 800-900 tonnes, Vasen, Svdrdet, Nyckeln, and Scepter, which required many 20- and 10-pounders. The only nav}^ to which Swedish naval ordnance may be compared in the period 1571-1615 is the English. Because guns and gunnery of the Elizabethan navy is an important part of both the national heritage and popular mythology, a considerable amount of literature exists. There are striking similarities. English naval guns were predominantly cast in bronze, although cast-iron guns were used in the 16th century. The number of light anti-personnel guns was m u c h reduced in the last decades of the 16th century, and some references indicate that they were being replaced by muskets. The weight of guns in relation to the displacement increased for ships buih after 1570. In 1595, 14 major warships built between 1573 and 1590 carried on the average guns of 5.3 per cent of their displacement, compared to 4.1 per cent on older ships. A (probably) normative list from 1602 of various weights

" Losses of g u n s a n d firepower o n active ships: SH 62:1, 63:3 a n d 64:1, RA; AR 1611/1, KrA, " Jakobsson 1938, 2 7 - 2 8 , 168, 2 4 4 - 4 5 .

544

CHAPTER SEVEN

on the warships gives ordnance weights of around 4.5 per cent for all ships, and about the same relation is listed in another probably normative list f r o m 1625. It is known, however, that some of the newer ships which existed in 1625 later in their career (when cheap iron guns were available) carried guns of 7 to 8 per cent of their displacements. English naval construction was determined by demands for strong and durable hulls, and these could obviously be heavily loaded, at least for summer campaigns.®-^ The larger Swedish warships in the 1560s had carried armament of around 4 per cent of their displacement, and this became the n o r m in the plan of 1579. Tliere are no examples of major Swedish warships really being armed for battle fleet contests between 1570 and 1611, however. Warships serving in the blockade fleets were more lightly armed, probably because hulls were less strained and because endurance and sailing qualities were more important than firepower. By 1611, this armament pattern appears to have become the norm. Because the weight of guns which actually were carried is not recorded, detailed calculations are not possible, but a rough estimate shows that warships in 1611-12 were armed with guns of 2 to 3 per cent of their displacements.'^® It is possible that the decades of blockade and transport service had created an (unwritten) armament policy that required lighter armament than in the battle-fleet concept, which had predominated in the 1560s and 1570s. That may explain why no greater efforts were made to produce guns in the early 1600s. The survey of English ordnance in 1595 reveals that English guns on average were markedly lighter in proportion to their shot than the Swedish "standard" guns of the 1560s that dominated the Swedish inventory into the next century. There are no studies which explain these differences in shape, thickness, and quality of English and Swedish 16th-century guns, but Swedish bronze guns of the 1560s had

Oppenheim 1896, 124 (list of 1602), 212; Julian C o r b e t t (ed.). The Spanish War, N a \ 7 Records Society, 11, 1898, 3 0 0 - 1 2 ( i n v e n t o r y of 1565 a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e " p r o p o r t i o n " of 1569); Lewis 1960, esp. 4 1 - 7 5 ; Brian Lavery, Ship of the line, I, L o n d o n , 1983, 1 9 3 - 9 4 (list of 1625); Caniana 1994, 2 9 - 5 5 ; Parker 1996. N o t e that C a r u a n a ' s list of g u n s o n ships in 1595 (p. 40) e r r o n e o u s l y o m i t s iron guns, see Parker 1996, 70. The g r o w t h of a r m a m e n t o n English warships: c o m p a r i s o n s of Prince rebuilt as a slightly larger ship in t h e early 1660s), Rainbow, Victory, Swiftsure, St George, a n d Triumph in 1625, Lavery 1983, 193; in 1664: Lavery 1987, 270; in 1677, Fox 1980, 183-90. Calculated f r o m a s a m p l e of ships in 1611-12, w h i c h seem to h a v e received their full i n t e n d e d a r m a m e n t , S H 63:3, 64:1, RA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

545

been made to shoot with powder charges of the same weight as the shot. Tills was apparently regarded as excessive by 1615, and one of the main parts of Gustav II Adolf's ordnance reforms which started at that time was to get more firepower in terms of weight of shots out of the large capital which was invested in bronze ordnance for his navy. 7.8

Gustav II Adolf and naval gunnery,

1616-1643

Hie reforms of the Swedish artillery and production of guns from 1611 to 1632 have been studied by Swedish army artillery historians.®' Hiis section surveys this development in a naval context. The sources about naval ordnance up to 1630 are unusually rich. Existing guns were listed separately for the army and the navy, making it possible to see how the total inventory of naval guns changed and which guns were used at sea.®® There are several plans of how many guns the navy required, making it possible to study both how armament policy changed and how it determined new production.®' After 1630, there are almost no

® Jakobsson 1938, esp. 165-86, 2 0 8 - 5 1 ; Hedberg 1985, 6 1 - 9 8 (Bengt Brusewitz), 1 2 1 - 4 3 (Sten Claeson). ^ H i e total i n v e n t o r y of g u n s at t h e S t o c k h o l m o r d n a n c e d e p o t 1 6 2 1 - 5 4 is listed in Hedberg 1985, 9 1 - 9 4 , b u t w i t h o u t s e p a r a t i o n of naval a n d a r m y guns. A c c o u n t s or lists of g u n s o n ships for 1621 in AR 1621/3 a n d S M H F 18:3; 2 0 - 2 1 / 7 ( u n d a t e d b u t w i t h o u t d o u b t 1623) in S H 70:5; a r m a m e n t i n v e n t o r i e s of eight ships at Alvsborg a n d 26 galleys, M a y 1626, S M H A D 4, 172-173; several Usts f r o m 1 6 2 8 - 2 9 in S H 71:7, S M H F 8:6, SS Z 2872, 2 8 7 6 - 2 8 7 7 , all RA, except AR at KrA, O r d n a n c e a c c o u n t s of g u n s a n d a m m u n i t i o n delivered to or received f r o m ships in AR 1616/1, 1623/1 ( g u n s lost with ships 1621-24), 1624/12, 1624/15 a n d 1624/20, 1625/1, 1626/1, 1626/18, 1626/25 a n d 1626/28, 1627/2 a n d 1627/20, 1628/35, 1628/37, 1628/38, 1628/44 (actually 1629), 1629/10 a n d 1629/22, KrA. ® Plan for a r m a m e n t a n d m e n o n 23 ships, u n d a t e d b u t can b e d a t e d to 1616 (Josua lost late in that year a n d Hannibal, n a m e d f r o m 1616 are b o t h included), M 1761; plan of a r m a m e n t a n d g u n n e r s o n 23 ships, u n d a t e d , b u t f r o m 1617/18, M 1761; a slightly different p l a n for 22 ships for 1618, E 8561; plan for a r m a m e n t o n 28 m a j o r a n d seven m i n o r w a r s h i p s for 1621, Bdckstrdm 1884, 3 8 8 - 8 9 (original s o u r c e n o t f o u n d , t h e m a n n i n g p l a n p r i n t e d o n t h e s a m e pages is in S M H F 8:7); p l a n a n d i n v e n t o r y 2 0 - 2 1 / 7 ( u n d a t e d , b u t w i t h o u t d o u b t 1623) for 24 ships a n d 13 galleys, SH 70:5 (an u n d a t e d i n v e n t o r y w i t h 21 s h i p s b u t with m o r e g u n s in t h e last v o l u m e of t h e AR series, KrA is f r o m t h e s a m e time, p r o b a b l y later in 1623); list f r o m 1623 or early 1624 of t h e n u m b e r of g u n p o r t s o n 32 ships, S M H F 8:6; t h r e e slightly varying plans d a t e d 10/6, 10/6 a n d 12/6 1624 for a r m i n g of 33 ships a n d 24 galleys a c c o r d ing to their g u n p o r t s , i n c l u d i n g lists of deficiencies a n d m e a s u r e s to fulfil t h e plan, M 1761 a n d S H 70:6; t h r e e slightly v a r y i n g p l a n s for a r m i n g ships a c c o r d i n g to their g u n p o r t s for 1625: for 36 ships a n d 30 galleys, SH 70:6; for 35 ships (less Tre Kronor) a n d 30 galleys (with i n v e n t o r y d a t e d 2 4 / 8 1624), AR 1625/12, KrA; for 34 ships (less Tre Kronor a n d Falken, t h e latter w r e c k e d 1624) a n d 30 galleys (with i n v e n t o r y d a t e d

546

CHAPTER SEVEN

sources about how ships actually were armed, but there are plans of how they should be armed, and it is possible to approximately follow the yearly development of the total inventory of naval guns until 16457" As outlined earlier in this chapter, the reforms started with the introduction of a new calibre system in 1616. Guns were classified by the weight of their shots, and four standard calibres—24-, 12-, 6-, and 3-pounders—were fixed. Gustav Adolf's determination to rapidly standardize his artillery is obvious from his order in 1616 that many guns should be bored to new and larger calibres: 32 fdltslangor and 10 3/4 slangor to 12-pounders, 82 y2 slangor to 6-pounders, and 10 double falkonetter to 3-pounders.^' It is probable that some half kartoger were rebored to 24-pounders, and it is known that several heavy 16th-century guns were melted down to provide metal for new guns. There remained an old inventory of 1- and 2-pounders, and smaller weapons for small craft and a number of 48- and 36-pounders were in use, but other non-standard calibres were eliminated by the mid-1620s. The number of guns of the four standard calibres was soon sufficient to arm warships with homogeneous batteries of the same calibre. From the 1620s and until the 1650s, Swedish warships usually had only guns of two or three calibres and usually only one calibre in the main battery. Internationally, this was apparently unique at this time. Reboring must have made existing guns markedly thinner and lighter, and lighter guns were an essential part of the reform program. New guns cast from 1614 were usually markedly lighter than earlier guns and even those that were cast as late as in 1611-12.^^ Gustav

28/10 1624) a n d with eight ships at Alvsborg listed separately, AR 1625/12, KrA; a revised plan f r o m 1625 (in G e r m a n ) , AR 1625/11, KrA;. p l a n for 1627 w i t h i n v e n t o r y d a t e d 28/9 ( m o s t p r o b a b l y 1626), SH 71:7; two p l a n s for 1627, SS Z 2847, S M H F 8:7; t w o plans for 1628, SS Z 2850, S H 71:7; o n e plan d a t e d 18/4 1628, N N S II, 12a, KrA; t h r e e plans f o r 1629, SH 71:7, SS Z 2852 (also in M 1761), Z 2853; two plan for 1630, SS Z 2854, Sveriges big. III, 5 6 7 - 6 8 (original n o t f o u n d , p r o b a b l y in an a r m y archival series), t h e latter with n u m b e r of g u n s identical w i t h a list of naval a m m u n i t i o n 1630, M 1793. All RA, except AR a n d N N S II at KrA. ™ The m a i n sources for naval o r d n a n c e 1 6 3 0 - 4 5 are KAR, A r t i l l e r i h u v u d b 5 c k e r 1 6 3 4 - 4 5 (1636 lost), a n d KARS, Arkliriikningar 1 6 3 0 - 4 5 (1633 a n d 1640 are lost), KrA. List of g u n s available for t h e navy 16/12 1631, S, Z 2947; plan of a r m a m e n t for t h e navy a n d available g u n s 14/12 1632, M 1761; g u n s a n d a m m u n i t i o n o n 24 active ships, J u n e 1633, SS Z 2 8 0 7 - 2 8 0 8 ; list of naval g u n s 1633 (?), M 1761; p l a n s of a r m a m e n t for t h e navy a n d available g u n s 1639 (with t h e date 2/12 1645 a d d e d later) a n d 3/7 1643, M 1848, all RA. '' Jakobsson 1938, 169-70. W e i g h t s of b r o n z e g u n s cast 1611-32, Jakobsson 1938, 2 1 2 - 1 4 .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

547

Adolf evidently wished to have lighter guns for his siege artillery, his navy, and his field artillery. Hie latter, his bronze 3-pounder regementstycken, are famous in military history, but they were actually a late development and were produced only after 1629. Most new guns made in this period were intended for the navy, and the introduction of light guns was a central part of the king's naval reforms. Hie early development of light guns was made around 1620 by Hans Henrik von Siegroth, and light guns were often referred to as "Siegroth guns" in the accounts. From 1615 to 1625, production was concentrated on bronze 12pounders, of which 227 were cast, usually weighing around 0.6 to 0.9 tonnes." No fewer than 134 of these guns were cast in 1624-25. Tliey were the result of plans made in 1624 to increase the navy's armament, first as preparations for an attack on Denmark in early summer that year but continued as a program for rearming the fleet by 1625. These plans showed a requirement of up to 214 12-pounders, while only 97 existed on 14 July 1624. That deficiency was eliminated by 1625. In 1620-24, 18 extremely light 48-pounders, most weighing around 1.5 to 1.6 tonnes, were cast, 12 of them in 1624. Twenty were planned for the navy's new great ship Applet (1621), but like that ship they appear to have been failures. All except four disappeared after 1628. Production of lighter bronze guns was limited to 37 6- and 3-pounders cast 1615-17 and 1623-24. In 1621-24, 27 48- and 40 24-pounder bronze stormstycken for hailshots were cast. They were short guns, and their weight was only between 200 and 375 kilograms. They were made at the same as the navy built 28 small galleys, and armament plans of 1624/25 show that these galleys should have two 24-pounder stormstycken each. Actually, most stormstycken were in use on sailing warships until they disappeared around 1650. Production of cast-iron guns for the navy had practically ceased after 1610. This makes it even more probable that the production of such guns was one of Karl IX's (d. 1611) personal projects, originally not favoured by his son and successor. In 1614, Gustav II Adolf ordered that cast-iron guns on the ships should be transferred to fortresses, and they practically disappeared from the navy.'"* As a business

" Jakobsson 1938, 2 1 2 - 1 4 . This includes 23 faltslangor a n d 19 3/4 slangor cast in 1 6 1 5 - 1 6 w h i c h w e r e in t h e s a m e weight g r o u p a n d w h i c h m a y have b e e n r e b o r e d to 12-pdrs. '' Hedberg 1985, 72-73.

548

CHAPTER SEVEN

enterprise, Swedish cast-iron guns production was a major success, however, and attracted international interest. By the early 1620s, a large export industry, primarily directed by Louis de Geer and Willem de Besche, was thriving. In 1624, when major efforts were made to strengthen the navy for a possible conflict with Denmark, the capacity of this industry was tested by the Swedish navy. A large number of 6- and 3-pounder iron guns appeared in the plans and rapidly also in the inventories. At least 33 6- and 34 3-pounders of cast iron were delivered to Stoclcholm in 1624, while 62 6- and 32 3-pounders were delivered to eight purchased warships in Gothenburg, which arrived from Netherlands in spring 1624." The naval inventory of cast-iron guns was rapidly reduced, however, and on 28 September 1626 there were only 38 6- and 32 3-pounders. It is probable that many cast-iron guns had been landed in Prussia and placed on various fortifications when Sweden invaded that province in summer 1626. Hie number of iron guns in the navy declined further in the following years, but in the late 1620s it again increased to around 100. Production of iron 6- and 3-pounders was considerable in 1629-30, as a part of the preparations for invading Germany, but it is uncertain to which extent they actually went to the navy. Several guns, apparently intended to arm transport ships, were sent to Stralsund in 1630, and others were used to arm the merchantmen provided by the Skeppskompaniet. Originally, 16 ships were to have 16 iron 6-pounders each, a total of 256; but that goal was almost certainly not achieved. In 1633-34, all naval iron 3- to 6-pounders were placed on fortifications in northern Germany, Prussia, and Finland. For the second time, the navy had ceased to use cast-iron guns.^® Few 24-pounders were made until 1626. Most of those which were cast were rather heavy, 2.0 to 2.4 tonnes, and mainly intended as siege guns. From 1626, production of bronze guns was concentrated to short and light 24-pounder of 1.2 tonnes, however, 102 of which were cast until 1629. Also in 1628-29, 18 "long" 24-pounders were cast. Most or all of these guns were intended for the navy's two new large

" T h i r t y - t h r e e 6 - a n d 34 3 - p d r s of i r o n are listed in t h e i n v e n t o r y d a t e d 15/7 1624 in t h e a r m a m e n t plan for 1625, SH 70:6, RA; an increase of t h e i n v e n t o r y in Stockholm of exactly t h e s a m e n u m b e r of g u n s f r o m 1624 to 1625: Jakobsson 1938, 174; g u n s on the Alvsborg ships in O c t o b e r (?) 1624, AR 1625/12, KrA. 1627-28, SH 71:7, RA; 1629-30, Sveriges Krig, III, 2 5 2 - 5 4 , 274; 1633-34: KARS, A r k l i r a k n i n g a r 1634, KrA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

549

ships, Vasen and Applet, launched in 1627-28. On 10 August 1648, 46 of the hght 24-pounders were lost (together with two heavy 24-pounders) with Vasen, the largest loss at sea of Swedish bronze guns since Mars had been lost in 1564/^ Production of 24-pounders continued at Stockholm in the early 1630s. In 1632, seven long and 20 short guns were cast, at least 15 long and 11 short guns in 1633, and 12 long guns in 1634.^'' After 1634, only few guns produced at Stoclcholm were added to the inventory of naval guns. From 1630, production of guns started at Stora Kopparberget (presentday Falun) in Dalarna, Europe's largest copper mine in this century. Until 1650, this production surpassed that of Stockholm by a wide margin. These guns were cast with a lower content of tin than those cast in Stockliolm and were listed separately in the accounts. Hie Kopparberg guns were mainly intended for the navy, but many were also sold to merchants and exported. The net result of production and sales by the end of 1643 was a stock of 54 24-, 361 12-, 145 6-, and 41 3-pounders of the Kopparberg type. To the extent that the weights of these guns are on record, they were considerably heavier than the light guns typical for Stoclcholm's production in the 1620s and 24-pounders of 1.6 to 1.9 tonnes and 12-pounders of 1 to 1.2 tonnes were common. Normally, only the total weights of the yearly production of each calibre are mentioned in the accounts, and these figures may hide greater variations. The Swedish inventory of bronze guns from the 1630s was a mixture of light, medium, and heavy guns of the standard calibres and the weight of the armament of individual ships is difficult to estimate.^' A considerable addition to the navy's gun inventory came with the 14 Imperial warships captured at Wismar in 1631-32. The capture

" Unusually, t h e weight of t h e 64 g u n s (48 24-, eight 3-, a n d two 1 - p d r s a n d six stormstycken) lost with Vasen is o n r e c o r d , 468'/2 skeppund, or 63.7 t o n n e s , AR 1628/37, KrA. This was 5.3 per cent of a d i s p l a c e m e n t of a r o u n d 1,250 t o n n e s . T o o heavy a r m a m e n t c a n n o t be an e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y t h e ship capsized. Vasen's a r m a ment: E d w a r d Clason, " O m Vasas bestyckning", TiS, 127, 1964, 7 6 2 - 7 9 , 8 4 9 - 6 4 . ™ Jakobsson 1938, 212, KARS, A r k l i r a k n i n g a r 1632 a n d 1634, KrA. The a c c o u n t s for 1633 are lost, a n d c h a n g e s in t h e i n v e n t o r y b e t w e e n t h e e n d of 1632 a n d t h e beginning of 1634 have b e e n used to estimate p r o d u c t i o n . P r o d u c t i o n in 1632 is f r o m Jakobsson's list, b u t t h e r e is a possibility that it includes 13 2 4 - p d r s t a k e n with t h e Imperial navy at W i s m a r . " Hedberg 1985, 123-24, 129-30, 141-42, a n d t h e yearly a c c o u n t s of g u n p r o d u c tion in KAR, A r t i l l e r i h u v u d b o c k e r a n d KARS, A r l d i r a k n i n g a r , KrA.

550

CHAPTER SEVEN

yielded 165 bronze and 65 iron guns, including 13 24-, 22 12-, 72 6-, and 38 3-pounders of bronze and 52 3- to 6-pounders of iron.®" The plans made in 1616 and 1620/21 for the ideal future armament of the navy show a total firepower of 3,720 and around 6,400 pounds each.®' Both were ambitious and would require a drastic increase of the number of guns. They are marked by the new policy of standardisation and homogeneous batteries with only guns of the four standard calibres and only two calibres on each ship (excluding stormstycken). Internationally, this was probably unique at this time, and the 1616 plan shows that a total re-arming of the navy was central for the new ordnance program launched in that year. The reality was still a bit different, as shown by what actually was delivered to the 21 warships armed for the Riga expedition in 1621: bronze guns of eight calibres with a total firepower around 2,150 pounds, stormstycken, and four different types of light fire-weapons. The guns carried on the 21 ships in 1621 were close to the maximum of what was available for the navy at that time.®^ Between 1624 and 1632, several plans included lists of how many guns of each calibre were required and how many were available. This planning started with a survey of how many gunports the navy actually had on its ships, a basic fact which apparently not had been recorded earlier. It continued with planning for how to fill these ports with guns and the large program of production of guns which began in 1623/24. This program very soon showed results. The plan for the navy's armament in 1624 called for a total firepower of 4,362 pounds from bronze guns and 450 pounds from cast-iron guns. The inventory of 10 June 1624, made at a time when war with Denmark seemed imminent, shows that 96 per cent of the firepower f r o m the bronze

"" KARS, A r l d i r a k n i n g a r 1632, KrA. Plan f o r 23 ships, u n d a t e d , b u t can be dated to 1616: M 1761, RA; p l a n for a r m a m e n t o n 28 m a j o r a n d seven m i n o r w a r s h i p s for 1621: Bdckstrom 1884, 3 8 8 - 8 9 (original s o u r c e n o t f o u n d ) . The firepower in p o u n d s does n o t include stormstycken. Smaller g u n s t h a n 3 - p d r s a n d small craft a r m e d with s u c h g u n s are n o t i n c l u d e d in these plans. The p l a n f r o m 1616 includes ships of a r o u n d 10,400 t o n n e s b u t o m i t s seven ships of a r o u n d 3,400 t o n n e s . If they are included, t h e total firepower w o u l d have to be increased to a r o u n d 4,800 p o u n d s . The p u b l i s h e d p l a n for 1621 lists i m p r o b a b l e light a r m a m e n t for Scepter a n d Riksnyckeln b u t also i m p r o b a b l y heavy a r m a m e n t for t h r e e small ships a n d very light a r m a m e n t for Samson a n d Harboviks Lejonet. Errors in editing are p r o b a b l e b u t partially cancel each other. S M H F 8:3, RA; AR 1621/3, KrA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

551

guns called for in the plan was available, and 78 per cent from the cast-iron guns.®' This inventory, however, included the Stockliolm ordnance depot's entire stock of 48-, 36-, 24-, and 16-pounders. Most of these guns were heavy for their calibres, and it was only the light 48-pounders recently cast for Applet which really were intended for the navy.®'' Gustav Adolf's intention with the planned attack on Denmark was most probably to strike at Copenhagen or Malmo (or both), and for that purpose it was logical to send heavy guns, suited for a siege operation with the ships. When plans for how the navy should be armed in 1625 were made during summer and a u t u m n 1624, these 36-, 24-, and 16-pounders were first listed, but in later versions of the plan they disappeared and were replaced by 12-pounders.®® The planners—the king was most likely the ultimate decision-maker—obviously thought that lighter guns were more suitable on ships. There was no intention to give up large-calibre guns, however, and f r o m 1626 the large program of light 24-pounders started. The firepower available to the navy increased markedly during the following years, but so did the firepower goals for the navy. A plan from December 1632 shows a requirement of around 9,600 pounds of firepower, but only around 73 per cent existed.®® Several additional large ships were under construction at that time, and many more guns would be required to arm them. The continued program of bronze gun production during the

List f r o m 1623/24 of the n u m b e r of g u n p o r t s o n 32 ships, S M H F 8:6; t h r e e sUghtly varying plans d a t e d 10/6, 10/6 a n d 12/6 1624 for a r m i n g of 33 ships a n d 24 galleys a c c o r d i n g to their g u n p o r t s , M 1761. S H 70:6; all RA. W e i g h t s of g u n s existing in 1624: Jakobsson 1938, 166-67. H i e weights of t h e n i n e 3 6 - p d r s listed for Kronan were b e t w e e n 2.3 to 3.3 t o n n e s . Scepter, Nyckeln, a n d Stockholm each h a d six of t h e o r d n a n c e stock of 19 2 4 - p d r s of 1.5 to 3.8 t o n n e s , a n d Apollo h a d 14 16-pdrs of 1.1 to 1.9 t o n n e s . These are t h e heaviest a r m a m e n t s r e c o r d e d o n these ships. Three slightly varying plans for a r m i n g ships a c c o r d i n g to their g u n p o r t s for 1625: for 36 ships a n d 30 galleys, SH 70:6, RA; for 35 ships (less Tre Kronor) a n d 30 galleys (with i n v e n t o r y d a t e d 24/8 1624), A R 1625/12, KrA; for 34 ships (less Tre Kronor a n d Palken, the latter w r e c k e d 1624) a n d 30 galleys (with i n v e n t o r y d a t e d 28/10 1624) a n d with eight ships at Alvsborg listed separately, AR 1625/12, KrA. "" D r a f t plan 14/12 1632, M 1761, RA. This plan is i n c o m p l e t e because Enhdrningen, Havfrun, Oraniebom, Papegojan, Svarta Hunden (possibly sold), a n d Muskijl are lacking. Its d a t i n g is interesting; i m m e d i a t e l y after G u s t a v II A d o l f ' s d e a t h b e c a m e k n o w n in Stockholm. It seems as if the C o u n c i l h a d asked for a survey of the n a v y w h e n t h e y discussed c h a n g e s in t h e n e w c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o g r a m .

552

CHAPTER SEVEN

1630s was necessary to fill the gunports of all the warships initiated by Gustav II Adolf in the last years of his reign. By 1639, the production had practically achieved this goal. At the beginning of that year, the Stoclcholm depot had four 48-, 166 24-, 431 12-, 263 6-, and 119 3-pounder bronze guns of types that were intended for the navy {skeppsstycken and Kopparbergsstycken). The corresponding naval requirement was in a plan made later in 1639 four 48-, 182 24-, 451 12-, 292 6- and 80 3-pounders for 49 warships. A large production program carried out during 1639 was about to eliminate the last deficiencies. Sweden was however a state involved in an expensive continental war and in 1639 31 24-, 214 12- and 62 6-pounders were sold on export to provide cash to the Treasury. The armament plan of 1639, which probably was made to analyse the consequences of this transaction showed that only 8,707 pounds or 73 per cent of the planned firepower of 11,964 pounds existed.**^ The large gun export in 1639 shows that the regency government did not plan for a war with Denmark in the near future. W h e n such planning began, a new armament plan was prepared, dated 3 July 1643. It included 55 warships and armed transports, and also 150 small craft (lodjor) for amphibious warfare, which were to be armed with one 3-pounder each.''® The total amount of firepower had been increased to 15,186 pounds, all from bronze guns, of which existing guns could provide 10,218 pounds. The increase of c.1,500 pounds since 1639 was considerable but not sufficient, because the plan showed a more ambitious arming policy for the navy which Gustav II Adolf had created. The plan called for 11 warships of 800 to 1,700 tonnes, launched 1628 to 1634, to be armed with 24-pounders on their lower battery. It called for five more to have two or four such guns. This may have been the ambitious king's original armament policy, which the regency had hesitated to continue to its full extent until now.®'

KAR, A r t i l l e r i h u v u d b o c k e r 1639, KrA; u n d a t e d a r m a m e n t p l a n with t h e date 2/12 1645 a d d e d later, b u t actually f r o m 1639, M 1848, RA. The g u n i n v e n t o r y is close to t h e i n v e n t o r y at Stockliolm at t h e e n d of 1639, b u t t h e list of w a r s h i p s includes Jonas, lost in 1639. "" In 1644, only 60 lodjor were a r m e d for war, a n d it is u n c e r t a i n to w h i c h extent they were a r m e d with guns. ® M 1848, RA. The ships listed with lower batteries of 2 4 - p d r s w e r e Nya Kronan (1632), Scepter (1634), Gota Ark (1634) a n d Applet (1628) of 1,350 to 1,700 tonnes, a n d Nyckeln, Jupiter, Draken, Samson, Goteborg, Mars, a n d Smalands Lejonet of 8 0 0 900 t o n n e s , l a u n c h e d 1630-34. Tlie f o u r larger w e r e p r e s u m a b l y to be a r m e d with the l o n g a n d heavy 24-pdrs, while the light 1.2 t o n n e s 2 4 - p d r s cast f r o m 1626 to 1633

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

553

Tlie regency government had fulfilled Gustav Adolf's program of creating a navy armed with bronze guns of four standard calibres. The king had obviously regarded cast-iron guns as a temporary solution, mainly useful for old ships and hired merchantmen. W h e n the regents began planning to use the navy for an attack on Denmark, they faced the fact that the bronze gun policy had proven too expensive. The bronze guns had been too valuable and easy to sell in order to finance other efforts. This policy was not very adventurous as long as the navy's inventory was sufficient for a purely defensive strategy against Denmark. With huge resources in copper and Europe's largest export industry for cast-iron guns, Sweden could quicldy increase the navy's firepower. But in 1643/44, offensive war efforts and financial considerations initiated a new policy, which in a few decades was to radically change the navy's stock of ordnance. Gustav II Adolf's policy for arming his navy had, from an early date, aimed at markedly increasing the firepower in relation to the displacement. In the first year of his reign, he had to send out a fleet of 22 ships and two galleys with a mediocre ratio between total firepower in pounds and total displacement in tonnes of 0.12.'° Erik XIV had done much better in the 1560s. Already the long-term plan of 1616 had a ratio of 0.36 and that of 1621 not less than 0.42. The various short-term plans for 1624-25 show a less ambitious reality, with ratios varying from 0.23 to 0.26. The 1632 has a ratio of 0.40 (0.38 if ex-Imperial ships are included), that of 1639 0.40, and that of 1643 of not less than 0.49. Comparable figures for other navies are difficult to find. A plan for arming the English navy in 1625 shows a ratio of 0.38, while 59 Dutch warships with a known armament in 1629 had a ratio of 0.50. Twenty-eight Dutch warships built f r o m 1625 to 1652 were in 1654 armed with 0.71 pounds of firepower for each tonne of their displacement. The ratio for 11 Danish warships in 1644-45 was 0.61. The French navy in 1648 had armed its 34 warships with to a ratio of 0.68 and planned to arm 30 of them to a ratio of 0.74. That navy included four ex-Swedish warships bought in 1647, which were armed to a ratio of 0.78, that is, above the average for French warships.

would suit t h e smaller ships. The n u m b e r of t h e latter w a s n o t sufficient to a r m all seven ships, however. SH 64:1, RA.

554

CHAPTER SEVEN

Of these navies the Dutch and the French had a high proportion of (mostly Swedish-made) iron guns. This type of calculation is highly approximate. Displacement calculation in some cases (the French navy and the Dutch in 1629) is built on somewhat shaky evidence, the pounds and calibre systems are not exactly similar, and guns of the same calibre varied dramatically in weight. The Swedish armament plans do not look over-ambitious, however, in relation to other navies, and the much higher ratio for Swedish-built ships in French service shows that they had a potential to be more heavily armed. These calculations also show that Gustav II Adolf's ambition to reduce the weight of the guns in relation to their calibres was typical rather than unusual at this time. 91

7.9 From bronze to cast iron, 1644-1674 During the 17th century, the European navies changed their armament from almost exclusively bronze to predominantly cast-iron guns. By the end of the century, production of naval bronze guns had practically ceased, and during the early decades of the 18th century, many surviving bronze guns were withdrawn from naval service. The timing and causes are rather obscure in the literature. The early breakthrough of cast-iron technology in mid-16th-century England and the establishment of a large cast-iron gun industry in early 17th-century Sweden have attracted much attention and may have led to the conclusion that this was the breakthrough for cast-iron guns in the navies. However, both the English and the Swedish navy remained predominantly armed with bronze guns until the middle of the 17th century, and both phased out their first generation of cast-iron guns in the early 17th century. The large market for cast-iron guns was the armed merchantmen, and the large number of such guns which were made The English navy 1625: Lavery 1983, 193-94. Dutch warships in 1629, Staet van Oorloge te water, 1629, Manuscript X 828, Kungliga Biblioteket, Stockholm; Dutch warships 1654, Admiraliteitsarchief, xxxvii, no, 79, Lijste van de schepen van oorlooge van de staat, 17/7 1654, Nationaal Archief, The Hague. Danish warships 1644-45, armament of ten captured Danish ships, Leufstaarkivet, vol. 47, RA; KAR, Artillerihuvudbok 1644, KrA; E 8560, RA (three slightly different lists of the same captured guns; the guns of St Sophia in a Danish inventory 20/3 1644, M 1291, RA. The French navy 1648, Melanges de Colbert, fols 471-77, Bibliotheque nationale de France, Paris. 91

BRONZE AND IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL ORDNANCE

555

rather early probably shows that the average life of earlv r.ct • was short and that they had to be r e p l a c e f f l e l e n t l y " " A comparison of the European navies shows that the breakthrough for cas,.>ron guns as the predominant armament on warshm o ^ m the third quarter of the 17th century. In all navies fo w h t h h dmsion between n-on and bronze in various calibres are know t t pattern :s the same. Iron guns were first made in small " Z e s t the mid-17th century they were increasingly important in t S m H ^ calibres (12- to 18-pounders); and finally they beca r c o m m the heaviest guns. TI.e English navy w L a ^ n , bronze guns m the 1620s, and iron guns became only m a r g S l v J o e

l a r . fle. Should be a n ^ ^ r i S ^ K

~

^

.. was com.de,-ed poss.ble ,„ arm eva„ ,he,n w,.h cas,-i,- r g u L «

power came from such guns, although only a few wer

larg r than

n7ln l Z % r " ^^ - 1674 64 per cent" .n 8 I e 2T r ; ^^^^ common'alread in the 690 U e n f • K number En.h!h r ! ? ' been a pioneer buyer of b ^ t e Z s T t ^ ' r ^^^^^^^^ - p l a c e d those guns'with r i 6 4 4 Bv 167 s f ' - - totally dominant 1644. By 1675, 52 per cent of the firepower came f r o m cast-iron

'

556

CHAPTER SEVEN

guns, including many 18-pounders. Cast-iron 24-pounders appeared in 1690s when they were made in large numbers, and by 1700, 63 per cent of the firepower came from cast-iron guns. In 1718, that share was 80 per cent.'^ The literature has little to say about the relative cost of bronze and iron guns. In his classic study of 1965, Carlo Cipolla worked with the problem and made much use of Swedish literature and sources. He did not find any useful price series for guns, however; only for Swedish copper and bar iron. Those, however, illustrate that copper often was unusually cheap in relation to bar iron from the late 1620s to the 1650s, at least partly a result of intense Swedish efforts to finance war efl:orts with copper export.'"' This policy may have delayed the final breakthrough of cast-iron guns. In England, bronze guns were estimated to cost 4 to 4.5 times as much as cast-iron guns of the same weight in 1625 and in the 1630s, while the difference in 1670 was more than eight times.'' The cost of bronze guns remained practically the same, but the cost of iron guns was in 1670 only 45 per cent of what it was in 1625. There have been no price studies of Swedish guns, even though preconditions for comparisons are unusually good. Sweden produced both bronze and iron guns in regions for which transport costs of raw material or guns to Stockholm were approximately the same. No great effort has been made in this study to create price series for guns (or anything else), but interesting information has been found in the naval archives. They are estimates made by the Swedish naval administration about prices of bronze and cast-iron guns on the Swedish market. The state produced its own bronze guns, and the naval administrators at Stocldiolm worked close to the international market for cast-iron guns, so they must have been well informed about current prices. It is probable that the estimated prices are for the highest qualities of Swedish cast-iron guns, because a navy that still considered

" D u t c h w a r s h i p s in 1629, Staet van Oodoge te water, 1629, M a n u s c r i p t X 828, Kungliga Biblioteket, S t o c k h o l m ; D u t c h w a r s h i p s 1654, AdmiraUteitsarchief, xxxvii, no. 79, N a t i o n a a l Archief, The H a g u e . F r e n c h w a r s h i p s 1648, M e l a n g e s de Colbert, fols 4 7 1 - 7 7 , Bibliotheque n a t i o n a l e de Paris. F r e n c h naval o r d n a n c e 1661-1700; Boudriot & Berti 1992, 192. D e n m a r k 1644; Blom 1877 a n d Swedish inventories of c a p t u r e d D a n i s h ships; D e n m a r k 1675: C h r i s t i a n B r u u n , Curt Sivertsen Adelaer: En historisk undersogelse, C o p e n h a g e n , 1871, 4 3 0 - 3 1 ; D e n m a r k 1700 a n d 1718, Soetaten efter 1655, SK 924 a n d 930, Rigsarkivet, C o p e n h a g e n . Cipolla 1965, 3 7 - 7 5 , 151-59. '' Cipolla 1965, 42, n o t e 3; Lavery 1987, 87.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

557

buying expensive copper guns could hardly be interested in lower qualities of cast-iron guns. In a request for naval expenditure for 1647, bronze guns were estimated to cost 66 daler silvermynt (dsm) per skeppund, while iron guns were estimated to cost 18 dsm, a price relation of 3.67:1. In the request for new cast-iron guns for 1659, the price per skeppund is not stated but must have been somewhere between 8V2 to 10 dsm. In a similar estimate for 1666, the bronze guns cost 90 dsm and iron guns 10 dsm per skeppund. A price relation of 3.67 to 1 had changed in two decades to a relation of 9 to 1, and the change rapidly continued. In an estimate from around 1671, the relation was 11.7 to 1 for larger cast-iron guns (18- and 24-pounders) and 15.9 to 1 for light cast-iron guns (3- to 8-pounders). In 1673, copper prices had increased, but the prices of cast-iron guns were the same. Bronze guns cost 14.2 times the price for heavy cast-iron guns. In 1691, the price ratio was 14.8 to 1. Like in England, the price of bronze guns was relatively stable while that of cast-iron guns dramatically plummeted. The changed price ratio for bronze and cast-iron guns reflect major progress in the process of casting iron. It became possible both to cast heavier objects from iron and to cast guns more inexpensively than before. Most early cast-iron guns were 3- to 6-pounders, weighing up to 0.5 tonnes, but by the 1660s and 1670s, it was possible to cast dependable 24- and 36-pounders with a weight of two to three tonnes or more.'® The price ratio between iron and bronze guns in both Sweden and England indicates that a major technological breakthrough must have occurred sometime between the 1640s and the late 1660s. After—and probably also before—these decades, the price ratios were fairly stable. Cast-iron guns were always cheaper than bronze, but the quality for a long time was much lower, and only small guns could be cast in iron

D r a f t to request of naval f u n d s for 1647, N N S II, 133, A m i r a l i t e t s a n o r d n i n g a r , KrA; request for naval f u n d s 1659, M 1779, RA ( n o weights of g u n s are stated, t h e price has b e e n calculated b y t h e a u t h o r f r o m weights of cast-iron g u n s stated in the requests for 1647 a n d 1666); r e q u e s t of a d d i t i o n a l naval f u n d s in 1666, M 1761, RA; u n d a t e d request, p r o b a b l y for 1672, of a d d i t i o n a l naval f u n d s , N N S II, 157, KrA (filed with o t h e r requests dated 21/12 1671, the n u m b e r of r e q u e s t e d b r o n z e g u n s are t h e same as t h e deficiencies listed in t h e navy's a r m a m e n t p l a n of 1671, m a n u s c r i p t , L 422, U U B ) ; request of f u n d s for g u n s 1673, N N S II, 159; cost of a r m a m e n t for a 8 0 - g u n ship, 3/2 1691, M 1754, RA. There is also a calculation of t h e cost of lost a n d discarded g u n s in 1677, N N S II, 166;1, KrA, w h e r e b r o n z e g u n s are valued to 100 daler silvermynt ( d s m ) per skeppund, 2 4 - p d r iron g u n s to 9 d s m a n d lighter g u n s to 7 d s m . Swedish c o p p e r a n d b a r i r o n prices 1624-94: Cipolla 1965, 156-57.

558

CHAPTER SEVEN

with any reliability. After the 1660s, the economic and naval rationale for casting guns in bronze had largely disappeared. Their survival in most navies can be explained by the prestige connected with beautiful bronze guns and the administrative inertia created by their reliability. They seldom wore out, and it took an active decision to withdraw them from service and regain the capital invested in the metal by melting them. More studies are required to find out what the technological breakthrough actually consisted of and if it was stimulated by naval demand or the result of other demands for cast iron. The breakthrough was an important precondition for the growth of the large battle fleets and the increased size of warships of in the 1650s and 1660s, because it became possible to mass-produce the heaviest types of guns at reasonable prices. This made it affordable to arm many large ships with batteries of 18- to 36-pounders. How did the Swedish naval administration act in a period when a large export industry experienced a breakthrough of major importance for naval policy and technology? The first test came in the war with Denmark 1643-45. There are no sources for how the large fleet which sailed to the southern Baltic in summer 1644 was armed, but its firepower most probably was roughly equal to the inventory which existed in 1643 and early 1644. This was considerably less than the ambitious plan of 1643, although the 12 ships sent to the southern Baltic in September 1644 (the operation that led to the battle of Femern) were at least as heavily armed as in that plan." This must have been achieved by partially disarming other ships left in Stockholm, and that made new guns for these ships for 1645 even more urgent. Cast iron was in practice the only short-term way to increase firepower to the desired level. The quality of the bronze guns made at Kopparberget since 1630 seems also to have been uneven: several guns developed defects during the 1644 campaign. They had to be sold for their metal value to Louis de Geer to pay for the armed merchantmen he had hired in Holland. The problem was discussed at a meeting with the Council on 4 October 1644, where de Geer was present. Naturally he spoke in favor cast-iron guns, which he claimed were equally efficient as bronze guns at one third their price; he also argued that copper was better used to make money. This raised scepticism in the Council, where someone remarked that iron guns corroded, which changed

Plan of 1643 a n d a r m a m e n t of 12 ships, M 1848, RA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

559

their calibre. Axel Oxenstierna spoke about recasting (deficient?) bronze guns, and the riksmarsk Jakob de la Gardie expressed concern that the bronze guns might disappear.'^® Nevertheless, orders for cast-iron guns to increase the armament in the campaign of 1645 were made, and rapid deliveries followed. An armament plan for 1645 shows a requirement of 224 iron guns, including 78 18-pounders. Interestingly, the two copies of the plan which have survived are from the private collections of Axel Oxenstierna and Louis de Geer. In fact, the navy in 1645 may have had close to 380 cast-iron guns, including captured guns, but no iron guns of larger calibres than 14 (12) pounds can be found in the sources. Tlie total firepower/displacement ratio in that year was around 0.47, that is, close to the goal of 0.49 articulated in the plan of 1643. This increase was much helped with the capture of ten Danish warships at the battle of Femern in October 1644. They were armed with guns with of firepower of around 3,600 pounds and a total weight (except a few cast-iron guns) of 263y2 tonnes. The ships had a total displacement of around 6,000 tonnes. Their average firepower/displacement ratio was 0.60, but their total armament weight was only around 4.5 per cent of their total displacement, due to many light guns of larger calibres. These bronze guns were of greater long-term value than the ex-Danish ships themselves. The ships were rather old, and most of them had been discarded by the late 1650s, while many of the guns had a long life in Swedish service.'' An armament plan for 1648 shows an inventory of 12 20 (18)-, 120 14 (12)-, 130 6-, and 40 3-pounders or a total of 302 cast-iron guns, mainly from production during 1644-45. The requirement listed was 446 cast-iron guns, including 94 20 (18)-pounders. The requirement of bronze guns was 982 guns. In terms of firepower, they still represented around two thirds of the requirement, but iron guns had obviously been

" SRP 10, 1643-1644, 640. The sale of 52 K o p p a r b e r g e t b r o n z e g u n s of a r o u n d 491 skeppund to Louis de Geer is r e c o r d e d in KAR, A r t i l l e r i h u v u d b o k 1644, KrA. " A r m a m e n t plan for 25 ships (those b a s e d in Stockliohn) for 1645, M 1848, RA ( f r o m O x e n s t i e r n a ' s collection, T i d o s a m l i n g e n ) , a n d (with s o m e a d d i t i o n a l notes) in Leufstaarkivet, vol. 47, RA. Tlie total a r m a m e n t of t h e Swedish navy in 1645 can be reconstructed a p p r o x i m a t e l y with that p l a n a n d with t h r e e lists of the real a r m a m e n t of ships f r o m S t o c k h o l m a n d W i s m a r in Karl G u s t a v W r a n g e l ' s collection, E 8 5 6 0 - 8 5 6 1 , RA, s u p p l e m e n t e d with O R 1645:3, KrA ( g u n s o n seven ships), a n d a list of g u n s o n six ships at G o t h e n b u r g at t h e e n d of 1645, N N S II, 12a, KrA. Plan of 1643, M 1848, RA. The weight a n d calibres of t h e g u n s o n ten c a p t u r e d D a n i s h ships, Leufstaarkivet, vol. 47, RA. Their total weight has b e e n calculated b y Niels Probst.

560

CHAPTER SEVEN

accepted as standard naval guns after the experiences of 1644-45. In its requests for new funds for 1647 and 1648, the Amiralitetskollegium did ask for more bronze guns, however, and production of such guns at Kopparberget continued until 1650.""' New ideas were tested however. Among Karl Gustav Wrangel's papers from his years as riksviceamiral (1653-57) is a collection of armament plans for 1653 to 1656, which are the main source for information about the navy's guns in these years. For 1653 there are two alternatives, one with 1,088 bronze guns and only 28 iron guns and another with 298 bronze guns (mainly 24- and 12-pounders) and 758 cast-iron guns, including 158 18-pounders. The ratios between total firepower in pounds and total displacement of the ships was 0.61 in the bronze alternative and 0.52 in the cast-iron alternative, which shows that bronze guns were markedly lighter for the same amount of firepower. Someone in the naval administration must have been interested in studying two equally radical alternatives, a costly return to a bronze-gun navy and a daring transformation to a navy predominantly armed with guns of a material which still was regarded as inferior, especially for larger calibres. The profit would come from the sale of approximately 1,000 tonnes of valuable bronze."" Neither plan was implemented, but during 1652-54, the Amiralitetskollegium expressed serious interest in increasing its stock of cast-iron guns. The Anglo-Dutch naval war in these years increased tensions in Northern Europe as Denmark sided with the Dutch and Sweden had friendly relations with England. In the requests for funds for 1653, the Amiralitetskollegium asked for only eight bronze guns (18-pounders) but also for no fewer than 497 cast-iron guns, including 146 18-pounders. In February 1653, it invited tenders from three leading gun-founders for 18-pounders to be delivered in April. Of those submitting tenders, Hubert de Besche on the Nafweqvarn ironworks had no twin blast-furnace and was unable to cast guns larger than 12-pounders. Louis de Geer Jr on Finspong and Peter Rochet on Forsmark were apparently too occupied with export orders to be interested in this

M 1761, RA. The r e q u e s t for naval e x p e n d i t u r e s in 1647 has a hst with a total lack of 235 b r o n z e g u n s of 3,468 p o u n d s a n d 135 i r o n g u n s of 1,758 p o u n d s , including 84 i r o n 18-pdrs, M 1779, RA, s a m e in N N S II, 133. H i e request for 1648 was for 236 b r o n z e a n d 166 iron guns, i n c l u d i n g 60 2 0 - p d r s (18-pdrs), AK till Kunglig Majestat, vol. 1, 12/12 1647, RA. P r o d u c t i o n at K o p p a r b e r g e t : Hedberg 1985, 142. «" E 8 5 6 1 , R A .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

561

order from the navy. Negotiations continued under threats of sequestration of export guns. In October 1653, the Amiralitetskollegium briefly sequestered 136 18- and 60 12-pounders from Finspong, which were about to be shipped to Holland, probably for the Dutch navy's large wartime shipbuilding program. This decision was quicldy reversed by Queen Christina, but the Amiralitetskollegium demanded that de Geer deliver 100 18- and 100 12-pounders to the navy by spring 1654.'"' Actually, fewer cast-iron guns were added to the naval inventory, probably because the risk for Swedish involvement in the West European war disappeared with the peace in early 1654. Gun production and the stock of guns in these years are uncertain; it requires a study of both army and naval guns to understand all changes. The navy's armament plans from 1648 and 1653 are confusing; they show a great deficiency in bronze guns, which suddenly disappears after 1654 when a large number of such guns, many of them of non-standard calibres (42, 30, 18, 14, 10, 8, and 5 pounds), are listed. These guns were not new; they were ex-Danish guns captured in 1644, and possibly also guns taken in Germany prior to 1648, which were transferred to naval control from the Ordnance. They had been available and also used by the navy since 1644. The total number of guns in the naval inventory changed little from 1654 to 1658, and no major increase in the stock was necessary. The navy was aging and declining in strength, and the existing stock of guns was sufficient to arm The war with Denmark from 1657 became a test for the new system with hired Swedish merchantmen as auxiliary warships. Sixteen merchantmen were hired in 1657 and 12 more in 1658. These ships had some defensive armament when they sailed to Western Europe, but as

Requests for 1653 in N N S II, 137. Amiralitetskollegium's letters to Peter Rochet, Forsmark, H u b e r t de Besche, N a f w e q v a r n a n d Louis de G e e r Jr, F i n s p o n g 20/2 1653, to Peter Rochet, Louis de Geer Jr, a n d H u b e r t de Besche 19/3 1653, to H u b e r t de Besche 2/4 1653, to H u b e r t de Besche a n d Louis de Geer Jr 27/6 1653, to artillery lieutenant M a n s Assarsson 22/10 a n d 27/10 1653, AK, registratur 1653, fols 7 7 - 7 8 , 150-53, 198-99, 398, 562, 5 6 7 - 6 8 , KrA. "" The navy's g u n i n v e n t o r y for 1650-52, O R 1650:5, 1651:5, 1652:6, KrA; a r m a m e n t plans a n d g u n inventories 1653-56, 8561, RA; an i n c o m p l e t e plan for 1653 in M 1761, RA; plans for 1658 in M 1761, RA, N N S II, 144, KrA. There are small c h a n g e s in the n u m b e r of b r o n z e g u n s f r o m 1654 to 1656, w h i c h m a y be t h e result of n e w p r o d u c t i o n b u t also of c a p t u r e s or t r a n s f e r s f r o m t h e a r m y . There is an increase of t h e n u m b e r of iron 18-pdrs f r o m 12 in 1653 to 46 in 1655 a n d a decline to eight in early 1658. The n u m b e r of 14 ( 1 2 ) - p d r s increased f r o m 112 in 1654 to 138 in 1655 b u t was back to 112 in 1658. C a s t - i r o n g u n s m a y h a v e b e e n t r a n s f e r r e d to fortifications d u r i n g the wars w i t h P o l a n d , Russia, a n d D e n m a r k f r o m 1655.

562

CHAPTER SEVEN

warships they required many more guns, and it was the navy which had to arm them. Initially there was a lack of cast-iron guns for the hired ships, but during 1658-59, these ships seem to have been fairly well armed. An armament plan for 1658 listed 35 armed merchantmen with a planned firepower of 3,154 pounds, of which around 80 per cent came from iron guns. In December 1658, a plan for 24 armed merchantmen for 1659 listed guns with firepower of around 4,400 pounds, of which more than 90 per cent came from iron guns. Production of such guns had begun in 1657, but it cannot be followed in detail. The total inventory of iron guns did grow from 294 in 1656 to 711 in December 1658, but most of the new guns were 8-, 6-, and 4-pounders. They were sufficient for many of the armed merchantmen because only the larger of them had a substantial number of heavier guns than 8-pounders."''' The navy's stock of bronze guns changed little during the 1650s. After the formal transfer of trophy guns to the navy in 1653/54, there were 994 bronze guns. In December 1658, there were 922.'°^ There is a marked difference between the plan for 1658 and the plan for 1659 (dated to December 1658). The first had an ideal armament of 1,261 bronze guns with a firepower of 15,000 pounds and a deficit of 338 bronze guns and 3,700 pounds of firepower to be filled. The later plan took its departure from an existing stock of 922 bronze guns and redistributed them among existing ships. The deficit was now to be filled with new cast-iron guns, including 154 IS-pounders.""" Cast-iron gun were evidently now accepted as a normal part of the armament of warships, including the larger units. It is important to observe that this change took place shortly after the battle in the Sound on 29 October, 1658, which had tested the cast-iron guns of both the Swedish and the

The p r o b l e m s with a r m i n g m e r c h a n t m e n in G o t h e n b u r g : Bergman, Kompaniskeppen 1965, 197-219; a r m a m e n t plans for eight h i r e d m e r c h a n t m e n in G o t h e n b u r g 1657-58, M 1850, RA. A r m a m e n t plans for 1658, M 1761, RA; for 1658 a n d 1659, N N S II, 144-45, KrA; for G o t h e n b u r g ships also in M 1757, RA. Lists of t h e fleet's real a r m a m e n t in A u g u s t 1658, M 1850, E 8561, RA. The c h a n g e s in t h e inventories f r o m 1654 to 1659 seem superficially to be considerable, b u t a closer i n s p e c t i o n s h o w that to a large extent t h e y m u s t be reclassifications of 12-pdrs to 14-pdrs. By 1665 (M 1761, RA), t h e b r o n z e 14-pdrs h a d d i s a p p e a r e d , b u t t h e y are obviously identical with w h a t in 1658 was called heavy 12-pdrs. There were p r o b a b l y p r o b l e m s with classifications of c a p t u r e d D a n i s h g u n s b e h i n d this. A r m a m e n t plan for 1659 a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e q u e s t of g u n s , N N S II, 1 4 4 45, KrA. A s o m e w h a t revised request d a t e d 21/2 1659, M 1779, RA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

563

Dutch navies (all cast in Sweden) in an intense battle. The result must have been positive, and it reduced fears that they were unreliable. New production of bronze guns did occur, however. A small number of heavy 30- and 36-pounders were cast 1659-61, most probably as a part of Karl X Gustav's new construction program of great ships. Tlieir year of casting and weight are known because several of them still exist. They must represent lessons learned during the war, because such heavy guns had not been previously used by the navy, except for a few heavy guns in the 1560s and the temporary use of some very heavy guns in 1624. Production apparently ceased after 1661, and together with some captured guns (the oldest from 1514), a stock of 12 36- and 12 30-pounders existed until 1 June 1676 when all of them were lost with Kronan and Svdrdet.^^^ The stock at the end of the war in 1660 is not known, but it was probably not very different f r o m that in an armament plan for 1665, although the arithmetic there is confused. It lists a requirement of 960 bronze and 824 iron guns, of which 950 and 525 existed. The deficit was concentrated to heavy iron guns: 82 24- and 72 18-pounders were required, but none existed. In 1666, a requirement of 104 bronze and 339 iron guns was listed, including eight 30- and 30 24-pounders of bronze and 116 24- and 54 18-pounders of iron. These plans show that heavy cast-iron guns, even 24-pounders, which Swedish gun foundries now produced for export, were accepted by the Swedish navy. However, they were only bought in small numbers, even though several new large ships required them if they were to be adequately armed.'"® There are no further armament plans known until 1671. It shows a small increase in the stock of bronze guns to 996, possibly due to transfers from the army, and an increase in the number of iron guns

"" H i e s e g u n s are listed in t h e inventories of 1665, M 1761, RA, a n d 1671, m a n u script L 422, U U B . The latter states a total r e q u i r e m e n t of 24 36- a n d 24 30-pdrs. It is k n o w n that 12 3 6 - p d r s existed in m i d - 1 6 7 5 w h e n it was d e c i d e d to place eight on Kronan a n d f o u r o n Svardet, a q u e s t i o n that was i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h to r e q u i r e a special decision b y AK, p r o t o k o l l 7/7 1675, KrA. F r o m t h e w r e c k of Kronan, o n e Stockliolm-made 3 6 - p d r a n d o n e S t o c k h o l m - m a d e , o n e B r u n s w i c k a n d o n e I m p e r i a l 30-pdr were raised 1 6 7 9 - 8 6 a n d seven 36- a n d five 3 0 - p d r s h a v e b e e n located by t h e Kalmar lans m u s e u m since 1980, i n c l u d i n g six 36- a n d two 3 0 - p d r s cast in 1659-61. O n e G e r m a n 3 6 - p d r was cast in 1514 a n d w a s 162 years old w h e n it was lost: Glete, Kronans artilleri. "" A r m a m e n t plan 1665 a n d requests for 1666, M 1761, RA. The earUest deliveries of cast-iron 2 4 - p o u n d e r s to the navy c a m e f r o m A k e r s in 1666: Hammar 1974, 284.

564

CHAPTER SEVEN

to 760, including 24 24- and 9 18-pounders. Requirements had been increased to 1,075 bronze and 958 iron guns. The total numbers are less important. What was important was that the navy lacked 12 36-, 12 30-, 178 24-, and 79 18-pounders; in other words, the navy lacked no fewer than 281 heavy guns necessary to fill the lower battery of about 12 of its largest ships. Since 1660, the navy had built the great ship Kronan of 2,300 tonnes, Svdrdet of 1,700 tonnes, and nine ships of 1,150 to 1,450 tonnes. The plan of 1671 reveals that these ships had not yet received their main batteries. On paper, there was a surplus of almost 100 10- and 12-pounders, but they (and many more) were necessary to arm hired merchantmen in a future war.'"' Tlie sources about gun production for the navy in the 1670s are meagre, and there are few surviving inventories. An intense program of iron gun-casting took place in 1672-73, when at least 200 18- and 24-pounders were acquired. By 1675, there were guns to fill the main batteries of all larger warships, although not always with full batteries of 24- to 36-pounders as planned in 1671. It was evidently the outbreak of war in Western Europe which finally brought the regency of Karl XI to action. Sweden was connected with France through the alliance system and might be dragged into the war."" Tlie new guns were almost entirely made of cast iron. The navy's requests for funds from 1672-73 still requested money for the purchase of many bronze guns which had been included in the plan of 1671, but these repeated requests also show that they were not made. The requests show that the cost of bronze guns was dramatically higher than for the same weight of iron guns, so it is not difficult to understand why the financially strained Swedish state had postponed the idea of large-scale production of such guns and chose to acquire cast-iron guns.'" Since the mid-1640s, Sweden's rulers, the Council, the Amiralitetskollegium, and the naval administrators had debated whether they

A r m a m e n t p l a n of 1671, m a n u s c r i p t , L 422 U U B ; u n d a t e d request for n e w g u n s filed t o g e t h e r with requests d a t e d 21/12 1671 a n d with t h e s a m e r e q u e s t of b r o n z e g u n s as t h e deficiency in t h e 1671 a r m a m e n t plan, N N S II, 157, KrA. List of r e q u i r e m e n t s , n o year d u e to d a m a g e d p a p e r b u t p r o b a b l y 1672, M 1761, RA (list of g u n s exactly as deficiencies in a r m a m e n t plan of 1671); letter f r o m Amiralitetskollegium to Krigskollegium 13/1 1673 a b o u t r e q u i r e m e n t s of guns, Krigskollegium, I n k o m m a n d e h a n d l i n g a r , KrA; list of r e q u i r e m e n t s for 1673, N N S II, 159, w h i c h shows that t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of i r o n 24- a n d 18-pdrs largely w e r e filled d u r i n g 1672-73. P r o d u c t i o n of b r o n z e g u n s h a d n o t entirely ceased, h o w e v e r . In 1675, o n e 24a n d 12 3 - p d r s were cast in S t o c k h o l m , N N S II, 161, KrA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

565

dared to rely on cast-iron guns rather than the reliable but expensive bronze guns to deliver firepower f r o m their warships. They ended up placing large orders for cast-iron guns whenever wars or imminent dangers of war appeared: in 1644-45, 1653, 1657-59, and 1672-73. There was for a long time a considerable reluctance to acquire heavier types of iron guns. A small number of 18-pounders appeared in the 1650s; they were clearly accepted after 1658; but only in the 1670s were 18- and 24-pounders ordered in large numbers. There was no longterm policy to gradually phase out bronze guns, release the capital tied up in their metal, and use the profit to buy cast-iron guns. There was an inherent inertia in the large stock of bronze guns, many of them prestigious trophies from victories at sea and on land. After 1645 and up to the 1660s, there was no acute shortage of guns to be filled with cast-iron guns. The policy of Karl XI's regents of creating a force of great warships without their main batteries was a risk which only a country with vast gun-producing resources could afford to take. Table 7.2

Bronze guns

Year 1624, 1624, 1632, 1639, 1639, 1643, 1654 1655 1656 1658, 1658, 1665 1671 1677, 1687 1700,

The total inventory of Swedish naval guns, 1624-1700

10/6 22/10 14/12 1/1 late 3/7

early Dec

1/1 1/1

4,200 3,300 6,700 11,400 8,900 10,200 11,800 12,000 12,400 11,400 11,200 11,100 10,100 7,100 6,200 4,700

Cast-iron guns

800 400 -

2,500 3,400 3,200 3,200 5,100 4,000 6,100 11,300 22,700 26,200

Total 4,200 4,100 7,000 11,400 8,900 10,200 14,300 15,400 15,600 14,600 16,400 15,000 16,200 18,400 28,900 30,900

% iron guns -

19.0 5.5 -

17.5 22.0 20.5 22.0 31.5 26.5 37.5 61.5 78.5 85.0

Total firepower, r o u n d e d to h u n d r e d s of p o u n d s . Sources: 10/6 1624, M 1761, RA; 22/10 1624, AR 1625/12, KrA; 14/12 1632, M 1761, RA; 1/1 1639, Krigskollegium, A r t i l l e r i d e p a r t e m e n t e t , Stocldiolms slotts arkli, Arklirakningar, 1639, KrA; late 1639 a n d 3/7 1643, M 1848, RA; 1654-56, E 8561, RA; 1658-59, M 1761, RA a n d N N S II, 144, KrA; 1665, M 1761, RA; 1671, L 422, U U B ; 1/1 1677, N N S II, 166:1, KrA; 1687, M 1762, RA; l / I 1700, N N S II, 12b, KrA.

566

CHAPTER SEVEN

7.10

A navy with cheap guns,

1675-1721

On 1 June 1676, Sweden's two largest warships, Kronan and Svardet, sank during the dramatic battle of Oland against the Danish and Dutch fleets. With these two ships around 300 tonnes of bronze guns, with a value of almost a quarter million daler silvermynt (dsm), went to the bottom. The two ships were valued to 160,000 dsm and 106,800 dsm, respectively and Kronan was worth somewhat less than the guns the ship carried. Later in June, Applet was wrecked. This large ship, apparently in less good condition than Svdrdet, was only valued to 40,000 dsm while the guns, 70 of bronze and eight of iron, were valued to 75,768 dsm. Several other losses in the war of 1675-79 were costly in terms of bronze guns, although the cost of lost iron guns was rather modest. In the catastrophic year 1677, the navy lost 182 bronze guns of 1,529 skeppund (208 tonnes) with an estimated value of 152,900 dsm and 414 cast-iron guns of 3,786 skeppund (515 tonnes) with a value of 27,206 dsm."2 Bronze guns had been costly to produce, and the total loss of a warship armed with them was a major financial disaster. It is not surprising that advanced methods of diving at considerable depth were developed in the mid-17th century. In the 1650s and 1660s, the Swedish entrepreneur Hans Albrekt von Treileben was successful in salvaging bronze guns from Vasen (sunk in 1628), Danish St Sophia (wrecked off Gothenburg in 1645), and Dutch Brederode, sunk in the battle in the Sound in 1658. In 1679-86, the Swedish navy recovered 60 guns, weighing 92 tonnes, f r o m the wreck of Kronan at 26 meters depth in the open sea. Many other bronze guns lost on 16th and 17th century Swedish had been salvaged earlier, although usually from stranded wrecks or from limited depths.'"

Evaluation of t h e cost of lost ships a n d g u n s 1 6 7 5 - 7 7 (copy, p r o b a b l y f r o m the 19th century), N N S II, 12a. This evaluation has certain e r r o r s a n d m u s t b e treated with c a u t i o n because t h e m e t h o d of evaluation is n o t stated. A s u m m a r y of g u n s lost a n d d i s c a r d e d in 1677, N N S II, 166:1, KrA. Carl Olof C e d e r l u n d (ed. Fred H o c k e r ) , Vasa, I. The Archaeology of a Swedish Warship of 1628, O x f o r d , 2006, 6 8 - 1 0 7 (texts of G e o r g H a f s t r o m a n d Fred H o c k e r ) ; g u n s recovered f r o m Kronan, AK till Kunglig Majestat, vol. 8, 29/3 1686, RA; Lars Einarsson, "Artefacts f r o m t h e Kronan (1676): Categories, p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d social structure", in M a r k R e d k n a p (ed.), Artefacts from Wrecks: Dated assemblages from the late Middle Ages to the Industrial revolution, O x f o r d , 1997, 2 0 9 - 2 0 . G u n recoveries f r o m Riksnyckeln, lost in 1628, Bengt Grisell a n d Sten Ahlberg, "Riksnyckeln 1628", Forum navale, 28, 1973, 6 3 - 8 1 .

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

567

When the war started in 1675, cast-iron gun production continued, but the sources about this are incomplete. Hie actual armaments of the individual ships during the war of 1675-79 are not known. In the few cases where it is known, it varied widely from the armament plan of 1671 and the modified plan of 1675.'"' Deficiencies certainly existed; around 25 hired merchantmen required several hundred guns, mainly 12-pounders and lighter, but lack of guns was not the major problem for the crisis-stricken navy. Guns could quicldy be purchased from the gun-founders, but ships and experienced officers took time to find. A list of guns in existence at the beginning of 1677 shows a stock of bronze guns with firepower of around 7,000 pounds, a reduction of 30 per cent since 1671, largely due to the losses in 1676. The stock of iron guns had firepower of around 11,300 pounds, an increase of 84 per cent since 1671. The plan for 1677 was to acquire 1,077 new cast-iron guns, mainly of smaller calibres suitable for the hired armed merchantmen. Already by the end of July 1677, 972 of these were delivered, a demonstration of the capacity of the Swedish iron gun-founders. In the war years, the navy evolved f r o m a predominantly bronze-gun-armed force to a predominantly cast-iron gun-armed force."' In the war of 1675-79, the navy used many cast-iron 24- and 18pounders, calibres that it earlier hardly had acquired from the iron foundries. The result must have been satisfactory, and in the early 1680s even cast-iron 36-pounders were ordered. Their career on the largest warships was brief, but they became the main armament of the fortifications that guarded the entrance to the new naval base at Karlskrona. When guns of all calibres could be cast in iron of acceptable quality, Swedish naval armament policy became radically simplified. Guns

The a r m a m e n t plan of 1675 is only k n o w n f r o m a copy m a d e in 1697, w h i c h does n o t separate b r o n z e a n d i r o n guns. The c o p y is in Amiralitetskollegium's report to t h e P a r l i a m e n t 7/10 1697, R 4871, RA, a n d p r i n t e d in S a m u e l L o e n b o m (ed,), Handlingar till Konung Carl Xhtes historia, 11, Stocldiolm, 1769. The g u n s raised f r o m Kronan s h o w a widely different a r m a m e n t t h a n in this plan: Glete Kronans artilleri. Amarant a n d Andromeda h a d in 1675 m a n y i r o n 8- a n d 4 - p d r s instead of (bronze?) 1 2 - a n d 6-pdrs: M 1728, RA, There are several lists of lack of cast-iron g u n s in 1675; o n e listing a lack of 142 1- to 8 - p d r s a n d o n e listing 304 1- to 1 2 - p d r s as lacking, N N S II, 408; a request 23/11 1675 lists 318 2- to 8 - p d r s , M 1853, RA; a m e m o r a n d u m of 10/11 1675 has a r e q u i r e m e n t s 42 3- to 12-pdrs for t h e G o t h e n b u r g s q u a d r o n , M 1728, RA. These lists exclude lack of b r o n z e g u n s a n d p r o b a b l y d i d n o t i n c l u d e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s for all a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n h i r e d in 1675-76. G u n i n v e n t o r y 1/1 1677 a n d g u n deliveries until 30/7 1677, N N S II, 166:1, KrA. A list of deficiencies 1/10 1678 lists 86 i r o n guns, N N S 11, 168:1, KrA.

568

CHAPTER SEVEN

could be produced in large series at reasonable cost by domestic iron works, and the existing stock of high-value bronze guns was no longer a major strategic asset. The many armament plans with large but unfulfilled requirements of expensive bronze guns, which had been typical since the 1610s, were no longer made. From the 1680s, the navy had the guns it required, and deficiencies created by new construction or discarded guns were rapidly filled. In 1680-84, the navy built ships of around 19,000 tonnes, its largest program of new construction until then. Earlier, in the 1570s, the early 1620s, the 1630s, and the 1660s, smaller expansions had created large deficiencies of guns because gun production was slower. In the 1680s, the new ships were quickly armed. An armament inventory of 8 October 1687 even shows a surplus of guns of the largest calibres.'"^ Fortunately, detailed gun inventories for all ships have been preserved for 1691 and 1693. They show a well-armed navy with predominantly cast-iron guns and the remaining bronze guns concentrated to the largest warships. Many ships with cast-iron armament had a few bronze guns, possibly to provide the great cabin with martial decorations which also could be used in combat, or to fulfil some special need, such as long chase guns."^ By 1700, there were still 390 bronze guns (1- to 36-pounders) with firepower of 4,703 pounds in the naval inventory. It was more firepower than the navy had had at any time before the 1620s, but it was totally dwarfed by the 2,424 iron guns with 26,228 pounds of firepower, excluding the 77 guns on the fortifications."® There were 25 iron and 10 bronze 36-pounders, 320 iron and 88 bronze 24-pounders, and 278 iron and 36 bronze 18-pounders.

Swedish naval g u n s 1675-1721: Hamtnar 1974, 2 8 1 - 9 8 . A r m a m e n t p l a n s 168387, M 1762, RA. H i e inventories of naval o r d n a n c e in 1683-84, O R 1683:9, 1684:11, KrA. C o n t r a c t s f o r 408 i r o n g u n s are listed in a letter f r o m AK till Kunglig Maiestat, vol. 7, RA, 2 / 1 1685 ( e r r o n e o u s l y d a t e d 2/1 1684). O R 1692:17, KrA. Detailed request of g u n s a n d a r m a m e n t .stores for an 8 0 - g u n ship, 3/2 1691, M 1754, RA. The a r m a m e n t p l a n of 1697 in Amimlitetskollegium's report to t h e P a r l i a m e n t 7/10 1697, R 4871, RA, p r i n t e d with m i n o r errors in Loenbom 1769. "" A s u m m a r y of t h e i n v e n t o r y of all g u n s in K a r l s k r o n a f r o m 1700 to 1728, dated 13/7 1728, N N S II, 12b, KrA, is t h e m a i n s o u r c e a b o u t naval g u n s after 1699 in this section. The a r m a m e n t o n individual ships in t h e K a r l s k r o n a fleet 1700-21: Berg 1970, 6 6 - 8 5 . The a r m a m e n t p l a n of 1713 is in Amiralitetskollegium's r e p o r t to t h e P a r l i a m e n t 1/12 1713, R 4878, RA. A r e p o r t by t h e navy's M a s t e r of o r d n a n c e {tygmdstare) Johan Vilhelm Leijonfelt a b o u t t h e g u n s o n individual ships 5/12 1704, N o r d i n s k a samlingen, 134, 30, U U B . Daniel G r u n d e l l , Nodig underrdttelse om artilkriet till lands och sioss, Enaeus, Stockholm, 1705, is t h e first Swedish t e x t b o o k o n naval artillery, written by a officer w h o was t h e navy's M a s t e r of o r d n a n c e 1712-16.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

569

Iron was now predominant even in calibres for which it hardly had been used 30 years earlier. Gun production continued in large scale during the Great Northern War. From 1701 to 1711, 1,228 cast-iron guns were delivered to Karlskrona and 110 more in 1716. Of these, 418 were of battleship caHbres: 12-, 18-, 24-, and 36-pounders. Numerically, but not in terms of cost and firepower, new deliveries were dominated by 3-, 4-, 6-, and 8-pounders, which mainly were acquired to arm the many cruising vessels built during the war. Light anti-personnel weapons, which practically had gone out of use in the navy during the first half of the 17th century, returned in these years, first with 241 short 3-pounder swivel guns {nickhakar) delivered to Karlskrona from 1701 to 1705. Later, many more were acquired to the galley squadrons in Gothenburg and Stocldiolm. It was oared warfare and the many small craft required to fight the Russians and Danes on lakes and in archipelagos which led to a revival of small fire-weapons in the Swedish navy. They remained important until the end of oared warfare in the mid-19th century. New production of iron guns was only to a small extent necessary to replace discarded guns. Only 45 iron guns were discarded in Karlskrona from 1700 to 1721, which show that the quality of such guns was surprisingly good. The gradually reduced windage and the increased weight of shots formaUsed in the artillery system of 1705 are other signs of improved quality and reliability. Iron guns did deteriorate in quality when they were in use, however, and by the end of the Great Northern War, the navy had an old and partly worn out stock of guns. In 1725, a survey of the existing guns at Karlskrona condemned 367 of 1,459 guns (including some bronze guns) as worn out and dangerous to use.'" Iron guns still required replacement more often than bronze guns, although many of the guns acquired soon after 1721 were still in the navy's inventory in the 1840s. In 1695, Karl XI had ordered that the 160 trophy guns of b r o n z e Russian, Dutch (Holland), Bavarian, West Frisian, Danish, Turkish, Spanish, Lubeckian, and Polish—which the navy used should be replaced wfth iron guns. This was only partially fulfilled, however, as evidenced by the listing of many trophy guns as late as 1714. The aging

Hammar 1974, 291. List of g u n s at K a r l s k r o n a 1843, K a r l s k r o n a F o r t e c k n i n g a r over artilleripjaser, vol. 1, KrA.

Orlogsvarv,

Tygkontoret,

47 CHAPTER SEVEN

Stock of bronze guns was reduced by 35 in 1702-03 and 116 in 1715 when guns were sent to Stockholm to be melted down. Between 1722 and 1728, 106 more bronze guns were sold as scrap metal, leaving an mventory of 108 1- to 36-pounders at Karlskrona. These transactions which released the capital invested in bronze, could have been made earlier. There had been vexing financial problems ever since the war started in 1700, but for a long time the sale of bronze guns was not a part of the solution. There remained a sentimental affection for bronze guns, especially trophies, which made them worth keeping, even after they had lost their great advantage compared to iron guns.'^'

7.11

Armament

weight and shipbuilding

technology

The development of specialised gun-carrying warships was, to a large extent, the growth of knowledge of how sailing, wooden-hulled ships should be built to carry heavy weights on their decks without compromising their sailing and fighting qualities or the structural strength of their hulls. The timing and diff-usion of various innovations in this process are insufficiently known and frequently misunderstood, but there is no doubt that innovations occurred in several parts of Europe in the 16th and 17th century. The early Swedish sailing warships built from the 1520s to the 1550s were about as heavily armed as the only other warships for which reliable figures exist, those of the English navy. In the 1560s, Swedish warships were built to carry guns with a weight of around 4 per cent of the total displacement. This was about the same as for contemporary English warships, and with the evidence from ex-Danish warships armed in Swedish service, it appears as if Denmark also had achieved the same level of development. There are no signs that Swedish warship technology underwent any further changes towards heavier armament m the 16th century, while the English navy further increased its ability to carry heavy armament in the 1570s and 1580s. During the first half of the 17th century, the Dutch, French, and Danish navies had warship technologies which made it possible to carry heavy armament, although it seems as if these navies in this period usually had rather

Hammar uTSnneT

1974, 290. I n v e n t o r y 1700-28, N N S II, 12b, KrA ''''

A K till Kunglig

superfluous bronze g u n f w e S h i n g

•f BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

571

light guns with high firepower in relation to their weight. Firepower/ displacements r atios of around 0.50 to 0.75 are known in these navies. Swedish warships sold to France in 1647 were somewhat more heavily armed than the average of French warships. From the 1610s, Sweden's ambition was to increase the firepower of the navy beyond the ceiling it had reached in the 1560s. In several armament plans, the ratio between firepower in pounds and displacement in tonnes increased from around 0.40 in the 1610s, 1620s, and 1630s to 0.49 in 1643, 0.66 in 1658, and 0.75 in 1671. Tliis was partly achieved with lighter guns but also with stronger hulls suited to carry heavier armament. However, these ambitious arament plans were far from fulfilled. Normally, one fourth to one third of the planned firepower did not exist as concrete guns. Individual ships and partially mobilised fleets could be provided with their full armament, but if the entire navy was to be commissioned, more guns had to be ordered. That was done in 1644-45 and 1657-59 and again in 1672-73, while the solution in the 1620s had been to send many ships to sea with reduced armament. Cast-iron guns with the same effect as bronze guns meant heavier guns, and this is reflected in the armament plans after 1671 when the number of iron guns grew and gradually became dominant. The ratio fefl from 0.75 in 1671 to 0.71 in 1675, 0.70 in 1687, and 0.63 in 1697. This ratio changed little until the latter half of the 18th century. The difference compared to the period up to the 1670s was that the guns in the plans normally existed and the plans are not lists of what the navy desired but distribution lists of existing guns.'^^ The weight of the guns in relation to the armament before 1721 is difficult to study with contemporary Swedish sources, but because several ships continued to serve for many years with little change in their armament, weight figures f r o m later decades are of interest. The weights of the armament in 1754 are known for twelve battleships launched 1686 to 1719, ranging from the largest 100-gun threedecker of 2,650 tonnes to small 50-gun two-deckers of 1,050 tonnes. The designed displacement is known for five of these ships from 18thcentury calculations, and for the others it is easy to estimate, because the dimensions are known and the designs were based on the same

A r m a m e n t plans: 1616, M 1761, RA ( u n d a t e d ) ; 1621, Bdckstrdm 1884, 3 8 8 - 8 9 ; 14/12 1632, M 1761, RA; 1639 ( u n d a t e d ) a n d 3/7 1643, M 1848, RA; 1658, M 1761, RA; 1671, L 422, U U B ; 1675, R 4871, RA; 1687, M 1762, RA; 1697, R 4871, RA.

572

CHAPTER SEVEN

principles. The guns had total weights ranging from 6.8 to a little more than 8 per cent of the displacements. These figures are the same as in an English armament plan of 1677, which is close in time to the earlier ships in the sample of ten Swedish battleships.'^' It is possible to make some comparisons further back to get a grasp of how much weight the 17th-century Swedish warships were designed to carry on their decks. If the Swedish armament plans from the third quarter of the 17th century are studied alongside the plausible weights of the guns, it seems likely that the ships in these plans also were intended to carry armament of around 7 to 8 per cent of their displacement. Such calculations are uncertain, however, and would require a long discussion of sources and uneven information about weights of guns.'^"* A simpler method is to look at the armament of those ships built from the 1640s to the 1660s which still existed in the armament plans of the 1680s and 1690s. If we assume that the guns they carried on average had the same weights as guns of the same calibres on ships built in the 1680s and 1690s, we find no significant difference in the firepower-to-displacement ratio between the old and new ships. The latter often had slightly less nominal firepower, probably because new ships got new and heavier iron guns than old ships. The conclusion is that shipbuilding technology used in Sweden had developed ships able to carry guns of 7 per cent or more of the total displacement at least by the 1640s, decades before the state could afford to actually arm all its ships to that level. The cast-iron gun had solved an imbalance in the relation between warship technology and met-

W e i g h t of a r m a m e n t o n w a r s h i p s at K a r l s k r o n a 1754, K a r l s k r o n a Orlogsvarv, T y g k o n t o r e t , I n k o m n a h a n d l i n g a r , vol. 1, KrA d i s p l a c e m e n t calculations, AK, O v e r s k e p p s b y g g m a s t a r n a , S h e l d o n i a n a , vol. 5, KrA. The 12 ships are Gota (1686), Pommern (1692), Konung Karl (1694), Konung Fredrik (ex Enigheten, 1696), Vdstmanland (1696), Skane (1697), Fredrika Amalia (1698), Prins Karl Fredrik (1704), Bremen (1705), Verden (1706), Stockholm (1708) a n d Drottning Ulrika Eleonora (1719). The ship with t h e lightest a r m a m e n t was t h e largest, Konung Karl, w h i c h h a d b e e n built for a m i x e d lower battery of 3 6 - a n d 2 4 - p d r s b u t w h i c h in 1754 only h a d 24-pdrs. English ships in 1677: Fox 1980, 183-86. Kronan's a r m a m e n t plan of 1671 m a y have given t h e ship an a r m a m e n t of a r o u n d 180 t o n n e s or a r o u n d 8 p e r cent of an e s t i m a t e d d i s p l a c e m e n t of 2,300 tonnes: Glete Kronans artilleri. The ships w h i c h have b e e n c o m p a r e d are Wismar (1646/47), Carolus (1650), Hercules (1650), Phoenix (1651), Mdnen (1653/4), Victoria (1658), Andromeda (1659), Saturnus/Bohus (1662), Wrangel (1662), Jupiter/Uppland (1665), Spes (1666), Solen (1667), a n d Venus/Finland (1667). The a r m a m e n t plans used for c o m p a r i s o n s are t h o s e of 1683 a n d 1687, M 1762, RA, a n d 1697, R 4871, RA.

BRONZE A N D IRON: SWEDISH NAVAL O R D N A N C E

573

allurgy. How and when that imbalance had developed remains to be investigated. It was probably connected with the introduction of British and Dutch know-how into Swedish naval technology, which started under Karl IX and reached its full maturity under Gustav II Adolf when the navy solely came to rely on Dutch master shipwrights. Swedish warships built in the 1620s and 1630s often had a larger firepower/displacement ratio when they grew old in the 1640s and 1650s than when they were new. It appears that they originally had been under-gunned due to the great cost of bronze ordnance, although as the Femern operation in autumn 1644 shows, it was possible to arm a limited number of ships with heavier armament when required. Hie problem of making full use of the fighting capacity of the most recent warship technology with bronze guns was probably a general European experience during much of the 17th century. It is reasonable to assume that it became a demand factor behind the technical development of cheap but dependable cast-iron guns. This can be studied if more empirical research is devoted to weights of guns, displacements of warships, and cost of production of bronze and cast-iron guns.'^*^

F u r t h e r studies of Swedish w a r s h i p a n d g u n t e c h n o l o g y in the first half of t h e 17th c e n t u r y is best d o n e in c o n n e c t i o n with studies of t h e o n l y ship surviving f r o m that period: Vasen.

•jt

0 I

CHAPTER EIGHT

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA: MEN, LEADERS, AND PROVISIONING 8.1

The problems and the sources

In wartime, the cost of manning and provisioning dominated a sailing navy's resource consumption. In peacetime, maintaining a permanent force of warships and their guns usually constituted the largest portion of its expenditures, but when it was fully mobilised, recruitment of men, wages, and food became dominant. As an example, the Swedish navy spent 364,376 daler silvermynt (dsm) on wages and provisions to its men in 1644, a year when the whole navy was mobilised for war against Denmark. Because at least one third of the crew consisted of soldiers, paid by the army, the real cost of keeping a fully mobilised fleet at sea was close to half a million dsm. The cost of building and fitting out the ships (of around 25,000 tonnes) which served at sea in 1644 had in round figures been three quarter of a million dsm; the copper guns, known in numbers and calibres but not in weight, likely cost somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 dsm. The ships and the guns had been acquired over decades, yet the cost of one single year of operations equalled around half the entire a m o u n t of capital invested in material assets.' Naval manning was not only a quantitative problem. Seaman skills were critical because ships could not sail without a number of highly qualified seamen. But the number of men also mattered, as much of the work on deck and at the guns required unskilled muscle power as

' Cost of wages and provisioning in 1644, Rikshuvudbocker, vol. 70. The cost of shipbuilding, repair, and outfitting in the same year was 59,147 dsm, The total cost of the warships and their outfitting is (with m u c h uncertainty) calculated f r o m 23 warships built under contract 1618-54, while the cost of outfitting is calculated f r o m costs recorded during the contract period 1615-28 (see chapter 6). The real average value of the ships was lower, because m a n y ships were not new or recently repaired. The cost of guns is a rough estimate of h o w m u c h the guns recorded as existing in 1643 would have cost at the prize for bronze guns recorded in 1647, 66 dsm/skeppund (see chapter 7), The cost of hiring Dutch a r m e d m e r c h a n t m e n in 1644, including p a y m e n t and provisioning to the crews, was 735,835 dsm, Rikshuvudbocker, vol. 70, fol. 657.

576

C H A P T E R SEVEN

well as skills for a particular task in a team, rather than long experience at sea. Unskilled men were paid less than skilled seamen, but the cost of provisioning was usually the same. Frequently, early modern navies operated with forces far below their nominal strength of warships because they could not find skilled seamen or could not afford to pay and provision a large number of men for all their ships. Wars at sea were often decided by exhaustion and financial strength rather than by decisive battles. To channel the resources of a society to manpower and provisioning of a battle fleet operating in a strategically important sea was a challenging political and administrative problem for any European state. Warships and fleets did not only require men. They also required men with several types of skills and men able to lead, instruct, and coordinate men with different skills and tasks. Men with these scarce abilities must be available at short notice, at the right place, and in sufficient number when a fleet needed to be mobilised for service. Early modern states with naval ambitions required access to skilled seamen, to experienced masters able to manoeuvre sailing ships, to pilots who could navigate along coasts and in the open sea, and to men who could direct gun crews. States also needed men able to lead and coordinate the crew of a warship and command the several warships which formed a fleet. Men with these competencies could be linked to the state with organisational methods. The state could train and employ men permanently for a particular naval task, or it could make agreements with men with necessary skills that they should turn up for service when required. States with viable maritime societies could usually find most of its personnel in these environments and could hire or conscript suitable men when required. To develop organisational capabilities to mobilise a large number of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled men and a cadre of leaders was probably the most challenging problem for early modern navies. Because no early modern state could afford to keep a fully manned navy in permanent service, navies had to be able to integrate external h u m a n resources with their core competencies. They had to do that quickly in order to gain advantages in competition with adversaries, and the mobilised men had to trust that they would be paid for their service within a reasonable period of time. Naval provisioning also required special organisational capability to handle large resources in concentrated periods of time. Failures in provisioning caused lack of men and widespread illness, which restricted naval operations.

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

577

Traditionally, private ship-owners and maritime societies had a comparative advantage in developing sea power, not only because they had ships but also because they knew how to create efficient teams to m a n the ships. They were in a good position to find skilled and experienced masters, pilots, boatswains, and quartermasters, who in their turn might find seamen with the combination of maritime and martial skills which made the crew efficient. Private ship-owners also knew how to provision ships for long voyages and merchants often knew better than states how to find and concentrate large amounts of food. Medieval and early modern rulers often sought out such maritime entrepreneurs when they wished to form or increase a navy. Gradually, the navies developed competence and cadres of leaders who understood how to find and recruit seamen and form them into teams. However, until the end of the sailing-ship period, large-scale mobilisation for war usually relied on men who temporarily left the mercantile marines to serve in the navies, either voluntarily or through some form of conscription. Mechanisms for transfer of large numbers of seamen, as well as unskilled landsmen to the navies were essential parts of all naval organisations. A well-balanced study of organisational and technical capabilities connected with naval power should give equal attention to hardware and men. In this respect, this book is seriously unbalanced; the three preceding chapters about warships, fittings, and guns together are much longer than this chapter about men, leaders, and provisioning. This is because the present author has worked primarily with detailed source-based research about naval hardware and has integrated the results of these studies in this book. One person is able to study two centuries of archival sources about these subjects, but in comparison, the sources about how the Swedish state provided its warships with men and leaders for naval operations and how these men were fed and paid are overwhelming. Some studies of these problems have been done in recent years but most of the sources are still unexplored. Most of the accounts for wages and provisioning from the 1520s to the 1620s are preserved in several archival series. The names and service careers of most officers, non-commissioned officers, petty officers, and seamen from this period can be traced in these sources. The number of men taking part in an operation can also often be reconstructed, but only by combining several sources, including army accounts that list soldiers who served at sea. For the next century, the wage and provisioning accounts are less well preserved, but large archival series

578

CHAPTER SEVEN

about personnel are available, and if properly used and combined they provide much new knowledge. The 17th- and 18th-century sources are also more varied than the 16th-century sources. They are products of an administration with more correspondence, board minutes, and policy documents. This makes it possible to answer more questions and to investigate the decision-making process. To work with such sources is time-consuming, however. Sampling and case studies are necessary, and the total results of several historians' studies have until now provided only partial answers. The only attempt to write a general history of officers and men from 1521 to 1680 is still the chapters on naval manning in Axel Zettersten's twovolume work from 1890 and 1903. It is concentrated on organisational structures, of the number of seamen, and biographical information about officers. The strength in Zettersten's work is its ambition to be comprehensive and present a balanced history of both administration and operations. He gave an overall picture which still is relevant, and much of his information about naval personnel remains useful.^ Zettersten was a pioneer, and his results were often only a first outline of what the sources may provide. He often wrote as if his results were definite, which they were not. His study of the period 1635-80 is still in its basic structure a reliable (if dated) work of reference about naval manning, but the volume about the period 1521-1634 is obsolete. Zettersten did not (and could not) use all relevant sources from that period. He mainly worked with wage accounts and lists of men in the naval accounts {Skeppsgdrdshandlingar), but that archival series is far from a complete collection of sources connected with the Vasa navy. Many wage accounts and muster rolls f r o m the navy are in files not connected with the navy, primarily central Treasury accounts (Rantekammarbdcker, Rikshuvudbocker), local accounts [Landskapshandlingar), accounts of wages {Loningsregister), or administrative papers related to the navy {Militdra dmnessamlingar). When Zettersten

' Zettersten 1890, 3 3 - 1 9 2 ; Zettersten 1903, 3 9 - 1 3 1 , 2 3 8 - 5 2 . The c h a p t e r s a b o u t pers o n n e l 1 5 2 1 - 1 6 7 9 by Erik Spens in Svenska flottans historia, I, are m a i n l y based on Zettersten: "Flottans p e r s o n a l u n d e r aldre vasatid", 121-36; "Livet o m b o r d och i land u n d e r aldre vasatid", 137-154; "Sjovapnets b e m a n n i n g u n d e r s t o r m a k t s t i d e n f r a m till 1679", 3 3 1 - 5 4 ; "Livet o m b o r d och i l a n d u n d e r s t o r m a k t s t i d e n f r a m till 1679", 3 5 5 - 8 0 . F u r t h e r surveys u p to 1721, Svenska flottans historia, II: H o l g e r W i c h m a n , " P e r s o n a l f o r h a l l a n d e n a i n o n i svenska flottan aren 1680-1720", 8 6 - 9 8 ; A n d e r s Lindahl, "Livet o m b o r d och i land aren 1680-1720", 9 9 - 1 1 6 . A n early s t u d y of Swedish naval m a n n i n g was Olof Rabenius, Om bdtsmanshallet, Uppsala, 1851.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

579

made his research, many naval accounts were also placed in files of unregistered papers in the old Treasury archive {Kammararkivet). Much information about the number of men who served are in the provision accounts (in Skeppsgdrdshandlingar and Proviantrakenskaper), but Zettersten did not use them. He also indiscriminately mixed plans of manning with wage lists of men who actually served. Consequently, his lists of the number of naval personnel are incomplete and have many gaps and unrealistic ups and downs. Since Zettersten published his books, published and unpublished biographical studies of sea officers from the 16th to the 18th centuries have been made by Hjalmar Borjeson, Georg Hafstrom, Carl Ekman, James Cavallie, Gunnar Arteus, Lars Einarsson, and Ingvar Sjoblom. Since the 1980s, Nils Erik Villstrand has published important studies of 17th-century naval manning as a part of the Swedish state's resource mobilisation for war.^ Ingvar Sj5blom has investigated the earUer untouched accounts of wages to seamen 1527-60. Studies of naval manning from the 1610s to the 1640s have been made by Olle Tornbom and Nils Erik Villstrand. Several studies of the regional organisation for naval manning which developed in this period and lasted until the late 19th century have been made by Jarl Stormbom, Lennart Hennel, Carl Hamnstrom, Nils Erik Villstrand, Kjell Olsson, Carl Koch, and others. Urban Skenback has studied officers, seamen, and soldiers serving at sea in the 1620s.'' There is one study by Ulrica Soderlind of naval provisioning f r o m the 16th to the 18th century, with emphasis on changes and continuity in food and nutrition during three centuries and how food was prepared on ships. Studies have also been made of how officers' conduct and seamen's behaviour are reflected in the archives of the navy's court.' It has been c o m m o n in Swedish naval history to complain about the quality of sea officers and seamen and their lack of training and

' A s u m m a r y of his research: Nils-Erik Villstrand, " ' B o n d p o j k a r d o p p a d e i vatten". Svensk sjomilitar rekrytering ur eU j a m f o r a n d e p e r s p e k t i v ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 8 0 0 ) " , Manniskan iflottans tjanst, J u n g f r u s u n d , 6, A b o , 2001, 4 3 - 5 8 . U r b a n Skenback, Sjdfolk och knektar pd Wasa, Stocldiolm, 1983. ^^ M a r g a r e t a O s t e r g r e n , " N a g r a a n t e c k n i n g a r o m riittsvasendet vid orlogsflottan i b o r j a n av 1700-talet", Forum navale, 30, 1976, 7 5 - 8 5 ; H a n s A n d e r s s o n , "Brottsliga b a t s m a n : En u n d e r s o k n i n g o m b a t s m a n s brottslighet i S t o c k h o l m u n d e r senare delen av s t o r m a k t s t i d e n " . Forum navale, 4 9 , 1 9 9 3 , 3 9 - 7 2 ; M a g n u s P e r l e s t a m , " 'Jag lovar och sviir': Ett plikttroget b e t e e n d e i de f o r n y a d e sjoartiklarna ar 1685", Militarhistorisk Tidskrift, 2003, 157-220; M a g n u s Perlestam, ' " R i n g a p r o f af b e h j a r t a d soldat': M o d , plikt och h e d e r i en m a r i n krigsratt vid slutet av 1600-talet", Forum navale, 60, 2004, 15-81.

