Soldier: A Visual History of The Fighting Man

FOREWORD BY

COLONEL TIM COLLINS

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1 don 't yet fully und erstand th e co mpulsio n th at drew me to the life of a sold ier. Certainly th ere

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was a traditi o n of m ilitary service in my fam ily; but there was an invisible, mo re powerful force

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that was abo ve family tradition . Kipling o nce wrote th at " Irishmen m ove to th e sound of guns like salmo n to the sea". Perhaps it is j ust so.T he regime nts in w hich I served, the R oyal Irish, with over three hund red years of history and th e much yo unger Spec ial Air Service, have both left an ind elible mark o n me. It was the regiments that made me th e man I am . Increasingly in modern societies, th e affl ue nt first wo rld, w here mi litary serv ice is reser ved for the daring and the inspired, th e pri vilege of bel on gin g to a profession al army unit is still an expe rience that changes the ind ivid ual, their o utlook, and how the world perceives them. It is also extremely expensive for the nation s to maintain such forces - with the largest portio n go ing o n salaries. Has it not always been th e case that elite fighting men co mmand a premium? Societies have raised and maint ained the se standing fightin g elites since before wr itten record s. Many were th e preser ve of k in gs and em pero rs, while othe rs, like the Zulu ill/pis or th e Spartan regim ents, embo died a warrior code th at was woven int o th e very fabric of th eir society. So me were pri vileged elites, set apart from so ciety like N apoleon 's Imperial G uard, and some even becam e so influ enti al that the y challenge d the very power of th e state they were created to prot ect, like the Otto man janissaries did in th e ISth cent ury. But o ne thing remai ns co nsistent; the m ilitary o rganizatio ns from across the m illen nia reflect the society fr om w hich they arc drawn and arc underpinned and m otivated by the standards of th at soc iety. T hey reflect not j ust the values of the soc iety bu t the way in w hich those soc ieties wish to see th em selves. Essent ially it is the way that soc ieties organize their fightin g forces that gives those forces their uniqu e qualities. In Asian soc ietie s th e mart ial tradit io n is preserved wit hi n tribes and castes. In Japan it was formalized under the code of bushido, the " warrio r's way".

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In Europe, th e broad principl es o f military traditi on evo lved o ut o f th e m edi eval co ncept

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o f chivalry. Across Europe, however, a number of different traditi on s developed . In th e United

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Kin gd om and its em pi re, th e traditi on was m aintain ed by th e regiments, w ith eac h o ne tracing its own history back to the date of its formation . In Pru ssia and subseq ue ntly in th e Germ an Em pire, states relied m ore o n their own history as a state, altho ugh ce rtain regiments withi;l elite form ations did maintain unit histor ies. The Fren ch, meanwhile, created th e co nce pt of esprit de corps, or pride in o ne's unit, within most elite o r uniqu e Frenc h units. But a sing le th read , a bond forged by histo ry, gro up ri tual, an d an invisible force of wi lling obligatio n runs th rou gh all these traditi on s. It is beca use of th is thread , thi s co m mon need, that th e mann er in w h ich states and soc ieties have raised and o rgan ized th ei r fightin g forces across the conti ne nts of th e wo rld has rema ine d essentially the same for over two tho usand year s.

Soldier takes yo u th rou gh th e story of th is m arti al tradi tion . It features 30 key in dividual soldiers and warr iors, inclu di ng sailors and air me n, w ith over 70 o thers covered in lesser detail. T hese inc lude not o nly th e fighting elites of great em pi res, but also inexpe r ienc ed conscr ipt s an d voluntee rs. For eac h of th e key soldiers th ere is a full acco unt of the ir orga nizat io n and eq uipment w ith insights into th eir m otivation and an assessme nt of th eir achievemen ts. T his will allow yo u to sense th e spiri t of th e G reek hoplite co nv ince d that the re was nothing finer in life th an to stand in a ph alan x bristlin g wi th 2.7 m (8ft) spea rs, see th e remot e o utposts of th e R oman Em pire throug h th e eyes of a legi on ary, and under stand th e co nfide nce o f th e British red coats standing !;ISt, loadi ng and firin g more qu ickl y and acc ura tely than th eir foes. M ore m odern ar m ies arc featured too, allowi ng yo u to trace the unbro ken thread o f darin g, o bedie nce, and skill that lin ks the sold iers of every per iod o f h um an history. CO LONEL T I ,\ \ C O L LI N S

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600 BC E -

300 B C E

H E C IT Y-ST ATES OF AN C I ENT GIl EEC E

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inv ented a di stinctive

kind of armo ured infantry force : th e hop lit es. These spea r-a rme d citizen-sold iers pro ved th eir worth in th e 5th ce ntu ry

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first in th e repulse of Per sian in vader s and

th en in th e Peloponn esian Wars that pitted At hen s aga inst Sparta . Wi dely recogni zed as th e finest foot sold iers of th ei r time, G ree k hoplites later serve d in th e all-conquering army of Alexand er th e Great and as mercen aries

in the service of o the r power s, including th e Egy ptians and Persian s.

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The A nci e nt Gre ek world embraced no t on ly co nsisting o f a c u irass, g reaves to pro te ct hi s m a inl and Greece. bu t ex te nd ed alo ng the co ast legs, and a hel m et : he ca rried a la rge sh ield, of mod ern Turke y and acro ss the M ed iter ra nean a spC;lr, and a sho rt iron sw o rd . He tC)llght in to Sicily. so uthe r n Ital y. a nd eve n the so u th a tig ht (orm ario » kno wn as a phalan x , of Fra nce. T hou gh th e llIan y cit y- states typi cally eig h t ranks d eep . using th e and their co lo nies showed grea t cu ltural lon g spl';lr as h is primar y weapon . un ity, po litically they were mor e oft en tha n not di vid ed . T hey co uld unite ATH EN I AN H OPLI TE S to cou nte r th e th reat of a co m m o n Ath en s and Sparta diff ered sha rply, enem y. as they had do ne again st however, in their organi znrion the Trojans in the legendar y and train ing. In Athen s hoplites era of pr ehi stor y described in were barely trained partHOllier 's e pic poelll, th e JIi..d. rimers, ex pec ted to abando n T hi s th e y did again , although their c ivilian occupation and not without dis ag reements and present th em selves for serv ice nc ar-disasters. when they thwarted wh en e ver th e state requ ired . the in vasion atte mpts o f the Pe rsian The Trojan War They had to bu y th eir o w n This relief shows Achilles kin gs Da riu s and Xerxes in the ea rly eq uipm en t. A full pan opl y of dragging the body of Hector years of th e 5th ce nt ury nCE. But in armour was very expe nsive and around the wallsof Troy. the second half of the ce nt ury rivalr y almo st ce rta in ly beyo nd t he between Athe ns and Sparta prov oked th e so mean s o f m any Ath enians, wh o will have calle d Pelo po nn csian War (431- 404 nCE). The presented them selve s with o n ly part o f th e alliance s formed b y th e two main powers during standard kit. The w ealth iest cit izens, o n the o ther t hi s period invo lved almost all th e Greek cityhand , we re deck ed o ut ill the fine st armour to stare s and as J result their citizens had to be ill a proclai m thei r status. T ho se too po or to own any state of perm anent readiness for war . The warrior s armo u r at all ofte ll ended up beco mi ng oarsmen w ho did t he bul k of the fi ght in g in th e lon g in the At he n ian fleer. O ne man w ho ser ved bloody struggle that d evelop ed were th e ho pl itcs. Ath ens in th is wa y was the ph ilo sopher Socrate s. A lth o ug h t he tr adition al pr act ice of foo tWEA PO NS A N D TACT I C S raci ng , w restl ing , and ot he r co m pet it ive spo rts Se rv ice as a ho pl ire wa s bo th a dut y and a provided t he Ath en ia ns w ith a k ind of ph ysic II pr ivil ege of ad ul t m ales enjoy ing fu ll citize n co nd itio ning , the y se e m to have had little or no status. T he tw o mo st prom in ent ci ty- state for ma l mi litar y t rai n ing or dr ill. But they were arm ies , those of Athen s and of Sparta , we re free me n fig hti ng for their cit y and their honour, broad ly sim ilar in th eir eq uip me nt and tacti cs. and t hus ex hibited at ti mes a hi gh level o f T he ho plire wo re th ick, he av y bron ze armour mo rale and co m m in u cnt.

TH E KO PIS, A LO NG SLASHING KNIFE

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Phalanx meets phalanx Ancient Greek. warfare was highly symmetrical . When two phalanxes clashed, each presented exactly the samewall of shields topped bya bristling rowof spears. On the left. a musician

with a doubleflute plays a Spartan-style war song to keep up the spirit of the advancing hoplites.

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By co nt rast. Spa rta was a tota lly militari zed state. The Sparta n cit izens , who w er e probabl y man y fewer in number than the At henia n s. relied 0 11 a large popu lation o f no n- ci ti ze n labo u rers - the helot s. These were essent ially se r fs that belonged to the state: and, as suc h, po sed :I mu c h gr ea ter th reat to the sec u rity of the Spartan reg im e than did th e slaves o w ned by in di vidu al Athenia ns. That all Sparta's m ale citizens were raised to be sold iers was partly t hrou gh fea r of a helo t revol t.

SPA RTAN U PBR I NG ING Youn g Spartans were subj ected to a rigorou s system o f militar y tr ainin g and bondin g. Mal e c h ild re n were to ug he ned up by expos u re to the elem ents - th ey we nt barefo ot a nd lightly clad throu gh the wi nte rs - and punishments fo r f.liling tests o f initiati ve and daring. At the age o f 20. the y were assig ned to a barrack s w here th ey ate and sle pt , kept apart from w omen , for the followi ng ten Yt.'ars. It was a syste m designed to c reate a d isciplined fighting force . a nd it see ms to have succeeded. The Sparta ns m arched to battle

in ste p to m usic. a sk ill that wa s quite be yo nd the Ath e nians . T hey had a co he re nt cha in of co m m and and co uld ca rry out rela tivel y co m plex bat tlefield m an o eu vres wit ho ut lo sin g formatio n.

W hen cit y-s tate armies m et , th ey fir st m ad e sac rifices to th e gods and then drew up in pha lan xe s facing o ne anot her, choosing the most level piece of gro und available - pha lan x tacti cs did not work we ll on rou gh terrai n . T he most

G R EEK V ERSUS G REEK

ex pe rie nced fig hters were placed in the front t h ree rows of the ph alan x a nd in the back row, w hen: it wa s their job to deter w eaker spirits fro m attemptin g to run aW:ly. A c ro wd of sk irm ish ing troops, many o f th em probably the per son al slaves o f t he hoplires, o pe rated aro u nd th e ph alan xes, harassin g th e e ne my with a deluge of sto nes, j avel ins, and ar ro ws . The ad vance of a n armoured ph alan x to contact - each m an

C am paig ns foug ht by city - sta te cit ize n arm ies we re of necessity sho rt. usually re stric ted to the su m mer seaso n . T here wa s no prope r supply sys te m to ma intain an ar m y in the field . altho ugh large numbers of slaves - o r, in the case of the Spartan s. helo ts accompanied an army 0 11 its march to meet the ene my. and foragi ng a nd pr ep arin g food w ould have been an important part o f th eir duties. A militar y ca m paig n o fte n came to an end sim ply be cau se most o f the so ld iers o n both sides were farmers who had to go home to their field s to har ve st th eir crops.

Cooking on campaign The Greeks madeportableearthenware cooking stoves that were fuelled by charcoal. These may well havebeen used by Greekarmies on the march.

GREEK NAVAL WARFARE The Greeks w ere famed for their skill at naval

A trireme wa s ext remely cramped. There wa s

wa rfare, using th e light. fast w arships known

room only for t hree days' supply of food and

as triremes. Each trireme w as run by a captain,

wa ter. Crews usually we nt ashore to eat at

or " trierach". In Athens trie rarchs we re

midd ay and at nightf all to sleep. Mu ch tim e

appointed f rom among tho se who ow ned

wa s spent foraging for food and drin k, unless

" land and a house" in the city. It w as the

the w ar fleet w as supported by supply vessels.

captain's responsibility to recruit and pay a

The tri reme had a heavy bronze ram at it s

crew, th e majorit y of wh om we re oarsmen.

prow . In batt le, ships manoeuvred around one

Since a fleet of 100 ships might be assembl ed

anot her, atte mpti ng to ram an enemy in th e

for a campaign, it w as hard to f ind suff icient

f lank. Meanwhile the marines and archers

recruits . Most trir emes wen t to sea w ith a

rained missiles upon the enemy - t he marines

mix of paid citizens, fo reign mercenaries,

t hrew their javelins fro m a seated posit ion,

and slaves at the oars. A trireme also typically

to avoid unbalancing the ship. A trireme wi th

carried ten armoured marines and four archers.

a skilled helmsman and a disciplined crew could ram an enemy vessel or ride over its

Trireme It took 170 men to crew the oarsof a trireme and synchronizing the strokes wasnot easy, as volunteersaboard the reconstructed trireme Olympias discover.

oars and then reverse, leaving it crippled in the water. Alternatively, the marines w ould board t he rammed vessel, seizing it afte r hand-t o-hand f ight ing wi t h spears and axes.

a ph alan x wo u ld collapse und er t he pre ssurl' of

THE SPARTANS MARCHED SLOWLY AND TO THE MUSIC OF MANY PIPERS IN THEIR RANKS ... SO THAT TH E MEN COULD CLOSE ON THE ENEMY STEADILY AN D EVE N LY AND NOT FALL OUT OF FORMATION . THUCYDIDES. DESCRIBING SPARTANS AT THE FIRSTBATTLE OFMA NTINEA. 418 BCE . PElOPONNESIAN WAR

w ith hi s sh ield ho ok ed over hi s left fo rea r m and a spea r held in h is righ t hand - wa s an int im id ating sight. The Spa rta ns initi ated th e custo m of singing a " paean", o r wa r so ng. as they march ed forwa rd . a hab it eventua lly ado pte d by m o st Greek force s. Sing ing helped men to co pe with t he de sperate feel ing o f vu lne ra b ility as t he shoc k o f co ll isio n with th e ene my app ro ac he d . T he G re ek h isto ri a n T hucyd ides recorded how an advan cin g ph a la n x tended to drift to the righ t , sinc e "fear m akes ever y m an w ant to do hi s be st to find prote ction for hi s u na r m ed side in the shi eld o f the m an Respite from wa r During the Olympic Games. a pan- Hellenic festival held every four years, hostilities between warring cities were normally suspended. One of the best-preserved sites at Olympia is the palestra or gym whe re th e athle tes t rained .

next to him o n th e ri ght . thinking th at th e m ore clo sel y the sh ield s are lo ck ed to ge t he r. the sa fer he w ill b e: ' Ther e w as alwa ys a ri sk o f losing th e ti ght phalan x form ati on . G ree k w rite r Xe no pho n described a ll occasion w he n " part o f the phalan x surged for ward in front o f the re st a nd t he part t hat w as left be hi nd be gan to ad vanc e at the do ub le" to catc h up. At a ce rta in di stance fro III t he e ne m y, t he ho plitcs wo u ld break into a run , ch a rg ing forward whi le e m itt ing a hi gh -pitch ed w ar c r y. Then the two ph alan xes clashe d sh ield to sh ield. the hopl it cs in the front ranks th r u st ing with th eir sp ears th rou gh th e gaps in the e ne my sh ield w all. At so m e point in this st r u g g le o ne p a rt of

t h e a tt ac k. A s the form ation br ok e u p a n d me n att e m pted to flee th e field , th e de feate d side cou ld ex pect t o su ffe r h e av y c a su a lt ie s. It see ms th at lo sses 0 11 t he w in n ing side we re ty pica lly a ro u nd five p er ce nt - includin g a rel at ivel y hi gh per cen tage o f the ho plitcs in th e fro nt li nes, the m en ac t iv ely e ngaged in t h e fi gh ti n g . O n th e lo sin g side. casua lt ies w o uld probabl y mount to around 15 per ce nt of the so ld iers in till' field , m an y bein g but chered as th ey fled .

FIG HT I NG T HE PERSI A NS The fig hti n g qu a liti c» of t he Greek hoplitc we re p ut t h o rou g h ly to th e test wh en larg e Pe rsian a r mi e s in vad ed G reece, fi rst i n 4<JO Be E a n d th en ag a in a d e c ad e later. On the fir st o c ca sio n a pr ed ominantl y At henian force cl ash ed w it h a ( I r larger Pe rsia n a r ru y, includi n g

cava lry. at Marathon . Dcspin; the ir in fer io r numbe rs, t h e h oplit c s c h a rge d th e Pe rsia n li n e s.

Gre ek w arrior

This stylized figurine shows a hophte with a crested helmet and a round shield. Hoplites dressed and fought in much the same way across all the smallcity-states of the Greek world.

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Ochre dye

used to create red stnpes

on crest Chalcidian helm et Once thought to have originated in the Greek city of Chalcis, this o rnate style of helmet w as made in the Greek colonies of southern Italy in the 5th century BCL

and th e foll owing year co m bine d Greek forces \\'011 v icto ries o ve r th e: Persians a ll land at the battles of Plat aea and M ycalc,

AU XILI ARY TROO PS Although th e d efe at o f th e Pe rsia ns wa s a tribute th e co u rage and fighting sk ills o f th e armoured c itize n-sold ier. th e account of th e battles by Greek hi sto ri an H e ro d o t us makes it clea r th at m an y light tro op s fou ghr o n th e Greek side . H e sta tes . tllr exa m ple, that " 35 ,O()() lil'htly armed helo ts" su ppo rt e d th e 5 ,I)()O Spartan ho plirc s at Platen and th at th e At hc ni an force s at t he same (0

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Art iculated cheek. piece can be rarsed to vent ilate

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The Pe rsia ns we re unaccu sto m ed to th e Greek s' aggressivl' u se of infantr y, d ep en d ing m ore upo n a rche rs, cava lry, a nd cha rio ts. D espite th e ir sur p rise at the tacti cs of th e hoplit es , the y succeed ed in ro ut ing the Greek centre, b ut st ro nge r Greek forces 0 11 eac h win g d ro ve into th e Pe rsia n flanks, forc ing th em to tll'l' to their bo at s. T he second in vasion in -HoW neE w as th e o ccasio n o f th e cele bra te d Ill'ht to th e de at h by 300 Spa r ta n hoplite s ho ldin g th e narrow pass at T her mo py lac. SOO Il after this d elaying ac t io n t he Per sian fleet was de ci sively de feat ed at Sa lam is.

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battle included HOO a rc he rs . In th e co urse o f th e Pclop o n ucsian W ars these sk inuish crs see m to have g row n in importan ce. An ex am ple of th e use of lighr tro op s - a nd o f th e pitil ess brutali t y of G reek w a rfare - is give n by Thuc yd id cs, w ho rel ates that in 45tJ IK E th e Athcnian s m an aged to trap a large numbe r of Al'e in g Corint h ians and "s urro u ndi ng th e e nc losu re w ith li ght-armed tro op s, sto ne d to death a ll w ho w er e in side". The mo st f;ul1oUS ski r mi shers we re T h rac ian pclr asts. W earing a flim sy tun ic and car ry ing a light w icker sh ield , these fleet - foot ed so ld iers har assed th e e ne my phalan x by t h ro wi ng j avelin s into th eir midst, Slow- mov ing hoplitc s, ove rbu rde ne d w it h hea vy sh ields and ar mou r, w er e vu lne rab le to this for m of attack . Fighr iu g ill t he serv ice of Ath en s.

pelt usts famou sly .m nihi larcd a Spart an hoplir e brigade o u tside C o r in th ill 3 'JO li CE .

WE " , ARETO FIGHT MEDES AND PERSIANS. NATIONS LONG STEEP ED IN LUXURY, WHIL E W E HAV E LON G BEEN HARD EN ED BY WARLIK E TOILS AND DANG ERS ... IT WILL BE A FIGHT OF FREE M EN AGAIN ST SLAVES . ALEXANDER THE GREAT, ADDRESSING HIS ARMY BEFORE THEBATTLE OF ISSUS, 333 BCE

Styl es of f ighting

Ancient Greek. images of warfare often dep ict men fight ing wi t h a swo rd and a small oval " Boeo ti an" shield (far left). It is not clear whether thi s shield and style of fight ing belong to an earlier hero ic age or we re still in use w hen wa r

was dominated by hoplites

in phalanxes. The shield wa s clearly held diff erentl y

from the larger round shield carrie d by hop lites (left).

The in creasing e ffec t ive ness oflight troops led to change s in hoplite eq uipment and tacti cs . In the early -lth ce nt ury till' Athenian genera l lph ic rarcs stripped his hoplitcs of th e ir metal greaves an d cu irass , and rep laced thei r large bron ze - covered sh ield wi th a sma ller sh ield face d w it h le at he r. M or e ligh tl y e qu ipped, th e lph ic rat id hopl ite was be tter able to f ace the ch alle nge pr esented by t he pcltasts an d ot her sk ir m ish e rs. At th e same rim e, he wa s given a lo n g... r spear to ou treac h more heav ily armo ured hopl ite o pponent s. In general , Greek w arfare u nd er w ent a grad ua l profes siona li zation. C a m pa ig n s be came too sustained a nd am b it io us in scale to be cond uc ted as a part-ti me activity by citi zen- soldiers. R eg u lar troops and mercenaries cou ld p rovi de spec ialist ski lls on th e batt lefie ld an d co nd uct lo n g, draw nout sieges of forti fied to w ns. U nde r th e leadershi p of a mili tar y ge n ius, Epa m ino nda s, th e T hc ba ns becam e the dom in an t mi lita r y force ill G reece aro u nd 3S0 BeE wit h a n ar my shar ply diffe rent from the Athenian o r Spartan for ces tha t h ad foug ht Persia. At the hea rt of t he T hc ba n a r m y was a body of full -ti me so ld iers paid hy t he state, the Sacred Ba nd . This elite for ce to ok the princi ple of co m rad ely bonding to its lim it, bei ng co m posed appare n tl y of ho mosex u al co uples . Theban ta ct ics in c lud ed an in novative u sc of the ph alan x a nd a m ajo r role for cavalr y, w ho we re suppo rte d by lightl y cla d run ner s tra in ed to kee p up w ith t he ho rses o n foo t . Fo r battle the c rea m of th e Thcba n hopl itcs, includ ing t he Sac re d Band , we re typi call y m assed in a ph alan x up to 4S ran ks deep o n the left w ing , th is shoc k fo rce dest ro yin g the enemy w h ile cava lry a nd ligh t tr oop s pro tec ted the ce ntre an d righ t.

The hoplitcs were no lo n ge r sel f- co nsc io usly brave and noble citizen - so ldiers, b u t rela tively lo w er - cl ass pro fession als d ri lle d into a stea dy pe rform an ce on th e battle field . M a ny Gree ks also foug ht ~l ga i nst Alexand er, for the ir ren owned qu alitie s as ar mo ured foo t so ld iers h ad m ade th em so ug ht-a fter m er cen a ries. w hose se rv ice s we re bo u g ht by Per sian c..'m pl.'rors, as we ll as m an y o ther ru ler s in th e eas tern M ed ite r ran ean . T ill' hop lite sty le of warfare wi t h ph a lan x a nd sp ear co n tinue d to show its wo rt h u nt il the armies of t he H ell e n ist ic world ca me into

conflict with the rising power of R o m c in th e 2nd ce nt ury liC E. At the decisive batt le o f Pyd na in I(,S li CE, the R om ans deli ber ately re tire d over rough gro und, w hi ch ca used the pu rsu in g M accd on ia ns to lo se th eir t ig ht for mat ion . T he R o m an infa n t ry. armed wit h swords and j avel in s, we re th en ab le to slash a path int o t heir ph a la n x . Once t he fi ght ing wa s at clo se q uarte rs the lon g , u nw ieldy sarissa b eca me a u se less enc umbrance . H oplircs th re w awa y th e ir spe ars a nd fough t with daggers, b ut were c u t to pie ce s by t hc R om an sw o rd s. A new er a of infantr y w arfare wa s born .

HOPLITE BATTLE TACTICS The tactics illustrated here are those of th e 5th century BCE, w hen the tightly packed phalanxes of two opposing Greek city-states wo uld line up to do batt le in exactly t he same formation. The men at th e fro nt

wi th their shields on those ahead of t hem, contributing to th e otbismos, or "shoving match", with th e rival phalanx. The details of Greek hop lite tact ics are,

advanced wi th their shields locked to get her and th eir spears ready to engage w it h the enemy. When the

however, t he subject of dispute. Some historians have argued th at as hoplites ran to attack t hey wo uld have been forced to spread out, although t hey could

front ranks clashed, t he men behind pressed forwa rd

have locked shields if standing on t he defensive.

Advan cing in a t igh t ph a lanx Here th e ph alanx advances to meet an opposi ng pha lanx in very t igh t format ion , shou lder-to-sho ulder and w it h shields up against th e back of the man in front. Only the front thr ee or four rank s could have reached the enemy wi th their spears. l ater, w hen spears grew mu ch longer, they were probably held underarm.

PHALAN X VIEWED FRO M ABOV E

Spears of front three hcplites project ing in front of fo rmatio n

Phalanx eight ranks deep

MAC EDO NI A NS AND ROMANS From 337 nc s, the Greek city-s tates cam e: un der the: do mi na nce of M acc donia n ru lers. first Ph ili p II and th e n h is so n, A lexande r the G reat. H oplitcs beca me a c r ucia l but seconda ry ele me nt in M acedo n ia n- led a r m ies. w hic h h ad cavalr y as the ir eli te ar m . O n hi s asto n ish ing: ca m pa ig n s o f conques t from 33 4 to 323 BCE, A lexan d er u sed a pha lan x 16 o r 32 ra nk s d ee p, ar med wit h th e lon g " sari ssa" spear, m easur in g 6 -7 m (20-23ft).

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ROMAN LEGIONARY IN EVERY BATTLE VICTORY IS GRANTED NOT BY MERE NUMBERS AND INNATE COURAGE BUT BY SKILL AND TRAINING ... WE PREVAILED BY SKILFUL SELECTION OF RECRUITS, BY TEACHING THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR, BY PUNISHMENT FOR INDOLENCE. VEGETIUS, A MILITARY DIGEST, 4TH CENTURY CE

T IT S PEA K T H E 1l0 M A N A IlMY

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wa s pro bably th e most effective

fighti ng fo rce in th e An cient Wo rld . It co nque re d and m aintain ed an empire th at, by the 1st century c u, stretched fro m Britain to N orth Afr ica and fro m Spa in to Egy pt.

At the heart of th is form idable organi zati on w ere th e legion aries - tough professio nal infan try equipped w ith sword, sh ield, and javeli n. Equa lly do mi nant in pit ched battl es and in siege wa rfare, th ey we re used to cow or destroy the ene m ies of R ome in cam paig ns of ruthless effic iency . en o o m

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T he R om an Jrmy was originally a militia of part -time so ld ie rs, w ith every prop e rtied cit izen o w ing pe riod s of m il ita r y se rv ice to the state . A ro u nd 30 0 BC E th e leg ion s began to assu m e the for m and orga ni zatio n that wo uld m ake them suc h all invincible for ce. T he soldiers.

aux ilia ry co ho rts that wou ld be rec ruit ed fro m vario us "barbarian " peo ples w ho did not h ave the pr ivi lege o f Romanc itize ns h ip. It a lso in cluded cava lry , u sua lly au xi lia r ies, w ho fo r m ed a n im po rtant el em en t of the arm y o n the batt lefield . Bu t th e re is no qu esti on t ha t th e he art and so u l of th e ar my w as the Rom an c itize n fo ot so ld ie r. T he leg io nary. upon w ho m the

a lt ho ugh still not profe ssiona ls, were ex tre m ely successfu l ill co m bat, m o st notabl y in d efeati ng the C ar rh ag in ia ns ill the Pu n ic Wars. But as vi ct or iou s bu rd en o f m ai ntainin g the R om an cam paig ns ex te nde d R o man ru le Em pire at its apogee rested. wa s o ve r an e ve r w ide r area, part-t ime an in fantr ym an train ed to ti ght ill ser vi ce be ca m e inade qu ate to close formati on w ith sho rt sw o rd l egionary e mble m R o m e's m il itary nee ds. Ordina ry a nd j avel in . A Ith ou gh co n scrip tion This tile is embossed with a leaping boar, emblem of the c itize ns co u ld Bo t be ex pec ted to was no t u nkno w n at t im es of 20th Legion, based in Chester. eng age in pro lon ged campaig ns far mi lit ary c risis, he w as ge nera lly fro m home o r m an pe rma ne nt g arriso lls in a vo lunte e r and in prin cip le had to fu lfi l ce rtain d istant pr o vi nce s. By the t im e J u liu s Caesar w as c r ite r ia . Fir st ly, he h ad to b e a c it ize n. T hi s e nga ged up on his f.' 11l0 11S co nque st o f the Gau ls did no t mea n he had to be born in the city of (58-5 1 BC E) , the Ro m an ar m y h ad e vo lved in to R ome , b ut in the ea rly d ays of th e Empire it did a p er ma nent fo rce of pro fessio na l so ld iers. m ean th at he w as probably at least fro m Ita ly. By 2 12 C E, ho we ver, c it ize ns h ip had be en ex te nded LEGIONARI ES AND AUX I LIA R IES to all free m en ac ross the Em pire . Slave s we re T he pr ofc ssio na li zar ion o f the arm y was not rig o ro usly excl uded fro m the ran ks o f t he w it ho u t its drawbacks. R e g u la r so ld ie rs te nd ed legi ons a nd a ny w ho had e n liste d by fa lsel y to devel op an allegia nce to the co m ma nde r w ho cla imi ng to be free m en co u ld ex pe ct sev ere led the m rathe r than to t he stare , and R o m e w as puni shm ent if their decep tion w as di sco vered . for a tim e torn apart by c iv il w ars be tw ee n rival Mcn co nvicted o f se rio us crime s or f:1C ing ge ne ra ls. Bu t afte r Au gustu s es tablishe d himsel f prosecut io n we re also barred . Evcr y pot enti al as R o m e's fir st e m pe ro r (fro m 3 1 BCE to 14 C E) , recru it wa s subjected to a physical ex am inatio n the regu lar arm y became the rock o n w hich the and so me w er e reject ed as to o sho rt o f stat u re R o m a n Empire sto o d. T h is ar m y inclu ded o r as u nfit for se rv ice 0 11 m edica l g ro unds.

GlA DIUS AND SCABBARD

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Centurion 's he lme t In th e early centuries of the Empire a leg ion usually had a tot al of 59 centurio ns. The high est-rank ing of these was centurio n of the First Cent ury of th e First Coho rt, w ho was known as the pr imu s pi/us.

IT WOULD NOT BE WRONG TO CALL T H EI R DRI LLS BLOODLESS BATTLES AND THEIR BATTLES BLOODY DRILLS. FLAVIUS JOSEPH US, JEWISH HISTORIAN, DESCRIBING ROMAN TRAINING METHODS

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T he cx istc ncc o f selec tio n cr itcr ia sho uld not be r.ikc u to imply. t ho ugh , th at Iq.?;ionaril's we rt.' ;1 hand -pi cked elite . Wh erca« th e carlicr milit ia Iq.d oll S h;ld been recr u ite d from c it ize n s tncctin g

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ce r ta i n pr opert y qu.rlifi r ati on . vo lu ntee rs for th e professional arm y came pr cd omin.mr ly fro in t he lower rank s o f so c iety - from th e SO ilS o f farmers .m d arti san s down to plai n vag ra nts. R om a n re cruitin g parties m ay have p re fe r red to selec t tall. ro bu st c iriz c ns accu sto med to ph ysical labo u r, hu t mu ch of the rim e the y prcsu ma blv had to aCCt.-pl w hat ev er vag udy acce ptable ca nd id ates presented t h l' Il 1SC ) Vl' S.

LIF E I N T H E LEGI ON S The .u t ractio ns oflife ill th e leg io n» we re su ch as wo u ld ap pea l to m en who o therw ise f;lCl'd lives bli ght ed b y in securit y and poor pr o spe ct ». Em ployme nt as a legionary o fti.-rcd m od e st pay -

probabl y 110 more th an th e in come o f a n ordin ar y lab ourer - but a hi gh level o f job sec uri ty . n..' gubr meals, and SOl11l' cha nce o f adva nce me nt in lifc. U su all y re cruited ill hi s ca rly 20s, the Iq.donary wa s required to make a daulltin g co m mi t me n t. H e sig ncd lip for:!O ye a rs active serv ice plu s five yea rs as a "vetera n" w it h ligh ter duties. I lurin g that quarter - celltury he W ;lS likel y to be stationed at re mo te lo cat io n s 011 t he fr o nti e rs oft he Em pire, subj ect to ri go ro u s di sciplin e a nd draco nian pu n ishm ents - the pen alt y for

_Image (imago) of the emperor carried on a pole by a junior officer with the title /magintfer

t:l ll i ll~ aslee p 0 11 gua rd dut y w as to b e clubbed to d eath by yo u r co m rades. In principle, he wa s not pcr ruittcd to m ar r y du rin g h is serv ice , t1HllI ~dl hum an

nature proved st ro nge r than regu lation s and mall Y men rai sed families whi le ill t he arlll Y, At t he end of h is 25 years, th e lcg io n a r y co u ld ex pect to he reward ed wit h a g ran t of land. This w as frequ ently alongside

ot her reti red vetera ns ill a mi litar y co lo ny . W hat l'vl'r t heir uio rivcs for joining up, so ld ie rs were so o n bo und to t he a r my by tie s o f ~ ro ll P lo yalt y t hat we re d elib erate ly fostered at l' Vl'ry le vel, Arriving at hi s d esignated unit with h is lead identit y tabl et

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as j e ru salem . th at w ere co ns ide re d su ffic ie ntly u n re liab le to req ui re a st ro ng mi lita r y pr esl·IKe . Since w arfa re te nd ed to hl' spora dic. the y w e re likel y to spe nd th e m aj or ity of th e ir t im e in th e ar m y o n pencc ri m e ga rr iso n d ut ies in a barra cks . Ke epi n g m ilit ari ly up to scra tc h under th ese c irc u ms ta nces w as in c vitabl v a cha lle nge. The t rai ni ng o f a k'g io n:1ry, w h ich co nt in ued t hrou gh out hi s service. fo cu sed 0 11 thre e goa ls: phys ica l fitness a nd vu dur.m cc: th e ski lle d u se of wea po n ry: a nd di sc iplined .ic rio n as part of a uni t. M e n we re t.ik c n o u t o n torccd m arch e s o f 311-511k m (2 11-3I1 m ik-Il wi th heav y pack s a nd fu ll e q u ip me n t . Thcv " Ilgag,-d ill m o ck co m bat , fr om o nc -ort-onc fi gh ting to ela bo ra te exe rc ises invol ving entire u nit s. Nat u rall y, they were taught to march in ste p a nd th e y carricd o ut for m at ion drills in prep arati o n for c lose -order co m ba t. Ap art from th e routine of rr.iini ng, d r ill , g uard duties, and fat ig u" 1_ th e' lcgi o n .rr ic s fulfill ed a ll essent ia l eve r yd ay fu nct ion in patrollin g and po lic in g areas proll e to lawl essn ess, reb e llio n . or in cu rsion s h y arm ed g ro ups fr om ac ro ss the borde r. T he y were also resp on sib le for large- sca le buildi n g w o r k , carr yi ng o ut both c iv ilian and mili tar y project s, incl udi n g t he co ns t r uc tio n o f ro ad s, fortre sses, and aq uedu ct s. H adri an 's W all in northe rn Eng land is a no ta b le exa m ple o f a leg io n ar y- bu ilt st ruc tu re , eac h sec t io n of the w all bei ng co m ple te d b y a d iff erent cc ut u r y, Leg io n s al so had a ll impo rta nt ro ll' as m au u facturc rs. their w orksh o ps su pply ing mall )' of t he a r my's material n eed s. from pot tery to w e;lponry. Rom an b att le o rd er Roman legionaries advanced on t heir enemies wi th swor ds drawn and shields raised . Flags and othe r standards we re impo rtan t symbol s of Roman pow er and served as rallying points for th e cohorts and centuries WIthin the legio n.

Alt ho ug h leg ion aries spe nt

o n ly a fracti o n of t heir time OIl

act ive: se rv ice . w arfare w as

in the end w hat th ey were for. Probably m o st m en w elco med c:lI11 paignillg as a chance to escape t he dull ro ut ine o f ga rrison duties and to put into

pr actice t he m il itary skills endlessly rehearsed in training. Ca mpaigns mostly invo lved the aggn:ssivc m o ve m en t o f forces int o ho stile territo r y

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T he leg io nar y was ex pe cted to m arch at a spe ed of aro und 6kph (.jm ph) under no rma l circ ums tanc es, and faste r if a c risis requ ir ed it. Bu t the pr actical spe ed o f movem en t o f R oman fo rces was set by th eir su pply wa go ns. pack an im als, 3 11d sieg e trai n . The lo g istical arrangements o f

legi on s were generally W ood en fort ex ce llent and bo t h so ld iers The fort at lunt near Coventry in England and ani ma ls co u ld ex pec t isa reconstruction of one built there in the 1st century ct. The design of the gate tower in resp o n se to a revolt w it h in to be reaso na bly fed w hi le o n is based on exampleson I rajan's Column. the em pire o r attacks from cam paig n, althoug h 3 certain o u tside it. T he aim wa s pun iti ve - to i nrl ic t suc h am o u nt of foragi ng alo ng th e route wa s no rm al. spectac u lar su ffer ing and destru c tion 0 11 th o se So me tim es o n punit ive ex pe d itio ns the main respo nsible that the inciden ts wo uld no t re c ur. fun ct ion o f th e leg ionaries w as to devastate the R OB U Il

a rea aro u nd th e m arch , destro ying c ro ps and anim als and layi ng wa ste to v illage s and to wns.

Th is was a task R om an so ldi ers per formed w ith th oro ughness and co nsc ience-free bruta lity.

CO NST RUCT IO N DUTI ES At the end of eve ry da y th e legi on ari es would co ns truct a m archi ng ca m p. a temp or ary defen sive po sition su rro unded by a ram part

and dit ch . Th e ba ck-break ing work of d igging dit ch es and bui lding ram pa rt s to establish th e ca m p w as d o ne by co nt ing e nts draw n fro m all th e cent u ries invo lved in th e cam paig n - perh aps ten men fro m each . M arching ncar the head o f the co lu m n . these m en wo uld aim to have th e site ready by the time th eir co lleag ues , ncar th e rear o f the co lu m n, arrived lo oking fo r re st. Paced w ith natur al o bstacles . leg io ns

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I G IV E THA NKS ... T HAT WHI LE AL L AR E WORKIN G HARD TH E WHOLE DAY CUTT I NG STONES. I AS A PRIN CIPALI S GO ABOUT DO I NG N OT HIN G. ROMAN SOLDIER STATIONEDIN EGYPTIN A LETTER TO HIS FAMILY. 109 CE

agai nst th e Dacians in 10\

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Emperor Trajan's

arm y cro ssed the Ih llube o n a rapid ly co nstruc ted brid ge of boa ts. But ret urnin g fo r a sec o nd Arch of Trajan. Thamug adi. Algeria While legionaries built magnificent paved roads across the empire, emperorserected memorials to their military triumphs. This arch in a once prosperous North African city commemoratesTrajan's vic toriesover the Parthians in 114- 117 CEo

decisive c am pa ig n five years lat er th e y built a m o numental sto ne-a nd-w o o d ar c he d bridge , accessed by an approa c h roa d cur int o th e cl iffs lining th e ri ver. It h as be en suggeste d th at th e legion ari es shou ld h e re garded more as co m ba t e ng ineers than as straight fo rward in fantr y, T he need to lI SC to o ls as m uch as weapo ns was also mu ch in ev ide nce dur ing siege o pe rati on s, w h ich for m ed suc h a n imp orta nt pa rt of th e wa rfa re o f the age . T aki n g a for t ifie d po siti o n th at w as sto u tly d efe nd ed was a cha lle nge to an y attac ki ng force. hu t th e R o m an leg io ns ach ieved th e fea t time an d again th rou gh a co m bina tion o f

engineering skills and indomi table tigll£ing spirit.

SIEGE TACT ICS AND WEA PONS Sieges w er e norm all y lon g. d rawn - out affairs, bc..' cJU SCan assault 0 11 a fortress o r fortified to wn wa s a de sperate bu siness to attem pt . even o nce the w all s w e re br each ed . Fig ht in g yo ur w ay into a stro ng ho ld w as a last reso rt, and defend ers w ho m ade it ne ce ssary by re fusin g to su rrende r co uld

ex pec t no merc y. Vic to riou s leg io naries. w ho had see n co lleag ues ki lled Of w o unded by m issi les as th e y adva nce d o n th e fo rt ifica t io ns a nd in the confuse d clo se -qu arter s fighti n g th at followed. indu lged in an orgy of slaug h te r. rap e. and pillage. T h is w as th e legi on ar y's reward fi)[ th e h ard sh ips and dan gers of the siege and hi s re ve ng e o n th o se wh o had ca use d him so m uch trouble . It w as also d elib e rat e R o man poli c y. d esig ned to de te r o the rs fro m att e m p ting to defy R om an p ow e r.

The str onghold of Masada The tak.ing of the cliff-top fortress in 73 cs showed greatengineering skill and ruthless determination. When the Romans finally broke into the fortressafter two years' siege. the few remainingdefenders had committed suicide.

The scale of th e sie ge w o rks u nd ert ak en w as o fte n h ighl y im pressive. Besieging th e G allic ar my o f Vcr cingerorix at AleSI in ce nt ra l G au l in 52 Bel: . Caesar's leg ionari co nstructed a ci rc ular d it ch - and-ram part wa ll a ro u nd th e Ga u ls' h ill fort stre tc h ing lSk m (11 m ile s) and inco rpor atin g 23 fort s a nd ove r 10 0 woode n ro wer s, H av in g co m plete d th is ma ssive w o rk. th ey th en bui lt a n ev e n lon ger for ti fied w all fac ing o utw ard , to de fend th emselves agai nst a Gall ic army arriv ing to rel ieve Vcr cin gctor ix. At the siege o f the mountain fortress o f M asada in Palest ine, h eld b y a d e fiant band o f J ew ish re be ls in 73 CE o till' T enth Leg io n bu ilt a ra m p (,OO m (nea rly 2,()(IOft) lo n g reaching from the foor to th e top of th e 200- m (650- ft) h igh shee r roc k o n which the fort ress per ch ed . Constr uc te d unde r co nstant fire . this ram p allo wed them to haul a g iant batterin g ram lip to th e fortress and hamme r a bre ach in its w alls.

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The R o m an s h ad siege art ille ry w ith w hich to bo mbard the e ne m)'. These we re m o stly torms o f ballista, a tor sio n ma ch in e superficially resembling a lar ge c ross bow, In the late e m pire peri od bdJliStll!' w e n..' sup pleme nte d by the (l1l' ~l!{'r, a o ne-a rme d c atapult. N o ne o f the se siege e ngines , however, packe d su ffic ie nt pu nch to breach c ity wa lls o r o the r so lid fort ifi carion s. T hey w ere usually fired from rowers w ith the ai m of pickin g off defe nders o n the ramparts o r ca usi ng rand om damage in side the w all s. To m ak e a br each th at co u ld he sto r m ed,

lcg io uar ics had to ge t rig ht up to rill' ra m pa rts . Th is W JS th e m ain use o f the f.l t110US tcstudo.

ROMAN AUXILIARIES AND CAVALRY The auxiliaries we re troops recruited from "ba rbarian " peoples. usually livingwithin the borders of the Roman Empire but not enjoying the privilege of Roma n citizenship. They provided extra manpower and specialist skills that the Roman arm y very much needed . In particular. they constituted the majority of the army's skirmishing light infantry and of its cavalry. Li ke the legiona ries. auxiliaries we re expec ted to serve for 25 years . On completing the full te rm of service. the ir rewa rd was the grant of Roman citizenship to them and thei r de scendants. An auxiliary cohort wa s composed of recruits from a single area or eth nic group. but it was usua ll y sta tioned AU XILIARY SHiElD

away from its home a rea. Auxiliaries wer e paid less than legionaries and seem often to have been thrown into the most dangerous fighting as relatively dispensable troops. On the other ha nd. they were subjec t to less strict discipline. did less work - they were not involved in engineering or building - and ca rried less weigh t on the march. Ma ny of the auxiliaries we re trained to fight in a similar mann er to the legionary. but so me regions supplied specia list troops - the Ba learics produced stone-slinqers. for instance, and Syria was a source of bowmen. Most importan t were the expe rt horsemen from areas such as Batavia, Pannonia , and Thrace. They were the cream of the Rom an

cavalry. armed with spears, javelins. and the spatha - a longe r sword than the infantry

gladius. Although they did not have stirrups. their horned sadd les served to hold them firmly on their mounts in combat. Roman cavalry did not usuallyact as shock troop s charging infantry. but instead defended the army's flanks. carried out encirclements. and hunt ed dow n defeated enemy so ldiers in the pursuit afte r a victory. In the later pe riod of the Empire. cavalry probably becam e more numerous

an d played an increasingly important role in battle. Cavalry training Cavalry training in the useof the spear isdemonstrated by re-enactors. Note that Roman horsemen did not have stirrups.

CAVALRY HELMET

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III t h is aptly named torm ati on - trstudo is Latin for tortoise - J body of so ld iers wou ld adva nce wit h sh ield s covering t he m fro m above as we ll as fro m all sides . When t h~y reach ed the wa lls. they would e it her attack the m w ith me tal bars and picks

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I N T O II AT TL E Pu ll-s cale' field ba tt les we re infre q ue nt, bu r th ey were the ulti mate test of a leg io n ar y's mora le an d fighting ski lls, Con fro n ted w ith a "bar bari an" army. the R o m an s h ad no c r u cia l tec h no logica l adva ntage 0 11 the bat tlefield . T hey did d epl oy field a rr illcr y ill t he for m of sma ll ba llistae k now n as " sco r pio ns" , b ut a lt ho ugh these we re acc u rate a nd l.,trt.'ct ivl.' mi ssile wea po ns th ey wer e not de cisive, T he R o m ans ra rel y m ad e u se o f Ii '14 to rt ifi rnri on s, a nd th e n o n ly to defe nd the ir Hank s. It was the d iscipline, stam in a, an d t of th e l q.~i on a r y th at so o fte n b ro ug ht vi H e was , it is t r ue. bett er ar mo u red t h an hi s o ppo ne n ts, bu t sword, spe ar, and sh ield were co m mo n to bot h sides . T he savage ry o f close-quart ers co mba t de ma nde d emotio nal co m m itm e n t to co u nte r hi s inev itab le fear. H er e hi s bo nd in g w ith co m rad es fight ing alo ngs ide a nd id ent ificat io n w it h t he hon our of the coh o rt a nd I~gio ll wo u ld have their fu ll effect.

Roman art i ll ery A team of legionaries mans a ballista . Two of them prepa re to wi nch back the bows tr ing into th e firi ng posit ion . This kind of ballista could fire stone projecti les or heavy darts.

Bu t the R o m an leg ion ari es we re no t invi nc ib le. 53 li C E th ey we re wors te d b y Parthian a rche rs at Ca rr hne . In <J C E three R o m an legi on s we re surro u nded a nd massacred in t he Te u to b u rg Fo rest by Germa n tr ib es led b y Armi ni us , Th e in rh Leg io n was parti all y des t royed by Quee n B OlH.li CCJ of th e lrc n i ill (ll) \.1:. before th e l-lth and 20 th L ~g i o ns d efeated he r a nd reasse rt ed R om an p ow~r ill Britaill. But th ei r reco rd of success against ene mies fro m o utsi de a nd wi t hi n th e Em pi re in th e first two ce ntu ries of the C h r ist ia n e ra was impressive, I II

Fro m th e 3rd ce ntu ry CE th e leg io ns often becam e to ol s in th e powe r str uggles of a m b itio us lead ers, Economic probl em s led to th e adoptio n of chea pe r armou r and polit ical di sruption m ad e armies much h ard e r to raise a nd sup ply. M ost o f th e sold iers of the b tl.' Empi re we re conscripts and the di stin cti on be tween th e ci rizc n- lcgiona r ics a nd " b arbar ian" aux iliaries w as la rgely lost. But th e event ua l f.1 11 of th e R o m an Em pire in th e wes t ill th e 5th ce ntu ry CE was not th e resu lt of defeat s su ffere d by th e leg io ns, a nd much of th e tradi tion of th e R o m a n army was pr ese r ved by th e Em pi re in th e cast.

ROMAN BATTL EFIELD TACTICS Roman battle tactics obviously changed radically over

enemy fighting largely on foot, such as the Briton s

silence at a slow and steady pace to meet th e warriors

time and depended on whether they were fighting

in the 1st century

charging towards them . It wa s at thi s point that the

CEo

Roman infantry drew up on

fellow Romans or " barbarians". The Romans wou ld

the batt lefield in close order, with the most reliable

also have to adapt their battl e formations to th e

troops in the fro nt lines. The fir st century of each

the test, for there had to be no wavering as the enemy

terrain and in orde r to cou nter forces emp loying

cohort , the one w it h t he best troo ps, was placed

came ever closer. Then th e order wa s given to charge.

large numbers of cavalry or chariots. The deployment

in front of th e ot hers wi th the veterans at the rear.

The previously silent legionaries wo uld raise a spine-

of troop s show n below is one that might have been

When t he mo ment came for batt le to be joine d -

discipline of the legionary was put most severely to

chilling shou t and hurl their javelins into the mass of the

adopte d by a legion - along with it s cavalry and

usually afte r a prolonged exchange of arrows,

enemy, then surge forwa rd to make conta ct, shoving

assorted auxiliary troops - to confront a " barbarian"

slingshots, and artille ry - the cohorts advanced in

with their shields and stabbing with their short sw ords.

A legi on in order of battle Here the cohort s of a legion are lined up side by side, but they could also have been deployed with five cohorts in front and five behind . Gaps between the cohort s and between the individual centuries were essential to battlefield manoeuvring, but they could be speedily closed in th e event of an enemy charge.

Century in marching ord er The legionaries approached the battlefield marching in disciplinedranks and fIles, probably led by their centurion and signifer - the junior officer who carried the century's standard.

Cavalryheld In reserve until required. when It would probablybe deployedon the wings

CAVALRY

RESERVE

LEGIONARIES

DO

~ent~ 80men Direction of Infa ntry adva nce

SliNGERS &

SLiNGERS &

SKIRM ISHERS

SKIRMISHERS

Ord e r of battle Depending on how the enemylined up, the Romans might greet them with arrowsand artillery boltsor harass them with skirmishersand slingers. The latter would withdraw asthe main infantry force of legionariesadvanced . Comicen (trumpeter)

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First cohort - five centuriesof 160 men each

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Opnc (junior officer)

Centu ry in attack formation The century hasdeployed in four ranks to attack, first launching a volley of javelins, then assuming closer order to smash into the enemyfront linewith a wall of shields.

Fust two ranks advance WIth swo rd and shieldalter

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ROMAN FORT

NORTH GATE

The Romans were the greatest experts in fortificatio n in th e Ancient World. When on campaign. a legion wou ld co nstruct a fortified camp. surro unde d by a rampa rt and dit ch . at every stop . Whereas fighting migh t often be left to less wel l-t rai ned auxi liaries.

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CAVALRY BARRACKS

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building wo rk was always the job of legio naries. T hey wou ld have bu ilt th e fort show n here at Arbei a in northern Eng land, altho ugh it subseq uently housed aux iliary tro ops.

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Permanent forts and fortresses. like thi s one that has been recon structed at Arbeia, wer e bui lt of sto ne rath er than the wood used for temporary camps. T hey acted as barracks, supply depots. and ad m in istrative headquarters to m aintain R OIllC'S militar y presen ce in potentia lly hostile te rri tory. In addition to their mi lita ry tasks. edu cated sold iers might be assig ned to cle rica l duties. keepi ng the written records required by Roman

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bureaucracy. Outposts o f Roman civilization. they made no co ncessions to local climate or cu lture s. displaying simil ar features thro ug hout the empire . Living co nditio ns were cramped and basic. but with their heated bath ho uses and latr ines cleaned by ru nnin g wate r, the forts had a stan dard of hygiene far superior to any of the qua rters provided for th e arm ies th at fought almo st 2,000 year s later in th e C rimean War . Sett leme nts of local civilians grew up aro un d fort s an d fort resses to service th e R oman troo ps and many mode rn-day to wn s and cities trace the ir origins back to a R oman mi litary base.

WORKSHOPS

EAST GATE

'ITJIJ [QJ~ GRANARIES

OFFICER'S HOUSE

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INFANTRY BARRACKS

layout of a Roman fort Arbeia wasa small fort housing about 600 men. l egionary fortresses, housing 5,000. were much larger, but had a similar layout with barracks for cavalry and infantry, workshops. granaries. and a headquarters building.

WHAT OTHERS WOULD HAVE SPREAD OVER SEVERAL DAYS TOOK YOU ONLY ONE TO FINISH: YOU HAVE BUILT A WALL ... IN NOT MUCH MORE TIME THAN IS RECWIRED FORA TURF RAMPART. EMPEROR HADRIAN TO TROOPS AT l AMBAESIS IN MODERN ALGERIA

Garrisoning the fort Barrack life would have been familiar to any soldier in a modern regular army. There wasmorning parade, drill, guard and patrol duties, training exercises. kit to maintain, and latrines to clean.

Building a fort legionaries on the Dacian campaign (101102CE) build a stone fort. They are working in full armour in case of a surprise enemyraid.

Gatehouse battlements The plaque statesthat the fort wasbuilt by l egio VI Victrix under SextusCalpurnius Agricola, governorof Britain ( .163- 166 CE.

Doorway The solid wa lls and doors of the for t wo uld have kept out the tribal fighterswho might carry out raidsin Roman-occupied Britain.

Gat ehouse The gatehouse of the for t of Arbeia, on th e Tyne estuary in nor thern England, has been recontru cted to give an impression of its original appearance. Built in the 2nd century CE, the fo rt became a majo r supply depot for the troop s manning Hadr ian's Wall. Although the tw in tow ers are imposing, th ey are smaller than those at some othe r Roman forts, which had gateho uses up to four storeys high .

TH E BARRACKS T he barrack blocks at Arbcia were built of plastered sto nework o utside w ith wartl c- and-daub dividin g walls in side . The aux iliary t roops th at wen.' statio ned th er e would have be en di vid ed , lik e legion ari es, into eig ht- ma n ( tlU / u b n tt ;ll . O[ "tent gro ups". Each in [;lIlt r y block hous ed five ( llJlu/n'", i" and each (dUlubt'rlli" m was allo tted a cramped two-roomed su ite . which also had to accom mo da te mu ch of their equipment, The cent ur io n and thv lower rank ing officers lived in a slightly larger su ite at th e end of the barracks. Cavalryme n were bill eted in sim ilar sized barr acks. W ith 30 men and th eir horses housed in each blo ck , co nditio ns were even less en viab le rhan those of the in fantry.

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letter and stylus


Soldiers w rote lett ers both off icial and personal - eith er in ink on t hin wo od en panels or using a stylus to w rite on w ax. The lette rs w ere about the size of a large postcard .

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Do rm itory The ordinary soldiers of a Roman contubernium wou ld have spent most of their time in the larger of their tw o rooms . It was here th at they slept - either under wooll en blankets on beds like these or simply on matt resseson the floo r.

Sanitation Many fort s had a bathhouse out side th e fort for the troops, w hile the commanding off icer's family had their own bath s in th e house. This communal latr ine near Hadrian's Wall makes up for lack of privacy w ith hiqh-quehty plumbin g .

courtyard of th e hous e The house w as arranged around an op en courtyard, whi ch may have contained fountains. Courtyard wa lls-are likely to have been decorated w ith garden scenes. The principal roo ms led off a colonnaded walkway.

Sing le room The smaller room of th e suite allotted to a contubernium was either a living area or th e space where the soldiers stored their military equipment.

Board game Soldiers are known to have whiled away off-duty hour s with a variety of board games played with dice and coun ters.

COMMANDING OFFICER'S HOUS E In dramatic co ntrast to th e pr ivation s of barr ack-r oom life, th e co m ma ndi ng offic er of th e fort was provided with a co m fortable hou se, Sin ce th e R om an s took th eir dom estic arch itec tura l sty les wh er ever th ey went , th e building would have mimicked a typical Med iterran ean town hou se, complete with dinin g roo ms, bedrooms, a kit ch en . stables. and its ow n hyp ocau sr (u nder- floor heating system). No co ncessions we re nude to the local clima te , and th ese airy hou ses huilt aro u nd an ope n central courtyard may not have been so appealing du ring mid -winter in th e northern reach es of the empire.

Comm andi ng officer 's bed room Unlike the sleeping quarters in t he barracks, t he bedrooms in the hou se were spacious and kept warm by t he hypocaust. Both the furn it ure and decora tion reflect contempo rary taste in Rom e. The beds w ere richly carved and someti mes painted .

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Food and dr ink The office rs and men seem to have enjoyed a reasonably varied diet based on bread and locally produ ced meat. vegetables, and fruit. l uxuries shipped in amphorae from Spain and Italy included wine, olive oil, and garum (a fermented fish sauce that the Romans used to add flavo ur to food ).

ENEMIES OF ROME T he forces agai nst w hic h th e R oman s fou ght ranged from th e

var ied in th eir battl e tacti cs, th eir level of orga n izatio n and

ar mies of rival states or em pires - includ ing th e Ca rthagin ians in

di scipline, and th eir view of war fare. The co nt rast between

the west and the Parth ian s and Sassan id Per sian s in th e cast - to

C eltic or Germ an ic tr ibal fighters foll owin g th eir ch iefs int o

triba l wa rba nds and nomad ic cava lry. Althou gh th ere was never

battl e and th e co m plex polyglot army of Ca rthage tr anslated into

any great tec h no logica l gu lf di stin gui shin g th ese d iffer ent forces

a very di ffer ent battl efield performan ce - th e Ca rt hag inia n ar my

from one anot her or fro m the R oman s, th ey wer e ex tre m ely

co m ing close to achiev ing th e co nquest o f R ome.

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The ar m y with which the in spired Ca rt hagin ian ge neral H ann ibal invaded Italy in 2 1H li CE wa s a mu lticu ltura l force of mercenaries, chie fly recrui ted from C arthage 's Nort h Africa n allie s o r tributaries and from Spain . No at tempt was m ad e to blend th ese troops into a un ifo rm force . Instead eac h et hnic group st uck to geth er and fo ug ht in its o w n style. Libyan s ma de red o ubtable foo t sold iers, while th e sem i- no mad ic Numidia ns we re su perb light hor sem en, riding bar eb ack ar med w ith j avelin s and spears. Spa n ish hi ll tr ibe sme n foug ht mounted o r o n foot , usuall y ar me d with sho rt swo rds. Baleari c Islanders spec ialized in th e use of slingsho ts. firin g a hail o f sto nes o r lead pellets. H annibal's war elepha nt s. a small African br eed , wer e mostl y Exotic army A 16th-century artist's impression of Hannibal's Carthaginian forces attempts to convey their exotic variety of personnel. One of the uses of a war elephant may have been asa mobilecommand post.

su pplied by the Nu mid ian s - the bea sts served to di srupt enem y cavalry and provided a platfo rm for arc hers or ja veli n- throwers. W hat hel d thi s di sparate army to gether was the shared ex perience o f co mbat and , above all. alleg iance to th eir co m m ander. T he mercena ries wo u ld tig ht forever as lo ng as pay o r plu nd er were available to reward them. At C arinae in 216 li CE H an ni bal's army infli cted a th orough and blo od y defeat o n the R oman s, and it sustain ed its cam paig n in Italy for 15 yea rs. W hen th e war eve nt ually sh ifted to N orth Afri ca, lo cal co nscripts wer e drafted in to mak e up a lar ge part of th e Ca rt hag in ian ranks. This diluted army was definitively de feated by th e R o mans at Z am a in 202 li CE .

ORNATE CARTHAG INIAN

BREASTPl ATE

THE GERMANS Gcrm ani c tribes and fed er ati ons - Teuron es, Alam anni, G oths, Franks, Vandals, a nd m an y o the rs - w er e amo ng th e m o st d et ermined and pe rsistent e ne m ies o f thc R oman Em pire from th e 2 nd cen tu ry BC E to th e 5th ce nt u ry C I'. Lik e th e C elts. th e Germa ns wer e used to m arc o r less pcrm an cnt tribal warfare, often pr actised b y wa rba nd s o f yo u ng men led by an exp eri en ced fighter o f noted prowcss. T he ir battlefield tacti cs see m to have differed from rhe C elts in so far as the y invo lved a m or e co m pac t formati on and a

T HEY T H I NK IT TAME A ND STUPID ... TO ACQlJIRE BY T HE SWEAT OF TO IL W HAT T HEY M IGHT W IN BY T H EI R BLOO D.

TACITUSDESCRIBI NG THE CHARACTER OF THE GERMANIC PEOPLES, 1ST CENTURY CE

lar ger m easure o f coordi na t io n, According to J ul ius Caesar, writin g in th e l st ce n tu ry s cu , the y fough t in a tig ht infantr y ph alan x. armed wit h ir on -tipp ed spcars. T he G cr mans were also ad ept at avo idi ng pitc hed ba tt les, usin g am bus he s and har assin g h it- and -ru n tact ics. It wa s in th is wa y th at thcy wea ke ne d a nd even tua lly de stroyed the R om an Germ ans def eat ed Mad e in around 250 CE, this relief on th e Ludovisi sarcophagus shows clean-shaven Romans tr ium phing over hirsute bearded Germanic warr iors.

legions led b y Varus at th e Tcutobu rger Wald in time cavalry becam e a n im portan t part of Germani c fo rcc s. Ho rsem en o n sho rt st urdy m ounts rode for w ard a rme d w ith sh ield and j avelin , accompani ed b y sw iftly runn in g foo t so ld ie rs sim ilarly arm ed . Amon g th e O strogot hs a nd the Vandals ther e evo lved an armo ured ho rse- r id ing ari sto cr acy that pointed forwa rd to th e me dieva l k n ig ht. M an y G cr man trib es found cmp lo ymcnt as R om an au xi liaries and , b y th e 4th ce n tu ry CE, had a dominant po sition in the for ce s o f rhc later We stern Em pire. T he Goth s wh o sacked th e cit y of R ome in 410 C E had been part o f th e R o m an army . and it was Gothic and o the r G erm an ch iefs who ruled th e successo r states when the Wcstcrn Em pire fin all y di sint eg rated . <) C Eo Ovcr

THE CELTS T he C elts of weste rn Eu ro pe - G au ls, Ib eri ans. Br itou s - had a di stinctive style o f wa rfarc th at co nt rasted strik ing ly with th at of rhe R om ans . Bands o f yo u ng m en , foll owing a leader of ack no w ledged stre ng th a nd co u ragc, would regularl y e m bark o n raid s o n uci ghbouriu g peopl es. Tribal bat tics we re probabl y heav ily formal izcd, with individual warrio rs fir st stepping forward to procla im their prowcss and cha llenge ene m ies to sing le co m ba t. A n attack invo lved a wi ld charg e

CELTIC HORNED HELMET

accom pa nied by a caco pho ny o f noi se, Although so m e R oman hi storian s d escribe th e C elts as fig ht ing naked , the y mostl y wore a tunic and tr ou sers. Elite warrior s would have worn a helmet a nd eve n cha in ma il or leather a rmo u r, alt ho ug h sh ields w ere their m ain defence. M ostl y fighting on foot , th e y wi eld ed long slash ing swo rd s and sho rt spcars. So me C elt ic pe oples employed war cha rio ts to di sr upt t he e ncmy fo rmation . T he R o m a ns first en co u nt ered t he C elts w he n t he lat te r invaded Italy in the 4 th ce nt u ry uc u, and subseq ue n tly fo ug ht th em on m an y occa sion s, most no tabl y in th e campaign against the Ga u ls under Ver cingetorix in 52 liC E a nd the sup pressio n of the Icen i revolt Icd by Uoud icca in Britaiu in 60 -61 C Eo T he R o m ans were impressed b y the C elts' phy sical st reng th - they arc desc ribed as ta ll, with ripplin g m uscles - and b y th eir wi ld co u rage in battle.

WE IRD, D ISCORDA NT HORNS WE RE SOUNDED THEY BEAT THE IR SWO RDS RH YT H M ICA LLY AGA I NST T H EI R SHI ELDS .

DIODORUS SICULUS DESCRIBING CELTS IN BATTLE . 1STCENTU RY BCE

Ceremonial shield Ma de of bro nze wi th studs of colou red glass, this shield once belonged to an elite Celt ic wa rrio r in Britain. Dat ing from the 2nd centu ry BeE, it was probably inte nded for ceremonial use rather than fo r comba t .

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VIKING

v

I KI N G WA IliliOH S ['HOM SC AN DIN AV IA

fir st appeared in

do cumented hi story in th e lat e St h ce n t ury as sea far ing raiders terrori zing th e populati on of coasts a nd islan d s aro u nd W estern Europe . Over time , ra ids ex pa nded into

ca m pa ig ns o f conq uest and perm an ent set tle me n t. Vik in gs voyaged as (;11' as N orth Am erica and, via Ru ssian ri vers,

to

th e Black Sea. Althou gh the

excellence o f their long sh ips a nd th e boldn ess of th eir m ari t im e e nterprise w as th e key to th eir success, t hey w ere also formidabl e fig h te rs o n la nd .

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Wh y t he agri c ulr u ral and fishi n g co n u n u n it ics

isla nd off t he Nort h um hr iuu coast. w as s.ickcd

o f Sca nd iu av ia sho u ld have sud d e n ly gCllcratc d

b y Viki n g s in a rai d ofsc ns.uion.rl sudde n ne ss

a pl ag ue ofra iders to p re y

UPOII

t he k in g do m s

a nd viole nce. T he 5r ho !ar Alcuin wrote,

o f An g lo - Sa xo n Eng lan d and t he Fr allki sh

ill a lett er to Nort ln uubr ia's K illg Et hc lrcd ,

Emp ire is not k uo wn for certa in . The 1II0 st

" never b e fore has suc h terror app eared as

likely ex pla nat io n is t hat ill ovcr po p u la rcd co asta l co m m u n it ies on ly the eldes t

we have now su ff ered trom ;) p;lgan race" . A late r chronicler, Sim eon of I )ur!1 ;llll .

SO il

inhcrircd h is father's po ssession s. so

d escribed ho w the..' raid er s kill ed so m e

yo u ng er siblings . with no mean s of mak in g a livin g lo ra II)'. so ug h t (;lml ' a nd torru nc overse as. The fir st raidin g for ces would have co n vis«..d o f perh aps a co uple o f sh ips fro m two neighbouring villagl's sctt ing o ff in sea rc h oftrade goods - silver a nd S Ia \' l ' S see m to have b een

monk s, ca rr ie d others o tr "in tl·tte..' rs·'. and lo ot ed rh e mon astery of its co usid crah lc t rc.isu res . I >c..' parti ng tor N o rwa y with a ho ard of gold and silver pl at e . a nd w irh p r iso ncrs to r s;11e..' as slave s, t he Vi k in g s p re sumabl y viewed th e r;lid a\ a grea t suc ccsv .

particul arl y d e sirable co n u nod iric s.

EXPAN D ING HO RI ZO NS

A s tew as 4 0 armed m en co ul d c;lsi ly

R a id in g was spora dic and small-s cale

h av e over whelmed a n Engl ish coasta l v ilLage..' o r isolated monaster y. The An gl o - Sa xon invasion of En gl and ill

Swed ish Viking pendan t Silver loot ed on Viking raids wa s of ten melted down and turned int o personal jewe llery.

unt il th e' H.'Os - h it- and -run attac ks m ore a ki n to pi rac y t h an warfa re . But th en I h lli\ h Vik in g s b cg.m to m ount m ore subsr.u u ia l o pcr.u io n-,

t he Sth ce n t u ry C E had b egun i n ve..' r y much the same w ay, w it h sma ll raidin g parri es

aga ins t so u t he r n En gland. th e Low Co u nt ries,

developin g into m u ch larg er inv asion fo rce s.

a nd th e coast o f Fr an ce. Ant w erp, tl )r exa m ple ,

The fi rst recorded Vikin g lan din g ill E n g land

was laid was t,' ill K)(. a nd N an tes ill H4J. III H45 a

probably too k place ill 7H7, b u t , a lt hou g h b lood

w arrio r ca lle d R ag lla r led a fle er of sh ips up th e

wa s she d, it did not de ve lo p i n to a raid . T Ill'

ri ver Se ine, d ro ve offa Frank ish arm y a nd sac ked

sho ck of th e ti rs t k n o wn ra id is

Paris. Voyages becam e ever m ore am bitious, wit h

g rap h ica lly d escribed ill t he w r it ings o f m o nks a nd sc ho la rs. III 7()J th e

at least o ne Hccr rou ndi ng Sp ain a nd ravag in g t he

m on aste r y of l.i nd isfarn c, a f;lll1l'd ce n t re of C h r isti a ll lc.i r u iu g

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wes ter n M editerran ean . w h ile allot her reach ed t he Black Sea v ia th e rivers of RlI \\i a a nd Ukra in e

and appea red o ut side the wal ls of Coust.mti nopl c.

SAX AND SCABBARD

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T he key to th e Viking s su ccess wa s their abil ity to co nce ntrate f()fCCS at an u nex pected point with a rapidit y o f m ov ement far su per io r to that o f th e defenders . Whe n th ey sailed th eir lon gships across the No rt h Sea o r alo ng th e coast line, the y co u ld la nd w hereve r th ey chose, gro u nd ing th eir vesse ls o n a st re tc h of beach . Althou gh th e Franks and An gl o - Sa xon s built w at ch towers to lo ok o ut for Vik in g raiding parties, they rarel y h ad time to mount a sign ificant arme d respon se. On oc casions w he n Vikings need ed to m ak e a rapid escape , the y bcncfitrcd fro m th e de sign of th eir sh ips , which h ad a prow at eac h e nd a nd co u ld therefore b e relaunched without being turned aro und . When Vikin gs pe netrated in la nd up rivers. th eir pro gress was slo wer. with much use of oars and po ssib ly t he need to m o ve th e sh ips fo r sho rt di stan ces o n land arou nd shallows o r o ther obs tacles . T h is gave t he defender s a better c ha nce to

ruth less, and fea rless in act io n wou ld win you acce ptance Decorative inscriptions wit hin the group and also . from the runicalphabet alsoknown as "Futhark " e ventu ally . promotion to th e warband leade r's inner c ircle . The lead er. for hi s part . h ad o rganize a n army to me et to provide action a nd plunder them. With arou nd 50 me n in if he was to hold the loya lty o f hi s eac h sh ip, however. a nd probabl y foll ower s and stave o ff co m p et it io n between 100 and 200 sh ips in volved in a major from other warbands. Annual raiding expedition s att ack such as that o n Paris in 845, t he Vikings kept up the supply of loo t o ff which the men lived and satisfied their c raving for excit em ent - for h ad a good cha nce o f matchi n g an y force that cou ld be m uste red to ha lt their progress. th e re can be no doubt th at th e Vikings thrived on the th ri ll o f co m ba t and enj o yed t he th oroughGA NG I NG UP go ing rape and ma ssacre in which they indu lged The basic fig hti ng force in Viking raid in g wa rfare whe n given a chance. In the absence of outside rs to wa s th e warba nd , a ga ng of ad vent ur er s att rac ted atta ck . Vi king warriors would fight one ano the r. to the serv ice of a wa rrior of prove n co urage and C h alle nges to single co m bat were ap pa re n tly co m mo n, eithe r to settle issues o f status ab ilit y. You ng me n witho u t pro spec ts a nd kee n for actio n wo uld co mpete fo r adm issio n into a o r simply so that the w inning fig hter successfu l wa rband . Pro v in g yo urs elf fierce . co u ld claim the lose r's prop erty. Badg e of lo yalt y

l eadersof Viking war bands would sometimesreward an especially loyal follower with a heavy silver armlet. If the warrior subsequently fell on hard times,he could snap off piecesof silver when required.

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From out of nowh ere The first reported Viking raid on Britain was the sacking of the monastery at Undisfarne in 793. The attack came completelywithout warning.

SpItzbergen THE VIKING WORLD c.80 0 - 1000 CE

GREEl\'I..A N D

NORTH AMERICA

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Viking settl ement Date 01Viki ng voyage. raid or seme meet

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Vik ing voyages Norwegian Vikings sailed prodigious distances. reaching Iceland by 860 and North

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The to p of thi s 8th -centur y carved sto ne from the Swedish Island of Got land depict s wa rriors enter ing Valhalla - t he eight-leg ged hor se is Odi n's steed Sieipnir. The lower part of th e picture shows a Viking longship.

warbands sta rted wintering at fortified cam ps at sites suc h as t he lie d e N oirmoutier o n th e we st co ast of Fra nce , Dublin in Irela nd , and th e Isle o f T ha ne t on the coast of so utheast En gland . So me of these cam ps becam e per m an ent bases. In H(l5 a Dan ish for ce described in the A ngl o - Saxo n C h ro ni cles as " a g rea t heath en ho st" established itselfin East An gli a, initiati ng a series o f land ca m pa ig ns that , o ve r th e foll owing decad e. brought th e Dan es v ict or y over th e kin gd oms o f N orthumbria , East Angli a, and M ercia. Alth ou gh hard-pressed b y th e invad e rs. t he An glo - Saxo n k ingd o m of Wessex sur v ived. In Fran ce , a Vik in g arm y besieged Paris for almost a year fro m HH5 to HH(" unt il bou ght o ff by th e kin g of the Fra n ks an d Ho ly R oman Em peror C harles th e Fat. The Norsemen w er e by then a n un shak eable

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pr esen ce. a (l ct reco gni zed by th e Pranks ill g ra n ting th em co ntrol of N ormand y ill <J 11. In th e cast. o the r g ro u ps o f Vik ing s established kingd om s ce n tred o n Novgorod a nd Kie v, T he la nd arm ies for med by the Vik ing s st ill had a substa nt ial co re of wa rr iors fu nctioni ng as wa rbands, but large r forces wo uld also in clude a co ns ide rable number of o rd ina ry (H ille rs o r craftsme n drummed int o th e rank s for a fig ht in g seaso n. So me o f these levies we re prob ably ar m ed o n ly w ith spea rs. T he Viki ngs had alwa ys had horses - eve n raidi ng part ies had often ca rried J few in thei r boats.

Ship's prow Longships had high curving stem and stern posts, oft en carved in the shape of dragons. These clearly helped strike terror into the victims of Viking raids.

TH E NUMB ER OF SHIPS INCR EASES, T HE ENDLESS FLOOD OF VIKING S BEGIN S TO GROW ... TH EY OV ERRUN ALL THAT LI ES BEFOR E THEM AND NONE CAN WITHSTAND TH EM . ERMENTARIUS, FRANK ISH MONK

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America by 1000. Mea nw hile, Swedish Vikings navigated the rivers of Russia as far as Constantino ple and even the Caspian Sea.

Spe cifi c mi litar y training w as probably mor e o r less nonexi stent am o ng the Scandinavian peoples. The ba sic sk ills of sailing and of wa rfa re we re sim ply part of eve ryday life. H u nt in g a nd spo rt m ade all m ales fam iliar wit h the use of wea po nry to some deg ree, as d id the in security of Viking ex iste nce - a No rd ic text o f the 'i th cent ury adv ises: "Never pa rt w ith yo u r weapons w he n out in the field s. for yo u never kn ow w hen yo u will need yo ur spea r". Skilled in m et alw o rking, Sca ndinavian cra ftsm e n su pplied formidab le slash in g swo rd s a nd iron axesbo th lo ng- shafted two - handed axes and sho rt er " bearded axes" wielded w it h o ne hand . Spea rs, k nives. a nd bo ws we re less cos tly and m a r c co m mo n . For h is defen ce a Viki n g wa rr ior wo u ld hope to ha ve a m etal-bo ssed ro u nd sh ield and , ifh e co u ld affor d it. a k nee - le ng th cha in m ai l coa t and m etal helme t. T he ave rage Viking co u ld probably aspire to no mor e th an a padd ed leath er o r fur garment.

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Fig ht ing methods a nd w eaponry The main wea pons o f t he Vikings we re spears and axes, w ielded w ith great

force. Swords, usually the wea pons of leaders. were fo rg ed by skilled sm iths. They play an imp ortant part in Norse my thology. The

woo dcarving (far right) shows an episode in the story of Sigurd: the testi ng of th e sw or d Gram by banging it against an anvil.

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M o re o ft e n, ho w eve r, they wo u ld sim ply ro u nd lip t he ho rses ill th e area they we re att acki ng a nd appro p r iarc t he m fo r th eir 0 \\' 11 purpo ses. A lt hou g h tlu-y d id not ti ~ht m ou n ted, t he V ik ings u sed t ill' an im als to in c rea se th eir sp l'c... d o f 1Il;III Ol' lI Vn.' - the r ra u si r ion from raidin g to co nq ues t did nor alt er th e Vi ki ngs' ta st e fo r m o bili t y an d su r pr ise. 111 th eir ca m pa ig ns ill En g land a ~ai ll st K ill ~ A lfre d o f Wcvsc x ill H777H. t hl' Y used both sh ips a nd ho rses to m o ve m e n sw ift ly int o oc c upatio n of A n glo - Saxon ter rit or y. fo rcing A lfr ed to ta ke n .· fu ge ill im pe ne tr ab le m.irshc« w itho ut a b attl e fo u g ht.

BAT T LE FO RM AT IO N W hen th e Vik in gs we re o b liged to fi g ht a pi tched batt le. th e y for m ed up 0 11 to o t, probably w ith a line o f m en sho u lde r- to -s ho u lde r c reating a sh ield w all. their spl'ars br istl in g o ut ward th ro ugh t he sm all ope nin gs b et w e e n sh ield and sh ie ld. T he elite w arr io rs w ith th eir ar mo u r a nd he av ier w l'apo n ry wo u ld stand clo se to th eir lead er . w ho se ba n ne r wo u ld be ra ised be h ind th e fr ont li ne. A bat t l« alwa ys bl'g all w it h an exc ha nge o f mi ssile ti n ' . th e Vik ing bo w m en form in g all essent ial if ra rel y m e ntio ned par t o f til e ar m y. Skir m ishers wo u ld thro w spears o r sm all a xes and there wo u ld probab ly be sling sho ts also used , At so me poin t o ne o r o the r side wo u ld mo u nt a ch arge . At th e battle

o f Ed in gto n ill M ay H7H, the' D an ish a r lllY o f Gur hr u m appa re n tl y f.liled to br eak t h ro u g h the An glo - Saxo n sh ield w all a nd was worn do w n u ntil t' JI'L", d to abando n t he ti cld . Bu t if t he' attac ke rs

in fro m e lse whe re and a recen t gc nc nc st udy h as sho wn th at t he fema le a ncesto rs o f ro d ay's lcc landc rs we re, alm o st w it ho ut exceptio n . Ir ish . T he fou nd atio n of co lo n ies an d tOWIlS d id no t

bro ke' t h ro u ~h , th e bat tl e w o u ld frag m e n t in to a se rie s o f fi erce co n te sts b er wce n ind ivid uals o r sm all g ro ups o f w arriors.

m ea n th at t he V ikin gs reno u nced t heir wa rl ike c u lt u re. T he ir a r mi es st ill str uc k te rr o r into th e ne ig hb o u r in g kin gdo m s o f th e An glo Saxo n s a nd Fran ks. Pace to fa ce , th e Vik in g w arrior w as a form id ab le o ppo ne nt . Vi k in gs we re gc nera lly hea lthy a nd of lar ge stat u re,

V I KI N G SETTLE M ENTS

As th e .un o u nr o f te r rit o r y co n tro lled by t he V ik ings ill En g la nd . lrelaud , and par tl y a tr ibut e to th e q u al it y norrh crn Fr an ce inc rea sed , of th e d iet they enjoyed iu thei r II l al 1Y w arr io rs we re re wa rd ed Sc and inav ia n hom ela nd . In w ith g ra nts of lan d . and ra id s co m b at the y w ielde d th ei r la rge Dice cup a nd ex pe di tio n s of co nq ues t sw o rd s a nd a xe s w it h fe ro ciou s Ar chaeo logica l find s show t hat the Vikings b ecame le ss fre q ue nt . V ik in g clll' rg y th at put ph ysical streng th had exact ly the interests you wou ld expect m CI1 bl' gan to i nr crmnrr y in a wa rrior race - dr inking and gam bling . a nd e nd u ranc e at a premi u m . w it h w o m e n fro m the lo cal populatio n a nd in re g ion s suc h as N orma nd y. GO I NG BERSERK ce ntral and no rth er n Eng land . a nd the a re a The nat ure of Vik ing c u ltu re also m c n tully aro u nd I)ublin t here we re ex te nde d pe r io d s o f st reng thl'lll' d th e warr ior's co m m it me n t to t he peace fu l coex iste nce . Fa r off Vik in g co lo n ists in battle , T he c u lt o f O din , th e one- ey ed ~{)d of Icel and face d a d iffe ren t problem: t here w as 110 wa r. st ressed th e im po rta nce o f a w arr io r d yin g he roi call y ill battle rat her tha n sh.u u cfu lly ill native populat io n an d co nse q ue nt ly a se ve re h is bed . O d in 's m o st e n thus iast ic d evo tees w e re sho r tage o f WOlI Il'n . Th ese h ad to be sh ippe d t he " b e rserke rs". A ltho ug h co nteste d b y so m e h istorian s, th l' ex iste nce o f th e se wi ld w arrio rs HUNTIN G HORN is w ell attested in N o rse li te rar y so u rces. Ad m itte d ly m :1I1 Y o f these w e re not co m m it te d w r it ing unt il 30 0 years atte r th e even ts th e y d escr ibe , Bcsc rkcrs apl", ar to h aw fought na ked to

but fo r b ear o r w o lf sk ins . wo rk i ng th em sel ves int o a tra ncelike fu ry befo re co m bat. Once in th eir in spired state , t he y we re alleged ly in unu uc to pa in and u nco nt ro llable in th eir agg ressio n . (Jill' text d esc r ib e s the n : as " m ad as do gs o r wolves" an d " st ro ng as hear s or w ild bu lls" . T he y had th e stra nge h ab it of che w ing the ed ge o f t he ir sh ield s befo re battle and

Hunting. eat ing. and drinking These replicas o f archaeologi cal find s show that Viki ng craft smen app lied decor ati on to everyday obje ct s as we ll as to wea po ns and jewelle ry. The interlacing pattern on the leather sheat h is a common moti f.

cm ittinp; roars and grow ls. We arc told that they "killed people wit h a sing le blow" and were hurt "n eith er by

Thor 's hammer Small silver pendants in the shape of Thor's hammerwere widelyused by the Vikingsas religiousamulets. Thor, the Norse god of thunder, was the son of Odin, the god of war.

followed in the sec o nd decad e o f th e I Ith cent ury

by the co nq uest that mad e Norwegia n Kin g C n ut ruler of En gland , For a time C n ur ruled D en m ark also . c re at ing a sh ort lived N orth Sea empire. But thi s tur ned o u t to be a LHe tlo wc ring of Viking intlucn cc. In IU (I(. thl' o rwcg ian Kin g Harald H ard rad.i, a formidahle warrio r wh o. dur in g ~1 per io d of exi le , had se r ve d in Consta nti no ple in th e Var.m g i.m Guard, inva ded Britain to uphold his claim to t he ro yal successio n, but w as d efeated at Stamfo rd Brid ge by An ~l o ­ Sa xon Kin~ H a ro ld . Iro n ically, H aro ld was th en dcfcan-d at the bailie o f I-I ,,,t i n ~s by th e N orma ns, des cend ant s of th e Vik in ~s w ho had b y th en be co me French ill langua ge and c u ltu re .

tire nor iron". The berserk ers' beha viour may have been caused by ingesting drugs o r large qu antities o f alco ho l and must ce rtain ly ha ve made them d ifficult to e m ploy dle cti wl y o n th e battlefield . But altho ug h th eir c ult was banned ill places. some w ar lead ers are said to have used th em as personal bod ygu ard o r as sho c k troops in batt le. Per haps the mo st o bject ive testimon y to tile qua lit y o f" llOn- bcse rkcr" Viking warriors was their emp lo ym ent in C o nstant ino ple as m crcc uari cs o f th e Byz an tin e Empi re, T he y d isting ui shed the m selve s so d1t..' ctivdy ill warfa re as lou a field as Syria th at , fro m t he lat e 10t h ccnt u r y, they were fo rme d into the emperor's elite Varangian G ua rd . Na tura lly t he Hyz.inrincs lik ed to pat ro ni ze th e se fo reign m e rcen a ri es. dl'scribing t he m as "axe - bea ring ba rbnr ia n s". T he ir dru n ken ness wa s as mu ch an o bject of

LATER V I K IN G C O N Q1JES TS R e latively q u iesce nt throu gh mu c h o f t he ln rh centu ry. Viki ng po wcr unde rwent a rcsurgcnce..' fro m the 9Hlls. An ~lo -Sa x on Br ita in su ffe red the aggrc ssivc raids o f the fe arsome O laf Trygva sson ,

Warriors' resting place The burial ground at lindholm Heje in northern Denmark contains over 700 graves dating from about 700-1100 ct. The bodies were cremated, but grave goodsshow that men's graves were marked by stones arranged in the shape of ships.

KNYTL/NGA SAGA. DESCRIBING KING (NUT WARRING IN ENGLAND, PROBABLY WRITTEN AROUND 1250

astonishment to their soph ist icate d hosts as th eir ticr cen css in co mbat. But it was lor th eir strc ng rh and lo yalt y that th e y were pri zed a nd o fte n lib eral ly rewarded .

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YOU WORK ED WELL IN THE SHIELD -WAR, WARRI ORK I NG : BROW N WAS THE FLESH OF BOD IES SE RVE D TO THE BLOOD-BIRD: IN THE SLAUGHT ER. YOU WON , SI RE , WITH YOUR SW O RD ENOUGH O F A NAME

VIKING LO NGSH IP

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The Viking lo ngship was a sw ift, sturdy, and versatile m ilitary transpo rt. Propelled

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Backstay

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either by a sailor by oars, it cou ld cross th e o pen seas but also, because of its shallow

Fore stc1v

draught , penetrate inland along rivers or be pu lled up onto a beach . T he lon gship featured here, known as Havhingstenjra

Glcllda/(lll.~h

(the Sea Stallioujron: Glc/lda/(ll/.~h),

is a reconstruction of a vessel excavated from R oskilde Fjord, Den mark, in th e 1960s.

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The o rig ina l o f the Sca S tallion, referred to as 51",/dch'" 2, w as deliberately su n k, along with four other sh ips, in th e late l lth ce nt ury. Thi s was d on e to blo ck the ent ra nce of the fjord, thu s protecting R oskild e, at that time th e Dan ish ca pital, against att ack from the sea. Study of the o ak from which the ve ssel wa s ma de revealed that it had been bui lt around 104 2 in Dublin , Irel an d . th en a major Vikin g set tlem ent . T he lon gsh ip has a pro w at both e nds an d is ste e red by mean s of a sid e rudde r. It is cli n ke rbui lt - that is, wit h a hu ll made of overla pping

planks . As far as poss ible, the reconstruction used tools, te chniques, and m aterials of the Viking period; the t imber fro m 300 oak trees wa s requ ired to b ui ld it . A lo ngshi p of t his size wo uld have been co m m issio ned b y a m an of wea lth a nd power and its co nst ructio n wo u ld have take n an e n tire w in te r. At least 60 m en wo u ld have bee n nee de d to row the longsh ip . T he ir muscle powe r co u ld have del ivered a sustained spee d of 5-6 k nots, but wit h its sail raised and a favo u rable w ind the ship co u ld have m ad e 15- 20 k nots .

Defensive wall of shields

Prow

Longsh ip p ro fil e The long, narrow shape of the longship was designed for speed. Sku/de/ev 2 w as appro ximately 30m (98ft) long but on ly 3.8m (12ft 6in) wide. It could sail in wate r less than a metr e (3ft 3in) deep.

N EV ER BEFORE HAS SUCH TERROR AP PEARED .., NOR WAS IT THOUGHT T HAT SUCH AN INROAD FROM THE SEA CO UL D BE MADE. AlCUIN ON THE SACK OF UNOI SFARNE. 793

Landf all Viking s waited fo r a favourable wind before sett ing sail on a raid. Theywou ld get hardly any sleep on the gruelling voyage from England from Denmark, but could make it in about two days.

Clinker co nst ru cti o n The overlapping planks, or "strakes", are fixed with iron nails. The whi te objects are the locks sealing the oar ports . Only materials available to the Vikings we re used in th e linseed-oil paint.

Shie ld Vikings used their shields as a defen ce as they rowed to land on a hostile shore, but it is not known how they we re attached to the side of the ship.

Sail pow er an d o ar po w er The rope fastened to the cleat (lef t) is one of the sheets that controls the yard (t he wooden spar that carries the sail). When the ship wa s under sail and the oar s not in use, the oar ports (right) w ere sealed with a special lock.so that they w ould not let in water .

Oar p ort and frame t imb er Oar ports wer e designed so that the wh ole oar and blade could pass through them . Frame timb ers (centre) were fixed at inte rvals to th e top three planks to reinforce the hull.

Bu ilt f or spee d

Sku/de/ev 2 wa s th e produ ct of W eather vane Many laterViking ships had a high ly decorative weather vane, madeof gildedbronze,attached to the prow.

Viking shipbu ilding technology at its most advanced. Its modern reincarnation, the Havhingsten, has been fitted wi th 11 2 sq m 0,200 sq It ) of sail. W ith this and its superblystreamlined hull, it is thou ght that, given a favourable wind, the ship will be ableto attain a speed of 20 knots.

Oars The pine oarsare about 4.55m (15ft) long With blades just 15cm (6in) across. It has been found that thiswidth isthe most effective for rowing long distances at sea.

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Blowing horn The Vikings used blowing horns to call their ships tog eth er. They could be heard from long distancesand would have been especiallyuseful at night and in foggy weather.

M ast and mast fish Themast slotted into the keelson, a block of wood in the bottom of the boat, and the "mast fish", seen here at the centre of th e ship at deck level.

Seat ing arrange ments The narrow benches may look uncomfortable, but they allowed the oarsmen to shift position regularly on a long journey. There wasenough spacebetween them for a man to lie down and rest.

Rowing for th e shore Vikingsfixedtheir shieldsto the ship'sgunwhale asa defence againstspears and arrows. The warlikeappearance of the ship must have intimidated anywatchi ng enemy.

OTH ER WARRIORS OF THE VIKING ERA Vi king raid s and sett lem ent we re j ust one d em ent in a peri od of

band of fu ll- time warriors support ed by a mu ch larger nu mb er of

w ide spread in securit y th rou gh ou t Europe and the Mediter ran ean

sel f-equ ipped lev ies - men for ced int o serv ice. In the Srh and 9th

zo ne after the splinter ing of the Western R om an Em pire. 13y the

centu ries th e Fra n ks created a substa ntia l, if frag ile, em pire in

7th century eve n the Byzan tin e successors of R om e in the east

wes te rn Europe throu gh th e effective ness of thei r heavy cavalry,

we re no t we althy enoug h to pay and equi p a large sta nding ar my.

but it was the Norma ns, Fre nch-s pea king descendan ts of th e

T he Ang lo -Saxons were not unu sual in relyin g upon a sma ll

Vik ings, w ho proved th e most fo rmidable figh ters of th e era.

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Tak ing ov er co ntro l of Englund fr0111 the 5 th

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ce n t ur y C Eo th e A ngl o - Saxon r u le rs initia lly led pe rson al w a rbands ill th e G e rm ani c tr aditi on . By th e t ime Kin g Alfr ed (ru led H7 1-H'i'i) wa s fighting the I)all es, he was leading all army o f le vi es, k no w n as the " fyrd ". Th ey w ere raised 0 11 a regi on al basis. A lo cal nob lem an o r "theg n" w as o bliged to present him «.. lf w he n req u ired w ith the appro priate n u m be r of m en d rawn from

" ho usccarls"

amo ng t he lo w er rank s of the fno-'c..' popula ti on . Th e y had to co nic equipped w ith basic armo ur a nd a Wl'apo n . T he fyrd not o n ly su p plie d t ro ops for the kin g to lead ill b at t le but also m ai ntained and m ann ed fo r t ified " bu rg hs" as ce n t re s of lo cal de fe nce . In the 11 th ce n t u ry An gl o - Saxon

- :1 syste m

co pied from the Danes. Fu nd ed fr om ta xar io n, these fo rmidable fig hte rs acted as th e k in g 's esc o rt and co m pan io ns, and w en.' th e COH.' o f h is arm y i ll battl e . M o st An gl o - Sa xon so ld ie rs tra velled on hor seb ack. hut they al wa ys di sm o unted to tight. T he ho usccar ls w ere armed w ith sw ords or w ith torm id ab lc t wo- handed axes - nrig in ally a Vik in g Wt';lpOll . Most of the fyrd ca r r ied spears . the eas iest W C:1P OIl for a 10c l 1 blacksmith to make and th e sim plest for all u n tr ained man to u sc. A rche rs f()fl11 cd a norm al part of An gl o - Saxo n ti..>rcl's. althou g h few w e re pr e sent at the battl e of Ha stin gs i n 1Ci(,(,. On th e bat tlefield. th e

An gl o - Sa xo ns sto o d ill tig ht tor m ar io n . crcari ng a sh ield wa ll. H o usc car ls, w ho w en' o ft e n prot ect ed by a shield- bearer and a spearm an, cou ld cho p do w n a hor se w ith a sing le blow o f thei r tw o - hand ed ax es . Ell"ing the N o rman m o unted kn ights near th e village o f H asting s, th e Aug lo-Sa xo ns w e re still vl'ry effec tive ti gh ters despite be ing ex hausted fr om th e lo ng m arch so uth fro m Yor kshire, after defe atin g the Nor w egian Kin g H arald H ardrada . The result uf the battl e co u ld eas ily have go ne the other w ay. l ast stand A scene from the Bayeux Tapestry showsAnglo-Saxon hou secar!s. clad in chainmail "bymies", desperately resi sting a Norman cavalry chargeat the battle of Hastings in 1066 .

Angl o-Saxon armour, w eapo ns, and cloth ing

THE FRANKS

By the 11th century. warriors across nort hern Europe all wo re similar chainmail. Angl o-Saxon swords we re th e we apons of wea lthy w arriors .

SWO RD

AND

The Fran ks we re a G er man ic pe op le w ho m ade a kin gd om in Ga u l a fter th e (;, 11 o f t he R om an

Handle made of

antler _ _

SCA BBA RD

Blade

served as tool and

weapon

Em p ire in t he we st . Durin g th e rei g n o f th v-ir g re.uesr ki n g, C h arleu mg n e (r u led 77 1- HI.J), t he Pra nks co nq ue red a n v-mpir v· th at co ve red mo st of C h ristian we ste r n Eur o p c, fig ht in g Sa xo ns. D all es. Muslims. a nd Ava rs in a n nua l milita r y cam pa ig n s a ro u nd the bo rd er s o f the ir lan d s. T he m aj orit y o f th e Frank ish ar m y o f the Hth and ()t h ce nt u ries w as m ad e up o f levi es. A ll frcv· men w ho we 1'v' j ud ged to h.. .· su ffi c ie ntl y we ll-off to a ffo rd a r m o u r .m d a wc apo n had to pr esent t he m selves fo r m ilita r y serv ice, led b y th eir lo ca l co u nt , w he never the kin g req u ire d . M ore impo rt a nt th an th ese par t- t im e so ld ie rs we re th e rra incd w arr io rs w ho form ed t he h eav y cav a lry. T hcsv· co n siste d of t he k in g's ho u seh ol d tro op s a nd of th e follo w e rs of nobl e s, w ho held rhc-ir hi gh po sition in th e r.. .-ahn in retu rn to r mil itar y se r vice. T hcsc• ari sto c rats w o u ld be o rde red to tu r n up at a ce r ta in t im c an d place no t on lv w ith ;1 rc-rin uc of fu lly eq u ippe d ho rsc·I1 K·t1 hut a lso w it h a supp ly train of ca rts ca r ry ing food and ot h er neec·ssit ies for rh rc· C 1lI00 Hh s' ca m pai g ni ng . T IK' Fra n ki sh cava lr y wo re the " b yr n ic", o r m a il co at , an d ca rr iv-d sh ields , T he ir pri nc ipa l we apo lls we re t he lan r v· or spea r and th e sw o rd . Accordi n g to C h ark l1l;lg nc's ed icts the ho rsem e n w ere also ex pec tcd to lK' eq u ippe d w it h ;\ bo w . At till".' f:1I 110 U S h:Htk' o f l'o it ic rs ;lga illst Ar :1h ra ide rs in 732 th e Frank s t'" l ~ h t o n fo o t , h ut h y C ha rle ma g llc··s ti m e th e y fough t m ou nt cd . usin g stir ru p , a nd th e h i ~h -ha c k ed sadd le to pro v ide a su ffic ie n tly stab le platfo rm fo r w ield ing the ir we apo ns. Wi th thi s st yle of ti ~h t i n ~ th e y pre saged tilt' kn i ~ht o f tilt' hi ~ h M iddl e A ~l' S . Frank ish cavalry The charge wi th lance couchant - held hor izo ntally as in a jo ust - w as one way that th e Frankish cavalryman fought ; he also wiel ded the weap on overarm, using a stabbing mot ion .

SCRAM ASEAXE

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THE BYZANTINES T he Byzant ine Empire was th e co ntinuatio n o f th e R oman Empire in th e cast and its armed force ' at fir st follo w ed t he R o m an pro fessio n al model. In th e 7t h ce nt ury, ho w eve r, w he n th e e mpire came u nder th reat from Mu slim A rab force s, a new form o f military organi zation

carry ing bows as w ell as sw o rds and lance s; the y also lacked the spec ial soc ial ' tat", that went with kni g ht hood. T he cata phra c ts t yp ica lly m ad e re pea ted lance charges in w aves suppo rte d by a rain of arrows , wea ri ng d own the enemy rather tha n attem pt ing to break through in a

single n13SS charge. 13y the 'tart of the l lrh ce nt ury, whe n Basil l l , known a, the Bul garslaye r, wa s e m pe ror, the Byzant ine arm y wa s OIlC' of the world 's mo st effec tive ti ~ht ill g forces, It never fully recovered, ho wever , from defeat by t he Selju k T u rks at Man zikert in 107 1.

e me rge d . The em pire w as di vided in to military d istricts kn own as "the me s", eac h und er the com ma nd o f J gc uc ra l o r "s tratcgos". Soldiers

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we re g ranted land to suppo rt th em selves, as the e m pi re co uld no t afford to pay thcm . Fro m th e Ht h ce nt u ry . Byzantium put m ore reli an ce upon the "ragma ra". cava lry and in fantr y regiment s in the dire ct e m ploy of th e e mpe ro r. T he re w as also an inc reasin g usc of forei gn auxi liarie s a nd me rcen ar ie s, incl udi ng the f:lIno us Vara n g ia n G uard. T he c rack troo ps w ere armoured cavalry, the ca ta ph rac ts. T he se differed from We
THE NORMANS A Viki ng w arba nd co n u u .mdcd by R oll o se tt led in nort her n Fra nce in <) 11, wi th t he agreeme nt of th e Fra nki sh kin g. C h arles the Sim ple. R oll o",

Norman adve nturer Robert G ui scard and hi s broth e rs took ove r so uthe rn Ital y a nd Sici ly after defeati ng the

d escendant' be came th e D u ke' of Norm andy. Because o f in te rm ar riage w ith o the r inh abitants of Fr an ce, b y th e I lth ce nt ury th e Norm ans Scandi navia n blo od w as mu ch diluted . but the wa rrio r spirit of th e ir intre pid ances to rs rem ain ed vl'ry mu ch alive . Norma n conques ts w ere wide-ran gin g. In the Mediterra nea n. rhe

force ' o f the H ol y Rom an Emperor H e nr y III at C iv itate in 1053 . They w er e re peated ly vict o ri ous aga inst th e Byzantine Greeks and threat en ed to attack Consta n tinople in th e to HO,. N orm an s were also pr ominent in th e First C rusade . wh ich ca ptu re d J er"'alem from th e Mu slim s in lO99 . R obert G u isca rd "s
"

Riveted bands reinforcinglap of helmet

Reinforcement of rim

Norman helmet The Normans wore a conical helm made of sheet iron. While offering some protection, it would not have been strong enough to withstand a direct blow with a sword or axe.

