Realizing Rawls

T H O M A S W. P O G G E

Realizing

Rawls

C o r n e l l University P r e s s Ithaca and London

Copyright © 1989 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief q u o t a t i o n s in a review, this book, o r parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n in writing from t h e publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, N e w York 14850. First published 1989 by Cornell University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pogge, T h o m a s Winfried Menko. Realizing Rawls / T h o m a s W. Pogge. p. c m . Bibliography: p Includes index. ISBN 0-8014-2124-1 talk, paper). — ISBN 0-8014-9685-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Rawls, John, 1 9 2 1 - Theory of justice. 2. Justice. I. Title. JC578.R383P64 1989 320'.o'l'l—dc20 89-42879 Printed in the United States of America 0 0

The paper u s e d in this publication m e e t s t h e m i n i m u m r e q u i r e m e n t s of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

FOR JOHN RAWLS, w h o m a d e it p o s s i b l e and necessary

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction

ix xi 1

Part One: Defending the Main Ideas 1. N o z i c k a n d t h e F o c u s o n t h e B a s i c S t r u c t u r e §1

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice

§2

T h e Relevance of Patterns

§3

T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of Justice

§4

Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative

28

Natural E n d o w m e n t s

36

48

2 . S a n d e l a n d t h e C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n §5

15

15

63

63

§6

Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert

§7

Desert

§8

T h e " D e o n t o l o g i c a l " Self

§9

Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n

73

81 86 94

Part T w o : D e v e l o p i n g Rawls's Criterion of Justice 3. T h e First P r i n c i p l e of Justice §10

The General Parameters

§11

T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e

109

109 122

Contents

viii §12

T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties

§13

T h e Political P r o c e s s

134

148

4. T h e S e c o n d P r i n c i p l e o f J u s t i c e §14

Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle

§15

Educational and Employment Opportunities

161

§16

Medical Opportunities

§17

The Difference Principle

173

181 196

Part T h r e e : Globalizing t h e Ravvlsian C o n c e p t i o n of Justice 211

5. F r o m M o d u s Vivendi to V a l u e O v e r l a p §18

T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of J u s t i c e

211

§19

International Relations as a M o d u s Vivendi

§20

A Value-Based World Order

218

227

6. A C r i t e r i o n of G l o b a l J u s t i c e §21

T h e T r a d i t i o n a l L a w of N a t i o n s

§22

T h e Internal A r g u m e n t

246

§23

T h e External A r g u m e n t

259

§24

Conclusion

240 240

273

Selected Bibliography Index

281 285

Acknowledgments

H o w e v e r critical a n d revisionist, this b o o k is i n s p i r e d b y a d e e p a d m i r a t i o n for J o h n Rawls's t h e o r y of justice, in w h i c h I s e e , d e s p i t e its s h o r t c o m i n g s , a b a s i c framework of c o m p e l l i n g s c o p e a n d m o r a l b e a u t y . My f o r e m o s t a i m w a s t o e x p r e s s t h i s vision. My w o r k in political p h i l o s o p h y h a s greatly benefited over t h e y e a r s from t h e critical a t t e n t i o n it received from Rawls a n d later from S i d n e y M o r g e n b e s s e r , C h a r l e s L a r m o r e , a n d B r u c e A c k e r m a n . T h a t n o n e of t h e m is p a r t i c u l a r l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o m y a p p r o a c h a n d c o n c l u s i o n s h a s m a d e o u r d i s c u s s i o n s all t h e m o r e v a l u a b l e t o m e . A c k e r m a n b e a r s a n a d d i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : W h e n I h a d a b a n d o n e d p l a n s for t h i s book, h e i n s i s t e d , a m i c a b l y b u t very firmly, t h a t it b e w r i t t e n . He cheerfully a d d e d t h a t it w o u l d n ' t b e great, b u t it w o u l d still b e a g o o d b o o k . T h e a c t u a l w r i t i n g w a s d o n e in t h e a d v e n t u r o u s fluvial e n v i r o n m e n t of Wolfson College, O x f o r d — a p l a c e of w o n d e r f u l p e o p l e a n d i d e a s t h a t proved most inspiring a n d hospitable. Upon m y return, I received e x t e n s i v e c o m m e n t s o n t h e e n t i r e t y p e s c r i p t from C h a r l e s L a r m o r e , A n d r e a s Follesdal, B r u c e A c k e r m a n , a n d Ling T o n g . H e n r y R i c h a r d s o n a n d O s c a r S c h a c h t e r p r o v i d e d a d d i t i o n a l feedback o n C h a p t e r s 2 a n d 5 respectively. T h e s e b e n e v o l e n t critics h a v e t a u g h t m e m u c h a n d , I h o p e , e n a b l e d m e t o give c l e a r e r e x p r e s s i o n t o m y t h o u g h t s . T h o m a s W. Pogge New York, New York

ix

Abbreviations

Works by J o h n Rawls are abbreviated as follows: BLP

BSS DPOC FG IMT IOC JF JFFM JR KCMT ODPE PFE

PRIG RAM

" T h e B a s i c L i b e r t i e s a n d T h e i r P r i o r i t y , " i n S. M . M c M u r r i n , e d . , The Tanner Lectures on Human Value, 3 (Salt L a k e C i t y : U n i v e r s i t y o f U t a h Press, 1982). " T h e B a s i c S t r u c t u r e a s S u b j e c t , " i n A. I. G o l d m a n a n d J. K i m , e d s . , Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978). " T h e D o m a i n o f t h e P o l i t i c a l a n d O v e r l a p p i n g C o n s e n s u s , " i n New York University Law Review 6 4 ( J u n e 1 9 8 9 ) . " F a i r n e s s t o G o o d n e s s , " Philosophical Review 8 4 (1975), 5 3 6 - 5 4 . " T h e I n d e p e n d e n c e o f M o r a l T h e o r y , " Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 4 8 ( N o v e m b e r 1975), 5 - 2 2 . " T h e I d e a o f a n O v e r l a p p i n g C o n s e n s u s , " Orford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (Spring 1987), 1 - 2 5 . " J u s t i c e a s F a i r n e s s , " Philosophical Review 6 7 (April 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 6 4 - 9 4 . "Justice a s Fairness: Political n o t Metaphysical,"P/iz7osop/7yandP(jfo/f'c Affairs 1 4 ( S u m m e r 1 9 8 5 ) , 2 2 3 - 5 1 . " J u s t i c e a s R e c i p r o c i t y , " i n S. G o r o w i t z , e d . , Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill, with Critical Essays ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). " K a n t i a n C o n s t r u c t i v i s m i n M o r a l T h e o r y , " Journal of Philosophy 77 ( S e p t e m b e r 1980), 5 1 5 - 7 2 . " O u t l i n e o f a D e c i s i o n P r o c e d u r e f o r E t h i c s , " Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 1 7 7 - 9 7 . " P r e f a c e f o r t h e F r e n c h E d i t i o n " o f TJ, E n g l i s h t y p e s c r i p t ( A u g u s t 1 9 8 6 ) , p p . 1 - 6 . F r e n c h v e r s i o n i n Theorie de la justice, trans. Catherine A u d a r d (Paris: Seuil, 1987). " T h e P r i o r i t y o f R i g h t a n d I d e a s o f t h e G o o d , " Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 7 (Fall 1 9 8 8 ) , 2 5 1 - 7 6 . " R e p l y t o A l e x a n d e r a n d M u s g r a v e , " Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 ( N o v e m b e r 1974), 6 3 3 - 5 5 .

xi

xii

Abbreviations

RMC

" S o m e R e a s o n s for t h e M a x i m i n C r i t e r i o n , " American view 6 4 ( M a y 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 4 1 - 4 6 .

SUPG

"Social U n i t y a n d P r i m a r y G o o d s , " in A. K. S e n a n d B. W i l l i a m s , e d s . , Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). " T w o C o n c e p t s o f R u l e s , " i n S. G o r o w i t z , e d . , Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill, with Critical Essays ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1 9 7 1 ) .

TCR TG

TJ WOS

Economic

Re­

Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, t r a n s . H e r m a n n Vetter (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1 9 7 5 ) . All t r a n s l a t i o n s o f TJ w e r e p r e p a r e d f r o m a r e v i s e d E n g l i s h t e x t c o m p l e t e d in M a r c h o f 1 9 7 5 (cf. P F E 1 ) . H a v i n g c h e c k e d all p a s s a g e s c i t e d f r o m TJ a g a i n s t t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n T G , I n o t e a n y relevant d i s c r e p a n c i e s . A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). "A W e l l - O r d e r e d S o c i e t y , " i n P. L a s l e t t a n d J. F i s h k i n , e d s . , Philosophy, Politics, and Society, 5th s e r i e s ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), first p u b l i s h e d a s "A K a n t i a n C o n c e p t i o n o f E q u a l i t y , " Cam­ bridge Review ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 5 ) , 9 4 - 9 9 .

REALIZING

RAWLS

Introduction

T h i s b o o k is b o t h a d e f e n s e a n d a c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e of t h e w o r k of J o h n Rawls. T h e s e t w o a s p e c t s p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r . T h e c o n s t r u c ­ tive c r i t i q u e is n e c e s s a r y to s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n c o r e i d e a s of Rawls's t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n b e d e v e l o p e d in a w a y t h a t m a k e s t h e m w o r t h d e f e n d i n g . After all, t h e r e is little i n t e r e s t in j u s t k e e p i n g t h e s c o r e straight. T h e d e f e n s e is n e c e s s a r y t o s h o w t h a t t h e s e i d e a s h a v e re­ m a i n e d u n d a m a g e d — a n d e v e n largely u n r e c o g n i z e d — i n t h e b a r r a g e of criticism Rawls h a s p r o v o k e d . T h e b o o k as a w h o l e is m e a n t to s h o w t h a t Rawls offers a s o u n d b a s i s for p r o g r e s s in political p h i l o s o p h y as well a s for political p r o g r e s s . I d o n ' t a i m for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m e n t a r y o n Rawls. I n s t e a d , I c o n c e n t r a t e o n t w o c e n t r a l Rawlsian i d e a s : first, t h e focus o n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , for m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m u s t i n c l u d e , even b e g i n from, a reflec­ t i o n u p o n t h e j u s t i c e of o u r b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; s e c o n d , t h e m a x i m i n i d e a t h a t a s c h e m e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o b e a s s e s s e d b y t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s , t h a t its j u s t i c e d e p e n d s o n h o w well it d o e s b y its least a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s . My m a i n i n t e r e s t is t h u s in o n e p a r t of Rawls's t h e o r y , h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I a m centrally c o n ­ c e r n e d w i t h t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice h e h a s p r o p o s e d , w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l e for this criterion, a n d w i t h its a p p l i c a t i o n to existing a n d feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . M a t t e r s p e r i p h e r a l to t h e s e e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l political c o n c e r n s , h o w e v e r i m p o r t a n t t h e y m a y b e to Rawls, figure o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y h e r e . 1

J

N o r d o I aim to p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m e n t a r y o n the s e c o n d a r y literature o n Rawls. I d o cite s o m e of t h e s e s o u r c e s w h e r e it m a y b e illuminating to s e e h o w I agree or disagree w i t h t h e m , b u t I make n o effort to a c k n o w l e d g e a n d d i s c u s s every previous c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e i s s u e s I a m c o n c e r n e d w i t h . Given the a m o u n t of s e c o n d a r y writing o n Rawls, s u c h a n e n d e a v o r w o u l d have m a d e this b o o k u n r e a d a b l e .

1

2

Introduction

I d o not, for example, treat t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i t i o n in a n y detail, t h o u g h I d o s o m e t i m e s e m p l o y it t o d r a m a t i z e t h e priority c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d ( u n d e r v a r i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s ) , w h o m t h e p a r t i e s take t h e m s e l v e s t o b e r e p r e s e n t i n g . N o r d o 1 offer a n elaboration, either critical or defensive, of K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c t i v i s m o r of t h e m e t h o d of w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m , t h o u g h I a p p e a l t o t h e m occasionally to s h o w t h a t Rawls h a s r e a s o n to agree w i t h m e o n s o m e point. I avoid extensive d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e t o p i c s b e c a u s e it is n o t essential to m y objective. I w a n t t o explicate a n d d e v e l o p w h a t I take to b e Rawls's two m o s t powerful a n d i m p o r t a n t i d e a s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r practical political implications (as I see t h e m ) . All t h i s c o u l d b e d o n e w i t h o u t even m e n t i o n i n g t h e "expository device" (TJ 21) of t h e original position, a n d o n e c a n fully a c c e p t m y c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r o n e a c c e p t s or rejects (or is even a c q u a i n t e d with) K a n t i a n constructivism or t h e m e t h o d of w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . My a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p a s y s t e m a t i c a n d c o n c r e t e c o n c e p t i o n of justice b a s e d on Rawlsian i d e a s g o e s against a p o p u l a r t r e n d in AngloAmerican a c a d e m i a . T h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d s e n s e t h a t Rawls's w o r k is in s h a m b l e s b e c a u s e h i s critics have s h o w n its f o u n d a t i o n s to b e essentially a n d irremediably flawed. Since Rawls's m i s t a k e is t h o u g h t t o b e a d e e p o n e , t h e collapse of h i s t h e o r y is s a i d t o i n d i c a t e s o m e t h i n g larger, to m a r k t h e e n d of a n era, p e r h a p s t h e d e a t h of liberalism, t h e d e m i s e of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t tradition, or even t h e b a n k r u p t c y of s y s ­ tematic m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . W h a t w e n e e d is a radical r e o r i e n t a t i o n in o u r ethical thinking, or so t h e story goes. Several a u t h o r s h a v e a l r e a d y v o l u n t e e r e d t o set t h e a g e n d a for t h e d a w n i n g p o s t - R a w l s i a n era, a n a g e n d a b a s e d o n t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n not m e r e l y of Rawls's c o n c l u s i o n s b u t of his goals a n d entire a p p r o a c h . 2

Rather t h a n directly confront t h e s e n e w a g e n d a s h e r e , I e x a m i n e o n e m a i n s o u r c e of t h e i r popularity, t h e n o t i o n t h a t Rawls's t h e o r y h a s collapsed. My defense of t h a t t h e o r y in Part O n e is m e a n t t o s h o w t h a t t h e obituaries are p r e m a t u r e , t h a t Rawls's critics have n o t e x p o s e d a n y d e e p flaw i n h i s w o r k at all; t h e y have m e r e l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d it (albeit deeply). T h a t Rawls's t h e o r y easily survives t h e c o m m o n c r i t i c i s m s directed against it d o e s not, of c o u r s e , g u a r a n t e e t h a t it i s n ' t d e e p l y flawed in o t h e r w a y s . But j u d g m e n t o n its u l t i m a t e tenability is b e s t deferred until w e have a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t h e o r y , t o g e t h e r w i t h its p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d practical i m p l i c a t i o n s , t h a n h a s y e t b e e n achieved. However u n d a m a g e d phUosophically, Rawls's w o r k is i n d e c l i n e a s a m a t t e r of a c a d e m i c politics. T h e critics have clearly w o n i n t h e a r e n a of public relations. We are well b e y o n d t h e stage w h e n , in Robert Nozick's w o r d s , political p h i l o s o p h e r s n o w m u s t e i t h e r w o r k w i t h i n R a w l s ' 8

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Introduction

3

t h e o r y o r e x p l a i n w h y n o t " (ASU 183). T o d a y it is m o r e c o m m o n for political p h i l o s o p h e r s to m a k e d o w i t h a brief r e m i n d e r t h a t Rawls's t h e o r y c a n b e set a s i d e b e c a u s e of its i r r e m e d i a b l e failure to c o m e to t e r m s w i t h this o r t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l difficulty. T h i s shift in a c a d e m i c p r e p o s s e s s i o n s is in large p a r t d u e t o t h e w o r k of Rawls's t w o m o s t influential critics, Nozick a n d M i c h a e l Sandel, w h o m I c o n f r o n t in detail in Part O n e . I a m o n l y m a r g i n a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in t h e i r o w n p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h I m a k e n o claim t o h a v e u n d e r m i n e d . Rather, m y c o n c e r n is to s h o w in all clarity h o w t h e i r r e a d i n g a n d criticism of Rawls a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y m i s t a k e n . B e g i n n i n g in t h i s w a y allows m e to s h o w t h a t Rawls is still w o r t h taking seriously a n d to c o r r e c t s o m e b a s i c m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t are o n t h e verge of b e c o m ­ i n g official Rawls d o c t r i n e . Nozick a n d Sandel, t h e libertarian a n d t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n , s h a r e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls. Both fail t o a p p r e c i a t e his d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d morality, b e t w e e n t h e focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e focus o n p e r s o n s ' c o n d u c t a n d c h a r a c t e r . But in C h a p t e r 1, w h e n I explicate a n d d e v e l o p t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a n d t h e R a w l s i a n focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , I d r a w u p o n Nozick's criticism only, b e c a u s e S a n d e l , heavily i n f l u e n c e d b y Nozick, offers n o t h i n g es­ sentially n e w o n this s c o r e . S a n d e l figures p r o m i n e n t l y in C h a p t e r 2, b e c a u s e of a s e c o n d , i n d e p e n d e n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls, p a r t l y i n s p i r e d b y Nozick, w h i c h h e h a s d e v e l o p e d a n d grafted o n t o t h e first. T h i s s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g involves Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r ­ s o n as, s u p p o s e d l y , a b a r r e n , u n e n c u m b e r e d self, d e v o i d of c o n s t i t u t i v e c o m m i t m e n t s a n d a t t a c h m e n t s . I s h o w t h a t Rawls is n o t c o m m i t t e d to s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a n d t h a t t h e tenability of his c o n c e p ­ tion of j u s t i c e e v e n d e p e n d s , in part, o n t h e d e n i a l of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n that S a n d e l a t t r i b u t e s to h i m . T h e critics' s u c c e s s , h o w e v e r unjustified, h a s stifled w h a t , in m y view, w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t u p s h o t of Rawls's w o r k — a b r o a d d e b a t e a b o u t t h e j u s t i c e of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d feasible a v e n u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. I n d e e d , Rawls's w o r k h a s a u n i q u e affinity for a c o n c r e t e d e b a t e a b o u t j u s t i c e b e c a u s e of its c o m m i t m e n t to t h e p r i m a c y of t h e practical: 3

T h e s e a r c h for r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t r o o t e d i n o u r c o n c e p t i o n of o u r s e l v e s a n d in o u r r e l a t i o n t o s o c i e t y r e p l a c e s t h e s e a r c h f o r m o r a l t r u t h i n t e r p r e t e d a s fixed b y a p r i o r a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o r d e r o f objects a n d relations, w h e t h e r natural or divine, an order apart a n d dis­ t i n c t f r o m h o w w e c o n c e i v e o f o u r s e l v e s . T h e t a s k is t o a r t i c u l a t e a p u b l i c 3

N o z i c k h a s p r e s e n t e d a crisp a n d interesting political p h i l o s o p h y of h i s o w n , a n d Sandel is d e v e l o p i n g h i s . T h e s e p o s i t i o n s are w o r t h s t u d y i n g (for s o m e s e c o n d a r y litera­ ture, s e e , e.g., Paul, RN; G u t m a n n , CCL; a n d Larmore, PMC 1 2 1 - 2 9 ) . My claim that Nozick a n d Sandel have m i s u n d e r s t o o d Rawls d o e s not e x p r e s s d i s r e s p e c t for their positive a c h i e v e m e n t s . Moreover, t h e mere fact that m a n y h a v e followed their m i s r e a d i n g s s h o w s that t h e s e m u s t h a v e s o m e plausibility, b o t h as r e a d i n g s of Rawls a n d in their o w n right.

4

Introduction c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e t h a t all c a n live w i t h w h o r e g a r d t h e i r p e r s o n

and

their relation to society in a certain w a y . A n d t h o u g h d o i n g t h i s

may

i n v o l v e s e t t l i n g t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e p r a c t i c a l s o c i a l t a s k is p r i m a r y . [KCMT 519]

Previous writers o n justice c o u l d derive comfort from t h e fact t h a t t h e i r work, w h a t e v e r its political i m p a c t or lack thereof, w o u l d at least h e l p elucidate w h a t justice is a n d r e q u i r e s . T h e y v i e w e d t h e truth of a t h e o r y as i n d e p e n d e n t of its p o p u l a r a p p e a l a n d political s u c c e s s , a n d t h u s c o n s i d e r e d it a great a c h i e v e m e n t to c o n s t r u c t t h e just s o c i e t y "as a m o d e l laid u p in heaven. . . . It m a k e s n o difference w h e t h e r it exists a n y w h e r e o r will exist" (Plato, Republic 592b). Rawls c a n derive n o s u c h comfort, for h e c l a i m s n o t r u t h for his c o n c e p t i o n b e y o n d its p o t e n t i a l to serve a s t h e c o r e of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . W h e t h e r his c o n c e p t i o n of justice h a s t h i s p o t e n t i a l is n o t a theoretical m a t t e r that c o u l d b e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t s within t h e theory itself. Rather, it is a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n that c a n b e settled conclusively only by t h e a c t u a l s u c c e s s of t h e c o n c e p t i o n in t h e role for w h i c h it w a s i n t e n d e d . Here a great d e a l of w o r k r e m a i n s t o b e d o n e before Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n will h a v e e v e n a c h a n c e t o s u c c e e d . Some of this w o r k I a t t e m p t to d o h e r e . My c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e of -Rawls in Parts T w o a n d T h r e e d e v e l o p s h i s c o n c e p t i o n in a w a y t h a t r e n d e r s it mpre_concrete a n d m a k e s its full progressive p o t e n t i a l m o r e visible. Both t h e s e aims go a g a i n s t t h e t r e n d of Rawls's l a t e r w o r k t o w a r d abstraction, v a g u e n e s s , a n d c o n s e r v a t i s m . I s e e this t r e n d as d u e , in large part, to t h e w i d e s p r e a d criticism of his work, w h i c h , in this d e c a d e at least, h a s b e e n p r e d o m i n a n t l y conservative. Rawls h a s b e e n exceptionally unwilling t o disagree s h a r p l y w i t h h i s critics. R e l u c t a n t to claim privileged a c c e s s to h i s work, h e h a s s h i e d a w a y from s a y i n g (and showing) clearly a n d straightforwardly t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r r e a d i n g of it is just p l a i n w r o n g . Instead, a i m i n g for a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s a m o n g political p h i l o s o p h e r s a s well, h e h a s m a d e every c o n c e i v a b l e effort to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m o r a l p o s i t i o n s of o t h e r s , e v e n w h e r e s u c h a c c o m m o d a t i o n h a s d i l u t e d t h e c e n t r a l m o r a l s t a t e m e n t of h i s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of justice. With h i n d s i g h t it s e e m s fair t o say that this h a s n o t b e e n a w i n n i n g strategy. It h a s certainly not s t o p p e d t h e criticism a n d r e j e c t i o n of h i s work; o n t h e contrary, by s h o w i n g Rawls o n t h e defensive, it h a s p e r ­ h a p s even e n c o u r a g e d attack. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h i s strategy h a s m o v e d t h e d e b a t e in exactly t h e w r o n g direction. As t h e political c o n t e n t of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n h a s b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e vague a n d i n d e t e r m i ­ nate, a t t e n t i o n h a s shifted to t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s of t h e theory. We are back to issues in m o r a l psychology, m e t a e t h i c s , a n d m o r a l e p i s t e m o l o g y — t o d e b a t e s that are m e t a p h y s i c a l i n s t v l e , if n o t in substance. J

T h o s e for w h o m t h e practical social task is p r i m a r y w o u l d take j u s t

Introduction

5

t h e o p p o s i t e a p p r o a c h to t h e subject. T h e y w o u l d n o t begin w i t h t h e f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h a w h o l e edifice of m o r a l k n o w l e d g e is t o b e e r e c t e d . I n s t e a d , t h e y w o u l d start from c o n c r e t e m o r a l i s s u e s a c t u a l l y in d i s p u t e a n d t h e n e x t e n d t h e i r m o r a l reflection a s far afield as is n e c e s s a r y to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t . T h e y w o u l d n o t w a n t to learn a b o u t K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , reflective e q u i l i b r i u m , a n d t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n u n t i l t h e y h a d first g r a s p e d t h e political c o n t e n t of Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice, h o w it is to govern social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d g u i d e t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t a n d reform. O t h e r m a t t e r s are i m p o r t a n t only insofar a s t h e y affect t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this criterion o r its justification a g a i n s t c o m p e t i n g criteria t h a t are a c t u a l l y p u t f o r w a r d in g o o d faith. T h i s difference in a p p r o a c h h a s political r e l e v a n c e . C u r r e n t l y , m o r a l a n d political p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e g e n e r a l c o m p l a ­ c e n c y a b o u t m o r a l i t y in v a r i o u s w a y s . S o m e of t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are s c a r c e l y a v o i d a b l e . T h e r e h a v e always b e e n p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o c a t e r to t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective self-concern of t h e i r a u d i e n c e s , t h e r e b y t u r n i n g s o m e into e a g e r c o n v e r t s a n d o t h e r s i n t o m o r a l c y n i c s . W h a t w e c a n avoid is p r e s e n t i n g t h e i m a g e of a c o m m u n i t y of e x p e r t s totally a n d h o p e l e s s l y d i v i d e d o n even t h e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s . T h i s i m a g e m a k e s it far too e a s y for politicians, professionals, a n d p e o p l e in g e n e r a l t o cast m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a s i d e in s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e a t t e n d ­ i n g to t h e m is liable to c a u s e discomfort. F o c u s i n g t h e ethical d e b a t e o n c o n c r e t e i s s u e s of practical r e l e v a n c e w o u l d alleviate this p r o b l e m in t w o w a y s : m o r a l d e b a t e s are h a r d e r to i g n o r e w h e n t h e i r p o i n t is to c o m e to terms with malnutrition, homelessness, a n d oppression than w h e n t h e y e x h a u s t t h e m s e l v e s in s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t ideal observers, s e c o n d a r y qualities, a n d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i ­ s o n s ; a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t c o n c r e t e m o r a l i s s u e s is generally n a r 4

*Our l i m e h a s p e r h a p s m o r e than its share of t h e s e b e c a u s e of the p o p u l a r n o t i o n (a vulgar version of Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium I that morality is w h a t e v e r fits best with "our" reactions a n d i n t u i t i o n s — e q u a t e d , in a c o m m o n e x p r e s s i o n , w i t h the moral facts. W h e n moraJists from all c a m p s s e e it a s their task to d e m o n s t r a t e that their respective theories c a n "account for o u r moral experience," w e n e e d not be surprised, at the h e i g h t of what is often called the rne-generahon, to find p h i l o s o p h e r s proliferating all sorts of h i g h - s o u n d i n g p h r a s e s (and p u r p o r t e d justifications] for individual a n d c o l l e c ­ tive self-concern: a g e n t - c e n t e r e d prerogatives, a robust z o n e of moral indifference, a cutoff for h e r o i s m , a n d t h e like. Justifications for s u c h n o t i o n s generally e m p h a s i z e h o w very i m p o r t a n t it is to u s — i n d e e d , a matter of integrity—to be faithful to o u r d e e p projects a n d constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s . There is praise for lovality to family, f i i e n d s , a n d c o m m u n i t y a n d ridicule for abstract universalistic moraJism s u p p o s e d l y p r o d u c i n g moral s a i n t s a n d d o - g o o d e r s w h o are intolerable as friends a n d lovers. It is transparent e n o u g h that this diversion of the agent's moral c o n c e r n from t h o s e m o r e distant to t h o s e a r o u n d h i m a n d to h i m s e l f will, in a w o r l d of radical inequalities, benefit the m o r e advantaged p e r s o n s a n d g r o u p s at the e x p e n s e of the l e s s advantaged. It s h i e l d s u s from moral c l a i m s invoking the e x t r e m e misery of distant others Is this the point of s u c h m a n e u v e r s ? A n d if not, w h y hasn't their authors' (quite u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e ) c o n c e r n for the value of d e e p p r o j e c t s a n d c o m m u n i t y alerted t h e m to the fact that s o m a n y h u m a n beings, c o n s u m e d by a lifelong yet often short-lived daily struggle against h u n g e r a n d d i s e a s e , are i n n o p o s i t i o n t o enjoy m e m b e r s h i p in a h a r m o n i o u s c o m m u n i t y o r to lead a life of integrity by forming a n d h o n o r i n g d e e p projects a n d constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s ?

6

Introduction

rower, even a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s , t h a n d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t abstract, "foundational'' q u e s t i o n s . At stake in t h e a t t e m p t t o m a k e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice m o r e c o n c r e t e , t h e n , is its m o r a l value by t h e lights of h i s o w n t h e o r y , tf this t h e o r y c a n m a k e n o c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e practical t a s k s of facilitating a g r e e m e n t a n d alleviating injustice, t h e n it e n d s u p s e l f - c o n d e m n e d . For in Rawls's view, the_truth of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s in its ability t o a p p e a l a n d motivate. Going a little further, o n e m i g h t s a y that t h e p o i n t of political p h i l o s o p h y is n o t merely t o s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n principles are true, b u t to m a k e t h e m t r u e by m o t i v a t i n g t h e s t r u g g l e for their g r a d u a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Also at stake is t h e very m e a n i n g of Rawls's t h e o i y . An a r r a n g e m e n t of c o n c e p t s a n d ideas m a y look meaningful if it is well o r g a n i z e d s o that e a c h of its various e l e m e n t s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d a n d m o t i v a t e d in t e r m s of the others, b u t s u c h a n a r r a n g e m e n t is n o t a t h e o i y if it is n o t p i n n e d d o w n t o its subject m a t t e r . It is n o t meaningful as a w h o l e if it d o e s n o t have significant implications statable o u t s i d e t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e t h e ­ ory itself. If the goal is t o facilitate a g r e e m e n t o n a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e "a public basis in t h e light of w h i c h citizens c a n justify to o n e a n o t h e r their c o m m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s " (KCMT 5 6 1 ) — t h e n it m u s t b e m a d e clear what this criterion m e a n s , t h a t is, h o w it w o u l d a s s e s s p a r t i c u l a r in­ stitutional s c h e m e s . Rawls c a n plausibly reply that it is n o t his role a s a p h i l o s o p h e r to d e c i d e w h e t h e r , say, t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is satisfied in t h e United States. Such a n investigation m u s t surely d r a w u p o n t h e expertise of e c o n o m i s t s , a m o n g o t h e r s . Yet it is part of Rawls's task to s h o w h o w experts in o t h e r fields s h o u l d go a b o u t settling s u c h m a t t e r s . Rawls m u s t s h a r p e n t h e relevant q u e s t i o n s t o clarify w h a t sort of empirical d a t a (and t h e like) a r e n e e d e d from o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s a n d w h a t a n s w e r s given d a t a w o u l d entail. Similarly, in r e g a r d to h i s ideal well-ordered society, Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice n e e d n o t specify in detail w h a t social institutions are required, b u t it m u s t state c l e a r l y — i n t e r m s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t o jurists, e c o n o m i s t s , a n d political s c i e n t i s t s — what is required of such institutions. T h e b e a u t y a n d p o w e r of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n are w a s t e d insofar a s t h e y c a n n o t b e i m p o r t e d i n t o t h e political a r e n a . Although Rawls s e e m s to a c c e p t this d e m a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , i n p r a c ­ tice h e h a s fallen far s h o r t of m e e t i n g it, a n d t h e g a p is i n c r e a s i n g . Let m e h e r e confine myself to a single e x a m p l e , o n e of several p o i n t s extensively d i s c u s s e d in Part Two. T h r o u g h t h e first p r i n c i p l e of justice, Rawls r e q u i r e s t h a t social institutions p r o t e c t t h e f r e e d o m a n d i n t e g 5

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Introduction

7

rjty pf t h e p e r s o n . H o w d o w e j u d g e w h e t h e r this requirement is m e t ? M u s t w e look at infant mortality r a t e s a n d t h e i n c i d e n c e of violent c r i m e s ? Is it relevant w h e t h e r s o m e a m o n g t h e p o o r a r e m a l n o u r i s h e d or starving? Rawls d o e s n o t say. His s i l e n c e facilitates a c o n s e n s u s of s o r t s : m a n y c a n e n d o r s e t h e a b s t r a c t r e q u i r e m e n t , i n t e r p r e t i n g it b r o a d l y o r n a r r o w l y a c c o r d i n g to t a s t e . But this is t h e w r o n g s o r t of c o n s e n s u s — o r , r a t h e r , n o c o n s e n s u s at all. T o p r o v i d e a s h a r e d b a s i s for a g r e e m e n t o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t i n c l u d e a n s w e r s t o q u e s t i o n s of t h i s sort, a n d obviously, t h e relevant specifications m u s t b e p r o v i d e d in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o r e of t h e c o n ­ c e p t i o n itself. N o jurist o r social t h e o r i s t c a n a n s w e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s for us. T h e specification of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is a p a r a d i g m a t ically i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y e n t e r p r i s e . P h i l o s o p h e r s c a n n o t s i m p l y d e v e l o p s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n u p to a c e r t a i n p o i n t a n d t h e n invite social t h e o r i s t s a n d jurists to "take over." T h e i d e a s a n d t e r m i n o l o g i e s of t h e v a r i o u s d i s c i p l i n e s m u s t e n g a g e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . It m u s t b e a s s u r e d , for e x a m p l e , t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e , s t a t e d in t e r m s t h a t e c o n o m i s t s a r e familiar w i t h a n d c a n w o r k with, really e x p r e s s e s , closely e n o u g h , t h e a s s e s s m e n t i n t e n d e d in t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p h i l o ­ s o p h i c a l c r i t e r i o n of justice. Specification p r o c e e d s from a n a r e a t h a t is p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l to a n a r e a t h a t is p u r e l y n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , b u t a l o n g t h e way, it p a s s e s t h r o u g h a n a r e a t h a t is g e n u i n e l y i n t e r d i s c i ­ p l i n a r y — a n a r e a that, I think, Rawls h a s for t h e m o s t part failed to reach. In p r o p o s i n g a specification of Rawls's criterion (in Part Two), I v e n t u r e i n t o this i n t e r m e d i a t e area. Against t h e s t a n d a r d s a n d t e r m i ­ nologies of o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s , this effort is b o u n d to a p p e a r s o m e w h a t a m a t e u r i s h — e x c u s a b l y so, I h o p e , given t h a t it is m e r e l y a first s k e t c h of h o w t o achieve g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n , a n invitation for c o o p e r a t i o n a n d n o t a n a t t e m p t to go it a l o n e . I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n m u s t b e specified to m a k e clear w h a t h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice means, h o w it is to b e u s e d to a s s e s s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a p a r t i c u l a r social s y s t e m a n d to g u i d e t h e i r reform. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t also b e d e v e l o p e d in t w o f u r t h e r d i m e n s i o n s to m a k e it sufficiently c o n c r e t e . O n e task is to clarify t h e d o m a i n of this c o n c e p t i o n . Rawls offers it for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e of a society t h a t is (as h e variously p u t s it) "selfc o n t a i n e d , " " m o r e o r less self-sufficient," o r "a c l o s e d s y s t e m isolated from o t h e r s o c i e t i e s " (TJ 457, 4, 8). "At s o m e level t h e r e m u s t exist a c l o s e d b a c k g r o u n d s y s t e m , a n d it is this s u b j e c t for w h i c h w e w a n t a t h e o r y . We a r e b e t t e r p r e p a r e d to take u p this p r o b l e m , " h e f u r t h e r s u g g e s t s , "for a s o c i e t y (illustrated b y n a t i o n s ) — If w e a r e successful in t h e c a s e of a society, w e c a n try to e x t e n d a n d to a d j u s t o u r initial t h e o r y a s f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s " (BSS 70 n . 8; cf. TJ 8). In t h e m o d e r n w o r l d t h e r e a r e n o self-contained n a t i o n a l societies, a c l o s e d b a c k ­ g r o u n d s y s t e m exists only at t h e global level. T h e q u e s t i o n , therefore, is

1

t-

8

Introduction

w h e t h e r Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , if it a p p l i e s at all, a p p l i e s to o p e n national societies (as Rawls s e e m s to prefer) or to t h e c l o s e d social s y s t e m ot h u m a n i t y at large (as I m a i n t a i n in Part Three). T h e o t h e r additional task is to s k e t c h h o w t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o w a r d juster social institutions is to b e b r o u g h t a b o u t . T h e u l t i m a t e political i m p o r t of a c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o n s i s t s in s h o w i n g t h a t p e r s o n s o u g h t to d o c e r t a i n t h i n g s . Like specification, t h i s task is essentially interdisciplinary. It m u s t d r a w u p o n t h e k n o w l e d g e of h i s t o r i a n s a n d social scientists a n d u p o n t h e practical e x p e r i e n c e of j u r i s t s a n d politi­ cians to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h institutional reforms a r e feasible, w h i c h policies w o u l d b e effe^ve* a n d h o w s u c h reforms a n d policies might b e initiated. But it also, to a significant e x t e n t , calls for p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection. A c o n c e p t i o n of justice m a y affect w h a t w e o u g h t to d o in at least t h r e e ways: w e o u g h t t o h e l p reform existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s so as to r e n d e r t h e m m o r e just; w e o u g h t to mitigate a n d alleviate the plight of t h o s e d e p r i v e d a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d by existing u n j u s t institu­ tions; a n d w e o u g h t to a c c e p t certain c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n o u r c o n d u c t a n d policies t h a t anticipate t h e ideal of just g r o u n d lilies t o w a r d w h i c h we are striving. Philosophical reflection is r e q u i r e d to resolve (1) c o n ­ flicts of moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h i n a n d a c r o s s t h e s e t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s ; (2) c o m p e t i t i o n s a m o n g t h e s e m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o scarce r e s o u r c e s of time, m o n e y , a n d energy; a n d (3) conflicts a n d c o m p e t i t i o n s a m o n g s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice a n d o t h e r c o n s i d ­ erations. T h e p r o b l e m of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is a d d r e s s e d — a l b e i t n e i t h e r systematically n o r at l e n g t h — i n Parts T w o a n d Three. I have m e n t i o n e d t w o k i n d s of a b s t r a c t n e s s in Rawls t h a t I w a n t to avoid: abstract p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i z i n g (e.g., a b o u t K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c ­ tivism) a n d abstract m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t are too v a g u e to settle t h e m o r e interesting political c o n t r o v e r s i e s a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n j u s t i c e s . T h e s e m u s t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a n o t h e r k i n d of a b s t r a c t n e s s , e m ­ b o d i e d in Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h is of g r e a t fertility a n d i m p o r t a n c e . To u n d e r s t a n d this a b s t r a c t n e s s , begin w i t h the ultimate, c o n c r e t e q u e s t i o n of e t h i c s — H o w o u g h t I t o live?— central to w h i c h is t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w I o u g h t to c o n d u c t myself t o w a r d o t h e r s . For u s t h e q u e s t i o n arises in t h e c o n t e x t of a pervasive s t r u c t u r e of g r o u n d r u l e s p u r p o r t i n g to r e g u l a t e h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s . We find ourselves a s p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n o n g o i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . This preexisting s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s j s of crucial i m p o r t a n c e i n at least t w o w a y s . First, t h e relevant g r o u n d r u l e s a r e at least p a r t l y constitutive. T h e y d e t e r m i n e w h o w e are (mother, juror, d o c t o r , d e l e ­ gate, convict, c a n d i d a t e , p r i n c e T o n j r i e s t ) andTwnat o u r a c t i o n s m e a n (buy or sell, c o m m a n d or p r o m i s e , vote or veto, m a n y o r d i v o r e e , a p p l y or appeal) in t h e n e t w o r k of h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n . W i t h o u t an u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of t h e g r o u n d rules w e w o u l d lack t h e very t e r m s i n w h i c h t o reflect upon o u r c o n d u c t . Second, t h e evolution of t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s h a s m a d e our social w o r l d highly c o m p l e x a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . T h e

Introduction

9

effects of m y c o n d u c t r e v e r b e r a t e t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d , i n t e r m i n g l i n g w i t h t h e effects of t h e c o n d u c t of billions of o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g s (as i l l u s t r a t e d by m a r k e t t r a n s a c t i o n s ) . T h u s , m a n y m o r a l l y salient features of t h e s i t u a t i o n s of h u m a n b e i n g s ( p e r s i s t e n t starvation in n o r t h e a s t e r n Brazil, civil w a r in El Salvador, f a m i n e in India) a r i s e from t h e c o n ­ f l u e n c e of t h e often veiy r e m o t e effects of t h e c o n d u c t of vast n u m b e r s of h u m a n b e i n g s . W e as i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e n o h o p e of c o p i n g w i t h s u c h c o m p l e x i t y a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e if w e take t h e existing g r o u n d r u l e s for g r a n t e d a n d m e r e l y ask " H o w s h o u l d 1 a c t ? " o r " W h a t s h o u l d I d o differently?" W e c a n c o p e only by a t t e n d i n g t o t h i s all-pervasive s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s w h i c h s h a p e s t h e w a y p e r s o n s act a n d c o d e t e r m i n e s h o w t h e i r a c t i o n s , t o g e t h e r , affect t h e lives of o t h e r s . H e r e , t h e n , is t h e fruitful a b s t r a c t i o n in Rawls's a p p r o a c h . In o r d e r t o c o p e a d e q u a t e l y w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w to live, o n e m u s t , at least in t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , a b s t r a c t from this q u e s t i o n a n d reflect u p o n t h e b a s i c g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t s h a p e us, u p o n t h e social c o n t e x t in w h i c h w e all act. S u c h reflection c a n n o t p r o c e e d p i e c e m e a l . W e c a n n o t just reflect s e p a r a t e l y u p o n t h e e t h i c s of e a c h role a n d office, b e c a u s e t o d o s o w o u l d take for g r a n t e d t h e existing differentiation i n t o roles a n d offices, w o u l d b l i n d u s to t h e joint effects of h o w t h e s e roles a n d offices are c o n c e i v e d . N o r c a n w e a t t e n d to i n s t i t u t i o n s o n e b y o n e (marriage, p r o p e r t y , t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , t h e market), b e c a u s e t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , t o o , i n t e r p e n e t r a t e in t h e i r effects. T h e p r o b l e m is a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of s e e k i n g t o o p t i m i z e s o m e p r o c e s s of p r o d u c t i o n . Even if it is t r u e t h a t e a c h p a r t of t h e p r o c e s s is d e s i g n e d in t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e way, given t h e w a y t h e o t h e r p a r t s a r e d e s i g n e d , it m a y still b e p o s s i b l e to i m p r o v e t h e e n t i r e p r o c e s s greatly b y r e d e s i g n i n g all p a r t s t o g e t h e r o r (more i m p o r ­ tant) b y a l t e r i n g its very s t r u c t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g its division i n t o p a r t s ) . W e m u s t , t h e n , reflect u p o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e roles a n d offices t h e y involve a s o n e scheme, against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of feasible a l t e r n a ­ tive s c h e m e s . T h i s reflection is highly a b s t r a c t , b u t w i t h o u t it w e c a n n o t e v e n b e g i n to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t w e are d o i n g to o t h e r s , h o w w e a r e involved in t h e i r lives, a n d w h a t c o n c r e t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w e m i g h t h a v e t o w a r d t h e m . As I see it, Rawls's w o r k is i m p o r t a n t for a c h i e v i n g this a b s t r a c t i o n , y e t w e a k in m a k i n g it relevant to t h e c o n c r e t e political i s s u e s before u s . T h e a b s t r a c t i o n is crucial, b u t it m u s t b e b r o u g h t b a c k d o w n to earth. T h i s f o c u s o n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e priority c o n ­ c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d , m a k e s Rawls a r a d i c a l t h i n k e r . M y r e ­ m a r k s a b o u t h i s (increasing) c o n s e r v a t i s m a r e t h u s m e a n t in a relative s e n s e . It s e e m s t h a t in w o r k i n g o u t h i s t w o c e n t r a l i d e a s (as I h a v e called t h e m ) , Rawls h a s b e e n resisting t h e i r p r o g r e s s i v e p o w e r every s t e p of t h e w a y . T o s o m e e x t e n t h e h a s d o n e t h i s b y leaving h i s c o n c l u ­ sions abstract a n d vague w h e r e further development w o u l d have m a d e t h e m m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d critical of t h e s t a t u s q u o . A n d w h e r e h e d i d a r g u e t o w a r d s o m e w h a t m o r e definite c o n c l u s i o n s , h i s a r g u m e n t s

10

Introduction

seem bent—bent on ensuring that these conclusions would be as b l a n d , traditional, a n d m a i n s t r e a m A m e r i c a n a s p o s s i b l e . While Rawls is t h e n b o t h a radical a n d a conservative, I will t i y t o b e faithful t o t h e radical core of h i s c o n c e p t i o n , c o u n t e r i n g t h e m a n y ( a n d individually often minor) conservative s t i p u l a t i o n s t h a t t h r e a t e n t o o b s c u r e t h e great progressive p o t e n t i a l of h i s p r i n c i p a l i d e a s . T h u s it is n o t essential t o m y goal h e r e t h a t Rawls s h o u l d fully a g r e e w i t h m y c o n c l u s i o n s . Of c o u r s e , insofar a s I try t o e x p l i c a t e a n d d e f e n d h i s position, especially in Part O n e , it m a t t e r s t h a t I s h o u l d d o s o correctly, that w h a t I reject a s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s really a r e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . But insofar a s I m a k e his criterion of justice m o r e c o n c r e t e , m y o v e r r i d ­ ing c o n c e r n is to develop t h e t w o c e n t r a l i d e a s i n a p l a u s i b l e w a y . I w o u l d certainly be p l e a s e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d if Rawls w e r e t o find s o m e of t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s attractive, a n d I w o u l d r e t h i n k m y c o n c l u s i o n s if h e gave r e a s o n s t o reject t h e m , b u t t h e s e a r e m y a t t i t u d e s t o t h e r e s p o n s e s of a n y r e a d e r . My d e e p e s t allegiance h e r e is n o t to Rawls b u t to his foremost ideas. T h e s e ideas have a life a n d p o w e r i n d e p e n ­ d e n t of Rawls, w h i c h is t e s t i m o n y , surely, t o t h e g r e a t n e s s of b o t h . Rawls's m o s t i m p o r t a n t conservative s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t h i s f o c u s o n major social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o e x c l u d e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . Rawls follows t r a d i t i o n in treating n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s a s m o r a l w a t e r ­ s h e d s . Only w i t h i n a n a t i o n a l territory a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n it d e f i n e s does h e view t h e focus o n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a s a p p r o p r i a t e . He thereby c i r c u m v e n t s a crucial m o r a l question, w h i c h h i s t h e o r y o u g h t to answer, n a m e l y w h e t h e r t h e institutionalization of n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s really h a s t h i s magical m o r a l force of shielding u s from (or r e d u c i n g t h e force of) t h e m o r a l c l a i m s of "foreigners." T h e p r a c t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e of this q u e s t i o n is e n o r m o u s , s e e i n g t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n state is a crucial c o n t r i b u t o r to t h e c u r r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n of e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities. Rawls's c o n s e r v a t i s m is exemplified also in h i s specification of t h e m a x i m i n i d e a a n d i n his r e m a r k s a b o u t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e h e r e is h o w Rawls lets h i s lexical p r i o r i t y of t h e basic liberties (the first principle of justice) u n d e r m i n e h i s p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged. T h i s p r o b l e m arises e v e n a p a r t from t h e s t u n n i n g lack of interest in b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s t h a t is reflected in Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e lexical priority. As it s t a n d s , t h e lexical priority of t h e basic liberties will s u p p o r t t w o of Rawls's c o n c l u 6

7

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Introduction

11

s i o n s : t h e fulfillment of its p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c liberties s h o u l d b e t h e p r i m a r y c r i t e r i o n for identifying t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r s o m e in­ s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , a n d e n h a n c i n g t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e least a d v a n ­ t a g e d s h o u l d b e t h e m o s t u r g e n t i m p e r a t i v e g u i d i n g t h e reform of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . But Rawls d r a w s t h e further c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e f o r m s involving a n e n h a n c e m e n t of b a s i c liberties are always t h e m o s t u r g e n t , e v e n w h e n t h e y involve a n e x p a n s i o n of t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d ( w h o s e b a s i c liberties are a l r e a d y m o r e c o m p l e t e o r b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d ) at t h e e x p e n s e of a d v a n c e m e n t s in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . As I d e m o n s t r a t e in s o m e detail (§11.3.1, cf. §11.2.1), this c o n c l u s i o n is a clear violation of t h e m a x i m i n idea,. M a k i n g Rawls's c e n t r a l i d e a s m o r e c o n c r e t e in a w a y that c o r r e c t s for h i s conservative t e n d e n c y , I h o p e to leave t h e r e a d e r at t h e e n d w i t h r e a s o n a b l y clear t h e s e s a b o u t w h e r e o u r w o r l d is n o w as far as j u s t i c e is c o n c e r n e d , h o w w e a r e m o r a l l y related to existing injustices, a n d w h a t a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d p r o g r e s s t o w a r d it m i g h t look like. T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s s t a n d o p p o s e d to t h e s m u g c o n s e n s u s t h a t t r u l y grievous i n j u s t i c e s exist only in t h e p a s t o r in d i s t a n t l a n d s a n d s o n e e d n o t c o n c e r n u s h e r e a n d n o w . I c o n c l u d e t h a t w e are a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t p r o d u c e s e x t r e m e p o v e r t y o n a m a s s i v e s c a l e so t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s a r e b o r n w i t h n o realistic p r o s p e c t s of a life w i t h o u t h u n g e r , m a l n u t r i t i o n , a n d o p p r e s s i o n . T h e s c h e m e is i m p o s e d u p o n t h e s e , its m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s — a n d i m p o s e d n o t b y fate o r n a t u r e b u t b y o t h e r , m o r e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , o u r s e l v e s i n c l u d e d . C u r r e n t injustices a r e n o less s e v e r e t h a n t h o s e suffered by earlier d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , a n d o u r r e s p o n ­ sibility for t h e s e i n j u s t i c e s is n o less t h a n t h a t of earlier m o r e a d v a n ­ t a g e d g r o u p s . But b e c a u s e of t h e vastly g r e a t e r differentiation a n d c o m p l e x i t y of t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , t h e injustice a n d o u r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for it a r e b o t h m u c h m o r e o p a q u e . Clearly, t h e p l i g h t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is d u e t o social realities. It is n o t n a t u r a l , for m o s t of t h e m , like m o s t of us, are perfectly c a p a b l e of l e a d i n g h e a l t h y a n d successful lives if given a c h a n c e t o e s c a p e from t h e i r p r i s o n of p o v e r t y . But t h e n w e a r e n o t like s l a v e h o l d e r s , w h o e m b o d y a n d live o u t t h e injustice of slavery in t h e v i o l e n c e a n d c r u e l t y t h e y visit u p o n t h e i r slaves. W e l e a d o r d i n a r y , civilized lives, a n d n o t h ­ ing w e d o s e e m s to have a m a j o r o r even m i n o r negative i m p a c t u p o n t h e lives of t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d . A n d so, paradoxically, t h e relevant social realities t a k e o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a n o n y m i t y — s e e m t o be p r o d u c e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t a t r a c e of h u m a n a g e n c y . Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e i r effects m a k e s it p o s s i b l e t o clarify h o w injustice c a n b e s y s t e m i c , c a n exist w i t h o u t b e i n g t r a c e a b l e to a n y manifestly u n j u s t a c t i o n s b y i n d i v i d u a l s o r g r o u p s . O u r c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e suffering of t h e p o o r is ex­ t r e m e l y i n d i r e c t a n d i n t e r m i x e d w i t h t h e c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of o t h -

12

Introduction

ers. It is quite infeasible for u s t o adjust o u r c o n d u c t s o as to avoid s u c h effects. A n d h e r e again, Rawls's i n s t i t u t i o n a l a p p r o a c h is c r u c i a l for s h o w i n g t h e alternative to s u c h a n (infeasible) a d j u s t m e n t of o u r c o n ­ d u c t . We m u s t initiate i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s t o w a r d a s c h e m e that, h o w e v e r differentiated a n d c o m p l e x , d o e s n o t t e n d t o e n g e n d e r t h e severe poverty a n d o p p r e s s i o n so typical of o u r c u r r e n t w o r l d . T h o s e p r e s e n t l y m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d have virtually n o m e a n s for initiating s u c h reforms. We d o . And o u r responsibility vis-a-vis existing i n j u s t i c e s hinges u p o n o u r ability to initiate a n d s u p p o r t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . T h e u l t i m a t e goal of s u c h reforms is a fully j u s t global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , d e n n e d , p e r h a p s , b y reference t o t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s . O u r n^porisibility, however, in n o w a y d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r s u c h a fully just s c h e m e is practicable or realistically a t t a i n a b l e . Yes, Rawls's c r i t e ­ rion c a n b e u s e d to design a b l u e p r i n t of ideal i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e perfectly just. But m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t for n o w is its role in t h e comparative a s s e s s m e n t of alternative feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . P e r h a p s w e will never r e a c h a s c h e m e w h o s e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n is optimal. But w e d o n ' t n e e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t s u c h a s c h e m e is r e a c h ­ able in o r d e r to r e c o g n i z e t h a t w e o u g h t to s u p p o r t i n s t i t u t i o n a l re­ forms t h a t improve t h e w o r s t social position, j u s t as o n e d o e s n o t n e e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t o n e c a n r e a c h perfection for u n d e r t a k i n g to b e c o m e a better h u m a n being.

P A R T

O N E

DEFENDING T H E MAIN IDEAS

C H A P T E R

1

Nozick and the Focus on the Basic Structure

1. T h e P r o b l e m o f J u s t i c e It is J o h n Rawls's a m b i t i o n t o p r e s e n t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice for t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m . To get a n intuitive i d e a of w h a t t h i s m e a n s , I b r i n g in Robert Nozick's w o r k , i n c l u d i n g h i s r e a d i n g a n d criticism of Rawls. I a m especially i n t e r e s t e d in Nozick's claim t h a t Rawls's a p p r o a c h begs i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a g a i n s t historical e n t i t l e m e n t t h e o r i e s of distributive justice, in w h i c h o w n e r s h i p rights a r e d e n n e d recursively a n d o p e r a t e as s i d e c o n ­ straints. 1.1. W e c a n quickly get to t h e c o r e of Nozick's a t t a c k o n Rawls b y a c c e p t i n g a c h a l l e n g e h e raises (ASU 167n, 204-5) w h i c h Rawls h a s n o t t a k e n u p , t h e c h a l l e n g e to e x a m i n e t h e plausibility of c o m p e t i n g c o n ­ c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e in a surveyable, small-scale c o n t e x t . To a c c o m m o ­ d a t e Rawls, a n d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to Nozick, let u s i m a g i n e a c l o s e d a n d s e l f - c o n t a i n e d g r o u p of p e r s o n s , p e r h a p s s h a r i n g a small i s o l a t e d island, a collectivity t h a t is r e p r o d u c i n g itself over t i m e , w i t h c o n t e m ­ p o r a r i e s w i d e l y s c a t t e r e d in age. F o r n o w , w e c a n m a k e t h e simplifying a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y social o r d e r w e c o n s i d e r for this g r o u p w o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d a n d g e n e r a l l y c o m p l i e d w i t h . To k e e p m a t t e r s even m o r e s i m p l e , let u s leave a s i d e m o s t of t h e b a s i c features of t h e social o r d e r a n d f o c u s o n t h e d e t a i l s of t h e g r o u p ' s i n s t i t u t i o n of private p r o p e r t y . In t a k i n g for g r a n t e d t h a t this primitive, a g r a r i a n e c o n o m y p r o m i n e n t l y involves t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n in s o m e form, w e p r e s u p p o s e a c o m m i t m e n t 1

•We c a n t h e n largely rely, for the m o m e n t , o n Rawls's difference principle in its s i m p l e s t f o r m — c o v e r i n g o n l y the single g o o d , i n c o m e — t o bring out w h a t is distinctive a b o u t h i s full criterion of justice, w h i c h is merely a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d m a x i m i n criterion, a d d r e s s i n g a w i d e r range of social g o o d s w i t h a priority ordering a m o n g t h e m .

15

16

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.1

Rawls a n d Nozick s h a r e a n d c a n c o n c e n t r a t e i m m e d i a t e l y o n w h a t is controversial b e t w e e n t h e m . We c a n further eliminate t h e m o r e a b s t r u s e p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s Nozick e n t e r t a i n s — t h a t p r o p e r t y s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to p e r s o n s ' m o r a l merit, usefulness to society, n e e d , intelligence, r a c e , or s o m e m i x t u r e or c o m b i n a t i o n of these, o r s o as to m a t c h s o m e a n o n y ­ m o u s profile. Against this u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l b a c k g r o u n d , let u s c o n s i d e r s o m e i m p o r t a n t p a r a m e t e r s of t h e definition of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , e s p e ­ cially w h a t k i n d of i t e m s are o w n a b l e , h o w o n e c o m e s t o o w n s u c h items, a n d w h a t rights o n e h a s w h e n o n e o w n s t h e m . Let m e give a t h i n sketch of t h e e c o n o m i c o r d e r Nozick w o u l d envision for o u r i s l a n d , followed b y a n equally thin c o u n t e r s k e t c h m o r e Rawlsian in spirit. Nozick defines t h e set of o w n a b l e s q u i t e widely, i n c l u d i n g e v e n p e r s o n s w i t h i n its s c o p e : "I believe t h a t . . . a free s y s t e m will a l l o w [a p e r s o n ] to sell himself i n t o slavery" (ASU 331). He allows slavery b e c a u s e h e is convinced, c o n t r a r y to t h e A m e r i c a n D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n ­ d e n c e , t h a t all rights s h o u l d b e alienable. Still, a p e r s o n is a n o w n a b l e of a special kind, in that s h e is initially self-owned w h e n s h e c o m e s of age (ASU 289, 331, 38f). That h e r p a r e n t s or t h e i r o w n e r s o w n e d all t h e ingredients to h e r " p r o d u c t i o n " d o e s not, in this one case, entail t h a t they o w n t h e p r o d u c t . P e r s o n s c a n b e c o m e slaves o n l y b y a l i e n a t i n g themselves. C o n c e r n i n g control of the island's pivotal n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e — l a n d — Nozick advocates t h e s e m a i n rules: All l a n d is subject to a c q u i s i t i o n b y t h e first c o m e r , w h o t h e r e b y gains full, e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over it, i n c l u d i n g t h e right t o transfer any or all of h i s rights a s o w n e r to s o m e o t h e r person(s) of h i s choice. A legitimate l a n d h o l d i n g is t h e n d e f i n e d recursively as o n e t h a t arose from a valid first a c q u i s i t i o n t h r o u g h a n y n u m b e r of valid transfers. S o m e o n e w i t h Rawlsian leanings might p r o p o s e t h e following alter­ native g r o u n d rules. T h e r e is to b e n o i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery; p e r s o n s c a n n o t alienate themselves or c o m e to b e o w n e d in a n y w a y . All l a n d is subject to a p p r o p r i a t i o n by t h e first comer, w h o t h e r e b y g a i n s full, exclusionary control over it. As o w n e r , h e is free to r e l i n q u i s h o w n e r ­ s h i p over (a portion) of his l a n d at a n y time ( t h r o u g h e x c h a n g e , gift, o r bequest), b u t h e controls t h e a s s i g n m e n t of only 80 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d h e relinquishes. T h e r e m a i n i n g 20 p e r c e n t is a s s i g n e d ( p e r h a p s via s o m e lottery m e c h a n i s m ) t o y o u n g p e r s o n s from l a n d l e s s families or, s h o u l d t h e r e b e n o l a n d l e s s families, t o y o u n g p e r s o n s from families w i t h the lowest l a n d h o l d i n g s p e r c a p i t a . T h u s , a legitimate l a n d h o l d i n g is again defined recursively as o n e that a r o s e from a valid first a c q u i s i ­ tion t h r o u g h any n u m b e r of applications of t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p rules. O u r Rawlsian prefers t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s t o Nozick's, b e c a u s e they can b e e x p e c t e d to e n g e n d e r less, a n d l e s s severe, poverty. 2

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T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.2

17

1.2. I p u r s u e t h i s d i s p u t e to t h e next h i g h e r level i n §3, e x a m i n i n g h o w Rawls a n d Nozick m i g h t d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h a t s o r t s of c o n s i d e r ­ a t i o n s s h o u l d resolve t h e lower-level d i s p u t e a b o u t a just social o r d e r for o u r i s l a n d , b u t first w e m u s t c h a r a c t e r i z e p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e d i s p u t e is a b o u t . In p a r t i c u l a r , w e m u s t k e e p s h a r p l y distinct, as Nozick d o e s not, our subject, how the ground rules of a social system ought to be assessed/designed, from t h e (secondary) s u b j e c t of h o w a c t o r s (individ­ uals, a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t ) m a y a n d s h o u l d act w i t h i n a n o n g o i n g s c h e m e w h o s e t e r m s are t a k e n as fixed. T h e f o r m e r of t h e s e s u b j e c t s , justice, is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t a n d justifica­ tion of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e latter, morality, w i t h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of conduct a n d character. Both Rawls a n d Nozick are essentially c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e first s u b ­ ject, b u t Nozick e x p e n d s m u c h effort a t t a c k i n g a view that is n o t Rawls's. While Rawls seeks to c o n s i d e r g r o u n d r u l e s from a h i g h e r level, Nozick often c a s t s t h e i r d i s p u t e a s o n e a b o u t w h i c h g r o u n d r u l e s it is p e r m i s s i b l e to infringe u n d e r w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h o u g h h i s argu­ m e n t s in t h i s vein a r e n o t relevant to Rawls's project, t h e y are likely to h a v e a significant r h e t o r i c a l effect u p o n t h e u n w a r y r e a d e r . Let m e give three prominent examples. First, Nozick f r e q u e n t l y c o n j u r e s u p t h e h o r r o r of redistribution, the i d e a t h a t s o m e a u t h o r i t y (the g o v e r n m e n t , say) will c o m e along, w h e n ­ ever it p l e a s e s , to take a w a y p a r t of w h a t y o u o w n in o r d e r to d e v o t e it t o s o m e p u r p o s e it d e e m s w o r t h y . But o u r Rawlsian's p r o p o s a l regarding l a n d o w n e r s h i p is n o t r e d i s t r i b u t i v e in t h i s s e n s e . It e n v i s i o n s n o m e c h ­ a n i s m t h a t m a k e s a d h o c c o r r e c t i o n s a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e d i s ­ t r i b u t i o n of l a n d t h a t h a s e m e r g e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r u l e s of first a c q u i s i t i o n a n d c h a n g e of o w n e r s h i p . Rather, it e n v i s i o n s a p a r ­ t i c u l a r content for t h e s e rules, w h i c h d e t e r m i n e h o w ( p a t t e r n s of) l a n d h o l d i n g s arise in t h e first place. No p r o p e r t y is t a k e n from s o m e o n e a n d given t o a n o t h e r . A l a n d o w n e r c o n t r o l s h i s e n t i r e p r o p e r t y u p t o t h e m o m e n t w h e n h e r e l i n q u i s h e s it; n o l a n d is t a k e n a w a y from h i m . His d e s i g n a t e d a s s i g n e e receives 80 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d in q u e s t i o n ; n o l a n d is t a k e n a w a y from h e r either, b e c a u s e s h e n e v e r o w n e d t h e full p l o t to b e g i n w i t h . N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t w h a t is t a k e n a w a y is t h e l a n d ­ o w n e r ' s p o w e r to d i s p o s e of all h i s p r o p e r t y a s h e d e e m s fit. But n o s u c h p o w e r exists ( a n d t h u s c o u l d b e t a k e n away) u n d e r t h e Rawlsian's p r a c t i c e . All l a n d is h e l d , from t h e very b e g i n n i n g , o n t h e p u b l i c u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p r u l e s . No o n e n e e d h o l d l a n d o n these terms, b u t those w h o d o are b o u n d by t h e m . S e c o n d , Nozick often c o m p l a i n s t h a t Rawls b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n a g a i n s t all entitlement t h e o r i e s of distributive j u s t i c e (e.g., ASU 199, 2 0 3 - 4 , 207, 3

3

T h i s constraint is structurally a n a l o g o u s to limitations that figure in Nozick's o w n s c h e m e : "My property rights in m y knife a l l o w m e to leave it w h e r e I will, but not in y o u r c h e s t " (ASU 171). "Each o w n e r ' s title to his h o l d i n g i n c l u d e s the historical s h a d o w of t h e Lockean p r o v i s o o n appropriation" (ASU 1801. Again, n o o n e n e e d o w n things o n t h e s e t e r m s , b u t t h o s e w h o d o are b o u n d by t h e m .

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T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.2

215) Straightforwardly u n d e r s t o o d , this c o m p l a i n t is false. T h e e c o ­ n o m i c s t r u c t u r e o u r Rawlsian is p r o p o s i n g also revolves a r o u n d a n o t i o n of e n t i t l e m e n t . It, too, features a recursive definition of legiti­ m a t e l a n d h o l d i n g s , involving r u l e s of first a c q u i s i t i o n a n d c h a n g e of o w n e r s h i p . R e l i n q u i s h e d e n t i t l e m e n t s are t r a n s f o r m e d , in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p rules, i n t o n e w e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e c h o s e n assignee a n d of s o m e o t h e r person(s). A n d again, a s in Nozick, t h e p r o p o s a l s t i p u l a t e s t h a t existing e n t i t l e m e n t s m a y n o t b e infringed for t h e sake of, for e x a m p l e , d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Third, Nozick offers r e a s o n s for conceiving of rights a s side con­ straints (ASU 28-34), in c o n t r a s t to a c o n c e p t i o n of rights a s goals w h i c h w o u l d u r g e a g e n t s t o act so as t o m a x i m i z e t h e w e i g h t e d s u m of r i g h t s fulfillment overall. O n t h e latter view, o n e s h o u l d , d e s p i t e a r i g h t of i n n o c e n t s n o t t o b e killed, kill i n n o c e n t s w h e n d o i n g s o s e c u r e s a greater gain i n t e r m s of rights (for e x a m p l e , saves m o r e i n n o c e n t s from b e i n g killed) e l s e w h e r e . But t h e s i d e - c o n s t r a i n t c o n c e p t i o n of r i g h t s , w h i c h Rawls c a n a n d d o e s a c c e p t , again fails t o a d v a n c e Nozick's c a s e for a p a r t i c u l a r specification of p r o p e r t y rights (ASU 172-73). It i m p l i e s t h a t if we e n d u p a c c e p t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y rights Nozick p r o p o s e s , t h e n n o l a n d c a n b e t a k e n by t h e l a n d l e s s (or given t h e m b y s o m e official authority) w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of its o w n e r . But this i m p l i c a t i o n , a g a i n , is irrelevant t o o u r subject, n a m e l y , w h a t side c o n s t r a i n t s s h o u l d b e r e c o g n i z e d or, m o r e specifically, h o w p r o p e r t y rights a r e t o b e specified to begin w i t h . C h o o s i n g t h e p r a c t i c e p r o p o s e d b y o u r Rawlsian d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e rights of l a n d o w n e r s are violated for t h e sake of fulfilling t h e right to a n initial plot of l a n d . R a t h e r it m e a n s t h a t t h e conflict b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o purported rights is resolved b y r e c o g n i z i n g t h e latter a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g a n a d j u s t e d version of t h e former. T h e p r o p o s a l is not t h a t t h e Nozickian p r o p e r t y rights of t h e l a n d o w n e r s s h o u l d b e violated b u t t h a t s u c h rights s h o u l d n o t exist. O u r Rawlsian finds insufficient t h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g a right to r e a s ­ sign all o n e ' s land, a n d so rejects a b initio t h e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s Nozick favors. 4

5

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Vet Nozick's complaint may also h a v e another s e n s e , that Rawls is begging the q u e s ­ tion against the claim that "historical-entitlement principles are fundamental" (ASU 202). Here, the point is not that Rawls is b i a s e d against all w a y s of specifying property rights as historically recursive but rather that w e are to identify the correct specification of property rights without any reasons or, at any rate, w i t h o u t the kind of r e a s o n s Rawls d e e m s relevant. This issue will be central in § § 3 - 4 . ^Analogues to t h e s e three points c a n be m a d e about an income-tax-funded welfare s c h e m e . There is no redistribution u n d e r the historical entitlement rules of s u c h a s c h e m e , b e c a u s e u n d e r these rules p e r s o n s are entitled only to their net i n c o m e ( w h i c h a l o n e is distributed to them in the first place) I n c o m e taxes w o u l d represent part of v o u r property, w h i c h a be.ng taken away from y o u , only if y o u w e r e entitled to y o u r g r o s s income, which, u n d e r the s c h e m e , y o u are not. T h o u g h the tax portion . n W s t K physically in y o u r possession, it is (when due) n o longer y o u r s but rather b e S s to the

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1.3. I n r e s p o n s e to Nozick's affirmation of a p a r t i c u l a r specification of rights, Rawls w o u l d n o t offer r e m a r k s o n a different subject, c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e s e N o z i c k i a n rights ( a n d w h a t e v e r e n t i t l e m e n t s t h e y give rise to) s h o u l d s o m e t i m e s b e o v e r r i d d e n b y o t h e r m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (cf. BSS 65). I n s t e a d , h e w o u l d a d d u c e r e a s o n s o n a h i g h e r level against a c c e p t ­ i n g Nozick's specification of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s in t h e first p l a c e . It m a y h e l p t o fix t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o levels terminologically b y c o n t r a s t i n g t h e rights specified a s p a r t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w i t h t h e values a p p e a l e d to in t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of a l t e r n a ­ tive i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . Values m a y conflict a n d t h e n r e q u i r e t r a d e ­ offs a n d sacrifices. But w h a t e v e r liberties a n d rights (side c o n s t r a i n t s ) a r e specified by t h e c h o s e n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e are d e s i g n e d t o b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r from t h e start. T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r to violate s o m e o n e ' s right in o r d e r to fulfill t h e rights of o t h e r s s h o u l d in principle never arise. It is likely, for e x a m p l e , t h a t Nozick w o u l d value b o t h f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t a n d t h e c h a n c e of e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over l a n d . It is n o t p o s s i b l e for b o t h v a l u e s to b e fully i n c o r p o r a t e d into o n e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , h o w e v e r . A m o n g t h e v a r i o u s possibilities of sacrifice a n d c o m ­ p r o m i s e , Nozick favors a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s h a v e full exclu­ s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over w h a t e v e r l a n d t h e y o w n , as well as a c o r r e s p o n d ­ ingly l i m i t e d right t o f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t . T h o u g h t h e value of free­ d o m of m o v e m e n t is sacrificed in p a r t , t h e l i m i t e d right t o f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t t h a t e m e r g e s from t h e trade-off is n o t s u b j e c t to violation for t h e s a k e of o t h e r r i g h t s . Similarly, t h e Rawlsian's s c h e m e , t h o u g h it 6

7

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N o z i c k ' s failure to appreciate this d i s t i n c t i o n c o n f u s e s not o n l y h i s l o n g d i s c u s s i o n of Rawls but a l s o his d e v e l o p m e n t of h i s o w n theory. T h u s , c o n s i d e r h i s v i e w (ASU c h a p . 4) that s o m e b o r d e r s may b e c r o s s e d (i.e., s o m e rights m a y be violated) w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , p r o v i d e d that c o m p e n s a t i o n is paid. Offhand this v i e w m u s t s e e m i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . If I a m at liberty to d o X w i t h o u t y o u r c o n s e n t provided I p a y y o u c o m p e n s a t i o n , t h e n y o u have no right that I refrain from d o i n g so, a n d h e n c e m y d o i n g it c r o s s e s n o border at all. But the mistake is c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , b e c a u s e Nozick, operating o n a single level, h a s n o intelligible alternative. What a m I p a v i n g y o u c o m p e n s a t i o n for if n o right violation (border crossing) is involved in m y action? T h e difficulty d i s a p p e a r s if w e u n d e r s t a n d Nozick's p r o p o s a l as resolving, o n the h i g h e r level, a c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n values. S h o u l d there be a right not to have X d o n e to o n e w i t h o u t o n e ' s c o n s e n t or a liberty to d o X to o t h e r s w i t h o u t their c o n s e n t ? Given s t r o n g r e a s o n s in favor of e a c h , o n e might, rejecting both, b e d r a w n to a c o m p r o m i s e of the sort N o z i c k p r o p o s e s . Let there b e a liberty t o - d o - X - w i t h - c o n s e n t - o r - s i d e - p a y m e n t , a n d a right n o t - t o - h a v e - X - d o n e - t o - o n e - w i t h o u t - c o n s e n t - a n d - w i t h o u t - s i d e - p a y m e n t . In this c o m p r o m i s e , t h e s i d e p a y m e n t c o m p e n s a t e s not for violation of a right (it enters into h o w the right is formulated in the first placel but for abridgment of a value, the value of controlling w h e t h e r o t h e r s d o X to oneself. One d o e s not get s u c h control, but t h e institutionalized s i d e p a y m e n t t e n d s to make l e s s u n p l e a s a n t a n d l e s s frequent the o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h X is d o n e to o n e w i t h o u t o n e ' s c o n s e n t . B u t s u c h conflicts will, of course, arise in practice. Even the m o s t rational legal structure c a n n o t fully anticipate all p o s s i b l e conflict s c e n a r i o s or p r e e m p t all p o s s i b l e d i s p u t e s a b o u t its o w n interpretation. A value, e v e n w h e r e it is abridged, might still be partly realized, t h r o u g h c o n s e n t . In Nozick's s c h e m e , p e r s o n s c a n b u y or e x c h a n g e t r e s p a s s rights; in the reverse s c h e m e , l a n d o w n e r s c a n b u y their neighbors' p r o m i s e not to trespass. Still, Coase's t h e o r e m n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e c h o i c e of s c h e m e will make a n e n o r m o u s difference in h u m a n 7

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T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.1

c o m p r o m i s e s c e r t a i n values, features ( m o r e limited) p r o p e r t y rights t h a t m a y n o t b e violated for t h e sake of o t h e r rights. Neither s c h e m e is o r involves a "utilitarianism of rights," w h o s e r u l e s r e q u i r e o r p e r m i t t h a t p e r s o n s violate t h e rights of o t h e r s w h e n e v e r d o i n g s o p r o d u c e s a net gain for r i g h t s fulfillment overall (cf. ASU 28). A n d both s c h e m e s c o u l d b e justified t h r o u g h a balancing of values, d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h institutional s t r u c t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t e q u a l p a c k a g e of r e c o g n i z e d rights a n d liberties) y i e l d s t h e b e s t lives for individuals. 1.4. Still leaving a s i d e t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice, let m e n o w e x p o u n d s o m e w h a t m o r e p r e c i s e l y its s u b j e c t , t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of a self-contained social s y s t e m . My e x p o s i t i o n of t h e t w o key n o t i o n s involved d e p a r t s from Rawls's o w n in t w o m i n o r respects. 1.4.1.1 prefer t o s p e a k of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social system, r a t h e r t h a n , a s Rawls, of a society. He explicates t h i s n o t i o n a s follows: "Let u s a s s u m e , t o fix ideas, t h a t a society is a m o r e o r less self-sufficient association of p e r s o n s w h o i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o o n e a n o t h e r r e c o g n i z e certain r u l e s of c o n d u c t a s b i n d i n g a n d w h o for t h e m o s t p a r t a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m . S u p p o s e f u r t h e r t h a t t h e s e r u l e s specify a s y s ­ t e m of c o o p e r a t i o n d e s i g n e d t o a d v a n c e t h e g o o d of t h o s e t a k i n g p a r t i n i t . . . . [A] society is a cooperative v e n t u r e for m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e " (TJ 4 ) . T h i s explication s e e m s n a r r o w , for t h e r e a r e s u r e l y m a n y h i s t o r i c a l societies (standardly so-called) w h o s e r u l e s fail e i t h e r to b e d e s i g n e d for m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e o r t o b e r e c o g n i z e d a s b i n d i n g b y all p a r t i c i p a n t s . For e x a m p l e , t h e r u l e s m a y b e d e s i g n e d for t h e a d v a n t a g e of a minority, and compliance by the remaining participants m a y be d u e to coercion o r religious s u p e r s t i t i o n . N o w Rawls is free, of c o u r s e , t o e x c l u d e s u c h c a s e s from h i s inquiry, leaving o p e n w h e t h e r a n d h o w s u c h social s y s t e m s c a n b e a s s e s s e d a s m o r e o r less just. B u t a s h i s f r e q u e n t u s e of slavery a s a n e x a m p l e of a social i n s t i t u t i o n m a k e s clear, t h i s is n o t h i s i n t e n t i o n . Seeing t h a t Rawls is u n c l e a r a b o u t t h e s c o p e of his inquiry in 9

1 0

11

terms, a s c a n b e s e e n b y comparing, e.g„ t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e landless poor u n d e r t h e s e t w o alternative s c h e m e s . ^ h i s statement fits w i t h what Nozick says w h e n h e is clear about t h e distinction b e t w e e n the t w o levels. In d i s c u s s i n g h o w his principles of appropriation a n d rectifica­ tion s h o u l d b e formulated, h e remarks about t h e latter (which governs a d j u s t m e n t s of h o l d i n g s in light of past infractions of his acquisition or transfer principles), "Whatever difficulties (the entitlement theorist] h a s in applying the principle of rectification t o p e r s o n s w h o d i d n o t t h e m s e l v e s violate t h e first t w o principles are difficulties in b a l a n c ing the conflicting considerations so a s correctly to formulate t h e c o m p l e x princiole o f rectification itself; h e will n o t violate moral side constraints b y applying t h e nrinrinle" ASU 173, cf. 1 4 6 , 1 8 0 - 8 1 ) . My point is that s u c h balancing of c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s T q u S d t h r o u g h o u t - . n the formulation of all s i d e constraints or other institutional f e a n ^ s « l think Rawls is here defining what a society is. Were he about what a society ought to be, I w o u l d not need t o objectTo This p t s s f g e " T h i s problem is first n o t e d bv Wolff tIR 77 7C u ;„ ,i ' t-"»s&age. 32,150n. ,thoughBeit tal<esS^ be mutuary advantageous (rather than be

S f f « S L P

P

5 2

Z

d ^ ^ ^ S ^ .

T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.4.2

21

t h i s r e s p e c t , I a m s t a r t i n g o u t w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of a (self-sufficient) social s y s t e m , w h i c h is b r o a d e r t h a n Rawls's official n o t i o n of a society. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , I a m also b r o a d e n i n g his e x p r e s s i o n "social c o o p e r a ­ t i o n " to a l l o w t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n a social s y s t e m m a y b e largely coercive r a t h e r t h a n g e n u i n e l y c o o p e r a t i v e a n d t h a t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t social i n t e r a c t i o n s m a y t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e t h e e c o ­ n o m i c s p h e r e . My initial focus, t h e n , is o n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d r e a s o n a b l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d s y s t e m of social i n t e r a c t i o n . I a m n o t d e n y ­ i n g t h e possibility t h a t t h e r e a r e s o m e s u c h s y s t e m s to w h i c h Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is n o t p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e , b u t w e d o b e s t t o confront t h i s possibility later (§23), w h e n h i s c o n c e p t i o n is before u s in d e v e l o p e d form. 1.4.2. W h a t , t h e n , is t h e basic structure of a self-sufficient social s y s t e m ? Rawls leaves t h i s n o t i o n n o t m e r e l y v a g u e b u t also a m b i g u o u s . Let m e e x p l a i n b y e l a b o r a t i n g o n e of its t w o s e n s e s in Rawls, h o w I u n d e r s t a n d t h e t e r m basic structure. I will t h e n d e f e n d m y c h o i c e b y c o n t r a s t i n g it to t h e o t h e r s e n s e in w h i c h Rawls u s e s t h e t e r m . In A Theory of Justice t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social s y s t e m is d e n n e d a s "the w a y in w h i c h t h e m a j o r social i n s t i t u t i o n s d i s t r i b u t e f u n d a m e n ­ tal r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e division of a d v a n t a g e s from social c o o p e r a t i o n " (TJ 7). Social i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e a s p e c i e s of social p r a c t i c e s a n d t h u s a r e in s o m e w a y s a n a l o g o u s t o g a m e s a n d rituals (TJ 55; cf. TCR 175 n. 1; JF 164 n. 2). So t h e t e r m institution is u s e d h e r e in a s e n s e t h a t — a l l o w i n g t h e ( r e d u n d a n t ) a d d i t i o n of " s o c i a l " — c o n t r a s t s w i t h its o t h e r s e n s e of o r g a n i z a t i o n o r c o r p o r a t i o n (as in " i n s t i t u t i o n of h i g h e r learning"). F o r this latter s e n s e of institution, Rawls u s e s t h e term association. Not every collective activity, h o w e v e r regular, c o n s t i t u t e s a social p r a c t i c e . It is further r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e relevant r u l e s b e g e n e r a l l y k n o w n a n d u n d e r s t o o d b y t h o s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e activity. A p r a c t i c e involves a s y s t e m of r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s t h a t "defines offices a n d p o s i t i o n s w i t h t h e i r rights a n d d u t i e s , p o w e r s a n d i m m u n i t i e s , a n d t h e like" (TJ 55). T h i s s y s t e m m a y i n c l u d e w a y s of d e a l i n g w i t h rule viola­ t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , p r o c e d u r e s for d e t e r m i n i n g violations, a list of a d m i s s i b l e e x c u s e s , p e n a l t i e s , a n d s o forth. Moreover, s o m e of t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e activity m u s t b e constitutive rules, w h i c h stipulate roles a n d m o v e s t h a t c o u l d n o t exist ( u n d e r t h e i r relevant d e s c r i p t i o n s ) o u t s i d e of t h e activity in q u e s t i o n (goalkeeper, t o c h e c k m a t e , e t c . ) . A 1 2

13

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C p . Hoffe, PG 3 2 6 - 2 8 . " R a w l s s l a t e s this s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t and t h e n illustrates it w i t h baseball terminol­ o g y a s follows: "The rules of practices are logically prior to particular c a s e s Given a n y rule w h i c h specifies a form of a c t i o n (a move), a particular a c t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be taken a s falling u n d e r this rule given that there is the practice w o u l d not b e described as that sort of a c t i o n u n l e s s there w a s t h e practice. In the c a s e of a c t i o n s specified by practices it is logically i m p o s s i b l e to perform t h e m o u t s i d e the stage-setting provided by t h o s e p r a c ­ tices, for u n l e s s there is t h e practice, a n d u n l e s s the requisite properties are fulfilled, w h a t e v e r o n e d o e s , w h a t e v e r m o v e m e n t s o n e makes, will fail to c o u n t as a form of a c t i o n w h i c h t h e practice specifies" (TCR 189). I have w e a k e n e d this c o n d i t i o n by a s s u m i n g that

22

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.2

g a m e , for e x a m p l e , m a y involve v a r i o u s r o l e s (batter, u m p i r e ) , w i t h e a c h role envisaging v a r i o u s g a m e - d e p e n d e n t m o v e s t h a t o c c u p a n t s of this role m a y o r m u s t m a k e in c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s . T h e r e s e e m s t o b e n o very clear w a y of d e n n i n g social i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of social p r a c t i c e s . If g a m e s a n d rituals a r e n o t n o r m a l l y t h o u g h t of a s i n s t i t u t i o n s , it is p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e t h e y are, at least i n m o d e m W e s t e r n c u l t u r e , m a r g i n a l t o t h e o n g o i n g c o m p e t i ­ tion over c o n t r o l of c o n d u c t a n d r e s o u r c e s . T h o u g h p e r s o n s ' b e h a v i o r w i t h i n a g a m e o r ritual m a y b e subject t o m o r a l critique, s u c h p r a c t i c e s t h e m s e l v e s are m u c h less so, a s s u m i n g t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n c a n easily b e d e c l i n e d , risks are limited, a n d s o o n . I n s t i t u t i o n s , by c o n t r a s t , d o call for m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t . For t h i s subject Rawls r e s e r v e s t h e t e r m justice a s "the first virtue of social i n s t i t u t i o n s " (TJ 3) or, p e r h a p s b e t t e r — t o b y p a s s t h e s i d e i s s u e of h o w to i n d i v i d u a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s — a s t h e first virtue of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . Given this n o t i o n of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , Rawls's p r o j e c t is t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of justice (or t h e c e n t r a l p a r t thereof) t h a t a s s e s s e s t h e most important i n s t i t u t i o n a l features of a n y self-contained (TJ 457) o r all-inclusive social s y s t e m (BSS IV). T h e s e e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of a c l o s e d s y s t e m ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e — " t h e political c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e legally r e c o g n i z e d forms of p r o p e r t y , . . . t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , a n d t h e n a t u r e of t h e family" (BSS 47), w h o s e effects a r e " p r o f o u n d a n d pervasive, a n d p r e s e n t from b i r t h " (TJ 96)—Rawls refers t o a s its b a s i c s t r u c t u r e (TJ §2, BSS). I will also say t h a t t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s of t h e , largely constitutive, g r o u n d rules t h a t s h a p e a society, o r of t h e terms oj'social interaction t h a t significantly involve o r a t least affect all its p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s define t h e society's c e n t r a l p r o ­ c e d u r e s , b o d i e s , a n d offices, a n d t h e y regulate t h e a s s i g n m e n t of b e n e ­ fits a n d b u r d e n s (rights a n d d u t i e s , p o w e r s a n d i m m u n i t i e s , g o o d s a n d services) t o p a r t i c i p a n t s in g e n e r a l a n d t o t h e o c c u p a n t s of special roles. In b r o a d outline, t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s of a society's b a s i c m o d e of e c o n o m i c organization; t h e p r o c e d u r e s for m a k i n g social 1 4

1 5

only some rules of the practice n e e d have this character (there might b e a rule in baseball that forbids players to bite or kick others). T h i s point is relevant t o Rawls's subject of a social system's basic structure. S o m e of the c o n d u c t rules in s u c h a system m a y m e r e l y restate natural duties, w h i c h p e r s o n s have toward o n e another irrespective o f a n v practices they may jointly participate in—criminal-law prohibitions against crueltv (TJ 1141 or against harming the innocent ITJ 109), for e x a m p l e " C o m p a r e t h e distinction Rawls makes in another context b e t w e e n "a practice i n which there is n o option w h e t h e r to e n g a g e in it or not, a n d o n e must plav" a n d prachce m w h i c h there ,s s u c h an option, and o n e m a y decline the invitation" t m 242; ci.

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T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.4.2

33

c h o i c e s t h r o u g h t h e c o n d u c t of, or i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g , i n d i v i d u a l s a n d groups, a n d limitations u p o n s u c h choices; the more important prac­ tices g o v e r n i n g civil ( n o n e c o n o m i c a n d nonpolitical) i n t e r a c t i o n s , s u c h a s t h e family o r t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m ; a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e s for i n t e r ­ p r e t i n g a n d enforcing t h e r u l e s of t h e s c h e m e . T h e first category in­ c l u d e s a specification of w h a t k i n d of i t e m s c a n b e o w n e d a n d b y w h o m , h o w o w n e r s h i p is g a i n e d a n d lost, b u t n o t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i ­ z a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c a s s o c i a t i o n s s u c h as firms o r u n i o n s , w h i c h o n l y s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s are involved in. Similarly, t h e last c a t e ­ gory m i g h t i n c l u d e a specification of t h e w a y s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h infractions of social r u l e s are to b e p r o t e s t e d , d e t e r m i n e d , p u n ­ i s h e d , d e t e r r e d , o r p r e e m p t e d b u t n o t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e j u d i c i a r y o r t h e full details of c r i m i n a l trial p r o c e d u r e s . A m o n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s t h a t , w h e r e t h e y exist, are p a r t of t h e basic s t r u c ­ t u r e a r e t h e u s e of m o n e y , "competitive m a r k e t s , private p r o p e r t y in t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s family" (TJ 7), r u l e s g o v e r n ­ ing t h e u s e of force, slavery (TJ 248), t h e division of p o w e r s , p a r l i a m e n ­ tary d e m o c r a c y , judicial review, a t a x - f u n d e d welfare s y s t e m , a n d c o m ­ pulsory primary education. T h i s n o t i o n of a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , a n e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e a c c o u n t in A Theory of Justice, conflicts w i t h a n a r r o w e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m w h i c h d o m i n a t e s Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n in " T h e Basic S t r u c t u r e as S u b ­ ject." T h e r e t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is defined in t e r m s of " a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l division of labor b e t w e e n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e r u l e s a p p l y i n g directly t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s " (BSS 55). " T h e role of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t b e l o n g t o t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t o s e c u r e just back­ g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e a c t i o n s of individuals a n d a s s o ­ c i a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e " (BSS 53). By this n a r r o w c o n s t r u a l , Rawls's e x a m ­ p l e s of private p r o p e r t y in t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e m o n o g a ­ m o u s family w o u l d n o t b e i n c l u d e d , b e c a u s e it is n o t t h e i r role, e v e n ideally, to p r e s e r v e just b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s . T h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a d e v e l o p e d society m i g h t t h e n i n c l u d e little m o r e t h a n its welfare a n d s c h o o l s y s t e m s , a n d s o m e historical societies, o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d r u l e s t h a t a p p l y directly t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s , w o u l d lack a b a s i c structure altogether. I n w h a t follows, I w o r k w i t h t h e first, w i d e r s e n s e of t h e t e r m basic structure. In a way, t h i s c h o i c e reflects n o d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h Rawls, b e c a u s e it leaves u n d i s p u t e d h i s reasons for t h i n k i n g t h a t s p e c i a l m e c h a n i s m s a r e n e e d e d to p r e s e r v e a fair d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r a m o n g t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a social s y s t e m . I also believe, h o w 16

17

1 6

H e r e a b a s i c structure m a y allow for c h o i c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h features of itself are changed. T h e n o t i o n of t h e basic structure, like m a n y o t h e r important c o n c e p t s , retains a certain v a g u e n e s s , w h i c h it w o u l d b e futile to try to r e m o v e c o m p l e t e l y . The n o t i o n m a y surely b e significant a n d p e n e t r a t i n g e v e n w i t h o u t a s h a r p line b e t w e e n practices that are a n d t h o s e that are not part of the basic structure. 1 7

T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.2

24

ever, t h a t Rawls's n a r r o w i n g of t h e n o t i o n w a s a s t r a t e g i c m i s t a k e , b e c a u s e h e w a s t h e r e b y a c c e p t i n g t h e w a y Nozick w a n t s to s t r u c t u r e t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e i r t w o a p p r o a c h e s . W h a t 1 h a v e in m i n d c a n b e c o m e c l e a r only gradually, as I d e v e l o p t h e c o n t r a s t in a w a y that differs from Nozick's a n d Rawls's p r e s e n t a t i o n s . But o n e q u i c k w a y of sketching m y w o r r y is this: O n t h e n a r r o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m , Rawls's e n t e r p r i s e — t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t p r o v i d e s a criterion for t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s — either b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n by a s s u m i n g t h a t social s y s t e m s o u g h t t o have a basic s t r u c t u r e o r h a s n o t h i n g t o s a y a b o u t social s y s t e m s t h a t lack a basic s t r u c t u r e . T h e latter, m o r e c h a r i t a b l e v e r d i c t w o u l d render Rawls's a p p r o a c h p a r o c h i a l , as h e h i m s e l f s e e m s to c o n c e d e w h e n h e suggests t h a t (only?) w h e n w e o p t for a s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t d o c t r i n e a n d (only?) " o n c e w e t h i n k of t h e p a r t i e s to a social c o n t r a c t a s free a n d equal (and rational) m o r a l p e r s o n s [are t h e r e ] s t r o n g r e a s o n s for taking t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e as t h e p r i m a r y s u b j e c t " (BSS 48). " T h e l i b e r t a r i a n d o c t r i n e . . . h a s n o p l a c e for a s p e c i a l t h e o r y of j u s t i c e for t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e " (BSS 52). T h i s p a r o c h i a l c h a r a c t e r of Rawls's a p p r o a c h is close to w h a t Nozick is s u g g e s t i n g . T h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i ­ tion at b e s t p r o v i d e s a s u i t a b l e s t a n d p o i n t for r a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s t h a t a r e o r g a n i z e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h (what Nozick calls) patterned p r i n c i p l e s . It is u n s u i t a b l e for a fair a s s e s s m e n t of t h e liber­ tarian i n s t i t u t i o n s Nozick favors (ASU 198-204). O n t h e w i d e n o t i o n of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e w h i c h I a m p r e s u p p o s i n g , any c o m p r e h e n s i v e social s y s t e m h a s a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e a n d t h u s falls w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of Nozick's m i n i m a l state, for e x a m p l e , c o n s i s t s of c e r t a i n p r o h i b i t i o n s against force a n d fraud, c e r t a i n r u l e s of a c q u i s i t i o n , transfer, a n d r e c ­ tification of h o l d i n g s , a n d s o m e b a s i c m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t . Rawls a n d Nozick c a n t h e n b e s e e n t o b e o p e r a t i n g 18

19

,8

T h i s wide notion is not fully displaced in Rawls's later work. It still appears, for example, at BSS 55, where he varies the expression with "institutional form" and "social structure," suggesting that every social s y s t e m has such a core of basic institutions. "Nozick discusses some other basic structures in which the same rules and prohibi­ tions are combined with different methods of adjudication and enforcement—involving an ufrraminimal government, protection agencies, and individuals (respectively) As we shall see, Rawls's conception of justice is applicable even to the last of these Nozick's state of nature can be understood as a basic structure, provided the rules and practices he postulates for it are sufficiently known and honored to enable reasonably settled expectations about how persons will interact. T h u s it is false, I think, that "anarchist theoryrftenable undercuts the w h o l e subject of political philosophy" (ASU 4 l - 7 t teas if one allows that Rawls's question is in political philosophy. A n a r c W s s o p p o s e nsntu ..onal s c h e m e s involving governmental authorities and coercion, but this not onnosl tion to institutions as such. In fact, anarchist t h e o r i s t * Km.v,ii , I , ^ opposiof practices, procedures, rules, a n c f n Z n t h a t Z „ ^ ? J ^ P P social system^ T h e s e are anareWs. basT sSictu^s(irTmvtiH ^ Nevertheless, some intercourse is cleany n T - S t e a ° ^ ' I n ­ ared i n s t l , u t I o n s w justice c o u l d be a s s e s s e d ( p a r a d i g m a t i c X T h V ^ t t ? ? ^ civUizati ns Rawls contends that even S ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ° »by certain natural duties (cf Chap n 1 7 w a l l y constrained m

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T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.5

25

w i t h i n t h e s a m e a r e n a of possibilities, offering c o m p e t i n g a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e s a m e subject, t h e justice of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . 1.5. O n c e t h i s focus o n a social s y s t e m ' s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e h a s b e e n fully u n d e r s t o o d , it h a s a s t r o n g claim to p r i m a c y w i t h i n m o r a l reflec­ t i o n q u i t e a p a r t from w h e t h e r o n e believes in social c o n t r a c t s o r free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n h o o d . T h e reason is t h a t w e c a n n o t , c o n c e p ­ tually o r causally, e v a l u a t e w h a t w e a r e d o i n g t o o t h e r s w i t h o u t u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t give m e a n i n g to o u r a c t i o n s a n d o m i s s i o n s a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e i r (often r e m o t e ) repercus­ s i o n s . N o r c a n w e s i m p l y take t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s for g r a n t e d . To s o m e e x t e n t t h e c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules, t h e w a y w e s t r u c t u r e h u m a n i n t e r a c ­ tion, is u p to u s collectively, a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this c h o i c e are of t h e g r e a t e s t m o r a l significance. C o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w o n e o u g h t to c o n d u c t oneself w i t h i n a social context, therefore, o n e c a n n o t s i m p l y follow t h e prevailing social i n s t i t u t i o n s b u t m u s t e x a m ­ i n e t h e s e from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. W h e r e t h e y are just, t h e y s h o u l d be c o m p l i e d with a n d s u p p o r t e d . Where they are unjust, one s h o u l d s e e h o w o n e m i g h t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e i r reform a n d p e r h a p s h e l p miti­ g a t e s o m e of t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . A n d w h e r e (just) i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e lacking a l t o g e t h e r , t h e task is to h e l p b r i n g t h e m a b o u t . T h i s crucial c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t w o m o r a l subjects, d e a l i n g respec­ tively w i t h i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d w i t h c o n d u c t , is n o t t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n m a c r o - a n d m i c r o c o n t e x t s , t h o u g h m a n y h a v e followed Nozick (ASU 167n, 2 0 4 - 5 ) in s u p p o s i n g o t h e r w i s e . U n d e r s t o o d generally, Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice is a p p l i c a b l e , in t h e limit, to t h e d e s i g n of g r o u n d r u l e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of t w o p e r s o n s s t r a n d e d t o g e t h e r o n a n isolated i s l a n d o r t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t m a y h a v e e m e r g e d b e t w e e n t h e m . If it is i n a p p l i c a b l e t o h o w p a r e n t s s h o u l d allocate r e s o u r c e s to t h e e d u c a t i o n of t h e i r c h i l d r e n , h o w t e a c h e r s s h o u l d g r a d e t h e i r p u p i l s , or h o w firms s h o u l d r e m u n e r a t e t h e i r e m ­ p l o y e e s , t h e reason is n o t that t h e s e a r e small-scale i s s u e s b u t t h a t t h e y raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t c o n d u c t w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . Rawls's criterion is also i n a p p l i c a b l e to t h e d e s i g n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a s s o c i a t i o n s ( s u c h a s firms) a n d s u b s y s t e m s ( s u c h as n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m s ) , n o m a t t e r h o w large t h e s e m a y b e . T h i s m u s t b e s o o n p a i n of i n c o n s i s ­ t e n c y , a s t h e r e is every r e a s o n t o believe t h a t t h e global c r i t e r i o n a n d t h e local criteria a r e n o t cosatisfiable. T h e e n t i r e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m c a n b e o r g a n i z e d so as to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e , o r e a c h p a r t of t h i s social s y s t e m m i g h t b e o r g a n i z e d s o a s to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h a t part, b u t w e c a n n o t h a v e it b o t h w a y s , b e c a u s e t h e t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s w o u l d i n p r a c t i c e conflict w i t h each other. 2 0

2 0

T h o u g h basic structure is s o m e w h a t m o r e restrictive than institutional scheme in regard to i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d , this difference will not matter in w h a t follows. I will generally prefer institutional scheme, b e c a u s e it is m o r e descriptive a n d not peculiar to Rawls.

26

T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.6

T h e crucial p o i n t , t h e n , is t h a t Rawls f o c u s e s o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l "rules of t h e g a m e " a n d n o t o n w h a t m o v e s p l a y e r s a r e m o r a l l y free or c o n s t r a i n e d t o m a k e w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r g a m e in p r o g r e s s . T o stay w i t h t h e m e t a p h o r for a m o m e n t , t h e q u e s t i o n is n o t w h e t h e r in a n o n g o i n g p o k e r g a m e t h o s e w h o h a v e w o n a great d e a l s h o u l d n ' t (be m a d e to) give s o m e of t h e i r w i n n i n g s to t h o s e w h o h a v e lost n e a r l y all t h e y h a d . T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r w e o u g h t n o t r a t h e r p l a y s o m e o t h e r g a m e t h a t d o e s n o t , t i m e a n d again, p r o d u c e d e s t i t u t e l o s e r s . T h i s q u e s t i o n m a y s e e m silly in t h e c o n t e x t of g a m e s t h a t p e r s o n s c a n join a n d q u i t at will, b u t it is of c o n s i d e r a b l e u r g e n c y in r e g a r d to t h e f r a m e w o r k of basic social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e b o r n i n t o it a n d s h a p e d b y it, c a n n o t quit at will, a n d a r e s u b j e c t t o violent c o e r c i o n w h e n t h e y try to i g n o r e its r u l e s . 1.6. T h e c o m m o n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls's p r o j e c t h a s v a r i o u s s o u r c e s . F r e q u e n t l y h i s t e r m institution is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s p e c i a l k i n d of actor, s u c h a s a g o v e r n m e n t o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t y . T h i s a s s o c i a ­ tion is s o m e w h a t e n c o u r a g e d b y h i s n a r r o w u s e of t h e t e r m b a s i c structure in " T h e Basic S t r u c t u r e as Subject." T h e c a s e of o u r s i m p l e island e c o n o m y (or even that of t h e p o k e r g a m e ) m a y h e l p s h o w h o w Rawls's q u e s t i o n c a n arise e v e n i n very small-scale social s y s t e m s w h o s e relevant p r a c t i c e s c o u l d q u i t e conceivably w o r k w i t h o u t a n y a u t h o r i t i e s or officials. T h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is p e r h a p s f u r t h e r e n c o u r a g e d b y a reluc­ t a n c e t o a c c e p t t h a t social i n s t i t u t i o n s or b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n exist (be quantified over) a n d c a n h a v e m o r a l p r o p e r t i e s . But I d o n ' t believe Rawls's a p p r o a c h , p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , h a s s u c h i m p l i c a t i o n s . In d e ­ veloping a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e (in h i s sense), o n e is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o thinking of social i n s t i t u t i o n s a s t h i n g s t h a t , like p e r s o n s , a r e responsi­ ble for c e r t a i n m o r a l l y salient a s p e c t s of reality. (In fact, t h i n k i n g t h i s w a y invites t h e m i s t a k e n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t insofar as i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e responsible, p e r s o n s are not.) Rather, o n e c a n allow t h a t talk a b o u t social i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y b e s h o r t h a n d for ( m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x ) talk a b o u t e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d m o d e s of i n t e r a c t i o n p r e v a l e n t in s o m e social s y s t e m a n d , c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h a t a c r i t i q u e of s o m e institution as u n j u s t c a n b e c a s h e d o u t a s a critique of c o n d u c t as w r o n g (namely, t h e c o n d u c t of t h o s e w h o i n a u g u r a t e d , p e r p e t u a t e , or are in a p o s i t i o n to reform t h e m o d e of i n t e r a c t i o n in question). Even w i t h s u c h reducibility, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n justice a n d morality is significant a n d fruitful. T h i s m a y b e overlooked i f — p e r h a p s led o n by t h e fact t h a t t h e adjectivesjusf a n d unjust c a n also a p p l y t o (individual a n d collective) a g e n t s a n d t h e i r c o n d u c t — o n e c o n c e i v e s t h e reducibility simplistically, that is, t h i n k s of institutional injustice a s s p l y the aggregate of m a n y h o m o l o g o u s i n t e r p e r s o n a l "injustices" 21

i m

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27

c o m m i t t e d b y (individual or collective) a g e n t s . I have a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d h o w this view is m i s l e a d i n g . T h e social injustice blacks h a v e suffered a s victims of t h e institution of slavery d o e s n o t c o n s i s t of a m u l t i t u d e of w r o n g s c o m m i t t e d against t h e m by t h e i r ("unjust") s l a v e h o l d e r s . W e c a n n o t c o m b a t this injustice by stealing a n d p r o t e c t i n g slaves o r t h r o u g h a t t e m p t s to reform s l a v e h o l d e r s ( p e r h a p s b y u r g i n g t h e m to r e l e a s e t h e i r slaves o r at least to give t h e m b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t ) . W e m u s t reform institutions. O n l y w h e n t h e relevant legal a n d political s y s t e m c e a s e s t o r e c o g n i z e p r o p e r t y rights in p e r s o n s is t h e social injustice o v e r c o m e . Likewise, w h e n Rawls c l a i m s t h a t e c o n o m i c inequalities prevailing i n d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n societies a r e u n j u s t (TJ 226, 279), h e is n o t e n v i s a g i n g t h a t — t h a n k s t o a c h a n g e of h e a r t a m o n g t h e rich o r t o i n t e r v e n t i o n s by t h i r d p a r t i e s — w e a l t h is to b e t r a n s f e r r e d or r e d i s t r i b ­ u t e d t o t h e p o o r . Rather, t h e p o i n t is t o c h a n g e t h e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u ­ t i o n s t h a t g o v e r n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources (and give rise to e x c e s ­ sive inequalities) in t h e first p l a c e . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h e responsibility for s u c h u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e task of r e f o r m i n g t h e m a r e n o t c o n f i n e d to s l a v e h o l d e r s or t o t h e r i c h b u t r a t h e r fall u p o n all p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e social s y s t e m ( t h o u g h p e r h a p s i n p r o p o r t i o n to t h e benefits a n d a d v a n t a g e s t h e y enjoy u n d e r t h e u n j u s t s c h e m e a n d surely in p r o p o r t i o n to t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e y h a v e of s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform). Spelled o u t in this way, t h e focus o n a social s y s t e m ' s b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s a w a y of a d ­ d r e s s i n g ( a n d t h u s a s s u m e s ) a s p e c i a l t y p e of m o r a l responsibility, t h e joint r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e h a v e for its j u s t i c e . N o w o n e m i g h t t h i n k that, s o u n d e r s t o o d , t h e subject of justice will largely p r e e m p t t h e subject of morality. O n c e t h e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e given, i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s o u g h t s i m p l y t o a b i d e b y t h e m , at least s o l o n g a s t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e just; it is o n l y w h e n g r o u n d r u l e s a r e u n j u s t , o r p a r t l y lacking, t h a t morality c o m e s i n t o play. But this view, s o m e w h a t e n c o u r a g e d b y Rawls's earlier baseball a n a l o g y (TCR), is a s u b s t a n t i a l o v e r s t a t e m e n t . Even w h e n a j u s t a n d c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s exists, it d o e s n o t s u p e r s e d e morality. I n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d r u l e s p r i n c i p a l l y govern e x t e r n a l c o n d u c t (generating d u t i e s of j u s t i c e in Kant's s e n s e ) a n d t h u s largely leave a s i d e o u r i n n e r lives. Morality (or ethics) a d d r e s s e s q u e s t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r , m a x i m s , virtues, i n t e n t i o n s , s e n t i m e n t s , a n d t h e like, w h i c h w o u l d b e i m p o r t a n t even (or r a t h e r , especially) in a perfectly just w o r l d . Next, a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e p r o v i d e s o n l y a g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k for i n t e r a c t i o n . Morality is relevant t o h o w w e a c t w i t h i n t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e l e e w a y left b y s u c h a framework. Not e v e r y t h i n g t h e g r o u n d r u l e s p e r m i t is of e q u a l m o r a l quality. Finally, m o r a l i t y s u p p l i e s i n d e p e n d e n t reasons for a c t i o n w h i c h m a y conflict w i t h just g r o u n d r u l e s in s p e c i a l c a s e s . Even p a r 2 2

zz

See

Kant, KPW 1 3 2 - 3 3 .

28

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.1

t i c i p a n t s in a (nearly) just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y in s p e c i a l c i r c u m ­ stances have moral reasons not to comply with particular obligations t h a t p r o p e r l y a r o s e w i t h i n it (cf. §9.5). 23

Z. T h e R e l e v a n c e o f P a t t e r n s 2 . 1 . Let u s begin t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e criteria for a s s e s s i n g feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s b y asking w h a t r e l e v a n c e p a t t e r n s m i g h t h a v e for o u r subject. T h i s inquiry s h o u l d f u r t h e r i l l u m i n a t e o u r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o t y p e s of m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t , as well as t h e c h a r a c t e r of Rawls's p r o j e c t a n d of Nozick's m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it. With a n eye to e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s especially, Nozick p o s t u l a t e s a f u n d a m e n t a l division b e t w e e n patterned a n d unpatterned p r i n c i p l e s of distributive justice (ASU 155-60). He favors u n p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h specify p r o c e d u r e s t h r o u g h w h i c h h o l d i n g s c a n b e a c q u i r e d (initially or from others) a n d t h e n , so to speak, let t h e c h i p s fall w h e r e t h e y m a y . P a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , b y c o n t r a s t , involve t h e i d e a t h a t s o m e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of i n c o m e or w e a l t h are b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s — f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t h o l d i n g s (at a n y m o m e n t o r over time) s h o u l d b e r o u g h l y e q u a l , s h o u l d reflect h o w h a r d p e o p l e work, or s h o u l d b e above a c e r t a i n t h r e s h o l d . Nozick o p p o s e s p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , b e c a u s e t h e y r e q u i r e m e d d l i n g in c o n s e n s u a l e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s ("between c o n s e n t i n g adults") w h e n e v e r t h e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s w o u l d o t h e r w i s e u p s e t t h e fa­ vored p a t t e r n . T h e y l e a d t o " h e a d - o n c l a s h e s . . . [with] m o r a l s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s o n h o w individuals m a y b e t r e a t e d " (ASU 173; cf. t h e tale of Wilt C h a m b e r l a i n , ASU 161-64). A n d h e s e e s Rawls as p r e p o s s e s s e d in favor of p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , "for p e o p l e m e e t i n g t o g e t h e r b e h i n d a veil of i g n o r a n c e to d e c i d e w h o g e t s w h a t , k n o w i n g n o t h i n g a b o u t a n y special e n t i t l e m e n t s p e o p l e m a y have, will treat a n y t h i n g to b e d i s ­ t r i b u t e d a s m a n n a from h e a v e n " (ASU 199; b u t cf. TJ 88). T h e mistake h e r e is t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n a r e t o d e c i d e not w h o gets w h a t b u t r a t h e r w h i c h criterion will govern t h e c h o i c e of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t regulate w h o gets w h a t . A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, s u c h a criterion s h o u l d b e sensitive t o w h a t sorts of p a t t e r n s various alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Nozick fails t o a p p r e c i a t e that any p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e might b e d e e m e d relevant in t w o different w a y s . O n e might p r o p o s e its i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e g r o u n d rules, as a r e q u i r e m e n t u p o n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s (officials) t o w o r k for i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e prevailing distribution of h o l d i n g s b y a d j u s t ­ ing t h e i r o w n e c o n o m i c activities a n d by interfering w i t h t h o s e of " F o r examples of how such intrapersonal conflicts may arise even in a basically just socery, see Femberg, RI i - 2 4 . Rawls once had the ambition of extending; n s contractanan conception "to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system includTng pnnctp es for all the virtues" (TJ 17, cf. 109,130; BSS II), to be titled "rightn'ssasSness" 2 0

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.2

29

o t h e r s . S u c h a p r o p o s a l conflicts w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d r u l e s Nozick a d v o c a t e s a n d m o r e generally w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o c e d u r a l . Alternatively, t h e p a t t e r n prefer­ e n c e m a y b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n t h e a s s e s s m e n t ( a n d design) of g r o u n d r u l e s . W h a t is p r o p o s e d in this c a s e is that w e b e g u i d e d in r a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s by t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e . S u c h a p r o p o s a l d o e s n o t conflict w i t h t h e i d e a of p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s . W h e t h e r it s u p p o r t s t h e p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d r u l e s Nozick a d v o c a t e s d e p e n d s o n w h a t p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e is p r o p o s e d a n d o n e m p i r i c a l d a t a a b o u t t h e p a t t e r n s of h o l d i n g s t h a t v a r i o u s alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s (Nozick's i n c l u d e d ) t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Rawls's difference p r i n c i p l e m i g h t i n d e e d b e d e s c r i b e d a s "pat­ t e r n e d . ' ' It d o e s involve t h e i d e a t h a t s o m e p a t t e r n s a r e b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s . But it is a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e in t h e s e c o n d s e n s e . Rawls e m ­ p l o y s it a s a c r i t e r i o n for t h e a s s e s s m e n t ( a n d design) of g r o u n d r u l e s . He d o e s n o t w a n t it to b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of t h o s e r u l e s t h e m s e l v e s . In fact, like Nozick, h e w a n t s t h e e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s to b e p r o c e d u r a l . If t h e y a r e just, t h a t is, t e n d to g e n e r a t e a b e t t e r p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s t h a n a n y feasible alternative i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d , t h e n t h e r e is n o n e e d for official i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s n e e d n o t w o r r y a b o u t t h e i m p a c t of t h e i r e c o n o m i c activities u p o n t h e overall p a t t e r n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h (cf. TJ 8 7 - 8 8 ; BSS 54). So t h e difference p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t select a p a t t e r n as s u c h ; it selects a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e o n t h e b a s i s of t h e p a t t e r n it t e n d s to p r o d u c e . H e n c e f l u c t u a t i o n s in t h e p a t t e r n a just e c o n o m i c s c h e m e g e n e r a t e s a r e n o t r e a s o n s for interfer­ ing ( t h r o u g h r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s ) w i t h t h e w o r k i n g s of t h i s s c h e m e . Moreover, in m a k i n g this selection, t h e difference p r i n c i p l e f u n c t i o n s r a t h e r differently from t h e o t h e r " p a t t e r n e d " p r i n c i p l e s t h a t Nozick l u m p s t o g e t h e r w i t h it. F r o m e x a m i n i n g a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e w i t h t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s it t e n d s t o p r o d u c e , o n e c a n tell h o w close it c o m e s to e q u a l i t y o r to h o l d i n g s b e i n g p r o p o r t i o n a l t o IQ o r m o r a l w o r t h . Yet o n e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r it satisfies t h e difference p r i n c i p l e or e v e n w h e t h e r it d o e s well o r poorly. T h i s a s s e s s m e n t essentially d e p e n d s u p o n w h a t o t h e r s c h e m e s are feasible a n d w h a t p a t t e r n s t h e y w o u l d t e n d t o g e n e r a t e . W h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is preferred a n d w h a t sort of p a t t e r n t h e p r e f e r r e d s c h e m e t e n d s to p r o d u c e d e p e n d u p o n t h e full r a n g e of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l alternatives. T h i s p o i n t u n d e r s c o r e s t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h : Rawls is n o t c o m m i t t e d to s o m e p a t t e r n . He s e e k s to b e c o m m i t t e d , like Nozick, to a p a r t i c u l a r institu­ tional s c h e m e a n d t o t h e a c c e p t a n c e of w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u ­ t i o n s t h i s s c h e m e m a y g e n e r a t e over t i m e . But h e w a n t s t o b a s e t h i s c o m m i t m e n t u p o n a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e p a t t e r n s t h a t v a r i o u s a l t e r n a ­ tive s c h e m e s t e n d t o p r o d u c e . He h o l d s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d o r c h o s e n via t h e i r p a t t e r n s . 2Jt. If w e a s s e s s social i n s t i t u t i o n s via t h e p a t t e r n s t h e y t e n d t o produce, w e m u s t ultimately compare entire basic structures, because

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T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.3

t h e best w a y of setting o n e p a r a m e t e r of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e m a y n o t be i n d e p e n d e n t of h o w its o t h e r p a r a m e t e r s will h a v e b e e n set. T h e value of c e r t a i n rights a p e r s o n h a s u n d e r o n e i n s t i t u t i o n , for e x a m p l e , m a y d e p e n d o n w h e t h e r h e h a s c e r t a i n o t h e r r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d b y a n o t h e r . It w o u l d also b e i m p l a u s i b l e , in c o m p a r i n g alternative s c h e m e s , to p r o ­ c e e d p i e c e m e a l t h r o u g h t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s of g o o d s w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is p r e s u m e d t o m a t t e r . If t w o g o o d s — i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , for e x a m ­ p l e — a r e u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d , it will often b e relevant w h e t h e r t h e s a m e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e d i s a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r b o t h d i s t r i b u t i o n s . While t h e r e is p l e n t y of r o o m for a b s t r a c t i o n s a n d simplifications of v a r i o u s kinds, t h e u l t i m a t e i d e a m u s t t h e n b e to c o m p a r e e n t i r e b a s i c s t r u c ­ t u r e s by reference to t h e master pattern e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e . H e r e a m a s t e r p a t t e r n c o n t a i n s i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e overall v a l u e s o m e in­ stitutional s c h e m e h a s for e a c h of its p a r t i c i p a n t s . 2 . 3 . T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s c a n e n g e n d e r p a t t e r n s is a n i d e a Nozick himself a p p e a l s to i n t h e c o n t e x t of h i s d i s c u s s i o n of invisibleh a n d e x p l a n a t i o n s , w h i c h explain " s o m e overall p a t t e r n o r d e s i g n " a s t h e u n i n t e n d e d r e s u l t of t h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d activities of p e r s o n s c o e x ­ isting w i t h i n a c e r t a i n e n v i r o n m e n t (ASU 18). Let m e s h o w h o w t h e i d e a of p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s in Rawls's s e n s e c a n b e p r e s e n t e d a s a n e x t e n ­ sion of t h i s p o i n t of Nozick's. A h o m i c i d e r a t e is a s i m p l e e x a m p l e of a p a t t e r n t h a t e m e r g e s a s t h e b y - p r o d u c t of t h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d activities of m a n y i n d i v i d u a l s . It is n o t i n t e n d e d o r b r o u g h t a b o u t b y a n y o n e . S u c h r a t e s a n d t h e w a y t h e y vary from c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e to t h e m o ­ tives a n d beliefs of i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s , t h o u g h t h e s e a r e c r u c i a l t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r h o m i c i d e s . T h e social p h e n o m e n o n of h o m i ­ cide calls t h e n for e x p l a n a t i o n o n t w o d i s t i n c t levels: for m a c r o e x p l a n a tions of its rates of i n c i d e n c e a n d for m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s . N e i t h e r t y p e of e x p l a n a t i o n c a n fully p r e e m p t t h e o t h e r . Individuals' m o t i v e s c a n n o t a c c o u n t for statistical p a t t e r n s , a n d t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of a statistical p a t t e r n d o e s n o t a c c o u n t for w h y t h e p h e ­ n o m e n o n w a s m a n i f e s t e d i n these i n s t a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n in o t h e r s . N o w s u p p o s e , for t h e sake of t h e a r g u m e n t , it b e c a m e k n o w n t h a t s t r i c t n e s s of h a n d g u n legislation is o n e m a i n factor in t h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of h o m i c i d e . (Assume it explains s o m e sizable p a r t of n a t i o n a l differentials in h o m i c i d e rates, a n d d o n ' t w o r r y a b o u t w h e t h e r s u c h legislation is i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h t o b e p a r t of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e ) It w o u l d t h e n b e t r u e t h a t if w e have m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a l o w e r over a h i g h e r h o m i c i d e rate, t h e n w e have m o r a l r e a s o n to s u p p o r t s t r i c t e r 24

" N o z i c k offers this refutation of methodological individualism- "Tfth »>;« B I , , U , filters out (destroys) all non-P Q>, then the MDlanattorTof n « a filter that Q pattern P) will refer this filter For each S b O 5 l"* * ^ explanation w h y it is P, h o w it came tn he P Jjh« . • 1 Particular 01 w h y all Q s a r e ^ w i l T h e T e .hough t h e s e a r e a l l t h e ^ t h e r e ^ r e Z ^ P

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r a t h e r t h a n laxer h a n d g u n legislation. O n c e w e c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t r o u g h p a t t e r n s various alternative s e t s of r u l e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r , w e c a n b r i n g o u r m o r a l v a l u a t i o n s of t h e s e p a t t e r n s to b e a r u p o n o u r m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative sets of r u l e s . For e x a m p l e , w e c a n u s e o u r n e w k n o w l e d g e t o c o n s t r u c t a m o r a l c r i t i q u e of existing h a n d g u n legislation. S u c h a c r i t i q u e w o u l d b e d e p e n d e n t u p o n a p a r t i c u l a r m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h o m i c i d e r a t e (involving r e f e r e n c e to institu­ t i o n a l factors), just a s t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r killing is d e p e n ­ d e n t u p o n a p a r t i c u l a r m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n (involving t h e killer's a c t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) . Nozick's o w n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i c r o - a n d m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s c a n t h e n serve a s a b r i d g e . It c a n facilitate a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e parallel d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o s u b j e c t s of m o r a l reflection: i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s , w h i c h c a n b e m o r e o r less just o r unjust, a n d c o n d u c t , w h i c h m a y b e right o r w r o n g in d e g r e e s . And it c a n m a k e clear h o w p a t t e r n s m a y play a valid role in the former t y p e of a s s e s s m e n t s . Let m e a d d t w o clarifications. First, t h e s e t w o t y p e s of a s s e s s m e n t , just like Nozick's t w o t y p e s of e x p l a n a t i o n , d o n o t p r e e m p t e a c h o t h e r . F a u l t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors for a h i g h m u r d e r rate n e e d n o t at all e x o n e r a t e t h e c r i m i n a l s , n o r is d e n o u n c i n g all m u r d e r s a n d m u r d e r e r s t a n t a m o u n t to c o n d o n i n g laxity of g u n c o n t r o l . And faulting institu­ tional factors c a n a g a i n b e t a k e n a s s h o r t h a n d for a s c r i b i n g a r e s p o n ­ sibility t h a t all c i t i z e n s s h a r e . Even t h o u g h e a c h a n d every m u r d e r e r is fully a c c o u n t a b l e for h i s act, t h e citizens in a d e m o c r a c y m a y also b e a r a n a d d i t i o n a l collective responsibility for s o m e fraction of all h o m i c i d e s if t h e s e a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e lack of a d e q u a t e h a n d g u n legislation, for e x a m p l e , o r to a n u n j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n . S e c o n d , I h a v e so far m e r e l y tried to s h o w how, in a Rawlsian view, t h e m o r a l v a l u a t i o n of p a t t e r n s e n t e r s — v i a i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t w h a t p a t ­ terns alternative institutional s c h e m e s t e n d to e n g e n d e r — i n t o the m o r a l d e b a t e a b o u t t h e a s s e s s m e n t of s u c h s c h e m e s . It is a s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , o n c e t h e y h a v e e n t e r e d , will b e w e i g h t y e n o u g h to affect o u r a s s e s s m e n t s — t h a t is, in t h e c a s e at h a n d , w h e t h e r t h e y c a n o v e r t u r n t h e belief in a p e r s o n ' s right to o w n firearms o r in a majority's right to set risk levels for t h e p o p u l a t i o n at large. 2 . 4 . Let u s e x t e n d t h e s e t h o u g h t s to e c o n o m i c i s s u e s , to w h i c h Nozick's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p a t t e r n e d a n d u n p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s is chiefly a d d r e s s e d . I b e g i n by s k e t c h i n g a n a r g u m e n t t h a t c o u l d h a v e m o t i v a t e d t h e s u p p o r t e r s of t h e N e w Deal. S u p p o s e t h e y believed t h a t (1) t h e r e is m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s w i t h less r a t h e r 25

26

" N o z i c k explicitly a c c e p t s the related p o i n t that t w o p e r s o n s c a n e a c h b e fully r e s p o n ­ sible for a single m u r d e r (ASU 130). H e r e a n d in the s e q u e l I a s s u m e that it w o u l d be objectively w r o n g not to d o w h a t o n e c a n easily d o t o w a r d the reform of unjust features of a n institutional s c h e m e for w h i c h o n e s h a r e s a collective responsibility. I d o not m e a n , however, to p r e j u d g e the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n d to w h a t e x t e n t o n e is b l a m e w o r t h y for not b e i n g aware of this responsibility or for b e i n g aware but ignoring it. T h e s e i s s u e s I leave a s i d e b e c a u s e t h e y w o u l d lead u s t o o far b e y o n d m y m a i n t o p i c : the moral a s s e s s m e n t of social institutions. 2 6

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t h a n m o r e severe p o v e r t y a n d a l s o (2) t h e r e a r e feasible alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s (besides t h e laissez-faire s c h e m e prevailing in t h e 1920s) t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r less severe poverty. A s s u m e s u c h N e w Dealers f u r t h e r believed t h a t t h e m o r a l r e a s o n r e s u l t i n g from (1) a n d (2) is n o t n e u t r a l i z e d b y o t h e r m o r a l r e a s o n s favoring t h e existing s c h e m e over alternatives e n g e n d e r i n g less severe poverty. T h e y w o u l d t h e n c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e prevailing s c h e m e is u n j u s t a g a i n s t t h e back­ g r o u n d of s u p e r i o r alternatives. W h a t d o e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n m e a n for individuals? In p a r t i c u l a r , d o e s it entail t h a t t h e p o o r h a v e a right t o a c e r t a i n m i n i m u m i n c o m e , w i t h c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligations o n t h e p a r t of o t h e r s ? Asserting s u c h a right in this c o n t e x t c o u l d b e triply m i s l e a d i n g . First, as a m a t t e r of terminology, rights a r e b e s t specified by r e f e r e n c e t o a n institutional s c h e m e . U n d e r t h e s c h e m e prevailing in t h e 1920s n o right to a m i n i m u m i n c o m e existed. S e c o n d , t h e f o r m u l a t i o n m a y s u g g e s t t h a t u n d e r a just alternative s c h e m e p e r s o n s w o u l d h a v e a right t o a certain m i n i m u m i n c o m e . But t h i s n e e d n o t b e s o . T h e just s c h e m e w o u l d b e o n e that, s o m e h o w or other, t e n d s t o e n g e n d e r less severe poverty. It m a y n o t i n c l u d e t h e right in q u e s t i o n i f — h o w e v e r unlikely u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s — t h i s right is infeasible o r if t h e r e a r e m o r e effective alternatives for p r e v e n t i n g severe poverty. Is t h e p o i n t , t h e n , t h a t t h e p o o r h a v e a moral right t o a c e r t a i n m i n i m a l i n c o m e ? In a s e n s e , y e s . But third, t h e "right to" f o r m u l a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t w h a t is at i s s u e is a positive m o r a l right t h a t w o u l d give t h e p o o r a claim, against all of h u m a n k i n d , t o b e h e l p e d i n t h e i r n e e d . B u t n o s u c h c l a i m is at i s s u e . I a p p e a l t o a negative m o r a l right, a claim t h e p o o r h a d against A m e r i c a n citizens, specifically, w h o w e r e c o l l a b o r a t i n g in t h e i m p o s i ­ t i o n of a n u n j u s t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e t h a t t e n d e d t o p r o d u c e m o r e severe poverty t h a n is morally justifiable. T o b e s u r e , A m e r i c a n s p r e ­ s u m a b l y h a d t o do s o m e t h i n g ("positive") t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform in o r d e r to avoid violation of t h e negative m o r a l right i n q u e s t i o n . But in t h e context of p r a c t i c e s , it d o e s n o t follow t h a t t h e i r d u t y to act is therefore a positive o n e . T h e negative d u t y n o t t o a b u s e just p r a c t i c e s m a y d e m a n d positive action, a s w h e n o n e m u s t act t o k e e p a p r o m i s e o r c o n t r a c t o n e h a s m a d e . Similarly, t h e negative d u t y n o t t o collabo­ r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y also d e m a n d positive a c t i o n s (with t h e s o m e t i m e s possible alternative of w i t h d r a w i n g al­ t o g e t h e r from p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e u n j u s t s c h e m e ) . 27

All this suggests h o w o u r Rawlsian c a n begin to s u p p o r t t h e a l t e r n a ­ tive specification of l a n d o w n e r s h i p rights against Nozick's. I left t h e i r W h i l e h i s conception of justice, I think, strongly suggests it R a w U Hr> „ . i i edge such a negative right and duty but merely promote ,ust institutes (TJ 115, 334), which he classifies as posi,^ ira) Thta teav^s him unable to expla n whv one's r p ^ n n n c i h i i i t , , r„„ .u • . ^"°'" "- tnis leaves greater when one^s a panicTpantTnTa S m T h i s d T ^ ° * ^ negative duty, postulatetogether w M i *P " weight than positive ones" (TJ 1 1 4 ^ a r y view that negahve duties have more 2 7

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T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.5

33

d i s p u t e in a standoff, s h o w i n g h o w n e i t h e r p r o t a g o n i s t c o u l d r e a s o n ­ ably take his specification of p r o p e r t y rights for g r a n t e d a n d t h e n a c c u s e t h e o p p o n e n t of a d v o c a t i n g a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h t h e c o r r e c t p r o p e r t y rights w o u l d b e r o u t i n e l y violated. W e n o w have a c o n s i d e r ­ a t i o n t h a t m i g h t b r e a k t h e standoff. As Nozick u n d e r s t a n d s , h i s set of r u l e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r a certain r o u g h p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s , r e a s o n a b l y stable over t i m e : "Heavy s t r a n d s of p a t t e r n s will r u n t h r o u g h it; signifi­ c a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e v a r i a n c e in h o l d i n g s will b e a c c o u n t e d for b y p a t t e r n - v a r i a b l e s " (ASU 157). N o w it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t u n d e r h i s libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s o u r i s l a n d e c o n o m y w o u l d t e n d t o b e d o m i ­ n a t e d b y t w o o r t h r e e large family e s t a t e s w h e r e t h e r e m a i n i n g l a n d l e s s p o p u l a t i o n w o u l d s p e n d t h e i r lives as l a b o r e r s or s e r f s . T h e Rawls­ i a n ' s s c h e m e , by c o n t r a s t , w o u l d k e e p l a n d w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d a n d w o u l d t h u s e n s u r e t h a t t h o s e w h o d o e n d u p l a n d l e s s c a n at least c h o o s e a m o n g m a n y c o m p e t i n g e m p l o y e r s a n d sellers of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c e . In s h o r t , t h e available e v i d e n c e from h i s t o r y a n d social t h e o r y m a y s u g g e s t that Nozick's s c h e m e w o u l d h a v e feudalistic features a n d t h a t t h e Rawlsian's s c h e m e w o u l d t e n d to e n g e n d e r a c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t e c o n o m y in w h i c h t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n s , especially, w o u l d b e m u c h s u p e r i o r to t h a t of serf. 2 . 5 . I h a v e said t h a t Rawls's t o p i c — m o r a l reflection u p o n b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s — i s c r u c i a l for g a i n i n g a m o r a l o r i e n t a t i o n , for u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing w h a t w e are d o i n g to o t h e r s . Social i n s t i t u t i o n s play a large role in d e t e r m i n i n g b o t h t h e m e a n i n g a n d t h e effects of o u r c o n d u c t . T h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h e last few p a g e s b r i n g o u t t w o f u r t h e r r e a s o n s w h y t h i s t o p i c is s o i m p o r t a n t . First, i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l factor in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s prevailing in s o m e social s y s t e m . This is easily a p p r e c i a t e d t h r o u g h c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d i e s of n a t i o n a l societies t h a t differ in social institu­ t i o n s (for e x a m p l e , form of g o v e r n m e n t , legal s y s t e m , o r g a n i z a t i o n of military a n d p o l i c e forces, e d u c a t i o n a l facilities, s y s t e m of l a n d t e n u r e , specification of p r o p e r t y rights, o r tax s t r u c t u r e ) . S u c h i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors c o n d i t i o n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e various a c t o r s — c i t i z e n s , officials, a s s o c i a t i o n s , a n d g o v e r n m e n t s — b y s h a p i n g t h e i r values a n d o p t i o n s a n d b y fixing t h e i r "pay-off matrix," t h a t is, t h e s c h e d u l e of incentives a n d d i s i n c e n t i v e s t h e y confront. In this w a y t h e y d e t e r m i n e (in a r o u g h statistical way) m o r a l l y significant aggregate features of t h e social sys­ t e m , s u c h a s t h e level a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a s i c f r e e d o m s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s , political influence, h e a l t h care, e d u c a t i o n , w o r k satisfaction, self-re­ s p e c t , c u l t u r e , poverty, crime, life e x p e c t a n c y , infant mortality, c h i l d a b u s e , s u i c i d e , a n d s o forth. T h e p a t t e r n so e n g e n d e r e d a l r e a d y reflects t h e fact t h a t s o m e p e r s o n s try, w i t h i n t h e i r m e a n s , to h e l p alleviate c o n d i t i o n s t h e y c o n s i d e r objectionable. While s u c h efforts m a y cer­ tainly m a k e a g r e a t difference, it d o e s n o t s e e m r e a s o n a b l e o r realistic 28

2 8

C o m p a r e h e r e Nozick's e n d o r s e m e n t of "private t o w n s " (ASU 270n, cf. 322-23).

