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T H O M A S W. P O G G E

Realizing

Rawls

C o r n e l l University P r e s s Ithaca and London

Copyright © 1989 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief q u o t a t i o n s in a review, this book, o r parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n in writing from t h e publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, N e w York 14850. First published 1989 by Cornell University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pogge, T h o m a s Winfried Menko. Realizing Rawls / T h o m a s W. Pogge. p. c m . Bibliography: p Includes index. ISBN 0-8014-2124-1 talk, paper). — ISBN 0-8014-9685-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Rawls, John, 1 9 2 1 - Theory of justice. 2. Justice. I. Title. JC578.R383P64 1989 320'.o'l'l—dc20 89-42879 Printed in the United States of America 0 0

The paper u s e d in this publication m e e t s t h e m i n i m u m r e q u i r e m e n t s of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

FOR JOHN RAWLS, w h o m a d e it p o s s i b l e and necessary

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction

ix xi 1

Part One: Defending the Main Ideas 1. N o z i c k a n d t h e F o c u s o n t h e B a s i c S t r u c t u r e §1

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice

§2

T h e Relevance of Patterns

§3

T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of Justice

§4

Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative

28

Natural E n d o w m e n t s

36

48

2 . S a n d e l a n d t h e C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n §5

15

15

63

63

§6

Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert

§7

Desert

§8

T h e " D e o n t o l o g i c a l " Self

§9

Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n

73

81 86 94

Part T w o : D e v e l o p i n g Rawls's Criterion of Justice 3. T h e First P r i n c i p l e of Justice §10

The General Parameters

§11

T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e

109

109 122

Contents

viii §12

T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties

§13

T h e Political P r o c e s s

134

148

4. T h e S e c o n d P r i n c i p l e o f J u s t i c e §14

Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle

§15

Educational and Employment Opportunities

161

§16

Medical Opportunities

§17

The Difference Principle

173

181 196

Part T h r e e : Globalizing t h e Ravvlsian C o n c e p t i o n of Justice 211

5. F r o m M o d u s Vivendi to V a l u e O v e r l a p §18

T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of J u s t i c e

211

§19

International Relations as a M o d u s Vivendi

§20

A Value-Based World Order

218

227

6. A C r i t e r i o n of G l o b a l J u s t i c e §21

T h e T r a d i t i o n a l L a w of N a t i o n s

§22

T h e Internal A r g u m e n t

246

§23

T h e External A r g u m e n t

259

§24

Conclusion

240 240

273

Selected Bibliography Index

281 285

Acknowledgments

H o w e v e r critical a n d revisionist, this b o o k is i n s p i r e d b y a d e e p a d m i r a t i o n for J o h n Rawls's t h e o r y of justice, in w h i c h I s e e , d e s p i t e its s h o r t c o m i n g s , a b a s i c framework of c o m p e l l i n g s c o p e a n d m o r a l b e a u t y . My f o r e m o s t a i m w a s t o e x p r e s s t h i s vision. My w o r k in political p h i l o s o p h y h a s greatly benefited over t h e y e a r s from t h e critical a t t e n t i o n it received from Rawls a n d later from S i d n e y M o r g e n b e s s e r , C h a r l e s L a r m o r e , a n d B r u c e A c k e r m a n . T h a t n o n e of t h e m is p a r t i c u l a r l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o m y a p p r o a c h a n d c o n c l u s i o n s h a s m a d e o u r d i s c u s s i o n s all t h e m o r e v a l u a b l e t o m e . A c k e r m a n b e a r s a n a d d i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : W h e n I h a d a b a n d o n e d p l a n s for t h i s book, h e i n s i s t e d , a m i c a b l y b u t very firmly, t h a t it b e w r i t t e n . He cheerfully a d d e d t h a t it w o u l d n ' t b e great, b u t it w o u l d still b e a g o o d b o o k . T h e a c t u a l w r i t i n g w a s d o n e in t h e a d v e n t u r o u s fluvial e n v i r o n m e n t of Wolfson College, O x f o r d — a p l a c e of w o n d e r f u l p e o p l e a n d i d e a s t h a t proved most inspiring a n d hospitable. Upon m y return, I received e x t e n s i v e c o m m e n t s o n t h e e n t i r e t y p e s c r i p t from C h a r l e s L a r m o r e , A n d r e a s Follesdal, B r u c e A c k e r m a n , a n d Ling T o n g . H e n r y R i c h a r d s o n a n d O s c a r S c h a c h t e r p r o v i d e d a d d i t i o n a l feedback o n C h a p t e r s 2 a n d 5 respectively. T h e s e b e n e v o l e n t critics h a v e t a u g h t m e m u c h a n d , I h o p e , e n a b l e d m e t o give c l e a r e r e x p r e s s i o n t o m y t h o u g h t s . T h o m a s W. Pogge New York, New York

ix

Abbreviations

Works by J o h n Rawls are abbreviated as follows: BLP

BSS DPOC FG IMT IOC JF JFFM JR KCMT ODPE PFE

PRIG RAM

" T h e B a s i c L i b e r t i e s a n d T h e i r P r i o r i t y , " i n S. M . M c M u r r i n , e d . , The Tanner Lectures on Human Value, 3 (Salt L a k e C i t y : U n i v e r s i t y o f U t a h Press, 1982). " T h e B a s i c S t r u c t u r e a s S u b j e c t , " i n A. I. G o l d m a n a n d J. K i m , e d s . , Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978). " T h e D o m a i n o f t h e P o l i t i c a l a n d O v e r l a p p i n g C o n s e n s u s , " i n New York University Law Review 6 4 ( J u n e 1 9 8 9 ) . " F a i r n e s s t o G o o d n e s s , " Philosophical Review 8 4 (1975), 5 3 6 - 5 4 . " T h e I n d e p e n d e n c e o f M o r a l T h e o r y , " Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 4 8 ( N o v e m b e r 1975), 5 - 2 2 . " T h e I d e a o f a n O v e r l a p p i n g C o n s e n s u s , " Orford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (Spring 1987), 1 - 2 5 . " J u s t i c e a s F a i r n e s s , " Philosophical Review 6 7 (April 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 6 4 - 9 4 . "Justice a s Fairness: Political n o t Metaphysical,"P/iz7osop/7yandP(jfo/f'c Affairs 1 4 ( S u m m e r 1 9 8 5 ) , 2 2 3 - 5 1 . " J u s t i c e a s R e c i p r o c i t y , " i n S. G o r o w i t z , e d . , Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill, with Critical Essays ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). " K a n t i a n C o n s t r u c t i v i s m i n M o r a l T h e o r y , " Journal of Philosophy 77 ( S e p t e m b e r 1980), 5 1 5 - 7 2 . " O u t l i n e o f a D e c i s i o n P r o c e d u r e f o r E t h i c s , " Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 1 7 7 - 9 7 . " P r e f a c e f o r t h e F r e n c h E d i t i o n " o f TJ, E n g l i s h t y p e s c r i p t ( A u g u s t 1 9 8 6 ) , p p . 1 - 6 . F r e n c h v e r s i o n i n Theorie de la justice, trans. Catherine A u d a r d (Paris: Seuil, 1987). " T h e P r i o r i t y o f R i g h t a n d I d e a s o f t h e G o o d , " Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 7 (Fall 1 9 8 8 ) , 2 5 1 - 7 6 . " R e p l y t o A l e x a n d e r a n d M u s g r a v e , " Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 ( N o v e m b e r 1974), 6 3 3 - 5 5 .

xi

xii

Abbreviations

RMC

" S o m e R e a s o n s for t h e M a x i m i n C r i t e r i o n , " American view 6 4 ( M a y 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 4 1 - 4 6 .

SUPG

"Social U n i t y a n d P r i m a r y G o o d s , " in A. K. S e n a n d B. W i l l i a m s , e d s . , Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). " T w o C o n c e p t s o f R u l e s , " i n S. G o r o w i t z , e d . , Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill, with Critical Essays ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1 9 7 1 ) .

TCR TG

TJ WOS

Economic

Re

Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, t r a n s . H e r m a n n Vetter (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1 9 7 5 ) . All t r a n s l a t i o n s o f TJ w e r e p r e p a r e d f r o m a r e v i s e d E n g l i s h t e x t c o m p l e t e d in M a r c h o f 1 9 7 5 (cf. P F E 1 ) . H a v i n g c h e c k e d all p a s s a g e s c i t e d f r o m TJ a g a i n s t t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n T G , I n o t e a n y relevant d i s c r e p a n c i e s . A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). "A W e l l - O r d e r e d S o c i e t y , " i n P. L a s l e t t a n d J. F i s h k i n , e d s . , Philosophy, Politics, and Society, 5th s e r i e s ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), first p u b l i s h e d a s "A K a n t i a n C o n c e p t i o n o f E q u a l i t y , " Cam bridge Review ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 5 ) , 9 4 - 9 9 .

REALIZING

RAWLS

Introduction

T h i s b o o k is b o t h a d e f e n s e a n d a c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e of t h e w o r k of J o h n Rawls. T h e s e t w o a s p e c t s p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r . T h e c o n s t r u c tive c r i t i q u e is n e c e s s a r y to s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n c o r e i d e a s of Rawls's t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n b e d e v e l o p e d in a w a y t h a t m a k e s t h e m w o r t h d e f e n d i n g . After all, t h e r e is little i n t e r e s t in j u s t k e e p i n g t h e s c o r e straight. T h e d e f e n s e is n e c e s s a r y t o s h o w t h a t t h e s e i d e a s h a v e re m a i n e d u n d a m a g e d — a n d e v e n largely u n r e c o g n i z e d — i n t h e b a r r a g e of criticism Rawls h a s p r o v o k e d . T h e b o o k as a w h o l e is m e a n t to s h o w t h a t Rawls offers a s o u n d b a s i s for p r o g r e s s in political p h i l o s o p h y as well a s for political p r o g r e s s . I d o n ' t a i m for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m e n t a r y o n Rawls. I n s t e a d , I c o n c e n t r a t e o n t w o c e n t r a l Rawlsian i d e a s : first, t h e focus o n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , for m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m u s t i n c l u d e , even b e g i n from, a reflec t i o n u p o n t h e j u s t i c e of o u r b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; s e c o n d , t h e m a x i m i n i d e a t h a t a s c h e m e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o b e a s s e s s e d b y t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s , t h a t its j u s t i c e d e p e n d s o n h o w well it d o e s b y its least a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s . My m a i n i n t e r e s t is t h u s in o n e p a r t of Rawls's t h e o r y , h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I a m centrally c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice h e h a s p r o p o s e d , w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l e for this criterion, a n d w i t h its a p p l i c a t i o n to existing a n d feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . M a t t e r s p e r i p h e r a l to t h e s e e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l political c o n c e r n s , h o w e v e r i m p o r t a n t t h e y m a y b e to Rawls, figure o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y h e r e . 1

J

N o r d o I aim to p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m e n t a r y o n the s e c o n d a r y literature o n Rawls. I d o cite s o m e of t h e s e s o u r c e s w h e r e it m a y b e illuminating to s e e h o w I agree or disagree w i t h t h e m , b u t I make n o effort to a c k n o w l e d g e a n d d i s c u s s every previous c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e i s s u e s I a m c o n c e r n e d w i t h . Given the a m o u n t of s e c o n d a r y writing o n Rawls, s u c h a n e n d e a v o r w o u l d have m a d e this b o o k u n r e a d a b l e .

1

2

Introduction

I d o not, for example, treat t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i t i o n in a n y detail, t h o u g h I d o s o m e t i m e s e m p l o y it t o d r a m a t i z e t h e priority c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d ( u n d e r v a r i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s ) , w h o m t h e p a r t i e s take t h e m s e l v e s t o b e r e p r e s e n t i n g . N o r d o 1 offer a n elaboration, either critical or defensive, of K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c t i v i s m o r of t h e m e t h o d of w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m , t h o u g h I a p p e a l t o t h e m occasionally to s h o w t h a t Rawls h a s r e a s o n to agree w i t h m e o n s o m e point. I avoid extensive d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e t o p i c s b e c a u s e it is n o t essential to m y objective. I w a n t t o explicate a n d d e v e l o p w h a t I take to b e Rawls's two m o s t powerful a n d i m p o r t a n t i d e a s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r practical political implications (as I see t h e m ) . All t h i s c o u l d b e d o n e w i t h o u t even m e n t i o n i n g t h e "expository device" (TJ 21) of t h e original position, a n d o n e c a n fully a c c e p t m y c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r o n e a c c e p t s or rejects (or is even a c q u a i n t e d with) K a n t i a n constructivism or t h e m e t h o d of w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . My a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p a s y s t e m a t i c a n d c o n c r e t e c o n c e p t i o n of justice b a s e d on Rawlsian i d e a s g o e s against a p o p u l a r t r e n d in AngloAmerican a c a d e m i a . T h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d s e n s e t h a t Rawls's w o r k is in s h a m b l e s b e c a u s e h i s critics have s h o w n its f o u n d a t i o n s to b e essentially a n d irremediably flawed. Since Rawls's m i s t a k e is t h o u g h t t o b e a d e e p o n e , t h e collapse of h i s t h e o r y is s a i d t o i n d i c a t e s o m e t h i n g larger, to m a r k t h e e n d of a n era, p e r h a p s t h e d e a t h of liberalism, t h e d e m i s e of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t tradition, or even t h e b a n k r u p t c y of s y s tematic m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . W h a t w e n e e d is a radical r e o r i e n t a t i o n in o u r ethical thinking, or so t h e story goes. Several a u t h o r s h a v e a l r e a d y v o l u n t e e r e d t o set t h e a g e n d a for t h e d a w n i n g p o s t - R a w l s i a n era, a n a g e n d a b a s e d o n t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n not m e r e l y of Rawls's c o n c l u s i o n s b u t of his goals a n d entire a p p r o a c h . 2

Rather t h a n directly confront t h e s e n e w a g e n d a s h e r e , I e x a m i n e o n e m a i n s o u r c e of t h e i r popularity, t h e n o t i o n t h a t Rawls's t h e o r y h a s collapsed. My defense of t h a t t h e o r y in Part O n e is m e a n t t o s h o w t h a t t h e obituaries are p r e m a t u r e , t h a t Rawls's critics have n o t e x p o s e d a n y d e e p flaw i n h i s w o r k at all; t h e y have m e r e l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d it (albeit deeply). T h a t Rawls's t h e o r y easily survives t h e c o m m o n c r i t i c i s m s directed against it d o e s not, of c o u r s e , g u a r a n t e e t h a t it i s n ' t d e e p l y flawed in o t h e r w a y s . But j u d g m e n t o n its u l t i m a t e tenability is b e s t deferred until w e have a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t h e o r y , t o g e t h e r w i t h its p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d practical i m p l i c a t i o n s , t h a n h a s y e t b e e n achieved. However u n d a m a g e d phUosophically, Rawls's w o r k is i n d e c l i n e a s a m a t t e r of a c a d e m i c politics. T h e critics have clearly w o n i n t h e a r e n a of public relations. We are well b e y o n d t h e stage w h e n , in Robert Nozick's w o r d s , political p h i l o s o p h e r s n o w m u s t e i t h e r w o r k w i t h i n R a w l s ' 8

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Introduction

3

t h e o r y o r e x p l a i n w h y n o t " (ASU 183). T o d a y it is m o r e c o m m o n for political p h i l o s o p h e r s to m a k e d o w i t h a brief r e m i n d e r t h a t Rawls's t h e o r y c a n b e set a s i d e b e c a u s e of its i r r e m e d i a b l e failure to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h this o r t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l difficulty. T h i s shift in a c a d e m i c p r e p o s s e s s i o n s is in large p a r t d u e t o t h e w o r k of Rawls's t w o m o s t influential critics, Nozick a n d M i c h a e l Sandel, w h o m I c o n f r o n t in detail in Part O n e . I a m o n l y m a r g i n a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in t h e i r o w n p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h I m a k e n o claim t o h a v e u n d e r m i n e d . Rather, m y c o n c e r n is to s h o w in all clarity h o w t h e i r r e a d i n g a n d criticism of Rawls a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y m i s t a k e n . B e g i n n i n g in t h i s w a y allows m e to s h o w t h a t Rawls is still w o r t h taking seriously a n d to c o r r e c t s o m e b a s i c m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t are o n t h e verge of b e c o m i n g official Rawls d o c t r i n e . Nozick a n d Sandel, t h e libertarian a n d t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n , s h a r e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls. Both fail t o a p p r e c i a t e his d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d morality, b e t w e e n t h e focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e focus o n p e r s o n s ' c o n d u c t a n d c h a r a c t e r . But in C h a p t e r 1, w h e n I explicate a n d d e v e l o p t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a n d t h e R a w l s i a n focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , I d r a w u p o n Nozick's criticism only, b e c a u s e S a n d e l , heavily i n f l u e n c e d b y Nozick, offers n o t h i n g es sentially n e w o n this s c o r e . S a n d e l figures p r o m i n e n t l y in C h a p t e r 2, b e c a u s e of a s e c o n d , i n d e p e n d e n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls, p a r t l y i n s p i r e d b y Nozick, w h i c h h e h a s d e v e l o p e d a n d grafted o n t o t h e first. T h i s s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g involves Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n as, s u p p o s e d l y , a b a r r e n , u n e n c u m b e r e d self, d e v o i d of c o n s t i t u t i v e c o m m i t m e n t s a n d a t t a c h m e n t s . I s h o w t h a t Rawls is n o t c o m m i t t e d to s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a n d t h a t t h e tenability of his c o n c e p tion of j u s t i c e e v e n d e p e n d s , in part, o n t h e d e n i a l of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n that S a n d e l a t t r i b u t e s to h i m . T h e critics' s u c c e s s , h o w e v e r unjustified, h a s stifled w h a t , in m y view, w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t u p s h o t of Rawls's w o r k — a b r o a d d e b a t e a b o u t t h e j u s t i c e of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d feasible a v e n u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. I n d e e d , Rawls's w o r k h a s a u n i q u e affinity for a c o n c r e t e d e b a t e a b o u t j u s t i c e b e c a u s e of its c o m m i t m e n t to t h e p r i m a c y of t h e practical: 3

T h e s e a r c h for r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t r o o t e d i n o u r c o n c e p t i o n of o u r s e l v e s a n d in o u r r e l a t i o n t o s o c i e t y r e p l a c e s t h e s e a r c h f o r m o r a l t r u t h i n t e r p r e t e d a s fixed b y a p r i o r a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o r d e r o f objects a n d relations, w h e t h e r natural or divine, an order apart a n d dis t i n c t f r o m h o w w e c o n c e i v e o f o u r s e l v e s . T h e t a s k is t o a r t i c u l a t e a p u b l i c 3

N o z i c k h a s p r e s e n t e d a crisp a n d interesting political p h i l o s o p h y of h i s o w n , a n d Sandel is d e v e l o p i n g h i s . T h e s e p o s i t i o n s are w o r t h s t u d y i n g (for s o m e s e c o n d a r y litera ture, s e e , e.g., Paul, RN; G u t m a n n , CCL; a n d Larmore, PMC 1 2 1 - 2 9 ) . My claim that Nozick a n d Sandel have m i s u n d e r s t o o d Rawls d o e s not e x p r e s s d i s r e s p e c t for their positive a c h i e v e m e n t s . Moreover, t h e mere fact that m a n y h a v e followed their m i s r e a d i n g s s h o w s that t h e s e m u s t h a v e s o m e plausibility, b o t h as r e a d i n g s of Rawls a n d in their o w n right.

4

Introduction c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e t h a t all c a n live w i t h w h o r e g a r d t h e i r p e r s o n

and

their relation to society in a certain w a y . A n d t h o u g h d o i n g t h i s

may

i n v o l v e s e t t l i n g t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e p r a c t i c a l s o c i a l t a s k is p r i m a r y . [KCMT 519]

Previous writers o n justice c o u l d derive comfort from t h e fact t h a t t h e i r work, w h a t e v e r its political i m p a c t or lack thereof, w o u l d at least h e l p elucidate w h a t justice is a n d r e q u i r e s . T h e y v i e w e d t h e truth of a t h e o r y as i n d e p e n d e n t of its p o p u l a r a p p e a l a n d political s u c c e s s , a n d t h u s c o n s i d e r e d it a great a c h i e v e m e n t to c o n s t r u c t t h e just s o c i e t y "as a m o d e l laid u p in heaven. . . . It m a k e s n o difference w h e t h e r it exists a n y w h e r e o r will exist" (Plato, Republic 592b). Rawls c a n derive n o s u c h comfort, for h e c l a i m s n o t r u t h for his c o n c e p t i o n b e y o n d its p o t e n t i a l to serve a s t h e c o r e of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . W h e t h e r his c o n c e p t i o n of justice h a s t h i s p o t e n t i a l is n o t a theoretical m a t t e r that c o u l d b e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t s within t h e theory itself. Rather, it is a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n that c a n b e settled conclusively only by t h e a c t u a l s u c c e s s of t h e c o n c e p t i o n in t h e role for w h i c h it w a s i n t e n d e d . Here a great d e a l of w o r k r e m a i n s t o b e d o n e before Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n will h a v e e v e n a c h a n c e t o s u c c e e d . Some of this w o r k I a t t e m p t to d o h e r e . My c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e of -Rawls in Parts T w o a n d T h r e e d e v e l o p s h i s c o n c e p t i o n in a w a y t h a t r e n d e r s it mpre_concrete a n d m a k e s its full progressive p o t e n t i a l m o r e visible. Both t h e s e aims go a g a i n s t t h e t r e n d of Rawls's l a t e r w o r k t o w a r d abstraction, v a g u e n e s s , a n d c o n s e r v a t i s m . I s e e this t r e n d as d u e , in large part, to t h e w i d e s p r e a d criticism of his work, w h i c h , in this d e c a d e at least, h a s b e e n p r e d o m i n a n t l y conservative. Rawls h a s b e e n exceptionally unwilling t o disagree s h a r p l y w i t h h i s critics. R e l u c t a n t to claim privileged a c c e s s to h i s work, h e h a s s h i e d a w a y from s a y i n g (and showing) clearly a n d straightforwardly t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r r e a d i n g of it is just p l a i n w r o n g . Instead, a i m i n g for a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s a m o n g political p h i l o s o p h e r s a s well, h e h a s m a d e every c o n c e i v a b l e effort to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m o r a l p o s i t i o n s of o t h e r s , e v e n w h e r e s u c h a c c o m m o d a t i o n h a s d i l u t e d t h e c e n t r a l m o r a l s t a t e m e n t of h i s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of justice. With h i n d s i g h t it s e e m s fair t o say that this h a s n o t b e e n a w i n n i n g strategy. It h a s certainly not s t o p p e d t h e criticism a n d r e j e c t i o n of h i s work; o n t h e contrary, by s h o w i n g Rawls o n t h e defensive, it h a s p e r h a p s even e n c o u r a g e d attack. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h i s strategy h a s m o v e d t h e d e b a t e in exactly t h e w r o n g direction. As t h e political c o n t e n t of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n h a s b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e vague a n d i n d e t e r m i nate, a t t e n t i o n h a s shifted to t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s of t h e theory. We are back to issues in m o r a l psychology, m e t a e t h i c s , a n d m o r a l e p i s t e m o l o g y — t o d e b a t e s that are m e t a p h y s i c a l i n s t v l e , if n o t in substance. J

T h o s e for w h o m t h e practical social task is p r i m a r y w o u l d take j u s t

Introduction

5

t h e o p p o s i t e a p p r o a c h to t h e subject. T h e y w o u l d n o t begin w i t h t h e f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h a w h o l e edifice of m o r a l k n o w l e d g e is t o b e e r e c t e d . I n s t e a d , t h e y w o u l d start from c o n c r e t e m o r a l i s s u e s a c t u a l l y in d i s p u t e a n d t h e n e x t e n d t h e i r m o r a l reflection a s far afield as is n e c e s s a r y to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t . T h e y w o u l d n o t w a n t to learn a b o u t K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , reflective e q u i l i b r i u m , a n d t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n u n t i l t h e y h a d first g r a s p e d t h e political c o n t e n t of Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice, h o w it is to govern social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d g u i d e t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t a n d reform. O t h e r m a t t e r s are i m p o r t a n t only insofar a s t h e y affect t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this criterion o r its justification a g a i n s t c o m p e t i n g criteria t h a t are a c t u a l l y p u t f o r w a r d in g o o d faith. T h i s difference in a p p r o a c h h a s political r e l e v a n c e . C u r r e n t l y , m o r a l a n d political p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e g e n e r a l c o m p l a c e n c y a b o u t m o r a l i t y in v a r i o u s w a y s . S o m e of t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are s c a r c e l y a v o i d a b l e . T h e r e h a v e always b e e n p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o c a t e r to t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective self-concern of t h e i r a u d i e n c e s , t h e r e b y t u r n i n g s o m e into e a g e r c o n v e r t s a n d o t h e r s i n t o m o r a l c y n i c s . W h a t w e c a n avoid is p r e s e n t i n g t h e i m a g e of a c o m m u n i t y of e x p e r t s totally a n d h o p e l e s s l y d i v i d e d o n even t h e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s . T h i s i m a g e m a k e s it far too e a s y for politicians, professionals, a n d p e o p l e in g e n e r a l t o cast m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a s i d e in s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e a t t e n d i n g to t h e m is liable to c a u s e discomfort. F o c u s i n g t h e ethical d e b a t e o n c o n c r e t e i s s u e s of practical r e l e v a n c e w o u l d alleviate this p r o b l e m in t w o w a y s : m o r a l d e b a t e s are h a r d e r to i g n o r e w h e n t h e i r p o i n t is to c o m e to terms with malnutrition, homelessness, a n d oppression than w h e n t h e y e x h a u s t t h e m s e l v e s in s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t ideal observers, s e c o n d a r y qualities, a n d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s ; a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t c o n c r e t e m o r a l i s s u e s is generally n a r 4

*Our l i m e h a s p e r h a p s m o r e than its share of t h e s e b e c a u s e of the p o p u l a r n o t i o n (a vulgar version of Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium I that morality is w h a t e v e r fits best with "our" reactions a n d i n t u i t i o n s — e q u a t e d , in a c o m m o n e x p r e s s i o n , w i t h the moral facts. W h e n moraJists from all c a m p s s e e it a s their task to d e m o n s t r a t e that their respective theories c a n "account for o u r moral experience," w e n e e d not be surprised, at the h e i g h t of what is often called the rne-generahon, to find p h i l o s o p h e r s proliferating all sorts of h i g h - s o u n d i n g p h r a s e s (and p u r p o r t e d justifications] for individual a n d c o l l e c tive self-concern: a g e n t - c e n t e r e d prerogatives, a robust z o n e of moral indifference, a cutoff for h e r o i s m , a n d t h e like. Justifications for s u c h n o t i o n s generally e m p h a s i z e h o w very i m p o r t a n t it is to u s — i n d e e d , a matter of integrity—to be faithful to o u r d e e p projects a n d constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s . There is praise for lovality to family, f i i e n d s , a n d c o m m u n i t y a n d ridicule for abstract universalistic moraJism s u p p o s e d l y p r o d u c i n g moral s a i n t s a n d d o - g o o d e r s w h o are intolerable as friends a n d lovers. It is transparent e n o u g h that this diversion of the agent's moral c o n c e r n from t h o s e m o r e distant to t h o s e a r o u n d h i m a n d to h i m s e l f will, in a w o r l d of radical inequalities, benefit the m o r e advantaged p e r s o n s a n d g r o u p s at the e x p e n s e of the l e s s advantaged. It s h i e l d s u s from moral c l a i m s invoking the e x t r e m e misery of distant others Is this the point of s u c h m a n e u v e r s ? A n d if not, w h y hasn't their authors' (quite u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e ) c o n c e r n for the value of d e e p p r o j e c t s a n d c o m m u n i t y alerted t h e m to the fact that s o m a n y h u m a n beings, c o n s u m e d by a lifelong yet often short-lived daily struggle against h u n g e r a n d d i s e a s e , are i n n o p o s i t i o n t o enjoy m e m b e r s h i p in a h a r m o n i o u s c o m m u n i t y o r to lead a life of integrity by forming a n d h o n o r i n g d e e p projects a n d constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s ?

6

Introduction

rower, even a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s , t h a n d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t abstract, "foundational'' q u e s t i o n s . At stake in t h e a t t e m p t t o m a k e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice m o r e c o n c r e t e , t h e n , is its m o r a l value by t h e lights of h i s o w n t h e o r y , tf this t h e o r y c a n m a k e n o c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e practical t a s k s of facilitating a g r e e m e n t a n d alleviating injustice, t h e n it e n d s u p s e l f - c o n d e m n e d . For in Rawls's view, the_truth of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s in its ability t o a p p e a l a n d motivate. Going a little further, o n e m i g h t s a y that t h e p o i n t of political p h i l o s o p h y is n o t merely t o s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n principles are true, b u t to m a k e t h e m t r u e by m o t i v a t i n g t h e s t r u g g l e for their g r a d u a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Also at stake is t h e very m e a n i n g of Rawls's t h e o i y . An a r r a n g e m e n t of c o n c e p t s a n d ideas m a y look meaningful if it is well o r g a n i z e d s o that e a c h of its various e l e m e n t s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d a n d m o t i v a t e d in t e r m s of the others, b u t s u c h a n a r r a n g e m e n t is n o t a t h e o i y if it is n o t p i n n e d d o w n t o its subject m a t t e r . It is n o t meaningful as a w h o l e if it d o e s n o t have significant implications statable o u t s i d e t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e t h e ory itself. If the goal is t o facilitate a g r e e m e n t o n a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e "a public basis in t h e light of w h i c h citizens c a n justify to o n e a n o t h e r their c o m m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s " (KCMT 5 6 1 ) — t h e n it m u s t b e m a d e clear what this criterion m e a n s , t h a t is, h o w it w o u l d a s s e s s p a r t i c u l a r in stitutional s c h e m e s . Rawls c a n plausibly reply that it is n o t his role a s a p h i l o s o p h e r to d e c i d e w h e t h e r , say, t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is satisfied in t h e United States. Such a n investigation m u s t surely d r a w u p o n t h e expertise of e c o n o m i s t s , a m o n g o t h e r s . Yet it is part of Rawls's task to s h o w h o w experts in o t h e r fields s h o u l d go a b o u t settling s u c h m a t t e r s . Rawls m u s t s h a r p e n t h e relevant q u e s t i o n s t o clarify w h a t sort of empirical d a t a (and t h e like) a r e n e e d e d from o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s a n d w h a t a n s w e r s given d a t a w o u l d entail. Similarly, in r e g a r d to h i s ideal well-ordered society, Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice n e e d n o t specify in detail w h a t social institutions are required, b u t it m u s t state c l e a r l y — i n t e r m s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t o jurists, e c o n o m i s t s , a n d political s c i e n t i s t s — what is required of such institutions. T h e b e a u t y a n d p o w e r of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n are w a s t e d insofar a s t h e y c a n n o t b e i m p o r t e d i n t o t h e political a r e n a . Although Rawls s e e m s to a c c e p t this d e m a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , i n p r a c tice h e h a s fallen far s h o r t of m e e t i n g it, a n d t h e g a p is i n c r e a s i n g . Let m e h e r e confine myself to a single e x a m p l e , o n e of several p o i n t s extensively d i s c u s s e d in Part Two. T h r o u g h t h e first p r i n c i p l e of justice, Rawls r e q u i r e s t h a t social institutions p r o t e c t t h e f r e e d o m a n d i n t e g 5

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Introduction

7

rjty pf t h e p e r s o n . H o w d o w e j u d g e w h e t h e r this requirement is m e t ? M u s t w e look at infant mortality r a t e s a n d t h e i n c i d e n c e of violent c r i m e s ? Is it relevant w h e t h e r s o m e a m o n g t h e p o o r a r e m a l n o u r i s h e d or starving? Rawls d o e s n o t say. His s i l e n c e facilitates a c o n s e n s u s of s o r t s : m a n y c a n e n d o r s e t h e a b s t r a c t r e q u i r e m e n t , i n t e r p r e t i n g it b r o a d l y o r n a r r o w l y a c c o r d i n g to t a s t e . But this is t h e w r o n g s o r t of c o n s e n s u s — o r , r a t h e r , n o c o n s e n s u s at all. T o p r o v i d e a s h a r e d b a s i s for a g r e e m e n t o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t i n c l u d e a n s w e r s t o q u e s t i o n s of t h i s sort, a n d obviously, t h e relevant specifications m u s t b e p r o v i d e d in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o r e of t h e c o n c e p t i o n itself. N o jurist o r social t h e o r i s t c a n a n s w e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s for us. T h e specification of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is a p a r a d i g m a t ically i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y e n t e r p r i s e . P h i l o s o p h e r s c a n n o t s i m p l y d e v e l o p s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n u p to a c e r t a i n p o i n t a n d t h e n invite social t h e o r i s t s a n d jurists to "take over." T h e i d e a s a n d t e r m i n o l o g i e s of t h e v a r i o u s d i s c i p l i n e s m u s t e n g a g e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . It m u s t b e a s s u r e d , for e x a m p l e , t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e , s t a t e d in t e r m s t h a t e c o n o m i s t s a r e familiar w i t h a n d c a n w o r k with, really e x p r e s s e s , closely e n o u g h , t h e a s s e s s m e n t i n t e n d e d in t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t e r i o n of justice. Specification p r o c e e d s from a n a r e a t h a t is p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l to a n a r e a t h a t is p u r e l y n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , b u t a l o n g t h e way, it p a s s e s t h r o u g h a n a r e a t h a t is g e n u i n e l y i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y — a n a r e a that, I think, Rawls h a s for t h e m o s t part failed to reach. In p r o p o s i n g a specification of Rawls's criterion (in Part Two), I v e n t u r e i n t o this i n t e r m e d i a t e area. Against t h e s t a n d a r d s a n d t e r m i nologies of o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s , this effort is b o u n d to a p p e a r s o m e w h a t a m a t e u r i s h — e x c u s a b l y so, I h o p e , given t h a t it is m e r e l y a first s k e t c h of h o w t o achieve g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n , a n invitation for c o o p e r a t i o n a n d n o t a n a t t e m p t to go it a l o n e . I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n m u s t b e specified to m a k e clear w h a t h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice means, h o w it is to b e u s e d to a s s e s s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a p a r t i c u l a r social s y s t e m a n d to g u i d e t h e i r reform. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t also b e d e v e l o p e d in t w o f u r t h e r d i m e n s i o n s to m a k e it sufficiently c o n c r e t e . O n e task is to clarify t h e d o m a i n of this c o n c e p t i o n . Rawls offers it for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e of a society t h a t is (as h e variously p u t s it) "selfc o n t a i n e d , " " m o r e o r less self-sufficient," o r "a c l o s e d s y s t e m isolated from o t h e r s o c i e t i e s " (TJ 457, 4, 8). "At s o m e level t h e r e m u s t exist a c l o s e d b a c k g r o u n d s y s t e m , a n d it is this s u b j e c t for w h i c h w e w a n t a t h e o r y . We a r e b e t t e r p r e p a r e d to take u p this p r o b l e m , " h e f u r t h e r s u g g e s t s , "for a s o c i e t y (illustrated b y n a t i o n s ) — If w e a r e successful in t h e c a s e of a society, w e c a n try to e x t e n d a n d to a d j u s t o u r initial t h e o r y a s f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s " (BSS 70 n . 8; cf. TJ 8). In t h e m o d e r n w o r l d t h e r e a r e n o self-contained n a t i o n a l societies, a c l o s e d b a c k g r o u n d s y s t e m exists only at t h e global level. T h e q u e s t i o n , therefore, is

1

t-

8

Introduction

w h e t h e r Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , if it a p p l i e s at all, a p p l i e s to o p e n national societies (as Rawls s e e m s to prefer) or to t h e c l o s e d social s y s t e m ot h u m a n i t y at large (as I m a i n t a i n in Part Three). T h e o t h e r additional task is to s k e t c h h o w t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o w a r d juster social institutions is to b e b r o u g h t a b o u t . T h e u l t i m a t e political i m p o r t of a c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o n s i s t s in s h o w i n g t h a t p e r s o n s o u g h t to d o c e r t a i n t h i n g s . Like specification, t h i s task is essentially interdisciplinary. It m u s t d r a w u p o n t h e k n o w l e d g e of h i s t o r i a n s a n d social scientists a n d u p o n t h e practical e x p e r i e n c e of j u r i s t s a n d politi cians to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h institutional reforms a r e feasible, w h i c h policies w o u l d b e effe^ve* a n d h o w s u c h reforms a n d policies might b e initiated. But it also, to a significant e x t e n t , calls for p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection. A c o n c e p t i o n of justice m a y affect w h a t w e o u g h t to d o in at least t h r e e ways: w e o u g h t t o h e l p reform existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s so as to r e n d e r t h e m m o r e just; w e o u g h t to mitigate a n d alleviate the plight of t h o s e d e p r i v e d a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d by existing u n j u s t institu tions; a n d w e o u g h t to a c c e p t certain c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n o u r c o n d u c t a n d policies t h a t anticipate t h e ideal of just g r o u n d lilies t o w a r d w h i c h we are striving. Philosophical reflection is r e q u i r e d to resolve (1) c o n flicts of moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h i n a n d a c r o s s t h e s e t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s ; (2) c o m p e t i t i o n s a m o n g t h e s e m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o scarce r e s o u r c e s of time, m o n e y , a n d energy; a n d (3) conflicts a n d c o m p e t i t i o n s a m o n g s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice a n d o t h e r c o n s i d erations. T h e p r o b l e m of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is a d d r e s s e d — a l b e i t n e i t h e r systematically n o r at l e n g t h — i n Parts T w o a n d Three. I have m e n t i o n e d t w o k i n d s of a b s t r a c t n e s s in Rawls t h a t I w a n t to avoid: abstract p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i z i n g (e.g., a b o u t K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c tivism) a n d abstract m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t are too v a g u e to settle t h e m o r e interesting political c o n t r o v e r s i e s a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n j u s t i c e s . T h e s e m u s t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a n o t h e r k i n d of a b s t r a c t n e s s , e m b o d i e d in Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h is of g r e a t fertility a n d i m p o r t a n c e . To u n d e r s t a n d this a b s t r a c t n e s s , begin w i t h the ultimate, c o n c r e t e q u e s t i o n of e t h i c s — H o w o u g h t I t o live?— central to w h i c h is t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w I o u g h t to c o n d u c t myself t o w a r d o t h e r s . For u s t h e q u e s t i o n arises in t h e c o n t e x t of a pervasive s t r u c t u r e of g r o u n d r u l e s p u r p o r t i n g to r e g u l a t e h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s . We find ourselves a s p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n o n g o i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . This preexisting s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s j s of crucial i m p o r t a n c e i n at least t w o w a y s . First, t h e relevant g r o u n d r u l e s a r e at least p a r t l y constitutive. T h e y d e t e r m i n e w h o w e are (mother, juror, d o c t o r , d e l e gate, convict, c a n d i d a t e , p r i n c e T o n j r i e s t ) andTwnat o u r a c t i o n s m e a n (buy or sell, c o m m a n d or p r o m i s e , vote or veto, m a n y o r d i v o r e e , a p p l y or appeal) in t h e n e t w o r k of h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n . W i t h o u t an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e g r o u n d rules w e w o u l d lack t h e very t e r m s i n w h i c h t o reflect upon o u r c o n d u c t . Second, t h e evolution of t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s h a s m a d e our social w o r l d highly c o m p l e x a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . T h e

Introduction

9

effects of m y c o n d u c t r e v e r b e r a t e t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d , i n t e r m i n g l i n g w i t h t h e effects of t h e c o n d u c t of billions of o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g s (as i l l u s t r a t e d by m a r k e t t r a n s a c t i o n s ) . T h u s , m a n y m o r a l l y salient features of t h e s i t u a t i o n s of h u m a n b e i n g s ( p e r s i s t e n t starvation in n o r t h e a s t e r n Brazil, civil w a r in El Salvador, f a m i n e in India) a r i s e from t h e c o n f l u e n c e of t h e often veiy r e m o t e effects of t h e c o n d u c t of vast n u m b e r s of h u m a n b e i n g s . W e as i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e n o h o p e of c o p i n g w i t h s u c h c o m p l e x i t y a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e if w e take t h e existing g r o u n d r u l e s for g r a n t e d a n d m e r e l y ask " H o w s h o u l d 1 a c t ? " o r " W h a t s h o u l d I d o differently?" W e c a n c o p e only by a t t e n d i n g t o t h i s all-pervasive s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s w h i c h s h a p e s t h e w a y p e r s o n s act a n d c o d e t e r m i n e s h o w t h e i r a c t i o n s , t o g e t h e r , affect t h e lives of o t h e r s . H e r e , t h e n , is t h e fruitful a b s t r a c t i o n in Rawls's a p p r o a c h . In o r d e r t o c o p e a d e q u a t e l y w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w to live, o n e m u s t , at least in t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , a b s t r a c t from this q u e s t i o n a n d reflect u p o n t h e b a s i c g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t s h a p e us, u p o n t h e social c o n t e x t in w h i c h w e all act. S u c h reflection c a n n o t p r o c e e d p i e c e m e a l . W e c a n n o t just reflect s e p a r a t e l y u p o n t h e e t h i c s of e a c h role a n d office, b e c a u s e t o d o s o w o u l d take for g r a n t e d t h e existing differentiation i n t o roles a n d offices, w o u l d b l i n d u s to t h e joint effects of h o w t h e s e roles a n d offices are c o n c e i v e d . N o r c a n w e a t t e n d to i n s t i t u t i o n s o n e b y o n e (marriage, p r o p e r t y , t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , t h e market), b e c a u s e t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , t o o , i n t e r p e n e t r a t e in t h e i r effects. T h e p r o b l e m is a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of s e e k i n g t o o p t i m i z e s o m e p r o c e s s of p r o d u c t i o n . Even if it is t r u e t h a t e a c h p a r t of t h e p r o c e s s is d e s i g n e d in t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e way, given t h e w a y t h e o t h e r p a r t s a r e d e s i g n e d , it m a y still b e p o s s i b l e to i m p r o v e t h e e n t i r e p r o c e s s greatly b y r e d e s i g n i n g all p a r t s t o g e t h e r o r (more i m p o r tant) b y a l t e r i n g its very s t r u c t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g its division i n t o p a r t s ) . W e m u s t , t h e n , reflect u p o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e roles a n d offices t h e y involve a s o n e scheme, against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of feasible a l t e r n a tive s c h e m e s . T h i s reflection is highly a b s t r a c t , b u t w i t h o u t it w e c a n n o t e v e n b e g i n to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t w e are d o i n g to o t h e r s , h o w w e a r e involved in t h e i r lives, a n d w h a t c o n c r e t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w e m i g h t h a v e t o w a r d t h e m . As I see it, Rawls's w o r k is i m p o r t a n t for a c h i e v i n g this a b s t r a c t i o n , y e t w e a k in m a k i n g it relevant to t h e c o n c r e t e political i s s u e s before u s . T h e a b s t r a c t i o n is crucial, b u t it m u s t b e b r o u g h t b a c k d o w n to earth. T h i s f o c u s o n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e priority c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d , m a k e s Rawls a r a d i c a l t h i n k e r . M y r e m a r k s a b o u t h i s (increasing) c o n s e r v a t i s m a r e t h u s m e a n t in a relative s e n s e . It s e e m s t h a t in w o r k i n g o u t h i s t w o c e n t r a l i d e a s (as I h a v e called t h e m ) , Rawls h a s b e e n resisting t h e i r p r o g r e s s i v e p o w e r every s t e p of t h e w a y . T o s o m e e x t e n t h e h a s d o n e t h i s b y leaving h i s c o n c l u sions abstract a n d vague w h e r e further development w o u l d have m a d e t h e m m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d critical of t h e s t a t u s q u o . A n d w h e r e h e d i d a r g u e t o w a r d s o m e w h a t m o r e definite c o n c l u s i o n s , h i s a r g u m e n t s

10

Introduction

seem bent—bent on ensuring that these conclusions would be as b l a n d , traditional, a n d m a i n s t r e a m A m e r i c a n a s p o s s i b l e . While Rawls is t h e n b o t h a radical a n d a conservative, I will t i y t o b e faithful t o t h e radical core of h i s c o n c e p t i o n , c o u n t e r i n g t h e m a n y ( a n d individually often minor) conservative s t i p u l a t i o n s t h a t t h r e a t e n t o o b s c u r e t h e great progressive p o t e n t i a l of h i s p r i n c i p a l i d e a s . T h u s it is n o t essential t o m y goal h e r e t h a t Rawls s h o u l d fully a g r e e w i t h m y c o n c l u s i o n s . Of c o u r s e , insofar a s I try t o e x p l i c a t e a n d d e f e n d h i s position, especially in Part O n e , it m a t t e r s t h a t I s h o u l d d o s o correctly, that w h a t I reject a s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s really a r e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . But insofar a s I m a k e his criterion of justice m o r e c o n c r e t e , m y o v e r r i d ing c o n c e r n is to develop t h e t w o c e n t r a l i d e a s i n a p l a u s i b l e w a y . I w o u l d certainly be p l e a s e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d if Rawls w e r e t o find s o m e of t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s attractive, a n d I w o u l d r e t h i n k m y c o n c l u s i o n s if h e gave r e a s o n s t o reject t h e m , b u t t h e s e a r e m y a t t i t u d e s t o t h e r e s p o n s e s of a n y r e a d e r . My d e e p e s t allegiance h e r e is n o t to Rawls b u t to his foremost ideas. T h e s e ideas have a life a n d p o w e r i n d e p e n d e n t of Rawls, w h i c h is t e s t i m o n y , surely, t o t h e g r e a t n e s s of b o t h . Rawls's m o s t i m p o r t a n t conservative s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t h i s f o c u s o n major social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o e x c l u d e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . Rawls follows t r a d i t i o n in treating n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s a s m o r a l w a t e r s h e d s . Only w i t h i n a n a t i o n a l territory a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n it d e f i n e s does h e view t h e focus o n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a s a p p r o p r i a t e . He thereby c i r c u m v e n t s a crucial m o r a l question, w h i c h h i s t h e o r y o u g h t to answer, n a m e l y w h e t h e r t h e institutionalization of n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s really h a s t h i s magical m o r a l force of shielding u s from (or r e d u c i n g t h e force of) t h e m o r a l c l a i m s of "foreigners." T h e p r a c t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e of this q u e s t i o n is e n o r m o u s , s e e i n g t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n state is a crucial c o n t r i b u t o r to t h e c u r r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n of e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities. Rawls's c o n s e r v a t i s m is exemplified also in h i s specification of t h e m a x i m i n i d e a a n d i n his r e m a r k s a b o u t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e h e r e is h o w Rawls lets h i s lexical p r i o r i t y of t h e basic liberties (the first principle of justice) u n d e r m i n e h i s p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged. T h i s p r o b l e m arises e v e n a p a r t from t h e s t u n n i n g lack of interest in b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s t h a t is reflected in Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e lexical priority. As it s t a n d s , t h e lexical priority of t h e basic liberties will s u p p o r t t w o of Rawls's c o n c l u 6

7

"Still, it would b e of s o m e historical interest if one could get Rawls t o be more specific about h own 0wews, if only m response to the specifications proposed by others as^eH ^ ™lh » ^ in detail. As for the no.abredU?ZnnfT ^ °" S " " ° ^ ^ ™™P^ o mcall b e r t ^ f s ? T H f " " « ° " ™ s t maintain the fair value of the ^enlnrirfi . °PP° ™*y °ne might also point out ls

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Introduction

11

s i o n s : t h e fulfillment of its p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c liberties s h o u l d b e t h e p r i m a r y c r i t e r i o n for identifying t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r s o m e in s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , a n d e n h a n c i n g t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d b e t h e m o s t u r g e n t i m p e r a t i v e g u i d i n g t h e reform of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . But Rawls d r a w s t h e further c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e f o r m s involving a n e n h a n c e m e n t of b a s i c liberties are always t h e m o s t u r g e n t , e v e n w h e n t h e y involve a n e x p a n s i o n of t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d ( w h o s e b a s i c liberties are a l r e a d y m o r e c o m p l e t e o r b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d ) at t h e e x p e n s e of a d v a n c e m e n t s in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . As I d e m o n s t r a t e in s o m e detail (§11.3.1, cf. §11.2.1), this c o n c l u s i o n is a clear violation of t h e m a x i m i n idea,. M a k i n g Rawls's c e n t r a l i d e a s m o r e c o n c r e t e in a w a y that c o r r e c t s for h i s conservative t e n d e n c y , I h o p e to leave t h e r e a d e r at t h e e n d w i t h r e a s o n a b l y clear t h e s e s a b o u t w h e r e o u r w o r l d is n o w as far as j u s t i c e is c o n c e r n e d , h o w w e a r e m o r a l l y related to existing injustices, a n d w h a t a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d p r o g r e s s t o w a r d it m i g h t look like. T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s s t a n d o p p o s e d to t h e s m u g c o n s e n s u s t h a t t r u l y grievous i n j u s t i c e s exist only in t h e p a s t o r in d i s t a n t l a n d s a n d s o n e e d n o t c o n c e r n u s h e r e a n d n o w . I c o n c l u d e t h a t w e are a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t p r o d u c e s e x t r e m e p o v e r t y o n a m a s s i v e s c a l e so t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s a r e b o r n w i t h n o realistic p r o s p e c t s of a life w i t h o u t h u n g e r , m a l n u t r i t i o n , a n d o p p r e s s i o n . T h e s c h e m e is i m p o s e d u p o n t h e s e , its m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s — a n d i m p o s e d n o t b y fate o r n a t u r e b u t b y o t h e r , m o r e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , o u r s e l v e s i n c l u d e d . C u r r e n t injustices a r e n o less s e v e r e t h a n t h o s e suffered by earlier d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , a n d o u r r e s p o n sibility for t h e s e i n j u s t i c e s is n o less t h a n t h a t of earlier m o r e a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . But b e c a u s e of t h e vastly g r e a t e r differentiation a n d c o m p l e x i t y of t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , t h e injustice a n d o u r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for it a r e b o t h m u c h m o r e o p a q u e . Clearly, t h e p l i g h t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is d u e t o social realities. It is n o t n a t u r a l , for m o s t of t h e m , like m o s t of us, are perfectly c a p a b l e of l e a d i n g h e a l t h y a n d successful lives if given a c h a n c e t o e s c a p e from t h e i r p r i s o n of p o v e r t y . But t h e n w e a r e n o t like s l a v e h o l d e r s , w h o e m b o d y a n d live o u t t h e injustice of slavery in t h e v i o l e n c e a n d c r u e l t y t h e y visit u p o n t h e i r slaves. W e l e a d o r d i n a r y , civilized lives, a n d n o t h ing w e d o s e e m s to have a m a j o r o r even m i n o r negative i m p a c t u p o n t h e lives of t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d . A n d so, paradoxically, t h e relevant social realities t a k e o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a n o n y m i t y — s e e m t o be p r o d u c e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t a t r a c e of h u m a n a g e n c y . Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e i r effects m a k e s it p o s s i b l e t o clarify h o w injustice c a n b e s y s t e m i c , c a n exist w i t h o u t b e i n g t r a c e a b l e to a n y manifestly u n j u s t a c t i o n s b y i n d i v i d u a l s o r g r o u p s . O u r c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e suffering of t h e p o o r is ex t r e m e l y i n d i r e c t a n d i n t e r m i x e d w i t h t h e c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of o t h -

10

Introduction

s e e m b e n t — b e n t o n e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s w o u l d b e as b l a n d , traditional, a n d m a i n s t r e a m A m e r i c a n as p o s s i b l e . While Rawls is t h e n b o t h a radical a n d a conservative, I will try t o be faithful to t h e radical core of h i s c o n c e p t i o n , c o u n t e r i n g t h e m a n y (and individually often minor) conservative s t i p u l a t i o n s t h a t t h r e a t e n to o b s c u r e t h e great progressive potential of his p r i n c i p a l i d e a s . T h u s it is n o t essential to m y goal h e r e t h a t Rawls s h o u l d fully a g r e e w i t h m y c o n c l u s i o n s . Of c o u r s e , insofar a s I try t o e x p l i c a t e a n d d e f e n d his position, especially in Part One, it m a t t e r s t h a t I s h o u l d d o s o correctly, t h a t w h a t I reject as m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s really are m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . But insofar as I m a k e his criterion of justice m o r e c o n c r e t e , m y overrid ing c o n c e r n is to develop t h e t w o central i d e a s in a p l a u s i b l e w a y . I w o u l d certainly b e p l e a s e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d if Rawls w e r e to find s o m e of t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s attractive, a n d I w o u l d r e t h i n k m y c o n c l u s i o n s if h e gave r e a s o n s t o reject t h e m , b u t t h e s e a r e m y a t t i t u d e s t o t h e r e s p o n s e s of any r e a d e r . My d e e p e s t allegiance h e r e is n o t t o Rawls b u t to his foremost i d e a s . T h e s e i d e a s have a life a n d p o w e r i n d e p e n d e n t of Rawls, w h i c h is testimony, surely, to t h e g r e a t n e s s of b o t h . Rawls's m o s t i m p o r t a n t conservative s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t h i s focus o n major social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o e x c l u d e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . Rawls follows t r a d i t i o n in treating n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s as m o r a l w a t e r s h e d s . Only w i t h i n a national territory a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n it d e f i n e s d o e s h e view t h e focus o n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a s a p p r o p r i a t e . He thereby c i r c u m v e n t s a crucial m o r a l question, w h i c h h i s t h e o i y o u g h t to answer, n a m e l y w h e t h e r t h e institutionalization of n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s really h a s t h i s magical m o r a l force of shielding u s from (or r e d u c i n g t h e force of) t h e m o r a l claims o f ' f o r e i g n e r s . " T h e practical i m p o r t a n c e of this q u e s t i o n is e n o r m o u s , seeing t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n state is a crucial c o n t r i b u t o r to t h e c u r r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n of e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities. Rawls's c o n s e r v a t i s m is exemplified also in h i s specification of t h e m a x i m i n i d e a a n d in h i s r e m a r k s a b o u t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e h e r e is h o w Rawls lets his lexical p r i o r i t y of t h e basic liberties (the first principle of justice) u n d e r m i n e h i s p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged. This p r o b l e m arises e v e n a p a r t from t h e s t u n n i n g lack of interest in basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s t h a t is reflected in Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e lexical priority. As it s t a n d s , t h e lexical priority of t h e basic liberties will s u p p o r t t w o of Rawls's c o n c l u 6

7

«Still it would be of s o m e historical interest if one could get Rawls to b e m o r e specific about his own views ,f only in response to the specifications proposed by others n ° . ^ J^° ° meters in detail. As for the flslI,iL n

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s o m e

f t h e s e

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2 7 9

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5 3 6 )

Introduction

11

s i o n s : t h e fulfillment of its p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c liberties s h o u l d b e t h e p r i m a r y c r i t e r i o n for identifying t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r s o m e in s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , a n d e n h a n c i n g t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d b e t h e m o s t u r g e n t i m p e r a t i v e g u i d i n g t h e reform of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . But Rawls d r a w s t h e f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e f o r m s involving a n e n h a n c e m e n t of b a s i c liberties are always t h e m o s t u r g e n t , even w h e n t h e y involve a n e x p a n s i o n of t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d ( w h o s e b a s i c liberties a r e a l r e a d y m o r e c o m p l e t e or b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d ) at t h e e x p e n s e of a d v a n c e m e n t s in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . As I d e m o n s t r a t e in s o m e detail (§11.3.1, cf. §11.2.1), this c o n c l u s i o n is a clear violation of t h e m a x i m i n idea,. M a k i n g Rawls's c e n t r a l i d e a s m o r e c o n c r e t e in a w a y t h a t c o r r e c t s for h i s c o n s e r v a t i v e t e n d e n c y , I h o p e to leave t h e r e a d e r at t h e e n d w i t h r e a s o n a b l y clear t h e s e s a b o u t w h e r e o u r w o r l d is n o w a s far a s j u s t i c e is c o n c e r n e d , h o w w e a r e m o r a l l y r e l a t e d t o existing injustices, a n d w h a t a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d p r o g r e s s t o w a r d it m i g h t look like. T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s s t a n d o p p o s e d to t h e s m u g c o n s e n s u s t h a t truly g r i e v o u s i n j u s t i c e s exist only in t h e p a s t o r i n d i s t a n t l a n d s a n d s o n e e d n o t c o n c e r n u s h e r e a n d n o w . I c o n c l u d e t h a t w e are a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t p r o d u c e s e x t r e m e p o v e r t y o n a m a s s i v e scale s o t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s a r e b o r n w i t h n o realistic p r o s p e c t s of a life w i t h o u t h u n g e r , m a l n u t r i t i o n , a n d o p p r e s s i o n . T h e s c h e m e is i m p o s e d u p o n t h e s e , its m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s — a n d i m p o s e d n o t b y fate o r n a t u r e b u t by o t h e r , m o r e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , o u r s e l v e s i n c l u d e d . C u r r e n t injustices are n o less severe t h a n t h o s e suffered b y earlier d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , a n d o u r r e s p o n sibility for t h e s e injustices is n o less t h a n t h a t of earlier m o r e a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . But b e c a u s e of t h e vastly g r e a t e r differentiation a n d c o m p l e x i t y of t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , t h e injustice a n d o u r responsibility for it a r e b o t h m u c h m o r e o p a q u e . Clearly, t h e plight of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is d u e t o social realities. It is n o t n a t u r a l , for m o s t of t h e m , like m o s t of u s , are perfectly c a p a b l e of l e a d i n g h e a l t h y a n d successful lives if given a c h a n c e to e s c a p e from t h e i r p r i s o n of p o v e r t y . But t h e n w e are n o t like s l a v e h o l d e r s , w h o e m b o d y a n d live o u t t h e injustice of slavery in t h e violence a n d c r u e l t y t h e y visit u p o n t h e i r slaves. We l e a d o r d i n a r y , civilized lives, a n d n o t h ing w e d o s e e m s t o h a v e a m a j o r or even m i n o r negative i m p a c t u p o n t h e lives of t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d . A n d so, paradoxically, t h e relevant social realities t a k e o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a n o n y m i t y — s e e m t o b e p r o d u c e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t a t r a c e of h u m a n a g e n c y . Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e i r effects m a k e s it p o s s i b l e t o clarify h o w injustice c a n b e s y s t e m i c , c a n exist w i t h o u t b e i n g t r a c e a b l e to a n y manifestly u n j u s t a c t i o n s by individuals o r g r o u p s . O u r c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e suffering of t h e p o o r is ex t r e m e l y i n d i r e c t a n d i n t e r m i x e d w i t h t h e c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of o t h -

12

Introduction

ers. It is quite infeasible for u s t o adjust o u r c o n d u c t s o as to avoid s u c h effects. A n d h e r e again, Rawls's i n s t i t u t i o n a l a p p r o a c h is c r u c i a l for s h o w i n g t h e alternative to s u c h a n (infeasible) a d j u s t m e n t of o u r c o n d u c t . We m u s t initiate i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s t o w a r d a s c h e m e that, h o w e v e r differentiated a n d c o m p l e x , d o e s n o t t e n d t o e n g e n d e r t h e severe poverty a n d o p p r e s s i o n so typical of o u r c u r r e n t w o r l d . T h o s e p r e s e n t l y m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d have virtually n o m e a n s for initiating s u c h reforms. We d o . And o u r responsibility vis-a-vis existing i n j u s t i c e s hinges u p o n o u r ability to initiate a n d s u p p o r t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . T h e u l t i m a t e goal of s u c h reforms is a fully j u s t global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , d e n n e d , p e r h a p s , b y reference t o t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s . O u r n^porisibility, however, in n o w a y d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r s u c h a fully just s c h e m e is practicable or realistically a t t a i n a b l e . Yes, Rawls's c r i t e rion c a n b e u s e d to design a b l u e p r i n t of ideal i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e perfectly just. But m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t for n o w is its role in t h e comparative a s s e s s m e n t of alternative feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . P e r h a p s w e will never r e a c h a s c h e m e w h o s e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n is optimal. But w e d o n ' t n e e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t s u c h a s c h e m e is r e a c h able in o r d e r to r e c o g n i z e t h a t w e o u g h t to s u p p o r t i n s t i t u t i o n a l re forms t h a t improve t h e w o r s t social position, j u s t as o n e d o e s n o t n e e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t o n e c a n r e a c h perfection for u n d e r t a k i n g to b e c o m e a better h u m a n being.

P A R T

O N E

DEFENDING T H E MAIN IDEAS

C H A P T E R

1

Nozick and the Focus on the Basic Structure

1. T h e P r o b l e m o f J u s t i c e It is J o h n Rawls's a m b i t i o n t o p r e s e n t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice for t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m . To get a n intuitive i d e a of w h a t t h i s m e a n s , I b r i n g in Robert Nozick's w o r k , i n c l u d i n g h i s r e a d i n g a n d criticism of Rawls. I a m especially i n t e r e s t e d in Nozick's claim t h a t Rawls's a p p r o a c h begs i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a g a i n s t historical e n t i t l e m e n t t h e o r i e s of distributive justice, in w h i c h o w n e r s h i p rights a r e d e n n e d recursively a n d o p e r a t e as s i d e c o n straints. 1.1. W e c a n quickly get to t h e c o r e of Nozick's a t t a c k o n Rawls b y a c c e p t i n g a c h a l l e n g e h e raises (ASU 167n, 204-5) w h i c h Rawls h a s n o t t a k e n u p , t h e c h a l l e n g e to e x a m i n e t h e plausibility of c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e in a surveyable, small-scale c o n t e x t . To a c c o m m o d a t e Rawls, a n d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to Nozick, let u s i m a g i n e a c l o s e d a n d s e l f - c o n t a i n e d g r o u p of p e r s o n s , p e r h a p s s h a r i n g a small i s o l a t e d island, a collectivity t h a t is r e p r o d u c i n g itself over t i m e , w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r i e s w i d e l y s c a t t e r e d in age. F o r n o w , w e c a n m a k e t h e simplifying a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y social o r d e r w e c o n s i d e r for this g r o u p w o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d a n d g e n e r a l l y c o m p l i e d w i t h . To k e e p m a t t e r s even m o r e s i m p l e , let u s leave a s i d e m o s t of t h e b a s i c features of t h e social o r d e r a n d f o c u s o n t h e d e t a i l s of t h e g r o u p ' s i n s t i t u t i o n of private p r o p e r t y . In t a k i n g for g r a n t e d t h a t this primitive, a g r a r i a n e c o n o m y p r o m i n e n t l y involves t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n in s o m e form, w e p r e s u p p o s e a c o m m i t m e n t 1

•We c a n t h e n largely rely, for the m o m e n t , o n Rawls's difference principle in its s i m p l e s t f o r m — c o v e r i n g o n l y the single g o o d , i n c o m e — t o bring out w h a t is distinctive a b o u t h i s full criterion of justice, w h i c h is merely a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d m a x i m i n criterion, a d d r e s s i n g a w i d e r range of social g o o d s w i t h a priority ordering a m o n g t h e m .

15

16

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.1

Rawls a n d Nozick s h a r e a n d c a n c o n c e n t r a t e i m m e d i a t e l y o n w h a t is controversial b e t w e e n t h e m . We c a n further eliminate t h e m o r e a b s t r u s e p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s Nozick e n t e r t a i n s — t h a t p r o p e r t y s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to p e r s o n s ' m o r a l merit, usefulness to society, n e e d , intelligence, r a c e , or s o m e m i x t u r e or c o m b i n a t i o n of these, o r s o as to m a t c h s o m e a n o n y m o u s profile. Against this u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l b a c k g r o u n d , let u s c o n s i d e r s o m e i m p o r t a n t p a r a m e t e r s of t h e definition of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , e s p e cially w h a t k i n d of i t e m s are o w n a b l e , h o w o n e c o m e s t o o w n s u c h items, a n d w h a t rights o n e h a s w h e n o n e o w n s t h e m . Let m e give a t h i n sketch of t h e e c o n o m i c o r d e r Nozick w o u l d envision for o u r i s l a n d , followed b y a n equally thin c o u n t e r s k e t c h m o r e Rawlsian in spirit. Nozick defines t h e set of o w n a b l e s q u i t e widely, i n c l u d i n g e v e n p e r s o n s w i t h i n its s c o p e : "I believe t h a t . . . a free s y s t e m will a l l o w [a p e r s o n ] to sell himself i n t o slavery" (ASU 331). He allows slavery b e c a u s e h e is convinced, c o n t r a r y to t h e A m e r i c a n D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e , t h a t all rights s h o u l d b e alienable. Still, a p e r s o n is a n o w n a b l e of a special kind, in that s h e is initially self-owned w h e n s h e c o m e s of age (ASU 289, 331, 38f). That h e r p a r e n t s or t h e i r o w n e r s o w n e d all t h e ingredients to h e r " p r o d u c t i o n " d o e s not, in this one case, entail t h a t they o w n t h e p r o d u c t . P e r s o n s c a n b e c o m e slaves o n l y b y a l i e n a t i n g themselves. C o n c e r n i n g control of the island's pivotal n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e — l a n d — Nozick advocates t h e s e m a i n rules: All l a n d is subject to a c q u i s i t i o n b y t h e first c o m e r , w h o t h e r e b y gains full, e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over it, i n c l u d i n g t h e right t o transfer any or all of h i s rights a s o w n e r to s o m e o t h e r person(s) of h i s choice. A legitimate l a n d h o l d i n g is t h e n d e f i n e d recursively as o n e t h a t arose from a valid first a c q u i s i t i o n t h r o u g h a n y n u m b e r of valid transfers. S o m e o n e w i t h Rawlsian leanings might p r o p o s e t h e following alter native g r o u n d rules. T h e r e is to b e n o i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery; p e r s o n s c a n n o t alienate themselves or c o m e to b e o w n e d in a n y w a y . All l a n d is subject to a p p r o p r i a t i o n by t h e first comer, w h o t h e r e b y g a i n s full, exclusionary control over it. As o w n e r , h e is free to r e l i n q u i s h o w n e r s h i p over (a portion) of his l a n d at a n y time ( t h r o u g h e x c h a n g e , gift, o r bequest), b u t h e controls t h e a s s i g n m e n t of only 80 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d h e relinquishes. T h e r e m a i n i n g 20 p e r c e n t is a s s i g n e d ( p e r h a p s via s o m e lottery m e c h a n i s m ) t o y o u n g p e r s o n s from l a n d l e s s families or, s h o u l d t h e r e b e n o l a n d l e s s families, t o y o u n g p e r s o n s from families w i t h the lowest l a n d h o l d i n g s p e r c a p i t a . T h u s , a legitimate l a n d h o l d i n g is again defined recursively as o n e that a r o s e from a valid first a c q u i s i tion t h r o u g h any n u m b e r of applications of t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p rules. O u r Rawlsian prefers t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s t o Nozick's, b e c a u s e they can b e e x p e c t e d to e n g e n d e r less, a n d l e s s severe, poverty. 2

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T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.2

17

1.2. I p u r s u e t h i s d i s p u t e to t h e next h i g h e r level i n §3, e x a m i n i n g h o w Rawls a n d Nozick m i g h t d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h a t s o r t s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o u l d resolve t h e lower-level d i s p u t e a b o u t a just social o r d e r for o u r i s l a n d , b u t first w e m u s t c h a r a c t e r i z e p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e d i s p u t e is a b o u t . In p a r t i c u l a r , w e m u s t k e e p s h a r p l y distinct, as Nozick d o e s not, our subject, how the ground rules of a social system ought to be assessed/designed, from t h e (secondary) s u b j e c t of h o w a c t o r s (individ uals, a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t ) m a y a n d s h o u l d act w i t h i n a n o n g o i n g s c h e m e w h o s e t e r m s are t a k e n as fixed. T h e f o r m e r of t h e s e s u b j e c t s , justice, is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t a n d justifica tion of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e latter, morality, w i t h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of conduct a n d character. Both Rawls a n d Nozick are essentially c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e first s u b ject, b u t Nozick e x p e n d s m u c h effort a t t a c k i n g a view that is n o t Rawls's. While Rawls seeks to c o n s i d e r g r o u n d r u l e s from a h i g h e r level, Nozick often c a s t s t h e i r d i s p u t e a s o n e a b o u t w h i c h g r o u n d r u l e s it is p e r m i s s i b l e to infringe u n d e r w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h o u g h h i s argu m e n t s in t h i s vein a r e n o t relevant to Rawls's project, t h e y are likely to h a v e a significant r h e t o r i c a l effect u p o n t h e u n w a r y r e a d e r . Let m e give three prominent examples. First, Nozick f r e q u e n t l y c o n j u r e s u p t h e h o r r o r of redistribution, the i d e a t h a t s o m e a u t h o r i t y (the g o v e r n m e n t , say) will c o m e along, w h e n ever it p l e a s e s , to take a w a y p a r t of w h a t y o u o w n in o r d e r to d e v o t e it t o s o m e p u r p o s e it d e e m s w o r t h y . But o u r Rawlsian's p r o p o s a l regarding l a n d o w n e r s h i p is n o t r e d i s t r i b u t i v e in t h i s s e n s e . It e n v i s i o n s n o m e c h a n i s m t h a t m a k e s a d h o c c o r r e c t i o n s a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of l a n d t h a t h a s e m e r g e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r u l e s of first a c q u i s i t i o n a n d c h a n g e of o w n e r s h i p . Rather, it e n v i s i o n s a p a r t i c u l a r content for t h e s e rules, w h i c h d e t e r m i n e h o w ( p a t t e r n s of) l a n d h o l d i n g s arise in t h e first place. No p r o p e r t y is t a k e n from s o m e o n e a n d given t o a n o t h e r . A l a n d o w n e r c o n t r o l s h i s e n t i r e p r o p e r t y u p t o t h e m o m e n t w h e n h e r e l i n q u i s h e s it; n o l a n d is t a k e n a w a y from h i m . His d e s i g n a t e d a s s i g n e e receives 80 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d in q u e s t i o n ; n o l a n d is t a k e n a w a y from h e r either, b e c a u s e s h e n e v e r o w n e d t h e full p l o t to b e g i n w i t h . N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t w h a t is t a k e n a w a y is t h e l a n d o w n e r ' s p o w e r to d i s p o s e of all h i s p r o p e r t y a s h e d e e m s fit. But n o s u c h p o w e r exists ( a n d t h u s c o u l d b e t a k e n away) u n d e r t h e Rawlsian's p r a c t i c e . All l a n d is h e l d , from t h e very b e g i n n i n g , o n t h e p u b l i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p r u l e s . No o n e n e e d h o l d l a n d o n these terms, b u t those w h o d o are b o u n d by t h e m . S e c o n d , Nozick often c o m p l a i n s t h a t Rawls b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n a g a i n s t all entitlement t h e o r i e s of distributive j u s t i c e (e.g., ASU 199, 2 0 3 - 4 , 207, 3

3

T h i s constraint is structurally a n a l o g o u s to limitations that figure in Nozick's o w n s c h e m e : "My property rights in m y knife a l l o w m e to leave it w h e r e I will, but not in y o u r c h e s t " (ASU 171). "Each o w n e r ' s title to his h o l d i n g i n c l u d e s the historical s h a d o w of t h e Lockean p r o v i s o o n appropriation" (ASU 1801. Again, n o o n e n e e d o w n things o n t h e s e t e r m s , b u t t h o s e w h o d o are b o u n d by t h e m .