FIGHTING MET HODS A N orman a rm y alway, includ ed co ns ide rab le n umber s offoot so ld ie rs. These co mprised armoured infantr y wit h spea rs and bowmen ligh t arc her s w ith si mp le b o w, and a lesse r number of c ross bow mc n, But it wa s heav y cava lry t hat co nst it uted t he cream of t he

Crusading knight This knight armed with a spear wearsa Norman helmet and carriesa Norman shield. The distinctive long. kite-shaped shield is emblazoned with a cross that indicates that the knight isa crusader.

N orm an forces. These horsemen did not ye t h ave the soc ial stat us of the medieval knight ; th e y wer e sim ply profession al fightin g men w ho cou ld afford to ow n a warhorse . A N orman knight would j oin the e nto urage of a nobl em an in the ho pe o f reward through victory in war. It w as o n ly after th e co nque st of En gla nd tha t a fu ll-blow n "feu da l" syste m d eve lo ped. w it h k n ights ow ing service to thei r overlord - and ul t im at ely th e kin g - in re t u rn for land (" fiefs'). The N orman s w er e sk illed at war be came th e y pr acti sed it co nsta n tly. N ormandy w as th e sire o f end less lo wle vel w arfa re inv ol ving raid s and sie ges th at kept th e fig hti ng men act ivel y occ upied . The y were e xp ert cas tle- b ui lde rs, a ltho ug h until th e 12th ce nt ury these we re usu ally forts of earth and wood rather than sto ne structures. T he No rma ns b u ilt cast les a, pa rt of an offensive strate g y. regard in g them as mil itary bases fro III w hi ch mobi le force ' wou ld sally fo rt h to exer c ise co ntro l ove r a co nq uered reg io n .

The inva sion of Eng land offers a prime exa mple of ho w t he Normans waged wa r. Assemblin g a fleet of more than 700 vessels to carry arou nd 10,000 men , 3,000 hor ses, and all th e necessary eq uipme nt across th e C ha n nel showed exceptiona l orga nizat iona l ab ility. At H ast ings th e N orman tac tics we re in itiall y to soften up the Anglo Saxons w ith a ra in of arrows and th en laun ch a cava lry charge aga inst th e sh ield-wa ll with lances, r idi ng straig ht- legg ed in lo ng sti rrups o n th eir sho rt , st ur dy horses. Later in th e battl e th ey feig ned a ret reat to draw th e An glo-S axo ns o ut of form ati on , afte r w h ich th e kn ights co uld ge t amo ng th em wi t h swo rds. The N orm an s' subjectio n of Eng land afte r their victory at H astings showed a ru th less w ill to po wer.

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o Sicilian stronghold Some of th e most enduring monuments to th e military pow er of the Nor mans are to be fo und in Sicily, such as this cast le perched high on a cliff to p at Erice in th e we st of the island.

SHIELDS , HELMETS, AND COATS OF MAIL WERE SHIVERED BY THE FURIOUS AND IMPATIENT THRUSTS OF HIS SWORD ; SOME HE DASHED TO THE EARTH WITH HIS SHI ELD ORDERIC VITALIS DESCRIBING WILLIAM fiGHTING AT THE BATTLE Of HASTINGS

The battle of Ha st ings Chainmailed Norman foot soldiers advance to attac k th e An glo· Saxon line in a spectacular mod ern re-en act ment of t he battle.

MEDIEVAL KNIGHT WHAT IS THE FUNCTION O F KNIGHTS? TO GUARD THE CHURCH , TO FIGHT UNBELIEVERS, TO VENERATE THE PRIESTHOOD, TO PROTECT THE POOR FROM INJURIES , TO POUR OUT THEIR BLOOD FOR THEIR BROTHERS ... AND IF NEED BE , TO LAY DOWN THEIR LIVES. JOHN OF SALISBURY, POLICRATICUS, 1159

H E EU HO I'EAN KN I GH T

T

wa s a formidable wa rrior, an armou red

horseman equ ippe d w ith lan ce and swo rd who - in prin ciple if no t always in practi ce - domin ated the m edi eval battl efield I

J

w ith h is superior fightin g sk ills. T he knight also represen ted

a cu lt u ral idea l of C h ristian m an hood wh ose hon o u r, valo u r, and virt ue we re cele b rated in th e epic poetry o f the period . In pr acti ce , as professio nal fighting men, kni ghts we re of necessity im mersed in th e inglorio us realit y of m edi eval war fare, besm irched by cou ntless episodes of plunder a nd m assacre.

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T he m edi e va l knight e m e rges obscurely into the pag es of h istor y fro III the heav y cava lry e m plo ye d in the realm s of th e g re at Fr an ki sh ru le r C h ar le m ag ne and hi s succes so rs ill the <)th and lut h ce nt u r ies. T hese we re m oun ted fighti ng: m e n w ith ;1 key roll' in w ar fare hut 110 special stat us o r prest ige. se rv in g a local lord o r

the k in g . From aro u nd the m id dl e o f the l l th century, howe ver, kni gh ts began to be recogn ized as elite warriors of notable so ci al standing . T he c r usader mo ve m e nt agai nst M uslim co ntro l of

wa s fo rma lly co nferred wi th the ce re mo ny of the "accolade" .

;1

g ird ing w it h a swo rd or touch

of sw o rd or hand on the sho u lde r, In the case o f a ro yal p rince o r the so n o f a noble ma n th is wo uld he the o ccasio n fo r elaborate fe sti viti es.

COST LY RO LE Kin g s in c reasing ly assu med the excl us ive righ t to c0 11 I<'·r kni g ht ho o d s and u sed th is as a l1le;lll"

Th e speci al status of kn ig ht s wa s co n firmed by

of rai si ng re ven u e. c harg in g a he ft y t<" e fl.)!" the pr ivileg e . By the J.lth ce ntury, m a ny qualified b y birth to be k ni g hts tried to avo id the ex pe nse and o nero us duties it in vo lved . A s we ll as the cos t o f th e accolade. t here wa s a su bsta nt ia l ou tlay for eq u ip me n t and mo un ts. A k n ig ht ne ed ed at lea st tw o ho rves w he n 011 cam paig n - a pa lfrey. o r sadd le ho rse , fo r ord inary tra vel a nd a splend id d estr icr, or w arhorse . f()r co m bat . Fu ll plate armo ur. w h ich g radua ll y re place d the m i x of cha in m a il and plate, w as vc ry e xpens ive, shaped

pub lic cc rc m o u ics and sy m bols. as wel l as b eing pro te ct ed by law s an d decree s tha t atte m pted

to oft<'·r pro tec tion again "t Illi"siks and sw o rd blows. ye t lig ht .iud \\'l·1I ba la ucc d e no ug h to he

to g uarant,..·e its e xclu sivi ty. H era ld ic e m ble m s.

co m forta b le wh e n fIg htin g o n fo ot . T he k ni g lu wo ul d also nccd » lan ce , a sw o rd . a sh ield, and pro ba b ly a m ace , war- h.u nmer. or po lea xe, Many yo u llg 11It' lI w ith i ry were prepared to p;ly tor the ho rse s an d kit hut ba u lkc d at th e cos t ofa kn igh th o od , or lacked the req ui site birt h q ual iti cat ion . T hey rem ain e d

the I-I o ly Lan d h ig h lig hted t he ima ge of k ni g ht s

as spec ifically C hristian warriors and d e fen der s of t he C hurc h . K ni g h ts' p re st ige ro se so rap id ly th at . hy the l Zt h ce nt u r y. e ver y no bleman wa s h appy to d escr ibe h im self as a k n ig ht . alt ho u g h m o st kn igh ts were nor noble m e n .

BECOM ING A KN IGHT

used to deco rate ban ner s. shie lds . and surcoats

so t hat helm eted kni g ht s co u ld be readil y ide n ti fi ed at to u r na m e nt s Of in battle. devel o ped in to a sys te m of syurhols ide nti fyi ng eac h warrio r's place ill the k n igh tly caste . O ver tim e the lo w bo r n were e x plic it ly forbid de n tr om be com ing kn ig ht s an d k ui g hrly sta t us

became la rgel y he re dita ry . [Jo ys of appropria te soc ial stand ing wou ld serve first as pag es and the n as sq u ires in the ho useh o ld of a kn ig ht w ho en sured thei r cd ucat io n in ho rse m an sh ip and the U Sl' o f the sw o rd and lan ce . W he n th e y w ere o ld eno ug h and were j udged tit to be k n igh ts. kn ightho od

m

l ita

amhit i on s

squ ires or se rg ea nts . fIg hting alon g sid e the kn ig hts an d larg el y iudi snn guishuhlc fro m the m 0 11 the bar rlcfic ld . A squ ire o r serge ant mi g ht ho pe to recei ve .in acco lade o n the batrlcficld ill

re co g n ition of SOllie spec tac ular fea t o f a rm s. thou gh suc h on -t he- spot k nig htin gs we re no t co m m o n . Kni g hts. squ ires , a nd se rg eants we re co llec tive ly k no w n as " men- at- ar ms".

ITALIAN HHO UN5KUl l BA51N ET

H

ex pec t to be paid for th e ir se rv ices . even tho ugh till' service w as recog n ize d as :1 fcud al o blig atio n. By th e same tok en , t hey co u ld o fte n pay m onl' y ill lieu of se r v ice - shield tax o r "sc utage".

C H I VA LRY A N D GLO RY

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Heraldry Heraldic devices. such ao; the shieldsdisplayed by this 15th-centuryknight in the Codex capodi/ista, wereboth a military statussymbol and a mark of social standing.

Kn ight s broad ly tin ed into the

Sp. tL'111 Of Pl' fS0 I13 1

lo yalt y and mut u al o bliga tio n th at shape d m edieval society. T he)' m ight. for cxa m pk.. . OWL' military se r v ice 3'\ vasva l.. or licgc m c n to a lord or k in g

ill re tu rn for a g ran t of land held as a fief - th e classi c patt ern of th e " feuda l" syste m . But in the late r M idd le Ag es

1l101 1L't ar y

a rra ngc mc uts

progn.,v"i\'l·)y cam e to the fore. Wheth er k ni ghts

lived 011 their OW I1 laud O f as rc tai ucrs in a noble ho usehold, by the l-lt h cen t u r y they w ould

M edieval societv tho rou ghl y e nco u rage d yo ung ma les of social stand ing to see k g lory ill wa r. The y were pro vid ed wi th rol l' m od els ho th ill fic t io n - as ill the Arthuri an leg end s o r till.' French "chan son s de gcs rc" - and ill tales of th e tl.-ats of co nte m po rary real-life hero es suc h as Engla nd's Blac k Pr i nce or Ber t rand du Gu csclin , th e co n- ta ble o f Fran ce . The C hurch sa nct ifie d th e prac tice of wa r, at least if directed agai nst " in fi dels" o r in so me o ther j ust c.iusc , and the co de o f ch ivalry established princ iples o f co nd uc t th at a kni ght sho u ld li llio w . C h ivalry incorp or ate d man y of the usual princi ples of wa rrio r m or alit y, suc h as lo yalty to yo ur leader o r to yo ur brorhc rs-iu - arm s, to g e ther with C h r ist ia n- d crivc d values suc h as respect for til . ., po o r and need y, But rhc, ch ivalric co de w as a lso a practi cal a r ra nge me n t bcrwcc' 1I kni ghts to limit th e ri sk s o f wa rfa re . Being of th e same rank :lI HI o fte n related by blood o r m ar r iugc . o pposing kn ights had an inte res t ill avo iding a ti ght to the dea t h. If they were I;K in g d e feat . they co uld u su all y su r re n de r ill the co n fi de n t ex pecta t ion of bei ng t reated we ll as prisoners and eventua lly ra nsomed -

altho ugh there we re exce ptions to thi s ru le, as wh en t he English Kin g I knr y V o rde re d the killin g of Fren ch pr isoners at Ag incourt in 14 15. R an soms co u ld be co nsidera ble su ms of m otl e y, so t here was o bv io us ly a p rofit mo tive at work ill t he prese r vat ion of pri son er s' lives. H o we ver mu ch kn igh ts mi gh t be inspired hy the prospect of ho nou r and g lo ry, the y usuall y a lso h ad m an-ri al goa ls in sig ht. M an y kn igh ts w e n ' 1;1t from w ealth y, T hey m ight ho ld fil' fs th at were sma ll plot s ofla nd sim ilar to th ose worke d by pea sant fam ili e s, o r they co uld be yo u llgl' r so ns wi th no cx pcc rario n of an in hc r irance. Skill in th e USl' o f a r m s gave a m an a chan ce to better h im se lf H e co u ld li>rgl' a di stin gui shl'd m ilit ary career, as Bert ra nd d u Gucsclin d id from un promisin g pro v inci al ori g ins, or w in land s throu gh part ici pating in co nques t, :lS h appe ned d ur in g th e C r u sades .

PRIN C IPL ES AND PROfI T So me kni ghts j oin ed m ilit ary or ders , swearing a llcgia ucc to thl' m aster of th e o rde r and fidelit y to th eir co m panions , These orde rs, o ft en all elite :Ull o ng the kni ghtho od , we re ei ther reli g iou s lik e th e Tcmpl ar s, Ho spit.illc rs. or Te uto nic Kn ights Horse armour The warhorsewas the knig ht's most expensive and vltal- piece of equipment. Horsearmour.such asthis 15th·century Germanshaffron(head plate). helped protect mountsin battle or during jousts.

EVOLUTION OF THE KNIGHT The evolution of European knight s' helmets and body

hood the knight wore his helm, a cone of iron with

armour from the l l th to the 16t h century reflected

a nosepiece as the sole protection for the face. The

countered by wearing identifying plumes on helmet s or cloth surcoats - the latter also serving to cool th e

advances in the technology of metalworking. but also the changing status of the knight. At the start of the

limitations of mail are evident in th e fact tha t knights still carried shields to ward off blow s.

metal in hot sun. From the 15th century onwa rds. plate armour was at its most elaborate. Metalworkers in Milan

period he was a rough -and-ready figh ting man in the

In t he followi ng centurie s. sections of plate we re added to t he chainrnail, spreading from vulnerable point s such as the lower legs, arms. and shoulders to

we re luxury works of art, intended primarily for tou rnament s. Meanw hile the battl efield fun ct ion of

service of a great lord or ruler; by it s end the knight had a prestige and self-impor tance that generally outweighed his practi cal funct ion on the batt lefield. The basic armour of the knight in the 11th century was the hauberk, a coat of chainmail knee-length, short- sleeved. and with a hood (or coif) to protect the head and neck. Over this 10th ·century helm This wencesles-stvte helm isforged from a single piece of iron Withan added nasal guard. Body armour of the period would be mainly chainmail.

cover the enti re body, including the feet, by around 1400. The head received maximum protection, with a steel cap wo rn under the mail coif and over it a flat- or roun d- topped helmet wit h a visor covering the face. The anonymity of this ou tfit was 14th-centur y basinet Full plate armour only gradually replaced chammail. This Italian basmet combinesa mail collar with a removable conical plate visor.

and Augsburg produced engraved suits of armour that

knighlly armour was undermined by the spread of firearms and disciplined pike-wielding infantry. Both knig ht s and their armour became increasingly decorative and decreasingly effective. 16th-century Armet Helmets and armour reached the heightof their magnifICence in the 16th century. fashions growingincreasingly elaborate asthe knight's battlefield role declined.

in o ne cxrcpr ionu lly co,t1y to u r n .u ncnt at l' U ~' in 1241 . A subs tunr ial a mo u nt ofda llugt,.' W ;I'\ ;11,0

WH EN TH E TOURNAM ENT WA S IN PROGR ESS KN IGHTS ... FE LL IN SUCH N UMBERS, SOM E DEAD, SOM E PERMANENTLY DISA BLED, T HAT IT SEE M ED T HE SPORT NOT SO MU CH OF M EN AS OF DE MO NS . TH OMA S OF CA N TIMPRt. DESCRIBING A TOURNAME NT AT NEUSS, 1241

ded icat ed to follow ing ~l 1Il 0 1l ;1 ~[ i ( ru le or secu lar like till' Order of th e

of co m pe ti tive fu n hut also a public arena in w hi ch talented co mb.u anrs co u ld see k fa me and for tun e. In it iall y tournament s we n ' th e occas io n of mock b att les foughr b etwee n t w o sides ran gin g ove r ;1

Colden Fle ece ill Hu rg u ud v. t he O rd e r of the Stu ill Fra nce. or till' O rder of th e Band ill Ca st ile . Bu t kni ght s were nor always so loft y ill t hc... ir

wi de area o f co u n trys ide . As ill real battl es. klli ~ht s w e re oft ell ta ke n prisoner , t
pret en sion s. O thers became o utr ig ht m cr ccu ar ics. lead in g " fre e co m pa n ies" th at w ere ill effe ct pr ivate pro fe ssion al armies. sl'lIing: t heir serv ices to cities and states. non e of w hic h co u ld afford ( 0 m a int ain pe r m3 l1l'llt sta ndi ng armies , T hus till' fo rce t ha t a m edi eval k in g led off to war woul d be far fro m homoge no us. It m ight incl ude h is

OWIl

ho use hol d

kni g hts. h is bar on s o r lo rd s an d the ir feudal fo llo w er s, co n ringc nr« pr ovid ed

by th e mi litary o rders . and m erce n ar ies led by th eir ow n ch ie fs. At wo r st, durin g times o fdi so rder and soc ial breakdo w n . k n ights mi g ht d ege ne rat e int o bri gands, usin g their sk ills to carve out a di shon est living throu gh ro b be ry , plu nd e r. and p illage ,

TO U RNA MENTS O nce the warrior cas te of knigh ts h ad been

cre ated. rlu-y need ed a const.m r su pply of pret ext s to r ti ~ht ill ~ , so th ey co u ld fulfil t hei r am bitious pursu it of ~Iory and pr ofit . There were norma lly W ;1fS to be rou nd. if not in a kni g ht's home co u nt ry t he n a ro u nd rh c per iphe r y o f th e C h r ist ia n wo rld w he re cr us ades we re m o re or k'ss pcnu a ucu t ly in pr o gr e ss ;lga inst Muslim s o r pagan s. But a ll o utlet for mar tial e ne rg ies an d am bi tio ns w as a lso to be fo u nd ill the rourn nm cn ts th at bee.nn e popular throu gh out W est ern Eu ro pe from th e l Zth ce n tu ry o nwa rd . Although th ese d id fu nct io n as pr act ical m ilitar y trainin g exercises. th e y we re prim ar ily spo rt - a so u rc e Jousting to urna me nt The pomp and pageantr y of the late r medieval tournament is well captured in this scene from a 15th- century editio n of Froissat t's Chronicles .

k ni ghts rep o rt edl y killed Jo ust ing helm This late l Sth· century German helmet features sloping sides to de flect an opp on ent 's lance and steel attac hments to lock t he helm to th e bod y armou r.

don e to propl' rty ill th e co m bat ZOUl' . By the l-lth cen t ury. rh esc hu gel y dcs t r uct ivc frc c -fo r- a lls h ad Iar~e l y be e n rep laced by st r ict ly for m a lizcd co m ba t foug h t wi th b lunted Wl';l PO llS a nd u nd e r str ic tly e n fo rc ed ru les . J ou , t in g hCC1111l' a cc n trul t'i..';ltUl"e o fro u ru am c uts ill w h ich indi vidu al k n ights c ha rged o ne allo t he r w it h co uched lance and co m p let ing th e ir du d w it h swo rds o n fo o t . U nde r the in flu en ce of chiva lric rom an ce . kn igh ts t
M A KI NG WAR M edi eva l kni ghts we re co m m itte d to an idea l o f wa r fare in wh ich mo u nte d warriors fo ug ht o ne ano the r at close qua r te rs in a ta il' co nt est of co u rage. st re ngt h . and sk ill. Bu t th e rea lity of wa rfare wa s o fie n \'(.'r y di fferent ,

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Siege wa rfa re An illustration from the Chronicles of Charles VII showing a group of knightsand other men -at- arms under the banner of the Dauphin Louis spearheading an assault on the bastille at Dieppe in 1443.

PITCHED BATTLE TACTICS ,-1/

A s profe ssio na l so ld iers , kni l;ht s o ft e n co nduc ted cam paig ns ill which such no ble passag c..'s at anus

were rare. Pitch ed ha t ties were UIl C0ll11l1 01l in med ieva l warfa re. In stead . siege warfare occ up ied cen tre stage. Sin ce th e bui ldi ng of castles and torrifi ed tow ns was h i ~hl y d e veloped , s it.'~es were as pro lo nged as the y were frequen t . KJli ~llt s o ccasio na lly perf ormed he ro ics ill assau lting cast le wa lls, but more ofte n th eir role wa s m argi nal. since spc ri a list« we re e mployed to o pe rate siege engi nes o r to to di g m ines under de fen ce s. There was

little hut bored om a nd hardshi p to he..' ttnll1 d in cam piug for JJ1 01lth s in un he althy cond itio ns o ut sid e th e wa lls of a town, or ill be in g on e of the besieged defenders. and it wa s not u nkn o wn tor kni ghts from th e o ppos ing sides to ag n:e..' to su g e ~1 to uru.nncnr to allevia te th e tedium . If a to wn

h eld out until it w as taken by sto r m . the ru les o f war permitted the vic to rs to re lie ve th eir fru stration s by SU hjl· ( t i ll~ its population to pilla g e: a nd slaug hter. Thi s was a right of w hic h knigh ts to o k fu ll adva ntage, as when c r u sade rs massacred th e' citizens of'jc rusa lc m in 10 ')') or w he n till' Black Prince o rde red th e syscc ma ti c slaughter o f t he people of Lim o ge s in 1370.

C LOSE C O M BAT

The mount ed element of a medieval army wo uld consist of gro ups of 30 or 40 men-at-arms, each behind th eir leader's banner. A number of such groups, combined with foo t soldiers, would form a "battle", the basic all-arms division. Two or three batt les typically made up an army in the field. Drawing up his forces on the battlefield, an experienced commander woul d try to position them so t hey had the sun and wind at their backs. The mo re confiden t side wou ld hope to win the battl e through the shock effect of a charge by its mo unted knights and othe r men-at-ar ms.

Apart from sieges, wa rfare

co ns iste d largely of rai d in g and lay ing was te to e ne lllY rcrrirory. a m essy bu sin e ss th at impo sed m aximum cos t up on lo cal popu lati o n s wi t h

Knights o f Christ A lineof crusader knights charge their opponents at Ascalon, near Jerusalem, in

1099. The impact from a groupof well-ordered mounted knights moving at speed could be immense, particularlyagainst less heavily armoured opposition.

CHARGE AND COUNTER-CHARGE A commander w ho intended to stan d on th e defensive wo uld exploit natural obstacles such as hedges, ditches, or soft ground to block the enemy charge. Alternatively, his soldiers woul d create artifici al obstacles, digging trenches or making palisades. Afte r some preliminary skirmishing, especially by bow men, the knight s on one side woul d launch th eir charge, surging forward on ho rseback or on foo t to engage their oppo site num bers wi th lance, mace, axe, and swo rd. If the initial advance was halted, the men-at-arms standing on the defensive wo uld advance on foo t to engage the opposing knight s in a melee or might mount to deliver a counter-charge.

WH EN BATTLE IS JOINED, NO NOBL E KNIGHT THINKS OF ANYTHING OTHER T HAN BREAKING H EADS AND ARMS. BERTRA N DE BORN. FRENCH BARON AND TROUBADOUR (c.1140- 1215)

m in imum kni g htl y co m bat . Nonetheless, heavil y ar mo u re d . m ou nt ed k n ig hts we re a fo rmid abl e fo rce w he never battle was j o ine d in O pl' ll field . At batt les suc h as Bou vincs in 12 14 a nd I'oitic rs in U 5(" k ni g hts fo rm ed up in th eir fu ll splendo ur ca r ried o ur cla ssic cha rges a nd fought o ne ano ther in savage melees m ounted a nd 0 11 fo ot. W ell- ma de a rmo u r o ffered exc el le nt pr ot ecti on and gavc a kn ight fu ll m o bility to w ield h is lan ce, swo rd . or axe, in the sadd le o r o ut of it. T he shoc k of close- quarte rs co m bat w as, o f co urse, inte nse an d put a pr emium up on ph ysical st re n g th an d end u ra nce. es pec ia lly if hor wea the r m ad e the wei ght of t he ;IrIHO Ur h ard to bear, Bu t fo r ti fie d by their co de o f perso nal hon ou r and du ty. kn igh ts rarel y fli nch ed o nce co m bat was join ed . The ir ch ie f wea k ness b y in t he in rcmpcrarc agg ress io n and qu ar relsomen e ss o f hot-head ed individu als ben t up on g lory. C h ro n ic les o f medie val wa r fare tell t im e a nd aga in o f g ro ups of kni gh ts un wi sel y br ea kin g ra n ks to cha rge J supe r io r r lll' lllY in a self-c o nsc io us sho w of co m pe t itive bra ver y. oft ell in defian ce ofa battl e plan ag ree d in adv anc e. T he kni gh ts' d isc ipl in e rar el y m at ch cd th eir va lo ur.

Europ ean sword s Early medieval swords were broad and heavy. used to hack through mail. As plate armour improved , swords grew longer and more sharply pointed fo r thru stin g.

Tourna me nt ar mour During the 16th century. specialist armour for use in tou rnaments became common . This ornate German suit feat ures heavier protectio n along th e more vulnerable left arm and shoulder, while ventilation holes are kept to the right -hand side of the visor.

LIVI N G O N Eve n in th e l-lt h ce n t u ry , th e battlefield domin an ce o f kni ghts w as ch alle nged by lightl y ar mo u re d foot so ld ie rs at Cou r t ra i a nd Banno ckburn and b y a rch ers at C recy, Fro m rh e second ha lf o f th e 15th centu ry, g u npo wd er w eapo n s w ere in creasin gly effect ive. as were d isciplined in fan tr y armed w ith pik es. But a r mo u red cava lry w as not dri ven fro m the ba ttle field by arro w s. ca n no n or ar q ue b uses. In so m e th ing close to it s medieva l form it rem ained a n impo rt ant cle me nt in bat tl es int o th e lat e 1(,th ce ntu ry . By th en , ho w e ver , th e soc ia l a nd c u lt u ra l basis of kn ightho od had d ecline d wi th a n in c rease in ce n tra l state p owe r a nd t he in exorable ri se of pro fessio na l so ld ie r ing .

RIDIN G SWO RD. EARLY 14TH CENTURY

HAN D· AN D· A·H AlF SWORD. EARLY 15TH CENTU RY

M EDI EVAL CASTLE Fortificati on s were ubiquitous in medi eval Europe, from the high wall s and citadels th at prot ect ed major tow ns to th e castles th at served as military srrongpoints and ad m in istrative

Great hall

ce ntres. ll odiam Cas tle in so uthern England . constructed during the Hundred Years' War . is an exampl e o f a fortified individual dwel ling - th e residen ce of a we alth y knight. Sir Edward Dallin gridgc, who beli eved hi s horne was at risk from att ack by the Fren ch .

Square side tower

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C astle design evo lved co nti n uo usly through th e m edieval per iod . O r ig ina lly Eu ro pea n cas tles we re bu ilt o f wo od a nd eart h. T he ad op tion o f sto ne as a co n str u ct io n m at erial [rom th e 1 t th ce n tu ry m ad e th em more ex pe nsive to build but far m or e e nd u ring and pre sti gious struc t u res, immun e to fir e a nd rot. The ea rliest sto ne castles co nsisted o fa ce nt ral tower, Of "keep ", w hi ch w as e nc ircle d by a dcf..n sive w a ll. By the time Bodiam was b ui lt i ll 13H5, ho we ve r, towers had been integrated in to t he walls and the gatc ho usc had become the m ost st ro ng ly defended po sition

in th e fortificati ons. A castle was a visua l state m e nt o f th e we alth , po w er. a nd pr esti ge o f its ow ne r. But it W:l S a lso a pr acri ral milirar v st r uc t u re, sk ilfu ll y d esign ed to g ive its defender s th e be st ch a nce o f holdi ng off an cnelllY. Its wall s a nd tower s h ad to be resistant to sto ne - th ro w ing sieg e e ng ines , and diffic ult for tUlllld-di gging en gineers to undermi ne . T he incr easing use of ca n no n in the 15th ce ntury eventua lly m ade the h igh , t hi ck sto ne wa lls of the m edi eva l castle ob so lete. for th e y co u ld not w it hsta nd th e batter in g o f su ch powerful projectiles ,

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Causeway

Bodi am Cast l e Built around a courtyard, Bodiam Castl e had round towe rs at each corner, square towers on each side, and for ti fied gatehouses at both t he front and the back.

AT BOD IA M . N O T RACE OF THE MODERN WORLD APPEARS TO I N VA D E THE A NC IENT AND SOLITARY BEAUTY OF T H E SCEN E. LO RD (UR ZON OF KEODLESTO N. 1859 -1925

Knight in armo ur A castle was stocked with armou r and weapons. Full plate armou r and visored helme ts of sophistica ted shape came into use in the 15th century.

W at er o bsta cle An aerial view shows how the moat would force any attacker to advance up the narrow causeway at the front of the cast le.

Cast le g ate The main gate was a potential weak point, since it could succumb to a battering ram . The gate would be protected during a siege by lowering the iron portcullis.

Sieg e engi ne The tor sio n-pow ered ballista was inherited by med ieval Europe from the Roman Empire. It was, in effect, a powerful crossbow.

Ston e sh ields Heraldic shields carved above the castle gates were meant to impress visitors with the owner's status . Many owners, however, were in fact minor knights grown rich on plunder.

Battl em ents Corbels support the battlements, which have crenels (gaps) used by archers .

of a wealthy man, and as such had its hall

thicknessof the castle's outer walls. The needs

Fin e ceili ng The castle's inner chambers boasted elaborately vaulted ceilings. Such

designed in the finest contemporary fashion, with Gothic arched windows.

of defence dictated that outer openings be kept small, making for a sombre interior.

decoration was another display of the owner's wealth and refined taste .

Great hall

Sturdy w alls

The castle was the fortified manor house

Window embrasures reveal the impressive

Ston e interi or The castle buildings were hard to heat. The stone floors were strewn with rushes. straw, or herbs and

tapestries bedecked the walls.

Fairy-tale castl e Aesthetics were as important in the design of Bodiam as military considerations . It was consciously built to fulfil the ideal of a beautiful castle as described in medieval romances .

Machicolations

Loophole

Round tower

Inn er chamb ers

Openings known as machicolations between the corbels of a projecting battlement allowed the defenders to drop missiles onto an enemy beneath. These machicolations are in the gatehouse.

The walls are dotted with loopholes and arrow-slits to allow defenders to shoot outwards. This one is in the lower gatehouse wall.

The corner towers were an excellent vantage point from which to observe the surrounding countryside . Their curved surfaces deflected missiles hurled by siege engines .

Smaller structures within the castle walls provided accommodation for the knight's household and storerooms for weapons and armour.

M EDI EVAL MOUNTED WARRIORS The state of military techno logy in the med ieval pe riod ensured

M uslim - do mina ted eastern M edi ter ran ean fro m 1098 to 1291,

that , u nder most circu m stances, the armo ured fight ing m an o n

orde rs of wa rr io r- mon ks we re fou nde d to fig ht a holy war. T hei r

horseback was a decisive figure in wa rfare, But th ese heavy

Muslim cncm ies wer e equa lIy inspired by rei igiou s ent husiasm,

cava lry me n, altho ug h all fighting with lan ce and sword, were

as well as by more practi cal moti ves. At the other ex tre me, bands

varied in th eir mili tar y orga n ization. In th e co urse of th e C rusa des,

o f m ercen ari es led by faith less kni ghts fou ght cy n ically for

w hi ch estab lished and sustained C hr istian k ing do ms in th e

per son al profi t, at tim es layin g regions of Europe to waste .

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Po unded hy crusade r kni gh ts b.iscd ill th e Temple o f So lo III 01 1 ill j eru salem ill 111 <), th e T e m plnrs W Cf C the tirst monastic military o rder. Like mo n ks, th e y lived b y a rule of po vert y. ch ast ity, and o bed ie nce, hut th e y also de ve lop ed int o a ll e lite m il itar y force. N u m ber i ng aro u nd J O() " brothe r kn ig hts", the Te mp lar s were n.'co g nizl'd as th e best di sc ipli ned cleme nt ill the c rusade r armies. The)' were also the wea lt hiest, thank s to the piou s don atio n s th e y recei ved fro m all ov er C h rist ian Euro pe . T hi s a llo we d the m to b u ild im pressive castles and e m ploy substantial

number s of foot so ld iers. T he T cmplar s fou ~ht co u rag eo u sly ill d efence of th e c r usad e r state s to th e vt'r y en d . T hei r Gran d Master, Wi lliam o f Bcauj eu , w as amo ll ~ t ho se ki lled w hen th e port of Acr e, th e last c ru sade r stro nghold ill th e H o ly Land, fell to th e Eg yptia n Maruluks ill 1291. T he Tcmplars' we alth ev e ntu ally pr oved th eir und o ing . In 13 07 th e impec u n io u s Fren ch K ing Philip IV a rrested all t he Tc m plar s wi th in h is lan d s, cha rgi ng th em wi th hereti cal and obsce ne prac tices. Pop e C lement V suppressed rh e o rd er ill 1.1 12 an d th e last Te m plar G ra nd M aster , J acques de M ol ay, w as burned at t he stake ill 1.1 14 .

... THEY APPEAR GE NTLER THA N LAMBS. YET FI ERCER THA N LI O NS. Sf BERNARD OF ClAIRVAU X PRAISING THE TEMPlARS IN THEEARLY YEARS OF THE ORDER

The mili tary o rde r o f th e Teut onic Kni ght s wa s t(HlIlded by G erma n c rusade rs at Acrc ill the K in gdo m

of'j c r usalcm in 11 9H. It is 1110 st fam o us for its c r usade s ill Euro pe . From 1226 th e o rder waged ;1 lon g . br utal w ar to su bjug ate th e pag an Pru ssians, establi shi ng its o w n state i n Pru ssia. III th e l-lth ce nt ury its a n nu al ca m paig ns ag ainst pag an Lithuani a we re j oined by kn ig h ts from ac ro ss Europ e. TI1l' o rde r w as also at o dds w ith its Cat ho lic ne ig hbou rs, th e Pol es. When th e Lithu ani an s. no w C h ristian iz ed , and th e Pol es unircd ag a in st th e Te ut o ni c Kn ights. the y cru shed them at t he battl e of G runwa ld ill 14 10. T h e order ne ve r reco ver ed from th is defeat a nd gradu a lly lo st a ll its Balt ic te rr ito ries, alt ho ugh it survived - ill n am e at least - u nt il I H09. Rond el d agg er This style of dagger was popular With kniqht s across northernEurope.

Crusader helm et The flat-topped "pot helm", wi th a hinged visor covering the face, was the standard headgear of Christian knights in the Crusades.

Templ ar castle In Portugal the Order of Christ took over th Templar headquarters at Toma r, where it preservedthe tradition of warrior-monks.

THE CONDOTTIERI In th e l-Ith and 15 th ce n tu r ies , th e wars foughr

ill northern Italy wer e dominated by co m pan ies o f 1J1l'TCCIJarics led

by com ma nders kn own

as

"coudo trieri" - fr om tilt: "condorr a" or co nt ract o f service th at th ey w ould negotiate with th eir employers. The co ndo trier i provided armed

forces fo r city state s suc h as Milan. Florence. Veni ce . and Genoa, which had grow n rich 011 trade and m an ufa cture but had no substa ntial milita r y forces of th eir o w n. The lirst of these

co ndo rtier i w e re rootle ss kni ghts from o utside Italy, hailing from co u n tr ies suc h as G erm any, Spain , H u n gar y, and En gland , They were later

It alian sallet This fine example of a sallet, a style of helmet that came into fash ion in the mid- 15th century, was made in Milan around 1480.

su pplan te d b y Ital ia ns, sim ila rly see k ing to m ake their fortunes through the pro fe ssio n o f arms .

with oth er mercen aries th at mi ght cos t their men's lives, They tended in ste ad to bribe th e oppo siti on to give

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way - or, preferabl y. to he bribed them selves. Yet SOIl 1l.' condorticri WOIl gr e.u renown . The

T he co ndo tric r i were e ntrepreneurs wit h a w ho lly cyn ical attitude to th eir pr ofe ssio n , T he mc rcc nary co m pan ies that they asse mb led t ypi ca lly consist ing of a few th ousan d k nig hts and fo ot soldiers - w o u ld figh t fo r whoever paid th em and w ere notoriou s for changing sides at sho rt not ice . A ll , at rimes, l()u g ht

aga ins t c ities th at h ad p rev io usly e m ployed th em . Alth oug h th ey liked to m a ke a go o d sho w on th e battlefi eld, we ari ng su per b su its of ar mo ur, the y avoided any h in t 0(;' lig ht to th e death , The y co u ld be vi cious in till' ma ssacre of c iv ilia ns , bu t ba cked off from se r io us clas hes Brigand ine Worn chiefly by the foot soldiersin condottieri bands, the brigandine wasa light sleeveless body armour of canvasand steel plates faced with rich material, in this case crimson velvet, which hasall but perished .

re ca ptu re d j e ru salem fo r Isla m after de ci sively dc fcariu g a C hris t ia n ar my at H att in in II H7. O n ly the ar r iva l of forces fro m Euro pe led by Kin g Ri ch a rd t he Lionhea rt of Engla nd and Ph ilip Au gu stu s o f Fr an ce ena b led a cru sader p r~ s~n c~ to su r v ive in th e H o ly Land , D ivisio ns betwee n the neighbo uring Mu slim states gavl' the Christians a rep rie ve unti l the M aml u ks, slave so ld ie rs o f Turki sh o r ig in , overthrew their m asters and se ize d power ill Eg yp t in I2(,lI. Under their in spired ge ne ra l ll aybars. rhc Mam luks intlict,'d a s~ r i ~s o f crus h ing d~f~at s up on th~ Christians, as w~ 1I as triu m ph ing ov~ r th~ Mongo ls at t h~ battl~ of Ain jalut. T Ill' c rusa d~ rs w~r~ ~tT~ctivel y b~at~n well brfor~ t h ~ (,II o f Acr~ in 12') 1 brought their presen ce in Pale stine to an c nd .

M uslim arm ies u sed broad ly the "1I111' militar y tc chuolog y as their C h r ist ia n o pponents, b ut t heir ta cti cs were co m pletely d ifferent. Un li ke European knights, the y h ad no spec ial lik in g for the cava lr y charge or clos e-q ua r te rs co m bat, tend in g to avo id pit ch ed battl e unr il t he ir o ppo ne n ts had been fata lly wea ke ne d o r IUTl·d int o an e nc irc leme n t. T hcy m ad e g rea t usc o f mounted arche rs fig htin g as sk irm ishers. w ho wo u ld iufli cr lo sse s fro m a di stan ce, th en m ak e thei r cs ca pe if the C hristian kni gh ts atte m pted to charg e . Mu slim cav a lry me n wore sig n ifica ntly Saladin 's army Despitereligious enmity, the crusadersrecognized Muslim warriorsas worthy and chivalrous opponents. They were represented by many European artists as digni fiedand pious.

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Eng lish kn ig ht Sir j o h n Hawk w ood . lea de r uf the W hit" Com pan y, died a wea lthy man in Plorc nce in 13')4 and had h is equestrian po rt ra it pain ted as a fresco ill the ci ty 's cat hedra l. Som e of th e le ad in g condo tt ic r i de velo ped po lit ica l am bitio ns, the mo st successfu l fi.H lIlding ru lin g d yn asti e s, Thu s Fra ncesco Sfor za , hi m sel f t he so n of a m c rce llar y captain, fo ug hr ill a di zzyin g se r ies of wars for and again st the Pope . Mi lan, Flo ren ce , and Venice (am o ng o the rs) befor e establishin g himself as Duke o fMi l.m in 14511 . From the btl' 15th ce nt u ry on ward , much of

Ital y was foug ht over b y th e ar m ies of Fran ce and Spain , assisted by Swi ss and C crm an m er ce nar ies. These fo rces showed up th e military ddi ci cll ci e s o f th e Italian condo rricri bands, so that by th e

mid- Iorh ce n t u ry till' trad it ion h ad di ed o u t.

MUSLIM WARRIORS Th e invasion of Palestine by C hri sti an armies at the e nd of the 11th ce n tu ry wa s a sh oc k to the Islam ic wo rld . It provoked a rev ival of the spir it ofjilltJd (religious w ar) ill a se ries of co unteroffensives thro ugh the fo llowi ng two ce nturies. The Kurdi sh- bor n r u ler of Egy pt, Sa ladi n,

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lcvs arm o u r than th e C h r istians and we re thuv b etter adapted to lightin g in a hot c lima te. In general. pro spcrous Mu slim states suc h as Eg YlH, fig htin g ncar to horne. w ere able to assl'mbk' far larger ar m ics than the C hr isrian s co uld ever fi eld . ensu ring their vi ctor y ill the lo nge r term.

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has been acc u rately described as "a n ord inary

wo oden bow". Yet th e o utsta nd ing sk ill o f English and Wel sh arche rs tran sformed thi s rather primit ive wea pon into a decisive battl e-winn in g technolog y. It becam e th e

key to th e militar y power of Eng lish kin gs in th e l-lrh and l St h cent uries, allow ing th em to defeat "the Ro wer o f Fren ch ch ivalry" at C recy, Poitier s, and Agincourt. T he arche rs we re recogni zed as an elite force, althoug h w ith out th e social status to m atch their importan ce to th e English cro w n .

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T he t,tlt,eti vl' use o f m assed arc hers armed with lo n gb o w s e me rged du r in g warfare ill Br ita in in t he lat e 13th a nd ea rly l-Ith ce nt u ries . So me h isto ri an s have asserted t hat t he Eng lish learn ed the po w e r of th e lon g bo w fro m the Welsh . w ho a lll"g l"dly e m ployed it to d ead ly c ffi-cr ag a ins t t he a r m ies o f Edwa rd I (re ig ned 1271- 131l7 ) . A lth o ug h this thcor y is d isputed . so uthe r n W ales was ce rtain ly a n area where ard H..· r y tlo u ri sh cd . Both Wc'h h a nd Eng lis h lon gbo w m cu we re p resent in Edward's army when he dd i: atc..'d the Scots at Fulk ir k in 12'JX. Bu t true credit fo r develo ping the effec t ive..' deployment of archers ;1S a so u rce of m.iss ti rep o wc r must he accorded to Edward III (re ig ne d 1327- 77 ) . Fig h ting till' Sco ts at H alido n H ill in 13.1.>, he m ade the Engli sh k ni gh ts fig ht di smounted w ith bodi es of lo ngbowmc n positioned OIl th eir tlank v, C h ro ni cle rs tell u s t h.u arro ws Hew "as thi ck 3 S mo te s in 3 sunbcam". A c cord in ~ to O IH: co ntl' m po rar y source, till' Scots "were ab le to su ... rai n nei th e r t ill' for ce of ar chers, nor the arms of the kn i~hts" : anot her source tel l.. us sim ply th at th e Scots "were be ate n hy th e Ellgli sh arc he rs", A fter t hi s SUCCl'SS . Edward and hi s successo rs we n t 01 1 to de plo y m assed bow me n in a se r ies of wa r... a~ai l1 s t French k in gs bcrwcc n 1337 a nd 1453 , kn o wn co uvc n tio n a lly as th e Hu nd re d Year s' W ar.

MA SS AND SKI LL 'I'he grl'at adva ntage o f

t he lo ngbo w co m pared w it h the c ross ho « : - a co nsi dera bly mo re po we rful and co m ple x \\Ta pOII - w as its t;Jr g reate r rat e of shot . An e xper ie nced a rc he r wa s expected to sho o t around 12 a r ro ws ;) m iu u tl', ifl1l' wa s only rel] uirl'd to ai m in the ge ncra l

'" o o di recti o n o f the l'l1l'lllY, T he EIl~ lis h so ug ht to put tho u san d s o f arc lu-r-, in the ti cld. By th e l Srh ce n tury t he n ' we re at l c.i vt t h ree h owm cn to ev e ryo ne k ni ght ill the EIl!-di sh ar m y. a nd th e ratio llIay have risc u at t i m cs to tell to o ne , Collec t ive ly th is m ass o f ar chcrv wo u ld ddu ge th e e ne my ill a d l'lI Sl' showe r ofa r ro w s almos t co m pa rab le to m o der n mu chinc-gu n ti re , At th e bat tle o fAg inco urr ill l-l lS, it is thought t ha t t he Enp li.. h 10 ngh o\\'lll l' ll Illa y have had th e capac it y to lo o se ()O .ll()() ar rowv a m inute . A medieva l ...tate incvir.iblv round it 3 ch alle nge to ... uppl y wl'aponr y and ammunition o n such a sca le. III 1.>41 Edward III sco u red hi s ki ngdom to co llect 7,7t1t1 bow« and 13t1.tItiti sheaves of ar row.... which were th en store d in th e Tower of Lo ndon and other ar m o u r ic s. It w as sa id t hat in the IJ 511s not all a rro w w as to b e tou nd in till' whole of En gl and, since the k in g had rakcn them all t'{u' h is cam paign in France. T he problem (If su pply illg hows and arrows w as no thing, ho wever. co m pare d with th e d iffi c u lty of assl' mhlillg su ffic ie nt numbers of arc he rs . Shooti ng a lon g bo w wa s a spec ialist sk ill. requ irin g li t,:loll g pr art irc - boys ty pi ca lly learn ed t he USl' o f t he how trom t he ag e of seve n. The arc he r had to d evel op co n side rab le physica l st re ng th, Arch e rs' ske leto ns o f th e pe r io d h ave be e n fo u nd w ith d efo r m ed Id i: arms and shou lde r bon es, and badly tw iste d ver te brae . as a result of the rep eat ed dl(l rt of drawi ng t he I. HIll (M t) bow. Awa re of th e need to ma in ta in ;1 pool of bowmen fro m w hom till' b est co u ld be

selec ted for service, th e English m on arc hy took active StqlS to l'll cou ra gl' thl' pra cti ce o f arc hl' r y,

BARBED ARROWHEADS

l o ngbow s in action At the battl e of Aljubarrota in 138 5 (right) English longbowmen helpedthe Portuguese defeat the French and Spanish forces . Here,asin manymedieval illustrations. mostof the archers are shown firing their arrows from the wrong side of the bow. A modernre-enac tor (far right) demonstrates how the bow should be drawn.

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Tour na me n ts were mou nted to sho wcase ar cher s'

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skills. and stat utes we re proclai med banning


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limi ting o ther spo rts and pastim es that mi gh t

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co m pere w it h a rchery, In the 13(,0" a' well a' banning ti ll' l'X IHU ( of bows and arro w s, the kin g forbad e arch er s to leave Eng la nd w itho ut hi ,


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l'xprcss permi ssion . presumabl y th rough fe ar that th e y might jo in the arm ies of hi s e n e m ies ,

CALL TO A RMS T he lISC of III i!\sih.' Wl'apo ns. especia lly bows and arrows, was ge nerally deni grated ill medi eval European war fare , Kn igh ts affecte d to despise a , ty le o f co m bat th at allowed a m an to k ill fro m a di stan ce, d en ounci ng it as co wa rd ly an d b ase . A, a resu lt , th e nobilit y a nd ge nt ry d id no t fig ht as arc hers , Bo w m e n w ere typ ically d rawn fro m

tlK' middl in g ra nks o f so cie ty, th e ' m all free ho lde rs o r "yeo men" - alt ho ug l: at rim es pk'm y of poorcr, le ss respectable folk undoubtedly fille d o u t t he ranks. As we ll as south WJles, mo st fore sted 3rCJ S o f England we re major so urces of bowmen, as the traditiona l basic use o f archery was fix hunting, Since there was no standing army in medieval En gland, ar c he rs w ere not fu ll-time so ld ie rs but men w ho undertook to serve for a parti cular campaig n. III an atte mpt to e n su re th eir quality, ro yal officials kno wn as co mm issio ns o f array we re entr uste d w ith select ing the best men from th os e mu stered b y lo cal she r iffs in the shi re s. Later in th e period , ar chers were m o re likely to be en ro lled as indentured member s of forces that nobleme n co nt ra ct ed to su pply to th e k in g . On cam paig n archers we re co m ma nded by offic ers

kno w n JSccn tcuar s, w ho co m ma nde d co m pan ies o f tOO men, and vin re nar s w ho co m ma nde d 20. T hey we re paid t wi ce as much as ordinary foo t so ld ie rs, so we can assume that thcy w ere co nscio us of a spec ia l e lite status . Lik e all o t he r mediev al so ldiers. they wo uld ex pec t to au gment their pay hy pi lla ging or hy the ransom o f pri so ner s, Ar ch er s wo uld not ben efit from being ran somed themselves if captu red OIt th e batt lefield. ho w eve r, D espised Th e last years of t he Hundred Years' W ar In thisencounter between the French (left)

and English near Cherbourg in 1450, both sides include longbowmen, but theywere no longer the force they had been earlier in the war.

LONGBOWMEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD

T HE ENG LIS H A RCHERS ISSU ED FROM BEH IND THE IR STOCKADE . THREW AWAY THE IR BOWS ... THEN TOOK THE IR SWORDS .. . AND OTHER WEAPONS. AND K ILLED THESE FRENCHMEN W ITHOUT MERCY. FRENCH CHRONiCl ER JEHAN DE WAVRIN, DESCRIBING THE BATTLE OF AGINCOURT

The English deployed archers defen sively, relying on their enemies to atta ck first. How exactly the archers were positioned is a matter of dispute between historians, and may well have varied considerably according to the terrain and the numbe r of troop s on each side. On some occasions they were massed on the flank s of the army. or on the flanks of each "battle" into which the army

both for their cowardly ' l yle of wa~i n~ WJr and for their lo w socia l statu s. they wo uld probably be m uti late d . to rtu red. or ki lled ou t of hand ,

was subdivided . But at Agincourt they were probably deployed in front of or in between the men-at-arms. protected against the enemy's cavalry charge by sharpened stakes laid out in a chequerboa rd pattern. The archers would generally

I N BATTLE

be by far the most numerous element of the English army. Their showe r of arrows was intended to halt and disorganize th e advancing enemy. Men-alarms fig htin g on foot and t he archers themselves wo uld then rush fo rwa rd to fi nish them off .

DEC LIN E OF T HE LO N G I> O W M A N

Armo ured bowman This English longb ow man from the end of th e 15th centu ry wear s light armour and a helme t and carries a sw ord and buckler. Archers from th e golden age o f Crecy and Agincourt wou ld not have been so we ll armed .

Long bow an d ar rows The greatest archaeo log ical hoa rd of English longbows and arrows was found aboard the Mary Rose. th e Tudor warship that sank in 1545 and was raised fro m the seabed in 198 2. The bow s ranged between 1.87m and

2.11m (6ft lin and 6ft l Oin) in length.

LONGBOW f RO M THE MARY ROSE

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NO(k (notch)

T he English arclu..-rs were by 110 means universa lly v ictor io us, how e ve r. Indeed . after Aginco \1 rt t hey we re almost a lways Oil t he lo sing sid e, es pecia lly w he n th e Fren ch bega n to m ake cffl.'ctivC' lise of ca n no n in the closing srages of t he Hu nd re d Years' War. W het her the longbow was rendered obsolete by the rise of g Ul1p o w c.k r wl' ap ons is not clear. Its virt ua l dis appeara nce from the batrlcficld in the I()ch century (l·rtaill ly co inc ided with the int roduction of th e arquebus and till.' musket . Bu t it would he anot her Jon yt.';l P :' hd()fl' allY firearm co u ld mat ch the lon gbow\ performan ce, tirin g 12 t imes a minute and CO IlS iS ( t.' l lt l y h itt in g a ta rget 200m (2 1H yard , ) dist.mr .

Pe rh aps the 1110\t cOllv inc ing c xpl .matiou o f the mi litar y de cli ne of the lon gbow lies ill rhe d isappea ra nce of the e xten sive po o l of sk illcd arc he rs 0 11 w h ich it depend ed, itself part ly caused by a l oll ~ per io d dllrill ~ wh ich Eng lan d wa s relati vely at peace . It was 110 lo nge r po ssib le to e m ploys ma ssed bo w s b ecau se the re we re sim ply 1I 0t c uo ug l. pe o ple ca pa ble o f sllootillg th em .

Flight. usually of goose Of sw an feathe rs

REPLICA ARROWS

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MEDIEVAL FOOT SOLDIERS Medieval knights te nded to desp ise foot soldie rs as a lowborn

crossbows, or early for ms of can no n, foot soldie rs co uld mor e

rabble. T heir presen ce o n th e battl efield was a necessity, but

easily subve rt th e social orde r. Knights espec ially resented th ese

it was a regr ettable o ne . O n m any occ asions, however, infa ntry

men w ho fou g ht at a d istance, an actio n they co nside red no t o nly

arme d w ith pikes, club s, and other sim ple weapo ns pro ved th eir

coward ly, but un fair, at least w hen used aga inst the m . In general

effective ness against armo ure d cavalry when resolute and prop erly

no quarter was given to foot soldiers when th ey wer e taken

orga n ized. Arm ed w ith mi ssile weapons , whe the r w ith longb ows,

prison er - after all, they were not in a position to pay a ransom .

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FLEMISH FOOT SOLD IER

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III 1302 Fran ce sen t a su hsta nt ia l ar m y, includ iu g a lar ge hod y o f kni ghts. to crush ~1 reb ell ion in Flander s, Th e Flemish fielded a for ce co m posed alm o st e nti rely of foo t so ld ie rs. Th ey w e re a well- dri lled urb an art isan militi a. led b y a sm a ll numbe r of noblemen , T heir d istin ct ive arm w as the "go cd c ud ag", a long pole wi t h a spe arhe ad at o ne t'IH. I and a m ace he ad at t1H..' o ther. At Cou r t ra i 011 II J ul y. th e y too k up a po sit io n 0 11 grou nd criss- cr osscd by st reams . to which th ey adde d di tches of th eir ow n. T his gave th em some pro tec tion fro m tilt' Fre nch cavalry charge . whic h the y b rou g ht to a halt b y stu bborn ly hold in g t he ir lines. H cm ish so ld ie rs then su r ro u nde d and pick ed off th e stalle d k n ig hrs o ne by on e .

SCOTTISH SCHILTRON III its w ar against England ill the 13t h and l-lth centu ries. the core o f Sco tland's forces were the in fantr y sch ilt ro ns. Th e sch iltro n w as a ph ala n xlik e fo r m atio n o f pik cmcn stand ing sho u lde rto - shoulde r, o fte n o rga ni zed in a c ircle, Th e rn ajo r ity o f th e foo t so ld iers wer e le vi es wh o , de pe ndi ng o n t hei r we alth , wer e ex pec te d to turn up ei ther sim ply w ith a pike . o r w ith ad d irio na l cq u ip m c nt suc h as a sword, h elmer. quilted body arm o ur. and prot ective glo ves. T he armourcd uicn we re placed in th e fro nt rows. Bristling with pike s. till' sch ilt ro n w as a hi gh ly e ffi'c tivl' d efe nsive formari on aga inst a cavalry charge . but co uld also be used offen sivel y as it w as at Banno ckburn in 1314. But in th eir park ed fo r ma t io n the Scotti sh in fant ry were vu lner able to the arrows o f the English king's lo ngb o wmcn .

Battle of Courtr ai Although the armour and weaponsof the Flemishare not accu rately portrayed in this painting, it shows how they halted the knights and methodically unhorsed and killed them.

HUSSIT E SOLDIER Hu ssitcs w e n: th e radica l fo llowers o f a stric t for m of C h rist ia n ity ill l Sr h- cc n tur y Bohemi a. D ecla red he ret ica l b y th e papa c y, t he y had to d efend t he m sel ves again st a cru sade . U nder t he lea de rsh ip o f C zech sq u ire J a il Z iz ka , a ba nd of peasant far m er s, artisans, a nd traders was turn ed into a di sc iplined for ce , obeyi ng written statute s that bid dow n rules fo r p un ishmen ts. calll p li fe, Hussite batt le wag ons The Hussites formed defensive encampments bycirchng their wagons. Defended by cannons, arquebuses. and crossbows, these laagersalmost invariably thwarted any attackers.

a nd the di vi sio n o f b o ot y. Un ited by th e ir b eli e fs , the Hu ssit cs m ar ch ed to b attl e sing ing h ymns. TI1l'Y de vi sed in nova tiv e tact ics, e mplo y ing new and o ld Wl'apo ns sid e by side, Ma n y of the ir so ld iers wer e a rmed w ith sim ple flails o r pol e arm s, and the y employed mo unt ed crossbo w mcu, But th ey also bu ilt batt le wa gons, reinfor ced wit h iro n, in w h ich they insta lle d ca n no ns and m en w ith fi rea r m s. T he se co uld be u sed as m ob ile fi re platfo rm s, d rivin g in co lu m ns throu gh e ne my lin es. Thc Hu ssires' 1I10 st fam o us vic to ry w as at Kun ui Ho ra in 142 1.

Y E WHO AR E WARRI ORS OF GO D AN D OF HI S LAW. PRAY TO GOD FOR HEL P HUSSITE BATTLE SONG

GENOESE CROSSBOWMAN D u rin g th e: Fir st C r usade , a ll ex ped it io n ary fro m th e Ita lia n c ity of G en o a la nded at

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j;. tl J in IO')'). th en joine d the c r usad ers at the siq !;c o f'jc rusalcm. Like the o the r m aritime republ ics, Ven ir e and Pisa, Ge noa had de velo ped c rossbo w co nt inge n ts for naval wa r fare..- they we re used to sho o t fro m ga lle y to galley in close c ng .rgem c uts . T he perfo rm ance of the G CllO CSC: c rossbo w mc n d u r ing th e: siege wa s impressive e no ug h to esta blish a d u rab le reputat io n.

RENOWNED ACROSS EURO PE It is sa id th at OI11' adv an tage o f t he cro ssbo w, co mpared w ith th e lon gbow. WJS that it req uired littlc tr :lin ing o r ex pe rie nce to usc. Eve n so . Eu ro pea n arm ies sho wed a health y respect fo r pr ofe ssion al ex pe rtise whe n it cam e to e m ploy ing crossbo w m c n. T he re put at io n of the G eno cse ena bled the m to ti nd m an y c usto m e rs for th e Composue tiller made of stnps of horn . Sinew, and wood

ser v ices of a co m pany seve ra l tho usand st ro ng. a rme d by a g u ild o f cross bo w- m ake rs. In (J et. th e cro ssbo w m cn we re not prima r ily recruited fro m the city itself bu t fro m the su rro u nd ing mo untai nou s Ligu ria n co u n tr yside . Th ey practised t heir shoot ing ill the tidd s o utside t he city wa lls - a so u rce o f so nic co m plain t fro m lando w ner s in t he ar ea. The CO J11P ;II1Y fo ug ht in d efe nce of G en oa w he n req u ire d , but o t her wise sold its se rv ices to t he hi gh est fo re ign bidder, Ex pe rie nce d cros sbo w mc n we re acc u ra te e no ug h to act JS sni pe rs durin g sieges, O n th e battlefi eld the y wer e usua lly deployed offe nsive ly. se nt o u t in fro nt o f th e arm y to so ft e n up th e o ppos it io n befor e the m ain charge wa s deli vered , T o spa n th eir bo w s the y norm all y used a ho ok o n th eir waist bel t: the bo wm.m ben t fo rward . ho o ked the bo w str ing and sto od up . spa n n ing the bo w w ith the st re n g th o f hi s

It is u n for ruua tc t hat their m o st m e m o rable appeJ ra ncc o n th e h istori cal stag e, at th e battl e of C recy in 134(,. w as a fi asco, Em ploy ed by the Fren ch , th e y adva nced towa rd s the Eng lish lines b ut we re in e ffec tu al . appareut ly because th e co rds o f t hc ir bo ws had slackened th rou gh da m p, R etreat in g un d er J de luge o f arro w s tired b y th e Eng lish lo ngbowmcn , th ey w e re tra mp led . under fo o t by the charg ing Fre nch k n ig hts.

Steel pin to which spdnning lever is attached

-= back . Apart fro m th e bo w. th eir eq u ipme nt co nsiste d of a helm et. so m e bo dy armo u r. u d agger. a nd a large sh ie ld , th e pavi sc, T hey so me t ime s fo ug ht in tea m s. w ith t he bo wm a n shelte re d by a se rva nt ho ld in g the pav ise an d po ssibl y back ed up by ano ther assista n t lo ad in g a seco nd bo w while he sho t t he ti rst. G c no ese crossbo wmc n co nt in ue d to play J ke y ro le o n Eu ropea n barrlcficlds. ev en aft e r the ad ve nt o f h and-held fire arm s in th e 15th cent u ry.

Rotalln g nut With notch 10 hold bowstring when bow is spanned

Crossbow a nd bolts This late 15th-century bow required a lever to crank th e bow string back to it s firinq po sition , hooked over the central rotating nut. The bolt was then placed in the groove. Pressing the trigger on th e under side of th e bow rotated th e nut to release th e string.

Pavis e This fo rm of shield wa s most usefu l when crossbow men we re shooting at defenders on ramparts dur ing a siege. They wou ld crouch down behind it to reload.

BOD KIN HEAD CROSSBO W BOLT

TRIANG ULAR·HEADEO BOLTS

Flight . made of wood or paper

WH AT EV ER THESE DARTS CHANC E TO HI T, THEY D O NOT FALL BACK, BUT THE Y PIERCE THROUGH A SHIELD, THEN CU T T H RO UGH A H EAVY IRON CORSELET. ANNA COMNEN A DESCRIBING BYZANTINES' FIRSTEXPE RIENCEOF CROSSBOWS IN THE A LEX/AD. WRITTEN C.1148

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fro m th e Asian ste ppe , the M o ngols

establishe d on e o f the world 's lar gest eve r land em pires in th e 13th cent ury. After the tr aditi on all y warri ng steppe tribes united under th e lead ershi p of G cn ghi s Khan, th ey

laun ched ca m paig ns of co nq uest westwards into th e Midd le East and Eu ro pe, and eastwa rds to C h ina's Pacific coast. The arm ies of th e settl ed civilizatio ns of Eura sia were overw he lme d time and aga in by th e speed of movem ent , aggressio n, and fighting sk ills o f th e all- co nque ring M on gols.

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Be fo re th e r ise of T c m uj i n , later k no wn as

per io d s even ill t he 1110 , t in ho spit.rblc tcr r.iin .

G cn ghi s K han . th e M on gol s we re m er el y o ne

a nd so w er e not slo we d do wn hy a su p ply rr.uu . T h e ho rse m en cx istcd 0 11 a di et o f d r ied m e.it a n d 1"L'rlll cl lt cd llIa rc 's m ilk , allg llH.'llt l'd at t i n u -s hy fre sh hOfse's b lood . Sincl' l'a r h w a r r ior had a st r ing ofIou r o r ll vc m ounts. he cou ld rOllt illua lly ch allg l' ho rses and th us keep m o villg over lo ng d istnncc s d ay atr cr d ay. R ivcr s were 110 obsr.rclc to a M o ngol ca m p,lig ll : t he m en wo u ld un d rc vv,

amon g ma llYTu rk ic tribes living ill the tou gh th e 'itl'PPl' nort h of t il L' Go bi dese rt . Th ese rent-dw el lin g ho rsem en h ad mosr ly en tered re corded h isto r y as raider- and

L'II Vi r OIl I1H.'l lt o f

invaders rh rcuten ing rhc to wn s and r ities o f no rth e rn C h ina . Th e S{C.' P Il l' tr ihcs we re cons ta ntly at w ar wi th O I1e..' ano ther limit. ill 120(), ti ll.' )' rccog n iz,.. d M ou gol lcad cr Tc muj in a' t hei r k han (C c ng h i« K h all mc.urs " lo rd of th e eart h"}. ( ;l' n ghis .m d his slIcn's,ors W L'n.' able to d irect th l" energies of t he tri ha l ho rse m e n o u twa rds a nd t ra nsfo r m rai ders into ftHll lul'rors.

TOUG H FIG HTER S The Mon gols lived a ll their li, 'e, in a close rela tio ns hi p w ith t heir to ugh ho rvcs . It wa s ,aid th at a M o n go l ho y le.rrncd to r id l' before he cou ld wa lk . A, we ll 'l\ a ho rse m a n , l"Vl'fY M o n gol m a le w a, a hunter a nd a warrior. Fr o m a n l'a rl)' agl' h e wa s tau gh t th l' u vc o f the co m posi te how, a po wer fu l we;lpon m ad e of ho r n , wood, a nd sinew. H e to ok part in t he la rge..' mou nt ed h unt ing parties th at th e step pe trib es e m ployed to e nc ircle a nd k ill ga me , t hu s acq u ir i ng pr act ice ill coo rd ina tio n and m ano eu vr e tha t wo u ld se r ve him w ell ill late r hatti e " T he M on gol w a r r io r hon ed hi , tig hti ng sk illv in lo cal tr iba l w ars a nd h is su rv iva l sk ills ill th e h ard lit" o f t he 'te p pe . Com posed o f suc h men . G cnghi s's ar m ies we re hi gh ly mo bi le ca m pa ig n ing over d istan ces of thousa nds of

stow the ir clo th es ill a w.ucr pro o f b.rg . and sw im ac ros s w it h the ir ho rs,«. T he warrior", w ca pon r y w as u su all y light. M o vt were mou nted a rchers w ho wou ld car ry t wo or three how-, and a co uple of qu ive rs of arrows. A thorou ghly vclf-rcli .mt ma ll , the w a r rio r ca r r icd a vh .u pcn irn; StOIlC to r h is weapon \ a lld a needl e and thread fo r runni n g re pairs to h iv clothi ng and le.uhcr ar m o u r.

RUTH LES S V I CTOR S The M on gol s used their g re..';H mobilit y to fi nd . fI X, and de stroy e n em y Iorcc s. Th ey we re ti-roc iou» fIgh t in g m en . but ill 110 scn vc a di sorgani ze..' d horde. Eac h wa rr ior hclon gcd to a g ro u p of te n (a n Inl'I/II), itsel fp a rr of a g ro u p o f lilli, I ,ClI II I, a nd I CI,Cl Cl CI, T ill' a r lllY was w <'1 1

oftl cl'n 'd , wit h h igh l'f ap po in tm ents ma de b y t he kh an and lo we r o ftlCl'rs chosen by t heir men . III pr ac t ice th is .u uo uu rc d to pr omo t io n b y mer it. Sm a ll uni ts co u ld o perate wit h g n 'at indep enden ce . b ut th e M ongol co u u naudcrs we re also ra pahll' of coo rdinati ng largc-sc.rlc f()fCe..' S 011 t he bat tl e fi eld . using sm o ke sig ua ls. t rum pet s, an d ba nners to communi cate orders.

kil ometres. They we re capa ble o f living o ff th e land fo r long

NOGAl HORD E

HElMET

When victo rious, t he Mon go ls we re tOt311 y r ut h less in t heir t rc ar meu t of e ne my co m ba ta nts a nd o fren of who le c iv ilian po pu lat ions, T hei r reputat io n for terror g re w wi th th eir co nq ue sts. Genl(hi s inva de d nort hern C hi na in 121 1 a nd h ad seiz ed wh at is now Be ij in g by 121 5, a lthoug h ri ch a nd popu lous so u the r n C h i na rem ain,.'. d fo r th l' ti nu- und e r th e ru le o f th e So n I( d yn ast y. In 12 1X the M ongol s att acke d th e powerful Kwarcsm ian Em pire ill ce n tra l Asia. ap pa re n tly a ft e r its sha h off en ded G engh is b y ki lling tw o

tr aders w ho

c..· I~oyt: d

t he kha n's pr ot ect ion . T he

>

ca tll pai l(ns th at fo llowed la id w aste th e f.lJIIOU S c it ies o fS a m a rkand a nd Bo kh ara, a nd man y

>

ot her h isto ric cit ies, so me of whi ch wou ld 11I..' v (,.' r r ecover t he ir fo r me r glo ry .

..... '"
:I: U

C Z

GENG H IS'S LEGACY


T h e d eath of G e ng hi s i n 11 27 di d not chec k t he co u rse of de st ru ction a nd ex pa ns io n , In th e 123 0 s C Cllg h is's SO il O gcr ai se nt

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11\ W

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A SAVAGE PEOPLE , HELLISH OF ASPECT, AS VORACIOUS AS WOLVES IN THEIR HUNGER FOR SPOI LS BRAVE AS LIONS ... Q UEEN RUSSUO AN Of GEORGIA DESCRIBING THE MONGOLS

h is arm ies fu rther w est. T he M on gol ge ne ra l Subo ta i o verra n Russia, sacking M osco w in 123 H. III 1240 it wa s the t u r n o f t he Ukra ine . w ith th e de stru cti o n o f th e ve ne rable c it y of Ki e v

- a Euro pea n tr aveller visiting Kiev five yca rs later found " J I1 eno rmo us number of sk u lls and bo nes of slaug hte red men lyin g o n th e plain" and " barely 200 h o uses sta nd ing", III 12 4 1 Subo ta i led h is M OIIl(ol forces into Po lall d a nd Hu n gar y,

defl-atin g arm ies of Euro pean kni g ht s at t he battles of Liegn it z a nd M o hi. Since the hea vi ly armoured C h r istian cava lry h ad proved utterl y in capable o f co ping

Deco rat ed quiver Mo ngo l warriors were taught the use of the composite bow from an early age. A quiver was a crucial part of their armou ry.

w it h th e spee d o f m an oeuv re of th e M on gol hor sem en , nothing sto od in the wa y of a M on gol co nq uest of western Eu ro pe. T he M on gol s were ap proa chi n g Vie nn a w he n , by w h at

C h rist ian Eu ro pe regar ded as a mi racle. new s ar r ive d o f the deat h o f O ge ta i. T he Asian hor sem en turned back , head in g home to tak e part in the selectio n o f a ne w lead er. T he y

never pro gr essed as far westwa rd agai n .

C H ANG ING M ETH O DS T he M OIIl(ol < rela t io ns hip to th e cou nt r ies th e y

su bj ug ated w as not , ho we ver , a pu rd y destructi ve one . T hey bcn cfi rcd fro m the sk i\ls o f states wi th J high er level of rcch nological de velopment. Fro m th e t im e of hi s vt.'ry fir st ca m paig n in C h ina , Ge ng h is becam e aware of t he limitat ion s of h is tr ib al ho rsemen . l'accd w ith th e torrifi ed defence s

of C h inesc cities, th ey need ed to acquire th e techniques and machin er y for siege w ar fa re , It wa s almo st certainly t hr ou gh cm ploying C h ine se ex pe rtise and per so nnel th at tilt.' Mon gol ar m y wa s able to dep lo y ra ms and man gon cls - heavy sro ne- th ro w ing catapults - in th e successful siege o f llc iji lll( in 12 14- 15. Fr om th at tim e o nwa rd a

sit.'ge tr ain was ofte n att ache d to Mon go l forces, and C h inese o r Mu slim t.'ngi nce rs reg ul ar ly put th ei r spe cia list ski lls at th e service o f th e k h ans .

BAGHDAD MASSACRE It was than ks to th is pr ofi cien cy in siege w arfare th at ill 125 H a M OIIl(ol ar my led by Hulegu wa s ab le to ca pture Bag hd ad. the scat o f t he Islamic Abbasid Ca liph ate . Almo st th e entire populat ion of th e city WJ S ma ssacr ed , inc ludi ng th e C alip h h im sel f To th e del ight of C hr ist ian C rusaders , w ho we re at that rim e st ruggling to keep J pr csen cc in Palestine, thi s vi ctory see m ed to ope II up t he Muslim Arab world for M OIIl(ol co nq u est. Syria fdl to Hulcgu ill 125 1) . which left o n ly th e M aml uks o f Egypt to d efy M OIIl(ol pow er. But th e M on gol s

Born warriors As most Mongol warriors fought as ho rsemen th ey w ore leather body armour for ease of movement . Warrior s form ed a close bond with th eir horse, w hich w as impor tant in the heat of battl e.

we re th w arted in thi s goa l: the fi)llowi ng yea r, o nce again th e death of the great khan o blig:ed I-I uleg u and a large pro por t ion of h is arm y to retur n to M on gol ia, T he remnan ts o f h is fo rces were defeat ed by the M arn luk s, co m m a nd ed by Baibars, at Ain j al ur - the o n ly oc casio n w he n th e M on go ls were decisively beaten in bat t le.

Lu-gnitz

JAI'A N

MONGOLS I N C H I N A In C hi na the M o ngo l style o f war fare e ve nt ua lly und e rw en t an almos t tot al transfo rm atio n , Fro m 12(,() Ccng h is's de scend ant Kub lai Kh an , r u ling from Beiji ng, lau nch ed a w ar o f co nquc st agai nst th e So ng d yn ast y tha t still co ntrolle d so uth ern C hi na , H is ar my e m ployed so p h ist icated C h ine se wca ponry, ranging fro m po werfu l c ro ssbo w s, or ball istas, to va r ie ties of g u npowde r wea pon , incl udi ng bombs flun g by cata p u lts, primit ive flam e- t h ro wers. and early ant eced en ts o f the handgun , T he M ongol s a lso learn ed from the C h inese ho w to co nduc t ri ver and seabo rne operatio ns, Kub la is fin al victory over th e So ng , w h ich made h im u nd isputed l'lllpe rOr o f C h i na, wa s a n aval batt le t(llIg h t in the So uth C h ina Sea , No dou b t buoye d by t his success , Kub lai w ent 0 11 to atte mpt a seaborne invasio n ofJ apan, w hich wa s laun ch ed from Kor ea , Aft er a reco nn aissan cein - force b y a fle et of aro u nd ~()() vess el s in 1274 , a fu ll-s ca le invasion invo lvi ng m ore th an 4 ,()(1l ) warsh ips was launched se ve n ye;lfs late r. T he enco u nter w ith the M o ngol s wa s ce r ta in ly :l shoc k fo r the j ap an ese samurai, w ho had ne ve r ex pe rience d anythi ng like t he ir ma ssed bo w men or g unpo wde r bom bs. But a co m bi natio n o f sto ut Japanese resistance and a de vastat ing ty phoon made th e Mo ngol ex pe d itio ns cos tly failure s, Mace, spear, and bow This 14th-century depiction of Mongol warriors, led by Genghis Khan(with mace), accurately portrays their weaponry, but their small, sturdy horses were very different from these steeds.

-128 1

Ningbo

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Campaigns o f Ge-nghis Khan 1206- 1227 Emp ire-of Genghis Khan 1227 Campaigns o f Genghis Khan's suuessors Khanates o f Geng his Kha n's successors 1300

I ~

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I N D I A N

OCEAN

Frontiers of M ongol khanates

OLD H A BI T S T he M on go ls rema ined essentially true to the ir roo ts. Eve n as Empe rors o f C h ina , they co ntinued to de lig ht ill h un t in g and va lue ho rse m anshi p above all othe r sk ills . Th ey also ne ver e sca pe d from the bad habit of ti ght ing eac h o the r ove r the successio n to lcad e rsh ip. By the late 13th ce lltu ry Mon go l ru le e xte nde d fro m Ru ssia to C h ina and Korea. bu t th is ar e a was div ide d into four separate k ha nates . It was becau se they re m ained at heart ste ppe wa rrio rs that the y co uld not fo und a d u ra b le e m p ire . After Kuh lai's deat h in 12tJ4 , M on go l po w cr we n t into rapid decl ine .

The Mong ol Empire The Mongols ruled an area stretching from modern-dayKorea to the eastern edge of Europe. By 1300 the Monqol territories were divided into four khanates: one centred on China; the Chagatai Khanate in central Asia; the ll-Kh anate in Iran and Iraq; and the Khanate of the Golden Horde in Russia .

MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER The Mongol horsemen typicallywent into battle spread ou t in a disper sed fo rmatio n. The majority of them we re tra ined to fight as hit-and- run skirmishers . Their weapon was the composite bow, which existed in two versions: a light bow was shot from horseb ack, wh ile a heavy bow wa s shot by a dismounte d man . At the start of a battle the archer s wo uld advan ce to within range of the enemy and inflict a steady d rain of losses by shooting arrows into th eir midst . At the same time they wo uld avoid any efforts by the enemy to join battle, sw iftly with draw ing in th e face of co unteratt acks. CUNNING WARRIORS The Mo ngols delighted in battlefield trickery and would take pleas ure in luring unwary opponents into a head lo ng pursu it by simulating flight, only to tu rn sw iftly and tra p thei r disorganized forces. When the ene my wa s at length worn down, frustrated and exhausted by the arrows of the skirmishers , the Mo ngols would bring in the ir elite armoure d ho rsemen . Charg ing forwa rd armed with lance, swo rd, and mace, they wou ld engage the enemy at close q uart e rs to finish the m off. The ho rseme n on th e wings of the Mongol line wo uld by then have advanced at speed to co mplete an encirclement, leaving the enemy with no avenue of esca pe whe n the final attack wa s launched .

1150 -

1650

SAMURAI

li E SA MU Il A I WE llE M O U N T ED

armo ured wa rrio rs w ho

enjoyed elit e status in medi eval j apan ese society - in a sense, the j apan ese equivalent of th e Euro pea n kn ight . T hei r code of chiva lry, know n as ln ssliido, was based on the pr incipl e of absolute loyalt y to th e master th ey served. Fro m th e 12th cent u ry, sam u rai clans were th e effec tive rul ers ofj apan under figure head em pero rs. Samurai ar mies fou ght o ne anothe r in intermi nable civil wars unti l the pacification

.

ofj apan under th e To kugawa shogu nate in th e loOOs.

In

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In

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Th e sam u rai o rig inated as serva nts o f the ~ m p~ ror. probably as ~" r1y as the Ht h ce ntu ry c u. T he y fu nc tio n ed as pa lace g u ards a nd u pheld the e mpe ror's aut ho rit y in th e pr o v ince s, Over ti m e the sam u rai evo lve d into an aristo crati c elite bas ed on birt h rat her than functi on. T he sam u rai wa rrio r's tru e alle gi ance sh ifted from the e m pe ror, w hom he nomin ally served , to h is O W Il clan, or ex tended family. In th e Ge m pe i Wars ( I IHO- 85) - a turning point in j ap an ese history - two samurai clans fought for supreme..' po wer. The Min amoto fam ily emerged tr iu m pha n t, defeating th eir riva ls th e T aira. M in am ot o Yorito mo was decl ared sho g u n . o r milit ar y ruler, of' j apa n . At t he time of th e fo u nd atio n of th e sho g u nate . th e bow, rathe r tha n th e sw o rd . was th e sam u rai 's mo st prestigi ou s wcapon . It appea rs that th e elite w ar ri ors re garded wa r as above all an o ppor tunity to d em onst rat e individual fig ht ing sk ill a nd co urage . When o ppo sing arm ie s w ere drawn lip o n th e bnttl cfi eld. leadin g sa m ura i w ould d ism ount and ste p fo rwa rd to recit e th eir ancestry and pre vi ou s feat s o f ar ms . The two ar m ies wo u ld th en shoot t heir bows in a ge neral exchan ge o f arrows, after w hi ch sam u rai wo uld sec k o ut a su itable o ppone n t to c nga gc in sing le co m bat - it wou ld

be di shon ourable for " sam u rai to fig ht so me o ne of lesse r stand ing th an h im self. This, at least, W " S t he id eal to which th e w a rri o rs aspire d . At

times batt les wert' ( U" more co m plicated . involv ing the usc of both trickery and surprise . At Kurikara in IIH3 , the Min .nn o to arlll Y re po rted ly trou nced the Tai ra by sne aking aro u nd their defen sive po sitio n in a mou nrnin pass and attack ing th em from the rea r, whi le sunu lrnnco usly d rivin g :1 herd o f ox e n int o their rank s from th e fron t .

BUSH IDO AND SEPPU KU Sa m u rai o f th e l Zth and 13th ce n tu ries were

acu te ly aware of th eir e lite status. A w arrior W :1S ex pected to sho w both literary and artistic re fine ment . as wdl as milit ary v irt ue s. A sam u ra i's trai ni ng w as o fte n accomplished by th e bon d in g of a yo ung warr ior to a ve te ran . a co m plex rclarion ship in which ho mosex ual love played its part. The sam urai co de o f behavio ur iniria lly to r ma li zcd 1")'111,,, " " lI/i(!Ii (the wa y of horse and bow) a nd later as I",-,!I id" (the way o f th e wa r rior) - em ph asi ze d the need to r abso lute sel f-co ntro l. restraint. and the avo id ance of any os te ntation . Som e of th e c usto m s that wert' o bserve d in samu rai wa rfa re were a strange mi xture o f th e savagt' :1I1d civilized . P Ol' in stan ce, it w as co ns id er e d norm al for a w arri or to c ut o ff the head of "n y m an h e killed in battle as ev ide nce o f h is pr owe ss. The seve red head wo uld th en he w ashed . g roo me d , a nd pr ettified w ith cosm etics befor e being m oun ted o n a spiked board. lft hc head bel on g ed to a w arrior of hi gh stand ing , it w ou ld be co nside red hon ourable to return it to hi s farnil y.

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Iron tsub a This tsub a (metal guard ) for a swo rd is carved and inlaid w ith a depict ion of a samurai und er a flowering prunu s tree. It dat es from the Edo period (1603- 1876).

They we re prot ect ed fr om th e mounted sa m u rai of T ak eda Katsuyo ri hy a fence of sta kes J I1<.1 by o t he r tlS/":!!I'''' a rmed with long sp"'ars. Fir ed in vo lleys. th e mu sket s c ut do wn

sta t u s a nd n oble birth . H e a lso g;lV'" th e sa m u ra i a monopol y o f h earin g a r ms . UI1<.k' r the Tokugawa . . hogunatc, w h ich pacifi ed japan in th e 17th ce nt ury, firearms were 1aq.~l'ly withdrawn from u sc an d as a result th e cu lt o ft he sam u rai sword and swords ma ns h ip g rc w. The /'mIJidl) tr adition was co d ifie d and g lo ri fied as

J apan moved into an era o f pea ce. With 110 enemi es to fight , th e s.u u u r.ii we re el evat ed to the sta tus o f a na ti onal tr ea sure. while lo sing a ll pract ical fu nc t io n . The s.u n u ra i class was fin a lly abolishe d in IX7(, afte r t he M eiji resto rati on . th e Emperor c nd inj; t heir rig ht to b e th e o n ly ar m ,..-d force ill J apan ill ( l\"our of a mod ern . Westernst yle co uscr iprcd a r my. H owever , the values anributcd to th e sam urai lived Oil as all esse nt ia l c leme nt in th e c u lture o f m odern Ja pan .

T ak ed a's ho rsemen . ex posi ng th e Taked a for ces to a de adl y cou n tc ra rrac k .

FOSSI LI Z ED TRAD IT ION In stead o f fadi ng fro m th e limelight with th e ad ve nt of th e g u npo w dc r agl' , j apa nese s.u n u r.ri w ere pres erved and m yrhificd . To yor o mi H id cyosh i, th e d clim)'t1 who ro se to dom in .mcc in j ap an afi cr th e death of Nobun ag. r in 15 X2 . passed d ecrees restori ng the lin k bet we en sa m u rai Ritu al beh ead ing A detail of samurai beheading a member of an enemy clan from a scroll painting of The Burning of the 5anjo Palace.

EVE N I F A M AN HA S N O NATURAL ABILI T Y H E C A N BE A WARRIOR .. . GENE RA LLY SPE A K I NG. T HE WAY OF TH E WARRIOR IS RESOLUT E ACC EPTAN C E OF D EATH . M IY A M O TO MUSASHI. GO RIN NO SHO (THE BOOK OF FIVE RINGS)

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PRE-CO LUM BIAN WARRIORS Befor e the arrival of Eu ro peans at the end of the 15th centu ry,

co m m ande d o n th e battlefield , dre ssed in elabora te deco rati ve

th e peoples of th e Americas had a cultu re o f warfare that had

costu mes. O ne o f the pri ncipal aims of war fare was the tak ing o f

develop ed independently across tho usands of ycars. In the absence

prison ers for use as slaves or as victims of reli gio us sacri fice. Some

of th e hor se and of any form of art illery, pre- C o lumbi an forces

states , no tably the Aztecs and Incas, assem bled substant ial arm ies

consisted exclusively of in fant ry, Weapo ns wer e pr im ari ly of

wh ich enabled the m to exert pol itical and m ilitary co ntrol ove r

wood and stone. M an y soc ieties had a warrior aristo cra cy that

large areas that had previou sly been ind epend en t chiefdo ms.

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THE MAYA

THE INCAS

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In the sec o nd h.ilf of thc 15th celltu ry the Incas established an e x te n sive e m p ire ill w este r n So u th A mcric« stre tc h ing fro m north ern Ec u ador to c e nt ral C h ile . T h e c reat io n o f the

e m pire was largely d ue to the milit ary skills of t il l' I ncas' te n th ru ler. T o p a I nca (reigned

147 1- 93) w ho led cam pa ig ns o f co nq ue st both b ef ore and aftc r asce nd i ng the th ro ne . Hi s

m ili tary o pe ratio ns showed a rare d egree

of organizational skill. On one o cca sio n , fo r

ex am ple. the so u th o f the e mp ire wa s t h rea te ned b y th e C a lch nq u i peo ple fro m nor t hern Ar g clltina

c ro ssing the m ouu t ni n s to the P;u: itic coast. To pa ( Il ea

ma rch ed hi s Il ll"ces I.oook lll (()o o miles) dow n t he A nd es

from his capital at C uzc o ill Peru. Engineers wen t ahead o f the army bu ilding mou ntai n roads and bridges. while supplies of w eapo ns and foo d w ere carrie d so ut h by se a 011 balsa rafts. R e supp li ed 0 11 reach ing the c o ast, the Inca arm y threw itself up on the C alchaq u i and d c tca rcd the m in bat tle . At its heigh t the Inca e m p ire was a thoroughly militaristic sta te , From the age o f 12. boys we re ro ug hen ed lip w ith a rou tin e o f strenuo us g.u n cs and exe rc ise, T hen, from the age o f 15 to 20 . the y had to p er form co mpulso ry mi lita ry serv ice. A m ino rity of yo li ng co nsc ripts stay ed O il to m ak e a career

in the army and a few ach ieved high position as a re w ard fo r co nspic uo us brave ry. T he Inca bur eaucrac y e ns ured rhar the Jf lll Y w as wel l fed and clot he d. Th e mo st co m mon we apo ns w ere the slings ho t and the sto ne-ed ge d spe:u o r axe. Mem bers of the Inca clan , who co nstituted the nob il it y o f the e m pire and m ade up the hi gh e r COl lll11311d o f the arnlY. so m et imes car ried axes o f br on ze. O n ca m pa ig n they wo uld march alo ngs id e thei r ruler. w ho W :lS carried 0 11 :1 litter. T he Inc" "rm y was acco mpanied by a hagg;lg:e t ra in o f lla m as. and of wo men bowed dow n under their e n o rm o us lo ads. A lar ge par t o f th e ar m y w as made up o f co ntinge nts fro rn subj ec t peo ples. so me o f d o ub t fu l lo yalty. It was dissen sion w ithin the empire. and civ il wa r betw een m embe rs of the ru lin g In c" c lan itself th at expo sed the empire to European co nquest ill the !(lth ce ntury. No net heless. it took the Spa n ish 50 ye ars. from t he 1520 s to th e 1570 s. to ful ly subd ue the Inca pe op le .

Inca w arrior Elaborate feathered headdresses were part of the war costume of many Americanpeoples, serving as symbolsof warrior status.

T Ill' M aya c ivilizatio n o f easter n C c n rra l Am erica. w hich reached its peak in around 2S0 to ()()() C E , was o nce tho ught to have b een ave rse to w arfa re. But in rece n t years histo rians have revi sed the ir o pinion s, co nc luding that th e Maya fo ug ht wars o f co nq uest and to ok pri son er s to use as slaves and fi)r ritua l sacr ifice . T he bu lk u f their force s w er e probably p easant m ilit ia It,d by warrio rs draw n fro m royal and no ble fa m ilies. T em ple wall paintings sho w ar mi e s w ith splend id rcgal ia - war rio rs decked o ut in masks and plumes, carrying standards and shields deco rated wi th relig io us symbo ls. More pro sa ically, so ld iers w e re eq u ipped w it h q ui lte d ja ck et s as armo ur and ca rried a r:1n gt' of ed ge d and m issile weapo ns, including spears, sto neblad ed woode n axes. thro w ing sticks. sli ngsho ts and bow s. It is assumed that co nflicts we re brief. if blo od y, since the pcnsan t m ilitia wo uld have need ed to return ho me to tl-'IH.I their cro ps after a sho rt spell 01 1 cam paig n. W h cn the M aya e nco u n te re d Spanish invaders in th l' I(,th ce n tu ry , the y we re able to sustain armed resistance for far lon ger t ha n e ither the Incas o r A ztecs. The y we re not fu lly subj ug "[l' d unti l th e !(>')Os. a nd reb el M aya ns co ut inu cd to ti gh t the Mex ican sta te from till' IH40 s to th e 20 th ce n tury.

COME LET US EAT) A ND CO ME LET US DR I N K LET US EAT A ND DR I NK OF TH E BLOOD A ND T HE BO N ESOFOUR EN EMY

INCA WAR CHANT

Tomb fight er This terracotta warrior comes from a Maya tomb on Jaina island, off Yucatan.

THE AZTECS III th e: 15th ce nt u r y the A zt ecs w c-rc th e most po werful people in M esoamerica. d omin ating o ver o t her c ity- states in a Lug\.' area a ro u nd their ca pita l. Tcn o chritl an. Their ar my. o rga n ized into legi on s 8 ,000 st ro ng . was frequently O il ca m paign , e ngaged in wars to ex te nd th e: e m pi re o r su ppress rebellion a lllo ng the tributaries. When no practi cal J110 tiVl' for w arf ar e pr esented it self. the A zt ecs arran gl'd .. flowe r wa rs", A tr ibutar y state was o bliged to pre sent it s force s for battle at a specifi ed time and pla ce . to g ive th e A ztecs pr actice ill fighti n g a nd provid e" fre sh sup ply o f pri so ne rs. Taki n g

prison er s wa s esse nt ia l to Azt ec life b l' C;lU SC it pro v id ed vic tims for human sac r ifice. It a lso

allowed a ll Azt ec warrior to achie ve pr omot ion . H is sta tus dep ended 01 1 th e n umber of l' IH..' 1l 1Y ti ghtcrs he captu red. T hus Aztec warr ior s struc k at th e legs of th eir o p po ne nts, scc kin g to d isable th em. rather than killing th em wit h a bl o w to th e head . The most success fu l warrio rs joi ned th e elite order s o f ja gu ar o r l'ag k' " k n ig hts", The Azt ecs wer e not alway s victo rio us in pr l'Colu m b ia n tim es. For e xampl e , in 147H th ey lost a hatti e wi th th e nei ghbourin g Tar ascan s. But they were fierce, co urageo us fighte rs.

PONDER TH IS, EAGLE A ND JAGUA R KNIGHTS, THOUGH ... C A RVE D IN JA D E, YOU W ILL BREAK. FROM A POEM BY KI NG NE ZAHUALCOYOTl OF TEXCOCO. 15TH CENTURY

Pieces o f obsidia n I

Wood

Fea ther ed shi eld and w a r club Aztec w arr iors often carried round shields decorated with jagua r skin and feather s. Their wooden wa r clubs were edged with razor-sharp pieces of volcanic glass. A zt ec do w nfall Cortez, the leader of the Spanish conquistado rs, battles the A ztecs for the causew ay to their island capit al Tenochtitlan in 1520 .

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LANDSKNECHT WE TOOK ROME BY STORM, PUT OVER 6,000 MEN TO THE SWORD, SEIZED ALL THAT WE COULD FIND IN CHURCHES ... AND BURNED DOWN A GREAT PART OF THE CITY, TAKING APART AND DESTROYING ALL. PAUL DOLSTEIN, LANDSKNECHT, ON THE SACK OF ROME, 1527

A IUS II LY- DilESSE D LA ND SK N ECIIT

G

m er cen ari es were a

co nsta nt presen ce o n th e Eu ropean battl efield s of the late 15th and 16th ce nt uries. Fighting as den se form ations of pik ern en support ed by firearms, th ey we re at their best

exc eptiona lly tough foot sold iers in co m bat. O ut of battl e, however , th ey co u ld be a dan ger to all and sund ry, especially if th eir em ployer failed to keep th em adequ atel y paid and fed . Qu arrelsome and resistant to author ity, th e Landsknechts earned a fear some rep ut ati on for plunder and m assacre. ~

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T he first Landskn cc hr bands we re raise d in 14H(,. at a ti m e w h e n sig n ifica nt cha nges w ere taki ng place in Eu ro pe an warfare. T he br eakup of t he m edie val so cia l o rde r w as leav ing ru lers eve r m ore dependen t upon m ercenary troops, rather

th an fo rces asse m b led o n th e b asis of feuda l lo yalt y o r o b liga t io n. In Pran ce and Bu rgu nd y, m ercen aries had be en tak en int o pe rma ne nt em ploy me nt to for m regu lar armies. A t the same tim e , tacti cal in novations were que stioning the ro le of heavy cava lry as the sho ck o ffe ns ive force o n th e battlefield . At t he battles o f M urren and Nanc y, in 147(,- 7 7, Sw iss infa ntr y armed wi th lo ng pik es wo n no tab le vic tories thro ugh attacki ng thei r e ne m y in tight. m assed ph alan xes. Lac k ing both a reg ula r ar m y and p ike- w ield in g infantry, Ge r ma n Empero r M a x im il ian I felt threat en ed by t hese m ili tar y developme nt s. H is respo nse wa s to pay for t he forma tio n of Landskn ccht (" la nd serv ant") ba nd s. T he se were to be in fantr y paid as m ercen aries, but read y to fig ht for th e e m peror w h en requ ir ed . FO R M I NG UP T he so ld ie rs w ho for med and led m l'r een ary co m pa nies h ad to b e b ot h mi litar y leade rs and ambitious e nt re pre ne u rs . A I11l'r ccn ar y captain wo u ld co ntrac t w ith the e m pero r

im mcnsc ly tc mpt iug to anyo nl' do w n O il hi s luck. Beyo nd t hi s th er e we re a ll the t rad itio nal ben e fits of co nte m pora r y m ilita r y life on o ffe r, fro m th e chance to ind ulge ill lo o tin g and p illage to thc .u n u scmc nt s of a vagabo nd lift' rich in adve n tu re and gc ncrn l hcll ra isin g. A pot ential recruit had to pr esent h im sel f eq ui pped w ith . at min imu m . a :;-(11" ( 1(,-20 ft) lo ng pik e . Since suc h a W1.'3pOn co u ld he pu rch ased fo r on e gu ilder - a c he apness that goes a lo ng way to e xplain thc popularit y of the pik e as an in fantry ar m - most m en we re ca pable o f fu lti lling this obligation , The better off might turn up wi th sw o rds , a r mo u r, o r eve n an arqueb us . A cand idate wa s traditionall y subj ec ted to a sim ple fitn ess te st, bein g requ ire d to j ump over J Il obst acle m ad e of thre e pik e s or h alb e rd s. This d on e, he wa s cons ide re d tit fo r se rvi ce an d h is name W JS entered in thl' roll. Given the se lcss-rhan- stringcn t entran ce require m ent s. thc Laud sk nc ch rs m u st have heen o f un even q ua lity, A successfu l m er cenar y captain need ed a shar p e ye for the individual q ua lities of h is men , Deployin g pikc mc n ill han k' in a tig ht m ass formation had thc co nside rable adv antage of allo win g h im to hid e incx pcricnccd so ld ier s. As lo ng as th e fro nt rank s

CEREM QNIAl 8 RQAOSWO RD

to pro vide a ce rtai n num ber of so ld ie rs and re cei ve the payme nt fo r thei r se rv ices, hop in g to crea m off a h and so m e profit. l.audsku cch ts we re m o stly recruited fro m G erman - speakin g areas of ce nt ral and northern Euro pe, suc h as th e R h in ela nd , Swabia, a nd A lsace . M en co u ld be

at t ra cted fro m far afield, however, w ith e ve n Sco tla nd pro vid in g vol u ntee rs. T he im media te lure was the pro mi se offou r g uilde rs a m onth in pay - a reasonable in come for th e d ay a nd

advanced bo ldl y into co m ba t . and th e back ro w we re sto ut c haracte rs w ho wo uld no t turn and run , the me n in the mi dd le had no cho ice but to hol d the ir po sit ion and go alon g with th e c ro wd . T he bo ldest. fierce st fighters w ere rewarded w ith double pay - hen ce th eir Il JIll C

d"ppclsiild""" w h ich translates as " double- pay m en " - a nd deployed independentl y to attac k w ith do ub le- handed broad sword or ha lberd .

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Batt le of M aren g o Sw iss and Landsknecht mercenaries c1astfa (;........;"~---M areng o in 1515. A short katz balger swo rd ..... can be seen raised in the for egou nd; it proved hig hly eff ective at close quarte rs.

The Landsknc chts also formed elite bllI!{.IIIl/('// (b lo o d ba nn cr) un it s th at m ade nc a r- su icida I attacks on es pecia lly wel l-defended en emy po siti ons. The arq uc hu siers w ho provided the Landskn cchts' firepower did not ne ed to be espe c ia lly w ell tr ained , Ind eed , one of t he adv a ntages of fir earms wa s tha t a lmost anyo ne co u ld be ta ug h t to usc the m , w hatever th e ir perso na l q ualit ies: a pik e o r halbe rd . by co ntrast , req uired co us iderab lc st re ng th to usc ,

--- .....

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IT WA S SO HOT THAT THE ARMOURED M EN N EARLY SU FFOC ATED ... AND WH EN O NE W ENT TO H ELP T HE OT H ER BY LOOSEN ING TH E ARMOUR H E WOULD BU RN HI S FI NGE RS O N T H E M ETA L. NIKlAU S GUl DI. l AN DSKNECHT SOl DIER, ON THE TUNIS EXPEDITION. 1535

ST Y LE AND V IO LENCE Exactl y how till' l. a nd sk ncc hts dev eloped their dis ti nct ive sw aggering st yle o f dress is no t cle ar , alt ho ugh it see ms to have b een ba sed 0 11 th e cost u me of the ir g re..'a te..'s t r ival s. th e Swi ss Con fede ra te s. o n ly g rl'a tl y e..' xagge..'r;He..'d . As w ell as fa vou r i ng br oad flat hats crow ned wi th large fe..'a the..'rs and j e rk in s spo r t ing pn ffed sleeves , till' l.andsku cchrs adopted hos e w ith till' k'gs of differ ent co lo u rs

.uid de veloped till' c us to m o f slash ing th eir d oublet s o pe n a nd pull in g " pn ffs"

la ndskne cht capt a in A mount ed capta in, holding a spear used for directin g troo ps. addresses his bodyguard before battle.

of sh irt throu gh from undcrucar h, A look that e xpressed arro gance..' and non- confor mit y, it became a maj or in flue nce 011 R cu aissanrc fashion. Whether th e Land skncchr s were ;lIlY wilder o r m ore nngodl y than the ge neral run of fightin g men in th e ir pe r io d is hard to say. T hey were ce rtain ly much g ive n to ha rd d ri n k and gam bli ng, w hi ch o cc u pie d t he dead tim e o ut of co m bat. M a ny arc known to h ave be en killed in fight s wit h t heir co m rades rath er th an with th e ene lll Y, with luck at di ce a nd card s often th e so u rce o f the di scord . Like all lIle rce na r y ba nds, the y were liable to ca u se troub le w h e n th e re wa s 110 war to p ro vide th em wit h a n o utlet for their

ene rg ies and legit imate so u rces o f plunder at th e ex pc ns e..' o f th e e nc m y. It wa s the failure o f

employers to pay th em th at provoked th e most ser io u s Landsku echt di sturban ces. The m o st infamou s cxn m ple w as the sac k of R ome in 1527. Unpaid Landsk ncchts mutinied from the arm y o f C ha rles V, the H o ly R o m an Emperor. a nd we n t 01 1 the ra m pa ge , se ek ing to make up w hat they w e re owed t h rough pill age . W it h ot he r im pe r ial troo ps (so m e 35 ,llI)O ill a ll), the y attac ke d and laid waste the c ity dur in g a rei g n of te r ro r that lasrcd nine mo nth s. The m errcn arics refu sed to leav e th e c ity until th e y were paid t heir arrea rs of wa ges.

