in Democratic Network Governance

Methods in Democratic Network Governance Edited by

Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

Methods in Democratic Network Governance

Also by Peter Bogason PUBLIC POLICY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE: Institutions in Postmodern Society SAMFUNDSFORSKNING BOTTOM-UP: Teori og Metode (co-editor with Eva Sørensen) TAMPERING WITH TRADITION: the Unrealized Authority of Democratic Agency (co-editor with Sandra Kensen and Hugh T. Miller)

Also by Mette Zølner RE-IMAGINING THE NATION: Debates on Immigrants, Identities and Memories

Methods in Democratic Network Governance Edited by Peter Bogason Professor of Public Administration Roskilde University, Denmark

and

Mette Zølner Associate Professor Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

Editorial Matter, Selection, Introduction and Conclusion © Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner 2007 All remaining chapters © respective authors 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries ISBN-13: 978-1-4039-9529-2 ISBN-10: 1-4039-9529-X

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This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Methods in democratic network governance / edited by Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-4039-9529-X (cloth) 1. Public administration—Europe. 2. Public-private sector cooperation—Europe. 3. Manpower policy—Europe—Case studies. 4. Comparative government. I. Bogason, Peter. II. Zølner, Mette. JN94.A58M48 2007 351.4—dc22 2006048376 10 16

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents List of Figures

viii

List of Tables

ix

List of Boxes

x

Foreword by Jacob Torfing

xi

Notes on the Contributors

xii

List of Abbreviations

1

Methods for Network Governance Research: an Introduction Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

2

Why a book on methodology? What is network governance? Empirical research on network governance Methodology Structure of the book Notes

A Comparative and Multi-level Analysis of Governance Networks: a Pilot Study of Employment Policy Jacob Torfing 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5

3

xiii

Selection of scope, policy area, countries and sites Research strategy: output-based backward mapping Multiple methods Managing collective research processes and data collection Lessons learned from the pilot study

1 1 3 6 9 16 20

21 23 28 32 34 38

Empirical Findings: Seven Network Stories Jacob Torfing

41

3.1 3.2 3.3

43 47 52

The transnational governance network The Danish national governance network The English national governance network v

vi

Contents

3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4

The French national governance network The local governance network in Køge The local governance network in Birmingham The local governance network in Grenoble Summing up

55 59 63 67 71

Comparative Analysis Based on Expert Reports Jacob Torfing

74

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

74 76 79 84 85 97

Introduction Comparative studies based on expert reports A critical assessment of the use of expert reports How should expert reports be analysed? Assessing and analysing expert reports Lessons learned

5 Document Analysis of Network Topography and Network Programmes Anders Esmark and Peter Triantafillou 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6

Introduction Different ways of reading documents Documents lost and found Analysing network topography Analysing network programmes Conclusions

6 Qualitative Interviews: Studying Network Narratives Mette Zølner, Iben Ørum Rasmussen and Allan Dreyer Hansen 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6

Introduction Qualitative interviews in relation to the study of network governance Selecting respondents Conducting interviews Analysing policy actors’ narratives on labour market governance Conclusion Notes

7 Studying Local Network Exclusion through Observation and Diaries Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing 7.1 7.2

Introduction Observation studies and diary writing

99 99 100 104 107 116 122 125 125 127 132 136 141 145 147

148 148 150

Contents

7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6

8

Interactive Focus Group Interviewing in Studies of Network Governance Bodil Damgaard and Eva Sørensen 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5

9

Introduction Interactive focus group interviewing and network governance Practical application Analysing network governance through focus group interviews Lessons from interactive focus group interviewing in studies of governance networks

Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods for the Analysis of Network Governance: Promises, Problems, Pay-offs and Potentials Susana Borrás and Hans-Peter Olsen 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4

10

Undertaking observation and diary studies in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble The data material and how it was analysed Analysing observations and diaries: some tentative research results Concluding remarks on the use of observation and diaries in network studies

The promises of method-mixing for the analysis of network governance Experiences from the pilot study: the problems Experiences from the pilot study: the pay-offs Potentials: lessons learned and future directions Notes

vii

156 160 165 177

179 179 181 187 194 204

207

207 209 214 221 223

Conclusion Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

224

10.1 10.2 10.3

224 227 229

Questions and answers Challenges in the research process Final points

References

233

Index

239

List of Figures 2.1 9.1 9.2

Location and key findings of the three local cases The collection and analysis of data Graphic representation of EES governance network

viii

29 211 216

List of Tables 2.1 2.2 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 7.1 8.1 9.1 9.2

Brief comparison of the three case countries Overview of the collected data Seven governance networks at a glance Questions answered by experts in country reports Assessment of the quality and consistency of expert reports The EU’s metagovernance of the NAPs Involvement of various network actors in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAP The political and institutional background The composition, development and impact of the national governance networks Effective and democratic governance Political, institutional and discursive effects of the NAP Analysing external and internal exclusion Key characteristics of interactive focus group interviews Different SNA measurements Brokerage measures

ix

26 33 43 82 89 90 91 93 94 96 97 164 188 215 220

List of Boxes 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8

Transnational case French case French case Danish case (group A) Danish case (group A) Danish case (group B) British case British case

196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203

x

Foreword This volume is a part of a small book series that aims to analyse how governance networks contribute to the governing of our increasingly complex and fragmented societies. The book series consists of three books: Theories of Democratic Network Governance edited by Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, Methods in Democratic Network Governance edited by Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner, and Democratic Network Governance in Europe edited by Martin Markussen and Jacob Torfing. The three books are self-contained volumes that can be read independently, but they are all part of the same endeavour to develop a second generation of governance network research that focuses on new and important questions about the dynamics of governance networks, the conditions for their success and failure, the attempt to metagovern governance networks and their democratic problems and potentials. The contributing authors are either members of the Centre for Democratic Network Governance that was established at Roskilde University in 2003, or have been associated with the Centre as guests or visiting research fellows. Anonymous reviewers have provided valuable comments to earlier versions of the chapters. Our student assistants have collected data and gathered material for the books, and Andrew Crabtree and Jon Jay Neufeld have helped to improve the language. We thank them for their excellent work. Jacob Torfing Series Editor Roskilde

xi

Notes on the Contributors Peter Bogason, Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark Susana Borrás, Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark Bodil Damgaard, Research Associate, Danish National Institute of Social Research, Denmark Anders Esmark, Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark Allan Dreyer Hansen, Associate Professor, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark Hans-Peter Olsen, PhD student, Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark Iben Ørum Rasmusen, PhD student, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark Eva Sørensen, Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark Jacob Torfing, Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Roskilde University, Denmark Peter Triantafillou, Associate Professor, Department of Social Science, Roskilde University, Denmark Mette Zølner, Associate Professor, Department of Intercultural Communication and Management, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

xii

List of Abbreviations AEG AFPA AMS ANPE ARF AWM BCC BSP CBI CDSEI

CEEP CFDT CGT DA DSI EAPN EES EGL EMCO ESG ETUC FO FRESA FTF JCP LAA

Access to Employment Group National Association for Education of Adults (Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes) Labour Market Directorate (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen) National Employment Service (Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi) Association of Danish Regions (Amtsrådsforeningen) Advantage West Midlands Birmingham City Council Birmingham Strategic Partnership Confederation of British Industry Committee for Social Dialogue about European and International Questions (Comité du Dialogue Social pour les questions Européennes et Internationales) European Centre of Public Enterprises Democratic French Confederation of Labour (Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail) General Confederation of Labour (Confédération Générale du Travail) Danish Employers’ Confederation (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) Association of Handicap Organizations (De Samvirkende Invalide Organisationer) European Anti-Poverty Network European Employment Strategy Employment Guidelines Employment Committee Employment Strategy Group European Trade Union Confederation General Federation (Force Ouvrière) Framework for Regional Employment and Skills Action Association of Public Employees (Funktionærernes og Tjenestemændenes Fællesråd) Job Centre Plus Local Area Agreement xiii

xiv

List of Abbreviations

LCC LO LSC MEDEF NAP NRF OMC PLIE PLO RSP SALA

SGCI

TUC UNICE WMRA

Local Coordination Committees for Preventive Labour Market Measures Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen) Learning and Skills Council French Employers’ Association (Mouvement des Entreprises de France) National Action Plan Neighbourhood Renewal Funds Open Method of Coordination Local Plan for Integration and Employment (Plan Local pour l’Insertion et l’Emploi) General Practitioners’ Association Regional Skills Partnership The Danish Confederation of Employers’ Associations in Agriculture (Sammenslutningen af Landbrugets Arbejdsgiverforeninger) Interministerial Coordination Committee for European Economic Cooperation (Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne) Trades Union Congress The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe West Midlands Regional Assembly

1 Methods for Network Governance Research: an Introduction Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

1.1

Why a book on methodology?

This book discusses the reflections about and choices of methodology in a research project on network governance completed in 2005.1 It is a challenging task to discuss how a research process evolves and how decisions about research methods are made. Although the process is crucial for research results, it mostly remains an untold story. This is the case both within the social sciences in general and in network governance research in particular. When reporting their results obtained from empirical research, researchers often cover methodological issues only briefly in introductions, in footnotes or in technical appendices. Mostly, the purpose is to justify the value of the findings in terms of reliability, validity or representativity. More in-depth discussions are mostly reserved for the overwhelming and thorough literature on methodology in which the focus is on how research processes should ideally be and on how to apply specific research methods in general. A textbook discussion of methodology is, indeed, important, but its weakness is that it rarely raises and explains methodological issues in relation to research questions within the context of a concrete research project.2 As a consequence, researchers’ accounts of particular research processes mostly remain private stories that might be shared among close colleagues, but they are rarely discussed and critically reflected upon in the written form that constitutes the formal academic forum par excellence. One explanation for this most likely lies in the genres available for academic work. These include reporting results on empirical research, discussing theoretical approaches and the implication of empirical results for theories and the other way around, or reflection upon methodology in general. Thus, there is no academic genre that leaves 1

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

room for a thoughtful and self-aware discussion of experiences gained from research processes relating to well-defined research questions and within a specific context. A second reason for rarely telling the story of how we go about doing research in practice might be that telling it is difficult. Methodology is at the heart of our professional identity as researchers. Mastering research skills and methods is what qualifies us as researchers, and it justifies our findings. Consequently, talking openly about dilemmas, struggles and dead ends we went through on the analytical path to results is painful because it is felt to question the quality of our findings and our professional identity. This is even more the case as the social sciences remain strongly influenced by the legacy of positivism and its aim of structuring the research design and data generation in ways that make it possible to generalize over time and space. Positivists believe that rules about methodological choice pre-empt subjectivity in choice. Hence, within that tradition of the social sciences, reflection on subjectivity in the research process is hardly encouraged, unless it concerns how to limit it as much as possible. In contrast, researchers within the constructivist tradition accept the situated nature of their research. Therefore, they apply qualitative research methods to the situation and are more ready to accept and discuss elements of subjectivity and the consequences following such data ‘distortion’. Yet, even when accepting this, telling about our experiences of the difficulties and uncertainties springing from concrete research processes is a challenge which requires a careful analysis of the research processes and interaction with the field in order to find out which phases were crucial for the way in which results were progressively achieved. It also raises the question of whether and how the problem of subjectivity might be changed into an opportunity. Finally, once such awareness has been reached, we still need to adopt a style for writing the stories. That is, a style that goes beyond the account in our research diary, sharing with the reader our research experiences in a way that enhances awareness and reflexivity with the aim of improving future research projects concerning democratic network governance. This book tells stories of how a group of researchers went about doing research in practice. In particular, we want to tell about the difficulties and uncertainties that arose in the process, and how we decided to solve them. We include such themes as how we constructed data, how we aggregated and worked up data into information that supported, modified or rejected the theses inherent in our research questions, how our respondents reacted, and how we, step by step, started getting the picture of

Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

3

network governance in European employment policies. Our awareness of research practices has been enhanced by this task of telling the stories of research practices in situated contexts. Further discussion will help us in enlarging both the repertoire of methods, from which we, as individual researchers, choose, and our knowledge of potentials and pitfalls of each method in relation to particular research areas, such as the study of democratic network governance. In addition, reading this story provides a useful insight into the craft of doing research that is likely to be particularly helpful for junior researchers and graduate students. The book is written on the basis of concrete experiences in research practices gained from an international pilot study of European employment policies (using cases from Denmark, France, England and the EU) carried out by the Centre for Democratic Network Governance at Roskilde University, Denmark, in the period from 2004 to the end of 2005. The pilot study aimed at exploring and evaluating the potentials and problems of various research methods in empirical studies on network governance. This choice was founded on the observation that, so far, methodological questions have been given little attention among researchers within the field of network governance – despite the fact that non-standardized approaches are required in this research that tends to be cross-disciplinary, problem-driven, multi-level and comparative. With the aim of anchoring the discussion on such methodological questions within a concrete research process, the pilot study was conducted within one policy field in which similar research questions were investigated by applying various research methods to seven cases at the transnational, national and local levels.

1.2

What is network governance?

Neither ‘networks’ nor ‘governance’ are new concepts (Bogason 2006). ‘Networks’ were introduced in the emerging public policy literature by Hugh Heclo who wrote that in policy analysis, one should be careful ‘not to reify collectivities into individual deciders but to understand the networks of interaction by which policies result’ (Heclo 1972: 106). He therefore recommended analysing programmes instead of analysing organizations, which was what most researchers did at that time. Subsequent research led him to formulate what were to become core concepts within policy analysis: policy communities and issue networks (Heclo and Wildawsky 1975). Policy communities were defined as more stable interaction patterns among policy interests, issue networks were understood as mostly being ad hoc.

4

Methods in Democratic Network Governance

Over the years, these concepts were developed further by, among others, Rod Rhodes, who based his main book on the subject (Rhodes 1997) on the research he had undertaken over a decade. Other venues were concepts like neo-corporatism (Schmitter 1974), followed by various discussions of political and social interaction (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). In Norway, Gudmund Hernes spoke of the negotiated economy (Hernes 1978), a concept that was developed further by Scandinavian researchers in the 1980s (Andersen et al. 1996). In Great Britain, planners discussed the role of networking planners, so-called reticulist planners (Friend et al. 1974). All these authors were united by scepticism towards the importance of formal organizations in the policy process. Instead, they formulated alternatives based on network concepts. Governance is a concept that arose in the 1990s. It was preceded by discussions based on ‘new institutionalism’, which came to the fore as policy analysts found that the formal organizational system of government did not adequately describe the patterns of interaction they found in policy formation and implementation. Some formulated network alternatives along the systemic lines we saw above. Others followed a rational choice approach and discussed the actions of rational actors within systems of rules – or institutions (Ostrom 1990). Yet other researchers did not want to pursue a line of methodological individualism in their research and, therefore, they put more emphasis on the perseverance of such institutional rules and the mechanisms (for example organizational culture or logics of appropriateness) that made people rule followers (March and Olsen 1989). The aim of governance research is to give up the idea of the organization as an anchor point in society, and instead focus on governance processes. Hierarchical state–society relations are being replaced by other forms of interrelationships which often imply some ‘co-action’ between public and private (Kooiman 1993: 4–6). Such an interpretation invites us to reconceptualize modern theories of the state of which there are many such attempts; examples are theories of reflexivity (Beck et al. 1994) and of postmodern conditions (Bogason 2000; Miller 2002). These authors invite us to understand the state as a network mingled with society at large, and consequently, the analytical interest moves away from the traditional focus on parliamentary and bureaucratic processes of negotiation. Instead, scholars want to analyse interaction patterns between various forms of interest representation, broadly understood. The results of this interaction then are recognized as de facto public policies. So, combining governance and networks into network governance is to join two forces of the same character, and as indicated above, coming

Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

5

out of the same research concerns. Rather than envisioning policymaking as a top-down process fully controlled by the government, network governance approaches it as the result of negotiated interaction between a plurality of public and private actors, and that takes place within relatively stable frameworks in particular policy fields (Sørensen and Torfing 2006, Introduction: 3). We use the concept of network governance as an analytical means to catch a movement of politics and administration towards being intertwined in various forms of interactive networks which in many cases are not prescribed by constitutions, legal frameworks or statutes. Network governance is neither market nor government nor civil society, it is a hybrid organizational form. In our understanding, network governance integrates a number of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors in concrete negotiations based on a common understanding established through factors like regulation, norms and perceptions. They often help to produce and coordinate policy decisions, and they may achieve a certain degree of self-regulation. Network governance goes beyond the interactions of the formal system of government without losing the capacity to include the formal system in the analysis. So by using the concept of network governance we do not lose past understandings of governing and the initial ideas about governance, but we expand the conceptual horizon to include recent changes, in so far as they have come about. We use the concept of network governance because we want to understand the needs for communication and interaction across the formal organizational boundaries of parliaments, political parties, administrative agencies, interest organizations, private enterprises, local governments, third sector organizations and citizens’ movements. These interactions may be seen as responses to demands for in-depth information, needs for personal contacts between decision-makers, calls for citizen involvement in cases of local importance, and demands for uses of the third sector to make room for alternative solutions to those of the public sector, various other public–private partnerships and so on. In countries like Denmark, network governance is conspicuous, in other countries it is just emerging – this is the case in most of Eastern Europe. Whatever the case, there is, in all countries, a growing debate about whether network governance is at odds with representative forms of democracy, or whether they can be reconciled by new understandings of democratic action. One way to ensure the democratic features of governance is to let the elected politicians take more action, but in slightly new ways. We see a call for the decision-makers at the top of the system to help resolve differences by adapting existing instruments and

6

Methods in Democratic Network Governance

introducing new ones. We call such a role or function metagovernance – governing the system of governance (Jessop 2002; Sørensen 2002). Metagovernance is an activity of control, and extremely important in our understanding of how governance is played out in practice. This is typically where formal government at all levels – with its elected politicians and executive civil servants acting as metagovernors – has room to perform a legitimate role, not by detailing and deciding the contents of policy, but, metaphorically speaking, by orchestrating and conducting a policy process without going into the nitty-gritty details that seem to enthuse quite a few politicians. But the role of the metagovernor requires the politicians to accept that some of the actors may improvise within an overall framework rather than playing the tune exactly as found in the score. Network governance appears to be a challenge for the existing system of government. Many actors, particularly those who are used to dealing with policy details, do not understand how to work within a general policy framework and tend to see metagovernance as a threat to their role of determining policy contents. Therefore, careful analysis is required to enhance our understanding of the ways in which metagovernance works.

1.3

Empirical research on network governance

Although network governance is not new, it is a developing field of research and the literature is rich in definitions and theoretical approaches. In the following, we shall use a conception of governance networks, characterized by the five points listed below, which is also used in the two companion volumes: 1) a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors; 2) who interact through negotiations; 3) which take place within a common regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; 4) that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies; and 5) which contributes to the production of public purpose. (Sørensen and Torfing 2006, Introduction: 9) This definition points to several methodological challenges we encounter when we have to decide whether something qualifies as network governance. The process of policy-making is at the centre of our attention, and in particular we are interested in the interactions between the actors. However, data on the policy output and on the kinds of actors that participate (public, private or semi-public) do not suffice to

Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

7

illuminate whether or not we can identify a governance network. It calls for data providing us with information on whether actors are interdependent in the sense of, for example, resources (knowledge, money) or process (de facto requirement of consensus) or action, which may require other actors to adapt or raise questions of appropriateness. Likewise, it requires data on the nature of the interaction among actors as a way to get insight into whether negotiations with concessions are going on or whether the interaction merely involves the exchange of information or consultation. Our interest in researching network governance has three roots. The first two are visible in the definition above; they come from network theory and institutional theory and serve the purpose of analysing the character and operations of the networks. The third one comes from democratic theory and serves to evaluate the networks from a democratic perspective. These theoretical roots were drawn on in a comparative perspective so that both differences and similarities in the three countries (Denmark, England and France) and at the EU level could be identified. On the basis of network theory, we formulated research questions such as: How were the networks formed? Who took the initiative? How stable were they, and did they have a spatial dimension? Why were they formed? What were their purposes? What objects were they directed at? What kind of knowledge did they produce and what instruments were they using? What types of actors were involved? How open and accessible was the network, and how did the actors perceive their roles? What role did metagovernance play? How were the actions of networks overseen? Did some (other) actors prescribe and monitor substantial goals, or were networks only monitored regarding their processes? Did the network actors have any sense of a hierarchy looming in the offing? On the basis of institutional theory, we were interested in the following questions: What types of norms and political discourses would play a role as the basis for the formation of networks? Once identified, how could one detail the norms in substantial terms, for example in the shape of overall paradigms (workfare/welfare) and normative systems like Work First and Human Capital approaches? How were such principles adapted by various instruments? And, what procedural principles were used by the networks? What was their degree of autonomy? How did their interaction take place internally and in relation to other bodies or networks? Did the networks apply any measures of efficiency like benchmarking or comparative output measures? In relation to democratic theory, the following research questions were asked: How do the new forms of network governance challenge existing

8

Methods in Democratic Network Governance

democratic norms? More precisely, did the network violate principles of democratic representativity? Did they function as exclusionary agents precluding the influence of legitimate actors? Were the decisions of networks publicly visible and accessible? Were the networks subject to democratic oversight and control by elected bodies? New forms of governance suggest the need to rearticulate our democratic standards and theories – if so, what would they look like? Were the participants in the networks equal partners in the processes? Did the networks empower interests in society that otherwise had little access to political or administrative decision-making? Did the networks create a common identity among the participants? Did the networks have any power in implementing their decisions? The methodological challenge of the above research questions is, first of all, to identify, collect and process the kind of data that can be expected to illuminate such processes which more often than not remain informal, in the sense of not being accessible in written form. And they are rarely discussed in public by the actors involved. Many networks are not mentioned in the public organizations’ reports, and if they are, they are treated from the very perspective of the participating organization. Networks which are not formalized, do not keep files. Therefore, the research challenge points to, first, the use of a number of qualitative research techniques such as observation and interviews. These provide us with opportunities to either get information that is not reflected in minutes or papers from meetings (observation), or to engage in dialogue about phenomena which do not occur in the political and administrative processes due to the initiative of the actors themselves. But second, one may also ask some of the participants in the policy networks to produce special documents. One possibility is an expert report presenting the view of that participant on the various qualities of the policy. Another possibility is a diary written by some of the participants, recording their views of the policy process as it evolves. Third, focus group interviews are useful to follow up on results gained from other research methods; one can, so to say, let the interests negotiate what the research is about and how to interpret preliminary results. All these types of data gathering necessitate close contact with practitioners in the field and, therefore, they point to important questions in relation to our strategies, choices and actual performances when we interact with the field. However, we also need to address the wider historical and institutional settings. The above does not mean that one can omit a larger perspective. Documents are important in informing the researcher about the historical changes and the formal parameters for the policy under scrutiny, and they often

Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

9

point to new research questions that need to be raised. Furthermore, one can use various macro- and microindicators in quantitative network analysis to supplement the findings gained from the microanalysis through the use of qualitative methods. A second methodological challenge posed by the definition above concerns how to identify the contours of something that might be a network. While some governance networks are initiated top-down by regulations and laws and can be identified by some formal characteristics, such as a statutory list of participants, others are self-grown, bottom-up. These might be informal because they are identified exclusively on the basis of the interaction among their participants, not on the basis of their formal role. This kind of informal network presents us with the challenge of establishing concepts that put us into a position to discriminate among various forms of interaction so that we can distinguish between the different patterns. Phenomena such as (resource) interdependence, recurrence and regularity of interaction, perceptions of common purpose(s) and interest perception(s) in relation to such purposes may be of some importance here, as are indications of negotiations. These may surface as exchanges of points of view and possible expressions (airings) of links to other spheres of common interest (quid pro quo).