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T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.2

215) Straightforwardly u n d e r s t o o d , this c o m p l a i n t is false. T h e e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e o u r Rawlsian is p r o p o s i n g also revolves a r o u n d a n o t i o n of e n t i t l e m e n t . It, too, features a recursive definition of legiti m a t e l a n d h o l d i n g s , involving r u l e s of first a c q u i s i t i o n a n d c h a n g e of o w n e r s h i p . R e l i n q u i s h e d e n t i t l e m e n t s are t r a n s f o r m e d , in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p rules, i n t o n e w e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e c h o s e n assignee a n d of s o m e o t h e r person(s). A n d again, a s in Nozick, t h e p r o p o s a l s t i p u l a t e s t h a t existing e n t i t l e m e n t s m a y n o t b e infringed for t h e sake of, for e x a m p l e , d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Third, Nozick offers r e a s o n s for conceiving of rights a s side con straints (ASU 28-34), in c o n t r a s t to a c o n c e p t i o n of rights a s goals w h i c h w o u l d u r g e a g e n t s t o act so as t o m a x i m i z e t h e w e i g h t e d s u m of r i g h t s fulfillment overall. O n t h e latter view, o n e s h o u l d , d e s p i t e a r i g h t of i n n o c e n t s n o t t o b e killed, kill i n n o c e n t s w h e n d o i n g s o s e c u r e s a greater gain i n t e r m s of rights (for e x a m p l e , saves m o r e i n n o c e n t s from b e i n g killed) e l s e w h e r e . But t h e s i d e - c o n s t r a i n t c o n c e p t i o n of r i g h t s , w h i c h Rawls c a n a n d d o e s a c c e p t , again fails t o a d v a n c e Nozick's c a s e for a p a r t i c u l a r specification of p r o p e r t y rights (ASU 172-73). It i m p l i e s t h a t if we e n d u p a c c e p t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y rights Nozick p r o p o s e s , t h e n n o l a n d c a n b e t a k e n by t h e l a n d l e s s (or given t h e m b y s o m e official authority) w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of its o w n e r . But this i m p l i c a t i o n , a g a i n , is irrelevant t o o u r subject, n a m e l y , w h a t side c o n s t r a i n t s s h o u l d b e r e c o g n i z e d or, m o r e specifically, h o w p r o p e r t y rights a r e t o b e specified to begin w i t h . C h o o s i n g t h e p r a c t i c e p r o p o s e d b y o u r Rawlsian d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e rights of l a n d o w n e r s are violated for t h e sake of fulfilling t h e right to a n initial plot of l a n d . R a t h e r it m e a n s t h a t t h e conflict b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o purported rights is resolved b y r e c o g n i z i n g t h e latter a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g a n a d j u s t e d version of t h e former. T h e p r o p o s a l is not t h a t t h e Nozickian p r o p e r t y rights of t h e l a n d o w n e r s s h o u l d b e violated b u t t h a t s u c h rights s h o u l d n o t exist. O u r Rawlsian finds insufficient t h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g a right to r e a s sign all o n e ' s land, a n d so rejects a b initio t h e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s Nozick favors. 4

5

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Vet Nozick's complaint may also h a v e another s e n s e , that Rawls is begging the q u e s tion against the claim that "historical-entitlement principles are fundamental" (ASU 202). Here, the point is not that Rawls is b i a s e d against all w a y s of specifying property rights as historically recursive but rather that w e are to identify the correct specification of property rights without any reasons or, at any rate, w i t h o u t the kind of r e a s o n s Rawls d e e m s relevant. This issue will be central in § § 3 - 4 . ^Analogues to t h e s e three points c a n be m a d e about an income-tax-funded welfare s c h e m e . There is no redistribution u n d e r the historical entitlement rules of s u c h a s c h e m e , b e c a u s e u n d e r these rules p e r s o n s are entitled only to their net i n c o m e ( w h i c h a l o n e is distributed to them in the first place) I n c o m e taxes w o u l d represent part of v o u r property, w h i c h a be.ng taken away from y o u , only if y o u w e r e entitled to y o u r g r o s s income, which, u n d e r the s c h e m e , y o u are not. T h o u g h the tax portion . n W s t K physically in y o u r possession, it is (when due) n o longer y o u r s but rather b e S s to the

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1.3. I n r e s p o n s e to Nozick's affirmation of a p a r t i c u l a r specification of rights, Rawls w o u l d n o t offer r e m a r k s o n a different subject, c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e s e N o z i c k i a n rights ( a n d w h a t e v e r e n t i t l e m e n t s t h e y give rise to) s h o u l d s o m e t i m e s b e o v e r r i d d e n b y o t h e r m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (cf. BSS 65). I n s t e a d , h e w o u l d a d d u c e r e a s o n s o n a h i g h e r level against a c c e p t i n g Nozick's specification of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s in t h e first p l a c e . It m a y h e l p t o fix t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o levels terminologically b y c o n t r a s t i n g t h e rights specified a s p a r t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w i t h t h e values a p p e a l e d to in t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of a l t e r n a tive i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . Values m a y conflict a n d t h e n r e q u i r e t r a d e offs a n d sacrifices. But w h a t e v e r liberties a n d rights (side c o n s t r a i n t s ) a r e specified by t h e c h o s e n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e are d e s i g n e d t o b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r from t h e start. T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r to violate s o m e o n e ' s right in o r d e r to fulfill t h e rights of o t h e r s s h o u l d in principle never arise. It is likely, for e x a m p l e , t h a t Nozick w o u l d value b o t h f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t a n d t h e c h a n c e of e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over l a n d . It is n o t p o s s i b l e for b o t h v a l u e s to b e fully i n c o r p o r a t e d into o n e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , h o w e v e r . A m o n g t h e v a r i o u s possibilities of sacrifice a n d c o m p r o m i s e , Nozick favors a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s h a v e full exclu s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over w h a t e v e r l a n d t h e y o w n , as well as a c o r r e s p o n d ingly l i m i t e d right t o f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t . T h o u g h t h e value of free d o m of m o v e m e n t is sacrificed in p a r t , t h e l i m i t e d right t o f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t t h a t e m e r g e s from t h e trade-off is n o t s u b j e c t to violation for t h e s a k e of o t h e r r i g h t s . Similarly, t h e Rawlsian's s c h e m e , t h o u g h it 6

7

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N o z i c k ' s failure to appreciate this d i s t i n c t i o n c o n f u s e s not o n l y h i s l o n g d i s c u s s i o n of Rawls but a l s o his d e v e l o p m e n t of h i s o w n theory. T h u s , c o n s i d e r h i s v i e w (ASU c h a p . 4) that s o m e b o r d e r s may b e c r o s s e d (i.e., s o m e rights m a y be violated) w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , p r o v i d e d that c o m p e n s a t i o n is paid. Offhand this v i e w m u s t s e e m i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . If I a m at liberty to d o X w i t h o u t y o u r c o n s e n t provided I p a y y o u c o m p e n s a t i o n , t h e n y o u have no right that I refrain from d o i n g so, a n d h e n c e m y d o i n g it c r o s s e s n o border at all. But the mistake is c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , b e c a u s e Nozick, operating o n a single level, h a s n o intelligible alternative. What a m I p a v i n g y o u c o m p e n s a t i o n for if n o right violation (border crossing) is involved in m y action? T h e difficulty d i s a p p e a r s if w e u n d e r s t a n d Nozick's p r o p o s a l as resolving, o n the h i g h e r level, a c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n values. S h o u l d there be a right not to have X d o n e to o n e w i t h o u t o n e ' s c o n s e n t or a liberty to d o X to o t h e r s w i t h o u t their c o n s e n t ? Given s t r o n g r e a s o n s in favor of e a c h , o n e might, rejecting both, b e d r a w n to a c o m p r o m i s e of the sort N o z i c k p r o p o s e s . Let there b e a liberty t o - d o - X - w i t h - c o n s e n t - o r - s i d e - p a y m e n t , a n d a right n o t - t o - h a v e - X - d o n e - t o - o n e - w i t h o u t - c o n s e n t - a n d - w i t h o u t - s i d e - p a y m e n t . In this c o m p r o m i s e , t h e s i d e p a y m e n t c o m p e n s a t e s not for violation of a right (it enters into h o w the right is formulated in the first placel but for abridgment of a value, the value of controlling w h e t h e r o t h e r s d o X to oneself. One d o e s not get s u c h control, but t h e institutionalized s i d e p a y m e n t t e n d s to make l e s s u n p l e a s a n t a n d l e s s frequent the o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h X is d o n e to o n e w i t h o u t o n e ' s c o n s e n t . B u t s u c h conflicts will, of course, arise in practice. Even the m o s t rational legal structure c a n n o t fully anticipate all p o s s i b l e conflict s c e n a r i o s or p r e e m p t all p o s s i b l e d i s p u t e s a b o u t its o w n interpretation. A value, e v e n w h e r e it is abridged, might still be partly realized, t h r o u g h c o n s e n t . In Nozick's s c h e m e , p e r s o n s c a n b u y or e x c h a n g e t r e s p a s s rights; in the reverse s c h e m e , l a n d o w n e r s c a n b u y their neighbors' p r o m i s e not to trespass. Still, Coase's t h e o r e m n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e c h o i c e of s c h e m e will make a n e n o r m o u s difference in h u m a n 7

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T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.1

c o m p r o m i s e s c e r t a i n values, features ( m o r e limited) p r o p e r t y rights t h a t m a y n o t b e violated for t h e sake of o t h e r rights. Neither s c h e m e is o r involves a "utilitarianism of rights," w h o s e r u l e s r e q u i r e o r p e r m i t t h a t p e r s o n s violate t h e rights of o t h e r s w h e n e v e r d o i n g s o p r o d u c e s a net gain for r i g h t s fulfillment overall (cf. ASU 28). A n d both s c h e m e s c o u l d b e justified t h r o u g h a balancing of values, d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h institutional s t r u c t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t e q u a l p a c k a g e of r e c o g n i z e d rights a n d liberties) y i e l d s t h e b e s t lives for individuals. 1.4. Still leaving a s i d e t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice, let m e n o w e x p o u n d s o m e w h a t m o r e p r e c i s e l y its s u b j e c t , t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of a self-contained social s y s t e m . My e x p o s i t i o n of t h e t w o key n o t i o n s involved d e p a r t s from Rawls's o w n in t w o m i n o r respects. 1.4.1.1 prefer t o s p e a k of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social system, r a t h e r t h a n , a s Rawls, of a society. He explicates t h i s n o t i o n a s follows: "Let u s a s s u m e , t o fix ideas, t h a t a society is a m o r e o r less self-sufficient association of p e r s o n s w h o i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o o n e a n o t h e r r e c o g n i z e certain r u l e s of c o n d u c t a s b i n d i n g a n d w h o for t h e m o s t p a r t a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m . S u p p o s e f u r t h e r t h a t t h e s e r u l e s specify a s y s t e m of c o o p e r a t i o n d e s i g n e d t o a d v a n c e t h e g o o d of t h o s e t a k i n g p a r t i n i t . . . . [A] society is a cooperative v e n t u r e for m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e " (TJ 4 ) . T h i s explication s e e m s n a r r o w , for t h e r e a r e s u r e l y m a n y h i s t o r i c a l societies (standardly so-called) w h o s e r u l e s fail e i t h e r to b e d e s i g n e d for m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e o r t o b e r e c o g n i z e d a s b i n d i n g b y all p a r t i c i p a n t s . For e x a m p l e , t h e r u l e s m a y b e d e s i g n e d for t h e a d v a n t a g e of a minority, and compliance by the remaining participants m a y be d u e to coercion o r religious s u p e r s t i t i o n . N o w Rawls is free, of c o u r s e , t o e x c l u d e s u c h c a s e s from h i s inquiry, leaving o p e n w h e t h e r a n d h o w s u c h social s y s t e m s c a n b e a s s e s s e d a s m o r e o r less just. B u t a s h i s f r e q u e n t u s e of slavery a s a n e x a m p l e of a social i n s t i t u t i o n m a k e s clear, t h i s is n o t h i s i n t e n t i o n . Seeing t h a t Rawls is u n c l e a r a b o u t t h e s c o p e of his inquiry in 9

1 0

11

terms, a s c a n b e s e e n b y comparing, e.g„ t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e landless poor u n d e r t h e s e t w o alternative s c h e m e s . ^ h i s statement fits w i t h what Nozick says w h e n h e is clear about t h e distinction b e t w e e n the t w o levels. In d i s c u s s i n g h o w his principles of appropriation a n d rectifica tion s h o u l d b e formulated, h e remarks about t h e latter (which governs a d j u s t m e n t s of h o l d i n g s in light of past infractions of his acquisition or transfer principles), "Whatever difficulties (the entitlement theorist] h a s in applying the principle of rectification t o p e r s o n s w h o d i d n o t t h e m s e l v e s violate t h e first t w o principles are difficulties in b a l a n c ing the conflicting considerations so a s correctly to formulate t h e c o m p l e x princiole o f rectification itself; h e will n o t violate moral side constraints b y applying t h e nrinrinle" ASU 173, cf. 1 4 6 , 1 8 0 - 8 1 ) . My point is that s u c h balancing of c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s T q u S d t h r o u g h o u t - . n the formulation of all s i d e constraints or other institutional f e a n ^ s « l think Rawls is here defining what a society is. Were he about what a society ought to be, I w o u l d not need t o objectTo This p t s s f g e " T h i s problem is first n o t e d bv Wolff tIR 77 7C u ;„ ,i ' t-"»s&age. 32,150n. ,thoughBeit tal<esS^ be mutuary advantageous (rather than be

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T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.4.2

21

t h i s r e s p e c t , I a m s t a r t i n g o u t w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of a (self-sufficient) social s y s t e m , w h i c h is b r o a d e r t h a n Rawls's official n o t i o n of a society. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , I a m also b r o a d e n i n g his e x p r e s s i o n "social c o o p e r a t i o n " to a l l o w t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n a social s y s t e m m a y b e largely coercive r a t h e r t h a n g e n u i n e l y c o o p e r a t i v e a n d t h a t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t social i n t e r a c t i o n s m a y t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e t h e e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . My initial focus, t h e n , is o n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d r e a s o n a b l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d s y s t e m of social i n t e r a c t i o n . I a m n o t d e n y i n g t h e possibility t h a t t h e r e a r e s o m e s u c h s y s t e m s to w h i c h Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is n o t p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e , b u t w e d o b e s t t o confront t h i s possibility later (§23), w h e n h i s c o n c e p t i o n is before u s in d e v e l o p e d form. 1.4.2. W h a t , t h e n , is t h e basic structure of a self-sufficient social s y s t e m ? Rawls leaves t h i s n o t i o n n o t m e r e l y v a g u e b u t also a m b i g u o u s . Let m e e x p l a i n b y e l a b o r a t i n g o n e of its t w o s e n s e s in Rawls, h o w I u n d e r s t a n d t h e t e r m basic structure. I will t h e n d e f e n d m y c h o i c e b y c o n t r a s t i n g it to t h e o t h e r s e n s e in w h i c h Rawls u s e s t h e t e r m . In A Theory of Justice t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social s y s t e m is d e n n e d a s "the w a y in w h i c h t h e m a j o r social i n s t i t u t i o n s d i s t r i b u t e f u n d a m e n tal r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e division of a d v a n t a g e s from social c o o p e r a t i o n " (TJ 7). Social i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e a s p e c i e s of social p r a c t i c e s a n d t h u s a r e in s o m e w a y s a n a l o g o u s t o g a m e s a n d rituals (TJ 55; cf. TCR 175 n. 1; JF 164 n. 2). So t h e t e r m institution is u s e d h e r e in a s e n s e t h a t — a l l o w i n g t h e ( r e d u n d a n t ) a d d i t i o n of " s o c i a l " — c o n t r a s t s w i t h its o t h e r s e n s e of o r g a n i z a t i o n o r c o r p o r a t i o n (as in " i n s t i t u t i o n of h i g h e r learning"). F o r this latter s e n s e of institution, Rawls u s e s t h e term association. Not every collective activity, h o w e v e r regular, c o n s t i t u t e s a social p r a c t i c e . It is further r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e relevant r u l e s b e g e n e r a l l y k n o w n a n d u n d e r s t o o d b y t h o s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e activity. A p r a c t i c e involves a s y s t e m of r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s t h a t "defines offices a n d p o s i t i o n s w i t h t h e i r rights a n d d u t i e s , p o w e r s a n d i m m u n i t i e s , a n d t h e like" (TJ 55). T h i s s y s t e m m a y i n c l u d e w a y s of d e a l i n g w i t h rule viola t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , p r o c e d u r e s for d e t e r m i n i n g violations, a list of a d m i s s i b l e e x c u s e s , p e n a l t i e s , a n d s o forth. Moreover, s o m e of t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e activity m u s t b e constitutive rules, w h i c h stipulate roles a n d m o v e s t h a t c o u l d n o t exist ( u n d e r t h e i r relevant d e s c r i p t i o n s ) o u t s i d e of t h e activity in q u e s t i o n (goalkeeper, t o c h e c k m a t e , e t c . ) . A 1 2

13

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C p . Hoffe, PG 3 2 6 - 2 8 . " R a w l s s l a t e s this s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t and t h e n illustrates it w i t h baseball terminol o g y a s follows: "The rules of practices are logically prior to particular c a s e s Given a n y rule w h i c h specifies a form of a c t i o n (a move), a particular a c t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be taken a s falling u n d e r this rule given that there is the practice w o u l d not b e described as that sort of a c t i o n u n l e s s there w a s t h e practice. In the c a s e of a c t i o n s specified by practices it is logically i m p o s s i b l e to perform t h e m o u t s i d e the stage-setting provided by t h o s e p r a c tices, for u n l e s s there is t h e practice, a n d u n l e s s the requisite properties are fulfilled, w h a t e v e r o n e d o e s , w h a t e v e r m o v e m e n t s o n e makes, will fail to c o u n t as a form of a c t i o n w h i c h t h e practice specifies" (TCR 189). I have w e a k e n e d this c o n d i t i o n by a s s u m i n g that

22

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.2

g a m e , for e x a m p l e , m a y involve v a r i o u s r o l e s (batter, u m p i r e ) , w i t h e a c h role envisaging v a r i o u s g a m e - d e p e n d e n t m o v e s t h a t o c c u p a n t s of this role m a y o r m u s t m a k e in c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s . T h e r e s e e m s t o b e n o very clear w a y of d e n n i n g social i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of social p r a c t i c e s . If g a m e s a n d rituals a r e n o t n o r m a l l y t h o u g h t of a s i n s t i t u t i o n s , it is p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e t h e y are, at least i n m o d e m W e s t e r n c u l t u r e , m a r g i n a l t o t h e o n g o i n g c o m p e t i tion over c o n t r o l of c o n d u c t a n d r e s o u r c e s . T h o u g h p e r s o n s ' b e h a v i o r w i t h i n a g a m e o r ritual m a y b e subject t o m o r a l critique, s u c h p r a c t i c e s t h e m s e l v e s are m u c h less so, a s s u m i n g t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n c a n easily b e d e c l i n e d , risks are limited, a n d s o o n . I n s t i t u t i o n s , by c o n t r a s t , d o call for m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t . For t h i s subject Rawls r e s e r v e s t h e t e r m justice a s "the first virtue of social i n s t i t u t i o n s " (TJ 3) or, p e r h a p s b e t t e r — t o b y p a s s t h e s i d e i s s u e of h o w to i n d i v i d u a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s — a s t h e first virtue of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . Given this n o t i o n of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , Rawls's p r o j e c t is t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of justice (or t h e c e n t r a l p a r t thereof) t h a t a s s e s s e s t h e most important i n s t i t u t i o n a l features of a n y self-contained (TJ 457) o r all-inclusive social s y s t e m (BSS IV). T h e s e e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of a c l o s e d s y s t e m ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e — " t h e political c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e legally r e c o g n i z e d forms of p r o p e r t y , . . . t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , a n d t h e n a t u r e of t h e family" (BSS 47), w h o s e effects a r e " p r o f o u n d a n d pervasive, a n d p r e s e n t from b i r t h " (TJ 96)—Rawls refers t o a s its b a s i c s t r u c t u r e (TJ §2, BSS). I will also say t h a t t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s of t h e , largely constitutive, g r o u n d rules t h a t s h a p e a society, o r of t h e terms oj'social interaction t h a t significantly involve o r a t least affect all its p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s define t h e society's c e n t r a l p r o c e d u r e s , b o d i e s , a n d offices, a n d t h e y regulate t h e a s s i g n m e n t of b e n e fits a n d b u r d e n s (rights a n d d u t i e s , p o w e r s a n d i m m u n i t i e s , g o o d s a n d services) t o p a r t i c i p a n t s in g e n e r a l a n d t o t h e o c c u p a n t s of special roles. In b r o a d outline, t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s of a society's b a s i c m o d e of e c o n o m i c organization; t h e p r o c e d u r e s for m a k i n g social 1 4

1 5

only some rules of the practice n e e d have this character (there might b e a rule in baseball that forbids players to bite or kick others). T h i s point is relevant t o Rawls's subject of a social system's basic structure. S o m e of the c o n d u c t rules in s u c h a system m a y m e r e l y restate natural duties, w h i c h p e r s o n s have toward o n e another irrespective o f a n v practices they may jointly participate in—criminal-law prohibitions against crueltv (TJ 1141 or against harming the innocent ITJ 109), for e x a m p l e " C o m p a r e t h e distinction Rawls makes in another context b e t w e e n "a practice i n which there is n o option w h e t h e r to e n g a g e in it or not, a n d o n e must plav" a n d prachce m w h i c h there ,s s u c h an option, and o n e m a y decline the invitation" t m 242; ci.

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c h o i c e s t h r o u g h t h e c o n d u c t of, or i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g , i n d i v i d u a l s a n d groups, a n d limitations u p o n s u c h choices; the more important prac tices g o v e r n i n g civil ( n o n e c o n o m i c a n d nonpolitical) i n t e r a c t i o n s , s u c h a s t h e family o r t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m ; a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e s for i n t e r p r e t i n g a n d enforcing t h e r u l e s of t h e s c h e m e . T h e first category in c l u d e s a specification of w h a t k i n d of i t e m s c a n b e o w n e d a n d b y w h o m , h o w o w n e r s h i p is g a i n e d a n d lost, b u t n o t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c a s s o c i a t i o n s s u c h as firms o r u n i o n s , w h i c h o n l y s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s are involved in. Similarly, t h e last c a t e gory m i g h t i n c l u d e a specification of t h e w a y s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h infractions of social r u l e s are to b e p r o t e s t e d , d e t e r m i n e d , p u n i s h e d , d e t e r r e d , o r p r e e m p t e d b u t n o t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e j u d i c i a r y o r t h e full details of c r i m i n a l trial p r o c e d u r e s . A m o n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s t h a t , w h e r e t h e y exist, are p a r t of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a r e t h e u s e of m o n e y , "competitive m a r k e t s , private p r o p e r t y in t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s family" (TJ 7), r u l e s g o v e r n ing t h e u s e of force, slavery (TJ 248), t h e division of p o w e r s , p a r l i a m e n tary d e m o c r a c y , judicial review, a t a x - f u n d e d welfare s y s t e m , a n d c o m pulsory primary education. T h i s n o t i o n of a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , a n e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e a c c o u n t in A Theory of Justice, conflicts w i t h a n a r r o w e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m w h i c h d o m i n a t e s Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n in " T h e Basic S t r u c t u r e as S u b ject." T h e r e t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is defined in t e r m s of " a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l division of labor b e t w e e n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e r u l e s a p p l y i n g directly t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s " (BSS 55). " T h e role of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t b e l o n g t o t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t o s e c u r e just back g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e a c t i o n s of individuals a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e " (BSS 53). By this n a r r o w c o n s t r u a l , Rawls's e x a m p l e s of private p r o p e r t y in t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s family w o u l d n o t b e i n c l u d e d , b e c a u s e it is n o t t h e i r role, e v e n ideally, to p r e s e r v e just b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s . T h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a d e v e l o p e d society m i g h t t h e n i n c l u d e little m o r e t h a n its welfare a n d s c h o o l s y s t e m s , a n d s o m e historical societies, o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d r u l e s t h a t a p p l y directly t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s , w o u l d lack a b a s i c structure altogether. I n w h a t follows, I w o r k w i t h t h e first, w i d e r s e n s e of t h e t e r m basic structure. In a way, t h i s c h o i c e reflects n o d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h Rawls, b e c a u s e it leaves u n d i s p u t e d h i s reasons for t h i n k i n g t h a t s p e c i a l m e c h a n i s m s a r e n e e d e d to p r e s e r v e a fair d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r a m o n g t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a social s y s t e m . I also believe, h o w 16

17

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H e r e a b a s i c structure m a y allow for c h o i c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h features of itself are changed. T h e n o t i o n of t h e basic structure, like m a n y o t h e r important c o n c e p t s , retains a certain v a g u e n e s s , w h i c h it w o u l d b e futile to try to r e m o v e c o m p l e t e l y . The n o t i o n m a y surely b e significant a n d p e n e t r a t i n g e v e n w i t h o u t a s h a r p line b e t w e e n practices that are a n d t h o s e that are not part of the basic structure. 1 7

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.2

24

ever, t h a t Rawls's n a r r o w i n g of t h e n o t i o n w a s a s t r a t e g i c m i s t a k e , b e c a u s e h e w a s t h e r e b y a c c e p t i n g t h e w a y Nozick w a n t s to s t r u c t u r e t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e i r t w o a p p r o a c h e s . W h a t 1 h a v e in m i n d c a n b e c o m e c l e a r only gradually, as I d e v e l o p t h e c o n t r a s t in a w a y that differs from Nozick's a n d Rawls's p r e s e n t a t i o n s . But o n e q u i c k w a y of sketching m y w o r r y is this: O n t h e n a r r o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m , Rawls's e n t e r p r i s e — t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t p r o v i d e s a criterion for t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s — either b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n by a s s u m i n g t h a t social s y s t e m s o u g h t t o have a basic s t r u c t u r e o r h a s n o t h i n g t o s a y a b o u t social s y s t e m s t h a t lack a basic s t r u c t u r e . T h e latter, m o r e c h a r i t a b l e v e r d i c t w o u l d render Rawls's a p p r o a c h p a r o c h i a l , as h e h i m s e l f s e e m s to c o n c e d e w h e n h e suggests t h a t (only?) w h e n w e o p t for a s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t d o c t r i n e a n d (only?) " o n c e w e t h i n k of t h e p a r t i e s to a social c o n t r a c t a s free a n d equal (and rational) m o r a l p e r s o n s [are t h e r e ] s t r o n g r e a s o n s for taking t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e as t h e p r i m a r y s u b j e c t " (BSS 48). " T h e l i b e r t a r i a n d o c t r i n e . . . h a s n o p l a c e for a s p e c i a l t h e o r y of j u s t i c e for t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e " (BSS 52). T h i s p a r o c h i a l c h a r a c t e r of Rawls's a p p r o a c h is close to w h a t Nozick is s u g g e s t i n g . T h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i tion at b e s t p r o v i d e s a s u i t a b l e s t a n d p o i n t for r a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s t h a t a r e o r g a n i z e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h (what Nozick calls) patterned p r i n c i p l e s . It is u n s u i t a b l e for a fair a s s e s s m e n t of t h e liber tarian i n s t i t u t i o n s Nozick favors (ASU 198-204). O n t h e w i d e n o t i o n of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e w h i c h I a m p r e s u p p o s i n g , any c o m p r e h e n s i v e social s y s t e m h a s a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e a n d t h u s falls w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of Nozick's m i n i m a l state, for e x a m p l e , c o n s i s t s of c e r t a i n p r o h i b i t i o n s against force a n d fraud, c e r t a i n r u l e s of a c q u i s i t i o n , transfer, a n d r e c tification of h o l d i n g s , a n d s o m e b a s i c m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t . Rawls a n d Nozick c a n t h e n b e s e e n t o b e o p e r a t i n g 18

19

,8

T h i s wide notion is not fully displaced in Rawls's later work. It still appears, for example, at BSS 55, where he varies the expression with "institutional form" and "social structure," suggesting that every social s y s t e m has such a core of basic institutions. "Nozick discusses some other basic structures in which the same rules and prohibi tions are combined with different methods of adjudication and enforcement—involving an ufrraminimal government, protection agencies, and individuals (respectively) As we shall see, Rawls's conception of justice is applicable even to the last of these Nozick's state of nature can be understood as a basic structure, provided the rules and practices he postulates for it are sufficiently known and honored to enable reasonably settled expectations about how persons will interact. T h u s it is false, I think, that "anarchist theoryrftenable undercuts the w h o l e subject of political philosophy" (ASU 4 l - 7 t teas if one allows that Rawls's question is in political philosophy. A n a r c W s s o p p o s e nsntu ..onal s c h e m e s involving governmental authorities and coercion, but this not onnosl tion to institutions as such. In fact, anarchist t h e o r i s t * Km.v,ii , I , ^ opposiof practices, procedures, rules, a n c f n Z n t h a t Z „ ^ ? J ^ P P social system^ T h e s e are anareWs. basT sSictu^s(irTmvtiH ^ Nevertheless, some intercourse is cleany n T - S t e a ° ^ ' I n ared i n s t l , u t I o n s w justice c o u l d be a s s e s s e d ( p a r a d i g m a t i c X T h V ^ t t ? ? ^ civUizati ns Rawls contends that even S ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ° »by certain natural duties (cf Chap n 1 7 w a l l y constrained m

6 a C h p e r S O n

2

s

c o n d u c t

l s m

M

r o

o s a ) s

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.5

25

w i t h i n t h e s a m e a r e n a of possibilities, offering c o m p e t i n g a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e s a m e subject, t h e justice of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . 1.5. O n c e t h i s focus o n a social s y s t e m ' s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e h a s b e e n fully u n d e r s t o o d , it h a s a s t r o n g claim to p r i m a c y w i t h i n m o r a l reflec t i o n q u i t e a p a r t from w h e t h e r o n e believes in social c o n t r a c t s o r free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n h o o d . T h e reason is t h a t w e c a n n o t , c o n c e p tually o r causally, e v a l u a t e w h a t w e a r e d o i n g t o o t h e r s w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t give m e a n i n g to o u r a c t i o n s a n d o m i s s i o n s a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e i r (often r e m o t e ) repercus s i o n s . N o r c a n w e s i m p l y take t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s for g r a n t e d . To s o m e e x t e n t t h e c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules, t h e w a y w e s t r u c t u r e h u m a n i n t e r a c tion, is u p to u s collectively, a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this c h o i c e are of t h e g r e a t e s t m o r a l significance. C o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w o n e o u g h t to c o n d u c t oneself w i t h i n a social context, therefore, o n e c a n n o t s i m p l y follow t h e prevailing social i n s t i t u t i o n s b u t m u s t e x a m i n e t h e s e from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. W h e r e t h e y are just, t h e y s h o u l d be c o m p l i e d with a n d s u p p o r t e d . Where they are unjust, one s h o u l d s e e h o w o n e m i g h t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e i r reform a n d p e r h a p s h e l p miti g a t e s o m e of t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . A n d w h e r e (just) i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e lacking a l t o g e t h e r , t h e task is to h e l p b r i n g t h e m a b o u t . T h i s crucial c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t w o m o r a l subjects, d e a l i n g respec tively w i t h i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d w i t h c o n d u c t , is n o t t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n m a c r o - a n d m i c r o c o n t e x t s , t h o u g h m a n y h a v e followed Nozick (ASU 167n, 2 0 4 - 5 ) in s u p p o s i n g o t h e r w i s e . U n d e r s t o o d generally, Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice is a p p l i c a b l e , in t h e limit, to t h e d e s i g n of g r o u n d r u l e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of t w o p e r s o n s s t r a n d e d t o g e t h e r o n a n isolated i s l a n d o r t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t m a y h a v e e m e r g e d b e t w e e n t h e m . If it is i n a p p l i c a b l e t o h o w p a r e n t s s h o u l d allocate r e s o u r c e s to t h e e d u c a t i o n of t h e i r c h i l d r e n , h o w t e a c h e r s s h o u l d g r a d e t h e i r p u p i l s , or h o w firms s h o u l d r e m u n e r a t e t h e i r e m p l o y e e s , t h e reason is n o t that t h e s e a r e small-scale i s s u e s b u t t h a t t h e y raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t c o n d u c t w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . Rawls's criterion is also i n a p p l i c a b l e to t h e d e s i g n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a s s o c i a t i o n s ( s u c h a s firms) a n d s u b s y s t e m s ( s u c h as n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m s ) , n o m a t t e r h o w large t h e s e m a y b e . T h i s m u s t b e s o o n p a i n of i n c o n s i s t e n c y , a s t h e r e is every r e a s o n t o believe t h a t t h e global c r i t e r i o n a n d t h e local criteria a r e n o t cosatisfiable. T h e e n t i r e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m c a n b e o r g a n i z e d so as to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e , o r e a c h p a r t of t h i s social s y s t e m m i g h t b e o r g a n i z e d s o a s to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h a t part, b u t w e c a n n o t h a v e it b o t h w a y s , b e c a u s e t h e t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s w o u l d i n p r a c t i c e conflict w i t h each other. 2 0

2 0

T h o u g h basic structure is s o m e w h a t m o r e restrictive than institutional scheme in regard to i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d , this difference will not matter in w h a t follows. I will generally prefer institutional scheme, b e c a u s e it is m o r e descriptive a n d not peculiar to Rawls.

26

T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.6

T h e crucial p o i n t , t h e n , is t h a t Rawls f o c u s e s o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l "rules of t h e g a m e " a n d n o t o n w h a t m o v e s p l a y e r s a r e m o r a l l y free or c o n s t r a i n e d t o m a k e w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r g a m e in p r o g r e s s . T o stay w i t h t h e m e t a p h o r for a m o m e n t , t h e q u e s t i o n is n o t w h e t h e r in a n o n g o i n g p o k e r g a m e t h o s e w h o h a v e w o n a great d e a l s h o u l d n ' t (be m a d e to) give s o m e of t h e i r w i n n i n g s to t h o s e w h o h a v e lost n e a r l y all t h e y h a d . T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r w e o u g h t n o t r a t h e r p l a y s o m e o t h e r g a m e t h a t d o e s n o t , t i m e a n d again, p r o d u c e d e s t i t u t e l o s e r s . T h i s q u e s t i o n m a y s e e m silly in t h e c o n t e x t of g a m e s t h a t p e r s o n s c a n join a n d q u i t at will, b u t it is of c o n s i d e r a b l e u r g e n c y in r e g a r d to t h e f r a m e w o r k of basic social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e b o r n i n t o it a n d s h a p e d b y it, c a n n o t quit at will, a n d a r e s u b j e c t t o violent c o e r c i o n w h e n t h e y try to i g n o r e its r u l e s . 1.6. T h e c o m m o n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls's p r o j e c t h a s v a r i o u s s o u r c e s . F r e q u e n t l y h i s t e r m institution is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s p e c i a l k i n d of actor, s u c h a s a g o v e r n m e n t o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t y . T h i s a s s o c i a tion is s o m e w h a t e n c o u r a g e d b y h i s n a r r o w u s e of t h e t e r m b a s i c structure in " T h e Basic S t r u c t u r e as Subject." T h e c a s e of o u r s i m p l e island e c o n o m y (or even that of t h e p o k e r g a m e ) m a y h e l p s h o w h o w Rawls's q u e s t i o n c a n arise e v e n i n very small-scale social s y s t e m s w h o s e relevant p r a c t i c e s c o u l d q u i t e conceivably w o r k w i t h o u t a n y a u t h o r i t i e s or officials. T h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is p e r h a p s f u r t h e r e n c o u r a g e d b y a reluc t a n c e t o a c c e p t t h a t social i n s t i t u t i o n s or b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n exist (be quantified over) a n d c a n h a v e m o r a l p r o p e r t i e s . But I d o n ' t believe Rawls's a p p r o a c h , p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , h a s s u c h i m p l i c a t i o n s . In d e veloping a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e (in h i s sense), o n e is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o thinking of social i n s t i t u t i o n s a s t h i n g s t h a t , like p e r s o n s , a r e responsi ble for c e r t a i n m o r a l l y salient a s p e c t s of reality. (In fact, t h i n k i n g t h i s w a y invites t h e m i s t a k e n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t insofar as i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e responsible, p e r s o n s are not.) Rather, o n e c a n allow t h a t talk a b o u t social i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y b e s h o r t h a n d for ( m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x ) talk a b o u t e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d m o d e s of i n t e r a c t i o n p r e v a l e n t in s o m e social s y s t e m a n d , c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h a t a c r i t i q u e of s o m e institution as u n j u s t c a n b e c a s h e d o u t a s a critique of c o n d u c t as w r o n g (namely, t h e c o n d u c t of t h o s e w h o i n a u g u r a t e d , p e r p e t u a t e , or are in a p o s i t i o n to reform t h e m o d e of i n t e r a c t i o n in question). Even w i t h s u c h reducibility, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n justice a n d morality is significant a n d fruitful. T h i s m a y b e overlooked i f — p e r h a p s led o n by t h e fact t h a t t h e adjectivesjusf a n d unjust c a n also a p p l y t o (individual a n d collective) a g e n t s a n d t h e i r c o n d u c t — o n e c o n c e i v e s t h e reducibility simplistically, that is, t h i n k s of institutional injustice a s s p l y the aggregate of m a n y h o m o l o g o u s i n t e r p e r s o n a l "injustices" 21

i m

T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.6

27

c o m m i t t e d b y (individual or collective) a g e n t s . I have a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d h o w this view is m i s l e a d i n g . T h e social injustice blacks h a v e suffered a s victims of t h e institution of slavery d o e s n o t c o n s i s t of a m u l t i t u d e of w r o n g s c o m m i t t e d against t h e m by t h e i r ("unjust") s l a v e h o l d e r s . W e c a n n o t c o m b a t this injustice by stealing a n d p r o t e c t i n g slaves o r t h r o u g h a t t e m p t s to reform s l a v e h o l d e r s ( p e r h a p s b y u r g i n g t h e m to r e l e a s e t h e i r slaves o r at least to give t h e m b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t ) . W e m u s t reform institutions. O n l y w h e n t h e relevant legal a n d political s y s t e m c e a s e s t o r e c o g n i z e p r o p e r t y rights in p e r s o n s is t h e social injustice o v e r c o m e . Likewise, w h e n Rawls c l a i m s t h a t e c o n o m i c inequalities prevailing i n d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n societies a r e u n j u s t (TJ 226, 279), h e is n o t e n v i s a g i n g t h a t — t h a n k s t o a c h a n g e of h e a r t a m o n g t h e rich o r t o i n t e r v e n t i o n s by t h i r d p a r t i e s — w e a l t h is to b e t r a n s f e r r e d or r e d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e p o o r . Rather, t h e p o i n t is t o c h a n g e t h e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t g o v e r n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources (and give rise to e x c e s sive inequalities) in t h e first p l a c e . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h e responsibility for s u c h u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e task of r e f o r m i n g t h e m a r e n o t c o n f i n e d to s l a v e h o l d e r s or t o t h e r i c h b u t r a t h e r fall u p o n all p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e social s y s t e m ( t h o u g h p e r h a p s i n p r o p o r t i o n to t h e benefits a n d a d v a n t a g e s t h e y enjoy u n d e r t h e u n j u s t s c h e m e a n d surely in p r o p o r t i o n to t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e y h a v e of s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform). Spelled o u t in this way, t h e focus o n a social s y s t e m ' s b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s a w a y of a d d r e s s i n g ( a n d t h u s a s s u m e s ) a s p e c i a l t y p e of m o r a l responsibility, t h e joint r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e h a v e for its j u s t i c e . N o w o n e m i g h t t h i n k that, s o u n d e r s t o o d , t h e subject of justice will largely p r e e m p t t h e subject of morality. O n c e t h e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e given, i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s o u g h t s i m p l y t o a b i d e b y t h e m , at least s o l o n g a s t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e just; it is o n l y w h e n g r o u n d r u l e s a r e u n j u s t , o r p a r t l y lacking, t h a t morality c o m e s i n t o play. But this view, s o m e w h a t e n c o u r a g e d b y Rawls's earlier baseball a n a l o g y (TCR), is a s u b s t a n t i a l o v e r s t a t e m e n t . Even w h e n a j u s t a n d c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s exists, it d o e s n o t s u p e r s e d e morality. I n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d r u l e s p r i n c i p a l l y govern e x t e r n a l c o n d u c t (generating d u t i e s of j u s t i c e in Kant's s e n s e ) a n d t h u s largely leave a s i d e o u r i n n e r lives. Morality (or ethics) a d d r e s s e s q u e s t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r , m a x i m s , virtues, i n t e n t i o n s , s e n t i m e n t s , a n d t h e like, w h i c h w o u l d b e i m p o r t a n t even (or r a t h e r , especially) in a perfectly just w o r l d . Next, a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e p r o v i d e s o n l y a g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k for i n t e r a c t i o n . Morality is relevant t o h o w w e a c t w i t h i n t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e l e e w a y left b y s u c h a framework. Not e v e r y t h i n g t h e g r o u n d r u l e s p e r m i t is of e q u a l m o r a l quality. Finally, m o r a l i t y s u p p l i e s i n d e p e n d e n t reasons for a c t i o n w h i c h m a y conflict w i t h just g r o u n d r u l e s in s p e c i a l c a s e s . Even p a r 2 2

zz

See

Kant, KPW 1 3 2 - 3 3 .

28

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.1

t i c i p a n t s in a (nearly) just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y in s p e c i a l c i r c u m stances have moral reasons not to comply with particular obligations t h a t p r o p e r l y a r o s e w i t h i n it (cf. §9.5). 23

Z. T h e R e l e v a n c e o f P a t t e r n s 2 . 1 . Let u s begin t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e criteria for a s s e s s i n g feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s b y asking w h a t r e l e v a n c e p a t t e r n s m i g h t h a v e for o u r subject. T h i s inquiry s h o u l d f u r t h e r i l l u m i n a t e o u r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o t y p e s of m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t , as well as t h e c h a r a c t e r of Rawls's p r o j e c t a n d of Nozick's m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it. With a n eye to e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s especially, Nozick p o s t u l a t e s a f u n d a m e n t a l division b e t w e e n patterned a n d unpatterned p r i n c i p l e s of distributive justice (ASU 155-60). He favors u n p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h specify p r o c e d u r e s t h r o u g h w h i c h h o l d i n g s c a n b e a c q u i r e d (initially or from others) a n d t h e n , so to speak, let t h e c h i p s fall w h e r e t h e y m a y . P a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , b y c o n t r a s t , involve t h e i d e a t h a t s o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of i n c o m e or w e a l t h are b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s — f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t h o l d i n g s (at a n y m o m e n t o r over time) s h o u l d b e r o u g h l y e q u a l , s h o u l d reflect h o w h a r d p e o p l e work, or s h o u l d b e above a c e r t a i n t h r e s h o l d . Nozick o p p o s e s p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , b e c a u s e t h e y r e q u i r e m e d d l i n g in c o n s e n s u a l e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s ("between c o n s e n t i n g adults") w h e n e v e r t h e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s w o u l d o t h e r w i s e u p s e t t h e fa vored p a t t e r n . T h e y l e a d t o " h e a d - o n c l a s h e s . . . [with] m o r a l s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s o n h o w individuals m a y b e t r e a t e d " (ASU 173; cf. t h e tale of Wilt C h a m b e r l a i n , ASU 161-64). A n d h e s e e s Rawls as p r e p o s s e s s e d in favor of p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , "for p e o p l e m e e t i n g t o g e t h e r b e h i n d a veil of i g n o r a n c e to d e c i d e w h o g e t s w h a t , k n o w i n g n o t h i n g a b o u t a n y special e n t i t l e m e n t s p e o p l e m a y have, will treat a n y t h i n g to b e d i s t r i b u t e d a s m a n n a from h e a v e n " (ASU 199; b u t cf. TJ 88). T h e mistake h e r e is t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n a r e t o d e c i d e not w h o gets w h a t b u t r a t h e r w h i c h criterion will govern t h e c h o i c e of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t regulate w h o gets w h a t . A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, s u c h a criterion s h o u l d b e sensitive t o w h a t sorts of p a t t e r n s various alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Nozick fails t o a p p r e c i a t e that any p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e might b e d e e m e d relevant in t w o different w a y s . O n e might p r o p o s e its i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e g r o u n d rules, as a r e q u i r e m e n t u p o n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s (officials) t o w o r k for i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e prevailing distribution of h o l d i n g s b y a d j u s t ing t h e i r o w n e c o n o m i c activities a n d by interfering w i t h t h o s e of " F o r examples of how such intrapersonal conflicts may arise even in a basically just socery, see Femberg, RI i - 2 4 . Rawls once had the ambition of extending; n s contractanan conception "to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system includTng pnnctp es for all the virtues" (TJ 17, cf. 109,130; BSS II), to be titled "rightn'ssasSness" 2 0

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.2

29

o t h e r s . S u c h a p r o p o s a l conflicts w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d r u l e s Nozick a d v o c a t e s a n d m o r e generally w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o c e d u r a l . Alternatively, t h e p a t t e r n prefer e n c e m a y b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n t h e a s s e s s m e n t ( a n d design) of g r o u n d r u l e s . W h a t is p r o p o s e d in this c a s e is that w e b e g u i d e d in r a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s by t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e . S u c h a p r o p o s a l d o e s n o t conflict w i t h t h e i d e a of p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s . W h e t h e r it s u p p o r t s t h e p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d r u l e s Nozick a d v o c a t e s d e p e n d s o n w h a t p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e is p r o p o s e d a n d o n e m p i r i c a l d a t a a b o u t t h e p a t t e r n s of h o l d i n g s t h a t v a r i o u s alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s (Nozick's i n c l u d e d ) t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Rawls's difference p r i n c i p l e m i g h t i n d e e d b e d e s c r i b e d a s "pat t e r n e d . ' ' It d o e s involve t h e i d e a t h a t s o m e p a t t e r n s a r e b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s . But it is a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e in t h e s e c o n d s e n s e . Rawls e m p l o y s it a s a c r i t e r i o n for t h e a s s e s s m e n t ( a n d design) of g r o u n d r u l e s . He d o e s n o t w a n t it to b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of t h o s e r u l e s t h e m s e l v e s . In fact, like Nozick, h e w a n t s t h e e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s to b e p r o c e d u r a l . If t h e y a r e just, t h a t is, t e n d to g e n e r a t e a b e t t e r p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s t h a n a n y feasible alternative i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d , t h e n t h e r e is n o n e e d for official i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s n e e d n o t w o r r y a b o u t t h e i m p a c t of t h e i r e c o n o m i c activities u p o n t h e overall p a t t e r n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h (cf. TJ 8 7 - 8 8 ; BSS 54). So t h e difference p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t select a p a t t e r n as s u c h ; it selects a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e o n t h e b a s i s of t h e p a t t e r n it t e n d s to p r o d u c e . H e n c e f l u c t u a t i o n s in t h e p a t t e r n a just e c o n o m i c s c h e m e g e n e r a t e s a r e n o t r e a s o n s for interfer ing ( t h r o u g h r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s ) w i t h t h e w o r k i n g s of t h i s s c h e m e . Moreover, in m a k i n g this selection, t h e difference p r i n c i p l e f u n c t i o n s r a t h e r differently from t h e o t h e r " p a t t e r n e d " p r i n c i p l e s t h a t Nozick l u m p s t o g e t h e r w i t h it. F r o m e x a m i n i n g a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e w i t h t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s it t e n d s t o p r o d u c e , o n e c a n tell h o w close it c o m e s to e q u a l i t y o r to h o l d i n g s b e i n g p r o p o r t i o n a l t o IQ o r m o r a l w o r t h . Yet o n e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r it satisfies t h e difference p r i n c i p l e or e v e n w h e t h e r it d o e s well o r poorly. T h i s a s s e s s m e n t essentially d e p e n d s u p o n w h a t o t h e r s c h e m e s are feasible a n d w h a t p a t t e r n s t h e y w o u l d t e n d t o g e n e r a t e . W h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is preferred a n d w h a t sort of p a t t e r n t h e p r e f e r r e d s c h e m e t e n d s to p r o d u c e d e p e n d u p o n t h e full r a n g e of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l alternatives. T h i s p o i n t u n d e r s c o r e s t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h : Rawls is n o t c o m m i t t e d to s o m e p a t t e r n . He s e e k s to b e c o m m i t t e d , like Nozick, to a p a r t i c u l a r institu tional s c h e m e a n d t o t h e a c c e p t a n c e of w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n s t h i s s c h e m e m a y g e n e r a t e over t i m e . But h e w a n t s t o b a s e t h i s c o m m i t m e n t u p o n a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e p a t t e r n s t h a t v a r i o u s a l t e r n a tive s c h e m e s t e n d t o p r o d u c e . He h o l d s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d o r c h o s e n via t h e i r p a t t e r n s . 2Jt. If w e a s s e s s social i n s t i t u t i o n s via t h e p a t t e r n s t h e y t e n d t o produce, w e m u s t ultimately compare entire basic structures, because

30

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.3

t h e best w a y of setting o n e p a r a m e t e r of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e m a y n o t be i n d e p e n d e n t of h o w its o t h e r p a r a m e t e r s will h a v e b e e n set. T h e value of c e r t a i n rights a p e r s o n h a s u n d e r o n e i n s t i t u t i o n , for e x a m p l e , m a y d e p e n d o n w h e t h e r h e h a s c e r t a i n o t h e r r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d b y a n o t h e r . It w o u l d also b e i m p l a u s i b l e , in c o m p a r i n g alternative s c h e m e s , to p r o c e e d p i e c e m e a l t h r o u g h t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s of g o o d s w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is p r e s u m e d t o m a t t e r . If t w o g o o d s — i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , for e x a m p l e — a r e u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d , it will often b e relevant w h e t h e r t h e s a m e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e d i s a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r b o t h d i s t r i b u t i o n s . While t h e r e is p l e n t y of r o o m for a b s t r a c t i o n s a n d simplifications of v a r i o u s kinds, t h e u l t i m a t e i d e a m u s t t h e n b e to c o m p a r e e n t i r e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s by reference to t h e master pattern e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e . H e r e a m a s t e r p a t t e r n c o n t a i n s i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e overall v a l u e s o m e in stitutional s c h e m e h a s for e a c h of its p a r t i c i p a n t s . 2 . 3 . T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s c a n e n g e n d e r p a t t e r n s is a n i d e a Nozick himself a p p e a l s to i n t h e c o n t e x t of h i s d i s c u s s i o n of invisibleh a n d e x p l a n a t i o n s , w h i c h explain " s o m e overall p a t t e r n o r d e s i g n " a s t h e u n i n t e n d e d r e s u l t of t h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d activities of p e r s o n s c o e x isting w i t h i n a c e r t a i n e n v i r o n m e n t (ASU 18). Let m e s h o w h o w t h e i d e a of p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s in Rawls's s e n s e c a n b e p r e s e n t e d a s a n e x t e n sion of t h i s p o i n t of Nozick's. A h o m i c i d e r a t e is a s i m p l e e x a m p l e of a p a t t e r n t h a t e m e r g e s a s t h e b y - p r o d u c t of t h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d activities of m a n y i n d i v i d u a l s . It is n o t i n t e n d e d o r b r o u g h t a b o u t b y a n y o n e . S u c h r a t e s a n d t h e w a y t h e y vary from c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e to t h e m o tives a n d beliefs of i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s , t h o u g h t h e s e a r e c r u c i a l t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r h o m i c i d e s . T h e social p h e n o m e n o n of h o m i cide calls t h e n for e x p l a n a t i o n o n t w o d i s t i n c t levels: for m a c r o e x p l a n a tions of its rates of i n c i d e n c e a n d for m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s . N e i t h e r t y p e of e x p l a n a t i o n c a n fully p r e e m p t t h e o t h e r . Individuals' m o t i v e s c a n n o t a c c o u n t for statistical p a t t e r n s , a n d t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of a statistical p a t t e r n d o e s n o t a c c o u n t for w h y t h e p h e n o m e n o n w a s m a n i f e s t e d i n these i n s t a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n in o t h e r s . N o w s u p p o s e , for t h e sake of t h e a r g u m e n t , it b e c a m e k n o w n t h a t s t r i c t n e s s of h a n d g u n legislation is o n e m a i n factor in t h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of h o m i c i d e . (Assume it explains s o m e sizable p a r t of n a t i o n a l differentials in h o m i c i d e rates, a n d d o n ' t w o r r y a b o u t w h e t h e r s u c h legislation is i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h t o b e p a r t of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e ) It w o u l d t h e n b e t r u e t h a t if w e have m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a l o w e r over a h i g h e r h o m i c i d e rate, t h e n w e have m o r a l r e a s o n to s u p p o r t s t r i c t e r 24

" N o z i c k offers this refutation of methodological individualism- "Tfth »>;« B I , , U , filters out (destroys) all non-P Q>, then the MDlanattorTof n « a filter that Q pattern P) will refer this filter For each S b O 5 l"* * ^ explanation w h y it is P, h o w it came tn he P Jjh« . • 1 Particular 01 w h y all Q s a r e ^ w i l T h e T e .hough t h e s e a r e a l l t h e ^ t h e r e ^ r e Z ^ P

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T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.4

31

r a t h e r t h a n laxer h a n d g u n legislation. O n c e w e c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t r o u g h p a t t e r n s various alternative s e t s of r u l e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r , w e c a n b r i n g o u r m o r a l v a l u a t i o n s of t h e s e p a t t e r n s to b e a r u p o n o u r m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative sets of r u l e s . For e x a m p l e , w e c a n u s e o u r n e w k n o w l e d g e t o c o n s t r u c t a m o r a l c r i t i q u e of existing h a n d g u n legislation. S u c h a c r i t i q u e w o u l d b e d e p e n d e n t u p o n a p a r t i c u l a r m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h o m i c i d e r a t e (involving r e f e r e n c e to institu t i o n a l factors), just a s t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r killing is d e p e n d e n t u p o n a p a r t i c u l a r m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n (involving t h e killer's a c t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) . Nozick's o w n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i c r o - a n d m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s c a n t h e n serve a s a b r i d g e . It c a n facilitate a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e parallel d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o s u b j e c t s of m o r a l reflection: i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s , w h i c h c a n b e m o r e o r less just o r unjust, a n d c o n d u c t , w h i c h m a y b e right o r w r o n g in d e g r e e s . And it c a n m a k e clear h o w p a t t e r n s m a y play a valid role in the former t y p e of a s s e s s m e n t s . Let m e a d d t w o clarifications. First, t h e s e t w o t y p e s of a s s e s s m e n t , just like Nozick's t w o t y p e s of e x p l a n a t i o n , d o n o t p r e e m p t e a c h o t h e r . F a u l t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors for a h i g h m u r d e r rate n e e d n o t at all e x o n e r a t e t h e c r i m i n a l s , n o r is d e n o u n c i n g all m u r d e r s a n d m u r d e r e r s t a n t a m o u n t to c o n d o n i n g laxity of g u n c o n t r o l . And faulting institu tional factors c a n a g a i n b e t a k e n a s s h o r t h a n d for a s c r i b i n g a r e s p o n sibility t h a t all c i t i z e n s s h a r e . Even t h o u g h e a c h a n d every m u r d e r e r is fully a c c o u n t a b l e for h i s act, t h e citizens in a d e m o c r a c y m a y also b e a r a n a d d i t i o n a l collective responsibility for s o m e fraction of all h o m i c i d e s if t h e s e a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e lack of a d e q u a t e h a n d g u n legislation, for e x a m p l e , o r to a n u n j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n . S e c o n d , I h a v e so far m e r e l y tried to s h o w how, in a Rawlsian view, t h e m o r a l v a l u a t i o n of p a t t e r n s e n t e r s — v i a i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t w h a t p a t terns alternative institutional s c h e m e s t e n d to e n g e n d e r — i n t o the m o r a l d e b a t e a b o u t t h e a s s e s s m e n t of s u c h s c h e m e s . It is a s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , o n c e t h e y h a v e e n t e r e d , will b e w e i g h t y e n o u g h to affect o u r a s s e s s m e n t s — t h a t is, in t h e c a s e at h a n d , w h e t h e r t h e y c a n o v e r t u r n t h e belief in a p e r s o n ' s right to o w n firearms o r in a majority's right to set risk levels for t h e p o p u l a t i o n at large. 2 . 4 . Let u s e x t e n d t h e s e t h o u g h t s to e c o n o m i c i s s u e s , to w h i c h Nozick's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p a t t e r n e d a n d u n p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s is chiefly a d d r e s s e d . I b e g i n by s k e t c h i n g a n a r g u m e n t t h a t c o u l d h a v e m o t i v a t e d t h e s u p p o r t e r s of t h e N e w Deal. S u p p o s e t h e y believed t h a t (1) t h e r e is m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s w i t h less r a t h e r 25

26

" N o z i c k explicitly a c c e p t s the related p o i n t that t w o p e r s o n s c a n e a c h b e fully r e s p o n sible for a single m u r d e r (ASU 130). H e r e a n d in the s e q u e l I a s s u m e that it w o u l d be objectively w r o n g not to d o w h a t o n e c a n easily d o t o w a r d the reform of unjust features of a n institutional s c h e m e for w h i c h o n e s h a r e s a collective responsibility. I d o not m e a n , however, to p r e j u d g e the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n d to w h a t e x t e n t o n e is b l a m e w o r t h y for not b e i n g aware of this responsibility or for b e i n g aware but ignoring it. T h e s e i s s u e s I leave a s i d e b e c a u s e t h e y w o u l d lead u s t o o far b e y o n d m y m a i n t o p i c : the moral a s s e s s m e n t of social institutions. 2 6

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T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.4

t h a n m o r e severe p o v e r t y a n d a l s o (2) t h e r e a r e feasible alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s (besides t h e laissez-faire s c h e m e prevailing in t h e 1920s) t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r less severe poverty. A s s u m e s u c h N e w Dealers f u r t h e r believed t h a t t h e m o r a l r e a s o n r e s u l t i n g from (1) a n d (2) is n o t n e u t r a l i z e d b y o t h e r m o r a l r e a s o n s favoring t h e existing s c h e m e over alternatives e n g e n d e r i n g less severe poverty. T h e y w o u l d t h e n c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e prevailing s c h e m e is u n j u s t a g a i n s t t h e back g r o u n d of s u p e r i o r alternatives. W h a t d o e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n m e a n for individuals? In p a r t i c u l a r , d o e s it entail t h a t t h e p o o r h a v e a right t o a c e r t a i n m i n i m u m i n c o m e , w i t h c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligations o n t h e p a r t of o t h e r s ? Asserting s u c h a right in this c o n t e x t c o u l d b e triply m i s l e a d i n g . First, as a m a t t e r of terminology, rights a r e b e s t specified by r e f e r e n c e t o a n institutional s c h e m e . U n d e r t h e s c h e m e prevailing in t h e 1920s n o right to a m i n i m u m i n c o m e existed. S e c o n d , t h e f o r m u l a t i o n m a y s u g g e s t t h a t u n d e r a just alternative s c h e m e p e r s o n s w o u l d h a v e a right t o a certain m i n i m u m i n c o m e . But t h i s n e e d n o t b e s o . T h e just s c h e m e w o u l d b e o n e that, s o m e h o w or other, t e n d s t o e n g e n d e r less severe poverty. It m a y n o t i n c l u d e t h e right in q u e s t i o n i f — h o w e v e r unlikely u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s — t h i s right is infeasible o r if t h e r e a r e m o r e effective alternatives for p r e v e n t i n g severe poverty. Is t h e p o i n t , t h e n , t h a t t h e p o o r h a v e a moral right t o a c e r t a i n m i n i m a l i n c o m e ? In a s e n s e , y e s . But third, t h e "right to" f o r m u l a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t w h a t is at i s s u e is a positive m o r a l right t h a t w o u l d give t h e p o o r a claim, against all of h u m a n k i n d , t o b e h e l p e d i n t h e i r n e e d . B u t n o s u c h c l a i m is at i s s u e . I a p p e a l t o a negative m o r a l right, a claim t h e p o o r h a d against A m e r i c a n citizens, specifically, w h o w e r e c o l l a b o r a t i n g in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a n u n j u s t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e t h a t t e n d e d t o p r o d u c e m o r e severe poverty t h a n is morally justifiable. T o b e s u r e , A m e r i c a n s p r e s u m a b l y h a d t o do s o m e t h i n g ("positive") t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform in o r d e r to avoid violation of t h e negative m o r a l right i n q u e s t i o n . But in t h e context of p r a c t i c e s , it d o e s n o t follow t h a t t h e i r d u t y to act is therefore a positive o n e . T h e negative d u t y n o t t o a b u s e just p r a c t i c e s m a y d e m a n d positive action, a s w h e n o n e m u s t act t o k e e p a p r o m i s e o r c o n t r a c t o n e h a s m a d e . Similarly, t h e negative d u t y n o t t o collabo r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y also d e m a n d positive a c t i o n s (with t h e s o m e t i m e s possible alternative of w i t h d r a w i n g al t o g e t h e r from p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e u n j u s t s c h e m e ) . 27

All this suggests h o w o u r Rawlsian c a n begin to s u p p o r t t h e a l t e r n a tive specification of l a n d o w n e r s h i p rights against Nozick's. I left t h e i r W h i l e h i s conception of justice, I think, strongly suggests it R a w U Hr> „ . i i edge such a negative right and duty but merely promote ,ust institutes (TJ 115, 334), which he classifies as posi,^ ira) Thta teav^s him unable to expla n whv one's r p ^ n n n c i h i i i t , , r„„ .u • . ^"°'" "- tnis leaves greater when one^s a panicTpantTnTa S m T h i s d T ^ ° * ^ negative duty, postulatetogether w M i *P " weight than positive ones" (TJ 1 1 4 ^ a r y view that negahve duties have more 2 7

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33

d i s p u t e in a standoff, s h o w i n g h o w n e i t h e r p r o t a g o n i s t c o u l d r e a s o n ably take his specification of p r o p e r t y rights for g r a n t e d a n d t h e n a c c u s e t h e o p p o n e n t of a d v o c a t i n g a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h t h e c o r r e c t p r o p e r t y rights w o u l d b e r o u t i n e l y violated. W e n o w have a c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t m i g h t b r e a k t h e standoff. As Nozick u n d e r s t a n d s , h i s set of r u l e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r a certain r o u g h p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s , r e a s o n a b l y stable over t i m e : "Heavy s t r a n d s of p a t t e r n s will r u n t h r o u g h it; signifi c a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e v a r i a n c e in h o l d i n g s will b e a c c o u n t e d for b y p a t t e r n - v a r i a b l e s " (ASU 157). N o w it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t u n d e r h i s libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s o u r i s l a n d e c o n o m y w o u l d t e n d t o b e d o m i n a t e d b y t w o o r t h r e e large family e s t a t e s w h e r e t h e r e m a i n i n g l a n d l e s s p o p u l a t i o n w o u l d s p e n d t h e i r lives as l a b o r e r s or s e r f s . T h e Rawls i a n ' s s c h e m e , by c o n t r a s t , w o u l d k e e p l a n d w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d a n d w o u l d t h u s e n s u r e t h a t t h o s e w h o d o e n d u p l a n d l e s s c a n at least c h o o s e a m o n g m a n y c o m p e t i n g e m p l o y e r s a n d sellers of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c e . In s h o r t , t h e available e v i d e n c e from h i s t o r y a n d social t h e o r y m a y s u g g e s t that Nozick's s c h e m e w o u l d h a v e feudalistic features a n d t h a t t h e Rawlsian's s c h e m e w o u l d t e n d to e n g e n d e r a c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t e c o n o m y in w h i c h t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n s , especially, w o u l d b e m u c h s u p e r i o r to t h a t of serf. 2 . 5 . I h a v e said t h a t Rawls's t o p i c — m o r a l reflection u p o n b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s — i s c r u c i a l for g a i n i n g a m o r a l o r i e n t a t i o n , for u n d e r s t a n d ing w h a t w e are d o i n g to o t h e r s . Social i n s t i t u t i o n s play a large role in d e t e r m i n i n g b o t h t h e m e a n i n g a n d t h e effects of o u r c o n d u c t . T h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h e last few p a g e s b r i n g o u t t w o f u r t h e r r e a s o n s w h y t h i s t o p i c is s o i m p o r t a n t . First, i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l factor in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s prevailing in s o m e social s y s t e m . This is easily a p p r e c i a t e d t h r o u g h c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d i e s of n a t i o n a l societies t h a t differ in social institu t i o n s (for e x a m p l e , form of g o v e r n m e n t , legal s y s t e m , o r g a n i z a t i o n of military a n d p o l i c e forces, e d u c a t i o n a l facilities, s y s t e m of l a n d t e n u r e , specification of p r o p e r t y rights, o r tax s t r u c t u r e ) . S u c h i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors c o n d i t i o n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e various a c t o r s — c i t i z e n s , officials, a s s o c i a t i o n s , a n d g o v e r n m e n t s — b y s h a p i n g t h e i r values a n d o p t i o n s a n d b y fixing t h e i r "pay-off matrix," t h a t is, t h e s c h e d u l e of incentives a n d d i s i n c e n t i v e s t h e y confront. In this w a y t h e y d e t e r m i n e (in a r o u g h statistical way) m o r a l l y significant aggregate features of t h e social sys t e m , s u c h a s t h e level a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a s i c f r e e d o m s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s , political influence, h e a l t h care, e d u c a t i o n , w o r k satisfaction, self-re s p e c t , c u l t u r e , poverty, crime, life e x p e c t a n c y , infant mortality, c h i l d a b u s e , s u i c i d e , a n d s o forth. T h e p a t t e r n so e n g e n d e r e d a l r e a d y reflects t h e fact t h a t s o m e p e r s o n s try, w i t h i n t h e i r m e a n s , to h e l p alleviate c o n d i t i o n s t h e y c o n s i d e r objectionable. While s u c h efforts m a y cer tainly m a k e a g r e a t difference, it d o e s n o t s e e m r e a s o n a b l e o r realistic 28

2 8

C o m p a r e h e r e Nozick's e n d o r s e m e n t of "private t o w n s " (ASU 270n, cf. 322-23).

34

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.5

t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e y c o u l d m u l t i p l y t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y w o u l d fully offset s t r o n g c o u n t e r v a i l i n g t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c t o a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . In a n y case, o n e s h o u l d e x p l o r e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e strategy that g o e s b e y o n d s u c h r e m e d i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s d e m a n d e d o r e n c o u r a g e d by morality, a i m i n g for a n e w i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d t e n d to engender a more acceptable pattern land t h u s w o u l d r e d u c e the need for r e m e d i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s ) . S u c h a t t e m p t s at i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e w o u l d s e e m t o h o l d o u t t h e greatest h o p e t h a t o u r c o m b i n e d m o r a l efforts will a c c u m u l a t e i n t o lasting p r o g r e s s . C o n c e n t r a t i n g exclusively o n private a t t e m p t s t o i m p r o v e a prevailing p a t t e r n , o n e c a n at b e s t h o p e t h a t c o n t i n u i n g efforts will m a i n t a i n t h e social s y s t e m s o m e w h a t a b o v e its e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t ( w h e r e it w o u l d b e if e v e r y o n e a c t e d self-interestedly). By c o n t r a s t , institutional c h a n g e , as exemplified b y t h e abolition of slavery o r b y t h e N e w Deal, c a n m o v e this e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t itself, t h e r e b y also b r i n g i n g further i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms w i t h i n r e a c h . Moral efforts are likely t o b e of e n d u r i n g historical significance o n l y w h e n t h e y c a n b e c o m e c u m u l a t i v e in t h i s way. T h i s first n e w r e a s o n m a y s u g g e s t t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m is b e i n g r e c o m m e n d e d for its effectiveness a l o n e , t h a t it is m e r e l y a different ( a n d better) w a y of d o i n g s o m e t h i n g m o r a l b y m a k i n g t h e w o r l d a little b e t t e r . But t h i s c o n c l u s i o n m i s s e s a crucial p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e g r o u n d of t h e d u t y t o take a n i n t e r e s t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s . An a r g u m e n t f o u n d e d o n morality w o u l d seek t o s h o w t h a t p e r s o n s i n g e n e r a l have positive claims against o n e a n o t h e r — f o r e x a m p l e , t o b e r e s c u e d , fed, o r d e f e n d e d . S u c h a n a r g u m e n t w o u l d g o a g a i n s t t h e grain of t h e Anglo-American m o r a l a n d legal t r a d i t i o n , i n w h i c h it is often d e n i e d t h a t p e r s o n s h a v e d u t i e s t o p r o t e c t a n d aid o t h e r p e r s o n s in d i s t r e s s : it's a g o o d t h i n g t o h e l p t h o s e w h o m i g h t o t h e r w i s e d r o w n o r starve o r b e m u r d e r e d , b u t it i s n ' t very w r o n g n o t to, especially if t h e trouble, e x p e n s e , o r risks involved a r e n ' t negligible. I a m n o t challeng ing this view h e r e . T h e m o r a l responsibility I a m s p e a k i n g of is f o u n d e d o n justice a n d involves p e r s o n s ' negative claim n o t t o b e m a d e victims of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s t h o u g h t i n d i c a t e s t h e s e c o n d n e w r e a s o n for t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Rawls's topic, t h a t (advantaged) p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a n institutional s c h e m e s h a r e a responsibility for t h e justice of t h e s c h e m e . If t h e s c h e m e is unjust, o n e m a y b e i m p l i c a t e d with o t h e r s in a collective w r o n g w h o s e victims h a v e u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s i m p o s e d u p o n t h e m . Since, a s a m o r a l p e r s o n , o n e w a n t s to avoid being involved in s u c h w r o n g s , o n e h a s r e a s o n t o reflect u p o n t h e justice of social i n s t i t u t i o n s S u c h reflection is especially needful b e c a u s e injustices m a y n o t b e obvious. T h e c o n n e c t i o n of excessive deprivations a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s t o t h e institutional s c h e m e p r o d u c i n g t h e m m a y b e o p a q u e T h e in justice of a n institutional s c h e m e t e n d s to b e m o s t manifest w h e n t h e radical m e q u a l m e s it p r o d u c e s are clearly " o n t h e b o o k s " a r e for

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35

n e i t h e r explicitly n o r e v e n implicitly called for b y t h e prevailing g r o u n d r u l e s b u t h a v e merely, a s a n e m p i r i c a l m a t t e r , c o m e a b o u t p u r s u a n t t o them. T h u s t h e injustice of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery (as it existed in t h e U n i t e d States) is c o m p a r a t i v e l y obvious. Not o n l y w e r e s o m e forced to live in a h i g h l y d e h u m a n i z i n g c o n d i t i o n , b u t this c o n d i t i o n of slavery w a s "official," explicitly i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e A m e r i c a n political a n d legal s y s t e m (in voting rights, fugitive slave laws, a n d so forth). B e c a u s e of its d i s t i n c t l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s y s t e m i c c h a r a c t e r , it is a l s o especially evident that the moral problem concerned not slaveholders alone but e v e n t h o s e A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s w h o n e i t h e r o w n e d slaves n o r benefited from slavery. T h e s e w e r e n o t u n c o n c e r n e d b y s t a n d e r s , a s t h e i r S w e d i s h c o n t e m p o r a r i e s m a y h a v e b e e n — m e r e l y a w a r e of e n s l a v e m e n t a n d in a p o s i t i o n t o d o at least a little bit a b o u t it. Rather, t h e y s h a r e d a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e injustice; t h e y h a d a negative d u t y to s t o p c o o p e r a t i n g in its i m p o s i t i o n , for e x a m p l e , by h e l p i n g to e n d slavery t h r o u g h institutional reforms. T h e o t h e r e n d of t h i s s p e c t r u m c a n b e exemplified, o n c e again, b y t h e laissez-faire i n s t i t u t i o n s p r e c e d i n g t h e N e w Deal. S u p p o s e t h e s e e n g e n d e r e d severe d i s a d v a n t a g e s — i n t e r m s of n u t r i t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h care, etc.—for t h o s e b o m into t h e l o w e r classes, w h o s e plight w a s t h e s y s t e m a t i c c o r r e l a t e of a n u n c o n s t r a i n e d m a r k e t s c h e m e in w h i c h t h e i n c o m e of m a n y h o u s e h o l d s w a s d e t e r m i n e d solely by t h e vagaries of s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d for t h e k i n d s of l a b o r t h e i r m e m b e r s c o u l d sell. Unlike slavery, this s c h e m e did n o t (explicitly or implicitly) call for excessive d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . Yet it d i d in fact c o n s i s t e n t l y e n g e n d e r t h e m . It is o n t h e basis of this fact, a n d against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of at least o n e a c c e s s i b l e alternative s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d n o t t e n d to p r o d u c e similarly r a d i c a l inequalities, t h a t o n e c a n reject t h e relevant e c o n o m i c s c h e m e a s u n j u s t a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s at t h e t i m e w e r e i m p o v e r i s h e d (rather t h a n m e r e l y poor), w e r e starved ( r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y starving). A n d this c o n c l u s i o n in t u r n s u p p o r t s t h e j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in this s c h e m e , insofar as t h e y p e r p e t u a t e d it (or e v e n r e s i s t e d its reform), s h a r e d a responsibility for its injustice. T h e y h a d a negative d u t y n o t t o c o l l a b o r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h in p r a c t i c a l t e r m s m e a n s t h a t t h e y o u g h t to h a v e p l a n n e d a n d p r o m o t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. It is p o s s i b l e t h a t in o u r c o m p l e x a n d functionally highly differenti29

2 9

I n s u c h clear c a s e s it is also m o s t obvious that reforms c a n n o t b e b l o c k e d by t h e a r g u m e n t that a liberation of slaves w o u l d violate the e n t i t l e m e n t s of their p r e s e n t o w n e r s a n d is therefore e x c l u d e d by moral s i d e constraints. Perhaps e n t i t l e m e n t s that arose p u r s u a n t to legally valid but unjust rules s h o u l d not be simply disregarded. T h e u n j u s t rules w e r e not u n i q u e l y the slaveholders' responsibility, a n d s o there m a y be r e a s o n s w h y c i t i z e n s at large s h o u l d c o m p e n s a t e slaveholders for their l o s s . There is n o reason, h o w e v e r , w h y the slaveholders s h o u l d have the o p t i o n to retain their slaves in preference to appropriate c o m p e n s a t i o n . N o o n e c a n have a claim that unjust institu t i o n s s h o u l d exist or c o n t i n u e , a n d the slaves land their progeny) have a c o n t i n u i n g negative c l a i m not to b e forced to e n d u r e u n j u s t c o n d i t i o n s .