34

T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.5

t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e y c o u l d m u l t i p l y t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y w o u l d fully offset s t r o n g c o u n t e r v a i l i n g t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c t o a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . In a n y case, o n e s h o u l d e x p l o r e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e strategy that g o e s b e y o n d s u c h r e m e d i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s d e m a n d e d o r e n c o u r a g e d by morality, a i m i n g for a n e w i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d t e n d to engender a more acceptable pattern land t h u s w o u l d r e d u c e the need for r e m e d i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s ) . S u c h a t t e m p t s at i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e w o u l d s e e m t o h o l d o u t t h e greatest h o p e t h a t o u r c o m b i n e d m o r a l efforts will a c c u m u l a t e i n t o lasting p r o g r e s s . C o n c e n t r a t i n g exclusively o n private a t t e m p t s t o i m p r o v e a prevailing p a t t e r n , o n e c a n at b e s t h o p e t h a t c o n t i n u i n g efforts will m a i n t a i n t h e social s y s t e m s o m e w h a t a b o v e its e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t ( w h e r e it w o u l d b e if e v e r y o n e a c t e d self-interestedly). By c o n t r a s t , institutional c h a n g e , as exemplified b y t h e abolition of slavery o r b y t h e N e w Deal, c a n m o v e this e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t itself, t h e r e b y also b r i n g i n g further i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms w i t h i n r e a c h . Moral efforts are likely t o b e of e n d u r i n g historical significance o n l y w h e n t h e y c a n b e c o m e c u m u l a t i v e in t h i s way. T h i s first n e w r e a s o n m a y s u g g e s t t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m is b e i n g r e c o m m e n d e d for its effectiveness a l o n e , t h a t it is m e r e l y a different ( a n d better) w a y of d o i n g s o m e t h i n g m o r a l b y m a k i n g t h e w o r l d a little b e t t e r . But t h i s c o n c l u s i o n m i s s e s a crucial p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e g r o u n d of t h e d u t y t o take a n i n t e r e s t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s . An a r g u m e n t f o u n d e d o n morality w o u l d seek t o s h o w t h a t p e r s o n s i n g e n e r a l have positive claims against o n e a n o t h e r — f o r e x a m p l e , t o b e r e s c u e d , fed, o r d e f e n d e d . S u c h a n a r g u m e n t w o u l d g o a g a i n s t t h e grain of t h e Anglo-American m o r a l a n d legal t r a d i t i o n , i n w h i c h it is often d e n i e d t h a t p e r s o n s h a v e d u t i e s t o p r o t e c t a n d aid o t h e r p e r s o n s in d i s t r e s s : it's a g o o d t h i n g t o h e l p t h o s e w h o m i g h t o t h e r w i s e d r o w n o r starve o r b e m u r d e r e d , b u t it i s n ' t very w r o n g n o t to, especially if t h e trouble, e x p e n s e , o r risks involved a r e n ' t negligible. I a m n o t challeng­ ing this view h e r e . T h e m o r a l responsibility I a m s p e a k i n g of is f o u n d e d o n justice a n d involves p e r s o n s ' negative claim n o t t o b e m a d e victims of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s t h o u g h t i n d i c a t e s t h e s e c o n d n e w r e a s o n for t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Rawls's topic, t h a t (advantaged) p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a n institutional s c h e m e s h a r e a responsibility for t h e justice of t h e s c h e m e . If t h e s c h e m e is unjust, o n e m a y b e i m p l i c a t e d with o t h e r s in a collective w r o n g w h o s e victims h a v e u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s i m p o s e d u p o n t h e m . Since, a s a m o r a l p e r s o n , o n e w a n t s to avoid being involved in s u c h w r o n g s , o n e h a s r e a s o n t o reflect u p o n t h e justice of social i n s t i t u t i o n s S u c h reflection is especially needful b e c a u s e injustices m a y n o t b e obvious. T h e c o n n e c t i o n of excessive deprivations a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s t o t h e institutional s c h e m e p r o d u c i n g t h e m m a y b e o p a q u e T h e in­ justice of a n institutional s c h e m e t e n d s to b e m o s t manifest w h e n t h e radical m e q u a l m e s it p r o d u c e s are clearly " o n t h e b o o k s " a r e for

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n e i t h e r explicitly n o r e v e n implicitly called for b y t h e prevailing g r o u n d r u l e s b u t h a v e merely, a s a n e m p i r i c a l m a t t e r , c o m e a b o u t p u r s u a n t t o them. T h u s t h e injustice of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery (as it existed in t h e U n i t e d States) is c o m p a r a t i v e l y obvious. Not o n l y w e r e s o m e forced to live in a h i g h l y d e h u m a n i z i n g c o n d i t i o n , b u t this c o n d i t i o n of slavery w a s "official," explicitly i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e A m e r i c a n political a n d legal s y s t e m (in voting rights, fugitive slave laws, a n d so forth). B e c a u s e of its d i s t i n c t l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s y s t e m i c c h a r a c t e r , it is a l s o especially evident that the moral problem concerned not slaveholders alone but e v e n t h o s e A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s w h o n e i t h e r o w n e d slaves n o r benefited from slavery. T h e s e w e r e n o t u n c o n c e r n e d b y s t a n d e r s , a s t h e i r S w e d ­ i s h c o n t e m p o r a r i e s m a y h a v e b e e n — m e r e l y a w a r e of e n s l a v e m e n t a n d in a p o s i t i o n t o d o at least a little bit a b o u t it. Rather, t h e y s h a r e d a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e injustice; t h e y h a d a negative d u t y to s t o p c o o p e r ­ a t i n g in its i m p o s i t i o n , for e x a m p l e , by h e l p i n g to e n d slavery t h r o u g h institutional reforms. T h e o t h e r e n d of t h i s s p e c t r u m c a n b e exemplified, o n c e again, b y t h e laissez-faire i n s t i t u t i o n s p r e c e d i n g t h e N e w Deal. S u p p o s e t h e s e e n g e n ­ d e r e d severe d i s a d v a n t a g e s — i n t e r m s of n u t r i t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h care, etc.—for t h o s e b o m into t h e l o w e r classes, w h o s e plight w a s t h e s y s t e m a t i c c o r r e l a t e of a n u n c o n s t r a i n e d m a r k e t s c h e m e in w h i c h t h e i n c o m e of m a n y h o u s e h o l d s w a s d e t e r m i n e d solely by t h e vagaries of s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d for t h e k i n d s of l a b o r t h e i r m e m b e r s c o u l d sell. Unlike slavery, this s c h e m e did n o t (explicitly or implicitly) call for excessive d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . Yet it d i d in fact c o n s i s t e n t l y e n g e n d e r t h e m . It is o n t h e basis of this fact, a n d against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of at least o n e a c c e s s i b l e alternative s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d n o t t e n d to p r o d u c e similarly r a d i c a l inequalities, t h a t o n e c a n reject t h e relevant e c o n o m i c s c h e m e a s u n j u s t a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s at t h e t i m e w e r e i m p o v e r i s h e d (rather t h a n m e r e l y poor), w e r e starved ( r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y starving). A n d this c o n c l u s i o n in t u r n s u p p o r t s t h e j u d g ­ m e n t t h a t t h e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in this s c h e m e , insofar as t h e y p e r p e t u a t e d it (or e v e n r e s i s t e d its reform), s h a r e d a responsibility for its injustice. T h e y h a d a negative d u t y n o t t o c o l l a b o r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h in p r a c t i c a l t e r m s m e a n s t h a t t h e y o u g h t to h a v e p l a n n e d a n d p r o m o t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. It is p o s s i b l e t h a t in o u r c o m p l e x a n d functionally highly differenti29

2 9

I n s u c h clear c a s e s it is also m o s t obvious that reforms c a n n o t b e b l o c k e d by t h e a r g u m e n t that a liberation of slaves w o u l d violate the e n t i t l e m e n t s of their p r e s e n t o w n e r s a n d is therefore e x c l u d e d by moral s i d e constraints. Perhaps e n t i t l e m e n t s that arose p u r s u a n t to legally valid but unjust rules s h o u l d not be simply disregarded. T h e u n j u s t rules w e r e not u n i q u e l y the slaveholders' responsibility, a n d s o there m a y be r e a s o n s w h y c i t i z e n s at large s h o u l d c o m p e n s a t e slaveholders for their l o s s . There is n o reason, h o w e v e r , w h y the slaveholders s h o u l d have the o p t i o n to retain their slaves in preference to appropriate c o m p e n s a t i o n . N o o n e c a n have a claim that unjust institu­ t i o n s s h o u l d exist or c o n t i n u e , a n d the slaves land their progeny) have a c o n t i n u i n g negative c l a i m not to b e forced to e n d u r e u n j u s t c o n d i t i o n s .

36

T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.

a t e d w o r l d , injustices of this s o r t a r e q u i t e p r o m i n e n t , e s p e c i a l l y if I am right (in Part Three) to e x t e n d t h e Rawlsian p r o j e c t t o t h e global basic s t r u c t u r e . It is n o t easy to c o n v i n c e oneself t h a t o u r c u r r e n t global order, a s s e s s e d from a Rawlsian p e r s p e c t i v e , is m o d e r a t e l y just despite t h e w i d e s p r e a d a n d e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s it en­ g e n d e r s . Even if w e limit o u r vision to o u r o w n a d v a n c e d Western society, it is h a r d l y o b v i o u s that t h e b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s w e p a r t i c i p a t e in are just or nearly just. In a n y c a s e , a s o m e w h a t u n o b v i o u s b u t massive t h r e a t t o t h e m o r a l quality of o u r lives is t h e d a n g e r t h a t w e will have lived as a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o l l a b o r a t i n g in their p e r p e t u a t i o n a n d benefiting from t h e i r i n j u s t i c e . 30

3. T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of J u s t i c e 3.1. If h i s g r o u n d r u l e s d i d really t e n d to e n g e n d e r a d e g e n e r a t e form of feudalism, Nozick m i g h t well regret it. But h e w o u l d n o t r e c o n s i d e r h i s c o m m i t m e n t to libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s . W h y n o t ? We h a v e s e e n t h a t Nozick's i n s i s t e n c e o n (property) rights c o n c e i v e d a s s i d e c o n ­ straints, w i t h t h e correlative r e j e c t i o n of r e d i s t r i b u t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e s , c a n n o t b e a g o o d r e a s o n , b e c a u s e Nozick's antifeudalist p r e f e r e n c e c a n still b e relevant t o t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t r i g h t s (or i n s t i t u t i o n s generally) t h e r e s h o u l d b e in t h e first p l a c e . W h e n b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n this q u e s t i o n , t h e p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e cannot collide w i t h p r o p e r t y rights, for t h e c h o i c e of a s c h e m e of s u c h r i g h t s is still at i s s u e . C a n w e a t t r i b u t e t o Nozick a n o t h e r r a t i o n a l e t h a t w o u l d e x p l a i n h i s indifference t o t h e k i n d of e m p i r i c a l a r g u m e n t o u r R a w l s i a n p r o p o s e s ? At t i m e s Nozick s e e m s q u i t e u n w i l l i n g t o e n t e r t a i n a n y d e e p e r ra­ tionale or justification for h i s view, insisting i n s t e a d t h a t "historicale n t i t l e m e n t p r i n c i p l e s are f u n d a m e n t a l " (ASU 202). T h e s u g g e s t i o n is t h a t it is n o t g o o d e n o u g h for Rawls's criterion t o favor p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s ( s u c h as a specification of p r o p e r t y rights a s historically recursive). T h e p r o b l e m Nozick s e e s is t h a t Rawls w o u l d h a v e d e r i v e d t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s from higher-level c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : "Rawls' c o n s t r u c ­ t i o n will yield a p p r o x i m a t i o n s of [the precisely correct principles) at b e s t ; it will produce the wrong sorts of reasons for them" (ASU 202, m y e m p h a s i s , cf. 2 0 3 - 4 , 215). But w h a t is Nozick's alternative? Are w e t o take it as just plain obvious t h a t t h e rights he p r o p o s e s e x p r e s s " t h e precisely correct principles"? And w h a t if s o m e alternative specifica­ tion of rights ( p e r h a p s that of o u r Rawlsian) is r e c o m m e n d e d a s o b ­ vious as well? T h e d e b a t e m i g h t b e c o m e r a t h e r dull But p e r h a p s Rawls a n d Nozick are n o t so far a p a r t . Rawls, t o o , conviction, n a m e l y , this conviction is not self-verifving can be s u h W ^ H f well b e untenable. Still. 1 cWt^^nretend t h ^ ' t h sufficient to u n d e r m i n e t P

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believes t h a t w e h a v e c e r t a i n m o r a l fixed p o i n t s , o n all levels of g e n e r ­ ality, w h i c h a n y c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t by a n d large a c c o m m o d a t e . T h u s , a l t h o u g h all r i g h t s m u s t b e derivable from t h e relevant h i g h e r level c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (those reflected in t h e original p o s i t i o n I, t h e failure of s u c h a derivation w o u l d in m a n y c a s e s b e m o r e likely to m a k e u s doubtful a b o u t Rawls's c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i t i o n t h a n a b o u t t h e right in q u e s t i o n . So Rawls w o u l d agree that s o m e rights a r e f u n d a m e n ­ tal in t h e s e n s e t h a t w e w o u l d reject a n y c o n c e p t i o n of justice that d i d n o t — u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s a n y w a y — f i r m l y entail t h e s e rights. But h e w o u l d not, of c o u r s e , agree t h a t Nozick's favorite p r o p e r t y rights are f u n d a m e n t a l . Nozick, too, c o u l d p r o v i d e s o m e rationale for his a c c o u n t of rights, o r s o I s u g g e s t . J u s t as Rawls agrees w i t h Nozick t h a t g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o c e d u r a l , Nozick c a n agree w i t h Rawls t h a t t h e e n d o r s e m e n t of a p a r t i c u l a r set of g r o u n d r u l e s c a n be justified, or at least motivated, by a p p e a l t o a ( m a s t e r - I p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . In o n e s e n s e this point is trivial. Nozick c a n say t h a t h e prefers t h e institutional s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h c e r t a i n rights a n d liberties are d i s t r i b u t e d in exactly t h e w a y p r o v i d e d for b y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e favors. W h a t I a m suggesting, however, is a m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g s c e n a r i o in w h i c h Nozick w o u l d offer a n i n d e p e n d e n t n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l freedom, for e x a m p l e , a n d w o u l d t h e n p r o c e e d t o a r g u e t h a t t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e favors w o u l d p r o d u c e a n o p t i m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m so c o n c e i v e d . This s c e n a r i o m i g h t t h e n get s o m e d e b a t e going by p u t t i n g Nozick i n t o conflict w i t h Rawls over w h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be d e e m e d relevant, a n d how relevant, to t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . Nozick w o u l d a c c e p t t h e invitation to justify' his favored g r o u n d r u l e s t h r o u g h a " p a t t e r n e d " c r i t e r i o n of distributive justice t h a t involves w h a t I earlier called a s y s t e m a t i c b a l a n c i n g of values. For p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , w e c a n a n a l y z e e a c h s u c h p a t t e r n e d criterion by asking t h r e e m a i n q u e s t i o n s a b o u t it: Who is a participant, a unit of moral concern, or where should we look for information? What goods and 01s are morally significant and what is their comparative significance, or what information must we look for and how does this information determine a participant's position (intrapersonal balancing/ aggregation)? How should one rank the distributions of positions that alternative institu­ tional schemes might generate among their participants (interpersonal balancing/aggregation)? A n s w e r s t o t h e first t w o q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e w h a t information is n e e d e d for t h e c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of institutional s c h e m e s . An­ s w e r s to t h e last t w o q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e h o w t h a t information is to b e e v a l u a t e d s o a s to arrive at this a s s e s s m e n t . T a k e n together, t h e t h r e e answers constitute a pattern preference. 3 . 2 . Let u s t r y t o l o c a t e Nozick's view a n d its c o n t r a s t to Rawls w i t h i n

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t h e framework of t h i s analysis. It is clear, 1 think, t h a t t h e y d o not seriously differ in r e s p e c t to t h e w h o - q u e s t i o n . Nozick is s o m e w h a t m o r e o p e n t o t h e c l a i m s of a n i m a l s (ASU 35-42), b u t in e s s e n c e they s h a r e t h e c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n i s m a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m . F o r b o t h of t h e m , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t s of m o r a l c o n c e r n are i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n persons. We c a n also say, at least w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of this a n a l y s i s , t h a t it is n o t helpful t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick as b e i n g centrally a b o u t t h e relative m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e of f r e e d o m a n d equality. F r e e d o m a n d equality figure in t h e a n s w e r s to different q u e s ­ t i o n s — w h a t a n d h o w , r e s p e c t i v e l y — a n d therefore d o n o t c o m p e t e . Yes, Nozick is willing to tolerate even e x t r e m e i n e q u a l i t i e s i n h o l d i n g s , w h e n t h e s e a r e p r o d u c e d by h i s libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s . But this is not, I think, b e c a u s e h e c a r e s so little a b o u t equality, b u t b e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t view h o l d i n g s as a significant a s p e c t of t h a t p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n m a t t e r s for t h e d e s i g n of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . With r e g a r d to t h e a s p e c t s of individual f r e e d o m h e d o e s r e c o g n i z e , Nozick is, as w e will see, at least a s egalitarian as Rawls. A n d Rawls, tor h i s part, is n o less c o m m i t t e d to f r e e d o m t h a n Nozick is. Not o n l y d o e s h e give lexical priority to certain b a s i c liberties; h e e v e n w a n t s to formulate h i s s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e of justice s o t h a t b o t h p r i n c i p l e s to­ g e t h e r are t a n t a m o u n t to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t "to m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h t o t h e least a d v a n t a g e d of t h e c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d b y all" (TJ 205; cf. BSS 41). T h e s u b s t a n t i v e divergence b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick m u s t t h e n c o n c e r n t h e w h a t - q u e s t i o n , reflecting differences a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m a n d t h e relative m o r a l significance of v a r i o u s a s p e c t s thereof. Here I s e e as t h e crucial difference t h e i r conflicting views a b o u t t h e m o r a l relevance of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n ­ d e r e d p a t t e r n features. By engendered p a t t e r n features I m e a n o n e s that, like i n c o m e differentials in a free-market s y s t e m , are n o t directly called for in t h e relevant r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s b u t m e r e l y foreseeably c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h t h e m . T h e y are a s u b s e t of t h e larger class of social p h e n o m e n a a n institutional s c h e m e e n g e n d e r s (this class m a y also i n c l u d e its b i r t h rate, h o m i c i d e rate, d e g r e e of political a p a t h y , a n d s o on). In assigning c a u s a l responsibility for s u c h p h e n o m e n a to (particu­ lar) social i n s t i t u t i o n s o n e will often have to rely o n c o m p l e x a n d s o m e w h a t speculative e m p i r i c a l generalizations, w h i c h m u s t also d e a l w i t h s u c h b a c k g r o u n d factors as c u l t u r e a n d n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t G o o d s a n d ills are established w h e n t h e y are directly called for i n t h e (written or unwritten) rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s of t h e social s y s t e m , even if t h e y are n o t specifically assigned to p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s o r n a t u r a l 0

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T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3 . 2

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p r i n c i p l e p o s s i b l e t h a t all s h o u l d m e e t i t . By e s t a b l i s h i n g c e r t a i n d i s a d v a n t a g e s , a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e m a y e n g e n d e r further b u r d e n s , a s w h e n g e n d e r - s e n s i t i v e i n h e r i t a n c e laws have r e s u l t e d in a n inferior e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n for w o m e n . Nozick gives c o n s i d e r a b l e m o r a l significance to this d i s t i n c t i o n . I take h i m to h o l d t h a t in d e s i g n i n g a n ideal i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , w e s h o u l d b e p r i m a r i l y o r even exclusively c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u ­ tion of e s t a b l i s h e d g o o d s a n d ills a n d , m o r e particularly, w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . We n e e d n o t b e c o n c e r n e d (or w e n e e d b e m u c h less c o n c e r n e d ) w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e n g e n d e r e d g o o d s a n d ills. T h e r e is a great difference, morally, b e t w e e n a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e are a s s i g n e d inferior p r o p e r t y rights a n d a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e c o m e to h a v e inferior p r o p e r t y rights p u r s u a n t t o p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t d o n o t call for this inequality. Rawls, b y c o n t r a s t , m a i n t a i n s t h a t w e s h o u l d a s s e s s feasible s c h e m e s of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s in light of t h e overall p a t t e r n s e a c h w o u l d t e n d to g e n e r a t e (and s h o u l d d e s i g n a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e accordingly). E c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s a n d entire basic s t r u c t u r e s are to b e j u d g e d by t h e i r effects. But not b y t h e i r effects a l o n e . T o s o m e e x t e n t m o r a l l y significant g o o d s a n d ills are directly called for by prevailing institu­ tions, are p a r t of t h e s c h e m e r a t h e r t h a n effects of it. Rawls t a k e s benefits a n d b u r d e n s of b o t h k i n d s to b e o n a p a r . It m a k e s n o differ­ e n c e to t h e a s s e s s m e n t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w h e t h e r given d e ­ privations forseeably existing u n d e r it are e s t a b l i s h e d or e n g e n d e r e d . Either way, t h e i r i n c i d e n c e w o u l d be, in a b r o a d s e n s e , a c o n s e q u e n c e of (the c h o i c e of) a p a r t i c u l a r institutional s c h e m e . Let u s call a criterion of j u s t i c e broadly consequentialist if a n d only if it a s s e s s e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s exclusively o n t h e basis of t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s , b r o a d l y c o n ­ ceived, t h a t is, if it takes e q u a l a c c o u n t of g o o d s a n d ills e s t a b l i s h e d a n d of e q u i v a l e n t g o o d s a n d ills e n g e n d e r e d by s u c h s c h e m e s . S u c h a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h involves t w o s u b s i d i a r y t o p i c s . O n e m u s t settle o n specific g o o d s a n d ills w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is 3 2

3 3

3,

A d m i t t e d I y , t h e r e are borderline cases, as w h e n t h o s e earning less t h a n the m e a n i n c o m e are e x c l u d e d . It is just barely possible that all have the s a m e i n c o m e , and s o the e x c l u s i o n m i g h t (implausibly) s e e m to c o u n t as e n g e n d e r e d . D e s p i t e s u c h problematic possibilities, I h o p e the d i s t i n c t i o n is clear e n o u g h in realistic scenarios a n d for the role it will play in w h a t follows. I n contrast to Rawls, Nozick s h o w s little interest in h o w to rank institutional s c h e m e s that are l e s s t h a n just by h i s standards. I a s s u m e h e w o u l d say that in a s s e s s i n g s u c h a s c h e m e w e m u s t normally b e m u c h m o r e sensitive to the restrictions o n f r e e d o m it calls for than to restrictions o n f r e e d o m it effects. T h e justice of a n institutional s c h e m e is, in S e n s phrase, "given by the g o o d n e s s of its c o n s e q u e n t states of affairs" (WAF 175). Calling Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n broadly c o n s e q u e n ­ tialist is s o m e w h a t at o d d s w i t h current u s a g e in p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h , strongly influenced by Rawls himself, w o u l d e n c o u r a g e u s to characterize Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n as d e o n t o l o g i ­ cal. My a t t e m p t at revision is motivated by t h e idea, to be d e v e l o p e d later in this section, that w e s h o u l d reserve the t e r m s deontological and consequentialist for a d e e p e r a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t h a n the o n e Rawls e m p h a s i z e s . 3 a

3 3

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T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3 . 3 . 1 . 2 1 4

to b e i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n a n d o n a w a y of weighting a n d aggregating i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t s u c h g o o d s a n d ills (for p u r p o s e s of ranking p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s via t h e i r m a s t e r p a t t e r n s ) And t h e r e n e e d s t o b e a b r o a d l y e m p i r i c a l i n q u i r y , involving social theory a n d c o m p a r a t i v e historical investigations, a i m e d at e s t i m a t i n g what m a s t e r p a t t e r n s v a r i o u s feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d t e n d to pro­ duce. 3 . 3 . Calling Rawls a c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t r e q u i r e s clarification of his relation t o utilitarian c o n c e p t i o n s of justice w h i c h h e s o forcefully attacks. 3 . 3 . 1 . T h i s task c a n c o n v e n i e n t l y b e b e g u n b y e x a m i n i n g h o w his c o n t r a c t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n in A Theory of Justice differs from t h e util­ itarian view h e h a d s k e t c h e d e a r l i e r . T h i s e s s a y e m p l o y s o u r division of subjects in a s o m e w h a t different w a y . Rawls e n v i s i o n s a social sys­ t e m w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e t o b e justified o n u t i l i t a r i a n g r o u n d s but w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e to c o m p l y w i t h t h e s e (optimal) p r a c t i c e s irre­ spective of utilitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Let m e d i s c u s s a c e n t r a l weak­ n e s s in Rawls's earlier i n d i r e c t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d h o w it is o v e r c o m e in h i s later c o n c e p t i o n . 3 . 3 . 1 . 1 . A utilitarian a s s e s s m e n t of social p r a c t i c e s p o s e s t h e n o t o ­ r i o u s p r o b l e m of e x p l a i n i n g w h y a n actor, a n d officials i n p a r t i c u l a r , s h o u l d feel c o n s t r a i n e d t o h o n o r a r u l e of a p r a c t i c e e v e n t h o u g h violating it in this case w o u l d clearly b e b e t t e r in t e r m s of a g g r e g a t e utility. Yes, t h e g o i n g p r a c t i c e is t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e o n e , a n d it w o u l d b e w o r s e if a c t o r s i n g e n e r a l h a d s u c h d i s c r e t i o n , b u t if o n l y utility ul­ timately m a t t e r s , w h y s h o u l d o n e n o t m a x i m i z e utility j u s t t h i s o n c e ? F u r t h e r utilitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will n o t h e l p , n o r d o e s it s e e m p o s s i ­ ble t o resolve t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r o b l e m b y a p p e a l to t h e m e a n i n g of c o n c e p t s ("rule," "practice," "authority," e t c . ) . W h a t o n e w o u l d h a v e t o claim is t h a t utility is s o m e h o w a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e value to a p p e a l to in justifying o n e ' s c o n d u c t i n s u c h a c a s e . T h i s c l a i m raises n e w q u e s ­ t i o n s : w h a t o t h e r values are relevant, a n d w h y a r e n ' t t h e y relevant also t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of p r a c t i c e s ? But t h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m is to e x p l a i n h o w utility c a n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b e valuable (so t h a t in d e s i g n i n g p r a c ­ tices w e s h o u l d b e g u i d e d b y it) a n d n o t valuable (so t h a t w e s h o u l d i g n o r e it in d e c i s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a practice). 3.3.1.2. T h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d b e solved if a suitable s u b s t i t u t e w e r e p r o v i d e d for utility a s t h e value u p o n w h i c h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o t u r n . W h a t is valuable a b o u t t h e provisions a n d effects 35

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of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s h o u l d b e d e n n e d in s u c h a w a y t h a t individ­ u a l s cannot affect it (except, of c o u r s e , t h r o u g h t h e i r role in i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e ) . T h i s , I think, is t h e i d e a of t h e l a t e r Rawls. He a t t e m p t s t o define h i s M a s t e r P a t t e r n (via w h i c h basic s t r u c t u r e s a r e to b e a s s e s s e d ) in t e r m s of features t h a t p e r s o n s c a n n o t affect b y t h e i r c o n d u c t w i t h i n t h e p r a c t i c e s of a n o n g o i n g social s y s t e m . P e r s o n a l efforts, t h o u g h t h e y c a n mitigate (or aggravate) t h e effects of injustice, c a n n o t r e d u c e (or i n c r e a s e ) t h e i n j u s t i c e itself, c a n n o t alter t h e fact t h a t s o m e institu­ tional s c h e m e u n j u s t l y fails to establish c e r t a i n rights o r t e n d s to e n g e n d e r certain inequalities. 3 . 3 . 1 . 3 . T h i s s t r a t e g y is s t r e n g t h e n e d by c o n c e i v i n g t h e M a s t e r Pat­ t e r n s o t h a t p e r f e c t i o n is p o s s i b l e . U n d e r a utilitarian criterion, t h e b e s t b a s i c s t r u c t u r e will b e t h e o n e t h a t t e n d s to p r o d u c e t h e m o s t utility. But even t h i s o p t i m a l s t r u c t u r e still leaves indefinite r o o m for f u r t h e r i m p r o v e m e n t ; t h e r e is n o limit to h o w m u c h utility t h e r e m i g h t b e . Even u n d e r perfectly just i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e q u e s t i o n c a n therefore a r i s e w h e t h e r o n e s h o u l d violate t h e g r o u n d r u l e s for t h e s a k e of a n e t i n c r e a s e in utility. In Rawls's later c o n c e p t i o n , by c o n t r a s t , t h e values u n d e r l y i n g t h e a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e invoked t o justify violating t h e r u l e s of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s o n l y w h e n s u c h violation c o m e s in r e s p o n s e to s o m e injustice. S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery in s o m e social s y s t e m is u n j u s t b e c a u s e t h e p o s i t i o n of slaves is m u c h w o r s e t h a n a n y p o s i t i o n m u s t u n a v o i d a b l y b e ( m o d u l o t h e prevailing n a t u r a l environ­ m e n t a n d level of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ) . S u p p o s e that, u n d e r s u c h c o n d i t i o n s , a citizen w e r e to h e l p a slave e s c a p e from h e r m a s t e r . S u c h a n a c t i o n w o u l d n o t m a k e t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e slaveholding society a n y m o r e j u s t (even t h e e s c a p e e is still legally unfree, m a y b e r e c a p t u r e d , etc.), b u t it m a y still b e justifiable t o b r e a k t h e r u l e s in this w a y s o a s t o s h i e l d o n e slave from unjustifiable h a r m s s h e w o u l d o t h e r w i s e suffer. So far, Rawls's later c o n c e p t i o n agrees w i t h h i s earlier o n e . It differs in that, w h e n t h e existing b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is fully justifiable (in t h a t t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it t e n d s to p r o d u c e is s u p e r i o r t o t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n s feasible a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e ) , t h e n t h e r e are n o unjustifiable b u r d e n s of t h e relevant k i n d to s h i e l d o t h e r s from. T h e values u n d e r l y i n g Rawls's criterion of justice a r e fully a c c o m m o d a t e d , "exhausted," c a n n o t (logically) b e satisfied to a n even g r e a t e r d e g r e e , a n d h e n c e c a n n o t justify a n y violation of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t h e y also justify.37 Rawls's l a t e r criterion of justice is satiable?* T h i s quality is often o v e r l o o k e d ; r e a d e r s take this criterion ( a n d especially t h e differ37

I t m a y still b e a morally g o o d thing, of c o u r s e , to h e l p t h o s e w o r s e off than oneself. But this a s s e s s m e n t n o w involves a separate v a l u e — e n s h r i n e d , perhaps, in a principle of m o r a l i t y — w h i c h c a n p l a u s i b l y b e s u b o r d i n a t e d to the values in terms of w h i c h the basic structure is justified (so that" the c o n c e r n to h e l p others is a n insufficient reason for violating t h e t e r m s of just practices). Moral r e a s o n s b a s e d o n utility, by contrast, c a n n o t be s o s u b o r d i n a t e d ; all that c a n matter are the quantities involved. T h e t e r m satiable is b o r r o w e d from Raz (MF 2 3 5 - 4 4 ) . 3 8

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e n c e principle) to r e q u i r e t h a t t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d b e as welloff as p o s s i b l e . T h i s r e a d i n g is m i s t a k e n . O n l y t h e basic structure inso­ far as it generates inequalities is r e q u i r e d t o o p t i m i z e t h e position ot t h o s e least a d v a n t a g e d by t h o s e i n e q u a l i t i e s (cf. §§14.1, 14.3). 3.3.1.4. T h r o u g h t h e s e revisions Rawls arrives at v a l u e s for t h e as­ s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s that c a n n o t c o m e i n t o conflict w i t h themselves in the w a y t h e earlier value of utility c o u l d . T h i s is t h e first s t e p toward realizing a n a i m that, I believe, Rawls h a d earlier failed t o achieve, namely, to s k e t c h a n overall m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t is (in w h a t for Rawls is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s e n s e of this w o r d ) deontological. J u s t institu­ t i o n s confer rights t h a t give p e r s o n s " a n inviolability f o u n d e d o n justice t h a t even t h e welfare of society a s a w h o l e c a n n o t o v e r r i d e " (TJ 3). In his s e c o n d a t t e m p t Rawls h a s s u c c e e d e d in t a k i n g a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n ­ tialist a p p r o a c h to t h e c h o i c e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ( a n d n a t u r a l duties) t h a t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a strictly d e o n t o l o g i c a l a s s e s s m e n t of a c t o r s p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s ( b o u n d b y t h e s e n a t u r a l d u t i e s ) . T h e entire c o n c e p t i o n is a s u c c e s s f u l v e r s i o n of indirect consequential­ i s m — s u c c e s s f u l in t h a t t h e b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t justification of t h e g r o u n d r u l e s d o e s n o t c o r r u p t t h e strictly d e o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e t o h a v e for (individual a n d collective) a c t o r s . H e n c e n o t h i n g is lost if this justification is fully p u b l i c . T h e w i l l i n g n e s s of a c t o r s t o give p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d r u l e s over t h e p u r s u i t of a n y social o r i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s is s u s t a i n e d r a t h e r t h a n s u b ­ verted b y t h e i r full u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e e p e r c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n ­ s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t unify a n d s u p p o r t t h o s e g r o u n d r u l e s . 3 . 3 . 2 . T h e r e a r e t w o f u r t h e r i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t u r e s from h i s e a r l i e r v i e w — t h e s e explicitly e m p h a s i z e d in A Theory of Justice—that move h i s criterion of justice itself in a recognizably d e o n t o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n . Rawls defines a d e o n t o l o g i c a l (or non-teleological) c o n c e p t i o n a s o n e "that e i t h e r d o e s n o t specify t h e g o o d i n d e p e n d e n t l y from t h e right, or d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . . . . J u s t i c e as fairness is a d e o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y i n t h e s e c o n d w a y " (TJ 30, cf. 24). He t h e n e m p h a s i z e s t w o w a y s i n w h i c h h i s criterion of justice, u n l i k e t h e utilitarian o n e , d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . First, i n u s i n g a s i m p l e function for aggregating t h e g o o d of different p e r s o n s ( s u m r a n k i n g or averaging), t h e utilitarian criterion is i n s e n s i ­ tive to h o w g o o d s a n d ills a r e d i s t r i b u t e d . I n s t i t u t i o n s g e n e r a t i n g t h e m o s t e x t r e m e inequalities in utility are r e q u i r e d b v justice, s o l o n g a s t h e greater welfare of s o m e o u t w e i g h s t h e g r e a t e r suffering of o t h e r s a s c o m p a r e d t o m o r e egalitarian alternative s c h e m e s (TJ §5) Against t h i s criterion Rawls seeks t o p r e s e n t a distribution-sensitive c r i t e r i o n o n w h i c h an institutional s c h e m e m a y p e r m i t inequalities only insofar a s d o i n g so raises t h e w o r s t position as against t h o s e u n d e r all feasible m o r e e g a h t a n a n alternative s c h e m e s . This modification b y itself is C

XS m

^i°X^^ Tf ° ^ l o g i c a l oySs's hghts. If the distribution of g o o d s is also c o u n t e d as a good, p e r h a p s a f ) U S t i C e

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h i g h e r o r d e r o n e , a n d t h e t h e o r y d i r e c t s u s to p r o d u c e t h e m o s t g o o d ( i n c l u d i n g t h e g o o d of d i s t r i b u t i o n a m o n g others), w e n o l o n g e r have a teleological view in t h e classical s e n s e . T h e p r o b l e m of d i s t r i b u t i o n falls u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t of right as o n e intuitively u n d e r s t a n d s it, a n d s o t h e t h e o r y lacks a n i n d e p e n d e n t definition of t h e g o o d " (TJ 25, cf. 210-11). But t h e n , s u c h a b r o a d definition w o u l d also classify a s d e o n t o l o g i c a l a q u a s i - u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i o n t h a t gives n o w e i g h t to t h e well-being of t h e worst-off 5 p e r c e n t , say. S e c o n d , Rawls a r g u e s t h a t a utilitarian criterion relies o n a n i n a p ­ p r o p r i a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d as h a p p i n e s s or t h e satisfaction of rational d e s i r e . T h i s w a y t h e j u s t i c e of i n s t i t u t i o n s c o m e s to d e p e n d excessively u p o n t h e d e s i r e s t h a t h a p p e n to b e d o m i n a n t at t h e t i m e (TJ 4 4 7 - 5 1 ) . Moreover, certain g o o d s (such as basic rights a n d liber­ ties) are m u c h m o r e valuable t h a n their c o n t r i b u t i o n to a p e r s o n ' s utility m a y s u g g e s t (TJ 207). To a c c o m m o d a t e t h e s e p o i n t s , Rawls p o s ­ t u l a t e s a " t h i n t h e o r y of t h e good," e m b o d i e d in h i s c o n c e p t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s (TJ §60). Only this thin, objective n o t i o n of t h e g o o d is a p p e a l e d to in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . Rawls t a k e s this d e p a r t u r e as a f u r t h e r r e a s o n for t h i n k i n g t h a t his c o n c e p t i o n is d e o n t o l o g i c a l in t h a t it "does n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . . . . (Here I s u p p o s e w i t h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m t h a t t h e g o o d is d e n n e d a s t h e satisfaction of r a t i o n a l desire.)" (TJ 30, cf. 396). Yet again, this definition s e e m s excessively b r o a d ; it w o u l d classify as d e o n t o l o g i c a l a c r i t e r i o n r e q u i r i n g that i n s t i t u t i o n s m a x i m i z e g r o s s national p r o d u c t . 3 . 4 . T o s u m u p , by defining t h e right as " m a x i m i n n i n g t h e t h i n g o o d " — t h a t is, a s d e m a n d i n g t h a t inequalities b e a r r a n g e d so as t o o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s — Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice reflects a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p ­ p r o a c h . Feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e to b e a s s e s s e d by r e f e r e n c e to t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s e a c h of t h e m t e n d s to p r o d u c e , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e extent to w h i c h this d i s t r i b u t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d . (Obviously t h e effects of social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t b e d e s c r i b e d in a r o u g h , statistical way, involving g e n e r a l t e n d e n ­ cies, p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s , a n d t h e like.) Moreover, Rawls's c o n ­ s t r u c t i o n p r e c l u d e s a n y spillover of t h e values informing t h e a s s e s s ­ m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o t h e subject of c o n d u c t a s s e s s m e n t . In this w a y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s justified t h r o u g h his criterion of justice c a n be m o r ­ ally d e t e r m i n a t i v e , a n d h i s e n t i r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is in this s e n s e d e o n 39

3 9

H e r e utilitarians might reasonably reply that t h e y d o not take existing desires for granted but treat d e s i r e s as a d e p e n d e n t variable that, as far as possible, is to b e adjusted for the sake of t h e greatest h a p p i n e s s . T h e c h o i c e of an institutional s c h e m e will impor­ tantly involve a t t e n t i o n to w h a t sort of d e s i r e s various alternative s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d to e n g e n d e r in p e o p l e . Utilitarians prefer, o t h e r things equal, institutions that generate easily satisfiable d e s i r e s w h o s e pursuit will p r o d u c e intrapersonal a n d social harmony, thereby in turn s u p p o r t i n g t h o s e institutions. In this r e s p e c t utilitarians n e e d not differ from w h a t Rawls s a y s about his o w n c o n c e p t i o n (TJ §9 a n d c h a p . 8).

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tological. Finally, t h e p a r a m e t e r s of Rawls's b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h a r e s e t s o a s t o y i e l d a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t itself h a s a d e o n t o l o g i c a l flavor, i n t w o r e s p e c t s : Its p r e e m i n e n t c o n c e r n for t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n e n s u r e s t h a t t h e n e e d s a n d vital i n t e r e s t s of e v e n smaU m i n o r i t i e s c a n n o t b e o u t b a l a n c e d b y t h e g r e a t e r g o o d of t h e m a n y . And b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g a t h i n a c c o u n t of t h e good, Rawls's c r i t e r i o n partially d i s c o n n e c t s t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s from w h a t e v e r d e ­ sires a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d m a y b e e m p i r i c a l l y p r e v a l e n t (be­ c a u s e of n a t u r a l o r social f a c t o r s ) . 3 . 5 . I h a v e s a i d t h a t o n e i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick i s t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n is b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , a n d Nozick's is n o t . Let m e n o w try t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h i s c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e m into a more complex framework that extends t h e deontological/ c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t d i s t i n c t i o n from c o n c e p t i o n s of m o r a l i t y t o c o n c e p ­ t i o n s of j u s t i c e . A d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l i t y typically gives c o n s i d e r a b l e w e i g h t to t w o d i s t i n c t i o n s : b e t w e e n w h a t p e r s o n s d o a n d w h a t t h e y m e r e l y let h a p ­ p e n ; a n d w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of w h a t t h e y d o , b e t w e e n w h a t t h e y intend a n d w h a t t h e y m e r e l y foresee (or s h o u l d foresee). T h e p o i n t of b o t h d i s t i n c t i o n s is t h a t s o m e X is m o r a l l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n s o m e Y. But t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s m a y b e d r a w n in v a r i o u s w a y s . T h e difference in m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e m a y o b t a i n always o r o n l y s o m e t i m e s . A n d Y m a y b e w e i g h t e d less heavily t h a n X o r m a y b e r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s t a t u s of a tie b r e a k e r (X h a s lexicographical priority), o r i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Y m a y b e d i s r e g a r d e d altogether. T h e r e a r e t h e n at least 2 X 3 = 6 w a y s i n w h i c h e a c h d i s t i n c t i o n m i g h t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y . T o m a k e c l e a r w h a t is d e m a n d e d of s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n for it t o c o u n t a s deontological, w e m u s t t h e n specify n o t m e r e l y t h a t it m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials i n m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e b u t also h o w p r o m i n e n t t h e s e t w o differentials m u s t m i n i m a l l y b e . I p r o p o s e that a c o n c e p t i o n of morality is d e o n t o l o g i c a l if a n d o n l y if it h o l d s both that (a) a n y h a r m a n a g e n t d o e s is always m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y h a r m t h a t a g e n t m e r e l y lets h a p p e n (so t h a t t h e latter c a n figure at m o s t as a tie b r e a k e r in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n d u c t ) , a n d t h a t (b) h a r m a n a g e n t i n t e n d s a n d d o e s , s o m e t i m e s at least, h a s m o r e w e i g h t t h a n equivalent h a r m t h e a g e n t d o e s b u t m e r e l y foresees (or s h o u l d foresee). T o b e fully c o n s e ­ quentialist, a c o n c e p t i o n of morality m u s t d e n y b o t h (a) a n d (b). S u c h c o n c e p t i o n s will typically n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials at a l l . 40

41

« A s my objections suggest, it is probably futile to look for a s h a r p d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e extension of deontological this last s e n s e . It is e n o u g h that criteria of justice m a y b e more o r less d e o n t o ogical in this sense, d e p e n d i n g o n how t h e y define the g o o d a n d o n h o w they are sensitive to its distribution. Rawls's criterion d o e s n o t m e r e l y satistV t h e m i n i m u m c o n d i t i o n s for being deontological (in h i s excessively broa™aense) ftls a s I w o u l d put tt, m u c h more significantly deontological than ^ ^ S S ^ cntena (requiring, respectively, t h e maximization of gross i L o n d ^ K ^ a ^ t h t maximization of utility for the best-off 95 percent) national p r o d u c t a n d m e m

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45

In analogy, a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is d e o n t o l o g i c a l if a n d only if it h o l d s both t h a t (A) a n y benefits a n d b u r d e n s a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b r i n g s a b o u t a r e a l w a y s m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y g o o d s a n d ills it m e r e l y lets h a p p e n (so t h a t t h e latter c a n figure at m o s t as a tie b r e a k e r in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of institutions), a n d t h a t (B) w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of w h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b r i n g s a b o u t , benefits a n d b u r d e n s it e s t a b l i s h e s have, s o m e t i m e s at least, m o r e w e i g h t t h a n equivalent b e n ­ efits a n d b u r d e n s it foreseeably e n g e n d e r s . A c o n c e p t i o n of justice is fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t o n l y if it d e n i e s b o t h (A) a n d (B). Again, s u c h c o n c e p t i o n s will typically n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials at all. 3 . 5 . 1 . 1 . Let m e s k e t c h h o w Nozick's views c a n b e motivated, in p a r t , by a t t r i b u t i n g t o h i m t h e t w o d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s . H u m a n life is e x p o s e d to a w i d e r a n g e of n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , s u c h a s g e n e t i c h a n d i c a p s , illnesses, a c c i d e n t s , a n d o t h e r m i s f o r t u n e s n o t socially in­ d u c e d . S u c h c o n t i n g e n c i e s restrict o u r o p t i o n s . T h u s it m a y s e e m t h a t in e v a l u a t i n g t h e p r o s p e c t s for p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m u n d e r s o m e institu­ tional s c h e m e , o n e m u s t take into a c c o u n t to w h a t e x t e n t s u c h restric­ t i o n s a r e m i t i g a t e d t h r o u g h this s c h e m e . Nozick, however, d i s p u t e s t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . O n e r a t i o n a l e for his o p p o s i t i o n is p r o v i d e d b y (A): a b s t r a c t i n g from n a t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o n freedom, w e s h o u l d a s s e s s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s by reference to t h e " i n s t i t u t i o n a l " f r e e d o m e a c h t e n d s to g e n e r a t e . T h u s Nozick thinks t h a t w h e n a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e r e q u i r e s t h e h e a l t h y to s u p p o r t t h e h a n d i c a p p e d , it i n t r o d u c e s (rather t h a n mitigates) a n inequality. It restricts t h e free­ d o m of t h e f o r m e r a n d confers benefits u p o n t h e latter. A s c h e m e t h a t r e q u i r e s n o s u c h s u p p o r t , by c o n t r a s t , involves n o morally significant inequality, b e c a u s e t h e special h a r d s h i p s suffered by t h e h a n d i c a p p e d a r e n a t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e i r f r e e d o m a n d h e n c e d o n o t c o u n t in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . T h e intuitive idea is t h a t w e o u g h t n o t conflate t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is just b e ­ t w e e n its p a r t i c i p a n t s w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d at large (the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e i n c l u d e d ) is just b e t w e e n t h o s e s a m e p e r s o n s . 3 . 5 . 1 . 2 . Nozick's libertarian s c h e m e i m p o s e s s e r v i t u d e u p o n slaves a n d e x c l u d e s p e r s o n s from things, s u c h as l a n d , h e l d b y n o n c o n s e n t ing o w n e r s . U n d e r it t h e f r e e d o m of large s e g m e n t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is likely t o b e v e r y severely r e s t r i c t e d . But Nozick s h o w s n o i n t e r e s t in a n e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s i s s u e , a n d a s t r o n g version of (B) p r o v i d e s o n e r a t i o n a l e for t h i s r e l u c t a n c e . In a s s e s s i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s it p r o d u c e s , w e should care m u c h m o r e about established than about engendered benefits a n d b u r d e n s . W e s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m t h a t t h e s c h e m e directly calls for a n d b e m u c h less c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t ( d e p e n d i n g o n h o w p e o p l e interact) 42

tions. I n e e d not w o r r y a b o u t this difficulty here, s i n c e m y task is to clarify the a n a l o g o u s d i s t i n c t i o n s in t h e d o m a i n of justice. S u c h a r g u m e n t s have b e e n a d v a n c e d , for e x a m p l e , by G. A. C o h e n , CFP. See also Cohen's m o r e g e n e r a l critique of Nozick in RNWC. 4 2

46

T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.5.2.1

m a y o r m a y n o t b e i m p o s e d u n d e r t h e s c h e m e ( t h o u g h t h e y predict­ ably will be). I n t h e libertarian s c h e m e it is i n t e n d e d o n l y t h a t p e r s o n s s h o u l d have t h e f r e e d o m t o a l i e n a t e t h e i r r i g h t s o v e r l a n d a n d even over t h e m s e l v e s a n d also t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m s enforcing w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t l e m e n t s m a y c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h s u c h transactions. But the g r o u n d rules d o not "intend" a n y particular e n t i t l e m e n t s so g e n e r a t e d . T h e y d o n o t p r e s c r i b e t h a t s o m e s h o u l d be slaves or b e l a n d l e s s , n o r d o t h e y p r e s c r i b e a n y p a r t i c u l a r distribu­ tional feature of t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s t h e y e n g e n d e r . Even t h o u g h it m a y b e a statistical c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e s c h e m e p r o d u c e s ( w i d e s p r e a d ) slavery or a (large) l a n d l e s s class, t h e r u l e s d o n o t m a n d a t e t h a t (many or) a n y o n e at all s h o u l d o c c u p y t h e s e social p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e freedom of s u c h p e r s o n s , h o w e v e r severe, c o m m o n , a n d pre­ dictable, a r e m e r e l y a n i n c i d e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e libertarian s c h e m e . H e n c e , Nozick c o u l d c o n c l u d e by a p p e a l t o a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of (B) t h a t t h e s e restrictions a r e m o r a l l y insignificant for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of h i s s c h e m e , at least in t h i s c a s e , w h e r e t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s t h e s c h e m e d o e s directly p r e s c r i b e a r e t h e c o r r e c t o n e s . 4 3

3.5J2.1. Rawls s h a r e s w i t h Nozick t h e c o m m i t m e n t t o (A). H e c o n ­ fines h i s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social i n t e r a c t i o n (e.g., TJ 4 - 5 ) . His c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e g o v e r n s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i ­ m a r y g o o d s a l o n e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e joint p a t t e r n e m e r g i n g w h e n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n t h a t of n a t u r a l g o o d s a n d ills. I n a p p l y i n g t h i s criterion, " w e a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o e x a m i n e citizens' p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s n o r t h e i r c o m p a r a t i v e lev­ els of w e l l - b e i n g " (SUPG 163). C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , h i s c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h c i t i z e n s ' social p o s i t i o n s , o r shares, a n d n o t w i t h t h e i r overall situations, o r standard of living (in S e n ' s sense). T h e y c a r e a b o u t t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d , n o t a b o u t t h e least well. S o m e r e a d e r s , overlooking t h i s p o i n t , h a v e s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h all factors affecting t h e lives of t h o s e t h e y represent, w h i c h h a s given rise t o m a n y m i s t a k e n c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s , a b o u t h o w i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t b e d e s i g n e d so a s t o o p t i m i z e t h e quality of life of t h o s e m o s t sick, feeble, ugly, o r r e t a r d e d . Yes, t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is m e a n t to reflect a c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n n e e d s (RAM 643; WOS 15; FG 554; SUPG 172-73). But t h e s e are t h e standard n e e d s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a given social s y s t e m . T h r o u g h o u t , Rawls leaves aside differences a m o n g p e r s o n s t h a t affect h o w useful a given b u n d l e of social g o o d s 4 4

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47

will b e t o e a c h . In t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t to (A) Rawls a n d Nozick s t a n d t o g e t h e r a g a i n s t s u c h fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of justice as u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r t h e capabilities a p p r o a c h r e c e n t l y set forth b y S e n . 3 . 5 . 2 . 2 . Yet Rawls d e n i e s (B). His criterion of justice r a n k s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s o n t h e b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e overall p a t t e r n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Rawls explicitly d e v e l o p s h i s c o n c e p t i o n in c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t t e r m s : "The b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t o b e a r r a n g e d t o m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h to t h e least a d v a n t a g e d of t h e c o m ­ p l e t e s c h e m e of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d by all" (TJ 205), for e x a m p l e , a n d " t h e p a r t i e s . . . strive for as h i g h a n a b s o l u t e s c o r e as p o s s i b l e " (TJ 144) His c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e is u l t i m a t e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e institu­ tional f r e e d o m p e r s o n s actually enjoy, a n d h e evaluates t h e foreseeable d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u c h f r e e d o m w i t h o u t asking t o w h a t e x t e n t it is e s t a b ­ l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d b y social i n s t i t u t i o n s . Rawls, therefore, p a y s m u c h m o r e a t t e n t i o n t h a n Nozick d o e s to t h e effects of institutional s c h e m e s . I s e e t h i s a s a c e n t r a l d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m : Nozick's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is d e o n t o l o g i c a l in m y s e n s e , w h e r e a s Rawls's, b e c a u s e of its r e j e c t i o n of (B), is b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . But t h e n , b e c a u s e of its c o m m i t m e n t to (A), Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is n o t fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . Let m e call c o n c e p t i o n s of justice t h a t are c o m ­ m i t t e d t o (A) b u t n o t t o (B) a n d likewise c o n c e p t i o n s of m o r a l i t y c o m ­ m i t t e d t o (a) b u t n o t t o (b) semiconsequentialist c o n c e p t i o n s . This t e r m s h o u l d n o t give rise to confusion, at least if it is t r u e t h a t n o significant m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n i n s t a n t i a t e s t h e inverse c o m b i n a t i o n : a c o m m i t m e n t t o (B) b u t n o t t o (A), t o (b) b u t n o t to (a). 45

4 6

47

^ A c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o m m i t t e d to (A) i p s o facto e m p l o y s an objective criterion for interpersonal c o m p a r i s o n s , w h e r e a s the criterion e m p l o y e d by fully consequentialist c o n c e p t i o n s m a y b e either subjective, as w i t h utilitarianism, or objective, as in Sen (EW, SL, WAF). Sen's c o n c e p t i o n is fully consequentialist (in m y s e n s e ! b e c a u s e it evaluates a person's b u n d l e of benefits a n d b u r d e n s in light of particular features of this p e r s o n (notably capabilities, disabilities, a n d special n e e d s ) . It is objective, b e c a u s e n o a c c o u n t is taken of particular interests or preferences. See Scanlon, PU 6 5 6 - 5 8 , a n d SC 1 9 7 - 2 0 1 , for this subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n . '"'On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Rawls also says that "the c o n c e p t i o n defined by t h e s e principles is not that of m a x i m i z i n g anything" (TJ 211), but h e is here speaking i n rejection of the narrower idea that social institutions s h o u l d be d e s i g n e d s o as to "maximize the s u m of intrinsic value or the net b a l a n c e of the satisfaction of interests" (ibid.) in a distributioninsensitive w a y . Rawls b e l i e v e s that in d e v e l o p e d societies certain established benefits and b u r d e n s are of p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e . Yet h e gives t h e s e n o special w e i g h t from the start but rather a r g u e s for this result. T h e priority of t h e first principle is d e f e n d e d by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e special i m p o r t a n c e of certain g o o d s for citizens a n d is t h u s not b a s e d o n t h e idea that e s t a b l i s h e d g o o d s are m o r e important a s such (TJ §26, §33). That this is s o is confirmed b y h i s first p r i n c i p l e of justice, w h i c h is c o n c e r n e d with o n l y some estab­ l i s h e d g o o d s (certain basic rights a n d liberties) a n d also with e n g e n d e r e d inequalities in the w e l l - p r o t e c t e d n e s s of t h e s e rights a n d liberties a n d in the worth of the basic political liberties. 1 d i s c u s s t h e s e m a t t e r s further in Chapter 3. B y p r o p o s i n g a n a l o g o u s tripartite typifications for c o n c e p t i o n s of justice a n d c o n ­ c e p t i o n s of morality, I don't m e a n to suggest that r e a s o n s for preferring a s e m i c o n s e ­ quentialist c o n c e p t i o n of justice, say, have a n a l o g u e s in t h e d o m a i n of c o n c e p t i o n s of morality. It i s perfectly c o n c e i v a b l e that t h e m o s t reasonable c o m b i n a t i o n will consist of a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o u p l e d with a fully consequentialist or d e o n t o l o g i c a l morality. 4 7

48

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.1

4. Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative 4 . 1 . Let m e d e v e l o p t h e s u g g e s t e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views a little f u r t h e r b y l o o k i n g m o r e closely at w h a t h e could say in s u p p o r t of h i s O r w e l l i a n c o n c l u s i o n t h a t if w e a r e firmly com­ m i t t e d to f r e e d o m , w e m u s t e n d o r s e g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t r e c o g n i z e a n d enforce s l a v e r y . For Nozick, slavery involves total a n d u n l i m i t e d p e r p e t u a l unfreed o m . Slaves h a v e n o c o n t r o l over t h e i r o w n lives, a n d a r e legitimately subject to every conceivable form of s a d i s t i c o r s e x u a l p e r v e r s i o n — m a y b e w o r k e d t o d e a t h , e a t e n alive, t o r t u r e d , a n d s o f o r t h . Evidently, Nozick d o e s n o t t h i n k t h a t t h i s sort of u n f r e e d o m disqualifies t h e g r o u n d rules h e p r o p o s e s . Nor w o u l d h e b e t a k e n a b a c k , I s u p p o s e , if h i s t o r i a n s a n d social t h e o r i s t s p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e of o u r Rawlsian w o u l d p r o d u c e a w o r l d of m a n y m o r e o p t i o n s t o c h o o s e a n d lives to lead, t h a t u n d e r Nozick's c o n s t i t u t i o n a slave e c o n ­ o m y w o u l d e m e r g e o n o u r i s l a n d a n d few p e r s o n s , b e i n g n e i t h e r slaves n o r slaveholders, w o u l d h a v e t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d i n c e n t i v e s to c o m m e n c e novel v e n t u r e s — t o t r a d e , c o m p o s e , invent, e x p l o r e , r h y m e , r e s e a r c h , a n d p e r f o r m . Against o b j e c t i o n s of t h e s e k i n d s , N o z i c k c a n a p p e a l t o a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of (B): t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e is a d v o c a t i n g d o n o t call for slavery; t h e y d o n o t p r e s c r i b e t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s or g r o u p s o r p r o p o r t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n s h o u l d b e slaves; t h e y d o n ' t even m a n d a t e t h a t t h e r e b e a n y slaves at all; a n d therefore, s i n c e t h e b u r d e n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h slavery, t h o u g h p r e d i c t a b l e a n d officially e n ­ forced, are entirely e n g e n d e r e d , t h e c o s t s of its r e c o g n i t i o n a r e m o r a l l y insignificant i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e g a i n s . For t h e benefits slavery c o n ­ fers a r e e s t a b l i s h e d : Every p e r s o n is a s s i g n e d t h e liberty of selling himself i n t o slavery if h e s o c h o o s e s . A n d e v e r y o n e (so l o n g as h e h a s n o t s o l d himself) h a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o o w n slaves, b y a c q u i r i n g a n 48

49

•">Cf. ASU 331. C o n c e r n i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w g r o u n d rules s h o u l d he d e s i g n e d , 1 s e e n o e v i d e n c e that Nozick r e c o g n i z e s any values b e y o n d freedom. It is true, h e "feel[s] m o r e comfortable" w i t h a capitalist s y s t e m , b e c a u s e t h e circulation of a s s e t s w i t h i n it is "largely reasonable a n d intelligible" a n d correlated with persons' s u c c e s s in "serving others a n d w i n n i n g t h e m as c u s t o m e r s " IASU159). But I think h e w o u l d e n d o r s e t h e s a m e entitlement structure e v e n if p e o p l e u n d e r it m a d e transfers i n less appealing w a y s If so, t h e p o i n t h a s n o w e i g h t against freedom considerations. Elsewhere Nozick a p p e a l s to t h e "familiar social considerations favoring private property," but h e adds i m m e d i a t e l y , "These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s enter a Lockean theory to support t h e claim that a p p r o p r i a t i o n of pnvate property satisfies t h e intent b e h i n d t h e e n o u g h a n d as g o o d left over' proviso, not as a utihlanan justification of property" IASU 177; cf. Locke, STG §41). T h o s e for w h o m h e r e is n o l a n d left to appropriate are allegedly c o m p e n s a t e d b y the s u p e r i o r options they have u n d e r Nozick's s c h e m e . Acceptable property s c h e m e s m u s t s a f e f v t h i s c o n d i t.on, but Nozick w o u l d d e n y that, b e y o n d this threshold, suchTcheme^^ t h m l acceptable t h e b e t t e r they satisfy it (i.e., the better t h e worst o p t i o n set theTengen^erT y ••This is s o b e c a u s e N o z i c k — i n contrast in a I Y<1 • s '/-

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.1

49

existing slave from h e r p r e s e n t o w n e r or a self-owned p e r s o n from herself. I n light of t h e s e t w o o p t i o n s , slavery, a s envisaged b y Nozick, s h o u l d clearly b e r e c o g n i z e d in "a free system." O n e m a y q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r having t h e s e t w o o p t i o n s really c o n ­ s t i t u t e s a benefit. Is n o t t h e first o p t i o n r a t h e r a liability, given that t h e d e c i s i o n t o sell oneself m a y well t u r n out t o h a v e b e e n a dreadful m i s t a k e ? N o z i c k w o u l d s a y that t h e possibility—even p r o b a b i l i t y — o f m i s t a k e s d o e s n o t c o u n t against slavery, b e c a u s e , w h e n s h e w a s still self-owned, t h e slave h a d t h e liberty to sell herself into s o m e m o r e limited form of d e p e n d e n c e , or n o t to sell herself at all. It w o u l d b e p a t e r n a l i s m p u r e a n d s i m p l e to s e c o n d - g u e s s or disallow s u c h c h o i c e s . Even if s o m e slaves, or even all, w o u l d have h a d m o r e f r e e d o m a n d a b e t t e r life if t h e y h a d n o t sold t h e m s e l v e s , w e c a n n o t c o u n t this differential a g a i n s t Nozick's i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery. T h e loss of f r e e d o m suffered by a slave d o e s n o t c o u n t , b e c a u s e it c a m e a b o u t p u r s u a n t t o free c h o i c e ( w h e t h e r r a t i o n a l or o t h e r w i s e ) . But t h e r e a r e n o n p a t e r n a l i s t i c a r g u m e n t s as well. To invoke a c o m ­ m o n p l a c e from g a m e t h e o r y , t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of slavery will create t h e very e m e r g e n c y s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h selling oneself c o u l d b e rational. C o n s i d e r a sick p e r s o n w h o h a s m a n a g e d to r e a c h a d o c t o r b u t is t o o p o o r or w e a k t o m a k e it to t h e n e x t p h y s i c i a n alive. T h e doctor, w h o c a n easily c u r e h e r , is in a p o s i t i o n to exact a n y p r i c e . He c a n d e m a n d all t h i n g s s h e o w n s . If slavery is r e c o g n i z e d , t h e p a t i e n t ' s situation is m u c h w o r s e , a s h e m a y d e m a n d her in a d d i t i o n . In t h i s case, t h e p a t i e n t h a s n o r e a s o n t o b e grateful t h a t s h e h a d t h e liberty to sell herself: T h e n e e d to u s e t h i s o p t i o n a r o s e o n l y b e c a u s e s h e h a d it in t h e first p l a c e . 50

s l

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T h i s reply a l s o e x p l a i n s w h y t h e "Lockean proviso" d o e s not protect slaves against mistreatment. T h o u g h p e r s o n s are o w e d c o m p e n s a t i o n (by whom?) insofar as their o p t i o n s are inferior to the s t a n d a r d state-of-nature o p t i o n s IASU 178-79n), their o p t i o n s are v a l u e d e x ante. C o m p a r e the situation of a n u n i n s u r e d rider w i t h o u t h e l m e t w h o is badly hurt in a s e l f - c a u s e d m o t o r c y c l e a c c i d e n t ; s h e h a s n o right to c o m p e n s a t i o n e v e n if her o p t i o n s n o w are m u c h l e s s valuable than the standard state-of-nature o p t i o n s . It w a s h e r o w n free c h o i c e to ride w i t h o u t h e l m e t a n d i n s u r a n c e (and a c h o i c e that it w o u l d have b e e n w r o n g to deprive h e r of). M e d i c a l expertise, not b e i n g a natural resource, d o e s not fall u n d e r Nozick's "Lock­ e a n proviso" (cf. ASU 181, the c a s e s of the m e d i c a l researcher a n d the surgeon). T h e following trialogue is t h e n a realistic scenario within Nozick's libertarian society. A police officer c o m e s u p o n a c o u p l e struggling w i t h e a c h other, the m a n evidently trying to rape the w o m a n . W o m a n : Please, sir, p l e a s e h e l p m e . Officer [to man): Hey, y o u , let h e r go at o n c e ! Man: Don't get involved. Officer: I m u s t . You are violating this w o m a n ' s right not to be assaulted. Man: N o , I'm n o t . S h e is m y slave. Here are the papers, s i g n e d b y herself. W o m a n : But I w a s c o e r c e d i n t o signing. He said h e w o u l d not treat m y father if I refused to sign. Officer: That's n o t c o e r c i o n b u t at m o s t d u r e s s . H e w a s at liberty not to treat y o u r father or to ask c o m p e n s a t i o n for treating h i m . W o m a n : But m y father is d e a d ! Man: T h e c o n t r a c t s a y s o n l y that I w o u l d try to save him, a n d I did. 51

50

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

Moreover, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery p r o v i d e s i n c e n t i v e s for would-be slaveholders t o try to entrap a n o t h e r in a s i t u a t i o n t h a t m a k e s it rational t o sell herself. O n e c a n l u r e h e r i n t o a l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g s i t u a t i o n and t h e n offer t o r e s c u e h e r , o n e c a n p a y o t h e r s to b o y c o t t h e r a n d then offer t o save h e r from starvation, a n d s o f o r t h . All t h e s e examples s h o w h o w it m a y b e q u i t e a b u r d e n to b e t o o free (by h a v i n g t h e liberty t o sell oneself). 52

H e r e it d o e s n o t h e l p m u c h t o insist (cf. ASU 331) t h a t if s o m e o n e finds it d a n g e r o u s t o h a v e t h e o p t i o n t o sell herself, t h e n s h e c a n e n t e r a c o n t r a c t d i s a b l i n g this o p t i o n , t h a t is, give a w a y t h i s liberty. (Could her p u r s u e r b u y t h i s c o n t r a c t from t h o s e w i t h w h o m it w a s m a d e , and w h e n h e h a s h e r in a d e s p e r a t e s i t u a t i o n , quickly r e s t o r e h e r liberty to sell herself b y releasing h e r from t h e p r o m i s e ? ) O n e m a y d o u b t that s u c h c o n t r a c t s c o u l d b e p e r m i s s i b l e in a l i b e r t a r i a n s o c i e t y . If they w e r e , c o u l d n ' t y o u a n d y o u r friend m a k e a s i m i l a r c o n t r a c t , p r o m i s i n g e a c h o t h e r t h a t n e i t h e r of y o u will ever sell y o u r h o u s e , t h e r e b y p r o t e c t ­ ing y o u r s e l v e s against p o t e n t i a l c r e d i t o r s ? B u t e v e n if s u c h c o n t r a c t s w e r e r e c o g n i z e d , t h e y w o u l d n o t h e l p i n all c a s e s . For e x a m p l e , a slaveholder w o u l d find it easy to m a k e t h e c h i l d r e n of h i s slaves his p r o p e r t y : W h e n s u c h a c h i l d c o m e s of age (before s h e c a n m a k e any disabling c o n t r a c t s ) , h e c a n t h r e a t e n to m i s t r e a t h e r p a r e n t s if s h e will n o t give herself over a s h i s slave. He also h a s every o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e t e r m i n e h e r u p b r i n g i n g , to m o l d h e r abilities, d e s i r e s , a n d a m b i t i o n s so that s h e will a c c e p t slavery r a t h e r t h a n b e c h a s e d a w a y from t h e only p l a c e s h e k n o w s . T h e c h i l d r e n of slaves, at t h e very least, a r e likely to b e m u c h b e t t e r off w i t h o u t t h e o p t i o n of selling t h e m s e l v e s , b u t d o e s having t h e o p t i o n r e d u c e t h e i r freedom (as Nozick c o n c e i v e s t h i s n o ­ tion)? 4 . 2 . Let u s s t e p b a c k from t h e e x c h a n g e at t h i s point, t o e x a m i n e m o r e generally w h a t sort of a c o n c e p t i o n of distributive justice Nozick m i g h t h a v e p r e s e n t e d h a d h e c a r e d t o s y s t e m a t i z e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s like t h e foregoing i n t o a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for h i s view a n a l o g o u s to t h e o n e Rawls d e v e l o p s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r differing views a b o u t t h e m o r a l relevance of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n ­ d e r e d p a t t e r n features, t h e r e is a s e c o n d i m p o r t a n t difference w i t h i n t h e w h a t - c o m p o n e n t . This difference c o n c e r n s t h e o p t i o n s p a c e in t e r m s of w h i c h a p e r s o n ' s freedom is d e s c r i b e d . For Rawls, t h i s o p t i o n Officer Uo Woman): I'm sorry, ma'am, but I c a n n o t help y o u Man: But y o u c a n h e l p m e in forcing her to fulfill her contractual obligations S h e h a s already scratched m e . See if y o u c a n tie her h a n d s """gallons. &ne n a s

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

51

s p a c e is largely s t r u c t u r e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s . His b a s i c liberties cover s u c h c o n v e n t i o n a l o p t i o n s a s voting, m a r r y i n g , w o r s h i p i n g , mak­ ing a s p e e c h , h a v i n g a c c e s s to t h e m e d i a , a n d so o n . T h i s e m p h a s i s is closely a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e constitutive a s p e c t of social p r a c t i c e s . Nozick, t h o u g h h e t o o views t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of freedom as r e g u l a t e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h i n k s of f r e e d o m itself a s a n o n c o n v e n t i o n a l g o o d . T h e o p t i o n s of t h e v a r i o u s individuals are l o c a t e d w i t h i n a preex­ isting s p a c e . T h e y are, i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , o p t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t to c h u n k s of s p a c e - t i m e , p h y s i c a l objects, a n d p e r s o n s . T h e r e are, in a d d i t i o n , s e c o n d - o r d e r o p t i o n s , t h a t is, o p t i o n s to m a k e certain c h a n g e s i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-order o p t i o n s (for e x a m p l e , gaining a n o p t i o n o r d e p r i v i n g another of one), as well a s t h i r d - o r d e r o p t i o n s , a n d s o o n u p . While g r o u n d r u l e s b r i n g into b e i n g n e w k i n d s of rela­ tions b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d o p t i o n s — p e r s o n s c a n n o w h a v e o p t i o n s legitimately, c a n b e e n t i t l e d to t h e m — t h e y d o n o t alter t h e s p a c e of possible o p t i o n s o r t h e p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . Therefore, seeing t h a t a given u n i v e r s e of s p a c e - t i m e , objects, a n d p e r s o n s fixes t h e s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s , Nozick t e n d s t o t h i n k of f r e e d o m as a c o n s t a n t - s u m g o o d . F o r Rawls, b y c o n t r a s t , t h e s p a c e of possible o p t i o n s is a function of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms will c h a n g e t h e s h a p e a n d s t r u c t u r e of this s p a c e , m a k e it larger or smaller o r (when t h e y are significant) i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e a l t o g e t h e r . T h i s b r i n g s u s to t h e t h i r d c o m p o n e n t , t h e h o w - q u e s t i o n , w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e d e m a n d s Nozick m a k e s o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom. He s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e s a formal c o n s t r a i n t , namely, t h a t a set of g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d restrict p e r s o n s ' (legitimate) o p t i o n s s o as to achieve a c o m p l e t e o r d e r i n g of claims, or interpersonal consistency. This d e m a n d is b r o u g h t o u t e s p e c i a l l y in h i s a r g u m e n t s (ASU 28-35) for s e e i n g r i g h t s a s s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t — b y m e a n s of a b o u n d a r y , line, or h y p e r - p l a n e (ASU 57)—define a m o r a l s p a c e for e a c h individual (there­ by r e s t r i c t i n g t h e o p t i o n s of o t h e r s ) . In a d d i t i o n , Nozick s e e m s c o m m i t t e d to t h r e e s u b s t a n t i v e c o n ­ straints. First, p e r s o n s ' o p t i o n s p a c e s s h o u l d b e not only m u t u a l l y exclusive b u t a l s o e x h a u s t i v e . P e r s o n ' s o p t i o n s m a y be r e s t r i c t e d only insofar a s is n e c e s s a r y for i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e rights a n d liberties of t h e v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s t o g e t h e r m u s t "fill t h e s p a c e " (ASU 53

54

53

N o z i c k w o u l d r e c o g n i z e , of course, that the set of o w n a b l e objects of value m a y fluctuate, that the total of w e a l t h p r o d u c e d m a y be affected by the c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules. But h e w o u l d d e n y , I think, that this c h o i c e c o u l d affect the s h a p e and structure of the s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s . T h i s idea of a fixed s p a c e is compatible with carving the s p a c e u p in very c o m p l i c a t e d w a y s , as w h e n p e r s o n s have partial control over s o m e thing, e.g., over s o m e a s p e c t o r t i m e s l i c e of it, or t h r o u g h voting rights or veto p o w e r s . S u c h imaginative reflection a b o u t freedom in spatial m e t a p h o r s is p r o m i n e n t before Nozick, e.g., in H o b b e s , Locke, a n d Kant. It a l s o appears in Rawls's reference to liberties a s "a framework of legally p r o t e c t e d paths" IBLP 40). For an illuminating w a y of e x t e n d i n g the m e t a p h o r in t e r m s of railway lines, s w i t c h e s , a n d l o c o m o t i v e s , s e e Feinberg, ILS. 5 4

52

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

238); f r e e d o m m u s t n o t b e w a s t e d . T h i s ephaustiveness c o n s t r a i n t pro­ vides a straightforward r a t i o n a l e for o n e of Nozick's views, h i s (' nonpaternalistic ") rejection of i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s . S u p p o s e s o m e p e r s o n , P, inalienably h a d s o m e right, R. T h e n n o o n e c o u l d legitimately have the h i g h e r - o r d e r o p t i o n of divesting P of R; s o m e bit of f r e e d o m w o u l d go to w a s t e . T h i s i d e a m a y m o t i v a t e Nozick's o p p o s i t i o n to d e e p r i g h t s (for e x a m p l e , t h e right t o h o l d p r o p e r t y ) t h a t define t h e p e r m a n e n t frame­ w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h superficial r i g h t s (for e x a m p l e , to t h i s piece of property) arise a n d l a p s e . All r i g h t s are o n a p a r . For e a c h right o r liberty t h e r e is a d e e p e r right or liberty t o c h a n g e its o w n e r s h i p , a n d s o on, ad infinitum. Insofar as t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e o p t i o n s is t h e r e s u l t of the exercise of h i g h e r - o r d e r o p t i o n s , it is e n g e n d e r e d a n d h e n c e of little m o r a l significance, if a n y . T h e u n i v e r s a l alienability of r i g h t s a n d liber­ ties, as r e q u i r e d b y t h e e x h a u s t i v e n e s s c o n s t r a i n t , t h e r e f o r e r e d u c e s t h e m o r a l l y i m p o r t a n t p a r t of Nozick's view to t h e key q u e s t i o n of the initial d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p t i o n s a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s (on all levels). T h i s q u e s ­ tion c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e i t h e r t h e s u b j e c t s or t h e objects of rights. W h a t are t h e initial rights a n d liberties of t h e various p e r s o n s , w h i c h s p r i n g i n t o e x i s t e n c e at t h e m o m e n t of social b i r t h (but are t h e n i m m e d i a t e l y salable a n d t h u s i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y o n a p a r w i t h t h e n e w p e r s o n ' s infinitely m a l l e a b l e holdings) or w h a t are t h e initial rights a n d liberties relating t o e a c h p i e c e of t h e u n i v e r s e ( c h u n k of s p a c e - t i m e , p h y s i c a l object, o r p e r s o n ) ? Second, t h e r e m u s t b e n o i n e q u a l i t i e s in e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . While p e r s o n s ' liberties m a y have t h e s a m e object (all c a n b e at liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e this thing, for example), t h i s is n o t p o s s i b l e for r i g h t s s u c h a s p r o p e r t y rights. But p e r s o n s c a n a n d s h o u l d h a v e s y m m e t r i c a l rights, as w h e n e a c h h a s certain rights w i t h r e g a r d to his own b o d y . We m a y call this t h e equality or t h e majcimin c o n s t r a i n t . Given t h e c o n ­ s t a n t - s u m n a t u r e of Nozick's good, t h e s e t w o f o r m u l a t i o n s d o n ' t differ i n r e s p e c t t o t h e d e s i g n of ideal g r o u n d r u l e s . T h e y d o differ in h o w t h e y r a n k l e s s - t h a n - i d e a l g r o u n d rules, b u t w e d o not h a v e Nozick's views o n this t o p i c . Let m e n o t e t h a t Nozick offers n o c o m m e n t o n , or rationale for, h i s egalitarian c o m m i t m e n t — a s o m e w h a t a m u s i n g lack, given his c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t a d e a r t h of valid a r g u m e n t s for e q u a l i t y (ASU 223, 233). W h y s h o u l d n ' t s o m e p e o p l e start out a s slaves; w h y s h o u l d n ' t s o m e b e able to a c q u i r e m o r e p r o p e r t y t h a n o t h e r s t h r o u g h t h e s a m e acts; a n d w h y s h o u l d n ' t m e n n e e d t h e c o n s e n t of a female relative to transfer p r o p e r t y ? P r o p o n e n t s of s u c h inequalities c o u l d tell Nozick (in analogy to w h a t h e tells u s at ASU 239-41) t h a t h i s h a n g - u p w i t h certain equal rights is t h e historical p r o d u c t of envy, w h i c h h a s rankled away for g e n e r a t i o n s in t h o s e b o r n less excellent T h i r d as far as o p t i o n s (on all levels) w i t h r e s p e c t t o p e r s o n s a n d t h e i r a c u o n s are c o n c e r n e d , p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e initial rights t o t h e 6 8

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.3

53

4 . 3 . My q u i c k s k e t c h of a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views w a s m e a n t to b r i n g o u t t h e a b s e n c e of d r a m a t i c s t r u c t u r a l d i s p a r i t y in h o w h e a n d Rawls a p p r o a c h political p h i l o s o p h y . T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t is o n e in s u b s t a n c e . Yet it m a y look s t r u c t u r a l (ASU 2031 b e c a u s e Rawls a n d Nozick h a v e w o r k e d o u t different halves of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n s . Rawls h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h e h i g h e r level of a b s t r a c t i o n , o n s u p p o r t ­ ing a c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g alternative sets of g r o u n d rules. T h i s crite­ rion h a s t h e form of a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . Basic s t r u c t u r e s are to b e r a n k e d b y t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s e a c h t e n d s to p r o ­ d u c e . Nozick, by c o n t r a s t , h a s d e v e l o p e d a set of g r o u n d rules, s h o w i n g t h e i r i n n e r c o h e r e n c e a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e social s y s t e m a s a w h o l e . T h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e p u r e l y p r o c e d u r a l , t h a t is, d o not re­ quire the participants to orient their c o n d u c t toward any particular p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . It is clear t h a t Rawls, d e s p i t e h i s p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e on t h e h i g h e r level, c a n a n d d o e s favor p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s . And it is clear t h a t a r g u m e n t s N o z i c k might give for h i s c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules c o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d as a p a t t e r n preference, t h o u g h Nozick m a y n o t w i s h t o r e s t a t e t h e m in t h i s w a y . To b r i n g o u t t h i s last p o i n t s o m e w h a t dramatically, let u s imagine, as a vivid i m a g e e q u i v a l e n t to m y c o n j e c t u r e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views, a Nozickian a n a l o g u e to t h e original p o s i t i o n . As in Rawls's o w n c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of p e r s o n s w o u l d b e asked to c h o o s e a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e for t h e d e s i g n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of basic social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e y w o u l d m e e t b e h i n d s o m e veil of i g n o r a n c e so that t h e y k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r "clients'" p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r c l i e n t s ' interests, s u c h parties w o u l d again be e x t r e m e l y risk-averse. But, in c o n t r a s t to Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e s e parties w o u l d b e given to k n o w that t h e i r clients c a r e (almost) exclu­ sively a b o u t t h e i r p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m insofar as it is directly called for by an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d c a r e m u c h less, if at all, a b o u t f u r t h e r w a y s in w h i c h (the c h o i c e of) a n institutional s c h e m e might p r e d i c t a b l y affect t h e i r i n s t i t i t u t i o n a l f r e e d o m . E a c h d e l i b e r a t o r w o u l d a s s u m e t h a t h e r client w a n t s as large as possible a s h a r e of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m so conceived. ( B e c a u s e of t h e c o n s t a n t - s u m c h a r a c t e r of t h e relevant good, w e n e e d n o t w o r r y w h e t h e r s h a r e s w o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d in relative o r a b s o l u t e terms.) In a n initial s i t u a t i o n s o d e s c r i b e d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d t h e n c h o o s e a criterion t h a t r a n k s e a c h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e by t h e w o r s t s h a r e of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . 55

56

" A s Rawls says, "The contractarian m e t h o d is a useful way of studying ethical theories and of setting forth their u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s " (TJ 16). "We m a y conjecture that for each traditional c o n c e p t i o n of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial situation in w h i c h its p r i n c i p l e s are the preferred solution" (TJ 121). R a w I s h a s n o w s e t t l e d o n v i e w i n g the parties a n d the citizens they represent as distinct (SUPG 165, BLP 1 9 - 2 1 ) , w h e r e a s in TJ the prospective participants t h e m s e l v e s were generally p i c t u r e d as e n t e r i n g the original position. In a sense, "it makes n o difference either w a y " (KCMT 525), but I follow Rawls's later style by distinguishing b e t w e e n the parties a n d their c l i e n t s (my term) b e c a u s e d o i n g s o makes it easier to k e e p separate t w o s e t s of "psychological" a s s u m p t i o n s . As w e will see, Rawls's picture of t h e S6

54

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

4.4. T h e rationale I have s k e t c h e d for Nozick's views d o e s not solve his p r o b l e m s , of c o u r s e , b u t it h i g h l i g h t s t h e m . T h e s e p r o b l e m s are of t h r e e m a i n k i n d s : h o w p l a u s i b l e are t h e key v a l u e s u n d e r l y i n g Nozick s g r o u n d rules w h i c h c a n b e identified b y a n a l y z i n g t h e i r p o t e n t i a l ra­ tionale, h o w clear are t h e s e b a c k g r o u n d values, a n d are t h e y sufficient to derive t h e views Nozick h a s p u t forth? T h o u g h I c a n n o t d i s c u s s these q u e s t i o n s in detail, let m e offer a few c o m m e n t s o n e a c h . 4 . 4 . 1 . U n d e r t h e first h e a d i n g , let m e briefly s u g g e s t t w o internal r e a s o n s for d e p a r t i n g from Nozick's d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t in the direction of a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t alternative (cf. §10.4.1). T h e first r e a s o n arises from Nozick's a d v e r t i s e m e n t (in ASU pt. 3) of h i s p r o p o s e d social system as a "framework for Utopia," f e a t u r i n g "a w i d e a n d diverse r a n g e of c o m m u n i t i e s w h i c h p e o p l e c a n e n t e r if t h e y are a d m i t t e d , leave if t h e y w i s h to, s h a p e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r w i s h e s ; a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h Utopian e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n c a n b e tried, different styles of life c a n be lived, a n d alternative visions of t h e g o o d c a n b e individually o r jointly p u r s u e d " (ASU 307). T h e m e r i t s of s u c h a free f r a m e w o r k a r e t o b e an i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e of s u p p o r t for t h e m i n i m a l s t a t e w i t h its p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s (ASU 333). T h e y c a n l e n d s u c h s u p p o r t , however, only if it is empirically t r u e t h a t Nozick's g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d i n d e e d e n g e n d e r s u c h a framework. I h a v e a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d r e a s o n s for be­ lieving t h a t Nozick's rights w o u l d l e a d i n s t e a d to a feudal s y s t e m (with slavery) offering a very n a r r o w r a n g e of diverse c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o p ­ p o r t u n i t i e s for e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . S h o u l d this b e so, t h e n t h e m e r i t s of Nozick's f r a m e w o r k for Utopia w o u l d f u r n i s h i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n s against h i s libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s . Nozick r u s h e s to assert t h a t h i s are " t h e precisely c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s " (ASU 202) w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g this possibility, a n d h e c a n d o so by heavily d i s c o u n t i n g t h e e n g e n d e r e d effects of h i s s c h e m e . But t h i s defense h a s t w o d r a w b a c k s . If b a d d a t a d o n ' t c o u n t for m u c h , g o o d d a t a c a n ' t c o u n t for m u c h either. T h u s , e v e n if h i s libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s d i d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r his f r a m e w o r k for Utopia, t h a t t h e y d i d so c o u l d n o t b e m u c h of a r e a s o n in t h e i r favor. Moreover, it a p p e a r s from Nozick's lyrical celebration of t h e framework-for-utopia idea, t h a t h e himself m i g h t b e quite u n c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h a b a n d o n i n g t h i s ideal so easily for d r a b feudalism, if t h a t is w h a t h i s favorite g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d likely p r o d u c e . After all, it is p o s s i b l e that a modified s c h e m e of i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d i n fact t e n d to e n g e n d e r a n d s u s t a i n s o m e t h i n g like t h e social ideal h e envisions. J u s t as Nozick is n o t sensitive to w h a t sort of social w o r l d h i s g r o u n d rules w o u l d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r given full c o m p l i a n c e , h e a l s o p a y s n o a t t e n t i o n to w h e t h e r t h e r e w o u l d be c o m p l i a n c e . A s e c o n d r e a s o n for moving in a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t direction is t h e n t h a t Nozick's disregard for e n g e n d e rther e d p h e n o m e n a l e a d s h i m to ignore t h e e m p i r i -

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Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

55

g e n d e r a g o o d d e a l of n o n c o m p l i a n c e , as c o m p a r e d to m a n y differently o r g a n i z e d social s y s t e m s — r a m p a n t c o r r u p t i o n a m o n g minimal-gov­ e r n m e n t officials, f r e q u e n t private f e u d s a n d civil w a r s , a n d a high c r i m e r a t e ( b o m , p e r h a p s , of t h e d e s p e r a t i o n of large n u m b e r s of people). It is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e m i n i m a l s t a t e c o n ­ stitute o n l y a m i n i m a l i m p r o v e m e n t over t h e Lockean state of n a t u r e . Nozick i g n o r e s s u c h possibilities; a n d , again, h e c a n d o so by heavily d i s c o u n t i n g t h e e n g e n d e r e d effects of his s c h e m e . But h e t h e r e b y risks e n d o r s i n g a s o c i e t y w h o s e m e m b e r s enjoy less p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m (as Nozick h i m s e l f defines it) t h a n t h e m e m b e r s of differently o r g a n i z e d societies t h a t h e c o n d e m n s a s u n j u s t . T h e s e d a n g e r s of ignoring h o w t h e c h o i c e of g r o u n d r u l e s affects c o m p l i a n c e is a further r e a s o n against d e s i g n i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e by looking only at w h a t t h e "rules of t h e g a m e " call for, r a t h e r t h a n also at h o w t h e y w o u l d actually work in p r a c t i c e . T h e s e t w o i n t e r n a l o b j e c t i o n s t o Nozick b r i n g o u t a n i m p o r t a n t point. My p r o j e c t i n g a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e a n d especially an a n a l o g u e to the original p o s i t i o n b e h i n d Nozick's views m a y well have l o o k e d like begging t h e q u e s t i o n in favor of b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t criteria of justice: "Once w e look at i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of their p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e d i s c o u n t i n g of e n g e n d e r e d benefits a n d b u r d e n s d o e s i n d e e d c o m e to look silly. F a c e d w i t h s o m e given p r o s p e c t of b e i n g e x c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n , o n e will, of c o u r s e , n o t c a r e w h e t h e r t h i s is d u e to a n official p r o h i b i t i o n (based o n g e n d e r or descent) o r a c o n d i t i o n a l effect of t h e rules (based on e n g e n d e r e d p a r e n t a l poverty, say). But w h a t this fact s h o w s is n o t that d e o n t o l o g i ­ cal c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e a r e u n t e n a b l e b u t t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n against t h e m . " I c a n n o w r e s p o n d that a d o p t i n g t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s is n o t a n arbitrary move. Nozick h i m s e l f a p p e a l s to this p e r s p e c t i v e in p a r t 3 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, a n d it is u n c l e a r w h a t else o n e c a n plausibly a p p e a l to if o n e c a r e s at all t o give a justification of the g r o u n d rules o n e favors. C o n s i d e r h o w t h e s e c o n d d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t loses its p l a u ­ sibility o n c e it g e t s t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e d o m a i n of c o n c e p t i o n s of morality to t h a t of c o n c e p t i o n s of justice. W h e n w e are a s s e s s i n g t h e c o n d u c t of t h o s e w h o s h a p e d t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m in q u e s t i o n , it m a y well m a t t e r t o u s w h e t h e r t h e y i n t e n d e d that t h e s c h e m e s h o u l d effectively e x c l u d e s o m e p r o p o r t i o n of all c h i l d r e n (as they m u s t have if t h e e x c l u s i o n is g e n d e r - b a s e d ) . It is p l a u s i b l e to a s s e s s their c o n d u c t b y m o r e t h a n its c o n s e q u e n c e s . But it is n o t plausible, I suggest, to a s s e s s the relevant e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m itself b y m o r e t h a n its c o n s e q u e n c e s . O n c e it is k n o w n effectively t o e x c l u d e s o m e given p r o p o r t i o n of all children, t h e n t h e d e s i r e t o h a v e a c c e s s to a n e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h p o t e n ­ tial p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e p r e s u m e d t o have, c o u n t s equally against b o t h schemes. 5 7

S7

T h i s is not t o d e n y that there m a v be other reasons for preferring o n e of the two s c h e m e s . In o n e of the t w o c a s e s , the e x c l u s i o n m a y c o m e o n top of m a n y o t h e r

56

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

T h i s line of t h o u g h t e x p o s e s Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m to an attack from t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . If p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s d o not c a r e w h e t h e r given benefits a n d b u r d e n s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d or engen­ d e r e d , w h y s h o u l d t h e y c a r e w h e t h e r given differences i n welfare are d u e t o n a t u r a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors? F a c e d w i t h s o m e given prospect of b e i n g less well e d u c a t e d t h a n o t h e r s , w h y s h o u l d o n e c a r e w h e t h e r i t is b e c a u s e of social factors (official p r o h i b i t i o n s o r h i g h t u i t i o n fees) o r a n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p (blindness, say) t h a t is n o t e v e n e d o u t t h r o u g h social i n s t i t u t i o n s ? Rawls m a k e s w h a t a p p e a r s to b e a n a r b i t r a r y stipulation b y giving h i s p a r t i e s to k n o w t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s c a r e exclusively about t h e i r s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . So h o w c a n I p r o t e s t if Nozick were t o m a k e a n equally arbitrary s t i p u l a t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t h i s p a r t i e s are given t o k n o w t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s c a r e exclusively a b o u t t h e i r established s h a r e of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m ? My a n s w e r h a s t w o p a r t s , w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d t o t w o w a y s i n w h i c h it m a y b e i m p l a u s i b l e t o t r u n c a t e t h e a c c o u n t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l g o o d — from a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t (goods a n d ills, or welfare) t o a s e m i c o n s e ­ quentialist (benefits a n d b u r d e n s ) t o a d e o n t o l o g i c a l o n e (established benefits a n d b u r d e n s ) . S u c h t r u n c a t i o n s m a y b e s e e n a s irrational b e c a u s e all m a y e n d u p intuitively w o r s e off if c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n is d i s r e g a r d e d , o r t h e y m a y b e s e e n a s unfair b e c a u s e of t h e i r distribu­ tional i m p l i c a t i o n s . I will d i s c u s s b o t h o b j e c t i o n s a s t h e y a p p l y t o the two truncations. Rawls's d i s r e g a r d of n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s d o e s n o t e x p o s e h i m t o the c h a r g e of irrationality, b e c a u s e , t h o u g h h e i g n o r e s i n t e r p e r s o n a l dif­ ferentials i n n e e d s , h e d o e s n o t i g n o r e h u m a n n e e d s as s u c h . O n t h e contrary, h i s a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is specifically d e s i g n e d to reflect o p t i m a l l y t h e m o r e vital standard n e e d s of h u m a n b e i n g s , o r so, at least, h e c l a i m s . Nozick's d i s r e g a r d of e n g e n d e r e d p a t t e r n features d o e s e x p o s e h i m t o t h e c h a r g e of irrationality, b e c a u s e everyone's d e s i r e t o enjoy a f r a m e w o r k for Utopia a n d a h i g h level of c o m p l i a n c e m a y b e b e t t e r fulfilled u n d e r c o m p e t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . It c o u l d b e s a i d t h a t Rawls's a t t e m p t t o s e c u r e a n a c c e p t a b l e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s for every p a r t i c i p a n t t r e a t s s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s , namely, t h o s e w h o suffer s p e c i a l n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s , unfairly. Rawls c a n r e p l y (with Nozick's approval) t h a t it is n o t t h e role of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e to e v e n t h i n g s o u t in t h e interest of t h e overall justice of t h e h u m a n u n i v e r s e (the institutional s c h e m e i n c l u d e d ) . W h a t p e r s o n s m a y r e a s o n a b l y d e m a n d of a n institutional s c h e m e is o n l y t h a t it s h o u l d situate t h e m fairly as participants vis-a-vis t h e o t h e r s Society's r e s p o n s e to t h e b l i n d objector w o u l d t h e n b e that, by h y p o t h e s i s , t h e a m o u n t of r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d to h i s e d u c a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a s h a r e t h a t 58

disadvantages a n d therefore b e less tolerable, o r the financially b a s e d e x c l u s i o n m a y prov.de valuable m c e n t i v e s to parents to work harder. A l S S 2 S t 7

"1 wilt examine this claim critically in Chapters 3 a n d 4.

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.2

57

w o u l d b e fair for a n o r m a l , s i g h t e d p a r t i c i p a n t . His n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p , t h o u g h n o fault of h i s o w n , is in n o w a y a c o n s e q u e n c e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s (or a n y o t h e r social factors, for t h a t m a t t e r ) . Therefore t h e claim for a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s h e a d d r e s s e s to h i s fellow p a r t i c i p a n t s can a p p e a l o n l y t o morality, n o t to j u s t i c e . T h e Rawlsian p a r t i e s ' selec­ tive c o n c e r n w i t h s h a r e s of benefits a n d b u r d e n s , h o w e v e r unintuitive psychologically, at least h a s a philosophical rationale. But t h e s a m e is n o t t r u e of Nozick's further t r u n c a t i o n of t h e g o o d to s h a r e s of e s t a b l i s h e d benefits a n d b u r d e n s . T h e p e r s o n e x c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n b e c a u s e of p a r e n t a l poverty is n o t h a n d i c a p p e d b u t d i s a d ­ v a n t a g e d . In h e r c a s e t h e i n e q u a l i t y is a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e (choice of) institutional s c h e m e . S h e is t r e a t e d w o r s e t h a n o t h e r s by the scheme. She c a n t h e n d e m a n d t h a t t h e inequality b e justified to h e r — p e r h a p s t h r o u g h s o m e b a l a n c i n g of v a l u e s m o d e l e d in a c o n t r a c t a r i a n situation. Her claim m a y b e o u t w e i g h e d , b u t it c a n n o t be d i s c o u n t e d . 4.4J2. U n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of clarity, a pervasive p r o b l e m for any a t t e m p t to give a p r e c i s e justificatory b a c k g r o u n d suitable for liber­ tarian views d e r i v e s from t h e fact t h a t t h e objects of rights a n d liberties can b e d e s c r i b e d in m a n y different w a y s . To illustrate, let u s ask h o w abstract t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of rights m a y b e for p u r p o s e s of t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t . T a k e t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e of t w o subjects a n d o n e thing. T h e e x h a u s t i v e n e s s c o n s t r a i n t entails t h a t t h e t h i n g m u s t be u s a b l e a n d o w n a b l e . T h e e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t entails t h a t initially n e i t h e r subject o w n s a n d b o t h m a y u s e t h e t h i n g . H o w t h e n c a n it c o m e to be o w n e d ? The s t a n d a r d s o l u t i o n is, of c o u r s e , t h a t b o t h subjects have a s e c o n d o r d e r liberty t o h e l p t h e m s e l v e s , t h r o u g h "first a p p r o p r i a t i o n , ' ' to a n e x c l u s i o n a r y p r o p e r t y right i n t h e t h i n g (which e x t i n g u i s h e s t h e o t h e r ' s liberty t o u s e it). H o w c a n t h i s s i m p l e s y m m e t r i c a l s o l u t i o n c o p e w i t h the r e a l - w o r l d fact t h a t s u b j e c t s c o m e into being at different times? In a p p r o p r i a t i n g s o m e t h i n g , d o e s Senior d o so p u r s u a n t to a liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e t h i s t h i n g o r p u r s u a n t to a b r o a d e r liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e u n o w n e d t h i n g s i n g e n e r a l ? If t h e former, t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t w o u l d require t h a t t h e arrival of a n e w subject e x t i n g u i s h all p r o p e r t y rights, so t h a t for every t h i n g , t h e n e w p e r s o n h a s a n equal initial liberty to u s e a n d a p p r o p r i a t e it. If t h e latter, t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t is satisfied even if t h e r e is n o t h i n g left u n o w n e d u p o n w h i c h J u n i o r c o u l d exercise liberties t o u s e a n d a p p r o p r i a t e . 59

Both t h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e i m p l a u s i b l e e x t r e m e s of c o n c i s e n e s s a n d a b s t r a c t i o n , a n d t h i s implausibility motivates t h e s e a r c h for a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , J u n i o r m u s t h a v e a n initial liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e stuff t h a t is equivalent to t h e stuff Senior h a d t h e initial liberty t o a p p r o p r i a t e ; S e n i o r m u s t leave " e n o u g h , a n d as g o o d " for J u n i o r (Locke, STG §33, cf. §27). But libertarians typically w a n t to justify / • W h e t h e r this rationale c a n u n d e r m i n e the idea that e a c h feasible basic structure s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d via the worst quality of life that w o u l d exist u n d e r it is another matter, ^ e r , I d e v e l o p R a w l s i a n r e s p o n s e s t o this a n d o t h e r fully consequential.s

views m

various c o n t e x t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e e s p e c i a l l y t r o u b l e s o m e c a s e of m e d i c a l n e e d s l§10.4 . w , §§14-16).

S8

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.3

a w o r l d in w h i c h everything is o w n e d a n d in w h i c h n e w s u b j e c t s (some of t h e m o w n i n g n o t h i n g ) will find n o u s e for t h e i r initial liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e . So t h e y favor a n o t h e r i n t e r m e d i a t e f o r m u l a t i o n of the equality c o n s t r a i n t . J u n i o r m u s t have initial e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s and liberties t h a t a r e at least equivalent t o t h e initial e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s a n d liberties of Senior. But o p t i n g for o n e of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n s d o e s n o t r e m o v e the unclarity, given t h e v a g u e n e s s of t h e n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e . A relaxed n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e c a n m a k e t h e e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t very weak i n d e e d , as w h e n t h e liberty to seek e m p l o y m e n t in a c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m y is offered as a s u b s t i t u t e for earlier p e r s o n s ' liberties to a p p r o p r i a t e large t r a c t s of l a n d (Locke, STG §37; Nozick ASU 175-82). A d e m a n d i n g n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e c a n yield q u i t e r a d i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s , a s in t h e case of Bruce A c k e r m a n ' s t h e o r y of justice (SJLS), w h i c h also differs from Nozick's in its a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of g o o d s o t h e r t h a n f r e e d o m . 4 . 4 . 3 . Besides clarification, t h e p r o p o s e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d n e e d s c o n s i d e r a b l e specification before it c a n single o u t a n y p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d rules ( s u c h as t h e o n e s Nozick p r o p o s e s ) . Very different s c h e m e s satisfy all t h e c o n s t r a i n t s s o far i m p o s e d u p o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom. A s c h e m e m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , define a m o r e l i m i t e d s e c o n d - o r d e r liberty of a p p r o p r i a t i o n . T h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a p i e c e of l a n d w o u l d leave intact c e r t a i n liberties of t r e s p a s s , a n d (some of) t h e rights it confers w o u l d b e l i m i t e d t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r (that is, w o u l d b e n o n t r a n s f e r a b l e by him, as u n d e r t h e Rawlsian's change-ofl a n d o w n e r s h i p rules). Alternatively, p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e a n initial lib­ erty to gain o w n e r s h i p of a plot of l a n d for t h e next p l a n t i n g s e a s o n by organizing s o m e o p e n a n d fair b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e t h r o u g h w h i c h s u c h p l o t s are d i s t r i b u t e d . M o r e radical still, p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e a n initial liberty t o u s e a n d c o n s u m e everything, t o g e t h e r w i t h a s e c o n d o r d e r right n o t to b e d e p r i v e d of this liberty w i t h o u t t h e i r c o n s e n t . In this a n a r c h i s t w o r l d , p e o p l e w o u l d "own" w h a t t h e y s w a l l o w a n d m a y b e w h a t they w e a r b u t w o u l d s h a r e everything else w h e n a s k e d to. Private p r o p e r t y , in p l o t s of l a n d for e x a m p l e , w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e in p r i n c i p l e (as m a n d a t e d b y t h e exhaustiveness constraint) t h r o u g h u n a n i m o u s c o n s e n t , b u t it w o u l d be extremely unlikely a n d a l s o h i g h l y u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e of t h e a p p e a r a n c e of n e w p e r s o n s . U n d e r all t h r e e p r o p o s a l s t h e liberty of u n i l a t e r a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n is defined as m o r e limited, s o t h a t it w o u l d give rise t o l e s s extensive, less 60

^ h i s instability raises the cute question whether the exhaustiveness constraint requnjs that plot fu ures be ownable today (in which case the instability would not exist as alleged). In Noz.ck s scheme plot futures are ownable today. A property owner by first appropnanon owns all future stages of the object as well. But' is it reasonable to make this t w T Z " °NH ^ °fg T U n d m l 6 S ? T o d o s o w o u l d b e » the case of the scheme d.scussed m the text because those in the present generation, by giving up hbert.es meanmgless to them, could constrain the liberties of future generations. If ZT£ "HT C 0 1 N S E N T S 1 I N A « < * should now own Manhattan-in W ^ great-granddaughter will, , have the right to exclude everyone elsefrommeLand. N o z i

m

2 0 8 0

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.5

59

exclusionary, o r less e n d u r i n g p r o p e r t y rights. S u c h a modification s e e m s attractive if t h e r e is r e a s o n to prefer a m o r e egalitarian distribu­ tion of e n g e n d e r e d f r e e d o m . Given Nozick's e n d o r s e m e n t of equality in the d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom, it s e e m s t h a t this p r e f e r e n c e s h o u l d exist at l e a s t as a s e c o n d a r y p r i n c i p l e (tie breaker). But t h e m a i n point of s k e t c h i n g t h e s e alternative possibilities w a s to s h o w t h a t — c o n s i s t e n t w i t h m y c o n j e c t u r e d c o n s t r a i n t s , h o w e v e r clarified—there are indefinitely m a n y a n d very different w a y s of specifying t h e initial package of rights a n d liberties to b e a s s i g n e d to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s . 4.5. Before c o n c l u d i n g t h i s section, I m u s t briefly a d d r e s s a n objec­ tion. It m a y b e s a i d t h a t Nozick, i n s t e a d of a c c e p t i n g a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d involving a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e , c a n b r i n g in a structurally different justificatory b a c k g r o u n d t h a t a p p e a l s to historical facts. W h e r e a s for Rawls t h e j u s t i c e of a basic s t r u c t u r e h i n g e s o n a forwardlooking (broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t ) a s s e s s m e n t of it a n d its feasible alternatives, Nozick a s s e r t s t h a t its justice c a n n o t b e a s s e s s e d apart from i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t h o w t h i s s c h e m e c a m e a b o u t . F o r h i m , t h e justification of p a r t i c u l a r social i n s t i t u t i o n s is historically recursive just like t h e justification of a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of h o l d i n g s . T h u s , institutional c h a n g e s (for e x a m p l e , from a b a r t e r to a m o n e y e c o n o m y or from p r o t e c t i v e a g e n c i e s t o t h e m i n i m a l g o v e r n m e n t ) are legitimate only if t h e y a c t u a l l y c a m e a b o u t t h r o u g h legitimate p r o c e s s e s (for e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h a n i n v i s i b l e - h a n d p r o c e s s or t h r o u g h a m a n d a t o r y a t t e m p t t o s a f e g u a r d m o r a l rights t h a t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have b e e n violated). He m i g h t t h e n reject c o m p e t i n g g r o u n d r u l e s m o r e Rawlsian in spirit b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d n o t (or n o t plausibly) have c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h a s e q u e n c e of legitimate t r a n s i t i o n s from a n original state of n a t u r e c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y b y Nozickian rights (cf. ASU 280-90). T h i s a p p e a l t o h i s t o r y c a n m o v e b u t it c a n n o t fill t h e g a p in Nozick's a c c o u n t . His favorite i n s t i t u t i o n s , even w i t h t h e i r historically recursive justification, still h a n g in m i d a i r so l o n g as it h a s n o t b e e n s h o w n w h i c h g r o u n d r u l e s w e r e valid at t h e very b e g i n n i n g . I n s t e a d of challenging 61

62

" N o z i c k o n c e e n t e r t a i n s s h a p i n g "the p r e c i s e c o n t o u r of the b u n d l e of property rights'— s p e c i a l c a s e — w i t h a n e y e to the m o s t efficient internalization of externalities 'ASU 280). We s h o u l d c h o o s e property rights s o that productive e x c h a n g e s are e n c o u r ­ aged at l o w t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . I n a s m u c h as productive e x c h a n g e s are o n e s that make both s i d e s subjectively better off, this proposal c o m e s perilously c l o s e to a utilitanan criterion for assessing' institutions. Moreover, it w o u l d s e e m to favor a specification of property rights that t e n d s to e n g e n d e r m o r e egalitarian patterns of holdings. For p r o d u c ­ tive e x c h a n g e s of t h e relevant kind actually to occur, t h e parties w i t h o u t right must have the f u n d s t o b u y off (part of) t h e rights of the o p p o s i t e party, a n d this consideration supports a s s i g n i n g t h e right to t h e generally p o o r e r party. (Consider the c h o i c e b e t w e e n a purported right to p o l l u t e and a p u r p o r t e d right to veto pollution in o n e s area. The latter o p t i o n is s u p e r i o r for p u r p o s e s of internalizing externalities if it is m o r e likely that industrialists h a v e t h e f u n d s to b u y p o l l u t i o n e n t i t l e m e n t s from their neighbors t h a n that residents have t h e f u n d s to b u y p o l l u t i o n limitations from industnalists.) a

" T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e unclariry e v e n about w h a t h e takes t h e s e original g r o u n d rules to b e in t h e e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . M o s t often it s e e m s that t h e s e are his p n n c i p l e s ot

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his p r o p o s e d g r o u n d rules, o n e w o u l d n o w challenge h i s p r o p o s e d original g r o u n d r u l e s , i n c l u d i n g r u l e s for t h e i r valid revision. T h e core idea of s u c h a negative strategy is c l e a r e n o u g h , a n d I will confine myself t o a few brief i l l u s t r a t i o n s . C o n c e r n i n g t h e original g r o u n d rules, h o w c a n w e settle, for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d w a s originally u n o w n e d o r o w n e d collectively? C a n w e d e c i d e o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d s a n d , if so, w h i c h ? O r c a n w e d e c i d e b y a p p e a l t o h i s t o r y a n d , if so, h o w ? C o n c e r n i n g r u l e s for t h e valid revision of t h e original g r o u n d rules, b o t h Nozick a n d Locke s u g g e s t t h a t s u c h r e v i s i o n s m u s t be m u t u a l l y beneficial. (Must e v e r y o n e u n d e r t h e n e w s c h e m e b e b e t t e r off t h a n anyone w a s u n d e r t h e o l d o n e ? H o w c o u l d it b e s h o w n t h a t they w e r e ? Or is s o m e w e a k e r c o n d i t i o n sufficient; a n d w h i c h m i g h t this be?) Both e m p h a s i z e t h a t p r i v a t e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of s o m e plot of l a n d o n t h e t e r m s they p r o p o s e will t e n d t o i m p r o v e t h e s h a r e s of all ( i n c l u d i n g t h o s e w h o will n o t o w n l a n d ) a s a g a i n s t a s t a t e w i t h o u t p r i v a t e l a n d o w n e r s h i p . But t h e s a m e c o u l d b e said, w i t h g r e a t e r plausibility p e r h a p s , a b o u t m a n y o t h e r revised s e t s of g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t w o u l d p e r m i t less extensive, less e x c l u s i o n a r y , o r less p e r m a n e n t p r i v a t e a p ­ p r o p r i a t i o n t h a n t h e i r s d o . Again, h o w d o w e d e c i d e a m o n g v a r i o u s s u c h revisions? O n p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d s ? O r b y a p p e a l t o h i s t o r i c a l facts a b o u t h o w p r o p e r t y rights a n d o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t u a l l y e m e r g e d ? A n d w h a t if t h e y e m e r g e d differently i n Egypt, G r e e c e , Rome, etc.? T h o s e w h o w a n t t o a s s e r t t h a t t h e r e is one o b v i o u s s e t of (original) g r o u n d r u l e s will h a v e t o d e f e n d "obvious" a n s w e r s t o t h e s e a n d m a n y o t h e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s . T h e Rawlsian, favoring w h a t I h a v e c a l l e d a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , c a n m a i n ­ tain t h e g r o u n d o n t h e h i g h e r level b y m e r e l y b l o c k i n g s u c h a s s e r t i o n s . P e r h a p s t h e b e s t w a y t o s u c c e e d at t h i s negative t a s k is t o confront t h e v a r i o u s proffered d e s c r i p t i o n s of s u p p o s e d l y o b v i o u s o r n a t u r a l in­ s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , t o m a k e c l e a r h o w h o p e l e s s is t h e p r o j e c t of legitimating o n e p a r t i c u l a r set of (original) g r o u n d r u l e s as m o r a l l y fundamental. And so long as n o s u c h s c h e m e h a s been so legitimated, 6 3

acquisition, transfer, a n d rectification of h o l d i n g s . But if s o , t h e n there w o u l d b e n o reason for Nozick to try to "rebut t h e claim t h a t . . . n o natural right t o private p r o p e r t y c a n arise b y a Lockean p r o c e s s " IASU 1771. This right w o u l d n ' t n e e d to arise, b e c a u s e it w o u l d exist a b initio. I don't think this p a s s a g e is just a slip o n Nozick's part. Rather, I b e l i e v e (in elaboration o f n. 6) that Nozick takes t h e institution of private property to have arisen, b e c a u s e h e w a n t s to reaffirm t h e Lockean proviso but c a n m a k e s e n s e of it o n l y as s o m e kind of c o m p e n s a t i o n requirement. If property rights h a d existed at t h e very b e g i n n i n g , t h e n t h e Lockean proviso w o u l d s e e m to h i m t o have n o rationale. Nozick c a n s o l v e this s u p p o s e d problem by a s s u m i n g , w i t h Locke, that t h e institution of private property developed in a a world aUOrthat originally b e l o n g e d t o h u m a n k i n d in c o m m o n . If so, t h e n t h e " 6 n S U 0r eneSa st hh aa tr et h e e m e r 8 e ™ e of this institution m a k e s n o o n e 6 t o eveI (S Bd initial freedom that is n o w o r s e t h a n t h e 1 6 F?WolffTa«en7nn?h ~ ™ d e l i n g ofd Nozick conflicts w91 i t h B. P riginally <See M S1 0 1

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61

n o t h i n g h a s b e e n s h o w n t o p r e e m p t o r c o n s t r a i n Rawls's p a t t e r n pref­ e r e n c e (as a p p l i e d to t h e r a n k i n g of s u c h s c h e m e s ) . I n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d in a d d i t i o n , t h e r e are r e a s o n s against a c c e p t i n g t h e very i d e a t h a t t h e justification of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d have to fit t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y r e c u r s i v e m o l d . T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t s u c h a c o n ­ c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is h i g h l y inflexible a n d u n a d a p t a b l e t o t h e e n o r m o u s r a n g e of social a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s to w h i c h h u m a n b e i n g s have b e e n a n d m i g h t b e — s o m e t i m e , s o m e w h e r e — e x p o s e d . Rights that s e e m o b v i o u s w i t h i n a small-scale social s y s t e m m a y m a k e a largescale o n e e n t i r e l y u n m a n a g e a b l e . A specification of p r o p e r t y rights t h a t is p l a u s i b l e for a n a g r i c u l t u r a l society may, in a h u n t i n g society, lead to extinction from s t a r v a t i o n . Variations in technology, c u l t u r e , a n d p o p u ­ lation d e n s i t y define a n e n o r m o u s s p a c e of possibilities. Reflecting o n this p o i n t d r a i n s a w a y y e t m o r e of w h a t e v e r plausibility Nozick's c o n ­ c e p t i o n m a y h a v e . T h e original g r o u n d r u l e s h e p r o p o s e s d o n ' t look so b a d in t h e s t a t e of n a t u r e Locke d e s c r i b e s , in w h i c h vast t r a c t s of fertile l a n d a r e available t o b e b r o u g h t u n d e r cultivation a n d t h e Rawlsian's c h a n g e - o f - l a n d o w n e r s h i p r u l e s (besides b e i n g pointless) w o u l d far ex­ c e e d existing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a c i t i e s . Of c o u r s e , I c o u l d d e s c r i b e a n o t h e r s t a t e of n a t u r e in w h i c h t h i n g s w o u l d b e o t h e r w i s e , but even waiving this objection, w h y s h o u l d w e n o w have to justify o u r institu­ tions by r e f e r e n c e to s o m e base-line s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n plausible at t h e b e g i n n i n g s of h u m a n history? And if w e do, w h y is Nozick's a r g u m e n t a justification for t h e m i n i m a l state r a t h e r t h a n t h e r e d u c t i o a d a b s u r d u m of h i s specification of original rights? A t h e o r y e n v i s i o n i n g a historically recursive a s s e s s m e n t of institu­ tional s c h e m e s vastly o v e r b u r d e n s u s w i t h morally significant c o n s i d e r ­ a t i o n s . O n e m u s t n o t m e r e l y d e s i g n a s c h e m e suitable for a p a r t i c u l a r social s y s t e m at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e in history. In d e s i g n i n g s u c h a s c h e m e o n e m u s t a l s o b e c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h i s s c h e m e c a n plausibly have c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h a s e q u e n c e of legitimate institutional c h a n g e s from t h e original s c h e m e , t h a t t h e original a n d all i n t e r m e d i a t e s c h e m e s b e suitable t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e social c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t all o t h e r s c h e m e s t h a t might p l a u s i b l y h a v e legitimately e m e r g e d (or m i g h t yet so emerge) from t h e original s c h e m e also b e suitable u n d e r all sorts of social a n d n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s , a n d t h a t n o alternative specification of t h e original s c h e m e s h o u l d g e n e r a t e a t r e e of accessible s c h e m e s t h a t s e e m s m o r e a c c e p t a b l e o n t h e w h o l e t h a n t h e tree g e n e r a t e d by Nozick's o w n original s c h e m e . Given t h e s e fantastic complexities, o n e m a y c o m e t o a p p r e c i a t e w h y Nozick is t e m p t e d — e v e n at t h e e x p e n s e of d e c o u p l i n g t h e t h i r d p a r t of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, w h i c h h o l d s o u t t h e p r o m ­ ise of a " f r a m e w o r k for U t o p i a " — b y t h e q u i c k e r r o u t e of d e c l a r i n g his specification of original rights " f u n d a m e n t a l " b y insisting t h a t his a r e "the p r e c i s e l y c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s " (ASU 202). If t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s ( p e r h a p s t h r o u g h s o m e p l a u s i b l e s e q u e n c e of legitimate i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes) lead to m a s s i v e slavery, s e r f d o m , starvation, o r n o n c o m p l i a n c e , t h e n

62

Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.6

t h e r e is p e r h a p s r e a s o n t o violate s o m e rights h e r e a n d t h e r e — " t o avoid c a t a s t r o p h i c m o r a l h o r r o r " (ASU 3 0 n ) — b u t c e r t a i n l y n o t r e a s o n to change one's m i n d about the principles themselves. 4.6. Rawls i n A Theory of Justice also a i m s for a t h e o r y that is applicable to social s y s t e m s u n d e r very different social a n d natural c o n d i t i o n s . But h e w a n t s t o a s s e s s t h e justice of a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e by h o w it w o r k s n o w , w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o its h i s t o r y . T h r o u g h h i s broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t m o d e of a s s e s s m e n t , Rawls g a i n s a g o o d d e a l of se­ curity against s h o c k i n g s u r p r i s e s , for i n s t a n c e , t h a t t h e m o s t r e p u g n a n t s c h e m e s c a n b e just a n d t h e m o s t beneficial o n e s u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of their genesis. E m p l o y i n g a t h i n n o t i o n of t h e h u m a n g o o d , R a w l s m a k e s t h e justice of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t u r n o n h o w its least a d v a n t a g e d fare in c o m p a r i s o n to t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r feasible alternative basic s t r u c t u r e s . Rawls's p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e w o u l d entail a l o w r a n k i n g for Nozick's g r o u n d r u l e s . If Nozick p r o t e s t s t h a t h i s g r o u n d r u l e s a r e s o m e h o w n a t u r a l or obvious, h e is unlikely to prevail. T h e r e are j u s t t o o m a n y p r e t e n d e r s t o t h e s e a t t r i b u t e s , a n d o n l y if t h e r e w e r e s o m e conver­ g e n c e u p o n o n e set of g r o u n d r u l e s m i g h t t h e s e b e u s e d t o t e s t (and reject) t h e Rawlsian criterion. A b s e n t s u c h c o n v e r g e n c e , it s e e m s m o r e p r o m i s i n g for Nozick to e x t e n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n t o t h e h i g h e r level s o as to p r e v e n t Rawls from m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t g r o u n d b y default. D o i n g so, I have suggested, w o u l d l e a d h i m t o d e f e n d a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t in its b a l a n c i n g of values, is s t r u c t u r a l l y similar to Rawls's o w n . T h i s balancing, however, w o u l d n o t b e b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , b e c a u s e Nozick in c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s M a s t e r P a t t e r n w o u l d give m u c h less w e i g h t to t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t a r e t h e effects of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a n to equivalent benefits a n d b u r d e n s it calls for. This c h a p t e r h a s d o n e little t o d e f e n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r criterion Rawls p r o p o s e s for a s s e s s i n g alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . My m a i n c o n c e r n w a s t o m a k e p l a u s i b l e t h e very i d e a of s u c h a criterion, t h e i d e a of t h i n k i n g a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s in t e r m s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l pat­ t e r n s . I h a v e also tried to gain s o m e initial credibility for t h e s e m i c o n s e ­ quentialist a p p r o a c h to t h e subject of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e . S u c h a n a p p r o a c h is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s a n institutional s c h e m e t e n d s to p r o d u c e , irrespective of t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h it e s t a b l i s h e s o r e n g e n d e r s t h e m .