1.4

Methodology

Above, we briefly mentioned a number of methods which are particularly suited to the analysis of network governance. Most literature on research in the public sector requires a known organization or at least a programme whose fulfilment of goals is to be assessed; it requires lines of responsibility and defined tasks in relation to implementation. In other words, traditional research examines how public policy and the people who deliver it may be appraised, audited, valued and controlled (Parsons 1995: 461). There is a large academic industry devoted to writing ‘how to’ books on, for example, programme evaluation across nations; many of those authors restrict themselves to taking formal goals into account. Increasingly, however, such approaches are being questioned because goals are often difficult to measure, good data are difficult to obtain, side effects will probably occur but are difficult to trace, and, all in all, robust traditional social research designs are difficult to establish (Wollmann 2003: 6). There are also non-traditional evaluators who discuss their task from other perspectives than those of programme goals, and who have developed social scientific methodologies to serve research purposes under ambiguous conditions. The so-called Fourth Generation of Evaluation

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

(Guba and Yvonna 1989) works with qualitative methods and enhances a research set-up that permits adaptation along the road. These researchers have reached sophisticated levels of social research which are applicable outside the field of evaluation, and we have made use of some of their experiences and the lessons they have learned. In network governance, we do not expect the roles in policy-making to be very clear at the outset, and therefore, a flexible research design is desirable. Of course, network governance also involves public programmes, but in so far as the network may involve several programmes, the boundaries of the scope of the network may be difficult to identify, particularly on the outcome side. This is because several public policies may affect the same aspects of society which are the concern of the network. Besides, many aspects are influenced by other factors (economic, social) than the instruments of public policies. This is common knowledge. When we turn to (policy) networks, they may sometimes have some prescribed roles, particularly if they are backed up by formal rules. But apart from that, one would expect roles to develop as a consequence of processes that are difficult for an outside researcher to determine beforehand. Therefore, one must approach the theme with a relatively open research agenda in terms of what methods to use and how much one can take for granted. Furthermore, the triangulation of methods is desirable so that one can use alternative methods to confirm, modify or reject results obtained by another research technique, and, maybe, modify the overall research set-up as well. Above, we briefly mentioned a number of research methods that appear to be particularly suited to addressing methodological challenges encountered when studying network governance. In the pilot study we applied these methods with a view to exploring the potentials and pitfalls of each method in concrete cases of network governance as well as to initiate a discussion of how the methods can be developed further and fruitfully combined in future full-scale studies of network governance. Below, we will briefly introduce these methods: expert reports, documents, interviews, observation, diaries, focus group interviews and social network analysis. We shall go through them one by one. Expert reports are what their name suggests, namely a report written by an expert on a particular theme. In a way it is a fuzzy concept, but in the USA, expert reports have increasingly become an instrument which is used in the court system, and now a formal definition exists. After a Supreme Court ruling in 1993 (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), the courts have required expert testimonies to be based on scientific knowledge in order to establish a standard of evidentiary reliability, meaning

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that the results of an expert report must be based on more than a subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The reliability depends on factors like whether a testimony is based on a testable theory, whether the theory is subject to peer review, whether there is a discussion of error factors and whether the theory or methodology is generally accepted in the scientific community. In American courts, the judge must now make sure that such reliability is respected, and one will therefore see a discussion of the Daubert quality of any expert report (Martin 2004). Thus in an introduction to the report, experts will be expected to state their specific scientific qualifications, and the report will tell the reader about the theory and methodology used. In the practice of public administration, expert reports are often used in order to sum up relevant information about a particular topic, and we have used them in a similar fashion. Expert reports are considered as almost having research status, but they are rarely tested in the strict sense of the American courts. In practical public administration, many expert reports are simply written as documents on the state-of-the-art knowledge within a particular theme, and the author is often a public employee who has worked within the relevant field for an extended period of time. S/he then has an overview of the field which may be difficult for outsiders to obtain, but mostly reports are based on the sources from within a specific organization, and the scientific literature is not included. Consequently, such authors have a particular perspective, normally congruent with that of the public organization that employs him or her, and this is simultaneously the strength (insight) and weakness (organizational bias) of the report. Another solution to getting expert evidence is to identify an independent observer, for example from a think tank or a university. In that case, one will expect the report to come closer to having a scientific status, but given the development of the social sciences towards constructivism and post-structuralism, that status will rarely be like that required by the American courts. Documentary analysis is part and parcel of much qualitative research. Many activities in the public sector are described in documents of various kinds. Examples are historical accounts, institutional mission statements, annual reports, budgets, minutes of meetings, internal memoranda, policy manuals, institutional histories, handbooks, official correspondence, demographic material, mass media reports and presentations, and even lengthy descriptions of programme development and evaluation. Documents are particularly useful for unveiling the history of a network formation and transformation, as well as shifts in overall institutional logics, policy goals and strategies.

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

In the analysis of network governance, documents may be used in various ways. They are useful to get a first impression of a policy field; in most cases one will find documents presenting the policy to the public. These are accessible to anyone, but, in addition, there will be internal documents which were written in the process of preparing a particular policy or intervention, laying out rationales, often alternatives, for action. Mostly, such documents will be found on file, containing stakeholders’ opinions, minutes from meetings, drafts of policy stances, etc. But the documents may not be available to researchers in all countries – there are large differences in legislation and traditions regarding secrecy in public administration. Even so, it is possible to find documents which, read in the right sequence, indicate how a policy has been prepared, decided and implemented. Today, much of such material may be found on the Web. A case in point, in recent years, is the EU. The sixth Framework Programme for Research is one example where one can find documents from working groups preparing the contents, White Papers laying out the principles the Commission would like to pursue, and numerous documents on the ensuing discussion within the EU. The final documents describing the contents of the decisions on the sixth Framework Programme for Research will, if one reads them closely, clearly indicate what has taken place in the last phases of preparing the research policies. It is not that one can see who has done what, but one will know whose interests were furthered, and what options were discarded. Consequently, a close reading of the documents gives the patient reader a starting point for thinking about what actors were involved, what their standpoints were, when they made themselves known in the process, and what some of the outcomes of the process were. In other words, some facts become clear, and one can start formulating questions about the details of the policy process – to be used by other methods like interviews and observation. On the basis of interviews or observation, one may go back to documents either because one has learned about ‘new’ sources, or because the information obtained calls for a renewed reading of past papers. Interviews are core instruments in most qualitative research projects, and there is a huge literature on ‘how to’. Much of that literature, however, is concerned with two aspects, namely how to create representative interviews (in order to generalize), and how to remove the traces of the interviewer (to strengthen neutrality). As to representativity, the rationale is that one selects from a large pool of possible informers, and one wants to get someone who is representative of the majority of views.

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How to define that majority, then, is a major concern of the research design, requiring massive brainstorming concerning what is typical and why. As to the effect of the interviewer, the concerns are mostly: how to be neutral, how not to affect the interviewee through dress code, physical poise, or by leading questions; how to be to the point (structured interview), how not to interject comments or be sarcastic or use academic jargon, etc. From such a perspective, the interviewee is a pool of information which can be reaped by the correct interview technique, and one major goal is to get this information out ‘as is’, i.e. unbiased, and not in any way distorted from the form it is stored in the mind of the participant. This makes sense if the research project aims to generalize across time and space. One needs information from interviewees who are typical and the interviewer should be as unattached to the interview situation as possible. In the pilot project on network governance in employment policies, these factors have had less relevance. We did not seek information across time and space, so the traditional neutrality signals did not apply. And we had no established ideas of what may be typical behaviour within governance networks, so we did not have to make distinctions between possible interviewees on that basis. Nor was our goal one of ethnomethodology; we did not aim towards getting the perfect view of the way the participants experienced the processes they went through, we were not interested in whether or not this gave them a meaning in their personal or professional lives. And we were not interested in a phenomenological or grounded-theoretical uncovering of the essence of networks. Rather, we needed interviews as a primary source of information about what has gone on in the recent past in the networks; these interviews should take us beyond processing documents and making decisions. In addition, we needed assessments of the process from the participants of the networks. Interviews were used for those purposes, not in the search of the truth, but to learn about the (assumed) diverse understandings of network governance. This concerned both factual information and evaluations both as filtered by the perceptions of the interviewees, and as based on the reflexivity they expressed during the interviews. Observation is the specialty of anthropologists, ethnographers and psychologists. Our version is ethnographic in that we do not pretend to observe a client with the purpose of intervening to improve his or her mental health. On the other hand, we do not pretend that we visit a local tribe (network participants) and immerse ourselves in their habits and mores by staying for an extended period of time. Our observations

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

relate to a limited conception of fieldwork: we participate in a number of meetings and record observations during those meetings in order to learn more about a setting that is not well known to us, that is to study interaction in practice. Our purpose is to observe action and non-action relating to processes of negotiating the policy under scrutiny. We do this as relatively passive participants; we do not intend to provoke any particular actions from the other participants; but we are present in the room and may take questions from the other participants. That, of course, does not make us neutral, and we may in fact have provoked actions or dialogues that otherwise would not have taken place. Nor does it inhibit us from having opinions about that policy, and we may structure observations in order to glean lessons for future policy-making out of this, but this is a later step. The immediate purpose is to put the researcher in a situation that makes it possible for him or her to communicate to outsiders about what is going on. Of particular interest are negotiations among the participants which may concern the interpretation of the policy, administrative means of implementation, ways of evaluating the policy outputs or outcomes, and questions of procedure within the network. During observation, the observer will, first of all, take note of policy stances, but it is also of interest to notice the ‘climate’ among the participants – signs of hostility, accommodation, general mood, etc. Furthermore, there is a strong interest in recording influence from actors outside the immediately visible network. Is the ‘real’ network larger than indicated by the presence of these actors? In other words, we do not pursue a linguistic analysis, trying to decode the expressions of participants to reveal cultural biases (for example related to gender or ethnic aspects) or particular understandings of the policy issues. We are interested in knowing more about the policy process, relating it to outputs and outcomes, and to aspects of network governance as a social activity in that respect. We maintain the setting of the meetings; we do not put people in a laboratory, but the search of the researcher(s) present is structured beforehand, as indicated above. Diaries have always been interesting sources for historians and literary research. These were used after the fact, and mostly written for other purposes. Using diary writing actively to get particular forms of information from the perspective of an actor is a rather uncommon research technique in the social sciences. It seems to be more common in health research; respondents are asked to write about features important to the research topic, to reveal patterns of, for example, eating behaviour, smoking habits or sexual behaviour. In order to accomplish the goal, such diaries will mostly be structured, telling the respondent what to log, for

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example in the case of eating behaviour, time and place of consuming meals (and snacks), structured data (quantity, type) on those meals and snacks, and maybe specific comments about social setting of the event. Diaries may, however, go beyond such structured data and contain reflections by the writer which would not be easy to obtain by either observation or interview – such reflections are instantaneous, and more or less related to the research topic, giving the researcher possibilities to include factors that were not preconceived in the research set-up. Furthermore, there is ample opportunity to obtain opinions and judgements that might not have been expressed in other settings (Lewis and Massey 2004). Diaries are, then, useful for exploratory research because they may generate information which would otherwise be difficult to get. In this project, we were interested in getting as broad a database as possible in order to chart unknown territory – networks of governance. Asking key actors to share their work in that respect with us was, perhaps, a risky step because seasoned administrators may use such a channel as a tactical instrument, but we found that possibility worth risking, given the potential benefits. We were, of course, interested in the facts about meetings, but also about other aspects like sentiments about the other participants and the possibilities of the inclusion of other actors who did not participate in a meeting. Due to the exploratory character of the project, the diaries were not structured, but the respondents were asked to reflect on certain topics. Again, our interest did not lie in the linguistic aspects of reflections in the diaries, but in the contents and their relations to the policy process. Focus group interviews are being increasingly used in the social sciences. ‘Focus’ may mean several things. First, a structural or ‘class’ focus in that the group members share some characteristics, for example they may have a similar job such as social workers, and then the focus may be on their work ethics or working experience; or they may be citizens from the same village, being heard on their views on the state of local democracy. Second, the focus may be on a particular theme; so they may have different points of origin in the workplace, but they are then invited to share their (maybe differing) opinions of, for example, a research report on that workplace with the researchers; or they may be a mixed group of administrators and councillors asked to discuss a recent report on local government restructuring. The two types of focus can, of course, be blended so that one theme may be treated by homogeneous as well as different groups, depending on the aims of the research. Whatever the case, the important characteristic of focus group interviews is the interactive character of the process (Oates 2000: 185). One

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

may get views or opinions in ordinary interviews, and the answers then reflect the opinions of the interviewee, but in a group it is another ball game. Any view put forward is open to discussion and is desired to be discussed, so what emerges is a form of negotiated consensus, or a number of fairly radical stand-alone evaluations of the phenomenon which forms the theme. In the latter case, it is because members of the group do not agree and do not want to compromise their views. ‘Interview’, therefore, is a slightly misleading word; ‘negotiation’ or in some cases ‘confrontation’ may cover the actual process of focus groups better. The composition of the group must be carefully analysed before the group is convened. If one wants the opinions of street-level bureaucrats regarding their work conditions, it may not be wise to put them in a group including their immediate superiors. On the other hand, it is exactly that composition that may start a discussion that creates a ‘moment of truth’ for either side; this would never have come about without that confrontation. But there is a clear risk that nothing comes out beyond pleasantries. The researcher may, in addition to the responses obtained from discussions, reap the benefits of observing a group responding to what some of them may regard as challenges or outright provocations. In groups in which there is dissent, the behaviour may serve as an indicator of relations that exist between individuals or among classes of employees or citizens in a wider perspective than the case at hand. One chapter goes beyond using a single method, in this case we present a combination of qualitative and quantitative network analyses. Of particular interest are the observations about how during the research project one may modify the research design and questions in the light of results obtained by other methods. Given the classic scepticism against changing a research design once it is established, this discussion may produce new insights and fuel discussions about how to establish a dynamic frame of reference for research.

1.5

Structure of the book

We have chosen to organize the book around our stories of the research processes we went through in our pilot study on network governance. Jacob Torfing sets the stage for the subsequent stories about our application of research techniques to the study of network governance. In Chapter 2, Torfing explains the scope and the research design of the pilot study, emphasizing the reflections that led us to carry out a comparative, multi-level analysis of governance networks within the policy

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field of employment. He also reflects upon the complexity of the study which comprises seven case studies relating to local, national and transnational levels and the inherent challenges of managing such a research process which involved a team of ten researchers. In Chapter 3, Torfing goes on to present a synthesis of the main empirical findings of the pilot study, based on seven case studies of employment policies: the EU at the transnational level, Denmark, France and England at the national level, and Køge, Grenoble and Birmingham at the local level. The chapter provides an overview of the main characteristics of these seven governance networks and thus Torfing situates and contextualizes the chapters on methods which follow. Each of the chapters tells a story about the potentials and pitfalls that we encountered when applying our research techniques, and we present recommendations about how one might improve methodological applications in future full-scale studies. Most chapters deal with one research technique only. However, two chapters go into the question of how multiple methods can supplement one another. Thus, Chapter 7 illustrates how a combination of observation studies and diaries can be used to give information on interaction among network participants during formal meetings and in-between such meetings. Chapter 9 shows how a combination of focus group interviewing, quantitative social network analysis, qualitative interviews and documents can shed light on the density of interactions within a governance network, and the authors also discuss the order in which these methods can be applied in the research process. Due to the complexity of this multi-level and comparative pilot study each of the chapters focuses on case studies at one or two levels (the transnational, the national or the local), and reflects the fact that we did not apply all research methods at all of the three levels. One reason was, of course, the limited scope of the pilot study and another reason was that the research methods were expected to be varyingly applicable at the different levels due to their character and their requirements in terms of field access and trust. For example, we chose to try out observation and diary methods at the local level only, in the expectation that it would be easier to gain access to the field locally than at the transnational and national levels. In a similar vein, we chose to undertake document studies primarily at the national level where documentation was likely to be ample and easily accessible. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the national level case studies, but in relation to the EU guidelines for employment policy. Chapter 6 on interviews draws on both national and local levels in Denmark, France and

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England. Chapter 7 on observation and diaries deals exclusively with the local level (Køge, Grenoble and Birmingham). Chapter 8 discusses focus group interviewing at the local and the European levels, and finally, Chapter 9 concerns itself with the European level alone. In each chapter, the author(s) raises a substantial research question regarding network governance with the aim of illustrating how the methods explored could shed light on this particular question. Some of the chapters focus on only one question, whereas others raise two or three related questions, but all of these stem from the list of research questions that the research team established on the basis of network theory, institutional theory and democracy theory. A number of the chapters address the question of the contours of governance network (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 9). This is not surprising as identifying a research object is a condition for studying it and moreover, as mentioned above, one of the methodological challenges when studying a governance network is, indeed, to identify its contours. A second issue raised in a number of chapters should also be understood as a methodological challenge, and moreover at the core of network governance, namely the form of interaction among network participants (Chapters 7, 8, 9). When selecting the research question for the backbone of these chapters, the authors were guided by their individual interests as well as scope of the data generated. In Chapter 4, Torfing explores how expert reports shed light on the impact of European Guidelines on the National Action Plan for employment and the impact of National Action Plans on national policies. He argues that an expert report is a promising approach when carrying out comparative studies, as it provides an initial picture of the field which may be of particular value when one deals with institutional contexts which are not familiar to the researcher. Yet, the method also suffers from drawbacks such as difficulties in finding experts who are willing and capable of writing a quality report that is comparable to the other reports. He suggests that expert reports could constitute a platform for an interview with its author(s) as a way to clarify uncertainties, that experts might be used to identify interviewees and finally, that an interactive seminar with all experts would facilitate cross-national analysis. In Chapter 5, Esmark and Triantafillou investigate how document studies can contribute to identifying the contours (network topography) and the norms (network programmes) of the national governance network on employment policies. They conclude that documents can only provide an initial mapping of the official network topography which needs to be supplemented with other sources. Moreover, they point to

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the fact that the reading of documents is at times a cumbersome way of clarifying the contours of formal networks, in particular in comparison to simply asking network participants themselves. Conversely, they argue that the primary strength of documents is to provide data that illuminate the historical formation, change and continuity of a network and its norms. Yet, documents merely provide insight into the official and formal aspects of a governance network and they can rarely tell much about informal aspects, nor about the interaction among network participants. In Chapter 6 on qualitative interviews, Zølner, Dreyer Hansen and Ørum Rasmussen illustrate, first, how selecting interviewees is part of the process of identifying the contours of governance networks, in particular self-grown and informal networks. Second, they show how an analysis of interview data in terms of narratives constitutes a productive starting point for clarifying interviewees’ norms for good governance on labour market policy. The authors point to two important strengths of qualitative interviews. One is providing data on aspects of governance networks that remain informal, and therefore, mostly, inaccessible other than through network participants’ accounts of their individual experiences. A second is to give insight into the way in which network participants perceive and evaluate the functioning of a governance network. The authors draw attention to the fact that, though the qualitative interview is a key method to use when studying governance networks, applying it requires thorough reflection on the whole process of doing interviews and its implications for the reliability and validity of the data collected. In Chapter 7, Sørensen and Torfing investigate the issue of how to study processes of internal and external exclusion within a governance network on the basis of observation of policy interaction in formal meetings and of written diaries by network participants that indicate informal interaction with other network actors between such meetings. They hold that these methods make a particular contribution by providing a more contemporaneous view (diaries) and relatively unmediated perspective (observation) on formal and informal interaction among the network participants. However, though diaries and observation are important for gaining insight into a key element of governance networks, namely interaction, applying the methods raises a number of challenges. For example, the mostly contingent and impressionistic character of the data collected makes a systematic analysis difficult, and it calls for combining the two methods with other methods. We should also mention the difficulties encountered in gaining access to meetings and in persuading network participants to write diaries.

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In Chapter 8, Damgaard and Sørensen deal with how focus group interviewing can produce knowledge about the functioning of governance networks in terms of efficiency and democracy. They hold that the method provides valuable insights into the norms and logics of appropriateness that regulate the interaction within governance networks by offering a possibility to study how the interviewees negotiate the construction of a socially acceptable meaning. In addition, focus group interviewing is a unique opportunity for engaging in a dialogue with the field; it can serve not only to validate and enrich preliminary research results, but is also likely to be of interest for a number of practitioners. Nevertheless, the authors draw attention to a number of drawbacks such as difficult access and reliability as well as to ethical considerations on the researchers’ impact on the research field. In Chapter 9, Borrás and Olsen discuss how a research design with mixed methods can shed light on the issues of network density, metagovernance, and inclusion and exclusion in the network governance identified at EU level. They argue that the usage of multiple methods is particularly suited to capturing the multifaceted patterns of network interaction, which are mostly impossible to capture by using a single methodological tool. Regarding the quantitative social network analysis, they point to the fact that this technique is highly applicable to method mixing since its key features resemble qualitative research more than traditional quantitative methods. Yet, Borrás and Olsen also draw attention to difficulties, such as the demanding resources required to compile different types of data and the access to the research field. Indeed, trust, between the respondent and the researchers, is also a key element when gathering quantitative data.

Notes 1. The book is part of a series of three books that focuses on the contribution of network governance to effective and democratic governance of modern societies. One volume deals with theories of network governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2006) and a second presents a series of empirical case studies of democratic network governance at the local, national and transnational levels (Marcussen and Torfing 2006). 2. Of course, there are exceptions such as Gergen (2001), Heron (1996) and Reason (1994).

2 A Comparative and Multi-level Analysis of Governance Networks: a Pilot Study of Employment Policy Jacob Torfing

While several empirical studies of governance networks exist (e.g. Marin and Mayntz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Heffen et al. 2000) and an array of different theoretical approaches to network governance can be identified (e.g. Rhodes 1997; Scharpf 1997; March and Olsen 1995), the methodological question concerning how to study governance networks has received only scant attention thus far. To some extent, this reflects the general predicament within the qualitatively oriented parts of political science, where the post-positivist critique of epistemology appears to legitimize a general disregard for methodological questions. Hence, hermeneutic and social constructivist approaches have done a great job criticizing the positivist belief that correspondence with an unmediated reality and the application of strict methodological rules can guarantee scientific truth, but the abstract philosophy of science arguments tend to make people forget that we must continue to find ways of tackling the concrete methodological questions about how to produce relevant and plausible research results (Howarth and Torfing 2005). In any case, there are very few studies addressing the ‘nitty-gritty’ of conducting research from a post-positivist stance. In order to compensate for the unfortunate neglect of methodological reflections in the field of governance network research, the researchers from the Centre for Democratic Network Governance decided to focus explicitly on how different methods can be applied in a study of governance networks. Since it is futile to assess the fruitfulness of various methods in an empirical vacuum, we decided to conduct a method-oriented pilot study of particular empirical cases of network governance within a specific policy area. The different methods should be put to the test in a small-scale 21

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case study of public policy and governance that later could be turned into a full-scale study. A pilot study is something that social science researchers always want to carry out, but often fail to accomplish due to the lack of time, resources and energy. When we were finally able to conduct a pilot study, we soon experienced a number of crucial problems. First, it was difficult to strike the optimal balance between, on the one hand, the substantial focus on the political and institutional aspects of the network-based policy formulation and policy implementation, and, on the other hand, the methodological focus on the experiences with the design and application of different social science methods. The deployment of different methodological tools rendered it necessary to gain substantial knowledge of the actual content of the policy process, and we soon discovered how easy it was to become absorbed by the attempt to master the empirical policy field and neglect the methodological problems that we were supposed to focus upon. Second, it was difficult to judge the amount of data we ought to collect and analyse in order to facilitate the kind of experiencebased learning that the pilot study was intended to convey. Additional data collection always appeared perfectly justifiable in order to gain more and new experience. On the other hand, conducting a pilot study on the basis of limited resources meant that we could not seek to develop perfect solutions to all of the emerging problems of data collection and data analysis. Hence, we were struggling throughout the pilot study to maintain our focus on the methodological questions, as we were often seduced by the intricacies of the policy-making process to focus on the substantial – rather than methodological – issues. We attempted to limit ourselves to merely testing our methodological design, but ultimately we did much more than a small-scale pilot study. Most certainly, this will help later when carrying out the full study, but we could have done less and nevertheless gained the methodological experience that we aimed to acquire. The scope, design and conduct of this ‘oversized’ pilot study form the topic of the present chapter, which provides important background knowledge for the subsequent chapters dealing with the specific methodological tools of analysis. The plan of the present chapter is as follows: the first section discusses the selection of the scope, policy case, countries and sites of analysis. The second section explains the overall research strategy, with a particular view to the question of how to identify the relevant governance networks. The third section provides a brief account of the comparative advantages of the different methods for data collection. The managing of the collective research process and data collection is described and

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assessed in the fourth section. Finally, the chapter is concluded with a brief assessment of the lessons learned in relation to our pilot study.