36

T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.

a t e d w o r l d , injustices of this s o r t a r e q u i t e p r o m i n e n t , e s p e c i a l l y if I am right (in Part Three) to e x t e n d t h e Rawlsian p r o j e c t t o t h e global basic s t r u c t u r e . It is n o t easy to c o n v i n c e oneself t h a t o u r c u r r e n t global order, a s s e s s e d from a Rawlsian p e r s p e c t i v e , is m o d e r a t e l y just despite t h e w i d e s p r e a d a n d e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s it en g e n d e r s . Even if w e limit o u r vision to o u r o w n a d v a n c e d Western society, it is h a r d l y o b v i o u s that t h e b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s w e p a r t i c i p a t e in are just or nearly just. In a n y c a s e , a s o m e w h a t u n o b v i o u s b u t massive t h r e a t t o t h e m o r a l quality of o u r lives is t h e d a n g e r t h a t w e will have lived as a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o l l a b o r a t i n g in their p e r p e t u a t i o n a n d benefiting from t h e i r i n j u s t i c e . 30

3. T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of J u s t i c e 3.1. If h i s g r o u n d r u l e s d i d really t e n d to e n g e n d e r a d e g e n e r a t e form of feudalism, Nozick m i g h t well regret it. But h e w o u l d n o t r e c o n s i d e r h i s c o m m i t m e n t to libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s . W h y n o t ? We h a v e s e e n t h a t Nozick's i n s i s t e n c e o n (property) rights c o n c e i v e d a s s i d e c o n straints, w i t h t h e correlative r e j e c t i o n of r e d i s t r i b u t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e s , c a n n o t b e a g o o d r e a s o n , b e c a u s e Nozick's antifeudalist p r e f e r e n c e c a n still b e relevant t o t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t r i g h t s (or i n s t i t u t i o n s generally) t h e r e s h o u l d b e in t h e first p l a c e . W h e n b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n this q u e s t i o n , t h e p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e cannot collide w i t h p r o p e r t y rights, for t h e c h o i c e of a s c h e m e of s u c h r i g h t s is still at i s s u e . C a n w e a t t r i b u t e t o Nozick a n o t h e r r a t i o n a l e t h a t w o u l d e x p l a i n h i s indifference t o t h e k i n d of e m p i r i c a l a r g u m e n t o u r R a w l s i a n p r o p o s e s ? At t i m e s Nozick s e e m s q u i t e u n w i l l i n g t o e n t e r t a i n a n y d e e p e r ra tionale or justification for h i s view, insisting i n s t e a d t h a t "historicale n t i t l e m e n t p r i n c i p l e s are f u n d a m e n t a l " (ASU 202). T h e s u g g e s t i o n is t h a t it is n o t g o o d e n o u g h for Rawls's criterion t o favor p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s ( s u c h as a specification of p r o p e r t y rights a s historically recursive). T h e p r o b l e m Nozick s e e s is t h a t Rawls w o u l d h a v e d e r i v e d t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s from higher-level c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : "Rawls' c o n s t r u c t i o n will yield a p p r o x i m a t i o n s of [the precisely correct principles) at b e s t ; it will produce the wrong sorts of reasons for them" (ASU 202, m y e m p h a s i s , cf. 2 0 3 - 4 , 215). But w h a t is Nozick's alternative? Are w e t o take it as just plain obvious t h a t t h e rights he p r o p o s e s e x p r e s s " t h e precisely correct principles"? And w h a t if s o m e alternative specifica tion of rights ( p e r h a p s that of o u r Rawlsian) is r e c o m m e n d e d a s o b vious as well? T h e d e b a t e m i g h t b e c o m e r a t h e r dull But p e r h a p s Rawls a n d Nozick are n o t so far a p a r t . Rawls, t o o , conviction, n a m e l y , this conviction is not self-verifving can be s u h W ^ H f well b e untenable. Still. 1 cWt^^nretend t h ^ ' t h sufficient to u n d e r m i n e t P

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believes t h a t w e h a v e c e r t a i n m o r a l fixed p o i n t s , o n all levels of g e n e r ality, w h i c h a n y c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t by a n d large a c c o m m o d a t e . T h u s , a l t h o u g h all r i g h t s m u s t b e derivable from t h e relevant h i g h e r level c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (those reflected in t h e original p o s i t i o n I, t h e failure of s u c h a derivation w o u l d in m a n y c a s e s b e m o r e likely to m a k e u s doubtful a b o u t Rawls's c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i t i o n t h a n a b o u t t h e right in q u e s t i o n . So Rawls w o u l d agree that s o m e rights a r e f u n d a m e n tal in t h e s e n s e t h a t w e w o u l d reject a n y c o n c e p t i o n of justice that d i d n o t — u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s a n y w a y — f i r m l y entail t h e s e rights. But h e w o u l d not, of c o u r s e , agree t h a t Nozick's favorite p r o p e r t y rights are f u n d a m e n t a l . Nozick, too, c o u l d p r o v i d e s o m e rationale for his a c c o u n t of rights, o r s o I s u g g e s t . J u s t as Rawls agrees w i t h Nozick t h a t g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o c e d u r a l , Nozick c a n agree w i t h Rawls t h a t t h e e n d o r s e m e n t of a p a r t i c u l a r set of g r o u n d r u l e s c a n be justified, or at least motivated, by a p p e a l t o a ( m a s t e r - I p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . In o n e s e n s e this point is trivial. Nozick c a n say t h a t h e prefers t h e institutional s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h c e r t a i n rights a n d liberties are d i s t r i b u t e d in exactly t h e w a y p r o v i d e d for b y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e favors. W h a t I a m suggesting, however, is a m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g s c e n a r i o in w h i c h Nozick w o u l d offer a n i n d e p e n d e n t n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l freedom, for e x a m p l e , a n d w o u l d t h e n p r o c e e d t o a r g u e t h a t t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e favors w o u l d p r o d u c e a n o p t i m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m so c o n c e i v e d . This s c e n a r i o m i g h t t h e n get s o m e d e b a t e going by p u t t i n g Nozick i n t o conflict w i t h Rawls over w h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be d e e m e d relevant, a n d how relevant, to t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . Nozick w o u l d a c c e p t t h e invitation to justify' his favored g r o u n d r u l e s t h r o u g h a " p a t t e r n e d " c r i t e r i o n of distributive justice t h a t involves w h a t I earlier called a s y s t e m a t i c b a l a n c i n g of values. For p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , w e c a n a n a l y z e e a c h s u c h p a t t e r n e d criterion by asking t h r e e m a i n q u e s t i o n s a b o u t it: Who is a participant, a unit of moral concern, or where should we look for information? What goods and 01s are morally significant and what is their comparative significance, or what information must we look for and how does this information determine a participant's position (intrapersonal balancing/ aggregation)? How should one rank the distributions of positions that alternative institu tional schemes might generate among their participants (interpersonal balancing/aggregation)? A n s w e r s t o t h e first t w o q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e w h a t information is n e e d e d for t h e c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of institutional s c h e m e s . An s w e r s to t h e last t w o q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e h o w t h a t information is to b e e v a l u a t e d s o a s to arrive at this a s s e s s m e n t . T a k e n together, t h e t h r e e answers constitute a pattern preference. 3 . 2 . Let u s t r y t o l o c a t e Nozick's view a n d its c o n t r a s t to Rawls w i t h i n

38

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t h e framework of t h i s analysis. It is clear, 1 think, t h a t t h e y d o not seriously differ in r e s p e c t to t h e w h o - q u e s t i o n . Nozick is s o m e w h a t m o r e o p e n t o t h e c l a i m s of a n i m a l s (ASU 35-42), b u t in e s s e n c e they s h a r e t h e c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n i s m a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m . F o r b o t h of t h e m , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t s of m o r a l c o n c e r n are i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n persons. We c a n also say, at least w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of this a n a l y s i s , t h a t it is n o t helpful t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick as b e i n g centrally a b o u t t h e relative m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e of f r e e d o m a n d equality. F r e e d o m a n d equality figure in t h e a n s w e r s to different q u e s t i o n s — w h a t a n d h o w , r e s p e c t i v e l y — a n d therefore d o n o t c o m p e t e . Yes, Nozick is willing to tolerate even e x t r e m e i n e q u a l i t i e s i n h o l d i n g s , w h e n t h e s e a r e p r o d u c e d by h i s libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s . But this is not, I think, b e c a u s e h e c a r e s so little a b o u t equality, b u t b e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t view h o l d i n g s as a significant a s p e c t of t h a t p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n m a t t e r s for t h e d e s i g n of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . With r e g a r d to t h e a s p e c t s of individual f r e e d o m h e d o e s r e c o g n i z e , Nozick is, as w e will see, at least a s egalitarian as Rawls. A n d Rawls, tor h i s part, is n o less c o m m i t t e d to f r e e d o m t h a n Nozick is. Not o n l y d o e s h e give lexical priority to certain b a s i c liberties; h e e v e n w a n t s to formulate h i s s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e of justice s o t h a t b o t h p r i n c i p l e s to g e t h e r are t a n t a m o u n t to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t "to m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h t o t h e least a d v a n t a g e d of t h e c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d b y all" (TJ 205; cf. BSS 41). T h e s u b s t a n t i v e divergence b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick m u s t t h e n c o n c e r n t h e w h a t - q u e s t i o n , reflecting differences a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m a n d t h e relative m o r a l significance of v a r i o u s a s p e c t s thereof. Here I s e e as t h e crucial difference t h e i r conflicting views a b o u t t h e m o r a l relevance of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d p a t t e r n features. By engendered p a t t e r n features I m e a n o n e s that, like i n c o m e differentials in a free-market s y s t e m , are n o t directly called for in t h e relevant r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s b u t m e r e l y foreseeably c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h t h e m . T h e y are a s u b s e t of t h e larger class of social p h e n o m e n a a n institutional s c h e m e e n g e n d e r s (this class m a y also i n c l u d e its b i r t h rate, h o m i c i d e rate, d e g r e e of political a p a t h y , a n d s o on). In assigning c a u s a l responsibility for s u c h p h e n o m e n a to (particu lar) social i n s t i t u t i o n s o n e will often have to rely o n c o m p l e x a n d s o m e w h a t speculative e m p i r i c a l generalizations, w h i c h m u s t also d e a l w i t h s u c h b a c k g r o u n d factors as c u l t u r e a n d n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t G o o d s a n d ills are established w h e n t h e y are directly called for i n t h e (written or unwritten) rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s of t h e social s y s t e m , even if t h e y are n o t specifically assigned to p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s o r n a t u r a l 0

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p r i n c i p l e p o s s i b l e t h a t all s h o u l d m e e t i t . By e s t a b l i s h i n g c e r t a i n d i s a d v a n t a g e s , a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e m a y e n g e n d e r further b u r d e n s , a s w h e n g e n d e r - s e n s i t i v e i n h e r i t a n c e laws have r e s u l t e d in a n inferior e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n for w o m e n . Nozick gives c o n s i d e r a b l e m o r a l significance to this d i s t i n c t i o n . I take h i m to h o l d t h a t in d e s i g n i n g a n ideal i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , w e s h o u l d b e p r i m a r i l y o r even exclusively c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u tion of e s t a b l i s h e d g o o d s a n d ills a n d , m o r e particularly, w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . We n e e d n o t b e c o n c e r n e d (or w e n e e d b e m u c h less c o n c e r n e d ) w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e n g e n d e r e d g o o d s a n d ills. T h e r e is a great difference, morally, b e t w e e n a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e are a s s i g n e d inferior p r o p e r t y rights a n d a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e c o m e to h a v e inferior p r o p e r t y rights p u r s u a n t t o p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t d o n o t call for this inequality. Rawls, b y c o n t r a s t , m a i n t a i n s t h a t w e s h o u l d a s s e s s feasible s c h e m e s of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s in light of t h e overall p a t t e r n s e a c h w o u l d t e n d to g e n e r a t e (and s h o u l d d e s i g n a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e accordingly). E c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s a n d entire basic s t r u c t u r e s are to b e j u d g e d by t h e i r effects. But not b y t h e i r effects a l o n e . T o s o m e e x t e n t m o r a l l y significant g o o d s a n d ills are directly called for by prevailing institu tions, are p a r t of t h e s c h e m e r a t h e r t h a n effects of it. Rawls t a k e s benefits a n d b u r d e n s of b o t h k i n d s to b e o n a p a r . It m a k e s n o differ e n c e to t h e a s s e s s m e n t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w h e t h e r given d e privations forseeably existing u n d e r it are e s t a b l i s h e d or e n g e n d e r e d . Either way, t h e i r i n c i d e n c e w o u l d be, in a b r o a d s e n s e , a c o n s e q u e n c e of (the c h o i c e of) a p a r t i c u l a r institutional s c h e m e . Let u s call a criterion of j u s t i c e broadly consequentialist if a n d only if it a s s e s s e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s exclusively o n t h e basis of t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s , b r o a d l y c o n ceived, t h a t is, if it takes e q u a l a c c o u n t of g o o d s a n d ills e s t a b l i s h e d a n d of e q u i v a l e n t g o o d s a n d ills e n g e n d e r e d by s u c h s c h e m e s . S u c h a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h involves t w o s u b s i d i a r y t o p i c s . O n e m u s t settle o n specific g o o d s a n d ills w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is 3 2

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A d m i t t e d I y , t h e r e are borderline cases, as w h e n t h o s e earning less t h a n the m e a n i n c o m e are e x c l u d e d . It is just barely possible that all have the s a m e i n c o m e , and s o the e x c l u s i o n m i g h t (implausibly) s e e m to c o u n t as e n g e n d e r e d . D e s p i t e s u c h problematic possibilities, I h o p e the d i s t i n c t i o n is clear e n o u g h in realistic scenarios a n d for the role it will play in w h a t follows. I n contrast to Rawls, Nozick s h o w s little interest in h o w to rank institutional s c h e m e s that are l e s s t h a n just by h i s standards. I a s s u m e h e w o u l d say that in a s s e s s i n g s u c h a s c h e m e w e m u s t normally b e m u c h m o r e sensitive to the restrictions o n f r e e d o m it calls for than to restrictions o n f r e e d o m it effects. T h e justice of a n institutional s c h e m e is, in S e n s phrase, "given by the g o o d n e s s of its c o n s e q u e n t states of affairs" (WAF 175). Calling Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n broadly c o n s e q u e n tialist is s o m e w h a t at o d d s w i t h current u s a g e in p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h , strongly influenced by Rawls himself, w o u l d e n c o u r a g e u s to characterize Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n as d e o n t o l o g i cal. My a t t e m p t at revision is motivated by t h e idea, to be d e v e l o p e d later in this section, that w e s h o u l d reserve the t e r m s deontological and consequentialist for a d e e p e r a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t h a n the o n e Rawls e m p h a s i z e s . 3 a

3 3

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to b e i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n a n d o n a w a y of weighting a n d aggregating i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t s u c h g o o d s a n d ills (for p u r p o s e s of ranking p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s via t h e i r m a s t e r p a t t e r n s ) And t h e r e n e e d s t o b e a b r o a d l y e m p i r i c a l i n q u i r y , involving social theory a n d c o m p a r a t i v e historical investigations, a i m e d at e s t i m a t i n g what m a s t e r p a t t e r n s v a r i o u s feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d t e n d to pro duce. 3 . 3 . Calling Rawls a c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t r e q u i r e s clarification of his relation t o utilitarian c o n c e p t i o n s of justice w h i c h h e s o forcefully attacks. 3 . 3 . 1 . T h i s task c a n c o n v e n i e n t l y b e b e g u n b y e x a m i n i n g h o w his c o n t r a c t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n in A Theory of Justice differs from t h e util itarian view h e h a d s k e t c h e d e a r l i e r . T h i s e s s a y e m p l o y s o u r division of subjects in a s o m e w h a t different w a y . Rawls e n v i s i o n s a social sys t e m w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e t o b e justified o n u t i l i t a r i a n g r o u n d s but w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e to c o m p l y w i t h t h e s e (optimal) p r a c t i c e s irre spective of utilitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Let m e d i s c u s s a c e n t r a l weak n e s s in Rawls's earlier i n d i r e c t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d h o w it is o v e r c o m e in h i s later c o n c e p t i o n . 3 . 3 . 1 . 1 . A utilitarian a s s e s s m e n t of social p r a c t i c e s p o s e s t h e n o t o r i o u s p r o b l e m of e x p l a i n i n g w h y a n actor, a n d officials i n p a r t i c u l a r , s h o u l d feel c o n s t r a i n e d t o h o n o r a r u l e of a p r a c t i c e e v e n t h o u g h violating it in this case w o u l d clearly b e b e t t e r in t e r m s of a g g r e g a t e utility. Yes, t h e g o i n g p r a c t i c e is t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e o n e , a n d it w o u l d b e w o r s e if a c t o r s i n g e n e r a l h a d s u c h d i s c r e t i o n , b u t if o n l y utility ul timately m a t t e r s , w h y s h o u l d o n e n o t m a x i m i z e utility j u s t t h i s o n c e ? F u r t h e r utilitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will n o t h e l p , n o r d o e s it s e e m p o s s i ble t o resolve t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r o b l e m b y a p p e a l to t h e m e a n i n g of c o n c e p t s ("rule," "practice," "authority," e t c . ) . W h a t o n e w o u l d h a v e t o claim is t h a t utility is s o m e h o w a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e value to a p p e a l to in justifying o n e ' s c o n d u c t i n s u c h a c a s e . T h i s c l a i m raises n e w q u e s t i o n s : w h a t o t h e r values are relevant, a n d w h y a r e n ' t t h e y relevant also t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of p r a c t i c e s ? But t h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m is to e x p l a i n h o w utility c a n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b e valuable (so t h a t in d e s i g n i n g p r a c tices w e s h o u l d b e g u i d e d b y it) a n d n o t valuable (so t h a t w e s h o u l d i g n o r e it in d e c i s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a practice). 3.3.1.2. T h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d b e solved if a suitable s u b s t i t u t e w e r e p r o v i d e d for utility a s t h e value u p o n w h i c h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o t u r n . W h a t is valuable a b o u t t h e provisions a n d effects 35

36

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" view when he wrote this

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of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s h o u l d b e d e n n e d in s u c h a w a y t h a t individ u a l s cannot affect it (except, of c o u r s e , t h r o u g h t h e i r role in i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e ) . T h i s , I think, is t h e i d e a of t h e l a t e r Rawls. He a t t e m p t s t o define h i s M a s t e r P a t t e r n (via w h i c h basic s t r u c t u r e s a r e to b e a s s e s s e d ) in t e r m s of features t h a t p e r s o n s c a n n o t affect b y t h e i r c o n d u c t w i t h i n t h e p r a c t i c e s of a n o n g o i n g social s y s t e m . P e r s o n a l efforts, t h o u g h t h e y c a n mitigate (or aggravate) t h e effects of injustice, c a n n o t r e d u c e (or i n c r e a s e ) t h e i n j u s t i c e itself, c a n n o t alter t h e fact t h a t s o m e institu tional s c h e m e u n j u s t l y fails to establish c e r t a i n rights o r t e n d s to e n g e n d e r certain inequalities. 3 . 3 . 1 . 3 . T h i s s t r a t e g y is s t r e n g t h e n e d by c o n c e i v i n g t h e M a s t e r Pat t e r n s o t h a t p e r f e c t i o n is p o s s i b l e . U n d e r a utilitarian criterion, t h e b e s t b a s i c s t r u c t u r e will b e t h e o n e t h a t t e n d s to p r o d u c e t h e m o s t utility. But even t h i s o p t i m a l s t r u c t u r e still leaves indefinite r o o m for f u r t h e r i m p r o v e m e n t ; t h e r e is n o limit to h o w m u c h utility t h e r e m i g h t b e . Even u n d e r perfectly just i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e q u e s t i o n c a n therefore a r i s e w h e t h e r o n e s h o u l d violate t h e g r o u n d r u l e s for t h e s a k e of a n e t i n c r e a s e in utility. In Rawls's later c o n c e p t i o n , by c o n t r a s t , t h e values u n d e r l y i n g t h e a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e invoked t o justify violating t h e r u l e s of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s o n l y w h e n s u c h violation c o m e s in r e s p o n s e to s o m e injustice. S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery in s o m e social s y s t e m is u n j u s t b e c a u s e t h e p o s i t i o n of slaves is m u c h w o r s e t h a n a n y p o s i t i o n m u s t u n a v o i d a b l y b e ( m o d u l o t h e prevailing n a t u r a l environ m e n t a n d level of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ) . S u p p o s e that, u n d e r s u c h c o n d i t i o n s , a citizen w e r e to h e l p a slave e s c a p e from h e r m a s t e r . S u c h a n a c t i o n w o u l d n o t m a k e t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e slaveholding society a n y m o r e j u s t (even t h e e s c a p e e is still legally unfree, m a y b e r e c a p t u r e d , etc.), b u t it m a y still b e justifiable t o b r e a k t h e r u l e s in this w a y s o a s t o s h i e l d o n e slave from unjustifiable h a r m s s h e w o u l d o t h e r w i s e suffer. So far, Rawls's later c o n c e p t i o n agrees w i t h h i s earlier o n e . It differs in that, w h e n t h e existing b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is fully justifiable (in t h a t t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it t e n d s to p r o d u c e is s u p e r i o r t o t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n s feasible a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e ) , t h e n t h e r e are n o unjustifiable b u r d e n s of t h e relevant k i n d to s h i e l d o t h e r s from. T h e values u n d e r l y i n g Rawls's criterion of justice a r e fully a c c o m m o d a t e d , "exhausted," c a n n o t (logically) b e satisfied to a n even g r e a t e r d e g r e e , a n d h e n c e c a n n o t justify a n y violation of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t h e y also justify.37 Rawls's l a t e r criterion of justice is satiable?* T h i s quality is often o v e r l o o k e d ; r e a d e r s take this criterion ( a n d especially t h e differ37

I t m a y still b e a morally g o o d thing, of c o u r s e , to h e l p t h o s e w o r s e off than oneself. But this a s s e s s m e n t n o w involves a separate v a l u e — e n s h r i n e d , perhaps, in a principle of m o r a l i t y — w h i c h c a n p l a u s i b l y b e s u b o r d i n a t e d to the values in terms of w h i c h the basic structure is justified (so that" the c o n c e r n to h e l p others is a n insufficient reason for violating t h e t e r m s of just practices). Moral r e a s o n s b a s e d o n utility, by contrast, c a n n o t be s o s u b o r d i n a t e d ; all that c a n matter are the quantities involved. T h e t e r m satiable is b o r r o w e d from Raz (MF 2 3 5 - 4 4 ) . 3 8

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e n c e principle) to r e q u i r e t h a t t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d b e as welloff as p o s s i b l e . T h i s r e a d i n g is m i s t a k e n . O n l y t h e basic structure inso far as it generates inequalities is r e q u i r e d t o o p t i m i z e t h e position ot t h o s e least a d v a n t a g e d by t h o s e i n e q u a l i t i e s (cf. §§14.1, 14.3). 3.3.1.4. T h r o u g h t h e s e revisions Rawls arrives at v a l u e s for t h e as s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s that c a n n o t c o m e i n t o conflict w i t h themselves in the w a y t h e earlier value of utility c o u l d . T h i s is t h e first s t e p toward realizing a n a i m that, I believe, Rawls h a d earlier failed t o achieve, namely, to s k e t c h a n overall m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t is (in w h a t for Rawls is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s e n s e of this w o r d ) deontological. J u s t institu t i o n s confer rights t h a t give p e r s o n s " a n inviolability f o u n d e d o n justice t h a t even t h e welfare of society a s a w h o l e c a n n o t o v e r r i d e " (TJ 3). In his s e c o n d a t t e m p t Rawls h a s s u c c e e d e d in t a k i n g a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n tialist a p p r o a c h to t h e c h o i c e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ( a n d n a t u r a l duties) t h a t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a strictly d e o n t o l o g i c a l a s s e s s m e n t of a c t o r s p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s ( b o u n d b y t h e s e n a t u r a l d u t i e s ) . T h e entire c o n c e p t i o n is a s u c c e s s f u l v e r s i o n of indirect consequential i s m — s u c c e s s f u l in t h a t t h e b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t justification of t h e g r o u n d r u l e s d o e s n o t c o r r u p t t h e strictly d e o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e t o h a v e for (individual a n d collective) a c t o r s . H e n c e n o t h i n g is lost if this justification is fully p u b l i c . T h e w i l l i n g n e s s of a c t o r s t o give p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d r u l e s over t h e p u r s u i t of a n y social o r i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s is s u s t a i n e d r a t h e r t h a n s u b verted b y t h e i r full u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e e p e r c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t unify a n d s u p p o r t t h o s e g r o u n d r u l e s . 3 . 3 . 2 . T h e r e a r e t w o f u r t h e r i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t u r e s from h i s e a r l i e r v i e w — t h e s e explicitly e m p h a s i z e d in A Theory of Justice—that move h i s criterion of justice itself in a recognizably d e o n t o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n . Rawls defines a d e o n t o l o g i c a l (or non-teleological) c o n c e p t i o n a s o n e "that e i t h e r d o e s n o t specify t h e g o o d i n d e p e n d e n t l y from t h e right, or d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . . . . J u s t i c e as fairness is a d e o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y i n t h e s e c o n d w a y " (TJ 30, cf. 24). He t h e n e m p h a s i z e s t w o w a y s i n w h i c h h i s criterion of justice, u n l i k e t h e utilitarian o n e , d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . First, i n u s i n g a s i m p l e function for aggregating t h e g o o d of different p e r s o n s ( s u m r a n k i n g or averaging), t h e utilitarian criterion is i n s e n s i tive to h o w g o o d s a n d ills a r e d i s t r i b u t e d . I n s t i t u t i o n s g e n e r a t i n g t h e m o s t e x t r e m e inequalities in utility are r e q u i r e d b v justice, s o l o n g a s t h e greater welfare of s o m e o u t w e i g h s t h e g r e a t e r suffering of o t h e r s a s c o m p a r e d t o m o r e egalitarian alternative s c h e m e s (TJ §5) Against t h i s criterion Rawls seeks t o p r e s e n t a distribution-sensitive c r i t e r i o n o n w h i c h an institutional s c h e m e m a y p e r m i t inequalities only insofar a s d o i n g so raises t h e w o r s t position as against t h o s e u n d e r all feasible m o r e e g a h t a n a n alternative s c h e m e s . This modification b y itself is C

XS m

^i°X^^ Tf ° ^ l o g i c a l oySs's hghts. If the distribution of g o o d s is also c o u n t e d as a good, p e r h a p s a f ) U S t i C e

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h i g h e r o r d e r o n e , a n d t h e t h e o r y d i r e c t s u s to p r o d u c e t h e m o s t g o o d ( i n c l u d i n g t h e g o o d of d i s t r i b u t i o n a m o n g others), w e n o l o n g e r have a teleological view in t h e classical s e n s e . T h e p r o b l e m of d i s t r i b u t i o n falls u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t of right as o n e intuitively u n d e r s t a n d s it, a n d s o t h e t h e o r y lacks a n i n d e p e n d e n t definition of t h e g o o d " (TJ 25, cf. 210-11). But t h e n , s u c h a b r o a d definition w o u l d also classify a s d e o n t o l o g i c a l a q u a s i - u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i o n t h a t gives n o w e i g h t to t h e well-being of t h e worst-off 5 p e r c e n t , say. S e c o n d , Rawls a r g u e s t h a t a utilitarian criterion relies o n a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d as h a p p i n e s s or t h e satisfaction of rational d e s i r e . T h i s w a y t h e j u s t i c e of i n s t i t u t i o n s c o m e s to d e p e n d excessively u p o n t h e d e s i r e s t h a t h a p p e n to b e d o m i n a n t at t h e t i m e (TJ 4 4 7 - 5 1 ) . Moreover, certain g o o d s (such as basic rights a n d liber ties) are m u c h m o r e valuable t h a n their c o n t r i b u t i o n to a p e r s o n ' s utility m a y s u g g e s t (TJ 207). To a c c o m m o d a t e t h e s e p o i n t s , Rawls p o s t u l a t e s a " t h i n t h e o r y of t h e good," e m b o d i e d in h i s c o n c e p t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s (TJ §60). Only this thin, objective n o t i o n of t h e g o o d is a p p e a l e d to in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . Rawls t a k e s this d e p a r t u r e as a f u r t h e r r e a s o n for t h i n k i n g t h a t his c o n c e p t i o n is d e o n t o l o g i c a l in t h a t it "does n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . . . . (Here I s u p p o s e w i t h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m t h a t t h e g o o d is d e n n e d a s t h e satisfaction of r a t i o n a l desire.)" (TJ 30, cf. 396). Yet again, this definition s e e m s excessively b r o a d ; it w o u l d classify as d e o n t o l o g i c a l a c r i t e r i o n r e q u i r i n g that i n s t i t u t i o n s m a x i m i z e g r o s s national p r o d u c t . 3 . 4 . T o s u m u p , by defining t h e right as " m a x i m i n n i n g t h e t h i n g o o d " — t h a t is, a s d e m a n d i n g t h a t inequalities b e a r r a n g e d so as t o o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s — Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice reflects a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h . Feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e to b e a s s e s s e d by r e f e r e n c e to t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s e a c h of t h e m t e n d s to p r o d u c e , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e extent to w h i c h this d i s t r i b u t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d . (Obviously t h e effects of social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t b e d e s c r i b e d in a r o u g h , statistical way, involving g e n e r a l t e n d e n cies, p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s , a n d t h e like.) Moreover, Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i o n p r e c l u d e s a n y spillover of t h e values informing t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o t h e subject of c o n d u c t a s s e s s m e n t . In this w a y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s justified t h r o u g h his criterion of justice c a n be m o r ally d e t e r m i n a t i v e , a n d h i s e n t i r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is in this s e n s e d e o n 39

3 9

H e r e utilitarians might reasonably reply that t h e y d o not take existing desires for granted but treat d e s i r e s as a d e p e n d e n t variable that, as far as possible, is to b e adjusted for the sake of t h e greatest h a p p i n e s s . T h e c h o i c e of an institutional s c h e m e will impor tantly involve a t t e n t i o n to w h a t sort of d e s i r e s various alternative s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d to e n g e n d e r in p e o p l e . Utilitarians prefer, o t h e r things equal, institutions that generate easily satisfiable d e s i r e s w h o s e pursuit will p r o d u c e intrapersonal a n d social harmony, thereby in turn s u p p o r t i n g t h o s e institutions. In this r e s p e c t utilitarians n e e d not differ from w h a t Rawls s a y s about his o w n c o n c e p t i o n (TJ §9 a n d c h a p . 8).

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tological. Finally, t h e p a r a m e t e r s of Rawls's b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h a r e s e t s o a s t o y i e l d a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t itself h a s a d e o n t o l o g i c a l flavor, i n t w o r e s p e c t s : Its p r e e m i n e n t c o n c e r n for t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n e n s u r e s t h a t t h e n e e d s a n d vital i n t e r e s t s of e v e n smaU m i n o r i t i e s c a n n o t b e o u t b a l a n c e d b y t h e g r e a t e r g o o d of t h e m a n y . And b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g a t h i n a c c o u n t of t h e good, Rawls's c r i t e r i o n partially d i s c o n n e c t s t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s from w h a t e v e r d e sires a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d m a y b e e m p i r i c a l l y p r e v a l e n t (be c a u s e of n a t u r a l o r social f a c t o r s ) . 3 . 5 . I h a v e s a i d t h a t o n e i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick i s t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n is b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , a n d Nozick's is n o t . Let m e n o w try t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h i s c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e m into a more complex framework that extends t h e deontological/ c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t d i s t i n c t i o n from c o n c e p t i o n s of m o r a l i t y t o c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e . A d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l i t y typically gives c o n s i d e r a b l e w e i g h t to t w o d i s t i n c t i o n s : b e t w e e n w h a t p e r s o n s d o a n d w h a t t h e y m e r e l y let h a p p e n ; a n d w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of w h a t t h e y d o , b e t w e e n w h a t t h e y intend a n d w h a t t h e y m e r e l y foresee (or s h o u l d foresee). T h e p o i n t of b o t h d i s t i n c t i o n s is t h a t s o m e X is m o r a l l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n s o m e Y. But t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s m a y b e d r a w n in v a r i o u s w a y s . T h e difference in m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e m a y o b t a i n always o r o n l y s o m e t i m e s . A n d Y m a y b e w e i g h t e d less heavily t h a n X o r m a y b e r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s t a t u s of a tie b r e a k e r (X h a s lexicographical priority), o r i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Y m a y b e d i s r e g a r d e d altogether. T h e r e a r e t h e n at least 2 X 3 = 6 w a y s i n w h i c h e a c h d i s t i n c t i o n m i g h t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y . T o m a k e c l e a r w h a t is d e m a n d e d of s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n for it t o c o u n t a s deontological, w e m u s t t h e n specify n o t m e r e l y t h a t it m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials i n m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e b u t also h o w p r o m i n e n t t h e s e t w o differentials m u s t m i n i m a l l y b e . I p r o p o s e that a c o n c e p t i o n of morality is d e o n t o l o g i c a l if a n d o n l y if it h o l d s both that (a) a n y h a r m a n a g e n t d o e s is always m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y h a r m t h a t a g e n t m e r e l y lets h a p p e n (so t h a t t h e latter c a n figure at m o s t as a tie b r e a k e r in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n d u c t ) , a n d t h a t (b) h a r m a n a g e n t i n t e n d s a n d d o e s , s o m e t i m e s at least, h a s m o r e w e i g h t t h a n equivalent h a r m t h e a g e n t d o e s b u t m e r e l y foresees (or s h o u l d foresee). T o b e fully c o n s e quentialist, a c o n c e p t i o n of morality m u s t d e n y b o t h (a) a n d (b). S u c h c o n c e p t i o n s will typically n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials at a l l . 40

41

« A s my objections suggest, it is probably futile to look for a s h a r p d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e extension of deontological this last s e n s e . It is e n o u g h that criteria of justice m a y b e more o r less d e o n t o ogical in this sense, d e p e n d i n g o n how t h e y define the g o o d a n d o n h o w they are sensitive to its distribution. Rawls's criterion d o e s n o t m e r e l y satistV t h e m i n i m u m c o n d i t i o n s for being deontological (in h i s excessively broa™aense) ftls a s I w o u l d put tt, m u c h more significantly deontological than ^ ^ S S ^ cntena (requiring, respectively, t h e maximization of gross i L o n d ^ K ^ a ^ t h t maximization of utility for the best-off 95 percent) national p r o d u c t a n d m e m

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45

In analogy, a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is d e o n t o l o g i c a l if a n d only if it h o l d s both t h a t (A) a n y benefits a n d b u r d e n s a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b r i n g s a b o u t a r e a l w a y s m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y g o o d s a n d ills it m e r e l y lets h a p p e n (so t h a t t h e latter c a n figure at m o s t as a tie b r e a k e r in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of institutions), a n d t h a t (B) w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of w h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b r i n g s a b o u t , benefits a n d b u r d e n s it e s t a b l i s h e s have, s o m e t i m e s at least, m o r e w e i g h t t h a n equivalent b e n efits a n d b u r d e n s it foreseeably e n g e n d e r s . A c o n c e p t i o n of justice is fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t o n l y if it d e n i e s b o t h (A) a n d (B). Again, s u c h c o n c e p t i o n s will typically n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials at all. 3 . 5 . 1 . 1 . Let m e s k e t c h h o w Nozick's views c a n b e motivated, in p a r t , by a t t r i b u t i n g t o h i m t h e t w o d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s . H u m a n life is e x p o s e d to a w i d e r a n g e of n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , s u c h a s g e n e t i c h a n d i c a p s , illnesses, a c c i d e n t s , a n d o t h e r m i s f o r t u n e s n o t socially in d u c e d . S u c h c o n t i n g e n c i e s restrict o u r o p t i o n s . T h u s it m a y s e e m t h a t in e v a l u a t i n g t h e p r o s p e c t s for p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m u n d e r s o m e institu tional s c h e m e , o n e m u s t take into a c c o u n t to w h a t e x t e n t s u c h restric t i o n s a r e m i t i g a t e d t h r o u g h this s c h e m e . Nozick, however, d i s p u t e s t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . O n e r a t i o n a l e for his o p p o s i t i o n is p r o v i d e d b y (A): a b s t r a c t i n g from n a t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o n freedom, w e s h o u l d a s s e s s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s by reference to t h e " i n s t i t u t i o n a l " f r e e d o m e a c h t e n d s to g e n e r a t e . T h u s Nozick thinks t h a t w h e n a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e r e q u i r e s t h e h e a l t h y to s u p p o r t t h e h a n d i c a p p e d , it i n t r o d u c e s (rather t h a n mitigates) a n inequality. It restricts t h e free d o m of t h e f o r m e r a n d confers benefits u p o n t h e latter. A s c h e m e t h a t r e q u i r e s n o s u c h s u p p o r t , by c o n t r a s t , involves n o morally significant inequality, b e c a u s e t h e special h a r d s h i p s suffered by t h e h a n d i c a p p e d a r e n a t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e i r f r e e d o m a n d h e n c e d o n o t c o u n t in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . T h e intuitive idea is t h a t w e o u g h t n o t conflate t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is just b e t w e e n its p a r t i c i p a n t s w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d at large (the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e i n c l u d e d ) is just b e t w e e n t h o s e s a m e p e r s o n s . 3 . 5 . 1 . 2 . Nozick's libertarian s c h e m e i m p o s e s s e r v i t u d e u p o n slaves a n d e x c l u d e s p e r s o n s from things, s u c h as l a n d , h e l d b y n o n c o n s e n t ing o w n e r s . U n d e r it t h e f r e e d o m of large s e g m e n t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is likely t o b e v e r y severely r e s t r i c t e d . But Nozick s h o w s n o i n t e r e s t in a n e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s i s s u e , a n d a s t r o n g version of (B) p r o v i d e s o n e r a t i o n a l e for t h i s r e l u c t a n c e . In a s s e s s i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s it p r o d u c e s , w e should care m u c h m o r e about established than about engendered benefits a n d b u r d e n s . W e s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m t h a t t h e s c h e m e directly calls for a n d b e m u c h less c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t ( d e p e n d i n g o n h o w p e o p l e interact) 42

tions. I n e e d not w o r r y a b o u t this difficulty here, s i n c e m y task is to clarify the a n a l o g o u s d i s t i n c t i o n s in t h e d o m a i n of justice. S u c h a r g u m e n t s have b e e n a d v a n c e d , for e x a m p l e , by G. A. C o h e n , CFP. See also Cohen's m o r e g e n e r a l critique of Nozick in RNWC. 4 2

46

T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.5.2.1

m a y o r m a y n o t b e i m p o s e d u n d e r t h e s c h e m e ( t h o u g h t h e y predict ably will be). I n t h e libertarian s c h e m e it is i n t e n d e d o n l y t h a t p e r s o n s s h o u l d have t h e f r e e d o m t o a l i e n a t e t h e i r r i g h t s o v e r l a n d a n d even over t h e m s e l v e s a n d also t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m s enforcing w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t l e m e n t s m a y c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h s u c h transactions. But the g r o u n d rules d o not "intend" a n y particular e n t i t l e m e n t s so g e n e r a t e d . T h e y d o n o t p r e s c r i b e t h a t s o m e s h o u l d be slaves or b e l a n d l e s s , n o r d o t h e y p r e s c r i b e a n y p a r t i c u l a r distribu tional feature of t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s t h e y e n g e n d e r . Even t h o u g h it m a y b e a statistical c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e s c h e m e p r o d u c e s ( w i d e s p r e a d ) slavery or a (large) l a n d l e s s class, t h e r u l e s d o n o t m a n d a t e t h a t (many or) a n y o n e at all s h o u l d o c c u p y t h e s e social p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e freedom of s u c h p e r s o n s , h o w e v e r severe, c o m m o n , a n d pre dictable, a r e m e r e l y a n i n c i d e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e libertarian s c h e m e . H e n c e , Nozick c o u l d c o n c l u d e by a p p e a l t o a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of (B) t h a t t h e s e restrictions a r e m o r a l l y insignificant for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of h i s s c h e m e , at least in t h i s c a s e , w h e r e t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s t h e s c h e m e d o e s directly p r e s c r i b e a r e t h e c o r r e c t o n e s . 4 3

3.5J2.1. Rawls s h a r e s w i t h Nozick t h e c o m m i t m e n t t o (A). H e c o n fines h i s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social i n t e r a c t i o n (e.g., TJ 4 - 5 ) . His c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e g o v e r n s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s a l o n e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e joint p a t t e r n e m e r g i n g w h e n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n t h a t of n a t u r a l g o o d s a n d ills. I n a p p l y i n g t h i s criterion, " w e a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o e x a m i n e citizens' p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s n o r t h e i r c o m p a r a t i v e lev els of w e l l - b e i n g " (SUPG 163). C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , h i s c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h c i t i z e n s ' social p o s i t i o n s , o r shares, a n d n o t w i t h t h e i r overall situations, o r standard of living (in S e n ' s sense). T h e y c a r e a b o u t t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d , n o t a b o u t t h e least well. S o m e r e a d e r s , overlooking t h i s p o i n t , h a v e s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h all factors affecting t h e lives of t h o s e t h e y represent, w h i c h h a s given rise t o m a n y m i s t a k e n c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s , a b o u t h o w i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t b e d e s i g n e d so a s t o o p t i m i z e t h e quality of life of t h o s e m o s t sick, feeble, ugly, o r r e t a r d e d . Yes, t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is m e a n t to reflect a c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n n e e d s (RAM 643; WOS 15; FG 554; SUPG 172-73). But t h e s e are t h e standard n e e d s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a given social s y s t e m . T h r o u g h o u t , Rawls leaves aside differences a m o n g p e r s o n s t h a t affect h o w useful a given b u n d l e of social g o o d s 4 4

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will b e t o e a c h . In t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t to (A) Rawls a n d Nozick s t a n d t o g e t h e r a g a i n s t s u c h fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of justice as u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r t h e capabilities a p p r o a c h r e c e n t l y set forth b y S e n . 3 . 5 . 2 . 2 . Yet Rawls d e n i e s (B). His criterion of justice r a n k s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s o n t h e b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e overall p a t t e r n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Rawls explicitly d e v e l o p s h i s c o n c e p t i o n in c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t t e r m s : "The b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t o b e a r r a n g e d t o m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h to t h e least a d v a n t a g e d of t h e c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d by all" (TJ 205), for e x a m p l e , a n d " t h e p a r t i e s . . . strive for as h i g h a n a b s o l u t e s c o r e as p o s s i b l e " (TJ 144) His c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e is u l t i m a t e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e institu tional f r e e d o m p e r s o n s actually enjoy, a n d h e evaluates t h e foreseeable d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u c h f r e e d o m w i t h o u t asking t o w h a t e x t e n t it is e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d b y social i n s t i t u t i o n s . Rawls, therefore, p a y s m u c h m o r e a t t e n t i o n t h a n Nozick d o e s to t h e effects of institutional s c h e m e s . I s e e t h i s a s a c e n t r a l d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m : Nozick's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is d e o n t o l o g i c a l in m y s e n s e , w h e r e a s Rawls's, b e c a u s e of its r e j e c t i o n of (B), is b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . But t h e n , b e c a u s e of its c o m m i t m e n t to (A), Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is n o t fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . Let m e call c o n c e p t i o n s of justice t h a t are c o m m i t t e d t o (A) b u t n o t t o (B) a n d likewise c o n c e p t i o n s of m o r a l i t y c o m m i t t e d t o (a) b u t n o t t o (b) semiconsequentialist c o n c e p t i o n s . This t e r m s h o u l d n o t give rise to confusion, at least if it is t r u e t h a t n o significant m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n i n s t a n t i a t e s t h e inverse c o m b i n a t i o n : a c o m m i t m e n t t o (B) b u t n o t t o (A), t o (b) b u t n o t to (a). 45

4 6

47

^ A c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o m m i t t e d to (A) i p s o facto e m p l o y s an objective criterion for interpersonal c o m p a r i s o n s , w h e r e a s the criterion e m p l o y e d by fully consequentialist c o n c e p t i o n s m a y b e either subjective, as w i t h utilitarianism, or objective, as in Sen (EW, SL, WAF). Sen's c o n c e p t i o n is fully consequentialist (in m y s e n s e ! b e c a u s e it evaluates a person's b u n d l e of benefits a n d b u r d e n s in light of particular features of this p e r s o n (notably capabilities, disabilities, a n d special n e e d s ) . It is objective, b e c a u s e n o a c c o u n t is taken of particular interests or preferences. See Scanlon, PU 6 5 6 - 5 8 , a n d SC 1 9 7 - 2 0 1 , for this subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n . '"'On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Rawls also says that "the c o n c e p t i o n defined by t h e s e principles is not that of m a x i m i z i n g anything" (TJ 211), but h e is here speaking i n rejection of the narrower idea that social institutions s h o u l d be d e s i g n e d s o as to "maximize the s u m of intrinsic value or the net b a l a n c e of the satisfaction of interests" (ibid.) in a distributioninsensitive w a y . Rawls b e l i e v e s that in d e v e l o p e d societies certain established benefits and b u r d e n s are of p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e . Yet h e gives t h e s e n o special w e i g h t from the start but rather a r g u e s for this result. T h e priority of t h e first principle is d e f e n d e d by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e special i m p o r t a n c e of certain g o o d s for citizens a n d is t h u s not b a s e d o n t h e idea that e s t a b l i s h e d g o o d s are m o r e important a s such (TJ §26, §33). That this is s o is confirmed b y h i s first p r i n c i p l e of justice, w h i c h is c o n c e r n e d with o n l y some estab l i s h e d g o o d s (certain basic rights a n d liberties) a n d also with e n g e n d e r e d inequalities in the w e l l - p r o t e c t e d n e s s of t h e s e rights a n d liberties a n d in the worth of the basic political liberties. 1 d i s c u s s t h e s e m a t t e r s further in Chapter 3. B y p r o p o s i n g a n a l o g o u s tripartite typifications for c o n c e p t i o n s of justice a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of morality, I don't m e a n to suggest that r e a s o n s for preferring a s e m i c o n s e quentialist c o n c e p t i o n of justice, say, have a n a l o g u e s in t h e d o m a i n of c o n c e p t i o n s of morality. It i s perfectly c o n c e i v a b l e that t h e m o s t reasonable c o m b i n a t i o n will consist of a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o u p l e d with a fully consequentialist or d e o n t o l o g i c a l morality. 4 7

48

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.1

4. Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative 4 . 1 . Let m e d e v e l o p t h e s u g g e s t e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views a little f u r t h e r b y l o o k i n g m o r e closely at w h a t h e could say in s u p p o r t of h i s O r w e l l i a n c o n c l u s i o n t h a t if w e a r e firmly com m i t t e d to f r e e d o m , w e m u s t e n d o r s e g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t r e c o g n i z e a n d enforce s l a v e r y . For Nozick, slavery involves total a n d u n l i m i t e d p e r p e t u a l unfreed o m . Slaves h a v e n o c o n t r o l over t h e i r o w n lives, a n d a r e legitimately subject to every conceivable form of s a d i s t i c o r s e x u a l p e r v e r s i o n — m a y b e w o r k e d t o d e a t h , e a t e n alive, t o r t u r e d , a n d s o f o r t h . Evidently, Nozick d o e s n o t t h i n k t h a t t h i s sort of u n f r e e d o m disqualifies t h e g r o u n d rules h e p r o p o s e s . Nor w o u l d h e b e t a k e n a b a c k , I s u p p o s e , if h i s t o r i a n s a n d social t h e o r i s t s p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e of o u r Rawlsian w o u l d p r o d u c e a w o r l d of m a n y m o r e o p t i o n s t o c h o o s e a n d lives to lead, t h a t u n d e r Nozick's c o n s t i t u t i o n a slave e c o n o m y w o u l d e m e r g e o n o u r i s l a n d a n d few p e r s o n s , b e i n g n e i t h e r slaves n o r slaveholders, w o u l d h a v e t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d i n c e n t i v e s to c o m m e n c e novel v e n t u r e s — t o t r a d e , c o m p o s e , invent, e x p l o r e , r h y m e , r e s e a r c h , a n d p e r f o r m . Against o b j e c t i o n s of t h e s e k i n d s , N o z i c k c a n a p p e a l t o a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of (B): t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e is a d v o c a t i n g d o n o t call for slavery; t h e y d o n o t p r e s c r i b e t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s or g r o u p s o r p r o p o r t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n s h o u l d b e slaves; t h e y d o n ' t even m a n d a t e t h a t t h e r e b e a n y slaves at all; a n d therefore, s i n c e t h e b u r d e n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h slavery, t h o u g h p r e d i c t a b l e a n d officially e n forced, are entirely e n g e n d e r e d , t h e c o s t s of its r e c o g n i t i o n a r e m o r a l l y insignificant i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e g a i n s . For t h e benefits slavery c o n fers a r e e s t a b l i s h e d : Every p e r s o n is a s s i g n e d t h e liberty of selling himself i n t o slavery if h e s o c h o o s e s . A n d e v e r y o n e (so l o n g as h e h a s n o t s o l d himself) h a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o o w n slaves, b y a c q u i r i n g a n 48

49

•">Cf. ASU 331. C o n c e r n i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w g r o u n d rules s h o u l d he d e s i g n e d , 1 s e e n o e v i d e n c e that Nozick r e c o g n i z e s any values b e y o n d freedom. It is true, h e "feel[s] m o r e comfortable" w i t h a capitalist s y s t e m , b e c a u s e t h e circulation of a s s e t s w i t h i n it is "largely reasonable a n d intelligible" a n d correlated with persons' s u c c e s s in "serving others a n d w i n n i n g t h e m as c u s t o m e r s " IASU159). But I think h e w o u l d e n d o r s e t h e s a m e entitlement structure e v e n if p e o p l e u n d e r it m a d e transfers i n less appealing w a y s If so, t h e p o i n t h a s n o w e i g h t against freedom considerations. Elsewhere Nozick a p p e a l s to t h e "familiar social considerations favoring private property," but h e adds i m m e d i a t e l y , "These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s enter a Lockean theory to support t h e claim that a p p r o p r i a t i o n of pnvate property satisfies t h e intent b e h i n d t h e e n o u g h a n d as g o o d left over' proviso, not as a utihlanan justification of property" IASU 177; cf. Locke, STG §41). T h o s e for w h o m h e r e is n o l a n d left to appropriate are allegedly c o m p e n s a t e d b y the s u p e r i o r options they have u n d e r Nozick's s c h e m e . Acceptable property s c h e m e s m u s t s a f e f v t h i s c o n d i t.on, but Nozick w o u l d d e n y that, b e y o n d this threshold, suchTcheme^^ t h m l acceptable t h e b e t t e r they satisfy it (i.e., the better t h e worst o p t i o n set theTengen^erT y ••This is s o b e c a u s e N o z i c k — i n contrast in a I Y<1 • s '/-

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.1

49

existing slave from h e r p r e s e n t o w n e r or a self-owned p e r s o n from herself. I n light of t h e s e t w o o p t i o n s , slavery, a s envisaged b y Nozick, s h o u l d clearly b e r e c o g n i z e d in "a free system." O n e m a y q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r having t h e s e t w o o p t i o n s really c o n s t i t u t e s a benefit. Is n o t t h e first o p t i o n r a t h e r a liability, given that t h e d e c i s i o n t o sell oneself m a y well t u r n out t o h a v e b e e n a dreadful m i s t a k e ? N o z i c k w o u l d s a y that t h e possibility—even p r o b a b i l i t y — o f m i s t a k e s d o e s n o t c o u n t against slavery, b e c a u s e , w h e n s h e w a s still self-owned, t h e slave h a d t h e liberty to sell herself into s o m e m o r e limited form of d e p e n d e n c e , or n o t to sell herself at all. It w o u l d b e p a t e r n a l i s m p u r e a n d s i m p l e to s e c o n d - g u e s s or disallow s u c h c h o i c e s . Even if s o m e slaves, or even all, w o u l d have h a d m o r e f r e e d o m a n d a b e t t e r life if t h e y h a d n o t sold t h e m s e l v e s , w e c a n n o t c o u n t this differential a g a i n s t Nozick's i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery. T h e loss of f r e e d o m suffered by a slave d o e s n o t c o u n t , b e c a u s e it c a m e a b o u t p u r s u a n t t o free c h o i c e ( w h e t h e r r a t i o n a l or o t h e r w i s e ) . But t h e r e a r e n o n p a t e r n a l i s t i c a r g u m e n t s as well. To invoke a c o m m o n p l a c e from g a m e t h e o r y , t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of slavery will create t h e very e m e r g e n c y s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h selling oneself c o u l d b e rational. C o n s i d e r a sick p e r s o n w h o h a s m a n a g e d to r e a c h a d o c t o r b u t is t o o p o o r or w e a k t o m a k e it to t h e n e x t p h y s i c i a n alive. T h e doctor, w h o c a n easily c u r e h e r , is in a p o s i t i o n to exact a n y p r i c e . He c a n d e m a n d all t h i n g s s h e o w n s . If slavery is r e c o g n i z e d , t h e p a t i e n t ' s situation is m u c h w o r s e , a s h e m a y d e m a n d her in a d d i t i o n . In t h i s case, t h e p a t i e n t h a s n o r e a s o n t o b e grateful t h a t s h e h a d t h e liberty to sell herself: T h e n e e d to u s e t h i s o p t i o n a r o s e o n l y b e c a u s e s h e h a d it in t h e first p l a c e . 50

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T h i s reply a l s o e x p l a i n s w h y t h e "Lockean proviso" d o e s not protect slaves against mistreatment. T h o u g h p e r s o n s are o w e d c o m p e n s a t i o n (by whom?) insofar as their o p t i o n s are inferior to the s t a n d a r d state-of-nature o p t i o n s IASU 178-79n), their o p t i o n s are v a l u e d e x ante. C o m p a r e the situation of a n u n i n s u r e d rider w i t h o u t h e l m e t w h o is badly hurt in a s e l f - c a u s e d m o t o r c y c l e a c c i d e n t ; s h e h a s n o right to c o m p e n s a t i o n e v e n if her o p t i o n s n o w are m u c h l e s s valuable than the standard state-of-nature o p t i o n s . It w a s h e r o w n free c h o i c e to ride w i t h o u t h e l m e t a n d i n s u r a n c e (and a c h o i c e that it w o u l d have b e e n w r o n g to deprive h e r of). M e d i c a l expertise, not b e i n g a natural resource, d o e s not fall u n d e r Nozick's "Lock e a n proviso" (cf. ASU 181, the c a s e s of the m e d i c a l researcher a n d the surgeon). T h e following trialogue is t h e n a realistic scenario within Nozick's libertarian society. A police officer c o m e s u p o n a c o u p l e struggling w i t h e a c h other, the m a n evidently trying to rape the w o m a n . W o m a n : Please, sir, p l e a s e h e l p m e . Officer [to man): Hey, y o u , let h e r go at o n c e ! Man: Don't get involved. Officer: I m u s t . You are violating this w o m a n ' s right not to be assaulted. Man: N o , I'm n o t . S h e is m y slave. Here are the papers, s i g n e d b y herself. W o m a n : But I w a s c o e r c e d i n t o signing. He said h e w o u l d not treat m y father if I refused to sign. Officer: That's n o t c o e r c i o n b u t at m o s t d u r e s s . H e w a s at liberty not to treat y o u r father or to ask c o m p e n s a t i o n for treating h i m . W o m a n : But m y father is d e a d ! Man: T h e c o n t r a c t s a y s o n l y that I w o u l d try to save him, a n d I did. 51

50

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

Moreover, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery p r o v i d e s i n c e n t i v e s for would-be slaveholders t o try to entrap a n o t h e r in a s i t u a t i o n t h a t m a k e s it rational t o sell herself. O n e c a n l u r e h e r i n t o a l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g s i t u a t i o n and t h e n offer t o r e s c u e h e r , o n e c a n p a y o t h e r s to b o y c o t t h e r a n d then offer t o save h e r from starvation, a n d s o f o r t h . All t h e s e examples s h o w h o w it m a y b e q u i t e a b u r d e n to b e t o o free (by h a v i n g t h e liberty t o sell oneself). 52

H e r e it d o e s n o t h e l p m u c h t o insist (cf. ASU 331) t h a t if s o m e o n e finds it d a n g e r o u s t o h a v e t h e o p t i o n t o sell herself, t h e n s h e c a n e n t e r a c o n t r a c t d i s a b l i n g this o p t i o n , t h a t is, give a w a y t h i s liberty. (Could her p u r s u e r b u y t h i s c o n t r a c t from t h o s e w i t h w h o m it w a s m a d e , and w h e n h e h a s h e r in a d e s p e r a t e s i t u a t i o n , quickly r e s t o r e h e r liberty to sell herself b y releasing h e r from t h e p r o m i s e ? ) O n e m a y d o u b t that s u c h c o n t r a c t s c o u l d b e p e r m i s s i b l e in a l i b e r t a r i a n s o c i e t y . If they w e r e , c o u l d n ' t y o u a n d y o u r friend m a k e a s i m i l a r c o n t r a c t , p r o m i s i n g e a c h o t h e r t h a t n e i t h e r of y o u will ever sell y o u r h o u s e , t h e r e b y p r o t e c t ing y o u r s e l v e s against p o t e n t i a l c r e d i t o r s ? B u t e v e n if s u c h c o n t r a c t s w e r e r e c o g n i z e d , t h e y w o u l d n o t h e l p i n all c a s e s . For e x a m p l e , a slaveholder w o u l d find it easy to m a k e t h e c h i l d r e n of h i s slaves his p r o p e r t y : W h e n s u c h a c h i l d c o m e s of age (before s h e c a n m a k e any disabling c o n t r a c t s ) , h e c a n t h r e a t e n to m i s t r e a t h e r p a r e n t s if s h e will n o t give herself over a s h i s slave. He also h a s every o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e t e r m i n e h e r u p b r i n g i n g , to m o l d h e r abilities, d e s i r e s , a n d a m b i t i o n s so that s h e will a c c e p t slavery r a t h e r t h a n b e c h a s e d a w a y from t h e only p l a c e s h e k n o w s . T h e c h i l d r e n of slaves, at t h e very least, a r e likely to b e m u c h b e t t e r off w i t h o u t t h e o p t i o n of selling t h e m s e l v e s , b u t d o e s having t h e o p t i o n r e d u c e t h e i r freedom (as Nozick c o n c e i v e s t h i s n o tion)? 4 . 2 . Let u s s t e p b a c k from t h e e x c h a n g e at t h i s point, t o e x a m i n e m o r e generally w h a t sort of a c o n c e p t i o n of distributive justice Nozick m i g h t h a v e p r e s e n t e d h a d h e c a r e d t o s y s t e m a t i z e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s like t h e foregoing i n t o a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for h i s view a n a l o g o u s to t h e o n e Rawls d e v e l o p s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r differing views a b o u t t h e m o r a l relevance of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d p a t t e r n features, t h e r e is a s e c o n d i m p o r t a n t difference w i t h i n t h e w h a t - c o m p o n e n t . This difference c o n c e r n s t h e o p t i o n s p a c e in t e r m s of w h i c h a p e r s o n ' s freedom is d e s c r i b e d . For Rawls, t h i s o p t i o n Officer Uo Woman): I'm sorry, ma'am, but I c a n n o t help y o u Man: But y o u c a n h e l p m e in forcing her to fulfill her contractual obligations S h e h a s already scratched m e . See if y o u c a n tie her h a n d s """gallons. &ne n a s

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

51

s p a c e is largely s t r u c t u r e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s . His b a s i c liberties cover s u c h c o n v e n t i o n a l o p t i o n s a s voting, m a r r y i n g , w o r s h i p i n g , mak ing a s p e e c h , h a v i n g a c c e s s to t h e m e d i a , a n d so o n . T h i s e m p h a s i s is closely a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e constitutive a s p e c t of social p r a c t i c e s . Nozick, t h o u g h h e t o o views t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of freedom as r e g u l a t e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h i n k s of f r e e d o m itself a s a n o n c o n v e n t i o n a l g o o d . T h e o p t i o n s of t h e v a r i o u s individuals are l o c a t e d w i t h i n a preex isting s p a c e . T h e y are, i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , o p t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t to c h u n k s of s p a c e - t i m e , p h y s i c a l objects, a n d p e r s o n s . T h e r e are, in a d d i t i o n , s e c o n d - o r d e r o p t i o n s , t h a t is, o p t i o n s to m a k e certain c h a n g e s i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-order o p t i o n s (for e x a m p l e , gaining a n o p t i o n o r d e p r i v i n g another of one), as well a s t h i r d - o r d e r o p t i o n s , a n d s o o n u p . While g r o u n d r u l e s b r i n g into b e i n g n e w k i n d s of rela tions b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d o p t i o n s — p e r s o n s c a n n o w h a v e o p t i o n s legitimately, c a n b e e n t i t l e d to t h e m — t h e y d o n o t alter t h e s p a c e of possible o p t i o n s o r t h e p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . Therefore, seeing t h a t a given u n i v e r s e of s p a c e - t i m e , objects, a n d p e r s o n s fixes t h e s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s , Nozick t e n d s t o t h i n k of f r e e d o m as a c o n s t a n t - s u m g o o d . F o r Rawls, b y c o n t r a s t , t h e s p a c e of possible o p t i o n s is a function of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms will c h a n g e t h e s h a p e a n d s t r u c t u r e of this s p a c e , m a k e it larger or smaller o r (when t h e y are significant) i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e a l t o g e t h e r . T h i s b r i n g s u s to t h e t h i r d c o m p o n e n t , t h e h o w - q u e s t i o n , w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e d e m a n d s Nozick m a k e s o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom. He s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e s a formal c o n s t r a i n t , namely, t h a t a set of g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d restrict p e r s o n s ' (legitimate) o p t i o n s s o as to achieve a c o m p l e t e o r d e r i n g of claims, or interpersonal consistency. This d e m a n d is b r o u g h t o u t e s p e c i a l l y in h i s a r g u m e n t s (ASU 28-35) for s e e i n g r i g h t s a s s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t — b y m e a n s of a b o u n d a r y , line, or h y p e r - p l a n e (ASU 57)—define a m o r a l s p a c e for e a c h individual (there by r e s t r i c t i n g t h e o p t i o n s of o t h e r s ) . In a d d i t i o n , Nozick s e e m s c o m m i t t e d to t h r e e s u b s t a n t i v e c o n straints. First, p e r s o n s ' o p t i o n s p a c e s s h o u l d b e not only m u t u a l l y exclusive b u t a l s o e x h a u s t i v e . P e r s o n ' s o p t i o n s m a y be r e s t r i c t e d only insofar a s is n e c e s s a r y for i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e rights a n d liberties of t h e v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s t o g e t h e r m u s t "fill t h e s p a c e " (ASU 53

54

53

N o z i c k w o u l d r e c o g n i z e , of course, that the set of o w n a b l e objects of value m a y fluctuate, that the total of w e a l t h p r o d u c e d m a y be affected by the c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules. But h e w o u l d d e n y , I think, that this c h o i c e c o u l d affect the s h a p e and structure of the s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s . T h i s idea of a fixed s p a c e is compatible with carving the s p a c e u p in very c o m p l i c a t e d w a y s , as w h e n p e r s o n s have partial control over s o m e thing, e.g., over s o m e a s p e c t o r t i m e s l i c e of it, or t h r o u g h voting rights or veto p o w e r s . S u c h imaginative reflection a b o u t freedom in spatial m e t a p h o r s is p r o m i n e n t before Nozick, e.g., in H o b b e s , Locke, a n d Kant. It a l s o appears in Rawls's reference to liberties a s "a framework of legally p r o t e c t e d paths" IBLP 40). For an illuminating w a y of e x t e n d i n g the m e t a p h o r in t e r m s of railway lines, s w i t c h e s , a n d l o c o m o t i v e s , s e e Feinberg, ILS. 5 4

52

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

238); f r e e d o m m u s t n o t b e w a s t e d . T h i s ephaustiveness c o n s t r a i n t pro vides a straightforward r a t i o n a l e for o n e of Nozick's views, h i s (' nonpaternalistic ") rejection of i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s . S u p p o s e s o m e p e r s o n , P, inalienably h a d s o m e right, R. T h e n n o o n e c o u l d legitimately have the h i g h e r - o r d e r o p t i o n of divesting P of R; s o m e bit of f r e e d o m w o u l d go to w a s t e . T h i s i d e a m a y m o t i v a t e Nozick's o p p o s i t i o n to d e e p r i g h t s (for e x a m p l e , t h e right t o h o l d p r o p e r t y ) t h a t define t h e p e r m a n e n t frame w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h superficial r i g h t s (for e x a m p l e , to t h i s piece of property) arise a n d l a p s e . All r i g h t s are o n a p a r . For e a c h right o r liberty t h e r e is a d e e p e r right or liberty t o c h a n g e its o w n e r s h i p , a n d s o on, ad infinitum. Insofar as t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e o p t i o n s is t h e r e s u l t of the exercise of h i g h e r - o r d e r o p t i o n s , it is e n g e n d e r e d a n d h e n c e of little m o r a l significance, if a n y . T h e u n i v e r s a l alienability of r i g h t s a n d liber ties, as r e q u i r e d b y t h e e x h a u s t i v e n e s s c o n s t r a i n t , t h e r e f o r e r e d u c e s t h e m o r a l l y i m p o r t a n t p a r t of Nozick's view to t h e key q u e s t i o n of the initial d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p t i o n s a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s (on all levels). T h i s q u e s tion c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e i t h e r t h e s u b j e c t s or t h e objects of rights. W h a t are t h e initial rights a n d liberties of t h e various p e r s o n s , w h i c h s p r i n g i n t o e x i s t e n c e at t h e m o m e n t of social b i r t h (but are t h e n i m m e d i a t e l y salable a n d t h u s i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y o n a p a r w i t h t h e n e w p e r s o n ' s infinitely m a l l e a b l e holdings) or w h a t are t h e initial rights a n d liberties relating t o e a c h p i e c e of t h e u n i v e r s e ( c h u n k of s p a c e - t i m e , p h y s i c a l object, o r p e r s o n ) ? Second, t h e r e m u s t b e n o i n e q u a l i t i e s in e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . While p e r s o n s ' liberties m a y have t h e s a m e object (all c a n b e at liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e this thing, for example), t h i s is n o t p o s s i b l e for r i g h t s s u c h a s p r o p e r t y rights. But p e r s o n s c a n a n d s h o u l d h a v e s y m m e t r i c a l rights, as w h e n e a c h h a s certain rights w i t h r e g a r d to his own b o d y . We m a y call this t h e equality or t h e majcimin c o n s t r a i n t . Given t h e c o n s t a n t - s u m n a t u r e of Nozick's good, t h e s e t w o f o r m u l a t i o n s d o n ' t differ i n r e s p e c t t o t h e d e s i g n of ideal g r o u n d r u l e s . T h e y d o differ in h o w t h e y r a n k l e s s - t h a n - i d e a l g r o u n d rules, b u t w e d o not h a v e Nozick's views o n this t o p i c . Let m e n o t e t h a t Nozick offers n o c o m m e n t o n , or rationale for, h i s egalitarian c o m m i t m e n t — a s o m e w h a t a m u s i n g lack, given his c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t a d e a r t h of valid a r g u m e n t s for e q u a l i t y (ASU 223, 233). W h y s h o u l d n ' t s o m e p e o p l e start out a s slaves; w h y s h o u l d n ' t s o m e b e able to a c q u i r e m o r e p r o p e r t y t h a n o t h e r s t h r o u g h t h e s a m e acts; a n d w h y s h o u l d n ' t m e n n e e d t h e c o n s e n t of a female relative to transfer p r o p e r t y ? P r o p o n e n t s of s u c h inequalities c o u l d tell Nozick (in analogy to w h a t h e tells u s at ASU 239-41) t h a t h i s h a n g - u p w i t h certain equal rights is t h e historical p r o d u c t of envy, w h i c h h a s rankled away for g e n e r a t i o n s in t h o s e b o r n less excellent T h i r d as far as o p t i o n s (on all levels) w i t h r e s p e c t t o p e r s o n s a n d t h e i r a c u o n s are c o n c e r n e d , p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e initial rights t o t h e 6 8

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.3

53

4 . 3 . My q u i c k s k e t c h of a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views w a s m e a n t to b r i n g o u t t h e a b s e n c e of d r a m a t i c s t r u c t u r a l d i s p a r i t y in h o w h e a n d Rawls a p p r o a c h political p h i l o s o p h y . T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t is o n e in s u b s t a n c e . Yet it m a y look s t r u c t u r a l (ASU 2031 b e c a u s e Rawls a n d Nozick h a v e w o r k e d o u t different halves of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n s . Rawls h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h e h i g h e r level of a b s t r a c t i o n , o n s u p p o r t ing a c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g alternative sets of g r o u n d rules. T h i s crite rion h a s t h e form of a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . Basic s t r u c t u r e s are to b e r a n k e d b y t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e . Nozick, by c o n t r a s t , h a s d e v e l o p e d a set of g r o u n d rules, s h o w i n g t h e i r i n n e r c o h e r e n c e a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e social s y s t e m a s a w h o l e . T h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e p u r e l y p r o c e d u r a l , t h a t is, d o not re quire the participants to orient their c o n d u c t toward any particular p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . It is clear t h a t Rawls, d e s p i t e h i s p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e on t h e h i g h e r level, c a n a n d d o e s favor p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s . And it is clear t h a t a r g u m e n t s N o z i c k might give for h i s c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules c o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d as a p a t t e r n preference, t h o u g h Nozick m a y n o t w i s h t o r e s t a t e t h e m in t h i s w a y . To b r i n g o u t t h i s last p o i n t s o m e w h a t dramatically, let u s imagine, as a vivid i m a g e e q u i v a l e n t to m y c o n j e c t u r e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views, a Nozickian a n a l o g u e to t h e original p o s i t i o n . As in Rawls's o w n c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of p e r s o n s w o u l d b e asked to c h o o s e a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e for t h e d e s i g n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of basic social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e y w o u l d m e e t b e h i n d s o m e veil of i g n o r a n c e so that t h e y k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r "clients'" p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r c l i e n t s ' interests, s u c h parties w o u l d again be e x t r e m e l y risk-averse. But, in c o n t r a s t to Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e s e parties w o u l d b e given to k n o w that t h e i r clients c a r e (almost) exclu sively a b o u t t h e i r p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m insofar as it is directly called for by an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d c a r e m u c h less, if at all, a b o u t f u r t h e r w a y s in w h i c h (the c h o i c e of) a n institutional s c h e m e might p r e d i c t a b l y affect t h e i r i n s t i t i t u t i o n a l f r e e d o m . E a c h d e l i b e r a t o r w o u l d a s s u m e t h a t h e r client w a n t s as large as possible a s h a r e of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m so conceived. ( B e c a u s e of t h e c o n s t a n t - s u m c h a r a c t e r of t h e relevant good, w e n e e d n o t w o r r y w h e t h e r s h a r e s w o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d in relative o r a b s o l u t e terms.) In a n initial s i t u a t i o n s o d e s c r i b e d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d t h e n c h o o s e a criterion t h a t r a n k s e a c h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e by t h e w o r s t s h a r e of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . 55

56

" A s Rawls says, "The contractarian m e t h o d is a useful way of studying ethical theories and of setting forth their u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s " (TJ 16). "We m a y conjecture that for each traditional c o n c e p t i o n of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial situation in w h i c h its p r i n c i p l e s are the preferred solution" (TJ 121). R a w I s h a s n o w s e t t l e d o n v i e w i n g the parties a n d the citizens they represent as distinct (SUPG 165, BLP 1 9 - 2 1 ) , w h e r e a s in TJ the prospective participants t h e m s e l v e s were generally p i c t u r e d as e n t e r i n g the original position. In a sense, "it makes n o difference either w a y " (KCMT 525), but I follow Rawls's later style by distinguishing b e t w e e n the parties a n d their c l i e n t s (my term) b e c a u s e d o i n g s o makes it easier to k e e p separate t w o s e t s of "psychological" a s s u m p t i o n s . As w e will see, Rawls's picture of t h e S6

54

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

4.4. T h e rationale I have s k e t c h e d for Nozick's views d o e s not solve his p r o b l e m s , of c o u r s e , b u t it h i g h l i g h t s t h e m . T h e s e p r o b l e m s are of t h r e e m a i n k i n d s : h o w p l a u s i b l e are t h e key v a l u e s u n d e r l y i n g Nozick s g r o u n d rules w h i c h c a n b e identified b y a n a l y z i n g t h e i r p o t e n t i a l ra tionale, h o w clear are t h e s e b a c k g r o u n d values, a n d are t h e y sufficient to derive t h e views Nozick h a s p u t forth? T h o u g h I c a n n o t d i s c u s s these q u e s t i o n s in detail, let m e offer a few c o m m e n t s o n e a c h . 4 . 4 . 1 . U n d e r t h e first h e a d i n g , let m e briefly s u g g e s t t w o internal r e a s o n s for d e p a r t i n g from Nozick's d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t in the direction of a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t alternative (cf. §10.4.1). T h e first r e a s o n arises from Nozick's a d v e r t i s e m e n t (in ASU pt. 3) of h i s p r o p o s e d social system as a "framework for Utopia," f e a t u r i n g "a w i d e a n d diverse r a n g e of c o m m u n i t i e s w h i c h p e o p l e c a n e n t e r if t h e y are a d m i t t e d , leave if t h e y w i s h to, s h a p e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r w i s h e s ; a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h Utopian e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n c a n b e tried, different styles of life c a n be lived, a n d alternative visions of t h e g o o d c a n b e individually o r jointly p u r s u e d " (ASU 307). T h e m e r i t s of s u c h a free f r a m e w o r k a r e t o b e an i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e of s u p p o r t for t h e m i n i m a l s t a t e w i t h its p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s (ASU 333). T h e y c a n l e n d s u c h s u p p o r t , however, only if it is empirically t r u e t h a t Nozick's g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d i n d e e d e n g e n d e r s u c h a framework. I h a v e a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d r e a s o n s for be lieving t h a t Nozick's rights w o u l d l e a d i n s t e a d to a feudal s y s t e m (with slavery) offering a very n a r r o w r a n g e of diverse c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s for e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . S h o u l d this b e so, t h e n t h e m e r i t s of Nozick's f r a m e w o r k for Utopia w o u l d f u r n i s h i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n s against h i s libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s . Nozick r u s h e s to assert t h a t h i s are " t h e precisely c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s " (ASU 202) w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g this possibility, a n d h e c a n d o so by heavily d i s c o u n t i n g t h e e n g e n d e r e d effects of h i s s c h e m e . But t h i s defense h a s t w o d r a w b a c k s . If b a d d a t a d o n ' t c o u n t for m u c h , g o o d d a t a c a n ' t c o u n t for m u c h either. T h u s , e v e n if h i s libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s d i d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r his f r a m e w o r k for Utopia, t h a t t h e y d i d so c o u l d n o t b e m u c h of a r e a s o n in t h e i r favor. Moreover, it a p p e a r s from Nozick's lyrical celebration of t h e framework-for-utopia idea, t h a t h e himself m i g h t b e quite u n c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h a b a n d o n i n g t h i s ideal so easily for d r a b feudalism, if t h a t is w h a t h i s favorite g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d likely p r o d u c e . After all, it is p o s s i b l e that a modified s c h e m e of i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d i n fact t e n d to e n g e n d e r a n d s u s t a i n s o m e t h i n g like t h e social ideal h e envisions. J u s t as Nozick is n o t sensitive to w h a t sort of social w o r l d h i s g r o u n d rules w o u l d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r given full c o m p l i a n c e , h e a l s o p a y s n o a t t e n t i o n to w h e t h e r t h e r e w o u l d be c o m p l i a n c e . A s e c o n d r e a s o n for moving in a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t direction is t h e n t h a t Nozick's disregard for e n g e n d e rther e d p h e n o m e n a l e a d s h i m to ignore t h e e m p i r i -

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

55

g e n d e r a g o o d d e a l of n o n c o m p l i a n c e , as c o m p a r e d to m a n y differently o r g a n i z e d social s y s t e m s — r a m p a n t c o r r u p t i o n a m o n g minimal-gov e r n m e n t officials, f r e q u e n t private f e u d s a n d civil w a r s , a n d a high c r i m e r a t e ( b o m , p e r h a p s , of t h e d e s p e r a t i o n of large n u m b e r s of people). It is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e m i n i m a l s t a t e c o n stitute o n l y a m i n i m a l i m p r o v e m e n t over t h e Lockean state of n a t u r e . Nozick i g n o r e s s u c h possibilities; a n d , again, h e c a n d o so by heavily d i s c o u n t i n g t h e e n g e n d e r e d effects of his s c h e m e . But h e t h e r e b y risks e n d o r s i n g a s o c i e t y w h o s e m e m b e r s enjoy less p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m (as Nozick h i m s e l f defines it) t h a n t h e m e m b e r s of differently o r g a n i z e d societies t h a t h e c o n d e m n s a s u n j u s t . T h e s e d a n g e r s of ignoring h o w t h e c h o i c e of g r o u n d r u l e s affects c o m p l i a n c e is a further r e a s o n against d e s i g n i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e by looking only at w h a t t h e "rules of t h e g a m e " call for, r a t h e r t h a n also at h o w t h e y w o u l d actually work in p r a c t i c e . T h e s e t w o i n t e r n a l o b j e c t i o n s t o Nozick b r i n g o u t a n i m p o r t a n t point. My p r o j e c t i n g a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e a n d especially an a n a l o g u e to the original p o s i t i o n b e h i n d Nozick's views m a y well have l o o k e d like begging t h e q u e s t i o n in favor of b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t criteria of justice: "Once w e look at i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of their p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e d i s c o u n t i n g of e n g e n d e r e d benefits a n d b u r d e n s d o e s i n d e e d c o m e to look silly. F a c e d w i t h s o m e given p r o s p e c t of b e i n g e x c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n , o n e will, of c o u r s e , n o t c a r e w h e t h e r t h i s is d u e to a n official p r o h i b i t i o n (based o n g e n d e r or descent) o r a c o n d i t i o n a l effect of t h e rules (based on e n g e n d e r e d p a r e n t a l poverty, say). But w h a t this fact s h o w s is n o t that d e o n t o l o g i cal c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e a r e u n t e n a b l e b u t t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n against t h e m . " I c a n n o w r e s p o n d that a d o p t i n g t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s is n o t a n arbitrary move. Nozick h i m s e l f a p p e a l s to this p e r s p e c t i v e in p a r t 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, a n d it is u n c l e a r w h a t else o n e c a n plausibly a p p e a l to if o n e c a r e s at all t o give a justification of the g r o u n d rules o n e favors. C o n s i d e r h o w t h e s e c o n d d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t loses its p l a u sibility o n c e it g e t s t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e d o m a i n of c o n c e p t i o n s of morality to t h a t of c o n c e p t i o n s of justice. W h e n w e are a s s e s s i n g t h e c o n d u c t of t h o s e w h o s h a p e d t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m in q u e s t i o n , it m a y well m a t t e r t o u s w h e t h e r t h e y i n t e n d e d that t h e s c h e m e s h o u l d effectively e x c l u d e s o m e p r o p o r t i o n of all c h i l d r e n (as they m u s t have if t h e e x c l u s i o n is g e n d e r - b a s e d ) . It is p l a u s i b l e to a s s e s s their c o n d u c t b y m o r e t h a n its c o n s e q u e n c e s . But it is n o t plausible, I suggest, to a s s e s s the relevant e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m itself b y m o r e t h a n its c o n s e q u e n c e s . O n c e it is k n o w n effectively t o e x c l u d e s o m e given p r o p o r t i o n of all children, t h e n t h e d e s i r e t o h a v e a c c e s s to a n e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h p o t e n tial p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e p r e s u m e d t o have, c o u n t s equally against b o t h schemes. 5 7

S7

T h i s is not t o d e n y that there m a v be other reasons for preferring o n e of the two s c h e m e s . In o n e of the t w o c a s e s , the e x c l u s i o n m a y c o m e o n top of m a n y o t h e r

56

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T h i s line of t h o u g h t e x p o s e s Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m to an attack from t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . If p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s d o not c a r e w h e t h e r given benefits a n d b u r d e n s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d or engen d e r e d , w h y s h o u l d t h e y c a r e w h e t h e r given differences i n welfare are d u e t o n a t u r a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors? F a c e d w i t h s o m e given prospect of b e i n g less well e d u c a t e d t h a n o t h e r s , w h y s h o u l d o n e c a r e w h e t h e r i t is b e c a u s e of social factors (official p r o h i b i t i o n s o r h i g h t u i t i o n fees) o r a n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p (blindness, say) t h a t is n o t e v e n e d o u t t h r o u g h social i n s t i t u t i o n s ? Rawls m a k e s w h a t a p p e a r s to b e a n a r b i t r a r y stipulation b y giving h i s p a r t i e s to k n o w t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s c a r e exclusively about t h e i r s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . So h o w c a n I p r o t e s t if Nozick were t o m a k e a n equally arbitrary s t i p u l a t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t h i s p a r t i e s are given t o k n o w t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s c a r e exclusively a b o u t t h e i r established s h a r e of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m ? My a n s w e r h a s t w o p a r t s , w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d t o t w o w a y s i n w h i c h it m a y b e i m p l a u s i b l e t o t r u n c a t e t h e a c c o u n t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l g o o d — from a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t (goods a n d ills, or welfare) t o a s e m i c o n s e quentialist (benefits a n d b u r d e n s ) t o a d e o n t o l o g i c a l o n e (established benefits a n d b u r d e n s ) . S u c h t r u n c a t i o n s m a y b e s e e n a s irrational b e c a u s e all m a y e n d u p intuitively w o r s e off if c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n is d i s r e g a r d e d , o r t h e y m a y b e s e e n a s unfair b e c a u s e of t h e i r distribu tional i m p l i c a t i o n s . I will d i s c u s s b o t h o b j e c t i o n s a s t h e y a p p l y t o the two truncations. Rawls's d i s r e g a r d of n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s d o e s n o t e x p o s e h i m t o the c h a r g e of irrationality, b e c a u s e , t h o u g h h e i g n o r e s i n t e r p e r s o n a l dif ferentials i n n e e d s , h e d o e s n o t i g n o r e h u m a n n e e d s as s u c h . O n t h e contrary, h i s a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is specifically d e s i g n e d to reflect o p t i m a l l y t h e m o r e vital standard n e e d s of h u m a n b e i n g s , o r so, at least, h e c l a i m s . Nozick's d i s r e g a r d of e n g e n d e r e d p a t t e r n features d o e s e x p o s e h i m t o t h e c h a r g e of irrationality, b e c a u s e everyone's d e s i r e t o enjoy a f r a m e w o r k for Utopia a n d a h i g h level of c o m p l i a n c e m a y b e b e t t e r fulfilled u n d e r c o m p e t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . It c o u l d b e s a i d t h a t Rawls's a t t e m p t t o s e c u r e a n a c c e p t a b l e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s for every p a r t i c i p a n t t r e a t s s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s , namely, t h o s e w h o suffer s p e c i a l n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s , unfairly. Rawls c a n r e p l y (with Nozick's approval) t h a t it is n o t t h e role of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e to e v e n t h i n g s o u t in t h e interest of t h e overall justice of t h e h u m a n u n i v e r s e (the institutional s c h e m e i n c l u d e d ) . W h a t p e r s o n s m a y r e a s o n a b l y d e m a n d of a n institutional s c h e m e is o n l y t h a t it s h o u l d situate t h e m fairly as participants vis-a-vis t h e o t h e r s Society's r e s p o n s e to t h e b l i n d objector w o u l d t h e n b e that, by h y p o t h e s i s , t h e a m o u n t of r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d to h i s e d u c a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a s h a r e t h a t 58

disadvantages a n d therefore b e less tolerable, o r the financially b a s e d e x c l u s i o n m a y prov.de valuable m c e n t i v e s to parents to work harder. A l S S 2 S t 7

"1 wilt examine this claim critically in Chapters 3 a n d 4.