FIG HT ING R EGIM EN T S A s fig h ting force s, th e Landskncchts were at th eir peak in till' ea rly \6th cc uru ry . From 150 H, under th e leadership o f a German kni ght, Georg \' 011 Fr undsbcrg, Emperor Ma ximi linn I's La nd sk ncclus w er e o rga ni zed into a regime nt mo re t han 10 ,0 0 0 stron g . w h ich fo ught w ith di stinction in a se r ies o f cam paig n s ill Ital y. Bu t ill t he se Ital ian wa rs t he re were ofte ll Landskn cch ts a lso fig h ting o n t he o ther side , Officia lly the Lands k nc c ht s w e n '

k i ng's lines fu ll t ilt .

Ste e l sku ll cap This light, close-fitting skull cap was worn by a l andsknecht soldier c.1510. Secured with a chinstrap, it afforded all-round vision aswell as essential protection.

force s. but th e Bla ck Band ea r ne d the g rc arc r fam e by fightin g to the last mall afte r the rest of th e Fre nch a r m y had fled th e fie ld .

Bu t th e Land sk n cch rs abso rb ed th e ru omcntum of the c h a r~ i ll ~ ph al an x a nd the two force s o f

not permitted to fight fo r the e m pe ro r's ene m ies, but findin g imperial pay in adequ ate o r in suffi ci ently reli abl e , com pa n ies so ugh t a diffe rent m aste r. The Fren ch k in g, Fr an coi s I, wa s ab le to bu y th e se rv ic es n f a "Black Balld " regiment of ren egad e Laud skncchts at least sim i lar ill numbe rs to the imper ial m er cen ari es. III 15 15 , Fran cois l ie d a n ar m y ac ro ss th e A lp s into Ital y to fig ht rh e Sw iss fo r p osse ssion of M ilan , At Marengo , 0 11 13- 1-1 Septe m be r, the co n fi de nt Sw iss pik emcu , co nside re d th e Sll p n..'I11C infaur r y force ill Eu ro pe , arrack cd th e Fr en ch

LATE D EC LIN E

pikcmcn sw aye d back and forth ill a d ead ly pushin g co ntes t. An cvcn t un l Fren ch v ic to ry. after so m e 2H hours o f int ermittent butch er y. d ep ended as m uch upo n Fr.m coi s' cavalry and ar t illcry as UpOIl th e fo o t so ld iers . But th e d efe at of th e Sw iss ine v itably se nt th e Landskn cchr s' stock so aring. In 1525 . wh en the army of th e new l'm pc ro r. C h arles V, to ok 0 11 th e Fr en ch at Pav ia, t he l.a nd sk ucchrs we re at the heart o f the co m bat 011 hoth sides. The imperial p ikc m c n m ad e a vi ta l co ntributio n to a c rush ing v ic to ry for C harles'

The Landskncchts neve r performed w ith thi s le vel of co m m itme nt ag ain . Fightin g as " lan sq u cnct s" du rin g th e Prcnch Wa rs o f R eli gi on ill the sec o nd

h al f of th e I(,t h ce nt u ry, th e y we re so mc t im cs di sparag ed even by those w ho e m ployed th em .

Spa in's gc nc rul. th e Duke o f A lva, e ntrus ted w ith suppressing the Du tch re vo lt. cl ai m e d that he bou ght the l. a nd k ucc hrs' serv ic es not be ca u se

they w e re

;lIl Y

lise ill hat tie . hut so th at they

co u ld not appe ar tightin g O il th e ot her side.

Whate ver their later decaden ce. howeve r, til l' Lan d sk ncc ht s had left an c nd u r i ng Il'gl'nd as th e qu i 11 rcs scnria l R en aissa 11 Cl' m crccn ari cs.

LANDSKNECHT TACTICAL FORMATIONS The Landsknechts' battl e tact ics we re primarily designed for symmet rical combat against the

pike-wi elding phalanxes approached one anot her, arquebusiers or crossbow men on the flanks of the

opposing army's pikemen. Unlike th e Sw iss, the

Landsknecht phalanx would fi re into the enemy ranks, hoping to weaken and disrupt th eir format ion. At the

Landsknechts do not seem to have used th eir pike phalanx for a shock charge into the enemy line. Instead th ey typically stood on th e defensive or advanced at a steady grinding pace. As two dense

same tim e th e fearsom e Landsknecht dopp elsoldn er would advance ahead of th e mass of pikes, attac king the enemy pikemen wi t h blow s from th eir halberds

and massive two-handed swords. If th e Landsknechts retained format ion, t heir pikemen we re invulnerable to all but missile weapons, their pikes form ing an unbreachable barrier. Once th e format ion was disrupted, however. t he pike was a clumsy weapo n. Most Landsknechts carried a short swo rd, th e katzba/ger, for close-quarters combat.

Gevierte ordnung

Defensive igel

Adopte d from the Swiss, this gevierte ordnung (square order) format ion w as typically made by a single fahnlein (company) of 400 men. It was ofte n preceded by an advance part y, or " forlorn hope", of criminals, prisoners, and volunteers seeking promot ion . A regiment consisted of ten fahnleins.

W hen atta cked by cavalry, the fahnlein would form a defensive igel (hedgehog). Arqu ebusiers retreated to th e th ird row, wh ile pikemen came for ward w ith pikes extended in all direct ions. (The numbers show n here are greatly reduced.)

KEY

,

ARQUEBUSIER

~

PIKEMAN

~

SW ORDSMA N

~r"·"·"

Arquebusiers in third row

~

VI

o o I

FOOT SOLDIERS OF THE RENAISSANCE T he R enaissan ce was a peri od w hen new technologies, in th e

attem pts to rec rea te th e orde r and di sciplin e of th e R om an ar my

form of firearm s and can no n, had a profou nd im pact o n wa r.

fou nde red up on th e fina ncia l and o rga n izat io na l weak nesses of

Yet sim ulta ne o usly Europeans soug ht to lea rn fro m the classica l

Europea n states. So ldiers remained d iversely clad , cy n ically

wo rld in w ar fare. as wel l as in art and architecture. The stu dy

m ercenar y, and da ngero usly prone to plu nder and mut iny. Fo rce s

o f An cient Gree ce and R om e convinced m ilitar y thi n kers tha t

tha t suc ce ssfu lly co mb ine d firea r ms w it h pike for mations simi lar

di sci pli ned infan tr y we re the key to success in batt le, altho ug h

to th e Gree k ph alan x had th e edge on th e battl efield .

III

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SWISS PI KEMAN

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Th e pikcmen o f the Sw iss Confederation WOII a l l in u nc dia re na m e for th CIll Sl '! VCS i ll 1476, w he n the y tr o u nced th e m i ~h t y !lur~ull d i a ll ar m y at th e battle s of Grandso n and Murren . T he Swiss fo ot so ldiers were mi litia called up for service by th eir ca nto", (self-go vern ing d ist ri ct s), a nd thei r sty le

of fi~htill~ e xp re ssed th e so lid arity of th e ir egalitarian soc iety, Form ing de nse CO IU Ill JIS armed w ith pike s or hal be rd s, t hey att ac ke d sho ulder- to -s ho ulde r at a t ro t, ove rru n ni ng th e ir enemie s before the ir canno n o r cavalry could mount an effective ri poste. After their victories over the Bu rgu nd ian s, the Swis s were in gn .-ar de m an d as mercen aries. From the 14'Jlls t hey were either h ired o u t e ll ma sse by a canton to a fore ign employe r. or serve d ill inde pe nd e nt m er ce' ''lr y bands. Gari sh ly d re ssed

ill st riped ho se a nd pu ffed sleeves, th e y a lwa ys so ug ht to take the o ffensive . dep endin g 0 11 the mom e nt u m of their massed co lu m ns to stea m ro ller the o ppo sitio n. A few cro ssbow rnc n or ar quc hus ier s m ight accolt1 pany the pikes and h albe rd s, bu t th e ir ro le wa s periphe ral.

GE RMA N COM PETITI O N In th e co urse of th e Italian W ar s of 1494 to 1525 th e Sw iss sco red so me not able suc cesses, espe c ia lly th e defe at o f th e Fren ch at N o var a in 1513 . But o the r force s imitat ed their den se pike for ma tio n , parti cularl y th e Lands k uc chr m er cen ar ies, w ho be came the Swi ss so ld iers' bi tte rest enemi es, And th e lim irations of Swiss tac tics were re vea led 3 S ar mies learned ho w to co mbine pike s w it h a so p his ti ca te d use of firep o w er. At the battle of Bico r ca in 1521 the Sw iss rank s were decim ated by fire from arque buses and ca n no n after their ini tia l " push o f pik e" had been blocked by field fortifications . T he Sw iss, ho w e ver , put in a lac kl ust re perform an ce o n t he lo sin g side at th e batt le of P" vi a in 1525 . w h ich effect ively e nded the ir period of ascendanc y o a m o n g Euro pean infan tr y. T he y co ntinued to fig ht as me rce na ries in the ser v ice o f th e French o m on ar ch y, ho w ever, throug hou t the religi ou s wa rs 16TH ·C ENTURY in the second hal f SW ISS HALBE RD o f th e !(,th ce llt ur y. Swiss triumph at Grandson . 1476 The battle turned when the Burgundian knights we re surprised by the opportune arrival of a second force of well-disciphned Swiss pikemen and fled in disarray.

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SPANISH TERCIOS Aft "r th e uni ficati on of Spa in had been co m pleted wi th th e co nq ues t of Gra na da in 149 2 . th e Spanish 1110113( rh )' create d J statuti ng ar my to pr ot ect its in ter ests abroa d . T he first infmtry co m pa n ies ( "l'il'II/;"5) were sen t to fi ght in Italy iu 14W.; th ey were orga nized int o 12- compan y tcrcios in 1534 .

H ARD EN ED PRO FESSION ALS

CORSElET

LATE 16THCENTURY SWORD

(BREASTPLATE)

Corselet attached to / backplate WIth leather straps

Whc..'n.' as t he m ajorit y o f the so ldie rs se rvi ng Spain wen: fo reign , the trrcios co nsisted ent irely of Spa u ish vo lu n tee rs. They w ere an eli te force, th orough ly trained and o rga niz ed by the sta nda rds of their tim e . Ser vi ce w as in principle for lift', so a co re of veteran s built li p with ex pe rienc e of

Most prkemen and erquebusiers would not have worn armour on their arms

garr iso n du t ies in Ital y. ex ped it io ns to Muslim Nort h Africa . an d sus ta ine d wa rfa re aga in st th e Dutch in Plandcrs, O n the battl efiel d. th e trrcios' heav ily ar moured pih .' 111l.' 11 fo ug ht ill d en se s'1ua res . flank ed by so ld ie rs w ith tircar m s. T he y w er e also capab le of o pe rat i ng in sm a ll u ni ts, with g ro ups of sk ir m ish ing arq ucbusier s harassing the e ne m y. suppor te d by so ld iers wi th ha lb erds, The tcrcios suffe re d from till.' limitation s o f the ir time . In pr actice. pikcmen o fte n h ad littl e o r no a r mo ur. Althou gh so ld ie rs w ere supposed to rece ive m onthly wage..'s. pay w as o fte n in a rrea rs. Ic..' ad in g to m uti n ies and to the sacki ng o f c ities in pursuit of payment in kind . About ten pe..' r ce nt of so ld ie rs d eserted eve r y yc ar, di sgruntled over h arsh di sc ipl ine a nd irregular

Blade cut down from an earlier sw ord of the 15th century

TA SSETS

pay. Yet t he tcnios rem ained th e m o st e ffecti ve in fa nt r y in Eu ro pe unt il defeat by th e Fren ch at R o cro i in 164 3 m arked th e e nd of th eir domi nan ce .

MO RIO N

Brim typically turn ed up to a poi nt at back and front of the helmet

Spa nish a rmo ur

AS THEIR VALIANCE WAS TO BE MUCH COM ME N DE D, YET CA N I MUCH DISCOMMEND TH EIR BARBAROU S CRU ELTY. GEORGE GASCOIGNE, EYEWITNESS TO THE SACK OF ANTWERP BY SPANISH TROOPS . 1576

Only in a very wellequipped tercio wo uld all th e men have been issued wi th half armo ur and a "ma rion" helmet. The armou r was of ten made in Italy. whe re Spain had extensive possessio ns. A small numb er of the pikernen wo uld also have carried swo rds.

-,

1300 -

.. . ,

"

17 0 0

OTTOMAN SOLDIER ALL THROUGH THE DAY THE TURKS MADE A GREAT SLAUGHTER OF CHRISTIANS . BLOOD FLOWED LIKE RAIN WATER IN THE GUTTERS AFTERA SUDDEN STORM, AND CORPSES FLOATED OUT TO SEA LIKE ME LO N S A LO N G A CA N A L.

NICOLO BARBARO O N THEFA LL OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 14 53

T T ilE STA IlT 0 1' Til E 16'1'11 C EN TU IlY

A

the army of th e Turkish

Ottoman Empire was probably the most effective fighting force in the wo rld, It was a unique mi x of different kinds of fighting men , wel l reward ed and organized, and wi th high

morale as a result of an unbroken string of victo ries, The most famo us eleme nt in th e Ottoman army were th e ja n issaries, slave-sold iers train ed from a you ng age wh o form ed an in fantry elite, but cavalry and arti llery played just as important a role in the sultan's wars aga inst C hristian and Mu slim powers, ~

VI

o o I

T he Ottom.m s o rig inatl'd as a band o f a few hund red T urkis h g haz is - fierce Muslim t riba l wa rrior s - w ho establishe d co ntro l over an area o f Auatol ia during th e 13th ce nt u ry. T he y were lIeig hbo llrs of th e Byznnt inc Em pi re, still a maj o r s t ~lte but by then enter ing all adva nce d stag e of d isiurcgr arion . U nder O sma n (w ho ru led 12HI to 132()) and h is suc cess o rs, th e O ttoman s ex plo ite d Byzanti ne w C;lkIlCSS to i nfi ltrate into Euro pe . taki ng over the Balkan s in th e co urse of t he l-lth ce nt u ry, T hey fina lly seized th e Byzaut in c ca pita l. C ons tant ino ple. in 1453 and made it th e ce ntre o f th eir e m pire . III th e 16th ce nt u ry th eir arm ies penetrated C h ristian Europe up to th e wa lls of Vienna, whi le they also batt led the Persian Safavid s and the Eg ypti an Mam luk s, taking co nt ro l o f N orth Afri ca and mu ch of the Midd le East. T he se extrao rdinar y wide-ranging co nques ts were achieved hy a military syste m that ex ploi ted the best of a number o f differ en t fighting trad ition s .1 1H.1 techn ologies.

GOO D LEARNERS In iti all y. the Ottoma ns fiHl g ht in t he sty le of steppe ho rsem en . They were moun ted archer s using the co mpos ite ho w as thei r main wca pon and ge nera lly avoid ing clo se-quarter s co mbat. Swi ft- movi ng , mi ssi le - arm ed cavalry wo uld rema in an impo rtant elem ent of O tto m an forces throu ghout th e peak Yl'a rs of th eir em pi re , but th ey co uld not have ach ieved th e succ e ss th ey d id w it ho ut develop ing highl y effective heavy cavalry. in fa ntry, and arti llery, as wel l as c reating th e ir o w n nav y. O ne of th e most str iki ng aspects of Ottoman r u le in th e 15th and I(,th cent uries wa s the vigour wi th w h ich the y ada pted to ne w ways o f making war.

A Eu ropean ob ser ver co m men ted that "no nation has sho w n less relu ctance to ado pt the use ful in vcntiou s of o t hers". T he Ottoman s mimick ed C hr istian Europ e ill till' ado ptio n of firearm s. prog rcssing fro III the arq uebu s, v ia the matc hlo ck mu sket , to th e Aintl ock (altho ug h th ey never

cr ea ted Euo pcan-sty lc bo d ies of pik emen) . Th ey were sim ilarly sw ift to eq u ip the i r arm y w ith can no n , init ially by purcha sing th l' skills of European ex perts. Meluncd th e C o nque ror fam ously employed a H uu gari.m, kn own as Urban. to found the g reat g u ns with w hic h he battered the walls of Consta nt ino ple in 1453. Although the Ot tomans becam e re no w ned felf thei r usc of ex tra large ca n no n in siege wa rfare, they d id not neg lect light er ticld art ille ry, w h ich always formed all etTc.'ct ivc part of th eir arm ic«.

CO M ('LEX FORC ES The forces o f th e m atur e Ottom an Emp ire:

cent red aro und a stalld ing army of hou seh old sold iers in th e direct pay of th e sulta n. Th ese pcrm .mcnt forces included th e su ltan's elite iufantry bod yguard . the j an issa r ies. wh o at least unti l rh c late 17th cc n ru r y we re slaveso ld ie rs, ;lIId non - slave cavalry, Whcll till.' su ltan e m barked 011 a military c.uupai gu . th is relativel y sma ll regular arm y wa s aug me n te d by pro vin ci al fo rces ra ised th rou gh the timor sys te m, which w as ill so n ic wa ys ak in to Europ ean fl'lHb lism . H o rsemen known as sipahis we re gi ven the rig ht to raise rent from all area of land ill ret u r n t(lr military duti es. Th ey were requ ired to pr esent them sel ve s tor serv ice along w ith a ce rtai n number of th eir foll o wers, equipped tor w ar, at the bidding of th e su ltan . RAWHIDE CHICHA K (HELMET ) WITH (OPPER GILT

Ottoman campa ign s The Siegeof Belgrade in 14S6led by Sultan Mehmet II " The Conqueror" (right ) and the typical arms and armour of an Ottoman soldier (far right) . The siege eventually escalated into a major battle, dunng which John Hunyadi led a sudden counterattack that overran the Turkish camp, ultimately compelling the wou nded

Sultan to retreat.

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... T H EN EACH [WARRIOR] WAS ORDERED TO KI LL H IS OWN PRISO NE RS, AND FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT WISH TO DO SO TH E KING [BAYEZID] APPOINTED OTHERS IN THEIR PLACE.

UJ

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JOHA NN SCHILTBERGER DESCRIBING THE CRUSADEOf NICOPOllS, 1396

Orh er cavalry we re recru ited as 'Jkil~i;. They were .u n h itio u-, yo u n g warriors wit h a horse and a t.ivtc tor advc n run..' w ho viewed wa rfa re as ;1 ch.mr...' to make t hei r \\';1)' ill th e world . The ,,/.:ily'; vcr vcd ;1\ ligh t cavalry - . . r o ut ing a nd ra id ing ahc.id of the m a in ;lfllly. The.')' profit ed f ro m plunde r a nd mi ght ho pe, i f the ir va lo u r at tracted offic ia l at te ntio n . to o ne d ay be ~ r~lIl tl'd ;) timor. At t he bo tt o m of t he ~l rJ H Y hi e rarch y were t he I'Zt,f,s. They served a" manual labou rer s a nd as toot so ld ie r». and were rl'~a nkd as di spl'lIsahk' C, II III 01 1 tt,ddl'r. Fin all y, a ll importan t co nt r ib ur io n to Ottom .in f()f(.'l' S w as m ad e by ro un tr ic s ow ing a lk'~ia l1 cl' to the su ltan th at pr o v ided n at ion al co llt i n ~l' n b u nder t heir ow n com m.m dcrs - tor e xa m p le, th e Serb s fro m till' late l-It h cent ury,

SLAVE -SO L D I

ens

l. ikc m ost Mu slim statl's , till' Ot rom.ms e mp loy ed slave s both ill hi ~h admin istratio n a nd to f( )rJll e lite troops i ll the ar med forces - t he M amlu ks Otto man w eapons A miquelet rifle and a gurz (mace) - both 18th century. Al thou gh Ottoman forces readily deployed firearms in batt le, th ey rejected the use of t he bayonet. seemq it as an " infidel weapon" ,

III Eg ypt were a prune exa m ple. The j a nissa ry co r ps w as ra ised th roug h th e dcrshinnc. :1 selec ti ve co nscript io n of bo ys fr om

till' C h ri stia n co m m uni ries of th e Halka ns th at c.uue under O tt oman rul e in th e l-lth ccu tury. Ottoman l'>rl.'SS ~a n~s tou red t he Halka ns l'Vl'ry year, tak in g th e chi ldren th at lo oked th e m o st pr o m isin g m il ita r y m at e ri al. R em o ved from th e ir C hr isti a n fam ilies. the bo ys were taken back to C o ns ta n riuo plc a nd raised as M u slim s, W hen th e y ca me: o f ag e: th e y e nte red the su lt an's se r v ice , e ither as j ani ssar ics o r as c iv ilia n ad ru iu isrr.uo rs. Forb idd en to m ;lrry o r o w n pr opert y and defi n it ivel y sepa ra te d from th e ir fa mi lies, t he slave-so ld iers we re re garded as t he idea l f;li t hfu l se rv an ts o f th e su lta n becau se th e y had no ot he r arta clu uv nrs o r pe rson a l am bition s, W ha t till' sys te m (:ti ll'd to allow fo r w as th e inevi tab le

Warrior 's cuirass This example of Ott om an body armo ur wo uld have provided superb prot ection, featur ing several large plates and shoulder guards,

de velopme nt over t im e o f th e ja n issa ries' lo yalt y to th eir o w n co rps, wh ich in th e en d would n u ke th em d e vot ed less to till' su ltan th an to the ir o w n intere sts as a militar y elite. H o w eve r, in the ir golde n a ~e b efore sel fin te res t took ho ld , t hey were tine in fmrr ymcn . di scipli ned, asce ti c , fea rless , and sk illed in the use of fire arm s. T he y we re the tro ops ex pecte d to sto r m t he w a lls of a be sie ged fort re:ss o r h old t he lin e o n the battlefi eld in t he f:,ce of c harg m g e ne m y cava lr y.

EFFECT I V E FIG HTE RS Altho u g h la rge a nd va r icgarcd. the O tto ma n ar m y wa s no ted fo r t he good o rder of its mil it a r y operatio n s, w it h ca m ps dea n and well o rg a ni zed and th e o ff- d u ty be hav io ur o f so ld iers less

.. '

.......... .... .... Ott om an ex pa nsio n In th e course of 150 years, the Ottoman Turks grew from a small band of holy wa rrio rs. sett led on land in north w est Anatotia. int o rul ers of an empire straddling Europe and A sia. The scale of their expansion. as Illustrated. is extraordmary. They wo n almost 20 key battles in t he 16th century alone, but by the end of the 17th century their empire was in decline.

d run ken and d isr u pt ive than was common a mo ngs t th eir co nte mpo ra r ies in the C hrist ia n w o rld . T he ir hi ghl y d eco rated \wap on r y and noi sy milit ar y ba nd gave th e Ottom an forces an a ir of grea t splendo ur, but th e y we re th o rou ghly pr acti cal light iu g m en ski lle d in t he d epl o ym ent o f th eir diffe rent arms an d capa b le of di sc ipl ined battl efi eld m an o eu vres. In co m pariso n to this effic iency, th ei r e ne m ies o fte n see m ed fatall y n.nvc. At Ni cop oli s, for exa m ple, in I.W(" a bod y o f C h rist ian c r usa de r knights laun ch ed a h ast y cavalry c ha rge ag ainst an arm y led by su lta n B;lye zid with out tir st estab lish ing the siz e or di spo sition of the Ot toma n force s. After scarrer ing the '\, ZIl!JS", w ho ha d been placed ill forward po sit io ns as sacr ifici al pawns. the knight s fo u nd th e m selves ex pose d to a co u n te ratt ac k hy Bayezid 's far more numerous cava lry and w ere dul y mas sac red . At M oha cs )31l years later, C h r ist ia n knights su ffe red a sim ila r fa«- on a ba ttl efi eld wh er e g u n po wd e..·r w l';lpons we re pr ese n t. Facing th e usu al en rh usiasric ch arge b y armoured Ch ris tia n knights. th e

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, 1574 TUNI'

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\ OTTO MAN EMPIRE C.1650

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Ottoman Empire and lIanali 1639

Ottoman de fea t

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1526

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Ottoman sip"his fei gn l'd tiigllt . d rawin g the knights st raigh t into th e de vastatin g tir e o f a rtil lery and o f di sciplined ra n ks o fj;ln is,aril's a r m ed with arq ue buses , Al so ha rassed b y th e flan k in g attacks o f th e Ottoman light cav alry, th e k nig hts we re finall y swe pt away by a co u nte r-c ha rge lau nched by th e su ltan's heav y cava lry armed w it h swo rds a nd spea r, . The Ot to ma n s wer e l'q ua lly successfu l again st Muslim oppo nc uts. T heir dd \:;1t of th e Egyp tian M amluks at M arj D ahik , in Syri a. in 15 16 o wed mu ch to th e po ssessio n o f g u npowdl'r we..·apOJ 1S. which th e Eg y pt ian s did not have . W hen th e M am lu ks depl oyed th eir own hastil y asse m bled ca n non at R ayd a u iya in Eg ypt the foll owin g year. the y we re no netheless d l'feate..'d aga in, t he sk ilfu l Ottoman cava lry exec ut in g n im ble Hank ing attack s th at nu llifi ed the fi re power o f the Eg ypti an for ces .

FA I R- WE AT H ER FIG HTE RS If t he Ottom an army h ad a maj or weakness. it w as t he shee r numbers of its sold iers and hors es. W ith o n ly limited logi sti c su ppo rt, this ho st h ad m o stl y to live 011' rhc co u nt ry and could not su rv ive a winter o n Ottoman d ru m s Janisserles are shown here With the drums that were used to urge soldiers into battle. Janissaries lived in their barra cks and served as policemen and firefighters in peacet ime.

c.uupai gn in ce n tra l Europe. Thu s whe n Su ley ma n rhe M agni t, c"1\t (ru led I521l -(,(,) put Vienna, t he cap ita l of the llabshu rg Em pire , u nd er siege in 152 1) . he had to wit hdraw afte..·r o n ly a m onth in orde r to h ave ri me to complet e th e lon g m ar ch ha r k to Constantinople before th e we at he r wo rsened . 111 t he Euro pean theatre. th e O tt oman forces were on ly a su m me r arm y.

D EC LIN E A N D FALL Th rou gh th e 17th a nd lSt h cc nrur ies th e Otroman a rmy g rad ua lly ti:1l in to a decadence th at refle ct ed p ro b lems ex pe rienced by t he w ho le 0 [ O tto m3 11 soc iety. Th er e was a f ailurc to keep up with technological adva nces th at were preval e nt throu gh out We stern Eu ro pea n an d ;1 decl in in g e.·. C0I1OJ 11Y that underm in ed th e resou rces ava ilable fo r military c.u n pa ig ns . The 1;1111" syste m b egan to de cay a nd w as eve n tu a lly abandoned . Espe cia lly sad wa s t he (;lte..' o f the j aui ssar ics. Du r in g the 17th ce ntury t he y ceased to he slaves re c r uited b y the ilrvshinnr, iu stc ud hl'in g dra wn fro m fr ee- bor n Mu slim s eagl'r to join a pri vileged military set. The j anissa r y corps sw clh-d in number s, from around 2 0 .()()O at th e rime o f Sulcyman to well in excess of IOIl, IlIl Il hy th e e nd o f th e lSt h ce n tury. Thi s hlo ared body ceased to have a ny ctfecr ivc mil itar y fun ct io n , d q~el1 l' ra ti n g int o a pamper ed socia l elite an d blocking effo rt s to re for m a nd mode r n ize t he armed forces. It wa s fin all y sup presse d , w ith considerable bloodshed, in 182() - k nown as "The Aus picious Incid en t". By then O tto man Turkey had declined , now little more th an a rams hac k le mil itar y power cl inging p reca rio us ly to th e remains of its empi re ,

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MUGHAL WARRIOR DURING THE SEVEN OR EIGHT DAYS WE LAY IN PAN IPAT, OUR MEN WENT CLOSE TO IBRAHIM'S CAMP A FEW AT A TIME, RAINED ARROWS DOWN ON THE RANKS OF HIS TROOPS, CUT OFF AND BROUGHT BACK THEIR HEADS. BABUR, ON THE BUILD-UP TO THE FIRST BATTLE OF PANIPAT. 1526

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th e 16th and 17th cent uries,

th e M ughal em pero rs of Ind ia com ma nded far larger armed fo rces tha n an y co ntem porary Eu ro pea n power co uld have mu stered . Like th eir fellow Mu slim s, th e Otto ma n Turks,

th ey co mbined the Cent ral Asian cavalry traditio n of th e M ongols and Tartars w ith th e use of can non and firea rms. T hei r wea k nesses we re a failure to apprec iate th e effectiveness of disciplined in fant ry and th e lack of a cohe rent co m m and struc ture to direct their un w ieldy and mul ti- ethn ic army. ~

VI

o o I

Ilahur. th e fou nde r of t he M u gh al Em pi re , was a Turco -M on gol d escendant of t il l' mu ch - feared co nque ro r Timurlan c. As the ch ie f of a hand o f Mu slin : wa rr ior s, or ,l.? IIIlZ ;S. he con q uered K abu l in Afgha ni ,ta n in IS0 4 :1I1d [rom ISI(, be gan raidin g south into India. His de feat of Su lta n Lod i o f Delhi at Pan ipar in 152(, allowed him to establish his full' in northern India. Th e empire w as not set tled O il a so lid basis. IU )\\,C \' l' r. un t il th e reig n o f Akbar (r u led 1556-! (,05 ). A n ac tive military ca m paig ne r. Akbar ex te nd ed th e area of Ind ia ti nde r M u gh a] co ntrol :1I1 d integ rated warrio rs fro m varied ba ck g rounds, Muslim and Hindu. into a large- scale imp erial army.

m an -r o -m an a nd despi sed m issile w arfare . T he )' a lso st resse d self-sacri fice and the c ho ice of deat h rather th an di shon our. T he mo re pragm ;ltic M u gh" " a rc' rep orted to have felt the Rajput ' " k ne w how to di e hut 110t ho w to fi gh t", hut the)' we lcomed th e cava lry and arme d peasantry that H indu w arrio rs hrou gh t to till' army,

AM I RS AN D HOU SEHO LD FOR C ES

T he wa rlords and nob les w ho bro ug ht th e ir follo wers to serve the l'm pl'ror were design ated " am irs". As we ll as stat u s ill the co urt h ie rarchy, they received 1110lll'y fro III till' Mu gh al treasur y to pay the ir m en alld t he right to raise re venu e from pro vin ces placed unde r their co ntro l. T he n' we re several hund red .u n irs at any g ivl'n ri me, IM PERI A L ARMY wi th aro u n d 100 .0 0 0 to 200.000 rc raiuers. A, The ar lllY A kb ar created kept co nt ac t wi t h th e w el l as these troo ps, the em pl'ror had hou seh old Mu gh al s' Ccn trnl Asian ro ot s. The e mperor forces und er h is d irect co ntrol. T hese co nsiste d rec ru ited nom adic warbands into hi s army, Of :1 few tho usand cava lry and mu sket eers, added attracti ng them wit h the pro spect o f a share ill t he em pire's wea lt h. T he y in clud ed lar ge to large qua nt ities of arti ller y .m d a subs ta nt ia l numbe r of wa r- e leph ant s. Surprising ly, thou gh , co nt inge nts of Tura ni s. o rig inating fr om he did 110t h ave any sold ier-slaves , a m ajor Central Asia. Th ese we re horsem en espec ially skilled in th e lise of til l' co mpo site bow, w ho fea rurc o f co nte m po ra ry Mu slim armies ill \\TTe boun d to th ei r wa rband lead er by till' Tu rk ey. Egy pt . and Iran . T he fu nct io n of the Mu gh al army wa s to sim ple principl e of fid elit y to till' m an w hose maintain and extend the: emperor's rule in food th e y ate . lran is and Afgh all i' - th e the Indian subcouti nen t . Th e: emperor latt er noted bot h for their fier cen ess was ne ver clo se to csrabli shin g a nd t he ir unrel iabilit y - also a Il1OTH)pol y o f armed for ce c ame so uth to ser ve the within h is ow n domain s, e mpire. But Akbar and As o ne o bse rve r co m men ted , subsequent empe rors also wi th refere nce to the int egrated int o their wi desprea d d istribut io n of fo rces the wa rrio rs o f m atchlo ck mu ske ts, "even each area of lnd ia th at the: cu ltivator at the ti me of the y co nque red . Thus plou ghin g has hi , loaded for e xam ple the R ajputs, g Ull faste ne d to the ren o wn ed Hi ndu m ilitar y TURBAN HELMETWITH plou gh . a nd hi , m arch aristo crats, bro u ght t heir NASALAND NECK GUARD bu rnin g ", It has bee n foll o wers int o till' serv ice calc u lated that ill the Iatl' o f th e Mughal s, The lfith cent ur y the M ughal R ajl'u! , espoused a ch ivalric co de of hon our Empi re contained over that value d close co mbat fou r m ill ion arme d men .

By maint aining such a larg e army. t he l.'m pc..' ror both reduced th e number of potentia l so ld ie rs availab le to those tempted to o ppos<' him , b y ta k in g rhe in in to im pe ria l serv ice. and upheld th e e m p ire 's prestige. Emper ors spent mu ch of th eir tim e movin g around th eir lands in a vast m ob ile a rmed c u n p which. with milit ar y per sonnel a nd han gers-on together . m ay ha ve n umber ed h alf a million p eople. It w as th e m ost pract ical w ay o f demon strating th eir we alth JIHI prestige to th eir subj ec ts and tribu tari es.

WHEN HE TRAVELS THROUGH HIS COUNTRY. THE EMP EROR TAK ES FIFT EEN HUNDRED THOUSAND HUMA N BE lNGS. HORSEMEN . SOLDIERS . OFFICERS . WOMEN . CH ILDREN. W ITH TEN THOUSAND ELEPHANTS . AND W ITH A GREAT DEAL OF ART ILLERY. FRE NCH TRAVElLER AUGUSTIN HIRIART, C.1605

C AVA LRY AN D IN FAN T RY VI

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As a tightin g torrc. the M u g hal Jfm y \V 3 S ce n tred up on th e usc o f cavalry. The shee r I11ll11h "'f of horsemen wa s astonishi n g. at times almost ce rt ain ly e xcee d ing 100,000 m en . T he ne ed to ti nd m o u nt s for cavalry 0 11 t hi s scale - espec ially w he n ev er y m a ll wo u ld at least asp ire to ow n ing

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Ma ny of the wa rriors depicted in the batt le below are brandishing the type of distinctive cur ved sword, ea/war, that was commo n in Mughallndia.

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tw o horses - made horse-bree ding a major ac tivi ty in part s o f Ind ia, notably th e Pu nj ab a nd Sind , bu t warhorses also had to b e im po rt ed in bu lk fro m C e nt ral Asia via Kab ul. T he m ajo ri t y of t he cav alry w e re lig ht ly eq u ippe d mou nt ed a rche rs, alt ho ugh there were al so large numbe rs of heav y cava lr y w ho w ore substa nt ia l bod y ar mo u r - t y pically a hel m e t, plate c u irass , and coat of m ai l - a nd

who had the sw o rd as t heir m ain weapo n. T he ho rsem e n we re expect ed to w in battles; but littl e was ex pec ted of t he ar med pea san ts w ho m ad e up th e in fautr y. T he y we re m en of lo w status co nsc ri pted into part- ti m e mi litar y se rv ice , an d m ad e lip the num ber s at li ttl e cost to th eir e m ployers, li vin g o ff a IIll'ag re di et of flou r, rice, bu tt er , an d salt. In fan tr y mi gh t car r y a ny o f a variety of edged we apo n s, but th eir m ajo r a rm wa s t he m atchl o c k muske t .

GUNPOWDER W EA PON S Althou gh the Mu gh als ca n n o t be c red ited wit h int rod ucing g unpowder w ea pon s in to t he Ind ia n subco nrine nt Fran cisco de A lmeida defeated co m b ined Arabian a nd Egypti an force s at th e Bat tle of Diu , in Febru ar y 1509, with sh ips' ca n no n - the first use of can no n and fir earm s there ce rta in ly da res from around th e start of the M ughal period . Artiller y a nd arq ue buses pla yed a c r uc ia l part in Babu r's v icto ry at Pa n ipat in 1526 . In th at early p er io d the Mugh al s d epe nded heavil y on fore ig n e xpe rti se in thi s a rea . T hc Otto m an T u rks and vario us Eu ropea ns, espe cia lly Po rt u gu ese fro m Goa , carr ied o ut the transfer of rec h nolog y, demonstr atin g ho w to fou n d ca n no n a nd m a ke fircar ms an d g u npowder. Ind ia n cra fts m e n we re q ui ck lear ne rs. Ill' the e nd of the I()th ce nt ur y the ir m atc hl o ck mu ske ts we re b et te r m ad e th a n m o st Eu ro pea n firea rm s a nd they we re rnanu facrurin g ligh t a nd h eav y can no n o f b rass a nd bron ze . Fo rei g n ex perts were still e m ploy ed to h elp with the aim in g and fir ing of art ille r y pieces. W hen the Mu gh al a rmy wa s o n ca m pa ig n , its he av y a rt ille ry wa s d rawn >-

Ceremon ial dagger This extremely ornate 17th -century dagger wi th scabbard is typical of th ose from the Mu ghal period . Its ram-shaped hilt is studded with semi-precious sto nes. It wo uld have been used for ceremo nial purposes.

MUGHAl lNDIA 1525 - 170 1

by oxen o n ca rts o r transpo rt ed in pi eces st rappe d to th e back s o f ca mels . T he ligh t a rt illery was pulled by hor ses. The ve ry largest ca n no n. required for th e siege o f stu bbo rn st ro ng ho lds, wo u ld be m a nu factu red o n t he SP01. Althou gh siege warfa re wa s t he pri ma ry usc of arri llcr y, its effec tiveness was lim ited . T he M ugha l« co m in ucd to resort to traditiounl tacti cs suc h as di ggin g mines unde r fort re ss w311s and sim ply sta rvi n g th e d efe nd er s into sub m issio n . The m ai n impact o f ca n no n see ms to have bee n psycho lo gi ca l. add ing to the mo un ting pressu re o n besieged for ces to ag ree su rre nde r terms.

-

Mu g hals in Indi a Babur's defeat of Sultan l od i of Delhi at Panipat in 1526 allowe d him to establish Mughal rule in northern India . From th is base, t he M ugh als expanded and consolidated territor y to the south for almost a further 200 years, under successive rulers including Akba r and Aur enq zeb.

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Alth ou gh th e Mu ghal Em pire reach ed its ze n ith , te rritorially, under Aur e ng zcb (ru led 1(.5H-170 7). it wa s by the n in m ilitary d ecli ne. M ugha l arm ies suffere d defeat s at the ha nd s o f th e M arathas in

Ind ian kard (dagg er) and scabb ard Brought to India through Mughal expansion, this st raight-bladed, singleedged kard was in use across much of the Islamic world by the 18t h century .

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1596- 1600

Mugh al forces ty pica lly too k form for battle w ith m assed light cava lry o n th e flanks and heav y cava lry in the ce nt re. The a rt ille ry and the mu sket- armed infan t ry we re de plo yed as a de fe nsive blo ck, w ith a lin e of wa r- elepha nt s behind them . T he pr esen ce of g u npo wde r we apOllS re nd e red elepha nts useless as a n o ffens ive for ce, since the noi se and smo ke m ad e th em panic u nco nt ro llabl y. The y fu nction ed in stead as co m ma nd a nd o bse rva t io n po sts, and as a last lin e of d efe nce. The psycho lo gical impact of their to we ring presen ce wa s also sig n ifica nt. T he Mugh als wo u ld usu all y start a battl e b y send ing thei r m o unted arc hers for ward 0 11 th e flanks to delu ge th e e ne m y w it h a rrows. After this h ighly effecti ve so fte nin g- up ph ase, th e heav y cavalry wo uld cha rge and eng age the o ppos it io n in a ge ne ra l m elee. An alte rna tive batt le plan, execute d success fu lly aga inst nume ricall y supe rio r for ces at Pan ipat a nd in seve ra l o the r co n flic ts, was for th e Mu gh al cavalry to fei g n a retreat, drawi n g th e cne my into th e fire of nl:lssed ca nnon and infantry firear ms . The cava lry wo u ld th en co u ntera ttac k to d evastat in g effec t.

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Anim al ar my Heavily armoured elephants in battle we re a fearsom e sight for the Mughals' enemies. Furthe rmor e, mounted w arriors could exploit the animal s' heigh t to direct the battl e,

southe rn Ind ia fro m th e late 17th cen tury a nd had to m ake peace w ith the m. T hey were also defeated by Pe rsian a nd Afgh a n armies in t he 1731ls - led b y Na di r Sha h. ru ler of Pe rsia - well befor e th e British takeo ver of Ind ia got u nd er way . Sha h in vad ed D el h i, ca rry ing away man y tr easu res, incl ud ing t he Peaco c k T h ron e in 1739. T he Mu ghnl fo rces we re in m an y ways hig hl y so ph ist icate d. T he ir e ng inee rs, for ex a m ple, we re sk illcd roa d bui lders w ho o pe ne d up ro ut es fo r t he ar m y to usc t h rou gh o t her w ise im passable te rrain. But th e y we re lim ited in t hei r ado pt io n

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and lise of new m ilitar y technolo g y. Their cavalry d id not carr y pistol s a nd t heir infa ntry had neither pikes nor bayonets . They failed to m o ve O il fro m till' m atchlo ck to the superior flintl o ck m usket , st ill e m ploy ing t he o ld fashio ned fire ar m in to t he IHth ce nt ury. Despi sin g in fan tr y. the y d id no t subject th e m to d rill , so th at fo ot so ld iers were slo w to lo ad t heir musket s and co u ld no t fi re ill vo lle ys. The frag ility of Mu gh al po w er wa s, ho we ve r, lar gely a co nseque nce of t he army's tu ud a m c nta l struct u re, de pendi ng o n wa rlo rds bri nging their ret ainer s to serve the l'm pl'ror. T his p re vented the creat io n of allY pe rma nent h ier a rch y of co m m and , since ea ch warlord owed allegiance d ir ectl y to the rul cr and accepted or ders on ly fro m h im . Amirs were in e vit abl y te m pte d to asse rt thei r in dcp eu dcn ce ill t he ir pr o vincial po wer base, rath e r tha n j oinin g the impc rial arm y. Pro fessio nal so ld ie rs wo u ld sel l t heir se rv ices to ano the r e m ploye r OIlCl' imperial w ea lt h a nd po wer wa ned . The Mu gha l Em pi re t he oretica lly co nt in ue d to ex ist unti l IH57. b ut b y th en it was a m er e g hos t of its forme r g lor y. H O\Vl' VCr, till' e m pire's legacy W;lS lon g-la sting: m all Y m onuments of th e Mu gh al pe rio d (m o st famo usly th e T aj M ah al) a rc sti ll in usc to da y.

H E AHMIES THAT I:O U GH T

in th e civil w ars in Brit ain

between 1642 and 1651 were co m ma nded by office rs w ith ex perience of war in co ntine ntal Europe. T hei r tac tics and o rga nization thus foll owed cur re ntly fash iona ble Euro pean models, in wh ich well- d rilled in fantry armed wi th a m ix of pik es and mu sket s were co nside red essential to battl efield success. But Britain had few men train ed in th e use of arms and it took yea rs to crea te trul y via ble fightin g forces, a pro cess th at reach ed its peak in th c N ew Model Army. ~

v.

o o I

At th e hea rt of t ill' co m plex se ries of co n flic ts tha t w rea ke d havo c in En~la n d . Scotla nd . and Ire land from 16 42 o nwa rd wa s a po lit ical a nd religious co n fro nta t io n bet w ee n K ing C ha rles I a nd t he Eng lish parlia me nt . M an y of thos e w ho fough t in th e civ il war s were princ ipled I1H..' 11 wi th a se nse of co m m itm e nt to t he ro yali st or parliamen tarian cause. Yet from the o utset th ere w ere also many so ld ie rs w ho sim p ly fou ght fo r whichever side happened to co nt ro l th e area th ey lived in; some fou ght for both sides at di ffer e nt times. R AI SI N G TROOP S The bulk o f th e initi al co mbatants in the c iv il w ars were e ithe r volunteer s o r members o fl oc al m ili tias (k no w n as the "Trained Band s" ). As the co n flic t dra gge d o n. however , both sides had to raise lev ies to fill the ranks o f their in fa ntr y, lISin ~ a cha otic process of co nsc riptio n th at pro duce d most ly poor q ua lity troo ps from the lo w est le vel s of so c ie ty. Equ ipping and payin g tro op s w as J challenging task und er the co nd itio ns of the time . With g reat effort . all so ldiers in t he civ il wa rs were fitte d o ut w ith basic Wl'apo ns, shoes, and so me kind of un iform . T he u n ifo rms were ge ne rally so d ive rse , however. tha t o n t he day of a ba ttl e so ld ie rs wou ld be issue d wi th a spec ial item to wear, suc h as a sash . to d istingui sh frie nd fro m foe. T he sold ie rs' pa y wa s no rm ally h eavil y in arrears - a frequ ent cause of mu tiny. M e n

o ften had to he paid so m e o f the m Olle y they w ere owed befo re a batt le or sie ge ill o rder to get t he m to tight. U npai d so ld iers dep ended o n p illa ge a nd t he s a c k i n ~ of to w n s for the c hance o f gain .

A N EW A R MY In 1(,45 the Eng lish parliament established the New M odel Arm y ill o rde r to ce ntrali ze the o rganiza tio n o f its m ilit ary forces. w hich had previou sly be en rai sed and trai ne d lo call y. I t co ntai ne d a st ron g co re o f ideolog ica lly com m irrcd offi ce rs and vete ra ns wh o saw the m se lves as t he "army of th e Livin g Cod". It w as u n iqu e in titt ill ~ o ut all its infa utr y in identical uniform s and it w as also better th an o ther c iv il w ar forma tion s at pa yin g its tro op s regularl y. But it co u ld not escape from the ge ne ra l co nd itio ns of arm ies o f its d ay. As we ll as the d edicat ed core. the arm y co n ta in ed man y so ld ie rs wh o had joi ned for th e pay and ad venture, o r be cau se as co nscripts they had be en g ivl'n no cho ice . All o ffice r, C o lo nel J oh n Venn , co m pla ined tha t the lev ies he was se nt w e re " m en ta ken o ut of prison , tin ke rs, pe dlar s. and vag rants that have 110 dw ell in g ". Suc h men had to be brou g ht to the arm y und e r arm ed guard and man y of t hem d ese rted at the ve ry first o ppo rt u n ity . Nor did th e new arm y alw ays succe ed in paying its tro o ps o n ti me , and its soldi ers so ug ht th ei r own fortune s in traditional military f.lsh io n.

MATCHLOCK MUSKET

Matchlock d rill In the first of these pictures from a Dutchillustrated drill manual, the match in the musketeer 's left hand is already lit. In the second, he poursgunpowder froma flask from his bandolier. He then rams down a musket ball. before preparing to pourpriming powder into the pan, keeping the smouldering match at a safe distance between the fIngers of hisleft hand.

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A fter their victory over t he R o yalists at th e

bau lc of Na seb y in )(,-15, N ew M od el A r m y foo t so ldie rs plu ndered the ba ttl efield and d eser ted in Iar~~ num ber s to carr y o ff t he ir bo o t y.

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A R M Y LIr E

To the civilian po pu lati o n allY civil wa r army o n th e m arch wa s like a pla gu e o f lo cu sts. Th e so ld ie rs d id no r ca rry ten ts, so when away fro m perma ne nt c~lI n p th e alternative to sleepi ng und er the o pe n sky wa s to co m ma ndeer space in hou ses o r barn s. As wel l as accom modatio n , a lo cal co m m u nity mi ght be ex pec ted to prov ide food , As armies strugg led to keep the ir m en CAVA LRY

HE LM ET Toughleather provided some

protection eqems t swordcuts BUFF LEATHER

COAT

supp lied wi th basics suc h as biscu its, cheese, boil ed beef, and beer, the y reso rte d [ 0 " free q uar te r" im po sing troops upon civilians w ith the pro mi se of fut ure paym ent fo r foo d a nd lodgi ng . Fre e quarte r easily slippe d o ve r into straig htfo rward ar m ed ro bbe r y, as so ld ie rs to ok w h ateve r th e y fancied or need ed . T he horses req u ired fi" cavalry and tran spo rt, fo r exa m ple . w en.' ofte n sto le n. Wh en th e N t'W M o del Ar m y mutin ied in 1(,-17, o ne o f the m en's p rinc ipal dem and s w as t h at th ey be g iven im m un it y from prosecuti on for hor se th eft s co m m it ted w hi le in u n ifor m . T he pu ritan ical co m ma nders of th e N ew M od el A rm y m ad e v igoro us efforts to alte r th e b eh avi o ur and at ti t udes of th ei r so ld iers. T he y tried to esrab lish payment fo r pro vi sions and put an end to loot ing. Preachers. who were co nside red a vi tal part of th e a r m y esta b lish me nt , le ft m en in no d o ubt of th e Movable visor fut ure w rat h God wo u ld visit up on th e

sin ful. If th is d id no t det er them . there we re h arsh p unish m e nt s to New M odel Army cavalry armour While musketeersusually fought without armour, the soldiersmost likely to be struck by musket balls. the cavalry, wore iron breastplatesand backplates. New Model Armycavalry had distinctive "lobster-tail" helmets.

fo c us the ir m ind s o n v irtue . Fo r blasph emy, a m an mi ght have h is to ngue pie rced w ith a redho t iron. T he pu ui slu n c n t for desert io n wa s h an g in g. Yet the New M od el A rm y in fantr y co nt in ue d to in clude. alon g w ith a so lid co re of co m m itte d , go d- fearing: m e n , a m ass o f un reform ed reprobates, Suppressing the galnbling, dr in k in g, h u nt in g. a nd w ho ring that m ade up th e usu al tex ture o f ca m p life w as an uph ill struggle . T ho u sa nd s deserted o n the m arch, de sp ite th e death pe na lt y, a nd t he ar my read ily e mployed d eserte rs from th e o t he r sid e.

I N FA N T R Y TRA IN IN G O ut of o fte n u npro m ising m ateri al. the armies of th e C iv il Wa r n ever th eless succeeded in c reating t ra ine d foot so ld iers. One of the kno wn adva ntages of a m us ket w as that any foo l co u ld fire o ne w ith 3 littl e train ing; learning ho w to hand le a pike was even simp ler. The in fan trym an w o u ld belong to a co mpa ny of perhap s 120 m en at full st re n g th , ge ne ra lly w ith two musket ee rs to ~ve r y o ne p ikc man , T he so ldier recei ve d systema t ic training - mu c h of it re cor ded in co nte m pora ry dri ll books - in t he h a ndling of hi s we apon (" Po st ure") . and was ta ught h ow to ope rate in ba t tlefield for mat io n (" Mo tio "''' a nd "Evolu t ions") . Bo t h m u sket s a nd pikes were co llect ive weapons that m ade indi vi dual in itiati ve w o rse tha n useless. Mu ske teers had to b e d isc iplin ed to fig h t as a body, fir in g vo lleys as rap id ly as po ssible in t he ge ne ral direc tio n o f the e n emy. A ll fo ot so ld iers we re d rille d to m ano e uvre co he re ntly in rank s and files.

M O ST LY YOU NG ME N AND BOYS ... WHO HAD LEFT THE IR TRAD ES TO FOLLOW WAR AND HAD BECOME ACCU STOM ED TO LEAD A LI FE OF DEBAUCH ERY AN D PI LLAGE , CONTEM PORARY EYEWITNESSDESCRIBI NG CONSC RIPTSIN THE NEW MODELARMY

On the battlefield, a battal io n w ould line up wit h its pi kemcn in the ce ntre and mu sket eers a ll eac h side . There w ould he ca valry o n th eir flanks and rese rve s behind th em. So me mu sketeers mi ght also be tormcd in to mobi le co m pan ies to g ive ti re support to the cava lry as it ad va nced . A se rgea nt w ith ;1 hal be rd sto o d alo ngside ea ch co mpany o rga nizing its mo vem en ts and vo lley fire. A rank of mu sket eer s h ad to " make read y",

fir earm s. however. th e reac h o f the 5m ( I(.ft) pike was not u ecessar ily deci sive. Cool heads and good di scipline were needed to make pik e - and muske t infantr y e ffec t ive o n th e battlefield . Once their formation wa s br oken , th e fo ot sold iers w ere capable of not hi ng but a de sperat e melc e .

V ICTOR IOU S ARMY

"pre sent ". an d " gi ve fire" as ordered by the sergean t - the wh ole pro cess takin g abo ut 30 seconds w ith a mat chl o ck mu sket - and then m ov e o ut of th e wa y for an other rank to fire. Wh en co mbat w as j oined at clo se quarter s, the mu sketeers wo uld usc the buns of th eir we apo ns as clubs. In fant r y co u ld oper ate o ffens ively. rushing the e ne my to e ngage th em in "push o f pike", o r st and o n the defensi ve . If th e y were atta cked h y cava lry , probabl y the mo st un ner v ing ex perience for foot so ld ie rs. the pikcm cn wo u ld for m a bri st lin g sq u are. Since th e cava lry had

T he c reat io n o f t he New M odel Arm y g;av e the I'arliaml'ntarian force s a d istinc t adva ntag e ove r the R o yalists. especially in tenus o f orga ni zation . Between 1(,-15 a nd 1(.52 it w as repeatedl y v icto rio us, subduing R o yali sts, Scot s, and Irish . The c iv il auth orities ne ver lik ed it, because it wa s ex pe ns ive to m aint ain and became a hotbed of political and reli gious radic alism. But it was a hi ghl y pro fe ssion al arlll Y by the standards o f its day. led by dedicated , experie nced o ffice rs , and wit h a co re of ve teran so ldiers at its heart. It o utl ive d the e nd of th e war s but was e ve nt ually di sban ded by C harles II at th e R estoratio n in I(.(.().

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Def ending th e musketeers Themusketeerswere extremelyvulnerable to attacks by cavalrymen or pikemen, especially while theywere reloading. They were alwaysdrawn up on the battlefield accompanied by pikemen , who would come to theiraid in the case of attack.

MUSK ET AND PIKE TACTICS In the 17th cen tury European militar y commande rs an d theoreticians all agreed on deplo ying pikemen in close -packed phalanxes an d on exploiting mat chlock muskets fired in volleys. But differen ces arose over the numerical bala nce between pikemen and musketeers, the depth ot tormat ion, and the most effective system for firing. Through the first halt ot the century the

prop ort ion of musketeers te nde d to increase, from equalit y with the pikem en to double their number. The depth of ranks in the same period lessened, from around te n-deep to six-deep. There were two we ll known meth od s for using musket s. The counte rmarch system associated with Dutch leader Maurice of Nassau aimed to achieve a steady rolling fire. The

other metho d, associated with Ki ng Gustav Adolt ot Sweden, had three ranks of musketee rs firing a simulta neo us salvo. This had maximum shock effect , alth ough it left the musketeers e ntirely dep end e nt upon the pikemen tor detence in inte rvals bet we en volleys wh ile they reloaded. Commanders in the English Civil War employed both systems of firing.

Pikemen can deployto protect _ _ _ musketeers in case of attack

Dutch countermarch The front rank of musket eers fires and countermarches to the rear to reload , as the secon d ran k ste ps forwa rd to take the ir place. The pikemen placed in the centre can deploy to defend the musketeers agains t cavalry.

Second rank moves up

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to take place of the first after they have fired

PIK EM EN

MUSKETEERS

MUSKETEERS

Swedish salv ee

~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~

Three ranks of musketeers stan ding, crouching, and knee ling - fire in a single volley. The rear thre e ranks eithe r move to the front as their colleagues retreat to reload, or line up be tween them to join in a single salvo of the entire musket force. Front three ranks _ Withdraw throughthe rear ranks to reload

_ _ The first three ranks- a to tal of 18 musketeers- looseoff a Simultaneous volley

FIRST THREE RANKS

PIK EME N

MUSKETEERS

MUSKETEERS

17TH-CENTURY EUROPEAN SOLD IERS Th e 17th cent ur y was a transitional period for Europea n arm ies.

co ntinued to em ploy large foreign co nt ingents in th eir forces.

In fan tr y bega n the ce nt u ry arme d w ith pikes and arquebuses

Sta ndards of di scipline gradua lly improved , as did th e qu alit y

or m at ch lock m uskets and ended it w ith flintlock mu skets and

of army ad m in istration . Sold iers w ho we re regularly paid and

bayo nets. T he wars of th e first hal f of the ce ntury we re mostly

fed beca me less likel y to mutin y or wrea k havoc up on civilians.

fought by mercena ry forces raise d by m ili tary ent re preneur s;

Cava lry return ed to fash io n afte r its declin e in the 16th ce ntury,

in later decades, stand ing ar mies pred omi nated , altho ug h rul ers

di ver sifying into heavy and light horse and dragoons.

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I II the b tl' l(lt h cc nr u ry a D utch arm y. co nsisting o f a m ix o f lo cal le vi es :1I1d forei gn vo lu nte e rs or mer cen ar ies, w as ti ~htil1 g fo r ind ep enden ce fro m tilt' rule o f th e Spa ni sh H absb u rgs. Th e D u tch h ad usu ally had th e w o rst of any

co n fr o n rar i o n

w ith the Spanish

Im h,s. b ut fro m t he 15')Os

on ward their per form an ce Plain. basic helmet. rein forced by projecting comb

PIKEMAN' S POT

BREASTPLATE AND TASSElS

~ Swivel hook for fastening shoulder straps

Tessets attached by hasps to studs on breastplate

impr o ved und er the directi on of M aurice o f N assau ( 15(,7- 1(,25) . T he supply and paym ent

o f th e arlll Y beca me exce pt io na lly rel iable b y the: stand ards of th e t im e, and the in fant r y were dri lled and di sc ip lin ed in a systematic fash io n, M auri ce and hi s adv isers e vo lve d a mo re fle xible battlefield fo rm ation t han th at o f th e trrcios. The Dutch in fan tr y to o k th e field in battalion s abo ut 500 stro n g. w ith rou gh ly eq ual nu mber s o f pik cmen and "shot " so ld iers w ith arqueb uses o r mu sket s. The armo ured pik cmen de ployed ill a fo rm atio n m uch broad er than it w as d eep . u sually in files o f ten me n fro m fro nt to rea r. The "shot ". w ho flank ed t he pik cm cn . were dri lled to m aintain a rolling fire, each rank firing and the n w it hd raw in g to relo ad as the ne x t rank fire d . Th e pik em cn held off th e cavalry and provided th e o ffen sive "push o f pik e" to drive the cnc m y from the field at th e deci sive m ome nt. A lthou gh th e Dutch ne ve r tru ly go t t he be tt er of t he Span ish in battl e. th e H absbu rg m on arch y w as even tu ally forced to reco g ni ze th eir ind ep endence for m a lly in 16 4H. T he D utch syste m o f fighti n g h ad w ide spread infl uen ce o n Eu ropea n military think ing . SW ORD, DATED 16 33

1Il'll1l'- - - - -

Pierced shell guard is a decorative feature. but alsogives protection

Dutch armour and w eapons The half armour, consisting of a breastplate, backplate. and tassets to protect the thighs, is typical of pikeman's armour in the early 17th century. So, too, is the pot helmet. The sword and decorative halberd would have belonged to an officer.

In 1620 Sw ed en introd uced a n O rdin ance of M ilitar y Pe rso nn el. registe ring all me n o ver 15 for mi lit ar y se rv ice. So me W.OOO w ere co n scr ipted cv c ry ycar. A lon g w ith mercen ari es hired from Pro testant G erm any . they allowed Kin g Gustav Ad o lf to field a for m id ab le arm y. Gustav bui lt up o n the D ut ch infantry m o d el , thinnin g th e fo rmation o f pike rncn to on ly six ran ks and do ub lin g the proportion o f mu sket eer s. T he latter we re train ed to fire m ass vo lleys in three ranks - kn eelin g , cro uc h ing . and standing . G ustav also m ade: aggressive usc of cavalry. ch arging w it h sabres drawn . The Sw edi sh army int e rven ed deci sively in th e Thirt y Years' War , b ut at gre at co st. Of 23o co nsc r ipts recru ited fro m o n e Swe d ish vi lla ge , 2 15 died ab ro ad .

FRENCH MUSK ETEER In 1622 Fre nc h Kin g Louis XI II equ ipped a ligh t cavalr y co m pany o f h is ro yal hou se ho ld with m at ch lock mu skets . Sin ce this represented th e latest in militar y te ch no lo gy, it h elped g ive th e mu sket ee r co m pany elit e status . Its proximity to the kin g g u ara nt ee d th at ge nt lema n so ldiers would see k se rvice in its rank s. In th e 1(,(,Os two co m pan ies we re cr eated , kn own as th e Gre y M u sket eer s and the mack Mu sket eer s fro m th e co lour 17TH ·C ENTU RY o f th eir slee veless su rco ats. RAPIER D espit e t heir n am e, th ese units ge nera lly pr eferred th e sw o rd to the mu sket , w h ic h , having lost its aur a o f no velt y, wa s d espised by th e aristo cr acy as a n arm su itab le on ly for lowl y fo ot so ld ie rs. T he two co m pan ies remain ed in ex iste n ce unti l 177(,. T heir reputati on for pan ache a nd flambo yan ce w as lat er immortal ized in the no vel s of A le xandre D umas.

POLISH WINGED CAVALRY T he Poli sh J r my of the 17 th ce nt u ry WJ S pr cd om iu anrl y J cava lry for ce - horsemen o u tn u m be re d foot so ld ie rs by th ree o r four to D ill' . th e reverse of th e pr oportions fo u nd in o the r Eu ro pea n ar mies. T he ar my's el ire fo rce w as the w in g,..-d cava lry, or hussaria. Origina lly lig ht sk ir mis h ing horsemen in t he 1113111H.'r o f th e H Ul1 gJ r iJ I1 hu ssars, hy the 17t h ce ntu ry the y had evolve d into J shoc k force o f heavy cava lry. Se rvin.' in rhe hu ssaria offe re d pr estige and pri vi leges that attrac ted vo lu nteers fro m th e c ream of th e Pol ish ari sto c racy . The ca va lry ma n no t o n ly h ad to pro vid e hi s o w n po w erful ho rses, he also had to eq ui p h im sel f with J fu ll pan oply of a r m o u r an d w ea pons, in cl ud ing a c u irass a nd Z;SdUl.~l!t' hel m et, ;111 armo u r- pierci ng sabre kn o wn JS I n "slor, a pa ir of p isto ls, and probab ly a lon g crclean WJ r hammer . The o n ly eq u ipm ent supplied

by th e state WJS th e IIIISSe";"'< key a r m, th e kol';" J lo ng holl ow woode n lance w it h a stee l t ip. Wing ed cava lry sq ua d ro n l oday's Polish cavalry recreates the astonishing spectacle of 17th-century hussaria wit h th eir form idable lances and curio us " wi ngs" attached to the back plates of the ir armo ur. They were the pride of the

Polish army, defending the country from attacks by the Russians, the Swedish, the Ott omans, and marauding Cossack bands.

A hussatia regime nt was altoget he r a stran ge and im posi ng sig ht. M an y of th e cava lrymen wore gi lde d w o oden " wi ngs", deco rated with eag le fea t hers, up on their b ock s. T hey a lso d ecked themselves in cloa ks o f leopard or t iger ski n a nd hun g lo ng silk st rea mers o n th eir la nces. When th ey ch arge d , th e feat hers a nd th e st rea m e rs emi tt ed a sin iste r h issin g so u nd th at repo rte d ly h ad 3 psych o lo g ica l impact UpOIl t he ir e ne mies . T he pr act ica l e ffective lle..'ss of till.' hussaria o n th e batt lefie ld W3S d em onst rat ed OJ) lIlall Y

occasio ns. O pe ratin g ill rcg im cuts of aro u nd 300 rid e rs, th e y wo u ld ch arge at acce leratin g speed, o pe n in g and d o si ng th e ir ran ks as t hey ro dc in orde r to eva d e musket fin.', T hei r lan ces. w hi ch co u ld o ut re ac h a n in fautr y pike , were

ex pected to sha tter O il im pact . They wo ul d no netheless serve to b rea k up t he d efe nsive fo rm atious of th e CIIe..'IJ)y's p ikcm cn . T he sabres a nd war hammer s wo u ld co me in to USl' once till." CIlCIHY was ex posed: no armour wa s pro o f agai nst them . I k's pite..' their armo ur and largc IIH.HlIJts, t he 11II55crr ;(I ret ained t he spee d an d tlcxibil it y of th e ir hu ssar origins. ottCIl making re peated ch arges th at sho we d an abili ty to regro up and m an o eu vre en m awc un equall ed by any ot her cava lry of th e d ay. V ict o r ies attr ib ur ablc to th e Po lish w inged cava lry LUlgC tro m t he r r ush ing of the Swede s a nd R ussia ns at til<' batt le o fK lus hi no in !(,! O to the h isto ri c de..,tl'at o f the Ot tom an T urks o uts ide Vie n na i ll !(IHJ u nd er J an Sob ies ki.

NO SOONER DOES A HUSSAR LOWER HIS LANC E T HAN A TURK IS IM PALED ON THE SPIKE. W ESPAZJAN KOCHOWSKI DESCRIBING A CHARGE BY THE POLISHCAVALRY IN THE SONG OF VIENNA liBERATED, 1684

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18TH-CENTURY EUROPEAN ARMIES Between 1700 and th e Fren ch R evol utio n of 1789. th e militar y

in battl e th ey would exec ute orde rs like auto mata. O n campaign.

co m manders of th e major European powers - France. Brit ain,

arm ies were supplied from magazin es (m ilitary sto reho uses)

Austri a. Pru ssia. and Russia - aspired to an ideal of rationa l o rde r.

through an exte nsive supply tr ain . This slowe d th eir movem ent s

R egul ar arm ies we re maintained by th e state and supplied with

but reduced destru cti ve foragin g. Battl es we re fou ght on ope n

standard equipme nt and uniforms. Infantry recruited fro m th e

gro und. w ith art illery. cavalry. and in fantry co mbining in

low er classes we re dep erson alized by discipline and drill, so th at

agg ressive man oeu vres th at ofte n result ed in heavy casualties.

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The P r USSi 3 Jl ar my \V;tS the m o st ad m in..-d fo rce in lSth-ccn tu ry wa r fa re, renowne d for its di scipline

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to stare o r nat ion . They we re trained

like ani ma ls. b y the b u ildi n g up of co nd it io ned n:tll-xl'" th rough rep ented pu ni sh me n t. Any

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o rdered , wo u ld ad van ce un ar m ou rcd in t igh t for m at io n across o pc n g ro u nd in t he t:1Cl' o f m usket and can no n ti re . I-Ie w as ex pected to h ave abso lutel y 110 indi vidu al w ill , ca r ry i n~ o ut l'v e r)' ac t io n o n t he co m m and of an offi cer o r N e (). T h is id eal o f di scipli n ed infan rr y w as. ne ed le ss to say. ne ver ac h ieved . On ca m pa ig n . d eser t ion

was a co ns tant pro b le m . and o n th e bat tl efi eld. so ld iers g r ippe d by tl,ar sto ppe d lo adin g th eir m usk et s properl y. appear in g to keep up w ith the vo lleys b y ti r in g prim er po wd er on ly. Eve n so, (' r u ssian infanrry ge nera lly m an o eu vred qu ickl y o n th e banlcticld , h ad eff e ctive fi rep o w e r. and we re d aun ting adva nc ing wit h b ayonet s fi xed .

th e..' parade gro und. w here th ey

spe nt m any ho u rs eVt' ry d3 Y. w o u ld instan tl y meri t a blow wit h a CJ Ile..' o r th e Hat o f a sword . M o re serio us iufri ng c me nts resu lted

in tiogging o r eve n exec ut io n . T he p rodu ct of th is sys te m w as a m a n w ho co u ld execu te th e 22 actions re q ui re d to fi re a flintlo ck musk et in aro u nd J() seco nd s. H e co u ld depl o y rap idl y fr om ma rc h ing colu mn into batt le line an d . when

Ba tt le of Ho hen fried be rg, 1745 Frederick II's Grenadier Guards advance across the battlefield directly into the fire of the Austrians. These aggressive tactics contributed to a fam ous victory.

IF MY SOLDIERS WERE TO BEGIN TO THINK, NOT ONE OF THEM WOULD REMAIN IN THE ARMY. FREDERICK II OF PRUSSIA, WHOSE VICTORIES WERE THE ENVYOFOTHER EUROPEAN RULERS

Pruss ian un ifo rm The army buitt up by FrederickWilliam I and used soeffectively by hisson Frederick II was always beautifully turned out. Most infantry regiments wore long, darkblue coats with red facingsand lining ,

Flint lock carbine The principal weapon was the standard flintlock musket of the day. Pru ssian muskets were wellmadeand generally reliable. Thisexample isa rifled carbine, used by cuirassiers and dragoons, dating from 1722.

Striking steel attached to pan cover

__ Shorter barrel than infantry musket

COSSACK Aft er the majo r Eu ro pean po w ers had c reated th ei r str ictly co n tro lled IHth-ce llt llrY ar mi es, they wer e forced to turn to the un tam ed e thn ic g ro ups that lived 0 11 the ex treme margin s of their te rritori e s in search o f men w ho co u ld act w ith ind iv idual in itiat ive as sco uts and skirm ishe rs. Au stria's G rc n zcr sharpsho o te rs fro m C roa tia and Sloven ia we re o ne cx.u u plc: Ru ssia's C oss ack ho rsem en we re ano the r. T he Cossack co m m unities of the sout he rn ste ppe see m mo stly to have be en found ed by fr eedo m - lo ving Slav s w h o fled t he rapid ly ex pand ing k in gd o m s o f Russia an d Pol and -L ithu an ia in th e 15th and 16th ce ntu ries, pr cfcrrin g a hard but ind ep endent life to se rfdo m , O ut of har sh necessity they becam e w arrior band s, fighting as ligh t horsemen in th e t radition al wa y o f th e ste p pe . Mu ch o f th e ti me the y wo u ld fig ht aga in st bo th Ru ssia and Poland , asse rti ng the ir in d epe nd en ce . At o the r tim es th ey acted as sem i- inde pe nde nt frontier fo rces. raidin g Ot to ma n terri tor ies in search o f plu nde r, o r fi g hti ng o n beh al f o f th e T sar s, g ua rd ing It u ssia fro m att ack b y the T aCHS;1I1d helpin g to ext e nd th e border s o f th e Ru ssian Em pire furt her to th e cas t.

SERV ING T HE STATE In th e co u rse o f th e l Sth ce nt u ry , te ns o f tho usauds of Cossac k we re in teg rated int o the Ru ssian imp er ial arm y as lig ht cava lry re g im en ts. In add itio n to their trad itio nal sw o rds and kni ve s, thei r prin cip al weJ po ns wer e a mu sket or rifle, used ch ie fly to r de fen ce, and a lon g slende r lan ce w ith w hi ch the y wo u ld cha rge e ne my po sit ion s in lo o se fastm ov in g lines. Their savage sk ill at harassin g the flank s of In e ne my o n the march or runnin g do wn fle ein g in fantr ymen m ad e them mu ch fe ared and re spe ct ed . In 1775, Russian M arsh al Ruur yan tzc v re cogn ize d the Cossacks' co u rage in w ar w ith the O tto man Tur ks, describin g them as "the fir st int o th e fir e, di sti n gui sh in g the m sel ve s w ith o utstand ing: brave r y", Shashk a Thiscurved , single-edged sword originated in the Caucasus, from where it was adopted by the Cossacks. Even though the straight handle had no guard, it later replaced the sabre in the Russian cavalry.

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AMERICAN RIFLEMAN

r

X PUlH IUI ' LEM EN

E

wer e the first com pa nies of sold iers raised

by the reb elli o us N orth American colo nies to fig ht th e British army and its Loyali st suppo rte rs at the sta rt of the Ameri can R evo lutio nary W ar. At a time w he n in accu rate

musket s wer e th e standard mil itar y firearm , the accura cy o f the Am eri can fronti er m arksm en's rifle fire in spired fear and awe . Alth ou gh they we re resistant to form al di sciplin e, these to ugh and indep endent fighters pro ved impressively effective as sha rp- shoo ting sni pe rs and battl efield sk irurishe rs. ~

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T h e rifle m en o rig illa tt.·d from the A m e rican fro nt ier world of far me rs a nd hunter s - se ttle rs ca r v in g o ut a li fe fix t h l' I1l Sl ' )VCS i ll t he w ild. gUll i ll h and . In tro d uce d to No rt h Amer ica fro m Eu ro pe by G e rm an a nd Swi ss iuunig ran ts, riAL'S w e re rega rd ed prin cip a lly as a hunting: \vc apo n . A m e rica ns d evel op ed th e desig n o f the Eu ro pean ri fle to g ive it g rea te r acc u racy a nd ran ge'. c re ati ng wh at W;lS lat e r called th e Kentuck y rifl e. With th is lon g-barrell e d , sm a llbore g U ll , fa r m bo ys a nd WOO dS llll' 11 lear ned to sho o t wi th asto n ish in g ac c u rJcy. They hon ed t he ir sk ills in hunting , in skirmishes w it h Ind ia ns. and in shooting: compe t itions. w hi ch beca me a favo u rite fro ntier pastime. M en w o u ld, fo r in stan ce, co m pe re to h it th e head of a tu rkey - alive and mo v in g - at a ran ge of a ro u nd 100 111 (330 ft) _ Front ier sm en we re a lso kn own for t hei r h ardiho od and indepe ndent sp irit , h avin g lear n ed th e art of su rviva l in vi rgi n wi lde r ne ss. T hey wo u ld consc quc urly show e nd u ra nce 0 11 th e m a rch a nd a n ab ility to tr avel light , liv in g o ff th e la nd w he n req ui red .

LO NG RIFLE MADE IN PENNSYLVAN IA IN THE 1750S

RI H EM EN FOR T H E R EVOLU T ION T he fron tier smen w er e not m ate ri al from w h ich regu lar so ld iers co u ld eas ily be m ade, bu t the lead er s o f the Amer ican co lo n ies ga thered in th e Conti ne nta l Congre ss we re quick to recog nize t he ir mi lit ar y pot e nti al. Fut ure US P resid e nt J ohn Adams ex p ressed th e o pin io n th at t hey w ould ma ke "a n ex cel le nt species of ligh t

in fan tr y" since th e y we re " t he 1110 st exce llent m ark sm e n in t hl- wo rld " , T hu s on 14 J UIl<- 1775 . C o ngre..'ss reso lved tha t "s ix co m pa nies of e xpert riflemen b e iunn cd iarcly ra ised ill l'cu nsvlvania. tw o ill Ma r yla nd , a nd t w o ill Virg in ia". T he respo nse in l'cnnsylv.m ia was so cnrhusiasri« that t he sta te ill fact pr o vid ed n ine co m pa n ies. Vol un teer s initia lly e n listed I'lr a year. wi th till' pr o m ise of a gift of land to reward th eir serv ices after victor y, Each co m pa ny t ypi ca lly h ad office rs, ci g hr Ne t )s_and (,H men . Their inuncdi.ue mi ssio n was to join t he Amcr ic.m for ce s b esie..'gillg th e British a nd Lo yalist s in Boston . T he jou rne y [ro m t he front ier reg io ns to th e New England co ast had to he m ad e o n foo t , a formidable m ar c h undcrt .ikeu at a pu ni shing rat e. The rirlcmcn frolH wes ter n M ar yland . led by M ic ha cl Cresap, cove red till' 990k m (550 mi les) fro m th e ir re cruit in g point to Bo ston in three week s - tak in g t im e e..'11 route

I,"I'

to stage dcmon strntio us o f the ir m ar ksm a n shi p. in cl udi ng , in o ne in stance, ;1 ritlcrna n firi ng at a ta rget he ld bet w ee n h is brot her's k ne es. T he a r riva l of th e fro nt ic rsm eu outside Bo sto n ca used a co usidcr.ihle st ir. T heir dress im me dia tely m ar ked them out as wi ld men : th e y wore frin ged hunting shirt s, moccasin s. and hat s decorat ed wi t h feat hers or animal tail s, and 111:111)' car ried sca lping knives and tomahawks as well as t he ir rifles. Their acc u rate sn ipe r tir e SOOI1 b egan to take its to ll o f Br itish sentries aro u nd Ho ston a nd even of o ffice rs who had t he tem e rit y to sho w thl'II1Se!Vl'S in the 01"""11.

Sni pe rs a nd woodsm en The incident at the battle of

Saratoga in 1777 when Tim Murphy shot General Fraser soon became the stuff of

legend. Here he is depicted high up in the pine tree on the right aiming at his distant target (right). The appearance of the rifle companies. with fringed

shirts and axes tucked in the" be lts (far right). wa s in marked contr ast to that

of the British Army regulars.

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At t he: s.u n e tim e, t he fro nt ie rsme n n..-vea lcd the m selve s to he: ;1 t ho roughl y undi scipluu.-d

bun ch . givt..' 11 to stc.il in g from o rd in ary so ld ie rs " lid di sre spe ctful o f al l co nve n tio n al au tho r ity. Th ey wo u ld , hy co nt rast , t'lithfu lly fol lo w officers of t he ir O W II ilk, suc h as th e fo r m idable Vi rgi ni a n I h n icl M organ , w ho ill hi s ca rlicr mil irnr y caree r ill the Fre nch and l ud ian War had su rv ived !lavin g m o st o f h is te et h b lo wn O ll t by " bul le r th ar pa ssed throu gh h is nec k and chee k . T he Ameri can co m rna ndc r- in-ch ic f G enera l Geo rge Wa shill~toll , w as co nv inced th at on ly a d isci plin ed a rmy tra ine d and dri lled o n Eu ro pea n li ne s co u ld b eat th e British . Bm he appreciate d the fro n t ier sme n's fl~ h t i n~ qu alities and

CANVAS

BAG

MANY OF TH EM AT 150 YARDS WILL HIT A CARD NIN E TIME S OUT OF TEN. BRITISH OFFICER AT THE SIEGEOF BOSTON, 1775

e nc o u rage d M o rgan ill parti c ular to form and lead bod ies o f rifleme n to ac t as sn ipe rs a nd sk ir m ish ing lig ht infantry. Mnrgan th orou gh ly j us tified th e co n fide nce show n in h im with a notab le conrr ib ut io u to th e de feat o f th e Br itish at Sa ra toga in 1777. As G en eral J o h n Burgo yne 's ar my adva nce d so uth do w n th e H ud so n Vall ey o n 1<) Se pte m be r. th eir ri ght flank ra n into M o rgan 's rifl e m en at Freem an's Farm . A im ed fire direct ed fro m w o odland across a c k'a rin~ decim at ed rh e Brit ish Rifleman' s haver sack

PEWTER MUG

Accusto med to hunt ing and livin g off his w its in the woods of the frontier colonies. t he rifl eman was much better equi ppe d fo r most eventualities th an any regular soldier.

SALT HO RN

adva nc ed g uard . in pa r ticu lar ki llin g " Im o st a ll of t he o ffice rs. T he rifle m en we re less successfu l in atte m p ting to ex plo it th e ad vantage th u s ga ine d . t heir ill - organi zed cha rges b eing repel led b y th e di sciplined British ba you et s. The b at tle was re sumed after a lull o n 7 Octobe r with " Briti sh assa u lt o n Bem is H eig h ts. In a famou s in cident. American G en eral Benedic t Arnold ca lled up o n M organ to get rid o f one of the ab lest Brit ish o ffice rs, Ge ne ra l Simo n Fr aser. w ho was b ravel y r id ing in the opcn o n a g rcy h orse . One of M organ 's m en , a le gendar y Indi an fighter called Tim Murphy, oblige d hy sho o ting Frase r d ead at a ran ge of so me 275 m (30 0 ya rd s). This lo ss had a cr ush ing effect o n Br iti sh m orale . co nt ri bu ting to the failu re of th eir attac k and th eir even tua l de feat .

U N FA I R T ACT IC S Sail handy for preservmq meet

The poli c y of sn iping at ind ividu al o fficers wa s as co n trove rsial as it was l,f(i-'c t ivl' . M organ . w ho

WOODEN SPOON

The h.• •.t-resistem

nn meen ttbe cup could be used fo r cooki nq as we ll as dnnkinq

Y BO NE· HA ND LED FORK

re puted ly te sted ne w re cruits by ask ing th em to shoot at a ta rget in th e sh ape o f a Brit ish o fficer's head , w as re ga rded hy so m e of hi s o ppo nen ts as in c Hi-'c t a war cr im in al. Brit ish Lieu te na n t Wi ll ia m Di gby, co m p lain ing of thi s "c o wa rd ly a nd c r ud w ay of ca rry ing o n t he w a r" ca lle d for sn ipe rs to be placed in " t he h ands of the ha ngmnn". The Br it ish eq u ally o bje cted to th e rifl emen 's sk ir m ish ing sty le o f wa rfa re, Th e front iersm en were expert at explo it ing cover. firin g at will fro m behind trees, ro cks , o r "," lis. The y a lso did not hesit at e: to hi d e o r run away wh en f.lcing a cou nrc ratrack . These tacti cs were viewed w ith CO ntl' l11llt by British sold iers tr ained to fi re muske ts in vo lleys and sta nd up to th eir CIlC llt)' in the o pen . O ne w rote indiguan tl y of till' r iflem en : " T hose people ill fa ir ac tio n in o pe n field wo u ld sig n ify no thin g ." atura lly

Kings Mountain. 1780 The buckskin-clad rebel irregulars found the terrain much more to their liking than their l oyalist opponents, and madeexcellent use of the cove r provided by the hill's wooded slopes.

the fro nt ier tightt.·rs delighted ill the irritation the y caused the Briti sh and deliber atel y cu ltivated the ir "w ild m an" ima ge..' to psych o lo g ical effe ct . Morga n ado pted a spine- chi lling wi ld t u r ke y gob bk as a sig na l to hi s men and they fre q uen t ly raised all lnd ian war c ry w hen en ter ing co m bat.

FRON T I ER I R R EG U LA RS M organ 's ritlem en were emplo yed as light infan rr y

sk irmish cr s in Wa shingt on's C o ntine n ta l Arm y. But as the: gt,.'ograph ical scope of th e Revolutionary War ex pa nde d int o the back country o f th e So uth , m an y more fro nt ie rsme n we re drawn int o th e con flic t. wh o fought as irre gular hands under

Battl efield of Cowp ens This was the scene of Daniel Morgan's greatest triumph. Skilful use of his sharpshooterscaused havoc among the attacking British dragoons; he then ordered a sudden counterattack that led to the surrender of the British force.

self-a ppoi n te d co lo nels, T he y ha rassed till' Brit ish and Loyali sts . u sin g the c lassic g u erri lla tactics of hit- and-run att ac ks and am bus hes . The raid in g o f m en suc h as Fran ci s Marion o f South Ca ro lina . kn o wn as th e "sw am p fox", were a persistent nuisan ce to th e Brit ish . a nd at rimes in flicted heav y lo sse s. T he most famo u s v icto ry by fro nt ier ir regu lar s w as WO Il at K iu g s M ount ain in rh e Carolina s, in October 17HO, A for ce of 1.000 Lo yalist mi liti a, led by Br it ish officer C o lo n el Patr ic k ['e rgu so n - iro ni call y h im sel f a lead in g advocate of th e use of rifle s - W :l S su rro unded by a so m ew h at sm a ller for ce o f rille-ar m ed ba ck wood smen w ho " o pe n,..-d all irregu lar but de structive fir e ... Fergu son mounted bayon et cha rge s to drive the rifl emen oft: but th e y sim ply withdrew, avo idi ng co ntac t. and resumed their po sition s o nce the force o f th e charge was spe n t. After suffc..· ring m or e than ) llO cas ua lties , in cludin g Fer guso» and 156 othe rs killed , the e nt ire Loyalist for ce su rre nde red .

Fire-ligh ting kit A rifleman would be able to light a fire at a moment'snoticeusing tow (hemp or flax fibres) to catch the sparks he struck with hisflint and steel. He often carried a pouch of dry kindling as well.

W ORLDWID E IN FLU EN C E P ro b ably t he fin e st hour of th e American rifl em en ca me at Cowpe ns in J anu ar y 17HI, when a mi xed fo rce of militia and Continen ta l Arm y tro ops com ma nde d by M organ intl ict cd a hum il iati ng d efeat o n th e Brit ish u nd er Sir Ban astre T arleton . TI ll' final Brit ish surre nder at Yo rkto wn ill O ct ober 17 HI wa s occasioned by th e co m b ine d action of th e A m erican and Fren ch a r m ies and th e Fre nch nav y - a reminder that. whatever th e ir ac h ievemen ts, fro ntier riflem en co uld not them selves wi n a wa r. But their successes stim u late d Euro pea n arm ie s to increase the ir use o f rifl e- armed li ght infantry an d b cgau a sh ift away from reli a nce o n mcriculou vly dr ill ed form ati on s a r m ed wi th mu sket and bayonet .

POU CH FOR DRY TIN D ER

AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR FORCES T he wa r th at gave birth to th e United States o f Am eri ca sta rted

forces fro m I·lessen and o ther G erm an sta tes, failed to impose

as a sma ll-sca le enco unter between Briti sh troop s and Am er ican

a decisive defeat upon th e Am eri can Cont ine nta l Arm y, which

colo nial mil itia and ende d as a m ajor int ernati on al co n flict. The

instea d sco red a not able victory at Saratoga in 1777. In th e vast

British ini tia lly hop ed th at Am eri can loyal ists wo u ld carry th e

spaces of N orth Am eric a. th e Briti sh co u ld not br in g th eir superior

main bu rde n of suppressing rebelli on , but th ey wer e di sapp ointed .

forma l fighting skills to bear. In th e end th e in ter venti on o f th e

The dep loy ment of a substa ntia l British army. includin g m ercen ar y

French army and navy tipp ed th e balan ce decisively aga inst Britain .

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The deci sion of the C o ntine ntal Congress, the go vern m e nt Sc.. r lip hy the 13 re be l Am eri can co lo n ies, to fo rm a ll ar lll )' 0 11 14 jun e 1775 wa s ha " 'd on the bc lic f thut o n ly a reg ul ar ar lllY. ra t her rh.m a c itiz e ns' mil it ia . co u ld b eat the Ilri ti sh R ed coat s. G eorge Wa shingto n . the army 's co m m ande r. had a lo w opinion of m ilitias a nd aspired to crea te a di sciplined Europ ,..a ust yh.· force. traine d to ti n .' m usk et vo lleys a nd adva nce ill form ari on with bayon et s fi xed . From the o utset, th e Contine nta l Army fall into di t ticultic s. Th e o n ly tro ops initiall y avai lab le were e w Englan d m il iri amc n. who ,iglll'd 011 as shor t- ter m rcg u l.ir«, and und isc iplined riflem an vo lu ntee rs trom t he ba rk woods . At t he sta rt of 177() eve n th is ragt a ~ ar my threat en ed to di sintegrat e. hl'C11I Sl' on ce t hl'y had se rve d the ir term mo st of til l' mi liri.i we nt ho rne. h av in g t:UIUS a nd bu vinessc to at te nd to . It wa s not unt il 1777 th at a ser io us

cHort WJ S ma d e to rai se J pc n u nnc n t nationa l recru ited on a quota basis from all 1J

;l rJ llY,

states. w it h m en co nuu itrcd eit her to a th re eYl.'ar te rm of se r v ice or for rh c d u rati o n of th e war. Boun t y paym e nt s were offered to att ract vo lu ntee rs - initia lly 211 h ut ri sin g sha rp ly over time as recruits p ro ved in creasin g ly re lu ct ant to

co m e forward . In ev itab ly, q uotas w er e filled from the lo w est leve ls o f soc iety . Vagrants a nd c rim in als found the m se lve s pressed into ser v ice , a lo ng w ith Ilr it ish and H essian de serte rs and pri so ne rs of wa r. I >Cspitl' initia l o pposit io n fro m Wash in g ton , slave and fn,' l' Afri can A mc ri ca ns were allowed to e nter the ranks. T he states neve r m ana ged to su pply IlWIl in sufficie nt n umbers, althoug h so me of the sho rt fall w as made up by th e conscr ipt io n of sta te miliri amcn to se r ve onc- ycar te rm s under Conriuc n ml co m ma nd . It was probabl y j us t as well th at th e numbers o f recruits always fell below planned level s, for it pr o ved impo svible for th e rlcd glin g republic to pay, li:ed , o r clo the th em adeq u ately . A lth ough some men we re k ittcd o ut in uniforms by th eir state o f o rigin . afte r a while o n ca m paign m an y so ld ie rs lac ked

Uniform of 4th M aryland Indep end ent Com pa ny This was one of seven compa nies of 100 men autho rized by the state of Maryland in January 1776. Later that year th e men, arme d w it h muskets and bayonets, marched north to JOIn the Continental Army in the def ence of New York .

KNAPSACK

• • • • • • • • •

1 BAYONET ON BELT

COULD W E G ET A GOOD REGULAR ARMY, WE SH O U LD SO O N CL EAR TH E COUNTRY OF THE SE DAMNED INVADERS.

MINUTEMEN

THOMAS NEl SON WRITING TO THOMA S JE ff ERSON, 1777

( o ats. blanket s. o r even sho es. Wh c u supp ly pr obl ems w e re at th eir worst. 1Il l'1I we n..' reduced to living o ff Hour-and-water " fi rcca kc -,". Ca m pe d for th e winter at Valle y Forgl." l'crm sylva n ia. in 1777- 7X. th e arm y reach ed ex tr e mes o f pri vati on . Vet it was her e th at till' ar my at last be gan to co me to gether as a di scipli ned for ce. u nder the d ir ectio n o f P r ussi.ui 111c..' r CC) l a r y o fficer Baro » Fri ed rich W ilhelm VO Il Ste ube n . H e d rilled rhc m en d aily. raised m ora le. cracke d d o wn 0 11 u nru ly be havio u r. and red uced di sea se by im pr o v in g clean lin ess a nd san itat io n . T he probl ems o f supply and payrucnt wen.' never so lved . There W;'i S another major crisi« ill till' winter o f 17XI)- XI wh en th os e wh o h ad enrolled for three yea rs ill 17 77 wa n ted to quit . Mutinies ill the Pc u usylva n ia and cw J ep\e y regime nt s had to he su ppresse d in J anuar y 17HI. But Wa shingt on succ eeded in keepin g his ar my in exi stence. A me asure of th e success o f th e Cont inc n ral Arm y. de spite all diffic u ltie s, is t he ad mi ra tio n tor Am er ica» troo ps ex pressed hy A discipli ned voll ey The idea l to w hich Geo rge Washing to n aspir ed - a d iscip lined, smar tly d ressed, Europ ean -st yle ar my - was neve r achieve d by the w hole army, although cer ta in un its di d thei r leade r prou d.

The Battl e of l e xington Vall ey Forg e In the grim winte r of 1777- 78. Washington believed that his Con tinental Army must "starve, dissolve, or disperse, In order to obtain subsistence", But, in the end, it survived, all the stronger fo r the experience of shared hardship.

torci gn o bse rve rs. Baro n \'011 C losc n . a mem ber o f th e Fren ch cx pc d itioua ry force sen t to aid th e Am er ican reb els, wrot e : ..It i.. incred ible th at so ldi er s co m pose d of m en o f \.'ver y ag\.' , e \'\.' 11 of ch ildren o f 15. of whites and blacks . almos t naked , unpaid , and rather po o rly fed , can m a rch so w ell a nd w ithsrand fire so stead fastly." The Hrirish su r re nd er at York tow n ill O ct ober 17HI w as a t rium ph for an a rlllY O IlC\.' di smi ssed by Brit ish G enera l j o h n Hu rgo ync ;I S ;1 " rab ble in arm s".

The first sho ts o f the war we re fired across the village g reen at lexington, Massachusetts. A confused encounter watched by spec ta to rs stan ding along the road. it ended with eig ht of the American minutemen lying dead .

The o n ly f( )rce\ at th e d ispo sal of th e Am eri ca n co lo nies at th e sta rt of t he ir rebe ll io n we re militia . T here wa s ;I lon g- cst.ibl ixhcd t rad ition th at all m ale ci ti ze ns had ;1 dut y to turn o u t w ith a w eapon tor th e defence o f th eir co lo n y or lo cal co uun unit y w he n req uired , III 17 7..L ill th e co lo ny of M avs.uhuscn s, th \.' or ig ma l to e- u s of th e reb el lio n , a propo rti on of th e m ilit ia were d e\ igll :1ted " m in urc mc n". U . . U;l II)' yo u nge r unma rr icd cit ize ns , th e y elec te d o ftin'r\ tor t heir co m p.m ics and pled ged to 11l.' ava ilab le to r act io n at a minute's notice. Th e first sho ts o f th e w ar, at l.c x ingro n a nd Concord in Apr il 1775. were excha nged bet we en m inutemen a nd Brit ish so ldi er s. At Conco rd th e m inutem e n go t th e better o f a sma ller force of Br irish repll ars and pursued them back to Bo sto n .

T H E ROL E OF T H E M I LI T I A S 111 all t he rebe l co lo n ies , co lo n ial m ilit ias tu r ned int o state mi liti as tind e r rebel co n tro l. with a ll lo ya lists e xpelled . At ti mes state m ilitias co m pe ted wit h the C o n rinenral Arm y tor resou rces. but the mi litia , ;)1 s0 pr o vided c.. scu tia l sho rt - te r m drafrcc-, to hol ster th e a r m y's ranks an d aux iliar y units to tigh t a lo ngside th e regular s. Alth ou ~h militia tr uinin g im proved dur in g: the w ar, the se part-time soldie rs fre sh fro m till' wo rk . . hop and th e plough rarel y stood up to Br it ish tr o ops in o pe n battle. Yet in sp ire o f a rep uta tion for r u nnin g awa y when th e fightin g w as ho t. t hey perfor m ed in valuable serv ice as sec u rity fo rces, en su r in g: t he succ ess of th e reb elli on at lo cal le vel b y m annin g garr iso n s and supp ressing t he act ivities of lo yal ists.

BRITISH REDCOATS

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The red - co ated Bri ti sh a r my w as a ty pical Eu ropea n force of its d ay, sp lendi d ly uu ifo rmcd . har shl y d isciplined , a nd d rilled in th e use o f mu sket and bayon et . It was co mposed o f reg u lars enl iste d to r lite , but to ra ise ex t ra tro op s for the Am eri can war short- ter m culisrmc uts were in tr oduced a nd eve n t ua lly a v irt u al press ga ng was in srir utcd . M o st so ld ie rs ca m e from t he lo we st lev el s o f Brit ish so c iet y and man y wer e fro m pot ent ia lly di satfe c red a reas o f Sco tla nd and Irela nd , b ut t hey ge nera lly fo ught wi th as mu c h dctcrm in ati on as allY Ame rican pa t ri ot. Sh ipped ac ross t he Atl a nt ic, Il riti sh so ld ie rs e n te re d a ho sti le a nd alie n e nv iro n me nt . T he sn iping a nd a m b ushes e m plo yed by rebel militia seemed o ut rageo us to tr o op s tr ain ed to tig ht ill th e o pe n - O lH.' British e n sig n referred to it as " the ir sk u lk ing wa y b ehind h ed ges and wa lls", A m er ica n-, de rid ed t he Bri ti sh for paradin g ill Brown Bess The Long l and-Pattern flintl ock musket , know n famili arly as Brown Bess, was th e standard Brit ish infantry arm from 1722 to 1838 . The version show n here was Issued in 1742.

bright co lours w hen stealth and camo uflagc wo uld have served them bett er. Yet the Brit ish were not in tlcx ible in their ta ct ics. T hey ad apt ed as best t hey co u ld to lo cal co nd it io ns. e m plo y in g ligh t troop s as skirm ishers and makin g small adaptations such as sho rte n ing t he ir ja ck et s to prevent th eir coat tai ls becom ing entang led in u nd ergro wth .

LOG ISTI CS AND SU PPLY T he British unqu estio n abl y fo und A m e rican co nditio ns hard . Ca mpaig ning o n foo t across vast t racts o f w ilder ness tended to erode th eir fo rces throu gh exha ustio n and di sease . A brgc part of th eir supplies wer e imported across th e Atlanti c. and th e y su ffe red sho rtage s of eve ry th ing from fo od to ho rses. The Am er ican s pro ved expe rt not o n ly at ambu sh in hill y. wooded terra in b ut also at field fort ificati ons , In battles such as Bun ke r H ill in 177 5 and Sa ratoga in 177 7, Br itish tr o ops su ftc rl'd mor ale- sapping losses in fro nta l attacks ag ainst determ ined Am erican tr oop s w ho sk ilfu lly ex plo ited n atural defe nsive pos itio ns, streng the ned by entre nc h ment and stoc kades .

Voll ey fire British tro op s we re trained to fire in volley and deploy on th e battlefield in for mal line and square formation s. Man y we re disconcert ed by the Ame rican snipers and tactics.

Facin g rebel acti vit y that ex tended from Georgia ill the so uth to C anada in the north, the British always had to o fe w me n to garr ison areas t he y co nt rolled and siuiu lra nco us ly cam paig n in streng t h . Th e Briti sh arm y th at su rrendered at Yorkto wn in 17HI was o ut nu mbe red t wo to on e by its Am erican and French o ppo nents.

Battle of Bunker Hill Redcoats sto rm the America n stockade at Bunker Hill in 1775. The British overran the tor uned earthworks on their third assault, but su ff ered devasta ting losses in the process.

LOYALISTS GREEN IS TROOP S

THE BEST COLOUR FOR LIGHT

Green and wtute plume of the LIght Company o f the Quee n's Ranger s

Lea ther cap with crescen t embl em _

AN 0 I F PUT ON IN TH E SPRI NG , BY

AUTUMN IT NEARLY FAD ES WITH THE LEAVES . JO HN GRAV ES SIMCO E, COM MANDER OF THE QUEEN 'S RANGERS 1777-83

Cons ide rable number s o f Am eri can s fought o n th e llritish side in the war. Some participated in pro vincial regiments o f th e Br itish arm y - for ex a m ple, the Ki n g's R oya l Regiment c reated b y Lo yal ist refuge es in C anada in 1776 , a nd the C aledo n ian Volu ntee rs co m pos ed of Loya list Scott ish settle rs. So m e of these un its, like t he New York- ba sed Qu ee n's R an ge rs. proved to be to ugh fig hti ng men capable of weldi n g American rifie m ark smanship and flexible tacti cs to British di scipline. Others fought as mi liti a o r irregula rs. o fte n 1I1Hlcr Br it ish o ffice rs. w ag ing parti san w ar fare aga ins t th e rebels. Butler's R an ger s, a mi xed for ce o f Lo yali sts a nd Ind ia ns, w as respon sible for J not oriou s ma ssacr e in W yoming Valle y in 1778 . T arl et on's R aiders, ope rating in th e C arolinas, also earned J fearsom e reputation . Black slaves foug ht for th e Brit ish in return for J pr omise

of freed om , both as reg u lars in Lord Dunmore's Et h iopian Reg iment, raised in 1775, a nd as g ue rrillas. At th e wa r's e nd most Lo yalist fighters. bla ck o r w hite, chose to leave t he U nited States .

Can vas kna psack painted WIth reg imental emb lem

Queen's Rang ers un iform Founded in 1776 in New York, th e Oueen 's Rang ers was th e fir st reg iment in the Brit ish army to w ear green uniforms for the purposes of camo uflage.