2.1

Selection of scope, policy area, countries and sites

Interactive governance through networks of interdependent and yet operationally autonomous actors is increasingly conceived of as an effective and legitimate means with which to govern our complex, fragmented and increasingly dynamic societies. As such, it is crucial to analyse why and how governance networks are formed and institutionalized; how they are functioning and developing over time; how they are metagoverned by governments and public authorities; and how they contribute to effective and democratic governance. These were the main research questions that we aimed to answer in the pilot study and which lay behind our methodological choices. In order to answer our basic research questions, we could have settled for a study of a number of local Danish governance networks, which we could have scrutinized from A to Z through the deployment of different methods. However, the decision was made in the pilot study to extend the scope of analysis. This entailed the far more ambitious choice of conducting a comparative, multi-level analysis of a range of different governance networks. Hence, the basic idea of the pilot study was to apply different methods to map and analyse democratic network governance in different countries and at the local, national and transnational levels of governance. The ambitious and extremely resourcedemanding choice of undertaking a comparative, multi-level analysis, instead of a single case study, was motivated by the fact that contemporary governance networks are found in many different countries and at different regulatory levels. They often cut across levels and countries to create complex and tangled networks. The widespread use of governance networks in different political and administrative contexts constitutes a major methodological challenge. It raises the question of how the various methods can help provide interesting, valid and reliable data when studying governance networks across countries and levels dominated by different political and institutional traditions. Indeed, we were curious to see the contrasts between countries and levels and wanted to test our methods in contexts we were not fully acquainted with. Had it not been for the relatively large number of researchers in our research group and the existence of prior experiences and complementary competences, our pilot study would not have been manageable, and we would indeed have settled for less than a comparative, multi-level study.

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Our decision to conduct a comparative, multi-level study provided a number of clear – but also rather restrictive – criteria for the selection of the policy area within which we should to be looking for suitable cases for analysis. Hence, the policy area ought to be one in which it was possible to identify governance networks, both at different levels and in different countries. Of course, there is no guarantee that governance networks are neatly confined to a particular policy area. In fact, governance networks will often define the policy problem they are dealing with in ways that cut across pre-established and well-defined policy areas, and sometimes even create a new policy area. Nevertheless, examining particular policy areas would, we believed, help us to identify governance networks that might – or might not – overflow their boundaries. The problem was finding a policy area that met our restrictive selection criteria. After a collective brainstorming process, we came up with three policy areas where we were likely to find governance networks, both at different levels and in different countries: environmental regulation, food safety and employment policy. The latter two were relatively new and problemfocused policy areas in which it was quite likely that the inherent governance networks would define their policy problems within the particular policy area, thus limiting the problem of overflowing policy problems discussed above. After closer examination, employment policy was chosen as the main focus of the pilot study on the grounds that it clearly lived up to our selection criteria and there was already considerable background knowledge about employment policy within the research team. The various national traditions for social partnerships in the area of employment policy, together with the EU Commission’s strong recommendations regarding the integration of the social partners and civil society actors in the formulation and implementation of employment policy at all levels, provided us with ample reason to believe that we would find governance networks in all countries and at the local, national and transnational levels. Moreover, the presence of considerable knowledge regarding employment policy in our research group meant that the transaction costs of acquiring sufficient knowledge to conduct a pilot study would be lower than if we chose to study food safety or environmental regulation. Such a practical concern is important in a large research team of 10–12 researchers who cannot be expected to spend a significant amount of time acquainting themselves with a new policy field. Since we were primarily interested in the patterns of negotiated interaction between various network actors, the content of the policy area was not really important to us. We could have chosen to study a completely

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different policy area, as long as it provided adequate opportunity for studying democratic network governance. However, our initial studies soon revealed how important and interesting employment policy is. First, employment policy is a new policy area, constructed through a fusion of particular elements of social policy, labour market policy and educational policy rearticulated around the main goal of combating unemployment and raising the aggregate level of employment. Second, it is a policy area that is increasingly considered to be ‘high politics’ due to the fact that a higher employment rate will help consolidate the European welfare states by alleviating the mounting fiscal pressures and solving the problems caused by the ageing of the workforce. Third, there have been dramatic changes in the area of employment policy that can be described in terms of a shift from ‘welfare’ to ‘workfare’ (Torfing 1999a, b). Hence, in most Western countries, passive benefit schemes have been replaced, or at least supplemented, by active policy measures in terms of counselling, education and job training that are sometimes combined with a general lowering of the benefits, the introduction of in-work tax credits and a tougher sanctioning of what is conceived as ‘inadequate job search efforts’. Last but not least, ‘social partnership’ has become a nodal point in the new active employment policy, because the social partners can help to open up the labour market for the weak unemployed who are not likely to find employment under ordinary conditions, instead requiring some kind of sheltered and/or subsidized jobs. Having chosen the policy area that we were going to study, the next task was to decide which countries and local sites to include in our comparative, multi-level analysis of the network-governed employment policy. The cross-national aspect was important in order to avoid being captured within the confines of a single-country case study in which it would be impossible to discern whether our methodological experiences and substantive findings were typical and common or strange and remarkable. Although we were not aiming to generalize our substantive research results on the basis of the choice of ‘most similar’ or ‘most dissimilar’ cases (see Flyvbjerg 2001), we wanted to select countries and local sites that were similar enough to be comparable and different enough to be interesting to compare. After some discussion, we finally agreed to carry out a comparative study of three countries: Denmark, England and France (see Table 2.1). These three countries are similar in so far as they are all Western European countries with lengthy democratic traditions, modern capitalist economies and relatively large welfare states. They all entered the 1990s with a high unemployment rate, which they attempted to reduce by adopting a more active employment

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Table 2.1

Brief comparison of the three case countries Denmark

France

UK

Population in thousands – 2005

5,411

60,561

60,035

Total employment rate in % – 2004

75.7

63.1

71.6

Total unemployment rate in % – 1995

6.7

11.1

8.5

Total unemployment rate in % – 2000

4.3

9.1

5.4

Total unemployment rate in % – 2005 Head of government

4.9 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Liberal Party (Prime Minister since 2001)

9.5 Jacques Chirac, Union pour un mouvement populaire (President since 1995) and Dominique de Villepin (Prime Minister since 2005)

4.6 Tony Blair, New Labour (Prime Minister since 1997)

Data source: EUROSTAT: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid⫽1090,30070682,1090_33076576&_dad⫽ portal&_schema⫽PORTAL

policy, Denmark being the clear front-runner and France and England rapidly catching up (Madsen 2003). However, despite these similarities, the three countries varied and still vary a great deal in terms of their welfare and workfare regimes, the governance capacity of the state, and their political traditions for partnership and network governance. As such, Denmark has a social democratic welfare state regime with generous, tax-financed benefits based on citizenship, whereas England has a liberal welfare regime with low, tax-financed benefits combined with private insurance schemes; France has a conservative-corporatist regime with medium-level benefits based on labour-market contributions and backed by tax-financed social assistance schemes (EspingAndersen 1990). The three countries also differ in terms of the kind of activation strategies they have adopted (Lødemel and Trickey 2001). While England has strengthened the incentives to work by lowering benefits, tightening controls and sanctions, increasing minimum wages and introducing tax credits for low-paid workers, Denmark and France

Jacob Torfing

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have relied on publicly sponsored offers of education or job training to the unemployed. However, whereas reintegration into the labour market in Denmark has been propelled by high and persistent job growth, the French activation strategy has been hampered by low job growth, which has been counteracted by a lowering of the social insurance contributions of the employers (Barbier and Théret 2005). The three countries also differ with regard to the general capacities of the state to govern the economy and society (Jessop 2002; Jørgensen 2002; Hewlett 1998). State capacities are strong in Denmark, especially when state intervention is negotiated together with the social and political actors. The public sector is highly decentralized and local governments are the main welfare providers. There are also strong state capacities in France, but they are rooted in the strategic capacities of the elite of state modernizers, who perceive themselves as incarnating the will of the people. Welfare is provided through a highly centralized system of government, although with some delegation and an increasing decentralization from the 1980s onwards. In England the state capacities are much weaker, reflecting the lack of strategic capacities of state modernizers. The public sector is relatively decentralized, as it is based on the delegation of welfare delivery to quasi-non-governmental agencies that have dramatically weakened the role and influence of local government. Finally, the three countries differ in terms of their traditions for partnership and network governance (Jessop 2002; Jørgensen 2002; Keeler 1987). There is a long and strong corporatist tradition in Denmark based on the negotiated involvement of large and unified labour-market organizations at the national level. More recently, the direct influence of the social partners on the formulation of laws and regulations has been somewhat weakened, and the involvement of social and political actors has been broadened to include stakeholders from civil society who, together with the social partners, participate in governance networks that are involved in policy implementation at local and regional levels. In England, corporatist interest mediation has always been weak due to the presence of weak and fragmented labour-market organizations and a rather hostile relationship between employers and trade unions. However, the articulation of a new social partnership discourse has recently led to the inclusion of a range of different stakeholders in local and regional policy implementation. Nevertheless, there is still only a limited involvement of the social partners in the national policy consultations. By comparison, France is caught halfway between Denmark and England. On the one hand, there is a relatively strong tradition for the corporatist involvement of the social partners. On the other hand, this involvement

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

takes the form of consultation rather than negotiation; it is mainly restricted to the national level; and it is rather selective, as militant trade unions are often excluded or marginalized. The choice of the three countries was primarily motivated by concerns for their comparability, which is ensured by the balance between similarities and differences. However, practical concerns, such as accessibility in terms of language, cultural proximity and cheap and easy transportation, also played a crucial role in our selection of the three countries. As such, we could have chosen to compare Denmark and England with Germany instead of France, but particular expertise in the French language and political culture made France an obvious choice. In order to analyse democratic network governance at the local level, we had to select three local sites – one in each of the three countries. Here, we deliberately chose not to analyse local governance networks in the capital, which often are quite extreme due to the magnitude of the city and the proximity of the network actors to the central state bureaucracy. Instead, we chose to study local employment policy networks in the provinces. Practical concerns about physical access, which were important since we planned to visit the localities several times, finally led us to the selection of three relatively large cities, namely Køge in Denmark, Birmingham in England and Grenoble in France (see Figure 2.1). The three cities vary significantly in size, Birmingham and Grenoble being the largest and Køge the smallest; however, they are all located outside of a main economic growth area. Birmingham and Grenoble are both located far away from the capital, whereas Køge lies just outside the Danish capital, Copenhagen. We planned to study and compare local governance networks in three different municipalities, but – as we shall see – the local governance networks in each of the three localities covered several municipalities. Hence, intermunicipal coordination was an integral part of the local governance networks in all three sites. The final matter to be decided was the time frame for our empirical analyses. Here we agreed that data was to be collected and analysed in the period from the autumn of 2004 to the autumn of 2005. The empirical process and events that would be focused upon in the case studies was supposed to take place either within this particular period, or within the previous year. This would ensure that the network actors would have a relatively fresh memory of the policy-making process.

2.2

Research strategy: output-based backward mapping

In order to study governance networks in the field of employment policy at different levels and in different countries and localities, we had to find

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29

Population: 1,192,800 Unemployment rate: 6.5%

Population: 75,802 Unemployment rate: 5.3% KØGE BIRMINGHAM

GRENOBLE

Population: 396,792 Unemployment rate: 9.5%*

Figure 2.1 Location and key findings of the three local cases. All numbers are from Jan. 2004. * 9.5% is the national unemployment rate. Numbers for municipalities (communes) are not available. Notes: • The unemployment rate measures the number of unemployed as a percentage of the economically active working age population • The population and unemployment figures for Køge cover the municipalities of Køge, Stevns, Vallø and Skovbo, which constitute the intermunicipal coordination committee (Source: Danmarks Statistik) • The population and unemployment figures for Birmingham cover both the municipalities of Birmingham and Solihull (Source: Office of National Statistics) • The population and unemployment figures for Grenoble cover the municipality of Grenoble and the 27 ‘communes’, which surround it (Source: Grenoble-Alpes Métropole)

a uniform way of identifying these governance networks to ensure that we were comparing more or less the same kind of networks. The solution we arrived at was to identify a particular policy output at the local, national and transnational levels and then undertake a backward mapping (Elmore 1985) of the policy actors and processes involved in the production of the particular policy output. Hence, instead of conducting a top-down policy analysis focusing on the policy formation and implementation strategies of the formal decision-makers (Pressman and

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

Wildawsky 1973), or performing a bottom-up policy analysis focusing on the coping strategies of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) and their attempts at involving resourceful citizens (Sabatier 1986), we wanted to study the complex interaction among all of the social and political actors that had contributed to the production of a certain policy output. Both top-down and bottom-up policy analyses tend to privilege a certain policy actor, but by beginning with a certain policy output and then attempting to unravel the complex network of actors somehow involved in its production, we remained open to capturing all of the relevant policy actors. The gradual step-by-step identification of all of the relevant policy actors is slow and time-consuming, but can be accelerated by looking for some formal network structures that can be assumed to be responsible for the policy output. The method of backward mapping can then be used to identify the more informal network structures consisting of both strong and weak ties among a plurality of actors (Granovetter 1973). The first step in the backward mapping of local, national and transnational governance networks is to identify a particular policy. We deliberately wanted to identify the different governance networks in relation to a policy output in terms of a specific policy report, action plan, project, regulation or initiative. The alternative would be to start out from a policy outcome in terms of the problem-solving effect of a certain policy. However, policy outcomes are not only difficult to measure, but also notoriously difficult to ascribe particular effects to particular policies due to the presence of multiple and contingent causalities (March and Olsen 1995). By comparison, policy outputs are much easier to identify and trace back to a host of policy actors who, in one way or another, are responsible for their form and content. Much to our surprise, it proved to be relatively easy to find a number of clearly identifiable policy outputs capable of serving as the starting points for a backward mapping of relevant (and comparable) governance networks. Hence, at the transnational level, the EU would annually produce a set of Employment Guidelines as part of the European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination. From the EU Council meeting in Essen in 1994 onwards, the EU has become increasingly interested in supplementing the internal market and the common economic policy with a common policy to create and stimulate employment. Among others, the attempt of the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 to boost employment was conceived as a good popular cause capable of helping to counteract the elitist and technical–economic character of much of the EU initiatives. However, there was a strong opposition among the EU member states to surrendering national sovereignty

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in the area of employment policy. This forced the EU to restrict itself to issuing non-binding Employment Guidelines, monitoring the extent to which the member states are responding properly to these guidelines in their national employment policy, and ‘naming and shaming’ those who do not. Nevertheless, the Employment Guidelines provide a clearly identifiable transnational policy output. In principle, a new set of Employment Guidelines are issued every year. Since 2003, however, it has been agreed that the guidelines should remain relatively stable over a three-year cycle. Since the guidelines as of 2003 would set the policy agenda for the next three years, we decided to focus on this particular policy output. At the national level, all of the EU member states are obliged to draft an annual National Action Plan reporting on how well they live up to the EU Employment Guidelines. The National Action Plan contains a detailed account of the content and effects of the national employment policies. It is written during the summer and early autumn and submitted to, and evaluated by, the EU Commission, which can ask the Council of Ministers to make country-specific recommendations about how the member states ought to improve their respective employment policies. At the local level, we discovered that the different efforts to increase employment – especially for ‘weak unemployed’ persons, who were not likely to find employment through the ordinary job application and labour exchange procedures – were often directed by a loosely defined policy plan defining a number of key projects and initiatives. Together, the key projects and initiatives, and the plans in which they were inscribed, constituted a local policy output, which we could use as a starting point for mapping the local policy actors in the field of employment policy. The second step was to identify the network of policy actors contributing to the production of the different kinds of policy output. This can be done in many different ways and by using a variety of different methods. However, a particularly well-suited method for identifying the key actors involved in a certain policy process is the so-called ‘snowball method’, which aims to identify the relevant policy actors on the basis of their respective reputations within a particular policy field. Initially, informant interviews, documentary studies and Internet searches are used to identify a number of central policy actors, who are asked to name other key actors who have been involved in the policy-making process. These are then asked to do the same until, ideally, the policy actors no longer come up with any new names (Hjern and Porter 1981). In practice, however, one will often have to stop the snowball from rolling before the ideal moment of complete saturation. If the plan is to interview all of the actors identified by the snowball method, the total number of

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

actors must be held down, which is unproblematic as long as one has reason to believe that the most important policy actors are included. An alternative to the snowball method is to examine the formal decision-making structure in order to preselect a few, representative actors and then go out and analyse their particular role in the policy process. However, the advantage of the reputation-based backward mapping of the relevant policy actors by means of the snowball method is that it opens up the possibility of the mapping of informal governance networks that do not necessarily correspond with formal and politically initiated governance networks. One might at least be able to identify actors who are not part of the formal network structures and explore the role of informal networks vis-à-vis formal ones. The problem with the reputation-based mapping of governance networks is that it does not help us identify the relevant actors that are excluded from the governance network. The question of which actors are included and excluded from governance networks is central to the evaluation of the democratic problems and merits of network governance, but the reputation-based methods only reveal who is included in the various governance networks. We have attempted to solve this problem, partly by asking the network actors whether they think there are other relevant actors who are not part of the network and partly by scanning policy documents and mass media coverage in the search for excluded actors and repressed voices. However, there is no guarantee that these ‘solutions’ have revealed all of the excluded actors. Whether or not the social and political actors that have been identified through the backward mapping exercise are part of one, or several, governance networks depends on an empirical assessment of (1) whether they are operationally autonomous and yet linked due to their mutual interdependence; (2) whether they interact with one another through relatively institutionalized and self-regulated negotiations; and (3) whether the negotiated interaction between the actors contributes to the production of public purpose in the broad sense of visions, plans, projects, initiatives and regulations. If these criteria are fulfilled, we have successfully identified a governance network to be analysed and compared with other, similar governance networks.

2.3

Multiple methods

The concept of network governance is descriptive, but the analysis of governance networks certainly has explanatory ambitions, although not in the strict sense of seeking to identify causal mechanisms with a law-like

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status. Hence, the formal and informal governance networks identified through backward mapping are to be analysed with regard to how and why they are formed and institutionalized in a certain manner; how and why they function and develop over time; how and why they are metagoverned by different public authorities; and how they contribute to an effective and democratic governance of employment policy. In order to acquire sufficient data to explain, or at least understand, all of these things, we have applied a range of different methods that were all briefly introduced in the previous chapter (see Table 2.2). The reason for applying so many different methods is that we believe that they all have particular strengths and weaknesses. Hence, social network analysis might help uncover and describe patterns of interaction between key policy actors, but will not be able to provide answers to how-questions. The comparative analysis of expert reports might help us to gain a quick overview of the main characteristics of the national cases, but does not facilitate a fine-grained analysis of the form and functioning of the national governance networks. Documentary studies might help to identify the principal network actors and reveal how substantive and procedural norms have changed over time. However, documentary studies will not be very helpful in analysing the network-based interactions between the social and political actors. Qualitative research interviews might illuminate the network actors’ perceptions of themselves, the negotiated interaction within the network, and the effects of the network-based policy-making, but the somewhat distanced and rationalized interpretations of the actors might deviate from the actual practices in the governance networks. Observation studies might help to catch a glimpse of the actual policy interaction within governance networks as it takes place within formal meetings, but the data obtained through observation is difficult to handle in the subsequent analysis Table 2.2

Overview of the collected data Interviews

Denmark Køge France Grenoble UK Birmingham EU

6 20 8 14 3 14 8

Diaries

6

Documents

6 4 5

1 2

6 14 9

Observations

Focus group interviews

3

2

1

1

3

2 1

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

and relies heavily on the interpretations of the observer. Network diaries might be used to capture the informal network interactions between the formal meetings in the governance network and to attain a more immediate and contemporaneous evaluation of events and contacts within the governance network, but it is difficult to get the network actors to write and submit network diaries, which may convey some rather idiosyncratic views of the network process. Finally, focus group interviews might help to observe the negotiation of ‘the logic of appropriateness’ within the governance networks and to validate preliminary research results, but they might not lead to a free and open dialogue, as the dominant network actors will often be capable of controlling the event. The different methods will supplement each other in different ways. When used together, it will become possible to increase the validity of our research results by means of triangulation, whereby the same substantial aspects are illuminated by different types of data provided by different methods. It thereby becomes possible to compare different interpretations and reflect upon their degree of convergence or divergence. However, as this book focuses on the strengths, weaknesses and improvement of the different methods in the study of governance networks, attempts at triangulating or substantiating research results will be limited to a few paired comparisons of interpretations of data obtained by different methods.

2.4

Managing collective research processes and data collection

The pilot study was undertaken by a mixed group of junior and senior researchers from political science and public administration who were assisted by a couple of research assistants. Everyone in the research group had prior experience with conducting qualitative case studies at either the local, national or transnational level. One of the researchers had actually already conducted a small study of network governance in Køge. Nevertheless, the policy area, the focus on governance networks and some of the methods were new to many of the researchers in the group. Disparities among the researchers in terms of relevant experiences and actual knowledge were evened out by the creation of smaller teams consisting both of experienced and less experienced researchers. Working together to solve concrete research problems required the exchange of experience and knowledge, thus facilitating joint learning. Different teams were formed in relation to different tasks, and they generally worked quite well.