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.2

57

w o u l d b e fair for a n o r m a l , s i g h t e d p a r t i c i p a n t . His n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p , t h o u g h n o fault of h i s o w n , is in n o w a y a c o n s e q u e n c e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s (or a n y o t h e r social factors, for t h a t m a t t e r ) . Therefore t h e claim for a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s h e a d d r e s s e s to h i s fellow p a r t i c i p a n t s can a p p e a l o n l y t o morality, n o t to j u s t i c e . T h e Rawlsian p a r t i e s ' selec tive c o n c e r n w i t h s h a r e s of benefits a n d b u r d e n s , h o w e v e r unintuitive psychologically, at least h a s a philosophical rationale. But t h e s a m e is n o t t r u e of Nozick's further t r u n c a t i o n of t h e g o o d to s h a r e s of e s t a b l i s h e d benefits a n d b u r d e n s . T h e p e r s o n e x c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n b e c a u s e of p a r e n t a l poverty is n o t h a n d i c a p p e d b u t d i s a d v a n t a g e d . In h e r c a s e t h e i n e q u a l i t y is a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e (choice of) institutional s c h e m e . S h e is t r e a t e d w o r s e t h a n o t h e r s by the scheme. She c a n t h e n d e m a n d t h a t t h e inequality b e justified to h e r — p e r h a p s t h r o u g h s o m e b a l a n c i n g of v a l u e s m o d e l e d in a c o n t r a c t a r i a n situation. Her claim m a y b e o u t w e i g h e d , b u t it c a n n o t be d i s c o u n t e d . 4.4J2. U n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of clarity, a pervasive p r o b l e m for any a t t e m p t to give a p r e c i s e justificatory b a c k g r o u n d suitable for liber tarian views d e r i v e s from t h e fact t h a t t h e objects of rights a n d liberties can b e d e s c r i b e d in m a n y different w a y s . To illustrate, let u s ask h o w abstract t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of rights m a y b e for p u r p o s e s of t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t . T a k e t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e of t w o subjects a n d o n e thing. T h e e x h a u s t i v e n e s s c o n s t r a i n t entails t h a t t h e t h i n g m u s t be u s a b l e a n d o w n a b l e . T h e e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t entails t h a t initially n e i t h e r subject o w n s a n d b o t h m a y u s e t h e t h i n g . H o w t h e n c a n it c o m e to be o w n e d ? The s t a n d a r d s o l u t i o n is, of c o u r s e , t h a t b o t h subjects have a s e c o n d o r d e r liberty t o h e l p t h e m s e l v e s , t h r o u g h "first a p p r o p r i a t i o n , ' ' to a n e x c l u s i o n a r y p r o p e r t y right i n t h e t h i n g (which e x t i n g u i s h e s t h e o t h e r ' s liberty t o u s e it). H o w c a n t h i s s i m p l e s y m m e t r i c a l s o l u t i o n c o p e w i t h the r e a l - w o r l d fact t h a t s u b j e c t s c o m e into being at different times? In a p p r o p r i a t i n g s o m e t h i n g , d o e s Senior d o so p u r s u a n t to a liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e t h i s t h i n g o r p u r s u a n t to a b r o a d e r liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e u n o w n e d t h i n g s i n g e n e r a l ? If t h e former, t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t w o u l d require t h a t t h e arrival of a n e w subject e x t i n g u i s h all p r o p e r t y rights, so t h a t for every t h i n g , t h e n e w p e r s o n h a s a n equal initial liberty to u s e a n d a p p r o p r i a t e it. If t h e latter, t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t is satisfied even if t h e r e is n o t h i n g left u n o w n e d u p o n w h i c h J u n i o r c o u l d exercise liberties t o u s e a n d a p p r o p r i a t e . 59

Both t h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e i m p l a u s i b l e e x t r e m e s of c o n c i s e n e s s a n d a b s t r a c t i o n , a n d t h i s implausibility motivates t h e s e a r c h for a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , J u n i o r m u s t h a v e a n initial liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e stuff t h a t is equivalent to t h e stuff Senior h a d t h e initial liberty t o a p p r o p r i a t e ; S e n i o r m u s t leave " e n o u g h , a n d as g o o d " for J u n i o r (Locke, STG §33, cf. §27). But libertarians typically w a n t to justify / • W h e t h e r this rationale c a n u n d e r m i n e the idea that e a c h feasible basic structure s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d via the worst quality of life that w o u l d exist u n d e r it is another matter, ^ e r , I d e v e l o p R a w l s i a n r e s p o n s e s t o this a n d o t h e r fully consequential.s

views m

various c o n t e x t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e e s p e c i a l l y t r o u b l e s o m e c a s e of m e d i c a l n e e d s l§10.4 . w , §§14-16).

S8

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.3

a w o r l d in w h i c h everything is o w n e d a n d in w h i c h n e w s u b j e c t s (some of t h e m o w n i n g n o t h i n g ) will find n o u s e for t h e i r initial liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e . So t h e y favor a n o t h e r i n t e r m e d i a t e f o r m u l a t i o n of the equality c o n s t r a i n t . J u n i o r m u s t have initial e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s and liberties t h a t a r e at least equivalent t o t h e initial e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s a n d liberties of Senior. But o p t i n g for o n e of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n s d o e s n o t r e m o v e the unclarity, given t h e v a g u e n e s s of t h e n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e . A relaxed n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e c a n m a k e t h e e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t very weak i n d e e d , as w h e n t h e liberty to seek e m p l o y m e n t in a c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m y is offered as a s u b s t i t u t e for earlier p e r s o n s ' liberties to a p p r o p r i a t e large t r a c t s of l a n d (Locke, STG §37; Nozick ASU 175-82). A d e m a n d i n g n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e c a n yield q u i t e r a d i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s , a s in t h e case of Bruce A c k e r m a n ' s t h e o r y of justice (SJLS), w h i c h also differs from Nozick's in its a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of g o o d s o t h e r t h a n f r e e d o m . 4 . 4 . 3 . Besides clarification, t h e p r o p o s e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d n e e d s c o n s i d e r a b l e specification before it c a n single o u t a n y p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d rules ( s u c h as t h e o n e s Nozick p r o p o s e s ) . Very different s c h e m e s satisfy all t h e c o n s t r a i n t s s o far i m p o s e d u p o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom. A s c h e m e m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , define a m o r e l i m i t e d s e c o n d - o r d e r liberty of a p p r o p r i a t i o n . T h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a p i e c e of l a n d w o u l d leave intact c e r t a i n liberties of t r e s p a s s , a n d (some of) t h e rights it confers w o u l d b e l i m i t e d t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r (that is, w o u l d b e n o n t r a n s f e r a b l e by him, as u n d e r t h e Rawlsian's change-ofl a n d o w n e r s h i p rules). Alternatively, p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e a n initial lib erty to gain o w n e r s h i p of a plot of l a n d for t h e next p l a n t i n g s e a s o n by organizing s o m e o p e n a n d fair b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e t h r o u g h w h i c h s u c h p l o t s are d i s t r i b u t e d . M o r e radical still, p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e a n initial liberty t o u s e a n d c o n s u m e everything, t o g e t h e r w i t h a s e c o n d o r d e r right n o t to b e d e p r i v e d of this liberty w i t h o u t t h e i r c o n s e n t . In this a n a r c h i s t w o r l d , p e o p l e w o u l d "own" w h a t t h e y s w a l l o w a n d m a y b e w h a t they w e a r b u t w o u l d s h a r e everything else w h e n a s k e d to. Private p r o p e r t y , in p l o t s of l a n d for e x a m p l e , w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e in p r i n c i p l e (as m a n d a t e d b y t h e exhaustiveness constraint) t h r o u g h u n a n i m o u s c o n s e n t , b u t it w o u l d be extremely unlikely a n d a l s o h i g h l y u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e of t h e a p p e a r a n c e of n e w p e r s o n s . U n d e r all t h r e e p r o p o s a l s t h e liberty of u n i l a t e r a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n is defined as m o r e limited, s o t h a t it w o u l d give rise t o l e s s extensive, less 60

^ h i s instability raises the cute question whether the exhaustiveness constraint requnjs that plot fu ures be ownable today (in which case the instability would not exist as alleged). In Noz.ck s scheme plot futures are ownable today. A property owner by first appropnanon owns all future stages of the object as well. But' is it reasonable to make this t w T Z " °NH ^ °fg T U n d m l 6 S ? T o d o s o w o u l d b e » the case of the scheme d.scussed m the text because those in the present generation, by giving up hbert.es meanmgless to them, could constrain the liberties of future generations. If ZT£ "HT C 0 1 N S E N T S 1 I N A « < * should now own Manhattan-in W ^ great-granddaughter will, , have the right to exclude everyone elsefrommeLand. N o z i

m

2 0 8 0

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.5

59

exclusionary, o r less e n d u r i n g p r o p e r t y rights. S u c h a modification s e e m s attractive if t h e r e is r e a s o n to prefer a m o r e egalitarian distribu tion of e n g e n d e r e d f r e e d o m . Given Nozick's e n d o r s e m e n t of equality in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom, it s e e m s t h a t this p r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d exist at l e a s t as a s e c o n d a r y p r i n c i p l e (tie breaker). But t h e m a i n point of s k e t c h i n g t h e s e alternative possibilities w a s to s h o w t h a t — c o n s i s t e n t w i t h m y c o n j e c t u r e d c o n s t r a i n t s , h o w e v e r clarified—there are indefinitely m a n y a n d very different w a y s of specifying t h e initial package of rights a n d liberties to b e a s s i g n e d to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s . 4.5. Before c o n c l u d i n g t h i s section, I m u s t briefly a d d r e s s a n objec tion. It m a y b e s a i d t h a t Nozick, i n s t e a d of a c c e p t i n g a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d involving a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e , c a n b r i n g in a structurally different justificatory b a c k g r o u n d t h a t a p p e a l s to historical facts. W h e r e a s for Rawls t h e j u s t i c e of a basic s t r u c t u r e h i n g e s o n a forwardlooking (broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t ) a s s e s s m e n t of it a n d its feasible alternatives, Nozick a s s e r t s t h a t its justice c a n n o t b e a s s e s s e d apart from i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t h o w t h i s s c h e m e c a m e a b o u t . F o r h i m , t h e justification of p a r t i c u l a r social i n s t i t u t i o n s is historically recursive just like t h e justification of a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of h o l d i n g s . T h u s , institutional c h a n g e s (for e x a m p l e , from a b a r t e r to a m o n e y e c o n o m y or from p r o t e c t i v e a g e n c i e s t o t h e m i n i m a l g o v e r n m e n t ) are legitimate only if t h e y a c t u a l l y c a m e a b o u t t h r o u g h legitimate p r o c e s s e s (for e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h a n i n v i s i b l e - h a n d p r o c e s s or t h r o u g h a m a n d a t o r y a t t e m p t t o s a f e g u a r d m o r a l rights t h a t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have b e e n violated). He m i g h t t h e n reject c o m p e t i n g g r o u n d r u l e s m o r e Rawlsian in spirit b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d n o t (or n o t plausibly) have c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h a s e q u e n c e of legitimate t r a n s i t i o n s from a n original state of n a t u r e c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y b y Nozickian rights (cf. ASU 280-90). T h i s a p p e a l t o h i s t o r y c a n m o v e b u t it c a n n o t fill t h e g a p in Nozick's a c c o u n t . His favorite i n s t i t u t i o n s , even w i t h t h e i r historically recursive justification, still h a n g in m i d a i r so l o n g as it h a s n o t b e e n s h o w n w h i c h g r o u n d r u l e s w e r e valid at t h e very b e g i n n i n g . I n s t e a d of challenging 61

62

" N o z i c k o n c e e n t e r t a i n s s h a p i n g "the p r e c i s e c o n t o u r of the b u n d l e of property rights'— s p e c i a l c a s e — w i t h a n e y e to the m o s t efficient internalization of externalities 'ASU 280). We s h o u l d c h o o s e property rights s o that productive e x c h a n g e s are e n c o u r aged at l o w t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . I n a s m u c h as productive e x c h a n g e s are o n e s that make both s i d e s subjectively better off, this proposal c o m e s perilously c l o s e to a utilitanan criterion for assessing' institutions. Moreover, it w o u l d s e e m to favor a specification of property rights that t e n d s to e n g e n d e r m o r e egalitarian patterns of holdings. For p r o d u c tive e x c h a n g e s of t h e relevant kind actually to occur, t h e parties w i t h o u t right must have the f u n d s t o b u y off (part of) t h e rights of the o p p o s i t e party, a n d this consideration supports a s s i g n i n g t h e right to t h e generally p o o r e r party. (Consider the c h o i c e b e t w e e n a purported right to p o l l u t e and a p u r p o r t e d right to veto pollution in o n e s area. The latter o p t i o n is s u p e r i o r for p u r p o s e s of internalizing externalities if it is m o r e likely that industrialists h a v e t h e f u n d s to b u y p o l l u t i o n e n t i t l e m e n t s from their neighbors t h a n that residents have t h e f u n d s to b u y p o l l u t i o n limitations from industnalists.) a

" T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e unclariry e v e n about w h a t h e takes t h e s e original g r o u n d rules to b e in t h e e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . M o s t often it s e e m s that t h e s e are his p n n c i p l e s ot

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his p r o p o s e d g r o u n d rules, o n e w o u l d n o w challenge h i s p r o p o s e d original g r o u n d r u l e s , i n c l u d i n g r u l e s for t h e i r valid revision. T h e core idea of s u c h a negative strategy is c l e a r e n o u g h , a n d I will confine myself t o a few brief i l l u s t r a t i o n s . C o n c e r n i n g t h e original g r o u n d rules, h o w c a n w e settle, for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d w a s originally u n o w n e d o r o w n e d collectively? C a n w e d e c i d e o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d s a n d , if so, w h i c h ? O r c a n w e d e c i d e b y a p p e a l t o h i s t o r y a n d , if so, h o w ? C o n c e r n i n g r u l e s for t h e valid revision of t h e original g r o u n d rules, b o t h Nozick a n d Locke s u g g e s t t h a t s u c h r e v i s i o n s m u s t be m u t u a l l y beneficial. (Must e v e r y o n e u n d e r t h e n e w s c h e m e b e b e t t e r off t h a n anyone w a s u n d e r t h e o l d o n e ? H o w c o u l d it b e s h o w n t h a t they w e r e ? Or is s o m e w e a k e r c o n d i t i o n sufficient; a n d w h i c h m i g h t this be?) Both e m p h a s i z e t h a t p r i v a t e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of s o m e plot of l a n d o n t h e t e r m s they p r o p o s e will t e n d t o i m p r o v e t h e s h a r e s of all ( i n c l u d i n g t h o s e w h o will n o t o w n l a n d ) a s a g a i n s t a s t a t e w i t h o u t p r i v a t e l a n d o w n e r s h i p . But t h e s a m e c o u l d b e said, w i t h g r e a t e r plausibility p e r h a p s , a b o u t m a n y o t h e r revised s e t s of g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t w o u l d p e r m i t less extensive, less e x c l u s i o n a r y , o r less p e r m a n e n t p r i v a t e a p p r o p r i a t i o n t h a n t h e i r s d o . Again, h o w d o w e d e c i d e a m o n g v a r i o u s s u c h revisions? O n p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d s ? O r b y a p p e a l t o h i s t o r i c a l facts a b o u t h o w p r o p e r t y rights a n d o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t u a l l y e m e r g e d ? A n d w h a t if t h e y e m e r g e d differently i n Egypt, G r e e c e , Rome, etc.? T h o s e w h o w a n t t o a s s e r t t h a t t h e r e is one o b v i o u s s e t of (original) g r o u n d r u l e s will h a v e t o d e f e n d "obvious" a n s w e r s t o t h e s e a n d m a n y o t h e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s . T h e Rawlsian, favoring w h a t I h a v e c a l l e d a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , c a n m a i n tain t h e g r o u n d o n t h e h i g h e r level b y m e r e l y b l o c k i n g s u c h a s s e r t i o n s . P e r h a p s t h e b e s t w a y t o s u c c e e d at t h i s negative t a s k is t o confront t h e v a r i o u s proffered d e s c r i p t i o n s of s u p p o s e d l y o b v i o u s o r n a t u r a l in s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , t o m a k e c l e a r h o w h o p e l e s s is t h e p r o j e c t of legitimating o n e p a r t i c u l a r set of (original) g r o u n d r u l e s as m o r a l l y fundamental. And so long as n o s u c h s c h e m e h a s been so legitimated, 6 3

acquisition, transfer, a n d rectification of h o l d i n g s . But if s o , t h e n there w o u l d b e n o reason for Nozick to try to "rebut t h e claim t h a t . . . n o natural right t o private p r o p e r t y c a n arise b y a Lockean p r o c e s s " IASU 1771. This right w o u l d n ' t n e e d to arise, b e c a u s e it w o u l d exist a b initio. I don't think this p a s s a g e is just a slip o n Nozick's part. Rather, I b e l i e v e (in elaboration o f n. 6) that Nozick takes t h e institution of private property to have arisen, b e c a u s e h e w a n t s to reaffirm t h e Lockean proviso but c a n m a k e s e n s e of it o n l y as s o m e kind of c o m p e n s a t i o n requirement. If property rights h a d existed at t h e very b e g i n n i n g , t h e n t h e Lockean proviso w o u l d s e e m to h i m t o have n o rationale. Nozick c a n s o l v e this s u p p o s e d problem by a s s u m i n g , w i t h Locke, that t h e institution of private property developed in a a world aUOrthat originally b e l o n g e d t o h u m a n k i n d in c o m m o n . If so, t h e n t h e " 6 n S U 0r eneSa st hh aa tr et h e e m e r 8 e ™ e of this institution m a k e s n o o n e 6 t o eveI (S Bd initial freedom that is n o w o r s e t h a n t h e 1 6 F?WolffTa«en7nn?h ~ ™ d e l i n g ofd Nozick conflicts w91 i t h B. P riginally <See M S1 0 1

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n o t h i n g h a s b e e n s h o w n t o p r e e m p t o r c o n s t r a i n Rawls's p a t t e r n pref e r e n c e (as a p p l i e d to t h e r a n k i n g of s u c h s c h e m e s ) . I n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d in a d d i t i o n , t h e r e are r e a s o n s against a c c e p t i n g t h e very i d e a t h a t t h e justification of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d have to fit t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y r e c u r s i v e m o l d . T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is h i g h l y inflexible a n d u n a d a p t a b l e t o t h e e n o r m o u s r a n g e of social a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s to w h i c h h u m a n b e i n g s have b e e n a n d m i g h t b e — s o m e t i m e , s o m e w h e r e — e x p o s e d . Rights that s e e m o b v i o u s w i t h i n a small-scale social s y s t e m m a y m a k e a largescale o n e e n t i r e l y u n m a n a g e a b l e . A specification of p r o p e r t y rights t h a t is p l a u s i b l e for a n a g r i c u l t u r a l society may, in a h u n t i n g society, lead to extinction from s t a r v a t i o n . Variations in technology, c u l t u r e , a n d p o p u lation d e n s i t y define a n e n o r m o u s s p a c e of possibilities. Reflecting o n this p o i n t d r a i n s a w a y y e t m o r e of w h a t e v e r plausibility Nozick's c o n c e p t i o n m a y h a v e . T h e original g r o u n d r u l e s h e p r o p o s e s d o n ' t look so b a d in t h e s t a t e of n a t u r e Locke d e s c r i b e s , in w h i c h vast t r a c t s of fertile l a n d a r e available t o b e b r o u g h t u n d e r cultivation a n d t h e Rawlsian's c h a n g e - o f - l a n d o w n e r s h i p r u l e s (besides b e i n g pointless) w o u l d far ex c e e d existing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a c i t i e s . Of c o u r s e , I c o u l d d e s c r i b e a n o t h e r s t a t e of n a t u r e in w h i c h t h i n g s w o u l d b e o t h e r w i s e , but even waiving this objection, w h y s h o u l d w e n o w have to justify o u r institu tions by r e f e r e n c e to s o m e base-line s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n plausible at t h e b e g i n n i n g s of h u m a n history? And if w e do, w h y is Nozick's a r g u m e n t a justification for t h e m i n i m a l state r a t h e r t h a n t h e r e d u c t i o a d a b s u r d u m of h i s specification of original rights? A t h e o r y e n v i s i o n i n g a historically recursive a s s e s s m e n t of institu tional s c h e m e s vastly o v e r b u r d e n s u s w i t h morally significant c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . O n e m u s t n o t m e r e l y d e s i g n a s c h e m e suitable for a p a r t i c u l a r social s y s t e m at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e in history. In d e s i g n i n g s u c h a s c h e m e o n e m u s t a l s o b e c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h i s s c h e m e c a n plausibly have c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h a s e q u e n c e of legitimate institutional c h a n g e s from t h e original s c h e m e , t h a t t h e original a n d all i n t e r m e d i a t e s c h e m e s b e suitable t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e social c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t all o t h e r s c h e m e s t h a t might p l a u s i b l y h a v e legitimately e m e r g e d (or m i g h t yet so emerge) from t h e original s c h e m e also b e suitable u n d e r all sorts of social a n d n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s , a n d t h a t n o alternative specification of t h e original s c h e m e s h o u l d g e n e r a t e a t r e e of accessible s c h e m e s t h a t s e e m s m o r e a c c e p t a b l e o n t h e w h o l e t h a n t h e tree g e n e r a t e d by Nozick's o w n original s c h e m e . Given t h e s e fantastic complexities, o n e m a y c o m e t o a p p r e c i a t e w h y Nozick is t e m p t e d — e v e n at t h e e x p e n s e of d e c o u p l i n g t h e t h i r d p a r t of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, w h i c h h o l d s o u t t h e p r o m ise of a " f r a m e w o r k for U t o p i a " — b y t h e q u i c k e r r o u t e of d e c l a r i n g his specification of original rights " f u n d a m e n t a l " b y insisting t h a t his a r e "the p r e c i s e l y c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s " (ASU 202). If t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s ( p e r h a p s t h r o u g h s o m e p l a u s i b l e s e q u e n c e of legitimate i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes) lead to m a s s i v e slavery, s e r f d o m , starvation, o r n o n c o m p l i a n c e , t h e n

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t h e r e is p e r h a p s r e a s o n t o violate s o m e rights h e r e a n d t h e r e — " t o avoid c a t a s t r o p h i c m o r a l h o r r o r " (ASU 3 0 n ) — b u t c e r t a i n l y n o t r e a s o n to change one's m i n d about the principles themselves. 4.6. Rawls i n A Theory of Justice also a i m s for a t h e o r y that is applicable to social s y s t e m s u n d e r very different social a n d natural c o n d i t i o n s . But h e w a n t s t o a s s e s s t h e justice of a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e by h o w it w o r k s n o w , w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o its h i s t o r y . T h r o u g h h i s broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t m o d e of a s s e s s m e n t , Rawls g a i n s a g o o d d e a l of se curity against s h o c k i n g s u r p r i s e s , for i n s t a n c e , t h a t t h e m o s t r e p u g n a n t s c h e m e s c a n b e just a n d t h e m o s t beneficial o n e s u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of their genesis. E m p l o y i n g a t h i n n o t i o n of t h e h u m a n g o o d , R a w l s m a k e s t h e justice of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t u r n o n h o w its least a d v a n t a g e d fare in c o m p a r i s o n to t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r feasible alternative basic s t r u c t u r e s . Rawls's p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e w o u l d entail a l o w r a n k i n g for Nozick's g r o u n d r u l e s . If Nozick p r o t e s t s t h a t h i s g r o u n d r u l e s a r e s o m e h o w n a t u r a l or obvious, h e is unlikely to prevail. T h e r e are j u s t t o o m a n y p r e t e n d e r s t o t h e s e a t t r i b u t e s , a n d o n l y if t h e r e w e r e s o m e conver g e n c e u p o n o n e set of g r o u n d r u l e s m i g h t t h e s e b e u s e d t o t e s t (and reject) t h e Rawlsian criterion. A b s e n t s u c h c o n v e r g e n c e , it s e e m s m o r e p r o m i s i n g for Nozick to e x t e n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n t o t h e h i g h e r level s o as to p r e v e n t Rawls from m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t g r o u n d b y default. D o i n g so, I have suggested, w o u l d l e a d h i m t o d e f e n d a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t in its b a l a n c i n g of values, is s t r u c t u r a l l y similar to Rawls's o w n . T h i s balancing, however, w o u l d n o t b e b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , b e c a u s e Nozick in c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s M a s t e r P a t t e r n w o u l d give m u c h less w e i g h t to t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t a r e t h e effects of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a n to equivalent benefits a n d b u r d e n s it calls for. This c h a p t e r h a s d o n e little t o d e f e n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r criterion Rawls p r o p o s e s for a s s e s s i n g alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . My m a i n c o n c e r n w a s t o m a k e p l a u s i b l e t h e very i d e a of s u c h a criterion, t h e i d e a of t h i n k i n g a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s in t e r m s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l pat t e r n s . I h a v e also tried to gain s o m e initial credibility for t h e s e m i c o n s e quentialist a p p r o a c h to t h e subject of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e . S u c h a n a p p r o a c h is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s a n institutional s c h e m e t e n d s to p r o d u c e , irrespective of t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h it e s t a b l i s h e s o r e n g e n d e r s t h e m .

C H A P T E R

2

Sandel and the Conception of the Person

5- N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s have b e e n s o r o u t i n e t h a t a clear ( t h o u g h s o m e w h a t critical) defense of it s e e m s useful for t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e . My d i s c u s s i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s serves t w o a d d i t i o n a l p u r p o s e s as well, it allows m e to clarify a further i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of Rawls's focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , a n d it c o n s t i t u t e s a s m a l l - s c a l e p r e l u d e to t h e d i s c u s s i o n of Rawls's infamous c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , w h i c h , s u p p o r t i n g t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s a n d t h e m a x i m i n idea, plays a crucial role in his c o n c e p tion of social j u s t i c e . 5 . 1 . T h e severe c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s c e n t e r a r o u n d t h e m i s t a k e n i d e a t h a t t h e difference principle, as d e f e n d e d in A Theory of Justice, p e r m i t s or even r e q u i r e s t h a t p e r s o n s b e u s e d a s m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n thrives o n Rawls's c l a i m t h a t h i s is "a c o n c e p t i o n of justice t h a t nullifies t h e a c c i d e n t s of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t ' ' (TJ 15). It is confirmed by his adver t i s e m e n t of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e as a n a g r e e m e n t to regard t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s as a " c o m m o n , " "collective," or "social a s s e t t o b e u s e d for t h e c o m m o n a d v a n t a g e " (TJ 101,179,107). And it finds f u r t h e r s u p p o r t w h e n Rawls a n n o u n c e s t h a t " n o o n e deserves h i s p l a c e in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of native e n d o w m e n t s " (TJ 104, cf §48), t h a t s u c h e n d o w m e n t s a r e "arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of view"
64

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.1.1

5 . 1 . 1 . It h a s b e e n s u p p o s e d t h a t c o n t r o l over o n e ' s n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is itself u p for c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h a t Rawls is e x a m i n i n g t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s p e c i a l gifts a n d h a n d i c a p s a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of other, p e r h a p s m o r e d e s i r a b l e alternative p a t t e r n s . O n t h i s s u p p o s i tion, t h e c o n s i s t e n t p r o p o s a l s for Rawls t o m a k e w o u l d involve involun tary o r g a n t r a n s p l a n t s (Nozick, ASU 206-7), c o o w n e r s h i p b y o t h e r s of e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s (giving t h e m a right t o d e c i d e h o w t h e s e s h o u l d b e e m p l o y e d ) , o r at t h e very least a " h e a d tax" (ASU 229n) to b e i m p o s e d u p o n t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d . T h e s u p p o s i t i o n , h o w e v e r , is m i s t a k e n : "Greater n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a r e n o t a collective a s s e t in t h e s e n s e t h a t society s h o u l d c o m p e l t h o s e w h o h a v e t h e m to p u t t h e m to w o r k for t h e less favored" (RMC 145). "We h a v e a right to o u r n a t u r a l abilities" (BSS 65). This m u c h is e n s h r i n e d i n Rawls's first p r i n c i p l e . 1

W e s h o u l d recall h e r e t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is only s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . Natural p r i m a r y g o o d s , s u c h a s " h e a l t h a n d vigor, intelligence a n d i m a g i n a t i o n " (TJ 62), fall o u t s i d e t h e m a s t e r p a t t e r n s b y w h i c h feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s are a s s e s s e d . " T h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n is n e i t h e r just n o r u n j u s t " (TJ 102). Rawls is C o n c e r n e d only w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , w h i c h is / r e g u l a t e d b y t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e . All a n d only i n e q u a l i t i e s in this dis t r i b u t i o n r e q u i r e justification: "A h y p o t h e t i c a l initial a r r a n g e m e n t in w h i c h all t h e social p r i m a r y g o o d s are equally d i s t r i b u t e d . . . p r o v i d e s a b e n c h m a r k for j u d g i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s " (TJ 62). H e n c e t h e r e is n o rea s o n , n o t even a reason o v e r r i d d e n b y o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h y t h e u s e of p e r s o n s ' e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d b e d e c i d e d collectively, o r n a t u r a l inequalities b e offset b y social o n e s . T h e fact of n a t u r a l inequalities m a y p r o v i d e a n o t h e r sort of r e a s o n for d e p a r t i n g from a n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . P e r h a p s all s h a r e s c o u l d b e larger if special rewards w e r e offered for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise of special t a l e n t s . In this case, h o w e v e r , t h e resulting social inequalities w o u l d b e justified b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e preferred d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y m a k e p o s s i b l e ( a n d not by reference to a preferred d i s t r i b u t i o n of welfare o r of p r i m a r y g o o d s overall). I n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s — t h o u g h it p l a y s n o n o r m a t i v e role w i t h i n Rawls's criterion of justice, d o e s n o t figure in t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n — i s still n e e d e d in a n e m p i r i c a l role. It c o d e t e r m i n e s h o w this criterion c a n b e satisfied. T h e r e is t h e n n o d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d s h o u l d have a n d c o n t r o l t h e i r s u p e r i o r n a t u r a l gifts. Rawls d o e s n o t •Sandel has it arguing against

that Rawls's text is not merely i n c o n s i s t e n t with but is s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y the view "that I have certain privileged c l a i m s with r e s o e c t t o [my

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65

q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e y s h o u l d . T h e o n l y c o n t r o v e r s y is over w h a t advan tages t h e y a r e t o b e offered for d e v e l o p i n g a n d exercising t h e i r special endowments. 5.1.2. T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n c e m o r e involves t h e distinc tion of m o r a l s u b j e c t s : t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n d u c t . H o w w e feel a b o u t a p r e f e r e n c e for s o m e p a t t e r n s over o t h e r s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e role it is a s s i g n e d in m o r a l a r g u m e n t . Appeal t o t h e s a m e p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e m a y s e e m perfectly sensible a n d also q u i t e o u t r a g e o u s , d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r it is m e a n t to justify the ranking of o n e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e above a n o t h e r or the infringement of rights u n d e r s o m e ( r e a s o n a b l y just) existing institutional s c h e m e . T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n s i s t s in a s s u m i n g that Rawls's valua tion of i n c o m e p a t t e r n s , w h i c h reflect t h e n a t u r a l distribution of e n d o w m e n t s , is t o b e a p p l i e d w i t h i n a n o n g o i n g e c o n o m i c s c h e m e w h o s e t e r m s are t a k e n for g r a n t e d . Rawls is viewed as s u g g e s t i n g that w e s h o u l d try to factor o u t t h e p a r t of a p e r s o n ' s h o l d i n g s that is d u e to natural e n d o w m e n t s , a n d t h e r e f o r e u n d e s e r v e d , as a fit c a n d i d a t e for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . Against this p o s i t i o n Nozick c a n q u i t e convincingly ar g u e t h a t s o m e t h i n g m a y b e legitimately o n e ' s o w n even t h o u g h w h a t o n e u s e d t o o b t a i n it ( a n d w h a t o n e u s e d to o b t a i n that, etc.) are not "deserved, all the way down.. .. S o m e of t h e t h i n g s h e u s e s h e just m a y have, n o t illegitimately" (ASU 225). Taking n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s to b e a m o n g t h e s e things o n e just has, Nozick s k e t c h e s t h i s a r g u m e n t : 1- P e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r n a t u r a l a s s e t s . 2. If p e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o s o m e t h i n g , t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o w h a t e v e r f l o w s f r o m it (via s p e c i f i e d t y p e s o f p r o c e s s e s ) . 3. P e o p l e ' s h o l d i n g s flow f r o m t h e i r n a t u r a l a s s e t s . T h e r e f o r e , 4. P e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r h o l d i n g s . 5

If p e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o s o m e t h i n g , t h e n t h e y o u g h t t o h a v e it ( a n d t h i s o v e r r i d e s a n y p r e s u m p t i o n of equality there m a y b e about h o l d i n g s ) . (ASU 2 2 5 - 2 6 )

This a r g u m e n t is e n t i r e l y u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . O n l y it leaves o p e n w h a t those "specified t y p e s of p r o c e s s e s " s h o u l d b e via w h i c h h o l d i n g s flow from n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . A n d it is precisely this issue, a n d t h i s issue alone, t h a t Rawls's reflections a b o u t n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s are m e a n t to a d d r e s s . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t p e r s o n s a r e e n t i t l e d to w h a t e v e r they a c q u i r e u n d e r j u s t p r o c e s s e s , n o m a t t e r w h a t role their e n d o w m e n t s m a y h a v e p l a y e d i n t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n (cf. TJ 103). W h a t Rawls d i s p u t e s is t h a t p e r s o n s , in virtue of t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s , are entitled to o r d e s e r v e any particular specification of these processes (cf. TJ 104)— s o m e t h i n g Nozick w o u l d d i s p u t e j u s t as vigorously. O n c e again, t h e valuation of t h e relevant p a t t e r n features ( i n c o m e differentials reflect ing diverse n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s ) is m e a n t to influence t h e a s s e s s m e n t of institutions. It is n o t i n t e n d e d t o i n s p i r e rectificatory interference

66

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.2

w i t h t h e h o l d i n g s t h a t have a r i s e n u n d e r s o m e e x i s t i n g institutional scheme. 5.2. T h e s e t w o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s out of t h e w a y , w e c a n begin delineating t h e m a i n i s s u e : H o w a r e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s to be de signed a n d a s s e s s e d (the relevant "types of p r o c e s s e s " to b e specified)? W h a t is t h e m e a n i n g a n d plausibility of Rawls's v i e w t h a t institutional s c h e m e s s h o u l d regulate differentials in t h e s o c i a l r e w a r d s for develop ing a n d exercising n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s s o as t o o p t i m i z e t h e worst r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s ? Let m e give a c r u d e illustration of Rawls's p o s i t i o n , b a s e d , o n c e again, u p o n his difference p r i n c i p l e in its s i m p l e s t f o r m ( w h e r e it g o v e r n s only income) as a p p l i e d to t h e e c o n o m y of a small s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society. To further simplify m a t t e r s , I a s s u m e t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y t w o levels of e n d o w m e n t : e i g h t e e n specially gifted p e r s o n s ("the e x c e p t i o n a l s " ) , ca p a b l e of w o r k i n g in t h e c o m p l e x job, a n d fifty-four n o r m a l l y e n d o w e d p e r s o n s ("the normals"), w h o c a n w o r k only in t h e s i m p l e j o b . I con sider four alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n c o m e for o n e h o u r of w o r k in t h e c o m p l e x job is t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of s u c h labor m i n u s , respectively, 0, 40, 50, a n d 60 p e r c e n t . T h e i n c o m e for o n e hour of w o r k in t h e s i m p l e job is t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of s u c h l a b o r p l u s some p e r c e n t a g e , w h i c h is c h o s e n so that t h e total flow of s u p p l e m e n t a r y i n c o m e (that is, of "negative" i n c o m e t a x e s in t h e s i m p l e job) exactly b a l a n c e s t h e total flow of taxes r a i s e d in t h e c o m p l e x j o b . S u p p o s e empirical s t u d i e s s h o w t h e p a t t e r n s t h a t t h e f o u r a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r to be roughly as s h o w n in T a b l e 1 (stating i n each c o l u m n t h e d a t a for t h e c o m p l e x job first). For each s c h e m e , t h e first value in r o w [A] is e x o g e n o u s . All other values are calculated, e x c e p t for t h o s e in r o w s [B], [F], a n d (H). T h e s e are stipulated m accordance with three straightforward empirical assump tions a b o u t variations across s c h e m e s . First, as r e g a r d s [F], average ° ™ ™ group u n d e r each scheme are s u c h that groups higher n e t i n c o m e rates [D] have m o r e leisure [F] a n d e a r n m o r e i n c o m e [G). Second, as r e g a r d s [H], a n i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of the exceptionals prefer t o w o r k in t h e s i m p l e j o b a s t h e r a t i o b e t w e e n the r h ? d ^ « »from S to S ). T h i r d , a s r e g a r d s [B], olv S n xi " °f ° " ^ l i v e l y related to the labor suprelatTve J L H ° ^ a f u n c t i o n of t h e 2

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Table 1. Alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s a n d the difference principle S, [A I Tax rate IB] Gross i n c o m e rate p e r hour 1$) !C]Tax per h o u r [$), [A]X[B] !D!Net i n c o m e rate p e r hour 1 $ ) , IBJ+IC) (E) Net i n c o m e rate ratio, from ID] IF) Average working h o u r s per week IG] Average net i n c o m e p e r week l$),[D)x[F] (HINumber of workers (1) Total working h o u r s p e r week, [F]x[H] (J) Labor s u p p l y ratio,

0% 110.00

0% 13.00

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44% 16.00

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60% 15.00

-60% 96.00

64% 14.40

0.00 110.00

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are n e v e r t h e l e s s b e t t e r off (have a h i g h e r net i n c o m e rate [Dj—work less [F] a n d e a r n m o r e [G]) t h a n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r a n y of t h e alternative s c h e m e s . 5.3. While it is q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e Rawlsian criterion w o u l d entail a preference for S Rawls m a k e s it difficult to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t this preference m e a n s . C o n s i d e r his formulations in explication of t h e dif ference p r i n c i p l e : " T h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n favored b y n a t u r e . . . m a y gain from t h e i r g o o d f o r t u n e o n l y o n t e r m s that improve t h e situation of t h o s e w h o h a v e lost o u t " (TJ 101); " t h e m o r e fortunate are to benefit only in w a y s t h a t h e l p t h o s e w h o have lost o u t " (TJ 179); "no o n e gains or loses from h i s a r b i t r a r y p l a c e in t h e distribution of n a t u r a l assets . . 3

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A s the e x a m p l e m a k e s clear, Sandel g o e s w r o n g in believing that the s c h e m e ranked highest by Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n "nullifies the effect of t h e s e differences lin natural for tune]" (LU 69). In S t h o s e w o r k i n g in the c o m p l e x job have considerably more i n c o m e and m o r e leisure t h a n their fellows working in the s i m p l e job. Moreover, they prefer their c o m p l e x job (unavailable to the normals), as is w i t n e s s e d by the fact that they c o u l d switch at any time. There is n o q u e s t i o n that they h a v e — o n top of their better e n d o w ment, w h i c h is irrelevant for R a w l s — a better social position than the normals. It may s e e m that a w e a k e r c l a i m is true. A just s c h e m e is s u c h that some of the exceptionals just barely prefer t h e c o m p l e x job; s o m e of t h e m (in S ) w o u l d s w i t c h into the s i m p l e job if the net i n c o m e rate ratio w e r e reduced a little bit further. But o n e m u s t be careful with s u c h statements. Rawls's criterion c o m p a r e s long-term s c h e m e s (existing "in perpetuity," as it were). So t h e table d o e s n o t illustrate h o w actual persons, having convex indifference curves b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n d leisure w h i c h reflect decreasing marginal utility for both g o o d s , w o u l d a d j u s t their e c o n o m i c behavior to tax-rate fluctuations. Rather, the as s u m p t i o n is that p e r s o n s h a v e g r o w n u p in "their" s c h e m e , that their preferences a n d indifference c u r v e s (etc.) have b e e n s h a p e d by it. There is n o guarantee that p e r s o n s in S w o u l d adjust to short-term c h a n g e s in i n c o m e tax rates as s h o w n m the table. 5

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Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.3

w i t h o u t giving or receiving c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s in r e t u r n . . . . In justice as fairness m e n agree to s h a r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s fate" (TJ 102).These formulations invite t h e t h i r d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . G r a n t e d , it might be said, S is so organized t h a t n o t h i n g is t a k e n a w a y from t h e excep tionals or r e d i s t r i b u t e d . It's all d o n e a u t o m a t i c a l l y a n d o n a schedule a n n o u n c e d in a d v a n c e . But t h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s : W h y s h o u l d the exceptionals o w e t h e n o r m a l s any c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s ? In return for w h a t ? Yes, t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s a r e free to w o r k in t h e s i m p l e job, and they have to p a y only if t h e y c h o o s e to e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r endow m e n t s , b u t by w h a t right m a y t h i s c o n d i t i o n b e i m p o s e d u p o n them? Why s h o u l d t h e y b e f o r b i d d e n to e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r e n d o w m e n t s without h e l p i n g t h e n o r m a l s ? How is this w a y of u s i n g p e o p l e (or their talents or t h e i r work) for t h e benefit of o t h e r s m a d e a c c e p t a b l e by the fact that it's built into t h e rules of t h e g a m e , r a t h e r t h a n i m p o s e d by officials in a n a d h o c m a n n e r ? 5

This line of criticism is beautifully c a p t u r e d in Nozick's i m a g e of the exceptionals b e i n g harnessed to serve o t h e r s , " a n d h a r n e s s i n g ' is an a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m — a s it w o u l d b e for a h o r s e h a r n e s s e d to a wagon w h i c h d o e s n ' t have t o m o v e ever, b u t if it d o e s , it m u s t d r a w t h e wagon along" (ASU 229n). W h a t Nozick w a n t s to c o n c l u d e is t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice, b y favoring i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s u n d e r which t h e exceptionals are h a r n e s s e d , e n c o u r a g e s t h e u s e of s o m e p e r s o n s as m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . W h e n p e r s o n s are h a r n e s s e d , however, o n l y t h e i r work and efforts are i m m e d i a t e l y u s e d . Nozick's p a t h t o h i s c o n c l u s i o n r e q u i r e s then two further s t e p s : t o u s e p e r s o n s ' w o r k a n d efforts is t o u s e t h e i r natural e n d o w m e n t s , a n d to u s e t h e i r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is to u s e them. Nozick explicitly asserts t h e s e c o n d of t h e s e s t e p s : ' W h y w e , thick with particular traits, s h o u l d b e c h e e r e d t h a t (only) t h e t h u s p u r i f i e d m e n w i t h i n u s are n o t regarded as m e a n s is . . . u n c l e a r " (ASU 228). And 3 ° ! ^ ' P o i n t - i n s i s t i n g t h a t u s i n g t h e s p e c i a l gifts of the N

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ID N a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s a c o m m o n a s s e t . (2) H e n c e , t h e t a l e n t s a n d a b i l i t i e s o f (or " r e s i d i n g in") t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s m a y be u s e d as m e a n s . (3) H e n c e , t h e w o r k a n d e f f o r t s of t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s m a y b e u s e d a s m e a n s , or h a r n e s s e d . (4) H e n c e , a n i n c o m e tax s c h e m e like S m a y b e i n s t i t u t e d . 4

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If Rawls w e r e really a r g u i n g in this way, t h e n Nozick a n d Sandel w o u l d i n d e e d n e e d t o s h o w o n l y h o w (1) or (2) p r e s u p p o s e s that persons m a y be u s e d as m e a n s . Their r e a d i n g , h o w e v e r , is m i s t a k e n ; Rawls m a k e s n o s u c h a r g u m e n t and d o e s n o t e n d o r s e a n y of p r o p o s i t i o n s (l)-(3). My d i s c u s s i o n will c o n c e n t r a t e o n (3), for b y s h o w i n g that, d e s p i t e a p p e a r a n c e s , Rawls is not invoking (3) in a n y relevant s e n s e , I c a n d e s t r o y t h e o r d i n a r y ra tionale for a t t r i b u t i n g (1) a n d (2) to h i m . At the e n d I will look again at Rawls's c o m m o n - a s s e t f o r m u l a t i o n s to s h o w h o w t h e Nozick-Sandel reading of t h e m g o e s w r o n g a n d h o w t h e y s h o u l d i n s t e a d b e u n d e r stood. 5.4. T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g viewed Rawls as e n c o u r a g i n g officials to t a k e a w a y s o m e of p e o p l e ' s e a r n i n g s a n d p a s s t h e m along to the less f o r t u n a t e . I s a i d in r e s p o n s e t h a t Rawls is d i s c u s s i n g t h e scheme u n d e r w h i c h e a r n i n g s arise in t h e first place. He a d d r e s s e s himself t o t h e d e e p e s t b a s i s of e c o n o m i c e n t i t l e m e n t s a n d t h u s c a n n o t be criticized in a w a y t h a t a l r e a d y takes s o m e e n t i t l e m e n t - p r o d u c i n g p r o c e s s e s for g r a n t e d . To s a y t h a t w i t h Rawls in c h a r g e p e o p l e get less t h a n t h e y are e n t i t l e d t o b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n Rawls is raising, by a s s u m i n g w e a l r e a d y k n o w w h a t p e o p l e are e n t i t l e d to. T h e t h i r d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is similar to t h e s e c o n d in t h a t it again reflects t h e failure t o u n d e r s t a n d Rawls's focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e . The c h a r g e is t h a t u n d e r t h e s c h e m e Rawls favors, S , p e o p l e are entitled to less t h a n t h e y o u g h t to have. This objection can be embel lished b y a d d i n g t h a t p e o p l e o u g h t to have w h a t flows from t h e i r w o r k a n d efforts, b u t it still b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n , this t i m e by a s s u m i n g w e already k n o w w h a t flows from p e o p l e ' s w o r k a n d efforts a n d that this is what they o u g h t to have. But is n o t R a w l s h i m s e l f saying t h a t t h e exceptionals, if t h e y w a n t to exercise t h e i r s p e c i a l t a l e n t s , m u s t " h e l p " t h e n o r m a l s , m u s t "improve their s i t u a t i o n " a n d "give t h e m c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s " ? A n d d o e s this r e q u i r e m e n t n o t p r e s u p p o s e t h a t w e do k n o w w h a t flows from their w o r k a n d efforts, n a m e l y , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s u n d e r S plus w h a t ever " h e l p " w a s d i v e r t e d t o t h o s e in t h e s i m p l e job? In t w o of t h e t h r e e p a s s a g e s q u o t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of §5.3, Rawls formulates m o r e carefully, s a y i n g t h a t t h e m o r e f o r t u n a t e m a y gain s

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70

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.5

only on terms t h a t improve, m a y benefit o n l y in ways t h a t help those w h o have lost o u t . T h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s s u g g e s t a n a l t e r n a t i v e reading, w h i c h alone m a k e s t h e m meaningful a s a p a r a p h r a s e of t h e difference principle. O n this reading, t h e implicit r e f e r e n c e of s u c h comparative expressions as "gain," "improve," " h e l p , " "giving c o m p e n s a t i n g advan tages" is not to t h e (smaller) s h a r e t h e n o r m a l s w o u l d h a v e if the exceptionals d i d less w o r k in t h e c o m p l e x job. I n s t e a d , t h e implicit reference is to t h e (smaller) s h a r e of t h e n o r m a l s as it would exist under alternative schemes. It's n o t that t h e p r e f e r r e d e c o n o m i c scheme is rigged s o t h a t t h o s e in t h e c o m p l e x j o b c a n n o t b u t h e l p t h o s e in the simple job. Rather, Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e is s u c h t h a t its selection of a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e will (maximally) h e l p — t h a t is, improve—the lowest social position. T h u s S is preferred over S b e c a u s e t h e ("interschemic") gain in the c o m p l e x j o b is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a compensating gain i n t h e l o w e r job. (The "in r e t u r n " is m e a n i n g f u l if w e a p p r o a c h S from Rawls's e q u a l - i n c o m e b e n c h m a r k . ) s

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optimized t h r o u g h t h e c h o i c e of a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is n e v e r t h e position of t h e p r e s e n t l y p o o r e s t p e r s o n s (as if o n e c o u l d k e e p track of concrete i n d i v i d u a l s a c r o s s h y p o t h e t i c a l s c h e m e s ) but always the smallest s h a r e , t h a t is, in t h e s i m p l e s t case, t h e floor of t h e i n c o m e hierarchy. Second, Rawls m o v e s freely back a n d forth b e t w e e n (what I call) t h e /nfraschemic a n d / n f e r s c h e m i c s e n s e s of s u c h t e r m s as benefit a n d advantage. T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s m u s t be to t h e a d v a n t a g e of the least a d v a n t a g e d , for e x a m p l e , m e a n s that t h e s c h e m e m u s t be c h o s e n so t h a t t h o s e i n t r a s c h e m i c a l l v m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d will enjoy an / n f e r s c h e m i c a d v a n t a g e over t h o s e Uhtraschemically) m o s t disad vantaged u n d e r feasible alternative s c h e m e s . Likewise, h i s criterion selects t h e s c h e m e t h a t benefits m o s t t h o s e w h o m it benefits least (Rawls u s e s b o t h e x p r e s s i o n s ) . T h e s h a r e of this g r o u p is inferior to t h e shares of all o t h e r (existing) g r o u p s a n d yet s u p e r i o r to t h e (hypotheti cal! w o r s t s h a r e u n d e r a n y feasible alternative s c h e m e . 5.6. T h e i n t e r s c h e m i c c o n s t r u a l of t h e c o m p a r a t i v e t e r m s ("greatest," "gain," " i m p r o v e , " etc.) dissolves t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t Rawls himself explicitly favors a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e a r e h a r n e s s e d for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . Rawls is n o t r u n n i n g afoul of his o w n insistence that p e r s o n s m u s t n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s m e a n s (TJ 1831.1 c a n t h e n c o n t i n u e in his behalf t h e s t r a t e g y I h a v e e m b a r k e d u p o n in §4.5 (cf. §4.6)—the strategy of b l o c k i n g a n y a s s e r t i o n of a n obvious e c o n o m i c s c h e m e or of conditions t h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s m u s t obviously satisfy. 6

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C o n s i d e r h e r e t h e c o m p l a i n t that u n d e r s c h e m e s Rawls w o u l d favor people's ac tivities will have positive a n d negative externalities (on a c c o u n t of the tax system). Such a s c h e m e will allow that I c a n act to benefit myself in w a y s that m a k e y o u w o r s e off or las in S ) that y o u c a n n o t d o certain things w i t h o u t benefiting m e . But w h y s h o u l d this be inadmissible? After all, this m u c h is true of every market s c h e m e w e know. My i n c o m e may b e v e i y significantly affected by others' e c o n o m i c activities that don't involve m e at all- It w o u l d be r i d i c u l o u s to say that thev are h a r n e s s e d to m e just b e c a u s e I benefit las a shareholder, perhaps) every t i m e t h e v buv a n e w car ("They don't have to b u y a n e w car ever, but if they d o , t h e y m u s t g e n e r a t e s o m e gain for me"). Another external attack might charge that u n d e r w h a t Rawls c o n s i d e r s a just e c o n o m i c s c h e m e persons w o u l d not be receiving their marginal p r o d u c t s . (This idea s e e m s to m e already disqualified o n e c o nomic g r o u n d s . T h e r e is n o g u a r a n t e e that if factor inputs are multiplied, e a c h with its marginal p r o d u c t , a n d t h e results are a d d e d , the s u m will equal total production.) But a person's marginal c o n t r i b u t i o n d e p e n d s in various w a y s u p o n contextual factors that cannot reasonably b e attributed to this p e r s o n icf. TJ 308). Moreover, is it really obvious that t h o s e w h o c a n n o t contribute Ithe aged, o r p h a n e d , h a n d i c a p p e d , etc.) ought to be receiving their marginal p r o d u c t , i.e., nothing? D o thev not also have s o m e claim o n the material w o r l d that is a m a i n s o u r c e of e c o n o m i c values? Only a morally appealing notion of what "flows from'' a p e r s o n ' s work or efforts c o u l d overturn or constrain the Rawlsian Pattern preference. Finally, Nozick s u g g e s t s that t h e appropriate w a y of settling o n an e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is through an u n c o n s t r a i n e d collective bargaining s e s s i o n b e t w e e n the exceptionals las a team) a n d the n o r m a l s (ASU 193-95). In s u c h a s e s s i o n the exceptionals w o u l d b e fools to agree to S . T h e y c o u l d m a k e a c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l u n d e r w h i c h the s i m p l e |ob is taxed s o a s to fund a n i n c o m e s u p p l e m e n t for the c o m p l e x job. T h e bargaining w o u l d ^tycomwge toward a m i l d p r o p o s a l of this form (rather than S„J because, Nozick tells us, the normals have m o r e to lose, vis-a-vis S , from a b r e a k d o w n of social cooperation. But o n c e again 5

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Let m e a d d t h a t t h e i n t r a s c h e m i c c o n s t r u a J s u g g e s t e d b y t h e har n e s s i n g image is u n s o u n d even i n strictly e c o n o m i c t e r m s , b e c a u s e tax rates have a n i m p a c t o n g r o s s i n c o m e s . C o n s i d e r t h e c o m p l a i n t against S o r against c u r r e n t l y existing s c h e m e s t h a t w h a t i s p a i d i n i n c o m e tax a n d s p e n t o n t h e n e e d s of o t h e r s r e p r e s e n t s (unjustly) redistributed i n c o m e . In k e e p i n g c u r r e n t g r o s s i n c o m e s fixed, t h i s c o m p l a i n t pre s u p p o s e s t h e very i n c o m e t a x s c h e m e it r e j e c t s . If t h e c h a l l e n g e d tax really d i d n o t exist, t h e n g r o s s i n c o m e s ( a n d a v e r a g e w o r k i n g hours) in all jobs w o u l d b e different. Gross i n c o m e s r e p r e s e n t n o t t h e market price of o u r labor simpliciter b u t t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of o u r l a b o r within some particular institutional s c h e m e . To b e c o h e r e n t , t h e c o m p l a i n t m u s t t h e n b e f o r m u l a t e d in inters c h e m i c t e r m s . But, s o f o r m u l a t e d , it h a s c o n s i d e r a b l y less intuitive a p p e a l . Critics m a y a d v o c a t e t h e i r favorite a l t e r n a t i v e economic s c h e m e a n d p o i n t o u t t h a t relative t o it, a s c h e m e favored by the difference p r i n c i p l e w o u l d b e u s i n g o r e x p l o i t i n g t h e b e t t e r endowed. But t h i s c o m p l a i n t r e d u c e s to t h e c o m m o n p l a c e t h a t s o m e schemes are b e t t e r for s o m e g r o u p s a n d o t h e r s for o t h e r s . Relative t o S , S raises t h e p r o s p e c t s of t h e n o r m a l s w h i l e l o w e r i n g t h o s e of t h e exceptionals. But t h i s c o m p l a i n t p r e s u p p o s e s , a n d h e n c e c a n n o t s u p p o r t , a prefer e n c e of S over S , for it i s equally t r u e t h a t , relative t o S , S raises the p r o s p e c t s of t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s w h i l e l o w e r i n g t h o s e of t h e n o r m a l s . It is unlikely t h a t t h e r e is a feasible s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h n o g r o u p would lose relative t o any feasible alternative s c h e m e , a n d if t h e r e w e r e s u c h a s c h e m e (weakly P a r e t o - s u p e r i o r t o all alternatives) t h e n Rawls's criten o n w o u l d favor it i n a n y c a s e . s

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not persons b u t o n l y 'their' attributes are b e i n g u s e d as m e a n s to others' w e l l - b e i n g " (LIJ 78; cf. ASU 228). 8

6. N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d D e s e r t 6 . 1 . Rawls c l a i m s t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice nullifies t h e acci d e n t s of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t e n d o w m e n t s are to be e q u a l i z e d o r t h a t a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e m u s t not offer g r e a t e r r e w a r d s to t h o s e b e t t e r e n d o w e d . T h e p o i n t is t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d have n o s p e c i a l c l a i m s u p o n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e criterion of social justice. T h i s p o i n t h a s t w o i m p o r t a n t corollaries: w h e n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m s of e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n are n e g o t i a t e d (for e x a m p l e , in t h e original p o s i t i o n ) , it is m o r a l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e for e n d o w m e n t s to be a factor in t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n ; a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s d o n o t reflect a n i n t r i n s i c m o r a l w o r t h that w o u l d set b o u n d s o n the t e r m s a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e m a y offer for t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise. T h i s s e c o n d corollary will b e c e n t r a l to t h e p r e s e n t section. Given t h e c o n s t r a i n t u p o n its c o n s t r u c t i o n , Rawls arrives at a crite rion of ( e c o n o m i c ) j u s t i c e t h a t d o e s n o t m e n t i o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . It ranks e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s solely w i t h regard to t h e i n c o m e distribu tion (specifically, t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e s ) t h e v t e n d to p r o d u c e . H o w the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d b e r e w a r d e d is a s e c o n d a r y i s s u e , t o b e s e t t l e d b y reference to this criterion (and e m p i r i cal facts). E n d o w m e n t s p l a y n o role in specifying w h a t a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is s u p p o s e d t o achieve, t h o u g h t h e v d o of c o u r s e play a role in h o w it c a n b e s t a c h i e v e t h i s . T h u s , in t h e c o r r e c t r e a d i n g of t h e c o m m o n - a s s e t formulations, Rawls's p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b e s u c h that t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e y g e n e r a t e t e n d to m a x i m i z e , interschemically, the m i n i m u m s h a r e . T h i s p r e f e r e n c e leaves w i d e o p e n t h e kind a n d extent of i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e favored s c h e m e w o u l d allow. In particular, the r e w a r d s t h i s s c h e m e offers to p e r s o n s w i t h special gifts d e p e n d s o n h o w useful a n d h o w w i d e s p r e a d t h e s e are a n d also o n h o w t h e de v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of t h e s e gifts w o u l d b e affected by alternative r e w a r d s c h e d u l e s . By t h u s a d j u s t i n g t h e (choice of) e c o n o m i c s c h e m e 9

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*Nor n e e d Rawls a c c e p t Sandel's invitation to g o over to the c o m m u n i t a r i a n c a m p "by questioning the s e n s e in w h i c h t h o s e w h o share in my' assets are properly d e s c n b e d as o t h e r s ' . . . . if the difference p r i n c i p l e is to avoid u s i n g s o m e as m e a n s to others e n d s , it can o n l y b e p o s s i b l e u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e t h e subject of p o s s e s s i o n is a w e rather than a n T , w h i c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s i m p l y in r u m t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o m m u n i t y in the constitutive s e n s e " ( L U 7 9 - 8 0 ) . , . . . . ^ h i s corollary is explicit in a parallel p a s s a g e : "The idea of the original position u to s e UP a fair p r o c e d u r e s o that a n y p r i n c i p l e s agreed to will b e just. S o m e h o w w e must nullify the effects of s p e c i f i c c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (TJ 136). Compare the final paragraph of n 6. '"For e x a m p l e , if t h e r e w e r e a feasible s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h almost all the e x c e p t o n a l s w o u l d greatly e n j o y the c o m p l e x job a n d w o u l d c h o o s e to work in it even t h o u g h it pays

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to t h e distribution of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s l a n d of h u m a n dispositions), one regards a s a c o m m o n asset this distribution, n o t t h e particular e n d o w m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s o r w h a t flows from t h e i r e x e r c i s e within some e c o n o m i c s c h e m e . O n e might say that this fact of differential endow m e n t s is u s e d a s a m e a n s . Stated i n t h e abstract, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n 1 p r o p o s e h e r e m a y seem to have a n air of sophistry, so let m e offer a n i l l u s t r a t i o n of its significance. A travel c o m p a n y o p e r a t i n g w i t h r u n - d o w n a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , unsafe flights, h i d d e n charges, a n d t h e like m a y b e s a i d t o u s e t h e n e e d s and desires of its c u s t o m e r s as m e a n s for its o w n e n r i c h m e n t . T h i s u s e may well be, as Nozick a n d Sandel w o u l d insist, t a n t a m o u n t to u s i n g these c u s t o m e r s t h e m s e l v e s m e r e l y as m e a n s . By c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r a travel c o m p a n y that c h a r g e s different p r i c e s for i d e n t i c a l services provided at different times of t h e y e a r (off-peak, h i g h s e a s o n , etc.), s o a s to equalize d e m a n d . In this c a s e it is t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c u s t o m e r interests and desires, t h e fact t h a t c u s t o m e r s a r e different i n v a r i o u s relevant re spects, that is u s e d as a m e a n s . T h o u g h t h e e n d m o t i v a t i n g the policy m a y b e t h e s a m e i n b o t h c a s e s ( m a x i m i z a t i o n of profit, say), it seems clear that only t h e first policy c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e s a i d t o u s e customers as m e a n s . This distinction c o n c e r n i n g (the c h o i c e of) policies h a s an analogue, I believe, as regards (the c h o i c e of) social i n s t i t u t i o n s . Here Rawls s suggestion is a n a l o g o u s to t h e s e c o n d k i n d of policy. By adjust ing t h e t e r m s offered for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of e n d o w m e n t s , institutions m a k e this fact serve t h e Rawlsian i m p e r a t i v e of justice, that social inequalities m u s t b e t o t h e greatest benefit of t h o s e m o s t disad vantaged by t h e m . !S

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ligence, say, it is n e c e s s a r y b o t h t h a t I p o s s e s s m y intelligence (in some non-arbitrary s e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n ) , a n d t h a t I h a v e a right (in a strong, pre-institutional s e n s e of right) t h a t society v a l u e intelligence rather t h a n s o m e t h i n g else. But o n Rawls' a c c o u n t , n e i t h e r c o n d i t i o n holds (LLJ 77). Here Sandel u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t i n o r d e r t o d e n y t h e conjunc tion, o n e d o e s n o t need t o d e n y m o r e t h a n t h e s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n . How d o e s h e get t h e idea t h a t Rawls, w h o s e a i m i s t o a r g u e "from widely a c c e p t e d b u t w e a k p r e m i s e s " (TJ 18), unnecessarily invokes t h e shock ing c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y claim? O n e m i g h t b e t e m p t e d t o think that Sandel, so close a r e a d e r of Rawls, falls for Nozick's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n only b e c a u s e it fits s o wonderfully into his overall a t t a c k o n Rawls's (or "the liberal") c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n (to b e d i s c u s s e d i n §§8-9)6.2. While this m a y b e so, it w o u l d b e unfair t o c l a i m t h a t Sandel is taking a few s e n t e n c e s o u t of c o n t e x t a n d t h e n u s i n g t h e m to support a perverse c o n s t r u a l of Rawls's position. T h i s is c l o s e r t o w h a t Nozick does, brilliantly. Sandel m a n a g e s t o c o n n e c t t h e s e m i s r e a d i n g s in a systematic w a y a n d e n d s u p w i t h a r e a s o n a b l y c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t of large p o r t i o n s of Rawls's text, a s w e c a n s e e in a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e third quotation of m y o p e n i n g set (§5.1), t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t " n o o n e deserves his place in t h e distribution of native e n d o w m e n t s " (TJ 104), that such e n d o w m e n t s a r e "arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of v i e w " (TJ 312). To m a k e things m o r e vivid, let u s personify t h e d o u b t R a w l s is addressing in t h e s e p h r a s e s . S u p p o s e a n exceptionally gifted p e r s o n , Genius, has l o d g e d t h i s c o m p l a i n t against t h e difference p r i n c i p l e : "Perhaps it w o u l d b e nice, o t h e r t h i n g s equal, t o a r r a n g e a s c h e m e of economic institutions s o that t h e inequalities it p r o d u c e s t e n d t o o p t i m i z e the smallest representative s h a r e . But o t h e r t h i n g s a r e n o t e q u a l . I a m a lot m o r e t a l e n t e d t h a n most, a n d I d e s e r v e t h e s e t a l e n t s t o g e t h e r w i t h the greater i n c o m e t h a t flows from t h e m . It is n o t right t h a t t h e possibility of (mtraschemically) benefiting from o n e ' s e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d be in c o r p o r a t e d into t h e e c o n o m i c s c h e m e o n l y insofar a s s u c h incorpora (mterschemically) e n h a n c e s t h e s m a l l e s t s h a r e . " to c o p e w i t h this complaint, it w o u l d b e e n o u g h t o c h a l l e n g e Ge n i u s s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t s o m e t h i n g - n a t u r a l l y , a s it w e r e — " f l ° v * from h e r talents. Rawls m a k e s this r e s p o n s e , a s S a n d e l appreciates1 S m l G e n i u s ' s a r g u m e n t as well, 13

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(a) I h a v e e n d o w m e n t s . (b) O n e d e s e r v e s w h a t e v e r e n d o w m e n t s o n e h a s ; w h i c h i s t o s a v : it i s p r o p e r t h a t o n e h a v e t h e m , it w o u l d b e w r o n g for o n e t o b e d e p r i v e d o f them, a n d s o forth. (c) I d e s e r v e m y e n d o w m e n t s [ f r o m (a) a n d (b)J. (d) H e n c e , I d e s e r v e t h e g o o d s t h a t flow f r o m t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x ercise of m y e n d o w m e n t s .

Sandel a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t Rawls d e n i e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n from (c) to (d), and that t h i s d e n i a l is e n o u g h t o t u r n a w a y t h e c o m p l a i n t . Still, Sandel finds h i m d i s p u t i n g (c) a s well, r e p e a t e d l y d e n y i n g t h a t " t h e p e r s o n with g r e a t e r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s d e s e r v e s t h o s e a s s e t s " (TJ 103). Be cause h e d e n i e s (c), Rawls is c o m m i t t e d to d e n y i n g e i t h e r (a) o r (b), because t h e s e t o g e t h e r i m p l y (c). But h o w c o u l d Rawls possibly d e n y either, if b o t h s e e m s o p l a u s i b l e ? T h e i n g e n i o u s a n s w e r Sandel at tributes to Rawls is t h a t (a) a n d (b) a r e b o t h true, b u t that t h e y d o not employ t h e s a m e s e n s e of "to h a v e " a n d therefore d o not i m p l y (c); "Rawls' a r g u m e n t from a r b i t r a r i n e s s u n d e r m i n e s d e s e r t not directly, by claiming I c a n n o t deserve w h a t is arbitrarily given, b u t indirectly, by showing that I c a n n o t possess w h a t is arbitrarily given, t h a t is, that T, qua subject of p o s s e s s i o n , c a n n o t p o s s e s s it in t h e u n d i s t a n c e d , con stitutive s e n s e n e c e s s a r y to p r o v i d e a d e s e r t b a s e " (LLJ 85). This a n s w e r powerfully s u p p o r t s S a n d e l ' s chief t h e s i s a b o u t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of the p e r s o n , c o n d e n s e d i n t o t h e refrain: "On Rawls' c o n c e p t i o n , t h e characteristics I p o s s e s s d o n o t attach to t h e self b u t are only related to the self, s t a n d i n g a l w a y s a t a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e . T h i s is w h a t m a k e s t h e m attributes r a t h e r t h a n c o n s t i t u e n t s of m y p e r s o n ; t h e y are mine r a t h e r than m e , t h i n g s I have r a t h e r t h a n a m " (LLJ 85). This i m p r e s s i v e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of d e s e r t goes w r o n g b y m i s c o n s t r u i n g t h e s e n s e in w h i c h Rawls is s p e a k i n g of d e s e r t . According t o Rawls, for o n e t o d e s e r v e s o m e t h i n g entails t h a t it is p r o p e r t h a t o n e h a v e it. But it m e a n s m o r e . Desert, for Rawls, is moral deservingness, a reflection of o n e ' s m o r a l w o r t h in virtue of w h i c h a l o n e one c a n Deserve a n y t h i n g . T h i s m a y n o t b e t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e of t h e term. Rawls s u g g e s t s a s m u c h w h e n h e occasionally s p e a k s m o r e fully of moral d e s e r t a n d , o n c e , w h e n h e h a s t h e b r o a d e r s e n s e in m i n d , talks of p e o p l e b e i n g " d e s e r v i n g i n t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e " (TJ 74). Still, t h e r e can be n o d o u b t t h a t t h e s t r o n g e r , n a r r o w e r n o t i o n is t h e o n e h e is u s i n g . It follows t h a t m a n y t h i n g s d e s e r v e d in t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e are not Deserved in R a w l s ' s . You m a y h a v e w o r k e d all y o u r life o n y o u r a u t o b i o g r a p h y a n d t h u s d e s e r v e t h e National Book Award, b u t y o u w o u l d still n o t Deserve it i n Rawls's s e n s e , u n l e s s y o u r efforts s o m e h o w testi fied to y o u r s u p e r i o r moral w o r t h . 14

. "For e x a m p l e , Rawls writes, "there is a t e n d e n c y for c o m m o n s e n s e to s u p p o s e . t h a t "icome a n d w e a l t h , a n d t h e g o o d t h i n g s generally, s h o u l d b e distributed accordtng to moral desert. Justice is h a p p i n e s s a c c o r d i n g to virtue" (TJ 3101.