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2

Sandel and the Conception of the Person

5- N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s have b e e n s o r o u t i n e t h a t a clear ( t h o u g h s o m e w h a t critical) defense of it s e e m s useful for t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e . My d i s c u s s i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w ­ m e n t s serves t w o a d d i t i o n a l p u r p o s e s as well, it allows m e to clarify a further i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of Rawls's focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , a n d it c o n s t i t u t e s a s m a l l - s c a l e p r e l u d e to t h e d i s c u s s i o n of Rawls's infamous c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , w h i c h , s u p p o r t i n g t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s a n d t h e m a x i m i n idea, plays a crucial role in his c o n c e p ­ tion of social j u s t i c e . 5 . 1 . T h e severe c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of n a t u r a l e n d o w ­ m e n t s c e n t e r a r o u n d t h e m i s t a k e n i d e a t h a t t h e difference principle, as d e f e n d e d in A Theory of Justice, p e r m i t s or even r e q u i r e s t h a t p e r s o n s b e u s e d a s m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n thrives o n Rawls's c l a i m t h a t h i s is "a c o n c e p t i o n of justice t h a t nullifies t h e a c c i d e n t s of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t ' ' (TJ 15). It is confirmed by his adver­ t i s e m e n t of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e as a n a g r e e m e n t to regard t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s as a " c o m m o n , " "collective," or "social a s s e t t o b e u s e d for t h e c o m m o n a d v a n t a g e " (TJ 101,179,107). And it finds f u r t h e r s u p p o r t w h e n Rawls a n n o u n c e s t h a t " n o o n e deserves h i s p l a c e in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of native e n d o w m e n t s " (TJ 104, cf §48), t h a t s u c h e n d o w m e n t s a r e "arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of view"
64

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.1.1

5 . 1 . 1 . It h a s b e e n s u p p o s e d t h a t c o n t r o l over o n e ' s n a t u r a l e n d o w ­ m e n t s is itself u p for c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h a t Rawls is e x a m i n i n g t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s p e c i a l gifts a n d h a n d i c a p s a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of other, p e r h a p s m o r e d e s i r a b l e alternative p a t t e r n s . O n t h i s s u p p o s i ­ tion, t h e c o n s i s t e n t p r o p o s a l s for Rawls t o m a k e w o u l d involve involun­ tary o r g a n t r a n s p l a n t s (Nozick, ASU 206-7), c o o w n e r s h i p b y o t h e r s of e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s (giving t h e m a right t o d e c i d e h o w t h e s e s h o u l d b e e m p l o y e d ) , o r at t h e very least a " h e a d tax" (ASU 229n) to b e i m p o s e d u p o n t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d . T h e s u p p o s i t i o n , h o w e v e r , is m i s t a k e n : "Greater n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a r e n o t a collective a s s e t in t h e s e n s e t h a t society s h o u l d c o m p e l t h o s e w h o h a v e t h e m to p u t t h e m to w o r k for t h e less favored" (RMC 145). "We h a v e a right to o u r n a t u r a l abilities" (BSS 65). This m u c h is e n s h r i n e d i n Rawls's first p r i n c i p l e . 1

W e s h o u l d recall h e r e t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is only s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . Natural p r i m a r y g o o d s , s u c h a s " h e a l t h a n d vigor, intelligence a n d i m a g i n a t i o n " (TJ 62), fall o u t s i d e t h e m a s t e r p a t t e r n s b y w h i c h feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s are a s s e s s e d . " T h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n is n e i t h e r just n o r u n j u s t " (TJ 102). Rawls is C o n c e r n e d only w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , w h i c h is / r e g u l a t e d b y t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e . All a n d only i n e q u a l i t i e s in this dis­ t r i b u t i o n r e q u i r e justification: "A h y p o t h e t i c a l initial a r r a n g e m e n t in w h i c h all t h e social p r i m a r y g o o d s are equally d i s t r i b u t e d . . . p r o v i d e s a b e n c h m a r k for j u d g i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s " (TJ 62). H e n c e t h e r e is n o rea­ s o n , n o t even a reason o v e r r i d d e n b y o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h y t h e u s e of p e r s o n s ' e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d b e d e c i d e d collectively, o r n a t u r a l inequalities b e offset b y social o n e s . T h e fact of n a t u r a l inequalities m a y p r o v i d e a n o t h e r sort of r e a s o n for d e p a r t i n g from a n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . P e r h a p s all s h a r e s c o u l d b e larger if special rewards w e r e offered for t h e d e ­ v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise of special t a l e n t s . In this case, h o w e v e r , t h e resulting social inequalities w o u l d b e justified b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e preferred d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y m a k e p o s s i b l e ( a n d not by reference to a preferred d i s t r i b u t i o n of welfare o r of p r i m a r y g o o d s overall). I n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s — t h o u g h it p l a y s n o n o r m a t i v e role w i t h i n Rawls's criterion of justice, d o e s n o t figure in t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n — i s still n e e d e d in a n e m p i r i c a l role. It c o d e t e r m i n e s h o w this criterion c a n b e satisfied. T h e r e is t h e n n o d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d s h o u l d have a n d c o n t r o l t h e i r s u p e r i o r n a t u r a l gifts. Rawls d o e s n o t •Sandel has it arguing against

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65

q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e y s h o u l d . T h e o n l y c o n t r o v e r s y is over w h a t advan­ tages t h e y a r e t o b e offered for d e v e l o p i n g a n d exercising t h e i r special endowments. 5.1.2. T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n c e m o r e involves t h e distinc­ tion of m o r a l s u b j e c t s : t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e a s s e s s ­ m e n t of c o n d u c t . H o w w e feel a b o u t a p r e f e r e n c e for s o m e p a t t e r n s over o t h e r s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e role it is a s s i g n e d in m o r a l a r g u m e n t . Appeal t o t h e s a m e p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e m a y s e e m perfectly sensible a n d also q u i t e o u t r a g e o u s , d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r it is m e a n t to justify the ranking of o n e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e above a n o t h e r or the infringement of rights u n d e r s o m e ( r e a s o n a b l y just) existing institutional s c h e m e . T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n s i s t s in a s s u m i n g that Rawls's valua­ tion of i n c o m e p a t t e r n s , w h i c h reflect t h e n a t u r a l distribution of e n ­ d o w m e n t s , is t o b e a p p l i e d w i t h i n a n o n g o i n g e c o n o m i c s c h e m e w h o s e t e r m s are t a k e n for g r a n t e d . Rawls is viewed as s u g g e s t i n g that w e s h o u l d try to factor o u t t h e p a r t of a p e r s o n ' s h o l d i n g s that is d u e to natural e n d o w m e n t s , a n d t h e r e f o r e u n d e s e r v e d , as a fit c a n d i d a t e for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . Against this p o s i t i o n Nozick c a n q u i t e convincingly ar­ g u e t h a t s o m e t h i n g m a y b e legitimately o n e ' s o w n even t h o u g h w h a t o n e u s e d t o o b t a i n it ( a n d w h a t o n e u s e d to o b t a i n that, etc.) are not "deserved, all the way down.. .. S o m e of t h e t h i n g s h e u s e s h e just m a y have, n o t illegitimately" (ASU 225). Taking n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s to b e a m o n g t h e s e things o n e just has, Nozick s k e t c h e s t h i s a r g u m e n t : 1- P e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r n a t u r a l a s s e t s . 2. If p e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o s o m e t h i n g , t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o w h a t e v e r f l o w s f r o m it (via s p e c i f i e d t y p e s o f p r o c e s s e s ) . 3. P e o p l e ' s h o l d i n g s flow f r o m t h e i r n a t u r a l a s s e t s . T h e r e f o r e , 4. P e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r h o l d i n g s . 5

If p e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o s o m e t h i n g , t h e n t h e y o u g h t t o h a v e it ( a n d t h i s o v e r r i d e s a n y p r e s u m p t i o n of equality there m a y b e about h o l d i n g s ) . (ASU 2 2 5 - 2 6 )

This a r g u m e n t is e n t i r e l y u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . O n l y it leaves o p e n w h a t those "specified t y p e s of p r o c e s s e s " s h o u l d b e via w h i c h h o l d i n g s flow from n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . A n d it is precisely this issue, a n d t h i s issue alone, t h a t Rawls's reflections a b o u t n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s are m e a n t to a d d r e s s . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t p e r s o n s a r e e n t i t l e d to w h a t e v e r they a c q u i r e u n d e r j u s t p r o c e s s e s , n o m a t t e r w h a t role their e n d o w ­ m e n t s m a y h a v e p l a y e d i n t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n (cf. TJ 103). W h a t Rawls d i s p u t e s is t h a t p e r s o n s , in virtue of t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s , are entitled to o r d e s e r v e any particular specification of these processes (cf. TJ 104)— s o m e t h i n g Nozick w o u l d d i s p u t e j u s t as vigorously. O n c e again, t h e valuation of t h e relevant p a t t e r n features ( i n c o m e differentials reflect­ ing diverse n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s ) is m e a n t to influence t h e a s s e s s m e n t of institutions. It is n o t i n t e n d e d t o i n s p i r e rectificatory interference

66

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.2

w i t h t h e h o l d i n g s t h a t have a r i s e n u n d e r s o m e e x i s t i n g institutional scheme. 5.2. T h e s e t w o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s out of t h e w a y , w e c a n begin delineating t h e m a i n i s s u e : H o w a r e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s to be de­ signed a n d a s s e s s e d (the relevant "types of p r o c e s s e s " to b e specified)? W h a t is t h e m e a n i n g a n d plausibility of Rawls's v i e w t h a t institutional s c h e m e s s h o u l d regulate differentials in t h e s o c i a l r e w a r d s for develop­ ing a n d exercising n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s s o as t o o p t i m i z e t h e worst r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s ? Let m e give a c r u d e illustration of Rawls's p o s i t i o n , b a s e d , o n c e again, u p o n his difference p r i n c i p l e in its s i m p l e s t f o r m ( w h e r e it g o v e r n s only income) as a p p l i e d to t h e e c o n o m y of a small s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society. To further simplify m a t t e r s , I a s s u m e t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y t w o levels of e n d o w m e n t : e i g h t e e n specially gifted p e r s o n s ("the e x c e p t i o n a l s " ) , ca­ p a b l e of w o r k i n g in t h e c o m p l e x job, a n d fifty-four n o r m a l l y e n d o w e d p e r s o n s ("the normals"), w h o c a n w o r k only in t h e s i m p l e j o b . I con­ sider four alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n c o m e for o n e h o u r of w o r k in t h e c o m p l e x job is t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of s u c h labor m i n u s , respectively, 0, 40, 50, a n d 60 p e r c e n t . T h e i n c o m e for o n e hour of w o r k in t h e s i m p l e job is t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of s u c h l a b o r p l u s some p e r c e n t a g e , w h i c h is c h o s e n so that t h e total flow of s u p p l e m e n t a r y i n c o m e (that is, of "negative" i n c o m e t a x e s in t h e s i m p l e job) exactly b a l a n c e s t h e total flow of taxes r a i s e d in t h e c o m p l e x j o b . S u p p o s e empirical s t u d i e s s h o w t h e p a t t e r n s t h a t t h e f o u r a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r to be roughly as s h o w n in T a b l e 1 (stating i n each c o l u m n t h e d a t a for t h e c o m p l e x job first). For each s c h e m e , t h e first value in r o w [A] is e x o g e n o u s . All other values are calculated, e x c e p t for t h o s e in r o w s [B], [F], a n d (H). T h e s e are stipulated m accordance with three straightforward empirical assump­ tions a b o u t variations across s c h e m e s . First, as r e g a r d s [F], average ° ™ ™ group u n d e r each scheme are s u c h that groups higher n e t i n c o m e rates [D] have m o r e leisure [F] a n d e a r n m o r e i n c o m e [G). Second, as r e g a r d s [H], a n i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of the exceptionals prefer t o w o r k in t h e s i m p l e j o b a s t h e r a t i o b e t w e e n the r h ? d ^ « »from S to S ). T h i r d , a s r e g a r d s [B], olv S n xi " °f ° " ^ l i v e l y related to the labor suprelatTve J L H ° ^ a f u n c t i o n of t h e 2

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Table 1. Alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s a n d the difference principle S, [A I Tax rate IB] Gross i n c o m e rate p e r hour 1$) !C]Tax per h o u r [$), [A]X[B] !D!Net i n c o m e rate p e r hour 1 $ ) , IBJ+IC) (E) Net i n c o m e rate ratio, from ID] IF) Average working h o u r s per week IG] Average net i n c o m e p e r week l$),[D)x[F] (HINumber of workers (1) Total working h o u r s p e r week, [F]x[H] (J) Labor s u p p l y ratio,

0% 110.00

0% 13.00

-40% 82.00

44% 16.00

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60% 15.00

-60% 96.00

64% 14.40

0.00 110.00

0.00 13.00

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are n e v e r t h e l e s s b e t t e r off (have a h i g h e r net i n c o m e rate [Dj—work less [F] a n d e a r n m o r e [G]) t h a n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r a n y of t h e alternative s c h e m e s . 5.3. While it is q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e Rawlsian criterion w o u l d entail a preference for S Rawls m a k e s it difficult to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t this preference m e a n s . C o n s i d e r his formulations in explication of t h e dif­ ference p r i n c i p l e : " T h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n favored b y n a t u r e . . . m a y gain from t h e i r g o o d f o r t u n e o n l y o n t e r m s that improve t h e situation of t h o s e w h o h a v e lost o u t " (TJ 101); " t h e m o r e fortunate are to benefit only in w a y s t h a t h e l p t h o s e w h o have lost o u t " (TJ 179); "no o n e gains or loses from h i s a r b i t r a r y p l a c e in t h e distribution of n a t u r a l assets . . 3

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A s the e x a m p l e m a k e s clear, Sandel g o e s w r o n g in believing that the s c h e m e ranked highest by Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n "nullifies the effect of t h e s e differences lin natural for­ tune]" (LU 69). In S t h o s e w o r k i n g in the c o m p l e x job have considerably more i n c o m e and m o r e leisure t h a n their fellows working in the s i m p l e job. Moreover, they prefer their c o m p l e x job (unavailable to the normals), as is w i t n e s s e d by the fact that they c o u l d switch at any time. There is n o q u e s t i o n that they h a v e — o n top of their better e n d o w ­ ment, w h i c h is irrelevant for R a w l s — a better social position than the normals. It may s e e m that a w e a k e r c l a i m is true. A just s c h e m e is s u c h that some of the exceptionals just barely prefer t h e c o m p l e x job; s o m e of t h e m (in S ) w o u l d s w i t c h into the s i m p l e job if the net i n c o m e rate ratio w e r e reduced a little bit further. But o n e m u s t be careful with s u c h statements. Rawls's criterion c o m p a r e s long-term s c h e m e s (existing "in perpetuity," as it were). So t h e table d o e s n o t illustrate h o w actual persons, having convex indifference curves b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n d leisure w h i c h reflect decreasing marginal utility for both g o o d s , w o u l d a d j u s t their e c o n o m i c behavior to tax-rate fluctuations. Rather, the as­ s u m p t i o n is that p e r s o n s h a v e g r o w n u p in "their" s c h e m e , that their preferences a n d indifference c u r v e s (etc.) have b e e n s h a p e d by it. There is n o guarantee that p e r s o n s in S w o u l d adjust to short-term c h a n g e s in i n c o m e tax rates as s h o w n m the table. 5

5

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68

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.3

w i t h o u t giving or receiving c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s in r e t u r n . . . . In justice as fairness m e n agree to s h a r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s fate" (TJ 102).These formulations invite t h e t h i r d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . G r a n t e d , it might be said, S is so organized t h a t n o t h i n g is t a k e n a w a y from t h e excep­ tionals or r e d i s t r i b u t e d . It's all d o n e a u t o m a t i c a l l y a n d o n a schedule a n n o u n c e d in a d v a n c e . But t h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s : W h y s h o u l d the exceptionals o w e t h e n o r m a l s any c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s ? In return for w h a t ? Yes, t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s a r e free to w o r k in t h e s i m p l e job, and they have to p a y only if t h e y c h o o s e to e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r endow­ m e n t s , b u t by w h a t right m a y t h i s c o n d i t i o n b e i m p o s e d u p o n them? Why s h o u l d t h e y b e f o r b i d d e n to e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r e n d o w m e n t s without h e l p i n g t h e n o r m a l s ? How is this w a y of u s i n g p e o p l e (or their talents or t h e i r work) for t h e benefit of o t h e r s m a d e a c c e p t a b l e by the fact that it's built into t h e rules of t h e g a m e , r a t h e r t h a n i m p o s e d by officials in a n a d h o c m a n n e r ? 5

This line of criticism is beautifully c a p t u r e d in Nozick's i m a g e of the exceptionals b e i n g harnessed to serve o t h e r s , " a n d h a r n e s s i n g ' is an a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m — a s it w o u l d b e for a h o r s e h a r n e s s e d to a wagon w h i c h d o e s n ' t have t o m o v e ever, b u t if it d o e s , it m u s t d r a w t h e wagon along" (ASU 229n). W h a t Nozick w a n t s to c o n c l u d e is t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice, b y favoring i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s u n d e r which t h e exceptionals are h a r n e s s e d , e n c o u r a g e s t h e u s e of s o m e p e r s o n s as m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . W h e n p e r s o n s are h a r n e s s e d , however, o n l y t h e i r work and efforts are i m m e d i a t e l y u s e d . Nozick's p a t h t o h i s c o n c l u s i o n r e q u i r e s then two further s t e p s : t o u s e p e r s o n s ' w o r k a n d efforts is t o u s e t h e i r natural e n d o w m e n t s , a n d to u s e t h e i r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is to u s e them. Nozick explicitly asserts t h e s e c o n d of t h e s e s t e p s : ' W h y w e , thick with particular traits, s h o u l d b e c h e e r e d t h a t (only) t h e t h u s p u r i f i e d m e n w i t h i n u s are n o t regarded as m e a n s is . . . u n c l e a r " (ASU 228). And 3 ° ! ^ ' P o i n t - i n s i s t i n g t h a t u s i n g t h e s p e c i a l gifts of the N

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69

ID N a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s a c o m m o n a s s e t . (2) H e n c e , t h e t a l e n t s a n d a b i l i t i e s o f (or " r e s i d i n g in") t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s m a y be u s e d as m e a n s . (3) H e n c e , t h e w o r k a n d e f f o r t s of t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s m a y b e u s e d a s m e a n s , or h a r n e s s e d . (4) H e n c e , a n i n c o m e tax s c h e m e like S m a y b e i n s t i t u t e d . 4

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If Rawls w e r e really a r g u i n g in this way, t h e n Nozick a n d Sandel w o u l d i n d e e d n e e d t o s h o w o n l y h o w (1) or (2) p r e s u p p o s e s that persons m a y be u s e d as m e a n s . Their r e a d i n g , h o w e v e r , is m i s t a k e n ; Rawls m a k e s n o s u c h a r g u m e n t and d o e s n o t e n d o r s e a n y of p r o p o s i t i o n s (l)-(3). My d i s c u s s i o n will c o n c e n t r a t e o n (3), for b y s h o w i n g that, d e s p i t e a p p e a r a n c e s , Rawls is not invoking (3) in a n y relevant s e n s e , I c a n d e s t r o y t h e o r d i n a r y ra­ tionale for a t t r i b u t i n g (1) a n d (2) to h i m . At the e n d I will look again at Rawls's c o m m o n - a s s e t f o r m u l a t i o n s to s h o w h o w t h e Nozick-Sandel reading of t h e m g o e s w r o n g a n d h o w t h e y s h o u l d i n s t e a d b e u n d e r ­ stood. 5.4. T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g viewed Rawls as e n c o u r a g i n g officials to t a k e a w a y s o m e of p e o p l e ' s e a r n i n g s a n d p a s s t h e m along to the less f o r t u n a t e . I s a i d in r e s p o n s e t h a t Rawls is d i s c u s s i n g t h e scheme u n d e r w h i c h e a r n i n g s arise in t h e first place. He a d d r e s s e s himself t o t h e d e e p e s t b a s i s of e c o n o m i c e n t i t l e m e n t s a n d t h u s c a n n o t be criticized in a w a y t h a t a l r e a d y takes s o m e e n t i t l e m e n t - p r o d u c i n g p r o c e s s e s for g r a n t e d . To s a y t h a t w i t h Rawls in c h a r g e p e o p l e get less t h a n t h e y are e n t i t l e d t o b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n Rawls is raising, by a s s u m i n g w e a l r e a d y k n o w w h a t p e o p l e are e n t i t l e d to. T h e t h i r d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is similar to t h e s e c o n d in t h a t it again reflects t h e failure t o u n d e r s t a n d Rawls's focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e . The c h a r g e is t h a t u n d e r t h e s c h e m e Rawls favors, S , p e o p l e are entitled to less t h a n t h e y o u g h t to have. This objection can be embel­ lished b y a d d i n g t h a t p e o p l e o u g h t to have w h a t flows from t h e i r w o r k a n d efforts, b u t it still b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n , this t i m e by a s s u m i n g w e already k n o w w h a t flows from p e o p l e ' s w o r k a n d efforts a n d that this is what they o u g h t to have. But is n o t R a w l s h i m s e l f saying t h a t t h e exceptionals, if t h e y w a n t to exercise t h e i r s p e c i a l t a l e n t s , m u s t " h e l p " t h e n o r m a l s , m u s t "improve their s i t u a t i o n " a n d "give t h e m c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s " ? A n d d o e s this r e q u i r e m e n t n o t p r e s u p p o s e t h a t w e do k n o w w h a t flows from their w o r k a n d efforts, n a m e l y , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s u n d e r S plus w h a t ­ ever " h e l p " w a s d i v e r t e d t o t h o s e in t h e s i m p l e job? In t w o of t h e t h r e e p a s s a g e s q u o t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of §5.3, Rawls formulates m o r e carefully, s a y i n g t h a t t h e m o r e f o r t u n a t e m a y gain s

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70

Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.5

only on terms t h a t improve, m a y benefit o n l y in ways t h a t help those w h o have lost o u t . T h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s s u g g e s t a n a l t e r n a t i v e reading, w h i c h alone m a k e s t h e m meaningful a s a p a r a p h r a s e of t h e difference principle. O n this reading, t h e implicit r e f e r e n c e of s u c h comparative expressions as "gain," "improve," " h e l p , " "giving c o m p e n s a t i n g advan­ tages" is not to t h e (smaller) s h a r e t h e n o r m a l s w o u l d h a v e if the exceptionals d i d less w o r k in t h e c o m p l e x job. I n s t e a d , t h e implicit reference is to t h e (smaller) s h a r e of t h e n o r m a l s as it would exist under alternative schemes. It's n o t that t h e p r e f e r r e d e c o n o m i c scheme is rigged s o t h a t t h o s e in t h e c o m p l e x j o b c a n n o t b u t h e l p t h o s e in the simple job. Rather, Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e is s u c h t h a t its selection of a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e will (maximally) h e l p — t h a t is, improve—the lowest social position. T h u s S is preferred over S b e c a u s e t h e ("interschemic") gain in the c o m p l e x j o b is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a compensating gain i n t h e l o w e r job. (The "in r e t u r n " is m e a n i n g f u l if w e a p p r o a c h S from Rawls's e q u a l - i n c o m e b e n c h m a r k . ) s

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This r e a d i n g makes t h e s e n t e n c e s at i s s u e c o n t i n u o u s w i t h h o w we m u s t c o n s t r u e t h e principle they are i n t e n d e d t o e x p l i c a t e . T h e differ­ e n c e p n n c i p l e assesses institutional s c h e m e s w i t h a n eye to the in­ equalities e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e , w h i c h a r e t o b e "to~the greatest benefit of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d " (TJ 302). Rawls d o e s n o t m e a n to e n d o r s e t h e s c h e m e in w h i c h benefits a r e largest, w i t h benefits defined m a w a y internal t o e a c h s c h e m e . If t h i s w e r e h i s p o i n t , t h e n h e would nave t o prefer S , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n c o m e s u p p l e m e n t in t h e simple job is highest b o t h in relative a n d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s (64 p e r c e n t or $922 p e r h o u r or $22,394.88 in total, as c o m p a r e d t o 60 p e r c e n t o r $9.00 per srhJL° J °f " n ° e r S ). B u t Rawls i n t e n d s t o favor the so h T ^ t f ° P J ° h a v e t h e largest s h a r e , and " „ ™ ' n o t i o n of benefit across schemes. At issue C nCretepersons a^rhern. H ? I derive from o t h e r s ' a c t i o n s within abstract " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " ) g r o u p s derive 6

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optimized t h r o u g h t h e c h o i c e of a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is n e v e r t h e position of t h e p r e s e n t l y p o o r e s t p e r s o n s (as if o n e c o u l d k e e p track of concrete i n d i v i d u a l s a c r o s s h y p o t h e t i c a l s c h e m e s ) but always the smallest s h a r e , t h a t is, in t h e s i m p l e s t case, t h e floor of t h e i n c o m e hierarchy. Second, Rawls m o v e s freely back a n d forth b e t w e e n (what I call) t h e /nfraschemic a n d / n f e r s c h e m i c s e n s e s of s u c h t e r m s as benefit a n d advantage. T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s m u s t be to t h e a d v a n t a g e of the least a d v a n t a g e d , for e x a m p l e , m e a n s that t h e s c h e m e m u s t be c h o s e n so t h a t t h o s e i n t r a s c h e m i c a l l v m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d will enjoy an / n f e r s c h e m i c a d v a n t a g e over t h o s e Uhtraschemically) m o s t disad­ vantaged u n d e r feasible alternative s c h e m e s . Likewise, h i s criterion selects t h e s c h e m e t h a t benefits m o s t t h o s e w h o m it benefits least (Rawls u s e s b o t h e x p r e s s i o n s ) . T h e s h a r e of this g r o u p is inferior to t h e shares of all o t h e r (existing) g r o u p s a n d yet s u p e r i o r to t h e (hypotheti­ cal! w o r s t s h a r e u n d e r a n y feasible alternative s c h e m e . 5.6. T h e i n t e r s c h e m i c c o n s t r u a l of t h e c o m p a r a t i v e t e r m s ("greatest," "gain," " i m p r o v e , " etc.) dissolves t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t Rawls himself explicitly favors a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e a r e h a r n e s s e d for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . Rawls is n o t r u n n i n g afoul of his o w n insistence that p e r s o n s m u s t n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s m e a n s (TJ 1831.1 c a n t h e n c o n t i n u e in his behalf t h e s t r a t e g y I h a v e e m b a r k e d u p o n in §4.5 (cf. §4.6)—the strategy of b l o c k i n g a n y a s s e r t i o n of a n obvious e c o n o m i c s c h e m e or of conditions t h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s m u s t obviously satisfy. 6

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C o n s i d e r h e r e t h e c o m p l a i n t that u n d e r s c h e m e s Rawls w o u l d favor people's ac­ tivities will have positive a n d negative externalities (on a c c o u n t of the tax system). Such a s c h e m e will allow that I c a n act to benefit myself in w a y s that m a k e y o u w o r s e off or las in S ) that y o u c a n n o t d o certain things w i t h o u t benefiting m e . But w h y s h o u l d this be inadmissible? After all, this m u c h is true of every market s c h e m e w e know. My i n c o m e may b e v e i y significantly affected by others' e c o n o m i c activities that don't involve m e at all- It w o u l d be r i d i c u l o u s to say that thev are h a r n e s s e d to m e just b e c a u s e I benefit las a shareholder, perhaps) every t i m e t h e v buv a n e w car ("They don't have to b u y a n e w car ever, but if they d o , t h e y m u s t g e n e r a t e s o m e gain for me"). Another external attack might charge that u n d e r w h a t Rawls c o n s i d e r s a just e c o n o m i c s c h e m e persons w o u l d not be receiving their marginal p r o d u c t s . (This idea s e e m s to m e already disqualified o n e c o ­ nomic g r o u n d s . T h e r e is n o g u a r a n t e e that if factor inputs are multiplied, e a c h with its marginal p r o d u c t , a n d t h e results are a d d e d , the s u m will equal total production.) But a person's marginal c o n t r i b u t i o n d e p e n d s in various w a y s u p o n contextual factors that cannot reasonably b e attributed to this p e r s o n icf. TJ 308). Moreover, is it really obvious that t h o s e w h o c a n n o t contribute Ithe aged, o r p h a n e d , h a n d i c a p p e d , etc.) ought to be receiving their marginal p r o d u c t , i.e., nothing? D o thev not also have s o m e claim o n the material w o r l d that is a m a i n s o u r c e of e c o n o m i c values? Only a morally appealing notion of what "flows from'' a p e r s o n ' s work or efforts c o u l d overturn or constrain the Rawlsian Pattern preference. Finally, Nozick s u g g e s t s that t h e appropriate w a y of settling o n an e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is through an u n c o n s t r a i n e d collective bargaining s e s s i o n b e t w e e n the exceptionals las a team) a n d the n o r m a l s (ASU 193-95). In s u c h a s e s s i o n the exceptionals w o u l d b e fools to agree to S . T h e y c o u l d m a k e a c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l u n d e r w h i c h the s i m p l e |ob is taxed s o a s to fund a n i n c o m e s u p p l e m e n t for the c o m p l e x job. T h e bargaining w o u l d ^tycomwge toward a m i l d p r o p o s a l of this form (rather than S„J because, Nozick tells us, the normals have m o r e to lose, vis-a-vis S , from a b r e a k d o w n of social cooperation. But o n c e again 5

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Let m e a d d t h a t t h e i n t r a s c h e m i c c o n s t r u a J s u g g e s t e d b y t h e har­ n e s s i n g image is u n s o u n d even i n strictly e c o n o m i c t e r m s , b e c a u s e tax rates have a n i m p a c t o n g r o s s i n c o m e s . C o n s i d e r t h e c o m p l a i n t against S o r against c u r r e n t l y existing s c h e m e s t h a t w h a t i s p a i d i n i n c o m e tax a n d s p e n t o n t h e n e e d s of o t h e r s r e p r e s e n t s (unjustly) redistributed i n c o m e . In k e e p i n g c u r r e n t g r o s s i n c o m e s fixed, t h i s c o m p l a i n t pre­ s u p p o s e s t h e very i n c o m e t a x s c h e m e it r e j e c t s . If t h e c h a l l e n g e d tax really d i d n o t exist, t h e n g r o s s i n c o m e s ( a n d a v e r a g e w o r k i n g hours) in all jobs w o u l d b e different. Gross i n c o m e s r e p r e s e n t n o t t h e market price of o u r labor simpliciter b u t t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of o u r l a b o r within some particular institutional s c h e m e . To b e c o h e r e n t , t h e c o m p l a i n t m u s t t h e n b e f o r m u l a t e d in inters c h e m i c t e r m s . But, s o f o r m u l a t e d , it h a s c o n s i d e r a b l y less intuitive a p p e a l . Critics m a y a d v o c a t e t h e i r favorite a l t e r n a t i v e economic s c h e m e a n d p o i n t o u t t h a t relative t o it, a s c h e m e favored by the difference p r i n c i p l e w o u l d b e u s i n g o r e x p l o i t i n g t h e b e t t e r endowed. But t h i s c o m p l a i n t r e d u c e s to t h e c o m m o n p l a c e t h a t s o m e schemes are b e t t e r for s o m e g r o u p s a n d o t h e r s for o t h e r s . Relative t o S , S raises t h e p r o s p e c t s of t h e n o r m a l s w h i l e l o w e r i n g t h o s e of t h e exceptionals. But t h i s c o m p l a i n t p r e s u p p o s e s , a n d h e n c e c a n n o t s u p p o r t , a prefer­ e n c e of S over S , for it i s equally t r u e t h a t , relative t o S , S raises the p r o s p e c t s of t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s w h i l e l o w e r i n g t h o s e of t h e n o r m a l s . It is unlikely t h a t t h e r e is a feasible s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h n o g r o u p would lose relative t o any feasible alternative s c h e m e , a n d if t h e r e w e r e s u c h a s c h e m e (weakly P a r e t o - s u p e r i o r t o all alternatives) t h e n Rawls's criten o n w o u l d favor it i n a n y c a s e . s

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6. N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d D e s e r t 6 . 1 . Rawls c l a i m s t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice nullifies t h e acci­ d e n t s of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t e n d o w m e n t s are to be e q u a l i z e d o r t h a t a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e m u s t not offer g r e a t e r r e w a r d s to t h o s e b e t t e r e n d o w e d . T h e p o i n t is t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d have n o s p e c i a l c l a i m s u p o n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e criterion of social justice. T h i s p o i n t h a s t w o i m p o r t a n t corollaries: w h e n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m s of e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n are n e g o t i a t e d (for e x a m p l e , in t h e original p o s i t i o n ) , it is m o r a l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e for e n d o w m e n t s to be a factor in t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n ; a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w ­ m e n t s d o n o t reflect a n i n t r i n s i c m o r a l w o r t h that w o u l d set b o u n d s o n the t e r m s a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e m a y offer for t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise. T h i s s e c o n d corollary will b e c e n t r a l to t h e p r e s e n t section. Given t h e c o n s t r a i n t u p o n its c o n s t r u c t i o n , Rawls arrives at a crite­ rion of ( e c o n o m i c ) j u s t i c e t h a t d o e s n o t m e n t i o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . It ranks e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s solely w i t h regard to t h e i n c o m e distribu­ tion (specifically, t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e s ) t h e v t e n d to p r o d u c e . H o w the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d b e r e w a r d e d is a s e c o n d a r y i s s u e , t o b e s e t t l e d b y reference to this criterion (and e m p i r i ­ cal facts). E n d o w m e n t s p l a y n o role in specifying w h a t a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is s u p p o s e d t o achieve, t h o u g h t h e v d o of c o u r s e play a role in h o w it c a n b e s t a c h i e v e t h i s . T h u s , in t h e c o r r e c t r e a d i n g of t h e c o m m o n - a s s e t formulations, Rawls's p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b e s u c h that t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e y g e n e r a t e t e n d to m a x i m i z e , interschemically, the m i n i m u m s h a r e . T h i s p r e f e r e n c e leaves w i d e o p e n t h e kind a n d extent of i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e favored s c h e m e w o u l d allow. In particular, the r e w a r d s t h i s s c h e m e offers to p e r s o n s w i t h special gifts d e p e n d s o n h o w useful a n d h o w w i d e s p r e a d t h e s e are a n d also o n h o w t h e de­ v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of t h e s e gifts w o u l d b e affected by alternative r e w a r d s c h e d u l e s . By t h u s a d j u s t i n g t h e (choice of) e c o n o m i c s c h e m e 9

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to t h e distribution of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s l a n d of h u m a n dispositions), one regards a s a c o m m o n asset this distribution, n o t t h e particular e n d o w m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s o r w h a t flows from t h e i r e x e r c i s e within some e c o n o m i c s c h e m e . O n e might say that this fact of differential endow­ m e n t s is u s e d a s a m e a n s . Stated i n t h e abstract, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n 1 p r o p o s e h e r e m a y seem to have a n air of sophistry, so let m e offer a n i l l u s t r a t i o n of its significance. A travel c o m p a n y o p e r a t i n g w i t h r u n - d o w n a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , unsafe flights, h i d d e n charges, a n d t h e like m a y b e s a i d t o u s e t h e n e e d s and desires of its c u s t o m e r s as m e a n s for its o w n e n r i c h m e n t . T h i s u s e may well be, as Nozick a n d Sandel w o u l d insist, t a n t a m o u n t to u s i n g these c u s t o m e r s t h e m s e l v e s m e r e l y as m e a n s . By c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r a travel c o m p a n y that c h a r g e s different p r i c e s for i d e n t i c a l services provided at different times of t h e y e a r (off-peak, h i g h s e a s o n , etc.), s o a s to equalize d e m a n d . In this c a s e it is t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c u s t o m e r interests and desires, t h e fact t h a t c u s t o m e r s a r e different i n v a r i o u s relevant re­ spects, that is u s e d as a m e a n s . T h o u g h t h e e n d m o t i v a t i n g the policy m a y b e t h e s a m e i n b o t h c a s e s ( m a x i m i z a t i o n of profit, say), it seems clear that only t h e first policy c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e s a i d t o u s e customers as m e a n s . This distinction c o n c e r n i n g (the c h o i c e of) policies h a s an analogue, I believe, as regards (the c h o i c e of) social i n s t i t u t i o n s . Here Rawls s suggestion is a n a l o g o u s to t h e s e c o n d k i n d of policy. By adjust­ ing t h e t e r m s offered for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of e n d o w m e n t s , institutions m a k e this fact serve t h e Rawlsian i m p e r a t i v e of justice, that social inequalities m u s t b e t o t h e greatest benefit of t h o s e m o s t disad­ vantaged by t h e m . !S

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assets a s a collective r e s o u r c e " (ASU 228-9). Sandel, after q u o t i n g b o t h , p a r a p h r a s e s t h e m b y s a y i n g t h a t Rawls "regardls] p e o p l e ' s n a t u r a l assets as c o m m o n p r o p e r t y " (LLJ 7 8 ) . With this p o i n t c l e a r e d u p , a n u m b e r of further issues raised by Nozick a n d S a n d e l t u r n o u t t o b e irrelevant. T h u s Sandel, again d r a w ­ ing u p o n Nozick, s p e n d s a g o o d d e a l of effort (LLJ 96-103) o n t h e question w h e t h e r , if e n d o w m e n t s d o n o t b e l o n g to t h o s e w h o "have" them, it follows t h a t t h e y b e l o n g to society or h u m a n k i n d at large, or w h e t h e r t h e y m i g h t b e l o n g t o n o o n e at all? This q u e s t i o n r e a p p e a r s in his later d i s c u s s i o n of affirmative a c t i o n (LLJ 135-47), w h e r e h e writes: "The a r b i t r a r i n e s s of a n individual's a s s e t s a r g u e s only against t h e proposition t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l o w n s t h e m or h a s a privileged claim to their benefits, n o t in favor of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s o m e p a r t i c u l a r society o w n s t h e m o r h a s a privileged claim w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e m . And unless t h i s s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n c a n b e established, t h e r e w o u l d s e e m no g r o u n d s for favoring a utilitarian d i s p e n s a t i o n of s u c h a s s e t s a n d e n d o w m e n t s r a t h e r t h a n j u s t letting t h e m lie w h e r e t h e y fall" (LLJ 141). Rawls, far from s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s e c o n d , h a s n o r e a s o n to d e n y the first p r o p o s i t i o n . W i t h i n t h e o p t i o n s p a c e available in a just social system, p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e t h e right to d e v e l o p o r n o t to develop, to exercise or n o t t o exercise, t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s as t h e y w i s h a n d s h o u l d he entitled to t h e full benefits offered for t h e i r efforts in this regard. T h e question Rawls a n d R o n a l d Dworkin are raising is w h e t h e r having greater e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d entitle p e r s o n s to a n y t h i n g else, s u c h as a higher i n c o m e , p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t b y university a d m i s s i o n b o a r d s , a n d so forth. In S a n d e l ' s c a s e , t h e m i s r e a d i n g is all t h e m o r e p u z z l i n g in view of his exemplarily c l e a r g r a s p of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l issue. He writes: "In o r d e r for m e t o d e s e r v e t h e benefits a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m y ' s u p e r i o r intel12

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ligence, say, it is n e c e s s a r y b o t h t h a t I p o s s e s s m y intelligence (in some non-arbitrary s e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n ) , a n d t h a t I h a v e a right (in a strong, pre-institutional s e n s e of right) t h a t society v a l u e intelligence rather t h a n s o m e t h i n g else. But o n Rawls' a c c o u n t , n e i t h e r c o n d i t i o n holds (LLJ 77). Here Sandel u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t i n o r d e r t o d e n y t h e conjunc­ tion, o n e d o e s n o t need t o d e n y m o r e t h a n t h e s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n . How d o e s h e get t h e idea t h a t Rawls, w h o s e a i m i s t o a r g u e "from widely a c c e p t e d b u t w e a k p r e m i s e s " (TJ 18), unnecessarily invokes t h e shock­ ing c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y claim? O n e m i g h t b e t e m p t e d t o think that Sandel, so close a r e a d e r of Rawls, falls for Nozick's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n only b e c a u s e it fits s o wonderfully into his overall a t t a c k o n Rawls's (or "the liberal") c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n (to b e d i s c u s s e d i n §§8-9)6.2. While this m a y b e so, it w o u l d b e unfair t o c l a i m t h a t Sandel is taking a few s e n t e n c e s o u t of c o n t e x t a n d t h e n u s i n g t h e m to support a perverse c o n s t r u a l of Rawls's position. T h i s is c l o s e r t o w h a t Nozick does, brilliantly. Sandel m a n a g e s t o c o n n e c t t h e s e m i s r e a d i n g s in a systematic w a y a n d e n d s u p w i t h a r e a s o n a b l y c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t of large p o r t i o n s of Rawls's text, a s w e c a n s e e in a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e third quotation of m y o p e n i n g set (§5.1), t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t " n o o n e deserves his place in t h e distribution of native e n d o w m e n t s " (TJ 104), that such e n d o w m e n t s a r e "arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of v i e w " (TJ 312). To m a k e things m o r e vivid, let u s personify t h e d o u b t R a w l s is addressing in t h e s e p h r a s e s . S u p p o s e a n exceptionally gifted p e r s o n , Genius, has l o d g e d t h i s c o m p l a i n t against t h e difference p r i n c i p l e : "Perhaps it w o u l d b e nice, o t h e r t h i n g s equal, t o a r r a n g e a s c h e m e of economic institutions s o that t h e inequalities it p r o d u c e s t e n d t o o p t i m i z e the smallest representative s h a r e . But o t h e r t h i n g s a r e n o t e q u a l . I a m a lot m o r e t a l e n t e d t h a n most, a n d I d e s e r v e t h e s e t a l e n t s t o g e t h e r w i t h the greater i n c o m e t h a t flows from t h e m . It is n o t right t h a t t h e possibility of (mtraschemically) benefiting from o n e ' s e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d be in­ c o r p o r a t e d into t h e e c o n o m i c s c h e m e o n l y insofar a s s u c h incorpora­ (mterschemically) e n h a n c e s t h e s m a l l e s t s h a r e . " to c o p e w i t h this complaint, it w o u l d b e e n o u g h t o c h a l l e n g e Ge­ n i u s s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t s o m e t h i n g - n a t u r a l l y , a s it w e r e — " f l ° v * from h e r talents. Rawls m a k e s this r e s p o n s e , a s S a n d e l appreciates1 S m l G e n i u s ' s a r g u m e n t as well, 13

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(a) I h a v e e n d o w m e n t s . (b) O n e d e s e r v e s w h a t e v e r e n d o w m e n t s o n e h a s ; w h i c h i s t o s a v : it i s p r o p e r t h a t o n e h a v e t h e m , it w o u l d b e w r o n g for o n e t o b e d e p r i v e d o f them, a n d s o forth. (c) I d e s e r v e m y e n d o w m e n t s [ f r o m (a) a n d (b)J. (d) H e n c e , I d e s e r v e t h e g o o d s t h a t flow f r o m t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x ­ ercise of m y e n d o w m e n t s .

Sandel a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t Rawls d e n i e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n from (c) to (d), and that t h i s d e n i a l is e n o u g h t o t u r n a w a y t h e c o m p l a i n t . Still, Sandel finds h i m d i s p u t i n g (c) a s well, r e p e a t e d l y d e n y i n g t h a t " t h e p e r s o n with g r e a t e r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s d e s e r v e s t h o s e a s s e t s " (TJ 103). Be­ cause h e d e n i e s (c), Rawls is c o m m i t t e d to d e n y i n g e i t h e r (a) o r (b), because t h e s e t o g e t h e r i m p l y (c). But h o w c o u l d Rawls possibly d e n y either, if b o t h s e e m s o p l a u s i b l e ? T h e i n g e n i o u s a n s w e r Sandel at­ tributes to Rawls is t h a t (a) a n d (b) a r e b o t h true, b u t that t h e y d o not employ t h e s a m e s e n s e of "to h a v e " a n d therefore d o not i m p l y (c); "Rawls' a r g u m e n t from a r b i t r a r i n e s s u n d e r m i n e s d e s e r t not directly, by claiming I c a n n o t deserve w h a t is arbitrarily given, b u t indirectly, by showing that I c a n n o t possess w h a t is arbitrarily given, t h a t is, that T, qua subject of p o s s e s s i o n , c a n n o t p o s s e s s it in t h e u n d i s t a n c e d , con­ stitutive s e n s e n e c e s s a r y to p r o v i d e a d e s e r t b a s e " (LLJ 85). This a n s w e r powerfully s u p p o r t s S a n d e l ' s chief t h e s i s a b o u t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of the p e r s o n , c o n d e n s e d i n t o t h e refrain: "On Rawls' c o n c e p t i o n , t h e characteristics I p o s s e s s d o n o t attach to t h e self b u t are only related to the self, s t a n d i n g a l w a y s a t a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e . T h i s is w h a t m a k e s t h e m attributes r a t h e r t h a n c o n s t i t u e n t s of m y p e r s o n ; t h e y are mine r a t h e r than m e , t h i n g s I have r a t h e r t h a n a m " (LLJ 85). This i m p r e s s i v e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of d e s e r t goes w r o n g b y m i s c o n s t r u i n g t h e s e n s e in w h i c h Rawls is s p e a k i n g of d e s e r t . According t o Rawls, for o n e t o d e s e r v e s o m e t h i n g entails t h a t it is p r o p e r t h a t o n e h a v e it. But it m e a n s m o r e . Desert, for Rawls, is moral deservingness, a reflection of o n e ' s m o r a l w o r t h in virtue of w h i c h a l o n e one c a n Deserve a n y t h i n g . T h i s m a y n o t b e t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e of t h e term. Rawls s u g g e s t s a s m u c h w h e n h e occasionally s p e a k s m o r e fully of moral d e s e r t a n d , o n c e , w h e n h e h a s t h e b r o a d e r s e n s e in m i n d , talks of p e o p l e b e i n g " d e s e r v i n g i n t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e " (TJ 74). Still, t h e r e can be n o d o u b t t h a t t h e s t r o n g e r , n a r r o w e r n o t i o n is t h e o n e h e is u s i n g . It follows t h a t m a n y t h i n g s d e s e r v e d in t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e are not Deserved in R a w l s ' s . You m a y h a v e w o r k e d all y o u r life o n y o u r a u t o ­ b i o g r a p h y a n d t h u s d e s e r v e t h e National Book Award, b u t y o u w o u l d still n o t Deserve it i n Rawls's s e n s e , u n l e s s y o u r efforts s o m e h o w testi­ fied to y o u r s u p e r i o r moral w o r t h . 14

. "For e x a m p l e , Rawls writes, "there is a t e n d e n c y for c o m m o n s e n s e to s u p p o s e . t h a t "icome a n d w e a l t h , a n d t h e g o o d t h i n g s generally, s h o u l d b e distributed accordtng to moral desert. Justice is h a p p i n e s s a c c o r d i n g to virtue" (TJ 3101.

78

Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.3

6.3. With this n a r r o w e r s e n s e of Desert in m i n d , w e c a n also under­ s t a n d Rawls's claim t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is morally arbitrary. Rawls is n o t s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e is n o m o r a l reason to leave e n d o w m e n t s w h e r e w e find t h e m — o f c o u r s e t h e r e is—but that differences i n e n d o w m e n t s d o n o t , w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n of social justice, signify differences in m o r a l w o r t h . T h i s c l a i m d o e s n o t presup­ p o s e t h a t native e n d o w m e n t s a r e a m a t t e r of l u c k o r f o r t u n e . Even if p e o p l e h a d to have w o r k e d very h a r d t o b e b r i g h t o r a t h l e t i c , t h e s e traits w o u l d still b e arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h o s e w h o don t care to b e c o m e bright o r athletic t h r o u g h h a r d w o r k a r e n o t therefore to b e c o n s i d e r e d morally inferior (as far a s o u r s h a r e d p u b l i c concep­ tion of justice is c o n c e r n e d ) . So in Rawls's t e r m i n o l o g y t h e two locu­ tions express t h e s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n : s o m e t h i n g w e h a v e is morally arbi­ trary just in c a s e o u r having it is n o t D e s e r v e d . Given this distinction, t h e r e are t w o different w a y s in w h i c h a prac­ tice or a set of n a t u r a l rights a n d d u t i e s m a y specify s o m e t h i n g as a p e r s o n ' s d u e . If s o m e t h i n g is d u e y o u in t h e w i d e r s e n s e , t h e n you o u g h t to have it, it is right t h a t y o u h a v e it, a n d it w o u l d b e w r o n g for y o u to b e deprived of it. I h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s i n g t h i s s e n s e of " d u e " by s p e a k i n g — w i t h Nozick—of y o u r b e i n g entitled t o s o m e t h i n g . One might stretch this t e r m by i n c l u d i n g u n d e r t h e label of entitlements also u n d e s i r a b l e things t h a t are d u e y o u , s u c h a s a d e b i t o r a punish­ m e n t . In this s t r e t c h e d s e n s e , being e n t i t l e d to s o m e t h i n g d o e s not entail t h a t y o u have a choice w h e t h e r to receive it o r n o t . You m a y or m a y not have s u c h a choice. Something is d u e y o u in t h e n a r r o w s e n s e o n l y if y o u a r e e n t i t l e d to it in virtue o f y o u r m o r a l Deservingness, t h a t is, in v i r t u e of a m o r a l quality of yourself o r a m o r a l quality of s o m e t h i n g y o u h a v e d o n e . Y o u r d u e in this s e n s e p r e s u p p o s e s Desert (moral Deservingness) o n y o u r part. » w o u l d n o t b e u n n a t u r a l to s p e a k of d e s e r t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h most of y o u r e n t i t l e m e n t s (salary, a w a r d s , vacations) a n d in o t h e r c o n t e x t s as well (good luck, ill-behaved children, a n a c c i d e n t ) , b u t w e m u s t stick to the n a r r o w n o t i o n b e c a u s e it is t h e o n e Rawls is u s i n g . Keeping this n o t i o n of Desert in m i n d , let m e give a c o u n t e r s k e t c h of m e a r g u m e n t by Genius t h a t Rawls is e n t e r t a i n i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g to:

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the last s t e p of t h e r e a s o n i n g h a s b e c o m e m u c h m o r e plausible. If Genius is m o r a l l y m o r e w o r t h y t h a n o t h e r s less well e n d o w e d , t h e n one m a y b e t e m p t e d t o b e l i e v e — a s Rawls t h i n k s c o m m o n s e n s e is t e m p t e d (n. 1 4 ) — t h a t s h e s h o u l d h a v e a h i g h e r i n c o m e too. A n d t h u s my c o u n t e r s k e t c h m a k e s m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e w h y Rawls s h o u l d have s e e n t h e n e e d t o c o m p l e m e n t h i s d e n i a l of t h e last s t e p by denying its s t a r t i n g p o i n t a s well. Next, Rawls's d e n i a l of (C) is fully c o n s i s t e n t w i t h (a), (b), a n d (c), w i t h what, o n m y r e a d i n g , Rawls s i m p l y takes for g r a n t e d : p e r s o n s have t h e i r natural e n d o w m e n t s i n a thick, constitutive s e n s e a n d a r e fully entitled to (exercise c o n t r o l over) t h e m . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n that Genius's talents m u s t n o t b e d e s t r o y e d o r t a m p e r e d w i t h o r taxed a n d that s h e must n o t b e c o e r c e d to d e v e l o p or exercise t h e m . T h e denial of (C) gives n o s u p p o r t t o S a n d e l ' s v i e w t h a t Rawls thinks of e n d o w m e n t s as only t e n u o u s l y c o n n e c t e d t o t h e i r "repository'' or "guardian'' (LLJ 97), so that "it m a t t e r s little h o w s o m e c a m e to reside in y o u a n d o t h e r s in me" (LLJ 74). 1 5

Finally, t h e p r e m i s e Rawls c h a l l e n g e s is (B), claiming that it is n o moral d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e gifted, t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d are not for this reason m o r e w o r t h y , m o r a l l y : "Surely a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l w o r t h d o e s not vary a c c o r d i n g t o h o w m a n y offer similar skills, o r h a p p e n to w a n t w h a t he can p r o d u c e . N o o n e s u p p o s e s t h a t w h e n s o m e o n e ' s abilities are less in d e m a n d o r h a v e d e t e r i o r a t e d (as in t h e c a s e of singers) h i s m o r a l deservingness u n d e r g o e s a s i m i l a r shift" (TJ 311). It s e e m s q u i t e likely that Nozick a n d S a n d e l , h a d t h e y a p p r e c i a t e d h i s p o i n t , w o u l d have agreed w i t h Rawls. Nozick, at a n y rate, is c o n s t r a i n e d to agree, for u n d e r h i s o w n s c h e m e r e w a r d s a r e d e t e r m i n e d by existing m a r k e t d e m a n d , a n d s o G e n i u s w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o e a r n r e w a r d s for exercising her t a l e n t s if p e o p l e w e r e e i t h e r u n a b l e o r unwilling t o p a y h e r for s u c h exercise. So N o z i c k a n d Rawls a r e h e r e in full a g r e e m e n t . While G e n i u s has every right t o e a r n a n y s p e c i a l r e w a r d s for t h e exercise of h e r talents t h a t m a y b e offered u n d e r t h e p r e f e r r e d s c h e m e (and is surely fully e n t i t l e d t o w h a t e v e r r e w a r d s s h e m a y h a v e so earned), s h e h a s n o claim t h a t t h e r e b e a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s u c h r e w a r d s are offered, let alone r e w a r d s of a n y p a r t i c u l a r k i n d or m a g n i t u d e . Of c o u r s e , Rawls a n d Nozick d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s are just. T h e y merely agree t h a t t h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n is n o t c o n s t r a i n e d by claims of m o r a l w o r t h b a s e d o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . Sandel, o n t n e other h a n d , believes t h a t t h i s a n s w e r is c o n s t r a i n e d by s o m e claims or moral w o r t h a n d D e s e r t . I d i s c u s s his view in c a s e s w h e r e s u c h claims have a m o r e p l a u s i b l e b a s i s t h a n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s ($7.3), b u t nrsi, let u s b r i n g t h e w h o l e t o p i c of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s t o a c o n c l u s i o n . l 5

T n e is o n e p a s s a g e 1 m u s t d i s c o u n t a s a slip: "No o n e deserves 1 J ^ t e r r»tural < * P * % . . . . But it d o e f n o t follow that o n e s h o u l d eliminate t h e f f ' s t m c t w n s . Th ere >s another w a y to deal w i t h t h e m " (TJ 102). Nozick rightly a r e n ' t a n o t h e r w a y to d e a l w i t h t h e m ? Kawls h a s corrected the s h p in the u e r m translation (TG 122). r e

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6.4. Rawls h o l d s t h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s s h o u l d b e ranked on broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t g r o u n d s , specifically, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e worst social position e a c h t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . W h e t h e r a n d t o w h a t extent the favored e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d l e a d t o differentials i n income (etc.) b a s e d on differentials i n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is left open by Rawls, t o b e settled t h r o u g h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e i n light of empiri­ cal c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s a p p r o a c h i s s u b j e c t t o t w o m a i n s o r t s of attack on behalf of t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d : o n e i n s i s t s t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d pro­ cesses t h a t are t o r e g u l a t e e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s h o u l d b e c h o s e n in a w a y t h a t reflects t h e superior bargaining position of t h e better en­ d o w e d ; t h e o t h e r m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d , i n virtue of their g r e a t e r moral Deservingness, o u g h t t o r e c e i v e s p e c i a l r e w a r d s (of a certain relative o r a b s o l u t e m a g n i t u d e ) for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d ex­ ercise of their e n d o w m e n t s . T h e s e a t t a c k s m a y b e u s e d t o assert that t h e r e are morally obvious p r o c e s s e s ( w h i c h a r e t o b e c h o s e n regardless of t h e p a t t e r n t h e y w o u l d yield) o r t h a t t h e c h o s e n e c o n o m i c scheme or t h e distribution it w o u l d p r o d u c e m u s t satisfy c e r t a i n moral con­ straints. I have d i s c u s s e d h o w Rawls c a n b l o c k t h e s e a t t a c k s . H e c a n resist the assertion of morally obvious p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o c e s s e s a n d reject the claim t h a t p e r s o n s Deserve t h e i r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . N e i t h e r of these a e t e n s e s relies o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e self, let a l o n e on the a s s e r t i o n s Sandel a t t r i b u t e s t o R a w l s - t h a t " t h e v a r i o u s n a t u r a l assets ^ • T * b o m m a y b e said t o ' b e l o n g ' t o m e i n t h e weak, of n w r f I 8 6 " 5 6 a c c i d e n t a l l y w i t h i n m e , b u t t h i s sense rthtT^?h ° a n r i o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t I h a v e a n y special S £ ^ rT?ut0 ™y Privileged c l a i m t o t h e fruits of ™ ! ! ' , ' * n u a t e d s e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n , I a m n o t really the h e a S t S r ^ l ^ ° P°smory of t h e a s s o r t e d assets and a rfSZS^S ^ P bout R a w l s ' s treatment a £ T L ^ t h T T J ™ ° ' P ° l a m i n a t i o n , t o h a v e nothing 1

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then Nozick c o u l d b e p e r s u a d e d t o a c c e p t w h a t e v e r e c o n o m i c p r o c e s s does best b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . A m o n g p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e s t h a t do not m e n t i o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s Rawls's criterion m i g h t well w i n out almost b y default.

7. D e s e r t 7.1. G r o u n d r u l e s r e g u l a t e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s among i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s o n t h e basis of various p r e d i c a t e s that are t r u e of t h e m o r of t h e i r c o n d u c t . I will say that g r o u n d r u l e s are moralized insofar a s t h e p r e d i c a t e s t h e y invoke are p r e d i c a t e s of m o r a l evaluation. T h u s , w h e n g r o u n d r u l e s classify certain k i n d s of c o n d u c t as right o r w r o n g o r c e r t a i n k i n d s of p e r s o n s or a s s o c i a t i o n s as morally better o r w o r s e , t h e n a n y benefits or b u r d e n s a t t a c h e d to s u c h p r e d i ­ cates are (positive o r negative) s a n c t i o n s that, w h e n correctly applied, are Deserved b y t h e i r r e c i p i e n t s . Conversely, g r o u n d rules are unmoralized insofar a s t h e p r e d i c a t e s t h e y invoke are n o n m o r a l . Any benefits o r b u r d e n s a t t a c h e d t o s u c h predicates—(dis)incentives, for e x a m p l e — a r e v i e w e d a s m e r e l y d e s e r v e d , n o t Deserved. In s u c h c a s e s the moral quality of p e r s o n s o r t h e i r c o n d u c t is n o t at i s s u e . Let m e give a s i m p l e illustration of t h e distinction. Take, in o u r culture, a l a w t h a t i m p o s e s s o m e tax o n interest i n c o m e . This law is partly u n m o r a l i z e d . T h e r e is n o t h i n g morally u n w o r t h y a b o u t e a r n i n g interest, a n d s o t h e t a x is n o t a p u n i s h m e n t . In this t h e tax is akin to t h e interest itself, w h i c h also is m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved. Investing one's m o n e y for i n t e r e s t is n o b e t t e r o r w o r s e , morally, t h a n s p e n d i n g it or keeping it u n d e r o n e ' s pillow. Yet s u p p o s e t h e law m a k e s it a n offense to e v a d e t h e tax. It w o u l d t h e n , in this respect, b e m o r a l i z e d . It is w r o n g t o e a r n i n t e r e s t w i t h o u t p a y i n g t h e tax, a n d a n y fine for d o i n g so is a p u n i s h m e n t . This d i s t i n c t i o n m a k e s Rawls's task h a r d e r t h a n it m a y initially a p ­ pear. He is offering u s t h e original p o s i t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h a r g u m e n t s about h o w p a r t i e s s o s i t u a t e d w o u l d go a b o u t regulating h u m a n inter­ action. H e r e Rawls s e e k s t o s h o w t h a t t h e y w o u l d a d o p t a p a r t i c u l a r set of n a t u r a l rights a n d d u t i e s a n d a criterion of justice for t h e assess16

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" T h e d i s t i n c t i o n d r a w n h e r e is p u r e l v descriptive. So i leave o p e n what moral or nonmoral p r e d i c a t e s m a y b e i m p o r t a n t in or m a y b e incorporated into the g r o u n d m e s °f a given society. M o r e o v e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n is not entirely sharp. A parking ticket m a y (in our culture) b e a b o r d e r l i n e c a s e , in that it c a n b e v i e w e d as a Deserved p u m s h m e n for "aving d o n e s o m e t h i n g w r o n g or also a s a m e r e disincentive morally o n a par with a parkingfee. . . . "Rawls p r e s e n t s h i s a c c o u n t of natural d u t i e s in TJ § § 1 8 , J ' . " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ hold b e t w e e n p e r s o n s irrespective of their institutional relationships, (TJ U5l a n a "Klude the d u t i e s n o t t o b e cruel, not to harm or injure the innocent, h ° ^ ^ ' f l p t h o s e in n e e d , a n d to c o n t r i b u t e to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just m s t t t u t i o n , (TJ 1 0 a " 4 - 1 5 , 3 3 4 , 3 3 7 - 3 9 ) . It i s s o m e t i m e s overlooked that the a c c o u n t of natural d u t . e s a s ^ s o * o s e n through t h e original p o s i t i o n (TJ 1 1 6 , 3 3 4 , 3 3 8 t . T h u s , like the c n t e n o n of justice, .t 9

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m e n t of institutional g r o u n d rules. H e t h e n invites u s t o check these natural duties a n d basic s t r u c t u r e s t h a t m i g h t plausibly satisfy his criterion of justice u n d e r s t i p u l a t e d e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s against o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s . Is w h a t Rawlsian i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d specify as a p e r s o n ' s d u e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h w h a t w e intuitively believe o n e ought to have o r receive? Yet a n affirmative a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n is not e n o u g h , for n o t only m u s t a p e r s o n ' s d u e b y Rawls's lights m a t c h what w e intuitively think is d u e , b u t t h e t w o s e n s e s of due m u s t match as well. Even if w h a t p e r s o n s a r e e n t i t l e d to, p u r s u a n t t o Rawls's natural d u t i e s a n d u n d e r Rawlsian g r o u n d r u l e s , is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what we think p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e entitled t o , t h e r e m a y still b e disagreement a b o u t w h i c h of t h e s e e n t i t l e m e n t s s h o u l d involve D e s e r t . A n d even this is n o t all. We m u s t also b e satisfied t h a t Rawls is right a b o u t which Deserts a n d m e r e e n t i t l e m e n t s a r e n a t u r a l a n d w h i c h institutional, that is, w h i c h arise b e t w e e n p e r s o n s g e n e r a l l y (even in t h e absence of s h a r e d institutions) a n d w h i c h arise only a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s in an o n g o i n g practice o r institutional s c h e m e . T h e s e t w o crosscutting d i s t i n c t i o n s ( m o r a l i z e d / u n m o r a l i z e d and natural/institutional) yield four categories of e n t i t l e m e n t s , namely, benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t p e r s o n s (a) D e s e r v e a c c o r d i n g t o a natural taw (such a s a p u n i s h m e n t for cruelty); (b) Deserve u n d e r t h e terms of a n institutional s c h e m e (such a s a fine o r a jail s e n t e n c e ) ; (c) a r e entitled t o a c c o r d i n g t o a n a t u r a l l a w b u t d o n o t D e s e r v e ( m i n i m a l r e s p e c t and nonviolence, p e r h a p s ) ; o r (d) a r e e n t i t l e d t o u n d e r t h e t e r m s of an U tf ™ > (salaries, t a x e s , g o o d s and ; s 'a v ' c h Rawls refers t o a s legitimate expectations «.m*hi, k g a b o u t e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e first kind, pret Z Z « l f P s e d e d , o n c e r e a s o n a b l y j u s t institu° r i n " t h e s e c o n d k i n d . Still, h e c a n s a y that, civUTw JL 7 P u n i s h m e n t is m e t e d o u t i n a c c o r d a n c e with a uTJZ'Jtr* P d c a n always b e v i e w e d a s also the

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enables h i m to m a k e t h e effort t o cultivate his abilities . . . for h i s character d e p e n d s i n large p a r t u p o n f o r t u n a t e family a n d social cir­ c u m s t a n c e s for w h i c h h e c a n c l a i m n o c r e d i t " (TJ 104). T h e r e a s o n Rawls gives h e r e for t h e d e n i a l is n o t a g o o d o n e . It suggests that h e requires Desert itself t o b e D e s e r v e d "all t h e w a y d o w n " (cf. Nozick, ASU 225), with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e r e is n o Desert at all. Rawls c o u n t e r a c t s this impression b y i n s i s t i n g t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t s arising u n d e r t h e criminal law d o involve D e s e r t (TJ 3 1 4 - 1 5 ) . But t h e n Sandel c a n ask with s o m e plausibility h o w a c r i m i n a l c a n Deserve h e r inferior c h a r a c t e r if it d e p e n d s in large p a r t u p o n u n f o r t u n a t e family a n d social c i r c u m ­ stances (LLJ 9 1 - 9 2 ) . T h e r e a s o n Rawls gives w o u l d t h e n suggest t h a t the e c o n o m i c a n d p e n a l s y s t e m s are, pace Rawls, o p p o s i t e s of e a c h other—two u n m o r a l i z e d s y s t e m s of incentives a n d disincentives (re­ spectively), w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d t o s t e e r c o n d u c t in t h e interest of maximizing e c o n o m i c efficiency a n d t h e effectiveness of g r o u n d rules generally. Even if t h e r e a s o n Rawls gives is n o t a g o o d o n e , h i s c o n t e n t i o n itself seems p l a u s i b l e e n o u g h (at least if D e s e r t is u n d e r s t o o d in his n a r r o w sense). P e r s o n s w h o p u t s c a n t effort into t h e i r careers, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e they care little for m a t e r i a l w e a l t h or prefer to c o n c e n t r a t e their e n e r ­ gies u p o n o t h e r p r o j e c t s , a r e n o t for this r e a s o n morally less w o r t h y . Of course, h i g h e r i n c o m e s will g e n e r a l l y b e e a r n e d by t h o s e w h o m a k e special efforts to d e v e l o p a n d exercise abilities for w h i c h greater re­ wards are offered. B u t t h e s e h i g h e r i n c o m e s are m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved, b e c a u s e s u c h efforts at self-improvement are n o t c o n s i d e r e d (within o u r p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of justice) a form of moral excellence. That they a r e n o t is o n e r e a s o n p e r s o n s w h o m a k e special efforts to develop a n d e x e r c i s e u n r e w a r d e d abilities have n o valid g r o u n d s for complaint. T h a t s o m e h a v e t r a i n e d t h e m s e l v e s to juggle six balls or to recite the Iliad i m p l i e s n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r (moral) Deservingness. 7.3. But t h e o b j e c t i o n m a y b e r e n e w e d o n e last t i m e . Even if Rawls is "ght t h u s far, s u r e l y t h e r e a r e some forms of m o r a l excellence. Clearly, some p e r s o n s a r e m o r a l l y b e t t e r h u m a n b e i n g s t h a n o t h e r s , a n d m i g h t not these p e r s o n s r a i s e a valid c o m p l a i n t against a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e that is just b y Rawls's c r i t e r i o n , if t h e i r i n c o m e s u n d e r this s c h e m e d o not reflect t h e i r s u p e r i o r m o r a l c h a r a c t e r ? Let m e sketch s u c h a c o m ­ plaint. 18

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In this case, at last, Rawls's first line of d e f e n s e is s u r e l y overwhelmed, for h e c a n n o t d e n y (C*). T h a t (as Rawls insists) c r i m i n a l s Deserve pun­ i s h m e n t implies t h a t t h e y a r e m o r a l l y l e s s w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of their a c t i o n s (and i n t e n t i o n s ) . So surely it is p o s s i b l e t h a t C o u r t n e y is morally more w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of her a c t i o n s ( a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) , at least more w o r t h y t h a n t h e criminals. Rawls is right t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t "the c o n c e p t of m o r a l w o r t h does not provide a first p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . . . b e c a u s e it cannot b e i n t r o d u c e d u n t i l after t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e a n d of n a t u r a l duty a n d obligation" (TJ 312). N e v e r t h e l e s s , s u r e l y w e c o u l d settle on the n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d t h e civil a n d political a s p e c t s of a j u s t basic struc­ t u r e first, u s e t h e s e r e s u l t s t o define t h e i d e a of m o r a l l y ( m o r e or less) w o r t h y citizens a n d h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d t h e n c h o o s e a n economic s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h (insofar a s is feasible) i n c o m e reflects moral w o r t h . I n t h i s c a s e t h e e c o n o m i c a n d p e n a l s y s t e m s w o u l d o n c e again b e o p p o s i t e s of e a c h other, b u t t h e y w o u l d b o t h b e moralized, two s y s t e m s of (respectively) positive a n d n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n s that play a s e c o n d a r y role i n t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t of d u t i e s a n d g r o u n d rules inde­ p e n d e n t l y defined. In t h e face of t h i s c o m p l a i n t , Rawls is t h r o w n b a c k u p o n h i s second line of defense, w h i c h d e n i e s t h e s t e p s f r o m (C) t o (D), a n d from (CI to (D*): Even p e r s o n s w h o a r e g e n u i n e l y D e s e r v i n g o u g h t n o t therefore to b e entitled t o larger s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . A b a s i c structure u n d e r w h i c h s o m e g o o d o r b a d d e e d s g o u n r e q u i t e d i s n o t unjust for this reason. T h o u g h Rawls is clearly c o m m i t t e d t o t h i s view, h e does not seek t o s u p p o r t its intuitive plausibility. B u t I t h i n k it w o u l d not be too h a r d t o d o s o . It m a y b e e n o u g h t o i m a g i n e a s o c i a l s y s t e m i n which cash p r i z e s a r e p a i d t o t h o s e w h o d o n o t b r e a k a n y l a w s for five years or in w h i c h all m o r a l w r o n g s (lies, for e x a m p l e ) i n c u r fines, t o s e e t h a t this is n o t w h a t w e w o u l d t h i n k justice r e q u i r e s . 7.4. This s e c o n d line of d e f e n s e also s h i e l d s R a w l s ' s belief t h a t the distribution of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d , b y a n d large, by u n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d r u l e s . Again w e m u s t rely o n c o n j e c t u r e a s to how h e w o u l d s u p p o r t this belief. T h e n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d t h e civil and political g r o u n d rules of a just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i m p o s e s i m p l e , "binary c o n s t r a i n t s o n t ph ei nr s o n s ' c o n d u c t . No m o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e m a d e (by of p e r m i s s i b l e c o n d u c t . Participants s o l e nn ° m o r a l e x c e l l e n c e a s m e a s u r e d on sne^Zt " . y ^ j o i n e d t o refrain f r o m certain Ses t « „!T?- n ^ P g w i t h t h e s e n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d social pracude , ° 1 * t i c feats of m o r a l fortipmsible ^ s i g n e d t h a t c o m p l i a n c e is quite

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fr° "y y p ' °n for i n s t i t u t i o n i z i n g any ™ g n t even subvert t h e stand­ ing of the rules by drverting a t t e n t i o n a w a y from t h e m o r a l r e a s o n s for h

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honoring t h e m , m i g h t i m p e d e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a s e n s e of justice. Punishments will of c o u r s e b e n e e d e d , a n d s o m e of t h e s e m a y take t h e form of fines. Still, t h e s e will b e rare, a n d organizing t h e entire e c o ­ nomic r e w a r d s y s t e m a r o u n d t h e m w o u l d entail that m o s t p e r s o n s would receive ( a n d Deserve) t h e e q u a l m a x i m u m i n c o m e of a lawabiding citizen. Against s u c h a s c h e m e Rawls c a n plausibly ask: W h y not " u n m o r a l i z e " e c o n o m i c benefits s o a s t o allow i n c o m e differentials (among l a w - a b i d i n g citizens) insofar a s t h e s e benefit everyone? T h u s collective rationality m a k e s it p l a u s i b l e to prefer a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e under w h i c h i n c o m e is g e n e r a l l y c o n c e i v e d as m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved. Nozick w o u l d w h o l e h e a r t e d l y agree w i t h t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . E c o n o m i c sanctions a t t a c h e d t o (moralized) g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d n o t play a c e n ­ tral role in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h . 7.5. O n e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r S a n d e l w o u l d agree, b e c a u s e h e h a s n o t yet p r e s e n t e d h i s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of justice. Still, let m e briefly trace where his c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls g o w r o n g . As w e have s e e n , Sandel fails t o appreciate t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n Desert a n d desert, t h e stronger a n d weaker n o t i o n s . T h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g l e a d s h i m t o c o n s t r u e Rawls's distinction b e t w e e n D e s e r t a n d legitimate e x p e c t a t i o n s a s o n e b e t w e e n preinstitutional a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l e n t i t l e m e n t s . But even correcting for such terminological differences, S a n d e l is w r o n g to claim that Rawls makes "a d r a m a t i c d e p a r t u r e from t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s " in p r e s e n t ­ ing "a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e . . . r u l i n g o u t d e s e r t altogether" (LLJ 8 6 ) . " T h e Principles of j u s t i c e d o n o t m e n t i o n m o r a l desert, b e c a u s e , strictly speaking, n o o n e c a n b e s a i d t o d e s e r v e a n y t h i n g o n Rawls' view, people have no intrinsic worth, n o w o r t h t h a t is intrinsic in t h e s e n s e fhat it is t h e i r s p r i o r t o o r i n d e p e n d e n t of o r apart from w h a t just institutions a t t r i b u t e t o t h e m " (LLJ 8 8 ) . This d i a g n o s i s is false b e c a u s e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice i n c o r p o ­ rates a n o t i o n of D e s e r t c o n n e c t e d t o t h e m o r a l i z e d p a r t of a just basic structure (the g r o u n d r u l e s insofar a s t h e y a d m i t of violation). So t h e r e is an institutional n o t i o n of D e s e r t t h a t c o n t r a s t s w i t h t h e (institutional) notion of l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e r e is a p r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l notion of Desert as well. Violations of n a t u r a l d u t i e s — c r u e l t y o r injury of a n "mocent, for e x a m p l e — d o d e t r a c t from a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l w o r t h o r Deservingness ( a n d will e x p o s e t h a t p e r s o n t o p u n i s h m e n t within, a n d a y b e also a p a r t from, a n y i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ) . Perhaps S a n d e l w o u l d t h i n k t h i s t o o t h i n a n o t i o n of preinstitutional Desert. He a p p e a l s t o t h e classical i d e a of t h e virtues, defining various 'Perhaps c o r r e l a t e d ) d i m e n s i o n s of m o r a l excellence. M a y b e his idea is that p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i r scores i n t h e s e dimensions o r i n overall m o r a l excellence, b u t h o w is this idea t o b e 19

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" C o m p e n s a t i o n for "bonder c r o s s i n g s " is o w e d u n d e r unmoralized g r o u n d rules. It is not wrong to c r o s s a n d p a y . S e e C h a p . 1, n. 6; a n d Nozick, ASU, chap. 4.

86

T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.1

i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social s y s t e m ? Would Sandel prefer a society in w h i c h , say, t h e right t o r u l e is r e s e r v e d for the most virtuous? This sort of traditional c o n c e p t i o n r a i s e s familiar problems, s u c h as h o w w e r e a c h a g r e e m e n t o n a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e virtues and o n p r o c e d u r e s for selecting t h o s e w h o excel in t h e m . I c o n c l u d e t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n c a n a n d d o e s incorporate the distinctions b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d b e t w e e n moralized a n d u n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d r u l e s . H e n c e h e h a s b o t h a preinstitutional a n d a n institutional n o t i o n of D e s e r t — w h i c h n o t i o n s , moreover, are even s t r o n g e r t h a n Sandel's (and t h u s m o r e s p a r i n g l y invoked). Sandel is t h e n m i s t a k e n in claiming t h a t Rawls d i s p e n s e s w i t h Desert, and so t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to s a d d l e Rawls w i t h t h e r e a s o n S a n d e l predictably provides for this s u p p o s e d d e n i a l : "No o n e c a n b e s a i d to deserve a n y t h i n g (in t h e strong, p r e - i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e ) , b e c a u s e n o one can be said to p o s s e s s a n y t h i n g (in t h e s t r o n g , c o n s t i t u t i v e s e n s e ) " (LLJ 92f).K is n o t t r u e t h a t Rawls is p r e s e n t i n g "a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e w i t h o u t desert a n d a n o t i o n of t h e self as essentially d i s p o s s e s s e d , o r b a r r e n of constit­ u e n t traits" (LLJ 92). Let u s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n v e s t i g a t e t h e s e c o n d con­ junct of this claim as well. 2 0

8. T h e " D e o n t o l o g i c a l "

Self

8 . 1 . So far I h a v e s h o w n h o w , o n c e h i s N o z i c k i a n misre^lmg^ " c o m m o n asset," " m o r a l arbitrariness," a n d " d e s e r t are i ' large p a r t s of Sandel's attack dissolve. T h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s o i ^ ^ a r g u m e n t are q u i t e m a i n s t r e a m a n d h a r d l y w a r r a n t t h e ^ P , nt hostility t h e y h a v e evoked. P e r s o n s s h o u l d c o n t r o l t h e ^ p e a n d exercise of t h e i r o w n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s w i t h i n t h e o p ^ ial available i n a j u s t social system. T h e a s s e s s m e n t a n d d e s i g n j i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d n o t b e influenced b y t h e i d e a of bargamin& o n k n o w l e d g e of differential e n d o w m e n t s o r b y t h e i d e a t h a t t ° ^ j ] y have o r develop o r exercise g r e a t e r e n d o w m e n t s a r e t h e r e f o r e ,^ m o r e w o r t h y . Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n ^ ^ c o m e a n d w e a l t h s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d a s u n m o r a l i z e d , t h a t is, ^ j n o t b e d e s i g n e d t o achieve a c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n R a W

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worth. Since n e i t h e r t h e s e c o m m o n p l a c e views n o r a n y c o n c l u s i o n s anyone h a s n o n f a l l a c i o u s l y d r a w n from t h e m have even mildly exciting implications for o u r s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n a s p e r s o n s , Sandel's m o s t i m p o r ­ tant s o u r c e of e v i d e n c e for a t t r i b u t i n g t o Rawls a p a r t i c u l a r n o t i o n of the self is entirely u n p r o d u c t i v e . Still, Rawls is offering a n explicit c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , a n d w e should therefore s e e w h e t h e r S a n d e l a c c e p t s Rawls's s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing on this p o i n t o r p r e s e n t s p l a u s i b l e r e a s o n s t o d e p a r t from it. This undertaking p r e s e n t s a n e w task, n a m e l y , t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e idea of a "deontological" self, w h i c h S a n d e l c l a i m s t o h a v e discovered in Rawls's conception of j u s t i c e . 8.2. Sandel d e s c r i b e s h o w h e h a s d i s c o v e r e d t h i s i d e a a s follows: "The original p o s i t i o n is t h e f u l c r u m of t h e justificatory p r o c e s s in that it is t h e device t h r o u g h w h i c h all justification m u s t p a s s . . . . [W]hat issues at o n e e n d i n a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t issue at t h e o t h e r in a theory of t h e p e r s o n , o r m o r e p r e c i s e l y , a t h e o r y of t h e m o r a l subject. Looking from o n e d i r e c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e l e n s of t h e original position w e see t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of justice; looking from t h e o t h e r direction w e see a reflection of o u r s e l v e s " (LLJ 4 7 - 4 8 ) . Sandel's central discovery is that for Rawls t h e self, o r subject, is p r i o r t o its e n d s . Sandel links this priority w i t h five f u r t h e r p r i o r i t i e s : of t h e right over t h e good, of justice over o t h e r v a l u e s , of t h e c o n t r a c t over t h e p r i n c i p l e s it g e n e r a t e s , of plurality over u n i t y , a n d of p r i n c i p l e s of justice over t h e choice of conceptions of t h e g o o d . Sandel's g e n e r a l i d e a is t h a t "deontological" liberals, b y asserting certain m o r a l p r i o r i t i e s , m u s t p r e s u p p o s e c e r t a i n other, n o n m o r a l pri­ orities that h e w i s h e s t o e x p o s e a s e m b a r r a s s i n g . To his credit, Sandel is clear t h r o u g h o u t t h a t Rawls d o e s n o t himself assert t h e n o n m o r a l priorities S a n d e l a s c r i b e s t o h i m . T h u s h e r e c o g n i z e s , for example, t h a t Rawls's p h r a s e " t h e self is p r i o r t o t h e e n d s w h i c h are affirmed by it" (TJ 560) asserts a m o r a l p r i o r i t y ( p e r s o n s a r e t o c o n s t r a i n t h e i r p u r s u i t of ends by p r i n c i p l e s of r i g h t a n d justice) a n d t h a t h e , Sandel, m u s t show that Rawls implicitly p r e s u p p o s e s a n o n m o r a l priority of t h e self over "s ends (LLI19-20). Much less clear, h o w e v e r , a r e S a n d e l ' s a t t e m p t s t o d e m o n s t r a t e Rawls's s u p p o s e d i m p l i c i t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . O n e p r o b l e m is t h a t h e never states w i t h a n y p r e c i s i o n w h a t h e m e a n s w h e n h e speaks of priority in a n o n m o r a l s e n s e . H e r e t h e adjectives h e e m p l o y s t o refer t o the d e e p e r a n d r e v e a l i n g n o n m o r a l priorities h e claims t o have dis­ covered in Rawls a r e of little h e l p . S a n d e l a l t e r n a t e s b e t w e e n foundaJonal," " m e t a e t h i c a l , " a n d " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , " of w h i c h t h e latter is b y wr t h e m o s t f r e q u e n t , for e x a m p l e : " T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e s e l f . . . is 2 1

2,

f t remains u n c l e a r w h y a n d h o w , a c c o r d i n g to Sandel, t h e s e ^ " ^ T s s e X T ^ ° 'hey resemble o r s u g g e s t o r i m p l y e a c h other? Sandel's standard % ? * * « ™ ™ connection is in v a g u e sentences of t h e form "As X is prior to Y. s o V * p n o r t o W T h e k t h e r priorities are s o l i k e n e d t o t h e first at L U 7, 2 0 , 1 2 0 , 1 3 3 , 1 5 7 , respectively. D

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T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.2

above all a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c l a i m " (LLJ 182, cf. 12, 20) a n d "this is the epistemological priority t h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l e t h i c s c a r r i e s over into a m o r a l priority" (LLJ 156) a n d s o o n . Often, n o n m o r a l p r i o r i t y is e x p l a i n e d a s s o m e k i n d of independence: X is p r i o r t o Y if X (or t h e n o t i o n of X) is i n d e p e n d e n t of, o r derived i n d e p e n d e n t l y from, Y (the n o t i o n of Y). As I u n d e r s t a n d Sandel, such i n d e p e n d e n c e o b t a i n s if n o c h a n g e in ( t h e n o t i o n of) Y m a k e s a differ­ e n c e t o ( t h e n o t i o n of) X, if t h e l a t t e r c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t any u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e former. Using t h e w o r d " p r i o r i t y " i n this way is p u z z l i n g b e c a u s e S a n d e l is n o t c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e be unilateral ( a n d w e r e it m u t u a l , X a n d Y w o u l d b e p r i o r t o e a c h other, an o d d possibility). T h u s h e a s s e r t s t h a t for Rawls j u s t i c e is "prior in the s e n s e of i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e r i v e d " (LLJ 16). B u t o n e w o u l d t h i n k that the priority of justice over o t h e r v a l u e s ( b e n e v o l e n c e etc.) r e q u i r e s n o t only that it s h o u l d b e i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e m b u t a l s o t h a t they s h o u l d not be i n d e p e n d e n t of it. Sandel d o e s n o t w o r r y w h e t h e r t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e is mutual. 2 2

2 3

But even t h i s s t r a n g e n o t i o n of priority a s i n d e p e n d e n c e m i g h t work t o Sandel's a d v a n t a g e . A m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n d e r i v i n g t h e right indepen­ dently of t h e g o o d m u s t specify it, h e a s s u m e s , w i t h o u t a p p e a l to what w e k n o w a b o u t h u m a n n e e d s a n d e n d s — o n t h e b a s i s of t h e bare n o t i o n o f a self ( p e r h a p s c h a r a c t e r i z e d solely b y r a t i o n a l i t y a n d agency) It s u c h a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n also r e q u i r e s a c t o r s t o give p r i m a c y to c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e right (including just g r o u n d rules), t h e n , Sandel r e a s o n s , it is at least implicitly c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r e e m i n e n c e of this bare n o t i o n of t h e self. This t h o u g h t e s t a b l i s h e s t h e s o u g h t connection o e t w e e n a deontological m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n a n d a " d e o n t o l o g i c a l " self ' d e s : "If t h e c l a i m for t h e p r i m a c y of j u s t i c e is to H

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whether s u c h a " p r i m a c y of t h e s u b j e c t " w o u l d b e an e m b a r r a s s m e n t . Sandel is c e r t a i n l y w r o n g to c l a i m (LLJ 18) t h a t " t h e right is derived independently from t h e g o o d " by Rawls, w h o explicitly asserts t h e opposite: "It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l theories a r e defined as non-teleological o n e s , n o t a s views t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e r i g h t n e s s of institutions a n d a c t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y from t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . All ethi­ cal doctrines w o r t h o u r a t t e n t i o n t a k e c o n s e q u e n c e s i n t o a c c o u n t in judging r i g h t n e s s . O n e w h i c h d i d n o t w o u l d simply b e irrational, crazy" (TJ 30). So R a w l s e n d o r s e s n o i n d e p e n d e n c e of justice o r t h e right from t h e g o o d . His c r i t e r i o n of justice i n c o r p o r a t e s a n a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a t reflects a n o t i o n of t h e m o r a l subject as a being with c e r t a i n n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s (cf. WOS 15). We m u s t c o n c l u d e , then, that S a n d e l fails i n h i s first a t t e m p t t o s a d d l e Rawls with a conception of t h e self a s b a r r e n a n d d i s e n c u m b e r e d . 8.3. In a f u r t h e r a t t e m p t t o reveal Rawls's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e priority of the self, S a n d e l a t t r i b u t e s t o Rawls t h e view "that I c a n never fully b e constituted b y m y a t t r i b u t e s , t h a t t h e r e m u s t always b e s o m e attributes I have r a t h e r t h a n a m . O t h e r w i s e , just any c h a n g e in m y situation, however slight, w o u l d c h a n g e t h e p e r s o n l a m " (LLJ 20). Sandel freely admits that "this a c c o u n t is n o t offered b y Rawls himself . . (but] a reasonable r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e p e r p l e x i t i e s h e seeks to a d d r e s s " (LLJ 20). We a r e n o t t o l d w h e r e Rawls a d d r e s s e s s u c h perplexities, b u t t h e view a t t r i b u t e d t o h i m is s o far h a r m l e s s e n o u g h . Later Sandel s t r e n g t h e n s h i s c l a i m (LLJ 54-59): Rawls is really c o m ­ mitted to t h e view t h a t all of a p e r s o n ' s a t t r i b u t e s s t a n d o u t s i d e t h e self. As evidence, h e cites t w o p a s s a g e s from s e c t i o n 22 of A Theory of Justice, w h e r e Rawls s a v s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original position are to "try to a d v a n c e t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d as best t h e y c a n " (TJ 128). This does n o t m e a n , R a w l s a d d s , t h a t e a c h p e r s o n ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e good is a s s u m e d to b e egoistic. T h e ( u n k n o w n ) i n t e r e s t s t h e parties a r e to p r o m o t e " a r e n o t a s s u m e d to b e i n t e r e s t s in t h e self," t h o u g h they ^ "as t h e y m u s t a l w a y s b e , i n t e r e s t s of a s e l f (TJ 127, 129). Here, Sandel exclaims, " w e find t h e key t o Rawls' c o n c e p t i o n of t h e subject, • t h e n o t i o n of t h e self a s a s u b j e c t of p o s s e s s i o n To say t h a t I Possess a c e r t a i n trait o r d e s i r e o r a m b i t i o n is to say t h a t . . I a m distanced from it in a c e r t a i n w a y — t h a t it is mine r a t h e r t h a n m e (LLJ >- But in t h e p a s s a g e s S a n d e l q u o t e s ( a n d elsewhere) Rawls says nothing at all a b o u t p o s s e s s i o n , let a l o n e a b o u t p o s s e s s i o n m t h e attenuated" a s o p p o s e d t o t h e " u n d i s t a n c e d , constitutive s e n s e I U J 82-85). He m e r e l y s a y s t h a t i n t e r e s t s a r e always t h e interests oj a sett. Whereas p o s s e s s i o n m a y s o m e t i m e s f u n c t i o n as "a d i s t a n c i n g n o t i o n
^ d e n i e d , h o w e v e r , Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e •epistemological" priority, t h e other half * Sandel's reading of Kant. Rawls m a y w e l l b e mistaken o n thtf poutt, but Sandel n h i n g at all t o s h o w that h e i s n

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T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.4

t h e possibility t h a t s o m e of t h e s e m i g h t b e w h a t S a n d e l calls constitu­ tive i n t e r e s t s . 8.4. Sandel d r a w s f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s . S i n c e for R a w l s " t h e identity of t h e agent is b a r r e n of c o n s t i t u e n t traits s o t h a t n o a i m o r desire can b e essential to it" (LLJ 164), a Rawlsian self is i n c a p a b l e of genuine choice a n d c a n only w e i g h d e s i r e s a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r in t h e way of a h e d o n i s t : "The g o o d is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e satisfac­ tion of arbitrarily-given p r e f e r e n c e s , r e g a r d l e s s of w o r t h " (LLJ 168). Readers m i g h t think, S a n d e l foresees, " t h a t Rawls c o u l d e s c a p e this a p p a r e n t collapse of t h i s a c c o u n t of a g e n c y " (LLJ 163) b y suggesting that p e r s o n s m i g h t have s e c o n d - o r d e r d e s i r e s . T h i s is i n d e e d possible, in t h e s e n s e that s o m e of t h e a g e n t ' s d e s i r e s m a y b e d e s i r e s about desires. But s i n c e all d e s i r e s a r e equally o u t s i d e t h e self, second-order desires w o u l d b e n o m o r e essentially c o n n e c t e d t o t h e self t h a n firsto r d e r d e s i r e s are. H e n c e t h e y c o u l d n o t b e a u t h o r i t a t i v e b u t would simply b e w e i g h e d in "a slightly m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d e s t i m a t e of the relative i n t e n s i t y of p r e - e x i s t i n g d e s i r e s , first- a n d s e c o n d - o r d e r desires i n c l u d e d " (LLJ 164). It is only o n t h e s e c o n d to last p a g e of his b o o k t h a t S a n d e l informs us of w h a t s h o u l d h a v e dissolved all t h i s u n r e a l s p e c u l a t i o n ; h e quotes Rawls's " c o n c e s s i o n " t h a t "citizens in t h e i r p e r s o n a l affairs, o r within t h e internal life of a s s o c i a t i o n s , . . . m a y have a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves that t h e y believe t h e y w o u l d not, o r c o u l d not, s t a n d a p a r t from; a n d they might r e g a r d it a s u n t h i n k a b l e for t h e m t o v i e w t h e m s e l v e s without f v ™ ^^ous and philosophical convictions a n d commitments" IKCMT 5 4 5 ) U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Rawls's explicit s t a t e m e n t s t o t h i s effect w e r e n o t n o t i c e d in t i m e t o mitigate t h e p o w e r f u l i m p r e s s i o n evoked in Sandel by h i s r e a d i n g of " o f a n d t h u s to b l o c k h i s e l a b o r a t e tale of the e m p t y self a n d t h e " i m p o v e r i s h e d t h e o r y of t h e g o o d " (LLJ 165). in restricting his r e m a r k s to "citizens in t h e i r p e r s o n a l affairs, or 25

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within t h e i n t e r n a l life of a s s o c i a t i o n s " (KCMT 545), Rawls c r e a t e s t h e impression t h a t S a n d e l is right at least in t h e very limited s e n s e t h a t in "public life . . . n o loyalty o r allegiance c o u l d b e similarly essential to o u r sense of w h o w e a r e . . . , n o d e v o t i o n t o city o r n a t i o n , to p a r t y o r c a u s e , could possibly r u n d e e p e n o u g h t o b e defining" (LLJ 182, cf. 179). Yet consider h o w Rawls c o n t i n u e s after t h e q u o t e d s e n t e n c e a b o u t o u r nonpublic a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves: "But n o n e of this n e e d affect t h e conception of t h e p e r s o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h society's p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of justice a n d its i d e a l of social c o o p e r a t i o n " (KCMT 545). This is a statement a b o u t h o w citizens a r e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a n d t r e a t e d in politi­ cal contexts, from t h e p o i n t of view, a s it w e r e , of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of a well-ordered society. S u c h a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s t a n d s a p a r t from all m o r e particular political c o m m i t m e n t s a n d also views citizens as d e t a c h e d from w h a t e v e r s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s t h e y m a y have. T h u s a p e r s o n ' s deepest loyalties, c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s d o n o t affect his status as p a r t i c i p a n t in t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e — h i s basic rights a n d duties a n d s o f o r t h . A n d t h i s s t a t e m e n t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h citizens' having d e e p s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d c o n v i c t i o n s even of a political son. Citizens m a y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as political feminists o r m a y have strong c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o m m o n g o o d . To be sure, all s u c h constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s a r e s u b j e c t to a categorical s e n s e of justice (to be d i s c u s s e d in §9), a n d s o m e political a n d nonpolitical convictions will be e x c l u d e d b y R a w l s ' s c o n c e p t i o n of justice fully spelled out. But many of t h e political c o n v i c t i o n s m o s t d e e p l y h e l d t o d a y c a n b e equally deeply h e l d in a w e l l - o r d e r e d R a w l s i a n society. T h e s t a n d a r d issues concerning t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ; b u d g e t allocations to education, h e a l t h c a r e , s c i e n c e , a n d t h e arts; t h e school c u r r i c u l u m ; special taxes o n t o b a c c o o r g a s o l i n e ; s p e e d limits; etc. are h a r d l y fully settled by Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e s e m u s t b e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h the political p r o c e s s a s m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . Given their categorical s e n s e of j u s t i c e , p e r s o n s will have a sufficient m o r a l motive to comply w i t h e v e n t h o s e o u t c o m e s of this p r o c e s s t h a t go against their deeply h e l d c o n v i c t i o n s . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that t h e y have n o such convictions, t h a t t h e y w o n ' t d e e p l y identify w i t h s o m e political cause a n d c o n t i n u e t h e a t t e m p t to c o n v i n c e o t h e r s of its m e r i t s . 8-5. Two f u r t h e r a s p e c t s of S a n d e l ' s r e a d i n g m a y b e w o r t h examin27

28

f"'When citizens convert from o n e religion t o another, or n o longer affirm an^estab£ h e d religious faith, t h e y d o n o t c e a s e to be, for q u e s t i o n s of political ,ustice, the s a m e Persons they w e r e before T h e r e is n o l o s s of w h a t w e m a y call their public ' d e n h ^ t h e i r fi? \ S^evai, t h e y still have t h e same bas.c. rights and * J * t h e y o w n t h e s a m e p r o p e r t y a n d c a n m a k e the s a m e claims as before ^ P M f 4 1 K ^ of course, w a s w r i t t e n after, a n d partly in r e s p o n s e to, Sandel, but it .s anticipated at «3 and also, I believe, fully c o n s i s t e n t w i t h KCMT. nmredural a

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92 The "Deontological" Self, 8.5 ing. Sandel believes Rawls begs the question against communitarianism by describing the parties in the original position as mutually disinterested, that is, as seeking to promote their own client's (un­ known) conception of the good regardless of how this affects the lives of others. As Sandel understands (LLJ 42), the assumption of mutual disinterest does not mean that persons in real life are mutually disin­ terested. Rawls merely wants the basic structure of society to be ar­ ranged in accordance with a criterion that can be justified on the basis of undemanding, commonly shared assumptions. In reference to this ambition, Sandel correctly points to the relativity involved in calling such assumptions weak (LU 45-46). The assumption of mutual disin­ terest indeed demands little of those who see the primary function of social institutions as providing a framework within which people can choose and lead their own lives, safely, effectively, and with a minimum of restrictions and interferences. But it demands a great deal of those who, like Sandel, want the entire social system, not merely associations, to be a community in a strong sense. Such a community presupposes a set of defining values and loyalties that is "constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and embodied in their institu­ tional arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the partici­ pants plans of life" (LLJ 173). So why shouldn't the parties be informed mat their clients have an overriding desire to live in this sort of a comprehensive community? But this suggestion is still incomplete. Somehow the parties must be given or be enabled to derive the content of those "shared self-under­ standings that are to play a constitutive role both in shaping the community s institutions and in the identities of its members. Once AT! P into the original position, however, it is Tr^I. ?Tthan " y ^ would be pulled into the Zn^lT P by it to support institutional change ar^^rnt i ° t K that would best embody e C S fact f h ^ «™ constitutive. It is this S r r l p . ? chance that we might b a r i c .nshmt good and to arrange our m aTtem2HS a t ™»h it-that makes the Sandelian dSS^^ST'l " g - ^wls's vision of a vweU-or18 m c o r

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rejected by S a n d e l (LLJ 1 1 - 1 2 ) , b u t l a t e r r e s u r r e c t e d in a different guise (LLJ 4 4 - 4 6 ) — t h a t t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d b e e n d o w e d with b e n e v o l e n c e o r love of h u m a n k i n d , t h a t is, t h e d e s i r e t h a t o t h e r s s h o u l d b e successful in the p r o m o t i o n of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a s well. As Sandel notes only m u c h l a t e r (LLJ 171), Rawls h a s a n o t h e r plausible reply t o this suggestion a s well, n a m e l y , t h a t it w o u l d m a k e n o difference. T h e veil of i g n o r a n c e a l r e a d y e n s u r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c a n n o t safeguard a n d promote t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r o w n c l i e n t s w i t h o u t p r o m o t i n g t h o s e of all others as well. All p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e virtually r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e delib­ erations of every c o n t r a c t o r . 8.6. This r e s p o n s e S a n d e l a g a i n finds revealing: "Even in t h e face of so noble a virtue a s t h e love of m a n k i n d , t h e p r i m a c y of justice prevails, although t h e love t h a t r e m a i n s is of a n o d d l y judicial spirit" (LLJ 171). This remark i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a n o t h e r pervasive s t r a n d of Sandel's reaction to Rawls's w o r k , t h e c o m p l a i n t t h a t justice is a r e m e d i a l virtue, a virtue "not a b s o l u t e l y , a s t r u t h is t o t h e o r i e s , b u t only conditionally, a s physical c o u r a g e is t o a w a r z o n e " (LLJ 31, cf. 168-72), a n d w o u l d it not be nice to d o w i t h o u t c o u r a g e a n d e n j o y p e a c e a n d tranquility instead. This t h e m e is p l a y e d r e p e a t e d l y . T h e r e is t h e h e a r t r e n d i n g story a b o u t an ideal family s i t u a t i o n g o v e r n e d b y s p o n t a n e o u s affection, w h i c h deteriorates t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e " p a r e n t s a n d c h i l d r e n . . . dutifully it sullenly a b i d e b y t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s " (LLJ 33). Similarly d i s t u r b i n g is t h e imagined close friend w h o "insists o n calculating a n d p a y i n g his p r e ­ cise s h a r e of everv c o m m o n e x p e n d i t u r e " a n d is extremely r e l u c t a n t t o accept any "favor o r h o s p i t a l i t y " (LLJ 35). Finally, "intimate o r s o h d a n s tic associations" w o u l d a l s o s e e m t o get a l o n g well w i t h o u t too great a n emphasis o n j u s t i c e (LLJ 30). . . . But t h e n Rawls h a s p r a i s e d j u s t i c e a s t h e first virtue of social institu­ tions (TJ 3) a n d n o t a s t h e m o s t n o b l e p e r s o n a l virtue o r h u m a n senti­ ment. He is c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u c h i s s u e s a s t h e organization ot m e economy, of g o v e r n m e n t a n d political participation, a n d ot t h e legal and penal s y s t e m s . S u c h i s s u e s a r e n o t m a d e obsolete ty„^ "* stances of b e n e v o l e n c e , o r fraternity, o r of e n l a r g e d affections ( L U u>, for the s e n t i m e n t s of b e n e v o l e n c e a n d love c a n hardly, o n a large scaie, Peivade h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s s o t h o r o u g h l y as t o r e n d e r s h a r e d i n s u i u Sons u n n e c e s s a r y . F o r o n e t h i n g , e v e n if e v e r y o n e g e n u i n e l y s e e K s i u realize t h e c o m m o n g o o d , p e o p l e a r e likely t o disagree a b o u t w h a t h a s >s concretely.** H e n c e p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s of s e t t l e m e n t are n o t dispensable e v e n i n a w o r l d of s a i n t l y altruists, t h o u g h t h e y m a y o e among close f r i e n d s o r w i t h i n a family. e n t i r e s UI

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Now Sandel m i g h t w e l l a c c e p t t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i h t y ° ^ ™ * ^ procedures; h i s d e m a n d might t h e n b e that J ^ J ^ ^ J benevolence o r fraternity s h o u l d d i s p l a c e justice a s t h e foremost virtue 20™ . m i r 17B n 71, w h o cites "T1>» point is d u e , I believe, t o Kant. S e e a l s o Larmore, PMC 175 n. Michael Taylor, CAL 2 6 - 3 2 .

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of social institutions. But this i d e a is s u r e l y very different from, and m u c h m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n , t h e i d e a t h a t p e a c e a n d tranquility s h o u l d displace p h y s i c a l c o u r a g e as a v i r t u e of persons a n d t h u s can­ not b e i l l u m i n a t e d b y this vague a n a l o g y . O n e w a n t s s o m e sketch, at least, of Sandel's favored b e n e v o l e n t o r fraternal e c o n o m y , penal sys­ tem, or political p r o c e s s , t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e a s s u r a n c e that these w o u l d n o t give rise to t h e p a t h o l o g i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p r e v i o u s (philo­ sophical a n d political) a t t e m p t s t o c o n s t r u c t s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s . Sandel fails to a d d r e s s t h e s e issues.

9. R a w l s ' s C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n 9 . 1 . Having f o u n d n o t e n a b l e g r o u n d s for S a n d e l ' s v i e w t h a t Rawls is implicitly c o m m i t t e d to a c o n c e p t i o n of c i t i z e n s as mean-spirited "strangers" (LLJ 183) a n d b a r r e n selves, let u s e x a m i n e w h a t Rawls himself h a s t o say a b o u t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a n d its role w i t h i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice. Rawls is centrally c o n c e r n e d i n t h i s a n d o t h e r m a t t e r s t o argue from w e a k p r e m i s e s . T h i s a m b i t i o n c o u n s e l s , first of all, a g a i n s t relying on too thick or rich a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . If a h i g h l y specific concep­ tion of t h e p e r s o n is involved in c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice, t h e n this criterion is liable t o b e r e j e c t e d b y t h o s e w h o find t h i s specific c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n u n a p p e a l i n g . Rawls h i m s e l f h a s q u i t e effec­ tively u s e d t h i s strategy a g a i n s t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . By p o s t u l a t i n g a shared h i g h e s t - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e function, u t i l i t a r i a n s p r e s u p p o s e t h a t there is only o n e rational g o o d for h u m a n b e i n g s (SUPG 1 7 3 - 8 3 ) . T h e y assume that, if d o i n g s p o r t s in o n e ' s s p a r e t i m e m a k e s p e r s o n s h a p p i e r than reading, t h e n p e r s o n s o u g h t t o (be e d u c a t e d to) p r e f e r s p o r t s over reading. Moreover, b y d e m a n d i n g t h a t this (subjective) g o o d b e max­ imized, utilitarians view p e r s o n s as m e r e c o n t a i n e r s for this g o o d . In w h o m utility o c c u r s a n d h o w it is d i s t r i b u t e d a r e m o r a l l y immaterial (RAM 645). T h e utilitarian criterion c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e r e j e c t e d by any­ o n e w h o d o e s n o t s h a r e , a n d d o e s n o t w a n t t o live u n d e r institutions that reflect, t h i s view of p e r s o n s as l o c a t i o n s for t h e o c c u r r e n c e of valuable subjective s t a t e s . But t h e n it is n o t clear that a t h i n o r a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n of the p e r s o n c a n avoid s u c h p r o b l e m s . T o s e e w h y , s u p p o s e s o m e o n e has p r o p o s e d a n e l a b o r a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , r i c h w i t h s t i p u l a t e d features (such as n e e d s a n d interests) A t h r o u g h F A s s u m e also that various criticisms are d i r e c t e d against this c o n c e p t i o n , challenging teatures D, E, F a s empirically i n a c c u r a t e o r m o r a l l y u n c o n v i n c i n g . In r e s p o n s e t o s u c h criticisms, o n e m i g h t t r y t o r e t r e a t t o c o m m o n g r o u n d , by retracting t h e assertion of f e a t u r e s D, E, F a n d a r g u i n g from a mm or abstract c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n d e f i n e d b y t h e u n c o n t r o v e r s.at teatures A, B, C. But is o n e n o w relying o n w e a k e r p r e m i s e s ?

Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.1

95

With r e g a r d t o s t r i c t l y d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t s in logic, m a t h e m a t i c s , and geometry, t h e a n s w e r w o u l d b e affirmative. But in practical r e a s o n ­ ing, w h e n d e c i s i o n s m u s t b e m a d e "in light o f given p r e m i s e s , m a t t e r s are o t h e r w i s e . H e r e c o n c l u s i o n s m a y b e u p s e t b y t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of additional p r e m i s e s . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , t h e c a s e of a criminal trial, where t h e j u r o r s a r e a s k e d t o d e c i d e b e t w e e n conviction a n d acquittal on the b a s i s of v a r i o u s facts a s s e r t e d d u r i n g t h e trial. In this sort of situation, n o n e u t r a l i t y c a n b e h a d b y s i m p l y d i s c o u n t i n g alleged facts that are c o n t r o v e r s i a l a m o n g t h e j u r o r s . For s u p p o s e that s o m e alleged facts favoring t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e d i s p u t e d a n d that t h e jurors m u s t either i n c l u d e t h e s e a l l e g e d facts a m o n g t h e i r p r e m i s e s a n d acquit o r exclude t h e m a n d c o n v i c t . In t h i s c a s e , t h e latter c o u r s e c a n n o t b e said to be n e u t r a l b e t w e e n t h e m o r to rely o n w e a k e r p r e m i s e s , b e c a u s e t h e former c o u r s e i m p l i c i t l y a l s o invokes a d i s p u t e d p r e m i s e , namely, that no further facts favoring t h e d e f e n d a n t have b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . 30

Essentially t h e s a m e p o i n t c a n b e m a d e a b o u t t h e q u e s t to attain some m e a s u r e of p r o c e d u r a l n e u t r a l i t y . T h u s , a c c e p t a n c e of Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e m a y h i n g e o n w h e t h e r w e a c c e p t a n d i n c o r p o r a t e into the original p o s i t i o n t h e richer o r t h e t h i n n e r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e person. In c h o o s i n g t h e t h i n n e r c o n c e p t i o n , w e d o not get a clearly more n e u t r a l a r g u m e n t o r o n e b a s e d u p o n unequivocally w e a k e r premises, b e c a u s e w e a r e m a k i n g t h e s t r o n g a n d controversial a s s u m p ­ tion that A, B, C a r e t h e only f e a t u r e s of p e r s o n s relevant to a political conception of j u s t i c e . W e t h e r e b y s n u b all t h o s e w h o believe that persons' g e n e r a l b e n e v o l e n c e , say, o r g e n e r a l n o n b e n e v o l e n c e s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d a m o n g t h e p r e m i s e s . G e n u i n e p r o c e d u r a l neutrality would b e a c h i e v e d n o t b y l e a v i n g controversial p r e m i s e s aside b u t — a t best—only b y s h o w i n g t h a t a c o n c l u s i o n follows irrespective of h o w these a s s e r t i o n s a r e t r e a t e d , t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t g o e s t h r o u g h n o m a t t e r whether D, say, is a s s e r t e d , d e n i e d , o r left o p e n . Unfortunately, o n e will rarely b e a b l e t o s h o w t h i s . N o r is it p r o m i s i n g to seek t h e c o n c e p t i o n of justice t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s the most neutral c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . Many t e n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e will b e u n d o m i n a t e d a n d h e n c e ^ c o m m e n s u r a b l e in t h i s r e g a r d . 31

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^Similarly, t h e neutral g r o u n d a m o n g a n atheist, an agnostic, a n d a believer^is decid­ edly not a g n o s t i c i s m . Rattier, neutral g r o u n d a m o n g t h e s e three i n c l u d e s whatever ° u i be r e a s o n a b l e t o a c c e p t any t h e three perspectives. s l Met e d u r a l neutrality" m i g h t b e m o r e precise, b e c a u s e Rawls•' J ^J°" ' ? "ot w i t h t h e neutrality of r u l e ! a n d p r o c e d u r e s but w i t h n e u ral w a y s ' ^ W ^ * « « * rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s For t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n neutrality neutrality of p r o c e d u r e , s e e Raz, M F 1 1 4 - 1 5 ( w h o falsely ascribes to R a w l s * outcome view [MF 117-24]); a n d Larmore, PMC 4 2 - 4 7 . Rawls's o w n ^ f n o n o t h e ^ g u e s that in d i s p u t e s about the ,us^,ce ot

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Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.2

9.2. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n c o m p r i s e s w h a t e v e r empirical a n d (especially) n o r m a t i v e claims a b o u t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e implicit in various features of t h e original p o s i t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , t h e publicity c o n d i t i o n o n a d o p t a b l e criteria of justice, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the origi­ n a l position "so t h a t it is a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e m a x i r n i n r u l e applies' (TJ 155), t h e rationality of t h e p a r t i e s , a n d t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of those the parties r e p r e s e n t (including t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y goods). The m o s t i m p o r t a n t c h a l l e n g e s to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n con­ c e r n t h e last of t h e s e features. Rawls s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n "know t h a t they prefer m o r e r a t h e r t h a n l e s s p r i m a r y g o o d s . . . . [These] are things w h i c h it is s u p p o s e d a r a t i o n a l m a n w a n t s w h a t e v e r else he wants With m o r e of t h e s e g o o d s m e n c a n g e n e r a l l y b e assured of g r e a t e r s u c c e s s in c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s a n d i n a d v a n c i n g their e n d s , w h a t e v e r t h e s e e n d s m a y b e " (TJ 93, 92). While t h e c h o i c e of this a c c o u n t (for t h e p u r p o s e of i n t e r p e r s o n a l a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c compari­ sons) m a y b e " f o u n d e d o n t h e facts of p s y c h o l o g y " (FG 538), it is surely n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e s e facts a n d t h u s reflects s o m e b r o a d l y moral attitudes t o w a r d t h e s e g o o d s a n d t o w a r d t h e r o l e t h e y s h o u l d play in a successful h u m a n life. T h o s e w h o find r e a s o n t o d i s a g r e e significantly with Rawls's a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s a n d t o diverge from the a t t i t u d e s it e x p r e s s e s m a y r e a s o n a b l y reject h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice ( a t l e a s t if t h e y c a n p o i n t t o a n o t h e r s h a r a b l e b a s i s for a g r e e m e n t ) . This p o i n t is p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious i n r e g a r d to t h e p r i o r i t y Rawls gives in t h i s a c c o u n t t o c e r t a i n b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. O n e set of t h e s e fall u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l h e a d i n g of f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i e n c e (TJ S33). N o w if t h e p a r t i e s w e r e d e l i b e r a t i n g i n b e h a l f of p e r s o n s w h o care primarily a b o u t utility (one's o w n o r t h a t of o t h e r s ) , t h e y m i g h t not w a n t t h e rights a n d liberties of t h i s set t o b e very e x t e n s i v e . T h e s u p ­ p r e s s i o n of c e r t a i n beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s m a y w e l l r a i s e e a c h position, s c h e m i c a l l y a s e v a l u a t e d i n t e r m s of utilS i? J r e s u l t i n g from a b r i d g m e n t s of t h e relevant rights andI h b e r h e s are o u t w e i g h e d b y satisfactions g a i n e d d i r e c t l y (from S!? " ° / s u p p r e s s e d ) o r t h r o u g h i n t e r m e d i a t e soSl^r!H ^ . ° ° u n t t h e p a r t i e s deliberate rTn^nnhi ,^ y y ^ e m o r a l , religious, or t 6 r e S t *, " I * * * P j e o p a r d y u n l e s s there n t e ^ K S T ? ' US• V ^ rm ral ° o s eed opmr i n c i p l e s t h a t s e c u r e the d o n o t k n o w , of ° ° A c t i o n s . . [ a n d obligations hm TlTe ° ^ e s a s h a v i n g s u c h obligations, t ^ c ^ • • - h e y cannot 1

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their lives a r o u n d t h e i d e a of m a x i m i z i n g utility, Rawls must insist that persons " m a y h a v e a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves t h a t t h e y believe they w o u l d not, or c o u l d n o t , s t a n d a p a r t from; a n d t h e y m i g h t regard it as u n t h i n k ­ able for t h e m to view t h e m s e l v e s w i t h o u t c e r t a i n religious a n d philo­ sophical c o n v i c t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s " (KCMT 545). W h o e v e r is con­ vinced that this is not, o r o u g h t n o t to b e , a significant feature of h u m a n personality c a n r e a s o n a b l y reject t h e i m p o r t a n c e Rawls a t t a c h e s to freedom of t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i e n c e . 9.3. But Rawls d o e s n o t m e r e l y i n f o r m t h e p a r t i e s that their clients have constitutive i n t e r e s t s ; h e a l s o gives t h e m to know, m o r e specifi­ cally, w h a t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e i n t e r e s t s are. T h e p a r t i e s repre­ sent moral p e r s o n s , " c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t w o m o r a l p o w e r s . . . t h e c a p a c ­ ity for a n effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e . . . [and] t h e capacity to form, to revise, a n d r a t i o n a l l y to p u r s u e a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e good. C o r r e s p o n d ­ ing to t h e m o r a l p o w e r s , m o r a l p e r s o n s are said to be m o v e d by two highest-order i n t e r e s t s t o r e a l i z e a n d exercise t h e s e p o w e r s . By calling these i n t e r e s t s ' h i g h e s t - o r d e r ' i n t e r e s t s , I m e a n t h a t . . [they] are supremely regulative a s w e l l a s effective. This implies that, w h e n e v e r circumstances a r e r e l e v a n t to t h e i r fulfillment, t h e s e interests govern deliberation a n d C o n d u c t " (KCMT 5 2 5 ) . Clearly t h e s e a r e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l s t i p u l a t i o n s . A brief reflection o n the actual p e r s o n s w e k n o w is likely to p r e s s u p o n u s t h e question of how relevant Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e c a n b e t o o u r w o r l d if it has been a d o p t e d in behalf of m o r a l p e r s o n s so conceived. If Rawls aims for a comparative a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s by h o w suitable each would be for p e r s o n s h a v i n g t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests, a n d if these i n t e r e s t s a r e a n d will b e q u i t e r a r e in a c t u a l fact, t h e n Rawls's criterion, a n d t h e r a n k i n g of feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s b a s e d u p o n it, would s e e m t o b e d i s c r e d i t e d . Let m e c o n s i d e r t w o p o s s i b l e responses to s u c h d o u b t s . Rawls c o u l d say that p e r s o n s b o m i n t o a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society governed by his cnterion of j u s t i c e w o u l d b e m o r e likely to b e c o m e moral p e r s o n s . Perhaps so, b u t t h e r e w o u l d r e m a i n a significant n u m b e r of p e r s o n s in h o m t h e " h i g h e s t - o r d e r " i n t e r e s t s w o u l d n o t b e s u p r e m e l y regula­ tive. Moreover, u t i l i t a r i a n s c o u l d e q u a l l v well a r g u e t h a t p e r s o n s b o m jnto a self-contained s o c i e t y g o v e r n e d by t h e p r i n c i p l e of utility w o u l d °e more likely to c o m e t o h a v e a h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference function. Rawls c o u l d a l s o s a y t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n is to serve only 34

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for developing a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e : " W i t h i n different con­ texts w e c a n a s s u m e diverse p o i n t s of view t o w a r d o u r p e r s o n without c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o long a s t h e s e p o i n t s of v i e w c o h e r e t o g e t h e r when c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e " (KCMT 5 4 5 ; cf. JFPM 2 3 2 n . 1 5 ) . But the co­ h e r e n c e c o n d i t i o n s h a r p l y limits t h e u s e f u l n e s s of t h i s strategy as a r e s p o n s e to t h e difficulty. F o r c o n s i d e r a g a i n t h e possibility of a util­ itarian m a k i n g t h e s a m e r e s p o n s e t o Rawls's c r i t i c i s m s . Rawls would probably c o u n t e r this by s h o w i n g h o w c o n c e i v i n g of p e r s o n s as having a h i g h e s t - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n c a n n o t n e a t l y b e c o n f i n e d to politi­ cal p h i l o s o p h y b u t w o u l d also affect t h e w a y p e r s o n s in t h e envisaged utilitarian society w o u l d view t h e m s e l v e s o u t s i d e t h e political realm, especially if t h e operative c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a n d t h e r e a s o n s for it are r e q u i r e d t o b e p u b l i c (the p u b l i c i t y c o n d i t i o n , [cf. TJ 1 3 3 , 182]). P e r s o n s ' c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e i r p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e roles m u s t "cohere together." T h e a n a l o g o u s c o u n t e r w o u l d , I believe, d e f e a t t h e response in Rawls's behalf a s well. If c i t i z e n s — e v e n i n Rawls's m o s t favored s o c i e t y — w o u l d frequently set a s i d e t h e i r ( s u p p o s e d l y ) "highest-order" interests for t h e sake of o t h e r i n t e r e s t s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s , t h e n Rawls's ranking of basic s t r u c t u r e s is b a s e d u p o n a n e m p i r i c a l l y false assump­ tion. Therefore, if t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s really a r e "supremely regulative a s well as effective" (KCMT 5 2 5 ) , t h e n t h e d e s i r e to h o n o r just institutions m u s t c o n s t r a i n a n d (in c a s e of conflict) o v e r r i d e even our most constitutive private loyalties, c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d a t t a c h m e n t s , w h e t h e r p e r s o n a l , religious, o r e t h i c a l . T h e c o n c e p t i o n p e r s o n s are to have of t h e i r p u b l i c role c o n s t r a i n s h o w t h e y c a n c o n c e i v e of them­ selves from o t h e r p o i n t s of view. T h e two r e s p o n s e s I h a v e c o n s i d e r e d d o little t o d e f e n d t h e stipula­ tion of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s o r t o m i t i g a t e t h e conclusion t h a t this s t i p u l a t i o n m a k e s Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n very de­ m a n d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , it s e e m s t h a t Rawls d o e s n o t e v e n n e e d t o affirm tnis m o d e l of m o r a l p e r s o n a l i t y i n o r d e r t o d e r i v e h i s c r i t e r i o n of social justice; in A Theory of Justice t h e t w o m o r a l p o w e r s a r e i n t r o d u c e d onty n e a r t h e e n d (in very rcriterion u d i m e n t a r y form [TJ 5 0 5 , 5 6 1 ] ) , l o n g after the ST!!? I™!! * T 6 d t h 6 i r i « c e i n its final s t a t e m e n t (TJ Z " ' ' ™ * ™ y s e e m t o e n d o r s e far t o o controversial a sTvXK! K, , ° ' y S c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e excesu o o n 2Ur° "S «f s ° « a l p r i m a r y goods should?Z1T^T? ~ * * ; JFPM 2 2 4 n 2 ) , h e m e S n S ^ f f P ^ g o o d s a s t h e relevant a l l - p u r p o s e e ^ Smocrat^ V""**the P ™ P e r s o n s in modo

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the capacity r a t i o n a l l y t o revise t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . By relying o n a m o r e n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , this a r g u m e n t would have h a d w i d e r a p p e a l . So w h y d o e s Rawls insist o n t h e t w o highest-order i n t e r e s t s i n s t e a d ? 9.4. If t h e r e is a g o o d a n s w e r , t h e n it m u s t b e that Rawls c o n s i d e r s the more d e m a n d i n g s t i p u l a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for a n o t h e r p u r p o s e (other than establishing a p r e f e r e n c e in t h e original p o s i t i o n for h i s criterion). But what p u r p o s e ? T h e s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t Rawls w a s carried away by K a n t i a n p r e d i l e c t i o n s . T h e conviction, even p a t h o s , in his endorsement of t h e first h i g h e s t - o r d e r interest i s certainly n o t u n r e ­ lated to his s t r o n g a t t r a c t i o n t o K a n t : "The s e n s e of justice . . . reveals what t h e p e r s o n is, a n d t o c o m p r o m i s e it is n o t t o achieve for t h e self free reign b u t t o give w a y t o t h e c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d a c c i d e n t s of the world" (TJ 575). H e a d d s t h a t b y a c t i n g from a s e n s e of justice, w e express " o u r n a t u r e a s m o r a l p e r s o n s " (TJ 574). T h i s appeal, however, cannot b e t o a u n i v e r s a l " w e " b u t o n l v t o t h o s e w h o will s h a r e t h e Kantian a s p i r a t i o n t o t h e free reign of t h e self. T h a t Rawls's most favored society i s d e s i g n e d for K a n t i a n spirits will for them surely count in its favor b u t is b o u n d t o a l i e n a t e o t h e r s w h o are less t h a n enthusiastic a b o u t t h e i d e a l of free r e i g n for t h e self. Rawls's appeal t o Kant does n o t p r o v i d e t h e k i n d of b r o a d l y b a s e d a n d powerful argu­ ment that s o d e m a n d i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n r e q u i r e s . Is t h e r e a n o t h e r w a y ot providing s u c h a n a r g u m e n t ? 37

3-4.1. Let m e b e g i n w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t e d interest in a s e n s e ot justice. There is s u r e l y s o m e t h i n g m o r a l l y d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t a n institutional scheme that, relying o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d motivations, wouldI w o r k w i m equal effectiveness i n a n a t i o n of intelligent d e v i l s . But is £ ™enough t o s t i p u l a t e a highest-order i n t e r e s t ? T h e r e is, I trunK, a n even m o r e b r o a d l y b a s e d a n d c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t for moral c r a z e " ship. Rawls w a n t s t o s h o w n o t m e r e l y that h i s criterion o )ust.ce indicates a m o r a l l y p l a u s i b l e w a y of o r g a n i z i n g social m t e r a c t i o n u u also that a social s y s t e m satisfying t h i s criterion w o u l d b e w e l l - o m e r e a , *hich for h i m r e q u i r e s stability. T h a t a social s y s t e m is ™\™ a s p e c t t o its c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e . . . m e a n s t h a t . . . u s m e ! 38

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acquire . . . a sufficiently s t r o n g a n d effective s e n s e of justice, one that usually o v e r c o m e s t h e t e m p t a t i o n s a n d s t r e s s e s of social life'' (RAM 634). This is a c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r r e q u i r e m e n t t h a n t h a t of equtlibrium, w h i c h is satisfied even if "individuals c o m p l y w i t h t h e institu­ tional s c h e m e solely as a m e a n s to t h e i r s e p a r a t e c o n c e r n s . . . from selfor g r o u p - i n t e r e s t e d m o t i v e s " (TJ 455). Here, t h e n , is a partial r a t i o n a l e for Rawls's d e c i s i o n t o invoke strong­ er p r e m i s e s . If w e believe t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e i n d e e d capable of a regulative a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e a n d if w e c a r e s t r o n g l y that our criterion of justice a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s it favors s h o u l d h a v e a tendency t o w a r d stability (that is, t o w a r d e n g e n d e r i n g s u c h a s u p p o r t i n g sense of justice), t h e n it is r e a s o n a b l e t o s t i p u l a t e t h a t " o t h e r t h i n g s equal, the p e r s o n s in t h e original p o s i t i o n will a d o p t t h e m o r e stable s c h e m e of p r i n c i p l e s " (TJ 455). N o w o n e m a y well t h i n k t h a t t h e m o r e intuitive w a y of e m b e d d i n g t h e c o n c e r n for stability w o u l d b e given by the s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' clients v a l u e a n effective s e n s e of justice in one another, r a t h e r t h a n e a c h only in h i m - o r h e r s e l f a s t h e first highesto r d e r interest s u g g e s t s . In a l a t e r essay, Rawls d o e s i n d e e d explain the p a r t i e s ' p r e f e r e n c e for a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t e n g e n d e r s a n ef­ fective s e n s e of justice b y e m p h a s i z i n g h o w p e r s o n s living u n d e r stable i n s t i t u t i o n s will b e m o r e successful in a d v a n c i n g t h e i r determinate c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d , w h a t e v e r t h e s e m a y b e (BLP 3 1 - 3 2 ) . T h e r e is, I believe, n o s e r i o u s t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o a c c o u n t s of t h e parties reasoning, b e c a u s e b e h i n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e t h e t w o stipulations a r e equivalent. Still, t h e s e c o n d a c c o u n t (in BLP, p u b l i s h e d after KCMT) m a y have t h e a d v a n t a g e of m a k i n g m o r e p e r s p i c u o u s h o w t h e parties' rational d e l i b e r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t o u r own m o r a l r e f l e c t i o n s . 9.4.3. W h y t h e n s h o u l d t h e p a r t i e s h a v e so decisive a p r e f e r e n c e for stability over o t h e r forms of social e q u i l i b r i u m ? I s u g g e s t t h a t stability e n a b l e s a g o o d t h a t is o t h e r w i s e u n a t t a i n a b l e . Stability m a k e s certain features of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i m m u n e t o t h e shifting d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r w i t h i n t h e social s y s t e m in q u e s t i o n . T o s e e w h a t is at stake, c o n s i d e r t h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m u s t c o p e w i t h t h e as­ s u r a n c e problem.™ P e r s o n s ' p r u d e n t i a l a n d m o r a l r e a s o n s for accept­ ing t h e i r fair s h a r e of t h e b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e u n d e r ­ m i n e d w h e n t h e r e are n o a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r s a r e c o m p l y i n g a s well. This p r o b l e m c a n generally b e solved t h r o u g h m e c h a n i s m s for detect­ ing a n d penalizing n o n c o m p l i a n c e (TJ 270,240). T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , also a d e e p e r v e r s i o n of t h e a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m . H e r e t h e r e l e v a n t s u s p i c i o n is n o t t h a t o t h e r s m a y b e shirking t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s u n d e r the s c h e m e but t h a t m a j o r g r o u p s m a y b e s e e k i n g t h r o u g h t h e i r legitimate political a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r to shift t h e t e r m s of t h e institutional 39

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scheme itself i n t h e i r favor. T h i s s u s p i c i o n t e n d s t o d i s p o s e o t h e r groups to use their l e g i t i m a t e p o w e r in similar w a y s s o as to block any advances by t h o s e w h o m t h e y s u s p e c t a n d , if possible, to w e a k e n their position as well. As t h e situated a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m t h r e a t e n s pervasive noncompliance w i t h e x i s t i n g g r o u n d rules, so t h e fundamental as­ surance p r o b l e m t h r e a t e n s pervasive a n d u n r e s t r a i n e d c o m p e t i t i o n over what the g r o u n d r u l e s will b e . While, o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m c a n n o t be solved t h r o u g h i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m s , it may, o n the o t h e r h a n d , seem m u c h less t h r e a t e n i n g . S u p p o s e t h a t e a c h m a j o r g r o u p a c c e p t s the going s c h e m e o n l y p r u d e n t i a l l y , a s t h e b e s t it c a n for n o w exact from the others, a n d t h a t t h e r e a r e significant shifts in the distribution of bargaining p o w e r a m o n g t h e s e g r o u p s o r in t h e i r values a n d inter­ ests. Even then, a b r e a k d o w n of o r d e r is less likely t h a n a n a d a p t a t i o n of the scheme t o t h e a l t e r e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Even while t h e going s c h e m e would u n d e r g o s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e s , o r d e r w o u l d b e preserved through an underlying modus vivendi (cf. JFPM 247; IOC), a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the going terms of i n t e r a c t i o n will t e n d t o reflect a dynamic bargaining equilibrium. T h e c o n t i n u i t y a c h i e v a b l e t h r o u g h s u c h a m o d u s vivendi is quite weak, h o w e v e r , a s t h e g o i n g t e r m s are liable t o c h a n g e without limit. In fact, it is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e its t e r m s a r e flexible that a m o d u s wendi c a n e n d u r e over t i m e . As t h e b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r o r t h e values a n d interests of t h e v a r i o u s g r o u p s c h a n g e , t h e institutional distribution of benefits a n d b u r d e n s is a d j u s t e d s o t h a t t h e s c h e m e c o n t i n u e s t o b e rationally a c c e p t a b l e t o all. T h u s , w h e n a g r o u p ' s p o w e r h a s increased, so that it n o w h a s m o r e t o g a i n a n d less t o lose from a (partial) break­ down of orderly r e l a t i o n s , it will p r u d e n t l y p r e s s for m o r e favorable terms. And o t h e r g r o u p s will p r u d e n t l y a c c e d e t o its d e m a n d weakened g r o u p s b e i n g o b l i g e d to a c c e p t less favorable terms b e c a u s e °f their i n c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y o r d e c r e a s e d t h r e a t advantage. 9

-4-3- It is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t w h i l e t h e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g ^ ° " P s is effectively c o n s t r a i n e d at e a c h m o m e n t b y t h e going t e r m s ot ^ scheme, t h e r e a r e n o r e s t r a i n t s o n t h e t e r m s themselves. T h e r e are no limits o n h o w w e a k o r s t r o n g a g r o u p m a y b e c o m e t h r o u g h shifts in 2 distribution of p o w e r a s reflected i n a n d c o m p o u n d e d by shirts in e terms of t h e m o d u s v i v e n d i . A n d t h i s a b s e n c e of limits indicates t n e "^son for insisting o n a s e n s e of justice. T h e features characterizing a J»t basic s t r u c t u r e c a n b e p r e s e r v e d o n l y if e a c h major g r o u p within social s y s t e m will s u p p o r t t h e m even w h e n it is i n a position to exact n e w t e r m s m o r e favorable t o itself. A truly e n d u r i n g just scheme P*supposes a w i d e s p r e a d a n d d e e p m o r a l allegiance t o its basic «*n», so that e a c h of at least t h e influential social g r o u p s can b e rehea h o n o r t h e m e v e n w h e n t h e y significantly conflict with its moral or JJWous convictions o r w i t h its political o r e c o n o m i c ™erests O r i y in f y c a n all b e a s s u r e d t h a t t h e t e r m s of t h e s c h e m e will not.be Justly n o t b e forced into a d e c h n e

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ing spiral of fading power and deteriorating terms of participation. Such assurance, in turn, radically reduces the temptation to seek un­ justly to shift the scheme's terms in one's favor (cf. §19.2 and §20.4). 9.4.4. Rawls has, then, a crucially important reason for favoring a basic structure that has a strong tendency to engender a normally overriding moral allegiance to itself. T h e stipulation of thefirsthighestorder interest can be justified through the preference for a social system whose basic ground rules are "taken off the political agenda," are not themselves objects of the political and economic competition they are to regulate. T h e realization of this preference requires persons who, despite a wide diversity of conflicting values and interests, share an area of value overlap (cf. TJ 387-88), who have an overriding alle­ giance to this "kernel of political morality" and to its institutionaliza­ tion, and who know all this about one another. T h e aspiration toward such a social system with such persons is partly a matter of collective rationality, but it is also moral in three distinct respects. First, each social group will consider it morally important to protect its values and way of life, and for many such groups stability is the only feasible or at least the most reliable way of ensuring that its conception of the good will survive, will be available to be known, reaffirmed, and continued by whoever may choose to do so. S e c o n d , individuals and associations may also recognize other groups as having a valid claim that their values and form of life should remain accessible within the social system, and ensuring stability is then the best way of discharging this collective responsibility vis-a-vis other groups in general. Here stability is a way of assuring that we, as members of one group, will never be forced to choose between the security of our own conception of the good and the moral claims of others to live in accordance with theirs, tnird, a kernel of political morality would also engender greater social P e a c e and harmony than has been displayed by any of the large soaeties w e are familiar with from history, and such peace and harmony are of moral value for their own sake stinuLIS'Tr Sg d Rawls can give in defense of his stipulation of the first highest-order interest has this schematic form: 41

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The p r e f e r e n c e for stability m a y also furnish t h e m o s t broadly m o s t c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t for stipulating t h e s e c o n d high­ est-order interest i n r e a l i z i n g a n d exercising t h e capacity to form, to revise, a n d rationally t o p u r s u e a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . Social institu­ tions u n d e r w h i c h t h i s i n t e r e s t is w i d e s p r e a d w o u l d e n g e n d e r a strong and lasting allegiance to a k e r n e l of political morality t h a t allows a w i d e range of diverse a n d e v e n m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e c o n c e p t i o n s of the good. For c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r a social s y s t e m in w h i c h p e r s o n s are primarily m o t i v a t e d b y t h e i r i n t e r e s t in p r o t e c t i n g a n d advancing their own particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . In s u c h a system t h e s h a r e d political morality is liable t o c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to shifts in t h e relative strength of t h e g r o u p s s u p p o r t i n g t h e various c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good. There is little c o n c e r n t o p r e s e r v e s p a c e for values a n d ideals currently out of favor. H e n c e t h e a d h e r e n t s of e a c h g r o u p m u s t fear that, s h o u l d their n u m b e r s d e c l i n e t e m p o r a r i l y , t h e r e w o u l d b e p r e s s u r e s o n the basic structure t o c h a n g e s o a s t o m a k e a r e s u r g e n c e of their values less likely or even i m p o s s i b l e . T h i s fear in t u r n t e n d s to p r o d u c e in each group a strong d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o m a i n t a i n a n d increase its strength. The fear a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t e n d t o u n d e r m i n e t h e g r o u p s ' moral allegiance to t h e existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s . This p r o b l e m is avoided when the s e c o n d h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t is w i d e s p r e a d . In that case, many p e r s o n s will w a n t t h e social s y s t e m to b e o p e n to, a n d even to foster, a w i d e diversity of v a l u e s a n d projects, so as t o provide a rich background a g a i n s t w h i c h p e r s o n s c a n form a n d c h a n g e their o w n conceptions of t h e g o o d . A n d t h e a d h e r e n t s of e a c h particular w a y of "fe will t h e n b e a s s u r e d t h a t a n o p e n n e s s for, a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of, their particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d will b e preserved by others, even if their o w n s t r e n g t h s h o u l d d w i n d l e . 9.4.5.

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v a n c e t h e d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d of t h o s e t h e y represent (BLP 27, 29-32). But i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r h e g o e s right back to a highly p a r t i s a n K a n t i a n r a t i o n a l e : " T h e role a n d e x e r c i s e of [the moral] p o w e r s (in t h e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t a n c e s ) is a c o n d i t i o n of g o o d . . . . [Cit­ izens'] j u s t a n d h o n o r a b l e ( a n d fully a u t o n o m o u s ) c o n d u c t renders t h e m , a s Kant w o u l d say, w o r t h y of h a p p i n e s s ; i t m a k e s their accom­ p l i s h m e n t s w h o l l y a d m i r a b l e a n d t h e i r p i e a s u r e s c o m p l e t e l y good (BLP 49).« 9.4.7. T h e s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s will of course affect h o w t h e c o n t e n t of t h e favored c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is argued for w i t h i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e original p o s i t i o n . T h e a r g u m e n t will reflect t h e t h i n k i n g of p e r s o n s w h o v a l u e t h e i r s h a r e d c a t e g o r i c a l allegiance to a lasting k e r n e l of political m o r a l i t y a n d t h e i r s h a r e d i n t e r e s t in pre­ serving t h e s p a c e for a w i d e r a n g e of d i v e r s e c o n c e p t i o n s of the good. T h e s e p e r s o n s a r e n o t w e , b u t t h e m e m b e r s of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society c o r r e l a t e d w i t h Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . B u t t h e a r g u m e n t still t o u c h e s u s insofar as w e , u p o n reflection, w o u l d a s p i r e t o s u c h a social s y s t e m , w o u l d w a n t t o s e e o u r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a n d w a y of life b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d , w o u l d w a n t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t satisfy t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of justice, a n d w o u l d w a n t t o b e a n d live among p e r s o n s w h o , h o w e v e r different i n o t h e r w a y s , s h a r e a categorical c o m m i t m e n t t o m a i n t a i n t h e j u s t i c e of t h e i r s h a r e d b a s i c institutions. Some p e o p l e h e r e a n d n o w m a y s e e n e i t h e r r a t i o n a l n o r m o r a l reasons tor finding t h i s a s p i r a t i o n p l a u s i b l e a n d will, p e r h a p s r e a s o n a b l y , reject Rawls s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , a l t h o u g h t h e y m i g h t h a v e a c c e p t e d a m o r e n e u t r a l o n e sufficient for d e r i v i n g h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice. But losing t h e m c a n n o t b e h e l p e d , b e c a u s e a m o r e n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of m e p e r s o n w o u l d n o t s u p p o r t t h e a m b i t i o n for a s t a b l e , h a r m o n i o u s , a n d e n d u n n g l y j u s t social s y s t e m . 9 . 5 . Let m e c o n c l u d e w i t h s o m e r e m a r k s o n h o w Rawls's insistence o n a s u p r e m e l y regulative a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e m i g h t c o m e to t e r m s w i t h t h e d o u b t s first voiced b y B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s i n "Persons, Character, a n d Morality."*. T h e w o r r y i s t h a t o n c e w e r e s e r v e a special 0 " !* ° r a l m o t i v a t i o n s w e will n o t b e able to to r T r « . h ^ ^ s t r u c t u r a l i m p o r t a n c e t h a t c a n attach to o u r o t h e r c o n s h t u t i v e c o m m i t m e n t s (Williams, ML 2). T h u s Williams

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thinks we o u g h t "to a l l o w m o r e r o o m t h a n K a n t i a n i s m c a n allow for t h e importance of i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r a n d p e r s o n a l relations in m o r a l experience" (ML 5). F o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s mitigate this c o n c e r n as ad­ dressed to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n . First, w h a t is to take motivational p r e c e ­ dence over o u r d e e p loyalities, a t t a c h m e n t s , or g r o u n d projects is a political, r a t h e r t h a n a g e n e r a l a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e morality (cf. IOC 3 4TWhat Rawls s t i p u l a t e s is a n a l l e g i a n c e o n l y to t h e criterion of justice, to the basic s t r u c t u r e i n s o f a r a s it is justified by this criterion, a n d to legislative, judicial, a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s insofar as they are rendered p u r s u a n t t o justified p r o c e d u r e s a n d a c c o r d in c o n t e n t with the criterion of j u s t i c e . Second, t h e political m o r a l i t y is specifically conceived so as to be compatible with, a n d p r o t e c t i v e of, a w i d e range of diverse a n d often mutually i n c o m p a t i b l e religions, p e r s o n a l values, a n d ethical doctrines (of the more g e n e r a l a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e kind). These two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o w t h a t t h e o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h the sense of justice w o u l d c o m e i n t o conflict w i t h o t h e r constitutive c o m ­ mitments are likely to b e r a r e , at least i n c o m p a r i s o n to alternative, n o n Rawlsian basic s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s fact is w e l c o m e , b e c a u s e a regulative and effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e , t h o u g h it m u s t b e determinative, n e e d not be our s u p r e m e o r p r e e m i n e n t c o m m i t m e n t . It n e e d not be ranked above c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t d o n o t conflict w i t h i t . Third, Rawls's t h e o r y is a n e x e r c i s e in ideal theory. So even if it w e r e true that p e r s o n s a s t h e y n o w a r e h a v e s o m e constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s that may conflict w i t h a n a l l e g i a n c e t o a just institutional s c h e m e , it would not follow t h a t s u c h conflicts w o u l d o c c u r u n d e r that s c h e m e . The reason, as Williams h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t , is t h a t a p e r s o n ' s constitu­ tive c o m m i t m e n t s a r e "in g o o d p a r t . . . f o r m e d within, a n d formed by, dispositions w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a c o m m i t m e n t to morality" (ML 12)—in thJS case to t h e political m o r a l i t y Rawls is p r o p o s i n g . This consider­ ation shows h o w o n e n e e d n o t d e n y e i t h e r t h e crucial role of constitu­ t e c o m m i t m e n t s i n a w o r t h w h i l e h u m a n life or t h e fundamental "nportance of s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s o n c e t h e y have b e e n formed. Both these points a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e h o p e t h a t in t h e context ot a n 45

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o n g o i n g just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , p e r s o n s w o u l d t e n d e i t h e r n o t to form certain c o m m i t m e n t s or to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i v e commit­ m e n t s as limited from t h e start s o t h a t t h e possibility of s u c h conflicts is largely e x c l u d e d . Given w i d e s p r e a d m o r a l a l l e g i a n c e to a just regime, p e r s o n s might, for e x a m p l e , b e u n w i l l i n g to form a f r i e n d s h i p with a n o t o r i o u s tax c h e a t or m i g h t refuse t o u n d e r s t a n d s u c h a friendship as obligating t h e m t o h e l p cover u p t h e i r friend's f r a u d u l e n t activities. It m a y n e v e r t h e l e s s h a p p e n , of c o u r s e , t h a t a d e e p a n d long-standing c o m m i t m e n t c o m e s i n t o conflict w i t h political m o r a l i t y . S u c h conflicts w o u l d b e m u c h m o r e difficult t h a n Williams's c a s e (ML 1 7 - 1 8 ) , in w h i c h s o m e o n e , u n a b l e to r e s c u e b o t h of t w o e n d a n g e r e d persons, gives p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e o n e w h o is h i s wife. It w o u l d b e a case where t h e a g e n t ' s loyalty to his wife w o u l d r e q u i r e h i m to violate just rules, to b r e a k a law, to bribe a j u d g e , or s u c h like. It is n o t o b v i o u s that one s h o u l d w a n t to b e a p e r s o n w h o w o u l d , e v e n i n a perfectly j u s t society, d o s u c h t h i n g s if o n e ' s wife t u r n e d o u t to b e in t h e Mafia, say. I feel that at this p o i n t Williams overstates t h e significance of c o n s t i t u t i v e com­ m i t m e n t s w h e n h e writes (about t h e r e s c u e case): "It m i g h t have been h o p e d by s o m e (for i n s t a n c e , by h i s wife) t h a t h i s m o t i v a t i n g thought, fully spelled out, w o u l d b e t h e t h o u g h t t h a t it w a s h i s wife, not that it w a s h i s wife a n d t h a t in s i t u a t i o n s of this k i n d it is p e r m i s s i b l e to save o n e ' s wife," as t h e latter r e a s o n i n g " p r o v i d e s t h e a g e n t w i t h one | ! ? ^ k t o o j n a n y " (ML 1 8 ) . But t h e s e c o n d t h o u g h t is n o t o u t of place in~Tne c o n t e x t s relevant h e r e , for e x a m p l e , t h e Mafia c a s e . Even if s h e is o n e s wife, o n e m a y still ask w h e t h e r it is right t o violate a just practice tor h e r sake. This m u c h s e e m s perfectly c o m p a t i b l e w i t h having a character. J

Fourth, t h e s e n s e of justice n e e d n o t b e d e t e r m i n a t i v e for all persons all t h e t i m e . " T h e r e can c o m e a p o i n t at w h i c h it is q u i t e u n r e a s o n a b l e tor a m a n t o give u p , in t h e n a m e of t h e i m p a r t i a l g o o d o r d e r i n g of the w o r l d of moral a g e n t s , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is a c o n d i t i o n of h i s having any interest m b e i n g a r o u n d in t h a t w o r l d at all" (ML 1 4 ) I n d e e d , s u c h a E ° ° yi n k ' t h a t h e is justified i n Sh? r^u ' ' Williams's p h r a s e , t h a t "some s UJations b e y o n d justifications" (ML 1 8 ) . Moreover, t h e possibility of nf ™ i" !f P e w i t h t h e feasibility a n d desirability haveT^ f° ' P e r s o n s m o s t of t h e t i m e will C

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DEVELOPING RAWLS'S CRITERION O F J U S T I C E

C H A P T E R

3

The First Principle of Justice

10. T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s Rawls p r o p o s e s a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t r a n k s feasible alternative basic structures b y t h e m i n i m u m r e p r e s e n t a t i v e lifetime s h a r e of social primary goods e a c h of t h e m t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e . In this section, I analyze this proposal i n t o eight m a i n e l e m e n t s , w h i c h m a y b e g r o u p e d into o u r familiar three c o m p o n e n t s , t h e w h o - , w h a t - , a n d h o w - q u e s t i o n s of §3.1. J ^ e I discuss s o m e of t h e s e e l e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e (as indicated in Table 2), the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n is i n t e n d e d o n l y t o i n t r o d u c e t h e m briefly one place. T h e r e m a i n d e r of Part T w o focuses o n t h e core of the what-component, t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of Rawls's semiconsequentialist ac­ count of the i n d i v i d u a l g o o d , w h i c h is t o inform all interpersonal a n d Werschemic c o m p a r i s o n s i n m a t t e r s of social justice. m

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Humanism Individualism S e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m vs. d e o n t o l o g y i f n u c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m vs. full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m freedom, social primary g o o d s

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idea of m o r a l i t y — "Whatever y o u h a v e d o n e t o o n e of t h e least of these m y b r e t h r e n , t h a t y o u h a v e d o n e t o m e " ( M a t t h e w 25:40)—the ranking of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s is to d e p e n d u p o n t h e worst social p o s i t i o n e a c h of t h e m t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . All i n f o r m a t i o n about b e t t e r p o s i t i o n s is left a s i d e as irrelevant. T h u s Rawls invites u s to think of " t h e two p r i n c i p l e s a s t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e — [T]he t w o p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h o s e a p e r s o n w o u l d c h o o s e for the d e s i g n of a society in w h i c h h i s e n e m y is to a s s i g n h i m h i s place [T]hat t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w o u l d b e c h o s e n if t h e p a r t i e s were forced to p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t s u c h a c o n t i n g e n c y explains the s e n s e i n w h i c h t h i s c o n c e p t i o n is t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n " (TJ 152-53). As t h e s e r e m a r k s i n d i c a t e , Rawls's a r g u m e n t from t h e original position is divisible i n t o t w o s t e p s . T h e first of t h e s e links t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of the original p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e p a r t i e s ' e m p l o y m e n t of t h e m a x i m i n rule, a n d t h e s e c o n d p r e s e n t s t h e c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e h e p r o p o s e s as "the m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e . " After s o m e brief c o m m e n t s a b o u t t h e first s t e p , I c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of the s e c o n d , w h i c h b r i n g s in t h e o t h e r e l e m e n t s of h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice. 1

Rawls's u s e of t h e m a x i m i n i d e a h a s p r o v o k e d a flood of criticism T h e s e a p p e a r q u i t e d e v a s t a t i n g if o n e t a k e s literally Rawls's professed, aim "to c h a r a c t e r i z e [the initial] s i t u a t i o n s o t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s that w o u l d b e c h o s e n , w h a t e v e r t h e y t u r n o u t to b e , a r e a c c e p t a b l e from a m o r a l p o i n t of v i e w . . . . T h u s j u s t i c e a s fairness is a b l e to u s e t h e idea of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice from t h e b e g i n n i n g " (TJ 120). T h i s statement s e e m s t o i n d i c a t e t h a t Rawls's e n t i r e a r g u m e n t w o u l d c o l l a p s e if the p a r t i e s ' e m p l o y m e n t of t h e m a x i m i n r u l e w e r e r e f u t e d . In t h e same section, however, Rawls s u g g e s t s t h e o p p o s i t e p i c t u r e a s well. "The p r o c e d u r e of c o n t r a c t t h e o r i e s p r o v i d e s , t h e n , a g e n e r a l analytic m e t h o d for t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y of c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e . O n e tries to set o u t t h e different c o n d i t i o n s e m b o d i e d in t h e c o n t r a c t u a l situa­ tion i n w h i c h their p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d b e c h o s e n . In t h i s w a y o n e formu­ lates t h e various u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o n w h i c h t h e s e c o n c e p t i o n s s e e m to d e p e n d " (TJ 121-22). Here, Rawls s u g g e s t s t h a t o n e b e g i n s with a p a r t i c u l a r criterion of j u s t i c e a n d t h e n c o n s t r u c t s o n e ' s initial situa­ tion accordingly: "We w a n t to define t h e original p o s i t i o n s o t h a t w e get t h e d e s i r e d s o l u t i o n " (TJ 141); "the original p o s i t i o n h a s b e e n defined s o t h a t it is a s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e m a x i m i n r u l e a p p l i e s " (TJ 155). Each of t h e s e t w o p i c t u r e s is o v e r d r a w n a n d at o d d s w i t h Rawls's m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . Of t h e original p o s i t i o n a n d h i s max­ imin c n t e n o n , n e i t h e r is c o n c e i v e d p r i o r to a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the other. T h e p o i n t is r a t h e r to fit t h e m closely i n t o e a c h o t h e r while arguing for t h e specification of e a c h o n i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d s a s far as XeS

lO-UH^HT^nTTF ' 1 ' * ; Pettit, TJ 3 1 2 - 1 4 ; Naget, W provides f?UN ~ " " g r a v e , MULT; a n d Harsanyi, CMP. Rawls provides s o m e d e f e n s e s a n d elaborations in R M C a n d RAM

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possible (cf. TJ 20). H e n c e R a w l s ' s failure t o establish a tight c o n n e c t i o n between his original p o s i t i o n a n d h i s favored criterion w o u l d n o t d e ­ stroy his case for t h e latter. H e c o u l d still try t o r e d e s c r i b e t h e original position in a w a y t h a t p r e s e r v e s t h e plausibility of this "expository device" (TJ 21) w h i l e a l s o r e d e e m i n g h i s claim that t h e parties w o u l d employ t h e m a x i m i n r u l e ( a n d c h o o s e h i s favored criterion). Rawls's argument w o u l d b e d e f e a t e d o n l y if every d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e initial situation that c o u l d y i e l d h i s p r e f e r r e d c r i t e r i o n w e r e morally i m p l a u s ­ ible. But let u s n o t r u s h t o s p e c u l a t e a b o u t h o w t h e original position might best b e r e d e s c r i b e d . F o r it is far from clear t h a t s u c h revision is needed. It is Rawls's c l a i m t h a t a " c o n s t e l l a t i o n of w e a k e r a n d m o r e basic conditions o n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , e a c h w i t h its a p p r o p r i a t e pedigree o r justification . . . , w h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s t h e i r c o m b i n e d force, would lead r e a s o n a b l e p e o p l e t o c h o o s e a s if t h e y w e r e highly riskaverse" (RAM 649). Rawls h a s given at least six g r o u n d s for this claim, but his critics h a v e a l m o s t exclusively c o n c e n t r a t e d o n only t w o of these: that t h e r e is r e a s o n , b e h i n d t h e veil of ignorance, for sharply discounting p r o b a b i l i t y e s t i m a t e s (TJ 154) a n d t h a t c h o o s i n g in accor­ dance with t h e m a x i m i n r u l e e n s u r e s a n a c c e p t a b l e m i n i m u m position above which t h e r e is little t o g a i n a n d b e l o w w h i c h t h e r e is m u c h to lose (TJ 154-55). Let m e briefly r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e r e m a i n i n g four rea­ sons. 2

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Third, "the p a r t i e s w a n t t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o a p p e a r well f o u n d e d t o others" (TJ 173). W h a t is m e a n t , I s u p p o s e , is that t h e parties s h o u l d choose in t h e spirit of a t r u s t e e investing m o n e y for a w a r d . This attitude is i n d e e d a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e in s h a p i n g basic institutions t h e Parties (and we) a r e d e t e r m i n i n g t h e v a r i o u s social positions that per­ sons will b e b o r n i n t o , w i t h o u t c h o i c e . Fourth, t h e b e n c h m a r k ot 4

J take the original p o s i t i o n to i n c o r p o r a t e t h e following six features-. (II the « « * parties a s m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d a n d rational in t h e narrow s e n s e ™ ( e g . , TJ 1 4 4 - 4 5 ) ; (2) t h e characterization of those ^ s e n t as individuals, a n d e q u a l moral p e r s o n s w i t h t w o h . g h e s t e

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equality, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e c o n c e r n for t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d , appropri­ ately e x p r e s s e s t h e political c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , o u r aspiration for a society of free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s (RMC 1 4 4 - 4 5 ) . Fifth, a maximin criterion is m u c h e a s i e r t o apply, for it is c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h t h e worst s h a r e . It is especially s u i t a b l e as a p u b l i c c r i t e r i o n b e c a u s e one can m o r e easily u n d e r s t a n d it a n d c h e c k w h e t h e r it is satisfied (TJ 517; RMC 143-44). 5

Finally, t h e p a r t i e s ' c h o i c e is to b e a b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t t h a t persons s h o u l d b e able t o k e e p w i t h o u t t o o m u c h difficulty. W h e n Rawls's m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n is satisfied, t h e " s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t " are rela­ tively w e a k b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e will benefit from e x i s t i n g inequalities vis-a-vis t h e b e n c h m a r k of equality, a n d t h e w o r s t s h a r e , in particular, will n o t b e w o r s e t h a n n e c e s s a r y s o a s to a l l o w o t h e r s h a r e s to be h i g h e r t h a n t h e y c o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e . T h a t e v e n t h e w o r s t social posi­ t i o n will b e r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a b l e ( c o m p a r e d t o t h e w o r s t social posi­ t i o n u n d e r a n y alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e favored b y o t h e r criteria) is of s o m e m o m e n t b e c a u s e " t h e p a r t i e s m u s t d e c l i n e all risks e a c h possible o u t c o m e of w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t a g r e e i n g o o d faith t o a c c e p t " (RAM 653). Moreover, w e a k s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t a r e a n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e for t h e crucially i m p o r t a n t g o o d of stability (TJ 1 7 5 - 7 8 , 4 9 8 - 9 9 ; RMC 144). In v i e w of t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l positive r e a s o n s ( a n d t h e d e f e n s e s devel­ o p e d in §6.4) let m e t h e n a s s u m e t h a t t h e c a s e for m a x i m i n is still p l a u s i b l e a n d c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e s e c o n d s t e p : "If t h e original position h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d s o t h a t it is r a t i o n a l for t h e p a r t i e s t o a d o p t the conservative a t t i t u d e e x p r e s s e d b y [ t h e m a x i m i n ) r u l e , a conclusive a r g u m e n t c a n i n d e e d b e c o n s t r u c t e d for t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s " (TJ 153). T h e r e a r e m a n y different w a y s in w h i c h a m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n might be specified, however, d e p e n d i n g o n h o w o n e s e t s v a r i o u s f u r t h e r param­ e t e r s . In t h i s s e c t i o n a n d t h e n e x t I will p r e s e n t a n d p a r t l y d i s c u s s these f u r t h e r e l e m e n t s of Rawls's p a r t i c u l a r m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n . T h e discus­ s i o n will suggest v a r i o u s w a y s of revising t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n u p o n w h i c h t h e m a x i m i n r a n k i n g of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s is to be based. l O A . Rawls is c o m m i t t e d t o h u m a n i s m a n d t h u s d e n i e s t h a t a con­ c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d i n c l u d e a n i m a l s a s well: " T h o s e w h o c a n give j u s h c e a r e o w e d j u s t i c e " (TJ 510).« Rawls s e e m s a l s o t o d e n y that

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animals have m o r a l r i g h t s ( t h a t w e o w e t h e m morality), for h e says that we have "duties of c o m p a s s i o n a n d h u m a n i t y in their case" (TJ 512, m y emphasis). While t h i s s e c o n d t e n e t is c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e first is m o r e secure. Animals w o u l d b e suffering a n i n j u s t i c e if t h e y w e r e excessively disadvantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o r u n r e a s o n a b l y ex­ cluded from s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r . But n e i t h e r is t h e case. Ani­ mals cannot p a r t i c i p a t e i n b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b e c a u s e they c a n n o t understand political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , legal rights, m a r k e t s , money, marriage, a n d t h e like. If w e s h o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s take t h e m into ac­ count in t h e d e s i g n of o u r s o c i a l w o r l d , w e a r e b o u n d b y a collective duty of morality. 10.3. Rawls t a k e s t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t i c i p a n t s in social institutions, represented by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position, to b e individual persons. 10.3.1. One a l t e r n a t i v e s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e u n i t s of moral concern include g r o u p s , a n d i n h i s first s t a t e m e n t of his c o n c e p t i o n of justice Rawls d i d i n d e e d s t i p u l a t e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s also r e p r e s e n t "na­ tions, provinces, b u s i n e s s firms, c h u r c h e s , t e a m s , a n d s o o n " (JR 245, cf. 8-49).» He h a s s i n c e c o m e t o t h e v i e w t h a t o n e s h o u l d not postulate groups with r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n t e r e s t s over a n d above t h o s e of its m e m ­ bers: "For r e a s o n s of clarity a m o n g o t h e r s . . . w e w a n t to a c c o u n t for t h e social values, for t h e i n t r i n s i c g o o d of institutional, c o m m u n i t y , a n d associative activities, b y a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e that in its theoretical basis is individualistic" (TJ 264). A further, decisive r e a s o n s u p p o r t i n g ™» change is t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n of " s u p r a p e r s o n a l " u n i t s w o u l d b e incompatible w i t h R a w l s ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r i m a c y of (the subject of) "J; basic s t r u c t u r e . If w e a r e t o b e g i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y with t h e Section u p o n o u r m o s t b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e n w e c a n hardly take tor fatted that t h e s e a r e t o r e g u l a t e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g business 7

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JJ* » g n of b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . , , 10.3.2. In r o u g h l y t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n goes t h e d e m a n d tor m e dmjssion of " s u b p e r s o n a l " u n i t s . S a n d e l ' s i d e a of "a plurality of selves IT § < ^ d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g " (LLJ 63) c a n h a r d l y be useful g a n d a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t o n e might c o n s i d e r * slices of i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g s . T h i s i d e a raises various q u e s 3

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h e a d s of families" (TJ 128). T h i s idea plays a very to^rote in 1 ^ i ° n that t h e parties c a r e for m e m b e r s of ^ t u r e g e n e r a ^ ^ J that e a c h h o u s e h o l d , regardless o f size, h a s only o n e r e p r e s e n t ^ ^ P o s i t i o n . ) Rawls w a n t e d that c o n c l u s i o n ^ p u r p o s e s of an a c c o u n ^ J ? h a s s i n c e w i t h d r a w n this a c c o u n t (BSS70> o i ' d M d u a l i s h p f , W he h also a b a n d o n e d talk of h e a d s of families in favor of cleanly m d m a C o n c l

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tions: h o w "thick" s h o u l d t h e slices b e , a n d s h o u l d p e r s o n s b e sliced individually (by age) o r t o g e t h e r o n c e r t a i n fixed d a t e s ? T h e problems of i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h i s i d e a i n t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a modem society are evident, b u t m o r e d a m a g i n g is t h e p r o b l e m that these h u m a n slices w o u l d t h e m s e l v e s w a n t t o b e t a k e n into account as c o m p l e t e p e r s o n s , w o u l d w a n t to b e able to save for a n d b o r r o w against future i n c o m e , a n d t h e like. 10.4. T h e r e a r e t w o m a i n a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e semiconsequentialist e l e m e n t of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . 10.4.1. Rawls d e p a r t s from d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of justice by h o l d i n g t h a t equivalent benefits a n d b u r d e n s s h o u l d b e weighted equally, regardless of w h e t h e r t h e y a r e e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s . In t h e c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c structures t h e perspective of its p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s is decisive, o r s o a broadly consequentialist approach maintains. 10.4.2. W i t h i n s u c h a n a p p r o a c h , t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o s e m i c o n s e q u e n tialism is full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t p a y a t t e n t i o n n o t o n l y t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social goods b u t also to differences in p e r s o n s ' p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l constitutions. W e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r s h a r e s n o t in t h e a b s t r a c t b u t in relation t o the p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s w h o s e s h a r e s t h e y a r e . T h i s k i n d of objection to Rawls c a n b e specified in t w o w a y s , p o i n t i n g t o w a r d t w o roughly o p p o s i t e k i n d s of fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of justice. 10.4.2.1. O n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t relevant p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e defined a s i n c l u d i n g capabilities, n e e d s , g o o d looks, t a s t e s , preferences, or desires, so that n a t u r a l differences are compensated for. T h o s e whose lives a r e w o r s e b e c a u s e of t h e i r inferior p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l constitution s h o u l d , o t h e r things equal, h a v e a s u p e r i o r s h a r e of b e n e f i t s a n d bur­ d e n s ; i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t q u a l i t y of life (or standard of living, in Sen's p h r a s e ) . T h e a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g social i n s t i t u t i o n s m i g h t t h e n b e e i t h e r m a x i m i n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r s o m e mea­ s u r e c o m b i n i n g social a n d n a t u r a l p r i m a r y g o o d s . In r e s p o n s e to this objection, Rawls h a s s t r e s s e d t h e n e e d for " w o r k a b l e criteria for inter­ p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s w h i c h c a n b e publicly a n d , if p o s s i b l e , easily a p p l i e d " (SUPG 169). He h a s also p o i n t e d o u t t h a t h e c o n c e i v e s persons, in virtue of t h e i r s e c o n d m o r a l power, as free to c h o o s e a n d as responsi­ ble for t h e i r o w n final e n d s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . T h e y c a n b e e x p e c t e d to have ' a d j u s t e d t h e i r likes a n d dislikes over t h e c o u r s e of t h e i r lives to t h e i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h t h e y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t " (SUPG 169). But t h e s e r e m a r k s a d d r e s s only t h e easier c a s e s , b y p a s s i n g t h e difficult q u e s t i o n of h o w to c o p e w i t h t h o s e m a n i f e s t a n d objective interper­ s o n a l differences in n e e d s for a n d c a p a c i t i e s to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of social p n m a r y g o o d s for w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s r e s p o n s i b l e a n d to w h i c h they c a n adjust t h e m s e l v e s o n l y w i t h g r e a t difficulty, if at all. 10

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T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.4.2.2

115

The serious p r o b l e m for R a w l s i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t for p u r p o s e s of identifying t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n , s p e c i a l gifts a n d n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s (spe­ cial disabilities o r n e e d s ) s h o u l d b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . This idea is perhaps most c o m p e l l i n g in c a s e s s u c h as b l i n d n e s s or special medical needs, which Rawls leaves a s i d e (e.g., KCMT 546; SUPG 168). But it p o s e s a general challenge t o h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t for p u r p o s e s of assessing basic structures, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e defined solely in terms of benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social i n t e r a c t i o n . 104.2.2. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e m i g h t a r g u e that positions s h o u l d be defined so that n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s a r e corrected for. W h e n a basic structure generates u n e q u a l s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y goods, these give rise to questions of j u s t i c e o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y c a n n o t b e explained by reference to differences i n e n d o w m e n t s (or m o t i v a t i o n ) . On this view, the least advantaged a r e t h o s e w h o s e s h a r e s fall farthest short of t h e shares of others similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d e n d o w e d . T h e r e a r e two p r o b ­ lems with this view. Defining t h e b e n c h m a r k of equality a s a state in which persons' s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s m a t c h t h e i r natural endowments implicitly p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t g r e a t e r e n d o w m e n t s should entitle persons t o l a r g e r s h a r e s ; t h i s is t h e k i n d of claim w h o s e merits were questioned i n § 6 . 2 - 4 . M o r e o v e r , t h e institutional s c h e m e s favored y the p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i o n w o u l d b e likely t o e n g e n d e r considerable strains of c o m m i t m e n t , a s n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s a n d social disadvantages would powerfully aggravate e a c h o t h e r . T h o s e w i t h a weak physical ^ d mental c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d i n a d d i t i o n h a v e t h e smallest m i n i m u m share of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . . \ 11

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me second c h a l l e n g e is p e r h a p s n o t s o s e r i o u s , b u t it h e l p s m e bring °W how Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m is a plausible intermediate Point between t w o fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t e x t r e m e s . To illustrate, let m e jfetch how t h e difference p r i n c i p l e i n its s i m p l e s t form (symbolizing tawls's maximin c r i t e r i o n ) w o u l d e v a l u a t e a n i n c o m e distribution a b a c k g r o u n d of d i v e r s e n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s . On Rawls's proposal, Positions a r e a s s e s s e d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y i n t e r m s of i n c o m e alone_ he rejects, o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e i d e a of defining t h e m in t e r m s ot < f come + n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s > - i n w h i c h c a s e equality of i n c o m e for PWJons working e q u a l l y h a r d w o u l d r e q u i r e special l " ^ ™ * \ 2> «w i i y m o r e gifted (whose greater J J f B n o t r e w a r d e d ) vis-a-vis t h e n a t u r a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d . A n d h e on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e i d e a of defining positions i n t e r m s ot ^ c o m e relative t o n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s > - i n w h i c h case equality ot 8

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i n c o m e for p e r s o n s w o r k i n g e q u a l l y h a r d w o u l d r e q u i r e special justifi­ cation b e c a u s e it w o u l d d i s a d v a n t a g e t h e n a t u r a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d (to w h o m o t h e r h u m a n g o o d s are less a c c e s s i b l e ) vis-a-vis t h e naturally gifted. On Rawls's p r o p o s a l , justification is r e q u i r e d insofar as institu­ t i o n s g e n e r a t e unequal i n c o m e s for p e r s o n s w o r k i n g equally hard; the d i s a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w i t h t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e s , regardless of their specific n a t u r a l capabilities o r n e e d s . 10.5. In Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , all i n t r a - a n d interschemic c o m p a r i s o n s a r e to b e m a d e i n t e r m s of s h a r e s of social primary g o o d s — c e r t a i n b a s i c liberties a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i n c o m e a n d wealth, p o w e r s a n d prerogatives of offices, a n d t h e social b a s e s of self-respect (TJ 62, 92). Rawls h o l d s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position have r e a s o n t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t p r e f e r m o r e of these g o o d s t o less (TJ 9 3 , 1 4 2 - 4 3 , 253, 260, 396, 4 3 3 - 3 4 ) . But h e changes his m i n d a b o u t t h e i r b a s i s for t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . In A Theory of Justice the a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is s a i d (TJ 92) t o follow from the "thin t h e o r y of t h e g o o d , " featuring t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e a n d rational life p l a n s (TJ §§60-65). Later, this a c c o u n t is l i n k e d t o t h e highest- and h i g h e r - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s of free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s (KCMT 525-26). In b o t h cases, t h e a r g u m e n t , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t sketchy, is clearly r e l a t e d to t h e value of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m . 1 0 . 5 . 1 . It m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t p e r s o n s u l t i m a t e l y c a r e not about social p r i m a r y g o o d s but, for e x a m p l e , a b o u t h a p p i n e s s o r utility. Inter­ p e r s o n a l a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e m a d e in t e r m s of t h e utility value of s h a r e s , a s c a l c u l a t e d b y m e a n s of general f o r m u l a s (which, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , w o u l d leave a s i d e i n t e r p e r s o n a l differences). Rawls c a n reject t h i s p r o p o s a l o n the g r o u n d t h a t utility is just o n e e n d a m o n g o t h e r s . S o m e will a t t a c h great i m p o r t a n c e t o it, w h i l e o t h e r s will c h e r i s h w i s d o m , love, o r art. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s e g o o d s is n o t directly r e g u l a t e d b y t h e b a s i c struc­ t u r e — a n d c o u l d n o t p l a u s i b l y b e at a n y r a t e — a n d s o t h e r e is n o need to settle t h e i r relative i m p o r t a n c e . A c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d as far as possible avoid taking a s t a n d o n s u c h differences a b o u t t h e g o o d life It c a n d o so by d e s c r i b i n g s h a r e s in t e r m s of g o o d s t h a t overlap closely w i t h t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t a c t u a l l y g e t d i s t r i b u t e d in the c o u r s e of social i n t e r a c t i o n as r e g u l a t e d b y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s (are "at the disposition of society" [TJ 62]). F u r t h e r a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t the value of t h e s e g o o d s c o n s i s t s in a r e to b e a v o i d e d b e c a u s e s u c h as­ s u m p t i o n s w o u l d n e e d l e s s l y m a k e t h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e more controversial. T h e s a m e g o e s for further a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t s u c h goods s h o u l d best b e u s e d for. S h a r e s a r e t o b e d e s c r i b e d in very general t e r m s . I n s t e a d of asking w h e t h e r p e o p l e travel a n d r e a d books, for e x a m p l e it isC b e t tee r t o ask w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e t h e freedom t o travel a n d whiif exercise this f r e e d o m . I n s t e a d of asking w n e t n e r t h e y h a v e a c c e s s t o u n s p o i l e d n a t u r e , it is b e t t e r to ask 0

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whether they have l i b e r t i e s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t allow t h e m a n equal say about m a t t e r s of e n v i r o n m e n t a l quality. This way, Rawls's conception of j u s t i c e r e s p e c t s p e r s o n s ' f r e e d o m in t h a t it "does not look behind the u s e w h i c h p e r s o n s m a k e " (TJ 94; cf. SUPG 169-72) of t h e general all-purpose m e a n s a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l . It takes t h e s e m e a n s t h e m ­ selves as f u n d a m e n t a l a n d d e f i n e s relevant p o s i t i o n s in t e r m s of t h e m . 10.5.2. But o n e m a y still c h a l l e n g e Rawls's a p p r o a c h at this point without a b a n d o n i n g h i s r e s p e c t for f r e e d o m . Different institutional schemes will e n g e n d e r different a t t i t u d e s a n d will t h u s affect the ways in which p e r s o n s will u s e t h e i r f r e e d o m . P e r h a p s p e r s o n s w o u l d cher­ ish art and w o u l d s u p p o r t art t h r o u g h private a n d political efforts under some i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s b u t n o t u n d e r o t h e r s . Rawls is com­ mitted to the view t h a t s u c h differences s h o u l d not play a role in constructing a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . It s h o u l d n o t be p r e s u m e d a h e a d of time that art o u g h t t o b e c h e r i s h e d . 10.5.3. Even if R a w l s w e r e r i g h t a b o u t h o w a n a c c o u n t of social primary goods s h o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d , h e m i g h t still b e mistaken about what particular g o o d s s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d o r a b o u t h o w t h e y should be weighted relative t o o n e a n o t h e r . I will d i s c u s s several s u c h issues in Sll-12 and § § 1 5 - 1 7 . 10.5.4. Finally, R a w l s ' s w a y of b r i n g i n g t h e m a x i m i n idea to b e a r "pon his a c c o u n t of s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s m a y also s e e m problematic, w even if the p a r t i e s e m p l o v t h e m a x i m i n rule a n d a s s u m e that t h e Persons they r e p r e s e n t p r e f e r m o r e social p r i m a r y g o o d s t o less, it d o e s notfollowthat t h e y w o u l d favor w h a t e v e r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e offers t h e best share. It m u s t a l s o b e a s s u m e d t h a t Rawls's social primary goods have n o significant n e g a t i v e externalities. Even while each per°n is better off w i t h m o r e r a t h e r t h a n less, it m a y still b e t r u e that e a c h h a v e m o r e t h a n if all h a v e (Compare, even if each is *** with a g u t h a n w i t h o u t o n e , it m a y still b e t r u e that each is ess «e if all have g u n s t h a n if n o n e do.) I try to resolve this p r o b l e m i n §13.5 ™ C h t 4 t h r o u g h a p a r t i c u l a r v i e w of t h e basic political liberties s

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t h e i r i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s u p o n s o m e larger least advantaged g r o u p ( u n d e r e a c h s c h e m e ) . I find t h i s k i n d of r e a s o n i n g convincing in r e g a r d to engendered (intra- o r i n t e r s c h e m i c ) i n e q u a l i t i e s in social p r i m a r y g o o d s , s u c h a s i n e q u a l i t i e s i n i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , in the fair value of b a s i c political liberties, o r in t h e s e c u r i t y of o t h e r basic liberties. T h e r e a s o n i n g is l e s s c o n v i n c i n g i n r e g a r d t o p a r t l y established inequal­ ities h o w e v e r . W h e n s o m e a r e explicitly e x c l u d e d from certain consti­ t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s o r legally b a r r e d from c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the n u m b e r of p e r s o n s so d i s a d v a n t a g e d is m u c h l e s s relevant. But then we c a n n o t treat e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s differently—at least if I a m right t o a r g u e (§§2.2,11.2.1) t h a t t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice must c o n s i d e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of overall s h a r e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e separate d i s t r i b u t i o n s of v a r i o u s g o o d s . H e r e t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t consider­ a t i o n s s e e m t o p o i n t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s , and the countervailing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c a n b e a c c o m m o d a t e d b y stipulating that r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s a r e r e a s o n a b l y s m a l l o r t h a t representative s h a r e s a r e t h e g e o m e t r i c ( r a t h e r t h a n a r i t h m e t i c ) m e a n of t h e shares of t h e m e m b e r s of t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p . 1 3

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upward mobility w e r e 100 p e r c e n t . It w o u l d l e a d t o t h e a b s u r d conclu­ sion that a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h t h e least a d v a n t a g e d earn $5.00 a n hour all their lives is, o t h e r t h i n g s e q u a l , to b e preferred to a s c h e m e under which everyone's n e t i n c o m e r a t e g r a d u a l l y increases with age, say, from $4.50 t o $30.00. It is e v i d e n t , I t r u s t , t h a t t h e u p w a r d mobility under the latter s c h e m e m u s t c o u n t i n its favor. I suggest that Rawls m e a n s t o a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r p e r s o n s ' social positions a r e t o b e e v a l u a t e d ex post o r ex ante . Should w e care about those w h o s e lifetime e x p e c t a t i o n o r p r o s p e c t for social primary goods (a p r o b a b i l i t y - w e i g h t e d average) is w o r s t o r about t h o s e w h o would actually h a v e t h e w o r s t s h a r e of social p r i m a r y goods over a lifetime? Under a s c h e m e w i t h a lot of social mobility, representative expected lifetime s h a r e s m a y n o t differ m u c h b e t w e e n those b o r n into different classes. Yet actual lifetime s h a r e s m a y differ quite significantly, so that those (from all c l a s s b a c k g r o u n d s ) w h o fail in their careers are very badly off. U n d e r s u c h a s c h e m e , t h e w o r s t representative ex ante position (prospective s h a r e s of t h o s e b o r n into t h e lowest class) would °e much s u p e r i o r t o t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ex post position (the worst actual shares). I i n t e r p r e t Rawls's s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e irrelevance of social mobility t o m e a n t h a t h e is o p t i n g for t h e ex post perspective. The least a d v a n t a g e d a r e d e f i n e d a s t h o s e w h o w o u l d actually t u r n out have the w o r s t s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s over a complete life. 1S

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Another alternative t o t h e ex post p e r s p e c t i v e is the view that a criterion of justice s h o u l d b e c o n c e r n e d n o t w i t h lifetime shares at all y with t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of initial s h a r e s o r starting positions (at coming of age, say). T h e p r e f e r r e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is t h e one that generates the best m i n i m u m initial s h a r e . This view differs from t h e ex We Perspective in t h a t it d i s r e g a r d s social mobility. It does not matter the a s s e s s m e n t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e to w h a t extent initial •"equalities will t e n d to b e c o m p o u n d e d ( t h r o u g h centrifugal t e n d e n " » or to b e w a s h e d o u t . T h i s m a t t e r s very m u c h o n t h e ex ante Perspective a n d m a t t e r s a t l e a s t s o m e w h a t o n t h e ex post perspective. b u t

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Both alternative p r o p o s a l s c a n b e s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t by agreeing w i t h Rawls t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s (in expected s h a r e s o r s t a r t i n g positions) s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d o n a par. Yet both are s o m e w h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l i n spirit, i n t h a t p e r s o n s themselves are a s s i g n e d a m u c h larger r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e i r s u c c e s s in life. Still, n e i t h e r alternative g o e s to Nozickian e x t r e m e s , a n d t h a t in at least two r e s p e c t s . First, u n d e r Nozick's l i b e r t a r i a n s c h e m e s o m e m a y (subject to t h e Lockean proviso) start o u t i n d i r e p o v e r t y w i t h o u t any realistic p r o s p e c t of ever i m p r o v i n g t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Nozick is n o t concerned w i t h s t a r t i n g p o s i t i o n s insofar as t h e y a r e e n g e n d e r e d , o r with pros­ p e c t s for social mobility. S e c o n d , u n d e r Nozick's s c h e m e p e r s o n s may risk o r a l i e n a t e all t h e i r initial rights. T h e ex ante p e r s p e c t i v e , however, will favor i n a l i e n a b l e rights w h e n t h i s i m p r o v e s p e r s o n s ' prospects. Even t h e s t a r t i n g - p o s i t i o n view m a y well d o likewise o n t h e grounds t h a t a n initial b u n d l e of a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s c a n b e i m p r o v e d u p o n by t r a n s f o r m i n g s o m e of t h e rights it c o n t a i n s i n t o i n a l i e n a b l e ones. The s e c o n d - o r d e r liberty t o risk o r a l i e n a t e o n e ' s b a s i c r i g h t s is n o t advan­ t a g e o u s , q u i t e a p a r t from p a t e r n a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a b o u t the likeli­ h o o d of m i s t a k e s . It e n d a n g e r s a g e n t s b y p r o v i d i n g v a r i o u s n a s t y incen­ tives t o o t h e r s t o try t o bring t h e m u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l . Still, t h e t w o alternative views, like Nozick's, p a y m u c h less attention t h a n d o e s Rawls t o h o w p e r s o n s ' lives a c t u a l l y t u r n o u t u n d e r alterna­ tive s c h e m e s , w h e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e a g e n t ' s o w n failures a n d achieve­ m e n t s or t h r o u g h c o n t i n g e n t factors. Both m a y favor a s c h e m e under w h i c h s o m e p e r s o n s end up very b a d l y off i n d e e d , w h i c h w o u l d be justified t o s u c h p e r s o n s by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e y s t a r t e d o u t either r e a s o n a b l y well off (starting p o s i t i o n ) o r w i t h r e a s o n a b l y g o o d pros­ p e c t s of s u c c e s s a s w i t n e s s e d b y all t h e o t h e r s from t h e i r b a c k g r o u n d w h o " m a d e it" (ex ante). T h e r e are t w o m a i n k i n d s of a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e s e views. First, c o n s i d e r i n g alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s from t h e (risk-aversei s t a n d p o i n t of a p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t , o n e c a n n o t p l a u s i b l y ignore t h e possibility of e n d i n g u p very b a d l y off o r b e c o n c e r n e d with this possibility only in p r o p o r t i o n to its likelihood. It is t h u s i m p l a u s i b l e for t h e p a r t i e s to b e indifferent to h o w t h e i r c l i e n t s ' lives a c t u a l l y t u r n out. Of c o u r s e , if t h e p a r t i e s d e l i b e r a t e d in a risk-neutral fashion, t h e ex ante a n d ex p o s t p e r s p e c t i v e s w o u l d b e e q u i v a l e n t . But s i n c e t h e y are riskaverse, they m u s t b e c o n c e r n e d to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t lifetime shares r a t h e r t h a n t h e w o r s t e x p e c t e d lifetime s h a r e s , let a l o n e t h e worst initial s h a r e s . Second, t h e t w o alternative criteria of j u s t i c e w o u l d also b e risky in that t h e y w o u l d largely give u p t h e f o u r t h a n d sixth a d v a n t a g e s Rawls claims tor t h e m a x i m i n idea. T h e y m i g h t favor s c h e m e s t h a t e n g e n d e r radical e c o n o m i c inequalities, w h i c h w o u l d f r u s t r a t e Rawls's aspira­ tion tor a s h a r e d n o t i o n of e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p a n d w o u l d a l s o i n d u c e e x t r e m e strains of c o m m i t m e n t a s p e r s o n s w h o s e p o s i t i o n h a d gravely

T h e General Parameters, 10.7

121

deteriorated w o u l d b e s t r o n g l y t e m p t e d n o t to abide by t h e g r o u n d rules when all t h e y c o u l d n o w e x p e c t i s a life of abject poverty. Such schemes would b e less likely t o e n d u r e a n d unlikely t o e n g e n d e r a widespread categorical s e n s e of j u s t i c e . T h e s e a r e i m p o r t a n t reasons for describing t h e p a r t i e s s o t h a t t h e i r risk-averse c o n c e r n extends to the entire lives of t h e i r c l i e n t s . Yet one may t h i n k t h a t t h e R a w l s i a n ex post perspective is too con­ servative in favoring i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s t h a t prohibit almost all forms of gambling a n d (voluntary) e c o n o m i c risk taking. In considering any liberty to take risks, R a w l s ' s p a r t i e s p a y very little attention to t h o s e who gamble a n d w i n , for t h e y will b e u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d a m o n g t h e least advantaged. T h e y f o c u s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y u p o n t h o s e w h o gam­ ble and lose, w h o s e ex post p o s i t i o n is likely to be w o r s e t h a n t h e worst position u n d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w i t h o u t t h e liberty. That these losers w a n t e d t o g a m b l e a n d w e r e free n o t t o is simply ignored. This objection m a y s e e m t o t a k e a n e x t r e m e view of what it would mean to opt for t h e Rawlsian ex post p e r s p e c t i v e . It d o e s not m e a n that wery lottery ticket p e r s o n s m i g h t p u r c h a s e m u s t be considered ex post and that lotteries m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e p r o h i b i t e d . Rawls c a n say that buying a lottery ticket d o e s n o t r e d u c e one's n e t i n c o m e but is o n e way °f spending one's i n c o m e , like b u y i n g a movie ticket. T h e r e is n o reason hy consumption d e c i s i o n s of e i t h e r k i n d s h o u l d b e prohibited. «t I think t h e o b j e c t i o n c a n b e s t a t e d in a plausible form. Take t h e of a society i n w h i c h a c e r t a i n m i d d l i n g position is o p e n to *eryone but m a y b e d e c l i n e d i n favor of a riskier career that offers a J f w (ex ante) e x p e c t a t i o n b u t also involves s o m e d a n g e r of falling ^ovvfhe middling p o s i t i o n . H e r e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e w h o are u n s u c ««W in the risky c a r e e r c a n b e m e a s u r e d in t h r e e different ways: o n e ™W ascribe to t h e m t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of t h e middling posiJon. which is t h e o p t i m a l n o - r i s k s h a r e a t t a i n a b l e a n t e c e d e n t to their 2 ^ o i c e ; o n e m i g h t u s e t h e e x p e c t e d s h a r e of the risky career « t h e i r ex ante p r o s p e c t before t h e i r c a r e e r t u r n s out o n e way or ^ e r but after it i s c h o s e n ; finally, t a k i n g t h e ex p o s t perspecfive, one J * * ascribe t o t h e m t h e (poor) s h a r e t h e y actually h a d after having us?,! y r e e r . T h o s e o b j e c t i n g t o Rawls s view might say: Let ***e in ^ s e s o that s u c h risky vv

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S e c o n d , taking t h e ex ante p e r s p e c t i v e is also i m p l a u s i b l e when the w o r s t ex post s h a r e of t h o s e w h o fail in t h e risky c a r e e r is very bad, so t h a t t h e e q u a l - c i t i z e n s h i p a n d s t r a i n s - o f - c o m m i t m e n t arguments clearly c o m e i n t o play. W h e r e radical d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities are at stake, w e m u s t take t h e ex post p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u g g e s t a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n that makes t h e c h o i c e of p e r s p e c t i v e d e p e n d in p a r t u p o n t h e severity of the p o t e n t i a l inequalities at i s s u e . Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is already c o m m i t t e d t o a suitable n o t i o n of significance t h r o u g h w h i c h this idea c a n b e i n c o r p o r a t e d a n d m a d e m o r e c o n c r e t e — h i s lexical prioritiza­ tion of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s (within t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice). My c o n j e c t u r e , t h e n , is t h a t w h e n t h e lexical o r d e r i n g of t h e principles a p p l i e s , first-principle g o o d s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d always be de­ n n e d m a n ex post fashion, w h i l e all o t h e r g o o d s s h o u l d b e defined in a n ex ante fashion for c a s e s of v o l u n t a r y e x p o s u r e t o risk a n d in an ex post fashion otherwise.™ 1 c o n s i d e r this c o n j e c t u r e a p l a u s i b l e working h y p o t h e s i s t h a t m u s t r e d e e m itself b y fitting t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e remain­ ing e l e m e n t s of Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e .

11. T h e Split into T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice 1 1 . 1 . 1 have a n a l y z e d into its m a i n e l e m e n t s Rawls's general concep­ t i o n of justice, w h i c h t r e a t s all social p r i m a r y g o o d s a s c o m m e n s u r a b l e . "All social p r i m a r y g o o d s . . . a r e t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d e q u a l l y unless an u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of a n y o r all of t h e s e g o o d s is t o t h e advantage of t h e least favored" (TJ 303). Ultimately, h o w e v e r , Rawls w a n t s t o defend a specification of t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t d i v i d e s t h e s e g o o d s into t w o categories, e a c h g o v e r n e d b y its o w n c r i t e r i o n . T h i s special concep­ t i o n of justice is to a p p l y u n d e r " r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s " (BLP 11); t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n is to a p p l y u n d e r all o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e special c o n c e p t i o n raises several f u r t h e r issues. 11.1.1. Although b o t h t h e g e n e r a l a n d t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n s are m a x i m i n criteria, it is, strictly s p e a k i n g , t h e d i s j u n c t i v e c o m b i n a t i o n of g e n e r a l a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s that, a c c o r d i n g t o Rawls, constitutes " t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e " (TJ 152). It « t h u s i m p o r t a n t h o w t h e d o m a i n s of t h e t w o c o n c e p t i o n s a r e delimited, t h a t is, h o w "reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s " a r e d e f i n e d — a question Rawls largely e v a d e s . T h i s t o p i c i n c l u d e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r two c o n c e p t i o n s are really n e c e s s a r y o r w h e t h e r o n e of t h e m is superior u n d e r all c o n d i t i o n s (cf. §12.8.4). '"Even with this conjecture, the liberty t o take e x t r e m e risks or the a s s i g n m e n t of basic rights through (involuntary) lottery c o u l d still be justified u n d e r verv extraordinary S E N ^ T ? ' ' » ^ a r e s ^ " 6 o u t c o m e s of risk . ^ . n o w o r s e than the worst s h a r e s w o u l d be u n d e r any » h « FL.I?™ . ^ c o n t i n u o u s with the justification Rawls enter­ tains for the institution of slavery (TJ 248). 5

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11.1J2. Conversely, s e e i n g t h e g r e a t diversity of possible conditions, one may ask w h y t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d n ' t a d o p t a large n u m b e r of c o n c e p ­ tions, each fine-tuned t o a specific set of social c o n d i t i o n s . I think Rawls could plausibly resist t h i s i d e a , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s have reason not to want a long list of c o n c e p t i o n s . T o o c o m p l i c a t e d a n agreement is likely to be m i s a p p l i e d i n p r a c t i c e e v e n b y c o n s c i e n t i o u s p e r s o n s a n d is generally u n s u i t a b l e a s a p u b l i c c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h citizens c a n assess their common i n s t i t u t i o n s . So t h e p a r t i e s m a y well prefer Rawls's p r o ­ posal of only t w o c o n c e p t i o n s — a n d t h i s n o t m e r e l y as an acceptable approximation b u t a s t h e b e s t w a y of safeguarding the interests of those they r e p r e s e n t u n d e r f o r e s e e a b l e w o r s t - c a s e scenarios. 112. Let u s c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n is, u n d e r rea­ sonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s , a p l a u s i b l e m a x i m i n criterion. It r e a d s as follows (BLP 5): FIBST PRINCIPLE: Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties w h i c h is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. SECOND PRINCIPLE: Social a n d economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi­ tions. First, they m u s t be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity princi­ ple); and second, they m u s t be to the greatest benefit of the least advan­ taged members of society [the difference principle]. Underlying this s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n is t h e i d e a that "the social structure can be divided i n t o t w o m o r e o r less d i s t i n c t p a r t s , t h e first principle PPlying to t h e o n e , t h e s e c o n d t o t h e o t h e r . T h e y distinguish between ™ ^ P e c t s of t h e s o c i a l s y s t e m t h a t define a n d secure t h e equal Gerties of c i t i z e n s h i p a n d t h o s e t h a t specify a n d establish social a n d economic i n e q u a l i t i e s . . . . [T]he d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n fundamental "ghts and liberties and e c o n o m i c a n d social benefits marks a differ­ ence among p r i m a r y s o c i a l g o o d s that o n e s h o u l d try to exploit, it Jests an i m p o r t a n t d i v i s i o n in t h e social s y s t e m " (TJ 61,63). Assum"'gthat each b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c a n b e s o a n a l y z e d into two jointly ex^ s t i v e and n o n o v e r l a p p i n g p a r t s , Rawls p r o p o s e s that over a certain 2?e of c o n d i t i o n s t h e m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n governing t h e assessment ot X « u r e s s h o u l d c o n s i s t of t w o m a x i m i n criteria govem2 the a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e s e t w o p a r t s . T h i s way, e a c h basic structure E*"ves one s c o r e b a s e d o n t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s in terms ot « « c nghts a n d l i b e r t i e s a n d a n o t h e r s c o r e b a s e d o n t h e worst repre ° e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s . Of c o u r s e R a w l m u s J2J weights t o t h e s e tvvo s c o r e s s o a s to e n a b l e a " ^ " ^ r * ^ a t i v e basic s t r u c t u r e s . B u t e v e n before asking h o w t h e two scores jo be aggregated, I c a n s t a t e t w o o b j e c t i o n s right away, ' ^ a w i t h t h e split i n t o two criteria, t h e distributions oTthe^two J * * g o o d s a r e a s s e s s e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of « a c h o t h e r ^ m p o r t a n t N a t i o n a b o u t e a c h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is d i s r e g a r d e d . It c a n n o t c o m e a

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i n t o view w h e t h e r inequalities of t h e t w o k i n d s t e n d t o compensate or aggravate o n e a n o t h e r , b u t this i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e if the q u e s t is for t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of social justice. To clarify t h e o b j e c t i o n let m e s y m b o l i z e t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a social position by a n o r d e r e d p a i r of n u m b e r s t h a t r e p r e s e n t t h e p o s i t i o n ' s firstp r i n c i p l e s c o r e a n d s o c i o e c o n o m i c s c o r e , respectively. S u p p o s e basic s t r u c t u r e O N E h a s t w o relevant g r o u p s w i t h s c o r e s < 8 0 , 7 0 > and < 3 0 , 2 0 > , w h i l e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e T W O h a s t w o relevant g r o u p s with s c o r e s < 8 0 , 2 0 > a n d < 3 0 , 7 0 > . W e m a y a s s u m e t h a t o t h e r things and also t h e size of all four g r o u p s a r e e q u a l . I n t h i s case, t h e t w o basic s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d b e r a n k e d a s e q u a l s b y Rawls's split criterion; both p r i n c i p l e s of justice a r e equally well o r ill satisfied. But t h e parties w o u l d obviously p r e f e r a criterion y i e l d i n g a p r e f e r e n c e for b a s i c struc­ t u r e T W O b e c a u s e b o t h relevant social p o s i t i o n s u n d e r T W O a r e clearly s u p e r i o r to t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n u n d e r O N E . 1

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We s e e h e r e that t h e special c o n c e p t i o n — t h o u g h it i s i n o n e sense, a s its n a m e is m e a n t t o suggest, a limiting c a s e of t h e g e n e r a l concep­ tion, i n w h i c h specific w e i g h t s a r e a t t a c h e d t o t h e v a r i o u s social pri­ m a r y g o o d s relative t o e a c h o t h e r — i s also m o r e t h a n j u s t a special case of t h e general c o n c e p t i o n . T h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d always yield a p r e f e r e n c e for T W O over O N E , n o m a t t e r h o w t h e t w o scores are w e i g h t e d (so l o n g a s n e i t h e r k i n d of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is disre­ g a r d e d entirely). 11.2.2. A related difficulty derives from Rawls's v i e w t h a t "as far as possible t h e basic s t r u c t u r e s h o u l d b e a p p r a i s e d from t h e position of equal citizenship T h e p r o b l e m s of a d j u d i c a t i n g a m o n g t h e funda­ m e n t a l liberties a r e settled b y reference t o it" (TJ 97). By contrast, a m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n w o u l d b e sensitive t o w h a t a l t e r n a t i v e specifications of t h e b a s i c liberties w o u l d m e a n for t h e v a r i o u s s o c i o e c o n o m i c classes, a n d surely t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e rich a n d t h e p o o r might be o p p o s e d in regard to, say, h o w f r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s s h o u l d b e spec­ ified, h o w political s p e e c h s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d (cf. BLP 73-74), o r h o w judicial p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d b e f i n a n c e d . W h a t is t h e p r e f e r e n c e of "the representative equal citizen" in s u c h c a s e s ? " This p r o b l e m is s o m e w h a t m i t i g a t e d b y Rawls's qualification that differential effects of a set of equal b a s i c liberties " m a y b e left a s i d e . . . if social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities a r e just" (TJ 9 7 ) . T h i s suggests 2

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(though it does n o t entail) t h a t t h e y m a y n o t b e left a s i d e w h e n social and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e n o t j u s t . But w h e n Rawls actually dis­ cusses the specification of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties in the United States, he does s o from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of equal citizenship (BLP), even though he clearly believes t h a t t h e s e c o n d principle is not satisfied (TJ279). The problem h a s a n a n a l o g u e in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . How are we to compare i n c o m e s a c r o s s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s if these have different price v e c t o r s ? T h i s is e v i d e n t l y a n extremely complicated problem, which I c a n n o t a d d r e s s in a n y d e t a i l . Still, t h e intuitive idea must be to c o n s t r u c t s o m e s t a n d a r d b a s k e t of g o o d s a n d services a n d then ask h o w m a n y s u c h b a s k e t s c o u l d b e b o u g h t with t h e lowest representative i n c o m e u n d e r e a c h s c h e m e . T h e p r o b l e m is h o w to construct this s t a n d a r d b a s k e t — f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of "the equal citizen" or from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . In the former case, we would b e g u i d e d b y w h a t p e r s o n s in general tend to c o n s u m e in the two s c h e m e s . In t h e l a t t e r c a s e , w e w o u l d b e g u i d e d by what the poor would t e n d t o c o n s u m e a n d m i g h t , therefore, weight the price of basic foodstuffs m o r e heavily a n d t h a t of airline tickets less heavily, for example. Once t h e q u e s t i o n h a s b e e n clearly stated, it is h a r d to see how risk-averse c o n t r a c t o r s (or m a x i m i n p h i l o s o p h e r s ) can allow inter­ schemic income c o m p a r i s o n s t o b e m a d e from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of the rcpresentative (average) c i t i z e n r a t h e r t h a n t h a t of t h e least advantaged, 'tod the same h o l d s , for a n a l o g o u s r e a s o n s , for i n t e r s c h e m i c com­ parisons of alternative s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of b a s i c rights a n d liberties. 22

11.3. For r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s Rawls p r o p o s e s a serial or 'eacographical ("lexical") o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o scores, s o that first-score ^erentials always o v e r r i d e s e c o n d - s c o r e differentials. The reason he f es is that " t h e i n t e r e s t s of liberty . . . b e c o m e stronger as the conuiJ r the e x e r c i s e of t h e e q u a l f r e e d o m s are m o r e wily realized. % ° n d some p o i n t it b e c o m e s a n d t h e n r e m a i n s irrational from t h e ^andpoint of t h e original p o s i t i o n t o a c k n o w l e d g e a lesser liberty_tor foesake of r m a t e r i a l m e a n s a n d a m e n i t i e s of office" (TJ 542). The Parhes adopt t h e s p e c i a l r a t h e r t h a n t h e general c o n c e p t i o n for^sucn °ndiuons b e c a u s e , o n t h e b a s i s of t h e i r limited knowledge, they find t ^ ° n a l to a s s u m e t h a t t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t will, " n ^ " . J * * take a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y g r e a t e r interest in basics r i g h t a n d than i n all o t h e r s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s . Rawls n e e d not daw parties k n o w t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t o b e true, t h o u g h h e sometimes to think t h a t h e m u s t (BLP 83 n. 87). It is e n o u g h that rt be h e J« sensible o n e t o m a k e for t h e p a r t i e s w h o seek to safeguard the ^ ^ o n h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t u n d e r foreseeable worst-case see o n s

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narios. P e r h a p s t h e p a r t i e s k n o w o n l y t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s , given their two h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s a s s t i p u l a t e d b y Rawls, will u n d e r reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h v e r y g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e basic liberties relative t o social a n d e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s a n d b u r d e n s . If t h e dangers of u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g t h i s i m p o r t a n c e a r e g r e a t e r t h a n t h o s e of overestimat­ ing it, it m a y well b e rational for t h e m to m a k e t h e a s s u m p t i o n of infinite w e i g h t , especially w h e n this a s s u m p t i o n o b v i a t e s t h e need for w e i g h t i n g a n d b a l a n c i n g diverse g o o d s a n d t h u s r e s u l t s in a criterion t h a t is easier t o a p p l y a n d m o r e s u i t a b l e a s a p u b l i c criterion (all of w h i c h t e n d s t o raise t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n ) . Evidently, t h e serial o r d e r i n g h a s very c o n s i d e r a b l e advantages as a simplifying device. It n e a t l y resolves c a s e s w h e r e t h e t w o principles are n o t cosatisfiable. As Rawls u n d e r s t a n d s it, it a l s o g u i d e s o u r efforts t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform: " W h e n w e c o m e t o n o n i d e a l theory, we do n o t fall b a c k s t r a i g h t w a y u p o n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice. [T]he r a n k i n g of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i n i d e a l t h e o r y reflects back a n d g u i d e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s to n o n i d e a l situations. It identifies w h i c h limitations n e e d t o b e d e a l t w i t h first" (TJ 303, cf. 2461 in t h a t it " r e q u i r e s u s to satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e in t h e o r d e r i n g before w e c a n m o v e o n t o t h e s e c o n d , t h e s e c o n d b e f o r e w e c o n s i d e r the third, a n d so on. A p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t c o m e i n t o p l a y u n t i l t h o s e previous to it are e i t h e r fully m e t or d o n o t a p p l y " (TJ 43, cf. 244). T h i s lexical priority, however, also raises a n u m b e r of s e r i o u s difficulties for Rawls's claim to b e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m a x i m i n criterion of social j u s t i c e . 1 1 . 3 . 1 . Let m e again r e p r e s e n t t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a social position by a n o r d e r e d p a i r . S u p p o s e t h a t w h e n t h e first p r i n c i p l e is satisfied, the first n u m b e r will b e 100 for all p o s i t i o n s . N o w t a k e a b a s i c structure g e n e r a t i n g t w o p o s i t i o n s w i t h s c o r e s < 8 0 , 7 0 > a n d < 3 0 , 2 0 > . Here the last q u o t a t i o n w o u l d suggest t h a t o n e n e e d n o t w o r r y a b o u t t h e sec­ o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d ( u n j u s t l y low, let u s sup­ pose), so long a s s o m e first-principle s c o r e s h a v e n o t r e a c h e d 100. By contrast, a m a x i m i n criterion w o u l d d e m a n d t h a t political efforts and social r e s o u r c e s be d e v o t e d to raising t h e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of the least a d v a n t a g e d w h e n s u c h efforts d o n o t d e t r a c t from i m p r o v i n g their first-pnnciple s c o r e . All p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d a l w a y s b e "in p l a y " More i m p o r t a n t , b o t h q u o t a t i o n s entail t h a t feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s in the hrst-principle s c o r e of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d (for e x a m p l e , l a r g e r press freedoms for t h e S o u t h African whites) m u s t t a k e p r e c e d e n c e over feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of t h e l e a s t advan­ c e d (for e x a m p l e , b e t t e r e d u c a t i o n for t h e S o u t h African blacks). But the p a r t i e s m a x i m i n rule w o u l d l e a d t h e m t o prefer a c r i t e r i o n favoring precisely t h e o p p o s i t e priority

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Rawls gets i n t o t h i s p r o b l e m , I believe, b e c a u s e h e d o e s not properly distinguish two different r o l e s of t h e lexical priority. Initially h e takes it to be a design priority. O u r u l t i m a t e goal, as envisioned by t h e special conception, is t o satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e c o m p l e t e l y (which p r e s u p ­ poses the a c h i e v e m e n t of w h a t I call truly favorable conditions), n o matter how its satisfaction m a y c o n s t r a i n t h e distribution of secondprinciple scores. T h i s d e s i g n p r i o r i t y d o e s n o t clash with t h e preemi­ nent concern for t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d . T h e r e a s o n is that a basic structure u n d e r w h i c h t h e f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s of s o m e o r all are abridged ipso facto p r o d u c e s a w o r s t social position that is inferior to the worst social p o s i t i o n u n d e r a n y b a s i c s t r u c t u r e that completely satisfies the first p r i n c i p l e . F o r p u r p o s e s of d e s i g n i n g an ideal institu­ tional scheme, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e s e c o n d principle are then sub­ ject to those of t h e first a n d i n v a l i d a t e d in c a s e s of inconsistency. 2 4

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Without p r o p e r a r g u m e n t for t h e t r a n s i t i o n , Rawls also u n d e r s t a n d s his lexical priority in t h e q u i t e different s e n s e of a n implementation priority. For p u r p o s e s of r e f o r m i n g a less-than-just institutional scheme u n d e r r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s , feasible reforms de­ manded by t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e m u s t give way to t h o s e d e m a n d e d by *e first, w h e n d e m a n d s of t h e t w o k i n d s s t a n d in competition (on account of scarce r e s o u r c e s ) . Given t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s u m p t i o n of a pre­ eminent interest i n f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e s , t h i s move is unobjectionable when the c o m p e t i t i o n is b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t s of t h e s a m e representative S^up But in o t h e r c a s e s t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d clearly prefer a c n t e n o n in ^ c h (in the a l l o c a t i o n of s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s available for institutional ^orm) the priority c o n c e r n for t h e w o r s t representative share over"des the lexical p r i o r i t y of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e over second-principle scores. U-4. Before d i s c u s s i n g f u r t h e r difficulties, w e m u s t look m o r e °sely at Rawls's overall r a t i o n a l e for h i s t w o principles. Here it t u r n s °W that t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e aren't so distinct after all. goods falling u n d e r t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s are b o t h separated a n d united by the different c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h e y m a k e to t h e same s u p r e m e Jwe. Rawls m a r k s t h i s difference b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n h e ^ r e e *»» Persons h a v e , t h a n k s t o t h e i r b a s i c rights a n d liberties (an e n u S " ° b a p p e n d e d t o t h e first principle [TJ 61), a n d the £ of this freedom, a s e s t i m a t e d t h r o u g h second-principle scores. « interplay b e t w e e n t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s is envisaged as follows.

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the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and there­ fore greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of liberty is, however, compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate mem­ bers of society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satis­ fied. . . . Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. [TJ 204-5] Rawls reaffirms this i d e a eleven y e a r s later: The basic liberties are specified by institutional rights and duties that entitle citizens to do certain things, if they wish, and that forbid others to interfere. The basic liberties are a framework of legally protected paths and opportunities. Of course, ignorance a n d poverty, a n d the lack of material means generally, prevent people from exercising their rights and from taking advantage of these openings. But rather than counting these and similar obstacles as restricting a person's liberty, we count them as affect­ ing the worth of liberty, that is, the usefulness to persons of their liberties. Now in justice as fairness, this usefulness is specified in terms of an index of the primary goods regulated by the second principle of justice The basic structure of society is arranged so that it maximizes the primary goods available to the least advantaged to make use of the equal basic liberties enjoyed by everyone. [BLP 40-41) I believe Rawls's general idea is to c o n c e i v e w o r t h of f r e e d o m (what ultimately matters) as a function of t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s : t h e public rec­ ognition of certain b a s i c f r e e d o m s (the p u b l i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it is legitimate for m e to travel along c e r t a i n p a t h s ) ; t h e i r protection (the m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e s e p a t h s a s s e c u r e h i g h w a y s ) ; a n d t h e m e a n s at o n e ' s d i s p o s a l (my ability to o b t a i n f o o d a n d b o o t s , a c a r a n d gasoline, w i t h o u t w h i c h I c o u l d n o t travel o n even t h e b e s t a n d safest highway). Let u s say t h a t t h e first c o m p o n e n t d e t e r m i n e s (formal) legal freedom: that t h e first t w o c o m p o n e n t s t o g e t h e r d e t e r m i n e effective legal free­ dom (Rawls: freedom); a n d t h a t all t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s t o g e t h e r deter­ m i n e worth of freedom or (as I also say) worthwhile freedom. 26

While t h e t h i r d c o m p o n e n t is r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s e c o n d principle. Rawls s first p r i n c i p l e governs both of t h e o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s , reflecting t h e realization t h a t basic rights a n d liberties p r o t e c t o u r f r e e d o m only insofar as they are t h e m s e l v e s w e l l - p r o t e c t e d , t h a t is, u p h e l d a n d ent o r c e d / T h u s t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s n o t m e r e l y formal b u t effective legal freedom: "It is t h e institution as r e a l i s e d . . . w h i c h is just or u n i u s t (TJ 551 " W h e t h e r t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e g u a r a n t e e s e q u a l liberty of c o n s c i e n c e , o r freedom of t h o u g h t , is s e t t l e d b y . . . h o w t h e y are actually i n t e r p r e t e d a n d e n f o r c e d " (SUPG 163). U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Rawls m a k e s n o a t t e m p t to say how this i s s u e is t o b e s e t t l e d . Take the othTtS^^^^

T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice, 11.5

129

integrity of the p e r s o n , for e x a m p l e . S u p p o s e this is g u a r a n t e e d by laws against homicide, r a p e , a s s a u l t , d r u n k driving, a n d s o o n . What else is required for the integrity of t h e p e r s o n t o b e sufficiently well p r o t e c t e d ? What if 60 p e r c e n t of all w o m e n a r e r a p e d , o r 4 p e r c e n t of all black m e n murdered within t e n y e a r s of r e a c h i n g a g e sixteen? W h a t if 3 p e r c e n t ot the population m e e t t h e i r d e a t h s i n c a r a c c i d e n t s ? Without a clue h o w to answer s u c h q u e s t i o n s , w e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r t h e first principle is satisfied in a given social s y s t e m a n d h e n c e d o n o t k n o w w h a t political priorities Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d s e t for its institutional reform. My conjecture i n §10.7 a c h i e v e s s o m e w h a t m o r e specificity, t h o u g h perhaps at t h e p r i c e of i m p l a u s i b i l i t y . Effective legal freedom is evalu­ ated ex post. T h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w h o s e basic rights a n d liberties are actually ill p r o t e c t e d . It i s n o t e n o u g h t h a t certain crime rates are sufficiently l o w overall. T h e y m u s t also b e sufficiently low within the various p o p u l a t i o n c l u s t e r s . S u c h c l u s t e r s can b e defined quite narrowly, s o l o n g a s i n t r a c l u s t e r r a t e s a n d intercluster inequali­ ties in rates a r e statistically significant. It m a y b e t h e case, for' ^ P ^ ' that poor, black, female, i n n e r - c i t y r e s i d e n t s , o n a c c o u n t ot t n e inci dence of violent c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t t h e m , d o not effectively nave 'he right to p e r s o n a l integrity, t h o u g h o n p a p e r t h i s right is ^anieea to them as t o e v e r y o n e e l s e . T h i s violation of t h e first principle would Ny place t h e s e w o m e n a m o n g t h e least a d v a n t a g e d e

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c o m p o n e n t s over t h e t h i r d . T o m a k e p l a u s i b l e t h a t t h e parties would a c c e p t this priority of f r e e d o m o v e r its w o r t h ( w h i c h s t a n d s behind the lexical priority of t h e first over t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e ) , Rawls m u s t invoke a further p r e m i s e , r o u g h l y as follows: (b) The parties find it rational to assume that it is (something very close to) a necessary prerequisite to being in a position to enjoy, exercise, and take advantage of one's first-principle freedom that one should have certain publicly recognized and effectively enforced basic rights and liberties that institutionally protect such enjoyment. There is no worthwhile freedom without effective legal freedom. To b e sure, w h e n o n e d o e s h a v e s u c h b a s i c r i g h t s , o n e ' s enjoyment of t h e f r e e d o m t h e y p r o t e c t m a y still d e p e n d o n social a n d economic factors. T h e extent t o w h i c h o n e is in a p o s i t i o n t o enjoy t h e freedom to o w n p r o p e r t y , t o exercise f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t , o r t o take advantage of t h e freedom t o have o n e ' s o p i n i o n s p u b l i s h e d , for e x a m p l e , is a func­ t i o n of o n e ' s w e a l t h a n d i n c o m e . Still, if o n e d o e s n o t have t h e relevant basic rights at all, t h e n enjoying t h e correlative f r e e d o m s is altogether o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n . T h i s c o n j e c t u r e d p r e m i s e (b) w o u l d explain the p a r t i e s ' overriding c o n c e r n w i t h effective legal f r e e d o m . T h a t Rawls m u s t rely o n a n a r g u m e n t of this s o r t r a i s e s t h r e e f u r t h e r difficulties for his position. 11.5.1. Let u s begin w i t h t h e s i m p l e c a s e of a single a s p e c t of freedom for w h i c h t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s effective i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n in form of a b a s i c right o r liberty, L. T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h p e r s o n s actually enjoy t h i s f r e e d o m d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e y have L (effective legal freedom) a n d o n t h e further m e a n s ( m o n e y , e d u c a t i o n , etc.) at their disposal. N o w w h y s h o u l d having L b e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y m o r e impor­ t a n t t h a n having t h o s e m e a n s — s o t h a t in n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s establish­ ing t h e former always takes priority over i n c r e a s i n g t h e latter? The a n s w e r I h a v e s u g g e s t e d Rawls m u s t give is t h a t h a v i n g L is a prerequi­ site w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e m e a n s for t h e e n j o y m e n t c o m e t o n a u g h t . There a r e t w o w a y s of r e a d i n g this claim, b o t h p r o b l e m a t i c . W e c a n take the p r e r e q u i s i t e t o b e c o n c e p t u a l , t h a t is, to h o l d t h a t it is logically impossi­ ble to enjoy o r exercise a basic right o r liberty t h a t o n e d o e s n o t have. In this c a s e w e w o u l d h a v e to r e a d (a) as a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s care a b o u t f r e e d o m only insofar a s it is e n j o y e d a s a matter of right. But if we r e a d this way, (a) is i m p l a u s i b l e . W h y s h o u l d p e r s o n s w h o in virtue of their s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n d o in fact enjoy s o m e a s p e c t of t h e i r firstprinciple f r e e d o m b e c o n s i d e r e d unfree in t h e relevant r e s p e c t just a

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freedom is not publicly recognized and institutionally protected, then one will not, as a matter of fact, enjoy it. In this construal, (b) is implausible. It is not historically true, for example, that freedom from arbitrary arrest, or freedom of movement, is enjoyed only in societies in which a legal right to these aspects of freedom is publicly recognized and effectively enforced. Either way, the lexical priority of the interest in L over the interest in the means for enjoying the aspect of freedom that L protects jars with the idea of maximizing the worthwhile firstprinciple freedom of the least advantaged. 11.5.2. This conclusion can be further supported. Just as an aspect of freedom may be enjoyable in some degree even though it isn't legally protected, it may also be in s o m e degree unenjoyable even though it is so protected. A basic right or liberty L, though listed in the constitution, may not in fact be effectively enforced, for certain sectors of society perhaps, so that some find it very difficult to enjoy or exercise L even though they have the money, education, etc., to do s o . Now if having L were an all-or-nothing affair, t h e n it might be plausible to assign it the preeminence Rawls postulates over the means for enjoying the correla­ tive freedom. But if the transition from not having L to having L lies somewhere on a continuum, t h e n the priority is no longer plausible, for j * transition may then be a small step indeed (no matter where the toe is drawn). Thus, it was at some time during the 1960s, perhaps, that Macks in the United States began to have certain rights they had tor"wdy had only on paper. In such a case it seems implausible to assume «at the decisive incremental increase in their effective legal freedom should have made a greater contribution to their worthwhile freedom than any increase in their m e a n s of enjoyment could have done. »-5.3. Let us suppose, contrary to the preceding two objections, at without L (effective legal freedom) the means for enjoying tne ^ l a t i v e aspect of freedom are generally of little or no value, so that it plausible to assign lexical priority to the demand for the former over J* demand for the latter. Even this supposition would not be enough JWS needs to show not merely that for each basic liberty, L, having L is eacaUy n s for the enjoyment ot 2 ^ d o m L protects. He m u s t also show that having L is lencaUy £»? ""Portant than the m e a n s for the enjoyment of any tot-p^pta J**** ( F the fact that each daughter is younger than her mother <*s not follow that all daughters are younger than all motheraJ To 27

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a n effectively e n f o r c e d right) t h a n t h r o u g h a significant increase in their m e a n s for enjoying L. It is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t a g r e a t e r gain in the w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m of t h e p o o r w o u l d r e s u l t from a n improvement in t h e i r i n c o m e a n d e d u c a t i o n (enabling t h e m b e t t e r t o t a k e advantage of t h e i r existing b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties) t h a n from a d d i t i o n a l legal rights (whose effect o n t h e i r w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m m a y b e r a t h e r slight so long as they remain p o o r a n d uneducated). 11.6. T h e p r e c e d i n g t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e a s s u m e d (that the parties accept) t h e exclusive c o n c e r n for m a x i m i z i n g t h e w o r t h of freedom as Rawls u n d e r s t a n d s f r e e d o m . Before e x a m i n i n g t h a t a s s u m p t i o n , let us look m o r e closely at t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Rawls e x p l a i n s w h a t aspects of f r e e d o m h e is especially c o n c e r n e d w i t h b y specifying that the first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of a fully a d e q u a t e pack­ age of b a s i c civil a n d political r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s t h a t covers t h e follow­ ing four categories (outlined at TJ 61 a n d refined in BLP 5 et passim): (A) The basic political liberties, which are said to be connected with the capacity for a sense of justice (BLP 471. These include the basic right to vote and be eligible for public office as well as basic rights to political speech and assembly (freedom of thought). Rawls includes here as a first-principle requirement that institutions must maintain the fair value of the basic political liberties, though this requirement is left rather vague (BLP 42). (B) The basic rights and liberties protecting freedom of conscience, said to be connected to the capacity for a conception of the good (BLP 47). These include, in particular, rights to freedom of association as well as basic religious liberties (BLP 56-57). T h e r e m a i n i n g t w o categories c o n t a i n " s u p p o r t i n g " (BLP 50) basic liberties, n e c e s s a r y to t h e a d e q u a t e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d full exercise of both moral powers: (C) The basic rights and liberties protecting the freedom and integrity of the person. These are violated "by slavery and serfdom, a n d by the denial of freedom of movement and occupation" (BLP 50). Thev further include the right to be free "from psychological oppression arid physi­ cal assault'' (RAM 640) and also "the right to hold and to have the exclusive use of persona] property"—though this latter without cer­ tain (capitalist) "rights of acquisition a n d bequest, as well as the right to own means of production and natural resources" and without certain (socialist) rights "to participate in the control of means of production and natural resources, which are to be socially owned" (BLP 121. iu) The basic rights and liberties associated with the rule of law, including protections against arbitrary arrest and seizure. 11.6.1. T h e objection t o this a c c o u n t c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d b y charging Rawls with, alternatively, a t r u n c a t e d c o n c e p t i o n of f u n d a m e n t a l free­ d o m o r an overblown view of its i m p o r t a n c e . C o n s i d e r , t o b e g i n with t n e hrst formulation, a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e e n g e n d e r i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l inci-

T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice, 11.6.1

133

dence of severe a n d u n r e l i e v e d p o v e r t y . T h e p o o r u n d e r this s c h e m e are in many obvious w a y s u n f r e e o n a c c o u n t of their poverty. The existing ground r u l e s p r o v i d e n o legal p a t h o n w h i c h they can obtain more than part of w h a t t h e y n e e d . T h e y a n d their families m a y be unfree to p u r c h a s e a n u t r i t i o u s a n d healthful diet, sufficient clothing and heating fuel for t h e w i n t e r , n e e d e d m e d i c a l care a n d medications, adecent education, a n d s o f o r t h . W h e r e d o e s Rawls's account take note of this sort of u n f r e e d o m ? G r a n t e d , Rawls w a n t s his conception of freedom to b e c o n f i n e d t o its m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l aspects, b u t is it not fundamental w h e n social c o n d i t i o n s leave o n e w i t h o u t access to suffi­ cient food a n d h e a t i n g fuel w h i l e t h e r e is p l e n t y of it a r o u n d ? Rawls may reply that t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s p e c t s of freedom are identified through the t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s in t h e development a n d ex­ ercise of the two m o r a l p o w e r s , a n d t h a t p e r s o n s w h o are very p o o r in a democracy are m u c h b e t t e r a b l e t o satisfy these interests t h a n persons iiving under a d i c t a t o r s h i p b e c a u s e t h e v a r e still able to engage in the activities p r o t e c t e d b y t h e b a s i c civil a n d political rights a n d liberties. Even if you a n d y o u r family freeze t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r and m u s t feed yourselves o n d o g food, y o u c a n still a t t e n d political meetings a n d j*%ious c e r e m o n i e s . But p e r h a p s s u c h a reply w o u l d t e n d to cast doubt on Rawls's a c c o u n t of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests rather t h a n vindicate his list of first-principle g o o d s . In its second f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e o b j e c t i o n a c c e p t s Rawls's conception °f fundamental f r e e d o m a s it is a n d t h e n rejects t h e claim that the worth of freedom (so d e f i n e d ) is all t h a t ultimately matters to prospec°ve participants in social i n s t i t u t i o n s . P e r s o n s have s o m e basic social ^ e c o n o m i c n e e d s . F o r e m o s t a m o n g t h e s e are t h e n e e d s for a certain ""nhnurn access t o food, c l o t h i n g , shelter, care, culture, a n d educa°on S u g o o d s a r e of m u c h g r e a t e r u r g e n c y a n d importance than , derived b y v i e w i n g t h e m m e r e l y a s m e a n s for fulfilling a more J^ntneed t o s e c u r e t h e w o r t h of o n e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l freedoms. Rawls *** not do j u s t i c e t o t h i s p r o b l e m b v a d d r e s s i n g t h e p o s s ^ l ™ J> basic liberties m a y p r o v e t o b e m e r e l y formal" (BLP 40). This Posing of t h e i s s u e a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of social economic e s s e n t i a l s lies i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n as m e a n s to the enjoy^ t o f f u n d a m e n t a l (civil a n d political) freedoms. If the account ot 2 g ° ° d s is t o r e f l e c i a p l a u s i b l e n o t i o n of h u m a n needs WOS FG SUPG t h e n it cannot d e n y the ^ d a m e n t a l role b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s actually p ay m a J j j n hfe. But i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r e e m i n e n c e of t h e baste, cwland Pineal) t00d rights a n d l i b e r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e s just s u c h a demal.To xllus rate P * * ° f a m a x i m i n criterion, t h e a c c o u n t > goods t p r o v i d e a p l a u s i b l e m e a s u r e °f P « J » J * ^ c h

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c e r n e d w i t h t h e w o r t h of f r e e d o m , w o u l d a l w a y s c o u n t the social p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e l e s s e r b a s i c rights a s w o r s e . Of t w o g r o u p s with scores < 9 0 , 1 0 0 > a n d < 1 0 0 , 2 0 > , t h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e v i e w e d as the less a d v a n t a g e d . T h u s h i s c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d e n t a i l , for e x a m p l e , that (afflu­ ent) p e r s o n s w h o s e b a s i c rights t o f r e e d o m of political s p e e c h or as­ s e m b l y a r e (even slightly) r e s t r i c t e d i p s o facto h a v e a w o r s e share than o t h e r s w h o , t h o u g h free from t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n , a r e m a l n o u r i s h e d and h o m e l e s s . But t h i s r a n k i n g is intuitively i m p l a u s i b l e . O n e would be r e l u c t a n t t o e m p l o y Rawls's a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , with its heavy e m p h a s i s o n civil a n d political f r e e d o m s , a s a g u i d e for choosing "a society in w h i c h h i s e n e m y is to a s s i g n h i m h i s p l a c e . " O n e would be r e l u c t a n t t o u s e t h i s a c c o u n t e v e n if o n e w e r e p e r s u a d e d t h a t persons have h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s i n d e v e l o p i n g a n d e x e r c i s i n g their two m o r a l p o w e r s . It is n o t c r e d i b l e t h a t in t h e U n i t e d States today the lowest p r o s p e c t s for d e v e l o p i n g a n d e x e r c i s i n g t h e t w o m o r a l powers w o u l d b e r a i s e d m o r e b y o v e r t u r n i n g t h e " p r o f o u n d l y d i s m a y i n g " (BLP 74-79) p r e c e d e n t of Buckley v. Valeo (in w h i c h t h e S u p r e m e Court d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i o u s c o n g r e s s i o n a l l i m i t s o n election ex­ p e n d i t u r e s ) t h a n by i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e diet, s h e l t e r , o r education of the poorest citizens. 28

12. T h e P a c k a g e o f B a s i c R i g h t s a n d L i b e r t i e s T h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n h a s r a i s e d v a r i o u s d o u b t s a b o u t Rawls s pre s e n t a t i o n of " t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s a s t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p l e m of social j u s t i c e " (TJ 152). I n o w d i s c u s s s o m e p o s s i b l e P Rawls's behalf, i n c l u d i n g p r o p o s a l s for r e v i s i o n s t h a t w o u l d h e l p ^ c o p e w i t h t h e difficulties. H e r e I d o n ' t a d d r e s s t h e P ° radical r e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n w i t h a r e t r a c t i o n , p e r ap> of t h e m a x i m i n idea. Instead, I d i s c u s s f o u r m a i n s t r a t e g i e s for m Rawls's p r o p o s a l attractive t o t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position described. All four strategies h a v e a t least s o m e b a s i s i n Rawls s tex r

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O n e c o u l d r e s p o n d to t h i s criticism w i t h a n empirical claim, that t h e P ' ^ ' j ^ g n s , p o o r will not b e effectively a d d r e s s e d by t h e political p r o c e s s u n l e s s a n d until al whatever their s o c i o e c o n o m i c position, h a v e a roughly e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o in ^ the o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s . Buckley s t a n d s i n t h e w a y of p r e c i s e l y s equalization of political influence. But this r e s p o n s e is n o t available to Rawls• His ^ m e n t for t h e priority of the basic liberties is b a s e d o n their intrinsic rather tnan instrumental importance. His claim is that "the interests o f liberty . . . b e c o m e ' " £ , d the c o n d i t i o n s for t h e exercise of t h e equal freedoms are m o r e fully realized. ^ s o m e point it b e c o m e s a n d t h e n remains irrational from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e o " * ^ position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for t h e sake of greater material m ^ " * amenities of office" ITJ 542). Moreover, t h e s u g g e s t e d empirical c l a i m is u n a v a i l a case of o t h e r infringements of t h e first principle. Removing a restriction o n religi ^ freedom, for example, will n o t improve t h e situation of t h o s e w h o s e p r o s p e c s ^ developing a n d exercising their t w o moral p o w e r s are b l o c k e d by severe P ^V^ . removal w o u l d nevertheless, o n Rawls's a c c o u n t , have priority o v e r relieving their p erty. e

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Before I begin, let m e n o t e t h a t m o s t of t h e p r o b l e m s I have sketched involve the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s (serially ordered) to situa­ tions of injustice, t h a t is, t o s o c i a l s y s t e m s in w h i c h b o t h principles— (§§11.3.1, 11.5.1-3)—or at l e a s t t h e second—(§11.2.1)—are n o t satis­ fied. And even t h e r e m a i n i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s — t h o u g h also relevant to the ideal-theoretical q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e fully satisfying Rawls's two p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d i n d e e d o p t i m i z e t h e worst share (as intuitively a s s e s s e d i n t e r m s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s ) — b e c o m e m u c h more pressing w h e n , b e c a u s e of v i o l a t i o n s of t h e s e c o n d principle, social and e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e very great (§11.2.2) or basic social and economic n e e d s a r e n o t m e t (§11.6.1). Rawls's p r o p o s a l w o u l d be a great deal more p l a u s i b l e , t h o u g h also m u c h less interesting, if it did not presume to p r o v i d e g u i d a n c e for t h e reform of unjust institutional schemes. W.l. One might in large p a r t s i m p l y d e n y t h e s e difficulties by assert­ ing a weaker version of t h e e m p i r i c a l claim s k e t c h e d in note 28. The parties run n o risk b y a d o p t i n g t h e serial o r d e r i n g because efforts toward satisfying t h e first p r i n c i p l e d o n o t , as a n empirical matter, compete with efforts t o w a r d satisfying t h e s e c o n d . This assertion is doubly implausible. It w o u l d s e e m q u i t e possible that the establish­ ment or s t r e n g t h e n i n g of s o m e b a s i c liberty for all participants or for some group(s) c a n w o r s e n t h e w o r s t social position. One can readily raagine or cite from h i s t o r y s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h major e c o n o m i c re­ forms toward t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, a n d homelessness and a fairer d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h generally are im­ peded or blocked by t h e m o r e affluent (whose interests w o u l d be adversely affected b y t h e p r o j e c t e d reform) t h r o u g h their concerted use ft the media a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s a s g u a r a n t e e d by basic rights a n d p i t i e s . Even a p a r t from t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , it is quite conceivable that ™ establishment a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d t h e n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a n d effects p r o t e c t i o n of b a s i c liberties c a n divert political efforts a n d ources from t h e t a s k of r e d u c i n g social a n d e c o n o m i c a e ­ rations. An effective s y s t e m of e q u a l b a s i c liberties is not cost free but or p a r l i a m e n t s , a j u d i c i a r y , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , police forces, a n d mu <J more. It s e e m s c l e a r t h a t t h e effective i m p r o v e m e n t of these ^ a n i s m s w o u l d g e n e r a l l y d e m a n d a different allocation of efforts resources t h a n w o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o i m p r o v e nutrition a n d basic Ration for t h e p o o r , say. Given t h e s e eventualities, t h e parties m u s t res

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12.2. T h e failure of t h i s e m p i r i c a l l y b a s e d d e n i a l s u g g e s t s the first strategy: restrict t h e serial o r d e r i n g t o i d e a l t h e o r y , t h a t is, jettison the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority of t h e first p r i n c i p l e w h i l e reaffirming its de­ sign priority. I n d e e d , Rawls says o n c e t h a t " t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d their lexical o r d e r w e r e n o t a c k n o w l e d g e d w i t h [ n o n i d e a l ] situations in m i n d a n d s o it is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y n o l o n g e r h o l d " (TJ 245). Consider also h o w Rawls rejects t h e i d e a t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e should be a m e n d e d b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t h a v e a certain a b s o l u t e m i n i m u m of social a n d e c o n o m i c benefits ( e n s u r i n g that their b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e m e t ) : ' W h a t e v e r t h e merits of this suggestion, it is s u p e r f l u o u s in view of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . For any fraction of t h e i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s e n j o y e d b y t h e least advantaged c a n a l r e a d y b e r e g a r d e d in t h i s m a n n e r " (BLP 44). Clearly, this argu­ m e n t c a n b e r e a s s u r i n g only in r e g a r d t o t h e d e s i g n p r i o r i t y of the first principle. But t h e s e p a s s a g e s are d r o w n e d o u t b y c o u n t e r v a i l i n g evidence. That t h e p a r t i e s a d o p t a priority r u l e g o v e r n i n g w h a t c o n d i t i o n s justify u n e q u a l basic liberties (TJ §37, §39, 302) s h o w s t h a t t h e y d o deliberate a b o u t n o n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n s as w e l l . Moreover, Rawls d o e s n o t merely seek t o c o n s t r u c t t h e ideal of a perfectly j u s t w e l l - o r d e r e d society and t h e n h a v e u s u s e i n t u i t i o n a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y for muddling t h r o u g h t o w a r d this ideal. He r e i t e r a t e s a g a i n a n d a g a i n t h a t his con­ c e p t i o n of justice is to g u i d e t h e c o u r s e of social c h a n g e (TJ 520,263) and t h a t a crucial feature e n a b l i n g it t o d o this is t h e serial o r d e r i n g of the t w o p r i n c i p l e s (TJ 43, 244, 246, 303; BLP 11 et p a s s i m ) . Of c o u r s e , Rawls m a y still c h o o s e to limit h i s a m b i t i o n s , b u t t h i s l i m i t a t i o n w o u l d consti­ t u t e a devastating loss of practical political r e l e v a n c e for h i s theory. N o w it c a n h a r d l y b e k e p t s e c r e t from t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e two p r i n c i p l e s is t o b e relevant t o d e t e r m i n i n g which injustices " n e e d t o b e dealt w i t h first" (TJ 303). If it w e r e , t h e n the original p o s i t i o n w o u l d b e of n o u s e in justifying fo us (in o u r nonideal social w o r l d ) t h a t w e s h o u l d give p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of Rawls's first p r i n c i p l e . T h u s Rawls m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e p a r t i e s would find t h e serial o r d e r i n g c o n v i n c i n g o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t it is to be a p p l i e d i n n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s a s well. T h e serial o r d e r i n g m u s t lead to a plausible ranking of less-than-just r e g i m e s a n d t o p l a u s i b l e political priorities for c a s e s in w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e s a r e n o t satisfied (with plau­ sibility b o t h times u n d e r s t o o d by reference t o t h e p a r t i e s ' c o n c e r n for t h e worst ex post lifetime s h a r e s ) . « A n d t h i s is i n fact a crucial test 30

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T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.3