HESSIANS Abo ut" third of Bri ti sh force s e ngag ed in t he war wer e Germa n mc rcc nar ies hired fo r th e d u ratio n of t he co n flic t. T he se " H essia ns" came not on ly fro m Hesscn -K assel and Hcsseu -Han nau. but also from a nu m ber of ot he r pett y G erman princedoms th at provid ed co n tinge nts of troops in return for a cash payment. Such me rce nar y serv ice, co n t racted at govern me nt level . w as sta nda rd practice in lSth-cenru ry Eu ropean arm ies. The He ssian s we re not not ably inferior to British sold iers in battlefield performance o r in th eir be hav io u r to wa rds civ ilia ns . M o st we re schooled in th e sta nda rd musker- and-bayoner sty le of co mba t, but co m pa nies ofji(~cr - light rifl e- armed troops - m ad e excelle nt sk irm ishe rs. C lad in g ree n for cam o u flage, th ese Germa n

h u nt e rs on occasio n o utperformed the Am er ica n riflema n as sn ipe rs and woodland fig ht er s. T he American Congress and states attempted to brib e th e H essians with offers o f land a nd live sto ck . M an y did d esert. but no more th an was normal for a Eu ropea n army o n ca m paign. Around 60 per ce nt of th e 30 ,000 Hessian s eve nt ua lly retu rne d home. Comba t losses were q ui te low, bu t m any di ed of di sease. T he rest p resum abl y m ad e ne w lives (or th emselves in Am erica.

wnne canvas b reech es. wo rn

w ith half g art E"rs

_

1799 - 181 5

FRENCH CAVALRYMAN THE FRENCH CAVALRY OUTCLASSED ITS OPPONENTS SIMPLY BECAUSE, WHEN THE ORDER RANG OUT AND TRUMPETS CLARIONED ICHARGE !', IT PUT IN ITS SPURS AND CHARGED ALL OUT, CHARGED HOME! ARCHDUKE CHARLES , COMMANDER-iN -CHIEF OF THE AU STRIAN ARMY FROM 1806 TO 1809

SA GENE IlAL U N O E Il Til E 1' ll EN CII Il E I' U BLl C ,

A

an d later as

Em peror of Fra nce, N apole on Bon apart e based hi s style of wa rfa re o n rapid m o vement o f forces to brin g t he en emy to battle , and agg ressive battlefield tacti cs to c r ush h is

adve rsary in th e field. In h is increasin gly lar ge arm ies, in fa nt ry, arti llery, and cava lry all had th eir parts to play. Key fun ction s o f th e cava lry incl uded t he m ountin g of decisive charges at cr ucia l points in t he battle and the pursuit of a ro uted ene my to co m plete an overwhel m ing victory .

Th e Fre nc h R e volution of 17H') h ad a pro found

Na poleo n to ok ove r th e g o vc r nm cn r as Pirst

e ffect

CO Il SU I,

0 11 th

e Fren ch a r my a n d ot he r areas of

a n nu a l c o n sc r ip t io n till e d t h e a r my 's

Fr ench soc ie t y. The cava lry had a lwa ys b ee n th e m o st a r isto craric c lc nu..-n r o f Fran ce's a rme d fi )IT l' S.

to se r ve a lo ngside vet e ra ns of t h e ar m y of t he

Mall Y o f its o ffi ce rs were h o sti le to th e: revo lu t io n

m on a rc h y a n d of t he re vo luti o n ar y

a nd e m ig ra te d: o t he rs w ho wo u ld will ingly h ave

(m ass co n sc r ip t io n ) of 17<)J . Cava lr y rl'gillll'l Hs

co u rin u c d to se r ve th eir co u nt ry we re di smi ssed

we re

ra n k s. brin gin g a co n s.tant flo w of fr esh recr uits

;111 gi ve n

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ma guifi rcnr ne w uni form s, w it h a n

b ecause t he radi ca l rc voluti on nr y govc r n mc n r

e mp ha sis o n colo u r a n d fi.u u bo yaucc . as part o f a

di sappro ved of t hei r soc ia l origi ns. This was th e

su c c ess fu l c.u n pa ign to rai se m ornlc . Na poleo n's

tare o f th e M ar quis til' G ro uchy. w ho wa s st ri p pc d

re gim e in spired p a t ri o ti c ze a l, re vol ut ion a r y e n th us ias m . a n d t he att acluucnr o fm e n w ho owed to it th eir ad va ncc mc n r in liti-, T h e sh o rt age of ho rses wa s a pro bl em t hat

of hi s ran k in 17tJJ . hut h e lat er rose to b e com e

o ne o f Napoleo n's

1110 s t

co m m a n d e rs . For

SO Ill l'

di sti nguished ca va lr y m en of h u m b le o r igi n .

howe ver, the re vo lution provid ed u llp n..x cdcntcd o p po rt u n it y - J o ac him Murat, so n of a

wa s mu ch h ard er to re med y b e c au se it req uire d ye;us to bre ed su ffic ie n t num be rs of

v il la ge p o stm aster, e n liste d as a c av a lry

t he ri ght m o unt s. W he n Na poleo n' s

t roo p e r in 17H7 a nd wa s a co lonel h y

(; rand e A r mcc tirst asse mb led in

17')5. w h ile M ichel N cy, th e SO il o f a barrc l-m ukcr . j o in ed th e hu ssars a lso in 17H7 and wa s a g e n e ra l co m ma nd i ng a bri gad e h y 17<)().

IH05 . d ragoo n s were orde red to ti gh t on foot b e ca u se o f lack of h o rses. It was th e v ic to r ies at Au st erlitz ill

IXII5 and at J ell a and A ucrs r.idr ill IXII(, that e ftc:et ive ly so lve d t he

RID ERS AND MOUN T S

problem b y a llow in g t he Prl' n c h to

But overa ll, d espite th e prom otion

take larg e number s of h orses tr om

ofso me talented ind iv idu a ls. th e

t he d ef e at ed Au stri a n s a n d Pnl ssia n s.

rcvo lur io n pl ayed h avo c w it h t h e Fren c h cav a lry a n d it per fo r med

G LA MO U RA N D HAR DSHIP

p o orl y in m o st of th e b a tt les of till'

The c ava lr y se rv ice. w it h it s da shin g

R e volu ti ona r y Wa rs ( 17'J2 - IXIII) .

uniform s a nd its " d e at h o r g lo ry"

N apo leo n inherited a to rcc sh o rt of

fi gh tin g tradit io n . n a turall y att ract ed

h o rses. t ra ini ng. a nd co nfi de nce , A s

adve n t u ro u s yo u n g m en w it h a ra sr c

co ns u l an d rhcn e m pl' ro r, he set a bo ut

fo r g la mo u r a nd sty le , Na po leo ni c

re formi n g and upgradi n g t he c ava lr y

c a va lry m e n we re t;lI11 l'd to r t he ir h ard

ar m as a v ita l c leme n t in hi s reb uildin g o f th e e n t ire Fr l'n ch ;l f1ny.

O f th e two ke y c o m po ne n ts o f ;111 effec t ive ca va lr y forc e

- r id er s a nd horses Nap o leon found th e

drinkin g , th eir sh o rt tl'1II1H.'rs th at l';lsil y Harcd into ti ghts,

a nd abo ve a ll th e ir rel en tl e ss wo ma ni z ing , Bu t life i ll th e cava lr y \VJ S 0 11

t he wh ol e far

fr om lu xur iou s, eve n w he n n ot

0 11

c J m p a ig n .

h u m a n c le me n t ea sie r to d e a l w it h . From 17<)<). w hen

FULL DRESS SHA KO O F THE FIRST REGIM ENT O F CHASSE URS

II'

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m e 0 t e A group o f hussars gather rou nd a camp fire on the eve of the battle of Austerlit z, December 1805 . The lines o f fires blazing on the hi ll beyo nd give some idea of th e vast size o f Nap ol eon 's army .

T roo per s slept t wo to ;1 be d in barracks - th e bed co mpa n io ns usua lly becoming close co m rades in arm s. Training was tough . It started with learning ho rse m anship by rid in g without sadd le , bridle, or stirrups, progressing to th e difficult art of using th e swo rd or sab re and ca rbine while m ounted. New recru its were said to habituall y lo ve a lot of we ig ht du ring ini tia l tr ain in g. so str in genr wer e its ph ysical d em ands, G roo m ing hor ses wa s, o f ( O U f!\ C , hard un gl am orou s work - the Fren ch cavalry we re i ll fact often crit icized fo r not lo oking after th eir mounts adequa tely. Lik e those se rv in g in t he rest of Napo leo n's ar my. cava lry troopers had to he t reated as cit ize n so ld iers deser vin g of their officers' respect. T he re was not hing like t he ha rsh and arbitrary di scip lin e o f t he Ancie n R egime arm y. A tho rou gh ly professiona l att it ude to mil itar y life wa s e nco u rage d , altho ug h cavalry m e n co n tinued to asse rt th eir ind ividu alit y in var iou s wa ys. suc h as wearing th eir hair in lo ng. thin pigtai ls. Fier y

WHEN I SPEAK OF EXCELLENT FRENCH CAVALRY, I REFER TO IT S IMPETUOUS BRAVERY, A ND N OT TO ITS PERFECTION . ANTOINE·HENRI JOMINI. STAff OFfi CER IN NAPOlEON' S ARMY AND MILITARY THEORIST

yo u ng Fren chmen keen on w inn in g g lo ry we re temper am entall y ill- ad apt ed to th e boredom o f barrack life. with its intermin able ro u tine s o f mucking - out a nd drill , a nd w er e always relieved to set out o n cam pa ign , With N apo leon in charge, t her e was never an y lack o f militar y action ,

H EAVY A ND LI GH T T he m ost di stinc t ive feature of Napo leo ni c cava lr y was th e pro m ine nt ro le g ive n to ar mo u red ho rsem e n : th e c u irassier s. Alon g w it h two regim en ts of cara bi ni e rs - also eq uipped w it h ar mo u r fro m lH09 - t he c u irassiers co nst it uted t he heav y cav alry , Armoured horsemen had been co ns id e red an a ntiq uated co nce p t. lo o k in g backward to t he age of the medieva l kni ght. but Napoleon liked to usc it as a shoc k for ce o n the

battlefield. The c u irassiers were large m en mounted o n la rge hor ses, They wore metal helmets and plat e a rmo ur o n th ei r chest and back . For a rma m e nt th e y ca rried a he av y stra ig ht sab re and a pisto l. Like armo ured sold ie rs th rough th e ages, the c u irassie rs found t heir meta l shel l ho t and un com fo rtable in su m m e r; it was also ver y expe ns ive. T he c u irassiers wer e a self-c o nsc io us elite , for mi ng t he co re of t he cavalry re serve, w hi ch also included a n um be r of d rago on s. The rese rve WaS o n ly t h row n into act io n afte r d ue d eli be ra t io n, at w ha t was co nsid e red a decisive Heavy cavalry sabr e and scabb ard The cuirassier sabre wa s a straight single-ed ged sw ord that could be used as a cutting weapon, but in a disciplined charge cavalryme n tend ed to use th e point. Show n here is the An XIII (1810 ) model.

;;-

Plume.

usually wo rn

on parade rather than on

batttet«..ld

chas scu rs, w hose un iform s we re ch eape r and less sple nd id , and ri valr y between the two wa s inte nse . C hasseu rs ca rried ca rbines and 0 11 o ccas io n fou ght o n foo t. Otherwise. the functi on o f hu ssar s a nd ch asse u rs w as broadl y id entical. Th ey acted as SCOll tS. ca rry ing o ut reconnaissance patro ls and harassin g raids. and screeni ng the mo vements o f th e ar m y from th e c nc my. Activ it ies o f t h is kind in vol ved sm all g ro u ps o pe ra t ing independently a nd gavc plent y o f c ha nc e to sho w initi ati ve . On th e battlefi eld light cava lry w ould c ha rg e with their sabres held low to run in fantr ymen th rou gh . Th ey were noted for th eir spirit o f attack and speed in pu rsuit o f a de fe ate d l'llcmy.

LANCERS AND DRAGOONS

Dashing hussar The hussars cultivated an image of reckless courage and death-defying boldness in action, always trying to outdo the rest of the French cavalry in featsof horsemanship.

m oment in J. battle . They were used in Ill;) SS ch a rges, a rol e that required di scipline and hor sem an ship rath er than da sh and initi ati ve .

T he light cava lry , by con trast , w ere ge ne ra lly distributed am ong N apoleon 's army co rps large fo rma tio us in whi ch they o pe rate d in co ll abo rat io n w ith in fant ry and a rt ille r y, They consisted initially of hu ssars and cha sseu rs: th ese we re later join ed by inc reasing numbers o f lancers. Hu ssars S3 W them selves as the mo st dashing of cavalry. Their att ractive nes s to women was legendar y - the y were said to be " h arcd by hu sbands and lo ved b y wives". The hu ssars thought them selve s far supe rio r to the:

O ne of the notab le changes ill m il itar y tcchnol n g y th at too k place duri ng the Na po leo nic Wa rs was the widespread lise of lan ce s as a light cavalr y wca po n . Durin g the IHth ce ntu ry lan cer s W Cf C ge ne rally regarded as an ex ot ic . m arginal cleme n t in European warfare , The mo st f.l 1l10 1lS lancers in Europe were the Po lish cavalry kn own as Uhlan s, w ho w ere ren ow ned for the ir wild beh avi our a nd ind epe nde nt fighting spirit.

CA RTRI DG E

BOX

Cuirassier uniform The cuirassier'stunic waslessspectacular than those worn by the lightcavalry, but it wasusually covered by hisarmour - cuirass and back plate. He made up for thisWit h his magnificent plumed helmet.

HEAVY CAVALRY TACTICS Napoleon 's conception of the cuirass iers wa s as a force capable of de livering a mass cavalry charge of overwhelming power at a key point on the battlefield, if possible precip itating a general collapse of the ene my forces. In theory, the re wou ld be a pre liminary artille ry bombardment to weaken the ene my befor e th e charge was launched, gradually accelerating from its start to the moment of encounter. THEO RY AND PRACTICE

Beg inning at a tro t, the cuirassiers were supposed to shift up to a ca nter a nd then, some 150m (500ft) from the enemy. break into a gallop, reaching full tilt over th e last 50m (150ft). In practice. though. French commande rs preferred to use the cuirassiers in a close formation that militated aga inst such a headl ong cha rge . They ordered th e heavy cavalry

to ad vance in a massive. tightly packed column. with men riding boot to bo ot. The difficulty of main taining for mation in the massed column made it virtually impo ssible to prog ress at any g reat speed, an d of cour se deprived th e individ ual cavalryman of any chance to use his initiative. But it did create a body moving with almost unstoppable momentum, capable of break ing enemy cavalry format ions apart and beating down loosely orga nized infantry w ith ho of and sa bre. The cuirassiers, however, had no adequate ta ctics for pen etra ting infantry squares that held firm with bayon et s fixed , as was dem on strated at th e battle of Waterloo. When they charged in dense format ion they were also par ticular ly vulnerable to well-direct ed artillery fire .

SA BRE

It is not su rprising, then, th at tirst lancer s in the N apole onic cava lry WC f C: Po les. 111 Ixt ! a nu mber of dr;l ~( )()I ) regiment» W CfC: co nverted into lan cers, a-, the usefuln ess of a w eapon aro u nd J ill ( 10 ft) lon g was becom ing illc n.·asing ly appar ent . The l.m ccrs were pot entiall y e ffec t ivl' against infantr y sq uan's - im m u ne to all o the r form s o f cavalry attack - si nn..' their lan ce s outreached the mush.'( a nd bayonet . Ll I1Cl' P;, were al so g re at sk irmishcrs 0 11 th e

man y o cca sions. th l'y were immersed in th e c r ue l, dirty w ar o f .u u bus hcs and reprisal s ag a ins t Sp anish g ue r r illa fighters.

unwield y e nc u m bra nce and 110 match filf the sabre , To r o pe: w ith th is dd;"·(t. not all th e 1lH..'1l i ll lancer

The Fr ench cava lry

rq~ i l1H..· I HS wen.'

it s reputation as a batt l e -

hatr lcficld. marauding at will. In a cavalry IHl,IC:' l'. however, th eir lon g weapon wa s au

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se mi- heavy ca va lr y, From IHII7 t hey se r ve d ch ie lly in t he Pcn in su la r War in Sp ain. A, well a, fig htin g Wel lin gton's arm y Oil

arm ed with lan ce s. Ea ch g r o u p of rid er s that ca r r ie d la nce s wa s su pported h y a number of co m rades wit h sabres drawn . The dragoons were n umer ica lly th e Iar~c s t clc mc m of t he Fre nch cava lry . As th e y were arm ed wit h m u sket s a nd h ad o r i~ i ll a ll y hCl' 1I so ld iers w ho ro de to batt le hut fo ug ht o n foo t , Na po leo n w as rc ntprcd to usc the m in battl e as ill f:lIltry . Th e y pro ved un sarisfact or y in tha t ro le , ho w ev er , not possessing rhc d isc ip line d ste ad iness of tru e foot so ld ie rs, A t the sam e ri me. th e dis traction of iufan try tra i n ing te nded to re d uce th eir cff,'nive n,'" in the sad d le , Sti ll. in till' ea rly batrlcs o f till' Na poleonic Wars t he drngo on« frequen tl y di stinguished the m selves fig h t ing alo n gs id e the c u irassie rs as a ki nd of a nci llar y

CAVA LRY I N ACT ION WOII

winnin g force carly 011 in the Napoleonic Wars, At M are n go in IHIIII, a charg,' b y so me -iOO t ro o pers com ma nded by Ge ne ra l Fran co is Etienne Kcll crm .in plun ged i nt o the Hank o f an A ustr ia n infanr r y and cava lr y colum n (l.()()()-s tro ng. d riviu g th em fr o m ti ll; fi eld in pa ni c and co n f usion at a m ome nt wh e n t he Fr ench had be en t;K in g a lmost ce rta in d efea t. The Na poleo n ic cava lry reache d it, peak of effect ive ness , ho w eve r, in t he pe r iod 1H05 to IHI2 , W ell m oun ted. th o rou gh ly trained , de cked o ut in sp le ndid u n ifo r m " an d utte rl y self-co n fid e nt , th e y were a n elite tha t pro ve d it, wort h in ba tt le after battl e , T he y made a notable

Sabreta che of t he 8th Hu ssar s A distinctive leat her satchel carried by cavalrymen, the sabretache hung fro m th e sabre belt on t he left flank of th e horse. Orig inally ho lding w riting and sketching materials, by Napoleonic ti mes it was largely decorative.

co n tr ib urion to the vi ctories at Ulm and Austerlitz in IHII5, but their most spec tac u la r per fo r m an ce w as p robably JgJillst the Russia ns at Eylau in Februa r y IHII7. A t a desperate mo ment in the batt le. Mu rat led th e IO,OOIl- st ro ng cava lr y reserve in a ch arge t hat swe pt thro ug h t he Russian in fan tr y. then re fo r med and cha rged th ro ug h them a sec o nd t im e to re gain th e Fren ch li nes. Na po leo n's in vasio n o f Ru ssia in tHI2, ho weve r, b rou g ht catas t ro p he . Eve n at t he star t of t he ca m paig n , the lack of ad eq uate t()J"agl' fo r t he m assive cavalry force - the cava lry re se r ve alo ne w as 4 0 .l11 lf ) stro n g - m eant th at ma n y of th e ho rses b egan to sta rve . " O ne saw th eir g rea t emaciate d bodies d raggi ng th emselves alo ng:' an e yewit ne ss co m m en te d . "Every minu te one wou ld quiver a ltd f.1 11 on its rid e r, w ho abandoned it." T he Ru ssian Cossacks proved su pe r io r to the Prc nc h hu ssar s a nd c u irassie rs

YOU PERCEIVED IN THE DISTANCE WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN OVERWHELMING, LONG MOVING LINE ON CAME THE MOUNTED HOST ... WHILE THE VERY EARTH SEEMED TO VIBRATE BENEATH THEIR THUNDERING TRAMP. BRITISH INFANTRYMAN DESCRIBING THEFRENCH CAVALRY CHARGEAT WATERLOO

Th e cu ir assiers at Auste rli tz Napoleon considered Austerlit z his finest victory. He skilfully manoeuvred his for ces around th e battlefield to gain local numerical superiority and th en ord ered atta cks at crucial point s and decisive mom ent s. Here the cuirassiers w ait th eir turn to charge .

Okm

till' murder ou s ga me of harr yin g and skirm ishing. At the battl e of Bo rod ino i ll Septe m be r th e cu irassiers carried o ut o ne of th ei r most famo us act io ns. the capt ure of the formida bly defended Gra nd R edo ubt . but eve n t his was achieved at heavy cost. T he grim wi nte r re t reat fro m M oscow co m pleted the de struc t io n of the Fre nc h cavalry. Mos t of the hor ses we re slaug htered for foo d an d t he remnan ts of t he arm y rha r su rvived th e ca ll1 pai~n co uld m us te r less tha n 2,()()() 1110Ullts bet ween them, With desperate ene rg y, th e French cavalry was reb u ilt in IHl.l, h ut most o f the tr oo per s we re no w ill - train ed no vices an d hor ses were in sho rt supply. Still, th e spiri t o f the cavalry revi ved su Hicient ly fin a hero ic fi nale at Waterl oo in IHI 5. Late in th e battl e. wi th th e t ide alread y turning decisively again st th e French. Ney t hrew massed cavalry forward in an att em pt to br ea k th e Briti sh infantry squares . But, cha rging uph ill ov er mu dd y g ro u nd o nto th e po ints of bayo nets. the French cavalry were 1110wn dow n by a co m bina t io n of can no n and mu sket fire.

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THE NAPOlEONIC WARS 1796 -181S

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LESSON S OF WAR In t he last resort. Na po leo n's faith in cavalry ca n be see n as excessive. T he growt h in th e size o f ar mies during th e N apol eon ic Wars mean t th at an ade qua te size cava lry ar m requ ired a g reater nu m ber of su itable hor ses th an co u ld readil y be found . and th ose horses need ed an often impossible quautir y of fodder. On th e

batt lefield . th e in creasing fire po we r of art illery and th e resilien ce of wel l- t rained in fautr y with bayonet s fixe d tended to nulli fy th e im part o f th e cavalry charge. By 1815 the bold death -defyin g cavalry man. with hi s da sh and va lour, w as already o n th e verge of obso lesce nce .

Triump hs a nd disaste rs From his first victo ries in Italy in 1796. through the glori ou s campaigns of 1805-1807, and even dunng the desperate defence of France in 1814, Napoleon's armies w on many mor e victories than th ey suffe red defeats. In th e end, how ever, the con tinuou s British naval blockade and th e sheer numb er of his enemies - prin cipally Britain, Austr ia, Prussia, and Russia combined to bring Napoleon's dream to an end at Waterloo .

OTHER SOLDIERS OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY In formi ng his Gra nde Armee, Na poleon bu ilt on the in her itance

Mor e th an a mill ion are reckon ed to have died , many in combat

of the Frenc h R evolution, w ith its emphasis on the "citize n-so ld ier",

but far more of hardship or disease, expiring in military hospitals,

but created a force motivated by du ty, hon our, and the lust for glory,

foreign prisons. or simply by the roadside. Yet, inspired by devotion

rather than by revolution ary enthusiasm . Around 1.6 m illion men

to their great m ilitary leader, N apoleon's soldiers showed consistent

of French birt h and over 700,000 born in Italy, Poland , and other

courage , d isciplin e, and endurance, even in the face of steadily

parts of Euro pe event ua lly served in the ranks of N apoleon's army.

wo rsening odds after the disastrou s Russian cam paign of 1812 .

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III IHII.j th e infaurr y o f Na po leo n's Grande Arl1l t'c number ed so nic 35 0 .()()() men , d iv ide d into lin e infmtr y and light infantr y reg im en ts. At th at ea rly stage in th e N apo le o n ic adve ntu re the foo r sold ie rs were super bly tr ained and capable of ex ecut ing rapid and precise manoeu vr es 0 11 the bartlcficld. T he co nstant pressure o f wa r and the att rition o f vete ra ns ens ured th at th e Em pe ro r's troops wou ld never attai n th e SJ I111' qu al ity ag ain. Fro m IX1I5 onwa rd , fresh recruits receive d only the mo st basic training. be in g ex pected to le arn so ldiering fro m mo re ex perienced co lleag ues. T he an.-rage.: iufa utrym an was a co nscri pt. 3 1)( 1 in man y cases not a w i lling o ne. T he ann ua l c311 up wa-, the o ccasion of wi des prea d d rafi evasion.

the e..'n em y mu sket vo lleys, see ki ng to e ng age at cl o se quarters o r make the

Tricolour (red. while, and blue) cockade

e llt.' my brea k and flee . C asualt ies wer e

ex pe cted to be heav y ; so ld ie rs wert.' forbidde n to sto p to h elp wo u nded com rades . Eve n afier the de struction of a gene ratio n o f so ldie rs in the R ussian ca m paig n o f IH12, the e ve r m or e in e xp eri en ced in fan tr y ne ver cease d to tig ht with e nth u siasm and aggressio n .

The baSICcolour for Napoleo mc Infantry tumcs was dark blue With w hit e facings

The better- off paid substit u tes: o the rs sim ply hid o r de sert ed afier en ro lme nt. Yet the m or ale of th e

infantry reg iments were ge nera lly high . T he an ny ve..'r y qui ck ly beca me the co nsc ript's home, g ro up so lidarity e nsu ring low desertion rates OIlCe..' men were integ rated in th eir regiments. Napoleon "s sty le of wa rfa re . in vol vin g fo rce d

Corporal's stripes

m ar c hes punctu at ed by pit ch ed battles. pla ced dau llting demands UpOIl th e in fant ry. T hey w er e

expec te d to m ar ch 25 k m ( IS mi le s) a day for week s o n end . On ce o utside Fren ch territory the y supplied themselves by p i lla ~in ~ th e ar ea t hroug h w h ich th e y march ed . W hen the pop ulat io n wa s ac tive ly ho stile and the co u nt rys ide po o r, as ill Ru ssia and Spain, thi s w as a hazardou s mod e o f o peratio n. Wear and tear Il'ft th e foo t so ld in s a ra ~~ed body of men as a ca m pa ig n w en t O il. 011 th e ba tt lefi eld, th e in fantr y we re usua lly ex pected to tak e th e offe nsive . P receded by a sw arm of ski rm ishe rs - the " volt igcu rs" - m assed in fanrr y colu m ns marched . wi th bayonet s fixed , in to Infantry uniform and weapons like the redcoats. French infantry fought chieflywith musket and bayonet. Unlike their British counterparts. most French infantrymen alsocarried a sword.

I.. toose -httmq trousers worn for battle over knee breeches

THE ARTILLERY

The Polish Vistul a l egion The Poles were especially enthusiastic in their support for Napoleon ashe liberated manyof them from Russian and Austrian rule. The Vistula l egion fought in the Peninsular War andmarched with the Grande Arrnee to Moscow.

Eve n in the pre-Revol ut io nar y army, th e Fren ch a rt ille r y wa s a tech no cr ac y in w hi ch men o f ability w ere able to rise th rou gh thei r ow n merits. N apol eon's inn o vatio ns were prim arily tact ical. He co nc e n tra te d canno n in large batteries at decisive poi nt s o n th e b attlefield a nd de ploye d h orse art ille ry aggre ssivel y in fo r w a rd po siti o ns . N ap ol eonic a rt illery wa s ve ry profession al. A team of gu n ners co uld fire a 12-p ound er canno n three times a minute. Th ey w er e su ppo rted b y team ster s w ho lo o ked after the horses a nd carriages. and by artisans w ho maintained and repaired equipme nt. Piring the g uns was tou gh w ork . Aft er each sho t th e crew had to run the

canno n back, load, and rc- aim . Th eir arms and faces qu ickl y becam e blac k wit h po wd e r, wh ile targets we re often obscured by thick smo ke. At th e battle of Wagram in IHO'), Fre nch a rt ille ry fire d ')6,0 00 ca n no nba lls in two d ays. T he horse artillery was no less im pressive : gallo ping into enemy range, they were able to detach thei r g uns. sig ht, and fire in under a m inute. The q ua lity o f art ille ry perso nnel rem ain ed high . eve n though o fficer traini ng tim e was cut dram ati call y from IH1I7. By IHI4, ho w ever , ther e w ere chro n ic sho rt ag es of b oth po wd er and sho t. N apoleon never achieve d the ratio of five canno n to e ve ry th ou sand so ld ie rs he th ou ght o ptim a l.

THE IMPERIAL GUARD Ori ginally formed as th e the best of ea ch year's intak e of Con su la r G ua rd in 17')') a nd co nsc r ip ts from 1HO'), bar el y ren amed in 1804, th e Imperi al co nstit ut ed a n el ite force at all. Gua rd w as at fir st a relati vel y Al w ays in fu ll dress u ni for m sma ll force serving as N apoleon's o n campaig n. the Guards were pe rso na l bodygu ard . In 1804 a n impo sin g sig h t, especially th e it co nsisted of so me 5,0 0 0 G renadiers in their tall bearskins. in fantr y, 2 ,000 cavalry , and an Na po leo n was, ho wever. reluctant art ille ry co ntinge n t. By 181 2 , to co m m it hi s O ld Guard to batt le. Imp erial eagle it h ad swe lle d int o a lar ge arm y keeping them as his last reserve . The Napoleonic eagleand imperial co r ps w it h over 100 ,0 00 sold iers. crown figured prominently on the T he y we re not ab ly held back fro m uniforms and kit of all branches At the core o f the Imperial the slaug hte r at Bo ro d ino in IHI 2 , of the Imperial Guard. Gua rd we re th e h and-picked earning them the ironi c nickname ve te ra ns o f th e O ld Gua rd . To j oi n th is elite, " th e im mortals". When the Old Gua rd b roke in a so ldier n eed ed to have served in at least two th e face o f Bri ti sh an d Du tch voll eys at th e battle campaigns, have a minimum o f fo ur years o f Wat e rloo in IHIS, Na po leo n was fini shed . serv ice, and b e at least 1.65m (5ft Sin) tall . The sen ior in fantr y regiment w ith in th e O ld G ua rd were the Gren adiers, n icknamed Irs .~ n))!lJa rcfs (" th e g r u m ble rs" ) - be cau se th e y a lo n e d ar ed co m plain to th e Emperor's face. All th e Im perial G uard enj o yed privi leges. They h ad better pa y, foo d , equipm ent . and medical treatme nt than lin e in fantr y. Guard ranks rated o ne ste p ab ove their line equi val ent - so 3 co r po ral in the Gu ards w as equivalent to a n ordinary se rgea nt. T he Middle Guard , selected bet w een 180 6 a nd IHO'), had a hi gh per centage o f non-Fren ch t ro ops and nev er equall ed th e Old Guard in sta t us . The Young G ua rd, recruited from The Guard at Waterloo Asword spreadthat the Imperial Guard had beenforced to retreat. the newswasa crushing blow to morale in the rest of the French army.

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1808 - 1815

BRITISH REDCOAT

li E 1lI1iTISII THOOI'S

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who foug ht the armies of Napoleon in

th e Iberian Pen insula in 1808-14, and at Waterloo in 1815, we re mostly rec rui ted from among the lowest strata of soc iety. T heir co m ma nde r, the D uke of Wellington ,

famously stated: " We have in serv ice th e scu m of th e ea rth as co m mo n soldiers" . Yet th e red- coat ed Briti sh infa ntry proved hardy and de termi ned fighters, w he ther storming a breac h in for tress wa lls or standing up to the test of Frenc h firepower and cold steel in open battle.

The vast m aj orit y of th e men wh o filled th e rank s o f th e Br iti sh ar my durin g th e Na poleo n ic Wars were volunteer s e ithe r en liste d for life (in pract ice. 2 5 years) or for sho rte r peri ods of se rv ice permitted ill wa rtime . Wel lin gton d escribed his so ldiers' mot ives for sig ning lip in th e mo st disparag ing te rm s: "Som e of o ur men enlist from havin g go t bastard ch ild re n - so me for minor o ffences - and mallY mo re for dri nk". T he re is no question that so me so ldiers did join the army as a refuge fro m priso n o r fro m ot he r per sonal di fficultie s. M en due to sta nd tria l for pett y o ffence s such JS po achin g Bli ght enlist to avoid pro secution. D ebt ors found sh elter in th e ranks from th e pursuits of th eir credi tors. Sh e er po vert y drove man y to e n list. especia lly among th e h a lf- sta r v in g Irish . for whom the pro spe ct of re gular fo od w as a co m pe llin g motive . TH E KING ' S S H I L LI N G Yet th e po sitive att ractions of military life also drew eager and ambiti o us yo ung me n to "take the k in g' s sh ill ing". When ac tively rec ruiting, a lo cal regiment w ould put up pos te rs adve rtising th e ad va n tages o f a so ld ier's life, leaving no cli ch e: 11I1ll Sl'd in th eir appea l to m en w hose "h earts beat hi gh to tr ead the paths o f glory" . A recru iting part y - probably an o ffice r. a co u ple o f N COs (no n-co m m issio ned offi cers). and a drummer - w ou ld th en sc r up in a publi c place to recei ve volunteer s. J ohn Sh ipp. who e n liste d in 17')7. lat er re call ed how he w as attracte d by a v ision of a " me rry life. musket s rattl in g . ca nno n roaring , drum s beatin g . co lo urs flyin g, regiment s charging and sh o uts o f v icto ry !" At the sam e time, po tential rec ru its were lib er all y pli ed wi th

alco ho l. and m an y woke up w it h a h an go ve r an d a li fetime co m m itment to serve kin g and co untry th at t hey w ished t hey h ad n ot m ad e. PATH S O F G LO RY Durin g the N apo leo n ic War s, the arm y ex pande d so rapidl y (fo rcing Illany reg im e nts to cr eate new batt alio ns) that rec rui ts w ere in desperatel y sho rt supply. As ;l resu lt, substantial cash bounties were paid as an ind ucem ent to e n list, with the su m o f 12 g u inea » o n o ffer in I H05. When e ven thi s fai led to fill th e ra nk s. lar ge n umber s of soldie rs were recruited from the mi litia, a prOCl'SS that carne ver y close to co nsc r ipt ion , w h ile preser vin g th e vo lu ntary prin cipl e . T he mi liti a wa s a c it izc n hom e d efence l( >rn ' co m pose d o f m en se le ct ed by ba llot and from w h ic h tra nsfer to th e arm y w as hi ghl y d esir abl e : th e form e r afforded all th e h ardsh ips of m il itar y life b ut non e of the ad ve nt u re fo u nd in the arlll Y prop er. By the se vario us means Britain W ;lS able to ra ise a n a rm y of aro u nd '>00 .0 00 m en by III13. co m pare d w ith a pe acet ime stre ngt h o f abo ut 50.0 00. T Ill' pr ol o nged period of wa r far e also c reated a g reat dem and for o fficers. T hese were mo stly drawn from the m inor a ristoc racy o r the gen try - so ns of c lerg yme n mad e lip about a te nt h o f o ffi cer numbers. Alth ou gh me n o f SO lll t' so c ial stand ing . o fficers w en..' no t necessari ly at all wea lt hy. but th e m a n wi thou t mOJll'y or so cial co n uc cr io ns w as unlikely to make a brillia nt career. C o m m issio ns were obtai ned mos tl y by a mi x o f purch ase. patro nage , a nd sc n io riry. A t ypi cal o ffice r's ca ree r m ight start w ith h is parent s bu yin g him a place as an en sig n, th e 1110 st jun ior

GREEN·PLUM ED LIGHT INFANTR Y SHA KO

Trotter packs The inf ant ry kna psack or " Trott er pack" (right ) was a deeply resented burden . One soldier complained , "I am convinced th at many of our infant ry san k and died und er the wei ght o f th eir knap sacks". It w as worn eve n into battle (far right ), seen here on the Light Companies of the

First Guards as they repel fier ce French atta cks at Hougoum ont in 1815.

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TH E MEN ARE VERY PROUD OF [OFFICERS] WHO ARE BRAVE IN T HE FIELD, AND KIND AND CONSIDERATE TO THE SOLDIERS UNDER THEM ... I KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE THAT IN OUR ARMY THE MEN LIKED BEST TO BE OFFICERED BY GENTLEMEN. RIFLEMAN HARRIS, RECOLLECTIONS, 1808

co m m issio ned ra n k , for so m e £5()(J. As vac anc ies o cc urred abo ve h im ill hi s reg im e nt, he co u ld the n buy furt h er pro motio n . Free com m issio ns, tilled by st r ic t se n io r ity. c ro ppe d lip fro m t im e to t im e , o ffe r i ng a slo w path of ad va nceme nt to off icer s w it ho ut m Olle y. Eit her outstan d in g feats o f valo u r o r intl ucnt i.rl frie nd s ill th e rig ht pla ces o ccasiona lly a llo we d a m an to m ak e m ore rapi d p ro g re ss up th t' pro mo tion ladder w itho ut pa yment. Pro m o tio n fro m th e ra nks wa s no t co m m o n. h ut it di d o cc u r. About o ne in 20 ()tli ct' p\ were t(nnl t'r non - commission ed offi ce rs, O fficers cou ld ge nt' rally be reli ed up on to show co u rage in co mbat an d , as ex pe rie nce of wa r fare accumu lated in the lon g str uggle against th e Fre nch , incr ea sin g n u m be rs of the m becam e co m pe te nt at lead ing thei r m en. As in mo st ar m ies . SOl Ut' of the o fficers were respect ed a nd ad m ired by th e so ld iers u ndernea th t hem and ot hers we re d espised as ig no ra n t a nd u vcl c ss. In e ithe r case, off icers w er e

cr it ica lly de pe nden t on t he per fo rm an ce o f t he ir se rgea nts and scrgcan t-r uajors . w ho we re ofte n rhc m o st expe rie nce d a nd pro fe ssion a l mem be rs of a r o m pa ny. Th e sc rge ant- m aj o r wo u ld u su ally have star ted h is CHt'Cr as ;111 ordi na r y so ld ie r and wo u ld cer tai n ly have be en pr omot ed o n m erit . Hi , mi lita r y ab ilit y h ad to b e we dd ed to liter ac y a nd cleri cal sk ills fo r he bo re a h eav y burden of pap e rwork ill hi s ad m iu istrar ivc dut ies.

D R I LLA N D DI SCIPLIN E St rict drill J IH.I draconian puni sh m en ts w ere st ill see n J S th e ke ys to infa nrry pe rforman r e in th e Br iti sh ar m y o f th e Na poleo n ic W ars, as they h ad b een th ro u gh out the lSt h ce nt ur y, T he me o f th e inac c ura te flintl o ck m usket, Bro wn Bess, as the m ain infa ntr y wea po n m ad e di sciplined vo lle y fire csscn tial th e re was n o pla ce for ind ivi d ua l initi ati ve Oil t he part of t he o rd ina r y so ld ie r. Bu t th e assum pt io n s of a deci d ed ly u ne q ua l soc ie ty also di c tat ed the way that m en w er e crea te d . It «

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w as take n for g ra n ted tha t , in th e abse nce of co r po ral puni sh me nt , so ld ie rs draw n from th e co m m o n peo ple wo u ld sw iftly dcgc ncrar e in to a di sorgani zed and co w a rd ly rabble. Flogging WJ S a co m mo n place respon se to ~lt1 y resistance to au thori ty o r gene ra l di sorde r such as d ru nk en ness - to w hi ch so ld ie rs were ce r tain ly pr o n e. T he aim of the syste m wa s to create infa ut r y mc n w ho w ere unq uestion ingly o bed ien t to co m m a nds , w ho w he n it carn e to bat tle wo u ld mano eu vre co heren tl y and o pe ra te t heir flintl o ck m u skets wi th m in imum h arm to their co m rad es and t he m selv es, a nd m aximum h arm to th e e ne m y. l3y the IHOOs, how ever, t he o ld wa ys of t he ar my h ad im po rta nt c ritics , and reform s were unde r wa y. In th e li ght infa nt ry (" Iight b ob s" ) and the rifle regim en ts - w h ich prov ed a valu able a nc illary to t hc lin e infant r y in th e Pen in sul a r W ar - individual ini ti at ive wa s no t to ta lly di scouraged a nd a tentat ive e ffo r t was m ad e to lead m en m or e o n the principl e of mutu al respect th an o f fea r of punishmen t. For m o st so ld iers, in an y case , t here w ere more co m plex rea so ns to co m m it to a c re d itable p erfo r m an ce. incl uding th e usu al peer pr essure a nd lo ya lt y to fr iend, and co m rad e, fo u nd in all figh ting for matio n s So ld ier s ide nt ified stro ngly wi th thei r regim ent and its tra d itio ns - men oft en fou g ht to th e de ath to defend t he sy m bo lica lly

Feather spring flicks pan open as flint falls

Flintlock pistol c,1810 Although flin tlock muskets we re t he dominant inf ant ry weapo n of the period, pistols provided a useful status symbol for offi cers.

vi ta l regime nta l colour" Lo ya lty to kin g a nd co u n tr y wa s a lso pr esen t as a mo ti vatin g force . Yet th e Irish , serv ing in th e ir own regimen ts o r as ind ivid ua l so ldie rs in En g lish regiments. o n the w ho le pr oved o utsta nd ing ly loyal and rel iable ,

Musk et drill The Brit ish Redcoat was renowned for his steadiness in the face of enemy fire - the prod uct of stric t drilling, discipline. and long practice of battlefield manoeuvres.

d espite m ostl y being C atholics in the se rv ice o fa Pro testant k ing and co m ing from a co u nt ry sim me ring w ith re vo lt agai nst Brit ish ru le.

CA M PA IG N I NG ARMY T he a r m y th at Wel ling to n led o n ca m pa ig n in the Pe n insula r War wa s a co m plex and in so me wa ys un w ield y entit y, It w as a mul tin at ion al for ce , incl uding not o n ly Sco ts a nd Ir ish bu t also large nu m bers of troops from ou tsid e the United Kin gd om , notab ly th e King's G erm an Leg io n . In f aut r y reg im e nt s fou ght alo ngs ide cavalry and The st or min g of Badajol An assault party prepares to sto rm the garrison at Badejoz in Ap ril 1812. Around 3,000 English and Portuguese troo ps we re killed in the Imel successful assault.

art illc..'ry regimenr s hut wen: not iuregra te d with th em . The intantr y itself included d ifferent ki nd s o f troop!'i - " ce ntre co m pa n ies" of lin e infantry. a nd "Hauking co m pa n ies" o f light in fanrr y, rirlcmcn , a nd g re na d iers - ea ch of which had its ow n un ifo rm and tighti ng methods. Ther e wer e su rgeo ns o f o fte n dubi o us q ua lifi cati on, ch apla in s, vet s, ban d sm en a nd d rumme r bo ys, pion eers for di ggi ng t renches and tu nn ell ing d u rin g sieges , and co m m issary's me n arran g ing su pplies. A g reat train of tran sport . a n im als. and han ge rs- o il mo ved w ith th e arm y 0 11 th e march . The m en we re acco m pa n ied. for exam ple. by la rge he rd s of ca tt le. wit h so nic 3 ilil o f th e beasts be in g slaug hte re d ~ v~ ry d ay to fee d the troops in t he ca m paig ns o f 181 3 . T he hanger s- o n include d p ro stitutes, h ut also arm y wi ves a nd , ind eed . w ho le fam ilies - o ne rl'giment is recorded as tak in g -18 w ive s and 2il ch ild re n alo ng with tr o op !'i wh en em barked fo r Spa in. M arch ing and co u nter- mu rch ing across Por tu gal and Spa in in th e co m plex cam paigns tha t swayed ba ck a nd forth year afte r Yl'J r wa s a tri al o f e ndu ra nce . espec ially in th e heat of su m m e r.

An o rd ina ry so ld ie r carried a load o f aro u nd 25 kg (()illb) a nd w as e xpec te d to m arch aro u nd 25 k m ( 15 mil es) a d ay. O n so m e occasio ns me n m arch ed for 30 co nsec u tive da ys from su n rise u nt il d ark . R ifl ~m a n H a rr is' acc o u nt o f th e British ret rea t to Corunna a nd Vigo in I X09 pro vid es a v ivid impressio n o f the hard sh ips thi s occasio ne d : " O ur k na psack s to o were a bitter l'nl' m y o n t h is prol o nged marc h . M an )' a m an di ed . I am co n v inced, who wo uld have horne up well to the l'IH.I of the retreat hut fo r the infern al lo ad we ca rried o n o u r hack s." U n t il I X13 tent s were no t issued a nd so ld ie rs either bui lt ro ugh -a nd - rc.rdy huts o u t o f a ny m ateri als th ey co u ld find o r slept in th e o pe n. Throu gh ou t the Pen insu lar War , Brit ish so ld iers su ffere d a

te rrib le d eat h rate from fe ver s a nd ex ha ust io n .

I N T O T HE BR EACH T he sp ir it of th e R ed co at - .md h is d cfecrs we re show n at their starkest ill th e siege war fare th at tor m cd an im porta nt part of th e Pe n in su lar ca m paig ns. T he fo rtre sses of Ci ud ad R o dr igo , Bad ajo z, and Sail Sc hast i.m were a ll r.ik c n by sto rm afte r le ng t hy preparati on s. A Iicur cuaur o bse rve d that non e of th l' so ld ie r's o ther du ties was "so gall in g or so d isag reeable as ;1 siege ". Fo r wee ks th e m en wo u ld be for ce d [ 0 o ccu py tren ches under the elll' my walls. a co nsta nt pre )' to sn iping a nd m o rt ar fire, w h ile g u n ners and eng inee rs co n tr ived to m a ke a breac h in the fo rt ificat io ns. a lice a b reach wa s m ad e, the)' «

THE ENGLIS H REMAINED Ql)ITE SILENT WITH SHOULDERED ARMS, AN D FROM TH EIR ST EADINE SS THEY APPEARED TO BE A LO NG RED WAL L ... T H EY BEGAN TO FIRE. THE ENEMY'S ST EADY, CO NCE NT RAT ED VOLLEYS SWEPT OUR RANKS. THO M A S BOUG EAUD. fRENCH INfANTRY OffiCER IN THE PENINSULAR WAR

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faced the h azardous prOSpl'ct of fi~h t i l1~ the ir wa y th roug h the heavil y d efended o pe n ing. T he 3SS;l 11lt 0 11 the breac h was head ed by a j u n io r officer

w ho led a gro up of vo luntee rs k 1l0 WIl by lo ug t ra d it ion as t he Fo rlo r n H ope . In stea d o f it be in g diffi cu lt to ti nd vo lu n tee rs fo r t h is exce pt io n ally d a nger o us m ission , t he re w as kee n co m pe tit io n

to take part , especi ally amo ng office rs w ho co u ld hope for a pr om o t ion i f they su rv ived . The assau lt took place und er cove r ofdark ucss, but till' I'or lo rn Hope was in evitably unde r heavy ti re by th e ti me t he part y ru shed t he rubble- ti lle d breach , w hi c h h ad o fte n be en bo oby-trapped by French cng itll'c fS . O ne Forl o rn Ho pe d u ring t he siege of Bad ajo z lost so me 18 0 of its 200 m en .

T he assault parties followi ng be hi nd , some ea r ryi ng ladd ers, co u ld a lso ex pec t su bs ta nt ia l lo sse s. adva nc ing over the bod ies of the falle n. The ex isti ng ru les o f wa r were that i f a fo rtress Infa nt ry sq uare s French cuirassiers charge the 42nd Highlan ders at W aterloo in 1815. Drawn up in square fo rmatio n, infantr y batt alions we re almost im pervious to attack by cavalry, who we re unabk?-to penetrate the massed rank s o f me n and bayon et s.

fai led to su r re nde r

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its wall s we n." breach ed .

the att ac ke rs h ad th e ri g ht to p ill age t he place o nce take n . At Ci u da d R od r igo . Bad aj o z , and San Seb asti an , W ell in g to n's so ld ie rs ind u lged th is ri g ht to th e fu ll. C iv ilians were the vict ims o r an o rgy o f murd er, rape , a nd ro bber y as Br it ish so ld iers took t he ir rcvcll ge for th l' ri sks and ha rd sh ip s of t he ca m paig n. O N TH E F IELD OF BAT TL E Whe n f:ll' in g the Fr e nch in o pe n ba tt le, t he Brit ish infant r y we re ra d ica lly diff er ent creatu res fro m the drunken rabb le th at sac ked Bad ajo z, T he ir m o st str iking cha rac ter ist ic wa s "s tead iness", a qu alit y especia lly ad mi re d by th ose w ho h ad experie nce d at fir st h and th e she e r terror of t he N apol eonic battlefield . Unarmoured men h ad to sta nd fi r m in th e face or ca n no n tire , musk et s, ba yo net s. Jan el' s, a nd sab re s. Casu alt ies w ere in evitably h igh . Whe n Br iti sh in fant r y faced a Prc n ch onslaug ht at Albuera in 18 11,

aro u nd two -th irds of th eir J11l'!l were ki lled o r wo u nde d , and yet t he y he ld the field . A sold ier wro te proud ly that " men we re k no cked abo ut lik e sk ittl es , but not a step back wa rd s w as tak e n" . D urin g the l'c n in su lar ca m pa ig ns . W ell in gton bega n by explo it ing till' ab ility o f his tro o ps to hold a defen sive po siti o n , in pa rt ic ul a r o cc u py ing the line s o f T o r re s Vcd ras o utside Lisb on in IHIO- l l. But larcr h is arm y. wi th its Po rt u gue se and Spa n ish a ll ies, h ad o ppo rt u n it ies to sho w true o ffens ive sp ir it , es pecia lly at th e battle o f Sa la m a nca in IHI 2 . In this not ab le e n gage men t, Br it ish in fantr y bold ly m a rc hed fo r w ard in co lu m ns and th en dep lo yed in line - a textbook 1l13110 eU V r e - to atta ck French fo rc es th at had allo w ed th em selves to become o vere x te nded . Waterloo medal Aw ard ed to soldiers present at the bat tles of ligny, Ouetre Bras, and Waterloo, th is w as the fir st med al to be given to all ranks. Veteran s we re also credi ted w ith tw o years' extra service.

T he British cavalry - despised by Well in gt on as und iscipl ined poseu rs "gallo ping at eve ryth ing" - for o nce di stin gu ished them selves by th eir valour and agg ressio n . The French army su ffered a ncar-rout, wi t h aro und 7,000 casua lties and as m an y so ld ie rs agai n take n prisoner.

WATERLOO Fo r all thei r d raining effect upon Fren ch reso urces J IH.-t

manpower, ho we ver, the campaig ns of the

Peni nsular War w e re never mor e th an a side

sho w. It wa s in taki ng o n N apoleo n at Waterloo in 1815 that t he mettl e o f th e R ed coat s wa s

te sted to the limit. providing th em w ith their fine st hou r. T he effec t of t he famed N apoleo n ic a r rillery wa s lim ited as W ell in gton 's J11 c..' U ma de usc of th e co ve r prov ided by th e reve rse slope of a h ill and lay dowo w heneve r possible. T he British and their Dutch allies repulsed an o nslaug ht by massed Fren ch infa nt ry co lu m ns wi t h the grapesho t and ca nister fired by th ei r field art ille ry and th e musketballs o f in fantr y for med up in line. A s Well ingt o n on ce Co ltl I11CIH e d : " I do not desire better spor t than to me et o ne of their co lumns en ma sse with o ur li ne." When th e Fre nch cavalry charged , t he British in fantr y formed sq ua res and

held firm , the ho rse m e n su rgi ng a ro u nd the m li ke "a heavy surf breaking o n a coas t". T Ill' arriva l of the Pru svian army ill suppo rt of the Brit ish settled the o utco me 01 th e day's tight in g, in t he co urse of which Wellin gton 's ar my had su ffered 15,000 casua lt ies. At the start of the N apoleoni c Wars, th e Brit ish in fantr y we re at least a m atc h fo r th e Fren ch . but by th e end of th e co n flict in IHIS they had become tou gh , battl e-hardened tighte rs, ca pable o f stand ing up to :lny thi ng th e c nl'my co uld th row ar them . Wel lingt o n's "sc um of the ea rth" co u ld c laim to he th e m en wh o w on the wa r.

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REDCOAT BATTLE TACTICS All infantrymen in the Napoleonic period were taught to execute battlefield manoeuvres such as deployment from column (the ideal formation for coordinated movement) and into line (the best formation for firing musket volleys). The power of the French artillery, firing solid shot, shells, and canister, forced the infantry to use concealment when possible. Wellington liked to keep

his men out of sight of the guns on the reverse slope of a hill until ready to confront the enemy. If no cover was available, soldiers might be ordered to lie down, although they had to stand to deliver their volleys. The British infantry line was drawn up two ranks deep. Riflemen, acting as skirmishers, would deploy in loose order between the line infantry and the enemy.

SQUARE IN PRO FILE

GRENA DIERS

LIGH T I NFANTRY EIGHT CEN TRE CO MP ANI ES

LINE I N PROFilE

SINGLE COMPANY IN LINE FORMATION

Companies in square Descended from the pike formations that ended the dominance of cavalry on the late-Medieval batt lefield, the infantry square formed a four-deep wall, bayonets pointing outwards to provide protection from all directions. The front ranks held position; the rear ranks fired in volleys.

Officers and NCOs busied themselves around the line. With one rank firing while the othe r reloaded, infantry could deliver around six volleys a minute - an impressive volume of fire for an enemy to march into. If attac ked by cavalry they formed a square with bristling bayonets. This made them more or less impregnable unless cannon fire broke up the square, letting the cavalry in.

Companies turn to lace enemy

Battalion in column A batta lion was composed of ten companies, each comprising around 50 soldiers. It deployed onto the batt lefield in column, then wheeled into line to face the enemy. The two flanking companies (light infantry and grenadiers) were often detached for skirmishing.

Companies in line Arranged two-deep, soldiers in line fired in volleys, each loading up to three times a minute. This presented some 1,500 rounds per minute, per batt alion, to the enemy, a barrage tha t destroyed French columns. The volleys were followed by a bayonet charge.

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WAilS AGA IN ST l'1(AN CE

between 1793 and

18 15, the R oyal Nav y was outstandin gly succ essful, scoring a series of m ajor victories aga inst equa l or supe rior ene my forces. Its perform an ces in battle were th e product of a

well- established system for nurturing seama nsh ip and fighti ng skills at all levels fro m ord ina ry sailor upwards. At the same time, it mu st be ad m itted that th e sailors, man y of w hom were "p ressed " into serv ice aga inst th ei r will , led a not oriou sly hard life, subj ect to dracon ian disciplin e.

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Ho ratio Nelso n, Britain's mo st famou s ad m iral, began hi s nava l ca reer in 17 71 at th e ag c o f 12 . joining a ship cap ta i ne d hy his maternal uncle. In this there wa s nothing CX( c...ption al. T il l' officer cl ass of th e R o yal Navy w as m o st ly co mpo sed of th e so ns o f re spe c ta ble famil ics N elson's far ber wa s a vica r - w ho h ad j oi ne d th e ser vice at least by th e agl' of 14. T hey wou ld have fo u nd a place t h rough th e influence of some re lative or pat ron, o r through J pcrso ual co n nec t ion with a ship's captain. Alth ou gh the hazards o f ship-go ing life we re severe, the navy o ffe red a tempting ca ree r. As a mid shipman th e bo y w o u ld lear n th e co m plex bu siness of o pe rating J w arship . including the intricac ies o f navigation , and hopefu lly pass th e exa m lor >

prom oti on to li euten ant a fte r six years a rloa t:

If he had th e rig ht pat ronage. o r sutficicnrly impressed hi s supe rio rs. he mi ght he a po stca pta in w ith h is o w n sh ip b y th e rime he was 21, assured that i f he surv ived lon g e no ug h he w o uld o ne d ay be come an admiral by sim p le right of sen io rity. Th ere w as the dun ce not

agc o f III or II. T h ey did the lowliest j ob s O il bo ard, from ac riug as serva nts for the o fficers to lo o king afte r the an imals that w e re ca rried O il voyage s as ;1 so urce o f frcsh f()()d. Gr.rd ua lly the y wou ld de velop th e mu scle s a nd t he sk ills to b e sailo rs. They w ould learn to mo ve nimbly barefo ot 0 11 the pitch ing d eck and ill the rigg ing , and acquire th e br oad - sho ulde red . barrel- ch ested physiqu e o f 3 sailo r, till' produc t of yea rs o f heav y lifting and pu llin g 0 11 rop es. Suc h lon gterm vo lu n tee rs formed th e co re of the navy.

TH E N AV Y AT WA R In wa r ti me. ho we ver, the n umbe r of sai lo rs ex pa nded ra pid ly - from -I5,1I1111 me n at the sta n o f th e French R evolut ion ar y War in 17')3 , for exa m ple. to 120. 01l1l in 17')'). Suc h num bers cou ld 110t be su p plie d wi tho ut the use o f th e in fa m o us pre ss gangs. The Impre ss Se rv ice sco ured por ts for ex perie nced sea me n - to r exa mple, m en serv ing o n m c rch .mt ships o r river bo ats - and " pressed" th em int o th e kin g's ser vice , M en were a lso pre sse d ;11 sea, a wars hi p sto pping a

VOllE Y G UN

o n ly o f promot ion bu t a lso , ill ti me o f wa r, of m akin g o ne 's 1<>r!U IIC, for the ad m ira lty pa id p ri ze mon e y to the o fficers and crew of sh ips that capt u re d cncmy vessels, A capta i n wh o had th e luck to take a number o f hea vil y laden c nc my merch anrmen co u ld be come a rich 111:111 . In pea cetime. m ost o f the lo we r ranks o f t he lIavy also joined th e service at a n early age . C h ild re n fro III t he po orest st rata of so ci er y so me save d from the st re ets by th e cha rita ble M a rit im e So ci et y - became sh ip's bo ys at the «

rnc rc ha nn n.m and forcibly tak in g the pick of her crew, Pre ss gang s w er e h ig hl y unpopul ar 3 tH.! at times th eir meth od s we re littl e better t ha n k idnapping . but th ev pro vid ed a practi cal m et h od o f rapid selec tive co nscr iption . T he Quota System , introduced in tHOS, was worse . Eve ry lo cal aut hori ty was ordered to sup ply a ce rta in number o f men to the navy; to fill their qu ot a, th ey u su all y e nded up by c mprying th e prison s, thus mannin g ships wi th perry crim inals wh o w ere landsm en and often carriers of t yph us.

Boarding part y Britishsailors, armed with cutlasses. and marines, firing muskets, makea hazardous attempt to boarda French warship.

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TE A M A FLOAT O nce aboard a wars hi p. vo luntari ly o r not, a ma n took hi s place as part o f a complex . enclos ed so c iety o ver w hic h the captain ru led wi th almost ab solute po we r. The cha racter o f the ca pta in wa s th e ke y to a hap py or unh ap py sh ip. H e co u ld m ak e life unbea rable fo r eve ry bo dy on board. b ut a captai n who ca re d for h is o ffi cers and m en , w hi lst m aintainin g good di scip lin e and order, cou ld fo rm a crew into a hi ghly m otivated team in w hi c h eac h m an w illing ly played hi s part . T he sailors were orga nize d into tw o watche s, alte rn at in g at th eir statio ns to ke ep th e shi p ma n ne d 24 hours a d ay. As well as a watc h, each sailo r be longed to a "mess" of eig ht to ten men , w ho ate to get he r an d usua lly for me d a bonded g ro up wit hi n the crew. Sailors were assig ne d specific tasks de pen d ing on t heir sk ills - for exam ple, to pmen we re th o se sufficie nt ly nimble and assured to wo rk hi gh o n th e m asts.

LI V I N G CO N D IT I O N S A sh ip was a hard piarc to live and work . O perati ng a sai ling shi p in all weathers ex pos ed men to the co nstant risk of acc idents, which cost man y th eir lives. C ra m pe d liv in g co nd itio ns enco u rage d th e spread o f di sease even o n a ship ke pt spo tlessly cle a n . Di sease alway s k illed far more m en tha n co m ba t. espec ially in u nh ealth y reg io ns suc h as the West Ind ies. Sa ilor s. ho wev er, we re not bad ly fed by th e stand a rd s of th eir d ay, wi t h basic ratio ns of salted m eat . pea s. and dr y biscuits (" ha rd tack " ). plus an am ple supply of beer a nd wa te re d rum (" g ro g") . T he tack was un fortun atel y liable to infestati on with weevils a nd lar ger g rubs kn own as " barge m e n". O n a we ll- ru n sh ip sailo rs would also have som e fresh fruit and vegeta bles a nd lem o n j u ice to avo id sc ur v y. Officers ate better th an th e m en because they paid for th ei r ow n ex t ras su pplies. At sea as asho re . co rpo ra l pu ni shment was t he means by w hic h o rde r w as m aintain ed . In th e navy t his ra nged fro m "s ta rt ing" - casua l blows wi th a ro pe or ca ne ad mi nis te red to men th o ug h t

not to be w orkin g hard en o ugh - to flo ggin g w ith the cat o' n ine tail s and even han ging. Starti ng wa s mu ch resent ed by sailo rs and was for ma lly abo lished in 180 9. Flo ggin g was th e punishment for a ran ge o f o ffences from dru nkenness to slee ping o n dut y. It wa s a ritua li zed p ro ced u re carried o ut by the bo su n's mates in fro nt o f the w ho le cre w and widely. t ho ugh not unive rsally, acce pt ed as necessar y. Its usc co u ld be abus ed by a sad istic o ffice r. b ut thi s was the- e-xce-ptio n rathe r than the ru le. l-I ang ings were rare . T he y w er e th e punishme nt fo r m ut in y, tre ason , and so do my - th e latte r rare 0 11 boa rd sh ips that affo rde d no privacy. M en 's g rieva nce s. as ex p ressed in t he m ut in ies of Spit head and the N a rc in 1797. te nded to fo cus o n issues suc h as pay being ill arre-ars. th e un equal di stribu tion of p rize money, th e po o r quality o f to ad , a nd lack o f sho re leave . Bu t a m ut in y wa s ab o ve all lik ely to be provoked b y the irrati ona l and unj ust behav io ur o f a specific capta in .

COMBAT STAT IO NS In the agc o f Nelson. th e qua lit y o f R o yal Nav y sailo rs w as demon str ated time and ag ain . M any o peratio ns, suc h as th e blo cka d e o f t he Fre nch ports, were un showy feats of seam ansh ip, call ing for th e ma in te na nce o f vessels at sea for lo ng peri ods in all weat hers . Act ua l battles we re rar e eve n ts, b ut the y were o ne s for w h ich all cre ws were well pre pa red . As t wo o ppo sin g warships vied fo r po sition in rel at io n to th e wind

The horro r of naval warfa re At the bat t le of th e Nile in 1798, th e French flagship, L'Orienr (let t), blew up, killing almost the entire crew. Both sideswere so shocked by this catastrophe that th ey stopped firingfor a few minutes.

and o ne ano the r, the g u ns w ere mann ed by thei r c rews and ot he r sailo rs issued w ith wea po ns in

or d er to form o r repel a bo ard in g part y. T he m arin es, mean whi le. assembled wi th th ei r mu sket s. so me cli mbing aloft to act as sn ipe rs. Once the captain co nside red th e position right. gu n crews w ou ld follow a sequence of o rders rem o ve tampi on s; lo ad and ram ; tir e ; run back the g uns - to tire a bro adside abo ut o nce a minute. A sh ip wou ld co nti nue to engage an e ne my even w h ile bro adsid es tired at close- range scatt ere d d ead ly spli nt ers o f wood th rough th e sh ip like shra p nel, a nd th e su rgeo n , o pe rating unde r d readfu l co nd it io ns bel ow deck s, am p utate d lim bs at ter rifyin g speed . . Par from avo idin g co ntact with the ene my. R o yal N av y sh ips ac t ive ly soug ht it, driven b y the thirst tor g lory and fo r prize m o ne y. A lm o st absu rd risks were take n to c ut o ut e llem y sh ips ill defe nde d harbou rs o r u nd er t ak e o ne - o n- o ne ac tio ns aga inst he av ily g un ned o ppo ne nts. Pr0111 th e bo ys w ho carried t he cartridges to the g u ns hi din g t he m unde r th eir j acket s so a spa rk wo uld no t igni te th e po wd er and b u rn th eir face o ff up co the captain w ho stood o n d eck am id shot. she ll. and fall ing spa r, t hese were fighting men w ho se pu lses q ui cken ed at the sce nt of bat tle. By the lat e peri od of the N apole on ic Wa rs they had e na bled the R o yal N av y to esta blish a n un pre ced ent ed domin ance of t he world 's o ceans.

NAVAL TACTICS IN THE AGE OF NELSON Royal Navy w arships oft en depart ed from th e form al

and captains w ho foll ow ed his ideas preferred to cut

tradit ion of fig hting in line of battl e - w hen tw o

t hrough the enemy line to fight in w hat Nelson called

infl ict damage on the enemy's hull, chain shot (two

hostile fleet s sailing in th e same direction form ed up

a "pell-mell" fashion . They could do this because of

smaller projectil es linked by a chain) for attac king a

abreast of each ot her to exchange broadsides (volleys

th e high stan dard of their seamanship. In a sea battle,

ship's rigging and spars, and canister (a container of

fired by all t he guns on one side of th e ship). Nelson

th e ship's gun s cou ld be loaded wi t h various kinds of

small shot used as an anti -personnel wea pon) .

sho t: large round shot (t he t raditiona l cannonball) to

Broadsides The classical form of naval engagement throughout th e 18t h century wa s based on th e line of battle. The att acking fleet bore down on the enemy to fire broadsides. Well -t rained gun crew s cou ld tim e the moment of firin g a broadside, using t he roll ing motion of t he ship on th e w aves to direct th eir fire at the enemy hull or upwa rds at it s sails and riggin g .

<::2<Ships exchange

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broadsides

Line of battl e

The attacking fleet sailsfrom the windward side to attack the enemy. Each ship singlesout one of the enemy with which to engage.

Firing on th e downward roll

Firing on t he upward roll When a captain wanted to disable the other ship so it could not give chase. he directed chain shot and canister upwards to damage the sailsand rigging.

Thistacticwas used by captainskeen to win the encounter. Roundshot wasdirected at the enemy's hull, causing destruction and death on the gun decks.

Direction of wind

Cutting through the line This tact ic was employed wi th spectacu lar success by Nelson at Trafalgar. The Brit ish fleet bor e down on the Franco-Spanish line in two columns and one by one th e ships, led by HM S Victory, sailed through the line.

French fleet sailing in line

of battle

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First ship breaks enemyline. firing

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course of secon d British ship

Direction of wi nd

Raking fire As a ship cut s throu gh the

enemy line, it can unleash a broadside in either direction while the enemy isunable to return fire.

~ Leadi ng

ships of British column

.; broadsides as It

Column reaches enemy lin e As the attacking fleet sails towards the enemyline, it

placesall its shipsin grave danger asthey are in no positi on to return fire.

As ships following in the columnreachthe enemy they 100 cut through rather than engag,ng m hneof battle

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Direction of wind

As more and more shipscut the line, the battle becomes a melee, a confused, pell-m ell engagement, where skilful manoeuvring isat a premium.

SH IP OF THE LINE

~ Fo rema ~t

HMS Vietor), was a "first rate" ship of the line, mounting 104 guns and requi rin g a crew of aro und 850 men . It was an ex tremely expensive capita l investme nt, costi ng £63,175 to build - equivalent to perhaps £50 million in tod ay's mon ey. At least 6,000 trees, mostly oak , were felled for its cons truction. The ship won immortal fame as N elson's flagship when the R oyal N avy defeated th e Spanish and French at the battle ofTrafalgar in 1805.

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HMS Viaory was launch ed at Chatha m dockyard o n 7 M ay 1765, bu t it was not com m issioned until Brit ain went to wa r wit h France in 1778. Durin g the Fren ch R evoluti onary Wars (179299) it became th e R oyal N avy's flagship in the Mediterrane an and led the action that destro yed th e fleet of France's ally Spain at the batt le of Ca pe St Vincent in 1797. Aft er th is trium ph th e ageing Victory was declar ed " defective" and relegated to serv ice as a hospital ship. But from 1800 it un derwent a major rebui ldi ng and ret urned to service as Nel son's flagship in 1803.

Two years later, on 2 1 O ctober 1805. it played a pro m inent ro le in th e famo us actio n at T rafalgar. losin g 57 me n ki lled. includ ing its ad miral. Victory was kn own as a three- decked warship beca use it had th ree gu n decks. T he heaviest of the ship's gu ns. the 32-pou nde rs. were on the lower gun deck, the 24- po u nde rs on the midd le gun dec k, and the 12-p ou nders on the upper gu n deck. As well as the three gu n decks. however, the re were thr ee upper decks - the forecastle, the qu arterdeck, and poop - as well as th e orlop deck and hold below the wate rline.

Bowsprit

Side an d ae rial view of HMS Victory The gun decks w ere 57m (186ft) long and the ship was 16m (52f t) wi de at it s broadest point. The

masts and spars suppo rted a total of 37 sails.

EVE RY GU N WAS GO I NG OFF ... THERE WA S THE FIRE FROM ABOVE , THE FIRE FROM BELOW .. . THE GUNS RECOI Ll NG W ITH V IOLENCE ... TH E DECKS HEAVING AND THE SIDES STRAINING. LEW I S ROTELY. MARINE 2ND LIEUTENANT, ABOARD HMS VICTORY, OCTOB ER 21 1805

On the p oop de ck Re-enacto rs take the roles of Admi ral Nelson, the captain of the ship, and some of the officers standi ng on the poop deck surveying the action on the quarte rdeck below .

Stern w indows

Hig h lanterns

Behind th e three row s of windows in the stern w ere the cabins of the admiral , the captain, and the other officers.

The high stern lanterns . fuelled by whale oil. helped the ships of the fleet to maintain formation at night.

Powd er horn Each gun captain carried a cow horn fille d with powder to prime the gun .

Gun po rt This long gun has been run out of the gun port but the tampion would have to be removed from the mu zzle bef ore it could fire.

Rigging A mass of rigging controlled the ship's vast expanse of sail- around 16,000 sq m (4 acres) in total.

Block and line Experienced sailors had complete mastery of the the ship 's complex cordage .

High climb The main mast reaches 67m (220ft) above sea level at its tip . Fatal falls were common as men climbed on the yard arms to set or furl sails.

Jeer blocks Under the top (platform) on each mast the lower yard is held in place by four huge pieces of wood called jeer blocks .

Victory restored HMS Victory has been restored to Its condition before the battle of Trafalgar and now stands in dry dock at Port smouth , on the so ut h coast of England . It is the oldest ship in the w orld that is still officially commi ssioned in naval service.

Heavy anchors It required the effort of 144 men, pushing on the bars of two linked capstans, to raise the largest anchors, which weighed more than 4 .5 tons .

Ship's figurehead The figurehead had two cupids supporting the royal coat of arms. Fitted in 1803, it was much simpler than the original figurehead of 1765.

Forecastle The fore- and mainmasts were controlled from the forecastle . The ship's bell in the centre of the deck was rung every half hour. On the left are two carronades, powerful short -barrelled, short-range guns .

Low er gun deck

THE LOWER DECKS Mo st of th e sh ip's crew slept in hammocks slung from th e beam s of th e g u n deck s. Each man had 53c m (2 l in) of sleeping space. At meal tim es the crew messed ill the same area at tables that were also suspende d from th e bea m s. T he g un ports pro vid ed the o nly nat ura l ligh t and fresh air. but th ese we re o ften shut to kee p o ut the waves . T he areas below the wa ter- line w ere eve n 1110fl' dan k and gloo my. but the y were act ua lly the safest place in a bat tle and thu s su itable for sto ring g u npo wder. The ship 's surg eo n had h is d ispen sar y o n th e o rlop de ck below th e lower g u n de ck and thi s was w here wo unded men were brou g ht to be o perated 011,

The recoil of eachgun wascontrolled by a thick breeching rope. It allowed the gun to moveback enough to be in-boardof the gun port, so it could be reloaded .

Middle gun deck The wide low gun decks not onlyhoused the guns but alsoprovided the eatingand sleepinq space (below) for mostof the ship's crew

M ess kid This wasa kind of bucket made by

the ship's cooper. It was used byone memberof a mess to collect the food for his messmates from the galley.

Bosun's storeroom

Thisstoreroom housed stores to repair the rigging . The bosun wasin charge of the deck. crew and responsible for the cordage and anchors.

Carpenter's storeroom The upkeep and repair of the wooden fabric of the ship was a daily activity on board. The carpenter's storeroom was well forward in the hold.

Sick berth The sick were moved

to this light, airy pa rt of the ship fo rward on the upper gun deck.

Round shot The ship's cast-iron cannonballs weighed up to 14.5kg (32Ib).

Wheel and compass es Aft on the quarterdeck, the double whe el was op erated by four men in calm weather but could need the mu scle of eight in a storm. In front is the binnacle, holding two compasses.

Disp ensary The surgeon had a small dispensary for w ard on the orlop deck, below the lower gun deck. . The cockpit, on the same deck, served as his ope rating theatre .

Ship 's hold The hold is here almost emp ty. contai ning gravel for ballast and a few water barrels. However, w hen full it could store supplies for a six-month voyage.

TH E SH IP'S COMMAND CENTRE The quarterd eck , be hi nd th e m ainmast, was th e site of th e co m ma nd ing o fficers' cabins. w h ich also serve d as the ir offices. and th e sh ip', wh eel. Alo ng wi t h th e poop deck, whi ch pro vided a roof for the cabins and a navigation and o bserva t io n plat form . it co nsrituted th e co m ma nd centre o f the sh ip w he re sen io r offi cers wer e habituall y found . Off-dut y crew we re restri ct ed to th e fo recastle at the oth er end o f th e sh ip. It wa s on the qu art erd eck that Nel son was sho t by a Fren ch marine sn iper at Trafal gar . Captain's day ca bin At the stern of the quarterdeck the admi ral and the captai n bot h had light and spacious cabins th at provided separate areas for sleeping, dining, and wo rking.

1861 - 1865

UNION INFANTRYMAN WE WERE ... ALL HAPPY AND ALL EXPECTED TO COME HOME AFTER THE WAR WAS OVER ... LITTL E DID WE CARE FOR WHAT THERE WAS AHEAD OF US. WE WAS NOW ON THE ROAD SOUTH TO DO OR TO DIE. JEFFERSON MOS ES WRITING IN HIS DIARY ON JOINING UP, 1862

li E AM EIlI CA N C I V I L WAil ,

fou ght bet w een th e secessionist

Con fede racy and th e northern Union forces fro m 1861 to 1865 , was prim ar ily a foot sold iers' wa r. Around 80 per ce nt o f th ose w ho fou ght w er e infantry, C aree r sold iers were few and far bet ween on th e Union side below th e h ighest levels of co m ma nd . M en fres h to w ar learned how to fight th e hard wa y - o n ca m pa ig n . T he Union sold iers developed ten acity and endura nce in th e h arsh co nditions of a co n flict th at cos t o ne in fo ur o f th em th eir lives.

Presid ent Abra ham Lincol n fir st calle d fo r they se t lip a reg im enta l ca m p and el ected vo lunteers to fig ht to defend the U ni o n a fte r t he offi ce rs and N CO s. In practi ce. hi g her ra nk s C o n fed e rate attack on Fort Su mte r in Ap ril we re filled by th e co lonel's appo int ee s. but tho se 18 6 1. In it iall y m en we re inv ite d to aspiring to be j uni or o ffice rs had to sig n up for 90 days' serv ice - th e canvas for vo tes fro III the men ti m e optim isti ca lly co nsid ered t hey wo u ld th en co m m and. su ffic ient to supp ress th e Whet h er appo int ed o r rebellion - hut thi s was so o n elect ed . th e offi cer s rarely ex te nde d to a mor c realist ic had military ex pe rie nce . th re e years. As a torrent o f and neither did th eir m en . w ar fever sw ept the no rthern So me of th e first recruits sta tes. t he vo lu me of were memb ers o f local vo lunteer s fa r exceeded the mi litias, but e ven the se nu m b e r th at co u ld be taken w ere no more th an c iv ili ans OIl. Aro und 300.000 w e re w ho had enjoye d m eeting rec ru ite d b y th e first w int e r of up to parade in unifo rm. the w a r. but far more w ou ld- be Pro v isio n of un ifo rm s so ld iers h ad by t hen be en and eq u ipm e nt w as chao tic, turn ed aw ay. You ng m e n nai vel y dependin g upon lo cal initiative as fed eral organi zati on fai led to e nthusiastic for the ex perie nce of Forage cap battl e w ere de spe rate to sec act ion co pe. R egiments selec ted th eir OW II The insignia on the cap denotes before t he ex pec ted sh o rt co n flict o ut fits. so th e Uni on ar m y fir st th e 124th New York Infantry. a Union volunteer regiment. e nde d . M any fclt a vag ue but ent ered co m bat de ck ed o ut in a po w e rful patrioti c d evotion to t he wide rang e of uni form s, includ ing int eg rit y of th e U nited Sta tes ; ve ry few w e re Z o u aves atti red in a flam bo yant im itati on of inspired by th e notio n o f figh ting against slavery. Fre nch Africa n troo ps, com plete w ith a fe z.

AN EVOLV ING ARMY

After sk im py tra inin g. th ese d iver sely clad so ld ie rs wer e carried by train to cam ps ncar

A m erica's sm all reg ular artn y wa s o nly

th e w a r front. Not sur prising ly, t heir initia l

m argi nally invo lved in the creatio n of the U nion

perfo rmance wa s m ixe d , co u rage o n ly partl y

forces. Most reg imen ts w e re forme d fro m scratch,

co m pe nsating for lack o f sk ill . ex pe ri e nce, a nd lead er sh ip. D e feat at Bull R u n (M a nassas) in July 18 (,1 sho cked t he N ort h into bui lding a more p rofe ssio nn l- st vle army fo r a lon ger w ar.

set up by a pro min ent lo cal citizen w ho wo u ld later be con firm ed as the reg im ent's co lo nel, W hcn eno ug h vo lunte e rs had been att ract ed,

SPRINGFiEl D MO DEl 1861

By IH(,2 th e facto r ies of the No rt h we re ge Jr ing

lip to supply the expanding army w ith stand ard uniforms and eq ui pme nt, w hich we re soo n ill far

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b etter su pply fin t he U n io n so ldier th an fo r th e Southe rn er. Im pro ve d tra ini ng and d ail y d r ill gave the troo ps a more so ld ierly lo ok . T he ele ct io n of o fficers was g rad ua lly p hased o ut a nd m all Y incffic ic nr co m m a nd ers we re sacke d. Yet d isc ipline ofte ll rem ain e d po or co mpared w ith co nte m po rary Eu ro pe an armies. M o st Ame rica ns had 110 natur al se nse of o bed ience to autho rity . Sold iers were co nsc io us o f bein g citize ns w ith rig hts - o r we re j ust dow nrig ht o bstinate. O ne private co m plained bit terl y of office rs see m ing to "conside r t he m selve s as m ade of a di ffer ent ma te ria l fro m th e lo w fel lows ill the ranks", SOC IA L O R IG I NS T he U n io n so ld ier was m o st likely to b e fro m a farm ing bac kg ro und o r an urb an artisan. M o stly in thei r twenties, the tro op s reflec ted the d iversity of No r the rn so c iety. O ne in five U ni on so ld iers wa s of Ge rma n o rig in , w ith the Irish the next lar gest et h n ic gro u p. A round ten per ce nt o f th e arm y were recent immi gran ts fro m Eu rope . African Americans we re initia lly bann ed from en list me nt , but mounting m anpo w cr sho rtages necessitated a change of policy du rin g IH62 - tho ug h the y were not g rant ed e q ua l pay u nt iIJun e ·l H6 4 . Black so ld iers were u sed first in lab o ur batta lions, b ut were t hen for m ed into "colo u red" regiments unde r w hi te office rs.

Camp lif e A Union encampment at Cumberland landing on'the Pa munkey River in 1862. Soldiers usually slept undercanvas in conicalSibley tentsor increasingly. asthe war dragged on, in smaller wedge tents.

Afr ican -A me rican soldi ers The band of the 107th US Colored Infantry posesat Fort Corcoran, Virginia in 1865. African-American soldiers suffered disproportionately high casualties in the Civil War: approximately one-third of black Union soldierslost their livesduring the conflict.

,,

M ostl y esca pe d slaves know n as "contra ba nds" - th e bla ck so ld ie rs enco u ntere d v icious prejudice from m an y Union tro ops, as w el l as es pe c ia lly harsh treatm e nt from th e Confede rates . But t he ir per formance eve nt ua lly won them a g rudging re sp ect a nd su bs ta nt ia lly influen ced w h ite o pin io n in the N ort h in favour o f ema nc ipatio n. By the end of the wa r, Afri can -Ameri can sold iers co nstituted around ten per ce nt o f the U ni o n army.

EXP ER I ENC E OF WA R D ur in g th e fir st two ye a rs o f t he w ar th e U ni on fo rces su ffe red m a ny defeat s and se tbac ks , bu t in J u ly IH63 v icto r ies at G ettysburg in th e easte rn theat re a nd Vick sburg in the w e st sh ifte d the bala nce decisive ly aga ins t the Confedera te s. From th e n o n'war d th e So u th co u ld o n ly figl ll to pro lo ng the co n flic t, rath er tha n to wi n it.

The Civ il W ar has so me t imes been described as the first "mode rn wa r", w ith em phasis a ll in n o vation s suc h as th e usc o f train s for tran sport and the telegraph for co m m u n icat io ns. But for the ordin ar y so ld ier the ex per ie nce o f mili tar y lite had nothin g es pe c ially m odern abo u t it. O nce away from a rail depot he m o ved o n fo ot , o fte n over subs tanti al di sta n ce s. In ev itabl y a so ld ier had a heav y pack and w eap o n to carry, a bu rden he w as alw ays see k ing to ligh ten - t he ro u te of a m ar c h wa s usu all y litt ered w ith di scarded bl an ket ' a nd othe r kit. Unle ss str ict di scipline was e n fo rce d , st rag g lers wo uld fall by the wayside in d ro ve s. A ltho u g h foo d supplies in the Union arm y w e re

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Person al effect s Infant rymen had to carry everythi ng th ey needed for life in the field on their backs. A basic wash kit we ighed littl e, but heavier items were often jettisoned on long marches.

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A TLA N TIC ge lll' ra lly ad equate, so ld ie rs oft ell in d u lged ill fo rag in g a nd pi lla ge , Sin ce th e w ar w as mostly fou g ht 011 Con fede rate territory, t hi s w as to ler at ed or eve n c nro u r.igcd hy co nu ua ude rs. mo st not orio usly durin g th e M ar ch to th e Sea ac ross G eorgi a in IH(}4. l.ifc in a rlllY c:lIl1 p was a varia n t on agc- o k! milit ar y tr adi ti on s. So ld iers follo wed a rout in e o f drill and fat if;lIe' rS'f; lIlats'd by bu gl e ca ll, o r th e hl,:1ting of th e drum . Punishmcnts for ind iscipl ine cou ld be cr ude and severe, rang ing fro m han g in g hy the th u m bs to t he excr uc iat ing " bu ck ing " tyi ng t he ar ms :lIul legs toget her aro und a ri fle . D isca«: was ever-present a nd m o re soldiers di ed of d iarrhoea a nd dyscntcrv th a n lo st their lives in co mba t . As th e war wen t 011. im proved m edi cal services a nd tig hter di scipli ne - lead in g to be tter clean line ss - cut the d eath rate, When e ve r wa rfare beca me sta tic , th ou gh, as in th e siegl' s of Vick sburp; o r Richmond , epide m ic, flar ed lip. TI ll' worst lot w as to be tak en pri so ner: th ou sand s di ed ill th e aw fu l co nd itio ns at Ander son vill e. Geo rgia, and in o the r Co nfederate ca m ps .

C H ANG ING A RMY C o m ba t m ay h ave ca use d numeri ca lly sm a ller lo sses than d isease, b u t th e le vel of casu alt ies ill p itc he d batt le' mou nted a larmin g ly a' th e w ar g rl'w in intc nsit v. At Auti cta m in Septemb er IH(,2 the Union for ce' ",ffers'd 12, ililil casu alric in a sing le da y's fighting . In t he d eci sive batt le of G ett ysburg th e followin g ye:u th er e w er e aro u nd 23 ,000 Un ion cas ua lties a nd th eir Con fede rate o ppo ne n ts su ffered even heavi e r lo sses. M ountin g cas ua lties a nd th e pr o lon gati on of the w ar in creased th e U n ion ar my's ma npowc r req uirements w hi le sim u lta neo us ly blu n ting Gett ysburg Union casulties lie on the field of battle near Herbst woods in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The batt le of Gettys burg was one of the largest and blood iest of the wa r. Aft er three days of fig hting, around 50,000 Union and Confederate soldiers lay dead

OC EA N

l :lIlIp,l THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 18 6 1- 186 5

H .O R ll M ConfPde ra le fort

ConlPde rate SUI" 1861

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....... Union fro nt line December 1861

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ConfPderale victory

. . . . Union fron t line Decembef 186]

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Union sta tes 1861

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Union fort

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Dale at battle Of attack City destroyed by Union IOfe,",

popular ent hus iasm to vo lu n tee r. W he n the offc..' r

of bounty mOllcy ta iled to att ract e no ug h rec r u its, the Fed er al govern me nt in t ro d uce d co nvcri ption in IH(,J . Th is spa rked riot , in New York and" sta m pede of draft evas io n . The we ll-off bought the ir way o ut of se rv ice, m aking:a com m u ta t io n paYI11l'I1t o r paying a substitute to take their place, w hi le m an y poore r folk ha'tily voluntee red and gra bbe d the bo unt y mo ne y. O n ly a sma ll m inoriry o f Unio n so ld iers act ua lly serve d as co nsc ri p ,

Prog ress o f the w ar The wa r developed into a struggle on two front s. In the eastern theatre the Union's Army of the Potomac fought In a relatively restricted area of Vlrgmia, Maryland. and Pennsylvama. In the western theatr e. the fighting eventually ranged from Kentucky and M ississippi across to the coast of Georgia and the Carolinas.

Infantry and specialists The increasing emphasis on trenches and other field forti fication s during the Civil War meant specialists such

as these engineers from the

8th New York State Militia (right ) played a vital role in both Union and Confederate armies. A regula r Union infantryman in forage cap (far right ) sips wa ter from his canteen durin g a Civil War re-enactment ,

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I HAV E A MORTAL DREAD OF THE BATTLEFIELD ... I AM AFRAID T H AT THE GROANS OF THE WOUNDED AND DYING WILL MAKE ME SHAKE, NEVERTHELESS I HOPE AND TRUST THAT ST RE N GT H WILL BE GIVEN ME TO STAND AND DO MY DUTY. PRIVATE EDWARD EDES, LETTER TO HISfATHER BEFORE fiRST ENTERING COMBAT. APRIL 1863

At the same tim e as introducin g conscription. the gove rnme nt set abo ut enco urag ing th e volunteers of 1861 to stay in the arm y wh en their th ree-year term was up . War -weariness w as rife among th e men - man y of whom had had 110 ho me leave since cn listing - hut with the aid of the pro m ise o f a 3l1-day leave of absence , so me 20ll ,OOO we re indu ced to ex te nd t hei r serv ice to th e war's end, A gu lf separate d these pro ud "Veteran Volunteers" fro m the later recruits. bo unt y men and subs titu tes, ge nera lly dredged from the poorest sectors of society by th e lur e of cash . sA pr ivate, Fra nk Wilkeson , described them as "conscience less and co ward ly sco u nd rels" wh om "clean- mi nde d American and Irish and G erman

To ba cco Licensed vendors known as sutlers travelled wi th the army in th e field. selling everything from w riting paper to w hisky and toba cco . The pip e bow l show n here is hand carved - a popu lar pastime fo r bored soldiers.

vo luntee rs would not asso ciate with ". Desertion rat es had always been hi gh in th e Unio n arm y, men drifring away to co pe with diffi cu lti es back ho me or di sco ura ged with th e sold iering ex perience . But t he bo unt y men o r substitutes were no tori ou s fo r di sappeari ng as soo n as th ey recei ved their lu mp su m . Ge ne ral U lysses G rant co m piained in Scp tc m be r lll6 4: "The men we have been ~etti n~ in th is way almost all de sert."

BATTLI N G T H RO U G H Yet wh atever thei r chang ing nature - from th e naive volunteers of Ill61 to the mi x o f harden ed fighters and poor -qualit y recruits o f the latt er stages o f the co n flict - th e Union infa ntr y were the men who ultim atel y won th e war. C avalry pe rfo rmed a useful fun ct ion as sco uts and raiders. Art ille ry in flicted a hi gh percentage of co mbat casualties. Bur battles were decided by t he succ ess or failu re of wav es of in fantr y adva ncing in t he face of w ithering defe nsive fire . Soldiers on bot h sides used the Springfield o r En field rifle -musket, a muzzle-l oading firearm WATERPROOF MATCH CASE whi ch was fired by usin g a percussion cap. This was a step forward from th e unrifled flintlock musket of the Na po leo n ic era in MATCHES rate of fire. ra n~e , and accu racy. Since cauno n we re also sig n ificantly

mor e effect ive th an th ose used at Wat erloo, in fantr y o ut in the o pen were ce rta in to tak e heavy casualt ies. In th e co urse o f th e war, sold iers learn ed either to tak e up defensi ve positio ns that exploited exi sti ng cover suc h as sto ne walls o r d itch es. o r to co nst ruc t ear th

FIGHTING IN THE TRENCHES The intensification of infantry and artillery firepower as the Civil War went on increasingly led armies to resort to field fortifi cations. In the static warfare around Vicksburg in 1863 and around Petersburg in 1864-65, these developed into extensive trench systems - at Petersburg the trenches stretched for some 50km (30 miles). Inevitably in retrospect the Civil War trenches are seen as pointing forward to the stalemate on the Western fron t in World War I.

SAPPERS AND MINERS Entrenchment had been a familiar feature of siege warfare since the 17th century and before. Civil War armies deployed traditional siege weaponry, including mortars and grenades. Also in the siege tradition, Union engineers dug a tunnel under the Confederate lines outside Petersburg and exploded four tons of gunpowder in it, creating a vast crater which, however, Union soldiers were unable to exploit. Trench warf are was demoralizing for both sides. Soldiers were subject to boredom, disease, and the steady att rition of sniper and mortar fire.

Ine vitably. no t eve ryo ne 's ne rv e held . Some ind ividu als c re pt awa y a nd hid from t he m ayhe m . M ass pan ics to o k place in th e Union ranks at batt les suc h as Sh ilo h and Fredericksb urg. alo n gside d isplays o f so lid co ura ge a nd in d ivid ual he roi sm . In the heat o f batt le. eve n dete rm in ed so ld ie rs bo d ged th e procedures need ed to load a nd fire their weapon w h ich in vol ved rippin g o pe n th e pap e r ca rt ridge w it h th ei r teeth . rammin g ball and powder d ow n t he barrel. a nd placin g a per cu ssion cap in th e firi n g m ech a n ism . R ifles wer e fire d wi th the ramrod in th e barrel or failed to fire be cause no percussio n C3p was fitted. Some battles we re co ntested in heav ily for ested te rrain w he re the fig hting so o n di sinte g rated into a savage melee.

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Trench warfare A re-creation of a Civil War-era trench system, complete with wooden supports (revetments), of the type used at Spotsylvania in 1864. The trenches around the "bloody angle of Spotsyfvania " were the scene of savage close-quarters bayonet fighting .

parap et s as field fortifi cat ions. But the re wa s really no h idin g place o nce battle wa s joi ne d. If o n the d efe nsive . m e n had to hol d firm . fir ing stead ily. in th e face of the seem ing ly u nstoppable ad vance of enem y in fan try. a nd pu ll back in goo d o rde r if inst ru cted to do so . On the o ffensive . th ey o ften had to march forward in lines acro ss o pe n gro u nd. despit e th e rele ntless depred ati ons of ex plosive shel ls and rifle fire. Then would co me th e o rde r for the fin al charge with bayo net s fixed . throug h a hai l of bullet s and g rapeshot.

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VI CT ORY OF ATTR IT IO N ln fant ry- o n-infant ry e nco u nte rs at clo se ra n ge w ere a terri fyi ng but ex hilarating experience , The same co u ld not be said fo r the tr en ch wa rfa re that pr ed ominated in t he final stage o f the wa r. Union iu fan tr y disco vered tren ch es at t he sieg e o f Vick sburg in IR(,3 but this sty le o f co nflict reached its apogee in fron t of Petersbu rg in 1864- 65. A d aily att rit io n thro ugh the ex plos io n o f m ortar shells and th e sn ipi n g of ene my sharpsho o ters replaced the w ild slaugh ter o f pitch ed battl e. wh ile so ld iers beca m e as adept

whale-oil candles Candleswere an important piece of equipment for soldiers in camp. Candle tins with polished metal surfaces were used to increase illumination and avoidfires while under canvas.

at the usc of pick and spade as of th eir firea rms. By th en . precious littl e was left of till' glamour of war th at had e nt huse d th e vo lu nte e rs of 18 6 1. For mo st, the war had becom e a g rim . arduo us task that had to he carried thro ug h to its co nc lus io n . Victor y cam e to th e U n io n side in April 18(>5. bu t at a pri ce. So me 360.0 00 Union sold ie rs di cd in the co nflic t. abo u t o ne in eig ht of tho se w ho served. Th o se w ho survived co uld return ho me w ith th e sarisfac t io n of havin g achieved . at th eir best. an impressive co mbat pe rfo rma nce. When ba tt le-harden ed a nd properl y di scipl ined , Bill y Yank ex h ibi te d. in th e words of onc officer. "implicit obedience to o rde rs, un daunted co urage, a nd gre at e nd u ranc e". T he Confede rates m ay o fte n have fo ug h t w ith m or e fier y passion . but the U n ion infant rym an u ltim atel y proved to be a st ubbo rn and co o l- headed fight er. Union art illery Federal ordinance stands at a depot readyfor deployment during the siege of Petersburg, 1864- 65. Artillery played a major role in the entrenched warfarearound the city.

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CONFEDERATE INFANTRYMAN The American C ivil War was an un equ al contest, the Confedera cy

serve d in the Confe de rate ra nk s. So me 260 ,000 of the m di ed in

fightin g at a great d isadvant age in ter ms of manp ower and reso urces.

co m bat or of d isease - almo st o ne in four of those w ho took part .

But at least for the first two years of the conflict, despite undergoin g

T he Confedera tes' outstanding ge nera l, R obert E. Lee, was

privat ions and hardsh ip, the Sout he rne rs often o utfo ug ht the

u nsti nti ng in hi s praise of his men 's fight ing qu alities, stat ing:

U nio n forces, show ing aggressio n, co m m itment , and supe rior

"The ir co urage in battle enti tles the m to ran k w ith th e so ld iers

leadership. By the end of the war, over a m illion soldier s had

of any ar my and of any time."

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T he Co n fed er ate ar m y wa s c re ated virt ua lly o ut of no t h ing. ill mu ch th e sa me m an ner as t he U n io n for ce s. Vol u nte ers sta m pe d ed to e n list. in spir ed by d n.: ;lI 11S of g lo ry a nd co nv inced of th e right ne ss of their cause. So m e lO() .()OO so ld ie rs we n .' e n ro ll,.-d ill the fi rst fo u r mo nt hs of th e war. As i ll t he Nort h , co m pa n ies a nd re gime nt s we re m o stl y fo rm ed 0 11 a lo cal ba sis 1I 1H.tcr the leadership of ind ividu als of w ea lth a nd sta nd ing. a nd co m pany officers a nd N C() s were initia lly elec ted hy th e m en . T he Confederac y b enefited , ho w ev e r, from a substan t ial leaven of reg u lar a rillY o fficer s w ho res ig ne d fro m th e U S forc es to tig ht fo r secessio n.

CO M M IT TE D R EBELS G iven its sho rtage of m anpower , the Confe derac y. in IH()2 , wa s fo rced to re sort to co nscr ipt ion , but the y suc ceede d in maki ng till' d raft wo rk better th an th e Union ever did. A ll w h ite m ales age d

CON FED ERAT ES HAD GON E DOWN AS TH E GRA SS FAL LS BEFORE TH E SCYTH E. JOURNALIST CHARLES COFFIN DESCRIBESTHEAFTERMATH OF THE BATTLEOF ANTIETAM. 17 SEPTEM BER. 1862

bet wee n IHa nd 35 were liable fin military serv ice and 110 o ne co uld pay for a subst it ute to ta ke hi s pla ce . Confedera te so ld iers we re p rcd omi u.m rly f;ume rs or f;um hand s, an d unlik e th e U n io n t roops, ver y few we re fore ig n- born . It wa s w idely ag,ree d that the So uther n so ld iers foug ht wit h grea ter d ash and cnth usinsm tha n th e stu bbo rn , pragllla tic Nort he rne rs. T heir sh rill " rebel yel l" st ruc k d rea d in to heart s o f th eir e nem ies durin g an attac k. T he Confede ra te so ld ier gl'lle ra lly felt a greater co m m it me n t

to th e war th an th e aVl' rage U nio n soldier. C o nfede rates fe lt they we re fig hti ng in de fence of horn e and fami ly, and o f their e nt ire wa y o f life. Lee ex pr essed th e fl.' din gs of m o st of hi s m en w he n , in IH64, he decla re d : " Ifvi croriou s, we ha ve eve ry t h ing to hope for; if defea ted, nothin g w ill be left for lIS to live fo r." In th e last two yea rs of the wa r, wit h defeat lo omi n g, th e Confe dera te a rm y was swe pt by reli gi ou s re vi vali sm, w it h m an y so ld iers e ngagin g e nt h usiast ica lly in prayer m eetin gs and hymn - sin gin g, Hold ing t he li ne at All Ha za rds Confederate soldiers, despite being outnumbered fo r much of th e time, held t heir posit ions heroically.

fvtan y we re st ruc k by rhc co nt rast between th e reb els' ragged a p pt.'a r~l nce an d their co u rage . A woman w ho saw the Con fe dera te Army of o rt hc rn Virgin ia O il th e m arch in late SUIlIJIler IH()2. described th e "gauur sta rva t io n th at look ed from th eir (;1\'t.'rI 10US eyes " and co m mented: "Th at th ey co u ld march or fi ght at all see m s in cr edible." Yet th ese were th e soldie rs wh o ... hcck cd th e Union fo rces at Ant iet am.

A HOP ELESS C AUSE Th e Confederate so ld ier's ex pe rience o f war was o f a sho rt age of ev er yth in g : boot s, clo t he s. blankets. tent s. fo od, ca rt r idges . pay. M an y were reduced to mar chin g barcfoor u nless th ey co uld .. liberate.. so me U nio n footwea r. Face d wit h the Nort h 's overwhe lmi ng supe rio rity , the So uth had little cho ice bu t to rely upon the attack ing spirit of its so ld iers. It cost th e m dearl y a nd co uld not w ill the war. But the Con fede rate so ld ier eme rge d w ith ho no u r, if littl e else.

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BRITISH EN FiElD RIFlE -MUSKET,1853

Con f ed er at e w eap onry The standard infantr y weapon w as th e nt le-musket . The Enfield was imported in large numbers from manufacturer s in Britai n.

A MOTLEY-LOOKING CREW, BUT TH EY FIGHT LI K E DEV I LS. UNION SOLDIER ON HIS CONf EDERATE ENEMIES

Confed er at e un iform Infantr ymen fought in a huge variety of different colours, including grey, blue, and " butt ernut ", show n here in this replica of a uniform of 1862.

1800 -

1870

MAORI WARRIOR THEN, OH MY CHILDREN BE BRAVE! THEN OH MY FRIENDS BE STRONG! BE BRAVE THAT YOU MAY NOT BE ENSLAVED AND THAT YOUR COUNTRY MAY NOT BECOME THE POSSESSION OF STRANGERS. DYING SPEEC H OF MAORI CHIEF HONGI HIKA. 1828

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O LYNES I AN I:A nMER S A ND sx u.ous,

the M aori settled in

N ew Z eala nd some time between 800 and 1300

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War fare was a cent ral part of th eir tradition al cu lture . T hey bui lt fortified villages for defen ce and orga n ized wa r

parties eve ry year to fight th eir neighbours. In the 19th cent ury, co ntac t with Eu ropeans added mu sket s to th e M aori 's traditi on al wood-a nd-sto ne weaponry. Equipped w ith firearm s, th e M aori fought a series of costly wars - th e M usket Wars - aga inst one ano the r, and the Briti sh army.