580

C H A P T E R SEVEN

experience of the sea. It has ahiiost become a stereotypic picture of the Swedish naval seaman that he was less experienced and less skilled than seamen in other navies, particularly Denmark. This view is not the result of systematic comparisons (they do not exist) and is shaped by a narrow focus on skills rather than other essential operational requirements of a manning system, such as availability of men at short notice or ability to provide manpower during long wars. It is also influenced by a misunderstanding that a navy required homogeneous crews of skilled seamen, able to do most types of work required on a sailing ship. The manning of a warship was different from staffing a merchantmen, which required a small crew of men who all had seaman skills. Warships had large crews in order to fight, and most men were not necessary for ship-handling and work in the rig. An optimal naval manning system should supply its warships with a sufficient number of highly skiUed seamen, a large number of men with limited skills but with some experience of the sea, a number of unskilled m e n who may gain experience, and a considerable number of low-level leaders (petty officers) who could make the semiskilled and unskilled men useful by training and welding them into coherent teams. The manning system should also be resilient and able to replace losses during several years of war. The Swedish navy gradually developed a manning system hnked to the coastal population and the peasant society, in contrast to the typical European system connected with a maritime society with long-distance seafarers and experience of large square-rigged ships. The Swedish coastal and archipelago population had many men who, since childhood, were used to fishing and sailing in boats and small vessels, but experience of the sea in small craft, however useful, did not provide training in handling large square-rigged ships and their high rigs. Furthermore, local communities from inland districts frequently sent men to the navy. Swedish seamen experience on the larger ships existed, but they often served abroad, usually in the large Dutch mercantile marine. They were only of limited use for the navy as they seldom were available when it should be mobilised. During the late 17th and 18th centuries, Sweden had a dynamic maritime economy with many large sailing merchantmen, and a large number of experienced seamen used to sail to Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and on transoceanic routes. That did not influence the naval manning system, which remained tied to the forms it got in the early 17th century. It may be an expression of inertia and conservatism, but ft may

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

581

also indicate that the Swedish navy had a manning system that filled its requirement. Hie organisational efforts that shaped this system in the 16th and 17th centuries were substitutes for the lack of a viable Swedish maritime economy, and it should be studied from that perspective. The relevant questions are how it was possible to man a navy, which was very large in relation to the population; how it was possible to find competence for a navy in a society with a small mercantile marine; and how it was possible for a state which kept a very large army to also man a large navy. If maritime competence was unusually scarce, the organisational achievement of keeping large fleets at sea was more impressive than in a maritime society. Competence at various levels was a bottleneck for efficiency in all navies, and practical naval policy had to achieve a sufficient rather than maximum level of skills in the naval organisation. The regional system for recruitment and upkeep of soldiers and seamen remained in use until the late 19th century, and men serving the king were a notable part of local society in all parts of Sweden and Finland. Existing studies of the Swedish manning system are primarily studies of the regional manning organisation, the seamen's relations to the local society, and the tax system through which they were recruited and paid. The number of seamen to be maintained by the local communities at various times is often known in detail, and much is known about how seamen lived when they were at home. Studies of how seamen served on ships or how men of various skills formed teams have attracted less interest. Wage accounts and manning plans usually give details about special skills (topmen, gunners) and ranks {skeppmdn, kvartermdstare, etc.) among seamen and about how m e n of various skills were paid. It is also well known that diseases were major problems in most naval operations and that the number of m e n able to serve always dechned during an operational season, even if no battles were fought. The influence of weather on health is also little studied, although cold Baltic springs and autumns could hardly have been favourable for preventing illness. The rich Swedish sources about how individual ships were manned and provisioned make it possible to study aspects of naval life which are difficult to investigate in other navies. Information is available about for how long the same officers and men served together, the turnover of men, and the possibility to form teams of experienced and seasoned crews of men with different skills. The career paths of officers

582

C H A P T E R SEVEN

and non-commissioned officers are possible to trace from the earliest decades of the dynastic state. Their family relations and the possible patronage structure are more complicated, except for officers from the nobility for which there exist much genealogical information. Most unusual in an international perspective is that the names and often also the special skills of most common seamen serving in the navy from the 1520s are available in the sources. This chapter is mainly based on the existing literature, but it is also an attempt to outline some general problems and find some tentative answers to questions which seldom are asked. Tlie aim of the chapter is the same as in other parts of this book: to trace how the state attempted to achieve power at sea by developing organisational capabilities to use resources in an optimal fashion. When mercantile-related maritime competencies were scarce, the Swedish state attempted to find, feed, and organise men who were available, at as low a cost as possible. It had to find a working balance among unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled men and had to train leaders with sufficient competence to make ships and fleets useful as operational units. In practice, it gradually came to rely on permanent corps of both seamen and leaders and came to develop a naval manning system which was similar to the army's. Both were shaped by the necessity to extract manpower from the peasant society and by the desire to make this system affordable by integrating the men and their families with production and social structures in local society. Internationally, the number of studies of seamen and officers in early modern navies are increasing, but most such studies are about the period after the mid-17th century. The exception is the Mediterranean galley navies, for which important studies have been made. Because they used very different systems (chained oarsmen) compared to the Baltic navies, comparisons are not relevant. Manning of the permanent European sailing navies was normally different f r o m the early modern standing armies. Soldiers required constant drill and served in peace and war, while the bulk of the seamen normally were hired, conscripted, or pressed when a fleet needed to be mobilised. The Swedish system, with a large organised corps of seamen permanently serving the state, was practically unique in Europe; it was copied only by Russia in the 18th century, although in a different social context, that of a serf peasantry. Corps or permanent cadres of sea officers developed gradually in the sailing navies. In Denmark, it is believed to have existed since the 1540s; in the Dutch RepubUc since the 1630s; and in

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

583

England since the 1640s. These dates may be questioned, and more detailed studies may reveal a more gradual development of groups of men who, for most practical purposes, were continuously serving officers. It is obvious, in any case, that the Swedish navy had a permanent cadre of officers rather early in an international perspective.^' This chapter continues with a section about how the Swedish state recruited and organised seamen, gunners, and soldiers serving in the navy. The section after that (8.3.) is about how the competencies to handle warships and to lead and coordinate men were connected to the Swedish state and the role of established elites in that process. It would have been desirable to continue with a section about how these inflows of h u m a n resources were combined into teams on warships, but the state of research, unfortunately, would reduce such text to trivial and tentative observations. Instead, section 8.4 discusses naval provisioning and health.

8.2

Seamen, gunners, and soldiers

In contrast to most modern and contemporary navies, the early modern navies were primarily mobilisation organisations, with most of the warships laid up in reserve in peacetime. Most men required for warfare at sea were not in naval service in peace. Tliey had to be available at short notice, however, at affordable cost and at places where they could be brought to the warships without interference from the enemy. The crews of early modern warships, just like early modern armies, could be recruited by conscription or voluntary enlistment and could be hired permanently or temporarily. Navies also had to keep seamen in permanent service for guarding and maintaining the warships and for peacetime expeditions. It was possible to train these men to be skilled seamen or petty officers who could be a nucleus of the crews of a fully mobilised fleet.

H i e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a c k g r o u n d : Glete 2000, 4 0 - 5 9 . S i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s e a m e n : Pablo E. Perez-Mallafna, Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily life on the Indies fleets in the sixteenth century, Baltimore, 1998; a n d Cheryl A. Fury, Tides in the Affairs of Men: The social history of Elizabethan seamen, 1580-1603, W e s t p o r t , C o n n . , 2002. Research a b o u t E u r o p e a n seamen: P. C. van Royen, J. R. Bruijn, a n d J. Lucassen (eds.), "Those Emblems of Hell"?: European sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570-1870, St. John's, 1997.

584

CHAPTER SEVEN

Swedish naval seamen were recruited in the 16th century both as vohinteers and by conscription. Tliere were men who lived with their families at the navy s bases and worked continuously in the king's service, and there were part-time seamen who normally worked at the countryside or in towns and served only when called upon. The number of men serving in the different categories at various times has not been studied. Nor is it known whether or not the difference between conscription and voluntary recruitment was very marked. Active recruitment by the king's officials in local society might consist of finding a quota of both conscripted men and men who might be positively interested to serve in the navy. Foreigners were also recruited as seamen, but again too little is known about their number. From the early 17th century, the navy developed a manning system with voluntary enlistment and part-time service in peace. In principle, it was similar to the system which the army had used for the cavalry since the 16th century and began to use for the infantry from the 1680s. It is difficult to observe a wide gulf in inducements for conscripted and voluntarily recruited men. If wages and social conditions in peacetime were somewhat improved and made more predictable, it became possible to find volunteers to fill the ranks of both a growing navy and a large infantry. Remarkably, the Swedish state was able to conscript a considerable proportion of its male population for service in wars, even when the chance to return home was small. It may be even more remarkable that Sweden was able to abolish conscription and find even more men who served voluntarily. The navy is an obvious case; the voluntary system was gradually able to supply far more men to operational fleets than conscription had ever supplied. Wages and social conditions for young Swedish men who did not own a farm or been trained in a handicraft were bad enough to make the army and the navy look reasonably attractive. Young men, who might be willing, or not entirely unwilling to serve in the armed forces, were one of the main resources exploited by the Swedish fiscal-military state.^ It was not enough to have men, however. It was also necessary to organise their recruitment, training, and mobilisation in forms that suited policy and patterns of operations. Seamen were far f r o m a homogeneous group. In early modern Swedish lists of naval manning.

^ Swedish soldiers in society: Lars Ericson, Svenska knektar: Indelta soldater, och batsman i krig ochfred, L u n d , 2002. The b u r d e n of r e c r u i t m e n t : Lindegren

ryttare 1992.

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

585

the word sjdfolk was a general term for all men serving at sea, except soldiers. Hiis word is here translated as mariner. The common seamen and gunners and the petty officers were often called batsman, although that word could also mean only the c o m m o n seaman. Because most sjdfolk actually were batsman in the wider sense of the word, lists of naval manning may be imprecise in using these terms. Tliis section (8.2) is about batsman in general, including petty officers and gunners, while the next section (8.3) is about leaders. The total number of mariners {sjdfolk) frequently cited in this section also includes officers, non-commissioned officers, and a small number of civilians and specialists not included in any of these categories (secretaries, surgeons, chaplains, cooks, etc.). In the 16th and early 17th centuries, gunners (bysseskyttar; modern Swedish bosskyttar) were usually listed as a special category of men, in Sweden as well as in other navies. Gunners in this period were skilled specialists, and their number was rather small. Tliey were also a special corps connected with the Ordnance (Arkliet) and served on warships, at fortresses, and with field armies. It is obvious that these few men cannot alone have handled all heavy guns on a warship. Most of the gun crews must have been seamen and soldiers, while the gunners acted as team-leaders. Conditions were the same on land, where gunners were few and most men serving guns on the battlefield were infantry soldiers. Loading and firing an early modern gun did not differ much from loading and firing a musket, and trained musketeers understood the basic principles of gunnery. Obviously, most seamen also learned basic gun-handling. In the 17th century, the number of seamen on European warships was determined by the number of guns to be served, not by the requirements of service in rigs or on deck. In the Swedish navy, the number of men called gunners increased greatly in the 17th century. Gunners were now integrated with the naval manning system and regarded as common men, listed under the headings batsman and sjdfolk. Early modern navies were not only m a n n e d by seamen. In the 16th century, a considerable number of the crew were soldiers, who traditionally had been the armed component of the crew when merchantmen were fitted out as warships. Naval engagements were still often fought at close range, where conditions were suitable for musket fire, or decided by boarding. Naval operations might also include raids on land or occupation of territories, which made soldiers important. In the long run, the number of soldiers declined in relation to the number

586

C H A P T E R SEVEN

of seamen, but European navies normally had a force of infantry until the end of the sailing ship period (or later). In Sweden, there were no specialised naval infantry (marines). Infantry forces for the navy were supplied by the army. Swedish naval sources are not informative about soldiers serving in the navy. Hiey were recruited, paid, and administrated through their army organisation (fcinika, later regiment), not by the navy or the commander of the ship. It is usually possible (although often timeconsuming) to find out which army units served with the navy during a campaign, but the distribution of men on individual ships are difficult to follow in detail. The proportion of seamen, gunners, and soldiers is best known from normative plans of how ships should be manned, but unfortunately such plans are missing for long periods. Tliere are many normative lists which note how many mariners each ship should have, but far fewer which list soldiers. Tables 8:1 and 8-2 give in tabulated form most plans from the 16th and 17th centuries which include soldiers. After 1700, only a small selection of the several manning plans which exist are included.

Table 8.1 Naval manning 1557-1579. Normative plans Vlariners

Gunners

Soldiers

Total, men

1557

10 m i n o r

291

39

1,160

1,490

Soldiers %

78

Displacement,

Men per

tonnes

tonnes

-

-

ships 1557

2 0 galleys

472

74

1,802

2,348

77

1565

37 ships

2,966

480

3,196

6,642

48

1570

48 ships,

14,000

5,735

0.47

902

4,510

11,147

40.5

21,000

0.53

4 galleys 1578

31 s h i p s

2,420

582

1,580

4,582

30 ships

34.5

1579

13,700

0.34

3,062

734

4,750

8,546

55.5

15,000

0.57

Soiuces: 1557 m a n n i n g and provisioning plan for a campaign against Russia, S M H F 1:6; 1565, manning plan for tire m a m fleet. M 1848; 1570, m a n n i n g and provisioning plan for the active fleet, M 1761; 15/8, m a n n i n g plan and provisioning plan for tliree months, all warships, S M H F 4-8- 1579 m a n n i n e and a r m a m e n t plan, all warships, SH 35:2, all RA F , i^/y, manning U e plans of 1557, 1570, and 1579 explicitly includes oflrcers and n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers, while tlie otlier two are less detailed and give rounded n u m b e r s of men in each category.

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

Table 8.2 Year

Warships

1600

9 ships at Nykoping 27 ships. 2 galleys 29 major ships 27 ships, Stockholm 23 ships. Wismar 36 major, 31 minor. 31 hired ships 37 major ships 43 ships, 12 boyers Main fleet. plan Main fleet. plan 38 battleships

1614 1628 1645

1658

1666 1674 1675 1676 1700 1710 1714

21 battleships, 2 frigates 23 battleships, 3 frigates. 1 brigantine 6 battleships. 3 frigates, 1 brigantine

Naval

Mariners

manning

Soldiers

1599-1721.

587

Normative

plans

Total, men

Soldiers %

Displacement, tonnes

Men per tonnes

810

63

3,800

0.21

300

510

1,040

1,950

2,990

65

12,000

0.25

1,955

2,700

4,655

58

16,600

0.28

2,788

1,898

4,686

40.5

20,300

0.23

1,835

1,214

3,049

40

12,600

0.24

8,434

4,152

12,586

33

43,600

0.29

5,498

2,623

8,121

32.5

28,400

0.29

9,785

3,611

13,396

27

34,750

0.39

7,640

2,923

10,563

27.5

-

8,301

3,120

11,421

27.5

-

_

13,713

2,383

16,096

15

47,250

0.34

9,435

1,310

10,645

12.5

31,800

0.33

10,365

1,462

11,827

12.5

34,550

0.34

2,011

332

2,343

6,950

0.34

14

Sources: 1600, undated list with sliips in Nykoping during the winter 1599/1600, SMHF 10:4, RA; 1614, m a n ning plan for the whole navy, SMHF 7:8, RA; 1628, m a n n i n g plan for the active fleet, SMHF 8:6, RA; 1645, manning plan for the active fleet, initially divided between Stockholm and Wismar, M 1848, E 8560, RA; 1658, manning and a r m a m e n t plan for the projected fleet, never fitted out in its entirety, NNS II, 144, KrA; 1666, m a n n i n g plan, M 1761, RA; 1674, m a n n i n g plan, M 1761, RA; 1675-76, active fleet, planned strength, Zettersten 1903, 463, 475; 1700, m a n n i n g plan, Svemka flottam historia, II, 124; I 7 I 0 and 1714, m a n n i n g plans for the main fleet and the Gulf of Finland squadron, Amiralitetskollegiets skrivelser till Kunglig Majestat, vols 24, 28, RA. All plans include officers a n d non-commissioned officers. Small vessels and ships without soldiers (fireships, transports), which are included in some of these plans have been excluded in the table in order to make the numbers comparable.

588

CHAPTER SEVEN

Hiese manning plans are not exactly comparable. Some acknowledged the realities of available men while others could be achieved only under optimal conditions. A few trends are obvious, however. Hie number of soldiers in relation to the total crew declined during the two centuries, from a majority to around one eighth. The decline is not a straightforward process, however. Hie proportion of mariners serving on warships was high in the 1560s, when soldiers normally were a minority. It is known that they often were a majority in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, and this is reflected in the manning plans from 1579 to 1628. After that, a steady decline of army participation followed, until soldiers were a group of specialists on sailing warships. Hie size of the crew in relation to the size of the ship (men per tonnes displacement) varied. In 16th-century plans there were around twice as many men on warships in the first half of the 17th century. In the latter half of the 17th century, the crews increased somewhat. That is easy to relate to the marked increase of gun armament in relation to the displacement in the same period. Heavier armament required more men to handle. Tlie decline in manning in the late 16th century may be related to the fact that operational fleets mainly were engaged in blockades and seacontrol duties, which required endurance rather than strong fighting capability in terms of men and guns. Variations in the individual plans reflect special circumstances. The plan of 1557 was for a projected campaign in the Gulf of Finland against Russia. It would presumably have been amphibious, which explains the high proportion of soldiers on the sailing warships. On galleys, soldiers were the normal crew of oarsmen, and they always dominated the number on fully manned oared vessels. The plan of 1578, with its low ratio of men per ton, is a part of a plan of provisioning the whole fleet for three months, longer than the two months or less which had been typical in the 1560s. It may have been prepared in connection with Johan Ill's negotiations for fitting out his navy with Spanish funds, and it may show how the navy should be manned on an expedition partly outside the Baftic Sea. The plan of 1614 has an unusually low number of seamen compared to a plan for 1615. It is included only because it, unusually, lists the number of soldiers.® The

" Several ships w e r e s c h e d u l e d for t r o o p t r a n s p o r t duties in 1614, w h i c h m a y have r e d u c e d their m a n n i n g to a m i n i m u m . The soldiers listed in 1614 in table 8:2 are i n c l u d e d in t h e ships' crews, however. M a n n i n g p l a n s for 1614 a n d 1615, S M H F 7:8, RA.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

589

two manning plans of 1645 were prepared in the spring and probably reflect available iTien rather than ideal manning. Hie navy had been much increased with several captured Danish ships in 1644, and existing manpower resources limited the size of the crews. The plan of 1674 was a part of the Amiralitetskollegium's over-sized requirements in that year, which probably were part of a political bargaining process rather than a realistic plan of what the navy required. Most of the seamen in the earliest Vasa navy were hired from Liibeck, but there are no detailed lists of them. From 1527, however, there are lists of men paid for service as the king's seamen {batsman). They are preserved in several archival series, but there is a concentration of men in muster rolls and wage accounts connected with Stockholm or with the main fleet in the years when the navy was mobilised for operations. In addition, there are muster rolls and accounts of wages paid to seamen at royal castles where warships and transport vessels were based, and lists of seamen serving in smaller squadrons or individual ships. In the later decades of the 16th century, the wage accounts become more complicated, because men usually were paid one or two years in arrear. This makes it necessary to study accounts f r o m several years to find out how many men actually served in one year. Throughout the 16th and early 17th centuries, there are no sources which give a comprehensive list of all seamen, gunners, and soldiers serving in the navy during one year, although some wage and provisioning accounts from the 1560s come rather close to that ideal. For the period 1527-1560, Ingvar Sjoblom has investigated the number of seamen who were paid in the accounts preserved in the Treasury's central accounts {Rdntekammarbocker). This makes it possible to roughly quantify the development of Gustav I's naval manning system.' In the late 1520s and early 1530s, the m i n i m u m number of seamen varied between 78 and 188. The mobilisation of the navy against Liibeck in 1534-36 radically increased this number, which reached 745 in 1535. As mentioned in chapter 4, the king made frenetic efforts in 1534-35 to find men for his navy, and the wage accounts show that

' Ingvar Sjoblom, u n p u b l i s h e d w o r k i n g p a p e r a b o u t s e a m e n ' s wages 1527-1560, with R a n t e k a m m a r b o c k e r , SH a n d S M H F f o r 1527-1560, RA, as sources. W a g e s for s e a m e n 1544, M R 1544/1, KrA, a n d for 1 5 5 4 - 5 5 in Loningsregister, vol. 3, I ^ . M o r e s e a m e n served at royal castles a n d w e r e p a i d locally. They can be f o u n d in t h e L a n d s k a p s h a n d l i n g a r a n d FRA series. It is possible that t h e y were a significant p a r t of the navy's m a n n i n g in t h e 1520s a n d early 1530s, b u t p r o b a b l y only of m a r g i n a l i m p o r t a n c e in t h e 1540s a n d 1550s. See also Viljanti 1957, 8 8 - 1 0 8 .

590

C H A P T E R SEVEN

his ships were adequately manned by 1535. Hie number of men was reduced after 1536 but remained at a higher level than before the war. In the early 1540s, it was markedly increased, and a normal level of around 700 to 800 seamen was established, excluding men paid regionally and naval gunners, who were paid by the artillery. Except in 1543 and 1555-56, when many ships and galleys were in commission, the number of men serving on ships must have been considerably lower. The king had several minor warships in commission, and from 1545 to the late 1550s he sent royal merchantmen to trade with Western Europe. They probably required only a small number of the paid seamen. Just as the king from around 1540 paid an increasing number of men for service as part-time soldiers, he also paid men to serve as seamen in times of war. In peacetime they might stay at home or work for the king, in the case of the seamen typically at the shipyards. The seamen and the gunners in this period were still a minority of the crew of a fully mobilised fleet. The majority of the crewmen on the warships were soldiers. Gustav I throughout his reign had soldiers in sufficient number to man his warships, and with the change to native part-time soldiers from the early 1540s, even the large number of oarsmen required for the growing galley force was available. From 1559-60, the number of major warships in service grew each year until 1563, when the navy was fully mobilised for war against Denmark and Liibeck. There are a large number of wage and provisioning accounts from the 1560s. They make it possible to study naval manning in detail, including the turnover of men during a year and the number of men employed permanently {arstjdnare) and temporarily {hyrbatsman). The number of temporarily hired men was much larger than those in permanent service, and most of these m e n were probably conscripted. Conscription to the army and navy in this war (and the 16th century) is little studied. At least in the early years of the war, men may have been attracted by the wages the king was able to pay until he ran into a financial crisis in 1566/67. The number of arstjdnare was considerable—around 1,000 men. If they were skilled seamen, it explains why the great expansion of the navy in a few years was possible without diluting skills below a critically low level. The large number of men whom Gustav I had kept in excess of immediate operational requirements must have made the expansion of the navy easier. Zettersten, who apparently used the biannual wage accounts for the main fleet, shows a growth of the total number to around 1,800 seamen and gunners in 1563, 3,500 to 4,000

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

591

in 1564-66, and around 4,500 men in 1567.'" Actually there were more men, serving on small squadrons and on transports and storeships, who were not paid in the same lists as the main fleet. As men died or left the fleet because of wounds and disease, the number of seamen who served during a year was larger than the number of men paid in spring and autumn. Tlie few manning plans from the 1560s show that around half of the crews should consist of soldiers. Administratively, Erik XIV divided his army into four large regiments, of which one was called the Ship regiment {Skeppsregementet), intended for service on the fleet. Its composition was flexible, but a number of fdnikor (units of nominally 500 soldiers) were earmarked for naval service. In a study from 1926 of the Swedish army in the Nordic Seven Years War, the General Staff's historical branch listed the several units (fdnikor) serving at sea and calculated the number of soldiers each year. The result was around 2,000 men in 1563-64, 4,037 in 1565, 4,448 in 1566, 1,781 in 1567, and no fewer than 5,945 in 1570." The references to sources in this study are brief, and numbers in one or two wage accounts are not necessarily typical for an entire year. It is known, however, that the average number of men provisioned in the main fleet in summer 1566 was 7,250, and if smaller squadrons are included, the total number of men in the fleet was at least 8,000.'^ To reach this number there must have been around 4,000 soldiers. In 1568-69, activities at sea were reduced and the number of men in service declined, but a major effort was made in 1570. It fell short of the 11,000 men listed in the provisioning plan, but it may at least have reached the level achieved in 1566. The total number of men serving at sea in the 1560s was not surpassed until the 1670s. After 1570, the great battle fleet was decommissioned. In the following decades the navy was mainly used in blockade and troop transport services, which required few major warships and far fewer seamen than in the 1560s. Zettersten's lists of men reveal a large variation in numbers between 1571 and 1592, with a maximum of 756 common seamen {batsman) and gunners in 1579, and a m i n i m u m of only 53

Zettersten 1890, 131-32, 171. " Axtorna 1926, 116-17; Carl E k m a n , "Erik XIV:s s k e p p s r e g e m e n t e " , TiS, 1945, 5 5 6 - 6 1 . " Sdderlind 2006, 152.

108,

^^^

CHAPTER EIGHT

seamen in 1591.' After 1571, the bMsmiin were only arstjanare, presumably mainly skilled volunteers. These variations are not likely to be real, and the very low figures reported for some years are impossible considering that several ships were in commission and that the manv sliips laid up in reserve required caretaking crews. Instead, the figures reflect that the wage accounts fi-om this period were in disorder at the uiie Zettersten worked with these accounts, and there were many that he was never able to find. It is more probable that the navy r e t t e d o the level of manpower it had had before 1560, fewer than 1000 men but sufficient for the limited operational forces used against Russia Conscription of men to the navy took place in this period, but it was not of much i^iriportance, compared to the considerable conscriptions that were made to the army. There is no trace of a well-prepared mobilisation system in case the navy had to be fully manned, but Johan III tried to regulate how the n a v y s personnel should be supported by local taxes. Special efforts were made in 1579, when calculations were made of the n u m b e r of men required at the Stockholm shipyard, on the ships laid up there (includ ing ships not yet delivered), at the several local shipyards, and on the active fleet m Gulf of Finland. The total number was around 1,220 offi ^ r s , non-commissioned officers, seamen, gunners, and shipbuilders This resulted m a royal letter for how towns and other local communities should pay for their provisioning as a part of their taxes In addition to the men listed in the king's accounts, the total number of seamen m the Vasa dynasty's service also included Duke Karl's crews on his s ^ e r a l merchantmen which sailed to Germany and Western Europe^TTiese men may not have been more than a few hundred, but they had much experience of long-distance voyages with large squarengged ships and they must have been an asset for the duke when he took control with surprising ease of the royal navy during the conflict with Sigismund The number of soldiers serving on the ships in these decades is largely unknown and is not easy to calculate because of the many troop transport and army support missions in which the navy

Tl.e very low number of seamen in 1591 in

RR 21/5 1 5 " ' a ^ A i l l ' " anl^lt

K

f'''

«

plan or a draft); several^hundreds peai-

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

593

was involved. If soldiers were required on ships during the war with Russia in 1570-95, they were always available in the war zone. The latter half of the 1590s has left few administrative sources, because normal accounting practices broke down under the conflicts which ended in a civil war. Both Duke Karl and men loyal to King Sigismund mobilised naval forces, and, at least in 1598, most Swedish warships were active, the vast majority of them in the duke's service. The number of seamen, however, may not have increased very much above the level established after 1570. In 1599, administrative order was restored and a manning plan for the navy was prepared for 1600. It shows a total requirement of 1,866 mariners (sjofolk) for 54 warships in the Baltic Sea. Of these, 443 men were in service at Stockholm and Nykoping during the winter 1599/1600, while 350 hired men who had served in 1599 were scheduled to return to service in spring 1600 If all ships were active, 1,073 more m e n were required. The plan includes lists of how many men several towns and regions should supply to fill this deficit: a total of 862, 639 of which came from towns. The requirement of soldiers was only listed for nine ships at Nykoping, which were planned to have 310 mariners and 500 soldiers.'^ If the same proportion between mariners and soldiers was to be used for the whole Baltic fleet, nearly 3,000 soldiers were required. There were also six warships at Alvsborg, not mentioned in this plan. They required 500 to 600 mariners and soldiers if they were to be manned at the same level as the ships in the Baltic. The total manpower requirement for the navy in that case was around 5,500 men, of which at least 2,000 must be mariners (sjofolk). This level of manning in relation to the displacement was the lowest recorded in any manning plan during the entire history of the Swedish sailing navy, however, and a high proportion of the seamen needed to be skilled if the manning were to be adequate. The plan for 1600 could not reach this level, and it is highly questionable whether a manning system based primarily on the small and poor Swedish towns could ever easily supply a considerable number of skilled seamen. The navy was not fully mobilised for war service in 1600 or any other year before 1611. Many detailed wage and provisioning accounts and muster rolls exist in various archival series and show the manning of

" SMHF 10:4; ships at Nykoping, see also SMHF 6:14; ships at Alvsborg, SS Z 2933, all RA.

594

CHAPTER SEVEN

various naval forces 1600-10. Tliey would provide much interesting information if they were systematically investigated, but they do not provide any sums of the total number of men in service like do the accounts for the 1560s.'® This navy operated in several squadrons, with some ships on individual missions and on mercantile voyages to foreign ports, and no summary of the total number of men in service every year was made. Scattered observations show a low proportion of seamen in relation to the size of the ship, often considerably lower than the already low level established for 1600. Even these low levels of manning were frequently difficult to achieve, and squadrons were sometimes undermanned when they ought to have been ready to sail.'^ There is still no trace of a systematic mobilisation system where conscripted men or part-time volunteers were firmly linked to the navy and forced or attracted to service when called upon. It seems as if local communities, especially towns, had to organise recruitment whenever the navy lacked men. This system was likely to produce delays and supply men not used to the sea or to the navy. As had been the case since at least Johan Ill's regulation of 1579, the towns had to provide for seamen during winters, if they were not required for service at the shipyards. Rather than a force of 2,000 or more mariners (sjofolk) which would have been required to m a n the navy to the level established in 1600, there were probably no more than 1,000 men in service at the same time. There were often a large number of soldiers on the ships, mainly because the navy was much engaged in supporting the war in Livonia. Before the war with Denmark in 1611, a manning system with few seamen and soldiers may have been adequate. If the seamen who served included a high proportion of experienced and skilled men, soldiers could perform the unskilled tasks just as well as hastily recruited unskilled men formally listed as seamen. Soldiers trained to handle fire-weapons were useful as gun crews, and if army units were given the opportunity to serve at sea for years, they would turn into seasoned semi-skilled ship-crews, which could support skilled seamen and gunners. Erik XIV had intended and partially achieved this in the 1560s. It was problematic, however, if soldiers only served for brief

Zettersteii f o u n d it impossible to give m u c h i n f o r m a t i o n for this p e r i o d . Between 1592 a n d 1615, his lists only p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n for 1602 (1,176 officers a n d m e n ) a n d 1604 (906 officers a n d m e n ) : Zettersten 1890, 132, 171. " See, for example, several m a n n i n g lists f r o m 1601-02, M 1761, RA.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

595

periods at sea and otherwise on land, because that meant that the ships never could have teams of men who were used to serve together at sea. At present, little is known about whether Karl IX tried to solve these problems and, if so, how. In late 1610, a meeting with the Parliament took place in the shadows of a threatening war with Denmark. It resulted in decisions which provided the embryo of a long-term solution for distributing the burden of recruiting and maintaining soldiers and seamen among the four estates and between them and the crown. Seamen {batsman) should be provided by towns, the clergy, and certain coastal communities, which should provide for the men when the navy did not require their service. This decision was not intended as a permanent system, but the principles could be used to establish such a system. It is possible that the Parliament's decision increased the number of seamen available during the war against Denmark in 1611-12, but this has never been studied, not even by the otherwise thorough naval staff study of this war.'® Hie years after this war saw the beginning of a major reorganisation of both the army and the navy's manning system. The army was reorganised into a fixed number of regiments of a standardised composition of companies, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and with geographically fixed recruitment regions for each regiment. This reform took several years to implement, but during the 1620s it became firmly established that the administrative peacetime units, regiments, and companies also were operational units. Tliey were composed of regiments of eight companies which had been recruited from the same region and which fought under command of officers permanently attached to a certain company or regiment. This sort of organisation favoured coherence and team spirit from top to bottom in both peace and war.'' The navy also required coherent crews and teams, but naval manning is inherently different f r o m army organisation. The operational units are primarily warships, fleets, and squadrons. Ships are buih in different sizes, and fleets and squadrons are likely to be widely different in size and composition due to operational requirements. A ship is a suitable administrative unit, but only as long as it is kept in

Olle T o r n b o m , "Batsmanshallets u p p k o m s t " , Forum navale, 9, 1948, 3 0 - 7 1 . A s u m m a r y of the d e v e l o p m e n t u p to 1634; Jaii S t o r m b o m , Batsmanshallet i sydvdstm Finland pa 1700-talet, M a r i e h a m n , 1959, 5 - 1 4 . " Barkman 1931.

596

CHAPTER SEVEN

commission. If seamen should be kept in permanent naval service, they must be attached to another administrative unit for wage-paying, discipline, etc., when not serving on a ship. Because the size and armament of ships differed widely and because ships were not permanently manned, it was next to impossible to form administrative units shaped as the crew of an operational ship. A regiment required men of similar skills, trained to work in close formations. A warship required men of widely different skills, accustomed to work independently or in small groups: topmen who could work high in the rig, men on deck who understood how to handle sails and rudder to achieve complicated manoeuvres, men who could repair rigs and sails, and experienced gunners who could form unskilled men into effective gun-crews. What the navy required was a cadre of skilled men in permanent service, semi-skilled and unskilled men available at short notice through an efficient mobilisation system, and the possibility to use the same men for long periods at sea in order to improve their skills and give teams a chance to mature. This solution must be found within the existing Swedish socioeconomic framework, with few skilled seamen in the mercantile marine, and a large army, which unavoidably recruited the bulk of young Swedish men able to fight. The army also used foreign entrepreneurs and mercenary soldiers, but only for operations on foreign territories. The navy could have relied on skilled foreign seamen, who were available around the Baltic Sea, but there were three major problems with relying on them. They were expensive, they were not available at Stocldiolm in early spring, and they were often subjects of states with which Sweden might be in war. The new Swedish political leaders, Gustav II Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna, around 1615 were already determined to markedly increase both the army and the cadre of seamen. An undated m e m o r a n d u m in Oxenstierna's hand f r o m 1615-16, which outlined the first ideas, suggested that a fully manned navy should have 4,060 petty officers and seamen, although in peacetime 2,500 men were sufficient. Of these, Stockholm was to maintain 1,000 and the other towns 900. The text is brief, but the idea was that the navy should be manned primarily by seamen, not soldiers; that a substantial permanent force of seamen should be maintained, primarily by the towns; and that it was possible to find additional seamen quickly when the navy was fully mobilised.^"

AOSB

1:1, 3 6 6 - 6 9 .

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

597

Tliis is strikingly similar to the system that developed gradually in the 17th century, except that it was peasant society rather than the towns which had to carry the main burden. In practice, the army's reorganisation and manpower requirement was given a higher priority, but the ambition to increase the number of seamen is evident from several sources. A manning plan for the main part of the navy for 1615 shows a requirement of 1,597 mariners (sjofolk), and a plan for 32 warships (excluding minor craft) from 1617-18 required 1,464 mariners and 310 gunners. A plan for the whole navy in 1621 lists 48 officers, 253 non-commissioned officers, 126 men with specialised tasks (of which 70 cooks), 350 gunners, 210 petty officers, and 1,123 common seamen—a total of 2,110 mariners.^^' Tlie real number of seamen was at first considerably lower, but a long-term increase had begun in the late 1610s. Nils Erik Villstrand, who has studied this development, shows that the total number of mariners of various ranks increased f r o m around 800 in 1617 to around 1,100 in summer 1619.^^ These were years of peace and rather low activity, so this increase shows that an increased permanent force of seamen already had begun to take shape. Part of this force was at home when the navy did not require all men. The king did keep an eye on this new organisation, however, to see that it worked. On 24 July 1620, a rather remarkable event took place in Stockholm. The navy's entire personnel was mustered in the presence of Gustav II Adolf and formally divided into five "fleets". All existing ships were also divided into these fleets, which both in manning and in composition of ships were of approximately the same size and structure. Each fleet was commanded by a vice admiral assisted by three officers, who apparently were intended to be the equivalents of the regimental cadres of officers who were being formed in these years. This muster must have been carefully prepared. On paper, 1,494 named men, including officers, were distributed to the five "fleets" on this day. Of these men, only 897 were present, 224 were listed as absent, and 373 as "not arrived". The total requirement of officers and seamen for all ships was 1,610 men, 116 of w h o m still had to be recruited. Absent men had been mustered earlier or were at sea on the navy's

S M H F 7:8, RA; SH 68:4, RA; Backstrom 1884, 3 9 0 - 9 1 . ' ' Nils Erik Villstrand, " M a n s k a p o c h sjofolk i n o m orlogsflottan, 1617-1644", Historisk Tidskriftfor Finland, 71, 1986, 2 4 - 7 2 , N u m b e r s of m e n in service f r o m 1617 to 1631 in this section are f r o m this article.

598

CHAPTER SEVEN

ships. Those who had not arrived were regarded as legitimate absentees, evidenced by the fact that only a few men were listed as "run". An additional 205 men were listed as having turned up instead of men who had not arrived. The system was apparently flexible, and local communities could send replacements for men who were listed. Of the 1,474 men (except the 20 stafl" oflicers) who were listed, 478 came from Finland (including Aland), 444 from Stockholm, 163 from the island Oland, 188 from the three provinces Uppland, Sodermanland, and Viistmanland near Stockholm, and 201 came in small contingents from other provinces.^^ During 1621, when the whole navy was mobilised for the assault on Riga, at least 1,200 and possibly as many as 1,500 mariners served on the ships. The system of mobilisation of the new larger cadre of seamen worked rather well; men turned up in sufficient number and in time to m a n the whole navy for a major operation. The five "fleets" were not used as a tactical division, however, and there is no indication that they were used as an administrative system after 1621-22. Most probably it turned out to be impractical to divide ships and men into permanent units like regiments in the army. The experiment gives a glimpse of Gustav Adolf's thinking, however; he wished to have a stable and predictable manning system of a size and structure that closely corresponded to the navy's force of warships. The organisational drive to increase the number of men did continue, and in 1623 around 1,800 sjdfolk were in service, of whom around 90 per cent were batsman. In September and October 1623, the petty officers and c o m m o n seamen (batsman) were divided into four regional companies of around 400 men each: Abo provincial, Nyland's, Aland's, and Uppland's companies. These companies had a small administrative staff of officers and non-commissioned officers, but most sea officers and noncommissioned officers did not belong to them. Many of the seamen had originally been conscripted, but the company organisation was intended to provide a permanent system for the future. In this system the peasants should recruit and pay a fixed number of volunteers rather

^^ SH 69:3, RA. The division i n t o five "fleets" or amiralskap is also used in SS Z 2952, a d o c u m e n t w h i c h c o n t i n u e s with SH 69:6; S H 69:8, aU RA, a n d a Hst in W e s t i n s k a s a m h n g e n , vol. 318, U U B . These d o c u m e n t s are f r o m 1620-22. Zettersten 1890, 129, m e n t i o n s a division of batsman f r o m p r o v i n c e s a n d t o w n s w h i c h c a n n o t be f o u n d in t h e sources f r o m 24/7 1620.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

599

than paying ordinary taxes and running the risk of being conscripted. In addition, one company of long-term hired (vdrvade) Swedish and foreign seamen was formed to provide a nucleus of skilled seamen. It was paid by the towns with a tax that replaced their obligation to provide seamen to the navy. Two more such companies of skilled men were planned but never reached full strength. A company in western Sweden charged with manning the Gothenburg squadron existed only in 1624-26; it was abolished when the squadron was transferred to Stockholm.'-* During 1624-28, close to 2,300 to 2,400 men were in service; about 2,100 to 2,200 of these were c o m m o n seamen. In 1629, the total number reached 2,650, of which 2,300 were c o m m o n seamen. Tliere were considerable problems, however. Many seamen were still, in practice, conscripted and deserted if they got an opportunity, and many men had difficulty obtaining enough food from the poor peasants who were supposed to provide for them during winters. The towns renegotiated their obligations with the crown in 1629 and promised to permanently maintain 1,200 seamen if they were relieved of other burdens. Quantitatively, this was a better bargain than the company of expensive hired seamen which they had paid taxes to, but the navy soon became dissatisfied with how the towns fulfilled their obligations. Too few men were sent and many of those who arrived were unsuitable. The recruitment to the four provincial companies had ceased in practice, and the number of men in them rapidly declined. Nils Erik Villstrand, who has studied the Aland Company, has found a complicated picture of administrative problems and a probable miscalculation from both the state and the peasants of the economical parts of the system. It cost more than expected, and this caused conflicts between peasants and seamen. This hardly promoted the social and political stability around resource extraction which the Swedish crown by tradition saw as very important. In 1630, the peasants demanded a return to the traditional taxation system, and the navy agreed. By that time, all four regional companies of batsman had ceased to exist.'^

" Zetterstenl890,129-31; Tornbom i 948,45-51; Nils Erik Villstrand, "Batsmanshallet pa A l a n d och i F i n l a n d u n d e r 1620-talet", Skargard, 1979, 19-25; Nils Erik Villstrand, " B o n d e r och b a t s m a n pa A l a n d u n d e r 1620-talet", in Sune J u n g a r a n d Nils Erik Villstrand (eds), Vaster om skiftet: Uppsatser ur Alands historia, A b o a k a d e m i , D e p a r t m e n t of history, Abo, 1986, 4 7 - 7 3 . " Villstrand 1986.

M

600

CHAPTER SEVEN

Instead, the army had begun to conscript men in the coastal provinces earmarked for the navy. In 1630, fewer seamen turned up for service from the companies and the towns than in 1629. Tlie navy's manning system faced a crisis, ultimately, because the army's increasing demands during the 1620s gradually had exhausted the Swedish society's resources for providing taxes, food, and manpower. In the frenetic efforts to find resources for the army for the German war which dominated Sweden in 1629-31, the navy inevitably suffered. It had sufficient men to transport the army to the continent and blockade the Imperial fleet in Wismar. In the great gamble Gustav II Adolf played, that sufficed in the short run. The invasion of Germany was a one-time eff'ort, however, and if the enterprise succeeded, the occupied territories would bear a considerable part of the burden to pay and feed the army. Gustav II Adolf also supported an ambitious naval policy, and a powerful navy was obviously necessary if control of the southern Baltic Sea should be upheld against Denmark. It was also obvious that if the German enterprise failed, the navy must get priority access to manpower to defend the homeland. In January 1631, when Axel Oxenstierna outlined his ideas of how an increased navy should secure control of the sea, he also urged the king to secure its manning. The navy required more seamen, well paid and in good health, even if that meant the army must be reduced by one or two regiments.^^ Oxenstierna began, together with the admirals who were members of the Council (Gyllenhielm, Fleming, and Ryning), to work for a reallocation of resources from the army to the navy, a policy that became much easier after the batde of Breitenfeld in September 1631.^' The battle was the starting point of a new large construction program of warships, of which a part was cancelled, however, after Gustav Adolf's death. It was also the starting point for a new manning system, which became of fundamental importance for the navy during a quarter of a millennium. Administratively, Breitenfeld was the most decisive battle ever in Swedish naval history, although it is hardly remembered as such. No major conscription were necessary for the army during 1632-33, and from 1632 the Council supported a marked improvement in the navy's manning system by re-allocating several coastal communities

AOSB 1:6, 37. " Tlie r e f o r m s a n d tfie political process: Tornbom

1948, 5 1 - e

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

601

to it from the army. From 1634 to 1641, the newly formed Amiralitetskollegium used the increased territorial resources to create a new and lasting system of batsman companies. Twelve provincial companies were formed, in which men recruited by both towns and peasant communities in the province were integrated. The companies were adapted to local geographical and administrative conditions and were not of uniform size. The peasants were divided into small groups of equal tax-paying ability, rotar, which had to supply one m a n each, while the towns' obligations were distributed in proportion to their population. If the rotar and towns fulfilled their obligations to send batsman, they were free from conscription to the army and navy. The system was planned and negotiated with patience, and it was more fine-tuned to the local resources than the system of 1623, which had been decided and implemented in haste. By 1641, the batsman system was composed of around 2,720 men supplied by the same number of rotar and 1,130 men supplied by the towns. Each company was commanded by a naval captain, who was to ensure that the company was up to strength, that the men recruited by the peasants and towns were suitable for naval service, and that the peasants and towns fulfilled their obligations to their seamen. The companies were divided into three regiments, each headed by an admiral, although most of the central administration of the system was run by civilian administrators in the Amiralitetskollegium and the Treasury. Admirals were sent out from time to time to inspect the companies, although there was usually several years between each inspection.^® The company system of the 1630s gave the navy a formal structure for its manning. Its advantages were that the navy knew where to find men at short notice and that the same m e n might serve for several years (if they survived) and create at least a nucleus of experienced seamen. It was up to the navy to provide that experience by rotating the manning of its warships and transports between the companies. For the towns and peasant communities, the navy became a heavy but more predictable burden. It also turned out to be politically possible to use the system for increased demands. Tliis required persuasion and the ability to convince burghers and peasants that there were threats

^^ The batsmanshall a n d fdrdubbling system until 1680: Zettersten 1903, 5 9 - 8 7 ; Stormbom 1959, 14-27; Carl H a m n s t r o m , Forsvar och byggd i Angermanland och Medelpad: Batsmanshallet i Angermanland och Medelpad, Solna, 1972, 14-80.

602

CHAPTER SEVEN

that could be prevented only by helping the state, but the Swedish state was highly skilled in that type of bargaining. During the Great Nordic War (1700-21), when the army's system for recruiting soldiers in the 1680s and 1690s had been reorganised along the same lines as the navy in the 1630s, local communities were persuaded to increase the number of men to create additional wartime regiments to strengthen the army/' In the navy, a beginning was made already in December 1644 when the burgher estate promised to double the number of men until the war with Denmark ended. In 1652, that estate promised to make the same effort in a future war, and the towns had to fulfil this obligation in 1655-60. During that war the government also began to persuade the peasants to temporarily increase the number of seamen. This was successful, but the negotiations were probably hard and resulted in variations in how many additional men each province provided. The Parliament decided in 1672 to make this reinforcement system (/ordubbling) for war service a permanent part of the batsman organisation. In practice, many of the additional men, at the end of each war, were used to replace the vacancies that developed as men died or became unable to serve. Conquered provinces became an additional source of manning. Gotland was placed under the navy's recruitment system after it was taken from Denmark in 1645, and new companies were formed in Halland and Bohuslan in 1661.'° Most of Bohuslan was transferred to the cavalry in 1675, but the navy received new recruitment regions from the army in Osterbotten (northern Finland) for a new company. A small company was also formed in the ex-Danish provinces Skane and Blekinge in 1675. By 1680, the ordinary number of men in the system was 4,790, while it might supply more than 9,000 men in wartime.

" P r o p a g a n d a a n d political p e r s u a s i o n : Forssberg 2005. The a d d i t i o n a l r e g i m e n t s in the a r m y : Cavallie 1975, 136-54. Kjell Olsson, Det gotlandska batsmanshdllet, 1646-1887, Visby, 1993.

tremdnning

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

Table Regiment

8.3

Seamen

and gunner

Company

603

companies

1634-1680

Year of

Ordinary

Total

Formation

n u m b e r of men

number with Fdrdubbling

1 1

S o d e r m a n l a n d (incl. Stockholm)

1641

365

650

O s t g o t a (incl.

1641

320

600

Northern Smaland) 1

O l a n d (incl. K a l m a r )

1637

300

590

1

Smaland gunners

1635

285

500

2

Vastgota

1638

300

600

2

Inland towns' gunners

1638

300

575

2

Roslags ( U p p l a n d )

1640

300

2

Norrland

1638

508-670

3

Aland

1639

300

440

3

Soderfinland (Abo

1638

250

490

600 1,250

province) 3

N y l a n d (incl. V i b o r g )

1640

225

460

3

Norrfinland gunners

1637

200

380

(incl. O s t e r b o t t e n ) 1

Gotland

1648

300

440

2

Bohuslan

1661

300

-

1

Blekinge och Skane

1675

158

-

2

Halland

1675

121

242

3

Osterbotten

1675

290

580

Sources; Zettersten 1903, 6 7 - 7 0 ; Svenska flottans historia, I, 340. Figures are r o u n d e d . Except the I n l a n d t o w n s ' (Uppstcider's) G u n n e r C o m p a n y , w h i c h was f o r m e d b y several i n l a n d towns, these c o m p a n i e s were r e c r u i t e d f r o m t h e coastal parts of each province, while m o s t of t h e p r o v i n c e s w e r e r e c r u i t m e n t regions for t h e a r m y . The island p r o v i n c e s A l a n d , O l a n d , a n d G o t l a n d w e r e in their entirety used b y t h e navy, except G o t l a n d in 1661-65. Tlie r e i n f o r c e d s t r e n g t h increased gradually d u r i n g the p e r i o d , a n d t h e table shows the situation in t h e late 1670s. H i e N o r r l a n d C o m p a n y was successively increased. Tlie H a l l a n d C o m p a n y was f o r m e d in 1661 with 280 m e n but was in practice replaced with a v a c a n c y fee until 1675. Tlie Bohuslan C o m p a n y was r e d u c e d in 1675.

Although the Swedish navy was larger t h a n ever in t e n n s of warships, firepower, Republic

and seamen, the naval war with D e n m a r k and the in

1675-79

was

a disaster.

Reforms

became

Dutch

urgent.

One

p r o b l e m was that a considerable n u i n b e r of the m e n lived in N o r t h e r n S w e d e n a n d F i n l a n d a n d c o u l d only get to S t o c k h o l m w h e n the sea was f r e e f r o m ice. T h i s h a d c r e a t e d p r o b l e m s i n 1 6 7 6 a n d 1677, w h e n

the

604

CHAPTER SEVEN

fleet was delayed because men from the northern and eastern companies could not get to the base until late spring/' Another problem was the quality of batsman recruited by the coastal communities and towns. For the most part, these men were not highly skilled seamen; instead, they had limited or no experience of the sea, and the navy had to train them how to handle sails and rigs on large ships. Tliis had worked with some success up to 1660, when many ships were in service for troop transport and sea control duties, even when Sweden was not involved in a major naval war. But the 15 years of peace f r o m 1660 to 1675 had provided few such opportunities to train many batsman at sea. In the three naval wars since the 1630s, the navy had also tried to improve the situation by temporarily recruiting experienced Swedish and foreign seamen, partly those who served on the several armed merchantmen which the navy hired from private owners. This had produced rather limited results, and the navy's new leader, Hans Wachtmeister, was also determined to abolish the system that depended upon hired merchantmen. The radical reform to move the navy's main base from Stocldiolm to southeastern Sweden (Kalmar-Karlskrona; from c.1690, only Karlskrona) included an equally radical change in the structure and geography of the manning system. Hans Wachtmeister wanted the bulk of the navy's seamen to live close to the new base and wanted a substantial portion of them to be skilled and experienced seamen. In the early 1680s, his master plan was to form a cadre of 1,200 permanently enlisted (varvade) skilled seamen, who should live in Karlskrona, and 7,000 part-time batsman, living in Blekinge (2,000), Sodra More (1,000), Oland (2,000), and Halland (2,000). These men would not be recruited through groups of peasants {rotar) as had been done in the existing system. Instead, they would be paid through the local tax incomes {indelning), if necessary augmented by tax incomes from other regions. This system would make it possible to support a large number of men close enough to Karlskrona to enable them to reach the base within weeks. As the king and Wachtmeister planned to build a larger navy than earlier, the old system with men from several coastal provinces was still required to man all ships, but the bulk of the fleet

Clemensson

1938, 4 4 - 4 7 .

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

605

could be fitted out and manned quickly if more than 8,000 men were easily available.^^ In the short run, funds were released by partially suspending the existing system. After the war, the state agreed with the towns that they should pay a vacancy tax rather than keeping seamen for the navy. The towns who kept gunners continued to do that. The companies in Finland and Norrland were also replaced by vacancy taxes. A large number of batsman and their families were transferred from Finland and several Swedish towns to southeastern Smaland (Sodra More) and Blekinge, where they formed new, indelta, companies. The change in the population structure in the sparsely populated Blekinge had a sideeffect which had been intended by the Swedish state: it formed a considerable minority of men and women born as native Swedish subjects in a province which had been Danish until 1658 and in which sympathies for Denmark were still an important factor. Similarly, army regiments of native Swedes were formed in Skane. Intermarriages between soldiers and seamen and local girls then did part of the job of integrating Swedes and Danes." Wachtmeister's plan soon had to be modified. Halland was allocated to the army, Oland was much too poor for 2,000 men, Blekinge and Sodra More could not support more than 2,300 men, and the vacancy taxes were not sufficient to pay for 1,200 full-time varvade seamen. In 1686, Karl XI decided that a partial return to the old system was necessary. The towns were again requested to supply seamen, and two companies were formed in Norrland (northern Sweden). In the following decade, the manning system underwent further reforms, including a division of some companies into smaller units in order to improve their administration. In 1697, Hans Wachtmeister could summarise his and the recently deceased Karl XI's achievements in a report about the navy to the Parliament. The navy had 1,188 full-time enlisted {varvade) men (half gunners and half seamen) at Karlskrona and 2,356 indelta men in Blekinge and Sodra More, the latter available within 8 to 12 days. The three regiments of roterade m e n from

^^ Wendt 1950, 4 0 9 - 1 8 ; Nils Erik Villstrand, " M a n s k a p s r e k r y t e r i n g e n till Karl XI.s flotta", in Lars Ericson a n d Bjorn GafVert (eds), Med spade och gevdr: Meddelanden frdn Krigsarkivet, 12, Stockliolni 1989, 119-32. Nils Erik Villstrand, "Fran det avlagsna F i n l a n d till o r t e r n a r a flottan: D e finska b a t s m a n s k o m p a n i e r n a s f o r f l y t t n i n g pa 16804alet", in Nils Erik Villstrand (ed.), Kustbygd och centmlmakt, 1560-1721: Studier i centrum-periferi under svensk starmaktstid, Helsingfors, 1987, 3 8 7 - 4 2 7 .

606

CHAPTER SEVEN

coastal provinces and men provided by towns consisted of 4,296 men in peace and 7,842 men in war (including fdrdubbling), available at Karlskrona within one to two months. Hie total strength of the system when mobilised for war was 11,386 men. Furthermore, the navy now trained 100 boys (skeppsgossar) to become future skilled seamen In 1699, Karl XII decided to increase the navy with a west-coast squadron based in Gothenburg, and this decision was implemented by 1702 when a squadron requiring 1,774 seamen {batsman) had been formed.35 They were to be manned like the main fleet in Karlskrona, with men living near the base. The existing batsman organisation in the Bohuslan archipelago provided only a small nucleus. The squadron required many more men from the west coast—Bohuslan, Gothenburg, Halland, and northwestern Skane. After several investigations and discussions, it was decided in 1704 that the manning system should be enrolment (enrollering) rather than indelning or rotering. The navy sent recruiting agents along the coast who listed men used to the sea (sjovana). They were offered a small yearly sum (4 daler silvermynt) if they signed an agreement to serve in the navy for 5 daler silvermynt per m o n t h in wartime. They were otherwise free to work on merchantmen or as fishermen. Already in 1704, 1,715 men were enrolled, and the number rose to 2,830 in 1708.'® The choice of a different system on the west coast had an interesting background. Tiie system had its origin in Louis XIV's and Colbert's navy {inscription maritimes), and it had been introduced in DenmarkNorway." In Sweden, an attempt to introduce it had been made on the west coast already in the 1670s, but with little effect. The Swedish west coast consisted of provinces that up to 1645 and 1658 had been Danish and Norwegian territory, and there was traditionally a mobility of seamen around Kattegat and Skagerack, where maritime lines of communication connected Denmark, southern Norway, and western Sweden. Seamen living in Halland and Bohuslan served in local shipping but also on ships registered in Denmark, and the Danish enrolment sys-

" Stormbom 1959, 2 7 - 4 1 ; Hamnstrom 1972, 8 1 - 1 2 0 . W a c h t m e i s t e r ' s r e p o r t to tlie P a r l i a m e n t in 1697, R 4871, RA. Exactly t h e s a m e n u m b e r of m e n was given in a r e p o r t 1699, Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 42. ^^ Goteborgs eskader, 463. L e n n a r t H e n n e l , Batsmansrekrytering och bdtsmanshdll i Vdstsverige, licentiat thesis, L u n d 1964; private p r i n t i n g , L u n d 1993; Bertil Koch, Bdtsmanshdllet i Skdne, private p r i n t i n g , Saltsjobaden, 1999; Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 4 0 - 4 5 . Bergersen 1953-56, IV, 2 1 6 - 3 2 3 , 4 2 4 - 2 7 .

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

607

tern attracted some of them. Tlie Swedish system was introduced in competition with the potential enemy's manning system; men were paid to remain loyal to the Swedish crown. The west-coast seafaring population tried hard to make the navy promise that they only should serve in the Gothenburg squadron, not in the main fleet, probably because they were shrewd enough to understand that a war with Denmark-Norway meant that Swedish west-coast shipping would be drastically reduced and perceived that the navy could be an alternative source of employment. Service in the main fleet in the early 1700s meant service in the Gulf of Finland against Russia, a war that did not affect west-coast shipping. The navy avoided promising the enrolled men that they would only serve locally, but in practice they were not called to serve before 1709, when Denmark returned to the war. The manning system was tested and found to work in 1700 when the whole navy was mobilised. It had been calculated that such a mobilisation would require around 2,000 additional men, temporarily hired among mariners in Sweden and Germany. This was probably achieved.^^ Between 1701 and 1709, the navy was only partially mobilised, for troop transports and to provide a squadron in the Gulf of Finland against Russia. This provided the batsman with time at sea and must have improved their experience. After 1710, the system was tested to its utmost, when the navy had to send as many ships as possible to sea against Denmark and Russia. It is clear that manpower was a limiting factor during the 1710s and that some ships regularly were left in port due to lack of men. Tlie plague in 1710-11 caused severe losses: in October 1711 only 5,000 men were available. These lost men were replaced, but sea service during late autumns most probably affected the health of the m e n . ' ' The new manning system sent more m e n to sea during a longer war period than in any earlier Swedish naval war. It was resilient and useful in a war of attrition. A comparison to the Danish navy shows that its manning system, with a large proportion of enrolled seamen, had considerable problems and left many ships in port. One result of this system was that a total mobilisation interrupted shipping and affected

" Cavallie 1975, 2 0 2 - 0 5 . F r o m t h e a m o u n t of m o n e y paid to m e n it seems as if 1,500 were h i r e d in Sweden a n d 500 in G e r m a n y , Plans to hire 2,000 m o r e s e a m e n to replace losses w e r e n o t fulfilled b u t these m e n w e r e n o t necessary as t h e war with D e n m a r k t u r n e d o u t to be b r i e f " Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 87, 90.

608

CHAPTER SEVEN

the Danish economy. Hie Danish navy reached the peak of its effective strength in 1710 (table 3:1), but even then it failed to take control of the southern Baltic Sea. A more detailed comparison of the two Nordic systems in the 1710s would be interesting because it was the only long war both navies had been involved in since the 1560s.'"' Hie enrolled men on the west coast were, after all, to a considerable extent called to Karlskrona for service in the main fleet. This caused protests, and the number of enrolled men declined from 2,830 in 1708 to 2,238 in 1711 and 1,359 in 1712. It then stabilised at that level. It is not known whether this was caused by men leaving the system or by fewer new men being enrolled to replace losses. Many enrolled men chose to serve in the several privateers that were fitted out by local shipping interests on the west coast once the war with Denmark began in 1709. Hiis caused certain protests from the navy, but the Swedish state on the whole encouraged privateering, which tied up considerable Danish naval forces at no cost to the state.*" In 1717, Karl XII reorganised the navy's manning system. One intention was to make part of it, c.3,500 men, useful as auxiliary infantry {dntergastar), but why he reorganised the whole system has not been studied. The companies of seamen and gunners, which had developed since the 1630s, were formed into seven regiments, one battalion, and two independent companies. The regiments were structured more along military lines, at least on paper, with most officers and all noncommissioned officers being included in them, while infantry officers were assigned to some regiments in order to provide elementary infantry training. On paper, the navy had 717 petty officers and 9,409 seamen and gunners in 1718. In addition, it was supposed to have 2,500 enrolled men (certainly overly optimistic) and 800 temporarily hired seamen f r o m the mercantile marine. The latter seems to have existed, probably because the war made it difficult for them to find employment on merchantmen. The navy of 1718-19 also required 6,000 soldiers, most of them to man the several galleys which had been built in the 1710s. Actually, there were vacancies in the naval manning organisation, but a rough estimate (made by Herman Wrangel) shows that nearly

Hamnstrom 1972, 1 2 1 - 5 5 is a detailed s t u d y of h o w t h e batsman in o n e p r o v i n c e d u r i n g t h e w a r p e r i o d 1700-21. •» Hennel 1993, 4 1 - 4 2 .

system w o r k e d

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

609

10,000 seamen were available in 1719, adequate to man all serviceable warships. Tlie great problem of bringing warships to sea in that year was not lack of men but acute, if temporary, lack of food and financial means to pay wages. The provisioning problem was solved in 1720-21, although problems with delayed wages continued to limit the efficiency of the Swedish war efforts. Two decades of intense war had finally made taxpayers tired of further war efforts. Karl XII's changes in the manning system were abolished in 1719, together with many other innovations he had made in his last years, and the Swedish naval manning system returned to the structure it had in the late 17th century."'^

8.3

Leaders

Like all complex organisations, navies require leadership, chains of command, and men with specialised competencies. The Swedish navy already in the 16th century had a three-tiered system of leaders, which somewhat anachronistically can be called petty officers {underbefdl), non-commissioned officers {underojficerare), and officers. Tlie same system existed in practically all navies and armies into the 20th century. Petty officers were normally experienced c o m m o n seamen who gained promotion and better wages, but no marked change of social status. In Sweden, they were part of the manning organisation discussed in the preceding section (8.2). Non-commissioned officers were usually permanently employed by the navy, they were men of a certain standing in society, and when on ships they were part of what in Swedish provisioning accounts are called kajutfolk; men who ate in the cabin together with the officers. Officers were men of high social status in early modern Europe, although the difference between men of various ranks was wide. Tlie literature about Swedish naval leaders is totally disproportionate in relation to the size and importance of the three tiers. There is a considerable biographical literature about officers but practically nothing about non-commissioned officers. Petty officers disappear in the studies of naval manning, where their special role is ignored. It is known that navigation officers {styrmdn) got navy-organised education

The m a n n i n g system in 1717-21: Wrangel 1906-07, esp. 10-14, Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 112-15; Hennel 1993, 4 6 - 4 9 , 6 3 - 6 7 .

136-43;

610

CHAPTER SEVEN

since the 17th century. Young men suitable for training as non-commissioned officers were selected from the companies of enlisted (varvade) men which were established in Karlskrona. From the 1680s, boys {skeppsgossar) underwent formalised training to become skilled seamen and potential petty officers. The navy's specialised artillery officers were responsible for training of gunners."*^ Tliese specialised professions existed already in the 16th century, but there are no studies of how non-commissioned officers were recruited and trained before the late 17th century. We know equally litde about petty officers. Were these two groups of leaders recruited from within the naval organisation, or were they mainly found outside it? Did the navy provide career opportunities and training systems that made it possible to start as a c o m m o n seaman and end as a non-commissioned officer, or were the latter selected from a smaller circle of young men, presumably relatives of non-commissioned officers, trained by father and uncles? There are sources which may answer at least some of these questions, but only with patient work in the archives. Non-commissioned officers were men of three distinct specialities: masters {skeppare), navigation officers {styrman), and master gunners {arklimdstare, later konstaplar). Gradually, each branch developed hierarchies. Tliere were four levels of masters—the boatswain {hogbatsman) was the lowest—three levels of navigation officers, and two levels of master gunners. Masters were men able to manoeuvre a sailing ship, and they were responsible for the ship and its sails, cables, rig, and equipment even when it was laid up. Navigation officers were charged with navigating the ship at sea and using maps and navigation instruments. They also needed to understand how to steer a ship and how best to use its sails for keeping a desired course. In the 16th and much of the 17th century, when most warships only had one or two officers, masters and navigation officers must have had several duties that were later fulfilled by officers, such as watch-keeping and supervising of the crew's daily work. The master gunners supervised

W i l h e l m Sjostrand, Grunddragen av den militdra imdervisningens uppkomstoch utvecklingshistoria i Sverige till ar 1792, Uppsala, 1941, 261^375, s t u d i e d formalised t r a i n i n g in t h e navy, w h i c h Sjostrand f o u n d h a d started in t h e late 17th century. R e c r u i t m e n t of foreign n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers was m a d e in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s in t h e early 1640s a n d in E n g l a n d in 1658: Zettersten 1903, 59; u n p u b l i s h e d text by M A H a k a n Jakobsson.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

611

the ship's gunners and were administratively responsible for guns and ammunition on the ship."*^^ While non-commissioned officers are strikingly anonymous in Swedish and European historiography, the literature about officers is large. It has been popular, especially among officers, to collect biographical information about earlier generations of officers. There are several biographies of officers as well as historical and sociological studies of officer corps—their social origin, professionalisation, and political and social importance."''' Such studies are often made from a modern perspective: officers have a distinct profession with norms and value systems; they are formally trained; and their careers are shaped by formal ranks, which also represent the chain of command. From the perspective of the mature 18th- and 19th-century navies, professional sea officers should to be able to handle a sailing ship, navigate with maps and navigational instruments, c o m m a n d gun crews, uphold discipline, and control the daily routines among the crew. Such professional officers are presumed to have started with basic training in seamanship and to have passed through the lowest sea-officer grades before were given command of a ship or fleet. Early modern leaders at sea who did not progress through all these roles or who came to the profession from a different entry point have frequently been regarded as non-professional. In this perspective, leadership in itself is not regarded as a profession; it instead is regarded as constituted by the specialist skills. In historical scholarship, the professionalisation process of officers have been much influenced by Max Weber's ideas about bureaucracies as systems in which power-holders act through hierarchical chains of command manned by permanently employed individuals whose careers follow a path upwards along this chain of command. Promotions within bureaucratic organisations should be based on professional merit, not

A c o n t e m p o r a r y d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e duties of officers a n d n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers in A d m i r a l W e r n e r v o n Rosenfeldt's u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t to a naval i n s t r u c tion: James Cavallie (ed.), " W e r n e r v o n Rosenfeldts S j o m a n s m e m o r i a l " , KFA, 1976, 100-56. Brief survey: Glete 2000, 4 6 - 5 4 . I m p o r t a n t studies are G e r k e Teitler, The Genesis of the Professional Officer Corps, Beverly Hills, 1977; N. A. M . Rodger, The Wooden World: An anatomy of the Georgian navy, L o n d o n , 1986; Arteus 1982; a n d J. D. Davies, Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The officers and men of the Restoration navy, O x f o r d , 1992. A collection of articles: D. J. B. T r i m (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos and the Rise of Military Professionalism, Leiden, 2006.

612

CHAPTER SEVEN

social connections; bureaucrats are supposed to act in accordance with rules fixed by the central authority, and they should be independent of the surrounding society and its power structures. The professional skills of the bureaucrats in actuality belong to the organisation and should be transferred from senior to junior members through formal training rather than within families or from patrons to clients.'*' Modern officer corps and Weber's ideal bureaucracy have much in common, and his approach may give useful insights. To start an analysis of an early modern officer corps with a weberian ideal, however, is likely to lead to anachronistic conclusions about its efficiency and rationality."'® Efficiency and rationality in an organisation should be compared to contemporary organisations and the level of efiiciency and rationality in earlier social systems, not to later organisations shaped by other societies. Early modern officer were predominantly recruited from elite groups; family connections mattered a lot for career opportunities; and formal training programs were often rudimentary. That may have been efficient and rational when social status commanded obedience and when rulers needed participation from established elite groups if they were to implement their state formation projects. Early modern sea officers were often not professional seamen and navigators, but early modern navies did not lack specialist professional leadership. That was provided by the largely forgotten noncommissioned officers. They must be studied as the professional men they were if the rationality of early modern naval leadership is to be understood. The "professionalisation" of the sea officers was a process whereby practical seaman skills became so important for the states that men of a higher social standing than shipmasters had to be able to master them. The "ideal" professional officer corps also requires a stable situation, in which professional competence is well defined and radical innovations are unlikely or unwelcome. The ideal weberian officer corps may be a rational use of resources in a stable situation, but it may lead to inefficiencies and inertia in dynamic and unpre-

M a x W e b e r , Economy and Society: An outline of interpretive sociology, 3 vofs, N e w York, 1968, 2 1 7 - 2 6 , 9 5 6 - 1 0 0 5 . This is empliasised b y M A Ingvar Sjoblom, D e p a r t m e n t of W a r Studies, Swedish N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e College, Stocldiolm, in his studies of Swedish 1 6 t h - c e n t u r y sea officers. F o r an i n t r o d u c t i o n : Ingvar Sjoblom, " K o m p e t e n s och s j o e r f a r e n h e t h o s svenska sjoofficerare u n d e r 1600-talet", K n u t A r s t a d (ed.), Strategi, ledelse og samfunn, 1588-1720, Oslo, 2000, 3 9 - 5 2 .

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

613

dictable situations in which new combinations of competencies and activities are essential. Once these limitations of the bureaucratic model are understood, it is useful to apply some of its basic elements toward analysis of state formation and career opportunities within the new type of fiscalmilitary states. These states really required leaders who at various levels acted in the interest of the state. They had to use civilian bureaucrats as well as fighting men, who embodied the organisational capabilities which the state required to make use of large resources—men and material handled by the men. Prestigious corps of men who could rise to the powerful positions on the top of the hierarchy fulfilled two purposes: ambitious men could rise to the social elite by being useful for the state; and members of the elite had new opportunities to educate their sons for careers that would give them access to resources raised by the state. Much of this conforms to the weberian model, but early state formation could not begin by creating modern officer corps with mature professional ideals and behaviour. It had to combine existing social orders and various specialist skills in forms that could be used as instruments of power in a highly unstable situation that arose as new fiscal-military states were established in competition with traditional social orders. The first and original duties of an officer were to control violence and armed men and to uphold that monopoly of violence which rulers claimed that they had and which they demanded payment for from their subjects. Men with traditional social status and wealth and men with specialist skills both could use their difl^erent "social capitals" to gain access to the power and resources of the new type of state if they followed certain rules of h u m a n interaction. They had to cooperate with each other in order to develop those new organisational capabilities, which made it possible for the ruler to uphold order, control violence, and fight enemies. In early modern Europe, social status was required to command men, and for a long time social status gave established groups an advantage within the fiscal-military states. For a ruler, it was better to have them within their organisation than outside as opponents, even if it was costly in terms of shared profit f r o m protection-selling. Men who already had social authority could capitalise on it by making it useful to the ruler, but they expected rewards. The extensive transfer of state-controlled land {donationer, fdrldningar) to aristocrats, noblemen, and successful officers, which was typical for the Vasa state, is

614

CHAPTER SEVEN

an excellent example. The development of the permanent officer corps, however, was also a long-term effort of the state to create a new order of status—an alternative to family connections, nobility, and landownership—which suited the interests of the state. Men with abilities and loyalties important to the state could be given social authority, along with power to distribute rewards and punishment. The two origins of power within an officer corps—established social position and loyal work in service of the ruler—might lead to conflicts. Tlie test of the interior strength of an early modern state was often whether or not an aristocratic officer obeyed the orders of a superior officer of lower social origin. The early modern compromise was often to promote skilled men to higher positions in the traditional social hierarchy, typically by ennobling them. In Sweden, successful officer careers normally led to nobility even until the early 19th century."*'^ This section of the book is an attempt to show how men from the estabUshed Swedish elite and men who had ambitions to rise in social status developed into a sea-officer corps. As will be obvious, it is not a story of how noblemen competed with tarpaulins about control of the navy. The number of non-commissioned officers and shipmasters from the mercantile marine who permanently joined the Swedish seaofficer corps was small in relation to its size. This is rather a story of how both men with traditional social positions and men with ambition to rise used competence as leaders and organisers to gain power within the state. The king required men who could lead and coordinate various specialists at sea, but not necessarily admirals and captains who were the best seaman on their ship. As they progressed in their careers, leaders gained experience of seamanship, navigation, and gunnery, which made them better able to command warships and fleets, but it was their ability to lead men and their loyalty to the ruler and his political aim with naval operations that made them useful for the state.^°

" The early Swedisli officers, state a n d society: Nihson 1989. " C o m m o n e r s , t h e lower nobility a n d t h e aristocracy, a n d the r e c r u i t m e n t of officers a n d b u r e a u c r a t s in early m o d e r n Swedish state f o r m a t i o n : Sten Claeson, Hdradshovdingedmbetet i senmedeltidens och Gustav Vasas Sverige, S t o c k h o l m , 1987; Englund 1989; G o r a n G o r a n s s o n , Virtus Militaris: Officersideal i Sverige, 1560-1718, L u n d 1990; Svante N o r r h e m , Uppkomlingarna: Kanslitjanstemannen i 1600-takts Sverige och Europa, S t o c k h o l m , 1993; Jan Saniuelson, Aristokrat eller fdrddlad bonde? Det svenska frdlsets ekonomi, politik och sociala fdrbindelser under tiden, 1523-1611, L u n d , 1993; A n d e r s Olsson, Borgmdstare, bastioner och tullbommar: Goteborg och Halmstad under statligt inflytande, 1630-1660, L u n d , 1995; Fabian Persson, Servants of Fortune: The Swedish court between 1598 and 1721, L u n d , 1999, Hallenberg 2001;

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

615

Gradually, experience and training in seaman skills, ship-handling, and navigation became important in this process. Both men from the elite and men with ambitions to rise in society, found it useful or necessary to start their career with a proper education as seamen. Leadership, however—the ability to make other men obey and keep up their morale under dangerous conditions—remained essential for officers. Tlie present state of research makes it possible to write only an impressionistic picture of the process. It is unbalanced, because we know much more about the elite than about the many men with career ambitions who became officers. Because the behaviour of the elite is important, this method is defensible, if not ideal. Tliere are important published and unpublished collections of biographical information about Swedish sea officers, but only a few analyses of the sea-officer corps up to 1721.'' The most ambitious attempt to prepare a complete list of early modern Swedish sea officers was made by Hjalmar Borjeson, until his death in 1945. His list of 18th-century officers was published in 1942 (edited by Karl Wester), and that of 16th-century officers, revised and edited by Georg Hafstrom, was published in 1949. Tlie latter is useful but is not the definite work on the subject. Borjeson's 17th-century list was continued by Hafstrom but remains unpublished, and it is uncertain to what extent it is complete.'^ Analytical studies of the officer corps have only been made for certain periods, with a concentration on senior officers. There are still major gaps in our understanding of who the Swedish sea officers were, what were their social origin and career paths, and what was their competence and even their role in the navy's leadership structure."

Bo Eriksson, Statstjdnare och jorddgare: Adelsideologi i Per Brakes "Oeconomia", Stocldiolm, 2008. The oldest list of officers was c o m p i l e d b y C a p t a i n L o r e n z Leopold v o n H o r n in t h e late 19th c e n t u r y a n d p u b l i s h e d by his son: R o b e r t v o n H o r n (ed.), Kommenddrkapten L. L. von Horns biografiska anteckningar: I, Officerare, som tjenat vid orlogsflottan fore dr 1721, O r e b r o , 1927. Axel Zettersten p u b l i s h e d b i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t officers a n d a practically c o m p l e t e list of flag officers; Zettersten 1890, 5 - 1 0 4 ; Zettersten 1903, 3 9 - 5 5 , 5 3 3 - 4 5 , 5 8 9 - 6 3 6 . H j a l m a r Borjeson, Orlogsflottans officerare, 1700-1799 (ed. Karl W e s t e r ) , Stocldiolm, 1942; H j a l m a r B o r j e s o n a n d G e o r g H a f s t r o m , Skeppshovidsmcin vid orlogsflottan under 1500-talet, Uppsala, 1949; a n d H j a l m a r Borjeson, Biografiska anteckningar om officerare vid orlogsflottan 1600-1699, u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t , 1935 with h a n d w r i t t e n additions, H j a l m a r B o r j e s o n s samling, vol. 61, KrA. A review of Borjeson & Hafstrom 1949 with additions: Carl E k m a n , " S k e p p s h o v i t s m a n u n d e r 1500-talet", TiS, 113, 1950, 8 2 - 1 0 5 . ^^ Cavallie 1981; Asker 1983; Arteus 1986; Lars E i n a r s s o n , Studier av fordndringar

616

CHAPTER SEVEN

When Gustav I began to develop a naval organisation, he hired men who could handle ships, lead seamen, navigate, handle guns, and lead fighting men—soldiers—on both land and at sea. Hiese men were skeppare, styrmdn, arklimastare, and hovitsmdn. Hie latter is a Nordic title (similar to German Hauptman), which equals the word captain, which is of Latin origin. It meant "leader of armed men and military operations" and, like captain, was used in the 15th and 16th century to denote men who led both large and small forces. The king did not hire any men who were called sea officers, and in Europe of 1521 there was no model of naval power where such a profession was necessary. The Danish-Norwegian navy of King Hans and Christian II, of which Gustav I had personal knowledge from the 1510s, employed a mixture of Danish noblemen, Germans, and Scots to command ships and fleets. Several of them had gained considerable experience of command at sea. Hiere was no permanent cadre of such men, and when Danish naval activities declined in the 1520s, much of this leadership experience was lost.'"* The earliest major Swedish fleet of 1522-24 was manned from Liibeck, and its leadership structure is little known. The practical use of warships and fleets as instruments of power, however, soon showed King Gustav that he required men who could exercise control and command of the several specialists whom he employed to run his armed force at sea. Both in a formal and a practical sense, the development of the sea officer began as a delegation of the king's power as commander-in-chief of his armed forces. The men who first were given this general authority over other leaders at sea were commanders of fleets, a position that from the 1530s normally was called admiral in Sweden. Men serving as admirals in the early modern Nordic navies frequently became naval heroes, in Denmark also national heroes. Their actual origin and political loyalties prove that national interpretations of this period in Nordic history are anachronistic. This issue deserves some attention, because it shows the complications for the Nordic elite when the Union broke up. For example, the legendary Soren Norby, Christian II's admiral, was in his youth (at least in 1504) in Swedish

av det sociala ursprunget inom den svenska flaggmanskdren mellan aren 1650-1699, u n p u b l i s h e d , Historiska i n s t i t u t i o n e n , U p p s a l a universitet, 1986; Ingvar Sjoblom's i n p u b l i s h e d studies of 1 6 t h - c e n t u r y Swedish sea officers. Barfod 1990, 2 0 9 - 1 4 .

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

617

service on a naval expedition. One of Gustav I's earliest initiatives as king in 1523 was to send Norby an offer to become a Swedish commander and nobleman.^' Staffan Sasse, a German f r o m Westphalia and apparently an experienced leader at sea, commanded Swedish naval forces in the late 1510s. He joined the Swedish rebels with his ships in 1521 and became admiral and a Swedish nobleman. Sasse also represented Liibeck in Sweden, which made it impossible for him to serve as admiral of the Swedish fleet in the war against that city in 1534-36.'® The young German nobleman Berend von Melen served Christian II in 1520-21. He was taken prisoner by the Swedish rebels, changed sides, married into the Vasa family, and was entrusted with overall command of the Swedish fleet in 1522-24. After the failed Gotland expedition in 1524, King Gustav became suspicious of Melen's loyalty. Melen fled from Sweden and made a successful career in service of German princes.'^ Another change of loyalty took place in 1522, when Tord Bagge, one of Christian II's senior military leaders in Stockholm, escaped to the Swedes with his young son Jakob. They came from the Norwegian nobility but had lived in Denmark. Both men served Gustav I, and Jakob Bagge became one of his most trusted officers. From 1535 he often served at sea, first because his fdnika of soldiers was sent to serve in the fleet. By the 1550s, Jakob Bagge was Sweden's most experienced admiral.'® Swedish aristocrats and noblemen also served as commanders at sea. The brothers Erik and Ivar Fleming, members of the richest family in Finland and of the Council from 1523, were active at sea in the rebellion against Christian II, and they occasionally served as admirals later. They were also much used by the king as governors and military commanders. W h e n a major fleet was commissioned against Tiibeck in 1534, command was given to Arvid Trolle, a Swedish aristocrat whose father had held command for Christian II on land and at sea. In 1534, the father served Gustav Ts ally and brother-in-law. Christian III. Arvid Trolle's cousin, the former Swedish archbishop Gustav Trolle, fought in 1535 against the new Protestant and monarchic order in the Nordic

Carlsson 1949, GR 1, 9 5 - 9 6 (20/6 1523). Svenska man och kvinnor; GR 10. 357. " Hildebmnd 1901. ^^ A r n o l d M u n t h e , Svenska sjdhjaltar, II: Jakob Bagge, Stocldiolm, 1899, 1 - 2 . Bagge's military a n d naval service until 1560: Barkman 1937.

618

CHAPTER SEVEN

countries. He was killed in combat, together with another of Gustav I's brothers-in-law, Count Johan of Hoya. Hie Trolle family up to the 1520s had been one of Sweden's leading families and had members living in both Sweden and Denmark. Arvid Trolle's younger brother, Herluf Trolle, commanded the Danish fleet in 1564-65 and is one of Denmark's great naval heroes. His great grandfather, grandfather, two of his uncles, his cousin (Gustav Trolle), and his older brother had all been members of the Swedish Council, and some of them had competed for the position as regent and political leader of Sweden. Until 1521, the Trolle family was far more powerful than the Vasa family.^^ In spring 1535, when Arvid Trolle had been transferred to the army operating in Denmark and the Fleming brothers were occupied in Finland, King Gustav appointed the Swedish nobleman Mans Some and the Danish nobleman Peder Skram as joint commanders of his fleet. He may have done so for sheer lack of reliable men experienced to lead at sea or lack of aristocrats with authority. Both men were rather young and presumably ambitious.®" Some was commander of the Stockliolm castle and, as such, responsible for the outfitting of the fleet; Skram had been highly recommended by two Danish noblemen who had negotiated with Gustav about the war efforts. Some and Skram were, together with the commanders of the Prussian and the small Danish-Holsteinian fleets, joint commanders of the allied fleet that fought Liibeck in summer 1535. In August, Gustav expressed distrust of Skram, but at the same time Christian III gave him command over his fleet, now increased with captured ships. Mans Some continued as sole commander of the Swedish fleet until 1536.'^' Peder Skram's role in this war has been important in Danish historiography; he is both a national and a naval hero. Two of the decisive battles in the Count's War (Grevefejden) took place at sea when Some and Skram were joint commanders of the Swedish fleet. In Denmark, Skram is normally described as an experienced mariner, as the real leader of the naval operations, and it is even said that he held command over the Prussian and Danish fleets. Mans Some is described as a "political" leader of the Swedish fleet. In general literature about

'' Briatid de Crevecoeur 1959. The Trolle family: Svenska man och kvinnor. ™ Tlieir age is u n c e r t a i n , b u t S o m e a n d S k r a m lived until the 1570s, " Briand de Crevecoeur 1950. G u s t a v I's letters to a n d a b o u t P e d e r Skram in 1535, GR 10, 99, i l l , 145-46, 164, 128-239. Joint c o m m a n d with f o u r admirals: Erik J o r a n s s o n Tegel, Konung Gustaf Its historia, II, Stockliolm, 1622, 6 1 - 6 2 ,

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

619

Danish history, operations at sea in 1535 have been described as led by Skram or it has even been reported that the whole fleet was Danish and was led by Skram. In the Swedish literature, Skram's role in 1535 has been minimised to that of a sub-commander under Some, his chief of staff, commander of the soldiers, or commanding officer of the flagship. Tlie idea that two men could be joint and equal commanders seems to be difficult to grasp from a modern point of view. It has also been suggested that Skram was the commander of Christian Ill's fleet already f r o m the beginning and had never been in Swedish service even though he exercised his command from the Swedish flagship. Skram is not included in published lists of Swedish sea ofEcers.®^ Actually, Peder Skram was an experienced mflitary leader, but he had only once before, in 1532, commanded at sea, and then mainly in combination with the experienced Danish sea officer Tile Giseler." The operations in 1535-36 were the real start of his career as a naval leader, first as Swedish and later as Danish admiral. The idea that Skram was an experienced mariner w h o m Gustav I hired because he lacked experienced naval leaders is a part of stereotypic perceptions of Swedish and Danish naval history, wherein Swedish mariners of all grades typically are described as inexperienced and Danish-Norwegian as experienced, whatever the actual circumstances. Practically nothing is known about who actually took initiatives and held tactical command during the operations. The ships were, with all probability, handled by their masters—in the case of the fleet flagship Store Kravelen, by the veteran mariner Olof Eriksson {Skeppar Olof). The real situation in 1534-35 was that both Gustav I and Christian III lacked experienced men to lead their fleets. The experienced Danish naval leaders were dead (like Tile Giseler) or had sided with the enemy, while Gustav's only experienced admiral, Staffan Sasse, was politically suspect. Had the war ended differently, Peder Skram might have stayed in King Gustav's service and become a Swedish naval hero, like the Norwegian-Danish Jakob Bagge. The Nordic elite groups had, since the 14th century, regarded the three kingdoms as their common

The debate a b o u t Slcram a n d S o m e is too extensive to follow in detail, b u t see t h e m a n y q u o t a t i o n s f r o m it in Briand de Crevecoeur 1950, 6 3 - 1 1 6 . Recent r e s t a t e m e n t s of S k r a m ' s role: Dansk udenrigspolitiks historie: I. Konger och krige, 700-1648, 2002, C o p e n h a g e n , 2002, 272; a n d Paul D o u g l a s Lockliart, Denmark, 1513-1660: The rise and decline of a Renaissance monarchy, O x f o r d , 2007, 28. " Briand de Crevecoeur 1950, 2 3 - 3 8 .

620

CHAPTER SEVEN

sphere of actions, intermarriages between families from different countries were common, several families had branches in two countries, and Germans might easily intermix with this Nordic elite. It was not unusual to serve the ruler in another Nordic country without being regarded as a foreigner. From the 16th century, state formation was to radically change this, except that Germans from Holstein, Livonia, and north Germany continued to be important as officers in the Danish and Swedish armed forces. From a modern perspective, it may seem self-evident that a warship must have a commanding officer (Swedish fartygschef) who held authority over all men on board. But this was far from self-evident in 16th-century Europe, where warships had both seamen and soldiers and where the leaders of the latter normally had a higher social prestige. Hie earliest Swedish naval forces command structures are obscure. The instruction and the code of naval rules (Skeppsmtt) which Gustav I issued in April 1535, when he prepared his fleet against Liibeck, unambiguously speak about the admiral as commander of the fleet and about hovitsmdn (captains) as superior to skeppare when booty should be distributed. But the Skeppsrdtt also mentions skeppare and hovitsmdn as if they were joint commanders of other men on the ships. In the wage accounts for mariners of 1535-36, masters, not hovitsmdn, are mentioned as the senior officer on each ship. It seems likely that the hovitsmdn in this naval code are the officers of the soldiers embarked on the warships. It is far from clear if there was one such officer on each ship or if they were commanding officers of ships in the modern sense. Every ship had a master who most probably handled the ship.®"* In March 1536, Gustav issued 15 letters of commission {sjobrev), which gave the commander (or commanders) of a ship legal authority to act in the name of the king. He left an empty space for the name (or names) and sent them to his admiral Mans Some who commanded the fleet in Landskrona. In these letters, hovitsmdn are unambiguously stated to be the senior officer on each ship, although some letters used the plural, as though some ships should have more than one hovitsman. Joint command was obviously possible and had been used to command the fleet in 1535. It is not known if this command structure was a new idea formed by practical experience of the campaign of 1535. It is important to note that the king left it to his admiral to

GR 10, 1 2 7 - 3 5 (30/4 1535); S M H F 1:1-3, RA.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

621

appoint hovitsman on each ship. The power of the commanding officer of a ship was a further delegation of the power the king had delegated to his admiral, and he was supposed to know best how to use men under his command. It may also be seen as a delegation of patronage to a successful commander. Hiese appointments were obviously only temporary for the year 1536, and unfortunately it is not known which names Some inserted into the empty spaces.®^ The sources have little to say about the command structures of warships in the two following decades. Lists of men suitable to command on land and at sea were made as part of the mobilisation preparations in 1544, but they are not preserved. The appointment of hovitsman to ships in service is occasionally mentioned, but there are very few names which can be connected to individual ships. Tlie army by this time had several hovitsman. They commanded infantry and cavalry units and appear in the wage accounts as their leaders. The seamen were explicitly listed in the wage accounts as subordinate to the masters {skeppare), and there are no accounts for hovitsman serving in the navy.®*^ Many warships were in service from time to time, and most of them were mobilised against Russia in 1555-56, but no list of hovitsman appointed to c o m m a n d individual ships is known. The manning plan for a projected fleet for 1557, however, does explicitly include one hovitsman for every sailing warship and galley, and that person is intended to command the mariners, gunners, and soldiers. The function of commanding officer of a warship by that time was regarded as a special position separated f r o m the hierarchy of mariners and soldiers.®' From 1559 to 1562, more and more large warships were commissioned for active service in connection with the marriage plans of Duke Erik (from 1560, King Erik XIV). From 1563, the whole navy was mobilised for war and around a quarter of the men in the Swedish armed forces served yearly at sea. From 1559, Erik was the driving force and administrative leader behind this large-scale effort to send ships to sea, and a conflict with his father in spring 1560 shows that he personally appointed hovitsman on ships in service. The old king in his last months of life began to suspect that he was losing operational

'' GR 11, 69 (15/3 1536). Ingvar Sjoblom, U n p u b l i s h e d w o r k i n g p a p e r a b o u t s e a m e n ' s wages 1527-1560, a n d u n p u b l i s h e d studies of Swedish sea officers in t h e 16th century. " S M H F 1:16, RA.