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When the initial choices of the policy area, countries and local sites were made, the first task was to undertake an initial mapping of the various governance networks through desktop studies of research articles, policy reports and websites. To supplement the written material, we invited national policy experts to come and give us an in-depth briefing about the employment policies and governance structures in the three countries and within the EU. The live interaction with the different experts was extremely stimulating and helped us to fill many of the blanks left by the analysis of the official documents and websites. As the idea of the pilot study was to test how different methods could be used to provide answers to specific research questions about network interaction, public governance and democracy, we derived a set of analytical themes and questions on the basis of close readings of institutional theory, governance network theory and democratic theory (for a further discussion of this literature, see Torfing and Sørensen 2006). Through a series of research seminars with joint literature studies and individual presentations, we fleshed out the particular contribution of the different analytical strands to understand the formation and functioning of governance networks; the formation and transformation of procedural and substantive norms guiding network-based policymaking; and the democratic problems and potentials of network governance. Our deductive approach did not result in the development of empirically testable hypotheses; rather, it aimed at ensuring that we would capture as many important aspects of democratic network governance as possible. The analytical questions merely provided a list of the things that we could possibly want to gain knowledge about. Of course, we did not want to confine ourselves to the questions on our list and close our eyes to new and interesting research problems arising from the empirical analysis of our cases. However, a list of theoretically informed research questions provides a valuable eye opener, as it expands the analytical focus and reminds us of the many issues to raise questions about in interviews or to look for in policy documents or observed meetings. The list initially consisted of three sets of research questions about the formation and functioning of governance networks; the role and production of institutional norms in and through network governance; and the democratic implications of network governance. However, during the pilot study, and especially in the process of constructing the interview and observation guides, there was a tendency for the questions about the institutional norms guiding network interaction to disappear as an independent field of enquiry, instead becoming integrated with a broader list of questions concerning the formation, functioning, development,

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

contribution, metagovernance and democratic performance of governance networks. The original intention was to focus explicitly on the procedural norms governing network interaction and the substantive norms produced in and through this interaction. However, when analysing the dynamics of governance networks and their democratic implications, it was difficult not to include institutional norms and rules in the analysis. When the research questions multiplied in the meeting with the empirical field, the focus on procedural and substantive norms therefore became an integral part of the attempt to answer a new and broader list of research questions. In fact, only the documentary study of the national and transnational governance networks in Chapter 5 has maintained an explicit focus on institutional norms and rules – perhaps because it was relatively easy to find explicit references both to procedural and substantive norms in the various policy documents. The rest of the chapters have integrated the analysis of institutional norms and rules in the study of the substantial research questions that they are focusing upon. Equipped with a broad range of analytical research questions, we then carried out a close survey of different methods based on state-of-the-art literature in order to make an a priori assessment of their strengths and weaknesses and see how and for which purpose they could be applied in our case studies. At this stage, we had many problematizing discussions in which, for example, the issue was raised as to whether documentary studies would actually help us to illuminate network-based policy processes. There was also considerable scepticism as to the prospect of gaining access to observe network meetings at the national and transnational levels and motivating busy network actors to write and submit a network diary. However, instead of prematurely abandoning particular methods, we convinced ourselves that the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. Hence, all of the methods that we had described and assessed were to be applied in order to see whether our initial reservations would be confirmed or not. Since the task of applying all of the different methods in all of the case studies was obviously beyond our reach, we had to decide where the different methods were most likely to yield the most interesting results. Our decisions are accounted for in the chapters that follow. The initial mapping of employment policies, policy processes and governance networks, the list of theoretically informed research questions and the description and initial assessment of the different methods were collected in a jointly formulated research report, known as the ‘pilot study survival kit’, which constituted the central reference point throughout the pilot study. The report was made available to all via a joint electronic data archive and subject to multiple revisions and

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37

updates. The final edition of the ‘pilot study survival kit’ marked the termination of the preparation phase and the beginning of the data collection phase. Data collection was undertaken by small overlapping teams focusing on particular levels of governance: local, national and transnational. Each team was supposed to deploy different methods in order to construct a mixed data set that could be used in the analysis of the different governance networks at the particular level of governance. At the local and national levels, this required familiarization with three different governance networks and their respective political and socio-economic contexts. This manner of cutting the cake later proved to be problematic: first, it prevented the analysis of the interpersonal and interorganizational connections and overlaps between the governance networks at the different levels, which was something we were curious about and wanted to explore. Second, it posed a major problem for subsequent attempts at reporting on the methodological experience gained from the use of particular methods. Experience gained at one particular level of governance was insufficient, since the different methods were to be evaluated one at a time across the different levels rather than in and through their combination in relation to a specific governance network at a particular level. As such, it would have been better for the researchers to work with one particular method in relation to all of the relevant cases, but such a procedure would have been excessively demanding, as it required in-depth knowledge of all of the relevant cases and their particular political and socio-economic contexts. In order to solve this problem, we had to reshuffle the teams in the phase of analysis and evaluation and draw on data collected and experiences gained by colleagues at another level of governance. The latter proved to be difficult and time-consuming, but also helped stimulate internal dialogue and fruitful exchanges within the research group. Each of the three original teams produced a detailed plan for data collection, including all of the methods that were judged to be relevant and plausible for studying governance networks at the particular level of governance. Hence, as it was reckoned impossible to gain permission to observe the formal meetings in the transnational and national governance networks, it was decided to restrict the observation method to the local level. The research teams specified how the methods could help answer the different research questions and selected the units of analysis. Expectations regarding the outcomes and results were carefully discussed in order to be able to assess the final results. The plans for data collection were critically evaluated in joint meetings with all of the participating

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

researchers. The joint meetings also served to level out differences in the methodological designs, for example, as regards how to conduct interviews. Most of the data was collected over a nine-month period from October 2004 to June 2005, but a final round of focus group interviews was carried out in December 2005. Each of the researchers kept individual research diaries, and all of the data was transcribed and stored in an electronic data archive with joint access for all of the researchers. When the data collection was completed, samples of different types of data were analysed in joint research seminars in order to develop common experiences with how to interpret the data material. Joint discussions of the key findings were finally turned into written accounts of the seven governance networks focusing on their formation, composition and development and briefly analysing how they are metagoverned and how they contribute to effective and democratic governance of the local, national and transnational employment policies. The written accounts are briefly summarized in the next chapter, which presents seven brief network stories. As should be clear by now, the pilot study was rather large and ambitious, and it could only be carried out by a large group of researchers. However, managing a collective research process is quite demanding, as the need for coordination between various individuals and groups is large. Some of the necessary coordination is carried out spontaneously by the individual researchers and research teams, but the overall coordination of the tasks and activities requires strategic research management, which is difficult to exercise on the grounds that researchers are used to working on their own and certainly do not want to be led by anybody. Hence, research leadership must rely on ‘soft governance’ in terms of setting goals, encouraging action and providing adequate resources. As for the latter, external funding from the Danish Social Science Research Council was the sine qua non for this research project. Not only because the funding helped provide the necessary resources in an underfunded public university system, but also because it provided individual incentives in terms of additional research time that helped the researchers to maintain the focus on the joint research project and to deliver the necessary input to the project.

2.5

Lessons learned from the pilot study

The pilot study did not merely provide a small-scale study testing the fruitfulness of different methods for the study of democratic network governance in different countries and at different levels. The result of the

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two years of extensive research is a much larger study of both substantive and methodological questions that has accumulated a large and rich data material. A vast amount of time and energy has been invested in the pilot study, and had it not been for our steadfast determination to turn the pilot study into a full-blown study at a later time, our efforts would have appeared rather exaggerated, if not wasted. However, we are now able to hit the ground running in our subsequent research project. The pilot study clearly revealed that an array of different methods can be used to gain insights into the intricacies of democratic network governance. It also demonstrated that each method has its own problems and advantages in relation to particular research questions in particular contexts. This will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters, which will discuss the concrete experiences with the different methods and suggest ways of improving them. However, the case study also pointed to two general difficulties in the study of governance networks: first, it has been difficult to judge whether the kind of policy interaction that produces a certain outcome qualifies as a governance network. Many of the policy actors were unwilling to describe the institutionalized policy interactions as a ‘network’, preferring instead to talk about ‘consultations’. This was particularly striking at the national level, where the public authorities are steering the policy process tightly, leaving little space for open deliberation and self-regulated policy formulation and implementation. Of course, the policy actors’ own conceptions of what is going on neither prove nor disprove the existence of a governance network. However, the actors’ reactions to our questions and terminology raise the important question of how mutual and institutionalized policy consultations must be in order to qualify as network interactions. It was also difficult to draw a clear line between network governance and hierarchically governed consultation at the transnational level, whereas governance networks were clearly identified at the local level, although here the actors preferred to talk about ‘social partnerships’. Again, the actors’ reluctance to adopt our preferred terminology by no means disproves the presence of what we have conceptualized as a governance network, pointing instead to the need for a clearer ‘operationalization’, or application, of the central concepts and combination of different data types. Another difficulty relates to the inherent ambition of attempting to evaluate claims and hypotheses derived from competing theories about governance networks, institutions and democracy. For example, there are competing explanations of why governance networks are formed, as some theories tend to perceive governance networks as a response to the increasing fragmentation and complexity of society, while other theories

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

tend to view them as instruments for the pursuit of the interests of the various policy actors. The pilot study was intended to shed light on this matter, but it proved very difficult to test such competing explanations and hypotheses, because the long list of research questions did not leave sufficient time and space to provide adequate data to perform a proper hypothesis test. If this is the primary research goal, more time and space ought to be given to focus on a particular set of research questions relating to competing hypotheses. These and other difficulties would not have surfaced without the pilot study, which also provided us invaluable experiences with using different methods and interpreting the data they provide. In that sense, the pilot study was clearly worthwhile. However, the most important consequence of the pilot study has been that a fairly large group of researchers has learned to work together in relation to a common set of research questions and drawing a common theoretical and methodological vocabulary. In the highly individualized field of social science research, this is a major achievement that will prove its worth in future research.

3 Empirical Findings: Seven Network Stories Jacob Torfing

Empirical studies of policy networks undertaken during the 1980s and early 1990s primarily focused on the impact of various patterns of network interaction in the formulation and implementation of policy within a range of different policy areas (Marin and Mayntz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992). The implicit goals of such studies were to reveal that policy networks provided a viable alternative to traditional forms of governance through hierarchy or markets and that the institutional forms of governance networks had a decisive impact on the effectiveness of public policy and governance. With the widespread proliferation of governance networks, the demonstration of the effectiveness of various types of networks is no longer at the top of the agenda. New and important questions have come to the fore. Hence, a new, second generation of governance network research aims to address crucial questions about the sources of governance failure and the conditions for success; the attempts at influencing the functioning and performance of governance networks through various forms of metagovernance; and, last but not least, the democratic anchorage of governance networks and the possible trade-off between effectiveness and democracy. Comparative studies of the negotiated interaction among policy actors within different governance networks are important when attempting to answer these questions, since the goal is to uncover the different conditions and processes shaping the functioning, regulation and performance of governance networks. In that sense, the present study is emblematic of the second generation of governance network research. The new focus on the conditions and processes of network governance raises the question of how one ought to study the negotiated interaction transpiring within different governance networks. In order to answer this question, we decided to conduct a pilot study based on a wide range of 41

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance

standard and non-standard methods. However, the pilot study did not seek to conduct a general test of the merits of different methods; rather, it aimed to reflect on the experiences gained through the application of the different methods in concrete empirical studies of democratic network governance. The ultimate goal was not to produce a set of strict methodological guidelines to be followed meticulously in all future studies on democratic network governance. In fact, we do not believe that it is possible to construct a general set of methodological guidelines that are valid in all possible cases and contexts. As such, the goal of the pilot study is merely to provide some critical exemplars of how different methods can be applied in this kind of studies; what kind of problems and limitations they will engender; and what kind of results they will yield. Such exemplars may then serve as future reference points for other researchers interested in studying the use of governance networks in public policy and governance. The subsequent chapters report on the methodological experiences that have been gained in relation to specific methods. In order to properly situate and contextualize the methodological reflections offered in the following chapters, this chapter aims to provide an overview of the main features of the governance networks that we have studied in our pilot study. In order to avoid fragmented and repetitious accounts of the preliminary empirical findings in relation to the substantive research questions, the present chapter will aim to provide a relatively coherent account of the different governance networks by focusing on their respective background, role and composition; their formation, functioning and development; their contribution to public policy and governance; the different ways that they are metagoverned by local, national and/or transnational political authorities; and the democratic problems and potentials in relation to their internal functioning (internal democracy) and in relation to their social and political environment (external democracy). Space does not allow for a detailed empirical account of all of the different governance networks. Instead, our preliminary findings will be presented in and through the construction of a series of ‘network stories’ aiming to capture the main characteristics of the various governance networks. The network stories will neither provide subtle nuances nor thorough empirical documentation; instead, they use a broad brush to paint a rough picture of the most significant contours of the various governance networks. As Table 3.1 illustrates, our comparative, multi-level study of active employment policy has aimed to identify and analyse seven different governance networks: one transnational governance network in relation to

Jacob Torfing Table 3.1

43

Seven governance networks at a glance Denmark

The transnational

England

France

1. The transnational level governance network

The national level

2. The Danish national governance network

3. The English national governance network

4. The French national governance network

The local level

5. The local governance network in Køge

6. The local governance network in Birmingham

7. The local governance network in Grenoble

the drafting of the Employment Guidelines; three national governance networks in relation to the production of the National Action Plans in Denmark, England and France; and three local governance networks in relation to the formulation and implementation of local employment plans and initiatives in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble. We shall consider each of the seven governance networks in turn, starting from the top.

3.1

The transnational governance network

The key institution in the transnational governance network underpinning the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Employment Guidelines (EGLs) is the Employment Committee (EMCO), which is based on article 130 of the Amsterdam Treaty and subsequent Council decisions (presently 2000/98/EC, repeating decision 97/16/EC). The EU Commission and all of the member states each have two seats on the EMCO. The most important EMCO task is to prepare the meetings of the Council on EES matters. This gives the EMCO a pivotal role in the formulation of the EGLs and the subsequent recommendations to the member states. In fulfilling its task, the EMCO is required to liaise both with the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council. The EMCO is also required to consult ‘management and labour’ as well as other relevant bodies and committees ‘dealing with economic policy matters’ (2000/98/EC: article 5). These provisions have led the EMCO to establish close relations – and to often publish co-authored opinions – with the Economic Policy Committee, the Social Protection Committee and the Education Committee. Even though the EMCO is the key institution, the transnational governance network around the EGLs includes many groups of actors in addition to the member states who are represented in the EMCO. The first group of actors consists of the formal EU institutions. The most important

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of these is the EU Commission represented by DG Economy and Finance and DG Employment. The EU Commission provides the organizational and analytical basis for the advancement of the EES and the functioning of the EMCO. The EU Commission leads the EMCO meetings and drafts the guidelines and recommendations discussed in the EMCO. It also has the right to make final modifications in the guidelines subsequent to approval in the Council and before being forwarded to the member countries. The main goals of the EU Commission are to enhance inclusion and breed ownership in relation to the EES, and it generally acts as a broker and mediator between the various network actors. In short, we might say that the EU Commission is the principal metagovernor of the transnational governance network underpinning the EES and the EGLs. However, the Council of the Ministers of Employment also plays a pivotal role, since it formally adopts the guidelines and recommendations on the recommendation of the EMCO. In 2003, the Council openly challenged the metagoverning role of the Commission when it asked the Commission to establish a Task Force focusing on job creation in Europe. The resulting tensions between the Council and EU Commission were partly solved by placing the Task Force secretariat within DG Employment. The final report, named after its chairman, Wim Kok, was welcomed by most of the transnational network actors as an attempt at relaunching the EES. The European Council is also important in setting up the overall policy environment of the EES. Among the weaker EU institutions is the European Parliament, which must be consulted regarding the content of the EGLs prior to adoption by the Council. The social partners at the transnational level are a second group of actors: the UNICE-organized private employers, the CEEP-organized public employers, and the ETUC-organized trade unions. There are also a number of national labour market confederations seeking to influence the transnational policy process in a more direct manner than through the transnational labour market organizations, which are generally known to have few resources and limited political support from the national confederations. The EGLs are important to the social partners, since the national labour market organizations can use them as a lever for criticizing their respective governments and gradually changing the national employment policy. A third group of actors consists of civil society actors – NGOs – operating in the field of social policy, including policy for the disabled. The European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) has a dominant position in this field and appears to enjoy a special relationship with the EU Commission. There are also a number of national NGOs working to influence the content of the

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EGLs. The social partners are strongly against the inclusion of the various NGOs in the transnational governance network. The NGOs, it is claimed, play a marginal role in the formulation of national employment policies and do not really contribute to the national implementation of the EGLs. Therefore, they should not have any influence on the guidelines. Nevertheless, the EU Commission seems to favour a broad participation in the governance network, which includes the NGOs. Thus far, however, the social partners have had nothing to fear, as the influence of the NGOs remains marginal. A fourth group of network actors features transnational associations of local and regional authorities and organizations preoccupied with local and regional development. These may enter the network directly or through the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee. As these organizations are conceived to be rather weak, the direct approach appears to be the preferred one. Finally, different academic and non-academic policy experts are involved in and through various consultancy groups and task forces. The operations of the transnational governance network are largely framed by the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which relies on the non-binding coordination of national policies rather than the transference of policy-making competences to the EU level. This approach makes formal and informal contacts, consultations and hearings with other actors at the transnational, national and regional levels very important since, in the final instance, effective policy implementation depends entirely on the development of common goals, joint political commitments and shared programme responsibility in and through trust-based negotiations and interactions. Many of the different network actors meet and interact in relation to the EMCO, but many of the contacts within the transnational network appear to pass through the EU Commission, which is a central actor in the network (see Chapter 9 in this volume). The OMC works according to a particular policy cycle and is based on a very tight time schedule with an array of different deadlines for submitting action plans, joint reports, guidelines, opinions and recommendations. In the wake of a rather positive evaluation of the EES and OMC carried out by the EU Commission in 2002 (2002), the number of EGLs was reduced, the outcome focus of the guidelines and indicators was strengthened, and a new three-year cycle with a shifting focus on policy choice, policy implementation and policy evaluation was introduced. Most of the network actors appear to welcome these changes, which tend to leave greater room for the member states to translate the EGLs into national policy and tend to give more credit to the fact that the EES is concerned

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with structural policies requiring a lengthy time horizon to work properly and produce effects. The transnational governance network has generally managed to cope with the strict time schedule and produced an annual set of EGLs that have become increasingly integrated with the general economic guidelines with which they will be fully integrated from 2006 onwards as part of the Lisbon process. The transnational network actors have no direct control over the national implementation of the EGLs. Instead, they must rely on the voluntary cooperation of the national actors and, especially, the national governments in the member states. However, interaction and negotiation with other national and subnational actors can assist the EU Commission in establishing national pressure on the respective governments. The transnational network can exert a more direct influence on the national implementation of the EGLs in and through the annual evaluation of the National Action Plans (NAPs). The evaluation procedure includes bilateral meetings between the EU Commission and national representatives (governments and social partners); thematic peer reviews in which the member states comment upon each others’ NAPs; and the possibility for the Council to issue countryspecific recommendations that ‘name and shame’ countries paying insufficient attention to the EGL in their national policies. The transnational governance network in and around the EMCO appears to have developed into a set of rather sedimented interactions based on a certain division of labour, a relatively consensual policy process, and a general acceptance of the OMC procedures. However, there has been a relatively high turnover rate in the governance network, as people representing the different institutions and organizations come and go. The relative permanence of the EMCO members tends to favour the development of stronger ties between the formally included actors than between these and the more informally included actors. With regard to the more substantial issues of the EES, there tends to be consensus about the issues of ‘gender equality’ and ‘investment in human capital’, while political disagreement among the different social partners and between different member states persists in relation to issues such as ‘making work pay’, ‘reduction of non-labour costs’, ‘the combat against undeclared labour’, and ‘lifelong learning’. There is also disagreement regarding the spillover into social policy issues. The EU Commission and the EAPN tend to favour a broad policy agenda with some spillover into social policy, whereas the employers’ organizations in particular want a strict focus on labour market policy. Despite the political conflicts, there seems to be an underlying consensus about the

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overall objectives in terms of full and sustainable employment and regarding the importance of an active employment policy for growth and prosperity in Europe. The formation of a transnational governance network in relation to the formulation and evaluation of the EGLs enhances political participation in EU policy-making in an area in which the Community method based on binding EU legislation is impossible due to national resistance. Relatively clear policy-making procedures, public access to a wide range of policy documents, adherence to democratic norms for political interaction and a strong concern for producing policy outputs and monitoring policy outcomes provide a good basis for democratic network governance; however, several democratic problems remain. The EU Commission plays a dominant role within the transnational governance network, whereas the elected members of the European Parliament hardly have any influence on the final policy output. The NGOs continue to play a marginal role in the network, and the social partners exercise their influence through formal and informal consultations rather than genuine policy negotiations. Their influence is further limited by their weak mandates resulting from internal divisions in UNICE and ETUC. In addition, there is hardly any public interest in the policy process. The only way to hold the network actors accountable for the EES in general and the content of the EGLs in particular is through the intervention of the Council, which ultimately has the formal political responsibility for the EES.

3.2

The Danish national governance network

The Danish National Action Plan (NAP) from 2003 was formally discussed and approved by the Special Committee for Labour Market and Social Affairs, which is a formal, network-based board including a host of different public and private actors. This committee treats all EU-related questions within the area of labour market and social policy. The Special Committee is a part of the foreign policy system within the Danish government and central administration and is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Special Committee conducts a formal hearing of the social partners in relation to the NAP. According to a recently established procedure, the NAP is also discussed by the National Employment Council, which is an advisory body including the social partner representatives. When the NAP is finally adopted by the Special Committee, it is sent, via the government’s Foreign Policy Committee, to the European Committee and the Labour Market Committee in the Danish Parliament. These two parliamentary committees make comments that are supposed to be taken

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into account in next year’s NAP. The NAP is then submitted to the EU Commission, which will later invite the Danish government to discuss how the EU Commission understands the NAP and which recommendations it will advise the Council to make in relation to the Danish NAP. The Danish government will also participate in various thematic peer review sessions intended to enhance cross-national learning. The NAP is formally approved by the Special Committee, but it is drafted in a much more informal network consisting of representatives from the relevant ministries and a broad range of social partners from the private and public labour markets. The network-based writing process is kicked off by the Ministry of Employment, which arranges a practical–technical meeting with all of the main contributors (the so-called ‘contribution group’). In this meeting, the Ministry of Employment informs the other actors about the new EGL, and there is a discussion about who will contribute to the different parts of the NAP. The central labour market organizations make their own written contributions to the NAP. There is one contribution from the private labour market organizations and one from the public labour market organizations. Both of these contributions are written jointly by representatives from the relevant employers’ organizations (DA, SALA, KL and ARF) and trade unions (LO, FTF, AC, LH and KTO). There are usually two meetings in the contribution group and a number of e-mails and phone calls among the members of the two subgroups, where the first drafts, which are written by the lead organization, are discussed and revised. The members of the two subgroups feel that they are relatively free to write what they want in their contributions, but they do not invest a significant amount of resources in the writing process, since the NAP is not regarded as ‘real policy-making’, but merely as a retrospective reporting document. There are several informal contacts with the ministries during the writing process. When the social partners’ contributions are submitted, small excerpts from them will be included in the main part of the NAP that is written by various ministries under the leadership of the Ministry of Employment. Since 2001, the two contributions from the social partners have been published in extenso in the annex to the Danish NAP. The Danish NAP procedure has generally been quite stable. Initially, however, there were separate meetings about the NAP in the Special Committee, but now the NAP is merely one of many items on the agenda. This does not reflect a lack of interest in the NAP, but simply that the drafting of the NAP has become ‘business as usual’. The only genuinely new developments are that there is now a formal hearing of the National Employment Council and that the labour market organizations are now

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invited to participate in the meetings with the EU Commission in order to enhance their responsibility for the final result. The main actors in the formal and informal governance network that is formed in relation to the Danish NAP consist, first of all, of representatives from the Ministry of Employment, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but there are also a few other, less important, ministries involved in the drafting of the NAP. In line with the much celebrated ‘Danish Model’ for corporatist involvement (Due et al. 1993), the social partners have been actively involved in the NAP procedure from the outset. However, some of the minor labour market organizations only participate in the drafting of the NAP and in the formal hearing procedure. These organizations do not have a seat on the Special Committee. The employers’ organizations welcome the OMC on the grounds that it facilitates cross-national policy learning that might lead to reforms in the other European countries so that the Danish welfare and labour market model can be preserved. The trade unions tend to view the OMC/NAP procedure as a necessary supplement to the internal market. The economic goals concerning price stability ought to be balanced by political commitments to enhance employment. The Association of Handicap Organizations (DSI) is marginally involved in the Danish NAP procedure. It does not make a written contribution, but has recently become part of the National Employment Council and is likely to join the Special Committee. The social partners deeply regret this development, because the DSI is an NGO with no responsibility for delivering anything in relation to the NAP and the EGL. For the sake of completion, it ought to be mentioned that there are several other actors in the Special Committee who have no particular interests in the NAP. The ministries are the key actors in the national governance network, but the social actors also play an important role. As such, there are four crucial ways that the social partners can influence the NAP: (1) through their written contributions to the NAP; (2) through informal contacts with the ministry and the negotiations in the Special Committee; (3) through the formal hearing procedure; and (4) through alliances with the EU Commission. The latter point is particularly interesting. By forging a critical alliance with the EU Commission in the meetings in Brussels, the labour market organizations can place greater pressure on their national governments to change their priorities and deal with particular issues. In fact, the EU Commission strongly encourages the participation of the social partners in these meetings, because their participation helps the EU Commission to place pressure on the national governments. Indeed, the

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more actors that participate, the easier it is for the EU Commission to forge an alliance in favour of particular policy changes. Generally speaking, there is a good and constructive atmosphere in the contribution group. The negotiated interaction assumes the form of deliberation rather than bargaining, and there is a low level of conflict, although there is seldom full consensus. The lines of conflict are primarily drawn between the ministries and the social partners, and only secondarily between the employers and the trade unions. However, all of the main policy actors judged the NAP to have very limited effects on Danish employment policy. The main reason is that the NAP is generally considered to be a reactive, backward-looking reporting document that hardly contains any proactive, forward-looking policy intentions. Another reason is that Denmark is fulfilling almost all of the EGLs that are heavily influenced by the Danish employment policy. Hence, Denmark is conceived as a ‘policy giver’ rather than ‘policy taker’ in the field of employment policy. Nevertheless, the OMC/NAP procedure might lead to some limited policy changes in Denmark, as the critical recommendations from the EU Commission might open a window of opportunity for policy debate and policy reform, but only if there are Danish policy actors (the government, the ministries, or the social partners) who tend to agree with the EU Commission. In the long run, there might also be considerable policy effects from adopting a particular discursive framing of employment policy. Even if the recommendations are not always followed in the national legislation, the mere fact that the national employment policy is increasingly discussed and assessed in the light of the EGLs will affect the ways policy problems and policy solutions are perceived. The network-based Danish NAP procedure is metagoverned by the EU Commission that defines the general guidelines and common indicators as well as the structure of the NAP. At the national level, the Ministry of Employment is the principal metagovernor. It plans and organizes the NAP procedure, puts together the different contributions to the NAP, has most of the contacts with the social partners, and leads the Danish delegation at the EMCO meeting. However, the Ministry of Employment faces competition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which chairs the Special Committee, and from the Ministry of Finance, which is a central strategic actor in the field of structural policy, of which employment policy is an integral part. The involvement of the social partners and other actors is not motivated by democratic concerns for openness and participation, but rather, by their interests in influencing policy-making and ensuring an effective policy implementation in relevant and important areas. As such, the

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inclusion of the social partners is said to convey valuable knowledge, responsible actions and public legitimacy. The democratic potentials of the national governance network are found in the internal interactions between the network actors. Hence, it is claimed that the key strategic resources in terms of knowledge, analytical skills and well-informed arguments can be possessed by all of the actors – even the small organizations – a circumstance that tends to facilitate democratic influence on the policy output. However, it is also claimed that the social partners cannot match the massive resources of the ministries and that there is unequal resource allocation. Most of the administrative representatives from the various organizations claim to act on the basis of a vaguely defined mandate, but they tend to consult the political leaders in their organizations about major issues, which tends to provide a democratic anchoring of their interactions within the governance network. Finally, some of the interviews report that participation in the OMC/NAP procedure has an important empowerment effect, as it facilitates learning and a better understanding of international dynamics and trends. The democratic problems are mostly related to the external relation of the governance network to the wider public. The social partners claim that they pursue their own organizational interests in the governance network, although they also believe that they sometimes raise questions and issues on behalf of the general public. All of the uncontroversial policy documents in relation to the Danish NAP are matters of public record, but documents displaying conflicts are not. However, the real problem does not appear to be the lack of publicity, but rather, the lack of public interest in the NAP outside of a small circle of insiders. Finally, the social partners contribute to and endorse the NAP, and they tend to feel responsible for their contribution and the general level of employment. Ultimately, however, the network actors cannot be held accountable for the policy output, as everybody agrees that it is the government’s NAP and that the government is accountable through the general elections. In sum, the Danish NAP is mainly a reporting document and an advertisement product produced by the government, though through the active involvement of the social partners in accordance with the ‘Danish Model’. Reflecting the depoliticized character of the NAP, the governance network is dominated by administrative representatives from the ministries and the social partners. The political leaders from the public and private organizations play a very limited role in the drafting of the Danish NAP from 2003. The Danish Parliament also plays a marginal role, but it has, after all, passed all of the laws reported in the NAP. Nonetheless, it is left to administrative actors in the national governance network to

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evaluate the Danish employment policy in the light of the EES. This is legitimized by the commonly held view that the OMC/NAP procedure has very limited effects on actual policy-making. However, some of the central actors claim that the OMC/NAP procedure affects the political agenda by providing a new common language, new comparable statistics, a new forum for cross-national dialogue and learning and, last but not least, a good overview of the Danish employment policies that invite everybody to reflect on the general policy profile and to assess whether changes are required.