Much abo ut th e p re - co lo nia l hi story of t he

Maori is J m at ter of dispute. including the causes and natur e of the ir warfare . It wou ld app ear that. as in m any soc ieties befo re mod ern tim e s. wa r wa s regar ded as a no rma l ac tivi ty to be e ng aged ill at the ap pr o pria te tim e o f year. Ma le M ao ri w en..' train ed lip to he warriors, or toa, fro m boyho od . Since different Maori tribes lived in close proximit y o n w e ll popul ated

coas ta l farm land . m otives for fightin g w ith nei ghbours w ere never ill sho rt supply. Som e ant h ro po logists h ave arg ued th at the M ao ri battled m ainl y o ver po ssession o f sca rce land . but less o bv io usly rational ruorives see m ac tually to h ave pred ominat ed . The M aori we re high ly sensitive to an y in sult or injur y. IlH:mor y o f which might be tr an smitrcd through genera tio ns. Militar y act io n wa s j ustified in pursuit o f " en gean ce (11111) for w ha teve r offe nce th e tribal c h ief felt th at he h ad su ffe re d . Com ba t was also an end in itself providing the '(l"with J cha nce to pro" e th eir valour a nd their ch ief with an opportunit y to e n hance hi s status.

R ITUAL AND MA SSACR E M ao ri warriors would form a war part y on their ch ie f's orders ;

ty pica lly bet w ee n 70 an d 140 men co nstituted a warba nd 70 was the num ber that w o u ld tit ill a w ar cano e , the usual mode of t ra ns po rt fo r warriors. Variou s ritu als had to be observed before settin g off incl uding the rehe arsal of g rieva nce s again st the encmy and th e avoidance o f ce rtain foods. Ambushe s and sur p rise attack s pla yed a m ajor part in M aori warfare, but in evitab ly oppo sin g force s would sometimes co nfront o ne

another in 0 IH.'n co mbat. In preparation fo r batt le , w arrior s wou ld perfo r m ;1 dan ce (the !laka); th is wa s ;1 co m binatio n of w ar chants and agg ressive gestu rc« w ith g ro tesque g rim aces desig ncd to inr im id are the c llc my . T he w arr io rs wo u ld probably b e nak ed but for a b elt ar ound th ei r wa ist. T he y fou g ht w ith wooden spc ars and club s. g ive n a sharp edge by in corp or ating pie ces of sto ne, co ral, bon e, o r shel l. D espite ritua li zed c leme n ts th at so met imes limited cas ua lties . M aori wa rfare co uld be bru tal and thorough ly de adl y. If an ene my force tr ied to flee, for exa m ple. th c fle et est wa rrio rs m ight pur suc th em . striki ng as m an y as pos sible to rhe g round w ith their spea rs w itho ut sto pping . T he inju red men would th en he ove r take n by slo wermov ing wa rrio rs follo wi ng o n b ehind wh o ruthlessly slaughte red th em wi t h club, a nd axes .

Similarly. a w arband th at i"'l in to a n a m b ush co u ld often ex pec t to b e k ill ed to th e last m an. Aft er a v ic to ry, so me o f th e dea d ene my wou ld be eate n, for religi ou s rather th an nutrition al reason s. and th eir e m ba lme d heads e xhibited a ro u nd th e vill age as t rophi es o f battle. T he pri ncipl e o f vc ugca ncc co u ld ha ve led to w ars of c xrcrmin atio n . since if o n ly so m e of the e ne my were k illed . th e su rvivo rs wou ld in evi tabl y ret u r n to seek reven ge. W hat usually prev ente d t he tota l m assacr e or e nslave me n t of tribe s w e re the ir stro ng defe nsive preparatio ns. T he M aor i b u ilt 1''' (fo rt ified st ro ng ho lds) on h ill- to ps. su rro u nd ed by palisades. ditch e s. and bank s, and in corp oratin g fo od sto res that w ould enable th em to su rv ive a len gth y siege. Once withdrawn w ith in th ese defen ces, the M aori we re unlikely to be ove rrun , even by a clea rly stronge r enemy. JADE HEI-TIKI ( NECK PENDA NT)

MUSK ET WARFAR E

VI

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By HlOO, th e Maori h ad begun to have co ntac t with Europe an s, as whaler s. scalers , a nd t rade rs ' to p pe d o ff o n th e Ne w Zealand coast . T he Eu ro pea ns br ou ght w ith the m flintlock m us ket s. w h ich had a n ob v io us appeal for M aori wa rriors . In it ially, th ese inher ently clu m sy and in acc u rate firea rm' had litt le effec t o n lo cal w arfare . In IH07, wh en th e Nga I'uh i tribe firs t used m usket ' in battl e, th ey were tro un ced by their tr ad iti onall y ar me d enem ies, th e N gat i W hat ua . Q u ick ly, th ough , t ribe' th at eq u ippe d t he m selves w ith mu sket s be gan to esta b lish t he ir do m ina nce . A substa n tia l co m me rce de velo ped in wh ich th e M aori exc ha nged potatoes, pig s. o r flax for firearm s and a m m unit io n . T hey SO O Il d isco ver ed t hat t he product , of wa r co u ld also b e traded for g u ns , sinc e th e Europeans wo u ld acce pt w a r captive, a' slaves and t he em bal med head , of the sla in a, c u r ios. SOl"" M aori ch ief, trave lled to the Au stra lia n CO IO ll il ' S a nd at least O IlC' , H o n gi I-I ika, v isite d Brita in , w he re h e h ad an aud ience wit h Kin g Ge o rge IV in I H20 . T h ese co n tact'

War canoe Waka taud were the M aori wa rrior 's usual mo de of transpo rt. They we re as long as 4 0m (130ft) and could hold up to 70 men. Tw o canoes were sufficie nt to transpo rt an entire war part y. A bailer (below) was essential kit in case the boa t took on water.

wi t h th e wide r world e nco u ra ged th e terr ito rial ambit io n s o f som e M aor i leaders, and pro vided new and im proved mil itar y techno log y. From t he 18 10, to th e I H30, . th e M aori tr ib es e ngaged in a se ries of h ig h ly destruct ive co n flicrs th at h ave b een called th e M usket Wars . CA NO E BA ILER T hese co n flic ts we re fou g h t in w ays t hat we re bro ad ly sim ilar to tra d itio na l M ao r i wa rfa re , w ith w ar part ies atta ck in g tr ibcs aga inst w ho m th e y h ad g rieva nces , thc e nc my d ead b eing eate n. a nd w ea ke r gr ou ps ta k ing

refu ge in for ts. But t he sca le of t he figh ti n g was much g reate r th an befo re . Led by H on g i H ika , th e Nga Puh i se nt o u t m u sket - armed wa r parties SOO o r '100 stro ng o n lon g- d istan ce rai d ing ex p ed itio ns . Ot her trib e' suc h a' t he N ga ti Toa , led by Te R aup a rah a, im itate d their exa m ple. Weak e r tribes we re m assac red. e nslave d . or d riven o ff the ir la nd s. The co n flict, pet e red o ut in th e I H30" partl y be cau se o n ce all M ao ri h ad

NOT ONE ESCAPED. SOME RAN AWAY FROM US, THESE WE KILLED AND OTHERS WE KILLED - BUT WHAT OF THAT? IT WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CUSTOM. MAORI WARRIOR ON MASSACRE OF CHATHAM ISLAND POPULATION, 1835

Tribal gathe ring The wa rrior culture survived long after the pacification of New Zealand in the mid-19th centu ry. This photog raph of a meeting of Maori warriors dates from around 1920 . J

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musket s there were no easy gains to be made by any o f th e tri bes. An est ima te d 20 ,000 M aor i warriors di ed in th e Mu sket Wars, possibly on e in five of t he ent ire po pula ti on .

LAND WA RS In 18 40 Br itain too k ove r New Zeala nd as a colo ny, after ag ree ing the T reaty of Waitan gi wi t h th e M aori. W ithi n five yea rs the first of a str ing of conflicts had brok en o ut in wh ich M ao ri tribes co ntested th e rule of th e Briti sh aut ho rities and resisted land grabs by Euro pea n settl ers. Alth ou gh th e M aori Kin g M ovem ent attempte d to uni fy resistan ce fro m 1858. th ere we re always M aori w ho fou ght o n th e British side (k no w n as kllpapa), mostly moti vat ed by tribal r iva lry. Yet despit e their division s. th e Maori pro ved amo ng: the most effective o ppo nents the British army faced in its 19 th- cen t ur y co lo n ial campaig ns . Thi s was despite a lack of numbers for a co mbinatio n of British troo ps, settle r m ilit ias. and kllpapa co uld usuall y assem ble a larger force th an M ao ri rebel s co u ld field . M aori we apo n ry was also inferi or; alt ho ug h th ey obta ined rifle mu skets. they ofte n had no proper am mu ni t io n. resortin g to hom e-m ade substitutes. M aori wa rrio rs pro ved ade pt at g ue rr illa wa rfare, but th ey we re also surprisingly successfu l at ada pting the ir fortified stro ng ho lds to the dem and s of mod ern wa rfa re. They crea te d 1'" enc ircle d w it h co mplex syste ms of eart hworks and palisad es. co nst ruc te d to give ent re nche d defender s effective field s of fire aga inst ene my in fantr y atte m pting an assau lt. Deep bunkers wer e d ug insid e th e fort to allo w th e M aori to surv ive art ille ry fire . T hey inv ite d th e Briti sh to attack th em in th ese fortified positi o ns. wh ich they would aban do n o nce they had infli ct ed maximum casualties o n the attackers. Th e stre ng t h o f thi s syste m w as dem on strat ed o n 29 April 18(,4 at Ga te Pa. Tauran ga. Less th an 250 M aori in side th e fort faced 1.70 0 so ldiers under G en er al Duncan Ca mero n eq u ipped

Intricate carvingis an important part 01 Maori culture

Sacred feeding funnel The kumete isa ceremonial food vessel used to feed a warrior after his face had been tattooed. His scarswere sosevere from tattooing that he was unableto chew for several days; his food was therefore pounded to a pasteand takenthrough the funnel. Thecontentsof the kumete were not to be touched by others.

Battle ready A modern-day Maori in traditional costume perfoms the halea. He isarmed with a raiaha (long staff)used for stabbing and striking. and a wahaika (short-range club). secured inside a war belt.

wi th mortars, how itze rs, a Arm stron g g uns. Ca m ere r art illery de stroyed the fort pali sade. but hi s sold iers su ffered heavy casualt ies in failed att empt to sto rm the of tren ches. T he Ma ori stag a strateg ic wit hdrawal from t he pa w it h o n ly slight losse In the 1860 s C hr istianin spir ed prophet-led Maor i mo vem ent s erupted, w hose follower s waged a g ue rrilla wa r th at serio usly th rea ten th e co lon ists' hold o n N ort Island . In 1868. Titokowar forces wo n two victo ries defending forts against co lo militia and leupapa, and a w, led by Ti Kooti massac red at M atawh ero. Yet Titoko v reb elli on di sintegrated th e all yea r. w h ile Ti Kooti 's band stn o n as isolat ed raid ers until J8

The M aori had proved t ha t they' match the Europeans as fight not in th ei r capacit y for largeecono m ic o rganization and su campaig ning. Altogethe r thes colo nial co n flicts we re far less murderous t ha n the Musket War. , costing the lives of arou nd 2.000 M aor i rebels and so me 750 Briti sh sold iers. settle rs, and kllpapa. Th e Maori warrior ethic was not ent irel y lost afte r th e pacifi cation of N ~·! ••_-:c",,~_~._ Zealand. A M aori Pioneer batta lio n served in World War I and a vo lu nt eer batta. io n . was o rga n ized to fight as part of th e New · .;-~~~a:.;;~.:;;re Ze aland Exp edition ar y Force in World '!r I I. T he M aor i per formed with dist inc tion ill the M editer ranean th eatre. includ ing Greece.: C rete . North A frica. and Italy. The men who foug ht in th e desert at EI Alamcin and o n th slo pes of M onte Cassi no we re kee nly awa r of fulfill in g th e tr adition s o f th eir ancesto rs.

1800 -

1880

ZULU WARRIOR

N T H E EA IlLY 19 TII C E TU llY,

I

th e Z u lu develo ped an

agg ressive wa rr ior spirit and d iscipl ined fighti ng skills that m ad e th em a dominant m ilitary power in their region of southern Africa . D espite th eir low level o f tech no logy,

th ey proved di fficult o ppone nt s for the British ar my in th e A nglo -Zu lu War o f 1879, ach ieving a notable vict ory at Isandhl wana. l3ut their m ode of war fare, based o n th e spea r and th e shield , co uld not ult im ately pr evail in the face of th e overwhe lmi ng firep ower of rifles and arti llery.

Before 1816. wh en th ey ca rne under th e ru le of th e paramoun t ch icf Sha ka , th e Z ulu wer e a n in sign ifi cant pastoral pe op le w ith 110 preten sions to mi lit ar y excellenc e. Th ey part ici parcd in t he trad it ion al warfare of t he so u the rn African cart lc- hcrd iug tribes, wh ich co ns iste d o f ritualized fightin g that mi nimi zed cas ua lties . When o ppos ing sides m et for batt le, typi call y to decid e :& dispute ove r g razing land. individual w arrior s w ould dem o nstrate th ei r prowess by challeng ing an e nt" llly to sing le armed co mbat. Otherwise, th e two sides wo u ld limit th em sel ves first to an exc ha nge of insul ts fo llowed b y th e throwing of m issiles at a di stan ce . If th eir flim sy throw ing spe ars m anaged to ca use any deat hs. wa r rio rs had to b reak o ff fro m co m bat 10 c" rr y o ut clea nsi ng rites to ;lppcasc the spirits of th e d ead . T he wea ke r side acce pt ed defeat wit ho ut in sisti ng a ll a fight to th e tinish. The d evel opment of th e Z o lu into" mi litari sric soc ie ty began in th e ea rly 19th ce nt u ry o nd e r cla n chief D in gi sw ayo , but it was o n ly afier chief Sha ka seize d po wer in 1816 th at the ir pr acti ce of w ar was tr ansfor me d . Sha ka abandoned t he tradition al reliance 0 11 "SS(:~djS (t h ro w ing spea rs) as the m ain w capon, instead introduci ng

the stabbing spe"r and e nco u rag ing hi s w arrio rs to use it to dead ly effec t in clo se co m bat. Instead o f ritualized fightin g, Sh aka so ug h t to tix a nd destro y th e fo rce s o f hi s e ne my. In a se ries o f exterminatory ca m paig ns . kn own as the "!{i'ca"e ("c rus hing") , he

ma ssacred ne ighbo urin g peopl es o r forced them

into sub m issio n . By th e time of Shaka's d eath in 1828 , th e Z u lu had spre ad almo st as f.1I no rt h as Swa zilan d. T he militar y m ach in e, a nd sty le of war fare , that Shak a crea te d rem ained broad ly un ch anged un til the Z u lu's di sastro us encou nter wi th th e British Em pire forces in 1879.

FO RM ING A WA R R IOR As yo u ng bo ys, fut ure Z ulu warrio rs picked up info rm al fig h ti ng ski lls by bat rling one another with stic ks. The y also learned to be hard y and self-relia nt in the ir harsh natu ral env iro nment . accom pany ing their el de rs as bear er s o n lo ng c ross-co u ntry jou rneys and hunt in g sma ll ga nll', Induct io n into the w arrio r class came bet w een t he "ges of 18 a nd 20 . M e n of the same age group wen ' asse mbled to form a regimen t and set up a barrack s. T he wa rrio rs wo uld re main wi th the same regiment - identi fied by the ado ption o f" par ticul ar co lou r shield and other de rai ls of dress - for th e next two dec"des . Obviously. thi s regimen tal system enco uraged bonding an d gro up id ent ity. Althou gh in t he time of Shaka's ru le wa rrio rs were, accord ing to rep o rts. train ed ill forced m arch es and m ilitary m an o eu v res, the re seems ve ry little ev ide nce at any late r peri od for a tou g h trainin g routin e in the sty le of Western armi es. In fact, the wa rriors' eq u iva len t of parade-gro u ud dr ill an d weapons trai ning " ppe Jrs to ' lJ \'C largely co nsist ,..-d of performing co mplex rh ythm ic da nces wit h sh ields, sticks, o r spears.

COWHIDE SHielD AND STABBING SPEA R

Zulu wa r dance Zulu w arriors in full battle dress, armed w ith cow hide shields, stab bmq spears, and kncbkemes, perform a war dance (umghubha). Ceremonial dancing and singing, performed before and after batt le, was of great religious significanc e to the Zulu. Note the plum es of dust in the photograph, caused by th e vigorous sta mping of unshod feet.

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Yet mili tar y lile.: le.>r th e Z u lu w arrior w as f.1f from idy llic , r:igh rs we re co ns t;llJtly br eakin g o u t bet wee n in di vidu als or ri val rl'giml'nts, who att ack ed one an othe r with k nohkcrr ics (h eav y sticks) . Th ese pu ni shing duds we re CO il II ivcd at by the offi n :rs (i : iudlll/l'), w ho saw li g ht in g .rs a usefu l to ug he ning exerc ise tlU' the wa rriors , a ltho ug h co m bat wit h spea rs wa s strictl y

fo rb id de n . TIll" 'i lOd su pplied to th e rcgi m c n rs b y th e chief wa s oft en m e:1 grl' , at times :1 ser io us cause of di scontent . Warriors were gl' nc fa lly fo rb id de n to marr y, a rcgularion that be e.nne more irk some as men g re w o lder. In pra cti ce, m arr iage wa s pcrm irrcd afte r aroun d 15 yea rs of serv ice , War rio r« were re lea sed from th eir

military duties at aro u nd th e

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of ··H).

FI GH TIN G M ETH OD Co w hi de shield Shields needed to be both stro ng and fiqht w erqht . The distinct ive colouring of t he shield showed the- re-giment to w hich t he w arrior be-longed, and his status WIthin it.

A Zulu warrior tun ct ion cd as part o f a mobile ag g ress ive a r my dedicat ed to lo cat in g and then d estroy in g a n l't1emy for n ' at clo se quarters. One o f Shak a's reforms wa s to aba ndo n th e w earin g o f sa nd a ls, b ecause Ill' beli eved hi s warriors co u ld JI10ve f:lster unshod. Thus the Zulu rravcl lcd

barefoot - J Eu rop ean ob ser ver de scribed t he so les of thei r feet as h ar d e ned " like the ho o f of a co w " , Wa rr io rs adva nced in co lu m ns at aro u nd 311k m (2 11 mi ll's) a d ay, o ften accompa n ie d by bo ys un der 12 years o ld c:Hry in g their cook ing po ts, slec pin g ma ts, and ex tra weapo ns . On o ccasion, cattle were brought alo n g as a mo bile food supply, but when m aximum spee d wa s required th e w arriors travelled light and su rv ive d hy {()rag ing . Scouts rep orted back O il th e e ne my's lo cation a nd st re ng th , and ac te d as skir m ishe rs. sc rc c n iug the movement of th e arm y. A lth ough t he Z u lu alwa ys ex ploited spee d of m o ve m e nt an d k no wl cd gc of the co untry, the y wert.' ill no se nse g ue r r illa fig hters. T heir a im was to c ngage the c ne m y ill p itch ed batt le , d epl o yin g tho u sa nd s of m e n at a tim e in a dec isive attac k . Be fore l'lltl' r in g co m ba t. a warrior w o u ld ca rry o ut va r io us rit ua ls, incl uding anoi ntin g hi m self with a ma g ic potion to g u a ra ntee h is safl.· ty . With hi s regimcilt he wou ld then rak e up hi s

appointed po sit ion in till' traditional " bu ffa lo horn" batt lefi eld formation . Younger rcgimcnt« form ed th e "horns" Oil eac h flank . which were to en circle th e ene my . Th e ce ntre. or "c hest". wou ld be co m posed of exp eri en ced fighters. since it wa s ex pe cted to hear t he bru nt o f the ba tt le o n , fro nta l ch arge . T h e " lo ins", a bod y of o lde r vet e ran s. was h eld in re serve. Movement o n till' batt lefield wa s directed b y the izindun a using hand m o veme nt s o r me sse ngers, althou gh Z u lu armies ra re ly departed from sta nd ard ta ctics with which all were familiar. The warriors would adv ance towards their e ne my at a ste ad y jog, so m et im es heating their shi elds rh ythmical ly with their sp e.ns. Once within su itable di stan ce. th ey ru shed forward in a last fu ll-ti lt das h , la u n chi ng th eir throwi ng spears w he n "bout 3011I ( 100 ft) from the enelllY. At close qu art e rs th e sta b bi ng sp ear a nd sh ield were put to dead ly lise, T ilt' Z u lu never too k pri so ners. m assacrin g the ir e lle lll Y to the last mall and rippi ng opell the bodies of t ilt.' dea d to rele ase the ir spir its.

EFFECT OF FIR EARM S T lu- Z u lu fir st ex pe rienc ed the powe r of European fir earms when fightin g D utch spl'a ki ng Afrik aner settlers. kn own as th e Boe rs, At Blo o d R ive r in IX3X, th e fir epower of , few hundred Bo e rs dcfcar cd " Z u lu ,rlllY possib ly nUIIII",ri ng 10 ,1I0 0 1II1'n . Z u lu leade rs su b seq ue n tly o btained firea r m s fin th e ir warriors, but failed to m a ke " ny radi ca l ch a ug c in tacti cs. T hey co n tinue d to practise m assed in fmtr y assau lt , w hic h agai nsr r itlc-n r m cd troops in J prepared po sit io n wa s bound to Cos t t hem heav y cas ua lt ies . The Z u lu did learn to make good lise of cover ill ap proac h ing th e e ne my positi on and att ac ke d in

W E WILL GO AND EAT UP TH E WHIT E MAN AND FINI SH TH EM OFF. TH EY AR E NOT GOING TO TAKE YOU WHIL E WE ARE HERE, THEY MUST TAKE US FIRST. ZULU W A RRIO R SHiEl D

ZULU ARM Y, ADDRESSING KING CETSH W AYO AT THE BATTLE OF ULUNDI. 18 79

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SIOUX WARRIOR I WAS HOSTILE TO THE WHITE MAN ... WE PREFERRED HUNTING TO A LIFE OF IDLENESS ON OUR RESERVATIONS. AT TIMES WE DID NOT GET ENOUGH TO EAT AND WE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO HUNT. ALL WE WANTED WAS PEACE AND TO BE LET ALONE. CRAZY HORSE OGLA LA SIOUX (1842 - 1877)

HOM T ilE , So OS T O T ilE ,SS o s

F

th e Siou x tribes, alo ng wi th

o the r nomadic buffalo -hunt in g Plain s Indi an s such as th e C heye n ne and th e Arapaho , fou ght a g ue rrilla wa r agai nst the US A rm y in a last-ditch atte m pt to blo ck settler

enc roac h ment o n th ei r huntin g gro u nds. They evolved a form of wa r fare based o n th eir sk ills as horsemen , hunters, and raid er s. Although th ey had no cha nce o f ul tim at e success, given th e willpower and resources of the ir o ppo ne nts , th ey pro ved supe r ior in com ba t o n th eir ow n term s.

For the m en of the Sio ux na tion s, fighti n g: wa s a wa y of li fe. Warfa re w as cc nt rnl to the soc ia l and econo m ic ex iste nce of t he t ribe . But it w as also crucia l to pe rso n al a m b itio n. for it wa s t h ro ug h co m bat t ha t a ll ind iv idual warrior co u ld pr o ve h is co urag e and m ar tia l sk ills, a nd t hus hope to ri se ill t he w arrior hi erarchy of h is soci e ty . T he pra cti cal object ives o f war fare w en.' Illany a nd variou s. Tri b es raided th eir nei ghbo ur s to stea l horse s or ( 0 take w omen and c h ild re n caprives thus in cre asin g th eir O W I1 populati on . They fou ght fo r co nt ro l ofh un ring g ro llnds and for co ntrol of tr ad e. But w a rfare was a lso likel y to b e provok ed by so me ins u lt or mi sde ed that th e h O Il OU T of th e (rib c, re q ui red b e ave nged . The Plains Ind ian s tradit ion al fortll o f wa rfa re was wh at Euro pea ns o nce called "t he sk u lk ing w ay of w ar " , It co nsisrcd o f rai ds a nd a m b ushe s ca rri ed o ut by stea lth . R aid in g part ies t ypi call y numbering no m ore rhan 30 o r 40 w arriors w ou ld em ba rk o n a com ba t iui ssiou, u su all y returning a fte r a sing le tight w ith th e chose n e nemy. Fightin g w as gen era lly not vcry de structive. Min im izing o ne 's own casua lt ies w as an impor ta nt prin cip le. for Plains Ind ia n peoples ha d lo w b irth rates and the Jives o f the ir warr iors were a preciou s resource. M ostly there was a lso 110 att e m p t to inflic t heav y lo sse s 0 11 the e ne m y tr ibe . Co m hat h:HI ritu ali sti c clements b rin gin g it close to spo rt. M en wo u ld b e awa rded " poi nts" for ce rt a in ac h ievem en ts - suc h a, th e tota l of ho rses sto len w hi c h wo u ld co nt r ibu te to the ir grading as warr iors. e-

A Siou x warrior wou ld get m ore points tor t he co u rag eo us act o f tou ch in g ;111 e lle lllY w it h a "coup st ick " - the wi llow ro d u sed for th is ritu a l str ike - th an fi l f k illin g o ne wit h :I II a rrow at a di st an ce . Ye t it m u st no t b e imagined t hat Sio ux wa rfa re wa s :1 blo o dl ess gamc . The sca lping o f d ead e ne m ies w as a w e ll- e stab lished pra cti ce , app are ntl y de sign ed to pr event th e t:l llcn w arr io r from e n te ri ng the afrc rlifc w he re he mi ght h ave pursu ed rev e n ge again st h is killer . T h is pr acti ce wa s en couraged when whit e trad er s pr o ved ready to pa y good mone y for sca lps as cu rios .

TRADITION AND INNOVATION Ad opted as re centl y .1S th e 17th cc nt u r y, after bein g in troduced to th e Amer icas by Spa u ish invaders. horses were th e Sioux 's m o st pri zed po ssessions. v ira l for bo th hunting a nd wa r. M o stl y small, th in . h ard y. and fa st-mo vin g . th ey w er e accu m u late d by su cce ssfu l t ribes in brge numbers. Ever y w arrior ne ed ed seco nd - str ing ponies for rra vcllin g di stan ces and a spec ia lly pri zed mount as hi s wa rhorse, Th e Sio ux were excep tio n a l horsem en , ca pa b le o f trick s suc h as ha ng ing ov e r o ne side o f 3 ga llo ping horse to kee p its body between them and a ll en emy. Bu t th ey di d not a lw ays tight o n horseback, more often di sm ount in g w hen co m bat wa s j oined .

TRADE KNIFE AND SHEATH

W E MU ST ACT W IT H VIN DI CTI V E EAR NESTNESS AGA I NST THE SIO UX, EVEN TO T H EI R EXTERM I N AT IO N , M EN, W OM EN , A ND C H ILD RE N . GENERAL SHERM AN, 1866

Decorat ed def ence Shieldswere very important to the Plains Indians, not onlybecause of the obvious physical protection they provided, but also because of spiritual associations. This hunting shield is painted with a silhouette of a bison and decorated with feathers.

War between vario us Sio ux nation s and the United States wa s alm os t inevit able as th eir tcrritor y lay acr o ss

th e path o r T he Ind ians' trad itio na l key wea po n was the

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co m po site ho w, made of wo o d ha ck ed w ith sinew. A Sio ux wa rrio r was t rai ne d ill sho o ting a bo w fro m c h ild hood and co u ld deli ve r arro w s O il to a tar get w ith speed and :lcc urac y. Hi s o ther trad itio na l wca pons we re a 10 l1 g b uce and a knife th at was used fo r fi n ish ing off th e w o unde d and to r scalping . Toma haw ks we re ce re mo nial o bjec ts rathe r than wca po ns of w ar. The equipment th at th e Sio ux used was co nstantly evolving , espec ially un der th e impa ct of con tac t wi th Eu ropean sett ler ' and tr ad er s. lIy th e second h ai r of the 19 th ce nt u ry Sio ux we re as likel y to rid e th eir ho rses w ith sti rrups and saddl e as the y were to ride bareba ck, w h i le th eir arro w s had mera l tip s. instead or the traditi on al flint. T hey also ow ne d large qu antities o f fi rearm s, in cl udin g rifles and Colt p istol s, e ither ca ptu re d o r o bta ine d by trade. T he Sio ux never ach ieved an effect ive ne ss w ith fire arm s to m atch th eir sk i ll w ith th e bo w . Alth ou gh a Plain s Ind ian wa rrio r saw wa rfare as a chance to pro vc h is ind iv id ua l pro w ess. he wa s used to fight in g as part of a di sciplin ed g ro up.

us wes twa rd

The di scipline wa s

ex pansio n. From the ea rly

imp o sed by a num be r

IH(,Os, th e Ind ian peoples respo nded to aggressive

o f wa rrior soc iet ies w ith in th e trib e .

WA R R IO R SOC I ETI ES M ade up of men w ho had pro ved th eir co urage and ability, th ese

soc iet ies ac te d as a kind of po licc fo rce uph o ld ing co llec tive ru les aga ins t the impu lsive ness of unr ul y indi vid ual s. T he warr io r socie ties had all especially importan t task in th e huntin p; season , w he n success in ki llin g bi son w as esse n tial to the trib e's su rv iva l. They wo u ld se ver ely punish an y junior w arrio r w ho m en aced th e o ve ra ll succe ss o f the h u nt by step ping o u t of line. This d isc ipl ine co u ld also b e ap plied to wa r fare , Wh en the Sio ux fo u nd th em selves engaged i n a life- o r-death st r uggle w it h t he U S Arm y a nd w h ite set tle rs. the o rgani zation and directi on pro v ided by

in cursion s

by set tle rs and

th e U S A rm y wit h raid s again st iso lated outposts and settlements. usin g the hi t- and-run tact ics fam iliar from int ert ribal warfare . Transport and com mun icntion links we re di srup ted . w ith stagecoac hes and sup ply trains ambushed a nd telegra ph w ires rip ped down . Travellin g faste r and lig ht er than US tr o op s, Sio ux warrio rs co uld easily eva de army co lu m ns se n t to e ngage them .

T H E BOZE MA N T RA IL The most successfu l exe rc ise in Ind ian g ue r rill a

w ar far e w as led by C h ief R ed C lo ud or the O glala Sio ux in IH(,(, to IH(,H. The U n ite d Sta tes was det er mi ned to o pe n up the Bo ze man Trail, a route from th e East to th e M ontan a go ld field s,

the w arrio r socie ties was c ruc ia l to co ping

passin g thr o ugh Sio ux hunt in g: g ro u nds. In th e

w ith suc h an u npre ceden te d cha llen ge.

su m m e r or IH(,(, t he U S Arm y b uilt three forts alon g th e Tra il to g ive sec urity to travell ers. lu stcad , S io ux attac ks o n w ag o n train s in c reased w h i le the so ldiers we re trapp ed in side th e

forts by w arbands t hat pla ced t he m virt u ally under sie ge. In De cember IH(,(,. o uts ide Fort Kearn y, C o lon el Wi lli am J Fetter man was lu red int o pursuit o r a temptin g ly sma ll part y of Sio ux wa rrio rs; th ey led h im into an am bus h by a far su per ior fo rce that ma ssacr ed Fet term an and the HO cava lry a nd infa nt r y w it h him . Un ab le to protect travell er s. in IH6H th e U S gove rn mcnt ag ree d to aba ndo n th e Bo zem an T rai l and ev ac uate the forts. R ed C lo ud h ad the di sti ncti on o f b ein g the o n ly Ind ian leade r to sig n a peace treat y as a v ic to r w ith th e U nit ed Sta te s.

The Siou x's finest hour Soldiers from General Custer's 7th cavalry make an unsuccessfulattempt to resist the charging Plains Indians in June 1876. Althoughthe Sioux are depicted here on horseback it is likely they attacked on foot.

The tra ~i c cli ma x o f th e Plains Indian War s was pr ecip itat ed b y th e pen et rati on of U S tro op s an d go ld miners into th e Black Hills of So uth D ak ot a, w hich was th e spirit ual ce ntre of th e Sio ux wo rld, fro m IH74, Inspired by leaders such as C razy H orse and Sitt ing Bull . the warrior so cieties succeeded in organizi ng the Sioux and th eir Comanche and Arapaho all ies for larg e r- scale o pera tio ns to n.. . si.. t the US ad vanc ing cava lry.

LI T TL E BI GH ORN T here were p ro babl y more th an I,n n n w arrio rs in vol ved in the f.11l10 11S v ic to ry ov e r so ld iers led by Geo rge C uster at th e Littl e Big ho r n Ri ver in Ju ne IH76 , Although no trul y reli able acco u nt of th is battle ex ists, it ap pe ars that th e Ind ian s rapidl y fired a lar ge vo lu me o f u naimcd arro ws in a h i ~h traj ector y to foil in a dense sho we r up on the U S t ro ops. The y probab ly atta ck ed o n foot , cree ping forward wit h m aximum lise of allY pr otection affo rded by the terrain and vegetat ion . But eve n at Little High o rn , t he In di an wa r rio rs co u ld not ho ld the field , bein g for cs'd to n..-rreat behind a g rass fire smokes c ree n th e follo win g day to avoid enco untering more U S so ld ie rs. On ce th e U S wa s read y to devote resource s ruthle ssly to th e Plains Ind ian Wars. th e Ind ians had no answer to the destru cti on of Raiding party in battle dress Sioux warfare typically consisted of raidsandambushesmounted by stealth involvmq 30-40 warriors.

CAN A D A Battl egrounds and terr itori es As European settlerspushed westward. it was inevitable there would be conflict with PlainsIndians. Many of the major battlesand incidentsin the American West between 1850 and 1880 involved the Sioux.

cteerweter

1877

>ok.

BI~ Hole

~ 187

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e xh au sti o n, S i lt in~ Bull

initially took refuge in Ca na da , hut return ed to

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U N IT E D

S IIOSIlO""

' 861

Vkt" SufH"'Or •

Wood lake 1862

S TAT E S

l ~ill ''''''' :E l~iHJ"li

th e ir foo d sup plies or att acks o n th e ir e nca m pments. C razy H o rse a nd h is assor ted follo we r s surrende red th e following year, beaten by starvatio n and

Bear Paw Moun tain, 1877

Little . Bighorn ~ " ~mder Rlvef 1816 ~mbud ."i.1( l UX

inu

x.il 'I1JO OF PAC I FI C OC EAN

.i l~iC:IfE

THE AM ERICA N W EST 1850-18 80

UTE;

Hem.land, of major Native American tribes Battle involving Sioux Othe r battle be tween US and native tribes

g ive him sel f up to the US aut horiti es in IHHI. Iro n icall y, th e defeat ed Siou x warri or s were in sta ntl y em braced b y U S po p u lar cu lt u re as t he noblest of savag es . S itti n ~ Bull beca me a ce leb rity, appear in g briefl y in Buffalo Bill 's Wi ld W est Show and makin g a substantial in come from selling au tog ra p he d pictures o f him sel f, T he reality o f th e Sio ux's f:ltl' was , of co urse , g rim . TI l\' G host Dance re vival m o vement of IH'l l!, e nde d by th e infa mo us ma ssacre at Wou nd ed Kn ee, was a dOOI11l'u last thr o w in a struggle the Ind ians kn e w at heart the y were going to lo se . Better than bareback Traditionally bareback. riders.

by the 1850, the Sioux used saddlesand stirrups, bought from European traders.

AM ERI CA ..k. Palo Duro Canyon "V 1874

LI~ MIC .

FIGH T ERS OF THE INDIAN WARS The westward expansion of th e Un ited States in th e secon d half

US forces typically found th em selves tracking an elusive enemy

of the 19th century brou ght white settlers into co nflict w ith Native

across th ou sand s of kilom etres of w ilde rness. Foot soldie rs proved

America n peoples. who defended their territo ries by car ry ing out

of littl e use and by 1877 th e US army co nta ined almost 11 .000

hit-a nd -run raids and ambus hing trave llers. T he US ar my soug ht

cavalry me n. co mpared w ith only 10.000 in fantry. The N ative

to drive th e Indians off their land s and hunt ed down bands th at

Am eri cans fou ght with no real hope of victo ry but great skill and

refused to submit. T hese campaig ns rarely came to pitched battl e.

co urage . By 1890 th eir resistance had been pitil essly crus hed.

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Th e cava lry t(m'c w ith w h ich rhc United States t()ug ht the Sio ux, Apa che . N e z Pt.·ret" and ot her N ative Amcr ic.u: m o u n ted wa rrior s wa s largely created at the e nd of the Am erican C iv il War. Its higher Links we re su trl'd tro m the la rge surplus

o f Uni on offi cef s available whe n the Civil War arm ies di sb .mdcd. The c n lisrcd m en it att ractcd wen- a rag -ba g of fo otlo ose ad venturer s. th ose in trou ble wi th th e l.iw, fres h immi grants fro m Europe w ho spoke littl e Eng lish . and c'\T Il ;1 fair n umber of fo n ne l" Confe de rate o ffice rs . Tw o

regiments o f w h irc-officcrcd A frican -A mcri can cava lry. ni cknamed "bu ffa lo sold iers" by the Kiowa people, perfor med wit h g reat c red it. C avalry troope rs t;lced a hard lift.', garriso n ing re m ote fort s, escort ing travel ler s through di sputed territory, and m ou n tin g ca m paig ns again st Indian warbands. T he US cavalry were gl' ncrally slo wermoving than th eir hi gh ly mobi le en emies. In thr early ycars a trooper t ypi call y ca r rie d 22k g (50 Ib) o f equipmen t, including a 2 kg (5Ib) sword , and 7 kg ( 15Ib) o f grain for hi s horse . Gradua ll y th e y

Henry Model 1860 TheHenryriflewasone of the first prac tical repeating rifles, whichsawsome army usein the 1860s. Othercavalry firearms included the Coltpistol and the Spencer rifleandcarbine.

learned to imi tate lnd ian tacti cs. In IH76 tro op e rs pursu ing C razy H o rse we re orde re d to ca rry o n ly a tin c up. a carbine a nd am mu ni tio n, and fou r days' ratio ns , w h ile t heir horses fcd o n grass, not grai n. Extensive use wa s m ad e of In d ian sco uts, whose sk ill at tracking a nd speed of m o vcmcnr were inva lua ble . The co u n terin surge nc y war

co nd uc te d hy the cavalry wa s often vi c io us and inc lu ded m assacre s o f women and ch ild ren, but as fig hti ng m en tlll'y showed
little Big Horn A contingent of the US7th Cavalry wassurrounded and massacred by Sioux and Cheyenne warriors at little Big Hornin 1876, the worst cavalry defeat of the Indian wars.

APACHE In th e l'.Ith ce nt ury, th e six A pa che t ribes li ved ill th e mo uu tuin s and de sert s of prese nt- day w este r n Te xas, N ew M exi co , A rizo na, and north ern M ex ico . U nt il the I H40 s t heir great en e m ies w e re t he M ex ican s and the y we lconn..'d the takeover o f th e so ut hwest by the U n ited Sta tes in

vo lun teers laun ch ed all offen sive ag ainst th e Apa ch «. Un ion officer C o lo nel j am es Ca rleto n o rde red that Ind ian m e n w ere "to be slain w he ne ver and w herev er th ey ca n be fo u nd ", III 18(,3 M an gas Colo radas , lead e r o f the Bcd onkoh e Apa ch e, met w it h U S mi litar y co m m a nde rs to nc gor iare fo r pc..'ace . He wa s arrested , to rtured ,

184 8 . The Apach e m ai ntaine d a n unl'asy peace wit h t he U ni ted States u nt il t he 1850 s, but th e often violent intrusion o f Ame r ica» set tlers and th e US arm y in to Ap ach e territory SOOI1 e m birtc rc d re lations.

and sho t. suppos e dly whi le atte m pt in g to l'SGlpl'.

Tough. co urag t.'o lls . r u th less fig hters w ho exce lled in rai d s an d am bushes , th e A pac he m ou nted a ca m pa ig n of attac ks Oil se t tle rs and m ai l coa c hes intend ed to dr ive th e w h ite s o ff th e ir l.u id. From 18 (,2 , w hi le the C iv il Wa r raged furt her cast, federa l troo ps and se tt ler

pu rsu ed by 5 .000 US t ro ops, plu s t ho u sands of militi a and M e x ican vo lu nteers. G eronimo

sur re nde red in Se pt e mber 18Hr,. H e was held as a priso ner of wa r up to h is deat h i ll Jl) () () .

Decorated cap Apache warriorswore buckskin caps that were decorated with feathers and with colourful beadwork In elaborate individual designs.

T he Ap ac he responded wi th g ucrr illa w ar. The ir resista nce wa s initia lly le d by Coc hi se, a c h ief of rh e C h irica hua Ap ac he : aftl'r h is de ath in 1874 , till' lead e rsh ip o f till' Ap ache passed to G o yath lc y, k now n to w hite s as Geronimo . A fte r m any e x plo its and n arro w esca pe s, by th e m id-I xxu s G e ro nimo 's rebel fo rce had be en reduced to j ust 17 wa rrio rs a nd the ir tam ilies. T h is sm all band wa s

APACHE BUCKSKIN CAP

NEZ PERCE Th e N e e M e Po n, nam ed Nez Pl' rce by Fren ch C ana d ia u t rappe rs, lived by fish ing a nd h untin g o n th e Colu m bia Platea u in the no rthwest U nited States. The y h ad gener a lly good rel at ion s wi th th e w h ite s until th e 18(,Os,

whe n go ld pro spec to rs pen etrat ed th eir lands. In 1863 the U n ite d Sta te s to o k t he m ajority o f the

Ne z Perce

CarrYing strap

Bow and qu iver

The bow was the basic weapon of all Native American warriors. It was typically made of wood reinforced with sinew on the side facing away from the archer.

re serv at io n to op en lip the area fo r mining . T he

Nez Perce brave

leader o f the Wallo w a ban d, k no wn to w h ites as

A warrior poses with ceremonial headdress and lance. The Nez Perce were renowned for their skill in breeding horses. and kept their best mounts for warfare.

C h iefJ o seph , o rg an ized peace ful re sistan ce to the land se izure. In j u ne 1877, however, d ash es bro ke o ut bet w een the US ;1fIllY and Nez Pe rce hand s. N u m be ring less tha n a tho usa nd people, in clud ing wo me n and ch ild re n, the N e z Pe rcl' kn ew t ha t t he y co u ld no t sta nd a nd fig ht. Inste ad they co nd uct ed a fighti ng re tr eat ac ro ss 2 ,OOOk m (1,20 0 miles) of moun tai n a nd plateau toward s the Ca na d ian bord er, pu rsued by severa l th ou sa nd US troo ps a nd th eir Ind ian au x iliar ies. Th e N e z Perce re pea te d ly o ut fo ug ht and o ut m a noe uv re d their cuc mi cs, w in ni n g the pr aise o f Gene ra l Will iam Shen n an fo r th eir " a lmos t sc ie nt ific sk ill" in w ar fa re , Bu t in O ctob er 1877 t hey were surro u nde d nea r th e Be ar Paw m ou ut aius in M ontana. 65k m (40 m iles) sho rt of th e borde r. A fter a five-d ay sieg e in w hi ch m an y N e z Pe rce we re killed , C h iefj o se ph sur rend e re d . de cla ri n g : " M y hea rt is sick a nd sad. Fro m w her e the su n no w stands I w ill fig ht no mor e fo re ver ." A fe w w ar r iors slippe d th rou gh the arm y lin es a nd escap ed to C a na da . The re st of th e su rv ivo rs were ex i led to di sease - ridd en reser vati on s fa r from their a nces trnl lan d s.

BRITISH INFANTRYMAN WE WERE NEVER HIT, BYTHE GRACE OF GOD, FOR THE DEEP MUD WAS OUR SALVATION, THAT MUD WHICH WE CURSED AND IN WHICH WE STUCK AND STAGGERED, SLIPPED AND SLID, TUGGING OUR BOOTS OUT OF IT EACH TIME WE MADE A FRESH STEP. GUNNER LIEUTENANT RG DIXON ON THE BATTLE OF PASSCHENDAELE

BO U T l' O UIl M ILLI O N

British soldiers serve d o n th e Western

Fron t du ri ng Wo rld War I, m ann in g a secto r of the Allied tren ch es bet ween th e C ha n ne l and th e Ri ver Somme. T he majority of th em wer e eithe r voluntee rs or co nsc ripts, wh o left th eir facto ries, offices, o r fields to take up arms in their co unt ry's cause. More th an 1.7 m illi on of them wer e ki lled o r wou nd ed , yet th ey stuck to the ir task w ith dogged persever an ce in th e face of artillery bo m bard ment , toxic gas, and machine- gun fire, and ult im ately prevailed over their enemy.

Al one a mo ng till' m ajor power s th ar went to war ill Au gust 191-1. Brita in did no t h ave a ma ss co nsc ript ;lf my. T h e Bri t ish Expedit ionar y Foret' , se nt to the We stern Front at the o utbreak o f wa r, co ns isted of profe ssiona l so ld iers of t he sma ll re gular ar my : mo st w er e wiped o ut in the tir st five months' de sperate fi ghting. Lord Kit ch cn cr, the sec re tary for war, w as o ne of th e few men who from th e o u tset a nt ici pa te d a prol o nged con flic t. H aving lirtl e fairh ill till" rcrr itor ials - pr ewar part-ti m e so ld iers - as ;1 so u rce of m anpo w e r, he se t abo ut rai sin g a ne w m ass a r m y fro m scratc h. T he ap pea l tor vol u nteers (w it h t he sloga n " You r Country Need s YOU " ) brought a flo od o f pat r iotic yo u ng men to join lon g qu eu es o utside rccruinnent ce n tres. IJy th e e nd of Se pte m ber 1914 abou t 7S0.000 m en h "d come forward . Althou gh e n th usiasm be gan to w ane in th e fo llow ing ye ar, " total of2.(, mi llion had vo lu nteered to fig h t by t he t ime conscription w as be lated ly intro du ced in )')1(" In order to en cou ragc men to vo lu ntee r. th ey were allo we d to sign up O J) till' uudcrsranding th at thcy would serve with o thers fro m th eir OWI1 localit y o r occ upatio n a l g ro u p. Thu s we re formed th e famo us " 1',,1, Barta lio ns". T here were batta lio ns o f stoc kbro ke rs. of artist s, and

H o rn e Rule, we re perm itt ed to c n list toget her. form in g the 3(,th (U lste r) D ivi sion. N u m bers of Ir ish Ca tholics also vo lu n te er ed in lar ge g ro ups . inc lud ing o ne of 3S0 r ugh y player s and a co m pa ny ofDublin d o ck er s. The unforesee n re sult of the c rea t io n o f Pa ls' Battal ion s was lo cal tra ged y w he n a form ati on lat er su ffere d h eav y cas ua lt ies - as wh en th e "Acrr in gt on Pal s" had SH4 o ut o f7 20 m en k ille d or wo u nde d in the spaCl' o f half an hour at tlu- hat tlc of the Sommc,

TO T HE FRON T A lt houg h ma ny ea rly vo lu u rec rs w ere rej ected as m edically unfi t to r serv ice, t hose acce pted at ti rst far excee de d th e number s th at co u ld be tr a ined a nd eq u ippe d, Th ey were shu nte d off to m ak csh ifr te nte d ca m ps, lIlan y k itt cd o ur w ith UK itc h cnc r blu e" uuiforru s for lack of k h ak i m atcri nl. and , ill th e co m p lete abse nce ofweaponry. dr illed wit h broom st ick s under t he or ders of hi deb o un d reg ul ar NCO s too old to be sen t to the front . It WJS o n ly grad ua lly throu gh It) 15 th at th e m en rece ived prop e r un iform s and e qu ip me n t, c irizc u-, began to tu r n into so ldie rs . a nd the cw A rm y too k sha pe . Tough en ed up by route m ar ch es an d bo nded with their co m rad es . th e mcn 's m o rale was genera lly high by th e time the y e m barked t'()r France.

LEWIS GUN

of foot ba lle rs - so m e tim es incl uding t:1I1S as wel l as pla yer s; ther e were a lso ba tt alio ns ba sed 0 11 schools, suc h as t he " G r ims by C h u ms" from Wint ringham Se condar y Sch o ol ; but mo stl y the y were drawn from spec ific tOWI1S or vill age s, m ajor c it ies pro viding seve ra l battal ions. In Ire land , c leme n ts o f th e Ulster Volunteer Force, formed by Pro testa nts to resist till' g ra nt ing of

.., '" VI

Sold ie rs old a nd new Soldiers wa it in a tow n in northern France for tran sport at ion to th e front in August 1914 (right), By the end of the year many of these regulars had been killed or wo unded, to be replaced in 1915- 16 by Kitchene r's volun teers. By then the natu re of wa r had changed considerably, as is evident from the gas mask hold er hangi ng round th e soldier's neck (far right ),

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Tou g hen ed lip by rout e m ar c he s and bonded wit h t he ir co m rade s, the men 's m o rale was ge nera lly hi gh by th e t ime they embarked fo r Fran ce. But apa rt fro m bein g trai n ed in th e usc of th e rifk and bayon et , th e y we re inev it ably illpn..' pared for t he ex pe rie nce of tr e nc h w a rfare . Fe rri ed ac ro ss th e C ha n ne l a nd th en ca r ried by tr a in to ward s th eir sec to r of t he fr ont . a fresh d iv ision wo u ld ge ne ra lly h ave a long m ar ch before it tina lly reac he d till' tre nch e s. On a nu mber of oc casions ne w ar r iva ls we re th row n str.rig h r into ac t ion. T h is was th e fate of two New A rm y d iv ision s th at re ach e d the fro nt at Lo o s o n 2(, Sc prcm b cr 1'11 5. H avin g m ar ch ed for t wo d ays a lo ng cob bled road s in heav y ra in . t he m e n - co m pletely ex hau ste d an d w it h no co m bat ex pe rie nce - we re o rde red for ward int o t he fire of Germa n m ac hine - g uns. As a re su lt. so me X.1I1I11 out o f 10.111111 so ld iers w er e k illed or wo unded 0 11 th eir ti rst d ay at th e from . Fo rt u natel y. cases of such insta nt slau g h te r we re rar e . I f t he y we re fortu nat e . fresh so ld iers wo u ld a r r ive in ;l qu iet sec to r of t he fro nt and hav e ti m e to lea r n fro m ex pe rie nc ed t roops the secre ts of su rv iva l ill t re nc h w a rfar e ,

TRE NC H LIFE Newco mers to the fro nt- line tr ench e s we re in e vitabl y horr ified b y th e extraord ina ry spectacle they presented . W in sto n C hu rc h ill. a r riv ing to ser ve at the [rour ill No ve m ber Jl) 15. d esc r ib ed the srvnc in ;l lcu er to h is wi tl-; "Filt h an d ru bbi sh everywhe re , graves bu ilt int o the d"..fl'J)n:s .. . tt.-'l't and c lot h ing br eaking t hro ug h t he soil. wa ter a nd m uc k O J) all sid l'S: an d abo u t th is sce ne ill th e da zzl in g mo o n lig h r troo ps of e no r m o us rat s c rl'l'p and g Iidt:'." Yet in th is st ran ge wo rld m en m ad e th e m sel ves at ho rne.

Ob servi ng t he ene my Periscopeswere essential fo r observing activity in the German trenches and no man's land Some were simple met al tubes with a mirror at eithe r end. others we re more sophist icated.

CERTAIN PLATOONS OR COMPANIES FOUGHT SHOULDER TO SHOULDER TILL THE LAST MAN DROPPED. PRIVATE STEPHEN GRAHAM ON THE SACRIFICES OFTHE BRITISH INFANTRY

T he li fe of a so ld ie r at th e We ste rn Front wa s go ve rn ed b y a d ail y ro ut ine a nd by th e longerterm rhythm of rot ati o n bet ween ser vice ill t he fro nt lin e a nd spe ll, in rese r ve a nd at rest. T he d ay in the fro nt line hin ged aro u nd th e fixed po ints o f sra nd- ro at d awn - u su all y with a tot o f rum - and sta nd- do w n at d u sk . T im e w as filled w ith a bu sy ro uti n e o f c hores , fro m main ta ini ng and im provin g t he fabr ic o f th e trench es to ke e pi n g ri fles clea n and in per fec t orde r, plu s spec ia l tasks suc h as o bser vat io n d u ties. of obv io us im porta nce since th e e ne m y w as o n ly a few hund red m et res aw ay. R ati o ", we re adeq u ate if unexciting . C igarett e sm o k ing w as more o r less un iver sal. T he re wa s a co ns ta nt st r ugg le aga inst lice infe stat ion and agai u st th e rats th at th rived a mo ng t he unburi ed bodies a nd di sca rded fo od . T he so ld ie rs' m o rale d e pended in co ns ide rab le m easu re up o n th e physica l q ua lit y o f their tren ch es, w h ich va ried g rt:'a tly. A good , dr y d ugout w as a go dse nd . W h er e th e g ro u nd be ca me w at erl o gged . as in Fland er s. sod den tren ch es su rr o u nded by a shel l-chu rned sea of mud ma d e da ily life alm o st unbea rab le. T h e le vel o f d an ger a so ld ier faced d ep ended o n ho w ac tive a sec to r he w as in. In so me parts o f th e fro nt a n u nsp ok en truce pr eva iled . In o the r parts tr en ch m ortar fire , she ll ing, and sn iping ca used a stea dy att ritio n of m en.

Daily rourines suc h as b rin g in g up rat ion s fro m th e rear be came a per ilo us act iv ity w he n art iller y re g u larly bomb ard ed th e zo ne be hi nd th e front line. So ld ie rs we re ine v itab ly sha ke n by t he su dde n d eath o f a co m rade , a sn ipe r's bu lle t o pe n in g a hole in hi s fo re he ad or a mortar she ll blo w in g hi s body apar t. M any p re ferred act ive fightin g to J m onot on ous rou tin e in wh ich death was an ever- prese nt pos sibility. The re was rar ely any lack o f vo lu nt e ers to take part in n ig ht raid s o n c lle my tr ench es o r ni ght patro ls in no m an's la ud , ev e n th o u gh th e p crccntngc o f cas ua lt ies in suc h sm all-sc a le o pe rat io ns w as hi gh .

O FFIC ERS AND M EN O ffice rs sha red t he h ardship, and d an ger s o f the t re n ches and su ffe re d h igh casu a lty ra te s - 5X Brit ish ge nera ls w e re k ill ed in act io n in Worl d W ar I, a f.1I' h igh er to ll th an in World W ar I I. Su balterns - j u n io r offi cers w it h th e rank o f lieu ten an t or seco nd lieut e n a nt - w ho led fr om

Messag e pad M essage s w ere all numbered and timed and had to be signed fo r on receipt

Officers at th e front were bombarded by messages. each of wh ich demanded some act ion or reply.

N

BIU T A I N

t he front. '13d a h ig he r death rat e than " ny other g ro u p. The attitude of ordin ar y soldi er s to their o ffi ce rs va ried dependin g on person al factors. but re spe ct wa s m ore co m mo n than ho sril iry, despite an inevitable so c ia l class di vide . Th e w orking class predominated in th e rank s a nd set th e ton e fill the ordin ar y so ld ie r, ev en thou gh n13ny indi vidu als o f hi gh er so c ia l sta nd ing dutifully

served 3 S pri vates. Officer s wer e gener all y from th e m iddle or upper c lass. At the star t of the war, men fro m a public scho o l back ground w e n: abl e to step st raig ht into co m m issio ns 011 th e gr o u nd s of havin g: se rv ed in their schoo l cad et co rps. This did 110t , o f co u rse. m ean that the y were nece ssaril y poor offi cers o r o ut of to uch with the ex pe rience of th ei r men, th ou g h some wer e bot h . Yet promotion fro m the ra nk s wa s ill [;IC( no t unkno w n eve n ill th e pr ewar Brit ish ar m y till' head of th e Im pe ria l Ge ne ra l Staff Field M ar sh al Sir Wi llia m R ob e rt son, had sta rt e d hi s ar m y ca re e r as a priva te . Fro m 1<J !() o nwards th e Illaj ori ty of new ly co m m issio ne d o fficer s were men w ho had served in th e ranks.

D ISC I PLI NE AND PUNI SH M ENT T he stra ins of t ren c h lite in e v it ab ly k-d to di sciplinary problem s. The o dd fora y by Ilrit ish so ld iers in to Fren c h v illag es o fte n re su lted in drunkenness and di sorder: a lt hough th e m CII had litt le m Ollc y to spe nd o n their pleasures,

Occupying a ca pt ured trench Moments like this w hen men cou ld relax after a successful advance we re rare. The trench now had to be refort ifi ed qu ickly in preparatio n for the inevita ble German counterat tack.

N orth Se a

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A war of attrit ion Bet ween late 1914 and the summer of 1916, the front line barely moved . Even afte r that. as the Allies gradually wo re down German resistance, prog ress was pain fu lly slow . At the Armistice in November 1918 the Germans stili occupied most of Belg ium and signi fican t areas of France.

man y of th em st ill man aged to co n tract vene real di seases. As wel l as dr unkenness, co m m o n for m s of

Eng li sh

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Cha nnel

WESTERN fRONT 1914-18 i[n l~"'\

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ind iscipl ine lead in g to lr m.11 pun ishmen t inc luded Ne utr al i1a1e\ in solen ce to a supe rio r fron1li n~ bee 1914-Jul 1916 F It A N C E ....... Front hne al Ar mistl(~ 11 NOli 1918 an d va rio us fo r m s of slo ppi ne ss in dress or Major battle 1914--16 50 100 O'm co nd uct. In SO IllC o f Major ba ttle 1917- 18 Om!If'~ 50 th e..' m ore tr aditi on a list re gimen ts o ffice rs and NC()s we re e spec ia lly pu nc tilio us abo ut m inor w he e l of a he.ivv an ill c r y pil' n ' Il l! publi c reg u lat io us. hut th e ex cessive enfo rcemen t of hu mi liation - that w er e st ill ad tnini stcrcd . Man y suc h r u les co u ld at tra ct ad ver se atte nt io n from so ld ie rs obj ected to suc h pr acti n 's as inappropr i.u c t he prc..'ss - as when t he co u rt m ar t ial of a yo u n g for J c it ize n - a r m y. For the ~ r:l \'e..'st o ft'l'lln's. suc h offi cer for sh av in g off his mo usta ch e wa s quashed as st rik ing all officer a nd de sertion . th e d eat h after a public o utcr y. Alth ou gh tlo ggin g had lon g penalt y w as available. It W;l S rarclv applied , ~O Il 1c..' b een abolish ed, there were brutal o ld - fashio ned 2()() 1I1e..'1I be..'in ~ exe c ute d fo r m il itar y c rim es, arm y punishments - suc h as b eing tied to the mo stl y for de sert ion . in th e co u rse o f t he w a r.

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DU LLY, I HAULED MYSELF OUT OF THE MUD AND GAV E TH E SIG NAL TO ADVANCE , WHICH WAS ANSWERED BY EVERY MAN RISI NG AN D ST EPPING UNHE SITATI NGLY INTO TH E BARRAG E. LIEUTE NANT EDWIN CAMPION VAUGHAN. AT THE THIRD BATTLE Of YPRES, 1917

Sin ce 5 .7 mi llion Ilriti sh so ld iers served in th e

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con ti ic t. it wa s clearly not fear of the ti r in g sq u ad that kept th e III at their posts or drove them lo yall y to toll ow th eir o ffice rs "o ve r the top" when a n

attack was o rde red .

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OV ER T HE TO P So me inf antr ymen n ever ex pe r ie nced a maj or o ffe ns ive and m o st o n ly parric ip.ircd o nce o r twi ce ill fu ll- sca le opera tio ns, It wa s po ssib le to sp end ye ars ill the trenche s wi t ho ut go i ng "over th e top" at all. Bur wh en au o tlC: t1S i\'l' did happen , it was ce rtain ly a ll ex per ience th at no su r v ivi ng pa rt ic ip ant ever to rgor . At t he start o f th e batt le of the So m mc , 0 11 1 Jul y I<J 16 , i ucxpcricnced so ld iers m ar ch ed fo rwa rd w ith fu ll packs st ra ig h t in to m uchin c - gun fir e and un cut Germ an wi re , a nd 5 H,OOO m en were ki lle d or wounded i n ;1 d.l y, lIu t suc h futile b ut che ry wa s e xce ptio na l. U su all y a so ld ie r had a se nse o f taking pa rt in a fie rce b.urlc . rat her th an be in g herded to Jo ining a n offensive Bntish infantrymen thread their way along a sap - a narrow trench extend ing forwa rd from the front hne - and then out thr ough the barbed w ire befo re advancing across no man 's land.

slau g hte r. C arr y i ng a rifl e. cssc n ria l ratio n s, a nd di ggin g too ls. plu s po ssibl y grenades , he wo u ld move in to position b e fo re d aw n . T he: fir st W;1V(.' wou Id ad V;lIKC across 110 111 a 11 's Iand as close as po ssibl e b ehind a c re epin g a r till cry barrag e . hopefull y findin g the l' nl' my w ire c u t b y she llin g o r by a preparatory infantry raid. Fighting might be join ed at close ran g l'. w ith diffi cult assaults 011

co ncrete machi ne - g un posts and the d earin g

of G e r ma n fro nr - Ii nc tre nches w ith ~n.' lla dl' a nd bayonet . It wo u ld usu all y tall to sup porti n g tro o ps to pa ss through a ca pt u red trench and advance ag ain st th e next lin e o f C lll' I1lY defen ces. Attack s becam e in crcasingl y diffi cult to su stain as th ey st retc he d furth er tr om

ti re ra ined dow n 011 so ldiers w ho had t<'Hl ~h t their fo rwa rd to e x posed posit ion s a nd Ge rma n infan tr y mounted co u n te ra ttacks . til l ' ad van ce w ould com e to J halt or be for ced ba ck ,

W ;l Y

The awesome cavua lt ics su ffered we re a tuncti on o f th e vast d c strucri vc power o f m .isvpr oduced arrillerv shells and m achinc - guus. but

also o f the she er duration of battles t(111 ~ht with utter tcnacitv o n bot h sides, The Son un c o tlcnsi vc. bl'g u ll at the star t ofJ ul y !<J !(), co nt in ued u u til m id- N o vember : the o tfc nsivc at Yprcs th e foll owin g ye a r, infamo us tor t he appallin g m ud

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Key for se~ d i n g messages In Mor se code

the.' sta r t ing point. As cnt'm y an illcry

fi eld t el epho n e Commu nicat ion betw een th e art illery and th e infantry was crucial to th e successof an offens ive. In the absence of radio s, the infan try had to rely on the portable field telephone .

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Cable had to be played out behind telephone op erator as troops advanced

in wh ich it W :1S fou ght , lasrcd on ly a 1110mh less. Since the adva nces achieved ill tll ~lIlY weeks of costl y fi g hti ng we re a few kil om etres at best, t he wa r's reputa tio n for fut ility is und erstand able .

EX PER I ENCE OF WA R M o rale was o ft en lo w in t he later stages of t he war. The idea lism and patrioti sm so plen tiful ill th e ea rly days came to he ill short supply. Sold iers cu rsed staff office rs for their bluud ers and we re ho rrified by th e losses su ffered. T he exper ience o f sit ting passively under pro longed ar tillery bombard ment shook men to the co re . Gas att ack

was also t rau ma t ic, ofrcn mor e psych ologica lly d ist urbing than m ilitarily effect ive. So me men we re red uced to a catato n ic o r inco herent state and idc nrificd as vict ims of "shell shoc k". T hey we re few co mpa red w ith the victims of terr ible ph ysical injur ies. In the absen ce o f ant ibiot ics. yet to be in ven ted , amputat ion was oft en th e respo llse to a wo u nde d lim b. But eve n a serio us injur y wa s so me time s we lco me , for a " Blighty" wo und wo u ld get yo u ho me an d mi ght save yo u r life. Yet despite all th is. Hritain's citize n- sold iers, mostly youllg CO il scr ipts by 19 1H. stuck to th e ti ght and rarely wave red . Most took prid e ill

the m ilitar y sk ills they gr adua lly learn ed and believed the war had to be WO Il . T hey develop ed a feelin g o f co m rade shi p w ith their fellows that Illan y loo ked back O il as the closest bondin g in t he ir lives. Th e co urage and endu rance of men ta ken out of civilian life and th ro wn int o the most destructi ve batt les th e wo rld had eve r seen u ltimately bro ught victo ry in Nove mbe r 19 1H. Ma ny sold iers. di sillusioned w ith the peace that followed. we re later to look back O il the war as a waste of yo ung men 's lives. But at th e time most we re qu iet ly pro ud of th ei r per form ance, rega rdi ng it as a hard j ob wel l do ne .

BR EAKTHROUGH TACTICS Frustrated by static trench warfare, the British army repeatedly sought a decisive breakthrough, to be achieved by punching a hole in the German line and pouring troops through it. By 1917 breakthrough tactics were well thought-out. A brief but ferocious preparatory bombardment was followed by the advance of infantry behind a creeping barrage. This

curtain of fire moved torward at a prearranged speed equal to the expected rate of progress ot the troops. By "leaning on the barrage" - keeping at most SOm (SSyd) behind it - infantry could often reach the German front trench, which would be lightly held. Penetrating further through the trench lines was much harder. Forward observers tried to

keep artillery coordinated with the infantry, but communications usually broke down. Counterbarrage fire rarely su cceed ~ d in silencing the German guns, which shelled advancing troops. Even if a hole was eventually punched in the German defence-indepth, exploiting an initial success proved impossible because movement was too slow.

Launch ing an attack By 1917a British atta ck on German trenches required precise cooperation between waves of infantry and artillery tiring highexplosive, shrapnel, smoke, and gas shells. The guns kept enemy defences suppressed while the infantry crossed no man's land.

German s sheltering in concrete bun kers German support trench

Commun ication tren ch

High-explosive and gas shells fall on German support tre nch

Barrage moves on to prevent Germans from sending reinfor cements

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Shrapnel Shrapnel shells explode above German trenche s

Germans take shelter in bunker s

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Second wave of troops takes up position in front trench

Daw n a tta ck The first wave of infantry climb out of their trenches under cover of darkness and lie on th e ground ready to attac k at dawn. At a prearranged tim e, th e infant ry begin to advance across no man' s land, w hile th e artillery lays down a creeping barrag e ahead of th em.

Creepi ng barra ge The barrage forces German tr oop s to shelter in bunkers, allowing the Briti sh infantry to approa ch th eir tr ench largely unscath ed. By th e tim e the barrage passes on and th e German defend ers emerge to take up their posit ions. th e first wave of Briti sh infantry is upon th em,

Advanci ng in depth After close-quart ers combat the first w ave secures th e German front-line trench. The arti llery now moves on to the second line of tren ches, att empting to prepare th e w'ay for th e second w ave inf antry , w ho wi ll pass thr ough the fir st wave and cont inue the advance.

GERMAN STORMTROOPER WE ARE GOING LIKE HELL, ON AND ON ... WE ARE GLAD IF RATION CARTS AND FI ELD KITCHENS CAN GET UP TO US AT NIGHT. NOW WE GO FORWARD, PAST CRATERS AND TRENCHES , CAPTURED GUN POSITIONS, RATION DUMPS AND CLOTHING DEPOTS. DIARY OF RUDOLF BINDING , CAPTAIN IN THE GERMAN ARMY, DESCRIBING THE KAISERSCHLACHT OF MARCH 1918

LTHO UGII G EIIM AN Y WA S DEI'EAT ED

A

in World War I, th e

performance of German infantry was generally excellent, at least until morale began to waver in th e final months of th e co n fl ict. Enduring th e horrors and hard ship s of tren ch

warfare on the Western Front, German sold iers showe d not only co urage and resolution but also skill in the adoption of fl exibl e battlefield tactics. This was espec ially true of th e elite sto rmtroopers, wh o spea rheaded th e mi ghty German offen sive of M arch 1918, th e "Kaiserschla cht" (Kaiser's battl e).

The overw he lm ing m ajo rit y o f G e rm an so ld iers in World War I w ere co nsc ripts and reser vi sts,

tha n th at o f till' G cr m au ho m e fro nt . buo yed

by the usu al group bond ing of co m rades fig hting

product s o f a syste m of un iversal co nsc riptio n that sho u ld e r- to-s ho u lde r in the front Ii lie . eve n in peacetime made every male between the T he Gen tians were the ti rst so ld ie rs to beg in ag es of 17 and 45 liable to so m e form o f militar y di g gin g tren ches 011 the Wcsn-r n Prollt and se rvice . T he streng th of universal co nsc riptio n was se tt led in to t re nc h syste ms m o re eas ily its percei ved fairness - men from all classes th an th e ir c ncm ics. T hi s was partly mi xed in t he ranks - an d th e shee r a re su lt of th eir strategy, wh ic h fro m numbe rs o f train ed m en it co u ld m id-I v l S to spr ing I'J IH dicta te d a del ive r to th e a r my. R e se r vi sts broad ly d efens ive sta nc e on the were oftell rusty in the ir military W e ster» Fro nt . M o stly. G erma n traini n g, and th e q ua lit y of t he so ld iers b enefit ed from dr y iron perform an ce o f the c it ize nand-woo d -lined tren ches, so ld ie rs de pended heavily upo n so met imes with de ep co ncrete th e G er ma n ar m y's h ig hl y bunke rs for p rotection against pro fessio n al N COs. G en era lly h eav y a r t illcry, In pla ce s the y b etter ed ucated th an t heir A lli ed enjoyed e lect r ic ligh t in g, piped o pposite numbers, the y in sti lled w ater. and ve ntilation syste ms for Discus grenade di sci pline a nd e ns ured a h ig h level un derg ro u nd hu nk ers. But not all This grenade was in general use in the German army in o f train in g . T he y a lso p ro v id ed Germa n tre nch sys te ms we re o f h ig h the early yearsof the war. lead er ship o n t he battle field . T he y qua lit y and many so ld ie rs spe nt th e ir were in cha rge of plato o ns and e ve n co m pan ies. to u rs o f d uty in t he fro nt line shel te red by little and exercised a degr ee o f in itiativ e th at w as not m o re than hollo w s du g into t he side of a trenc h e nc o u rage d at th at level in All ied ar m ies. wa ll. A pol ic y o f m o u nt in g co u nte ra ttack s at all cos ts to regain any g ro u nd lo st ens ured that eve n A D EF EN SIV E WAR in defen sive battles casua lt ies were m assive. It w as not o n ly A llie d so ld iers w ho adva nced across o pe n The G e r m an so ld iers w ere initiall y hi ghl y m otivat ed , inspire d by the belief th at the y g ro u nd into heav y much iuc- guu fire . Ex pos ed w ere fig htin g in d efen ce of their home land . to prolonged ar tillery bom bardments. poi soned Al th ou gh so m e demora li zat ion w as in evitable gas att acks, a nd m ass iufa ntr y offe nsive s. it o fte n am o ng th e carnage of the We stern Pront , th eir seem ed to G erm an so ld iers that th ey we re holding co m m itm e nt rem ain ed to the e nd mor e so lid a ll in vain against a materially supe rio r e ne m y.

BERGMA NN MP 18 5U8M ACH IN E· GUN AND 32· ROUN D MAGAZINE

ST O RM ING FORWARD H u nd red s of thousand s of Cerma n s d ied in the g rea t blood-letti ngs of Vcrdu n and th e So m mc in 1916, and in the Al lied offe n sives of 1917. As t he wa r we nt o n , 3 g u lf opened lip ill t he: Ge rma n ranks bet w een bat tle- ha rde ne d tr oops w ho had su rv ive d t hi s car nage and the ag e ing reser vists Of fresh yOll ng co nsc ripts w ho we re req uired to m ake up t he n umber s at t he fron t. T he best so ld iers we re g ro upe d into elite for ma t io n s of "s tor un roo pc rs" a nd u sed to sp ear head co u n te ratt ac ks and offen sives. T he sto r m t ro o pe r co nce pt was tra ceable to an assau lt unit c reated in Marc h 1915 b y Ca ptain W ill y R o h r of t he Pru ssiau G U3nh R ifles. T hro ugh 1916 and 1<J1 7 sto rm batta lio ns be ca m e C0 l11 1110 n , 310ng with sm alle r sto r rn t ro o pc r detac hme nts in sta nd ard infantry regi me nt s. T hey were c reated e ithe r by t he co nve rsio n of un its of rifl em en (jagc r) o r by h and-pic k in g t he b est so ld iers fro m co nve n tio n a l infantr y. Sto r m t ro o pc rs rece ived inte nsive t rain in g and th ey we re e ncou raged to regard th em sel ves 3S th e

Trench axe Alth ough used primari ly as a general purpose to ol in the tr enches, th e axe was useful for close-quarters fight ing dur ing trench-ra iding mission s.

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STAR SHEllS

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Enl ightened warfare Magnesium flares. known as star shells. were fired into the air by a flare pistol to send prearranged signals. Some shells had parachu tes that slowe d thei r descent. Star shells were also used to illumina te No Man's l and and reveal enemy activity.

" prince s of the tren ch es". A stor m bat tal ion m ig ht co nsist of thr ee o r four infantry co m pan ies arme d w it h rifles a nd h and g rena des, a m ach in e- gun co m pa ny , a tr en ch mo rt a r co m pa ny. a ba rt c ry of light infa nt ry g UllS, an d 3 flam e thro wer section. T hey we re e x pec ted t o o perate 0)) the ir OW ))

initiative. punching h oles through the enemy 's trench systems wi t hout sto pp ing. T he co ncept of the storm rroopcr represented a bo ld attempt to ex ploit the lighting sk ills of su pe rb ly t ra in ed infa ntry in a war paralysed by the brute att ritio nal impact o f m assed fire po wer. Its d rawback was tha t sta nda rd infantr y units were str ippe d of th ei r best m e n , w h o were th en th ro wn into th e forefro nt of cve ry cos tly co u nte rattack o r o ffe nsive. lnevitah ly, t he stor nu ro opc rs to ok heavy casua lt ies . so th at G e rma n lo sses we re co nce nt rated among th eir fincsr. m o st ex perie nce d so ldiers.

KAI SERSCHL ACH T The ac id te st of th e cffe c tivc uc« of sto r mtroo pcrs ca m e w it h the Kai serschl aclu offensive of M arch 191H. T h is was 3 des perate ga mble by the Ger ma n Hi gh Com ma nd, w ho th rew the reso u rces released by v icto ry ove r R u ssia 0 11 th e Easte r n Prout int o :1 mJSSiVl' offe nsive in th e West, hop in g to w in th e wa r bcfor« A m erican tro op s we re re ad y to ti g ht . On 2 1 M ar ch t he full force of the Ge r m an onslaug ht fell u po n the Bri ti sh Th ir d and Fitih A rm ies. After being subjec te d to J feroc io us

I TRI ED TO CO N V I NCE MYSEL F OF WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPP ENED TO ME IF I HADN'T ... THRU ST MY BAYONET INTO HI S BELLY FI RST. STEFAN W ESTMANN, 29TH DIVISION GERMAN ARMY

Ov er the top German stormtroopers laden with equi pment advance over open but broken ground during the spring offensive of 1918 . The enemy know of the ir approach because of a preliminary barrage.

German pay book A Soldbuch wascarried by every member of the German army. It contained a record of the soldier'spay and home leave, unitinformation, equipment issued, and medical records.

art iller y bo m bard m ent for four hour s, Briti sh fro ur- linc tro op s were ove rru n by Ger man sto rmtro o pe rs as they e merged o ut of thi ck mo rn ing fog . O nce the Ge rma ns we re at clo se q uarters, there was no resisting the ir flamethr o w e rs, gre na de s. and submac hine-g uns. In son ic places, stor m troo pc rs adv ance d lrik m (10 m ile s) in a d ay's fi gh ti ng and (,Sk n l (40 mi les) by th e en d of a wee k, a n ac h ievemen t u np reced ented since the tre nch lin es had so lid ifie d in lat e 1914 . Bu t in o the r parts o f the front the Ge r ma n offensive failed o r made litt le pr ogress. Th e Kai scr sch lacht ga ine d th e Ge rmans territor y but not ove rall victo ry, and co mple ted the ex haustio n of their arm y.

BITTER D EF EAT As a re sult of t he co nscriptio n of far m workers and far m ho rses. Ger ma ny was despe rately short o f fo od by 191 H, and Ge r m a n so ld iers co u ld not be insulated from th ese sho rtages. At Easter, o ne so ld ier co mplained that his day's ration s had co nsiste d o f ha if a lo af of br ead a nd a c hu nk of roasted ho rsern c at . T he M arch o ffensive wa s Gas mas k The German army'smeans of protection from gas attacks wasmore sophisticated than the Allies' goggles and cotton wadding. This mask features a cylindrica l screw- fitt ed air filter.

INFILTRATION TACTICS The Germans sought to end th e dominance of defence on the Worl d War I batt lefield by tact ics designed to penetrate enemy lines rapidly and in depth . First used to full effect by General von Hutier at Riga in Septembe r 1917, infiltration t act ics dispensed with a prolonged preliminary bombardment of enemy trenches. Instead, a "h urricane" artillery barrage of great intensity, but short duration, was followed by th e advance of heavily-armed stormt roopers. Bypassing strongpoin ts, t hese elite troops wou ld overrun weaker points in front- line trenches w ith the force of their shock attac k. They then pressed on swiftly through second- and thi rd-line trenches to threaten enemy artille ry and communications . Assault infant ry would

di srupted w he n G erm an so ld ie rs o ve rran A lli ed sto res bri mmin g w ith fo od and dr ink, w h ich the y sto pped to plunde r a nd enjoy. T heir po or di et le ft them vl'ry susce pt ible to th e d ead ly Au epide m ic th at eru pted in the seco nd half of 191 H. Worse than hun ger and sick ne ss filr the Ge rman sold ie rs, how ever, w as the ce rtainty that they co uld no lo nger w in the w ar as Am erican troo ps arrive d in force, W he n the A ll ie s d rove the m back in a ser ies of we ll- pla n ne d offens ive s fro III the late su m me r, G erma n so ld iers began to su rrender. M ost ne ver gave lip, how e ver, and they re ma ine d 0 11 foreig n so il at the a r m ist ice .

follow immediately behind them cleaning up pockets of resistance such as machine-gun nests. Alt hough infi lt ratio n tactics of ten succeeded in th eir objective of punching a hole in enemy lines, they did not solve t he probl em of exploiting the oppo rtunity thus presented. In th e absence of motor vehicles, any advance soon slowed to a crawl because of insuperable logistical and transport problems. Stick grenade The Stielhandgranate, or stick grenade, was synonymouswith the sto rm tro opers' rapid assaults on enemy lines.

M an y Ge r ma n s co uld no r acce pt they had bee n de feated after suc h a titani c !\truggle , w hich had co st a ro u nd tw o mill ion so ldie rs th eir li ves. W h ile mo st ex-se rv ice me n becam e stau nch ly anti-wa r as a re su lt o f their e xpe rien ce s, a subs ta ntial m iuor it y recrea te d the co m rades h ip of the tren ches in n at ion alist par.l lll ili tary orga n izurio ns . T he memor y of the sto r m t ro o pc rs was later perv ert ed by th e Na zi Party ill searc h of a w arrio r myth to ju sti fy agg ressive m ilitarism . la st line of def ence Almost deserted, this German soldier stands in his trench about to deal one lastattackon the advancing enemy.

GERMAN TRENCH Throu gh most of World War I, a line of field fortifi cations stret ched for more than 700k m (450 m iles) alo ng the We stern Front fro m N ieuport in Belgium to the Sw iss bord er. T he first tr en ches, improvised in the aut u m n of 1914 , we re in tend ed as temp orary struc tur es, but th ese hastily-d ug dit ches gradually evo lved into perm anent in -dep th defe nsive syste ms incorporating co ncrete bu n kers and stro ngpo ints, prot ected by dense belts of barb ed w ire.

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The o pposing lines o f tr en ches were t ypi ca lly se pa rated by a " no m an 's lan d " so me 2UO-3UOm (22 0-33 0 yard s) w ide , altho ug h in places th ey co u ld be as close as 25 m (28 ya rds) . T he nature of tile tren ch e s varie d dep e ndin g 0 11 the terrain. In the d ry, fir m cha lk of Arto is and the Sam m e, so ld ie rs co uld dig d eep into th e ea rt h a nd c rea te safe, co mfo rta ble shel te rs. But in t he we t, so ft terrai n of Fland er s, w he re th e Baye rn wald tre nch , featured he re, was du g. deep structu res flo oded an d ea rt h walls cru m bled unless sho red up w ith timber or w icker. Life for sold iers in these sha llow

tren che s was o fte n a m ise rable st ruggle against

m ud a nd d amp. T he Ger man s at lea st had t he adva ntage of hav in g chosen their po sition to

di g in at the o utset, selec ting the h igh e r g ro u nd tha t was dri er and less exp osed to enemy fire . At minimum , a tre nch need ed a w all f.l cing t he e ne my that was taller than a m an , for sniper s pi cked o ff a nyo ne w hose head sho we d over t he to p of the pa rapet. Construc tio n and rep air work had to be ca rried o u t u nd er co ver o f d arkn ess. Keeping th e tr e nch es so lid and dr y used up much o f so ldie rs' ene rg ies thr ou g h the w ar.

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Tunnel

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w ire

Simp lified German tr ench system

After 1916the Germanskept their front-lin e trenches lightly manned. Theywere linked by a network of communication passag esto support and reserve trenchesto the rear.

ATTACKS ALT ERNATE WITH COUNTERATTACKS AND SLOWLY THE DEAD PILE UP IN THE FIELD OF CRAT ERS BETWEEN TH E TRENCH ES. ERICH MARIA REMARQUE IN HIS NOVel ALL QUIETON THE WESTERN FRON T

Pride in th eir work German officers and men pose in a newly constructed trench of unusually high quality. It is far too wide to be a front-line trench.

Gren ad e launcher

The Germanswere quicker than the Allies to produce specialist weaponsfor trench warfare such as this grenade launcher.

W inding line

Firest ep

Trenches were never dug in a straight line. Turnings prevented blast or shrapnel raking the whole length of the trench and also blocked the line of fire of any enemyunits that broke into the trench.

A wooden A-frame provides a firestep, enabling a soldier to step up and fire over the parapet. In drier areas firesteps would be dug out of the wall of the trench.

Entranc e to minesh aft

look ing do wn a mineshaft

Serv icing th e t re nch

Mines were dug in an effort to tunnel under enemy lines and plant explosives, as the British did at nearby Messines in 1917.

Two mineshafts 17m (55ft) deep survive at the site. It must have been a soul-des troying job digging them as they would freque ntly have flooded.

The leng th of timber spanning the trench could serve various purposes, such as carrying telephone wires or rigging a hose to pump out water.

Precast concrete

Two-room bunker

Uninv iting she lte r

There were originally ten bun kers at Bayernwald, of which two have survived . Built in 19 16, most were made of precast concrete blocks brought up to th e front by narrow-gauge railway.

Inside, each bunke r consisted of two rooms with ceilings only Um (4ft) high. A tube through the ceiling could be adapted as a flue for a stove or as a periscop e.

The soldiers we re allowed to use the bunkers only during heavy artillery bombardment. They were made cramped and uncomfortable for fear men might lose the will to come out and fight.

OTHER I NFAN T RYM EN OF WORLD WAR I The expe rience of wa r in 1914-1 8 was in man y ways com mo n

were always hi gh and gains fru stratingly sma ll in proportion to

to the in fantr y of all nation s. Wh atever their cou ntry of o rigin

th e losses suffered. T hat civilians, rushed in to uniform, coped so

and to whi chever front they were posted , soldiers had to end ure

wel l w ith the dem and s of mod ern warfare at its most destructive

artillery bo mba rdment and gas atta ck, adva nce in th e face of

is a tribu te to bot h th eir co urage and co m m itme nt. Man y of

machine- gun fire, and fight the squalid dai ly stru ggle in th e

them not o nly endured, but developed from poorl y trai ned

trenches agai nst rats, lice, and mud. Cas ualties in offen sives

amateur s into skilled, hard- bitten fight ing men.

FRENCH POI LU S The Fre nch "po ilu" - the in fm tr y co nsc ript -

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the produ ct o f a systc m desig ned to m ak e e ve ry French ma n into a train ed sold ier. III peacetime all malc French cirizcns did tw o years' nati on al serv ice (raised to three in 191 3 ), the n passing in to

t he arm y reserve, T hey were taug ht to regard se rv ice ill the arm)' as a so u rce of patr iotic pride . Mobilizat io n at the o utbrea k of wa r put m or e th an rhr,..-e millio n of the se c itize n-so ld ie rs ill the field within weeks. Inade quatel y armed and kit rcd o ut ill bri g ht uniform s th at m ade excellent target s. the..y were throw n away in offe nsive s that co llapsed ill the face of o verw he lming Germa n tir cpowcr. T he Fren ch army rall ied to defe at th e G s'm !;lIlS at t he First Bat tle o f the M a rn e, bu t b y th e e nd of th ree m o nth s about a mi llion Prc uch so ld iers h ad h ccn ki lled or wo u nde d . Af t er the se shatte..'ring lo sse..·s the Fren ch sett led ill to the demorali zin g attr ition o f tren ch war fa re . On th e

w ho le thcir cond itio ns were wor se th an those o f e ither Brit ish o r G erman tro o ps, w ith po or qu alit y t ren ch es, monot ono us fo od, and inadeq uate

rest faci lities w hen o ut of the front li ne. Prcn ch m or a le survived th e slaug hte r at Verdun ill 191(•. but futi le offensives ill ea rly 1917 brought wi de spread m uti n ie s. The autho rit ie s were forced to improve food " lid leave, and be less was tefu l of m en's lives. M o rale recovered su ffic iently tor th e Fre nch infa ntr y to m ake a m ajor co ntributio n to v ic to ry in 191H. O ut o fso me H.3 mil lion French so ld iers w ho serv ed in the co urse of the wa r, a lmost 1.4 mi ll io n we re ki lled .

Desperate measures French troops use rocks aswell asrifles to dislodge Germansoldiers from hillsidetrenches in eastern France.

Uniform and weapons The conspicuousuniform of 19 14 was changed in 1915 to a pale blue overcoat and trousers plus the Adrian steel helmet.

US IN FAN TR Y When t he United Sta tes e nte red Worl d Wa r J in Ap ril 19 17 it wa s in th e p ro cess o f ex pa nd ing its regu lar a rmy to 140,000 me n and c re at ing a vo lu ntee r reserve of 400.000 , in cor poratin g the Na t io na l G u ard . T hese numbers w er e. howe ver . w ho lly iusufficicnr for t he m ass a r my need ed for th e Eu ro pean w a r. T h e go ve rn m ent d eci d ed to c reate a new " n at io n al ar my " ra ised e nt ire ly by co nsc rip tio n. D espi te t rad iti o nal host ilit y to th e draft . co nsc riptio n we nt ahea d sm o o th ly, bu t it w as a slow pro cess asse m b ling and rran spo rr in g tro op s to Eu ro pe. T he Amer ican Ex pedi tio na ry Force nu m bered ove r 500 ,000 by June 1918 , w he n it fi rst e nte red co m bat 0 11 th e We ster» Front. N ick na med " do u gh bo ys', the co nsc ripts im pre ssed j ad ed Euro pe a ns as ph ysicall y fit, m enta lly fresh yo u n g m en, their o pt im ism co nt rasting sha r ply w ith th e cy n ic ism of th e w a r- weary Brit ish a nd Fre n ch. T he U S tro op s in exper ie nce. a nd th at o f th eir o fficers , co st the m dearl y in early e ng agem e nts . The ir su pply syste m wa s o fte n po o rly o rgan ize d an d tro ops at times w e nt

h ungry in t heir tr enches. Apa rt from rifles. m ost o f their fig hting equ ip me nt had to be su pplied by t he Brit ish an d Fren ch. But th e doug hb oy p ro ved h is figh ti n g w ort h. m os t not abl y in the St M ih id o ffensive in Sep tember 19 18 . U S fo rce s we re totall y raci a lly segregate d . So me 200,000 African-Ameri ca n co nsc ripts we re se nt to Europe, bu t o n ly a fili h o f th ese wer e allo we d to serve in J co m bat role, ill se pa rate all- black di v isio ns . By t he end o f t he wa r th er e we re t w o m ill ion U S tr o ops in Euro pe. A round 50.000 U S so ld iers di ed in co m b at; a sim ila r number were k ill ed by influ en za bet wee n 1918-19.

US equip me n t The Ameri cans added a few new touches to th e weaponry of the war, such as shotguns used to clear enemy tren ches.

COMBINED KNIFE AND KNUC KLE· DUSTER

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Americans on th e W est ern Fro n t M en of the 23 rd Infantr y Regiment fi re a 37-mm gun at a German posit ion during the successful St Mihiel offe nsive of September 19 18, th e first major US operatio n of the war.

PUMP-A CTION SHOTGUN

CANADIAN INFAN TR Y Ca na da h ad o n ly a few t ho usand m en in its reg u lar a rm y when t he w a r be gan . U n hesitati n g in its su ppo rt for Britain , t he do m in io n in vit ed vo lu n te e rs to c reate a Ca na d ia n Ex pe ditio na r y Force. So me (,00,0 00 C an ad ia ns e n liste d, o f w ho m 4 IH.OOO served o verseas. O rga n izi ng a n army alm os t fro m scratc h wa s a fo rmidable task . but a body of hastil y trained Ca n ad ia n civ ilia nsin -uni fo rm w as read y to tak e its place in th e fro nt line at Ypres in Ap ri l 19 15 - j ust in time to t:.ce the first ch lo rine gas att ac ks on the Western Pron t oAs C an ad ia n nu m be rs gr ew, so did their ex po su re to th e wo rst the w ar co u ld show. Ca n ad ians su ffe re d heav y casu alt ies at th e So m me in su m m er 19 16 and in th e mud o f Passch end aele th e foll owing yea r. T h eir exc e pt io n al fightin g qu alities we re uni ve rsall y recogni zed. T he C ana d ia n ca pt u re of h eavi ly d efended Vi my R idge o n 9 Apr il 1917, ch arg in g up a stet'p bare slo pe in sleet a nd snow, w as o ne o f th e g reat feats o f a r m s in th e wa r. M ore th an 56, 000 Ca na d ian so ld iers d ied in co m bat.

ROSS ,303 MK III SNIPER RIFLE

... ITS ASSAULT O N LY FAILED ... BECAUSE DEAD MEN CAN ADVANCE NO FURTHER. GEN . BEAUVO IR DE lYLE

ON THE NEWFOUNDLAND REGIMENT AT THE SOMME

Can adia n wea pons and kit The Canadia ns' khaki unif orm was based on t he Brit ish one, but they produ ced th eir ow n rifl e, th e Ross, w hich had an unusual sho rt, stu bby bayonet.

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THE ANZACS O n th e o ut b rea k o f war, yo u ng m e n in Austr ali » and New Z ea la nd respon d ed ea ge rly to th e ir gove r n me nts' ca ll fo r vo lu ntee rs to ti ght in su ppo rt o f Britai n - abo ut o ne in fi ve m alt' New Zea landers eve nt ua lly joined up . Gro up ed to get her as A N ZAC s, Au str al ia n an d N ew Zealand tr o op s we n ' ini t ially stat io ned ill Eg yp t for t rain in g . T he Australia ns ill particula r so o n gainl'd a re putation as to ug h char.rctcrs. T he ir indiffer en ce to m ili tar y et iqu ette o utraged Brit ish o fficer s a nd t he ir o tr -d ut ), bc ha vio ur appa lled t he Eg yp riau s. O nce in batt le, ho we ve r. AN ZAC tro op s pr o ved thl' m o st tl>;lrso lllc and effec tive fi g h ters o n th e Al lied side in till' w a r. Thei r bapt ism o f fire in t he not o riou s Gallip oli ca m paig n w o u ld h ave d em o ralized a less reso lut e b o d y o f so ld iers, but th ey w e nt 011 to ti ght at the Son un e a nd l'assch cnd ac lc . By su m mer 19tH th e Au st ralians had th eir OWI1 co r ps, wh ic h spea rheaded till' o ffe nsives th at ro lled back till' Ge rm a n Ar m y, Pro po r t iona lly, th e Au str alian s su ffe red t he h ig hest casua lty rare o f an y n at io n al a rm y in th e w ar , w it h 60,0110 ki lled and 220,Olli l w ounded o ut of aro und 320 ,000 sent fill oversea s serv ice . cw Zea la nd su ffere d 58,000 casu alt ies, incl udi n g 17,(JOO dead .

RUSSIAN TROO PS Peasant co nsc r ipts torm cd th e m ajorir y of t he R u ssian ar my. w ith a ll ad m ixt ure o f w orkers fr om t he m ajor ci t ies. M obili zati o n we nt vc ry smoo th ly, bur badl y- led Ru ssia n for ce' , u lTered a catastro ph ic de feat at T auu cnbcrg ill btl.' Aug u st 1')14 . From th e n O il t he R ussia ns we re be ate n wh enever they fi:H1 ght t he G er mans, altho ug h th ey so m et im es inflict ed til-feats O il the Au str ian s a nd the T u rk s. I ) iscoll{en t g rcw as li ves w e re 11\

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thrown away ill fut ile offen sive s an d cond itio ns at the fro nt s worsened . So ld ier s resente d th ose ex em pted fro m co nscr iptio n w ho m ade m Olle y out of the bo omin g wa rti me ec o no m y and ma n)' a lso h ated th eir arro ga n t a nd inco m peten t

o ffi ce rs. In March 1'.>1 7 so ld ie rs in rese r ve un its he lpe d overt hrow th e Tsarist regime. So ld iers' co m m ittee s (o r "sov iet s" ) were set u p a nd u npo pu lar officers were ejec te d b y th eir m en . T Ill' Il C W Pro v isio na l G o vcr n m c n t ca lled O il so ld iers to co n tin ue to re sist " the bayonet s o f co nq uero rs", but t he offens ive o f J u ne )(»)7 re vea led th e lim ited appea l of co nt in ued fighting . It pet ered o ut and th er e w er e m ass d esertio n s. o rb ing co u ld sto p th e ar my 's d issol ut ion as pe asan t so ldi ers la id d o w n th e ir ri rles and we nt home to j oin in land se iz u re s. Some 1.8 m ill ion R u ssian

PAPAKHA SHEEPSKIN HAT

Badge In Ro manov colours

t ro o p' had di ed in t he w ar.

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MOS IN-NAGANT RIFLE

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WHAT'S THE USE OF US PEASANTS GETTING LAND IF I AM KILLED AND GET NO LAND?

Russian un iform The khaki t unic. introd uced in 1907, w as wo rn w it h more tradit ion al items of clot hing. such as the Cossack papakha.

RUSSIA N PEA SA NT SO LDI ER, MAY 1917

ITALIAN TROO PS Ital y's bel ated d eclarat io n o f w ar on Au str ia1'l lI n ~a r y in M ay 1')1 5, m oti va ted b y rc r r itor ial a m b itio u s, was u np opu la r with much of til l' popularion . H aving been u n ified o n ly hal f a Bersaglieri hat The Bersaglieri, a crack rifle corps, wo re distinct ive plumed hats on parade.

ce nt ur y ea rli e r, Italy had bu ilt up on ly lim ited pat r iot ic se n ri m e u r. and co nsc ri pts from Sici ly a nd th e so ut h gl'nl' ra lly vi ewed t he north of Ital y as a fo reign po st in g . T he Alpine fr on t to w h ic h Ita lia n so ld ie rs were se n t WJS h arsh an d fo rbi dd in g terra in . Weat her co nd itio n s w e re often appa lli ng ~1I 1 d assau lt s 0 11 Alpin e r idges, ev e n if succes sfu l. o n ly re ve a led an o the r r id gc be hi nd to be ta ke n . O n ly t he elite A lp in i h ad an y spe c ia l

Mountain trenches Repeated Ital ian att empts to break th rough the Austrian lines failed despite heavy bom bardm ents and vicious

hand -to -hand lighting.

sk ills fo r co ping w ith m ountain warfa re . Frontline t ro o ps o fte n we nt sho rt o f foo d, clo thin g, and medi cal servi ces. So ldie rs we re routinely mi streat ed by th eir o ffi ce rs. Th e savi ng g ra ce fo r the Itali ans w as th at th e Au stro - Hunga ri an s we re ge nc ra lly in a sim ilar p lig ht to th em selves. The t ransfer of G erm an fo rces to th e Ita lia n fro nt pr ecipitat ed di saster t( )r Ita ly at C apo rerto in O ct ober 1')17. De m o ral ized , r id d led w ith pac ifist and d efeat ist se nt ime n t. in flu c ucc d by left - wing revo lut io na r y ide as, a nd ex h auste d by roo m a ny cos tly o ffen sive s. Ital ian so ld ie rs q ui t th e batt le field almost a, so o n a' t he ti ~ h ti n ~ beg an a nd tied as f." . and f;lS t a' th ey co u ld , A de fen sive lin e wa s stab ilized o n till' P iave R ive r in win ter 1917, A ft er a pe ri od cau tio u sly d e voted to th e re sto rat ion of m orale , th e Ita lia ns e nd ed th e w ar o n th e offe nsive. led by ne w assa u lt t ro ops, till' A rd it i. But overa ll th e Ita lia n so ld ie r', ex pe rien ce o f t he w ar w as di sillusioning in th e ex t re me . A lmo st h alf a mi lli on Ita lia ns di ed in th e co n flic t .

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY The Au str o - Hu n gnrian army re flec te d th e co m plex ity o f a m u ltina ti o na l e m pire in which Aust ria n G er m an s and Hun ga rian s do minat ed assor ted o ther peo ples - c h id ly Czec hs, Slovaks, C ro ats, S I<'>Vl' IlC S. Bo sn ians, Rur hc nes. a nd Po les. T he majo rit y of o fficers were Ger ma n spea ke rs. w hi le nea rly half the co nscripts wer e Slavs, man y of w ho m spoke 110 Germa n . The ar my. ho we ver. ini tia lly foug ht we ll an d the infa ntry wa s supplie d wit h good q ua lit y Wt'apons for t re nch warfare , even i f 4 U:lI1 t it i cs were ins uffic ien t. But c rac ks in

lo yalt y to th e empire soon began to appt'ar. T he shoc k o f till' Ru ssian Brusilo v offe ns ive in SlI Jl1I1lc..'r 1<) t (l led to ma ss d ese rt io ns by Czechs and R urhcncs. T Ill' ex hausted ar m y lat er came iucr ca sing ly unde r t h l' co n tro l o f its Ger ma n

allies , a (le t resented by m an y of th e troops. By Sept ember !9I H, w ith d deat inevit able, till' army was d isint eg rat in g int o its sepa rate nat io nal co m po ne n ts. Pr o bably aro u nd a mi llion Aust ro Hun garian so ld ie rs d ied ill th e wa r.

Mou ntain troops

The Austrians had specialist Alpine troops. w hose skills were called on bot h in nor th east Italy and in th e Carpathia n mo untains against the Russians.

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Schw a rzlose machine -q un This water -cooled machine-gun proved a very reliable wea po n even in th e fr eezing conditions of th e Alps and the Carpathians.

TURKISH TROOPS INFANTRY TUN IC

When it e n te re d World War I as an ally o f G erm any in N o vember )tJl·t, the multinatio nal O ttom a n Em pire wa s in th e middle of a poli ti cal upheaval th at wo u ld event ua lly create th e nati on- state of Turke y, Its co nsc ript ar my was lar gely recru ited from t he Turki sh A uatoJian peasant ry. There we re Kurd ish and Ar ab unit s. but th ese co u ld not be relied o n, ;111( 1 J ew s and C h ristians were o n ly used in su pport ro les. T he T urkish Arm y ha d per formed po orl y in rece nt wa rs in the Bal kans .1 1H.I again st Italy. W hen A llied for ce s carried ou t the Ga llipo li la nd ings in Ap ri l 19 15 , t he y were astonished b y the revi licn ce an d motivation of th e Turk ish so ld ie rs. A Germ an o bserver att ribu te d th e tr o ops' perform an ce to "s tu bbo r n d evot ion an d un shakeable loyalt y to th eir Sulta n an d Ca liph", For w ha teve r reason , "Mchmcdchik" - th e eq uiva lent o f th e Br it ish " To m my" - w as read y

to die in d esperate co u nrcrar r.icks to rep ulse the la ndings. Courage was no remed y fo r econom ic and ad mi nis trat ive failings. however. As th c war dragged on, T urk ish t roops rail sho rt of food. a\ di d the popul at io n at home. M edical ser v io .-s we re minimal and d isease took its toll. Germ an t ro op s. figh ti ng alongside t he Turks. o ccasioned g rea t rese ntment beca use of t heir supe rio r f(Hll l supplies a nd equipment . By su m mer 19 1H, d cfcarcd in Iraq and Palest ine, the Turki sh army wa s in full d isint egra ti on . Troops deserted e n m asse, eit he r re tu rn ing to wo rk th ei r aba ndo ned fid d s or rcsor rin g to banditry. O ver half a m illio n T u rki sh so ld ie rs d ied in co m bat, w ith pcrh .rps ha lf as m an y aga in d yin g of d isease.