622

CHAPTER SEVEN

control of his fleet to his sons, Erik and Johan, if the hovitsmdn obeyed them rather than the king. Erik was also interested in creating more articulated hierarchies and formalised offices of state. In these years, it became routine to appoint hovitsmdn as commanding officers on each warship, and larger ships had more than one hovitsman. In 1564, even most small warships had two, and wage accounts show a difference in how they were paid. One hovitsman on each ship was senior to the other (or others); they were "captain" and "lieutenant", although these titles were only occasionally used. From at least 1565, the largest warships had three to five officers {hovitsmdn). During the 1560s, the titie skeppshovitsman ("ship officer") replaced hovitsman, which became a title used only in the army. The number of sea officers was almost 60 already in 1563 and was far above 100 in the following years.®" Hie social background of these men to a large extent remains yet to investigate. Most were commoners and remained in that position, but some came from the lower nobility or became noblemen as a reward of their service. The Swedish nobility was usually poor, and service for the king was necessary if they were to have regular incomes and a social position corresponding to their ambitions. Several skeppshovitsman had served the king in various positions before the 1560s, but seldom at sea. Some are known to have been army officers, but it is probable that many of them also had administrative experience and knew how to find and handle resources in local society. The ability to administrate resources may have been an important competence for a skeppshovitsman, who had to control large groups of men, their provisioning, and their wages.® Masters {skeppare) were rarely promoted to sea officers (skeppshovitsmdn). They continued to serve in their special profession, although often in larger ships than before the war. It is therefore unlikely that many skeppshdvitsmdn in the 1560s were experienced mariners. It is interesting that several members of aristocratic families served as commanding officers, normally on the largest ships in the fleet. In fact, no other period in Swedish naval history saw so many men from prestigious families serving on warships. They were normally young, usually between 20 to 30 years, but a few of them were future members

™ Ingvar Sjoblom, U n p u b l i s h e d studies of Swedish sea officers. The text a b o u t sea officers in t h e 1560s is f r o m Sjoblom, s u p p l e m e n t e d b y Borjeson & Hafstwm 1949 a n d Zettersten 1890, 3 3 - 3 6 , 8 5 - 8 8 . " A n e x a m p l e of an experienced local bailiff w h o in t h e 1560s b e c a m e skeppshovitsman a n d undemmiral is Sigfrid f o n s s o n , b i o g r a p h y by M a t s Hallenberg, SBL 32.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

623

of the Council. Tliis group included Gustav, Peder, and Sten Axelsson Baner (three brothers); Anders, Lars, and Henrik Pedersson Fleming (three brothers); and Bo and Nils Birgersson Grip (brothers); and it also included Klas Eriksson Fleming, Arvid Turesson Trolle, Nils Carlsson Gyllenstierna, Christiern Gabrielsson Oxenstierna, Arvid Gustavsson Stenbock, and Sten Svantesson Sture. A few of these men were briefly appointed as deputy admiral {underamiral), usually a few in each main fleet, but these deputy admirals were normally also commanding officer of a large ship. None of these men continued in naval service after 1570, except Klas Fleming, who became Lord High Admiral (dversteamiral). The navy was evidently not their career, but to serve in a war must have been regarded as a duty for young aristocrats. It is possible that the moral value of having men of the leading families risking their lives together with conscripted seamen and soldiers was important, even if they were unlikely to have much experience. Three of them—Peder Baner, Anders Fleming, and Sten Sture—were killed in the battle of Bornholm on 7 July 1565, and Arvid Trolle was taken prisoner in 1564 by his cousin, the Danish admiral Herluf Trolle. Hans Kyle, Henrik Horn, and Nils Ryning were also aristocrats who served as senior skeppshovitsmdn and underamuiraler, but they belonged to an older generation with experience of command on land.™ Tlie large fleets sent to sea in the 1560s, and the division of the active fleet into a main battle force and smaller cruising force in the Gulf of Finland required the appointment of more than one admiral. However, few individuals served permanently as admirals. The title "deputy admiral" (underamiral) in the main fleet was given to commanding officers of the largest ships, who frequently changed. C o m m a n d in the Gulf of Finland shifted almost every year, and a man appointed admiral there could appear as skeppshdvitsman of a large ship in the main fleet another year. Erik XIV planned in the early 1560s to appoint an aristocrat to Lord High Admiral (dversteamiral) with the experienced, but not aristocratic, Jakob Bagge as permanent underamiral. Actually, no dversteamiral was appointed, and Bagge commanded the main fleet

™ Borjeson & Hafstrom 1949. Tlie y o u n g aristocrat Hogeiiskild Bielke is also m e n tioned as a skeppshdvitsman, b u t the c i r c u m s t a n c e s are u n c e r t a i n . H e n r i k H o r n was A d m i r a l Klas H o r n ' s uncle, a n d Nils R y n i n g was t h e father of t h e riksamiral Axel Ryning, g r a n d f a t h e r of A d m i r a l Erik R y n i n g a n d great g r a n d f a t h e r of A d m i r a l Klas Bielkenstierna, m e n w h o in t h e 17th c e n t u r y at v a r i o u s times c o m m a n d e d t h e m a i n Swedish fleet.

624

CHAPTER SEVEN

in 1563-64 until taken prisoner. Hie young underamiral Klas Eriksson Fleming was temporarily appointed fleet commander in 1564 but was soon replaced by Klas Kristersson Horn, who served in 1564-66. Fleming and Horn were aristocrats and members of the two leading families in Finland. Horn was one of Sweden's most experienced military leaders and administrators, and his years as admiral were markedly successful. After Horn's death in 1566, command of the fleet was given to Peder Bagge (no relation to Jakob Bagge). He was one of four brothers (the others were Anders, Bengt, and Broms Bagge) from the lower nobility who all served as skeppshdvitsmdn in the 1560s. Peder Bagge had been successful as skeppshdvitsman and underamiral since at least 1563, and he was preferred over several young aristocrats who also served in these positions. In 1568, however, Peder Bagge had to return to a position as skeppshdvitsman, when Erik XIV appointed Gabriel Oxenstierna as commander in-chief of the fleet. Oxenstierna had been a member of the Council since 1544, and it is likely that the appointment was made to make him loyal in a situation when opposition against the king was rising. The main fleet never sailed in 1568, because the civil war and Erik's fall from power stopped major operations in that year. Johan III appointed Klas Fleming, who changed loyalty very late, to oversteamiral, and he commanded the fleet in 1570. The four Bagge brothers served in the navy until the end of the war in 1570, but not afterwards. They were suspected of having sympathies for the dethroned and imprisoned Erik XIV, and all four were arrested in winter 1577 on suspicion that they led a conspiracy to depose Johan III in favour of Erik. Rumours of this conspiracy seem have convinced Johan to murder his brother in February 1577. Bengt Bagge was executed; the other three were released but not employed by the king. The reality behind the conspiracy is little known. It may seem strange that Johan believed that four members of the provincial lower nobility would be so dangerous for his regime that his brother had to die. He may have believed that there were considerable sympathies for Erik among the sea officers of the 1560s, however, and that the four brothers had several friends among them. It would not have been surprising if such sympathies existed, because the war and Erik's naval policy had been useful for the career of many sea officers.^'

'' Ericson 2004, 107-11, SBL 2; Borjeson

& Hafstrom

1949.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

625

After 1570, Sweden had a cadre of men who served as sea officers. There was also a permanent dversteamiral, Klas Eriksson Fleming. Many skeppshdvitsmdn of the 1560s are not known to have served in the navy after the war. However, around 80 of them served at least once in the 1570s as admiral, commanding officer of a warship, administrative leader of a shipyard or of recruitment, provisioning, and payment of seamen. Only a minority of them served continuously, but the war had created a group of men who had the experience and identity of sea officers and who normally used the title skeppshdvitsman. At least in the 1570s, when a large number of the veterans f r o m the 1560s still were available, Johan III had the leadership resources to recommission a large battle fleet if necessary. In the 1580s, the number of experienced men still alive and fit for c o m m a n d must have declined. At the same time, however, a smaller group of sea officers with more or less permanent service on small ships in the war against Russia had developed.'^ In 1590, 32 skeppshdvitsmdn are recorded, 17 of whom had served three to ten years and 13 of w h o m had served more than ten years." In the 1570s and 1580s, four men dominated as admirals in command of fleets: Erik Bertilsson Slang (dead 1592), Henrik Arvidsson (ennobled Gyllenankar, dead 1578), Bengt Soffringsson Juusten (ennobled Gyllenlood), and Arvid Eriksson Stalarm, all with experience as captains of warships before they became admirals. At least the first three were career sea officers who had risen in the social hierarchy by service in the king's navy since the 1560s, and Arvidsson and Soffiingsson had a family relationship. A fifth m a n serving continuously as admiral was Johan Bagge, son of Admiral Jakob Bagge. He had made a career as a civil administrator and ran the Stockholm yard from 1584 to 1594, but he never held a seagoing command. It is of interest to note that Soffringsson, StMarm, and Bagge, like the dversteamiral Klas Fleming, sided with King Sigismund in the conflict with Duke Karl while no admiral sided with the duke. After Fleming's death in 1597, Sigismund appointed Stalarm as commander-in-chief of all armed forces in Finland, and as such he tried to support his king with an amphibious attack of central Sweden in 1598.^''

" Borjeson & Hafstrom " Arteus 1986, 36. Borjeson & Hafstrom 22-25, 49-53, 73-75.

1949. 1949; SBL 17 (Gyllenaiickar), 20 (Juusten); Zettersten

1890,

626

CHAPTER SEVEN

During the 1590s, the demand for men commanding major saiHng warships at sea was much larger than in the two preceding decades Around 100 men are on record to have served as skeppshdvitsman or hapten (captain), which became the normal title in this decade. This title had been used by Duke Karl for his sea officers since at least 1581, and its introduction in the na.vy iTia.y be a sign of that he gciined control of it." Most of the captains in this period are only known to have served once or a few times, although the gaps in the sources from this decade make it probable that several of them served for longer periods. Hiere is no doubt that there was a break in the continuity, however. It was caused by the political upheavals which led to some captains loyal to the king to leave service after the civil war and to many new men being commissioned as captains by Duke Karl. Some sea officers are known to have changed sides once the duke had won. Because the duke had a large mercantile marine of his own up to 1598, it is probable that he had several loyal men suitable as captains. His senior admiral, Joakim Scheel, and the future admirals Johan Derfelt and Soffi-ing Jonsson had that background, as had probably Scheel's nephew Jakob Gottberg, who also became an admiral.^"^ By 1598, Duke Karl had a cadre of sea officers loyal to him. Thirtytwo men are listed on the warships which served him during the decisive year of the civil war.'" Thereafter, up to 1611, the navy had an increasing number of ships in commission and required many captains. Between 1599 and 1611, 151 captains are recorded, although most of them served only briefly. Of these, 45 were foreigners, 20 were born as Swedish noblemen, one was ennobled and 85 were (and remained) Swedish commoners. The high proportion of foreigners (Englishmen, Scots, Dutchmen, and Germans) was a new phenomenon that began in the 1590s and was closely connected with Duke Karl's rise to power."®* The foreigners presumably had experience of the sea, but little is known about their previous careers. The immigration of officers was a part of the Western European influence, which in this period began to change Swedish naval shipbuilding and gun technology.

Zettersten 1890, 88. Borjeson & Hafstrom 1949; Zettersten " SH 52:8, RA. "" Arteus 1986, 50. "

1890, 26-27,

54-60

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

627

Although several men were appointed as commanders of fleets and squadrons from time to time, the core of permanently serving admirals was small. Joakim Scheel commanded the main fleet from 1597 to 1601, while his successor as senior admiral, the riksamiral Axel Ryning, only did it three times. A group of men held command as admiral or deputy admiral repeatedly. From 1599 to 1610, Hans Bielkenstierna (Ryning's nephew) did that no fewer than eleven times; Jakob Gottberg (Scheel's nephew) nine times; Knut Kijl (dead 1603) four times; and Goran Gyllenstierna and Soffring Jonsson six times each.^' Except Gyllenstierna, these men had been close to Duke Karl before and during the civil war. Scheel, Gottberg, and Jonsson can be regarded as career sea officers, and the first two belonged to the category of foreign-born sea officers. Baron Goran Gyllenstierna was different and unusual in that he was an aristocrat who made the navy his career. It is probable that he hoped to gain Karl's favour and to bring his family back to the Council by loyalty and hard work, something which he achieved by 1609. His father had been cautiously loyal to Sigismund until 1598, his three older brothers were in exile in Poland until their deaths, and Karl was at first suspicious of Goran Gyllenstierna.®" Like Bielkenstierna, he became admiral without much practical experience at sea, but once appointed in 1603 he was at sea almost every year. W h e n Gyllenstierna was appointed riksamiral in early 1612, he was, by a wide margin, the most experienced sea officer of the six aristocrats who rose to that position from 1602 to 1664. The reign of Gustav II Adolf saw major and lasting changes in the cadre of sea officers, changes that have sometimes been described as the creation of a permanent officer corps.®' This is misleading, because a cadre of men serving more or less permanently had indeed existed since the 1560s, and the changes towards "weberian" professionalism may have started earlier and certainly was completed much later in the 17th century. Nevertheless, the position of sea officers as well as army officers became better defined and more specialised in the state, and a formalisation of careers and chains of c o m m a n d took place. The number of men who only briefly served as sea officers declined, while the

Borjeson & Hafstrom 1949; Zettersten SBL 17, Gyllenstierna. Zettersten 1890, 8 9 - 9 0 .

1890, 2 6 - 3 0 , 5 4 - 5 9 , 7 5 - 7 9 .

628

CHAPTER EIGHT

number of men who served permanently increased, and a hierarchy with several ranks was established. The aim, at least from 1620, was to establish a permanent corps of leaders of a size and structure which corresponded to the requirement of a fully mobilised fleet. When not mobilised, many of these officers could be occupied with administrative tasks connected with the permanent organisation of seamen (batsman) which was formed at the same time. Previously, the number of officers in service had been determined by the variable number of active warships and administrative charges suitable for sea officers. Like in the army, the hierarchy of ranks in the navy corresponded to diff"erent functions and responsibilities. Most warships f r o m the 1620s were commanded by two officers, a captain and a lieutenant (the largest had two lieutenants), and the number of captains and lieutenants was thus determined by the number of warships. By 1634, there were 35 captains and 40 lieutenants. These numbers varied somewhat up and down in the 17th century, and from 1650, the lieutenants were divided into a senior and junior grade: dverldjtnant and underldjtnant. In times of major naval war, the number of officers increased, partly because a number of men were given temporary commissions. Shipmasters from the mercantile marine were often given officer's commissions in the war periods 1657-60 and 1675-79, when several large merchantmen were hired as warships, but most of them did not stay after the end of the war. There were exceptions: the shipmaster and shipowner Henning Olofsson, born in Norway, reached flag rank in 1677, was ennobled Ankargrip, and stayed in the navy. Appointments of private masters after that were rare, although Admiral Mikael Henck (1667-1715), a Pomeranian shipmaster who entered naval service in 1696, made a rapid rise to the very top of the hierarchy.®^ The number of peacetime captains and lieutenants remained rather stable, around 75 to 90 from the 1630s to the 1680s. Then a marked increase took place. In 1686, the budget (stat) had 40 captains, 45 senior lieutenants, and 30 junior lieutenants; in 1697 there were 36, 48, and 30 respectively. As a result of the intense war efi'orts in the early 18th century, the numbers again increased to 58, 52, and 37 by 1711. By 1718 no fewer than 346 officers below flag rank were provided for in the budget, but many of them were infantry officers. The number of

Zettersten 1949.

1890, 8 4 - 1 0 4 ; Zettersten

1903, 4 4 - 5 5 , 5 8 9 - 6 3 6 ; Borieson

&

Hafstrom

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

629

sea officers below flag rank after 1721, in spite of the state's financial problems, was not reduced to the earlier level. In 1735, there were around 170 such officers in the budget. Interestingly, this number was regarded as much too low at that time. Partly, this was a result of the restructuring of the navy in the 1710s when a major galley fleet was recreated. Tliese ships required several commanding officers of lower ranks, but from around 1700 there was also a long-term trend to increase the number of officers, and this cannot be explained by the size or structure of the navy.®^ Tlie increased number of officer charges in the late 17th century was closely related to the increase of the navy in terms of ships and seamen, but after 1700, the number continued to increase and manning plans show a marked increase in the number of officers on ships. Battleships usually had two captains and several lieutenants, and a further differentiation of ranks became necessary. A number of captains had been promoted to commodores {kommendor) in the 1670s to mark their seniority in relation to other captains—their wages were unchanged. In the 1710s, the rank hapten was differentiated into kommendor, amiralitetskapten, and skeppskapten, while some senior lieutenants became kaptenldjtnant. The increased number of sea officers, the diff'erentiation of ranks, and the complicated problems of achieving parity in status with army officers, who had a more differentiated rank system since the 1620s, has never been studied. These changes may be the result of new ideas about the role of the officers on ships or of group interests: to increase the number of officer charges to promote career opportunities for officers' sons. Hie end effect in any case was that the number of sea officers grew, as did their formal status in relation to other servants of the state. There are no studies of the structure, national origin, and social composition of the total Swedish sea-officer corps in the 17th and early 18th centuries. It is also uncertain to what degree these structural and social components were different from the Swedish army, for which there are some, but far from complete, studies.®'' In several countries, navies are supposed to have recruited more commoners than the armies, whose officer corps were dominated by the nobility. Sea officers

Zettersten 1903, 4 4 - 5 5 ; Backstrdm 1884, 3 9 0 - 4 3 4 . Lack of officers in t h e 1730s: Svenska Flottans historia, II, 258. For e x a m p l e Klaus-Richard Bohnie, " O f f i c e r s r e k r y t e r i n g e n vid tre l a n d s k a p s r e g e m e n t e n 1626-1682, in Revera & Torstendahl 1979, 2 1 5 - 5 1 .

630

CHAPTER SEVEN

were more comparable to the technical branches of the army, the artillerists and engineers, and just like them, sea officers were often of a less aristocratic origin. A study of men reaching higher ranks in the latter half of the 17th century shows that more flag ofhcers in the navy originally were born as commoners than were generals and colonels.®^ It is not self-evident, however, that this applies to the officers corps in general. Part of the difference may be because most foreigners who reached high ranks in the navy were born commoners, while foreigners who made good careers in the army usually were of noble origin. The Swedish army and navy were attractive for foreigners with ambitions, but the navy attracted Western European mariners while the army attracted German, Livonian, and Scottish noblemen. Tlie Swedish army was, at least up to the mid- 17th century, very large in relation to the Swedish nobility, and many Swedish commoners were recruited as officers. The Swedish navy could not recruit many experienced mariners from a domestic mercantile marine and had to recruit from roughly the same group of men as the army. The social origin of the average Swedish sea officer may have been more similar to that of the average army officer than in other states. Sea officers were typically sons of officers, civil servants, burghers, and priests. In the 17th century, both army and navy were engines of social mobility; many officers were promoted to higher social status than their parents, and many were ennobled. After this initial period of growth, however, the armed forces became to a considerable extent engines for the maintenance of social status, as many officers were sons or nephews of officers. In the period of Imperial expansion, foreigners were actively recruited as sea officers. They were usually men from Western Europe with experience of warfare at sea or trade in dangerous waters with armed merchantmen. In the 1640s and until the mid-1650s, most such foreigners came from the Netherlands, and many of them stayed even when Sweden and the Dutch Republic were at war in 1658-60. In the battle in the Sound against the Dutch fleet in 1658, one squadron commander (Henrik Gerdtsson Sjohjelm) and one of seven junior flag oflicers were Dutch, as were probably eight of 41 captains of major ships. A few of the Swedish-born captains in that battle had also

Cavallie

1981, 151-53.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

631

gained experience in Dutch service.®® Naturally, no new officers could be recruited from the Dutch Republic when it was at war with Sweden, so in 1658-59, several English sea officers were recruited, although most of them left service when peace was concluded in 1660.®^ In the four decades after 1660, when Sweden was normally at peace, several young Swedish sea officers, or men who wished to become sea officers, served in the Western European navies during the great wars involving England, the Dutch Republic, and France. Young officers were also encouraged to gain practice in the Swedish mercantile marine, which grow from insignificance to a considerable level after 1645. It is tempting to believe that men with the ambition to climb socially by means of a career as an officer did their best to get practical training that would gain them an officer's commission and further promotion. It is also probable that such men saw the old habit of giving young noblemen and aristocrats early promotion without much practical training as a part of the conflict among social groups {stdndsstriden) that was particularly intense in the political debate from 1650 to 1680. Too little is known about the subject, however, to make any conclusions. The lack of studies of the average sea officer, those who never became more than captains or lieutenants, makes ft impossible to generalise about their training and experience. It is known from the biographical works, however, that sea officers in the latter half of the 17th century often had served at least a few years as non-commissioned officers before they were appointed lieutenants. By the late 17th century, this had become the typical beginning of an officer career. Men usually served as non-commissioned officers when they were in their late teens or early twenties, they were supposed to learn the profession, and they got a wage while they learned it. Even sons of admirals and aristocrats had to pass through that process, which also became the typical career path in the army. The realities behind this are htde studied. It seems, however, as if men who were commissioned as officers in the late 17th and early 18th centuries usually had at least a basic knowledge of shiphandling, navigation, and gunnery either f r o m the Swedish navy or from service in foreign navies or on merchantmen.

Askgaard 1974, 2 3 9 - 4 0 ; Zettersten 1903, 5 9 8 - 6 3 6 List of 13 w a r s h i p s in t h e S o u n d with the n a t i o n a h t y of its officers, n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers, a n d crew, u n d a t e d b u t f r o m Aug, 1658, E 8561 (Karl G u s t a v W r a n g e l ' s collection), RA. Ailes 2005.

632

C H A P T E R SEVEN

Above the rank of captain, the navy's highest leadership consisted of a small number of flag officers. Gustav II Adolf's navy had surprisingly few admirals until around 1630. It was hardly a result of pohcy. The king seems to have had a genuine problem finding men suitable for higher naval commands at a time when the growing army also required a large number of new colonels and several generals. The early deaths of riksamiral Goran Gyllenstierna (1618) and his deputy Hans Bielkenstierna (1620), followed in 1622 by the deaths of their younger brothers admirals Nils Gyllenstierna and Nils Bielkenstierna, probably upset the king's plans for developing naval leadership. These four men had both high social positions and much experience, and the two younger men had served several years as captain at sea before they became admirals. The Scotsman Rickard Clerck served as admiral at sea for some years, but from 1615 he was responsible for the navy's outfitting. In 1620, Gustav II Adolf attempted to organise his navy and its personnel into five "fleets", with a hierarchy of officers. He appointed his half brother Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm to riksamiral, while five men—three experienced sea officers and two aristocratic cavalry officers—were appointed to vice admirals, in charge of one fleet each. Within a few years, four of these men were either dead or transferred to other leading positions in the state. They were not replaced, and only one of the aristocrats, Klas Larsson Fleming, remained. He soon became the most central person in the navy, even though he never had been at sea before 1620. For several years, he and Gyllenhielm were the only permanently serving admirals who both commanded the operational fleet in summers and supervised administration in winters. From 1628 to 1630, this situation rapidly changed. A number of experienced captains were appointed to more senior positions, and an aristocratic colonel, Erik Ryning, was transferred from the army and appointed admiral. Permanent charges as vice admiral and major (the equivalent of rear admiral) were established, and a cadre of flag officers, sufficient to command a large fleet, was established. By 1634, there were, apart from the admiral in charge of the Stockholm shipyard (the holmamiral), one riksamiral, two admirals and members of the Council, three vice admirals, and three majors. These nine charges at three difl^erent levels correspond to the three squadrons into which the navy's warships were permanently divided at the same time. In theory, the riksamiral should command the fleet and the first squadron, the other two admirals the second and third squadrons, and the

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

633

vice admirals and majors should be second and third in command in each squadron.®^® In practice, however, the navy was seldom commanded exactly after this model (it was in 1689 and 1700), but the number of flag officers remained at around this level in the 17th and 18th centuries. The number tended to grow in wartime but remained at around ten in peacetime, even after 1721. The appointment to the senior positions of flag officers and also as administrative leaders and policy-makers in the 17th and early 18th centuries is discussed in chapter 4. The most senior positions as riksamiral and admirals who also had a seat in the Council remained reserved for the aristocracy until the 1670s, and some of them were appointed to that office with little or no previous career in the navy. Positions as vice admirals (called admiral-lieutenants from the 1640s to 1679) and majors (from 1679 called schoutbynachts) were normally filled with men with a successful career as lieutenants and captains. A few vice admirals and majors were also promoted to admiral rank, but outside the Council they were not influential as policy-makers. Several of these men were originally commoners, while others came from the lower nobility. Several were of foreign origin, noble or nonnoble. This group included six members of the Scottish Clerck family (two of them born in Sweden), the Scotsman Simon Stewart, the Dane S6fi!"ring Hansson, the Dutchmen Marten Thijssen Ankarhjelm, his son Adrian, and his daughter's son Marten Ankarhjelm as well as Henrik Gerdtsson Sjohjelm and Tonnes Speck, the German Peter Blume, and the Courlander Johan Bar.®' After the disasters at sea in 1675-77, no more aristocrats without a genuine background as junior sea officers reached flag rank. The admiral-general Hans Wachtmeister was the last of this type of admiral, but he was a friend to the king, not a member of the old aristocracy. He led the poHtical vendetta against the old aristocracy in 1680, with the support of officers and civil servants with a professional background. Count Klas Sparre, who was the highest ranked sea officer {dveramiral) at the end of the Great Nordic War, belonged to a junior branch of

The s a m e s t r u c t u r e of n i n e flag officers of t h r e e different ranks, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to three s q u a d r o n s in t h e m a i n fleet, developed in t h e English n a v y in t h e latter half of the 17th century. It r e m a i n e d fixed until t h e n i i d - 1 8 t h century, '' Zettersten 1903,589-636; Cavallie 1981; Einarsson 1986. The F r e n c h m a n A b r a h a m D u q u e s n e served as m a j o r 1 6 4 4 - 4 7 a n d later b e c a m e a f a m o u s F r e n c h admiral. The Englishmen G e o r g e Ayscue a n d O w e n C o x served in flag r a n k 1658-1660. These m e n served only t e m p o r a r i l y in t h e Sweden navy for o n e war, n o t f o r a career.

634

CHAPTER SEVEN

an aristocratic family, and his father was a vice admiral. That certainly favoured his career, but he had passed through the ranks as a non-commissioned officer, had served six wartime years in the Dutch navy, and was known as a competent commander at sea and interested in international trends in naval architecture. Spar re s weakness was administration and formalities, which even led to his presiding in the Amiralitetskollegium for several years without a proper appointment to that position. He was removed from this position by a revolt from the admirals and a decision by the Parliament in 1727. Later in the 18th century, his two sons reached the same position. He was succeeded by Baron Karl Hans Wachtmeister, admiral-general Hans Wachtmeister's nephew, who died in 1731. Wachtmeister's successor was Baron Evert Taube, son of an admiral and, like Wachtmeister, a member of a Livonian noble family. In 1734, Baron Gustaf von Psilander was appointed president in Amiralitetskollegium, the first m a n born as a commoner to reach the top position in the navy. He was the son of a middle-rank administrator and member of a family which, in the 18th century, produced several flag officers and senior naval administrators. Sparre, Wachtmeister, Taube, and Psilander were men of widely different social origins, but they had all been professionally trained and served long careers at sea in relatively similar career paths. The navy had become a social structure in itself, into which young men might enter, develop competence, use family contacts, and make a career.'" At least four 17th-century flag officers started as c o m m o n seamen or gunners: Admiral Johan Berg (ennobled Bergenstierna), vice admirals Lars Bubb (Roderskjold) and Lars Mattsson (Strusshjelm), and Major Olof Berg. They were appointed to flag rank from the 1630s to the 1670s, the years when privileged access to high offices for the nobility was formally at its peak. Their social backgrounds and career paths (as far as they are known) make it probable that they were men who had aimed for careers as non-commissioned officers. They were promoted to officers when they showed skill as leaders, and once they reached officer status they were apparently promoted to flag rank without being handicapped by their social background. Careers from the bottom to the top were very rare after this period, when officer famihes had a marked advantage in getting officer commissions for

Amiralitetskollegiets Jan Glete.

historia,

II, esp. 161-66; SBL 29, b i o g r a p h y of Psilander by

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

635

their sons. Hie tentative (perhaps provocative) conclusion is that a navy lead by aristocrats might be open to very marked social rise of a few? individuals with unusual abilities, because it did not threaten privileges of the aristocracy. The 18th-century officer corps, dominated by professional career officers, family networks among officer families, and rules of seniority, seems more closed to non-commissioned officers and to rapid promotion in general."

8.4

Provisioning and health

In recent decades, the logistical aspects of military and naval operations have been more studied by historians, and their central role in strategy and operations is increasingly understood to have been important or decisive. In the early modern period, provisioning was the most important part of army and navy logistics. Hie quality of provisioning was also important for health conditions. Organisational capability to raise, concentrate, and move large quantities of food was necessary for large armies and navies in the early modern period. This capability could either be organised by the state or hired on the market, where private entrepreneurs might buy food and distribute it to military units and ships. Because food was a major commodity on the market, merchants might have special competence to find, store, and transport food. A general ability to plan provisioning is essential for any state fighting a major war.'^ Provisioning of armies and fleets required different capabilities. Armies might buy or requisition local resources, at least in fertile regions, but no operational fleet could be successful unless the navy had a good organisation for its provisioning. A fleet, in contrast to a mobile army, could not be provisioned day by day by supply from local resources or magazines. Naval operations required that months of provisions, preserved and stored in a proper way, be concentrated

" This is based o n o b s e r v a t i o n s in Zettersten 1903,589-636; CavalUe 1981; Einarsson 1986; Borjeson 1942. For example, M a r t i n V a n Creveld, Supplying War: Military logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, C a m b r i d g e , 1977; J o h n Lynn (ed.), Feeding Mars: Logistics in western warfare from the Middle Ages to the present. Boulder, 1993; Olof v a n N i m w e g e n , De subsistentie van het leger, A m s t e r d a m , 1995; C h r i s t i a n Buchet, Marine, economie et societe, un example d'interaction: I'Avitaillement de la Royal Navy durant la guerre de sept ans, Paris, 1999.

636

CHAPTER SEVEN

to a port and brought on board the ships before the fleet could sail. Because early modern naval operations often started in spring, provisioning must be organised at the very time when much of last year's harvest had already been consumed. Re-supply of an operational fleet far from its base required either long transport at sea or local purchase of food from neutral or allied territories. Planning, timing, and ability to coordinate the supply of several types of food to one port were essential. Many famous naval heroes probably spent much of their time organising the food supply that would keep their men healthy and happy. The Swedish 16th- and 17th-century administrative system for naval and military provisioning has not been much studied. The army has generally been supposed to have lived off local resources, which is largely correct for operations in Poland, Germany, and Denmark but not for operations in Finland, the eastern Baltic, and the border regions to Denmark and Norway.'^ It is also well known that the early modern Swedish tax system consisted, to a large extent, of taxes in food paid by the peasant. In the 16th century, these taxes appear to have been the main source of provisioning for both the army and the navy, especially because much extra taxation for war was in the form of provision taxes {kostgdrder, skeppsgarder). Men and women serving the king on castles and royal manors took part in food processing for the navy, typically brewing and baking. In the 17th and 18th centuries, merchants had a more important role as intermediates between the local markets and the state, but the literature gives only brief information about how the supply system was organised and how the taxes in kind were used in wartime. It is known, however, that taxes in food still were important for a war within Sweden in 1676-79.'''' The early Vasa monarchy and its extensive administrative system for local taxes paid in kind, and the storing, processing, and distribution of food to the army and navy, has left a rich, possibly unique, inheritance of sources about provisioning in the 16th and early 17th centuries. It has hardly been studied as such. Traditionally, taxes in kind were regarded as primitive and a sign of that Sweden had a backward medieval system. Studies in the 1950s and 1960s by Ingrid Hammarstrom and Birgitta Oden demolished this idea. The tax system was an inno-

Lindegren, Karl XII, 197-208; Kuvaja Fredriksson 1976.

1999; Hardstedt

2002.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

637

vation which around 1540 replaced a normal European monetary tax system. It made the king the dominant food merchant in Sweden, an enterprise that at least Gustav I genuinely enjoyed running. His efforts to develop a strong local administration were the same as the creation of a large organisation to acquire and process food. This taxation system also supplied the Vasa state with what it required for military and naval operations: food. For large-scale military and naval operations in the 16th-century, the Swedish market had no structures to enable it to supply several thousand m e n concentrated on warships or in a limited region in the Baltic. It is possible to interpret the Vasa provisioning system as a state-administrated organisation for acquiring provisions for the military and naval organisations which were created around the same time. The king became able not only to pay but also to feed armed men if they followed his operational orders, and he became less dependent on food supply to soldiers and seamen organised by the local peasant society. Organised supply of food for armed men was a powerful instrument for controlling violence, and the ability to feed more or less conscripted soldiers and seamen with adequate rations of food might make it easier to keep them loyal, willing to fight, and less interested in deserting. If seen from an entrepreneurial and organisational perspective, the Vasa tax and provisioning system is strikingly modern; it created those capabilities which were necessary to wage war on a larger scale than previously and to project power across the Baltic. More comparative studies are required if we are to find out to what extent the Vasa state was ahead of its time in organisational capabilities to concentrate and move resource flows for warfare.^' What is known, however, is that this Swedish state with its army, navy, and provisioning system went out to create an empire around the Baltic Sea. The provisioning of the navy was a central part of the system only during total mobilisation of an operational fleet. In other war periods, especially in 1570-83, 1590-95, 1600-10, and the 1620s, it was mainly used by the army, while the navy was used to transport food to the operational army. Naval provisioning in the war 1534-36 seems to have worked, despite lack of experience, but there are few

This brief outline has its e m p i r i c a l base in Hammarstrom 1956, Oden 1966, a n d Hallenberg 2001, a n d in t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s in Oden 1967, Hallenberg 2002, a n d Hallenberg 2005.

638

CHAPTER SEVEN

sources to study. Logistics of the army and navy in Finland in the war against Russia 1555-56 was a full-scale test, because much food had to be sent from Sweden to the war zone. Various problems were revealed, but on the whole the royal administration was able to move far larger Swedish forces than ever before from one part of the realm to another."^ n i e Seven Years War, 1563-70, tested the system's ability to feed a navy with up to 8,000 men from spring to autumn. Again, there were initial problems but also a marked success, possibly culminating in summer 1566 when the operational fleet was resupplied in nine days.'^ The navy used many small ships {fetalieskepp) to transport provisions from various parts of Sweden to the navy, an organisation which seems to have been developed to a high degree of efficiency. The war against Denmark in 1611-12 was plagued by administrative insufficiency, but there are few signs that provisioning of the fleet was deficient. The years 1621-31 were dominated by large-scale amphibious warfare which demanded that most or all warships be mobilised every year and that a large number of soldiers be transported by the fleet and also fed. The provisioning system was strained but worked. Logistics and provisioning in subsequent wars in the Baltic region have been littie studied, but it seems as if the market for large-scale food supply and food processing had improved considerably. Tliere was a temporary crisis in summer 1644, when the main fleet should be supplied from the Kiel region, a theatre of war for two armies, but otherwise the lack of provisions is seldom conspicuous as a problem or cause of failures.'® Tlie fact that a larger number of m e n served in the navy in each war from the early 17th to the early 18th century is in itself proof of a growing capability to organise provisioning. Merchants were increasingly used to buy food for the navy, but a fullscale entrepreneurial system for naval provisioning seems only to have existed in Karlskrona from 1716 to 1718, on the initiative of Karl XIL It does not seem to have worked well, mainly because it was starved of cash, due to the critical situation for the state's finances.'' Stocldiolm grew in the 17th century to a city of 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants. They had to be fed by the market, and the city's supply

Viljanti 1957. Sddeiiind 2006, 150-59. SoderUnd 2006, 159^68. " Naval p r o v i s i o n i n g in 1700-21: Cavallie toria, II, 8 4 - 8 5 , 106-07. "

1975, 199-202; Amiralitetskollegiets

his-

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

639

system must have been better suited to support the navy's need of large amounts of food than the small 16th- and early 17th-century Stocldiolm. Karlskrona, a smaller city with a smaller regional food production, was less well situated and required organisational support from outside. In 1700, the mobilisation of the main fleet was partly supported by large food deliveries f r o m Stockholm. That could quicldy be arranged, because Stockholm was the administrative and economic centre where the central administration could handle problems if it had financial resources or credit. Hie system seems to have worked until summer 1719, when a severe financial crisis left Karlskrona without enough food to send the main fleet to sea. Similar problems seem to have paralysed the Gothenburg squadron, while the Stockholm squadron at least had food. The change of political system after Karl XII's death temporarily weakened the state's ability to get deliveries on credit, and the navy had no organisational or financial capability of its own to improvise with. These few months of administrative breakdown illustrate how closely related the navy had been to the political will and authority of the dynastic state founded in the 1520s. The state's servants, contractors, and creditors were accustomed to having a powerful and politically capable ruler who sooner or later would find means (usually taxes) to pay them if they did their job and delivered what was required for warfare. When that ruler was gone and the poUtical scene was in turmoil, the navy was temporarily paralysed. Old lessons, that power and control of armed forces is determined by the ability to feed them, were temporarily forgotten. Feeding and rations of food, its nutritional value, and storing and preparation of food on Swedish warships f r o m the 16th to the 18th century have been studied by Ulrica Soderlind. Her results show a marked reduction in the amount of food each m a n was served f r o m the mid-16th century to the early 17th century. This reduction was especially marked in meat and pork. From the mid-17th century, the consumption of fish was also markedly reduced, probably because it was regarded as less suitable. Consumption of bread was unchanged, while cereals, cheese, butter, and vegetables increased, but from a very low level. Unless waste was dramatically higher in the 16th century than in the 17th century, the crews of the early Vasa warships were very well fed. The same opulence is known from the king's tables for his servants in castles and manors on land. It is uncertain whether this is a result of 16th-century Swedes having a higher consumption of

640

CHAPTER SEVEN

food than in later centuries or whether the king simply served much food in order to attract servants, soldiers, and s e a m e n . P e r h a p s the development is related to an increased population or to a colder climate. Changes in political conditions, which made it possible for the state to ask the population for more in exchange for less, cannot be excluded. There are no studies of other navies before the 18th century that can be used for comparison, but Swedish sources show that the 17thcentury Swedish crews were fed to a markedly lower standard than contemporary Dutch crews. The crews of hired Dutch ships in 1644 could not be fed to Swedish standard and to feed them with food of the quality and quantity they were used to was very costly. It was likely to provide healthier crews, however. In 1630, Axel Oxenstierna experimented in Prussia, where he had two warships with mixed Dutch and Swedish crews serving from May to November. He fed the Swedish seamen to the same standard as the Dutch and found that it drastically improved the health of the Swedish crew and made the men serve better."" This did not change the standard rations, however. It seems as if the state saw the high cost of providing adequate food as prohibitive and saw health problems as unavoidable. Provisioning in the Swedish navy was typically for two months. Soderlind's calculation of the amount of food which could be stored in the hold of Vasen (1628) shows that two months was roughly what a warship could load if it was manned with 0.30 to 0.35 m a n per tonnes displacement. This was the normal manning level in the 17th century. Sixteenth-century warships with higher manning levels (around 0.5 man per tonnes was common in the 1560s) and with more food served to each m a n ought logically to have had less ability to stay at sea. It is nevertheless known that the main fleet could be on expedition for two months without known contact with a Swedish port (summer 1565). The main fleet could be kept operational for even longer periods without a return to Stockholm, but it was then apparently reprovisioned in Kalmar or at sea.'"^

Sdderlind 2006; Ulrica Soderlind, "Fish c o n s u m p t i o n a b o a r d Swedish warships d u r i n g t h e s e v e n t e e n t h century", Studia Atlantica, 8, 2006; Esbjerg, 153-64; Uh'ica S o d e r h n d , "Diet o n b o a r d t h e Swedish royal w a r s h i p Vasa", in Kersten Kriiger and Carl Olof C e d e r l u n d (eds), Maritime Archdologie heute, Rostock, 2002, 3 1 3 - 2 2 . "» AOSB 1:7, 338. Sdderlind 2006, 150-59, 194-201.

A PEASANT SOCIETY AT SEA

641

Epidemics and illness caused by nutrition failures were the great problems which restricted or destroyed even well planned and well financed operations throughout the early modern period. Studies of this problem have only begun, in Sweden as elsewhere, and it is complicated to study even when considerable sources exist.'"' Death and injury by accidents and fighting are easy to explain, but most men at sea became ill and died for at least two other reasons. They were exposed to bacteriological shocks when many men from different environments were brought on the same ship where they lived under extremely cramped conditions. They also were often inadequately fed, the food lacked essential components, such as vitamin C, and the food and water became contaminated and spread diseases if stored too long or if badly preserved. These causes of illness and death usually interacted with one another and are difficult to separate. In the Swedish navy, the manning system was likely to be vulnerable to epidemics. Men from many local communities were brought together on the same ship and exposed to bacteria to which they had no immunity. They were also exposed to epidemics from foreign countries when they were on a fleet operating in the Baltic Sea, especially if it cooperated with an army on land. The results are easy to observe in several wars when large-scale epidemics more or less paralysed the fleet during the second year of the war, especially 1711, 1742, and 1789. The situation markedly improved during the third year. The problem seems not to have been so severe in earlier wars, but systematic comparisons do not exist. Diseases caused by malnutrition ought to be possible to observe, because they were much less variable in intensity than epidemics, and contemporary observers were aware that food was inadequate. Studies of this problem require a combination of knowledge about naval manning, nutrition, and epidemiology, but they are likely to increase our understanding of how costly early modern warfare was in terms of h u m a n suffering and of how high a h u m a n sacrifice a state was willing to make to fulfil its policy.'"'*

Soderlind 2006, The 1746 French naval considerable literature Glete 1990-1991,

168-89; James S. P r i t c h a r d , The Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: expedition to North America, M o n t r e a l , 1995. Tliere is also a a b o u t scurvy a n d v i t a m i n C. 4 1 - 5 1 ; Glete 1992, 110-74.

642

C H A P T E R SEVEN

8.5

A peasant society goes to sea

Early modern Sweden was a sparsely populated peasant society in an agriculturally marginal part of Europe. It had long coasts, and a considerable part of the population used the sea for fishing and transportation, but only in a coastal and archipelagic environment. Sweden was not a maritime country with long-distance shipping and private entrepreneurs; with shipmasters and seamen accustomed to fit out and sail in large ships. Maritime interest groups had no influence on Swedish naval policy, nor could they do anything to support it. Swedish naval power was shaped by dynastic policy, and organisational capabilities formed to support that policy. These capabilities had to be strong, because the state had to organise resources which essentially were non-maritime, and they were different from those used in maritime societies to bring fleets to sea. The most essential organisational capability without doubt was the state's close control and detailed knowledge of the Swedish peasant society. The state knew where resources of men and food were, and it knew how to take control of these resources and channel them to purposes which suited its policy. For naval power, this led to recruitment among the coastal population to man the ships; taxes raised in kind were used to provision operational fleets; and, especially from the 1560s to the 1610s, peasants were used for timber transports and unskilled work in naval shipbuilding. The very successful mobilisation of men and provisions in the 1560s was made at a time when the state had saved cash to spend. Cash would have been useless, however, had the new Vasa state not formed capabilities to find and effectively use resources on a much larger scale than earlier. The early Vasa state did not create a permanent manning organisation sufficient to m a n the whole fleet. Perhaps it should rather be expressed in this way: the fleet of warships after the 1560s was much larger than the considerable manning organisation which existed. The early 17th-century solution to the problem—to leave much of the unskilled work on warships to conscripted soldiers—was apparently a stopgap measure which eventually became permanent. The state had other pressing commitments, especially to organise a growing army. The state had an adequate system to feed the crews of its navy, however, which was an important capability for operational efficiency. Prom the 1620s, a systematic organisation of the peasant society's resources to provide men to the navy began. It was basically similar to the system developed for the permanent national army, and the ter-

A P E A S A N T SOCIETY AT SEA

643

ritorial resource base was gradually divided between army and na\'y with bureaucratic precision. From the 1630s, the navy had a permanent peacetime manning organisation formed by the obligation of the coastal population and the towns to provide the navy with men. Hie strength of this manning system was that it supplied a pre-arranged number of men on whom the navy could rely on for most of the unskilled tasks on warships at any time. It was largely up to the navy to provide them with those experiences of life at sea which would make them useful. Tlie state must create the seaman skills and the leadership which a navy requires to be efficient. It could not be found in a largely nonmaritime country. The state predominantly did so by hiring leaders and men who were given opportunities to develop their competence in the service of the navy. This process is far from sufficiently investigated, but the method was to create incentives to social rise and, especially later, a framework of reproduction of established positions in society. Men were rewarded if they developed skills useful for the navy, foreigners with the necessary skills were induced to immigrate, and the mature corps of officers gave preference to sons of officers. It is probable that the same mechanisms were at work at lower levels, but little is known about it. Hie early cadre of professional and specialised naval leaders was the non-commissioned officers. Officers were originally primarily general leaders who were supposed to control and command men in combat and during operations at sea. Several of those who stayed in service when the main fleet was demobilised served in administrative tasks, while others served for long periods in other positions as managers and leaders in the service of the state. From the perspective of the state, it was supremely important that it had good leaders who were used to the sea and who understood how to make speciaHst officers and skilled and unskilled men work for the state. The state did not systematically train specialised sea officers in this period. The ideal that sea officers should be professional seamen appeared only in the 17th century and may have had its origin in competition among men for promotion and social rise. It was only f r o m the 1620s that the navy permanently employed sufficient officers to provide leadership of all ships in a fully mobilised navy. That was early, however, in a European perspective. The navy did employ a cadre of skilled seamen early on, to provide at least a m i n i m u m level of such men for a fully mobilised fleet. The manning problems during the great expansion of the fleet in the

r 644

C H A P T E R SEVEN

1560s could be solved with surprising ease, probably because it started with a rich state which could pay its men promptly and which already had a cadre of skilled men. It is probable that a nucleus of such men was maintained after 1570, but little is known about it. In the 1620s, a permanent cadre of skilled seamen was hired but was found to be expensive. It seems as if the navy, to a considerable degree, relied on foreign and Swedish mercantile seamen who served short terms in the navy when it was mobilised. Tlie reforms in the late 17th and early 18th centuries formed three different systems to provide skilled men: permanently hired, temporarily hired, and enrolled. Tliese men were easier to find than they had been previously, because Sweden now had considerable domestic shipping with many seamen. Hie most severe test of the navy's manning system was the long Great Nordic War. The manning system used in this war was found to be sufficient for Swedish naval requirements and was retained until the end of the sailing warship epoch.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION POWER T H R O U G H ORGANISATION

Instead of well-trained soldiers, great ships, guns and weapons, seamen and others to protect the Realm in dangerous times, there were only a few (armed) men, some skerry-boats and other useless measures... Merchants, who should supply the Realm with salt, hops, cloth and other necessities, had ships and goods plundered, the men were thrown over board and drowned like d o g s . . . I h e enemies m a d e great damage to poor men living in the archipelago... preventing their fishing, stealing their cattle, burning their houses, and drowning them like dogs if they found them hiding in the rocks. Also, in Finland, Abo, Raumo, Ulvsby and other t o w n s . . . suffered f r o m plunder, m u r d e r and arson; that is well remembered, this is also an old custom.' King Gustav I to the Swedish peasants, 30 December 1542, describing Sweden's military-political situation before his regime. The d o m i n i u m of the Baltic Sea, which since time immemorial has belonged to the Crown of Sweden.. A declaration about Swedish foreign policy, made by a parliamentary committee, January 1628.

1 GR 14, 395-96 (30/12 1542). H i e Swedish text: Jher man i then stad, som nu Miles drdpeligt Krigzfolk, Skone skep, bosser och warier, bdssmdn och annet, som Rijkitt til beskerm for noden dr, holt man ganska ringa folk. Item en hop Skdriebater och annet prackeri... Kopmdnnene som Rijket tilfdre skulle, Salt, humhla, Cldde och andra nodtorfter, til Rijkzens uppehdlle, blefwe rofwede til skip och godz, folket kastades dfwer bord, och drenchtes som hundar,... item, hwad skada fienderne giorde pa the fattige man som sate i Skdriegarden... forhindrandes them theres fiske, bort tagandes theres boskap, vpbrennendes husen, thess:tt hwar the them vti hafklipperne bekomme, worde the td drenchte som hundar. Item hure thett tilgick i Finland, med Abo stad, Rawmo och Ulfsby och flere the Stdder... med Rof mord och brand ( ) thett minnes man och wall, sadant dr och en gammal sedwane. ^ Sveriges krig. III, 133. The Swedish text: Ostersjons herraddme som afheedenhoos under Sveriges crono hordt och lydt hafver.

646

CHAPTER SEVEN

9.1

Interest aggregation and organisational

capabilities

In late 1542, King Gustav I issued a proclamation to the peasants in several Swedish provinces. It was probably to be read by his bailiffs at winter markets and used by men loyal to the king when they argued about the great peasant rebellion in Smaland led by Nils Dacke. Gustav's regime was under serious threat. The rebels demanded a return to old customs, with low taxes and the traditional religion with beautiful decorations in the church. As an answer to this, the king listed other old customs, which had been eliminated by the armed forces he had formed with increased taxes and confiscated church property. They included Danish blockade of Swedish trade, attacks on Swedish coasts and coastal towns, and plunder and murder of peasants and fishers. These had been a reality only a few decades ago, and within living memory of most Swedes. The king defended his policies of making guns from church-bells and raising taxes to keep armed men and great warships in peacetime. He had to explain the innovative connection between resource extraction and the benefit of protection provided by resources under his control. King Gustav won the contest with the peasant rebels by military means, but also with political persuasion, which made most Swedish peasants remain calm or even send men to support his cause. Eighty-five years later, a parliamentary committee elected by the four estates declared that the right to control the Baltic Sea had belonged to the Crown of Sweden since time immemorial. This text was probably written by Gustav II Adolf.' It was endorsed, however, by the estates at a time when nascent Habsburg naval power and a possible breakdown of Danish power in the southern Baltic exposed Sweden to the military might of the German Emperor, the German Catholic League, and the Spanish Monarchy in cooperation with Sigismund Vasa in Poland. It expressed the opinion that non-Nordic naval power in the Baltic Sea was an intoleraljle threat and that Parliament was ready to go to war to eliminate it. It meant support for an ambitious naval policy and eventually an invasion of Germany, which would be far more costly for the taxpayers and far more mortal for conscripted peasants than the rather peaceful policy of Gustav I had ever been.

Ahnlund

1933, 175-76.

CONCLUSION

647

Both Gustav I and his grandson had to motivate increased resource extraction for mihtary and naval purposes. The founder of the dynasty emphasised that his pohcy had achieved peace and security at home. Gustav II Adolf argued that Swedish dominion in the Baltic Sea was an old order which must be upheld, even with offensive means and great sacrifices. Something had happened between the 1540s and the 1620s. The Vasa dynasty's creation of naval power had become an integral part of how Swedish political decision-makers, including the peasants, perceived the power and security situation in Northern Europe. Permanent navies were not normal in early 16th-century Europe, and they were still small in the 1620s. In Sweden, however, naval power had changed from a strange innovation by a new ruler to a part of the rules of the political game. Tlie Vasa state controlled the sea, and all members of the society must support that policy with resources. Naval power made the Baltic Sea a roadblock for continental powers trying to reach Sweden; its absence would make the Baltic a highway for an invasion. The rise of the Swedish fiscal-military state in the 16th and early 17th centuries was the result of two intertwined innovative processes. One process was the growth of a complex organisation which made more efficient use of limited resources for violence-control; the other was the transformation of rules of political interaction which made it possible to transfer resources from society to that organisation. The Swedish ruling dynasty had persuaded the large majority of its subjects, the peasants, to give up resources for a new type of centralised armed forces, administrated and commanded by the king. The most centralised and, for the peasants, most distant and abstract part of these forces was the navy. Infantry and cavalry were visible parts of Swedish rural society, and their weapons and tactics were comprehensible for peasants with militia traditions. In contrast, few peasants understood how a fleet of gun-armed warships operated at sea. In spite of this, they provided the resources necessary to create a large navy. Aristocrats, the lower nobility, and the burghers were also parts of the political process that formed the Swedish state, but for them its rise was a mixture of burdens and opportunities. Career opportunities, access to patronage, political gifts of land and contracts with the state make their participation possible to explain as strategies for power and profit. Officers and bureaucrats were interest groups shaped by the state, and their support of its growth was normal selfinterest. For the great majority of the population, the state offered no

648

C H A P T E R SEVEN

opportunities for profit or social rise. Nevertheless, they sent conscripted men, labour, material resources, and money to the state on a scale that surpassed most other societies in Europe. In this study, the peasants have appeared as timber-cutters and workers on shipyards, as suppliers of transport services, as providers of food, timber, hemp, sailcloth and iron, and as seamen and soldiers serving on the king's warships. Tlie Peasant Estate never formulated anything which looks like a naval policy of their own. Tlieir behaviour is possible to explain in political terms, however. Most Swedish peasants were, in a European perspective, poor and lived close to the subsistence level. Their lives were unpredictable due to weather, disease, and violence. Of these factors, violence was something which could be controlled by rules of h u m a n interaction and organised protection. The new state claimed that it could protect society from both external violence and f r o m violence created by domestic political struggles among the elite. Swedish geography made it credible that control of the sea could keep most foreign threats at a distance and ensure that necessary commodities, primarily salt, could be imported for the peasants. Tlie Vasa state was founded with an unprecedented effort in naval power, and its early wars showed that the naval policy worked surprisingly well. Success usually legitimises policy, and the new naval policy became accepted as useful for keeping foreign powers out of Swedish territory and for ensuring communication with neutral and friendly powers in wartime. Once accepted, the navy could also be used to support offensive warfare around the Baltic. The political and organisational innovations were dependent on each other. Like entrepreneurship in private business, their substance was innovative ways of utilising existing resources by new and more productive combinations. The political innovation was the new rules of interaction among rulers, elites, and the peasant communities. Elites and peasants no longer started tax rebellions against Swedish rulers, nor did they ally with foreign rulers, aristocrats, or merchants, as they had in the times of the Nordic Union, the Catholic Church, and the Hanse networks of trade and power in the Baltic. Swedish domestic politics was now related to the dynastic state, and relations with powers outside Sweden were controlled by that state. Domestic conflicts could be sharp and lasting, but they were normally fought with political means, not with violence. The dynastic state had a monopoly on violence; domestic wars after the Dacke rebellion in 1542-43—the civil

CONCLUSION

649

wars in 1563, 1568, and 1596-99—resulted from conflicts between princes of the Vasa dynasty. No other individual or group even tried to use these opportunities to challenge this dynasty. That would have been normal in earlier centuries, when kings and regents in Sweden usually were deposed by competitors. Tliis was not a coincidence. The other innovation was that the use of armed force had been brought under control of organisational power to which only members of the dynasty had practical and legitimate access. The Vasa family had negotiated a contract with the Swedish society to protect it f r o m foreign threats and domestic disturbances. When the kingdom was made hereditary, the new dynasty was able to fulfil this contract on a long term basis and to make investments in administration and hardware that might outlast one generation of rulers. Uris made it easier to develop specialised organisational capabilities, which could give the state advantages in competitions with other states and power groups. Practical and legitimate access to these capabilities was the key to power. Several members of the dynasty worked hard to keep control of the state's organisational structures. They divided fiscal and military powers into separate chains of control, gathered information about human and material resources in the kingdom, introduced new ideas of how these resources should be combined, developed military and naval technology and tactics, and recruited leaders and an administrative staff loyal to the dynasty. The results were permanent armed forces, logistical support for these forces, and industrial enterprises which provided them with warships, cordage, sails, and weapons. This growth of new organisational capabilities interacted with the transformation of political behaviour. For the aristocracy, the lower nobility, peasants, burghers, priests, and m e n serving the king, relations with the state and what it could offer became more important than relations with regional or international power structures. The new type of state they related to was not a mere agglomeration of resources, which could be used equally well without processing them through its organisation. Instead, the capabilities of the state changed the input of resources into a very different output. This output markedly increased the state's power in competition with other power-holders; and the state's newfound power created a new political agenda, reducing the power of certain actors and increasing that of others, and providing the majority with an alternative which had not existed before.

650

C H A P T E R SEVEN

Hie navy with its large warships, heavy guns, infrastructure for maintenance, large-scale provisioning, and complex manning requirements is the most obvious example of how organisation transformed resources. The Swedish peasant communities and the landed elite could set up military forces for defence on their own, but they could not organise a modern navy. Hie burghers were too few and poor to do it, and few of them had the necessary maritime competence. Tlie king could form a navy if the others supplied him with long-term resources, and the navy provided important groups with better protection and a more predictable life. Hie input was skilled and unskilled labour, leadership, timber, hemp, sailcloth, iron, copper, tin, and food. The output was power at sea anywhere in the Baltic region. Tlie navy was one of the first parts of the new state, but this logic repeated itself in other forms of violence-control and protection. Most socioeconomic interest groups accepted the new state, they negotiated with the king about how it best should be provided with resources, and they tried to make as good a bargain as possible for their own interest. Tlie political support for the dynastic navy was seldom expressed in policy statements and special taxes voted by the Parliament. It was rather expressed in the very absence of debate about its existence or size. The early years of the dynasty's reign saw some resistance and rebellion, and at least the Churchbell Rebellion in the early 1530s was directed against the king's plans to provide his warships with heavy bronze guns. But remarkably soon, the peasants began to support efforts to build naval power. They paid for it through ordinary and extraordinary taxes, and they sent men to serve on warships, just like they sent men to serve in the army. They paid frequent special taxes in food, hemp, and sailcloth for naval purposes; they cut and transported timber for shipbuilding during winters; and they sent m e n to work with naval shipbuilding at several places around the coasts. In the 17th century, these efforts were formalised and centralised by decisions in Parliament and local negotiations that placed the navy's manning system on a permanent footing. In the 16th century, resource transfers often occurred in response to direct royal appeals to local communities for help with concrete problems to be solved: men, provisions, hemp, and sailcloth. These appeals had to be explained with politically acceptable arguments, and the king had to be careful to avoid tax strikes or undermine the loyalty of his taxpayers. The peasant communities usually responded by giving up resources, normally after adjustments had been made to local conditions and after time

CONCLUSION

651

schedules of payment had been negotiated so as to provide the least inconvenience for the peasants. The circumstances around these negotiations and the extent to which the extra taxes were paid remain to be studied. Taxes for the purpose of raising or supporting a navy were a radical break with the non-maritime past, so they provide an interesting example of how society reacts to innovations. This continuous and large-scale transfer of resources from society to the state is proof of important changes in the rules of the political game in Sweden. Rather than trying to solve protection and violencecontrol on their own, several interests aggregated their demand for protection behind the state. After the mid-16th century, no powerful group openly questioned the usefulness of the state's new capabilities. Tlie state had increased predictability, improved protection, and created new markets for certain products and labour. The power of the state was established; the power over the state and the resources, which it organised, became a political issue. There were deep conflicts over inequalities in taxes and career opportunities among aristocrats, career officers and bureaucrats, and the lower estates, but the temporary solution of these conflicts in 1680 led to a markedly better financed state, able to fight even more intense wars.

9.2 The dynamics of complex organisations and changing institutions The historical debate about motives behind Swedish state formation and imperial expansion has traditionally been concentrated in geostrategy, trade, and political ability to extract resources f r o m Swedish peasants. Such explanations emphasise unusual features in the Swedish experience rather than more general explanations of European transformation. Explanations of European state formation and warfare have been provided by historical sociologists, who usually regard the state as the outcome of negotiations between rulers and elites about resources for war (Charles Tilly) and its character as determined by political and administrative experiences (Thomas Ertman) or socioeconomic structures (Tilly). Historians who study war and early modern states have, in recent decades, been intensely engaged in debates about a "Military Revolution" (Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker, Jeremy Black, and others), which either is seen as an explanation for political change or as a result of such change. Much of this debate is about the art of war and

652

C H A P T E R SEVEN

military technology rather than state formation, and Sweden primarily appears as a possible pioneer in new military tactics. Hiis study is not a comprehensive survey of all aspects of Swedish state formation. It is a case study of how the long-term organisational capabilities for warfare at sea were developed by an early modern state in a non-maritime society. It also emphasises that resource extraction to the navy was related to changing rules of political interaction (institutions), changes which can be observed in how elite groups, estates, and local society responded to various demands from the state. These results are intended as empirical building blocks to support a general explanation of early modern European state formation, focused on growth of organisational capabilities and change in rules of interaction. These two processes interacted, and together they created a dynamic process which, over just a few centuries, transformed relations between state and society in Europe. Early modern European state formation was essentially the growth of fiscal and military structures and capabilities. These made it possible to organise protection of wide territories in a centralised form and sell this innovative product to many taxpayers (Frederic C. Lane). A number of state-controlled enterprises in protection-selling developed new organisational capabilities to use and control violence, and they searched for customers to protect. When these capabilities had achieved their original purpose (typically, control of a territory or a regional sea), the state frequently had surplus capacity to protect other customers. Organisational growth is often a result of the fact that unused capabilities make it tempting to expand to new markets, especially if competitors are perceived as weak (Edith T. Penrose). Similarly, early modern European state formation went hand in hand with changes in borders, with the rise and decline of the international power of various states, and with the formation and dissolution of empires and conglomerates under one ruler. International politics and wars were often caused by the uneven growth of organisational capabilities in different states and the convulsions created by different changes in rules of interaction in several societies. If seen in this perspective, Swedish state formation and the rise and fall of the Swedish Baltic empire were normal parts of a general European phenomenon. They may be studied as an early case of growth of a fiscal-military state and rapid changes in rules of political interaction which favoured centralisation of control of violence. They do not require any special macro-level explanations related to Sweden

CONCLUSION

653

or the Baltic, to security policy or trade. Both Nordic and non-Nordic historians have often searched for such explanations rather than applying more general theories. Sweden was a rather normal case of a European fiscal-military state, but it was an unusually early case. It is necessary to study growing organisational capabilities and changing political institutions on the micro- and meso-levels (local society and state) if the importance of the transformation should be fully understood. Tlie long and uneven process which transformed Europe is impossible to understand without studies of how and why rulers, elites, and c o m m o n men acted and reacted to the threats and opportunities they saw around them. Events and individuals may have been rather unimportant on the European macro-level, but certainly not on the micro-level. Hie creation of an innovative state during a formative period of crisis and change gave the Vasa dynasty the opportunity to enforce changes in the rules of political interaction, primarily because the dynasty effectively showed that organisation worked. This new type of state achieved credibility as protector and upholder of political stability, and this gradually made peasants and aristocrats ready to accept and support it rather than risk a new period of uncertainty and domestic violence, which had been typical in the preceding century. This support for new organisational capabilities provided resources which made it possible for the Vasas to act offensively in the Baltic. This policy led to long wars and increased demands for resources from taxpayers, who paid in the hope of avoiding a political breakdown that might have unpredictable consequences. Control of the sea and occupation of foreign territory, however, also provided an increasing flow of foreign resources, which were channelled into the organisation for war. The core competence of the state was to convert external resources into capability for war on land and at sea, and as long as no coalition of competent competitors appeared, it continued to grow, conquer, and gain control of more resources. If the dynamic interaction of organisational growth and institutional change is used to explain the Swedish experience, it is important to study other factors which traditionally have been used to explain it. Baltic geostrategy, toll f r o m international trade, the power and ambitions of Sweden's neighbours, and the elites' ambitions to extract resources from peasants are important as threats and opportunities which shaped political action.

654

C H A P T E R SEVEN

From the perspective of an ambitious ruling dynasty, allied with Swedish elite groups, the Baltic was primarily a region that presented opportunities. A considerably smaller Swedish fiscal-military state would have been sufficient to defend the old borders of the realm. Tlie dynamics of Swedish expansionism was created by the early and marked success of organisational growth and institutional change in the early decades of the dynastic state. When an international power game started in the Baltic in the mid-16th century, the new Swedish state had much unused capacity for armed conflict and power projection to put into that game. When this led to long wars with major powers, the dynamic interaction between organisational growth and institutional change intensified. Rather than breaking under the strain of very long wars, the Swedish state became stronger, it developed more sophisticated capabilities to defeat enemies, and it was able to intensify and rationalise resource extraction from society. Society developed and changed economically in order to accommodate the bulk of the strong fiscal-military state, and political institutions changed in order to make large-scale resource extraction more predictable and endurable. The timing of the changes of political institutions remains to be investigated, but there is no doubt that a major change took place. By the early 17th century, the idea of a smaller and less ambitious state was not on the agenda of any political interest group in Sweden. They had been accustomed to living in a strong military, naval, and imperial power and were prepared to pay for upholding it against real or imagined threats. W h e n Sweden's position as an imperial power in the 1670s was threatened by neighbours who by then also had developed strong fiscal-military states, the Swedish political system reacted with a major transfer of power over resources and decision-making to the dynastic state. For a time this restored the Swedish dominance in Northern Europe. The process of adapting ambitions and expectations to a new environment, in which Sweden was a less powerful state, was long and painful and lasted almost a century after 1721.

9.3

Resource flows and new capabilities for war

The transformation of the Swedish armed forces was a protracted and uneven process, and it took a century for them to full maturity. It was an early case of a European fiscal-military state, and there were few models to follow. Technology as such cannot be identified as a driving

CONCLUSION

655

force, but technical hardware (ships, guns) in an organisational context of h u m a n skills was important. The transformation was driven by a persistent and entrepreneurial dynasty which tried to find innovative solutions, domestic or imported, to administrative, technical, and tactical problems. It was of decisive importance that the state at an early stage had gained access to a continuous flow of resources, which made it possible to keep armed forces permanently and to develop them for long-term service. Late medieval Sweden had possessed one reasonably modern armed force: a peasant militia infantry which was adequate for defence and frequently even able to prevail on the open battlefield against professional mercenaries. There were also castles owned by the kingdom, but controlled by the ruling elite, which also organised a rather weak cavalry. There was little artillery and only minor naval forces. The early Vasa state used existing forces, but it also began to use resources in new ways. It created a navy and an ordnance organisation, which could arm warships and provide batteries for siege operations. This formed a mobile striking force, able to hit domestic and foreign enemies, break blockades, and control sea lines which connected various parts of Sweden with each other. Tlie king gradually took control of the castles, the peasant militia, and the nobility's cavalry; he kept a force of professional mercenaries; and he developed an efficient logistical organisation which made this army more mobile and suited for offensive operations. The same organisation supported naval operations with provisions. The navy ensured logistical support and created operational freedom for the army in the eastern Baltic. Military forces could be concentrated in the east on offensive operations against enemies who could not attack Sweden across the sea. Sixteenth-century Swedish armed forces were operationally able to reach the whole Baltic region, but they were frequently unable to exploit this advantage because of inferior tactical performance on land. Domestic politics were important in this: the peasant society was willing to provide soldiers for defensive warfare, but the peasant soldiers were little interested in being armed and trained for offensive warfare abroad. This resistance is important, because it shows that the peasant society had choices and could influence the political agenda and the rules of interaction. The final developments, in the 1620s and 1630s, were the creation of an elite army with a high degree of battlefield efficiency and the organisation of a unique permanent manning organisation for the navy, which ensured its rapid mobilisation. The domestic

656

C H A P T E R SEVEN

politics of this process would be interesting to study more intensely, as the earlier resistance may have been a conscious policy of the local society to keep the ruler's ambitions under some kind of control. It may also show that the peasants regarded the 16th-century navy as an essentially defensive force, worth to make sacrifices for, while they were more suspicious about an army operating outside the old borders of the realm. With all pieces in place, the empire building, which had started in 1561, gained m o m e n t u m and reshaped the Baltic from 1617 to 1660. By 1630, the Swedish state had achieved the capability to invade Germany and prevail against very powerful continental armies. The growth and transformation of the Swedish armed forces had reshaped the political balance in Northern Europe far earlier, however. Sweden had already in the 1530s shown that it had control of the northern Baltic Sea and was able to intervene with army and naval forces in the southern Baltic. Hie new royal militia army created an advantage in political bargaining with Denmark (without a permanent army), and in the 1560s Sweden was able to fight a war against three enemies. Armed forces, which in domestic politics were motivated as defensive and necessary for Sweden's survival, turned out in practice to be useful for expansion in the Baltic. They created a surplus capacity of power which the dynasty was tempted to use. Once committed to imperial expansion, the Vasa state was able to make resources for war and expansion flow in organisational moulds of their own design and was able, step by step, to increase their share of the market for protection. How was it possible? The first part of the explanation is that the rulers had understood that useful resources existed and could be combined in a new way. Late medieval Sweden and the Baltic was a European region with under-utilised resources, and entrepreneurs could acquire resources at low cost and profit f r o m them handsomely, if they achieved new combinations. There were cheap manpower, minerals, forests, waterpower, and naval stores (hemp, flax, pitch, and tar) in abundance. There were also under-utilised leadership resources in local elite groups and the Catholic Church, whose education, abilities, and ambitions could be used within new structures and organisational hierarchies. Businessmen could use these resources for shipping, trade, manufacture, and extraction of raw materials. W h a t was possible to achieve in the Baltic for upstart entrepreneurs with maritime and mercantile core competencies is shown by the steep rise of Dutch supremacy in shipping, trade, and financial services. The

CONCLUSION

657

Dutch introduced new technology and new business practices, and they indirectly reshaped agriculture and socioeconomic conditions in Eastern and Central Europe by the increased demand f r o m Western Europe. The second part of the explanation for the Vasa state's successful expansion is that the Vasa rulers possessed the political and organisational competence to initiate change. Politically, large parts of the Baltic region, initially including Sweden, had decentralised power structures, possible to change radically with moderate but well-organised resources. There was also a demand for protection both from local societies and from shipping and trade. Political entrepreneurs could make use of the cheap and under-utilised resources and create innovative enterprises in protection-selling in this region. Its geography demanded that such enterprises be amphibious, with ability to operate on both land and sea. They also had to be able to use the sea to achieve mobility throughout a large region with sparse population and weak infrastructures but good maritime lines of communication. The combination of decentralised power and cheap resources made violencecontrol and protection in the Baltic rewarding for entrepreneurs who possessed the ability to combine resources innovatively. However, nothing predetermined that the Vasas, one of the aristocratic families which dominated late Medieval Swedish politics, should become the entrepreneurs behind a large-scale Baltic protection-selling enterprise. The Baltic was a region with several princes, aristocrats, and cities who all had strong traditions of using armed force to promote their interests. Sweden had a rich natural-resource endowment, and its sheer geographical expanse made it a close neighbour to all other Baltic states, but the population was small, and there was litde tradition of participating in international politics, offensive operations, or maritime enterprises. The establishment of Swedish dominance of the Baltic required timing and luck, as well as the ability to reproduce successful entrepreneurship in the next generation. As in all family enterprises, there is a considerable amount of chance involved, if family power is to survive as the organiser of resource flows in the long run. Unusually, Gustav I and his descendants formed a dynasty comprised of capable political, administrative, and military leaders for six generations. The early Vasas were highly innovative. In their first century as Swedish rulers, they also ran enterprises in trade, shipping, and industry, which made them important as businessmen. In fact, these activities have been overshadowed by their activities as

658

C H A P T E R SEVEN

rulers. W h e n the third generation, Gustav II Adolf, decided to leave business to private interests and concentrate on organising the state and its armed forces, he became the most important military and political innovator in Europe in his generation. His successors were less innovative, but they were politically and militarily skilled. Karl X Gustav was the great opportunist who reshaped Northern Europe in a few years. Karl XI was the systematic reformer who enforced radical changes in decision-making, state finance, and military and naval organisation. Karl XII was less innovative—rigidity was his most characteristic feature—although even he eventually learned to initiate change in established organisations.

9.4

A dynastic enterprise at sea

Hie creation of naval power as a result of entrepreneurship (Joseph A. Schumpeter) is possibly easier to understand intuitively than is the entrepreneurial creation of an army. Navies depend on technical and industrial capabilities. They have ships, weapons, fittings, and equipment, and they require skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled manpower, leadership, and teams, just like an enterprise in trade or industry. Hie Vasa navy could be viewed as an early modern enterprise at sea, with fleets sent out on missions and where profit in form of increased power was the ultimate aim. In the 16th century, the dynasty was also engaged in long-distance maritime trade with defensively armed ships. The distinction between maritime trade and maritime warfare was far f r o m clear-cut. Early modern maritime enterprises in trade, privateering, and colonial expansion were combinations of ship-owning, violence, and profit-seeking under highly uncertain conditions. Seafarers often used violence to eliminate competition and defend monopolies. Modern large-scale carrying of cargo in unarmed ships was originally an exception, which only gradually came to dominate maritime enterprise. The earliest European penetration of the Indian Ocean and the China Seas was a royal enterprise in maritime protection-selling and monopoly trade, run by the Portuguese crown. It was followed by West European monopoly companies, authorised by states to make profit from trade and violence. In the course of two centuries, the Swedish dynastic enterprise at sea passed through five stages which are partly overlapping. The first stage was the period 1521-1544 which saw the Vasa dynasty pass the

CONCLUSION

659

threshold where the ruler grew f r o m one of several political actors to the actor who had a decisive comparative advantage in use of violence and firm control of the whole Swedish territory, hi classic entrepreneurial fashion, the young Gustav Eriksson gambled by founding his enterprise with a large loan. Naval power, acquired on credit, was used in the 1520s to gain control of the sea lanes to Swedish towns and castles, to break blockades of the coast, and to suppress resistance from Christian II's supporters. It showed taxpayers and potential troublemakers that the new ruler controlled the sea, that he could protect Sweden from blockade and invasion, and that he was able to isolate and defeat rebels in regions and castles close to the sea. Tlie first two decades of the Vasa regime were turbulent, and violence was still used in domestic power struggles. Control of the sea made it diflicult for domestic opponents to receive support f r o m abroad. It is significant for the priorities that naval forces in 1534-36 first were used to check possible connections between Liibeck and domestic opponents to the Vasa regime, and then to intervene against Liibeck in the southern Baltic. This broke Liibeck's traditional privileges in Sweden's foreign trade and discouraged the city f r o m further interventions in Swedish domestic politics. The navy also played a littleunderstood role during the Dacke rebellion in 1542-43. Hie navy prevented foreign powers from making contact with the rebels and supporting them. Naval power briefly reverted to this in the late 1590s, when control of the sea stretching f r o m Sweden, Finland, and Poland became important for control of Swedish territory. This type of warfare primarily required a battle fleet, able to break blockades enforced by a foreign battle fleet, but it was not necessary to fight far from the domestic resources. Stage 2 in this enterprise at sea was control of trade in the northern Baltic, a practical dominion over this part of the sea. Much of it was achieved without violence, because the navy gave Sweden political leverage in relation to interests that depended upon the sea. It was largely a bonus efli'ect of the earlier capability to control the sea lines to Sweden. The gulfs of Finland and Riga were important trade routes, and a Swedish navy could rather easily control them, something which became apparent during the war in 1534-36. Reval and the nobility in northern Estonia placed themselves under Swedish protection in 1561 because Sweden seemed the most credible protector and already controlled the sea in this region. During the war against Liibeck in the 1560s, control of trade through the Gulf of Finland was an important

660

C H A P T E R SEVEN

goal for Swedish operations, as was the blockade of Narva during the war with Russia f r o m 1570 until 1581, when Narva was finally taken. During the war against Poland, blockade of Riga and other Livonian ports was important from 1600 until 1621 when Riga was taken. After that, the northern Baltic Sea was a Swedish lake until the early 18th century. Hiis blockade and sea-control policy required a powerful force of medium and small warships, able to stay at sea from spring to autumn, and it created a continuous demand for sending ships and m e n to sea. The third stage of Swedish naval policy was control of the entire Baltic Sea in competition with all other naval powers in the region. Hiis ambition first appeared in the 1560s during the confrontation with Denmark and Liibeck. It was successful; both of these powers failed to blockade Sweden and to maintain Liibeck's trade through the northern Baltic. The policy required a strong battle fleet with efficient logistical support for deployment at a distance from central Sweden f r o m spring to autumn. Naval policy after the 1570s was shaped by an ambition to keep a fleet strong enough to challenge the Danish battle fleet in its home waters. The most conscious policy in this direction was probably initiated not by the Vasa dynasty but by Axel Oxenstierna, another innovative entrepreneur in politics and administration. At the pinnacle of his power over Swedish policy, he directed h u m a n and material resources to improve the quality of the navy: permanent manning, more officers, Dutch specialists, guns, hemp, and sailcloth. From the mid-1630s, this policy had created superiority in relation to the Danish navy. Oxenstierna used it for an ofi"ensive war in 1643-45 and was partially successful in conquering Danish-Norwegian territory with a decisive victory at sea. The next naval war with D e n m a r k (1657-60) was also fought in the southern Baltic, but this war was mainly the first confrontation between Swedish and Western European naval power. The most ambitious part of Swedish foreign policy was territorial conquests around the Baltic. One precondition was a Swedish battle fleet which controlled the sea to these territories, but naval power and amphibious warfare in connection with territorial expansion was often of a different character than battle fleet operations. It could be described as Stage 4 in the dynastic enterprise at sea. It began with fighting over Estonia already in the 1560s, continued with long wars with Russia f r o m 1570 to 1617, the Livonian wars with Poland f r o m 1600 to 1625, the interventions in Prussia and Pomerania in 1626-29, and the full-scale

CONCLUSION

661

invasions of Germany in 1630 and of Poland-Lithuania in 1655. Hie army was the most important instrument for this pohcy, but it was impossible to start without control of the sea, and it was difficult to achieve without logistical support f r o m the sea and cooperation between army and navy. Swedish naval construction was influenced by the requirements of amphibious and shallow water warfare; galleys, transports, and small sailing warships. In some periods, especially the years from 1621 to 1630, the whole navy was engaged in large troopcarrying operations. The end result was more Swedish territories on the continent and increased demand for battle fleet strength to secure the communications with them in wartime. The fifth and final stage in the Swedish dynastic enterprise at sea was defence of the earlier achievement. It began in 1660, when plans for further expansion disappeared from the political agenda, and it continued until the end of the dynastic state. This stage was dominated by battle-fleet policy and the possibility that Sweden would have to defend the Baltic lines of communication against both a regional power and battle fleets sent from Western Europe. It ended in a defeat for the Swedish state. The state had failed to achieve new combinations of army and navy units for amphibious and shallow water warfare, necessary for control of important territories around the Baltic Sea. Karl XII was probably the least maritime of the rulers who succeeded Gustav I, although in his last years he learned lessons f r o m Peter I, the great innovative ruler of his age. As an enterprise at sea, the Swedish dynastic state ended with a failure in entrepreneurship and in the ability to initiate new combinations in competition with Russia, which showed superior ability to achieve such combinations. A dynastic enterprise at sea like the Swedish could thus be central in a state-formation process. Naval power mattered in both domestic and international political struggles, not only about trade and colonies but also about territories and state power in Europe. Sweden was primarily a very strong military power, with a large army and many army leaders, including martial kings, at central positions in the state. Nevertheless, this state, its rulers, and elite were deeply committed to control of the sea. They devoted m u c h administrative competence and large resources to develop the navy. A long-term naval policy to keep control of the sea existed f r o m the early days of state formation to the final struggle for imperial survival. Tlie failure of the navy after it had been administrated by the aristocracy in 1660-72 turned into a political catastrophe for this earlier powerful elite group. It was replaced

662

C H A P T E R SEVEN

by career bureaucrats and professional officers who became powerholders close to the king and who gained control of administration and patronage in the Swedish state. W h e n the dynasty failed to protect Sweden, these men became central power-holders in a new type of regime, which preserved the state as a source of employment and patronage for established families. The fact that Sweden for a long time had a navy, while its continental adversaries had none, made it possible to start offensives at the enemies' coast and deny them the ability to take war to Swedish territory. Tliis ability to take the war to the enemy also made it easier to finance warfare, because resources could be extracted from the enemy's territory and from trade flowing through enemy ports. This was a decisive part of the explanation of why Sweden could fight and defeat powers with m u c h larger populations. Sweden used the enemy's resources, while the enemy could not reach Swedish resources. Swedish state formation and empire building had been able to integrate naval power in a fashion that was unique in the Baltic. The only other Baltic power with a large navy, Denmark, was not much active in Baltic empire building (the Oldenburgs directed their ambitions to Germany) and for a long period had no permanent army which could take advantage of naval power. Tliis maritime and amphibious character of Baltic warfare has often been misunderstood by conventional historians of warfare. Most studies are usually divided into army and navy operations and often fail to see opportunities and problems that are not part of these organisations' established doctrines and habits of decision-making. Lack of amphibious capability is not identified as a serious problem, and amphibious capability is not appreciated as a sophisticated form of naval-military competence. Military and naval history have also, until recently, suffered from an obsession with "decisive" battles and f r o m a neglect of logistical aspects of warfare, which often are dependent on army-navy cooperation. In the analysis of Baltic warfare, the interaction between land and sea must be placed in the centre, because it often is decisive. Armed forces which were able to defend long coasts and wide territories with a fleet in a strategic position, land army forces on defended coasts, and provide armies with seaborne supplies, had the best chance of achieving a decisive concentration of superior forces at the right place and at the right moment.

CONCLUSION

9.5

Resources and

663

entrepreneurship

Recent explanations of early modern European state formation often emphasise that it passed through certain stages. At first, rulers were unable to administrate large resources for war without local elites and private entrepreneurs. Merchants, military entrepreneurs, and taxfarmers created the backbone of the administration, while rulers coordinated their efforts and commanded the armed forces. Before the rise of the states, rulers supposedly had too few contacts with local society, too few technical and administrative skills, and too little power to run all armed forces during major wars. Foreign military entrepreneurs and financiers were often important. Gradually, the states developed their own administration, which took control of resources for warfare and channelled them to permanent armed forces. On the European level, this process took centuries and reached full maturity only in the 18th century. State formation is often identified with the rise of bureaucracy and the decline of private participation in administration of resources for war. An early reliance on market solutions to administrative problems is supposed to have been replaced by hierarchical, bureaucratic systems of administration. There is much empirical evidence to support this model of European state formation. The competence and contacts to find and administrate large resources were scarce and unevenly distributed. This model, however, describes what happened on the European macro-level. It cannot be used as a general model for all European states. The growth of individual states followed more or less unique patterns, and rulers cannot generally be described as administratively weak and dependent on private interests to wage war. Ambitious rulers had strong incentives to develop superior administrative capabilities on their own, and such capabilities made it easier for them to cooperate with private groups who also had competence and access to resources. Because violencecontrol is a highly competitive and ruthless activity, it is unlikely that a ruler ever could control a territory without being the best administrator of resources for war and protection, without being the strong m a n with whom the elite prefer to cooperate. The Swedish state, and especially the navy, is an interesting example. Late medieval Sweden had few maritime competencies and resources useful for creation of sea power. These assets were available outside Sweden, however, and they might be hired or bought. If private interests had dominated the development of Swedish naval power, they

664

C H A P T E R SEVEN

should have buih its ships, fitted them with privately manufactured cables, sails, and guns, recruited officers and crews, and supplied operational fleets with food. Most of these private suppliers of sea power would have been foreigners—German or Dutch—and they would have leased ships with guns and crews to the Swedish state as long as they were paid for it. These resources would have been available in exchange for money and economic privileges in Sweden. Hie few cases when foreign competence and resources for naval wars were bought or hired; 1522 and 1644, show that the costs were very high in relation to the costs of comparable Swedish resources. Actually, Gustav I took firm control of naval administration as soon as he controlled Sweden. He tried to make the nobility help him with it in the 1530s, but their response was lukewarm. After that, the dynasty ran the navy entirely on its own. It built and maintained warships, manufactured cables and sails, produced guns and ammunition, organised manning and training of skilled seamen, employed a cadre of leaders, and ran a large provisioning system. This navy soon grew to one of the largest in Europe in spite of the meagre marketbased maritime resources in Sweden. The 16th-century Swedish navy was, to an astonishing degree, domestic and not reliant on foreign resources. Foreign technology—carvel hulls, galleys, and gun-founding—was used, but the number of foreign specialists was small and naval leadership was mainly found among the traditional elite groups in Sweden. One explanation for this is that organisational capability, created by royal entrepreneurship, was a good substitute for the market. Furthermore, it is probable that Swedish resources were much cheaper than foreign resources. Wages were lower, raw material cheap, and transaction costs (including time for negotiations and transfer) could be kept low compared to buying such resources f r o m foreign countries. There were limits to what personal royal administration might achieve, however. They were reached under Karl IX when the navy became larger than ever before in terms of ships and tonnage but suffered f r o m lack of cables, sails, guns, and probably skilled seamen. Karl was very good at gathering material resources and men for his armed forces, a skill that essentially was political. His administrative and entrepreneurial abilities had been impressive in his younger days, but as a ruler he lacked the talent to provide efficient organisational structures for the large resources he gathered. Karl also lacked the sense to develop skills among his subordinates and make use of their abilities.

CONCLUSION

665

His orders were frequently not obeyed because they seemed divorced from administrative and financial realities, and Karl furthermore was unwilling to delegate responsibility and power over resources to lower levels in his state. Resources tended to get locked in the organisation rather than being processed through it. The several incomplete warships which he left at his death are a telling example. But Karl did leave a valuable heritage in the contacts he had developed with Western Europe and in his open attitude to foreign technical specialists and sea officers. Foreign competence placed in an unbalanced and partly demoralised organisation was of limited value, however. The administrative reforms under Gustav II Adolf introduced the market in several parts of the administration, not least the navy. Naval shipbuilding, the maintenance and outfitting of warships, and the production of cast-iron guns were placed under contract, and domestically produced sailcloth was largely replaced with imported high-quality products. The aim was not to increase quantity in relation to Karl IX's navy but to increase efficiency. The responsibilities of individual contractors and the cost of various parts of the navy became more transparent. Swedish natural resources were still the material base of the navy. Most probably this created a marked advantage in cost compared to other European navies, which had to rely on import, mainly from the Baltic. Some of the naval contractors of foreign origin were actually the king's men, who had been persuaded to work as contractors with little capital of their own. Most of this contracting system was but a brief episode. Swedish large-scale private enterprise was still in its infancy, as was shown by the attempt to create a fleet of armed merchantmen around 1630. That enterprise had to be organised by the state with the burghers as rather unwilling and not very competent participants. Once it was decided to start privateering against Spain, it was taken for granted that the navy should organise it, because private experience and capital was lacking. The large naval contracts were cancelled in the late 1620s, and the state's administrators, some of them former entrepreneurs or men employed by entrepreneurs, took over without any decline in efficiency. Private shipbuilding remained, and was used to supplement the main naval yard when several ships needed to be built. Private production of cast-iron guns remained as well, and after its transfer to private enterprise in the 1620s it became a large-scale export industry which easily could supply the navy if required. Finally, and important, the navy recruited foreign competence for shipbuilding and naval leadership:

666

C H A P T E R SEVEN

master shipwrights and skilled shipwrights, officers, and non-commissioned officers from Western Europe, primarily the Dutch Republic. The European market for technological and maritime skills was sufficiently open for a state to recruit those individuals it found useful, without having to use other states or elite groups as intermediaries. Tlie Swedish navy did not follow any European pattern of administration where market solutions and private entrepreneurs were replaced by a growing bureaucracy. State administration came first, followed by enthusiastic experiments with market solutions and finally a more balanced approach where the state provided the administrative framework but used the market when it provided cheap and reliable products. For a realistic understanding of what went on in early modern Europe, it is misleading to divide actors into "rulers" and "entrepreneurs" or to divide enterprises in violence into strictly private and public spheres. Some ruling dynasties, of which the House of Vasa probably is the best example, gained and kept power because they were active entrepreneurs who sought under-utilised resources and new combinations. They belonged to a group of rulers who were able to convert large input of resources into instruments of power and were able to quicldy assert a dominating position in relation to other elite groups in Sweden and the Baltic region. This competence was scarce, and those who had it did not cooperate with rulers. They ruled. Private entrepreneurs running mercenary armed forces were, in contrast, often princes and aristocrats with the same view of rules of h u m a n interaction as entrepreneurial rulers. Some of these entrepreneurs hoped to become rulers, and they had to consider political aspects when they used their privately administrated forces in war. Major private entrepreneurs in shipping and international trade were frequently running colonial enterprises that in practice made them rulers of territories or upholders of business monopolies with violence. These widely different groups of actors may be analysed as entrepreneurs. They responded to cheap resources with innovative ideas about how to make better use them, and they implemented these ideas with the aim of gaining both profit and power from it.

9.6

State formation

and naval power

This study has argued that the essence of early modern state formation was development of organisational capabilities which could integrate

CONCLUSION

667

various external resources with the core competence of the state and give the leaders at the top decisive advantages over competitors. States grow when they can use opportunities to raise and organise more resources and make more efficient use of them than if they remain decentralised. States continue to grow as long as they have surplus managerial capacity to organise resources more efficiently than competitors. State formation is not the same as bringing large resources together under formal control of one ruler, however. World history has seen many rapidly formed empires which, equally rapidly, have fallen to pieces because resources for power and violence were not well organised and used locally. In contrast, the formation of European fiscal-military states from the late 15th to the 18th century was the creation of such capabilities, which turned an input of widely different resources into an output that gave central power-holders a decisive advantage in controlling and protecting territories and sea lines of communication, compared to what earlier power-holders could achieve. Tliis view of state formation, derived f r o m non-mainstream economics (Schumpeter, Lane, and Penrose) rather than sociology or political science, is especially important when state formation involves creation of naval power. Navies operate in an element that not is natural for man to live in, and navies require more sophisticated technology and more profound conversion of resources than military operations. If there are few maritime resources—ships, shipyards, skilled seamen, and experienced leaders of maritime enterprise in the civilian society—the demand for organisational capability to convert and integrate non-maritime resources is even higher. Hie early modern Swedish navy is a case where the decisive importance of organisational capability is unusually easy to observe. The resource base was rather small in terms of population and very small in terms of maritime resources. There were, nonetheless, vast natural resources suitable for naval power. With an input of innovative technology gathered f r o m other parts of Europe and combined with traditional domestic skills, natural resources, and men willing to learn something new, a considerable part of the new fiscal-military state took the shape of a navy. Because competitive naval power was scarce, the ability to create naval power gave the Swedish state a comparative advantage. It could attack or put pressure on most powers in the Baltic with little risk of counterattacks on its own territory.

668

C H A P T E R SEVEN

The early m o d e m Swedish navy calls into question c o m m o n assumptions about both navies and the development of the European states. Hie navy lacked support from a viable maritime economy, yet it was important for control of domestic territory and was, f r o m an early stage, administrated by the rulers, not private contractors. Private contractors appeared later, when the Swedish economy had developed and the state was interested in new ideas in order to reduce transaction costs. It was entrepreneurial rulers who provided an innovative form of sea power, which made such power affordable at low cost in a society with few maritime skills. As a consequence, rulers, elites, and taxpayers developed new rules of political interaction, which secured the long-term existence of permanent armed forces. Tlie navy was also a result of the fact that the Swedish society was open to innovation and rewarded men who possessed advanced organisational, technical, and maritime competencies. Social mobility and positive attitudes to foreigners with new abilities were necessary for the rise of a navy in a peripheral and initially non-maritime region of Europe.