78

Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.3

6.3. With this n a r r o w e r s e n s e of Desert in m i n d , w e c a n also under s t a n d Rawls's claim t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is morally arbitrary. Rawls is n o t s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e is n o m o r a l reason to leave e n d o w m e n t s w h e r e w e find t h e m — o f c o u r s e t h e r e is—but that differences i n e n d o w m e n t s d o n o t , w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n of social justice, signify differences in m o r a l w o r t h . T h i s c l a i m d o e s n o t presup p o s e t h a t native e n d o w m e n t s a r e a m a t t e r of l u c k o r f o r t u n e . Even if p e o p l e h a d to have w o r k e d very h a r d t o b e b r i g h t o r a t h l e t i c , t h e s e traits w o u l d still b e arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h o s e w h o don t care to b e c o m e bright o r athletic t h r o u g h h a r d w o r k a r e n o t therefore to b e c o n s i d e r e d morally inferior (as far a s o u r s h a r e d p u b l i c concep tion of justice is c o n c e r n e d ) . So in Rawls's t e r m i n o l o g y t h e two locu tions express t h e s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n : s o m e t h i n g w e h a v e is morally arbi trary just in c a s e o u r having it is n o t D e s e r v e d . Given this distinction, t h e r e are t w o different w a y s in w h i c h a prac tice or a set of n a t u r a l rights a n d d u t i e s m a y specify s o m e t h i n g as a p e r s o n ' s d u e . If s o m e t h i n g is d u e y o u in t h e w i d e r s e n s e , t h e n you o u g h t to have it, it is right t h a t y o u h a v e it, a n d it w o u l d b e w r o n g for y o u to b e deprived of it. I h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s i n g t h i s s e n s e of " d u e " by s p e a k i n g — w i t h Nozick—of y o u r b e i n g entitled t o s o m e t h i n g . One might stretch this t e r m by i n c l u d i n g u n d e r t h e label of entitlements also u n d e s i r a b l e things t h a t are d u e y o u , s u c h a s a d e b i t o r a punish m e n t . In this s t r e t c h e d s e n s e , being e n t i t l e d to s o m e t h i n g d o e s not entail t h a t y o u have a choice w h e t h e r to receive it o r n o t . You m a y or m a y not have s u c h a choice. Something is d u e y o u in t h e n a r r o w s e n s e o n l y if y o u a r e e n t i t l e d to it in virtue o f y o u r m o r a l Deservingness, t h a t is, in v i r t u e of a m o r a l quality of yourself o r a m o r a l quality of s o m e t h i n g y o u h a v e d o n e . Y o u r d u e in this s e n s e p r e s u p p o s e s Desert (moral Deservingness) o n y o u r part. » w o u l d n o t b e u n n a t u r a l to s p e a k of d e s e r t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h most of y o u r e n t i t l e m e n t s (salary, a w a r d s , vacations) a n d in o t h e r c o n t e x t s as well (good luck, ill-behaved children, a n a c c i d e n t ) , b u t w e m u s t stick to the n a r r o w n o t i o n b e c a u s e it is t h e o n e Rawls is u s i n g . Keeping this n o t i o n of Desert in m i n d , let m e give a c o u n t e r s k e t c h of m e a r g u m e n t by Genius t h a t Rawls is e n t e r t a i n i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g to:

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the last s t e p of t h e r e a s o n i n g h a s b e c o m e m u c h m o r e plausible. If Genius is m o r a l l y m o r e w o r t h y t h a n o t h e r s less well e n d o w e d , t h e n one m a y b e t e m p t e d t o b e l i e v e — a s Rawls t h i n k s c o m m o n s e n s e is t e m p t e d (n. 1 4 ) — t h a t s h e s h o u l d h a v e a h i g h e r i n c o m e too. A n d t h u s my c o u n t e r s k e t c h m a k e s m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e w h y Rawls s h o u l d have s e e n t h e n e e d t o c o m p l e m e n t h i s d e n i a l of t h e last s t e p by denying its s t a r t i n g p o i n t a s well. Next, Rawls's d e n i a l of (C) is fully c o n s i s t e n t w i t h (a), (b), a n d (c), w i t h what, o n m y r e a d i n g , Rawls s i m p l y takes for g r a n t e d : p e r s o n s have t h e i r natural e n d o w m e n t s i n a thick, constitutive s e n s e a n d a r e fully entitled to (exercise c o n t r o l over) t h e m . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n that Genius's talents m u s t n o t b e d e s t r o y e d o r t a m p e r e d w i t h o r taxed a n d that s h e must n o t b e c o e r c e d to d e v e l o p or exercise t h e m . T h e denial of (C) gives n o s u p p o r t t o S a n d e l ' s v i e w t h a t Rawls thinks of e n d o w m e n t s as only t e n u o u s l y c o n n e c t e d t o t h e i r "repository'' or "guardian'' (LLJ 97), so that "it m a t t e r s little h o w s o m e c a m e to reside in y o u a n d o t h e r s in me" (LLJ 74). 1 5

Finally, t h e p r e m i s e Rawls c h a l l e n g e s is (B), claiming that it is n o moral d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e gifted, t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d are not for this reason m o r e w o r t h y , m o r a l l y : "Surely a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l w o r t h d o e s not vary a c c o r d i n g t o h o w m a n y offer similar skills, o r h a p p e n to w a n t w h a t he can p r o d u c e . N o o n e s u p p o s e s t h a t w h e n s o m e o n e ' s abilities are less in d e m a n d o r h a v e d e t e r i o r a t e d (as in t h e c a s e of singers) h i s m o r a l deservingness u n d e r g o e s a s i m i l a r shift" (TJ 311). It s e e m s q u i t e likely that Nozick a n d S a n d e l , h a d t h e y a p p r e c i a t e d h i s p o i n t , w o u l d have agreed w i t h Rawls. Nozick, at a n y rate, is c o n s t r a i n e d to agree, for u n d e r h i s o w n s c h e m e r e w a r d s a r e d e t e r m i n e d by existing m a r k e t d e m a n d , a n d s o G e n i u s w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o e a r n r e w a r d s for exercising her t a l e n t s if p e o p l e w e r e e i t h e r u n a b l e o r unwilling t o p a y h e r for s u c h exercise. So N o z i c k a n d Rawls a r e h e r e in full a g r e e m e n t . While G e n i u s has every right t o e a r n a n y s p e c i a l r e w a r d s for t h e exercise of h e r talents t h a t m a y b e offered u n d e r t h e p r e f e r r e d s c h e m e (and is surely fully e n t i t l e d t o w h a t e v e r r e w a r d s s h e m a y h a v e so earned), s h e h a s n o claim t h a t t h e r e b e a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s u c h r e w a r d s are offered, let alone r e w a r d s of a n y p a r t i c u l a r k i n d or m a g n i t u d e . Of c o u r s e , Rawls a n d Nozick d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s are just. T h e y merely agree t h a t t h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n is n o t c o n s t r a i n e d by claims of m o r a l w o r t h b a s e d o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . Sandel, o n t n e other h a n d , believes t h a t t h i s a n s w e r is c o n s t r a i n e d by s o m e claims or moral w o r t h a n d D e s e r t . I d i s c u s s his view in c a s e s w h e r e s u c h claims have a m o r e p l a u s i b l e b a s i s t h a n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s ($7.3), b u t nrsi, let u s b r i n g t h e w h o l e t o p i c of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s t o a c o n c l u s i o n . l 5

T n e is o n e p a s s a g e 1 m u s t d i s c o u n t a s a slip: "No o n e deserves 1 J ^ t e r r»tural < * P * % . . . . But it d o e f n o t follow that o n e s h o u l d eliminate t h e f f ' s t m c t w n s . Th ere >s another w a y to deal w i t h t h e m " (TJ 102). Nozick rightly a r e n ' t a n o t h e r w a y to d e a l w i t h t h e m ? Kawls h a s corrected the s h p in the u e r m translation (TG 122). r e

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6.4. Rawls h o l d s t h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s s h o u l d b e ranked on broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t g r o u n d s , specifically, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e worst social position e a c h t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . W h e t h e r a n d t o w h a t extent the favored e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d l e a d t o differentials i n income (etc.) b a s e d on differentials i n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is left open by Rawls, t o b e settled t h r o u g h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e i n light of empiri cal c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s a p p r o a c h i s s u b j e c t t o t w o m a i n s o r t s of attack on behalf of t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d : o n e i n s i s t s t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d pro cesses t h a t are t o r e g u l a t e e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s h o u l d b e c h o s e n in a w a y t h a t reflects t h e superior bargaining position of t h e better en d o w e d ; t h e o t h e r m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d , i n virtue of their g r e a t e r moral Deservingness, o u g h t t o r e c e i v e s p e c i a l r e w a r d s (of a certain relative o r a b s o l u t e m a g n i t u d e ) for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d ex ercise of their e n d o w m e n t s . T h e s e a t t a c k s m a y b e u s e d t o assert that t h e r e are morally obvious p r o c e s s e s ( w h i c h a r e t o b e c h o s e n regardless of t h e p a t t e r n t h e y w o u l d yield) o r t h a t t h e c h o s e n e c o n o m i c scheme or t h e distribution it w o u l d p r o d u c e m u s t satisfy c e r t a i n moral con straints. I have d i s c u s s e d h o w Rawls c a n b l o c k t h e s e a t t a c k s . H e c a n resist the assertion of morally obvious p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o c e s s e s a n d reject the claim t h a t p e r s o n s Deserve t h e i r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . N e i t h e r of these a e t e n s e s relies o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e self, let a l o n e on the a s s e r t i o n s Sandel a t t r i b u t e s t o R a w l s - t h a t " t h e v a r i o u s n a t u r a l assets ^ • T * b o m m a y b e said t o ' b e l o n g ' t o m e i n t h e weak, of n w r f I 8 6 " 5 6 a c c i d e n t a l l y w i t h i n m e , b u t t h i s sense rthtT^?h ° a n r i o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t I h a v e a n y special S £ ^ rT?ut0 ™y Privileged c l a i m t o t h e fruits of ™ ! ! ' , ' * n u a t e d s e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n , I a m n o t really the h e a S t S r ^ l ^ ° P°smory of t h e a s s o r t e d assets and a rfSZS^S ^ P bout R a w l s ' s treatment a £ T L ^ t h T T J ™ ° ' P ° l a m i n a t i o n , t o h a v e nothing 1

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then Nozick c o u l d b e p e r s u a d e d t o a c c e p t w h a t e v e r e c o n o m i c p r o c e s s does best b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . A m o n g p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e s t h a t do not m e n t i o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s Rawls's criterion m i g h t well w i n out almost b y default.

7. D e s e r t 7.1. G r o u n d r u l e s r e g u l a t e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s among i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s o n t h e basis of various p r e d i c a t e s that are t r u e of t h e m o r of t h e i r c o n d u c t . I will say that g r o u n d r u l e s are moralized insofar a s t h e p r e d i c a t e s t h e y invoke are p r e d i c a t e s of m o r a l evaluation. T h u s , w h e n g r o u n d r u l e s classify certain k i n d s of c o n d u c t as right o r w r o n g o r c e r t a i n k i n d s of p e r s o n s or a s s o c i a t i o n s as morally better o r w o r s e , t h e n a n y benefits or b u r d e n s a t t a c h e d to s u c h p r e d i cates are (positive o r negative) s a n c t i o n s that, w h e n correctly applied, are Deserved b y t h e i r r e c i p i e n t s . Conversely, g r o u n d rules are unmoralized insofar a s t h e p r e d i c a t e s t h e y invoke are n o n m o r a l . Any benefits o r b u r d e n s a t t a c h e d t o s u c h predicates—(dis)incentives, for e x a m p l e — a r e v i e w e d a s m e r e l y d e s e r v e d , n o t Deserved. In s u c h c a s e s the moral quality of p e r s o n s o r t h e i r c o n d u c t is n o t at i s s u e . Let m e give a s i m p l e illustration of t h e distinction. Take, in o u r culture, a l a w t h a t i m p o s e s s o m e tax o n interest i n c o m e . This law is partly u n m o r a l i z e d . T h e r e is n o t h i n g morally u n w o r t h y a b o u t e a r n i n g interest, a n d s o t h e t a x is n o t a p u n i s h m e n t . In this t h e tax is akin to t h e interest itself, w h i c h also is m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved. Investing one's m o n e y for i n t e r e s t is n o b e t t e r o r w o r s e , morally, t h a n s p e n d i n g it or keeping it u n d e r o n e ' s pillow. Yet s u p p o s e t h e law m a k e s it a n offense to e v a d e t h e tax. It w o u l d t h e n , in this respect, b e m o r a l i z e d . It is w r o n g t o e a r n i n t e r e s t w i t h o u t p a y i n g t h e tax, a n d a n y fine for d o i n g so is a p u n i s h m e n t . This d i s t i n c t i o n m a k e s Rawls's task h a r d e r t h a n it m a y initially a p pear. He is offering u s t h e original p o s i t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h a r g u m e n t s about h o w p a r t i e s s o s i t u a t e d w o u l d go a b o u t regulating h u m a n inter action. H e r e Rawls s e e k s t o s h o w t h a t t h e y w o u l d a d o p t a p a r t i c u l a r set of n a t u r a l rights a n d d u t i e s a n d a criterion of justice for t h e assess16

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" T h e d i s t i n c t i o n d r a w n h e r e is p u r e l v descriptive. So i leave o p e n what moral or nonmoral p r e d i c a t e s m a y b e i m p o r t a n t in or m a y b e incorporated into the g r o u n d m e s °f a given society. M o r e o v e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n is not entirely sharp. A parking ticket m a y (in our culture) b e a b o r d e r l i n e c a s e , in that it c a n b e v i e w e d as a Deserved p u m s h m e n for "aving d o n e s o m e t h i n g w r o n g or also a s a m e r e disincentive morally o n a par with a parkingfee. . . . "Rawls p r e s e n t s h i s a c c o u n t of natural d u t i e s in TJ § § 1 8 , J ' . " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ hold b e t w e e n p e r s o n s irrespective of their institutional relationships, (TJ U5l a n a "Klude the d u t i e s n o t t o b e cruel, not to harm or injure the innocent, h ° ^ ^ ' f l p t h o s e in n e e d , a n d to c o n t r i b u t e to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just m s t t t u t i o n , (TJ 1 0 a " 4 - 1 5 , 3 3 4 , 3 3 7 - 3 9 ) . It i s s o m e t i m e s overlooked that the a c c o u n t of natural d u t . e s a s ^ s o * o s e n through t h e original p o s i t i o n (TJ 1 1 6 , 3 3 4 , 3 3 8 t . T h u s , like the c n t e n o n of justice, .t 9

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m e n t of institutional g r o u n d rules. H e t h e n invites u s t o check these natural duties a n d basic s t r u c t u r e s t h a t m i g h t plausibly satisfy his criterion of justice u n d e r s t i p u l a t e d e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s against o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s . Is w h a t Rawlsian i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d specify as a p e r s o n ' s d u e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h w h a t w e intuitively believe o n e ought to have o r receive? Yet a n affirmative a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n is not e n o u g h , for n o t only m u s t a p e r s o n ' s d u e b y Rawls's lights m a t c h what w e intuitively think is d u e , b u t t h e t w o s e n s e s of due m u s t match as well. Even if w h a t p e r s o n s a r e e n t i t l e d to, p u r s u a n t t o Rawls's natural d u t i e s a n d u n d e r Rawlsian g r o u n d r u l e s , is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what we think p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e entitled t o , t h e r e m a y still b e disagreement a b o u t w h i c h of t h e s e e n t i t l e m e n t s s h o u l d involve D e s e r t . A n d even this is n o t all. We m u s t also b e satisfied t h a t Rawls is right a b o u t which Deserts a n d m e r e e n t i t l e m e n t s a r e n a t u r a l a n d w h i c h institutional, that is, w h i c h arise b e t w e e n p e r s o n s g e n e r a l l y (even in t h e absence of s h a r e d institutions) a n d w h i c h arise only a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s in an o n g o i n g practice o r institutional s c h e m e . T h e s e t w o crosscutting d i s t i n c t i o n s ( m o r a l i z e d / u n m o r a l i z e d and natural/institutional) yield four categories of e n t i t l e m e n t s , namely, benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t p e r s o n s (a) D e s e r v e a c c o r d i n g t o a natural taw (such a s a p u n i s h m e n t for cruelty); (b) Deserve u n d e r t h e terms of a n institutional s c h e m e (such a s a fine o r a jail s e n t e n c e ) ; (c) a r e entitled t o a c c o r d i n g t o a n a t u r a l l a w b u t d o n o t D e s e r v e ( m i n i m a l r e s p e c t and nonviolence, p e r h a p s ) ; o r (d) a r e e n t i t l e d t o u n d e r t h e t e r m s of an U tf ™ > (salaries, t a x e s , g o o d s and ; s 'a v ' c h Rawls refers t o a s legitimate expectations «.m*hi, k g a b o u t e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e first kind, pret Z Z « l f P s e d e d , o n c e r e a s o n a b l y j u s t institu° r i n " t h e s e c o n d k i n d . Still, h e c a n s a y that, civUTw JL 7 P u n i s h m e n t is m e t e d o u t i n a c c o r d a n c e with a uTJZ'Jtr* P d c a n always b e v i e w e d a s also the

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enables h i m to m a k e t h e effort t o cultivate his abilities . . . for h i s character d e p e n d s i n large p a r t u p o n f o r t u n a t e family a n d social cir c u m s t a n c e s for w h i c h h e c a n c l a i m n o c r e d i t " (TJ 104). T h e r e a s o n Rawls gives h e r e for t h e d e n i a l is n o t a g o o d o n e . It suggests that h e requires Desert itself t o b e D e s e r v e d "all t h e w a y d o w n " (cf. Nozick, ASU 225), with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e r e is n o Desert at all. Rawls c o u n t e r a c t s this impression b y i n s i s t i n g t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t s arising u n d e r t h e criminal law d o involve D e s e r t (TJ 3 1 4 - 1 5 ) . But t h e n Sandel c a n ask with s o m e plausibility h o w a c r i m i n a l c a n Deserve h e r inferior c h a r a c t e r if it d e p e n d s in large p a r t u p o n u n f o r t u n a t e family a n d social c i r c u m stances (LLJ 9 1 - 9 2 ) . T h e r e a s o n Rawls gives w o u l d t h e n suggest t h a t the e c o n o m i c a n d p e n a l s y s t e m s are, pace Rawls, o p p o s i t e s of e a c h other—two u n m o r a l i z e d s y s t e m s of incentives a n d disincentives (re spectively), w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d t o s t e e r c o n d u c t in t h e interest of maximizing e c o n o m i c efficiency a n d t h e effectiveness of g r o u n d rules generally. Even if t h e r e a s o n Rawls gives is n o t a g o o d o n e , h i s c o n t e n t i o n itself seems p l a u s i b l e e n o u g h (at least if D e s e r t is u n d e r s t o o d in his n a r r o w sense). P e r s o n s w h o p u t s c a n t effort into t h e i r careers, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e they care little for m a t e r i a l w e a l t h or prefer to c o n c e n t r a t e their e n e r gies u p o n o t h e r p r o j e c t s , a r e n o t for this r e a s o n morally less w o r t h y . Of course, h i g h e r i n c o m e s will g e n e r a l l y b e e a r n e d by t h o s e w h o m a k e special efforts to d e v e l o p a n d exercise abilities for w h i c h greater re wards are offered. B u t t h e s e h i g h e r i n c o m e s are m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved, b e c a u s e s u c h efforts at self-improvement are n o t c o n s i d e r e d (within o u r p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of justice) a form of moral excellence. That they a r e n o t is o n e r e a s o n p e r s o n s w h o m a k e special efforts to develop a n d e x e r c i s e u n r e w a r d e d abilities have n o valid g r o u n d s for complaint. T h a t s o m e h a v e t r a i n e d t h e m s e l v e s to juggle six balls or to recite the Iliad i m p l i e s n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r (moral) Deservingness. 7.3. But t h e o b j e c t i o n m a y b e r e n e w e d o n e last t i m e . Even if Rawls is "ght t h u s far, s u r e l y t h e r e a r e some forms of m o r a l excellence. Clearly, some p e r s o n s a r e m o r a l l y b e t t e r h u m a n b e i n g s t h a n o t h e r s , a n d m i g h t not these p e r s o n s r a i s e a valid c o m p l a i n t against a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e that is just b y Rawls's c r i t e r i o n , if t h e i r i n c o m e s u n d e r this s c h e m e d o not reflect t h e i r s u p e r i o r m o r a l c h a r a c t e r ? Let m e sketch s u c h a c o m plaint. 18

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In this case, at last, Rawls's first line of d e f e n s e is s u r e l y overwhelmed, for h e c a n n o t d e n y (C*). T h a t (as Rawls insists) c r i m i n a l s Deserve pun i s h m e n t implies t h a t t h e y a r e m o r a l l y l e s s w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of their a c t i o n s (and i n t e n t i o n s ) . So surely it is p o s s i b l e t h a t C o u r t n e y is morally more w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of her a c t i o n s ( a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) , at least more w o r t h y t h a n t h e criminals. Rawls is right t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t "the c o n c e p t of m o r a l w o r t h does not provide a first p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . . . b e c a u s e it cannot b e i n t r o d u c e d u n t i l after t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e a n d of n a t u r a l duty a n d obligation" (TJ 312). N e v e r t h e l e s s , s u r e l y w e c o u l d settle on the n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d t h e civil a n d political a s p e c t s of a j u s t basic struc t u r e first, u s e t h e s e r e s u l t s t o define t h e i d e a of m o r a l l y ( m o r e or less) w o r t h y citizens a n d h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d t h e n c h o o s e a n economic s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h (insofar a s is feasible) i n c o m e reflects moral w o r t h . I n t h i s c a s e t h e e c o n o m i c a n d p e n a l s y s t e m s w o u l d o n c e again b e o p p o s i t e s of e a c h other, b u t t h e y w o u l d b o t h b e moralized, two s y s t e m s of (respectively) positive a n d n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n s that play a s e c o n d a r y role i n t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t of d u t i e s a n d g r o u n d rules inde p e n d e n t l y defined. In t h e face of t h i s c o m p l a i n t , Rawls is t h r o w n b a c k u p o n h i s second line of defense, w h i c h d e n i e s t h e s t e p s f r o m (C) t o (D), a n d from (CI to (D*): Even p e r s o n s w h o a r e g e n u i n e l y D e s e r v i n g o u g h t n o t therefore to b e entitled t o larger s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . A b a s i c structure u n d e r w h i c h s o m e g o o d o r b a d d e e d s g o u n r e q u i t e d i s n o t unjust for this reason. T h o u g h Rawls is clearly c o m m i t t e d t o t h i s view, h e does not seek t o s u p p o r t its intuitive plausibility. B u t I t h i n k it w o u l d not be too h a r d t o d o s o . It m a y b e e n o u g h t o i m a g i n e a s o c i a l s y s t e m i n which cash p r i z e s a r e p a i d t o t h o s e w h o d o n o t b r e a k a n y l a w s for five years or in w h i c h all m o r a l w r o n g s (lies, for e x a m p l e ) i n c u r fines, t o s e e t h a t this is n o t w h a t w e w o u l d t h i n k justice r e q u i r e s . 7.4. This s e c o n d line of d e f e n s e also s h i e l d s R a w l s ' s belief t h a t the distribution of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d , b y a n d large, by u n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d r u l e s . Again w e m u s t rely o n c o n j e c t u r e a s to how h e w o u l d s u p p o r t this belief. T h e n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d t h e civil and political g r o u n d rules of a just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i m p o s e s i m p l e , "binary c o n s t r a i n t s o n t ph ei nr s o n s ' c o n d u c t . No m o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e m a d e (by of p e r m i s s i b l e c o n d u c t . Participants s o l e nn ° m o r a l e x c e l l e n c e a s m e a s u r e d on sne^Zt " . y ^ j o i n e d t o refrain f r o m certain Ses t « „!T?- n ^ P g w i t h t h e s e n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d social pracude , ° 1 * t i c feats of m o r a l fortipmsible ^ s i g n e d t h a t c o m p l i a n c e is quite

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fr° "y y p ' °n for i n s t i t u t i o n i z i n g any ™ g n t even subvert t h e stand ing of the rules by drverting a t t e n t i o n a w a y from t h e m o r a l r e a s o n s for h

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honoring t h e m , m i g h t i m p e d e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a s e n s e of justice. Punishments will of c o u r s e b e n e e d e d , a n d s o m e of t h e s e m a y take t h e form of fines. Still, t h e s e will b e rare, a n d organizing t h e entire e c o nomic r e w a r d s y s t e m a r o u n d t h e m w o u l d entail that m o s t p e r s o n s would receive ( a n d Deserve) t h e e q u a l m a x i m u m i n c o m e of a lawabiding citizen. Against s u c h a s c h e m e Rawls c a n plausibly ask: W h y not " u n m o r a l i z e " e c o n o m i c benefits s o a s t o allow i n c o m e differentials (among l a w - a b i d i n g citizens) insofar a s t h e s e benefit everyone? T h u s collective rationality m a k e s it p l a u s i b l e to prefer a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e under w h i c h i n c o m e is g e n e r a l l y c o n c e i v e d as m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved. Nozick w o u l d w h o l e h e a r t e d l y agree w i t h t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . E c o n o m i c sanctions a t t a c h e d t o (moralized) g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d n o t play a c e n tral role in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h . 7.5. O n e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r S a n d e l w o u l d agree, b e c a u s e h e h a s n o t yet p r e s e n t e d h i s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of justice. Still, let m e briefly trace where his c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls g o w r o n g . As w e have s e e n , Sandel fails t o appreciate t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n Desert a n d desert, t h e stronger a n d weaker n o t i o n s . T h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g l e a d s h i m t o c o n s t r u e Rawls's distinction b e t w e e n D e s e r t a n d legitimate e x p e c t a t i o n s a s o n e b e t w e e n preinstitutional a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l e n t i t l e m e n t s . But even correcting for such terminological differences, S a n d e l is w r o n g to claim that Rawls makes "a d r a m a t i c d e p a r t u r e from t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s " in p r e s e n t ing "a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e . . . r u l i n g o u t d e s e r t altogether" (LLJ 8 6 ) . " T h e Principles of j u s t i c e d o n o t m e n t i o n m o r a l desert, b e c a u s e , strictly speaking, n o o n e c a n b e s a i d t o d e s e r v e a n y t h i n g o n Rawls' view, people have no intrinsic worth, n o w o r t h t h a t is intrinsic in t h e s e n s e fhat it is t h e i r s p r i o r t o o r i n d e p e n d e n t of o r apart from w h a t just institutions a t t r i b u t e t o t h e m " (LLJ 8 8 ) . This d i a g n o s i s is false b e c a u s e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice i n c o r p o rates a n o t i o n of D e s e r t c o n n e c t e d t o t h e m o r a l i z e d p a r t of a just basic structure (the g r o u n d r u l e s insofar a s t h e y a d m i t of violation). So t h e r e is an institutional n o t i o n of D e s e r t t h a t c o n t r a s t s w i t h t h e (institutional) notion of l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e r e is a p r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l notion of Desert as well. Violations of n a t u r a l d u t i e s — c r u e l t y o r injury of a n "mocent, for e x a m p l e — d o d e t r a c t from a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l w o r t h o r Deservingness ( a n d will e x p o s e t h a t p e r s o n t o p u n i s h m e n t within, a n d a y b e also a p a r t from, a n y i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ) . Perhaps S a n d e l w o u l d t h i n k t h i s t o o t h i n a n o t i o n of preinstitutional Desert. He a p p e a l s t o t h e classical i d e a of t h e virtues, defining various 'Perhaps c o r r e l a t e d ) d i m e n s i o n s of m o r a l excellence. M a y b e his idea is that p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i r scores i n t h e s e dimensions o r i n overall m o r a l excellence, b u t h o w is this idea t o b e 19

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" C o m p e n s a t i o n for "bonder c r o s s i n g s " is o w e d u n d e r unmoralized g r o u n d rules. It is not wrong to c r o s s a n d p a y . S e e C h a p . 1, n. 6; a n d Nozick, ASU, chap. 4.

86

T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.1

i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social s y s t e m ? Would Sandel prefer a society in w h i c h , say, t h e right t o r u l e is r e s e r v e d for the most virtuous? This sort of traditional c o n c e p t i o n r a i s e s familiar problems, s u c h as h o w w e r e a c h a g r e e m e n t o n a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e virtues and o n p r o c e d u r e s for selecting t h o s e w h o excel in t h e m . I c o n c l u d e t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n c a n a n d d o e s incorporate the distinctions b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d b e t w e e n moralized a n d u n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d r u l e s . H e n c e h e h a s b o t h a preinstitutional a n d a n institutional n o t i o n of D e s e r t — w h i c h n o t i o n s , moreover, are even s t r o n g e r t h a n Sandel's (and t h u s m o r e s p a r i n g l y invoked). Sandel is t h e n m i s t a k e n in claiming t h a t Rawls d i s p e n s e s w i t h Desert, and so t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to s a d d l e Rawls w i t h t h e r e a s o n S a n d e l predictably provides for this s u p p o s e d d e n i a l : "No o n e c a n b e s a i d to deserve a n y t h i n g (in t h e strong, p r e - i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e ) , b e c a u s e n o one can be said to p o s s e s s a n y t h i n g (in t h e s t r o n g , c o n s t i t u t i v e s e n s e ) " (LLJ 92f).K is n o t t r u e t h a t Rawls is p r e s e n t i n g "a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e w i t h o u t desert a n d a n o t i o n of t h e self as essentially d i s p o s s e s s e d , o r b a r r e n of constit u e n t traits" (LLJ 92). Let u s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n v e s t i g a t e t h e s e c o n d con junct of this claim as well. 2 0

8. T h e " D e o n t o l o g i c a l "

Self

8 . 1 . So far I h a v e s h o w n h o w , o n c e h i s N o z i c k i a n misre^lmg^ " c o m m o n asset," " m o r a l arbitrariness," a n d " d e s e r t are i ' large p a r t s of Sandel's attack dissolve. T h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s o i ^ ^ a r g u m e n t are q u i t e m a i n s t r e a m a n d h a r d l y w a r r a n t t h e ^ P , nt hostility t h e y h a v e evoked. P e r s o n s s h o u l d c o n t r o l t h e ^ p e a n d exercise of t h e i r o w n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s w i t h i n t h e o p ^ ial available i n a j u s t social system. T h e a s s e s s m e n t a n d d e s i g n j i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d n o t b e influenced b y t h e i d e a of bargamin& o n k n o w l e d g e of differential e n d o w m e n t s o r b y t h e i d e a t h a t t ° ^ j ] y have o r develop o r exercise g r e a t e r e n d o w m e n t s a r e t h e r e f o r e ,^ m o r e w o r t h y . Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n ^ ^ c o m e a n d w e a l t h s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d a s u n m o r a l i z e d , t h a t is, ^ j n o t b e d e s i g n e d t o achieve a c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n R a W

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worth. Since n e i t h e r t h e s e c o m m o n p l a c e views n o r a n y c o n c l u s i o n s anyone h a s n o n f a l l a c i o u s l y d r a w n from t h e m have even mildly exciting implications for o u r s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n a s p e r s o n s , Sandel's m o s t i m p o r tant s o u r c e of e v i d e n c e for a t t r i b u t i n g t o Rawls a p a r t i c u l a r n o t i o n of the self is entirely u n p r o d u c t i v e . Still, Rawls is offering a n explicit c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , a n d w e should therefore s e e w h e t h e r S a n d e l a c c e p t s Rawls's s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d ing on this p o i n t o r p r e s e n t s p l a u s i b l e r e a s o n s t o d e p a r t from it. This undertaking p r e s e n t s a n e w task, n a m e l y , t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e idea of a "deontological" self, w h i c h S a n d e l c l a i m s t o h a v e discovered in Rawls's conception of j u s t i c e . 8.2. Sandel d e s c r i b e s h o w h e h a s d i s c o v e r e d t h i s i d e a a s follows: "The original p o s i t i o n is t h e f u l c r u m of t h e justificatory p r o c e s s in that it is t h e device t h r o u g h w h i c h all justification m u s t p a s s . . . . [W]hat issues at o n e e n d i n a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t issue at t h e o t h e r in a theory of t h e p e r s o n , o r m o r e p r e c i s e l y , a t h e o r y of t h e m o r a l subject. Looking from o n e d i r e c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e l e n s of t h e original position w e see t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of justice; looking from t h e o t h e r direction w e see a reflection of o u r s e l v e s " (LLJ 4 7 - 4 8 ) . Sandel's central discovery is that for Rawls t h e self, o r subject, is p r i o r t o its e n d s . Sandel links this priority w i t h five f u r t h e r p r i o r i t i e s : of t h e right over t h e good, of justice over o t h e r v a l u e s , of t h e c o n t r a c t over t h e p r i n c i p l e s it g e n e r a t e s , of plurality over u n i t y , a n d of p r i n c i p l e s of justice over t h e choice of conceptions of t h e g o o d . Sandel's g e n e r a l i d e a is t h a t "deontological" liberals, b y asserting certain m o r a l p r i o r i t i e s , m u s t p r e s u p p o s e c e r t a i n other, n o n m o r a l pri orities that h e w i s h e s t o e x p o s e a s e m b a r r a s s i n g . To his credit, Sandel is clear t h r o u g h o u t t h a t Rawls d o e s n o t himself assert t h e n o n m o r a l priorities S a n d e l a s c r i b e s t o h i m . T h u s h e r e c o g n i z e s , for example, t h a t Rawls's p h r a s e " t h e self is p r i o r t o t h e e n d s w h i c h are affirmed by it" (TJ 560) asserts a m o r a l p r i o r i t y ( p e r s o n s a r e t o c o n s t r a i n t h e i r p u r s u i t of ends by p r i n c i p l e s of r i g h t a n d justice) a n d t h a t h e , Sandel, m u s t show that Rawls implicitly p r e s u p p o s e s a n o n m o r a l priority of t h e self over "s ends (LLI19-20). Much less clear, h o w e v e r , a r e S a n d e l ' s a t t e m p t s t o d e m o n s t r a t e Rawls's s u p p o s e d i m p l i c i t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . O n e p r o b l e m is t h a t h e never states w i t h a n y p r e c i s i o n w h a t h e m e a n s w h e n h e speaks of priority in a n o n m o r a l s e n s e . H e r e t h e adjectives h e e m p l o y s t o refer t o the d e e p e r a n d r e v e a l i n g n o n m o r a l priorities h e claims t o have dis covered in Rawls a r e of little h e l p . S a n d e l a l t e r n a t e s b e t w e e n foundaJonal," " m e t a e t h i c a l , " a n d " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , " of w h i c h t h e latter is b y wr t h e m o s t f r e q u e n t , for e x a m p l e : " T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e s e l f . . . is 2 1

2,

f t remains u n c l e a r w h y a n d h o w , a c c o r d i n g to Sandel, t h e s e ^ " ^ T s s e X T ^ ° 'hey resemble o r s u g g e s t o r i m p l y e a c h other? Sandel's standard % ? * * « ™ ™ connection is in v a g u e sentences of t h e form "As X is prior to Y. s o V * p n o r t o W T h e k t h e r priorities are s o l i k e n e d t o t h e first at L U 7, 2 0 , 1 2 0 , 1 3 3 , 1 5 7 , respectively. D

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T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.2

above all a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c l a i m " (LLJ 182, cf. 12, 20) a n d "this is the epistemological priority t h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l e t h i c s c a r r i e s over into a m o r a l priority" (LLJ 156) a n d s o o n . Often, n o n m o r a l p r i o r i t y is e x p l a i n e d a s s o m e k i n d of independence: X is p r i o r t o Y if X (or t h e n o t i o n of X) is i n d e p e n d e n t of, o r derived i n d e p e n d e n t l y from, Y (the n o t i o n of Y). As I u n d e r s t a n d Sandel, such i n d e p e n d e n c e o b t a i n s if n o c h a n g e in ( t h e n o t i o n of) Y m a k e s a differ e n c e t o ( t h e n o t i o n of) X, if t h e l a t t e r c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t any u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e former. Using t h e w o r d " p r i o r i t y " i n this way is p u z z l i n g b e c a u s e S a n d e l is n o t c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e be unilateral ( a n d w e r e it m u t u a l , X a n d Y w o u l d b e p r i o r t o e a c h other, an o d d possibility). T h u s h e a s s e r t s t h a t for Rawls j u s t i c e is "prior in the s e n s e of i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e r i v e d " (LLJ 16). B u t o n e w o u l d t h i n k that the priority of justice over o t h e r v a l u e s ( b e n e v o l e n c e etc.) r e q u i r e s n o t only that it s h o u l d b e i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e m b u t a l s o t h a t they s h o u l d not be i n d e p e n d e n t of it. Sandel d o e s n o t w o r r y w h e t h e r t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e is mutual. 2 2

2 3

But even t h i s s t r a n g e n o t i o n of priority a s i n d e p e n d e n c e m i g h t work t o Sandel's a d v a n t a g e . A m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n d e r i v i n g t h e right indepen dently of t h e g o o d m u s t specify it, h e a s s u m e s , w i t h o u t a p p e a l to what w e k n o w a b o u t h u m a n n e e d s a n d e n d s — o n t h e b a s i s of t h e bare n o t i o n o f a self ( p e r h a p s c h a r a c t e r i z e d solely b y r a t i o n a l i t y a n d agency) It s u c h a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n also r e q u i r e s a c t o r s t o give p r i m a c y to c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e right (including just g r o u n d rules), t h e n , Sandel r e a s o n s , it is at least implicitly c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r e e m i n e n c e of this bare n o t i o n of t h e self. This t h o u g h t e s t a b l i s h e s t h e s o u g h t connection o e t w e e n a deontological m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n a n d a " d e o n t o l o g i c a l " self ' d e s : "If t h e c l a i m for t h e p r i m a c y of j u s t i c e is to H

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whether s u c h a " p r i m a c y of t h e s u b j e c t " w o u l d b e an e m b a r r a s s m e n t . Sandel is c e r t a i n l y w r o n g to c l a i m (LLJ 18) t h a t " t h e right is derived independently from t h e g o o d " by Rawls, w h o explicitly asserts t h e opposite: "It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l theories a r e defined as non-teleological o n e s , n o t a s views t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e r i g h t n e s s of institutions a n d a c t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y from t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . All ethi cal doctrines w o r t h o u r a t t e n t i o n t a k e c o n s e q u e n c e s i n t o a c c o u n t in judging r i g h t n e s s . O n e w h i c h d i d n o t w o u l d simply b e irrational, crazy" (TJ 30). So R a w l s e n d o r s e s n o i n d e p e n d e n c e of justice o r t h e right from t h e g o o d . His c r i t e r i o n of justice i n c o r p o r a t e s a n a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a t reflects a n o t i o n of t h e m o r a l subject as a being with c e r t a i n n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s (cf. WOS 15). We m u s t c o n c l u d e , then, that S a n d e l fails i n h i s first a t t e m p t t o s a d d l e Rawls with a conception of t h e self a s b a r r e n a n d d i s e n c u m b e r e d . 8.3. In a f u r t h e r a t t e m p t t o reveal Rawls's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e priority of the self, S a n d e l a t t r i b u t e s t o Rawls t h e view "that I c a n never fully b e constituted b y m y a t t r i b u t e s , t h a t t h e r e m u s t always b e s o m e attributes I have r a t h e r t h a n a m . O t h e r w i s e , just any c h a n g e in m y situation, however slight, w o u l d c h a n g e t h e p e r s o n l a m " (LLJ 20). Sandel freely admits that "this a c c o u n t is n o t offered b y Rawls himself . . (but] a reasonable r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e p e r p l e x i t i e s h e seeks to a d d r e s s " (LLJ 20). We a r e n o t t o l d w h e r e Rawls a d d r e s s e s s u c h perplexities, b u t t h e view a t t r i b u t e d t o h i m is s o far h a r m l e s s e n o u g h . Later Sandel s t r e n g t h e n s h i s c l a i m (LLJ 54-59): Rawls is really c o m mitted to t h e view t h a t all of a p e r s o n ' s a t t r i b u t e s s t a n d o u t s i d e t h e self. As evidence, h e cites t w o p a s s a g e s from s e c t i o n 22 of A Theory of Justice, w h e r e Rawls s a v s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original position are to "try to a d v a n c e t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d as best t h e y c a n " (TJ 128). This does n o t m e a n , R a w l s a d d s , t h a t e a c h p e r s o n ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e good is a s s u m e d to b e egoistic. T h e ( u n k n o w n ) i n t e r e s t s t h e parties a r e to p r o m o t e " a r e n o t a s s u m e d to b e i n t e r e s t s in t h e self," t h o u g h they ^ "as t h e y m u s t a l w a y s b e , i n t e r e s t s of a s e l f (TJ 127, 129). Here, Sandel exclaims, " w e find t h e key t o Rawls' c o n c e p t i o n of t h e subject, • t h e n o t i o n of t h e self a s a s u b j e c t of p o s s e s s i o n To say t h a t I Possess a c e r t a i n trait o r d e s i r e o r a m b i t i o n is to say t h a t . . I a m distanced from it in a c e r t a i n w a y — t h a t it is mine r a t h e r t h a n m e (LLJ >- But in t h e p a s s a g e s S a n d e l q u o t e s ( a n d elsewhere) Rawls says nothing at all a b o u t p o s s e s s i o n , let a l o n e a b o u t p o s s e s s i o n m t h e attenuated" a s o p p o s e d t o t h e " u n d i s t a n c e d , constitutive s e n s e I U J 82-85). He m e r e l y s a y s t h a t i n t e r e s t s a r e always t h e interests oj a sett. Whereas p o s s e s s i o n m a y s o m e t i m e s f u n c t i o n as "a d i s t a n c i n g n o t i o n
^ d e n i e d , h o w e v e r , Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e •epistemological" priority, t h e other half * Sandel's reading of Kant. Rawls m a y w e l l b e mistaken o n thtf poutt, but Sandel n h i n g at all t o s h o w that h e i s n

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T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.4

t h e possibility t h a t s o m e of t h e s e m i g h t b e w h a t S a n d e l calls constitu tive i n t e r e s t s . 8.4. Sandel d r a w s f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s . S i n c e for R a w l s " t h e identity of t h e agent is b a r r e n of c o n s t i t u e n t traits s o t h a t n o a i m o r desire can b e essential to it" (LLJ 164), a Rawlsian self is i n c a p a b l e of genuine choice a n d c a n only w e i g h d e s i r e s a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r in t h e way of a h e d o n i s t : "The g o o d is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e satisfac tion of arbitrarily-given p r e f e r e n c e s , r e g a r d l e s s of w o r t h " (LLJ 168). Readers m i g h t think, S a n d e l foresees, " t h a t Rawls c o u l d e s c a p e this a p p a r e n t collapse of t h i s a c c o u n t of a g e n c y " (LLJ 163) b y suggesting that p e r s o n s m i g h t have s e c o n d - o r d e r d e s i r e s . T h i s is i n d e e d possible, in t h e s e n s e that s o m e of t h e a g e n t ' s d e s i r e s m a y b e d e s i r e s about desires. But s i n c e all d e s i r e s a r e equally o u t s i d e t h e self, second-order desires w o u l d b e n o m o r e essentially c o n n e c t e d t o t h e self t h a n firsto r d e r d e s i r e s are. H e n c e t h e y c o u l d n o t b e a u t h o r i t a t i v e b u t would simply b e w e i g h e d in "a slightly m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d e s t i m a t e of the relative i n t e n s i t y of p r e - e x i s t i n g d e s i r e s , first- a n d s e c o n d - o r d e r desires i n c l u d e d " (LLJ 164). It is only o n t h e s e c o n d to last p a g e of his b o o k t h a t S a n d e l informs us of w h a t s h o u l d h a v e dissolved all t h i s u n r e a l s p e c u l a t i o n ; h e quotes Rawls's " c o n c e s s i o n " t h a t "citizens in t h e i r p e r s o n a l affairs, o r within t h e internal life of a s s o c i a t i o n s , . . . m a y have a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves that t h e y believe t h e y w o u l d not, o r c o u l d not, s t a n d a p a r t from; a n d they might r e g a r d it a s u n t h i n k a b l e for t h e m t o v i e w t h e m s e l v e s without f v ™ ^^ous and philosophical convictions a n d commitments" IKCMT 5 4 5 ) U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Rawls's explicit s t a t e m e n t s t o t h i s effect w e r e n o t n o t i c e d in t i m e t o mitigate t h e p o w e r f u l i m p r e s s i o n evoked in Sandel by h i s r e a d i n g of " o f a n d t h u s to b l o c k h i s e l a b o r a t e tale of the e m p t y self a n d t h e " i m p o v e r i s h e d t h e o r y of t h e g o o d " (LLJ 165). in restricting his r e m a r k s to "citizens in t h e i r p e r s o n a l affairs, or 25

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within t h e i n t e r n a l life of a s s o c i a t i o n s " (KCMT 545), Rawls c r e a t e s t h e impression t h a t S a n d e l is right at least in t h e very limited s e n s e t h a t in "public life . . . n o loyalty o r allegiance c o u l d b e similarly essential to o u r sense of w h o w e a r e . . . , n o d e v o t i o n t o city o r n a t i o n , to p a r t y o r c a u s e , could possibly r u n d e e p e n o u g h t o b e defining" (LLJ 182, cf. 179). Yet consider h o w Rawls c o n t i n u e s after t h e q u o t e d s e n t e n c e a b o u t o u r nonpublic a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves: "But n o n e of this n e e d affect t h e conception of t h e p e r s o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h society's p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of justice a n d its i d e a l of social c o o p e r a t i o n " (KCMT 545). This is a statement a b o u t h o w citizens a r e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a n d t r e a t e d in politi cal contexts, from t h e p o i n t of view, a s it w e r e , of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of a well-ordered society. S u c h a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s t a n d s a p a r t from all m o r e particular political c o m m i t m e n t s a n d also views citizens as d e t a c h e d from w h a t e v e r s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s t h e y m a y have. T h u s a p e r s o n ' s deepest loyalties, c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s d o n o t affect his status as p a r t i c i p a n t in t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e — h i s basic rights a n d duties a n d s o f o r t h . A n d t h i s s t a t e m e n t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h citizens' having d e e p s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d c o n v i c t i o n s even of a political son. Citizens m a y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as political feminists o r m a y have strong c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o m m o n g o o d . To be sure, all s u c h constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s a r e s u b j e c t to a categorical s e n s e of justice (to be d i s c u s s e d in §9), a n d s o m e political a n d nonpolitical convictions will be e x c l u d e d b y R a w l s ' s c o n c e p t i o n of justice fully spelled out. But many of t h e political c o n v i c t i o n s m o s t d e e p l y h e l d t o d a y c a n b e equally deeply h e l d in a w e l l - o r d e r e d R a w l s i a n society. T h e s t a n d a r d issues concerning t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ; b u d g e t allocations to education, h e a l t h c a r e , s c i e n c e , a n d t h e arts; t h e school c u r r i c u l u m ; special taxes o n t o b a c c o o r g a s o l i n e ; s p e e d limits; etc. are h a r d l y fully settled by Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e s e m u s t b e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h the political p r o c e s s a s m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . Given their categorical s e n s e of j u s t i c e , p e r s o n s will have a sufficient m o r a l motive to comply w i t h e v e n t h o s e o u t c o m e s of this p r o c e s s t h a t go against their deeply h e l d c o n v i c t i o n s . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that t h e y have n o such convictions, t h a t t h e y w o n ' t d e e p l y identify w i t h s o m e political cause a n d c o n t i n u e t h e a t t e m p t to c o n v i n c e o t h e r s of its m e r i t s . 8-5. Two f u r t h e r a s p e c t s of S a n d e l ' s r e a d i n g m a y b e w o r t h examin27

28

f"'When citizens convert from o n e religion t o another, or n o longer affirm an^estab£ h e d religious faith, t h e y d o n o t c e a s e to be, for q u e s t i o n s of political ,ustice, the s a m e Persons they w e r e before T h e r e is n o l o s s of w h a t w e m a y call their public ' d e n h ^ t h e i r fi? \ S^evai, t h e y still have t h e same bas.c. rights and * J * t h e y o w n t h e s a m e p r o p e r t y a n d c a n m a k e the s a m e claims as before ^ P M f 4 1 K ^ of course, w a s w r i t t e n after, a n d partly in r e s p o n s e to, Sandel, but it .s anticipated at «3 and also, I believe, fully c o n s i s t e n t w i t h KCMT. nmredural a

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92 The "Deontological" Self, 8.5 ing. Sandel believes Rawls begs the question against communitarianism by describing the parties in the original position as mutually disinterested, that is, as seeking to promote their own client's (un known) conception of the good regardless of how this affects the lives of others. As Sandel understands (LLJ 42), the assumption of mutual disinterest does not mean that persons in real life are mutually disin terested. Rawls merely wants the basic structure of society to be ar ranged in accordance with a criterion that can be justified on the basis of undemanding, commonly shared assumptions. In reference to this ambition, Sandel correctly points to the relativity involved in calling such assumptions weak (LU 45-46). The assumption of mutual disin terest indeed demands little of those who see the primary function of social institutions as providing a framework within which people can choose and lead their own lives, safely, effectively, and with a minimum of restrictions and interferences. But it demands a great deal of those who, like Sandel, want the entire social system, not merely associations, to be a community in a strong sense. Such a community presupposes a set of defining values and loyalties that is "constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and embodied in their institu tional arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the partici pants plans of life" (LLJ 173). So why shouldn't the parties be informed mat their clients have an overriding desire to live in this sort of a comprehensive community? But this suggestion is still incomplete. Somehow the parties must be given or be enabled to derive the content of those "shared self-under standings that are to play a constitutive role both in shaping the community s institutions and in the identities of its members. Once AT! P into the original position, however, it is Tr^I. ?Tthan " y ^ would be pulled into the Zn^lT P by it to support institutional change ar^^rnt i ° t K that would best embody e C S fact f h ^ «™ constitutive. It is this S r r l p . ? chance that we might b a r i c .nshmt good and to arrange our m aTtem2HS a t ™»h it-that makes the Sandelian dSS^^ST'l " g - ^wls's vision of a vweU-or18 m c o r

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rejected by S a n d e l (LLJ 1 1 - 1 2 ) , b u t l a t e r r e s u r r e c t e d in a different guise (LLJ 4 4 - 4 6 ) — t h a t t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d b e e n d o w e d with b e n e v o l e n c e o r love of h u m a n k i n d , t h a t is, t h e d e s i r e t h a t o t h e r s s h o u l d b e successful in the p r o m o t i o n of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a s well. As Sandel notes only m u c h l a t e r (LLJ 171), Rawls h a s a n o t h e r plausible reply t o this suggestion a s well, n a m e l y , t h a t it w o u l d m a k e n o difference. T h e veil of i g n o r a n c e a l r e a d y e n s u r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c a n n o t safeguard a n d promote t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r o w n c l i e n t s w i t h o u t p r o m o t i n g t h o s e of all others as well. All p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e virtually r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e delib erations of every c o n t r a c t o r . 8.6. This r e s p o n s e S a n d e l a g a i n finds revealing: "Even in t h e face of so noble a virtue a s t h e love of m a n k i n d , t h e p r i m a c y of justice prevails, although t h e love t h a t r e m a i n s is of a n o d d l y judicial spirit" (LLJ 171). This remark i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a n o t h e r pervasive s t r a n d of Sandel's reaction to Rawls's w o r k , t h e c o m p l a i n t t h a t justice is a r e m e d i a l virtue, a virtue "not a b s o l u t e l y , a s t r u t h is t o t h e o r i e s , b u t only conditionally, a s physical c o u r a g e is t o a w a r z o n e " (LLJ 31, cf. 168-72), a n d w o u l d it not be nice to d o w i t h o u t c o u r a g e a n d e n j o y p e a c e a n d tranquility instead. This t h e m e is p l a y e d r e p e a t e d l y . T h e r e is t h e h e a r t r e n d i n g story a b o u t an ideal family s i t u a t i o n g o v e r n e d b y s p o n t a n e o u s affection, w h i c h deteriorates t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e " p a r e n t s a n d c h i l d r e n . . . dutifully it sullenly a b i d e b y t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s " (LLJ 33). Similarly d i s t u r b i n g is t h e imagined close friend w h o "insists o n calculating a n d p a y i n g his p r e cise s h a r e of everv c o m m o n e x p e n d i t u r e " a n d is extremely r e l u c t a n t t o accept any "favor o r h o s p i t a l i t y " (LLJ 35). Finally, "intimate o r s o h d a n s tic associations" w o u l d a l s o s e e m t o get a l o n g well w i t h o u t too great a n emphasis o n j u s t i c e (LLJ 30). . . . But t h e n Rawls h a s p r a i s e d j u s t i c e a s t h e first virtue of social institu tions (TJ 3) a n d n o t a s t h e m o s t n o b l e p e r s o n a l virtue o r h u m a n senti ment. He is c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u c h i s s u e s a s t h e organization ot m e economy, of g o v e r n m e n t a n d political participation, a n d ot t h e legal and penal s y s t e m s . S u c h i s s u e s a r e n o t m a d e obsolete ty„^ "* stances of b e n e v o l e n c e , o r fraternity, o r of e n l a r g e d affections ( L U u>, for the s e n t i m e n t s of b e n e v o l e n c e a n d love c a n hardly, o n a large scaie, Peivade h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s s o t h o r o u g h l y as t o r e n d e r s h a r e d i n s u i u Sons u n n e c e s s a r y . F o r o n e t h i n g , e v e n if e v e r y o n e g e n u i n e l y s e e K s i u realize t h e c o m m o n g o o d , p e o p l e a r e likely t o disagree a b o u t w h a t h a s >s concretely.** H e n c e p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s of s e t t l e m e n t are n o t dispensable e v e n i n a w o r l d of s a i n t l y altruists, t h o u g h t h e y m a y o e among close f r i e n d s o r w i t h i n a family. e n t i r e s UI

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Now Sandel m i g h t w e l l a c c e p t t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i h t y ° ^ ™ * ^ procedures; h i s d e m a n d might t h e n b e that J ^ J ^ ^ J benevolence o r fraternity s h o u l d d i s p l a c e justice a s t h e foremost virtue 20™ . m i r 17B n 71, w h o cites "T1>» point is d u e , I believe, t o Kant. S e e a l s o Larmore, PMC 175 n. Michael Taylor, CAL 2 6 - 3 2 .

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of social institutions. But this i d e a is s u r e l y very different from, and m u c h m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n , t h e i d e a t h a t p e a c e a n d tranquility s h o u l d displace p h y s i c a l c o u r a g e as a v i r t u e of persons a n d t h u s can not b e i l l u m i n a t e d b y this vague a n a l o g y . O n e w a n t s s o m e sketch, at least, of Sandel's favored b e n e v o l e n t o r fraternal e c o n o m y , penal sys tem, or political p r o c e s s , t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e a s s u r a n c e that these w o u l d n o t give rise to t h e p a t h o l o g i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p r e v i o u s (philo sophical a n d political) a t t e m p t s t o c o n s t r u c t s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s . Sandel fails to a d d r e s s t h e s e issues.

9. R a w l s ' s C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n 9 . 1 . Having f o u n d n o t e n a b l e g r o u n d s for S a n d e l ' s v i e w t h a t Rawls is implicitly c o m m i t t e d to a c o n c e p t i o n of c i t i z e n s as mean-spirited "strangers" (LLJ 183) a n d b a r r e n selves, let u s e x a m i n e w h a t Rawls himself h a s t o say a b o u t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a n d its role w i t h i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice. Rawls is centrally c o n c e r n e d i n t h i s a n d o t h e r m a t t e r s t o argue from w e a k p r e m i s e s . T h i s a m b i t i o n c o u n s e l s , first of all, a g a i n s t relying on too thick or rich a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . If a h i g h l y specific concep tion of t h e p e r s o n is involved in c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice, t h e n this criterion is liable t o b e r e j e c t e d b y t h o s e w h o find t h i s specific c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n u n a p p e a l i n g . Rawls h i m s e l f h a s q u i t e effec tively u s e d t h i s strategy a g a i n s t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . By p o s t u l a t i n g a shared h i g h e s t - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e function, u t i l i t a r i a n s p r e s u p p o s e t h a t there is only o n e rational g o o d for h u m a n b e i n g s (SUPG 1 7 3 - 8 3 ) . T h e y assume that, if d o i n g s p o r t s in o n e ' s s p a r e t i m e m a k e s p e r s o n s h a p p i e r than reading, t h e n p e r s o n s o u g h t t o (be e d u c a t e d to) p r e f e r s p o r t s over reading. Moreover, b y d e m a n d i n g t h a t this (subjective) g o o d b e max imized, utilitarians view p e r s o n s as m e r e c o n t a i n e r s for this g o o d . In w h o m utility o c c u r s a n d h o w it is d i s t r i b u t e d a r e m o r a l l y immaterial (RAM 645). T h e utilitarian criterion c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e r e j e c t e d by any o n e w h o d o e s n o t s h a r e , a n d d o e s n o t w a n t t o live u n d e r institutions that reflect, t h i s view of p e r s o n s as l o c a t i o n s for t h e o c c u r r e n c e of valuable subjective s t a t e s . But t h e n it is n o t clear that a t h i n o r a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n of the p e r s o n c a n avoid s u c h p r o b l e m s . T o s e e w h y , s u p p o s e s o m e o n e has p r o p o s e d a n e l a b o r a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , r i c h w i t h s t i p u l a t e d features (such as n e e d s a n d interests) A t h r o u g h F A s s u m e also that various criticisms are d i r e c t e d against this c o n c e p t i o n , challenging teatures D, E, F a s empirically i n a c c u r a t e o r m o r a l l y u n c o n v i n c i n g . In r e s p o n s e t o s u c h criticisms, o n e m i g h t t r y t o r e t r e a t t o c o m m o n g r o u n d , by retracting t h e assertion of f e a t u r e s D, E, F a n d a r g u i n g from a mm or abstract c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n d e f i n e d b y t h e u n c o n t r o v e r s.at teatures A, B, C. But is o n e n o w relying o n w e a k e r p r e m i s e s ?

Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.1

95

With r e g a r d t o s t r i c t l y d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t s in logic, m a t h e m a t i c s , and geometry, t h e a n s w e r w o u l d b e affirmative. But in practical r e a s o n ing, w h e n d e c i s i o n s m u s t b e m a d e "in light o f given p r e m i s e s , m a t t e r s are o t h e r w i s e . H e r e c o n c l u s i o n s m a y b e u p s e t b y t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of additional p r e m i s e s . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , t h e c a s e of a criminal trial, where t h e j u r o r s a r e a s k e d t o d e c i d e b e t w e e n conviction a n d acquittal on the b a s i s of v a r i o u s facts a s s e r t e d d u r i n g t h e trial. In this sort of situation, n o n e u t r a l i t y c a n b e h a d b y s i m p l y d i s c o u n t i n g alleged facts that are c o n t r o v e r s i a l a m o n g t h e j u r o r s . For s u p p o s e that s o m e alleged facts favoring t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e d i s p u t e d a n d that t h e jurors m u s t either i n c l u d e t h e s e a l l e g e d facts a m o n g t h e i r p r e m i s e s a n d acquit o r exclude t h e m a n d c o n v i c t . In t h i s c a s e , t h e latter c o u r s e c a n n o t b e said to be n e u t r a l b e t w e e n t h e m o r to rely o n w e a k e r p r e m i s e s , b e c a u s e t h e former c o u r s e i m p l i c i t l y a l s o invokes a d i s p u t e d p r e m i s e , namely, that no further facts favoring t h e d e f e n d a n t have b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . 30

Essentially t h e s a m e p o i n t c a n b e m a d e a b o u t t h e q u e s t to attain some m e a s u r e of p r o c e d u r a l n e u t r a l i t y . T h u s , a c c e p t a n c e of Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e m a y h i n g e o n w h e t h e r w e a c c e p t a n d i n c o r p o r a t e into the original p o s i t i o n t h e richer o r t h e t h i n n e r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e person. In c h o o s i n g t h e t h i n n e r c o n c e p t i o n , w e d o not get a clearly more n e u t r a l a r g u m e n t o r o n e b a s e d u p o n unequivocally w e a k e r premises, b e c a u s e w e a r e m a k i n g t h e s t r o n g a n d controversial a s s u m p tion that A, B, C a r e t h e only f e a t u r e s of p e r s o n s relevant to a political conception of j u s t i c e . W e t h e r e b y s n u b all t h o s e w h o believe that persons' g e n e r a l b e n e v o l e n c e , say, o r g e n e r a l n o n b e n e v o l e n c e s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d a m o n g t h e p r e m i s e s . G e n u i n e p r o c e d u r a l neutrality would b e a c h i e v e d n o t b y l e a v i n g controversial p r e m i s e s aside b u t — a t best—only b y s h o w i n g t h a t a c o n c l u s i o n follows irrespective of h o w these a s s e r t i o n s a r e t r e a t e d , t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t g o e s t h r o u g h n o m a t t e r whether D, say, is a s s e r t e d , d e n i e d , o r left o p e n . Unfortunately, o n e will rarely b e a b l e t o s h o w t h i s . N o r is it p r o m i s i n g to seek t h e c o n c e p t i o n of justice t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s the most neutral c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . Many t e n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e will b e u n d o m i n a t e d a n d h e n c e ^ c o m m e n s u r a b l e in t h i s r e g a r d . 31

32

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^Similarly, t h e neutral g r o u n d a m o n g a n atheist, an agnostic, a n d a believer^is decid edly not a g n o s t i c i s m . Rattier, neutral g r o u n d a m o n g t h e s e three i n c l u d e s whatever ° u i be r e a s o n a b l e t o a c c e p t any t h e three perspectives. s l Met e d u r a l neutrality" m i g h t b e m o r e precise, b e c a u s e Rawls•' J ^J°" ' ? "ot w i t h t h e neutrality of r u l e ! a n d p r o c e d u r e s but w i t h n e u ral w a y s ' ^ W ^ * « « * rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s For t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n neutrality neutrality of p r o c e d u r e , s e e Raz, M F 1 1 4 - 1 5 ( w h o falsely ascribes to R a w l s * outcome view [MF 117-24]); a n d Larmore, PMC 4 2 - 4 7 . Rawls's o w n ^ f n o n o t h e ^ g u e s that in d i s p u t e s about the ,us^,ce ot

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9.2. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n c o m p r i s e s w h a t e v e r empirical a n d (especially) n o r m a t i v e claims a b o u t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e implicit in various features of t h e original p o s i t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , t h e publicity c o n d i t i o n o n a d o p t a b l e criteria of justice, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the origi n a l position "so t h a t it is a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e m a x i r n i n r u l e applies' (TJ 155), t h e rationality of t h e p a r t i e s , a n d t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of those the parties r e p r e s e n t (including t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y goods). The m o s t i m p o r t a n t c h a l l e n g e s to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n con c e r n t h e last of t h e s e features. Rawls s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n "know t h a t they prefer m o r e r a t h e r t h a n l e s s p r i m a r y g o o d s . . . . [These] are things w h i c h it is s u p p o s e d a r a t i o n a l m a n w a n t s w h a t e v e r else he wants With m o r e of t h e s e g o o d s m e n c a n g e n e r a l l y b e assured of g r e a t e r s u c c e s s in c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s a n d i n a d v a n c i n g their e n d s , w h a t e v e r t h e s e e n d s m a y b e " (TJ 93, 92). While t h e c h o i c e of this a c c o u n t (for t h e p u r p o s e of i n t e r p e r s o n a l a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c compari sons) m a y b e " f o u n d e d o n t h e facts of p s y c h o l o g y " (FG 538), it is surely n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e s e facts a n d t h u s reflects s o m e b r o a d l y moral attitudes t o w a r d t h e s e g o o d s a n d t o w a r d t h e r o l e t h e y s h o u l d play in a successful h u m a n life. T h o s e w h o find r e a s o n t o d i s a g r e e significantly with Rawls's a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s a n d t o diverge from the a t t i t u d e s it e x p r e s s e s m a y r e a s o n a b l y reject h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice ( a t l e a s t if t h e y c a n p o i n t t o a n o t h e r s h a r a b l e b a s i s for a g r e e m e n t ) . This p o i n t is p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious i n r e g a r d to t h e p r i o r i t y Rawls gives in t h i s a c c o u n t t o c e r t a i n b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. O n e set of t h e s e fall u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l h e a d i n g of f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i e n c e (TJ S33). N o w if t h e p a r t i e s w e r e d e l i b e r a t i n g i n b e h a l f of p e r s o n s w h o care primarily a b o u t utility (one's o w n o r t h a t of o t h e r s ) , t h e y m i g h t not w a n t t h e rights a n d liberties of t h i s set t o b e very e x t e n s i v e . T h e s u p p r e s s i o n of c e r t a i n beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s m a y w e l l r a i s e e a c h position, s c h e m i c a l l y a s e v a l u a t e d i n t e r m s of utilS i? J r e s u l t i n g from a b r i d g m e n t s of t h e relevant rights andI h b e r h e s are o u t w e i g h e d b y satisfactions g a i n e d d i r e c t l y (from S!? " ° / s u p p r e s s e d ) o r t h r o u g h i n t e r m e d i a t e soSl^r!H ^ . ° ° u n t t h e p a r t i e s deliberate rTn^nnhi ,^ y y ^ e m o r a l , religious, or t 6 r e S t *, " I * * * P j e o p a r d y u n l e s s there n t e ^ K S T ? ' US• V ^ rm ral ° o s eed opmr i n c i p l e s t h a t s e c u r e the d o n o t k n o w , of ° ° A c t i o n s . . [ a n d obligations hm TlTe ° ^ e s a s h a v i n g s u c h obligations, t ^ c ^ • • - h e y cannot 1

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their lives a r o u n d t h e i d e a of m a x i m i z i n g utility, Rawls must insist that persons " m a y h a v e a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves t h a t t h e y believe they w o u l d not, or c o u l d n o t , s t a n d a p a r t from; a n d t h e y m i g h t regard it as u n t h i n k able for t h e m to view t h e m s e l v e s w i t h o u t c e r t a i n religious a n d philo sophical c o n v i c t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s " (KCMT 545). W h o e v e r is con vinced that this is not, o r o u g h t n o t to b e , a significant feature of h u m a n personality c a n r e a s o n a b l y reject t h e i m p o r t a n c e Rawls a t t a c h e s to freedom of t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i e n c e . 9.3. But Rawls d o e s n o t m e r e l y i n f o r m t h e p a r t i e s that their clients have constitutive i n t e r e s t s ; h e a l s o gives t h e m to know, m o r e specifi cally, w h a t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e i n t e r e s t s are. T h e p a r t i e s repre sent moral p e r s o n s , " c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t w o m o r a l p o w e r s . . . t h e c a p a c ity for a n effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e . . . [and] t h e capacity to form, to revise, a n d r a t i o n a l l y to p u r s u e a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e good. C o r r e s p o n d ing to t h e m o r a l p o w e r s , m o r a l p e r s o n s are said to be m o v e d by two highest-order i n t e r e s t s t o r e a l i z e a n d exercise t h e s e p o w e r s . By calling these i n t e r e s t s ' h i g h e s t - o r d e r ' i n t e r e s t s , I m e a n t h a t . . [they] are supremely regulative a s w e l l a s effective. This implies that, w h e n e v e r circumstances a r e r e l e v a n t to t h e i r fulfillment, t h e s e interests govern deliberation a n d C o n d u c t " (KCMT 5 2 5 ) . Clearly t h e s e a r e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l s t i p u l a t i o n s . A brief reflection o n the actual p e r s o n s w e k n o w is likely to p r e s s u p o n u s t h e question of how relevant Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e c a n b e t o o u r w o r l d if it has been a d o p t e d in behalf of m o r a l p e r s o n s so conceived. If Rawls aims for a comparative a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s by h o w suitable each would be for p e r s o n s h a v i n g t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests, a n d if these i n t e r e s t s a r e a n d will b e q u i t e r a r e in a c t u a l fact, t h e n Rawls's criterion, a n d t h e r a n k i n g of feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s b a s e d u p o n it, would s e e m t o b e d i s c r e d i t e d . Let m e c o n s i d e r t w o p o s s i b l e responses to s u c h d o u b t s . Rawls c o u l d say that p e r s o n s b o m i n t o a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society governed by his cnterion of j u s t i c e w o u l d b e m o r e likely to b e c o m e moral p e r s o n s . Perhaps so, b u t t h e r e w o u l d r e m a i n a significant n u m b e r of p e r s o n s in h o m t h e " h i g h e s t - o r d e r " i n t e r e s t s w o u l d n o t b e s u p r e m e l y regula tive. Moreover, u t i l i t a r i a n s c o u l d e q u a l l v well a r g u e t h a t p e r s o n s b o m jnto a self-contained s o c i e t y g o v e r n e d by t h e p r i n c i p l e of utility w o u l d °e more likely to c o m e t o h a v e a h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference function. Rawls c o u l d a l s o s a y t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n is to serve only 34

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of h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests m a y mislead by suggesting ^ o n d - o r d e r d e s i r e s , w h i c h are d e s i r e s about desires a n d n e e d no be r e g u l a b v v * h * Pect to first-order d e s i r e s . H i g h e s t - o r d e r interests are n o t about but ^ P e c t to other interests. Rawls a l s o s t i p u l a t e s that moral persons• a » . r e p « s e n t e d by h e P^hes, have "a h i g h e r - o r d e r interest in p r o t e c t i n g a n d advancing their c o n c e p h o n ot the 6°oa (KCMT 5251 R a W l s s t U 1 c l a i l hemHH " *°™ advantage, a s s u m i n g that our considered £ T n o w w o u l d g o a g a i n s t a h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference function while supporting of moral p e r s o n a l i t y (as h e d e f i n e s it).

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for developing a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e : " W i t h i n different con texts w e c a n a s s u m e diverse p o i n t s of view t o w a r d o u r p e r s o n without c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o long a s t h e s e p o i n t s of v i e w c o h e r e t o g e t h e r when c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e " (KCMT 5 4 5 ; cf. JFPM 2 3 2 n . 1 5 ) . But the co h e r e n c e c o n d i t i o n s h a r p l y limits t h e u s e f u l n e s s of t h i s strategy as a r e s p o n s e to t h e difficulty. F o r c o n s i d e r a g a i n t h e possibility of a util itarian m a k i n g t h e s a m e r e s p o n s e t o Rawls's c r i t i c i s m s . Rawls would probably c o u n t e r this by s h o w i n g h o w c o n c e i v i n g of p e r s o n s as having a h i g h e s t - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n c a n n o t n e a t l y b e c o n f i n e d to politi cal p h i l o s o p h y b u t w o u l d also affect t h e w a y p e r s o n s in t h e envisaged utilitarian society w o u l d view t h e m s e l v e s o u t s i d e t h e political realm, especially if t h e operative c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a n d t h e r e a s o n s for it are r e q u i r e d t o b e p u b l i c (the p u b l i c i t y c o n d i t i o n , [cf. TJ 1 3 3 , 182]). P e r s o n s ' c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e i r p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e roles m u s t "cohere together." T h e a n a l o g o u s c o u n t e r w o u l d , I believe, d e f e a t t h e response in Rawls's behalf a s well. If c i t i z e n s — e v e n i n Rawls's m o s t favored s o c i e t y — w o u l d frequently set a s i d e t h e i r ( s u p p o s e d l y ) "highest-order" interests for t h e sake of o t h e r i n t e r e s t s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s , t h e n Rawls's ranking of basic s t r u c t u r e s is b a s e d u p o n a n e m p i r i c a l l y false assump tion. Therefore, if t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s really a r e "supremely regulative a s well as effective" (KCMT 5 2 5 ) , t h e n t h e d e s i r e to h o n o r just institutions m u s t c o n s t r a i n a n d (in c a s e of conflict) o v e r r i d e even our most constitutive private loyalties, c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d a t t a c h m e n t s , w h e t h e r p e r s o n a l , religious, o r e t h i c a l . T h e c o n c e p t i o n p e r s o n s are to have of t h e i r p u b l i c role c o n s t r a i n s h o w t h e y c a n c o n c e i v e of them selves from o t h e r p o i n t s of view. T h e two r e s p o n s e s I h a v e c o n s i d e r e d d o little t o d e f e n d t h e stipula tion of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s o r t o m i t i g a t e t h e conclusion t h a t this s t i p u l a t i o n m a k e s Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n very de m a n d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , it s e e m s t h a t Rawls d o e s n o t e v e n n e e d t o affirm tnis m o d e l of m o r a l p e r s o n a l i t y i n o r d e r t o d e r i v e h i s c r i t e r i o n of social justice; in A Theory of Justice t h e t w o m o r a l p o w e r s a r e i n t r o d u c e d onty n e a r t h e e n d (in very rcriterion u d i m e n t a r y form [TJ 5 0 5 , 5 6 1 ] ) , l o n g after the ST!!? I™!! * T 6 d t h 6 i r i « c e i n its final s t a t e m e n t (TJ Z " ' ' ™ * ™ y s e e m t o e n d o r s e far t o o controversial a sTvXK! K, , ° ' y S c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e excesu o o n 2Ur° "S «f s ° « a l p r i m a r y goods should?Z1T^T? ~ * * ; JFPM 2 2 4 n 2 ) , h e m e S n S ^ f f P ^ g o o d s a s t h e relevant a l l - p u r p o s e e ^ Smocrat^ V""**the P ™ P e r s o n s in modo

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the capacity r a t i o n a l l y t o revise t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . By relying o n a m o r e n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , this a r g u m e n t would have h a d w i d e r a p p e a l . So w h y d o e s Rawls insist o n t h e t w o highest-order i n t e r e s t s i n s t e a d ? 9.4. If t h e r e is a g o o d a n s w e r , t h e n it m u s t b e that Rawls c o n s i d e r s the more d e m a n d i n g s t i p u l a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for a n o t h e r p u r p o s e (other than establishing a p r e f e r e n c e in t h e original p o s i t i o n for h i s criterion). But what p u r p o s e ? T h e s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t Rawls w a s carried away by K a n t i a n p r e d i l e c t i o n s . T h e conviction, even p a t h o s , in his endorsement of t h e first h i g h e s t - o r d e r interest i s certainly n o t u n r e lated to his s t r o n g a t t r a c t i o n t o K a n t : "The s e n s e of justice . . . reveals what t h e p e r s o n is, a n d t o c o m p r o m i s e it is n o t t o achieve for t h e self free reign b u t t o give w a y t o t h e c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d a c c i d e n t s of the world" (TJ 575). H e a d d s t h a t b y a c t i n g from a s e n s e of justice, w e express " o u r n a t u r e a s m o r a l p e r s o n s " (TJ 574). T h i s appeal, however, cannot b e t o a u n i v e r s a l " w e " b u t o n l v t o t h o s e w h o will s h a r e t h e Kantian a s p i r a t i o n t o t h e free reign of t h e self. T h a t Rawls's most favored society i s d e s i g n e d for K a n t i a n spirits will for them surely count in its favor b u t is b o u n d t o a l i e n a t e o t h e r s w h o are less t h a n enthusiastic a b o u t t h e i d e a l of free r e i g n for t h e self. Rawls's appeal t o Kant does n o t p r o v i d e t h e k i n d of b r o a d l y b a s e d a n d powerful argu ment that s o d e m a n d i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n r e q u i r e s . Is t h e r e a n o t h e r w a y ot providing s u c h a n a r g u m e n t ? 37

3-4.1. Let m e b e g i n w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t e d interest in a s e n s e ot justice. There is s u r e l y s o m e t h i n g m o r a l l y d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t a n institutional scheme that, relying o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d motivations, wouldI w o r k w i m equal effectiveness i n a n a t i o n of intelligent d e v i l s . But is £ ™enough t o s t i p u l a t e a highest-order i n t e r e s t ? T h e r e is, I trunK, a n even m o r e b r o a d l y b a s e d a n d c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t for moral c r a z e " ship. Rawls w a n t s t o s h o w n o t m e r e l y that h i s criterion o )ust.ce indicates a m o r a l l y p l a u s i b l e w a y of o r g a n i z i n g social m t e r a c t i o n u u also that a social s y s t e m satisfying t h i s criterion w o u l d b e w e l l - o m e r e a , *hich for h i m r e q u i r e s stability. T h a t a social s y s t e m is ™\™ a s p e c t t o its c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e . . . m e a n s t h a t . . . u s m e ! 38

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acquire . . . a sufficiently s t r o n g a n d effective s e n s e of justice, one that usually o v e r c o m e s t h e t e m p t a t i o n s a n d s t r e s s e s of social life'' (RAM 634). This is a c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r r e q u i r e m e n t t h a n t h a t of equtlibrium, w h i c h is satisfied even if "individuals c o m p l y w i t h t h e institu tional s c h e m e solely as a m e a n s to t h e i r s e p a r a t e c o n c e r n s . . . from selfor g r o u p - i n t e r e s t e d m o t i v e s " (TJ 455). Here, t h e n , is a partial r a t i o n a l e for Rawls's d e c i s i o n t o invoke strong er p r e m i s e s . If w e believe t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e i n d e e d capable of a regulative a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e a n d if w e c a r e s t r o n g l y that our criterion of justice a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s it favors s h o u l d h a v e a tendency t o w a r d stability (that is, t o w a r d e n g e n d e r i n g s u c h a s u p p o r t i n g sense of justice), t h e n it is r e a s o n a b l e t o s t i p u l a t e t h a t " o t h e r t h i n g s equal, the p e r s o n s in t h e original p o s i t i o n will a d o p t t h e m o r e stable s c h e m e of p r i n c i p l e s " (TJ 455). N o w o n e m a y well t h i n k t h a t t h e m o r e intuitive w a y of e m b e d d i n g t h e c o n c e r n for stability w o u l d b e given by the s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' clients v a l u e a n effective s e n s e of justice in one another, r a t h e r t h a n e a c h only in h i m - o r h e r s e l f a s t h e first highesto r d e r interest s u g g e s t s . In a l a t e r essay, Rawls d o e s i n d e e d explain the p a r t i e s ' p r e f e r e n c e for a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t e n g e n d e r s a n ef fective s e n s e of justice b y e m p h a s i z i n g h o w p e r s o n s living u n d e r stable i n s t i t u t i o n s will b e m o r e successful in a d v a n c i n g t h e i r determinate c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d , w h a t e v e r t h e s e m a y b e (BLP 3 1 - 3 2 ) . T h e r e is, I believe, n o s e r i o u s t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o a c c o u n t s of t h e parties reasoning, b e c a u s e b e h i n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e t h e t w o stipulations a r e equivalent. Still, t h e s e c o n d a c c o u n t (in BLP, p u b l i s h e d after KCMT) m a y have t h e a d v a n t a g e of m a k i n g m o r e p e r s p i c u o u s h o w t h e parties' rational d e l i b e r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t o u r own m o r a l r e f l e c t i o n s . 9.4.3. W h y t h e n s h o u l d t h e p a r t i e s h a v e so decisive a p r e f e r e n c e for stability over o t h e r forms of social e q u i l i b r i u m ? I s u g g e s t t h a t stability e n a b l e s a g o o d t h a t is o t h e r w i s e u n a t t a i n a b l e . Stability m a k e s certain features of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i m m u n e t o t h e shifting d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r w i t h i n t h e social s y s t e m in q u e s t i o n . T o s e e w h a t is at stake, c o n s i d e r t h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m u s t c o p e w i t h t h e as s u r a n c e problem.™ P e r s o n s ' p r u d e n t i a l a n d m o r a l r e a s o n s for accept ing t h e i r fair s h a r e of t h e b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e u n d e r m i n e d w h e n t h e r e are n o a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r s a r e c o m p l y i n g a s well. This p r o b l e m c a n generally b e solved t h r o u g h m e c h a n i s m s for detect ing a n d penalizing n o n c o m p l i a n c e (TJ 270,240). T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , also a d e e p e r v e r s i o n of t h e a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m . H e r e t h e r e l e v a n t s u s p i c i o n is n o t t h a t o t h e r s m a y b e shirking t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s u n d e r the s c h e m e but t h a t m a j o r g r o u p s m a y b e s e e k i n g t h r o u g h t h e i r legitimate political a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r to shift t h e t e r m s of t h e institutional 39

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scheme itself i n t h e i r favor. T h i s s u s p i c i o n t e n d s t o d i s p o s e o t h e r groups to use their l e g i t i m a t e p o w e r in similar w a y s s o as to block any advances by t h o s e w h o m t h e y s u s p e c t a n d , if possible, to w e a k e n their position as well. As t h e situated a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m t h r e a t e n s pervasive noncompliance w i t h e x i s t i n g g r o u n d rules, so t h e fundamental as surance p r o b l e m t h r e a t e n s pervasive a n d u n r e s t r a i n e d c o m p e t i t i o n over what the g r o u n d r u l e s will b e . While, o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m c a n n o t be solved t h r o u g h i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m s , it may, o n the o t h e r h a n d , seem m u c h less t h r e a t e n i n g . S u p p o s e t h a t e a c h m a j o r g r o u p a c c e p t s the going s c h e m e o n l y p r u d e n t i a l l y , a s t h e b e s t it c a n for n o w exact from the others, a n d t h a t t h e r e a r e significant shifts in the distribution of bargaining p o w e r a m o n g t h e s e g r o u p s o r in t h e i r values a n d inter ests. Even then, a b r e a k d o w n of o r d e r is less likely t h a n a n a d a p t a t i o n of the scheme t o t h e a l t e r e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Even while t h e going s c h e m e would u n d e r g o s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e s , o r d e r w o u l d b e preserved through an underlying modus vivendi (cf. JFPM 247; IOC), a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the going terms of i n t e r a c t i o n will t e n d t o reflect a dynamic bargaining equilibrium. T h e c o n t i n u i t y a c h i e v a b l e t h r o u g h s u c h a m o d u s vivendi is quite weak, h o w e v e r , a s t h e g o i n g t e r m s are liable t o c h a n g e without limit. In fact, it is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e its t e r m s a r e flexible that a m o d u s wendi c a n e n d u r e over t i m e . As t h e b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r o r t h e values a n d interests of t h e v a r i o u s g r o u p s c h a n g e , t h e institutional distribution of benefits a n d b u r d e n s is a d j u s t e d s o t h a t t h e s c h e m e c o n t i n u e s t o b e rationally a c c e p t a b l e t o all. T h u s , w h e n a g r o u p ' s p o w e r h a s increased, so that it n o w h a s m o r e t o g a i n a n d less t o lose from a (partial) break down of orderly r e l a t i o n s , it will p r u d e n t l y p r e s s for m o r e favorable terms. And o t h e r g r o u p s will p r u d e n t l y a c c e d e t o its d e m a n d weakened g r o u p s b e i n g o b l i g e d to a c c e p t less favorable terms b e c a u s e °f their i n c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y o r d e c r e a s e d t h r e a t advantage. 9

-4-3- It is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t w h i l e t h e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g ^ ° " P s is effectively c o n s t r a i n e d at e a c h m o m e n t b y t h e going t e r m s ot ^ scheme, t h e r e a r e n o r e s t r a i n t s o n t h e t e r m s themselves. T h e r e are no limits o n h o w w e a k o r s t r o n g a g r o u p m a y b e c o m e t h r o u g h shifts in 2 distribution of p o w e r a s reflected i n a n d c o m p o u n d e d by shirts in e terms of t h e m o d u s v i v e n d i . A n d t h i s a b s e n c e of limits indicates t n e "^son for insisting o n a s e n s e of justice. T h e features characterizing a J»t basic s t r u c t u r e c a n b e p r e s e r v e d o n l y if e a c h major g r o u p within social s y s t e m will s u p p o r t t h e m even w h e n it is i n a position to exact n e w t e r m s m o r e favorable t o itself. A truly e n d u r i n g just scheme P*supposes a w i d e s p r e a d a n d d e e p m o r a l allegiance t o its basic «*n», so that e a c h of at least t h e influential social g r o u p s can b e rehea h o n o r t h e m e v e n w h e n t h e y significantly conflict with its moral or JJWous convictions o r w i t h its political o r e c o n o m i c ™erests O r i y in f y c a n all b e a s s u r e d t h a t t h e t e r m s of t h e s c h e m e will not.be Justly n o t b e forced into a d e c h n e

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ing spiral of fading power and deteriorating terms of participation. Such assurance, in turn, radically reduces the temptation to seek un justly to shift the scheme's terms in one's favor (cf. §19.2 and §20.4). 9.4.4. Rawls has, then, a crucially important reason for favoring a basic structure that has a strong tendency to engender a normally overriding moral allegiance to itself. T h e stipulation of thefirsthighestorder interest can be justified through the preference for a social system whose basic ground rules are "taken off the political agenda," are not themselves objects of the political and economic competition they are to regulate. T h e realization of this preference requires persons who, despite a wide diversity of conflicting values and interests, share an area of value overlap (cf. TJ 387-88), who have an overriding alle giance to this "kernel of political morality" and to its institutionaliza tion, and who know all this about one another. T h e aspiration toward such a social system with such persons is partly a matter of collective rationality, but it is also moral in three distinct respects. First, each social group will consider it morally important to protect its values and way of life, and for many such groups stability is the only feasible or at least the most reliable way of ensuring that its conception of the good will survive, will be available to be known, reaffirmed, and continued by whoever may choose to do so. S e c o n d , individuals and associations may also recognize other groups as having a valid claim that their values and form of life should remain accessible within the social system, and ensuring stability is then the best way of discharging this collective responsibility vis-a-vis other groups in general. Here stability is a way of assuring that we, as members of one group, will never be forced to choose between the security of our own conception of the good and the moral claims of others to live in accordance with theirs, tnird, a kernel of political morality would also engender greater social P e a c e and harmony than has been displayed by any of the large soaeties w e are familiar with from history, and such peace and harmony are of moral value for their own sake stinuLIS'Tr Sg d Rawls can give in defense of his stipulation of the first highest-order interest has this schematic form: 41

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The p r e f e r e n c e for stability m a y also furnish t h e m o s t broadly m o s t c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t for stipulating t h e s e c o n d high est-order interest i n r e a l i z i n g a n d exercising t h e capacity to form, to revise, a n d rationally t o p u r s u e a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . Social institu tions u n d e r w h i c h t h i s i n t e r e s t is w i d e s p r e a d w o u l d e n g e n d e r a strong and lasting allegiance to a k e r n e l of political morality t h a t allows a w i d e range of diverse a n d e v e n m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e c o n c e p t i o n s of the good. For c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r a social s y s t e m in w h i c h p e r s o n s are primarily m o t i v a t e d b y t h e i r i n t e r e s t in p r o t e c t i n g a n d advancing their own particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . In s u c h a system t h e s h a r e d political morality is liable t o c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to shifts in t h e relative strength of t h e g r o u p s s u p p o r t i n g t h e various c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good. There is little c o n c e r n t o p r e s e r v e s p a c e for values a n d ideals currently out of favor. H e n c e t h e a d h e r e n t s of e a c h g r o u p m u s t fear that, s h o u l d their n u m b e r s d e c l i n e t e m p o r a r i l y , t h e r e w o u l d b e p r e s s u r e s o n the basic structure t o c h a n g e s o a s t o m a k e a r e s u r g e n c e of their values less likely or even i m p o s s i b l e . T h i s fear in t u r n t e n d s to p r o d u c e in each group a strong d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o m a i n t a i n a n d increase its strength. The fear a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t e n d t o u n d e r m i n e t h e g r o u p s ' moral allegiance to t h e existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s . This p r o b l e m is avoided when the s e c o n d h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t is w i d e s p r e a d . In that case, many p e r s o n s will w a n t t h e social s y s t e m to b e o p e n to, a n d even to foster, a w i d e diversity of v a l u e s a n d projects, so as t o provide a rich background a g a i n s t w h i c h p e r s o n s c a n form a n d c h a n g e their o w n conceptions of t h e g o o d . A n d t h e a d h e r e n t s of e a c h particular w a y of "fe will t h e n b e a s s u r e d t h a t a n o p e n n e s s for, a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of, their particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d will b e preserved by others, even if their o w n s t r e n g t h s h o u l d d w i n d l e . 9.4.5.