Turkish w e apons a nd uni fom

FRAGMENTATION GRENAD E

The Turks were issued With Mauser rifles - some new. some older mo dels that the Germans no longer used. The style of their khaki unifor m also showed the influence of their German advisers.

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FIGHTERS OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR The failure of an attempted militar y co up in Spain in J uly 1936

Brigades. Apart from advanced experi me nts in th e usc of air

led to a three-year civil war, in wh ich right-wi ng Na tionalists led

pow er by th e Ge rma n Condo r Legion , th e war was mostly

by General Francisco Franco fough t forces loyal to th e R epub lican

foug ht using World War l- era tactics and equipme nt. T he

gove rn me nt. N azi Ge rmany and Fascist Italy int erven ed o n th e

Nation alists were ultim ately victo rious in a con flict th at cost

Nation alist side , while th e R epublicans received support o n a

more than 500 ,000 lives, aro und a qu art er of th em civilians

sma ller scale from Soviet R ussia and from voluntee r Intern ational

o r pri son ers massacred in cold blood .

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colony. Spanish Morocco . T he elite o f thi s f() f CC wa s t he Sp.m ish FOrl.-ig n l. cg io n . c re ate d ill 1() 2()

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the m odel of the Fr ench Forei gn Leg ion. b ut rec ru ited almost e ntirel y from Spa n ish vo lu ntee rs

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SPAN lARD S! T H E NATION CAL LS TO H ER DEFE NCE ALL T HOSE WH O H EAR THE HO LY NAM E OF SPAIN. FRAN CISCO FRANCO, MANIFESTO OF JULY 19, 1936

h.- ast until th e civ il wa r bro ught a ru sh o f

recru its from Po rtu gal an d else whe re. The Arm y ofAfri c;l also in cluded lar ge numbers of to u g h Moroccan Rifft ri bl'Sllll'11 se rvi ng under Spa n ish offi cers , Un li ke th e troops 0 11 the m ain land . w ho were m o stl y ill-trained co nsc r ipts. th e Legi on and M oroccan so ld iers were hardened profession als. After th e Army o f Afri ca , the most effect ive troops o n the Nationalist sid e we re th e Cat holic ro yali st mili tia s known as t he "rcqucres". C h iefly hill farmers from the Nava rre regio n. these so ld iers fought in ;1 c r us ad in g sp ir it , "one h and holdin g The siege of Madr id Nationalist soldiers attac k an enemy posit io n on th e Madr id front. Aft er thr ee years of fighting. the city finally fell to Franco's forces In March 1939.

a g n: na de, the o ther a ro sar y" . T he Na rio na lists a lso h od th e su pport of t he m ilit ia of th e t,\Sc ist Pa langi« m o vemen t and of m uch of th e Ci vil G ua rd , a paramilitar y pol icc fo rce t ha t was much b etter e q u ippe d t han th e conscri pt a r m y. At first th e ra pi d pro !,:re " ma de by th e A r my o f Africa promised an ea sy N at io n alist trium ph . Fe rr ied across to so u thern Spain aboard German

a nd lralian ai rcra ft , they adv an ce d o n M adr id m assacr in g thousands alo ng th e way . But stif1"l' lling resist ance broug ht t he co lonia l t roops to a halt in the sub u rbs of the cap ital. co nde m n ing t he ariona list s to fi~ h t in~ a lo n g wa r of attr ition . The su pe r io r fo reig n suppo rt th e y e njoyed . a nd th e d isu ni ty of t he ir Oppo llt.' nts , event ua lly gavt.' Fra nco's m e n a hard - fou ght victory .

SPANISH MAUSER MODEl 1893

CONDOR LEGION "Vo lu n teers" fro m the armed to rccs of Ccr mnn y 3'HI 1t31y supported t he ario na lists th rou ghout th e c iv il wa r, T he Ital ian s were m o re IlUl1ll'nHI S, hut the G e r ma ns w er e m ore c: tli..·c tivc:. Organ ized int o the Co ndo r L q~ i o ll from Novem be r ! tJ] (l. the Ge r ma n int ervention fo rce co ns isted pr im aril y of I.uft w a ffc ai rc raft a nd pilots. Ther e W3' 31, 0 3 co nt inge nt of lig ht ra nks a nd of 88m m a r tille ry u sed in an ant i- aircraft and a nt ita n k rol e . N az i leaders saw t he war as a testin g g ro u nd fin I R ' W equi pme nt and tact ics. T he Jun kers J u 8 7 Stu b d ive -bo mber

resp onsibl e for th e d est r u crio n o f th e Basq ue to wn of G uc r n ica by aerial bombardmenr in Apr il 11) 37. Pe rso n nel 'er v ing w it h the Legi o n were well paid by thei r govc r n mc nr and ret u r ned to G e r ma n y as ;) co m ba t- ha rde ne d el ite , Messerschmitt 8f-l09 0 Many Luf tw aff e pilots and aircraft such as th e Messerschml tt Sf-l 09 D saw their first combat With t he Condor l egion in Spain.

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INTERNATIONA L BRI GA DES From late )t) J (, the Sov iet U n io n o rga ni ze d

l nt crnationn l Br igadcs to fig ht aga inst fasci slll in Spai n . Ent hus iast ic vo lu nteers fro m m an y co u nt r ies. inclnd in g Fr.mcc. 1t ~) l y. Gl'r m a ny, Po land , Br ita in , and th e U n it ed St are s. j oined up ill Pa r is 31H.t w en: m o ved clandcvrinc ly in to Spa in . T he first Br igad l:s were rl'ad y ill rime to pla y a cruc ia l p.irt in th ,' d efen ce of M adr id in Nove m b e r 11J3 (,. T hro ug h 11)37- 3H tho usand s lo st th ei r li ve s in fu ti le front a l o tfcn vivcs. O t hers we re e xecu te d by com m u n isr o fficers fo r de vi at ion fro m t he co r rec t po lit ica l linc o r for de se rt io n . The Br igade s were di sh.m d ed in Se pte m be r 1'J3H, t ho se w ho rem ained be in g in tc g rnrcd into th e R epubli can Peo ple', A r m y. Our 0 ((,11,0 1111 vo lu n tee rs, 111,0 110 d i" d in Spa in .

the M csscr sch m itt Bf-I O,) tighte r w e re tWO':~;iii; airc ra ft bl o oded in Spa in tha t wo u ld prove c ruc ial in th,' o pe ni ng ph ase of W o rld Wa T he Lu ft w affe ga ilH.'d ex pe r ie nce ill air- to-air co m bat ~1I H.1 ill pro vid ing ai r suppo rt to g ro u nd fo rce s, Th e C o nd o r Legi on was in fam o u sly

LOYAL ISTS At th e start of the c iv il wa r the govcr nmc ur had the suppo rt o f lo yal un its of th e regular 3r m y a nd o f th e m ajo rity of the para mi litar y Assau lt G U3rd ,. Bu t the R epublic's su r vi val de pended up on the creat io n of people's m ilit ia' by a va r ie ty of le ftwi ng g ro ups, ch ief among th em th e anarch ist and soc ialist trad e union m o vemen ts. Sl'izing we apo ns fro III ar lllY de po ts, they sec u red maj or c it ies and m ou nt ed a d efe nce against th e N ati onali st fo rces , while sim u lta ne o us ly tr ying to carry th rou g h a soc ial re vo lut io n. T he

mi liti as w e re r u n 011 str ictly d emo c rat ic lin es, wi th th e elcc rion o f o fficers and a tota l lack of fo r ma l d isc ipl ine . At tim" , t hey perfo rm ed w ith o u tstandi ng braver y, but th e milit ias w e re pro babl y toll unreli abl e to tig ht 3 lo n g w a r of att r it io n aga in st Fra nco's regul ars, Pe rh aps su r p r ising ly, no o ne co n sidere d m ount in g a g u er r illa cam paig n agai n sr th e Na tio na lists. Iustead . the R ep ubl ican go ver n m e ru insisted O il c re ating J co nvent io nal J rmy to tight a co nve n tio na l wa r. T he Pe o ple's Arm y intcg rarcd th e popula r mili ti as, lo yal pre - ci vil wa r tr o o ps,

and fresh co nsc r ipts ti·OI I1 R epu bl ican- co ntro lled areas. It wa s wa tc hed ov er by po litical co m m issars w ho we re a lmos t cxclus ivc lv com m u n ist . With th e Sov ie t U n io n su pply ing th e R ep ubli c w ith arms and spec ialist per sonnel, th e in flue nce o f th e co m m u n ists, at first a mi no r it y, rapidl y increa sed . In - ti g ht ing bet we en le ft- w ing g ro ups w ith in th e ar m y hampered its e ffec ti ve ne ss. A lth ou gh b rave and stu bbor n . rhe tro ops were po o rly led , ofte n th ro w n away in o vcra m b it ious offl'llsi vl's.

It "'J S 3 w eJr y and d em ora lize d ;Jrmy th ar fi n ally sur re nd e red in M a rch 1')3').

Opucalvqb t

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Prop agan da post er " tst wi n the war: fewer wasted wor ds!" urges a 1937 poster - a reference to the in.flghting between left-wing grou ps that undermined the Loyalist cause. Pisto l gn p

A BATTLE IS I N PROGR ESS NOT MERELY TO DEFEND A PEOPLE FRO M A SAVAGE AG G R ESS O R, BUT TO DESTROY SO ME T H I N G THAT .,. W ILL ... C RUSH TH E PEOPLE OF ALL DEMOCRAT IC COUNTRI ES . BILL PAYN TER, BRITISH INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES MEMBER. MAY 1937

Hotc hk iss M I. 1914 The French-manufactu red Hotchkiss machine-gun saw service with both sides in the Spanish Civil War.

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N T H E SU M ME n 0 1' 19 4 0 ,

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Britain's RA F Fighter Com ma nd

faced a sustained air o ffensive by bomber and fighter ai rcr aft o f th e G erma n Luftwaffe. Kn own as th e Battle o f Britain, th is was th e fir st ba ttle fough t exclusively in th e air. It was a

co nflict for which th e R A F had m ade some preparati on , chiefly in th e form o f radar m asts placed arou nd the coas t, bu t it rem ain ed a k nife- ed ge co ntes t. T he defen ce of Britain dep ended up on a rem arkabl y sm all num ber o f pilo ts (aro u nd 1,50 0 at fu ll stre ng th) who fou ght to th e limit o f th eir endura nce .

Befo re the

W Jr.

th e R A F att rac te d a st re am o f

volun teers, some of wh o m w en.' then assig ned

to the aircra ft fio w u b y Fig hter Co m m and . Yo un g men we re excited by the pro spect of flying Britain's fast new mo noplane fighters. tilt: Supe rmarine Spit fire and th e H aw ker H ur r icane. They were also aware th at, a, fighter pil ot " they would be o bject' o f m ale e nvy and fem ale desire . O ne pilot described RA F fighter service a, just "beer, women a nd Spitfires '. In th e class-bo und Brirish so ciet y of t he 1930, . Fig hter C o m ma nd came to be regarded by so me offi ce rs as a ll elite flying club. So me of them we re recruit ed thro ug h socially exclusive o rgan izario ns suc h a, the Auxil iar y Air For ce and th e O xford University Air Squadr on, brin ging with them the public scho o l etho s o f th e "sti ff upper lip" and a bantering, self-d epreca to ry tone. But aspiring fliers fro m o ut side the privileged class also gailll'd entry to righter Command, throug h t he Vo lu nt eer R ese rve. M o st of these vo lu nte ers flcw as se rge ant pilo ts. rather than offi cers .

OV ERSEAS PI LOTS Ab out 20 per cent o f Fighter Com ma nd 's pilots in th e Batt le o f Britai n were non - Briti sh. On e in ten wer e prov ided by Com mo nwealth co u ntries , w ith New Zea lande rs the most nu me ro us single g ro up. C o m mo nw calth pi lot s we re o ften better sho ts t han th e Brit ish , w ho se trai nin g put less em pha sis on m ark sm anship, O the r Fig hte r Com ma nd pilo ts were refugee s fro m O cc upied Europe, includi ng Poles, Czech" French. a nd Belg ian s. T he Pol e' co m p rised the largest Europea n co ntinge nt, and the m os t mo t ivated ; beaten by t he Luft w affe during the invasion of Po lan d in Se pte mbe r 1939, t he y were hot for revenge . Whatev er their o rigins, all fighter pilot, were yo ung - in principle no on e o ver

the age o f 26 w as a llo we d to lead a squad ron. alt ho ug h the tw o g reates t lead er s in the Battle o f Britain wer e exceptions - "Sai lor" M alan and Do uglas Bad e r were bo t h aged 3D.

BATTL E C O M MEN CE S In th e spring of PHO . Fightl'r Com ma nd to ok o n the Luftwaffe in th e battle for Fran ce a nd dur in g the e vac uatio n of th e British army from Dunki rk . These earl y e ncou n ters showed th at the Gc rma ns were better at air fig htin g than t hc R A F, w ith mo re e x pe rienced pi lo ts and su pe rio r tac tics. A fter clashes ov er the C han nel thro ugh Ju ly, the Ger man aerial on slaught o n so uthern Eng land be gan in earliest in the second w eek o f Au gmt . with fleet s o f bombe rs. esco rte d by M esser schmirt fightcr«, atrnck ing in d aylight whenever the we ather permitted . T he aim of the Luft waffe ca m pa ign was to csrahlish air suprc macy, thus o pen ing the w ay for a seabo rne invasio n of Britain . Fig hter C o m m and ch ief H ug h Do wd in g intended to keep hi , tig ht er pilot s and aircraft in ex iste nce as ;1 vi ahie defen sive force , and hu sbanded re source s to that end . The RAF squad ro n, ba sed at air fie lds ill so uthe rn England found t he m selves in th e front line o f th e fightin g, a, th e vast maj orit y of Luft waffe raid, w e re laun ched ac ross th e C han nel from ba ses in no rthern Fra nce .

ENFiElD M K1 .38 REVOLV ER AND AMMUNITION

III

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Hurricane and Spitf ire A Hurricane fighter(foreground) files with a Spitfire durmgWorld War II. Though the Spitfire isbetter known, the Hurricane was more numerous. and so had the higher strike recordagamst the luftwaffe.

Inst ead of m ounting ai r pa t ro ls. th e RA F pilots wa ite d ncar th eir aircraft o n th e g ro und, re ad y to "sc ra m ble" at a mOI11 (,l1t's noti ce. C oasta l rad ar statio ns alert ed co ntro l ce nt res to the appro ach o f enemy aircraft : co nt ro lle rs o rde red sq uadrons into th e air. The fighters we re the n given radioed instr uct io ns to g u ide th em towards th e ell cln y.

at airfields dose to th e so uth coas t rail the risk o f b rin g caug ht 0 11 the g ro und. C o nse q ue ntly. pi lot s se t o ff for th eir aircra ft at a run . It t ypi cally took five minutes fo r a squad ro n to ge t airbo r ne . T here were cases o f men ca ught u nprep ared taki ng off wea rin g fly in g gear ove r pyj a m as. The pi lot wa s sq ue ezed int o a ti ght cock pit under a Ple xi gl ass ho od, w it h hi s feet o n th e

GETT I NG AIRBO RN E

rudder ba r, h is ri ght hand o n th e co nt ro l st ick . a nd hi s leti h an d o n the t hrott le . T he re was v irtua lly no space at all to r body m o vement: to lo o k aro u nd , t he pil ot co u ld o n ly turn hi s neck o r hi s aircraft. In th e ai r, he was ex pecte d to take hi s place ill a tight Vvshap ed "v ic" format ion o f t h ree aircraft , w h ich wo u ld usua lly be co m b ine d w ith ot her "vi es" in a squad ro n of 12 . For less ex pe rie nced pilot s, sim ply keeping formati on was a demanding activ ity that left 110 tim e for watc hi ng th e c nc m y. Alth ou gh hi gh er com ma nd in sisted o n th is tight formati on tiying , ex pe rie nce d pil ot s inc reasin gl y to ok the init iative and abandoned th e " v ies". The b ette r sq uad ro n s ado pted a 10 o St,

Sc ra m b li ng always had to be car ried o ut with ut rno.. t speed , be ca u se CVt'ry sec o nd of del ay wo uld t rau slatc int o less altitu de ga inl.'d b efore mcct ing the l.'IlI.'my. At worst, squadrons stat io ne d

The Luft w affe force typ icall y co n siste d o f a by M esscrsch rnit r fighte r esco rts e ither ill cl o se atte nda nce or at hi gh a ltit ude . T h e fig ht er s had le arn ed d urin g t he Spani sh C iv il War to ba se their formation o n a pair o f airc ra ft: a lead er and a wi ng ma n. The leade r w as th e se n ior pil ot and th e be st sho t : hi s win gman was suppo sed to g uard his tai l. Two such pai rs wo uld j oin togeth er to m ake a lo o se "finger - fou r" formation. T he fo u r aircraft flew at slig h tl y diffe ren t alt itu de s a nd rela t ively sp read o ut , so t hat th e y di d no t n eed to wo r ry abo ut t he risk of co llisio n . Th e lo o ser ((U l1lat io ll also m ad e th e nirc raft more difficult to spo t. T he w or st sce nario fo r the !t AF was to be " b o u nce d " by th e Messcr sc hm itt s. lf rhey f;l iled to spot th e Luftwaffe tighter s hi gh ab o ve t hem , t he latt er wo u ld att ac k in a h igh - sp e ed di ve. pick in g o n aircra ft at th e back of the Brit ish for ma tion . It is rec koned that fo ur o ut of fi ve R A F pil ot s sho t d o w n ne ve r saw th eir at tacker.

bomber sw a r m acco mpa ni ed

form ati o n an d acted o n th e prin ciple o f e ngagi ng the CIH.' my as ag gre ssivd y as po ssibl e wh en ever and in w ha teve r w ay m ight work.

Ex ploi ting th e mo me nt um of th e dive. th e M csscrschm irts co u ld escape before a ny of th e RA F fi ghter s reac te d . If till" Ge r ma n fi ghter s we re spo tt e d in time. th e RA F pilot s co u ld turn to c ngagc th em and a "dogfig ht" e n sue d - a

Eag le Squad ron pil ot Due to a shortage of pilotsafter the Battle of Britain, the RAF recruited volunteers from overseas to make up their numbers. The Eagle Squadronswere made up of US recruits.

ge ne ral m l'lec w ith aircraft chasing on e an oth er in tight turns and firi ng in sho rt bursts at any enem y in the ir sig hts. D ogfi g ht s we re m o stl y br ief but sha ttcr in gl y int en se and chao tic.

In e xp eri en ced pil ot s were liabl e to ti re at a llY aircra fi th e y S:lW, fr iend or ro c, O ut- t u rn ing a ll c nc my to gl.'t 0 11 his tai l W:lS t he m o st successfu l tacti c. bu t if a p ilot turned h i, fig h ter too tigh tl y he co u ld pass out th rou gh excessive g-fi)rces . Att :lck in g th e m ass of slo we r- moving D or ni c r, junker s, a nd H c i n kel bomber s po sed its own pr obl em s. The most cffec rivc tactic W:lS to tly h ead - on toward, th e' bo m bers , wh ich co u ld break up t he fo r ma tion . It wa s a lso incredi b ly ri sk y an d psych ol o g icall y d em andi n g . M o st pil ot s sc rrlcd for attac king b ombe rs from th e' flank o r re ar . Bombers wert' rel at ivel y e:lS)' to hit but we re h ard to shoo t d o wn , absorbi ng a g rea t d eal of pun ishment . T he li ghter h ad to fin' at c lo se ra nge to ac h ieve an y de ci sive effect , tak in g th e cha lice of bein g himsel f hi t by t he bomber s' wc ll- t ra iuc d g u n ners .

TH E BEST AND THE REST W he n aircraf r tlyi llg at o ver 4HOkph (J lllim p h) m et ill aeria l co m bat, the spe ed at which L'Vl.'lItS o cc urred req uired a pil ot to po sse ss ve ry spec ial

ex tre me . new pilo ts thrown into co m ba t aftt'r aro u nd 12 hou rs

Silk map This light. silk map was stitc hed into the pilot 's jacket. It was needed if he was fo rced to bail out - in this case, over th e Pyrenees.

q ua lit ies. In t he

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pre-compute r age, j ust co nt ro lli n g th e ai rc raft was a re fi ne d sk ill, eve n w ith out the need to man oeuvre ill a cro wded air spacc and lo cate a nd fire O il a tar get . It ha s b een est im ate d th at 110 m o re d un o ne in 20 Bart le of Br ita in p ilot s had th e co m bin atio n of flying sk ills, superb eyes ig ht, instant rea ction s, situ atio na l awa re ness , and killer insti nct to make a real ly e ffec tive fighter pi lot . A sm all nu mbe r o f ace s acco unted for a lar ge pr opo r t ion o f e ne my a irc ra ft sho t do w n - m en suc h as Sout h Afri ca n Ado lph " Sailo r" M a lan , Czech p ilo t j o se f Fr.mn sck. a nd Briti sh Scrgcanr "Gin ger" l.ar cy. At the o t he r

TH E BEST DEFENCE OF TH E COUNTRY IS TH E FEAR OF THE FIGHTER ... IF WE ARE WEAK IN FIGHTER STRENGTH .., TH E PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF TH E COUNTRY WI LL BE VI RTUALLY DESTROYED, SIR HUGH DOWDING. AI R CHIEFM ARSHAL

tly in g t im e on ti g hte r pla ne s were qui te likely to be killed o n t he ir tirst or SL'co IH.l mission especia lly as squadron leade rv, keen to h old onto their ex perienced pilot s, wou ld often put th e no vices in t he m o st v u lnera ble position at the rea r of the torui at ion. Pil o t Hu gh D undas recall ed bei ng "c lose to pan ic in t he bewi lde r men t and hot te ar " o f h is tir
Hurrican e squ adron Twelve pilots scramble for thei r Hurricane fighte rs during a peacetime exercise in 1939. Each wea rs a seatty pe parachute over his flying suit.

THE GRATITUDE OF EVERY HOME ON OUR ISLAND ... GOES OUT TO THE BRITISH AIRMEN WHO ARE TURNING THE TIDE OF WORLD WAR ... NEVER IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN CONFLICT WAS SO MUCH OWED BY SO MANY TO SO FEW. WINSTON CHURCHILL. PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

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22Hm (250y d) rathe r t han t he 366 m (-IllOyd) normal at the sta rt of th e conflict. The re were always sq uad ro ns that fought by th e bo ok. however , ente ring co m bat and m an oeu vring in t he rigid format io ns of t he pre war yea rs, oft en wit h di sastr ou s co nseq ue nces .

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WA R OF AT T R IT I O N T he R AP wa s aide d by the fact th at the Luft wa ffe's cam paig n su ffere d fro m a certa in lack of clarit y. R adar stat io ns a nd airc ra ft factories sho u ld h ave bee n top of t he Germa n ta rge t list. yet they we re Ce lebra t ing victory Pilots from a Spitfi re squadron celebrate With bottles of wine afte r fighting over France in 194 4 . Some Battle of Brita in fighter pilot s saw action t hrough to the end of the w ar.

so o n neg lected in favo ur o f ra id s o n airfields. T hen . Ge rma n bomber s and esco rts we re engaged b y alm ost 700 R A F fig hte rs. Ph ysical ex ha us tion becam e a se rio us pr obl em as almos t da ily co m ba t was sustained week afte r week . Pi lots becam e so ex hauste d th ey fell aslee p in th eir coc k pits w hile returnin g from mi ssions . At times t her e was little rest I ' 0 11 the g ro u nd . as airfields we re bombed a nd st ra fed b y the Luftwaffe. The co nstan t st ress of batt le wa s hard for anyo ne to co pe w it h - G inge r Lacey m ay have been a fig hte r ace. but he alwa ys vo rn itte d befor e taking o ff for co m bat. By mid- Sept embe r m ost pil ot s in fro nt -line squad ro ns had been sho t d own at least o nce . As the battle

Notebook fo r logg ing flig ht information

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Top of com puter wi th lid closed

Navigational computer For navigati on, a pilot had a map and a computer st rapped to his left and right leg respect ively.

Speed. altitude, and direction read ing s

RAF FIGHTER TACTICS Befo re the wa r, RAF Fig hter Com mand trained to fly and fight in tight forma tions und er st rict co ntrol. Disciplined execut ion of we ll-drilled ae rial manoeu vres was viewe d as th e key to success aga inst enemy bomb ers. The basic formatio n was th e "vic"; three aircraft almost win g- tip-to-wing-tip in a flat V. A sq uadro n practised flying as four "vies", all tig ht to o ne anothe r, and then de ploying into line aste rn, line ab reas t, or some other shape for various forms of

attack . Whe n it came to combat, th is fo rmatio n flying proved to ta lly unrealistic and po sitively ha rmfu l. Maint aining position an d avoiding a midair collision abso rbe d attention th at sho uld have bee n de voted to looking for the enemy. The V-sha pe was hope lessly vulne rable to attack from beh ind. To alleviate this pro blem, one pilot was desig nat ed to fly be hind the "vies" to gua rd the ir ta ils, bu t so many of the se we re sho t down th at the tac tic had to be abandoned .

Red 1 (leader)

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The Blitz Dornier Do 172 bombersof the Luftwaffe bomb London during the Battle of Britain, 1940. The Germans' decision to strike civi lian targets relieved the airfields that had been taking the brunt of the offensive, and allowed the RAF to recover.

RedJ (wongm, n)

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w as bein g fou ght ove r Engla nd, th ey had a good cha nc e o f ba iling out successfu lly and returnin g to the ir un its u nscathed . But hun dreds were not so lu ck y. A pi lot flew w ith an armoured plate behi nd hi s scat and a reinforced w indscree n in front, but ne ith er co u ld pro v ide prot ec tion again st a M csscrsch mirt's can no n tired at close range . T he worst anx iety for almost every flier was th e risk of the a irc ra ft ca tc h ing fire . Pilo ts fle w swa d d le d in cloth i ng and goggles la rgel y in th e hope o f find in g so me prot ect ion ag ai nst burns if the fuel tan k ignited . An u n fo rt u n ate few, their faces d est ro yed by flam es, su rvive d to be com e

ex pe rime ntal subj ec ts for plastic surge ry.

MORAL V ICTORY W h at kept th e pi lot s goi ng wa s par tl y the sheer j o y in flyin g a nd fig h ti ng. t he m o st exc it ing ex pe r ie nce th ey w o u ld ever kn o w . M an y Brit ish fliers also bore w itness to a mot ivating patriot ism the determination to defen d their co u ntry again st in vad ers. P ilo t D ou gla s Bad er ex press e d the indign ati on o f ma ny o f hi s colleag ues w he n h e w ro te : " W ho th e hell d o th ese H uns th ink th ey

arc flyin g like th is over o u r co untry in their blo od y bombers covered wi th Iro n C rosses and Swast ika s?" For o the rs, es pec ially the Po les, there w as a more savage, int imat e hatred o f the Ge r ma n e ne my. Su stai ned b y w hatever b el ief o r com m itme nt, th e R A F sq ua d ro ns n eve r faltered. Fighter Com ma nd's aim was to den y th e Luft waffe ai r su prem acy, a nd in thi s t hey succeede d . T he Luft w affe was no t b ea ten , but fro m Octo be r it was di vert ed to n ight bombing, an adm issio n that it cou ld no t ac h ieve d aylig ht com ma nd of the air. T he re we re aro u nd 1,9 0 0 Luft waffe airc ra ft sho t d o wn in th e Bartl e of Br it ai n for aro u nd 1.0 0 0 RAF ai rc ra ft lo st. It was b y no mea ns a clea r-c ut v icto ry, bu t it was eno ug h .

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BLUE SECTION

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Squadron in " vic" The standard search-and-cruise fo rmatio n was th e "vic "; a sq uadron of 12 planes co mpo sed of fou r three -plane "sectio ns". Each sectio n had a leade r and two wingme n. Towards the end of th e war, four or five squad rons were flow n to geth e r in "vic", fo rming "big wing s".

~~~ ! ! ! " LINE ABREAST

GREEN SECTION

Flying hne asternreduced the numberof planes exposedto enemyfire ~

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Fly,ng"ne,b,east

maximized a section's firepower

ECHElON

Battle of Britain The Battle of Britain saw an end to th e prewar tactics practised by the RAF. When German bom bers appea red esco rted by Messe rchmitt fighte r planes , the RAF Spitfires an d Hurricanes were forced to break formation and engage the ene my one-on-o ne . This often resulted in "dogfights ", with enemy fighters trying to ou t-turn ea ch other.

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Section formations Othe r th an the "vic", figh ters learned "line abreast". "line astern ", an d "echelon" flying. Abreast and aste rn we re offensive and defe nsive formatio ns, w hile echelon cou ld deploy either way.

Green 1

LINEASTERN

MESSERSCHMITI FIGHTER ESCORTS Attacking head-o n was the mosteffective meansof attacking bombers, but needed alot of

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Germanescorts flew some 1.000m (3,OOOft) above the bomberstream, and dived onto the RAF fighterplanes

'1) GERMAN BOMBERSTREAM RAF SPITFIRES

\ Attackingfrom beneath / wasoften the onlyoption available fighters from ~;Y southern airfields who were still gaining altitude ~ as the bombers a rrived ~;.Y RAFSPITFIRES

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The Germanbombers flew in a tight formation that required an escort from the faster, more manouevreable fighter planes

GE RMAN U-BOAT CREW

...

Whcn th ey were at th e pe ak o f their effectiv en ess, between 194 1

th e co urse o f the war. Yet th e U s-boats were them selves th e prcy

and 1943, Ge rma ny's U i-boars came close to cutt ing Britain's

o f Allied hunters, in th e shape o f esco rt warship s and patrol

supply lifelin e across th e Atlantic. Co m mandcd by capta ins o f an

aircraft. U-boat crews suffered probably the highcst percentage

ind epend ent, bu ccan ccrin g spirit, th cy hunted across vast expanscs

casualties of any gro up o f co mbatants in World War 11. SOl11e

of ocea n, assembling in " wo lf packs" to savage merchant co nvoys .

1,000 U'-boat s were su n k and rou gh ly two out of evc ry three

In to tal, U-boats san k some 14 million to ns of Alli ed shipping in

U-boat crew me n who serve d in the war lost th ei r lives.

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U vbo at CfC WS en tered th e war as a highly trained elite . Admira l Karl Donit z, who m asterminded

Cl Cl

five ye ars tr a ini ng be fo re they we n t ope rationa l, thus instilling a high degree of pr o fe ssio n alisIII and ream spirit. Th e Type VII, the most co m mo n U -boat , w as crow e d by fo u r o fficers and 40 pett y off ic ers a nd Sl' ;tI1lC Il. So me crew m embers had the ir 0\\' 11 spe c ialities - fin exa m ple. the per sonnel w ho ma intai ne d and tired the ro rp ... dol'S or th e rad io stuff wit h t heir E lligll1 ~l encoding mac hine, Others perf o r med ge ne ral duties , suc h as stand ing watc h or operating the g U llS.

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the U-boat progra m me . insisted that his men had

ON PATRO L The ro uti nes of a patrol in th e Atl antic were to ug h and dcmanding. The U -boat travelled 0 11 th e su r fac e - sub m e rg ing wa s an c tlle..' rgc llc y

tacti c on ly. C o ns tant a lert ness wa s req u ired to

co nd itio ns were cra mped a nd c laustro pho bic .

avo id being su rprised by cllcmy aircraft or

SOllie men shared bu n ks o n " shift syste m . On ly the captain had a c u rtain to gi ve SOIHC privac y to h is Jiv in g ' pace. O il a pat rol th at wo u ld last weeks o r eve n month s, th e c rew we re un ab le to

wa rsh ips. Watc h wa s ke pt 24 ho urs a d ay by fo u r seam en. eac h surveyi ng
wa s issued to palli ate the effec ts o f e n fo rce d un clca 111 i IR' SS i Jl a (0 11tined spaCl'.

A G IANTS FI ST SH O O K THE BOAT. IT SO UN D ED LIK E TH E DI SSOLUT ION OF TH E UN IV ERSE. I WA S CHOK I N G, TH I N K I NG IT WA S T H E EN D. WOLFGA N G HIR SCH FELD DESCRIBING A DEPTH· CHARG E ATTACK ON U·l09 BY AN AMERICAN DESTROYERIN 1942

Returning to base A German U-boat arnves at its base In Kielin November 1939. Most of the crew are on deck. wearmg their leatherweather-protection gear.

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bath o r shave o r change the ir cl o th es. D eodorant

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Matrose servic e suit An ordinary seaman, or Matrose. was issued With a blue service suit. When at sea, u-boat crewmen often wore working suits or even informal check shirts.

ATTACK AN D DEFEN C E In the early year s of the war, U -boats att ac ked m e rch an t co n vo ys 011 the su r face at night. exploiti ng th e ir good su rface speed and low profil e to slip th ro ugh th e: scree n of e sco r t wa rships and str ike at the heart o f t he co nvo y. T Ill' w atc h o fficer o n d eck rela yed ta rge ti ng inst r uc tio ns to t he to rpedo c re w thro ugh a vo ice tube. Later ill th e wa r, as the ene m y's rad ar im pr oved . l.J-boats we re in creasingly for ced to attac k submerged . Na tu rall y. co m in g u nder atta ck the m selve s w as the most nerve-ra cki ng experience for a U -boat crew. If spo tt ed by an enemy warship. their be st ch ance w as to c rash-d ive. wh ich took aro und 30 seco nd s. T he y would then ho pe to avoi d detect ion by so nar o r h yd ro p ho nes. m ain ta in in g st rict sile nce as thei r own hydrophon es p icke d lip th e so u nd of a ll esco rt vessel d rawi n g clo se. Bein g depth - ch ar ged wa s a severe rest of till' ner ves. Eve n a ncar mi ss co u ld cau se lea ks a nd o the r d a m agc rl'l]uir ing all ha nd s to th e pum ps. C o we ring u nd er th e sea was suc h a d e mo ralizing e xp erie nce t ha t. if atta cke d b y aircraft, Ll-bo at capta in s ofrc» p refe rre d to take t heir cha nce 0 11 figh ting back ra ther th an diving. Up to 1943. U -boat lo sses were lo w and sin k ings of m erch an t sh ips WCTl' co m mon . But ti mes cha ng ed , As A llie d ant i- sub m ar ine warfare tech niq ue s im proved rad ica lly, life becam e he ll for the U - bo at men . As lo sses m o u nted t he elite vet eran s were k illcd o ff a nd new U - b oats were r ushe d into serv ice w ith h ast ily t rain ed crews. Late in th e war, th e introd ucr io n o f the T yp e XX I U -bo at at last gavc the G er m an s a gen ui ne sub m a rine - a ves se l tha t co u ld pat ro l at good speed tinde r wa ter for lo n g pe rio ds. But it arrived to o late a nd ill to o sm a ll n umbers to affect th e co urse o f the w ar.

Engine room A U-boat 's engine room w as a narrow passageway runn ing betw een tw o diesel engines. The latt er prop elled the boat w hen it was on th e surf ace; w hen it was under w ater, it relied on relatively wea k electric moto rs.

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Blue shuts were worn throughout the war ; traditionally they were swapped for white shirts In summer .

194 1 - 1945

SOVIET TANK CREWMAN WHEN SHELLS HIT THEIR TARGETS DIRECTLY, TANKS GOING AT HIGH SPEED BLEW UP ... TANKMEN GOT OUT OF BURNING TANKS AND ROLLED ON THE GROUND TO EXTINGUISH THE FLAMES. YEVGENY SHKURDALOV. SOVIET SOLDIER AT THE BATTLE OF KURSK, JULY 1943

ROM H ITL ER'S INVAS ION

F

of the Soviet Union in Jun e 1941

to the co nquest o f Berli n in May 1945, the sold iers of th e Soviet R ed Army fought a titanic strugg le aga inst N azi G ermany, end uring the heaviest losses ever see n in th e

hi story of wa rfare; over eig ht m illion Soviet soldiers were killed. That thi s struggle sho uld have ended in victory for the Soviet Union was in lar ge part due to the performance of its tan k crews, w ho se T-34s took on and eve nt ua lly beat the for midable German pa n zers .

Ad o lf H itl er intended hi s in vasion o f the Sov ie t seated at the fron t w ith the tank 's IIl ;Kh iIH.:Un ion to produce a sw ift and spec tacu lar g u n lle r alo ng side him, co u ld o n ly sec d irect ly "blitz krieg" v ic to ry o ver op po ne nts he despised . fo rw ard and stee red mo stly o n iu srr uct ions both on racial g rounds because they w ere sho u ted by the tan k co m m an de r into Slavs and O il political g ro unds be cau se an int e rcom . Sitt ing w ith the lo ade r the y were co m m u n ists. At first the in the turret, the co m m ande r co urse of the fightin g seemed to h im sel f lac ked all -round vis io n. fu lfil th e Ge rma n di c tat o r's In co mbat he aimed the g u n e x pe c tatio n . In a string o f wit h hi s face pressed to the m ilit ar y di saster s. th e po orl y led rub be r e ye g uard of h is sig ht, R ed Army lo st million s of m en . w h ile th e load e r fet ched th t' killed o r tak en pri son er. and was nm m u n it io n to his orders. T h is d riven back to th e o u tsk irts o f wa s no simple task, as m o st o f the M o sco w . But even w h ile inflictin g rounds we re sto red in bi ns un d er d efeat afte r defeat up on th eir the rubb er mattin g of the turret enemy. the Ge rmans we re struck by rlo or. T he SCC Il C in the turret was th e ex traor d ina r y fighting spirit and ofte ll chao tic , w ith co m m a nde r Excell ent Tanker badg e almo st fata listic readiness for selfand loader dodging the reco il o f the This badge wasawarded to sacrifice ex h ibite d by Sov iet tro op s. crewmen who distinguish ed g u n w hi le ho t shel l cases fle w int o This w as true not on ly of the in fant r y themselves in battle. A Soviet a hal f- di sm antl ed ta ng le of she ll tank is depicted. but also o f Soviet armoured forces, bin s and mattin g. Ine vitably. w hic h w ere decim ated by the ir experienced in exper ien ced co m m a nde rs tended to lo se all Germa n o ppo ne nts. "C rews ill burnin g tank s kept sen se of t he battlefi eld situatio n around the m, up fire for as lon g as th er e wa s a ny breat h in their espe c ia lly as no ne of th e tank s h ad radi o s. bodi es," o ne G e rm an o ffi cer w rote . Yet tank crews quick ly fou nd m uch to praise about th e T - 3 4. It was a ru gged and rel iable TH E T-34 ENTE RS T HE SCENE fig hting m achin e capab le of trave llin g o ver icc It w as in th e midst o f t h is milita r y cata strophe or bogg y g round that would sto p other tank s th at . in autumn 194 \. t he T-34 ta n k m ad e its first dead . It wa s also quic k and nimble : a G erman appea ra nce o n th e battlefield . It was a ro ug h ly tank sergea nt co m me n te d that "the Ru ssian fin ished, noi sy ma chine that m ad e no co ncessio ns tank s ... wi ll cl imb a slo pe or c ro ss a piece of to th e co mfort o f its [o ur-m an c rew . T he dri ve r, sw am p faste r th an yo u can trave rse the turret ."

8SMM TANK SHELLS

Roll ing int o action Powered by a 12-cylin der 500 hp (370kw) diesel engi ne. the T-34 -8 5 had a

maximum speed of 55kph (34mph). Soldiers could

ride on the rear platform and on the si desof the hull, thusprovi ding instant infantry support. The tank commander'sview waspartially obscured by the forward-opening turret hatch.

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LEARN IN G C U RVE

G e nera l Pavel R onni stro v, the co m m ande r o f

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Th e Sov ie t ;If lllY took a IOll g t i me to learn ho w

5 th G ua rds Tank A rm y. w ho knew ho w to use armo u r effect ively . T he Sov iet U n ion also h ad

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to lise its tan ks d l l.'c ti vel y again st the Germa n in vad er s. T he y typ icall y ad va nced to geth e r in a rigidly dri lled formation. groping their way short-s ighted ly around the barrlcficld , blunder in g i nto C c r m .m a n rira u k gUll s and pr e yed up o n by the m or e flex ible panzers, w hich . in the w o rds o f a Gc rm an ta nk m au , pro wl ed aro u nd the m " like leopards stalking a herd o f bison ". By ,'arl y 1'i -13 , ho we ver , t he R ed Ar m y h ad so rted o ut its arm o ured o rga n iz.u io n and tact ics. fi ndin g leaders suc h as

e ra. w he n G er ma n panzers had h amm er ed d Tortkssly th rou gh in fa ntry lin e s and raced ac ross co untry in sw eeping enc ircl ing m anoeu vres. Tank s w e re now to ti g ht ill g rind ing attritio nal ba ttles th at pit te d ma ssed arm o ured form ations

ev e r inc re asing numbers o f ta nks po uring out of its factor ies. A ltho ug h a co re of battle-hard ened rankmcn had de velo ped. su rv ivo rs of the fearfu! lo sses o f th e p re v io us tw o years. m an y o f the c re w for the ex pa nd in g tank arm w e re in evi tabl y hastil y t rai ned d raft ee s. w ho wo uld have to use

not o n ly aga inst o ne anot her. hu t also agai nst

antirank g uns. arti llery. infan try ant itank weapons , tank-bustin g airc raft. an d m in es. T h is wa s a co ntex t in w hich tank s w e re po w e rless w itho ut infant ry an d ar ti llc r y su ppo rt, and in w h ich d oggedness, pe rse vl'rallce , and shee r nu mbe rs we re likel y to sco re o ver flair and i ni tiat ive.

co u rage as a su bstit u te fo r ex pe rie nce . T he armoured w ar fare they we re to u nd e rtake fro m 1'i-l3 to 1'i -l5 had littl e in co m mo n w it h the d ashing m obilit y o f th e ea rlie r " b litzk r ieg"

SHOWDOWN AT KUR SK T he largest tan k bat tle of Wo rld War II took place at Kur sk in ju ly 1'i-l3 . T h e G erm an s assembled Soviet victory aro und tw o -t h irds o f the ir e n tire Easte r n Fro nt Membersof a Soviet tank arm o ured forces to the no rth a nd so uth o f a bul ge . battalion are greeted by o r salie n t, in the fro nt . T h ey inte nded to c ut the people in t odz, Poland. after the Germanwithdrawal in n eck of the salie nt , t rapping the R ed A r m y forces 194 4 . A T-34 tank stands in sid e. Aw a re of th e Ge r m an plan . t he Sov iets in the background. t urn ed t he salic n r int o a fo r t re ss defen d ed by m iu cficld s, tre nch es. a rti lle r y, and m assed ar mo ured form atio n s. T he Ge rma n s lau nched th eir o ffensive o n 5 ju ly. In the no rt h th e pan ZL'rs we re foo ght to a sta ndstill by So viet antita n k gu ns and tanks in fixed c niplnccmc urs. Bur in the so uth 31l ar m o ur ed thr ust spearhe ade d by 55 Panzcr di vi sion s pen et rat ed to Pro kh o rovka. 30k m (20 mi les) behind the Sov iet defensive li ne. On 7 jul y R ormisrro v's 5th G u ard s Ta n k A rm y, in reser ve m o re th an 350 k m (2 17 miles) from th e fight ing. W 3 S o rde red to ad van ce to Pr okh o ro vka a nd co u n rerarrack. Trave llin g by d ay a nd n ight in un bea rabl e heat. the ma ssive arm oured co lu m n thre w tip a clo ud o f g rey du st that coa te d the c rews ' sweat- so aked skin OPY'f, HII. \{lbll)l{IIUII. and cho ked the ir par ched th roa ts. In 3 feat o f e nd u ra n ce

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Tanker' s not ebook Notebooks such asthis were used bytank commanders to logdetailsof the days' events. Information would include the amount of fuel and ammunitionused by the tank.

Shou lde r pad

6O.5cm ( 23 ~ l n )

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bar rel

Adju".bl. stock

7 0T machtne-qu n The T-34 tank was fitt ed wi th tw o 7.620T machine-guns. One, w hich was stat ic, used tracer rounds to guide the main turret gun. 062

Biped attached here

Canvas bag fo r catchi ng spe nt cart ridge cases

for bo th th e men and the ir ma ch in es. they co ve red the di stan ce in th ree days and arri ved ex ha uste d but in good o rde r at th e batt lefield. O n the morning of 11 Jul y some 850 So viet and (,00 Germ an tanks ad va nce d to attack on e ano t he r, clashing in an area measurin g aro u nd 705 sq km (3 sq mi les). A German office r descri bed the T-34s as "st ream ing like rats all o ver th e battl efield ." O utg u nne d by th e Ge rma n Ti ger s and Pant hers, th e Soviet tanks aime d to d rive clo se in to th eir enem ies, so th eir lighter gun s wou ld have ma ximu m effec t. Soon th e tank for ces we re so int ermingled tha t neit her side co uld use its art ille ry o r g ro u nd-attack ai rc ra ft. The fighting lasted for eig ht hours, a co lossa l armoured melee co nd uc ted amid int ermittent thunder sto rms. The T- 34 crews fou ght w itho ut a thou ght for sur viva l. Tanks that had lost track s o r w he els we nt on firi ng u nt il de stroyed by ene my she lls, exp lodi ng in flam es, their tur rets spin ning throu gh t he air, When th ey ran o ut of am m unit io n , com manders

7.62MM

CARTRIDGES

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deliber ately ram med the ir veh icle into an enemy tank . so the y co u ld " take on e with th em ". As man y as 70 0 tanks may hav e been destroyed by th e end o f th e d ay, mor e of th em So viet th an G erm an . The Sovi et s co uld co pe wi th th e sca le of th e losses, however : th e G erm an s co u ld not .

COSTLY V ICTO RY T he lon g advanc e o f the R ed Army fro m Kur sk in J ul y 1943 to th e streets of Berl in in Ap ril 194 5 was nev er easy and co st heavy casualties, thou gh f ar fewer tha n in th e battl es of 194 1- 42 . The readiness

of the Soviet tank cre ws. like all o ther R ed Army so ld iers, to end ure almost uni ma ginable IO SSl ' S and hard ship wa s in th e end t he key to th eir vietor y. In a sense they wer e given no cho ice. D iscipline in th e R ed Army was ferocious. en forced by till' Sta linis t politi cal police. th e NKVD. An y sold ier o r officer deemed to have sho w n co wardice or failed to exec ute o rde rs to th e lett er wo uld either be sho t irumcdiarcly o r placed ill J pu n ish ment batt alion - almost equa l to a death scurcnce . since suc h batt alion s wer e give n tasks such as march in g across m in efield s to clea r a path (or sold iers beh ind th em . Yet th er e is no q ues t io n th at most R ed Arm y so ld iers were ge nu inely moti vated to figh t - by pat r io t ism . by hat red of the invade rs and th eir atro cities, and also in SO Itl C cases by enth usiasm for th e So viet revol ut ion .

ONE WOULD THINK WE WERE ON AN ISLAND IN A SEA OF FIRE . IT WA S SENSELESS TO STAY ANY LONGER L1EUTENANT·GENERAL DRAGUNSKY DESCRIBINGTHE BATTlEOF KURSK, 8 JULY, 1943

Tank column A column of T-34 tanks moves west during the long offensive that began at Stalingrad. in th e Caucasus. and ended in Berlin .

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VI

T-34 TANK The Sov iet T-34 is co nsidered by many expe rt s to be th e best-design ed tank of World War II. Although by the end of the war ther e were German tanks that o utclassed it in firepower and ar mo u r, they were heavy, sophisticated machines that co uld no t be produ ced in such qu antities as th e relatively straig htforwa rd T-3 4, and never achieved the same ease of operatio n. Almost 40,000 T-34s we re built in the co u rse of the war.

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The T-3-l was d esign ed b y So v iet en gineer M ikh ail Ko sh k in , usin g a sus pe nsio n developed by the American inve nto r J Walt er C h rist ie. Ent e ring pro du c tion in su m mer 1'J-lO, t he T-3-l init ia lly mo u nte d J 76 m m m ai n g U ll - hen ce: the d esig n ati o n T-3 -l176. It had a c rew of fo u r, w ith th e tank co m m a nd e r doubling as th e m ain g un ner. T he to p spe ed of5 1kph (32m p h) w as impressive for a n ar m o u red ve h icle, while its rel ati vel y light w ei ght and wide tra ck s were exce lle nt for t ravellin g cross -cou n try ov e r mud an d snow. In co m ba t , th e hi gh - vel o ci ty g u n

Halch for starte r mot or

pr o ved effec t ive at ar mo u r pen etration . a nd t he T - 3-l\ o w n slo pe d a rmo u r, at a ro u nd IOlJmm Coaxret gun (-lin) thi ck , offe red goo d protect io n . The T- 3-l w as definitel y not a g lamoro us ve h icle , bur it was h ard y, easy to repair, a nd ideall y su ite d to m ass producti on , In I'J-l-lthe up - gunned T- 3-l/ K5 came int o service, As well as mountin g all H5111 1l1 main g u n , it had a turn.'( wit h space for t h ree me n , allowi n g t he function s Ru ssian T·34/85 o f g UlIller a nd co m m ande r to be sep arate d . In The T-34/85 had a different profile to it s predecessor, the T-34/7 6 . Its turr et was flatter, making it a more thi s versio n. the T - J4 re ma ined in se rv ice with difficult target. and its main gun wa s longer. so me armie s into the 1')f)()s.

TH E T-34 WA S TH E BEST EXAM PLE OF AN OFFENSIV E WEAPON IN WORLD WAR II ... WE HAD NOTHING COMPARABLE. FRIEDRICH VON MEllENTHIN, GERMAN GENERAL

Gunn er in act ion The gunner here operates th e elevatio n control on th e main gun ; th e traverse whee l is to his lef t. He was also responsibl e for firing the coaxial machine-gun alongsi de th e main gun .

Hull gun The low er machine- gu n w as mounted on a pintle that gave it a t raverse denied to th e static, coaxial gun above it. The gunn er sighted thr ough a ho le above the barrel.

Dri ver 's hatch The driver could climb int o his seat th rough a small hatch at the front of the hull. The tank was usually driven w it h th e hatch o pen to give the driver a bett er view .

Repair kit A very basic set of tools was kept inside the tan k to meet th e need for runnmg repairs.

Tow ing rope

Ste el wheel

This metal eye was at the end of a w ire haw ser (large rop e) runn ing along the side of the tank . It wa s used fo r tasks such as hauling di sabled vehicles from th e battlefield .

An all -steel wh eel and metal track made th e T·34 a no isy vehicle, but its suspension gave it good speed.

Gun sig ht While aiming the main gun (left) the gunner pressed his headon the rubber guard above th e optical sight . He could fire the gun by pulling the red wooden to ggle on the right.

Driving seat The driversatwith the hullgunnersqueezed in to his right. The interior of the tank was cramped and made no concessionsto the crewmembers' comfort.

Ammo drums Troop carr ier

Cleaning can

Soviet infantrymen rideinto battle on the back of a T-34/85 . The hole for the tank'scoaxial gun can just be seen on the right-hand side of the turret. beside the main gun.

A cancontaining cleaning fluidfor th e gun w as kept

inside the vehicle.

Ammunition for the gunner'scoaxial machine-gun lay ready to hand (above). The coaxial gun was usually loaded with tracer rounds, often fired as range finders for the main gun.

loader's seat The loader sat on a detachable sea t that wassuspended from the inside of the turret and the gun. It was a precariousperch, sincethe seat would twist as the gun traversed.

Back view At the back of the tank , a hatch between the exhaust pipesgave access to the startermotor,

Theexhauststendedto emit impressive clouds of smoke. especially when starting up.

Extra f uel

Spare track

Three drums containingspare diesel fuel were carried on the outside of the tank. They obviously constituted a fire hazard, but were usuallyempty when enteringcombat.

Spare piecesof caterpillar track werecarried in case repairs to the running gearwere needed. Hoo ked onto the turret. they also provided extra protection against enemy fire.

OTHER TANKMEN OF WORLD WAR II In 1940, tan ks seemed to be the most glamorous of milit ar y vehicles.

tanks promised a revolution in land wa rfa re. allowi ng decisive

Na zi pro paga nd ists portrayed tankmen as mod ern-day kni ghts.

victo ries to be won by sho ck effect and rapid m ano eu vre. But by

weld ing the latest techn ology to an agg ressive warrior eth ic. Yet

th e end of 1942 attritio n was back . In fantry learned to stand up to

the reality was o fte n closer to the iro nic British view of tank

armo ur, while massed tank s fou ght o ne ano ther in vast slogging

crews who "c hee rfully went to war in tin cans, closely sur ro u nded

match es. M ass produ ct ion , rath er th an dash and flair , becam e the

by a leth al mixture of pet rol and am m uni tion". Early in the war,

key to victory in a wa r th at took a heavy toll of tank crews' lives.

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US TANK CREWS

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In the inte rwa r years, US se n io r co m mande rs viewed tank s as pr im aril y an infantr y su ppo rt we apo n. T hey were therefore fo rtu nate in bein g able to watch the success of th e German blit zkrieg in 1'140 befor e themselv es becom in g co m m itt ed to parti cip ati on in Worl d War II. T he US 1st Ar mo red Di vision wa s estab lished in Jul y of that year. and was soo n followed by othe r di vision s. T he U S possessed an o utsta nd ing tank co m m ander in th e flam boyant G en er al Patt o n. w ho d id mu ch to prepare U S tank fo rces for th ei r entr y into co m bat in N orth Afri ca in 19 42 . Ine v itably, it to ok the crew s tim e to accusto m th em selves to real fig hting. but by t he t im e t he inva sion of Sicily was unde rta ke n in 1943. Patt o n wa s able to lead hi s armour w ith ve rv e. showi ng an insti ncti ve unde rstandi ng of the importance o f m ai ntaini ng the Ill OI11Cn tUI11 of an attack. The overw helm ing m ajo rity o f Am er ican armo ur ed units we re equipped wi th the She rma n tank. which was qu ick but inade q uately armo ured and wa s ar med w ith a 75m m g un th at co u ld

not da m age a G erman Tiger tan k from th e fro nt. Bu t it had th e su pre me adva nt age of qu ant ity th rou gh m ass prod uct ion. In th e breakout from Norm an d y in 1'144, Am erican tank cre ws . espec ially th ose in Patt on's T hi rd Arm y. sho wed what th ey co uld do, sweeping ac ross France fu ll tilt unti l sup ply prob lem s halted t heir pro g ress. The sw ift reactio n to the Ge rma n co unte ra ttac k at th e Bu lge in w inte r 1944- 45 wa s ano the r of th e fines t moment s in U S armou r's not able co nt ribut io n to t he defea t of th e R eich . Fall of Munich Tanks from General Patton's Third Army advancealong the Dachauerstrasse in Munichto occu py th e city in May 1945.

BRITISH TANK REGIMENT

----------------------T he Briti sh in vented th e tan k. but by the o utbreak o f W orld War II th e R oyal Tank R egiment had fallen behind th e Germ ans in the development of armo ured tacti cs. Bri tain had large slow tank s for in fant r y suppo rt. light tanks for reco nn aissance, a nd "cr uise rs" to e ngage e ne my tan ks in ru n n ing bat tles . Yet no ne of th is worke d agai nst G erma n force s in th e battle Desert warfare The Bnt ish Eighth Army made extensive useof US Grant and Leetanks in North Africa . This Grant M3A3 was used byGeneral Montgomery for forwardobservation.

of France in 1940. T he 7th Arm ou rcd D ivision (t he " Des ert Rats" ) overw hel me d th e Italians in Libya. but the arr ival of the Germa n Afrika Karl'S in 1941 soo n put thi s success in perspe cti ve . The defects o f Bri ti sh tanks early in th e wa r were mani fold . T he M at ilda heavy tan k had a top spee d o f o nly 13kph (8 m ph) ; th e C rusade r. a cruise r.

was fast but thi nly armoured . under- gunned . and unrel iable. Ta ct ica lly. the Bri ti sh had no answ er to th e G e rma n HHm m an titan k g uns. w h ich the y w e re o fte n reduce d to c harging as d isastro usly as World War I in fan try advancin g against machineg uns. Later in the wa r t he U S- su pp lied Sherman and the British Cromwell w ere an improve me nt but to the Germ an s all th ese tanks were " To m my cooke rs" be cause of the freq uenc y w ith w hich th ei r crews ro asted in flame s. Yet the Ilritish tankm an never lacked gri t and reso lution . The tank crews drove R om mel out

of Afr ica. slogged t hei r w ay th rou gh Norm an dy, and ha d the sat isfactio n of endi ng the war in the heart of Ge rma ny. T he R oyal T ank R eg im ent lived up to its motto . " Fear N aught". and its men wore the regime nta l black beret wi th prid e.

GERMAN PANZER CREWS Third ReICh

The mastermind behind Naz i G erm an y's pan zer di vision s w as Gener al H einz Guderian . III the 1930s he evolved the tactica l approach that wo uld be co me know n as " blitz krieg". He envisage d m assed tan k formati on s, suppo rte d by motori zed iufantry and artillery, pun chin g throu gh weak poin ts in th e enemy defen ces and pre ssin g o n at speed to ex ploit t he o pe n ing in depth . " If the tanks succee d ," Ge ne ral Gude rian wrote in J937, " victo ry follows". Unlike m any prop onents of armo u red war fare Guder ian wo n govern me nt backing for hi s plan s - Hitler was an ent husiast ic beli ever in th e shoc k effec t of m aximum force.

BLITZKR I EG AND ATTR IT ION In t he early years of World War II Germa ny had fewer ar mo ure d vehicles t han its ene m ies. and the tanks that it did have were not technologically superio r. G erman y's tank co m ma nde rs and crews, however , were unequal led in th eir sk ill and initiative. Scythin g across north ern Fran ce in th e sum me r of 1940, Guderian's panz ers initially produced the lightning victo ry he had pred icted . After R ommel took co m ma nd of the Afrika Karl'S in J anu ar y 194 J, he rep eatedl y o ut m anoe uv re d and o ut foug ht the British tank s in the desert wa r. It was the same sto ry in th e Sov iet Union in J().jJ - 42 . Gradua lly, how ever, t he pa nzer s w ere ove rw hel med on all fro nt s by the sheer weight of nu mbers o ppo sing th em . In the later years of t he war, the G erma ns introduced the Ti ger and Panther tanks, machi nes m atch ed o nly by the So viet T-34 for the power of th eir g uns and th e protecti on afforded by their armour. In th e slogging battles fou gh t in Normand y in July ]944, wh ere speed and m an oeu vr abilit y wer e negat ed by hed ges and banks, th ey to ok a terrible roll o n Allied tanks. One Panther is cred ited w ith de stro yin g nine She rm ans in a day. But on the Eastern From t hese soph isticated mach ines, supplied in too small num ber s and w it h an alar mi ng tenden cy to break down , had no chance of reversin g the tide of defeat. U n like the Lu ft w affe, the G er man panzers never su ffered a de gradation in the quality of per sonnel. Fightin g without air co ve r and sho rt o f fuel, th ey ofte n o ut foug ht th eir o ppo ne nts to th e bitter end .

Panzer d river 's un iform

national emblem

Panzer crew men wo re sho rt, dose-t ittinq jackets suitable for the cramped conditio ns inside a tank. Panzer crew s w ho w ere memb ers of the

FiElD CAP

w affen 55 deeth's head emblem

Waften SS(the combat arm of the 55) carried 55 victo ry runes on their uniform s as well as rank and divisional marki ngs.

Collar patch WIth 55 VICtOry run(>S_

NATIONAL EMBLEM

PANZER JACKET

BELT

Dtvislonal cuff

'0( tebstanderte 55 Adolf HlUpr

BOOTS

TRO USERS

THE ENGINE OF THE PANZ ER IS A WEAPON JUST AS THE MAIN GUN. GENERAL HEINZ GUDERIAN

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Ankle slit and edging

194 2

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1945

US BOMBER CREWMAN AS YOU GET CLOSER TO THE TARGET YOUR HEART BEATS FASTERAND FASTER. YOU BREATHE HARDER AND HARDER ... YOU'RE SO NERVOUS AND SCARED THAT EVERY TIME THERE'S A BURST OF FLAK OR THE PLANE JUMPS A LITTLE YOU THINK: THIS IS THE END. JOHN J BRIOl, BALL·TURRET GUNNER, WRITING IN HIS DIA RY

lI E US 1I0MIIEIl C HE W S

T

w ho flew B-17 Flying Fortresses

and B- 24 Liber ators o n d aylight mi ssion s ove r G erma ny and Occupied Euro pe su ffered some of th e high est co m bat losses o f any U S forces in World War II. Flyin g d aylight

m ISSIOns, ini tially witho ut fight er escorts, they w ere vu lne rable to ant iaircraft fire and to attack fro m G erman fight er aircr aft. In o rde r to h it th ei r assig ned target s deep inside hostile te rrito ry, th e bomber for ma tio ns had to "shoo t th eir way in and shoo t th eir way ou t agai n".

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All US Arm y Air Force flier s had volunteered fo r se rv ice ill th e air. Mostly in their late teens or early 20 s, the y cam e fro m every part of th e U S and e ver y occ upatio nal bac kg ro u nd . from stoc kbro kers to farm ha nds - alt hu ug h virt ua lly all wen.' white. as a co nsequellce o f th e determination of senio r air force co m ma nde rs to keep black s out of aeri al co mbat. Bo m b e r c rews receiv ed ex te ns ive training at Ameri can bases before b ein g se nt ab ro ad to fight. A 11 - 17 cr e w h ad fum offi cers - a pilot (t he se n io r- ra n k ing offi cer. often a ca ptai n). w ho wa s the Hight com ma nder , a co- pi lo t, a bomba rd ie r. and a navi g ator . It also had six N COs. na mel y a rad io ope rator. a flight eng ineer, two wai st gUlHlc rs. a tail gUll ll er. and a ball-turret gUll lle r. Each offic er or en listed mall w as tau ght the spec ia list ski lls co rres po nd ing to hi s ro le in the aircraft. T he pi lot s. in pa rt ic u la r. had to ma ster flyin g in close for mat io n , w h ich led to q u ite a few fata l traini ng acci de nts. A crew m igh t h ave aro u nd 3(,11 flyin g ho u rs u nder its be lt before com ple ting trainin g. but nothing cou ld pn.'pare them adequately lor what th ey faced when the y arrived in th e Eu ropea n th eat re.

STRATEG IC [I O M BI N G T he U SA AF mo u nted its strate gi c bombing ca m paig n from bases in England. N orth Africa. and , later , Italy. Air force com ma nde rs believed th at their [ 1St, h eavi ly armed b omber s co u ld car ry o ut pre c isio n raids o n targe ts such as factories or so urce s of fuel supplies. The b ombers wou ld att ack in da ylight. flying at high altitud e in m ass forma tion .

In th eor y, a co m binatio n o f speed. altitude. ;1I1d o ver wh elm ing fir ep ower would e nsu re th eir surv iva l - and usc of the ne w, so ph isticarcd No rden ho mbsig hr wo uld allow the ir bom bardiers to d el iver the pa yloa d on the target.

T H EORY A N D PRACTI C E But co mbat did not wo rk o ut as planned . Accurate bombin g prov ed a n elu sive ideal , T he wea t her ill Europe w as co m plet ely dificr cm to th e clear b lue sk ies of t he so ut her n o r we stern United States w he re t he bo mb er cr e ws had trai ned . T ar ge ts w e rt.' liable to be ob scu red by clo ud , and , in any case, under co mbat co nd it io ns fe w bombardi er s were capable of ()pt.'ratin g th ei r co m plex bombsight s successfully. The Am crir.ms soon o pte d fin a syste m in w hich on ly th e lead bomber in t he fo r m atio n used th e bomb sig ht; t he rest dro pped t heir bombs wh en th e leade r di d . Worse than thc' lack o f acc u rac y wa s tht.' prob lem of survi val. LOSSl'S ill tilt.' first phase of the bombin g cam p;lig n in 194J we re staggt.'ring , When 37(, 11 -17s raid ed t;K toric's at

Schweinfu rt and R cg l'nsbu rg o n 17 Au gu st 1')4 3. lo r insta nce. (lO bombers were shot do wn and a not her 11 so bad ly dama ge d th e y had to be wri tten otI For cr ew s at a US air bast.' ill easter n Eng land in 1')4 3 . th e d ay o f a co m bat m ission starte d ea rly, Wok en at aro u nd Ja m by an o pe ratio ns officer snapping on th e light s ill rhc crowd ed hut wh er e they slept , t hey wou ld st u m ble th rou g h the da rkne ss to ;1 briefin g room. wh er e th e day's mi ssion was o utl ine d .

US A RM Y A IR FORCE LIFE JA CKET

'"

Strat egic bo mbing A group of B-17s from the 398th

Bombardment Group fly a bombing run to Neumun ster, Germany, on B Ap ril 1945. By t hat stage of the wa r.

luftwaffe fighters had ceased to pose a serious threat to the Flying Fortresses.

swarms of M esserschm itts and Fo cke- W ulfs flown by Luftwaffe pilots. O ne adva ntage o f flyin g in tight format ion wa s t ha t t he cncmy fig hte rs w er e ex pos ed to the co llective fire o f th e en tire formati on 's g un turret s - ho w e ver, it also me ant t hat w he n under fir e themselve s, pi lot s w ere till able to take evasive actio n. Bo redo m and di sco m fort were ins ta ntly repl aced by fear a nd ad re na line -soa ke d excitement as the g unne rs strov e to hit their fast- movi ng ad ve rsaries. M a ny w o u ld forge t th eir training , o peni ng fire at too lo ng a range , or fai ling to u sc th eir sigh ts co r rec tly, T he w ais t and cop turret g u n ne rs wo u ld SOO I1 be stand ing in heaps o f spe nt ca rtridge case s. Some Ge rma n fighter s arta cke d fro m direct ly a head , w he re th e bomber 's o n ly defen ce co nsisted o f h and-held g u ns o pe rated by th e bomb ard ie r and n avigato r. ll -17s be gan to f.l ll fro m th e sky in flames wi th parachutes blo sso m in g as air men j u m pe d for th eir lives, App ro aching th e tar get th ro u gh heavy flak w as the m o st ner ve-racking part of th e e nt ire mi ssion. In th e lead a ircraft o f th e for matio n t he b ombardier took co ntro l of the ai rc raft, usin g hi s Norden b o m b - sig h t linked to a n autopi lot . b efo re heading towards th e coast o f T he whole formation O ccup ied Eur o pe . T he tail g u n nc rs h ad to fly stra ig ht a nd a nd ball -turre t g u n ncr d id not stead y for th e bomb o cc upy their po siti ons unt il after run. making a perfe ct rak e- off T he ba ll-turret g u n nc r target for the German had till' m o st un cn vi ablc po st in anti- aircraft g u n ne rs th e aircra ft. Sq uashed int o a foe tal bel ow. When th e ll -17 Flak helmet po siti on undcrn carh t he b ell y, he di d lurch ed up w ard s as t he This steel flak helmet was worn to not eve n have ro om to wear a parach u rc. bombs we re released , protect against enemyfire. It had a special coating that prevented the cvc ry me mb er o f th e Hut no o ne h ad a co m fo r ta ble flig ht. crewman's fingers freezing to the crew wou ld feci J su rge T rave lling in an u np rcssu rizcd metal at high altitude. aircra ft at 7,6 11lh n (25, 0 00 11:) , o f relief. But ge tt ing home w as, o f co u rse, no t necessari ly any easier men were e x po sed to temperature s as lo w as _45°C. Su rvi val o n fligh ts than the o u twa rd j ourn ey. The pil ot wa s often lastin g m an y hours d ep ended o n nur sin g a d am aged ai rc raft w ith wo u nde d o r d ead person nel o n bo ard. As sur v ivo rs landed w earin g oxyge n m asks and elec t ric ally heated flying sui ts. T here were back at base arou nd mi d - afte rn o on. lo sses were casua lties fro m fros tbite and death s tallied and th e wounded car ried o ff fo r tr eatrn en r. w h e n th e oxygen su pply fai led. CO P I NG A N D SU RV IVAL Once th ey t ravelled be yo nd th e ran g e o f the ir fighter e sco rts. the A b omber c re w's stand ard to u r of dut y initi all y bom ber s cam e u nder att ack from co nsiste d o f25 co m ba t m issions, alt hou gh this w as su bse q uen tly in cr eased to 35. The recei ved w isdo m wa s that a man had a o ne in three chance Sperry turr et gunner o f su rv iv ing h is to u r, In so me un fort un ate A gunner squeezes into the ball turret under the belly of a B-17E. wat ched by fellow crew members . fo rm ati on s, t hou gh, th e o dds we re far w o rse. The gunnerneverentered his position before One sq ua d ro n flying o u t o f East An gl in in 1943 take-off , instead climbing down into the turret from inside the aircraft once in the air. had lo st seve n o f its nine o rigi nal c re ws b y the

TH ETERROR STARTS ON THE NIGHT BEFO RE THE MI SSION ... ANXIETY, DREAMS EXCUSES NOT TO FLY ... LOOSE BOWE LS , SHAKING AND SILENCE. HOWARD JA CKSON. BOMBARDIER. USAAF 15TH AIR FORCE

A chor us of g roans and c urses g reeted th e .m no u ncc m c nt o f a ta rget d eep in side Ge r ma ny. Whi le g ro u nd cre ws pre pared th e airc ra ft . the a irm c n tucked into br eak fast, if t hey h ad th e sto m ac h t'()r it. Take- off w as usua lly at aro u nd d aw n , t he 11 -17s lift in g oIl at 311 -s econd in ter va ls, usin g t he full k'n gth of the ru nway bu rden ed with a m aximu m lo ad of bombs and fue l. The bombe rs then had to clim b to th e asscm bly po int and tak e their place in t he to r m .u i on (no sim ple ma t te r)

COMBAT BOX FORMATION A typical B-17 formation was based on a group of three squadrons, each consisting of six or seven bombers . The " lead " squadron flew with a " high"

Three groups combined to make a "wing " of 54-pl us aircraft , the groups also arranged as " lead", " high" , and "low". It was impossible to avoid problems at the

squadron above and to its right , and a " low " squadron below and to its left. All the aircraft were at different

trailing edges of this "combat box ", whe re the rear units would be relat ively exposed to attack by enemy

altitudes to allow t heir gunners a free field of fire.

fig hters. A group of three squadrons is shown below.

Top view The box was spread out horizontally in such a way that no plane was flyingin the path of another plane's

lead bomberhas bomb~ght; others follow SUit whenleaddrops bombs

Gunner and bombardier Bombardier Lt William Witt si ts in the nose of a B-17 returning from a mission over Germany. As well ashisvital role in guiding the aircraft on its bomb run, the bombardier operated the chin gun against enemy fighters making head-on attacks.

end of25 missions. T he ten sion ex perience d by men approachi ng their last o ne or tw o missions W3' a lmost unb earabl e , Su perstitio n Ho ur ishcd , m en puttin g their fait h in a t rea su re d lo ve letter o r 3 luc ky co in 31w3y' car r ied w ith the m int o co m bat. A II tra ces of th e d ead we re e rad icated in u ncdiatcly, t he acce pted o pin ion be ing that they were best never me ntioned and treated 3 S ift hcy had never existed . W hi le t he gro u nd crew remai ned the same mon th afier mon th, air personnel c ha nged all the time as new recruits replaced tho se w ho had failed to ret urn. For most Hiers, t he bomber c re w the y be lon ged to W3' th eir maj or so u rce of suppo rt a nd co m radesh ip,

'" ~

C::~i~~'---- Six bombers In

planeswere in fact struck fromabove attests to the difficulty of staying in tight format ion. The rearmost planes, known as "tail-end Charlies", were in the most exposed posi tions.

I

lead SQuadron

LEAD SQUA DRON

Seven bombers in highsquadron

LOW SQU ADRON

W INN ING T HROUG H A lthough th e stra tegic bo m b ing ca m paign W3' never easy. things did im pro ve ove r the co ur se o f the W3f. T he introduction of the chi n g Ull on B-17, . in th e second half of 19-13. help ed to ste rn th e lo sses inc urred by fro nt al attack s. From th e start of 19-1-1 . lon g-r an ge escort fight er s, especia lly the 1'- 51 M ustan g, tr an sform ed d aylight b ombin g mi ssion s, Ca pa ble o f accom pa ny ing t he b ombc r fo r matio n s to target s Jeep in sid e Germa ny, they im po sed u nsu stainab le losses on German figh ters. In the fina l YC3r o f the W3r. G e r ma n ind ustri al produ ctio n, co m m u n ica t io ns . and, above all. fuel su pplie s we re c r ippled by the Allied bombin g ca m paign . But succe ss was achieved at a heav y cost. Eigh th Air Fo rce, w hich ope ra te d o ut of Englan d fro m 19-12 to 19-15. h ad o ne in eight of its 210.000 airme n k illed : its to tal lo sses, incl nding th o se wou nde d and take n pri sone r after ba ilin g ou t, we re 53.000, more than o ne in finn of its air men . Ninth A ir Fo rce (w h ich tr a nsfe rr ed fro m 1t31y to England in 19H ) and Fifteent h A ir Fo rcc 31<0 suffered heav y casua ltie s. T he m en w ho flew in t he face of such severe pu n ishme nt sho w ed out standing co urage and commitme nt.

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bombs. The fact that many

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Seven bombers in "Tail-end Charlie:" ----E~~~:::;,

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low squadron

C~4~~::l.

HIGH SQUADRON

-----

__

HIGH SQUADRO N

"':" Tail--end Charlie "

HIGH SQUA DRON

LEAD SQUAD RON

LEAD SQUADRON

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LOW SQUA DRON

Right side view The box wasstacked vertically in such a way that no plane obscured another plane's side guns.

LOW SQUADRON

Front view The box wasspread laterally in such a way that no plane obscured another plane's front or rearguns.

L.

posuon called "Purple Heartcorner"

B-1? BOMBER Wh en th e Hoein g 11-1 7 bomber first flew as th e Modd 299 prototype o n 28 J ul y 1935, it was immediatel y dubbed " the Flyi ng Fort ress" by j ourn al ists, a ni cknam e th at stuck. The 11 -17 belo nged to a new ge nera tio n of all-me tal mon op lan e aircraft w ith enclosed cock pits. Large and

f.~s t

by the sta nda rds of its time, th e four- cn gin ed bomber becam e

a main stay of A me rica's strategic bombin g force of World War II.

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The B- 17 we nt t hro ug h radi cal modifications between the pro tot yp e stage and th e en tr y of the US into World War II. The first massproduced version, th e B- 17E, emerged in Sep tember !'H I, an d B- 17Fs and B-17Gs were introd uce d in 1'142 . A round two -thi rd s o f all B- 17s built wer e th e G versio n. T he B-17G had up to 13 m achine - gun s (he nce its nickn ame), and its m aximum speed was 462kph (2K7mph) at 7,(,OOm (25 ,OOOft), altho ug h the norma l o pe ratio nal spee d flyin g in mass formati o n wa s a more mod est 2'10kph (IKOmph) .

On a shor t- rang e flight th e airc raft cou ld lift a 7,'1K3kg (17,600Ib) bomb load, but the need to ca rry large amo unts o f fuel for lon g-range so rties meant that in practi ce the payload w as t ypi call y bet we en I,K14 an d 2,724kg (4,000 and 6,OOOl b). The B-17 wa s never a co m fo rtable aircra ft to fly in, but it was pop ular with its ten man cr ew s be cause of its legendary ability to surv ive heav y p u ni sh ment. Nonethe less. lo sses were severe ; aro u nd 4,750 B-17s were lost 0 11 co m bat mi ssio ns in the co urse of the war, more than a third of t he tot al of 12,761 bui lt.

Bomber profile The B-17 had a wingspan of 3 1.62m (103ft 9in) and measured 22 .78m (74ft 9in)

from nose to tail. The massive dorsal fin gives it its distinctive profile.

WE LIVED, SLEPT, ATE, WORKED, AND PLAYED TOGETHER, WE WOULD SHARE OUR LIVES UNTIL DEATH OR THE WAR'S END, LIEUTENANT ROLAND PEPIN , B- 17 NAVI GATOR

Flying boots

Aircrew wore sheepskin-lined rubber-soled boots to keep their

feet warm at high altitude. They alsohad electrically-heated flying suits that they could plug in on board the aircraft.

Aircraft nose The Plexiglass nose of th e B-17

provided a view for the bombardier, who guided the aircraft to its target.

Chin gun This isone of the remote-controlled chin gunsoperated by the bombardier. Theywere introduced to counter head-on attacks.

Lifejacket A "Mae West " inflatable jacket was amongthe array of life- savinq equipment provided for aircrew.

Wing root Radial engine Each of the B-I 7' s fou r engine s gene rated 1.200hp. The B-17 was mass produced and so construction

They were fitted with turbo-superchargersto improve performance at high altitude.

methods were kept as simple as possible. Riveted aluminium sheets were a majorcomponent.

Top turret Operated by the flight engineer, th e hydraulically powere d top gun turr et cou ld sweep the sky in a fu ll circle.

Machine·gun The 8-17 was equipped w ith O.Sin Brownin g machineguns, a ubiqu ito us American wea pon of Wo rld War 11. Here it is mounted in the waist w indow.

Cheek gun This O.Sin Brown ing is one of the flexible cheek gun s t hat we re someti mes mo unted on each side of the Plexiglass nose. It was operated by the navigator.

Constant manufactu re A B-17 flies over Europe in 1945. For everyone of the aircraft shot down by t he Germans during the wa r, two mo re were prod uced by US factories . For this reason there we re mo re B-17s in service dunn q the last mon ths of the war than at any tim e previously.

Strong wh e els

Sperry ball turret

Hydraulic suspension helped the undercarriage take the strain of operational flying ,

The Sperry ball turr et could swivel 360 degrees horizontally and 90 degrees vert ically. It was suspende d on a gimbal from a tu be attac hed to th e fuselage ceiling ,

Aluminium skin The fuselage was made of aluminium alloy ring s fastened with longitudinal aluminium st rips and covered with an aluminium skin.

INSIDE THE B-17 Packed with bombs and fuel. th e 1l-17 had limited space for its crew. The bombardi er and uavigator had to cro uch to reach their scats in th e nose o f the plane, altho ug h o nce there the y enjoyed J superb view . The pilot and co- pilot SJt on the Right deck, with the Right en gin eer above and behind them . The radi o ope rato r's roo m, separated fro m th e flight deck by th e bomb bay, WJS th e onl y place where J man could sta nd full y upri ght. The ball-turret gu n ner occ upied J not ori ousl y cra mped seat under the fuselage and the rail gun ne r had to crawl into hi s remote position .

To p gu n s The gun positions on the top of the B-l7's fuselage were mannedin combatby the radiooperatorand the flightengineer.

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M anu al cont rols The control, of a B-17 were complexenough to require the collaboration of pilot and co-pilot if the aircraft was to be flown with any ease.

Norden bo mb -sig ht The Nordenbomb-sight wasinstalled behindthe Plexiglass nose of the aircraft, in front of the bombardier's seat.Topsecret devices. the bomb-sights were removed from the aircraft between missionsand kept under guard.

Parachut e log

This logwasused for recording each time the parachute

f l\Rl\tBUTt

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was packed, used. and repaired.

Ball t urre t

The ball-turret gunner climbed into hiscramped position after take-off. He had to si t with hiskneesdrawn up to his chest and could not wear a parachute;he donned one rapidly in an emergency.

Bomb bay The bomb bay. Immediately behind the flight deck. had a walkway only some 20 cm (B in) wide . The bombers typically earned some 2.700 kg (6.000 Ib) of bombs. a mixof high explosive and incendiary munitions.

Oxygen regulator Eachcrew member had an oxygen hose at his position . If he needed to move around in the aircraft, he grabbed a walkaround oxygen bottle.

Sig ht and ammunition The waist guns had sophisticated sights to aid the gunner . In theory, a gunner could use up an ammunition belt in half a minu te, although in practice he naturally fired much shorter bur sts.

-'.-". I

W ai st gu n The waist gun ners, between th e radio operato r's posit ion and th e tail gun, fired out of each side of th e aircraft, exposed to th e f reezing air. Spent shell cases covered the floo r of the aircraft once the gun was in use. Tail turret The rear gunner knelt in his posit ion on padded kneeholds. Since attack from behind was the obv ious tactic for fighter aircraft, these hydraulically-controlled twin guns we re crucial to the bo mber's defence .

Ele va t o r w ir es Contro l cables ran along th e ceiling from the cockpit to the tail and w ings of th e aircraft to manipulate th e rudd er and w ing fla ps.

Fusel ag e int er io r This is th e view for wa rd alon g th e fu selage towards the radio operato r's posit ion, and, beyond th at, the bo mb bay. The alumi nium rings of w hich the fuselage str uctu re was made are visible. The black column suppo rts the ball tu rret beneat h the fuselage .

WORLD WAR II FIGHTER PILOTS Being a fighter pilot was th e most glamo rous job in World War II.

top five per cent of pilot s were responsibl e for 40 per cent of kills.

Young men in all combata nt cou ntr ies competed for a chance to

For th is reaso n. th e balance of air co mbat wo uld turn decisively

fly the most advan ced fighter aircraft in the wo rld. T hose few

against any co untry forced by heavy losses to field too many

individuals who possessed the idea l combination of fast reaction

inexperienced pilo ts. T his is w hat happened to both the Germans

times. sharp eyesight, and a ki ller instinct were able to have an

and the J apanese in the later stages of the wa r - a blow from

exceptional impact on the air war. It has been esti mated th at th e

which neith er co untry recovered .

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US ESCORT FIGHTER PILOTS T he Uni ted States' B- 17 and 13-24 bombers were designed to att ack in daylight w itho ut fight er escor ts, and th eir spee d, altitud e, and firepower wo uld supposedly make them immune to enemy fighters . But heavy losses in 1942-43 proved th ey needed fighter cover. At the ou tset. American ti ghter groups in Euro pe mostly flew Spitfires. whi ch had inadequate range, or 1'- 38 Lightn ings, whi ch had poor manoeu vrability. Th e R epublic 1'- 47 T hunde rbo lt was an imp ro vem ent . but still it could not acco mpany bombers all the way int o the heart of Germa n territory. It was the arri val of the No rt h Ameri can 1'- 51 Mu stang in early 1944 tha t transformed the situation. T he Mu stang could out perform any existi ng German fighterits top speed was an impressive 700 kph (435mph) - and with drop tanks it could fly anyw here th at the bombe rs could reach . US escort fight er pilot s had th e qualit y to mat ch th eir machin e. lly 1944 ma ny had lengthy co mbat ex perience . but intensive trainin g sessio ns

were still run to keep eve ryo ne at their peak. Some of Ameri ca's most famo us pilot s flew

P·51 Mustang The Mustang iswidely regarded asthe supreme fighter aircraft of World War U. It combined an American airframe with a British Rolls Royce Merlin engine.

escort in Mu stangs, incl uding fut ure sound- barr ier breaker C huck Yeager, who sho t down five Germa n aircraft in a single day in O ctob er 1944 . Like th e bo mbe rs, th e fighter gro ups flew mostly fro m bases in Engla nd and Italy. T here was compe tition bet ween d ifferent gro ups to be th e safest for bombers to fly wi th. Especially kee n was 332nd Fight er Gro up, all of whose pilot s we re black. T hese " Tuskegee airmen" had str ugg led lon g and hard against racial prejudice for th e right to fly fighters in com bat and th ey had plent y to prove.

Escort ing bom bers agai nst th e tou ghest targets, including Berlin and th e Ploesti oilfields, they claim ed , perh aps w ith slight exaggeration. never to have lost a bomb er und er their prote ction . The Luftwaffe fighter s adapted their tactics to meet the challenge of the Mu stang. They hit th e bombers with rapid mass attac ks, hop ing to disappear before the escort fighters could react . They also ~ int rodu ced th e Me 262. th e first j et fight er to enter combat. which was 160 kph (100mph) faster than th e Mu stan g. But noth ing availed to stem their losses, espec ially after the Ameri cans began rov ing away fro m the bom ber strea ms to hunt down Luftwaffe fighters and atta ck their bases. lly th e end of the war. Mu stang- equipped Tuskegee airm en fighte r groups had shot The black pilots of the 332nd Fighter Group, down some 5.000 Germa n trainedat Tusk.egee in fighte rs. and destroyed over Alabama, became AfricanAmericanheroes. 4.000 on the gro un d.

Keep us Iqing!

GERMAN FIGHTER PILOTS Eastern Front. A lth ough t he ho m e defe nce uni ts p er fo r m ed m agnifi cently ill both d ay a nd ni ght lif;h tillf;, th e y were subject to stead y att r itio n th at turned in to ma ssive lo sses o nce th e US lon g-

I II t he early ye ars o f W orld W ar II , Ger m an fig h te r pil ots W CT C su pe r io r to t heir o ppone nts

in t raini ng. tactics. and combat ex pe rience. The Luftwaffe o perated "S a m erito crac y wi th a n anti- uurhoritar ian et hos. Sta tus was based 0 11 flying ex pe r ie nce a nd co mba t record (t ho se who h ad se rv ed ill the Condo r Legi on d urin g th e Spa n ish C iv il W ar, I' H ex a m p le, ex pec te d to he treated as a pri vi leg ed eli te). a nd "SCO H .'

ran ge ti ghtl'r escor ts appe a re d over G erman y. On th e Ea stern Front lo sses were ev en heavi er, a ltho ug h G erma n pi lots ran up vas t k ill-ta lli es aga in st th e m assed Sov ie t avia t ion - Eri ch Ha rtm ann sho t d o w II 352 aircraft, ma king

chasing" wa s enco urage d. As the \ V:H developed, ho w e ver , till' Luf t w affe' s po siti on rad ica lly

By t he w ilite r o f I'J-\-\ the' l.ufr w.iffc w as short o f fu el and o f exp erien ced pil o ts. M an y of the su r v iv ing tigh ter aces, such as Adol f Ca lla nd . e nded up flyin g experi me nt a l M csscrschm it t M e 2()2 jets as in tercep tors in a last- d itch air d efen ce of Germ:ln y aga inst ove r whelming Al lied number s. By th en th e re w as nothing left to lif;ht I()r hu t ho nou r.

h im th e h igh e st- scoring a ir ace in h isto r y.

cha n ged . The lif;hte r pilo ts w ho h ad flown "S bom be r escorts over Engla nd in th e Battle of Bri tain were split b et w e en homel and d efen ce "f;a illst A ll ied b omber fle ets " lid air suppo rt for th e ar m y fight in g th e Sov iet U n io n 0 11 the

Three-blade metal propeller

M esserschmitt 8f1090 The 81109 was th e l uft w aff e', key fighter aircraft in the early years of th e war. However, it wa s t ricky to handle in landing and take-off, a defect that kill ed many pilot s.

Febnc-covered rudder

JAPANESE NAVAL PILO TS The Jap31l l' SC pilot s wh o caused de vastat ion at the US n aval base at Pearl H arbo r, H aw a ii. ill D ecember I'J-\I , were pa rt of t he fin est nava l air fo rce in th e w o rld . Not o n ly we re t hei r a ircraft . suc h as the M itsub ish i R ei sen " Z ero" fighter. o f the hi gh est quali t y, but the pil ots th em selves w ere su per b ly tr ained a nd battle-hardened, having

fought ill J "p""'S WU "f;"i llst C h ill" since 11)37. J apan ese na val avi ators co nt inue d to ho ld th eir o w n aga in sr the US in t he Pacific Wa r in 194 2 and )943, bu t the n u m be r of c x pc r ic nccd pi lo ts fe ll shar p ly throu g h balt ic cas ua lties , w h ile the performa nce of US pilot s a nd t hei r airc raft ste ad ily improved . In the battle of th e Ph il ippine Sea ill j u ne I'J-\-\, t he J apane se lo st 300 airc ra ft in a single d ay a nd the e n tire Japan e se car r ier fle et was de stro yed, le avin g n ava l av iato rs to o p e rate fro m sho re . Du rin g the battle o f Lcyre G u lf in O ctober I'J-\-\, the First Air Fleet , b ased

o n th e Ph il ipp ine s, ini tiated su ic id e tactics. Ka mika ze (" D iv ille W ind " ) pilot sv as the A m e r ica ns ca lled th em , pack ed their airc ra ft w ith ex plos ives and tr ied to crash o n t he d eck s of U S wa rships. They donned a hllchill/llk; headband o nce wo rn by th e sa m u ra i, a sig n o f th ei r su ppo sed sta tu s as eli te w a r rio rs. But since t he lives o f ex pe r ie nce d pi lot s were precious, th e ka m ika ze ro le so o n ill pr act ice d evolve d to ba re ly train ed yo u ngste rs. By Apr il I'J-\5, " ma ss "s pe c ial att ac k " fo rce o f over 2 ,0 0 0 aircraft dedicated to sui cide at tac ks had be en fo rm ed . In total. kamika ze raids san k 3 -\ warsh ips a nd d am aged 288 by th e w a r's en d .

MAY OUR DEATH BE AS SUDDEN AND CLEAN AS THE SHATTERING OF CRYST,4 K A MIK AZ E PILOT WRITING BEFORE HIS MI SSIO N

Kamikaz e attack A Japanese Zero fighter crashes ont o th e deck 01 the USS M issour i during the wave of suicide att acks launched against th e Allied fleet in 1944 -4 5.

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1945

SOE AGENT A NEW ORGANIZATION TO COORDINATE , INSPIRE , CONTROL, AND ASSIST THE NATIONALS OF THE OPPRESSED COUNTRIES ... WE NEED ABSOLUTE SECRECY, A CERTAIN FANATICAL ENTHUSIASM ... COMPLETE POLITICAL RELIABILITY. HUGH DALTON . MINISTER Of ECONOMI C WARFARE. JULY 1940

ASED I N LO NDON DUll iN G

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World War II, the Special

Operations Exe cutive (SO E) sent sec re t agents int o N aziocc upied Europe to suppo rt and o rga n ize resistan ce grou ps, gather intelligen ce, and carry o ut sabo tage and assassination

nussion s. It wa s despe rately dan gerous work and m an y agents fell int o the

hands of the 55 o r th e Ge stapo. SOE ended the w ar with some notable successes to its cred it, even if it never quite achieve d th e ambitio us goa l fixed by Prime Mi nister Winston C hurchill, to "set Europ e ablaze".

The Specia l Operation s Exe cutive W;l S set up in Jul y I'H O. as a n expressio n of C h u rc h ill's det ermin ation to take the fight to th e ene my eve n und er the most un favourabl e c ircu m stance s. T he de feat of the Br itish and Frenc h a r m ies had left G erman y a nd its allie s wi t h u nd isputed mi litary do minance o f co ntine ntal Eu rope . T he British govern me nt envisaged not hi ng less than a co nti ne nt- w ide re volut ion ar y upri sin g agai nst the Na zis a nd pro - N azi regim es. T he Mini ster of Eco nom ic W ar far e , D r Hu gh D al ton , in w ho se pol iti ca l do main SOE was pla ced . fo re saw the c reatio n of movements similar to Northern Irela nd 's Si n n Fei n or M ao Ze D o n g's C h inese gue rrillas and th e fo ster ing of " ind u st r ia l and milirar y sabo tage. labour ag imrio u and strikes . co ntinuo us propa gand a. terror ist ac ts agJin st traitors and Ge rma n leaders, bo ycott s and riot s" to thwa rt H itler's menace.

R ECR UI TM EN T A ND T RA IN I NG SOE se n io r sta ff we re recruited ill t ypi call y Briti sh f.,sh io ll v i" personal co ntacts - the "Old Bo y" net wo rk of fo r me r pupils of th e to p public sc ho o ls "li d g rad uates of O xford "lid C am b r id ge Universities . T his do es no t me an that th ey were u n su itable or in compete nt , a lt houg h the y were so m e tim es c ri t icized by the m ore e sta b lishe d intelligence service s. Colo ne l C o li n G u bb ins , for instance, put in cha rge ofSOE traini ng JIH.i o perat ions. w as an e ne rge tic ma n w ho had th ough t ill d ep th about the ta ctics and st ra teg y

W EBLEY & SCOTT 190 7 AUTOMATI C PISTO L WITH SILENCER

o f irreg u la r warfare . The organiza t io n set up its h eadquarters at (, .j Ba ker Street . London , and to ok o ver co u ntry ho uses aro und Britain as tr ain in g ce n tres. Pot en tial agents and ot her staff were recr ui ted from JII walks o f life - OIH.' oft he most e ffect ive ft.'lIlak' agcnrs. Violette Szab o . wa s the ha lf-French d au ghter o f" so ut h Lo nd o n car dea ler . BeCJUSl' age n ts w ou ld have to 1Ile..'rge int o a foreig n co untry durin g th e ir mis sion s. langu ;lge skills were at J premium . Ma ny rec r u its w ere , lik e Sza bo , b il in gu al Br it ish c it izc us with 0 11,' foreign parent, or forei gn nati ona ls, inc ludi ng members o f th e forces o f All ied govcr m uc uts in e x ile . SOE so ugh t spec ial sk ills w herever th ,' y co u ld b e fou nd . B u r~ la rs tau ght a~,· nts to p ick lo ck s a nd co nvi cte d fo r~"rs p re pa red the ir fal se id entit y p"pe rs. At it s pea k SO E p robabl y emplo yed "round 13 ,0 0 0 pe opl e, so me 5. 000 of t he se " S agents in th e field . In it ial training co nce nt ra ted Oil ph ysical fitnes s and the lise of basi c wea pon s. Candi dates were observe d to assess thei r psychological su ita b ilit y, w it h plent y of alco hol p ro v id ed to see ho w drink might affl'c t their be haviour. T ho se who m ad e it throu gh th e init ial stage w ere sent for co m ma ndo trainin g in th e rugged Hi g hl an ds of Sco tla nd. There they learned sk ills suc h as parachu te j umpi ng . the use o f explosives fo r sabo tage , and ho w to k ill an e n,' my wi th th eir bare h ands - leth al sing le co m bat being ta ug ht b y E A Syk e s a nd W E Fairbairn , for me rly o f t he Shanghai M unicipa l Po lice .

The fi nal stag e of trainin g foc used O il th e basic craft of an un de rco ve r agent. Th is incl uded lesson s in th e id ent ifi cati o n of me mbe rs of vario us e ne my po lice and sec u rity age nc ies. the o pe ratio n of a shortwave radio, the lise of co des, and re sistance to int erro gati on .

NO SOO NER HAD A DUMMY, IMP EL LE D BY WIR ES. LEAPED O UT O F BED TO TACKLE T HE INT RUDER AND BEEN SHOT FO R HIS PAIN S, T HAN A TRA PDO OR O PE NED, "M EN" EM ERGED FROM BEN EATH TABL ES, BOTTL ES AND C HAIRS CAME HURTLIN G DISCONCERT ING LY AT THE GUNMA N'S HEAD. EWA N BUTlER RECALL S HIS SOE TRA IN ING AT THE HANDS OF EA SYKES

m essages b rie f and avo id !\l'nd in g re peated ly fro m rhe same place, As a resu lt . ra dio operators we re o tt c u arreste d 3 11110st as ,",0 0 11 a s they star ted the ir wo r k . Agents' ft)rgt..,d d ocuments we re gl'l1l'ra lly exce lle nt , b ut d er.rilv. such as pro vidin g th em w it h th e ri gh t brand o f cig arctrcs, wen.'. somet imes m issed. S()E pion eered the usc of plastic ex plosives, yet ti me w as was te d 0 11 fan ciful id ea s suc h as stu ffi ng ex plos ives int o th e bodies of dead rat s o r m aking it resembl e a n ima l dun g to be sprea d 0 11 road s. In ge ne ra l, th e p fl' S...ure tor speedy actio n mea n t m an y agc nts we n t in to Eu ro pe: w it h p re pa rati o n to o sk im py for t he: dem andin g tas k th at face..'d th em .

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Secre t air d rop s The lysander aircraft was capable of landing on very short airstrip s and therefore wa s well suited to missions into Occup ied Europe, dropping of f SOE agent s and supplies.

The qu ali t y of th e t rainin g and cquipm cnr th e ag l'lltS received w as m ixed . For e xa mple. 110 o ne rea lized how qui ckl y th e Germans wo uld tra ck the so u rce of shor t wa ve radi o b roa dca st.. , Thus agcn ts we re not su ffic ie nt ly warned to ke ep rad io

Fal se i denti t ies It was essential for all SOE agents to have impeccable documentation to support their covert lives, and thus avoid detec tion .

CARTE O'IDENTlT£

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SOE FILE CA RD

I N T O OCC U PIE D EU RO PE S( )E 's o rigi n al pr eferred method o f in sertin g age.'llt . . int o O ccupi ed Europe: wa s by sea, e ithe r u sin g fishi n g boats or fast mo tor patrol boats to la nd O il iso lat ed stre tc hes o f co ast, The rel ucta nce

of the R oyal Na v y to co o pera te and a batt le for resources with th e Secret lurelligcn r,.. Se rv ice (SIS). w hi ch had th e same idea, fo rced SOE to Beh ind enemy lines Capta in John Roper of the SOE in a w ood near Savournon, shor t ly elfter parachut ing into the Haute Savoie region of France.

O RIGINAL AND UPDATED FRENCH IDENTITY CA RDS

turn to th e air. Flyin g by ni ght, agc n rs a nd su pplies we re dropped ill hy parachute o r landed in aircra ft suc h as rhe Lysander, wh ich we re capable o f o pera ting from sho rt , rou gh landing g ro u nd s. An age nt co u ld ty pica lly ex pe ct to be met by a recept io n co m m ittee ma de up of mem ber s of resistan ce.' gro ups or fell o w S<..) E ope rat ives , The y w ould a r range.' di scr eet light s to m ark a landin g st rip o r dr op zo ne, Arri val ill ho sti le territory and m o vemen t fro m t he initia l a rri va l po in t to safe ho u sin g wer e inevitab ly a m o ng the m o st dan gerou s pha ses o f all agl' n t's mi ssion .

U ND ERCOV ER SO E ag en ts wer e assig ne d a va rie ty of rol es. The m o st responsible we re o rga nize rs, en t r uste d w ith setti ng lip and d evel oping resistan ce n et works. Like rad io o pe ra to rs a nd sabotage spec ia lists. th ese we re a lmost alw ays men . Women agents w er e ge:ne.'rally e m ploye d as co u r iers, partly becau se it was telt th ey wer e less likel y to attract sus pic io n w he n tra velli n g aro und , Livin g under t he co ve r of a fal se ident ity ill host ile. heavily pol iced territory, age nts had to co pc w ith. i ll G ubbin s' words, " a co nt in u al a nx ie ty all da y and

e vcry (by". Arrest m eant ce r tain torture and alm o st ce r ta in d eath . To su rv ive, the y needed to play a ro le at a ll tim e s, scr upu lo us ly monitoring cv e ry derail of their b ehavi our to en sure the y we re not attractin g atte ntio n to th em sel ve s as in any w a)' unusual or foreig n. To ma ke a ny t hi ng h appen th ey h ad to contact lo cal peopl e, but t'Vt'ry co ntac t brought th e ri sk o f betrayal for opposition to the Na zi o cc upiers wa s nothi ng li ke as u n ive rsal as SOE had nai vely assu m ed . Under pressure, so me agc llts see med to fi>rgc t th e ir co m mon sense and mu ch of th ei r train ing . T Ill'Y wrot e down co des o r addresses that the y were suppose d to m em o ri ze, carried ide ntity do cu m e nt s for two d iffer ent aliases at the same rime , or eve n spo ke openl y to on e ano the r ill Engli sh in publi c plan 's. On th e o ther ha nd . so me b lend ed into their surro u ndings and sus ta ine d fa lse id cnt it ic s eve n under suspicio us c ross - q ues t io ni ng .

SUCC ESSES AND FAILUR ES Amon g SOE's mo st no ta ble o pe ra t io ns was th e assass ina t io n o f Reinhard H cyd r ich , d eputy c hid o f the G estapo . He was sho t in Prag ue by two age nts , J an Kub is and J oscf Ga bci k , parach u rc d in b y SOE in Ma y IlJ-I2. In reprisa l till' G er man s murdered so me 5,000 Czec h c iv ilia ns ; Kubis and G ab c ik also d ied, be t rayed b y a fell o w ag e nt w ho had cha nged sides . A more clear -cut exa m ple of success was the sabo tage of N orsk H ydro plant in occu pied N o rway in Februar y )lJ-I3; it was produ cin g he avy wat er. which co u ld h ave been used by the Germans to make an ato m ic bomb, Norwegia n SOE age nt s no t o n ly blew up the pla nt but also later san k a ft.'rry carryi ng a co nsig n me n t of he avy w ate r de stined for German y. Some SOE o pe ra t io ns. how ever , wer e cos tly fiasco s, non e w orse than the abo r rive effort to run a network in the c thc rla nds from 19..J 2 to )lJ-I-I . The first ag e nts se nt in w ere' b etrayed by a D utch co lla borato r and G erman iurelligcn cc c racked the ir comm u n ication co des . An arrested

Wom en at war The SOEdeployed many female agents In the war. Som e were tasked with sabotage or radio operating duties (left) , but most were successfully used ascouriers.

Covert communication The Type 3 MK II SUitcase radio was used bySOEagentsin the field to communciate with HQ. Coded transmissionsconstantly evolved to avoid detection by the Nazis.

SOE ra dio operato r ;lg rccd to se nd nH..'ssagc s for the G erm an s. ca refu lly omittin g sec ur ity c hec ks in order to alert hi s home sec t io n to till' 1" Ct th at he had b een " ru r ucd ", l u explicabl y, se n io r SOE o ffice rs ignored the lack of sec u rity chec ks in the m cssagc« th e y were recei vin g and se nt ill agl..·lltS and supplie s to re nd e zvous fixed by th e Na zi s. More than 50 agents had 1,1lie II into G erm an h ands before t he de cept ion was d isco vered.

LARGE-SCAL E R ESISTAN C E By )lJ-I-I SO E w as p ro v id ing support an d su pplies fo r substantial re sist an ce m o vements co nd uc ti ng rural g uc r r illa warfare ill Yugo slavia. Gree ce, and till' "m aq u is" o fsou thern Fra nrc . A lt hou g h the Sl1E had not c re ated th e se movement s. the pre..·St·llCe of S()E age..·llts clearly raised m orale, and

the Wl'apo nr y the y su pplie d e nco uraged o flc usivc o perations that tic..·d do w n large n umbers of Ger ma n tro op ' . (Jil l' of th e Sl )E's fi n est hou r's probabl y ca me wi th th e Nor ma ndy landin gs in

Jun e 1')-1 -1 , w he n SOlO agl'nts .m d the French rcs ist.mcc succeeded in prov id ing impo rtant i ntd l i~l..· llce o n German ddl'ncc, and 'iabota~il) g t ranspor t links to block the move ment of Gcrman re in fo rce me nts to N orm andy. Hu nd re ds ofSt)1: age nts die d ill Naz i t ort u r e

chambe rs and conceu rr .u io n ca mps ill the co urse o f the w ar. In Pr.mcc. fiu cx .n u plc, th e death rate fo r agl..·nts w as around o ne in to ur. W het he r t he orga niz.uio n's achievement- were worth the cov t is an im possible calculation. H o weve r, it is dear that S()E age nt"l sho we d J"I m uch bravcrv as any so ld ie r on t he ticld of ba tti l'.

LAPEl KNifE AND SCABBARD

SOE w eaponry SOE's laboratory in Hen tordshire, in the UK. desiqned a variety of concealed weapons, ranging from gas pens to cigarette pistols. However, manyagents were equippedonlyWith conventional pistols.

US PARATROOPER LIKE THE ... AMERICAN PIONEERS WHOSE COURAGE WAS THE FOUNDATION OF THIS NATION, WE HAVE BROKEN WITH THE PAST AND ITS TRADITIONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH OUR CLAIM TO THE FUTURE. GENERAL ORDER SIX, FOUNDING 101ST AIRBORNE. AUGUST 1942

o

UlUNG WO HLD WA H I I

th e U S crea ted five airbo rn e in fan try

d ivision s that wer e elite format ion s of o utsta ndi ng fig htin g effective ness. T hey we re m en no t ultim atel y defin ed by usc of a parachute or land ing in a glider, but by their exce ptio na lly

hi gh stand ard of fitn ess, train in g, initiativ e, fighting sk ills, and agg ressio n. T he 82 nd A irbo rn e "All American " Div ision and the lOls t A irb o rn e " Screa m ing Eag les" played a promin ent part in some of th e tou gh est fig hting in Europe , includin g thc D-Day land ings in N orm and y.

The U S wa s com pa rat ively slo w to d e velop army all th e vo lunteers were of ueressity w hi te, airbo rne in fantry - th e So vi et Union. Japan. but o rherw ise th ey co u ld rea son ab ly be said to Italy, G erm any. a nd Br itai n a ll had tra ined co me from ev ery part of the US and eVl' ry area paratro op s be for e th e Ame ri ca ns e ntered of soc ie ty. T he majorit y had lived ha rd live s the field. It w as in Au g usr 1')42 gro w ing up ill till' I)cpressiotl era . th at H2nd In fant r y beca m e Th e tou gh co ndi t ions t he y th e fir st US di vi sion with had to en dure in train ing the A irb orn e design ati on . we re les'\ of a shock to The IOlst A irborne w as them t han t hey might ne xt in se n io rity, w ith h ave be e n [ 0 recruits t he l uh, 13th. a nd 17th from a mo re pampe red A irborne fo llo w ing o n in gelleratio n. It has been said th e co u rse o f 1')4 3 . th at these were m en prep ared [ 0 Airborn e infan try insignia The vast m ajority o f US so ld ie rs risk d eath for th e rig ht to wear silver This silver badgebearing the who fou ght in W orld War II w e re win gs 011 the ir po ck et s and to tu ck paratrooper'swingsand parachute insignia wasworn the ir tro u sers into the top of thei r CO il scri pt c itiz e n-s o ld ie rs. not fu llon the jacket pocket. t im e, professio na l " lifers" . Bnt yo u boots. Stra n gl'i y. t he so ld ie rs o f th e co u ld no t be d rafted in to a par achu te reg ime nt: g lide r reg iments that forme d an esse nt ial part of con script s we re in vit ed to vo lu n tee r to be com e airborne di vi sion s w er e not vo luntee rs and did no t paratro op ers. It w as an o ptio n that att rac te d the re cei ve ex tra pay. even tho ug h landi ng in g liders mo st ambitio us and compe titive draft ees: men was mu ch more dan ger ou s than parachu t in p, \,..ho w anted to make some thing po sitive of th eir tim e in dH..' af my and we lco me d a chance to GO IN G A IRBORN E pro ve th emselv es . Th ey we re o ffe red th e lure From th e . . tart , th e ai rbo r ne di v isio ns pu sh ed of ex t ra pay, but a ltho ug h we lco me, this was a physical train ing to record- br eaking le vel s. A w eak m ot ivati on co m pa red w ith th e att ractio n spirit o f co m pet itio n was c uco u rngc d be tween of'j oining an elite with its spec ial standard.. and men and units 0 11 all ext re me programme of pro udl y- w orn in signia . Fo r thi s re aso n , the forced m ar ch es by da y a nd ni ght. Pu sh ed to th e n u mber of vo lunte e rs for p;lratroop se rv ice lim it o f end ura nce , 110 volu nt eer ev er wa nte d a lwa ys exceed ed the p lace s avai lab le. T hose w ho to su r re nde r to e x ha u st ion or tC..'ar - 110 on e got through initia l select io n and the su b.. eqll ent wanted to "w ash out" . Th e tirsr airbo rne JUIllP h ard m onths o f trai nin g had to be outsta ndingl y wa s always a c ruc ia l cha lle nge in w hic h th e h ealt hy a nd d et ermined . In th e seg regate d U S nerv e o f a t:lir numbe r of so ld iers failed .

M1 CARBINE WIT H FOLDING Bun STOCK

THOU SANDS OF WHITE PARACHUTES DROPPED THROUGH AN INF ERNO O F FLAK, WHILE GLIDERS RAMMED HIGH TE NS IO N CABLES IN SHOWERS OF BLUE SPARKS . FRENCH PILOT PIERRECLOSTERM ANN DESCRIBES AIRBORNELANDINGS ON THE RHINE , M ARCH 1945

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the m in th e a ir. Th is wa s espec ially tr ue of m e n attac he d to m achine - gu lls o r m ortar s.

ranks of th e par achute vo lu nte ers . T he airbo rne troops we re trained to he dr opped behind e lle my lin e s. wh ere th ey would ha ve to he capable o f tig hting un suppo rted ill sm all units. T hey had to learn to o p e f 3tl' rad io s, carry o ut sabo tage wit h hi ghex plos ives. fig ht at ni ght. a nd su rv ive to r lo ng peri ods w itho ut resupply. H aving to carr y with th em a ll th e eq ui pme nt need ed for light infanrr y o pe rat io ns. the y we re so encu m bered t har it W3S h ard fin th em to b o ard th eir

PO STE D OV ERSEAS

Serv ice diary A light weight service diary w as part of a soldier's basic kit.

Op erat io n M ar k et Gard en US paratro opers jump from troop transport planes to land in a Dut ch field during Operation Market Garden, 1944. Allied glider troops have already assembled in the foreground .

N or th A fri ca wa s till' d cst in ario n for till' fi rst U S airborne troops se nt ove rseas . On the ni ght of 'JJul y 1'J43, units of H2nd Airborne m ad e their first co m bat jump as part of th e inva sio n ofSiri ly. Th e H2nd a lso pa rt ic ipated in th e in vasion of m ainl and Ita ly at Sa lerno th e fi>lIowin g September. M o st American a irbor ne t roops. h owever. w e re se n t to Britain to prep3r,' for the N ormandy landings. The se yo u ng men not o n ly h ad no previou s ex pe r ie nce

of wa r, but th e vas t m aj orit y had ne ver bee n o u tside t he US , Carried across the Atl an t ic on overcrowde d tr o op shi ps. th e y ar rive d at bases ill rural Eng la nd. an env iro n m en t rad ically di fferen t from any th ey had kn own , R ele ased fr om th e cons tra in rs of th ei r home s, th ey we re hell-rai se rs when o ff the leash . But ill ca m p rigorous tra in ing co nt inu ed to occupy ;111 th ei r energ ies. In the Sicil y lan din gs, st ro ng wind s, th e' inh erent prob le m s o f nig ht fly in g, a nd e ne lllY anti -aircraft tire h ad res u lted in paratroopers landin g sca tte red o ver a w id e ar ea , D espite thi s. a sim ila r ni ghttim e jump. with acco m pany ing g lide r landin gs. W3S pl an ned to 3CCOIllP""y the invasion o f Nor ma ndy in Ju ne 1'J44, Lar ge - scal e exe rc ises in Br itai» in the ru n -up to 1)-1)3 Y did nothing to sugges t that problem s h ad been o ve rc o m e , but H2nd a nd Hl l st Airborne were

Invasion of France Paratroopers of the 439th Troop Carrier Group aboard a DouglasC·47 just before takingoff from an airbase in England . Secondary parachu tesand life vests were worn in case of emergencies (far left).

non e the less slated to se ize and hold vital o bjectives inland from the invasion b each es. For the major ity of paratro op e rs, w ho had not been in Sici ly o r Ital y, I) -I)ay w as t heir first re a l ex pe rie nce o f co m ba t afte r two Yl';US o f training. Since the drop wa s to rak e place ill pitch dark ne ss, the y were issued wi th "click er s" to em ir a sou nd th at wo u ld ho pefull y a llow them to find on e an o the r on ce o n the g round . and with a passw ord

the German -occupied Nc t hc rl.m ds. and hol d rhc m un til all ar mo ured co lum n ar rive d. T he H2nd a nd lOIst Airb orne wer e ag ain the US di v isions selected. Th e US so th ey wo u ld not k ill o ne a no ther. H yp in g them sel ve s lip for th e o peratio n, so me shaved tr o op s ach ieve d their object ives th eir head s a nd d aubed th eir (;ICl'S with war paint . and fought o ff numerou s G erman co u u rera rrac ks . but the British o n ly to ok o ne end of th e Rhin e bridge NORMANDY An armada of transport aircraft and towed g lide rs and overa ll t he operat ion ach ieved li fted the airborne di vi sion s off from Bri t ish little of value. Due so me rest after su pe rhu m a n e ffor ts. H2nd a nd IOl st Airborne th en found airfield s on th e night n f 5- ()June, th em sel ve s c llgagl'd in resistin g a d esp er at e but chaos ensue d Oil arrivi ng G errn au w in ter o ffe nsive in t he Battle of o ver the Fren ch co ast. th e Uul ge from I kce lllbe r )<)44 to J anuar y Con fuse d by fog a nd )94 5. Th e lO) st l'sp e ci all y di stin guished ging heav y flak , t he itsel f in th e def en ce o f Basto gnl'. Thi s aircraft dropped th eir parach utists o ver a w ide b attl e a lso brought 17th Airbor ne into ac tio n fo r the fi rst ri m e. and th is relat ivel y area . M an y m en lo st fresh d ivi sion we nt 0 11 to rak e part ill the their equipment. Some drowned , landin g in th e last major air assau lt of th e wa r, cast Garrison cap bad ge sea o r in mar shl and . It w as of t he Rhin e in M ar ch )945. the The garrison cap bore a badge showing a white parachute mo st wholl y successfu l o f the Alli es' a rema rk abl e tribute to th e against blue infantry piping parachute and g lide r o pe ratio ns . qu al it y o f US airbo rne training th at mo stly unbl ood cd troops, fightin g wit h lim ited arm s and ill scatte red unit s, succ ee d ed as we ll as they d id , spread ing (On fu sion be hi nd Ger ma n lin es, se iz ing ke y g Ull e m place me nts, brid ge s, and cao sl'ways, a nd helping ho ld o ff G erm an co u n tera t tacks aga ins t th e U S fo rces 0 11 U tah b each . Airborn e so ld iers rem ained in th e th ick of the li ghting in Nor ma ndy for be twee n th ree and tive weeks, taking su bs ta n tia l casualties .

WA R TO T HE END A fter Nor ma nd y, the (;lit h of A ll ied co n u u.m d c rs in airbo rne op eration s wa s at its peak . This led to the immense ga m ble o n Operation M arket G ard en in September 1944 , So me 33,970 U S, Brit ish . and Po lish airbo rne tro op s, formed into First Airborne Al lied Arm y, w ere to seize a series of bridges over the M aas, W aal, and Rh in e rivers in

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Washing equipment Standard-issue washing equipment included a safety razor and blades, ari d-neu nahzinq tooth powder and brushlessshaving soap.

D IST INGU IS HED SERV IC E Overa ll. Wo rld Wa r I I re ve aled t he lim itat io ns o f t he co nce pt of lar ge - scal e airbo rn e o pc rnt io ns. Pa rachu te tro op s w ere ex t re me ly v u lne ra ble to g round ti re w h ile floati ng do wn to ea rth . Lar ge number s o f g lide rs we re lo st to acc ide nts o r anti- aircraft fire. Ll'SS than perfect w eather and c nc my tirl' o fte n m eant that men landed dis per sed and tar fro m the ir object ive s. Surv iv ing w itho ut heav y eq u ipm e nt in the fare of co u nte rattac ks Heavy load Paratroopersof the 82nd Airborne Division prepare to jump during the invasion of Normandy, on 6 June. 1944. Their heavy loadsincluded a reserve parachute and leg bagsstuffed with kit.

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RAZOR AND BLADES

TOOTH POWDER

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wa s cos tly . In sho rt. parachutin g had a limi ted future . But as elite light infantr y. the Airborn e Di vi sion s had perform ed o utsta ndi ng ly. Th e IOlst a nd H2nd h ad susta ine d more th a n 16 ,111111 cas ual ties. includi ng 3 ,.JOII ki lled in ac tio n . A traditi on had b een esta blished that co u ld not be eas ily di scarded . The H2nd Airborn e was not d emobi li zed at the e nd o ft he w a r and IOl st A irbo r ne w as rcacti varcd in ) 1)5 4 . Bo th re m a in elite for ces withi n th e US Arm y, a lrho ug h ma ss com bat drop s arc 110 lon ge r part o f th eir tactics.

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PR E S E N T

FOREIGN LEGIONNAIRE EVERY OTHER LEGIONNAIRE IS YOUR BROTHER. IN COMBAT YOU ACT WITHOUT PASSION OR HATE BUT WITH RESPECT FOR YOUR VANQlJISHED ENEMY. YOU

NEVER ABANDON YOUR DEAD, YOUR WOUNDED, OR YOUR WEAPONS ... CODE OF HONOUR, FREN CH FOREIGN LEGION

H E FRE

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C H r-O R EIGN LEGI O N IS

a uniqu e m ercen ar y force

th at traditiona lly provided a no-questions-asked refu ge fo r rootless m isfits. T he most dramatic period in its ex traordina ry hi story came after World War II, w he n it was in th e fo refront

of Fran ce's lo sin g str uggle to m aintain a co lon ial empire. Its heroi c defeat at Di en Bien Phu in 1954 is th e stuff of militar y legend . N evertheless, th e Legion has outlived the Frenc h Em pire to go forward into th e 2 1st ce nt ury as o ne o f the world 's most resp ected elite mi litary formation s.

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The Forei g n Legi on w as formed in 183 1 as valid passport . o r some o ther ide ntity dOCUlI1 l,t1t, J wa y of e vad ing :1 ban imp o sed Oil emplo yi ng and their back ground will be che ck ed fo r security fo re ig ners in t he Fren ch A rm y proper. Based reason s. But it is still norma l to en list unde r a at Sid i- bel-A bbe s in A lge ria , it soo n esta blished a pse ud on ym a nd ac ce ptab le to lie abo ut marita l reputatio n for tou gh ness. impl acable di sci pline, status - offi ci ally all leg ionnaires ar c unmarr ied . and a readiness to tak e a ll re cruits from an y co u ntry without inquiring into th eir TRAINING AND SE LECT IO N identit y o r per sonal h istory. The The c h ief b ar rier to ;Kc l'IH:a I1Cl' in to th e l.egion attracted Fren ch and forei gn rank s of rh e Le gion lies in th e h igh volunteers - adve ntu rers, refu ge es. level o f ph ysical and m e nt al titll ess the unem ployed , and t he required o f re cruits. The y a rc hom eless. men w ith so me th ing subject ed to a harrag l' o f me di ca l to pro ve and m en w hose lives had a nd psyc ho lo gil'a l te sts. as we ll as tak en a wro n g tu r n , and n o do ubt gruellin g ex ercises b efo re bei ng so m e indi vidual s wh o sho u ld have accepte d int o th e rank s. Th is is j ust b een in jai l. Aft er World War I, as w ell , since th e train ing regime is tr aditionall y o ne of th e most rigorous potential recruits w ere fiugerprintcd to weed o ut escaped co nv ic ts and of any fo rce in th e w orld , in clud in g c rim inals o n the run, but the Legi on pitiless forced m a rch es ca rrying fu ll NCO', arm badg e rema ined a have n for m any w ith pasts Thisdiamond-shaped arm equ ipment . Th e di scip line and th e badge bears the Legion's the y wo u ld pr efer fo rgo tte n . Aft er austerit y o fl ife as a l q.~ i o ll n a i rl· , added "flaming grenade" insignia. Ge rma ny 's defeat in Wo rld War II , perhaps to un suirnhlc motives for the Legion act ively so ught recruits in Fre nch joinin g in the first place, have m ad e de se rtion :1 run pri son er - of-war ca m ps, some o f them W:affell co nsta nt probl em. En listment is initiall y fo r tive 55 so ld ie rs wh o mi ght o the r w ise ha w face d yea rs. A forei gn er w ho re-en list, will qu ali fy for Fren ch cit ize n sh ip at th e end of ten years' prosecut ion for war crim es . Even today. p:art o f the Legion's appea l lie s in th e o p port u n ity it service ; a fu ll 15 yea rs in th e Ll'gi on ea r n s the prese nts to star r a ne w life from scratc h . Po ten tial rig ht to a pe nsio n. A ll NCOs ar e promoted legionnair es w ho present th em selves at Leg ion fro m the ra nks , bu t o n ly 10 per ce n t of offi cer s, recruiting o ffice s in Prance no w have to show a t he re st be ing pro vid ed by th e Fre nch Ar m y.

MAT 4 9 SUBMACH INE· GUN

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Training a nd tradition l egionnaires head up t he Approuague River to a training centr e deep in th e jungle of French Guiana (right). Their FAMA S assault rifl es have a "bullpup" configuration; the barr el beg ins in the butt stoc k, wh ich shortens the gun , and the magazine is placed behind th e trigger. When standing at atten tion (far right), the rif le is worn hanging across the chest.

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YOU A RE A VOLUNT EER SE RV I N G FRANC E WITH HONOUR AND FIDELITY. EVERY LEG IO N N A I RE IS YOUR BROTHER ... R EGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY.

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RAC E, O R R ELIG ION. YOU WILL DEMONSTRATE TH IS BY THE STR ICT SOLI DA RITY WH ICH MU ST ALWAYS UNITE MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAM ILY. FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION CODE OF HO NOUR

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th e la ng u age o f co m ma nd is Fre nch . recru it» fro III Fran ce o r Fr ancophi le co u n t ries have t h l' be st chance of prom oti on . As a torcc drawn fro III ma n y nat io na lit ies, leg ionna ir es ha ve tr adition ally b een ta ugh t lo yalt y to the l.cgio n, rather th an to Pran ce - hen ce till.' mot to L(~i() patti» uostra (" the Legion is o u r homeland" ). Legionnaires arc in cul cat ed with t he hi sto ry of more than 170 yea rs o f warfare , a sto ry ill whi ch sacrificia l zea l in defeat is celeb rated with eve n great er enth usiasm than vir to ry. The Legion 's co m bat reputat io n wa s fou lldt'd upo n deca de s of desert warfare aga in st Mu slim tr ibesme n rt'sisti llg th e Fren ch pr eselKl' in Nort h Afri ca, from Abd a l- Q adi r to Abd a l- K rim, Becoming Fran ce 's favo u rite cx pcdi rio na ry force, it fou ght in th e Crimea in th e 1l\50s, in M exi co in th e IH60s, in lndo ch ina in t he IHHOs, and in D aho mey a nd Madagascar in the IHtJ{)s. The Me xican exped itio n was the oc casion t( )f t he dest ru cti on of a l.cgion r Olllpany in a ( 1I110 U S act io n at Ca rne ro ne . T he Leg io n also served wit h d istin ction in Europe, from th e battl es o f M agenta and So lferino in Italy in IHStJ to t he tr en ch es o f the Western

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Rear Sight

Front durin g W orld W ar I. In World War II, after t he defeat of France in IlJ40 , th e l.eg ion wa s sp lit be tw ee n alleg iance to th e Vichy go vcrumcnt and th e Fret' Fren ch move ment ; lcg io n narics briefl y fill ig ht one an other in Syria in \lJ41. Yct 1I11 its o f the l.e gion performed o ut standingl y against R o m mel 's forces at Bir H akc im in t he W ester n D ese rt in IlJ42 and Parat roop er ' s badg e e ven t ua lly pa rt ic ipate d in th e This beret badge bears t he parachu te regiment's mu lti libe rati on of Pran ce in IlJ44 .

tou gh er th an ever befor e o r since. Its largest nat ional co nt inge nt wa s fro m Ge rma ny. ma ny of th em , as has been menti on ed , recr uit ed directly fro m pri son er- of- war ra m ps at the war's end . To call these me n " batt le- hardened ' wo uld be an under statement, sinc e mall Y had taken part in the a lmost unimagi nab le car nage and ma ssacre of th e wa r 0 11 Ge rma ny 's Easte rn Fro nt. Ano t her maj or so u rce of II l'\V recruits we re Fre nc hmen w ho had wi nged dagger Insignia. co llabo rated wit h rhe Na zis d ur in g EN D OF EM PI RE the o ccupation of France, taking Determ ined to hold o n to its co loni al em pire , refuge in the Legi on to avoid retributi on . These France ce rtain ly need ed its Forei gn Legion afte r were th e so rt of men who faced the co m m u nistled Viet M inh mo vem ent in a br utal strugg le fin ItJ4S. For political rea son s, t he co nsc r ipts who made up t he bulk of t he Fren ch Artil y co uld no t co ntrol of Indo ch in a fro m llJ46 to llJ54 . At an y o ne ti me be twee n 20,000 a nd 30 .000 legionn aires be th ro w n in to th e cos tly job of resistin g anti co lo n ial upri sin gs. T h is tas k t,, 11 to Fre nc h we re serv ing the re . r aced w ith a ll elu sive cne m y co lo nia) force s and, above all, to t he Fore ig n using g uerrilla tact ics, the y were ordered to bu ild a nd defend formidab le "hedgehog" srro ngpoints Legi on . The Legion th at entered thi s most co n tro ve rsial ph ase o f its hi story wa s probably in co ntested territory. Sin ce th e Viet Minh

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Tf1gger guard

MAS 49 /S6 Ad opt ed by the Legion in 19S9, and chambered for the 7.5mm x 54 French round, the MAS 49/56 saw service until 1980, when it wa s replaced by t he FAMA S assault rifle . This version has a grenad e laun cher sight and a nigh t sight accessory .

proved le th all y ex pe rt at a m b us h ing for ces t rave lli ng to su pply o r reli e ve these srro n gpo ints by road. the Leg io n fo rm ed its first parachute batt ali ons to ai rd ro p m en into the war zo ne. T he Legion carried o ut 15(, co m ba t j u m ps in th e co u rse o f th e w ar. The bru ta l

of Al g ie rs in 1957, a r ut h le ssly effe ctive crac kdo w n on FLN terrorists o perating in the city's casbah q uar ter , w h ich wa s

accom plishe d part ly th rou gh the rout ine usc of torture, When in 1961 Fre nch Pr esiden t G en eral de Gau lle d ecided to fig ht in g, m ark ed by m assacr e a nd g rant Al g e ria inde pe ndence . l st atro city 0 11 both sides. culminated in R EP was prom inen t in suppo rting Foreign Legio n insignia the decisive d efeat o f th e Fre nc h at a co up at te m p t m ounted by This ringed. seven-flamed the Hartl e of Di cn Bien Ph u in 1() 54 . di saffe ct ed French ge ne ra ls. The grenade was adopted as the Legion's insignia in 1963. In tota l, so me 1O,OOOlcgi onnairs's co up was abo rt ive, howev er, as d ied in t he In d o ch in a W ar , w ith m o st of the Leg ion , and o f th e 30,000 m ore wo unded o r raken prison er. It w as Fren ch A r m y in ge ne ral, refused to suppo rt it. T he l st R EI' w as per m a ne ntl y d isbanded in a disa ster for t he Leg ion . and j ust as the war in pu ni shmen t fo r its ac t o f rebell io n. Indo ch ina ca me to an en d. a ne w co nflict o pe ned in A lgeri a, th e Legi on 's trad it ion al home. On 24 O ctober 1%2 , t he Legio n lcfi Al ger ia fo r go o d, relocat in g to Aubagn c, in th e so u th o f ALGER IA AND BEYOND Fran ce, It mi g ht have app eared that th e l.eg io n From 1954 a n at io n al ist m o vem en t . the FLN, had no future . b ut t here w as plenti ful ne e d fo r m ounted a g ue rrilla and terr or ist cam paig n to hi gh ly t rain ed for ces to pr oj ect Fre nch powcr aro un d th e world . The 2nd R EI', based in C o rsica , drive th e Frenc h o ut o f Al ge ria. Once mor e t he Leg ion wa s at the co re o f France 's m ilitary establishe d an im pressive reputatio n as a rapid ripo ste . T he l st R cg in w llt Erran ge re Pa rach u t istc intervention force. and demen ts o f the Leg io n we re sc m to fight agai ns t Iraq in 1991 an d m ore (R E I' - Forei gn Legi on Pa rachute R cg im cllt) played a leadin g ro le in t he co nt rove rsia l Hartle rece ntl y aga inst the T al iban in A fghan istan.

Parachut e drop into Dien Bien Phu l egionnaires parachute into the fortified valley of Dien Bien Phu during the disesterousIndochina War, 1953.

BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU In the winter of 1953-54, Fra nce flew in some 16,000 troops to construct an d occu py a se ries of stronqpoints around an airst rip at Dien Bien Phu, in a rem ote valley near the bord e r bet ween Vietnam and Laos. The Foreign Leg ion provide d the majo rity of the so ldie rs, sett ling into thei r fortified pos itions with suppo rt facilities th at included a we ll-sta ffed brot hel. By March 1954, Viet Minh co mmande r Genera l Vo Nguye n Giap had encircled Dien Bien Phu with some 50,000 men, installing heavy artillery on the surrounding hills. Defeat o f the Fren ch The French believed th at the y co uld keep their men supplied by air and that th eir firep owe r wo uld destroy the Viet Minh. But Giap's artillery quickly put th e airstrip ou t of action, and resuppl y by parad rop was mad e hazardou s by anti-aircraft fire. Two outl ying stro ng points, Beatr ice and Isab e lle, were overru n on 13- 14 March, but then the defence stiffe ned. Legion voluntee rs we re paradro ppe d in as reinfo rcem ents, some ma king th eir first eve r parachute jump to come to the ir co mrades' aid. Their co urage was was ted, however. On 7-B May th e final Fre nch position s we re overwhelme d. Almost half of the 4,000 def enders killed at Die n Bien Phu were Fre nch leg ionna ires.

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US MARINE

li E 1'lIl ST AM EIU CA N G HOUN D FOH C ES

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deployed in offensive

com bat operations agai nst the Viet C ong and the North Vietna me se Ar my (N VA) were the US Marin es who ca me asho re at Da N an g on th e coas t of South Vietnam

o n 8 M arch 1965. The cho ice of th e M arines to spearhead US involvement in Vietn am reflect ed both th eir status as an elite fightin g force and th eir tradi tion al ro le as age nts of US overseas int erventi on . T he followi ng six ycars of warfa re were to rest the Marin es' end urance to the lim it.

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I

T he US M arin e s w ho served in Vietnam we re in herito rs of a long and proud tra di tio n. The M arine: Co rps traced its o rigi ns back to the two battalions o f C onrinc ntal Marines established ill 1775 to serve as sold iers 01 1 board naval vessels during the Ameri can R c vo luri onar y W a r. In th e COlIrsC of th e !'Jth a nd ea rly 20th cent uries , t he M arines devel op ed a rol e as a ll ovc rSl'Js int er vent ion force -

infa nt ry w as the focus of Mar inc o pe ratio ns (M ar ine aircraft were int en ded prim aril y fo r ;111 Marine recru its had to und er go training as rifl em en . T he r igo u rs o ft he 13 - w cek M arin e "boot ca m p" at the Parris Island

close air suppo rt) and

R ec ruit D l'po t, and at the Corps' ot her in itial train ing facility at San J) i l'~o, are legenda ry . Gruelling m arches, pn.' ss-u ps, and ru ns arc ex ec uted to the co nstant accompa nimcnr

o ne of the ir not ab le ac tio ns o f aggressivel y yc lled o rde rs w as to seize the h arbo u r at and abuse fr om in stru ctor s. C u a uta na mo Bay in C u ba The process c ulm inates in the du r in g rhe IH9 H Spa n ish "Cr uci b le", ;) 5 4- ho ur fi eld traini ng exer cise in w hi ch the A m e r ica n W ar. T hc y se rv ed wi t h di st inction in W orld W ar I. rec ru it is al lowed a maximum of eight ho urs' sleep, Su cces sful for w h ich t he y were co ns id erab ly US M arine Cor ps badg e bet ter pr ep ar ed tha n rhe US A rm y. re c ru its then go Oil to ot he r cam ps Theeagle and anchor symbolize the Marine Corps' By Wo rld War II. the Ma rines were fo r re gul ar infan tr y tra ini ng, wit h air and sea capabilities. develo pin g techniques o f am phibious all e m pha sis o n acc urate shooting w a rfa re th at w ere applied successfu lly durin g at lo ng ran g e , and to learn spec ialist sk ills. A the island-h op pin g ca m paig n against the j ap.mcsc sig n at Parris Island proclaim s: "T he deadl iest in the Pac ific from 194 2 to 194 5. The Ko rea n wl'a po ll ill the wo rld - a M arine and h is ri fle." T he M arine infaurrymnn se nt to Viet nam W ar su hsc q u c ut ly confirmed thei r clai m to be t he "g ru nt" - wa s typica lly no more tha n IX to th e tou ghest Ame r ican infa ntry fo rce - a clai m wi th wh ich th c U S Ar m y nat u rall y d id no t ag ree, 20 yea rs o ld . R e cru its cam e from all over th e US , althoug h th er e was 3 tendency to r m o re to T RA I N I NG A N ELITE ha il fro m the rural M id - W est and So u th . Fu lly T he qu alit y of th e M arin es as fig h ting m en raci all y in teg rate d sinc e the later stages of the d ep ended la rgel y np nn t he qu alit y o f th eir Kor ean War, till' Ma rin es at tracted m an y t rai ni ng . At th e t im e of t he Viet n am W ar . the Afri can -A merica ns. w ho fou nd ill t he ar me d M arine Corps was , at it is to day. a self-contained

all-a rms for mat io n, with its own arrillcry , he licopters. a nd fixed -wi ng ai rcraft. Bu t th e

fo rces a be tter e m ploy me nt o pportu n it y and relatively eq ual treat ment at a rime when c iv i l righ ts were a hotl y contested issue in the US .

M60 MAC HINE·G UN

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Amphibious w arf are Amphibious landing techniques are a mainstay of Marine Corps training . Here a company disembarks from an M-l 13 Armoured Personnel Carrier on the coast of SouthVietnam, 1965.

O nce awa y from an Ameri can base . no sold ie r

Canteen ThIS standard-issue canteen, still in use today. hold s 95ml (1 U5 quart ) of w ater.

By !<)(,H j ust ove r o ne in te n M ari nes w ere bla ck , alt ho ug h a sig n ifica ntly hi gh er per centage wo u ld be fou nd at th e sha r p e n d of th e w ar, w it h less in safe tec h n ica l o r ad m in istrative jobs . Black officers were ran: - less tha n o ne in a hundred in I<)(,H , White or bla ck, t he g r u nts tended to belong to the less ed uca ted, mo st underpri vileged st rura o f Am erican soc iety. Th ey would make co u rageo us so ld ie rs. but not necessaril y se ns itive am bassadors for the Ameri can w ay oflifc . IN T O V I ETNAM

T he Marin es we re dep loyed in the north ern sec to r of So ut h Vier n.n u , in a regio n ab ut ti ng the D em ilit ar ized Zone ( D MZ) that sepa rated the US- backed South fro III com m u n ist- ru le d No rt h Viet na m . T he ar ea in w hi ch the y h ad to o pe rate comprised a densely popu lated COJs t J I pla in an d , furth er inl and , th e wi ld j u ngle-clad m o unt ains o f the Ann.uncse Co rdillera.

Both th e plain a nd the m ountain s were challenging, alic n e nv iro n me nts fo r th e

M arine soldie r. Am id th e villages a nd rice-paddies of th e plain he w as surro u nde d by a popul ati on w ith a cu lt ur e and lan g u age h e did not understand , and i ll w h ich active sup po rte rs of t he V iet C o ng g ue r rillas we n.' indistiuguishablc from gc nuinc non combat ants. In the H igh la nd s h e had to sec k o ut an el usive cncmy amo ng j agged rid g t's and ravines w rea the d in mi st, c utti ng a path thr ough th e tangled vi nes o f triple- can op y fo rest with a ma ch et e, pla gu ed by insec ts and battl in g wi t h heat and humidit y, Even o n ro u t ine patrols in areas t he o reti ca lly u nder the co nt ro l of th e So uth Viet namese govcr umcnt , there wa s a steady drain o f casu alt ies from mines and booby traps (w h ich th e Viet Cong exc el led at m aking), o r sn ipe r fire ,

co u ld affo rd to relax - taking otT yo ur flak jacke t because yo u were hot co u ld cost yo u yo ur life. At fir st th e M arines face d the cha lle nge o f Vietn am with go o d mo ral e and adapted well to the diffic ult co nditio ns. T hey eve n mo unted an int elligent cou nter- insurge ncy cffon in the v illages known as th e Com bined Action Pro g ram . Thi s inv ol ved puttin g sm all squads of M arin es in " fri endly" ha m le ts a longs ide lo cal militi a to keep o ut the V iet Cong o It w as o ne of the few occasions whcn thc Am eri can military c hose to re gard ordinary Vietnam ese as pot ential friends and alli es. Bu t little of t he Mari ne s' time w as devoted to w inni ng hearts and minds. T he ir m ain fu nct io n wa s to seek o ut and de stro y the e ncm y. whet her Viet Cong gu errillas o r NVA sold iers, primaril y in t he thinl y p opulated Highlands. U S co m ma nde rs believed that th e y cou ld w in th e co n flict th rou gh a com b ina t io n o f th e mobilit y provid ed by helicopter s and m aximum u se of th e firep ower available to American forces. To provid e the fi re power, M arin e s set up fireba scs in advance d po sitio ns fro m w hich thei r artille ry cou ld th en suppo rt infantr y advancing int o ene my-co ntro lled territor y. Helicopters inse rte d R econ tea ms o f six to eight M arin es int o ho stile tcrrit or y to rrack the moveme nts of e ne my form ati on s. o r fer ried larg er units int o jun gle la nding zo ne s ( LZs ) from w h ich the y co u ld launch patrols in search o f the ene my. It pro ved a n ex ha ust in g a nd co stl y wa y of wa gi ng war. M c n advancing through for ested mountains car ry ing 36 kg (801b) o f kit - in cludin g an M 16 rifl e, grenades. am m uni tio n , ca ntee ns , ent re nc h ing too l. m ach et e . fi rst-a id kit . and Aak

Foid-down If>af

SIght. graduated to 350m ( l , 150ft)

,.",

M79 " Bl oo pe r " With a maximum rangeof 300m (984ft). the M79 grenade launcher fills the gap between the hand grenade and the mortar. Two were issued to each rifle squad.

/ Rifledbarrel

rotates grenade \

Rear sling

attachment M 79 40MM GRENADE

j nckct e- m ight be luck y to mak e 500 m (I,650 ft) an hou r. Even without enemy action, casualties were sustaine d fro m falls, snakebite, heat stro ke, and

Jungle survival kit An assortment of medicationsand preventatives was issued to each Marine. In the absence of kindling , hexamine fuel tabletswere used for cooking.

o ther natural causes . "N o - co ntact" mi ssion s w e re co m m on . When fircfights occu rred , th e M arin es

inevita bly su ffered losses to th e w ell-trained , tena cio us co mmunist iu fan try. T he availability of heli copters to evac uate the wo unde d saved Illan y lives. although "mede vac" mi ssion s w e re ext remel y dangerou s; lo w -r o vin g heli copters w ere prim e targe ts for cn e my mortar tire.

UNDE R SIEGE T he M ar ines in creasingly fou nd the mselves o n t he de fensive as th eir firebases and o ut pos ts just so ut h of th e DM Z came under attac k from NVA fo rces. T he hill -top base at C o n T hien was th e object o f a det ermi ned N VA in fantr y assau lt in September 1967. T h is was beaten off by th e M arin e ga rr ison, bu t the y th en CJ I B e under sustained arti llery bo mba rd me nt fro m NVA IJOm m and 152mm gu ns sited inside th e DM Z . M arin e art illery and air craft hit back at th e artillery and at th e NVA sold iers aro u nd the base. For th e M arin es sheltering in bunker s at Con T hi en, the ex perience was reminiscent of World W;u I tr en ch w arfare, O nce th e mon so on rain s star te-d. th e: base becam e a qu agm ire of red mud in whi ch men sank kn ee-deep. Arou nd the

flood ed bu nk er s, artillery fire crea te d a barren moon scap e, scorche d and pock ed with crate rs. T he siege of Con Thien wa s lifted at th e end of O cto ber. but it w as sig n o f things to co me .

WATER

O n 2 1Januar y 196 8, NVA art ille ry, roc ket. and mortar fire struck th e M arine base at Kh e San h in the foo th ills of t he Cord illera . The Ma rines' am m un it io n dump explode d, destro yin g mu ch of th eir supplies. For th e Am eri cans it w as an

PURIFYING TABLETS

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inauspic io us start to a sieg e th at w as to

last for 77 ago n izing days. The base was defended by so me 6,000 men, mostly

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SOLID FUEL

TABLETS

FOOT POWDER

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THE CORPS WE LOVE IT AND SHALL DIE FOR IT. IF YOU HAVE NEVER BE EN IN IT, YOU SHALL NEVER UNDERSTAND IT. BRAD LEMKE, USMARIN E CORPS GUNNERY SERGEANT

Sea Knight A CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter arrives at the Marine base of Khe Sanh. The helicopter provided all-wea ther, day/night transport for troops, equipment, and supplies.

SEARCH AND DESTROY TACTICS US ground forces took the offensive in Sout h Vietnam. aiming to "find. fix . and destroy " the enemy. Typically. a com pany w ould be airlifted by helicopter into a part of the jungle w here communist t roops were known to be operating . The area around the designated land ing zone (Ll) would be "prepped " by air st rikes or by art illery fir e from th e nearest f irebase before th e

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helicopters we re sent in. Either alone or alongside othe r unit s in a wi der sweep. the company would

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then mo ve on foot through the fo rest seeking

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conta ct w ith enemy infant ry.

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AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT

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When a firef ight began . the Ame rican infa nt ry

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the enemy posit ion. Effort s to surro und enemy

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would call in artille ry fire and air strikes to hamm er fo rmatio ns generally failed. The agile communists were expert at filtering through any attempted encirclement. and at amb ushing reinfo rcements moving up to join the combat. The awesome firepower at the Ame ricans' disposal. especially

belonging to the 26 th M a rine R egi m ent . T he NVA force t h at su rro u nde d t he base w as probably 40,OOO- stron g . T h e N VA d u g tre nch es to wi th in 90m ( WOyd) o f th e per im e ter of sandbags and barbe d wire bu t failed to ta ke th e ba se by assau lt. O n th e o the r h and , the M a rin es h ad seve re di fficult ies keepi ng the garrison su pplied by air. T h e base's a irst rip w as ex posed to e ne my m ortar and a rt ille ry fir e and a nt i- a irc ra ft gu ns m en aced the approaches to the base. A ir o perations we re also rendered hazar dous by pe rsiste nt lo w clo ud . T he Amer ican night ma re wa s t hat the base wo u ld be overr un o r for ced to su rre nd er. as h ad happe ned to th e Fre nch at t he h and s of the Viet M inh at Di en Bie n I' h u in 1954 . T he re was a tr em or of an xi e ty wh e n, du rin g th e siege. 3 11 American o utpos t at Lan g: Vei was overr u n b y th e N VA usin g ta nk s. But the M arines held o n at Kh e Sa n h a nd at their sur ro u nd in g h ili -l op outposts unt il a reli ef co lu m n broke th rou gh on 8 Ap ril. T he M ar in es h ad lost \99 d ead an d 830 wo unde d in th e siege.

from the air. ensured that many more Viet (ong and NVA t roops died than US soldiers . On the ot her hand. the grunt on the gro und frequently foun d him self f ighting at a disadvant age. facing a nu merically far supe rior enemy.

On patrol Captain Charles Robb leads a group of M arines on patrol south of Da Nang in May 1968. Patrols wer e usually made in platoon (20- man) or company (lOO-man) str ength.

'II

US Ar m y no t e pad During th e Vietnam War much of a Marine's equipment. despite rivalr y, was US Arm y-issue,

W h ile th e siege of Kh e Sa n h was go ing o n, the co m m u n ists lau nc hed t he Te t O ffens ive (d urin g t he Tet hol id ay celebrat io ns) in which the y atte mpted to seize co ntrol of cit ies a nd to wns across So ut h Viet na m . W hi le mos t urban areas were held or sw iftly retak en b y U S a nd So ut h Viet n a m ese fo rces. the city of H ue was h eld b y NVA sold iers for 25 d ays. T he M arines played the leading part in wresti ng back co n tro l of the c ity . T hey fought from house to h ou se a nd fro m st reet to st re e t. at one poi nt re po rted ly ta k in g a casua lty for every yard o f grou nd ga ined . By the ti m e N VA resistan ce fin all y ce ased o n 24 Fe bru ar y, th e M arines h ad lo st alm ost a tho usand m en kill ed o r w o u nd ed .

CR ISIS OF MORALE At Khe Sanh a nd at H ue th e g ru nts had shown all th e q ua liti es ex pecte d of US M arines. M a ny men h ad been drive n to the lim its of enduran ce ; wa r co rr espo nde nt s d escri bed the " thousa nd - yard sta re" of th e so ld ie r red uced to m ental a nd e mo t io nal bl an kn ess by t he st re ss o f sustaine d Coo king eq ui pme nt Most of a Marin e's food came in cans. After eati ng, cutlery was slid o nto the pan handle through holes at their ends to keep them tog eth er wh ile being w ashed.

TIN PAN FOR COOKING AND EATING

( UTlE RY

THE STRENGTH OF THE PACK IS TH E WOLF, T H E STRENGTH OF THE WOLF IS THE PACK. M OTTO. 3RD LIGHT ARMORED RE CONNAISSANCEBATTALION

ex pos ure to co m ba t. Yet th ey Urban combat The Tet Offensive saw the city had tak en punishm ent from of Hue overrun byNVA troops. th e c ne my without crack ing Underthe constant threat of snipers, the Marinesof Task. Force and had go ne o n doing th e X-Ray fo ught street- by-street for job they we re e mployed to a month to regain the city. do . Morale in t he M a rines, as in the rest o f US grou nd for ces in Vie tna m, wa s non eth eless se rio usly on the w ane . As the nu mber of M arines m ak in g th ei r fina l jou rney home in a green rubber bodybag m o u nted , th e o rd ina ry gru nt's focu s inev itab ly fixed 0 11 surviv ing his 13 - l11onth to ur o f duty. Even w itho ut the persistent crit icism of the wa r bein g ex p ressed b y j ournalists and th e ant i- wa r mo vement in the United States, m en co u ld see th at th e pro spect of any th ing th at co uld be called "v icto ry" WJS remot e . M aint aining co m m itment was espec ially hard fo r bla ck M arines. After th e assassi na tio n of civ il rights leader M artin Luther Kin g in April 19 68 , m an y African -Ameri can s fclt t o rn in their allegiance . un sure wheth er they were right to be fig h ting for th e United States at all.

AFT ER V I ETNAM It was w ith relief rh at th e M arines withdrew from Vietn am in 1971 , leaving th e wa r to be foug h t by th e army alo ne . By th en , th ey had lo n g cea sed to car r y o ut o ffens ive o pera tions. Around SOO,OOO Mari ne s had serve d in t he wa r. Of th ese, 13,0 9 1 had been ki lled a nd 5 1,392 wo u nd ed in act io n. O ver all , M ari nes acco unted fo r about a qu arter of all U S co m bat d eat hs in Vietnam . R ebu ild in g t he im age and mo rale of t he Corps w as a task tha t took a de cad e, but t he M arin e s hav e su rv ived to play a prom in ent ro le in su bse q ue nt conflicts. in cluding th e in vasion a nd o cc upa tio n of Afgh an istan and Iraq in th e 21st ce lll u ry.

Purple Heart The Purpl e Heart. o r Badge of

Military Merit, was instituted by George Washington (depicted) in 1782, when he wascommanderin-chief of the Continental Army. It is awarded to soldierseither wounded or killed in battle.

VIET CONG GUERRILLA

H E PEOPL E'S l.lB ERATI O N A RMED POlleES ( P I.A I:),

T

kn own to

its Am eri can ene m ies as th e Viet Cong, was a rural-based gue rrilla army th at fou ght aga inst th e US and th e USbacked South Vietn am ese gove rn me nt in th e Vietn am War.

Like th e N orth Vietna mese Army (N VA) in fantry who foug ht with them , th e Viet Cong gue rr illas we re skilfu l and ded icated fighters . In co mbat they almos t always suffered far heavier losses th an thei r o ppo ne nts, but they were sustained by co mra desh ip and a clear sense of pu rp ose.

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T he Viet Cong evolved from the co m mu n ist- le d Viet M inh guer rilla mo vem ent that fo ug ht agai nst Fre nch co lonia l rul e in Ind o ch in a. A fter th e Viet Minh defeated t he French in 11)5.J. V iet n am wa s split. w ith the So ut h co m ing under th e co ntro l of th e US - back ed govcrumcnt of Ngo D inh Di em and the N ort h under co m m u n ist r u le, W he n the co u lltry was divided. tell s o f thou sand s o f Viet Minh g ue r rillas fro m th e So uth chos e to relo cate to the N orth ; o the r form er g ucr r illas resum ed a peasant life in their so u the r n v i llages. Di em 's go ve rn me nt prov ed to be co rrupt and brut al. soon alie nating mu ch of the popu lation of So u th Vietn am . By 1957. sm all-s ca le g ue r rill a warfare had resumed in m any rural areas . Se nsi ng that the time was ripe to resume the strug gle for a unified co m m u n ist- r u led Vietnam, in 1959 the N orth Vietnamese go ver n m ent sent ten s o f th ou sands o f forme r Viet Minh guerrillas back to th e South as "cadres" with th e intention o f o rgan iz ing a full - scale in surgen c y. D uring the ir time in the nort h , the se mcn had und ergone rigorou s trainin g in the theory and p ract ice of rev o luti onary war fare . They had learned th at the politi cal and mi litary st r uggles were in sepa rab le. Aft er the lo ng, ro ug h journey to the So ut h th ro u g h tra ck less j u n g le, th e y made

DEGTYAREV LIGHT MACHINE·GUN

contac t with v illagers, slipping into th e hamlet s at ni ght to talk to lo cal people and win their support fo r a gu e rri lla ca m pa ig n. T h e South Vietn amese peasant s we re prepared to listen to

the cadres as people of their o w n k ind. who spok e abo ut issu es that co nce rned them . suc h as ex ce ssive govcr u mc n t taxes and un po pul ar lo cal landown er s. T he Na tio na l Liberat io n Fron t (N LF). set up in !l)(,() as th e po liti ca l arm of the g ue rrilla movement, backed up the prop aganda efforts o f till' cad res w ith clandestin e radio broad casts, po sters, and ne w s shee ts.

GU ERRILLA ARMY Whereve r th e cad res fou nd suppo rt amo ng th e lo cal population . th e y recr ui te d g ue r r ill a so ld ie rs. The mo st promisin g yo ung men we re e ncou raged to leave the ir vi llage and become full -time gue rrillas: women we re also take n to serve in suppo rt rol es. Th e re w ere plent y of willing volunteer s. altho ugh va rio us kinds o f pressure we re applied, and in so me cases recrui ts were co nsc ripted at g u npoi nt. The full -time gu errill as w ere subd ivi ded into regi o nal forces, w h ich ca r ried o u t low-l e vel o pe ratio ns arou nd the g uerrillas' hom e area, and m ain force so ld ie rs. wh o rece ived thorou gh infanrr y trainin g at bases in sparsely in habited co untry and w ere readied for fu ll-scale co m bat in large mi litary format ion s. T he peasants w ho remained ill the vi llages we re organ ized into a part-time g ue rrilla mi litia . The y h ad o n ly t he m o st basic m ili tary trai nin g

but co u ld . for exa m ple. provide inte lligen ce. set b ooby-traps fo r gover n me n t patrols. and d ig tunnels to serve as hid in g places fo r g ue rr illa tro op s and the ir equipme nt. By ea rly 1l)(,5. th e V iet Cong h ad ex te nded its co ntro l ove r th ree- quarters of So ut h Vietnam . ac hieved m o stly th ro u gh sma ll-sca le g ue r rilla acti vit y. Viet Cong un its raide d v illages, k ill in ~ govern me nt-ap poi nted vill age lead er s and slaug hte ring local pro - gover nment m il itia.

VI

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Isolated military o utpos ts were ove rru n . R o ad s were re nde re d unu sable by a nu mber of ambushe s. In th e c ities, terrorist attack s were launc he d aga inst the go ve rn me nt's US military adv isers. incl udin g bo mbings of Am ericanfrequ e nted c ine m as and cl ubs.

FIGHT ING T HE AME R ICA NS

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From 1965. the nat ure of t he war cha nged radi ca lly. T he U ni ted States se nt in its arme d forces to pr event the fall of the South Vietn amese gover n me n t. At the same time. the North Vietnam ese Arm y began send ing tro op s int o the So uth ill large number s. Alth ou gh th e g ue rri lla war o f a m b ushes, bo ob y traps, and assassiua rio ns co ntinue d. SOO I1 mu ch of th e war was bein g foug h; between US so ld ie rs and N orth Vietn am ese in fautr y or Viet Cong m ain fo rce g ue rrillas in wi ld. largel y dese rted co u nt ry . Th e Vi et C o ng pro ved to be a match for U S g ro u nd forces as lig ht in fant r ym en . Led Guerri lla w eapo ns TheViet Conq used a wide variety of infantry weapons. manyoriginating from the Soviet Union. Hereguerrillasare equipped with a KoreanWar-vintage Goryunov7.62mm heavy machine-gun, Simonovrifles, and state-ofthe-art AK47 assault rifles.

Chinese compass Mu ch of t he equipment used by the Viet Cong wasprovided by communist China. Compasses such asthis were essential for orientation in the jungle.

by o ffice rs wh o shared their hard sh ips. th ey mo ved swi ft ly across cou ntry. m anoe uvred sk ilfully to ca rry o ut am b us hes and e ncircleme n ts, and hu gged th eir e ne m y in fircfi ghts to inhibit clo se air su ppo rt. US forces fou nd them fru str atingl y elu sive , filt erin g away be for e decisive defe at co u ld be inflicted . But for th e g ue rr illas, subj ect to bombi n g. she ll ing. napalm , and fire from fixe d -wi ng a nd hel ico pter g unsh ips. co mbat wit h t he US for ces w as, above all. a g ruelling ordea l in which th e y to ok heav y casua lt ies.

FAR FROM HO M E The g ue rrilla's ex pe rience o f wa r w as cha racte rized b y fear. hardship, homesickness. a nd bor ed om . The j u ng le wa s no m or e a fami lia r habitat to peasants from th e rice paddies th an it w as to th e Ame rican s. T o th e Vietn am ese. th e j u ng le-clad m ountain s we re a place to be fear ed , inhabit ed as th ey w er e by g hos ts and fearsome wild a n ima ls. They suffe re d te rribl y fro m m alaria and from snakebi tes - the gue rr illas' famous rubber sanda ls offe red ve ry poor prot ect ion agai nst poi son ou s reptiles. Sur vivin g mainl y o n Sl113 11 qu ant itie s of rice. salt. a nd dri ed fish o r meat . the g ue rrillas w ere often in a state o f sem i-s tarvatio n . The y aug me nte d t he ir ration s by ea ring juugle faun a. includin g mo nke ys, elep hant s. and large moth s

/

Transport ,outes

Enemybases

/

~aps ~hi n ese-suPPl i ed

an d ma p case map cases were used by the Viet Cong guerrillas. This map has marked on it detailed information about the location of enemy bases.

C H I N A

DUR ING THE DAY, THEY GE NERALLY DISAPPEAR, SLEEP ING AND HI DING BEN EATH THICK JUNGLE CANO PIES, TAKING REFUG E IN HILLSIDE CAVES.

Gulf

of

NORT H Tongking VI ET N AM -

-

Hainan

Aug 1964: North VtelrwllWW all.Kh report ed on US ~lrO)len

Gulf of Tonkin Resolut ior\. commit, US forces to w.r

.n.. .

CU ll Thien

ARTICLE IN US TIME MAGAZINE. 21 JULY 1967

M. r 1%5: Fir\1US ground forces

1~_-I~~~1~),':1 ~1~~:1~ Tn Hue'

Viet n am Wa r The Vietnam War was a conflict betw een communist North Vietnam (backed by China and Russia) and th e US-backed South Vietnamese government. It also spilled over into laos and Cambodia .

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Ho Chi Minh tra il

Sum

Sihan ouk tra il

Gulf of

Vletco n9 a nd NVAoffe n,I"'e,

Thailand

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Tet offensive 1968

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Viet Cong b stertkte offe nsiw' 1972

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Final o Hemiw 1974- 75

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125

MajOf b.ttln with US involve ment

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protecti o n , but th e re W3Salw ays the fear t hat th ey mi gh t co llapse a nd bury their OCCUp3ntS alive. So me g ue rrillas had to be ho spitali zed w ith shel l shoc k afte r persistent bo m bing .

T ET AND A FT ER l n j anu ar v-Peb ru ary 1968 . th e Viet C o ng to ok adv an tage of t he new yea r, or Tet , celebratio ns, when man y South Viema mese sold iers wou ld be on leave, and occ upied cities

purloined US howitze r shells re-fused to turn them into remote-contr olled mines. The gue rrillas' use of booby trap weapons had a devastating psychological impact on US or South Vietnamese troops. They frequently resulted in am putation of limbs, if not deat h. Sometimes guerrilla snipers would cover the site of a booby trap, read y to add to the mayhem. Sp iked booby t ra p' Common Viet Cong booby traps were

the spike plate and the grenad e (here w ith out it s tr ip wire ).

150

1967-69

VIET CONG BOOBY TRAPS Booby trap devices played a large part in the smallscale guerrilla wa r waged around the villages in Vietnam. One of the most effective - and most primitive - of these was the punji stick. Villagers sharpened pieces of bamboo, coated their tips with faeces or some other infectious substance, and planted them upright in the ground unde r a covering of leaves or grass. If a soldier ste pped on it, the stick wo uld pierce the sole of his boot. Whole clearings we re sometimes pla nted with punji sticks in an attem pt to sto p them being used as helicopter landing zones. When the Americans thickened their boot soles to resist punji sticks, the guerrillas invented a device made of two spiked panels that, when trodden on. penetrated the leg above the boot. Other booby trap devices included grenades atta ched to a tripwire made of fishing line and

Kompong T horn

No rth Vietnam

Communist supply lines ......

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Sout h Viet nam

M. r 1968 Noton ous m. n . cre of 300·400 South Vietn. mese dviU.ns by USsoldie'" in . ._ _ MyLii Th;lI1 ~ I'hon ~

THE VIETNAMWAR 1965-1 9 75

III

/

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T HA ILA ND rh at th ey barbecu ed in 3 flam e. G ue rr illas w ere paid 60 piaster s (abo u t 2 ) 3 m onth . w hich the y used to o rder lu xu ries such as suga r, soap. and tob acco tha r su pply o ffice rs wo u ld pu rchase in Ca mbodian markets. Amusements were rare. T he guerri llas t rained en dl essly or S3t th rough classes in w h ich th e y were tau ght re volution ar y slogans or upd ated on wo rld new s. An occas iona l visiting entert ain me nt unit wo u ld be welcom e despite its ge ne rally repetitiou s programmcs o f uplifting pa trio tic films a nd so n gs. To cou nter homesickn ess, gue rri llas we re occasio nally given leave , alt hough tr avell in g through 3 war zo ne to visit the ir fami lies was hazardous. Attack by 3 U S sca rch-a nd-dcsrroy sweep or by ac rial bo m ba rd me nt in stantl y rep laced 3ny bored om w ith fear . The m en mi g ht have to Ace at a mom ent's noti ce and then move thr ou gh the for est for d ays o n end. hi din g d esperat ely fro m th e ene my by d3Ya nd slee pi ng in 3 hammo ck slu ng be tw een two trees at n ight. By general agreeme nt. most terrifyi ng of all was a U-52 bo mbe r st rike. in w hi ch 3 who le area o f fores t wo u ld erupt w ith a roar that tore eard rums and shoo k ner ves to the co re. Shelt ering in tunnels, m 3ny of w h ich co ntained k itc he ns. sleeping roo ms . a nd m ake shift ho spita ls, offered so me

In