9.7

Swedish naval power in a European

perspective

Studies of early modern European state formation are normally focused on states that became the leading powers in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. Hie importance of a number of medium-sized states such as Venice, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and the Dutch Republic is noted in political and economic history, but few attempts have been made to explain why population and economic resources was not decisive in early modern power politics. Sweden is an exception, to a certain extent, because advanced 17th-century bureaucracy is normally mentioned as part of the explanation of its rise to great power status. It has not been noted previously that these medium-sized states all were strong naval powers which early had mastered the technical and administrative problems of running a complex organisation for exercising sea power. It is possible that ability to develop naval power is a sign that obstacles preventing centralisation were few and that conditions for state formation were, in general, favourable. A permanent navy was the most centralised and complex organisation that early modern states could run, and in order to persuade society to give up resources for a permanent navy, a decisive change of political rules of interaction (institutions) was required. The Swedish case shows that

CONCLUSION

669

such organisational capabilities and institutions were more important for naval power than a large population, an advanced financial system, or the existence of maritime interests and competencies in society. For two centuries, the Swedish state ran one of Europe's large sailing navies. In relation to the size of the population, it was, for most of this period, larger than the English navy and was always far larger than the French or Spanish sailing navies, if size is related to population. The Danish navy was comparable in both absolute size and size related to the population, while the Dutch Republic f r o m the mid-17th century was the only European state with around the same population as Sweden but a considerably larger navy. In these two centuries, the Swedish state also kept an army that was exceptionally large in relation to the population. In a European perspective, the Swedish state had an unusual organisational capability to raise and convert resources in competition with other states. With exception of the 17th-century Dutch Republic, no other European state had permanent armed forces of the same magnitude, again if size is related to the population. Sweden has usually been regarded as an undeveloped part of Europe until the early 17th century, when an increased integration into mainstream (Western) European development is supposed to have occurred. Hiis view is common also among Swedish historians, but it is formed by confusion between the level of economic development in society and the organisational capability of the state. The obvious flaw in this interpretation is that early 17th-century Sweden showed every sign not of catching up with advanced competitors but of being far in the lead ahead of the average European state. Political institutions favouring centralisation of resources and organisational capabilities to transform resources were more developed and mature in the economically backward Sweden than in most European states already in the 16th century. Several of the features which are significant for the 17th-century Swedish state existed in the preceding century: direct royal administration of resources flowing through the state, permanent armed forces, a tax organisation reaching out in the local society, nearly permanent wars, and continuous negotiations between rulers and taxpayers about how resources should be raised. If a high degree of resource concentration to the state is used to measure changes in rules of h u m a n interaction, Sweden was markedly ahead of most other parts of Europe already in the latter half of the 16th century. European resources were not generally and systematically directed to the states until later. European state formation

670

C H A P T E R SEVEN

underwent a long period of crisis and stagnation from the latter half of the 16th century until the mid-17th century, a crisis which saw organisational capabilities exist in certain states but fail to develop in other states, because they required major changes in rules of interaction. No such crisis is visible in Swedish state formation. Instead, it went ahead rapidly and created opportunities for Swedish expansion into a crisis-stricken Eastern and Central Europe. Tliese opportunities vanished when European state formation gained m o m e n t u m and created several modern fiscal-military states, able to compete with Sweden. Hie existence of a navy of exceptional size in a European perspective has seldom attracted much attention in Sweden or elsewhere. If the growth of organisational capabilities and rules of h u m a n interaction are seen as central in state formation, this navy, as well as the non-existence of competing navies in several Baltic states, is important. All states with coasts in Northern Europe had the opportunity to develop naval power in order to protect access to its ports, cut the sea lines for enemies, and gain political leverage by ability to control the sea. Sweden was one of the few states which actually did that. Hie Vasa dynasty did not control any technical or administrative secrets unavailable to other states, and the country they ruled had a serious lack of domestic maritime skills, but naval power existed and grew. Naval power existed because Swedish peasants were willing to pay taxes by cutting timber and transport it to shipyards, to provide taxes in food to the king's seamen, and to negotiate with the king about how coastal communities should send men to m a n the navy. Naval power existed because the usually poor burghers were willing to provide men to the na^'y and because merchants were willing to pay customs on export and import trade. Naval power also existed because aristocrats and nobility ceased to think in terms of local power and small-scale forces under their direct administration, and agreed to participate in the administration and command of the king's large-scale organisation of permanent armed forces. Nothing of this was self-evident in early modern Europe. Much of it was not even common. Resources extracted from peasants tended to be diverted to power-holders other than states, and elite groups tended to invest in their own economic and political enterprises rather than in the state. Early modern European politics were, for a long time, dominated by fear of powerful states with permanent armed forces controlled by central rulers. These rules of interaction among h u m a n beings had been normal in Europe and many other parts of

CONCLUSION

671

the world for many centuries. Trust and cooperation developed within local society, within families, and within groups with easily identifiable c o m m o n interests. It was not in accordance with these norms to transfer resources to a distant central state, to do that continuously, and to allow that state to gain an effective monopoly of violence. Swedish peasants and burghers were never enthusiastic about sending scarce resources to the central state. However, they did that on a larger scale and more continuously than people in most other parts of Europe. We do not know much about the thoughts of these peasants and burghers, but their behaviour may be explained as a strategy to secure stability and predictability in an uncertain world. Swedish noblemen and aristocrats had found that they had more to gain by sharing control of the state's resources with the ruler than by resisting royal power and forming alliances with foreign rulers and elites. Hie rules of interaction among state, elite, and c o m m o n taxpayers and between various regions in Sweden had become different from the normal European pattern. Taxpayers still needed to be convinced that war was the best of several bad alternatives in an evil world. But the process of convincing them that organised armed forces at sea were superior to other solutions was accomplished in the 16th century. The superiority of the state as a protector was no longer a question on the political agenda.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE

LIST OF SWEDISH WARSHIPS, 1521-1721 Scope and

limitations

Tliis historical ship-list provides basic information about Swedish warships which existed from 1521 to 1721. It includes sailing warships, oared warships, and armed merchantmen owned by the ruling dynasty or hired by the navy from private ship-owners for service as warships. Transport ships, which often were lightly armed for defensive purposes, are not included unless they at least periodically were fully armed as warships. Fireships are not included. Most Swedish fireships were old warships fitted out to be expended in battle when they were too old to carry their armament. If not expended, they were usually soon discarded. Tlie year of conversion f r o m warship to transport ship or fireship is the year of deletion from this list. Small craft of less than 100 tonnes displacement are often difficult to separate into combatants and transport vessels, and there was often no unambiguous border line between small warships and large armed boats. Several hundred small craft must be excluded in a list which only covers warships. Tliis list does not include large boats, such as lodjor, skdrbdtar, espingar, and slupar (eschalouper), even if they were named and armed. From the 1610s, the list does not include bojorter, galeoter, strussar, and jakter unless they are included in contemporary lists of vessels armed as combatants. Part 1 lists sailing warships up to 1679, divided into groups according to approximate displacement. The groups are the same as in the author's Navies and Nations in order to make international comparisons easier. Note, however, that there is a limit at 300 tonnes which was not used in Navies and Nations before 1680. Most ships below that limit were already in the 16th century not regarded as major combatants, suitable for battle fleet contests, and that makes it important to separate them from smaller units. Part 2 lists galleys up to 1679, and part 3 lists armed merchantmen owned by the royal dynasty or hired from private owners up to 1679. Part 4 lists warships f r o m 1680 to 1721 (including those existing in 1679/80), according to type rather than size groups. The few hired warships in this period are also listed here.

676

APPENDIX ONE

Sources Detailed references to the sources about the name, origin, final fate, and size of every ship would require a text of several hundred pages. A ship-list with detailed references for the period 1521-60 is Jan Glete, "Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1521-1560: Flottans grundliiggning under ett tekniskt brytningsskede". Forum navale, 31,1977, 23-119. For the period 1561-1610, I have prepared working papers with detailed references, which may be consulted at http://www2.historia.su.se/personal/jan_ glete/. Similar working papers for the period 1611-1721 may hopefully be ready for publication later. Niels Probst's unpublished list of Danish warships 1523-1660 have been very helpful, especially for the several warships which the Swedish and Danish navies captured f r o m each other. I have also received copies from Danish archival sources from Niels Probst. TTie ship-hst for the period 1521-1610 is prepared f r o m archival sources only. No information has been taken from earlier published or unpublished attempts to prepare ship-lists, because I have f o u n d no reliable lists with the relevant information. The most important archival series which have been investigated for this period are (unless otherwise stated, at Riksarkivet, Stockholm): Skeppsgardshandlingar, Strddda militiehandlingar fore 1631:2. Handlingar angdende flottan, Arklirdkningar and Militierdkenskaper (both Krigsarkivet, Stockholm); Fogdarnas rdkenskaper 1529-1533, Landskapshandlingar and Aldre rdkenskapsserien (the latter at Riksarkivet, Helsingfors), where local accounts for royal castles with shipyards and for places where shipbuilding for the navy took place have been investigated; Proviantrdkenskaper, Loningsregister, Rdntekammarbocker, Varuhus och Handling, Kaperirdkenskaper, Finska Cameralia, Strddda finska rdkenskaper och handlingar, Klddkammarrdkenskaper (at Slottsarkivet, Stockholm), Sandbergska samlingen, Kungliga ochfurstliga arkiv (Duke Johan of Finland and Duke Karl of Sodermanland), Militdra dmnessamlingar (especially M 1272, 1754, 1761, 1848), Riksregistraturet (the king's out-going letters) and Hertig Karls registratur (1568-98). Riksregistraturet has been published for the period 1521-60: Konung Gustaf den forstes registratur, 29 vols, Stoclcholm, 1861-1916. For the period from 1561, MA Dan Johansson, Historiska institutionen, Stockholm University, has made extensive notes about letters connected with the navy in Riksregistraturet and Hertig Karls Registratur, which have been very useful for this study.

LIST OF S W E D I S H W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

677

Lubeckian sources about ships sold to Sweden in 1522 are published in Hanserecesse, 3: 1477-1530, 8, Leipzig, 1910. For the period 1611-1679 the starting point for this hst has been three earher studies with detailed ship-lists; for 1611-32: Sveriges sjokrig 1611-1632, Stockholm 1937; for 1635-80: Axel L. Zettersten, Svenska flottans historia, 1635-1680, Norrtalje, 1903; and f r o m 1650: Hjalmar Borjeson, Lists of Men-of-War, 1650-1700, Part III: Swedish ships 16501699, London, 1936. On several points, however, especially for the 1610s and the period 1632-44, these lists have required extensive changes, and the present list up to 1660 is based on archival sources. From the 1630s, most sources related to the navy are parts of the archives of Amiralitetskollegium, at Krigsarkivet, Stockholm. Tlie minutes iprotokoll) and correspondence {registratur, inkomna handlingar) of this board have much information about warships. The notes made by Axel Zettersten and Hjalmar Borjeson f r o m these series are preserved in their collections at Krigsarkivet, and they have been useful in locating the relevant information. Zettersten's notes must be checked with the original documents, because he tended to make conclusions while he made the notes and did not always separate the original text from these conclusions. Borjeson's notes, which he continued to make until his death in 1945, must also be checked, but they sometimes provide more accurate information than his published list f r o m 1936. The scattered sources about ships under the heading Amiralitetskollegium, Varvskontoret (especially D II, Liggare, D VI, Inventarier and F VI, Diverse inkomna handlingar) have been used, and the several hundred volumes of provisionally filed naval papers in Nya nummerserien have been investigated in detail. The main series of naval accounts, Orlogsflottans Rdkenskaper 1634-1800, have also been used but most accounts from this period are lost. Other important archival series which have been used for this period are (unless otherwise indicated at Riksarkivet, Stocldiolm): Rikshuvudbocker, Kammarkollegiets kontraktsbocker, Skeppsgdrdshandlingar (until 1640), Strddda militiehandlingar fore 1631:2. Handlingar angdende flottan, Arklirdkningar (until 1629, at Krigsarkivet, Stockholm), Proviantrdkenskaper (until around 1620), Sandbergska samlingen, Likvidationer, nos 92-93:9, Militdra dmnessamlingar (especially M 1728, 1743, 1753, 1754, 1757, 1761, 1779, 1784, 1848-1854), Skrivelser till Gustav II Adolf (letters from Klas Fleming), Skrivelser frdn Amiralitetskollegium tillKungligMajestdt, and Riksregistraturet. For the

678

APPENDIX ONE

period until 1630, MA Dan Johansson, Historiska institutionen, Stockholm University, has made extensive notes about letters connected with the navy in Riksregistraturet, which have been veiy useful for this study. For the period 1630-80, I have used Axel Zettersten's notes from Riksregistraturet in his collection at Krigsarkivet. In the manuscript collection of Uppsala University Library, I used L 422, Nordinska samlingen, vol. 134 and Westinska samlingen, vols 314 and 318. Other sources used to prepare the lists of hired armed merchantmen are mentioned under the relevant sections of part 3. For the period 1680-1721, this list to a large extent relies on earlier published ship-lists, primarily: Borjeson 1936; Lars O. Berg, "Svenska Karlskronaflottans fartyg 1700-1721: En tabellarisk framstallning". Forum navale, 25, 1970, 66-85; Lars Otto Berg, "Peipuseskaderns fartyg, 1701-1704: En tabellarisk framstallning", Forum navale, 22, 1965, 129-33; Ernst Bergman, Gamla Varvet vid Goteborg, 1660-1825, Gothenburg, 1954, 227-34 (warships built in Gothenburg 1700-21); and Jan Glete, "Den svenska linjeflottan, 1721-1860: En oversikt av dess struktur och storlek samt nagra synpunkter pa behovet av ytterligare forskning". Forum navale, 45, 1990, 9-68. For the Stockholm squadron from 1714-21, Gunnar Unger's unpublished list in Gunnar Unger's collection, vol. 1, Krigsarkivet, Stockliolm, has been used and supplemented by notes about that squadron in the 1720s and 1730s in Einar Wendt's collection, vol. 13, Krigsarkivet. Hjalmar Borjeson's notes about warships in his collection at Krigsarkivet have been useful in supplying more detailed information for individual ships. I have used archival sources in Riksarkivet, Stockholm, primarily Riksdagsacta (R 4871, 4878), Militdra dmnessamlingar (M 1762-1763, M 18541866) and Skrivelser fran Amiralitetskollegium till Kunglig Majestdt, as well as sources in the archives of Amiralitetskollegium, Krigsarkivet, especially Varvskontoret, Tygkontoret, and Overskeppsbyggmdstarna (Sheldoniana).

Arrangement

of tables

The first column provides the name of the ship, with ex-names used before the ship was completed, bought, or captured given in parenthesis. Renamings and the years of renaming are also listed here. Swedish warships were, until the early 17th century, often named in a rather

LIST OF S W E D I S H W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

679

confusing way, with different names appearing in the sources at the same time. All variations cannot be given in this brief table. Prefixes which indicate the origin, size, and age of ships were c o m m o n and have, as far as possible, been included—in parentheses if they were used only infrequently. If two different names were used at the same time, both are given, separated by /. If one name was more c o m m o n than the other, the latter is given in parenthesis. Seventeenth-century major warships named for the crown regalia {Kronan, Svdrdet, Scepter, Applet, and Nyckeln) frequently had the word Riks as a prefix to their name, but that has not been included in this list. Names are spelled as in modern Swedish, f r o m which especially 16th-century spelling differs considerably. In a few cases, the latter spelling is given in parenthesis in order to avoid misunderstandings. Hie endings e (masculinum) and a (feminimum) on prefixes are difficult to normalise, as there is a certain ambiguity in both early modern and contemporary Swedish. The second column gives the date when the ship was added to the fleet. As far as possible, this is the year of launching. Ships were not complete when they were launched, but, if the material (timber, masts, spars, equipment, sails, and cordage) and a sufficient workforce were available, they could be made ready for sea in the same year they were launched or the next year. If the date or year of launching is not on record but the year of launching is indirectly known from accounts or progress reports of the construction, the year is marked with If it is not known exactly which year a ship was launched, the time span is indicated with / (e.g., 1624/5 when a ship is known to have been launched in 1624 or 1625). If the ship was bought, taken, or received as a gift, the year is listed, followed by B, P, or G respectively. If the origin of the ship is unknown and it only appears in the sources from a particular year, that year is given followed by FM (first mentioned). Uncertainties in dating are indicated with ?, while (?) indicate that the date is probable but not definitely proved. The third column gives the year when a warship left the effective force. Ships were broken up (BU), deliberately sunk as foundations in naval bases or to block entrances to ports, sold (S), given away (G), taken by the enemy (P), lost (sunk or destroyed by explosion or fire) in action (LA), sunk in port or destroyed in action in order to avoid capture (LAD), accidentally shipwrecked (Wr) or accidentally lost by explosion or fire (burnt, expl). Ships could also be discarded (D) as

680

APPENDIX ONE

warships without being actually disposed of for several years. It might be found irreparable, it might be stricken from the list of armed ships, or its rig and equipment might be removed. This became c o m m o n in the 17th century, and the year in which a ship was discarded has been preferred when it differs significantly from the year in which the hull was broken up, sold, or sunk. Warships could also be converted or reclassified as transport ships (Tp) or Fireships (FS). If the final fate of a ship is unknown, the year it is last mentioned in the sources is given (LM). Uncertainties are indicated with ?, while (?) indicates that the year is very probable but not definitely proved. § indicates that the wreck of the ship has been located. Hie fourth column gives the place of building. It is normally a placename, but sometimes only the province where it was built is known. Hie location of little-known shipyards is listed below. In the case of captured and purchased foreign ships, the land or city of origin is stated in parentheses. Captured or bought merchantmen are indicated with an M. Ships built under contract with a private entrepreneur are indicated with a C. The fifth column gives the displacement, in almost all cases estimated by the author. It is based on a combination of several types of information which indicate the size of the ships: -

dimensions lastetal (tonnage measured in lasts) the circumference of the thickest anchor cable the size of the crew (in normative lists) the m a x i m u m strength of the armament during the ship's career (as far as possible compared with other ships at the same time) - the ship's place in accounts and ship-lists arranged according to size - archaeological evidence from wrecks For some ships f r o m the late I7th century and on, mid-18th-century calculations of designed displacement are available and have been used. Dimensions for Swedish warships are, with few exceptions, known only for ships built after 1620. From the mid-17th century, the dimensions of practically all warships are available. Before that, estimates of displacement must be regarded as a rough indication of the size of the ship. Even when the shape of the hull is known from drawings, the displacement can be fixed only if the designer or the naval bureaucracy

LIST OF S W E D I S H W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

681

has determined a draught at which the "designed", "normal", or "full load" displacement should be calculated. A question mark indicates that the estimated displacement is doubtful, while (?) indicates a lower degree of uncertainty. In some cases, the information is too scarce to make an estimate of the displacement, but the ship has been placed in a size category which probably is correct. Information about small craft is scarce, and it is often not realistic to try to calculate an approximate displacement. For approximate calculations of the size of the navy, an average displacement of 50 tonnes is realistic. Size and displacements of galleys in the period 1521 -1680 are explained in part 2. Part 3 (armed merchantmen) is divided into eight parts with somewhat different column headings in each part. Part 4 (warships 1680-1721) has an additional column for number of guns. For abbreviations, see list of abbreviations.

Shipyards (not including well-known

ports)

Angered: in the north of present-day Gothenburg, at the river Gota alv Arno: between Enkoping and Uppsala, Lake Malaren Asp5: between Strangnas and Enkoping, Lake Malaren (Biskops Arno) Bergshammar: Stockholm archipelago, northern side Bjorkenas: north of Kalmar Bjorneborg: Swedish name for Finnish Pori Bodekull: from 1666 called Karlshamn Borstil, Roden: in the province of Uppland Dorpat: present-day Tartu, Estonia on Lake Peipus Ekolsund: east of Enkoping, Lake Malaren Enanger: between Soderhamn and Hudiksvall Esbo: west of Helsinki/Helsingfors Frakne harad: in the province of Bohuslan Gamla Lodose: between Gothenburg and Trollhattan on the river Gota alv Gripsholm: royal castle at Mariefred, Lake Malaren Haliko: south of Turku/Abo Harbovik: south of Oregrund in the province of Uppland

682

APPENDIX ONE

Helsingfors: Swedish name for Finnish Helsinki Haringe: Stockhohn archipelago, southern side Iggesund: in the province of Halsingland Kalvo: between Ekenas and Helsinki/Helsingfors Kaseburg: town on the island of Usedom, Pomerania Kastelholm: royal castle on the Aland isles Kexholni: on Lake Ladoga, present-day Russian Prioziorsk Kimito: island south of Turku/Abo Kungsor: at the west end of Lake Miilaren, also called Ulvesund Kvarsebo: east of Norrkoping, northern side of Braviken, also known as the Kolmarden yard Kvicksund: between Vasteras and Eskilstuna, Lake Malaren Lattis: between Turku/Abo and Raumo Medelpad (province): the naval shipyard was in 1666-80 located in the estuary of Indalsalven Monsteras: in the province of Smaland, also known as the Drakenas yard Neustadt: in Holstein Narpes: in the southern part of the province of Osterbotten, Finland Rido: island in Lake Malaren, south of Vasteras Rogstad: in the province of Halsingland Rotskar: see Alvkarleby Selanger: in the province of Medelpad Sibbo: east of Helsinki/Helsingfors Skoldoster: south of Uppsala Slite: on eastern Gotland Stegeborg: royal castle west of Soderkoping Torshalla: north of Eskilstuna, Lake Malaren Vadstena: town and royal castle. Lake Vattern Vadsbo: in the northern part of the province of Vastergotland on Lake Vanern Abo: Swedish name for Finnish Turku Alvkarleby: east of Gavle, also called the Rotskar yard Alvsborg: royal castle in present day Gothenburg Ostkind: east of Norrkoping, northern side of Braviken, possibly same as Kvarsebo

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

Part 1. Sailing Warships

683

1521-1679

Larger than 1500 tonnes

Name

Date

End

Built at/

Displacement

(origin) 1800

Store Kravelen

1528/30

1553/4 BU

Stockholm

Mars N e p t u n u s , 1569 R o d e Draken

1563* 1566

1564 LA

Bjorkeniis

1800

1591 B U

Vastervik

2000

Monsteras/Drakenas

1587/8

1609/10 D

Monsteras

2400

Applet Kronan

1628/9 1632

1659 S u n k

Stockholm

1600

Gota Ark Svardet

1634 1662

1 6 7 1 (?) D 1650 D

Stockholm Gothenburg/C

1700 1600

1676 LA

Stockholm

1700

Kronan

1668

Carolus XI

1678

1676 LA § 1721 D

Stoclcholm Stockholm

2300 1700

Skeppet, 1594 Stora Skeppet, 1599 M a r s , 1599 Julius Caesar/ Makalos

(ex Scepter), 1683 Sverige, 1684 W e n d e n , 1694 Prins Karl, 1694 Sverige

Larger than 1000 tonnes up to 1500 tonnes

Name

Date

End

Built at/ (origin)

Displacement

Store Kravelen, 1559 Elefanten

1555

1564 W r §

Stoclcholm

1200

St E r i k

1559-^ 1565 P

1584 B U

Bjorkenas

1100

1571 Ret

(Denmark)

1100

Valen

1566"^

Elefanten, D u k e Karl's

1575=^

1577 B U 1591 L M

Abo Striingnas

1400? ?

1590?) Smalands Lejonet

1577''

1591 S

Vastervik

1100

(Gyllene Vasen) K r o n a n , 1632

1618>'

1643 D

Harbovik

1050

J a g a r e n (ex Jaegermesteren)

ship (Wrecked

Gamla Kronan

684

A P P E N D I X ONE

{cont.) Name

Date

End

B u i h at/

Displacement

(origin) Applet Vasen (modern form: Vasa)

1621*

1625 S

1627'^

1628 W r raised 1961

Scepter

1 6 3 4 (?)

Patientia Draken

1644 P

Victoria

1658 1661

1686 D

Stocldiolm

1150 1500

1676 W r § 1707 S u n k

Gothenburg

1400

Bodekull

1150

Stoc k h o l m Bodekull

1250 1450

1655

Applet N y c k e l n , 1663 Saturnus, rebuilt

1662

Vastervik/C Stockholm/C

1300

1 6 7 1 (?) D

Stockholm

1350

1652/3 D 1677 P D a n

(Denmark) Stockholm

1100

1250

1 6 8 7 as B o h u s W r a n g e l , rebuilt 1689 Nyckeln

1664 1664

1713 D

Mars J u p i t e r , r e b u i l t 1 6 8 9 as

1665

1677 P D a n 1710 S u n k

Liibeck/C

1250

1665

Liibeck/C

1250

V e n u s , r e b u i l t 1 6 8 5 as Finland

1667

1706 S u n k

Karlshamn

1250

Solen

1667 1671

1694 S u n k

Liibeck/C Karlshamn

1200

Slite ( S w e d . M )

1100

Built at

Displacement

1679 LA §

Uppland

Mercurius St H i e r o n y m u s ( l a u n c h e d 1 6 7 4 (?))

1675 B

1677 P D a n 1677 P D a n

1400

Larger than 500 tonnes up to 1000 tonnes

Name Lybske Svanen Bryntan/Holken,

Date 1522 B 1534 1527/8

End

?

1543 D

(Liibeck) Alvsborg

600

1534 R e q

1536'^ R e t

(Kampen)

7/800

1535 P

1546/7 W r

(Liibeck)

6/700

Lejonet (Leonen)

1537/9

1562 D

Stockholm

1000

Angeln

1545'^

1572 S

Stockholm

600

Finske Svanen, Duke

1559/60

1571/3 D

Abo

750

1561/2

1563 lost?

Abo

?

Gamle Holken Kamperman

1524 W r

(Kampkravelen) Petter Hollender, 1536/8 Svanen

Johan's ship until 1561 Finske Bjornen, Duke Johan's ship

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

685

I52I-I72I

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Built at

Displacement

(Svenske/Store) H e c t o r

1561/2

900

1562/3

1589 B U 1588 S

Stockholm

St C h r i s t o f f e r

Vastervik

J u n g f r u n ? , lost while building

1563-^

1563 P D a n

Alvsborg

600 1000

Krabaten?, lost while building

1563=^

1563 P D a n

Alvsborg

900

Hercules

1563 P 1564 P

1571 Ret 1571 Ret

(Denmark)

Bose Lejonet

(Denmark)

800 600

(ex B y e n s Love) Wendekapan Tantheijen

1564 P

1571 Ret

1565* 1568/9

1574 S

(Liibeck? M ) Vastervik

600 700

Alvkarleby

900

Finland?

800 700

K a m p e n (ex D r a k e n ) Fortuna/Greken

1586 B U 1569 loan 1572 Ret 1583 B U 1574*

Kalvo (Swedish M)

Algen Gyllenstjernan/Stjarnan 1575 B 1576* Hjorten

1586 B U 1583 S

Alvkarleby

800 700

Lejonet, D u k e Karl's

1575/7

1591 L M

Strangnas

?

ship Angeln (Haringe

1577/8

1590 S

Haringe

700

Upplands Lejonet (Harbo Skeppet)

1578*

1590 B U

Harbovik

900

Viborgs Skeppet/ Morianen

1578 B

1583 S or

Raunio Kravelen/

1581*

1593 B U

Raumo

600?

1594 B U

Bjorneborg

600?

1598 S

Alvsborg

600

1589 L M

Rogstad

900

1590 G

Alvlcarleby

1000?

Skeppet)

G (Swedish? M )

800

Skeppet B j o r n e b o r g s K r a v e l e n / 1581* Skeppet 1581/2 Alvsborgs Skeppet, Q u e e n Gunilla's s h i p f r o m 1591 Halsinge Lejonet, D u k e 1584* Sigismund's ship f r o m 1585, see 1594 Alvkarleby Skeppet 1587/8 (possibly larger), perhaps Finske Lejonet 1594 Kunghg Majestats Skepp/Lejonet, probably Finske Lejonet (Klas Fleming's ship 1593-94) or perhaps Halsinge Lejonet, 1584

1594 F M

1594 L M

686

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name Alvsborgs Lejonet,

Date

End

Built at

1594 F M

1594 L M

?

1593/4 1593/4

1597 S

Stockholm?

7 0 0 (?)

1609/10 D

Bergshammar

1594/5

1612 D 1605 W r

Vastervik

700 700

Monsteras Alvsborg

700 700?

Vastervik or Kungsor?

600 600

Displacement ?

possibly Hiilsinge Lejonet, 1584 Troilus (Svenske) Angeln Pelikanen Draken

1594/5

Scipio Svarte Ryttaren

1595/7 1596/7

1602 W r

Elefanten

1596/7

1608 LA

Kungsor or

1607 B U

Rutenkrans

1597/9

1611 L A D

Vastervik? Skokloster

Vasen, built for D u k e Karl

1598"^

1623 B u r n t

Aspo

700 900

T r e K r o n o r (ex W e i s s e Adler)

1598 P

1624 D

(Sigismund)

700

Bla F a l k e n ( f r o m

1596/7

1610/1 BU

Nykoping?

600

D u k e Karl 1598) Fiiiske S v a n e n (cargo

1599 P

1610/1 B U

(Sigism./Finl.)

800

1601 W r

(Sigism./Finl.) (Sigism./Finl.)

carrier) (Viborgs) Rosen 1599 P V i b o r g s / F i n s k e H e c t o r 1599 P S a m s o n (cargo carrier) 1599/1600 Smalands Lejonet 160r Forgyllda Applet 1601 Scepter 1601/2 Rode Lejonet

1601/2

1609/10 D 1607 L M 1622 D 1611 L A D 1611 L A D

E n a n g e r / C (?)

600 600 700

Bjorkenas

800

Aland Stegeborg

800 700

1611 P D a n Vasteras or Kungsor

600

S a m s o n (cargo carrier) 1602/3 Svardet, 1626 G a m l a 1604/5 Svardet

1 6 0 8 S?

Alvsborg

?

1630 D

Vasteras

900

Lejoninnan

1608 P 1609 P

1611 L A D

(Dutch, M)

600

1627 D

(Dutch, M)

600

1609/10

1612 P D a n A l v s b o r g

700

Scepter (ex A r n o Byggning)

1 6 1 5 ^ (?)

1639 D

Arno

800

Nyckeln

1616*

1628 W r §

V a s t e r v i k (?)

800

Andromeda 1620* S t o c k h o l m (ex H e c t o r ) 1621* Maria 1622*

1648 S u n k

Stockholm Stockliolm

600

Hollands Forgyllda Rosen, 1610 Blomman Alvsborgs Hector (ex H j o r t e n )

1652/3 D 1625 W r

Stockholm/C

800 600

687

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Built at

Displacement

Apollo

1622-^

1648 S u n k

Harbovik

Gustavus

1623/4 1623/4

1625 W r

Stockholm/C

600 800

1627 W r

Vastervilc/C

600

1624 B 1624/5

1628 W r 1649/50 D

(Dutch) Stockholm/C

700

1624/5 1625

1647 S 1 6 5 0 D (?)

Vastervik/C Stockholm/C

600

1625=^

1658 W r

Vastervik/C

1626/7

1645 W r 1646 S

Vastervik/C Gothenburg/C

1659 D

Stockholm

700 900

Viistervik/C Vastervik/C

900 900

Caesar (ex A l e x a n d e r Magnus) Kristina M e r c u r i u s (ex Svarta

700

Hunden) Achilles Tre Kroner S v a r d e t (ex S a m s o n ? ) Vastervik Vastgota Lejonet

800 800 700

Nyckeln Samson

1629 1630* 1631/2

Mars

1632"-

1659 W r 1660 D

Hans von Wismar

1632 P

1635 W r

(Imperial)

7 0 0 (?)

R e c o m p e n s (ex M a r i a Reconipens)

1632 P

1 6 5 8 FS

(Imperial)

600

Draken Jupiter

1632*

1652/3 D 1647 S France

Riga Gothenburg/C

900

1632*

Hannibal G o t e b o r g (built

1632/3

1636 W r 1652/3 D

Gothenburg/C (Albrekt van

5 5 0 (?)

1633 B

900

900

Velden, M)

at G o t h e n b u r g 1631/2) 1633/4

1647 S

Vastervik/C

800

Raphael (launched

1640 B

France 1660 S

Vastervik (M)

600

1639/40) Leoparden (launched

1641 B

1658 LA

V a s t e r v i k (C?)

600

R e g i n a (ex C h r i s t i n a )

1643/4

1647 S France

Stocldiolm

700

N y e St J a k o b

1644 P

1645 Ret

(Hamburg, M)

6 0 0 (?)

Nya Goteborg (ex S o p h i a )

1644 P

1645 S

(Denmark, M)

600

Oldenborg

1644 P

1667/8 D

(Denmark)

900

T r e L e j o n (ex T r e

1644 P

1659 D

(Denmark)

900

Stormaren

1644 P

6 0 0 (?)

1644 P

1645 W r 1680 D

(Denmark)

O r n e n (ex-Danish,

Neustadt

650

1648 G

Stockholm

700

Smalands Lejonet

1640/1)

Lover)

taken o n stocks) Julius

1646/7

France

688

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name V a s t e r v i k (ex S m a l a n d , B 1647) Wismar C a e s a r (ex H e l i g a Tre Konungar?) Maria C a e s a r , 1 6 4 8 St A n n a Apollo Andromeda Hercules, rebuilt 1689-90

Date

End

Built at

Displacement

1646/7

1676 B u r n t

Viistervik/C

600

1646/7 1647/8

1692 G

Wismar/C Wismar/C

650

650 850

1648 1648"^ 1648"^ 1649/50 1650

1677 P D a n 1675/6 D

Stockholm

1650 G

Stockholm

France 1675/6 D

Wismar/C

850

1655 W r 1710 S u n k

Stockholm

550 6 0 0 (?)

Wismar/C

850

Carolus, 1678/9

1650

1684 D

Stockholm

850

C a r o l u s I X (X) Mercurius, rebuilt

1651

1675 P D a n

Stocldiolm

650

1653 1653/4

1677 P D a n 1696/7 D

Stockholm

650

Viistervik/C

650

1666 S

Stocldiolm

550

Gothenburg (Denmark)

650

1670/1, Falken Amarant M a n e n (B 1 6 5 4 ) , r e built 1 6 7 5 - 7 6 later often Halvmanen Falken

1654=^

Portugal Goteborg

1656 1658 P

1681 D 1658 P D u

Delmenhorst

1658 P

Andromeda Danska Phoenix

1659

1658 P D u 1692 D

1659 P 1659 P

1675/6 D 1668 D

1659 P 1662 B

1666 S

(Courland)

1677 P D a n

(Vastervik's Ship Co.)

750

Pelikanen

Gra Ulven Leoparden Svenska Lejonet (built 1656)

(Denmark) Gothenburg (Denmark) (Denmark)

700 600 600 650 650 550

Spes, rebuilt 1689

1666

1697 W r

Stockholm

650

Nordstjarnan (armed

1670

1683 FS

Medelpad

600 550 650

transport) Neptunus

1673

1676 P D a n

Karlshamn

Sundsvall Laxen

1674

1676 W r

Medelpad

1675 Riga, b o u g h t o n stocks 1675 B

1679 P D a n 1683 G

Medelpad Riga (M)

U n n a m e d ship 1676=^ K a l m a r (ex Endriikten, 1677 B l a u n c h e d 1676?)

1676 P D a n 1677 L A D

Karlshamn Kalmar (M)

650

1678 Ret

(Swedish M)

600

700 700 550

C r o n s t i e r n a (ex Stjarnan)

1678 B

Stenbock

1679

1 7 1 3 BS

Stockliolm

550

Wachtmeister

1680/81

1719 P Rus

Riga (orig. C)

700

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

300 tonnes to 500 tonnes

Name

Date

End

Built at

Displacement

1519^

1529 S

Danzig

?

1519 F M / B 1521 B 1522 B

1523 Sunk? 1521 P D a n

(Liibeck, M ) (Liibeck, M )

3/400?

1522 L M

(Liibeck, M )

3/400?

Henrik Kroens skepp Peter Heysens skepp

1522 B 1522 B

1522 L M

(Liibeck, M )

1523 L M

(Liibeck, M )

3/400? 3/400?

Hans Burmester

1522 B

1522 L M

(Liibeck, M )

3/400?

skepp Ugglan (Johan

1522 B

1530=^ D

(Stralsund,

300?

Danziger Svanen/ Prysske Svanen, 1525/6 Store Svanen Carsten Todes hoik Bartuneren Wolter Kramers

?

skepp

M)

Trittelfitzes hoik) 1525 F M

1534 L M

-

?

before 1526

1 5 2 6 S (?)

-

?

L u m p e r ( s a m e as

before

1 5 2 6 S?

(Swedish M)

?

ship F M 1519?) B j o r n e n (B 1 5 2 2

1526 1532/4 D

?

?

Johan av H o y a s kravell (private, perhaps two different ships) J o h a n av H o y a s h o i k (private, p e r h a p s a ship b o u g h t 1522 and t u r n e d over to Count Johan)

and renamed?)

before 1526 1531=^

300

1532/3?

1560 D 1546 S

Stockholm

N y e H o l k e n , 1540/ 41 Kilen?

Stockholm?

500

Riksens Rads skepp

1534/5

1536 L M

Finland

4/600

1535 P 1553/

1546 L M

(Lubeck)

4/600

D r a k e n (ex large galley 1541)

4 ship

Lille K r a v e l e n / F a l k e n

(private) Galeonen

1563 L M

-

400

Troilus

1559/60

1571 G

Stocldiolm

300

H a m b u r g s Kravelen

1561 B

1563 LM, lost?

(Hamburg?)

?

Forgyllde (Gyllene) Lejonet

1562 B

1565 LA

(foreign)

450

Svenske/Store/Stock-

1563 B

1571/3 D

(Swedish M )

450

(Morianen), Duke Johan's ship

holms Hjorten

A P P E N D I X ONE

690 {cont.) Date

Name (Gavle) Bjornen

Built at

End

1563 B (G?) 1 5 7 1 / 3 S

(Swedish M )

Displacement 450

(Brune Bjornen) ( 1 5 6 3 - 6 4 also Gavle Hjorten) Pelikanen/Baggen

450

1563 B

1566 L M

1563 P

1570 D 1571 Ret

(Denmark)

1563 P

1569 G 1571/2 G

(Liibeck, M ) (Liibeck, M )

Rode Lejonet (Brokige Lejonet)

1563 P

1571 W r

(Liibeck, M )

St G o r a n Brommaren

1563 P

1565 P D a n

(Liibeck? M )

1564* 1564/5

1571/2 D 1574 S u n k

Helsingfors

300 300

Abo

300

1564 P

1570 S 1570 G

(Liibeck. M ) (Liibeck, M )

350 300

1576 G

(Liibeck, M )

300

1571 Ret 1571 Ret

(Denmark) (Denmark)

450 300

1571 G

Helsingfors

400

1570 D 1571/3 Ret

(Swedish M ) (Swedish M )

500 300

(Konigsberg

450

Danske Hector Danske Hjorten Brune Lejonet Rode Gripen

(Finske) M e m n o n Forgyllda D u v a n Lybske Christoffer Lybske H j o r t e n Danske David Danske Morianen Renen Algen

1563 P 1563 P

1564 P 1564 P 1564 P 1564 P 1565^^ 1565 B 1565 B 1565 P

Samson Pryssen

1573 D

-

(Denmark)

300 300 300 300 300

iVi J 1570 G 1569 Ret

(Lubeck? M ) (Holland, M)

1568 Ret

(Holland, M)

500?

1571 Ret 1594 L M

(Denmark)

400

Stockholm

300

1574 P

1582 S

(Liibeck, M )

450

1574 P

1576 W r

(Liibeck, M )

300

1574/5 Ret 1576/7

1575 W r

(Swedish M )

400

1591 B U

H a l i k o (?)

300

Halvmanen/Manen

1565 P

Jonas van E m d e n Hollands Morianen

1567 R e q 1567 R e q

Danske Bjornen

1570 P 1572

Lybska (Forgyllda) Duvan Lybska O r n e n H a l v m a n e n (= 1565)

Svanen (Nya Barken)

Renen (1577-79

400 500?

Finske Svanen?) 1577 P

1582 S

(France, M )

300

Franske Hjorten

1579 P

1581 G

(France, M )

300

Gamle Frantsen (Franske) N e p t u n u s A n g e r m a n n e Skeppet

1579 P

(France, M )

?

1579 P

1582 D 1582 G

?

1579''

1582 S

(France, M ) Angerman-

1581 G

land (England, M)

(Franske)

Ormen

Engelske/Lille A n g e l n 1581 P (possibly larger)

300 ?

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

691

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Lybske Delfin

1581 P

Stjarnan Gripen

1581/2 P/B? 1584 S

1582 G

1581/2 P/B? 1584 S

Built at

Displacement

(Liibeck)

?

(Viborg?, M?) (Greifswald,

300? 300?

M) Angermanne Kravelen

1583/4

R a u m o Skeppet,

1591/3

1597 L M

Raumo

?

1592/4

1594 L M

Alvsborg

?

(Halsinge) Lejonet (Gavle) Svanen

1593/4 1593/4

1601/2 T p

Iggesund

1593/4

Gavle Alvkarleby

400 400

(Gavle/Svenske) Bjornen

1 5 9 8 Sig. 1608 D

1586/7 S

Angerman-

300

land

1597 r e n a m e d ? (size u n c e r t a i n ) Nya Alvsborgs Slceppet, t o F i n l a n d w i t h Klas F l e m i n g 1594, r e n a m e d ? (possibly larger)

400

Ulven

1593/4

1 5 9 8 Sig.

Kungsor?

?

Naktergalen

1596 F M

Aland

?

Finske Angeln Hjorten

1597 F M

1 5 9 8 Sig. 1 6 0 6 D (?) 1 5 9 8 Sig.

F i n l a n d (?) ?

500

1598 F M 1 5 9 7 / 8 (?)

1606 T p

Viborg

300?

1598 F M

1606 L M

?

1595/6

1609 L M

?

300 500

Gripen (from Duke Karl 1598)

1590/1

1602 W r

Gripsholm

400

Vite Falken (from

1598 F M

1602 G

?

300

(Viborgs) Finske

?

Morianen (from S i g i s m u n d to D u k e Karl 1600) Enhorningen St E r i k ( f r o m D u k e Karl 1598)

D u k e Karl 1598) Achilles

1598 R e q

1601 L M

(Swedish M )

400?

Alvsborgs Hector Alvsborgs Svanen

1598 B

1608 W r 1611 W r

(Swedish M)

400

Alvsborg

?

1602 W r 1604 W r

Hudiksvall

400

Gavle

300

1598/9?

Halsinge Morianen Gavle Ulven

1598/9

Nykopings Morianen D u v a n , 1604 Finska

1599 F M 1599 F M

1604 Gift

Nykoping?

400

1606 W r

Finland?

400

1599 F M 1599 F M

1603 W r

?

400

1 6 0 9 W r (?)

Vastervik?

300

1598/9

Duvan Loparden Unge Ryttaren

692

A P P E N D I X ONE

{cont.) Name

Date

Built at

End

Displacement

Hannibal

1599=^

1611 LA

Nyk5ping

500

V i b o r g s Liljan

1599 P

(Sigism./Finl.)

Lybske (Forgyllda) Hjorten

1599 P

1 6 0 4 D (?) 1606 Tp?

(Liibeck, M )

300 500?

Lybske Forgyllde

1599 P

1 6 0 5 L M (?) ( L i i b e c k , M )

500?

1599 P

Lejonet, 1604/5 B l a L e j o n e t (?) Lybske Svanen

300?

1599 P

1600 Ret 1604 L M

(Liibeck, M )

Lybske Bjornen (never armed)

(Liibeck, M )

300

Lybska H a v f r u n ,

1599 P

1609 L M

(Liibeck, M )

300

1601 H a v f r u n Lybske Falken

1599 P

1609 L M

(Liibeck, M )

S a l v a t o r ( r e b u i l t at Kalmar 1604-06)

1 5 9 9 P (B)

1611 L A D

(Danzig, M)

300 400

Strutsen (Duke

1599/1600

1607 L M

Nykoping

300

Hercules Finske Bjornen

1599/1600?

1602 W r

Alvsborg

?

1600 P

1606 L M

(Sigism./Finl.)

Finske Morianen

1600 P

1606 T p

(Sigism./Finl.)

500? 300?

(Sigismund?)

300?

Karl's s h i p of 1590 rebuilt?)

(see 1597/8 a b o v e ) (Stockholms) 1600 F M / P ? 1604 W r Stjarnan

Nykoping? 1611 L A D 1612 P D a n K u n g s o r or Vasteras

Rode Hanen

1601/2?

Gule Lejonet

1601/2

Kalmar Valen

1601/2?

1611/2 D

K a l m a r (?)

300

Mercurius

1601/2

1622 W r

400

Obekant

1602 F M 1602 P

1611 LA

Gamla Lodose Stockliolm?

1607 L M

(Emden, M)

400 500

(Stralsund?,

300

Emder Fortuna/ Emderman Sundska Maria

1602 P o r B 1 6 0 9 L M

400 500

M) Jupiter Lybska/Lilla D u v a n

1603'^ 1 6 0 3 B (?)

1609 L M

Alvsborg (Lubeck)

300?

1609 L M

Bla O r m e n Alands Hjorten, 1612 Elefanten

1603 F M 1603/04

1612 P D a n

?

1625 W r

Aland

400 500

Nykopings Ulven

1603/4

1610 G

Nykoping

300

M a r s (ex S t e g e b o r g s Pramen)

1 6 0 3 / 4 (?)

1625 W r

S t e g e b o r g (?)

300

300?

693

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Built at

Displacement

Rabocken (ex-Wendekapan?)

1604 P or B 1607 W r

(German? M)

300

K o p e n h a m n s Juten

1604 P o r B 1609 L M

(Denmark, M)

500?

Apelbom

1604 B 1 6 0 4 B (?)

(Dutch, M)

500? 400

1608 S 1608 L M 1604 P o r B 1624 W r

(Bmden, M) (Dutch, M)

Hollands

Angela, 1616 Angeln

1604 P o r B 1 6 2 1 W r

(Dutch, M)

300

Hollands Hagern

1604 P or B 1608 W r 1604 P or B 1606 L M

(Dutch, M)

300

(M) Kalmar

?

Emder Morianen Hollands Falken,

400

1611 F a l k e n or Vita/Hollands Falken

Jonas (van Eckelfyr) Josua

1604 F M

1616 W r

300

region or Vastervik Orpheus

1605/6

(Hollands) Krabban

1605 P? 1607? P

Justitia N y c k e l n , 1 6 1 7 Lilla

1611 L A D 1612 P D a n

Kungsor

500 400 300

1612 W r

(Dutch M) (Privateer?)

1607/8

1630 W r

Kalmar

400

1607/8

1611 P D a n

Stegeborg

400

Nyckeln Jonas

(Stockholm?) R i d d a r St G o r a n Kolmards Bjornen Obekant Fortuna

Stocldiolm

1608"^

1611 L A D

(Stegeborg?) Kvarsebo

300

1608? P?

1612 D 1624 D

(Dutch? M)

400

(Dutch? M)

1608 LA?

(Dutch, M)

500 400?

1608 L M 1612 W r

(Dutch, M)

400?

(Dutch, M)

300

1608 L M

(Dutch, M)

?

1613 S 1 6 2 2 Tp

M(?) (Dutch, M) (Dutch, M)

300

(Dutch, M)

500

1621 W r

(Dutch, M)

500

1613 D 1623 D

(Dutch, M)

500

(Dutch, M)

300

1609 P

1609 L M

(Dutch, M)

?

1609 P

1609 L M

(Dutch, M)

?

1608 P H o l l a n d s R o d e Lejon 1608 P 1608 P Hollands Josua 1608? P Hollands Svanen Svarta H u n d e n

Meerman

1608? P 1609 P?

(Hollands) Spegeln

1609 P

Hollands Hjorten

400

1611 L A D

1608"^

(Hollands) O r a n i b o m 1609 P 1609 P (Hollands)

1 6 3 6 s (?) 1611 P D a n

500 500

Mjolkpigan (Hollands) Samson

1609 P

(Hollands) C o n c o r d i a 1609 P 1609 P (Hollands) Draken Hollands Unge Tobias Hollands Lejon

694

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name

Date

(Nykopings) Stjarnan 1610^ Ostgota Lejonet, f r o m 1610/1 D u k e J o h a n 1611

End

Built at

Displacement

1 6 2 6 D (?) 1 6 2 6 D (?)

Nykoping Stegeborg

4 0 0 (?)

161P

1625 W r

Kungsor

500

161P

1625 W r

Rido

400

1611 P

1612 L M

(Denmark)

400

1614/5

1630 W r

R i d o (?)

400

H a r b o Lejonet

1616

Perseus V a s t e r v i k (ex

1619/20 1620/21

1625 W r 1625 W r

Vasterviks Pinass) A n g e l n (ex Harboviks Pinass) Hector Jungfrun

500

( 1 6 1 1 - 1 7 Stageborgs Byggning) Orpheus (1611-1613/ 4 Kungsors RvCJCrn i n cj 1 Hannibal (1611-16 Store Vasteras Byggning) Jute/Danske Stjarnan Jupiter (1615-17 R i d o B y g g n i n g (?)) Harbovik

500

1625 W r

Vastervik/C Viistervik/C

500 300

162r

1625 W r

Harbovik

300

1622/3 1623 B

1625 W r 1647 S

Vastervik/C (Dutch)

500

Tigern

1624 B

1627 P

(Dutch)

450

Solen

1624 B

(Dutch)

450

Manen

1624 B 1624 B

(Dutch) (Dutch)

450 400

300

Poland

Regnbagen

1627 L A D 1 6 5 1 D (?) 1632 L M

Enhorningen Pelikanen

1624 B

1646 S 1635 W r

(Dutch)

350

1624 B

(Dutch)

(Forgyllda) B o n a n

1626 P

1639 T p

(Prussia)

300 400

(Danziger) Delfin (Danziger) M e e r m a n

1626 P 1626 P

1639 T p

(Prussia)

400

1639 T p

(Prussia)

400

Svarta H u n d e n St J a k o b

1626 P 1627/8 P

1 6 3 2 / 3 S? 1644 FS

(Prussia) (Privateer)

400

Jagaren

1629/30

1635 W r

Stocldiolm

450

Fortuna (contract-

1629/30

1645 W r

Horningsholm

500

Havfrun

1 6 3 0 / 1 B?

1657 FS

(Dutch?)

400

Falken

1631^ 1631 P

1651 W r

Stockholm

1 6 5 1 (?) D

(Imperial)

500 450

(Watterman)

built or bought)

T i g e r n ( s a m e as T i g e r n , 1624)

400

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

695

I52I-I72I

{cont.} B u i h at

Displacement

Date

End

1632 P

1667/8 D

(Imperial)

500

(Wismarske) Meerman

1632 P

1644 FS

(Imperial)

400

(Wismarske)

1632 P

1 6 3 5 / 6 S?

(Imperial)

300

1632 P

1 6 3 2 S (?)

1632 P

1 6 4 4 FS

(Imperial) (Imperial)

300 300

1632 P

1638 L M 1634 Gift

(Imperial) (Imperial)

300

1632 P 1633/4

1635 W r 1645 S

Viistervik/C S t o c l d i o l m (?)

500? 300

1651 S 1641 L M

Stockholm Norrkoping

450?

Name Salvator (ex K o n i g Caspar)

Meerweib, Maarwif St J a k o b (Wismarske/Lille) Delfin Noe Ark P h o e n i x , fluyt (Nye) Svarta H u n d e n Lammet Oxen

1633/4

Norrkopings Kompaniskeppet

1 6 4 0 B?

1 6 3 8 (?)

300

300

(The Ship Co.)

( l a u n c h e d 1639, probably not purc h a s e d u n t i l 1642) (Nya) Kattan Jagaren

1641/2 1641/2

Svanen (probably Norrkopings

1642 B

Stocldiolm 1647 S F r a n S t o c k h o l m 1659 P D a n (Vastervik's 1649 W r

350 500 450

Ship Co.)

Kompaniskeppet, 1639) Fama

1642/3 B

1657 FS

(Hie Ship PN 1

350

(Vasterviks) F o r t u n a

1643 B

1678 S t m k

Vastervik

500

(C?) (Swedish M ) (Denmark)

400

(launched 1642/3) Konung David

1643/4 B

1645 S

Tva Lejon

1644 P

1658 FS

Fides Nellebladet

1644 P 1644 P

1667 D

Neptunus Kronfisken

1644 P

1656 S u n k 1657 FS

1644 P

Havhasten Kalmar Nyckel

400

(ex T u Lover) (Denmark) (Denmark)

450 450

(Denmark)

350

1655 W r

(Denmark)

400

1644 P

1648 S u n k

(Denmark)

400

1644/5 B

1651 S

(The Ship Co.)

300

St P e d e r

1645 P

400?

1645

1645 S 1680 D

(Denmark M)

H j o r t e n (ex O r n e n )

Stocldiolm

450

Phoenix, r e b u i h 1675 Monikendam

1651

1698 D

Stocldiolm

400

1659 P

1671/2 D

(Dutch)

500

696

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name Hollandske Prinsen (ex P r i n s W i l l e m ) Kuriska Angeln Neptunus Recompens (St J o h a n n e s , s e e

Date

End

Built at

Displacement

1659 P

1660 Ret

(Dutch)

450?

1659 P

1667/8 D 1659 Sunk? 1662 W r

(Courland)

1659 P 1659 P

/Courland) (Courland)

500? 450?

(1659 P)

-

(Denmark)

(500)

1674* 1675 B

1694 S u n k

Stockholm Slite ( S w e d .

300

350

merchantmen hired 1657-60) Fredrika Amalia A b r a h a m (ex A b r a h a m s OfFrande) ( l a u n c h e d 1674) Delfin

1680 S

300

M) 1677

1700 FS

Stockholm

300

100 tonnes to less than 300 tonnes

Name

Date

End

Built/Origin

H a n s Brasks skepp

1 5 1 6 (?)

1523 L M

K a l m a r (?)

(bishop's ship) Jasper Bruns bark Arvid Kurcks skepp

1520 F M 1521 B

1522 L M

(Lubeck?) (Liibeck, M )

1522 W r

Displacement 200/250 ?

(bishop's ship) H a n s Brasks bark (bishop's ship) Simon Schultens skepp H e n r i k Berges skepp Henrik Gronenbergs

1522 F M

1522 W r

1522 B 1522 B 1522 B

1523 L M (Lubeck, M ) 1522 L M (Lubeck, M ) 1523/4 W r ? (Lubeck, M )

skepp (hoik) Greger Barckes skepp Samson (Kort Verfers

1522 B

1522 L M

(Lubeck, M )

1522 B

1523/4 W r

(Stralsund, M )

hoik) K o r t Konigs kravel,

1523/4 B

1523/4 L M

(Lubeck, M )

1525 F M

1525 W r §

250

1526 F M 1526 F M

1540 L M 1539 L M

1526/30 FM

1543 D

Stockliolm?

100? 1/200 ?

1526/30

1539 L M

Kalmar?

2/300? 2/300?

200? 200? 200?

s a m e as b e l o w ? Kravelen, possibly s a m e as a b o v e Lille S v a n ( S v a n e n ) Lange Barken Blockhuset (floating battery?) Algen/Kalmar Barken, t w o ships?

FM

2/300

LIST OF SWEDISH WARSHIPS, I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

697

(cont.) Name Bojorten, Gamle Bojorten Lybska B o j o r t e n , Severin Kijls b o j o r t (see b e l o w ) Segelskeppet V i b o r g s B a r k e n , 1540 Gamle/Store Viborgs Barken Nye Bojorten Store Marsebojorten, 1544 G a m l e B o j o r t e n (= Lybska B, above?) Segelskeppet S e g e l s k e p p e t , 1542 S t a l n a b b e n (or s a m e as b o u g h t in 1534) Kalmar/Stora Segelskeppet Finske Barken/Ugglan Flemingen Nya Viborgs Barken B r e m e r Bojorten/Lille Bojorten Gripen/Store Gripen Lange Barken (ex Segelskeppet (?)) N y e B o j o r t e n , 1560 Store Rabojorten Lose G a l e o n e n / Alvsborgs Galeonen Vasterviks Barken N y e B a r k e n , 1560 Kalmar Barken Finske Falken, D u k e Johan's ship until 1561 Finske H o k e n , D u k e Johan's ship until 1561 Alvsborgs Barken (FM 1560 b u t p r o b a b l y s a m e as galley b u i l t at A l v s b o r g 1 5 5 6 - 5 7 )

Date

End

Built/Origin

Displacement

1 5 3 3 / 4 B? 1536 L M

(Dutch?)

1534 P

1536 L M

(Liibeck)

1534 B? 1535="

1535 L M (?) ( D a n i s h ? ) 1546 S Viborg

200

1535 F M 1535? P?

1535 L M 1565 G

perhaps Dutch (Liibeck?)

100? 125

1535 P 1535 L M 1535 P (?) 1544 D

(Liibeck?) (Liibeck?)

100? 100?

1536*

1547 L M

Kalmar

100?

1536 F M 1537/8 1540* 1543 B

1552 1546 1547 1547

F i n l a n d (?) Finland Viborg (Bremen)

150? 2/300 150 100?

1544* 1548 (?)

1565 LA

Stockliolm Stoclcholm (?)

175 125

Stockholm

125

Alvsborg

100? 150 150

LM LM Wr S

1565 W r 1549* 1566 W r 1553*

1557 G

1553/4 1556*

1573 G 1578/9 D

Vastervik Stocldaolm

1556/7

1564 L A D

Abo

1556/7

1566 L M

Abo

1571/3 D

Alvsborg

1556/7

100?

100?

150 (?)

175

150

A P P E N D I X ONE

698 (cont.) Name

Date

End

Nykopings Barken Hollands Barken

1557^

1574 G

1559'^

Viborgs Barken Vite Falken Harmastaren (Store) R o d e H u n d e n Lybske N a c k e n Lybska H a v f r u n Rosen

1560'<1561 B

1565 W r 1565 W r 1563 W r

Jonas/Lille Juten Sturen

1563 P

A b o Klinkaren, 1565 Rabocken (Uven) Enhorningen (Finske) Ugglan

1561 P 1562 P 1562 P 1562 P 1563* 1563 P 1563/4

1565 D 1571/3 S 1566 T p 1563 L M 1576 W r 1566 T p 1566 G? (?) 1 5 7 4 S u n k

Built/Origin Nykoping Stockholm Viborg ? (Livonia) (Privateer) (Liibeck, M ) (Liibeck, M ) Stockholm (Danish, M) Danish, M) A b o (?)

Displacement 150

100 125 200 125 200

100 100? 150

100 100? 250

1564'<-

1577/8 BU

Helsingfors

175

1564 P?

1 5 6 6 D (?)

(origin uncer-

275?

1564 P 1564 P 1564 P

1570 G

(Liibeck, M )

1566 L M

(Liibeck, M )

1569 D?

(Liibeck, M )

275 175 125

1564 P

1569 G

(Liibeck, M )

125

1564 P

1567 D?

(Liibeck, M )

125

Jorgen) Klosterkon Flygande Draken Lybske Ugglan

1564 P 1564 P

1565 T p

(Liibeck, M )

125

1567 L M

125 ?

1564 P

1565 G

(Liibeck, M ) (Liibeck, M ) ?

Soldanen U n n a m e d ship,

1565 P 1567 B

1566 P 1568 L M

(England)

b o u g h t at V a r b e r g Lybske/Viborgs

1567 P

1574 S u n k

(Liibeck, M )

200?

Morianen Lille R o d e H u n d e n

1569 P

1570 Ret

1569=^

1571 G 1574 G

(Liibeck, M ) Kalmar

150? 150

Stocldiolm (English? M ) Hiiringe

100

1570 G 1581 G 1586 B U 1595 D / B U 1575 G

Abo? Bjorkeniis Bjorneborg

(ex Flygande Gejst?) Lybske Svanen Maria (ex-Angeln) (Lybske/Lille) David, 1566 D u k e Karl's ship Blamannen (ex-Morian) ( L y b s k e ) O x e n ( e x St

(Kalmar) Falken K u n g l i g M a j e s t a t s Jakt

tain)

1570

Engelska P i n k e n / M a r i a 1570 P Hiiringe Barken 1572* (K M t Jakt) Finske Barken/Falken (Kalmar) Bjornen Bjorneborgs Galejan/ Gripen

1572* 1572* 1573*

150? ?

150? 125 150 250 100/150

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

699

(cont.) Name Engelske Morian/

Date

End

Built/Origin

Displacement

1573 P

1578 L M

(English, M )

100

Nye Finske Galejan Lybske Jonas/Bla Pinken

1573/4 1574 P

1575 W r 1584 S

Finland (Liibeck, M )

100/150 100?

Helsingfors Barken Buffeln, 1579/80 Gripen

1574/5

1575 G

H e l s i n g f o r s (?)

100/150

1575/6

1587 B U

Stockholm?

150

Kalmar Skeppet

1575/6

1579 W r

Bjorkenas

150?

(Bojorten) F a l k e n ( s a m e as 1 5 6 9 )

1576 Ret

1 5 8 7 W r (?)1 -

1576 P 1577 P

1582 B U

Maria Anna

Juten Lybska H i n d e n Jagaren

1577 P

1578 G 1578 G

1577/8

Skorstensjakten Flytspanen Strutsen Odensvalan/Svalan (Josefspinken)

(Danish?, M) (Liibeck, M )

150 150?

?

100 100

1590 BU?

Hahko

150

1579''

1586 L M

1579 P

1582 S

Haliko ?

100?

1579 P

1582 S

?

100?

Marspinken

1579 P

1584 G

?

100?

Bjorneborgs Galejan/ Barken, 1582 R o d e

1580*

1591 B U

Bjorneborg

150

1580=^

1 5 9 8 Sig.?

Raumo

150

1580/1

1587 L M

Osterbotten

100

H a l i k o G a l e j a n , 1581 N y a B a r k e n , 1584

150

(Davidspinken)

Hunden R a u m o Galejan/ Jakten/Barken, 1586 K M t Bark, 1589 K M t L a n g e Bark, 1592 Lange Barken Osterbotten/ Norrbotten Barken Alvsborgs Barken Lybske O r m e n

158r

1586 W r

Alvsborg

100

1581 P

(Lubeck, M )

Blefanten/Rostock

1581 P

1587 S 1582 S

150 200?

1581 P 1585 F M

1583 S 1592 L M

(Lubeck)

?

K e x h o l m (?)

?

1585 F M

1592 L M

K e x h o l m (?)

?

1586 F M 1588 F M

1591 L M 1598 D?

Finland?

100? 150?

Skeppet Lybske M o r i a n Gripen Lejonet Mussar Barken Finske Barken

(Rostock, M )

Abo/Helsingf.?

700

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name Lille B a r k e n , K M t Lille B a r k

Date

End

Built/Origin

1588/9

1 5 9 8 Sig.?

Bergshammar?

150

Kexholni Kexholm

?

Displacement

Valen (bark) Tantheijen (bark)

1590 F M

1592 L M

1590 F M

1592 L M

Helsinge Barken/

1590/1

Helsingfors?

100?

Bocken Bergshammars

1 5 9 8 (?) LM

1592 F M

1599 L M

Bergshammar

100/150

Bjorneborg? ?

100/150 ?

(Sigismund)

200

?

(Groneborgs) Barken, possibly r e n a m e d 1599 Konungs Barken Ulven

1 5 9 1 / 2 (?) 1 5 9 8 L M

Hinden

1598 F M

Engelske Draken/ Engelsman

1598 P

Forlorade Sonen Danziger Angeln

1598 P 1598 P

1608 L M 1600 L M

(Sigismund) (Danzig, M )

150 150

Raven (from Duke

1597 F M

1600 L M

?

?

Mikael Angel (Gavle Angeln)

1598/9

1612/3 D

Gavle

200

Ornen

1599 F M 1599 F M

1608 L M

?

200

T r a n a n , also called

1605 L M

?

200

galley W o l g e m o t , also called

1599 F M

1606 L M

?

150

galley Halvmanen

1599 F M

1606 L M 1600 L M

? ?

150 100

1603 S

(Sigism./Finl.)

200

(Sigism./Finl.)

1599 P

1605 S 1600 L M

250 100

1599 P

1605 L M

(Lubeck, M ) (Liibeck, M )

Ginkenas Skeppet (renamed?)

1600 F M

1600 L M

?

1 5 9 8 Sig. 1604 L M

Karl 1598)

Stalnabben Finske/Attuna Angeln

1599 F M 1599 P

(Viborgs) V i l d m a n n e n 1599 P Lybska Fortuna Lybske H a n e n , Lybske

100

Pinken 200

Svarte Katter

1602 F M

1613 D

?

150

Jagaren Frisk o p p

1601/2

Nykoping

1602*

1626 W r 1612 D

Kalmar Angeln

leos"^

1612 D

Stockholm Kalmar region

200 200

Tigern

1 6 0 3 * (?)

1611 L A D

Kalmar region

Spanske Barken,

1603? P?

1604 L M

(Spanish, M?)

1603/4 ?

1632 D

Kalmar region?

200 250 ?

renamed? Leoparden

250

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

1521-1721

701

(cont.) Name Nykopings Rosen Halsinge Lejonet K r o n t e Svan (Hollands) Fisken Franciscus Weiers Pinke

Date 1603/4 1603/4 1 6 0 3 / 4 (?) 1 6 0 3 / 4 P? 1604 F M 1604 F M / P?

Scipio 1606 F M Lamprellen 1606"^ F i n k e n (ex old lodja, 1606 relengthened) built N a k t e r g a l e n (ex n e w 1606 r e lodja, lengthened) built Stalnabben 1607 F M Stabi 1607 F M Bistocken 1607/8 P N y e Bla F a l k e n 1608 F M Smalands Hjorten 1608/09? 1610 F M Angelus, Angeruds pinass Basiliscus 1610 F M St P e r 1610 F M U n g e / L y b s k e S a l v a t o r , 1610? P 1613 S a l v a t o r Alvsborgs Angeln 1611 B (?) (Erik Siggessons s k e p p ) h i r e d ? Size uncertain S k o t s k e L e j o n e t , n e v e r 1611 B (?) b o u g h t ? Size uncertain 1612 F M J o n a s , ex m e r c h a n t m a n (?), o n e of the two mentioned above? P e r h a p s larger Jonas 1 6 1 8 (?) FM 1 6 2 2 / 3 (?) Jonas Papegojan 1624 B Storken 1624 B 1628 P Slusskryparen 1628/9 J u s t i t i a ( e x galley. 1623/4)

Built/Origin

End 1611 1613 1607 1605 1612 1607

G Tp Wr LM LAD Wr

Nykoping Enanger Strangnas? (Holland, M) ?

(privateer?)

Displacement 150 200 250 200 100 100

? 1611 W r 1612 P D a n A l v s b o r g 1614 D Stocldiolm

200 200 100

1614 D

Stocldiolm

100

?

200 100 100 200? 150? 150

1621 1613 1608 1608 1611 1619

Wr D Wr Wr LAD D

? ? ?

Bjorkenas? Angered ?

? 1622 D 1611 P D a n ? 1 6 2 6 D (?) ( L u b e c k , M )

150 150 200

1611 L M

(Swedish M )

?

1611 L M

(Scottish M )

?

1612 L A D

(M?)

?

1621 L M

?

100?

1639 1644 1635 1632 1636

Stocldiolm/C (Dutch) (Dutch) (Polish? M ) ?

125 250 250 125? 100?

Wr Sunk Wr LM Wr

702

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name (Vasterviks) Makrillen (ex galley 1623/4)

Date 1628/9

K a t t a n ( o a r e d p i n n a c e / 1 6 3 1 (?)

End 1 6 5 0 (?) D

Built/Origin Viistervik/C

Displacement 100?

1 6 4 3 / 4 D (?) S t o c k h o l m (?)

200?

struss) Forliingaren (ex V o r l a n g e r )

1632 P

1636 S

(Imperial)

250

St M i k a e l Muskijl

1632 P 1632 P

1647/8 S 1635 L M

(Imperial)

250

(Imperial)

250

Vita H u n d e n

1632 P

1636 S

(Imperial)

250

Turturduvan, Duvan Plioenix

1634/5 1634/5

1638 W r

Stockholm?

?

1646 W r

Naktergalen

1635/6

Stockholm? Stockliolm?

150? 150?

S t o c k h o l m (?)

200

(ex W e i s s e r H u n d )

(Vast Indiske) Gripen (perhaps bought 1639) Hoken

1658 T p (?) 1 6 3 6 / 7 (?) 1 6 4 7 S

1644 1645'<-

1674/5 D Stockholm 1647 L M (?) K a s e b u r g (?)

250

Postiljon/Postryttaren (ex Perseus?) Herdinnan (ex H a r d e r i n n e )

1645 B

1649 S

(Dutch)

150

Rosen Galeja

1645 P

1657

(Denmark)

125?

1645 P

custom 1653

(Denmark)

125?

custom 1654 L M

Stocldiolm?

125?

1663 S

Stockholm

125 250

S a m s o n Galeja

?

(Forgylda) Gasen Postryttaren

1648=^ 1 6 4 9 (?)

Jagaren

1651

Forgyllda Lejonet Delfin

1654?

1655 W r

Stocldiolm?

100/150

1655

Gothenburg

200

Kaseburg

100 200

1676 b u r n t § S t o c k h o l m

M j o h u n d e n (Boyer)

1656/7

1658/9 L M 1680 L M

Fagel Struts

1657/8

1674 S u n k

(Danske/Vita) Svanen (Danske) Falken Sjoblad

1658 P 1658 P

1 6 7 6 PS 1664 L M

1658 P

1664 L M

Danske Gripen

1658 P

1 6 5 8 / 9 FS c 1680 D

Wolgast (Denmark) (Denmark) (Denmark) (Denmark)

200? 200 200? 250

(ex G r i b b e n ) H a n d (ex struss)

1660

Margareta (ex-struss)

1660

Bodekull 1676 P D a n B o d e k u l l

125?

(Lille) J u p i t e r (ex struss)

1661

1666 W r

Gothenburg

150?

R a p h a e l (ex struss)

1661

1677? L M

Gothenburg

125?

100

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

703

(cont.) Name

Date

Postiljon, lengthened

Built/Origin

End

Displacement

1662

1683 FS

Gothenburg

200

U n n a m e d frigate, laid d o w n 1660/1

-

1662 C a n e

Gothenburg

200

Uttern

1672

1681/2 D

Enhorn

1674 B

1 6 7 4 , 2 5 0 ts

Grone Jagaren

1675 B

Gripen

1676'^ (?) ( S t r a l s u n d s k e ) G r i p e n / 1676=^ (?)

Greif Unnamed Laurentius (Boyer) (Stralsundske) Falken) K a r i s l i a m n ( s a m e as

Medelpad 1676 P B r a n ( K G Wrangel) 1680 L M / S ? ( M G d e la Gardie) 1678 L M 1 6 9 4 S (?)

125 100?

Gothenburg

125?

Pomerania

100?

1676* 1676 P D a n K a r l s h a m n 1 6 7 6 B (?) 1 6 7 9 T p ? (Swedish M?) 1676/7 1678 P D a n S t r a l s u n d 1677 P

1698 S u n k

(Denmark)

1678

1689 W r

Kalmar

1678

1679 W r

Fama

1 6 7 8 (?)

M a r g a r e t a ( s a m e as

1679 Ret

1709 FS 1686 D

Kalmar Kalmar

unnamed Castor

250

100

too? 125 100

1676)

Pollux

Bodekull

125 1 2 5 (?) 150 125?

1660/1)

Less than 100 tonnes Vessels mainly used for transport purposes and very small armed craft are not included. Information is more uncertain and incomplete than for larger warships.

Name

Date

End

Built/Origin

H a n s B r a s k s lilla j a k t D e n Store lakt

1522 F M

1523 L M

1525 F M

1525 L M

?

Berend von Mehlens

1525 F M

1525 L M

(B V M e h l e n )

Snorenalen, jakt

1525 F M

1530? D

?

Bose H u n d , jakt (same

1525 F M

1529 L M

?

1526 F M

1527/31 D

?

jakt

as B V M e h l e n s j a k t ? ) R h u t e m b e r g s (?) j a k t I v a r F l e m i n g s lilla j a k t

1526 G

(Ivar Fleming)

Displacement

704

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name

Date

End

I v a r F l e m i n g s jalct

1526/30 FM

1531 L M

Braskens jakt Lilla J a k t e n / L a n g a

1527 F M

1528 L M

H a n s jakt Lilla J a k t e n / L e o n e n Bengt Svenssons jakt M a n s Svenssons jakt Lilla J a k t e n Nya Jakten Lilla N y a J a k t e n Spillavalling Snapphanen Ivar Flemings jakt ( s a m e as 1526?) Svarte Prisen Anders Vastgotes

Built/Origin (Ivar Fleming) ( H a n s Brask) ?

1526/31 FM 1526/31 FM

1532 L M

?

1526/31 M 1526/31 M 1526/31 M 1526/31 M 1526/31 FM

1531 L M ?

1526/31 M 1533 F M 1534 F M

1533 L M 1534 L M

1 5 3 4 P (?) 1 5 4 1 L M 1535 F M

marsejakt Lille B o j o r t e n 1535 (P?) G r i p g e t e n ( f i s h i n g b u i : 11545 F M Svante Stures jakt 1545 B Gamla/Stora Pinken 1545 Gamla Jakten 1547 F M N y e Pinken, 1552 1547 Hollands Pinken

?

(Ivar Fleming) (Liibeck?)

1535 L M

(Anders

1 5 4 3 D (?) 1552 L M

Vastgote) (Lubeck?) ?

1545 L M 1565 S

(Svante Sture) Kalmar

1556 L M 1562 L M

Kastelholm Stocldiolm

Bocken

1549 F M

1561 L M

(Viborgs) Hjorten Lange Juten

1549 F M 1549 F M

1565 L M

V i b o r g (?) V i b o r g (?)

1556 L M

V i b o r g (?)

(Viborgs) H i n d e n Stalniibben Jakten, 1556 G a m l a

1549 F M

1565 L M

V i b o r g (?)

1549 1551 F M

1556 L M 1560 L M

Abo

1552/3

1565 L M

Abo

1 5 6 4 (?)

Helsingfors

Jakten A b o Jakten, D u k e Johan's 1556-63 N y a J a k t e n , 1 5 5 9 Lilla Nya Jakten Lotsmanspinken Lille R a b o j o r t e n Stora Jakten/

1556

Raseborg?

LM 1557/8

1569 D 1566 D

Stocldiolm

1557/8 1558/9 P

1562 Ret

(Reval)

1558/9 P

1562 Ret

(Reval)

Stockholm

Busmandsjakten Pinken

40

75 75

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

705

(cont.) Name Fingerhott Stora N y a Jakten,

Date

End

Built/Origin

Displacement

1558/9 P 1559

1562 Ret 1565/6 L M

(Reval) Helsingfors

40

1561

1566 L M

Viborg

50

1 5 6 1 B? 1562

1564 L M

(Hamburg)

1566 W r

Viborg

60

1562?

1570 L M 1565 W r

Viborg Kalmar

75

Lybske Bojorten

1564/5 1564 P

Skotske Pinken

1564 P

(larger?) Miserikert

1564 P

1563 H e l s i n g f o r s Jakten (1565 Marcolphus) Viborgs Gripen (1563 Marcolphus/ Pippingen) H a m b u r g s Bojorten Viborgs (Finske) Falken (1563 BufFeln/Pippingen) Flundran Ornen

1569 G 1566 L M

(Liibeck) (Denmark)

1567/8 T p 1564 P (?) 1 5 6 5 W r 1564 P (?) 1 5 6 8 T p

?

Lybska Havfrun/Lille Bojorten

1564 P

1566 L M

(Liibeck)

Stalnabben

1565 P

1582 G

?

(Lybske) Foxen Engelske Pinken Sjohunden

1565 P 1571 Ret (Liibeck) 1 5 6 5 P (?) 1 5 6 9 P D a n ? 1566 P 1568 T p (Lubeck)

Flygande Serpenten

1566 P

1574 s u n k

(Liibeck

1566/7

1567 L M 1567 L M

Varberg Varberg

1570 D

( P r u s s i a ?)

Hollands Bojorten H a m b u r g s Bojorten (Pinken) (perhaps

? (Hamburg?)

s a m e as 1 5 6 1 )

(belonged to Joran Persson 1566-68) Jakt ( u n n a m e d ) Jakt ( u n n a m e d ) Bornholms Pinken/

1566/7 1568 P

Konsbergs Jakten Flygande Gejst Prysske Pinken

1568 P 1569 P

1571 G 1571/3 D

(Lubeck) (Prussia?)

Ragpinken

1569 P

1571 L M

?

Lybska Bojorten

1570 P 1570 P

1570 S

(Liibeck)

1570/3 G

(Danish?)

1570 P

1571/? D

?

Gotlands Pinken, Ugglan Faie T a s k a n (Vegetaskan)

30

706

APPENDIX ONE

{cont.) Name L y b s k a Bla D u v a n (size u n c e r t a i n ) F r o k e n s Jakt Bjorne Dansen (Rode David) (possibly larger) Delfin (Dolphin) Engelske O r n e n L o t s m a n s b a t e n , 1578 Klosshuggaren Engelske Pinken/ Minion Petrus A r m e d b o a t / j a k t at Alvsborg (two different?) Roda Pinken Vatehonan Rundelen/Abraham Paven/Ulven Lybska Katten Svarte D r a k e n Stormpinken/ Lotsnianspinken Svarta P i n k e n Lybske Bojorten Hagern Gromen/Grymen, Princess A n n a ' s jakt 1 5 8 5 - 8 7 ( a n d later?) Ulven, Kungsors Jakten/Barken Kammarjakten, Kammarpinken L y b s k e Lille S v a n e n Hirsen N a c k e n (to K e x h o l m 1581/2) Samson Ugglan (renamed A r t a n 1583?) Laxen Alen

Date

End

Built/Origin

1571 P

1571/3 G

(Liibeck)

1572 1573 P

1581 G 1575 G

S t o c l d i o h n (?)

1573 P 1573 P 1573 P

1574 W r 1575 S 1582 S

(Engl./Scot.) (French?) ?

1573 P

1575 G

(Enghsh)

1573 P 1574 F M

1575? G 1577 L M

(English)

1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574

1576 G 1578 W r 1574/7 G 1575 S 1577 B U 1580 B U 1581 S

(Liibeck?) (Liibeck?) (Liibeck?) (Liibeck)? (Liibeck) (Liibeck?) (Liibeck?)

1577 P 1577 P 1579 P 1580

1581 1578 1581 1590

?

1580/1

1 5 9 2 / 3 D?

Kungsor

1581

1603 L M

Lake M a l a r e n

1581 P 1581 P 1581?

1582 L M 1581 G 1592 L M

(Lubeck) Sibbo

1581? 1581?

1588 L M 1583 L M

Kexholm? Kexholm?

1582 (?) 1582 (?)

1591 L M 1592 L M

K e x h o l m (?) K e x h o l m (?)

P P P P P P P

G R G D

Displacement

?

?

(Lubeck) (French?) Drakenas

?

75?

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

707

(cont.) Name

Date

Siken

1 5 8 2 (?)

A r t a n (ex U g g l a n ? )

1583 F M

End 1592 L M 1588 L M

N y a J a k t e n / K r a k a n (?), 1 5 8 4 F M Duke Sigismund's jakt

1587 L M

Oxen (renamed?) Uttern

1585 F M 1585 F M

Kalmar Pinken Hertig Sigismunds

1585 F M 1586 F M

1585 1592 1587 1589

Pinke Kanslijakten,

LM LM S LM

1587

1603 L M

Kanslipinken Oxen Harda/K Mts Jakt

1589 F M

1593 L M

Vasterviks Pinken Lilla J a k t e n , Lilla

1589 F M 1590 F M

1591 L M 1595 L M

spingjakten Lotsmansbaten

(more

Built/Origin K e x h o l m (?) K e x h o l m (?)

K e x h o l m (?) K e x h o l m (?) ?

1590 F M

1595 L M

than one?) Bergshammars Pinken Stortenbeck (renamed

1590/1 1592 F M

1595 L M

galley?) (K M t s ) N y a Jakt,

1 5 9 2 (?)

1594 L M

Bergshammar

1592? B

1597 L M

1592 F M 1593 F M 1593 F M

(?) (Baner?) ?

1597 L M

B e r g s h a m m a r s Jakten Djm'sholms Skeppet Danska Pinken Stora Jakten (Alvsborg) Lilla J a k t e n ( A l v s b o r g ) A n d e r s Boijes Pinke Lybska Pinken/

1598 F M

1598 1597 1597 1600 1602

Vinpinken A n d e r s Rickes Pinke

1598 F M

1598 L M

(private?) Flytspanen/Flygspanen Larkan

1599 F M 1600 F M

1603 L M 1601 L M

Svarte R a p p e n Alvsborgs D u v a n Lilla P i n a s s e n ,

1603 F M 1603 F M 1603/04

1609 L M

1604 F M

1607 L M

1605 F M 1606 F M

1605 L M 1607 L M

1597 F M

LM LM LM LM LM

1610 W r 1604 L M

probably renamed, possibly larger Weiers Falken Harkranken WMher, pinnace

Bergshammar

Alvsborg? Alvsborg?

Nykoping

Displacement

708

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Resenis, pinnace

1606 F M

Liljan (ex lodja), pinnace

1606

1607 L M 1613 L M

Stockholm

1611 P D a n

Stockholm

1608 L M 1613 D

?

1607 L M

?

1608 L M 1607 L M

?

?

rebuilt

(Lilla) R o s e n ( e x

1606

lodja), pinnace Liirkan, p i n n a c e

rebuilt 1606 F M

Oforsagd Ofornamnd, pinnace

1607 F M 1607 F M

Gripen, pinnace

1607 F M

Hannibal, pinace

1607 F M 1607 F M

Biikstert(?), p i n n a c e Alands Pinass

Built/Origin

1608 F M

?

?

1607 L M

?

1608 L M 1612 D

Aland

Pickala Pinass Bjorneborgs Pinass

1608 F M 1608 F M

A b o Pinass

1608 F M

Emsala Pinass Helsingfors Pinass

1610 F M 1610 F M

Borga Pinass

1610 F M 1611 F M

1610 L M 1611 L M

Rosen

1612 F M

1612 L M

(Privateer?)

Lybska Baten, possibly larger

1629 F M

1642/4 T p

(Liibeck?)

1629 F M

1645 L M

(?) 1629 F M

1640 L M

Rubben, Fribytarskeppet

Bojorten, 1633 P o s t r y t t a r e n (?) Lilla B o j o r t e n , 1 6 3 3 S k r a p e n k o r f (?)

1615 Tp?

Pickala Bjorneborg

1608 L M 1610 L M

A b o (?)

1611 L M

H e l s i n g f o r s (?) Borga

Emsala

(Privateer?)

(?) 1639 or 1641 B

1668 L M

Stettin ?

Rapphanen

1641 B 1642

1649 G 1652

S t e t t i n (?)

Rode Hanen

1642?

1679 L M

Storen

1643 F M

Svarta H u n d e n

1643?

1659 D ? 1 6 6 1 S (?)

Vita H u n d e n Ugglan

1643?

1658 L M

K a s e b u r g (?) K a s e b u r g (?)

1644?

1673 L M

K a s e b u r g (?)

Danske Prinsen Vaktaren

1644 P

1664 L M

1645 F M

(Denmark) 1659 P D a n ?

Nasvis

1645 F M

1653 L M

?

Storken

1647 F M 1 6 5 5 (?)

1652 S

?

1680 D

S t o c k h o l m (?)

Jagaren, 1660s G a m l e Jagaren Postpferd

?

custom

(Forgyllda) Gripen

Pomerania? ?

Displacement

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

709

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Built/Origin

Ulvsund

1655

1663 W r

Kungsor

Sparven, custom yacht in t e m p o r a r y naval

1657 F M

1658 L M

?

1657 B

1675 W r

1657 B

1680 S

(Holland) (Holland)

Displacement

service Fly O p p (ex V l i e g o p ) Fortuna (Hollands/Lille) Jagaren

1 6 5 7 (B?) 1 6 7 7 P D a n 1 6 5 7 (B?) 1 6 5 8 l o s t ? 1 6 5 7 (B?) 1 6 5 8 L A D a n s k e Svarta H u n d e n 1658 P 1659 P D a n Spes 1658 P 1663 W r Marsvinet 1659 F M 1674 W r Masen 1666 B 1686 S F o r t u n a (ex E n d r a k t ) G i i d d a n (ex M a k a l o s )

Posthornet Rabocken Ekorren

1666 F M 1674 B

Sjoliasten

1 6 7 5 (?)

Venus K a p a r e n ( e x St J a k o b )

1 6 7 5 (?)

Sjomannen Konung David (St) M a r i a Tre Broder St J o h a n n e s

1666 B

1675 P 1 6 7 5 B?

(Holland?) (Wismar?) (Wismar?) (Denmark) (Denmark, M?) ?

(Holland)

1679 W r

(Holland) 1679 (?) L M ? 1 6 7 7 P B r a n (L C r e u t z ) 1676 P D a n S t o c k h o h n ? 1677 P D a n G o t h e n b u r g ? 1679 L M

(Danish, Priv.)

1679 custom

(M?)

1 6 7 5 B? 1675 F M

1676 P D a n ( M ? ) 1676 P B r a n (M?) 1 6 7 5 / 6 P? 1676 L M (Dutch?)

Anna Margareta

1 6 7 5 / 6 B? 1 6 8 0 S (M?) 1 6 7 6 (?) 1677 P D a n G o t h e n b u r g ? 1676 B 1676 P D a n (K G

G r o n a (Flygande)

1677

Diana

75 60

60

Wrangel) Draken Lille J a g a r e n

1677 P D a n (M?)

FM/B 1677 F M

1680 LM/S? P o m e r a n i a ?

Part 2. Galleys

1521-1679

Part 2 is arranged as part 1, except that no individual displacements are calculated for each galley. From the available information (several armament lists, a plan for manning from 1556/57, and the circumference of anchor cables) it may be calculated that most galleys built from 1540 to 1562 were of around 75 to 150 tonnes. A few (marked large)

A P P E N D I X ONE

710

were larger, possibly up to 200 tonnes, and a few (marked small) were smaller, possibly around 50 tonnes. Draken (1541) was a "great galley", later regarded as (converted to?) a sailing warship. Most of the galleys built in the 1580s were of around 125 to 150 tonnes. Most galleys built in the 1620s were small and lightly armed amphibious craft which had no capability to fight major warships with guns. Dimensions from a contract (keel 60 feet, beam 13 feet, draught 3 to 4 feet) indicate a size of 40 to 50 tonnes. Four of them were larger and also called pinnaces. Some galleys were renamed early, but in most cases the names cannot be connected with the place of building. The total number of galleys built fr om 1620 to 1624 was probably 28, built at Abo (4), Stocldiolm (up to 11), Vastervik (5), Harbovik (at least 2), Stegeborg (at least 4), and Viborg (at least 2). The two galleys built in 1675 in Bohuslan for the Gothenburg squadron were built at local yards at Svansund and in Frakne hdrad, but the correspondence between the names and the building yards has not been found.

Name Ulven, 1541 L i n d o r m e n

Date 1540 F M

Built at

End 1559 B U

Stockholm

Size Large

(?) Siangan

1540 F M

D r a k e n (Stora Galejan)

1541

Igeln/Liljan Snorepilen

1541 1542*

Bjornen

1542/3

1548/52 D

(?) 1553/4 ship Stoclcholm 1555/6 W r Stockholm 1565 D Stockholm 1562 L M Stockholm

Enliorningen

1542/3

1563 L M

Uroxen Buffeln

1543 1543

1 5 6 7 D (?) 1563 L M 1556 B U 1563/4 L M 1552 L M

Finska Galejan

1543

Rosen

1544

Turken G a l l e y at V a d s t e n a

1545 1545/6

Stockholm

1559 L M

Stockholm Stockholm Stockliolm Abo

400 S m a l l (?) Small Large Large

Stockholm Stocldiolm Vadstena

(Lake Viittern) Soldanen Morianen, to D u k e

1546 1546

1 5 6 3 (?) B U S t o c k l i o l m 1 5 6 1 L M (?) S t o c k h o l m

Hjorten Havfrun

1547 1 5 4 7 (?)

1 5 6 7 D (?) 1561 L M

Stocldiolm Stockholm

N y a Galejan later n a m e d , see b e l o w

1548

1549 L M

Stocldiolm

J o h a n 1558

L a r g e (?)

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

711

(cont.) Name Unnamed

Date

End

Built at

Lose Segelskeppet, 1560

1547/8 1549

1562 W r

Alvsborg Stockholm

Lose Galejan Flytspanen, to D u k e

1551 F M

1562 L M

Stockholm

1552 F M

1565 W r

(?) Stockholm

Lille G r i p e n

1552 F M

1572 D

(?) Stockholm

Lille L e o n e n

1552 F M

1566 D

(?) Stockholm

Lose Klinkan Turken

1 5 5 3 (?) 1554/5

1560 L M 1566 L M

\V Alvsborg Ekolsund

N a c k e n , to D u k e Karl 1570

1556

1575 LM?

Stockholm

Springvalen

1556

1565 W r

Galley at A l v s b o r g ,

1556/7

J o h a n 1556 Ulven, D u k e Johan's

1552 L M

galley 1 5 5 8 - 6 3

-

Size

Small

Small

Stockholm Alvsborg

p r o b a b l y s a m e as Alvsborgs Barken 1556/7 Lille S v a n e n

1557 1557/8

1575 D

Stockholm

Hollands Galejan

1570 D

Stockholm

Galley on Lake V a n e r n

1559

1565 L M

Vadsbo

?

Galley on Lake V a n e r n Liljan

1559 1562

1565 L M 1570 S

Vadsbo Stockholm

?

Forgyllda G r i p e n , to

1569*

1576 L M

Stockholm

Small

?

(?)

D u k e Karl 1570 Falken/Koppargalejan

1583/4

1597 B U ?

Lindormen

1583/4

1 5 9 5 D (?)

Borstil, Roden

Small

Ostkind or

Large

Rotskar Jagaren

1583/4

1591 W r

Ostkind or Rotskar

Gripen Liljan

1584/5

1594 L M

1584/5

1593 L M

Helsingfors Abo

Hjorten

1585/6 1585/6

1595 L M

O s t k i n d (?)

1592 L M

O s t k i n d (?)

Hinden Ulven

1585/6

Vattuhonan, renamed? Algen

1585/6

1590 LA 1587 L M

Narpes Finland

1586*

1594 L M

Svalan

1587*

1593 W r

S e l a n g e r (?) Angermanland

Large?

A P P E N D I X ONE

712 (cont.)

Date

Name

Built at

End

galley,

later n a m e d

1586/7

1587 L M

galley,

later n a m e d

1586/7

1587 L M

Skelleftea Skelleftea

1586/7

1589 L M

Raumo

1587/8

1588 L M

N a r p e s (?)

1588"*

1589 L M

Esbo

1588*

1589 L M

Sibbo

1588 F M

1591 L M

Finland

A b o G a l e j a n , r e n a m e d (?) 1588'^ Alvsborgs Galejan, 1593 1587/9 Alvsborgs Barken

1590 L M 1 5 9 7 D (?)

Abo Alvsborg

H a v f r u n ( e x ?)

1596 D?

?

R a u m o Galejan, r e n a m e d (?) Osterbottens/

Size

Norrbottens Galejan, renamed

(Finske

Esbo Galejan, r e n a m e d (?)

Sibbo Galejan, r e n a m e d (?)

Finske Falken ^ (= O s t e r b G?)

S e r i s s a n ( e x ?) N a k t e r g a l e n ( e x ?)

1589 F M 1589 F M 1589 F M

1598 D? 1 5 9 5 L M (?)

1589 F M 1589 F M

1595 L M

D u v a n ( e x ?) K r a k a n ( e x ?)

1589 F M

1595 L M 1596/8 L M

Norrfinska Galejan Soderfinska Galejan

1589* 1589*

1591 L M

Lattis

1589 G

Kimito

Bjorneborgs Galejan, renamed?

1589*

1590 L M

Bjorneborg

Finske H e c t o r (ex A b o Galejan?)

1589 F M

1589 L M

Finland

F i n s k e S v a n e n ( e x ?)

1589* 1590 F M

1593 L M 1593 L M

Lattis

D e n M a l a d e U l v e n (ex ?) H a g e r n ( e x ?) ( t y p e

1591 F M

1594 L M

?

1597 F M

1597 L M

?

1598 F M

1 5 9 8 Sig.

?

1598 F M 1598 F M

1602 L M

?

1609 L M

?

Small Small

1598 F M

1600 L M

?

Small

U t t e r n ( e x ?) ( F i n s k a ) J u n g f r u n ( e x ?)

1589 F M

1595 L M

(= Uttern?)

?

uncertain) D r o t t n i n g Gunilla Galeja ( e x ?), r e n a m e d ? Stora Galejan (possibly s a m e as D r o t t n i n g Gunillas Galeja 1597) Jungfrun Postpferd Munken

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

713

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Built at

Size

Stora Galejan, D u k e Carl's Galeja

1598*

1602 W r

( H e r r e n s / K M t s ) Lilla

1 5 9 8 F M (?)