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because the serial o r d e r i n g is of c o m p a r a t i v e l y m i n o r significance in the (moreover r a t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l ) event t h a t all principles or all b u t o n e are fully satisfied. 12.3. If the difficulties c o n f r o n t i n g t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o principles c a n n o t b e p l a u s i b l y d e n i e d o r evaded, w e a r e r e d u c e d to finding ways of c o p i n g w i t h t h e m . In t w o m i n o r c a s e s there are rela­ tively straightforward s o l u t i o n s . T h e p r o b l e m set forth in §11.2.2 can be resolved through a m i n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n . W h e n conflicting specifications of the basic liberties w o u l d b e p r e f e r a b l e from t h e points of view of different socioeconomic c l a s s e s , s o t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of the representa­ tive equal citizen i s ill d e f i n e d a n d c a n n o t a d j u d i c a t e h o w the basic liberties should b e m a d e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , t h e n this ad­ judication s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e lowest socioeconomic class. The problems n o t e d i n §11.2.1 a n d §11.3.1 c a n likewise b e resolved through a modification. R a t h e r t h a n v i e w i n g a n y citizen as occupying two social p o s i t i o n s ( o n e w i t h i n e a c h of t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e basic structure), we c a n r e g a r d e a c h c i t i z e n a s having just o n e overall share, jvfoch is defined b y r e f e r e n c e t o both p r i n c i p l e s of justice. Here t h e 'east advantaged a r e s i n g l e d o u t b y first identifying those with t h e worst first-principle s c o r e s . S h o u l d t h i s g r o u p i n c l u d e everyone o r n o °ne or be otherwise t o o l a r g e o r t o o small t o qualify as a representative SNup in Rawls's s e n s e , t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e is b r o u g h t in as a secondj y criterion. O n c e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p of t h e least advantaged has Unidentified i n this w a y , its m e m b e r s ' first-principle scores a n d their ^ond-principle s c o r e s c a n b e a g g r e g a t e d so as to d e t e r m i n e t h e worst "Pvsentative s h a r e (cf. § 1 7 . 5 ) . T h e task of institutional reform is then raise this w o r s t social p o s i t i o n if p o s s i b l e . H e r e improving the repre^ntative first-principle s c o r e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d takes p n o n t y over ^proving their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e score, w h i c h in t u r n ^ s priority over i m p r o v i n g e v e n t h e representative first-principle of more a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . T h u s , u n d e r s t o o d as implementaJ * Priorities, t h e p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged overrides £ lexical priority of t h e first p r i n c i p l e , if t h e s e t w o priorities should m„H« ° t e x t s b e i n c o m p e t i t i o n for scarce resources^This ^ c a t i o n leaves i n t a c t t h e lexical design priority of t h e first over the 32

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s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . W e c a n n e v e r i m p r o v e o u r i d e a l of a perfectly just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e b y allowing a b r i d g m e n t s of first-principle goods for the sake of raising s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e s . Ideally, all participants must have a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. T h e s e modifications still leave t h e i m p o r t a n t w o r r y that the serial o r d e r i n g m a y l e a d t o a misidentification of t h e least advantaged (by being t o o c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h e t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e effective legal freedom r a t h e r t h a n w i t h w h e t h e r t h e i r b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c needs are met) o r m a y d e m a n d too m u c h a t t e n t i o n t o t h e establishment and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r b a s i c liberties at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e i r basic social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s (§§11.3.1 a n d 11.5.1-3). W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d the re­ m a i n i n g t h r e e strategies as a d d r e s s i n g t h i s w o r r y . 1 2 . 4 . T h e s e c o n d strategy c o n s i s t s i n p u n c t u r i n g , t o s o m e extent, the s h a r p "distinction b e t w e e n f u n d a m e n t a l rights a n d liberties and eco­ n o m i c a n d social benefits" t h a t Rawls h a d i n t r o d u c e d "to exploit.. an i m p o r t a n t division in t h e social s y s t e m " (TJ 6 3 ) . T h i s is done by specifying t h e first p r i n c i p l e s o t h a t it forbids r a d i c a l social a n d eco­ n o m i c inequalities (avoidably involving e x t r e m e p o v e r t y ) . Here we can d r a w u p o n a s o c i o e c o n o m i c p r o v i s i o n t h a t is a l r e a d y p a r t of the first principle, namely, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e fair value of the basic political liberties b e p r o t e c t e d : " T h e w o r t h of t h e p o l i t i c a l liberties to all citizens, w h a t e v e r t h e i r social o r e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n , m u s t b e approx­ imately equal, or at least sufficiently e q u a l , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t everyone h a s a fair o p p o r t u n i t y t o h o l d p u b l i c office a n d t o i n f l u e n c e the out­ c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s " (BLP 42), o r s o m e w h a t less vague, "those similarly e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d s h o u l d h a v e r o u g h l y the same 33

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chance of attaining p o s i t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y irrespective of their economic a n d social c l a s s " (TJ 225). In A Theory of Justice Rawls takes this requirement t o e n t a i l t h a t " t h e r e i s a m a x i m u m gain p e r m i t t e d to the most favored o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t , even if t h e difference princi­ ple would allow it, t h e r e w o u l d b e u n j u s t effects o n t h e political system and the like e x c l u d e d b y t h e p r i o r i t y of liberty" (TJ 81). "Disparities in the distribution of p r o p e r t y a n d w e a l t h t h a t far e x c e e d w h a t is compat­ ible with political e q u a l i t y h a v e g e n e r a l l y b e e n t o l e r a t e d by t h e political system" (TJ 226, cf. 225, 277, 279; BSS 6 5 - 6 6 ; PFE 5). By incorporating a l i m i t a t i o n o n e c o n o m i c inequalities into his first principle, Rawls c o u l d r e a s s u r e t h e p a r t i e s that by accepting t h e pro­ posed priority of t h e first o v e r t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e t h e y w o u l d not r u n a serious risk t h a t m e e t i n g b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s will in nonideal contexts t a k e s e c o n d p l a c e t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of basic liberties (which c o u l d h a r d l y b e e n j o y e d b y t h o s e w h o s e basic n e e d s remain unmet). Rawls's l a t e s t w r i t i n g s s e e m t o close t h e d o o r o n this strategy, however. T h e y e n v i s i o n t h a t t h e fair value of t h e basic political liberties be p r o t e c t e d t h r o u g h t h e " p u b l i c financing of political cam­ paigns and election e x p e n d i t u r e s , v a r i o u s limits o n contributions and other regulations" (BLP 73, cf. 4 2 - 4 3 ) . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y Rawls explicitly rejects, as we h a v e s e e n , t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a social m i n i m u m into the ™ Principle (BLP 44). T h e r e s u l t i n g n a r r o w interpretation of t h e first Principle fails t o give t h e p a r t i e s a n y a s s u r a n c e that w h e n the differ­ ence principle is not satisfied, m e e t i n g basic social a n d economic needs won't b e d e f e r r e d for t h e s a k e of (efforts toward) establishing basic civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . . l * S . A third s t r a t e g y for a d d r e s s i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g problems ot & n jw*es the proviso t h a t t h e serial o r d e r i n g applies only in "reasonably *orabl c o n d i t i o n s " (BLP 11) Rawls w r i t e s t h a t t h e lexical priority ot 7; basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s m a y n o t a p p l y " w h e n social conditions do not allow the effective e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e s e rights" (TJ 152,542).* And e

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h e c a n t h e n reject a s irrelevant a n y i m p l a u s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s his serial ordering might have u n d e r unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s . But t h e difficulties arise e v e n i n t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s in which t h e b a s i c liberties c a n b e effectively e s t a b l i s h e d for all. A social system u n d e r t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s is p r e s u m a b l y a d v a n c e d e n o u g h eco­ nomically to render feasible e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s u n d e r which the m o s t u r g e n t n e e d s a r e m e t , b u t t h e feasibility of s u c h institutions h a r d l y entails t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . T h o s e in t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c posi­ t i o n m a y in fact b e m a l n o u r i s h e d , illiterate, a n d d e s t i t u t e . It is not at all clear w h y t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d d e m a n d t h a t i n s u c h s i t u a t i o n s political efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d to t h e effective establishment of t h e basic liberties even t h o u g h t h e p o o r w o u l d largely b e u n a b l e to take advantage of t h e m . H. L. A. Hart h a s r a i s e d t h i s p r o b l e m in a clear f o r m . But in h i s r e s p o n s e t o Hart, Rawls m e r e l y reiterates without c o m m e n t t h a t r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e "circumstances w h i c h , p r o v i d e d t h e political will exists, permit t h e effective establish­ m e n t a n d t h e full exercise of t h e s e l i b e r t i e s " (BLP 11, m y emphasis). Given this definition, it is i n d e e d " e v i d e n t " (BLP 11) t h a t reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o d a y . T h e hypothesis t h a t if t h e U n i t e d States h a d a j u s t e c o n o m y t h e n all c o u l d fully exercise t h e i r basic liberties suffices t o trigger t h e serial o r d e r i n g , regardless of t h e extent t o w h i c h t h e real existing p o o r c a n i n fact take advantage of t h e i r b a s i c liberties. Curiously, w h e n Rawls actually tries to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e parties' be­ lief t h a t o n c e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n t h e i n t e r e s t in t h e b a s i c liberties is p r e e m i n e n t a n d t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e apply. suggests a quite different definition of " r e a s o n a b l y favorable condi­ tions." "As t h e general level of w e l l - b e i n g rises (as i n d i c a t e d by the i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e less favored c a n expect) o n l y t h e less urgent w a n t s r e m a i n t o b e m e t " (TJ 542). "Until t h e b a s i c w a n t s of individuals c a n be fulfilled, t h e relative u r g e n c y of t h e i r i n t e r e s t in liberty c a n n o t be firmly d e c i d e d in a d v a n c e . It will d e p e n d o n t h e c l a i m s of the least favored a s s e e n from t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative s t a g e s " (TJ 543). D e s p i t e t h e "can be," it s e e m s t h a t Rawls is h e r e c o n c e r n e d with the actually least a d v a n t a g e d , t h e r e b y s u g g e s t i n g a different i n t e r p l a y be­ t w e e n t h e general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t is m u c h m o r e conge­ nial to t h e p a r t i e s ' m a x i m i n c o n c e r n . T h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n comes i n t o play only w h e n t h o s e in t h e w o r s t actual s o c i o e c o n o m i c position c a n exercise basic liberties, a n d t h u s a r e sufficiently well-off rationally t o value s u c h liberties above f u r t h e r a d v a n c e s i n t h e i r m a t e r i a l weUn e m g . O h e r w i s e , t h e general c o n c e p t i o n a p p l i e s , d e m a n d i n g that ba­ sic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s b e m e t s o a s t o g u i d e social p r o g r e s s to t h e po.nt w h e r e t h e special c o n c e p t i o n c a n t a k e over. H a d Rawls 36

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T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.6

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adopted this w a y of d e l i m i t i n g t h e d o m a i n s of t h e general a n d the special conceptions, t h e s e r i a l o r d e r i n g in t h e latter w o u l d have been much more plausible as p a r t of a m a x i m i n criterion, t h o u g h it w o u l d then be quite u n c e r t a i n , r a t h e r t h a n " e v i d e n t . . . , that in o u r country today reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s d o o b t a i n " (BLP 11). This uncer­ tainty in turn w o u l d o n c e a g a i n frustrate Rawls's h o p e that his theory can provide definite p o l i t i c a l g u i d a n c e for institutional reform u n d e r existing conditions. 12.6. Rawls h a s y e t a f o u r t h s t r a t e g y for d e a l i n g w i t h t h e remaining problems, which involves a p a r t i t i o n i n g of h i s project. His m a i n goal for now is to s h o w t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n w o u l d prefer his proposal (with t h e serial o r d e r i n g ) o v e r " t h e first principles associated with the traditional d o c t r i n e s of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , w i t h perfectionism, or with intuitionism" (BLP 6). By c o n c e n t r a t i n g u p o n this "initial aim" of Justice as fairness (BLP 6 - 8 ) , Rawls leaves r o o m for his "doubt . . that the principles of j u s t i c e (as I h a v e d e f i n e d t h e m ) will b e t h e preferred conception on a n y t h i n g r e s e m b l i n g a c o m p l e t e list" (TJ 581). He there­ by retracts his c l a i m t o b e p r e s e n t i n g the m a x i m i n solution to the Problem of social j u s t i c e . °"e might t h i n k t h a t s u c h m o d e s t y is uncalled-for. Rawls could easily vindicate h i s c l a i m t o b e p r e s e n t i n g t h e maximin solution by abandoning t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o p o s i n g t h a t t h e general c o n c e p bon (or some even less s p e c i f i c m a x i m i n criterion) b e applied across the board, irrespective of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Yet b y leaving o p e n h o w the !J*nous social p r i m a r y g o o d s a r e t o b e w e i g h t e d vis-a-vis one another, general c o n c e p t i o n gives v e r y little g u i d a n c e for its own application thus avoids t h e difficulties a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e special conception ° 7 the price of i m p o s i n g significant risks of a n o t h e r sort. Seeking to ^ g u a r d the i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t in a definite a n d clear­ - w a y , the p a r t i e s w o u l d prefer a d e t a i l e d a n d specific c n t e n o n ot J f c e . But given t h e vast r a n g e of s u b t l y varying potential proposals ot ^ a p p r o p r i a t e specificity, it m u s t b e e x t r e m e l y difficult (if not imposto identify p r e c i s e l y the m o s t r a t i o n a l c h o i c e in t h e original P? *on as d e s c r i b e d . It m a y t h e n b e r e a s o n a b l e to aim first for a P^Posal that b e a t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l criteria of justice, while deferring the p w h e t h e r t h i s p r o p o s a l c a n itself b e s u r p a s s e d . does Rawls a c h i e v e e v e n h i s "initial aim"? Relying on t h e maxJ ? ruJe the p a r t i e s w o u l d f o c u s o n t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o r u n d e r J * of the various a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s . Yet a l t h o u g h Rawls discusses 'fength the w o r s t o u t c o m e s p o s s i b l e u n d e r « m i p e t a « ^ P ^ £ 3 f j n J criteria, a s i m i l a r s c r u t i n y of h i s o w n criterion is J * u * ^ e x a m i n e d , for e x a m p l e , t h e possibility of a n u n d e r c ^ s of W P ° n s living i n a s o c i e t y t h a t is econonncally advanced to bring i n t o p l a y t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o P ^ P ^ ™ ^ n t e x t Rawls's c r i t e r i o n w o u l d d e m a n d t h a t political efforts a n a m e

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social r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a fully adequate s c h e m e of b a s i c civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . B u t p r o g r e s s in this direc­ tion w o u l d n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y b e t t e r t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e in the under­ class, for w h o m i m p r o v e m e n t s in b a s i c liberties a r e of little worth. They w o u l d h a v e t o w a t c h g a i n s i n t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h o s e already much b e t t e r p l a c e d (who, u n l i k e t h e m s e l v e s , c a n t a k e a d v a n t a g e of increasing b a s i c liberties), w h i l e b e i n g a w a r e t h a t t h e i r o w n b a s i c social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s will take c e n t e r s t a g e o n l y after t h e first principle has b e e n fully satisfied. T h e likelihood of t h i s s c e n a r i o is n o t a s c e r t a i n a b l e a n d h e n c e irrele­ vant for t h e p a r t i e s , b u t let m e a d d a n y w a y t h a t t h e s c e n a r i o is by no m e a n s far-fetched. Rawls a p p a r e n t l y believes t h a t it obtains in the United States t o d a y . He says t h a t "for u s t h e p r i o r i t y of the basic liberties is r e q u i r e d " (BLP 11) a n d i m p l i e s t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e is not satisfied: "In o u r society p a r t of t h e political t a s k is to h e l p fashion t h e political will" for t h e effective e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e b a s i c liberties (BLP 11, cf. 75-79). Rawls d o e s n o t a t t e m p t t o give a n y t h i n g like an e x h a u s t i v e s t a t e m e n t of w h a t r e m a i n s t o b e d o n e t o w a r d satisfying his first p r i n c i p l e . But I a s s u m e h e w o u l d h a v e t o c o n c e d e that such reforms are likely to d e m a n d a different a l l o c a t i o n of political efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s t h a n w o u l d b e d e m a n d e d for t h e attempt to i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n ( o c c u p i e d , p e r h a p s , by wel­ fare r e c i p i e n t s , t h e u n e m p l o y e d , a n d t h o s e e v e n m o r e disadvantaged). T h e w o r s t - c a s e s c e n a r i o for Rawls's c r i t e r i o n is very bleak—quite significant d e a t h r a t e s in t h e u n d e r c l a s s from m a l n u t r i t i o n , trivial dis­ eases, o r lack of h e a t i n g fuels a r e n o t r u l e d o u t . T h e w o r s t - c a s e scenario for t h e p r i n c i p l e of utility is very bleak a s w e l l — p o l i t i c a l o p p o n e n t s and h a t e d m i n o r i t i e s m a y h a v e t o b e p e r s e c u t e d , e v e n e r a d i c a t e d , for the sake of achieving a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a u t i l i t y - m a x i m i z i n g society. It is possible that Rawls c o u l d still find w a y s of a c h i e v i n g h i s initial a i m But t h i s a c h i e v e m e n t is sufficiently difficult a n d d o u b t f u l t o motivate t h e a t t e m p t t o i m p r o v e u p o n Rawls's list of b a s i c liberties even now, m t h e h o p e of achieving t h e initial a i m i n a c l e a r a n d c o n v i n c i n g manner. 12.7. This t h o u g h t favors a r e s u s c i t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d strategy, w i n c h a l o n e r e s c u e s w h a t Rawls clearly c o n s i d e r s h i g h l y desirable, n a m e l y t h e practical political i m p o r t a n c e of h i s s p e c i a l conception, 37

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involving the design a n d implementation priorities of t h e first principle, which is so m u c h m o r e d e f i n i t e in its d e m a n d s t h a n t h e general conception. This s t r a t e g y p r e s e r v e s t h e j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e special con­ ception is widely a p p l i c a b l e t o d a y , r e q u i r i n g t h a t efforts a n d resources be allocated to satisfying t h e first p r i n c i p l e even at t h e expense of satisfying the s e c o n d . It s e e k s t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e plausibility of this priority by i n c l u d i n g w i t h i n t h e first p r i n c i p l e t h e requirement that basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s m u s t b e m e t . This first-principle social m i n i m u m is b e s t justified, I believe, by showing basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s to b e entailed by, or by stipulating t h e m as o n a p a r w i t h , t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests. Rawls would presumably p r e f e r t h e f o r m e r k i n d of justification. One might formulate the a m e n d m e n t a s g u a r a n t e e i n g t o everyone a b u n d l e of social and e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s t h a t is sufficient for normal persons iwhose physical a n d m e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s fall w i t h i n t h e normal range) io develop a n d e x e r c i s e t h e i r t w o m o r a l p o w e r s a n d to b e "normally active and fully c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r s of society over a complete life" 'SUPG 168; cf. BLP 85). T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n allows for variation in basic social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s w i t h age. Infants a n d t h e aged need more are, children m o r e e d u c a t i o n , a d o l e s c e n t s m o r e food, a n d so forth. True to Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , t h e formulation is based o n o u r standard n e e d s a s h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s in a given social system It assumes that all p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t h e s a m e n e e d s over a complete lite and thereby p r e s e r v e s t h e a d v a n t a g e for stability that I u s e d earlier to explain why Rawls b a s e s h i s a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y goods u p o n the %ulation of common h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r t h a n u p o n the interests p e r s o n s h a v e i n virtue of t h e i r diverse needs, endownts, preferences, o r c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d . c

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W h a t t h e s e s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e is in large part straightforward. H u m a n b e i n g s n e e d f o o d a n d drink, clothing and shelter, a s well a s s o m e i n t e r a c t i o n i n c l u d i n g e d u c a t i o n a n d care (for e x a m p l e , in c h i l d h o o d a n d o l d a g e ) . H e n c e it is r a t i o n a l in their behalf t o r e q u i r e of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t it a s s u r e its participants that t h e y c a n m e e t t h e s e n e e d s . I n m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s this require­ m e n t m i g h t b e s t b e satisfied t h r o u g h a s o l i d a r i s t i c family o r kinship s t r u c t u r e c o u p l e d w i t h s o m e f o r m of o r g a n i z e d c h a r i t y . In modern societies effective legal rights w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y b e necessary, but t h e s e n e e d figure o n l y a s a last r e s o r t . Basic s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c needs c a n b e m e t w i t h o u t a n e l a b o r a t e welfare s y s t e m o r g o v e r n m e n t "hand­ o u t s " — i f e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s m i n i m i z e u n e m p l o y m e n t , for exam­ ple, a n d i n c l u d e a d e q u a t e i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s for v a r i o u s contingen­ cies a n d r e t i r e m e n t . T h e m o r e d e t a i l e d specification of s t a n d a r d b a s i c socioeconomic n e e d s will t o s o m e e x t e n t d e p e n d u p o n a social s y s t e m ' s natural e n v i r o n m e n t , c u l t u r e , a n d level of political a n d e c o n o m i c develop­ m e n t . T h u s h o w m u c h i n c o m e p e r s o n s r e q u i r e t o m e e t t h e i r standard c l o t h i n g n e e d s w i t h i n s o m e social s y s t e m m a y d e p e n d o n t h i s system's n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t (prevailing climate), o n p r i c e s , a n d also o n cut tural factors if p e r s o n s m u s t b e in a p o s i t i o n t o a p p e a r in public w i t h o u t s h a m e . Similarly, p e r s o n s will b e p r e s u m e d t o n e e d access to e n o u g h of a n e d u c a t i o n to b e able t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d participate in t h e i r society's political, legal, a n d e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s a n d associational life. T o t h i s e x t e n t t h e m o r e d e t a i l e d s p e c i f i c a t i o n of s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s m a y have t o b e left t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative stages. It s h o u l d b e clear in a n y c a s e t h a t u n d e r s o m e w h a t m o r e fortunate c o n d i t i o n s t h e social m i n i m u m r e q u i r e d b y t h e first p r i n c i p l e w o u l d be well b e l o w t h e m i n i m u m e n t a i l e d b y t h e s e c o n d , s o t h a t s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , a n d first-principle r e q u i r e m e n t s generally, can b e m e t w i t h o u t m u c h strain o n t h e e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . 12.8. T h e r e a r e further r e a s o n s i n favor of t h e a m e n d m e n t . 40

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12.8.1. For o n e t h i n g , it is n e c e s s a r y t o r o u n d o u t t h e package of firstprinciple goods. T h u s R a w l s h o l d s t h a t "certain basic liberties are indispensable i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s o n c e o t h e r basic liberties are guaranteed; t h u s f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t a n d freedom of association are necessary to give effect t o l i b e r t y of c o n s c i e n c e a n d t h e political liber­ ties" (BLP 24). I u n d e r s t a n d h i m a s s a y i n g h e r e that t h e political liberties (for example), t h o u g h legally c o m p l e t e l y g u a r a n t e e d a n d also effectively protected, might still b e c l o s e t o m e a n i n g l e s s w i t h o u t t h e effective legal freedom to associate a n d a s s e m b l e in p e a c e . O n e c a n defend t h e firstprinciple social m i n i m u m a n a l o g o u s l y , as a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e institu­ tional condition n e c e s s a r y for m a k i n g m e a n i n g f u l t h e basic rights a n d liberties associated w i t h t h e f r e e d o m a n d integrity of the person, the basic political liberties, a n d t h e r u l e of law. W h e n p e r s o n s c a n n o t afford food or shelter o r w h e n t h e y l a c k a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n o r basic care, they can still have rights t o h o l d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y or t o r u n for public office 'effective legal f r e e d o m ) b u t c a n h a r d l y b e g i n t o enjoy o r fully to exercise these basic rights ( w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m ) . For t h e m t h e result may be that the integrity of t h e i r p e r s o n is p r o t e c t e d against violence even it collapses t h r o u g h d e p r i v a t i o n of food a n d shelter. For society at ge, it may b e t h a t a s e g m e n t of its p o p u l a t i o n c a n n o t (fully) partici­ pate in its legal s y s t e m , p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , a n d associational life. iar

U.8JJ. The a m e n d m e n t is n e c e s s a r y , too, to m a k e t h e fair value of the basic political liberties fully s e c u r e , t h u s preserving an important of what Rawls h a d e a r l i e r d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y for this purpose, namely, first-principle l i m i t a t i o n o n social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities 8 l , 226,277). His l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s a m e issue suggests that it is enough "to k e e p political p a r t i e s i n d e p e n d e n t of large concentrations Private e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l p o w e r in a private-property democracy, ^ of government c o n t r o l a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c p o w e r in a liberal socialist " f n e " IBLP 4 2 - 4 3 ) , p e r h a p s b y m e a n s of t h e "public financing of P°«hcal c a m p a i g n s a n d e l e c t i o n e x p e n d i t u r e s , various limits on con­ ations a n d o t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s " (BLP 73).« But s u c h m e a s u r e s cannot y to h o l d public office a

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t h e reduction in t h e s t r a i n s o f c o m m i t m e n t is p r o b a b l y most impor­ t a n t . T h o s e w h o , r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s notwithstanding, c a n n o t m e e t t h e m o s t b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f themselves a n d t h e i r families w o n ' t b e a s k e d to s u p p o r t a p r o g r a m o f institutional reform t h a t calls first a n d f o r e m o s t for t h e full e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a fully a d e q u a t e s c h e m e o f b a s i c civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . I n s t e a d , they are a s s u r e d t h a t m e e t i n g s u c h n e e d s i s a t o p p r i o r i t y o f institutional re­ form, c o e q u a l w i t h t h e e x p a n s i o n of effective legal f r e e d o m . I n this way t h e e n v i s i o n e d p a t h o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m c a n elicit t h e willing cooper­ ation o f t h o s e in t h e actually w o r s t social p o s i t i o n — s u r e l y desirable for a c o n c e p t i o n o f justice t h a t p r o f e s s e s s u p r e m e c o n c e r n for the leas! advantaged. 12.8.4. O n c e s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e s e c u r e d by the first p r i n c i p l e , t h e p r e c i s e d e l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e d o m a i n s o f t h e general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s b e c o m e s m u c h l e s s i m p o r t a n t — a n d Rawls's vague reference t o " r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s " t h u s m u c h less unsatisfactory. U n d e r t h e p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t , efforts to establish basic civil a n d political liberties c a n b e l i m i t e d for t h e s a k e o f social and e c o n o m i c gains w h e n e v e r t h e l a t t e r a r e themselves r e q u i r e d by the first p r i n c i p l e . A n d this m a y well b e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e first principle t h a t m a k e s t h e serial o r d e r i n g p l a u s i b l e e v e n for a large r a n g e o f dish ^^, ° - T h i s r e a s o n favors t h e a m e n d m e n t over t h e t h i r d strategy, w h i c h relies m u c h m o r e o n t h e g e n e r a l conception, b e c a u s e t h e m o r e definite g u i d a n c e for i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform that the special c o n c e p t i o n p r o v i d e s is n o w available for a w i d e r r a n g e o f lessthan-just basic structures. t

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ordering is to a p p l y in n o n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n s as well. T h e p r o p o s e d firstprinciple r e q u i r e m e n t e n s u r e s t h a t w h e n u n m e t basic social or eco­ nomic needs c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of t h e first principle, they cannot like demands i s s u i n g from t h e s e c o n d principle) b e set aside or de­ ferred for the sake of fully e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e basic liberties. This as­ surance would l e a d t h e p a r t i e s a s Rawls d e s c r i b e s t h e m to prefer the two principles s o a m e n d e d o v e r Rawls's later p r o p o s a l (in BLP), on which the first p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t c o n s t r a i n t h e distribution of social and economic g o o d s at all. T h e a m e n d m e n t , therefore, strengthens Rawls's claim to h a v e a c h i e v e d t h e "initial a i m " of his theory (which claim was weakened, I believe, b y h i s d e l e t i o n of t h e limitation on social and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s f r o m t h e first principle). 12.9. The first-principle g o o d s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e w h a t I would call a fully adequate p a c k a g e c a n t h e n b e c a t e g o r i z e d as follows (cf. §11.6): (A) basic p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e g u a r a n t e e of t h e i r fair value; IB) basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s p r o t e c t i n g f r e e d o m o f c o n s c i e n c e ; C) basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s p r o t e c t i n g t h e f r e e d o m a n d integrity of t h e person, i n c l u d i n g rights t o a s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n t h a t is suffient t o meet t h e b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f a n y n o r m a l h u m a n participant i n t h e r e l e v a n t s o c i a l s y s t e m ; 'D> basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s c o v e r e d b y t h e r u l e o f l a w . (

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t h e r e is n o h o p e t h a t o n e m i g h t " d e r i v e " the m a x i m i n solution to the p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e from t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original position, given t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' aversion t o risk favors v a r i o u s competing de­ siderata. T h e p r e f e r r e d c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d h a v e a c o n t e n t t h a t expresses c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d , s h o u l d e n g e n d e r stability w h e n satis­ fied, s h o u l d b e clear a n d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d s o t h a t it c a n serve as a public criterion, s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n a t e s o a s t o m a k e definite d e m a n d s upon existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d s o forth. T h e p r o b l e m s raised in §11 w e r e f o r m u l a t e d p r i m a r i l y b y a p p e a l t o t h e first c o n c e r n , b u t taking all c o n c e r n s t o g e t h e r , t h e r e m a y b e n o s o l u t i o n t h a t is clearly superior to t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s w i t h t h e a m e n d e d list of first-principle goods. In any case, s e e i n g t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s involved, it m a y b e w e l l t o follow the f o u r t h strategy. O n c e t h e initial a i m is a c h i e v e d , w e view this list "as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h a t c a n b e i m p r o v e d b y f i n d i n g a s e c o n d list such that t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original p o s i t i o n w o u l d a g r e e t o t h e two principles w i t h t h e s e c o n d list r a t h e r t h a n t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s w i t h t h e initial list (BLP 7). W e w o u l d p r o c e e d a n a l o g o u s l y for all o t h e r difficulties and i m p r o v e m e n t s — c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , t h e priority rules, t h e general c o n c e p t i o n , o r t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e d o m a i n s of the general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s .

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Rawls faces a further difficulty h e r e . W o u l d n ' t t h e parties prefer a criterion that favors inferior p a c k a g e s of basic rights a n d liberties for some when this i m p r o v e s t h e w o r s t p a c k a g e ? Rawls barely t o u c h e s u p o n t h i s q u e s t i o n , b u t a n explanation sug­ gests itself. T h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t a basic structure contain full safeguards for t h e m o s t b a s i c n e e d s of n o r m a l h u m a n p e r s o n s (as Rawls conceives of t h e m ) . N o w , a p a r t i c i p a n t ' s s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s — unlike his preferences, w h i c h m i g h t a l w a y s b e b e t t e r satisfied by m e a n s of indefinite i n c r e a s e s i n i n c o m e o r w e a l t h — c a n b e completely met. Moreover, since t h e r e a r e n o i n h e r e n t conflicts b e t w e e n t h e s t a n d a r d basic needs of a p l u r a l i t y of p a r t i c i p a n t s , truly favorable conditions make it possible for all p a r t i c i p a n t s t o b e a s s u r e d t h a t they c a n meet these needs. Rawls c a n t h e n c o n c l u d e t h a t a n ideal basic structure would protect a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of basic rights a n d liberties for every participant. His i n s i s t e n c e o n a n equal distribution of effective legal freedom (or of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s ) is t h e n a corollary of the fact that, under truly favorable c o n d i t i o n s , everyone's (by stipulation) equal basic needs c a n b e fully m e t . H e r e m a x i m i n entails equality, because when all first-principle s c o r e s c a n b e o p t i m a l (fully adequate), t h e n n o ""equal institutional d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-principle goods can be justi­ fied as optimizing t h e w o r s t s h a r e . This explanation is c o n f i r m e d bv w h a t Rawls says about halfway avorable conditions, w h i c h , t h o u g h " r e a s o n a b l y favorable," make it "npossible for e v e r y o n e t o h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e package. He takes the senal ordering of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s t o entail a "priority rule" according "which basic liberties c a n b e r e s t r i c t e d only for t h e sake of basic Arties. There a r e t w o c a s e s : (a) t h e b a s i c rights a n d liberties m a y be JJaty incomplete for all i n s o f a r a s t h i s i n c o m p l e t e n e s s (through the *"er protection of t h e r e m a i n i n g b a s i c liberties) improves t h e stanJ « package of b a s i c l i b e r t i e s overall, o r (b) t h e y m a y be unequal J**ras s u c h i n e q u a l i t i e s i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t package of basic: hberRawls's w i l l i n g n e s s t o a l l o w s u c h inequalities in the context ot D e s 4 8

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halfway favorable c o n d i t i o n s s h o w s t h a t t h e u n d e r l y i n g idea for assess­ ing t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l s o of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e goods is max­ imin, a n d n o t e q u a l i t y . It is o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s , Rawls asserts, t h a t " t h e q u e s t i o n of c o m p e n s a t i n g for a l e s s e r t h a n e q u a l liberty does n o t arise" (TJ 2 0 4 ) . T h e q u e s t i o n c a n a r i s e i n t h e real w o r l d , and here Rawls's c o n c e r n is t o s h o w w h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e t h e c a s e for institu­ t i o n s g e n e r a t i n g u n e q u a l b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties t o b e justified: There m u s t b e n o feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h everyone would h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e (that is, c o m p l e t e b a s i c rights and liber­ ties, sufficiently well-protected), a n d leaving s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l freedom(s) of s o m e g r o u p entirely u n r e c o g n i z e d m u s t o t h e r w i s e augment (the p r o t e c t i o n of) o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties s o significantly that a c o m p a r i s o n of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s w i t h a n e y e t o optimizing t h e w o r s t p a c k a g e ( n o w a n d i n t h e future) favors t h e s c h e m e with u n e q u a l b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. I n m o d e r n d e v e l o p e d societies dur­ ing p e a c e t i m e , it w o u l d s e e m q u i t e difficult t o justify institutions u n d e r w h i c h g r o u p s differ i n legal r i g h t s of c a t e g o r i e s (B)-(D). It is hard t o s e e h o w restricting a n y of t h e s e m i g h t s u b s t a n t i a l l y a u g m e n t (the p r o t e c t i o n of) o t h e r b a s i c rights a n d liberties i n w a y s t h a t w o u l d other­ wise b e impossible. * S o m e w h a t m o r e f o r m i d a b l e is J o h n Stuart Mill's a r g u m e n t for u n e q u a l b a s i c political l i b e r t i e s if i t i s u n d e r s t o o d as follows: s o m e p e r s o n s a r e t o h a v e inferior political liberties so that the better e d u c a t e d m a y have a s u p e r i o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o influence the o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s ; this p r a c t i c e is justified b e c a u s e under 49

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specifying t h e list basic rights a n d liberties. N o w both c l a u s e s t h e priority rule relevant o n l y to nonideal theory, w h e r e t h e y govern h o w , u n d e r halfway favorable conditions, restrictions of basic rights a n d liberties c a n be justified a s "adjustments to natursdlimitations a n d historical c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (TJ 246) If this claim correct, the (a)-clause, s h o u l d really c o n c e r n e d with the wont first-pnnciple score. Basic liberties m a y be equally restricted o n l y if those whose S l ^u P ' e c t e d have m o r e effective legal f r e e d o m than would u ° T " P ^ e c t e d package u n d e r a s c h e m e of equal complete fhe P i. 8 > * s h o u l d have o v e r l o o k e d this p o i n t formulating HlZ^Mh ™*^* * ° P P « a t e t h e parallel p o i n t in ideal theory irfh \ y ^ is that Rawls m e r e l y permits uniform o r u n e q u ^ package Icf 7 * « * necessary o p t i m i s e the ? " «ance require s u c h restrictions may well be wi^h vf a c d l , a , i n t n e c o n d i t i o n s i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d also be q U 3 t e P a G k a g efor n e c e s s a r y reforms t o w a r d a perfectly just institu­ T E V be m u c h harder to achieve ^ c o g n i z e d (for s o m e ) . 1 s u g g e s t that b l £y We s ™y interpretation t h e first principle a f n o n « ,hel e s sworst . P a t Z°P e r libertfirst-principle s c o r e . °* c h i l d r e n " (TJ 244). Though ^ 'Arties they have unequal

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the alternative p r a c t i c e w i t h e q u a l b a s i c political liberties t h e political process would t e n d t o b e s o ineffective o r s o liable t o abuse that t h e worst package w o u l d b e e v e n w o r s e ( p e r h a p s t h e political p r o c e s s itself would then b e u s e d t o r e s t r i c t b a s i c l i b e r t i e s ) . 1 will p r o c e e d with this line of thought o n c e t h e r o l e of t h e political p r o c e s s h a s b e c o m e somewhat clearer. 13JJ. The political p r o c e s s i s a p a r a d i g m i n s t a n c e of t h e idea of procedural justice. T h i s is p r i m a r i l y a n idea for t h e nonviolent recon­ ciliation of conflicting c l a i m s a n d t h u s a n alternative t o (unmediated) persuasion a n d c o m p r o m i s e . It p r e s u p p o s e s a p r o c e d u r e of reconcilia­ tion to which t h e r e l e v a n t c l a i m a n t s a r e sufficiently c o m m i t t e d to accept what this p r o c e d u r e p r o d u c e s b y w a y of settlements, w h i c h adjust their claims to a p o i n t of m u t u a l compatibility. Examples of s u c h procedures are t h e t o s s of a c o i n , e m p l o y m e n t of a mutually agreeable expert or arbitrator, c o u r t s , m a r k e t s (bidding), a n d t h e political process 'voting). Such p r o c e d u r e s c o m e i n t h r e e ideal-typical varieties, w h i c h in prac­ tice are often i n t e r m i x e d . O v e r a c e r t a i n r a n g e of possible outcomes the claimants disagree b u t a r e w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t w h a t e v e r o u t c o m e t h e Procedure m a y p r o d u c e . T h i s i s t h e e l e m e n t of pure p r o c e d u r a l justice. But while t h e y d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e o u t c o m e t o b e preferred, t h e claimants will often a g r e e t h a t c e r t a i n o u t c o m e s a r e unacceptable^ When they do, t h e y h a v e a s h a r e d (partial) criterion, i n d e p e n d e n t of procedure, for t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of o u t c o m e s . T h e y can u s e this jnterion to design, select, o r c o n s t r a i n t h e p r o c e d u r e in s u c h a way ™« mutually u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s a r e , as far as possible, ruled out. ^°far as t h e p r o c e d u r e r e l i a b l y e x c l u d e s certain mutually unaccept­ able outcomes, it c o n t a i n s a n e l e m e n t of perfect p r o c e d u r a l Juajcec h reliable e x c l u s i o n is s o m e t i m e s n o t achievable, typically oeJ«se it is l t h a n o b v i o u s w h e t h e r s o m e o u t c o m e i n fact satisfies the Shared criterion. A g r e e m e n t o n t h e criterion is t h e n t o s o m e extent " * n a l . it ^ g e n t s over w h e t h e r t h e c n t e n o n is ^sfied. w h e r e t h i s is t h e c a s e , t h e c l a i m a n t s m a y still agree that t h e P ^ e d u r e s h o u l d h a v e c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t h a t will t e n d to make it more W a t t h e o u t c o m e s p r o d u c e d will satisfy (or c o m e close to satistythe criterion i n q u e s t i o n . S u c h f e a t u r e s w o u l d e m b o d y t h e element Effect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . 52

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As a n illustration, c o n s i d e r o u r i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e c r i m i n a l trial. This is a c a s e of perfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e i n s o f a r a s t h e p r o c e d u r e firmly e x c l u d e s o u t c o m e s t h a t a r e u n i v e r s a l l y a g r e e d to b e unacceptable (for e x a m p l e , vicarious p u n i s h m e n t s o r t h e m a i m i n g of convicts). It is a case of imperfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e i n s o f a r a s e v e r y o n e a g r e e s that defen­ d a n t s s h o u l d b e c o n v i c t e d o n l y if guilty a n d b e a c q u i t t e d otherwise. A l t h o u g h t h i s a g r e e m e n t m a y b e m e r e l y n o m i n a l (so l o n g as there are d i s a g r e e m e n t s a b o u t w h e t h e r s o m e d e f e n d a n t s a r e guilty o r not), it will s u p p o r t a s h a r e d d e s i r e t o d e s i g n t h e p r o c e d u r e s o t h a t it is reasonably likely t o p r o d u c e o u t c o m e s s e n s i t i v e t o t h e facts. It is a case of pure p r o c e d u r a l justice, finally, i n s o f a r a s t h e r e is s o m e s l i p p a g e between even t h e m o s t c o m p l e t e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e e m p i r i c a l a n d legal facts of, a n d t h e exact p u n i s h m e n t a p p r o p r i a t e in, a p a r t i c u l a r criminal case. A m o n g t h e t h r e e e l e m e n t s , p u r e a n d p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l justice are t h e m o s t clearly distinct. T h e o t h e r t w o d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e m o r e gradual. Imperfect s h a d e s i n t o perfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e a s t h e reliability of s o m e (feature of a) p r o c e d u r e — t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t it will exclude certain u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s — a p p r o a c h e s 1. It s h a d e s into pure p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e a s t h e s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s g r o w s too large or t o o d e n s e for a n y o u t c o m e t o b e p r e c i s e l y c o n n e c t i b l e t o t h e agreedu p o n i n d e p e n d e n t criteria. T h e r e is a n o t h e r w a y in w h i c h t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n p u r e and imperfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e is p r o b l e m a t i c . W i t h p u r e a n d perfect p r o c e d u r a l justice, t h e r e c a n b e n o conflict b e t w e e n t h e s h a r e d com­ m i t m e n t t o t h e p r o c e d u r e a n d t h e s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t t o a n indepen­ d e n t criterion for u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s . I n t h e p u r e c a s e , t h e r e is no s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n , a n d i n t h e perfect ™L T " r satisfied o r else t h e p r o c e d u r e w a s not correctly foUowed ( t h o u g h w h i c h of t h e s e is t h e c a s e m a y still be o n n E ^ P « p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e , b y c o n t r a s t , such a 54

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153 e Political deliberations that t h e y c a n r e n d e r a n yT hverdict they Process, please b e c a133.u s e their verdict will define t h e c o r r e c t o u t c o m e . R a t h e r t h e y must try in good faith and to the b e s t of t h e i r abilities t o deliver w h a t e v e r verdict accords with the facts a n d t h e m e r i t s of t h e c a s e . It is only because they are trusted to take this a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e is believed to be reason­ ably reliable. And its reliability in t u r n s u p p o r t s t h e shared commit­ ment to the p r o c e d u r e , o n t h e b a s i s of w h i c h o u t s i d e r s are willing to accept its o u t c o m e s w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y b e . 13.3. Some i n s t a n c e s of p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e are m u c h simpler, but the political process involves t h e s a m e c o m p l e x i t i e s . T h e r e is a n i n d e p e n ­ dent criterion of j u s t i c e , a n d t h e political p r o c e s s therefore contains elements of perfect a n d i m p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l justice as it satisfies this criterion with c e r t a i n t y o r p r o b a b i l i t y . Insofar as o u t c o m e s are underdetermined by t h i s i n d e p e n d e n t criterion, t h e political process con­ tains an element of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . Within s o m e range, any outcome will count a s c o r r e c t m e r e l y b y virtue of having b e e n pro­ duced in the p r o p e r w a y . In t h i s i n s t a n c e s u c h leeway is welcome, for it allows more of a social s y s t e m ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l features to be s h a p e d in accordance w i t h collective p r e f e r e n c e s e m e r g i n g from political debate. An ongoing political p r o c e s s is t h e n a s s e s s e d a n d , if n e e d be, re­ formed °y reference t o t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s : first, t h e equal basic political Arties together w i t h t h e i r fair v a l u e m u s t b e fully recognized a n d Protected, so t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s e q u a l l y have a g e n u i n e opportunity for meaningful political p a r t i c i p a t i o n as d e m a n d e d by their first high­ est-order interest; s e c o n d , t h e political p r o c e s s m u s t b e reliable, that is, jst result in legislation a n d p o l i c i e s t h a t are just (insofar as they are °ject to an i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n ) . to theory, t h e s e t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s leave o p e n a vast range ot mstitu°nal options. Obviously, a t h o r o u g h a s s e s s m e n t of these options canJ» be made in t h e a b s t r a c t . Rather, it m i g h t start from comparative ^topical a l y s e s a n d b e f u r t h e r a d v a n c e d , p e r h a p s , by some social ^ e n r n e n t s . m v i e w of t h e g r e a t diversity of possibilities a n d our ignorance in r e g a r d t o t h e m , it is s o m e w h a t regrettable tha *J» largely takes for g r a n t e d a political p r o c e s s resembling the m o d e . to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d Great B r i t a i n - w i t h a BLP a multiparty system, a n d single-member constituencies (TJ first None of t h e s e t h r e e a s s u m p t i o n s is obvious. Concerning * e fin* role m i g h t b e r e s e r v e d for d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y , which w r t h m a **°*toy s e t t l e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y constitute a suitable m

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m e c h a n i s m for resolving m a t t e r s of a f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e . Typically, s u c h m a t t e r s arise infrequently, a r e clearly definable a n d not overly p r e s s i n g , a n d t h e r e f o r e p e r m i t of e x t e n s i v e d e b a t e culminating in a well-deliberated d e c i s i o n b y t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n . Referendums may b e especially a p p r o p r i a t e for d e c i s i o n s a l t e r i n g o r reaffirming the s c h e m e of indirect d e m o c r a c y t h r o u g h w h i c h " n o r m a l " decisions are b e i n g m a d e , a n d t h e r e b y m a y e n s u r e a m o r e m e a n i n g f u l form of selfgovernment. Against Rawls's s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n , o n e m i g h t envision a demo­ cratic single-party s y s t e m w i t h a h i e r a r c h y of o r g a n s , t h e higher-level o n e s b e i n g c o m p o s e d of d e l e g a t e s from t h e n e x t l o w e r level, who are p e r h a p s b o u n d b y a n i m p e r a t i v e m a n d a t e . S u c h a political process w o u l d s e e m c o m p a t i b l e w i t h Rawls's " p r i n c i p l e of (equal) participa­ t i o n " (TJ 221) a n d t h e fair v a l u e of t h e political liberties, at least if it is a s s u r e d "(1) t h a t t h e r e is full i n t r a - p a r r y d e m o c r a c y , (2) that party m e m b e r s h i p is o p e n , a n d (3) t h a t t h e p r i c e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the party is n o t a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of activity t h a n t h e average p e r s o n c a n reason­ ably b e e x p e c t e d t o c o n t r i b u t e . " S u c h a d e m o c r a t i c single-parry sys­ t e m m i g h t d o b e t t e r in involving o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s i n t h e formulation a n d r e s o l u t i o n of c o n c r e t e political i s s u e s t h a n d o e s a multiparty system u n d e r w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of m o s t c i t i z e n s m a y tend to d e g e n e r a t e into a n infrequent c h o i c e a m o n g t w o o r t h r e e preexisting p a r t y platforms. 36

Finally, o n e c o u l d a r g u e against Rawls's t h i r d a s s u m p t i o n that a wuiner-takes-all" electoral s y s t e m t e n d s t o o v e r r e p r e s e n t the larger a n d m o r e e s t a b l i s h e d g r o u p s . U n d e r s u c h a s y s t e m , m i n o r i t y views that are n o t c o n c e n t r a t e d in o n e o r a few territorial c o n s t i t u e n c i e s may be effectively e x c l u d e d from t h e legislative d e b a t e , p e r h a p s abridging the tair value of t h e political liberties of m e m b e r s of s u c h a m i n o r i t y . In a n y case, it is u n c l e a r w h y s o m e s y s t e m s of p r o p o r t i o n a l representa­ tion s h o u l d n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e a s w e l l My objective in briefly raising t h e s e i s s u e s is n o t t o a r g u e for or y against s emP o m e p a r t i c u l a r m o d e l of a reat d e m o c r a t i c political p r o c e s s but Whi0hpersonsof od d e a l of s p a c e for institutional v will m a y reasonably disagree. K ° P° < * ^ Part T h r e e " w h e r e I s u p p o r t the m e a l ot a global basic s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d e m b o d y a c e r t a i n degree ot 57

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tolerance toward d i v e r s e n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . It is likely that there are meaningfully d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s of self-government that are quite different from t h o s e A m e r i c a n s h a p p e n to b e a c c u s t o m e d to. 13.4. Another r e g r e t t a b l e o m i s s i o n is Rawls's c o m p l e t e silence on the subject of federalism. T h i s o m i s s i o n , in c o n j u n c t i o n with his almost exclusive c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h e e l e m e n t of imperfect procedural justice in the political p r o c e s s , m a y s u g g e s t t h a t h e finds decentralized organs of self-government s u p e r f l u o u s . Following R o u s s e a u a n d Mill, Rawls views democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s a s c e n t e r i n g a r o u n d t h e ideal that per­ sons vote their c o n s c i e n c e r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r self-interest; everyone is asked to make a moral, n o t a p r u d e n t i a l j u d g m e n t (TJ 357, 284, 2 3 0 31). When the task is t o f o r m u l a t e j u s t legislation (as defined by some independent criterion), t h e n it m a y s e e m t h a t all issues, including local ones, should b e d i s c u s s e d a n d d e c i d e d by all b e c a u s e "an ideally conducted d i s c u s s i o n a m o n g m a n y p e r s o n s is m o r e likely to arrive at the correct c o n c l u s i o n " (TJ 358). In fact, however, o n e c a n still p r e f e r a d e c e n t r a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e for making political d e c i s i o n s of m e r e l y local significance. This preference need not be b a s e d o n t h e c l a i m t h a t s o m e o n e ' s ability to influence a Political decision s h o u l d b e p r o p o r t i o n a l to h o w m u c h it affects one­ self. If persons a r e t o b e e x c l u d e d from political decisions of other localities, the r e a s o n is n o t t h a t t h e y s t a n d to gain or to lose nothing either way (that w o u l d m o r e likely b e a n asset) b u t rather that they are Presumably in n o p o s i t i o n t o m a k e a n informed, responsible judgment. ™y cannot possibly k n o w e n o u g h a b o u t all t h e s e matters, n o r is it «her practicable o r m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o delimit t h e g r o u p of those hoare c o m p e t e n t o t h e r w i s e t h a n b y r o u g h geographical criteria. The reasons for t h e p a r t i a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of political decision making become s t r o n g e r o n c e w e qualify Rawls's characterizations o ™ political p r o c e s s a s a n i n s t a n c e of imperfect p r o c e d u r a l justice ( J f> cf. §54). T h e r e a r e m a n y political i s s u e s t h a t d o not have a uniquely °<*ect outcome. In t h e s e c o n t e x t s a n d r e s p e c t s t h e political process, is case of p e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e , a n d citizens c a n argue a n d vote on J*basis of t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s . I s s u e s of this kind are the stuff of dayJ % politics: H o w m u c h s h o u l d b e s p e n t o n maintaining the p u n t y « public w a t e r s u p p l y , p u b l i c r e c r e a t i o n areas, or fire, ambulance, ^ l ^ a g e - c o U e c t i o n s e r ^ c e s ? H o w are o p e n i n g h o u r s hohdays, i a g e contracts, b r o a d c a s t i n g , c o n s u m e r protection, a n d the scnooi 58

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c u r r i c u l u m t o b e r e g u l a t e d ? S h o u l d h i g h - r i s e b u i l d i n g s b e allowed or c a r c o n g e s t i o n b e r e d u c e d i n s o m e p a r t i c u l a r a r e a a n d , if so, to what e x t e n t a n d h o w ? S u c h q u e s t i o n s d o n ' t h a v e u n i q u e l y correct answers, defined b y t h e d e c i s i o n a n ideally r e a s o n a b l e a n d well-informed legis­ lator w o u l d m a k e b e h i n d s o m e p a r t i a l veil of i g n o r a n c e (cf. TJ 196-98, 357). W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is m e r e l y t h a t t h e p e r s o n s affected have the p o w e r to s h a p e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t s h a p e s t h e i r lives, t h a t they can, w i t h i n b r o a d limits, a r r a n g e t h e i r m o r e i m m e d i a t e social world the way t h e y w a n t it t o b e . A n d t h i s v a l u e obviously, favors local mechanisms of political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . As t h e s e t h o u g h t s suggest, j u s t i c e p e r m i t s a n d p r o b a b l y favors feder­ alist i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t feature d e c e n t r a l i z e d legislative, executive, and judicial o r g a n s . T h i s i d e a m i g h t b e c o m b i n e d w i t h Rawls's four-stage s e q u e n c e (TJ §31). W h e r e a s a m o r e a b s t r a c t c r i t e r i o n of justice governs t h e g r o u n d r u l e s of t h e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m a s a whole, various different specifications of this c r i t e r i o n m i g h t g o v e r n p r a c t i c e s whose a u t h o r i t y is c o n f i n e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n a l division. T h u s the require­ m e n t of e q u a l basic political liberties c a n b e satisfied even while politi­ cal p r o c e s s e s are d e s i g n e d differently o n t h e v a r i o u s levels (global, national, provincial, m u n i c i p a l ) a n d in t h e v a r i o u s (territorially defined! divisions o n t h e s a m e level. In fact, w h y s h o u l d it n o t e v e n b e permissi­ ble t h a t in a representative d e m o c r a c y t h e d e l e g a t e s from t h e various political subdivisions are e l e c t e d i n d i v e r s e w a y s , s o l o n g as rough equality of political influence is p r e s e r v e d a m o n g p e r s o n s from dif­ ferent c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ? ^ Again, t h e s e t h o u g h t s are of s o m e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e a r g u m e n t of Part Three for t h e y s h o w that a w e l l - o r d e r e d w o r l d c o m m u n i t y n e e d not be a w o r l d state m t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e of "state." Political d e c i s i o n making o n t h e global p l a n e c a n b e c o n f i n e d t o i s s u e s t h a t a r e trulv transna­ tional in character, a n d s u c h i s s u e s c a n b e s e t t l e d t h r o u g h a demoP ° " » | P r o c e s s t h a t t a k e s a c c o u n t of t h e different political traditions of t h e v a r i o u s n a t i o n s . 13.5. T h e first p r i n c i p l e a t t e n d s only to s t a n d a r d b a s i c n e e d s , which h t

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can be completely safeguarded through a definite and limited package of effectively enforced basic rights and liberties. Hence, if the first principle were the only independent criterion for judging political decisions, then the political process of a just basic structure would contain a large element of pure procedural justice. But Rawls proposes that this remaining leeway should be further constricted through the second principle. This proposal can be recommended to the parties through the following rationale: if the design of the second part of the basic structure were left entirely to the political process as a matter of pure procedural justice, then a voting coalition including more affluent classes could easily impose or perpetuate economic institutions under which the poor would be much poorer than is unavoidable (though their standard basic socioeconomic needs would still be met). The least restrictive way of blocking this considerable danger in­ volves constraining the political process so that the interests of all Participants are tied to those of any least advantaged group. This, I tbink, is the general idea behind the second principle. It ensures that decisions made through the political process are framed in a way that Precludes bias against particular persons and groups. While the first Principle requires definite and specific safeguards in the form of a Package of enumerated basic rights and liberties, the opportunity pnnple requires nothing about what specific opportunities an institu­ tional scheme is to generate but constrains only the distribution of ch opportunities, whatever they mav be. Similarly, the difference Principle requires only of social and economic inequalities that they must optimize the socioeconomic position of the least advantaged; no such requirement is imposed upon any other features the social sys> may tend to produce. In this way, the choice of any institutional Panares that affect socioeconomic positions roughly equally are, insoJ«r as they are not preempted by the first or opportunity principles, ten be governed by the political process as matters of pure procedural These may include features that affect or constrain overall g n o m i c activity (working hours, pollution, depletion of mineralI re°*ces), the proportion of the social product allocated to education ^health care, the provision of public goods, and birth rates. J h e constraints added by the second principle make » * " J » mo* acceptable to the parties. The principle requires more of an y j u t a n a l scheme with regard to the worst socioeconomic position " P ^ i t s , without detracting from what is significant about the basic 61

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political l i b e r t i e s . O n e m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e s e additional con­ s t r a i n t s s h o u l d also p l a y a r o l e i n a s s e s s i n g a n e x i s t i n g political process a n d in g u i d i n g its reform. After all, t h e s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t upon any political p r o c e s s is t h a t it s h o u l d b e reliable, t h a t is, p r o d u c e legislation a n d policies t h a t a r e just. H e r e t h e reliability of t h e political process w i t h r e g a r d to t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is of s p e c i a l c o n c e r n . Often a large variety of m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e e c o n o m i c l a w s a n d policies can w i t h s o m e plausibility b e d e f e n d e d a s d o i n g b e s t b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e b e c a u s e i n t h i s m a t t e r s o m u c h " d e p e n d s u p o n speculative political a n d e c o n o m i c d o c t r i n e s a n d u p o n social t h e o r y generally" ITJ 199). Still, t h e r e is h o p e t h a t s u c h p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s can be c u r b e d t o s o m e e x t e n t s o a s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e difference principle is at least a p p r o x i m a t e l y satisfied. W h i l e t h e e q u a l b a s i c political liberties r e q u i r e social a n d e c o n o m i c legislation t o b e c r e a t e d democratically (rather t h a n b y a g r o u p of u p r i g h t e x p e r t s , say, t h o u g h legislators could of c o u r s e c o n s u l t s u c h experts), t h e y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a system ot judicial review t h a t w o u l d filter o u t a t least t h e c l e a r e r c a s e s of legisla­ tion violating t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . Alluding t o " t h e h i s t o r y of s u c c e s s f u l c o n s t i t u t i o n s " (BLP 52), Rawls o p p o s e s t h i s idea, h o w e v e r , w i t h h i s r e m a r k a b l e fiat t h a t "the second p r i n c i p l e of justice . . . is n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e constitution (ibid.). This is r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e it w o u l d s e e m t o c o n t r a d i c t Ravvls s official p o s i t i o n . T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e would clearly b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of b a s i c political liberties for all™ But if so, t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it should be 64

63

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incorporated m u s t b e s e t t l e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t w o principles them­ selves. The s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e o u g h t t o b e p a r t of t h e constitution if a n d only if this w o u l d t e n d t o i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t social position o n t h e whole. His opposition is f u r t h e r r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e Rawls himself suggests that existing i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e n o t all t h a t successful, in that they don't even remotely satisfy t h e difference p r i n c i p l e (TJ 87). And h o w c a n we expect them to, s o l o n g a s t h i s p r i n c i p l e is n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d into the public and official t e r m s of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ? How are actual legislators to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e y a r e t o frame their deliberations in accordance w i t h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h e n it is merely o n e among many incompatible i d e a s d e b a t e d b y t h e a c a d e m i c s of t h e well-or­ dered society? I w o u l d t h i n k , t h e n , c o n t r a r y to Rawls, that if the second principle is a r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e a t all, if it is part of that kernel of political morality t h a t is t o solve t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e problem by lasting t h r o u g h a n d c o n s t r a i n i n g all institutional changes, then it must be e n s h r i n e d in t h e legal o r d e r i n a w a y that reflects its perma­ nent and f o u n d a t i o n a l s t a t u s . It m u s t n o t b e merely a n idea that legislators m a y o r m a y n o t find attractive a n d m a y u s e o n occasion as a Preamble to a p a c k a g e of s o c i a l o r e c o n o m i c legislation. 66

13.6. When it c o m e s t o n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s , t h e s e c o n d principle once again gets s h o r t shrift, t h i s t i m e , h o w e v e r , for systematic reasons. The question h e r e is w h e t h e r a n d o n w h a t g r o u n d s equal basic political Jherties may b e r e s t r i c t e d for t h e s a k e of e n s u r i n g juster legislation, "ecall the t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s a political p r o c e s s m u s t satisfy. First, the Procedure s h o u l d b e s u c h t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s have basic political Gerties that a r e e q u a l l y c o m p l e t e a n d w e l l - p r o t e c t e d a n d w h o s e fair ™ is m a i n t a i n e d s o t h a t all h a v e "a fair o p p o r t u n i t y to hold public , and to i n f l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e of political decisions ( B U ' w . "Kofar as t h e political p r o c e s s is a n i n s t a n c e of p u r e procedural jus? ' r e q u i r e m e n t is u n o p p o s e d . I n t h e r e m a i n i n g "impure area, b°wever, w h e r e a n i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n exists for judging outcome* ™*e political p r o c e s s , a s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t c o m e s into play, m e Pob-hcal p r o c e s s s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d s o a s t o b e maximally reliable U e

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liberties a n d t h e i r fair v a l u e ; a n d a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t o u t p u t satisfy the s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h r a n k s lexically b e l o w b o t h first-principle re­ q u i r e m e n t s a n d t h u s c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e d e s i g n of t h e political process o n l y w i t h i n w h a t e v e r l e e w a y t h e y m a y leave. Not e v e n t h e slightest r e s t r i c t i o n of b a s i c political liberties o r of t h e i r fair value is justifiable w h e n t h e b e t t e r legislation it w o u l d l e a d t o m e r e l y r e d u c e s unjust social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s , h o w e v e r significantly. Rawls m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e risk-averse p a r t i e s , w i t h their decision rule, w o u l d find this r e s u l t a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s t a s k h i g h l i g h t s once again t h e crucial i m p o r t a n c e of m y p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t of t h e first princi­ ple. T h e p a r t i e s m u s t a s s u m e t h a t t h e p o o r m a y find it very difficult to p e r s u a d e a majority t o s u p p o r t s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s required by t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . Rawls h o l d s t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n s of basic political liberties for t h e s a k e of satisfying t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a r e nevertheless strictly r u l e d o u t ( u n d e r r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s ) . T h e parties w o u l d certainly find t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t u n a c c e p t a b l e u n l e s s they are a s s u r e d that restrictions of b a s i c political liberties m a y b e justifiable w h e n t h e y are n e c e s s a r y to m e e t s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c needs. H e n c e t h e p a r t i e s have y e t a n o t h e r r e a s o n t o w a n t a c l e a r a n d straight­ forward social m i n i m u m t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e first principle w h e r e it will play a p r i m a r y r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g h o w t h e political p r o c e s s is to b e a d j u s t e d t o n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s a n d historical con­ tingencies. U n e q u a l basic political liberties s u c h a s Mill h a d p r o p o s e d m a y be justifiable in this w a y w h e n t h e inequalities w o u l d make o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties significantly more c o m p l e t e or m o r e secure (cf. TJ §37). Put in m y terms, M i l l s claim (as Rawls reconstructs u n d e ? m r f W . h ^fL e x i s t i n g halfway favorable c o n d i t i o n s , w e o u g h t to accept a Z7£ to the first requirement in order to avoid a larger shortfall in

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4

The Second Principle of Justice

14. Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y P r i n c i p l e 14.1. The s e c o n d principle is a m o n g the features of his conception that Rawls has t e n d e d to d e e m p h a s i z e in recent years. He now believes, as we have seen, that t h e s e c o n d principle of justice is to be excluded from the written c o n s t i t u t i o n of a well-ordered society (BLP 52). More gently, he has e v e n d e c l a r e d t h e difference principle all but dispens­ able: "The primary a i m of justice as fairness is achieved once it is: clear "W" the parties w o u l d prefer average utilitarianism constrained by nis to** and opportunity p r i n c i p l e s over average utilitarianism unconfained 4). In this area, unsurprisingly, w e have nothing like tne bailed elucidations Rawls h a s s i n c e provided in support of his hrst f^ciple and t h u s m u s t rely m o r e extensively o n his account in A ^ory of Justice. There are s o m e significant revisions, "^ever ine amount of social primary g o o d s is n o w said to be based on the concepof the person as characterized by the two highest-order m t e r e s ^ Jvvewill e doubly ambiguous account ot m e J * * x t Principle in A Theory of Justice receives some clanncahon.m course of w h i c h Rawls all but d e l e t e s what w a s arguably the most Portant s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d : opportunities. The second principle (of The special conception) impose j t w o w u p o n the s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities.an 2 * * "V g e n ^ a t e : t h e opportunity principle and the d # r e n c e ^ p / e . These are serially o r d e r e d s o that the former ranks lex.caty f P F E

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above t h e latter, just a s t h e first p r i n c i p l e r a n k s lexically above the s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a s a w h o l e . Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e requirements in m o r e detail, I m u s t settle t w o p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r s . O n e of these con­ c e r n s t h e role " t h e social b a s e s of self-respect'' p l a y in t h e metric of s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s in t e r m s of w h i c h s o c i o e c o n o m i c positions are t o b e evaluated. T h e o t h e r p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r c o n c e r n s t h e ways in which institutional inequalities might b e generated. 14.3. T h e difference p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of what 1 call index goods—powers a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of offices a n d positions of re­ sponsibility; i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h ; a n d t h e s o c i a l b a s e s of self-respect. It r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e g e n e r a t e i n e q u a l i t i e s in i n d e x goods if a n d insofar a s t h e s e o p t i m i z e t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least advan­ t a g e d (or, as I have also said, t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e share). Here the i n c l u s i o n of t h e t h i r d i n d e x g o o d , t h e social b a s e s of self-respect, is p u z z l i n g . T h i s g o o d " h a s a c e n t r a l p l a c e " (TJ 62), i s "very important" (TJ "^'fi P i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (TJ 440), is even defined a s [the] m o s t i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (TJ 604 [index]). If it really is s o i m p o r t a n t , t h e n w h y d o e s it c o m e i n o n l y o n t h e lowest priority level, as a n i n d e x g o o d w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is t o b e governed by t h e difference p r i n c i p l e ? Rawls's i d e a s e e m s t o b e t h a t self-respect i s d u e t o various factors (has v a r i o u s "bases"), s o m e of w h i c h a r e m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t than o t h e r s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t social b a s i s of self-respect is (or in a just society o u g h t t o be) t h e e q u a l b a s i c liberties, a n d Rawls a p p e a l s extennr? - K ^ ! : P P o r t of h i s first p r i n c i p l e a n d its lexical i t °P social i n s t i t u t i o n s , merely by ™3r^rT P * ^ ' a r e i m m u n e t o c o m p l a i n t s invoking selfZ7nTJ I v ° ^ a j u s t s o c i e t y is n o t t h e n one's X rilhtTLn ^ y » e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of fundamental eSnnrnl? ^ T ^ ' ' , " ' [ W e e l i m i n a t e t h e significance of relative e c o n o m i c a n d social a d v a n t a g e s a s s u p p o r t s for m e n ' s self-confidence S

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the social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e y the worst s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n . T h e p o o r might excusa y socioeconomic p o s i t i o n t h a t , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t worse terms, is (in relative t e r m s ) s o m e w h a t less inferior. poRawls h a n d l e s t h i s p r o b l e m b y r e c o g n i z i n g that a i ^ , ram of self-respect m a y h a v e t o b e i n c l u d e d a m o n g nt Adding this i n d e x g o o d e n a b l e s t h e difference P ^ rior of abridgments of s e l f - r e s p e c t t h a t a r e d u e t o a signn share of other i n d e x g o o d s (see G r a p h 1). necessary inRawls's halfhearted offer t h a t "theoretically w e c difference dude self-respect self-respect ii n t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s " g ° ^ \ a n c e he nthe pnmaiy u ^ . „ Principle (TJ 546) d o e s n o t t h e n d e t r a c t from t h e ^ e a « _ ^ . Pnnaple (TJ 546) d o e s n o t t h e n d e t r a c t from t h e great impu..~~ if. "e a s—-mps that tuh ev need _ for. „settJ" e w h—e r •e a• t t a c h• e s t o self-respect. H s u m e s that d u a l

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full social b a s e s of self-respect t h a t a l s o figure s o prominently in Rawls's a r g u m e n t for t h e p r i o r i t y of t h e e q u a l b a s i c liberties. 1 4 . 3 . C o m i n g t o t h e s e c o n d p r e l i m i n a r y , i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y generate inequalities in v a r i o u s w a y s . P e r p e n d i c u l a r t o m y earlier distinction b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s , w e m u s t now dis­ t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e various k i n d s of n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts to which t h e inequalities p r o d u c e d b y a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y be related W h a t facts a b o u t p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s e x p l a i n t h e lifetime share each c o m e s t o have u n d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h e y participate in? If s h a r e s a r e u n e q u a l , t h e n t h e r e m u s t b e s u c h facts. T h e s e facts are not t h e m s e l v e s p a r t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d a r e therefore irrelevant t o its a s s e s s m e n t . W h a t is relevant is w h i c h k i n d s of facts an institu­ tional s c h e m e allows t o p l a y a c a u s a l role i n d e t e r m i n i n g shares and h o w significant a n i m p a c t it allows e a c h k i n d of fact t o have. Here Rawls w a n t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h a m o n g " t h r e e m a i n k i n d s of c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (WOS 11): n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , a n d " s u c h chance c o n t i n g e n c i e s as a c c i d e n t a n d g o o d f o r t u n e " (TJ 7 2 ) . In first explicating t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , Rawls p u t s a g o o d deal of weight u p o n t h e distinction b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d social contingencies Luck is a l m o s t entirely i g n o r e d , t h o u g h i n e q u a l i t i e s arising through c h a n c e a r e implicitly g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h o s e a r i s i n g from natural contingencies. T h e n a t u r a l / s o c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n is p r o b l e m a t i c in v a r i o u s ways, and Rawls d o e s n o t d r a w it precisely. C o n c e r n i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s related to differentials i n n a t u r a l t a l e n t — h i s p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e for natural con­ t i n g e n c i e s — R a w l s s u g g e s t s t h a t insofar a s s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities a r e t a l e n t - i n d u c e d , t h e y c a n b e e x p l a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o t w o factors: t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of t a l e n t s a n d t h e p r e v a i l i n g institutional s c h e m e . This suggestion, however, is t o o s i m p l e T h e r e is a t h i r d factor, namely, h o w valuable t h e various n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d to be in t h e relevant social system. T o s o m e e x t e n t t h i s t h i r d factor will itself b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . T o s o m e extent it will also b e d u e t o e x o g e n o u s d e t e r m i n a n t s , s u c h a s t h e systems IH ,f! e n v i r o n m e n t , c u l t u r e , a n d level of d e v e l o p m e n t . In any case, t h i s t h i r d factor e n s u r e s that even so-called natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s (the d i s t r i b u t e of valuable talents) will have a c o n s i d e r a b l e social component. ltur

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social institutions m u s t a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s in s o m e way, it is at least doubtful that b e i n g female o r black m a k e s o n e naturally h a n d i c a p p e d or that social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s to t h e natural diver­ sity of skin colors a n d g e n d e r s (or of h e i g h t o r h a i r growth, for that matter). These r e m a r k s m a k e it a p p e a r doubtful that a conception of justice can plausibly p l a c e a s m u c h w e i g h t o n t h e distinction between natural and social c o n t i n g e n c i e s a s Rawls d o e s in interpreting his second principle. I will s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e s e d o u b t s m o r e concretely in a moment. 144. With this b a c k g r o u n d , let u s c o n s i d e r w h a t Rawls takes the content of the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e to b e . He is clear throughout that this principle r e q u i r e s at l e a s t formal equality of opportunity, that is "equality as c a r e e r s o p e n t o t a l e n t s " (TJ 65). This requirement is scant­ ily explained. Surely Rawls m e a n s t o p r e c l u d e g r o u n d rules that call for exclusion of specific p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s from certain careers. Presum­ ably he wants t o r e q u i r e f u r t h e r t h a t g r o u n d rules m u s t positively mandate that o p p o r t u n i t i e s b e a l l o c a t e d in certain ways (for example, byfirmsand schools). I c o n j e c t u r e t h a t to m a i n t a i n formal equality of opportunity i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t p r e s c r i b e t h a t information about opengs be reasonably w i d e l y available a n d t h a t n o g r o u p be excluded wholesale from t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for a n o p e n i n g , u n l e s s this g r o u p is defined by its m e m b e r s ' (1) inability o r u n w i l l i n g n e s s to pay the access Pice (tuition, for e x a m p l e ) , (2) inferior suitability or qualifications as reasonably related to p r o s p e c t s of s u c c e s s in t h e relevant career, or (3) age. I think d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y a g e n e e d n o t b e prohibited for the sake ot maintaining formal equality^ of o p p o r t u n i t y as Rawls would specify it. % not admitting s t u d e n t s a b o v e t h e age of thirty-five, law schools *™Jd not be affecting p e r s o n s ' lifetime s h a r e s differentially. J n e s e conjectures still leave i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s open. May otne f u n d s (race, g e n d e r , g o o d looks, religious o r political affiliation)be to the extent t h a t d o i n g s o m e r e l y h a m p e r s s o m e group*.butdoes exclude t h e m a l t o g e t h e r ? M a y s u c h criteria b e considered compo­ r t s of suitability a f least, w h e n p a t i e n t s - t o take E m i s s i o n s to JJJcal schools a s a n e x a m p l e - h a v e m o r e trust in white, male, ugly, 5

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equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e (TJ 73-74), on which the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of efficiency is s t r e n g t h e n e d i n t o " t h e p r i n c i p l e of fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . " In first i n t r o d u c i n g this p r i n c i p l e , h e w r i t e s : " T h e t h o u g h t h e r e is that posi­ t i o n s a r e t o b e n o t o n l y o p e n i n a formal s e n s e , b u t t h a t all should have a fair c h a n c e t o a t t a i n t h e m . Offhand it is n o t c l e a r w h a t i s meant, but w e m i g h t s a y t h a t . . . t h o s e w h o a r e a t t h e s a m e level of talent and ability, a n d h a v e t h e s a m e w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e t h e m , s h o u l d have the s a m e p r o s p e c t s of s u c c e s s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r initial p l a c e in the social s y s t e m . . . . C h a n c e s t o a c q u i r e c u l t u r a l k n o w l e d g e a n d skills should not d e p e n d u p o n o n e ' s c l a s s p o s i t i o n , a n d so t h e s c h o o l system, whether p u b l i c or private, s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d t o e v e n o u t c l a s s b a r r i e r s " (TJ 731. T h e i n d e x ofA Theory ofJustice lists t h i s a s t h e p l a c e w h e r e "equality of fair o p p o r t u n i t y [is] d e f i n e d " (TJ 594). T h e r e a r e t w o r o u g h l y parallel p a s s a g e s : fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y r e q u i r e s " e q u a l c h a n c e s of educa­ tion a n d c u l t u r e for p e r s o n s similarly e n d o w e d a n d motivated" (TJ 275), a n d " t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . . . r e q u i r e s e q u a l life p r o s p e c t s in all s e c t o r s of society for t h o s e similarly e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d " (TJ 3011. This e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s that Rawls's o w n d e m o c r a t i c - e q u a l i t y inter­ p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e — " c o m b i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e " (TJ 75)—follows t h e liberal-equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in invoking t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a l l o w s to arise from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d t h o s e it a l l o w s t o a r i s e from natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s (TJ 72-75). T h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e e n t i r e l y p r o h i b i t e d by t n e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r w o u l d b e left to "the o i t t e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e [which] w o u l d a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s in education, t0 Pr e thu!°^ « - t e n n e x p e c t a t i o n of t h e least favored. If r ™ !?i y S n g m o r e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d , it is p e r m i s s i b l e ; o t h e r w i s e n o t " (TJ 101) 6

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who begin in t h e c l a s s of u n s k i l l e d l a b o r e r s . . . . [T]his kind of initial inequality in life p r o s p e c t s . . . is justifiable only if t h e difference in expectation is to t h e a d v a n t a g e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m a n w h o is worse of [TJ 78). And h e w r i t e s t h a t " a n inequality of opportunity must enhance the o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h o s e w i t h t h e lesser opportunity" (TJ 303)7 The first ambiguity, t h e n , c o n c e r n s t h e kind of limitation Rawls wants to impose u p o n s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities that institutions allow to arise from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Is h e requiring rough statisti­ cal equality a m o n g p e r s o n s b o r n i n t o different classes w h o are sim­ ilarly endowed a n d m o t i v a t e d , o r m a y t h e basic structure generate inequalities so l o n g a s d o i n g s o r a i s e s t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c position of the least advantaged in a b s o l u t e t e r m s ? The second a m b i g u i t y c o n c e r n s t h e q u e s t i o n Equality or inequali­ ties of what?' On o n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Rawls w a s postulating a separate social primary g o o d of i n t e r m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e , a n d such a good, opportunities, i n d e e d a p p e a r e d o n t h e c a n o n i c a l list of social primary goods (TJ 62, 92). It w o u l d i n c l u d e a c c e s s to "cultural knowledge and skffls" (TJ 73) a n d t o " e d u c a t i o n a n d c u l t u r e " (TJ 275). Postulating such good, Rawls c o u l d e x p l a i n t h e d e s i g n priority of t h e opportunity Principle over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e as follows: a basic structure under which t h e least a d v a n t a g e d suffer a shortfall from fair equality ot opportunity is a l w a y s u n j u s t , e v e n w h e n this enables t h e m to have a ^ d e x p o s i t i o n , b e c a u s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s are incommensurably important t h a n i n d e x g o o d s (just as first-principle goods are «commensurably m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n opportunities). In this vein Rawls writes: "It is n o t e n o u g h to a r g u e . . . that t h e whole of society deluding the least favored b e n e f i t from certain restrictions on equality I opportunity. W e m u s t a l s o c l a i m t h a t t h e a t t e m p t to eliminate these ^qualities w o u l d s o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e social system a n d the operatons of the e c o n o m y t h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n a n y w a y t h e opportunities ot disadvantaged w o u l d b e e v e n m o r e limited" (TJ 300-1). An ina

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equality of o p p o r t u n i t y m u s t e n h a n c e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of those with t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y " (TJ 3 0 3 ) — n o t m e r e l y t h e i r i n d e x position. Alternatively, Rawls m i g h t h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e possibility t h a t social c o n t i n g e n c i e s m i g h t b e a l l o w e d t o give rise t o inequalities in i n d e x g o o d s — i n i n c o m e a n d i n p o w e r s a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of offices and p o s i t i o n s of responsibility. T h i s v i e w is s u g g e s t e d , for example, by his p a r a p h r a s e : "Positions a r e t o b e n o t o n l y o p e n i n a formal sense, b u t . . all s h o u l d h a v e a fair c h a n c e t o a t t a i n t h e m " (TJ 73). There is no s e p a r a t e social p r i m a r y g o o d " o p p o r t u n i t i e s " . 8

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Cast a s q u e s t i o n s , t h e t w o a m b i g u i t i e s c a n b e s u m m e d u p this way: F i r s t u n d e r t h e ideal b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , a r e i n e q u a l i t i e s of opportunity arising from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s [1] p e r m i t t e d insofar as, ceteris par­ ibus, t h e y (interschemically) e n h a n c e t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c posi­ tion, o r a r e t h e y [2] strictly r u l e d o u t ? S e c o n d , d o e s t h e opportunity p r i n c i p l e limit h o w social c o n t i n g e n c i e s m a y give r i s e t o differentials in a c c e s s t o [A] i n d e x g o o d s o r t o [B] o p p o r t u n i t i e s u n d e r s t o o d as a social p r i m a r y g o o d in t h e i r o w n right? T h e s e t w o a m b i g u i t i e s permit (ini­ tially) four m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e r e a d i n g s of R a w l s ' s democraticequality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , i n c l u d i n g four different v e r s i o n s of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e a s it c o n s t r a i n s t h e difference principle, as follows: 11A] I n e q u a l i t i e s i n i n d e x g o o d s a r e g o v e r n e d b y t h e d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e , 2 y ™

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(2B) Inequalities in index goods are governed by the difference principle, subject to the condition (OP ) that there must be formal equality of opportunity, a n d no inequalities of opportunity may be allowed to arise from social contingencies (that is, access to education and the like must be equal for similarly endowed persons bom into different social classes!. 2B

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Since the texts d o n o t c l e a r l y favor o n e reading, let m e p r o c e e d with a brief analysis, w h i c h will s h o w t h a t o n l y version [1A] is tenable. 14.6. Version [IB] involves t h e i d e a t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s constitute a separate category of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , intermediate in t h e lexical hierarchy b e t w e e n f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s a n d index goods. It implies a preference for t h e feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a t optimizes the worst (set of) opportunities. But t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t m a k e s n o sense. For oppor­ tunities must b e u n d e r s t o o d e i t h e r i n a b s o l u t e or in relative terms. If we understand t h e m i n absolute t e r m s (as reflecting, for instance, h o w much education o n e h a s a c c e s s to), t h e n [IB] requires that resources must without limit b e d e v o t e d t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of opportunities in preference t o i n d e x g o o d s , b e c a u s e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of the least ad­ vantaged take p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e i r i n d e x position. This priority is absurd. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , if w e u n d e r s t a n d opportunities in relative 'erms (as reflecting h o w m u c h e d u c a t i o n o n e h a s access to as a per­ centage of t h e average, for e x a m p l e ) , t h e n t h e s e c o n d principle allows no inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y at all, a n d [IB] collapses into [2B]. This dilemma u n d e r m i n e s [IB], t o g e t h e r w i t h Rawls's idea that t h e w a y to Justify inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y is t o s h o w t h a t they "enhance the opportunities of t h o s e w i t h t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y " (TJ 303, cf. 300). Version [2B] p r e s u p p o s e s a r a t i o n a l e i n w h i c h opportunities are fonceived in relative t e r m s , a s a p o s i t i o n a l good. What is presumecI to °eimportant is n o t h a v i n g a c c e s s t o a s m u c h e d u c a t i o n as possible out ^ving n o less a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n t h a n others. With t h e good so Jfined, the p a r t i e s , r e a s o n i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e maximm rute, f adopt a n equality of o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e . They will not care^how "J«h there is b y w a y of o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n absolute terms (and t h u c a n the political p r o c e s s t o g o v e r n overall allocations to education), prohibit i n e q u a l i t i e s of o p p o r t u n i t y b e c a u s e a n y sucfi mg » t a h » m u s t (logically) r e d u c e t h e w o r s t set of W ^ ^ ^ - g i v e n t h e lexical priority w i t h i n t h e s e c o n d P™^* as lowering t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n overall (even w h e n they the w o r s t i n d e x p o s i t i o n ! . " A l t h o u g h it p r e s u p p o s e s s u c h a 0

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tionale, [2B] is also i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h it, b e c a u s e [2B] allows inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y b a s e d u p o n natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s , allows, for example, a s Rawls clearly w a n t s t o (e.g., TJ 101), inferior a c c e s s to education for p e r s o n s less well e n d o w e d . Version [2A] involves t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s d o not con­ s t i t u t e a social p r i m a r y g o o d i n t h e i r o w n right, t h a t socioeconomic p o s i t i o n s a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y i n d e x g o o d s a l o n e . O n this assumption, t h e p a r t i e s will prefer a c r i t e r i o n of social j u s t i c e t h a t a s s e s s e s all social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s t e n d t o p r o d u c e by refer­ e n c e t o t h e lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n . T h e y h a v e n o r e a s o n to allow this lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n t o b e l o w e r e d i n o r d e r t o e q u a l i z e across classes t h e i n d e x p r o s p e c t s of p e r s o n s similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d endowed. So (2AI t o o , is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h its s u g g e s t e d r a t i o n a l e . It collapses into [1AL w h i c h lets t h e difference p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n all inequalities of oppor­ tunity ( w h e t h e r b a s e d o n social o r n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s ) , subject only t o t h e o n e c o n s t r a i n t of formal e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . It m a y s e e m t h a t if t h e p a r t i e s c a r e d o n l y a b o u t i n d e x goods, then t h e y w o u l d g o even further a n d prefer t o [1A] a p r o p o s a l o n which the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e is d e l e t e d entirely. B u t I t h i n k Rawls could det e n d t h e w e a k e s t o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e e v e n if it w e r e n o t correlated w i t h a social p r i m a r y g o o d of its o w n . F o r m a l e q u a l i t y of opportunity r e q u i r e s a u m v e r s a l right to c o m p e t e for all o p e n i n g s o n t h e basis of o n e s suitability a n d qualifications a s well a s o n e ' s ability a n d willing­ n e s s t o p a y t h e a c c e s s price. T h i s i s a n e a r l y cost-free legal mechanism that, t h r o u g h a gains i n productivity, i s b o u n d t o p a y its o w n way, for it arg6rn U m b e r o f 1™*®** a p p l i c a n t s a r e available for ?riorih?rSSr 2U ° '™ ^ implementation fowesHnZ .? « Principle, involves negligible risks for the ^ h3S S n t a d v a n t a g e s in specificity and B P O , n t 3Su£^i^fr» ^ ° ' a t institutions

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suggest a r e q u i r e m e n t of formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity: "Announce­ ments of jobs a n d p o s i t i o n s c a n b e f o r b i d d e n to contain statements which exclude a p p l i c a n t s of c e r t a i n d e s i g n a t e d ethnic a n d racial groups, or of e i t h e r s e x T h e n o t i o n of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y . . . has a central r a n g e of a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h consists of various liberties together with c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s e liberties can be effectively exercised" (BLP 79). 14.8. We have f o u n d n o p l a u s i b l e r a t i o n a l e in A Theory of Justice for the view that i n e q u a l i t i e s i n a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n ([2B]) or to jobs with associated r e w a r d s <[2A)), a r e a c c e p t a b l e w h e n related to natural con­ tingencies, b u t u n j u s t w h e n r e l a t e d t o social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . But one might think t h a t t h i s v i e w is n e v e r t h e l e s s morally plausible or that it appeals to t h e p a r t i e s for o t h e r r e a s o n s (such a s publicity, equal cit­ izenship, or stability). Let m e p r e s e n t t w o r e a s o n s for doubting that this is so. 14.8.1. The first difficulty c a n b e illustrated by a social system whose Participants a r e d i v i d e d i n t o r i c h a n d p o o r , b e t t e r e n d o w e d a n d worse endowed. So t h e r e a r e f o u r g r o u p s : RB, PB, RW, a n d PW. Suppose this social system h a s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e O N E , w h i c h t e n d s to e n g e n d e r signifi­ cant class-induced differentials i n e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities. Admis­ sion to the better s c h o o l s r e q u i r e s little b y w a y of talents a n d motiva­ tion but is mainly r e g u l a t e d b y h i g h t u i t i o n charges. Many m e m b e r s of "Wean and d o a t t e n d s u c h s c h o o l s , b u t m o s t of t h o s e born a m o n g the Poor cannot d o likewise, w h a t e v e r t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s . Assume further mat the tuition b a r r i e r is in fact justified o n t h e [1A] reading of the second principle ( w h e r e it r e q u i r e s only formal equality of oppor^ t y ) . There a r e e n o u g h RB e n t r a n t s t o fill t h e m o s t important offices 2 qualified g r a d u a t e s , e v e n w i t h o u t offering subsidies to m e m b e r s ot f" the tuition b a r r i e r p r o v i d e s a powerful incentive to parents to *°rk especially h a r d for t h e s a k e of financing their children s educaJ»n-These t w o factors, b y m a x i m i z i n g overall income, make O N E t h e ^ e m e that o p t i m i z e s t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged (PW), „ T e r e n c e principle requires. , .. . , 14

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m u s t b e e q u a l i z e d . A s s u m e t h e r e is a feasible alternative basic struc­ t u r e , T W O , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d motivational entrance r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e r a i s e d a n d t u i t i o n fees m a d e affordable to members of PB; T W O c o m e s m u c h c l o s e r t h a n O N E t o satisfying O P ^ and 0 P . It also satisfies t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h t h i s t i m e , of course, is subject to a m o r e d e m a n d i n g o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e ( O P ^ or 0P ). N o w s u p p o s e i n d e x p o s i t i o n s a r e t h o s e given i n T a b l e 3. On reading [1A], O N E is p r e f e r r e d b e c a u s e it g e n e r a t e s t h e h i g h e r m i n i m u m index p o s i t i o n (20 a s a g a i n s t 17). O n r e a d i n g s [2A] a n d (2B), T W O is preferred b e c a u s e it avoids a h i g h e r - o r d e r i n j u s t i c e . U n d e r O N E t h e p o o r (PB and PW) suffer a m u c h g r e a t e r i n e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . T h i s p r e f e r e n c e for T W O i l l u s t r a t e s t h e first difficulty. Yes, thanks to t h e m u c h l o w e r p r o s p e c t s i n RW, t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d (PW) now enjoy s o m e t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g "fair e q u a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l opportunity.'' But t h e i r e d u c a t i o n is n o t o n e bit b e t t e r u n d e r T W O t h a n u n d e r O N E , nor is t h e i r overall d i s a d v a n t a g e at all r e d u c e d ; t h e y a r e still effectively ex­ c l u d e d from t h e b e t t e r s c h o o l s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e t o b e accessible to o t h e r s . It is a b s u r d t o r e g a r d t h e i r p o s i t i o n a s m u c h b e t t e r u n d e r TWO t h a n u n d e r O N E just b e c a u s e t w o other g r o u p s , PB a n d RW, have (so to speak) e x c h a n g e d p l a c e s . " A n d it w o u l d b e similarly bizarre to allow 2 • t u ?J ? P a t i o n p r i o r i t y over t h e difference principle, that is, t o h o l d t h a t efforts t o w a r d reversing t h e p r o s p e c t s of PB a n d RW are always m o r e u r g e n t t h a n efforts t o m i t i g a t e e v e n s e v e r e poverty within (as w h e n t h e i r i n d e x p o s i t i o n falls far s h o r t of t h e feasible minimum 2B

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Educational a n d E m p l o y m e n t Opportunities, 15.1 Table 3. Index positions u n d e r alternative b a s i c structures

173

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did not do this, their c h i l d r e n w o u l d have many intangible advantages in terms of the contact p e r s o n s t h e y are exposed to in their home, neighborhood, and p e e r g r o u p . A s c h o o l system that does literally even out class barriers" (TJ 73)—if possible at all—is bound to be extremely expensive a n d therefore w o u l d reduce index positions (in­ cluding that of t h e least advantaged). Requiring s u c h an education system is thoroughly i m p l a u s i b l e a n d surely unacceptable to the riskaverse parties, especially if t h e opportunity principle entailing this requirement is to have n o t o n l y d e s i g n but also implementation pri­ ority over the difference principle. T h e s e difficulties show decisively, I ^ that [1A] is preferable to [2A] a n d [2BJ. 1 7

1 5

-Educational a n d E m p l o y m e n t

Opportunities

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174 Educational and Employment Opportunities, 15.1 the ground that o n e ' s talents aren't worth developing may well be more devastating to one's self-respect than exclusion on the ground that one's parents cannot afford to pay tuition. Yet all four readings of Rawls that we have considered may support as ideal a basic structure under which very little education and training are available to the less well endowed. In each case their disadvantage is justified by appeal to the difference principle. The cost of offering more education to the worse endowed is a bad investment, is not fully redeemed by their greater productivity later in life. Skimping on their education maximizes over­ all income and therefore, given the difference principle, also the in­ come of the least advantaged (most of whom may themselves be among the worse endowed). Hence, severe talent-induced inequalities in edu­ cational opportunity may well be required by Rawls's second principle, e v e n under the best of circumstances. Rawls seeks to mitigate this harsh result by emphasizing "the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure s e n s e of his o w n worth" (TJ 101); "resources for education are not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly according to their return as estimated in productive trained abilities, but also according to their worth in enriching the personal and social life of citizens" (TJ 1071 Stated in proper form, his thought must be this: The severe educational inequalities in question are justified only when they (interschemicallyi optimize the index position of the least advantaged. But they are un­ likely to do this, because any gain in the income of the least advantaged they may produce will probably be outweighed by a loss in their selfrespect." Hence, only rather mild talent-induced inequalities of educa­ tional opportunity will be justifiable by the difference principle. Ot course, lacking any notion of how the various index goods are to be weighted and aggregated, we have no way of evaluating this claim. ShlJh . !?^" ccount of education in this waythen d ° "nCe ™rLrS* P be subjected to a further constraint specifically upon cfass-induced inequalities of opportunity' This question presses toward [1A]. But let me here pursue the inverse ?uXZsZ ^ ? ° "P™ Equalities of oppor­ tunity ansmg from socia/ contingencies, then why shouldn't this con­ straint need to be extended to inequalities X S ^ L y related to other kinds of conhngencies? This question presses toward a new version of the democratic-equality mterpretationTthe second princi16

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opportunity a n d rough equality of actual opportunity (that is, partici­ pants must have roughly equivalent access to education and the like). 19

0P requires, in a d d i t i o n t o formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity, that every­ one should have a c c e s s t o a r o u g h l y equivalent education, with equiva­ lence defined in t e r m s of c o s t . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that persons must actually receive s u c h a r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t e d u c a t i o n , only that it must be genuinely a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e m . P e r h a p s g e n u i n e access is incompat­ ible with d i s c o u r a g e m e n t s of t h e k i n d t h a t have b e e n subtly hampering the education of w o m e n . P r e s u m a b l y g e n u i n e access also does not exist when p a r e n t s m a y r e f u s e e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities o n their childrens' behalf ( w h i c h w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t t h e earlier stages of educa­ tion must be c o m p u l s o r y ) . Governed b y t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , s u c h access is inalienable, ^ o t be g a m b l e d o r given o r s o l d a w a y (cf. §10.7). Nevertheless, there may be cases of p e r s o n s h a v i n g g e n u i n e access t o but declining a roughly equivalent e d u c a t i o n . S u c h c a s e s d o n o t indicate an injustice in the relevant e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . Finally, O P is i n s e n s i t i v e t o how a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e ensures that all have access to a r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t e d u c a t i o n . Schools a n d universities ay be publicly financed, o r s t u d e n t s m a y have access to sufficient Personal or p a r e n t a l f u n d s , s c h o l a r s h i p s , s u m m e r jobs, or loans from Public or private s o u r c e s . 154. Version [3B] a c c o r d s w i t h [B] b y conceiving opportunities as a primary g o o d in t h e i r o w n right. In t h e o t h e r dimension, 13W is egalitarian, like [2], i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s in relative terms -w ? Positional good). In t h i s , it diverges from t h e a s s u m p t i o n implicit^in in namely, t h a t a p e r s o n g a i n s b y h a v i n g m o r e access absolutely even u ^ greater a c c e s s c o m e s at t h e e x p e n s e of having less access than Jfoers. C o m p a r e d t o [2], [3B] is more egalitarian by having the opporJ " % principle c o n s t r a i n all i n e q u a l i t i e s of o p p o r t u n i t y - n o t only * * * arising from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s b u t also those a n s m g from "fural c o n t i n g e n c i e s o r l u c k . T h u s [3B] a s s u m e s that a p e r s o n . c o m J j * ^ r e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s n o t only with those: h a d by o A e r s J»e talents a n d l u c k Z s i m i l a r t o h e r o w n . But t h e n [3B] i u d JtaMtan t h a n [2] in t h a t it e m p l o y s a less d e m a n d i n g notion 3B

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i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms t o w a r d y e t a n o t h e r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , T H R E E , under w h i c h , b e c a u s e of a s t r o n g e r c o n s t r a i n t u p o n t h e difference principle, t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d (PW) w o u l d o n c e again be w o r s e t h a n u n d e r O N E . This t i m e , h o w e v e r , t h e justification for this a b s o l u t e d e c l i n e i n t h e i r i n d e x p o s i t i o n (from O N E t o T H R E E ) is not blatantly i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e r e f o r m of t h e e d u c a t i o n system would greatly i m p r o v e t h e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e least advantaged, t h e r e b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g o n e i m p o r t a n t b a s i s of t h e i r self-respect. It w o u l d also t e n d to i m p r o v e t h e i r relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n , because [3B], unlike Rawls's four v e r s i o n s of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , d o e s not allow t h e i r h a n d i c a p in t e r m s of m a r k e t a b l e t a l e n t s t o b e c o m p o u n d e d by the d i s a d v a n t a g e of an inferior e d u c a t i o n . Moreover, [3B] is a great i m p r o v e m e n t i n simplicity. To determine w h e t h e r O P ^ a n d O P are satisfied, w e m u s t b e a b l e to delimit the various social classes a n d , w i t h i n e a c h of t h e s e classes, t h e subsets of p e r s o n s similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d e n d o w e d ; a n d w e m u s t b e able to a s c e r t a i n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y - w e i g h t e d average e x p e c t a t i o n for educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s ([2B]) o r future s u c c e s s ([2A]) w i t h i n all t h e s e relevant s u b s e t s . In o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r O P is satisfied, w e n e e d only u n d e r s t a n d w h a t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e v a r i o u s participants have. T h i s is also m u c h closer to h o w o t h e r social p r i m a r y goods are understood. ^ 2 B

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Version [3B] h a s t h e s a m e sort of a d v a n t a g e over [1A], w h i c h presup­ p o s e s a c o m p l e x (and quite p o s s i b l y u n m a n a g e a b l e ) i n d e x calculus for a s s e s s i n g t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities of e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h calculations, Rawls s e e m s t o think, w o u l d justify only minor t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities in a n y c a s e (TJ 101, 107). Version [3B] is m u c h s i m p l e r t h a n eRawls's v e r s i o n s a n d t h e r e f o r e m o r e suitable as n n R ° > ^ a t is t o e n g e n d e r stability, P

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to it ITJ100-1), r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e " b e t t e r e n d o w e d " have inferior access to education o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e y c a n still achieve as m u c h as others whose inferior e n d o w m e n t s a r e b r o u g h t to fruition. This ex­ treme and Rawls's v e r s i o n s of t h e s e c o n d principle fail, I believe, for much the same r e a s o n s . First, t h e y view e d u c a t i o n a s merely a m e a n s for producing s o m e d e s i r a b l e social result, w h i c h in both cases is evaluated in t e r m s of i n d e x g o o d s . Yet in virtue of its crucial role in shaping not only o u r i n d e x - g o o d p r o s p e c t s b u t t h e very p e r s o n s we are, education is a pivotal s o c i a l g o o d in its o w n right, an essential precondition for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e t w o moral powers a n d of a secure sense of self-respect. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t ranking access to e d u c a t i o n a b o v e i n d e x g o o d s , a s s o m e passages of,4 Theory of Justice suggest. But if e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s have this elevated status, they m u s t h a v e it i n all i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s , not just in comparing t h e social p o s i t i o n s of p e r s o n s similarly e n d o w e d . Second, Rawls's versions a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e d r e s s allow indefinite inequali­ ties in educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s for p e r s o n s differentially endowed. °n[3B], by contrast, n o r a n k i n g of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is incorporated mto the public c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . All p e r s o n s , n o matter what their endowments m a y b e , h a v e t h e s a m e claim u p o n educational resources. % understanding t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e in this way, w e (or t h e parties) avoid u n d e r m i n i n g t h e s e l f - r e s p e c t of t h o s e w h o m Rawls treats as the worse endowed a n d e n s u r e t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle . JJ ™ first principle, is a firm a n d p e r s p i c u o u s pillar of a shared public notion of equal c i t i z e n s h i p . ,. . The argument for [3B] c a n b e f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d by attending; to other main k i n d of c o n t i n g e n c i e s t h a t Rawls exempts from_ tne ^ P e of h i o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e — l u c k . C o n s i d e r a society in whicn *rne 20 p e r c e n t of all c h i l d r e n c a n n o t gain a d m i s s i o n to any school. scheme is d e f e n d e d o n t h e g r o u n d that t h e inequality is not J**? to social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , s i n c e s c h o o l s select pupils at random. J j i " versions of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e all allow this d e f e n s e ^ ^ d u a l s a n d g r o u p s c o m p e t e for a d m i s s i o n o n equal terms (formal 22

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equality of o p p o r t u n i t y ) , a n d similarly e n d o w e d a n d motivated per­ s o n s b o r n i n t o different social c l a s s e s h a v e e q u a l p r o s p e c t s for educa­ tion (OP ) a n d a c h i e v e m e n t ( O P ) . Rawls's a s s e s s m e n t of this scheme w o u l d t h e n t u r n u p o n w h e t h e r it satisfies t h e difference principle— a n d this it m i g h t well do, b e c a u s e it is c h e a p e r a n d m i g h t yield an equally s u i t a b l e w o r k force. O P , b y c o n t r a s t , p r o h i b i t s this scheme; a n d t h i s is surely p l a u s i b l e , s e e i n g t h a t t h e 20 p e r c e n t w h o are ex­ c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n will b e m a r k e d off for life as a distinct social g r o u p w h o s e inferior s t a t u s c a n n o t b e o u t w e i g h e d b y a n y gain in the m i n i m u m index position. 2B

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1 5 . 3 . Version [3B] h a s at l e a s t t w o m a i n w e a k n e s s e s . It is exposed to an a n a l o g u e of t h e s e c o n d difficulty w i t h v e r s i o n s [2A] a n d [2B]. The d i s p o s i t i o n of m o r e affluent p a r e n t s to s p e n d m o r e on t h e education of t h e i r c h i l d r e n m a y n e c e s s i t a t e an i m p l a u s i b l y e x p e n s i v e education s y s t e m t h a t m a k e s accessible to all an e d u c a t i o n e q u a l to t h e best. Moreover, [3B] r e q u i r e s t h a t r o u g h l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s b e available for the e d u c a t i o n of all, e v e n w h e r e s u c h r e s o u r c e s w o u l d h a v e a negative net i m p a c t on available i n d e x g o o d s . T h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a risk for the (abso­ lute) i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . T h e s e w e a k n e s s e s c a n b e m i t i g a t e d in t w o w a y s . First, o n e should n a r r o w t h e definition of educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s s o as to exclude m a n y e x p e n s i v e b u t n o t so c e n t r a l i t e m s (flying, m u s i c , a n d skiing l e s s o n s ; e d u c a t i o n a l travel; a h o m e t e l e s c o p e o r l a b o r a t o r y ; etc.). It s e e m s difficult to p u t this idea i n t o m o r e p r i n c i p l e d f o r m so that it can b e e v a l u a t e d b e h i n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e ( a n d d o e s n o t strike us as ad hoc), b u t it surely m u s t b e e m p l o y e d to s o m e e x t e n t . S e c o n d , o n e c a n t r y to define r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c e in a w a y t h a t is both s o m e w h a t liberal a n d especially sensitive to t h e p a r t i e s ' c o n c e r n for t h o s e w i t h t h e w o r s t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . W h a t is n e e d e d is not a m e a s u r e for t h e overall equality of c o s t (like t h e Gini coefficient), but a SP C C y ° T ° t o w h i c h t h e worst p H ° &T h e intuitive i d e a that n" n ^ ° " * s o n b l y high proportion what ^ ^ j * ™ m a y b e specified follows: T h e Stant teZ hn Tn ^ ° r ° s y s t e m is d e f i n e d not as aLrTXano,^«1ermS ° Percentile(s), w h e r e b y t h e m o r e extrav­ a g a n t e d u c a t i o n a l p n v u e g e s enjoyed by a f c h i l d r e n of very rich or very c o m m i t t e d p a r e n t s a r e j , ,, . m i n i m M y quite e d u c a t i o n then

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political p r o c e s s . W h e n t h e s t a n d a r d c o s t of e d u c a t i o n is defined in t e r m s of s o m e s u i t a b l e p e r c e n t i l e ( s ) , t h e n it c a n n o t easily b e forced into e s c a l a t i o n b y t h e d e t e r m i n e d efforts of s o m e p a r e n t s to give their c h i l d r e n a h e a d start. T h i s s t a n d a r d c o s t r e m a i n s largely under the c o n t r o l of t h e political p r o c e s s , w h i c h , t h o u g h it m u s t not permit significant e d u c a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e s a n d (especially) disadvantages for p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s , c a n r a i s e o r l o w e r t h e overall allocation of social r e s o u r c e s to t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . Unlike Rawls's v e r s i o n s [2AJ a n d [2B], [3B] c o n t a i n s , I believe, a princi­ ple of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y w h o s e p r i o r i t y over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is plausible. I have n o t t r i e d t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e oppor­ t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d take t h i s form o r b e c a s t a s a r e q u i r e m e n t for m e r e l y formal equality of o p p o r t u n i t y (as i n [1A]). H e r e a crucial ques­ tion is w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d a c c e p t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority of O P over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . Is it p l a u s i b l e t o reform a n institu­ tional s c h e m e t h a t g e n e r a t e s severe s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities by b e g i n n i n g from t h e l o w e r age g r o u p s , w i t h t h e e q u a l i z a t i o n of educa­ tional o p p o r t u n i t i e s ? S h o u l d political efforts a n d social resources be primarily devoted t o mitigating n o t t h e excessive p o v e r t y of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p b u t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l d i s a d v a n t a g e s suffered by its y o u n g e r m e m b e r s ? Are excessive e d u c a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a highero r d e r injustice t h a n excessive i n d e x i n e q u a l i t i e s ? Affirmative answers to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e m a d e at least p o s s i b l e b y m y p r o p o s e d amend­ ment to the principle. We a s s u m e t h a t b a s i c social a n d eco­ n o m i c n e e d s a r e satisfied o r w o u l d in a n y c a s e h a v e implementation priority over reforms of the e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m T h e u l t i m a t e tenability of [3B] also d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it can be 3 B

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M e d i c a l Opportunities, 16.1

181

Ranking fair a c c e s s t o e m p l o y m e n t above t h e index goods is not an implausible idea, given t h e s p e c i a l significance of s u c h access for selfrespect, for the realization a n d e x e r c i s e of t h e two moral powers, a n d for a shared sense of e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p . T h o s e w h o are involuntarily unemployed for long p e r i o d s t e n d t o b e c o m e a separate a n d disadvan­ taged social group w h o s e d i s a d v a n t a g e c a n n o t b e c o m p e n s a t e d by a better index position (by g e n e r o u s u n e m p l o y m e n t benefits, for exam­ ple). This reason in favor of a r e q u i r e m e n t of fair equality of employ­ ment opportunity r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r O P c a n b e extended to include such a r e q u i r e m e n t . H e r e w e m i g h t i n t r o d u c e a notion of standard participation in s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n (such as m e d i a n n u m b e r of hours worked in s o m e life p h a s e ) , w i t h minimally adequate employ­ ment denned as s o m e fraction of t h i s s t a n d a r d . O P would t h e n require that social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t safeguard minimally adequate employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s ( a c c e s s to minimally adequate employ­ ment)forall. Once again, t h e d e t a i l e d specification of this requirement focuses on those w h o fall below t h e m i d d l e range a n d leaves some ™ude so as n o t overly t o c o n s t r a i n t h e difference principle and the Political process. T h u s it l e a v e s t h e political p r o c e s s free to adjust the °wall level of e c o n o m i c activity, s u b j e c t only to t h e condition that such adjustments m u s t n o t selectively i m p o s e severe hardships^Laws Policies m a y d e c r e a s e j o b s available in s o m e profession with con­ sent short-term u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d m a y affect working hours lthro ugh annual v a c a t i o n s , a r e t i r e m e n t age, or s u c h like), but they t n o t p r o d u c e significant l o n g - t e r m u n e m p l o y m e n t , except w h e n J n be justified b y a p p e a l t o t h e first principle or to other parts ot ™ opportunity p r i n c i p l e . 3 B

24

3 B

mus

8 c a

,6

-Medical Opportunities

J8.1. Rawls s i m p l y leaves m e d i c a l n e e d s aside, apparently in the f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a r e is of only ^ g m * ^ J for the a p p r a i s a l of a c o n c e p t i o n of justice (e.g., ^ " f ^ 2 He seems far t o o s a n g u i n e in t h i s respect, however The fact oi J * * a l medical n e e d s c a s t s u p o n a cardinal ten*. ° H » s

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Medical Opportunities, 16.1

which access to medical care is used as a n incentive or channeled to where it will most effectively e n h a n c e patients' economic productivity. Such a scheme violates central commitments of Rawls's conception of justice, however, for it palpably values the life a n d health of different participants unequally and thus u n d e r m i n e s the self-respect of those having less access as well as the hope for a shared public notion of equal citizenship. These are strong reasons for believing that medical care, like education and employment, is special vis-a-vis the index goods and that the difference principle should not govern inequalities in access to health care by itself but should be constrained in this regard by some fair-equality requirement. But how can such a requirement be part of the opportunity princi­ ple? How is access to health care an opportunity? Rawls seems to use the term opportunity restrictively, to refer to access to goods that are useful in the competition for the better jobs. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the highest- and higher-order interests a n d his concern for the least advantaged favor a broader understanding of the term. The first princi­ ple alone cannot fully secure o u r opportunity—fundamental to the spirit of Rawls's conception—to participate in h u m a n interaction, to form (and revise) a conception of the good in t h e context of the political, cultural, a n d associational life around us. Rawls should, therefore, see the importance of education at least as m u c h in the fact that it enables one to understand, cherish, a n d participate in m a n y diverse forms of human good as in the fact that it may give o n e a shot at occupying a leadership office. He should appreciate, similarly, that the importance ot being employed consists not just in the chance to gather the skills and experience necessary to rise through the ranks but at least equally in the chance to collaborate with others a n d to share responsibility for the continuance of humankind. These considerations broaden the notion of opportunity sufficiently for it to cover access to medical care .' « . ° ° ^ t e g i c importance; its distribution H L I L 6 ? ^ 0 1 1 5 ' a C C e s s t o n e a % a» ft"™ of h u m a n g o o d wh i t e d to, the better j o b s . - Let us then explore whether another extension of O P can yield a constraint upon S

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Prequire, first of ^formal equality of mediSo extended O P would w h o l e s a l e d any availreS n s , a n d other health-relevant goods There are three exceptions, analogous to those in the case of educational and ,ob openings. The medical syltem may Zude whole­ sale from certain medical goods and services g ^ ^ d e f i n e d by their members (1) inability or unwilling™** . 6»""ps u e i m e u uy uungness y the access pnce, W

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Medical Opportunities, 16.2

183

medical unsuitability (as w h e n the procedure would be unnecessary or ineffective), or (3) age. 16.2 What more does fair equality of medical opportunity require? In outlining my answer, I first make the simplifying assumption that medical needs occur naturally, that is, are due to factors beyond hu­ man control. Once a reasonably clear specification for this central case is on hand, it will be easier to fit in medical needs of other kinds. While Rawls brackets the entire subject of medical needs, he is otherwise a thoroughgoing semiconsequentialist. He defines and com­ pares relevant positions solely in terms of social primary goods, irre­ spective of natural differentials in endowments, needs, good looks, tastes, and desires. Now one may think that semiconsequentialism is dearly untenable for the assessment of a medical system. What must be fair, in this area, is the distribution not of health care but (roughly) of health, that is, the distribution of medical care relative to medical needs. Contrary to this view, I will here provisionally preserve Rawls's semi­ consequentialism also in respect to medical care, even though Rawls himself, of course, is not committed to its tenability in this area. There «e two main reasons for taking this approach. Denying semiconsejjuentialism in one area would have enormous repercussions for ™vls's conception of justice as a whole. Suppose an exception is made in respect to medical n e e d s — a natural primary good plays a role in measuring distributive shares for purposes of assessing the justice ot ^ a l institutions, a n d the social good of health care is used to com­ i t a t e for differentials in this natural primary good. It would then be Jfe difficult to reject other exceptions in a principled way. If we take Terences in persons' native medical needs into account in > P ^ ' comparisons, then why shouldn't we have regard to other• conE fu " « i c e s too? Once the original position is redescnbed so 2 P ^ r e not merely about social positions j f P ™ " * * ? * * • * ) but also about medical needs, then why wou d hey no be ^ e m e d with the worst overall situation? Why would they not, in 2 * n g the distribution of income, bear in mind f*\*W ^_ hes are more important for the ugly or instruments for those espe 26

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M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.2

cially m u s i c a l ? W h y w o u l d n ' t t h e y , i n a s s e s s i n g t h e distribution of e d u c a t i o n , also t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e fact t h a t s o m e l e a r n more slowly a n d t h u s n e e d m o r e e d u c a t i o n t o a c q u i r e t h e s a m e knowledge or s k i l l s ? Taking a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h i n o n e area would exert c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e s t o w a r d a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t approach a c r o s s t h e b o a r d , t o w a r d u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r a c o n c e p t i o n like Sen's. T h e o t h e r m a i n r e a s o n is t h a t if m e d i c a l c a r e is t o compensate for m e d i c a l n e e d s , t h e n a j u s t m e d i c a l s y s t e m w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y have to m a i n t a i n r o u g h e q u a l i t y of r e s u l t , w h i c h c o u l d b e e n o r m o u s l y expen­ sive. If h e a l t h i s t h e g o o d w i t h r e s p e c t t o w h i c h fair equality of oppor­ t u n i t y m u s t b e m a i n t a i n e d , t h e n — s u b j e c t o n l y t o t h e proviso that sufficient r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d t o e n s u r i n g fully a d e q u a t e packages of first-principle g o o d s — a n y shortfalls from g o o d h e a l t h m u s t be re­ d u c e d a s m u c h a s p o s s i b l e , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e cost m a y b e in terms of i n d e x g o o d s . 9 T h i s result, h o w e v e r , is i m p l a u s i b l e . If existing medical (and educational) s y s t e m s a r e u n j u s t , t h e n t h i s is n o t , it w o u l d seem, b e c a u s e s o m e m e d i c a l (or e d u c a t i o n a l ) n e e d s r e m a i n u n m e t but be­ c a u s e s o m e have s o m u c h less a c c e s s t o m e d i c a l c a r e ( a n d education! than others with comparable needs. T h e s e r e a s o n s motivate m y a t t e m p t t o s k e t c h a semiconsequentialist n o t i o n of fair equality of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t fits w i t h h o w 0 P w a s specified m t h e areas of e d u c a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t . As far as l u s t r a is c o n c e r n e d , m e d i c a l n e e d a s s u c h d o e s n o t t h e n support a l^tu ?vl?, injustice, even i n a very affluent society, if kttle is s p e n t o n h e a l t h c a r e (or e d u c a t i o n ) . 28

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185

16.3. In view of t h e g r e a t differences in natural constitutions, it would be bizarre to r e q u i r e t h a t p e r s o n s , over their lifetimes, should receive roughly e q u i v a l e n t b u n d l e s of h e a l t h care. Such an equal dis­ tribution would w a s t e r e s o u r c e s o n t h o s e lucky a n d robust enough not to need much m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n at all, a n d it w o u l d also waste re­ sources in cases w h e r e s o m e w h a t m o r e t h a n a n equal b u n d l e would be needed to make t h e difference. I p r o p o s e i n s t e a d that w e conceive the social good that is t o s e r v e a s t h e a n a l o g u e to e d u c a t i o n a n d employ­ ment as health protection, d e f i n e d a s a c c e s s to medical care when needed. The s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t p e r s o n s h a v e a n equal n e e d to have, and to have the a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e y will have, s u c h access. O P requires, *en, that everyone s h o u l d h a v e a c c e s s to roughly equivalent health protection. My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d specification of this requirement will »eguided by t h e i d e a t h a t , a s w i t h e d u c a t i o n , overall allocations to the medical system s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e political process as a matter °fpure procedural j u s t i c e , a n d t h a t t h i s m e t h o d is plausible so long as rough equivalence in a c c e s s t o h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n is preserved. It may seem t h a t fair e q u a l i t y of a c c e s s to h e a l t h protection would in Practice d e m a n d a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p a n s i o n of existing medical sys­ tems, which w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a grave risk to t h e index position of the teast advantaged. But t h i s c a n b e a v o i d e d b y utilizing two ideas already fetched in t h e c o n t e x t of e d u c a t i o n . First, n e e d e d medical care should * defined narrowly a s c a r e t h a t d i r e c t l y alleviates a n existing medical condition (which, b y definition, i m p a i r s a p e r s o n ' s capacity for normal P^cipation in social i n t e r a c t i o n ) . T h i s definition w o u l d exclude vacajjmsin a health s p a , first-class h o s p i t a l b e d s , c o s m e t i c surgery, a n d the 3 B

Second, in a s s e s s i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of h e a l t h protection one should ^concerned n o t w i t h overall i n e q u a l i t i e s b u t with h o w f a r those at the £V bottom fall b e l o w t h e m i d d l e r a n g e . T h e intuitive idea is, once 2 ' e r y o n e s h o u l d h a v e a c c e s s t o s o m e reasonably h i g h p r o jWjon of w h a t o t h e r s a c t u a l l y h a v e . N o d o u b t , this idea_can^be i m p * *£»ed m m a n y different w a y s , b u t 1 will h e r e , s o m e w h a t a r t a f t ^ y J * one of t h e s e for p u r p o s e s of illustration. I begin with a d e t a j t t J* <* the various n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , e a c h defined by refer ° % to m e d i c a l f a c t o r s (affecting t h e u r g e n c y o r « * * * ^ ™ ^ t r e a t m e n t s ) a n d t h e a g e of t h e p a t i e n t , w i t h o u t reference toMttw 5*W'« race, g e n d e r , s o c i a l s t a t u s , a n d t h e like. We t h e n find the c o * u e S l cart, t h a t p e r s o n s in various P ° P f f ^ by a n y statistically r e l e v a n t p a r a m e t e r s , s u c h as M*™*^ K'/r «f r e s i d e n c e ) t e n d t o receive in t h e * * w b c a l c o n d i t i o n . D e f i n i n g a medical history as a j ^ ^ ^ e d e d ^ m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , w e c a n similarly find t h e cost of n e e d * * * * * care t h a t p e r s o n s i n v a r i o u s p o p u l a t i o n clusters tend e v

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ceive in t h e e v e n t of s o m e p a r t i c u l a r m e d i c a l history. We can then e s t i m a t e a p e r s o n ' s e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d medical care by averaging t h e cost of n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e t h a t p e r s o n s in his popula­ tion c l u s t e r receive in t h e e v e n t of v a r i o u s m e d i c a l histories. This is a w e i g h t e d average b a s e d o n ( w h a t o n e m i g h t call) " t h e average medical history," a realistic p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over medical histories b a s e d o n t h e i r relative f r e q u e n c i e s in t h e relevant social system. The e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e is h i g h e r for those who, for t h e s a m e m e d i c a l h i s t o r i e s , w o u l d r e c e i v e m o r e o r b e t t e r caie than o t h e r s . Given t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d medi­ cal care w i t h i n t h e social s y s t e m , w e c a n d e f i n e s t a n d a r d medical care in t e r m s of s o m e p e r c e n t i l e s for e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t a n d minimally a d e q u a t e m e d i c a l c a r e as s o m e fraction of s t a n d a r d medical care. Finally, w e c a n define minimally adequate health protection as access to m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e m e d i c a l c a r e . O P r e q u i r e s t h a t every participant b e able t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of h i s n e e d e d medical c a r e is at least X p e r c e n t of t h e cost of s t a n d a r d m e d i c a l care (that is, of t h e cost of m e d i c a l c a r e t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d p a r t i c i p a n t is expected to receive). 3 B

While t h e first of t h e s e t w o i d e a s limits t h e s c o p e of O P - the second it w o n ' t b e (very) sensitive t o t h e e x t r a v a g a n t medical care t h a t a few rich (or h y p o c h o n d r i a c a l ) p e r s o n s m a y s e c u r e for themselves o r to t h e special m e d i c a l c a r e p e r h a p s e n j o y e d b y a few prominent individuals. (And t h e r e is t h e n n o r e a s o n t o i m p o s e legal limits upon t h e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n enjoyed at t h e very t o p , even if t h e first principle a l l o w e d s u c h limitations.) P r e s u m a b l y , m o s t e x i s t i n g societies do not s e c u r e a c c e s s to minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for all and overall m e d i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e w o u l d u n d e n i a b l y i n c r e a s e if t h e y did. But t h e n e c e s s a r y i n c r e a s e is quite limited. It is n o t r e q u i r e d t h a t everyone h a v e a c c e s s to h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n close t o t h e very b e s t enjoyed by a n y o n e — w h i c h w o u l d b e q u i t e similar to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t , rejecte e a r l i e r . t h a t all m e d i c a l n e e d s m u s t b e m e t . T h e p r i n c i p l e demands ^.T 6 P « i o n b e i m p r o v e d for t h o s e in the M P d o s e ) t o t h e m i d d l e range nlriZn th f ' h a l f of t h o s e whose a c c e s s is much se^-resner. °H T*\ * * P P ° * e d b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ot entails n o m o r e t h a n t h 3B

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petitive market for h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e . In this case, if medical expenses are generally p a i d t h r o u g h i n s u r a n c e a n d if lifetime p r e m i u m s are roughly proportional t o e x p e c t e d lifetime m e d i c a l expenses, t h e n ev­ eryone would h a v e t o b e a b l e t o afford s o m e h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e coverage costing at least X p e r c e n t of s t a n d a r d h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e coverage. If, for example, the cost of h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e for t h e s t a n d a r d citizen (defined in terms of percentiles) is $2,000 p e r y e a r , t h e n everyone m u s t be able to afford health i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e c o s t i n g at least (say) 75 percent of this amount, that is, $1,500 a n n u a l l y . In a j u s t s c h e m e of this sort, adults may still be at liberty n o t t o i n s u r e t h e m s e l v e s (so long as they can # r d minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e ) , just as they may normally forgo needed m e d i c a l c a r e t o w h i c h t h e y have access. The principle is formulated so as t o r e q u i r e access to minimally a d e q u a t e access to needed medical c a r e , w h i c h is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h institutions u n d e r which persons h a v e t h e o p t i o n t o d e c l i n e o n either level. Obviously, the three possibilities I h a v e s k e t c h e d c a n b e c o m b i n e d in various ways. 31