3.3

The English national governance network

The participation of the social partners in the NAP procedure is much less and weaker in England than in Denmark, which is due to the general hostility between the trade unions and employers’ organizations and the absence of strong corporatist traditions. However, there are regular interactions between the ministries and the social partners in relation to the annual drafting of the NAP, the meeting with the EU Commission about the draft recommendations, and the national Task Force on skills development. Both the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) refuse to see these interactions as a kind of ‘network governance’. Instead, they prefer to talk about ‘regular consultations’ with the government. This reflects the fact that there is no formal, institutionalized forum for negotiations between the social partners and the government in relation to British employment policy in general and the British NAP in particular. As a matter of fact, there are very few institutionalized fora for negotiation between the government and the social partners. In addition to the Task Force on skills development, there is only the Low Pay Commission, the Health and Safety Commission and the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and a few other ad hoc working groups in which the social partners are formally represented. Regarding the NAP, the key actors are the various ministries: the Department of Work and Pensions, whose Joint International Unit is responsible for the drafting of the NAP; the Department of Education and Skills, which contributes to the sections in the NAP about education; the Department of Trade and Industry, which coordinates the consultation with the social partners; and HM Treasury, which provides relevant statistics and helps to streamline the NAP with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Both the TUC and the CBI are invited to participate in meetings with representatives from the various government departments and

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to contribute to particular sections of the NAP. The social partners make a few jointly written contributions that are inserted in the main text of the NAP. They are also encouraged to submit their own written contributions with requests for changes. The TUC is generally eager to contribute to the NAP process, which it conceives as one of the few opportunities for influencing the government’s employment policies, even though the TUC regards the NAP as having only marginal, if any, effects. The CBI perceives the NAP as a suitable device for benchmarking British employment policy, and it welcomes the OMC procedure on the grounds that it permits the member states to formulate their own respective national employment policies. CEEP UK, the public employers’ organization, is also consulted in relation to the NAP; it participates in the meetings, but it does not submit any written contributions. The consultative interactions among the public and private actors involved in the NAP procedure are limited to a few issues, and there is a tendency to avoid discussion of questions involving strong disagreements between the CBI and the TUC. The TUC is happy to be involved in the policy negotiations, but appears to be the underdog in the consultative network, as the CBI has a greater influence on the government’s policy and tends to be much more in line with the government on substantial policy issues, such as the need to increase the incentives to work and supporting innovation and entrepreneurship. Despite varying – but generally increasing – contributions from the CBI and the TUC, the basic format for the OMC/NAP procedure has remained more or less the same: the NAP is drafted through a policy process directed by the Department of Work and Pensions, which regularly consults with social partners on a limited number of issues. Despite the government’s recognition that the social partners ought to play a key role in the development of British employment strategy, as stated in the NAP in 2003, there are no institutionalized negotiations with the social partners. This is partly due to the government’s fear of being associated with the corporatist aspirations of Old Labour and partly due to resistance from the CBI, which is vehemently against institutionalized negotiations and does not conceive itself as being a ‘social partner’. It should be noted that the CBI and the TUC only meet to discuss their jointly written inputs to the NAP in the presence of the government. There are no bilateral contacts and negotiations between the CBI and the TUC. However, the TUC tends to see it as a major leap forward that there are regular tripartite contacts in relation to the NAP. It also welcomes the fact that the TUC and the CBI have recently been invited to participate in the meeting with the EU Commission about the draft recommendations and that the

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TUC is formally represented in the nationwide Skills Alliance. Although these developments can be viewed as significant steps towards the formation of a governance network, there is still some way to go before the network becomes more than a symbolic framework for non-binding policy consultations. The consultative network contributes to the formulation of the British NAP through the limited involvement of the central labour market organizations. As such, it is clearly the government’s NAP. At the local level of policy implementation, there seems to be much more networking (see the Birmingham case, below). However, also here the social partners play a limited role, except in the field of skills development, where they are represented in partnerships established by the Regional Development Agencies and in the boards of the local Learning and Skills Councils. Although the NAP exercise might have some important discursive learning effects over time, the NAP itself merely reports on laws and reforms passed by the British Parliament. Hence, the interactions in and around the NAP do not genuinely contribute to changing British employment policy, which is regarded by the government as highly successful when measured against the guidelines and indicators applied by the EU Commission. However, the TUC aims to use the NAP process as a platform for pressing the government to adopt a more ‘employmentfriendly social security policy’, though with little success thus far. More importantly, the TUC aims to exploit the EU Commission’s recommendations as a lever to further institutionalize the government’s negotiations with the social partners. There have been some changes in this area, as the government now signals a greater commitment to include the social partners and the other relevant actors in the NAP process. The British NAP procedure takes place within the framework crafted by the EU. The process is driven by the Department of Work and Pensions, which takes the initiative each year to begin the writing process and contacts the other departments contributing to the NAP. The Department of Work and Pensions is also responsible for putting together the final draft, but it is assisted by the Department of Trade and Industry in bringing together the social partners in consultative meetings about the NAP. When there are disputes and disagreements in the consultative network, the Department of Work and Pensions also appears to have the final word. In other words, the Department of Work and Pensions appears to be the unchallenged metagovernor of the network-based NAP procedure in England. In terms of the democratic problems and potentials, there seem to be internal democratic problems in relation to the somewhat limited influence

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of the TUC compared to the CBI and the various government departments. It is also a problem if discussions and negotiations are limited to particularly uncontroversial questions and issues, as it restricts the area of potential influence and suppresses important conflicts. Finally, the absence of formally institutionalized negotiations also undercuts the influence of the social partners, who cannot take their participation for granted. If there is excessive conflict, they may not be invited to participate to the same extent in the next round. The only positive aspect is that the participation of the social partners in the consultative network tends to increase over time, and the TUC seems to have become empowered through its increasing participation. The TUC feels that it is increasingly recognized as a legitimate partner in national policy-making. In the future, this might help to construct a governance network with a more equal participation of the social partners. There are also grave problems pertaining to the external relations to society at large. Firstly, there is an unfortunate exclusion of NGOs representing civil society. Neither the Disability Rights Commission, the National Council for Voluntary Organizations, the Commission for Racial Equality, the National Alliance of Women’s Organizations, the Poverty Alliance or the Network of Unemployed Workers’ Centres are part of the protean national governance network, despite the fact that the government signals a higher degree of openness towards consultation with civil society organizations and has tried to receive input from some of these groups via e-mail. The government justifies the limited inclusion of social and political actors by the fact that everything reported in the NAP has been passed by the British Parliament and, therefore, already has sufficient democratic legitimacy. Another problem relates to the lack of publicity. The key documents relating to the NAP are publicly available, and the sections of the NAP that the social partners have contributed to are clearly visible. However, neither the British mass media nor the British Parliament display any particular interest in debating the NAP or in holding the various departments and social partners responsible for the policy output produced by the consultative network.

3.4

The French national governance network

In terms of the involvement of social partners in a network-based policy process, the French case falls somewhere between the Danish and British cases. From a situation in which the social partners were merely asked to comment on the French NAP a few days before it was sent to Brussels, things have developed so that they are now involved in an increasingly

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institutionalized process of policy deliberation with the French government agencies. Subsequent to the adoption of the EGLs, a meeting is held in the Interministerial Coordination Committee for European Economic Cooperation (SGCI), where a general plan for the drafting of the NAP is agreed upon by representatives from the Ministry of Employment, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Women’s Rights. A second meeting is held in the Cabinet of the Ministry of Employment together with representatives from the political subunit Synthèse and the statistical subunit DARES, whose input to the NAP is subsequently gathered and coordinated by the Cabinet. Input from all of the different ministries is circulated and debated within the SGCI, and the first and final drafts of the NAP are discussed together with the social partners within the recently established Committee for Social Dialogue about European and International Questions (CDSEI). This networkbased committee consists of civil servants from Synthèse and DARES and representatives from the five trade unions and five employers’ organizations that were recognized as representative social partners by the state back in 1945. The social partners are invited to make written contributions, and extracts from these contributions are included in clearly discernible sections of the French NAP. The social partners are not making any joint contribution due to internal disagreements on both sides of the table. However, some of the organizations claim that they would like to make joint inputs at some time in the future. Some of the social partners are more active than others in the CDSEI. Whereas the CGT, the CFDT and the CEEP are very active, the MEDEF and the FO attend meetings on an irregular basis. The employers in MEDEF are reluctant to participate, because the EES and the OMC were strongly supported by the previous socialist government and therefore regarded as a part of a social democratic political project. The trade unionists in FO are reluctant to participate due to their inherent Euroscepticism. The CGT and the other active organizations participate in the CDSEI in order to gain access to relevant information and be able to present their views on French employment policy to the government. A number of actors are only informed about the NAP subsequent to its adoption by the government. This is the case for the regional and local authorities, the National Employment Service (ANPE) and the National Association for Education of Adults (AFPA). The French Parliament is heard prior to the final adoption of the NAP, but is less involved today than was the case in the beginning. This is not because the French Parliament lacks will and interest, but due to its limited resources and extremely tight schedule. There are no civil society actors included in the consultations

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and discussions about the NAP, and the NGOs claiming to represent unemployed persons in France are also excluded. The social partners are strongly opposed to the participation of these organizations, as they claim that they are representing the unemployed. There have been two significant changes in the French NAP process since 1997: first, the political interest has diminished considerably from the former socialist government to the present neo-Gaullist government. The NAP procedure is increasingly regarded as a matter for the central administration and its civil servants. However, the political interest in and attention given to the NAP are not merely a function of the political orientation of the government. Employment policy is generally conceived to be a national and highly politicized issue. Hence, the Minister of Employment is expected to formulate an independent political position. The EES is not very helpful to that end, as it tends to present employment policy as something that is directed by Brussels and excessively liberalistic in its content and political priorities. Secondly, the social partners have become increasingly involved in a network-based NAP process. Most importantly, the CDSEI has been established as a formal tripartite forum for discussions of the NAP and other related questions. Although the interaction within CDSEI is frequently described by the participants as a ‘consultation’, it would be incorrect to conclude that it is merely a forum for the exchange of opinions between the involved actors. Most actors agree that the CDSEI has developed into a forum for political dialogue about relevant ideas and visions. There might not yet be frequent and regular negotiations between the social and political actors, but ideas and visions are discussed and developed in a constructive and less politicized manner than that which normally characterizes social dialogue in relation to French policy reforms. Both the civil servants and the social partners describe the CDSEI as a forum for an informal dialogue that goes beyond the mere manifestation of the political interests of the various organizations. The informal contacts are strengthened by the stable participation of most of the CDSEI members. The social partners have been represented by the same people since the beginning, and most of the CDSEI members have been promoted within their respective organizations, so that they are today in a higher position than they were before. A number of working groups on issues of interest to the participants have been formed, and this tends to increase the self-regulating capacity of the network. The increasingly institutionalized policy deliberations in the CDSEI and its various subgroups also tend to enhance the political influence that the social partners may have on the NAP. Parts of the written contributions

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from the social partners have recently been included as a part of the main text of the NAP, and certain passages are clearly inspired by comments raised by the social partners in CDSEI meetings. There are also other signs that the involvement of the social partners is strengthened. Hence, they are now invited to participate in the meetings with the EU Commission, where they can present their criticism of government policies, and they are frequently invited to join ministerial delegations visiting other European countries to learn about their employment policy. In the Ministry of Employment, the civil servants claim that the increasing involvement of the social partners is a result of a deliberate strategy to increase the responsibility of the social partners in the field of employment policy. Although the civil servants describe the NAP procedure as a matter of filling in and translating French employment policies into a pre-given template provided by the EU Commission, this does not mean that they think that the NAP exercise has no positive effect on French employment policy. The annual NAP exercise is considered to provide a much-needed overview of French employment policy, which traditionally suffers from a high degree of institutional fragmentation. In addition, the exercise is judged to encourage and discipline the main actors to develop a long-term strategy for the development of French employment policy. Moreover, it is said to have introduced new concepts and terms affecting the way that policy problems are defined and resolved. For example, there is much greater emphasis on active measures now than before. Finally, the OMC has stimulated interest in the employment policies of the other European countries. As such, the French politicians have become increasingly interested in the British job centres and the Danish flexicurity model. However, the most important effect of the network-based policy process is probably that a less conflictual and politicized forum for ongoing policy discussions between a range of increasingly responsible policy actors has been created. The EU Commission metagoverns the form and content of the French NAP procedure, but according to the civil servants in the French ministries, metagovernance through guidelines, indicators and recommendations is subtle and structuring rather than directive. However, there are complaints that the EU Commission does not take the criticisms of the indicators and their political character seriously. At the national level, the Ministry of Employment is the principal metagovernor, and this role does not appear to be challenged by any other ministry. The Ministry of Employment drives the network-based NAP procedure from beginning to end, and it both frames and participates in the policy process. In terms of the democratic problems and potentials, it is positive that the strategic policy-making process is open to a range of social and political

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actors who are engaged in the open-ended deliberation of new policy initiatives. However, the extent to which the social partners refer back to their respective organizations is unclear, and several interviewees are strongly concerned about the systematic exclusion from the emerging governance network. The problem is not only that a range of civil society actors, such as handicap organizations, immigrant organizations, etc., are excluded. A far greater problem is the exclusion of the local and regional authorities and service delivery institutions, the different organizations for unemployed persons, and the different labour market organizations that were not originally recognized by the government as legitimate participants in the national policy negotiations. A further problem is the lack of transparency and publicity. The NAP process is an exclusive process for a few elite actors, and there is hardly anyone outside the closed circle who knows anything about what is going on. Only the final policy output in terms of the NAP is a matter of public record. Hence, there is limited access to information about the policy process and a general lack of interest in the French media as regards discussing the NAP. Even the French politicians appear to withdraw from the process and generally fail to provide a democratic anchorage for the national governance network.

3.5

The local governance network in Køge

Køge is a small provincial town situated a little south of the Danish capital of Copenhagen in the periphery of the economic growth centre in the metropolitan area. Many Køge residents commute to work in Copenhagen. The employment situation in Køge itself is not overly good, although it is much better than the one found in the smaller municipalities further south. A self-grown governance network with participation of public and private employment policy actors from Køge was already established when a new law introduced in 1998 demanded the formation of a new, formal governance network, named the Local Coordination Committee (LCC). The remit, composition and organizational status of the LCC were defined by law and differed slightly from those of the old governance network. The focus was now on the activation and integration of ‘weak unemployed persons’ through local partnership projects. In 2003, when Køge created a large quasi-autonomous job service unit (Job East) financed by government funding for social experiments, the LCC in Køge was expanded to include the three small southern municipalities covered by Job East. The new intermunicipal LCC consists of one politician from each municipality; two members from the local Trade Union Confederation

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(LO), the Employers’ Confederation (DA), the Association of Public Employees (FTF), the General Practitioners’ Association (PLO) and the Association of Handicap Organizations (DSI), and one member from the regional Employment Service and the Council for Integration of Immigrants and Refugees. A representative from Job East participates in the meetings with observer status. Several civil servants from the Social Policy and Employment Units in Køge and the three other municipalities are also present at the meetings, although they are not formal members of the LCC. The law makes it possible to appoint further members, but since the number of participants is already rather high, this option has not even been considered. At some point, the politicians wanted to double their number of representatives on the grounds that they had lost an important vote in the LCC, but this proved to be impossible, as the law maintains that the representatives from the local municipalities must not form a majority. As for the motivation to participate in the LCC, the three small municipalities were keen to cooperate with the large municipality of Køge, not least because a huge local government reform was under way and the prospect of an organizational and political fusion with a resourceful municipality such as Køge was highly attractive. The municipality of Køge and the social partners had already developed a shared ambition to help weak unemployed persons to find ordinary, subsidized or so-called ‘sheltered’ jobs in the private or public sector. They have a strong feeling of interdependence and are keen to cooperate about improving the public service and opening the private firms for the entry of social assistance claimants. The motivation of the general practitioners and the handicap organizations is less clear, although they are clearly involved in local activation policy, either as professional consultants or as benefit claimants. Hence, a vague feeling of interdependence appears to drive them, although it ought to be noted that it has been quite difficult to motivate the general practitioners who have required an allowance for expenses in order to participate. The law regulating the LCC has recently been adjusted so the payment of an allowance for expenses is now mandatory. Interviews and observations clearly reveal that the centrality and political importance of the formal governance network in the LCC are challenged by an informal governance network that is only partly overlapping with the formal network. Hence, a strong informal network, rooted in the previous governance network, is formed between a local trade union representative who is the vice-chair of the LCC; the heads of the Social Policy and Employment Units in the municipality of Køge, who are bystanders to the politicians in the LCC but not formal members; and the chief consultant in the local employers’ organization, who is not part

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of the LCC at all. The four actors in the informal network are very active. There are high levels of interaction and trust. If the people in the small, informal network have first reached an agreement on a certain matter, it is very likely that the large, formal network will concur. The executive civil servants will secure the support of the administrators and the politicians, and the LO and DA representatives will obtain the necessary support from the social partners. The rest of the network actors have very little influence. However, the informal network is not capable of controlling the LCC entirely. In fact, there are several cases in which the informal network has reached an internal agreement but has failed to prevent endemic conflicts from arising in the LCC. There are also other informal networks, as the handicap association tends to establish and use other, informal channels of political influence and as the civil servants in the four municipalities have formed a strong, cross-cutting network in which activities related to the many different employment projects are discussed and coordinated. There are roughly four to five annual LCC meetings. The meetings are well attended and rather formal, with long agendas, a chair and minutes. A full-time secretary is employed to provide administrative support to the network. There are also regular meetings in the different working groups under the LCC that are in charge of the concrete employment projects directed towards improving the situation for the weak unemployed. There is a high degree of trust between the network actors and relatively few conflicts, as everybody knows each others’ preferences and interests and attempts to steer free of the conflictual issues. However, one of the trade union representatives who has recently joined the network refuses to act according to the pre-established logic of appropriateness and tends to stir up much conflict and controversy. This tends to disturb the stable policy-making in the network, but also helps problematize and reduce the strong influence of the informal network. As regards the network’s contribution to local policy-making, some of the participants complain that the LCC does not devote adequate time to discussing the overall strategy for developing the local employment policy. There are heated debates about which employment projects the LCC ought to support and fund out of its own pocket. The social partners are against supporting all projects that are merely contributing to the ordinary public employment service of the four municipalities. Such projects ought to be financed by the municipalities themselves, and the LCC should only support new and innovative projects that would not otherwise receive funding. When the decision to support and fund a particular project is finally taken after lengthy debate, there appears to be little interest in its

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outputs and outcomes. The LCC runs about ten local employment projects, of which Job East is the largest. The concrete projects constitute the main LCC contribution. The LCC does not have any formal competences other than funding and directing a few employment projects and providing advice regarding employment policy to the City Council. The lack of formal political competences means that the local politicians as a whole do not pay much attention to the LCC. The LCC is regulated by national law that defines its remit, participants, budget and organizational adherence to the local municipality. The money for local employment projects stems from a national social policy development fund named the ‘Satspuljen’. The Labour Market Directorate (AMS) under the Ministry of Employment monitors the LCCs and how they spend their money, but it does not issue concrete targets and measurable indicators, only a few broadly defined objectives. In the LCC in Køge, the actors occasionally contact the AMS about how to interpret the law in the hope that the interpretation will support and strengthen their particular position in policy negotiations. An elected politician from the City Council in Køge chairs the LCC meeting, but the local politicians do not generally appear to pay much attention to the LCC. At the local level, the key metagovernor is one of administrative leaders from the informal network who clearly has a strategic approach to the development of the local governance network and the local employment policy and is responsible for many new policy initiatives. The other members of the informal governance network also act as metagovernors in relation to the LCC by aiming to influence its agenda. The formal and informal governance networks in Køge facilitate a flexible and trust-based policy development, coordination and implementation. The question is whether local network governance is also democratic. In relation to its external environment, the formal network has a problem in relation to weak unemployed people who are not directly represented in the LCC. The politicians might claim to represent this group of citizens, and the Association of Handicap Organizations (DSI) might also represent some of them, but they do not have their own organization that could be directly represented in the LCC. The problem with the informal network is that it is not formed on the basis of representation, but on the basis of resource endowment. It consists of strong and resourceful actors who exert a significant amount of power in relation to the formal governance network. Agendas, minutes and relevant policy documents produced by the LCC are publicly available on the LCC website. This kind of publicity and transparency is not found in relation to the informal network. However, even the formal governance network suffers from a lack of

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public control and accountability, as the local politicians do not pay much attention to the goings on in the governance network. Internally, the formal governance network tends to function in accordance with common norms about democratic deliberation and democratic decision-making. However, the decisive influence of the informal governance network tends to undermine the responsiveness of the network in relation to the many different groups of unemployed persons requiring attention. The dominance of certain key actors might also lead to an unfortunate situation in which the strongest network actors enhance their social and political competences more than the weaker network actors.