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v a n c e t h e d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d of t h o s e t h e y represent (BLP 27, 29-32). But i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r h e g o e s right back to a highly p a r t i s a n K a n t i a n r a t i o n a l e : " T h e role a n d e x e r c i s e of [the moral] p o w e r s (in t h e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t a n c e s ) is a c o n d i t i o n of g o o d . . . . [Cit izens'] j u s t a n d h o n o r a b l e ( a n d fully a u t o n o m o u s ) c o n d u c t renders t h e m , a s Kant w o u l d say, w o r t h y of h a p p i n e s s ; i t m a k e s their accom p l i s h m e n t s w h o l l y a d m i r a b l e a n d t h e i r p i e a s u r e s c o m p l e t e l y good (BLP 49).« 9.4.7. T h e s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s will of course affect h o w t h e c o n t e n t of t h e favored c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is argued for w i t h i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e original p o s i t i o n . T h e a r g u m e n t will reflect t h e t h i n k i n g of p e r s o n s w h o v a l u e t h e i r s h a r e d c a t e g o r i c a l allegiance to a lasting k e r n e l of political m o r a l i t y a n d t h e i r s h a r e d i n t e r e s t in pre serving t h e s p a c e for a w i d e r a n g e of d i v e r s e c o n c e p t i o n s of the good. T h e s e p e r s o n s a r e n o t w e , b u t t h e m e m b e r s of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society c o r r e l a t e d w i t h Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . B u t t h e a r g u m e n t still t o u c h e s u s insofar as w e , u p o n reflection, w o u l d a s p i r e t o s u c h a social s y s t e m , w o u l d w a n t t o s e e o u r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a n d w a y of life b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d , w o u l d w a n t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t satisfy t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of justice, a n d w o u l d w a n t t o b e a n d live among p e r s o n s w h o , h o w e v e r different i n o t h e r w a y s , s h a r e a categorical c o m m i t m e n t t o m a i n t a i n t h e j u s t i c e of t h e i r s h a r e d b a s i c institutions. Some p e o p l e h e r e a n d n o w m a y s e e n e i t h e r r a t i o n a l n o r m o r a l reasons tor finding t h i s a s p i r a t i o n p l a u s i b l e a n d will, p e r h a p s r e a s o n a b l y , reject Rawls s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , a l t h o u g h t h e y m i g h t h a v e a c c e p t e d a m o r e n e u t r a l o n e sufficient for d e r i v i n g h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice. But losing t h e m c a n n o t b e h e l p e d , b e c a u s e a m o r e n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of m e p e r s o n w o u l d n o t s u p p o r t t h e a m b i t i o n for a s t a b l e , h a r m o n i o u s , a n d e n d u n n g l y j u s t social s y s t e m . 9 . 5 . Let m e c o n c l u d e w i t h s o m e r e m a r k s o n h o w Rawls's insistence o n a s u p r e m e l y regulative a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e m i g h t c o m e to t e r m s w i t h t h e d o u b t s first voiced b y B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s i n "Persons, Character, a n d Morality."*. T h e w o r r y i s t h a t o n c e w e r e s e r v e a special 0 " !* ° r a l m o t i v a t i o n s w e will n o t b e able to to r T r « . h ^ ^ s t r u c t u r a l i m p o r t a n c e t h a t c a n attach to o u r o t h e r c o n s h t u t i v e c o m m i t m e n t s (Williams, ML 2). T h u s Williams

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thinks we o u g h t "to a l l o w m o r e r o o m t h a n K a n t i a n i s m c a n allow for t h e importance of i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r a n d p e r s o n a l relations in m o r a l experience" (ML 5). F o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s mitigate this c o n c e r n as ad dressed to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n . First, w h a t is to take motivational p r e c e dence over o u r d e e p loyalities, a t t a c h m e n t s , or g r o u n d projects is a political, r a t h e r t h a n a g e n e r a l a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e morality (cf. IOC 3 4TWhat Rawls s t i p u l a t e s is a n a l l e g i a n c e o n l y to t h e criterion of justice, to the basic s t r u c t u r e i n s o f a r a s it is justified by this criterion, a n d to legislative, judicial, a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s insofar as they are rendered p u r s u a n t t o justified p r o c e d u r e s a n d a c c o r d in c o n t e n t with the criterion of j u s t i c e . Second, t h e political m o r a l i t y is specifically conceived so as to be compatible with, a n d p r o t e c t i v e of, a w i d e range of diverse a n d often mutually i n c o m p a t i b l e religions, p e r s o n a l values, a n d ethical doctrines (of the more g e n e r a l a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e kind). These two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o w t h a t t h e o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h the sense of justice w o u l d c o m e i n t o conflict w i t h o t h e r constitutive c o m mitments are likely to b e r a r e , at least i n c o m p a r i s o n to alternative, n o n Rawlsian basic s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s fact is w e l c o m e , b e c a u s e a regulative and effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e , t h o u g h it m u s t b e determinative, n e e d not be our s u p r e m e o r p r e e m i n e n t c o m m i t m e n t . It n e e d not be ranked above c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t d o n o t conflict w i t h i t . Third, Rawls's t h e o r y is a n e x e r c i s e in ideal theory. So even if it w e r e true that p e r s o n s a s t h e y n o w a r e h a v e s o m e constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s that may conflict w i t h a n a l l e g i a n c e t o a just institutional s c h e m e , it would not follow t h a t s u c h conflicts w o u l d o c c u r u n d e r that s c h e m e . The reason, as Williams h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t , is t h a t a p e r s o n ' s constitu tive c o m m i t m e n t s a r e "in g o o d p a r t . . . f o r m e d within, a n d formed by, dispositions w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a c o m m i t m e n t to morality" (ML 12)—in thJS case to t h e political m o r a l i t y Rawls is p r o p o s i n g . This consider ation shows h o w o n e n e e d n o t d e n y e i t h e r t h e crucial role of constitu t e c o m m i t m e n t s i n a w o r t h w h i l e h u m a n life or t h e fundamental "nportance of s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s o n c e t h e y have b e e n formed. Both these points a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e h o p e t h a t in t h e context ot a n 45

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* « one accepts this p o i n t , a s Rawls s e e m s t o d o (IOC 17), then o n e m i g i t consider ^ n g Rawls's talk of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests. A preeminent .nteres m o n e s W f ° ' ™ P ' ' P ° s e s n o p r o b l e m s o l o n g as a confl.ct b e t w e e n . t a n d the o n W 5, °P exereiie ° " ° Justicejs . m p o s s bte lor at teas. V p o s s i b l e ) . T h u s o n e m a y prefer t o speak of a defrmmawe rrther than St 0rder ^ ^ call it "regulative in the political d o m a i n « ^ ^ P r e m e l y regulative." T h i s p r o p o s a l a l s o avoids t h e misleading a s s o c . a n o n of h.gnest a

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o n g o i n g just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , p e r s o n s w o u l d t e n d e i t h e r n o t to form certain c o m m i t m e n t s or to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i v e commit m e n t s as limited from t h e start s o t h a t t h e possibility of s u c h conflicts is largely e x c l u d e d . Given w i d e s p r e a d m o r a l a l l e g i a n c e to a just regime, p e r s o n s might, for e x a m p l e , b e u n w i l l i n g to form a f r i e n d s h i p with a n o t o r i o u s tax c h e a t or m i g h t refuse t o u n d e r s t a n d s u c h a friendship as obligating t h e m t o h e l p cover u p t h e i r friend's f r a u d u l e n t activities. It m a y n e v e r t h e l e s s h a p p e n , of c o u r s e , t h a t a d e e p a n d long-standing c o m m i t m e n t c o m e s i n t o conflict w i t h political m o r a l i t y . S u c h conflicts w o u l d b e m u c h m o r e difficult t h a n Williams's c a s e (ML 1 7 - 1 8 ) , in w h i c h s o m e o n e , u n a b l e to r e s c u e b o t h of t w o e n d a n g e r e d persons, gives p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e o n e w h o is h i s wife. It w o u l d b e a case where t h e a g e n t ' s loyalty to his wife w o u l d r e q u i r e h i m to violate just rules, to b r e a k a law, to bribe a j u d g e , or s u c h like. It is n o t o b v i o u s that one s h o u l d w a n t to b e a p e r s o n w h o w o u l d , e v e n i n a perfectly j u s t society, d o s u c h t h i n g s if o n e ' s wife t u r n e d o u t to b e in t h e Mafia, say. I feel that at this p o i n t Williams overstates t h e significance of c o n s t i t u t i v e com m i t m e n t s w h e n h e writes (about t h e r e s c u e case): "It m i g h t have been h o p e d by s o m e (for i n s t a n c e , by h i s wife) t h a t h i s m o t i v a t i n g thought, fully spelled out, w o u l d b e t h e t h o u g h t t h a t it w a s h i s wife, not that it w a s h i s wife a n d t h a t in s i t u a t i o n s of this k i n d it is p e r m i s s i b l e to save o n e ' s wife," as t h e latter r e a s o n i n g " p r o v i d e s t h e a g e n t w i t h one | ! ? ^ k t o o j n a n y " (ML 1 8 ) . But t h e s e c o n d t h o u g h t is n o t o u t of place in~Tne c o n t e x t s relevant h e r e , for e x a m p l e , t h e Mafia c a s e . Even if s h e is o n e s wife, o n e m a y still ask w h e t h e r it is right t o violate a just practice tor h e r sake. This m u c h s e e m s perfectly c o m p a t i b l e w i t h having a character. J

Fourth, t h e s e n s e of justice n e e d n o t b e d e t e r m i n a t i v e for all persons all t h e t i m e . " T h e r e can c o m e a p o i n t at w h i c h it is q u i t e u n r e a s o n a b l e tor a m a n t o give u p , in t h e n a m e of t h e i m p a r t i a l g o o d o r d e r i n g of the w o r l d of moral a g e n t s , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is a c o n d i t i o n of h i s having any interest m b e i n g a r o u n d in t h a t w o r l d at all" (ML 1 4 ) I n d e e d , s u c h a E ° ° yi n k ' t h a t h e is justified i n Sh? r^u ' ' Williams's p h r a s e , t h a t "some s UJations b e y o n d justifications" (ML 1 8 ) . Moreover, t h e possibility of nf ™ i" !f P e w i t h t h e feasibility a n d desirability haveT^ f° ' P e r s o n s m o s t of t h e t i m e will C

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DEVELOPING RAWLS'S CRITERION O F J U S T I C E

C H A P T E R

3

The First Principle of Justice

10. T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s Rawls p r o p o s e s a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t r a n k s feasible alternative basic structures b y t h e m i n i m u m r e p r e s e n t a t i v e lifetime s h a r e of social primary goods e a c h of t h e m t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e . In this section, I analyze this proposal i n t o eight m a i n e l e m e n t s , w h i c h m a y b e g r o u p e d into o u r familiar three c o m p o n e n t s , t h e w h o - , w h a t - , a n d h o w - q u e s t i o n s of §3.1. J ^ e I discuss s o m e of t h e s e e l e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e (as indicated in Table 2), the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n is i n t e n d e d o n l y t o i n t r o d u c e t h e m briefly one place. T h e r e m a i n d e r of Part T w o focuses o n t h e core of the what-component, t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of Rawls's semiconsequentialist ac count of the i n d i v i d u a l g o o d , w h i c h is t o inform all interpersonal a n d Werschemic c o m p a r i s o n s i n m a t t e r s of social justice. m

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10-1. Let begin with t h e key element within the h o w - c o m p j e n ^ , c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e m a x i m i n idea. In analogy to the biblical m

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idea of m o r a l i t y — "Whatever y o u h a v e d o n e t o o n e of t h e least of these m y b r e t h r e n , t h a t y o u h a v e d o n e t o m e " ( M a t t h e w 25:40)—the ranking of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s is to d e p e n d u p o n t h e worst social p o s i t i o n e a c h of t h e m t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . All i n f o r m a t i o n about b e t t e r p o s i t i o n s is left a s i d e as irrelevant. T h u s Rawls invites u s to think of " t h e two p r i n c i p l e s a s t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e — [T]he t w o p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h o s e a p e r s o n w o u l d c h o o s e for the d e s i g n of a society in w h i c h h i s e n e m y is to a s s i g n h i m h i s place [T]hat t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w o u l d b e c h o s e n if t h e p a r t i e s were forced to p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t s u c h a c o n t i n g e n c y explains the s e n s e i n w h i c h t h i s c o n c e p t i o n is t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n " (TJ 152-53). As t h e s e r e m a r k s i n d i c a t e , Rawls's a r g u m e n t from t h e original position is divisible i n t o t w o s t e p s . T h e first of t h e s e links t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of the original p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e p a r t i e s ' e m p l o y m e n t of t h e m a x i m i n rule, a n d t h e s e c o n d p r e s e n t s t h e c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e h e p r o p o s e s as "the m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e . " After s o m e brief c o m m e n t s a b o u t t h e first s t e p , I c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of the s e c o n d , w h i c h b r i n g s in t h e o t h e r e l e m e n t s of h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice. 1

Rawls's u s e of t h e m a x i m i n i d e a h a s p r o v o k e d a flood of criticism T h e s e a p p e a r q u i t e d e v a s t a t i n g if o n e t a k e s literally Rawls's professed, aim "to c h a r a c t e r i z e [the initial] s i t u a t i o n s o t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s that w o u l d b e c h o s e n , w h a t e v e r t h e y t u r n o u t to b e , a r e a c c e p t a b l e from a m o r a l p o i n t of v i e w . . . . T h u s j u s t i c e a s fairness is a b l e to u s e t h e idea of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice from t h e b e g i n n i n g " (TJ 120). T h i s statement s e e m s t o i n d i c a t e t h a t Rawls's e n t i r e a r g u m e n t w o u l d c o l l a p s e if the p a r t i e s ' e m p l o y m e n t of t h e m a x i m i n r u l e w e r e r e f u t e d . In t h e same section, however, Rawls s u g g e s t s t h e o p p o s i t e p i c t u r e a s well. "The p r o c e d u r e of c o n t r a c t t h e o r i e s p r o v i d e s , t h e n , a g e n e r a l analytic m e t h o d for t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y of c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e . O n e tries to set o u t t h e different c o n d i t i o n s e m b o d i e d in t h e c o n t r a c t u a l situa tion i n w h i c h their p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d b e c h o s e n . In t h i s w a y o n e formu lates t h e various u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o n w h i c h t h e s e c o n c e p t i o n s s e e m to d e p e n d " (TJ 121-22). Here, Rawls s u g g e s t s t h a t o n e b e g i n s with a p a r t i c u l a r criterion of j u s t i c e a n d t h e n c o n s t r u c t s o n e ' s initial situa tion accordingly: "We w a n t to define t h e original p o s i t i o n s o t h a t w e get t h e d e s i r e d s o l u t i o n " (TJ 141); "the original p o s i t i o n h a s b e e n defined s o t h a t it is a s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e m a x i m i n r u l e a p p l i e s " (TJ 155). Each of t h e s e t w o p i c t u r e s is o v e r d r a w n a n d at o d d s w i t h Rawls's m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . Of t h e original p o s i t i o n a n d h i s max imin c n t e n o n , n e i t h e r is c o n c e i v e d p r i o r to a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the other. T h e p o i n t is r a t h e r to fit t h e m closely i n t o e a c h o t h e r while arguing for t h e specification of e a c h o n i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d s a s far as XeS

lO-UH^HT^nTTF ' 1 ' * ; Pettit, TJ 3 1 2 - 1 4 ; Naget, W provides f?UN ~ " " g r a v e , MULT; a n d Harsanyi, CMP. Rawls provides s o m e d e f e n s e s a n d elaborations in R M C a n d RAM

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possible (cf. TJ 20). H e n c e R a w l s ' s failure t o establish a tight c o n n e c t i o n between his original p o s i t i o n a n d h i s favored criterion w o u l d n o t d e stroy his case for t h e latter. H e c o u l d still try t o r e d e s c r i b e t h e original position in a w a y t h a t p r e s e r v e s t h e plausibility of this "expository device" (TJ 21) w h i l e a l s o r e d e e m i n g h i s claim that t h e parties w o u l d employ t h e m a x i m i n r u l e ( a n d c h o o s e h i s favored criterion). Rawls's argument w o u l d b e d e f e a t e d o n l y if every d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e initial situation that c o u l d y i e l d h i s p r e f e r r e d c r i t e r i o n w e r e morally i m p l a u s ible. But let u s n o t r u s h t o s p e c u l a t e a b o u t h o w t h e original position might best b e r e d e s c r i b e d . F o r it is far from clear t h a t s u c h revision is needed. It is Rawls's c l a i m t h a t a " c o n s t e l l a t i o n of w e a k e r a n d m o r e basic conditions o n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , e a c h w i t h its a p p r o p r i a t e pedigree o r justification . . . , w h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s t h e i r c o m b i n e d force, would lead r e a s o n a b l e p e o p l e t o c h o o s e a s if t h e y w e r e highly riskaverse" (RAM 649). Rawls h a s given at least six g r o u n d s for this claim, but his critics h a v e a l m o s t exclusively c o n c e n t r a t e d o n only t w o of these: that t h e r e is r e a s o n , b e h i n d t h e veil of ignorance, for sharply discounting p r o b a b i l i t y e s t i m a t e s (TJ 154) a n d t h a t c h o o s i n g in accor dance with t h e m a x i m i n r u l e e n s u r e s a n a c c e p t a b l e m i n i m u m position above which t h e r e is little t o g a i n a n d b e l o w w h i c h t h e r e is m u c h to lose (TJ 154-55). Let m e briefly r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e r e m a i n i n g four rea sons. 2

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Third, "the p a r t i e s w a n t t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o a p p e a r well f o u n d e d t o others" (TJ 173). W h a t is m e a n t , I s u p p o s e , is that t h e parties s h o u l d choose in t h e spirit of a t r u s t e e investing m o n e y for a w a r d . This attitude is i n d e e d a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e in s h a p i n g basic institutions t h e Parties (and we) a r e d e t e r m i n i n g t h e v a r i o u s social positions that per sons will b e b o r n i n t o , w i t h o u t c h o i c e . Fourth, t h e b e n c h m a r k ot 4

J take the original p o s i t i o n to i n c o r p o r a t e t h e following six features-. (II the « « * parties a s m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d a n d rational in t h e narrow s e n s e ™ ( e g . , TJ 1 4 4 - 4 5 ) ; (2) t h e characterization of those ^ s e n t as individuals, a n d e q u a l moral p e r s o n s w i t h t w o h . g h e s t e

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'Haurf?' P y , ordering, a n d finality (TJ §23). annronoriate Rawls cues Fellner, PP l o 4 , a s s h o w i n g that t h e s e « n * ^ f ^ , ^ ^C^n spltaLP,fi6S ^ a c c o r d a n c e with the maximin m ' \ ^ « * Z t o ^ S , c o n d i t i o n i n t o t w o , t h o u g h t h e p o i n t m u s t b e that the potential g a m 'CW ' , »he p o t e n t i a l l o s s e s . „ ; w l i t v toward the 6 here Rawls's remarks that t h e parties have a r e s p o n s i b ^ t y tovvarc^ CexL^e™1 . 26) a n d a l s o t h e p a s s a g e about the= P ^ ^ d , » i « « l, dn e^r a t i o n " 2MM>. for w h i c h I s e e n o o t h e r rationale. It * J ^ . erse, 1 s ^ e parties t o k n o w that t h o s e they Pf** r h o s e they 42^™ - W e t h e parties w e r e g i v e n to k n o w t h a t o n to^^^^ " » e n t are e n t r e p r e n e u r s o r g a m b l e r s b y t e m p e r a m e n t . Even w i t h this s n p 4

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equality, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e c o n c e r n for t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d , appropri ately e x p r e s s e s t h e political c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , o u r aspiration for a society of free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s (RMC 1 4 4 - 4 5 ) . Fifth, a maximin criterion is m u c h e a s i e r t o apply, for it is c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h t h e worst s h a r e . It is especially s u i t a b l e as a p u b l i c c r i t e r i o n b e c a u s e one can m o r e easily u n d e r s t a n d it a n d c h e c k w h e t h e r it is satisfied (TJ 517; RMC 143-44). 5

Finally, t h e p a r t i e s ' c h o i c e is to b e a b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t t h a t persons s h o u l d b e able t o k e e p w i t h o u t t o o m u c h difficulty. W h e n Rawls's m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n is satisfied, t h e " s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t " are rela tively w e a k b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e will benefit from e x i s t i n g inequalities vis-a-vis t h e b e n c h m a r k of equality, a n d t h e w o r s t s h a r e , in particular, will n o t b e w o r s e t h a n n e c e s s a r y s o a s to a l l o w o t h e r s h a r e s to be h i g h e r t h a n t h e y c o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e . T h a t e v e n t h e w o r s t social posi t i o n will b e r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a b l e ( c o m p a r e d t o t h e w o r s t social posi t i o n u n d e r a n y alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e favored b y o t h e r criteria) is of s o m e m o m e n t b e c a u s e " t h e p a r t i e s m u s t d e c l i n e all risks e a c h possible o u t c o m e of w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t a g r e e i n g o o d faith t o a c c e p t " (RAM 653). Moreover, w e a k s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t a r e a n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e for t h e crucially i m p o r t a n t g o o d of stability (TJ 1 7 5 - 7 8 , 4 9 8 - 9 9 ; RMC 144). In v i e w of t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l positive r e a s o n s ( a n d t h e d e f e n s e s devel o p e d in §6.4) let m e t h e n a s s u m e t h a t t h e c a s e for m a x i m i n is still p l a u s i b l e a n d c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e s e c o n d s t e p : "If t h e original position h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d s o t h a t it is r a t i o n a l for t h e p a r t i e s t o a d o p t the conservative a t t i t u d e e x p r e s s e d b y [ t h e m a x i m i n ) r u l e , a conclusive a r g u m e n t c a n i n d e e d b e c o n s t r u c t e d for t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s " (TJ 153). T h e r e a r e m a n y different w a y s in w h i c h a m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n might be specified, however, d e p e n d i n g o n h o w o n e s e t s v a r i o u s f u r t h e r param e t e r s . In t h i s s e c t i o n a n d t h e n e x t I will p r e s e n t a n d p a r t l y d i s c u s s these f u r t h e r e l e m e n t s of Rawls's p a r t i c u l a r m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n . T h e discus s i o n will suggest v a r i o u s w a y s of revising t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n u p o n w h i c h t h e m a x i m i n r a n k i n g of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s is to be based. l O A . Rawls is c o m m i t t e d t o h u m a n i s m a n d t h u s d e n i e s t h a t a con c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d i n c l u d e a n i m a l s a s well: " T h o s e w h o c a n give j u s h c e a r e o w e d j u s t i c e " (TJ 510).« Rawls s e e m s a l s o t o d e n y that

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animals have m o r a l r i g h t s ( t h a t w e o w e t h e m morality), for h e says that we have "duties of c o m p a s s i o n a n d h u m a n i t y in their case" (TJ 512, m y emphasis). While t h i s s e c o n d t e n e t is c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e first is m o r e secure. Animals w o u l d b e suffering a n i n j u s t i c e if t h e y w e r e excessively disadvantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o r u n r e a s o n a b l y ex cluded from s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r . But n e i t h e r is t h e case. Ani mals cannot p a r t i c i p a t e i n b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b e c a u s e they c a n n o t understand political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , legal rights, m a r k e t s , money, marriage, a n d t h e like. If w e s h o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s take t h e m into ac count in t h e d e s i g n of o u r s o c i a l w o r l d , w e a r e b o u n d b y a collective duty of morality. 10.3. Rawls t a k e s t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t i c i p a n t s in social institutions, represented by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position, to b e individual persons. 10.3.1. One a l t e r n a t i v e s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e u n i t s of moral concern include g r o u p s , a n d i n h i s first s t a t e m e n t of his c o n c e p t i o n of justice Rawls d i d i n d e e d s t i p u l a t e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s also r e p r e s e n t "na tions, provinces, b u s i n e s s firms, c h u r c h e s , t e a m s , a n d s o o n " (JR 245, cf. 8-49).» He h a s s i n c e c o m e t o t h e v i e w t h a t o n e s h o u l d not postulate groups with r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n t e r e s t s over a n d above t h o s e of its m e m bers: "For r e a s o n s of clarity a m o n g o t h e r s . . . w e w a n t to a c c o u n t for t h e social values, for t h e i n t r i n s i c g o o d of institutional, c o m m u n i t y , a n d associative activities, b y a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e that in its theoretical basis is individualistic" (TJ 264). A further, decisive r e a s o n s u p p o r t i n g ™» change is t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n of " s u p r a p e r s o n a l " u n i t s w o u l d b e incompatible w i t h R a w l s ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r i m a c y of (the subject of) "J; basic s t r u c t u r e . If w e a r e t o b e g i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y with t h e Section u p o n o u r m o s t b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e n w e c a n hardly take tor fatted that t h e s e a r e t o r e g u l a t e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g business 7

24

and c h u r c h e s . W h a t k i n d s of a s s o c i a t i o n s exist is itself a function d e s

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JJ* » g n of b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . , , 10.3.2. In r o u g h l y t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n goes t h e d e m a n d tor m e dmjssion of " s u b p e r s o n a l " u n i t s . S a n d e l ' s i d e a of "a plurality of selves IT § < ^ d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g " (LLJ 63) c a n h a r d l y be useful g a n d a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t o n e might c o n s i d e r * slices of i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g s . T h i s i d e a raises various q u e s 3

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h e a d s of families" (TJ 128). T h i s idea plays a very to^rote in 1 ^ i ° n that t h e parties c a r e for m e m b e r s of ^ t u r e g e n e r a ^ ^ J that e a c h h o u s e h o l d , regardless o f size, h a s only o n e r e p r e s e n t ^ ^ P o s i t i o n . ) Rawls w a n t e d that c o n c l u s i o n ^ p u r p o s e s of an a c c o u n ^ J ? h a s s i n c e w i t h d r a w n this a c c o u n t (BSS70> o i ' d M d u a l i s h p f , W he h also a b a n d o n e d talk of h e a d s of families in favor of cleanly m d m a C o n c l

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tions: h o w "thick" s h o u l d t h e slices b e , a n d s h o u l d p e r s o n s b e sliced individually (by age) o r t o g e t h e r o n c e r t a i n fixed d a t e s ? T h e problems of i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h i s i d e a i n t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a modem society are evident, b u t m o r e d a m a g i n g is t h e p r o b l e m that these h u m a n slices w o u l d t h e m s e l v e s w a n t t o b e t a k e n into account as c o m p l e t e p e r s o n s , w o u l d w a n t to b e able to save for a n d b o r r o w against future i n c o m e , a n d t h e like. 10.4. T h e r e a r e t w o m a i n a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e semiconsequentialist e l e m e n t of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . 10.4.1. Rawls d e p a r t s from d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of justice by h o l d i n g t h a t equivalent benefits a n d b u r d e n s s h o u l d b e weighted equally, regardless of w h e t h e r t h e y a r e e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s . In t h e c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c structures t h e perspective of its p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s is decisive, o r s o a broadly consequentialist approach maintains. 10.4.2. W i t h i n s u c h a n a p p r o a c h , t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o s e m i c o n s e q u e n tialism is full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t p a y a t t e n t i o n n o t o n l y t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social goods b u t also to differences in p e r s o n s ' p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l constitutions. W e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r s h a r e s n o t in t h e a b s t r a c t b u t in relation t o the p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s w h o s e s h a r e s t h e y a r e . T h i s k i n d of objection to Rawls c a n b e specified in t w o w a y s , p o i n t i n g t o w a r d t w o roughly o p p o s i t e k i n d s of fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of justice. 10.4.2.1. O n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t relevant p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e defined a s i n c l u d i n g capabilities, n e e d s , g o o d looks, t a s t e s , preferences, or desires, so that n a t u r a l differences are compensated for. T h o s e whose lives a r e w o r s e b e c a u s e of t h e i r inferior p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l constitution s h o u l d , o t h e r things equal, h a v e a s u p e r i o r s h a r e of b e n e f i t s a n d bur d e n s ; i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t q u a l i t y of life (or standard of living, in Sen's p h r a s e ) . T h e a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g social i n s t i t u t i o n s m i g h t t h e n b e e i t h e r m a x i m i n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r s o m e mea s u r e c o m b i n i n g social a n d n a t u r a l p r i m a r y g o o d s . In r e s p o n s e to this objection, Rawls h a s s t r e s s e d t h e n e e d for " w o r k a b l e criteria for inter p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s w h i c h c a n b e publicly a n d , if p o s s i b l e , easily a p p l i e d " (SUPG 169). He h a s also p o i n t e d o u t t h a t h e c o n c e i v e s persons, in virtue of t h e i r s e c o n d m o r a l power, as free to c h o o s e a n d as responsi ble for t h e i r o w n final e n d s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . T h e y c a n b e e x p e c t e d to have ' a d j u s t e d t h e i r likes a n d dislikes over t h e c o u r s e of t h e i r lives to t h e i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h t h e y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t " (SUPG 169). But t h e s e r e m a r k s a d d r e s s only t h e easier c a s e s , b y p a s s i n g t h e difficult q u e s t i o n of h o w to c o p e w i t h t h o s e m a n i f e s t a n d objective interper s o n a l differences in n e e d s for a n d c a p a c i t i e s to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of social p n m a r y g o o d s for w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s r e s p o n s i b l e a n d to w h i c h they c a n adjust t h e m s e l v e s o n l y w i t h g r e a t difficulty, if at all. 10

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T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.4.2.2

115

The serious p r o b l e m for R a w l s i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t for p u r p o s e s of identifying t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n , s p e c i a l gifts a n d n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s (spe cial disabilities o r n e e d s ) s h o u l d b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . This idea is perhaps most c o m p e l l i n g in c a s e s s u c h as b l i n d n e s s or special medical needs, which Rawls leaves a s i d e (e.g., KCMT 546; SUPG 168). But it p o s e s a general challenge t o h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t for p u r p o s e s of assessing basic structures, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e defined solely in terms of benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social i n t e r a c t i o n . 104.2.2. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e m i g h t a r g u e that positions s h o u l d be defined so that n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s a r e corrected for. W h e n a basic structure generates u n e q u a l s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y goods, these give rise to questions of j u s t i c e o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y c a n n o t b e explained by reference to differences i n e n d o w m e n t s (or m o t i v a t i o n ) . On this view, the least advantaged a r e t h o s e w h o s e s h a r e s fall farthest short of t h e shares of others similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d e n d o w e d . T h e r e a r e two p r o b lems with this view. Defining t h e b e n c h m a r k of equality a s a state in which persons' s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s m a t c h t h e i r natural endowments implicitly p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t g r e a t e r e n d o w m e n t s should entitle persons t o l a r g e r s h a r e s ; t h i s is t h e k i n d of claim w h o s e merits were questioned i n § 6 . 2 - 4 . M o r e o v e r , t h e institutional s c h e m e s favored y the p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i o n w o u l d b e likely t o e n g e n d e r considerable strains of c o m m i t m e n t , a s n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s a n d social disadvantages would powerfully aggravate e a c h o t h e r . T h o s e w i t h a weak physical ^ d mental c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d i n a d d i t i o n h a v e t h e smallest m i n i m u m share of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . . \ 11

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me second c h a l l e n g e is p e r h a p s n o t s o s e r i o u s , b u t it h e l p s m e bring °W how Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m is a plausible intermediate Point between t w o fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t e x t r e m e s . To illustrate, let m e jfetch how t h e difference p r i n c i p l e i n its s i m p l e s t form (symbolizing tawls's maximin c r i t e r i o n ) w o u l d e v a l u a t e a n i n c o m e distribution a b a c k g r o u n d of d i v e r s e n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s . On Rawls's proposal, Positions a r e a s s e s s e d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y i n t e r m s of i n c o m e alone_ he rejects, o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e i d e a of defining t h e m in t e r m s ot < f come + n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s > - i n w h i c h c a s e equality of i n c o m e for PWJons working e q u a l l y h a r d w o u l d r e q u i r e special l " ^ ™ * \ 2> «w i i y m o r e gifted (whose greater J J f B n o t r e w a r d e d ) vis-a-vis t h e n a t u r a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d . A n d h e on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e i d e a of defining positions i n t e r m s ot ^ c o m e relative t o n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s > - i n w h i c h case equality ot 8

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i n c o m e for p e r s o n s w o r k i n g e q u a l l y h a r d w o u l d r e q u i r e special justifi cation b e c a u s e it w o u l d d i s a d v a n t a g e t h e n a t u r a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d (to w h o m o t h e r h u m a n g o o d s are less a c c e s s i b l e ) vis-a-vis t h e naturally gifted. On Rawls's p r o p o s a l , justification is r e q u i r e d insofar as institu t i o n s g e n e r a t e unequal i n c o m e s for p e r s o n s w o r k i n g equally hard; the d i s a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w i t h t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e s , regardless of their specific n a t u r a l capabilities o r n e e d s . 10.5. In Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , all i n t r a - a n d interschemic c o m p a r i s o n s a r e to b e m a d e i n t e r m s of s h a r e s of social primary g o o d s — c e r t a i n b a s i c liberties a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i n c o m e a n d wealth, p o w e r s a n d prerogatives of offices, a n d t h e social b a s e s of self-respect (TJ 62, 92). Rawls h o l d s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position have r e a s o n t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t p r e f e r m o r e of these g o o d s t o less (TJ 9 3 , 1 4 2 - 4 3 , 253, 260, 396, 4 3 3 - 3 4 ) . But h e changes his m i n d a b o u t t h e i r b a s i s for t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . In A Theory of Justice the a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is s a i d (TJ 92) t o follow from the "thin t h e o r y of t h e g o o d , " featuring t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e a n d rational life p l a n s (TJ §§60-65). Later, this a c c o u n t is l i n k e d t o t h e highest- and h i g h e r - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s of free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s (KCMT 525-26). In b o t h cases, t h e a r g u m e n t , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t sketchy, is clearly r e l a t e d to t h e value of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m . 1 0 . 5 . 1 . It m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t p e r s o n s u l t i m a t e l y c a r e not about social p r i m a r y g o o d s but, for e x a m p l e , a b o u t h a p p i n e s s o r utility. Inter p e r s o n a l a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e m a d e in t e r m s of t h e utility value of s h a r e s , a s c a l c u l a t e d b y m e a n s of general f o r m u l a s (which, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , w o u l d leave a s i d e i n t e r p e r s o n a l differences). Rawls c a n reject t h i s p r o p o s a l o n the g r o u n d t h a t utility is just o n e e n d a m o n g o t h e r s . S o m e will a t t a c h great i m p o r t a n c e t o it, w h i l e o t h e r s will c h e r i s h w i s d o m , love, o r art. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s e g o o d s is n o t directly r e g u l a t e d b y t h e b a s i c struc t u r e — a n d c o u l d n o t p l a u s i b l y b e at a n y r a t e — a n d s o t h e r e is n o need to settle t h e i r relative i m p o r t a n c e . A c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d as far as possible avoid taking a s t a n d o n s u c h differences a b o u t t h e g o o d life It c a n d o so by d e s c r i b i n g s h a r e s in t e r m s of g o o d s t h a t overlap closely w i t h t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t a c t u a l l y g e t d i s t r i b u t e d in the c o u r s e of social i n t e r a c t i o n as r e g u l a t e d b y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s (are "at the disposition of society" [TJ 62]). F u r t h e r a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t the value of t h e s e g o o d s c o n s i s t s in a r e to b e a v o i d e d b e c a u s e s u c h as s u m p t i o n s w o u l d n e e d l e s s l y m a k e t h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e more controversial. T h e s a m e g o e s for further a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t s u c h goods s h o u l d best b e u s e d for. S h a r e s a r e t o b e d e s c r i b e d in very general t e r m s . I n s t e a d of asking w h e t h e r p e o p l e travel a n d r e a d books, for e x a m p l e it isC b e t tee r t o ask w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e t h e freedom t o travel a n d whiif exercise this f r e e d o m . I n s t e a d of asking w n e t n e r t h e y h a v e a c c e s s t o u n s p o i l e d n a t u r e , it is b e t t e r to ask 0

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whether they have l i b e r t i e s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t allow t h e m a n equal say about m a t t e r s of e n v i r o n m e n t a l quality. This way, Rawls's conception of j u s t i c e r e s p e c t s p e r s o n s ' f r e e d o m in t h a t it "does not look behind the u s e w h i c h p e r s o n s m a k e " (TJ 94; cf. SUPG 169-72) of t h e general all-purpose m e a n s a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l . It takes t h e s e m e a n s t h e m selves as f u n d a m e n t a l a n d d e f i n e s relevant p o s i t i o n s in t e r m s of t h e m . 10.5.2. But o n e m a y still c h a l l e n g e Rawls's a p p r o a c h at this point without a b a n d o n i n g h i s r e s p e c t for f r e e d o m . Different institutional schemes will e n g e n d e r different a t t i t u d e s a n d will t h u s affect the ways in which p e r s o n s will u s e t h e i r f r e e d o m . P e r h a p s p e r s o n s w o u l d cher ish art and w o u l d s u p p o r t art t h r o u g h private a n d political efforts under some i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s b u t n o t u n d e r o t h e r s . Rawls is com mitted to the view t h a t s u c h differences s h o u l d not play a role in constructing a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . It s h o u l d n o t be p r e s u m e d a h e a d of time that art o u g h t t o b e c h e r i s h e d . 10.5.3. Even if R a w l s w e r e r i g h t a b o u t h o w a n a c c o u n t of social primary goods s h o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d , h e m i g h t still b e mistaken about what particular g o o d s s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d o r a b o u t h o w t h e y should be weighted relative t o o n e a n o t h e r . I will d i s c u s s several s u c h issues in Sll-12 and § § 1 5 - 1 7 . 10.5.4. Finally, R a w l s ' s w a y of b r i n g i n g t h e m a x i m i n idea to b e a r "pon his a c c o u n t of s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s m a y also s e e m problematic, w even if the p a r t i e s e m p l o v t h e m a x i m i n rule a n d a s s u m e that t h e Persons they r e p r e s e n t p r e f e r m o r e social p r i m a r y g o o d s t o less, it d o e s notfollowthat t h e y w o u l d favor w h a t e v e r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e offers t h e best share. It m u s t a l s o b e a s s u m e d t h a t Rawls's social primary goods have n o significant n e g a t i v e externalities. Even while each per°n is better off w i t h m o r e r a t h e r t h a n less, it m a y still b e t r u e that e a c h h a v e m o r e t h a n if all h a v e (Compare, even if each is *** with a g u t h a n w i t h o u t o n e , it m a y still b e t r u e that each is ess «e if all have g u n s t h a n if n o n e do.) I try to resolve this p r o b l e m i n §13.5 ™ C h t 4 t h r o u g h a p a r t i c u l a r v i e w of t h e basic political liberties s

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t h e i r i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s u p o n s o m e larger least advantaged g r o u p ( u n d e r e a c h s c h e m e ) . I find t h i s k i n d of r e a s o n i n g convincing in r e g a r d to engendered (intra- o r i n t e r s c h e m i c ) i n e q u a l i t i e s in social p r i m a r y g o o d s , s u c h a s i n e q u a l i t i e s i n i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , in the fair value of b a s i c political liberties, o r in t h e s e c u r i t y of o t h e r basic liberties. T h e r e a s o n i n g is l e s s c o n v i n c i n g i n r e g a r d t o p a r t l y established inequal ities h o w e v e r . W h e n s o m e a r e explicitly e x c l u d e d from certain consti t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s o r legally b a r r e d from c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the n u m b e r of p e r s o n s so d i s a d v a n t a g e d is m u c h l e s s relevant. But then we c a n n o t treat e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s differently—at least if I a m right t o a r g u e (§§2.2,11.2.1) t h a t t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice must c o n s i d e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of overall s h a r e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e separate d i s t r i b u t i o n s of v a r i o u s g o o d s . H e r e t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t consider a t i o n s s e e m t o p o i n t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s , and the countervailing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c a n b e a c c o m m o d a t e d b y stipulating that r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s a r e r e a s o n a b l y s m a l l o r t h a t representative s h a r e s a r e t h e g e o m e t r i c ( r a t h e r t h a n a r i t h m e t i c ) m e a n of t h e shares of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p . 1 3

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10.7. Rawls specifies a social p o s i t i o n i n t e r m s of a lifetime share of social p r i m a r y g o o d s : " T h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d a r e d e f i n e d as t h o s e who have t h e lowest i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s , w h e n t h e i r p r o s p e c t s are viewed over a c o m p l e t e life. T h i s definition i m p l i e s t h a t social mobility is n o t c o n s i d e r e d a p r i m a r y g o o d . I n d i v i d u a l s a c t u a l l y b o m into this g r o u p h a v e s o m e likelihood of i m p r o v i n g t h e i r s i t u a t i o n a n d of belong ing to t h e m o r e favoured; b u t w h a t e v e r t h i s l i k e l i h o o d is, it is irrelevant, s i n c e t h e least a d v a n t a g e d are, b y definition, t h o s e w h o a r e b o m into a n d w h o r e m a i n in t h a t g r o u p t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r life" (SUPG 164). The last s e n t e n c e , 1 suggest, c a n n o t b e t a k e n literally, b e c a u s e it w o u l d leave u s w i t h a n e m p t y g r o u p if in s o m e social s y s t e m t h e likelihood of 3

> It s o m e t i m e s s o u n d s a s t h o u g h Rawls h a s m o r e p r i n c i p l e d r e a s o n s for focusing on the least advantaged representative g r o u p rather t h a n p e r s o n (TJ 98)—similar to the parties p n n c i p l e d reasons for f o c u s i n g o n s o c i a l primary g o o d s rather t h a n utility, if so, 1 d o nor s e e w h a t t h e y might b e (see e n d of §17.5). T h e n o t i o n of representative groups raises t h e q u e s t i o n s h o w s u c h g r o u p s are to be d e n n e d a n d h o w t h e representative p r o s p e c t s of e a c h g r o u p are to be d e t e r m i n e d o n t h e b a s i s of empirical data about their m e m b e r s (cf. S c a n l o n RTJ193-94). T h e s e q u e s t i o n s , hardly t o u c h e d u p o n by Bawls, plav a cruc a] role i . Suppose, for l

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upward mobility w e r e 100 p e r c e n t . It w o u l d l e a d t o t h e a b s u r d conclu sion that a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h t h e least a d v a n t a g e d earn $5.00 a n hour all their lives is, o t h e r t h i n g s e q u a l , to b e preferred to a s c h e m e under which everyone's n e t i n c o m e r a t e g r a d u a l l y increases with age, say, from $4.50 t o $30.00. It is e v i d e n t , I t r u s t , t h a t t h e u p w a r d mobility under the latter s c h e m e m u s t c o u n t i n its favor. I suggest that Rawls m e a n s t o a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r p e r s o n s ' social positions a r e t o b e e v a l u a t e d ex post o r ex ante . Should w e care about those w h o s e lifetime e x p e c t a t i o n o r p r o s p e c t for social primary goods (a p r o b a b i l i t y - w e i g h t e d average) is w o r s t o r about t h o s e w h o would actually h a v e t h e w o r s t s h a r e of social p r i m a r y goods over a lifetime? Under a s c h e m e w i t h a lot of social mobility, representative expected lifetime s h a r e s m a y n o t differ m u c h b e t w e e n those b o r n into different classes. Yet actual lifetime s h a r e s m a y differ quite significantly, so that those (from all c l a s s b a c k g r o u n d s ) w h o fail in their careers are very badly off. U n d e r s u c h a s c h e m e , t h e w o r s t representative ex ante position (prospective s h a r e s of t h o s e b o r n into t h e lowest class) would °e much s u p e r i o r t o t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ex post position (the worst actual shares). I i n t e r p r e t Rawls's s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e irrelevance of social mobility t o m e a n t h a t h e is o p t i n g for t h e ex post perspective. The least a d v a n t a g e d a r e d e f i n e d a s t h o s e w h o w o u l d actually t u r n out have the w o r s t s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s over a complete life. 1S

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Both alternative p r o p o s a l s c a n b e s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t by agreeing w i t h Rawls t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s (in expected s h a r e s o r s t a r t i n g positions) s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d o n a par. Yet both are s o m e w h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l i n spirit, i n t h a t p e r s o n s themselves are a s s i g n e d a m u c h larger r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e i r s u c c e s s in life. Still, n e i t h e r alternative g o e s to Nozickian e x t r e m e s , a n d t h a t in at least two r e s p e c t s . First, u n d e r Nozick's l i b e r t a r i a n s c h e m e s o m e m a y (subject to t h e Lockean proviso) start o u t i n d i r e p o v e r t y w i t h o u t any realistic p r o s p e c t of ever i m p r o v i n g t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Nozick is n o t concerned w i t h s t a r t i n g p o s i t i o n s insofar as t h e y a r e e n g e n d e r e d , o r with pros p e c t s for social mobility. S e c o n d , u n d e r Nozick's s c h e m e p e r s o n s may risk o r a l i e n a t e all t h e i r initial rights. T h e ex ante p e r s p e c t i v e , however, will favor i n a l i e n a b l e rights w h e n t h i s i m p r o v e s p e r s o n s ' prospects. Even t h e s t a r t i n g - p o s i t i o n view m a y well d o likewise o n t h e grounds t h a t a n initial b u n d l e of a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s c a n b e i m p r o v e d u p o n by t r a n s f o r m i n g s o m e of t h e rights it c o n t a i n s i n t o i n a l i e n a b l e ones. The s e c o n d - o r d e r liberty t o risk o r a l i e n a t e o n e ' s b a s i c r i g h t s is n o t advan t a g e o u s , q u i t e a p a r t from p a t e r n a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a b o u t the likeli h o o d of m i s t a k e s . It e n d a n g e r s a g e n t s b y p r o v i d i n g v a r i o u s n a s t y incen tives t o o t h e r s t o try t o bring t h e m u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l . Still, t h e t w o alternative views, like Nozick's, p a y m u c h less attention t h a n d o e s Rawls t o h o w p e r s o n s ' lives a c t u a l l y t u r n o u t u n d e r alterna tive s c h e m e s , w h e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e a g e n t ' s o w n failures a n d achieve m e n t s or t h r o u g h c o n t i n g e n t factors. Both m a y favor a s c h e m e under w h i c h s o m e p e r s o n s end up very b a d l y off i n d e e d , w h i c h w o u l d be justified t o s u c h p e r s o n s by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e y s t a r t e d o u t either r e a s o n a b l y well off (starting p o s i t i o n ) o r w i t h r e a s o n a b l y g o o d pros p e c t s of s u c c e s s a s w i t n e s s e d b y all t h e o t h e r s from t h e i r b a c k g r o u n d w h o " m a d e it" (ex ante). T h e r e are t w o m a i n k i n d s of a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e s e views. First, c o n s i d e r i n g alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s from t h e (risk-aversei s t a n d p o i n t of a p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t , o n e c a n n o t p l a u s i b l y ignore t h e possibility of e n d i n g u p very b a d l y off o r b e c o n c e r n e d with this possibility only in p r o p o r t i o n to its likelihood. It is t h u s i m p l a u s i b l e for t h e p a r t i e s to b e indifferent to h o w t h e i r c l i e n t s ' lives a c t u a l l y t u r n out. Of c o u r s e , if t h e p a r t i e s d e l i b e r a t e d in a risk-neutral fashion, t h e ex ante a n d ex p o s t p e r s p e c t i v e s w o u l d b e e q u i v a l e n t . But s i n c e t h e y are riskaverse, they m u s t b e c o n c e r n e d to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t lifetime shares r a t h e r t h a n t h e w o r s t e x p e c t e d lifetime s h a r e s , let a l o n e t h e worst initial s h a r e s . Second, t h e t w o alternative criteria of j u s t i c e w o u l d also b e risky in that t h e y w o u l d largely give u p t h e f o u r t h a n d sixth a d v a n t a g e s Rawls claims tor t h e m a x i m i n idea. T h e y m i g h t favor s c h e m e s t h a t e n g e n d e r radical e c o n o m i c inequalities, w h i c h w o u l d f r u s t r a t e Rawls's aspira tion tor a s h a r e d n o t i o n of e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p a n d w o u l d a l s o i n d u c e e x t r e m e strains of c o m m i t m e n t a s p e r s o n s w h o s e p o s i t i o n h a d gravely

T h e General Parameters, 10.7

121

deteriorated w o u l d b e s t r o n g l y t e m p t e d n o t to abide by t h e g r o u n d rules when all t h e y c o u l d n o w e x p e c t i s a life of abject poverty. Such schemes would b e less likely t o e n d u r e a n d unlikely t o e n g e n d e r a widespread categorical s e n s e of j u s t i c e . T h e s e a r e i m p o r t a n t reasons for describing t h e p a r t i e s s o t h a t t h e i r risk-averse c o n c e r n extends to the entire lives of t h e i r c l i e n t s . Yet one may t h i n k t h a t t h e R a w l s i a n ex post perspective is too con servative in favoring i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s t h a t prohibit almost all forms of gambling a n d (voluntary) e c o n o m i c risk taking. In considering any liberty to take risks, R a w l s ' s p a r t i e s p a y very little attention to t h o s e who gamble a n d w i n , for t h e y will b e u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d a m o n g t h e least advantaged. T h e y f o c u s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y u p o n t h o s e w h o gam ble and lose, w h o s e ex post p o s i t i o n is likely to be w o r s e t h a n t h e worst position u n d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w i t h o u t t h e liberty. That these losers w a n t e d t o g a m b l e a n d w e r e free n o t t o is simply ignored. This objection m a y s e e m t o t a k e a n e x t r e m e view of what it would mean to opt for t h e Rawlsian ex post p e r s p e c t i v e . It d o e s not m e a n that wery lottery ticket p e r s o n s m i g h t p u r c h a s e m u s t be considered ex post and that lotteries m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e p r o h i b i t e d . Rawls c a n say that buying a lottery ticket d o e s n o t r e d u c e one's n e t i n c o m e but is o n e way °f spending one's i n c o m e , like b u y i n g a movie ticket. T h e r e is n o reason hy consumption d e c i s i o n s of e i t h e r k i n d s h o u l d b e prohibited. «t I think t h e o b j e c t i o n c a n b e s t a t e d in a plausible form. Take t h e of a society i n w h i c h a c e r t a i n m i d d l i n g position is o p e n to *eryone but m a y b e d e c l i n e d i n favor of a riskier career that offers a J f w (ex ante) e x p e c t a t i o n b u t also involves s o m e d a n g e r of falling ^ovvfhe middling p o s i t i o n . H e r e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e w h o are u n s u c ««W in the risky c a r e e r c a n b e m e a s u r e d in t h r e e different ways: o n e ™W ascribe to t h e m t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of t h e middling posiJon. which is t h e o p t i m a l n o - r i s k s h a r e a t t a i n a b l e a n t e c e d e n t to their 2 ^ o i c e ; o n e m i g h t u s e t h e e x p e c t e d s h a r e of the risky career « t h e i r ex ante p r o s p e c t before t h e i r c a r e e r t u r n s out o n e way or ^ e r but after it i s c h o s e n ; finally, t a k i n g t h e ex p o s t perspecfive, one J * * ascribe t o t h e m t h e (poor) s h a r e t h e y actually h a d after having us?,! y r e e r . T h o s e o b j e c t i n g t o Rawls s view might say: Let ***e in ^ s e s o that s u c h risky vv

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S e c o n d , taking t h e ex ante p e r s p e c t i v e is also i m p l a u s i b l e when the w o r s t ex post s h a r e of t h o s e w h o fail in t h e risky c a r e e r is very bad, so t h a t t h e e q u a l - c i t i z e n s h i p a n d s t r a i n s - o f - c o m m i t m e n t arguments clearly c o m e i n t o play. W h e r e radical d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities are at stake, w e m u s t take t h e ex post p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u g g e s t a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n that makes t h e c h o i c e of p e r s p e c t i v e d e p e n d in p a r t u p o n t h e severity of the p o t e n t i a l inequalities at i s s u e . Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is already c o m m i t t e d t o a suitable n o t i o n of significance t h r o u g h w h i c h this idea c a n b e i n c o r p o r a t e d a n d m a d e m o r e c o n c r e t e — h i s lexical prioritiza tion of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s (within t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice). My c o n j e c t u r e , t h e n , is t h a t w h e n t h e lexical o r d e r i n g of t h e principles a p p l i e s , first-principle g o o d s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d always be de n n e d m a n ex post fashion, w h i l e all o t h e r g o o d s s h o u l d b e defined in a n ex ante fashion for c a s e s of v o l u n t a r y e x p o s u r e t o risk a n d in an ex post fashion otherwise.™ 1 c o n s i d e r this c o n j e c t u r e a p l a u s i b l e working h y p o t h e s i s t h a t m u s t r e d e e m itself b y fitting t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e remain ing e l e m e n t s of Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e .

11. T h e Split into T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice 1 1 . 1 . 1 have a n a l y z e d into its m a i n e l e m e n t s Rawls's general concep t i o n of justice, w h i c h t r e a t s all social p r i m a r y g o o d s a s c o m m e n s u r a b l e . "All social p r i m a r y g o o d s . . . a r e t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d e q u a l l y unless an u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of a n y o r all of t h e s e g o o d s is t o t h e advantage of t h e least favored" (TJ 303). Ultimately, h o w e v e r , Rawls w a n t s t o defend a specification of t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t d i v i d e s t h e s e g o o d s into t w o categories, e a c h g o v e r n e d b y its o w n c r i t e r i o n . T h i s special concep t i o n of justice is to a p p l y u n d e r " r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s " (BLP 11); t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n is to a p p l y u n d e r all o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e special c o n c e p t i o n raises several f u r t h e r issues. 11.1.1. Although b o t h t h e g e n e r a l a n d t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n s are m a x i m i n criteria, it is, strictly s p e a k i n g , t h e d i s j u n c t i v e c o m b i n a t i o n of g e n e r a l a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s that, a c c o r d i n g t o Rawls, constitutes " t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e " (TJ 152). It « t h u s i m p o r t a n t h o w t h e d o m a i n s of t h e t w o c o n c e p t i o n s a r e delimited, t h a t is, h o w "reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s " a r e d e f i n e d — a question Rawls largely e v a d e s . T h i s t o p i c i n c l u d e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r two c o n c e p t i o n s are really n e c e s s a r y o r w h e t h e r o n e of t h e m is superior u n d e r all c o n d i t i o n s (cf. §12.8.4). '"Even with this conjecture, the liberty t o take e x t r e m e risks or the a s s i g n m e n t of basic rights through (involuntary) lottery c o u l d still be justified u n d e r verv extraordinary S E N ^ T ? ' ' » ^ a r e s ^ " 6 o u t c o m e s of risk . ^ . n o w o r s e than the worst s h a r e s w o u l d be u n d e r any » h « FL.I?™ . ^ c o n t i n u o u s with the justification Rawls enter tains for the institution of slavery (TJ 248). 5

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11.1J2. Conversely, s e e i n g t h e g r e a t diversity of possible conditions, one may ask w h y t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d n ' t a d o p t a large n u m b e r of c o n c e p tions, each fine-tuned t o a specific set of social c o n d i t i o n s . I think Rawls could plausibly resist t h i s i d e a , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s have reason not to want a long list of c o n c e p t i o n s . T o o c o m p l i c a t e d a n agreement is likely to be m i s a p p l i e d i n p r a c t i c e e v e n b y c o n s c i e n t i o u s p e r s o n s a n d is generally u n s u i t a b l e a s a p u b l i c c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h citizens c a n assess their common i n s t i t u t i o n s . So t h e p a r t i e s m a y well prefer Rawls's p r o posal of only t w o c o n c e p t i o n s — a n d t h i s n o t m e r e l y as an acceptable approximation b u t a s t h e b e s t w a y of safeguarding the interests of those they r e p r e s e n t u n d e r f o r e s e e a b l e w o r s t - c a s e scenarios. 112. Let u s c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n is, u n d e r rea sonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s , a p l a u s i b l e m a x i m i n criterion. It r e a d s as follows (BLP 5): FIBST PRINCIPLE: Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties w h i c h is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. SECOND PRINCIPLE: Social a n d economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi tions. First, they m u s t be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity princi ple); and second, they m u s t be to the greatest benefit of the least advan taged members of society [the difference principle]. Underlying this s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n is t h e i d e a that "the social structure can be divided i n t o t w o m o r e o r less d i s t i n c t p a r t s , t h e first principle PPlying to t h e o n e , t h e s e c o n d t o t h e o t h e r . T h e y distinguish between ™ ^ P e c t s of t h e s o c i a l s y s t e m t h a t define a n d secure t h e equal Gerties of c i t i z e n s h i p a n d t h o s e t h a t specify a n d establish social a n d economic i n e q u a l i t i e s . . . . [T]he d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n fundamental "ghts and liberties and e c o n o m i c a n d social benefits marks a differ ence among p r i m a r y s o c i a l g o o d s that o n e s h o u l d try to exploit, it Jests an i m p o r t a n t d i v i s i o n in t h e social s y s t e m " (TJ 61,63). Assum"'gthat each b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c a n b e s o a n a l y z e d into two jointly ex^ s t i v e and n o n o v e r l a p p i n g p a r t s , Rawls p r o p o s e s that over a certain 2?e of c o n d i t i o n s t h e m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n governing t h e assessment ot X « u r e s s h o u l d c o n s i s t of t w o m a x i m i n criteria govem2 the a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e s e t w o p a r t s . T h i s way, e a c h basic structure E*"ves one s c o r e b a s e d o n t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s in terms ot « « c nghts a n d l i b e r t i e s a n d a n o t h e r s c o r e b a s e d o n t h e worst repre ° e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s . Of c o u r s e R a w l m u s J2J weights t o t h e s e tvvo s c o r e s s o a s to e n a b l e a " ^ " ^ r * ^ a t i v e basic s t r u c t u r e s . B u t e v e n before asking h o w t h e two scores jo be aggregated, I c a n s t a t e t w o o b j e c t i o n s right away, ' ^ a w i t h t h e split i n t o two criteria, t h e distributions oTthe^two J * * g o o d s a r e a s s e s s e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of « a c h o t h e r ^ m p o r t a n t N a t i o n a b o u t e a c h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is d i s r e g a r d e d . It c a n n o t c o m e a

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i n t o view w h e t h e r inequalities of t h e t w o k i n d s t e n d t o compensate or aggravate o n e a n o t h e r , b u t this i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e if the q u e s t is for t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of social justice. To clarify t h e o b j e c t i o n let m e s y m b o l i z e t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a social position by a n o r d e r e d p a i r of n u m b e r s t h a t r e p r e s e n t t h e p o s i t i o n ' s firstp r i n c i p l e s c o r e a n d s o c i o e c o n o m i c s c o r e , respectively. S u p p o s e basic s t r u c t u r e O N E h a s t w o relevant g r o u p s w i t h s c o r e s < 8 0 , 7 0 > and < 3 0 , 2 0 > , w h i l e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e T W O h a s t w o relevant g r o u p s with s c o r e s < 8 0 , 2 0 > a n d < 3 0 , 7 0 > . W e m a y a s s u m e t h a t o t h e r things and also t h e size of all four g r o u p s a r e e q u a l . I n t h i s case, t h e t w o basic s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d b e r a n k e d a s e q u a l s b y Rawls's split criterion; both p r i n c i p l e s of justice a r e equally well o r ill satisfied. But t h e parties w o u l d obviously p r e f e r a criterion y i e l d i n g a p r e f e r e n c e for b a s i c struc t u r e T W O b e c a u s e b o t h relevant social p o s i t i o n s u n d e r T W O a r e clearly s u p e r i o r to t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n u n d e r O N E . 1

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We s e e h e r e that t h e special c o n c e p t i o n — t h o u g h it i s i n o n e sense, a s its n a m e is m e a n t t o suggest, a limiting c a s e of t h e g e n e r a l concep tion, i n w h i c h specific w e i g h t s a r e a t t a c h e d t o t h e v a r i o u s social pri m a r y g o o d s relative t o e a c h o t h e r — i s also m o r e t h a n j u s t a special case of t h e general c o n c e p t i o n . T h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d always yield a p r e f e r e n c e for T W O over O N E , n o m a t t e r h o w t h e t w o scores are w e i g h t e d (so l o n g a s n e i t h e r k i n d of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is disre g a r d e d entirely). 11.2.2. A related difficulty derives from Rawls's v i e w t h a t "as far as possible t h e basic s t r u c t u r e s h o u l d b e a p p r a i s e d from t h e position of equal citizenship T h e p r o b l e m s of a d j u d i c a t i n g a m o n g t h e funda m e n t a l liberties a r e settled b y reference t o it" (TJ 97). By contrast, a m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n w o u l d b e sensitive t o w h a t a l t e r n a t i v e specifications of t h e b a s i c liberties w o u l d m e a n for t h e v a r i o u s s o c i o e c o n o m i c classes, a n d surely t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e rich a n d t h e p o o r might be o p p o s e d in regard to, say, h o w f r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s s h o u l d b e spec ified, h o w political s p e e c h s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d (cf. BLP 73-74), o r h o w judicial p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d b e f i n a n c e d . W h a t is t h e p r e f e r e n c e of "the representative equal citizen" in s u c h c a s e s ? " This p r o b l e m is s o m e w h a t m i t i g a t e d b y Rawls's qualification that differential effects of a set of equal b a s i c liberties " m a y b e left a s i d e . . . if social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities a r e just" (TJ 9 7 ) . T h i s suggests 2

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(though it does n o t entail) t h a t t h e y m a y n o t b e left a s i d e w h e n social and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e n o t j u s t . But w h e n Rawls actually dis cusses the specification of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties in the United States, he does s o from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of equal citizenship (BLP), even though he clearly believes t h a t t h e s e c o n d principle is not satisfied (TJ279). The problem h a s a n a n a l o g u e in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . How are we to compare i n c o m e s a c r o s s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s if these have different price v e c t o r s ? T h i s is e v i d e n t l y a n extremely complicated problem, which I c a n n o t a d d r e s s in a n y d e t a i l . Still, t h e intuitive idea must be to c o n s t r u c t s o m e s t a n d a r d b a s k e t of g o o d s a n d services a n d then ask h o w m a n y s u c h b a s k e t s c o u l d b e b o u g h t with t h e lowest representative i n c o m e u n d e r e a c h s c h e m e . T h e p r o b l e m is h o w to construct this s t a n d a r d b a s k e t — f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of "the equal citizen" or from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . In the former case, we would b e g u i d e d b y w h a t p e r s o n s in general tend to c o n s u m e in the two s c h e m e s . In t h e l a t t e r c a s e , w e w o u l d b e g u i d e d by what the poor would t e n d t o c o n s u m e a n d m i g h t , therefore, weight the price of basic foodstuffs m o r e heavily a n d t h a t of airline tickets less heavily, for example. Once t h e q u e s t i o n h a s b e e n clearly stated, it is h a r d to see how risk-averse c o n t r a c t o r s (or m a x i m i n p h i l o s o p h e r s ) can allow inter schemic income c o m p a r i s o n s t o b e m a d e from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of the rcpresentative (average) c i t i z e n r a t h e r t h a n t h a t of t h e least advantaged, 'tod the same h o l d s , for a n a l o g o u s r e a s o n s , for i n t e r s c h e m i c com parisons of alternative s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of b a s i c rights a n d liberties. 22

11.3. For r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s Rawls p r o p o s e s a serial or 'eacographical ("lexical") o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o scores, s o that first-score ^erentials always o v e r r i d e s e c o n d - s c o r e differentials. The reason he f es is that " t h e i n t e r e s t s of liberty . . . b e c o m e stronger as the conuiJ r the e x e r c i s e of t h e e q u a l f r e e d o m s are m o r e wily realized. % ° n d some p o i n t it b e c o m e s a n d t h e n r e m a i n s irrational from t h e ^andpoint of t h e original p o s i t i o n t o a c k n o w l e d g e a lesser liberty_tor foesake of r m a t e r i a l m e a n s a n d a m e n i t i e s of office" (TJ 542). The Parhes adopt t h e s p e c i a l r a t h e r t h a n t h e general c o n c e p t i o n for^sucn °ndiuons b e c a u s e , o n t h e b a s i s of t h e i r limited knowledge, they find t ^ ° n a l to a s s u m e t h a t t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t will, " n ^ " . J * * take a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y g r e a t e r interest in basics r i g h t a n d than i n all o t h e r s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s . Rawls n e e d not daw parties k n o w t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t o b e true, t h o u g h h e sometimes to think t h a t h e m u s t (BLP 83 n. 87). It is e n o u g h that rt be h e J« sensible o n e t o m a k e for t h e p a r t i e s w h o seek to safeguard the ^ ^ o n h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t u n d e r foreseeable worst-case see o n s

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narios. P e r h a p s t h e p a r t i e s k n o w o n l y t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s , given their two h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s a s s t i p u l a t e d b y Rawls, will u n d e r reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h v e r y g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e basic liberties relative t o social a n d e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s a n d b u r d e n s . If t h e dangers of u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g t h i s i m p o r t a n c e a r e g r e a t e r t h a n t h o s e of overestimat ing it, it m a y well b e rational for t h e m to m a k e t h e a s s u m p t i o n of infinite w e i g h t , especially w h e n this a s s u m p t i o n o b v i a t e s t h e need for w e i g h t i n g a n d b a l a n c i n g diverse g o o d s a n d t h u s r e s u l t s in a criterion t h a t is easier t o a p p l y a n d m o r e s u i t a b l e a s a p u b l i c criterion (all of w h i c h t e n d s t o raise t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n ) . Evidently, t h e serial o r d e r i n g h a s very c o n s i d e r a b l e advantages as a simplifying device. It n e a t l y resolves c a s e s w h e r e t h e t w o principles are n o t cosatisfiable. As Rawls u n d e r s t a n d s it, it a l s o g u i d e s o u r efforts t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform: " W h e n w e c o m e t o n o n i d e a l theory, we do n o t fall b a c k s t r a i g h t w a y u p o n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice. [T]he r a n k i n g of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i n i d e a l t h e o r y reflects back a n d g u i d e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s to n o n i d e a l situations. It identifies w h i c h limitations n e e d t o b e d e a l t w i t h first" (TJ 303, cf. 2461 in t h a t it " r e q u i r e s u s to satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e in t h e o r d e r i n g before w e c a n m o v e o n t o t h e s e c o n d , t h e s e c o n d b e f o r e w e c o n s i d e r the third, a n d so on. A p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t c o m e i n t o p l a y u n t i l t h o s e previous to it are e i t h e r fully m e t or d o n o t a p p l y " (TJ 43, cf. 244). T h i s lexical priority, however, also raises a n u m b e r of s e r i o u s difficulties for Rawls's claim to b e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m a x i m i n criterion of social j u s t i c e . 1 1 . 3 . 1 . Let m e again r e p r e s e n t t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a social position by a n o r d e r e d p a i r . S u p p o s e t h a t w h e n t h e first p r i n c i p l e is satisfied, the first n u m b e r will b e 100 for all p o s i t i o n s . N o w t a k e a b a s i c structure g e n e r a t i n g t w o p o s i t i o n s w i t h s c o r e s < 8 0 , 7 0 > a n d < 3 0 , 2 0 > . Here the last q u o t a t i o n w o u l d suggest t h a t o n e n e e d n o t w o r r y a b o u t t h e sec o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d ( u n j u s t l y low, let u s sup pose), so long a s s o m e first-principle s c o r e s h a v e n o t r e a c h e d 100. By contrast, a m a x i m i n criterion w o u l d d e m a n d t h a t political efforts and social r e s o u r c e s be d e v o t e d to raising t h e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of the least a d v a n t a g e d w h e n s u c h efforts d o n o t d e t r a c t from i m p r o v i n g their first-pnnciple s c o r e . All p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d a l w a y s b e "in p l a y " More i m p o r t a n t , b o t h q u o t a t i o n s entail t h a t feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s in the hrst-principle s c o r e of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d (for e x a m p l e , l a r g e r press freedoms for t h e S o u t h African whites) m u s t t a k e p r e c e d e n c e over feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of t h e l e a s t advan c e d (for e x a m p l e , b e t t e r e d u c a t i o n for t h e S o u t h African blacks). But the p a r t i e s m a x i m i n rule w o u l d l e a d t h e m t o prefer a c r i t e r i o n favoring precisely t h e o p p o s i t e priority

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Rawls gets i n t o t h i s p r o b l e m , I believe, b e c a u s e h e d o e s not properly distinguish two different r o l e s of t h e lexical priority. Initially h e takes it to be a design priority. O u r u l t i m a t e goal, as envisioned by t h e special conception, is t o satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e c o m p l e t e l y (which p r e s u p poses the a c h i e v e m e n t of w h a t I call truly favorable conditions), n o matter how its satisfaction m a y c o n s t r a i n t h e distribution of secondprinciple scores. T h i s d e s i g n p r i o r i t y d o e s n o t clash with t h e preemi nent concern for t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d . T h e r e a s o n is that a basic structure u n d e r w h i c h t h e f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s of s o m e o r all are abridged ipso facto p r o d u c e s a w o r s t social position that is inferior to the worst social p o s i t i o n u n d e r a n y b a s i c s t r u c t u r e that completely satisfies the first p r i n c i p l e . F o r p u r p o s e s of d e s i g n i n g an ideal institu tional scheme, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e s e c o n d principle are then sub ject to those of t h e first a n d i n v a l i d a t e d in c a s e s of inconsistency. 2 4

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Without p r o p e r a r g u m e n t for t h e t r a n s i t i o n , Rawls also u n d e r s t a n d s his lexical priority in t h e q u i t e different s e n s e of a n implementation priority. For p u r p o s e s of r e f o r m i n g a less-than-just institutional scheme u n d e r r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s , feasible reforms de manded by t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e m u s t give way to t h o s e d e m a n d e d by *e first, w h e n d e m a n d s of t h e t w o k i n d s s t a n d in competition (on account of scarce r e s o u r c e s ) . Given t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s u m p t i o n of a pre eminent interest i n f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e s , t h i s move is unobjectionable when the c o m p e t i t i o n is b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t s of t h e s a m e representative S^up But in o t h e r c a s e s t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d clearly prefer a c n t e n o n in ^ c h (in the a l l o c a t i o n of s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s available for institutional ^orm) the priority c o n c e r n for t h e w o r s t representative share over"des the lexical p r i o r i t y of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e over second-principle scores. U-4. Before d i s c u s s i n g f u r t h e r difficulties, w e m u s t look m o r e °sely at Rawls's overall r a t i o n a l e for h i s t w o principles. Here it t u r n s °W that t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e aren't so distinct after all. goods falling u n d e r t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s are b o t h separated a n d united by the different c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h e y m a k e to t h e same s u p r e m e Jwe. Rawls m a r k s t h i s difference b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n h e ^ r e e *»» Persons h a v e , t h a n k s t o t h e i r b a s i c rights a n d liberties (an e n u S " ° b a p p e n d e d t o t h e first principle [TJ 61), a n d the £ of this freedom, a s e s t i m a t e d t h r o u g h second-principle scores. « interplay b e t w e e n t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s is envisaged as follows.