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its m a r g i n a l cost is o u t w e i g h e d b y i t s m a r g i n a l benefits in terms of i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y , b e c a u s e s u c h m e d i c a l c a r e will t e n d to raise all i n d e x p o s i t i o n s . T h i s d e s i d e r a t u m w o u l d s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t preventive m e a s u r e s i n t h e a r e a s of p u b l i c h y g i e n e , p r o p h y l a x i s (vaccinationsi, a n d t h e like. But t h e n [3B] a l s o a l l o w s t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s t o go far b e y o n d w h a t efficiency m a n d a t e s b y a l l o c a t i n g a very large proportion of t h e social p r o d u c t t o m e d i c a l c a r e a t t h e e x p e n s e of index goods. N o w s o m e p e r s o n s , a t (almost) a n y level of h e a l t h protection, will be u n l u c k y e n o u g h t o e n c o u n t e r a c o m b i n a t i o n of m e d i c a l conditions for w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t o b t a i n t h e m e d i c a l c a r e t h e y n e e d . Indeed, some m a y even b e b o r n w i t h m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t e x c e e d any level of h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n t h e y c a n afford. S u c h c a s e s i n t r o d u c e radical in­ equalities i n p e r s o n s ' quality of life. But, n o t b e i n g social inequalities, t h e s e a r e n o t , o n a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h , v i e w e d as indica­ ting a n injustice. Rather, t h e y a r e natural i n e q u a l i t i e s for which, or for t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of w h i c h , social i n s t i t u t i o n s b e a r n o responsibility. Nevertheless, s u c h n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a t least m i t i g a t e d by defin­ ing t h e relevant social g o o d s o t h a t it is s e n s i t i v e t o differentials in m e d i c a l n e e d s . A m o n g p e r s o n s w i t h t h e s a m e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n , those w i t h w o r s e m e d i c a l histories s h o u l d receive m o r e m e d i c a l care—up to a certain point. 1 6 . 5 . Insofar a s m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e u n p r e d i c t a b l y distributed (so m a t e v e r y o n e faces r o u g h l y t h e s a m e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over litehme m e d i c a l histories), t h e a l l o c a t i o n of s o c i a l r e s o u r c e s among the various n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s p o s e s n o d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o b l e m . SupSwS 1 ? ' minimaUy a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n is prornrnlh / - P ° r e d m e d i c a l s y s t e m a n d is defined m e d unTverSlL M iCal ° n s for w h i c h s p e c i f i e d t r e a t m e n t is nJedSS^S? ^l°f * R a w i n g u p t h e list of covered ™ £ o ^ ° ' ^ tSr P ° n d i n g t r e a t m e n t s , c a n b e left to the SSiSSS^.?8 ° P ^ c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . W h e n particiS 5 i T S e ^ S ? d , ^ e x p o s e d t o a r o u g h l y eoua^ e

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certain that they ( a n d t h e i r loved o n e s ) will never suffer the medical condition in q u e s t i o n — t o d e f i n e a s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d package of mini­ mally adequate h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n s o t h a t s u c h conditions are excluded. It may seem p r o m i s i n g t o r u l e o u t t h i s possibility t h r o u g h t h e require­ ment that minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n m u s t be defined in terms of cost only, s o t h a t e a c h p e r s o n is t o have access t o health protection that s e c u r e s a c c e s s t o all kinds of available medical care (for natural medical c o n d i t i o n s ) u p t o a c e r t a i n overall cost. But this is at best a partial s o l u t i o n b e c a u s e t h e p r o b l e m r e c u r s in the allocation of social resources t o v a r i o u s a r e a s of m e d i c a l research, which influences what medical p r o c e d u r e s a r e available a n d at w h a t price. Again, the Political process m a y t e n d t o a l l o c a t e few, if any, resources to research­ ing medical c o n d i t i o n s t h a t o n l y affect genetically h a n d i c a p p e d minor­ ities. On a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h w e c a n n o t criticize a medical system guided b y s u c h m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s as unjust even though it is unresponsive to t h e m e d i c a l n e e d s of s u c h minorities. One may think that semiconsequentialism i s t h e r e f o r e implausible here, but this is at 'east not obvious. O u r h y p o t h e t i c a l m e d i c a l system would secure g h l y equal h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l medical conditions that «eryone is r o u g h l y e q u a l l y likely t o h a v e . If m o r e is required on behalf «those w h o , t h r o u g h n o fault of t h e i r own, are genetically handi^PPed, then w h y s h o u l d n o t m o r e b e r e q u i r e d also o n behalf of those who, through n o fault of t h e i r o w n , h a v e r u n out of health protection, 'he fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h involves the dubious "ewthat an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , r a t h e r t h a n generate a fair distnc-uton of benefits a n d b u r d e n s for its p a r t i c i p a n t s , should operate in a jnedial way, s h o u l d d i s t r i b u t e benefits a n d b u r d e n s so as to balance out a m o n g its p a r t i c i p a n t s for t h e sake of t h e overall fairness ot universe. C o r r e c t i v e l y , t h e fully consequentialist alternative apa b a n d o n s t h e a t t r a c t i v e i d e a t h a t justice d o e s not mandate very 3aU . t e m s but requires, onfy 2 s y s t e m s f u n c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s o m e plausible p n n c i fair equality of a c c e s s This way of d e a l i n g w i t h m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s involving & ™ " * ] ^Positions m a y b e r a d i c a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h contemporary ad mu

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v a n c e s i n m e d i c a l t e c h n o l o g y t o w a r d m a k i n g g e n e t i c h a n d i c a p s avoid­ able. O n c e s u c h t e c h n o l o g i e s h a v e c o m e i n t o w i d e u s e , a genetic handi­ c a p will reflect a social d i s a d v a n t a g e ( r a t h e r t h a n a n a t u r a l handicap). T h i s s c e n a r i o w o u l d s u g g e s t y e t a n o t h e r e x t e n s i o n of O P , which I w o n ' t d i s c u s s — a r e q u i r e m e n t of r o u g h l y e q u a l a c c e s s to available p r o c e d u r e s for e n s u r i n g t h e c o n c e p t i o n of c h i l d r e n w h o a r e not genet­ ically h a n d i c a p p e d — w h i c h r e q u i r e m e n t m i g h t c o v e r n o t only genetic h a n d i c a p s relevant to h e a l t h , b u t a l s o t h o s e r e l e v a n t t o education and employment. 1 6 . 6 . So far w e h a v e at b e s t a first a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h e [3B] require­ m e n t of fair equality of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y . W e m u s t yet consider m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are socially produced, t h a t is, d u e to actions of a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e social s y s t e m . Socially pro­ d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s fall u n d e r t h e "benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n " (TJ 4-5), w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n Rawls's criterion of justice is m e a n t t o g o v e r n . S u c h d i s e a s e s a n d disabilities, unlike n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , a r e p a r t of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' shares a n d t h u s d o play a role in identifying a n d e v a l u a t i n g t h e worst social p o s i t i o n b y reference t o w h i c h a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is to be as­ s e s s e d . I will a r g u e t h a t O P s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e full health pro­ t e c t i o n against socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . Let u s begin w i t h socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s that are u n p r e d i c t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e d , d i s e a s e s c a u s e d b y g e n e r a l pollution, for e x a m p l e . O n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e s e at least c a n b e a c c o m m o d a t e d just like n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a u s i n g t h e m and t h e m e d i c a l r e s p o n s e t o t h e m c a n b o t h b e left t o t h e p o l i t i c a l process as m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e h a s a roughly e q u a l c h a n c e of suffering t h e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n . This a r g u m e n t fails for t h e r e a s o n I n o t e d earlier in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m t h a t r a n d o m l y e x c l u d e s 20 p e r c e n t of all children (§15.2)—those actually afflicted w i t h t h e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n , even if they a r e n o t identifiable in a d v a n c e , suffer d i s a d v a n t a g e s t h a t p l a c e them b e l o w t h e best m i n i m u m social i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n s e c u r e . T h i s would h a p p e n if, t h r o u g h o b t a i n i n g m e d i c a l c a r e for a socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s (personal f u n d s , p o t e n t i a l insur­ a n c e benefits, o r whatever) d e c l i n e t o a p o i n t at w h i c h t h e y (or mem­ b e r s of t h e i r family) fall b e l o w t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . It m i g h t also h a p p e n if t h e y s i m p l y c o u l d n o t obtain n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e for a socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n . In 3B

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such cases, t h e u n l u c k y c a n validly c o m p l a i n t h a t t h e institutional distribution of t h e b e n e f i t s a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n h a s left them at a n excessive d i s a d v a n t a g e vis-a-vis o t h e r s . T h e s a m e potential complaint s h o w s t h a t r e a s o n a b l e efforts m u s t b e m a d e to p r o d u c e t h e knowledge, facilities, a n d m e d i c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to care for socially produced m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . So e x t e n d e d , O P w o u l d r e q u i r e t h a t n e e d e d m e d i c a l care for so­ cially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s m u s t b e m a d e available. Moreover, (the cost of) s u c h m e d i c a l c a r e is n o t c o n s i d e r e d p a r t of p e r s o n s ' shares for p u r p o s e s of a n y o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t of Rawls's criterion of justice. Persons m u s t h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of first-principle goods, minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l medical conditions, minimally a d e q u a t e e d u c a t i o n a l a n d e m p l o y m e n t opportunities, a n d a fair index p o s i t i o n apart from w h a t e v e r n e e d e d medical c a r e they receive for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . Such c a r e is viewed as mitigating o r offsetting t h e s e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . 3 B

The cost of c a r i n g for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s may still be privatized, b u t o n l y insofar a s n o s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s are thereby r e d u c e d b e l o w t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m . P e r h a p s it is prefer­ able, however, n o t t o privatize s u c h costs at all. This way at least the measurable e x t e r n a l i t i e s of political decisions are fully internalized. The political d e c i s i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r , to w h a t extent, a n d o n w h a t terms p o l l u t i o n s h o u l d b e p e r m i t t e d is m a d e o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the m e d i c a l c o s t s of p o l l u t i o n c a n n o t b e shifted off u p o n a n unluckv f e w b u t m u s t b e i m p o s e d u p o n t h e polluting firms a n d h o u s e ­ holds o r else b e b o m e b y society at l a r g e - a n d similarly w i t h medical costs arising from c r i m e s a n d traffic accidents, w h o s e incidence is affected b y p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s a b o u t police d e p l o y m e n t a n d trattic regulations. 34

Insofar a s socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s are not u n p « « d i c » Wy distributed, t h e s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s apply, but they a p p l v Jth greater s t r i n g e n c y . W h i l e victims of u n p r e d i c t a b l y d i s t n b u t e d , m e d i c a l conditions L ( t h a n k s t o t h e n a t u r a l veil of ignorance) adequately represented i n t h e political p r o c e s s , this is n o t true o ^ P « ™ groups (those living n e a r a d a m , factory, or p o w e r P^ "*' ° ^ rorts This c o n s i d e r a t i o n p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r reason against ™P™^™™* of socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u p o n t h e i r victims insofar they c a n afford t h e m . C

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Moreover, t h e i m p o s i t i o n of c o n s i d e r a b l e m e d i c a l risks u p o n small g r o u p s , e v e n if t h e c o s t s of t r e a t m e n t a r e fully c o v e r e d , will often run afoul of t h e first p r i n c i p l e . T h e political p r o c e s s n e e d n o t be con­ s t r a i n e d t o a d o p t l a w s a n d p o l i c i e s t h a t r e d u c e t h e r a t e of crime or of p o l l u t i o n - i n d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a s far a s feasible. An institu­ tional s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h h i g h e r r a t e s a r e b e i n g a l l o w e d through the political p r o c e s s (treating c r i m e / p o l l u t i o n v i c t i m s m a y b e c h e a p e r than c r i m e / p o l l u t i o n - p r e v e n t i o n p r o g r a m s ) m a y b e just, s o l o n g a s t h e basic right of all t o t h e integrity of t h e i r p e r s o n is still sufficiently wellp r o t e c t e d . W h e n t h e risks a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d u p o n s m a l l g r o u p s , how­ ever, this c o n s t r a i n t will often n o t b e satisfied. I n s o m e such cases, special risks m a y b e r e d u c e d b y offering risk g r o u p s full information a b o u t k n o w n d a n g e r s a n d h e l p i n r e l o c a t i n g o r o t h e r w i s e protecting t h e m s e l v e s . In o t h e r c a s e s , p r o p o s e d l a w s a n d p o l i c i e s m a y have to be abandoned altogether. 35

O P w o u l d t h e n also r e q u i r e full h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n against socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ( m o d u l o feasibly p r o v i d a b l e medical care). Unlike t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e h e a l t h protection against n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t will materially c o n s t r a i n t h e difference p r i n c i p l e e v e n i n i d e a l t h e o r y b y mandating t h e allocation of social r e s o u r c e s t o m e d i c a l c a r e a t t h e expense of i n d e x g o o d s . But t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i s n o t i m p l a u s i b l e , for w h a t it de­ m a n d s is n o t t h a t i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e s o u r c e s b e diverted t o m e d i c a l c a r e b u t t h a t alternative r e g u l a t i o n s a n d p o l i c i e s b e evalu­ a t e d o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e i r ( i m p a c t o n ) m e d i c a l c o s t s must be fully covered. If s o m e social project, p o l i c y , o r r e g u l a t i o n is not, by and large, collectively beneficial e n o u g h t o c o v e r t h e c o s t of treating any (additional) m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s it e n g e n d e r s , t h e n it s h o u l d not be u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e first p l a c e . T h e difference p r i n c i p l e i s t h e n under­ s t o o d a s governing o n l y t h e net b e n e f i t s of social c o o p e r a t i o n , that is, its benefits m i n u s its b u r d e n s . T h i s r e a s o n i n g is p l a u s i b l e b e c a u s e the h i g h e r m i n i m u m i n d e x p o s i t i o n a t t a i n a b l e i n t h e a b s e n c e of this re­ q u i r e m e n t w o u l d b e a c h i e v e d at t h e e x p e n s e of a g r o u p of medical 3 B

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Here t h e q u e s t i o n is, in p a r t i c u l a r , w h e t h e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l , self-caused, a n d socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s can be m a d e sufficiently p r e c i s e t o b e a b l e t o c o p e w i t h t h e tremendous c o m p l e x i t i e s of t h e m e d i c a l c a s e s t h a t a c t u a l l y arise. T h o u g h I cannot possibly d i s c u s s t h i s q u e s t i o n t h o r o u g h l y , I will briefly indicate some of t h e complexities. I t h i n k t h e s e c a n b e s u m m a r i z e d u n d e r three main h e a d i n g s : first, it will s o m e t i m e s b e u n c l e a r h o w given c a u s e s of medi­ cal c o n d i t i o n s s h o u l d b e classified; next, t h e r e a r i s e p r o b l e m s about h o w t o classify a given m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n w h e n several c a u s e s of dif­ ferent k i n d s c o m b i n e to p r o d u c e it (for e x a m p l e , s o m e form of pollu­ t i o n t h a t affects only p e r s o n s w i t h a c e r t a i n g e n e t i c trait); last, ascer­ t a i n i n g w h a t c a u s e d a given m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l s o involves difficulties, c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e u n d e s i r a b l e i n c e n t i v e s t o w a r d c h e a t i n g that a m e d i c a l s y s t e m s t r u c t u r e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h m y p r o p o s a l may pro­ vide. Let m e offer a few r e m a r k s o n t h e first t w o k i n d s of complexities in t h e h o p e of s h o w i n g that at least a large r a n g e of o r d i n a r y medical c o n d i t i o n s c a n straightforwardly a n d p l a u s i b l y b e classified in accor­ d a n c e w i t h m y p r o p o s e d e x t e n s i o n of O P t o h e a l t h c a r e . 3 B

Injuries from m o t o r vehicle a c c i d e n t s will s o m e t i m e s have a natural c a u s e ( s u c h as a h e a r t attack) b u t a r e n o r m a l l y e i t h e r self-caused (negligence, d r u n k e n n e s s , etc.) o r socially p r o d u c e d ( w h e n someone else is at fault). In t h e latter case, a c c i d e n t v i c t i m s m u s t b e in a position to cover t h e i r m e d i c a l c o s t s w i t h o u t falling b e l o w t h e best feasible m i n i m u m s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n might best be m e t b y i m p o s i n g (excess) c o s t s n o t u p o n society at large (including n o n d n v e r s ) b u t primarily u p o n t h o s e c a u s i n g a c c i d e n t s a n d secondar­ ily u p o n all drivers (through m a n d a t o r y i n s u r a n c e , g a s o l i n e taxes, or w h a t e v e r ) . T h i s w a y of internalizing m e d i c a l c o s t s is applicable to a w i d e r a n g e of activities a n d p r o j e c t s t h r o u g h w h i c h p e r s o n s or associa­ t i o n s c r e a t e special h e a l t h risks, from i n d u s t r i a l facilities t o firearms Medical c o n d i t i o n s suffered by victims of c r i m e s a r e generally so­ cially p r o d u c e d . H e n c e crime victims m u s t b e in a p o s i t i o n to cover t h e i r m e d i c a l costs w i t h o u t falling b e l o w t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m s h a r e of social p r i m a r y goods. It m a y b e infeasible to i m p o s e s u c h costs fully u p o n c n m i n a l s , a n d t h e y m u s t t h e n in p a r t b e b o r n e b y society at large. T h t s result s e e m s plausible in t h a t it p r o v i d e s i n c e n t i v e s to the p o h t i c a l p r o c e s s t o reduce c r i m e rates even b e l o w w h a t is r e q u i r e d by t h e first p r i n c i p l e . W h e n costs a r e b o r n e by all, t h e political process is m o r e likely t o e x t e n d a d e q u a t e police p r o t e c t i o n t o m i n o r i t y areas, say, b e c a u s e n o t d o i n g so will also b e expensive 38

In e x c e p t i o n a l cases, m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s c a u s e d b y c r i m e m a y be M

I f the first principle is compatible with ic* i .• ( w h i c h m a y d e p e n d u p o n statist cal S ^ legislation u p o n rates of firearm r e l a t e d ^ * " ^ g* ? % s u c h a right e n g e n d e r s is best covered t h r o u i h . d e n t s ) , t h e n t h e m e d i c a l cosi u p o n criminals, o r strict liability by g u n w w e r s *° P' P C r e a t i n

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considered self-caused, namely, w h e n t h e victim foreseeably p l a c e d himself in a high-risk s i t u a t i o n . S u c h e x c e p t i o n s are likely t o exist for almost all m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s w i t h given n a t u r a l o r social c a u s a l c o m ­ ponents. P e r s o n s w h o k n o w t h e y a r e allergic t o certain k i n d s of food can r e a s o n a b l y b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for avoiding s u c h food; p e d e s t r i a n s may r e a s o n a b l y b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for staying clear of b u s y s u p e r h i g h ­ ways; a n d s o forth. Infection i n t h e c o u r s e of a n e p i d e m i c s u c h a s AIDS w o u l d in general be c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e a n a t u r a l c a u s e (assuming, of c o u r s e , that t h e virus d i d n o t o r i g i n a t e in s o m e i n d u s t r i a l o r military experiment). But it may c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h c a u s e s of t h e o t h e r t w o k i n d s as well. W h e n information a b o u t t h e d i s e a s e is w i d e s p r e a d , a case of AIDS c o n t r a c t e d through a high-risk activity (reused h y p o d e r m i c needles, u n p r o t e c t e d intercourse) is p r e s u m a b l y self-caused, at least w h e n alternatives (clean n e e d l e s , c o n d o m s ) are readily available. And if t h e infection occurs in t h e c o u r s e of m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n t (blood transfusion) o r through a c r i m e (rape) it w o u l d b e socially p r o d u c e d . O c c u p a t i o n a l h e a l t h p r o b l e m s , w h e n arising from risks that are fully u n d e r s t o o d a n d c o n s e n t e d to, are self-caused (and socially p r o d u c e d otherwise). It m a y s e e m , to t h e contrary, t h a t o c c u p a t i o n a l h a z a r d s should b e m i n i m i z e d e v e n if t h e cost of d o i n g so is m u c h greater t h a n the savings d u e t o r e d u c e d risk incentives. This view, however, is vulnerable t o t h e c h a r g e of p a t e r n a l i s m . If workers prefer t h e higher risks a n d h i g h e r i n c o m e s (part of w h i c h t h e y c a n s p e n d o n additional health i n s u r a n c e ) t h e n w h y p r o h i b i t ? This c h a r g e s e e m s plausible at least i n ideal t h e o r y , a s s u m i n g t h a t a n institutional s c h e m e satisfying Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e w o u l d provide t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s for gen­ uine c o n s e n t (especially by p r e c l u d i n g dire poverty a n d long-term unemployment). 16.9. M y p r o p o s e d v e r s i o n of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s formal e q u a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l , e m p l o y m e n t , a n d medical opportunity, h also r e q u i r e s t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s "have a c c e s s to a minimally a d e ­ quate e d u c a t i o n , t o m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e m p l o y m e n t , a n d to mini­ mally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l a n d full medical care for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . To c o n c l u d e , let m e r e s t a t e t h e t h r e e principal objectives of this discussion. First, i n specifying w h a t I take t o b e t h e strongest tenable version of Rawls's o p p o r t u n i t y principle, I h o p e t o have provided a reasonably c l e a r c o n c e p t u a l framework w i t h i n w h i c h alternative speci39

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* T h e s e remarks are c o m p a t i b l e , I think, with a d e f e n s e of the U P f. ^ and Health A d m i n i s t r a t i o n requirement that medical conditions.arising fromtoxic a n d other harmful materials at t h e w o r k p l a c e m u s t be avoided "to the extent feasible (see Daniels, JHC 144). At p r e s e n t s u c h m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s c a n stiUI count as socially pro duced o n t h e g r o u n d s that workers are either not fully informed about relevant heal £ "sks or c a n n o f r e a s o n a b l y avoid jobs i m p o s i n g s u c h risks (given t h e current extent ot u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d poverty). r

196

T h e Difference Principle, 17.1

fications of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e c a n b e d i s c u s s e d . S u c h specifica­ t i o n s m a y vary in s t r e n g t h in at least t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s : t h e opportunity p r i n c i p l e m a y r a n g e over e d u c a t i o n a n d / o r e m p l o y m e n t a n d / o r health c a r e ; in a n y of t h e s e a r e a s it m a y r e q u i r e e i t h e r m e r e l y formal or fair (including formal) e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y ; a n d a n y of its requirements m a y h a v e e i t h e r m e r e l y d e s i g n p r i o r i t y o r b o t h d e s i g n a n d implementa­ tion priority over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . S e c o n d , I h a v e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t Rawls's n o t i o n of formal equality of o p p o r t u n i t y is r a t h e r v a g u e a n d t h a t h e offers n o t e n a b l e specification of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y at all. He s e e m s n o w t o favor a variant of [1A], r e q u i r i n g m e r e l y formal e q u a l i t y of ( p r e s u m a b l y e d u c a t i o n a l and e m p l o y m e n t ) o p p o r t u n i t y . As a n a l t e r n a t i v e , I h a v e t r i e d to outline a t e n a b l e specification of fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . In d o i n g so, I have, third, b e e n c o n c e r n e d t o d e f e n d a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t approach in a r e a s w h e r e initially it w o u l d s e e m least p l a u s i b l e . A t t a i n m e n t of these last t w o objectives ultimately d e p e n d s u p o n t h e practicability of [3B] a n d u p o n t h e availability of p o t e n t i a l l y s u p e r i o r alternatives. 40

17. T h e Difference P r i n c i p l e 1 7 . 1 . Rawls's t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s differ n o t o n l y in r e s p e c t t o t h e social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y cover b u t also in t h e w a y t h e y c o n s t r a i n the institu­ tional d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s e g o o d s . F i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s a r e b y a n d large d e f i n e d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s . T h e y a r e definite p r o t e c t i o n s of the basic n e e d s of n o r m a l p e r s o n s as Rawls c o n c e i v e s t h e m . W h e n s o m e partici­ p a n t s (avoidably) h a v e a less t h a n fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of these g o o d s , t h e n t h i s is a n injustice q u i t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of w h a t packages ot these goods the others have. 41

42

""Allowing mixtures, t h e s e three p a r a m e t e r s permit at least 124 p o s s i b l e specifications (more, if different priorities m a y attach to the t w o c o m p o n e n t s of fair equality of oppor­ tunity). Let F = fair (with formal), f = formal, 0 = the principle d o e s not apply, a n d let P d e s i g n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority and p = d e s i g n priority o n l y T h e n there are at least five possibilities in e a c h area: FP, Fp, fP, f , a n d 0. For three areas, this y i e l d s 5 X 5 X 5 125 possibilities. Subtract o n e b e c a u s e if it applies i n n o n e of the three areas (0/0/Ot, « « principle d i s a p p e a r s , if the opportunity principle is o n e of either fair o r formal equality ot o p p o r t u n i t y t h r o u g h o u t a n d if it h a s d e s i g n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority over the differ­ e n c e p n n c i p l e , t h e n there are only 2 x ( x x - l ) « possibilities, ranging from the strongest p n n c . p l e r e q u i n n g fair equality of educational e m p l o y m e n t , a n d medical o p p o r t u n i t y (F/F/F), t o the three weakest principles requiring m e r e l y formal equality of o p p o r t u n i t y m o n l y o n e area (f/0/0). H o w strong a n o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e the parties w o u l d a d o p t d e p e n d s t o s o m e extent u p o n general empirical information (available in the original p o s . t i o n l - f o r example, about the marginal effects of alternative specifica­ tions u p o n t h e l o w e s t i n d e x position. p

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• • T h o u g h t h e r e are relative e l e m e n t s in the definition of s o m e first-principle require­ m e n t s , a s vvith t h e / a . r value of the political liberties a n d the culturalI variability in the n o t i o n of s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s « T h i s is not to d e n y that e v e n if a requirement is formulated in clearly a b s o l u t e terms, a n inferior p a c k a g e m a y strtl b e especially intolerable. It m a y b e m o r e d a m a g i n g t o selfr e s p e c t (as w h e n w o m e n are d e n t e d the vote u n d e r a s c h e m e rfunJ^wSmate « W ' a n d it m a y involve a c o m p e t i t . v e disadvantage (as w h e n t h e a d h e r e m s r f s o m e religions m a y n o t o r g a n i z e o r advertise t h e m s e l v e s w h i l e others are p e ^ t t e d to d o so).

T h e Difference Principle, 17.2

197

The s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e i m p o s e s t w o relative c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n t h e social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s a n institutional s c h e m e m a y t e n d to generate. T h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s a l l o w t h e political p r o c e s s to govern overall levels of e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h care, a n d e c o n o m i c activity, so long as such political d e c i s i o n s affect r o u g h l y equally t h e o p p o r t u n i t y a n d index p o s i t i o n s of t h e v a r i o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s (the least a d v a n ­ taged in p a r t i c u l a r ) . T h u s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e is largely i n s e n s i ­ tive to w h e t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e m u c h a c c e s s or little, requiring only t h a t no one's o p p o r t u n i t i e s fall significantly below t h e m i d d l e r a n g e . T h e difference p r i n c i p l e i m p o s e s a n even less definite relative c o n s t r a i n t upon t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of index g o o d s . It r e q u i r e s t h a t social i n s t i t u t i o n s , insofar a s t h e y p r o d u c e i n d e x inequalities, be s t r u c ­ tured so as to o p t i m i z e t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . H e r e even t h e d e g r e e of i n e q u a l i t y is left entirely o p e n , to b e d e t e r m i n e d , however, n o t b y t h e political p r o c e s s b u t by empirical facts (for e x a m ­ ple, c o n c e r n i n g t h e effectiveness of various incentives). It has s o m e t i m e s b e e n overlooked that t h e difference principle e n ­ tails n o g e n e r a l d e m a n d to raise t h e i n d e x position of t h e least a d v a n ­ taged by all feasible m e a n s a s far as possible—even by s t r i p - m i n i n g national p a r k s , by s h o r t e n i n g l u n c h breaks, or t h r o u g h subliminal messages p i p e d to w o r k s t a t i o n s . It is only insofar as t h e y g e n e r a t e social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities t h a t social institutions m u s t b e d e ­ signed t o o p t i m i z e t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged. T h e political p r o c e s s is a l l o w e d t o govern, as m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice, t h o s e o t h e r f e a t u r e s of t h e institutional s c h e m e that affect index p o s i t i o n s r o u g h l y e q u a l l y — s u c h as restrictions o n t i m e worked, resource d e p l e t i o n , a n d p o l l u t i o n . T h e s e restrictions m a y be q u i t e hght; to b e just, a s o c i e t y n e e d n o t b e affluent or aim to be (cf. FG 5451. 17.2. Before d i s c u s s i n g this p o i n t further, let m e m a k e a few c o m ­ ments o n t h e i n d e x . Rawls often d i s c u s s e s t h e difference principle in its simplest form, w h e r e it g o v e r n s the institutional distribution of o n l y income a n d w e a l t h (SUPG 162-63). Here it is i m p o r t a n t for p u r p o s e s of the i n d e x t h a t s h a r e s of i n c o m e a n d wealth b e corrected for a n y ex­ penses c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y principles. Whatever entitlements p e r s o n s h a v e to minimally a d e q u a t e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r ­ tunities o r w h a t e v e r f u n d s t h e y n e e d to gain access to first-pnnciple goods ( i n c l u d i n g g o o d s to m e e t t h e i r s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c needs), for e x a m p l e , a r e n o t t o b e i n c l u d e d in their i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h as evaluated u n d e r t h e difference principle. Persons c a n n o t be said t o enjoy fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y and a r e a s o n a b l e a m o u n t of d i s p o s ­ able i n c o m e , if i n fact t h e y face a c h o i c e b e t w e e n having only o n e o r t h e other. T h i s p o i n t is o n l y marginally i m p o r t a n t w h e n s u c h higher-order expenses (for e x a m p l e , t h e cost of m e e t i n g one's s t a n d a r d socioeco43

" T h e r e a r e l o w e r .imits o n t h e s e levels. There must be e n o u g h e c o ^ a g ^ v r f t h whatever e d u c a t i o n a n d h e a l t h care this p r e s u p p o s e s / tcicover the t especially t h e c o s t s of satisfying the first principle, and there m u s . be e n o u g n to ensure t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of legal a n d political institutions.

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T h e Difference P r i n c i p l e , 17.2

n o m i c n e e d s ) a r e r o u g h l y t h e s a m e for e v e r y o n e . But they may not be. T h e r e m a y b e great differences, for i n s t a n c e , in t h e e x p e n s e s persons i n c u r for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . With regard to a n o n g o i n g e c o n o m i c s c h e m e , t h e difference princi­ p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s affecting relative index positions ( i n c o m e tax rates, for e x a m p l e ) s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d , insofar as feasible, s o that they, ceteris paribus, o p t i m i z e t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of the least a d v a n t a g e d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s . T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t involves t h e assump­ tion t h a t i n a s s e s s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s , p e r s o n s (as represented in t h e original p o s i t i o n ) take a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y g r e a t e r interest in t h e i r absolute t h a n in t h e i r relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n . F o r t h e simplest case of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h t h i s a s s u m p t i o n is q u i t e clearly implausible. S o m e of "the g o o d t h i n g s in life" a r e p o s i t i o n a l g o o d s . A c c e s s to them is s c a r c e a n d therefore c o m p e t i t i v e . W h e t h e r I c a n o w n a s e c l u d e d lakefront property, s e e a f a m o u s o r c h e s t r a p e r f o r m , s h o w generosity to­ w a r d friends a n d relations, o r b u y m y c h i l d r e n t h e t o y s o w n e d by their p e e r s , d e p e n d s in p a r t o n h o w m u c h m o n e y o t h e r s c a n devote to these s a m e p u r p o s e s . If s u c h p o s i t i o n a l g o o d s a r e of s o m e i m p o r t a n c e or if p e r s o n s a r e s u s c e p t i b l e to feelings of relative d e p r i v a t i o n (or excusable envy), t h e n it m a y b e p l a u s i b l e t o a t t a c h s o m e c o m m e n s u r a t e impor­ t a n c e t o relative e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s . T o deflect s u c h criticisms, Rawls c a n b r i n g in t h e o t h e r t w o i n d e x g o o d s — t h e r e s i d u a l social bases of self-respect ( a c c o m m o d a t i n g e x c u s a b l e envy) a n d p o w e r s a n d preroga­ tives of offices a n d p o s i t i o n s of responsibility—which are, at least in large part, intrinsically p o s i t i o n a l (or c o n s t a n t - s u m ) g o o d s a n d will t h e r e f o r e limit t h e sacrifice of relative for t h e sake of a b s o l u t e income a n d w e a l t h . But since Rawls s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t h o w t h e s e other two g o o d s are to b e specified a n d w e i g h t e d w i t h i n t h e i n d e x , I won't d i s c u s s t h i s i s s u e further. 4 4

It s e e m s clear t h a t t h e i n d e x m u s t a l s o i n c l u d e leisure time as a d i s t i n c t social p r i m a r y good. This g o o d c a n b e d e f i n e d s i m p l y as the i n v e r s e of time w o r k e d , w h i c h is a b u r d e n of social c o o p e r a t i o n .

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Leisure t i m e m u s t p l a y a role in i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s t h r o u g h which t h e least a d v a n t a g e d w i t h i n a n existing social s y s t e m are identi­ fied. Even t h o u g h t h e i r a n n u a l o r lifetime i n c o m e is r a t h e r low, t h o s e who c h o o s e to d o o n l y a few h o u r s of well-paid work e a c h w e e k c a n n o t plausibly b e c o n s i d e r e d less a d v a n t a g e d t h a n o t h e r s w h o work m a n y more h o u r s p e r w e e k in a l o w e r - p a y i n g j o b . Leisure t i m e m u s t b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t in i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r ­ isons as well. T o s e e w h y , c o n s i d e r that o n e p r o m i n e n t w a y in w h i c h a relative r e d u c t i o n c a n l e a d to a n a b s o l u t e i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e lowest index p o s i t i o n is t h r o u g h incentives. T h e s e m a y b e u s e d to improve t h e matching of p e r s o n s to c a r e e r s a n d also to elicit greater efforts from persons a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d to a certain career. To satisfy t h e difference principle, t h e r e s u l t i n g i n c r e a s e s in productivity m u s t suffice to finance the incentives and also to raise t h e i n d e x position of t h e least advan­ taged. T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of s u c h incentives w o r s e n s t h e relative b u t improves t h e a b s o l u t e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of those w h o fail to w i n t h e m . In the spirit of t h i s R a w l s i a n idea, effective leisure-time incentives s h o u l d be equally w e l c o m e . P r o m i s i n g a n extra m o n t h of vacation to t h o s e willing to e n t e r a c e r t a i n profession or to t h o s e willing t o m a k e special efforts m a y e n h a n c e efficiency so that (holding p r o d u c t i o n constant) everyone will g a i n a few extra vacation days. T h e desirability of this institutional c h a n g e will register o n Rawls's i n d e x only if leisure t i m e is included. 46

47

good in m o s t s o c i e t i e s , a n d offices have b e e n sold o r auctioned off in many. Moreover, different k i n d s of work often differ greatly—in being more or less prestigious, healthful, dirty, d a n g e r o u s , interesting, tiring, a n d the like. Surely, s u c h differences must be taken mto a c c o u n t in a s s e s s i n g the justice of an e c o n o m i c s c h e m e . If o n e accepts "tune labored" o r "effort e x p e n d e d " (Reiman, LTDP 143) as an interpersonally invanant mea­ sure for the b u r d e n s of social cooperation, however, then o n e is constrained to view as the appropriate equalitarian b a s e l i n e a s c h e m e under w h i c h hours of work are rewarded equally, w h e t h e r the work is that of a gardener, miner, executive, or musician (cf. LTDP 143-44). Rawls p r o v i d e s at least the h e a d i n g s u n d e r w h i c h these complexities can be taken into a c c o u n t . T h e difference principle governs the institutional distribution not only of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h (including what is obtainable therewith! but also of p o w e r s f n d prerogatives of offices a n d of p o s i t i o n s of responsibility and of the (residual) social bases of self-respect. So Rawls leaves room for the plausible idea that persons index Position m a y differ m e r e l y b e c a u s e their jobs are differentially prestigious or demanding. ^ * r h i s c o n f o r m s to Rawls's suggestion that "twenty-four hours less a ^ ° * « day might b e i n c l u d e d in t h e i n d e x as leisure. Those w h o are unwilling to work w o u l d have a standard w o r k i n g d a y of extra leisure. . S o those w h o surf all day offMal.bu must find a w a y to s u p p o r t t h e m s e l v e s and w o u l d not be entitled to public funds I P W C ^ n . ' Unlike the o t h e r t w o i n d e x g o o d s Rawls proposes, leisure tune can ™ u r e ™ made c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h i n c o m e a n d wealth in a straightforward way. Here o n e * to define an e x c h a n g e rate of i n c o m e vs. work time by reference to he relevant so«aJ ^ t e r n ' s aggregate rate of productivity (the rate at w h i c h the populal o n at large trans w o r k h m e i n t o i n c o m e a n d wealth). T h o u g h the details are complicated, this task s

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1 7 . 3 . W i t h t h e s e r o u g h i d e a s a b o u t t h e i n d e x , let u s see how the difference p r i n c i p l e m a y b e a p p l i e d . G r a p h 3 r e p r e s e n t s h o w the lowest (absolute) i n d e x p o s i t i o n varies a s a f u n c t i o n of its relative status. This relative s t a t u s c a n b e given a s a p e r c e n t a g e of t h e m e a n (absolute) index p o s i t i o n so t h a t t h e leftmost vertical l i n e r e p r e s e n t s 100 percent or perfect e q u a l i t y . In o r d e r t o e l u c i d a t e t h e force of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , as I pro­ p o s e t o u n d e r s t a n d it, let m e d i s t i n g u i s h four ideal-typical kinds of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h o i c e s . First, t h e r e a r e c h o i c e s t h a t affect n e i t h e r relative n o r a b s o l u t e i n d e x p o s i t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , d e c i s i o n s a b o u t h o w the law specifies f r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s o r r e g u l a t e s m a r r i a g e a n d divorce. Inso­ far a s s u c h c h o i c e s a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d b y p r i o r p r i n c i p l e s of justice, t h e y c a n b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e political p r o c e s s a s m a t t e r s of p u r e pro­ c e d u r a l justice. T h e difference p r i n c i p l e h a s n o b e a r i n g o n t h e m . 48

S e c o n d , t h e r e are c h o i c e s t h a t — t h r o u g h t h e i r i m p a c t o n available i n d e x g o o d s overall—affect t h e vertical l o c a t i o n of t h e c u r v e . They do n o t affect relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n s b u t r e s u l t o n l y in p a r a l l e l transforma­ t i o n s u p or d o w n . Of this k i n d a r e c h o i c e s a b o u t limits o n working h o u r s a n d p r o d u c t i o n ( i n t e n d e d , p e r h a p s , t o c o n s e r v e r e s o u r c e s or to p r o t e c t t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ) , a b o u t a l l o c a t i o n s t o a n d w i t h i n the educa­ t i o n a n d m e d i c a l s y s t e m s , a b o u t t h e r a t e of i n v e s t m e n t , about the p r o d u c t i o n of p u b l i c g o o d s , a n d so o n . T h e difference principle, gov­ e r n i n g only (institutional) i n d e x inequalities, d o e s n o t c o n s t r a i n such c h o i c e s at all. They, too, insofar a s t h e y a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d by the first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s , c a n b e left t o t h e political p r o c e s s as m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice. T h e r e is n o significant risk of bias against t h e least a d v a n t a g e d b e c a u s e all r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n d e x positions a r e affected r o u g h l y equally. Third, t h e r e are c h o i c e s of institutional f e a t u r e s of t h e economic s y s t e m t h a t affect relative i n d e x positions, s u c h a s t h e c h o i c e of income tax r a t e s . S u c h c h o i c e s , r e p r e s e n t a b l e a s m o v e m e n t s a l o n g t h e curve, a r e p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y g o v e r n e d b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h favors w h a t e v e r unified s o l u t i o n to t h e i s s u e s of t h i s k i n d w o u l d o p t i m i z e the lowest index position in absolute terms T h e m o s t difficult a r e institutional c h o i c e s of t h e f o u r t h kind, which affect t h e s h a p e of t h e curve. S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , t h a t in a capitalist

counted as work wil depend on contextual factors. If birth rates are hieh enough high), ratsing chudren presumably need (/should) no, beTonsfdlre^I Sribution. But suppose hat n other circumstances it would not be unjust tTrZo^e such time burden of social cooperation, a contribution to the reproducton S «" optimizing the lowest index position might require such measures as subsidized d care services^for large, poor families.) The inclusion of l e t a S n ^ f a tte ta2^Uh«« way in which such matters can be accommodated **The graph cannot show how chances in th» .LI-M. .hat leave the relative status of the lowest index positton ,n?K ? ° ""T Lwe the lowest index position. Rawls excludes thU S w l ^ ^ index positions are close-knit (TJ 80-82), ^^^y^T™** 'U" ^ ^ne index position wil, affect ev.ry other index S S ^ ^ ' S S ^ t h i s

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economic s y s t e m t h e minimum i n d e x position is highest w h e n index inequalities a r e fairly large, w h i l e in a socialist e c o n o m y t h e m i n i m u m mdex p o s i t i o n is h i g h e s t w h e n i n d e x inequalities are less significant. Can the difference p r i n c i p l e b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n a choice of this kind? f o r a c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t to b e meaningful, w e m u s t m a k e strong ceteris paribus a s s u m p t i o n s . T h e two s c h e m e s m u s t not differ "t the e x t e n t t o w h i c h a n d m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e y d o a n d can satisfy t h e first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s , a n d institutional choices of the sec­ ond kind m u s t a l s o b e t h e s a m e as far as possible. S u p p o s e t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s a r e satisfied. D o e s it t h e n follow, in analogy to choices of the third kind, t h a t Rawls's criterion of justice requires capitalism (in Graph 4) b e c a u s e it m a k e s feasible a h i g h e r social m i n i m u m ? Or may, in analogy t o c h o i c e s of t h e s e c o n d kind, socialism b e c h o s e n t h r o u g h a democratic political p r o c e s s o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t the adverse effect of tnis c h o i c e u p o n t h e a b s o l u t e i n d e x position of t h e least advantaged is no greater t h a n its a d v e r s e effect u p o n t h e o t h e r representative index Positions? Rawls s e e m s t o p r e f e r t h e latter answer: "The theory of justice d o e s ° t by itself favor e i t h e r form of r e g i m e " (TJ 280; also BLP 12 n. 13). But it * u n c l e a r w h a t "by i t s e l f is s u p p o s e d to m e a n . Does his theory favor °ne form of r e g i m e o n c e t h e empirical information contained m the f a p h is s u p p l i e d ? It s e e m s not, for h e c o n t i n u e s : "Which system is best r a given p e o p l e d e p e n d s u p o n t h e i r circumstances, institutions,^and ^ t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s " (TJ 280, cf. 274). This statement suggests^that * a w l w a n t s t h e c a p i t a l i s m / s o c i a l i s m issue to b e d e t e r m i n e d by t n e n

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fictional p a r t i e s t o a " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n " (as h e calls it), who " n o w k n o w t h e relevant g e n e r a l facts a b o u t t h e i r society, that is, its n a t u r a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d r e s o u r c e s , its level of e c o n o m i c advance a n d political c u l t u r e , a n d so o n " (TJ 197). T h i s i d e a of a g r a d u a l lifting of t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e s e e m s t o arise from Rawls's t e n d e n c y to think of t h e political p r o c e s s a s exclusively a n i n s t a n c e of i m p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l justice, a t e n d e n c y from w h i c h I h a v e d e p a r t e d . I find t h e i d e a of a h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n ( a n d h y p o t h e t i c a l legislature) u n p a l a t a b l e b e c a u s e it suggests t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t c h o o s e their c o n s t i t u t i o n , l a w s , a n d policies, d o w n to t h e m i n u t e s t detail, in refer­ e n c e t o w h a t it w o u l d b e rational to c h o o s e (by Rawls's s t a n d a r d s ) for t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e i r social s y s t e m T h e s e circum­ s t a n c e s , t r a d i t i o n s , etc., fix t h e " c o r r e c t " political d e c i s i o n s , regardless of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s o w n c o n c e r n s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s My d i s c u s s i o n of t h e political p r o c e s s ( c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s in­ c l u d e d ) s u g g e s t s t h e i d e a t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s of a social s y s t e m may d e c i d e t h e c a p i t a l i s m / s o c i a l i s m i s s u e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y in lizht of their c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d historical t r a d i t i o n s . Like c h o i c e s of t h e s e c o n d k i n d a n d u n l i k e t h o s e of t h e third, t h i s decision b e t w e e n socialism and c a p i t a l i s m is p r o t e c t e d b y t h e political liberties a n d t h e r e f o r e t r e a t e d as a m a t t e r of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . T h i s a n s w e r is of c o u r s e still 4 9

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K , ° P ^ " t o G r a p h 4) t h a t me f and socialism m i n i m u m i n d e x p o s i t i o n s ( u n d e r capitalism both 3 P y' ceteris paribus, w o r s e t h a n t h e o t h e r v e a n d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s , Ltd^tr?™568 ^ , g difference p r i n c i p l e result will h P ° c i a J i s m i s s u e o n l y in special cases. This stabilitvhv T h r e e , for it p r o m o t e s international ar OVVmg Pe S compelling another peoversa miffhtK * • ° S capitalism to socialism or vice 17 4 Th y a p p e a l to Rawls's criterion of justice. " Presum hi i n d i c a t e h o w an ideal e c o n o m i c system, resourrn & t h e m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m a t least for purposes of ceduraT ™ > c a n be viewed as an instance of p r o justice ^ g r o u n d r u l e s a r e governed by Rawls's criterion of Proce* Q e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e s as e x p r e s s e d through the political feet ° n o m i c s y s t e m w o u l d e m b o d y an e l e m e n t of p e r e q u i l ^ h * * J t i c e i n s o f a r as it, for example, reliably maintains fair son" °^ P P i t y a n d e n s u r e s that everyone's s t a n d a r d basic p f i c n e e d s a r e m e t . It e m b o d i e s an element of imperfect cedural j u s t i c e i n s o f a r as t h e r e will p r e s u m a b l y always be s o m e m f o r ep about h o w design the institutions t h a t g e n e r a t e so j ° n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s so as to optimize (ceteris paribus) the absoe i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged. And it e m b o d i e s an e l e m e n t p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e insofar as it regulates h o w individuals get s t r i b u t e d " over t h e various index positions. Let me c o n c l u d e Part Two with a brief sketch of t h e interper­ sonal a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s involved in Rawls's criterion of Justice I h a v e d e v e l o p e d it)—which c o m p a r i s o n s serve, respec­ tively t o identify t h e least advantaged g r o u p within e a c h s c h e m e a n d c o m p a r e t h e p r o s p e c t s of least advantaged g r o u p s that w o u l d exist u n d e r feasible alternative s c h e m e s . Rawls d e f i n e s t h e least advantaged in t e r m s of index g o o d s alone, making t h e i d e a l - t h e o r y a s s u m p t i o n that t h e first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y Principles are fully satisfied. If his criterion is to g u i d e t h e c o u r s e of ° c i a l c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , t h e n it m u s t also rank feasible basic s t r u c t u r e s toat do not satisfy t h i s ideal-theory a s s u m p t i o n . My a t t e m p t to e x t e n d definition a c c o r d i n g l y is based on the idea of specifying the size of least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p as an interschemically invariant p e r c e n t a g e RawlsPproposeTto define least advantaged u n d e r difference S

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p r i n c i p l e a s "all t h o s e w i t h t h e a v e r a g e i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h of [unskilled workers], o r less," o r a s "all p e r s o n s w i t h l e s s t h a n half of the median i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h " (TJ 981. But, s o d e f i n e d , t h e least a d v a n t a g e d group m a y t u r n o u t to b e very large o r very s m a l l o r e v e n nonexistent. It is h a r d l y r a t i o n a l t o d e m a n d t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s s h o u l d aim to i m p r o v e t h e p o s i t i o n of a fictional social g r o u p . S o m e w h a t m o r e p r o m i s i n g is t h e i d e a of s e a r c h i n g out whatever least a d v a n t a g e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s , r e a s o n a b l y h o m o g e n e o u s but of varying sizes, w o u l d e m e r g e u n d e r t h e feasible alternative institu­ tional s c h e m e s . W i t h t h i s idea, as w i t h Rawls's earlier definitions, how­ ever, i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s involving a s m a l l e r a n d worse-posi­ t i o n e d v e r s u s a larger b u t b e t t e r - p o s i t i o n e d least a d v a n t a g e d group become indeterminate. T h e r e is s u r e l y s o m e a r b i t r a r i n e s s in s t i p u l a t i n g t h e size of least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s in a d v a n c e , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e c a s e of institutional s c h e m e s t h a t w o u l d i n fact p r o d u c e a r e a s o n a b l y h o m o g e n e o u s "natu­ ral" u n d e r c l a s s . But t h i s is n o t a s e r i o u s p r o b l e m . T h e fraction to be c h o s e n m u s t fall w i t h i n a c e r t a i n r a n g e — m u s t b e large e n o u g h to a p p e a l t o t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e i r c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d i s s u e in defi­ n i t e a n d significant d e m a n d s for s i t u a t i o n s of injustice a n d m u s t be small e n o u g h to a p p e a l t o t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t to a i m t h e s e d e m a n d s specifically at i m p r o v i n g t h e w o r s t s h a r e s . Half a p e r c e n t is too small a n d 60 p e r c e n t t o o large, t h o u g h b o t h 4 p e r c e n t a n d 20 p e r c e n t may be a r g u a b l e . " Fortunately, t h e p r e c i s e fraction size (within t h e reasonable range) is n o t t o o i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e different s t i p u l a t i o n s w o u l d lead t o t h e s a m e o r n e a r l y t h e s a m e p r a c t i c a l d e m a n d s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l re^T ~ ™ o p t i m i z e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d as d e n n e d will e i t h e r h a v e a s t r o n g t e n d e n c y t o i m p r o v e t h e general 5 1

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prospect of a s m a l l e r o r invariably i m p r o v e t h e general p r o s p e c t s of a larger actual u n d e r c l a s s . T h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t s a r e a c c o m m o d a t e d ei­ ther way. Within t h e r e a s o n a b l e r a n g e , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e least advantaged t o total p o p u l a t i o n d o e s t h e n n o t m a t t e r very m u c h , though it m a t t e r s , of c o u r s e , t h a t t h i s p r o p o r t i o n b e kept fixed for purposes of i n t e r s c h e m i c comparisons. Once t h e relative s i z e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p h a s b e e n stipu­ lated, the m e m b e r s of t h i s g r o u p a r e identified t h r o u g h t h e staggered application of t h r e e m e a s u r e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the lexically o r d e r e d account of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . W e m a y r e p r e s e n t e a c h participant's snare as a n o r d e r e d t r i p l e t o r triscore, <X,Y,Z>. Here X m e a s u r e s Principle g o o d s , Y o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d Z index goods. All t h r e e scores e c a p p e d a t 1 0 0 . T h e f o r m u l a X = 100 represents a fully a d e q u a t e Package of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties; Y = 100 r e p r e s e n t s (taking t h e strongest v e r s i o n of O P ) formal equality of educational, e m p l o y m e n t , «nd medical o p p o r t u n i t y , p l u s a c c e s s to a t least a minimally a d e q u a t e education, m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e m p l o y m e n t , minimally a d e q u a t e health p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l m e d i c a l conditions, and full medical care for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ; Z - 100 represents an index Position t h a t d o e s n o t fall b e l o w t h e best feasible social modulo i n s t i t u t i o n a l choices of t h e second and fourth lands.** Zs c o r e s - u n l i k e X- a n d Y - s c o r e s - a r e inherently comparative in an in^ c h e m i c s e n s e . T o s c o r e t h e i n d e x position of t h e l e a s t ^ a n ^ e d ,

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case t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w h o s e p a c k a g e of basic rights and l i b e r t i e s — i n c o m p l e t e o r ill p r o t e c t e d — i s l e a s t a d e q u a t e . They may suffer excessive e x p o s u r e t o violent c r i m e , b e u n a b l e t o meet their s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , b e significantly disadvantaged as regards (the fair value of) b a s i c political liberties, o r suffer abridgments of their civil liberties. The n e x t s t e p c o n s i s t s i n a g g r e g a t i n g t h e X-scores, t h e Y-scores, and the Z-scores of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d i n d i v i d u a l s . Here, I think, one can simply u s e t h e g e o m e t r i c (or a r i t h m e t i c ) m e a n t o derive t h e lowest representative triscore, w h i c h is t h e p r i m a r y m e a s u r e for assessing the basic s t r u c t u r e a s a w h o l e . Basic s t r u c t u r e s c a n t h e n b e r a n k e d by their lowest r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t r i s c o r e s , j u s t a s s h a r e s w i t h i n a basic structure were o r d e r e d o n t h e b a s i s of t h e i r t r i s c o r e s . To attain a perfectly j u s t b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , w e s h o u l d t h e n aim at institutional r e f o r m s t h a t raise all r e p r e s e n t a t i v e triscores toward <100,100,100>. H e r e t h e c o u r s e of social c h a n g e is g u i d e d by two i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p r i o r i t i e s : t h e p r i o r i t y of t h e least advantaged (the worst triscore) a n d , s e c o n d a r i l y , t h e p r i o r i t y of X-scores over Y-scores over Z-scores. T h u s political efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s m u s t be de­ voted first a n d f o r e m o s t t o i m p r o v i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e X-score of the least advantaged, followed b y t h e i r Y-score a n d Z-score, w h i c h in turn are followed b y t h e X-score, t h e Y-score, a n d t h e Z - s c o r e of t h e second least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p , a n d s o o n The d i s c u s s i o n of P a r t T w o h a s , I h o p e , m a d e t h e Rawlsian criterion of justice c l e a r e r a n d m o r e specific. Still, a g r e a t d e a l r e m a i n s to be d o n e before w e c a n arrive at s o m e t h i n g like a w o r k a b l e notion of representative t r i s c o r e s t h a t c o u l d really serve a s a p u b l i c criterion of social justice. O n e n e e d s t h e size of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s a n d a clearer idea of i n t r a p e r s o n a l a g g r e g a t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . M o r e impor­ tant, t h e v a r i o u s b a s i c rights a n d liberties m u s t b e d e f i n e d m o r e pre­ cisely, a n d w e i g h t s m u s t b e a s s i g n e d t o v a r i o u s w a y s i n w h i c h a pack­ age of b a s i c rights m a y b e i n c o m p l e t e o r ill p r o t e c t e d . M y s c h e m a for u n d e r s t a n d i n g fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y m u s t b e f u r t h e r specified by s h a r p e n i n g t h e n o t i o n s of e d u c a t i o n , e m p l o y m e n t , m e d i c a l condition, standard, m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e , socially p r o d u c e d , a n d s o o n . It m u s t be sketched h o w " p o w e r s a n d prerogatives of offices a n d positions of responsibility" a n d t h e (residual) social b a s e s of self-respect c a n be made c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h t h e o t h e r i n d e x g o o d s , i n c o m e / w e a l t h and leisure t i m e . T h e s e t a s k s a r e less p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h a n t h e o n e s I have here u n d e r t a k e n a n d w o u l d s e e m t o r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a b l e expertise in 56

5 7

'"Should l o w e s t triscores b e equal, t h e triscores o f m o r e a d v a n t a g e d representative groups m a y have t o b e b r o u g h t in as tie breakers. C o m p a r e h e r e Rawls's lexical difference principle (TJ 83). "This formulation i n c o r p o r a t e s m y p r o p o s a l (§12.3) that t h e priority c o n c e r n for the least advantaged g r o u p m u s t override t h e lexical priority of t h e first over t h e s e c o n d (and of the o p p o r t u n i t y over t h e difference) principle, w h e n t h e s e are u n d e r s t o o d as imple­ mentation priorities.

T h e Difference Principle, 17.5

307

other fields. I h o p e t h i s d i s c u s s i o n h a s at least m a d e clearer h o w s u c h expertise might b e e m p l o y e d . I also h o p e that my development of Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e h a s r e a c h e d a level of specificity on which we can gain at least a r e a s o n a b l y p r e c i s e idea of the institutional reforms that this criterion, a s a p p l i e d to a particular institutional scheme, would likely d e m a n d if it w e r e fully spelled out.

PART

T H R E E

GLOBALIZING THE RAWLSIAN CONCEPTION OF J U S T I C E

CHAPTER

5

From Modus Vivendi to Value Overlap

18. The P r a c t i c a l I m p o r t a n c e o f J u s t i c e 1M. When a p h i l o s o p h e r s p e n d s h i s life developing and refining an ^borate theory of j u s t i c e , it m a y b e interesting to ask about the imporance of his w o r k a n d a b o u t its a u t h o r ' s view thereof. Insofar as Rawls !" an a c a d e m i c a u d i e n c e , t h e a n s w e r is straightforward: h e has town how c e n t r a l s t r a n d s of K a n t ' s m o r a l a n d political philosophy be restated in a w a y t h a t m a k e s t h e m i n d e p e n d e n t of Kant s r i s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y w i t h its pervasive dualisms (WOS 18/. « e S,!K ? c o n t r i b u t i o n t o m o r a l theory, the comparative s udy of ^bstantive m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n s , b y bringing the neglected contractarT Paradigm u p t o d a t e ? H e h a s s u r e l y achieved m a n y other valuable ^ b e s i d e s , s u c h a s d e v e l o p i n g n e w ideas for theory construction ue^ « P t i o n s ) a n d justification (reflective ^ ^ ^ ^ uest«,n h e r e c o n c e r n s t h e p r a c t i c a l political message of Rawls s^pht °Phy, w h i c h is c o n c e r n e d he says, w i t h the indefinite politician l o o k s o n l y "to t h e n e x t election, the s t a t e s m a r t o t h e ^ g e n e r a t i o n " (IOC z / w h a t is t h e m o r a l import of h i s ^ w o r ^ r . J * * r e a d e r s h i p of p e r s o n s of g o o d will w h o also have the mdehnite ure at h e a r t ? J « a w l s s u g g e s t i o n s o n t h i s s c o r e go in two t e s f o r

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w e are to identify " t h e m o s t g r i e v o u s " i n j u s t i c e s in d e v e l o p e d Western societies (TJ 246). W h e r e s u c h s u g g e s t i o n s a r e at all c o n c r e t e , they refer to t h e first p r i n c i p l e a n d in p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e fair value of t h e political liberties (TJ 226; BLP 74-79). R e m a r k s o n w h a t n e e d s t o b e d o n e for the sake of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a r e r a r e a n d c u r s o r y . In h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , Rawls is m o r e p r o n e t o e m p h a s i z e the impor­ t a n c e of h i s w o r k for e n h a n c i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y of o u r social institutions. He w a n t s to d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t , t h r o u g h appeal to c o m m o n l y h e l d c o n v i c t i o n s , s t r e n g t h e n s c i t i z e n s ' m o r a l allegiance to t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e : " T h e real t a s k [of political p h i l o s o p h y ] is to discover a n d f o r m u l a t e t h e d e e p e r b a s e s of a g r e e m e n t w h i c h one h o p e s are e m b e d d e d in c o m m o n s e n s e , o r e v e n to o r i g i n a t e a n d fash­ ion s t a r t i n g p o i n t s for c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y e x p r e s s i n g in a new form t h e c o n v i c t i o n s f o u n d in t h e h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n b y connecting t h e m w i t h a w i d e r a n g e of p e o p l e ' s c o n s i d e r e d c o n v i c t i o n s : those w h i c h s t a n d u p to critical reflection" (KCMT 518). Rawls calls this a "practical social task" (KCMT 519), b u t n o t in a l l u s i o n t o o u r political task to b r i n g existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o l i n e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of justice. Rather, h e is e x p r e s s i n g a v i e w of t h e criteria for a d e q u a c y w i t h i n political p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h s h o u l d n o t " s e a r c h for m o r a l truth" (KCMT 519) b u t seek a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t t h e p r e s e n t citizens of t h e U n i t e d States find c o n v i n c i n g . If " o u r h i s t o r y a n d t h e traditions e m b e d d e d in o u r p u b l i c life," " o u r d i s p u t e s s i n c e , let's say, t h e Declara­ t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e , " o r " p e o p l e s c o n s i d e r e d c o n v i c t i o n s " (KCMT 519, 518) w e r e different, t h e real task of political p h i l o s o p h y w o u l d be c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y different as well. Lest this t h o u g h t b e m i s u n d e r s t o o d , let m e d i s t i n g u i s h t w o s e n s e s in w h i c h a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n m a y b e p a r o c h i a l . O n t h e o n e h a n d , it may b e p a r o c h i a l b y b a s i n g itself u p o n t h e v a l u e s a n d c o n s i d e r e d moral j u d g m e n t s p r e v a l e n t in o n e society at a c e r t a i n p e r i o d . Rawls's c o n c e p ­ t i o n of justice is self-consciously p a r o c h i a l in t h i s s e n s e . Its criterion of justice a n d t h e justification of t h i s c r i t e r i o n a r e c h o s e n for t h e i r s u p ­ p o s e d a p p e a l t o t h e reflective c o m m o n s e n s e of (primarily) p r e s e n t - d a y A m e r i c a n s . Rawls w a n t s t o h a v e p r e s e n t e d in a d e v e l o p e d a n d ide­ alized form t h e w a y t h o u g h t f u l c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n s w o u l d see the world, w o u l d a s s e s s t h e i r o w n p a s t a n d p r e s e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d the i n s t i t u t i o n s of o t h e r historical s o c i e t i e s . T h i s h e s e e s a s h i s practical s o a a l task. His c o n c e p t i o n fails if it d o e s n o t a p p e a l t o t h e moral c o n s c i o u s n e s s of h i s c o m p a t r i o t s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n m a y claim a l i m i t e d d o m a i n , t h u s it m a y view itself as a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o c e r t a i n k i n d s of social s y s t e m s u n d e r c e r t a i n k i n d s of e m p i r i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o r e m b r a c i n g s o m e v e r s i o n of c u l t u r a l relativism, it m a y s e e itself a s a p p l y i n g only w i t h m a c e r t a i n c u l t u r e a n d e p o c h , m u c h like a set of r u l e s of e t i q u e t t e . Rawls s c o n c e p t i o n in A Theory of Justice is o n l y slightly p a r o c h i a l in m i s s e n s e . I h o u g h it is in s o m e w a y s a d a p t a b l e t o v a r i o u s e m p i r i c a l

T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of Justice, 18.1

313

and cultural c o n d i t i o n s , it is n e v e r t h e l e s s applicable to all essentially self-contained social s y s t e m s existing u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of jus­ tice (TJ §22). On the view s t r e s s e d in t h e l a t e r writings, t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Rawls's work consists t h e n in f i n d i n g a w a y of arranging prevalent considered judgments o n all levels of g e n e r a l i t y into a unified a n d p e r s p i c u o u s whole, giving d u e w e i g h t to t h e values alive in this c u l t u r e — t o the liberty of t h e a n c i e n t s a n d t h a t of t h e m o d e r n s (TJ 201); to freedom, equality, a n d fraternity (TJ 105); to t h e ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Rous­ seau, Kant, a n d Sidgwick; t o rational choice theory a n d the perspective sub specie aeternitatis (TJ 587). Here the principal task is to resolve "an impasse in o u r r e c e n t political h i s t o r y T h e requisite u n d e r s t a n d i n g of freedom a n d e q u a l i t y . . ., a n d t h e most suitable way to balance the claims of t h e s e n o t i o n s , h a v e n o t b e e n expressed so as to meet general approval" (KCMT 517). If t h i s i m p a s s e c o u l d b e resolved, w e would perhaps feel differently a b o u t s o m e of o u r current institutions a n d change t h e m , b u t it is p r i m a r i l y t h e h o p e for broad public consensus, and not for s u c h c h a n g e s , t h a t l e n d s urgency to Rawls's work. Recently (JFPM; a n d e s p . IOC), Rawls h a s tried to explain m o r e fully why this justificatory t a s k is s o i m p o r t a n t . It matters that citizens have a mora/ (rather t h a n a m e r e l y p r u d e n t i a l ) allegiance to the institutions of their society. T h e task of political p h i l o s o p h y is to develop a kernel of Political m o r a l i t y t h a t c a n b e at t h e c e n t e r of an overlapping c o n s e n s u s and h e n c e c a n p e r m a n e n t l y resolve t h e fundamental assurance prob>em. Such a k e r n e l of political morality m u s t first a n d foremost settle what it is politicallv u r g e n t to settle: h o w to c h o o s e n o w a m o n g feasible •nstitutional a l t e r n a t i v e s . But stability requires that citizens s h o u l d also agree in b r o a d o u t l i n e u p o n the g r o u n d of s u c h settlements, that is, ^ o n a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . S u c h a criterion identifies a n d evaluates the ° r a l l y salient p r o p e r t i e s a n d features of institutional schemes a n d thereby a n t i c i p a t e s h o w s u c h a s c h e m e may a n d (especially! h o w i t nay not b e a d a p t e d to c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . If s u c h a shared politi­ cal morality a s s u r e s t h e v a r i o u s social groups that there will continue t° be r o o m for t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r values a n d way of life, then each s u c h &°up c a n d e v e l o p a m o r a l allegiance to t h e basic institutions (as hey a n d will be), i n c l u d i n g a willingness to u p h o l d these institutions 2

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even w h e n it is a b l e t o c h a n g e , s u b v e r t , o r b y p a s s t h e m to its own rational a d v a n t a g e . T h u s a s h a r e d political m o r a l i t y is a p r e r e q u i s i t e for a w i d e s p r e a d categorical s e n s e of justice, w h i c h i n t u r n is a n important c o m p o n e n t of a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m . To s o m e extent, t h e t w o v i e w s a r e h a r m o n i o u s a n d m u t u a l l y rein­ forcing. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is t o p r o v i d e a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d ­ i n g a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n of o u r v a l u e s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o o n e another. S u c h a p p r e c i a t i o n d e e p e n s t h e m o r a l a l l e g i a n c e t o o u r social institu­ t i o n s (insofar a s t h e y a r e just) a n d a l s o g u i d e s a n d facilitates institu­ tional reforms t h a t c a n b e s h o w n t o e n h a n c e t h e j u s t i c e of o u r basic s t r u c t u r e . A n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s for t h e s a k e of justice t e n d to b o l s t e r m o r a l allegiance t o o u r v a l u e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s . O n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e p r a c t i c a l political i m p o r t a n c e of this twin p r o j e c t is n e v e r t h e l e s s q u i t e l i m i t e d . T h e political c o m p e t i t i o n in the U n i t e d States a l r e a d y takes p l a c e i n t h e c o n t e x t of a n overlapping c o n s e n s u s t h a t a s s u r e s t h e m a j o r i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t h a t shifts in the political b a l a n c e of p o w e r will n o t b e e x p l o i t e d i n a n a t t e m p t t o shift t h e very t e r m s of t h e political c o m p e t i t i o n a g a i n s t t h e m . In fact, com­ p a r e d t o o t h e r d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , s o m u c h h a s b e e n taken off o u r political a g e n d a (cf. IOC 14 n . 22) t h a t o n e m a y b e e x c u s e d for finding A m e r i c a n political d e b a t e s positively d u l l . M o r e o v e r , t h e em­ p h a s i s o n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s l i m i t s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of a t t a i n i n g the k i n d of d e e p e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a g r e e m e n t Rawls e n v i s i o n s i n favor of a g r e e m e n t o n just a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . W e n e e d n o t agree o n the m e r i t s of v a r i o u s d o c t r i n e s b y Kant a n d Sidgwick o r o n t h e m e a n i n g ol f r e e d o m a n d equality b u t only " o n t h e w a y b a s i c social institutions s h o u l d b e a r r a n g e d if t h e y a r e t o c o n f o r m t o t h e f r e e d o m a n d equality of citizens a s m o r a l p e r s o n s " (KCMT 517). Again, it s e e m s that U.S. citizens—sharing a rhetorical c o m m i t m e n t to these values—already agree, b y a n d large, t h a t t h e i r b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n f o r m t o t h o s e values. Still, Rawls m i g h t t h i n k it w o r t h w h i l e t o e x t e n d a n d d e e p e n agree­ m e n t o n how a n d why t h e y s o c o n f o r m , for s u c h d e e p e r a g r e e m e n t w o u l d m a k e t h e c o n s e n s u s a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n s m o r e resilient t o c h a n g ­ ing c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d h e m a y , of c o u r s e , w a n t t o e x t e n d t h e existing 3

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R a w l s may disagree. At least h e seriously c o n s i d e r s (and t h e n d e n i e s ) t h e objection that t h e idea o f a n overlapping c o n s e n s u s i s Utopian." Unfortunately h e leaves this objection a m b i g u o u s — w h a t is s u p p o s e d l y Utopian is "either to bring about an overlap­ p i n g c o n s e n s u s ( w h e n o n e d o e s n o t exist), o r t o r e n d e r o n e stable ( s h o u l d o n e exist)" (IOC 18). And h i s e n s u i n g reply t o t h e o b j e c t i o n i s s o abstract that o n e can't tell w h a t he thinks about t h e political life of the s o c i e t y that i s t h e primary object o f h i s reflections. T h i s is n o t said to criticize Rawls. O n e c a n hardly fault h i s t h e o r y for t h e unexcitingn e s s of its c o n c l u s i o n s , if this is d u e to t h e fact that there is s o little left to d o for t h e sake of justice. I s h o u l d a d d , t h o u g h , that s o m e w o u l d n o t v i e w t h e n a r r o w n e s s of t h e American political d e b a t e a s reflecting a n overlapping c o n s e n s u s b u t w o u l d regard this debate a s c o n d u c t e d a n d controlled by a small elite, w h o s e e to it that m a n y significant i s s u e s never get o n t h e political a g e n d a in t h e 6rst p l a c e . T h e lack of d i s a g r e e m e n t reflects resignation a n d c o n s e q u e n t political apathy, n o t c o n s e n s u s

T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of Justice, 18.2

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overlapping c o n s e n s u s b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g into it some d e m a n d s tradi­ tionally raised b y s e g m e n t s of t h e D e m o c r a t i c party: t h e reform of legal regulations g o v e r n i n g t h e f i n a n c i n g of election campaigns, increased taxation o n t h e i n h e r i t a n c e of large estates, a n d improved educational opportunities for c h i l d r e n b o r n into disadvantaged environments. 18.2. This r a t h e r m a i n s t r e a m p r o g r a m of institutional reform be­ comes a little m o r e d e f i n i t e a n d exciting if o n e thinks through t h e deeper p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s of Rawls's conception. One m a y b e led, in reflecting u p o n t h e first principle, to look beyond the letter of the constitution, i m p o r t a n t legislation, a n d S u p r e m e Court decisions. A high crime r a t e i n u r b a n g h e t t o s may, for example, force the conclusion that their r e s i d e n t s lack a right (in t h e relevant sense) to personal integrity. I h a v e a l s o a r g u e d t h a t involuntary malnutrition a n d h o m e lessness, w h e n a v o i d a b l e , m u s t b e considered injustices of t h e first order of priority, a n d I h a v e d i s c u s s e d other modifications, especially in regard t o h o w R a w l s ' s c o n c e p t i o n s h o u l d treat t h e unemployed, t h e "worse e n d o w e d , " a n d t h o s e suffering from socially produced medical problems. Vet all t h e s e m a t t e r s p a l e i n c o m p a r i s o n to a n inquiry of truly mo­ mentous u r g e n c y a n d i m p o r t a n c e . S u p p o s e Rawls has correctly recon­ structed t h e c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h sincere a n d thoughtful Americans would assess t h e j u s t i c e of social institutions a n d the ideal of a wellordered s o c i e t y t h a t t h e y w o u l d affirm u p o n reflection. Then h o w would s u c h A m e r i c a n s reflect u p o n t h e justice of the prevailing inter­ national i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ; w h a t vision might they form of a wellordered global social s y s t e m ; a n d h o w would they evaluate U.S. foreign Policy insofar a s it will h a v e (and h a s had) any bearing on the structure global i n s t i t u t i o n s ? T h e t h i r d part of this essay is devoted to these 'ssues. / Proceed b y d i s c u s s i n g i n reverse order the international analogues J the two v i e w s of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Rawls's work. Thus I explore m next c h a p t e r w h a t t h e s u b s t a n c e of Rawls's conception ot justice 5

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m i g h t i m p l y for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d o r d e r and of v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e efforts t o w a r d global i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . But before looking at t h e c o n t e n t of s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n of global justice, I try to s h o w that ( a n d w h y ) w e m u s t a c h i e v e a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s upon s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n in t h e first p l a c e . So t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r argues for t h e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e , a n d t h e possibility, of w o r k i n g t o w a r d a n interna­ tional c o m m u n i t y t h a t is w e l l - o r d e r e d , at least in t h e s e n s e of sharing a k e r n e l of political m o r a l i t y t o g e t h e r w i t h a c a t e g o r i c a l allegiance to it. 1 8 . 3 . Let m e b e g i n b y e x p l a i n i n g h o w t h e i d e a l of a well-ordered w o r l d society differs from t h e (broadly H o b b e s i a n ) ideal of a n effective w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t , f e a t u r i n g c e n t r a l m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n and, especially, e n f o r c e m e n t . I n t h e c o u r s e of this e x p l a n a t i o n , I will try to s u p p o r t t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e a b s e n c e of w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t is nor the c e n t r a l p r o b l e m w i t h o u r c u r r e n t global o r d e r , s o l a c k i n g i n p e a c e and justice. T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e s h o u l d b e a w o r l d gov­ e r n m e n t is m i s l e a d i n g . By p r e s e n t i n g t h e i s s u e in stark e i t h e r / o r terms, it reflects a d e e p a n d historically influential m i s t a k e . T h e traditional form of this m i s t a k e m i g h t b e called t h e d o g m a of a b s o l u t e sovereignty, t h e belief t h a t a juridical state (as d i s t i n c t from a l a w l e s s s t a t e of nature) p r e s u p p o s e s a n a u t h o r i t y of last r e s o r t . T h i s v i e w a r i s e s (in H o b b e s a n d Kant, for example) r o u g h l y a s follows. A j u r i d i c a l state, b y definition, involves a r e c o g n i z e d d e c i s i o n m e c h a n i s m t h a t u n i q u e l y resolves any d i s p u t e . This m e c h a n i s m r e q u i r e s s o m e active authority because a m e r e w r i t t e n o r u n w r i t t e n c o d e (a h o l y s c r i p t u r e , set of legal docu­ m e n t s , o r w h a t e v e r ) c a n n o t settle d i s p u t e s a b o u t its o w n interpreta­ tion. A l i m i t e d or d i v i d e d a u t h o r i t y w o u l d n o t d o , h o w e v e r , since conflicts m i g h t a r i s e over t h e p r e c i s e l o c a t i o n of t h e limit o r division. T h e r e m u s t t h e n exist o n e u l t i m a t e , s u p r e m e , a n d u n l i m i t e d authority if civil p e a c e is t o b e p o s s i b l e at all. 6

T h i s d a z z l i n g r e a s o n i n g is n o w safely b u r i e d b e n e a t h t h e historical facts of t h e p a s t t w o h u n d r e d y e a r s , w h i c h s h o w c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t w h a t c a n n o t w o r k in t h e o r y w o r k s q u i t e well in p r a c t i c e . Law-governed societies are p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t a s u p r e m e a n d u n l i m i t e d authority. T h e r e is, it is t r u e , t h e possibility of ultimate conflicts, of d i s p u t e s in w h i c h even t h e legally c o r r e c t m e t h o d of r e s o l u t i o n is c o n t e s t e d . One n e e d o n l y i m a g i n e h o w a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y ' s t h r e e b r a n c h e s of g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t e n g a g e in a n all-out p o w e r struggle, e a c h going to t h e very brink of w h a t , o n its u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a u t h o r i z e d to d o . F r o m a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t of view, t h i s possibility s h o w s t h a t w e are n o t i n s u r e d a g a i n s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l crises, a n d t h u s •This d o g m a — p r e f i g u r e d in Aquinas, Dante, Marsilius, a n d B o d i n — i s m o s t fully f, ! " ? ' leviathan, c h a p s . 1 4 , 2 6 , 2 9 . For Kant's s t a t e m e n t s of it, s e e KPW 75,81, 1 4 4 - 4 5 . T h e d o g m a m a i n t a i n e d its h o l d well i n t o t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , w h e n it d e c l i n e d together w i t h the Austinian c o n c e p t i o n of j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Cf. Marshall, PSC pt. V, Benn a n d Peters, SPDS c h a p s . 3, 12; a n d Hart CL. 8

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live in p e r m a n e n t d a n g e r of t h e m . But this d a n g e r n o longer u n d e r ­ mines o u r c o n f i d e n c e i n a g e n u i n e division of p o w e r s . We have l e a r n e d that such crises n e e d n o t b e f r e q u e n t o r irresolvable. From a practical point of view, w e k n o w t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s can e n d u r e , can ensure a r o b u s t j u r i d i c a l s t a t e . Now all t h i s is h a r d l y s e r i o u s l y in d i s p u t e . What is p e r h a p s n o t generally u n d e r s t o o d is t h a t t h e s a m e p o i n t applies o n t h e "vertical" axis as well. J u s t a s it is n o n s e n s e to s u p p o s e that (in a juridical state) sovereignty m u s t r e s t w i t h o n e of t h e b r a n c h e s of government, it is similarly n o n s e n s i c a l t o t h i n k t h a t in a federalist s c h e m e sovereignty must" rest e i t h e r o n t h e federal level or with t h e m e m b e r states. Making this a s s u m p t i o n , o n e is b o u n d to c o n c l u d e that it m u s t rest on the federal level, for if it r e s t e d w i t h t h e states, t h e n t h e r e w o u l d n ' t b e a federalist s c h e m e a t all. But t h e n t h e a s s u m p t i o n is philosophically unsound, d e s c r i p t i v e l y i n a c c u r a t e of existing federalist c o n s t i t u t i o n s , and (as I will s h o w ) politically d i s a s t r o u s for the p r o s p e c t s of world peace a n d global j u s t i c e . 18.4. O n c e w e d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e traditional concept of sovereignty and leave b e h i n d t h e silly all-or-nothing debates about world govern­ ment, t h e r e e m e r g e s a c l e a r p r e f e r e n c e for an intermediate solution, which p r o v i d e s for s o m e c e n t r a l organs of world government, t h o u g h g a n s t h a t lack a n y u l t i m a t e sovereign p o w e r or authority. It is just such a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n , of course, that we have now, in the form °f some i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w w i t h s o m e m e c h a n i s m s of adjudication a n d enforcement ( s u c h a s t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of Justice a n d the United Nations Security C o u n c i l ) . Admittedly, t h e s e existing institutions have not exactly been sucoessful, a n d o n e m a y well claim that t h e i r failure, even by their o w n standards, m u s t b e e x p l a i n e d b y t h e w e a k n e s s of existing m e c h a n i s m s adjudication a n d e n f o r c e m e n t , that t h e violence a n d injustice per­ vading o u r w o r l d r e s u l t from t h e r e being not enough world govern­ ment. P r o p o n e n t s of t h i s view c a n u s e t h e weakness of international ad­ judication m e c h a n i s m s to explain t h e pervasive ambigmty a n d vague­ ness of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. So l o n g as only a small fraction of in tejjovern"tental d i s p u t e s a r e ever s e t t l e d impartially, there *?f£h * authoritative p r e c e d e n t s , a n d major disagreements about the inter 7

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p r e t a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s will p e r s i s t unresolved. Moreover, s o l o n g as g o v e r n m e n t s c a n p r e s u m e t h a t , in all likelihood, t h e y will b e a b l e to avoid a n a u t h o r i t a t i v e r e b u k e , t h e y will b e tempted to p u t f o r w a r d s u r p r i s i n g ( a n d e v e n l u d i c r o u s ) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of inter­ n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s in justification of t h e i r c o n d u c t . Similarly, o n e c a n u s e t h e w e a k n e s s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l enforcement m e c h a n i s m s t o e x p l a i n d i s r e g a r d of ( a n d c y n i c i s m a b o u t ) international law. So l o n g a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s a r e r a r e l y enforced for t h e i r o w n sake, g o v e r n m e n t s will b e t e m p t e d t o violate, abrogate, or r e i n t e r p r e t t h e m if t h e n e t benefit of d o i n g s o is c o n s i d e r a b l e . This t e n d e n c y will affect even g o v e r n m e n t s s t r o n g l y c o m m i t t e d t o t h e ideal of a l a w - g o v e m e d w o r l d o r d e r . W i t h o u t a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r govern­ m e n t s will fulfill t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s , t h e y c a n n o t find it e i t h e r r e s p o n s i b l e o r m o r a l l y r e q u i s i t e t h a t t h e y a l o n e s h o u l d make m a j o r u n i l a t e r a l sacrifices for t h e s a k e of l a w . T h o u g h t h e r e is s o m e t r u t h i n s u c h (essentially H o b b e s i a n ) accounts, I d o n o t t h i n k t h e y get t o t h e h e a r t of t h e p r o b l e m . O u r global institu­ tional o r d e r is s h a p e d b y i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d , more i m p o r t a n t , b y g o v e r n m e n t p r a c t i c e a n d a c q u i e s c e n c e — a l l of w h i c h are b a s e d o n p r u d e n t i a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n f o r m e d b y t h e c u r r e n t distribution of p o w e r . I n s u c h a n e n v i r o n m e n t , s t a t e s m e n a n d c i t i z e n s a r e left w i t h o u t a morai' r e a s o n for w a n t i n g t h e i r s t a t e t o s u p p o r t t h i s order, w h i c h is s e e n a s m e r e l y t h e crystallization of t h e m o m e n t a r y b a l a n c e of p o w e r . I w o u l d like t o e x p l o r e t h e possibility t h a t t h i s fact a b o u t inter­ n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , if it a n i m a t e s t h e d o m i n a n t a t t i t u d e t o w a r d them, is t h e c a r d i n a l o b s t a c l e b l o c k i n g m o r a l p r o g r e s s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs. In suggesting this hypothesis as a n alternative to Hobbesian accounts, I d o n ' t m e a n to i m p l y t h a t s t r o n g e r p r u d e n t i a l r e s t r a i n t s w o u l d n ' t b e a g o o d thing, o n l y t h a t t h e y will b e difficult t o e s t a b l i s h w i t h o u t c h a n g i n g this d o m i n a n t a t t i t u d e . M y h o p e is t h e n t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e next section, if it c o u l d b e fully w o r k e d out, w o u l d offer a d e e p e r u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of o u r p r e d i c a m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a n e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y p r o g r e s s t o w a r d m o r e effective c e n t r a l m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d en­ forcement has b e e n so elusive. 3

19. International R e l a t i o n s a s a M o d u s Vivendi 1 9 . 1 . I n p r o v i d i n g a b a s i c analysis of t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m a s it a r i s e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , m y objective is twofold, w a n t t o suggest a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n of w h a t is p l a i n l y m o r a l l y objec­ tionable i n t h e p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r , a n d I w a n t t o s h o w , partly T h e analysis to b e s k e t c h e d is i n t e n d e d to fit w i t h t h e c o n t r a s t Rawls develops (in I O O b e t w e e n t w o m o d e l s of institutionalized c o e x i s t e n c e . I d o n o t claim, however, that Ra h a s t h o u g h t about or w o u l d a p p r o v e m y e x t e n s i o n of t h i s c o n t r a s t t o i n t e m a t i o n relations.

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on the basis of t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , w h y it is of s u c h critical i m p o r t a n c e t o achieve a global o r d e r t h a t e m b o d i e s s h a r e d values. In the H o b b e s i a n d i m e n s i o n of p r o g r e s s , a first step bayonet u n ­ limited and u n i v e r s a l w a r is a n e l e m e n t of coordinated self-restrainr TWo parties ( p e r s o n s , t r i b e s , s t a t e s , o r whatever) u n d e r s t a n d th*t e a c n of them is r e s t r a i n i n g itself i n s o m e w a y in o r d e r to elicit ^ " r o cal self-restraint from t h e o t h e r s i d e . S u c h a m u t u a l ^ ™ need not b e explicit, n o r d o e s it r e q u i r e a n y value ™ / ™ tual assurance c a n r e s t e n t i r e l y u p o n e a c h party's WP™ * ™™^™ other party—given its i n t e r e s t s , capabilities, a n d situation "rational to d e s t r o y t h e a r r a n g e m e n t . . The Hobbesian Lai is a n e x t e n s i o n of this m o d e • Peace ^ o be achieved b y i n a u g u r a t i n g a m o d e of coexistence tofcon perpetuates itself b y e n s u r i n g t h a t e a c h p a r t y h a s sw p ^ ^ . to participate s o l o n g a s m o s t o t h e r s are p a r t i c i p a ^ ably, large-scale a r r a n g e m e n t s of this sort a r e too co y ^ but no m a t t e r h o w c o m p l e x , t h e m o d e l is s u p p o s e u ^ ^ shared values. E a c h p a r t y ' s c o n t i n u e d participation is the plain fact t h a t it w o u l d b e foolish t o quit. ^ explicit) When t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g p a r t i e s c e n t e r a r o u n ^ ., agreements a l o n g t h i s H o b b e s i a n axis—from i hensive, and transitory b i l a t e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t o t h e i z e their corobust, a n d e n d u r i n g u n i v e r s a l a c c o r d — w e c a n ^ ^ existence a s a modus vivendi. Let m e develop i n . l v motivated by their The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a m o d u s vivendi are p r i m J pothers own self-defined i n t e r e s t s a n d d o not m u c h cat ^i^iona! "iterests as s u c h . Yet e a c h h a s r e a s o n to s u p p ° c t i c e s and s c h e m e - t h a t is, a s y s t e m of r u l e s a n d conv ^ t Procedures, o r g a n s a n d o f f i c e s - t h a t accornm ^ ^ other parties t o t h e p o i n t w e r e t h e y find it « . agreePaticipate a s w e l l . O n t h e surface, a m ° ™ e t i t i v e behavior f ent a m o n g a p l u r a l i t y of p a r t i e s t o restrain the ^ continued * certain w a y s S i n c e t h e s c h e m e is t o b e scheme Participation is i n e a c h p a r t y ' s b e s t interes , tn ^ , t be >«ust satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n of P ™ * " " ^ " " the going t e r n * _ » * that aU p a r t i e s h a v e r e a s o n to' P « f as a c c e p t a b l e ^ o w Whether a given p a r t y , P, views t h e ^ ^ as P's ^ r , d e p e n d s u p o n a n u m b e r of ^ ^ of power ^erests and, most important, the g e n e ^ t r t at »J ^ e c t s P's v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a n d o p p o r * ^ d i t i o n is then S U D Which t e r m s satisfy t h e p r u d e n t i a l power h a , * * to f l u c t u a t i o n . S u p p o s e , for example- h a t ^ , bre that P n o w h a s m o r e t o gain a n d less s

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d o w n of o r d e r l y r e l a t i o n s . It m a y t h e n b e p r u d e n t for P t o press for m o r e favorable t e r m s , a n d o t h e r g r o u p s will p r u d e n t l y a c c e d e to P's d e m a n d , w e a k e n e d g r o u p s b e i n g o b l i g e d t o a c c e p t less favorable terms b e c a u s e of t h e i r i n c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y o r d e c r e a s e d t h r e a t advantage. If a m o d u s vivendi is to e n d u r e , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d burdens m a y t h e n h a v e to b e a d j u s t e d s o t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n t i n u e s to be each p a r t y ' s rationally p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y g e n e r a t e s , below the surface, a c o m p e t i t i o n over t h e terms of t h e m o d u s vivendi, a n d this c o m p e t i t i o n is n o t r e s t r a i n e d at all. T h e r e is n o limit t o h o w weak a p a r t y m a y b e c o m e t h r o u g h shifts i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r (com­ p o u n d e d by shifts in t h e t e r m s of t h e m o d u s vivendi), a n d t h e r e is no limit t o w h a t a w e a k p a r t y m a y p r u d e n t l y a c q u i e s c e i n w i t h i n a modus vivendi, in p r e f e r e n c e to q u i t t i n g . C o n t r a r y t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , it m a y s e e m t h a t t h e r e is a limit t o such shifts. T h e t e r m s of a m o d u s vivendi m u s t at l e a s t b e m u t u a l l y advan­ t a g e o u s in t h e s e n s e t h a t e a c h p a r t y d e r i v e s a n e t benefit from par­ ticipation a s c o m p a r e d t o total isolation. But t h i s is n o t s o . H o w well off a p a r t y w o u l d b e in s p l e n d i d isolation is i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e bargaining e q u i l i b r i u m if t h i s p a r t y c a n n o t s e c u r e s u c h i s o l a t i o n for itself. Even w h e n a c c e p t i n g t r i b u t a r y s t a t u s i n a m o d u s v i v e n d i is clearly less attractive t h a n isolation, it m a y still b e t h e p r u d e n t t h i n g to d o when t h e e x p e c t e d alternative is n o t isolation b u t a t t a c k a n d e n s l a v e m e n t , for example. 11

1 9 . 2 . T h e great virtue of a m o d u s vivendi is t h a t it c a n work, can p r e v e n t all-out war, even a m o n g p a r t i e s w h o h a v e n o faith in one a n o t h e r a n d believe t h e y h a v e n o t h i n g in c o m m o n b y w a y of shared values. In o r d e r t o a s s u r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s c o n t i n u e d c o m p l i a n c e , the p a r t i e s n e e d only c o n t i n u a l l y a d j u s t t h e g r o u n d r u l e s g o v e r n i n g their i n t e r a c t i o n s so t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m p l i a n c e c o n t i n u e t o b e each p a r t y s preferred o p t i o n . In a n o n - c o n s t a n t - s u m w o r l d , o r d e r l y coexis1S

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power reinforces a n d is r e i n f o r c e d by a deterioration in t h e t e r m s of its participation. If it a n t i c i p a t e s s u c h a t r e n d , it m a y prefer to fight n o w rather t h a n await a f u r t h e r d e c l i n e in its p o w e r . O r if o t h e r s s u s p e c t that this might b e i t s e v a l u a t i o n , t h e y m a y find it p r u d e n t t o p r e e m p t by attacking it first. S u c h d i s t u r b a n c e s c a n lead to a partial o r c o m p l e t e breakdown of o r d e r e d r e l a t i o n s . A n d even if the m o d u s vivendi sur­ vives, s o m e of its p a r t i c i p a n t s m a y n o t (or m a y see their freedom a n d values d e s t r o y e d ) . T h e r e i s n o lasting p r o t e c t i o n against even t h e very worst o u t c o m e s . Therefore, v a l u e s , h o w e v e r d e e p l y held, will have only a marginal impact u p o n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' c o n d u c t a n d (through this) u p o n t h e terms of t h e m o d u s vivendi. Since t h e parties are fearful of o n e another, each will g i p r e c e d e n c e t o its survival a n d to the long-term security of its values over t h e i r s h o r t - t e r m instantiation. No party is likely to im­ pose s e r i o u s e t h i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n its pursuit of p o w e r t h r o u g h which a l o n e it c a n h o p e t o survive a n d (ultimately) prevail. And e a c h will want t o prevail so a s t o e r a d i c a t e t h e threat from others, w h o m u s t be s u s p e c t e d of w a n t i n g t o prevail for just this reason. Let me illustrate e a c h p a r r y ' s r e a s o n i n g with a hypothetical train of thought: O t h e r s m a y b e s e e k i n g to shift t h e balance of p o w e r against us, w in t h e l o n g r u n , m i g h t e n a b l e t h e m t o eradicate us or o u r values altogether. W e c a n n o t e l i m i n a t e this d a n g e r for t h e time being. T h u s °ur best c o u n t e r s t r a t e g y for n o w consists in trying, within a m o d u s vivendi framework, t o s t e m a n v a d v a n c e s on their part a n d to weaken their p o s i t i o n . Since t h i s is a m a t t e r of survival, we m u s t not constrain these efforts b y o u r v a l u e s , for if w e d o , w e will b e c o m p e t i n g at a disadvantage. T h e y will certainly n o t constrain their c o n d u c t by o u r ^ u e s , a n d s i n c e t h e y a r e fearful (and p e r h a p s bent u p o n prevailing/, they a r e unlikely t o c o n s t r a i n it even b y their o w n values. In this situation, we m u s t n o t e n d a n g e r o u r survival a n d that of our values by t h e s e v a l u e s to h a m p e r o u r efforts to block a n d neutralize the threat from o t h e r s I c o n c l u d e t h a t r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n a m o d u s vivendi will b e neither Peaceful n o r j u s t . T h e l o n g - t e r m d a n g e r s to which a m o d u s vwench eposes its p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e b o u n d l e s s a n d p e r m a n e n t , d e m a n d i n g fiexr p e r s i s t e n t a n d u t m o s t vigilance; t h e competition over t h e chs n b u t i o n of p o w e r a n d over t h e t e r m s of association will ™ ° ^ Moreover, e v e n if t h e p a r t i e s t o a m o d u s vivendi have d e e p a n c s i m e r e ^ u e c o m m i t m e n t s , ft is likely that their values vvill n * » ^ J g ^ n j n t i m p a c t u p o n t h e i r e x t e r / a l c o n d u c t , will f ^ ^ Z t n Z ^ e i r d e c i s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e or in their efforts to ^ °f t h e s c h e m e . S i n c e e a c h participant cares P ^ ^ f j Z S c Position, t h e t e r m s of a m o d u s vivendi will ^ ^ ^ ^ Z > v bargaining e q u i l i b r i u m w h i c h - b a s e d u p « J ^ P ^ J ? hey may v e

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violate a n y ethical c o n c e p t i o n ( u n l e s s t h e belief i n " t h e right of the s t r o n g e r " c o u n t s as o n e s u c h c o n c e p t i o n ) . 1 9 . 3 . Let m e t r y t o b r i n g t h e s e a b s t r a c t o b s e r v a t i o n s t o b e a r upon i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . H e r e t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p a r t of m y a c c o u n t cen­ t e r s a r o u n d t w o h y p o t h e s e s : c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are in e s s e n c e a m o d u s vivendi, a n d t h e chief r e a s o n w h y i n t e r n a t i o n a l in­ s t i t u t i o n s a r e so m u c h less successful t h a n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of welle s t a b l i s h e d n a t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s is t h a t t h e l a t t e r e n s h r i n e s h a r e d values (and not that they include m o r e central government). I n a p p l y i n g t h e m o d u s - v i v e n d i m o d e l t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations, I t a k e for g r a n t e d a global b a c k g r o u n d c o n v e n t i o n . T h e l a n d of t h e world is d i v i d e d u p i n t o clearly d e m a r c a t e d t e r r i t o r i e s . E a c h t e r r i t o r y h a s one g o v e r n m e n t , t h e p e r s o n o r g r o u p w i e l d i n g o v e r w h e l m i n g p o w e r (ul­ timately, c o n t r o l l i n g irresistible m e a n s of c o e r c i o n ) w i t h i n t h e territory, a n d e a c h g o v e r n m e n t is r e c o g n i z e d b y o t h e r s a s h a v i n g full jurisdiction over all p e r s o n s a n d r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n its d o m a i n . Given t h i s back­ g r o u n d c o n v e n t i o n , t h e a c t o r s s h a p i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are, first a n d foremost, governments, a n d m y h y p o t h e s i s p o s t u l a t e s t h e n an intergovernmental m o d u s vivendi. My first h y p o t h e s i s c a n n o w b e s t a t e d , m o r e specifically, a s follows. G o v e r n m e n t s a r e e n g a g e d in a c o m p e t i t i o n t h a t is r e g u l a t e d b y what­ ever i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e m a i n a d v e r s a r i e s find it a d v a n t a g e o u s t o agree u p o n o r t o a c q u i e s c e in from t i m e t o t i m e . Yet t h e y a l s o s e e t h e i r rivalry, o n a d e e p e r level, as unlimited. No society's values, i n s t i t u t i o n s , o r way of life a r e b e y o n d t h e t h r e a t of violent s u b v e r s i o n b y e x i s t i n g e n e m i e s o u t s i d e t h e n a t i o n a l territory. At b o t t o m , i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are a struggle t o t h e d e a t h . T h a t t h e y are p r o v i d e s at l e a s t a p a r t i a l explana­ tion of t h e a b s e n c e of p e a c e a n d j u s t i c e i n t h e w o r l d t o d a y , a n e x p l a n a ­ tion t h a t , in p a r t i c u l a r , n e e d m a k e n o reference t o t h e content of the values affirmed b y t h e c o m p e t i n g g o v e r n m e n t s . I c a n n o t h e r e provide t h e d e t a i l e d political analysis t h a t m i g h t d e f e n d m y first h y p o t h e s i s but m u s t settle for a brief illustrative o u t l i n e . 1 9 . 3 . 1 . T h e m o d u s - v i v e n d i analysis of t h e s t a t u s q u o e x p l a i n s the a b s e n c e of g e n u i n e p e a c e b y viewing u s as t r a p p e d in a vicious cycle. T h e very fact t h a t g o v e r n m e n t s fear a n d d i s t r u s t o n e a n o t h e r gives t h e m g o o d r e a s o n for s u c h fear a n d d i s t r u s t . T h e r e a r e n o realistic p r o s p e c t s of e s t a b l i s h i n g p e a c e t h r o u g h a w o r l d s t a t e , b e c a u s e n o n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t c a n c o m e to rule t h e w o r l d w i t h o u t a global war, a n d t h e s t r o n g e s t g o v e r n m e n t s w o n ' t allow t h e c r e a t i o n of i n d e p e n ­ d e n t effective m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t Given t h e i r a v e r s e n e s s t o risk (their g r e a t e r c o n c e r n for surviving t h a n for prevailing), it w o u l d b e irrational to a c c e p t powerful o r g a n s of w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h , a l t h o u g h d e s i g n e d to c u r b e a c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o w e r , c o u l d affect its s e c u r i t y in e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n . T h i s is t r u e i n a w o r l d of c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s , a n d it is e v e n m o r e t r u e in a w o r l d of d i s p a r a t e values, in w h i c h e a c h g o v e r n m e n t m u s t fear t h a t c e n t r a l

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T h i s d o m i n a n t a t t i t u d e e n g e n d e r s w a r s a s g o v e r n m e n t s exploit per­ c e i v e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o g a i n t h r o u g h (illegal) a g g r e s s i o n , t h r o u g h pre­ e m p t i n g s u p p o s e d l y i m p e n d i n g (illegal) a g g r e s s i o n s , o r t h r o u g h pun­ i s h i n g s u p p o s e d violations of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s o r t r e a t i e s . T h e ground r u l e s of a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s v i v e n d i c a n t h e r e f o r e furnish only w e a k p r u d e n t i a l r e s t r a i n t s u p o n g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t . T h e i r infringe­ m e n t o r a b r o g a t i o n is c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e likely t h a n significant viola­ t i o n s of d o m e s t i c g r o u n d r u l e s , w h i c h a r e b a c k e d b y s h a r e d ultimate values (and m o r e effective s a n c t i o n s ) . Moreover, t h i s a t t i t u d e fosters a p e r m a n e n t c l i m a t e of t e n s i o n and insecurity, a s g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t a l w a y s r e c k o n w i t h n o n c o m p l i a n c e b y o t h e r s a n d t h u s c a n n e v e r t a k e full a d v a n t a g e of t h e freedom of a c t i o n t h e y m i g h t h a v e if a d h e r e n c e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d treaties c o u l d b e t a k e n for g r a n t e d . No d e c l a r a t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y , p e a c e treaty, m u t u a l - d e f e n s e alliance, o r n o n a g g r e s s i o n p a c t , for e x a m p l e , can re­ lieve a g o v e r n m e n t of t h e fear of f i n d i n g itself a l o n e i n t h e face of a foreign military a t t a c k . 1 9 . 3 . 3 . T h e e n d u r i n g c l i m a t e of i n s e c u r i t y a n d hostility is aggravated b y t w o a d d i t i o n a l t e n d e n c i e s . First, t h e (bargaining) p o w e r of govern­ m e n t s w i t h i n a m o d u s - v i v e n d i f r a m e w o r k is m a i n l y a f u n c t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of military s t r e n g t h (roughly, t h e c o m p a r a t i v e u n a c c e p tability of war), w i t h economic s t r e n g t h p l a y i n g a n i m p o r t a n t — p a r t l y subsidiary, p a r t l y i n d e p e n d e n t — r o l e . Any g o v e r n m e n t w h o s e military s t r e n g t h is g r e a t e r t h a n its e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h ( e a c h relative t o other g o v e r n m e n t s ) enjoys i n c r e a s e d b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r d u r i n g p e r i o d s of h e i g h t e n e d t e n s i o n b e c a u s e of t h e g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e of military (in c o m p a r i s o n t o e c o n o m i c ) s t r e n g t h . A p e r i o d of crisis, for example, m a k e s it e a s i e r for a military giant to exact c o n c e s s i o n s from a n eco­ n o m i c a l l y s t r o n g b u t militarily w e a k ally. Of c o u r s e , g o v e r n m e n t s w h o s e relative e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h is g r e a t e r t h a n t h e i r relative military s t r e n g t h m a y m u c h prefer a m o r e r e l a x e d global e n v i r o n m e n t , b u t their 14

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" T h e d o m i n a n t attitude of g o v e r n m e n t s toward international l a w s a n d treaties is then, o n m y h y p o t h e s i s , like t h e prevalent d o m e s t i c attitude t o w a r d parking regulations, international a g r e e m e n t s are treated as moralized rules in g o v e r n m e n t rhetoric, but as u n m o r a l i z e d rules m g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t , it i generally t h o u g h t a c c e p t a b l e that deci­ s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e s h o u l d b e b a s e d o n a self-interested calculation of (probabilityw e i g h t e d ) c o s t s a n d benefits. T h i s claim is evidently c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e fact that many treaties (covering copyrights, patents, postal cooperation, a n d s u c h like) are rarely or n e v e r violated. In t h e s e matters the strains of c o m m i t m e n t are m i n i m a l , a n d weak prudential restraints are therefore fully sufficient. (Moreover, t h e s e treaties w o u l d s e e m to b e t o o marginal in a n y c a s e to qualify as being part of the global basic structure.) s

" E v e n w h i t e it is u n d e r s t o o d that any government will break a n y international law or treaty w h e n t h e n e t benefit of d o i n g s o ,s substantial, s u c h g r o u n d r u l e s c a n still have great value. T h e y serve to c o o r d i n a t e expectations and to make certain future e v e n t s less likely a n d l e s s f r e q u e n t In this role international laws a n d treaties h e l p k e e p t h e ongoing m o d u s v i v e n d . in equilibrium. I s h o u l d a d d that I a m h e r e a d d r e s s i n g t h e current global institutional framework^ In s o m e local contexts, s u c h as Western E u r o p e , international relations are b e g i n n i n g to acquire a value-based character. H

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preference is of little m o m e n t insofar a s it is very m u c h easier to a u g m e n t t h a n t o r e d u c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension. Second, t h e t e n d e n c y t o w a r d t e n s i o n is further s t r e n g t h e n e d by each g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n t e r e s t in i n c r e a s i n g its s u p p o r t from its o w n population, w h i c h will e n h a n c e its international bargaining p o w e r . Vilifying o p p o n e n t s a n d i n d u c i n g crises is o n e m e t h o d of increasing d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t , exploiting t h e p r e d i c t a b l e t e n d e n c y of p o p u l a t i o n s "to rally a r o u n d t h e flag" in r e s p o n s e to a h e i g h t e n e d s e n s e of insecu­ rity. Obviously, a g o v e r n m e n t m a y b e t e m p t e d to e m p l o y s u c h m e t h o d s in t h e i n t e r e s t of less p a t r i o t i c p u r p o s e s as w e l l — t o i m p r o v e its c h a n c e s for r e e l e c t i o n p e r h a p s , or to consolidate its position at h o m e . Though t h e m o t i v e s for fueling s u c h crises arise domestically, the opportunity t o d o s o d e p e n d s o n t h e hostility e n d e m i c t o c u r r e n t international r e l a t i o n s . 19.3.4. In a m o d u s vivendi a m o n g hostile p o w e r s , t h e p r e s s u r e s toward s t r a t e g i c (amoral) g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t are overwhelming. Even if s o m e s t a t e s m a n s e e s himself as c o m m i t t e d to his nation's values a n d as c o m p e t i n g w i t h o t h e r s (partly) in behalf of t h e s e values, h e c a n n o t allow himself t o b e s e r i o u s l y h a m p e r e d by these values in t h e c o m p e t i ­ tion. He m u s t leave s u c h values b e h i n d w h e n h e e n t e r s t h e foreignpolicy a r e n a , w h e r e surviving a n d prevailing ("national security") take p r e c e d e n c e o v e r all else. T h u s values are unlikely t o play m u c h of a g e n u i n e (as o p p o s e d to a propagandistic) role in t h e c o n d u c t of foreign policy a n d i n t h e e m e r g e n c e of international institutions (through explicit o r tacit bargaining). This a c c o u n t e x p l a i n s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e prevailing disregard for the p o o r e s t a n d strategically least significant societies a n d regions. No g o v e r n m e n t will s h o w m u c h unilateral c o n c e r n for foreigners, for s u c h c o n c e r n t e n d s t o w e a k e n its o w n bargaining position. Moreover, gov­ e r n m e n t s a r e unlikely t o agree to i n c o r p o r a t e s u c h c o n c e r n into t h e s h a r e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e — b e i n g risk-averse, each will be reluctant to a c c e p t e v e n a d i s t r i b u t i o n of b u r d e n s that s e e m s to weaken itself n o more t h a n it w e a k e n s its relevant c o m p e t i t o r s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h i s a c c o u n t also explains two p r o m i n e n t aspects of the t e r m s of a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi: First, t h e s e t e r m s t e n d to e m b o d y little c o n c e r n for h o w p e r s o n s are treated within.their own society. E a c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s interest in controlling s o m e p a ^ a r m a t t e r w i t h i n its o w n territory normally vastly outweighs its; .uteres in influencing h o w t h e s a m e m a t t e r is dealt w i t h abroadL P e r h a p M h e value c o m m i t m e n t s o n all sides w o u l d favor clear, ™ ™ ^ p e n i s e d r u l e s a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a b u s e , but since it is " " P ^ ' ™ h o w s u c h r u l e s w o u l d affect t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e i , ™k^ave«e P ^ r s a m unlikely t o c r e a t e effective, i n d e p e n d e n t ^ ^ " r ^ r a l thoritative a p p l i c a t i o n of s u c h rules, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i sacrifices for h u m a n n e e d s a n d welfare. U n d e r the e x i g e n c e s ot com I

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petition, g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t b e e x t r e m e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h their own a n d t h e i r allies' i n t e r n a t i o n a l (bargaining) p o w e r , w h i c h d e p e n d s to a significant e x t e n t u p o n t h e i r s t r e n g t h at h o m e . T h e y m a y t h e n have to u s e — a n d s u p p o r t t h e i r allies w h e n t h e y u s e — r e p r e s s i v e measures ( s u c h a s secrecy, d i s i n f o r m a t i o n , s u r v e i l l a n c e , infiltration, intimidation, a n d worse) t o stifle d o m e s t i c d i s s e n t a n d t o m a x i m i z e d o m e s t i c con­ trol. S e c o n d , t h e t e r m s of a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi are likely t o i n c l u d e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t e a c h g r e a t p o w e r h a s special claims t o r e g i o n s t h a t a r e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y o r e c o n o m i c a l l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t to its s e c u r i t y t h a n t o t h a t of a n y o t h e r g r e a t p o w e r . W i t h i n its s p h e r e of influence ( " h e m i s p h e r e " ) , a great p o w e r m a y o p e r a t e w i t h o u t serious i n t e r f e r e n c e from o t h e r great p o w e r s . It m a y force w e a k states to c h a n g e t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t o r political s y s t e m ; t o " r e q u e s t " o r a c c e p t its military b a s e s a n d advisers (even invasion); t o o p e n t h e i r d o o r s for its e x p o r t s , its c r e d i t s , a n d its a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s a n d p r o d u c ­ tive facilities; a n d s o forth. S u c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g is, again, mutually a d v a n t a g e o u s for risk-averse p l a y e r s . 1 9 . 4 . T h i s c o n c l u d e s m y o u t l i n e of h o w s o m e of t h e less appealing f e a t u r e s of o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d m i g h t b e e x p l a i n a b l e , i n part, in t e r m s of t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c t o a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s - v i v e n d i framework. Even if t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s a r e n o t a l w a y s s t r o n g o r d o m i n a n t , t h e y d o a d d u p t o a firm e x p e c t a t i o n r e g a r d i n g a global o r d e r that p r i m a r i l y reflects t h e c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s of, a n d b a r g a i n s a m o n g , deeply h o s t i l e g o v e r n m e n t s : So long a s t h i s o r d e r p e r s i s t s , o u r w o r l d will b e p e r v a d e d b y violence (and t h e t h r e a t a n d d a n g e r of violence), political r e p r e s s i o n , a n d e x t r e m e poverty of strategically w o r t h l e s s p o p u l a t i o n s . T h i s is n o t t o d e n y t h a t v a l u e s s o m e t i m e s d o h a v e a r e a l i m p a c t u p o n foreign policy a n d u p o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (over a n d above their p r o p a g a n d i s t i c e m p l o y m e n t t o justify self-interested c o n d u c t ) . It is e n o u g h t h a t t h e s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n is a p p r o x i m a t e l y t r u e , t h a t t h e c u r r e n t m o d e of c o e x i s t e n c e is essentially a m o d u s vivendi, t h a t it e n g e n d e r s r o u g h l y t h e t e n d e n c i e s I have o u t l i n e d , a n d t h a t t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s a c c o u n t for a g o o d deal of c u r r e n t h u m a n m i s e r y . A n d this m i s e r y is significant. U p t o one-fifth of h u m a n k i n d s p e n d t h e i r e n t i r e hyes , n p o v e r t y a n d o n t h e e d g e of s t a r v a t i o n - p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o t e n t , m a l n o u r i s h e d , a n d w i t h o u t reserves for t h e e v e n t of even a m i n o r n a t u r a l o r social m i s f o r t u n e . Millions of c h i l d r e n d i e every y e a r from m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d e a s d y c u r a b l e d i s e a s e s - t h e vast majority of t h e m u n d e r e v e r y d a y c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e m i d s t of p l e n t y r a t h e r t h a n i n 1 6

17

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O n e m a y b e obliged to s u p p o r t brutal allies w h e n t h p v « , i „ K . . . . t o t h e p o s i t i o n by b e c o m i n g less tractable or b y s w i t c h i n g s f c W ™ s e damage one s tyrants have b e e n quite a d e p t at expoiting this fact ° T h e s e m e t h o d s , a s well, g o v e r n m e n t s will be t e m p t e d t o enrol • patriotic, p u r e l y d o m e s t i c p u r p o s e s , a n d again, their ornmH,.^^" ! i n t e r e s t of l e s s t h e hostility a n d insecurity e n d e m i c t o current international regions ° °" m

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well-publicized f a m i n e s . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , roughly a trillion dollars a r e spent a n n u a l l y o n " d e f e n s e " w o r l d w i d e , o n a t t e m p t s to shift o r p r e ­ serve t h e existing d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r . T h r o u g h t h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n , further m i l l i o n s of p e r s o n s a r e t r a p p e d in wars, civil wars, a n d c a m ­ paigns of r e p r e s s i o n a n d i n s u r r e c t i o n (often incited a n d a b e t t e d by third parties), w i t h t h e i r m e t h o d i c a l massacres, d e s t r o y e d h o m e s a n d livelihoods, o r g a n i z e d starvation, torture, rapes, a n d d i s a p p e a r a n c e s . Such h o r r o r s a r e t o o pervasive to b e explained, ultimately, b y refer­ ence t o p o w e r f u l a c t o r s w h o h a v e perverse values o r n o n e a t all. Rather, I submit, t h e y a r e in large p a r t e n g e n d e r e d by t h e reigning m o d u s vivendi f r a m e w o r k , w i t h i n w h i c h t h e fear for one's security a n d t h a t of one's values is p a r a m o u n t . T h i s is n o t t o d e n y that a g o o d n u m b e r of powerful a c t o r s a r e evil, b u t w e c a n n o t , I think, explain t h e p r o m i n e n c e and s u c c e s s of s u c h a c t o r s w i t h o u t reference to t h e c u r r e n t inter­ g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi, in w h i c h they have a n excellent c h a n c e to receive r e c o g n i t i o n a n d s u p p o r t in t h e n a m e of s o m e national inter­ est, a n d in w h i c h c o n c e r t e d action against t h e m is highly unlikely.