1611 P D a n ?

Norrkopings Galejan, renamed?

1599

1603 L M

Norrkoping

Gripsholms Galejan,

1599

1612 D

Gripsholm

1599 1599

1602 W r

Kvicksund

1599 L M

Sodertalje

Mellersta Galejan, renamed? A n g e l n ( e x ?)

1599 F M

1600 L M

?

1600 F M

1604 L M

Nykoping?

Hjorten

1600? 1600 F M

1605 L M 1611 D

Torshalla? Abo?

Stegeborgs Galejan,

1600 F M

1600 L M

S t e g e b o r g (?)

renamed V a l e n (ex S t e g e b o r g s

1601 F M

1605 L M

?

1606 F M

1606 L M

E k o l s u n d (?)

1 6 0 7 F M (?)

1623/4 D

?

1608 F M 1609 F M

1621/2 D

Gripsholm?

Remus (Remalus)

1618 D

?

V a l e n ( s a m e as

1610 F M

1611 P D a n ?

1611 F M 1611 F M

? 1611 L M 1611 P D a n ?

b e f o r e 1618

1 6 2 1 D (?)

Stegeborg?

L a r g e (?)

before 1618

1621 L M

Stegeborg?

Small

1620 F M

1621 L M

Nykoping

Galejan

1600 F o r t u n a Kvicksunds Galejan Galley b u i l t at Sodertalje, n a m e d ?

A b o Galejan (Finske Hector)

G a l e j a n ? ) ( s a m e as Valen

1610-11?)

E k h o l m s u n d s Galeja, renamed K Majestats Forgyllda Galeja Romulus

1601-05?) Rubets Springvalen Hertig lohans store

Small Small

galeja, p r o b a b l y s a m e as S t o r e O s t g o t e Galejan Hertig lohans mindre galeja, p r o b a b l y s a m e as Lille G a l e j a n , r e n a m e d c.1621? Nya Galejan, n a m e d 1 6 2 1 (?)

Small

714

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name 4 u n i t s , all c a l l e d N y a

Date 1620^

End 1621 L M

Built at Abo

Size Small

Finska Galejan or A b o Galejan, n a m e d 1621/2 1621 F M Friskopp, renamed 1621/2 F M Romulus 1621/2 F M S k a k t a n , r e n a m e d (?)

1622 L M

Small Small

1622 L M

Small

M a s e n , r e n a m e d (?)

1621/2 F M

1 6 2 9 (?) L M 1622/3 L M Abo? 1622/3 LM Abo?

Svalan, r e n a m e d Duvan, renamed

1621/2 F M 1621/2 F M

1622 L M

Salen

1621/2

1629 L M

Remains

1621/2 1622 F M

1626 L M 1626 L M

1622 F M

1628/31 L M 1622 L M

S t a Bi Sjohunden/Skytthunden Vasen, renamed

1622 F M

Venus

1623 F M 1623 F M

Neptunus

Abo? Abo? Stegeborg Stegeborg

Small Small Small Small Small Small Small? Small

1626 L A / W r

Small Small

1 6 2 9 (?) L M 1632 L M

Small Small

Cupido Tanthej Springvalen

1623 F M

Havfrun

1623 F M

Rudan

1623 F M 1623 del.

1626 LA Vastervik/C

Small Medium

1623 del.

1628/9 ship Vastervik/C

Medium

Raven Vargen, renamed

1623 del.

1626 LA

Viistervik/C

Small

1623 del.

1623 L M

Vastervik/C

?

Haren, renamed (Viborgs) Makrillen

1623/4 F M

Viistervik/C 1623 L M 1627 (?) L M S t e g e b o r g 1627 (?) L M V i b o r g

?

(Stegeborgs) Makrillen

1623 del. 1623/4 F M

(Viborgs/Grona) Draken

1624 F M 1624 F M

Stjarnan (pinnace) Vasterviks Makrillen

1623 F M 1623 F M

1 6 3 7 (?) L M

Small

1636 L M 1632 L M 1626 LA

Small

(pinnace)

Lejonet L e j o n i n n a n (see 1628

1624 F M

1635 L M

Viborg

Small Small Small

1633 L M 1626 LA

Small Small

below) Mjohunden

1624 F M

Vasterviks Draken

1624 F M

1637 (?) L M Vastervik/C 1626 LA

Small Medium

Pelikanen

1624 F M

1648 s u n k

Small

Svanen

1624 F M

1626 W r

Small

(Lilla) D u v a n

1624 F M 1624 F M

1632 L M 1628/9 ship

Small Medium

1624 F M

1639/40 BU

Small

(ex H a r e n o r V a r g e n ) (pinnace)

Justitia (pinnace) (ex H a r e n o r V a r g e n ? ) Spes

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

715

I52I-I72I

(cont.) Date

Name

End

Size

Built at

Fortuna/Drottningens

1624 F M

1 6 3 9 (?) L M

Small

galeja ( T u n a ? ) Lejoninnan, probably

1628 F M

1649 L M

Small

a r e n a m e d galley o r s a m e as 1 6 2 4 , s a l v a g e d 1665 T u r k i s k galej 1675 Stovaren Mjobunden

1675

1678 (?) L M

Gothenburg

Small

1688 L M

Bobuslan

Small?

1688 L M

Bohuslan

Small?

Part 3. Armed merchantmen in naval service Ltibeckian ships hired 1522-23 - Hans Techel's skepp - Bartell van Vrede's skepp - Six ships, names and owners not known Eight ships, all probably armed merchantmen, were hired f r o m Liibeck in the autumn of 1522 and served together with the ships which Sweden bought from Liibeck and Stralsund in that year. All were probably returned to their owners in 1523. Source: Hanserecesse, 3:8, no. 510. Royal cargo carriers

Name

1540-60

Date

End

Built at

1539/40

1555 W r

Viborg

1548/9 1548/9

1550 L M see b e l o w

Viistervik Alvsborg

1549/50

1558/9 D ( ? )

Abo

1550?

1551 L M

Alvsborg

Kalmar Holken Alands Furuholken Olof Skottes skepp

155r 155P 1551 B

1555/6 W r 1 5 5 7 S (?) 1552 L M

Kalmar Kastelbolm

Ekenasskeppet Alekrakan

1551 B 1553/4

1551 L M 1555 W r

(Swedish M) Ekenas Kalmar

Viborgs Holken, Duke Johan's ship f r o m 1556

1554/5

1560 S

Viborg

Furublasan/Finske Maisan Vastei-viks H o l k e n U n n a m e d cargo carrier Abo Furuholken Cargo carrier

Displacement

? ?

600 (?) ?

( s a m e as 1 5 4 8 / 9 ? ) ? ? ? ? ? ?

716

A P P E N D I X ONE

Tliese ships were built or bought by Gustav I for his mercantile activities, primarily for trade with northern Germany and Western Europe. Most or all of them were clinker-built, at least some of them of fir. Tliey carried only a light defensive armament as merchantmen, but they would probably have served as auxiliary warships in wartime. The list does not include the large number of small transport vessels {skutor, krejare, etc.) which the king owned for transport services within the royal administration (transport of provisions, timber, stone for the construction of fortifications, etc.). Source: Glete 1977, 47, 51-53. Swedish merchantmen,

hired

Name

Date

End

H o m e port

Nykopings Skeppet

1561 F M

1562 L M

N y k o p i n g (?)

Stockholms Skeppet

1561 F M

1562 L M

S t o c k l i o l m (?)

?

Giivle H j o r t e n Giivle K r a v e l e n

1561 F M 1562 F M

1562 L M 1563 B by

Giivle

?

Gavle

450

Gavle

?

(Bjornen) Gavle H o l k e n

1561-64

Displacement ?

the navy 1562 F M

1562 L M

Hie list is probably not complete. Same sources as for part 1. Duke Karl of Sddermanland's

Name

ships

Date

1569-1598

End

Built at/

Displacement

Origin Lybske

David,

see

warships 1564 Forgyllda D u v a n Lybske Christoffer Brune Lejonet Angeln

1569/70 G 1573 B 1573 B

1570 S 1574 L M 1575 L M 1578 L M

ex n a v y

350

e x navyex navy

300

?

300 ?

1577 L M

?

?

1575-^

1591 L M

Strangnas

?

Larkan

1575 F M

1583 L M

Lejonet (large w a r s h i p )

1575/77 1576 F M

1591 L M

1574 F M 1574 F M

Elefanten (large warship)

Rode Lejonet

Svanen Gripen

1576/7 F M

1578 L M 1587 L M

?

?

Strangnas ?

?

?

?

?

717

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I

(cont.) Name

Date

End

B u i h at/

Displacement

Origin Stralen Uroxen (Rode/Gyllene) H a n e n Giiddan Furuflasa (perhaps H j o r t e n 1586)

1577 F M 1577 F M 1578 F M 1581 F M 1581 F M

1578 L M

?

?

1585 L M 1586 S 1592 L M

?

?

?

?

?

?

1583 L M

?

?

Nacken

1582 F M

1582 L M

?

?

Laxen Hjorten

1585

1587 L M

Gripsholm

?

?

?

Bocken

1586 F M 1 5 8 6 (?)

1591 L M 1 5 9 3 (?)

Nykoping?

?

Strutsen (rebuilt

1590 F M

1598 L M

?

?

1599-1600?) Hanen

1590?

1597 L M

?

?

Gripen Falken

1590/91

1602 W r

Gripshohn

400

1591 F M

?

1591 F M

1598 L M 1593 L M

?

Naktergalen (perhaps

?

?

renamed) 1591 B

1594 S

(Liibeck)

?

1591 F M

1594 L M

Alvsborg

?

1 5 9 8 t o S?

?

?

St O l o f Hoken

1591 F M 159r B 1592 F M

1598 L M 1597 L M

(Stralsund?) ?

Bjornen

1591/2

1597 S

Nykoping?

?

Svanen

1593 F M 1593 F M

Portugal 1597 L M

?

?

1598 L M

?

?

1598 L M

?

?

1598 L M

?

?

?

Forgylda Masen Duvan Ormen

Ugglan U l v e n ( t o P o l a n d 1598?) Gravbocken

1593 F M 1593 F M

? ?

Stralen

1593 F M

1597 L M

?

Liljan (perhaps

1593 F M

1593 L M

?

?

1594 F M

?

?

?

?

Aspo?

?

renamed) Svalan (perhaps

1594 F M

1598 L M 1594 L M

renamed) Angeln

1594*

1595 S

Rosen

France 1598 L M

?

?

St E r i k

1595 1596-^

1606 L M

?

500

Justitia

1596 F M

1598 L M

?

?

1598 L M

?

?

1597 L M

Gripsholm?

?

Krakan

Rabocken Gripsholms Bocken

1597 F M 1597 F M

718

195 A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Haren

1597 F M 1597 F M

1597 L M 1598 L M

1597*?

1610/1 B U

1597 F M 1597'^?

1597 L M 1600 L M

1597 F M

1 5 9 8 t o S? 1602 L M

Siskan Bla F a l k e n Oxen Raven Dynkerken Vite Falken Larkan V a s e n , see warsliips, part 1

1598 F M 1598 F M 1598*

1598 L M

Built at/ Origin ?

Displacement

?

?

?

Nykoping?

600

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

300

?

?

Aspo

900

Hie sources for this list are the same as for part 1, especially Sddermanlands handlingar, (Nykoping, Strangnas), Varuhus och Handling: Nykoping, HertigKarls Registratur and Skeppsgdrdshandlingar. There is less information available about Duke Karl's ships than about the royal warships. Most of them were built for merchant service but as many of them sailed to Western Europe they are likely to have been defensively armed, although the armament is known for only a few of the ships. The displacement of most ships is not known. These ships would have been available for the royal navy in a war against a major naval enemy. Their capacity as warships is little known, however. Hre two great ships Elefanten and Lejonet, built in the mid 1570s were purpose-built warships and parts of the duke's failed program to establish himself as a naval entrepreneur. At least some of the ships built from the mid-1590s were probably intended as warships in the duke's struggle with King Sigismund. Some of them served as warships in the navy after 1598 when Duke Karl's ships were merged with the royal warships. A few of the several ships last mentioned in 1598 were possibly wrecked in the autumn that year. Several of these ships were built at the duke's main shipyard at Nykoping, where shipbuilding is often mentioned, but it is seldom possible to connect the names to ships built at that yard. It is probable that several ships were sold to merchants, but Duke Karl's financial records have not been searched for evidence of that.

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

719

Private-owned ships from Finland used in connection with King Sigismund's voyages from Poland to Sweden and back in 1593-94

Name

Date

End

Owner

1592/3?

1594 L M

Klas F l e m i n g

Large ship

1593 F M

1594 L M

Klas F l e m i n g

?

1593 L M

Klas F l e m i n g ?

Finslce L e j o n e t

Displacement

(also E l e f a n t e n ? ) Possibly Kungl. Maj:t skepp/Lejonet, 1594 Hjorten Hinden I n n a m m a Skepp

1593 F M 1593 F M

Duvan

1593 F M

1593 L M 1594 L M

Josef U t t e r n , galley

1593 F M

1593 L M

?

1589 G 1593 F M

1595 L M 1593 L M

Klas F l e m i n g

Renen, pinke

?

Klas F l e m i n g

small

Several more ships of foreign origin sailed with Sigismund in 1593-94, but it is not known if they were hired by him with Swedish funds. Twentyfour hired ships with mainly German names sailed with Sigismund when he left Sweden in 1594; see Strddda historiska handlingar, Sigismunds resa till Sverige 1593-94, Riksarkivet. Sources: same as part 1. Ships hired from Skeppskompaniet,

Name

Hired

1630-31

Released

H o m e port

Tonnage Last

Ornen/Die Hoffnung

1630

1631

Smalandsskeppet/Kalmar Nyckel?

1630

1632?

Norrkopingsskeppet Kristina

1630

1631

1630

Sankta Maria

Arboga Kalmar

110 120/130

Norrkoping Nykoping

120

1631

1630

1630

Stocldiolm

Vastervik

1630

1630 W r

Soderkoping/ Vastervik

135/140

Upplandsskeppet/Fama

1630 1630

1631 1631

Norrtalje

130

1631

1631

Vasteras Gamla Lodose

130 110/180

Gavle Stad

1631

1631

Gavle

135

Hudiksvallsskeppet/ Norrlands-skeppet

1631

1631

Hudiksvall

115

Vasterasskeppet Viistergotland/Gyllene

145 156?

Lejonet

A P P E N D I X ONE

720

Skeppskompaniet (the Ship Company) was an association formed by the Swedish towns on the initiative of the government in 1629 to provide the navy with auxiHary warships. Information about ships hired for the navy from this company is incomplete, and some ships owned by the company were never hired by the navy. Ships later taken over by the navy are listed in part 1 in this appendix. Hie displacement of these ships was around 300 to 400 tonnes but calculations of displacements of individual ships cannot be done without considerably uncertainties. Main sources: Hjalmar Borjeson, Stockholms segelsjdfart, Stockholm, 1932, 164-84; Sveriges Sjokrig 1611-1632, 234-54; Per Goran Norenstedt, Bildandet av det forsta seglande kompaniet: Skeppskompaniet 1629-1637, unpublished seminar paper 1984, Historiska institutionen, Stoclcholm University. Dutch armed merchantmen, entrepreneur

Name

hired in 1644 with Louis De Geer as

At Femern 13/10 1644

Guns: number/ effect

Length/beam

Displacement

yes yes

34/?

?/?

29/209

142/28

yes no

33/365

141/27

28/218

130/28

550 500

Lange Bark

no

500

yes

18/106 24/182

132/28

St M a t h e u s

500

G e c r o o n d e Liefde/ Charitas (van

yes

31/285

135/27 131/27 1/4

Patientia

yes

450

yes

24/194 28/194

126/261/2

Conink van Sweden

120/26 1/4

400

De Brouwer

yes

20/114

400

Drij Croonen Vergulde Posthorn

no yes

20/130

129/25 124/25

20/118

125/25

400

D e Liefde

yes

20/100

124/25

400

Campen

yes

24/192

1 1 0 / 2 8 (?)

4 0 0 (?)

Wapen van Medemblik

yes

26/142

115/271/2

400

(Nieuw) Vlissingen

yes

24/164

112/27

400

Groot Vlissingen

yes

24/160

113/27

400

Jupiter Groote/Vergulden

600? 550

Dolphin Witte Engel Vergulde Schwaen

500

Rotterdam)

400

(van H o o r n ? )

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

721

(cont.) At Femern

Guns:

13/10 1644

number/ effect

Swarte Arendt

yes, s u n k

24/148

116/26

400

Swarte Rave Nortcopyn

yes

112/27 120/25

400

no

30/206 20/132

St M a e r t e n

yes yes

20/116 20/132

103/27

400 350

yes

12/60

Name

Prins Harderinne, frigate

Length/beam

104/26 86/191/2 (?)

Displacement

400

150 (?)

Dimensions (Amsterdam feet of 283 m m , length measured f r o m stem to sternpost) and the effect of the armament (weight of shots from all guns in pound) are included. They are of special interest because such information seldom is available for Dutch armed merchantmen. Hie fleet, originally 21 armed ships, one frigate, and ten transport ships, was hired in early 1644 but returned to the Netherlands in June after unsuccessful battles with Danish warships. The severely damaged flagship Vergulde Schwaen was released in June/July 1644 and replaced by Jupiter. The wealdy armed Lange Bark and seven of the transport ships were also released at the same time. Twenty armed ships, one frigate, and three transports arrived in the Baltic Sea in August 1644, but of the armed ships, Nortcopyn and Drij Cronen did not participate in the battle of Femern. The frigate Harderinne was bought by the Swedish navy in 1645. The other ships were released soon after the battle of Femern on 13 October 1644 and returned to the Netherlands. Main sources: Leufstasamlingen, vol. 47; Riksarkivet; Slaget vid Femern, Stockholm, 1944. Swedish armed merchantmen,

Name

Hired

hired

1657-60

End

H o m e port

Displacement

Morgonstjarnan

1657

1658 LA

Stockliolm

700

Konung David

1657

1660 Ret

Gothenburg

700

SmMand Nordstjiirnan

1657 1657

1660 Ret 1660 Ret

StocldTiolm ( V ) Stoddrolm

650 650

(Goteborgs) Johannes

1657

1660 Ret

Gothenburg

600

(Goteborgs/Vita) Svanen Samson

1657 1657

1660 Ret 1660 Ret

Gothenburg Stockholm

600 550

A P P E N D I X ONE

722

(cont.) Name

H o m e port

End

Hired

Displacement

1657

1659 W r

Gothenburg

500

Fenix Halvmanen

1657 1657

1659 L A D

S t o c k h o l m (V)

500

Stoclcholm

500

(Forgyllda) Rosen

1657

1660 Ret 1658 P D u

(Forgyllda) M a s e n

1657 1657

Gothenburg Gothenburg

500 500

Goteborgs (Kalmar) Kastell

(Goteborgs) Hoppet ( S t r a l s u n d s ) St J o l i a n n e s Leoparden Oxen

1657/8 1657 1657

1660 Ret

1659 P D a . G o t h e n b u r g Stralsund 1660 Ret S t o c k h o h n (V) 1660 Ret 1658 Ret

300 500 400

Stockholm?

400

(•) ( G o t e b o r g s ) Fallcen Svenska Lejonet Gotland/Lammet

1657 1658

1660 Ret 1660 Ret

Gothenburg

400

Stocldiolm (V)

1658

1658

Stockliolm (V?)

750 600

P Dan Ostergotland/Gripen

1658

Sodermanland

1658

Fortuna

1658 1658

Jonas Angeln St J a k o b A n g e r m a n l a n d (fir) (Stockholm) Hoppet Solen

1658 1658 1658 1658 1658/9

1660 Ret 1660 Ret 1660 Ret

S t o c k h o l m (V) Stockliolm (V) Stockholm

600 600 500

1658 P Dan

S t o c l d i o l m (?)

1660 Ret

Stockliolm

500

?

400

S t o c k h o l m (?)

400 500

1659 Ret 1660 Ret 1659 FS 1660 Ret

Stockholm Stockholm

500

400

St Johannes from Stralsuiid was captured by Danish prisoners-of-war in 1658 and brought to Denmark. It was recaptured in 1659. The Ust only includes merchantmen actually commissioned as warships. A few more are mentioned in lists of ships which were intended to be hired. Some merchantmen were probably hired as transport ships. The displacement of the ships is primarily estimated f r o m the size of their (planned or actual) crew and armament. Lists of their tonnage in Idster exist, but they are often contradictory and unreliable for displacement estimates. Ships marked with (V) in the h o m e port colu m n were owned by Vdstervik's skeppskompani (or Stora Kompaniet), Sweden's largest shipping company at this time. Sources: Ship-lists f r o m 1657-60 in M 1761, M 1850, Riksarkivet and Nya nummerserien, II, 144-45, Krigsarkivet; Zettersten 1903, 563-87; Borjeson i932,203-18; Borjeson i 936,9-13; Ernst Bergman, "Kompanis-

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

723

keppen i Goteborg och den danska blockaden", in Arne Stade (ed.), Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Kdllkritik och krigshistoria, Stockholm, 1965, 197-219; Finn Askgaard, Kampen om Ostersjon pd Karl X Gustavs tid, Stocldiolm, 1974. Swedish armed merchantmen,

Hired

Name

hired

1674-79

End

H o m e port

Displacement

Trumslagaren

1674

1679 Ret

Stockholm

400

Flygande Vargen

1675 1675

1677 P D a n

Stockholm

1680 Ret 1680 Ret

Stocldioim Stockholm

650-^ 650

1679 Ret

Gothenburg

1677 P D a n 1676 L A D

Stockholm Stockholm?

1680 Ret

Stocldioim

1677 P D a n 1679 Ret

Stocldioim Wismar

1676 P D a n

Stocldioim

(Sankta) Maria Solen

1675

Rosen

1675 1675

W r a n g e l s Palats Coiistantia

1675

Salvator Angela Gabriel

1675 1675

Parian

1675

Jarnvagen L e o p a r d e n , 1676

1675 1675

fireship

700 700^ 550*^ 500 500 550"^ 500 500 500

(Store) K o n u n g D a v i d

1675

1676 P B r a n S t o c k h o l m 1680 Ret Stockliolm

Blisabet

1675

1680 Ret

Gothenburg

Caritas

1675 1675

1676 P D a n 1676 Ret ?

Stocldioim

400 350*

Gothenburg

300=^

K a l m a r Kastell Gripen

1676 1676

1677 L A D 1680 Ret

Kalmar Stockliohii

1000

Havfrun

1676

1677 P D a n

Stocldioim

Gustavus

1676 1676

1680 Ret 1678 Ret ?

Stockholm Helsingfors

750* 700

1676/7

1679 W r

Stocldioim?

300*

1678

1679 Ret

Riga

600*

St J o h a n n e s E v a n g e l i s t a (fluit)

Helsingfors Lille K o n u n g D a v i d Stjarnan

400

800

500

This Hst only includes merchantmen actually commissioned as warships. A few others are mentioned in the sources as intended for service, and others were hired for service as fireships or transports. By 1679, only Maria, Gripen, Gustavus, and probably Stjdrnan served as fully armed warships, while the others were transports or decommissioned. The boyers (Lilla) Fortuna, (Fdrgyllde) Falken, and Brune Jdgaren were also hired f r o m 1675-76 as small warships. Stjdrnan, hired in 1678-79, was oi'iginally bought by the navy in 1678, but this transaction was cancelled (see Cronstierna in part 1). Ships marked

724

APPENDIX ONE

have dimensions which are k n o w n f r o m Swedish and Danish sources. For other ships, the size is primarily estimated f r o m the size of their (planned or actual) crew and a r m a m e n t . Lists of the tonnage in Idster exist, but they are often contradictory and unreliable for displacement estimates. Sources: Lists of m e r c h a n t m e n in Handel och Sjofart, vol. 33, list of m e r c h a n t m e n available for naval service in 1675 in M 1728, undated list of m e r c h a n t m e n which had served in the navy during the W a r of 1675-79 in Strddda militiehandlingar fore 1631:2. Handlingar angaende flottan, 10:3, all Riksarkivet; list of m e r c h a n t m e n available for naval service in G o t h e n b u r g (including dimensions) attached to letter f r o m Kommerskollegium to Amiralitetskollegium 6/7 1675, Amiralitetskollegium, Ink handl, Index Navium (list of Swedish warships and hired ships c. 1675-77), several lists of m e r c h a n t m e n in naval service or available for service, both in Nya nummerserien, II, 12a, all Krigsarkivet; Zettersten 1903, 458-512, 563-87; Borjeson 1936, 17-22; Oscar Bjurling, "1672 ars skeppslista". Forum Navale, 7, 1946, 80-111.

Part 4:1. Sailing warships,

1680-1721

Part 4:1 is arranged as part 1 but also includes n u m b e r of guns, as far as possible the largest n u m b e r of guns carried for a longer period of time. There were m a n y m i n o r variations in the g u n n e r y establishment for individual ships in this period. Only 3 - p o u n d e r s and larger are included, except for m i n o r cruising warships for which a few 1- and 2-pounders are included. Swivel guns are n o t included. The displacements of blockships, etc. are highly approximate because the shape of their hulls differed f r o m n o r m a l ships and few drawings are preserved. There was n o consistent system of classification or rating of Swedish warships in this period, and up to the early 18th century the words skepp or orlogsskepp were used were used interchangeably to designate three-masted warships. Small ships built for high speed were frequently called jaktskepp (occasionally also fregatter), and m i n o r twomast warships were classified according to their rig. D u r i n g the Great Nordic War, ship-lists became divided into Skepp/Rangskepp (battleships), Fregatter (frigates, three-masted cruising vessels), Brigantines (two-masted cruising vessels with brigantine rig), etc.

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

I52I-I72I

725

Of warships classified as frigates in this list, Stenbock (1679) was regarded until at least 1689 as suitable for the battle-line. The frigates Riga (1684) and Stralsund (1687) were also included in the battle-line in 1689, but with a draught of only around three meters and an 18pounder battery, they were actually warships specialised for shallow water operations. Small warships with three masts but of the same size as the larger brigantines have in this list been placed under the heading minor cruising warships. Small craft and decked or undecked boats {galjoter, skdrbdtar, jakter, slupar, espingar, etc.) with only a few guns or only swivel guns and sometimes without individual names, are not included. Large and small transports are not listed, nor are royal yachts. Ships-of-the-line

(Battleships)

Name

Date

End

Ornen

1644

1680 D

Wismar

1646/7

C a r o l u s I X (X)

1650 1650

1692 G 1684 D

Hercules, rebuilt 1689-90, 62 guns (Halv) M a n e n Goteborg

1653/4

Victoria

1658

Andromeda

1659 1662

S a t u r n u s (ex N y c k e l n ) ,

1656

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

N e u s t a d t (P) Wismar/C

36

650

50

Stockholm

650 850

1710 S u n k

Wismar/C

56 54

1696/7 D 1681 D

Vastervik/C Gothenburg

52

650

48

700

1686 D 1692 D

Stocldiolm Gothenburg

80

1500 600

1707 S u n k

Bodekull

48 64

850

1150

r e b u i l t 1 6 8 7 as B o h u s , 74 guns W r a n g e l , rebuilt 1689,

1664

1713 D

Stockholm

60

1250

70 g u n s Jupiter, rebuilt 1689 as

1665

1710 S u n k

Liibeck/C

70

1250

Spes, rebuilt 1689 Solen

1666

1697 W r

Stocldiolm

1667

1694 S u n k

Liibeck/C

46 72

650 1400

V e n u s , rebuilt 1685 as

1667

1706 S u n k

Karlshamn

64

1250

Nordstjarnan (armed

1670

1683 FS

Medelpad

36

600

transport) Riga

1675 B

54 82

700

1678

1683 G 1721 D

Riga

C a r o l u s XI (ex Scepter),

Uppland

Finland

1683 Sverige, 1684 W e n d e n , 1694 Prins Karl, 1694 Sverige

Stockholm

1700

726

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name Drottning Hedvig E l e o n o r a , 1694 Sverige,

Date

End

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

1680

1726 D

Stockholm

70

1400

1680

1714 D

Kalmar

70

1400

1680/1

1719 P R u s Riga (orig. C) Kalmar 1705 W r 1713 S u n k K a r l s k r o n a

56

700

56 70

900

1694 S m a l a n d Drottning Ulrika Eleonora, 1692 P r i n s e s s a n Ulrika Eleonora, 1694 Victoria Wachtmeister Oland Blekinge P r i n s Karl (ex S m a l a n d ) , 1694 S t o c k h o l m

1681 1682 1682

1400 1400

1706 D

Kalmar

70

Kalmar

56 56

900 900

90

1950

Gotland

1682

Halland C a r o l u s XI (ex Sverige)

1682

1726 D 1722 S u n k

1683

1712 S u n k

Karlskrona Kalmar

1694 D r o t t n i n g H e d v i g Eleonora Livland

1683

1726 S u n k

Riga

56

900

Estland

1683

1723 H u l k

Osel

1683 1684

1718 B U 1712 S u n k

Riga Riga

56 56

900 900

Karlskrona

86

1950

1684

1722 D

Kahnar

86

1950

1684

1690 W r

Kalmar

1686

1726 D

Kalmar

56 70

900 1400

1686

1779 B U

Karlskrona

76

1400

1688 1690

1731 D 1710 L A D

Kalmar

82

Karlskrona

80

1400 1600

1692

1715 L A D

Karlskrona

80

1650

1770 B U

Karlskrona

1715 P D a n K a r l s k r o n a

56 56

1050 1050

1771 B U

110

2650

Gota, 1684 G o t a Rike, 1685 Sverige, 1694 Drottning Ulrika Eleonora Sverige (ex W e n d e n ) , 1685 G o t a Rike, 1694 Prins Karl Skane P r i n s e s s a n H e d v i g Sofia, 1694 Karlskrona Karlskrona, 1694 Gota, rebuilt 1737-39, 66 guns S m a l a n d , 1694 W e n d e n Victoria, 1694 Prinsessan Ulrika Eleonora Drottning Ulrika Eleonora, 1694 W e n d e n , 1694

P r i n s e s s a n H e d v i g Sofia P o m m e r n , rebuilt 1738-40 1692 Sodermanland 1693 C a r o l u s / K o n u n g Karl, 1694 r e b u i l t 1 7 2 4 - 2 5 , 100 guns

Karlskrona

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

727

I52I-I72I

(cont.) Date

Name

End

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

Wismar

1694

1701 W r

Karlskrona

46

625

Stettin

1695 1695

1719 L A D 1719 L A D

Karlskrona Karlskrona

46

675

46

750

C.1780 D

Karlskrona

94

2300

1757 H u l k

Karlskrona

64

1150

50 64

750

52 64

750 1150

750

Kalmar

Enigheten, rebuilt 1727-30, 1696 1732 K o n u n g F r e d r i k 1696 Vastmanland, rebuilt 1726-27 Goteborg

1696

1715 P D a n K a r l s k r o n a

Skane, rebuilt 1725-26

1697

1768 B U

Wrede Fredrika Amalia

1697 1698

1711 W r 1776 B U

1698

1708 W r

Karlskrona

52

1699 1702

1719 L A D

Karlskrona Karlskrona

46 94

Karlskrona Karlskrona Karlskrona

1150

(ex O s t e r g o t l a n d ) , rebuilt 1746-47 Norrkoping Halmstad

750

1702 P

1745 B U 1712 W r

50

2300 800

Prins Karl Fredrik,

1703 1704

1715 P D a n K a r l s k r o n a Karlskrona 1795 D

72 72

1600 1625

rebuilt 1745-46 Bremen, rebuilt 1748-49

1705

1781 B U 1742 W r

Karlskrona

64

Karlskrona

1350 1050

1710 L A D

Karlskrona

56 80

2000

1754 B U

Karlskrona Karlskrona

54 54

1050 1050

Gota Lejon Prins Fredrik Wilhelm Nordstjarnan

Oland Tre Kronor Verden

1705 1706 1706

(Courland, M)

1707 Riga Stockholm, rebuilt 1734-35 1708

1717 Expl 1781 B U

1350

-

-

Karlskrona Karlskrona

62

U n n a m e d , laid d o w n

62

1350

-

-

Karlskrona

54

1100

1713 P

1716 L M

(Russia)

K r o n s k e p p e t (ex Le B e a u Parterre)

1714 P

1722 S

(Privateer?)

50

800

Drottning Ulrika

1719

1765 B U

Karlskrona

84

2075

1 7 0 9 , l a u n c h e d 1 7 1 9 as Drottning Ulrika E l e o n o r a (84) U n n a m e d , laid d o w n 1709, l a u n c h e d 1716 as f r i g a t e I l l e r i m Bolingbroke, never added

?

800

to the navy

Eleonora, rebuilt 1730-33

728

Frigates (Major cruising

A P P E N D I X ONE

warships)

Date

Name

End

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ,

Hjorten

1644/5

1680 D

Stockliolm

36

400

Phoenix Postiljon

1651

1698 D

Stockholm

34

1662 1672

1683 FS 1681/2 D

Gothenburg

22

400 250 250

1694 S u n k

Medelpad Stockholm

24

1674 1675 B 1677

1680 S 1700 FS

36 32

300 300

1 7 1 3 BS

Stockholm Stockholm

26

1679

300 550

Riga (shallow d r a u g h t ) Falken

1684 1684

1704 S u n k 1705 S u n k

Riga Stralsund

Stralsund (shallow draught) Fredericus (Hertig Fredrik)

1687

1713 S u n k

1698

1719 L A D

Varberg

1699 1699

1719 P D a n 1714 W r

1700 1700 conv

Utteni Fredrika Amalia Abraham Delfin Stenbock

(Swedish M )

36 32

500

Stralsund

26 34

350 500

Karlskrona Karlskrona

40 40

550

Karlskrona

26

1716 W r

Karlskrona Stralsund/C

40 20

550

1703 W r

1700

1722/6 D

Stralsund/C

20

350

Delfin Postiljon

1701 1701

1707 W r 1714 W r

Karlskrona

20

275

Karlskrona

20

275

Froken Eleonora

1701

1709 W r

Karlskrona

Snarensven

1701 1702

1706 W r

Karlskrona Karlskrona

18 20

250 275

28

350 350

Marstrand Alvsborg (Profeten) Jonas (transport, 1698) R u s c h e n f e l t ( t r a n s p o r t ) , FS

550 300 350

1711-14

Charlotta Falken Reval (shallow-draught) Wolgast (transport)

1703 1704 1705 1706

1719 P D a n 1715 P D a n

Karlskrona

1740 B U

Karlskrona

28 40

1737 B U

Stralsund/C

24

425

500

24

475

1706

1709 W r 1738 B U

Stettin/C

St T h o m a s ( t r a n s p o r t ) St M a r c u s ( t r a n s p o r t )

Stralsund/C

30

425

1707

1711 W r

Stralsund/C

Viborg

1707 1708

1713 W r

Karlskrona

20 40

425 600

1720 P Rus 1735 B U

Karlskrona

34

450

1708

Stettin/C

36

450

1708

1715 LA

Stettin/C

34

450

Vita O r n

1711

1715 P D a n

Karlskrona

St J o h a n n e s ( t r a n s p o r t , 1 7 0 4 )

1712

1715 D

Osterbotten/C

30 12

475

1714 B

1719 P Rus

(Swedish M))

26

300

1714/5

1720 P R u s

Stralsund?

20

175

St M a t h i a s ( t r a n s p o r t )

(Stora) P h o e n i x O x e n ( t r a n s p o r t ) , 1712 Anklam D r o m e d a r i u s ( t r a n s p o r t ) , 1712 Stralsund

525

conv K a r l s k r o n a V a p e n (ex Karlskrona) Kiskin

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

729

I52I-I72I

(cont.) Date

Name

End

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

1715^

1729 S

Stralsund

24

300

Diicker (shallow-draught)

1715^^

1715 L A D

S t r a l s u n d (?)

1715*

1715 L A D

1715*

1715 L A D

S t r a l s u n d (?) S t r a l s u n d (?)

30 30

?

Sta F a s t Thais u n n a m e d , lost o n stocks (shallow-draught)

1715 P D a n

Stralsund

Svarta O r n , 1717 D a n s k a O r n I l l e r i m ( l a i d d o w n as 5 4

1715 P

1720 P R u s

1716

1717 P Br

30 34

Valkomsten/Willkomst aus Orient

-

?

36

550

(Denmark)

18

Karlskrona

36

400? 1050

gun ship) Jarramas

1716

1754 B U

Vastervik/C

Svarta O r n , c.1725 44 g u n s Ebenezer, 1721/2 Svalan

1717 1717 P

1741 W r 1724 D

Karlshamn/C (Denmark)

William Galley

1718 P?

1719 P D a n

( M o r priv.?)

Le C o m t e d e M o r n e r Louis et A n n e Vainqueur

1719 H

(Sw. p r i v a t e e r )

1719 H 1720 H

1719 LA 1 7 2 2 R e t (?)

Delfin, 1720s F o r t u n a

1720 H

1720 P R u s 1732 Ret

E n d r a k t e n / O r n s Pris

1720 P

1741 S

Date

End

600

20

700 200

18 36

300? ?

(Sw. p r i v a t e e r )

18

300?

(Sw. p r i v a t e e r ) (Sw. p r i v a t e e r )

30 18

400 300

(Russia)

34

700

Small frigates (Fr), brigantines (Br), snows, large yachts, etc. (Minor vessels)

Name

?

26

cruising

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

Gripen (Boyer) M j o h u n d e n (Boyer)

1655

1680 D

Stocldiolm

8

?

1656/7

Kaseburg

Fortuna (Boyer)

1657 B

1680 L M 1680 S

8 10

?

H a n o (Small ship)

1660

C.1680 D

Bodekull

Margareta (Small ship) M a s e n (Boyer)

1660/1

1686 D

Bodekull

12 12

100 125?

1666 B

4

?

1675 B

1686 S 1680 LM/S?

Holland

Grona Jagaren (Fr/ship)

( M G d e la Gardie)

12

100?

St J o h a n n e s ( B o y e r )

1 6 7 5 / B (?)

(M) S t r a l s u n d (?)

?

1 6 7 6 (?)

1680 S 1 6 9 4 S (?)

10

G r i p e n (Greif) (Fr)

12

100?

K a r l s h a m n (Fr) Lille J a g a r e n ( B o y e r )

1676 1677 F M

1698 S u n k

Karlshamn

12

1680 LM/S?

P o m e r a n i a (?)

?

100 ?

Castor (Fr)

1678

1689 W r

125

1678 1686

1709 FS

Kalmar Kalmar

12

F a m a (Fr)

16

150

1 7 1 1 / 2 D (?)

Kalmar

16

150

1687

C.1706 D (?)

Kalmar

16

150

Jagaren (Fr) Svan (Fr)

Holland

100

730

A P P E N D I X ONE

(cont.) Name

Date

End

Built/Origin

Guns

Disp

N e p t u n u s (Fr) Sofia (Lovisa) (Yacht)

1688

1703 S u n k

Kalmar

16

150

1695

1774 D / B U

8

M j o h u n d e n (Snow)

1698

1701 LA

Karlskrona Karlskrona

Hummern

1699/1700 1701 Hired?

1715 P D a n 1701 P R u s

6 8

125 100 70?

1701 H i r e d ?

1701 L M

?

6 4

?

H a b o r (Fr) Tlior (Fr)

1701 B 1701 B

1708 D 1704 W r

(Swedish M ) (Swedish M )

6

60

10

80

O d e n (Fr, 1706 Br)

1701 B

(Swedish M )

Frigga (Fr, 1704 Br)

1701 B 1701 B

1710 W r 1714 P Rus

8 6

110 80

4 12

40

Stralsund/C Karlskrona

14

125

(Br)

Falken (Galliot) T o v a Litet (Galliot)

Astrild (Br) D i s a (Br, ex t r a n s p o r t )

1701 c o n v

G o j a (ex Svalan) (Br), rebuilt

1701

1736 a n d 1770 H o k e n (Br)

1703 L A D 1709 S u n k 1782 S

Gothenburg ?

(Swedish M ) (Swedish M )

?

100

1701

1709 W r

Karlskrona

Elefanten, 1702 Fiavfrun (Ketch)

1701 F M

1703 L M

Lake Peipus

8 10

125 50

W a c h t m e i s t e r , 1703 Elefant

1701 F M

1703 P R u s

Lake Peipus

10

50

(?) ( K e t c h ) P o l l u x (Br)

1702

1717 P R u s 1712 W r

Karlskrona Karlskrona

14 14

125 125

1719 L M

C a s t o r (Br) S j o m a n (Br)

1702 1702

Sofia (Br)

1702

C a r o l u s (XII) (Br/yacht)

Gothenburg Gothenburg

6

60?

10

1702

1711 P D a n 1704 L A D

Dorpat,

12

100? 70

Vivat (Br/yacht)

1702

1702 L A D

Dorpat, Peipus

10

Ulrika (Br/yacht) Victoria (Yacht)

1702

1704 P Rus

10

1702

1704 P Rus

Dorpat, Peipus Dorpat, Peipus

6

35

Vivat (Yacht)

1702

Dorpat, Peipus

6

D o r p a t (Yacht)

1703

1704 P Rus 1704 P Rus

Dorpat, Peipus

(Grev) W a c h t m e i s t e r (Yacht) V a d u r e n (Br)

1703

1704 P Rus

1703

1712 L A D

Dorpat, Peipus Karlskrona

10 12

35 50

14

J u n g f r u n (Br) K r a f t a n (Br)

1703 1703

1737 B U 1712 P R u s

Karlskrona

14

S k o r p i o n e n (Br)

1703

1710 W r

Karlskrona Karlskrona

14 14

( G o t e b o r g s ) F a m a (Br)

1703

1 7 1 4 D (?)

Gothenburg

10

S k o l d p a d d a n (Galliot)

1706 1707

1737 D 1758 S

Gothenburg

Freden (Yacht)

6 4

N i e r o t h (Br)

1708

1711 L A D

Karlskrona Gothenburg

Sjoblad (Br)

1709

1711 W r

Gothenburg

Vita Falken (Br)

1709 P

C h r i s t i a n i a , (Br, o a r e d ? )

1711 P

1716 D 1719 L A D

(Russia) (Denmark)

G r i p e n (Fr) Falken (Fr/snow)

1713 1713/5

1715 W r

Stralsund

12

125?

1715 W r

S t r a l s u n d (?)

?

?

Peipus 70 50

60 100 100 100 100 100? 100?

10

90 100?

16 12

150? 125

6

?

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S ,

731

I52I-I72I

(cont.) End

Date

Name

Guns

Built/Origin

Displ.

1713/4

1723 T p

Wismar

1713/5

1723 T p

F a m a (Br) E k o r r e n (Br)

1716

1719 L M

Wismar Stockholm

1716

1741 W r

Stockholm

Sjokatten (Br)

1716 1716 P

1763 D 1 7 2 7 S (?)

Stockholm

6 6

(Sw. p r i v a t e e r )

8

90 80

1716 P

1719 P R u s

1717 P

1723 G

(Sw. p r i v a t e e r ) (Russia)

8 8

60

Date

End

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

Karlskrona

4

175

1735 B U

Karlskrona Karlskrona

4 4

175 175

1731 W r 1 7 4 0 / 1 D (?)

Karlskrona (Denmark)

4

175

4

150

Built/Origin

Guns

Displ.

P a c k a n (Fr) Lilla/Tyska P h o e n i x (Fr)

Jagaren (ex P a c k a n ) (Br) B e r n h a r d u s (Br) K o r p e n (Br)

10 12

125? 125?

6

90 90

125

Bomb-vessels

Name Askedunder

1698

Stromboli Vulcanus

1701

1733 D 1725 T p

Vesuvius

1701 1702

St J o h a n n e s

1719 P

Blockships, armed prams, floating

Name

batteries

Date

End

Gripen

1702

1702 P R u s

Dorpat, Peipus

6

?

Karlskrona Elefanten

1703

1704 P R u s 1714 P Rus

Dorpat, Peipus Stockhohn/C

10

1713^

18

150? 400?

Mars

1713/4

1723 S

Gavle/C

20

400?

S t e n b o c k e n (ex frigate, 1679) Elefanten

1713 c o n v

24

500 400?

Sjospoket

1717

Svarta Bjorn Kamelen

1717 1717

1716 P D a n c o n v G o t h e n b . 1 7 2 5 / 6 D (?) S t o c l d i o l m / G Stockliolm/C 1725/6 D Stockholm/C 1723/6 D

S k e p p s h o l m e n (ex large galley

1717

26 24

300?

16 20

300? 400?

1723 S

Stoclcholm/C

1718

1734 B U

Stockholm

Cassel) Stadig

1718

1732 B U

Landskrona/G

14

G e P a (ex D e O u d e Rose) Ga Pa (ex T r e Systrar)

1718 B 1718 B

1719 P D a n

(Swedish M )

1719 L A D

(Swedish M )

18 20

S t r o m s t a d (ex M a r g a r e t a )

1718 B

1719 L A D

(Swedish M )

20

? ?

(Denmark) (Denmark)

1736 B U

Kungsbacka/G

1719 P Spristaken, large m o r t a r float Lange M a r e n , large m o r t a r float 1719 P 1720 Prins Karl Fredrik

300?

20

52

1000?

732

A P P E N D I X ONE

Part 4:2. Galleys,

1680-1721

Very large galleys

Name

Date

Sta Bra

1717

Grave Morner Prins Fredrik av Hessen

1717 1717

Carolus Cassel, c o n v e r t e d to a r m e d

1717 1718?

End

Built/Origin

Oarspairs

Displ.

Gothenburg/C

30 30

500 500

1719 P D a n

Gothenburg/C Kungsbacka/C

1719 LA 1718 c o n v

Kungsbacka/C StocldTiolm

1719 P D a n 1719 P D a n

30 30

500

?

500 400

Built/Origin

Oarspairs

Displ.

Bohuslan

?

?

?

?

p r a m Skeppsholmen while building

Galleys

Name Mjohunden

Date 1675

End 1688 L M

Stovaren

1675

1688 L M

Bohuslan

Victoria Bellona

1701/2 1704

1719 B U 1719 L A D

Gothenburg Gothenburg

A n n a Regina, 1713

1705

1716 P D a n

1706 1707

?

?

13

?

Gothenburg

13

?

1719 LA 1716 P D a n

Gothenburg

?

Gothenburg

14

1713 1713

1725 D 1714 P Rus

Stockholm/C

15

Stockholm/C

15

Phoenix Gripen

1713 1713

1725 D 1714 P R u s

Stocldiolm/C Gavle/C

Tranan

1713

1714 P Rus

Gavle/C

Pelikanen

1725 D

Ulysses

1713 1715

1716 P D a n

Harnosand/C Gothenburg

Lucretia ( s a m e as U l r i k a

1717 P

1745 B U

1707) Lovisa

1717 P

Prins Christian

1719 P

Prins Carl Prins Georg

1719 P 1721

1719 P D a n

Bestandig

1721

Vaksam Stabi Plink och Fardig

Proserpina Wrede Ulrika, 1713 Lucretia Svanen Ornen

15 15 15 15

Large 75? 125 125 125 125 125 125 110

(Denmark)

20 14

75?

1719 L A D

(Denmark)

?

?

1725 D

(Denmark)

14?

?

?

?

1734/5 BU 1753 B U

(Denmark) Gothenburg

20

250

Lidingo/C

20

140

1721 1721

1758 S

Lidingo/C

140

1758 S

Norrkoping/C

20 20

1721

1742 W r

Norrkoping/C

20

140

140

733

LIST OF SWEDISH W A R S H I P S , I 5 2 I - I 7 2 I (cont.)

Oarspairs

Displ.

Tyres6/C Tyres6/C

18

120

18

120

Stockholm/C

120

Stockholm/C

18 18

1753 S

Vastervik/C Stockholm/C

18 18

120 120

End

Built/Origin

Oarspairs

Displ.

12 10?

40 50

Name

Date

End

Hurtig

1721

1753 S

Lustig Nasvis

1721

1753 B U 1742 W r

T o v a Litet Ormen

1721 1721

1753 S 1753 B U

Snail

1721

1721

Built/Origin

120

Small galleys

Name

Date

Narva Gaddan

1713

1704 P Rus 1714 P Rus

Dorpat, Peipus Stocldiolm/C

Valfisken

1713

1714 P Rus

Stockliolm/C

10?

50

Svardfisken

1713 1713

1739 D 1714 P R u s

Stocldiolm/C

50

1713

1722 S

Gavle/C Harnosand/C

10 10?

1714 1714

1719 L A D

M6lndal/C

1716 P D a n

1714

1716 P D a n 1716 LA

Molndal/C Gothenburg

Braxen Delfin Castor Pollux Achilles Hector

1703

1714 1714 P

Sudox Storken

1714 P

1721 S u n k 1721/5 D

1715 P

1721 S u n k

Draken Jungfrun

1717 1717

1730 B U 1729/30 BU

Kraftan

1717

Luren

1717

Framfuss Uppassaren

1717 1717

P o l l u x , s a m e as P o l l u x , 1 7 1 4 Dockan Rosen

Paltox

10? 10 10

50 50 30

13

30 40

Gothenburg

13

40

(Russia)

15 15

60 60

15

60

15

(Russia) (Russia) Stockholm Stockliolm

15

60 60

1729 B U 1729 S u n k

Stockholm Kungsbacka/C

15

60

15

60

1740 D

Kungsbacka/C

15

Kungsbacka/C

15

60 60

1717 P

1729 S u n k 1719 L A D

(Denmark)

10

30

1721

1729/30 B U

Stockholm/C

1729/30 B U 1721 LA

Stockliolm/C

50 50

U n n a m e d , lost while b u i l d i n g

1721 1721

15 15

Sundsvall/C

15

50

U n n a m e d , lost while b u i l d i n g

1721

1721 LA

Sundsvall/C

50

Ankan

1721

1730 B U

Gasen

1721 1721

1730 B U

Vastervik/C Vastervik/C

15 11

1721 LA

U n n a m e d , lost while b u i l d i n g

1721 1721

1721 L A 1721 LA

U n n a m e d , lost while b u i l d i n g

1721

1721 LA

U n n a m e d , lost while b u i l d i n g U n n a m e d , lost while b u i l d i n g

11

35 35

Sundsvall/C

11

35

Sundsvall/C Sundsvall/C

11

35

11

35

Sundsvall/C

11

35

734

APPENDIX ONE

Some small oared craft of less than 30 tonnes, armed with less than 4pounder guns, which sometimes were called galleys, are not included in this list. Information about Swedish galleys 1700-21 is partly from lists made by Gunnar Unger and Hjalmar Borjeson from a selection of archival sources and 18th-century historical ship-lists. The information in these lists is not always reliable, but names, building years, and places of construction are probably correct. List of galleys built for the Gothenburg squadron: Bergman 1954, 228-34. Hie displacement figures are mainly from a card index in the archives of Statens Maritima Museer, Stocldiolm, probably calculated by the marine engineer and naval historian Gustaf Halldin. In a few cases they have been revised by the present author.

_ _ _ _ _ _ 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800

_ _

-

_ _ _ _

-

-

_ _ _ _

-

-

_ _

1 1 1 1 1 1

1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535

-

_ _ _ _

_ _

1 1 1 1 2 3

1 1

1 1

D

1,001-1,500

N

>1,500

E n d o f N D

Year

2 2 750 750 - 6 - 6 _ 4 _ 4 600 600 600 600 600 600 1,350 2,000

-

N

N

N

D

100-299 N

D

<100 N

D

Galleys

150 - 3 950 600 ? ? 5 1,400 7 1,400 ? ? - 15 4,950 3 650 ? ? - 10 3,800 250 ? ? 7 2,650 ? 2+ 100+ 8 2,500 250 4+ 200+ - 10 2,050 250 11 350 - 17 2,200 2 250 10 300 - 17 2,750 2 250 9 250 - 15 2,300 3 500 8 200 - 15 3,900 3 500 1+ 50+ 9 4,050 3 500 1+ 50+ 8 3,650 3 500 1+ 50+ 9 4,150 6 800 1+ 50+ - 12 4,800 8 1,125 2+ 100+ - 18 6,825

D

300-500

800 1 800 3 7 2,800 6 2,400 2,400 1 2,400 ? 1,600 2 1,600 2 4 1,600 3 1,200 2 800 3 1,100 2 700 3 1,200 2 800 4 1,800

D

501-1,000

Part 1. Sailing warships and galleys, 1520-1680

N

D

Total

SWEDISH NAVAL STRENGTH, DIVIDED INTO DIFFERENT SIZES OF WARSHIPS, 1520-1721

APPENDIX TWO

1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -

1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 -

D

N

End o

f

>1,500

Year

(cont.)

1 1 1 1

-

-

2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

D

D

1,250 3 1,250 3 1.250 3 2,250 3 2,250 3 2,250 3 2,250 3 1,650 3 1,650 3 2,250 3 1,600 1 1,600 1 1,600 1 1,600 1 1,600 1 1,600 1 1,600 1 1,600 2 1,600 2 1,600 2 1,600 2 1,600 2 1,600 2

N

501-1,000 D

1,300 8 1,300 8 1,300 9 1,300 7 1,300 7 1,300 7 1,300 7 1,300 8 1,300 8 1,300 8 300 6 300 3 300 4 300 5 300 5 300 5 300 4 700 4 700 6 700 6 700 7 700 10 700 10

N

300-500 D

N

D

<100 N

D

Galleys N

1,175 2+ 100+ _ 16 5,625 1,175 2+ 100+ _ 16 5,625 1,425 2+ 100+ _ 17 5,875 1,025 2+ 100+ _ 16 6^475 1,075 2+ 100+ 2 250 18 6,775 1,075 1+ 50+ 4 700 19 7,175 1,075 1+ 50+ 5 800 20 7,275 1,175 ? ? 10 1,300 24 7,225 1,250 ? ? 11 1,400 25 7,400 1,250 2+ 100+ 12 1,500 29 8^200 800 2+ 100+ 15 1,800 27 6,400 450 4+ 200+ 17 2,000 28 6,350 575 4+ 200+ 19 2,200 31 6,675 700 9 450 20 2,300 38 7,150 700 9 450 19 2,200 37 7,050 700 10 500 19 2,200 38 7,100 550 9 450 20 2,300 37 7,000 550 10 500 20 2,000 38 5,350 800 10 500 20 2,000 40 5,600 800 10 500 20 2,000 41 6,800 950 11 550 21 2,100 44 7,100 1,475 8 400 22 2,200 45 7,575 1,475 10 500 23 2,300 48 7,775

N

100-299

D

Total

APPENDIX

- 2 - 2 1,200 2 1,200 2 1,200 2 1,200 2

N

1,001-1,500

736 ONE

1,800 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000

2 2 2 2

2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

D

N

D

300-500 N

D

100-299 N

D

<100 N

D

Galleys N

D

Total

2,300 2 1,600 2 700 11 1,575 14 700 23 2,300 54 9,175 2,300 3 2,350 2 700 12 1,700 13 650 22 2,200 54 9,900 2,300 3 2,350 3 1,100 14 2,025 14 700 20 2,000 56 10,475 2,300 4 3,000 4 1,550 17 2,425 12 600 18 1,800 57 11,675 2,300 5 3,650 11 3,900 18 2,475 12 600 14 1,400 63 16,125 1,100 7 4,850 17 5,900 28 4,300 16 800 14 1,400 83 18,350 2,200 8 5,550 21 7,500 21 3,350 13 650 9 900 74 20,150 3,600 8 5,550 20 7,050 19 2,150 10 500 7 700 68 21,550 3,600 8 5,550 22 8,050 13 2,300 9 450 5 500 61 22,450 3,600 8 5,550 21 7,550 12 2,100 9 450 5 500 59 21,750 3,600 10 7,250 19 6,750 12 2,150 7 350 6 600 58 22,700 3,600 10 7,250 15 5,300 11 1,825 9 450 4 400 53 20,825 2,500 6 4,500 3 1,050 8 1,325 4 200 4 400 28 11,975 2,500 4 3,100 4 1,350 11 1,750 4 200 3 300 29 11,200 2,500 4 3,100 3 900 12 1,925 10 500 3 300 35 11,225 2,500 4 3,100 4 1,350 10 1,450 15 750 3 300 39 11,450 3,750 5 3,900 4 1,350 8 1,200 9 450 1 50 31 12,700 3,750 6 4,600 2 750 11 1,600 8 400 31 13,100 3,450 7 5,350 4 1,350 12 1,625 8 400 35 14,175 3,450 10 7,750 4 1,350 9 1,325 6 300 33 16,175 3,450 10 7,750 8 2,750 12 1,675 7 350 41 17,975 3,450 10 7,750 8 2,750 14 1,975 7 350 43 18,275 3,450 12 8,950 8 2,850 18 2,600 10 500 52 20,350 3,450 13 9,550 4 1,200 14 2,050 9 450 44 18,700

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

N

501-1,000

1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582

D

1,001-1,500

N

>1,500

E n d o f N D

Year

SWEDISH NAVAL STRENGTH, 1520-1721 737

>1,500

1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605

1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 4,400 4,400 4,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400

E n d o f N D

Year

{cont.)

3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 -

3,450 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 -

N 10 11 11 9 9 9 8 5 4 4 3 3 5 5 7 10 13 14 16 16 17 17 17

D

1,001-1,500 D

N

D

300-500 N

D

100-299 N

D

<100 N

D

Galleys N

D

Total

7,350 4 1,200 13 1,800 9 450 40 16,250 8,250 3 900 11 1,650 10 500 3 375 41 16,025 8,250 3 900 13 1,825 12 600 5 625 47 16,550 6,550 2 600 11 1,525 12 600 10 1,250 47 14,875 6,550 2 600 7 1,000 10 500 13 1,625 44 14,625 6,900 2 600 8 1,150 8 400 17 2,125 48 17,925 6,000 2 600 9 1,300 9 450 23 2,875 55 17,975 3,450 2 600 10 1,550 10 500 19 2,375 50 15,225 3,450 1 300 9 1,400 9 450 19 2,375 43 10,375 3,450 1 300 7 1,050 9 450 18 2,250 40 9,900 1,800 3 1,100 7 1,050 9 450 14 1,750 37 8,550 2,000 5 2,000 7 1,050 9 450 11 1,375 36 9,275 3,400 5 2,000 6 800 7 350 5 625 29 9,575 3,400 6 2,400 6 800 6 300 3 375 27 9,675 4,600 6 2,500 6 800 3 150 1 125 24 10,575 6,900 9 3,600 5 775 3 150 5 500 33 14,325 8,900 26 9,900 14 2,300 4 200 9 900 67 24,600 9,600 29 11,100 10 1,800 4 200 11 1,100 69 26,200 11,300 27 10,300 10 1,800 3 150 11 1,100 68 27,050 11,200 30 11,600 13 2,350 2 100 8 800 70 28,450 11,900 33 12,700 15 2,750 3 150 7 700 76 30,600 11,900 39 15,100 20 3,650 3 150 6 600 86 33,800 12,100 39 15,000 16 2,900 3 150 4 400 80 32,950

N

501-1,000

738 A P P E N D I X ONE

2,400 2,400 2,400 1,600

1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1

-

1

-

D

N

D

300-500 N

D

100-299 N

D

<100 N

D

Galleys N

D

Total

17 12,100 33 12,600 18 3,200 7 350 5 500 81 31,150 15 10,800 31 11,800 19 3,250 7 350 5 500 78 28,700 14 10,100 33 12.500 16 2,800 7 350 6 600 77 28,750 13 9,400 32 12,800 17 2,950 6 300 6 600 74 26,050 12 8,700 32 13,000 21 3,6 6 300 7 700 78 26,300 - 7 5,300 25 10,200 16 2,700 4 200 4 400 56 18,800 - 5 3,900 18 7,500 12 1,900 4 200 3 300 42 13,800 - 5 3,900 16 6,700 8 1,350 1 50 3 300 33 12,300 - 5 3,900 16 6,700 6 1,150 1 50 3 300 31 12,100 - 6 4,700 17 7,100 6 1,150 - 3 300 32 13,250 - 7 5,500 17 7,300 6 1,150 - 3 300 33 14,250 - 7 5,500 17 7,300 6 1,150 - 5 500 35 14,450 1,050 7 5,500 17 7,300 7 1,250 _ 4 400 36 15,500 1,050 7 5,500 17 7,300 6 1,100 _ 4 400 35 15,350 1,050 8 6,100 18 7,800 6 1,100 - 8 600 41 16,650 2,350 9 6,900 18 7,600 4 800 - 6 350 39 18,000 2,350 10 7,300 16 6,700 3 650 12 650 43 17,650 2,350 9 6,400 17 7,200 4 775 17 950 49 17,675 2,350 11 7,800 21 8,700 6 1,275 28 1,600 68 21,725 1,050 13 9,300 12 4,700 6 1,275 28 1,600 60 17,925 1,050 13 9,300 14 5,600 4 875 20 1,100 52 17.925 2,300 12 8,800 12 4,700 4 875 17 950 47 17,625 1,050 10 7,300 13 5,100 5 1,000 17 950 46 15,400 1,050 11 8,000 13 5,100 7 1,200 3 150 12 600 48 17,700

1 1 1 1

N

501-1,000

1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629

D

1,001-1,500

N

>1,500

E n d o f N D

Year

SWEDISH NAVAL STRENGTH, I 5 2 O - I 7 2 I 739

N

f

1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2

End o

1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652

1,600 1,600 3,300 3,300 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 4,900 3,800 3,800 3,800

D

>1,500

Year

{cont.)

1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1

1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 1,350 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 1,350

N 11 11 17 19 20 19 18 18 18 17 18 19 19 19 26 22 21 20 21 20 21 22 19

D

1,001-1,500

8,000 8,000 12,900 14,350 15,150 14,450 13,900 13,900 13,900 13,100 13,700 14,300 14,300 14,300 19,250 16,750 16,050 15,000 16,000 15,300 15,950 16,600 14,000

N

D

501-1,000

13 16 20 20 21 17 16 16 16 13 14 13 16 18 22 21 20 18 17 16 16 12 12

D

5,250 6,600 7,900 7,900 8,400 6,850 6,350 6,350 6,350 5,150 5,550 5,150 6,450 7,300 9,050 8,600 8,250 7,450 7,050 6,700 6,700 5,100 5,100

N

300-500

7 8 10 10 10 10 8 9 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 10 9 6 7 7 6 7 7

D

N

<100 D

N

D

Galleys N

D

Total

1,200 3 150 12 600 48 17,850 1,400 3 150 12 600 52 19,400 2,025 3 150 9 450 62 27,775 2,025 3 150 8 400 63 29,175 2,025 3 150 8 400 67 33,425 1,875 3 150 7 350 61 30,975 1,425 3 150 6 300 56 29,425 1,625 3 150 4 200 55 29,525 1,425 3 150 4 200 54 29,325 1,300 4 200 2 100 48 27,150 1,300 3 150 2 100 49 28,100 1,300 4 200 2 100 50 28,350 1,300 5 250 2 100 54 29,700 1,100 8 400 2 100 57 29,450 1,100 10 500 2 100 71 37,350 1,700 11 550 2 100 71 35,050 1,550 11 550 2 100 68 33,850 900 12 600 2 100 63 31,400 1,025 12 600 1 50 63 32,075 1,000 11 550 - 59 30,900 900 11 550 - 58 29,850 1,150 11 550 - 56 29,150 1,150 9 450 - 50 25,350

N

100-299

740 APPENDIX ONE

N

f

2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 -

End o

1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676

3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 1,700 1,700 1,700 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400 3,400 5,700 5,700 5,700 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 - 11

D

>1,500

Year

D

N

D

501-1,000 N

D

300-500 N

D

100-299 N

D

<100 N

D

Galleys N

D

Total

1 1,350 20 14,650 12 5,100 6 1,025 8 400 49 25,825 1 1,350 22 15,850 12 5,100 6 1,025 8 400 51 27,025 2 2,500 21 15,250 11 4,700 6 1,100 9 450 51 27,300 2 2,500 22 15,950 10 4,250 6 1,100 10 500 52 27,600 2 2,500 22 15,950 7 3,150 6 1,075 16 800 55 26,775 3 4,000 19 13,950 7 3,150 8 1,425 13 650 52 26,475 3 4,000 20 13,700 9 4,100 8 1,425 11 550 52 25,475 3 4,000 18 12,200 8 3,650 10 1,650 11 550 51 23,750 4 5,400 18 12,200 8 3,650 12 1,925 10 500 53 25,375 5 6,550 19 12,950 7 3,300 13 2,125 10 500 56 28,825 5 6,550 19 12,950 7 3,300 12 2,000 9 450 54 28,650 7 9,250 19 12,950 7 3,300 10 1,600 8 400 53 30,900 9 11,750 19 12,950 7 3,300 10 1,600 8 400 1 100 56 33,500 9 11,750 18 12,500 7 3,300 9 1,450 11 550 1 100 57 33,050 11 14,400 17 11,600 7 3,300 9 1,450 11 550 1 100 58 34,800 11 14,400 16 10,950 4 1,850 9 1,450 10 500 1 100 54 34,950 11 14,400 16 10,950 4 1,850 9 1,450 10 500 1 100 54 34,950 11 14,400 17 11,550 4 1,850 9 1,450 10 500 1 100 55 35,550 11 14,300 17 11,550 3 1,350 9 1,450 10 500 1 100 53 33,250 11 14,300 17 11,550 3 1,350 10 1,700 10 500 1 100 54 33,500 11 14,300 18 12,100 3 1,350 10 1,700 9 450 1 100 54 34,000 11 14,300 19 12,750 4 1,650 9 1,525 9 450 1 100 55 34,775 12 15,400 17 11,650 5 1,950 10 1,625 14 700 3 300 63 35,625 14,000 14 9,850 5 1,950 9 1,250 13 650 3 300 55 28,000

N

1,001-1,500

SWEDISH NAVAL STRENGTH, I 5 2 O - I 7 2 I 741

D N

N

1 1 1

End of

Jf I 678 f9 1680

N

D

Major cruisers

Total, seagoing

ND N D N

Minor cruisers D

N

D N

Blockships D

Galleys ashore

Total, strength

Total naval

N: number of ships. D: total displacement in tonnes. The appendix is based on the ship-Hst in Appendix 1. When the year of addition or deletion is uncertam, the last possible year of addition and thefirstpossible year of deletion are used. Consequently thefiguresslightly underestimate the total naval strength, mainly in the 16th century. Ships with uncertain displacements are estimated to have been of the average size in its probable size category i.e., a ship listed in the 501-1,000 tonnes category in Appendix 1 has here been given an estimated displacement ot 750 tonnes All ships smaller than 100 tonnes are schematically estimated to have been of 50 tonnes. The displacement of many aallevs is uncertain although their approximate size is possible to estimate. Most galleys added in the years 1540-70 are estimated to have been of 100 tones, galleys added 1584-90 are estimated to have been of 125 tonnes, those added 1598-1618 of 100 tonnes, and those added 1620-25 of 50 tonnes, except four larger units of 100 tonnes. All displacementfiguresare additions of estimates and are in reality not as exact as the table may indicate. If quoted, they ought to be rounded.

- 7 9,250 10 6,900 6 2,250 10 1,350 ^lo 500 3 300 46 20 550^ 1>700 7 9,250 10 6,900 5 1,750 11 1,500 10 500 2 200 46 21 800 1,700 6 7,800 11 7,450 5 1,750 11 1,500 5 250 2 200 41 20 650 1,700 8 10,600 10 6,800 3 1,000 7 1,100 1 75 2 200 32 21,475

D

Battleships

Year

[cont.)

742 A P P E N D I X ONE

1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700

Year ^

N

18 19 23 25 27 27 28 28 29 29 29 29 29 30 31 33 35 36 38 39 39

of

N

D

N

D

Major cruisers N

D

Minor seagoing N

D

Total, N

D

Blockships inshore N

D

Galleys strength N

D

Total,

Total naval

18,550 6 2,050 6 675 30 21,275 - 2 200 19,450 5 1,800 6 675 30 21,925 - 2 200 2 200 32 22'] 25 24.050 5 1,800 6 675 34 26,525 - 2 200 2 200 36 26725 27,400 4 1,550 6 675 35 29,625 - 2 200 2 200 37 29 825 31,350 6 2,400 6 675 39 34,325 - 2 200 2 700 41 34525 31,350 6 2,400 6 675 39 34,425 - 2 200 2 200 41 34625 32,650 6 2,400 5 625 39 35,675 - 2 200 2 200 41 S875 32,650 7 2,900 6 775 41 36,325 - 2 200 2 200 43 35 525 34,050 7 2,900 7 925 43 37,875 - 2 200 2 200 45 SioS 34,050 7 2,900 6 800 42 37,750 _ _ 49 37 7S 34,750 7 2,900 6 800 42 38,450 _ _ . 4 9 3«'4sn 34,750 7 2,900 6 800 42 38,450 _ _ . 4 2 ^s^sn 36,200 7 2,900 6 800 42 39,900 _ _ _ 49 ^o'onn 37,250 7 2,900 6 800 43 40,950 _ _ _ 43 400^0 39,125 6 2,600 5 700 42 42,425 _ _ _ 42 4249s 40,550 6 2600 6 825 45 43,975 - _ _ _ _ 45 A^'g'jl 44.100 6 2,600 6 825 47 47,525 _ _ . 4 7 An^jl 45,350 6 2,600 6 825 48 48,775 _ _ . 4 0 40V7S 47,250 6 2,750 7 1,000 51 51,000 _ _ _ si s/nnn 48,000 8 3,600 7 1,000 54 52,600 _ _ _ s4 57 ^ 48,000 10 4,550 8 1,070 57 53,620 _ _ 57 53590

D

Battleships cruisers

Part 2. Battleships, cruisers and inshore warships 1680-1721

SWEDISH N A V A L STRENGTH, 1 5 2 0 - 1 7 2 1 743

38 40 41 42 43 43 43 43 43 39 38 35 33 33 29 29 28 27 24 24 23

N

47,375 50,475 52,075 53,700 55,200 55,600 55,400 56,000 56,000 50,400 49,650 44,950 42,300 41,700 36,650 36,650 35,600 34,700 33,900 33,900 32,200

D

14 15 15 16 15 16 17 20 18 18 17 18 15 16 14 15 16 17 12 10 10

N

Battleships

N

5,625 19 5,975 28 5,975 31 6,475 24 6,050 24 6,675 24 7,425 25 8,775 25 8,050 24 8,050 22 7,800 19 8,275 16 6,625 17 6,875 15 5,775 15 6,875 19 6,725 19 7,025 19 4,975 16 4,650 16 4,650 16

2,190 2.915 3,235 2,855 2,855 2,865 2,895 2,935 2,835 2,625 2,175 1,850 1,975 1,795 1,850 2,200 2,135 2,135 1,960 1,960 1,960

D

N 71 83 87 82 82 83 85 88 85 79 74 69 65 64 58 63 63 63 52 50 49

cruisers

cruisers

D

Minor

Major

55,140 59,365 61,285 63,030 64,105 65,140 65,720 67,710 66,885 61,075 59,625 55,075 50,900 50,370 44,275 45,725 44,460 43,860 40,835 40,510 38,810

D

seagoing

Total,

D

N

D

inshore

Galleys

N

D

strength

Total,

N

D

Total naval

- - 71 55,190 - 1 100 1 100 84 59,465 1 150 2 140 3 290 90 61,575 - 2 200 2 200 84 63,230 - 3 300 3 300 85 64,405 - 4 600 4 600 87 65,740 - 5 675 5 675 90 66,395 - 5 675 5 675 93 68,385 - 5 675 5 675 90 67,560 - 5 675 5 675 84 61,750 - 5 675 5 675 79 60,300 - 5 675 5 675 74 55,750 2 900 16 1,675 18 2,575 83 53,475 2 900 16 1,410 18 2,310 82 52,680 2 900 18 1,580 20 2,480 78 46,775 1 400 12 1,185 13 1,585 76 47,310 5 1,700 25 3,750 30 5,450 93 49,910 10 3,900 25 3,750 35 7,650 98 51,510 9 2,800 16 1,190 25 3,390 77 44,225 10 3,800 16 1,190 26 4,390 76 44,900 10 3,800 28 2,710 38 6,510 87 45,320

N

Blockships

N: number of ships. D: total displacement in tonnes. The appendix is based on the ship-list in Appendix 1. Bomb-vessels are included in minor cruisers. All displacementfiguresare additions of estimates and not as exact as the table may indicate. If quoted, they ought to be rounded. Displacementfiguresfor block-ships and galleys are, in several cases, only known with uncertainty, and thefiguresin this appendix are only indicative.

1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721

End of

Year

{cont.) 744 A P P E N D I X ONE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished

primary

sources

Riksarkivet, Stocldiolm (RA) Kunglig Majestats kansli Riksregistraturet (RR) Huvudserien, 1561-1630. Hertig Karls registratur, 1568-98 (HKR). Radsprotokoll och foredragningslistor, vol. 69, 1677. Kollegiers skrivelser till Kunglig Majestat Amiralitetskollegium, 1640-1721, vols 1-39. Skrivelser till K o n u n g e n Gustav II Adolfs tid, vol. 10, Klas Fleming, vol. 12, Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm. Riksdagsacta R 4844, 1680; R 4871, 1697; R 4878, 1713-14. Diplomatica Anglica, vol. 531. Hispanica, vol. 62. Kommissioner och kommitteer AK 63 Kommission for r a n n s a k n i n g angaende flottans hastiga aterkomst och for paskyndande av dess utlopande, 1675-76, 4 vols. AK 64 Kommissorialratt over amiralitetet, 1676-77, 4 vols. AK 65 Kommissorialratt angaende sjostriderna 25 och 26 m a j samt 1 juni, 1676-77, 2 vols. AK 213 Kommission angaende amiralitetsstaten, 1674-75, 1 vol. Kammarens arkiv och handlingar fore 1630 Strodda rakenskaper och h a n d h n g a r t.o.ni. 1630. Saltrakenskaper, vol. 1, 1556-67. Fogdarnas rakenskaper, 1529-33. Bestallningsregister, 1564-1618, vols 1 - 4 . Loningsregister, 1549-1614, vols 1-18. Strodda aldre rakenskaper, ny serie Anordningar, 1610-30, vols 1-10. Strodda kamerala handlingar, vols 15:3-4, 62. Strodda militiehandlingar fore 1631 1. Handlingar angaende armen, 1534-1635 (SMHA) Arkli och rustkammare, vols D 1 - 4 . 2. Handlingar angaende flottan, 1535-1800-talet, vols 1 - 1 0 (SMHF). Roda n u m n i e r , no. 235. Landskapshandlingar Upplands handlingar Stockholms slott, 1539-70. Ekolsimd gard, 1543-55. Skokloster, 1592-1600.

746

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sodermanlands handlingar N y k o p i n g s slott, 1556-1619. G r i p s h o l m , 1539-1620. Straiignas, 1573-90. Torshalla, 1601-08. Selebo h a r a d / A s p o , 1591-98. T y n n e l s o , 1601-07. Ostergotlands handlingar Stegeborg, 1543-59, 1572-1620. V a d s t e n a slott, 1545-1620. N o r r k o p i n g , 1598-1604. O s t k i n d s h a r a d / S k e d e n a s , 1580-85, 1591-92. Smalands handlingar K a h n a r slott, 1533-72, 1599-1610. B o r g h o l m , 1553-61, 1589-1600. N o r r a och Sodra T j u s t s h a r a d och T u n a l a n , 1547-1610. S t r a n d a h a r a d , 1577-92. Sevede h a r a d , 1597-1609. Vastergotlands handlingar Alvsborg, 1543, 1551, 1572-1611, 1618-30. Vastnianlands handlingar Vasteras slott, 1590-1616. K u n g s o r / U l v s u n d , 1578-1615. Gastriklands handlingar Gavle, 1563-70, 1590-1607. H a l s i n g l a n d s h a n d l i n g a r , 1574-1609. A n g e r m a n l a n d s h a n d l i n g a r , 1574-1603. V a s t e r b o t t e n s h a n d l i n g a r , 1574-1600. Ovriga svenska r a k e n s k a p e r D i p l o m a t r a k e n s k a p e r , 1542-93, vols 1 - 5 . K a p e r i r a k e n s k a p e r , 1562-1602, vols 1 - 7 . Proviantrakenskaper Fiilltag/Sjotag, 1560-1613, vols 1 - 6 . N y k o p i n g , 1611-25, 3 vols. S t o c k h o l m , 1549-1622, 35 vols. N o r r k o p i n g , 1572-1624, 5 vols. V a d s t e n a , 1559-74, 2 vols. S o d e r k o p i n g , 1545-1608, 5 vols. N y l o d o s e och Alvsborg, 1559-95, 1 vol. Kalmar, 1556-1616, 4 vols. Vastervik, 1580-1616, 3 vols. R a n t e k a m n i a r b o c k e r , 1526-1630. Rantekammarbocker, furstendomena H e r t i g M a g n u s , 1559-82. H e r t i g Karl, vol. 13, 1588-92. S k e p p s g a r d s h a n d l i n g a r , 1541-1640, vols 1 - 7 4 (SH). V a r u h u s och h a n d l i n g S t o c k h o l m s slott, 1539-75, vols 1 - 4 3 , 1590-1603, vols 5 1 - 5 5 . S o d e r k o p i n g , 1564-70, vol. 69. N o r r k o p i n g , 1548-62, vols 7 4 - 7 7 . Kalmar, 1538-80, vols 7 8 - 8 5 . A l v s b o r g / L o d o s e , 1538-63, 1572-95, vols 8 8 - 9 5 . Varberg, 1566-68, vol. 96. N y k o p i n g , 1562-99, vols 9 7 - 1 0 6 . Reval, 1561-70, vol. 108. S t r o d d a finska r a k e n s k a p e r och h a n d l i n g a r , vols 1 - 7 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

747

KammarkoUegiets arkiv Kansliet K o n t r a k t s b o c k e r , 1617-31, vols 1 - 5 . Generalbokhalleriet R i k s h u v u d b o c k e r och koiicept, 1623-77, vols 3 - 1 3 5 (RHB). Finska cameralia, 1538-1630, vols 3 - 4 , 6, 9 - 1 0 , 3 4 - 3 8 , 40, 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 6 - 5 4 . Likvidationsakter, n o s 91:20, 9 2 - 9 3 : 9 . H a n d l i n g a r a n g a e n d e statsverket, vol. 1. S a n d b e r g s k a s a m l i n g e n , Z 2 7 0 2 - 3 0 2 1 , Z Z 1 1 1 8 - 1 1 2 8 (SS). R a k e n s k a p e r efter 1630 P o m m e r n - W i s m a r , Reviderade r a k e n s k a p e r I, liuvudserien, 1629-1715. K a m m a r a r k i v e t s a m b e t s a r k i v till och n i e d 1921 Generalregister, Civila och militara, h u v u d s a k l i g e n centrala, r a k e n s k a p e r , vol. 2. Kungliga och furstliga arkiv P r i n s a r s och prinsessors arkiv H e r t i g J o h a n s av F i n l a n d , K 3 3 8 - 4 1 . H e r t i g Karls av S o d e r m a n l a n d , K 352. Militara dmnessamlingar M 1272, N o r d i s k a sjuarskriget, 1563-70. M 1689, Skrivelser f r a n o v e r a m i r a l e n Claes Sparre, 1715-24. M 1720-21, Skrivelser f r a n c h e f e n for amiralitetet i Stocldiolm, 1715-24. M 1728-30, Skrivelser f r a n c h e f e n for a m i r a l i t e t e t / e s k a d e r n i G o t e b o r g , 1675-1722. M 1740, Skrivelser f r a n g e n e r a l l o j t n a n t H. H. v o n Liewen. M 1741, Skrivelser f r a n overste G. F. v o n Rosen. M 1743, Skrivelser f r a n h a n t v e r k a r e och t i m m e r m a n , 1621-1814. M 1753, Sjoforsvaret i alhiianhet. M 1754, Fartygsbyggnader 1530-1725. M 1757, Skeppsbyggeriet i a l l m a n h e t . M 1758, Flottans u t r u s t n i n g , p r o v i a n t e r i n g . M 1759, Byggnader och varv. M 1761-63, Flottans styrka, 1 5 3 6 - 1 7 9 0 . M 1766, Skrivelser f r a n A m i r a l i t e t s k a m m a r v e r k e t , 1640-92. M 1767-68, Skrivelser f r a n Amiralitetsstats- o c h k a m m a r k o n t o r e t , 1692-1722. M 1779, Amiralitetsstater, 1629-1770. M 1784-85, Rullor m m , 1600-1723. M 1788-91, I n s t r u k t i o n e r , sjoartildar, seinebrev. M 1848, 1850-54, 1858-66, Sjoexpeditioner, 1557-1721. Handel

och sjofart, vol. 33.

Strddda historiska handUngar S i g i s m u n d s resa till Sverige, 1 5 9 3 - 9 4 . Enskilda arkiv Leufstaarkivet, vols 4 5 - 4 9 . Skoklostersamlingen, vols E 8 5 6 0 - 6 1 , A m i r a l i t e t s h a n d l i n g a r . T i d 5 s a m l i n g e n , vol. 46, R a k e n s k a p e r for s k e p p s b y g g n i n g e n v i d H o r n i n g s h o l m , 1629-30. Krigsarkivet, S t o c k h o l m (KrA) Arklirakningar, 1 5 3 5 - 1 6 2 9 (AR). Militierdkenskaper, 1537-1619, 1620-23.

748

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Krigskollegiuin Kansliet I n k o m n a h a n d l i n g a r , 1673. Artilleridepartenientet Rakenskaper R e d o v i s n i n g a r for materiel och a m m u n i t i o n Artillerliuvudbocker, 1634-45. Forslag och artillerirakningar Sverige och dess b e s i t t n i n g a r Stockhohms slotts arkli, ArkUrakningar, 1630-46. Amiralitetskollegiiim (AK) Kansliet Protokoll, H u v u d s e r i e n , 1649-1718. Registratur och k o n c e p t Registratur H u v u d s e r i e , 1630-1721. Inkomna handlingar F r a n a m b e t s v e r k m . fl. m y n d i g h e t e r s a m t enskilda, 1634-85. Kammarkontoret Rakenskaper R a k n i n g a r over proviantleveranser, 1642-45, vols 1 - 2 . Varvskontoret Liggare, DII, 1663-79, vol. 1, I n v e n t a r i e f o r t e c k n i n g a r for fartyg, D V I a , 1677-1718, vols 1 - 1 5 . I n v e n t a r i e f o r t e c k n i n g over s k e p p a r e u p p b o r d , D V I b , 1670, vol. 1. Diverse i n k o m n a h a n d l i n g a r , FVI, 1647-63. Tackel- och k o m n i i s s r a k n i n g a r , GVIa, 1655-73, vols 1 - 2 . H a n d l i n g a r o r d n a d e efter a m n e Diverse h a n d l i n g a r , JIV, vol. 7. Ovriga handlingar O r l o g s f l o t t a n s till- och a v t a g a n d e i f r a n A n n o 1691. Overskeppsbyggmastarna S h e l d o n i a n a , vols 1, 5. Nya nummerserien, 11 (NNS) N o s 1, 12a-b, 16, 20, 98, 127-79, 192:1-2, 408, 490. 751, 1013, 1023, 1 0 2 7 - 2 8 , 1036. Orlogsflottans

rakenskaper,

1634-1721

(OR).

Karlskrona Orlogsvarv Tygkontoret I n k o m n a h a n d l i n g a r , 1712-87, vol. 1. F o r t e c k n i n g a r over artilleripjaser, 1843, vol. 1. Forsvarsstaben Krigshistoriska a v d e l n i n g e n Arbetsarkiv, Sjohistoriska detaljen, vols 9 - 1 3 . Enskilda arkiv H j a l m a r B o r j e s o n s samling, vols 2, 18-22, 25, 4 2 - 4 8 , 61. G u n n a r U n g e r s arkiv, vol. la. Einar W e n d t s a r b e t s p a p p e r , vols 1 - 9 , 13, 16, 2 1 - 2 4 . Axel Ludvig Z e t t e r s t e n s a r b e t s p a p p e r , vols 1 - 4 , 7, 10.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Slottsarkivet. S t o c k h o l m K l a d k a m n i a r h a n d l i n g a r , 1531-60. H a n d l i n g a r r o r a n d e furstliga hov, 1 5 5 9 - 1 6 2 1 H e r t i g J o h a n av Finland. Kungliga Biblioteket. S t o c k h o l m Staet van O o r l o g e te water, 1629, M a n u s c r i p t X 828. U p p s a l a Universitetsbibliotek. U p p s a l a ( U U B ) Handskriftsamlingen N o r d i n s k a s a m l i n g e n , vols 134, 893. M u n t h e s samling, L 422. W e s t i n s k a s a m l i n g e n , vols 314, 318. Statens M a r i t i m a M u s e e r , S t o c k h o l m C a r d - I n d e x of Swedish warships. Riksarkivet. Helsingfors Aldre rdkenskapsserien (FRA) Handlingar rorande Hertig Johans furstendome, 1555-62. H a n d l i n g a r r o r a n d e krigsvasendet, krigsfolket. Fogderakenskaper A b o slott, 1538-70, 1591-1600. Haliko, 1576, 1594-97. B j o r n e b o r g , 1573-81, 1593-97. R a u m o , 1579-81. Aland/Kastelholm, 1546-70 Raseborg, 1 5 4 0 - 5 1 Helsingfors, 1551-70. N y l a n d (Helsingfors), 1594-99. V i b o r g s slott, 1541-71, 1577-85, 1591-1600. Kexholm, 1581-97. Rigsarkivet, C o p e n h a g e n Danske Kancelli B 46, DII, no. 124. Soetaten efter 1655 Sokrigskancelliet, SK 924, 930. Archives Nationales, Paris Marine Gibis, Etat abrege de la m a r i n e , 1671. Bibliotheque N a t i o n a l e de France. Paris Melanges

de Colbert, fols 4 7 1 - 7 7 .

749

750

BIBLIOGRAPHY

N a t i o n a a l Archief. H i e H a g u e Admiraliteitsarchief, 17/7 1654.

xxxvii, no. 79, Lijste van de s c h e p e n v a n o o i i o g van de staat,

Published

primary

sources

Cavallie, James (ed.), " W e r n e r v o n Rosenfeldts S j o m a n s m e m o r i a l " , KFA, 1976, 100-56. C o r b e t t , Julian (ed.). The Spanish War, N a v y Records Society, 11, 1898. " D e p e s c h e r f r a n det s p a n s k a s a n d e b u d e t till Sverige, k a p t e n Francisco de Eraso, 1 5 7 8 1579", HT, 6, 1886, 1 - 5 0 . "Ett b i d r a g till flottans historia u n d e r Erik XIV", HT, 13, 1893, 6 9 - 7 1 . F e n r y c h , W i k t o r (ed.), Akta i Diariusz Krdlewskiej Komisji Okretowej Zygrnunta III z lat 1627-1628 (Acts and diary of the Royal Naval Commission of Sigismund III in the period 1627-1628), Gdynia, 2001. Handlingar rorande Skandinaviens historia, 2 (1817), 17 (1832), 24 (1840), 26 (1843), (HSH). Hanserecesse, 3: 1477-1530, 8, Leipzig, 1910. I n v e n t a r i u m tiber Ihre Konigl. M a y t t zu Polen u n d t S c h w e d e n etc Erlogs Schiffe ( F e b r u a r y 1629), Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnoj, 15, 1967, 3 0 4 - 2 0 . K n i g h t o n , C. S., a n d Loades, D. M . (eds), The Anthony Roll of Henry VIII's Navy, A l d e r s h o t , 2000. Konung Gustaf den forstes registratur, 1521-1560, 29 vols, Stocldiolm, 1 8 6 1 - 1 9 1 6 (GR). L o e n b o m , Samuel {ed.}, Handlingar till Konung CarlXlites historia, 11, S t o c k h o l m , 1769. L u n d g r e n , K u r t (ed.), Sjdslaget vid Oland: Vittnesmal, Dokument 1676-1677, B o r g h o l m , 2001. M c G o w a n , A. P. (ed.). The Jacobean Commissions of Enquiry, 1608 and 1618, N a v y R e c o r d s Society, 116, L o n d o n , 1971. Mankell, Julius (ed.), Arkiv till upplysning om svenska krigens och krigsinrdttningarnas historia, 1, S t o c k h o l m , 1860. Melefors, Evert, a n d Siltberg, Tryggve (eds), Soren Norbys rdkenskapsbok for Gotland 1523-24, Arkiv pa G o t l a n d , Visby, 2003. Rikskanslern Axel Oxenstiernas shifter och brefvexling, Kungl. Vitterhets-, historie- och a n t i k v i t e t s a k a d e m i e n , S t o c k h o l m , 1 8 8 8 - 2 0 0 7 (AOSB). Stockholms stads tdnkebbcker, 1553-1567, Stockliolm, 1939 (SST). Stockholms stads tdnkebocker fran ar 1592, II, 1596-1599, Stockliolm, 1951 (SST). Svenska Riksdagsakter, I, 1521-1718 (only 1521-98, 1 6 1 1 - 1 7 p u b l i s h e d ) , Stocldiolm, 1 8 8 7 - 1 9 5 4 (SRA) Svenska Riksrddets protokoll, 1621-1658, 18 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1 8 7 8 - 1 9 5 9 (SRP). W e r n h a m , R i c h a r d Bruce (ed.), List and Analysis of State Papers, Foreign series, Elizabeth I, 1 - 2 , L o n d o n , 1964-69. Personal

communications

and unpublished

working

material

Lars E i n a r s s o n , The Kronan project, K a l m a r lans m u s e u m , Kalniar. Fred H o c k e r , V a s a m u s e e t , S t o c k h o l m . H a k a n Jakobsson, Stocldiolm University; w o r k i n g p a p e r s a b o u t Swedish s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y i m p o r t of W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n t e c h n o l o g y a n d expertise. D a n J o h a n s s o n , S t o c k h o l m University; n o t e s f r o m Riksregistraturet 1 5 6 1 - 1 6 3 0 a n d H e r t i g Karls registratur, 1568-98; w o r k i n g p a p e r s a b o u t naval s h i p b u i l d i n g , 1 5 2 1 1630. Klas Nyberg, U p p s a l a University; textile history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

751

Niels M. Probst, O r l o g s m u s e e t , C o p e n h a g e n ; list of D a n i s h w a r s h i p s 1523-1660, i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t D a n i s h archival sources. Ingvar Sjoblom, D e p a r t m e n t of W a r Studies, Swedish N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e College, S t o c k h o l m ; w o r k i n g p a p e r s a b o u t s e a m e n 1 5 2 7 - 6 0 a n d Swedish sixteenth c e n t u r y sea officers, list of Swedish sea officers 1561-70. Secondary

works,

unpublished

Borjeson, H j a l n i a r , Biografiska anteckningar om officerare vid orlogsflottan 1600-1699, u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t , 1935, with h a n d w r i t t e n a d d i t i o n s , H j a l m a r B o r j e s o n s samling, vol. 61, KrA. C e d e r l u n d , Carl Olof, Stockholms skeppsgard, 1605-1640: Personalens struktur och organisation, Statens Sjohistoriska m u s e u m , S t o c k h o l m , 1966 ( m i m e o ) . Einarsson, Lars, Studier av fordndringar av det sociala ursprunget inom den svenska flaggmanskaren mellan dren 1650-1699, s e m i n a r p a p e r , Historiska i n s t i t u t i o n e n , U p p s a l a universitet, 1986. Lindegren, Jan, Maktstatens resurser. Damnark och Sverige under 1600-talet, U p p s a l a University Library, U p p s a l a , u n p u b l i s h e d (1992/2000). N o r e n s t e d t , Per G o r a n , Bildandet av det forsta seglande kornpaniet: Skeppskotnpaniet 1629-1637, s e m i n a r p a p e r , Historiska i n s t i t u t i o n e n , S t o c k h o l m s universitet, 1984. Bibliographical

handbooks

Willers, U n o , Svensk sjdhistorisk litteratur, 1800-1943, S t o c k h o l m , 1956. Claesson, Claes, a n d G e r e n t z , Sven, "Sjohistorisk litteratur, 1944-1945", Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1944-1945, 245-56. G r o n q u i s t - F r a n z e n , Helena, Svensk sjdhistorisk bibliografi, 1946-1964, 2 vols, Stockliolm, 1996 S a n d s t r o m , A n d e r s , Maritim bibliografi 1965-1975, a p p e n d i x to Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1973-1974. G r o n q u i s t , Helena, Svensk sjdhistorisk bibliografi, 1976-1986, Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1987. G r o n q u i s t - F r a n z e n , Helena, a n d A n d e r s s o n , Stefan, Svensk sjdhistorisk bibliografi, 1987-1991, S t o c k h o l m , 1994. G r o n q u i s t - F r a n z e n , Helena, Svensk sjdhistorisk bibliografi, 1992-1996, Stockholm, 2000. Biographical

handbooks

Borjeson, H j a l m a r , Biografiska anteckningar om drlogsfiottans officerare, 1700-1799 (ed. b y Karl W e s t e r ) , S t o c k h o l m , 1942. Borjeson, H j a l m a r , a n d H a f s t r o m , Georg, Skeppshdvidsmdn vid drlogsfiottan under 1500-talet, Uppsala, 1949. Elgenstierna, Gustaf (ed.), Den introducerade svenska adelns dttartavlor, 9 vols, 1 9 2 5 36 ( 2 n d ed. 1998). H o r n , R o b e r t v o n (ed.), Kommenddrkapten L. L. von Horns biografiska anteckningar: I, Officerare, som tjenat vid drlogsfiottan fdre ar 1721, O r e b r o , 1927. Kleberg, Johan, Amiralitetskollegium-Marinfdrvaltningen: Biografiska anteckningar, 1634-1934, Stocldiolm, 1934. Svenska man och kvinnor. Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon.