3.6

The local governance network in Birmingham

Birmingham is situated in the West Midlands. It is a big and relatively young city that developed around an industrial core, which is now in decline. In 2004, the unemployment rate was approximately 7.8 per cent compared to 2.8 per cent at the national level. However, this merely hints at the existing disparities, as the unemployment rate in some deprived neighbourhoods is actually above 20 per cent. The number of jobs in the manufacturing sector is declining, but the jobs in retail, finance and other professional services are slowly growing. The workforce is ageing and the proportion of black and ethnic minorities is increasing. Since the economic and social decline in Birmingham began, there has been a growing emphasis on the need to work together in local and regional partnerships and networks in order to generate growth and employment and renew the deprived neighbourhoods. All of the major local and regional policy reports strongly recommend that public policy is formulated and implemented through partnerships with private actors. Indeed, if governance networks in England appear to be weak at the national level, they seem to be quite strong and well developed at the local level. Of particular relevance for employment policy and the efforts to help weak unemployed individuals back into the labour market, a series of formal and interconnected partnerships and governance networks has been formed. At the regional level, there is a network-based board governing the Regional Development Agency called Advantage West Midlands (AWM). AWM is in charge of regional planning and development and has set up a partnership in relation to the Framework for Regional Employment and Skills Action (FRESA) and a new Regional Skills Partnership (RSP). The AWM is overseen by the West Midlands Regional Assembly (WMRA), which consists of appointed representatives from the local governments, private

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business, and interest and community organizations. At city level, a network called the Birmingham Strategic Partnership (BSP) has been formed in order to facilitate policy coordination across the different policy areas. The BSP has its own funding and is responsible for the formulation of an overall Community Plan for Birmingham. Many of the actors who are part of the BSP are themselves partnerships. At the sector level, we find the Employment Strategy Group (ESG), which is a subgroup of the BSP and related to the regional FRESA. The ESG is a formal partnership responsible for coordinating the initiatives for weak unemployed persons in Birmingham and the small and relatively wealthy municipality of Solihull. The ESG has established eight so-called Access to Employment Groups (AEGs), which are local partnerships operating at the neighbourhood level. The AEGs play a crucial role in coordinating between the ESG goals and projects and the needs and resources of local citizen groups and community organizations. The ESG was established in late 2001, at which time it replaced another loosely defined governance network entitled the Job Alliance, which had a slightly different composition. The ESG currently consists of representatives from the Birmingham City Council, Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council, Job Centre Plus, Connexions (activation and jobs for the young unemployed), the Learning and Skills Council for Birmingham and Solihull, Birmingham Voluntary Sector Council, the public initiative for Fair Cities and a host of private contractors such as Pertemps, Working Links, Work Directions and Business Link (run by the Chamber of Commerce). Junior representatives from the various organizations meet in the Employment Strategy Operations Group a week before and after meetings in the ESG to plan the meeting and follow up on decisions. The AEGs mirror the membership of the ESG, but also include members from local citizen groups and community organizations that are appointed by the AEGs themselves. The network actors generally claim that the networks and partnerships help them to ‘coordinate’ their efforts instead of ‘competing’ with one another and ‘duplicating’ their initiatives. They participate in the different partnerships in order to align their goals, targets and interests, exchange information and resources, and provide opportunities for joint funding. In England, the local governments are not in charge of delivering direct services to the citizens. Such services are provided by a host of local semiautonomous government agencies that are established and regulated by the government departments. For example, the Department of Work and Pensions runs the local Job Centre Plus and the Department of Education and Skills operates through the local Learning and Skills Councils. The ‘agencyfication’ of the public sector and the many competing streams of

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funding enhance the local fragmentation of the public sector and partnerships, and networks are regarded as an attempt at facilitating coordination in the face of this fragmentation. The involvement of private firms, business associations and voluntary organizations in the local networks permits coordination with private actors and helps to breed responsibility and keep down public spending by drawing on private resources in the local policy implementation. The ESG is the key governance network in the field of local employment policy in Birmingham and Solihull. It has its own limited budget (£ 0.85 million) allocated by the BSP, but it also draws on the mainstream funding of the public actors and on money from the European Structural Funds and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund under the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office. The ESG meets bimonthly for approximately three hours to discuss progress reports, make new plans, launch new initiatives, secure additional funding and allocate money for different purposes. There is a good and constructive atmosphere in the meetings, which are relatively formal and give rise to only minor conflicts. The network actors have abundant daily interaction via e-mail, telephone and other meetings between the formal ESG meetings that serve the purpose of providing directions to the day-to-day activities within the policy field. The actors appear to be well prepared and almost everybody actively participates in the meetings, although some more than others. Many of the actors are engaged in preparing different items on the agenda and have either submitted a written report or made an oral presentation. The governance network is generally judged to be relatively stable and well functioning. There are written ‘terms of reference’ that briefly state the remit, objectives and membership of the ESG and a newer version that additionally specifies the norms and rationale of the partnership. However, there is no common strategic plan guiding the local employment policy initiatives. The ESG is merely pulling together the plans, goals and strategies of the various actors. However, in one of the meetings that we observed, a draft of a strategic policy plan for the ESG was presented. Many thought that the plan was fine, but that it ought to place greater emphasis on ‘alignment’ and the creation of ‘hubs’, which is the nickname for projects in relation to new urban developments in which local unemployed people, public agencies, building contractors and retailers are brought together in order to create new employment opportunities. The adoption of a joint strategy with common goals and priorities is regarded as a result of years of networking and trust building. It is also supported by the Local Area Agreement, which is a new government initiative aiming to enhance the integration of local policy implementation.

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Birmingham City Council (BCC), the Job Centre Plus (JCP) and the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) are the leading actors within the ESG and the local AEGs. The BCC plays an important role in the metagovernance of the ESG. The ESG was established on the initiative of the BCC, which perceives its role as changing from a key service provider to a facilitator and catalyst of local partnerships and governance networks. The BCC brings along a set of employment objectives that it formulates as a part of its Public Sector Agreement Targets, and it also provides some limited funding, which in contrast to the funding provided by the other key actors can be used in a highly flexible manner, as it is not tied to specific objectives. Finally, the BCC contributes democratic legitimacy to the network, as it is the only democratically elected body. The LSC also contributes to the metagovernance of the ESG. The LSC plays a dominant role in the meetings and provides secretarial functions for the ESG. The JCP plays a key role by running the local AEGs. The ESG is also metagoverned by external actors such as the BSP that sets goals for the ESG and submits the ESG to a regular performance management measurement. The central government departments aim to metagovern the ESG by, on the one hand, encouraging the formation of local partnerships and networks and, on the other, by setting strict performance targets for the JCP and the LSC, both of which are participating in the local governance network in order to see how the other actors can help them meet their targets. The different sets of mainstream targets limit the room for manoeuvring in the local employment policy, and the network actors struggle to find ways of taking the local needs into account while appearing to meet the mainstream targets. Network actors describe this skilful exercise as an attempt at ‘bending the mainstream’. The internal democracy of the ESG is relatively well functioning. There are complaints about the dominating behaviour of some senior members of the network and about the political marginalization of the small municipality of Solihull; however, there generally appears to be a healthy climate in the ESG. Common democratic norms are respected in the course of interaction, and although decisions are based on consensus, those who disagree are allowed to stand back. The actors in the ESG are quite strong and resourceful, and deliberate actions are taken to empower the weaker civil society actors in the AEGs, which are encouraged and helped to organize and express their views and interests. The partnerships as a whole appear to be much concerned about the outputs and outcomes of the different projects and initiatives, although there are some complaints that there is not enough evaluation of the failures in order to learn from them.

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The democratic performance of the governance network in relation to its external social and political environment is much more problematic. Although the ESG actors all have their own organizational interests, they tend to see themselves as a part of a bigger, common project of enhancing growth, prosperity and employment in the Birmingham area. However, there are few, if any, possibilities for the wider community to oversee the ESG and hold it accountable for its decisions. The ESG has no website and there is no public access to agendas, minutes or written accounts about the various ESG projects. Since there are no elected politicians in the governance network, the politicians cannot monitor the partnership on behalf of the electorate, at least not without going through the administrative representatives from the city council. In relation to the democratic norm about the inclusion of relevant and affected actors, there are both examples of deliberate exclusion, selfexclusion and blind exclusion. First, Netwerc, which is an umbrella organization for the local Employment Resource Centres helping weak unemployed persons from the black and ethnic communities on a contractual basis, is deliberately excluded from the ESG on the grounds that it is regarded as a private contractor, not a strategic actor. However, some of the other private contractors such as Pertemps, Work Directions, etc. are included primarily because of their size, but this is despite the fact that observations made at ESG meetings reveal that they do not act as strategic actors. Second, Enterprising Communities, a local community organization, refuses to participate in the ESG, which in turn rejected its action plan in relation to a sizable grant from the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund that was considered too loose and imprecise and not a result of ‘true partnershipping’. Finally, where the first exclusions are subject to discussion and contestation within the governance network, there appear to be no reflections about why the social partners – and the trade unions especially – are excluded from the governance network. There are trade union representatives in the regional skills network and on the board of the LSC, but the trade unions are not included in the ESG. Another blind exclusion is the unemployed people themselves, who are only represented through various citizen groups and community organizations participating in the AEGs.

3.7

The local governance network in Grenoble

The special initiatives directed towards weak unemployed people in the Grenoble metropolitan area stem from a local governance network entitled Plan Local pour l’Insertion et l’Emploi (PLIE). The PLIE in the Grenoble

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metropolitan area was formed in 2000 at the initiative of local politicians from Grenoble who were motivated by the prospect of attracting money from the European Structural Fund and by concerns for their political profile in local elections. The state provides a legal and political framework for the formation of PLIEs, but it is not compulsory for the local authorities to establish a PLIE. The state must approve the formation of a new PLIE, and in the case of Grenoble, it demanded that the 27 surrounding municipalities should be included in the partnership that ended up as an intermunicipal network such as the ones in Køge and Birmingham. The main PLIE objective is to provide a qualitatively better service for weak unemployed people, but within the existing framework and without replacing the existing services. The means by which to improve local employment service is to provide additional funding for extra and better support and to enhance coordination between the fragmented public agencies and between the public agencies and private companies. The PLIE receives funding from the state, the region of Rhône-Alpes and the department of Isère. It also receives funding from the European Social Fund. It has its own secretariat and three subcommittees that deal with strategic funding issues, political objectives and technical–administrative matters, respectively. Whereas the social partners play a key role in the local governance network in Køge and the private contractors and voluntary organizations are a key component for the local governance network in Birmingham, the PLIE is first of all a network among the many different public and semipublic agencies involved in the formulation and implementation of local employment policy. The only private actors are a couple of NGOs. As such, the PLIE is comprised of: 1. Elected politicians from the departmental and municipal levels; 2. Leading administrators from the department (replacing the elected politicians), the various municipalities in the metropolitan area of Grenoble, the local and regional offices of the Ministry of Employment, the National Employment Service (ANPE) and the National Association for Education of Adults (AFPA), and the so-called ‘Missions locales’ that are created by the mayors to help the young unemployed; 3. A local NGO aiming to assist homeless people and a national NGO that has been supporting women in male professions for over 50 years. There is nobody in the network representing the unemployed or the street-level bureaucrats who are actually dealing with the unemployed.

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Nor are there any private companies in the network, although there are contracts with several firms about helping integrate unemployed people. The social partners have been invited to join the partnership, but they do not participate, partly on the grounds that they think that the focus of the PLIE is far too technical and partly because the meetings in the PLIE take place during normal working hours, at which time they cannot participate. The actors that are included are linked by their mutual interdependence and their recognition of the urgent need to provide better policy coordination. There is a lot of formal and informal interaction between the network actors in the PLIE. Decisions are made by consensus and there has never been a vote in the PLIE meetings. If a proposal is met by strong opposition, it is abandoned. Over time, the PLIE has become increasingly occupied with technical questions about how the different policies, services and initiatives interact. This has not only deterred the social partners from participating. The elected politicians also appear to participate less and less in the PLIE, although their attendance remains good when the meetings are concerned with more political issues or with questions concerning the distribution of power and competences between the national, regional and local levels. Another development is taking place at the discursive level, where the PLIE is increasingly regarded as part of a new discourse of governance. The traditional republican view on governance emphasizes the general interest of the nation and the bureaucratic implementation of standardized services to the citizens. From this view, consultation with social and political actors is largely considered to be an illegitimate particularism. In contrast, the new approach to governance emphasizes the need for flexible services responding to different local needs articulated through participation of a plurality of actors in local partnerships. A further strengthening of the new discourse on governance will serve to consolidate and develop the local employment network. A last, but far from unimportant, development concerns the aborted attempt to replace negative coordination within the governance network with more positive coordination. From the very outset, the PLIE has been dominated by the idea that the network should merely coordinate existing initiatives rather than develop a new political platform for joint action that might clash with the institutional interests of the participating actors. This minimalist approach to coordination has recently been challenged, as it tends to hamper the realization of the main objective of engaging in a much closer cooperation with private companies regarding the integration of weak unemployed people. The state agencies appeared to block joint initiatives in this area, because

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they feel it is their remit. This provoked a major crisis in the partnership, since demands were raised for a more positive coordination within the network based on joint action. However, after a crisis meeting in the partnership, it was finally decided to return to business as usual and hope for a gradual development of a common accord among the network actors with regard to closer cooperation with private firms. The PLIE has not managed to improve the cooperation with private firms, and it has only delivered additional service to approximately 600 out of the 8000 social assistance claimants in the department of Isère. The main achievement of the PLIE lies in its coordination of existing activities and its enhancement of interorganizational knowledge sharing. The PLIE is also claimed to have improved contacts among the different actors in the field and to have created a more cooperative mentality, although some people claim that most actors already knew one another beforehand. The state appears to be the principal metagovernor in relation to the PLIE in Grenoble. The state provides a national regulatory framework defining the basic parameters of the PLIEs, and it must approve the geographical scope and composition of new PLIEs. It holds key competences in the field of employment and is the prime mover in the local employment politics, which the other actors must adjust to (the last major initiative was the establishment of joint Employment Houses, which has created quite a stir). Finally, the state participates directly in the local governance network through its local agencies and representations. The European Structural Fund is yet another source of metagovernance. Not only has it provided crucial funding for the PLIE, it has also affected the political objectives and priorities of the PLIE, which was forced to pay greater attention to the number of successful inclusions rather than the quality of its assistance in order to receive its funding. A third source of metagovernance is provided by the national association of local PLIEs producing soft guidance in terms of an exchange of local experiences, definitions of best practice and the distribution of software. Last but not least, the administrative staff of the PLIE and the civil servants from the participating municipalities are in charge of preparing the meetings, activating the participants and sending out minutes. Although common norms for democratic interaction are generally observed, there are two notable problems in relation to the internal democracy: the first is that the strict demand for a near total consensus between the network actors, which appears to have been conducive to the initial formation of the partnership, now tends to slow down – or even block – further progress, as cooperation only takes place in uncontroversial areas

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of minor importance. Through a democratic lens, the problem can be viewed as a repression of political creativity and plurality by an uncompromising demand for consensus. The second problem is that the increasingly technical character of the network tends to marginalize certain actors within the governance network and decrease the participation of the elected politicians. As for the external relation to the wider society, it is certainly a democratic problem that the technical discourse of the governance network also tends to exclude crucial social and political actors such as the private firms, the social partners and the organization of the unemployed people. The network recognizes the importance of including these actors, not only because they are relevant and affected, but also because they possess important knowledge about the private sector that is lacking in the governance network. The relatively extensive metagovernance of the PLIE helps ensure political control over what goes on in the governance network, but the complex organizational structure and pattern of interaction render it difficult to see who are actually responsible for the particular employment policy initiatives. The fact that the agenda, minutes and other relevant policy documents are not publicly available on the Internet also make it difficult to hold the governance network accountable for its actions and inactions.

3.8

Summing up

The case studies presented above show that the formulation and implementation of employment policy take place at multiple levels and involve a plurality of public and private actors. Hence, the days where employment policy was merely a prerogative of national governments are long gone. The point is not that the role of the government is rendered obsolete; but rather, that political authorities at different levels are formulating and implementing employment policy through negotiated interaction with a broad range of relevant and affected policy actors. The governance networks that we have identified in relation to policy outputs at different levels are all relatively permanent, established in relation to particular policy procedures and initiated by the political authorities. The political authorities play a crucial role in deciding how much competence and influence the governance networks ought to have. However, they also formulate goals and targets, provide funding and participate in the networks. As such, the seven governance networks that we have analysed in our pilot study are most certainly operating in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994).

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Comparing the local, nation and transnational levels, there appears to be much more network governance at the local level than at the national and transnational levels. This might be a result of the different interpretations of the political authorities of the need for relying on network governance in relation to the formulation and implementation of employment policy. As such, we might hypothesize that it is conceived to be relatively easier for the political authorities at the national and transnational levels to formulate employment policy without too much interaction with relevant and affected actors than it is for the local authorities and delivery agencies to implement policy without negotiated interaction with a plurality of actors. Hence, the formation of governance networks at the national and transnational levels only seems to be motivated by vague concerns for legitimacy and programme responsibility, whereas the formation of governance networks at the local level appears to be motivated by pressing demands for effective policy coordination. When comparing the three countries that we have analysed, we also find some clear differences in terms of the prevalence of network governance. In Denmark, the institutionalization and influence of the national governance network are relatively high. In France, the role and institutionalization of the national governance network are increasing, whereas in England its role and institutionalization are much lower than in both Denmark and France. This picture is unsurprising, as it mirrors the relative strength of the corporatist traditions in the three countries. However, when comparing the local governance networks in the three countries, it is interesting to see how this familiar picture changes in the sense that there seems to be much more partnershipping and network governance in Birmingham than in Køge and Grenoble. The local governance network in Køge is also quite strong and well developed. In Grenoble, on the other hand, it seems to be weaker and less inclusive, although it has good prospects for further development if it is sustained by the new, emerging partnership discourse. Still, the local governance network in Birmingham appears to be even more developed than the one in Køge, especially if we examine how it is embedded in a city-wide governance network (the BSP) facilitating cross-sector coordination and how it is anchored in a number of neighbourhood-based governance networks (the AEGs) aiming to enhance local participation and empowerment. The strong network governance in Birmingham, which is neither mandated nor regulated by national legislation, is a result of the need to coordinate policy initiatives in the light of the high degree of institutional fragmentation. There is an even higher degree of fragmentation in Grenoble. Nevertheless, when there seems to be more network governance in

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Birmingham than in Grenoble, this is explained by the different state traditions and welfare regimes found in the two countries. Hence, we might hypothesize that whereas the centralized system of state governance and universalistic welfare provision in France seem to block the further advancement of local network governance in Grenoble, the weak state capacities and liberal welfare regime in England seems to stimulate the integration of private, non-corporatist actors in Birmingham. There are striking differences between the three countries in terms of the willingness to include the social partners in governance networks. In Denmark, and to a less extent in France, the social partners are the natural sleeping partners of the public actors at both the national and local levels, whereas in England, the social partners are kept at a safe distance from the political authorities at the national level and are almost totally excluded from the governance networks at the local level. However, there are also important similarities between the governance networks at the different levels and in the different countries. Regardless of their form and strength, they all appear to make a positive contribution to public policy and governance by facilitating coordination and enhancing programme responsibility, and their inherent democratic problems in terms of unjustified exclusions and a lack of publicity and accountability are combined with democratic potentials in terms of broader democratic participation, an appreciation of common democratic norms for political interaction and the empowerment of the social and political actors. The brief network stories presented above serve to provide an overview of the main characteristics of the governance networks that we have identified at the different levels in Denmark, England and France. As such, the goal has not been to provide subtle analytical nuances and explicit empirical documentation. That will be provided in the subsequent chapters, which will thoroughly discuss how different social science methods can further substantiate the general observations made in this chapter.

4 Comparative Analysis Based on Expert Reports Jacob Torfing

4.1

Introduction

This chapter aims to show how expert reports can be used to open up a new policy area for comparative research by providing an initial overview of the main features of different national policy processes. Reports written by scientific experts are frequently used in courtrooms, investigations of major accidents, and procedures for prohibiting hazardous chemical substances. Such expert reports will normally contain assessments of technical evidence based on strict scientific standards. But there is also another kind of expert report offering a qualitative and quantitative assessment of societal problems, policy programmes and outcomes that are frequently used in public administration and governance. These are often written by national experts who are commissioned to write specific country reports that can be subjected to systematic cross-national comparisons in order to find policy problems, or identify ‘best practice’. Despite the ubiquitous use of comparative expert reports in research-based policy-making, it is not a method that is well described in the methodological literature. In order to compensate for this neglect, the present chapter critically assesses the systematic use of expert reports in comparative studies of network-based policy-making. The substantive research question that will be addressed through a comparative analysis of expert reports concerns the network-governed ‘translation’ of the EU’s Employment Guidelines into national policies in and through the National Action Plans for employment. According to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the EU member states must produce a National Action Plan (NAP) that provides an annual evaluation of their employment policy in the light of the Employment Guidelines (EGLs) issued by the EU Commission and the examples of 74

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‘best practice’ identified through an interactive peer review process. Since the issuing of non-binding guidelines is a relatively new way of governing the formulation and implementation of employment policy at the national and local levels, it is crucial to ask how and to what extent the EGLs and the peer review process affect the NAPs and, in turn, how much the NAPs affect the employment policy of the individual member states. With reference to Meyer and Rowan (1977), we might ask whether the national employment policies are ‘coupled’ or ‘decoupled’ in relation to the European Employment Strategy (EES) as it is expressed through the EGLs and the examples of ‘best practice’. The national policies will be decoupled to the extent that the member states pretend to follow the EGLs, but continue to do as they please. Since the EU strongly recommends that the NAP is produced in and through a social partnership that involves the employers, trade unions and various civil society organizations in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAP, the national governments are not the only actors responsible for the translation of the EGLs into national and local employment policies. The translation process is mediated by more or less well-developed national governance networks that will have a varying impact on the NAPs. The involvement of relevant and affected actors in the drafting and evaluation of the NAP will either enhance or impede the realization of the EGLs, depending on the opinions, interests and the political strength of the social partners and civil society organizations. However, the EU Commission no doubt believes that the national governance networks will tend to enhance rather than impede the realization of the EGLs, because the included actors give a high priority to the provision of full employment and adequate labour supply. But much depends on how much influence the national governance networks have, and this will in turn depend on the national legacy of corporatist involvement, the political attitudes of the government and the strength of the social and political actors that are included in the national governance networks. The present chapter will not only examine the role of the NAPs as ‘transmission belts’ within a system of multi-level governance, but also analyse the context-dependent impact of national governance networks on the NAPs. Methodologically, the analysis will be based on a comparative research design which is used in all the chapters of this book, but is brought to the fore in this chapter by focusing on comparative expert reports as a tool for analysing the formation and impact of different national governance networks. The consequence of the exclusive focus on the use of expert reports in comparative studies of network-governed

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policy-making is that the analysis will not provide a systematic analysis of interviews and policy documents. This clearly prevents the generation of conclusive research results. Hence, the comparative analysis of expert reports is only meant to be explorative in the sense of developing hypotheses for further research. The chapter begins with a brief account of the comparative research design and of how expert reports can be used in comparative analysis of network governance. Then follows a discussion of the credibility of expert reports and a brief explanation of how the expert reports were assessed and analysed. The main empirical findings from the comparative study of the formation and impact of the network-governed NAP process are presented in the last section, which is followed by a conclusion that speculates on the future use of expert reports as a method for accessing a new policy field and learning about national policy-making systems.

4.2

Comparative studies based on expert reports

The form, functioning and impact of the national governance networks that are established in relation to the NAPs will tend to vary a great deal from country to country. This calls for a comparative study that can help us to judge whether particular correlations, for example between the form and function of governance networks and their impact on the NAPs, are typical or not. In the present study we shall aim to compare a limited number of countries. The limited resources of the pilot study prevent the inclusion of all the relevant countries, but even a small number of countries can help to establish common traits and systematic differences. The identification of similarities and dissimilarities between the policy processes in different countries improves the explanatory power of the analysis, because we can check for the influence of contextual variables (Ragin 1989). However, the increasing explanatory power clearly has its costs, as the descriptive analysis of several national cases will not be as detailed as in a single country study. In a single case study, it is possible to turn every single stone, whereas in a comparative study we will have to content ourselves with looking at a limited number of variables. The risk is that we end up studying the interaction between a few factors in a large number of countries without sufficiently grasping the historical and societal context of the interaction among these factors. A comparative study of a limited number of countries tends to reduce this risk. However, a limited number of cases will not be enough to test the prevalence of all the possible combinations of the key factors that are analysed.