20. A V a l u e - B a s e d World Order

If the analysis of current international relations as an inter­ governmental modus vivendi could b e successfully completed, it would provide a systemic explanation of the sordid realities just sketched. Now it might be thought that such an explanation tends to condone prevalent government conduct, and thus lets statesmen off the hook too easily. But this need not be so. For suppose there is another kind of institutional scheme, feasible on a global scale, that would not engender the violence and injustice endemic to our modusvivendi framework. Then the account I have sketched would merelv reconceive the political task and responsibilities. We must transcend the prevailing modus vivendi and aim to establish that superior form of institutional scheme. We have seen how the modus-vrvendj m o d e l contrasts, on the one hand, with the total absence of restraints, as m a state of unlimited war though a modus vivendi is surely compatible with limited violence, excluding certain times, targets, or methods in warfare). I will now explore how this model contrasts, o n the other hand, with another conception of mutual accommodation-envisaging another way for a shared institutional scheme to emerge and be sustained even while its Participants have divergent interests and values. S e ^ S d S a is to * * * insUtutions that are based not upon free bargalnmg^^ ofpower but upon s o S ^ ^ m B ^ ^ ^ - " ° "ot exist if aTl oartlTpants seek secunry orrfeach wants its religion or form of regimetoS * " *" ^ " about 1

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whose s e c u r i t y o r which religion (form of r e g i m e l t h e y c a r e for. Nor can w e s p e a k of s n a r e d v a l u e s w h e n t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a c o m m o n i n t e r e s t in p e a c e , for e x a m p l e — t h a t is instrumental t o t h e i r d i s p a r a t e deeper c o m m i t m e n t s a n d p r o j e c t s . T h e y are t h e n n o t c o m m i t t e d to peace as s u c h . E a c h merely, for its o w n r e a s o n s , p r e f e r s p e a c e u n d e r current c o n d i t i o n s . So t h e i r c o e x i s t e n c e is still a m o d u s vivendi, b e c a u s e they d o n o t s h a r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s u l t i m a t e v a l u e s , w h i c h in a different context m i g h t l e a d t h e m t o w a r . An i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is v a l u e - b a s e d only if its p a r t i c i p a n t s h o l d in c o m m o n s o m e i m p o r t a n t ultimate values (in­ c l u d i n g s o m e p r i n c i p l e s for b a l a n c i n g o r o r d e r i n g t h e m ) t h a t are signif­ icantly e m b o d i e d in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s . 2 0 . 2 . It m a y s e e m t h a t s u c h r e l i a n c e o n s h a r e d v a l u e s p r e s u p p o s e s a s h a r e d v a l u e s y s t e m , s u c h a s C a t h o l i c i s m in t h e M i d d l e Ages, a n d that in a w o r l d of diverse f u n d a m e n t a l o u t l o o k s a p p e a l t o values c a n only be divisive. But t h i s objection is b a s e d u p o n a false d i c h o t o m y . W e need n o t envision for t h e w o r l d w h a t is lacking in every n a t i o n a l society, namely, a comprehensive a g r e e m e n t o n v a l u e s (cf. IOC 14-15). Instead, w e c a n start from w h a t w e a l r e a d y h a v e , a w o r l d in w h i c h some values are s h a r e d . O u r p r i m a r y p r e d i c a m e n t is n o t t h a t t h e r e is n o value overlap, o r e v e n t h a t t h e r e is t o o little, b u t t h a t e v e n t h o s e c o r e values t h a t a r e w i d e l y s h a r e d p l a y t o o m a r g i n a l a role in t h e d e s i g n of interna­ t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d in t h e c o n d u c t of foreign policy (including the prevailing a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d existing i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s ) . Moreover, s h a r e d values n e e d n o t b e all-pervasive. In a national society r e s o u r c e s m a y b e a l l o c a t e d t o t h e h i g h e s t b i d d e r , a n d many legislative i s s u e s m a y b e d e c i d e d by self-interested b a r g a i n i n g (logroll­ i n g a n d s o o n ) . Still, i n a well-governed s o c i e t y some m a t t e r s a r e n o n n e gotiable—for e x a m p l e , t h a t n o n e will b e slaves o r b e left to starve and, in particular, t h a t t h e b a s i c t e r m s of t h e political c o m p e t i t i o n m a y not b e shifted against t h o s e w h o s e s t r e n g t h d e c l i n e s . T h e s e m a t t e r s are p r o t e c t e d n o t by a n e n d u r i n g majority preference b u t b y t h e citizens' s e n s e of justice, w h i c h h e r e s u p e r s e d e s t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . In the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , b y c o n t r a s t , t h e d o m i n a n t a s s u m p t i o n — a n d wellg r o u n d e d f e a r — i s t h a t everything is negotiable, t h a t a n y l a w , treaty, c h a r t e r , o r d e c l a r a t i o n m a y b e " r e i n t e r p r e t e d , " violated, r e n e g o t i a t e d , a b r o g a t e d , a b a n d o n e d , or simply forgotten. T h e p r o g r e s s I envision begins, t h e n , from s o m e c o n s e n s u s o n val­ u e s , h o w e v e r n a r r o w , t h a t allows t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of institutional fixed p o i n t s t h a t s t a n d a b o v e o r d i n a r y n e g o t i a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g a n d t h u s a r e i m m u n e to shifts in t h e p o w e r , interests, a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e m a j o r p a r t i e s . T h e foremost p r e r e q u i s i t e of s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is t h a t s o c i e t i e s s h o u l d a c c e p t — m o r a / / y r a t h e r t h a n o n l y p r u d e n t i a l l y (as a vexing n e c e s s i t y i m p o s e d b y t h e p r e s e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r ) — t h e c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e of o n e a n o t h e r a n d of t h e v a l u e s c e n t r a l t o t h e i r d o m e s t i c social c o n t r a c t s . B e y o n d this p r e r e q u i s i t e , t h e p r o s p e c t s for a v a l u e - b a s e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e will d e p e n d u p o n w h a t , concretely,

A Value-Based World Order, 20.3

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theirvalues a n d a t t i t u d e s a r e , a n d u p o n t h e following t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s . First, the p a r t i e s a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e r e ought to be a s c h e m e t h a t through a fair d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s a c c o m m o d a t e s all of them to t h e p o i n t w h e r e e a c h c a n m a k e a s i n c e r e a n d reliable c o m m i t ­ ment that will w i t h s t a n d t e m p t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s a s well a s shifts in relative p o w e r a n d self-defined i n t e r e s t s . Second, t h e parties c a n i d e n ­ tify and p e r h a p s e x t e n d s o m e c o m m o n values—a starting p o i n t for a shared c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , for e x a m p l e , o r s o m e m u t u a l l y valued institutional r e f o r m s . T h i r d , t h e p a r t i e s a r e willing for t h e sake of w h a t <s itself a v a l u e d goal t o modify t h e i r values t o s o m e extent. Here t h e Ptvotal q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e y c a n s e e their w a y to e m b r a c m g a n institutional s c h e m e t h a t is m o r e tolerant of s o m e b r o a d e r r a n g e ot diverse values t h a n e a c h w o u l d have liked, a n d tolerant e n o u g h t o guarantee t h a t t h e (similarly modified) values of others can, in their essentials, survive forever. „ „ » s u c h a t r a n s i t i o n s u c c e e d s , t h e typical participant m a y w e 1 c o m e to value t h e r e s u l t i n g o r d e r in its o w n right r a t h e r t h a n c o n t i n u e toe ^ h for less t o l e r a n t i n s t i t u t i o n s built u p o n its o w n commitment to a mutually acceptable scheme deepen a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e t r a n s i h o n itself ( t h r o u g h . t h e expert ence of m u t u a l t r u s t a n d cooperation), ^ ^ £ ^ S n ^ r f shared values e x p a n d s . This, at least, w o u l d be t h e favored o u t c o m e ot

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T h e decisive c o n d i t i o n for a n a n a l o g o u s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in our cur­ r e n t w o r l d is, I believe, w i d e s p r e a d a c c e p t a n c e of w h a t o n e might call international pluralism, t h e i d e a t h a t k n o w l e d g e a b l e a n d intelligent p e r s o n s of g o o d will m a y r e a s o n a b l y favor different forms of (national) social o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e are t w o m a i n g r o u n d s for w a n t i n g this idea as a s h a r e d b a s i s from w h i c h t o w o r k t o w a r d a b e t t e r w o r l d . 2 0 . 3 . 1 . T h e first is r e a l i s m . A t t a i n i n g a w o r l d of p e a c e a n d justice requires w i d e s p r e a d a c c e p t a n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m , at least if t h e m o r e violent a v e n u e s of p r o g r e s s ("prevailing over t h e o t h e r side") are morally e x c l u d e d . It is a m i n i m a l d e m a n d u p o n political ideal t h e o r y t h a t it d e v e l o p a n ideal of a future w o r l d , t h a t is, of a w o r l d that is c o n n e c t i b l e to t h e s t a t u s q u o b y a m o r a l l y a d m i s s i b l e r o u t e (one that d o e s n o t p a s s t h r o u g h W o r l d W a r III, for e x a m p l e ) . T h i s d e m a n d is not m e t by a n ideal t h a t e n v i s i o n s t h e a b o l i t i o n of capitalist states or socialist s t a t e s or b o t h . A useful c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e political task at h a n d , t o o v e r c o m i n g violence a n d starvation, j u s t cannot consist in a r g u i n g t h a t all n a t i o n a l societies m u s t c o n f o r m to t h e w r i t e r ' s favored social i d e a l . In fact, s u c h a r g u m e n t s contribute to o u r p r e d i c a m e n t , our im­ p r i s o n m e n t in a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi. T o d a y , powerful factions i n e a c h of several m a j o r s o c i e t i e s a r e c o m m i t t e d t o t h e belief t h a t t h e i r form of r e g i m e is plainly s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of s o m e opposing societies a n d t h a t it w o u l d n o t b e w r o n g i n p r i n c i p l e t o destroy the o p p o n e n t s ' d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b y force (so a s t o l i b e r a t e t h e people t h e y o p p r e s s ) . T h e r e is, in fact, s o m e e a g e r n e s s to " t u r n a r o u n d " re­ g i m e s o n t h e o t h e r s i d e b e c a u s e t h e y , too, m a y r e c o g n i z e n o ultimate r e s t r a i n t s against "liberating" a s y s t e m of o u r t y p e a n d a r e liable to do s o w h e n t h e y c a n in o r d e r to r e m o v e t h r e a t s to t h e i r l o n g - t e r m survival. But t h e n , u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r , n e i t h e r s i d e c a n be c o n f i d e n t to survive a n all-out a t t e m p t to l i b e r a t e t h e societies o n the S^H l ^ ? t ec o an dmi o n g t h e s u p e r p o w e r s is, a n d b6 the c o n t i n u e d coexiswnuTri h e i S I , J t b e l i e v e s w e r e it significantly w e a k e r , its values 19

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2 0 . 3 . 2 . T h e s e c o n d g r o u n d tor a c c e p t i n g t h e i d e a of pluralism is its plausibility. In fact, t h e i d e a is r o b u s t l y p l a u s i b l e , in t h a t it can be a c c e p t e d for v a r i o u s a n d even i n c o m p a t i b l e r e a s o n s . It a c c o m m o d a t e s t h o s e w h o , t h o u g h c o n v i n c e d t h e y k n o w w h a t a just a n d humane society w o u l d look like, realize t h a t t h e y c a n n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e superi­ ority of t h e i r ideal from s h a r e d p r e m i s e s . It a c c o m m o d a t e s those who d o u b t t h a t t h e y c a n n o w (or t h a t a n y o n e c a n ever) b e r e a s o n a b l y certain to h a v e f o u n d the best w a y of o r g a n i z i n g a h u m a n society. It accommo­ d a t e s t h o s e w h o believe t h a t t h e b e s t social w o r l d w o u l d contain a variety of f o r m s of n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . It a c c o m m o d a t e s t h o s e who a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t different i n s t i t u t i o n a l i d e a l s m a y b e a p p r o p r i a t e to societies t h a t differ in n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d level of development. A n d it a c c o m m o d a t e s t h o s e w h o t h i n k t h a t e a c h n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y m u s t b e left free (within b r o a d limits) t o w o r k o u t its o w n constitution in light of its h i s t o r y a n d c u l t u r e , w h i c h it a l o n e is a b l e a n d entitled to i n t e r p r e t a n d to e x t e n d into t h e f u t u r e . No d o u b t , s o m e of t h e s e rea­ s o n s c a n b e c o m b i n e d , a n d n e w o n e s c o u l d b e a d d e d t o t h e list, but p e r h a p s t h e s e five a r e e n o u g h t o s h o w t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l pluralism is p l a u s i b l e — a n d m o r e p l a u s i b l e t h a n its o p p o s i t e , t h e c l a i m that some­ o n e is i n p o s s e s s i o n of a c o m p l e t e b l u e p r i n t for a just a n d h u m a n e society w h o s e s u p e r i o r m e r i t s c o u l d b e d e n i e d only b y t h e morally corrupt a n d the dim-witted. Of c o u r s e , I a m n o t c l a i m i n g t h a t o n e m a y r e a s o n a b l y favor any form of social o r g a n i z a t i o n . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , it is not reasonable t o advocate, say, slavery, colonialism, a p a r t h e i d , o r a u t o c r a c y . So t h e i d e a of plural­ i s m t h a t s h o u l d b e w i d e l y s h a r e d is b y n o m e a n s t a n t a m o u n t to a g e n e r a l a g n o s t i c i s m w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e j u s t i c e of n a t i o n a l institutions. W h a t is n e e d e d is t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t k n o w l e d g e a b l e a n d intelligent p e r s o n s of g o o d will m a y reasonably d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e s dividing t h e w o r l d t o d a y . F o r e x a m p l e , s h o u l d t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n b e c o n t r o l l e d b y n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s , o r locally b y work­ e r s o r b y private o w n e r s ? Is t h e b e s t f o r u m for d e m o c r a t i c d i s c u s s i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g afforded by a single-party, t w o - p a r t y , o r multi­ p a r t y s y s t e m ? W h i c h is m o r e i m p o r t a n t in t h e a p p r a i s a l a n d reform of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of civil a n d political liberties o r the satisfaction of b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s ? If o n l y w e c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d o u r d i s a g r e e m e n t s a b o u t s u c h m a t t e r s a s reasonable dis­ a g r e e m e n t s , t h e n w e c o u l d jointly w o r k t o w a r d a w o r l d in w h i c h alternative a n s w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s c o u l d coexist i n a peaceful, friendly, a n d s u p p o r t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t Insofar a s w e see a t t e m p t s to realize n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l ideals different from o u r o w n a s n e i t h e r evil n o r d e l u d e d (and n e e d n o t fear from t h e m violence a g a i n s t o u r d o m e s t i c v a l u e s a n d institutions) w e have n o g o o d r e a s o n t o resist s u c h a t t e m p t s . W e c o u l d c o m e t o r e s p e c t a n d e v e n t o l e a r n f r o m t h e variety of n a t i o n a l regimes existing b e y o n d o u r b o r d e r s . At l e a s t t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e p e o p l e of a n o t h e r society live u n d e r social

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institutions different from t h o s e w e favor gives u s n o g r o u n d at all to interfere in t h e i r affairs. 20.4. It will c e r t a i n l y b e said that there is very good r e a s o n for rejecting i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m . T h e reason is o u r historical experi­ ence with t h e a d h e r e n t s of t h o s e o t h e r values, which i n c l u d e s a n abundance of h o r r e n d o u s crimes c o m m i t t e d or s u p p o r t e d b y t h e m . Even a c u r s o r y g l a n c e at t h e o p p o n e n t s ' record of military aggression, economic e x p l o i t a t i o n , o r political repression, it is said, s h o u l d con­ vince a n y r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n that either their values are intolerable o r their p r o f e s s e d c o m m i t m e n t to t h e s e values is nothing b u t a cynical exercise in b a d faith. H e n c e w e m u s t not compromise o u r values to the point of a c c e p t i n g t h e i r right to exist, for to do so w o u l d a m o u n t to a wholesale b e t r a y a l of o u r m o s t venerable commitments. But t h e fact t h a t o u r historical experience s u p p o r t s s u c h a n argu­ ment against one o r b o t h m a i n forms of regime—and I will n o t d e n y this—does n o t s h o w t h a t a n y acceptable global o r d e r w o u l d have to exclude r e g i m e s of this sort. What our historical experience s h o w s is how capitalist a n d socialist governments design global institutions a n d how t h e y b e h a v e (within a n d outside their borders) in the context of a modus-vivendi framework. This may teach us very little a b o u t h o w capitalist a n d socialist governments would design global institutions and h o w t h e y w o u l d interact if surviving and prevailing w e r e n o l o n g e r at issue. Let u s at least entertain the thought that t h e h o r r o r s of this world a r e n o t , o r at least n o t primarily the horrors of capitalism a n d / o r socialism p e r s e b u t the horrors of an inconstant m o d u s vivendi a m o n g deeply h o s t i l e g o v e r n m e n t s , each fearing the eventual d e s t r u c t i o n of its values This t h o u g h t b a l a n c e s t h ^ ^ ^ ^

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g o v e r n m e n t s t o m a k e g e n u i n e sacrifices for t h e m , to h o n o r a l a w or a g r e e m e n t e v e n w h e n d o i n g so is against t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n t e r e s t s , all things c o n s i d e r e d . Yet over a n d over again, g o v e r n m e n t s c r e a t e t h e opposite p r e c e d e n t ; t h e y i g n o r e laws, c h a r t e r s , treaties, a n d d e c l a r a ­ tions t h a t t h e y h a d o n c e i n a u g u r a t e d w i t h great s h o w s of c o m m i t m e n t and t h e r e b y reinforce t h e d o m i n a n t c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l rela­ tions a s a m o r a l . A c a s e in p o i n t is t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of w a r c r i m e s a n d (especially) crimes a g a i n s t h u m a n i t y , w h i c h , at Nuremberg, w e r e said t o s h o c k t h e c o n s c i e n c e of h u m a n k i n d . In situations w h e r e t h e i r o w n military a c ­ tions o r t h o s e of t h e i r allies w e r e at stake, t h e relevant p o w e r s h a v e since b e e n willing, for t h e sake of even m i n o r objectives, t o ignore t h e w a r - c r i m e s s t a t u t e s t h e y formulated. This is n o t a c a s e w h e r e s h a r e d values a r e s a d l y a b s e n t . W h a t is lacking is t h e political will t o make effective t h e v a l u e s t h a t a r e s h a r e d , b y e m b o d y i n g t h e m as fixed p o i n t s into a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r w h e r e t h e y w o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e moral allegiance they evoke a m o n g t h e p e o p l e s of t h e world. T h i s is a m o r a l failure, primarily of politicians, w h o t h e r e b y subvert t h e v e r y i d e a t h a t international d o c u m e n t s c o u c h e d in t h e language of f u n d a m e n t a l law a n d s u p r e m e morality c o u l d ever b e a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n t e m p o r a r y bargains reinforced by p r o p a g a n d a penalties. Value-based i n s t i t u t i o n a l fixed p o i n t s might also develop, m o r e for­ mally, t h r o u g h a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l ethical dialogue. Just as t e a m s of n u ­ c l e a r - w e a p o n s e x p e r t s are asked to negotiate a draft a g r e e m e n t o n a r m s c o n t r o l , s o t e a m s of political p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d international law­ yers m i g h t b e a s k e d to identify, codify, a n d e x t e n d t h e area of s h a r e d value c o m m i t m e n t s . S u c h d i s c u s s i o n s w o u l d lead n a t i o n s to a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o n e a n o t h e r ' s m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e values, w h i c h is b o u n d to b r o a d e n a n d d e e p e n t h e c o m m i t m e n t to t h e value of toler­ a n c e — a n d t o l e r a n c e of alternative forms of national organization in Particular. T h e y m i g h t also lead to a g r e e m e n t on s o m e p a t h of institu­ tional r e f o r m s t h a t a r e g e n u i n e l y valued by b o t h sides a n d eventually, P e r h a p s , to a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of justice that could guide t h e a p ­ praisal a n d g r a d u a l reform of t h e global institutional order. At least in t h e b e g i n n i n g (before m u c h m u t u a l confidence h a s b e e n built up), t h e a g r e e m e n t s emerging from s u c h a high-level ethical di­ alogue will h a v e t o affect t h e participant states in a b a l a n c e d - ™ W > £ £ to m i n i m i z e t h e s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t . For instance, might b e u n a b l e at p r e s e n t to give a reliable ^ " " ^ f ^ tolerate t h e a p o s t a s y of a major ally b e c a u s e this undertaking w o u l d « * . C h a p t e r e, , ar^ue for a particular ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ w h i c h s e e m s t o m e to b e a n especially °m it is based o n a small family r international ethical dialogue. T h o u g h ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e national institutional of w i d e l y a c c e p t e d values a n d also tolerant of s o m e r a n g e o f d r ^ r s e n t h e m e s , i n c l u d i n g , in particular, s c h e m e s with a soc.ahst e c o n o m y

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i m p o s e severe s t r a i n s u p o n w h i c h e v e r s i d e w o u l d b e called u p o n to h o n o r it first. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e d i s c o u r s e m u s t aim (like n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e a r m s - c o n t r o l type) for a g r e e m e n t s t h a t a r e mutually a d v a n t a g e o u s . S u c h a g r e e m e n t s m i g h t , a n d p e r h a p s s h o u l d , rather be m u t u a l l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t s of t h e m o r e affluent n a t i o n s might, for e x a m p l e , a g r e e t o c r e a t e a n d f u n d a n agency, inde­ p e n d e n t from t h e m s e l v e s , t h a t is c h a r g e d w i t h p r o m o t i n g t h e eco­ n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e w o r l d ' s p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s a n d regions (com­ b a t t i n g m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, d i s e a s e , a n d e c o n o m i c dependence). W i t h s o m e g o o d will, s u c h a reform s h o u l d b e feasible (in a period of r e d u c e d t e n s i o n ) b y finding a m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of bur­ d e n s t h a t p r e s e r v e s t h e relative b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n of t h e relevant g o v e r n m e n t s . While s u c h a s c h e m e w o u l d r e d u c e t h e benefits these g o v e r n m e n t s derive from t h e i r s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n , it w o u l d r e d u c e them p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y a n d h e n c e n o t (dis)advantage a n y o n e of t h e m vis-a-vis t h e o t h e r s . T h e m o r a l significance of s u c h t a n g i b l e c o n c e r n for the w o r l d ' s m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p o p u l a t i o n s w o u l d g o far b e y o n d its im­ m e d i a t e effects. By d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o give increasing weight to values a t t h e e x p e n s e of c o n c e r n for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n and e x p a n s i o n of n a t i o n a l p o w e r , t h e relevant g o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d build u p , t h r o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e of n o n p r u d e n t i a l c o l l a b o r a t i o n , t h e mutual r e s p e c t a n d trust t h a t a r e n e c e s s a r y for t h e g r a d u a l t r a n s i t i o n to a value-based world order. 24

25

2 0 . 6 . So far, t h i s c h a p t e r h a s s k e t c h e d a s y s t e m i c analysis of one feature of a global institutional s c h e m e , d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h it h a s a m o d u s - v i v e n d i o r v a l u e - b a s e d c h a r a c t e r . I h a v e argued t h a t t h i s feature h a s a t r e m e n d o u s i m p a c t o n t h e o r d i n a r y level of dayt o - d a y h u m a n m i s e r y a s well a s o n t h e s h a r e d risk of extraordinary c a t a s t r o p h e ( t h r o u g h a n o t h e r w o r l d w a r , for i n s t a n c e ) . T h e s e t h o u g h t s a r e straightforwardly generalizable t o o t h e r w o r l d - o r d e r f e a t u r e s . The i d e a is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e existing f r a m e w o r k of i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations as a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i n t h e s e n s e of C h a p t e r 1, a n d t h e n t o investigate h o w v a n o u s morally significant m a c r o p h e n o m e n a vary w i t h variations m t h e features of t h e global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e T h i s s o r t of investigation is obviously m o r e difficult w h e n t h e d o m a i n is t h e w o r l d a t large. F o r o n e thing, it is m o r e difficult t o w o r k with "Yet even if they are mutually disadvantageous, the mere fact of having achieved cooperaton"

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comparative statistical i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e are n o s i m u l t a n e o u s alternative w o r l d s t o b e o b s e r v e d . Still, social theory w o u l d s e e m to provide e n o u g h of a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to s u p p o r t s o m e significant, though general, c o n c l u s i o n s . T h e centrifugal t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c to laissez-faire m a r k e t s c h e m e s , for e x a m p l e , are well e n o u g h d o c u ­ mented in t h e c o n t e x t of various national a n d regional e c o n o m i c schemes to a l l o w g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t o t h e global p l a n e . This generalization enables a s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e fact that international inequali­ ties are vast, a n d still i n c r e a s i n g , a s t h e poorest c o u n t r i e s t e n d to have the lowest (often negative) r a t e s of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . T h e c u r r e n t distribution i n n a t i o n a l r a t e s of infant mortality, life expectancy, a n d disease a n d t h e global i n c i d e n c e of starvation a n d poverty can t h e n be accounted for, in large p a r t , b y reference to t h e existing world market system w i t h its lack of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . Again, s u c h m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s c a n n o t b e fully p r e e m p t e d b y the c o r r e s p o n d i n g m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s . Having explained various particular wars a n d i n s u r r e c t i o n s b y reference to intrinsic factors, w e m u s t vet account for t h e overall rate of internal a n d external government vio­ lence, w h i c h (I h a v e s u g g e s t e d ) requires reference to an international modus vivendi t h a t p e r p e t u a t e s military competition a n d the a b s e n c e of effective m e c h a n i s m s for t h e creation, application, a n d enforcement °f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . Similarly, microexplanations of w h y this or that less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y h a s o r h a s n o t "taken off" economically d o not add u p to a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e centrifugal t e n d e n c y in p e r capita gross national p r o d u c t . And again, t h e t w o levels are separable not only for p u r p o s e s of explanation b u t also from a moral point of view. In m y h o m i c i d e example (§2.3), it w a s c o n s i s t e n t to h o l d e a c h a n d every m u r d e r e r fully responsible for h i s act and to criticize t h e legal system (lacking effective h a n d g u n legislation) o n a c c o u n t of s o m e percentage of these m u r d e r s . Similarly, h e r e , w e s h o u l d s u r e l y h o l d t h e Somozas a n d Marcoses fully a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e plight of their compatriots. But, consistent with this, w e c a n a l s o criticize t h e prevailing international order o n account of c u r r e n t m i s e r y , s o l o n g as t h e prevalence of corrupt military dictator­ 26

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s h i p s in T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s is itself e x p l a i n a b l e i n t e r m s of systemic factors—if it is t h e r e i g n i n g m o d u s - v i v e n d i f r a m e w o r k , for example, t h a t e x p l a i n s w h y typically e v e n t h e m o s t m u r d e r o u s t y r a n t c a n induce s o m e p o w e r f u l g o v e r n m e n t s t o give h i m political a n d military support (against h i s d o m e s t i c a n d foreign o p p o n e n t s ) b y a p p e a l i n g t o or agree­ i n g t o serve t h e i r larger s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . 2 0 . 7 . T h a t social i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e i m p l i c a t e d i n t h i s w a y makes it m o r a l l y u r g e n t t o investigate w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e realistic possibilities for i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e , for a N e w Deal, o n t h e g l o b a l p l a n e . S u p p o s e we believe that, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , (1) t h e r e is m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a w o r l d w i t h l o w e r r a t h e r t h a n h i g h e r r a t e s of m a l n u t r i t i o n , infant mortality, a n d g o v e r n m e n t v i o l e n c e a n d (2) t h e r e is a feasible alternative global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e u n d e r w h i c h s u c h r a t e s w o u l d b e significantly l o w e r . T h e n w e h a v e r e a s o n to v i e w t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d o r d e r as unjust a n d t o h o l d t h o s e collaborating i n its p e r p e t u a t i o n m o r a l l y responsible for t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h i s o r d e r u p o n (in p a r t i c u l a r ) t h o s e w h o are most likely t o b e m a s s a c r e d , t o r t u r e d , o r s t a r v e d u n d e r t h e c u r r e n t regime. At s t a k e h e r e a r e n o t m e r e l y positive b u t n e g a t i v e r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s . Posi­ tive d u t i e s (of m u t u a l aid, for e x a m p l e ) e s t a b l i s h a d i r e c t link b e t w e e n p e r s o n s in d i s t r e s s a n d t h o s e able t o alleviate t h e i r plight, irrespective of a n y further facts a b o u t t h e social c o n t e x t . C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice e s t a b l i s h a n i n d i r e c t link, p r e s u p p o s i n g f u r t h e r c o n t e x t u a l features, as follows: Certain d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s a r e u n d e r s t o o d as e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d by a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . T h i s s c h e m e is u n j u s t a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of at least o n e feasible alternative s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d n o t give rise t o similarly severe d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . A n d t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e are collectively r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e i n j u s t i c e of the s c h e m e insofar a s t h e y actively p e r p e t u a t e it a n d resist its r e f o r m . S u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice are h e r e at stake. By i g n o r i n g t h e misery of t h e w o r l d s p o o r e s t p o p u l a t i o n s , w e a r e d i s r e g a r d i n g n o t m e r e l y our positive d u t y of m u t u a l aid b u t o u r negative d u t y n o t t o m a k e o t h e r s the v i c t i m s of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s . As c i t i z e n s of t h e d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s , w e h a v e c r e a t e d a n d are p e r p e t u a t i n g b y u s e of o u r e c o n o m i c a n d military p o w e r a global institutional o r d e r u n d e r w h i c h t e n s of mUlions avoida­ bly c a n n o t m e e t t h e i r m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l n e e d s for f o o d a n d p h y s i c a l security. 29

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responsibility e x t e n d s b e y o n d n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s : "We s h a r e r e s p o n ­ sibility only for o u r n a t i o n a l institutional s c h e m e , in w h i c h w e partici­ pate as c i t i z e n s , a n d w h i c h w e c a n m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y affect (e.g. through voting)." I reject this view b e c a u s e it treats t h e existing global institutional f r a m e w o r k a s a n a t u r a l or God-given fact. If we, t h e cit­ izens of p o w e r f u l a n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y democratic countries, d o not share s o m e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for this global order, t h e n n o o n e d o e s . And this is i m p l a u s i b l e , given t h a t w e are advantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in this order, w h o h e l p m a i n t a i n a n d are (collectively) capable of c h a n g i n g it. My affirmation of t h e m o r a l salience of (and of a collective moral responsibility for) t h e global basic structure, a m o u n t s to a partial d e ­ fense a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of §28 of t h e Universal Declaration of Human Rights: " E v e r y o n e is e n t i t l e d to a social and international o r d e r in w h i c h the rights a n d f r e e d o m s set forth in this Declaration can be fully real­ ized" (my e m p h a s i s ) . The s e c o n d q u e s t i o n is h o w w e s h o u l d assess a global institutional framework from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. Here I favor a broadly c o n s e ­ quentialist a s s e s s m e n t t h a t is c o n c e r n e d , first a n d foremost, with its least a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , those in o u r world w h o lack well-pro­ tected f u n d a m e n t a l rights a n d liberties (as stipulated, for e x a m p l e by the Universal Declaration o r by Rawls's first principle in its a m e n d e d form).

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21. T h e Traditional Law of Nations 2 1 . 1 . 1 . Rawls r e c o g n i z e s t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n c h a r a c t e r of h i s t h e o r y by sketching, at least, h o w h i s criterion for a s s e s s i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a n a t i o n a l society m i g h t b e c o m p l e m e n t e d b y a d d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of justice governing i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s brief o u t l i n e jars, how­ ever, w i t h c e n t r a l c o m m i t m e n t s of h i s t h e o r y , chiefly h i s focus o n the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e a n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n of all h u m a n b e i n g s a s free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h e s e c o m m i t m e n t s w o u l d i n s t e a d , 1 will argue, l e a d o n e t o a b a n d o n Rawls's p r i m a r y e m p h a s i s o n d o m e s t i c institu­ t i o n s in favor of globalizing h i s entire c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . S u c h a globalization is n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s of Rawls's w o r k t h u s far. It is o n l y for t h e p u r p o s e of' a first a p p r o x i m a ­ t i o n " (BSS 70 n . 8), t h a t h e w a n t s t o "leave a s i d e h e r e t h e p r o b l e m of justice b e t w e e n n a t i o n s " (BSS 57) a n d b e g i n w i t h t h e i d e a l i z e d c a s e of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society. "At s o m e level t h e r e m u s t exist a c l o s e d back­ g r o u n d s y s t e m , a n d it is t h i s subject for w h i c h w e w a n t a t h e o r y . W e are b e t t e r p r e p a r e d t o take u p t h i s p r o b l e m for a s o c i e t y (illustrated by n a t i o n s ) c o n c e i v e d a s a m o r e o r less self-sufficient s c h e m e of social c o o p e r a t i o n a n d a s p o s s e s s i n g a m o r e o r less c o m p l e t e c u l t u r e . If w e a r e successful in t h e c a s e of a society, w e c a n try t o e x t e n d a n d t o adjust o u r initial t h e o r y a s f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s " (BSS 70 n 8; cf TJ 8). a

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difficult to s h o w t h a t Rawlsian p a r t i e s w o u l d a d o p t s o m e t h i n g like Charles Beitz's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e redistribution principle, even for a world of t r u l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d societies. But this d o e s n o t suffice t o demonstrate t h a t Rawls is really c o m m i t t e d to r e q u i r e m e n t s of global distributive j u s t i c e t h a t m a k e d e m a n d s even in t h e a b s e n c e of i n t e r n a ­ tional i n t e r a c t i o n . It r e m a i n s to b e s h o w n that t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e onginal p o s i t i o n is r e l e v a n t t o t h e question w h e t h e r m e m b e r s of truly self-contained s o c i e t i e s h a v e a n obligation to establish contact a n d to develop joint i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s u c h societies. This Rawls s e e m s to deny: H e r e s t r i c t s t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h e original position t o q u e s t i o n s ofjustice a n d c o n c e i v e s (in)justice a s a property of social institutions (which, b y h y p o t h e s i s , a r e a b s e n t o n t h e global plane). T h e r e a r e cer­ tain "relations of i n d i v i d u a l s t o o n e a n o t h e r which set t h e stage for questions of j u s t i c e " (TJ 130). I s u r m i s e Rawls would agree with Kant's more p r e c i s e f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t (just) institutions are required " a m o n g human b e i n g s . . . w h o c a n n o t avoid mutually influencing o n e a n ­ other.'^ Within h i s t h e o r y a s a w h o l e , there are g r o u n d s for bringing his contractarian d e v i c e t o b e a r o n t h e global plane only if there is signifi­ cant global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . 1

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Fortunately, t h e c o n c e s s i o n a n d t h e debate s u r r o u n d i n g it a r e e n ­ tirely a c a d e m i c , s i n c e all a g r e e that t h e r e is and will b e extensive global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . If m o d e r n societies are not closed, w e m u s t at s o m e Point g o b e y o n d Rawls's "first approximation" and ask h o w his c o n c e p ­ tion of j u s t i c e m i g h t best b e a d a p t e d to t h e complexities of t h e real world. Rawls h a s n o t y e t seriously a d d r e s s e d this issue. The central Place of d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s in his work u p to n o w rests o n n o t h i n g deeper t h a n h i s (entirely plausible) h u n c h that making the simplifying ^ s u m p t i o n of n a t i o n a l isolation h a s significant expositional advan­ tages for i n t r o d u c i n g h i s b r o a d l y consequentialist approach. . 21.1-3. H o w o n e a d a p t s Rawls's conception to m o r e complex real­ t i e s will e v i d e n t l y affect h o w t h e deliberations of t h e p a r t e s m t n e original p o s i t i o n will eventually be p r e s e n t e d a n d ^ J ^ ™ argue for v i e w i n g t h e p a r t i e s as immediately addressing t h e world at

'Cf. Beitz, PTIR 1 3 6 - 4 3 . ^..^tp broader requirement, J K a n t , KPW 7 3 (cf. MEJ §§8-9). Vet Kant does " ^ J ^ ^ n l . ^ d r e s s e d t o "all m e n w h o c a n at all influence o n e a n o t n e r 'Scanlon m a k e s t h e s a m e point, relying on the f a c t o y or "regularized c o m m e r c e " IRTJ 202). (n h.s book, I R 143-53). f ^ e s elaborately for t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of current global m i H ^ ^ ,„ t . p r o m p t e d b y criticism from David Richards [VOl upon opposite v i e w - f h a t m a k i n g t h e validity of a f " ° " " X r a r U y favor the status quo he factual q u e s t i o n o f global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " " ^ f t e r b e r s of differer, N S 595, a n d cf. n . 8) I fail to s e e this ^ g e r , m societies c a n o r c a n n o t avoid m u t u a l l y influencing one arca ^ i s . i c a l l y avo d ^ t t e r , surely n o t u p t o t h e m . At this stage of world ^ mcenuve to ™ e m t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d s o the • n f ^ ^ S applytfsocieties were self*Ptoit t h e fact that t h e criterion of global , u s n c e would n contained. f

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large a n d a s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of n a t i o n a l societies only w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t s o p r o v i d e d . T a k e n s e r i o u s l y , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice will m a k e t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e globally l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d the t o u c h s t o n e for a s s e s s i n g o u r b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n n e e d s d e f e n s e o n t w o levels. In t h i s s e c t i o n a n d the next, I s h o w h o w m y global i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice is p l a u s i b l e within h i s framework, h o w it is s u p p o r t e d , especially, by his i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d h i s a r g u m e n t s for t h e f o c u s o n t h e b a s i c structure. I n §23 I a r g u e t h a t o n t h i s , its m o s t u n i f i e d a n d e l e g a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n is still p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e t o o u r w o r l d — d e s p i t e , in particular, significant i n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity of c o n v i c t i o n s even a b o u t justice. D r a w i n g o n a r g u m e n t s from all p a r t s of t h i s book, the c o n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n a d d r e s s e s t h e p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g of a Rawlsian c o n c e p t i o n of global j u s t i c e i n o u r w o r l d . 2 1 J*. In d i s c u s s i n g h o w t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s h o u l d b e b r o u g h t t o b e a r u p o n t h e p r o b l e m of global justice, I will c o n c e n ­ t r a t e u p o n t h r e e m a i n alternatives, t w o of w h i c h are s u g g e s t e d by Rawls's o w n brief r e m a r k s o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e s e remarks are clear insofar a s t h e y p r o p o s e t h a t after a c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e h a s b e e n c h o s e n , t h e c o n t r a c t a r i a n device s h o u l d b e r e u s e d on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. B e y o n d this, Rawls's d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s e c o n d , global s e s s i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n p e r m i t s t w o c o m p e t i n g r e a d i n g s , w h i c h h e d o e s n o t k e e p distinct. O n t h e f i r s t — h e n c e f o r t h R j — t h e global p a r t i e s are viewed as r e p r e s e n t i n g persons from t h e various societies, w h o , o n c e again, are "to m a k e a r a t i o n a l c h o i c e to p r o t e c t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s " (TJ 378). T h e y m u s t d o so, h o w e v e r , e v e n t h o u g h "they k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e i r o w n society, its p o w e r a n d s t r e n g t h i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s , n o r do they know their place in their own society" (TJ 378, m y e m p h a s i s ) . O n t h i s r e a d i n g , t h e p a r t i e s will again b e g u i d e d by t h e i r clients' i m p u t e d d e s i r e for social p r i m a r y g o o d s , a n d s i n c e t h e i r p l a c e in their o w n society a n d t h a t of t h e i r society a m o n g o t h e r s a r e u n k n o w n , the p a r t i e s will, b y m a x i m i n , c h o o s e a c r i t e r i o n t h a t m a k e s t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d t h e p r e e m i n e n t t o u c h s t o n e of global j u s t i c e , n o m a t ­ t e r w h i c h s o c i e t i e s t h e y m a y b e l o n g t o . Global i n s t i t u t i o n s will t h e n b e a s s e s s e d b y h o w w e l l t h e y satisfy Rawls's c r i t e r i o n i n t e r p r e t e d glob­ ally. This claim—that the parties w o u l d choose essentially the same c r i t e r i o n in t h e s e c o n d s e s s i o n as in t h e first—is s u p p o r t e d b y Rawls's e n d o r s e m e n t of a thick veil of i g n o r a n c e . T h e p a r t i e s d o n o t k n o w "the 4

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T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.3

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general c o n f i g u r a t i o n of society, its political s t r u c t u r e a n d e c o n o m i c organization, a n d s o o n "—including p r e s u m a b l y its size a n d t h e d e ­ gree of its e t h n i c , c u l t u r a l , a n d geographical diversity—because s u c h knowledge w o u l d at b e s t " o b s c u r e h o w intimately t h e p r i n c i p l e s adopted are t i e d t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n " (KCMT 550; cf. BSS 58; WOS VI). M o r e o v e r , i n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e parties' task, Rawls refers o n l y vaguely to t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a n inclusive, self-contained system. For aught t h e y k n o w , t h e p a r t i e s might be deliberating about t h e w o r l d at large. On t h e o t h e r r e a d i n g of Rawls's r e m a r k s — R — t h e s e c o n d session involves a m o r e d r a m a t i c a d j u s t m e n t of t h e original position, s i n c e t h e parties are n o w c o n c e i v e d as "representatives of states" (TJ 378,379, m y emphasis). R a w l s tells u s t h a t s u c h representatives w o u l d b e c o n ­ cerned to f u r t h e r " t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . . . [as] defined by the princi­ ples of j u s t i c e t h a t h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n acknowledged [A] n a t i o n will aim above all t o m a i n t a i n a n d to preserve its just institutions a n d t h e conditions t h a t m a k e t h e m p o s s i b l e " (TJ 379). So the parties' ideal of a just w o r l d w o u l d b e , essentially, a world of just states. For a world falling s h o r t of t h i s ideal, t h e parties, a s s u m i n g they again e m p l o y t h e maximin r u l e , w o u l d a d o p t a priority rule focused u p o n the states whose d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e least just. So R, entails weaker con­ straints t h a n R o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities. In this regard, a just global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e n e e d m e r e l y e n s u r e that n o states are too p o o r to °e able to satisfy Rawls's criterion domestically. Despite this difference, t h e two readings agree that first-principle goods a r e p a r a m o u n t T h o s e farthest from having a complete a n d well-protected p a c k a g e of basic rights a n d liberties ipso facto c o u n t as the globally l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r R„ a n d those societies w h o s e least advantaged suffer t h e g r e a t e s t shortfall from s u c h a fully a d e q u a t e Package i p s o facto c o u n t as t h e least just u n d e r R . However mconsistently Rawls m a y h a v e d e s c r i b e d t h e parties' second, global session, it ^ill q u i t e clearly yield a criterion that assesses global basic structures hy t h e severity of t h e first-principle violations each t e n d s to P r o d u c e »1 A It is t h e n a s t o n i s h i n g that Rawls takes this global session to 2

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result in a reaffirmation of t h e "familiar" p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, for w h i c h h e relies o n t h e s e m i n a l b u t d a t e d a c c o u n t in J a m e s Brierly's b o o k The Law of Nations. U n d e r t h i s r e g i m e , " s t a t e s h a v e c e r t a i n funda­ m e n t a l e q u a l r i g h t s . . . a n a l o g o u s to t h e e q u a l r i g h t s of citizens in a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e " (TJ 378). As e x a m p l e s , Rawls m e n t i o n s (TJ 37879) t h e rights t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n , a n d self-defense; t h e r u l e s ofj u s in bello; a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t r e a t i e s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s are t o b e k e p t (the r e m a i n i n g t r e a t i e s b e i n g void ab initio). T h e p a r t i e s , o n e i t h e r R o r R , h a v e v a r i o u s r e a s o n s for rejecting this p r o p o s a l . T o b e g i n w i t h , it is w h o l l y i n s e n s i t i v e t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l con­ c e r n s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s s h a p e d by free bargaining ( a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o t h e r e c o n o m i c a g e n t s ) afford n o a s s u r a n c e t h a t n a t i o n a l societies will n o t avoidably lack "a sufficient m a t e r i a l base for m a k i n g t h e e q u a l liberties effective" (FG 545). But t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d u r g e n t l y w a n t a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t p r o v i d e s s u c h as­ surance. 1

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Next, a w o r l d of g r e a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s will give rise to c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t . M a n y a g o v e r n m e n t will b e b o u n d b y very b u r d e n s o m e treaties, w h o s e t e r m s , n e g o t i a t e d p e r h a p s by s o m e p r e d e c e s s o r g o v e r n m e n t , reflect a b y g o n e a n d unfavorable dis­ t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r . T h e c o m m i t m e n t to k e e p s u c h treaties will frequently c o m e u n d e r severe s t r e s s . Moreover, t h e r e are, o n Rawls's p r o p o s a l , n o effective m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t t h a t c o u l d offset t h e s e c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t a n d t h e r e b y k e e p t h e s i t u a t e d a s s u r a n c e p r o b ­ l e m from arising. In t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h r e c o g n i z e d m e c h a n i s m s , g o v e r n m e n t s have n o a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r s will c o m p l y w i t h t h e g o i n g g r o u n d r u l e s even w h e n t h e n e t c o s t s of c o m p l i a n c e (including o p p o r t u n i t y costs) are high. T h e lack of s u c h a s s u r a n c e s m a k e s it m o r e often advisable a n d also m o r a l l y m o r e a c c e p t a b l e n o t to c o m p l y oneself w h e n c o m p l i a n c e is costly or even risky. T h i s c l i m a t e of a c t u a l a n d potential noncompliance, together with "honest disagreements" a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t are equally e n t i d e d to j u d g e a n d enforce i n t e r n a t i o n a l laws a n d treaties, e n s u r e s t h a t t h e p e r e n n i a l s c o u r g e of w a r will c o n t i n u e , as Rawls implicitly a c k n o w l e d g e s b y c o n c e n t r a t i n g m o s t of h i s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n u p o n t h e r u l e s of warfare. T h i s p e r m a n e n t d a n g e r from n o n c o m p l i a n c e a n d w a r ( a n d t h e fear, hostility, a n d s u s p i c i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h it) will in t u m a c t u a l i z e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m . E a c h g o v e r n m e n t will, a n d will d e e m itself m o r a l l y e n t i t l e d to, shift t h e g r o u n d r u l e s in its favor w h e n it can, s o a s t o m a k e itself a n d its d o m e s t i c p o p u l a t i o n less v u l n e r a b l e to n o n c o m p l i a n c e or attack by other governments. T a k e n t o g e t h e r , t h e s e four c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o w t h a t u n d e r t h e r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w Rawls e n d o r s e s e v e n a n initially w e l l - o r d e r e d (sta­ ble) i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m w o u l d t e n d t o d e g e n e r a t e i n t o a m o d u s vi-

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vendi in w h i c h c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e g r o u n d rules a n d t h u s their endurance w o u l d b e p r o b l e m a t i c . In o t h e r words, it is n o t t h e case that the familiar l a w of n a t i o n s (at Brierly's time or our's) w o u l d work well if only t h e r e w e r e mutual t r u s t . Rather, t h e prevailing modus-vivendi framework is t h e e q u i l i b r i u m state t o w a r d w h i c h a n international sys­ tem g o v e r n e d b y t h i s l a w of n a t i o n s will t e n d regardless of initial governmental a t t i t u d e s a n d g o o d will. A world o r d e r based o n t h e s e ground r u l e s is inherently u n s t a b l e , a s can be s h o w n by e x t e n d i n g Rawls's o w n o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e strains of c o m m i t m e n t a n d t h e two assurance p r o b l e m s . We h a v e s e e n h o w t h e p a r t i e s have important r e a s o n s for rejecting the traditional i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime Rawls e n d o r s e s . The inequality and instability (fostering n o n c o m p l i a n c e a n d wars) s u c h a regime tends t o e n g e n d e r w o u l d j e o p a r d i z e t h e parties' aspiration for a world in w h i c h first-principle g o o d s are universally secure. These r e a s o n s apply even if w e a s s u m e t h a t all of t h e world's societies are firmly committed to p r o t e c t i n g first-principle goods within their b o r d e r s (at least insofar as t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e levels of development permit). Since this assumption is h i g h l y unrealistic, however, one s h o u l d also consider whether p r o p o s e d g r o u n d rules for international relations are plausi­ ble w h e n s o m e societies are less t h a n just a n d w h e t h e r they will exert some i n f l u e n c e u p o n n a t i o n a l regimes to gravitate toward domestic justice. Rawls's p r o p o s a l of equal state rights fails on these two c o u n t s as well. Societies a n d t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s are to be accepted as equals under t h o s e r u l e s , e v e n if t h e i r internal constitutions are characterized °y tyranny, r e p r e s s i o n , exploitation, a n d radical inequalities. Persons abused by t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s have no official remedies a n d m u s t "ely on t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of o t h e r governments or agents to intercede in their behalf. M o r e o v e r , s i n c e e a c h state is sovereign over its internal ^ a i r s , this i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r generates no countervailing forces that * o u l d resist t h e d e g e n e r a t i o n of a national basic s t r o c h r o . Such in­ stitutional indifference to t h e d o m e s t i c (in)justice of national regimes aggravates t h e instability of t h e p r o p o s e d world o r d e r b e c a u s e , u n d e r ­ l i n e s t h e moral r e a s o n s for unconditional compliance with interna­ tional l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s . , „„tr,fthPtradid o r e e 21.4. T h e s e Rawlsian criticisms of Rawls's ^ Xrlns oft "onal i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime indicate three ^ ^S5tT-nd ftitutional r e f o r m t o w a r d a global order u n d e r ™ Gerties w o u l d be more c o m p l e t e a n d ^ J ^ ^ X « e w o u l d favor an organization of the world economy that makes sensitive to d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n c e r n s , so that ^ ^ ^ S X - S b c sufficient m a t e r i a l b a s e to satisfy t h e first P T ^ ^ T t o i r t t t a d ° n d , t h e y w o u l d w a n t (more) international disputes to oe 8

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c « RMC 144 On what I have *On t h e strains of c o m m i t m e n t , s e e TJ 176-78; RAM 6 5 3 , ™ ^ called t h e s i t u a t e d a n d fundamental assurance problems, and 1 9 - 2 0 , respectively. I

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T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22

t h r o u g h m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d legal p r o c e d u r e s r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h w a r o r t h r e a t a d v a n t a g e — a reform t h a t in d u e c o u r s e m i g h t b e comple­ m e n t e d b y c e n t r a l e n f o r c e m e n t m e c h a n i s m s . P r o g r e s s t o w a r d this s e c o n d goal w o u l d r e d u c e o r e l i m i n a t e t h e i n c i d e n c e of w a r a n d make it m u c h m o r e likely for right r a t h e r t h a n m i g h t t o prevail in interna­ t i o n a l conflicts. T h i r d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d p r e f e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to afford s o m e r e m e d i e s t o p e r s o n s a g a i n s t a b u s e b y t h e i r o w n govern­ m e n t s , s o m e i n c e n t i v e s for societies t o reform t h e m s e l v e s — m i n i m a l l y b y p r o v i d i n g for d i p l o m a t i c a n d e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s ( w h e n these w o u l d b e effective) against u n j u s t n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s . S e e i n g t h a t prog­ ress h a s b e e n m a d e s i n c e Brierly's t i m e , o n t h e l a t t e r t w o fronts, a n d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s , o n a n y textually t e n a b l e c o n s t r u a l of t h e i r s e c o n d s e s s i o n , w o u l d a d o p t a criterion t h a t favors s u c h r e f o r m s , I a m at a loss t o e x p l a i n Rawls's quick e n d o r s e m e n t of a b y g o n e s t a t u s q u o . Given the g e n e s i s of t h e i n t e m a t i o n a l - l a w r e g i m e a s a n i n s t r u m e n t d e v e l o p e d by g o v e r n m e n t s t o serve t h e i r o w n s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , it w o u l d s e e m a s u r p r i s i n g c o i n c i d e n c e i n d e e d if it (in a n y of its h i s t o r i c a l versions) w e r e t h e m o s t s u i t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for realizing b a s i c rights a n d liberties. In o n e c o n c r e t e c a s e Rawls himself s h o w s a c o n c e r n for b a s i c liber­ ties t h a t radically d e p a r t s from t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. He writes t h a t a n a r m y of c o n s c r i p t s r a t h e r t h a n m e r c e n a r i e s m a y b e " d e m a n d e d for t h e defense of liberty itself, i n c l u d i n g h e r e n o t o n l y t h e liberties of t h e c i t i z e n s of t h e society i n q u e s t i o n , b u t a l s o t h o s e of p e r s o n s in other societies a s well. Therefore if a c o n s c r i p t a r m y is l e s s likely to b e a n i n s t r u m e n t of unjustified foreign a d v e n t u r e s , it m a y b e justified o n this b a s i s a l o n e d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t c o n s c r i p t i o n infringes u p o n t h e equal liberties of c i t i z e n s " (TJ 380). This d e m a n d g o e s far b e y o n d h i s c o n s e r ­ vative e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e l a w of n a t i o n s . O n e m i g h t , t h e r e f o r e , best d i s c o u n t t h i s e n d o r s e m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n r e c o g n i z e it a s e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t a n y r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w Rawls d e s c r i b e s t h e p a r t i e s s e c o n d , global s e s s i o n . 9

22. The Internal Argument Let m e t h e n r e t u r n t o t h e t w o i d e a s Rawls h a s s u g g e s t e d for e x t e n d ­ i n g t h e original p o s i t i o n t o t h e subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d field a g a i n s t t h e s e i d e a s m y o w n alternative, G. I n s t e a d of t w o s e p a r a t e 9

F o r e x a m p l e , t h e International Covenant o n Civil a n d Political Rights a n d t h e Interna­ tional Covenant o n E c o n o m i c , Social, and Cultural Rights b o t h involve specific legal obligations, t h o u g h o n l y a minority of states h a v e a c c e d e d to t h e m . T h e former o f t h e s e e n v i s i o n s jurisdiction by the U.N. H u m a n Rights C o m m i t t e e (1CCPR §41) a n d also c o n ­ tains a n o p t i o n a l protocol recognizing the right to individual p e t i t i o n t o this U.N. b o d y Similar p r o v i s i o n s are c o n t a i n e d in the E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n o n H u m a n Rights. Reflect­ ing t h e parties' c o n c e r n for first-principle rights a n d liberties, a criterion of global justice a c c e p t a b l e to t h e m w o u l d d e m a n d substantial further reforms a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s .

T h e Internal Argument, 22.1.1

247

sessions in w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s a d o p t criteria for national a n d t h e n for international i n s t i t u t i o n s , G envisions a single, global, original position. This modification, again a p p e a l i n g t o t h e thick veil of ignorance, leaves intact Rawls's w h o l e a r g u m e n t for t h e two principles, directing it how­ ever at o u r e n t i r e social w o r l d . T h e relevant "closed s c h e m e " is n o w taken t o b e t h e w o r l d at large. This section will first s h o w h o w R is incompatible w i t h Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s a n d t h e n p r e s e n t a n u m b e r of a r g u m e n t s t h a t favor G over R, (and R ). 22.1.1. O n e m a i n r e a s o n Rawls gives for taking t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a s the p r i m a i y m o r a l s u b j e c t is that institutional inequalities, at least insofar a s t h e y a r e b a s e d u p o n natural o r social contingencies, a r e inescapable a n d p r e s e n t from birth. They deeply s h a p e o u r c h a r a c t e r and interests, g o a l s a n d aspirations, even talents a n d abilities (BSS V; TJ 7,259). T h u s t h e y affect o u r lives m u c h m o r e profoundly a n d call m o r e urgently for m o r a l reflection t h a n inequalities arising from w h a t indi­ viduals c h o o s e t o d o (including participation in associations s u c h as firms, c h u r c h e s , o r universities) a n d from h o w their activities h a p p e n t o turn o u t . Nationality is j u s t o n e further d e e p contingency (like genetic e n d o w ­ ment, race, g e n d e r , a n d social class), o n e more potential basis of in­ stitutional i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e inescapable a n d p r e s e n t from birth. Within Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , there is n o reason to treat this case dif­ ferently from t h e o t h e r s . A n d s o it w o u l d seem that w e can justify o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r only if w e c a n s h o w that the institutional inequalities it p r o d u c e s t e n d to optimize (against t h e b a c k d r o p ot feasible a l t e r n a t i v e global regimes) t h e worst social position. N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e r e is a n o t h e r kind of justification peculiar to t h e global c a s e , w h e r e t h e claims of states m u s t also b e given their due. S u c h a t h o u g h t is suggested by R , on * °P^™^™Zt as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of stales. Even conceding ^\Xh^nZorm^l alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s that would genera e a « " P " ™ ^ m u m s h a r e , o n e c a n still a r g u e that a n y s u c h f f ™ ^ ^ ^ e infringe m o r e i m p o r t a n t rights a n d interests ™ g a p l a u s i b l e i n s t a n c e of s u c h a justification, b u t in ^J™*^™ not fit i n t o a Rawlsian framework, with Rawls's individualistic conviction ^ ^ ^ L l cononly persons a r e t o b e viewed as " ' t i m a t e u n i t s , ^ d o f c e m : "We w a n t t o a c c o u n t for the social values, o r t h e m institutional, c o m m u n i t y , a n d associative a c " ™ ^ ^ justice t h a t i n its theoretical basis i s j n m v pt clarity a m o n g o t h e r s , w e d o not w a n t to relyjo ^ ^ a Jife of c o m m u n i t y , o r to s u p p o s e t h a t ; J m b e r s in their of its o w n d i s t i n c t from a n d superior-to i n however mdividurelations w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . . . . From this cone v . alistic it m a y s e e m , w e m u s t eventually explain nity" (TJ 264-65). 2

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C o n s e q u e n t l y , Rawls r e c o g n i z e s o n l y p e r s o n s a s "self-originating s o u r c e s of valid c l a i m s " (KCMT 543) a n d s o c o m m i t s h i m s e l f to basing h i s criterion of social j u s t i c e exclusively u p o n d a t a a b o u t individual s h a r e s . This c o m m i t m e n t favors a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e original posi­ tion t h a t , like G a n d R„ c o n s i s t e n t l y c o n c e i v e s t h e p a r t i e s as represent­ i n g persons, n e v e r a s s o c i a t i o n s o r s t a t e s a s in R . In a n y c a s e , h o w a s s o c i a t i o n s , c o m m u n i t i e s , a n d s t a t e s a r e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a n d what roles t h e y a r e t o p l a y w i t h i n a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m m u s t for Rawls d e p e n d o n l y u p o n h o w a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s w o u l d affect this social s y s t e m ' s i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s . 2

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2 2 . 1 . 2 . Let u s t u r n to Rawls's s e c o n d m a i n r e a s o n for b e g i n n i n g with t h e s u b j e c t of b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d for a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e in­ equalities t h e y t e n d to p r o d u c e m u s t b e g o v e r n e d b y n o t h i n g less d e m a n d i n g t h a n a m a x i m i n criterion. I n t e r p e r s o n a l a g r e e m e n t s c a n c a r r y m o r a l w e i g h t o n l y if t h e y are freely e n t e r e d i n t o u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are fair (cf. BSS 5 2 - 5 3 ) . This, Rawls believes, is often n o t t h e case w h e n s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c rights a n d liberties, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , or e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s are grossly inferior. T h e attractive i d e a of "interac­ t i o n a m o n g c o n s e n t i n g a d u l t s " c a n b e m o r a l l y a p p e a l i n g o n l y if dif­ ferentials in b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r d o n o t e x c e e d c e r t a i n l i m i t s . A t e n d e n c y t o g e n e r a t e excessive i n e q u a l i t i e s is a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e e p m o r a l defect in a social s y s t e m b e c a u s e m a n y of t h e v o l u n t a r y i n t e r a c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n it will b e m o r a l l y flawed as a r e s u l t . It is t h e n of c o n s i d e r a b l e m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e t h a t social s y s t e m s b e s o s t r u c t u r e d t h a t t h o s e limits are m a i n t a i n e d , o r (as Rawls p u t s it) " b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e " is p r e s e r v e d . This is given a s o n e m a i n r e a s o n for t h e p r e e m i n e n c e , w i t h i n m o r a l reflection, of t h e q u e s t for a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e for t h e b a s i c s t r u c ­ ture. T h i s r e a s o n , too, e x t e n d s to t h e global p l a n e b e c a u s e , e v e n if e a c h state maintained a distributional b a c k g r o u n d ensuring that interac­ t i o n s a m o n g its c i t i z e n s a r e free a n d fair, i n t e r n a t i o n a l ( i n c l u d i n g inter­ g o v e r n m e n t a l ) inequalities in i n f o r m a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r m a y still b e s o g r e a t as t o r e n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s unfair a n d c o e r c i v e — h e n c e t h e n e e d for a c o n c e p t i o n of global b a c k g r o u n d justice. 1 1

" T h i s constraint is still c o m p a t i b l e with the claim that the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l right of persons is the right t o live i n a state that h a s t h e k i n d of state rights a c c o r d e d by international law. If this w e r e true, t h e n the p r e s e n t o r d e r m i g h t i n d e e d b e t h e b e s t w e c a n h o p e for. At least the foremost right of p e r s o n s is fairly s e c u r e . Given all Rawls h a s s a i d a b o u t the basic liberties, t h i s p i e c e of conservative i n g e n u i t y will n o t fit i n t o h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice, but it is p o p u l a r w i t h others, m o s t notably Walzer (JUW 5 3 - 5 4 ; MSS). " H e r e , w e s h o u l d think not m e r e l y of individual transactions, s u c h a s a treaty e s t a b ­ l i s h i n g a foreign military b a s e o r a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n a W e s t e r n tourist a n d a Bangkok prostitute. T h e r e are m o r e c o m p l e x c a s e s , as w h e n , in s o m e p o o r country, local d e m a n d for grain a n d b e a n s c o m p e t e s w i t h foreign d e m a n d for c o t t o n a n d coffee. Even if the coffee c o n s u m e r s are n o m o r e affluent than the relevant l a n d o w n e r s a n d n e v e r h a v e any d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e ( m u c h poorerl w o u l d - b e c o n s u m e r s of grain, g r o s s l y u n e q u a l bargain-

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The c u r r e n t l a w of nations is a c o m p l e t e failure in t h i s r e s p e c t because it is e n t i r e l y insensitive to s u c h differentials in bargaining power. On R t h e global p a r t i e s w o u l d a d o p t a criterion that a s s e s s e s t h e terms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n b y h o w t h e y t e n d t o affect t h e inter­ nal justice of (especially t h e least just) states. This criterion might support s o m e i m p o r t a n t institutional reforms in t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r n a ­ tional-law r e g i m e . In p a r t i c u l a r , it w o u l d require a reorganization of t h e world e c o n o m y s o a s t o e n s u r e that, a s far a s possible, e a c h society has "a sufficient m a t e r i a l b a s e for m a k i n g t h e equal liberties effective" (FG 545). Still, t h i s c r i t e r i o n d o e s not offer an acceptable c o n c e p t i o n of global b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e in Rawls's sense, b e c a u s e it c o u l d b e fully satisfied d e s p i t e indefinite i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities. Let m e e l u c i d a t e this p o i n t by d i s c u s s i n g s o m e w h a t m o r e concretely two i s s u e s w i t h respect to w h i c h R , t h o u g h s u p p o r t e d by ordinary prejudice, conflicts with Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s (which are a c c o m m o d a t e d by G a n d R,). 2 2 . 1 . 2 . 1 . O n e conflict c o n c e r n s t h e relative r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e first principle, w h i c h ( b e y o n d specific "threshold" safeguards) envision rough equality in r e g a r d to s o m e basic liberties. T h u s decisions t h r o u g h the political p r o c e s s a r e r e q u i r e d to b e m a d e in s u c h a w a y that t h o s e significantly affected b y t h e m have equal rights a n d roughly equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e deliberations a n d to influence their o u t c o m e s (cf. TJ §36). S h o u l d this r e q u i r e m e n t e x t e n d also to political choices significantly affecting t h e citizens of m o r e t h a n o n e society? R , v i e w i n g t h e p a r t i e s a s r e p r e s e n t i n g states a n d t h u s yielding a criterion t h a t a s s e s s e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions exclusively in t e r m s ot t h e i n t e r n a l j u s t i c e of s t a t e s , w o u l d lead h e r e to a break m continuity. The right t o e q u a l political participation extends u p to but not b e y o n d the n a t i o n a l level. Political m a t t e r s of supranational significance Jd t h e n b e d e c i d e d by o n e state unilaterally, provided only that the(deci­ sion is s a n c t i o n e d t h r o u g h t h e d o m e s t i c political process a n d d o e s . n o t u n d e r m i n e o r e n d a n g e r t h e internal justice of o t h e r socie ^ F o r ­ eigners, if u n a b l e to exact a treaty, w o u l d b., <* igated to d e c i s i o n s from w h i c h t h e y a r e by right e x c l u d e d . " This result is consis 2

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t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u s q u o , b u t it conflicts w i t h Rawls's individualistic c o m m i t m e n t , w h i c h links t h e first p r i n c i p l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t o t h e status of all h u m a n b e i n g s as free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h i s c o m m i t m e n t , w h i c h m a k e s t h e r e s t r i c t i o n of political e q u a l i t y t o t h e n a t i o n a l a n d s u b n a t i o n a l levels a p p e a r arbitrary, is h o n o r e d b y b o t h R a n d G, w h i c h s u p p o r t a right t o e q u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n (for t h o s e significantly affected) in t h e m a k i n g a l s o of s u p r a n a t i o n a l political d e c i s i o n s . 22.1J2J2. T h e o t h e r conflict c o n c e r n s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls's second principle. According to R , international institutions should e n c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t t h e fulfillment of t h i s p r i n c i p l e within each state. T h e t e r m s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n m i g h t t h e n b e perfectly just, even if t h e y t e n d t o p r o d u c e vast i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s in a c c e s s t o h e a l t h c a r e a n d e d u c a t i o n a n d in i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h . T h e c r i t e r i o n of global justice, a s Rawls's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of states w o u l d fashion it, d e m a n d s only t h a t global c o n d i t i o n s b e m a x i m a l l y s u p p o r t ­ ive of e a c h society's a t t a i n i n g its n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t "to m a i n t a i n a n d to p r e s e r v e its just i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e m possi­ b l e " (TJ 379). Yet if excessive social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s are u n j u s t d o m e s t i c a l l y , h o w c a n like i n e q u a l i t i e s a r i s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y be a m a t t e r of m o r a l indifference? T h e g r o u n d s o n w h i c h Rawls h o l d s t h a t fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y a n d t h e difference p r i n c i p l e c o n s t i t u t e r e q u i r e m e n t s of b a c k g r o u n d justice militate a g a i n s t c o n f i n i n g t h e s e requirements within national borders. Let m e explicate this i d e a of a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e s o m e w h a t m o r e concretely b y examining the natural a n d social contingencies that international socioeconomic inequalities m a y be based u p o n or r e l a t e d t o (cf. §14.3). Let u s b e g i n w i t h a reflection u p o n t h e m o r a l s t a t u s of t h e n a t u r a l a s s e t s ( s u c h as m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s , fertility, c l i m a t e , etc.) of t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s . T h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u c h a s s e t s is cer­ t a i n l y m o r a l l y arbitrary in Rawls's s e n s e . " T h e n a t u r a l a s s e t s in a state's t e r r i t o r y are n o t a reflection of t h e m o r a l w o r t h o f — a r e n o t Deserved b y — e i t h e r this s t a t e o r its citizens. T h e m o r a l a r b i t r a r i n e s s of t h e d i s t n b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s s u p p o r t s (within a R a w l s i a n framework) t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h o s e w h o s e territory i n c l u d e s e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r a l a s s e t s h a v e n o c l a i m t h a t a j u s t global e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s h o u l d offer a n y p a r t i c u l a r r e w a r d s for m a k i n g t h e s e a s s e t s available. J u s t a s G e n i u s t

2

b e t w e e n g e n e r a t i o n s , or our natural duties (including t h o s e toward o t h e r f o r m s of life). G r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s i n political i n f l u e n c e are u n j u s t in b o t h t h e s e c a s e s , albeit for s o m e ­ w h a t different r e a s o n s . Possible e x a m p l e s of supranational political c h o i c e s are p o l i c i e s p e r t a i n i n g to t h e installation a n d proliferation of nuclear t e c h n o l o g i e s ; d i s e a s e control; g e n e t i c engineering; the preservation of historical a n d cultural treasures; t h e storage, use, a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of information; exploitation of natural assets (air a n d w a t e r p o l l u t i o n , u s e of o c e a n s a n d o u t e r s p a c e , d e s t r u c t i o n of tropical forests a n d o z o n e layer); d e c i m a ­ t i o n a n d e x t i n c t i o n of biological s p e c i e s ; experimentation w i t h a n i m a l s global capital a c c u m u l a t i o n ; g r o u n d rules for international trade a n d investment (operation of interna­ t i o n a l financial i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d multinational corporations). " A s a r g u e d in Beitz, PTIR 1 3 6 - 4 2 — t h o u g h Beitz d o e s not u s e "morally arbitrary" in (what I think is) Rawls's s e n s e .

T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2

251

has no prior c l a i m t h a t s h e b e offered a n y specific i n c o m e a d v a n t a g e for the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of h e r g r e a t e r talents (cf. §6.3), s o t h e Saudis have n o p r i o r c l a i m t o b e i n g offered a n y specific i n c o m e advan­ tage for p r o d u c i n g a n d delivering c r u d e oil. T h e t e r m s of international cooperation m a y a n d s h o u l d therefore be d e s i g n e d s o that t h e social inequalities t h e y a l l o w t o a r i s e from n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s (the dis­ tribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s ) t e n d to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t representative individual s h a r e (cf. §6.4). I n t h i s way, a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e would c o n s t r a i n b u t n o t p r e c l u d e i n c o m e inequalities t h a t reflect skewed t e r m s of t r a d e (for e x a m p l e , c r u d e oil versus cotton) arising, via patterns of s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d , from t h e morally arbitrary g e o g r a p h ­ ical d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s . Beitz w a n t s t o d e r i v e m o r e from t h e parallel b e t w e e n n a t u r a l e n d o w ­ ments a n d n a t u r a l a s s e t s , n a m e l y a global r e s o u r c e redistribution prin­ ciple (which h e believes s h o u l d a p p l y even in t h e a b s e n c e of a n y international i n t e r a c t i o n ) . He w a n t s t h e criterion of global justice to govern n o t m e r e l y t h e t e r m s o n w h i c h states c a n develop a n d market their n a t u r a l a s s e t s b u t a l s o rights over t h e s e assets themselves. But Beitz's a r g u m e n t for h i s global r e s o u r c e redistribution principle cru­ cially d e p e n d s u p o n Nozick's m i s t a k e n interpretation of h o w Rawls treats n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . If social institutions m a y be d e s i g n e d to rectify i n e q u a l i t i e s i n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s — p e r h a p s t h r o u g h organ transplants o r t h r o u g h collective o w n e r s h i p of (or a h e a d tax on) spe­ cial g i f t s - t h e n w e c a n i n d e e d c o n c l u d e that social institutions m a y also r e d i s t r i b u t e n a t u r a l a s s e t s (provided t h e s e are relevantly similar to natural e n d o w m e n t s ) . But t h e n , as w e have seen (§5.1.1), Rawls is not c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r e m i s e of this a r g u m e n t . There is n o r e a s o n vvrthrn his s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e - n o t e v e n a ^ a j overidden b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p e r s o n a l the n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of special gifts a n d h a n d i c a p ^ E a c h . p e r s o n * to have a right t o h e r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s a n d » » ^ ™ ^ 5 d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise. W h a t w o u l d follow from ? £ ^ * ™ Parallel of n a t u r a l a s s e t s w i t h n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t t h e r e f o r e quite different from w h a t h e c o n c l u d e s . E a c h state is t . h a v e a n g h t t o ^ n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d t h u s m a y beefy ^ ^ " ^ ^ S a e d them domestically, o r to market them ^ ^ T e n T o f such a within a j u s t global e c o n o m i c h e m e Under t n e , e

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But t h e n Beitz's parallel b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w ­ m e n t s is m i s t a k e n . Yes, t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l assets is just a n a t u r a l fact o r c o n t i n g e n c y , b u t h a v i n g a p r o p e r t y right or e m i n e n t d o m a i n over n a t u r a l a s s e t s is very m u c h a social fact. Such rights a r e a m o n g t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , unlike t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of en­ d o w m e n t s , d o e s t h e n s t a n d in n e e d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Part of t h e dis­ t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s is i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a s t e r p a t t e r n i n t e r m s of w h i c h a Rawlsian c r i t e r i o n of global justice w o u l d a s s e s s a n y p a r t i c u l a r global basic structure. This d o e s not m e a n t h a t — a s s u m i n g global interdepen­ d e n c e — B e i t z ' s r e s o u r c e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n p r i n c i p l e c a n after all b e de­ rived from Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s . Rather, h o w a j u s t global institu­ tional s c h e m e w o u l d regulate o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l over natural a s s e t s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e empirical q u e s t i o n of w h i c h institutional d e s i g n w o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n . T h e parallel b e t w e e n individuals a n d s t a t e s , w h i c h t h e parallel be­ t w e e n n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is p a r a s i t i c u p o n , will n o t fit i n t o a Rawlsian m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n . F o r Rawls, i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n p e r s o n s , a n d t h e y a l o n e , a r e t h e u l t i m a t e u n i t s of m o r a l c o n c e r n . While p e r s o n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s , a r e t h e f u n d a m e n t of his s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of justice, all o t h e r u n i t s (firms a n d families, states, c h u r c h e s , a n d universities) a n d t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s are v i e w e d a s d e p e n d e n t o n a n d r e g u l a t e d b y social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h are t o b e d e s i g n e d for t h e sole benefit of p e r s o n s , v i e w e d as potential p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s . It m a y s e e m t h a t a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e is m u c h l e s s plausible a s a c o n s t r a i n t o n inequalities b a s e d u p o n social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . But I d o n ' t t h i n k t h i s is so. For s u p p o s e , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t s o m e n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y is p o o r o w i n g to a g r e a t e r aggregate p r e f e r e n c e for l e i s u r e t i m e a n d c o n s u m p t i o n , d e p r e s s i n g t h e r a t e of savings. Even t h e n , t h e rela­ tive n e g l e c t of t h e h e a l t h a n d e d u c a t i o n of its c h i l d r e n c a n n o t b e justified m e r e l y b y t h e fact t h a t o t h e r s in this s o c i e t y d i d n o t m a k e a d e q u a t e savings. W i t h its e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l lifetime s h a r e s , Rawls's criterion of justice w o u l d favor i n s t i t u t i o n s d e s i g n e d s o t h a t p e r s o n s w h o b y c h o i c e enjoy m o r e leisure t i m e o r c o n s u m p t i o n m u s t n o r m a l l y b e a r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s b y receiving less of (other) g o o d s , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o r at o t h e r t i m e s . B e y o n d t h i s provision, Rawls r e q u i r e s 15

" I t m a y b e helpful (though slightly m i s l e a d i n g in light of t h e n e x t paragraph) to recall here w h a t I have said about Rawls's distinction b e t w e e n natural a n d social c o n t i n g e n ­ c i e s . Social inequalities related to the distribution of natural a s s e t s d o n o t really arise e i t h e r from a natural c o n t i n g e n c y (as d o t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities) or from a social c o n t i n g e n c y (as d o c l a s s - i n d u c e d inequalities). T h e y are c l o s e s t to g e n d e r - a n d racei n d u c e d inequalities. T h e y are b a s e d o n natural facts that, a b s e n t certain social facts, m i g h t n e v e r have h a d the slightest social i m p o r t a n c e . It is a social fact that h u m a n b e i n g s c a m e to a t t a c h s u c h e n o r m o u s moral i m p o r t a n c e t o skin color, a n d it is a social fact that t h e y d i v i d e d the w o r l d into national properties.

T h e Internal Argument, 22.1.3

253

domestic i n s t i t u t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e w h a t e v e r b u r d e n s r e m a i n in w a y s satisfying t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , a n d h e s h o u l d t h u s require i n t e r n a ­ tional i n s t i t u t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e s u c h b u r d e n s analogously. P e r s o n s should suffer from t h e u n p r o d u c t i v e n e s s of their p a r e n t s o r c o m ­ patriots o n l y i n s o f a r a s ( b e c a u s e of t h e resulting incentives) t h e i r social position w o u l d still b e b e t t e r t h a n t h e worst social position u n d e r all feasible a l t e r n a t i v e e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s (including o n e s that d o n o t permit selective p e n a l i z a t i o n at all). Rawls's individualistic perspective never allows b u r d e n s to b e i m p o s e d u p o n s o m e o n e merely on a c c o u n t of t h e c o n d u c t of h e r relatives or compatriots. Their propensities to­ ward l e i s u r e t i m e a n d c o n s u m p t i o n a r e inappropriate d e t e r m i n a n t s of her social p o s i t i o n — n o l e s s morally arbitrary t h a n t h e geographical distribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s . 22.1.3. O n e m a y think, d e s p i t e t h e arguments presented, that t h e description of t h e global p a r t i e s as representatives of states can y e t be saved o n s o m e o t h e r interpretation. T h e global parties could b e d e ­ scribed, for e x a m p l e , a s c o n c e r n e d for t h e (political, economic, mili­ tary) s t r e n g t h of t h e s t a t e s t h e y represent, so that they w o u l d c h o o s e a criterion t h a t is sensitive t o t h e wealth a n d bargaining p o w e r of t h e worst-off s t a t e s . But s u c h modifications of ^ - b e s i d e s simply assum­ ing a m o r a l l y f u n d a m e n t a l role for t h e s t a t e - s t i l l d o not adequately cope w i t h t h e relative a s p e c t s of justice. If the problem is split u p s o that i n e q u a l i t i e s a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s a n d inequalities a m o n g states a r e dealt w i t h s e p a r a t e l y , t h e n n o excessive ^ ^ ^Za7ZrdeS view even t h o u g h e n o r m o u s inequalities exist across Togiveasimplfexamp^^ by a ratio of 30:1. Allowing t h e separation of-levels w o ^ ^ ^ weaken fhY« tional H poorest state {with a p e r capita gross b e h e s t si i ° ' ° and < in t h e spread " h P capita gross national product of 6,000) the tions c ^ f °' ' - P° S two separate 30:1 Umita'- T ° i? - P s inequalities of 5,000:1 (a spread of 60,000 to qualit\ / ^ c a n b e a d a p t e d to m o r e complex measures of in°f c o m . t Gini coefficient} or to nonquantifiable dimensions 'ar t h ^ ^ a s political influence). It undermines, in particu°f inrT ^ ° ^ P maximin criteria, one formulated in terms othp f s h a r e s a n d applying to domestic basic structures, t h e irisft . ^ " l a t e d i n t e r m s of national shares a n d applying to the global gloh ^ J framework. Even if both are satisfied, t h e position of the a n y l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d could still b e far worse than is unavoidable. on ^ P t a b i l i t y of s u c h a dual criterion emerges clearly when ° h s e r v e s that it w o u l d provide a n incentive to "just-ify" otherwise cessive i n t e r p e r s o n a l inequalities (in political influence, socioecoborH ' a n d t h e like) through t h e interposition of national refers. A n unjust state can conveniently be split into two just ones, ' " h a b i t e d , respectively, b y the rich and the poor. This "reform" would l

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b e essentially c o s m e t i c , r e m o v i n g t h e injustice (as d e n n e d b y t h e p r o ­ p o s e d d u a l criterion) w i t h o u t m i t i g a t i n g t h e g r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s in bar­ g a i n i n g p o w e r a n d social p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o g r o u p s . S u c h i n c e n ­ tives a r e n o t a farfetched possibility. T h e y m a y w e l l b e at w o r k i n South Africa, w h e r e t h e w h i t e s a r e p u r s u i n g s u c h " r e f o r m s " b y c r e a t i n g a n u m b e r of s e p a r a t e " h o m e l a n d s " ; a n d o n e m a y a l s o a r g u e t h a t t h e First W o r l d ' s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a formerly colonial p e r i p h e r y i n t o sovereign s t a t e s w a s p a r t l y m o t i v a t e d b y i n c e n t i v e s of t h i s sort. I n o u r world, n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s f u n c t i o n a s w e l c o m e b l i n d e r s for o u r m o r a l sen­ sibilities. T h e individualistic b a s i s of Rawls's t h e o r y a s e m b o d i e d i n h i s con­ c e r n for b a c k g r o u n d justice s u p p o r t s , t h e n , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n o n w h i c h t h e global p a r t i e s r e p r e s e n t p e r s o n s a n d t h e r e f o r e a s s e s s a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a ­ tive i n d i v i d u a l s h a r e it t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . Ideally, t h e y w o u l d w a n t s u c h a s c h e m e to b e m a x i m a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties, to foster fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y w o r l d w i d e , a n d t o g e n e r a t e social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s o n l y insofar a s t h e s e o p t i m i z e t h e s o c i o e c o ­ n o m i c p o s i t i o n of t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s . H e n c e Ri p r o v i d e s t h e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y m o r e satisfactory r e a d i n g of Rawls's re­ m a r k s , a n d t o it I will n o w t u r n . 2 2 . 2 . 1 . O n e a r g u m e n t favoring G over R is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e i s s u e s j u s t d i s c u s s e d . O n R t h e p a r t i e s , c o n c e i v e d a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of persons, l e a m at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e s e c o n d s e s s i o n t h a t t h e i r society is n o t really c l o s e d a n d self-sufficient b u t p a r t of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l s c h e m e . T h i s b r i n g s o u t a n i n c o h e r e n c e in R , for t h e p a r t i e s (to p u t it dramatically) w o u l d c o m e t o regret t h e i r p r i o r c h o i c e of a c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e . T h e y w o u l d n o w , b y m a x i m i n , favor a c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h all b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s are a s s e s s e d by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e globally w o r s t social p o s i t i o n . Only p r i n c i p l e s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s re­ m a i n t o b e c h o s e n , h o w e v e r , s i n c e e a c h n a t i o n a l b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is a l r e a d y p l e d g e d t o its o w n d o m e s t i c least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p . A n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s d e v i s e d for t h e m a x i m u m benefit of t h e glob­ ally least a d v a n t a g e d m a y n o t benefit t h e m very m u c h . In a n y c a s e , t o w h a t e v e r e x t e n t t h e d a m a g e c a n b e c o n t a i n e d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d at t h i s p o i n t w a n t t o u n d o t h e i r first a g r e e m e n t , s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t all b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e t w o p r i n c i ­ p l e s , i n t e r p r e t e d globally. 16

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I elaborate this t h o u g h t in a forthcoming e s s a y o n mora! i n c e n t i v e s . F o r e x a m p l e , the m o r e favorable the t e r m s of international trade are t o t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d , the l e s s s u c h trade there w o u l d t e n d to be. Overly favorable t e r m s u n d e r m i n e their o w n p u r p o s e a n d therefore will n o t b e favored b y t h e global difference p r i n c i p l e . T h u s , e v e n i n a w o r l d that fully satisfies b o t h criteria a d o p t e d o n R„ institu­ t i o n s m a y n o t sufficiently mitigate t h e effects of c o n t i n g e n c i e s — m a y a l l o w e x c e s s i v e inequalities p r e s e n t from birth or m a y fail t o e n s u r e the fairness of individual transac­ tions. , 7

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2 2 . 2 . 2 . My s e c o n d a r g u m e n t targets m o r e generally t h e priority of t h e domestic c a s e . S u p p o s e w e finally begin (as Rawls d o e s provisionally) with a n a t i o n a l s e s s i o n of t h e original position, yielding a criterion of domestic j u s t i c e , a n d t h e n c o m p l e m e n t this result with p e r h a p s quite elaborate i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u n d rules for preventing global injustice. This p r o c e d u r e involves a n implausible a n d u n n e c e s s a r y a s s u m p t i o n , namely t h a t t h e favored m o d e l of t h e national basic s t r u c t u r e can b e developed w i t h o u t p a y i n g a n y attention to t h e international environ­ ment in w h i c h n a t i o n a l societies exist. This a s s u m p t i o n is i m p l a u s i b l e b e c a u s e the fact of a plurality of nations c a n n o t b e a c c o m m o d a t e d simply by a d d i n g further rules. O n e difficulty, w h i c h Rawls raises in regard to d o m e s t i c institutions, is that the r u l e s g o v e r n i n g a g r e e m e n t s a n d individual transactions c a n n o t b e too c o m p l e x , o r r e q u i r e t o o m u c h information to be correctly a p p l i e d " (BSS 54). In t h e global c o n t e x t , it is even less reasonable to i m p o s e u p o n the v a r i o u s i n t e r a c t i n g a g e n t s t h e responsibility to c o n d u c t t h e i r trans­ actions s o a s t o p r e c l u d e , say, t h e e m e r g e n c e of excessive d i s c r e p a n ­ cies in b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r . S u c h agents " c a n n o t c o m p r e h e n d t h e ramifi­ cations of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s viewed collectively, n o r can they b e e x p e c t e d t o foresee future c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t s h a p e a n d transform p r e s e n t t e n d e n c i e s " (ibid.). T h e r e are t h u s n o practicable rules that could reliably p r e v e n t t h a t "the invisible h a n d guides things in the w r o n g d i r e c t i o n a n d favors a n oligopolistic configuration of a c c u m u l a ­ tions t h a t s u c c e e d s in m a i n t a i n i n g unjustified inequalities a n d restric­ tions o n fair o p p o r t u n i t y " (ibid.). H e n c e there is a n e e d for "institutions that d e f i n e t h e social b a c k g r o u n d a n d . . . continually adjust a n d c o m p e n s a t e for t h e inevitable t e n d e n c i e s away from background fair­ n e s s " (ibid.). This difficulty is h e i g h t e n e d by t h e fact that if a n international in­ stitutional s c h e m e is t o e n d u r e , it m u s t e n g e n d e r in national govern­ m e n t s a n d p o p u l a t i o n s sufficient c o m p l i a n c e with a n d a basic moral allegiance t o its g r o u n d rules. W h e t h e r it will e n g e n d e r s u c h com­ p l i a n c e a n d allegiance, however, d e p e n d s in large part on the internal i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of national societies. Reflections o n national i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d therefore be c o n d u c t e d with a n eye to s u c h consid­ e r a t i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e counterfactual a s s u m p t i o n of national isolation. T h i s p r o b l e m , again, c o r r e s p o n d s to o n e Rawls discusses on t h e n a t i o n a l level. He h o l d s that it w o u l d be pointless to address the internal o r g a n i z a t i o n of associations or to describei various roles n social c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e prerogatives a n d obligations a t t j c h e d t o t h e m , before d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of background jusnce which s t i p u l a t e s w h a t features t h e society as a whole should P?»™™£% d BSS II). o r a n a l o g o u s r e a s o n s o n e M t global b a c k g r o u n d justice from t h e start. nation of s o c i e t i e s m u s t b e developed t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e preferred ,o F

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of a global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e w i t h w h o s e stability a n d o p t i m a l functioning they are to h a r m o n i z e . I n v i e w of t h e a p p a r e n t c o m p l e x i t y of t h e p r o b l e m of b a c k g r o u n d justice, it is t h u s i m p e r a t i v e t o take a global p e r s p e c t i v e from t h e start, to a d j u s t o u r m o r a l reflections a b o u t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of so­ cieties a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s a n d a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n i n d i v i d u a l c o n d u c t in light of o u r a s p i r a t i o n for a s t a b l e a n d just global basic structure. A look a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n c o n f i r m s t h i s r e s u l t . As is p l a i n from o u r h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , the stability a n d o p t i m a l f u n c t i o n i n g of a society's d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s are heavily d e p e n d e n t u p o n its global e n v i r o n m e n t . O r in Kant's w o r d s , " T h e p r o b l e m of e s t a b l i s h i n g a perfect civic c o n s t i t u t i o n is d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e p r o b l e m of a lawful e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n a m o n g s t a t e s , a n d c a n n o t b e solved w i t h o u t a s o l u t i o n t o t h e l a t t e r p r o b l e m " (KPW 47). Since n a t i o n a l a n d global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s s t r o n g l y affect e a c h o t h e r ' s stability a n d a r e closely i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t h e i r effects u p o n individual lives, w e s h o u l d t h i n k a b o u t o u r b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s in general a n d from a global p o i n t of view, t h e r e b y a i m i n g for a n i n t e g r a t e d solution, a just a n d stable i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e p r e s e r v i n g a d i s t r i b u t i o n of basic rights, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d i n d e x g o o d s t h a t is fair b o t h globally a n d w i t h i n e a c h n a t i o n . S u c h a n institutional s c h e m e , if c o n s t r u c t e d along Rawlsian lines at all, w o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h a single unified original p o s i t i o n global in s c o p e . 2 2 . 2 . 3 . Let m e reinforce t h e p r e c e d i n g t w o a r g u m e n t s t h r o u g h a parallel p o i n t t h a t c a n b e m a d e w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to global i n s t i t u t i o n s . If w e follow Rawls's brief s k e t c h (in TJ §58) a n d a p p l y h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice for a self-contained social s y s t e m t o t h e s t a t e s of o u r closely i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w o r l d , t h e n w e r e p e a t a failing t h a t is c o m m o n t o all historical s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t d o c t r i n e s . In a s s e s s i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c ­ t u r e of a s o c i e t y b y looking m e r e l y at h o w it affects ( d i s t r i b u t e s benefits a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g ) its members, w e fail t o c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h h o w o u r s o c i e t y affects t h e lives of foreigners ( a n d h o w o u r lives a r e affected b y h o w o t h e r societies a r e o r g a n i z e d ) — w e d i s r e g a r d t h e (negative) externalities a n a t i o n a l social c o n t r a c t m a y i m p o s e u p o n t h o s e w h o are not p a r t i e s t o i t . T h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d p r e f e r for t h e i r c l i e n t s ' o w n society n e e d n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e o n e t h e y w o u l d rationally w a n t in t h e o t h e r societies of a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n t 1 8

19

"^National d e m o c r a t i c control over a given territory a n d its natural a s s e t s , say, s e e m s o b v i o u s l y desirable in itself a n d y e t m a y have distributive effects that t e n d t o subvert the fairness of international e c o n o m i c relations. T h i s consideration is a n a l o g o u s to Rawls's point that rules p e r m i t t i n g free transfer a n d bequest, t h o u g h u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e i n t h e m ­ selves, w o u l d t e n d to disrupt a fair distribution of opportunities a n d bargaining p o w e r (BSS 54). B a c k g r o u n d justice m i g h t b e preserved i n the face of differential n a t i o n a l a s s e t s t h r o u g h s o m e form of s h a r e d control over, (or an extraction tax u p o n ) n o n r e n e w a b l e natural a s s e t s . R a w l s is s o m e t i m e s aware of this point, a s I have s h o w n i n §21.4 (TJ 380) , 9

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i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . A n d s i n c e impartiality (/the veil of ignorance) p r e c l u d e s u s ( / t h e parties) from making a n exception of o u r (/their clients') o w n society, t h e criterion of d o m e s t i c justice m u s t t h e n b e a d o p t e d from a p o i n t of view that c o m b i n e s b o t h perspectives—from the s u i t a b l y c o n s t r a i n e d s t a n d p o i n t of p e r s o n s w h o a r e b o t h insiders a n d o u t s i d e r s of (different) national societies. Precisely s u c h a s t a n d ­ point is afforded b y t h e global original position I have p r o p o s e d . 2 2 . 2 . 4 . F u r t h e r m o r e it w o u l d s e e m difficult in a context of tight global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t o m a i n t a i n t h e s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n national a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions t h a t Rj a n d R p r e s u p p o s e . H o w does o n e d e c i d e w h e t h e r s u c h institutions as "competitive markets, private p r o p e r t y i n t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s family" (TJ 7) a r e n a t i o n a l o r international, a n d therefore a r e t o b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e d o m e s t i c criterion a d o p t e d in t h e first or by t h e global criterion a d o p t e d in t h e s e c o n d session of t h e original position? By r e c o u r s e to t h e i r history, by t h e a m o u n t of international interaction they involve, o r b y s o m e c o n c e p t u a l criterion? Or c a n w e follow Rawls, w h o s i m p l y d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e task of t h e global parties is confined to c h o o s i n g " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principles to adjudicate conflicting claims a m o n g s t a t e s " (TJ 378)? But e v e n t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n o n l y highlights t h e most intractable i s s u e — the institution of the modern state as a particular form of political a n d e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n c e n t e r i n g a r o u n d governments that have emi­ n e n t d o m a i n i n a d e m a r c a t e d territory, control overwhelming force w i t h i n it, a n d i n t e r p r e t a n d enforce international law beyond its bor­ d e r s . T h i s i n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d simply b e taken for g r a n t e d . In Rawls's sketch, t h e m e r e e x i s t e n c e of t h e states system in its c u r r e n t form r e d u c e s t h e a g e n d a of t h e parties' global session to dealings between g o v e r n m e n t s a n d motivates t h e priority of d o m e s t i c over global p n n c i 2

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° P r e s u m a b l y Rawls here has conflicting claims among state 8™™™*?* Constricting the a g e n d a for the global session in this way would c ^ a ^ m a t e t easier to have the p a r t i e f a d o p t s o m e t h i n g like the familiar W ^ ™ ^ ^ o w o u l d e n s u r e in a d v a n c e that the a d o p t e d critenon could ^ P ^ ^ ' t h e oToor»he other, w h a t m a n y believe to b e t h e most significant in,ust>c e . o t o u r ^ ^ T ^ . •unities for international exploitation that the world martet affords to powerful e c o n o m i c a g e n t s o p e r a t i n g in impoverished Third World ™™™™^ j ' T h e claim that a b s o l u t e military and territorial T characteristic of states, and h e n c e must be c o n c e p t i o n of global justice, w o u l d go counter to Rawls s repea , y

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p i e s of j u s t i c e . His e n d o r s e m e n t of this i n s t i t u t i o n c a n h a v e force, h o w e v e r , only if it h a s b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o m o r a l e x a m i n a t i o n (like o t h e r social i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . O t h e r w i s e Rawls w o u l d b e b e g g i n g a c r u c i a l q u e s ­ tion, p r o v i d e d w e allow, as r e a s o n a b l y w e m u s t at t h e o u t s e t , t h a t j u s t i c e m a y fail to require t h e s t a t e s s y s t e m in its p r e s e n t form. Here Rawls, given h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m , c a n n o t r e s p o n d t h a t s t a t e s o r t h e tradi­ t i o n s a n d c o m m u n a l life t h e y p r o t e c t h a v e in t h e i r o w n right a claim to exist. A n d w h i l e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a n y i s o l a t e d s t a t e m i g h t b e justified b y r e f e r e n c e t o its least a d v a n t a g e d m e m b e r s , a system of sovereign s t a t e s r e q u i r e s a global justification, w h i c h , w i t h i n a R a w l s i a n c o n c e p ­ tion, m u s t involve a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t e m b o d i e s a p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s . 2 2 . 2 . 5 . My final a r g u m e n t in favor of G is t h a t it offers a significant e x p o s i t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e . Not o n l y c a n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e motivational a s s u m p t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e p a r t i e s a s r e p r e s e n t i n g persons w h o s e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y seek t o o p t i m i z e , r e m a i n t h e s a m e o n t h e global level. (Rj also h a s this advantage.) But in a d d i t i o n w e s e c u r e t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d h a r m o n y of o u r c o n c l u s i o n s in a d v a n c e . All i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e ideal e x t e n t of n a t i o n a l sovereignty, a r e n o w systematically a d d r e s s e d w i t h i n a single f r a m e w o r k . T h e r e is n o c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n institu­ tional d e s i d e r a t a i s s u i n g from t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of p a r t i e s differently defined, n o r a r e specific institutional features p r e s u p p o s e d a d h o c p r i o r t o t h e original p o s i t i o n . By n o t taking t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e s s y s t e m for g r a n t e d , b y letting t h e p a r t i e s d e c i d e (as it were) a m o n g criteria t h a t a c c o m m o d a t e e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l diversity in different w a y s , w e c a n t h e n c o n s i d e r a b l y d e e p e n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , m a k e it m o r e unified a n d e l e g a n t . T h i s gain is significant in its o w n right, e s p e c i a l l y i n v i e w of Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , w h i c h a i m s t o s y s t e m a t i z e o u r m o r a l c o n ­ s c i o u s n e s s i n t o a p r i n c i p l e d a n d surveyable w h o l e . Rawls h o l d s t h a t w h a t m o v e s u s t o a c c e p t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice over o t h e r s is first its c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s i n a c c o m m o d a t i n g o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s (the a g g r e g a t e initial plausibility of its v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s ) a n d , s e c o n d , t h e u n i t y a n d e l e g a n c e a c h i e v e d in their s y n t h e s i s (cf. KCMT 5 1 8 - 1 9 ) . G is a m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t in b o t h t h e s e r e s p e c t s . 2 2 . 2 . 6 . Let m e a d d t h a t G is also i n g r e a t e r h a r m o n y ( t h a n R a n d R ) w i t h a n ideal to w h i c h Rawls s e e m s to b e q u i t e a t t r a c t e d , t h e i d e a l of a c o m m u n i t y of h u m a n k i n d . T h u s , in h i s d i s c u s s i o n of stability, h e m a i n ­ t a i n s t h a t o u r "sense of justice is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e love of m a n k i n d " (TJ 476) a n d a d d s t h a t w e w o u l d ideally d e v e l o p a "devotion t o i n s t i t u 22

t

2 a

2

T h i s greater u n i t y is a l s o reflected in n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s w h e r e , for i n s t a n c e , national b o r d e r s m a y b e controversial. What looks like t h e repression of a local d i s t u r b a n c e from o n e p e r s p e c t i v e m a y a p p e a r to b e d e n i a l of t h e right to self-determination from a n o t h e r . Given t h e p r o p o s e d m o d i f i c a t i o n , o n e c a n systematically tackle s u c h q u e s t i o n s t h r o u g h a specification of t h e basic political liberties, w h e r e a s conceiving justice a s w i t h i n a n d b e t w e e n s o c i e t i e s p r e s u p p o s e s that their b o r d e r s are already b e y o n d d i s p u t e . Cf. D'Amato, J 268.

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tions a n d t r a d i t i o n s . . . w h i c h serve the general interests of m a n k i n d " (TJ 489, cf. 501). In e n l a r g i n g u p o n Humboldt's ideal of a social u n i o n of social u n i o n s , Rawls again finds himself "led to t h e n o t i o n of t h e c o m m u n i t y of h u m a n k i n d the m e m b e r s of w h i c h enjoy o n e a n o t h e r ' s excellences a n d individuality elicited by free institutions, a n d t h e y recognize t h e g o o d of e a c h as a n e l e m e n t in t h e c o m p l e t e activity t h e w h o l e s c h e m e of w h i c h is c o n s e n t e d t o a n d gives p l e a s u r e t o all" (TJ 523).

33. T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t So far I h a v e s h o w n only t h a t Rawls's idea of a global interpretation of the original p o s i t i o n , o n a n y of t h e t h r e e specifications I have consid­ ered, y i e l d s a c r i t e r i o n of global justice that is unlikely to vindicate t h e traditional i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime, w h i c h Rawls also e n d o r s e s . T h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y c a n b e dissolved in two ways. We might say that d e s p i t e this e n d o r s e m e n t , Rawls is really c o m m i t t e d to s u p p o r t i n g global in­ stitutional r e f o r m s t o w a r d a regime u n d e r which radical inequalities and d e p r i v a t i o n s (especially of basic rights a n d liberties) w o u l d b e less w i d e s p r e a d a n d severe. Alternatively, o n e might h o l d that s u c h a criten o n of global j u s t i c e is so implausible that one s h o u l d rather reaffirm Rawls's e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e law of nations a n d t h e n modify drastically, or even w i t h d r a w h i s i d e a of globalizing the original position. I will defend t h e f o r m e r s o l u t i o n . In m a k i n g t h i s defense, I will not worry about the charge that a global order satisfying Rawlsian principles w o u l d be morally unacceptable in itself, for t h i s w o u l d b e a n objection to Rawls's entire conception a n d not to its g l o b a l i z a t i o n . His c o n c e p t i o n centrally involves the claim that any s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social system satisfying the two principles is morally acceptable. My c o n c e r n is w i t h objections asserting that in the world as it is t h e r e are s p e c i a l factors, relevant o n the global but not the national plane, that m a k e it i n a p p r o p r i a t e to apply Rawls's maximin criterion to the global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e It is convenient to sort s u c h objections into four categories, d e p e n d i n g o n whether they appeal to (A) realist or IB) moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a n d o n w h e t h e r they concern (1) the ideal of a just world o r d e r o r (2) t h e transition toward s u c h an order. This section P r o c e e d s i n t h r e e s t e p s . I will first (§23.1) s h o w that only objections in category (fil) c a n seriously e n d a n g e r m y main t h e s i s - n a m e l y that given R a w l s i a n c o m m i t m e n t s , w e s h o u l d assess t h e justice,ot our global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y reference to the worst representahve s h a r e it t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e . I will t h e n (§23^) discuss three less impor ' a n t o b j e c t i o n s i n this category, before (§23.3) s'der t h e m o s t s e r i o u s objection, the argumentTrom ^ers'ty. W e m i g h t still c o n c l u d e in t h e end, after the most thorough

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analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l o p t i o n s w i t h t h e i r c o o r d i n a t e p a t h s of transi­ tion, t h a t t h e r e is n o feasible a n d m o r a l l y viable a v e n u e of institutional reform t o w a r d a j u s t e r global r e g i m e . P e r h a p s o u r w o r l d , s o full of o p p r e s s i o n , starvation, a n d w a r , p r o v i d e s t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m s h a r e . O r p e r h a p s j u s t e r global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e o u t of r e a c h from w h e r e w e a r e . If t h i s w e r e really t r u e , it w o u l d g o s o m e w a y t o w a r d s h o w i n g t h a t t h e w o r l d is a s just as w e n o w c a n o r m a y m a k e it, b u t it w o u l d not s h o w t h a t a R a w l s i a n c r i t e r i o n is i n a p p r o p r i a t e o n t h e global p l a n e . It still " c a n serve a s a s t a n d a r d for a p p r a i s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d for g u i d i n g t h e overall d i r e c t i o n of social c h a n g e " (TJ 263), t o b e c a r r i e d "as far a s c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t " (TJ 246). S u c h a s t a n d a r d w o u l d n o m o r e b e refuted b y t h e fact t h a t it c a n n o t b e fully satisfied t h a n a n achieve­ m e n t test w o u l d b e refuted b y t h e fact t h a t n o o n e c a n a n s w e r all the q u e s t i o n s in t h e allotted t i m e . It is n o t a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h a b o u t justice t h a t a just w o r l d is a t t a i n a b l e t h r o u g h m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms. It i s a l s o possible, t h o u g h n e v e r k n o w a b l e , t h a t w h a t e v e r i m p r o v e ­ m e n t s a r e feasible will never t a k e p l a c e . P e r h a p s it is n a i v e o r Utopian t o h o p e t h a t a n y future w o r l d will b e t t e r a c c o r d w i t h a Rawlsian c o n c e p ­ tion of global justice. But this is a n i n d i c t m e n t n o t of t h a t c o n c e p t i o n b u t of o u r s e l v e s . Realism h a r d l y r e q u i r e s t h a t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e m u s t c o n f o r m t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e prevailing s o r d i d realities. W e d o n ' t feel justified t o give u p o u r ideals of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e o r p e r s o n a l h o n e s t y just b e c a u s e w e d e s p a i r of achieving t h e m fully. W e c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y d e m a n d of m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t t h e y v i n d i c a t e t h e s t a t u s q u o . All w e m a y a s k is t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice p r o v i d e a c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g o u r global o r d e r t h a t allows u s t o c h o o s e from a m o n g t h e feasible a n d m o r a l l y a c c e s s i b l e a v e n u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e a n d t h u s specifies o u r m o r a l t a s k g r a d u a l l y t o improve t h e j u s t i c e of t h i s o r d e r . T h o u g h t h e y d e f e n d m y c e n t r a l thesis, t h e s e r e m a r k s a r e i n a n i m p o r t a n t s e n s e a w e a k defense, leaving o p e n w h e t h e r t h e existing global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c a n b e criticized a s u n j u s t . W h e t h e r it c a n d e ­ p e n d s o n g e n e r a l e m p i r i c a l facts t h a t I c a n n o t e s t a b l i s h : Is t h e r e a feasible alternative global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o g e n e r a t e less s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n s i n first-principle g o o d s ? Is t h e r e a feasible p a t h of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o w a r d s u c h a w o r l d o r d e r ? T h e R a w l s i a n crite­ r i o n of global j u s t i c e still m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to justify t h e prevailing i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t all feasible a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e e v e n g r e a t e r d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d in­ equalities. 2 3

^ S u c h a d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d b e akin to t h e "slaveholder's argument" i n Rawls (TJ 1 6 7 - 6 8 ) . Yet this justification of t h e s c h e m e w o u l d still leave o p e n w h e t h e r w e are entitled t o t h e particular p o s i t i o n s w e o c c u p y w i t h i n t h e s c h e m e Even if t h e a i m i m e n t justifies slavery (the institution), t h e slaves m i g h t still argue that this slaveholder is n o t e n t i t l e d t o h i s advantaged p o s i t i o n , a p o i n t Rawls d o e s n o t take n o t i c e of l i k e w i s e e v e n if the prevailing institutional s c h e m e w e r e a s just a s w e c a n or m a y m a k e it it c o u l d still b e true that b e c a u s e o f past c r i m e s o r injustices, m a n y p e r s o n s a n d g r o u p s are n o w m o r e (dis)advantaged t h a n b y right t h e y o u g h t to b e .

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Alternatively, o n e c a n a r g u e t h a t all feasible w a y s of working for o r implementing i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms are blocked by m o r a l c o n s i d e r ­ ations. Yet t h i s is a h o p e l e s s claim. T h e r e surely are i m p o r t a n t m o r a l constraints o n h o w to p r o m o t e institutional c h a n g e , centrally i n c l u d ­ ing c o n s t r a i n t s o n violence, b u t t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s still leave us, the more a d v a n t a g e d , m a n y o p t i o n s (though t h e y limit w h a t t h e less ad­ vantaged m a y d o w h e n t h e m o r e advantaged resist institutional re­ forms t h a t j u s t i c e d e m a n d s ) . Similarly s p u r i o u s ( t h o u g h c o n v e n i e n t a n d therefore popular) are claims t o t h e effect t h a t t h o u g h w e may p r o m o t e institutional reform, we also may insist o n t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of o u r advantaged position. Let me briefly d i s c u s s t w o c l a i m s of this kind. First, it is said o n behalf of the advantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n unjust institutional s c h e m e that t h e y formed " l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s " guiding their choice of a profession, their d e c i s i o n s t o f o u n d a family, t o save money, a n d so forth a n d that it is unfair t h a t t h e y s h o u l d have to c h a n g e their lives now, after having m a d e c o n s e q u e n t i a l d e c i s i o n s o n t h e basis of sincere, albeit false, moral beliefs. T o b e g i n with, s u c h a view is questionable in that it w o u l d increase t h e i n c e n t i v e s t o w a r d p e r s u a d i n g others (for example, o u r children) t h a t p r e v a i l i n g institutions are just even w h e n w e are not at all c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y are. By inculcating s u c h legitimate expectations in t h e m , w e i n s u r e t h e m against institutional reforms that w o u l d re­ d u c e t h e i r a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n . Moreover, t h e view clashes with w h a t is w i d e l y affirmed for morality, t h a t y o u have n o moral claim to stolen Property b e q u e a t h e d to y o u by y o u r mother, n o m a t t e r h o w (inno­ cently) a t t a c h e d y o u m a y h a v e b e c o m e to it in t h e m e a n t i m e . Why s h o u l d m a t t e r s b e different w h e n w h a t is b e q u e a t h e d to y o u is a n excessively a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n in a n unjust institutional s c h e m e ? Finally, t h e a p p e a l t o fairness c a n be raised m u c h m o r e plausibly for the o t h e r s i d e . F o r it is h a r d l y fair that t h o s e w h o have been h a r m e d a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d b y u n j u s t institutions should continue to suffer so that t h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n unjustly advantaged by t h e m will not have their e x p e c t a t i o n s d i s a p p o i n t e d . , , ... S e c o n d , it is often said t h a t p e r s o n s have an indefeasible right 'strictly: privilege) t o s p e n d m o s t of their i n c o m e a n d wealth as they Please, t h a t w e enjoy, as J a m e s Fishkin p u t s it, a cutoff for heroism a n d a " r o b u s t z o n e of [moral] indifference" (LO c h a p s . 3-4). Let us> grant (for t h e s a k e of a r g u m e n t ! ) t h a t there is s u c h a n ^erno^gpn^ege. h a t P e r h a p s l i m i t i n g m o r a l l y m a n d a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s to 2 P « « £ ° ( £ w e o w n . W e m a y "sacrifice" m o r e b u t c a n n o t be m o r a l l y £ -o- Again, s u c h a f u n d a m e n t a l privilege c a n ^ ^ X ^ Z ) Z morally e n t i t l e d t o . It n e e d n o t a p p l y to w h a t a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h c r i m e s or w i t h i n a n unjust i n s t i t u t i o n ^ scheme. S o even if w e g r a n t t h e overriding moral privilege a r g u m e n t l e l d s n o w h e r e if it is t r u e ^ ^ J T ^ S ^ S ^ P a n t s u n d e r prevailing institutions a n d scheme a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a t least o n e accessible alternau

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u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s c o u l d e n j o y t h e i r (ex hypothesi) p r e e m i n e n t Fishkinian privilege, w h i l e l e s s e r r i g h t s (to b e free from v i o l e n c e a n d starva­ tion) a r e also b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d . A parallel r e s p o n s e a p p l i e s t o t h o s e w h o i n v o k e o t h e r v a l u e s — s u c h a s o u r c o m p a t r i o t i c fellow feeling o r o u r d e e p loyalties a n d c o m m i t ­ m e n t s , c o n s t i t u t i v e a t t a c h m e n t s a n d f r i e n d s h i p s , a n d e s s e n t i a l proj­ e c t s — t o a r g u e t h a t w e m a y resist p r o g r e s s t o w a r d global justice. W i t h i n a j u s t w o r l d o r d e r , all p e r s o n s , a n d n o t j u s t a small minority, c o u l d l e a d lives t h a t e m b o d y a n d a r e e n r i c h e d b y t h e s e v a l u e s . T h e r e ­ fore, t h o s e c o n c e r n e d for s u c h v a l u e s h a v e r e a s o n t o s u p p o r t global i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . Yet all t o o often w h a t s u c h critics c a r e a b o u t is n o t t h a t s u c h v a l u e s s h o u l d thrive b u t t h a t they ( p e r h a p s w i t h t h e i r family, friends, c o m m u n i t y , o r nation) s h o u l d e n j o y t h e m . Yes, p r o g r e s s w o u l d entail t h a t w e w o u l d h a v e less of a c h a n c e t o p u r s u e o u r m o r e e x p e n s i v e p r o j e c t s , b u t t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n is a g a i n w h y t h e existing c o m m i t m e n t s of t h o s e greatly a d v a n t a g e d b y u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d take p r e c e d e n c e over t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e w h o , at t h e m a r g i n s of survival, are i n l a r g e p a r t d e p r i v e d of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o form a n d p u r s u e s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s in t h e first p l a c e . My r e s p o n s e s t o c l a i m s of t h i s g e n e r a l k i n d a r e s o m e w h a t t a n g e n t i a l t o m y m a i n goal. Even if t h e r e w e r e significant m o r a l o b s t a c l e s to i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s (be t h e y e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d or f u r t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s o n action), t h e y w o u l d n o t c o u n t a g a i n s t t h e Rawls­ ian criterion of global j u s t i c e . T h e y w o u l d m e r e l y s h o w t h a t it is m o r e difficult t o m a k e p r o g r e s s t o w a r d satisfying t h i s c r i t e r i o n . 2 3 . 2 . Let m e n o w d i s c u s s t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s of c a t e g o r y (Bl), w h i c h , b y a p p e a l t o s p e c i a l factors p r e s e n t o n t h e global p l a n e , s e e k t o d e n y t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Rawls's m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n t o t h e w o r l d at large. 2 3 . 2 . 1 . C o n s i d e r t h e view t h a t w h e r e a s Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e is m e a n t t o a p p l y to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m w h o s e p a r t s a r e closely i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n is in fact r a t h e r insignificant. C o m i n g , as it d o e s , from t h e m o r e affluent c i t i z e n s of t h e First W o r l d , t h i s objection is m a r r e d b y h i s t o r i c a l c o n s i d ­ e r a t i o n s . P e r h a p s our history, e c o n o m y , a n d social life h a v e n o t b e e n affected v e r y m u c h b y e x o g e n o u s influences, b u t c o n s i d e r t h e i n v e r s e v i e w p o i n t . T h e N o r t h Atlantic s t a t e s have, r a t h e r brutally, i m p o s e d a single global s y s t e m of military a n d e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n , d e s t r o y i n g in t h e p r o c e s s t h e social s y s t e m s i n d i g e n o u s t o four c o n t i n e n t s . O u r political a n d e c o n o m i c t r a n s a c t i o n s , even t h o s e i n t e r n a l t o t h e devel­ o p e d W e s t , c o n t i n u e t o exert a n o v e r w h e l m i n g influence o n n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social p o s i t i o n s i n T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s . My p o i n t h e r e is n o t t h a t w e m u s t m a k e g o o d for colonial p l u n d e r , slavery, a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n . N o r a m I a r g u i n g t h a t t h e s e historical e v e n t s c o n t r i b u t e d t o o u r a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t o d a y ' s radically u n ­ e q u a l g l o b a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p o s i t i o n s a n d t h a t w e a r e t h e r e f o r e beneficiaries of p a s t c r i m e s a n d i n j u s t i c e s ( t h o u g h it s e e m s difficult t o

T h e External Argument, 23.2.2

263

deny that w e a r e ) . It is e n o u g h t h a t t h e lives of t h e vast majority of human b e i n g s a r e p r o f o u n d l y s h a p e d a n d affected b y events rever­ berating t h r o u g h a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c h e m e of trade a n d d i p l o m a c y i n which w e a r e h i g h l y a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s . But c o u l d w e n o t g o b a c k t o a w o r l d of closed, self-contained s o ­ cieties in w h i c h , a s I h a v e a l r e a d y c o n c e d e d , a Rawlsian criterion of global j u s t i c e w o u l d b e o u t of place, since t h e r e w o u l d be n o global basic s t r u c t u r e for t h e m t o a p p l y to? Or couldn't w e move t o w a r d a world of m i n i m a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l interaction in w h i c h straightforward rules of r a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e ? 1 a m n o t d e n y i n g such possibilities, b u t t h e y a r e a c a d e m i c . T h e world is not, a n d h a r d l y will b e again, o n e i n w h i c h a criterion of global justice is u n n e c e s s a r y o r undemanding. 23.2.2. Still, s u c h a c a d e m i c speculations are relevant for a s e c o n d objection t o g l o b a l i z i n g Rawls, w h i c h asserts that a criterion of justice is to b e r e j e c t e d if t h e s c h e m e it favors would not be mutually benefi­ cial. T h e m o r e p r o s p e r o u s states, t h e objection continues, would d o better w i t h o u t a n y i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation t h a n within a global in­ stitutional s c h e m e satisfying a Rawlsian criterion. This objection is raised b y Brian B a r r y against Beitz: "I d o not think that [a global differ­ ence p r i n c i p l e ) c a n p l a u s i b l y b e said to b e advantageous to rich as well as p o o r c o u n t r i e s ' ' (HJGP 232, cf. 233-34). Barry's o b j e c t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u e d in two ways. He c a n be taken to assert t h a t t h e transition to a j u s t global s c h e m e m u s t benefit even those n o w u n j u s t l y a d v a n t a g e d . Barry would then be insisting that existing a d v a n t a g e s i n capital, technology, education, a n d t h e like, need n o t b e r e l i n q u i s h e d voluntarily. This is the construal to which David R i c h a r d s r e s p o n d s : " W h e n . . . J o h n Stuart Mill . . . cnticizfed) '"-justices to w o m e n , h e c o n c e d e d that m e n , as a class, would suffer some l o s s e s w h e n t h e y s u r r e n d e r e d their unjust domination, just as slaveowners d i d w h e n slavery w a s e n d e d ; Mill's argument is quite d e a r * a t t h e g a i n is n o t o n e of a c t u a l reciprocal » ^ ' " ^ *hey lose), b u t t h e g a i n in justice w h e n m e n regulate their conduct by Principles t h e y w o u l d r e a s o n a b l y accept if they were w o m e n o n t h e " t ^ ^ ^ o as claiming that t h e n e w institu• FI « intprpsl rates or speculative 24

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T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.2.2

tional s c h e m e , once in place, m u s t b e a m u t u a l l y beneficial o n e . He c o u l d t h e n r e p l y to R i c h a r d s that, w h e r e a s m e n d o b e t t e r w i t h sex equality t h a n if t h e y d i d n o t i n t e r a c t w i t h w o m e n at all, t h e United States, say, w o u l d d o w o r s e i n a Rawlsian w o r l d o r d e r t h a n in s p l e n d i d isolation. T h i s objection m a y rest o n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m a x i m i n criterion. T h e t e r m s of social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e r e q u i r e d t o o p t i m i z e (interschemically) t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n , a n d t h e y will d o s o o n l y if t h e y e n g e n d e r a g o o d d e a l of c o o p e r a t i o n . C o o p e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r — b e t w e e n p e r s o n s o r c o l l e c t i v i t i e s — c a n n o t b e c o e r c e d ; it m u s t b e elic­ ited. P a r t i c i p a n t s will b e p r e p a r e d t o c o n d u c t i n t e r p e r s o n a l / i n t e r c o l lective t r a n s a c t i o n s only insofar a s t h e s e benefit t h e m u n d e r t h e p r e ­ vailing t e r m s . Here t h e e q u a l i z i n g t e n d e n c y of t h e m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n is c h e c k e d . T h o u g h a n egalitarian s c h e m e e n s u r e s for t h e least a d v a n ­ t a g e d (the p o p u l a t i o n s of less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s ) a large relative s h a r e of t h e benefits of social c o o p e r a t i o n , it m a k e s s u c h c o o p e r a t i o n less attractive t o o t h e r s a n d t h u s less extensive. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , it m a y b e less j u s t t h a n a m o r e inegalitarian s c h e m e . In a n y c a s e , a global o r d e r t h a t is j u s t b y Rawlsian lights is o n e u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s a n d collectivities a r e free t o s h u n e c o n o m i c t r a n s a c t i o n s of specific k i n d s . T h e p o p u l a t i o n s of m o r e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a n d r e g i o n s , i n p a r t i c u ­ lar, w o u l d b e free t o t r a d e only d o m e s t i c a l l y a n d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d h e n c e c a n b e p r e s u m e d to benefit from w h a t e v e r f u r t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n s t h e y w o u l d c o n d u c t . In this s e n s e o n e c a n say, b a r r i n g externalities, t h a t a n a t i o n a l o r global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e satisfying t h e Rawlsian crite­ r i o n is, by t h e very construction of this criterion, m u t u a l l y beneficial for i n d i v i d u a l s a n d collectivities a s against a b e n c h m a r k of n o n c o o p e r a t i o n ( t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y n o p a r t i c i p a n t s w o u l d benefit a s m u c h a n d as d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y from t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s a s w e in t h e d e v e l o p e d West d o at p r e s e n t ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Barry's objection m a y b e r e n e w e d o n e last t i m e . A global difference p r i n c i p l e m a y justify n o t m e r e l y a g e n e r a l a d j u s t m e n t of m a r k e t p r i c e s b u t a different specification of p r o p e r t y rights over n a t u r a l assets—involving, for e x a m p l e , a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a x o n (or inter­ n a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l of) n a t u r a l a s s e t s . It is t h e n q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t a n a s s e t - r i c h society or g r o u p of s o c i e t i e s w o u l d d o w o r s e u n d e r a just global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a n i n perfect isolation, n a m e l y , w h e n t h e benefits of c o o p e r a t i n g are o u t w e i g h e d b y t h e c o s t s of s h a r ­ ing natural assets. But is t h i s a p r o b l e m ? S h o u l d o n e , in c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l isolation s c e n a r i o s t h a t are t o serve as b e n c h m a r k s , t a k e as given t h e 27

2 8

"Barry's objection, s o c o n s t r u e d , arises n o t o n l y in t h e global c o n t e x t It c a n e q u a l l y b e raised w i t h i n a state, o n behalf of a w e a l t h y province, for e x a m p l e , or b y a g r o u p of s u c h p r o v i n c e s s e e k i n g to e x c l u d e a p o o r o n e . Quite apart from the i s s u e of globalization, then, it is crucial for Rawls's theory that this objection b e m e t , as I h o p e t o d o in t h e text. *»Cf. Rawls's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n "perfectly just" a n d "just t h r o u g h o u t " (TJ 7 8 - 7 9 ) .

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natural a s s e t s of t h e v a r i o u s societies (territories w i t h their m i n e r a l resources, fertility, c l i m a t e , etc.)? Doing s o involves t w o p r e s u p p o s i ­ tions, b o t h of w h i c h s e e m q u e s t i o n a b l e a n d difficult t o defend. First, one w o u l d b e p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e institution of s t a t e s s h o u l d b e understood a s i n c l u d i n g full national o w n e r s h i p of all n a t u r a l assets within t h e n a t i o n a l territory, regardless of t h e distributional effects of this u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e r e little is gained by simply declaring in t h e style of Nozick t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e of national sovereignty "is f u n d a m e n t a l . " Arguing for t h e p r i n c i p l e w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y involve t h e claim t h a t it is morally i m p e r a t i v e t h a t s t a t e s o r national c o m m u n i t i e s , p e r h a p s c o n ­ ceived a s u l t i m a t e u n i t s of moral c o n c e r n , s h o u l d fully o w n s o m e territory. It w o u l d n o t b e e n o u g h t o s h o w that they s h o u l d fully control some n a t i o n a l territory, b e c a u s e s u c h control w o u l d b e compatible with, for e x a m p l e , a n international tax o n t h e extraction of national mineral r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h at least t h e distributional effects of the morally a r b i t r a r y g e o g r a p h i c a l distribution of natural assets c o u l d e mitigated. S i n c e t h e p r e m i s e that t h e r e ought to b e full national control of n a t u r a l a s s e t s d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e desired conclusion, t h e complaint d o e s t h e n involve t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n that nations have a moral claim fully t o own t h e natural assets within their territory. It seems d o u b t f u l t h a t t h i s full-ownership claim h a s sufficient plausibility to furnish (part of) a n i n d e p e n d e n t constraint against w h i c h a criterion °f global j u s t i c e c a n b e c h e c k e d . The s e c o n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n is that the currently existing distribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s a m o n g states is morally acceptable. I find this i m ­ plausible i n light of h o w s u c h assets w e r e in fact acquired m a history involving g e n o c i d e , colonialism, slavery, unjust wars, andI t h e hke. These h L o r i c a l facts c a n n o t b e corrected for. We cannot natural ( a n d social) assets w e w o u l d n o w ^ * t * * ™ ^ ^ and injustices of t h e p a s t h a d never occurred. Who would w e e v e n be, i n s u c h a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l world? This different specification of Barry's benchmark,yielding:a ^ ™ ™ J Rawlsian m a x i m i n criterion m e e t s easily. ° societies, m u s t b e m o r e p r o s p e r o u s c o o p e r a t m g ^ £ g £ « £ t t h basic s t r u c t u r e t h a n it/they w o u l d be if e x i s h n g m P ^ J° , . a s h a r e of t h e w o r l d ' s n a t u r a l assets proportionate to its/tne p P h

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T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.2.3 30

c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e a s w e m i g h t a p p l y to t h e l a t t e r . Rawls, however, w a n t s h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t o b e m o r e w i d e l y a p p l i c a b l e His n o t i o n of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society is n o r m a t i v e , n o t d e s c r i p t i v e : "It em­ b o d i e s . . . c e r t a i n g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of a n y s o c i e t y t h a t it s e e m s one w o u l d , o n d u e reflection, w i s h t o live in a n d w a n t to s h a p e o u r interests a n d c h a r a c t e r " (RAM 634). T h u s , w h e n t h e p a r t i e s a r e s a i d to c h o o s e a criterion of j u s t i c e for a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, t h i s c a n n o t m e a n t h a t t h e i r c r i t e r i o n is a p p l i c a b l e only to w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t i e s , t h a t a dif­ ferent c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d b e u s e d for a s s e s s i n g s o c i e t i e s t h a t a r e n o t wello r d e r e d . (If it m e a n t this, t h e n Rawls's p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d b e entirely irrelevant b e c a u s e m o s t of h i s twelve c o n d i t i o n s for w e l l - o r d e r e d n e s s [RAM 634-36] a r e n o t satisfied b y a n y e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y either.) Rather, it m e a n s t h a t t h e c h o s e n c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t h a r m o n i z e w i t h a c l u s t e r of o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s t h a t R a w l s c o l l e c t s t o g e t h e r i n t o t h e " m o d e l c o n c e p t i o n " of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society. It m u s t be satisfiable u n d e r t h e ideal c o n d i t i o n s of a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m . B e y o n d this, h o w e v e r , it m u s t also g u i d e u s t o w a r d s u c h i d e a l c o n d i ­ t i o n s , m u s t " p r o v i d e a n A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t for a p p r a i s i n g existing i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d a r d for g u i d i n g t h e c o u r s e of social c h a n g e " (TJ 520). Precisely t h i s f u n c t i o n of Rawls's criterion w o u l d b e j e o p a r d i z e d if t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t itself shifted in re­ s p o n s e t o c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , o u r c h a n g i n g d i s t a n c e from a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m . T h i s p o i n t is clear o n t h e n a t i o n a l level. W h e n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l de­ m o c r a c y l a p s e s into t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m or a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m (as G e r m a n y d i d i n t h e 1930s o r Chile in t h e 1970s), w e a r e h a r d l y l e d t o t h i n k t h a t n o w a different criterion of j u s t i c e s h o u l d b e u s e d t o a p p r a i s e t h e n e w r e g i m e a n d t o g u i d e o u r efforts to effect c h a n g e . Similarly, I w o u l d think, w e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of o u r criterion of global j u s t i c e , o u r r a n k i n g of alternative global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s , a s c h a n g i n g i n r e s p o n s e to varying i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s . Of c o u r s e , m a n y i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a ­ n i s m s c r u c i a l for a n y t h i n g like a w e l l - o r d e r e d w o r l d c o m m u n i t y are p r e s e n t l y lacking, b u t h o w d o e s this l a c k u n d e r m i n e t h e belief t h a t in a 3 1

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I o w e t h i s objection, forcefully stated, t o Robert F u l l i n w i d e r of t h e University of Maryland Center for P h i l o s o p h y a n d Public Policy. "Originally Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n w a s t o have b e e n applicable to all s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m s e x i s t i n g i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of justice (TJ §22). Rawls h a s s i n c e b e e n n a r r o w i n g the s c o p e h e c l a i m s for h i s c o n c e p t i o n . He n o w says that "justice a s fairness is f r a m e d to a p p l y t o w h a t I have called t h e basic structure' of a m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . W h e t h e r justice a s fairness c a n b e e x t e n d e d to a general political c o n c e p t i o n for different k i n d s of s o c i e t i e s . [or] to a general moral c o n c e p t i o n . . . are a l t o g e t h e r separate q u e s t i o n s . I avoid p r e j u d g i n g t h e s e larger q u e s t i o n s o n e w a y or t h e other" (JFPM 2 2 4 - 2 5 ) . He d o e s n o t m e a n , I a m afraid, that the ideal of a just b a s i c structure h e s e e k s t o specify is to e n v i s i o n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . Rather, h e s e e m s to b e d e l i m i t i n g w h a t i s n o w the s c o p e of h i s theoretical c o n c e r n . His c o n c e p t i o n is to apply to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c ­ racies; it m a y o r m a y n o t be relevant to social s y s t e m s t h a t are s t r u c t u r e d differently. It is t h e r e b y left o p e n w h e t h e r it is still applicable e v e n to Great Britain, w h i c h d o e s n o t h a v e a constitution.