752

BIBLIOGRAPHY Secondary

works, published

on web

Glete, Jan, Kronans artilleri: Kort genomgdng av arkivmaterial och data om bdrgade kanoner, 2002 {Glete Kronans 2002), h t t p : / / w w w 2 . l i i s t o r i a . s u . s e / p e r s o n a l / j a n _ g l e t e / . , Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1561-1570; Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1571-1590; Svenska drlogsfartyg, 1591-1599; Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1599-1610, http://www2.historia.su.se/ personal/jan_glete/. Sveriges Riksbank, A Consumer price it^dex for Sweden, 1290-2006, http://www.historia.se/indexprisjamforelse.html. Secondary

works

Acerra, M a r t i n a , Rochefort et la construction navale frangaise, 1661-1815, 4 vols, Paris, 1993. A d a m s , J o n a t h a n , Ships, Innovation and Social Change: Aspects of carvel shipbuilding in Northern Europe, 1450-1850, S t o c k h o l m , 2003, A d a m s , J o n a t h a n , a n d R o n n b y , Johan, Furstens fartyg: Marinarkeologiska undersokningar av en renassanskravell, S t o c k h o l m , 1996. A g r e n , K u r t , "Rise a n d Decline of an Aristocracy: U i e Swedish social a n d political elite in the 17th century, Scandinavian Journal of History, 1, 1976, 5 5 - 8 0 . A h l u n d , Bertil, Historia kringflottans kanoner, Karlskrona, 1998. , Historia kring vara sjokort, S t o c k h o l m , 2002. A h n l u n d , Nils, Gustav Adolf infor tyska kriget, S t o c k h o l m , 1918. , Sveriges Riksdag, III; Standsriksdagens utdaning, 1592-1672, Stocldiolm, 1933. , "Svensk ostersjopolitik u n d e r det tidigare 1600-talet", Forum navale, 7, 1946, 3-15. Ailes, M a r y Elizabeth, "Ships, Sailors a n d M e d i a t o r s : E n g l a n d ' s naval aid to Sweden, 1658-1659", The Historian, 67, 2005, 2 7 5 - 9 8 . Albrectsen, Esben, Danmark-Norge 1380-1814: I, Faelleskabet bliver til, 1380-1536, Oslo, 1997. Aldridge, D a v i d D., Admiral Sir John Norris and the British Naval Expeditions to the Baltic Sea, 1715-1727, L u n d , f o r t h c o m i n g . A i m , Josef, "Artillerimattstocken", Meddelande, Armemuseum, 15, S t o c k h o l m , 1954, 5-15. A l m q v i s t , Daniel, " D e n ryska offensiven i F i n l a n d ar 1712", KFA, 34, 1943, 1 4 9 - 2 3 5 . Almqvist, Helge, Sverige och Ryssland, 1595-1611: Tvisten om Estland, forbundet mot Polen, de ryska grdnslandens erdfring och den stora dynastiska planen, S t o c k h o l m , 1907. AmiralitetskoUegietshistoria,ll-Y, 1696-1968,Ma\m6,1974-83 (vol. l , s e e Wendtl950). A n d e r s o n , M . S., Peter the Great, L o n d o n , 1995 (1st ed. 1978). A n d e r s o n , R. C., Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522-1850, L o n d o n 1910/1969. , " S e c o n d - h a n d M e n - o f - W a r in 1712-14", MM, 17, 1931, 3 2 1 - 2 6 . , " U i e Mars a n d t h e Adler", MM, 25, 1939, 2 9 6 - 9 9 . — , "A List of the Royal N a v y in 1590-1591", MM, 43, 1957, 3 2 2 - 2 3 . A n d e r s s o n , H a n s , "Brottsliga b a t s m a n : En u n d e r s o k n i n g o m b a t s m a n s brottslighet i S t o c k h o l m u n d e r s e n a r e delen av s t o r m a k t s t i d e n " . Forum navale, 49, 1993, 3 9 - 7 2 . A n d e r s s o n , Ingvar, Erik XIV:s engelska underhandlingar: Studier i svensk diplomati och handelspolitik, L u n d , 1935. A n t h o n i , Eric, Till avvecklingen av konflikten mellan hertig Carl och Finland: Konfliktens uppkomst och hertigens seger, Helsingfors, 1935. , Konflikten mellan hertig Carl och Finland: Avvecklingen och forsoningen, Helsingfors, 1937. A r f w i d s s o n , Eredrik, Forsvaret av Ostersjoprovinserna, 1708-1710, Gavle, 1936.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

753

Arnell, Sture, Die Aufldsungdes livlandischen Ordensstates: Das schwedischen Eingreifen und die Heirat Herzog Johans von Finnland, 1558-1562, L u n d , 1937. , Bidrag till belysning av den baltiska fronten under det nordiska sjiiarskriget, 15631570, S t o c k h o l m , 1977. Arteus, G u n n a r , Krigsteori och historisk fdrklaring: I. Kring Karl XILs ryska fdlttdg; II. Karolinsk och europeisk stridstaktik, 1700-1712, G o t h e n b u r g , 1970-72. , Krigsmakt och samhdlle i frihetstidens Sverige, S t o c k h o h n , 1982. , Till militdrstatens forhistoria: Krig, professionalisering och social fordndring under Vasasdnernas regering, S t o c k h o l m , 1986. Asker, Bjorn, Officerarna och det svenska samhdllet, 1650-1700, U p p s a l a , 1983. Askgaard, Finn^ Kampen om Ostersjon pd Karl X Gustavs tid, S t o c k h o l m , 1974. Askgaard, Finn, a n d Stade, A r n e (eds), Kampen om Skane, C o p e n h a g e n , 1983. A t t m a n , A r t u r , Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiskapolitik, 1558-1595, L u n d , 1944. , The Russian and Polish markets in international trade, 1500-1650, Gothenburg, 1973. , The struggle for Baltic markets: Powers in conflict, 1558-1618, G o t h e n b u r g , 1979. " D e n svenska O s t e r s j o p o l i t i k e n s arkitekt", in Vetenskap och omvdrdering: Till Curt Weibull pd hundraarsdagen, 19 augusti 1986, G o t h e n b u r g , 1986. Axtorna: En studie i organisation och taktik, S t o c k h o l m , 1926. B a c k s t r o m , Per Olof, Svenska flottans historia, S t o c k h o l m , 1884. Bagger, H a n s , "En b e g i v e n h e d der ikke f a n d t sted. D e n d a n s k - r u s s i s k e l a n d g a n g 1 Skane 1716", ( D a n i s h ) Historisk Tidsskrift, 103, 2003, 1 1 8 - 6 0 . Barfod, Jorgen H. Niels Jueh A Danish admiral of the 17th century, Copenhagen, 1977. , "Slaget i Koge Bugt d e n 1. juli 1677", ( D a n i s h ) Historisk Tidsskrift, 80, 1980, 2 8 7 324. , Flddens fddsel, C o p e n h a g e n , 1990. , Christian 3.s fldde: Den danske flades historic, 1533-1588, C o p e n h a g e n , 1995. -, Niels Juels fldde: Den danske flades historic, 1660-1720, C o p e n h a g e n , 1997. B a r k m a n , Bertil C:son, Gustav II Adolfs regementsorganisation vid det inhemska infanteriet: En studie over organisationens tillkomst och huvuddragen av dess utveckling mot bakgrunden av kontinental organisation, S t o c k h o l m , 1931. , Kungl. Svea Livgardes historia, I, 1523-1560, S t o c k h o l m , 1937. , Kungl. Svea Livgardes historia, II, 1560-1611, Stocldiolm, 1938-39. Baugh, Daniel A., British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, P r i n c e t o n , 1965. Bellamy, M a r t i n , Christian IV and his Navy: A political and administrative history of the Danish navy, 1596-1648, Leiden, 2006. Berg, Lars O t t o , " P e i p u s e s k a d e r n s fartyg, 1701 - 1 7 0 4 ; En tabellariskframstallning", Porwm navale, 22, 1965, 129-33. , "Karolinsk flotta: Studier o c h tabeller", Forum navale, 25, 1970, 3 - 8 5 . , " P e i p u s e s k a d e r n 1701-1704. D o r p t s k a skeppsflottan", Aastaraamat. Annales societatis litterarum Estonicae in Svecia, 11, 1 9 8 8 - 9 9 0 , Stockliolm, 1992, 2 7 - 3 8 . Bergersen, Olav, Era Henrik Bielke til Iver Huitfeldt: Utsyn over den dansk-norske fellesfldtes historic i perioden 1630 til 1710, 4 vols, T r o n d h e i m , 1953-56. B e r g m a n , Ernst, Garnla Varvet vid Goteborg, 1660-1825, G o t h e n b u r g , 1954. , "Carl X Gustaf och flottan 1 6 5 7 - 1 6 5 8 " , in Stade 1965, 2 2 1 - 5 1 . , " K o m p a n i s k e p p e n i G 5 t e b o r g och d e n d a n s k a b l o c k a d e n " , in Stade 1965,197-219. B e r g m a n , Ulf, Fran bondelots till yrkesman: Lotsning i Ostergdtland, 1537-1914, Lund, 1995. Beskrovnyj, L j u b o m i r G., Russkaja armija i flot v XVIII veke (Ocerki), M o s c o w , 1958. Bidrag till den Store Nordiske Krigs Historic, 10 vols, C o p e n h a g e n , 1899-1934. Bijker, W i e b e E., H u g h e s , T h o m a s P., a n d P i n c h , T r e v o r J. (eds). The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology, C a m b r i d g e , M A , 1987.

754

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bjarne Larsson, Gabriela, Stadgelagstiftning i senmedeltidens Sverige, S t o c k h o l m , 1994. Bjerg, H a n s C h r . (ed.), Slaget i Kbge Bugt 1. Juli 1677, C o p e n h a g e n , 1977. Bjerg, H a n s C., a n d Ericksen, J o h n , Danske orlogsskibe, 1690-1860: Konstruktion og dekomtion, C o p e n h a g e n , 1980. Bjurling, Oscar, " S t o c k h o l m s f o r b i n d e l s e r m e d u t l a n d e t u n d e r 1670-talets vaxlingar". Forum navale, 10, 1951, 3 - 3 7 . Black, Jeremy, Continental Commitment: Britain, Hanover and interventionism, 17141793, L o n d o n , 2005. Blom, O t t o , Kristian den fierdes artilleri, hans toihuse og vaabenforraad, Copenhagen, 1877. B l o m d a h l , R u n e , Fdrmyndarrciftens huvudskede: En studie i Stora Kommissionens historia, S t o c k h o l m , 1963. Bohnie, Klaus-Richard, Die schwedische Besetzung des Weichseldeltas, 1626-1636, W u r z b u r g , 1963. , " O f f i c e r s r e k r y t e r i n g e n vid tre l a n d s k a p s r e g e m e n t e n 1626-1682", in Revera & Torstendahl 1979, 2 1 5 - 5 1 . B o n n e y , Richard, The European Dynastic states, 1494-1660, O x f o r d , 1991. Borjeson, H j a l m a r , " H i e Swedish ship Stora Krafwelen of 1532", MM, 14,1928, 149-57. , Stockholms segelsjdfart: Anteckningar om huvudstadens kofferdiflotta och dess man med en dverblick av stadens och rikets sjofartsforhdllanden frdn dldsta tid intill vara dagar, S t o c k h o l m , 1932. Lists ofMen-ofWar, 1650-1700, P a r t III; Swedish ships, 1650-1699, L o n d o n , 1936. B o u d r i o t , Jean, a n d Berti, H u b e r t , L'artillerie de Mer: Marine francaise, 1650-1850, Paris, 1992. Brewer, John, The Sinews of Power: War, money and the English state, L o n d o n , 1989. B r i a n d de Crevecoeur, E., Peder Skram: Danmarks Vovehals, C o p e n h a g e n , 1950. , HerlufTrolle: Kongens Admiral och Herlufsholms Skoles stifter, C o p e n h a g e n , 1959. Bruijn, J. R., De admiraliteit van Amsterdam in rustige jaren, 1713-1751: Regenten en financien, schepen en zeevarenden, A m s t e r d a m / H a a r l e m , 1970. , The Dutch Navy of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, C o l u m b i a , SC, 1993. B r u u n , C h r i s t i a n , Curt Sivertsen Adelaer: En historisk undersogelse, C o p e n h a g e n , 1871. B u c h a n a n , B r e n d a (ed.). Gunpowder: The history of an international technology, Bath, 1996. , Gunpowder, Explosives and the State: A technological history, L o n d o n , 2006. Buchet, Christian, Marine, economic et societe, un example d'interaction: L'avitaillement de la Royal Navy durant la guerre de sept ans, Paris, 1999. Buchholz, W e r n e r , Staat und Stdndegesellschaft in Schweden zur Zeit des Ubergangs vom Absolutismus zum Stdndeparlamentarismus, 1718-1720, S t o c k h o l m , 1979. Bushkovitch, Paul, Peter the Great: The struggle for power, 1671-1725, C a m b r i d g e , 2001. Cambridge History of Scandinavia, Volume 1: Prehistory to 1520 (ed. b y K n u t Helle), C a m b r i d g e , 2003, 6 7 9 - 7 7 0 (by H e r m a n Schiick a n d Jens E. Olsen). C a n d i a n i , G u i d o , " T i b u r z i o Bailo e i c a n n o n i di Sarezzo. Politica navale e f o r n i t u r e militari nella r e p u b b l i c a di Venezia d u r a n t e la P r i m a g u e r r a di M o r e a ( 1 6 8 4 - 9 9 ) " , Societd e storia, 102, 2003, 6 7 7 - 7 0 8 . Carl X Gustav-studier (several a u t h o r s a n d tides), 8 vols, Stockliolm, 1 9 6 5 - 7 9 . Carlsson, G o t t f r i d , "Karl K n u t s s o n s t e s t a m e n t e " , HT, 63, 1943, 1 - 4 7 . , "Svante Nilssons f i n l a n d s e x p e d i t i o n 1504 och Soren N o r b y " , HT, 69, 1949, 4 1 - 5 0 . C a r r L a u g h t o n , L. G., "Early T u d o r Ship G u n s " , MM, 46, 1960, 2 4 2 - 8 5 . C a r u a n a , A d r i a n B., The History of English Sea Ordnance, 1523-1875: I, The Age of Evolution, 1523-1715, Rotherfield, 1994. , The History of English Sea Ordnance, 1523-1875: II, The Age of the System, 17151815, Ashley Lodge, 1997. C a s s o n , M a r k , The Entrepreneur: An economic theory, 2 n d ed., C h e l t e n h a m , 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

755

Cavallie, James, Fran fred till big: De finansiella problemen kring krigsutbwttet ar 1700, Uppsala, 1975. , De hoga officerarna: Studier i den svenska militiira hierarkien under 1600-talets senare del, S t o c k h o l m , 1981. C e d e r l u n d , Carl Olof, "Svanen s o m blev en anka: V r a k i d e n t i f i e r i n g och m a r k n a d s foriiig av nationella m y t e r " , Tvdrsnitt, 17, 1995, 6 - 1 2 . (ed. Fred H o c k e r ) , Vasa, I; The archaeology of a Swedish warship of 1628, O x f o r d , 2006. C h a n d l e r Jr, Alfred D., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the history of the industrial revolution. N e w York, 1962. , The Visible Hand: Vie managerial revolution in American business, C a m b r i d g e , M A , 1977. C h r i s t e n s e n , Aksel E., Dutch Trade to the Baltic about 1600: Studies in the Sound Toll Register and Dutch shipping records, C o p e n h a g e n , 1941. , Kalmarunionen og nordisk politik, 1319-1439, C o p e n h a g e n , 1980. C h r i s t i a n s e n , Jesper, " D e n d a n s k e flades f o r s y n i n g s s i t u a t i o n i d e n N o r d i s k e Syvarskrigs forste ar", Marinehistorisk Tidsskrift, 15, 1982, 3 - 1 7 . Cipolla, Carlo, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400-1700, L o n d o n , 1965. Claeson, Sten, Hdradshovdingedmbetet i senmedeltidens och Gustav Vasas Sverige, S t o c k h o l m , 1987. Clason, E d w a r d , " O m Vasas bestyckning", TiS, 127, 1964, 7 6 2 - 7 9 , 8 4 9 - 6 4 . C l e m e n s s o n , Gustaf, Flottans forldggning till Karlskrona: En studie i flottstationsfragan fore ar 1683, S t o c k h o l m , 1938. C o l e m a n , James S., Power and Structure of Society, N e w York, 1974. Corrales, M a g d a l e n a Pi, Espana y las potencias nordicas: "La otra invencible", 1574, M a d r i d , 1983. Corrales, M a g d a l e n a de Pazzis Pi, "La ' c o m i s i o n ' del c a p i t a n Francisco de Eraso a Suecia: U n a posible alternativa al conflicto c o n Flandes", in Jose M a r t i n e z Millan (ed.), Felipe II (1527-1598): Europa y la Monarquia Catdlica, I, M a d r i d , 1998, 617-30. Daggfeldt, Bertil, "Lybska Svan", TiS, 126, 1963, 3 - 2 7 . D a h l g r e n , Erik Wilhelni, Louis De Geer, 1587-1652: Hans lif och verk, 2 vols, U p p s a l a , 1923 (2nd ed., S t o c k h o l m , 2002). D a h l g r e n , Per, a n d Richter, H e r m a n , Sveriges sjokarta, Stockliolm, 1944. D a h l g r e n , Stellan, Karl X Gustav och reduktionen, S t o c k h o l m , 1964. D a h l g r e n , Stellan, a n d N o r m a n , H a n s , The Rise and Fall of New Sweden, Stocldiolm, 1988. Dansk udenrigspolitiks historic, 1. Konger och krige, 700-1648, C o p e n h a g e n , 2002 (authors: Esben Albrectsen, Karl-Erik F r a n d s e n a n d G u n n e r Lind). Davies, J. D., Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The officers and men of the Restoration navy, O x f o r d , 1992. D e g n , Ole, a n d Gobel, Erik, Dansk sofarts historic: II, Skuder og kompagnier, 15881720, C o p e n h a g e n , 1997. Dessert, Daniel, La Royale: Vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil, Paris, 1996. DeVries, Kelly, Medieval Military Technology, P e t e r b o r o u g h , 1992. , Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200-1500: Studies in military history and technology, A l d e r s h o t , 2002. Dosi, G i o v a n n i , G i a n n t t i , Renato, a n d Toninelli, Pier A n g e l o (eds). Technology and Enterprise in a Historical Perspective, O x f o r d , 1992. Dosi, G i o v a n n i , Nelson, Richard R., a n d W i n t e r , Sidney G., " I n t r o d u c t i o n : Tlie n a t u r e a n d d y n a m i c s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l capabilities", in G i o v a n n i Dosi, R i c h a r d R. Nelson, a n d Sidney G. W i n t e r (eds). The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities, O x f o r d , 2000, 1 - 2 2 .

756

BIBLIOGRAPHY

E d e n , Nils, Om centralregeringens organisation under den dldre Vasatiden (1523-1594), Uppsala, 1899. , " D e n svenska riksstyrelsens o r g a n i s a t i o n , 1594-1602", H T , 21, 1901, 1 9 1 - 2 2 6 . , Den svenska centralregeringens utveckling till kollegial organisation i borjan af sjuttonde drlmndradet (1602-1634), Uppsala, 1902. E h r m a n , J o h n , The Navy in the War of William III, 1689-1697: Its state and direction, C a m b r i d g e , 1953. E i n a r s s o n , Lars, "Artefacts f r o m t h e Kronan (1676): Categories, p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d social s t r u c t u r e " , in M a r k R e d k n a p (ed.). Artefacts from Wrecks: Dated assemblages from the late Middle Ages to the Industrial revolution. O x b o w , O x f o r d , 1997, 2 0 9 - 2 0 . E k m a n , Carl, "The Swedish Ship Mars or Makalos, MM, 25, 1939, 1 - 1 0 . , "Stora Kravehi Elefanten", in Svenska Flottans Historia, I, 1942, 8 9 - 9 8 . , "Erik XIV:s s k e p p s r e g e m e n t e " , TiS, 108, 1945, 5 5 6 - 6 1 . , " N a g r a data o m Erik XIV:s sjokrigskonst", TiS, 109, 1946, 5 0 - 8 3 . , "Skeppshovitsmiin u n d e r 1500-talet", TiS, 113, 1950, 8 2 - 1 0 5 . E n g l u n d , Peter, Det hotade huset: Adliga fdrestallningar om samhdllet under stormaktstiden, S t o c k h o l m , 1989. , Den oovervinnelige: Om den svenska stormaktstiden och en man i dess mitt, Stockh o l m , 2000. Ericson, Lars, " P i o n j a r e r och r u s t n i n g a r 1680-1721", in Karlskronavarvets historia, 1, 1993, 9 - 6 4 . , Lasse i Gatan: Kaparkriget och det svenska stormaktsvaldets fall, L u n d , 1997. , Svenska knektar: Indelta soldater, ryttare och batsman i krig och fred, L u n d , 2002. Eriksen, Egon, a n d Erantzen, Ole L., Dansk artillerie i Napoleonstiden: Porudsaetninger og udvikling, 1760-1814, C o p e n h a g e n , 1988. Eriksson, Bo, Statstjdnare och jorddgare: Adelsideologi i Per Brahes "Oeconomia", S t o c k h o l m , 2008. E r t m a n , T h o m a s , Birth of the Leviathan: Building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe, C a m b r i d g e , 1997. Eagerlund, Rainer, Bonder, krigsfolk och borgldger: Den militdra tungan i egentliga Finland under dldre Vasatid, Abo, 2003. Eagerlund, Rainer, Jern, K u r t , a n d Villstrand, Nils-Erik, Finlands historia, II, 15231809, Esbo, 1993. Eahlborg, Birger, "Ett blad u r d e n svenska h a n d e l s f l o t t a n s historia ( 1 6 6 0 - 1 6 7 5 ) " , HT, 43, 1923, 2 0 5 - 8 1 . , Sveriges yttre politik, 1660-1664, S t o c k h o l m , 1932. , 1664-1668, 2 vols, Stockliolm, 1949. , 1668-1672, 2 vols, Stocldiohn, 1961. E a h l s t r o m , Jan M a g n u s , " K r i n g d e n politiska och militara b a k g r u n d e n till slagen i Listerdyb d e n 16 och 25 m a j 1644", Skrifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska Samfundet, 6, 1945, 7 9 - 1 0 9 . Fenicia, Giulio, II regno di Napoli e la difesa del Mediterraneo nell'eta di Filippo II (1556-1598): Organizzazione e finanziamento, Bari, 2003. Eerreiro, Larrie D., Ships and Science: The birth of naval architecture and the Scientific Revolution, 1600-1800, C a m b r i d g e , M A , 2007. F i n c h a m , John, A History of Naval Architecture, L o n d o n , 1979 (original ed. 1851). Forssberg, A n n a M a r i a , Att hdlla folket pa gott humor. Informationsspridning, krigspropaganda och mobilisering i Sverige, 1655-1680, Stocldiolm, 2005. Fox, F r a n k , Great ships: The Battlefleet of King Charles II, L o n d o n , 1980. Fox, F r a n k L., A Distant Storm: The Four Days' Battle of 1666, Rotherfield, 1996. Fran Femern och Jankow till Westfaliska freden, Stocldiolm, 1948. F r a n t z e n , Ole L., Truslen fra ost: Dansk-norsk flddepolitik, 1769-1807, Copenhagen, 1980.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

757

F r a n t z e n , Ole L., "Sveiiske s t o b e j e r n s k a n o n e r i d a n s k tjeneste 1 6 6 0 - 1 8 1 4 " , in Fred Sandstedt a n d T h o m a s R o t h (eds), Athena och Ares, S t o c k h o h n , 1999, 147-60. Fredriksson, B e r n d t , Forsvarets finansiering: Svensk krigsekonomi under skanska kriget, 1675-79, Uppsala, 1976. Frost, R o b e r t I., The Northern Wars: War, state and society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, H a r l o w , 2000, Fury, Cheryl A., Tides in the Affairs of Men: The social history of EUzabethan seamen, 1580-1603, W e s t p o r t , C T , 2002. Gerentz, Sven, Kommerskollegium och ndringslivet, 1651-1951, S t o c k h o l m , 1951. G j e r u l d s e n , Ole H e n d r i k , Defensjonsskipsordningen i Norge, 1630-1704, Oslo, 2002. Glasgow, Jr, T o m , " M a t u r i n g of Naval A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1556-1564", MM, 56, 1970, 3-26. Glete, Jan, "Svenska orlogsfartyg, 1521-1560: Flottans g r u n d l a g g n i n g u n d e r ett tekniskt b r y t n i n g s s k e d e " , Forum navale, 30, 1976, 5 - 7 4 ; 31, 1977, 2 3 - 1 1 9 . , ASEA under hundra dr: En studie i ett storfdretags organisatoriska, tekniska och ekanomiska utvecUing, Vasteras, 1983. -, Agande och industriell omvandling: Agargrupper, skogsindustri, verkstadsindustri. 1850-1950, S t o c k h o l m , 1987. — , " D e n svenska linjeflottan, 1721-1860: En oversikt av dess s t r u k t u r och storlek s a m t n a g r a s y n p u n k t e r pa b e h o v e t av ytterligare f o r s k n i n g " , Forum navale, 45, 1990, 9-68. "En styrka m e s t pa p a p p e r e t ? Historiografiska s y n p u n k t e r pa 17004alets svenska linjeflotta", in Studier i modern historia tilldgnade Jarl Torbacke den 18 augusti 1990, S t o c k h o l m , 1990, 9 7 - 1 1 2 . — , "1700-talets svenska linjeflotta - en offentlig i n s t i t u t i o n m e d o m s t a l l n i n g s p r o b lem", Historieldrarnas Forenings Arsskrift, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 , 4 1 - 5 1 . "Kriget till sjoss", in G u n n a r A r t e u s (ed.), Gustav IILs ryska krig, S t o c k h o l m , 1992, 110-74. — , "Johan Ills Stora Skepp: Att finna ett s k e p p i 1500-talets skeppsgardsriikenskaper". Forum navale, 49, 1993, 5 - 1 7 . -, Navies and Nations: Warships, navies and state building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, 2 vols, Stockliolm, 1993 {Glete 1993). — , "Beredskap och v i d m a k t h a l l a n d e , Varvet o c h linjeflottan, 1772-1866", in Karlskronavarvets historia, I, 1993, 1 4 5 - 2 5 2 {Glete 1993b). -, "Bridge a n d Bulwark: The Swedish navy a n d t h e Baltic, 1500-1809", in Rystad, et al. 1994, 9 - 5 9 . —, Ndtverk i ndringslivet: Agande och industriell omvandling i det mogna industrisamhdllet, 1920-1990, S t o c k h o l m , 1994. " O s t e r s j o n s o m m a r i t i m t o p e r a t i o n s o m r a d e - ett historiskt perspektiv", TiS, 162, 1999, 2 7 2 - 8 0 . — , "Axel Zettersten o c h d e n svenska flottans historia", in Historia, krig och statskonst: Vdnbok till Klaus-Richard Bohme, S t o c k h o l m , 2000, 2 7 - 4 4 . Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime conflicts and the transformation of Europe, L o n d o n , 2000 {Glete 2000). — , " V a s a t i d e n s galarflottor", in Norman 2000, 3 7 - 4 9 {Glete 2000b). — , "Sheldon, af C h a p m a n och de svenska l i n j e s k e p p e n , 1 7 5 0 - 1 8 0 0 " , in E m m a H a v i n g (ed.), Marinmuseum. Modellkammaren 250 dr - ett marinmuseums fddelse, Karlsk r o n a , 2002, 18-31. War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as fiscal-military states, 1500-1660, L o n d o n , 2002. — , "Naval Power, 1450-1650: Tlie F o r m a t i v e Age", in Geoff' M o r t i m e r (ed.). Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815, L o n d o n , 2004, 8 1 - 1 0 0 .

758

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- , "Navies a n d P o w e r Struggle in N o r t h e r n a n d Eastern E u r o p e , 1 7 2 1 - 1 8 1 4 " , in Rolf H o b s o n a n d T o m Kristianssen (eds), Navies in Northern Waters, 1721-2000, L o n d o n , 2004, 6 6 - 9 3 . (ed.), " I n t r o d u c t i o n " , Naval History, 1500-1680, A l d e r s h o t , 2005, xi-xxvi. , " A m p h i b i o u s W a r f a r e in the Baltic, 1550-1700", in M a r k Charles Fissel a n d D. J. B. T r i m (eds). Amphibious Warfare, 1000-1700: Commerce, state formation and European expansion, Leiden, 2006, 123-47. , "Naval A d m i n i s t r a t i o n " , in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, II, N e w York, 2007, 6 4 0 - 4 8 . , " V a r f o r flyttade Sverige vasterut?", in L e n n a r t P a l m a n d M a r i a Sjoberg (eds), Historia. Vdnbok till Christer Winberg den 5 juni 2007, G o t h e n b u r g , 2007, 1 0 5 - 1 6 . , " W a r f a r e , E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p a n d t h e Fiscal-Military State", in F r a n k Tallett a n d D. J. B. T r i m (eds), European Warfare, 1350-1750, C a m b r i d g e , f o r t h c o m i n g . Gobel, Erik, " S e j l d u g s m a n u f a k t u r e t i Koge, 1687-1735", Maritim kontakt, 12, 1988, 59-83. G o o d m a n , David, Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665: Reconstruction and defeat, C a m b r i d g e 1997. G o r a n s s o n , G o r a n , Virtus Militaris: Officersideal i Sverige, 1560-1718, L u n d , 1990. Goteborgs eskader och orlogsstation, 1523-1870, G o t h e n b u r g , 1949. G r a t f t o n , Bo, Soren Norby: Sjokrigare i Ostersjon pa 1500-talet, Visby, 1995. G r a m - J e n s e n , lb, " V i n d e g taktik i Koge Bugt 1. juli 1677", Tidsskrift for Sovaesen, 158, 1987, 149-227. G r a u e r s , Sven, Atten Wachtmeister genom seklerna, I, S t o c k h o l m , 1941. , Atten Wachtmeister genom tiderna, II: Grevliga atten Wachtmeister av Johannishus, S t o c k h o l m , 1946. , Atten Wachtmeister genom seklerna, 111:1-2, S t o c k h o l m , 1953-56. , " D e militara t r a n s p o r t e r n a over O s t e r s j o n u n d e r stora n o r d i s k a krigets forsta skede, 1700-1708", in Historiska studier tilldgnade Folke Lindberg, S t o c k h o l m , 1963, 79-95. G r e n a n d e r , G u n n a r , "Artilleriets pjaser och a m m u n i t i o n " , in Jonas H e d b e r g a n d H a n s Ulfliielm (eds), Kungl. ArtHleriet: Karl XI:s och Karl XILs tid, S t o c k h o l m , 1993, 65-112. G r e n a n d e r Nyberg, G e r t r u d , Segelduksvdvningpa 1600-talet, S t o c k h o l m , 1960. Grisell, Bengt, a n d Ahlberg, Sten, "Riksnyckeln 1628", Forum navale, 28, 1973, 6 3 - 8 1 . G r u n d e l l , Daniel, Nodig underrattelse om artilleriet till lands och sioss, S t o c k h o l m , 1705. G u i l m a r t i n , Jr, J o h n F., "Tlie Early Provision of Artillery A r m a m e n t o n M e d i t e r r a n e a n W a r Galleys", MM, 59, 1973, 2 5 7 - 8 0 . , Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century, C a m b r i d g e , 1974. " G u n s a n d G u n n e r y " , in R o b e r t G a r d i n e r a n d Richard W . U n g e r (eds.). Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: The sailing ship, 1000-1650, L o n d o n , 1994, 1 3 9 - 5 0 . G u s t a f s s o n , H a r a l d , "The C o n g l o m e r a t e State: A perspective o n state f o r m a t i o n in Early M o d e r n E u r o p e " , Scandinavian Journal of History, 23, 1998, 1 8 9 - 2 1 3 . , Gamla riken, nya stater: Statsbildning, politisk kultur och identitet under Kalmarunionens uppldsningsskede, 1512-1541, Stocldiolm, 2000. Gyldendal og Politikens Danmarkshistorie: VI, De fire staender, 1400-1500 (by Troels D a h l e r u p ) ; VII, Pd Guds og Herskabs nade, 1500-1600 (by Alex W i t t e n d o r f ) ; VIII, Ved afgrundens rand, 1600-1700 (by Benito Scocozza), C o p e n h a g e n 1989. Gyllengranat, Carl A u g u s t , Sveriges sjokrigs-historia i sammandrag, 2 vols, K a r l s k r o n a , 1840. H a g g m a n , Jean, Studier i Frihetstidens fdrsvarspolitik: ett bidrag till Sveriges inre historia, 1721-1727, Stocicholm, 1922. Halldin, Gustaf (ed.), Svenskt skeppsbyggeri: En oversikt av utvecklingen genom tiderna, M a l m o , 1963.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

759

Hallenberg, Mats, Kungen, fogdarna och riket: Lokalforvaltning och statsbyggande under tidig Vasatid, S t o c k h o l m , 2001. , "Militar eller civil? K u n g a t j a n a r e o c h v a l d s v e r k a r e fore professionaliseringen", Militdrhistorisk Tidskrift, 2002, 145-72. " B o n d e r i vapen: Mobilisering, m a k t och m o t s t a n d i 1500-talets Sverige", Militdrhistorisk tidskrift, 2005, 13-37. Statsmakt till salu. Arrendesystemet och privatiseringen av skatteuppbdrden i det svenska riket, 1620-1635, L u n d , 2008. H a m n i a r , M a g n u s , "Overstyrelsen och v a p e n u t v e c k l i n g ( 1 6 9 6 - 1 8 0 3 ) " , in Amiralitetskollegiets historia, II, 2 8 1 - 3 3 1 . H a m m a r s t r o m , Ingrid, Finansfdrvaltning och varuhandel, 1504-1540: Studier i deyngre sturarnas och Gustav Vasas statshushallning, Uppsala, 1956. H a m n s t r o m , Carl, Porsvar och byggd i Angermanland och Medelpad: Batsmanshdllet i Angermanland och Medelpad, Solna, 1972. H a r d i n g , Richard, "Sea Power; The struggle for d o m i n a n c e , 1650-1815", in Geoff M o r t i m e r (ed.). Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815, H o u n d s m i l l s , 2004. H a r d s t e d t , M a r t i n , Om krigets fdrutsdttningar: Den militdra underhallsproblematiken och det civila samhdllet i norra Sverige och Finland under Finska kriget, 1808-09, U m e a , 2002. Harris, D a n i e l G., "Charles S h e l d o n a n d t h e Bahic's First D r y Dock", M M , 85, 1999, 396-404. H a r r i s o n , Dick, Uppror och allianser: Politiskt vald i 1400~talets svenska bondesamhdlle, L u n d , 1997. H a t c h , M a r y Jo, Organization Theory: Modern, symbolic and postmodern perspectives, O x f o r d , 1997. H a t t e n d o r f , J o h n B. (ed.), 77ie Influence of History on Mahan, N e w p o r t , 1991. H a t t e n d o r f , J o h n B., a n d U n g e r , R i c h a r d W . (eds). War at Sea in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, W o o d b r i d g e , 2003. H a t t o n , R a g n h i l d M., Charles XII of Sweden, L o n d o n , 1968. H e c k s c h e r , Eli P., Sveriges ekonomiska historia fran Gustav Vasa, 1:2, Stockliolm, 1936. , " D e n svenska h a n d e l s s j o f a r t e n s e k o n o m i s k a historia s e d a n Gustaf Vasa", Shifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska samfundet, 1, 1940, 5 - 3 1 . H e d b e r g , Jonas, Kungl. Artilleriet: Medeltid och dldre vasatid, S t o c k h o l m , 1975. , Kungl. Artilleriet: Carl X Gustafs tid, S t o c k h o l m , 1982. (ed.), Kungl Artilleriet: Yngre Vasatiden, S t o c k h o l m , 1985. H e d b e r g , L e n n a r t , Foretagarfursten och framvdxten av den starka staten: Hertig Karls resursexploatering i Ndrke, 1581-1602, O r e b r o , 1995. H e d e n s t i e r n a , Bertil, " F r a n r y s s h a r j n i n g a r n a i Stockliolms s k a r g a r d 1719", Shifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska Samfundet, 6, 1943, 2 0 - 4 0 . H e i j k e n s k j o l d , Carl, "Svensk s t y c k e g j u t n i n g och l o d s t o p n i n g av j a m u n d e r p e r i o d e n , 1540-1840", Artilleri-Tidskrift, 64, 1935, 5 7 - 8 0 . H e l m f r i d , Bjorn, Norrkopings historia. III, N o r r k o p i n g , 1971. H e n n e l , L e n n a r t , Bdtsmansrekrytering och bdtsmanshdll i Vdstsverige, licentiat thesis, L u n d , 1964; private p r i n t i n g , L u n d , 1993. H i l d e b r a n d , Emil, "Gustaf Vasa och B e r e n d v o n Melen", HT, 21, 1901, 2 4 5 - 3 1 6 . H i l d e b r a n d , Karl, Johan III och Europas katolska makter, 1568-1580: Studier i 1500talets politiska historia, U p p s a l a , 1898. H i l d e b r a n d , Karl-Gustaf, "Salt a n d C l o t h in Swedish E c o n o m i c History", Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2, 1954, 7 4 - 1 0 2 . , "Till Karl X l l - u p p f a t t n i n g e n s historia, M I " , HT, 74, 1954, 3 5 3 - 9 2 ; 7 5 , 1 9 5 5 , 1 - 4 6 . , Swedish Iron in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Export industry before the industrialization, Stockliolm, 1992. H i l d e m a n , Nils-Gustav, "Ryssarnas h a r j n i n g a r i G a s t r i k l a n d och H a l s i n g l a n d ar 1721", KFA, 41, 1950, 147-216.

760

BIBLIOGRAPHY

H j e l m q v i s t , Fredrik, Kriget i Finland och Ingermanland 1707 och 1708, L u n d , 1909. H o l m , E d v a r d , "Studier til d e n Store N o r d i s k e Krigs historie: I. Frederik IV o c h C z a r Peter i A a r e t 1716", ( D a n i s h ) Histoiisk Tidsshift, 5:3, 1881-82, 1 - 1 6 0 . H o l m , Johan, Komtniktionen av en stormakt: Kungamakt, skattebdnder och statsbild-^ ning, 1595-1640, S t o c k h o l m , 2007. H o l m b e r g , G., "Skeppsbyggarslakten Sheldon: Sex g e n e r a t i o n e r s v e r k s a n i h e t i svenska flottans tjanst", Sjohistorisk Arsbok, 1957-1958, 3-63. H o r n b o r g , Eirik, "Karl Sioblad och slaget vid Fliso", Shifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska samfundet, 4, 1944, 4 1 - 6 8 . H o w a r d , F r a n k , Sailing Ships of War, 1400-1860, L o n d o n , 1979. Israel, J o n a t h a n I., "The Politics of I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e Rivalry d u r i n g t h e l l i i r t y Years W a r : Gabriel de Roy a n d Olivares' mercantilist projects, 1621-1645", International History Review, 8, 1986, 5 1 7 - 4 9 . , Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740, O x f o r d , 1989. Jakobsson, H a k a n , "Tekniska influenser och centrala n o r m e r i svensk s k e p p s b y g g n a tion - Liibeck 1664-1667", Forum navale, 55, 1999, 2 6 - 4 3 . , "Tlie W a r s h i p in Swedish S e v e n t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Society - A cultural c o n s t r u c t i o n ? " , Scandinavian Journal of History, 24, 1999, 2 2 5 - 4 3 . Jakobsson, T h e o d o r , Lantmilitar bevdpning och beklddnad under dldre Vasatiden och Gustav IIAdolfs tid, Sveriges Krig 1611-1632: Bilagsband II, S t o c k h o l m , 1938. , Artilleriet under Karl Xll-tiden, S t o c k h o l m , 1943. Jal, Auguste, Abraham Du Quesne et la marine de son temps, 1, Paris, 1873. James, Alan, Navy and Government in Early Modern France, 1572-1661, Woodbridee 2004. Jensen, F r e d e P., " D e n d a n s k e ' i n k r e d s n i n g ' af V a s a - t i d e n s Sverige, Svensk historiet o l k n i n g i Karl X l l - r e n a e s s a n c e n s tegn", ( D a n i s h ) Historisk Tidsshift 76, 1976, 1-24. Jensen, Frede P., Danmarks konftikt med Sverige, 1563-1570, C o p e n h a g e n , 1982. , " F r e d e r i k II og truslen fra de katolske m a g t e r : linjer i d a n s k u d e n r i g s - och sikJcerh e d s p o l i t i k 1571-88", ( D a n i s h ) Historisk Tidsshift, 93, 1993, 2 3 3 - 7 8 . Jespersen, K. J, V., "Social C h a n g e a n d Military Revolution in Early M o d e r n E u r o p e : S o m e D a n i s h evidence". Historical Journal, 26, 1983, 1 - 1 3 . , "Rivalry w i t h o u t Victory: D e n m a r k , Sweden a n d t h e struggle for t h e Baltic, 1500-1720", in Rystad et al 1994. Jespersen, Leon (ed.), A Revolution from Above? The power state of 16th and 17th century Scandinavia, O d e n s e , 2000. J o n a s s o n , Gustaf, "Kriget m o t D a n m a r k ar 1700: F o r b e r e d e l s e r n a for l a n d s t i g n i n g e n p a Sjiilland och b a k g r u n d e n till fredsslutet", KFA, 43, 1962, 129-72. , Karl XII och hans radgivare: Den utrikespolitiska maktkampen i Sverige, 16971702, U p p s a l a , 1960. KarlXILs polska politik, 1702-1703, Stocldiolm, 1968. Jong, Michiel de, 'Staat van oorlogl': Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621, H i l v e r s u m , 2005. J o n s o n , Erik, Skdrgdrdskriget 1719: En bok om rysshdrjningarna invid Stockholm, S t o c k h o l m , 1961. Jonsson, A l e x a n d e r , De norrldndska landshovdingarna och statsbildningen 1634-1769 U m e a , 2005. Kaiserfeld, T h o m a s , " C h e m i s t r y in t h e W a r M a c h i n e : Saltpeter P r o d u c t i o n in Eighte e n t h - C e n t u r y Sweden", in Brett D. Steele a n d T a m e r a D o r l a n d (eds). Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment, Cambridge, Mass., 2005, 2 7 7 - 9 2 . , "Saltpetre at the I n t e r s e c t i o n of Military a n d Agricultural Interests in E i g h t e e n t h C e n t u r y Sweden", in Buchanan 2006, 142-57. Kammarkollegiets historia, Stocldiolm, 1941.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

761

Karl XII pd slagfciltet: Kawlinsk slagledning sedd mot bakgrunden av taktikens utvecklingfrdn dldsta tider, 4 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 . Karlskronavarvets historia (ed. Erik N o r b e r g ) , 2 vols, K a r l s k r o n a , 1993. K e r n k a m p , G. W . , De sleutels van de Sont: Het aandeel van de Republiek in den DeenschZweedschen oorlog van 1644-1645, H i e H a g u e , 1890. Kirby, David, Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic world, 14921772, L o n d o n , 1990. K i r c h n e r , W a l t h e r , The Rise of the Baltic Question, N e w a r k , Del., 1954. Klein, P. W . , De Trippen in de 17e Eeuw: Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de hollandse stapelmarkt, Assen 1965 ( n e w ed., L o n d o n 1999). Kloth, H e r b e r t , "Liibecks Seekriegswesen in der Zeit des n o r d i s c h e n Siebenjahrige Krieges, 1563-1570: Bin Beitrag z u r deutsclien Seekriegsgescliichte im 16. Jalirh u n d e r t " , Zeitschrift des Vereins fiir Liibeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 21, 1923, 1 - 5 1 , 185-256; 22, 1925, 121-52, 3 2 5 - 7 9 . Koch, Bertil, Bdtsmanshdllet i Skdne, Saltsjobaden, 1999. K o t l j a r c h u k , A n d r e j , In the Shadow's of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden in the European crisis of the mid-17th century, H u d d i n g e , 2006. Kraft, S a l o m o n , Sveriges historia till vara dagar: 3:11, Senare Medeltiden, 1448-1520, Stockliolm, 1944. Krotov, P, A., Gangutskaia Bataliia 1714 goda, St P e t e r s b u r g , 1996. Kulturhistoriskt Lexikon for Nordisk Medeltid. K u m l i e n , Kjell, Sverige och hanseaterna, L u n d , 1953. Kuvaja, Christer, Fdrsdrjning av en ockupationsarme: Den ryska armens underhdllssystem i Finland, 1713-1721, Abo, 1999. L a g e r m a r k , J. A., "Forsvaret av det egentliga Sveriges o s t e r s j o k u s t 1709", KFA, 14, 1923,87-119. , "Forsvaret av det egentliga Sveriges o s t e r s j o k u s t 1710", KFA, 15, 1924, 127-207. , "Forsvaret av det egentliga Sveriges ostersjokust, viistra Sverige och F i n l a n d 1711", KFA, 19, 1928, 10-96. Lagerroth, Fredrik, Statsreglering och finansfdrvaltning i Sverige till och med Frihetstidens ingdng, M a l m o , 1928. Landberg, Georg, De nordiska rikena under Bromsebroforbundet, Uppsala, 1925. , Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 1:3, 1648-1697, S t o c k h o l m , 1952. Lane, Frederic C., Profits from Power: Readings in protection rent and violence-controlling enterprises, Albany, 1979. Larsen, Axel, Kalmarkrigen: Et bidrag til de nordiske Rigers Krigshistorie, Copenhagen, 1889. Larsson, H u g o , "Var flotta u n d e r det stora n o r d i s k a kriget", TiS, 89, 1926, 5 7 - 7 5 (including reply b y G u n n a r U n g e r ) . , " F l o t t o p e r a t i o n e r n a i s o d r a O s t e r s j o n 1712", TiS, 89, 1926, 191-95. Larsson, Lars J., Soren Norby och Ostersjdpolitiken, 1523-1525, L u n d , 1986. Larsson, Lars-Olof, " G u s t a v Vasa o c h ' d e n nationella h a r e n ' " , Scandia, 3 3 , 1 9 6 7 , 2 5 0 - 6 9 . , Gustav Vasa: Landsfader eller tyrann?, S t o c k h o l m , 2002. , Arvet efter Gustav Vasa: En berdttelse omfyra kungar och ett rike, Stockliolm, 2005. Lavery, Brian, "The Rebuilding of British W a r s h i p s , 1 6 9 0 - 1 7 4 0 " , MM, 6 3 , 1 9 7 7 , 3 3 5 - 5 0 . , Ship of The line, I, L o n d o n , 1983. , The Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War, 1600-1815, L o n d o n , 1987. Lees, James, The Masting and Rigging of English Ships of War, 1625-1860, L o n d o n , 1979 ( 2 n d ed. 1990). Lengeler, Jorg Philipp, Das Ringen urn die Ruhe des Nordens: Grossbritanniens Nordeuropa-Politik und Ddnemark zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am M a i n , 1998. L e p a s o o n , U r v e , " O r l o g s v a r v e t s plmYiggnrngochaldrehyggnadev", in Karlskronavarvets historia, II, 1993, 2 0 3 - 4 2 .

762

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lewis, Michael, Armada Guns: A comparative study of English and Spanish armament, L o n d o n , 196L Lind, G u n n e r , Haeren og magten i Danmark, 1614-1662, O d e n s e , 1994. Lind, H a n s D., Fra kong Prederik den andens tid: Bidrag til den dansk-norske somagts historie, 1559-1588, C o p e n h a g e n , 1902. Lindahl, A n d e r s , "Livet o m b o r d och i l a n d aren 1680-1720", in Svenska flottans historia, II, 9 9 - 1 1 6 . Lindeberg, Gosta, Svensk ekonornisk politik under den gortzka perioden, L u n d , 1941. L i n d e g r e n , Jan, Utskrivning och utsugning: Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdea, 1620-1640, U p p s a l a , 1980. , "Karl XII", in Kungar och krigare, S t o c k h o l m , 1992, 149-225. Llinares, Sylviane, Marine propulsion et technique: L'evolution du systeme technologique du navires de guerre au XVIIIe siecle, 2 vols, Paris, 1994. Lockhart, Paul Douglas, Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648: King Christian IV and the decline of the Oldenburg state, Selinsgrove, 1996. , Prederik II and the Protestant Cause: Denmark's role in the Wars of Religion, 1559-1596, Leiden, 2004. , Sweden in the Seventeenth Century, Basingstoke, 2004. -, Denmark, 1513-1660: The rise and decline of a Renaissance monarchy, Oxford, 2007. L o n n r o t h , Erik, Statsmakt och statsfinans i det medeltida Sverige, G o t h e n b u r g , 1940. , Sverige och Kalmarunionen, 1397-1457, S t o c k h o l m , 1969 (1st ed. 1934). L u n d g r e n , Kurt, De stora orlogsskeppen fran Carlshamn, 1659-1676: En mikrohistorisk studie om skeppsbyggnad, teknik och livsvillkor under stormaktstiden, Karlshamn, 1999. , Sheldon, Day, Turner: Pre engelska skeppsbyggmdstare i Sverige under stormaktstiden, Fiirjestaden, 2000. Lundkvist, Sven, "Resurser, skattetryck och f a t t i g d o m i 1610-talets Sverige", in Revera & Porstendahl 1979, 133-62, , "Sverige och N e d e r l a n d e r n a , 1524-1534", Scandia, 27, 1961, 9 - 5 2 . , Gustav Vasa och Europa: Svensk handels- och utrikespolitik, 1534-1557, Uppsala, 1960. Lynn, J o h n (ed.), Peeding Mars: Logistics in western warfare from the Middle Ages to the present. Boulder, 1993. M a g n u s , Olaus, Historia om de nordiska folken, II, Uppsala, 1912 (original ed. 1555). Mankell, Julius, Uppgifter rorande svenska krigsmagtens styrka, sammansiittning och fdrdelning sedan slutet av femtonhundratalet jemte dfversigt af svenska krigshistoriens vigtigaste hdndelser under samma tid, 2 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1865. Marinehistorisk Pidsskrift, 2 4 - 2 6 , 1991-93. M e d i g e r , W a l t h e r , Mecklenburg, Russland und England-Hannover, 1706-1721: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Nordischen Krieges, H i l d e s h e i m , 1967. Meister, Jurg, "Svensk sjokrigforing pa B o d e n s j o n u n d e r trettioariga kriget", TiS, 130, 1967, 4 7 4 - 9 8 . M e m a i n , Rene, Le materiel de la Marine de guerre sous Louis XIV: Rochefort, arsenal modele de Colbert, Paris, 1937. M e r i n o N a v a r r o , Jose P. La Armada Espahola en el siglo XVIII, M a d r i d , 1981. Metcalf, M i c h a e l F. (ed.), Phe Riksdag: A history of the Swedish parliament, Stockholm, 1987. M o r r i s , M a r t h a , " H i e Rise of t h e English Sailcloth I n d u s t r y , 1565-1643: Coastal t r a d e r e c o r d s as a n i n d i c a t o r of i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n " , MM, 84, 1998, 1 3 9 - 5 1 . , "Naval c o r d a g e p r o c u r e m e n t in early m o d e r n E n g l a n d " , International Journal of Maritime History, 11, 1999, 8 1 - 9 9 . M o r t e n s e n , M i c h a e l H., Dansk artilleri indtil 1600, C o p e n h a g e n , 1999. Miiller, Leos, " S j o m a k t e n och d e n civila sjofarten, 1650-1809", in Norman 2000,342-52.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

763

M u l i t h e , A r n o l d , Svenska sjdhjaltar, II: Jakob Bagge, S t o c k h o l m , 1899. , Svenska Sjdhjaltar, V: Klas Fleming, Karl Gustaf Wrangel, Martin Hujsen Anckarhielm: Danska kriget 1643-1645, 1-11:1-2, S t o c k h o l m , 1905-10. Sjdmaktens inflytande pa Sveriges historia, I: Fran cildsta tid till omkring 1640, S t o c k h o l m , 1921. Karl XII och den ryska sjomakten, 3 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1924-27. M u r r a y , J o h n J., " S j o m a k t e r n a s e x p e d i t i o n till O s t e r s j o n 1715", KFA, 44, 1953, 134-96. , "Tlie U n i t e d Provinces a n d t h e A n g l o - D u t c h S q u a d r o n of 1715", Bijdragen voor Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 8, 1953/54, 2 0 - 4 5 . -, George I, the Baltic and the Whig Split of 1717: A study in diplomacy and propaganda, L o n d o n , 1969. M y r d a l , Janken, a n d Soderberg, Johan, Tlte Agrarian Economy of Sixteenth-Century Sweden, S t o c k h o l m , 2002. Nelson, Richard R., a n d W i n t e r , Sidney G., An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Boston, 1982. N e r g a r d , Maj-Britt, Mellan krona och marknad: Utldndska och svenska entreprendrer inom svensk jdrnhantering frdn ca 1580 till 1700, U p p s a l a , 2001. Nikula, Oscar, Svenska skdrgdrdsflottan 1756-1791, S t o c k h o l m , 1933. Nilsson, Sven A., Krona och frdlse i Sverige, 1523-1594: Rusttjdnst, Idnsvdsende, godspolitik, L u n d , 1947. , " R e d u k t i o n eller k o n t r i b u t i o n : Alternativ i n o m 1600-talets svenska finanspolitik", Scandia, 24, 1958, 6 8 - 1 1 4 . , Pa vdg mot reduktionen: studier i svenskt 1600-tal, S t o c k h o l m , 1964. , Pa vdg mot militdrstaten: Krigsbefdlets etablering i den dldre Vasatidens Sverige, Uppsala, 1989. -, De stora krigens tid: Om Sverige som militdrstat och bondesamhdlle, Uppsala, 1990. N i m w e g e n , Olof van, De subsistentie van het leger, A m s t e r d a m , 1995. N o r b e r g , Axel, Polen i svensk poiitik, 1617-26, S t o c k h o l m , 1974. N o r d e n s v a n , Carl O t t o , "Svenska a r m e n a r e n 1 7 0 0 - 1 7 0 9 " , KFA, 7, 1916, 120-80. N o r m a n , H a n s , Skdrgdrdsflottan: Uppbyggnad, militdr anvdndning och forankring i det svenska samhdllet, 1700-1824, L u n d , 2000. N o r r h e m , Svante, Uppkomlingarna: Kanslitjdnstemdnnen i 1600-talets Sverige och Europa, Stocldiolm, 1993. N o r t h , Douglass C., Structure and Change in Economic History, N e w York, 1981. , Understanding the Process of Economic Change, P r i n c e t o n , 2005. Oakley, Stewart P., War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790, L o n d o n , 1992. O d e n , Birgitta, Rikets uppbord och utgift: Statsfinanser och finansfdrvaltning under senare 1500-talet, L u n d , 1955. , "Karl X G u s t a v och det a n d r a d a n s k a kriget", Scandia, 27, 1961, 5 3 - 1 5 6 . , Kronohandel och finanspolitik, 1560-1595, L u n d , 1966. , " N a t u r a s k a t t e r och finanspolitik - ett finansiellt d i l e m m a " , Scandia, 33, 1967, 1-19. O h m a n , Christer, Nykoping och hertigdomet, U p p s a l a , 1973. Olofsson, Sven I n g e m a r , Efter Westfaliska freden: Sveriges yttre poiitik, 1650-1654, S t o c k h o l m , 1957. Olsson, A n d e r s , Borgmdstare, bastioner och tullbommar: Goteborg och Halmstad under statligt inflytande, 1630-1660, L u n d , 1995. Olsson, Kjell, Det gotldndska bdtsmanshdllet, 1646-1887, Visby, 1993. O p p e n h e i m , Michael, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, 1509-1660, L o n d o n , 1896. O r e d s s o n , Sverker, "Livskraften h o s Karl X l l - f o r s k n i n g e n s ' n y a skola'", in Historia, krig och statskonst: Vdnbok till Klaus-Richard Bohme, S t o c k h o l m , 2000, 4 5 - 7 0 . , Gustav II Adolf S t o c k h o l m , 2007.

764

BIBLIOGRAPHY

O r r m a n , Eljas, "Militar r e s u r s m o b i l i s e r i n g u n d e r aldre Vasatid", Historisk Tidskrift for Finland, 88, 2003, 4 4 4 - 4 9 . O s t e r b e r g , Eva, Gransbygd under krig: Ekonomiska, demografiska och administrativa fdrhallonden i sydvdstra Sverige under och efter nordiska sjudrskriget, L u n d , 1971. O s t e r g r e n , M a r g a r e t a , " N a g r a a n t e c k n i n g a r o m rattsvasendet vid orlogsflottan i b o r jan av 1700-talet", Forum navale, 30, 1976, 7 5 - 8 5 . Palme, Sven Ulric "Sverige och H o l l a n d vid L u n d a k r i g e t s u t b r o t t 1674-1675", KFA, 29, 1938, 8 4 - 1 7 2 . , Sverige och Danmark, 1596-1611, Uppsala, 1942. , " K o n u n g S i g i s m u n d s flotta i O s t e r s j o n 1599", Shifter utgivna av Sjdhistoriska Samfundet, 3, 1943, 3 - 1 9 . Sten Sture den dldre, 2 n d rev. ed., S t o c k h o l m , 1968 (1950). Parker, Geoffrey, "The Dreadnought Revolution of T u d o r E n g l a n d " , MM, 82, 2 6 9 - 3 0 0 . , The Dutch Revolt, L o n d o n , 1990 (1977). P e n r o s e , E d i t h Tilton, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, O x f o r d , 1959 (3rd ed. 1995). Perez-Mallaina, Pablo E., Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily life on the Indies fleets in the sixteenth century, B a k i m o r e , 1998. Perlestam, M a g n u s , "'Jag lovar och svar': Ett plikttroget b e t e e n d e i de f o r n y a d e sjoartiklarna ar 1685", Militarhistorisk Tidskrift, 2003, 157-220. , " 'Ringa p r o f af b e h j a r t a d soldat': M o d , plikt och h e d e r i en m a r i n krigsratt vid slutet av leOO-talet", Forum navale, 60, 2004, 15-81. P e r r o w , Charles, Complex Organizations: A critical essay, 3rd ed.. N e w York, 1993. Petersen, Erling Ladewig, The Crisis of the Danish Nobility, 1580-1660, O d e n s e , 1967. , " F r o m D o m a i n State to T a x State", Scandinavian Economic History Review, 23, 1975, 116-48. - , "Defence, W a r a n d Einance: C h r i s t i a n IV a n d t h e C o u n c i l of Realm, 1 5 9 6 - 1 6 2 9 " , Scandinavian Journal of History, 1, 1982, 2 7 7 - 3 1 3 . P e t e r s o n , Claes, Reter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish antecedents and the process of reception, Stocldiolm, 1979. Petrini, Hasse, Kallstudier till Erik XIV:s och Nordiska sjuarskrigets historia, L u n d , 1942. Phillips, Carla R a h n , Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial defense in the early seventeenth century, Baltimore, 1986. Phillips, E d w a r d J., The Founding of Russia's Navy: Peter the Great and the Azov Fleet, 1688-1714, C o n n . , 1995. P i e r r e Dollinger, The German Hansa, L o n d o n , 1970. Piiriniae, H e l m u t , "Die finanziellen B e z i e h u n g e n Livlands u n d Estlands z u m s c h w e d ischen Staat i m 17. J a h r h u n d e r t " , in A n u M a i K611 (ed.). Time of Change in the Baltic Countries: Essays in honour of Aleksander Loit, S t o c k h o l m , 2000, 3 1 - 5 6 . Pitelis, C h r i s t o s (ed.), The Growth of the Firm: The Legacy of Edith Penrose, O x f o r d , 2002. Pool, B e r n a r d , Naval Board Contracts, 1660-1832: Contract administration under the Navy Board, L o n d o n , 1966. Porfiriev, Evgenij L, Peter I: Grundldggare av den ryska reguljdra armens och flottans krigskonst, Stocldiolm, 1958 (Russian ed. 1952). P r i t c h a r d , James, Louis XV's Navy, 1748-1762: A study of organization and administration, M o n t r e a l , 1987. , The Anatomy of a Naval Disaster: The 1746 French naval expedition to North America, M o n t r e a l , 1995. P r o b s t , Niels, " N o r d e u r o p e i s k s p a n t e o p s l a g n i n g i 1500- og 1600-talIet: Belyst u d fra d a n s k e kilder", Maritim kontakt, 16, 1993, 7 - 4 2 . , Christian 4.s fldde: Den danske flades historic, 1588-1660, C o p e n h a g e n , 1996. Rabenius, Olof, O m batsmanshdllet, Uppsala, 1851.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

765

R a l a m b , Ake C:son, Skeps byggerij eller Adelig ofnings tionde torn, S t o c k h o l m , 1695, r e p r i n t e d Stockliolm, 1943. Reinliard, W o l f g a n g (ed.). Power Elites and State Building, O x f o r d , 1996. R e i n h o l d s s o n , Peter, Uppror eller resningar? Samhallsorganisation och konflikt i senmedeltidens Sverige, U p p s a l a , 1998. Renvall, Pentti, Klaus Fleming und der Finnische Adel in den Anfangsphasen der Krise der neunziger Jahre des 16. Jahrhunderts, T u r k u , 1939. Revera, M a r g a r e t a , a n d T o r s t e n d a h l , Rolf (eds), Bordor, bonder, hard i 1600-talets Sverige, Uppsala, 1979. Rian, Oystein, Danmark-Norge, 1380-1814: II, Den aristokratiske fyrstestaten, 15361648, Oslo, 1997. R i m b o r g , Bertil, Magnus Dwell och Danmark: Studier i information, Gothenburg, 1997. Roberts, Michael, Gustavus Adolphus: A history of Sweden, 1611-1632, 2 vols, L o n d o n , 1953-58. , Ihe Early Vasas: A History of Sweden, 1523-1611, C a m b r i d g e , 1968. , The Swedish Imperial Experience, 1560-1718, C a m b r i d g e , 1979. Rodger, N. A. M., The Wooden World: An anatomy of the Georgian navy, L o n d o n , 1986. , "The D e v e l o p m e n t of Broadside G u n n e r y , 1 4 5 0 - 1 6 5 0 " , M M , 82, 1996, 3 0 1 - 2 4 . , The Safeguard of the Sea: A naval history of Britain, I, 660-1649, L o n d o n , 1997. , The Command of the Ocean: A naval history of Britain, 1649-1815, London, 2004. Rogers, Clifford J. (ed.). The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe, Boulder, 1995. Rollof, Yngve, "Segelduk och segeldukstillverkning i Sverige", Fran Gastrikland 1981, Giivle, 1982, 8 4 - 1 0 3 . , "Tagvirke och r e p s l a g a r b a n o r " , Aktuellt, M a r i n n i u s e u m , Karlskrona, 1994, 167-80. Resell, Ingrid, " H o r n i n g s h o l m s s k e p p s g a r d o c h s k e p p e t F o r t u n a : P r e s e n t a t i o n av ett arkiv, 1629-30", Forum Navale, 49, 1993, 18-19. Rosen, Jerker, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, I L l , 1697-1721, S t o c k h o l m , 1952. Royen, P. C. van, Bruijn. J. R., a n d Lucassen, J. (eds.), "Those Emblems of Hell"?: European sailors and the maritime labour market, 1570-1870, St. John's, 1997. Rystad, G o r a n , Johan Gyllenstierna, radet och kungamakten: Studier i Sveriges inre politik, 1660-1680, L u n d , 1955. , "Ryssland eller Polen? Karl XILs p l a n e r efter D i i n a o v e r g a n g e n . N a g r a s y n p u n k ter", Scandia, 27, 1961, 2 9 8 - 3 3 6 . , "The Estates of the Realm, t h e M o n a r c h y , a n d E m p i r e , 1611-1718", in Metcalf 1987, 6 1 - 1 0 8 . B o h m e , Klaus-R., a n d Carlgren, W i l h e l m M . (eds). In Quest of Trade and Security: The Baltic in power politics, 1500-1990: I; 1500-1890, L u n d , 1994. -, Karl XI: En biografi, L u n d , 2001. S a e n z - C a m b r a , C o n c e p c i o n , " U n a a r m a d a sueca p a r a Felipe 11", Revista Historia Naval, 23, 2005, 7 1 - 8 4 . Salgado, A u g u s t o , " P o r t u g u e s e Galleons' A r m a m e n t at t h e E n d of t h e Sixteenth C e n tury", in IX Reunido Internacional de Histdria da Ndutica e da Hidrografia, Cascais, 2000, 2 7 7 - 9 2 . S a m u e l s o n , Jan, Aristokrat eller fdrddlad bonde? Det svenska frdlsets ekonomi, politik och sociala fdrbindelser under tiden, 1523-1611, L u n d , 1993. Sandahl, Bjorn, "De svenska k a p e r i e r n a i O s t e r s j o n 1 5 6 2 - 1 5 6 6 " , Forum navale, 56, 2001, 2 0 - 3 4 . S a n d s t r o m , Ake, Mellan Tornea och Amsterdam: En undersokning av Stockholms roll som formedlare av varor i regional- och utrikeshandel, S t o c k h o l m , 1990.

766

BIBLIOGRAPHY

S c h m i d t c h e n , Volker,iSomf;fl)'de«, Befestigungen, Biichsemneister: Von den ersten Matterbrechern des Mittelalters zur Belagenmgsartillerie der Retmissance, Diisseldorf, 1977. S c h o e n i e r , K a t a r i n a (ed.), Det seglande skeppet: Uppsatser kring en iitstdllning, Stockh o l m , 1997. Schiick, H e r m a n , Ecclesia Lincopensis: Sttidier om Linkopingskyrkan under Medeltiden och Gustav Vasa, S t o c k h o l m , 1959. , "Sweden as an Aristocratic Republic", Scandinavian Journal of History, 9, 1984, 65-72. , "Sweden's Early P a r l i a m e n t a r y I n s t i t u t i o n s f r o m t h e l l i i r t e e n t h C e n t u r y to 1611", in Metcalf 1987, 5-60. S c h u m p e t e r , Joseph A., The Theory of Economic Development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, C a m b r i d g e , Mass., 1934. Scott, W . Richard, a n d Davis, G e r a l d P., Organizations and Organizing: Rational, natural and open system perspectives. U p p e r Saddle River, 2007. Seager II, Robert, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The man and his letters, A n n a p o l i s , 1971. Sicking, Louis, Zeemacht en onmacht: Maritieme politick in de Nederlanden, 14881558, A m s t e r d a m , 1998. Sjoblom, Ingvar, " K o m p e t e n s och s j o e r f a r e n h e t h o s svenska sjoofficerare u n d e r 1600talet", in K n u t A r s t a d (ed.), Strategi, ledelse og samfunn, 1588-1720, Oslo, 2000, 39-52. S j o s t r a n d , W i l h e l m , Grunddragen av den militdra tmdervisningens uppkomstoch utvecklingshistoria i Sverige till dr 1792, Uppsala, 1941. Slaget vid Femern, 1644-1944: Minnesskrift utarbetad av Forsvarsstabens krigshistoriska avdelning, Uppsala, 1944. S m i t h , R o b e r t Douglas, a n d DeVries, Kelly, The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgtmdy, 1363-1477, W o o d b r i d g e , 2005. Soderberg, Ulf, Gustav I:s arv och eget i Uppland: En godsmassas framvdxt, organisation och fdrvaltning, S t o c k h o l m , 1977. S o d e r l i n d , Ulrica, "Diet O n b o a r d the Swedish Royal W a r s h i p Vasa", in Kersten Kriiger a n d Carl Olof C e d e r l u n d (eds), Maritime Archdologie hetite, Rostock, 2002, 3 1 3 - 2 2 . , "Pish C o n s u m p t i o n A b o a r d Swedish W a r s h i p s d u r i n g the S e v e n t e e n t h C e n t u r y " , Studia Atlantica, 8, 2006, Esbjerg, 153-64. . Skrovmal: kosthdllning och matlagning i den svenska flottan fran 1500-tal till 1700-tal, S t o c k h o l m , 2006. S o m m a r s t r o m , H u g o , Finland under striderna mellan Sigismtind och hertigKarh I, Klas Flemings tid, S t o c k h o l m , 1935. Soop, H a n s , Flytande palats: Utsmyckning av dldre svenska orlogsfartyg, Stockholm, 2007. Spens, E., " S j o m a k t e n s i n f l y t a n d e pa striden o m V o r p o m m e r n 1715", TiS, 102, 1939, 288-311. , "Flottans p e r s o n a l u n d e r aldre vasatid", in Svenska fiottans historia, I, 121-36. , "Livet o n i b o r d och i l a n d u n d e r aldre vasatid", in Svenska flottans historia, I, 137-54. , "Livet o m b o r d och i l a n d u n d e r s t o r n i a k t s t i d e n f r a m till 1679", in Svenska flottans historia, I, 3 5 5 - 8 0 . , "Sjovapnets b e m a n n i n g u n d e r s t o r n i a k t s t i d e n f r a m till 1679", in Svenska flottans historia, I, 3 3 1 - 5 4 . Stade, A r n e (ed.), Carl X Gustaf och Danmark: Kdllkritik och krigshistoria, Stocldiolm, 1965. Steckzen, Birger, Krigskollegii historia, I, 1630-1697, S t o c k h o l m , 1930. Stolt, Eva-Marie, "Ron o m Vasa rigg", Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1994-1995 (1994), 3 5 - 5 0 . S t o r m b o m , Jarl, Bdtsmanshdllet i sydvdstra Finland pa 1700-talet, M a r i e h a m n , 1959, 5-14.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

767

S t r o m b e r g - B a c k , Kerstin, Kalmare stadgar 1587, U m e a , 1989. S u m i d a , Jon T e t s u r o , Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: Tlw classic works of Alfred Thayer Mahan reconsidered, Baltimore, 1997. Svalenius, Ivan, Rikskansliet i Sverige, 1560-1592, S t o c k h o l m , 1991. Svenska Akademiens Ordbok. Svenska flottans historia, 1521-1945, 3 vols, M a l m o , 1 9 4 2 - 4 5 . Svensson, Sam, " H i e Swedish Ship Stora Kraveln, 1559", MM, 24, 1938, 2 9 3 - 3 0 1 . , " W a s a s segel och n a g o t c m jildre segelmakeri", Sjdhistorisk Arsbok, 1963-1964 (1965), 3 9 - 8 2 . Sveriges krig, 1611-1632, 6 vols a n d 2 s u p p l e m e n t a r y vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1 9 3 6 - 3 9 (see also 'Ilieodor Jakobsson, Bevcipning och beklcidnad a n d Sveriges sjokrig, 1611-1632). Sveriges sjokrig 1611-1632, M a r i n s t a b e n , S t o c k h o l m , 1937 (also Sveriges krig, 16111632, Bilagsband 1). T a n d r u p , Leo K., Mod triumfeller tragedie: Enpolitisk-diplomatisk stiidie overforldbet af den dansk-svenske magtkamp fra Kahnarkrigen til Kejserkrigen, 2 vols, A a r h u s , 1979. Teece, David J., Pisano, Gary, a n d S h u e n , A m y , " D y n a m i c Capabilities a n d Strategic M a n a g e m e n t " , in G i o v a n n i Dosi, Richard R. Nelson, a n d Sidney G. W i n t e r (eds). The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities, O x f o r d , 2000, 3 3 4 - 6 2 . Tegel, Erik J o r a n s s o n , Konung Gustaf I:s historia, II, S t o c k h o l m , 1622. , Konung Erics den XIV:des historia (ed. A n d e r s A n t o n v o n S t i e r n m a n ) , S t o c k h o l m , 1751. Teitler, Gerke, The Genesis of the Professional Officer Corps, Beverly Hills, 1977. Tliam, W i l h e l m , Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia, 1:2, 1560-1648, Stockholm, 1960. Tlianner, Lennart, Revolutionen i Sverige efter KarlXlhs dod: Den inrikespolitiska maktkampen under tidigare delen av drottning Ulrika Eleonora d y:s regering, S t o c k h o l m , 1953. H i o m p s o n , I. A. A., "Spanish A r m a d a G u n s " , MM, 61, 1975, 3 5 5 - 7 1 . , War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620, L o n d o n , 1976. H i o m s e n , Mildcel H., "En s a d a n nasestyver: O m en slem overraskelse for d e n d a n s k h o l l a n d s k e flade - og for arkaeologen", Maritim Kontakt, 28, C o p e n h a g e n , 2006, 69-93. Tilly, C h a r l e s (ed.), The Formation of States in Western Europe, P r i n c e t o n , 1975. Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, O x f o r d , 1990. T j a d e n , A n j a , "The D u t c h in t h e Baltic, 1560-1720", in Rystad et al 1994, 6 1 - 1 3 6 . Toijer, Daniel, Sverige och Sigismund, 1598-1600: Fordraget i Unkoping - Riksdagen i Linkoping, S t o c k h o l m , 1930. T o r n b o m , Olle, "Batsmanshallets u p p k o m s t " . Forum navale, 9, 1948, 3 0 - 7 1 . T o r n q u i s t , Karl Gustaf, Utkast till svenska flottans sjotag, 2 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1788. , The Naval Campaigns of Count de Grasse during the American Revolution, 17811783, Philadelphia, 1942. T o r s t e n d a h l , Rolf, "Mellan n o r m a l s t a t och fasta a n o r d n i n g a r : D e n m e d e l l a n g a finansp l a n e r i n g e n villkor i Sverige 1620-1680", in Revera & Torstendahl 1979, 2 5 3 - 8 5 . T r a u n g , Olof, Lars Gathenhielm: Kaperiverksamheten under Karl XII:s tid 1710-1719, G o t h e n b u r g , 1952. T r i m , D. J. B, (ed.). The Chivalric Ethos and the Rise of Military Professionalism, Leiden, 2006. Troebst, Stefan, " D e b a t i n g t h e M e r c a n t i l e B a c k g r o u n d to Early M o d e r n Swedish E m p i r e Building: M i c h a e l Roberts versus A r t u r A t t m a n " , European History Quarterly, 24, 1994, 4 8 5 - 5 0 9 , T u n b e r g , Sven, Sigismund och Sverige, 1597-1598: Fore andra resan. Samuel Laskis beskickningar, Uppsala, 1917. , Sigismund och Sverige, 1597-1598: 2. Andra resan till Sverige, U p p s a l a , 1918.

768

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tunstall, Brian, Warfare in the Age of Sail: The evolution offighting tactics, 1650-1815 (ed. b y N i c h o l a s Tracy), L o n d o n , 1990. U d d g r e n , H u g o , Kriget i Finland 1713, S t o c k h o l m , 1906. , Kriget i Finland 1714, S t o c k h o l m , 1909. U n g e r , G u n n a r , Illustrerad svensk sjokrigshistoria, 2 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1909-23. , "Sjohistoriska vrangbilder", TiS, 88, 1925, 5 1 1 - 3 5 . , " F l o t t o p e r a t i o n e r n a i sodra O s t e r s j o n 1712. Slutreplik", TiS, 89, 1926, 2 5 1 - 6 4 . , Karl XII och ostersjokriget 1715: En sjdhistorisk strategisk studie, S t o c k h o l m , 1928. U p t o n , A n t h o n y F., Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism, C a m b r i d g e , 1998. V a n Creveld, M a r t i n , Supplying War: Military logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, C a m b r i d g e , 1977. Veselago, F e o d o r F., Spisok russkich voennych sudov, 1668-1860, St P e t e r s b u r g , 1872. Viljanti, Arvo, Gustav Vasas ryska krig, 1554-1557, 2 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1957. Villiers, Patrick, Marine royale, corsaires et trafics dans VAtlantique de Louis XIV a Louis XVI, 2 vols, D u n k i r k , 1991. Villstrand, Nils Erik, "Batsmanshallet pa A l a n d och i F i n l a n d u n d e r 1620-talet", Skdrgdrd, 1979, 19-25. , " B o n d e r och b a t s m a n pa A l a n d u n d e r 1620-talet", in S u n e J u n g a r a n d Nils Erik Villstrand (eds). Vaster om skiftet: Uppsatser ur Alands historia, A b o , 1986, 4 7 - 7 3 . , " M a n s k a p och sjofolk i n o m orlogsflottan, 1617-1644", Historisk Tidskrift for Finland, 71, 1986, 2 4 - 7 2 . , "Fran det avlagsna F i n l a n d till o r t e r n a r a flottan: D e finska b a t s m a n s k o m p a n i e r n a s f 5 r f l y t t n i n g p a 1680-talet", in Nils Erik Villstrand (ed.), Kustbygd och centralmakt, 1560-1721: Studier i centrum-periferi under svensk stormaktstid, Helsingfors, 1987, 3 8 7 - 4 2 7 . , " M a n s k a p s r e k r y t e r i n g e n till Karl XLs flotta", in Lars Ericson a n d Bjorn GiifVert (eds), Med spade och gevdr: Meddelanden frdn Krigsarkivet, 12, S t o c k h o l m , 1989, 119-32. , Anpassning eller protest: Lokalsamhdllet infor utskrivningarna av fotfolk till den svenska krigsmakten, 1620-1679, A b o , 1992. , " ' B o n d p o j k a r d o p p a d e i vatten'. Svensk sjomilitar rekrytering u r ett j i i m f o r a n d e p e r s p e k t i v ( 1 5 0 0 - 1 8 0 0 ) " , in Mdnniskan iflottans tjdnst, Jungfrusund, 6, Abo, 2001, 43-58. W a n n e r , Michal, "Albrecht of W a l l e n s t e i n as ' G e n e r a l of t h e O c e a n s a n d t h e Baltic Seas' a n d t h e N o r t h e r n M a r i t i m e Plan", Forum Navale, 64, 2008, 8 - 3 3 . W e b e r , M a x , Economy and Society: An outline of interpretive sociology, 3 vols. N e w York, 1968. W e n d t , Einar, Det svenska licentvdsendet i Preussen, 1627-1635, Uppsala, 1933. , Amiralitetskollegiets historia, I, 1634-1695, S t o c k h o l m , 1950. , " M e d N y e n e s k a d e r n i osterled 1708", Forum navale, 17, 1960, 3 - 3 8 . W e s t i n , G u n n a r T., Riksfdrestandaren och makten: Politiska utvecklingslinjer i Sverige, 1512-1517, L u n d , 1957. W e s t l i n g , Fredrik, Det nordiska sjuarskrigets historia, S t o c k h o l m , 1879-80. , "Sveriges f o r h a l l a n d e till D a n m a r k f r a n f r e d e n i Stettin till F r e d r i k ILs d o d ( 1 5 7 1 - 1 5 8 8 ) " , HT, 39, 1919, 5 5 - 1 0 2 , 123-154. W h e e l e r , James Scott, The Making of a World Power: War and the military revolution in seventeenth century England, P h o e n i x Mill, 1999. W i c h m a n , Holger, " P e r s o n a l f o r h a l l a n d e n a i n o m svenska flottan a r e n 1 6 8 0 - 1 7 2 0 " , in Svenska flottans historia, II, 8 6 - 9 8 . W i l d a n d , Erik, Elizabethan Players in Sweden 1591-92: Facts and problems, S t o c k h o l m , 1962. W i l l i a m s o n , Oliver, The Mechanisms of Governance, O x f o r d , 1996. W i m a r s o n , Nils, Sveriges krig i Tyskland, 1675-1679, 3 vols, L u n d , 1897-1912. , " A m i r a l Ugglas e x p e d i t i o n v i n t e r n 1676", HT, 20, 1900, 3 4 1 - 6 9 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

769

W i t t r o c k , Georg, Karl XI:s formyndares finanspolitik, 2 vols, Uppsala, 1914-17. Wollin, Nils G., Skeppsholmen under 300 dr: Skeppsholmens, Kastellholmem och Galarvarvets bebyggelsehistoria, S t o c k h o l m , 1971. W i a n g e l , H e r m a n , Kriget i Ostersjon, 1719-1721, 2 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1 9 0 6 - 0 7 ( n e w ed. 2007). Ylikangas, Heildci, Klubbekriget: Det hlodiga bondekriget i Finland 1596-97, S t o c k h o l m , 1999 (1st Finnish ed. 1977). Yrwing, H u g o , "Lybeck, de n o r d i s k a rikena och k o n u n g a v a l e t i S t r a n g n a s 1523", Scandia, 24, 1958, 194-254. Zettersten, Axel L., Svenska flottans historia, 1522-1680, 2 vols, S t o c k h o l m , 1890 a n d N o r r t a l j e , 1903.