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The number of combinations will often tend to exceed the number of cases in a comparative analysis, especially if the units of analysis are European countries that are members of the EU. Hence, while the number of cases should not be too large, it should certainly not be too small, either. If, as in our case, the number of cases is limited to three countries – Denmark, England and France – we will have to give up the ambition of assessing the prevalence of different national models. In order to be able to answer the crucial question about the impact of the national governance networks on the translation of the EGLs into the NAPs and subsequently into national policies through a comparative analysis of Denmark, England and France, we need a combination of descriptive and evaluative data. We need adequate descriptions of how the NAP procedure is structured in the three countries: Which actors are involved? How are they involved and in relation to which part of the policy process? We also need evaluations of the impact on the EGLs on different aspects of the NAPs and the impact of the NAPs on the national employment policies. The descriptive data can be provided by policy documents, observational studies, etc., whereas the evaluative data is best provided through qualitative interviews. However, the initial problem in comparative country studies is that the researcher will often have a limited knowledge about what goes on in the different countries that are to be compared. Since the study of democratic network governance requires a relatively detailed knowledge about structures, processes and political contexts, this is a serious problem and a great barrier in conducting studies of this kind. In order to overcome this barrier, we have in this pilot study commissioned a number of national experts in the field of employment policy to write a series of country reports that aim to answer a series of questions pertaining to our basic research questions. Expert reports do not constitute an independent social scientific method, but should rather be seen as a sort of written informant interview that serves to open up a new field of research by offering a quick, accessible and reliable account of the key features of the policy area in question. However, it can also be used as a data source in its own right in the later analysis where the empirical findings can be triangulated with findings based on other types of data. The advantage of expert reports in the initial phases of a new research project is that they provide an easy and cost-efficient access to reliable information and qualified evaluations that might be difficult to find elsewhere. If you are a stranger to a particular policy area, or country, the information provided by expert reports is extremely valuable. The empirical findings can be

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further elucidated in subsequent interviews and document studies and extracts from expert reports can be used directly in the analysis of the substantive research questions. The ‘question-and-answer’ format of the expert reports means that the coding of their contents in relation to the analytical dimensions is easily done. An obvious disadvantage of expert reports is that it might be difficult to identify the right experts and motivate them to write a country report, especially if the questions are not merely factual ones, but require personal reflections and assessments. In order to find the various experts and assess their knowledge, status and proximity to the policy field, Internet searches are extremely helpful, and although most experts are well-paid, a small honorarium might provide an incentive for the experts to write a lengthy report of high quality. Another problem with expert reports is that the questions that the experts are asked to answer might be too open, too difficult or too culturally biased to provide valid and reliable answers. Hence, if the questions are too open, the experts will give different kinds of answers that are difficult to compare, or even to understand properly. If the questions are too difficult in the sense of asking for information that is not readily available or asking for assessment of highly complex rules or processes, the experts might not answer, or provide insufficient and incorrect answers. Last but not least, if the questions are heavily dependent on the national and cultural framework within which they are formulated, they might be difficult to understand and answer by experts from other countries and cultures who might end up answering a question that is completely different from the one that was asked. Finally, the experts might provide some rather idiosyncratic and politically biased answers, even to the most straightforward questions. You never know exactly who you are asking and how the answers that are provided will be tainted by personal, professional, organizational or political norms and interests. The problem is quite big since a biased expert report might send the researcher off in a wrong direction, and the costs of getting back on track might be very high. On the other hand, an expert report that goes against knowledge obtained through other channels might help the researcher to ask interesting and critical questions in the subsequent research. However, the problem is that, initially, one does not know whether the expert report is biased or not. The immediate solution to this problem is to commission several independent reports from the same country and compare them with each other. Later on, the bias of the expert reports can be checked through a triangulation with data obtained by other methods.

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A critical assessment of the use of expert reports

The commissioning of comparative expert reports is a method that is frequently used by government departments and institutes for applied policy analysis that aims to survey the policies of other countries in order to assess the scope for handling a particular policy problem. Hence, when the Danish Ministry of Labour, at the beginning of the 1990s, contemplated changing the Danish unemployment benefit system, and reduce the take-up period, a comparative survey of the unemployment benefit systems in other Western countries was made in order to show how overly generous the character of the Danish system was. In order to gather that sort of information, the commissioning of country reports written by national policy experts is an excellent method. Research institutes evaluating specific policy programmes in order to advise the policy-makers about possible reforms frequently use expert reports to compare their national policy programmes with similar programmes in other countries. However, in academic research, expert reports are seldom used as they are, presumably, considered a poor substitute for indepth studies based on more authoritative data sources. This is a pity as some of the advantages of expert reports in terms of providing a fast and accessible source of reliable information and evaluations are lost. Expert reports will often be able to save academic researchers some valuable time and energy during the initial phase of a new comparative research project. Hence, they should not be discarded as ‘unscientific’, but rather be used and handled with care. The procedure for the commissioning of expert reports that we planned to follow in the present study of network-based policy-making consisted of seven steps: 1. A number of policy experts from different countries were selected on the basis of an Internet-based assessment of their knowledge of the governance network in question. For each country, two different kinds of experts were selected (an academic and an executive civil servant) in order to be able to validate their answers through an assessment of their consistency. The experts were kindly asked if they could help us by writing a country report on the specific topic. If they declined, they were asked to recommend other experts in the field. 2. A minimal amount of background information about the networkbased policy process was gathered in order to be able to formulate some relevant questions that the experts would be able to understand and answer.

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3. A number of descriptive, analytical and evaluative questions were formulated. Often expert reports are based on a lot of rather descriptive questions, but in case of the predominance of analytical and evaluative questions, the total number of questions should be limited to about seven to nine in order not to place too large a burden on the experts. 4. The experts were briefed about the research project, the procedure for writing and submitting their reports and the subsequent use of these. The experts were also sent an electronic file with the questions and clear instructions with regard to the expected length and depth of their answers. 5. After several reminders the expert reports were collected and stored in an electronic data archive. 6. After a quick reading the experts were contacted to clarify queries. 7. The analysis of the expert reports with regard to differences and similarities began. The procedures for the commissioning of expert reports often take the form of tacit knowledge. However, by making the procedure explicit, it becomes possible to assess the actual procedure in the light of the planned procedure and spot some of the unforeseen problems that we experienced in relation to the different steps. The first step was to identify and select the experts. Here we drew up an initial list of academic experts on the basis of literature references and personal homepages. We had four to five candidates from each country, but whereas the first academic experts that we approached in Denmark and France immediately accepted our invitation to write a country report, we soon ran out of British candidates and had to find two more before we finally succeeded in making an agreement. We then asked the three academic experts to name a non-academic expert from each country and that proved to be very helpful, at least in relation to Denmark and France, but the method carried the risk that the academic experts would name non-academic experts from the public administration whom they knew very well and who held more or less the same views as themselves. In Denmark and France, the executive civil servants we approached asked whether they could do the country report together with another equally qualified colleague. As we thought that this would help to increase the reliability of the answers, we agreed. The Danish civil servants subsequently informed us that their country report would be considered an official ministerial report, and that meant that it would not contain any personal comments or evaluations, but only the ‘official

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story’. We were forced to accept that, although it would clearly result in a less interesting and informative report. Both the academic and nonacademic experts were offered an honorarium of 350 euros each. Everybody accepted the payment, except two of the non-academic experts who could not receive any payment because their co-authored report had an official status and writing it was a part of their job. The next step was to gather enough background information to be able to ask some interesting and relevant questions. Reading a few policy documents and research reports convinced us that network governance was a central feature of the national NAP procedures, but we were not sure that the experts would know exactly what we meant by ‘network governance’. Therefore, we decided that we would ask questions about ‘the involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors’ instead and leave it to the experts to define the form and character of this involvement and to label it as they wished. The third step was to formulate the questions to be answered by the three academic and the three non-academic experts. Although most of the questions were more evaluative than descriptive, we ended up with 12 questions which are a few too many. However, three of the questions were actually part of a larger question that was subdivided to increase precision, so the total number seems acceptable. The questions are to be found in Table 4.1. The first two questions were concerned with the influence of the EGLs and the peer review process on the NAPs. The idea was to get a brief assessment of the vertical and horizontal policy transfers from the transnational to the national level. The next three questions were concerned with the official strategy for involving the social partners and other relevant actors on the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAP. We thought it would be interesting to hear whether there was an official strategy for the formation of governance networks, or whether governance networks are developing through a more uncoordinated process and a series of ad hoc decisions. The sixth question asked for an assessment of the path-dependent character of the strategies for involving social partners and other actors in the NAP procedure. We wanted to know whether there was a specific political or institutional background for the particular form and functioning of the governance networks in the three countries. The next three questions were concerned with how much the different network actors were involved, how their involvement develops over time and how they influence the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAPs. Questions 10 and 11 were concerned with the effect of the national governance

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Table 4.1

Questions answered by experts in country reports

1. How and to what extent is the National Action Plan for employment (NAP) 2003/2004 influenced by the EU employment guidelines? 2. Are there elements in the NAP 2003/2004 that are inspired by the way things are done in other EU member states? Please give examples. 3. To what extent is there an official strategy at the national level for involving the social partners and other relevant actors in the formulation of the NAP? 4. To what extent is there an official strategy at the national level for involving the social partners and other relevant actors in the implementation of the NAP? 5. To what extent is there an official strategy at the national level for involving the social partners and other relevant actors in the evaluation of the NAP? 6. What is the political and institutional background for the presence or absence of the strategies for involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors at the national level? 7. Which public, semi-public and private actors are actually involved in the formulation of the NAP 2003/2004? How much are the different actors involved and in which phases of the policy process? 8. Is the trend moving towards more or less involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors in the governance of the NAP? Why is this the case? 9. How and to what extent are the actors involved in contributing to the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAP? 10. What are the positive and negative effects of the involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors for the quality and effectiveness of the national employment policy initiatives reported in the NAP? 11. What are the democratic problems and potentials of involving the social partners and other relevant actors in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the national employment policy initiatives reported in the NAP? 12. What are the political, institutional and discursive effects of the NAP in your country?

networks. What are the positive and negative effects in relation to effective and democratic governance? The last question concerned the political, institutional and discursive effects of the NAP and aimed to assess the value of participation in governance networks. The questions were formulated in the early phase of the research project and some of the formulations later proved to be misleading, or at best unclear. In question 1 the precise meaning of ‘influence’ is unclear. It can be taken to mean that the NAP is formally structured by the EGLs, that the policies reported in the NAP are in line with the EGLs, or that the policies that are reported in the NAP are influenced by the EGLs. The

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experts are clearly a little confused about the exact interpretation of the question, but their answers tend to cover most of the possible meanings of ‘influence’. In questions 4 and 11 there is misleading use of the notion of ‘implementation’. Given its status as a reporting document, the NAP itself is not meant to be implemented. It is only the policies reported in the NAP that are implemented. Two of the experts commented on the misleading phrasing of the question, but ended up answering it in the way it was intended. Finally, in questions 10 and 11 it is unclear what exactly we meant by effective and democratic governance. It is entirely up to the experts to interpret and define what ‘effectiveness’ and ‘democracy’ mean in relation to network governance. We should no doubt have specified what we meant by these key terms. On the other hand, it is interesting to see how the experts interpret effectiveness and democracy within their particular national, academic and professional contexts. The fourth step was to brief the experts about the country reports they had agreed to write. The briefing was done via e-mail and was kept very short. The experts were told that the research project focused on the network governance of employment policy at the national and local levels and then asked them to answer the 12 questions that were listed in the attachment to the e-mail. The experts were also told that we expected the country reports to be six to ten pages long. Finally, a deadline of two months for returning the country reports was set. The experts were encouraged to contact us if they had questions about the country report, and the fact that nobody contacted us might indicate that the briefing was adequate and precise. The next step was to collect the country reports and that was not without problems. We received half of the expert reports within one to two weeks after the deadline, but the rest arrived three months after the deadline. The late arrival was problematic as the expert reports were supposed to open up the field of study and provide a first-hand impression of the national governance networks and their influence on the NAPs. So, unfortunately, some of the interviews with the national network actors ended up being conducted before we had received all the country reports. The sixth step was to discuss queries in relation to the expert reports with the experts. Due to the late arrival of some of the expert reports no queries were raised in relation to the first reading that served to provide input for the interviews with central network actors from the three countries. Commitments to work on other parts of the pilot study meant that the present comparison of the answers provided by the

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expert reports began only nine months after the reception of the first expert reports. Because of the large time gap the number of queries was kept at a minimum in order not to bother the experts too much with things that might be deeply buried in their memory. The decision to limit the number of queries is highly questionable since the experts might have seen our queries as a way of providing positive feedback and our understanding of the answers could have been improved by a larger number of queries. The final step was to analyse and compare the six expert reports in relation to the basic research questions. Here it is striking how the quality of the expert reports varies with the type of experts (see section 4.5). The expert reports are generally of a relatively high quality, but in terms of the length and detail of the answers provided the reports written by the academic experts are of a higher quality. This might be explained by the fact that emphasis was put on evaluative rather than descriptive questions, thus favouring the academic experts who are better trained to answer that kind of question and freer than the non-academic experts to express their opinions. So, although we followed the steps we had planned to follow, the actual procedure was not without problems. However, it is our firm belief that the problems that we encountered could have been solved by a more careful design, and none of them seems to invalidate the use of expert reports as such.

4.4

How should expert reports be analysed?

When expert reports are used in the initial phase of a comparative research project, they might significantly shape the researchers’ impressions and hypotheses about the object of their analysis. Therefore, it is very important that the expert reports can be trusted. In our case, the knowledge, status and central position of the experts clearly helped to guarantee their credibility. The academic experts are university professors who have published widely on the subject and the non-academic experts are executive civil servants who are, or have been, in charge of coordinating the formulation of the NAPs. In short, the experts are ‘subjects supposed to know’. Still, their country reports might be slightly biased, either due to an unconscious wish to present things as being more coherent, rational and rosy than they actually are, or due to a conscious wish to promote a particular view of the NAP procedure based on a particular academically or politically motivated opinion about the OMC and the NAP procedure. Even the experts’ expert can be guilty of

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either rationalizing or politicizing. In fact, the idea of a completely objective country report written by a neutral expert observer is a myth. Observations and assessments are tainted by personal, organizational, professional or political norms and interests. What we say and write is always conditioned by particular discourses. However, this does not disqualify the use of expert reports which are neither more nor less biased than data acquired through policy reports, interviews, observation or diaries. Expert reports provide personal accounts of rules, events, processes and mechanisms and they can be trusted to provide accurate pictures of how knowledgeable and centrally placed actors perceive things. Different experts from the same country might produce different pictures of the same phenomena and large discrepancies will urge us to look for explanations of the different views and stimulate our curiosity as to how other types of data can help us to determine further what is going on. When analysing the six expert reports that we have collected, we followed a simple two-step procedure. First, we compared the two expert reports from each country with each other in order to assess their quality and consistency and establish a general picture of the networkgoverned policy process in each country. Then we divided the 12 questions into six small groups and compared the answers to the six issues across the three countries. The goal of the stepwise comparison of the six issues was to formulate some tentative hypotheses for further analysis. In order to understand the answers provided in the expert reports better, we drew on relevant background knowledge about the three countries when needed. Context certainly matters when interpreting the interpretations of the national policy experts.

4.5

Assessing and analysing expert reports

Expert reports are supposed to provide reliable information and qualified evaluations about the issues in question and their quality should be judged accordingly. If there is more than one expert report from each country, it is possible to assess their consistency by comparing their answers. Since this is the case here, we shall begin the analysis with a brief assessment of the quality and consistency of the three pairs of expert reports. The quality of the two Danish expert reports varies considerably. Whereas the academic expert provided long and detailed answers to all of the 12 questions, the report by the non-academic experts clearly suffers from its status of being an ‘official report’. Hence, it is only half the

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requested length and the answers are brief, factual and in one case even missing. As for the content of the answers, there is a lot of overlap between the two expert reports and hardly any disagreements. In fact, there is only one minor disagreement in relation to the second question about the inspiration from other countries (i.e. from the peer review process), where the academic expert claims that, according to his knowledge, there is none, and the non-academic experts claim that the Danish government has been inspired by Dutch employment policy in strengthening the role of private firms in the local delivery of employment policy. The two expert reports tend to supplement each other on various points. For example, the academic expert provides a detailed account of the social partners’ influence on the formulation and implementation of active employment policy at the local, regional and national levels and he also offers a lengthy account of a new governance reforms which he believes will reduce the social partners’ influence on the political priorities and resource allocations at the regional level (questions 3 and 4). Likewise, the non-academic experts provide valuable information about how the social partners have been invited to participate in strategic discussions about how to design the NAP procedure in the light of the new Lisbon strategy (question 9). The non-academic experts answered ‘no comment’ to the question about the democratic problems and potentials of the inclusion of the social partners and other relevant actors. A qualified guess is that they have considered the question to be too normative to be answered by two civil servants in an official report. Fortunately, the academic expert has no problems offering his reflections on the democratic implications. So, all in all, the two expert reports provide a fairly broad and consensual picture of the network-governed NAP procedure in Denmark. Also, the English expert reports differ in quality. The academic expert report is a result of thorough research and includes references to different policy reports, phone calls and personal conversations. It provides long and detailed answers to all the questions. The report by the nonacademic expert is half the length of the academic expert report and the answers are short and relatively formal and do not really contain any personal or political evaluations, despite the fact that the report does not have any official status. Instead of answering the questions that were listed on the electronic file, it reformulates the questions with the result that several questions end up being answered in the same way. All the questions are answered, but the question about the democratic implications of network governance is answered by a brief account of democratic policy-making in and around the British Parliament. That

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was not exactly what we were looking for, but it merely shows how difficult it is to pose that kind of normative question to a civil servant. As for the content of the two expert reports, they tend to agree on who the main partners are and how they are involved in the formulation of the English NAP. They also agree that there is very little public awareness about the NAP and the EES. The report by the non-academic expert is supplemented by the academic report on two crucial points. Whereas the former merely describes who is involved and how in the NAP procedure, the latter claims that there is no official strategy for the inclusion of the social partners and other relevant actors and notes that this has been criticized by the EU in its recommendations to the British government. In relation to the question of the political and institutional background, the academic expert’s report also emphasizes that the institutionalized tripartite consultations during the Labour governments in the 1970s were abandoned by Conservative governments in the 1980s and have not been restored by the New Labour governments in the 1990s, although consultations with the social partners have increased slightly. The non-academic expert does not deal with this at all. There are two significant disagreements between the two expert reports. The first concerns the involvement of ‘other relevant actors’. The non-academic expert claims that the government aims to engage with the widest possible range of partners, whether business groups, trade unions, the voluntary sector, non-profit organizations, community groups and others. This is strongly contested by the academic expert who claims that only the social partners are actively involved in the formulation of the NAP, despite the fact that unofficial reports indicate hundreds of potentially relevant organizations and partners. The second disagreement concerns the impact of the EES and the EGLs on English employment policy, which is a highly controversial issue considering the strong Euroscepticism present in the UK. The disagreement is threefold. The non-academic expert, who represents the government, claims that the British NAP lives up to the guidelines, but is not influenced by them. In addition, he claims that although the government is committed to learning from other countries, it has nothing to learn since the UK had formulated a well-developed employment strategy prior to the EES. The academic expert report questions all three claims. First, it is claimed that the British NAP does not share the overarching aims of the EES, since contrary to the intentions of the EES, the British government aims to replace welfare with workfare and thus believes that employment is the only route to social inclusion. Second, it is noted that the British government has been forced to respond to the EU’s recommendation to

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reduce the unacceptably high gender wage gap. Finally, it is claimed that the British government has actually adopted several key terms from the various EU documents and discussions with other EU countries. A good example are the notions of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, which are now widely used in official government documents. Hence, it is possible to find signs of mutual learning. Despite the significant disagreements and the uneven quality, the factual observations of the non-academic expert and the evaluative claims of the academic expert together provide an informative account of the network-based interaction between the guidelines, the NAP and the national employment policy. Both of the French expert reports are of a relatively high quality. They are quite long and provide elaborate and reflexive answers to all the 12 questions, except for brief answers to the two questions about the positive and negative effects of the involvement of network actors. In terms of the content of the answers, there is a lot of overlap and hardly any disagreement between the two reports. They both agree that the NAP is structured by and follows the guidelines, although not without some ‘window dressing’ in terms of inclusion of policies normally considered to have nothing to do with employment policy. They provide identical accounts of which actors are included and excluded in the consultations and of how the actors who are included are involved in the formulation of the NAP. They also agree that the influence of the social partners is limited, as the governance network is mainly about consultation rather than negotiation or co-decision-making. Finally, they agree that the effects of the NAP are mainly to be found at the level of discourse, although some political and institutional effects can be identified. The two expert reports supplement each other in many respects. There are two significant examples of this. First, while the two experts agree that there are a few instances where French employment reforms can be said to be inspired by experiences drawn from other countries, they give different examples of this. Moreover, the academic expert claims that quite often policy changes are opportunistically presented in the NAP as being inspired by experiences from other countries, or the EES, while, in fact, they are results of national learning processes or long-term pressures from the OECD and international debates within mainstream economics. Second, the two experts tend to agree that the increasing role of the Committee for Social Dialogue about European and International Questions (CDSEI) is a part of a conscious strategy for involving the social partners, that the social partners are generally involved in the formulation of the policies reported in the NAP, and that they have been increasingly involved in the evaluation of the NAP. To this, the

Jacob Torfing Table 4.2

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Assessment of the quality and consistency of expert reports

Quality Consistency

Danish reports

English reports

French reports

Differs High

Differs Low

Equally high High

non-academic expert adds that the participation of the social partners is made difficult partly by their internal conflicts and partly by the fact that the NAP is the government’s reporting of policies already passed. There is not much room for negotiation and bargaining in relation to the NAP. The result of our brief assessment of the quality and consistency of the expert reports is summarized in Table 4.2. The Danish and British expert reports differ in quality, whereas the quality is equally high in both of the French expert reports. However, they all provide valuable information and insights. The Danish and French expert reports are highly consistent, whereas the English reports contain two significant disagreements. In both cases, the position of the non-academic expert seems to be a result of a more or less conscious political censorship. Hence, it seems to be difficult for the British civil servant to admit any cases of ‘influence from Brussels’ and it is equally difficult for him to admit the failure to include relevant NGOs. As such, it is tempting to see the non-academic expert’s contrasting views as a corrective to the report of the non-academic expert. However, rather than siding, prematurely, with the academic expert, we shall treat conflicting views as open questions that can only be settled through further analysis and triangulation with other forms of data. Having completed the assessment of the quality and consistency of the expert reports, we can now turn to the analysis of their contents. The basic idea of commissioning a series of expert reports from different countries is to compare the answers they give to different research questions in order to get a picture of differences and similarities among the countries. The comparison of expert reports is often done through the construction of a synoptic table where the policy-makers can get a quick overview of the national peculiarities. We shall do the same here, but divide the synoptic table into five small tables that will be briefly commented on in order to derive hypotheses for further analysis. The first issue concerns the vertical and horizontal metagovernance of the NAPs (questions 1 and 2). The idea is to get the experts to assess the extent to which the EU succeeds in influencing the NAPs by means of the EGLs and the peer review process. The answers provided by the experts from the three countries are summarized in Table 4.3.

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Table 4.3

The EU’s metagovernance of the NAPs

Denmark

England

France

The Danish NAP is structured by the EGLs

The British NAP is structured by the EGLs

The French NAP is structured by the EGLs

The 2004 Joint Employment Report states that the Danish NAP is generally in line with the EGLs

The British NAP claims to be in line with the EGL, but that is contested by one of the experts

The French NAP is judged to be in line with the EGL, but there is considerable window dressing

There are no examples of policy changes in response to the recommendations from the EU

There are two examples of policy change in response to the recommendations from the EU: reduction of gender pay gap and involvement of social partners

No comments on responses to recommendations, but examples of influence from the EGLs (causalities remain blurred)

One of the experts gives an example of inspiration from the other countries: more contracting out

One of the experts gives an example of inspiration from the other countries: greater focus on inclusion

There are several examples of policy learning: local job centres, pension reform, and more contracting out

The comparison seems to indicate that the EGLs and the peer review process have some influence on the national policies reported in the NAPs. The NAPs are structured by the EGLs, and are generally in line with them. Except in Denmark, there are examples of policy responses to recommendations and EGLs. In all three countries, there are examples of inspiration from other countries. The rosy picture of the possibility of ‘soft guidance’ of the national employment policies through the EGLs and the peer review process is contested by the remarks of one of the French experts who claims that there is a good deal of ‘window dressing’ in the NAPs as ruptures in the national policy-making are hidden and disparate policies are cited in reference to particular EGLs. Moreover, the NAPs often pretend that new policies are inspired by the recommendations of the EES or by the policies in other EU countries. There is no reason to believe that these serious caveats do not apply to the Danish and English cases as well. In fact, this is confirmed by the policy documents and the research interviews. Nevertheless, the comparison permits us to hypothesize that there is a small, but significant impact of the both EGLs and the peer review process on the three countries’ NAPs.