~~~:,m~li~::.Slbly to

and towns across South Vietn am . Leadin g to the br ief occ upatio n of Sa igon . th e capital, th e Tc r Offen sive . 3S it W3S kn own . d ealt a f.1t31 blo w to America's will to co ntinue th e war. but at the cost of massive guerrilla casualties. T her e wer e n13ny th ou sands of d efecti o ns from th e Viet C o ng in th e foll ow in g ye3r. as men foond th e ten sion and hardship o f ye3rs of gue rr illa li fe cu mu latively un bearable. Uut desertion s wer e never as numero us as from the go vern me nt forces. A m ember of th e Viet C o n g polit ical lead er ship, Truon g N h n Tra ng, wro te : "A lt ho ug h th e g ue rri llas we re sho rt o f food 3!H1 ofte n sick. th e y m aintained th e ki nd o f esprit and co m radeship th at an ima tes peo ple who are fighting for a com mon purpose in w h ich they bel ieve wit h all thei r hea rt s. They go t on, u nder horrendous co nd itions, through mutu al su pport a nd a rough but ge nuine love for each other ." In the end . howe ver. the defeat of t he South Vietn am ese gove rn ment in 1975 W3Sach ieved by th e N orth Vie rua mese Arm y fight in g a co nventional war w ith conventional we apons, suc h 3S tanks and a rt illery. Mil itari ly sidelined, many Viet C ong guerrillas were also di sillusion ed w it h the outcome of th e W3r. Few o f th e ra n k a nd file had bee n co m m u n ists and th e harsh austeri ty o f th e reun ified Vietn am W3S not w ha t th e y had wa nt ed , w hich W3S sim ply a n end to fo re ign inte rfe ren ce in their co u nt ry and 3 better life for th ei r fami lie s.

-<

MODERN GUERRILLA FIGHTERS In th e 1930s M ao Zedong in C h ina formulated th e th eory

cruc ial to preventin g th e spread of co m m u nism in th e Cold War.

o f rural-ba sed gue rrilla war as the path to co m mu nist revolut ion .

Yet fro m the late 1970s America itself backed gue rrilla forces in

Hi s triu mp h in C hina in 1949 and the subsequent defeat of France

wars aga inst left-wing gove rn me nt s in Afgh ani stan , An gola, and

by Viet Minh guerrillas in Vietnam in 1954 was followed by

Ni caragu a. 13y th e 2 1st century, gue rrilla activ ity had in some

victo ry for Fidel C astro 's armed ban d in C uba in 1959. 13y th e

co u ntries degenerated into perman ent wa rfare bet ween arme d

1960s the U nit ed States regard ed co u nte rinsurgency warfare as

gangs , ex isting in sym biosis wi th the intern ational narcotics trade .

III

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MUJAHIDEEN IN THE 19805 III 1<J7H in sur ge nt g ro ups opposed to the pro-Soviet M arxi st govern ment o f A fgh ani stall hcgall trai n ing at ha st's in Pak istan. Fro m the su m m e r of )«)7'.> these m uj ahi dccn (o r "thos e who stru ggle ") were ba cked b y the A m eri ca n C I A as well as by Pak ista n i sec re t se rv ic es. In I)c rl'l11bcf 1')79 the Sov ie t Union sent troops

into Afghanistan to co unter the burge onin g in surgen c y, Th e gu errilla s wh o took 0 11 the Sov iet for ces co nsisted mostly of local tribesmen o pe rati ng in g ro ups a tew hundred stro ng . In the course o f th e war , links between guerri lla gro ups de veloped until they were able to mount operations in vo lvin g as m any as 10 .0 0 0 men . T he m uj ahidce n ma in tain ed a cam paig n of

h it-a nd -r u n raid s in the (ICe of inten sive Sovi et

including Saudi bu sin essman O s.nna bill Lade n ,

co u nte r ins u rge ncy operat io ns , ex ploiti ng their kno w led ge of til l' moun taino us terrain , but were un su ccessfu l w hen th ey at tem pted to overrun

also became invol ved ill the co nfl ic t. Fro m IlJH5

urba n areas. They o btain ed w capons chiefly

from th e US. Saudi Arabia . Iran , a nd C h ina. fu n ne lle d into Afghan ist an vi a Isla m ic parties in Pak ista n . which cla im ed leadership of the in surrection . Arab Islam ic fund amentalists.

till' mujah id ccn we re su pplied wi th Am er ican Stinger a nd Br it ish Blo wpipe anti -ai rcra ft mi ssiles. which redu ced the effe ctiveness of Soviet hel ico pters. The Soviet s never co nt ro lled mu ch of Afgh ani stan o utside th e towns and pulled o u t their t ro ops in \')l!l! -l!'). h aving su ffe red 64,()()() cas ua ltie s.

RPG·7 This Russian-made rocket launcher was regularly used against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Asymm etric warfar e

Afghan mujahideen stand on the remains of a Russian helicopter brought down by an American-su pplied Stinger surtece-to-ai r missile.

SANDINI STA REBELS

-

Th e Frente Sa ndi n isra d e Lib cracion Naciona l (FSLN Sand in isra N ati ona l Lib e rat io n Front ) w as nam ed aft e r Au gu sto Cesa r Sandi no, w ho lau nche d

Brit ish l1A1 M any o f the se Briti sh army service rifl es came to th e Sandinistas from Belize, a on e-t ime Briti sh co lo ny.

3 11 an ti- A me r ica n g ue rr illa cam pa ig n in N ica ragua in th e )f)20s. S~1I 1di l1o W3S assassin ate d in 1<)3 4 by t he So moza fam ily, w h ic h es tablishe d a US- backed d ict ato rsh ip, T he FSLN was fo un ded in 1962 3S J sma ll M arx ist g uer r illa band ill a remo te: area of Nicaragua . In the 1<J70 s the unpopu larit y of th e Somoza d ict ato rsh ip allowed the Sa nd in ista s to win th e ac tive suppo r t o f the popul ati on . D espite a lar ge - sca le co u nte r ins u rge ncy cam pa ig n w ag e d by th e Somozan Nationa l G uard, by Se pt ember 1<)78 most of Nicaragua w as in Sandi uis ra hands. In j u ly 1<)7 <) the di ctatorship co llapsed afte r th e Un ited Sta tes withdrew it s su pport. Iro n ically, in th e 1<)8 0s th e Sand in ista re g im e wa s in its tu rn un d e r mi ne d by a ruthless g uerr illa campaign . t his time m ounted by th e US -arllled and - fi n anced Cont ras .

.

~


'"I -e m '" m '" Z -<

Popular support Sandinista rebels in a village unde r Sandmista contro l near the Honduras border, July 1983 .

CUBAN REBEL ARMY On 2 D ecember 1<)5(" Fidel Cast ro and 8 1 follo w ers landed o n the coast o f C uba intent up o n o ve r t h ro wi ng th e di ct at orship o f Ful gc nci o Bati st a . A n e nco u nte r w ith gove r u mc nt forces, ho w ever, soon reduced th eir numbers to 22, and from M ay I<)57 th e y ca r r ied o ut sm a ll-s ca le g uc r rill., raid s to wh ich th e C uba n gove r n me n t cou ld not re spond. A go ve r n me nt offensive in t he m o untai n s in spr i ng )lJ58 was a di saster. w it h Bati sta's troops repeated ly de fe ated by th e far in ferior g ue r r ill a force s, M eanwh ile , th e American go ve r n me nt w ithd re w m ilitar y suppo rt from the di ct at orship. Then numberin g severa l th ou sand s, th e g ue rr illas we n t on th e o ffe ns ive agai ns t th e regime in August 1<)58 , Forces led b y an Argeutinian do ct o r. Ernesto " Che" G ueva ra, m ar ch ed into H ava n a o n I januar y 1<)5<). Castro and hi s com m anders Fidel Castro and members of his staff planning a raid in 1957. Che Guevara is seated second fr om the right.

A REVOLUTION IS A STRUGGLE TO THE DEATH BETWEEN TH E FUTU RE AND THE PAST. fIDEl CASTRO. SPEAKING IN HAVANA. 1 JAN 19 61

FARC Th e FA RC ( Pu er zns Arm ada s R c voluci onar ias d e Colo m b ia - R ev olut ionar y Armed Forces ofColo m b ia) was se t up in t he llIid - I'HlOs b y M ar xi st s ch imi ng to be fig hti ng 011 b eh al f of th e Colom bian pe opl e . From till' 1<)8 0s, under th e in fluence of' jacobo A re n as, it d e veloped into a self-s ty led "a r my of th e peopl e" wit h a plan fo r m ounting J mil ita r y cam pa ig n to seill' power in the co u ntry . Colo mbia's re mo te j u ng le and m o u ntai n regions provided SJfl' haven s th at the g uc r r illas co u ld co ntro l, w hi le th e co u ntry's coc a c ro p offered a potcntia l so u rce o f rev enue to bu y so ph ist icate d ar ms. A lthou gh th e FA R e ca rr ied o ut a number o f notable m il itar y o pe ra t io ns in th e 1<)<)l)s, it has ex h ibi te d a tenden c y to degen erate into a sim ple c rimi na l o rga n iza tion , It barrl es wi th Colom bia's powerful ri ght- w in g param ilitar y gro ups for contro l of th e dru gs trad e a nd ra ises furth er fina nce by kidn appin g, ex to r t io n . a nd protect io n racket s. H o w eve r, in sp ite o f th e ri sk s invo lve d. joining th e FARC mi ght w el l see m a sens ib le career c ho ice a m id th e po vert y and in se curit y of r u ra l C o lo m b ia , sinc e a m ember o f thc g ro up is proba bly pa id f.,r h igh er th an a per so n wo rkin g ill leg it im ate e m plo y me nt.

1941 -

PH E SE N T

SAS SOLDIER

N ELI TE I N I'A

A

THY FO llMAT IO

first establishe d durin g World

War II, th e Special Air Se rvi ce (SAS) has develop ed into the co re of th e British A rmy's spec ial forces. O rigin ally de sig ne d to ca rry out ope rations behind ene my lines in the

co ntex t of a co nve ntional wa r, it has also engage d in co u nteri nsu rgency cam paigns aga inst g ue rrilla forces and in co u nte rterr orist op eratio ns, such as the h ighly publici zed storm ing o f th e Iran ian Em bassy in London in \lJHO. T he supreme professionalism o f th e SAS sold ier is recogni zed wo rldw ide.

.'" VI

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The: SAS too k time to e stablish its perman ent place i ll t he IIrit ish arme d f'lrcs·s. Ori gina lly for med ill Nort h Africa in j u ly IlJ4 1 to carry

ch a llc ng« of te sti ng rhcm vclvc« to th eir m cnt.rl and ph y sicll limit s, as wel l as hy t h e prl'sti g l' of bd o ngin g to all el ite l()rlll ;lti o ll . Abou r 1 ill In

o ut ra ids beh ind A xis lines ill the

.rpplicants f;,ils at t hc first h u rd le.

D ese rt W ar . it wa s di sband ed at th e

w h ich co ns ists of;l th or o ug h

e nd of World W a r II. T"" need for

m ed ical chec k and

speci a l t()fCCS to track and destroy g ucrr illa s in t he Malayan jung le: saw that it wa s resurrected as part o f th e n: gular army in the: 1950s. Furthe r succcss fu l o pe rat io ns followed again st rebel s ill th e Arabian pen i nsula and Bo rneo , lI y t he IlJ70 s. t he SAS h ad a Ilrm ly

titlK'ss te st. The rest embark

three-week ini tial selectio n co urve that is famou.. t()r it.. dem and s on ph ysical a nd mental stam ina . H eld ill the Brccon Beacons, Wal es, th e co urse is conduc te d ill ;1 gentle m an ly and ci vili zed

established reputation in mili tary

th or ou ghl y imb ue d with till' hasics

;1

stand ard O il

a

manner. Alread y sl'rv i ng vold ier-,

c ircles as a to ugh . c ffic ic n r reg ime n t

o f di sci pline , the m en are se t a

tha t w as likely to

series of tests o fmo u nrin g di ffic u lty

SCI,.' a

lo t o f ac tive

service. It wa s also k now n tl)f hav in g the hardest selec t io n an d trai n i ng routine ill the British Arm y.

SAS insign ia A winged Sword of Damocles isshown with the SAS motto: "Who Dares Wins".

ill whic h the y pit th e m selves agaill st the cle me n ts .m d .igain sr their

OW 11

limi tations. Making lon g hikes alone across tr ack lc« terr ain . hurd...-ncd

R ECRU ITM ENT A N D T RA IN I NG SAS recruits are drawn fro m the regular army

with a hl'av y pack and riflc, ma y see m a c r ude test o f a m ;\l1\ wo rth , hut th o vc wh o have r.ik c n

or from th e regiment 's o w n rerrirorial s. All

p'lrt tl.'sti fy to th e ex tre m e m ental revo lu tio n

ca nd ida tes have th us already received

required to COPl' w ith till." e n~'ets o f ex ha ust ion . l'XpO\ Url', and isolati on . Inj u ries are co m mon ,

.i t

least

basic mi litar y trai ni ng befo re the y present the m selve s fix all SAS se lect io n co u rse. Volunte ers, w he ther offi cer s. NCOs, o r o ther ranks, requi re a reco mm en d.it ion fro III the ir co m m and i ng officer. M en ;l IT att racted b y the

H& K MP 5K

SUBMAC HINE· GUN

and 011 sev era l o ccasion s SAS trainee s have d ied 0 11 th e h ill s. By t he end of t he init i.rl se lect io n co urse, rou gh ly 4 o ut o f5 cand idates wi ll have been rej ect ed and returned to the ir uni ts.

VI

m

... Z

Ongoing t rain ing All personnel share skills, inclu ding counte rterrorist skills in which soldiers learn

how to move swiftly in confined spaces (far right). Speci alist t rainin g depends

on the troop a soldier belong s to: Air Troop (airborne insertion), Boat Troop (wat erborne inserti on), Mobility Troop (land vehicle in sert ion ), o r

M oun tain Troop (climbing an d skiing techniq ues).

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LIKE THE SAS ITSELF, SAS SELECTION IS SIMPLE, DIRECT AND DEADLY EFFECTIVE. MI CHAEL ASHER , SAS TERR ITORIAL VOlU NTEER, WRITING IN SHOOT TO KILL

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If a ca ndi da te surv ives all t h is, he is o ffi ci ally a me m ber of the regi men t. But he w ill st ill u nde rgo a great deal m o re spec ialist tr ainin g, w hic h co uld r~lJlgl' fro m learn in g fi)rl'ign la ng uages to roc k climbi ug , tree-f all pa r~l chut i n g, or ti cld surge ry. T he so ldier who l'II1t:rges from t hi s sele ct io n .m d traini ng pr o cess is ex pe cted to be we llbalan ced , self-reliant. a nd bo th m entally and ph ysicall y in peak co nd it io n, H e must be able to o perat e ill :l sma ll uni t for lon g peri od s under t ry in g co nd itio ns wi tho u t t;tl lin g out w it h hi s co lleagues. W he n Ill'cessary he mu st ca rryo n alo ne and w itho ut o rde rs. T he SAS a rc tra ine d to ki ll ill co ld blood w hen d eemed csscuria l, but me n co ns ide re d to have to o mu ch of a taste for kiI1in g arc weeded o ut. Agg rl'ssio n mu st be st ric tly co ntrolle d a nd directed . Kl'l'pin g a cool head

un d er pressu re is a defi ning character istic of SAS m en . T hey are neit he r br aw lers no r braggarts. D rill a nd mi lit ar y " bu llshi t" (as it is k no wn) are kept to a m in imum , wit h di stin ct ion o f rank less impo rt ant th an ski lls and pe r fo rm ance.

CO UN TE R- REVO LUT IO N A RY WAR FAR E TACTI C S SAS t radition stre sses sec re cy an d ano ny m ity - pr ati ng in public abo ut th e reg ime nt's acti vities is to ta lly d iscou raged . It wa s the Iran ia n Em bassy siege th at t ran sfo rm ed t he reg im en t's public pro fi le. In th e late 1<)(,Os and 1')70 s, a spate

o f ho stage- tak in g a nd airline r hij ack in gs had an no un ced the arriva l o f iur ernatioual te r rorism o n the wo rld sce ne. T he SAS respo nde d b y sett ing lip J Cou nte r R e vo lut io na ry Wa rfa re (C R W ) tr ainin g scho o l at He refo rd , w her e th e y d eveloped an d pr acti sed techniques for dealin g w ith ho stage sit uat io ns. T her e was a " killing ho use" for exercise ill sto rm in g buildin gs w he re ho stages we re bein g held a nd a mo ck airline r fix practi ce in d ealin g w ith hij ackings. C R W in sta ntread in ess team s we re formed to respond to a terrori st in cid ent at any time. O n 5 M ay !<)BO, th e years o f trai ning we re p ut in to effec t w hen an SAS tea m assau lted the Irani an Em bas sy bu ild in g in Prin ce's G ate, London , w he re a

Model of Ir ani an Embassy This wooden model of the Iranian Embassy building was made by the SASto familia rize soldiers with the rooms they would be entering. Each storey wa s detachable to reveal the layout of the floor beneath .

ENTRY TACTICS leader covers right

In the 1970s, the SAS played a prominent role in the development of tacti cs for entering bu ildings occupied by hostile armed group s hold ing hostages, The first prob lem was to gain entry, w hich mig ht involve blowin g in wi ndows or doors w ith contro lled charges, The next step was to disor ient ate the hostage -take rs by throwing in stun grenades or CS gas grenades, Small armed units would follow a thoroughly rehearsed procedu re to sweep the whole space rapidly with t heir automatic weapons, iden tifying any hostile presence, They we re stric tly

Deploying fla,hbang

trained to avoid risks of shoo ting one another or

Red 1 opens th e door and

innocent hostages , Each man would be positione d

Stack ing up

deploys a flashbang grenade

so that no other membe r of t he team came w ithin

A typica l ent ry team consists of five men; Red 1 and Red 2, who head the team, the element leader, who

his line of fi re at any t ime, It was SAS policy to shoo t

holds the middle, and Blue 1 and Blue 2 at the rear,

all hostage-takers dead, th us preventi ng th e

To clear a room , the teams starts by "stack ing up" at the side of the doo r w here th e handle is located .

w hile t he rest of the team covers the hallway in all directio ns. The grenade stuns everyone inside th e roo m, but causes no lasting harm .

act ivation of concealed explosive devices.

~ro u p o f six A rah terro rists w ere holding 26 pe opl e hostage . M eti culo usly prepared and ex ec ute d , the assau lt to ok 11 minutes to ach ie ve its o bje ct ive . Five of the te rro rists w ere sho t dead and the ot her W~l S arrested . Tw o ho stages had a lso di ed at the han d s o f the terrori sts. Show n live o n tele v isio n , thi s o peration m ad e the SAS fam ou s throug ho ut the world . Part o f th e ne w SAS image created by the Iran ian Embassy siege wa s o f co ld- blo o ded killers, for at

lea st so me of the terror ists had been sho t de ad afte r ceasin g resistance. C rit ic isrn o f th e SAS's

al leged ly exce ssive ruthlessn ess su rfaced d urin g the lon g struggle aga inst IR A ter ror ism in the I ~ H () s . SAS uni ts w er e dep lo ye d in an unde rco ve r role in N o rthe rn Ireland w ith g reat success, unt i l accusatio ns o f a shoo t- ro-kill po licy led to their w it hd rawal fro m th e p ro vince. In a h ighl y pub lic ized o pe rat io n , in G ib ra ltar in M ar ch I ~ H H , t he SAS sh ot th re e I R A bomber s de ad under co ntro ve rsial c irc u ms tances. T he ruth lessness of the SAS m en w as praised ill so me quarters and c ritic ized in o the rs. but no o ne suggestcd they h ad go ne beyond th e ir orde rs.

Irani an Embassy siege An SAS soldier becomes entangledin his rope during the Iranian Embassy siege in 1980 . The team rappelled from the roof to a first floor balcony.

As a British T ask Force he ad ed for the islands, w h ich h ad b een o cc upie d by A rge nt in ian tro op s, fou r- ma ti SAS patrol s w e re in serted into th e islan d s by heli cop te r to establish co ve rt o bse rvatio n po sts. Su rv iv ing fo r w eeks in hi din g am id harsh te rrain and appall ing wea the r co nd itio ns, the y transm itted details o f th e deploy men t of Ar gen t ine forces. A fte r o ne patrol identified an airstrip as a targe t fo r a raid, mo re than 50 SAS men we re Hown in by heli cop te r. destro y ing 11 Ar gcntini.u: airc raft o n the g ro u nd and esc aping w ith o n ly minor c asualties . Save fo r the usc o f heli cop ters, th is w as ju st th e sort o f o pe ra tio n t ha t t he SAS h ad ca rr ied o ut agai nst R ommel 's force s in the Wester n D e sert dur in g W orl d Wa r II . SAS uni ts w e re

invo lved in sim ilar beh ind -th e - line s operatio ns in th e I ~ ~ I Gu lf W ar. D rop ped into Iraq b y hel icop te r o r driving acro ss t he dese r t bo rde r in Land R o ve rs o r o n mo torbik e s. they hu nted do w n and de stro yed Sc ud m issile lau ncher s and di srupted c nl'lllY co nu n u n ica rio ns.

M O VI N G O N N COs an d troop e rs ge ne ra ll y o n ly leave th e SAS w he n it is tim e to re tu rn to c iv ilian life. A ce rtain per cen tage fi nd o cc upatio ns that e m ploy th e sk ills they have lea rn ed , suc h as bein g bod yg uards, carryi ng o ut ind ust ria l espio n age. o r even being m er ce naries. O ffi ce rs o n ly join till' SAS o n scc o nd mc n r fro m th eir paren t rcg itu c nt s and o fte n ret urn to more co nve nt io na l du n es after a time . So me have risen to ve ry senio r po sitio ns in the Briti sh A rmy. re flec ti ng the h igh este e m in w hi ch the SA S is hel d . SAS "Pink Panth er " Named after itsdesert camouflage, this modified Land Rover, in usefrom the 1960s to the 1980s, had fuel tanks th at gave it a range of 2,400km (1,500 miles).

SPECIA LIST IN FAN TRY D espit e th e pu blic it y at tra ct e d b y C o u n ter R evolu t ion ar y Wa rfa re , th e prim ar y ro ll' of t he SA S h as remain ed as spec ialist ligh t infantry. H o w t heir spe c ia l sk ills co u ld be used in a co nve nt io n al w ar wa s d emon st rated w hen Britain we nt to wa r w ith Arge nt ina o ver po sse ssio n of the Falk lan d Island s in I ~ H 2 .

The fat al funn el Red 1 enters first and covers the right half of the room, then Red 2 follows, cove ring the left. Blue 1 and Blu e 2 prepare to enter while the leader covers the hallway.

Clearing th e room As Red 1 moves to the far right corner, pointing his weapon at the opposi te corner, Red 2 moves to the near left corner, pointing hisweapon at the opposi te wall.

Securing th e roo m Red 2 clears the near left corner while Red 1 cove rsthe far left. Blue 1 enters and holdsthe near right corner. followed by Blue 2 who covers the door. Finally the leader enters.

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OTHER SPECIAL FORCES Since World War II arm ies have recogni zed the usefulne ss of elite

and surv ival under di fficult co nd itio ns. In reaction to the mass

tro ops, capable of opera ti ng in sma ll units deep behind ene my

co mbat of th e World Wars, specia l forces represent a reassert ion

lines in co nve nt ional wa rfare or as co unter- insurge ncy forces

of pro fessionalism and of qu ality ove r qua nt ity of tr oop s. Since

against guerrillas. All special forces opera te rigo rous selection

the 1970s, co unter- terro rist wa rfare has been a centraI co ncern

procedu res an d gruelling trainin g prog rammes, with an emphasis

of spec ial forces, and tec hniques for dealin g w ith hostage-

upon ind ividual ini tia tive, ment al streng th, co nt ro lled agg ression,

takin g situations have been sha red bet ween states.

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In the g ue rr illa wa rfa re th at led to th e c reatio n o f the sta te of Israel in 1'I4ll, t he Israel is develo pe d a traditi on o f ruth less co vert o pe ratio ns invol vin g raids inside hostile territor y. sabo tage . and assassin ation. This was carried forwa rd in to the ir co n flict w ith Ar ab states and w ith parami litar y o rga n iza t io ns aro u nd Israel's border s afte r ind ep enden ce. Israel's first spec ial fo rces group. Unit 101, led by Ar iel Sharon , was d isba nded in )lJS3 aft er a no tori o us ra id i nto the West Bank in w h ich (,9 Palestinian civ ilians were massacred . It was succeede d by o the r special for ces u n its, howeve r, incl ud ing Saye rc t G o lani . Saye rc t T 'z ~lI1 l13 11 i Ill , a nd the 111 0 st fa m ous, Sayerc t Matk al (po pu larly kn own as " T he Unit" ). Fo unded in 19S1l , Sayer er M atk al was o rig inally J top- se cret u n it recruited thr ou gh per so nal and fam ily co ntacts, so me w hat like

_ Muule compensator

MagaZine catch 35-round detachable ./ box maqazme . /

Br itain's wa rt ime SO E. T his partiall y ex plains its clo se lin ks with Israel's gove rn ing elit e . Sayc ret M atkal is no w staffed by vo lu ntee rs w ho have su rviv ed a feroc io usly dem and in g selec tio n co urse. It has esta blished" formi da ble reputati on for int elligen ce - gath erin g and sabo tage raid s deep into A rab ter rito ry. Ma ny of its o perations

Galil assault rifl e Designed by Israel Galli in 1974. this light. gas-operatedassaultrifle isthe Israeli answer to the Russian AK47. It isbased on the Finnish ValmetM62 and chambered for the Amercian 5.56 x 45 round .

have rem ain ed shro ude d in sec recy: th ey are believed o fte n to in vol ve the assassin ation o f suspected ene m ies of lsracl , Saye ret Ma rkal also spec ializes in d ealing with ho stage-taking situa tio ns . Its mo st hi ghly publ ici zed success w as th e freeing o f ho stages held b y ter rorists at Enr eb be air po rt in Uganda in J ul y, 11) 76 .

GSG-9 Gc n na ny 's lack of an adeq uate cou nte r- terrorist force was revealed by a bungl ed response to ho stage -takin g: by Pale stinian terrorists at the I'l n Munich O lympics. GSG -'I (G rc nzsc hu rzg ru ppe-'I, or "Border G ua rds , G roup 'I ")

went o pe rat io na l o n 17 April 1973. Its name sugges ted th at it was par t of Fed er al Ge rma ny 's border guards, althou gh in pract ice it was a tot ally new organi zati on wit hin the cou ntry's poli ce force . Under th e strong leadership o f Ulrich Wegen er, GSG -'I quickl y developed into an elite co u nter- te rrorist organi zati on, In th e 1'170 s, Fed er al Ge rma n y face d a home - g ro w n terrori st m ovem e n t, kn own as th e R ed A rm y Fact io n. In Oc tober '177 a gro up o f Troop carr ier Bell Huey troopcarriersare among the helicopters used by GSG-9 to fly offic ers anywhere in Germany.

terrorists led by Zohair Ak ach c. a Pa lestinian . hij acked " l.ufrh an sa ai rlin er with H() passcn gt'rs o n boa rd . T hey d e m anded th e release o f Red Arm y Fact io n priso ners in G erma ny GSG-9 INSIGNIA in return for the passen gers' safe release . Art e r rhe cap tain of th e ai rc raft had been murder ed b y th e ter ro rists, GS G - 9 o peratives suppo rted by tw o SA S m en sto rme d th e hij acked airliner at M o gadishu airport, Somali a. Three of th e four ter rorists were kill ed in an exc hange of firc, while o n ly o ne ho stage w as injured . T he Mogadishu o pe ratio n m ad e GSG - Y's reputati on - OIl C w hi ch has bee n co n fir me d by subse q ue nt o pe ratio ns.

US SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES : - - - _ Folded rear Sight

/ Muu le compensator Over th e half ce nt ur y since the US Arm y Spec ial For ces, po pu larl y k now n as t he G ree n Berets, we re te nta tively fou nded in 1952. un its devoted to u nconve ntional warfare. co unter-i nsu rge ncy . and co u nterterrorism have prolifera ted in th e US ar med Weapon s forces . Since 1987 all have been gro uped together Special forces throughout the world use army-issue under US Spe cial O pe rat io ns Com ma nd in weapons. In the US, favou rites include the M 16 assault rifle and the MP7 submachine-gun. Tampa, Florida . 13y the early 2 1st centu ry th er e were est imated to be aro u nd 50 ,0 0 0 me n in partl y becau se th e hi ghl y publici zed failu re t he US militar y d evot ed to spec ial o pe rat io ns. of its attem pt to free Am e rican ho stages held T he G ree n Ber ets, pr im aril y based at Fo rt in Iran in l <JHO was such an embarrassment. 13 ra ~~, No rth Carolina, becam e a hi gh -p rofi le format io n after winn in g the patro nage of U S US special o pera t ions for ce s have played a prom ine n t role in recen t co n flicts, Presid ent j o h n F Ken ned y in hi s dr ive to de velop a co u nrcr- insu rgc ncy capac ity in the ea rly 19(,Os. not ably th e invasio ns of Iraq and The Ber et s' reputati on was co n firme d by th eir Af~ha ni st an , and the prolon ged de te rm ined effo rts to o rganize m ountain co un rer- iusu rgeu cy campaigns in both th o se co u nt ries. The tribe sme n as auri-com m u n ist forces du rin g the Viet nam WJf. Vietn am also saw the rc-form arion U S Defen se Dep artment env isages th at th e y w ill have of t he U S Arm y R an ger s as a lo ng - ra nge pat ro l fo rce . Ano ther p ro du ct of th at pe riod 's int er est a cru cial fut ure ro le in co un te ri ng the th reat of in co untering g ue rrilla wa rfare was the US N avy SEAL (Sea- Air- La nd) tea ms , foun de d in 196 2 globa l terro rism netwo rks. and first se nt into co m ba t in Vietnam in 1966 , spe cia lizi ng in rive rine o pe ratio ns. T he 19 70 s brought a diffe re nt empha sis, wi th th e rise of inte rn atio na l terrorism . T he US Ar my's C o m bat Applications Gro up , po pularl y know n as Delt a Force , was set up by Colonel C harles Beck w it h in 1977 prim a rily as a counter-terrorist warfare US NAVY SEAL CODE OF HONOUR EXCERPT u n it. It has remained o ne o f th e most sec re tive of unco nve ntiona l w arfare organizations . perhaps

M 16A1 A SSAULT RIFLE W ITH M 203 GRENA DE LAUNCHE R

TRAIN FOR WAR, FIGHT TO WIN , D EFEAT OUR NATION 'S ENEMIES.

Small Bo at Un it

US Navy SEAls on a special operation with an SBU (Small Boat Uni t) in Panama . 199 4 , In the

foregrou nd a camouflaged soldier bearsan M 16A3 rifl e fitted with an M209 grenade launche r.

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Flash hider

MODERN WESTERN INFANTRY Th e ending of the Cold War confrontatio n with the Sov iet Union

the invas ions of Afgha nistan in 200 1 and Iraq in 2003, bo th

in th e late 1980s suggested that th e forces of th e Nort h Atla nt ic

headed by the US wi th Britain in suppo rt , and bot h followed by

Treaty O rga niza tion (N ATO) states mi ght find th em selves without

a tr oubled occ upatio n, Th e all-voluntee r in fantry w ho fou gh t in

an cnc my to fight. lnsread , the Iraqi invasio n o f Kuwait in 1990

these co n flicts were well tr ained and enj oyed a supe rb level of

provoked the US and its allies to fight th e G u lf War aga inst Iraq

equi pme nt. 13m th ei r ex perience showed th at th e lot of th e soldier

in 1991. Islam ic terro ris m and Iraqi intransige nce furth er led to

o n th e gro u nd rem ain ed as de m anding as it had ever been.

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US INFANTRYMAN

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Sin ce 1') 73 , when till' US wi thd rew fro m Vietn am . till' U S Arm y has been an all-vo luntee r tor cc co m m itte d to equa l o pportuni tie s. Th e presl'llce o f lar ge number s of wo me n in the ~Ir I11 Y (up from:2 per ce nt of perso nnel in 1973 to almost 15 per cent by 100(,) ma rke d a sha rp break w ith the lon g trad itio n of wa rfa re as a ma le prese rve. Vo lu n tee rs m ale or fem ale primaril y ca me from sec tio ns o f US soc iety in w hich other em ployme nt pr ospect s we re poor. g iv ing the army th e probl em of t raining ind iv idua ls ofte n sho rt 0 11 ed uca tio n and potent ially resistant to d iscipline, This was US infantryman on patrol A US infantryman, carrying an M16 assault

rifle with grenade launcher, patrolsin an armoured personnel vehicle in Iraq, 2005 .

part iall y allev iate d by th e imposition of hi gh er ad m issio n standa rds . R ec ru its arc g ive n Basic C o m bat Train in g follo we d by Ad vanced Ind ivid ual Training - till' latt er a spec ialist co u rsc in recogn itio n o f the rcchn ica I d cma nds imp osed by modern warfare, The Gul f Wa r of 1991 and th e in vasion of Iraq in 1003 demon str ated till' ovcrwhc lru ing e ff ec t iveness of the US Arm y ill co nve ntio nal wa rfare at;ain st a less w e'll- equipped . less welltrain ed foe, W ith land, sea, and air force s coordi nate d u nder a si ng le com ma nd, co mbat pro ceed ed with relentless spee d and vio lence .

and its suc cess pr o vid ed a much - need ed bo o st to US c red ibili ty - its co m pete nce, at least o n the batt lefi e ld, had been in que stion since the Vi etn am War. But th e su bseq ue nt mi litar y occ upatio n of Iraq and A f~h ani st all showed rh ar rhe US co u ld no t su p press all elusive c..'ne m y armed with light but so phis ticated equi pme nt a nd a ruthl ess determination to use it. In spite of regul ar setbac ks, the g reat maj o rit y of US so ld ie rs co ntinued to show a strong co m m itme nt to th e arm y and to find ill mil itary ser vice ;1 cha nce to learn valua ble sk ills and to ea rn a resp ect ofte n den ied the m in civilia n socie ty.

BRITISH IN FANTRYMAN Br irain has 3 lon g h isto r y of e m plo y in g 3 sm all professional arm y to tight varic rics o f limited war ov erseas, :1 traditi on that w as o n ly temporaril y int errupted in th e 20 t h ce n t u ry by th e drafrin g o f a mass o f co nscripts in tw o world wars. The ret urn to an all -volunteer regular arm y since t he start of the 1l)(,Os ha s th u s bee n in line w ith Bri t ish tr ad ition . In o ther W3yS, battle h as b een joi ned aga inst the arm y's tradi tion s. wit h successive reform s of a regimental sys te m w id ely regarded 3< o utd ate d . yet stubbornly defended by its adher ents. Up to th e 19l)Os, th e post-World W3t II Briti sh Army "'3< ch iefly dep lo yed 3< part of NATO to fight 3 defe n sive war ag ainst a Soviet inv asion nfWest German y that I H,' V l' r h app e ned . and i ll a CO li nt er in surgency ro le in vario us British- ruled territories, latterl y in Northern irel and . The end o f th e Cold War, follo we d by th e cess at ion of th e IR A in surgen c y. naturally led cos t-c o nscio us poliricians to c n t back o n in fantry nu m be rs ill the 19 <)Os. T here wa s a lso a sh ift to w ards hi gh er investment ill advanced technology and training for a war of rapid deploymcur and man oe uvre, in line with Ameri can military doctrine. T he Bri tish Arm y cont ributed the se co ndlar gest co ntinge nt to th e U N for ces t ha t d rove the Iraqi s o ut of Kuwait in th e Gulf War o f 1991 - the larg est. o f course , was supplied by the US . in the earl y 2 1st ce ntury. t he Brit ish agai n su ppo r ted the US in the in vasio ns of Afg han ista n (2 00 !) and Iraq (200J ). and th e su bseq ue n t co u n te r- in su rgency ca m pa ig ns conducted by th e o cc upy ing fo rces. The demand s o f prolonged wa rfa re on thi s sca le sever ely rested morale and revea led defi cienc ies in th e army's equipment and lo gi sti cs. In 200 7. the British Arm y co nsisted of o ver 100.000 fu ll-time so ld iers. ba cked up b y around -10.000 pa rt -ti m e Tcrritoria ls. Partl y as a resu lt of low un emplo yment in Britain , th ere we re shortfa lls in d omesti c recruitmen t. so th at an in cr easin g pe rce ntage o f so ld ie rs ca me fro m abroad . m o stly from the Bri tish C o m m o nw ealth. W hether o n patrol in Iraq o r fighting th e Ta liba n in Afghani stan 's H elm and Pro vince. th e Brit ish infant r yman showed h im self rime and again to be a thorough-goi ng professional.

MK 6 KEVLAR INFANTRY HElMET

Desert combat uniform This British Armycombat uniform isa lightcotton and polyester mix designedfor use in the desert. It was worn by troops in Iraqand Afghanistan in the early 2000 s.

HYDRATION SACK

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SASO assault rif le The SABO is one of on ly three "bullpup " rifl es ado pted w orldwi de; the othersare the French FAMAS, and the Austrian AUG. To make the rifle shorter, the action is placed in the butt, with the magazine behind the trigger. This model is the LBSA1.

••• DESERT BOOTS

CAMOUFLAGE TROUSERS

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INDEX P.l ~l· nu mbers in b o ld indi cate referen ces

IIU i l1

..All Am er ican ,. IJiviviou 299 All H azards. Banh.. o f 20(. Almeida. Fran cisco de t 2() Alpine front. World War 1 24M,

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AIli-l,tI, King Of \Vl·....ex 52.60 Algeria 313.3 15 Algil'TS. Han le of 3 t 5 AljuharrotJ. Baul l' of H2

Acn- 7X. 7 1) Ad.n u s. Pre...idcn r Jo h n 1-17 Af~lul1i\t 'lI1 4(1, 127 Fn'IKh Pon-ign Legion in 3 15 invasion of (2IHII) 3.23. 3-1 X Mujahidccu 33X Talibau 3 -13 US spec ial opcr.rnon s for ce s ill .\-1 7 Afr ic;lll-A m c ri r.m se rvi ce me n Amer -ica n C ivil War \1)2 bul I llo so ld ie rs 222 T uskegee air men 2XX US Mar in es .\ t 9- 2(1, J2.1 Worl d War I 2-17 Afrika Korp . . 27-1. 275 Alrik:lIIl'r , 212 Agin l"tHirt. Hutlc of (IX. XI . 83 A~riL'ol.l . Sextus C alp ur n ius 3X Ai n j.ilut, Battle 0 1'79 .ur co m bat Condor Legio n 253 Gcrtuan fighter p ilo ts 2X9 ja p.mcsc naval pilo ts 2X9 R A F f ightvr pilo t 25 -1-63 U S bom be r crewman 276-X7 US esco rt fighter pilots 2XX Vil'tn.1II1War 332, 3 33 \Vorl d W;lr II 2 27 airborn e d ivisiou s sec paratroopers .lira.lli: B- 17 H ying Fo rtrl'S\ 276-X I,

2H2-5 , 2HH B- 2-1 Lib n ;lw r 277. 2XH B- 52 bo m ber 3 ,\.\ I )ornil' r bOlllbl'r 257 . 25 9 I'(K kc- \Vulf 27X I i l'in kd bOlllb l' r 257 I hlfri call l' 22 7 . 255, 256. 25 7 ,25lJ junh'r 253 , 257 l.i ~IHnill g 2XX LY\;lIIdc r 29 2 M t.·\\t.'r ...dll niu 25.1. 255. 256, 257, 259,27H. 2XX, 2X9 M it\ubishi R l'iw n ··Z t.'ro" fight l'r 21'W M U\un g 27'), 2XX rl·IIH)tt.'-l"lHitro llt.·d J 1I) Il l'pu blir 1)- -1 7 T huIH!C'rbolt 2XX Spit tirc 22 7 , 255. 256. 258. 251),2XX Stuka diw-bombl'r 227 . 253 ,lira,lti: guiding ligh ts 2 1)5 ,Iirlinl' hijarking .1-12

AK47 rill<, ., II . .H 2. 334 Abd ll·. Zo lui r .1-1(1 Akb;lr. ElIlpl'ro r I Ill), 125

"ki"ji 120 At l;II;llllli 43 Alhm"r:l. lb ttle of 17-1 Aku in -It), 5X Alt.·.. i;l. \iCgl' of J I Ah.'x.mdt."r tht.' Crt.'.n 9 , IS , 17, 20,21

2-1 1) Alva. D uke of 113 American C ivil War 11, 1-1 5. 190-203. 222 Am er ican Exp edi tiona ry Force

247 Ame r ican R evolu tio nar y \Var

1-17- 55, 319 Ame rican ritleman I·H . 146-51 rec ru itm en t 1-17 tac tics 14M-C) unif orm alit! Wl."apon\ 15(1-1 ;1I11i rs 125. 127

amp hibious warfare 3 19, .no Anglo - Saxo lls ar mo ur and

W l'JpOIIS

61

U.mle of Hastings " 6,47, 53.