GENERAL INDEX

Abo, 216, 334, 372 n, 122, 645 castle at, 254, 281 Duke Karl's expedition to (1597), 378 shipbuilding at, 282, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 380, 381 n. 139, 382, 399 shipyard at, 333, 334 Abo archipelago, 218 Abo provincial, regional c o m p a n y of seamen, 598, 599 Absolutism, 303, 316, 424 and naval administration, 306-312 and naval fittings, 501-504 Accounts, 7, 142 n. 5, 146, 266, 268, 273, 274, 275, 276, 290, 294, 296, 298, 327, 358 n. 100, 379, 450, 452, 453, 455, 460, 465, 467, 468, 475, 476, 477, 493, 494, 495, 496, 508, 525, 539 n. 57, 594 arklirdkningar (ordnance accounts), 8, 508, 522 a r m a m e n t accounts, 146, 536, 538, 539, 542, 543, 545 n. 68 artillerihuvudbdcker (ordnance ledgers), 8, 508, 539 fitting accounts, 318 gun f o u n d r y accounts, 529 landskapshandlingar (local accounts), 327, 578 loningsregister (wage accounts), 578 naval, 8, 47, 64 n. 16, 141 n. 4, 142, 146, 176 n. 40, 185 n. 48, 257 n. 22, 270, 271, 298, 308, 309, 310, 318, 319 n. 10, 325, 326, 330, 372, 388, 389, 438, 453, 476, 477, 478, 579 o r d n a n c e accounts, 8, 146 n. 8, 148 n. 11, 149 n. 12, 257, 269, 519, 522, 530, 533, 534, 538, 545, 547, 549; see also accounts, arklirdkningar, artillerihuvudbdcker orlogs-flottans rdkenskaper, 8, 508 proviantrdkenskaper, 146 n. 8, 164 n. 28, 270 n. 43, 335 n. 50, 579 provisioning acounts, 146, 270 n. 43, 327, 380 n. 138, 577, 578, 589, 590, 593, 609 rdntekammarbocker (Treasury's central accounts), 578, 589 rikshuvudbocker (Treasury ledgers), 578

sailcloth accounts, 494 skeppsgdrdshandlingar (shipyard accounts), xi, 7, 47, 146 n. 8, 255 n. 17, 257, 270, 274 n. 51, 327, 337 n. 57, 350 n. 85, 368 n. 113, 378, 380 n. 138, 381 n. 139, 388 n. 151, 391 n. 155, 421 n. 205, 465, 467, 468, 469, 475 n. 62, 476, 522, 578, 579 skeppsruUan, central naval accounts, 372, 466 wage accounts, 577, 578, 581, 589, 590, 592, 593, 620, 621, 622 Adeler, Cort, naval c o m m a n d e r , 187 Administration, naval, 19-22, 100, 101, 135-312, 318, 397, 663, 664, 665 and absolutism, 3 0 6 - 3 1 2 and Amiralitetskollegium, 296-305 and aristocrats, 2 9 6 - 3 0 5 and battles at sea, 234-240 and castles, 270, 272, 273 centralised, 248-253, 290 civilian, 269, 307, 289 development of, 248 division of, 290 and fittings, 449-504 French, 248, 249, 252 and hierarchy, 289 a n d m a n n i n g , 575-635, 642-644 medieval, 2 4 6 - 2 5 3 modem, 246-253 a n d nobility, 259, 260 a n d operations at sea, 135-240 a n d ordnance, 5 0 5 - 5 7 3 over-reach in, 385-394 a n d professionalism, 306-312 and provisioning, 635-641 regionalisation of, 308, 309 royal administration, 467-474 and society, 2 4 1 - 2 5 3 and the state, 241-253, 266-280 Vasa, 2 5 3 - 2 8 7 of warships, 250, 252, 272, 273 Administrators, naval, 272, 296-305, 310, 331, 564, 565 Admirals, xxii, 46, 49, 64, 83, 91, 115, 116, 119, 120, 126, 141, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 156, 167, 168, 169, 173, 177, 180, 182, 185 n. 48, 186, 187, 189,

Ill

GENERAL INDEX

190, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 202, 210, 213, 217, 219, 221, 224, 228, 247, 251, 259, 271, 273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 310, 311, 329, 332, 339 n. 62, 340, 342, 345, 360, 366, 391, 401, 405, 409, 412, 414, 415, 420, 425, 426, 428, 431, 438, 442, 447, 465, 477, 488, 490, 493, 504, 524, 597, 601, 614, 616, 621, 625, 627, 628, 632, 633, 634 a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 273, 277, 278, 279, 280 a d m i r a l - l i e u t e n a n t s , 633 amiralitetsrad, a d m i r a l with C o u n c i l m e m b e r s h i p , 297, 298, 299, 300, 302 e x e c u t i o n of, 170, 171 holmamiral, c o m m a n d e r of H o l m e n naval base, xxi, 277, 278, 279, 280, 295, 296, 298, 301, 418, 487, 489, 494, 632 Lord H i g h A d m i r a l , 623, 624, 625 dversteamiral (senior a d m i r a l ) , xvi, xxii, 91, 273, 274, 276, 278, 282 n. 66, 372, 374, 377, 380, 623, 624, 625 rear a d m i r a l , 632 r e c r u i t m e n t of, 307, 308 riksamiral (senior a d m i r a l ) , xxi, xxii, xxiii, 179, 186, 273, 277, 278, 279, 280, 293, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 310, 329, 393, 397, 401, 488, 627, 632, 633 riksviceamiral, xxi, 279 280, 293, 299, 304, 496 n. 110, 560 underamiral ( d e p u t y a d m i r a l ) , xxi, 274, 275 n. 54, 278, 465, 622 n. 69, 623, 624 vice a d m i r a l , 294, 597, 627, 632, 633, 634 A d r i a n , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 333, 334 Aebeltoft, naval battle at (23rd July 1659), xvi, 182, 183, Akers, 563 n. 107 A k e r s h u s , fortress at, 223 A l a n d islands, 218, 225, 228, 229, 231 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 337, 378, 382, 385, 386, 387, 388 n. 152 A l a n d regional c o m p a n y of s e a m e n , 598, 599, 603 Aln, Swedish u n i t of length, xxii, 452 Alvkarleby, 372

s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 283, 336, 359, 361, 366, 376, 377, 378 Alvsborg, 83, 87, 92, 95, 96, 162, 163, 275 n. 54, 278, 360, 381, 382, 384, 393, 394, 476 castle at, 254, 281, 350, 386, 529 galleys f r o m , 354 g u n s at, 541 naval a d m i n i s t r a t o r s at, 482 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 283, 334, 336, 350, 356, 359, 360, 371, 372, 374, 376, 378, 380, 384, 387, 388, 391 s h i p y a r d at, 359, 360 siege of, 236 A l v s n a b b e n , island of, 476 a n c h o r a g e at, 139 A m a g e r , island of, 202 A m e r i c a n W a r of I n d e p e n d e n c e , 46 n. 38 Amiralitetskollegium ( A d m i r a l t y Board), 7, 8, 48, 115, 116, 117, 219, 220, 292, 294, 2 9 6 - 3 0 3 , 306, 307, 311, 318, 330, 340, 412, 417, 424, 425, 426, 429 n. 213, 431, 438, 442, 494, 499, 500, 525, 560, 561, 564, 568 n, 118, 589, 601, 634 Amiralskap, fleets of t h e Swedish navy, 598 n. 23 A m m u n i t i o n , 271, 293, 611; see also shots A m s t e r d a m , 111 A n c h o r s , 271, 368 n. 114, 377, 449, 450, 452, 460, 464, 470, 475, 476, 492, 496 cost of, 471 n. 52 p r o d u c t i o n of, 469 weight of, 455 see also, cables, a n c h o r cables A n c k a r s t i e r n a , C o r n e l i u s , a d m i r a l , 310

n. 112 A n d e r s s o n , Erik, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 A n g e r m a n l a n d , 283 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 371 A n g l o - D u t c h W a r s ( 1 6 5 2 - 7 4 ) , 192 n. 63, 234 First A n g l o - D u t c h W a r ( 1 6 5 2 - 5 4 ) , 106, 179, 182, 420 Second A n g l o - D u t c h W a r ( 1 6 6 4 - 6 7 ) , 421 A n k a r h j e l m , A d r i a n , a d m i r a l , 633 A n k a r h j e l m , M a r t e n Thijssen, a d m i r a l , 633 A n n a , d o w a g e r q u e e n , ruler of France, 414

GENERAL INDEX

Antergastar, auxilliary infantry, 608 Apostles, t h e (10 turn s t o n e guns), 528 A r b o g a , 259 Archaeology, u n d e r w a t e r , 154 Archangelsk, 215, 224 Arctic, 90 Swedish claims on, 95 Arctic O c e a n , 89 Aristocracy, 5, 76, 253, 254, 257, 259, 260, 265, 268, 271, 273, 276, 278, 279, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 340, 351, 366, 435, 613, 614, 617, 622, 623, 624, 627, 631, 633, 634, 635, 649, 653, 657, 670 a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 2 9 6 - 3 0 5 Aristocrats, 647, 666 A r m a m e n t plans, 519 n. 23, 521, 525, 526, 539, 540, 545 n. 69, 546, 548 n, 75, 551, 552, 554, 557 n. 96, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564 n. 110, 567, 568, 571, 572 A r m a m e n t / d i s p l a c e m e n t ratio, 399 A r m i e s , 6, 14, 26, 42, 77 Armies, B r a n d e n b u r g , 183, 194 A r m i e s , Catholic, 403 Armies, D a n i s h , 20, 36, 55, 61, 84, 94, 99, 122, 147, 162, 163, 172, 187, 188, 190, 194, 202, 203, 208, 214, 217, 221, 223, 224, 226 at battle of G a d e b u s c h (1712), 214 at battle of L u n d (1676), 190 m e r c e n a r i e s in, 146 in p e a c e t i m e , 146 Armies, D u t c h republic, 25 n. 24 Armies, F r e n c h , 75 Armies, G e r m a n Imperial, 166, 168, 169, 174, 403 Armies, H a b s b u r g , 99 Armies, N o r w e g i a n , 167 Armies, Polish, 93, 203, 212, 214 Armies, Prussian, 218 Armies, Russian, 124, 133, 203, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 224, 226, 229 A r m i e s , Saxonian, 212, 213, 214 at battle of G a d e b u s c h (1712), 214 A r m i e s , Spanish, 25 n. 24 A r m i e s , Swedish, 25, 26, 34, 75, 83, 84, 85, 88, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 137, 141, 147, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 183, 184, 185, 187, 190, 192

773

n. 61, 194, 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 213, 214, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 355, 384, 398, 410, 618, 655 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, 290, 307 at battle of G a d e b u s c h (1712), 214 at battle of L u n d (1676), 190 at battle of T o n n i n g (1713), 214, 215 cavalry of, 621 c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n s , 98 c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e of, 621 c o n s c r i p t i o n in, 592, 600, 601 Erik XIV's, 591 f o r e i g n e r s serving in, 630 G u s t a v I's, 68 i n f a n t r y , 621 Karl XII's, 125, 206, 207 M e r c e n a r i e s in, 596 m o b i l i s a t i o n of, 202 m u s e u m of, 525 officer c o r p s of, 629, 630 in p e a c e t i m e , 146 p e r m a n e n t r e g i m e n t s of, 294, 395, 595 p r o v i s i o n i n g of, 636 r e c r u i t m e n t , 97, 595, 602 social m o b i l i t y in, 630 s t r e n g t h of, 206 wages of, 575 A r n o , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 337, 393, 394, 401, 410 A r r o w s , b u r n i n g , as naval w e a p o n , 533, 540, 541 Arsenals, 242 A r s o n , 645 Arteus, G u n n a r , s t u d y of sea officers, 579 Artillerihuvudhdcker, o r d n a n c e ledgers, 508 Artillerists, 630 Artillery, 208, 213, 250, 281 Artillery officers, 297 n. 92 Arvidsson, Henrik (ennobled G y l l e n a n k a r ) , a d m i r a l , 274, 366, 625 A s p o , island of, 196 n. 69, 379 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 336, 337 n. 57, 384 s h i p y a r d at, 283 Atlantic f r a m e w o r k , in studies of c o n t r o l of t h e sea, 16, 17 Atlantic O c e a n , 2, 29, 37, 249 naval o p e r a t i o n s in, 250 Austria, 107 H a b s b u r g , 112 Aviz, d y n a s t y of, 249

Ill GENERAL INDEX Ayscue, George, flag officer, 633 n. 89 Azov, Sea of, 124 B a c k s t r o m , Per Olof, naval a d m i n i s t r a t o r , 47 Bagge, A n d e r s , 624 Bagge, Bengt, 624 execution of, 624 Bagge, B r o m s , 624 Bagge, Jakob, Swedish A d m i r a l , 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 274, 360, 617, 619, 624 Bagge, J o h a n , son of A d m i r a l Jakob Bagge, 274, 625 Bagge, Peder, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 624 Bagge, T o r d , military leader, 617 Bahia, S p a n i s h - P o r t u g u e s e r e c o n q u e s t of, 101 Bailiffs, 268, 285, 622 n. 69, 646 tax raising by, 473 n. 58 Baking, 636 Baltic Sea, 2, 3, 5, 25, 28, 33, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 53, 88, 90, 96, 99, 100, i l l , 112, 124, 125, 126, 127, 131, 313, 394, 407, 412, 430, 446 c o n t r o l of, 30, 74, 76, 7 8 - 8 0 , 118, 135-240, 253, 404 D a n i s h c o n t r o l of, 29, 35, 118, 170, 176, 193 dominium over, 53, 69, 70, 94 g e o g r a p h y of, 41, 42, 45, 139 geostrategy of, 3 9 - 4 6 , 135 m a r i t i m e e n t e r p r i s e s in, 247 naval p o w e r in, 79, 80, 81, 1 0 5 - 1 1 2 surveys of, 297 Swedish c o n t r o l of, 103, 112, 116, 125, 135-240, 366, 417, 494, 600, 646, 647, 656, 660 Swedish e m p i r e in, 2, 5, 6, 33, 9 6 - 1 0 5 , 114-131, 313 t r a d e in, 35, 91, 81, 105, 247 Baner, Gustav, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Baner, Peder, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Baner, Sten Axelsson, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Bar, J o h a n , amiralitetsrad, 302, 633 Barges, 326 Barkar, small a r m e d vessels, 322, 323, 324, 347, 351, 355, 356, 374 B a r k m a n , Bertil, 49 B a r o s u n d , 162

Barque, large sailing m e r c h a n t ship, 323 Bdtsmiin, see s e a m e n Bdtsmanshdll, 306 Batteries, land, 202, 204, 209 Battle line, see line-of-battle Battles: naval, 139, 2 3 4 - 2 4 0 a n d strategic goals, 136 Battleships, 126, 139, 199, 201, 202, 204, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 367, 428, 429, 430, 433, 445, 502, 503, 571, 587 Beacons, 297 Beer, 278 Bell rebellion, 527, 650 Bells, c h u r c h , as s o u r c e of g u n metal, 527 Berg, J o h a n ( e n n o b l e d Bergenstierna), a d m i r a l , 634 Berg, Lars O t t o , 49 ship list of, 319 Berg, Olof, m a j o r , 634 B e r g m a n , Ernst, ships list of, 319 B e r g s h a m m a r , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 377, 378, 384 B e r g s h a m r a , Sweden, 377 Bielke, H e n r i k , A d m i r a l , 177 Bielke, H o g e n s k i l d , skeppshdvitsman, 623 n. 70 Bielke, Sten, amiralitetsrad, 299, 300 Bielkenstierna family, 304, 393 Bielkenstierna, H a n s , riksviceamiral and holmamiral, 279, 280, 293, 299, 300, 304 n. 103, 477 n. 68, 490 Bielkenstierna, Klas, A d m i r a l , 117, 199, 623 n. 70, 627, 632 Bielkenstierna, Klas Jnr, s o n of H a n s Bielkenstierna, 304 n. 103 Bielkenstierna, Nils, 279, 632 Bishops, 76, 347 castles of, 255 ships of, 254 Bisittare (assessors), 297 Bjorkenas, 336 Elefanten's w r e c k at, 355 n. 96, 361 naval y a r d at, 153, 333, 357 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 357, 358, 359, 385 Bjorko, 212, 216

GENERAL I N D E X

Bjorneborg, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 371, 376, 381 n. 139 Black Sea, 90, 124, 127 Black, Jeremy, o n t h e state a n d w a r f a r e , 651 Blacksmiths, 467 g u n p r o d u c t i o n by, 510 Blasieholmen, 280 Blast f u r n a c e s , 560 Blekinge, 152, 154, 190, 196, 306 g o v e r n o r of, 306 o a k resources in, 306 r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m , 602 s e a m e n f r o m , 604, 605 Swedish c o n t r o l o f 103, 110 Blekinge archipelago, 122, 194, 195 Blekinge och Skane, s e a m a n c o m p a n y o f 603 Blinda, see sails, spritsail Blockades, naval, 88, 90, 93, 94, 95, 108, 110, 113, 114, 126, 137, 155, 158, 147, 161, 162, 167, 201, 211, 213, 384, 389, 435, 446, 470, 478, 588, 591 b l o c k a d e r u n n e r s , 88, 323, 363 Blockmakers, 280 Blocks, 449 Blockships, 200, 427, 432, 433 Blockskepp, floating battery, 326 Blume, Peter, a d m i r a l , 633 Boards, administrative, 2 9 0 - 2 9 2 see also Amiralitetskollegium, KommerskoUegiuin Boatswains, 577, 610 Bodekull, 340 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 419, 420 Bodensee, Lake, Swedish naval forces on, 46 n. 37 B o h e m i a , 174 Bohuslan, 44, 127, 432 cession to Sweden, 110 r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m , 602 s e a m a n c o m p a n y o f 603, 606 Bohuslan archipelago, 206, 224, 227, 228 batsman o r g a n i z a t i o n at, 606 Bojorter, small a r m e d vessels, two m a s t e d , 322, 323, 324, 325, 351, 352, 355, 356, 389, 397, 406 n. 175, 423, 478 Bolts, 317 B o m b ketch, 325, 331 B o m b vessels, 200, 204, 206, 217, 221, 427, 430, 431, 433 Bombkits, see b o m b ketch

775

B o n d e , Karl K n u t s s o n , King of Sweden, 31, 32, 59 n. 8 exile o f 59 B o o k - k e e p i n g , 266, 298 d o u b l e Italian system of, 298 Borga, 216 B o r g h o l m , 163 castle at, 60, 254 Borglager, see q u a r t e r i n g Borjeson, H j a l m a r , naval historian, 7, 48, 318 ship list o f 319 s t u d y of sea officers, 579, 615 B o r n h o l m , island o f 43, 112, 151, 152, 154, 155, 173, 174 cession to Sweden, 110 naval battle at (9th June 1535), xvii, 44, 143, 144, 238, 350 n. 87, 351, 527 naval battle at (30th M a y 1563), xvii, 44, 148, 235, 360, 362 naval battle at (7th July 1565), xvii, 44, 236, 238, 362, 363, 623 Bosskyttar, see g u n n e r s Bovenblinda, see sails, sprit topsails, 462 Bowsprit, 461, 462, 463 Boyer, small a r m e d vessel, 322, 323 rigging o f 461 Boys, in naval service, 606, 610 Braed, 278 B r a h e family, 301 n. 97 Brahe, Nils, amiralitetsrdd, 300, 301, 302 Brahe, Per, riksdrots, 301 Brammast, see masts, topgallant m a s t s Bramsegel, see masts, topgallant m a s t s B r a n d e n b u r g , 106, 107, 112, 118, 121, 184-197 Brask, H a n s , b i s h o p of Linkoping, 254, 347, 348 Braviken s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 372 Breitenfeld, battle of (1631), 101, 406, 411, 600 B r e m e n , 249 D u c h y o f 105 B r e n i e n - V e r d e n , 121, 187, 191, 219, 222, 230 Brewing, 636 Brigantin, t w o m a s t e d w a r s h i p , 325 Brigantines, 200, 204, 205, 206, 209, 211, 212, 217, 220, 427, 430, 431, 432

Ill GENERAL INDEX

Britain, 215, 2 2 3 - 2 3 1 g o v e r n m e n t of, 218, 226 Brittany, F r e n c h n a v y in, 249 B r o c k e n h u s , Jakob, D a n i s h A d m i r a l , 148 B r o m s e b r o , Peace of B r o m s e b r o , 174 Bronze, 510, 511 sale of, 560 B r u n k e b e r g , C h r i s t i a n f s defeat at (1471), 58 Budgets, 290, 291, 295 Bukovi', naval battle at (4th June 1565), xvii, 155, 235 Bureaucracy, 2 4 1 - 2 4 6 , 611, 663, 666, 668 Bureaucrats, 611, 613 Burghers, 28, 62, 66, 142, 253, 256, 373, 437, 468, 480 n. 73, 481 n. 78, 601, 630, 647, 649, 650, 665, 669, 670, 671 Burghley, Lord, 369 Byggmastare, T o m a s , 386 n, 145 Bysseskyttar, see g u n n e r s Byzantine E m p i r e , 249 naval p o w e r of, 247 Cahel (cable), 449 n. 1 Cables, 253, 271, 280, 292, 295, 368 n. 114, 370 n. 118, 377, 386 n. 145, 438 n. 221, 449, 450, 451, 452, 456, 460, 465, 467, 468, 470, 471, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 484, 485, 486, 489, 492, 494, 495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 610, 664 a n c h o r cables, 449 n. 1, 452, 455, 456, 464, 467, 486, 492, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502 cost of, 459, 471 n. 52 D u t c h naval s t a n d a r d s for, 491 obsolescence of, 494 p r o d u c t i o n of, 469, 477, 486 p u r c h a s e of, 256 s u p p l y of, 459 C a d i z Bay, s e q u e s t r a t i o n of Swedish ships at (1632), 437 Canifas see C a n v a s Canvas, 454, 485, 487, 490 Capital ships, 331 C a p t a i n s , 614, 616, 619, 620, 622, 626, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633 amiralitetskapten, 629 kommendor, 629 skeppskapten, 629

C a r g o carriers, 435 C a r p e n t e r s , 280, 282, 286 Carvel, g u n - a r m e d w a r s h i p , 321, 322, 348, 349 carvel technology, 354, 356 Castles, 253, 254, 257, 269, 270, 272, 655 a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 270, 272, 273 g u n s at, 529, 541 s e a m e n serving at, 589 n. 9 C a t h o l i c League, G e r m a n , 646 Catholics, 66, 90, 103, see also C h u r c h , Catholic Cavallie, James, s t u d y of sea officers, 579 Cavalry, 269, 655 Chaplains, in naval service, 585 C h a p m a n , Fredrik Henrik, master shipwright, 332, 345, 346 C h a r l e s V, E m p e r o r , ruler of t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , 64, 258, 259 n. 25, 352 Charles, King of Sweden, see B o n d e , Karl K n u t s s o n Charters, in D u t c h rating system, 332 C h r i s t i a n I, King of Sweden ( 1 5 4 7 - 6 4 ) , also King of D e n m a r k ( 1 4 4 8 - 8 1 ) a n d King of N o r w a y ( 1 4 5 0 - 8 1 ) , 31, 32, 54, 58 C h r i s t i a n II, King of Sweden ( 1 5 2 0 - 2 1 ) , also King of D e n m a r k a n d N o r w a y ( 1 5 1 3 - 2 3 ) , xxii, 31, 54, 58, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 140, 141, 235, 254, 257, 347, 467, 526, 616, 617, 659 C h r i s t i a n III, King of D e n m a r k ( 1 5 3 4 - 5 9 ) , also K i n g of N o r w a y ( 1 5 3 7 - 5 9 ) , 66, 67, 69, 70, 142, 143, 144, 352, 617, 618, 619 d e a t h of, 81 C h r i s t i a n IV, K i n g of D e n m a r k ( b o r n . 1588, a t t a i n e d m a j o r i t y 1596, died 1648), 89, 94, 96, 98, 103, 104, 125 n, 95, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 175, 236, 375, 398, 403 naval policy of, 94, 103, 416, 439, 512, 515 C h r i s t i a n V, King of D e n m a r k ( 1 6 7 0 - 9 9 ) , 125 n. 95 Christina, Q u e e n of Sweden ( 1 6 3 2 - 5 4 ) , also regency g o v e r n m e n t ( 1 6 3 2 - 4 4 ) , xxii, 102, 103, 107, 298, 299, 330, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 561 a b d i c a t i o n of, 107

GENERAL INDEX

ChristofFer, C o u n t of O l d e n b u r g , g o v e r n o r of D e n m a r k - N o r w a y , 66 C h u r c h , 57, 65, 66, 69, 76, 255, 282, 347, 527, 646 C a t h o h c , 5, 33, 48, 60, 62, 70, 531, 648, 656 C h u r c h bell rebellion, 527, 650 C h u r c h bells, as s o u r c e of g u n metal, 646 Cipolla, Carlo, naval g u n s cost study, 556 Claesson, Johan, m a s t e r shipwright, 336 Cleiton, Lorentz, A d m i r a l , 477 n. 68 Clerck family, 304, 338, 466, 488, 489, 495, 633 Clerck, H a n s H a n s s o n Jnr ( 1 6 3 9 - 1 7 1 1 ) , a d m i r a l , 296 n. 89, 301, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 425, 426, 428 Clerck, H a n s V i l h e l m s s o n ( 1 6 0 7 - 7 9 ) , 296 n. 89 Clerck, Jakob, 338, 391, 491 n. 101 Clerck, J o h a n ( H a n s , died 1644), 292, 295, 296 n. 89, 302, 459, 487, 488, 489, 491 Clerck, Rickard (died 1625), 280, 292, 296 n. 89, 329 n. 31, 338 n. 62, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 490, 491, 632 Clerck, Rickard Jnr ( 1 6 0 4 - 6 8 ) , 296 n. 89, 418, 459, 489 Clerck, William, 296 n, 89 Clinker technology, 354 Cloth, for flags, 452 Colonels, 632 C o m m o d o r e s , 629 C o m m o n e r s , in naval service, 268, 269, 622, 630 C o m p a n y system, a n d naval m a n n i n g , 601 C o m p a s s e s , 449 C o m p e t i t i o n , a n d p r o t e c t i o n selling, 12 C o m p l e x organisations, 12-14, 241, 242 C o n s c r i p t i o n , 262, 263, 264, 576, 582, 583, 590, 592, 598, 599, 600, 601, 646 C o n s c r i p t s , 101, 304 C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , 251 C o o k i n g utensils, 476 C o o k s , in naval service, 585, 597 C o p e n h a g e n , 42, 43, 64, 66, 69, 76, 83, 85, 98, 122, 123, 141, 143, 144, 147, 163, 164, 167, 168, 172, 173, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 191, 197, 202, 209, 210, 219, 220, 224, 230, 235, 251, 384, 551

777

arsenal at, 68 b l o c k a d e of, 64, 110, 179, 349 naval y a r d at, 342 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 417 s h i p y a r d at, 55, 342 siege of, 180 Swedish m i n i s t e r in, 415 n. 191 C o p p e r , 510, 511, 513, 529 n. 38, 553, 556, 650 cost of, 515, 557 as p a y m e n t , 485 Swedish e x p o r t s of, 556 C o p p e r m i n e s , 523, 537, 549 C o r d a g e , 451, 465, 468, 471, 473, 480, 484, 489, 492, 494, 501, 649 cost of, 459 C o r n e l i u s s o n , C o r n e l i u s , shipbuilder, 391 Corneliusson, Tideman, Dutch m e r c h a n t , 373 Corsia, g a n g w a y o n galley, 353 C o u r l a n d ( n o w w e s t e r n Latvia), 43, 81, 97, 112, 402 d u k e of, 183 Coxe, O w e n , Swedish r e a r - a d m i r a l , 182, 633 n. 89 Cranfield, Lionel, Sir, civilian a d m i n i s t r a t o r , 329 Crayer, t r a n s p o r t vessel, 326 Credit, a n d w a r s h i p s , 347, 348 Creutz, Lorentz, naval a d m i n i s t r a t o r a n d c o m m a n d e r in chief, 188, 190, 302, 305 C r o m w e l l , Oliver, 108 C r o o n , G e r d t , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 339, 341 C r o o n , Pieter G e r d t s s o n , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 341 Cruisers, 12, 60, 122, 198, 213, 321, 323, 363, 371, 386, 411, 420, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 445, 446, 447, 454, 463, 503 a r m a m e n t of, 569 sailcloth for, 454 C u r r e n c y , Swedish, xxii C u s t o m s , 116, 147, 420, 440, 442, 670 Dacke, Nils, leader of p e a s a n t (Dacke) rebellion, 646 D a c k e rebellion ( 1 5 4 2 - 4 3 ) , 659 D a l a r n a , 257, 549 D a l a r o , as naval p o r t , 139 Daler, Swedish c o p p e r coinage, 405

Ill GENERAL INDEX D a n i s h Straits, 40, 43, 167, 237 D a n z i g , 61, 91, 96, 99, 108, 140, 146, 164, 176, 209, 210, 249, 254, 256, 275 n. 54, 348, 381, 383, 434, 467 b u r g h e r s of, 468 h e m p f r o m , 480 naval supplies f r o m , 258 sailcloth f r o m , 485, 486, 487, 490 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 349 toll at, 176 D a r t m o u t h , Elefanten's s h i p w r e c k at, 369 D a u g a v a , see Diina, river Day, Richard, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 418, 419 Day, T h o m a s , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 340 de Besche, H u b e r t , 560 de Besche, W i l l e m , architect a n d g u n m a s t e r , 523, 524, 548 de F i n n e , J o h a n M a r t e n s s o n , A d m i r a l , 477 n. 68 de F r e n n d e , Johan, 370 n. 118 de Geer, Louis, D u t c h - S w e d i s h m e r c h a n t , 104, 166, 398, 399, 436, 523, 524, 548, 558, 560, 561 m e r c h a n t m e n of, 439, 440 de G r o o t , A r e n t H y b e r t s s o n , m e r c h a n t , 293, 401, 458 n. 20, 488 de la Gardie, Jakob, riksmarsk, 559 d e la Gardie, M a g n u s Gabriel, Lord H i g h T r e a s u r e r , 299, 300 de M o n i e r , A n t h o n i e , d e p u t y M a s t e r of O r d n a n c e , 292, 293, 397, 398, 399, 400, 436 de P r o u , Jacob, a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112 de Ruyter, Michiel, D u t c h naval c o m m a n d e r , 183 de Voss, Jakob, m a s t e r shipwright, 339, 341, 419 de W i t h , W i t t e , D u t c h A d m i r a l , 180 Defensjonsskip (armed merchantmen), 439, 440 Delaware, 167 n. 33 Swedish c o l o n y in, 102, 413, 438 D e n m a r k , 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 41, 42, 44, 56, 66, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 78, 81, 83, 85, 89, 98, 103, 107, 110, 112, 122, 127, 130, 143, 146, 148, 152, 159, 161, 164, 165-233, 237, 258, 273, 280, 410, 411, 436, 494, 660, 668 aristocracy in, 32, 38, 54, 55, 57, 66, 69 b o r d e r s of, 34, 36, 37, 78

civil w a r in ( 1 5 3 4 - 3 6 ) , 32, 66, 76, 235 C o u n c i l of, 54, 66, 94, 95, 109, 144, 384 n, 143, 404 a n d D u t c h Republic, 394 East Indies e x p e d i t i o n ( 1 6 1 8 - 2 2 ) , 390 elites in, 62, 109, 115 foreign policy, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36 general staff, 199 n. 72 a n d K a l m a r U n i o n , 52, 53, 54 kings of, 54, 55, 58, 69, 109 m o n a r c h y of, 32, 77 naval policy, 43, 55, 56, 87, 94, 211, 313, 316 naval supplies f r o m , 258 a n d Philip II of Spain, 88 political d e v e l o p m e n t of, 3, 64 p r o t e c t o r a t e s of, 81 r e g e n c y g o v e r n m e n t of, 89 state f o r m a t i o n in, 77 trade of, 34, 35, 37, 40 a n d H a b s b u r g s , 71 D e n m a r k - N o r w a y , 142, 145, 179, 206, 208, 423, 430 d e f e n c e policy, 433 k i n g of, 64 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 249 s h i p b u i l d i n g in, 284 n. 69 D e p t h , m e a s u r e m e n t of, 449 Derfelt, Johan, a d m i r a l , 626 D e t e r r e n c e , 145 Devil, the, (18 turn s t o n e g u n ) , 528 Devil's m o t h e r , t h e (18 turn s t o n e g u n ) , 528 Diaries, naval, 166 n. 30 Discipline, 177 Disease, 159, 163, 169, 177, 187, 211, 245, 367, 591, 641 a n d provisioning, 576 see also m a l n u t r i t i o n , plague, v i t a m i n shortages Disguise, in naval o p e r a t i o n s , 191 D i s p l a c e m e n t , 177 n. 41, 200 a n d fleet s t r e n g t h , 138 D i t m a r s k e n ( G e r m a n y ) , rebellion at, 60 Diving, 566 Docks, for ship repair, 429 D o m e s n a s , n o r t h e r n cape of C o u r l a n d , 402 D o n river, 127 Donationer, t r a n s f e r of s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d l a n d to individuals, 613 Double contract, 260-266

GENERAL INDEX

Drakenas; s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 370, 378 s h i p y a r d at, 335 D r a w i n g s , in shipbuilding, 341, 342, 343, 345 D r o g d e n , 167, 174, 177, 202, 213, 214 D r o g d e n passage, 45 d u Rees, A r n o l d , m a s t e r shipwright, 344, 345 Diina line, a n d c o n q u e s t of Livonia, 100 Diina river, 45, 93 estuary of, 209 Swedish c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n s at, 98 D i i n a m i i n d e , Swedish c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n s at, 97 Duquesne, Abraham, French admiral, 633 n. 89 D u t c h rebels, 87; alliance against Philip II of Spain, 88 D u t c h Republic, 3, 101, 105, 110, 111, 173, 176, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 194, 201, 203, 208, 215, 237, 367, 368, 668 a n d D e n m a r k , 394 a n d England, 109, 111 a n d France, 13, 111, 118 g o v e r n m e n t of, 218 a n d Louis XIV, 118 m e r c a n t i l e m a r i n e of, 218, 580 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 248, 250, 251 naval policy of, 313 Swedish officers f r o m , 630, 631 t r a d e of, 109, 186 a n d Spain, 13, 407 a n d Sweden, 103, 107, 118, 121 Dvina, see Diina, river Dynasties: a n d state authority, 10 Dynekilen, naval battle at (26th June 1716), xvi, 224 East Indies, D a n i s h e x p e d i t i o n to ( 1 6 1 8 - 2 2 ) , 390 E d a m , H o l l a n d , 336 E h r e n s k o l d , family of, 308 E i n a r s s o n , Lars, s t u d y of sea officers, 579 Ekenas, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 361 Ekipagemdstare ( M a s t e r of e q u i p m e n t ) , 296 E k m a n , Carl, s t u d y of sea officers, 579 E k o l s u n d , royal m a n o r of, n e a r Stockliolm, 354

779

Elbing, Prussia: strussar p r o d u c t i o n in, 405 treaty of, 109 Elizabeth I, Q u e e n of E n g l a n d , 82, 315, 358, 369 E n a n g e r , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 379, 384, 388 Engelsnian, R o b e r t see Siwers, R o b e r t Engineering, m e c h a n i c a l , a n d g u n technology, 511 Engineers, 630 E n g l a n d , 59 n. 8, 88, 101, 107, 111, 182, 203, 358, 369 C o m m i s s i o n of E n q u i r y r a t i n g system of, 329 a n d D u t c h Republic, 111 k i n g of, 59 n. 8, 77 m e r c h a n t fleet of, 218 m e r c h a n t s in, i l l naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 249 naval policy of, 313 n a v i g a t i o n laws of (1651), 106 p a r l i a m e n t of, 315 a n d Philip II of Spain, 88 Swedish naval p e r s o n n e l f r o m , 630, 631 E n r o l m e n t , 606, 607, 608 E n t r e p r e n e u r s , 20, 34, 36, 38, 55, 87, 2 4 1 - 2 4 7 , 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 260, 265, 280, 286, 291, 293, 311, 314, 338, 339, 401, 434, 435, 439, 451, 454, 458, 487, 488, 489, 491, 532, 596, 656, 657, 660, 663, 666, 668 d e f i n i t i o n of, 242, 243 a n d g u n p r o d u c t i o n , 523, 524 a n d p r o v i s i o n i n g , 577, 635 royal e n t r e p r e n e u r s , 2 6 0 - 2 6 6 S c h u m p e t e r ' s t h e o r y of, 242, 243 a n d s h i p b u i l d i n g , 396, 397, 398, 401, 402, 414, 420 E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p , 19-22, 28 a n d naval p o w e r , 658 a n d resources, 663 Ericson, Lars, s t u d y of K a r l s k r o n a s h i p y a r d , 49 Erik of P o m e r a n i a , 31 Erik XIV, King of Sweden ( 1 5 6 0 - 6 8 ) , xxii, 82, 83, 84, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 160, 263, 264, 268, 272, 282, 285, 286, 290, 335, 357, 358, 360, 363, 462, 517, 532, 594, 624 naval policy of, 86, 153, 160, 365, 366, 446, 553, 621, 622 Erik, St, n a t i o n a l saint of Sweden, 357

Ill GENERAL INDEX Erik, S h i p m a s t e r , 256 Eril<sson, G u s t a v (Vasa), see G u s t a v I, King of Sweden Eriksson, Jakob, 335 Eriksson, Olof, naval a d m i n i s t r a t o r , 256, 467, 619 E r t m a n , Tliomas, o n state f o r m a t i o n , 651 Eskilsson, Erik, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 Estonia, 74, 78, 79, 81, 85. 88, 89, 90, 93, 100, 117 n. 86, 127, 129, 147, 160, 203, 206, 208, 283, 383, 660 Europe: c o m p l e x o r g a n i s a t i o n s in, 1 2 - 1 4 state formation in, 24, 25 E x e c u t i o n , of naval staff, 170, 171 Falck family, 345 Ealck, Carl Johan, (son of J o h a n Falck) s h i p w r i g h t , 343, 344, 345 Falck, J o h a n , shipwright, 343, 345 Falster, island of, 181 Falun: c o p p e r m i n e at, 523 g u n f o u n d i n g at, 523 Famm, Swedish u n i t of length, xxii Fanikor, ( a r m y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e units), 269, 289, 586, 591 Fanor, (cavalry a d m i n i s t r a t i v e unit), 269, 289 Farkoster, m i s c e l l a n e o u s small vessels, 328 F a r m i n g , 284, 285 Fatbursldn, c r o w n territory, 253 F e m e r n , 43, 44, 169, 171 naval battle at (Kolberger Heide, 1st July 1644), xvii, 168, 169, 172, 177, 234 n. 124, 236 naval battle at (13th O c t o b e r 1644), xvii, 172, 174, 238, 413, 416, 439, 558, 559 naval battle at (13th April 1715), xvii, 219, 220, 239 F e m e r n a n d Lollund, naval battle at (battle of R o d s u n d , 30th April 1659), xvi, 181 F e m e r n Belt, 213, 214, 219 naval battle at (31st M a y - l s t June 1677), xvii, 191, 239 Fetalieskepp (small p r o v i s i o n i n g ships), 638 F i n l a n d , 35, 45, 62, 74, 78, 88, 90, 92, 126, 127, 129, 140, 141, 142, 147, 149, 160, 204, 206, 208, 212, 216, 217, 218,

225, 228, 230, 231, 259, 273, 275, 276, 354, 385, 645 d u k e of, 282, 365 g o v e r n o r general of, 67, 301 a n d Kalniar U n i o n , 53 Lfl«-holders in, 349 p e a s a n t revolt in ( 1 5 9 6 - 9 7 ) , 263 Russian c o n q u e s t of, 128 sailcloth p r o d u c t i o n in, 453 s e a m e n f r o m , 598 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 351, 372, 387 shipyards in, 283 F i n l a n d archipelago, 212, 216, 217, 218, 227, 347 Finland, Gulf of, 40, 45, 68, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, 85, 89, 90, 95, 125, 126, 142, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 160, 162, 198, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 211, 215, 220, 226, 257, 263, 274, 366, 371, 431, 470, 481, 482, 607, 659 F i n s p o n g , 560, 561 i r o n w o r k s at, 524 Fir, 317, 356, 365, 374, 379, 385, 388, 421, 422, 423, 425, 426, 430 Firepower, 507, 520, 535, 540, 543, 544, 545, 550, 551, 552, 553, 555, 567, 568, 571, 572 c o m p o s i t i o n of, 535 definition of, 508 firepower-displacement ratio, 535, 536, 544, 549 n. 77, 553, 554, 559, 560, 571, 572, 573, 588 Fireships, 167 n. 33, 168, 170, 172, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 418, 424, 501, 502 Fiscal military state, Swedish, 2 5 - 2 8 Fittings, naval, 451 a n d absolutism, 5 0 1 - 5 0 4 c o n t r a c t u a l m a n a g e m e n t of, 450 Flags, 280, 292, 449, 497 cloth for, 452, 493 n. 103 s u p p l y of, 459 Flagships, 190 Flanders, 250 Flax, 451, 453, 485 n. 87, 656 p r o d u c t i o n of, 468 Fleet in being, 194, 228, 501 Fleet s t r e n g t h , 199, 200 a n d ship size, 138 m e a s u r e m e n t of, 137 Fleming, A n d e r s , Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Fleming, Erik, a d m i r a l , 17, 259, 618

GENERAL INDEX

Fleming, H e n r i k P e d e r s s o n , Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Fleming, H e r m a n , amimlitetsrad, 298, 299, 300, 301, 305, 340, 415, 494 Fleming, Ivar, a d m i r a l , 617, 618 Fleming, Klas Eriksson, dversteamiral (died 1597), xxii, 91, 151, 152, 273, 274, 275, 276, 282 n. 66, 283, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377, 380, 385, 465, 474, 476, 623, 624, 625 Fleming, Klas Larsson, amiralitetsrad ( 1 5 9 2 - 1 6 4 4 ) , 167, 168, 169, 294, 295, 297, 305, 401, 405, 406, 407, 408, 438, 447, 488, 493, 600, 632 d e a t h of, 169, 298 letters of, 405 n. 173, 407 Fleming, Lars, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Flensborg, y a r n f r o m , 480 n. 73 Fleut, t r a n s p o r t vessel, 326, 411, 438 n. 221 F l i n t r a n n a n , eastern passage to t h e S o u n d , 45, 174, 202 Floating batteries, 200, 503 Flojt, t r a n s p o r t vessel, 326 Florisson, Jakob, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 339 Pockmcirssegel, see sails, fore topsail Fockskdnval, see sails, foresail Fogdar, see Bailiffs Fogderdkenskaper, 270 n. 44 Food, 159, 575, 577, 579, 600, 609, 637, 648, 650 c o n t a m i n a t i o n of, 641 d i s t r i b u t i o n of, 635, 636 p r e p a r a t i o n of, 449 processing of, 638, 636 p r o d u c t i o n of, 635 r a t i o n i n g of, 639, 640 as resource, 284 s u p p l y of, 6 3 5 - 6 4 0 a n d violence control, 637 Fdrdubbling, r e i n f o r c e m e n t system for naval m a n n i n g , 602, 603, 606 Forests, 656 exploitation for shipbuilding, 101, 102 Karl IX's policy on, 523 Forges, 280 FoHaningar, e n f e o f f m e n t of state l a n d , 613 F o r s m a r k , 560 Fortifications, g u n s at, 567, 568 Fot, Swedish u n i t of length, xxii

781

F o u n d r i e s , 280 France, 70, 182, 184, 185, 194, 215 a m b a s s a d o r of, 414 a n d D u t c h Republic, 13, 111 elites in, 115 a n d E n g l a n d , 73 a n d H a b s b u r g s , 71 a n d H o l l a n d , 106 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 248, 249, 252 naval policy of, 313 a n d Swedish i m p e r i a l policy, 108 F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n , 411 F r a n s k a S t e n a r n a , carvel w r e c k at, 348 Frederik I, King of D e n m a r k a n d N o r w a y ( 1 5 2 3 - 3 3 ) , also D u k e of H o l s t e i n , xxiii, 64, 65, 66, 141, 467 F r e d r i k I, King of Sweden ( 1 7 2 0 - 5 1 ) , also C o u n t of H e s s e n - C a s s e l ( 1 7 3 0 - 5 1 ) , xxii, 130 Frederik II, King of D e n m a r k ( 1 5 5 9 - 8 8 ) , 82, 83, 85, 87, 146, 148, 149, 153, 375 d e a t h of, 89 a n d D u t c h rebels, 88 f o r e i g n policy, 87, 88 a n d Liibeck, 82 naval policy of, 82 a n d P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a , 82 F r e d e r i k IV, K i n g of D e n m a r k ( 1 6 9 9 - 1 7 3 0 ) , 201, 203, 222 Fredrik, C o u n t of Hessen-Cassel, see F r e d e r i k I, K i n g of Sweden Frederik, D u k e of Holstein, see Frederik I, King of D e n m a r k a n d N o r w a y F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I, King of Prussia ( 1 7 1 3 - 4 0 ) , 222 F r e d e r i k s o d d e , D a n i s h fortress, 178 Frederikssten, 223, 227 siege of, 130 Fregatter, see frigates Fries, Daniel, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 344, 345 Frigates, 126, 139, 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 228, 229, 231, 322, 323, 324, 326, 331, 341, 342, 343, 385, 415, 427, 430, 431, 432, 433, 442, 445 b u i l d i n g of, 342, 343, 344 Fust, small galley, 353, 354 Fusta, see Fust Fyn, island of, 143, 166, 178, 183, 191 D u t c h invasion of. 111

Ill GENERAL INDEX

G a d e b u s c h , battle at (1712), 214 Galcir, o a r e d w a r s h i p , 325 Galea grossa, h y b r i d sailing a n d o a r e d w a r s h i p , 353 Galea see Galley Galea, M e d i t e r r a n e a n galley, 353, 354 Galeae see Galleon Galejer, 331, 353, 354 Galejor, o a r e d w a r s h i p , 325, 328 Galeon see Galleon Galeota, M e d i t e r r a n e a n galley, 353 Gallon see Galleon Galleasses, 353, 355 Galleon, large p u r p o s e built warship, 321 Galleys, 200, 204, 281, 323, 325, 326, 329, 344, 3 5 3 - 3 5 7 , 372, 374, 385, 399, 400, 410, 411, 427, 431, 432, 433, 434, 459 n. 24, 469, 503, 551 n. 85, 582, 590 a n c h o r s of, 464 a n d archipelago warfare, 355 a r m a m e n t of, 353, 527, 528, 547 b u i l d i n g of, 344 crew t o d i s p l a c e m e n t ratio, 354 n. 93 F r e n c h , 355 galea grossa, h y b r i d sailing a n d o a r e d w a r s h i p , 353 h y b r i d , 355 m a n n i n g of, 588 M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 200, 321, 325, 326, 344, 353 o a r e d , 17, 73, 74, 80, 89 o a r s m e n of, 353, 354, 355 rigging of, 461 sizes of, 353 soldiers on, 354 n. 93 Galliot, t w o m a s t e d warship, 324, 325 Gait, Peder, A d m i r a l , 170, 171 G a m l a Lodose, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 386 G a n g u t , battle of, see H a n g o U d d , naval battle at Gcird fgiirder) taxes in kind, 482, 489 Gdrdskapten (yard captain), 277, 296 Giivle, 228, 360 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 377, 378, 382, 388 n, 152 Generals, 632 G e n o a , as sea p o w e r , 247 G e o r g e I, King of E n g l a n d ( 1 7 1 4 - 2 7 ) , 218, 219, 230 Geostrategy, 34, 37

of naval bases, 281 Swedish, 29 n. 27 G e r m a n y , 46 n. 37, 54, 55, 56, 70, 71, 99, 147, 151, 154, 157, 165, 166, 168, 172, 174, 175, 178, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 195, 198, 202, 208, 212, 494 C a t h o l i c League in, 646 D a n i s h p r o v i n c e s in, 208 elites in, 97 e m p e r o r of, 61, 646 e m p i r e o f 249 H a b s b u r g s in, 102 h e m p f r o m , 480 a n d Philip II of Spain, 88 sailcloth p r o d u c t i o n in, 453, 454 s e a m e n f r o m , 607 n. 38 a n d Sweden, 103 n. 72, 121, 405 Swedish p r o v i n c e s in, 109, 118, 122 t r a d i n g cities in, 112 Giseler, Tile, D a n i s h sea officer, 619 G o t a Alv, river, 44, 45, 350 s h i p b u i l d i n g on, 386 Svanen's w r e c k at, 355 G o t h e n b u r g , 45, 83, 95, 122, 129, 167, 172, 173, 174 n. 39, 185, 186, 191, 196, 201, 206, 224, 225, 228, 293, 349, 367, 398, 418, 476 s e a m e n f r o m , 606 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 338, 340, 341, 406, 408, 409, 410, 416 n. 195, 419, 422 s h i p y a r d at, 344, 416, 499 St Sophia's w r e c k at, 566 G o t l a n d , island of, 64, 141, 143, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 158, 162, 189, 220, 234 n. 124 cession to Sweden, 104 G o v e r n o r of, 157 Lcin of, 254 r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m , 602 N o r t h of G o t l a n d , naval battle (11th S e p t e m b e r 1563), xvii, 149, 235 G o t l a n d s e a m a n c o m p a n y , 603 G o t t b e r g , Jakob, a d m i r a l , 626, 627 Governance, 287-292 G o v e r n o r s , provincial, 289, 291 G r e a t Belt, 202, 213 G r e a t Britain, 3, 127, 201, 208 G r e a t Lakes, N o r t h A m e r i c a , 46 Greifswald, 194, 221, 223 n. 110 Grek, Jakob, m e r c h a n t , 361 G r e n g a m n battle of, see L e d s u n d , naval batrie

GENERAL I N D E X

Grip, Bo, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 G r i p s h o l m , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 387, 388 n. 149 G u i e n n e , F r e n c h navy in, 249 G u i l m a r t i n , J o h n F., studies of M e d i t e r r a n e a n galley w e a p o n s , 507 Gulf of Finland, see Finland, Gulf of G u n f o u n d e r s , 517, 523, 542, 560, 567 G u n f o u n d i n g , 517, 523 G u n i n d u s t r y , 554 Gunilla, Q u e e n a n d wife of J o h a n III, 374 G u n n e r s , 269, 271, 524, 525, 581, 5 8 3 - 5 0 9 , 610, 611, 621, 634 a r m y , 524 c o m p a n i e s of, 603, 608 g u n - c r e w s , 521, 575, 576, 596, 611 m a s t e r g u n n e r s , 271, 610, 611, 616 G u n n e r y , 159, 420, 505, 506, 514, 614 b r o a d s i d e fire, 192 l o n g range, 514 G u n p o r t s , 545 n. 69, 551 n, 83, 552 b r o a d s i d e ports, 521 spacing of, 521 G u n p o w d e r , 76, 271, 507, 510, 511, 514, 515, 516, 518 n. 19 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, 297 n. 92 p r o d u c t i o n of, 256, 257 G u n s , 138, 200, 253, 269, 271, 272, 5 0 5 - 5 7 3 , 611, 660, 664 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, 297 n. 92, 298 a n t i - p e r s o n n e l , 138, 531, 535, 538, 540, 543, 569 anti-ship, l a n d based, 541 Apostles, t h e (10 turn s t o n e g u n s ) , 528 of barks, 323 b o r e of, 518 n. 18, 519, 520, 546 b o w chasers, 515, 516 brass, 510 n. 11 b r e e c h loaders, 510, 511, 528, 535 b r o n z e , 427, 446, 507, 510, 512, 513, 517, 518, 519, 522, 523, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 632, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 548, 550, 551, 552, 553, 5 5 4 - 5 6 6 , 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 573, 575 calibre of, 514, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 527, 530, 532, 533, 536, 541, 546, 550, 553, 554, 555, 559, 567, 569

783

calibre systems, 518, 519, 546, 554 c a n n o n s , 513, 515 c a p t u r e of, 533, 561 cast i r o n , 159, 293, 507, 511, 512, 513, 518, 519, 523, 524, 527, 532, 536, 538, 542, 543, 547, 548, 553, 5 5 4 - 5 6 6 , 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 665 c h a m b e r guns, 542 charges, 518 n. 19, 537, 545 classification of, 516, 518, 519, 520, 546 c o p p e r g u n s , 159, 280, 293, 510 c o r r o s i o n of, 558, 559 cost of, 556, 557, 558, 564, 568, 573, 575 n. 1 coulebrine, 513 culverin, 513, 515 curtow, 513 n. 15 Devil, the, (18 turn s t o n e gun), 528 Devil's m o t h e r , t h e (18 turn s t o n e g u n ) , 528 draaken, 515 drake, 515 English, 511, 544 e x p o r t of, 547, 549, 552, 553, 561, 563 falconer, 514, 517, 532, 540 falconetter, 513, 514, 517, 530, 532, 534 n. 49, 538, 546 faltslangor, 517, 522, 527, 528, 530, 532, 540, 546, 547 n. 73 fdltstat, ( a r m y g u n s ) , 525 field g u n s , 522 fortress g u n s , 522 fyrpihtycken, (for b u r n i n g arrows), 517, 533, 540, 541 hailshots, see G u n s , stormstycken hakar, 514, 517, 540 historical studies of, 5 0 5 - 9 kartaun, 513 1/2 kartoger, 389 n. 153, 517, 522, 527, 528, 530, 531, 537, 546 kartoger, 517, 522, 528, 534 n. 49, 537 kartoger, 513, 514, 515, 517, 522, 527, 528, 529, 532, 535, 534 n. 49, 536, 537, 540, 546 kartoger, (double), 522 kopparberg guns, 549, 552 of l a n d i n g craft, 400 l o a d i n g gears for, 280 longevity of, 525 loss of, 542, 543, 548, 566

Ill GENERAL INDEX mdrsstycken, (top m a s t guns), 517, 533 mickhakar, 517, 530, 532 m o u n t i n g of, 521, 542 m u s k e t s , 514, 543 m u z z l e loaders, 510, 511, 535 m u z z l e velocity, 514 nickhakar, s h o r t swivel guns, 569 notslangor, 517, 528, 529, 534 n. 49, 535, 537 obsolescence of, 538 potthund, 517 p r o d u c t i o n of, 159, 256, 257, 507, 523, 524, 532, 533, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 554, 558, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 567, 568, 569, 626, 665 'A p o u n d e r s , 532 '/2 p o u n d e r s , 532, 534 n. 49 1 p o u n d e r s , 400, 532, 546, 549 n. 77, 567 n. 114, 567 n. 115, 568, 570 2 p o u n d e r s , 400, 532, 533, 534 n. 49, 546 3 p o u n d e r s , 200, 205, 400, 427, 518, 519, 522, 532, 534, 535, 537, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 552, 559, 567 n. 115, 569 4 p o u n d e r s , 200, 427, 428, 429, 526, 562, 567 n. 114, 569 5 p o u n d e r s , 561 6 p o u n d e r s , 200, 406 n. 175, 425, 427, 428, 442, 518, 519 n. 23, 526, 546, 547 7 p o u n d e r s , 522, 532, 534 n. 49, 535, 540, 541, 542, 543 8 p o u n d e r s . 200, 425, 427, 428, 429, 442, 519, 526, 561, 562, 567 n. 114, 569 9 p o u n d e r s , 519 10 p o u n d e r s , 522, 532, 534, 535, 537, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 561, 564 12 p o u n d e r s , 200, 425, 426, 428, 431, 441, 518, 519, 521, 526, 546, 547, 549, 550, 551, 552, 555, 559, 560, 561, 564, 567, 569, 570 14 p o u n d e r s , 519, 561, 562 n. 105 16 p o u n d e r s , 551 18 p o u n d e r s , 200, 425, 427, 428, 429, 431, 442, 519, 526, 555, 556, 559, 560, 561, 563, 564, 565, 567, 568, 569 20 p o u n d e r s , 519, 522, 532, 534, 535, 540, 541, 542, 543

24 p o u n d e r s , 200, 409, 425, 427, 428, 431, 442, 518, 518, 520, 521, 526, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 555, 556, 560, 562 n. 105, 563, 564, 565, 567, 568, 569, 572 n. 123 30 p o u n d e r s , 535, 561, 562, 563, 564 36 p o u n d e r s , 546, 551, 555, 563, 567, 568, 569, 570, 568, 572 n. 123 40 p o u n d e r s , 534 n. 49, 535, 539, 543 42 p o u n d e r s , 561 48 p o u n d e r s , 546, 547, 551, 552 r a n g e of, 514, 515 r e b o r i n g , 546 recasting, 559 regementsstycken (light field artillery), 522, 547 salvage of, 566 as scap metal, 570 schlange, 513 siege guns, 41, 212, 522, 528, 537, 539, 548 Siegroth guns, 547 skeppskvarterstycken (wrought-iron breech loader), 528 skeppsstycken, 552 skeppstat, 525 sketbreckor (stone g u n s ) , 536 skerpentiner (wrought-iron breech loader), 528 'A slangor, 537 slangor, 517, 522, 527, 530, 532, 534 n. 49, 536, 537, 546 slangor 517, 522, 530, 523, 532, 538, 534 n. 49, 536, 546, 547 n. 73 slangor, 513, 514, 515, 532, 535, 537, 541, 542 sling, 513 n. 15 s m o o t h bore, 346, 507, 514 s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of, 517, 550, 553 stern chasers, 515, 516 s t o n e guns, 513, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 536 stormstycken, 400, 517, 533, 540, 541, 547, 549 n. 77, 550 swivel guns, 138, 324, 326, 569 t r o p h y guns, 569 types of, 5 1 3 - 5 2 1 w i n d a g e , 516, 518, 519, 520, 569 w r o u g h t iron, 159, 510, 511, 513, 526, 528, 530, 531, 533, 534, 535, 537, 538, 639, 640, 541 see also firepower, m o r t a r s

GENERAL INDEX G u n s h o t s , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, 297 n. 92

Giistafsson, H a r a l d , historian, 31 G u s t a v I, King of Sweden ( 1 5 2 3 - 6 0 ) , also regent ( 1 5 2 1 - 2 3 ) , xxii, 32, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 74, 76, 77, 80, 97, 124, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 266, 285, 287, 335, 348, 349, 352, 354, 355, 467, 526, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 645, 646, 647, 657, 659, 661, 664 d e a t h of, 81, 281, 358 as e n t r e p r e n e u r , 74, 75 letters of, 142 n. 5, 258 a n d Liibeck, 68 a n d m a n n i n g 590 naval policy of, 86, 334, 350, 435, 444, 479 G u s t a v II Adolf, King of Sweden ( 1 6 1 1 - 3 2 ) , xxii, 25, 29 n. 27, 50, 75, 86, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 103, 124, 125, 129, 163, 264, 267, 279, 286, 288, 289, 291, 294, 298, 318, 330, 394, 404, 406, 407, 410, 412, 414, 484, 488, 515, 523, 543, 573, 627, 646, 647, 658, 665 a n d a r m y r e f o r m , 96 calibre system of, 519 d e a t h of, 102, 408, 551 n. 86 foreign policy, 437 and gunnery, 545-554 naval policy, 101, 102, 407, 408, 416, 436, 437, 444, 445, 446, 450, 490, 491, 596, 597, 598, 600 o r d n a n c e r e f o r m s of, 545 V a s t m a n l a n d d u k e d o m of, 391 Gyldenlove, U l r i k Christian, D a n i s h A d m i r a l - g e n e r a l , 210, 213 Gyllengranat, Carl A u g u s t , a d m i r a l a n d naval minister, 46 Gyllenhielm, Karl Karlsson, riksamiral, xxiii, i n , 293, 294, 295, 297, 298, 299, 397, 401, 488, 600, 632 Gyllenstierna, Elisabet, wife of H a n s Bielkenstierna, 304 n. 103 Gyllenstierna, family of, 304 Gyllenstierna, G o r a n Nilsson, riksamiral (died 1618), xxii, 279, 293, 303 n. 100, 329, 366, 393, 490, 627, 632 Gyllenstierna, G o r a n G o r a n s s o n , a d m i r a l ( 1 6 0 1 - 4 6 ) , 303 n. 100 Gyllenstierna, G o r a n G o r a n s s o n , amimlitetsrdd ( 1 6 3 2 - 1 6 8 6 ) , 302, 303 n. 100, 305

785

Gyllenstierna, J o h a n , advisor to Karl XI, 303 Gyllenstierna, Nils Carlsson, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623, 632 H a b s b u r g E m p i r e , 13, 108 H a b s b u r g s , 30, 33, 90, 102, 250, 367, 368, 403, 407, 408, 434, 494, 646 H a f s t r o m , Georg, 318 s t u d y of sea officers, 579, 615 H a l d e n , fortress at, 223 Haliko, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 366, 381 n. 139 H a l l a n d , 37, 44, 68, 103, 104 cession to Sweden, 104 r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m , 602 s e a m a n c o m p a n y of, 603 s e a m e n f r o m , 604, 605, 606 Halldin, Gustaf, o n d i s p l a c e m e n t in s h i p b u i l d i n g analysis, 318 n. 8 Hdlsingeduk, sailcloth, 454 Halsingelarft, (sailcloth), 453, 485 n. 87 H a l s i n g l a n d , 283, 379, 453 flax p r o d u c t i o n in, 468 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 371, 377 H a m b u r g , 215, 249, 403 H a m m a r , M a g n u s , C o m m o d o r e , naval artillery s t u d y of, 509 H a m n i a r s t r o m , Ingrid: o n Swedish financial system, 266, 267 o n taxation, 636 H a m n s t r o m , Carl, naval m a n n i n g s t u d y of, 579 H a n g o p e n i n s u l a , 216, 217, 218 H a n g o U d d , naval battle at ( 2 6 t h - 2 7 t h July 1714), xvi, 218, 432 H a n o v e r , 127, 130, 208, 218, 219, 222, 230 elector of, 127 H a n s , King, 31, 54, 58, 59, 60, 616 H a n s , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 333 H a n s e , 56, 61, 64, 105, 111, 160, 249, 434 H a n s e cities, 59, 143, 248 t r a d e n e t w o r k s of, 648 H a n s s o n , Soffring, a d m i r a l , 485, 633 Haradsting (local c o u r t ) , 57 Harbovik: s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 292, 337, 338, 366, 376, 388 n. 149, 389 n. 153, 393, 394, 399, 401, 410 s h i p y a r d at, 397

Ill

GENERAL INDEX

H a r i n g e , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 283, 366, 376, 388 n, 149 H a r j e d a l e n , cession to Sweden, 104 H a r n o s a n d , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282 Hasslo, island of, 196 n, 69 liauptman (captain), 616 H e a l t h , 21, 245 a n d provisioning, 6 3 5 - 6 4 1 see also disease, infections, plague, v i t a m i n shortages H e c k s c h e r , Eli F., o n Vasa taxation system, 266 H e d b e r g , Jonas, C o l o n e l - l i e u t e n a n t , Swedish artillery studies of, 509, 541 H e i n s s o n , Evert (Sivert), assistant m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 339 Hellweg, J o h a n Pieter, e n t r e p r e n e u r , 454 H e l s i n g b o r g , 45 Helsingfors, 74, 281 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 359, 361, 381 s h i p y a r d at, 334 H e l s i n g o r , 45, 202 Helsinki, 74 H e m p , 271, 370 n. 118, 449, 450, 451, 4 5 2 - 4 6 0 , 465, 467, 469, 470 n. 48, 471, 472, 475, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 485 n. 87, 486, 488, 489, 490, 491, 493, 494, 499, 501, 540, 541, 648, 650, 656, 660 for a n c h o r cables, 455, 456 cost of, 458 i m p o r t s of, 480, 481 p u r c h a s e of, 256 r e q u i r e m e n t s for, 499, 500 reserves of, 460 for rigging, 456, 457 Russian, 468 s h o r t a g e s of, 483, 499, 500 a n d taxation, 472, 473, 482 t r a d e of, 452 H e n c k , Mikael, a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112, 628 H e n n e l , L e n n a r t , naval m a n n i n g s t u d y of, 579 H e n r i k s s o n , Bertil, m a s t e r shipwright, 335 H e n r i k s s o n , Evert, see H e i n s s o n , Evert H e n r i k s s o n , Jakob, m a s t e r shipwright, 333, 334, 470 n. 48 H e n r y VIII, k i n g of E n g l a n d ( 1 5 0 9 - 4 7 ) , 531 Hess, M a r k u s , C o p e n h a g e n m e r c h a n t , 369

Hierarchies, 289, 290, 291, 292, 613 a n d b u r e a u c r a c y , 244 and governance, 287-292 a n d shipbuilding, 344 H j a l m a r e n lake, 45 Hogbdtsman, see b o a t s w a i n s Holkar, clinker t e c h n o l o g y built ships, 142, 247, 322, 352, 356 H o l l a n d , see N e t h e r l a n d s Hollander, Adrian, master shipwright, 333 H o l l e n d e r , Johan, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 n. 56 H o l m , 379 H o l m e n , naval base, 277 Holmkapten ( D e p u t y c o m m a n d e r ) , 296 Holmmajor ( D e p u t y c o m m a n d e r ) , 296 Holstein, 32, 54, 104, 141, 143, 168, 175, 202, 215, 258, 426 d u k e of, 64 a n d K a l m a r U n i o n , 53 H o l s t e i n - G o t t o r p , D u c h y of, 121, 122, 123, 131, 201, 203 H o r n , Gustav, Swedish Field-marshal, 166 H o r n , H e n r i k , a d m i r a l general, 191, 192, 302, 623 n. 70 H o r n , Klas Kristersson, a d m i r a l , 152, 153, 155, 156, 405, 623 n. 70, 624 Hovitsmcin (captain), 616, 620, 621, 622 Hovrcitten ( C o u r t of Appeal), 290 Hudiksvall, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283 H u l k , ship n o longer seagoing, 322 n, 15 Hulls, 164 n. 29, 323, 346, 430, 450, 478, 479, 483, 495, 496, 500, 503, 504, 544 c o n s t r u c t i o n of, 477 obsolescence of, 494 H u m l e b a e k , 202 Huvudskepp, large w a r s h i p , 331, 441 Hybertsson, Henrik, Master shipwright, 292, 293, 337, 338, 339, 388 n. 151, 389 n. 153, 390, 398, 401, 405, 458 n. 20, 459 n. 22 H y b e t s s o n , A r e n t , m e r c h a n t , 339 Ice bridges, a n d military o p e r a t i o n s , 178 Iceland, a n d K a l m a r U n i o n , 53 Iggesund, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 284, 378 I n d i a n O c e a n , 249 E u r o p e a n p e n e t r a t i o n of, 658 I n d r e t , France, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 339 n. 66

GENERAL INDEX I n f a n t r y , 269, 586; see also soldiers Infections, bacterial, 641 Ingria, Swedish province, 95, 125, 204, 206, 207 I n l a n d t o w n s ' g t u i n e r c o m p a n y , 603 I n n o v a t i o n , 266 I n t e n d a n t s , civilian a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , 252 Inventories, naval, 449, 450, 452, 453, 455, 4 6 0 - 4 6 6 , 468, 469, 470, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 492, 494 n. 106, 496, 497, 500, 502, 503, 504, 526 g u n inventories, 508, 509, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 539, 540, 545, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552 n. 87, 561, 562, 563 n. 107, 568 o r d n a n c e inventories, 516, 540, 541 Iron, 317, 350, 377, 378, 511, 513, 648, 650 for a n c h o r s , 452 bar iron, 556 cast iron technology, 554, 558 p r o d u c t i o n of, 454 I r o n ore, 512 I r o n w o r k s , 271, 452, 512, 560, 568 leasing of, 523, 524 I s b r a n d s s o n , Johan, j u n i o r m a s t e r shipwright, 339 Italy: H a b s b u r g territories in, 186 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 248 Ivan IV, t h e Terrible, T s a r of Russia ( 1 5 3 3 - 8 4 ) , 74, 81 Jagellonica, Katarina, wife of J o h a n III, 358 Jagiello dynasty, 90 Jakob, m a s t e r shipwright, 334 Jakob, Finske, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 333 Jakobsson, Eskil, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 335, 336 Jakobsson, H e i n ( H e n r i k ) , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 339 Jakobsson, T h e o d o r , C o l o n e l - l i e u t e n a n t , Swedish artillery studies of, 509 Jakter, small a r m e d vessels, 142, 254, 257, 259, 322, 323, 324, 325, 328, 347, 349, 352, 356, 374, 399 Jaktskepp, small t h r e e - m a s t e d ship, 324, 341, 423 J a m t l a n d , cession to Sweden, 104 Jankow, battie at, 174

787

Jensen, F r e d e P., historian, 31 J o h a n III, King of Sweden ( 1 5 6 8 - 9 2 ) , xxii, 84, 85, 124, 263, 264, 273, 274, 282, 283, 286, 357, 358, 360, 363, 365, 368, 373, 376, 475, 588, 592, 624, 625 Baltic policy of, 88 foreign policy, 474 letters of, 335 a n d m a n n i n g regulations, 594 m a r r i a g e of, 90 naval policy of, 86, 87, 369, 370, 374, 375, 435, 444, 446, 472, 480, 539, 540 a n d Philip II of Spain, 87, 88 s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m m e s of, 3 6 4 - 3 7 6 a n d Swedish Council, 288 wife of, 87 J o h a n , C o u n t of H o y a , 67, 68, 257, 349, 618 d e a t h of 68 Johan, D u k e of F i n l a n d , see J o h a n III, King of Sweden J o h a n , D u k e of O s t e r g o t l a n d , 391 Johansson, Isbrand, master shipwright, 337, 338, 339, 385 n. 144, 388 n. 151, 389, 391, 393, 394, 397 J o h a n s s o n , Lorentz, M a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 391 n. 155 J o n s s o n , Mats, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 335 n. 50 J o n s s o n , Sigfrid, 622 n. 69 Jonsson, Soffring, a d m i r a l , 626, 627 Juel, Niels, A d m i r a l , 192 J u t l a n d , 99, 104, 109, 110, 141, 143, 166, 167, 168, 169, 175, 176, 178, 183 Juusten, Bengt S o f f r i n g s s o n ( e n n o b l e d G y l l e n a n k a r ) , a d m i r a l , 625 Kajutfolk, 609 K a l m a r , 60, 68, 94, 91, 96, 122, 140, 142, 143, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 162, 170, 175, 196, 236, 278, 282, 303, 306, 336, 392, 476, 482, 483, 492, 543 castle at, 163, 254, 255, 281, 529 g u n s at, 541 a c c o u n t s f r o m , 270 n. 44 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 337, 341, 356, 357, 366, 385, 388 n. 152, 389 n. 153, 390, 425, 426 s h i p y a r d at, 423, 475 n. 62 K a l m a r lans m u s e u m , 563 n. 107 K a l m a r U n i o n , 29, 31, 35, 52, 53, 54, 61, 69, 82

Ill GENERAL INDEX K a l m a r s u n d , 43, 152, 162, 163, 193, 194 Elefanten's w r e c k at, 153 Kalvo, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282 Kammamrkivet ( T r e a s u r y archive), 579 Kammaren, see Sweden, T r e a s u r y Kamrnarkollegiet, 450 KammarkoUegium, 307 Kansliet, see Sweden, Chancellery K a p p l i n g e h o l m e n , island, 280 Karl IX, King of Sweden (1604-11), also regent ( 1 5 9 9 - 1 6 0 4 ) , xxii, 84, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 161, 162, 165, 187, 188, 236, 264, 268, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 283, 286, 288, 290, 338, 339, 365, 367, 368, 369, 373, 375, 3 7 6 - 3 8 4 , 385, 387, 388, 391, 435, 465, 466, 476, 379, 523, 573, 592, 593, 626, 627, 664, 665 d e a t h of, 163 naval policy, 91, 188, 385, 393, 447, 450, 475, 476, 477, 480, 481, 482, 490, 541, 542, 543, 547 royal t r a d e system, 482 Karl X Gustav, King of Sweden ( 1 6 5 4 - 6 0 ) , xxii, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 117, 125 n. 95, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 298, 299, 300, 417, 418, 658 d e a t h of, 112, 114 naval policy of, 108, 340, 417, 418, 419, 496 s h i p b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m , 563 Karl XI, King of Sweden ( 1 6 6 0 - 9 7 ) , also r e g e n c y g o v e r n m e n t ( 1 6 6 0 - 7 2 ) , xxii, 114, 117, 119, 120, 125, 129, 130, 189, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 300, 302, 304, 306, 309, 310, 311, 312, 330, 420, 496, 502, 569, 658 naval policy, 424, 425, 426, 428 Karl XII, King of Sweden ( 1 6 9 7 - 1 7 1 8 ) , also r e g e n c y g o v e r n m e n t (1697), xxii, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131, 198, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 212, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 331, 608, 609, 658, 661 d e a t h of, 130, 227, 232 foreign policy, 127 naval policy of, .129, 205, 218, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 606 in O t t o m a n E m p i r e , 207, 218, 310 Karl, D u k e of S o d e r m a n l a n d , see Karl IX, K i n g of Sweden

K a r l s h a m n , 190, 196, 340 D a n i s h c a p t u r e of, 423 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 341, 421, 422, 423 s h i p y a r d at, 499 Karlskrona, 126, 127, 128, 129, 195, 197, 201, 208, 209, 210, 213, 217, 219, 220,' 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 306, 308, 309, 318, 426, 428, 608, 610 as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre, 303 blockade of, 201 fortifications at, 567 g u n s at, 567 naval base at, 7, 40, 44, 49, 122, 238, 325, 341, 466, 567, 604, 606 plague at, 211 p r o v i s i o n i n g , 639 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 342, 343, 425, 426, 427, 430 Kasimir, John, King of P o l a n d , 112 Kastelholm: casrie at, 254 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 356 Katarina, wife of J o h a n III, 90 Katt, t r a n s p o r t vessel, 326 Kattegatt, 44, 186, 191, 209, 211, 213, 214, 217, 606 Keels, 377, 386 n. 145 Kettles, 449, 529 n. 38 K e x h o l m , 95, 370 fortress at, 95 Kiel: Bay of Kiel, 169 Kijl, K n u t , a d m i r a l , 627 Klockupproret, see Bell rebellion Koch, Carl, naval m a n n i n g s t u d y of, 579 Koge Bay, 43, 44, 210, 222, 223, 224, 225 naval batrie at (1st July 1677), xvi, 192, 193, 238 naval battle at ( 2 3 r d - 2 6 t h S e p t e m b e r 1710), xvi, 210, 238, 429 Kolberger Heide, naval battle at (1st July 1644), xvii, 168, 169, 172, 177, 234 n. 124, 236 KoUegium ( a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e p a r t m e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n ) , 291, 294, 306 Kommendor, see c o m m o d o r e s Kommerskollegium, B o a r d of C o m m e r c e , 106, 438, 442 Konig, Kort, Liibeckian m e r c h a n t , 348 Konigsberg, 226 h e m p f r o m , 486, 487 Konstaplar, see G u n n e r s , m a s t e r gunners

GENERAL I N D E X K o p p a r b e r g e t , 558 g u n p r o d u c t i o n at, 549, 560 Kotlin, see Retusaari, island of Kravel, see Carvel Kraveller, naval vessel, 142, 257, 322, 352 Krejare, t r a n s p o r t vessel, 326, 328 Krigsarkivet, S t o c k h o l m , 7, 318, 508 naval p a p e r s collection, 8 KrigskoUegium, A r m y b o a r d , 297 n. 92, 307, 508 K r o n b o r g , 181 siege of (1535), 529 K r o n o b y , naval yard at, 422, 423 K r o n s t a d t , 129, 212, 216, 230, 231 Russian naval base at, 125, 204 Kungsor: s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 337 n. 61, 377, 378, 382, 384, 385, 386, 391 s h i p y a r d at, 283 Kurck, Arvid, b i s h o p of A b o , 347 Kvarsebo, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 338, 390 L a b o u r , as resource, 284, 285, 286, 287 Ladoga, lake, 45, 89, 125, 203, 370, 374, 430 L a d u g a r d s l a n d e t , Stockliolm, 280 Lagerbielke, family of, 308 Lagercrantz, family of, 308 Lagom, " m i d d l e - s i z e d " w a r s h i p , 328 Laicho, Erik, 333 n. 41 Laicho, Jakob, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 333 Lakes, a n d a r m y logistics, 45, 46 Ldn system, 253, 254, 257, 259, 260, 265, 288, 347 Lcin holders, 253, 254, 257, 349, 467 L a n d i n g craft, 400 Landshovdingar (civilian provincial governors), 289, 291 L a n d s k r o n a , 69, 181, 183, 184, 256, 495 Svdrdet s i n k i n g at, 418 Swedish naval base at, 44, 111, 118, 144 L a n d s t i n g (provincial c o u r t ) , 57 Lane, Frederic C., historian, 11 o n state f o r m a t i o n , 652, 667 Langeland, 181 Ldntagare (aristocratic govenors), 31 Ldrft, (flax cloth), 453, 479, 483, 489 Larsson, Bengt, d e p u t y a d m i r a l , 274, 275 n. 54 Lastdragare, t r a n s p o r t vessel, 326

789

Leister, m e a s u r e of cargo c a r r y i n g capacity, 326, 329 Latvia, 43 G e r m a n rule of, 81 Lauridsen, H a n s , D a n i s h A d m i r a l , 157 Lead lines, 449 Leaders, 6 0 9 - 6 3 5 p e r m a n e n t c o r p s of, 627, 628 t h r e e - t i e r e d system of, 609 Leadership, 253, 576, 577, 580, 609, 611, 612, 615, 616, 632, 650, 656, 665 organisational, 14 political, 245, 246 L e d s u n d , naval battle at (1720), 231 Ledung system, 247 Leijonfelt, J o h a n Vilhelm, M a s t e r of O r d n a n c e , 568 n. 118 Length, u n i t s of, Swedish, xxii L e n m a n , H a n s , m e r c h a n t , 442 Lepanto, battie of (1571), 353 L e p a s o o n , Urve, 49 L e w e n h a u p t , Axel, c o m m a n d e r of G o t h e n b u r g s q u a d r o n , 344 Lieutenants, 622, 628, 629, 631, 633 kaptenldjtnant, 629 dverldjtnant, 628 underldjtnant, 628 Lights, 449 Lillebaelt, 178 Lillie, Erik, a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112 L i n e - o f - b a t d e , tactical f o r m a t i o n , 192 n. 63, 199, 222, 316, 321, 331 Lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , 122 Linjeskepp, see ships of t h e line Linkoping, b i s h o p of, 347 Lisbon, 251, 374 Lispund, Swedish u n i t of weight, xxii 452 Listerdyb, 167 naval b a t d e at (1644), 167, 171, 172 Lithuania: G r a n d D u k e of, 90 see also P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a Livonia, 79, 81, 93, 97, 99, 112, 113, 117, 127, 162, 203, 206, 208, 298, 400, 405, 477, 481, 660 forests in, 102 naval supplies f r o m , 258 Lode lines, 449 Lodja, large i n l a n d w a t e r boat, 325, 328 Lodjor, (small u n a r m e d t r a n s p o r t vessels), 283, 284, 372, 376, 389, 393, 395, 399, 412, 474, 478, 552

Ill GENERAL INDEX Lodose, 349, 350, 367 Lolland, island of, 181 Louis XIV, K i n g of F r a n c e ( 1 6 4 3 - 1 7 1 5 ) , 118, 195, 414 Liibeck, 33, 34, 35, 36, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 78, 81, 82, 85, 111, 112, 114, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 151, 155, 159, 160, 235, 247, 248, 249, 258, 273, 347, 348, 349, 403, 434, 467, 617, 659, 660 h e m p f r o m , 480 m e r c h a n t fleet of, 146 naval suppHes f r o m , 256, 257, 258, 260 sailcloth f r o m , 454, 485, 486 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 360, 420, 422, 499 s h i p y a r d at, 499 Sten Sture's ships at, 254 Swedish privileges of, 67 t r a d e of, 67, 146, 160 L u n d , battle of (1676), 190, 195 Lundkvist, Sven, historian, 31 L u t h e r a n i s m , 65, 69 L u t h e r a n s , 66, 97 Liitzen, 408 G u s t a v II A d o l f ' s d e a t h at, 102 Machtstaat, see State, p o w e r state M a g n u s , Olaus, C a t h o h c c h u r c h m a n , 353 M a h a n , Alfred, naval historian, 15, 16 M a h a n i a n f r a m e w o r k , in studies of c o n t r o l of t h e sea, 16, 17 M a i n t e n a n c e , c o n t r a c t s for, 4 8 4 - 4 9 2 Major, j u n i o r flag r a n k , 304, 632, 633 M a l a r e n lake, 37, 45, 147, 167, 173, 174, 281, 283, 377, 379, 385, 388 n. 149, 393, 394, 402, 483 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283 M a l m o , 66, 551 M a l n u t r i t i o n , 641 M a n n a i n e n , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 381 n. 139 M a n n i n g , 5 7 5 - 6 4 4 , 650, 660, 664 a n d a r m a m e n t , 588 d e m o g r a p h i c s , 605 indelta, c o m p a n i e s , 605 m e r c h a n t m e n , 580 studies of, 578, 579 M a n n i n g lists, 584, 585 M a n n i n g plans, 526, 539, 545 n. 69, 579, 581, 586, 587, 588, 589, 591, 597 for Gulf of F i n l a n d c a m p a i g n (1557), 588

M a n n i n g systems, 581, 582, 584, 593, 594, 595, 598, 600, 606, 607, 608, 609, 643, 644, 650 G u s t a v I's, 589 objectives of, 580, 581 M a n p o w e r , 136, 253, 656 naval r e q u i r e m e n t s for, 499 M a p s , 610, 611 M a r g a r e t a , wife of J o h a n of Hoya, 350 n. 85 M a r i n e r s , 585, 586, 587, 588, 593, 594, 597, 598, 607, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 630 M a r i n e s , 586 M a r i t i m e skills, a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 251 Markets, a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 246, 666 M a r s t r a n d , fortress of, 228 M a r s t r a n d , naval battle at (1719), 430 M a r t e n s s o n , Erik, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 M a r y Stuart, 358 M a s t e r of e q u i p m e n t , 296 M a s t e r of o r d n a n c e , 293, 296, 299, 532, 568 n. 118 Masterknekt, assistant m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 339 Masters, 576, 577, 610, 614, 616, 619, 622 Masters, levels of, 610 Masts, 271, 449, 450, 452, 461, 471, 496 f o r e m a s t s , 461 f o r e t o p g a l l a n t masts, 463 m a i n masts, 461, 462, 463 Mdrsmast, see masts, t o p m a s t m i z z e n masts, 461 m i z z e n t o p m a s t s , 461, 462 t o p masts, 352, 461, 462 topgallant masts, 461, 462 t o p - m a s t s , 352 Matsson, Markus, master shipwright, 334, 335 M a t t s o n , Lars ( e n n o b l e d S t r u s s h j e l m ) , vice a d m i r a l , 406, 634 M a z a r i n , C a r d i n a l , ruler of France, 414 M e c k l e n b u r g , 44, 71, 105, 131, 155, 400, 411 M e c k l e n b u r g - G i i s t r o w , D u c h y of, 121 M e d e l p a d , naval y a r d at, 341, 421 M e d i t e r r a n e a n Sea, 101, 186, 313, 315 Meijerfeldt, J o h a n A u g u s t , d i r e c t o r of naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 310

GENERAL INDEX M e r c a n t i l e m a r i n e , 40, 361, 385, 435, 436, 441, 442, 577, 580, 581, 608, 614, 626, 628, 630, 631 M e r c e n a r i e s , 33, 36, 55, 61, 63, 65, 83, 95, 101, 140, 146, 166, 655, 666 M e r c h a n t m e n , 17, 77, 83, 106, 135, 153, 166, 167, 250, 321, 322, 347, 356, 361, 362, 374, 375, 413, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 447, 590, 592, 608, 628 a r m a m e n t of, 390, 441, 442, 548, 554, 567, 575 n. 1 hire of, 21, 436 m a n n i n g of, 580 Metallurgy: a n d g u n s , 505, 506, 507, 511 a n d w a r s h i p technology, 572, 573 Militdra dmnessamlingar (naval a d m i n i s t r a t i v e papers), 8, 578 Militias, 5, 52, 61, 78, 83 peasant, 57, 61, 62, 72, 75 royal, 75, 260, 262 Minerals, 656 Karl IX's policy on, 523 M o n , naval battle at ( 1 2 t h - 1 3 t h S e p t e m b e r 1657), xvii, 177 M o n a r c h i e s , rise of, 77 M o n i e r , A n t h o n i e , 459 n. 22 M o n o p o l i e s , 666 m o n o p o l y c o m p a n i e s , 658 a n d violence, 18, 76, 288, 613, 670, 658 M o n s t e r a s , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 371, 376, 377, 384 M o r r i s , M a r t h a , sailcloth studies, 451 M o r t a r s , 200, 325 M o r t a r floats, 432 M o s c o w , 126, 206, 207 a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 251 M u n d , Pros, D a n i s h A d m i r a l , 171 M u s k e t e e r s , 514, 585 M u s k e t s , 138, 585 M u s k o , naval base at, 139 M u s t e r rolls, 578, 589 N a f w e q v a r n , i r o n w o r k s at, 560 Nails, 317 Naples, galley n a v y of, 249 N a p o l e o n i c W a r s , 42 N a r k e , 367 N a r o v a , river, 45 N a r v a , 81, 89, 124, 125, 133, 151, 201, 204, 273, 482

791

b l o c k a d e of, 84, 88, 362, 364, 365, 371, 435, 446, 471, 538, 660 g u n s at, 541 h e m p f r o m , 480, 481 N a t t och Dag, Barbro, wife of H a n s Bielkenstierna j n r , 304 n. 103 N a t t och Dag, family of, 304 n. 103 Naval bases, a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 20 Naval p o w e r , 35, 51, 84, 246, 247, 659, 661 A m e r i c a n , 16 British, 16 a n d c o m p l e x o r g a n i s a t i o n , 19 a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p , 658 a n d fiscal military state, 2 5 - 2 8 a n d geostrategy, 39 a n d political p o w e r , 5 1 - 5 2 a n d state f o r m a t i o n , 6 6 6 - 6 6 8 Vasa dynasty, 7 4 - 7 8 Swedish, 79, 85, 663, 664, 665, 668-671 Western, 105-112 Navies, 2, 3, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24, 39, 80, 96, 241, 242, 245, 668 early m o d e r n , 1 4 - 1 9 E u r o p e a n , 16 financing of, 22 f u n c t i o n , of, 241 galley navies, 249, 250, 313 historical studies of, 15, 16, 17 i n d u s t r i a l c o m p o n e n t s of, 242 n a t i o n a l p a r a d i g m s of, 19 p e r m a n e n t , 51, 52, 77, 245, 248, 261, 647, 668 Navies, B r a n d e n b u r g , 193, 194 Navies, British, 128, 219, 222, 223, 224, 226, 228, 230, 232, 249, 431 battle fleet of, 130, 231 battleships of, 219, 222, 224, 230, 233 frigates of, 225 m e r c h a n t m e n of, 435, 436 Navies, D a n i s h , 27, 29, 33, 42, 44, 60, 71, 84, 85, 94, 104, 109, 110, 128, 261, 352, 357, 363, 371, 375, 384, 392, 394, 395, 416, 420, 431 a r m a m e n t of, 94, 171, 512, 530, 536, 537, 538, 542, 555, 559, 570 Baltic naval o p e r a t i o n s , 1 3 5 - 2 4 0 battle fleet of, 43, 114, 128, 131, 132, 213, 214, 221, 232, 237, 238, 433, 660

Ill GENERAL INDEX battleships of, 201, 209, 210, 211, 213, 215, 217, 219, 222, 223, 225, 232, 233, 433 b l o c k s h i p s of, 432, 433 b r i g a n t i n e s of, 432 Christian IV's, 404 cruiser force of, 433 e n r o h i i e n t system of, 606 firepower, 553, 556, 559 fleet s t r e n g t h , 164, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 186, 189, 192, 193 n65, 201 n. 74, 210, 212, 314, 364, 365, 400, 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 418, 423, 424, 427, 429, 433 frigates of, 209, 213, 214, 219, 223, 432, 433 galleys of, 200, 346, 354, 410, 433 g i m n e r y of, 177, 192, 495 Liibeckian c o n t r o l of, 144 m a n n i n g system of, 607 m e r c h a n t m e n of, 193 n. 65, 219, 356, 434 s e a m e n of, 580 shallow d r a u g h t flotilla, 128, 129, 224, 433 s h i p b u i l d i n g , 340, 341 s n o w s of, 432 tactics, 537 t r a n s p o r t s , 210 w a r s h i p technology, 570, 571 w a r s h i p s of, 66, 68, 69, 148, 193 n. 65, 346, 352, 356, 362, 365, 424 yachts of, 410, 433 Navies, D u t c h Republic, 25 n. 24, 104, 110, 111, 173, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 201, 202, 219, 225, 237, 298, 395, 420 a r m a m e n t of, 512, 555 battle fleet of, 114, 107, 109, 183 battleships of, 219, 225, 233 firepower, 553, 554, 555 fitting of, 490 fleet s t r e n g t h , 179, 185 n. 49, 186, 189, 417, 423 frigates of, 225 g u n n e r y of, 495 m e r c h a n t m e n , 435, 436 s h i p b u i l d i n g , 561 Swedish officers in, 631 w a r s h i p technology, 570, 571 w a r s h i p s . 111 Navies, English, 111, 304, 315, 329, 369, 395, 420

a r m a m e n t , 512, 531, 536, 543, 544, 554, 555, 570 b a t d e fleet of, 107 c o r d a g e of, 451 firepower, 531, 553 fleet s t r e n g t h , 423 g u n n e r y of, 543 r a n k s of, 633 n, 88 sailcloth, 451 size of, 314 Swedish officers in, 631 w a r s h i p technology, 570, 571 warships, 445 Navies, F r e n c h , 46 n. 38, 75, 185, 194, 249, 395, 414, 420 battle fleet of, 107 firepower, 553, 554 fleet s t r e n g t h , 185 n. 49, 423 galley fleet, 73, 75, 249 size of, 669 Swedish officers in, 631 Navies, H a b s b u r g , 96, 99, 403, 404 Swedish c a p t u r e of, 101 Navies, Lubeckian, 60, 68, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 235, 236, 360, 363, 527 m e r c h a n t m e n , 362, 434 Navies, Naples: galley ffeet of, 249, 250 Navies, O t t o m a n E m p i r e : galley fleet of, 89, 249, 250 Navies, Polish, 99, 402, 403, 404 H a b s b u r g c o n t r o l of, 99 Navies, P o r t u g u e s e , 249 Navies, P r u s s i a n , 618 Navies, Russian, 107, 124, 128, 198, 200, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 261, 395 a m p h i b i o u s capability of, 98 battle fleet of, 124, 215, 217, 230, 231, 238, 433 battleships of, 211, 215, 216, 217, 220, 224, 225, 228, 230, 231, 232, 433 Black Sea fleet of, 127 b o m b vessels of, 433 c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n s of, 133 fleet s t r e n g t h , 216, 217, 433 frigates of, 203, 213, 217, 220, 433 galley fleet of, 124, 225, 344, 432, 433, 434 galleys of, 200, 204, 217, 229, 231

GENERAL INDEX m e r c h a n t m e n of, 215 o a r e d fleet of, 128, 204, 207, 211, 212, 216 Reval s q u a d r o n , 224 shallow w a t e r operations, 206 warships, 220 Navies, Sicilian: galley fleet of, 249, 250 Navies, Spanish, 25 n. 24, 96, 102, 250 fleet s t r e n g t h , 185 n. 49 galley fleet, 89, 249 N e t h e r l a n d s s q u a d r o n , 404 size of, 669 warships, 445 Navies, Swedish, 2, 3, 12, 49 n. 3, 52, 59, 60, 61, 68, 69, 71, 75, 80, 83, 85, 89, 94, 95, 99, 101, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 130, 302, 352, 368, 371, 384, 392, 395, 398, 420, 575, 630, 650, 662 Alvsborg s q u a d r o n , 542 a m p h i b i o t t s o p e r a t i o n s of, 97, 98, 99, 100, 113, 123, 125 aristocratic, 1 1 4 - 1 1 9 a r m a m e n t of, 171, 425, 427, 428, 430, 445, 446, 5 0 5 - 5 7 3 Baltic naval o p e r a t i o n s , 1 3 5 - 2 4 0 battle fleet of, 43, 44, 6 1 - 7 0 , 8 0 - 8 5 , 87, 113, 114, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 195, 197, 201, 213, 214, 217, 2 2 1 , 2 2 6 , 230, 2 3 1 , 2 3 2 , 236, 237, 238, 375, 376, 409, 427, 428, 429, 430, 446, 447, 498, 502, 503, 541, 543, 544, 591, 625, 659, 660, 661 battleships of, 126, 201, 202, 204, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 215, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 367, 428, 429, 430, 445, 502, 503, 571, 587 blockships of, 217, 218, 220, 228, 229, 427, 432, 443, 444 bojorter of, 355, 356, 389, 397, 406 n. 175, 423, 478 b o m b vessels of, 204, 206, 208, 209, 2 1 1 , 2 1 7 , 2 2 1 , 4 2 7 , 430, 431 boyers of, 187 n. 54, 424, 497, 500 b r i g a n t i n e s of, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 2 1 1 , 2 1 7 , 220, 2 2 1 , 2 2 8 , 427, 430, 431, 587 b u d g e t of, 493 n. 103 c a p t u r e d ships in, 362, 363, 371, 383 c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e s of, 621, 622

793

c o m m o n e r s serving in, 630, 633 C o r p s of C o n s t r u c t o r s , 343 C r u i s e r s of, 12, 429, 430, 431, 445, 446, 503 d e t e r i o r a t i o n , 429 d e v e l o p m e n t of, 52, 112-114, 2 9 2 - 2 9 6 , 664, 670 division i n t o five fleets, 294, 295 Erik XIV's, 83, 84, 86, 152-160, 264, 272, 282, 285, 286, 3 5 7 - 3 6 5 , 446, 462, 517, 553, 594 financial cost o f 188 n. 58, 575 firepower, 531, 532, 540, 543, 550, 551, 552, 553, 558, 559, 560, 562, 565, 567, 568, 571, 572 fireships, 167 n. 33, 168, 170, 172, 187, 189, 191, 192, 418, 424, 501, 502 fleet s t r e n g t h of, 160, 164, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 177, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 201, 206, 210, 212, 217, 229, 364, 365, 400, 404, 409, 413, 415, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 482, 541 411, 438 n. 221 floating batteries of, 503 f o r e i g n e r s serving in, 626, 627, 630, 631, 632, 633 a n d f o r e i g n policy, 8 5 - 9 0 , 121, 122 frigates, 200, 204, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 217, 219, 220, 221, 224, 228, 229, 231, 427, 430, 431, 439, 442, 445, 587 galley fleet o f 7 0 - 7 4 , 89, 113, 124, 230, 344, 3 5 3 - 3 5 7 , 372, 385, 402, 444, 530, 541, 569, 629 galleys o f 200, 204, 206, 209, 217, 218, 220, 228, 229, 346, 363, 364, 365, 374, 376, 399, 4 0 0 , 4 1 1 , 4 2 7 , 431, 432, 469, 503, 530, 545 n. 69, 547, 551 n. 85, 586, 608 G o t h e n b u r g s q u a d r o n , 143, 144, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 198, 209, 211, 212, 213, 219, 308, 319, 344, 399, 430, 431, 440, 441, 567, 599, 606, 607 Gulf of F i n l a n d s q u a d r o n , 209, 216 g u n n e r y , 148, 155, 177, 180, 181, 184, 189 G u s t a v I's, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 86, 124, 139-145, 254, 255, 256, 260, 281,

Ill GENERAL INDEX

334, 3 4 8 - 3 5 8 , 457, 467, 479, 517, 530, 531, 616, 617, 619, 620 G u s t a v II A d o l f ' s , 86, 9 6 - 1 0 2 , 124, 279, 286, 288, 318, 330, 3 9 5 - 4 1 4 , 445, 446, 447, 450, 484, 490, 491, 515, 543, 5 4 5 - 5 5 4 , 573, 589, 590, 5 9 6 - 5 9 8 , 600, 627, 628, 632 h i r e d fleet of, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 261, 439 h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of, 4 6 - 5 0 huvudskepp (capital ships) of, 411 jakter of, 356, 374, 399 jaktskepp of, 423 J o h a n Ill's, 86, 87, 88, 89, 124, 273, 285, 286, 323 n. 17, 3 6 4 - 3 7 6 , 385, 409, 444, 446, 472, 539, 540, 588, 592, 594, 624, 625 Kalniar s q u a d r o n , 163, 165 Karl IX's, 91, 92, 93, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 283, 335, 336, 338, 339, 363, 365, 367, 368, 3 7 3 - 3 9 3 , 445, 447, 466, 4 7 4 - 4 8 4 , 490, 523, 541, 542, 543, 547, 573, 5 9 3 - 5 9 5 , 626, 664, 665 Karl X Gustav's, 111, 125, 175-184, 298, 340, 417, 418, 419, 563 Karl XI's, 117, 187, 188, 189, 193, 197, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 342, 4 2 0 - 4 2 7 , 496, 499, 502, 565, 569, 605 Karl XII's, 120, 126, 129, 205, 206, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 309, 310, 311, 331, 4 2 7 - 4 3 4 , 444, 606, 608, 609, 638 K a r l s k r o n a s q u a d r o n , 319 Ladoga flotilla, 370 Lodjor of, 376, 389, 395, 399, 412, 478 L t i b e c k - a d m i n i s t r a t e d fleet, 140, 141 manning, 575-644 m a n p o w e r , 184, 396, 500 m e r c h a n t m e n of, 69, 170, 171, 172, 177 n. 41, 179, 182, 184, 186, 189, 191, 347, 360, 361, 363, 374, 375, 403, 426, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 447, 495, 501, 548, 561, 562, 608, 628 m o b i l i s a t i o n of, 122, 123, 197, 201, 202, 237, 243, 244, 252, 259, 280, 284, 301, 302, 491, 492, 495, 499, 538, 575, 576, 577, 582, 583, 589, 592, 593, 594, 598, 606, 607, 621, 637, 644 m o r t a r floats of, 432

m u t i n y in, 167 N y e n s q u a d r o n , 204 o a r e d fleet of, 129, 133, 205, 208, 444 obsolescence in, 494, 503 offensive capability of, 654, 655, 667 Peipus flotilla, 319 pintor of, 356, 374 p i n n a c e s of, 388, 395, 399, 400, 411, 412 P o m e r a n i a n flotilla, 221 pmmar of, 376, 387, 388, 395, 478 privateers in, 211, 215, 216, 218 professional, 1 1 9 - 1 2 2 r a n k s of, 628, 629 r e d u c t i o n of, 373, 374, 375, 376 sailcloth r e q u i r e m e n t s of, 457, 458 s e a m a n s h i p of, 189, 190, 196 Skeppsratt (code of naval rules), 62 social m o b i l i t y in, 630 S t o c k h o l m s q u a d r o n , 220, 227, 229, 308, 319, 440, 441 s t r u c t u r e of, 4 4 3 - 4 4 8 strussar of, 406, 409, 412, 419 tactics of, 153, 537 t r a n s p o r t s of, 183, 187, 206, 214, 223 n. 110, 387, 395, 396, 397, 411, 415, 422, 424, 425, 444, 497, 500 Vasa, 6 1 - 7 4 , 9 0 - 9 6 , 575, 578, 589, 592, 658 w a r s h i p s of, 74, 83, 117, 137, 148, 159, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 177 n. 41, 179, 182, 186, 189, 191, 253, 256, 275, 3 1 3 - 4 4 8 , 495, 496, 497, 500, 501, 530, 534, 544, 545 n. 69, 550, 570, 571, 572, 590, 632 yachts of, 424 N a v i g a t i o n , 449, 576, 610, 614, 615, 616 n a v i g a t i o n i n s t r u m e n t s , 610, 611 N e t h e r l a n d s , 61, 64, 70, 71, 106, 166, 168, 170, 171, 215, 250, 256, 258, 293, 351, 367 cables f r o m , 486 Charles V ' s p r o v i n c e s in, 70 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 248 naval supplies f r o m , 258 sailcloth f r o m , 453, 454, 467, 477, 480 s h i p b u i l d i n g in, 351 Neva river, 45, 74, 95, 125, 204, 372 e s t u a r y of, 45, 74, 90 N e w D e e p , e n t r a n c e to Stralsund, 213 N e w Sweden, colonial project, Delaware, 438

GENERAL INDEX N e w Sweden C o m p a n y , 413, 438 Nilsdotter, M a r g a r e t a , c o n t r a c t o r , 293 Nilsson, Svante, regent, 32, 60, 253 Nilsson, T o m a s , m a s t e r shipwright, 337, 385 n, 144, 393, 394 Nobility, 26. 55, 57, 64, 81, 99, 100, 119, 120, 143, 253, 259, 260, 265, 269, 287, 288, 290, 303, 308, 351, 424, 582, 613, 614, 617, 618, 622, 624, 625, 626, 628, 629, 630, 633, 634, 647, 649, 655, 664, 670 N o r b y , Soren, a d m i r a l , 64, 141, 349, 616, 617 N o r d i c U n i o n , 61, 70, 648 conflicts in, 5, 31, 32 m o n a r c h y of, 76 N o r m a n d y , F r e n c h navy in, 249 N o r r e F o r s t a d e n , S t o c k h o l m , 280 Norrfinland, gunners company from, 603 N o r r i s , John, Sir, 230 N o r r k o p i n g , 228 sailcloth p r o d u c t i o n at, 454 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 388 n. 149 Norrkopingdsuk, sailcloth, 454 N o r r l a n d , s h i p y a r d s in, 283 N o r r l a n d s e a m a n c o m p a n y , 603 N o r r m a l m , S t o c k h o l m , 280 N o r r t a l j e , 377 N o r t h A m e r i c a , 46 N o r t h Sea, 40, 85, 131, 167, 168, 211, 213, 215, 247 N o r w a y , 29, 31, 44, 58, 60, 64, 66, 76, 78, 83, 94, 112, 122, 129, 173, 198, 211, 223, 224, 227, 228, 432 b o r d e r s of, 34, 36, 37 civil war in, 32 C o u n c i l of, 66 a n d K a l m a r U n i o n , 52, 53 see also D e n m a r k - N o r w a y N o t e b o r g , Russian fortress at, 74 N o v g o r o d , 95, 161 N i i r n b e r g calibre system, 518, 519 Nya nummerserien (naval papers), 8, 509 N y k o p i n g , 92, 94, 162, 164, 278, 384, 476, 483, 593 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 367, 384, 386, 387, 388, 391, s h i p y a r d at, 91, 336, 337 n. 57, 368 n. 114, 378, 475 n. 62, 479