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the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and there fore greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of liberty is, however, compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate mem bers of society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satis fied. . . . Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. [TJ 204-5] Rawls reaffirms this i d e a eleven y e a r s later: The basic liberties are specified by institutional rights and duties that entitle citizens to do certain things, if they wish, and that forbid others to interfere. The basic liberties are a framework of legally protected paths and opportunities. Of course, ignorance a n d poverty, a n d the lack of material means generally, prevent people from exercising their rights and from taking advantage of these openings. But rather than counting these and similar obstacles as restricting a person's liberty, we count them as affect ing the worth of liberty, that is, the usefulness to persons of their liberties. Now in justice as fairness, this usefulness is specified in terms of an index of the primary goods regulated by the second principle of justice The basic structure of society is arranged so that it maximizes the primary goods available to the least advantaged to make use of the equal basic liberties enjoyed by everyone. [BLP 40-41) I believe Rawls's general idea is to c o n c e i v e w o r t h of f r e e d o m (what ultimately matters) as a function of t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s : t h e public rec ognition of certain b a s i c f r e e d o m s (the p u b l i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it is legitimate for m e to travel along c e r t a i n p a t h s ) ; t h e i r protection (the m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e s e p a t h s a s s e c u r e h i g h w a y s ) ; a n d t h e m e a n s at o n e ' s d i s p o s a l (my ability to o b t a i n f o o d a n d b o o t s , a c a r a n d gasoline, w i t h o u t w h i c h I c o u l d n o t travel o n even t h e b e s t a n d safest highway). Let u s say t h a t t h e first c o m p o n e n t d e t e r m i n e s (formal) legal freedom: that t h e first t w o c o m p o n e n t s t o g e t h e r d e t e r m i n e effective legal free dom (Rawls: freedom); a n d t h a t all t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s t o g e t h e r deter m i n e worth of freedom or (as I also say) worthwhile freedom. 26

While t h e t h i r d c o m p o n e n t is r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s e c o n d principle. Rawls s first p r i n c i p l e governs both of t h e o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s , reflecting t h e realization t h a t basic rights a n d liberties p r o t e c t o u r f r e e d o m only insofar as they are t h e m s e l v e s w e l l - p r o t e c t e d , t h a t is, u p h e l d a n d ent o r c e d / T h u s t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s n o t m e r e l y formal b u t effective legal freedom: "It is t h e institution as r e a l i s e d . . . w h i c h is just or u n i u s t (TJ 551 " W h e t h e r t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e g u a r a n t e e s e q u a l liberty of c o n s c i e n c e , o r freedom of t h o u g h t , is s e t t l e d b y . . . h o w t h e y are actually i n t e r p r e t e d a n d e n f o r c e d " (SUPG 163). U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Rawls m a k e s n o a t t e m p t to say how this i s s u e is t o b e s e t t l e d . Take the othTtS^^^^

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129

integrity of the p e r s o n , for e x a m p l e . S u p p o s e this is g u a r a n t e e d by laws against homicide, r a p e , a s s a u l t , d r u n k driving, a n d s o o n . What else is required for the integrity of t h e p e r s o n t o b e sufficiently well p r o t e c t e d ? What if 60 p e r c e n t of all w o m e n a r e r a p e d , o r 4 p e r c e n t of all black m e n murdered within t e n y e a r s of r e a c h i n g a g e sixteen? W h a t if 3 p e r c e n t ot the population m e e t t h e i r d e a t h s i n c a r a c c i d e n t s ? Without a clue h o w to answer s u c h q u e s t i o n s , w e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r t h e first principle is satisfied in a given social s y s t e m a n d h e n c e d o n o t k n o w w h a t political priorities Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d s e t for its institutional reform. My conjecture i n §10.7 a c h i e v e s s o m e w h a t m o r e specificity, t h o u g h perhaps at t h e p r i c e of i m p l a u s i b i l i t y . Effective legal freedom is evalu ated ex post. T h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w h o s e basic rights a n d liberties are actually ill p r o t e c t e d . It i s n o t e n o u g h t h a t certain crime rates are sufficiently l o w overall. T h e y m u s t also b e sufficiently low within the various p o p u l a t i o n c l u s t e r s . S u c h c l u s t e r s can b e defined quite narrowly, s o l o n g a s i n t r a c l u s t e r r a t e s a n d intercluster inequali ties in rates a r e statistically significant. It m a y b e t h e case, for' ^ P ^ ' that poor, black, female, i n n e r - c i t y r e s i d e n t s , o n a c c o u n t ot t n e inci dence of violent c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t t h e m , d o not effectively nave 'he right to p e r s o n a l integrity, t h o u g h o n p a p e r t h i s right is ^anieea to them as t o e v e r y o n e e l s e . T h i s violation of t h e first principle would Ny place t h e s e w o m e n a m o n g t h e least a d v a n t a g e d e

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Now, surely, s o m e p e r s o n s o u t s i d e this c l u s t e r will suffer-voiem chmes, a n d s o m e p e r s o n s w i t h i n t h i s c l u s t e r w o n ' t . But singiu g ^ persons w h o s e b a s i c r i g h t s a r e a c t u a l l y violated, ^ h e r ^ m ™ * ^ o s e basic rights a r e a c t u a l l y ill p r o t e c t e d , is ^ P * " * ^ ^ Pwposal t h e identification of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d heavily P ™ chance factors t h a t h a v e little t o d o w i t h t h e prevailing basic stru *Jich may result in a h i g h l y h e t e r o g e n e o u s a n d u n r e p r e s e n tehvete advantaged g r o u p . T h e p r o p o s a l also d i s r e g a r d s the'fact ma• whose basic r i g h t s a r e ill p r o t e c t e d live in fear even if they never in ffer a violation of t h e i r r i g h t s . , j titu1

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Given their limited general knowledge, the parties find-^^^^ assume that those they represent have a piwsroujem :i ^ ^.^ worth of their freedom, in being in the best social posu ^ exercise, or take advantage of whatever freedom m . squires them to have. Hence they want individual snai ted in terms of worthwhile freedom. i p l e

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T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.5.1

c o m p o n e n t s over t h e t h i r d . T o m a k e p l a u s i b l e t h a t t h e parties would a c c e p t this priority of f r e e d o m o v e r its w o r t h ( w h i c h s t a n d s behind the lexical priority of t h e first over t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e ) , Rawls m u s t invoke a further p r e m i s e , r o u g h l y as follows: (b) The parties find it rational to assume that it is (something very close to) a necessary prerequisite to being in a position to enjoy, exercise, and take advantage of one's first-principle freedom that one should have certain publicly recognized and effectively enforced basic rights and liberties that institutionally protect such enjoyment. There is no worthwhile freedom without effective legal freedom. To b e sure, w h e n o n e d o e s h a v e s u c h b a s i c r i g h t s , o n e ' s enjoyment of t h e f r e e d o m t h e y p r o t e c t m a y still d e p e n d o n social a n d economic factors. T h e extent t o w h i c h o n e is in a p o s i t i o n t o enjoy t h e freedom to o w n p r o p e r t y , t o exercise f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t , o r t o take advantage of t h e freedom t o have o n e ' s o p i n i o n s p u b l i s h e d , for e x a m p l e , is a func t i o n of o n e ' s w e a l t h a n d i n c o m e . Still, if o n e d o e s n o t have t h e relevant basic rights at all, t h e n enjoying t h e correlative f r e e d o m s is altogether o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n . T h i s c o n j e c t u r e d p r e m i s e (b) w o u l d explain the p a r t i e s ' overriding c o n c e r n w i t h effective legal f r e e d o m . T h a t Rawls m u s t rely o n a n a r g u m e n t of this s o r t r a i s e s t h r e e f u r t h e r difficulties for his position. 11.5.1. Let u s begin w i t h t h e s i m p l e c a s e of a single a s p e c t of freedom for w h i c h t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s effective i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n in form of a b a s i c right o r liberty, L. T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h p e r s o n s actually enjoy t h i s f r e e d o m d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e y have L (effective legal freedom) a n d o n t h e further m e a n s ( m o n e y , e d u c a t i o n , etc.) at their disposal. N o w w h y s h o u l d having L b e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y m o r e impor t a n t t h a n having t h o s e m e a n s — s o t h a t in n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s establish ing t h e former always takes priority over i n c r e a s i n g t h e latter? The a n s w e r I h a v e s u g g e s t e d Rawls m u s t give is t h a t h a v i n g L is a prerequi site w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e m e a n s for t h e e n j o y m e n t c o m e t o n a u g h t . There a r e t w o w a y s of r e a d i n g this claim, b o t h p r o b l e m a t i c . W e c a n take the p r e r e q u i s i t e t o b e c o n c e p t u a l , t h a t is, to h o l d t h a t it is logically impossi ble to enjoy o r exercise a basic right o r liberty t h a t o n e d o e s n o t have. In this c a s e w e w o u l d h a v e to r e a d (a) as a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s care a b o u t f r e e d o m only insofar a s it is e n j o y e d a s a matter of right. But if we r e a d this way, (a) is i m p l a u s i b l e . W h y s h o u l d p e r s o n s w h o in virtue of their s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n d o in fact enjoy s o m e a s p e c t of t h e i r firstprinciple f r e e d o m b e c o n s i d e r e d unfree in t h e relevant r e s p e c t just a

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freedom is not publicly recognized and institutionally protected, then one will not, as a matter of fact, enjoy it. In this construal, (b) is implausible. It is not historically true, for example, that freedom from arbitrary arrest, or freedom of movement, is enjoyed only in societies in which a legal right to these aspects of freedom is publicly recognized and effectively enforced. Either way, the lexical priority of the interest in L over the interest in the means for enjoying the aspect of freedom that L protects jars with the idea of maximizing the worthwhile firstprinciple freedom of the least advantaged. 11.5.2. This conclusion can be further supported. Just as an aspect of freedom may be enjoyable in some degree even though it isn't legally protected, it may also be in s o m e degree unenjoyable even though it is so protected. A basic right or liberty L, though listed in the constitution, may not in fact be effectively enforced, for certain sectors of society perhaps, so that some find it very difficult to enjoy or exercise L even though they have the money, education, etc., to do s o . Now if having L were an all-or-nothing affair, t h e n it might be plausible to assign it the preeminence Rawls postulates over the means for enjoying the correla tive freedom. But if the transition from not having L to having L lies somewhere on a continuum, t h e n the priority is no longer plausible, for j * transition may then be a small step indeed (no matter where the toe is drawn). Thus, it was at some time during the 1960s, perhaps, that Macks in the United States began to have certain rights they had tor"wdy had only on paper. In such a case it seems implausible to assume «at the decisive incremental increase in their effective legal freedom should have made a greater contribution to their worthwhile freedom than any increase in their m e a n s of enjoyment could have done. »-5.3. Let us suppose, contrary to the preceding two objections, at without L (effective legal freedom) the means for enjoying tne ^ l a t i v e aspect of freedom are generally of little or no value, so that it plausible to assign lexical priority to the demand for the former over J* demand for the latter. Even this supposition would not be enough JWS needs to show not merely that for each basic liberty, L, having L is eacaUy n s for the enjoyment ot 2 ^ d o m L protects. He m u s t also show that having L is lencaUy £»? ""Portant than the m e a n s for the enjoyment of any tot-p^pta J**** ( F the fact that each daughter is younger than her mother <*s not follow that all daughters are younger than all motheraJ To 27

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a n effectively e n f o r c e d right) t h a n t h r o u g h a significant increase in their m e a n s for enjoying L. It is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t a g r e a t e r gain in the w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m of t h e p o o r w o u l d r e s u l t from a n improvement in t h e i r i n c o m e a n d e d u c a t i o n (enabling t h e m b e t t e r t o t a k e advantage of t h e i r existing b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties) t h a n from a d d i t i o n a l legal rights (whose effect o n t h e i r w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m m a y b e r a t h e r slight so long as they remain p o o r a n d uneducated). 11.6. T h e p r e c e d i n g t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e a s s u m e d (that the parties accept) t h e exclusive c o n c e r n for m a x i m i z i n g t h e w o r t h of freedom as Rawls u n d e r s t a n d s f r e e d o m . Before e x a m i n i n g t h a t a s s u m p t i o n , let us look m o r e closely at t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Rawls e x p l a i n s w h a t aspects of f r e e d o m h e is especially c o n c e r n e d w i t h b y specifying that the first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of a fully a d e q u a t e pack age of b a s i c civil a n d political r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s t h a t covers t h e follow ing four categories (outlined at TJ 61 a n d refined in BLP 5 et passim): (A) The basic political liberties, which are said to be connected with the capacity for a sense of justice (BLP 471. These include the basic right to vote and be eligible for public office as well as basic rights to political speech and assembly (freedom of thought). Rawls includes here as a first-principle requirement that institutions must maintain the fair value of the basic political liberties, though this requirement is left rather vague (BLP 42). (B) The basic rights and liberties protecting freedom of conscience, said to be connected to the capacity for a conception of the good (BLP 47). These include, in particular, rights to freedom of association as well as basic religious liberties (BLP 56-57). T h e r e m a i n i n g t w o categories c o n t a i n " s u p p o r t i n g " (BLP 50) basic liberties, n e c e s s a r y to t h e a d e q u a t e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d full exercise of both moral powers: (C) The basic rights and liberties protecting the freedom and integrity of the person. These are violated "by slavery and serfdom, a n d by the denial of freedom of movement and occupation" (BLP 50). Thev further include the right to be free "from psychological oppression arid physi cal assault'' (RAM 640) and also "the right to hold and to have the exclusive use of persona] property"—though this latter without cer tain (capitalist) "rights of acquisition a n d bequest, as well as the right to own means of production and natural resources" and without certain (socialist) rights "to participate in the control of means of production and natural resources, which are to be socially owned" (BLP 121. iu) The basic rights and liberties associated with the rule of law, including protections against arbitrary arrest and seizure. 11.6.1. T h e objection t o this a c c o u n t c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d b y charging Rawls with, alternatively, a t r u n c a t e d c o n c e p t i o n of f u n d a m e n t a l free d o m o r an overblown view of its i m p o r t a n c e . C o n s i d e r , t o b e g i n with t n e hrst formulation, a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e e n g e n d e r i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l inci-

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dence of severe a n d u n r e l i e v e d p o v e r t y . T h e p o o r u n d e r this s c h e m e are in many obvious w a y s u n f r e e o n a c c o u n t of their poverty. The existing ground r u l e s p r o v i d e n o legal p a t h o n w h i c h they can obtain more than part of w h a t t h e y n e e d . T h e y a n d their families m a y be unfree to p u r c h a s e a n u t r i t i o u s a n d healthful diet, sufficient clothing and heating fuel for t h e w i n t e r , n e e d e d m e d i c a l care a n d medications, adecent education, a n d s o f o r t h . W h e r e d o e s Rawls's account take note of this sort of u n f r e e d o m ? G r a n t e d , Rawls w a n t s his conception of freedom to b e c o n f i n e d t o its m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l aspects, b u t is it not fundamental w h e n social c o n d i t i o n s leave o n e w i t h o u t access to suffi cient food a n d h e a t i n g fuel w h i l e t h e r e is p l e n t y of it a r o u n d ? Rawls may reply that t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s p e c t s of freedom are identified through the t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s in t h e development a n d ex ercise of the two m o r a l p o w e r s , a n d t h a t p e r s o n s w h o are very p o o r in a democracy are m u c h b e t t e r a b l e t o satisfy these interests t h a n persons iiving under a d i c t a t o r s h i p b e c a u s e t h e v a r e still able to engage in the activities p r o t e c t e d b y t h e b a s i c civil a n d political rights a n d liberties. Even if you a n d y o u r family freeze t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r and m u s t feed yourselves o n d o g food, y o u c a n still a t t e n d political meetings a n d j*%ious c e r e m o n i e s . But p e r h a p s s u c h a reply w o u l d t e n d to cast doubt on Rawls's a c c o u n t of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests rather t h a n vindicate his list of first-principle g o o d s . In its second f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e o b j e c t i o n a c c e p t s Rawls's conception °f fundamental f r e e d o m a s it is a n d t h e n rejects t h e claim that the worth of freedom (so d e f i n e d ) is all t h a t ultimately matters to prospec°ve participants in social i n s t i t u t i o n s . P e r s o n s have s o m e basic social ^ e c o n o m i c n e e d s . F o r e m o s t a m o n g t h e s e are t h e n e e d s for a certain ""nhnurn access t o food, c l o t h i n g , shelter, care, culture, a n d educa°on S u g o o d s a r e of m u c h g r e a t e r u r g e n c y a n d importance than , derived b y v i e w i n g t h e m m e r e l y a s m e a n s for fulfilling a more J^ntneed t o s e c u r e t h e w o r t h of o n e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l freedoms. Rawls *** not do j u s t i c e t o t h i s p r o b l e m b v a d d r e s s i n g t h e p o s s ^ l ™ J> basic liberties m a y p r o v e t o b e m e r e l y formal" (BLP 40). This Posing of t h e i s s u e a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of social economic e s s e n t i a l s lies i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n as m e a n s to the enjoy^ t o f f u n d a m e n t a l (civil a n d political) freedoms. If the account ot 2 g ° ° d s is t o r e f l e c i a p l a u s i b l e n o t i o n of h u m a n needs WOS FG SUPG t h e n it cannot d e n y the ^ d a m e n t a l role b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s actually p ay m a J j j n hfe. But i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r e e m i n e n c e of t h e baste, cwland Pineal) t00d rights a n d l i b e r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e s just s u c h a demal.To xllus rate P * * ° f a m a x i m i n criterion, t h e a c c o u n t > goods t p r o v i d e a p l a u s i b l e m e a s u r e °f P « J » J * ^ c h

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a n d compare t h e social positions <* s u p p o s e b a s i c r i g h t s a r e u n e q u a l (in> a n m t r a or ^ c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n ) . F o r s u c h c a s e s , Rawls's crrtenon, N

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T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12

c e r n e d w i t h t h e w o r t h of f r e e d o m , w o u l d a l w a y s c o u n t the social p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e l e s s e r b a s i c rights a s w o r s e . Of t w o g r o u p s with scores < 9 0 , 1 0 0 > a n d < 1 0 0 , 2 0 > , t h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e v i e w e d as the less a d v a n t a g e d . T h u s h i s c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d e n t a i l , for e x a m p l e , that (afflu ent) p e r s o n s w h o s e b a s i c rights t o f r e e d o m of political s p e e c h or as s e m b l y a r e (even slightly) r e s t r i c t e d i p s o facto h a v e a w o r s e share than o t h e r s w h o , t h o u g h free from t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n , a r e m a l n o u r i s h e d and h o m e l e s s . But t h i s r a n k i n g is intuitively i m p l a u s i b l e . O n e would be r e l u c t a n t t o e m p l o y Rawls's a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , with its heavy e m p h a s i s o n civil a n d political f r e e d o m s , a s a g u i d e for choosing "a society in w h i c h h i s e n e m y is to a s s i g n h i m h i s p l a c e . " O n e would be r e l u c t a n t t o u s e t h i s a c c o u n t e v e n if o n e w e r e p e r s u a d e d t h a t persons have h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s i n d e v e l o p i n g a n d e x e r c i s i n g their two m o r a l p o w e r s . It is n o t c r e d i b l e t h a t in t h e U n i t e d States today the lowest p r o s p e c t s for d e v e l o p i n g a n d e x e r c i s i n g t h e t w o m o r a l powers w o u l d b e r a i s e d m o r e b y o v e r t u r n i n g t h e " p r o f o u n d l y d i s m a y i n g " (BLP 74-79) p r e c e d e n t of Buckley v. Valeo (in w h i c h t h e S u p r e m e Court d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i o u s c o n g r e s s i o n a l l i m i t s o n election ex p e n d i t u r e s ) t h a n by i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e diet, s h e l t e r , o r education of the poorest citizens. 28

12. T h e P a c k a g e o f B a s i c R i g h t s a n d L i b e r t i e s T h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n h a s r a i s e d v a r i o u s d o u b t s a b o u t Rawls s pre s e n t a t i o n of " t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s a s t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p l e m of social j u s t i c e " (TJ 152). I n o w d i s c u s s s o m e p o s s i b l e P Rawls's behalf, i n c l u d i n g p r o p o s a l s for r e v i s i o n s t h a t w o u l d h e l p ^ c o p e w i t h t h e difficulties. H e r e I d o n ' t a d d r e s s t h e P ° radical r e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n w i t h a r e t r a c t i o n , p e r ap> of t h e m a x i m i n idea. Instead, I d i s c u s s f o u r m a i n s t r a t e g i e s for m Rawls's p r o p o s a l attractive t o t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position described. All four strategies h a v e a t least s o m e b a s i s i n Rawls s tex r

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O n e c o u l d r e s p o n d to t h i s criticism w i t h a n empirical claim, that t h e P ' ^ ' j ^ g n s , p o o r will not b e effectively a d d r e s s e d by t h e political p r o c e s s u n l e s s a n d until al whatever their s o c i o e c o n o m i c position, h a v e a roughly e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o in ^ the o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s . Buckley s t a n d s i n t h e w a y of p r e c i s e l y s equalization of political influence. But this r e s p o n s e is n o t available to Rawls• His ^ m e n t for t h e priority of the basic liberties is b a s e d o n their intrinsic rather tnan instrumental importance. His claim is that "the interests o f liberty . . . b e c o m e ' " £ , d the c o n d i t i o n s for t h e exercise of t h e equal freedoms are m o r e fully realized. ^ s o m e point it b e c o m e s a n d t h e n remains irrational from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e o " * ^ position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for t h e sake of greater material m ^ " * amenities of office" ITJ 542). Moreover, t h e s u g g e s t e d empirical c l a i m is u n a v a i l a case of o t h e r infringements of t h e first principle. Removing a restriction o n religi ^ freedom, for example, will n o t improve t h e situation of t h o s e w h o s e p r o s p e c s ^ developing a n d exercising their t w o moral p o w e r s are b l o c k e d by severe P ^V^ . removal w o u l d nevertheless, o n Rawls's a c c o u n t , have priority o v e r relieving their p erty. e

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Before I begin, let m e n o t e t h a t m o s t of t h e p r o b l e m s I have sketched involve the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s (serially ordered) to situa tions of injustice, t h a t is, t o s o c i a l s y s t e m s in w h i c h b o t h principles— (§§11.3.1, 11.5.1-3)—or at l e a s t t h e second—(§11.2.1)—are n o t satis fied. And even t h e r e m a i n i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s — t h o u g h also relevant to the ideal-theoretical q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e fully satisfying Rawls's two p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d i n d e e d o p t i m i z e t h e worst share (as intuitively a s s e s s e d i n t e r m s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s ) — b e c o m e m u c h more pressing w h e n , b e c a u s e of v i o l a t i o n s of t h e s e c o n d principle, social and e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e very great (§11.2.2) or basic social and economic n e e d s a r e n o t m e t (§11.6.1). Rawls's p r o p o s a l w o u l d be a great deal more p l a u s i b l e , t h o u g h also m u c h less interesting, if it did not presume to p r o v i d e g u i d a n c e for t h e reform of unjust institutional schemes. W.l. One might in large p a r t s i m p l y d e n y t h e s e difficulties by assert ing a weaker version of t h e e m p i r i c a l claim s k e t c h e d in note 28. The parties run n o risk b y a d o p t i n g t h e serial o r d e r i n g because efforts toward satisfying t h e first p r i n c i p l e d o n o t , as a n empirical matter, compete with efforts t o w a r d satisfying t h e s e c o n d . This assertion is doubly implausible. It w o u l d s e e m q u i t e possible that the establish ment or s t r e n g t h e n i n g of s o m e b a s i c liberty for all participants or for some group(s) c a n w o r s e n t h e w o r s t social position. One can readily raagine or cite from h i s t o r y s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h major e c o n o m i c re forms toward t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, a n d homelessness and a fairer d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h generally are im peded or blocked by t h e m o r e affluent (whose interests w o u l d be adversely affected b y t h e p r o j e c t e d reform) t h r o u g h their concerted use ft the media a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s a s g u a r a n t e e d by basic rights a n d p i t i e s . Even a p a r t from t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , it is quite conceivable that ™ establishment a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d t h e n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a n d effects p r o t e c t i o n of b a s i c liberties c a n divert political efforts a n d ources from t h e t a s k of r e d u c i n g social a n d e c o n o m i c a e rations. An effective s y s t e m of e q u a l b a s i c liberties is not cost free but or p a r l i a m e n t s , a j u d i c i a r y , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , police forces, a n d mu <J more. It s e e m s c l e a r t h a t t h e effective i m p r o v e m e n t of these ^ a n i s m s w o u l d g e n e r a l l y d e m a n d a different allocation of efforts resources t h a n w o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o i m p r o v e nutrition a n d basic Ration for t h e p o o r , say. Given t h e s e eventualities, t h e parties m u s t res

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12.2. T h e failure of t h i s e m p i r i c a l l y b a s e d d e n i a l s u g g e s t s the first strategy: restrict t h e serial o r d e r i n g t o i d e a l t h e o r y , t h a t is, jettison the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority of t h e first p r i n c i p l e w h i l e reaffirming its de sign priority. I n d e e d , Rawls says o n c e t h a t " t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d their lexical o r d e r w e r e n o t a c k n o w l e d g e d w i t h [ n o n i d e a l ] situations in m i n d a n d s o it is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y n o l o n g e r h o l d " (TJ 245). Consider also h o w Rawls rejects t h e i d e a t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e should be a m e n d e d b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t h a v e a certain a b s o l u t e m i n i m u m of social a n d e c o n o m i c benefits ( e n s u r i n g that their b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e m e t ) : ' W h a t e v e r t h e merits of this suggestion, it is s u p e r f l u o u s in view of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . For any fraction of t h e i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s e n j o y e d b y t h e least advantaged c a n a l r e a d y b e r e g a r d e d in t h i s m a n n e r " (BLP 44). Clearly, this argu m e n t c a n b e r e a s s u r i n g only in r e g a r d t o t h e d e s i g n p r i o r i t y of the first principle. But t h e s e p a s s a g e s are d r o w n e d o u t b y c o u n t e r v a i l i n g evidence. That t h e p a r t i e s a d o p t a priority r u l e g o v e r n i n g w h a t c o n d i t i o n s justify u n e q u a l basic liberties (TJ §37, §39, 302) s h o w s t h a t t h e y d o deliberate a b o u t n o n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n s as w e l l . Moreover, Rawls d o e s n o t merely seek t o c o n s t r u c t t h e ideal of a perfectly j u s t w e l l - o r d e r e d society and t h e n h a v e u s u s e i n t u i t i o n a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y for muddling t h r o u g h t o w a r d this ideal. He r e i t e r a t e s a g a i n a n d a g a i n t h a t his con c e p t i o n of justice is to g u i d e t h e c o u r s e of social c h a n g e (TJ 520,263) and t h a t a crucial feature e n a b l i n g it t o d o this is t h e serial o r d e r i n g of the t w o p r i n c i p l e s (TJ 43, 244, 246, 303; BLP 11 et p a s s i m ) . Of c o u r s e , Rawls m a y still c h o o s e to limit h i s a m b i t i o n s , b u t t h i s l i m i t a t i o n w o u l d consti t u t e a devastating loss of practical political r e l e v a n c e for h i s theory. N o w it c a n h a r d l y b e k e p t s e c r e t from t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e two p r i n c i p l e s is t o b e relevant t o d e t e r m i n i n g which injustices " n e e d t o b e dealt w i t h first" (TJ 303). If it w e r e , t h e n the original p o s i t i o n w o u l d b e of n o u s e in justifying fo us (in o u r nonideal social w o r l d ) t h a t w e s h o u l d give p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of Rawls's first p r i n c i p l e . T h u s Rawls m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e p a r t i e s would find t h e serial o r d e r i n g c o n v i n c i n g o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t it is to be a p p l i e d i n n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s a s well. T h e serial o r d e r i n g m u s t lead to a plausible ranking of less-than-just r e g i m e s a n d t o p l a u s i b l e political priorities for c a s e s in w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e s a r e n o t satisfied (with plau sibility b o t h times u n d e r s t o o d by reference t o t h e p a r t i e s ' c o n c e r n for t h e worst ex post lifetime s h a r e s ) . « A n d t h i s is i n fact a crucial test 30

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because the serial o r d e r i n g is of c o m p a r a t i v e l y m i n o r significance in the (moreover r a t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l ) event t h a t all principles or all b u t o n e are fully satisfied. 12.3. If the difficulties c o n f r o n t i n g t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o principles c a n n o t b e p l a u s i b l y d e n i e d o r evaded, w e a r e r e d u c e d to finding ways of c o p i n g w i t h t h e m . In t w o m i n o r c a s e s there are rela tively straightforward s o l u t i o n s . T h e p r o b l e m set forth in §11.2.2 can be resolved through a m i n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n . W h e n conflicting specifications of the basic liberties w o u l d b e p r e f e r a b l e from t h e points of view of different socioeconomic c l a s s e s , s o t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of the representa tive equal citizen i s ill d e f i n e d a n d c a n n o t a d j u d i c a t e h o w the basic liberties should b e m a d e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , t h e n this ad judication s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e lowest socioeconomic class. The problems n o t e d i n §11.2.1 a n d §11.3.1 c a n likewise b e resolved through a modification. R a t h e r t h a n v i e w i n g a n y citizen as occupying two social p o s i t i o n s ( o n e w i t h i n e a c h of t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e basic structure), we c a n r e g a r d e a c h c i t i z e n a s having just o n e overall share, jvfoch is defined b y r e f e r e n c e t o both p r i n c i p l e s of justice. Here t h e 'east advantaged a r e s i n g l e d o u t b y first identifying those with t h e worst first-principle s c o r e s . S h o u l d t h i s g r o u p i n c l u d e everyone o r n o °ne or be otherwise t o o l a r g e o r t o o small t o qualify as a representative SNup in Rawls's s e n s e , t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e is b r o u g h t in as a secondj y criterion. O n c e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p of t h e least advantaged has Unidentified i n this w a y , its m e m b e r s ' first-principle scores a n d their ^ond-principle s c o r e s c a n b e a g g r e g a t e d so as to d e t e r m i n e t h e worst "Pvsentative s h a r e (cf. § 1 7 . 5 ) . T h e task of institutional reform is then raise this w o r s t social p o s i t i o n if p o s s i b l e . H e r e improving the repre^ntative first-principle s c o r e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d takes p n o n t y over ^proving their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e score, w h i c h in t u r n ^ s priority over i m p r o v i n g e v e n t h e representative first-principle of more a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . T h u s , u n d e r s t o o d as implementaJ * Priorities, t h e p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged overrides £ lexical priority of t h e first p r i n c i p l e , if t h e s e t w o priorities should m„H« ° t e x t s b e i n c o m p e t i t i o n for scarce resources^This ^ c a t i o n leaves i n t a c t t h e lexical design priority of t h e first over the 32

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s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . W e c a n n e v e r i m p r o v e o u r i d e a l of a perfectly just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e b y allowing a b r i d g m e n t s of first-principle goods for the sake of raising s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e s . Ideally, all participants must have a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. T h e s e modifications still leave t h e i m p o r t a n t w o r r y that the serial o r d e r i n g m a y l e a d t o a misidentification of t h e least advantaged (by being t o o c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h e t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e effective legal freedom r a t h e r t h a n w i t h w h e t h e r t h e i r b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c needs are met) o r m a y d e m a n d too m u c h a t t e n t i o n t o t h e establishment and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r b a s i c liberties at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e i r basic social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s (§§11.3.1 a n d 11.5.1-3). W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d the re m a i n i n g t h r e e strategies as a d d r e s s i n g t h i s w o r r y . 1 2 . 4 . T h e s e c o n d strategy c o n s i s t s i n p u n c t u r i n g , t o s o m e extent, the s h a r p "distinction b e t w e e n f u n d a m e n t a l rights a n d liberties and eco n o m i c a n d social benefits" t h a t Rawls h a d i n t r o d u c e d "to exploit.. an i m p o r t a n t division in t h e social s y s t e m " (TJ 6 3 ) . T h i s is done by specifying t h e first p r i n c i p l e s o t h a t it forbids r a d i c a l social a n d eco n o m i c inequalities (avoidably involving e x t r e m e p o v e r t y ) . Here we can d r a w u p o n a s o c i o e c o n o m i c p r o v i s i o n t h a t is a l r e a d y p a r t of the first principle, namely, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e fair value of the basic political liberties b e p r o t e c t e d : " T h e w o r t h of t h e p o l i t i c a l liberties to all citizens, w h a t e v e r t h e i r social o r e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n , m u s t b e approx imately equal, or at least sufficiently e q u a l , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t everyone h a s a fair o p p o r t u n i t y t o h o l d p u b l i c office a n d t o i n f l u e n c e the out c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s " (BLP 42), o r s o m e w h a t less vague, "those similarly e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d s h o u l d h a v e r o u g h l y the same 33

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" R a w l s wants the differentiation into two principles t o reflect three distinct divides^ division in the social system, as thefirstprinciple governs its civil and political, the second its social and economic aspects; a different order of importance, as the need for first-principle goods is ranked lexically above the need for social and economic benefits: and a distinction m kind, as thefirstprinciple requires certain specific protections while the second merely demands that representative socioeconomic shares be related in certain ways. It would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, if these three divides were to coincide as perfectly as Rawls wants. 6

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chance of attaining p o s i t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y irrespective of their economic a n d social c l a s s " (TJ 225). In A Theory of Justice Rawls takes this requirement t o e n t a i l t h a t " t h e r e i s a m a x i m u m gain p e r m i t t e d to the most favored o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t , even if t h e difference princi ple would allow it, t h e r e w o u l d b e u n j u s t effects o n t h e political system and the like e x c l u d e d b y t h e p r i o r i t y of liberty" (TJ 81). "Disparities in the distribution of p r o p e r t y a n d w e a l t h t h a t far e x c e e d w h a t is compat ible with political e q u a l i t y h a v e g e n e r a l l y b e e n t o l e r a t e d by t h e political system" (TJ 226, cf. 225, 277, 279; BSS 6 5 - 6 6 ; PFE 5). By incorporating a l i m i t a t i o n o n e c o n o m i c inequalities into his first principle, Rawls c o u l d r e a s s u r e t h e p a r t i e s that by accepting t h e pro posed priority of t h e first o v e r t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e t h e y w o u l d not r u n a serious risk t h a t m e e t i n g b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s will in nonideal contexts t a k e s e c o n d p l a c e t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of basic liberties (which c o u l d h a r d l y b e e n j o y e d b y t h o s e w h o s e basic n e e d s remain unmet). Rawls's l a t e s t w r i t i n g s s e e m t o close t h e d o o r o n this strategy, however. T h e y e n v i s i o n t h a t t h e fair value of t h e basic political liberties be p r o t e c t e d t h r o u g h t h e " p u b l i c financing of political cam paigns and election e x p e n d i t u r e s , v a r i o u s limits o n contributions and other regulations" (BLP 73, cf. 4 2 - 4 3 ) . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y Rawls explicitly rejects, as we h a v e s e e n , t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a social m i n i m u m into the ™ Principle (BLP 44). T h e r e s u l t i n g n a r r o w interpretation of t h e first Principle fails t o give t h e p a r t i e s a n y a s s u r a n c e that w h e n the differ ence principle is not satisfied, m e e t i n g basic social a n d economic needs won't b e d e f e r r e d for t h e s a k e of (efforts toward) establishing basic civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . . l * S . A third s t r a t e g y for a d d r e s s i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g problems ot & n jw*es the proviso t h a t t h e serial o r d e r i n g applies only in "reasonably *orabl c o n d i t i o n s " (BLP 11) Rawls w r i t e s t h a t t h e lexical priority ot 7; basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s m a y n o t a p p l y " w h e n social conditions do not allow the effective e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e s e rights" (TJ 152,542).* And e

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h e c a n t h e n reject a s irrelevant a n y i m p l a u s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s his serial ordering might have u n d e r unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s . But t h e difficulties arise e v e n i n t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s in which t h e b a s i c liberties c a n b e effectively e s t a b l i s h e d for all. A social system u n d e r t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s is p r e s u m a b l y a d v a n c e d e n o u g h eco nomically to render feasible e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s u n d e r which the m o s t u r g e n t n e e d s a r e m e t , b u t t h e feasibility of s u c h institutions h a r d l y entails t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . T h o s e in t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c posi t i o n m a y in fact b e m a l n o u r i s h e d , illiterate, a n d d e s t i t u t e . It is not at all clear w h y t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d d e m a n d t h a t i n s u c h s i t u a t i o n s political efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d to t h e effective establishment of t h e basic liberties even t h o u g h t h e p o o r w o u l d largely b e u n a b l e to take advantage of t h e m . H. L. A. Hart h a s r a i s e d t h i s p r o b l e m in a clear f o r m . But in h i s r e s p o n s e t o Hart, Rawls m e r e l y reiterates without c o m m e n t t h a t r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e "circumstances w h i c h , p r o v i d e d t h e political will exists, permit t h e effective establish m e n t a n d t h e full exercise of t h e s e l i b e r t i e s " (BLP 11, m y emphasis). Given this definition, it is i n d e e d " e v i d e n t " (BLP 11) t h a t reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o d a y . T h e hypothesis t h a t if t h e U n i t e d States h a d a j u s t e c o n o m y t h e n all c o u l d fully exercise t h e i r basic liberties suffices t o trigger t h e serial o r d e r i n g , regardless of t h e extent t o w h i c h t h e real existing p o o r c a n i n fact take advantage of t h e i r b a s i c liberties. Curiously, w h e n Rawls actually tries to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e parties' be lief t h a t o n c e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n t h e i n t e r e s t in t h e b a s i c liberties is p r e e m i n e n t a n d t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e apply. suggests a quite different definition of " r e a s o n a b l y favorable condi tions." "As t h e general level of w e l l - b e i n g rises (as i n d i c a t e d by the i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e less favored c a n expect) o n l y t h e less urgent w a n t s r e m a i n t o b e m e t " (TJ 542). "Until t h e b a s i c w a n t s of individuals c a n be fulfilled, t h e relative u r g e n c y of t h e i r i n t e r e s t in liberty c a n n o t be firmly d e c i d e d in a d v a n c e . It will d e p e n d o n t h e c l a i m s of the least favored a s s e e n from t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative s t a g e s " (TJ 543). D e s p i t e t h e "can be," it s e e m s t h a t Rawls is h e r e c o n c e r n e d with the actually least a d v a n t a g e d , t h e r e b y s u g g e s t i n g a different i n t e r p l a y be t w e e n t h e general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t is m u c h m o r e conge nial to t h e p a r t i e s ' m a x i m i n c o n c e r n . T h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n comes i n t o play only w h e n t h o s e in t h e w o r s t actual s o c i o e c o n o m i c position c a n exercise basic liberties, a n d t h u s a r e sufficiently well-off rationally t o value s u c h liberties above f u r t h e r a d v a n c e s i n t h e i r m a t e r i a l weUn e m g . O h e r w i s e , t h e general c o n c e p t i o n a p p l i e s , d e m a n d i n g that ba sic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s b e m e t s o a s t o g u i d e social p r o g r e s s to t h e po.nt w h e r e t h e special c o n c e p t i o n c a n t a k e over. H a d Rawls 36

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T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.6

141

adopted this w a y of d e l i m i t i n g t h e d o m a i n s of t h e general a n d the special conceptions, t h e s e r i a l o r d e r i n g in t h e latter w o u l d have been much more plausible as p a r t of a m a x i m i n criterion, t h o u g h it w o u l d then be quite u n c e r t a i n , r a t h e r t h a n " e v i d e n t . . . , that in o u r country today reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s d o o b t a i n " (BLP 11). This uncer tainty in turn w o u l d o n c e a g a i n frustrate Rawls's h o p e that his theory can provide definite p o l i t i c a l g u i d a n c e for institutional reform u n d e r existing conditions. 12.6. Rawls h a s y e t a f o u r t h s t r a t e g y for d e a l i n g w i t h t h e remaining problems, which involves a p a r t i t i o n i n g of h i s project. His m a i n goal for now is to s h o w t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n w o u l d prefer his proposal (with t h e serial o r d e r i n g ) o v e r " t h e first principles associated with the traditional d o c t r i n e s of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , w i t h perfectionism, or with intuitionism" (BLP 6). By c o n c e n t r a t i n g u p o n this "initial aim" of Justice as fairness (BLP 6 - 8 ) , Rawls leaves r o o m for his "doubt . . that the principles of j u s t i c e (as I h a v e d e f i n e d t h e m ) will b e t h e preferred conception on a n y t h i n g r e s e m b l i n g a c o m p l e t e list" (TJ 581). He there by retracts his c l a i m t o b e p r e s e n t i n g the m a x i m i n solution to the Problem of social j u s t i c e . °"e might t h i n k t h a t s u c h m o d e s t y is uncalled-for. Rawls could easily vindicate h i s c l a i m t o b e p r e s e n t i n g t h e maximin solution by abandoning t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o p o s i n g t h a t t h e general c o n c e p bon (or some even less s p e c i f i c m a x i m i n criterion) b e applied across the board, irrespective of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Yet b y leaving o p e n h o w the !J*nous social p r i m a r y g o o d s a r e t o b e w e i g h t e d vis-a-vis one another, general c o n c e p t i o n gives v e r y little g u i d a n c e for its own application thus avoids t h e difficulties a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e special conception ° 7 the price of i m p o s i n g significant risks of a n o t h e r sort. Seeking to ^ g u a r d the i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t in a definite a n d clear - w a y , the p a r t i e s w o u l d prefer a d e t a i l e d a n d specific c n t e n o n ot J f c e . But given t h e vast r a n g e of s u b t l y varying potential proposals ot ^ a p p r o p r i a t e specificity, it m u s t b e e x t r e m e l y difficult (if not imposto identify p r e c i s e l y the m o s t r a t i o n a l c h o i c e in t h e original P? *on as d e s c r i b e d . It m a y t h e n b e r e a s o n a b l e to aim first for a P^Posal that b e a t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l criteria of justice, while deferring the p w h e t h e r t h i s p r o p o s a l c a n itself b e s u r p a s s e d . does Rawls a c h i e v e e v e n h i s "initial aim"? Relying on t h e maxJ ? ruJe the p a r t i e s w o u l d f o c u s o n t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o r u n d e r J * of the various a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s . Yet a l t h o u g h Rawls discusses 'fength the w o r s t o u t c o m e s p o s s i b l e u n d e r « m i p e t a « ^ P ^ £ 3 f j n J criteria, a s i m i l a r s c r u t i n y of h i s o w n criterion is J * u * ^ e x a m i n e d , for e x a m p l e , t h e possibility of a n u n d e r c ^ s of W P ° n s living i n a s o c i e t y t h a t is econonncally advanced to bring i n t o p l a y t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o P ^ P ^ ™ ^ n t e x t Rawls's c r i t e r i o n w o u l d d e m a n d t h a t political efforts a n a m e

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T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.7

social r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a fully adequate s c h e m e of b a s i c civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . B u t p r o g r e s s in this direc tion w o u l d n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y b e t t e r t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e in the under class, for w h o m i m p r o v e m e n t s in b a s i c liberties a r e of little worth. They w o u l d h a v e t o w a t c h g a i n s i n t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h o s e already much b e t t e r p l a c e d (who, u n l i k e t h e m s e l v e s , c a n t a k e a d v a n t a g e of increasing b a s i c liberties), w h i l e b e i n g a w a r e t h a t t h e i r o w n b a s i c social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s will take c e n t e r s t a g e o n l y after t h e first principle has b e e n fully satisfied. T h e likelihood of t h i s s c e n a r i o is n o t a s c e r t a i n a b l e a n d h e n c e irrele vant for t h e p a r t i e s , b u t let m e a d d a n y w a y t h a t t h e s c e n a r i o is by no m e a n s far-fetched. Rawls a p p a r e n t l y believes t h a t it obtains in the United States t o d a y . He says t h a t "for u s t h e p r i o r i t y of the basic liberties is r e q u i r e d " (BLP 11) a n d i m p l i e s t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e is not satisfied: "In o u r society p a r t of t h e political t a s k is to h e l p fashion t h e political will" for t h e effective e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e b a s i c liberties (BLP 11, cf. 75-79). Rawls d o e s n o t a t t e m p t t o give a n y t h i n g like an e x h a u s t i v e s t a t e m e n t of w h a t r e m a i n s t o b e d o n e t o w a r d satisfying his first p r i n c i p l e . But I a s s u m e h e w o u l d h a v e t o c o n c e d e that such reforms are likely to d e m a n d a different a l l o c a t i o n of political efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s t h a n w o u l d b e d e m a n d e d for t h e attempt to i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n ( o c c u p i e d , p e r h a p s , by wel fare r e c i p i e n t s , t h e u n e m p l o y e d , a n d t h o s e e v e n m o r e disadvantaged). T h e w o r s t - c a s e s c e n a r i o for Rawls's c r i t e r i o n is very bleak—quite significant d e a t h r a t e s in t h e u n d e r c l a s s from m a l n u t r i t i o n , trivial dis eases, o r lack of h e a t i n g fuels a r e n o t r u l e d o u t . T h e w o r s t - c a s e scenario for t h e p r i n c i p l e of utility is very bleak a s w e l l — p o l i t i c a l o p p o n e n t s and h a t e d m i n o r i t i e s m a y h a v e t o b e p e r s e c u t e d , e v e n e r a d i c a t e d , for the sake of achieving a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a u t i l i t y - m a x i m i z i n g society. It is possible that Rawls c o u l d still find w a y s of a c h i e v i n g h i s initial a i m But t h i s a c h i e v e m e n t is sufficiently difficult a n d d o u b t f u l t o motivate t h e a t t e m p t t o i m p r o v e u p o n Rawls's list of b a s i c liberties even now, m t h e h o p e of achieving t h e initial a i m i n a c l e a r a n d c o n v i n c i n g manner. 12.7. This t h o u g h t favors a r e s u s c i t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d strategy, w i n c h a l o n e r e s c u e s w h a t Rawls clearly c o n s i d e r s h i g h l y desirable, n a m e l y t h e practical political i m p o r t a n c e of h i s s p e c i a l conception, 37

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involving the design a n d implementation priorities of t h e first principle, which is so m u c h m o r e d e f i n i t e in its d e m a n d s t h a n t h e general conception. This s t r a t e g y p r e s e r v e s t h e j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e special con ception is widely a p p l i c a b l e t o d a y , r e q u i r i n g t h a t efforts a n d resources be allocated to satisfying t h e first p r i n c i p l e even at t h e expense of satisfying the s e c o n d . It s e e k s t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e plausibility of this priority by i n c l u d i n g w i t h i n t h e first p r i n c i p l e t h e requirement that basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s m u s t b e m e t . This first-principle social m i n i m u m is b e s t justified, I believe, by showing basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s to b e entailed by, or by stipulating t h e m as o n a p a r w i t h , t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests. Rawls would presumably p r e f e r t h e f o r m e r k i n d of justification. One might formulate the a m e n d m e n t a s g u a r a n t e e i n g t o everyone a b u n d l e of social and e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s t h a t is sufficient for normal persons iwhose physical a n d m e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s fall w i t h i n t h e normal range) io develop a n d e x e r c i s e t h e i r t w o m o r a l p o w e r s a n d to b e "normally active and fully c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r s of society over a complete life" 'SUPG 168; cf. BLP 85). T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n allows for variation in basic social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s w i t h age. Infants a n d t h e aged need more are, children m o r e e d u c a t i o n , a d o l e s c e n t s m o r e food, a n d so forth. True to Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , t h e formulation is based o n o u r standard n e e d s a s h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s in a given social system It assumes that all p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t h e s a m e n e e d s over a complete lite and thereby p r e s e r v e s t h e a d v a n t a g e for stability that I u s e d earlier to explain why Rawls b a s e s h i s a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y goods u p o n the %ulation of common h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r t h a n u p o n the interests p e r s o n s h a v e i n virtue of t h e i r diverse needs, endownts, preferences, o r c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d . c

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W h a t t h e s e s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e is in large part straightforward. H u m a n b e i n g s n e e d f o o d a n d drink, clothing and shelter, a s well a s s o m e i n t e r a c t i o n i n c l u d i n g e d u c a t i o n a n d care (for e x a m p l e , in c h i l d h o o d a n d o l d a g e ) . H e n c e it is r a t i o n a l in their behalf t o r e q u i r e of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t it a s s u r e its participants that t h e y c a n m e e t t h e s e n e e d s . I n m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s this require m e n t m i g h t b e s t b e satisfied t h r o u g h a s o l i d a r i s t i c family o r kinship s t r u c t u r e c o u p l e d w i t h s o m e f o r m of o r g a n i z e d c h a r i t y . In modern societies effective legal rights w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y b e necessary, but t h e s e n e e d figure o n l y a s a last r e s o r t . Basic s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c needs c a n b e m e t w i t h o u t a n e l a b o r a t e welfare s y s t e m o r g o v e r n m e n t "hand o u t s " — i f e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s m i n i m i z e u n e m p l o y m e n t , for exam ple, a n d i n c l u d e a d e q u a t e i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s for v a r i o u s contingen cies a n d r e t i r e m e n t . T h e m o r e d e t a i l e d specification of s t a n d a r d b a s i c socioeconomic n e e d s will t o s o m e e x t e n t d e p e n d u p o n a social s y s t e m ' s natural e n v i r o n m e n t , c u l t u r e , a n d level of political a n d e c o n o m i c develop m e n t . T h u s h o w m u c h i n c o m e p e r s o n s r e q u i r e t o m e e t t h e i r standard c l o t h i n g n e e d s w i t h i n s o m e social s y s t e m m a y d e p e n d o n t h i s system's n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t (prevailing climate), o n p r i c e s , a n d also o n cut tural factors if p e r s o n s m u s t b e in a p o s i t i o n t o a p p e a r in public w i t h o u t s h a m e . Similarly, p e r s o n s will b e p r e s u m e d t o n e e d access to e n o u g h of a n e d u c a t i o n to b e able t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d participate in t h e i r society's political, legal, a n d e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s a n d associational life. T o t h i s e x t e n t t h e m o r e d e t a i l e d s p e c i f i c a t i o n of s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s m a y have t o b e left t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative stages. It s h o u l d b e clear in a n y c a s e t h a t u n d e r s o m e w h a t m o r e fortunate c o n d i t i o n s t h e social m i n i m u m r e q u i r e d b y t h e first p r i n c i p l e w o u l d be well b e l o w t h e m i n i m u m e n t a i l e d b y t h e s e c o n d , s o t h a t s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , a n d first-principle r e q u i r e m e n t s generally, can b e m e t w i t h o u t m u c h strain o n t h e e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . 12.8. T h e r e a r e further r e a s o n s i n favor of t h e a m e n d m e n t . 40

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12.8.1. For o n e t h i n g , it is n e c e s s a r y t o r o u n d o u t t h e package of firstprinciple goods. T h u s R a w l s h o l d s t h a t "certain basic liberties are indispensable i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s o n c e o t h e r basic liberties are guaranteed; t h u s f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t a n d freedom of association are necessary to give effect t o l i b e r t y of c o n s c i e n c e a n d t h e political liber ties" (BLP 24). I u n d e r s t a n d h i m a s s a y i n g h e r e that t h e political liberties (for example), t h o u g h legally c o m p l e t e l y g u a r a n t e e d a n d also effectively protected, might still b e c l o s e t o m e a n i n g l e s s w i t h o u t t h e effective legal freedom to associate a n d a s s e m b l e in p e a c e . O n e c a n defend t h e firstprinciple social m i n i m u m a n a l o g o u s l y , as a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e institu tional condition n e c e s s a r y for m a k i n g m e a n i n g f u l t h e basic rights a n d liberties associated w i t h t h e f r e e d o m a n d integrity of the person, the basic political liberties, a n d t h e r u l e of law. W h e n p e r s o n s c a n n o t afford food or shelter o r w h e n t h e y l a c k a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n o r basic care, they can still have rights t o h o l d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y or t o r u n for public office 'effective legal f r e e d o m ) b u t c a n h a r d l y b e g i n t o enjoy o r fully to exercise these basic rights ( w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m ) . For t h e m t h e result may be that the integrity of t h e i r p e r s o n is p r o t e c t e d against violence even it collapses t h r o u g h d e p r i v a t i o n of food a n d shelter. For society at ge, it may b e t h a t a s e g m e n t of its p o p u l a t i o n c a n n o t (fully) partici pate in its legal s y s t e m , p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , a n d associational life. iar

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ordering is to a p p l y in n o n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n s as well. T h e p r o p o s e d firstprinciple r e q u i r e m e n t e n s u r e s t h a t w h e n u n m e t basic social or eco nomic needs c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of t h e first principle, they cannot like demands i s s u i n g from t h e s e c o n d principle) b e set aside or de ferred for the sake of fully e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e basic liberties. This as surance would l e a d t h e p a r t i e s a s Rawls d e s c r i b e s t h e m to prefer the two principles s o a m e n d e d o v e r Rawls's later p r o p o s a l (in BLP), on which the first p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t c o n s t r a i n t h e distribution of social and economic g o o d s at all. T h e a m e n d m e n t , therefore, strengthens Rawls's claim to h a v e a c h i e v e d t h e "initial a i m " of his theory (which claim was weakened, I believe, b y h i s d e l e t i o n of t h e limitation on social and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s f r o m t h e first principle). 12.9. The first-principle g o o d s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e w h a t I would call a fully adequate p a c k a g e c a n t h e n b e c a t e g o r i z e d as follows (cf. §11.6): (A) basic p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e g u a r a n t e e of t h e i r fair value; IB) basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s p r o t e c t i n g f r e e d o m o f c o n s c i e n c e ; C) basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s p r o t e c t i n g t h e f r e e d o m a n d integrity of t h e person, i n c l u d i n g rights t o a s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n t h a t is suffient t o meet t h e b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f a n y n o r m a l h u m a n participant i n t h e r e l e v a n t s o c i a l s y s t e m ; 'D> basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s c o v e r e d b y t h e r u l e o f l a w . (

All these must exist n o t m e r e l y o n p a p e r b u t effectively, in practice. A J% adequate p a c k a g e is a p a c k a g e of b a s i c rights a n d liberties that are ^ complete (so t h a t all s t a n d a r d b a s i c n e e d s are covered) a n d wellPWected (so t h a t t h e s e b a s i c n e e d s a r e actually s e c u r e d ) . ven if R i p r o p o s a l , s o a m e n d e d , achieves t h e initial aim in a convincing way, it still faces a n u m b e r of p r o b l e m s . Among these are, in ^akened form, s o m e of t h e difficulties r a i s e d in t h e preceding sec ion, IT} < I t i ° n s a b o u t w h i c h civil a n d political liberties to include " « how to specify t h e m . * T h e s e p r o b l e m s c a n n o t be neatly resolved, 45

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t h e r e is n o h o p e t h a t o n e m i g h t " d e r i v e " the m a x i m i n solution to the p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e from t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original position, given t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' aversion t o risk favors v a r i o u s competing de siderata. T h e p r e f e r r e d c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d h a v e a c o n t e n t t h a t expresses c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d , s h o u l d e n g e n d e r stability w h e n satis fied, s h o u l d b e clear a n d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d s o t h a t it c a n serve as a public criterion, s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n a t e s o a s t o m a k e definite d e m a n d s upon existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d s o forth. T h e p r o b l e m s raised in §11 w e r e f o r m u l a t e d p r i m a r i l y b y a p p e a l t o t h e first c o n c e r n , b u t taking all c o n c e r n s t o g e t h e r , t h e r e m a y b e n o s o l u t i o n t h a t is clearly superior to t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s w i t h t h e a m e n d e d list of first-principle goods. In any case, s e e i n g t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s involved, it m a y b e w e l l t o follow the f o u r t h strategy. O n c e t h e initial a i m is a c h i e v e d , w e view this list "as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h a t c a n b e i m p r o v e d b y f i n d i n g a s e c o n d list such that t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original p o s i t i o n w o u l d a g r e e t o t h e two principles w i t h t h e s e c o n d list r a t h e r t h a n t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s w i t h t h e initial list (BLP 7). W e w o u l d p r o c e e d a n a l o g o u s l y for all o t h e r difficulties and i m p r o v e m e n t s — c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , t h e priority rules, t h e general c o n c e p t i o n , o r t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e d o m a i n s of the general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s .

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Rawls faces a further difficulty h e r e . W o u l d n ' t t h e parties prefer a criterion that favors inferior p a c k a g e s of basic rights a n d liberties for some when this i m p r o v e s t h e w o r s t p a c k a g e ? Rawls barely t o u c h e s u p o n t h i s q u e s t i o n , b u t a n explanation sug gests itself. T h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t a basic structure contain full safeguards for t h e m o s t b a s i c n e e d s of n o r m a l h u m a n p e r s o n s (as Rawls conceives of t h e m ) . N o w , a p a r t i c i p a n t ' s s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s — unlike his preferences, w h i c h m i g h t a l w a y s b e b e t t e r satisfied by m e a n s of indefinite i n c r e a s e s i n i n c o m e o r w e a l t h — c a n b e completely met. Moreover, since t h e r e a r e n o i n h e r e n t conflicts b e t w e e n t h e s t a n d a r d basic needs of a p l u r a l i t y of p a r t i c i p a n t s , truly favorable conditions make it possible for all p a r t i c i p a n t s t o b e a s s u r e d t h a t they c a n meet these needs. Rawls c a n t h e n c o n c l u d e t h a t a n ideal basic structure would protect a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of basic rights a n d liberties for every participant. His i n s i s t e n c e o n a n equal distribution of effective legal freedom (or of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s ) is t h e n a corollary of the fact that, under truly favorable c o n d i t i o n s , everyone's (by stipulation) equal basic needs c a n b e fully m e t . H e r e m a x i m i n entails equality, because when all first-principle s c o r e s c a n b e o p t i m a l (fully adequate), t h e n n o ""equal institutional d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-principle goods can be justi fied as optimizing t h e w o r s t s h a r e . This explanation is c o n f i r m e d bv w h a t Rawls says about halfway avorable conditions, w h i c h , t h o u g h " r e a s o n a b l y favorable," make it "npossible for e v e r y o n e t o h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e package. He takes the senal ordering of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s t o entail a "priority rule" according "which basic liberties c a n b e r e s t r i c t e d only for t h e sake of basic Arties. There a r e t w o c a s e s : (a) t h e b a s i c rights a n d liberties m a y be JJaty incomplete for all i n s o f a r a s t h i s i n c o m p l e t e n e s s (through the *"er protection of t h e r e m a i n i n g b a s i c liberties) improves t h e stanJ « package of b a s i c l i b e r t i e s overall, o r (b) t h e y m a y be unequal J**ras s u c h i n e q u a l i t i e s i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t package of basic: hberRawls's w i l l i n g n e s s t o a l l o w s u c h inequalities in the context ot D e s 4 8

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halfway favorable c o n d i t i o n s s h o w s t h a t t h e u n d e r l y i n g idea for assess ing t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l s o of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e goods is max imin, a n d n o t e q u a l i t y . It is o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s , Rawls asserts, t h a t " t h e q u e s t i o n of c o m p e n s a t i n g for a l e s s e r t h a n e q u a l liberty does n o t arise" (TJ 2 0 4 ) . T h e q u e s t i o n c a n a r i s e i n t h e real w o r l d , and here Rawls's c o n c e r n is t o s h o w w h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e t h e c a s e for institu t i o n s g e n e r a t i n g u n e q u a l b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties t o b e justified: There m u s t b e n o feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h everyone would h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e (that is, c o m p l e t e b a s i c rights and liber ties, sufficiently well-protected), a n d leaving s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l freedom(s) of s o m e g r o u p entirely u n r e c o g n i z e d m u s t o t h e r w i s e augment (the p r o t e c t i o n of) o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties s o significantly that a c o m p a r i s o n of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s w i t h a n e y e t o optimizing t h e w o r s t p a c k a g e ( n o w a n d i n t h e future) favors t h e s c h e m e with u n e q u a l b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. I n m o d e r n d e v e l o p e d societies dur ing p e a c e t i m e , it w o u l d s e e m q u i t e difficult t o justify institutions u n d e r w h i c h g r o u p s differ i n legal r i g h t s of c a t e g o r i e s (B)-(D). It is hard t o s e e h o w restricting a n y of t h e s e m i g h t s u b s t a n t i a l l y a u g m e n t (the p r o t e c t i o n of) o t h e r b a s i c rights a n d liberties i n w a y s t h a t w o u l d other wise b e impossible. * S o m e w h a t m o r e f o r m i d a b l e is J o h n Stuart Mill's a r g u m e n t for u n e q u a l b a s i c political l i b e r t i e s if i t i s u n d e r s t o o d as follows: s o m e p e r s o n s a r e t o h a v e inferior political liberties so that the better e d u c a t e d m a y have a s u p e r i o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o influence the o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s ; this p r a c t i c e is justified b e c a u s e under 49

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the alternative p r a c t i c e w i t h e q u a l b a s i c political liberties t h e political process would t e n d t o b e s o ineffective o r s o liable t o abuse that t h e worst package w o u l d b e e v e n w o r s e ( p e r h a p s t h e political p r o c e s s itself would then b e u s e d t o r e s t r i c t b a s i c l i b e r t i e s ) . 1 will p r o c e e d with this line of thought o n c e t h e r o l e of t h e political p r o c e s s h a s b e c o m e somewhat clearer. 13JJ. The political p r o c e s s i s a p a r a d i g m i n s t a n c e of t h e idea of procedural justice. T h i s is p r i m a r i l y a n idea for t h e nonviolent recon ciliation of conflicting c l a i m s a n d t h u s a n alternative t o (unmediated) persuasion a n d c o m p r o m i s e . It p r e s u p p o s e s a p r o c e d u r e of reconcilia tion to which t h e r e l e v a n t c l a i m a n t s a r e sufficiently c o m m i t t e d to accept what this p r o c e d u r e p r o d u c e s b y w a y of settlements, w h i c h adjust their claims to a p o i n t of m u t u a l compatibility. Examples of s u c h procedures are t h e t o s s of a c o i n , e m p l o y m e n t of a mutually agreeable expert or arbitrator, c o u r t s , m a r k e t s (bidding), a n d t h e political process 'voting). Such p r o c e d u r e s c o m e i n t h r e e ideal-typical varieties, w h i c h in prac tice are often i n t e r m i x e d . O v e r a c e r t a i n r a n g e of possible outcomes the claimants disagree b u t a r e w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t w h a t e v e r o u t c o m e t h e Procedure m a y p r o d u c e . T h i s i s t h e e l e m e n t of pure p r o c e d u r a l justice. But while t h e y d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e o u t c o m e t o b e preferred, t h e claimants will often a g r e e t h a t c e r t a i n o u t c o m e s a r e unacceptable^ When they do, t h e y h a v e a s h a r e d (partial) criterion, i n d e p e n d e n t of procedure, for t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of o u t c o m e s . T h e y can u s e this jnterion to design, select, o r c o n s t r a i n t h e p r o c e d u r e in s u c h a way ™« mutually u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s a r e , as far as possible, ruled out. ^°far as t h e p r o c e d u r e r e l i a b l y e x c l u d e s certain mutually unaccept able outcomes, it c o n t a i n s a n e l e m e n t of perfect p r o c e d u r a l Juajcec h reliable e x c l u s i o n is s o m e t i m e s n o t achievable, typically oeJ«se it is l t h a n o b v i o u s w h e t h e r s o m e o u t c o m e i n fact satisfies the Shared criterion. A g r e e m e n t o n t h e criterion is t h e n t o s o m e extent " * n a l . it ^ g e n t s over w h e t h e r t h e c n t e n o n is ^sfied. w h e r e t h i s is t h e c a s e , t h e c l a i m a n t s m a y still agree that t h e P ^ e d u r e s h o u l d h a v e c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t h a t will t e n d to make it more W a t t h e o u t c o m e s p r o d u c e d will satisfy (or c o m e close to satistythe criterion i n q u e s t i o n . S u c h f e a t u r e s w o u l d e m b o d y t h e element Effect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . 52

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As a n illustration, c o n s i d e r o u r i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e c r i m i n a l trial. This is a c a s e of perfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e i n s o f a r a s t h e p r o c e d u r e firmly e x c l u d e s o u t c o m e s t h a t a r e u n i v e r s a l l y a g r e e d to b e unacceptable (for e x a m p l e , vicarious p u n i s h m e n t s o r t h e m a i m i n g of convicts). It is a case of imperfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e i n s o f a r a s e v e r y o n e a g r e e s that defen d a n t s s h o u l d b e c o n v i c t e d o n l y if guilty a n d b e a c q u i t t e d otherwise. A l t h o u g h t h i s a g r e e m e n t m a y b e m e r e l y n o m i n a l (so l o n g as there are d i s a g r e e m e n t s a b o u t w h e t h e r s o m e d e f e n d a n t s a r e guilty o r not), it will s u p p o r t a s h a r e d d e s i r e t o d e s i g n t h e p r o c e d u r e s o t h a t it is reasonably likely t o p r o d u c e o u t c o m e s s e n s i t i v e t o t h e facts. It is a case of pure p r o c e d u r a l justice, finally, i n s o f a r a s t h e r e is s o m e s l i p p a g e between even t h e m o s t c o m p l e t e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e e m p i r i c a l a n d legal facts of, a n d t h e exact p u n i s h m e n t a p p r o p r i a t e in, a p a r t i c u l a r criminal case. A m o n g t h e t h r e e e l e m e n t s , p u r e a n d p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l justice are t h e m o s t clearly distinct. T h e o t h e r t w o d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e m o r e gradual. Imperfect s h a d e s i n t o perfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e a s t h e reliability of s o m e (feature of a) p r o c e d u r e — t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t it will exclude certain u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s — a p p r o a c h e s 1. It s h a d e s into pure p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e a s t h e s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s g r o w s too large or t o o d e n s e for a n y o u t c o m e t o b e p r e c i s e l y c o n n e c t i b l e t o t h e agreedu p o n i n d e p e n d e n t criteria. T h e r e is a n o t h e r w a y in w h i c h t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n p u r e and imperfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e is p r o b l e m a t i c . W i t h p u r e a n d perfect p r o c e d u r a l justice, t h e r e c a n b e n o conflict b e t w e e n t h e s h a r e d com m i t m e n t t o t h e p r o c e d u r e a n d t h e s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t t o a n indepen d e n t criterion for u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s . I n t h e p u r e c a s e , t h e r e is no s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n , a n d i n t h e perfect ™L T " r satisfied o r else t h e p r o c e d u r e w a s not correctly foUowed ( t h o u g h w h i c h of t h e s e is t h e c a s e m a y still be o n n E ^ P « p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e , b y c o n t r a s t , such a 54

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m e c h a n i s m for resolving m a t t e r s of a f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e . Typically, s u c h m a t t e r s arise infrequently, a r e clearly definable a n d not overly p r e s s i n g , a n d t h e r e f o r e p e r m i t of e x t e n s i v e d e b a t e culminating in a well-deliberated d e c i s i o n b y t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n . Referendums may b e especially a p p r o p r i a t e for d e c i s i o n s a l t e r i n g o r reaffirming the s c h e m e of indirect d e m o c r a c y t h r o u g h w h i c h " n o r m a l " decisions are b e i n g m a d e , a n d t h e r e b y m a y e n s u r e a m o r e m e a n i n g f u l form of selfgovernment. Against Rawls's s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n , o n e m i g h t envision a demo cratic single-party s y s t e m w i t h a h i e r a r c h y of o r g a n s , t h e higher-level o n e s b e i n g c o m p o s e d of d e l e g a t e s from t h e n e x t l o w e r level, who are p e r h a p s b o u n d b y a n i m p e r a t i v e m a n d a t e . S u c h a political process w o u l d s e e m c o m p a t i b l e w i t h Rawls's " p r i n c i p l e of (equal) participa t i o n " (TJ 221) a n d t h e fair v a l u e of t h e political liberties, at least if it is a s s u r e d "(1) t h a t t h e r e is full i n t r a - p a r r y d e m o c r a c y , (2) that party m e m b e r s h i p is o p e n , a n d (3) t h a t t h e p r i c e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the party is n o t a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of activity t h a n t h e average p e r s o n c a n reason ably b e e x p e c t e d t o c o n t r i b u t e . " S u c h a d e m o c r a t i c single-parry sys t e m m i g h t d o b e t t e r in involving o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s i n t h e formulation a n d r e s o l u t i o n of c o n c r e t e political i s s u e s t h a n d o e s a multiparty system u n d e r w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of m o s t c i t i z e n s m a y tend to d e g e n e r a t e into a n infrequent c h o i c e a m o n g t w o o r t h r e e preexisting p a r t y platforms. 36

Finally, o n e c o u l d a r g u e against Rawls's t h i r d a s s u m p t i o n that a wuiner-takes-all" electoral s y s t e m t e n d s t o o v e r r e p r e s e n t the larger a n d m o r e e s t a b l i s h e d g r o u p s . U n d e r s u c h a s y s t e m , m i n o r i t y views that are n o t c o n c e n t r a t e d in o n e o r a few territorial c o n s t i t u e n c i e s may be effectively e x c l u d e d from t h e legislative d e b a t e , p e r h a p s abridging the tair value of t h e political liberties of m e m b e r s of s u c h a m i n o r i t y . In a n y case, it is u n c l e a r w h y s o m e s y s t e m s of p r o p o r t i o n a l representa tion s h o u l d n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e a s w e l l My objective in briefly raising t h e s e i s s u e s is n o t t o a r g u e for or y against s emP o m e p a r t i c u l a r m o d e l of a reat d e m o c r a t i c political p r o c e s s but Whi0hpersonsof od d e a l of s p a c e for institutional v will m a y reasonably disagree. K ° P° < * ^ Part T h r e e " w h e r e I s u p p o r t the m e a l ot a global basic s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d e m b o d y a c e r t a i n degree ot 57

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tolerance toward d i v e r s e n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . It is likely that there are meaningfully d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s of self-government that are quite different from t h o s e A m e r i c a n s h a p p e n to b e a c c u s t o m e d to. 13.4. Another r e g r e t t a b l e o m i s s i o n is Rawls's c o m p l e t e silence on the subject of federalism. T h i s o m i s s i o n , in c o n j u n c t i o n with his almost exclusive c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h e e l e m e n t of imperfect procedural justice in the political p r o c e s s , m a y s u g g e s t t h a t h e finds decentralized organs of self-government s u p e r f l u o u s . Following R o u s s e a u a n d Mill, Rawls views democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s a s c e n t e r i n g a r o u n d t h e ideal that per sons vote their c o n s c i e n c e r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r self-interest; everyone is asked to make a moral, n o t a p r u d e n t i a l j u d g m e n t (TJ 357, 284, 2 3 0 31). When the task is t o f o r m u l a t e j u s t legislation (as defined by some independent criterion), t h e n it m a y s e e m t h a t all issues, including local ones, should b e d i s c u s s e d a n d d e c i d e d by all b e c a u s e "an ideally conducted d i s c u s s i o n a m o n g m a n y p e r s o n s is m o r e likely to arrive at the correct c o n c l u s i o n " (TJ 358). In fact, however, o n e c a n still p r e f e r a d e c e n t r a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e for making political d e c i s i o n s of m e r e l y local significance. This preference need not be b a s e d o n t h e c l a i m t h a t s o m e o n e ' s ability to influence a Political decision s h o u l d b e p r o p o r t i o n a l to h o w m u c h it affects one self. If persons a r e t o b e e x c l u d e d from political decisions of other localities, the r e a s o n is n o t t h a t t h e y s t a n d to gain or to lose nothing either way (that w o u l d m o r e likely b e a n asset) b u t rather that they are Presumably in n o p o s i t i o n t o m a k e a n informed, responsible judgment. ™y cannot possibly k n o w e n o u g h a b o u t all t h e s e matters, n o r is it «her practicable o r m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o delimit t h e g r o u p of those hoare c o m p e t e n t o t h e r w i s e t h a n b y r o u g h geographical criteria. The reasons for t h e p a r t i a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of political decision making become s t r o n g e r o n c e w e qualify Rawls's characterizations o ™ political p r o c e s s a s a n i n s t a n c e of imperfect p r o c e d u r a l justice ( J f> cf. §54). T h e r e a r e m a n y political i s s u e s t h a t d o not have a uniquely °<*ect outcome. In t h e s e c o n t e x t s a n d r e s p e c t s t h e political process, is case of p e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e , a n d citizens c a n argue a n d vote on J*basis of t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s . I s s u e s of this kind are the stuff of dayJ % politics: H o w m u c h s h o u l d b e s p e n t o n maintaining the p u n t y « public w a t e r s u p p l y , p u b l i c r e c r e a t i o n areas, or fire, ambulance, ^ l ^ a g e - c o U e c t i o n s e r ^ c e s ? H o w are o p e n i n g h o u r s hohdays, i a g e contracts, b r o a d c a s t i n g , c o n s u m e r protection, a n d the scnooi 58