60. 63. 64- 5 Viking iuva ..ions -19 . 50 , 5 l •

52.53 wa rriors 60- 1

Auglo- Z ulu War 145. 211 . 2 t.> Angola 3 I I..HH nui -uircrafi guns 27H anti- nircr ati m issiles 33H anti tan k g rena des 33 () antitan k gum 2(lH, 27-1 An tieta m, Bau k' o f 19 3 , 20 ! Ant iod 1 62 an tipe rso n nel mi nes J27 Antwerp -It), I 17 An zac s 2-17 An zio . Battle of 302 Apa ch e w arriors 222, 22 3 Arab armics, lIlcdi eval -16, 6 I , (12, 79 _\I' j' II/SO M lI',lim w arr io r'ii Arab statl'S, l"lm tlil-t \\lith I\ ral'!

3 11.34(, Ar'lb ian pl'nimlila 3 -1 1 Arap ah o \\;arr iors 217,2 19 ArbeiJ R o m,1I1 fo rt 38-4 1 ;lrdu'rs Anglo -Saxon 60 Engli'iih longbowlllall HO-5 Ge noe'iie cmssbowlllan H7 M on gol hor'iiclII:ln -16 , 88-93 Mu gh al 12(,,1 27 P;lrdl bn 32 Sio ux wa rr io r 2 18, 220- 1 Vik in g 5(1 Ardi ti 24K Arl'n J \,jacopo 33') Argcm ina, Falkla nd s War 3-13 ar llllC'ii age of Em pi re 1-1-1- 5 ancielH 1-1- I 5 early Illo dl' rn 108-9.1-10- 1 med ie\·al -16--7 po stw ar 3 10- I I wo rld wa rs 226-7 SIT II/SO ar mi es by Ilam e ; co u mr ics by nJIlle: Ar lllini m 32 an no ur An cielH Greek 17 . 22-3 Anglo -Saxon 61 Cart hag iniall -12 Ct.,hie -1 3

con do n ic r i 79 I Jutch fo o t soldier I.1X Land...kn echt 11-1 -1 5 lon gbowman X3 med ieval kn igh t 67. 6 8.71,

Sio ux ro ruah avvkv 22 1 trenc h 2-10

Viking 5 1. 56-7 .,~.,"S

120 , 121 Azte cs 10. 10 5. 109

72-3, 76 M o ngol ho rseman t)O . 9 2-3 Mugha l 12X- 9 New MOth..1 Army cavalry 132 Ottoma n 120 , 12 2-3 R o m an .14-5 Sam ur ai 96 , 98-9 Spani.. h trrdos I t 7 Vikin g 5-1-5 ar moured vests, US Marines 324 A r my of Afri ca {Spanis h) 252 A r m y R angers. US 3-17 A r n hcm 22 7 A rn old , General Ben edi ct I -IX arq uebuses Landsknccht 112.1 13, 11-1- 15 Mu ghal 12(1 ar row s lo ngh ow man XI, X-I-5 Sio ux 220- 1 Vik in g 56 art illery Am erican ta nk crew s 27-1 German "h urricane " artillery ba r rages 24 I German pa nzer crews 275 Mu gbal 125.126-7 N apoleo n ic 167 O UOI1l:lII 119 , 12 1 R oman 32 R OY'll Ta nk R egime n t 27 -1 Soviet tan k crewman 266-73 Unionist for ce s 195 US, in Vie tnam 322 \Vorl J War II 227 Ascalon 70 ilS /II:~I'", l)(~7

'lSl'is (shield) 23 Jss;l\\inatio n 29 1, 293 , 3 -16 as"auh fu ck , "w rI1u roo pe r 242 J"saliit su it, SAS 3-14-5 d5:;t:~" is (spt.'J r) 2 11 As"yri JI1 Em pire 1-1 Athem 17 , IH. 19 At lant ic co m'oy" 26 -1.265 atom bomb 227 att ri tio nal wa rfare 226, 23 1, 233,258 All er st.ldt, ll.ltde of 157 AU G ritl es 3 -19 AUb"ll.. tus , Empero r 27 Auren gzeb. Emperor 127 " T he Aus pi cious In cidem " 12 1 A ustt.·rlit z, Battle of 157 , ISH, 160 A mtrJlia, An zJcs 2-1 7 Aus tr ia Aust ro -Hun gar ian ar my

24H. 249 G rt.· llzc r "ha rp.,)lOoter s 1-1 I N ap o h..o ni c \Vars 160 , 16 1, 166 Au xiliar y Air Forc e 255 ,l ux iliJ ry tro o ps G rC'C' k 20 R o m'lII 15 , 27. 31 Avar s (II Jxe:S Alll l' r ic;ln riflelll al1 150 Anglo - S;lXOIl 60 Br itjl', h sailor boanting aXl'

184-5 Greek ho pli te 23 M aor i 208-9

B B- 17 Flying Fortress 27h-H I,

2H2-5. 2HH B- 2-1 Liberato rs 277, 2HK B- 52 bombers 333 Babu r 109, 12-1 . 125 ,126 B,llb j o z. l', iege o f 173 ,1 7-1 Bad er. D o uglas 255, 251) Baghdad massacre 90 lu ll-t urret gu nne rs 278 , 28 -1 ballista .1I, 32, 76, I) I ban ds of bro th er s X- 9 Bann ock burn . Battle o f7 1, XCI barb.n-iaus ;1" e nemies o f R o me 15,33.

42. 43 as R oman aux iliarie s 27 .

3 1. 32 Harbarossa. Operation 2511.26 7 ba r rac ks. Roma n 40-- 1 baseball grcnJdcl', 327 B,l l', il II . Em peror (12 bas ine t hel met (17, ilX Ih srogue 30 t Batavia 3 1 Batista, Pul gen cio 33 9 battl e wagons. H ussite K6 Bayhars 79 Hayeux Tapestry (10 Hayczid, Su ltan 120 . 121 bayo nets Br itish infa ntry ( 19 14- 18) 235,236 Bri tish R ed co Jt 17 X Ca lu dia n R m s 2-1 7 Con fl,de rJte inf.l l1try man 20 1 l. t.· nll'\I1 sw r l1ltro o pc r 2-13 M I bJyonet k nu rk k' d ustL'r

307 Na po leo nic inf:lIltry m:m I CJ(I

SAHli 349 T u rk ish , Worl d Wa r 1 2-19 Union infamrYIll.111 197 , 198- 9 ViC't Cong 336 BC'ar PJW lllollmJi llS 223 Ueau jeu , WiIIi J111 of 7X Bt.·JlIvo ir d e: Lyle. G el1l'ral 247 lk ckw it h , Colo nel C h arles 3 47 Ill'd Ollkoh c Apach e 223 lkij illg 90 , 9 1 Bd g rJde, siegl' of 120 Bell H u ey tro o p t.·arrit.'rs 3-16 be lt p il', toll', 296 BC'rgalll lln M P 18 l', ub m Jc h ineb"lJll 239 Berlin 267 , 269.288 Bers,lglier i h,lt 2-18 bcse rke rs 52-3 Bieo cea, Uau le of 116 h ill Lad l'n , O sallla 3 1 t , 338 Bir I b h illl . Bau k, of 3 1-1 " blitzkr ieg " 226, 2(17 , 2(IH, 275 Wo o d R ivcr, BJ ttle 0(2 12 B1m l,'pip e ami -aircraft m issiles

338 bluif.J/mm u ni ts 112 Bo d iam C al', t1e 224-5

Bo er War 2.l-t Bo ers 2 12 Bohemia 86 Hoh em on d 62 Hokhar a 90 holt. crossbow X7 bomber crew ma n, US 276-8 1 bombi ng Allied, Wo rld War II 227 ,

277- 1) G ucr u ica 253 Vietn am War 332, 333

bo mbs o n B- 17 bo mbe r 28-1 gunpowder 9 1 Norden 277 Bonap ar te, Napoleo n see Na poleon I, Empero r booby traps, Viet Cong 320, 333 boots desert .1-1 9 escape 2(d flying 2HI. 2M2 j u m p .1OJ Sdl'l~~ i 27 1 tro p ical com bat 325 Born. Bertran d de 8 Bo rn eo 3-11

Borod ino.Hm lc of 145.161 ,167 Bo ston 1-17 , 14X, 153 Bo ud icca. Q ueen 32 , -1 3 Bo uvi n es, B,m le of 71 b ow s G eno ese crossbo w 87 lo ngb ow HI. 83, 84-5 M o ngol HI), 92 - 3 Na tive Am eri can 223 Sio ux 218. 220-- t b rcnstplatev Carthaginian -12 IJurch (00[ so ldie r 13X Land skucche 11-1 medi eval kni ght 72 -.1 New M odel Army cavalry 132 Sp Jn ish tt'rci llj 1 17 bri dles, c!USSl' ur 16-1 hr igall dill c 79 Br itJin Ur itish infan tryman (11)14- I H)

22ll-37 Br itish inf.llHr yman (mo d ern)

349 Br itish R e(!co at 7. 14 4, 154 .

16H- 9. 170-9 Ilr iti,h ,ailor (179}- IHI5) 180-9 t.·o lo n ialislll 14 5, 207 , 23-1 for ces in Afgh anistan .l-t 9 forces in Ir;lq 3-1 9 Nt'w M od el Ar m y 131 - 3

R AF fight« pilor 254-(,3 SAS so ld ier 340-5 SOE agc n t 21)0- 7 st't' dlstl banlt.·s Jnd wa rs by Ilanle; EnglJlld; Northern Ireland ; R oyal Air Force; R op l Navy; Sco tla nd ; Wa lcs Ur itain , Uaul t.' of 227, 255-9 Brit ish Expe d it io nary For ce , Worl d W;lr J 229,2-1 1 British illt;lIltrym JIl ( 19 I -1- 1X)

228-37 discip linc and pu n ishlll l'nt

231-2 going m ·C'r the top 232-3 recrui tlllL'lH Jnd train in g 229-30

tren ch life 230 u niform 22tJ. 23 4-5 weap om 23()- 7 British infa n trym an (mode r n) 349 Brit ish R ed coat 7 . 144 . 154 . 16 H- 9 . 171f-9 in Am erican R evolut ionary War 152.15 4 o n cnm paig u 173 cq uip nu..·nt and \wapom 17 H- 9 recr u itm en t 154 . 17 1 siege war f are 173-4 tacti cal form.trio n 154 , 175 training 172 uniform 17()- 7 Br iti..h R ifle Br igad e It Hriti vh sailo r (17'1.\- 1HIS) 180-9 livin g co n d itio n.. I X2 nJva i tacti cs I X3 recru itm en t IXI uniform and w eapo lls 1X4-5 J-tM S Victl''}' 186-9 Br itish tank regiment 274 Bri ton s. An cient 32 . 43 b roadsid es IH3 Brow n lkss utu..kcrs 154 . 172 , 17 H- 9 Brow n in g I-IIJ pistol .145 Brusilov offenvive 249 buffalo so ld iers 222 Bulge. Hartle o f th e 274 . 30 1 Bu ll Run . n .ml es of 191, 19 6 bull etproo f ve st, SA S 344-5 " b ullp up" ritl l,.·" 34 1) Uunk ~ r H ill. B,m le of 15 4 Burgoyn l,.·. Gc m'ral j ohn 14K t 53 Burgundy 111 .11 6 bmllidl) 6 . 47 . 95 , 97 Butlcr's R angl,.· r" 155 Byzan tinc Emp irl' 4(,. 53 . 62 . I 19

c C al'sar. j ulius 27. 3 1, 43 C alchaq ui pcopk' 104 C all'd o n i.ln Voluntcer s 15 5 Cam bo d ia .'33 Call1l'ron. G cn l'r al D u ncan 207 C all1l'ro ne . B.lttl e of 3 14 t'alllOu tlage Bo er W.lf 23 -1 Briti"h dl...ert (om b.lt uni form 349 QU l'l'n 's R an ger.. 155 US M ar in l' 326 Viet C o ng .B 4 , 335 Wo rld War I 234. 24 2 . 2 47 .302 C anada Am er ican War o f Ind l'p l'nd l'llcl' 155 Wo rld War I 247 can nih ali,;t)l. M :lOr i 20 5 C aJlII<1l,.", Battl e o f 4 2 t'alllio ns Mugh al 12()-7 N ap ol eo nic lll7 Ottoman 119 . 121 HM S I "ictl'ry IHH-tJ cano e... M .lOri w ar 205. 20 6 Ca pe lb t.m g:m 32H C ape St Vin cellt . B.utl e o f IH6 C aporeuo. B aul ~ o f 24H carb in e ritl es 164-5 C arle to n , Colo nel J.unes 22 3 Carl ist " rl,.·l)Ul,.·tl·S" 252 Carr hae , Baul e o f 32 c n ro n.a k·s IH7 C an hagin ial1S 14 , 27.4 2 castles, Illed ieval 7()-7

C; l..tro. Fidel .B N. 33 9 c.uaphract v 15. 4(. C;IU pUIt.. 9 1

cavalrv l),Jrk nian 15

condo n ieri 7CJ Frank ish

(I

I

French cavalrym an 11)1). 15 663 Kn igh t Tcruplnr -1 7. (IX, 7 8 med ieval kn igh t t). 4(), 47 , ()(,-7 9 , X2 M on go l ho rsem an 4(1. 88 -93

Mughal 125- 1) M uslim wa rr ior s 7 1) New M odd Army 132 Ott oman 119- 23

Poli..h winged cavalry (09. 139 R o man 3 1. 40 R u wiau 109 . 141 Sam u rai lJ-1-103 su periorirv of moun ted warri ors 9- 1(1 Te u tonic Knight 6X-9. 7M Uhl.m.. 159 U n io nist cavalry 194 US cavalry 145. 222 Celt, 15. 43 rvr uct crics I I , 53 C en tral Am l'r icl 10, 104 . 1( 1) , ., 10 ce ntu ri o nv, R o man 2M . 2lJ. 40 C crshw ayo. C hid 21 2. 21 3 ch ain ruai l An glo -Sa xo n 6 I m edi ev al kni ght 6X. 74 Muglul 12S- 9 Ouom.1II 122- 3 Vik ing 54-5 C luki.. 20 cb r io t.. 1-1 C lu rll'lI1.1gn e. Emperor 61 ,67 C lu rles 1, Kin g 131 C IUrll'" II . King IJ J C ha rk' s V, H o ly R oman Em peror 112 . 11.\ C ll;\rk's, Archd u ke o f Austr i.l 15(, C ha rk's th e Ell . I iol y R o nwi Emp l'ror 5 1 C lu rk's thc Sim p k Kin g o f tl1l' rrank s 62 dlJS"l·ur ... Frendl 15(H ,5 uniform 1(.2- 3 \Vl'ar Om ;lIId etJu ir me llt 16-1- 5 C lu th:u ll Isb n d 206 dll'l,k gu m 2M3 C hl'yl' llIll' wa rr ior s 2 t 7, 222 (hicl"Jk (hel me t) 122 C h ile 1114 ch in gu n 27 1) , 2X3 C h ina C ivil War 33 M M .llldlU n m q ul'st 101) M ongol s in 46 , HlJ. I)l), 1) 1 Peo p le's Lib eration Ar m y J 10 Vil'm am War 332 Wo rld War II 226 C h irit'a hu:l Apach e 22 3 d li\',llry 7 , 47. 67 ,6H. 7 1, KI ch lor ine g:l.. 247 Ch ri..tic. j Walt er 272 C h urc h , att itu de to wa rfare (.H C h ur dlill, Wi nston 230, 25H. 29 1 C IA 33H cig.n l·tt l· p i..tols 2lJ6 citizen- sold ier.. 10-1 I. 15. 22(1 , 233 .299 city- ..t.lt es G rl,,,..k 15 .1 7 , I X. 2 1 Italian 7 1) C iu dad R o dri go , sil·gl,.· o f 17 3 , 174 C ivil C liard , Spallish 252

civil wa rs Am eri can I t. 1-1 5. 19 0- 203 . 222 C h inevc 3 1n..'U S English 130--5 Spani..h 252- 3 C ivi r.n e. Banl c o f (12 C lem en t V. Po pe 7 H C lo wn . Baro n von 15.1 d ubs Apa che 22 3 Aztec 1115 Ma o r i 21)7 . 2(IX_I) Sio ux 22 11- I trench 23 7 C n u t, Ki ng 53 Cochise. C h ief 223 code of hono ur bu shido 6 . 47 . 9 5. 1)7 Fre nch For eign Leg io n .112. ., 14 R ajp ut 125 Sparta n (, US Navy SEA L 347 sec .JlSII chivalry Codex C'ptldj/i51l1 lIX co h o rt ... R o ma n .1I. 32 .•),.> C o ld War 3 10. 3 11..'3H . .14H collabor ator s, Na zi J 14 C olombia. I:AR C JJt) coloniali..m J il l CO IUIlIII foruuu ion 17 5 Coma nc he warrior.. 2 1t) Com bat Ap phcat io us Force .1--17 co mba t box fo rmation 279 t"Ollllllis'iio llS. h uyi ng 17 1- 2 n ll1IIlIUni, t.. Cold W;u 3 .>X Ind ot.'h in.l 3 I 4 Spa n ish C ivil W:lr 253 View.lIn W.lf 321I. .12I. 32 2. 33 1..>.\3 C(m lp uter.., IUVig.ltiOlul 25 X C o n Thi t'li . Sil'gl' of .121 co nCl'alllll'n t Wl';lpOIl" 2 1) ( ) C CO I1 (ord 153 Co nd or Leg ion 252. 253. 25(,. 2H9 n m do u it'r i 7 1) Con ll:dl' ratl' for n " , AIIIl,.'r it'all C ivil Wa r I ') 1- 5 . 20 0--1. 222 C o n fedl' r:ltl' in falltry lll.l11 21MI-I co nscr ip tio n 51'1' renui tllll,.· nt CO ll'i.u llt ino pll· 47 ,49, I IH. 119 C OTl tilll·llt.l l Ar m \' 144 . I -n - 9. 15 2- 3 . Com r;I... N ic:uagu :1 3.W (llf1t" lwrl/i., -to . 4 1 co o k ing _~ n' fo od ;lIId dr ink C o r int h 20 co rporal pu n ish llll'l1t 145. 172. I H2 . 2.'1 Cort ez , H l'rn ;i n 105 . lO e) Cor ulln a 17.l Cms;ll'ks IOl). 141. H'Il. 2-1 H Cou n te r R e"olu tiOlury Warf.lre (SAS) .140 . 3 42- 3 . 34 4 co u n ter im ur gl,.·IKY warfare .>20 . 33 H-9. 3 46 . 347 . 349 l,.' o Ulltert l·r m r i, t o pl'r:Hio m 3--11 13 . .1411. .147 Cour trai. Ib u k' o f 7 1. X(, co u rt l11J.ni;11 131 Cowpem. Baul l' o f t 49 C razy H Or"ie 2 16,2 19 .222 Crt·t"y. B.ltt k· o f 47 . ()7 . HO, HI. H3 .H7 crl'l'p ing b.lrr ;lgl· 233 Cresap, Midu d 147 Cr i lll~:l 3 1-1 C r im l"an \Var 145 C ro m w d l tan ks 27 4

nm"bo w'i HI.9 1 ( ;l'nOl·, e cro....bowman X7

SO E

agcnr ~l)()-7

C r usad er ·t.I,lks 274 C ru..adcs 47 . (,2. 67. ()H. (II). 70. 7H. H7 . 'm. 120 . 121 CS g,l" g renades 342 Cuba ( : uh ;1II rebel .m u v revolution :U X. 3:)1) Spani sh -A m cri can War .1II} cuir.r 51'1' pl.u c nr ruo ur cuira icrv. Fren ch 15H. 15 1) . 174 C u- te r. General George 2 17. 2 1H.2 1tJ o uti ng th rou gh th e lin e I X.\ C uu Lon g I ) l'1 t;t 33 1

:rw

o

I >-Ihy I I . 2lJ3 . 2 I )I}.JIHI. Jil l

1).1 Na nu 3 I I) d .rggcr s •

med ieval kni ght 7 3. 7H M o ngo llJ2 M ugh.rl 12() Ot toman 122 R OIll.1II 37 Samurai 100-- 1 1/.11/1 (sh id d) 129 I ),Ihom t'y .11-1 I ),lilll\' O \Var.. t)()-7 J ).lh o ;l . H ugh 21m. 21) 1 I >.lIIuhl'. R iwr .111- 1 I >.tr im , Kiu g of Pl'f..i.1 17 . 211 tIL· GJ ulk G en cf.11 C Il.lrll'S .>I:; tlL'nl!on il. lt in n 3 111 d d t.'m iw ~I!d 113 I k V;l)'an'v liV;ht IIl.Khill t.'- gu n .1.' I Ild hi 127 I k it;) For n ' 3 11. .147 I km ilit;u ized Zo nt.' (Vit'u l.ln l) .1211,.121 dt.'..t.' rt co m b at 1IIlit(.lfIll. Br itish .H I) " I k't'rt Ra t.... 27 4 I k ' t.'rt War. \Vo rld War II 27 4. 275 . .\ 14.34 1 D il·lll . Ngo D in h .B I I )il'lI Bil'; l Phu . n ,m ll' of .1IJ. 3 15. .\ 22 I )il'Pfw. "il·gl,.· of 711 I )ing i..wa )'o , C hid 21 1 d i, clI'i gr l'n .Hk· 2.W I )iu. B,ltt k' of 12(1 d o nn lll'lIts. to r~l'r \' o f 29 2 d ogfi glH.. 256.257' I) iinit z, Admiral Karl 26 4 l/llppd"ii/d"a ." II I. I IS I )o rni l'r h Olllber .. 2 57 . 25 1) ./llm (' pl' ar) 22- .1 " do llgllhoys" 2 47 I )o w di ng. I lu gh 255.257 ~ l raV;( )( )J I" , N apokUl lic l iN, 159-60 I )u blin 5 1. 52. 5H I )u n u s, Alt.' xan dr l' IJ H I )u nk irk. evanl;uio ll o f 255 I)UI1I11Orl", Lord 155 I )utdl -'fl ' N ethe rland.. I )u td l rl'vo lt I U

E E;l~ll'

StIU;ld rons . R AF 25( , Ea' t An glia 5 1 E.l..tl·rn Fro nt 240, 2()()-I) , 275 . 2XI). J I-l Ecu;H!or 104 Ed ingto n , Battl e of 52

Edward L

Kill ~

of En gland XI

Edward Hl, Ki'nv; nf E·nv;l.lIld 1.7 . XI Edward . th e B!.Jd : Pr im-e (IX, HI

El--loVt Mn uclukc 7H. 7 1) , 1)1 1- 1, 119 . 120 .1 2 1 N l'W Kin gdom I) . 14 Eig h ty Year..· W;lr 1.)(1, I.>S EI Al.uncin . Hu rlv of 20 7 elephant.. 42 . 125 . 12(1. t 27 em pires. brea kup o f J i l l Enfield revolve rs 25 5 . 2(13 Enfield ritlc- tuuckct 11) -1 . 211 1 cng juc cr v,Amcric.m C ivil \V:u (I)'"

England Ci vil W" r IllS . 130-5 lougbowm.m 80 -5 Nor m.in co nq ll\..vt 47 . 5.>. (,II . (12 Engli..h m usket eer 130-5 .m uv !iti: 1.12 rl'n ~l i t lll l' l lt I .l I rr.unin u I .l2 -.l un it( lr;lI .urd \ W ,l pOm 1.l-l - 5 Eni guu enc o d ing m .u-lu nc 2(,4 Ent vbbc airp ort .l4(1 cntrcm-luucn t sa tren ch wa rfa re l'ntr)' t;ICtit'" SAS .>42-.1 Ep.uuiuoud.ts 2 1

vquiptn cnr Auu-rir.tn ritlcm.m 1511- 1 llr iti, h infm tr vm.m ( I t) 14- 1H) ~ .\4 -5

Br iti..h Redcoat 172. 17 .>. 1 7 H-~

dl.l""l·ur I lI-I- 5 C Olltl·d l·r,ttl· illl;lIItr\,lII.lIl ~ ll I En gli'i.h Il1USkl·t l·l·r 1'.l-l - 5 G l·r lll.lll ..torm trn o p er ( 1'J 14- IH) 242-3 R AF tight l'r pilot 2(12-.\ R OIl1;1II lq.d Olu ry .>(1 SAS , o ld il' r .144-5 S( ) E agl·!It ~1>4 -5 U ll io n int;lIltr ylll ,1I 1 Ji) .\. 1'>4. 1t)5 , JI)X_I) US hOIllIll' r rfl'\\'IlW I 2XO- l US c lVa!r" 222 US M ,lril;t'" J2()-7 US p,lr.m o opl'r .\() 1. 30 4-5 Vil·t C on g glll' rr ill.1 .l.l 4- 5 Erlll l·IH.lrill'i 5 1 esnnt ti ~ ht t' r pilo ts. U S 2XH

n p,jt 111- Ctl,ps 7 Ethdrl·d . Kin g o f Northumbri ,l 4') Ethiopi,lI1 It l'g illl l'lH 155 Eyl.llI. n ,ltt k' o f HIli

F r:airb ur n , W E 2 1) I Ell.lllV;i..t 1II0\'l"ml'lH 252 Falkirk. H,ltt k' o f XI Falkb nd.. W:lr J -1J FAl\\ AS ,1".llIh ril ll" 3 13,

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.' 41) FA R e (FlIl·T7.1.. Arm.ub.. R l'vol lKi(HUr i:ls d l' C o lo m bi'l) .B 9 fa'i.ci..m 227 . 2 52 . 25.> t;tt i!-.'l.ll's Frend' hlfl'i ~n Ll'g io n 3 11>- 17 US l\1.lrin c j un gk' .124-5 I:l,.·rgm oll. C o!o l1 d P.ltr ick 14 1) Fl,tt l'rnu ll. C o lo n d Will bm J 2 1S ft.'u d al sy, rl"1Il 6 2. (IH Figh tt'r CO lllIll;lIHI. Il A F 255 . 257 . 259

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tin:ti ght \ .12 J. 322 first-aid kir. juugle (U S Marine} J27 tl.ik helmet (U S bomber) 27K. 2X5 n.lk vest (U S bomber ) ~X 1 t1.11111'- thmWl.'Ts

G eruuu 24 1 M OIl ~oI 91

tlarcs

.. x

w C Z

tlarc pistols 2·m ma gnesi um 2-tO pa rachut e 32() tlachb.m g g rena de s .142 fl em ish foo r soldi er Nfl tliutlo ck m uskct v 10K. lOt), 125 .1 4 1, 17 2. 2116 flint lock pi sto l.. Ih-l . 172 FL tcrrori stv ,, 15 Floren ce 79 fl ying tonn.ruons (R Ail 25 1) Flying Fortress Jf f B- 17 hom her flying j ac ket R A F (Irvin) 2110-1 US 27X. 2 X ( ~ I Fockc- Wulf fighter.. 27M food and d r ink

Amcrican rit1c.· II1.11l 14K British infantryman 19 14-1 H

230.235 Briti..h sailo r (17 1).l,- IH15) 1X2 Ger man ..hoTtagl''', Wo rld \VaT I 241 Greek hoplitc IH. 2.\ HM S Vi((M") ' HIM Mongol hO r \I,'111.111 Xl) R o m .11I 4 1 Ullio!l int:lnt rYllull I t)H US f\.hrint.· 3 20 . 322 US p.ua (roopt.·r 30 4- 5 Vit.·( Con~ ~u t.'rr ill.1 33 2-3 . .'.1 4. 33 5 Fort.· i~ll Lq!;ioll llain', Frt.·IKh 3 12- 17 AI ~t.·ri ;lII W;lr 3 I S. 3 I (I Indo c h ina War 3 14 - 15 n ·cru i(Illt.·1I( and trai n in g 3U- 14 u ni for l11 and \wapo n.. 3 16..... 17 tl>r~e.·r y of do c ulll e.' m.. 292 Forlorn I lope.' 17 4 Fort Kt.·;1fI1Y 2 1H r:on SUnHl"f 191 fi)f«•. R Ollun 30. 3X-4 1 ff-1>.1)' 11. 293 . 2 1)') . 31MI,301 ("5l' ril d("CtIrl' s 7 fi> re.·ign Iq!;io llllai re.· 3 12- 17 Fre.' !lch cavalrYlll.lll 156-63 Fre.'IH:h Illus kc.·te.·t.'r 1( 1). 138 (m p e.· r ial Cllard (), 1(17 libe ratio n o f ( 11)44) 3 1... N apo le.'o llic ani lle.· ry 1(17 Napolc.·olli c in (;lI1try 1(1(.-7 Poil us 24(1 re.·..iq ;lIKt.' 11l0\·e.'111e.'1lt 293 use.' o f 1lle.· rn·lIarit.'s III , 11() SCC disil hattie.. a nd wa rs by n.1111 e.· halKo. ( ;e.·IIe.·ral Fran (i ..e.·o 252 FU lll;oi.. I. King: of Frall ce 113 h ;lI1ks 43. "'6- 7. 49 . 50. 51. 52 \\ 'arriors 6 t frami..e k . j ose.·f 25 7 fraser. G t.'IIe.·ral Simoll I...H Frt.·daic.-k II . Kinl-!; of Pru ....ia 109 . 140 . 14 1 Frt.'d l'ri ( k Wi llialll I. King of Prus ..i;l 1...1 Frl'd l'r ic ksburg. ll.1tt lc.. of 11) 5. 20 2

Free French 11l00't.·IUe.·m J 14 French cavalryman 156-/13 rccruinuen t 157 (.Kti n 159 traini ng ISH uni form 157.1 59 . 162-3 \\'c.'apom 15X. 164- 5 French Fo reign Legion 252. 3 12-17 French R evolu tion 1 I. 157 Fren ch R evolu tionary Wa rs 15.... 157. IXI. I HI, Fren ch War s of R elig ion I 13 Prc u tc Sa u di ni..ta d e Lib c r.u-ion Naciona l (r:SLN) 3,V) Pre..lu uau, O peration 291 Priedland. Battle of 157 Pmiscm. jean XO. K\ fronri cr smeu 147-9. 1511 Pru nd..berg , Georg von 113

fyrd (,0

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G. lbc.' ik . jose.·f 2 1)3 (; ;llil a....;H1 h ritlc 3 4(, Gallan d. Ad o lf 2H9 (;a llipo li c.nupaigu 247 .249 ga.. m asks. Ge r man 2...1 gall warfare 229.233. 23').247 Goue.· Pa. Ta u ran g a 2117 (;atling gum 213 (;;1lI1.. 27 . 31 . ...3 GClllpcoi Wa~ 95. WI ( ~t.·lIgh i ll Kh an HH.Ht).911. 91, 93 G l·tH);! nmdottie.'ri 79 cro~ ..howman H7 Cc.'mgc.' IV. Kinl-.!; of G rc.·at Br iui n 211(, ( ;e.· rnuII Y Cond or Lc.·l-.!;ion 252 . 25 3 , 25f1 ( ;C.' fIlla ll tig ht e.' r pilo ts 2HI) (; l'rlll;lll ..to TllltrnOp t·r ( I'J I 4- IX) I I. 23X-lS G Cfllun ic.' tr illl''' 15 , 3 2, 42 , 43 (; S( ; -~ 346 H essians 152 . 15 5 Lal1thk nnht 110- 15 lu n ze.· r cre.·ws 275 U -ho.lt Cfl' W 2(,4-5 sn' .dsl) baull,.·.. ;m d wan hy name.' (;l"fonimo 223 Gc.·..tJ po 291. 293 Gcuphl1fl-.!;. B;m !c.· of I I. 19 2 , 19 3 ,1!l'l'iatl' ,)rd"m~\? 113 .\?/", zis (M uslim wa rr io r..) I It) . 125 ( ;h O\t I h lll't.· re.' vival 1ll0Vt:' I11Cllt 2 19 ( ;iap , Ge.'Ile.· r;l1Vo N gu yc.' n .' 15 G ibralt;lr 3 ·B ,\?I.'IJillS (..wo rd) 15 , 27 . 3(.-7 j.!;lide.·r ope.'ratiom 2 1)1), .lOO. 30 1 GO;l 12(1 "l-.!;Ot·dc.· mbl-.!;·· (spe.u) H6 goWc.·s R A F ti l!;h te.' r pilot 2e.2 SOE .1j.!;l' nt 294 So\,it.·t t.m k c.."rt.'wmall 270 US homhe.·r O \ ·\\ ·1l1.l11 2XB ( ;m Yllno\, madlint:-gum .'\.'\ 2 Goth .. 15.43 G(l yOith ley. C hit: f 22.\ G rand Arl1ll·e.·. Na pole.·oni c.· 157-(,7 G raillh o n , Batt le o f I 1(1 C ran t , G e.· m'ral U ly....e.. 194 C rant ta nks 27 4

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g r.rves. Viking 53 Crear Patriotic Wolr 270 g reaves (Ie.·g .m uo ur) Greek hoplitc 23 medi eval kni gh t 73 Samurai 9H Greece naval warfa re I H resistance movem e nt 293 C reek hopli rc 7. 10, 14- 15. 16--23 a r m o ur 22 -.l tac tics 17, 2 1 traini ng 17-1 H wca pom 14-1 5. 22 - 3 Green Berets .l 47 grenade 1,IUIK hc.·rs • Ge rman . Wo rld War I 244 M 79 "Blooper" 3211 M 20'\ 327. 34 7. 35(H SAS 3 45 Vit.'t C ong .\.\ (.-7 grenades an tita n k 33t. b.r..d u ll .l2 7 CS ga.. 3...2 d iscu s 23') 11.Ishhan ~ .H 2 fragm en tat ion 2"'9 .33(.-7 han d I'N . 2.1(1 , .\.\ 5 , 33 () Mi ll.. bombs 2.\(1 M KI I ,\0 5 ri fle 2.'t.

H I Iab..burg dyn.w y 121 . I ., H 1Iadri.m, Emperor J X 1bdriJIl 's \V;lll 29 ,.\') I,.d...., (wa r d.mce) 20 5 . 207 . 20X halb erd s I Jurch foo t ..o ldicr 1JX l.and sk uc rh t I 1J. 11"'- 15 Sw iss 11(, l lalido n H ill. B,m lc of HI hand g re na de .. 11)1). 23(1 , 3J5- (1 I i.nuu bal 1.... 42 " 4 Ha r ri s, R itle.· II1J l1 172 . 17.\ I [nr trn an n , Erich

2~W

"'7. 53.

Ha ..ting.... Hnrlc of "'('. 60 . 6.\. 6"'-5 Hatrin , Battle of 79 H .IvoUl.l .U 9 Ha wk wo od. Sir john 7 1) hcaddrcs..e.' s Apache 22.\ Nez PlT( l' 223 Sio ux 22 0 Z ulu 2 14 heavy water 2() I. 2 1)J H ec kle r &. Ko ch MI'5

..ubma chinc-gun .H I.

R u wian R GI> - 5 .\.\6 stick 23e.. 2...1. 243 stu n 3 44 Grt.'llJdi e.'r .., Na pole.'tmic It.7 Grc.·n ur ..h ,1fp~hoot e.'r'i 14 I " G r ilm hy C h Ulm" 229 Grouc hy. M .lTlllli'i dc.· 157 Gf{) ll~e.·, Opc.·r.Hion 29 1 G ru nwald, Ihttl e.· of 7H G SG -9 (G re.·n zsd n u zg ru ppc.' - 9) 346 (;uantllUI1l0 Ih y .' I t) G ubbim , Colo nd Co lin

21) I. 21)2-3 (;ud e.'r ian , G t.'Ile.·ral I k inz 275 G ue.'fIl iCI 253 h'lIc.·r r ilLi w.1ff;lre.· 3 10- 11 AIl-.!;c.·r b .l I S Ap .ld ll,·. 22 .l C uhan n ·bd army 339

FARe .\.W In do d lilu War 3 14-15 , .\.\ 1 Israd 3...e. M ;w r i 2117 M Uj ;lh idc.· e.· Jl .\.\K S.lndinista rc.·hcl.. 339 Sioux 217-19 Vict Conl-.!; ~ue.' rr i lla 330-7 Wo rld W.lr II 293 G uc.·..elin . lk rtralld d u (.H C lIc.· var a. Emc.·sto " C he " J39 gllidc.'d llIi....i1 e.·.. 3 10 Gu i..c m i , It ob e.· rt ()2 G u lf War .H.l, .H X. 349 G lInnc.·rside.·, O pe.·ratioll 29 t h'llnpowdc.·r \w apo m "'7 . 71 , ~ 1. lOX. 12 1. 126-7 h"llllS ami -.lirnati: 27K ant itank 274 B- 17 homhe.·r 2H2-5 c he l"k 2H3 c.' hi ll 27 1), 2H2 T-34 tank 27 2-3 wai ..t 2X5. 2X(.-7 .\ 1'1' .,lsl)..pc. ·c ilic ty pc .. o f l-.!;1I1l Cmt;lv Adolf, Kin g o fSwe.·de.·1I 1119 , 1.13. I3 X G lith ru m 52

=

344. .145 I lcin kd hOl1lhe."fs 25 7 hdinlptc.·r.. Bd l H ul,.·Y tmop (a r r il'rs 3...6 in Kor c.· Jl1 W.lf 3 III in Vil,.·ul.lm 3 10. 320. 32 1 hdlllCt.. Br itish in l;lIltrylll.l1l ( I'J I 4- I X) 2.14 B r i ti ~h in l;lI HrVIll.lIl (m m lc.' m) 349 C d tic 4.\ C hak id ian 20 C orint h ian 22 C rm ;ld e.'r 7 M cllira....i e.· r 15 1) I )ut(h pi kc.·man I .' X (;e.·rl1l.l11 ..tnr illtroope.·r ( 1 ~ 1 4- 1 X ) 242 Gn·e.·k hopli tc.· 20 . 22 It.lli;lll ·· ho u ll..k ul l" h.ISille.·t 6 7. 6X It.lliall ..alle.·t 79 jOU'itinl!; hdm 69 Lall d ..kncdlt 113 . 114 ll1l'dil'va l knight 68 . 72 M OI1 l-.!;o l K9. 1)2 M u gl1.11 125 . 12K Ncow M od d Army c lYalry 132 Nor ma n 62 O u om,lIl I )I) , 12.\ it A F pilo t 2(lO, 2(12 Roman c;lv.llry 3 I R o m an ce.·n turio ll 2M R o m an 1c.· l-.!;i Olu ry 34 S;lI111lrai 95 . 9H SOE al-!;e.·lH 294 Sovict tank n c.· wnW1 270 Sp .1Ilish (CrnlIS 117 US hOl11blT crc.·wnWl 2KO US 1M 27X. 2X5 US infantry. World War J 24 7 US M ar ine 32 4 US p aT;1(roope.'r 30 2 Vikill g 54 h d ot .. I H ~knry III . H ol y R Ollun Elllpt.'ror 62 11c.· Ilf), V. Kin l-.!; o f Eng lan d 6M H c.· Ilf Y r itk 222 hc raldr y 67, (IH, 7(,

I Icrodo tu v 14.20 H l·..... iaus 152 . 155 f Icyd rich , R ei n hard 29 3 H i-Sta nda rd .22 silenc ed pi..tol

2 1U H idcyoshi . Toyo tomi 1)7 hijacking , ai rlin e 311 . 3"'2 , .H (, H ind cnb urg. G eneral 239 H iroshima 22 7 H itle r. Ad olf 26 7 .275.29 1 H o C hi M inh (ra il 33 (1 l Io h c n fr icd bvrg. Hartle of 1...0 H o ly l .and "'7. (12 , ()7. (IX. h9 . 70. 7 X. X7 . ~ 0. 120. 12 1 H Olli e.' Rul e. Ir ish 173 . 229 110 111t.'r 17 Hongi Hi b , C hief 20 "'. 21)6 hoplites. Greek 7. 10. 1"'-15. 16-23 horses An glo-S ;lxon (,II int ro d uct io n of I.... I S m edie val hor..r- .ir ru o ur (.H M o ngol h or..em an 46 . 88-93 M u glu l I2() Sio ux 2 17 su pcriori ty of m ou nt ed war r-ior.. 9 -10 Vik ing 5 1, 52 sec ,,1St' cavalry H ospi tallc r.., Kn ig ht s "'7, (,X hO\tJl-!;e.·-t ak in g 3 11. .\"'2- 3 . J 44, 341>.347 H o rch ki.... ma chine-gun s 253 homccarls (,0 H u l" 3 22. 323 H lI l c h"l1 9( ~ 1

Hundre.·dYc.lf'i·War 67. 76 . KI. X2. X3 H u ngary 90 . 109. 119. 12 1 Au~tro - f l u nga r iJIl a rm y 2...H. 24 9 Hu ns 15 Ilunyadi .joh n 120 I-Iur rr icam' aircra fi: 22 7 .255, 25t.. 257 ,259

hl/ss."i•• 13') hu ..sar... Napolc olli c 157 . 159 I-Im ..ein , S.llld.lI11 3 11 HlI s..itc.· so ld ic.· rs K6 H utic r. Ge.·I1e.·r;11 vo n 24 1 hyd rat ion sack 3 49

I Ih e.·r iallS 43 In ni 32.43 ikillu (..pcar) 2 14-15 Im pc r i.l l G ua rd . N .lpo leo n ic 6 . 167 imp rl's"I1lt.'1lt 1H1 h K ;l ~ 10. to4 in d e.·p e.· nd e.·lll' t· Illo vcnl e.·nt .. 3 1() Ind ia Br iti..h troop" in 145 . 234 Mu ghal w arrio r 109 . 12 4-9 Indi all Mut iny 179 In do c h ina War 3 14- 15 . •\3 1, 33H inf~1I1 t ry

17th-n ·lltury Ellropcan ..oldicrs 13 H Amt: ric .lII r itlcn u n 146-51 Allza r s 24 7

cu/,,:\? ,m 9(.-7 Am tro -I-Iun gar ian . World War I 249 Br itish inf.lntrymall (19 14- 1M) 22X-37 Brit ish in f:lI1t r ylllJ.n (m o dc:rn) 3 49 Br itish R cd co at 16 8- 9 . 170-9 Calladia n , Wo rld War I 2...7

,

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C o nfede rate infantryman 2tHf-1 Engli..h mu sket eer 130-5 foo t sold ier'; of the: R enaissan ce 1 t (t-1 7

Fren ch Poilus 2-16 G er man sto nu troo pc r (19 14- IH) 23H-43 G reek hoplit c 7. 14- 15. 16-23

Italian, World W;u I 2-1H Landskncchr 110-1 5 lo ngbow man Hl )-S

medieval fo o t so ldie rs 9, 86-7 Mu ghal 126,1 27 Na po leo nic iu fantr ym au

166- 7 Ottoman 119-21 Pru ssian infantrym an 1119. 140-1 R oman legio nary 7. 10, 15. 26--37 R ussian . World War 1 24 M SAS sold ier 3411- 5

M on gol attacks o n 9 1 nava l pilots 2H9 S.ulIuu i 47, 9 4- 103, (01) World War II 22(. , 227 , 2XI),J I9 javelins, R o man 3(.-7 j cna. Battl e o f 157 j eru salem 2 1) .62, 78 . 7Y, 87

iihad 71) J oseph . C hid 22 3 j oseph us. Flavius 28, 3(. joustin g (,I) j um p jackets (U S paratrooper] J 02 j um psuit (SO E agent ] 294-5 jungle fatigu es (U S M arin e) ,' 24-5 jungle ti N -aid kit (U S M ar inl') .127 ju ng le sur vival kit (U S Ma rine} .121 junkers aircraft 25 3.257 j urchcn 4(.

Swi ss 11 1

Turkish. World W ;tT I 2-tlJ U nion in fantryma n 190- 9

US infantryman (modern) 3-1H US Marine 22 7.3 111. 3 IH-29 . 351f-! U S pa rat ro o per 227. 29H-307. 3 111

infant ry squ;m:s J l'f squ.Ift.' formation infiltration tac tics 2-1 1 influ enza ep idem ic 19 IH- I c) 24 1. 24 7 insole s, co nce alment 21)5 Internatio nal Hrigadcv 252. 25 3 inrerroganon 29I , 2lJ3 lphicrates 2 1 IR A 343 . •14'1 Iran Iranian Emb assy siege (Lo ndo n) 34 1. 3 42- 3 .344 U S hm tagt,.' s in 3 47 Iraq Fn.'n ch Fore ign Ll'gi o n in 3 15 Gulf War 343 . 3 4H.34'1 inV,lsion of Ku wait 3 11, .14H. 34') invasion and Occ ulu tion of (2003) 3 11. 3 23. 34H. 351f- 1 US sp ~da l o pl'ratio ns for ces in 347 lrd and , H O Il R' R ull' 173.229 Irvin 11ying j ach t 26 H-I Isand hlwana, Ih u le of 2 10. 2 11. 2 13 Islam 46, 79 fundalll t:ntalisl11 33 8. 3 48 J I'C d iN Muslim w,u r iors Israd co nflil·t w ith Arab statl's 3 1 I spt:cial fim.·es 3 46 Issus, U;ltd c o f 20 h alian Wars ( 1495- 1525) 79. I U . 116. 117 h aly co ndo ttil'ri 7 1) Fren ch Fo rei ~l Ll'gioll in 3 14 Norm ans in so ud1l'TI1 47, ()2 World War I troo ps 248 iz j,l/l w llJ (Z ulu o llicer) 212 . 2 I3

J

J Kkson , H oward 27 H ja de 205. 208 , 209 j agl'r (rill l'Illt,.·n) 155, 240 janisari cs 6, 109. 11'). t2 U. 121 J lpa n mili tarislll 22 7

K Kabul 125 Kniscr whlaclu (Kaiser's Battl l') 2.1H. 2.1'). 240- 1 Knl.rsluuk o v ri fles sec AK4 7 k" fk.m (shid d) 123 Kam ikaze pilo ts 2H9 k,m/ 127 k.,,,,,,,, (swor d) 47, 96. 100- 1 k.u zhalgcr (swo rd ) 112, 113 Kd lt.' TI1W I, G eneral Francoi s Etien ne 160 Kenned y, President j oh n F J47 kCl'i blanc 3 16 khaki 234 . 247. 249 kha nates, M on gol 9 I kI",,, d,, (broa dswo rd] 12 1) J..'h"'!i'lf (daggl'r) 122 Khe S;lIIh, Sil'gl' of 32 1-2 Kid 2(.4 Kit'V 5 I. t)O ki/ii (swo rd) 122- 3 Ki;lg. M art in Lllth t,.'r 323 Kin l-,rs M ount;lin. lb ttk' of 147. 141) King's R ora l R egim l·nt 155 th l' King's Shilling 171 Kipling. Rud yard 6 Kih:hl'n er, Lord 22 9.231) Klushillo, Bau k' of 139 kni g ht , lIled ieval 9. 46 . 47. 66-79. H2. 12 1 .Ul1lo ur and \W.1POns 7 I,

72- 3 chivalry and glory 47. 68 l'vo!luio n of 68 Im,dieval l':Istie 76-7 piKh t,.·d batt le tactics 70. 7 I sil'gt,.' wart;lre 70 Knig ht s I lospit'lllers 47. (.H Kni ght s Tl"m plar 47. 6H. 78 kn i\'l's C l'mu n tlg hti ng 243 C rl'l"k ho plit l' 17. 22 Sio ux 2 17,221 SO E 293 , 296 trench J03 U S in fJntrym an 247 US Mari lle 326 US Jurat roo per 304-5 Vil·t C o ng l1Iad ll'te 33 (. k nob h-rril' (fighting stick) 2 12. 2 14-15 klluck lt..· -d ustl'rs 24 7. 30 7 k'll'is ("c ho ppe r") 17. 22 Kor l·;\. M o ngo l ru ll" 9 1 Ko rl';l11 War 3 10 . 3 19

Kochkiu . M ik hail 272 Krulak. Lieu tenant G ene ral V 1-1 325

Kubiv.jan 293 Kuhl ai Khan 4(•. 91. 96 I.·fllllel f

(fl'l'd ing funnd) 207

Kurik ara. Hartle of95 Kur sk. Battle o f 2Mt, 268-9 Kut n.i HOTa. Hu tlc o f X(. Ku wait 3 48,349 Kwa rcsmi au Empire 88. 90

L LI A I nfl e J J9 Lacey, Ser geant " G inger" 25 7,25X lancer s N apo leonic 15 t) -(,o Po lish J(,O lances M o ngol 9 2 Nez Pl'rn:' 223 Po lish wi nge d cavalry 139 Landskucc ht IOH. 110-1 5. I 1(. .ITl110 Ur and weapo ns 114- 15 decline of I 13 recru itm ent and train in g 111-1 ., regim ent s I 12- 13 style o f dr ew 112 violen t behaviour o f I 12 Laos 3 15, .H3 Lebel ri tlcs 24() Lee. Gen eral R o bert E 200 Lee En field rifles 2." .-7 l.ee tanks 274 Legion d ' Honn cur 246 Levellers JJO Lew is h'\ lI1S 229 Lexin gton . Battl e o f 153 Lcyt c Gu lf, Hattle of 289 Lihya 42. 274 I.il'gn itz. Ban k, o f 46. I) () life wsts R AF tight er pilo t 262 -3 U S Army Air For l"e 277, 2H2 U S p;uatroop er J OI. 30(.-7 Lighming ti ght l'rs 288 li gny, Batd t,·. o f 174 LilKoln . Pn'sid t,.' nt Ahralulll 191 Lindi sf.u m' 49 . 50 . 58 lint.' forma tion 175 linot hor ax 22- 3 Lith u.1Ilia 7H Litt le: lli gh orn, B.ml e: of2 17 . 21 9 . 222 LOth . Sultan 125 Lod z 26H Lo ndo n. blitz 259 lo ngbo wll 1a1l K (~5 in hatti e H3 t'all to arm s H2-3 d ot hi llg and wl'apo ns H4-5 lk'di ne of 83 lo n brships. Viking 49. 50. 5 1. 58-9 Lo uis XI, Kin g o f Fr;uKl' 70 Louis X IlJ. King o f Fr;mce 138 Loyalists. Am eri can War o f Ind e:pl' lllil"nl"e 152. 155 Loyalists. Sp.1Ili"h C ivil War 252 . 253 Lufi:ham a. hij .1Ck 346 Luftw alfe Battl e o f Br it.l in 255-9. 289 on Eastl' rn r:ront 289 Gl'rl1lan fighter pilo ts 9, 28 9 Spanish C ivil War 25 3 ;lnd US hOlllbin g m issio ns 27H. 2HH Lut ZCll, Ib tt!e of 10<) Lysander aircraft 292

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The publ isher would like to

thank the following for their kind permission to reproduce thei r photographs.

ABBREVIATIONS KEY : Key: a = above , b = below, c = centre, I=-Ieft , r= -righ t, te -top. f=-far, S =-sidebar

2-3 G e t ty hllll~c s : A FI~ 4 DK Im a ges: Hoard of'Trucrccs o f th e Anuounes (tI). " · 5 OK Im ages: By kin d I~c r lll i ,..ion o f till"Trmll'!,.'" uf rhc W,)II.ll'C Collection (lx·). 5 OK lina g e s: AIIIl"riclIl r-..1U\l'UI1Iu f NJtur.d H i..ttlty (hi): Im pl"rul \VJr M U' l' um (t:h); 1'in Riwf' MU\l"UIll.

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(he). 7 IJK (m aRl's: St.ltc I l i ,t n r k~I J M m l' ulII. Mu\cu\\' (11). 9 D K lin ag es: Uu.m i nfTrmtl'l'\ uf lilt' Arllluurie.. (IT) (hI). • 4 OK 111131:('5: Brni dl M U\l' UIII (t'). 14·-13 Werne r Fo r man Arc h h1e: Briti..h Mml'ulIl (1/ \idcbJr). 15 I) K/ StURm Spl' llrl-r: Er lllilH' Stn'~'1 (;u.ml (tr) (hl') (bl). 1(,·1 7 a kg~ i m ag('s : Er idl I.t·....illg:. 17 DK hml g(''': Urili, h MU " ~'ulll (n). 18 The Art A rc h ive: Mmt'l) di VillJ.G iuliJ.. R nlll c I I ) J~1i ()ni (I). H t'II('n ic Navy: (hi). 19 Ala m y h u age s: W,llt ~'f Ih hikuw (h). D K Im ag es: Ufiti\ h I\hl \t'um (n ol). 20 T he A rt Archi \'e: Art: h J. ~'nl ng: i ~·.11 MU "~'u ll1 , N .II,b I I ).Ig:1i O fti (b). 21 A l,u ny Im a gt' s: TIll' Pr int Cull~'t· tnr (tI). DK/ Sll.Irnll Sp l' I K~'f : I lo plitt' Sm' it'l)' (Ir). 22 D K/ Slu TOIl Sp~' llet' r: I ~ u pli t ~· Snt"i~·ty ( I r/~ h i cl d) . 24-25 Lu isa Ri c ciarin i Pho l o a g('n c y. M ila n. 26-27 C o rb is: Auldo d<." l UCI (c). 27 DK Imag('s: Urili,h I\tll"'~'Ulll (a h) (hr) (cr). 28·29 DK I SllJnm Sp<."lll'l·r : E f lll i ll~' Strn·t ( ;u.ml (b). 30 C o rb is: R ug:cr Wnm l (h). Lunl R o m an Furc: (tll fim). 3 I Curb is: N.llIl.lll IIl'nll (tr). 32 akg - iml lges: (If). 3 4 D K/ SllJ fo n Spt'n et' r: Erlllim' Stn·cc (;u.ml (trl dl('('k ~'ll.l rJ,) . 35 D K IIna g('s: Erlllill l' Scn't'c (;u.lTd (tr) . DK/ Sh,lTOIl SPl'IKl'r : Erm in ... Strt·~·t (;u.ml (III l'Uf' l·). 36 DK Images : Bru i..h Mm ~' u lll (Ir). 3H akg-im ag ('s: (hi). '1y ne ;lIu l We ar M U!i("um/ Sh,ITOn Spl'nCt'r : (hl') (hf). T h e Viking Sh ip M1Ueunt , R tnkild(', J)('umark : (cr). 39 Ty n(' a n d ~I(' a r Mu s('um l SluRm Spl.'nn:r. 40 OK Ima ges: Uritid1 M U't' mll (11:1)(d ol). '1).'n(' and \\'('ar Mus('u m / Sharon Spc nn'r : (hi) (0). 40- 4 I T) 'I1l' a n d Wl"ar Museum / Slu ro ll SP~' Ilt't'f : (h). 4 1 DK Im ag es: Brici,h M m~'ulll (b~·) . Ty n(' and W('ar Mus('UlII / Sh;m m S Pt'IK~'r : (d) (br) (Ir). 42 C urb is: <:i.lIl11i D .I~li (lni (h) (n) .43 C o rb is: ArJ.ldo tit' LtKJ. (d). DK Ima g('s: Urilid l I\hht'um (hI). Wl"rn t>t Fo rman Arch h 'e: Hrili..h Mll'o(.·u m (h r). 46 D K Im ag:e s: WJrw id.: CI..t l~·, W;lrwkk 011). O K/ Sh"RlIl S I'~' llC ~' r : (d ,). 4(I- l 0 5 OK 11110l g('S: By kiml r~'rll1i \\io n o f t h ~' Tr u..t~·l'~ of

rbc Wall.Kc C ollec tion (t /" IJchJ.r). 47 The Bo a rd of Trustees of th e Ae ruo ue ies : (h i) (be). T h e Art A rc h ive : Laur ic Pla tt Win frey (I). UK Im ages: lto.ird llfTrm l~'~'" of rbc Anuo nri cc (b r). 48-49 C o rh is: T he An Archive I Alf redo I ).Ig:1i O ni (I). 49 ilK Images: SIJ.I~·Il " H i..tor i..ka M U "~· lI m . Stockholm (cr). 511 Sk y H igh E nte rtain m ent , Q uebec : (h). 5 I O K Ima ge s: SUtc lh l l icro r i..ka M U..vum . Stockholm (d. l): Univcrviu-ts t )ld...rk...unliug. <.) ..1(1 (br). 52 C o rbi s: Wt'TlIcr Foruuu (rr). Au d eew H ore ck yj : (tl'). 53 Corbis: Ted Spieg el (b). 54 Geoff Hu xl ol1: (It'). A nd rew H ore ck y] : (It r) (tr). 55 Andrew Hoeeck yj: (t1). 58 M ick Hake r: (d). T hl" Vik ing Sh ip Ml l!ie um , R o sk ild e, D enma rk: Erw .lll CfUU.1ll (hi) (he): W~·t1Wf K,lrrN' h (b r). 59 T he Vi k in g Shi p M IlSetlll1, H.uskild (', D enm ark : (tI) (I): Erw;1Il Cnnl.lll (t"u) (n b): Wt'f ll~' f KJrr N "h (tr) (br). 60 T he A rt Arc hin~ : Mmt't' dl' iJ.T.1pi.... ~·ril.. BJ)'cux 1 1>J.g:h O rti (h) . 61 akgimages: AllIt·lol (br). 62 A ncie nl A rt & A rc h it(' ctu r(' Colleclion : R . ShCfid.lII (r;l). il K Ima ge s: B)' kind I'l'r llli....ioll nf tlw T fU..t~·t·s til' tht' W;IIl,l n' CO ll~'t" lio ll (br). (,3 DK Im 'lgt·s: N i~d I lil-b (tr). M-67 a kg-im,lg('s : Britid l li hrary. 6K T h (' Bo ard ofTrust('es of t h (' Armouries: (he) . C o rb is: (;i.1lllli J)J. ~1i Orti (tI). OK Im ag es: B)' kinti I'l'r llli....iull of Ihl' Tru ..t~·t'" ufdu' W.1I1Jl"t' Cullt't'linll (n) O,r). 69 T he Board ofTru ste('s of Ihe Ar m o llri(' s: (dol). Th e II r id gt' m ;1I1 A rt Li b ra ry : British lihr.lry. l Olll!OIl Bri ti..h I.ihrJ.r y Ihl.lrd (h r). 70 C o rh is: Ht·ltlll.lIlli (h) . G('tl)' Im ag es: Kt·J.lI Col1 ~'cllon I I luhon An-hiw (t). 7 1 il K Im ag es: Uo m t ofTrmt ~'l'" (If tlu' Arll1uur il'S (Ih l) (hI) (b r): By kin d p~' rllli ",~ iu n of dw Tr l!"I ~' c~ of 11ll' W.III.Kt· ( :l)llt·.-ciull (r) (hf ). 72 DK Im ag es: B)' killd pl'rllli....ioll o f t ht' Tr mt ~·t·s of lill' W.1 Il J~·t' C(l lI<."l'lioli (hc). 72 ·73 DK Ima ges: By kind pl'rmi",iull of Ih~' Trmc ...t".. (If Ih ~' WJlI.K~' Col1~'.-cio ll (l'J): W.1rwkk C.1..II<.". WJfwl l'k (h) 01<-). 73 il K Im ag('s: Ho m ! of Tru ..tt·t·" tlf tilt" Arlll (lur i ~', (c/s wn nt) (br/t· ui....t·, ):W;lfWirk (:.N lt'. WJrw ick (n.l/ k'g: p rtlt ~'<"Ii (lll ) (n ) (Ih r). 74-75 T he Art Arc hi\'e: Bihliot t'CI J.liOll.llc M JrciJ.llJ..Vt'n in ' I n J ~ i (ln i. 76 C o rb is: DJ.r .1l1l.1 l l clJ (d): An~d() Il o TllJ k (hi). OK Im a g('s: ()nln of chI.' n !Jck " rilKe (n). 77 Nalio na l Trus t Ph ol o ~ r aph i c Lib rary : AI.N bir () g: i l v i ~' (Ix-) (It l). R ichard W h it e : (tI) (br) (Illr) (lir ) (Ir). 78 il K Im ,lg('s: W;It\\'ic k C a..t k W;lrw it·k (d). 79 T h(' Bri d g em an A rt Li hr;lry : I h b l i o l h t- ~ I U t' NJtiOll.lll'. l'J.ri\ (b r). Hil-HI Gett)· Im a ~e s : B r i ~lg:l' lll J n An l.ihury (c). 81 DK lin ag es: UOJrtl ofTrl1"t l't'" o f tilt" Arlllouril'" (b r). 82 T he Arc A rchh'l": Briti\ h lihr J.r y 0') (It"). H3 ilK linag es: Un.lfd ol- rnhtt't'" of th t' A r il lt m r i~'\ (h); R u bill Wig:i n~ t \ l ll. Arbou r AlIlillul'" Lcd . Slr.lllllrd- u pu ll-

Avon (H b /.1rmws). Getty Ima ge s: Suing: t'r I I fulto n Archive (t·). 86 The Art Arc hive: (hi). T he Brid g('m an Art Lib rar y: Collection uf tilt" liarl of l.cu-c..tcr. H ol kh.nn Hall . N o rfolk (t·). 87 T hl" Hoard ofTrustees o f t he Armo urtcs : (hi). il K Ima ge s: Hoard o f'Tru ..tccc o f the Armounc.... (crb/ bohs): By kind pcmuwion of th e Tru srcc-, of th e \\'.1I1.l("t· Colle ct io n (n ). 88 ·H9 ak g - im a gcs : (t) . 9f1 C orb is: B.lTr)' l.cwi.. (b). O K hnag('s : Umvcrsiry M uw ullI of Arc h .I~·\ ) I \)hry .md A nt h nlp(lh)~ry. Cll llh r i d~t' (d)" 91 T he Bridg eman Ar c Libra ry: Pri vate Collection (h) . 92 T he Boa rd ofTrustees of th e A r mouries: (hi). 92·93 Thl" Bo ard ofTrustees of Ihe Armou ril"s : O,r) (c). 93 T he Bo ar d ofTrusl ('es of t he Arm oll r i('s: (e1) ( t ~·). 94 ·95 The Kobat C o llt' c tio n : W.I Tll~· r Urn... I I l.lvid J.llll ~·' (t). 95 11K Ima g('s: By killl! pt·rllli ....iull uf tilt' Tr ll\l ~· ~·s of Ihl' W.IllJ.(C ColIl'dioil (h). 96 A la my Imag ('s: I'h ocu JJ.pJ.n (If) . DK Ima g(,s: Judith Mil1~'r I BJ.rry nJ. v i ~·" OriCIlIJ.1 Arl ltd (c) : I'in R iw r.. MU'o(.·ul1l. Unin·,..if)· of ( h llmt (h). 97 C o rh is: BUT\lt'in C(l Il~'t" lin n (h). il K I m :lge !i: Judit h M ilkr I Sh),ln'" (tI). 98 UK I m ,lg('s: Bo .ml o( Tnhlt'~'\ of t ht' A r llluuri~'" (hi) (dol) (n). 9H- 99 il K Im a gl' s: BUJrl! of Tru ..l t· ~·\ nf tilt' Arlllouri t'~ (n) (c) (t). 99 il K I m a g('s: Bu,m! nl"ru,c~'~"" of tht' Ar lllo urit'" (n.l). 100 D K h n a g('s: BOJ.nl (} rrnh lt' ~'" of th~' Arlll u ur i ~'" (d .1) (c I/ ..wmd &: ..c lhlu rd) . 100· 101 OK Im ;lg('s: I ~l l;l rd n rrr ll\t~'t'" ( If till' Arnlt Hlfit's (t-); I'in Ri Vt'T\ M lI\~·ulll . U lliw r~i ty ufOxllml (I) (h) (br/ m p kng:.li). 101 il K Ima ge s: Buan! ()t~rrtht ~'t"" of tilt" Armuurit'" (h r/ cup k01Ub). 102-103 Al a m)' Im a ge s : J J lll i ~' M.u...l ull l Tnh.1I ~')"~· 11Il.Jg:l"i. 104 T he A rl Archh'(': U lliwr\ity MU\t'ulIl C uzn) I M irl'iIll'V;u uil' r (1).J us tin K(' rr : (h r). 105 T Ill' Ar t Ar chh'e : E il ~' t'll ·I i.\"l' ~· d y (b). DK Im ag es: CLlN ACU LrA - IN AII -MEX / Mkhd ZJ.ht· (11) (c). 106 TopFolo. c o .u k: R~~· r -Viol1 ~·t (h) . 108 DK hna g('s: By kind pcrmi....iu ll of th~' Tru ..tct.... of till' W31bn' Col1t'nioll (hi). IOH· 141 D K Im a ge": Boan l (If TrU "l l' ~'" of tilt' A rlll nll r i ~'" (t / ..idd,.lr). I (II} T ht' UU,Irtl o f Trust('l'S of Ihe Arm ouri{'s: (hl'). C o rb ili: Bm o klyn M lI \~' lI ll1 (t r). il K Il1Ia g('s: Pin RiwN l\tU"t·UIIi. Ullin'nil)' o f Oxllml (hr). 110-1 11 T he Arl Archin: C h.ilt·JII d~' Bln i\ I J)J.g:1i t ),ti (c). III DK Im ag es: B)' kind I'~·r lll i ....iu ll of th c Trll"t~'t" (If till' W;lll.ln· C(l ll~'t' l iu ll (hr). 112 akgim l'J:('s: (h) . Getty h ml gl' s: Il. md mn I I fulto n An"h iw (I). 114· 115 DK Ima g('s: BUJ.n l of TnNn... uf tilt' Ar lll () lI r i ~.... (h) (("a) (t): By kind Ix·r mi....iull of tltt' Trm tct.... ()f thl' WJ.IIJt"l· ( :oll~'t'li ()ll (t>/ arIllOllr) (f) . 116 akg-i l1laii:es: (hi). 117 OK Im age s: Bo.m l () frnNc ~"" of thc Arlll nur il'" (d h) (cr). 118-11 9 T h(' Bri dgem an Ar t Lih rOlr )': "' i.lpb l' i P.ILln · M U..t·lllll. I.. t .lIIb llI. Turk ~·y (t).

120 Ala l11)' Im ag es: I mJ. g:~'\& St or i t'" (t r). T he Br id geman Art Lib rary: Tc pkapi 1'.II.ICt· M uwum . "'t.mbul. Turkey (tc) . OK I ma g es: Boar d o f Tr ustees of the Arlllourit·.. (br) . 12 1 T be Arl A rc h ive: Top k.rpi MU"l'UlIl h tJ.n bul l 1>.Ig:li O ni (hi). 124· 125 C o rh is: SlJ.p!a:WIl Collection (I). 126 T he Bri dgema n A rl Lib ra r y: Eh')"PUJIlNational Library, Cain) . Egypt I Grraudon (hi). il K I m a ge s: National M uwutu , New Delhi (br). 127 T he Hoard ofTr us tees of rhc A r m n u ri es : ((';1). 12H- 129 Tht• Bo ar d ofTruste es of th e Ar l1lo u ril"s: (t) (b) (~' J.)" DK Images : Bo ard of'Tru-rees of tilt' Armoune.... (t·.l/ m.u·c). 129 The Ho ard of T rusll"l"S of t hl" A r l11ollri('s: (br) (n h). D K Im aJ:es: l' ltt R iw f' MlI\~'ulll . U nin·,..ity of ( lxtl ml (t r). 130 ·13 I P;HII Se lf: Eng:li\h C ivil W;lr Snell' IY (t1). 132 C nrh is: Ik u lllJllll (t). 136- 137 a kg- im; lg('s : RJh.u li Il omi ng it'. 139 Corbis: Um!l'Twoud &: Undl'twtHld (b). 140-141 akgim a ge s: (h). 14 1 DK hnaJ!:e s: ImIx·riJ.1WJT Mu \t'um (r). 144-223 O K Il1Ia g('s: Mlh(-t' <1t' I'Empi·ri. S.I I() Il ·d~· - I'm\'t' IKc (t). 145 The Bo a rd o f T n lr.le('s of th e A rmourit' s: (hi). D K hU llge s: I'in R iw f' Mlht·UIlI. U ni\'t' r..ity nf (lxlilfd (Ix"). Na tio na l Archi,,'('s a n d R e co rd s Ad min ist ration. USA : (tt) . 146-147 M il ila r y &: H isto ri c al Im a ge Hank : (tI). 14K A rm)' Arl Colleclion, U.S . Army C ('n t n of Mili l a ry lI ist or y: H . CIl.Irb Mdt lTnlll (tI). 149 C orb it : W illi.1I1l A"B.Ill· (h) . P('t ('r N ('wa rk 's Mi lit ar y Pi c tu res: E C.Vo h n (tI). 153 T he A r l Arc h ive : (ca). A r l R esourc e, NY: (tr). G('lIy Im ag l"s: Bn:nd.lll SlIl ioll(Jw~ki I Slrill~a (hI). 154 T he Ur id gem an Art Lib ra ry: Count")' of tilt' Count"il. NJtiUll.l1 Army M m~·lllll. lmi d o n (h). OKI Sh.lnl ll SI'l'lln' r: 15(1-1 57 Th(' Hr id g('m lll1 Arl Libra r y: An (i,llkry o f Nt'\\' So lllh W;lb (tI). I SH T h(' Arl Archh'e : M lh t't' dl' l'Arlll C-l·. )lu i, I UJ. ~ i Oni (c). 159 T hl" Ur id gt'm an Arl Lib ra ry : M lI' l'C du l.o u\' fC.PJ.r i, (t1). DK Im age s: I )J.vid Edg:~' (Ir) (h r) (n). 160- 16 1 T he Urid gem an Ar t Libra ry : MU " l' ~' ( :OlHll·. (:ll.l lu illy. Fr.lIln · 1 ( ;ir;Hldon (h) , 1(,6 OK Im age s: I).wid Edg:l' (hi) (ht") (n a). 166- 167 Th(' Ar t A rc hh'e : M lI' l't' du Ch.il t·.llI d ~' VC""'I1 I1~.... I I )J.~i Un i (h :). 167 T hl" Br id geman Art Li brary : M m l'c dc I'Arllll·c. Bn m d \ 1 1'J.u it·k l OTl'tt c (hr). 16K. 169 T h e Britlg em an Art Libr;lry : N.ll i(lI1.11 (;.l ll~·ry 1)IV irlt )ria. M ~·lb( I U T1 lt' . Am lr'lli.l. 170-1 7 1 11K/ Sh.ln lll S P~' IKt' r : (tI) . 172 G etty Im ag es: T illll' &: Lil...• Pictun'\ (tr). 173 M ar y E\f311'!i Pi c tu re Lih ra ry: (h). 174 akt=:-i ll1ages : 01). O K Im a ges: Rupl G rccll J .1d;;~· c~ MU\l' IlIll. Windll·..lt·r (n). 180· UU N aliona l M ar it im e MUSl"Ultl, Lo n don: Ikn i\ J) i ()~h t () ll (t1). 182 T he Bridf.:;l· m an Art Lib ra r y: St.l p l~· t o ll ColIl·t"lioll. U K (tI). IR2-I K3

Na tional Ma ritime Mnseuru , Lo ndon: G reenwich Ilo"l' il.l1 Collection (be). 186 Ala my l m a gcs: ( ;.Iry Cun i~ (br): Ri dl.ml Naudc (d); Tr.l t:II~.lr :zooS (be). ({o yOlI Nav;11 M1I\ e1lm , Po rr smourh : (crb). 187 A la rny Im ag es: Nigel Reed (br). IHK ({u) 'a l N av a l M us e um, Po rt sm ou t h: (d). IH9 R oyal Naval MU S<' III11 , Por tsm o u t h : (d J.). 190191 Gett y Image s: Sirin g:~'r I I fu lto n Ardll w (rl) . 192 Li brary Of C o n g re ss, Was hi ll~to n, D.C . : (h) (If). 194 il K Ima ge s: COlltc·dl·r.ltt· M l·lllur i.11 I t.111. N ew l ) rklm (hI! except tri cnon 1ll. lIdll" ). National A rc hives a n d Re cords Adminisrrarion , USA : (tI). Robert Sz aho. 195 Librar }' Of C o n g re ss, Was hi ngton , D. C . : (h). Ro bert Szaho : (tl). 199 ilK Im a ges: ( ;~·tty\hll rg: N ;HiOll.l1 M ilit.lr)' !'.Irk. PA (n.I/ Kl·tdHlIll Il.Ind ~ n·Il .Hk·) . 200 T he Br id g('m;1IIA r l Lib rary : Priv.llt· Colknioll (h) . 20 2- 2lJ3 Natio na l Archh'('s and R ('c o rd s Administration , U S A . 204-20 5 C o rbi s: An ~k ,.. R YIll.Ill. 205 OK Im ag es: I' itt Itiwr.. Mll ..~· U Ill. U lliWf ..ity o( t htlml (b). 206 DK Im a g(' ~ : Pm It in ·r.. MIlWlllll . U n iwf..ity o( th illtd (LI). P lu ll u N l' w Z e iltand : ( ;l'ulr M.N lll (u). 207 OK Im ag es: I'lt( Iti vn... MU'o(.·ulll . Ulli\'t'r \it y of (hllml (hi). PhOIONewZ('aland : (r). 20H-209 The Bridgeman Art Ulna r) ': Midl.ld (;r.lh.1111-Stl'w.ln 01). 2 1lJ-2 11 T he Ko bal C o llec l io n . 2 11 T Ill' Bo ard ofTrus l('es of th t' Ar mou r ies: (h r). ilK h ll ,lg('S: Powdl -( : (lll llll M t "'~· II Ill . Kt·!lt (brl ..hidd). 212 The Bo ard ofTrustel" s of Ihe Armouries : (bl). C urb is: Undaw(lod &. Untla\\'()(llI (t). 2 13 Alalll)' I m a ges: Thc Pu nt Cullcl'lur 01). T h(' Bridge man A rl Libra ry: SI.lpkl<J1l Cnll~·ftiull . U K (Ir). 2 14 T he Br hl gt'm;lIt A r t Librar y: I' r i \',l t ~· ( :ul k'nio n I I h'in i Sch rwdwli (tI). D K IlII ag ('s: ('owl'll-C o tto n MU"t'ulII. K~·llt (tr) (a/ d uh). 214-2 15 T h e lIoard ofTrmt e('s of Ihe Arlllouries : (n )" ilK Im ag es: I'owl'll-C u u o n I\hN'UIl1. K ~'1l1 (hr) . 2 15 The II r id g ('ma n Art Librar)': I lc llli Sdllwdldi. DK Imag es: I'mw ll-C o tto ll Mll"l'lllll. Kt·llt (II). 2 1(1-2 17 C orh is: !l ri.1lIA .Vi b ll d~·r. 2 17 ilK Im ag es: I' ut R ivl'n Mus~·ull1. Ulliwr~il Y (If (h tlml (h rl. 2 18 Ala m)' Im ag es: Vi\ll.1l Art~ l ihtJ ry (l u lillo n) (hi). ilK Imag ('s: AllI~'r i f;ll11\ h"'~'lllll u(NJ.llIrJI IIi \w ry (1). 2 19 C o rh i..: (h). DK lina ge ..: AllIl·ri ~·J.1l I\tU"l'UlIl of N ;uut.ll ll i..l<Jry (n). 22t1· 22 1 OK ItI100gt'S: AlIIl'Tkall f\..t u~~· U l1l of Nal ur al 11i..lOry (hr) (n h). 22 1 D K h ll ;I~(, S : AlIl ~·ricJ.n f\tu..l·Ulll of Natural I h..cnry (l'l): Bril i..h MU"CUTU I MU"t'ulll uf M.1ukind (n): I' itt Riwf' Mu wllm. Uni w f'it y o f (hllmt (kn in"'i .lIll! ..Iw.lth\). 222 DK Ima g es: Bn ,lrd nfTrmll't'" of till' A r lllour i~'" (d). G(' lI y IlII ag es: M I' l I Stri rlg:t'r I Il uiton An 'h i\'(' (h). 223 T ill' Brid gelll an Arc Lib ra r)' :

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I' r i\',Ht' C ollect ion. Peter Nl'W .lrk\ Allll'ri l ,lIl I' i ll urt' ~ (br). DK Im ag es: Allll'tic.1l1 t\ 1tI\l'Ulll of Nnur.il 11i' lm )' (11) (tr) ; Britj,h MU\ t'UllI I Mucc um of Mank ind (1'01). 225 DK htl i1lo":("s : Collecnou UI Jt·.lIl- I'il,ttl' Vl'rIll'Y (cl/ canrccn) . 2U, DK / Sh.m lll SPl' IKl' r: (f). 227 C o rbis: Bcnnun n (It). 22N- 229 Alarny Ima~l"'i : Poppcrforo. 23 0 C o r b is: H ulto n Deut -ch Collccnon (II). 2.U Ahlin)' Im ag es: Popp erforo (b). 234 DK Im ag es: ltoard o f' Trn-n-c of ti ll' Anuo unc s (clh). 23 4-235 DK IlI1 a~("s : Imp l'ri.11\\'.ar Muwu m (1'01) (n/htltll\). 235 DK huagc s: Collccnou Oljl'.lll- I'll·rrl"Vt'rnl'Y (be) . 236 DK 1t1IlI~l"i: Uo.m! u t' "t1hll'l" 0 1 th e Armo uric-, (h/h.•yo m·I): Cnlll'l' IHIIl o(k.m- l'l l'rrl·Vl·f!Il'Y (n,11 110 .1 ~ rt· n.H k·); Imperi.,1W lr MUWlllll (CIltlllll, bo mb). 237 UK I l1IiI ~"' !i : Cnll"'l'lillll 0t.k .lII- I' u' rR·Vt·TIIt·y (I) (c) (CJ). 23M-239 e m h io;: Ik u lIl,llln . 239 UK hn aJ!:t>s: lln.Jrd u flhNt't" (If IIw Arlll o ur it'" (h) . 240 C o r h is: I l ulw lI- 1)c uN"h {:oll t'fli llll (h). DK Im ;IJ!;{"s: {:nUt'n illll " f jt'.m - I'it·rrt· Verlll'y ([1") , 24 t C urh is: 111,.' ((11 1.11111 (hr). 24 4 C o r h is: Ik ll lll.11ll1 (d ). OK h WIJ!;t' s: Cll llt'l"lIOIl o f jt'.IllPIt'rr e Vl'TIIey (n h). Pl't t>r Gumhl'ir : B.I)w llw.lld Trl' nd l (hi) (h r). 245 Pl't l'r Gom ht"ir : ItI Yl·TII w.ald'It l'lIl"h (Ii) (he) (hi) (h t) (f ) (If) (tl). 246 C u r h i'i: I l u1ln n - 1k ut,""h COUt·.UUIl (hi), OK h n a ~ l' s : Colk·rt io ll Ofjl'.IllPil'm ' Yt'TII1'y (d l) (n) , 24 7 C urh is: Ik ll lll.llill (n .I)"UK hl1 aJ!;l's: { :oUt'I'l iull o f,k .IIl- I'll·rrt· Vl·t!ll' Y (Ir) (hI') (d): Mmi, tr y 111' 1)l'ft·nu .· 1'.!ttl·T11 R oolll. Nllllin~h.llIl (hi). 24MC o r b is: Iknlll.lllll (hi). DK Im a):l's: C t)lIt't'll\l ll u f je.an - I'u' rn.'Yt·r1wy (Ir) (h r) (d) (n h) : fi n·po \\w.The R oy.11 Artll kry MUWlIlIl. Il op l Arti lk'r y Il i' lUrif ;\1 Tr u'[ (d.I). 24 1} C n r h io; : Il u1l0 1l- 1h'u N "h ( :lllll'n iOlI (n .l) (lh r/ b,IY(Jlll'I). OK Im aJ!:l's: Colll'l"tion ofjt· .IIl- PIt·rrt, Vt'r m·y (cl.1) (d h) (n h); h n'p owt'r,Tlw R oy.11 Art illl' ry M lh t'Ulll, R opl Artill t'r y f h , tur k al Ttl ht (h rl c.n h illl"). 25 0-25 1 Getty Itna J!;l' s: S trlll~I' r I I fultoll Ardliw , 252 C o r h is: ErE (h). 253 Tlu' Br hl J!;,,' m lUl Arl Lihrllr)': BihliotlH:'lJUl' N.llioll.llt" 1'.lri, I Ardli w .. ( :h .lTIIll'1 (d h). H.o h e rl Hunt Librar y : (tc) . 25 4- 255 GI'II )' 111I "~l' s : Auhur l :ulIwr I Str illgl'r I I l ullu n Ardllw . 25h Gell)' Il1I il ~"' o;: Fo x I' ho tm I S t r ill~l'r (t); H .ll h W Ild I S IrlIl~I' r (hi). 25 7 GI' II)' 1 11I 00 ~l' s : Fox Pho w , I S t r i l l~l' r (b)" 25 MG I'II )' hn a):t:'s : ILlnY Sh l"plll'rd I Slr ill ~I'r I I Iu1Io n Ardliw (\1). 259 C u r h i",: f IU1lo llwi ku t\dl {:tJllt·l"tioll (11). 2£..1 C tJr h is: Iktt lll,mll (h). 26 5 Alall1 )" Il11aJ!;e..: P"ppl' rtl )lU (hi). 26()-267 DK / Sll.In lll Spt..· lll1·r, 26 M(i 1'1I)' Irn il ~t' '' : Hu1Iu n Arl hiw (hi). 269 C u r b i..: Th \" I hlll tn B,lhl'rlll.llll ' CUlll'l"IlO lI (h). 272 OK / Sh.101Il S ~ll' Ill"I' r : (1111) (hr) . 27 ,\ OK / Sh.ln lll Spl' llfl' r: (bf ). 274 il K h l1ll ~""i : Impl'ri,11Wn J\l m l'Ulll (hi). (;1.'11)' 11I1i1~t>s : Il o r.Kl' Abr .ah.allh I Strill ~l"r I f l uh ull Ardliw (n) . 275 UK Il11 a ~e s: Mi (l l.Id Ih lllt'r ( :ollt'l"ti()fl (t') (d h) (r). 276-277 C o r h i..: Il ultn nI k lll'l·h Colk·l"Iio li. 27M Gl'tI )· 11I1lI):es: h .lI1kSdwr\ dld I S t r i ll~I'r I T illlt' &: Lili.' I' id llrl" (hI). Wikipl' di a , TIll" Fr et'

E nc yclo p ed ia: (rl ). 27 1} Gett y IlI1 a ~ e s : Frank Sdll'r\I' hl'1 I Smugc r I Tilllt' &: Lili.· I' Ktllrl'" (tI). 2H2 A lilll1)' Il11a):e",: N il' Hamilto n (Ih l). Gett y 111I" ~l' s : M.lr~.I rt."1 Bourk eWhItt' I Strin ger I T illlt' &. l ili,: 1'll"IUrt·\ (d), 2M3 Ala l11)r Imil~l' s : Nic 11.1I11ihull (tI). G I'CI )' Im ag es: Kt'y' to lll" I S l r i n~t' r I H ulto n Arrhivt" (c), 2M4 EAA : (hi) (bt') (e1) . Hri;1I1 Lo ck en {w ww... Ir- an d - spa ce . l'mn) : (tr). 2M5 UK Il1IiI ~(" s : Bo ,ltd o fl h Nt't'\ o f tilt' Announce (d .I). EA A: (cr ) (br). 2M 6~ 2 H 7 G etty I l1Iil ~t> S : PN A Itul .a I S lri ll~t'r I Hulton Archive. 2MM Wikipl'di a , Tbc Free Encyclo ped ia : .1Iinn.11 Ardli vt"" .alld Itt"f ord ..Adminictr.nion (cb): U SAI: (n) (hi). 2HtJ C o r h i..: 1111 110 11 -1kmsdl ( :o lll'C1ion (h r). 2911- 29 1 T hl' IttHl"hI G r'lIll Ar chiw . 29 1 OK IlI1a):l's: Un.ltd Ilflrmll't'.. u f tlll" Arlll ouri t".. (h r). 2tJ2 C o d )' IlI1 it ~t' s: (d). ilK hn a ~cs : h nrt'r iJI W.ar MU\t'Ulll (n J). Il11 p "' r ial \\'ar MII\I'UI1I: (hi). 293 DK Inlll~l's : (m l' t' ri,11W"lr MU\t'ulII (th l) (hi); Mini 'lry 111' 1kli.·nu · 1'.lttl'rll R oo m , NO ll i ll~ h .1ll1 (h): R oy.11 (;rt't'lI J.I,"h ·I' MU' ""Um. Windll",t t'r (tr ). T hl' Koh lll C o lIl'c l io n : Ct' ntr.ll ( Uli n ' (lfi llftmu.atiull (11,.'). 294 UK I l1Iil ~t' S : Impt:ri.al W,lr Mll ' '''UIIl (1,.'). 29 4- 295 OK IlI1a ~l's: Imrt"riJI W.ar )\IU, t'\l1II (h). 295 OK ImaF:l' s: Thl' I.ltt· C l l.l rll'~ Fr.I,,"'r -Smi th (t d li~ l lIs) (tr); f I. Kl·illl Mdwll C(llkcliun (n .l) (cr / lw]( pi,tul)"2% ilK h n a):l' s: I I. Kl·ith MdlOIl Colll'n ion (d / pipl' pi, tol): Illlpl'r iJI War Mlhl'UIlI (r) (br ) (lh r). IlUll cri al W"r Musl'um : (d l Pl'lll"il kni fl"). 296·297 DK 111I"~l's : RAr foo hllt'ulIl, l h "lldn n (c). 297 ilK Il11a):e'l : Illlp t·ri .11W.ar '''' ' u ~l" U1 n (r). 29M C o r b is: Bt·lIl1l.11l1l . 311l! (lell)' I lII il ~l' S : Tilllt' &. Lili.' I' i et ur~' ~ I Sirill /-:l'r (h) . 30 t G t'U )' I lH il ~t· ..: 'fi liI\' &: I.ili.· I'in un" I Str ingl'r (tl'); US Arm )' Air Furce I Slrill ~t'r I Tilll\' &. Lili.' l' iI'lu rt'" (hr)"30 4- 305 UK 111101 J!;I'S: Bu.anJ ()fi 'rm lt't'" Of lhl' Arlll o uri l"~ (b). 3 111 DK Im a ~e ..: 1~( I J rd ofltlh tl"t'" (If till" Arll ltHlrit"" (h r). G t>II)' hU il~I''' : hl'dl' ri~' J. Bm wll I An' (t'). 3 11 U,S, A r m )': PH : Br.mdo ll It . Ainl (11,.'). 3 12· 3 13 C n r h is: Al.!ill Ntl~\ll''' ' 3 13 ilK Im il):t's: Bo.lrd ofltIMt't'\ of til\' Arlll uurit'" (hr ); I k m\ I..,)" u" I'.ari, (l:). 3 14 C o r b is: It n hh it' Coupt.·r (It'); Plt"rr t' Y.nuht'y (rr). OK I lII a ~,,' s : l"kurl"IUIIt <':Ollllll.illdaW.M , ThornltJll MilE RIl RNIt (l:) " 3 15 ak F:-ill1a~ es : ull' lt'ill bill! (h) . DK Illl a ~ e s: Lk lltl'Il,ln[ ( :U11 1111.l11l!I"r W.M ,T hurllton M BE Il l> RN R (tl) . 3 18-3 19 (ll' tt )' 1111" J!;c s: Thrt't· 1.ioll\ I Slrin ~l'r I 1IIIltull AK hiw. 3 19 ilK Il11a~ es: Bn.Jnl ofTrmtt't'.. uf till' Arlll uurit'" (h); R uyal M .lrlllt'" MU' "·UIll. l)orNllllllth (c). 3 2l! OK 1 11 1i1 ~t> s : Bond l,fTru ..tl"t'" o f till' Arlllllurit'S (b). (;l'lIy 1t 11a ~es : P.1lI1 Sdl\lul"r I Str ill ~l' r I Tilll\' &. Lili.· I' id url'\ (t). 321 C n r h is: Ikttll l.lllll (h). 322 C o r h is: Ik lllll,lIln (hi) , 323 C o r h is: Bl·ttm .11l1l (r). DK Ill1aJ!:es: Amt rt'w L. C hl·nI.at·k (bl). 32 M-329 G ell)' Il11a~l' s : 1'.1lI1 SI,hutZt'r I Str i n ~t'r I T illw &. Jill' Pinurt'" 33 11- 33 1 GI'II)' hml~e,, : AF I~ 33 2 (11.'11 )' h 11l1):l' o; : Thn 'l' I.io ll\ I Strill gt'r I I lulto ll An "hin ' (h) . 33M C nrh is: AI.lin I k Jl".1Il I S y ~m ;1 (h) .

U K IlH il~I''' : Bo.mf nflh...tl·l'" of till' Ar mour il', (cr). 339 C o rb is: j ean-Loui e AtLIIl I SY ~ ll .1 (C.I): Ik tu n.lIl1l (be). ilK l m ag es: Uo .lrd (lf rrU' lt'l~ of till' Arm uuril"' (tr). 3 4U-34 1 ~tilil ar )" Pi cture Library, 3 4 1 UK 111I 3J,::t"'I: Ilu.anl o fl h l'tt'''-S of th e Anuour ic (h r); Roval S i~Il J ls Mu seum. BI.ulllttlrlt Camp. l Jorwt (c) (1';1). 342 DK I nt .. gcs : hupcri.t l W.lr M U\\'I1111 (I,.) M ilita r-y Pi c ture Lihrllf )': ('I'[I' r Itu\\dl (tI) (rr) . 34 3 C o d )' Im a);e..: (tI). DK 1 11I1I ~c s : Veh icle supplied by S[t'W Wri ~l lI , C h,II)UIII, Kt"1II (cr). 3 44-3 45 DK I m a ~e s : Illlrt'riJI \Var MU"CUlll (d u lhing). 3 45 l>K 1r1ll1J,::I'S: Hoard ollrLl\tt't'" of th e Armouncs (trl -uluu.rc biuc-gun . ,III11 IlUllitit)II' .md ~ rl· l l.1l lt·) . 34(1 C o d )' h l HIJ!;I'S: (hi). 347 C o r b i",: Lt.· i f S k o\l~ti JT\ (h) . 3 4MC u r h is: T im ·I:lddl"r. 35 11-351 C orh i..: 1.yl1'>t')" Add .lrin

Viki n); Shi p M lIn ' u l1I, D en m ark ( Y i k i ll ~ I O ll ~...hip to ur),

R ikki T o rn-o jolunsen Hattie o f fb stil1J,::s t>\,'('111 ( or mm And Saxon rt."-"·Il.aI'Ull,,·m), Thank s ro all th l" ~ nm r\ featur ed in rlu- , honk including: AI.IIl Larsen u( T IlI' T roop J-hg O ik Aru.urd Lefebre F ra n k ()- F la l l1 i5(' ho,,- Kon t i ll~l' n t

Trigtav D omsb orgcl a g Igo r Gort.'WiC1

Shogun Fi~ht Sc hool (S.llllllr,li rl"- I·n,IClllll·nt). I km W;lyl.lIld , M .lry (; t"nt!l', .llld Rohl'n jt)hll'tlll

( Ell~l i\ h {~ t'orgt'

C i\ "il War So d el)' l1lu,k t."tn 'r kit), Uowyt'r , ( :hri\li JJl 'n ,Wt'"

Q Ul'l' n's Ril n):l'rs (U S W;tr nrJmlt'pt'lld l"IKl' ( ~ ll t't' Il 's I t ; l l l ~t" r, kit , Alll l'r ic;1 1l ri llt..'lll.l11 kit). M idl.ld Bllllt' riid d. C hri .. Smith

Durlin g Kind,,·rs.le )· wo u ld like 10 th'lI1k I he fullowing "'v"' l1ls, re ~"' I101ct I1 1Cl1t orga niza t io ns, a n d indi vidu al s fi l r th l' m od ('lIing n n d o;u P ll ly of kit . as WI.' ll a!i I hci r allvice a n d inforl l1alion :

471h R egiment of Fo ol (Ih'dnu" o f AIlIt'f ican R t·...t)!ut io ll.lry W;lr rt'- t'IlJ l"tllwnl ), lI.ml P.m im u ll. Ni ~d I l.lOt ln l'

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I er C h a ~ \ l' u n C h eval d l' la LiJ!:l1e,21' C Ol11p aJ,::l1ie Allili ,ltt'd tu Ihl' N.lroll'o nil' A\..()('iJt io n nf( ~ rt'A [ Ilr juiu (N .apo lt·tm ic cl"'AlrylllJ n lil), j ohn Norr i,

Kl'lmiinh FI'o;tivl,1 of J-Ih IOr )" "Vt' nt, Ke llllllrsh fl ail . EUJ!;lio;h Hl' rila~l'

T hl' Po lish LiJ!;ht lI o n t> l )i ~pl il )" l (> am N;IP(lll'tm ir I"avalry rt·-t' ll.lftIlWllt). (;('tlrgt' Luhtlrll, ki

Milililr)' Od psl')' h isl o r )' e\'I'III, O t>lIing , Kel1l (: Jr )" How.n d

Po lis h Vislula ugion (N.al'0 lt"'tlllic JrlllJt"'\ re-t"IUCUl1t"nt)

ll alil e o f Ha slil1~s ("'.....111. E IlJ,::lis h flu illl~l' (N u r m.1Il ,1Ill! S,IXUIl rt'-I' Il,KtllIl'lll)

33 rd Re-l'n acll11el1l (Rt· doJ.lIs of NJ po lt"ol1ir lOU n' ~ t·Il.lCllllt·nt ) , K,ltl' M .KbrlJlll"

Oq~lIni z"lion s

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,n u l p r iva l l'

c o ll ccl o r s: G rl'l' k ftopli le Soci l' l) ' (Allcu' nt ( ;rn·k rt'- t"ll.IClmt"nt). (; t'llrgl' e t'n r~ i t l\l w\\'w,4 hop lites "co m (Andl'nt ( ;rt·t·k kit ). El.lim· .md Antl y Cmppl'r E r m int" SUCl't G uard (R UIII.1Il rt."-t·Il.KIIlIt..'Ilt. kil), ( :Ilri .. H .aillt" "l )"lIe & Wear Museu m ",. Di sco\"l'r) " M Uo;I' UII1 New("lIstll' n p on 1 y lll' (R (II11 .1Il PtJrl).A ll' X Cn)(l111 Vikil1~ " !

(o f M itld ll' E I1J!:lillHI ) kil ,ul' ~. lit'd hy: I ).a"-'1II.wr 1l .lt·lllull d.....m 11.11Ii.b tl B ,hl ~t' rht,.lr\t I f n l( h ~.tr S i~lI nh\( Hl R .lli.·n.Th l' M l·rki 'lIl.lth ir Bi;lwrkr inn frblhr

R N Sailor 11101.1 ...1. R t,)·.alArn Uluri l"': Silu rt

WWII RA F fighl e r pil ot kil I'ri v.ate co llecto r. Ri ch ard Simms 2n d G ua rds Rifle D ivi sion (W W II Sovit'l rank crew man kit ), Adria n Steve nson

Soviet T-34 tan k Private collecto r: Neil C ulham

EI1J!;lish I0I1J!;howl11an model, R I')'.)IATIlltIlUit"': Andrew 1 ~.II Il I I{ JrIh

En ~l ish

All tltlw r IllIJ ~"" I )orllll~ Ki ll ~k" "I t.''Y Ftlr Ii.ml wr illli mn.ltion \1'1,.': www.lIkin laJ!;I. S.Cml1

51e . Ko m pagn ic, In fant er !c R e g b ucnt ur. 2101 ' vo n Goebe u' (W W I Gc nn.m Stor uurooper kit), j oh n PI'AKl"

( ;rt." i~

UMS t'7C1ory (Sh ip of th l" lim' tour) I'l'tt'r (;oodwin . Kl'l"pl'r ;lnd l.ur;lIo r SOllt h l' r n Skirl11ir.h Associ at ion (AItll"rir ,)1I Civil \I,'dr n ·-l"Il.al' Ulll"11I - U nio n kit. Con fedl' rAIl" kll). It oy I l.aint.... AIll!rl"w R m t' .1Ild Srl'\'(' Boul toll Sou l h Sialltmh hi rl' R l'g ill1t'nl M USl'lII11, W hill i n~to n Barrac k s. Lkhfic ld , St am (W W I alld WWI I u hjt'c ls). Erik II1.Jkd y .and W illy TUTlwr

Y ik i ll ~

lJirll1in~halU Pills (W W I Brirish InfJllIrym .1Il kit ). R ll'h .mf Slw.ml. Etlwill H l"ld, St·.1Il h ';uhl'r \l tJlll" ;lIld M,lknlll Conk

W"'II 8 ·17 b o mber c rew k it Pri vate colle ctor s.Tim Parker. R icha rd Simn w Finl AlliN I Airhor ne AS!iodah U1 (W W II US P;lr;lIn)()p"'r kit ). Lt't' Bowdl'n ;lond Nl'i l (;~Uoway I'ri v,ltt, t.·tlll\"t'lor:T im P.arkt"r Flame Torbay C os t u m i...n lionel 1ll gby (I' ru\\ i.m sold ia kit . (; 1"rm.lIl U- ho.lt crew kit , h l"lll'h Fo n' i ~n L l"~ i o l\ n J i rl" kit ) U S M ar im' k it l' riv;ltl' l'u lll'n or :T im I'.arkl"r Vil'tnilm Rolli nJ,:: Th under (Yit·t Cong "-'Ul"rr ilb kil ). ~r\l.art B,,·t·nt.·y

T hil n ks also fo r th e auis t" ncl' fro m lIu' fo llowing g ro llll!l a n d in d i\ 'idu als 1101 f("alu re d d Ut> t o Ihl' li miled con fi n es o f Ihe book : Tht> G a r r iso n Kt·ilh Br i~...to,k Ran~er R I'~t> I1" cll11cl1l ().avid Prout 1)51h R c):ilUenl ( RO)'~ I (;n'l"1l jJ l'k\"IS) N t' ll C o llins. Atu lrt'w IC\)'fi l'ld . 1.1IlWi lkilNm . ;lIld R o b C r.IY A nJ!;le!ll')' H u n a n lall WJlkl"r

DK wou ld ..Iso like to thank tlu.· fo llowi ng fo r their c o n t r ih u l io n s t o th is b o o k : T ill' R oyal Arlll our it"s in Ll"t' d, .lIId I'h illip Ahhott for hi\ hdp Alld .Idvil,t"; Ri ch.mf H olmt... for Jd vif C ~bo LU 1rt"lIch l"S:john Frt'l"1l1.111 for thc r rt"\cll tJti ol1 ph ol o t..hoot; 1ll-lIlli\ B.KOIl t(lr a....i,t allcc 0 11 l(lC.ltioll pholushouts; S[t"\'C S('t!ord Phillip I'Jr kn , Jlld U)m B rod~'r for l·ditor i.d work ;'!ed KilN'y .ml1 Tl"rr y Jt'.I\'OIlSfor d l'\ i ~ll work ; Shu M .ld.lIIi .md Sarah {)i l,..t.ld for dl,..i ~1l \lIrport ; I'h il ( ;amhl t" for lart it.·!> illu..tutions ; It ob StrJI,llJ n t(lr I)T P ..up port; SJrah Slllilhi"" ft)r r inllrt' r('SC'~ rt'h ; M yrj ,un M t"gh Olrhi ftlr pinur(' reS('J.n'h \lIpp on . b l.·l)· ct«'n h.r.11Ol"\"1I rII,l
Oil wr int"11 n"n lir,lUo ll to th...l' uhh, lll"r' "