795

Nyland: regional c o m p a n y of s e a m e n f r o m , 598, 599, 603 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 372, 381 n, 139 N y n a s h a m n , 189 Nyslott, F i n l a n d castles of, 67 Oak, 205, 282, 283, 306, 317, 365, 387, 397, 421, 430, as resource, 284 t r a n s p o r t of, 306 Oars, 346 O a r s m e n , 73, 205, 326, 353, 354, 588, 590 c h a i n e d , 582 O d e n , Birgitta: o n Swedish financial system, 267 t a x a t i o n studies, 636 O d e r , river, 45 e s t u a r y of, 99, 218 Officer c o r p s , 612, 613, 614, 615, 627, 630, 635, 643 aristocrats in, 614 Officers, 577, 579, 581, 582, 592, 597, 598, 608, 609, 615, 628, 629, 631 artillery officers, 610 b i o g r a p h i c a l studies of, 611 c o n s t r u c t i o n officers, 342 e d u c a t i o n of, 609, 610 fartygschef ( c o m m a n d i n g officer), 620 flag officers, 310 n. 112, 630, 632, 633, 634 f o r e i g n e r s as, 631, 633 hierarchical r a n k i n g of, 628, 629 n a v i g a t i o n officers, 609, 610, 612, 616 n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d , 577, 585, 592, 597, 598, 608, 609, 610, 611, 614, 634, 666 in p e a c e t i m e , 628, 629, 631, 633 p e t t y officers, 577, 580, 583, 585, 596, 597, 608, 609, 610 p r o f e s s i o n a l i s a t i o n of, 611, 612, 627 r e c r u i t m e n t of, 610, 612 sea officers, 270, 273, 274, 276, 279, 280, 294, 298, 303, 308, 309, 331, 341, 579, 582, 583, 615, 616, 619, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 629, 630, 631, 632, 643 skeppshdvitsman, see officers, sea officers t r a i n i n g of, 345, 611, 612, 631

Ill GENERAL INDEX w a r r a n t officers, 252 in w a r t i m e , 628, 633 O l a n d , island of, 43, 44, 60, 152, 154, 155, 162, 163, 193, 349, 425 N o r t h e r n O l a n d , naval battle at ( 3 0 t h - 3 1 s t M a y 1564), xvii, 150, 151, 235, 360 N o r t h e r n O l a n d , naval battle at (26th July 1566), xvii, 157, 236 O l a n d , naval battle of ( l l t h - 1 5 t h A u g u s t 1564), xvii, 152, 153, 234 n. 124, 235 S o u t h e r n O l a n d , naval battle at (1st June 1676), xvii, 189, 190, 237, 238, 566 s e a m e n f r o m , 598, 604 O l a n d s e a m a n c o m p a n y , 603 O l d e n b u r g dynasty, 32, 33, 35, 36, 41, 53, 55, 56, 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 57, 58, 60, 70, 76, 105, 164, 235, 249 Baltic c a m p a i g n s of, 5 2 - 6 1 Oliva, battle of (1627), 407 n. 179 Olof, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 350 Olofsson, H e n n i n g ( e n n o b l e d A n k a r g r i p ) , 628 Olsson, Hollinger, shipwright, 333, 334 Olsson, Jakob, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 333 Olsson, Kjell, naval m a n n i n g s t u d y of, 579 O r d e r of Knights, G e r m a n , 74 Ordnance, 505-573 O r d n a n c e depots, 271, 272 O r d n a n c e organisations, 517, 518, 522, 529 a r m y b r a n c h , 524 n a v y b r a n c h , 524 Organisations: c o m p l e x , 2, 3, 12-14, 28, 6 5 1 - 6 5 4 hierarchical, 13, 14 Osel, island of, 81, 94, 114, 158, 161 cession to Sweden, 104 Oslo, 45, 223 O s l o f j o r d , 45 O s t e r b o t t e n , F i n l a n d , 422, 423 naval r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m , 602 s e a m e n f r o m , 603 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 372, 381 n. 139, 425 O s t e r g o t l a n d , 92, 283, 350 O s t e r g o t l a n d archipelago, 162 O s t e r m a l m , S t o c k h o l m , 280 Ostgota, s e a m e n c o m p a n y f r o m , 603 O s t k i n d , 372

O t t o m a n E m p i r e , 127, 207, 211, 212 Karl XII in, 2 0 7 , 2 1 8 , 3 1 0 m o n a r c h y in, 77 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 249 Overkommissarie, civilian chief c o m m i s s i o n e r , 307, 311 Overskeppare (senior m a s t e r ) , 277 Overstdthdllare ( G o v e r n o r ) , 297 Oversteamiral, see A d m i r a l s , Lord H i g h Admiral O x e n s t i e r n a , Axel, C h a n c e l l o r of Sweden, 25, 102, 103, 104, 167, 267, 279, 288, 293, 294, 295, 329, 316, 330, 331, 395, 396, 400 n. 164, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415 n, 191, 416, 440, 447, 559, 596, 600, 640, 660 p a p e r s of, 328 O x e n s t i e r n a , C h r i s t i e r n Gabrielsson, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 O x e n s t i e r n a family, 297 O x e n s t i e r n a , Gabriel Bengtsson, riksamiml, xxiii, 299, 416, 624 Packet, Gilius, g u n - f o u n d e r a n d military engineer, 532 P a c k - t h r e a d , 468 Painters, 280 Parker, Geoffrey, o n t h e state a n d w a r f a r e , 651 P a t r o n a g e , a n d organisations, 14 Peasants, 32, 38, 52, 57, 58, 66, 140, 253, 262, 264, 265, 266, 284, 285, 286, 304, 306, 312, 354, 369, 472, 582, 642, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 653, 655, 656, 670 c o n s c r i p t i o n of, 646 a n d G u s t a v I, 71, 645, 646 militia, 5, 57, 61, 62, 255, 260, 263, 655 a n d naval m a n n i n g , 306, 597, 598, 599, 601, 602 a n d naval policy, 647, 650 a n d provisioning, 642 rebellion by, 71, 527, 646, 648 in s h i p b u i l d i n g , 642 a n d taxation, 482, 636, 599, 642, 646, 670 see also rotar P e d e r s s o n , A n d e r s , private s h i p b u i l d e r , 379 Peipus lake, 45, 89, 125, 204, 430 lodjor o n , 389 n. 153 Penrose, E d i t h T., o n o r g a n i s a t i o n a l g r o w t h , 652, 667

GENERAL INDEX

797

P e r e v o l o c h n a , 127 delegation o f 14 P e r n a u , 81, 97 d o m e s t i c , 19 Perssoii, Mats, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 335 a n d fiscal military state, 25 n. 50, 336 i n t e r n a t i o n a l , 19 Peter I, T s a r of Russia ( 1 6 8 2 - 1 7 2 5 ) , 106, naval p o w e r , 2 - 8 , 15, 16, 19, 25, 28, 107, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 133, 198, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 52, 58, 59, 201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 213, 215, 61, 63, 7 4 - 8 5 , 105, 106, 108, 111, 216, 217, 220, 225, 226, 230, 231, 433, 112, 116, 127, 129, 130, 142, 143, 661 145, 182, 185, 227, 229, 241, 246, PhiUp II, King of Spain (1554^98), 87, 252, 255, 272, 298, 308, 346, 394, 88, 367, 368, 369, 435 404, 411, 433, 440, 450, 468, 505, Pilots, 576, 577 532, 577, 616, 642, 646. 647, 648, Pine, 317 650, 6 5 8 - 6 7 0 Pinkor, small a r m e d vessel, 322, 323, a n d o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 15 324, 356, 374 p r o j e c t i o n o f 76, 137, 252 Pinnaces, small a r m e d vessels, 324, 328, Prdmar, t r a n s p o r t vessels, 283, 326, 328, 330, 388, 395, 399, 411, 412 376, 387, 388, 393. 395. 478 Pitch, 317, 656 P r a m s , 200 Plague, 211, 607 Privateering, 59, 341, 437, 438, 437, 438, P l u n d e r , 17, 645, 646 608, 658, 665 P o l a n d , 19, 33, 81, 84, 90. 91, 92, 93, Privateers, 60, 211, 347, 363, 430, 98, 99, 100, 112, 115, 126, 127, 131, 608 146, 147, 176, 206, 273, 275, 279, 288, P r o t e c t i o n , 1, 2, 4, 5, 10 290, 381, 382, 384, 405, 411, 494, 646, a n d society, 5 660 P r o t e c t i o n selling, 5, 35, 66, 76, 78, 80, k i n g o f 84, 90 81, 111, 613, 652, 657, 658 naval policy, 95 a n d g u n s , 505 P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a , 13, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, a n d t h e state, 8 - 1 2 38. 78, 82, 90, 99, 107, 108, 112, 145, Vasa dynasty, 27 175, 210, 203, 249 P r o t e s t a n t s , 90, 617, 618 Jagiello d y n a s t y o f 90 alliance against Philip II of Spain, 88 k i n g of, 201 Provianthus, see Provision d e p o t s P a r l i a m e n t o f 93 Proviantrdkenskaper, p r o v i s i o n accounts, p r o t e c t o r a t e s o f 81 146 n. 8, 164 n. 28, 270 n. 43, 335 P o l a n d - S a x o n y , 123 n. 50, 579 Poltava, battle of (1709), 127, 128, 198, Proviantskepp, storeships, 328 199, 207, 208, 215, 231 P r o v i s i o n i n g , 159, 177, 178, 240, 245, P o m e r a n i a , 45, 105, 121, 127, 129, 155, 252, 271, 272, 293, 5 7 5 - 6 4 4 , 664 174 n. 39, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , 250 n. 61, 194, 212, 213, 215, 219, 220, failures in, 576 221, 223, 224, 324, 400, 405, 411, 431, a n d health, 576, 6 3 5 - 6 4 1 660 P r o v i s i o n i n g plans, 591 naval supplies f r o m , 258 P r u n c k , Jakob Jakobsson, m a s t e r s h i p b u i l d i n g in, 431 s h i p w r i g h t , 339 strussar p r o d u c t i o n in, 405 Prussia, 45, 97, 98, 99, 102, 112, 130, Swedish bases in, 103 n. 72 208, 226, 230, 293, 403, 405, 411, P o r t cities, 246, 247, 248, 249 660 Portugal, 77, 87, 668 d u k e o f 69, 143 C r o w n o f 658 g o v e r n o r o f 410 a n d m e r c h a n t m a n hiring, 436 naval supplies f r o m , 258 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 249 sailcloth p r o d u c t i o n in, 453 naval policy o f 313 sequester o n Stettin, 218 t r a d e o f 378 use of strussar in, 324 P o w e r , political, 1 , 1 9 P r u s s i a - B r a n d e n b u r g , 127

Ill GENERAL INDEX

Psilander, d y n a s t y of, 308 Psilaiiderhielm, 308 P s i l a n d e r s k j o l d , 308 Putzig, Prussia, 402 Q u a r t e r i n g , 263 Q u a r t e r m a s t e r s , 577 R a b e n , Peter, D a n i s h A d m i r a l , 221 Rang, rate (ship classification), 331 Ranges, in F r e n c h r a t i n g system, 332 Rangskepp, battleship, 199 n. 72, 323, 331 Raseborg, castle at, 254 Rates, 331, 332 R a t i n g systems, 3 2 6 - 3 3 2 English, 329, 331, 332 D u t c h , 331, 332 F r e n c h , 331, 332 Rats, d a m a g e caused by, 496 n. I l l R a u m o , 645 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 371, 374, 376, 381 n. 139 Realskepp (warship), 328, 329 R e c r u i t i n g agents, 606 R e c r u i t m e n t , 271, 575, 594, 642 v o l u n t a r y e n l i s t m e n t , 583 see also c o n s c r i p t i o n Reduktion ( r e t u r n of d o n a t e d l a n d to t h e Swedish c r o w n ) , 116, 117, 120, 300, 302, 303, 424 Regeringsform (rules of g o v e r n m e n t ) , 276 Renzel, C l e m e n t , naval a d m i n i s t r a t o r , 467 Resources, 12, 241, 243, 251, 266, 290, 292, 651, 663, 664, 665, 667, 667, 669, 670 centralisation of, 669 extraction of, 11, 652, 654, 656, 670 financial, 12 foreign, 653 flow of, 2 4 1 - 2 4 6 , 654, 655 m o b i l i s a t i o n of, 267, 268, 317 t r a n s f e r of, 291, 651 utilisation of, 1, 12, 13, 14, 28 Retusaari, island of, 125 n. 96, 204, 205, 212, 216 Reval (Tallinn), Estonia, 68, 71, 74, 142, 158, 217, 220, 230, 256, 347, 482, 659 h e m p f r o m , 468, 480 n. 73, 481 n. 78 naval action at (1534), 67, 527 p r o t e c t o r of, 81

Richter, Jakob, b u i l d e r of royal castles, 334 n. 44 Rido (Ridon), s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 337 n. 57, 391, 393, 394 Riga, 68, 81, 93, 98, 100, 101, 124, 201, 209, 249, 293 b l o c k a d e of, 93, 114, 161, 389, 660 Gulf of, 659 h e m p f r o m , 486, 487, 489, 493 naval yard at, 341, 342, 415, 426 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 406, 407, 409, 410, 425 s h i p y a r d at, 415 siege of (1700), 201 Rigging, 253, 293, 295, 449, 450, 451, 452, 460, 461, 466, 470, 471, 473, 474, 475, 478, 479, 482, 483, 4 8 4 - 5 0 1 cost of, 471 n. 52 D u t c h , 485, 490, 491 of galleys, 461 p r o d u c t i o n of, 469 of Store Kravelen, 467 s u p p l y of, 459 of warships, 461 Rigs, 280, 292, 438 n. 221, 449, 456, 467, 468, 475, 476, 477, 481, 484, 495, 500, 501, 503, 610 battle d a m a g e to, 495 obsolescence of, 494 rig m a k e r s , 475 rig plans, 463 Riksarkivet ( N a t i o n a l Archives), xi, xvi, 318, 508 Militaria series at, 509 Riksdag, f o u r estate P a r l i a m e n t , 261, 262 Riksfdrestdndare (Swedish regent), 32 Rikshuvudbocker (state's m a i n ledgers), 8 Rikskansler (Chancellor), 279 Riksmarsk (Lord H i g h Constable), 274, 279, 301 Riksradet, (Swedish C o u n c i l of t h e Realm), 57, 59 Riksregistraturet, 7, 271 Riksskattmdstare, (Lord H i g h T r e a s u r e r ) , 299, 300 Roberges, h y b r i d galleys, 355 Robert, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 388 n, 151 Roberts, Michael, o n t h e state a n d warfare, 651 Rochet, Peter, 560 R o d s u n d , naval battle (30th April, 1659), xvii, 181, 237

GENERAL I N D E X Rodvin, W e l l a m , see R u t h v e n , W i l l i a m Rogstad, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 371, 376 R o l a n d , Mats, m a s t e r shipwright, 335 R o p e m a k e r s , 475, 484, 487, 495 n. 109 R o p e m a k i n g , 483, 489 Ropes, 449, 452, 467, 468 Ropewalks, 280, 468 at Karlskrona, 453 at S t o c k h o l m , 453 Roslags, s e a m e n c o m p a n y f r o m , 603 Rostock, 83, 151, 249 Rotar, p e a s a n t g r o u p s of equal tax paying ability, 601, 604 Roth, G u n n a r Olofsson, m a s t e r shipwright, 341, 342, 344 Roth, Rollof, s h i p w r i g h t , 343, 344 Royalskepp, warship, 328, 329, 330 R u b b , Lars ( e n n o b l e d R o d e r s k j o l d ) , vice a d m i r a l , 634 Rud, O t t o , A d m i r a l , 155, 156 R u d d e r s , 370 n. 118 Riigen, island of, 105, 177, 194, 212, 213, 215, 221, 222, 223 n. 110, 238, 431 naval b a t d e at (28th July 1715), xvi, 222, 310 n. 112 naval battle b e t w e e n Riigen, Bornholm and the Sound ( 2 5 t h - 2 6 t h M a y 1676), xvi, 44, 189, 237 Rulers, 13, 14 a n d a r m e d forces, 19, 20 a n d c o n t r o l of t h e sea, 41 a n d society, 12 Rullar, sailcloth m e a s u r e , 458 Russia, 13, 19, 29, 30, 34, 37, 39, 45, 74, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89, 91, 95, 94, 96, 107, 108, 112, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 145, 161, 197-233, 273, 275, 308, 660, 661 civil war in, 94 foreign policy, 33, 35 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 251 naval policy of, 96 t r a d e of, 37, 81, 89, 90, 154, 216 Ruthven, William Robertsson, master s h i p w r i g h t , 337, 338 n. 62, 391 R u u t h , Karl, a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112 Ryning, Axel, riksamiral, xxii, 275, 277, 279, 294, 297, 298 Ryning, Erik, a d m i r a l , 416, 600, 623 n. 70, 627 Ryning, family of, 304

799

Ryning, Kerstin, m o t h e r of H a n s Bielkenstierna, 304 n. 103 Ryning, Nils, 623 n. 70 Sail cloth, 468 Sail m a k e r s , 280, 450, 453, 475, 484, 487, 495 n. 109, 497 n. 112 Sail plans, 463 Sailcloth, 271, 449, 450, 451, 4 5 2 - 4 6 0 , 465, 467, 469, 470, 471, 472, 475, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 483, 489, 490, 491, 494, 496, 501, 540, 541, 648, 650, 660, 665 buldan, 454, 486 cost of, 453 n. 5, 458, 459 D u t c h , 454, 490 f r o m D a n z i g , 485, 486, 487 i m p o r t s of, 453, 454, 468, 480, 482, 483 m e a s u r e m e n t of, 457, 458 p r o d u c t i o n of, 453, 468, 487 n. 112, 493 r e q u i r e m e n t for, 457, 458, 499, 501 reserves o f 460 s h o r t a g e s of, 483 t a x a t i o n for, 472, 473 vadmal (woollen sailcloth), 453, 454, 472, 483, 489 Sails, 253, 280, 292, 295, 346, 377, 438 n. 221, 4 4 9 - 5 0 4 , 610, 649, 664 cost of, 471 n, 52 d o u b l e sails, 463 D u t c h naval s t a n d a r d s for, 491 f o r e topsails, 461, 463, 496 foresails, 454, 461, 461, 463, 496, 497 kryssegel, type of sail, 462 lateen, 353 m a i n topsails, 461, 463 mainsails, 454, 461, 463, 496, 497 m a n u f a c t u r e o f 468 mdrssegel, see sails, topsails m i z z e n sails, 454, 461, 463, 496, 497 m i z z e n topsails, 463, 497 obsolescence of, 494 p r o d u c t i o n of, 469 p u r c h a s e of, 256 repair of, 596 spare, 463, 464, 492, 495, 496, 497, 500, 502, 503, 504 sprit topsails, 462, 463, 464, 497 spritsails, 461, 463, 497 square, 353, 461 stay-sails, 463, 464 s u p p l y of, 459

Ill GENERAL INDEX t o p gallant sails, 454, 461, 463, 464, 485, 497 topsails, 461, 485, 486, 488 triangular, 461 Saimen, lake, 45 St P e t e r s b u r g , 90, 127, 128, 129, 204, 205, 206, 207, 212, 215, 231 a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 251 f o u n d i n g of, 125 Salt, trade in, 157 salt ships, 361 Saltholm, island of, 174, 202 Salvage, of guns, 566 San Lucar, s e q u e s t r a t i o n of Swedish ships at (1632), 437 Sasse, Staffan, Swedish a d m i r a l , 347, 617, 619 S a t a k u n t a , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 372 Sawmills, 377 n. 132 Saxony, 126, 206 elector of, 201 S a x o n y - P o l a n d , 127, 203, 207 Scandinavia, 247 Scheel, Joakim, a d m i r a l , xxii, 276, 277, 278, 283, 626, 627 Schoutbynacht, naval r a n k , 633 S c h u m p e t e r , Joseph: o n e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l f u n c t i o n , 242, 243, 267 o n state f o r m a t i o n , 667 S c o r c h e d e a r t h strategy, 207 Scotland, 358 naval supplies f r o m , 258 Sculptors, 280 Sea, c o n t r o l of, 39, 40, 41 Sea of Azov, 203, 211 Sea lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , 12, 36, 39, 43, 51, 56, 59, 66, 75, 76, 78, 79, 84, 86, 95, 96, 107, 111, 127, 128, 131, 135, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 226, 232, 235, 241, 249, 371, 422, 433, 655, 659, 667, 670 S e a m a n s h i p , 240, 614 S e a m e n , 258, 259, 263, 269, 271, 295, 325, 326, 370 n. 118, 450, 577, 578, 579, 5 8 3 - 6 0 9 , 612, 614, 619, 628, 634 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, 252 arstjdnare ( p e r m a n e n t l y e m p l o y e d s e a m e n ) , 590, 592 batallions of, 608 b a t s m a n s h a l l e t see S e a m e n , p a r t t i m e c o m p a n i e s of, 603, 608, 610 c o n s c r i p t i o n of, 582, 584, 590, 592, 594, 598, 599, 601

d e a t h of, 641 desertion of, 599 enrolled, 606, 607, 608, 644 h i r e of, 582, 589, 593, 599, 604, 607, 616, 644 hyrbdtsmdn (temporarily employed s e a m e n ) , 590 p a r t time, 297, 584, 594 peasant, 648 p e r m a n e n t l y enlisted, 604 provincial c o m p a n i e s of, 601 r a n k s of, 581 r e c r u i t m e n t of, 102, 581, 583, 584, 594, 595, 601, 606, 642 r e g i m e n t s of, 608 semi-skilled, 580, 582 skilled, 582, 590, 592, 599, 604, 643, 644, 664, 667 skills of, 575, 576, 579, 580 t r a i n i n g of, 579, 580, 584, 604, 606, 610, 664 unskilled, 580, 582, 604 vdrvade (enlisted), 604, 605, 610 volunteers, 584, 599 Secretaries, in naval service, 585 Segelgarn, see p a c k t h r e a d Seidenskepp, low hulled sailing ship, 351 Sforza, Bona, 87 Sheldon, Charles, m a s t e r Shipwright, 342, 343, 345, 427, 429 n. 213, 431 S h e l d o n family, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t s , 332, 345 Sheldon, Francis, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 340, 341, 342, 344, 418, 426 Sheldon, Francis j n r , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 342, 343, 427 Sheldon, Gilbert, s h i p w r i g h t , 343 Sheldon, Jakob, (son of C h a r l e s S h e l d o n ) shipwright, 343, 344, 345 Ship h a n d l i n g , 580, 615, 616 Ship lists, 318, 319, 327, 328, 330, 331, 415 n. 191 Ship rolls, 275 n. 53, 318, 465 Shipbuilders, 365, 366, 377, 592, 600, 616, 642 D u t c h , 389 English, 340 Shipbuilding, 86, 87, 89, 91, 101, 102, 115, 117, 119, 255, 271, 281, 282, 283, 287, 307, 313, 314, 3 3 2 - 4 4 8 , 568 a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of, 2 8 0 - 2 8 7 , 297 Baltic-Nordic, 338 British, 338 b u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n of, 345, 346

GENERAL INDEX carvel-building, 321 centralised, 284, 292, 396 contract, 406, 407, 408, 414, 419, 458, 665 decentralised, 282, 283, 284, 285, 335, 343, 369, 370, 372, 377, 396 D u t c h , 338, 340 J o h a n Ill's p r o g r a m m e s , 3 6 4 - 3 7 6 Karl IX's policies on, 3 8 5 - 3 9 4 m a s s p r o d u c t i o n , 205 prdmar, 387, 388 p r o d u c t i o n lines, 396, 425 a n d r e s o u r c e extraction, 2 8 0 - 2 8 7 t e c h n o l o g y of, 341, 383, 385, 573, 570-573 t h e o r y of, 340 S h i p m a s t e r s as naval a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , 256 Ships, classification of, 321 Ships of t h e line, 139, 199, 201, 321, 323, 331, 342, 343, 344 Ships Royal, 329 Shipwrights, 271, 284, 666 British, 390 D u t c h , 390 m a s t e r shipwrights, 296, 3 3 2 - 3 4 6 , 386 n. 145, 388, 573, 666 t r a i n i n g of, 345 Shipyards, 242, 270, 276, 277, 281, 283, 284, 286, 377, 378, 667 leasing of, 523 Shots, 271, 514, 515, 516, 519, 569 hail shots, 533, 534, 540, 541, 547 iron, 510, 511, 531, 535 r o u n d shots, 517 s t o n e shots, 510, 511, 531, 534, 535 weight of, 518, 520 Sigfrid, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 334, 336 Sigfridsson, Mats, m a s t e r shipwright, 336 Sigfridsson, T o m a s , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 S i g i s m u n d , King of Sweden ( 1 5 9 2 - 9 9 ) , also King of P o l a n d ( 1 5 8 7 - 1 6 3 2 ) , xxii, 90, 92, 99, 100, 264, 273, 274, 275, 276, 279, 280, 288, 290, 374, 379, 380, 381, 382, 384, 473, 474, 475, 593, 625, 627, 646 d e t h r o n i n g of, 93 S i g i s m u n d August, ruler of t h e Jagiello dynasty, 90, 358 Signals, 449 Silver, 405 n. 171, 488 n. 97 Simonsson, Marten, Dutch merchant, 374

801

Sioblad, d y n a s t y of, 308 Si5blad, Erik, A d m i r a l , 306, 308, 431 discharge of, 310 n. 112 Sivers, Robert, see Siwers, R o b e r t Siwers, R o b e r t , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 337, 393 Sjaelland, island of, 68, 110, 124, 132, 166, 167, 178, 179, 188, 191, 201, 202, 203, 224 Sjdartilleribdcker, naval o r d n a n c e ledgers, 508 Sjdblom, Ingvar, s t u d y of sea officers, 579, 589 Sjdfolk, see m a r i n e r s Sjohjelm, H e n r i k G e r d t s s o n , a d m i r a l , 630, 633 Skagerack, 44, 217, 606 Skdlpund, Swedish u n i t of weight, xxii, 518, 520 Skane, 37, 43, 68, 103, 104, 118, 147, 167, 171, 172, 173, 174, 188, 190, 192 n, 61, 193, 202, 203, 209, 224, 226, 605 cession to Sweden, 110 naval r e c r u i t m e n t f r o m , 602 s e a m e n f r o m , 606 Skiirbdtar, archipelago boat, 325 Skdrjebdtar, see Skdrbdtar Skedenas, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 388 n, 152 Skenback, U r b a n , Swedish naval studies of, 579 Skepp, battle line warship, 322, 323, 331 Skeppare, see m a s t e r s Skeppsbyggmdstare see M a s t e r shipwright Skeppsgdrdar, see s h i p y a r d s Skeppsgossar, see boys Skeppshjdlpen, tax for ship c o n s t r u c t i o n , 420 S k e p p s h o l m e n , 277, 280, 295, 471, 496, 525 Skeppshovitsman, see officers, sea officers Skeppskompaniet, Ship C o m p a n y , 406, 413, 437, 438, 548 Skeppsrullan (Ship Roll), 275 n. 53, 318, 465 Skeppund, Swedish u n i t of weight, xxii, 452 Skokloster: s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 336, 377, 378, 384 s h i p y a r d at, 283 Skottprdm, floating battery, 326 S k r a m , Peder, D a n i s h a d m i r a l , 148, 149, 618, 619 Skrivare, (civilian clerks), 270, 273

Ill GENERAL INDEX Skuta, small cargo vessel, 326, 328 Slang, Erik Bertilsson, a d m i r a l , 625 Slottsfogde, c o m m a n d e r at royal castle, 270 Slottslan, see Castles S m a l a n d , 152, 259, 283, 292, 357 d u k e of, 282 o a k resources in, 306 p e a s a n t rebellion in, 71, 72, 646 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 335, 377, 389 n. 153 S m a l a n d g u n n e r s c o m p a n y , 603 Smith, W i l l i a m , m a s t e r shipwright, 343, 344, 345, 431 S n o w s (naval vessels), 200, 432, 433 Social status, a n d c o m m a n d , 613, 614 Society, a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 241-253 Soderfinland, seamen company from, 603 S o d e r l i n d , Ulrica, naval p r o v i s i o n i n g studies, 49, 579, 639 S o d e r m a n l a n d , 283, 367 g o v e r n o r of, 307 s e a m e n f r o m , 598 Sodermanland seaman company from, 603 Sodra M o r e , s e a m e n f r o m , 604, 605 Soldiers, 582, 583, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 591, 592, 593, 594, 608, 616, 619, 621 p a r t time, 590 p e a s a n t , 648 r e c r u i t m e n t of, 581, 602 Some, M a n s , Swedish a d m i r a l , 618, 620 S o n n e n b u r g castle, Swedish c o n q u e s t of, 158 Soop, H a n s , 49 S o u n d , t h e (strait s e p a r a t i n g D a n i s h Z e a l a n d f r o m Swedish p r o v i n c e of Scania), 34, 43, 44, 45, 55, 66, 69, 71, 74, 76, 98, 111, 112, 123, 140, 147, 155, 158, 167, 168, 170, 173, 179, 180, 182, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 196, 202, 203, 208, 219, 235, 425 naval battle at (29th O c t o b e r 1658), xvii, 180, 181, 184, 237, 238, 418, 420, 421, 562, 566, 630, 631, 632 S o u n d Toll, 35, 55, 61, 69, 80, 103, 104, 105, 106, 155, 173, 439, 524 S o u t h C o m p a n y , see N e w Sweden Company Spain, 13, 87, 102, 103, 185, 194, 250, 251, 369

H a b s b u r g , 408 king of, 61 m o n a r c h y of, 77, 250 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 248 naval policy o f 313 s e q u e s t r a t i o n of Swedish ships (1632), 437 t r a d e of, 378 Spanish W a r of Succession ( 1 7 0 1 - 1 4 ) , 215, 216 Sparre, d y n a s t y of, 308 Sparre, Erik, 373 Sparre, Klas, dveramiral a n d p r e s i d e n t of t h e Amiralitetskollegium, xxiii, 221, 310, 311, 633, 634 Spars, 271, 449, 450, 452, 496 Speck, T o n n e s , a d m i r a l , 633 Stalarm, Arvid Eriksson, a d m i r a l , 625 Stangebro, battle o f 92, 381 State, the, 8, 9, 10, 16, 19, 25, 246, 651, 653 absolute state, 9 e c o n o m i c analysis o f 11, 12, 13 as e n t r e p r e n e u r , 246, 260, 267, 286, 291 fiscal military, 9, 10, 12, 17, 25, 38, 53, 64, 72, 76, 98, 115, 160, 241, 242, 243, 613, 652, 653, 654, 667 a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 2 4 1 - 2 5 3 , 266-280 o r g a n i z a t i o n a l capabilities o f 651, 652 t h e tax state, 9 a n d violence, 11 a n d warfare, 651 State f o r m a t i o n , 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 24, 25, 53, 77, 111, 114, 115, 613, 620, 651, 652, 653, 663, 668, 669, 670 a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations, 2 8 - 3 9 a n d naval p o w e r , 6, 23, 24, 6 6 6 - 6 6 8 a n d p r o t e c t i o n selling, 8 - 1 2 in Sweden, 27, 28 a n d warships, 3 1 3 - 3 1 9 Statens Sjohistoriska M u s e u m , 318 n. 8 Stater (budget), 295 Stdthallare, c o m m a n d e r at royal castle, 270 Statskontoret, 450 Stegeborg, O s t e r g o t l a n d , 92 casrie at, 254 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 338, 385, 386, 388 n. 149, 388 n. 152, 390, 399 s h i p y a r d at, 391

GENERAL INDEX

Stegeholm, 350 Stenbock, Arvid G u s t a v s s o n , Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 382, 623 Stenbock, Gustav, riksamiral, xxiii, 186, 310 Stenbock, Katarina, G u s t a v I's dov^ager q u e e n , 373 Stenbock, M a g n u s , Sv^edish General, 213, 214, 310 Stenbdssa, see G u n s , s t o n e g u n s Stettin, 85, 105, 194, 218, 221 peace treaty of (1570), 364 Stewart, S i m o n , admiral, 633 Stiernskold, Klas, amiralitetsrdd, 300, 301, 302 Stocldiolni, 7, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 76, 80, 91, 92, 94, 104, 105, 126, 127, 129, 139, 140, 141, 142, 156, 157, 158, 162, 164, 170, 173, 174, 178, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 196, 209, 220, 221, 225, 229, 256, 275, 276, 278, 281, 284, 294, 308, 309, 370, 381, 384, 387, 411, 432, 458, 467, 476, 477, 483, 491, 492, 496, 499, 502, 528, 593, 596, 597 castle at, 253, 270, 272, 274, 275, 525 b u r g h e r s of, 62 a n d geostrategy, 40 g o v e r n o r of, 297, 493 g u n p r o d u c t i o n at, 517, 523, 549 a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 251, 280, 281 naval base at, 40, 44, 139, 604 a n d provisioning, 638, 639 o r d n a n c e d e p o t at, 272, 508, 517, 522, 545 n. 68 o r p h a n h o u s e in, 493 sailcloth p r o d u c t i o n at, 454, 493 s e a m e n f r o m , 598 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 283, 286, 292, 334, 336, 337, 338, 340, 350, 351, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 376, 377, 382, 385, 386, 387, 390, 397, 399, 400 n. 164, 401, 406, 408, 409, 410, 413, 414, 415, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 425, 439 n. 222, 467 s h i p y a r d at, 142, 277, 281, 295, 339, 340, 343, 405, 413, 421, 468, 471, 472, 481 n. 79, 475 592, 632

255, 256, 257, 270, 325, 327, 333, 337, 354, 396, 397, 401, 425, 438, 464, 467, 477, 478, 479, 480, n. 62, 487, 489, 522,

803

S t o c k h o l m archipelago, 139, 141, 151, 164, 167, 169, 176, 177, 189, 190, 191, 194, 235, 347, 348, 349 Stora Arkliet ( o r d n a n c e d e p o t ) , 271, 272 Stora K o p p a r b e r g e t , see K o p p a r b e r g e t Storblinda, see spritsail Stores, naval, 451, 492 S t o r m b o m , Jarl, naval m a n n i n g s t u d y of, 579 Stralsund, 100, 140, 149, 155, 194, 212, 213, 215, 217, 218, 221, 223, 249, 255, 349, 434, 467 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 425, 426 siege of, 99 Swedish c o n t r o l of, 105 Strangnas, 336, 379 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 283, 335, 367, 376, 388 n. 149, 388 n. 152, 389 n, 153, 472 s h i p y a r d at, 283 S t r o m m e n , 280 Strossi, H i e r o n y m u s , shipbuilder, 399 Strussar, shallow d r a u g h t vessel, 324, 329, 405, 409, 412, 419 a r m a m e n t of, 406 n. 175 Sture, Sten, (the older), 32, 60, 140, 253, 254, 347, 348 Sture, Sten, (the y o u n g e r ) , 60, 61, 253, 256 Sture, Sten Svantesson, Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 623 Sturko, island of, 196 n. 69 Styrmdn, see Officers, n a v i g a t i o n officers S u l p h u r , in g u n p o w d e r m a n u f a c t u r e , 256 Sundsvall, R u s s i a n raid o n (1721), 432 Surgeons, in naval service, 585 Svarvare ( b l o c k m a k e r s ) , 280 S v e n d b o r g s u n d , naval battle at (16th June 1535), xvii, 143, 238 Svenska Flottans Historia, survey of naval history, 48 S w a h n , Erik, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 343 Sweden, 12, 13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 55, 57, 57, 58, 59, 60, 67, 71, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 108, 110, 112, 118, 124, 131, 135-240, 254, 259, 299, 411, 437, 564 aristocracy in, 32, 38, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 102, 106, 114, 115, 116, 119, 139, 188, 195, 253, 254, 257,

Ill GENERAL INDEX 260, 265, 268, 271, 273, 276, 278, 279, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 340, 351, 613, 614, 617, 622, 623, 624, 627, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 647, 649, 653, 657, 666, 670 Baltic e m p i r e of, 2, 5, 6, 33, 9 6 - 1 0 5 , 114-131, 313 Baltic naval o p e r a t i o n s of, 1 3 5 - 2 4 0 b l o c k a d e of, 140, 149, 155 b o r d e r s of, 34, 36, 37, 223 Chancellery, 268, 278, 290, 296, 300 C h a n c e l l o r , 279, 410 civil war in, 41, 84, 93, 158, 475 coast of, 44, 56, 73, 87, 112, 149, 150, 228 c o n s t i t u t i o n of (1634), 289, 292 C o u n c i l of, 102, 119, 161, 163, 273, 276, 279, 280, 287, 288, 290, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306, 351, 375, 379, 408, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 419, 437, 438, 440, 500, 551 n. 86, 558, 564, 600, 617, 618, 623, 624, 627, 632, 633 C o u r t of Appeal, 290 C r o w n of, 347, 599 as dynastic e n t e r p r i s e at sea, 658, 659, 660, 661 eastern policy of, 8 5 - 9 0 e c o n o m y of, 25, 38, 116, 580 elites in, 62, 66, 75, 92, 115, 614, 648, 650, 654, 655, 656, 668, 670 e m p i r e of, 2, 3, 4, 13, 27, 29 n. 27, 42, 44, 78, 79, 98, 112, 131, 195, 656 e n c i r c l e m e n t of, 29, 34, 35 e x p a n s i o n i s m , 2, 3, 4, 24, 25, 26, 34, 35, 36, 37, 46, 74, 78, 107, 114, 670 as fiscal military state, 5, 10, 11, 27, 265, 647 foreign policy of, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 74, 107, 112, 117, 121, 127, 146, 411, 437, 450, 648, 645 geostrategy, 29 n. 27, 36 G e r m a n p r o v i n c e s of, 122 g u n i n d u s t r y in, 554 H o u s e of Nobles, 300, 301 a n d K a l m a r U n i o n , 52, 53, 54 kings of, 54, 58, 81, 111, 265, 268, 290 military policy, 39, 42 m o n a r c h y of, 32, 33, 40, 77, 80 naval policy of, 28, 43, 44, 52, 80, 82, 8 5 - 9 0 , 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 117,

119, 120, 121, 124, 129, 131, 132, 137, 195, 196, 197, 218, 227, 229, 230, 238, 247, 252, 255, 316, 317, 394, 407, 411, 415, 418, 419, 420, 422, 423, 424, 425, 428, 431, 433, 434, 436, 437, 440, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 450, 468, 499, 522, 532, 581, 642, 646, 647, 648, 660 nobility of, 120, 259, 303, 305, 351, 617, 618, 613, 614, 622, 624, 625, 626, 630, 633, 634, 647, 649, 655, 664, 670 O l d e n b u r g c o n t r o l of, 56, 62, 63 p a r l i a m e n t of, 38, 71, 91, 92, 93, 114, 115, 119, 120, 188, 256, 261, 262, 263, 264, 288, 289, 303, 311, 317, 331, 420, 424, 425, 438, 595, 634, 646, 650 political d e v e l o p m e n t of, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64 p o p u l a t i o n of, 25 a n d p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n , 79, 80, 97, 98, 129 rebellion in, 31, 32, 71, 72, 76, 257 regency g o v e r n m e n t of, 89, 102, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 195, 265, 298, 300, 301, 422, 423, 424, 494, 497, 499, 553, 564, 565 regent of, 57, 60, 61, 62, 253, 254, 347, 618 state, 2, 6, 7, 20, 21, 27, 30, 115, 116, 2 6 6 - 2 8 0 , 648, 649, 655, 663, 669 a n d state f o r m a t i o n , 78, 114, 115, 651, 652, 653, 670 t r a d e of, 35, 37, 40, 44, 82, 91, 102, 122, 154, 157, 159, 165, 218, 226, 378 T r e a s u r y of, 7, 8, 268, 269, 271, 278, 290, 291, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298, 300, 302, 305, 307, 311, 476, 488, 489, 500, 503, 485, 533, 552, 578, 579, 601 Sweden, w a r s of: Civil W a r ( 1 5 9 7 - 9 9 ) , xxiii, 93, 114, 278, 283, 288, 3 7 6 - 3 8 5 , 475, 538, 624, 626, 627, 649 C o u n t s ' W a r ( 1 5 3 4 - 3 6 ) , xxiii, 68, 69, 142-145, 259, 266, 468, 617, 618, 620, 637, 659 G r e a t N o r t h e r n W a r ( 1 7 0 0 - 2 1 ) , xxiv, 46, 123-127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 139, 197-233, 237, 309, 427, 428, 430, 431, 432, 442, 445, 502, 569, 570, 602

GENERAL INDEX

Kalniar W a r ( 1 6 1 1 - 1 3 ) , 94, 95, 161-165 N o r d i c Seven Years W a r ( 1 5 6 3 - 7 0 ) , xxiii, 83, 84, 85, 114, 139, 145-161, 235, 236, 273, 360, 361, 362, 363, 373, 434, 446, 470, 532, 538, 591, 638, 659 N o r t h e r n W a r ( 1 6 5 5 - 6 0 ) , xxiii, 108-111, 114, 175-184, 237, 432, 441, 561, 630, 631, 660 Scanian W a r ( 1 6 7 4 - 7 9 ) , xxiv, 118, 119, 121, 131, 132, 1 8 4 - 1 9 7 , 237, 423, 441, 567, 603 H i i r t y Years W a r (Sweden involved 1628, a n d 1630-48), xxiii, 96, 106, 121, 174, 206, 299, 394, 405, 494, 600 W a r against C h r i s t i a n II ( 1 5 2 1 - 2 4 ) , xxiii, 63, 64, 65, 139-142, 347, 348, 349 W a r against C h r i s t i a n II ( 1 5 3 1 - 3 2 ) , xxiii, 66, 67, 467, 468 W a r against the City of B r e m e n (1654), xxiii W a r against t h e City of B r e m e n (1666), xxiii W a r against D e n m a r k ( 1 6 4 3 - 4 5 ) , 104, 114, 165-175, 236, 237, 413, 416, 419, 439, 464, 494, 558, 559, 660 W a r against P o l a n d - L i t h u a n i a ( 1 6 0 0 - 1 6 6 0 ) , xxiii, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 637, 660, 661 W a r against Russia ( 1 5 5 4 - 5 7 ) , xxiii, 74, 78, 79, 372, 469, 474, 530, 621, 638 W a r against Russia ( 1 5 7 0 - 9 5 ) , xxiii, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 263, 275, 3 6 4 - 3 7 6 , 379, 471, 538, 593, 637, 660 W a r against Russia ( 1 6 0 9 - 1 7 ) , xxiii, 95, 393, 394, 660 Svi'itzerland, b o r d e r with G e r m a n y , 46 n. 37 Tackling, 449 n, 1 Tallin, Estonia, 74 Tar, 271, 378, 470 n. 49, 656 T a u b e , Evert, p r e s i d e n t of Amimlitetskollegium, 634 T a x a t i o n , 11, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 31, 39, 66, 71, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 130, 141, 242, 255, 2 6 0 - 2 6 6 , 267, 270, 285, 289, 291, 303, 304, 387, 396, 420,

805

424, 437, 451, 453, 471, 472, 475, 482, 489, 524, 592, 599, 600, 604, 609, 636, 637, 642, 646, 650, 651, 652, 669, 670 bell tax, 527 tax f a r m e r s , 291, 292, 396, 663 for galley p r o d u c t i o n , 474 n. 59 for h e m p , 473, 474 in k i n d , 266, 267 for lodjor p r o d u c t i o n , 474 n. 59 in food, 636 indelning, local tax i n c o m e , 604, 606 kostgarder, (provision tax), 636 a n d revolts, 264, 648 for sailcloth, 474 s k e p p s g a r d e r , (provision tax), 636 skeppshjdlpen, special tax for ship c o n s t r u c t i o n , 420 systems o f 636, 637 as tributes, 12 v a c a n c y tax, 605 Taxpayers, 51, 52, 668 Technology, 22-25 D u t c h i n f l u e n c e on, 462 a n d military tactics, 24 a n d political history, 22, 23 a n d p o w e r , 23 a n d s h i p b u i l d i n g , 344, 345 a n d society, 23 a n d state f o r m a t i o n , 24 w e s t e r n i s a t i o n o f 390 T e u t o n i c O r d e r , 81 Textile p r o d u c t i o n , 483 T h o m a s , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 Tlireshold effect, a n d naval o p e r a t i o n , 245 T i d e m a n , H a n s , 348 T i d o collection, 328 Tilly, Charles, o n state f o r m a t i o n , 651 T i m b e r , 271, 278, 282, 285, 317, 350, 472, 648, 650 for m a s t s a n d spars, 452 for pramar, 387 t r a n s p o r t o f 284, 285, 424 see also fir, oak, p i n e T i n , 510, 529 n. 38, 549, 650 T j u r k o , island of, 196 n. 69 T o m m e s s o n , Jens, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 335 T o n n i n g , battle at (1713), 214, 215 T o p m e n , 581, 596 T o r d e n s k j o l d , Peder, 228 T o r n b o m , Olle, studies of naval m a n n i n g , 579

Ill GENERAL INDEX T o r n q u i s t , Karl Gustav, sea officer, 46 Torshalla, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 388 n. 149, 389 n. 153 T o r s t e n s s o n , L e n n a r t , Swedish Field-marshal, 166, 168, 169 T o t t family, 32 T o w n s , a n d naval m a n n i n g , 601, 602, 605 T r a d e , 15, 17, 28, 34, 81, 267, 658, 659 b l o c k a d e of, 40 e m b a r g o of, 226 T r a n s a c t i o n cost analysis, 267, 268 T r a v e m i i n d e , o u t p o r t of Liibeck, 155, 348 Trolle family, 618 Trolle, Arvid T u r e s s o n , Swedish naval c o m m a n d e r , 617, 618, 623 f a t h e r of, 617, 618 Trolle, Gustav, A r c h b i s h o p , 60, 617, 618 Trolle, Herluf, D a n i s h a d m i r a l , 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 618, 623 T r o m p , Cornells, D a n i s h a d m i r a l general, 189 T r o n d h e i m province, N o r w a y , 112 cession to Sweden, 110 T u d o r , d y n a s t y of, 249 Tugh, see Cables, a n c h o r cables Turn, Swedish u n i t of length, xxii, 452 T u r n e r , Robert, m a s t e r shipwright, 340, 341, 342, 343, 419, 426 Tygindstare, see M a s t e r of O r d n a n c e Tygofficerare, naval o r d n a n c e officers, 525 T y n n e l s o , s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 388 n. 149 Uggla, Klas, amiralitetsrdd, 190, 302 U k r a i n e , 108, 127, 207 Ulfsparre, Ake, amiralitetsrdd, 298, 414 Ulfsparre, Erik, Colonel, 414 Ulfsparre, family of, 304 Ulrika E l e o n o r a , Q u e e n of Sweden ( 1 7 1 9 - 2 0 ) , xxii, 130 U l v e s u n d , 378 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 337 n. 61, 389 n. 153, 391 s h i p y a r d at, 391 Ulvsby, 645 Underbefdl, see Officers, p e t t y officers Underofficerare, see Officers, non-commissioned U n g e r , G u n n a r , r e a r - a d m i r a l , 49 ships list of, 319

Upphandlingskommissioiien ( c o m m i s s i o n c o n c e r n e d with financial regulation), 311 U p p l a n d , 263, 283, 292, 351, 397 U p p l a n d regional c o m p a n y of s e a m e n , 598, 599 U s e d o m , island of, 218, 221 V a d s t e n a , fortress at, 354 van der Burgh, Tliijs M a t h i a s H e r m a n s s o n , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 341 van E d a m , J o h a n Claesson, m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336 n. 56 van Horn, Paridon, Dutch entrepreneur, 292, 396, 397, 398, 400 n. 164, 402, 413, 459 n, 24 van Velden, Albrekt, D u t c h m e r c h a n t , 405, 406, 408, 409, 416 van W a s s e n a e r - O b d a m , Jacob, D u t c h l i e u t e n a n t a d m i r a l , 179 V a n e r n lake, 45, 354 Vasa, see Eriksson, Gustav, K i n g of Sweden Vasa dynasty, 5, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 39, 53, 62, 67, 69, 70, 71, 80, 9 0 - 1 1 2 , 115, 139, 193, 235, 249, 276, 288, 316, 375, 382, 434, 613, 617, 618, 649, 653, 657, 658, 659, 662, 666, 670 a n d naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 2 5 3 - 2 8 7 a n d naval p o w e r , 7 4 - 7 8 V a s a - O l d e n b u r g - H o h e n z o l l e r n alliance, 69 Vasteras, s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 337, 385, 386, 387, 388 n. 149, 388 n. 152, 389 n, 153, 391, 401 V a s t e r b o t t e n , g o v e r n o r of, 304 Viistergotland, 257, 259 s h i p y a r d at, 475 n. 62 Vdsterhavet ( W e s t e r n Sea), 44 Vastervik: s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 282, 283, 292, 337, 338, 359, 360, 366, 376, 377, 378, 380, 384, 388 n. 149, 388 n. 152, 393, 394, 399, 400 n. 164, 401, 402, 406, 410, 415, 417, 458 s h i p y a r d at, 334, 335, 359, 360 tax f a r m i n g in, 292 Vastervik Ship C o m p a n y , 414, 415, 420 Vastgota, s e a m a n c o m p a n y f r o m , 603 Viistmanland, G u s t a v A d o l f ' s d u k e d o m in, 338 s e a m e n f r o m , 598 V a t t e r n lake, 45, 354

GENERAL INDEX Vattublinda, see sails, spritsail Vaxholm: fortress at, 141, 164 g u n s at, 541 Veil, island of, 180 Venice, 668 galley fleet of, 315, 89 as sea p o w e r , 247 a n d m e r c h a n t m a n hiring, 436 naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in, 248 V e r d e n , D u c h y , Swedish c o n t r o l of, 105 Viborg, 74, 89, 208, 209, 216, 482 b u r g h e r s of, 366 castle at, 67, 254, 257, 281, 529 g a r r i s o n of, 68 g u n s at, 541 h e m p f r o m , 44, 68, 481 n. 79 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 356, 380, 381 n. 139, 399 Villstrand, Nils Erik, studies of naval m a n n i n g , 579, 597, 599 V i n d , Jorgen, D a n i s h Lord H i g h A d m i r a l , 168, 169 Violence, 1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 666, 667 c o n t r o l of, 10, 11, 12, 53, 647, 648, 650, 652, 657, 663 m o n o p o l y of, 18, 76, 288, 613, 658, 670 Visby, 141, 236, 527 D a n i s h naval base at, 64 D a n i s h - L u b e c k i a n fleet disaster at, 157 Liin of, 254 naval battle at, 349 Vistula, river, 45 estuary of, 98, 100 V i t a m i n shortages, 641 v o n Gortz, G e o r g H e i n r i c h , h e a d of Upphandlingskommissionen, 311 v o n Liewen, H a n s H e n r i k , d i r e c t o r of naval a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 310, 311 v o n M e l e n , Berend, G e r m a n k n i g h t , 254 n. 14, 255, 617 v o n Otter, family of, 308 v o n O t t e r , S a l o m o n , m e m b e r of Upphandlingskommissionen, 311 v o n Pilsander, Gustav, p r e s i d e n t of AmiralitetskoUegium, 308, 634 v o n Rosen, Gustaf Friederich, colonel, 310, 311 v o n Rosenfeldt, V e r n e r , a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112 v o n Siegroth, H a n s H e n r i k , 547

807

v o n Treileben, H a n s Albrekt, Swedish e n t r e p r e n e u r , 566 V o r o n e z h , 127 Voss, Jakob, 340 Voss, Klas Jakobsson, m a s t e r shipwright, 341 W a c h t m e i s t e r family, 304, 311 n. 114 W a c h t m e i s t e r , H a n s , p r e s i d e n t of t h e AmiralitetskoUegium (1641 -1714), xxiii, 119, 120, 122, 126, 193, 194, 195, 197, 202, 205, 210, 213, 214, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311 n. 114, 342, 343, 424, 425, 427, 442, 501, 604, 605, 633, 634 W a c h t m e i s t e r , Karl H a n s , r e a r - a d m i r a l , 219, 224, 311, 634 W a c h t m e i s t e r , Sofia Lovisa, 111 n. 114 W a g e s , 577, 609, 664 w a g e a c c o u n t s , 581 wage lists, 386 n. 145, 579 W a l l e n s t e i n , a r m y of, 403 W a l t e r , T h o m a s , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336, 337 n. 57 W a l t e r s , Frans, s h i p w r i g h t , 344, 345 Warfare: a m p h i b i o u s , 2, 96, 73, 97, 98, 100, 101, 112, 113, 123, 125 n. 95, 129, 130, 133, 158, 181, 198, 201, 326, 406 archipelagic, 133, 232, 326, 371 battle analysis of, 136 guerilla, 140 a n d political o r g a n i s a t i o n , 4 a n d resources, 251 riverine, 100 a n d sea p o w e r , 17 strategy of, 41, 42 W a r s h i p s , 17, 21, 148, 153, 155, 242, 136, 167, 200, 269, 314, 326, 331, 427, 435, 455, 464, 530, 544, 649 a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 20 a r m a m e n t of, 200, 425, 427, 428, 505-573 c a p t u r e of, 361, 362, 371, 389, 390 carvel built, 281, 355, 361 classification of, 3 2 6 - 3 3 2 c o m m a n d of, 621, 622, 628 c o n t r o l of, 275, 276 cost of, 348, 349 a n d d e t e r r e n c e , 411 d e v e l o p m e n t of, 507 d i s p l a c e m e n t of, 138, 319, 322, 348 d r a u g h t of, 425, 426, 428

Ill GENERAL INDEX fitting of, 4 4 9 - 5 2 4 as gifts, 414 h i r e of, 87, 250, 251, 252, 403 m a i n t e n a n c e of, 458, 459, 487, 665 p u r c h a s e o f 389, 398 as prizes, 360 r a t i n g systems of, 3 2 6 - 3 3 2 , 427 refitting of, 471, 483, 491, 502 repair of, 421 n. 205, 429, 430, 484, 475 sale of. 89, 373, 378, 379, 387 size of, 138, 139 a n d state f o r m a t i o n , 3 1 3 - 3 1 9 types of, 320 W a t c h keeping, 610 W a t e r p o w e r , 280, 656 Karl IX's policy on, 523 w a t e r - p o w e r e d saw-mills, 377 n. 132 W a t t r a n g , Gustav, a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112 W e a t h e r , adverse, a n d naval o p e r a t i o n s , 140, 149, 157, 158, 159, 173, 174, 177, 178, 184, 187, 190, 210, 212, 223 n. 110, 236, 391, 402, 404, 418, 446, 464, 581 W e b e r , M a x , o n b u r e a u c r a c y , 611, 612, 613, 627 Weichsel, see, Vistula W e i g h t , u n i t s of, Swedish, xxii W e l s h u i s e n , Christian, D u t c h e n t r e p r e n e u r , 292, 396, 397, 402, 406, 407, 408, 413, 459 n. 24 W e n d t , Einar, naval historian, 7, 49 W e r n f e l d t , Olof, a d m i r a l , 310 n. 112 W e s t e r n Sea, 44, 173 g e o g r a p h y of, 45 w a r f a r e in, 45 Westphalia: Peace of W e s t p h a l i a (1648), 105 Wheels, 529 n. 38

W h i t e Sea, 215 W i l h e l m , Friederich, c o m m a n d e r of B r a n d e n b u r g a r m y , 183 Wilshuisen, Christian, see W e l s h u i s e n , Christian W i s m a r , 99, 101, 105, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 178, 187, 212, 220, 223, 403, 404, 437, 549 cession to Sweden, 175 naval base at, 44, 118 s h i p b u i l d i n g at, 339, 404, 414, 417 Wollter, T o m a s , m a s t e r s h i p w r i g h t , 336, 337 n. 57, 391, 393 W o o l , 453, 485 n. 87 W r a n g e l family, 301 W r a n g e l , G u s t a v ( 1 6 3 0 - 8 8 ) , 299, 300, 301 W r a n g e l , H e r m a n , 608 W r a n g e l , Karl Gustav, riksamiral ( 1 6 1 3 - 7 6 ) , xxiii, 169, 170, 171, 172, 179, 180, 299, 300, 340, 440, 509 p a p e r s of, 166 n. 30, 560 W u r m s , cloth f r o m , 485 Wurmsduk, cloth f r o m W u r m s , 485 Yacht, small a r m e d vessel, 322, 323, 324, 410, 433 Yarn, 453, 468, 478, 479 i m p o r t s of, 467 p u r c h a s e of, 256 Young Master Tomas, master shipwright, 337 Zeeland, 250 Zettersten, Axel, 7, 47, 48, 318 m a n n i n g studies of ( 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 0 3 ) , 578, 579, 590, 591, 592 ship's list of, 319 Zinc, 510 n. 11

INDEX OF SHIPS

Danish Argo (1601), 410 Bjdrnen (captured by Sweden 1570), 362, 538 Base Lejonet (captured by Sweden 1564), 362, 364 Byens Love, 153 Danske Hector (captured by Sweden 1563), 362, 364 Danske Stjcirnan (captured by Sweden 1611), 476 n. 66 David (captured by Sweden 1564), 153, 362 Elefanten (originally Swedish Mjolkpigan, captured 1611), 390 Fides (captured by Sweden 1644), 413 Fortuna, 356, 361, 384, 537 Gabriel, 537 n. 53 Hamborger Galleon, 537 n. 53 Hercules (captured 1563), 148, 362, 364, 461 n. 26, 462, 563 Jaegermesteren, (flagship, captured by Sweden 1565, r e n a m e d Jagaren), 156, 362, 364, 536, 537 Dutch

warships Justitia (1609), 410 Kronfisken (captured by Sweden 1644), 413 Lange Grib, 537 n, 53 Lybske Admiral, 537 n. 53 Michel, 143 Morian, 153 Oldenborg (launched 1628, captured by Sweden 1644), 410, 413, 417, 418 Patientia (launched 1616, captured by Sweden 1644), 410, 413, 416, 417 St Anna (1608), 410 St O/K/(completed 1573), 361, 375 St Sophia, 168, 173, 174 n. 39, 554 n. 91, 566 Samson, (in service 1599), 384 Spes (1612), 410 Stora Sophia (1627), 410 Struds, 537 n. 53 Trefoldighed, 168 Wol Her (completed 1570), 361, 375

warships

Apelbom (bought by Sweden 1604), 389 Brederode, flagship, 180, 420, 566 English Antelope, 536 n. 52 Elizabeth Bonaventure, 536 n. 52 Elizabeth Jonas, 536 n. 52 Hope, 536 n. 52 Lion, 536 n. 52 Mary Rose, 531, 536 n. 52 Nonpareil, 536 n. 52

warships Rainbow, 544 n. 65 St George, 544 n. 65 Swiftsure, 544 n, 65 Triumph, 536 n. 52, 544 n. 65 Victory, 536 n. 52, 544 n. 65 White Bear, 536 n. 52

French Le Soleil (completed 1642), 339 n. 66

warships

810

INDEX OF SHIPS

Lubeckian Gwsse Adler

warships

(1566), 358 n. 101, 361 Swedish

Abraham ( b o u g h t 1675-76), m e r c h a n t m a n , 422, 423, 442 Achilles (sequestered 1598), 382 Achilles (delivered 1624^25), 397, 401, ^ 413, 459 n. 24, 487 n. 93 Alands Hjorten ( r e n a m e d , Elefanten, ^ l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 387, 478 Alands Ndktergalen (first m e n t i o n e d 1596), 378, 382 Algen ( l a m i c h e d 1526-31), 351, Algen ( b o u g h t 1565), 361 Algen ( l a u n c h e d 1574), 366, 373, 472, 473 Alvkarleby Skeppet ( l a u n c h e d 1587-88), 371, 374, 376, 380, 473, 474 Alvsborgs Barken, galley, 354 n. 93 Alvsborgs Hector ( l a u n c h e d 1609-10), 382, 391, 392 Alvsborgs Lejonet, see Hdlsinge Lejonet Alvsborgs Skeppet ( l a u n c h e d 1581-82), 371, 374, 376, 473, 474 Alvsborgs Svanen ( l a u n c h e d 1598-99), 379 Amarant ( l a u n c h e d 1653-54), 415, 421 n. 205, 567 n. 114 Andromeda ( l a u n c h e d 1620), 397, 398, 401, 416, 459 n. 24, 487 n. 93 Andromeda ( l a u n c h e d 1659), 414, 416, 421 n, 205, 495, 567 n. 114, 572 n. 125 Angeln ( l a u n c h e d 1545), 353 n. 92, 355, 357, 364, 469 Angeln ( l a u n c h e d 1577-78), 366, 367 n. 112, 373, 376, 461 n. 26, 472, 473, . 478 Angermanne Kravelen ( l a u n c h e d ^ 1583-84), 371, 373 Angermanne Skeppet ( l a u n c h e d 1579), ^ 371, 373 Angermannen, 472 Apollo (L 1622), 397, 401, 414, 416, 421 n. 205, 459 n. 24, 551 n. 84 Applet, ( l a u n c h e d 1601), see Forgyllda Applet Applet II ( l a u n c h e d 1621), 397, 401, 402, 403, 459 n. 24, 487, n. 93, 547, 551 Applet (III) ( l a u n c h e d 1628), 167 n. 33, 401, 403, 407, 410, 412 n. 186, 416, 417, 418, 488 n. 97, 496, 549

warships Applet ( l a u n c h e d 1661), 190, 419, 422, 423, 497, 498, 566 Atturia Angeln ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 382 Beau Parterre ( c a p t u r e d 1714), 442 Bjdrneborgs Kravelen ( l a u n c h e d 1581), 371, 374, 376, 473 Bjdrnen ( b o u g h t 1522), 349, 351, 467 Bjdrnen (gift f r o m t h e t o w n of Gavle 1563), Swedish m e r c h a n t m a n , 360 Bjdrnen ( l a u n c h e d 1572), Swedish, warship, 365, 374, 472 Bjornon, 385, 387 Bla Falken ( l a u n c h e d 1596-97), 379, 384 Bid Ormen ( l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 388 Blekinge ( l a u n c h e d 1682), 503 n. 122 Blomman (originally Forgyllda Rosen, c a p t u r e d 1609), 390, 392, 401, 403 Bolingbroke ( c a p t u r e d b y Sweden 1713), 442 Bremen ( l a u n c h e d 1705), 428, 429 n. 212, 503 n. 122, 572 n. 123 Brommaren ( l a u n c h e d 1564), 359, 360 Brune Lejonet (Lubeckian warship, c a p t u r e d by Sweden 1563), 362, 367 n,

112

Bryntan 352

( l a u n c h e d 1527-28), 350, 351,

Caesar ( l a u n c h e d 1623-24), 397, 401, 402, 459 n, 24, 487 n. 93 Caesar ( l a u n c h e d 1647-48), 192, 414, 417, 421 n. 205 Caritas, fleut, 438 n. 221 Carolus ( l a u n c h e d 1650), 414, 417, 421 n, 205, 572 n. 125 Carolus ( l a u n c h e d 1678), 423, 425 Carsten Todes hoik, 347, 348, 349 Concordia ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390 Danska Phoenix, 421 n. 205 Danziger ( l a u n c h e d 1519), 348 Delfin ( l a u n c h e d 1655), 416 Delfin G a u n c h e d 1677), 423 Draken ( l a u n c h e d 1541), 353, 357, 528 Draken ( l a u n c h e d 1594-95), 378, 384, 461 n. 26 Draken ( l a u n c h e d 1632), 409, 410, 416, 552

INDEX OF SHIPS

Draken ( l a u n c h e d 1655), 192, 339, 417, 420, 421 n. 205, 422, 423, 498 Drakends (Monsteras) Skeppet ( l a u n c h e d 1587-88), 370, 371, 374, 473 Dwttning Hedvig Eleonora (1683), 503 n. 122 Dwttning Uhika Eleonora (1684), 503 n. 122 Dwttning Ulrika Eleonora ( l a u n c h e d 1719), 430, 572 n. 123 Duvan, 380, 472 Elefanten ( l a u n c h e d 1555, originally Store Kravelen 11), 153, 154, 355, 357, 358 n, 101, 361, 363, 469 Elefanten ( l a u n c h e d 1575), 367 n. 112, 368, 369, 376, 472, 474 Elefanten ( l a u n c h e d 1596-97), 378, 384 Elefanten (originally Alands Hjorten, l a u n c h e d 1603-04), 387, 478 Emder Morianen ( b o u g h t 1604), 389 Engelske Angeln ( c a p t u r e d 1579-81), 373 Enhorningen ( l a u n c h e d 1564), 360 Enhorningen (first m e n t i o n e d 1598), 379 Enhorningen ( b o u g h t 1624), 398, 399, 413, 551 n. 86 Enigheten ( l a u n c h e d 1696), 427 Ealken (or Lille Kravelen, l a u n c h e d 1531), 351, 352, 353 n. 92, 357, 358, 469 Ealken ( l a u n c h e d 1631), 405 Palken G a u n c h e d 1654), 415 Ealken ( l a u n c h e d 1651, originally Mercurius, r e n a m e d Ealken 1 6 7 0 - 7 1 ) , 187, 421 n. 205 Eama ( b o u g h t 1 6 4 3 - 4 4 ) 167 n, 33, 413, 438 n. 221 Fides (1615), 418 Einska Ugglan ( c a p t u r e d 1564), 362 Einske Angeln (first m e n t i o n e d 1597), 378 Einske Bjdrnen ( l a u n c h e d 1561-62), 282, 358, 359, 360 Einske Bjdrnen ( b o u g h t 1600), 382 Finske Lejonet (first m e n t i o n e d 1594), 374, 380, 474 Finske Morianen ( c a p t u r e d 1600), 382 Einske Svanen ( l a u n c h e d 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 ) , 357, 359, 360, 364, 365, 469 Finske Svanen ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 382, 384 Flemingen ( l a u n c h e d 1537-38), 259 Flygande Vargen (hired 1575), Swedish m e r c h a n t m a n , 193

811

Fdrgyllda Applet ( l a u n c h e d 1601), 386, 392, 461, 477 n. 69, 478 Fdrgyllda Duvan, c a p t u r e d f r o m Liibeck, 362 Fdrgyllda Lejonet ( b o u g h t 1562), 360, 362 Fdrgyllda Rosen ( c a p t u r e d b y Sweden 1609), w a r s h i p , 390 Fortuna (loaned 1569, Jakob Grek's ship, also called G r e k e n ) , Swedish m e r c h a n t m a n , 361, 364 Fortuna ( b u i l t / b o u g h t 1629-30), 405, 421 n. 205 Franske Ormen ( c a p t u r e d 1577), 373 Fredrika Amalia ( l a u n c h e d 1674), 420 Fredrika Amalia ( l a u n c h e d 1698), 572 n. 123 Galeonen ( c a p t u r e d 1535), 351, 352, 355 Gamla Kronan ( l a u n c h e d 1618), 410 Gamla Scepter ( l a u n c h e d 1615), 410 Gamla Svdrdet ( l a u n c h e d 1604-05), 405 Gamle Gripen ( l a u n c h e d 1544), 362 Gcivle Angeln (Mikael Angel) ( l a u n c h e d 1 5 9 8 - 9 9 ) , 379 Gavle Bjdrnen ( l a u n c h e d 1593-94), 378 Gdvle Svanen ( l a u n c h e d 1593-94), 378 Gdta Ark ( l a u n c h e d 1634), 168, 409, 410, 416, 493 n. 103, 552 n. 89 Gdta Lejon ( l a u n c h e d 1702), 223 n. 110, 428, 503 n. 122 Gdta Lejon (built 1745-46), 342 Gdteborg ( b o u g h t 1633), 409, 410, 416, 552 n. 89 Gdteborg ( l a u n c h e d 1656), 416, 421 n. 205 Greken (loaned 1569, Jakob Grek's ship, also called F o r t u n a ) , Swedish m e r c h a n t m a n , 361, 364 Gripen ( l a u n c h e d 1 5 9 0 - 9 1 ) , 379, 442 n. 231 Gule Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1601-2), 164 n. 28, 386, 477 n. 69 Gusatvus ( l a u n c h e d 1623-24), 398, 401, 402, 459 n. 24, 487 n. 94, 488 n. 97 Gyllenstjernan ( b o u g h t 1575), Swedish, w a r s h i p , 366, 373 Hdlsinge Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1584), 371, 374, 376, 474 Hdlsinge Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1593-94), 378 Hdlsinge Lejonet, ( l a u n c h e d 1 6 0 3 - 4 ) , 388

812

INDEX OF SHIPS

Hahinge Morianen ( l a u n c h e d 1598-99), 379 Halvmanen (1566), 157 n. 25 Hamburg Kmvelen / Morianen (bought 1561), 360 Hannibal ( l a u n c h e d 1599), 380 Hannibal ( l a u n c h e d 1611), 391, 402, 485, 545 n. 69 Hannibal ( l a u n c h e d 1632-34), 409 Hans von Wismar ( c a p t u r e d 1632), 407 Harbo Lejonet, ( l a u n c h e d 1616), 394, 402 Harboviks Lejon, 459 n. 24, 487 n. 93 Harboviks Lejonet, 550 n. 81 Havfrim (first m e n t i o n e d 1631), 411 n. 183, 551 n. 86 Havhdsten ( c a p t u r e d 1644), 413 Hector ( l a u n c h e d 1562), 148 n. 11, 156 n. 22, 357, 359, 361, 364, 373, 376, 397, 471, 472, 535 Hector ( l a u n c h e d 1622-23), 402, 459 n. 24, 487 n. 93 Hercules ( l a u n c h e d 1599-1600), 380 Hercules O a u n c h e d 1650), 414, 417, 503 n, 122, 572 n. 125 Himmelsfart, 382 n. 140 Hinden (first m e n t i o n e d 1598), 380, 382, 474 Hjorten ( b o u g h t 1563) Swedish m e r c h a n t m a n , 360 H j o r t e n ( l a u n c h e d 1576), 366, 373, 380, 472, 474 Hjorten (first m e n t i o n e d 1598), 382 Hjorten ( l a u n c h e d 1644-45), 414, 421 n. 205 Hoken ( l a u n c h e d 1556-57), 282, 421 n. 205 Hollands Draken ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390 Hollands Josua ( c a p t u r e d 1608), 390 Hollands Morianen, m e r c h a n t m e n , 361 Hollands Rode Lejon, ( c a p t u r e d 1608), 390 Hollands Svanen, ( c a p t u r e d 1608), 390 Igeln ( l a u n c h e d 1541), galley, 353 Illerim ( l a u n c h e d 1716), frigate, 431 Innamma Skepp (first m e n t i o n e d 1593), 380 Jdgaren (originally D a n i s h flagship Jaegermesteren, c a p t u r e d 1565), 156, 362, 364, 537 Jdgaren ( l a u n c h e d 1601-02), 402 Jdgaren ( l a u n c h e d 1629-30X 405, 407 Jdgaren ( l a u n c h e d 1642-43), 413, 414

Jdgaren ( l a u n c h e d 1651), 415, 421 n. 205 Jarramas ( l a u n c h e d 1716), frigate, 431 Jasper Bruns bark (first m e n t i o n e d 1520), 254 n, 14, 347, 348 Jonas ( l a u n c h e d 1607-08), 390 Jonas ( b o u g h t 1623), 398, 552 n. 87 Jonas von Emden (requisitioned 1567), m e r c h a n t m a n , 361 Josef (first m e n t i o n e d 1593), 380 Julius Caesar ( l a u n c h e d 1587-88, also called Makalds a n d Stora Skeppet), 335, 384, 386, 406, 409, 473, 475, 477, 478 Julius ( l a u n c h e d 1646-47), 414 Jungfrun ( l a u n c h e d 1563), 359 Jungfrun ( b o u g h t 1623), 398, 413, 167 n. 33 Jupiter, Swedish cargo carrier, 439 n. 222 Jupiter ( l a u n c h e d 1603), 388 Jupiter ( l a u n c h e d 1614-15), 394, 405, 485 Jupiter ( l a u n c h e d 1632), 409, 410, 414, 552 n. 89 Jupiter ( l a u n c h e d 1665), 420, 422, 423, 498, 572 n. 125 Justitia (first m e n t i o n e d 1624), p i n n a c e , 400 Kalmar ( b o u g h t 1675-76), m e r c h a n t m a n , 193, 423 Kalmar Angeln ( l a u n c h e d 1603), 388 Kalmar Barken (first m e n t i o n e d 1526-30), 351 Kalmar Nyckel ( b o u g h t 1643^44) 413, 416, 438 n. 221 Kalmar Pinassen, p i n n a c e , 388 n. 151 Kalmar Valen ( l a u n c h e d 1601-2), 386 Kdmpen ( l a u n c h e d 1 5 6 8 - 6 9 ) , 359, 361, 363, 364, 373, 456, 457 n, 18, 470 n. 49, 471, 472, 473, 536 Kamperman (requisitioned 1534), 143 Kilen ( l a u n c h e d 1532-33, ex Nye H o l k e n ) , 352, 355 Kolmards Bjdrnen ( l a u n c h e d 1608), 390 KoningKarl ( l a u n c h e d 1694), 427, 503, 572 n, 123 Konung David ( b o u g h t 1643-44), 167 n, 33, 413 Konung Fredrik ( l a u n c h e d 1696, ex Enigheten), 572 n. 123 Krabaten ( l a u n c h e d 1562), 359 Kristina ( b o u g h t 1624), 399, 401, 402, 403

INDEX OF SHIPS

Kronari ( l a u n c h e d 1618), 397, 401, 410, 485, 551 n. 84 Kronan ( l a u n c h e d 1632), 168, 406, 410, 412 n. 186, 416, 417, 418, 422, 552 n. 89 Kronan ( l a u n c h e d 1668), 189, 190, 406, 421, 422, 423, 498, 521, 563, 564, 566, 567 n. 114 Krdnte Svan ( l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 388 Lammet ( l a u n c h e d 1633-34), 413 Lange Barken (first m e n t i o n e d 1526), 349 Larkan (first m e n t i o n e d 1575), 367 n. 112 Laxen ( l a u n c h e d 1675), 194, 421 Le Beau Parterre ( c a p t u r e d 1714, r e n a m e d Kronskeppet), Swedish privateer, 442 Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1537-39), 351, 352, 357, 358, 413, 469 Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1575-77), 367 n. 112, 368, 369, 374, 376, 392, 472, 474 Lejoninnan ( c a p t u r e d 1608), 390, 392 Leoparden (first m e n t i o n e d 1599), 380 Leoparden ( l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 388 Lilla Jupiter, Swedish ship, 439 n. 222 Lilla Nyckeln ( l a u n c h e d 1607-08), 390, 405 Lille Barken ( l a u n c h e d 1588-89), 382 Lille Kravelen (or Falken, l a u n c h e d 1530-31), 351, 352 Lille Svan (first m e n t i o n e d 1526), 349 Lindormen (originally Ulven, first m e n t i o n e d 1540), galley, 353 Lose Klinkan ( l a u n c h e d 1553), galley, 354 Lumper, 349 Lybska Duvan ( c a p t u r e d 1574), 373 Lybske Christoffer ( b o u g h t 1564), c a p t u r e d f r o m Liibeck, 362, 367

n. 112 Lybske Fdrgyllde Lejonet ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 383 Lybske Hjorten ( c a p t u r e d 1564), 362, 383 Lybske Svanen ( b o u g h t 1522), 140, 348, 349, 527 Lybske Svanen ( c a p t u r e d 1564), c a p t u r e d f r o m Liibeck, 362 Makalds, see Julius Caesar Manen ( c a p t u r e d 1565), 362 Manen ( b o u g h t 1624), 399

813

Mdnen ( l a u n c h e d 1 6 5 3 - 5 4 ) , 415, 416, 421 n. 205, 572 n. 125 Maria ( l a u n c h e d 1622), 398, 401, 414, 421 n. 205, 459 n, 24, 487 n. 93 Mars ( l a u n c h e d 1563), 150, 282, 333, 358, 359, 360, 361, 363, 534, 535, 536, 549 Mars ( l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 388, 402 Mars ( l a u n c h e d 1632), 406, 410, 417, 418, 552 n. 89 Mars ( l a u n c h e d 1665), 192, 420, 422, 423, 498 Meerman ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390, 407 Memnon ( l a u n c h e d 1564), 359, 360 Mercurius ( l a u n c h e d 1601-2), 386 Mercurius G a u n c h e d 1624-25), 398, 401, 488 n. 97 Mercurius ( l a u n c h e d 1651), 415, 416 Mercurius G a u n c h e d 1671), 193, 421, 422 Mjolkpigan ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390, 476 n. 66 Monsterds Skeppet/Drakends Skeppet ( l a u n c h e d 1587-88), 370, 371, 376 Morianen ( b o u g h t 1561), 360 Morianen {Danske, c a p t u r e d 1564), 362 Morianen ( b o u g h t 1578), 366 Morianen ( b u l k 1596-98), 380 Muskijil, 551 n. 86 Nellebladet ( c a p t u r e d 1644), 413 Neptunus/Rode Draken ( l a u n c h e d 1566), 192, 282, 334, 359, 361, 363, 364, 374, 376, 455 n. 10, 470 n. 49, 471, 472, 473, 535, 536 Neptunus ( c a p t u r e d 1644), 413 Neptunus ( l a u n c h e d 1673), 421 Noe Ark ( c a p t u r e d 1632), 407 Nordstjdrnan (1670), a r m e d t r a n s p o r t , 421 Nordstjdrnan ( l a u n c h e d 1703), 428, 503 n. 122 Nya Goteborg (ex Sophia, c a p t u r e d 1644), m e r c h a n t m a n , 413 Nya Scepter ( l a u n c h e d 1634), 410 Nyckeln ( l a u n c h e d 1 6 0 7 - 8 ) , see Lilla Nyckeln Nyckeln ( l a u n c h e d 1616), 394, 401, 402, 485, 543, 551 n. 84 Nyckeln ( l a u n c h e d 1630), 405, 407, 409, 410, 417, 418, 496, 552 n. 89 Nyckeln ( l a u n c h e d 1662, later Saturnus), 419

T h i s b o o k is a l o n g - t e r m c a p a b i l i t i e s as parts of

e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H

S w e d e n was a l a r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H which

nevertheles^^^^^^^^^^H

navy as p a r t of t h e a r m e d f w r e ^ v h l ^ ^ r ^ a t ^ a Baltic e m p i r e . M a n y of t h e resources c a m e from the peasant society which was exploited in an e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l f a s h i o n by a h i g h l y a m b i tious d y n a s t y . For a l o n g time S w e d e n was o r g a n i s a t i o n a l l y m o r e a d v a n c e d t h a n its n e i g h b o u r s b u t t h e e m p i r e c e a s e d to g r o w a n d finall) c o l l a p s e d w h e n o t h e r N o r t h e r n p o w e r s develo p e d s t r o n g states. T h e b o o k p r o v i d e s d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e navy in Jan G l e t e ( 1 9 4 7 - 2 0 0 9 ) , p r o f e s s o r of

t e r m s of w a r s h i p s , e q u i p m e n t , g u n s a n d m e n

H i s t o r y at S t o c k h o l m University,

a n d it relates c h a n g e s in size a n d s t r u c t u r e t o

p u b l i s h e d m a n y i m p o r t a n t w o r k s on e c o -

c h a n g e s in policy.

n o m i c history, i n t e r n a t i o n a l naval h i s t o r y a n d early m o d e r n E u r o p e a n state f o r m a t i o n . Swedish Naval Ailministrcttion 1521-1724 is his last m a j o r w o r k .

814

INDEX OF SHIPS

Nyckeln ( l a u n c h e d 1664), 194, 420, 422, 423, 498 Nye Holken ( l a u n c h e d 1532-33), 259, 351, 352, 355 Nykopings Morianen (first m e n t i o n e d 1599), 380 Nykopings Rosen ( l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 388 Obekant (first m e n t i o n e d 1601-2), 386 Obekant Fortuna ( c a p t u r e d 1608), 390 Oland ( l a u n c h e d 1705), 429, 502 Oranibom ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390, 402 n. 167, 551 n. 86 Ormen ( c a p t u r e d 1577), 373 Ormen (first m e n t i o n e d 1591), 382 Omen ( c a p t u r e d 1644), 413, 421 n. 205, 496 n. 111 Orpheus ( l a u n c h e d 1605-6), 387, 391, 402, 485 Ostgota Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1610-11), 391, 402 n. 167, 403, 485 Oxen l a u n c h e d 1638), 416 Papegojan ( b o u g h t 1624), 399, 551 n. 86 Pelikanen / Baggen ( l a u n c h e d 1563), m e r c h a n t m a n , 360 Pelikanen ( l a u n c h e d 1594-95), 378, 384, 392, 461 n. 26, 478 Pelikanen ( b o u g h t 1624), 399 Perseus ( l a u n c h e d 1619-20), 397, 398, 402 Peter HoUender ( c a p t u r e d 1635), 351 Phoenix ( l a u n c h e d 1651), 415, 421 n. 205, 572 n. 125 Pommern ( l a u n c h e d 1692), 572 n. 123 Postiljon ( l a u n c h e d 1662), 421 n. 205 Prins Fredrik Wilhelm ( c a p t u r e d 1702), m e r c h a n t m a n , 442 Prins Karl ( l a u n c h e d 1684), 430 Prins Karl Fredrik, ( l a u n c h e d 1704), 428, 429 n. 212, 503 n. 122, 572 n. 123 Prydsen, 157 n. 25 Pryske Svanen (built 1519), 348 Pryssen ( c a p t u r e d 1655), m e r c h a n t m a n , 362 Rdbocken ( l a u n c h e d 1563-64), 360 Raumo Kravelen ( l a u n c h e d 1581), 371, 374, 376, 473 Recompens ( l a u n c h e d 1612, c a p t u r e d 1632), 407, 410 Regina ( l a u n c h e d 1643-44, originally Christina), 413, 414 Regnbdgen ( b o u g h t 1624), 399

Renen ( l a u n c h e d 1565), 359, 361 Renen ( l a u n c h e d 1576-77), 366, 374, 472, 473 Riddar St G o r a n ( l a u n c h e d 1607-08), 390 Riga ( b o u g h t 1675), m e r c h a n t m a n , 423, 442 Riga ( l a u n c h e d 1707), 429, 503 n. 122 Riksens Rdds skepp ( l a u n c h e d 1534-35), 259 Riksnyckeln, 550 n. 81 Rode Draken/Neptunus ( l a u n c h e d 1566), 192, 282, 334, 359, 361, 363, 364, 374, 376, 455 n. 10, 470 n. 49, 471, 472, 473, 535, 536 Rode Gripen ( c a p t u r e d 1563), 362 Rode Hanen ( l a u n c h e d 1601-2), 386, 392 Rode Lejonet ( c a p t u r e d 1563), 362, 367 n. 112 Rode Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1601-02), 386, 392, 476 n. 66, 477 n. 69 Rutenkrans ( l a u n c h e d 1597-99), 378, 384, 392 St Anna ( l a u n c h e d 1648), 414 St Christopher ( l a u n c h e d 1562-63), 148 n. 11, 282, 359, 360, 364, 373, 471, 472, 536 St Erik ( l a u n c h e d 1559), 282, 357, 359, 364, 373, 379, 461, 469, 471, 472, 535 St Goran ( c a p t u r e d 1563), 362; St Hieronymus ( b o u g h t 1675), 193, 433, 423, 441 St Jakob ( c a p t u r e d 1627-28), privateer, 167 n. 33, 403 St Mikael ( c a p t u r e d 1632), 407 St Peder ( c a p t u r e d 1645), m e r c h a n t m a n , 413 Salvator ( c a p t u r e d 1599, rebuilt 1604-06), 383, 402 n. 167, 403 Salvator ( c a p t u r e d 1632), 407, 418 Samson ( b o u g h t 1522), 348 Samson ( c a p t u r e d 1534), 143 Samson ( b o u g h t 1565), 361 Samson G a u n c h e d 1 5 9 9 - 1 6 0 0 ) , 379, 384 Samson ( l a u n c h e d 1602-3), 387, 477 n. 69 Samson ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390, 550 n. 81 Samson ( l a u n c h e d 1631-32), 406, 410, 417, 418, 552 n. 89 Saturnus ( l a u n c h e d 1662, originally Nyckeln), 419, 422, 498, 572 n. 125

I N D E X OF SHIPS

Scepter ( l a u n c h e d 1601-2), 386, 392, 477 n. 69 Scepter ( l a u n c h e d 1614-15), 394, 401, 410, 485, 422, 459 n. 24, 485, 543, 550 n. 81, 551 n. 84 Scepter ( l a u n c h e d 1634), 168, 409, 410, 417, 418, 552 n. 89 Scipio ( l a u n c h e d 1595-97), 378, 384 Skane (1697), 572 n. 123 S m a l a n d s Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1577), 335, 366, 373, 375 n. 129, 376, 472, 473 Smalands Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1601), 386, 392, 477 n. 69, 478 Smalands Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1633-34), 409, 410, 414, 493 n. 103, 552 n. 89 Solen ( b o u g h t 1624), 399, 402 Solen ( l a u n c h e d 1667), 420, 422, 442 n. 231, 498, 500 n. 118, 572 n. 125 Spegeln ( c a p t u r e d 1609), 390 Spes ( l a u n c h e d 1666), 420, 572 n. 125 Stjdrnan (hired 1598), 382, 472 Stjdrnan ( l a u n c h e d 1610), 391, 402 n. 167, 403 Stjdrnan (delivered 1623), p i n n a c e , 400 Stenbock ( l a u n c h e d 1679), 423 Stockholm ( l a u n c h e d 1621, originally Hector), 398, 401, 410, 416, 551 n. 84 Stockholm ( l a u n c h e d 1708), 428, 429 n. 212, 503 n. 122, 572 n, 123 Stora Galdren (first m e n t i o n e d 1598), 382 Stora Krafwelen (1532), 350 n. 85 Store Barken ( l a u n c h e d 1580), 382 Store Kravelen ( l a u n c h e d 1528-30) 143, 255, 256, 258, 285 n. 70, 333, 350, 351, 352, 355, 464 n. 32, 467, 468, 469, 527, 528, 619 Store Kravelen ( l a u n c h e d 1555, r e n a m e d Elefanten), 355, 357, 469, 529 Store Svanen (built 1519), 349, 351 Storken ( b o u g h t 1624), 399 Stormaren ( c a p t u r e d 1644), 413 Strutsen (built 1599-1600), 380 Sundsvall ( l a u n c h e d 1674), a r m e d t r a n s p o r t , 421 Svanen (built 1519), 347 Svanen ( l a u n c h e d 1559-60), see Finske Svanen, l a u n c h e d 1 5 5 9 - 6 0 Svanen (built 1598-99), 336 n. 56 Svanen ( c a p t u r e d 1535, originally Peter Hollender), 351, 352, 355 Svanen (built 1571-74), 365, 472 Svardet ( l a u n c h e d 1604-05), 387, 392, 394, 401, 405, 478, 485, 543

815

Svardet ( l a u n c h e d 1625), 402, 403, 410, 417, 418, 488 n. 97 Svardet ( l a u n c h e d 1662), 190, 419, 422, 423, 497, 498, 563, 564, 566 Svarta Hunden ( c a p t u r e d 1608), 390, 402 n. 167 Svarta Hunden ( l a u n c h e d 1633-34), 409, 493 n. 103, 551 n. 86 Svarta Orn (1717), frigate, 431 Svarte Ryttaren ( l a u n c h e d 1596-97), 378, 384 Svenska Lejonet ( b o u g h t 1662), m e r c h a n t m a n , 193, 420, 421 n. 205 Svenska Phoenix, 421 n. 205 Svenske Angeln ( l a u n c h e d 1593-94), 378, 384 Svenske Hector ( l a u n c h e d 1 5 6 1 - 6 2 ) , 364 Tantheijen ( l a u n c h e d 1565), 157 n, 25, 282, 359, 360, 364, 365, 470 n. 49, 471, 536 Tigern (first m e n t i o n e d 1603), 388 Tigern ( b o u g h t 1624), 399, 402, 407 n. 179, 416 Tre Kroner ( c a p t u r e d 1598, originally Weisse Adler), 381, 382 n. 140, 384, 392, 402 n. 167, 403 Tre Kronor ( l a u n c h e d 1625), 398, 403, 410, 416, 488 n. 97, 545 n. 69, 551 n. 85 Tre Kronor ( l a u n c h e d 1706), 210, 428, 503 n. 122 Tre Lejon ( l a u n c h e d 1642, c a p t u r e d 1644) 413, 417, 418, 496 Troilus ( l a u n c h e d 1559-60), 357, 359 Troilus (built 1593-94), 378 Tvd Lejon ( c a p t u r e d 1644), 413 Ugglan ( b o u g h t 1522), 348, 349, 351 Ulven (first m e n t i o n e d 1540), galley, 353 Ulven ( l a u n c h e d 1593-94), 378, 382 Ulven ( l a u n c h e d 1603-4), 388 Uppland (1665), 503 n. 122 U p p l a n d Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1578), 366, 374, 376, 472, 473 Uttern ( l a u n c h e d 1672), 421 Valen ( l a u n c h e d 1566), 359, 361, 363, 364, 373, 470 n. 49, 471, 536 Vasen ( l a u n c h e d 1598), 336, 379, 384, 392, 394, 401, 461 n, 26, 478, 485, 543 Vasen (1627), 401, 403, 405, 444, 451 n. 3, 455 n. 10, 457 n, 17, 459 n. 23,

816

INDEX OF SHIPS

459 n. 24, 462 n. 29, 463, 485 n. 87, 488, 521, 549, 566, 573 n. 126, 640 Vastervik ( 1 6 2 0 - 2 1 ) , 397, 402, 488 n. 97 Vdstervik ( 1 6 2 6 - 2 7 ) , 402, 403 Vastervik ( 1 6 4 5 - 5 0 ) , 414, 421 n. 205 Viisterviks Bojort, 459 n. 24, 487 n. 93 Vdsterviks Draken (first m e n t i o n e d 1624), p i n n a c e , 400 Viisterviks Makrilkn, p i n n a c e , 400 Viisterviks Pinass, 459 n, 24, 487 n. 93 VHstgota Lejonet ( l a u n c h e d 1629-30), 405, 413 Viistmanland (1696), 572 n. 123 Venus ( l a u n c h e d 1667), 421, 422, 498, 572 n. 125 Verden ( l a u n c h e d 1706), 429, 503 n. 122, 572 n, 123 Viborgs Hektor ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 382, 384 Viborgs Holken ( l a u n c h e d 1554-55), 357 Viborgs Liljan ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 382

Viborgs Morianen, 472 Viborgs Rosen ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 382, 384 Viborgs Skeppet ( b o u g h t 1578), 373 Victoria ( l a u n c h e d 1658), 417, 418, 421 n. 205, 422, 495, 498, 503 n. 122, 572 n. 125 Vildmannen ( c a p t u r e d 1599), 382 Vita Falken ( 1 5 9 7 - 9 8 ) , 379 Vita Orn ( l a u n c h e d 1711), cruiser, 431 Weiers Falken (first m e n t i o n e d 1604), p i n n a c e , 388 n. 152 Weisse Adler, see Tre Kronor ( c a p t u r e d 1598) Wendekapan ( c a p t u r e d 1564), 362, 364 Wismar ( 1 6 4 6 - 4 7 ) , 414, 421 n. 205, 572 n. 125 Wismarske Delfin, 167 n. 33 Wismarske Meerman, 167 n. 33 Wrangel (1664), 420, 422, 498, 503 n. 122, 572 n. 125