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c u r r i c u l u m t o b e r e g u l a t e d ? S h o u l d h i g h - r i s e b u i l d i n g s b e allowed or c a r c o n g e s t i o n b e r e d u c e d i n s o m e p a r t i c u l a r a r e a a n d , if so, to what e x t e n t a n d h o w ? S u c h q u e s t i o n s d o n ' t h a v e u n i q u e l y correct answers, defined b y t h e d e c i s i o n a n ideally r e a s o n a b l e a n d well-informed legis lator w o u l d m a k e b e h i n d s o m e p a r t i a l veil of i g n o r a n c e (cf. TJ 196-98, 357). W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is m e r e l y t h a t t h e p e r s o n s affected have the p o w e r to s h a p e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t s h a p e s t h e i r lives, t h a t they can, w i t h i n b r o a d limits, a r r a n g e t h e i r m o r e i m m e d i a t e social world the way t h e y w a n t it t o b e . A n d t h i s v a l u e obviously, favors local mechanisms of political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . As t h e s e t h o u g h t s suggest, j u s t i c e p e r m i t s a n d p r o b a b l y favors feder alist i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t feature d e c e n t r a l i z e d legislative, executive, and judicial o r g a n s . T h i s i d e a m i g h t b e c o m b i n e d w i t h Rawls's four-stage s e q u e n c e (TJ §31). W h e r e a s a m o r e a b s t r a c t c r i t e r i o n of justice governs t h e g r o u n d r u l e s of t h e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m a s a whole, various different specifications of this c r i t e r i o n m i g h t g o v e r n p r a c t i c e s whose a u t h o r i t y is c o n f i n e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n a l division. T h u s the require m e n t of e q u a l basic political liberties c a n b e satisfied even while politi cal p r o c e s s e s are d e s i g n e d differently o n t h e v a r i o u s levels (global, national, provincial, m u n i c i p a l ) a n d in t h e v a r i o u s (territorially defined! divisions o n t h e s a m e level. In fact, w h y s h o u l d it n o t e v e n b e permissi ble t h a t in a representative d e m o c r a c y t h e d e l e g a t e s from t h e various political subdivisions are e l e c t e d i n d i v e r s e w a y s , s o l o n g as rough equality of political influence is p r e s e r v e d a m o n g p e r s o n s from dif ferent c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ? ^ Again, t h e s e t h o u g h t s are of s o m e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e a r g u m e n t of Part Three for t h e y s h o w that a w e l l - o r d e r e d w o r l d c o m m u n i t y n e e d not be a w o r l d state m t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e of "state." Political d e c i s i o n making o n t h e global p l a n e c a n b e c o n f i n e d t o i s s u e s t h a t a r e trulv transna tional in character, a n d s u c h i s s u e s c a n b e s e t t l e d t h r o u g h a demoP ° " » | P r o c e s s t h a t t a k e s a c c o u n t of t h e different political traditions of t h e v a r i o u s n a t i o n s . 13.5. T h e first p r i n c i p l e a t t e n d s only to s t a n d a r d b a s i c n e e d s , which h t

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can be completely safeguarded through a definite and limited package of effectively enforced basic rights and liberties. Hence, if the first principle were the only independent criterion for judging political decisions, then the political process of a just basic structure would contain a large element of pure procedural justice. But Rawls proposes that this remaining leeway should be further constricted through the second principle. This proposal can be recommended to the parties through the following rationale: if the design of the second part of the basic structure were left entirely to the political process as a matter of pure procedural justice, then a voting coalition including more affluent classes could easily impose or perpetuate economic institutions under which the poor would be much poorer than is unavoidable (though their standard basic socioeconomic needs would still be met). The least restrictive way of blocking this considerable danger in volves constraining the political process so that the interests of all Participants are tied to those of any least advantaged group. This, I tbink, is the general idea behind the second principle. It ensures that decisions made through the political process are framed in a way that Precludes bias against particular persons and groups. While the first Principle requires definite and specific safeguards in the form of a Package of enumerated basic rights and liberties, the opportunity pnnple requires nothing about what specific opportunities an institu tional scheme is to generate but constrains only the distribution of ch opportunities, whatever they mav be. Similarly, the difference Principle requires only of social and economic inequalities that they must optimize the socioeconomic position of the least advantaged; no such requirement is imposed upon any other features the social sys> may tend to produce. In this way, the choice of any institutional Panares that affect socioeconomic positions roughly equally are, insoJ«r as they are not preempted by the first or opportunity principles, ten be governed by the political process as matters of pure procedural These may include features that affect or constrain overall g n o m i c activity (working hours, pollution, depletion of mineralI re°*ces), the proportion of the social product allocated to education ^health care, the provision of public goods, and birth rates. J h e constraints added by the second principle make » * " J » mo* acceptable to the parties. The principle requires more of an y j u t a n a l scheme with regard to the worst socioeconomic position " P ^ i t s , without detracting from what is significant about the basic 61

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political l i b e r t i e s . O n e m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e s e additional con s t r a i n t s s h o u l d also p l a y a r o l e i n a s s e s s i n g a n e x i s t i n g political process a n d in g u i d i n g its reform. After all, t h e s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t upon any political p r o c e s s is t h a t it s h o u l d b e reliable, t h a t is, p r o d u c e legislation a n d policies t h a t a r e just. H e r e t h e reliability of t h e political process w i t h r e g a r d to t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is of s p e c i a l c o n c e r n . Often a large variety of m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e e c o n o m i c l a w s a n d policies can w i t h s o m e plausibility b e d e f e n d e d a s d o i n g b e s t b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e b e c a u s e i n t h i s m a t t e r s o m u c h " d e p e n d s u p o n speculative political a n d e c o n o m i c d o c t r i n e s a n d u p o n social t h e o r y generally" ITJ 199). Still, t h e r e is h o p e t h a t s u c h p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s can be c u r b e d t o s o m e e x t e n t s o a s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e difference principle is at least a p p r o x i m a t e l y satisfied. W h i l e t h e e q u a l b a s i c political liberties r e q u i r e social a n d e c o n o m i c legislation t o b e c r e a t e d democratically (rather t h a n b y a g r o u p of u p r i g h t e x p e r t s , say, t h o u g h legislators could of c o u r s e c o n s u l t s u c h experts), t h e y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a system ot judicial review t h a t w o u l d filter o u t a t least t h e c l e a r e r c a s e s of legisla tion violating t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . Alluding t o " t h e h i s t o r y of s u c c e s s f u l c o n s t i t u t i o n s " (BLP 52), Rawls o p p o s e s t h i s idea, h o w e v e r , w i t h h i s r e m a r k a b l e fiat t h a t "the second p r i n c i p l e of justice . . . is n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e constitution (ibid.). This is r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e it w o u l d s e e m t o c o n t r a d i c t Ravvls s official p o s i t i o n . T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e would clearly b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of b a s i c political liberties for all™ But if so, t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it should be 64

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incorporated m u s t b e s e t t l e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t w o principles them selves. The s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e o u g h t t o b e p a r t of t h e constitution if a n d only if this w o u l d t e n d t o i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t social position o n t h e whole. His opposition is f u r t h e r r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e Rawls himself suggests that existing i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e n o t all t h a t successful, in that they don't even remotely satisfy t h e difference p r i n c i p l e (TJ 87). And h o w c a n we expect them to, s o l o n g a s t h i s p r i n c i p l e is n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d into the public and official t e r m s of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ? How are actual legislators to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e y a r e t o frame their deliberations in accordance w i t h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h e n it is merely o n e among many incompatible i d e a s d e b a t e d b y t h e a c a d e m i c s of t h e well-or dered society? I w o u l d t h i n k , t h e n , c o n t r a r y to Rawls, that if the second principle is a r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e a t all, if it is part of that kernel of political morality t h a t is t o solve t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e problem by lasting t h r o u g h a n d c o n s t r a i n i n g all institutional changes, then it must be e n s h r i n e d in t h e legal o r d e r i n a w a y that reflects its perma nent and f o u n d a t i o n a l s t a t u s . It m u s t n o t b e merely a n idea that legislators m a y o r m a y n o t find attractive a n d m a y u s e o n occasion as a Preamble to a p a c k a g e of s o c i a l o r e c o n o m i c legislation. 66

13.6. When it c o m e s t o n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s , t h e s e c o n d principle once again gets s h o r t shrift, t h i s t i m e , h o w e v e r , for systematic reasons. The question h e r e is w h e t h e r a n d o n w h a t g r o u n d s equal basic political Jherties may b e r e s t r i c t e d for t h e s a k e of e n s u r i n g juster legislation, "ecall the t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s a political p r o c e s s m u s t satisfy. First, the Procedure s h o u l d b e s u c h t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s have basic political Gerties that a r e e q u a l l y c o m p l e t e a n d w e l l - p r o t e c t e d a n d w h o s e fair ™ is m a i n t a i n e d s o t h a t all h a v e "a fair o p p o r t u n i t y to hold public , and to i n f l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e of political decisions ( B U ' w . "Kofar as t h e political p r o c e s s is a n i n s t a n c e of p u r e procedural jus? ' r e q u i r e m e n t is u n o p p o s e d . I n t h e r e m a i n i n g "impure area, b°wever, w h e r e a n i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n exists for judging outcome* ™*e political p r o c e s s , a s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t c o m e s into play, m e Pob-hcal p r o c e s s s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d s o a s t o b e maximally reliable U e

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liberties a n d t h e i r fair v a l u e ; a n d a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t o u t p u t satisfy the s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h r a n k s lexically b e l o w b o t h first-principle re q u i r e m e n t s a n d t h u s c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e d e s i g n of t h e political process o n l y w i t h i n w h a t e v e r l e e w a y t h e y m a y leave. Not e v e n t h e slightest r e s t r i c t i o n of b a s i c political liberties o r of t h e i r fair value is justifiable w h e n t h e b e t t e r legislation it w o u l d l e a d t o m e r e l y r e d u c e s unjust social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s , h o w e v e r significantly. Rawls m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e risk-averse p a r t i e s , w i t h their decision rule, w o u l d find this r e s u l t a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s t a s k h i g h l i g h t s once again t h e crucial i m p o r t a n c e of m y p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t of t h e first princi ple. T h e p a r t i e s m u s t a s s u m e t h a t t h e p o o r m a y find it very difficult to p e r s u a d e a majority t o s u p p o r t s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s required by t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . Rawls h o l d s t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n s of basic political liberties for t h e s a k e of satisfying t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a r e nevertheless strictly r u l e d o u t ( u n d e r r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s ) . T h e parties w o u l d certainly find t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t u n a c c e p t a b l e u n l e s s they are a s s u r e d that restrictions of b a s i c political liberties m a y b e justifiable w h e n t h e y are n e c e s s a r y to m e e t s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c needs. H e n c e t h e p a r t i e s have y e t a n o t h e r r e a s o n t o w a n t a c l e a r a n d straight forward social m i n i m u m t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e first principle w h e r e it will play a p r i m a r y r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g h o w t h e political p r o c e s s is to b e a d j u s t e d t o n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s a n d historical con tingencies. U n e q u a l basic political liberties s u c h a s Mill h a d p r o p o s e d m a y be justifiable in this w a y w h e n t h e inequalities w o u l d make o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties significantly more c o m p l e t e or m o r e secure (cf. TJ §37). Put in m y terms, M i l l s claim (as Rawls reconstructs u n d e ? m r f W . h ^fL e x i s t i n g halfway favorable c o n d i t i o n s , w e o u g h t to accept a Z7£ to the first requirement in order to avoid a larger shortfall in

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4

The Second Principle of Justice

14. Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y P r i n c i p l e 14.1. The s e c o n d principle is a m o n g the features of his conception that Rawls has t e n d e d to d e e m p h a s i z e in recent years. He now believes, as we have seen, that t h e s e c o n d principle of justice is to be excluded from the written c o n s t i t u t i o n of a well-ordered society (BLP 52). More gently, he has e v e n d e c l a r e d t h e difference principle all but dispens able: "The primary a i m of justice as fairness is achieved once it is: clear "W" the parties w o u l d prefer average utilitarianism constrained by nis to** and opportunity p r i n c i p l e s over average utilitarianism unconfained 4). In this area, unsurprisingly, w e have nothing like tne bailed elucidations Rawls h a s s i n c e provided in support of his hrst f^ciple and t h u s m u s t rely m o r e extensively o n his account in A ^ory of Justice. There are s o m e significant revisions, "^ever ine amount of social primary g o o d s is n o w said to be based on the concepof the person as characterized by the two highest-order m t e r e s ^ Jvvewill e doubly ambiguous account ot m e J * * x t Principle in A Theory of Justice receives some clanncahon.m course of w h i c h Rawls all but d e l e t e s what w a s arguably the most Portant s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d : opportunities. The second principle (of The special conception) impose j t w o w u p o n the s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities.an 2 * * "V g e n ^ a t e : t h e opportunity principle and the d # r e n c e ^ p / e . These are serially o r d e r e d s o that the former ranks lex.caty f P F E

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above t h e latter, just a s t h e first p r i n c i p l e r a n k s lexically above the s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a s a w h o l e . Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e requirements in m o r e detail, I m u s t settle t w o p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r s . O n e of these con c e r n s t h e role " t h e social b a s e s of self-respect'' p l a y in t h e metric of s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s in t e r m s of w h i c h s o c i o e c o n o m i c positions are t o b e evaluated. T h e o t h e r p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r c o n c e r n s t h e ways in which institutional inequalities might b e generated. 14.3. T h e difference p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of what 1 call index goods—powers a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of offices a n d positions of re sponsibility; i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h ; a n d t h e s o c i a l b a s e s of self-respect. It r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e g e n e r a t e i n e q u a l i t i e s in i n d e x goods if a n d insofar a s t h e s e o p t i m i z e t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least advan t a g e d (or, as I have also said, t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e share). Here the i n c l u s i o n of t h e t h i r d i n d e x g o o d , t h e social b a s e s of self-respect, is p u z z l i n g . T h i s g o o d " h a s a c e n t r a l p l a c e " (TJ 62), i s "very important" (TJ "^'fi P i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (TJ 440), is even defined a s [the] m o s t i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (TJ 604 [index]). If it really is s o i m p o r t a n t , t h e n w h y d o e s it c o m e i n o n l y o n t h e lowest priority level, as a n i n d e x g o o d w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is t o b e governed by t h e difference p r i n c i p l e ? Rawls's i d e a s e e m s t o b e t h a t self-respect i s d u e t o various factors (has v a r i o u s "bases"), s o m e of w h i c h a r e m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t than o t h e r s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t social b a s i s of self-respect is (or in a just society o u g h t t o be) t h e e q u a l b a s i c liberties, a n d Rawls a p p e a l s extennr? - K ^ ! : P P o r t of h i s first p r i n c i p l e a n d its lexical i t °P social i n s t i t u t i o n s , merely by ™3r^rT P * ^ ' a r e i m m u n e t o c o m p l a i n t s invoking selfZ7nTJ I v ° ^ a j u s t s o c i e t y is n o t t h e n one's X rilhtTLn ^ y » e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of fundamental eSnnrnl? ^ T ^ ' ' , " ' [ W e e l i m i n a t e t h e significance of relative e c o n o m i c a n d social a d v a n t a g e s a s s u p p o r t s for m e n ' s self-confidence S

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the social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e y the worst s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n . T h e p o o r might excusa y socioeconomic p o s i t i o n t h a t , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t worse terms, is (in relative t e r m s ) s o m e w h a t less inferior. poRawls h a n d l e s t h i s p r o b l e m b y r e c o g n i z i n g that a i ^ , ram of self-respect m a y h a v e t o b e i n c l u d e d a m o n g nt Adding this i n d e x g o o d e n a b l e s t h e difference P ^ rior of abridgments of s e l f - r e s p e c t t h a t a r e d u e t o a signn share of other i n d e x g o o d s (see G r a p h 1). necessary inRawls's halfhearted offer t h a t "theoretically w e c difference dude self-respect self-respect ii n t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s " g ° ^ \ a n c e he nthe pnmaiy u ^ . „ Principle (TJ 546) d o e s n o t t h e n d e t r a c t from t h e ^ e a « _ ^ . Pnnaple (TJ 546) d o e s n o t t h e n d e t r a c t from t h e great impu..~~ if. "e a s—-mps that tuh ev need _ for. „settJ" e w h—e r •e a• t t a c h• e s t o self-respect. H s u m e s that d u a l

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full social b a s e s of self-respect t h a t a l s o figure s o prominently in Rawls's a r g u m e n t for t h e p r i o r i t y of t h e e q u a l b a s i c liberties. 1 4 . 3 . C o m i n g t o t h e s e c o n d p r e l i m i n a r y , i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y generate inequalities in v a r i o u s w a y s . P e r p e n d i c u l a r t o m y earlier distinction b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s , w e m u s t now dis t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e various k i n d s of n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts to which t h e inequalities p r o d u c e d b y a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y be related W h a t facts a b o u t p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s e x p l a i n t h e lifetime share each c o m e s t o have u n d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h e y participate in? If s h a r e s a r e u n e q u a l , t h e n t h e r e m u s t b e s u c h facts. T h e s e facts are not t h e m s e l v e s p a r t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d a r e therefore irrelevant t o its a s s e s s m e n t . W h a t is relevant is w h i c h k i n d s of facts an institu tional s c h e m e allows t o p l a y a c a u s a l role i n d e t e r m i n i n g shares and h o w significant a n i m p a c t it allows e a c h k i n d of fact t o have. Here Rawls w a n t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h a m o n g " t h r e e m a i n k i n d s of c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (WOS 11): n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , a n d " s u c h chance c o n t i n g e n c i e s as a c c i d e n t a n d g o o d f o r t u n e " (TJ 7 2 ) . In first explicating t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , Rawls p u t s a g o o d deal of weight u p o n t h e distinction b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d social contingencies Luck is a l m o s t entirely i g n o r e d , t h o u g h i n e q u a l i t i e s arising through c h a n c e a r e implicitly g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h o s e a r i s i n g from natural contingencies. T h e n a t u r a l / s o c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n is p r o b l e m a t i c in v a r i o u s ways, and Rawls d o e s n o t d r a w it precisely. C o n c e r n i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s related to differentials i n n a t u r a l t a l e n t — h i s p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e for natural con t i n g e n c i e s — R a w l s s u g g e s t s t h a t insofar a s s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities a r e t a l e n t - i n d u c e d , t h e y c a n b e e x p l a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o t w o factors: t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of t a l e n t s a n d t h e p r e v a i l i n g institutional s c h e m e . This suggestion, however, is t o o s i m p l e T h e r e is a t h i r d factor, namely, h o w valuable t h e various n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d to be in t h e relevant social system. T o s o m e e x t e n t t h i s t h i r d factor will itself b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . T o s o m e extent it will also b e d u e t o e x o g e n o u s d e t e r m i n a n t s , s u c h a s t h e systems IH ,f! e n v i r o n m e n t , c u l t u r e , a n d level of d e v e l o p m e n t . In any case, t h i s t h i r d factor e n s u r e s that even so-called natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s (the d i s t r i b u t e of valuable talents) will have a c o n s i d e r a b l e social component. ltur

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social institutions m u s t a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s in s o m e way, it is at least doubtful that b e i n g female o r black m a k e s o n e naturally h a n d i c a p p e d or that social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s to t h e natural diver sity of skin colors a n d g e n d e r s (or of h e i g h t o r h a i r growth, for that matter). These r e m a r k s m a k e it a p p e a r doubtful that a conception of justice can plausibly p l a c e a s m u c h w e i g h t o n t h e distinction between natural and social c o n t i n g e n c i e s a s Rawls d o e s in interpreting his second principle. I will s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e s e d o u b t s m o r e concretely in a moment. 144. With this b a c k g r o u n d , let u s c o n s i d e r w h a t Rawls takes the content of the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e to b e . He is clear throughout that this principle r e q u i r e s at l e a s t formal equality of opportunity, that is "equality as c a r e e r s o p e n t o t a l e n t s " (TJ 65). This requirement is scant ily explained. Surely Rawls m e a n s t o p r e c l u d e g r o u n d rules that call for exclusion of specific p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s from certain careers. Presum ably he wants t o r e q u i r e f u r t h e r t h a t g r o u n d rules m u s t positively mandate that o p p o r t u n i t i e s b e a l l o c a t e d in certain ways (for example, byfirmsand schools). I c o n j e c t u r e t h a t to m a i n t a i n formal equality of opportunity i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t p r e s c r i b e t h a t information about opengs be reasonably w i d e l y available a n d t h a t n o g r o u p be excluded wholesale from t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for a n o p e n i n g , u n l e s s this g r o u p is defined by its m e m b e r s ' (1) inability o r u n w i l l i n g n e s s to pay the access Pice (tuition, for e x a m p l e ) , (2) inferior suitability or qualifications as reasonably related to p r o s p e c t s of s u c c e s s in t h e relevant career, or (3) age. I think d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y a g e n e e d n o t b e prohibited for the sake ot maintaining formal equality^ of o p p o r t u n i t y as Rawls would specify it. % not admitting s t u d e n t s a b o v e t h e age of thirty-five, law schools *™Jd not be affecting p e r s o n s ' lifetime s h a r e s differentially. J n e s e conjectures still leave i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s open. May otne f u n d s (race, g e n d e r , g o o d looks, religious o r political affiliation)be to the extent t h a t d o i n g s o m e r e l y h a m p e r s s o m e group*.butdoes exclude t h e m a l t o g e t h e r ? M a y s u c h criteria b e considered compo r t s of suitability a f least, w h e n p a t i e n t s - t o take E m i s s i o n s to JJJcal schools a s a n e x a m p l e - h a v e m o r e trust in white, male, ugly, 5

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equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e (TJ 73-74), on which the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of efficiency is s t r e n g t h e n e d i n t o " t h e p r i n c i p l e of fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . " In first i n t r o d u c i n g this p r i n c i p l e , h e w r i t e s : " T h e t h o u g h t h e r e is that posi t i o n s a r e t o b e n o t o n l y o p e n i n a formal s e n s e , b u t t h a t all should have a fair c h a n c e t o a t t a i n t h e m . Offhand it is n o t c l e a r w h a t i s meant, but w e m i g h t s a y t h a t . . . t h o s e w h o a r e a t t h e s a m e level of talent and ability, a n d h a v e t h e s a m e w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e t h e m , s h o u l d have the s a m e p r o s p e c t s of s u c c e s s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r initial p l a c e in the social s y s t e m . . . . C h a n c e s t o a c q u i r e c u l t u r a l k n o w l e d g e a n d skills should not d e p e n d u p o n o n e ' s c l a s s p o s i t i o n , a n d so t h e s c h o o l system, whether p u b l i c or private, s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d t o e v e n o u t c l a s s b a r r i e r s " (TJ 731. T h e i n d e x ofA Theory ofJustice lists t h i s a s t h e p l a c e w h e r e "equality of fair o p p o r t u n i t y [is] d e f i n e d " (TJ 594). T h e r e a r e t w o r o u g h l y parallel p a s s a g e s : fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y r e q u i r e s " e q u a l c h a n c e s of educa tion a n d c u l t u r e for p e r s o n s similarly e n d o w e d a n d motivated" (TJ 275), a n d " t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . . . r e q u i r e s e q u a l life p r o s p e c t s in all s e c t o r s of society for t h o s e similarly e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d " (TJ 3011. This e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s that Rawls's o w n d e m o c r a t i c - e q u a l i t y inter p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e — " c o m b i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e " (TJ 75)—follows t h e liberal-equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in invoking t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a l l o w s to arise from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d t h o s e it a l l o w s t o a r i s e from natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s (TJ 72-75). T h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e e n t i r e l y p r o h i b i t e d by t n e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r w o u l d b e left to "the o i t t e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e [which] w o u l d a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s in education, t0 Pr e thu!°^ « - t e n n e x p e c t a t i o n of t h e least favored. If r ™ !?i y S n g m o r e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d , it is p e r m i s s i b l e ; o t h e r w i s e n o t " (TJ 101) 6

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who begin in t h e c l a s s of u n s k i l l e d l a b o r e r s . . . . [T]his kind of initial inequality in life p r o s p e c t s . . . is justifiable only if t h e difference in expectation is to t h e a d v a n t a g e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m a n w h o is worse of [TJ 78). And h e w r i t e s t h a t " a n inequality of opportunity must enhance the o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h o s e w i t h t h e lesser opportunity" (TJ 303)7 The first ambiguity, t h e n , c o n c e r n s t h e kind of limitation Rawls wants to impose u p o n s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities that institutions allow to arise from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Is h e requiring rough statisti cal equality a m o n g p e r s o n s b o r n i n t o different classes w h o are sim ilarly endowed a n d m o t i v a t e d , o r m a y t h e basic structure generate inequalities so l o n g a s d o i n g s o r a i s e s t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c position of the least advantaged in a b s o l u t e t e r m s ? The second a m b i g u i t y c o n c e r n s t h e q u e s t i o n Equality or inequali ties of what?' On o n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Rawls w a s postulating a separate social primary g o o d of i n t e r m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e , a n d such a good, opportunities, i n d e e d a p p e a r e d o n t h e c a n o n i c a l list of social primary goods (TJ 62, 92). It w o u l d i n c l u d e a c c e s s to "cultural knowledge and skffls" (TJ 73) a n d t o " e d u c a t i o n a n d c u l t u r e " (TJ 275). Postulating such good, Rawls c o u l d e x p l a i n t h e d e s i g n priority of t h e opportunity Principle over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e as follows: a basic structure under which t h e least a d v a n t a g e d suffer a shortfall from fair equality ot opportunity is a l w a y s u n j u s t , e v e n w h e n this enables t h e m to have a ^ d e x p o s i t i o n , b e c a u s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s are incommensurably important t h a n i n d e x g o o d s (just as first-principle goods are «commensurably m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n opportunities). In this vein Rawls writes: "It is n o t e n o u g h to a r g u e . . . that t h e whole of society deluding the least favored b e n e f i t from certain restrictions on equality I opportunity. W e m u s t a l s o c l a i m t h a t t h e a t t e m p t to eliminate these ^qualities w o u l d s o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e social system a n d the operatons of the e c o n o m y t h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n a n y w a y t h e opportunities ot disadvantaged w o u l d b e e v e n m o r e limited" (TJ 300-1). An ina

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equality of o p p o r t u n i t y m u s t e n h a n c e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of those with t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y " (TJ 3 0 3 ) — n o t m e r e l y t h e i r i n d e x position. Alternatively, Rawls m i g h t h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e possibility t h a t social c o n t i n g e n c i e s m i g h t b e a l l o w e d t o give rise t o inequalities in i n d e x g o o d s — i n i n c o m e a n d i n p o w e r s a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of offices and p o s i t i o n s of responsibility. T h i s v i e w is s u g g e s t e d , for example, by his p a r a p h r a s e : "Positions a r e t o b e n o t o n l y o p e n i n a formal sense, b u t . . all s h o u l d h a v e a fair c h a n c e t o a t t a i n t h e m " (TJ 73). There is no s e p a r a t e social p r i m a r y g o o d " o p p o r t u n i t i e s " . 8

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(2B) Inequalities in index goods are governed by the difference principle, subject to the condition (OP ) that there must be formal equality of opportunity, a n d no inequalities of opportunity may be allowed to arise from social contingencies (that is, access to education and the like must be equal for similarly endowed persons bom into different social classes!. 2B

11

Since the texts d o n o t c l e a r l y favor o n e reading, let m e p r o c e e d with a brief analysis, w h i c h will s h o w t h a t o n l y version [1A] is tenable. 14.6. Version [IB] involves t h e i d e a t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s constitute a separate category of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , intermediate in t h e lexical hierarchy b e t w e e n f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s a n d index goods. It implies a preference for t h e feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a t optimizes the worst (set of) opportunities. But t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t m a k e s n o sense. For oppor tunities must b e u n d e r s t o o d e i t h e r i n a b s o l u t e or in relative terms. If we understand t h e m i n absolute t e r m s (as reflecting, for instance, h o w much education o n e h a s a c c e s s to), t h e n [IB] requires that resources must without limit b e d e v o t e d t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of opportunities in preference t o i n d e x g o o d s , b e c a u s e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of the least ad vantaged take p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e i r i n d e x position. This priority is absurd. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , if w e u n d e r s t a n d opportunities in relative 'erms (as reflecting h o w m u c h e d u c a t i o n o n e h a s access to as a per centage of t h e average, for e x a m p l e ) , t h e n t h e s e c o n d principle allows no inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y at all, a n d [IB] collapses into [2B]. This dilemma u n d e r m i n e s [IB], t o g e t h e r w i t h Rawls's idea that t h e w a y to Justify inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y is t o s h o w t h a t they "enhance the opportunities of t h o s e w i t h t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y " (TJ 303, cf. 300). Version [2B] p r e s u p p o s e s a r a t i o n a l e i n w h i c h opportunities are fonceived in relative t e r m s , a s a p o s i t i o n a l good. What is presumecI to °eimportant is n o t h a v i n g a c c e s s t o a s m u c h e d u c a t i o n as possible out ^ving n o less a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n t h a n others. With t h e good so Jfined, the p a r t i e s , r e a s o n i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e maximm rute, f adopt a n equality of o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e . They will not care^how "J«h there is b y w a y of o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n absolute terms (and t h u c a n the political p r o c e s s t o g o v e r n overall allocations to education), prohibit i n e q u a l i t i e s of o p p o r t u n i t y b e c a u s e a n y sucfi mg » t a h » m u s t (logically) r e d u c e t h e w o r s t set of W ^ ^ ^ - g i v e n t h e lexical priority w i t h i n t h e s e c o n d P™^* as lowering t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n overall (even w h e n they the w o r s t i n d e x p o s i t i o n ! . " A l t h o u g h it p r e s u p p o s e s s u c h a 0

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tionale, [2B] is also i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h it, b e c a u s e [2B] allows inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y b a s e d u p o n natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s , allows, for example, a s Rawls clearly w a n t s t o (e.g., TJ 101), inferior a c c e s s to education for p e r s o n s less well e n d o w e d . Version [2A] involves t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s d o not con s t i t u t e a social p r i m a r y g o o d i n t h e i r o w n right, t h a t socioeconomic p o s i t i o n s a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y i n d e x g o o d s a l o n e . O n this assumption, t h e p a r t i e s will prefer a c r i t e r i o n of social j u s t i c e t h a t a s s e s s e s all social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s t e n d t o p r o d u c e by refer e n c e t o t h e lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n . T h e y h a v e n o r e a s o n to allow this lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n t o b e l o w e r e d i n o r d e r t o e q u a l i z e across classes t h e i n d e x p r o s p e c t s of p e r s o n s similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d endowed. So (2AI t o o , is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h its s u g g e s t e d r a t i o n a l e . It collapses into [1AL w h i c h lets t h e difference p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n all inequalities of oppor tunity ( w h e t h e r b a s e d o n social o r n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s ) , subject only t o t h e o n e c o n s t r a i n t of formal e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . It m a y s e e m t h a t if t h e p a r t i e s c a r e d o n l y a b o u t i n d e x goods, then t h e y w o u l d g o even further a n d prefer t o [1A] a p r o p o s a l o n which the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e is d e l e t e d entirely. B u t I t h i n k Rawls could det e n d t h e w e a k e s t o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e e v e n if it w e r e n o t correlated w i t h a social p r i m a r y g o o d of its o w n . F o r m a l e q u a l i t y of opportunity r e q u i r e s a u m v e r s a l right to c o m p e t e for all o p e n i n g s o n t h e basis of o n e s suitability a n d qualifications a s well a s o n e ' s ability a n d willing n e s s t o p a y t h e a c c e s s price. T h i s i s a n e a r l y cost-free legal mechanism that, t h r o u g h a gains i n productivity, i s b o u n d t o p a y its o w n way, for it arg6rn U m b e r o f 1™*®** a p p l i c a n t s a r e available for ?riorih?rSSr 2U ° '™ ^ implementation fowesHnZ .? « Principle, involves negligible risks for the ^ h3S S n t a d v a n t a g e s in specificity and B P O , n t 3Su£^i^fr» ^ ° ' a t institutions

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suggest a r e q u i r e m e n t of formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity: "Announce ments of jobs a n d p o s i t i o n s c a n b e f o r b i d d e n to contain statements which exclude a p p l i c a n t s of c e r t a i n d e s i g n a t e d ethnic a n d racial groups, or of e i t h e r s e x T h e n o t i o n of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y . . . has a central r a n g e of a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h consists of various liberties together with c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s e liberties can be effectively exercised" (BLP 79). 14.8. We have f o u n d n o p l a u s i b l e r a t i o n a l e in A Theory of Justice for the view that i n e q u a l i t i e s i n a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n ([2B]) or to jobs with associated r e w a r d s <[2A)), a r e a c c e p t a b l e w h e n related to natural con tingencies, b u t u n j u s t w h e n r e l a t e d t o social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . But one might think t h a t t h i s v i e w is n e v e r t h e l e s s morally plausible or that it appeals to t h e p a r t i e s for o t h e r r e a s o n s (such a s publicity, equal cit izenship, or stability). Let m e p r e s e n t t w o r e a s o n s for doubting that this is so. 14.8.1. The first difficulty c a n b e illustrated by a social system whose Participants a r e d i v i d e d i n t o r i c h a n d p o o r , b e t t e r e n d o w e d a n d worse endowed. So t h e r e a r e f o u r g r o u p s : RB, PB, RW, a n d PW. Suppose this social system h a s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e O N E , w h i c h t e n d s to e n g e n d e r signifi cant class-induced differentials i n e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities. Admis sion to the better s c h o o l s r e q u i r e s little b y w a y of talents a n d motiva tion but is mainly r e g u l a t e d b y h i g h t u i t i o n charges. Many m e m b e r s of "Wean and d o a t t e n d s u c h s c h o o l s , b u t m o s t of t h o s e born a m o n g the Poor cannot d o likewise, w h a t e v e r t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s . Assume further mat the tuition b a r r i e r is in fact justified o n t h e [1A] reading of the second principle ( w h e r e it r e q u i r e s only formal equality of oppor^ t y ) . There a r e e n o u g h RB e n t r a n t s t o fill t h e m o s t important offices 2 qualified g r a d u a t e s , e v e n w i t h o u t offering subsidies to m e m b e r s ot f" the tuition b a r r i e r p r o v i d e s a powerful incentive to parents to *°rk especially h a r d for t h e s a k e of financing their children s educaJ»n-These t w o factors, b y m a x i m i z i n g overall income, make O N E t h e ^ e m e that o p t i m i z e s t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged (PW), „ T e r e n c e principle requires. , .. . , 14

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m u s t b e e q u a l i z e d . A s s u m e t h e r e is a feasible alternative basic struc t u r e , T W O , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d motivational entrance r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e r a i s e d a n d t u i t i o n fees m a d e affordable to members of PB; T W O c o m e s m u c h c l o s e r t h a n O N E t o satisfying O P ^ and 0 P . It also satisfies t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h t h i s t i m e , of course, is subject to a m o r e d e m a n d i n g o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e ( O P ^ or 0P ). N o w s u p p o s e i n d e x p o s i t i o n s a r e t h o s e given i n T a b l e 3. On reading [1A], O N E is p r e f e r r e d b e c a u s e it g e n e r a t e s t h e h i g h e r m i n i m u m index p o s i t i o n (20 a s a g a i n s t 17). O n r e a d i n g s [2A] a n d (2B), T W O is preferred b e c a u s e it avoids a h i g h e r - o r d e r i n j u s t i c e . U n d e r O N E t h e p o o r (PB and PW) suffer a m u c h g r e a t e r i n e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . T h i s p r e f e r e n c e for T W O i l l u s t r a t e s t h e first difficulty. Yes, thanks to t h e m u c h l o w e r p r o s p e c t s i n RW, t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d (PW) now enjoy s o m e t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g "fair e q u a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l opportunity.'' But t h e i r e d u c a t i o n is n o t o n e bit b e t t e r u n d e r T W O t h a n u n d e r O N E , nor is t h e i r overall d i s a d v a n t a g e at all r e d u c e d ; t h e y a r e still effectively ex c l u d e d from t h e b e t t e r s c h o o l s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e t o b e accessible to o t h e r s . It is a b s u r d t o r e g a r d t h e i r p o s i t i o n a s m u c h b e t t e r u n d e r TWO t h a n u n d e r O N E just b e c a u s e t w o other g r o u p s , PB a n d RW, have (so to speak) e x c h a n g e d p l a c e s . " A n d it w o u l d b e similarly bizarre to allow 2 • t u ?J ? P a t i o n p r i o r i t y over t h e difference principle, that is, t o h o l d t h a t efforts t o w a r d reversing t h e p r o s p e c t s of PB a n d RW are always m o r e u r g e n t t h a n efforts t o m i t i g a t e e v e n s e v e r e poverty within (as w h e n t h e i r i n d e x p o s i t i o n falls far s h o r t of t h e feasible minimum 2B

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did not do this, their c h i l d r e n w o u l d have many intangible advantages in terms of the contact p e r s o n s t h e y are exposed to in their home, neighborhood, and p e e r g r o u p . A s c h o o l system that does literally even out class barriers" (TJ 73)—if possible at all—is bound to be extremely expensive a n d therefore w o u l d reduce index positions (in cluding that of t h e least advantaged). Requiring s u c h an education system is thoroughly i m p l a u s i b l e a n d surely unacceptable to the riskaverse parties, especially if t h e opportunity principle entailing this requirement is to have n o t o n l y d e s i g n but also implementation pri ority over the difference principle. T h e s e difficulties show decisively, I ^ that [1A] is preferable to [2A] a n d [2BJ. 1 7

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' ° E d u c e s a g o o d deal of empiricalI of aSed i m p l e m e n t i n g t h i s p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h h e calls classes. N a t i o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e for children born mto rf n a l d e w w a y s of i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t mvo a u ^ a u t o n o m y , it l e a r w h e t h e r Rawls takes t h e first P ™ ^ £ conception of (see J sii). m a n y c a s e , it w o u l d b e rather embarrassing rfn.sc " ^ d i d , practice, require s u c h i n v a s i o n s of family autonomy. J

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174 Educational and Employment Opportunities, 15.1 the ground that o n e ' s talents aren't worth developing may well be more devastating to one's self-respect than exclusion on the ground that one's parents cannot afford to pay tuition. Yet all four readings of Rawls that we have considered may support as ideal a basic structure under which very little education and training are available to the less well endowed. In each case their disadvantage is justified by appeal to the difference principle. The cost of offering more education to the worse endowed is a bad investment, is not fully redeemed by their greater productivity later in life. Skimping on their education maximizes over all income and therefore, given the difference principle, also the in come of the least advantaged (most of whom may themselves be among the worse endowed). Hence, severe talent-induced inequalities in edu cational opportunity may well be required by Rawls's second principle, e v e n under the best of circumstances. Rawls seeks to mitigate this harsh result by emphasizing "the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure s e n s e of his o w n worth" (TJ 101); "resources for education are not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly according to their return as estimated in productive trained abilities, but also according to their worth in enriching the personal and social life of citizens" (TJ 1071 Stated in proper form, his thought must be this: The severe educational inequalities in question are justified only when they (interschemicallyi optimize the index position of the least advantaged. But they are un likely to do this, because any gain in the income of the least advantaged they may produce will probably be outweighed by a loss in their selfrespect." Hence, only rather mild talent-induced inequalities of educa tional opportunity will be justifiable by the difference principle. Ot course, lacking any notion of how the various index goods are to be weighted and aggregated, we have no way of evaluating this claim. ShlJh . !?^" ccount of education in this waythen d ° "nCe ™rLrS* P be subjected to a further constraint specifically upon cfass-induced inequalities of opportunity' This question presses toward [1A]. But let me here pursue the inverse ?uXZsZ ^ ? ° "P™ Equalities of oppor tunity ansmg from socia/ contingencies, then why shouldn't this con straint need to be extended to inequalities X S ^ L y related to other kinds of conhngencies? This question presses toward a new version of the democratic-equality mterpretationTthe second princi16

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opportunity a n d rough equality of actual opportunity (that is, partici pants must have roughly equivalent access to education and the like). 19

0P requires, in a d d i t i o n t o formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity, that every one should have a c c e s s t o a r o u g h l y equivalent education, with equiva lence defined in t e r m s of c o s t . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that persons must actually receive s u c h a r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t e d u c a t i o n , only that it must be genuinely a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e m . P e r h a p s g e n u i n e access is incompat ible with d i s c o u r a g e m e n t s of t h e k i n d t h a t have b e e n subtly hampering the education of w o m e n . P r e s u m a b l y g e n u i n e access also does not exist when p a r e n t s m a y r e f u s e e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities o n their childrens' behalf ( w h i c h w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t t h e earlier stages of educa tion must be c o m p u l s o r y ) . Governed b y t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , s u c h access is inalienable, ^ o t be g a m b l e d o r given o r s o l d a w a y (cf. §10.7). Nevertheless, there may be cases of p e r s o n s h a v i n g g e n u i n e access t o but declining a roughly equivalent e d u c a t i o n . S u c h c a s e s d o n o t indicate an injustice in the relevant e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . Finally, O P is i n s e n s i t i v e t o how a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e ensures that all have access to a r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t e d u c a t i o n . Schools a n d universities ay be publicly financed, o r s t u d e n t s m a y have access to sufficient Personal or p a r e n t a l f u n d s , s c h o l a r s h i p s , s u m m e r jobs, or loans from Public or private s o u r c e s . 154. Version [3B] a c c o r d s w i t h [B] b y conceiving opportunities as a primary g o o d in t h e i r o w n right. In t h e o t h e r dimension, 13W is egalitarian, like [2], i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s in relative terms -w ? Positional good). In t h i s , it diverges from t h e a s s u m p t i o n implicit^in in namely, t h a t a p e r s o n g a i n s b y h a v i n g m o r e access absolutely even u ^ greater a c c e s s c o m e s at t h e e x p e n s e of having less access than Jfoers. C o m p a r e d t o [2], [3B] is more egalitarian by having the opporJ " % principle c o n s t r a i n all i n e q u a l i t i e s of o p p o r t u n i t y - n o t only * * * arising from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s b u t also those a n s m g from "fural c o n t i n g e n c i e s o r l u c k . T h u s [3B] a s s u m e s that a p e r s o n . c o m J j * ^ r e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s n o t only with those: h a d by o A e r s J»e talents a n d l u c k Z s i m i l a r t o h e r o w n . But t h e n [3B] i u d JtaMtan t h a n [2] in t h a t it e m p l o y s a less d e m a n d i n g notion 3B

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i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms t o w a r d y e t a n o t h e r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , T H R E E , under w h i c h , b e c a u s e of a s t r o n g e r c o n s t r a i n t u p o n t h e difference principle, t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d (PW) w o u l d o n c e again be w o r s e t h a n u n d e r O N E . This t i m e , h o w e v e r , t h e justification for this a b s o l u t e d e c l i n e i n t h e i r i n d e x p o s i t i o n (from O N E t o T H R E E ) is not blatantly i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e r e f o r m of t h e e d u c a t i o n system would greatly i m p r o v e t h e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e least advantaged, t h e r e b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g o n e i m p o r t a n t b a s i s of t h e i r self-respect. It w o u l d also t e n d to i m p r o v e t h e i r relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n , because [3B], unlike Rawls's four v e r s i o n s of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , d o e s not allow t h e i r h a n d i c a p in t e r m s of m a r k e t a b l e t a l e n t s t o b e c o m p o u n d e d by the d i s a d v a n t a g e of an inferior e d u c a t i o n . Moreover, [3B] is a great i m p r o v e m e n t i n simplicity. To determine w h e t h e r O P ^ a n d O P are satisfied, w e m u s t b e a b l e to delimit the various social classes a n d , w i t h i n e a c h of t h e s e classes, t h e subsets of p e r s o n s similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d e n d o w e d ; a n d w e m u s t b e able to a s c e r t a i n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y - w e i g h t e d average e x p e c t a t i o n for educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s ([2B]) o r future s u c c e s s ([2A]) w i t h i n all t h e s e relevant s u b s e t s . In o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r O P is satisfied, w e n e e d only u n d e r s t a n d w h a t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e v a r i o u s participants have. T h i s is also m u c h closer to h o w o t h e r social p r i m a r y goods are understood. ^ 2 B

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to it ITJ100-1), r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e " b e t t e r e n d o w e d " have inferior access to education o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e y c a n still achieve as m u c h as others whose inferior e n d o w m e n t s a r e b r o u g h t to fruition. This ex treme and Rawls's v e r s i o n s of t h e s e c o n d principle fail, I believe, for much the same r e a s o n s . First, t h e y view e d u c a t i o n a s merely a m e a n s for producing s o m e d e s i r a b l e social result, w h i c h in both cases is evaluated in t e r m s of i n d e x g o o d s . Yet in virtue of its crucial role in shaping not only o u r i n d e x - g o o d p r o s p e c t s b u t t h e very p e r s o n s we are, education is a pivotal s o c i a l g o o d in its o w n right, an essential precondition for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e t w o moral powers a n d of a secure sense of self-respect. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t ranking access to e d u c a t i o n a b o v e i n d e x g o o d s , a s s o m e passages of,4 Theory of Justice suggest. But if e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s have this elevated status, they m u s t h a v e it i n all i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s , not just in comparing t h e social p o s i t i o n s of p e r s o n s similarly e n d o w e d . Second, Rawls's versions a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e d r e s s allow indefinite inequali ties in educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s for p e r s o n s differentially endowed. °n[3B], by contrast, n o r a n k i n g of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is incorporated mto the public c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . All p e r s o n s , n o matter what their endowments m a y b e , h a v e t h e s a m e claim u p o n educational resources. % understanding t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e in this way, w e (or t h e parties) avoid u n d e r m i n i n g t h e s e l f - r e s p e c t of t h o s e w h o m Rawls treats as the worse endowed a n d e n s u r e t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle . JJ ™ first principle, is a firm a n d p e r s p i c u o u s pillar of a shared public notion of equal c i t i z e n s h i p . ,. . The argument for [3B] c a n b e f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d by attending; to other main k i n d of c o n t i n g e n c i e s t h a t Rawls exempts from_ tne ^ P e of h i o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e — l u c k . C o n s i d e r a society in whicn *rne 20 p e r c e n t of all c h i l d r e n c a n n o t gain a d m i s s i o n to any school. scheme is d e f e n d e d o n t h e g r o u n d that t h e inequality is not J**? to social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , s i n c e s c h o o l s select pupils at random. J j i " versions of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e all allow this d e f e n s e ^ ^ d u a l s a n d g r o u p s c o m p e t e for a d m i s s i o n o n equal terms (formal 22

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equality of o p p o r t u n i t y ) , a n d similarly e n d o w e d a n d motivated per s o n s b o r n i n t o different social c l a s s e s h a v e e q u a l p r o s p e c t s for educa tion (OP ) a n d a c h i e v e m e n t ( O P ) . Rawls's a s s e s s m e n t of this scheme w o u l d t h e n t u r n u p o n w h e t h e r it satisfies t h e difference principle— a n d this it m i g h t well do, b e c a u s e it is c h e a p e r a n d m i g h t yield an equally s u i t a b l e w o r k force. O P , b y c o n t r a s t , p r o h i b i t s this scheme; a n d t h i s is surely p l a u s i b l e , s e e i n g t h a t t h e 20 p e r c e n t w h o are ex c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n will b e m a r k e d off for life as a distinct social g r o u p w h o s e inferior s t a t u s c a n n o t b e o u t w e i g h e d b y a n y gain in the m i n i m u m index position. 2B

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1 5 . 3 . Version [3B] h a s at l e a s t t w o m a i n w e a k n e s s e s . It is exposed to an a n a l o g u e of t h e s e c o n d difficulty w i t h v e r s i o n s [2A] a n d [2B]. The d i s p o s i t i o n of m o r e affluent p a r e n t s to s p e n d m o r e on t h e education of t h e i r c h i l d r e n m a y n e c e s s i t a t e an i m p l a u s i b l y e x p e n s i v e education s y s t e m t h a t m a k e s accessible to all an e d u c a t i o n e q u a l to t h e best. Moreover, [3B] r e q u i r e s t h a t r o u g h l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s b e available for the e d u c a t i o n of all, e v e n w h e r e s u c h r e s o u r c e s w o u l d h a v e a negative net i m p a c t on available i n d e x g o o d s . T h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a risk for the (abso lute) i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . T h e s e w e a k n e s s e s c a n b e m i t i g a t e d in t w o w a y s . First, o n e should n a r r o w t h e definition of educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s s o as to exclude m a n y e x p e n s i v e b u t n o t so c e n t r a l i t e m s (flying, m u s i c , a n d skiing l e s s o n s ; e d u c a t i o n a l travel; a h o m e t e l e s c o p e o r l a b o r a t o r y ; etc.). It s e e m s difficult to p u t this idea i n t o m o r e p r i n c i p l e d f o r m so that it can b e e v a l u a t e d b e h i n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e ( a n d d o e s n o t strike us as ad hoc), b u t it surely m u s t b e e m p l o y e d to s o m e e x t e n t . S e c o n d , o n e c a n t r y to define r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c e in a w a y t h a t is both s o m e w h a t liberal a n d especially sensitive to t h e p a r t i e s ' c o n c e r n for t h o s e w i t h t h e w o r s t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . W h a t is n e e d e d is not a m e a s u r e for t h e overall equality of c o s t (like t h e Gini coefficient), but a SP C C y ° T ° t o w h i c h t h e worst p H ° &T h e intuitive i d e a that n" n ^ ° " * s o n b l y high proportion what ^ ^ j * ™ m a y b e specified follows: T h e Stant teZ hn Tn ^ ° r ° s y s t e m is d e f i n e d not as aLrTXano,^«1ermS ° Percentile(s), w h e r e b y t h e m o r e extrav a g a n t e d u c a t i o n a l p n v u e g e s enjoyed by a f c h i l d r e n of very rich or very c o m m i t t e d p a r e n t s a r e j , ,, . m i n i m M y quite e d u c a t i o n then

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PIE, ONE MIGHT DEFINE t h e STANDARD AS THE MEAN of PER CAPITA EDUCA TED COSTS AT THE 80TH, 40TH, a n d 30TH PERCENTILES and AN EDUCATION AS ^ a l l y ADEQUATE WHEN its COST DOES not fall SHORT OF THE STANDARD BY ["WE THAN 2 5 PERCENT. OBVIOUSLY, THE DETAILS OF THIS PROPOSAL, AS GIVEN and IN GRAPH 2 ARE for PURPOSES OF ILLUSTRATION ONLY. VERSION [3BJ J * SUBJECTS THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE TO THE REQUIREMENT that ALL par«PANTS ARE TO ENJOY FORMAL EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY and MINIMALLY ^ U A T E EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES (that IS, ACCESS TO AT LEAST A MIMADEQUATE EDUCATION). _ ... 154. MY PROPOSED SPECIFICATION of [3B] PUTS n o WEIGHT on RAWLS S Junction BETWEEN SOCIAL a n d NATURAL CONTINGENCIES. HENCE,,U rt a s « >Y) SENSITIVE t o WHETHER A FEW RICH PARENTS HIRE PRIVATE: TUTORS CHUDREN, it is ALSO n o t (VERY) SENSITIVE to WHETHER THERE ARE J » SMALL but EXPENSIVE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS DESIGNED to IMPROVE ^ppli p o o l for SOME ECONOMICALLY CRUCIAL SET of f * S J J J &

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political p r o c e s s . W h e n t h e s t a n d a r d c o s t of e d u c a t i o n is defined in t e r m s of s o m e s u i t a b l e p e r c e n t i l e ( s ) , t h e n it c a n n o t easily b e forced into e s c a l a t i o n b y t h e d e t e r m i n e d efforts of s o m e p a r e n t s to give their c h i l d r e n a h e a d start. T h i s s t a n d a r d c o s t r e m a i n s largely under the c o n t r o l of t h e political p r o c e s s , w h i c h , t h o u g h it m u s t not permit significant e d u c a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e s a n d (especially) disadvantages for p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s , c a n r a i s e o r l o w e r t h e overall allocation of social r e s o u r c e s to t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . Unlike Rawls's v e r s i o n s [2AJ a n d [2B], [3B] c o n t a i n s , I believe, a princi ple of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y w h o s e p r i o r i t y over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is plausible. I have n o t t r i e d t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e oppor t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d take t h i s form o r b e c a s t a s a r e q u i r e m e n t for m e r e l y formal equality of o p p o r t u n i t y (as i n [1A]). H e r e a crucial ques tion is w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d a c c e p t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority of O P over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . Is it p l a u s i b l e t o reform a n institu tional s c h e m e t h a t g e n e r a t e s severe s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities by b e g i n n i n g from t h e l o w e r age g r o u p s , w i t h t h e e q u a l i z a t i o n of educa tional o p p o r t u n i t i e s ? S h o u l d political efforts a n d social resources be primarily devoted t o mitigating n o t t h e excessive p o v e r t y of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p b u t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l d i s a d v a n t a g e s suffered by its y o u n g e r m e m b e r s ? Are excessive e d u c a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a highero r d e r injustice t h a n excessive i n d e x i n e q u a l i t i e s ? Affirmative answers to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e m a d e at least p o s s i b l e b y m y p r o p o s e d amend ment to the principle. We a s s u m e t h a t b a s i c social a n d eco n o m i c n e e d s a r e satisfied o r w o u l d in a n y c a s e h a v e implementation priority over reforms of the e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m T h e u l t i m a t e tenability of [3B] also d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it can be 3 B

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Ranking fair a c c e s s t o e m p l o y m e n t above t h e index goods is not an implausible idea, given t h e s p e c i a l significance of s u c h access for selfrespect, for the realization a n d e x e r c i s e of t h e two moral powers, a n d for a shared sense of e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p . T h o s e w h o are involuntarily unemployed for long p e r i o d s t e n d t o b e c o m e a separate a n d disadvan taged social group w h o s e d i s a d v a n t a g e c a n n o t b e c o m p e n s a t e d by a better index position (by g e n e r o u s u n e m p l o y m e n t benefits, for exam ple). This reason in favor of a r e q u i r e m e n t of fair equality of employ ment opportunity r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r O P c a n b e extended to include such a r e q u i r e m e n t . H e r e w e m i g h t i n t r o d u c e a notion of standard participation in s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n (such as m e d i a n n u m b e r of hours worked in s o m e life p h a s e ) , w i t h minimally adequate employ ment denned as s o m e fraction of t h i s s t a n d a r d . O P would t h e n require that social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t safeguard minimally adequate employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s ( a c c e s s to minimally adequate employ ment)forall. Once again, t h e d e t a i l e d specification of this requirement focuses on those w h o fall below t h e m i d d l e range a n d leaves some ™ude so as n o t overly t o c o n s t r a i n t h e difference principle and the Political process. T h u s it l e a v e s t h e political p r o c e s s free to adjust the °wall level of e c o n o m i c activity, s u b j e c t only to t h e condition that such adjustments m u s t n o t selectively i m p o s e severe hardships^Laws Policies m a y d e c r e a s e j o b s available in s o m e profession with con sent short-term u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d m a y affect working hours lthro ugh annual v a c a t i o n s , a r e t i r e m e n t age, or s u c h like), but they t n o t p r o d u c e significant l o n g - t e r m u n e m p l o y m e n t , except w h e n J n be justified b y a p p e a l t o t h e first principle or to other parts ot ™ opportunity p r i n c i p l e . 3 B

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-Medical Opportunities

J8.1. Rawls s i m p l y leaves m e d i c a l n e e d s aside, apparently in the f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a r e is of only ^ g m * ^ J for the a p p r a i s a l of a c o n c e p t i o n of justice (e.g., ^ " f ^ 2 He seems far t o o s a n g u i n e in t h i s respect, however The fact oi J * * a l medical n e e d s c a s t s u p o n a cardinal ten*. ° H » s

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M e d i c a l Opportunities, 16.2

183

medical unsuitability (as w h e n t h e p r o c e d u r e w o u l d be unnecessary o r ineffective), or (3) a g e . 2 6

16.2. What m o r e d o e s fair e q u a l i t y of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y require? In outlining my a n s w e r , I first m a k e t h e simplifying assumption that medical needs o c c u r naturally, t h a t is, a r e d u e t o factors beyond h u man control. O n c e a r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r specification for this central case is on hand, it will b e e a s i e r t o fit i n m e d i c a l n e e d s of other kinds. While Rawls b r a c k e t s t h e e n t i r e s u b j e c t of medical needs, h e is otherwise a t h o r o u g h g o i n g s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . He defines a n d com pares relevant p o s i t i o n s s o l e l y i n t e r m s of social primary goods, irre spective of natural differentials i n e n d o w m e n t s , n e e d s , good looks, tastes, and desires. N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t semiconsequentialism is dearly untenable for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of a m e d i c a l s y s t e m . W h a t m u s t b e , to, in this area, is t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n n o t of h e a l t h care but (roughly) of j that is, t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of m e d i c a l c a r e relative t o medical j needs.

B u t h o w c a n s u c h a r e q u i r e m e n t b e p a r t of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y princi p l e ? H o w is a c c e s s t o h e a l t h c a r e a n o p p o r t u n i t y ? Rawls seems to use t h e t e r m opportunity restrictively, t o r e f e r t o a c c e s s t o g o o d s that are useful in t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for t h e b e t t e r j o b s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s emphasis o n t h e highest- a n d h i g h e r - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s a n d h i s c o n c e r n for the least a d v a n t a g e d favor a b r o a d e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m . T h e first princi p l e a l o n e c a n n o t fully s e c u r e o u r o p p o r t u n i t y — f u n d a m e n t a l to the spirit of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n — t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n h u m a n interaction, to j Contrary to this view, I will h e r e provisionally preserve Rawls's semi form ( a n d revise) a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e political, consequentialism a l s o i n r e s p e c t t o m e d i c a l care, even though Rawls cultural, a n d associational life a r o u n d u s . R a w l s s h o u l d , therefore, see ^self, of course, is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o its tenability in this a r e a . There t h e i m p o r t a n c e of e d u c a t i o n a t l e a s t a s m u c h i n t h e fact t h a t it enables are two main r e a s o n s for t a k i n g t h i s a p p r o a c h . Denying semiconse o n e t o u n d e r s t a n d , c h e r i s h , a n d p a r t i c i p a t e i n m a n y d i v e r s e forms of quentialism in o n e a r e a w o u l d h a v e e n o r m o u s repercussions for h u m a n g o o d a s i n t h e fact t h a t it m a y give o n e a s h o t a t occupying a l e a d e r s h i p office. He s h o u l d a p p r e c i a t e , similarly, t h a t t h e importance ™*'s conception of j u s t i c e a s a w h o l e . S u p p o s e a n exception is m a d e o t b e i n g e m p l o y e d c o n s i s t s n o t j u s t i n t h e c h a n c e t o g a t h e r t h e skills aspect to m e d i c a l n e e d s — a n a t u r a l p r i m a r y g o o d plays a role in a n d e x p e r i e n c e n e c e s s a r y t o rise t h r o u g h t h e measuring distributive s h a r e s for p u r p o s e s of assessing the justice ot i n t h e c h a n c e t o collaborate — i n t h e c h a n c e t o g a t h e r t h e skii ^ a l institutions, a n d t h e s o c i a l g o o d of h e a l t h care is u s e d to com the n e c e s s a r y t o rise t h r o u g h t h e r a n k s b u t a t least equau> for differentials i n t h i s n a t u r a l p r i m a r y good. It would t h e n be in t h e c h a n c e t o collaborate w i t h o t h e r s a n d t o s h a r e responsibility for difficult to reject o t h e r e x c e p t i o n s i n a p r i n c i p l e d way. If we take t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of h u m a n k i n d . T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b r o a d e n the n o t i o n of o p p o r t u n i t y sufficiently for it t o c o v e r a c c e s s t o m e d i c a l care Terences in p e r s o n s ' n a t i v e m e d i c a l n e e d s into a c c o u n t in £ t e r p e r a s well. T h i s g o o d i s of g r e a t strategic i m p o r t a n c e ; i t s distribution sonalcomparisons, t h e n w h y s h o u l d n ' t w e have regard to other-concrucially affects p e r s o n s ' a c c e s s t o n e a r l y a ll — f o rM mLsUU oS fhuman good0S r o m e d i c a l care emtal differences t o o ? O n c e t h e original position is y e d e s c n b e d s o i.n c l,u d- i-nvg ,«uects but by n o m e a n s l i m i t e d to, t h e b e t t e r ;~»~ »« * ' persons' P ° r t a n c e ; i t s distribution eincluding, x p l o r e w h ebtuhte rb ya nnoot hm e re «a *n -s I •L ed t0 * * the parties c a r e n o t m e r e l y a b o u t social positions J f P ™ " ^ ° of h u m a n g o o d t h e Hiffo^— mother Jobs - Let u s then but also a b o u t m e d i c a l n e e d s , t h e n w h y w o u d they n o t be ten h e duTerenee r i n ™ O P c a n y i e l d a c o n s t r a i n t upon * <*rned with t h e w o r s t overall s i t u a t i o n ? Why w o u l d hey not m •n a p l a u s i b l e way. ° p e s w i t h t h e p r o b l e m of m e d i c a l needs £ * « t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e , b e a r in m i n d that * s are m i m p o r t a n t for t h e ugly o r i n s t r u m e n t s for those espe So e x t e n d e d , OP w o u l d

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16.3. In view of t h e g r e a t differences in natural constitutions, it would be bizarre to r e q u i r e t h a t p e r s o n s , over their lifetimes, should receive roughly e q u i v a l e n t b u n d l e s of h e a l t h care. Such an equal dis tribution would w a s t e r e s o u r c e s o n t h o s e lucky a n d robust enough not to need much m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n at all, a n d it w o u l d also waste re sources in cases w h e r e s o m e w h a t m o r e t h a n a n equal b u n d l e would be needed to make t h e difference. I p r o p o s e i n s t e a d that w e conceive the social good that is t o s e r v e a s t h e a n a l o g u e to e d u c a t i o n a n d employ ment as health protection, d e f i n e d a s a c c e s s to medical care when needed. The s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t p e r s o n s h a v e a n equal n e e d to have, and to have the a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e y will have, s u c h access. O P requires, *en, that everyone s h o u l d h a v e a c c e s s to roughly equivalent health protection. My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d specification of this requirement will »eguided by t h e i d e a t h a t , a s w i t h e d u c a t i o n , overall allocations to the medical system s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e political process as a matter °fpure procedural j u s t i c e , a n d t h a t t h i s m e t h o d is plausible so long as rough equivalence in a c c e s s t o h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n is preserved. It may seem t h a t fair e q u a l i t y of a c c e s s to h e a l t h protection would in Practice d e m a n d a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p a n s i o n of existing medical sys tems, which w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a grave risk to t h e index position of the teast advantaged. But t h i s c a n b e a v o i d e d b y utilizing two ideas already fetched in t h e c o n t e x t of e d u c a t i o n . First, n e e d e d medical care should * defined narrowly a s c a r e t h a t d i r e c t l y alleviates a n existing medical condition (which, b y definition, i m p a i r s a p e r s o n ' s capacity for normal P^cipation in social i n t e r a c t i o n ) . T h i s definition w o u l d exclude vacajjmsin a health s p a , first-class h o s p i t a l b e d s , c o s m e t i c surgery, a n d the 3 B

Second, in a s s e s s i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of h e a l t h protection one should ^concerned n o t w i t h overall i n e q u a l i t i e s b u t with h o w f a r those at the £V bottom fall b e l o w t h e m i d d l e r a n g e . T h e intuitive idea is, once 2 ' e r y o n e s h o u l d h a v e a c c e s s t o s o m e reasonably h i g h p r o jWjon of w h a t o t h e r s a c t u a l l y h a v e . N o d o u b t , this idea_can^be i m p * *£»ed m m a n y different w a y s , b u t 1 will h e r e , s o m e w h a t a r t a f t ^ y J * one of t h e s e for p u r p o s e s of illustration. I begin with a d e t a j t t J* <* the various n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , e a c h defined by refer ° % to m e d i c a l f a c t o r s (affecting t h e u r g e n c y o r « * * * ^ ™ ^ t r e a t m e n t s ) a n d t h e a g e of t h e p a t i e n t , w i t h o u t reference toMttw 5*W'« race, g e n d e r , s o c i a l s t a t u s , a n d t h e like. We t h e n find the c o * u e S l cart, t h a t p e r s o n s in various P ° P f f ^ by a n y statistically r e l e v a n t p a r a m e t e r s , s u c h as M*™*^ K'/r «f r e s i d e n c e ) t e n d t o receive in t h e * * w b c a l c o n d i t i o n . D e f i n i n g a medical history as a j ^ ^ ^ e d e d ^ m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , w e c a n similarly find t h e cost of n e e d * * * * * care t h a t p e r s o n s i n v a r i o u s p o p u l a t i o n clusters tend e v

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ceive in t h e e v e n t of s o m e p a r t i c u l a r m e d i c a l history. We can then e s t i m a t e a p e r s o n ' s e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d medical care by averaging t h e cost of n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e t h a t p e r s o n s in his popula tion c l u s t e r receive in t h e e v e n t of v a r i o u s m e d i c a l histories. This is a w e i g h t e d average b a s e d o n ( w h a t o n e m i g h t call) " t h e average medical history," a realistic p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over medical histories b a s e d o n t h e i r relative f r e q u e n c i e s in t h e relevant social system. The e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e is h i g h e r for those who, for t h e s a m e m e d i c a l h i s t o r i e s , w o u l d r e c e i v e m o r e o r b e t t e r caie than o t h e r s . Given t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d medi cal care w i t h i n t h e social s y s t e m , w e c a n d e f i n e s t a n d a r d medical care in t e r m s of s o m e p e r c e n t i l e s for e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t a n d minimally a d e q u a t e m e d i c a l c a r e as s o m e fraction of s t a n d a r d medical care. Finally, w e c a n define minimally adequate health protection as access to m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e m e d i c a l c a r e . O P r e q u i r e s t h a t every participant b e able t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of h i s n e e d e d medical c a r e is at least X p e r c e n t of t h e cost of s t a n d a r d m e d i c a l care (that is, of t h e cost of m e d i c a l c a r e t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d p a r t i c i p a n t is expected to receive). 3 B

While t h e first of t h e s e t w o i d e a s limits t h e s c o p e of O P - the second it w o n ' t b e (very) sensitive t o t h e e x t r a v a g a n t medical care t h a t a few rich (or h y p o c h o n d r i a c a l ) p e r s o n s m a y s e c u r e for themselves o r to t h e special m e d i c a l c a r e p e r h a p s e n j o y e d b y a few prominent individuals. (And t h e r e is t h e n n o r e a s o n t o i m p o s e legal limits upon t h e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n enjoyed at t h e very t o p , even if t h e first principle a l l o w e d s u c h limitations.) P r e s u m a b l y , m o s t e x i s t i n g societies do not s e c u r e a c c e s s to minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for all and overall m e d i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e w o u l d u n d e n i a b l y i n c r e a s e if t h e y did. But t h e n e c e s s a r y i n c r e a s e is quite limited. It is n o t r e q u i r e d t h a t everyone h a v e a c c e s s to h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n close t o t h e very b e s t enjoyed by a n y o n e — w h i c h w o u l d b e q u i t e similar to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t , rejecte e a r l i e r . t h a t all m e d i c a l n e e d s m u s t b e m e t . T h e p r i n c i p l e demands ^.T 6 P « i o n b e i m p r o v e d for t h o s e in the M P d o s e ) t o t h e m i d d l e range nlriZn th f ' h a l f of t h o s e whose a c c e s s is much se^-resner. °H T*\ * * P P ° * e d b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ot entails n o m o r e t h a n t h 3B

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its m a r g i n a l cost is o u t w e i g h e d b y i t s m a r g i n a l benefits in terms of i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y , b e c a u s e s u c h m e d i c a l c a r e will t e n d to raise all i n d e x p o s i t i o n s . T h i s d e s i d e r a t u m w o u l d s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t preventive m e a s u r e s i n t h e a r e a s of p u b l i c h y g i e n e , p r o p h y l a x i s (vaccinationsi, a n d t h e like. But t h e n [3B] a l s o a l l o w s t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s t o go far b e y o n d w h a t efficiency m a n d a t e s b y a l l o c a t i n g a very large proportion of t h e social p r o d u c t t o m e d i c a l c a r e a t t h e e x p e n s e of index goods. N o w s o m e p e r s o n s , a t (almost) a n y level of h e a l t h protection, will be u n l u c k y e n o u g h t o e n c o u n t e r a c o m b i n a t i o n of m e d i c a l conditions for w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t o b t a i n t h e m e d i c a l c a r e t h e y n e e d . Indeed, some m a y even b e b o r n w i t h m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t e x c e e d any level of h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n t h e y c a n afford. S u c h c a s e s i n t r o d u c e radical in equalities i n p e r s o n s ' quality of life. But, n o t b e i n g social inequalities, t h e s e a r e n o t , o n a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h , v i e w e d as indica ting a n injustice. Rather, t h e y a r e natural i n e q u a l i t i e s for which, or for t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of w h i c h , social i n s t i t u t i o n s b e a r n o responsibility. Nevertheless, s u c h n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a t least m i t i g a t e d by defin ing t h e relevant social g o o d s o t h a t it is s e n s i t i v e t o differentials in m e d i c a l n e e d s . A m o n g p e r s o n s w i t h t h e s a m e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n , those w i t h w o r s e m e d i c a l histories s h o u l d receive m o r e m e d i c a l care—up to a certain point. 1 6 . 5 . Insofar a s m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e u n p r e d i c t a b l y distributed (so m a t e v e r y o n e faces r o u g h l y t h e s a m e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over litehme m e d i c a l histories), t h e a l l o c a t i o n of s o c i a l r e s o u r c e s among the various n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s p o s e s n o d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o b l e m . SupSwS 1 ? ' minimaUy a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n is prornrnlh / - P ° r e d m e d i c a l s y s t e m a n d is defined m e d unTverSlL M iCal ° n s for w h i c h s p e c i f i e d t r e a t m e n t is nJedSS^S? ^l°f * R a w i n g u p t h e list of covered ™ £ o ^ ° ' ^ tSr P ° n d i n g t r e a t m e n t s , c a n b e left to the SSiSSS^.?8 ° P ^ c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . W h e n particiS 5 i T S e ^ S ? d , ^ e x p o s e d t o a r o u g h l y eoua^ e

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certain that they ( a n d t h e i r loved o n e s ) will never suffer the medical condition in q u e s t i o n — t o d e f i n e a s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d package of mini mally adequate h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n s o t h a t s u c h conditions are excluded. It may seem p r o m i s i n g t o r u l e o u t t h i s possibility t h r o u g h t h e require ment that minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n m u s t be defined in terms of cost only, s o t h a t e a c h p e r s o n is t o have access t o health protection that s e c u r e s a c c e s s t o all kinds of available medical care (for natural medical c o n d i t i o n s ) u p t o a c e r t a i n overall cost. But this is at best a partial s o l u t i o n b e c a u s e t h e p r o b l e m r e c u r s in the allocation of social resources t o v a r i o u s a r e a s of m e d i c a l research, which influences what medical p r o c e d u r e s a r e available a n d at w h a t price. Again, the Political process m a y t e n d t o a l l o c a t e few, if any, resources to research ing medical c o n d i t i o n s t h a t o n l y affect genetically h a n d i c a p p e d minor ities. On a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h w e c a n n o t criticize a medical system guided b y s u c h m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s as unjust even though it is unresponsive to t h e m e d i c a l n e e d s of s u c h minorities. One may think that semiconsequentialism i s t h e r e f o r e implausible here, but this is at 'east not obvious. O u r h y p o t h e t i c a l m e d i c a l system would secure g h l y equal h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l medical conditions that «eryone is r o u g h l y e q u a l l y likely t o h a v e . If m o r e is required on behalf «those w h o , t h r o u g h n o fault of t h e i r own, are genetically handi^PPed, then w h y s h o u l d n o t m o r e b e r e q u i r e d also o n behalf of those who, through n o fault of t h e i r o w n , h a v e r u n out of health protection, 'he fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h involves the dubious "ewthat an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , r a t h e r t h a n generate a fair distnc-uton of benefits a n d b u r d e n s for its p a r t i c i p a n t s , should operate in a jnedial way, s h o u l d d i s t r i b u t e benefits a n d b u r d e n s so as to balance out a m o n g its p a r t i c i p a n t s for t h e sake of t h e overall fairness ot universe. C o r r e c t i v e l y , t h e fully consequentialist alternative apa b a n d o n s t h e a t t r a c t i v e i d e a t h a t justice d o e s not mandate very 3aU . t e m s but requires, onfy 2 s y s t e m s f u n c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s o m e plausible p n n c i fair equality of a c c e s s This way of d e a l i n g w i t h m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s involving & ™ " * ] ^Positions m a y b e r a d i c a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h contemporary ad mu

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v a n c e s i n m e d i c a l t e c h n o l o g y t o w a r d m a k i n g g e n e t i c h a n d i c a p s avoid able. O n c e s u c h t e c h n o l o g i e s h a v e c o m e i n t o w i d e u s e , a genetic handi c a p will reflect a social d i s a d v a n t a g e ( r a t h e r t h a n a n a t u r a l handicap). T h i s s c e n a r i o w o u l d s u g g e s t y e t a n o t h e r e x t e n s i o n of O P , which I w o n ' t d i s c u s s — a r e q u i r e m e n t of r o u g h l y e q u a l a c c e s s to available p r o c e d u r e s for e n s u r i n g t h e c o n c e p t i o n of c h i l d r e n w h o a r e not genet ically h a n d i c a p p e d — w h i c h r e q u i r e m e n t m i g h t c o v e r n o t only genetic h a n d i c a p s relevant to h e a l t h , b u t a l s o t h o s e r e l e v a n t t o education and employment. 1 6 . 6 . So far w e h a v e at b e s t a first a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h e [3B] require m e n t of fair equality of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y . W e m u s t yet consider m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are socially produced, t h a t is, d u e to actions of a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e social s y s t e m . Socially pro d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s fall u n d e r t h e "benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n " (TJ 4-5), w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n Rawls's criterion of justice is m e a n t t o g o v e r n . S u c h d i s e a s e s a n d disabilities, unlike n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , a r e p a r t of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' shares a n d t h u s d o play a role in identifying a n d e v a l u a t i n g t h e worst social p o s i t i o n b y reference t o w h i c h a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is to be as s e s s e d . I will a r g u e t h a t O P s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e full health pro t e c t i o n against socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . Let u s begin w i t h socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s that are u n p r e d i c t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e d , d i s e a s e s c a u s e d b y g e n e r a l pollution, for e x a m p l e . O n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e s e at