T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.3

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just w o r l d s u c h m e c h a n i s m s w o u l d exist a n d t h a t t h e y o u g h t to be established? T h e c r e a t i o n of political a n d legal institutions o n b o t h t h e national a n d g l o b a l levels w o u l d s e e m p a r a d i g m a t i c i n s t a n c e s of o u r natural d u t y "to a s s i s t in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just a r r a n g e m e n t s w h e n they d o n o t e x i s t " (TJ 334, cf. 115). 2 3 . 3 . T h e final o b j e c t i o n I will c o n s i d e r is that t h e ideal of a global regime t h a t is j u s t b y Rawlsian lights m a y c o h e r e well with our cultural heritage a n d our c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s b u t is nevertheless i n a p p r o p r i ­ ate o n a c c o u n t of existing i n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity of traditions a n d m o r a l j u d g m e n t s . W e m u s t n o t i m p o s e o u r values u p o n t h e rest of t h e world, m u s t n o t p u r s u e a p r o g r a m of institutional reform that envisions t h e gradual s u p p l a n t i n g of all o t h e r c u l t u r e s by a globalized version of o u r own c u l t u r e a n d v a l u e s . This is, I t h i n k , t h e m o s t s e r i o u s objection to globalizing Rawls a n d the o n e t h a t s e e m s to have influenced Rawls himself. C o n s i d e r this passage: 32

33

We take our examination of the Kantian conception of justice as addressed to an impasse in our recent political history; the course of democratic thought over the past two centuries, say, shows that there is no agreement on the way basic social institutions should be arranged if they are to conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons.. [W]e are not trying to find a conception of justice suitable for all societies regardless of their particular social or historical circumstances. We want to settle a fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions within a democratic society under modem conditions How far the conclusions w e reach are "of interest in a wider context i s a separate question. [KCMT 5 1 7 - 1 8 ] It is w o r t h n o t i n g , t o begin with, that in t h e r a t h e r agnostic final s e n t e n c e Rawls is careful n o t to prejudge the question of an eventual global e x t e n s i o n (as h e says explicitly at JFPM 225). Moreover by a p ­ p e a l i n g t o s u c h l a n d m a r k s of "our" political culture as t h e D e d a r a t m n of I n d e p e n d e n c e , I m m a n u e l Kant, a n d t h e French Revolution, Rawls - T h e p l e a n o t t o ride r o u g h s h o d over the values ^ ^ ^ S S A ^ w e i g h , . But i, c a n b e a m u s i n g to observe ^ J ^ ^ t e arena e m p h a t i c p r o t e s t a t i o n s against pursuing our .deals o - V ^ £ L d v a n t a g e d ones at that, c o m e from m e m b e r s of o u r o w n culture, and from «™ without protection from There is n o c o m p a r a b l e outcry from that global m a j a r f l j l v m g vvi. j-^ ^ ^ h u n g e r a n d o p p r e s s i o n . Asserting that tyranny and « ^ « » ^ well be a c c e p t e d parts of its culture is often convenient b u t ' * ° , e e m e n t than is m u c h l e s s g e n u i n e l y Intercultural (and thus m o r a U y . ^ ^ t u ^ e n « y from a often taken for g r a n t e d . See Bergen ATHR tor s o m e iu sociologist. . .u„ f global justice a n d n o T h e later Rawls, that is, w h o is withdrawingfron>*e top.c^ j j j ^ ^ longer a s s e r t s that h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice is appropi m s to have s p a t i o t e m p o r a l d o m a i n that h e claims his conception i ^he United States in the u n d e r g o n e substantial shrinkage t ° r d J h e centrat ma 1960s a n d '70s. T h o s e u n e a s y with thus » ? £ £ ™ £ accommodates it. interpretation. G d o e s n o t s i d e s t e p cultural divergence out 7

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i m p l i e s that h e takes this c u l t u r e to e x t e n d well b e y o n d o u r national borders. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , Rawls's h e s i t a t i o n s affect o n l y o n e a s p e c t of the global e x t e n s i o n . T h e y i n d i c a t e s o m e d o u b t as to w h e t h e r h e should take a s t a n d o n h o w societies c u l t u r a l l y different from o u r o w n should b e o r g a n i z e d a n d o n h o w t o a s s e s s t h e j u s t i c e of t h e i r d o m e s t i c institu­ t i o n s . C o n c e r n i n g this q u e s t i o n , t h e r e m a y s e e m to b e a m o r a l l y attrac­ tive alternative, namely, t o leave t h i s u p t o t h e m e m b e r s of t h a t society. No s u c h alternative is available, h o w e v e r , w i t h r e g a r d to t h e d e e p e r q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d a n d reformed. This q u e s t i o n w e c a n n o t e v a d e s h o r t of r e n o u n c i n g interna­ tional i n t e r a c t i o n altogether. Nor c a n w e a d e q u a t e l y r e s p o n d to it e x c e p t t h r o u g h a c o n c e p t i o n of b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e . T h e r e is n o recog­ n i z e d natural criterion of justice. Nor c a n t h e r e b e a neutral criterion equally c o n g e n i a l to all v a l u e s a n d c u l t u r e s — m i n i m a l l y b e c a u s e t h e r e is o u t r i g h t d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t f o r m s of n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a just global o r d e r s h o u l d allow. S o m e will a d v o c a t e t o l e r a n c e for as m a n y diverse forms of n a t i o n a l r e g i m e as c a n coexist, w h i l e o t h e r s will insist o n t h e global proliferation of s o m e n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d form of regime. But if t h e s e t w o a p p r o a c h e s fail a n d if global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e p o s e s a g e n u i n e p r o b l e m of b a c k g r o u n d justice, t h e n h o w c a n Rawls even h e s i t a t e t o globalize t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s — h i s c r i t e r i o n for assessing b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s ? H o w c a n h e d e c l i n e t o take a s t a n d , a Rawlsian stand, o n a global o r d e r in w h i c h t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is u n i m a g i n a b l y w o r s e t h a n t h a t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d i n t h e d e v e l o p e d West, in w h o s e behalf Rawls h a s criticized t h e d o m e s t i c b a s i c s t r u c ­ t u r e s of a d v a n c e d W e s t e r n societies? T h e a n s w e r h a s to d o , I believe, w i t h Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i v i s t m o d e of justification. Reflective e q u i l i b r i u m is a c h i e v e d a m o n g , a n d relies u p o n , o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , at least s o m e of w h i c h a r e m o r a l o n e s : "There is a n a p p e a l t o intuition at t h e b a s i s of t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e ' ' (TJ 124-25). Rawls d o e s n o t s p e a k of i n t u i t i o n s in t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e , h o w e v e r , as a priori a n d s h a r e d b y all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . He r e c o g n i z e s t h a t o u r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s evolves h i s t o r i c a l l y a n d o n t o g e n e t i c a l l y a n d t h a t its fixed p o i n t s , t h o u g h w e h a v e n o t h i n g e l s e t o g o on, lack a n y 3 4

35

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S e e also his references to "the c o u r s e of d e m o c r a t i c t h o u g h t over the past two centuries, say" (KCMT 517), to "a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y u n d e r m o d e m c o n d i t i o n s " (KCMT 518, 537), a n d to "a m o d e m constitutional d e m o c r a c y " UFPM 224). " A n o t h e r flaw in the ideal of neutrality is that alternative global basic s t r u c t u r e s differ in t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e y w o u l d s u p p o r t a n y particular form of national organization. T h i s is a n a l o g o u s to a point Rawls m a k e s w h e n h e s a y s that the c h o i c e of a d o m e s t i c basic structure will differentially affect t h e c h a n c e s of alternative religions a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of the g o o d t o gain a d h e r e n t s (FG 549). T h e idea of institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s u n d e r w h i c h all v a l u e s f l o u n s h equally is d e e p l y i n c o h e r e n t .Any institutional s c h e m e c a n b e o p p o s e d o n t h e (accurate) g r o u n d that it is comparatively i n h o s p i t a b l e t o s o m e particular v a l u e or form of life.

T h e Externa] Argument, 23.3

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ultimate foundation—rational or empirical (cf. JFPM 235). Rawls's ex­ plicit s t r a t e g y is therefore to convince others of t h e criterion h e p r o ­ p o s e s b y b r i n g i n g t h e i r o w n considered j u d g m e n t s to b e a r u p o n t h e issue of social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e idea of globalizing Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is t h e n c h a l l e n g e d by the great international diversity of c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , w h i c h rules out any "appeal to intuition" in t h e global s e t t i n g . But I d o n ' t t h i n k this p r o b l e m defeats t h e idea of globalization, at least w h e n t h e " s e a r c h for reasonable g r o u n d s for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t . . . r e p l a c e s t h e s e a r c h for moral truth," a n d "the practical social task is p r i m a r y " (KCMT 519). To attain this practical goal o n t h e global p l a n e , an a g r e e m e n t n e e d n o t specify a particular derivation of o r rationale for t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice, "there can, in fact, b e considerable differences in c i t i z e n s ' c o n c e p t i o n s of justice provided that t h e s e c o n c e p t i o n s lead to s i m i l a r political j u d g m e n t s . And this is possible, since different p r e m i s e s c a n yield t h e same conclusion. In this case t h e r e exists w h a t w e m a y refer t o as overlapping rather t h a n strict c o n s e n s u s (TJ 38788- cf JFPM 246-51- IOC). What counts, then, regardless of t h e consid­ e r e d j u d g m e n t s a n d other reasons mat m a y motivate a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n , is c o n v e r g e n c e u p o n the criterion itself T h e p r e s e n t objection to t h e globalization of Rawls's criterion m u s t t h e n s h o w m o r e t h a n c u l t u r a l diversity; it m u s t at least show that a g r e e m e n t o n s u c h a c r i t e r i o n of global justice is out of r e a c h ^ 36

I s a y "at l e a s t " because, v * ^ e n d o r e e d j f f e r e n t M o f overlapping consensus. i justice a n d a different long-term v> ^ ^ , agree a b o u t t h e first stretch oi in , politically s u p possibility. M a n y proposals ro , d hv Rawlsian prinp o r t e d b y T h i r d World nations an « ^ ^ . ciples, h a v e b e e n blockea m diversity is exploited to v e l o p e d West. Here the taci ^ ^ j i t i v e self-interest l e u p h e c o m p l e m e n t t h e tedious a p p moral justification for s u c h mistically, t h e "national intere ^ i d aU, s t o resist resistance. Such a j u s t i n c a t i o ^ ^ s w e ourselves u n d e r s t a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms d e m a n - recognize as unjust advantages w e it a n d t o exploit what we ou the g r o u n d s that o t h e r e n j o y w i t h i n t h e current int h i s is a n a l o g o u s c u l t u r e s d o n o t (nifty) share ^ , . to t h e familiar if outdated beiiei f

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n i z e a n d enslave o u r n e i g h b o r s so long a s t h e y a r e n o t C h r i s t i a n s themselves.) If w e m a y not, t h e n w e n e e d a c o n c e p t i o n of global justice at least for t h e critical a s s e s s m e n t a n d g u i d a n c e of o u r o w n govern­ m e n t ' s policies, w h i c h m a y c o n s t i t u t e very significant o b s t a c l e s to global i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o d a y — o b s t a c l e s , m o r e o v e r , for w h i c h w e would be most immediately responsible. H o w e v e r n a r r o w a m o r a l o v e r l a p w e m a y a i m for, I a d m i t w e w o n ' t get it. T h e r e are b o u n d to b e p e r s o n s w h o d i s a g r e e w i t h u s , in g o o d faith, e v e n a b o u t t h e very first s t e p s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . T o t h e m , t h e Rawlsian f r a m e w o r k p o s e s a c h a l l e n g e t o w o r k o u t t h e i r o w n c o n c e p ­ t i o n of justice or at least to e x p o u n d t h e g r o u n d s of t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t . P e r h a p s s o m e of t h e i r criticisms c a n b e u n d e r c u t internally, or Rawls s m a i n c o n c l u s i o n s c a n b e p r e s e r v e d b y justifying a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e m in t h e objectors' t e r m s t o t h e i r satisfaction. M a y b e t h e Rawlsian con­ c e p t i o n will h a v e t o b e revised in light of t h e i r c r i t i q u e . S u c h t h i n g s c a n n o t b e k n o w n in a d v a n c e . Only t h e e n s u i n g d i s c u s s i o n c a n s h o w w h e r e c o n v e r g e n c e is a t t a i n a b l e a n d w h e r e a g r e e m e n t o n p a r t i c u l a r reforms c a n i n d e e d n o t b e achieved. Even if d i s a g r e e m e n t p e r s i s t s , w e m a y still c o n c l u d e t h a t a c o m p e t ­ ing p o s i t i o n is w r o n g , a n d w e m a y t h e n w o r k for a j u s t e r w o r l d w i t h o u t or e v e n a g a i n s t o u r o p p o n e n t s , insofar a s d o i n g s o is m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i ­ ble b y o u r lights. T h i s is w h a t h a p p e n e d in t h e A m e r i c a n Revolution, in t h e Civil War, a n d in t h e N e w Deal. Social i n s t i t u t i o n s derive n o special m o r a l s a n c t i t y from t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e y n o w exist. If w e a r e c o n ­ v i n c e d o n reflection t h a t t h e y are u n j u s t , t h e n w e o u g h t t o w o r k t o w a r d feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s , even if s o m e g e n u i n e m o r a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s c a n n o t n o w b e resolved. T h e fact of d i s a g r e e m e n t is n o r e a s o n n o t to act in light of w h a t e v e r (factual and) m o r a l beliefs w e n o w t h i n k a r e best s u p p o r t e d . O u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s s u p p o r t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice w h o s e s c o p e is universal, even t h o u g h its p r e s e n t a p p e a l is n o t . A n d w e a r e s u r e l y n o t morally r e q u i r e d t o a c q u i e s c e i n a n y c o n d u c t or p r a c t i c e b a c k e d b y t h e (sincerely held) c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s of o t h e r s . As Rawls says, "A t h e o r y of justice m u s t w o r k out from its o w n p o i n t of view h o w to t r e a t t h o s e w h o d i s s e n t from it" (TJ 370). W h y s h o u l d liberals s h u n t h e political struggle over i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s , leaving t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o t h e n o n l i b e r a l d i s p u t a n t s ? T h e c e n t r a l p o i n t of t h e last t w o p a r a g r a p h s is t h a t t h e difficulty is n o t u n i q u e t o t h e global p l a n e . I n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity is o n l y a s p e c i a l c a s e of diversity of c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s in g e n e r a l . T h u s , p r e d i c t a b l y , critics of Rawls h a v e rejected h i s ideal of a w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t y by refusing a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e "requisite u n d e r s t a n d i n g of f r e e d o m a n d e q u a l i t y " (KCMT 517) t h a t h e c l a i m s is implicit i n o u r p u b l i c c u l t u r e . Rawls w a s n o t d e t e r r e d b y t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t o t h e r t h i n k e r s in t h e W e s t w o u l d , in light of t h e i r m o r a l convictions, c o m e to reject h i s c o n c l u 3 7

37

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271

sions. He c o u l d n o t a n d d i d n o t achieve even the narrowest overlap within a single n a t i o n a l society. He c o u l d h o p e to (and, I think, did) express t h e c o n v i c t i o n s of a s e g m e n t of t h e intelligentsia in the United States a n d s o m e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , b u t c a n h e claim to speak for t h e o'ack, Hispanic, a n d native A m e r i c a n s u b c u l t u r e s or even for ordinary nners, clerks, h o u s e w i v e s , o r factory workers? Rawls left s u c h q u e s ­ tions open, a t t e m p t i n g m e r e l y to systematize "one (educated) p e r s o n s sense of j u s t i c e " (TJ 50). He h a s thereby initiated a discourse a b o u t Justice from w h i c h g r e a t e r clarity a n d convergence m a y emerge m d u e course fa

The idea of g l o b a l i z i n g Rawls a i m s for n o more a n d w^™?™* "ot be d i s h e a V t e n e d - o r feel a b s o I v e d ! - b y P ^ l ^ Z T X T o f 'bout t h e a p p e a l a n d political s u c c e s s J W K » o r of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms it ^ ^ . T Z t h objections develop a n d p r o p o s e this c o n c e p t i o n a n d then d e a ^ ^ and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s from o t h e r cultures o r fromrw* they a c t u a l l y a r i s e . A cross-cultural ^ c o u r s e J b o vision of its moral i s s u e of g r e a t c o m m o n concern ™ t i o n s involved less Participants a n d will t e n d to m a k e the moral y i r a b I e or even Parochial a s e a c h tries to a c c o m m o d a t e w h a t valuable in o t h e r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . of justice is a n especially A g l o b a l i z e d v e r s i o n of Rawls's f P ross-cultural discourse. It is suitable o n e w i t h w h i c h to e n t e r sucn ^ ^ based u p o n a s m a l l set of widely X i d g i n g a n d incorporating °ffer a g o o d d e a l of flexibility for-a ^ dical, cultural diversity. My proposal G, m a - w n sketch of global h a s m o s t t o offer by way of s u c h n e w ^ e r y national or j u s t i c e — o n e i t h e r Ri two principles, toward a p r e society p r o g r e s s e s , in light ot ° ? ajjovvs s o m e variation in national d e t e r m i n e d institutional i d e a l - ^ d through a hypoc o n s t i t u t i o n s by letting each oi g behind a thinner u thetical "constitutional general facts a b o u t their levant veil of i g n o r a n c e , w h o know flexibility society" including i » P ^ U of ignorance is quite limited, afforded b y this g r a d u a l ^ J ^ o n in h o w m s c n t e n o n of d o m e s t i c T h o u g h Rawls a l l o ^ e d ^ " ° c n t e n o n itself t o vary j u s t i c e m a y be from society to society^ ^ believing that an international d i s c u s s i o n of t h e

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G is m o r e liberal in t h i s r e s p e c t . T h e global p a r t i e s a r e n o t con­ s t r a i n e d b y a n y p r i o r c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c justice; a n d t h e y will t h e n specifically d e c i d e h o w m u c h r o o m t o leave for differences in n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d in n a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s of d o m e s t i c justice. Seeing h o w t h e original p o s i t i o n is d e s c r i b e d , t h e p a r t i e s d e c i d e this q u e s t i o n b y b a l a n c i n g t w o d e s i d e r a t a (cf. §13.3 a n d §13.5): T h e y w a n t t o e n a b l e c i t i z e n s t o c h o o s e a n d revise t h e i r o w n d o m e s t i c c o n s t i ­ t u t i o n , e v e n t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e , s o l o n g a s s u c h c h o i c e r e s u l t s from a n d g u a r a n t e e s for t h e f u t u r e free a n d i n f o r m e d d e c i s i o n s . Yet t h e y also w a n t t o p r e c l u d e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t e n d to p r o d u c e severe d e p r i v a t i o n s o r d i s a d v a n t a g e s for s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e r e s u l t i n g c r i t e r i o n of global j u s t i c e m i g h t b e s i m i l a r t o t h e crite­ rion I h a v e d e v e l o p e d in Part T w o . A s s u m i n g t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n a p p l i e s , t h e globalized first p r i n c i p l e m i g h t b e v i e w e d a s r e q u i r i n g a " t h i n " set of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties ( a n a l o g o u s t o t h e Universal Declaration of Human Rights a n d i n c l u d i n g a n effective right to emi­ grate), w h i c h e a c h n a t i o n a l society c o u l d , in light of its n a t i o n a l c o n ­ c e p t i o n of d o m e s t i c justice, "inflate" a n d specify i n t o its o w n bill of rights. T h i s s u g g e s t i o n is in line w i t h o u r c u r r e n t m o r a l beliefs. While w e firmly believe t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s of o u r (Western) societies o u g h t t o p r o h i b i t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d a y s of g o v e r n m e n t - e n f o r c e d religious fasting, w e c a n still a c c e p t as just a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e i n w h i c h s u c h legislation is n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l in s o m e ( n o n - W e s t e r n ) so­ cieties. (Yet w e c a n n o t a c c e p t as just a global o r d e r i n w h i c h t o r t u r e is n o t r u l e d o u t in all societies, w h a t e v e r t h e i r culture.) Similarly, w h i l e t h e global s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e w o u l d c o n s t r a i n h o w s o c i e t i e s m a y a r r a n g e t h e i r e c o n o m i e s , t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s w o u l d b e less s t r i n g e n t t h a n Rawls's r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t e a c h s o c i e t y m u s t satisfy t h e difference p r i n c i p l e internally. This m a y b e so b e c a u s e a c o u n t r y ' s c h o i c e a m o n g v a r i o u s forms of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n ( m o r e o r less egalitarian t h a n Rawls's n a t i o n a l difference p r i n c i p l e w o u l d require) d o e s n o t affect t h e globally w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s o r b e c a u s e t h i s c h o i c e is p r o t e c t e d b y t h e b a s i c political liberties w h i c h a l l o w t h e c i t i z e n s of e a c h n a t i o n t o c h o o s e , w i t h i n c e r t a i n limits, t h e i r o w n m o d e of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t i n g global institu­ t i o n a l ideal w o u l d t h e n a l l o w e a c h society a g o o d d e a l of c h o i c e as r e g a r d s its i n t e r n a l p r a c t i c e s ( a n d m o r a l principles), s o l o n g a s s u c h c h o i c e s a r e s u p p o r t e d b y m o s t of its c i t i z e n s a n d are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e b a s i c r i g h t s of all h u m a n beings, c i t i z e n s a s well as o u t s i d e r s . 4 0

variation h e a l l o w s to t h e diversity of national c i r c u m s t a n c e s , rather t h a n to t h e diversity of national collective p r e f e r e n c e s (§17.3). Even w h e r e constitutional a n d political c h o i c e s m a y differ from c o u n t r y t o c o u n t r y , h e requires s u c h differences to b e rationally related to differences in national c o n d i t i o n s . Actual c i t i z e n s a n d legislators are required to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i n their deliberations a n d d e c i s i o n s t h r o u g h t h e t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t of h o w R a w l s i a n rational parties (placed b e h i n d a veil of i g n o r a n c e of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e thickness) w o u l d a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m . "°Rawls m a y n o w actually agree w i t h this view. At least this is o n e p o s s i b l e w a y of m a k i n g s e n s e of this cryptic remark: "The political liberties, a s s u r e d their fair-value a n d

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24. Conclusion 2 4 . 1 . Let m e r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e main s t e p s t h r o u g h w h i c h I have c o m e to d o u b t t h e a p p e a l i n g m o r a l conviction that t h e r e is n o t h i n g seriously w r o n g , m o r a l l y speaking, w i t h the lives w e lead. I s h o u l d say in a d v a n c e t h a t s t e p s 1, 2, 3, a n d 6 are essential to m y a r g u m e n t ; s t e p s 4 a n d 5 m e r e l y b r o a d e n a n d s t r e n g t h e n its conclusion. 2 4 . 1 . 1 . T h e r e a r e t h e a b u n d a n t l y d o c u m e n t e d facts of w i d e s p r e a d e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d disadvantages. Large s e g m e n t s of h u m a n ­ kind suffer severe o p p r e s s i o n a n d poverty. They have n o effective civil a n d political rights a n d are helplessly e x p o s e d to violence a n d a b u s e by s o l d i e r s a n d guerrillas, l a n d o w n e r s a n d officials. Moreover, t h e y are e x c l u d e d from t h e n a t u r a l a n d social r e s o u r c e s of this p l a n e t : t h e y are so p o o r a s to b e chronically exposed to malnutrition a n d outright starvation; t h e y lack a c c e s s to even minimal health care, a n d are liable to die early from t h e m o s t trivial diseases; they rarely have e n o u g h e d u c a t i o n e v e n t o b e able to read, write, or d o e l e m e n t a r y arithmetic. Finally m o s t a r e in n o position to improve their situation or to e s c a p e from it. S u c h w i d e s p r e a d h u m a n misery provides t h e occasion for m o r a l reflection, w h i c h m u s t e x a m i n e two ways in w h i c h w e might be c o n n e c t e d to this misery: Why d o s u c h radical inequalities persist, a n d w h a t r o l e (if any) d o w e p l a y in their p r o d u c t i o n ? And h o w might s u c h radical i n e q u a l i t i e s be overcome, a n d w h a t role (if any) can w e play in their eradication? 2 4 . 1 . 2 . T h e r e are t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of s u c h extreme depriva­ t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . T h e s e d o n o t c o m p e t e with true microex­ p l a n a t i o n s , s u c h a s : this villager is killed by a d e a t h s q u a d b e c a u s e its l e a d e r believes h i s village to b e sympathetic to t h e rebels, this baby is s t a r v e d b e c a u s e h e r father lost his job, this s t u d e n t is r a p e d a n d tor­ t u r e d b e c a u s e s h e p a r t i c i p a t e d in a d e m o n s t r a t i o n against the reigning military j u n t a . M a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s aim for a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s leave u n e x p l a i n e d : Why d o e s o u r world have s u c h h i g h rates of m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, a n d infant mortality? What ac­ c o u n t s for t h e incidence of torture a n d poverty; for the frequency ot w a r s , d e a t h s q u a d s , a n d military j u n t a s ; for the increasing gap between rich a n d p o o r ? T h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of these aggregate p h e ­ n o m e n a p r o m i n e n t l y involve reference to basic global institutions. 1 h e "other r e l e v a n t g e n e r a l principles, properly circumscribed, may of course supplement the p r i n c i p l e s of justice'' (BLP 49-50).

274

C o n c l u s i o n , 24.1.4

f r e q u e n c y of w a r s a n d military j u n t a s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d a p a r t from t h e fact t h a t o u r global political o r d e r reflects a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi. A c c o u n t i n g for t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e s of m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d infant m o r t a l i t y r e q u i r e s in a d d i t i o n r e f e r e n c e to h o w t h e existing global e c o n o m i c s c h e m e a s s i g n s e m i n e n t d o m a i n over n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d h o w it r e g u l a t e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h u n c o n s t r a i n e d market m e c h a n i s m s . Such macroexplanations m a y be highly complex, b u t w h a t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e is o n l y t h a t o u r global f r a m e w o r k of basic i n s t i t u t i o n s figures p r o m i n e n t l y in t h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of m o r ­ ally significant p h e n o m e n a a n d t h a t r e f o r m s of t h i s f r a m e w o r k c o u l d l e a d t o s u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t s in r e s p e c t to t h e s e p h e n o m e n a . I d o n o t p r e t e n d to h a v e p r o v i d e d satisfactory m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s o r t o have s k e t c h e d in a n y detail p a t h s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t o w a r d a w o r l d order that w o u l d not t e n d to p r o d u c e radical inequalities. 2 4 . 1 . 3 . In t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e a s s e s s m e n t a n d reform of b a s i c institu­ tions, w e m u s t n o t i g n o r e t h e i r effects a n d , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h e y t e n d t o engender. By d e n y i n g t h e r e l e v a n c e of e n g e n ­ d e r e d p h e n o m e n a , o n e c o u l d insist t h a t o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame­ w o r k is perfectly j u s t a l r e a d y : " T h e g r o u n d r u l e s d o n o t d i r e c t l y call for d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , s t a t e s a r e officially a s s i g n e d e q u a l r i g h t s a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r a n d e q u a l sovereignty to r e g u l a t e t h e i r o w n i n t e r n a l affairs. (Even p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l is b a s e d o n e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s in power.) Any i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e political a n d e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h of s t a t e s a n d in t h e r i g h t s a n d affluence of t h e i r c i t i z e n s , h o w e v e r radical and predictable they m a y be, are not established but only engendered b y t h e prevailing global o r d e r a n d h e n c e c a n n o t b e h e l d a g a i n s t this o r d e r . " In c o n t r a s t t o s u c h a s t r o n g l y d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice, I h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d Rawls a s c o m m i t t e d to a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n ­ tialist ( m o r e specifically, a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t ) a p p r o a c h to t h e s u b ­ ject of social justice, w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d benefits a n d b u r d e n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d o n a p a r . A l t h o u g h I h a v e myself d e f e n d e d this a p p r o a c h , m y m a i n c o n c l u s i o n d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e s o s t r o n g a claim. So l o n g as e n g e n d e r e d d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s c o u n t for a n y ­ t h i n g at all i n t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , a g o o d c a s e c a n b e m a d e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t global o r d e r is u n j u s t against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s t h a t w o u l d n o t e n g e n d e r s u c h r a d i c a l i n e q u a l i t i e s . Even a m i l d l y d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e w o u l d s u p p o r t this conclusion. 2 4 . 1 . 4 . T h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e existing global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t e n d s t o p r o d u c e affords a n a p p r o p r i a t e v a n t a g e p o i n t for a s s e s s i n g t h e j u s t i c e of t h i s o r d e r a s a w h o l e . I n a s s e s s i n g t h e e x i s t i n g global o r d e r i n c o m p a r i s o n t o its feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l alternatives, o n e s h o u l d b e p r e e m i n e n t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e worst-off p a r t i c i p a n t s u n d e r e a c h i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . N o w it m a y b e d e n i e d t h a t t h e c o n ­ c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d h a v e t h e a b s o l u t e priority it h a s for

C o n c l u s i o n , 24.1.5

275

Rawls. O n e m a y s a y that, w h i l e terrible poverty a n d o p p r e s s i o n a r e certainly p r e v a l e n t a n d w i d e s p r e a d , h u m a n k i n d h a s m a d e g r e a t p r o g ­ ress, a s w i t n e s s e d b y t h e s e c u r i t y a n d affluence enjoyed by t h e citizens of t h e d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n n a t i o n s . Although t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a r e as badly off a s ever, at least t h e b e t t e r positions (the t o p quintile o r so of world p o p u l a t i o n ) h a v e b e e n i m p r o v e d considerably. But s u c h p r o g ­ ress, w h i c h c e r t a i n l y exists, also raises t h e p r o b l e m of justice in s h a r p e r form. B e c a u s e w e a r e s o affluent a n d powerful, almost everything w e d o has a significant i m p a c t u p o n living c o n d i t i o n s elsewhere, a n d b e c a u s e we a r e s o affluent a n d powerful, w e are in a u n i q u e position to take u p the t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l task of institutional reform. In a n y case, it s e e m s q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e to d e n y that t h e position of its least a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s is at least o n e i m p o r t a n t m e a s u r e of t h e justice of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . If s o m e feasible institutional reform is e x p e c t e d to lead t o a significant i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e worst position, t h e n this is surely a n i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n in its favor. 2 4 . 1 . 5 . A p l a u s i b l e evaluation of t h e morally significant c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s of feasible institutional s c h e m e s m u s t give a p r o m i n e n t p l a c e to t h e satisfaction of basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s . Here it m a y be too m u c h to r e q u i r e t h a t a n institutional s c h e m e b e so d e s i g n e d that even t h e s p e c i a l n e e d s of its naturally h a n d i c a p p e d participants are met. P e r h a p s s u c h special n e e d s raise issues of morality r a t h e r t h a n justice (as Rawls suggests b y favoring a semiconsequentialist over a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h ) . W h e n even the s t a n d a r d basic socio­ e c o n o m i c n e e d s of s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s are not met, however, w e have a m o s t u r g e n t r e a s o n t o think about, a n d p r o m o t e , institutional reforms. This c l a i m is often o p p o s e d by t h e assertion that it is m o r e i m p o r t a n t that social i n s t i t u t i o n s recognize a n d protect basic civil a n d political rights a n d liberties t h a n that they e n s u r e that basic social a n d eco­ n o m i c n e e d s a r e m e t . Even if this assertion could be sustained (and I have a r g u e d extensively t h a t it cannot), my m a i n conclusion w o u l d r e m a i n largely i n t a c t . T h e c u r r e n t global distribution of basic civd a n d political r i g h t s a n d liberties is extremely uneven. While we, t h r o u g h exercising c o n t r o l over a very powerful g o v e r n m e n t car. play a s ^ n i h c a n t r o l e in s h a p i n g t h e c o m m o n future of h u m a n k i n d , lack political rights altogether or exercise s o m e ^cra^ontrol w i t h i n a s t a t e t h a t is t o o p o o r a n d i m p o t e n t to have any real influence. While o u r f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e are s e c u r e o h « t to u n d e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d rulens i n s t a l i e d o r approved' * ^ ^ J , iect t o t h r e a t s , subversion, o r invasion from a b r o « L A n d iritate^the ba c rights a n d liberties r e c o g n i z e d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S i f y tion c l u s t e r s , s u c h basic rights a n d "berties are ° " e n n e n f o r c e d a b r o a d even w h e r e they are officially o n h e books, n m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e s e international the a n d political f r e e d o m will again p r o m i n e n t l y involve teatu existing global o r d e r . o f

276

C o n c l u s i o n , 24.2

2 4 . 1 . 6 . A global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is i m p o s e d b y all of u s o n e a c h of u s . It is i m p o s e d o n u s i n t h a t w e c a n n o t s i m p l y d r o p o u t a n d r e n o u n c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s fact is m o s t significant in t h e c a s e of t h e s c h e m e ' s m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h o a r e literally b e i n g forced, u l t i m a t e l y w i t h r e s o r t t o violence, to a b i d e b y t h e g o i n g g r o u n d r u l e s . T h u s a m o t h e r , u n a b l e t o find e m p l o y m e n t a n d d e s p e r a t e t o feed h e r c h i l d r e n , will b e p u n i s h e d if s h e tries to take food from a s h o p , will b e c h a s e d a w a y if s h e tries t o g r o w food o n l a n d t h a t is n o t h e r s , will b e a r r e s t e d if s h e tries t o d e m o n s t r a t e , will b e t u r n e d a w a y if s h e tries t o c r o s s i n t o a n o t h e r c o u n t r y ( s u c h a s o u r s , for e x a m p l e ) — a n d t h i s n o t b y crooks a n d t h u g s b u t b y "the law,'' by j u d g e s , i m m i g r a t i o n i n s p e c t o r s , a n d t h e police, w h o , b a c k e d b y o u r r e c o g n i t i o n o r a c q u i e s c e n c e , d o t h e i r "duty" in t h e n a m e of h u m a n j u s t i c e . T h i s reflection reveals h o w unjust institutions e m b o d y not only the d e e p e s t a n d m o s t c o n s e q u e n ­ tial form of h u m a n w r o n g b u t also ( i n d e p e n d e n t l y ) t h e m o s t intoler­ able. At least in t h e m o d e r n era, injustice a p p e a r s in official c l o t h i n g , u n d e r t h e n a m e of justice, o p e n l y before t h e e y e s of t h e w o r l d . It s u b v e r t s n o t m e r e l y w h a t is right b u t t h e very i d e a of right a n d leaves its victims w i t h o u t a n y r e c o u r s e o r a p p e a l . A global i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k is i m p o s e d by, especially, its m o r e advantaged, m o r e powerful participants. Institutions are n o t only "staffed" a n d e n f o r c e d by h u m a n b e i n g s (are c o m p l e x p a t t e r n s of h u m a n c o n d u c t ) ; t h e y are also c r e a t e d , s h a p e d , p e r p e t u a t e d , o r c h a n g e d b y u s . P r o p e r t y a n d p r o m i s e s , m o n e y a n d m a r k e t s , govern­ m e n t s a n d borders, treaties a n d diplomacy—all these d o not o c c u r n a t u r a l l y b u t are i n v e n t e d b y h u m a n b e i n g s a n d c o n t i n u o u s l y evolve t h r o u g h h u m a n c o n d u c t . S u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e " u p to u s , " collectively, a n d w e therefore have a collective causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for existing institutions. Together w e change t h e m or preserve t h e m as they are. Since social i n s t i t u t i o n s are m o r e o r less j u s t d e p e n d i n g o n h o w t h e y d i s t r i b u t e m o r a l l y significant benefits a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g t h e i r h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s , this c a u s a l responsibility gives rise t o a moral r e s p o n ­ sibility, w h i c h is a collective responsibility for o u r collective role i n i m p o s i n g existing i n s t i t u t i o n s u p o n , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e i r m o s t d i s a d v a n ­ t a g e d ( a n d involuntary) p a r t i c i p a n t s . This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a y b e of g r e a t m o m e n t w h e n w e find o u r s e l v e s t o b e (advantaged) p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . W e h a v e a negative d u t y n o t t o c o l l a b o r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s ; a n d w e m u s t t h e n reflect u p o n a n d p r o m o t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. 24.2. Taken together, these considerations s u p p o r t two conclusions: 41

4 1

S u c h r e c o g n i t i o n is not c o n f i n e d w i t h i n national borders; t h e p r a c t i c e s i n a n o t h e r c o u n t r y are not "a different ballgame." We d o not just take n o t i c e of foreign g o v e r n m e n t s , l a w s , judges, a n d p o l i c e m e n (as empirical facts); w e r e c o g n i z e t h e m a s g o v e r n m e n t s , l a w s , j u d g e s , a n d p o l i c e m e n . T h e plausibility of t h e i d e a of a global basic structure derives n o t o n l y from t h e w o r l d w i d e e x i s t e n c e of states w i t h national g o v e r n m e n t s , l a w s , j u d g e s , a n d p o l i c e m e n b u t from their international r e c o g n i t i o n a n d their role i n interna­ tional p r a c t i c e s a n d interactions.

Conclusion, 24.3 277 o u r c u r r e n t global institutional s c h e m e is unjust, a n d as a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in this o r d e r w e s h a r e a collective responsibility for its injustice. T h e injustice m e a n s , in h u m a n terms, not merely that m a n y p e r s o n s t o d a y a r e very b a d l y off—are unfree, u n e d u c a t e d , powerless, starving, a n d p o o r — b u t t h a t they are disadvantaged by existing institu­ tions, d e p r i v e d of f r e e d o m a n d education, o p p r e s s e d , starved, a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d . T h e responsibility m e a n s that t h o s e w h o u p h o l d a n d p e r p e t u a t e t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , all of u s together, are collectively d o i n g w h a t is d o n e t o (in particular) t h e least advantaged. We have a negative d u t y t o d e s i s t ; w e o u g h t to u s e o u r m o r e advantaged political a n d e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n to w o r k for global institutional reforms. T h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e s e conclusions d o e s not materially d e p e n d on s t e p s 4 a n d 5 (the priority c o n c e r n for the least advantaged a n d t h e a m e n d m e n t t o t h e first principle). If they h a d to be w i t h d r a w n or modified, t h e n t h e c u r r e n t global o r d e r might b e less unjust (and w e collectively r e s p o n s i b l e for less deprivation) t h a n I a m presently in­ c l i n e d t o believe. Nevertheless, t h e failure of t h e s e two ideas w o u l d not entail t h e c o l l a p s e of m y a r g u m e n t . To r e a c h its c o n c l u s i o n s , m y a r g u m e n t m u s t a s s u m e that t h e r e are feasible p a t h s of institutional reform w h o s e p u r s u i t w o u l d substan­ tially r a i s e t h e globally w o r s t representative share, particularly in re­ gard to t h e satisfaction of s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s (as a c c o m m o d a t e d by t h e first p r i n c i p l e ) . T h a t t h e r e are s u c h feasible p a t h s of reform is s o m e t h i n g t h a t , h o w e v e r likely it m a y seem, I have m a d e n o a t t e m p t to establish. In o n e r e s p e c t , this is n o t a serious gap. For s u p p o s e my argument w e r e a c c e p t e d We w o u l d t h e n have gained a reasonably clear a n d d e t e r m i n a t e i d e a of w h a t a plausible defense of the status q u o m u s t look like. My a r g u m e n t leaves room for t h e attempt (by s o m e social scientists, p e r h a p s ) t o provide s u c h a defense by showing, for example, t h a t t h e globally w o r s t representative share c a n n o t be raised through i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . T h e c h a n c e that s u c h a claim could survive collegial s c r u t i n y s e e m s slight, given the severity a n d extent of c u r r e n t h u m a n m i s e r y . Still, t h e r e is a r e m o t e possibility that some such argu­ m e n t will t u r n o u t t o be convincing, a n d so w e ( t h o u g h h a r d l y elated) to learn that o u r global order is n o w as j u s t a s w e c a n m a k e h a n d that t h e r e is n o t h i n g by way of institutional reform that we o u g h t to undertake. , , _ , i^p l

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2 4 . 3 . I have argued that we tive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e existing global o r d e r (specincany

278

C o n c l u s i o n , 24.4

social p o s i t i o n w e p r o d u c e t h r o u g h its i m p o s i t i o n ) a n d t h a t w e h a v e a negative d u t y t o h e l p reform t h i s o r d e r insofar a s it is u n j u s t . But I d o n o t m e a n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n t o entail a n a t t r i b u t i o n of b l a m e o r guilt. It w o u l d b e (not o n l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e b u t also) plainly i m p l a u s i b l e to claim of m o s t o r d i n a r y citizens of d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s t h a t t h e y a r e b l a m e w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of all t h e existing h u m a n m i s e r y . An a n a l o g o u s p o i n t c o u l d b e m a d e a b o u t p a s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s in­ volving slavery o r a radically inferior s t a t u s for w o m e n . M a n y of t h o s e w h o c o l l a b o r a t e d t h r o u g h t h e c e n t u r i e s in t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of s u c h u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n n o t fairly b e b l a m e d , b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y h a v e a p p r e c i a t e d t h e w r o n g n e s s of t h e i r c o n d u c t . Still, as is n o w agreed, their c o n d u c t was wrong, a n d they o u g h t to have worked t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s insofar as t h e y w e r e a b l e t o d o s o . It is in this k i n d of situation, I believe, t h a t m o s t o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s of t h e d e v e l o p e d West a r e t o d a y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e prevailing global i n s t i t u ­ tional f r a m e w o r k . It w o u l d b e m o r a l i s t i c a n d s o m e w h a t silly, p e r h a p s , t o b l a m e s u c h p e r s o n s for v i o l e n c e a n d s t a r v a t i o n a b r o a d . But t h i s d o e s n o t d e v a l u e t h e a t t e m p t to explain to t h e m h o w , t o t h e best of o n e ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e y d o in fact s h a r e responsibility for s u c h w r o n g s a n d o u g h t t o reflect u p o n a n d h e l p w o r k t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. T h i s a t t e m p t is n o t silly o r m o r a l i s t i c , b e c a u s e , insofar a s t h e y a r e m o r a l p e r s o n s , t h e y w o u l d t h e m s e l v e s w a n t to b e c h a l l e n g e d t o reflect u p o n s u c h p o t e n t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a n d d u t i e s . My c o n c e r n , t h e n , is n o t w i t h b l a m e o r guilt. I m e r e l y w a n t to s h o w w h a t , I think, is n o t easily a p p r e c i a t e d — t h a t o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r is u n j u s t , t h a t w e d o w r o n g i n s i m p l y c o l l a b o r a t i n g in t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n a n d i m p o s i t i o n of t h i s o r d e r , a n d t h a t w e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e e x p l o r e n e w w a y s of a c t i n g for o u r s e l v e s ( w h o c a n h e l p in t h e reform of institutions) a n d for t h o s e w h o will c o m e after u s (who, t h a n k s t o t h e j u s t e r i n s t i t u t i o n s w e will leave b e h i n d , s h o u l d find it e a s i e r t h a n w e d i d to live well). 2 4 . 4 . D e s p i t e t h i s qualification, m y c o n c l u s i o n m a y p r o v o k e s o m e i n c r e d u l i t y (if n o t a n n o y a n c e ) . Please r e m e m b e r t h a t even t h e i n j u s ­ tices w e n o w r e c o g n i z e a s t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s (slavery a n d t h e inferior s t a t u s of w o m e n ) w e r e o n c e e n t i r e l y t a k e n for g r a n t e d . T h o s e a d v a n t a g e d b y t h e m f o u n d it e a s y n o t t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e m or, a t b e s t , t o invoke s o m e s h a l l o w r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s , especially s i n c e t h o s e s u b j e c t e d t o s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s typically lack t h e r e s o u r c e s fully to u n d e r s t a n d a n d p r o t e s t t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Are w e t o d a y a n y m o r e i m m u n e t o c o m f o r t a b l e e r r o r s of m o r a l j u d g m e n t ? M o r e o v e r , n o t all t h e f e a t u r e s t h a t m a k e t h e p r o m i n e n t i n j u s t i c e s of t h e past so c o n s p i c u o u s are present in w h a t I have portrayed as t h e p r i n c i p a l i n j u s t i c e s of o u r t i m e ( a n d it is therefore p e r h a p s e v e n l e s s a p p r o p r i a t e t o a t t a c h b l a m e a n d guilt t o t h e m ) . Here t w o factors a r e of s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h e p r e e m i n e n t i n j u s t i c e s of o u r t i m e t y p i c a l l y involve r a d i c a l i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e engendered rather than estab-

Conclusion, 24.4

279

lished, a n d t h e y a r e injustices in the global s t r u c t u r e of h u m a n i n t e r a c ­ tion r a t h e r t h a n in t h e internal s t r u c t u r e of relevant social u n i t s (a family, city, o r state). T h e r e a r e two ways in w h i c h t h e s e t w o factors t e n d to o b s c u r e injustice a n d responsibility for it. O n t h e o n e h a n d , b o t h factors make injustice h a r d e r to d i a g n o s e a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s h a r d e r to conceive a n d to i m p l e m e n t . T h e q u e s ­ tion w h e t h e r a n institutional s c h e m e establishes excessive depriva­ tions o r d i s a d v a n t a g e s c a n b e a n s w e r e d r a t h e r straightforwardly. But s u p p o s e w e w a n t to find o u t w h e t h e r existing h a r d s h i p s , t h o u g h n o t called for by t h e g r o u n d r u l e s of an institutional s c h e m e , are neverthe­ less e n g e n d e r e d b y it a n d w h e t h e r there are feasible institutional r e ­ forms t h r o u g h w h i c h the i n c i d e n c e of the relevant deprivations c o u l d be r e d u c e d . Before o n e c a n a n s w e r these questions affirmatively, o n e m u s t h a v e g a t h e r e d a great deal of empirical information, developed e s t i m a t e s a b o u t w h a t deprivations a n d disadvantages feasible alterna­ tive i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d to p r o d u c e , a n d c o n s t r u c t e d a n d t e s t e d v a r i o u s m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h e s e tasks are obviously even m o r e difficult o n t h e global p l a n e b e c a u s e of t h e greater size a n d complexity of t h e global social system a n d also b e c a u s e of t h e lesser accessibility of comparative data. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h e n excessive deprivations a n d disadvantages clearly a r e avoidable c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e prevailing institutional s c h e m e , b o t h factors also t e n d to make it h a r d e r to appreciate that t h e relevant s c h e m e is therefore unjust a n d that we, as advantaged partici­ p a n t s in it, s h a r e a m o r a l responsibility for s u c h injustice. Here t h e injustice of national institutions that establish radical inequalities a n d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of citizens for s u c h injustice were easiest to u n d e r ­ s t a n d ( a n d historically the earliest to be widely understood). The wide­ s p r e a d a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e s e points in t h e United States w a s a main p r e c o n d i t i o n for t h e abolition of slavery in the 1860s a n d the i n t r o d u c ­ tion of w o m e n ' s suffrage in t h e 1920s. Meanwhile w e have (one might say s o m e w h a t simplistically) advanced to t h e point w h e r e o n e factora l o n e n o l o n g e r o b s c u r e s o u r vision. It is n o w widely u n d e r s t o o d that national i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y b e unjust o n account of radical inequalities t h e y engender a n d t h a t citizens may share a moral r e s p o n s e J i t y for s u c h injustice. T h e w i d e s p r e a d appreciation of t h e s e ^ * a c h i e v e t h e institutional reforms of the New Deal in t h e , 1 9 3 0 * 1 : u n o w also g e n e r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d that a global institutional s c h e m e may be u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of radical inequalities it e s t a t ^ * r i h a t it participants ought to contribute » J % Z * £ ^ £ % ^ J o n s . T h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n ^ . J ™ ? ™ ^ Z ^ T t L of o u r global

S ^ ^ f f i S ^ i_

T * P — of

7

that the citizens of countries tnai - I t is p r o b a b l y the general ^ ^ ^^Z7hZ duty to w o * for global d i d n o t h a v e c o l o n i e s h a d merely a positive rather than n e g d

tm

a negate

280

C o n c l u s i o n , 24.4

c o n c l u s i o n c o m b i n e s t h e s e t w o w i d e l y a c c e p t e d p o i n t s — a global in­ s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y b e u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of excessive d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s it engenders. institutional reform. O n m y view, the d u t y w o u l d be a negative o n e — p r o v i d e d c o l o n i a l ­ i s m is correctly u n d e r s t o o d a s a global institution rather than a set of separate b u t similar crimes.

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Index

Ackerman, liiuce, 58, 190n33, 231n20 d i j u d i c a t i o n , 24, 93; international, 2 1 6 18, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 236n25, 244 Advantaged (participants), 5n4, 11-12, 3 4 36, 238-3!), 2 0 0 - 6 3 , 2 7 6 - 7 9 . .See also Disadvantaged; Least advantaged group/class Advantages, 6 8 - 7 1 , 251. Sen also Disad­ vantages AIDS, wr, Aiiii;iidnn;iil d o first principle), 138-39, J 80, 243n7, 27. >, 277; explained, 142-44, 147; justified, 142-47, 160. .Sec also f'iisl principle, social m i n i m u m u n d e r Anarchism, 24nl!f, 58 Animals, 38, U 2 - 1 3 , 25tinl2 Apartheid, 147n46, )56n60, 232, 254 Aquinas, T h o m a s , 2 1 6 n 0 A r c h i m e d e a n point (in Rawls), 213n2, 266 Aristotelian Principle (in Rawls), 116, 1 6 1 n i . .See a/so Good, thin theory of Arms control, 2 3 5 - 3 6 Arrow, Kenneth, H O n l Associations, 21, 23, 25, 9 0 - 9 3 , 113, 145, 182, 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 5 - 5 6 A s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m , 100-102, 223, 233; f u n d a m e n t a l , 1 0 1 - 4 , 106,159. 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 1 8 - 2 1 , 2 2 5 - 3 1 , 2 4 4 - 4 5 ; situated, 101, 2 1 8 - 2 0 , 223, 233, 2 4 4 - 4 5 . See also Com­ p l i a n c e ; Enforcement r

B a c k g r o u n d justice, 23, 248-50, 2 5 4 - 5 6 , 268 Balance o f p o w e r , 214, 218, 221, 225, 2 3 4 n 2 2 . S e e also M o d u s vivendi Balancing of values, 20, 37, 57, 62, 213, 228, 2 7 3 Bargaining, 58, 2 2 3 - 2 9 , 234-35, 244; and justice, 71n6, 86

Bargaining equilibrium, 2 1 9 - 2 1 , 224nl4, 231; dynamic, 101, 221. See also Modus vivendi Bargaining positions, 73, 80, 225, 236 Bargaining power, 2 3 - 2 4 , 100-101, 2 2 4 26, 234n22, 244, 248-49, 253-56 Barry, Brian, 2 6 3 - 6 5 Basic liberties. See Basic rights and liber­ ties Basic needs. See Needs; Standard n e e d s Basic rights and liberties (or firstprinciple goods), 10-11, 38, 47n46, 51, §§11-12, 149-50, 156-57, 162, 196-97, 205-6, 244-46, 272 enumerated, 132, 147 freedom and integrity of the person, 132, 145, 147, 170nl3, 192 well-protectedness of, 6 - 7 , 129, 192, 215 liberty of conscience, 96-97, 128, 132, 145, 147, 229 liberty of speech, expression, the me­ dia" 51, 124, 132, 134-35 fair value of, 148n46 liberty of thought, 96-97, 128, 132, 145", 229 political liberties, 117, 132, 145, §13, 249-50, 258n22, 272 fair value (worth) of, 10n7, 132, 134, 138-39, 145, 151n52, 153, 212, 215n5 religious liberty, 96, 132,134n28 rule of law, 132, 145, 147 fair value of, 147n46 packages of, 157, 160n67, 206 ftlllv adequate, 132, 134-351, 156n60, 158n65, 196, 205 complete, 128-29, 147, 149-50 well-protected (secure), 47n46,

285

286

Index

Basic rights a n d liberties (conf.l U 8 n l 4 , 1 2 8 - 3 0 , 135, 147, 148n47, 275 S e e also Effective legal freedom roughly equal, 1 4 8 - 5 1 , 156n60, 196n42, 249 w o r s t package (score), 53, 131n27, 137, 1 4 9 - 5 1 , 160n67, 168n8, 1 6 9 n l 2 , 206 a n d standard basic n e e d s , 147, 149, 1 5 6 - 5 7 , 1 9 6 , 277 Basic structure, 8 - 9 . §1; defined, 2 1 - 2 5 ; as having t w o parts (in Rawls), 123, 1 3 8 - 3 9 , 1 4 8 ; primacy o f (focus on), 1, 3, 9, 25, 6 5 - 7 2 , 247-48* 2 5 5 - 5 6 ; stability of, 100-105; t w o n o t i o n s o f in Rawls, 2 1 24. S e e also Global basic structure; In­ stitutional s c h e m e Beitz, Charles, 2 0 n l l , 270n37; o n global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , 241, 263; o n resource redistribution, 241, 2 5 0 - 5 2 Benefits a n d b u r d e n s (of social coopera­ tion). S e e Goods a n d ills Benevolence, 88, 9 3 - 9 5 Benn, S. I., 216n6 Berger, Peter, 267n32 Blameworthiness, 31n26, 238n29, 278. S e e also Responsibility Bodin, Jean, 216n6 Brierly, J a m e s L., 2 4 4 - 4 6 Buchanan, Allen, 99n36 Buckley v. Valeo, 134 Burdens. See G o o d s a n d ills Capitalism, 48n48, 58, 132,158n65, 2 0 0 203, 215n5, 2 2 9 - 3 0 , 233 Character, 3 , 1 7 , 27, 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 0 5 , 247. See also C o n d u c t ; Morality Children, 50, 5 5 , 1 4 3 - 4 4 , 1 5 0 n 5 0 , 1 7 1 - 7 3 , 175, 1 7 7 - 8 0 , 188, 1 9 0 , 1 9 2 n 3 5 , 1 9 8 n 4 4 , 199n47, 226, 2 5 2 - 5 3 Circumstances of justice, 93, l l l n 2 , 213, 266n31 Citizenship, equal, 1 2 0 , 1 2 2 - 2 5 , 150n51, 1 7 0 - 7 1 , 177-78, 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 186 Clark, Barry, 158n65 Class, 35, 38, 46,119, 124, 137, 139, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 157, 166-74, 176, 178, 2 0 4 - 5 , 247 Clients (of parties i n original position), 46, 53, 56, 9 2 - 9 3 , 96-97, 100, 104, 1 1 1 - 1 3 , 116-17, 120-26, 129, 198, 242, 2 5 6 - 5 7 ; w h y distinct from parties, 53n56 Close-knitness (in Rawls), 200n48 Coase, Ronald, 1 9 n 8 Cohen, G. A., 45n42 Colonialism, 232, 254, 262, 265, 269, 2 7 9 80 C o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , 2, 5n4, 73n8, 92. S e e also Individualism C o m m u n i t y , 2, 5n4, 7 6 n l 3 , 86n20, 90n25, 92, 1 1 3 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 8 - 5 9 C o m p a r i s o n s : b a s e d o n objective vs. s u b ­ jective criteria, 47n45; interpersonal, 5, 37, 96, 109, 1 1 4 , 1 1 6 , 1 7 7 , 1 8 3 , 1 9 9 , 2 0 3 ;

i n t e r s c h e m i c , 42, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73, 96, 109, 1 1 6 - 1 8 , 125, 133, 199, 2 0 3 - 5 ; intras c h e m i c , 116, 133 C o m p l e t e n e s s . See Basic rights a n d liber­ ties C o m p l i a n c e , 20, 28, 40. 54, 82, 84, 91, 1 0 0 101, 2 2 0 - 2 1 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 231, 236n25, 2 4 4 45,255 C o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d , 9 2 - 9 3 , 97, 99, 1 0 2 - 4 , 268n35 Conditions: defined, 139n39 reasonably favorable, 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 125-27, 136n29, 1 3 9 - 4 1 , 146, 149, 160 halfway favorable, 131n27, 149-50, 160n67, 243ri7 truly favorable, 127, 140, 1 4 9 - 5 0 , 168n8 unfavorable, 140, 146 See also Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice C o n d u c t , 3, 8 - 9 , 12, 17, 2 5 - 2 7 , 31, 4 0 - 4 3 , 8 4 - 8 5 . 106, 2 5 5 - 5 6 , 278 S e e also Char­ acter; Morality C o n s c r i p t i o n , 246, 2 5 6 n l 9 C o n s e n s u s . See Overlapping c o n s e n s u s C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , 3 9 - 4 3 ; indirect, 42. S e e a/.so Justice; Utilitarianism Conservatism, 4, 9 - 1 1 , 121, 246, 2 4 8 n l 0 . S e e also Risk a v e r s e n e s s C o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , 37, 8 1 - 8 2 , 97n35, 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 258, 2 6 8 - 7 1 . S e e also Reflective equilibrium Constitution, 22, 131, 148n47, 1 5 8 - 5 9 , 1 6 1 , 202, 2 1 5 - 1 7 , 231, 256, 2 7 1 - 7 2 Constitutional c o n v e n t i o n / s t a g e (in Rawls), 140, 144, 178n23, 2 0 1 - 2 , 271 Constitutive attributes/traits, 77, 79, 86, 89-90 Constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s , 3, 5 n 4 . 9 0 - 9 2 , 96-98, 104-6, 262 Constitutive rules, 8, 2 1 - 2 2 , 51 Constructivism, 2 - 3 , 5, 8, 258, 268 C o n t i n g e n c i e s , 73n9, 99, 110, 149n48, 160, 252, 2 5 4 n l 7 ; of c h a n c e (luck), 164, 175, 177, 180; natural, 4 5 , 7 4 n l l , 1 6 4 - 6 6 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 2 - 7 3 , 175, 179, 247, 2 5 0 - 5 2 ; social, 1 6 4 - 7 1 , 1 7 4 - 7 5 , 177, 180, 247, 250, 252 Contractarianism. See Social contract doctrines Contracts, 32, 4 9 n 5 1 , 50, 1 1 2 n 5 , 1 5 5 C o o p e r a t i o n , 2 0 - 2 1 , 181, 1 9 0 - 9 3 , 198-99, 2 6 3 - 6 5 . See also Interaction Courtney, 8 3 - 8 4 Crimes, 8 3 - 8 4 , 152n54; against humanity, 235; r e l e v a n c e t o a s s e s s m e n t o f institu­ tions, 7, 3 1 , 33, 55, 129, 194n38, 206, 215. S e e also H o m i c i d e D'Amato, A n t h o n y , 2 5 8 n 2 2 Daniels, Norman, 182n25, 1 8 4 - 8 5 , 187n31, 195n39 D a n i e l s o n , Peter, 2 6 3 n 2 5 D a n t e (Alighieri), 2 1 6 n 6 Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e , 16, 2 1 2 , 2 6 7

Index

287

D e m o c r a c y , 31, 1 5 3 - 5 9 , 2 0 0 - 2 0 2 , 216-17, 96, 215; minimally adequate (access to 2 4 9 - 5 0 ; direct/indirect, 1 5 3 - 5 4 . S e e minimally adequate education), 179 also Political p r o c e s s 191, 205 Deontological, as applied to. c o n c e p t i o n s Effective legal freedom, 128-32, 138, 1 4 5 of morality, 44, 47n47; criteria of justice, 46, 149-50; s e c u r e d bv basic rights a n d 39n33, 43, 45, 47, 5 4 - 5 5 , 114, 120, 274; liberties, 1 2 8 - 2 9 moral c o n c e p t i o n s in general, 8 8 - 8 9 ; Efficiency, 59n61, 83, 166, 187-88, 199 overall moral c o n c e p t i o n s , 42; the self, Employment, 58, 144. 1 7 0 - 7 1 , 195, 198n45, 87-88 199; minimally adequate, 181, 205; stan­ Deprivations, 39, 122, 2 7 3 - 7 4 , 2 7 7 - 8 0 dard, 181 s o c i o e c o n o m i c (poverty), 1 1 - 1 2 , 32, 35, Employment opportunities, 1 8 0 - 8 1 ; mini­ 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 1 3 3 - 3 5 , 142n38, 145, 171-73, mally adequate (access to minimally 2 2 6 - 2 7 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 275 adequate employment), 181, 191, 205 relative, 162, 198 Endowments, §5, 115-16, 164-78, 184n28, Desert, 65, 7 5 - 7 7 250-52; as common/collective asset, 63, moral s e n s e : Desert, 7 7 - 8 6 , 250 68-69, 72-77, 80; as morally arbitrary defined, 7 7 - 7 8 (not Deservedl, 63, 65, 68, §6 Enforcement, 24, 48, 128, 130-32, 157; in­ institutional n o t i o n of, 82, 8 5 - 8 6 ternational, 216-18, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 244, 246. narrower than entitlement, 78-79, S e e also Assurance problem 82-83, 85 Engendered p h e n o m e n a (effects of an in­ S e e also Deservingness; Moral ar­ stitutional scheme), 38-39, 274 bitrariness; Moralized ground attitudes and desires, 43n39, 117 rules allegiance. 1 0 2 - 3 , 255 ordinary s e n s e ; desert, 77-78, 81, 8 5 - 8 6 compliance/noncomplianee, 55, 255 S e e also Entitlements s e n s e of equal citizenship, 170 Deservingness, 77-85 sense of justice, 100, 121 D e s i g n priority ( a m o n g principles of jus­ strains of commitment, 115 tice), 127, 136-37, 143, 167, 170, 173, untrustworthiness, 234 187n31, 196. See also Ideal theory; Pri­ benefits and burdens (goods a n d ills). ority: lexical 38-39, 45, 48, 55-56, 114, 274 Difference principle, 6, 29, 4 1 - 4 2 , 63, 6 9 deprivations/poverty, 16, 3 5 - 3 6 , 39, 76, 8 0 - 8 2 , 1 1 5 n l 2 , 128, 136, 139, 146, 55, 274, 2 7 9 - 8 0 1 6 1 - 6 3 , 1 6 6 - 7 4 , 177-82, 188n32, 1 9 2 freedom, 39n32. 59 93, §17, 215n5, 272; cited, 123; global, medical conditions, 192 2 5 4 n l 7 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 ; a n d political process, distributions ipattems. pattern fea­ 1 5 7 - 5 9 , 2 0 0 - 2 0 3 ; in simplest form, tures), 3 0 - 3 1 . 33, 4 6 - 4 7 1 5 n l , 6 6 - 6 7 , 71, 115-16, 197; social disadvantages a n d inequalities 3 4 m i n i m u m u n d e r (best feasible mini­ 36, 38, 47n46, 118, 2 7 8 - 8 0 m u m i n d e x position), 198n44, 2 0 1 - 3 , rates (birth, crime). 7. 31, 33, 38. 55, 205. See also Index goods; Index posi­ 129, 194n38, 215 tions systemic features. D i s a d v a n t a g e d (participants), 11-12, 30, competitive market economy, 33 57, 113, 116, 118, 129, 150n51, 261, 2 7 6 degenerate form of feudalism. 36 78. See also Advantaged; Least advan­ framework for Utopia, 54 taged group/class linlstability, 100, 148, 176, 220. 245 Disadvantages, 3 5 - 3 6 , 39, 196n42, 279; violence and wars, 224, 227 distinct from handicaps, 115-16, 176, Entitlement theories of distributive jus­ 1 9 0 - 9 1 . See also Advantages tice, 15, 17-18, 20n9. 36, 265 Discrimination, 147n46, 165, 183n26 Entitlements, 18-19, 35n29, 65. 69, 1 8 9 Distributive justice. See Justice 90. 197, 260n23, and desert, 7 8 - 7 9 , 8 2 Diversity, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 ; of conditions, 85; and legitimate expectations, 51, 82, 54, 123, 243; of e n d o w m e n t s , 115, 143, 85. 261-62 1 6 4 - 6 5 , 175n20, 176; of values, 102-5, Environment protection of natural, 143, 175n20, 228-29, 267-72 59n61. 91, 117. 155, 157, 190-92. 194, Division of powers, 23, 216-17 197, 200. 205n55, 250nl2, 2S6nl8: of so­ Doyle, Michael, 2 3 0 n l 9 cial systems, 30, 38, 41, 61, 101, 144. 156. D u t i e s . See Natural duties 164. 175n20, 201-2. 224, 2 3 2 - 3 3 , 255-57. 267 Dworkin, Ronald, 75,152n54 Envv. 52: excusable, 162, 198 Equality 38, 52, 57-59, 114-16, 124n21, Education, 5 5 - 5 7 , 1 4 4 - 4 5 , 166-80, 1M. 148-51, 158063, as benchmark, 64, 70, 184; minimally adequate, 178-81, 112, 115, I ' opportunity: see Op­ 205; standard, 178-80 portunity principle Educational opportunities, §15, 191. 2 2

o

f

288

Index

Equilibrium, 34, 9 9 - 1 0 4 , 245. See also Re­ flective equilibrium Established p h e n o m e n a tby a n institu­ tional s c h e m e ) : benefits a n d b u r d e n s (goods and illsi, 3 8 - 3 9 , 45, 47n46, 48, 5 6 - 5 7 , 114, 274 deprivations, 35, 39, 279 freedom, 39, 5 1 - 5 3 , 5 6 , 5 8 - 5 9 rights a n d liberties, 41, 58 distributions (patterns, pattern fea­ tures), 4 6 - 4 7 disadvantages and inequalities, 3 4 35, 3 8 - 3 9 , 52, 118, 137n32, 2 7 8 - 7 9 Explanation, 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 2 5 - 2 7 ; invisible-hand, 30, 59; macro-, 3 0 - 3 1 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 7 3 - 7 5 , 279; micro-, 3 0 - 3 1 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 273 Externalities, 59n61, 71n6, 117, 191, 256, 264 Fair equality. S e e Opportunity principle Fair value. See Basic rights a n d liberties Fairness, 28n23, 5 6 - 5 7 , 189, 193, 229, 2 4 8 49, 2 5 4 - 5 6 , 261, 278. See also Justice a s fairness Family, 2 2 - 2 3 , 9 3 , 1 1 3 n 9 , 198n44,199n47, 2 5 2 - 5 3 , 257; and fair equality of o p p o r ­ tunity, 5 5 - 5 6 , 167n7, 1 7 1 - 7 5 Favorable c o n d i t i o n s . See C o n d i t i o n s Federalism, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , 217 Feinberg, Joel, 28n23, 5 l n 5 4 Fellner, William, l l l n 3 Feudalism, 33, 36, 54, 162n3 First principle, 6 - 7 , 1 0 - 1 1 , 47n46, 64, Chap. 3, 173nl7, 197n43, 203n50, 215, 249-50 cited, 123 a n d equality, 1 4 8 - 5 1 , 156n60,198n42, 249 global, 272 a n d political process, 1 5 6 - 6 0 , 2 4 9 - 5 0 , 258n22, 272 social m i n i m u m under, 136-37, 139, 160, 2 0 1 - 2 a n d standard basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , 143-46, 275 a n d standard basic n e e d s , 1 4 7 , 1 4 9 , 156-57, 196, 277 S e e also A m e n d m e n t First-principle g o o d s . S e e Basic rights a n d liberties Fishkin, James, 1 7 3 n l 7 , 2 6 1 - 6 2 Foreign policy, 215, 2 2 5 - 2 6 , 228, 234n22, 271n38 Foreigners, 1 0 - 1 1 , 225, 249, 256, 275 Formal equality of opportunity. See Op­ portunity principle Formal legal freedom, 128, 147n45, 149n47 Free c h o i c e , 4 9 , 1 7 0 Free market, 38, 2 4 8 - 4 9 , 2 5 5 - 5 6 , 257n20. See also Laissez-faire Free s o c i e t y / s y s t e m , 16, 38, 49, 54, 72n7 Freedom, 38, 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 5 2 , 116-17, 1 2 7 34,248

as c o n s t a n t - s u m , 5 1 - 5 3 , 1 4 9 - 5 0 distribution of, 37, 39, 47, 51, 5 8 - 5 9 e n g e n d e r e d , 39n32, 59 e s t a b l i s h e d , 39. 5 1 - 5 3 , 56, 5 8 - 5 9 f u n d a m e n t a l I first -principle), 130-33, 149-50 w o r t h w h i l e , 1 2 7 - 3 4 , 142, 145 effective legal, 1 2 8 - 3 2 , 138, 145-46, 149-50 formal legal. 128, 147n45, 149n47 institutional, 45, 47, 53 personal, 3 7 - 3 8 , 45, 53, 55, 116 restrictions o n : natural, 45 social: e n g e n d e r e d 39n32, 4 5 - 4 6 e s t a b l i s h e d , 39n32, 45, 5 1 - 5 2 F r e e d o m of a s s o c i a t i o n , 132, 145 F r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t , 19, 116, 130-32, 156n60, 170 F r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s (medial, 124, 135, 148n46, 200 F r e e d o m of thought. 9 6 - 9 7 , 128, 132, 145, 229 Fried, Charles, 184n29, 187n31 Full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m S e e Justice Fullinwider, Robert. 2 6 6 n 3 0 Future g e n e r a t i o n s , 4 6 n 4 3 , 5Hn60, 113n9, 150, 211, 275 Galston, William A., 104n43, 175n20, 282 Games, 2 1 - 2 2 , 26, 49, 55, 68, 223, 276n41 Gauthier, David, 2 2 0 n l l Gender, 39, 52, 55. 129, 148n47, 164-65, 171, 173, 175, 180, 183n26, 185, 196n42, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 , 278 General c o n c e p t i o n of justice, 122, 1 2 4 26, 1 4 0 - 4 1 , 143, 146, 148, 242n5, 243n7. S e e also Special c o n c e p t i o n ol justice Genetics, 45, 1 8 8 - 9 0 , 194, 247, 2 4 9 n l 2 Genius's c o m p l a i n t , 76, 7 8 - 7 9 , 82, 251. See also E n d o w m e n t s Gibbard, Allan, 66n2, 125n22 Gini coefficient, 178, 253 Gintis, Herbert, 158n65 Global basic structure, 36, 154, 2 2 4 n l 4 , 236, 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 240, 263, 2 7 6 n 4 1 . S e e also Basic structure Global interpretation of Rawls, 7 - 8 , 1 2 , 36, 1 5 4 - 5 6 , 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 , C h a p . 6; argu­ m e n t s for, 1 5 4 - 5 5 , 203, 235n23, 2 4 7 - 7 2 Good, 4 2 - 4 4 , 8 7 - 9 0 , 94; c o m m o n , 68, 86n20, 91, 93; c o n c e p t i o n s of, 9 2 - 9 3 , 97, 99, 1 0 2 - 4 , 268n35; t h i n t h e o r y of, 43, 62, 116, l 6 1 n l . See also Priority: of the right over t h e g o o d G o o d s a n d ills, 30, 3 7 - 4 0 natural, 46, 183 e n d o w m e n t s , § § 5 - 6 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 , 164-78, 184n28, 2 5 0 - 5 2 h a n d i c a p s , 4 5 - 4 6 , 6 4 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 , 164-65, 1 8 0 , 1 8 4 n 2 8 , 1 8 9 - 9 0 , 251, 275 natural primary g o o d s , 6 4 , 1 1 4 , 177n22, 183

Index Highest-order preference function (in s p e c i a l capabilities/disabilities/ n e e d s , 47n45, 6 4 - 6 9 , 73, 115 utilitarianism), 94, 9 7 - 9 8 s o c i a l (benefits a n d burdens), 22, 5 6 - 5 7 Hobbes, Thomas, 51n54, 213, 216, 2 1 8 ' 0 - 7 1 , 114 223nl2 Hbffe, Otfried, 2 1 n l 2 d e s e r v e d (entitlements), 81 Holmes, Stephen, 102n41 Deserved, 8 1 - 8 2 . 250 Homicide, 18, 3 0 - 3 1 , 34, 38, 129, 2 3 7 - 3 8 earned, 81, 83, 8 5 273 e n g e n d e r e d , 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 48, 5 5 - 5 6 Humanism, 38, 109, 1 1 2 - 1 3 114, 274, 2 7 9 - 8 0 Humankind, 8 - 9 , 32, 56, 60n62, 75, 93, established, 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 47n46 48 182, 226, 233n21, 235, 258-59, 263. 273 56-57, 114,274,279 275 p o s i t i o n a l g o o d s (constant-sum), 5 1 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 259 53, 169, 175, 198 public g o o d s , 157, 170nl3, 200 Ideal theory, 39, 52, 105, 126-27, 135-36, social primary g o o d s , 43, 46, 64, 9 6 138, 146, 149. 150n49, 187n31, 2 3 0 - 3 1 . 99, 1 1 4 - 3 9 , 122-24, 133, 143, See also Design priority; ,\'onideal the 356n60, 2 0 5 - 6 ory split b y Rawls into civil/political and Implementation priority (among princi­ s o c i a l / e c o n o m i c , §§11-12 ples of justicel, 127, 130, 136-37, 143, G o v e r n m e n t violence, 9, 93,217, 219, 222, 170, 172-73, 180, 186-87, 196, 206. S e e 2 2 6 - 2 7 , 2 3 0 - 3 5 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 244, 246, 260, also Nonideal theory: Priority: lexical 276 Inalienability, 16, 52, 120, 175, 192n35 G o v e r n m e n t s , 2 1 6 - 1 8 , 222-27, 231-38, Incentives, 33, 50, 83, 120, 193n37, 194, 2 4 4 - 4 6 , 255, 257; minimal, 59; ultra199, 253-54, 261 minimal, 2 4 n l 9 . See also Modus vi­ Income (and vvealthi, 84-85, 121. 125, vendi; World government/state 143-44, 168n9, 197-99: earned vs. De­ G r o u n d rules, 8 - 9 , 16-17. 22, 25, 27-29, served, 8 3 - 8 5 , m i n i m u m , 32, 38, 3 6 - 3 9 , 42. 48, 5 1 - 5 4 , 62, 244-45, 255; 143n39, 187n31 moralized, 8 1 - 8 2 , 84-85, 224nl4; origi­ I n c o m e taxes, 18n5, 6 6 - 7 2 , 81, 198, 200, nal, 5 9 - 6 1 ; procedural, 29, 36-37, 39, 203n50 53, 203; unmoralized, 81-86, 224nl4. Index goods, 162-63, 167-74, 177-78, S e e also Institutional scheme; Practices 187-88, 192, 200, 203, 206; i n c o m e and G u n s (firearms), 3 0 - 3 1 , 117, 194, 237, wealth, 8 4 - 8 5 . 121, 125, 143-44, 168n9, 263n24 197-99; leisure time, 115nl2, 198-99, G u t m a n n , Amy, 3n3, 91n28, 138n34, 252-53: powers a n d prerogatives, 116, 162-63, 168, 174nl8, 198-99; residual 158n63, 213n2, 282 social bases of self-respect, 163, 168n9, 198. See also Difference principle H a n d i c a p s , 4 5 - 4 6 , 64, 115-16, 164-65, Index positions. 205 180, 184n28, 189-90, 251, 275. See also absolute vs. relative. 163, 198-203 Contingencies: natural; Disadvantages lowest l o r m i n i m u m l , 169-70, 172, 1 7 8 Hare, Richard M., HOnl 79, 192 196n40, 199-201, 203, 206 Harsanyi, J. C HOnl best feasible m i n i m u m social mini­ Hart, H" L. A., 124n20, 140, 142n37, 149n48, m u m u n d e r difference principle), 198n44, 2 0 1 - 3 . 205 216n6 Individualism. 38, 109, 113-14, 242, 2 4 7 Health care. See Medical care 48, 250, 253-54, 258 See also C o m m u ­ Health insurance, 187, 189n32,190, nitarian ism 191n34, 19Zn35, 193-95 Inequalities: Health problems. See Medical conditions natural, 4 5 - 4 7 , 5 6 - 5 7 , 64, 114-16, Health protection (access to n e e d e d med­ 177n22, 184n28. 188 ical care), 185-93; full (access to full international, 2 5 0 - 5 1 m e d i c a l care) for socially produced social, 64, 74. 177n22. 188 m e d i c a l conditions, 190,192-93, 195, institutional. 42, 57, 64, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73. 205; minimally adequate (access to 112. 129. 2 4 7 - 4 8 minimally adequate medical care), for in basic rights a n d liberties, natural medical conditions, 179 (Graph 137n32, 149, 150n51, 160n67 2), 1 8 6 - 8 9 , 1 9 1 - 9 3 , 195 class-induced. 166-68, 171, 173-74, Higher-order interest, 97n34,103, 161nl 176, 178, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 Highest-order interests, 97-99. ™3-4. engendered, 3 4 - 3 5 , 38, 47n46, 118 lllnZ 124n20, 126,133-34, 143^U9n48, 278-79 155n59,161, 178n23; better called deter­ established, 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 8 - 3 9 , 52, 118, minative, 105n45; first, 99-102, 153; sec­ 137n32, 2 7 8 - 7 9 o n d , 103. See also Moral powers; Person

290

Index

Inequalities tconu g e n d e r - i n d u c e d , 39, 52, 55, 129, 148n47, 1 6 4 - 6 5 , 173, 175, 183n26, 196n42, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 , 278 global, 237, 2 4 3 - 4 5 , 2 4 8 - 5 4 , 2 7 3 - 7 5 , 279 initial, 46n43, 119 luck- induced, 175, 180, 1 9 0 - 9 1 r a c e - i n d u c e d , 129, 131, 156n60, 1 6 4 - 6 5 , 173, 183n26, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 radical, 5n4, 3 4 - 3 5 , 120, 122, 138, 188 ( s o c i o ) e c o n o m i c , 1 1 8 n l 3 , 120, 1 2 4 25, 1 3 8 - 3 9 , 157, Chap. 4, 250 talent-induced, 1 6 4 - 6 6 , 173-74, 176, 2 5 2 n l 5 infant mortality, 7, 33, 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 7 3 - 7 4 Initial situation (in contract doctrinesi, 5 3 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 . See also Original position Institutional reform. See Reform Institutional s c h e m e , 8 - 9 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 22, 2 9 32, 3 7 - 3 9 , 45, 5 5 - 5 7 , 62, 82, 101, 117, 164, 228, 276, 2 7 9 - 8 0 ; d e n n e d , 2 1 - 2 5 , 219. See also Basic structure; Ground rules; Practices Institutions. S e e Institutional s c h e m e Integrity, 5n4, 1 0 5 - 6 ; of the person: see Basic rights a n d liberties Interaction, 8, 2 1 - 2 8 , 46, 80, 144, 241, 248, 251, 257, 2 6 2 - 6 4 , 268. See also Coopera­ tion I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , 8 - 9 ; global, 241, 242n4, 251, 2 5 6 - 5 7 , 2 6 2 - 6 3 , 268 International law, 2 1 6 - 1 8 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 228, 235, 237, 2 4 4 - 4 6 , 249, 257, 259 Interpersonal c o m p a r i s o n s , 5, 37, 96, 109, 114, 116, 177, 183, 199, 203 Interschemic benefits/optimizing, 7 0 - 7 2 , 76, 168, 174, 264 Interschemic c o m p a r i s o n s , 42, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73, 96, 109, 1 1 6 - 1 8 , 125, 133, 199, 2 0 3 - 5 Intraschemic benefits/optimizing, 7 1 - 7 2 , 76 Intraschemic c o m p a r i s o n s , 116, 133 Johnson, Conrad D., 40n36 Juridical state, 2 1 6 - 1 7 . S e e a l s o State of nature Justice (distributive), 1 5 , 1 7 , 28, 37, 50, 84, 188, 241 c i r c u m s t a n c e s of, 93, H l n 2 , 213, 266n31 c o n c e p t i o n s of, 15, 26, 53n55, 110, 229, 235, 269 p a r o c h i a l i s m of, 24, 2 1 2 - 1 4 , 2 6 7 - 7 1 a n d stability, 9 9 - 1 0 4 , l l l n 2 , 143, 148, 171, 176, 203, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 256, 2 5 8 - 5 9 See also Justice as fairness criteria of, 24, 170 distribution-sensitive, 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 4 n 4 0 a n d e n d o w m e n t s , 5 6 - 5 7 , 73, 82, 1 1 4 16, 177 patterned, 16, 24, 2 8 - 3 1 , 37, 53 broadly consequentialist, 39, 4 2 -

44, 4 6 - 4 7 , 55, 62, 7 5 n l 2 fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 4 5 - 4 7 , 55, 57n59, 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 138n34, 184, 189, 275 s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 47, 64, 120, 138H34, 156H60, 1 8 8 - 8 9 , 196, 251-52, 274-75 d e o n t o l o g i c a l , 43, 45, 47, 5 4 - 5 5 , 114, 120, 274 a n d publicity, 6, 42, 78, 83, 91, 96, 98, l l l n 2 , 112, 114, 123, 126, 128, 148, 171, 172nl6, 1 7 6 - 7 7 , 206 satiahility of, 41 and specificity, 6 - 8 , 129, 141, 144, 157, 2 0 6 - 7 ' subject of, 3, 1 7 - 2 7 , 180, 2 7 4 - 7 5 h o w distinct from morality, 17, 2 6 27, 31, 65 h o w related to morality, 9, 11-12, 1 8 19, 2 5 - 2 7 , 31, 34-36,^40-43, 47n47, 55, 65, 102, 110, 227, 2 3 4 - 3 5 , 2 3 8 39, 270 See also Procedural justice; Retributive justice; S e n s e of justice Justice as fairness (Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justicel, 1-8, 15, 2 1 1 n l b a s e d o n c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , 37, 8 1 - 8 2 , 97n35, 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 258, 2 6 8 - 7 1 a n d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , 89, 9 4 98 to foster a sense of justice, 91, 9 9 - 1 0 6 , 121, 132, 212, 214, 258, 271 initial aim of, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 1 4 7 - 4 8 p r i m a i y a i m of, 161 Rawls's criterion of justice, 12, 110, 266 broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 46, 5 4 - 5 5 , 5 9 - 6 0 . 80, 114, 239, 274 disjunctive c o m b i n a t i o n of general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s , 122, 242 n5 d o m a i n of, 2 0 - 2 5 , 29, 266 full satisfiability n o t required, 12, 260 global e x t e n s i o n s of, 235n23, 240, 242-44, 246-72 i n d i v i d u a l i s m of, 38, 109, 1 1 3 - 1 4 , 242, 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 250, 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 258 a n d m a x i m i n , 1, 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 5 n l , 63, 8 0 81, 1 0 9 - 1 2 , 1 2 2 - 2 6 , 1 4 0 - 4 3 , 145, 148, 254, 2 6 4 - 6 5 a n d natural inequalities, 4 5 - 4 6 , 5 6 57, 6 3 - 6 4 , 7 3 - 7 5 , 1 1 4 - 1 6 a n d neutrality, 95, 9 9 , 1 0 4 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 p a r a m e t e r s of, 1 1 2 - 2 2 p a t t e r n e d , 2 8 - 2 9 , 53, 62 a n d political p r o c e s s , 9 1 , 1 5 6 - 6 0 political role of, 6 n 5 , 78, 8 2 n l 7 , 83, 91, 9 5 - 9 8 , 123 satiable, 41 s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 4 6 - 4 7 . 62, 64, l l S n l l , 138n34, 1 7 2 n l 6 , 181, 2 5 1 52 specification of, 6 - 8 , 10, 109,112, 132, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 156, 175n20, 1 9 5 96, 2 0 6 - 7 , 2 7 1 - 7 2

Index See also General c o n c e p t i o n of jus­ tice; Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice Justification, 3 6 - 3 7 , 4 0 - 4 2 , 5 7 - 5 9 , 61, 6 4 65, 87, 95n31, 106, 111, 136, 213, 2 6 8 - 6 9 S e e also Reflective equilibrium

Kanbur, Ravi, 1 1 9 n l 5 Kant, Immanuel, 2, 5, 8, 27, 51n54, 88, 93n29, 99, 100n40, 104-5, 211, 213-14, 216, 233n21, 241, 256, 267 Laissez-faire, 32, 35, 38, 237, 248-49, 2 5 5 56, 257n20 Larmore, Charles, 3n3, 93n29, 95n31 95n33, 104n43 Law, 19n7, 3 4 - 3 5 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 192, 276; crimi­ nal, 2 2 n l 3 , 23, 8 3 - 8 4 , 9 3 - 9 5 , 100, 129, 152; international, 216-18, 2 2 3 - 2 4 « 8 235, 237, 2 4 4 - 4 6 , 249, 257, 259; rule of ' 132, 145, 147, 223 Least advantaged group/class, 1-2, 9 - 1 1 4 6 - 4 7 , 70, 1 1 7 - 1 9 , 129, 157, 163, 176 1 9 7 - 9 9 , 2 0 3 - 6 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 , d e n n e d a s fixed fraction, 2 0 4 - 5 ; as defined by Rawls 2 0 3 - 4 ; globally, 239, 2 4 2 - 4 3 , 2 5 3 - 5 4 258, 264, 268, identification of, 1 3 7 - 3 8 142n37,193 Legal freedom .effective, 128-32, 138. 1 4 5 46, 149-50; formal, 128, 147n4S. S e e also Worthwhile freedom Legislation, 3 0 - 3 1 , 91n28, 151n52, 153-60. 194n38, 202, 215, 228, 237. 2 7 1 - 7 2 Legislative stage (in Rawlsi, 140, 144, 175n20,178n23 Legitimate expectations, 51, 82, 85, 2 6 1 62. See also Desert; Entitlements Leisure, 66-67, 115nl2, 198-99, 205n55, 206, 252-53 Leisure time (an index good), 115nl2. 198-99, 206, 252-53 Lexical (lexicographical serial i ordering. See Priority: lexical Liberalism, 2, 76, 87, 145, 213n2. 230nl9, 270, 273 Libertarianism, 24, 45-46. 49n51. 54, 57 120 Liberties. See Basic rights and liberties Life expectancy, 33, 237 Life prospects. See Shares of social pri­ mary goods Locke, John, 51n54, 55, 57, 6 0 - 6 1 . 211nl 213 Lockean proviso, 17n3, 49-50. 60n62 120 220nll Luck. See Contingencies; Inequalities Lyons, David, 40n36 Maclnlyre, Alasdair, 2n2 Macpherson, Crawford B„ 154nrf Macroexplanations, 30-31, 2 3 / 3» 75, 279

291

Majority rule, 31, 158n65, 189, 223, 228 Malnutrition a n d starvation, 35. 143n39, 226-27, 2 3 6 - 3 8 , 2 4 8 n l l , 263n24, 2 7 3 74, 277 Markets, 9, 35, 71n6, 187, 203, 215n5, 237, 2 4 8 n l l , 251, 264 Marshall, Geoffrey, 216n6 Marsilius (of Padual, 216n6 Martin, Rex, 7 4 n l l , 158n64, 167n7, 189n32 Master Pattern, 4 0 - 4 1 , 62, 64, 112, 177n22; S e e also Pattern preferences; Patt e m e d / u n p a t t e m e d principles Master pattern, 30, 37, 40, 64. 252 Maximin criteria, 80, 110-12, 122-26, 248, 253, 264 Maximin idea. 1, 10-11, 63. 109-10, 117. 120 Maximin rule, 96-97, 110-12, 117, 126. 140-41, 169, 179, 242, 254. S e e also Par­ ties in original position Maximin solution. 110, 122, 124. 134, 141, 145, 148, 242n5 Medical ihealth) care, 49n51, 138n34, §16 for natural medical conditions, 185-89, 194-95 minimally adequate, 186 standard. 186 for socially p r o d u c e d medical condi­ tions, 190-95, 198 full, 190, 192-93, 195 Medical conditions, 185, 206; natural, 185-89, 194-95, 205; self-caused, 1 9 3 95; socially produced. 190-95. 198, 205, 215 Medical opportunities, §16, 205. See also Health protection Michaelman, Frank I., 138n34. 162n2 Mill, John Stuart, 150-51, 155, 160n67. 263 Minorities, 20, 44, 92, 112n6. 142, 154, 189. 194. 246n9, 262 Mobility (social). 1 1 8 - 2 0 Modus'vivendi, 101, §§19-20; defined. 101. 219; and fundamental assurance problem 219-21 225-27: intergovern­ mental. 222, 224-27, 229nl8, 2 3 0 - 3 1 ; and situated assurance problem, 2 1 9 20, 223 233 Moral arbitrariness 63, 67, 7 5 - 7 8 , 147n4s, 250-51 253 265. S e e also Desert: Moral deservingness Mora! c o n c e p t i o n s 47, 8 2 n l 7 , 88, 212, 252. 269n36 281; of justice a n d of morality distinguished, 17 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 65; overall of justice a n d morality). 4 2 - 4 4 : paro­ chialism of 2 1 2 - 1 4 , 267-71 S e e also Justice Morality Moral deservingness (worthi. 73, 77-87, 250 See also Desert Moral philosophy, 1-2, 5, 113, 211 Moral powers, 9 7 - 9 8 , 104, 132-34, 143, 177, 181: first, 97: s e c o n d , 97, 99n36, 114 S e e also Highest-order interests; Person Moral theory, 211

292

Index

Moralism, 234n22, 278 Morality, 5n4, 41n37, 105, 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 113, 183n27, 235, 238, 2 4 8 n l l , 261, 275 c o n c e p t i o n s of, 44, 47, 55 deontological, 4 4 fully consequentialist. 44 semiconsequentialist, 47 political, 1 0 2 - 5 , 144n40, 159, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 216 subject of: c o n c e r n e d w i t h character a n d c o n ­ duct, 3, 17, 2 5 - 2 7 , 65, 275 h o w distinct from justice, 17, 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 65 h o w related t o justice, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 5 - 2 7 , 31, 3 4 - 3 6 , 4 0 - 4 3 , 47n47, 55, 65, 110, 238-39 S e e also Responsibility Moralized g r o u n d rules, 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 4 - 8 5 , 224nl4 Morgenthau, Hans, 234n22 Motivation/motives, 6, 30, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 0 3 - 6 , 115, 138, 1 6 6 - 6 7 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 , 219, 225, 269; moral, 9 1 , 1 0 4 Musgrave, R. A., H O n l , 198n45 Mutual benefit (advantage), 20, 60, 220, 226, 236, 2 6 3 - 6 4 Mutual disinterest (of parties), 92, l l l n 2 Nagel, T h o m a s , H O n l , 237n27 Nation slate. See Stale Nationality (a contingency!, 247 Natural assets; of p e r s o n s : see E n d o w ­ m e n t s ; of States, 222, 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 2 5 0 - 5 2 , 2 5 6 n l 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 274 Natural duties, 2 2 n l 3 , 2 4 n l 9 , 42, 78, 8 1 82, 8 4 - 8 5 , 113, 189n32, 238, 2 5 0 n l 2 ; d u ­ ties c o n c e r n i n g injury a n d cruelty, 85; d u t i e s c o n c e r n i n g the justice of s h a r e d institutions, 32, 3 4 - 3 5 , 82, 211, 238, 267, 2 7 6 - 7 7 , 279n42; duties of mutual aid, 183n27, 189n32,193n36, 238; negative VS. positive, 32, 3 4 - 3 5 , 238, 2 7 6 - 7 7 , 279n42 Natural primary g o o d s . See Goods a n d ills Natural rights, 78, 81. S e e also Natural d u ­ ties N e e d s (human), 44, 46, 56, 8 8 - 8 9 , 1 1 4 - 1 6 basic social a n d e c o n o m i c , 1 0 , 1 3 3 - 4 7 , 180, 232, 275 outlined, 133 medical, 57n59, 1 1 5 , 1 8 1 - 8 9 special, 47n45, 275 See also Standard n e e d s Neutrality, 95, 9 9 , 1 0 4 , 224, 268; metaprocedural, 95n31; procedural, 95 N e w Deal, 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 4 - 3 5 , 238, 270, 2 7 8 Noncompliance, 54-56, 61,100-101,121, 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 231, 236n25, 2 4 4 - 4 5 . S e e a l s o A s s u r a n c e problem; C o m p l i a n c e N o n i d e a l theory, 8, 12, 39n32, 5 2 , 1 0 5 n 4 6 , 1 2 6 - 2 7 , 130, 1 3 5 - 3 7 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 5 - 4 7 , 149n48, 159, 258n22. See also Ideal the­

o i y ; I m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority; Transi­ tion Nozick. Robert. 2 - 3 , C h a p 1, 78, 120, 157n61 a n d anarchis m, 2 4 n l 9 , 58 a n d capitalism, 48n48, 58 and c o m p e n s a t i o n . 35n29, 48n48, 49n50, 6 0 n 6 2 for b o r d e r c r o s s i n g s , 19n6, 8 5 n l 9 a n d constraints: c o n s i s t e n c y , 51 equality, 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 52, 5 7 - 5 9 exhaustiveness, 51-52, 57-58 relatedness, 52 a n d desert, 65, 7 8 - 8 1 , 83, 85 a n d e n d o w m e n t s , 6 4 - 6 5 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 71-76, 251 a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s , 15, 1 7 - 2 0 , 28, 3 5 - 3 6 , 46, 48n48, 51, 5 9 n 6 1 , 65, 69, 72, 78, 265 a n d e x p l a n a t i o n , 3 0 - 3 1 , 59, 157n61 a n d harnessing, 6 8 - 6 9 , 7 1 - 7 2 a n d initial rights, 4 6 n 4 3 , 52, 5 7 - 5 9 , 120 a n d Ujcke, 48, 55, 6 0 - 6 1 a n d Lockean proviso, 17n3, 4 9 - 5 0 , 60n62, 120 a n d original grounrirules, 5 9 - 6 1 and original position, 5 3 - 5 5 a n d p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , 16, 24, 2 8 - 3 1 , 37, 53, 6 2 and property, 1 5 - 2 0 , 3 2 - 3 3 , 3 6 - 3 7 , 39, 48n48, 52, 5 8 - 6 1 a n d s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s , 15, 1 8 - 2 0 , 28, 3 5 36, 51 a n d slavery, 16, 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 5 0

a n d Utopia, 54, 56, 61 See also P a t t e m e d / u n p a t t e r n e d princi­ ples O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 33, 116, 118, 122, 156n60, 157, § § 1 4 - 1 6 , 197, 205, 215, 248, 256; ed­ ucational, §15, 191, 1 9 5 - 9 7 , 205, 215; e m p l o y m e n t , 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 191, 205; medical, §16, 205; w h e t h e r a social primary g o o d , 161, 1 6 7 - 7 0 , 1 7 5 - 7 6 O p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , 10n7, 127n25, 147n46, 157, 158n64, § § 1 4 - 1 6 , 197, 205, 215n5, 250, 2 5 4 c i t e d , 123 four readings d i s c u s s e d , 1 6 6 - 7 3 revision of: fair equality, 1 6 6 - 7 3 of e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s (ac­ c e s s to m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e d u ­ cation), 1 7 2 - 8 0 , 196 of e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s (ac­ c e s s to m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e m ­ p l o y m e n t ) , 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 196 of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s (access t o m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e h e a l t h pro­ t e c t i o n for natural, a n d to full h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for socially p r o d u c e d medical conditions), 183-96 formal equality, 155, 1 6 8 - 7 1 , 1 7 3 - 7 5 ,

Index 177-80 of e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities, 180, 196 of e m p l o y m e n t opportunities, 180, 196 of m e d i c a l opportunities, 1 8 2 - 8 3 , 196 O p p r e s s i o n , 5, 1 1 - 1 2 , 132, 230, 260, 267n32, 273, 275, 277 Original p o s i t i o n (in Rawls), 2, 24, 28, 37, 53n56, 73n9, 8 1 - 8 2 , 87, 92, 9 5 - 9 6 , 1 1 0 12, 136, 141, 148, 183, 213n2, 2 4 1 - 4 2 , 272; central features of, l l l n 2 ; a n d global justice, §22; Nozickian analogue to, 5 3 - 5 5 . See also Initial situation; Par­ ties i n original position; Veil of igno­ rance Orwell, George, 48 Overlapping c o n s e n s u s , 4, 144n40, 2 1 3 16, 269. S e e also Political morality; Value overlap

293

Peters, R. S., 216n6 Pettit, Philip, HOnl, 213n2 Philosophy, 2, 4 - 8 , 39n33, 57, 60, 75 94 125, 206-7, 211, 2 1 4 - 1 5 ; moral, 1-2, 5, 113, 211; political, 1-6, 2 4 n l 9 , 53, 98, 2 1 1 - 1 3 , 235 Plato, 4,165n5 Pluralism, 232; international, 2 3 0 - 3 3 Police, 31, 33, 49n51, 135, 147n45. 191, 194 276 Political liberties. S e e Basic rights and lib­ erties Political morality (kernel of), 102-5, 144n40,159, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 216. S e e also Over­ lapping c o n s e n s u s Political philosophy, 1-6, 2 4 n l 9 , 53, 98, 211-13, 235 Political process, 91, 94, 117. 135, 145, §13, 148n46, 271n39 a case of procedural justice, 151 imperfect, 91n28, 153, 155. 202, 249nl2 Packages. S e e Basic rights a n d liberties perfect, 153, 203 Parfit, Derek, 70n5 pure, 91, 110, 153, 155, 157, 159, 185, Participation, 22, 32, 113, 144-45, 158n63, 188, 190, 197, 200, 2 4 9 n l 2 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 185, 2 1 9 - 2 1 , 276 evaluated by its fairness and reliability, 153, 159 political, 38, 93, 117, 153, 188, 2 4 9 - 5 0 principle of equal, 154 fairness of (basic political liberties), 134n28, 145, 150-51, 153-54, 156, 159, Parties in original position, 4 6 - 4 7 , 56-57, 160n67, 2 4 9 - 5 0 89, 9 2 - 9 3 , 9 6 - 9 8 , 100, 110-13, 123, 1 2 5 reliability of (just outcomes). 158-59 27, 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 3 5 - 3 6 , 139-42, 144n42, 266, qua first principle. 156-57, 1 5 9 - 6 0 271n39 qua s e c o n d principle, 157-60, 197 global, 2 4 2 - 4 9 , 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 256-58, 272 qua difference principle, 157-59, as representatives of states, 243, 2 4 7 200-203 50, 253 qua opportunity principle, 157, as mutually disinterested, 92, l l l n 2 169, 179-80, 185, 187-94 as risk-averse, 53, 110-12, 1 2 0 - 2 1 , S e e also Democracy; Legislation 1 2 4 - 2 5 , 138n34, 148, 160, 173 Poverty. See Deprivations See also Clients; Maximin rule; Origi­ Power" 100-102, 104n43, 145. 156, 216-23, nal position; Veil of ignorance 226-31, 234-36, 238. 242, 274-77; bal­ Paternalism, 48n49, 49, 52, 120,195 ance of, 214, 218, 221, 225, 234n22. See Pattern features, 50, 65 also Bargaining p o w e r e n g e n d e r e d vs. established, 12,16, 2 8 Powers and prerogatives (an index good', 36, 4 5 - 4 8 , 5 4 - 5 6 , 118, 164, 274, 2 7 8 116, 162-63, 168. 174nl8, 198-99. 206 80 Practices, 17-18, 2 1 - 2 3 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 78. S e e distinguished, 38-39 also Ground rules; Institutional s c h e m e Pattern preferences, 2 8 - 2 9 , 36-37, 53, 55, Prices, 49, 66, 72, 74, 125, 144, 189, 2 4 9 n l l , 59, 6 1 - 6 2 , 65, 71n6, 73, 8 0 - 8 1 ; How264 c o m p o n e n t , 3 7 - 3 8 , 51, 109-10; WhatPrimacy of the practical, 1-6, 12, 136, 142, c o m p o n e n t , 3 7 - 3 8 , 50, 109; Who211-14, 269, 2 7 5 - 7 6 c o m p o n e n t , 3 7 - 3 8 , 1 0 9 . See also Master Primary goods. S e e Goods and ills; Social Pattern primary goods Patterned/unpatterned principles, 16, 24, Principles. S e e Special conception of jus­ 2 8 - 3 1 , 37, S3, 62 tice Person, 44, 120 Priority: Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of, 3, Chap. 2, 112 of domestic over global principles, 2 5 5 14, 116, 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 143, 161, 243, 247-48, 57 252 of the least advantaged, 2, 9 - 1 0 , 127, political role of, 91, 9 8 , 1 0 5 - 6 , 1 1 2 137, 206, 258, 274, 277 rationale for, 9 9 - 1 0 4 lexical. 16nl, 44, 205 Sandel's c o n c e p t i o n of, 73n8, 86n20, of first over s e c o n d principle, 10, 38, 90n25, 9 2 - 9 4 , 1 1 3 - 1 4 47n46, 96, 122, 125-31, 134-49, 160, u s e d as m e a n s , 6 3 - 6 4 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 7 2 - 7 4 162-64, 206, 243n7 See also Self

394

Index

Priority Icont.) of o p p o r t u n i t y over difference princi­ ple, 1 6 1 - 6 2 , 167, 169, 1 7 2 n l 6 , 196n40, 206 u n d e r s t o o d a s d e s i g n priority, 127, 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 143, 170, 173, 187n31, 196 u n d e r s t o o d a s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n pri­ ority, 127, 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 143, 170, 1 7 2 - 7 3 , 180, 1 8 6 - 8 7 , 1 9 6 , 206; See also Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice of the right o v e r the g o o d , 8 7 - 8 9 See also Good; Right of the self over its e n d s , 87, 89 See also Self Procedural justice, 1 5 1 - 5 3 imperfect, 1 5 1 - 5 2 in e c o n o m i c s y s t e m (market), 203 in political p r o c e s s , 91n28, 153, 155, 202, 2 4 9 n l 2 perfect, 1 5 1 - 5 2 in e c o n o m i c s y s t e m (market), 203 in political p r o c e s s , 153, 203 pure, 29, 3 6 - 3 7 , 39, 53, 1 5 1 - 5 2 in e c o n o m i c s y s t e m (market), 203 in political p r o c e s s , 91, 110, 153, 155, 157, 159, 185, 188, 190, 197, 200, 249nl2 Property rights, 1 5 - 2 0 , 23, 27, 3 2 - 3 3 , 3 6 37, 39, 48n48, 52, 5 7 - 6 1 , 1 3 2 , 1 4 5 , 2 3 0 n l 9 , 261 national, 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 264 See also Natural a s s e t s Prudential equilibrium c o n d i t i o n , 2 1 9 - 2 0 . See also Bargaining equilibrium Public g o o d s , 157, 1 7 0 n l 3 , 200 Publicity (of criteria of justice), 6, 42, 91, 96, 98, 112, 114, 123, 126, 1 7 2 n l 6 P u n i s h m e n t . S e e Retributive justice Pure p r o c e d u r a l justice. See Procedural justice Quality of life, 46, 57n59, 114, 188 Race, 16, 27, 129, 131, 147n46, 156, 1 6 4 - 6 5 , 185, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 , 271 Raz, J o s e p h , 2 6 n 2 1 , 41n38, 95n31 Realism, 2 3 4 n 2 2 Redistribution, 27, 29, 36, 65, 68, 72, 250; m i s l e a d i n g n e s s of the term, 1 7 , 1 8 n 5 . See also R e s o u r c e redistribution princi­ ple Redress, p r i n c i p l e of, 1 7 6 - 7 7 Reflective equilibrium, 2, 5 , 1 1 0 , 211, 268 Reform: of institutions, 8 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 27, 32, 34, 51, 1 2 6 - 2 7 , 135, 137, 139n35, 1 4 5 - 4 6 , 2 0 6 - 7 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 , 2 6 0 - 6 1 , 271, 2 7 4 - 7 9 economic, 118nl3,135 e d u c a t i o n a l , 176, 180 global, 216, 231, 2 3 4 - 3 6 , 238, 2 4 5 - 4 6 , 249, 2 5 7 n 2 1 , 2 5 9 - 6 0 , 262, 2 6 7 - 7 0 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 , 277, 279n42

of o t h e r s o c i e t i e s , 246, 256, 257n21 of political p r o c e s s , 153, 158 pseudo-, 253-54 social a n d e c o n o m i c , 160, 177n22 of p e r s o n s , 27 Reiman, Jeffrey, 198n45 Religion, 20, 90, 91n27, 9 6 - 9 8 , 1 0 5 - 6 , 133, 149n47, 196n42, 2 2 7 - 2 9 , 268n35, 2 7 2 73; Christian d o c t r i n e s , 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 2 6 9 - 7 0 ; history of, 228, 229; religious liberties, 96, 1 3 2 , 1 3 4 n 2 8 Representative equal c i t i z e n (in Rawls), 1 2 4 - 2 5 , 137 Representative g r o u p s , 70, 109, 1 1 7 - 1 9 , 176n21, 197, 206; d e n n e d , 137, 2 0 3 - 4 . S e e also Least a d v a n t a g e d R e s o u r c e redistribution p r i n c i p l e (in Beitz), 241, 2 5 0 - 5 2 Responsibility, 1 1 4 , 1 2 0 , 1 9 3 , 1 9 5 , 198n44, 2 4 9 n l l , 255 for injustice, 9, 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 102, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 227, 2 3 4 - 3 5 , 237, 270 related to negative d u t i e s , 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 4 35, 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 2 7 6 - 7 8 See also W r o n g Retributive justice, 2 2 n l 3 , 23, 78, 8 1 - 8 5 , 9 3 - 9 5 , 100, 152, 224 Richards, David A. J., 241n3, 263 Right, 4 2 - 4 3 , 8 7 - 8 9 , l l l n 2 . See also Good; Priority: of t h e right over the g o o d Rights, 18, 30, 32, 37, 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 9 n 6 1 , 123, 194n38, 274; alienability of, 16, 52, 120; d i s t i n g u i s h e d from v a l u e s , 1 9 - 2 0 ; h u ­ man, 239, 246n9, 272; moral, 32, 59, 113, 2 6 1 - 6 2 ; natural, 60n62, 78, 81; negative and positive, 32, 238; of states, 2 4 4 - 4 5 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 258; utilitarianism of, 20; to welfare, 138n34, 215n5. S e e Basic rights a n d liberties; Property rights Risk, 22, 31, 34, 112n6, 1 2 0 - 2 2 , 147n46, 1 8 8 , 1 9 1 - 9 5 , 236; in t h e original p o s i ­ tion, 135, 1 3 8 - 3 9 , 141, 146, 170, 1 7 2 n l 6 , 178,185, 200 Risk a v e r s e n e s s . of g o v e r n m e n t s , 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 2 5 - 2 6 , 231, 244 of parties in original p o s i t i o n , 53, 1 1 0 12, 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 1 2 4 - 2 5 , 138n34, 148, 160, 173 See also M a x i m i n rule R o u s s e a u , Jean-Jacques, 155, 2 1 1 n l , 213 Rule of law, 132, 145, 147, 223. See also Basic rights a n d liberties

also

Sandel, Michael, 2 n 2 , 3, 2 6 n 2 1 , 9 5 n 3 2 a n d desert, 7 6 - 7 7 , 7 9 - 8 0 , 83, 8 5 - 8 6 a n d e n d o w m e n t s , 6 4 n l , 67n3, 6 8 - 6 9 , 72-76 o n priorities, 8 7 - 8 9 o n t h e self: as Rawls c o n c e i v e s it, 77, 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 -

Index 91, 96 a s Sandel c o n c e i v e s it, 73n8, 86n20, 90n25, 9 2 - 9 4 , 1 1 3 - 1 4 S c a n l o n , T. M., 47n45, 7 5 n l 2 , 1 1 4 n l 0 , 1 1 8 n l 3 , 204n52, 2 4 1 n 3 Scores, 204n53 first-principle (X-scores), 1 2 3 - 2 7 , 131n27, 134, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 142n37, 149, 150n49 second-principle (socioeconomic), 2 3 27, 134, 1 3 7 - 3 8 i n d e x (Z-scores), 201, 2 0 5 - 6 o p p o r t u n i t y (Y-scores), 179 (Graph 2), 205-6 triscores, 2 0 5 - 6 S e c o n d principle, 10n7, 38, 1 1 8 n l 4 , 1 2 3 28, 1 3 5 - 3 9 , 147, C h a p . 4, 250 cited, 123 d e m o c r a t i c - e q u a l i t y interpretation of, 1 6 5 - 6 8 , 174 four r e a d i n g s of, d i s c u s s e d , 1 6 8 - 7 3 e x c l u d e d from c o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 5 8 - 5 9 , 161 global, 2 5 0 - 5 3 , 263, 272 liberal-equality interpretation of, 1 6 5 66 natural-liberty interpretation of, 165, 168nl0 a n d political p r o c e s s , 1 5 7 - 6 0 See also Difference principle; Oppor­ tunity principle S e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s , 124, 1 2 8 , 1 5 8 n 6 3 . See also I n d e x g o o d s ; Opportunities; Socioeconomic positions Self (subject), 77, 80, 8 6 - 9 0 , 99; "deon­ tological," 77, 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 - 9 1 , 96; a s prior to its e n d s (Sandel), 87, 89. See also Per­ son Self-determination (self-government), 1 5 4 - 5 5 , 244, 2 5 8 n 2 2 Self-interest, 5, 34, 72n6, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 155, 2 2 3 28, 269 Self-respect, 33, 153n55, 162-63, 170, 1 7 1 n l 4 , 1 7 4 - 7 8 , 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 186, 196n42 natural b a s e s of, 177n22 social b a s e s of, 116, 1 5 0 n 5 1 , 1 6 2 - 6 4 , 176 residual social b a s e s of (an index g o o d ) , 163, 168n9, 198, 199n45, 206 Self-restraint, 219, 2 2 3 Semiconsequentialism: for justice, 6 4 , 1 2 0 , 1 3 8 n 3 4 , 156n60, 172nl6, 188-89,196, 251-52, 274-75 d e f e n d e d , 5 5 - 5 7 , 114-16, 143, 177n22, 1 8 3 - 8 5 , 189 d e f i n e d , 47, 62 a n d m e d i c a l care, 1 1 5 , 1 8 1 , 1 8 3 - 8 4 , 188-89,196 for morality, 47 Sen, Amartya K., 39n33, 4 6 - 4 7 , H O n l , 114, H S n l l , 143n39, 184, 2 4 9 n l l S e n s e of justice, 85, 91, 9 9 - 1 0 6 , 1 2 1 , 1 3 2 , 212, 214, 228, 258, 271 Serial ordering. See Priority: lexical

295

Shares of social primary g o o d s (or social positions), 4 6 - 4 7 , 5 6 - 5 7 , 1 1 4 - 1 7 , 124, 137,156n60, 1 9 1 - 9 3 c o n c e i v e d as lifetime ex post shares, 1 1 8 - 2 2 , 129, 165, 183n26, 198n44, 252 c o n c e i v e d as representative shares, 117-18, 137 worst (or m i n i m u m ) share, 1, 25, 41-44, 73, 1 1 0 - 1 2 , 115, 117-24, 127, 135-37, 141-42, 204, 206, 2 5 1 - 5 4 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 , 277 best feasible m i n i m u m share (social m i n i m u m ) , 12, 71,117, 190-91, 194, 253, 260 Shue, Henry, 105n46 Side constraints (in Nozick), 15, 18-20, 28, 3 5 - 3 6 , 51 Sidgwick, Henry, 2 1 3 - 1 4 Singer, Peter, 113n7 Slaveholder's argument (in Rawls), 260n23 Slavery/slaves, 11, 16, 20, 23, 27, 35, 41, 4 5 46, 4 8 - 5 0 , 112n4, 122nl8, 132, 262, 2 7 8 79 Smith, Adam, 144n41 Smoking, 91, 193 Social contract doctrines, 2 4 - 2 5 , 28n23, 40, 5 3 - 5 5 , 57, 87, 93, 110, 204n52, 211, 228, 2 4 1 - 4 2 , 256 Social m i n i m u m , 12, 71,117, 1 9 0 - 9 1 , 194, 253, 260 u n d e r first principle, 136-37, 139, 1 4 3 46, 160, 2 0 1 - 2 , 275 u n d e r s e c o n d principle, 144 u n d e r difference principle, 198n44, 2 0 1 - 3 , 205 u n d e r opportunity principle, 178-79, 181,186-89 Social mobility, 1 1 8 - 2 0 Social positions. See Shares of social pri­ mary g o o d s Social primary g o o d s , 43, 64, 96-99, 11419, 1 2 2 - 2 4 , 1 4 3 , 1 5 6 n 6 0 , 2 0 5 - 6 ; and standard n e e d s , 46, 56, 133; u s e d to identify and to compare social posi­ tions, 133, 2 0 3 - 6 . See also Basic rights and liberties; Second-principle goods; Shares of social primary g o o d s Social systems (societies), 17, 2 0 - 2 6 , 3 3 34, 6 1 - 6 2 , 92, 102-4, 242-43, 2 4 5 - 4 6 as consisting of two parts (in Rawls), 123, 138-39, 148 global, 215, 265, 279 self-contained, 7, 25, 240-43, 254, 2 6 2 63 well-ordered, 99, 104, 106, 2 6 5 - 6 6 just, 6, 28n23, 105n46, 106. 136, 158n65 Socialism, 132, 145,158n65, 2 0 1 - 3 , 215n5, 2 2 9 - 3 0 , 233, 235n23 S o c i o e c o n o m i c positions, 130, 134n28, 138 147-48, 162, 170, 205n54, 253-54, of least advantaged, 11, 157, 167; worst, 123, 137, 140, 142, 146, 157, 163, 168. .See also Second principle

296

Index

Sovereignty, 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 245. 254, 2 5 7 - 5 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 2 7 4 ; absolute, d o g m a of, 2 1 6 - 1 7 Special c o n c e p t i o n (two principles) of justice, § § 1 1 - 1 2 , 242n5, 243n7, 272; cited, 123; r e a s o n s against, §11; strat­ egies for improving, 1 3 5 - 4 2 ; s u g g e s t e d revision of, 1 4 2 - 4 7 . See also A m e n d ­ ment; C o n d i t i o n s ; General c o n c e p t i o n of justice; Priority, lexical Stability, l l l n 2 , 143, 148, 171, 176, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 5 8 - 5 9 ; a n d equilibrium, 9 9 - 1 0 4 , 245; international, 203, 256. See also As­ s u r a n c e problem; S e n s e of justice Standard n e e d s , 1 4 3 - 4 4 , 156n60 a n d social primary g o o d s , 46, 56, 133 standard basic n e e d s , 143n39 a n d first-principle g o o d s , 147, 149, 1 5 6 - 5 7 , 196, 277 standard basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , 144, 157,160, 196n41, 1 9 7 - 9 8 , 203, 205n55, 206, 275 a n d first-principle social mini­ m u m , 143-46, 275 Standard of living (in Sen), 46, 114. See also Quality of life Starting positions, 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 215n5 Starvation. S e e Malnutrition a n d starva­ tion State: minimal state, 24, 5 4 - 5 5 , 59, 61 n a t i o n state, 226, 230, 234n22, 235, 2 4 3 45, 2 4 7 - 5 4 , 2 5 6 - 5 8 , 276n41 institution of, 9 - 1 0 , 2 5 7 - 5 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 274 w o r l d state, 156, 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 222 State of nature, 2 4 n l 9 , 49n50, 55, 59, 61, 216-17 Strains of c o m m i t m e n t , 1 0 5 n 4 6 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 5 , 120, 122, 146, 170, 2 2 4 n l 4 , 235, 2 4 4 - 4 5 Talents. See E n d o w m e n t s Taxes, 23, 3 3 , 1 0 6 , 186, 194, 215; o n g a s ­ oline, 91, 192n35,194; head, 64, 79, 251; i n c o m e , 18n5, 6 6 - 7 2 , 81, 198, 200, 203n50; international, 2 5 6 n l 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 Taylor, Michael, 93n29 Third World, 237n28, 238, 257n20, 262, 269 Threat advantage, 101, 220, 246. See also Bargaining p o w e r Transition, 8, 59, 105n46, 145, 229, 234n22, 2 3 6 , 2 5 9 - 6 0 , 2 6 3 5 e e a/so I m p l e m e n t a ­ tion priority; Nonideal theory Triscores. S e e Scores Trust(worthiness), 220, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 229, 2 3 3 34, 236, 245. See also A s s u r a n c e p r o b ­ lem Tuck, Richard, 16n2 T w o p r i n c i p l e s . See Justice as fairness; Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice

Ultimate values, 224, 228, 234n22 Unfreedom, 41, 48, 130, 133, 277 United Nations, 246n9; Security Council, 217, 2 2 3 n l 3 , 274 United States, 6, 10, 35, 1 1 8 n l 3 , 125, 131, 134, 140, 142, 1 5 3 - 5 5 , 158n64, 187n31, 195n39, 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 217n8, 263n24, 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 267n33, 270; D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n ­ d e n c e , 16, 212, 267; M e d i c a i d , 187n31; N e w Deal, 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 4 - 3 5 , 238, 270, 278, O c c u p a t i o n a l Safety a n d Health A d m i n ­ istration, 195n39; S u p r e m e Court, 217n8 Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, 239, 272 U n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d rules, 8 1 - 8 6 , 2 2 4 n l 4 Utilitarianism, 4 0 - 4 4 , 47, 48n48, 59n61, 75, 96, 114, 116, 1 1 8 n l 9 , 135n29, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 161, 184; a n d h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference f u n c t i o n , 94, 9 7 - 9 8 Utilitarianism of rights, 20 Utopia, lin Nozick), 54, 56, 61 Value overlap, 102, 2 2 8 - 2 9 , 234, 2 7 0 - 7 1 . See also Overlapping c o n s e n s u s Van Dyke, Vernon, 113n8 Veil of i g n o r a n c e , 28, 53, 93, 100, 111, 178, 188, 191, 242, 247, 257 lifting of (four stages), 140, 144, 155-56, 178n23, 202, 2 7 1 - 7 2 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a g e (convention), 2 0 1 - 2 , 271 legislative stage, 140, 144, 175n20, 178n23 See also Original p o s i t i o n ; Parties in original p o s i t i o n Virtual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 93, 188, 193 Walzer, Michael, 2n2, 2 4 8 n l 0 War, 9, 93, 219, 227, 230, 235, 244, 246, 260 Wealth, 27, 30, 51n53, 83, 139, 145n43, 151n52, 253. See also I n d e x g o o d s Welfare, 18n5, 23, 42, 56, 64, 144, 215n5; rights to, 138n34, 2 1 5 n 5 W e l l - o r d e r e d n e s s , 99, 104, 106, 266; of w o r l d s o c i e t y , 156, 216, 244, 2 6 5 - 6 6 W e l l - p r o t e c t e d n e s s (of basic rights), 6 - 7 , 1 2 8 - 2 9 , 147, 192, 215 Williams, Bernard, 2 n 2 , 90n26, 1 0 4 - 6 Wolff, Robert Paul, 2 0 n l l , 6 0 n 6 2 World, 7 - 9 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 36, 60, 86n20, C h a p s . 5-6 World g o v e r n m e n t / s t a t e , 156, 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 222 W o r t h w h i l e (worth of) f r e e d o m , 1 2 7 - 3 4 , 1 4 2 , 1 4 5 . See also Legal f r e e d o m Wrong, 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 34, 36n30, 81, 84, 2 3 4 35, 273, 2 7 6 - 7 8 . S e e also Blameworthi­ ness; Responsibility