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Table 4.4 Involvement of various network actors in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAP Denmark

England

France

There is an implicit national consensus about the need to involve the social partners in employment policy and their participation is relatively institutionalized

There is no national strategy for involving any network actors in employment policy and the actual involvement of the social partners is not institutionalized, but takes place on an ad hoc basis

The institutional body for tripartite consultation, CDSEI, was established as a part of an official strategy for the involvement of the social partners

The social partners and at least one civil society actor are involved in the formulation of the NAP: they participate in meetings and make written contributions

The social partners (only) are involved in the formulation of the NAP: they participate in meetings and make written contributions

The social actors (only) are involved in the formulation of the NAP: they participate in meetings and make written contributions

Both the social partners and civil society actors are involved in the regional and local implementation of most of the policies reported in the NAP through mandatory governance networks

Voluntary organizations and private firms are involved in the local implementation of employment policy, but the social partners are only involved in regional and local skills development

The implementation of employment policy is mainly undertaken by government agencies (though some devolution has occurred) and the social partners are not really involved in the regional and local implementation of employment policy

No comments on the involvement of the social partners in the meetings with the EU Commission where the NAP is evaluated. There has been no national evaluation of the Danish NAP

The social partners are invited to participate in the meetings with the EU Commission where the NAP is evaluated. There has been no national evaluation of the British NAP

The social partners are invited to participate in the meetings with the EU Commission and have been increasingly involved in the national evaluation of the French NAP

The second issue concerns the presence of an official strategy for involving the social partners and other relevant actors in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the NAPs (questions 3–5). The result of the comparison of the three countries is shown in Table 4.4. The comparison

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indicates that Denmark and France are more committed than England to involving the social partners in institutionalized governance networks. However, the social partners are involved in the formulation of the NAP in all three countries. In relation to the local and regional implementation, the social partners are only involved in Denmark, whereas in England the local networks include semi-autonomous government agencies, private contractors and civil society actors and in France they merely include public and semi-public actors. Other data sources confirm that the social actors in Denmark also participate in the meetings with the EU Commission about the draft recommendations, so this is the same in all three countries. However, only in France do we find national evaluation procedures with involvement of the social partners. On the basis of these findings, we might hypothesize that the involvement of the social partners is found in varying degrees in all three countries, with Denmark at the top followed by France and then England. With regard to the EU’s ambition of integrating other relevant actors there still seems to be a long way to go in all three countries, with the exception of England at the local level where there is a liberal tradition for the involvement of voluntary organizations and community groups. The third issue concerns the political and institutional background for the involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors, and thus touches on the importance of the historical and societal context and the whole question of the path-dependency of network governance (question 6). A comparison of the three expert reports gives the results displayed in Table 4.5. The answers provided by the expert reports suggest that the political and institutional context has a significant impact on the form and functioning of governance networks at different levels and in different countries. As such, two hypotheses can be formed. The first is that a long and relatively strong corporatist tradition and a government committed to the inclusion of societal actors in the policy-making process tends to favour the formation of national governance networks with a relatively high degree of institutionalization. At least, that seems to be the case in both Denmark and France. The second hypothesis concerns the local level and here there seems to be a relation between the institutional fragmentation of the public sector and the composition of the local governance networks. As such, the hypothesis is that the more fragmented public policy delivery is at the local level, the more the public actors will tend to dominate the governance network. Hence, in France, where the institutional fragmentation is high, the local governance network is

Jacob Torfing Table 4.5

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The political and institutional background

Denmark

England

France

There is a strong corporatist tradition for responsible involvement of the social partners that is particularly pronounced in the field of employment policy

There is a weak corporatist tradition that was completely destroyed by the Conservative government in the 1980s and has not been rebuilt by the New Labour government

There is a long tradition for corporatist involvement with a selected range of actors, but there are many conflicts between the social partners and they do not like to take responsibility for public policy

The current liberal government is also committed to the involvement of the social actors, but the new governance reforms decrease their influence at the local and regional levels

The current New Labour government has strengthened the involvement of the social partners in a few areas, and it claims that it aims to engage the widest possible range of actors in social partnerships

The current liberal government has committed itself to policy consultations with the social partners at the national level, but there is still a strong tradition of centralized governance by the state

There is an increasingly unified system for policy delivery at the local level and the social partners are supposed to play an active role in policy implementation

There is a certain fragmentation of agencies, programmes and actors at the local level that calls for coordination between public and semi-public agencies

There is a very high degree of fragmentation in the local policy delivery that calls for horizontal and vertical coordination between the various public and semi-public agencies

completely preoccupied with interorganizational coordination among the public and semi-public agencies. In England, where we find considerable fragmentation, there is a predominance of public agencies, but also some room for private contractors and civil society organizations. Finally, in Denmark, where there is little fragmentation, we find a strong focus on the inclusion of the social partners and the enhancement of their programme responsibility through active engagement in local policymaking and policy implementation. The fourth issue concerns the composition of the national governance networks and their development and impact on the NAPs (questions 7–9). The experts’ answers to the questions about this issue are summarized in Table 4.6. The experts carefully describe the actors participating in the national governance network, but they do not comment on the

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Table 4.6 The composition, development and impact of the national governance networks Denmark

England

France

The governance network mainly consists of the relevant ministries and different sets of employer and wage earner organizations, but the local governments and one civil society organization are also represented. The Danish Parliament is not actively involved in its formulation

The governance network mainly consists of the relevant ministries, but also involves the social partners through a formal consultation procedure. Inputs from other relevant actors are – with limited success – obtained via the Internet. The British Parliament is not actively involved in its formulation

The governance network mainly consists of the relevant ministries and a selected group of social partners. The regional and local delivery agencies and civil society organizations are not represented in the national network. The French Parliament is not actively involved in its formulation

The governance network has been relatively stable, but the channels of influence have become further institutionalized, the Association of Handicap Organizations has been included and the National Employment Council has obtained the right of consultation

The consultation process has been relatively stable, but there is increasing recognition of the need to give more room to the social partners and to broaden participation. A certain spillover effect is observed as the number of tripartite bodies has increased in other areas

The governance networks have been relatively stable, but there is a trend towards an increasing and broader involvement of the social partners (some of whom are quite sceptical) and the local delivery agencies have an increasing influence on the content of the policies reported in the NAP

The social partners and other relevant actors gain influence on the NAP through formal meetings, written contributions and hearings as well as through informal meetings and contacts

The social partners’ channels of influence are restricted to formal meetings and written contributions

The social partners’ channels of influence are mainly formal meetings and written contributions

degrees of involvement and relative influence of the different network actors. That might have been too difficult for the experts to assess. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that can be formulated on the basis of the comparison of the pattern of inclusion and exclusion is that the relevant

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ministries and the social partners constitute the core of the governance networks. However, at the same time, there seems to be a general trend towards a stronger involvement of the social partners (at least in England and France) and a broadening of the network to include other relevant actors. A hypothesis might be that this trend is a result of pressures from the EU Commission to expand the social partnership model. In terms of the channels of influence, the hypothesis is that in countries with a long and strong corporatist tradition, where there is a high degree of trust and the barriers between the public and private organizations have become blurred, the governance network will not only be stronger, but also rely more on informal meetings and contacts (at least that is the case in Denmark). The fifth issue concerns the contribution of network-based policy consultations to an effective and democratic governance (questions 10–11). Governance networks at different levels may have an impact on the effectiveness of public governance and will certainly have consequences for our democracy. The answers provided by the experts in relation to these crucial effects are summarized in Table 4.7. It is remarkable that none of the experts refer to any negative aspects of governance networks, such as cognitive closure, internal conflict, or unclear and muddy compromise. One of them quotes the social partners in France as saying that it takes a lot of time, energy and resources to participate in the national governance network, but that problem does not impinge on the effectiveness of the public governance produced in and through networks, although it might prevent the broad inclusion of social actors. When we look at and compare the experts’ lists of the positive contributions of networks to effective governance, the British and to some extent also the French experts are rather modest in their appraisal of the contributions of the national governance networks, whereas the Danish experts reckon that governance networks can help to improve public governance at all stages: formulation, implementation and evaluation. The hypothesis here is that the more extensively governance networks are used, the larger their positive contribution to effective governance. In relation to the question of the democratic implication of network governance, the answers are generally quite ‘thin’. However, in sharp contrast to the comments about the effectiveness of governance networks, they seem to make a point of balancing the positive and negative consequences of network governance for democracy. The positive contribution of networks to democratic governance is that they tend to increase the participation of social actors on the output side of the political system, whereas the negative contributions are their illegitimate exclusions of relevant policy actors and the lack of

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Table 4.7

Effective and democratic governance

Denmark

England

France

The network-based involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors helps to identify and define policy problems, enhances programme responsibility, and strengthens the monitoring of the results

The network-based involvement of the social partners may help to identify and define policy problems, promote new policy initiatives, and stimulate discussions of different policies

The network-based involvement of the social partners at the national level helps to improve implementation by enhancing programme responsibility. At the local level, governance networks help to get funding from the EU

Governance networks add an element of direct participation on the output side of the political system, but this may come into conflict with representative democracy where voters, parties and government are the key actors

Involvement of the social partners and other relevant actors helps to make neglected groups visible, but the problem is the lack of representativeness of some of the NGOs

The democratic gains in terms of increasing the participation of relevant and affected groups are countered by the problem of exclusion of many relevant actors from the network-based consultation process

representativeness of some of the included actors, especially some of the NGOs. A hypothesis for further investigation is that governance networks will lead to a more effective and democratic governance in so far as the problems in terms of illegitimate exclusions and the lack of representativeness are solved through a proper metagovernance of the network by the political authorities. The last issue concerns the question of the impact of the NAP on the national employment policies in the three countries. Since the NAPs are merely reporting policies that have already been passed by the national parliament and implemented by the government, we should not expect it to function as a blueprint for national policy-making. Nevertheless, the NAPs might have different political, institutional and discursive effects on the national policy fields. The experts’ assessments of these effects are summarized in Table 4.8. It seems clear that the NAP itself has very limited effects. There are some institutional effects in France and England where a new consultative

Jacob Torfing Table 4.8

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Political, institutional and discursive effects of the NAP

Denmark

England

France

There are some political and discursive effects as issues from the NAP have been taken up in the collective wage negotiations and the NAP is being discussed in the National Employment Council, which is a tripartite body advising the Minister of Employment on policy reforms

Political effects are limited Political effects are by the lack of public limited by the lack of knowledge of the NAP public knowledge of the NAP There is an institutional effect as the tripartite NAP procedure has no exact parallel in British government circles and seems to have triggered a slow and hesitant return to long-abandoned practices

There is an institutional effect as the existing tripartite consultation body, CDSEI, has become completely overhauled by its new function of organizing the social partners’ involvement in the NAP

There are some discursive effects as the NAP has spurred the import of new notions of ‘inclusion’ and ‘employability’ into the British policy discourse

There are some discursive effects as the NAP has spurred the recent French discussions about the Danish model of ‘flexicurity’

practice has been established as a part of the NAP process. There are also some limited political and discursive effects. The hypothesis that can be derived is that the most important hindrance to larger political and discursive effects is the lack of public interest in, and discussion of, the NAPs.

4.6

Lessons learned

The analysis presented above shows that systematic comparisons of country reports written by academic and non-academic experts can provide an initial overview of crucial aspects of network-governed policy processes and lead to the formulation of preliminary hypotheses. As such, the use of expert reports can help us to ask informed questions in subsequent interviews with central policy actors. However, we should not forget that expert reports also provide valuable data that can be used in combination with other kinds of data when the final research results are generated. Hence, the expert reports provide information and insight not found elsewhere.

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Our comparative analysis of a limited number of cases helps us to distinguish typical from atypical phenomena, but does not permit us to make statistical generalizations on the basis of the patterns we have unveiled. Since such generalizations can only be made through extreme simplifications, the loss is not that big, and there are other forms of generalization that can be made which are more important; such as, for example, analytical generalizations about the fruitfulness of the theoretical categories informing the analysis or about the hypotheses that might deserve further attention in future research. Although the expert reports we have commissioned as a part of our pilot study have helped to provide an initial picture of national policymaking and the role of governance networks, our concrete experiences indicate that expert reports are not always an easy, quick and accessible tool for reaping important information and insights from the abundant fields of expert knowledge. It proved to be quite difficult to find knowledgeable experts willing to write a country report. Deadlines for submission of expert reports were in some cases transgressed by several months and some of the answers in the expert reports were relatively ‘thin’, or did not really answer the question that was posed. The quality of the expert reports varied a great deal, and there was considerable disagreement between the two experts on crucial issues in one of the three countries. Despite the problems specified in sections 4.3 and 4.5, the procedures for commissioning the expert reports, assessing their quality and consistency, and analysing the answers have been quite useful and can be recommended with a few caveats and amendments. Certainly, the positive evaluation of the expert report ‘method’ does not preclude the possibility for future developments of the expert report method. At least three ideas should be considered. First of all, it might be a good idea to use the expert reports as a starting point for interviews with the experts who wrote them. That will not only clarify the queries arising from reading the reports, but also help to fill in the blanks and establish an even more nuanced picture of the different issues. Another idea is to use the experts to start the snowballing interviews of the key network actors. This strategy was adopted in the French case and was very helpful. A final and more ambitious idea is to arrange an interactive seminar with all the national policy experts in order to facilitate cross-national analysis, feedback and learning. Such an event might even provide a further incentive for the experts to write a good and reliable expert report. Conceived as a method, the procedure for using expert reports can be further developed along these lines, but even without further development, it has proved itself in the present study as a helpful tool in the study of democratic network governance.

5 Document Analysis of Network Topography and Network Programmes Anders Esmark and Peter Triantafillou

5.1

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate and discuss the potentials and limitations of the use of documents in the analysis of governance networks. Our discussions and arguments are based on documents pertaining to the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the National Action Plans (NAPs) in the period 1998–2004. In broad terms, our argument is that documents are highly useful in illuminating the historical formation, continuities and shifts in the norms and rationalities informing governance networks. In contrast, the documents are less useful, or at least less efficient, in illuminating the actual interactions within networks and network participants. Before proceeding it may be worth briefly clarifying what we regard as a document. It is possible to distinguish between at least three different types of documents: (1) Physical artefacts (non-textual, non-visual), such as buildings, dams, weapons, etc.; (2) Audio-visual materials, such as radio programmes, video recordings, etc., and (3) Text materials, such as reports, books, journals, newspapers, etc. We focus on text materials only, because they are the most utilized form of document involved in the networking processes around the EES/NAP. Setting aside the introduction and the conclusion, the chapter is divided into four parts. First, we outline the strategy pursued in our analysis and how this is linked to certain research questions about network topography and network programmes. In broad terms, our mode of document reading is inspired by discourse analysis, but also by a more conventional representational approach that allows us to identify concrete actors engaged in transnational and national networks. Second, we specify in more detail how our analysis was carried out in terms of document selection, 99

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reflections on the nature of different documents, etc. Third, we reflect on some of the methodological issues raised by our attempt to uncover the network topography through the use of documents. Finally, we discuss some of the methodological issues raised by our attempt to uncover network programmes through the use of documents.

5.2

Different ways of reading documents

The decisive feature that sets documents apart from other sources is the fact that documents are already on record rather than produced in the research process. Whereas interview transcripts, questionnaire results, diaries and observation notebooks are all co-produced by the researcher, documents are bundles of information produced and stored for some other purpose than that of a particular research project. This reliance on what is already on record is both an advantage and a weakness. The primary weakness is of course that the researcher has to utilize what is already available. Thus document analysis does not allow for the custommade design of data production as do other methods, such as questionnaires, interview guides, frameworks for diary writing, etc., where data is co-produced by the researcher and his research target. Moreover, document analysis does not provide access to the world of speech, gestures and concrete interactions. It does, however, provide access to a level of textual practice and may thereby shed light on the ways in which the texts function either as the facilitator (cause) of political and social action or as the result (effect) of such action. Depending on the ontological and epistemological position taken by the document analyst, a number of different modes of document reading can be adopted. In the pilot study, we pursued a mode of document reading that can be broadly designated as discourse-analytic. Discourse analysis, at least as in the form inspired by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida (Foucault 1974; Derrida 1976; see also Titscher et al. 2002), seeks to demonstrate the contingency and instability of social problems and identities. Methodologically speaking, discourse analysis falls within the area of structuralism and post-structuralism (Williams 1999): it seeks to uncover – and in some cases also to influence – the frames of meaning and rules of communication that constitute particular social domains. The purpose of such analysis for most discourse analysts is either ‘genealogical’ or ‘deconstructive’ in the sense that such a mode of document reading can illuminate how, over time, certain ultimately contingent and singular problems and identities become hegemonic at the expense of other possible problems and identities. It should be stressed, however, that our intention when conducting the study was

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not to conduct genealogies or deconstruction in any strict sense, but rather to probe the extent to which elements of the discourse-analytical approach could be helpful in answering research questions about network governance. The traditional counterpart to discourse analysis is the representational mode of document reading. The goal of representation is to reproduce (past or present) social practices and events as accurately as possible. Contrary to some suggestions, discourse analysis and the representational mode of reading are not in opposition on the basic issues of document research, such as the need to conduct thorough document searches, to read everything relevant, to be meticulous in dating and authorship, etc. Where discourse analysis and the representational mode of reading do part ways is rather on the question of whether to conceive of documents as an image of reality or as a level of reality in itself. For the representational mode of reading, documents are not seen as a ‘textual practice’ in themselves, but rather as a representation of the material reality of events, ideas and intentions. Thus, our reason for turning to the discourse-analytical approach is that the representational mode of reading is ill suited to showing how particular understandings, imageries, or systems of knowledge are informing and/or shaping network governance and concrete ways of acting within networks. What do we mean by the term ‘network governance’? At the most basic level, we define network governance as a mode of governing that depends upon the mutual adjustment and coordination of the selfgoverning capacities of autonomous, but interdependent actors. Network governance then is characterized by its attempt to provide an answer to the question of how (by what means) it is possible to facilitate, adjust and coordinate the self-governing capacities of actors in a way that does not encroach on their autonomy. We contrast this to ‘hierarchical steering’ which we conceive as a mode of governing that depends upon authoritative legal commands. While our focus in the document analysis is on network governance, we also touch upon hierarchical steering to the extent that it impacts or – in the case of EES – complements network governance. In short, hierarchical steering will be analysed in terms of the metagoverning of governance networks. Initially, our intention was to see just how far document analysis would allow us to go in illuminating all three groups of research questions (network, norms and democracy) described in Chapters 1 and 2. However, at some point we realized that the vast scope of these questions would make it impossible – within the limits of our project – to pursue them all in depth. We therefore decided to narrow down our focus. This was done in two steps.

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First, at the most general level, we decided to focus mainly on the historical transformation of employment policy governance and on the norms informing employment policy networks at the transnational and national levels. We simply believed that documents would have more to say about these aspects of governance networks than about the regular interactions within the network(s) or the democratic quality of (especially the internal) workings of the network. Second, in order to narrow down our focus even further, we introduced the concepts of network topography and network programmes. These concepts seek to illuminate those particular aspects of network governance that we believed would be amenable both to representational and discursive reading of documents. Network topography refers to the relative position of actors over time within the network. At one level, document reading may help to uncover who participates in networks through direct reference to actors both in terms of authorship and in terms of reference to actors other than the author in a particular document. Document studies may even yield some information about who is either excluded or outside the network – information typically considered the purview of interviews and observations. In addition to searching for concrete references to particular organizations or individuals by name, we also conducted an analysis of subject positions (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 114–22). The term ‘subject position’ is central to discourse analysis and designates the capacities in which actors may act and speak within particular frames of meaning. Whereas the mention of UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe) in a document constitutes a direct reference to an actor, the position of ‘social partner’ constitutes a subject position within a broader employment policy discourse. As such, the concept of subject position resembles the concept of ‘role’ within sociological or anthropological research – the primary difference being that the former takes discourses rather than organizations and professions to be the relevant level of analysis. In terms of network governance, the crucial question is how positions offered within a particular discursive framework resonate with the autonomy and interdependence that are deemed so crucial to network governance. Network programmes refer to institutionalized norms and logics of action as expressed in the strategies constituting the networks that we study: the problems, the ends and means, the instruments and techniques of the area of employment policy. Mapping network topography tells us something about concrete actors and the principles of network formation by which they are included – and others included – but it does not

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tell us much about the logic of action guiding the network. Following discourse analysis, such logics of action include various forms of expert knowledge such as supply-side economics, integration theory or game theory, which support employment policies in the EU. Such logics of action also depend on various techniques of registration, calculation and inscription (Latour 1987) that contribute to the making of comparable objects (such as ‘employment’ as regular and measurable phenomena) and facts (such as ‘unemployment rates’). In our analysis we distinguished between substantive norms and procedural norms. Substantive norms refer to policy strategy, i.e. the overall values, objectives and goals of a particular policy area and the policy instruments. Procedural norms, on the other hand, are the standards or sequencing defining how a policy process or a mode of policy formulation and implementation should take place. The latter type of norms is especially important in distinguishing between network governance, which is defined as a self-governing process, and hierarchical steering, which is defined by a more unilateral, centralized governing process. In our utilization of document studies in the analysis of network governance, we emphasized the historical dimension of the governing of the European employment strategy and policies. The primary strength of document studies is the possibility of tracing the object of study back through history. Document analysis need not necessarily be conducted as historical analysis, but the comparative advantage of document studies is the access to past events – sometimes even in considerable detail. To some extent, interviews and questionnaires also offer the possibility of uncovering past events. But as is well known, these methods are bounded by personal knowledge, memory and the tendency of interviewees and respondents to rationalize past events according to their own idiosyncratic interpretation. In short, no other method offers the same degree of access to the historical preconditions of current affairs. Correspondingly, document studies are very well suited to helping answer the question of network formation. Document studies afford – at least in principle – the possibility of getting close to the initial moment of network formation, the positions taken and the ideas at the genesis of a particular network. The historical dimension offered by document studies not only concerns the moment of initial formation, but also the issues of stability and change between the beginning and the end of the period of analysis. A key purpose of historical analysis has always been to identify, explain or understand the historical transformation of ideas, institutions, discourses, etc. at ‘critical junctures’ and ‘transitional stages’ of history. Stability, on the other hand, designates the periods between transformations that are marked by

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repetition, consolidation and sedimentation. Thus, document studies are well suited for helping to answer research questions about the historical development of networks in general, and in this study, the development from the late 1990s onwards of transnational, national and local networks in the area of employment policy.

5.3

Documents lost and found

When embarking on a document analysis, the initial question is obviously what type of documents to analyse. According to the representational mode of document analysis, the answer is simply that we need to gather enough sources to provide the best possible reproduction of ‘what really happened’: Who interacted, how and when? Consequently, the representational mode of reading is preoccupied with the adequacy and truthfulness of the recorded events. Furthermore, the representational mode of reading is very often preoccupied with finding private or even secret sources, based on the proposition that such sources often provide privileged access to events as they really were. Few things will please a practitioner of the traditional craftsmanship of historical analysis more than the opening of a secret archive or the discovery of a hitherto unknown private archive. Within discourse analysis, documents are not seen as sources to a reality outside of the documents of themselves, but rather as ‘monuments’ within the archive of a discourse (Foucault 1974: 130). ‘The archive’ of a discourse – or a particular period of time in the history of a discourse – is not an actual physical archive, but rather a corpus of texts deemed central to the discourse by the analyst. The crucial question is not whether the document presents a credible record of events, but rather whether the document does in fact act as a carrier of a particular discourse and if so, how effective it has been in that capacity. For the same reason, discourse analysis does not seek out secret or private documents, but rather the readily available and commonly accepted documents. Put briefly, only public sources are of interest from a discourse-analytical point of view. Furthermore, discourse analysis is not preoccupied with discovering a meaning behind the texts themselves (e.g. ‘real’ interests or intentions) or something ‘in-between the lines’. Rather, discourse analysis implies identifying and combining the key sections of the selected texts, which provide information about the analytical dimensions of discourses such as involved forms of knowledge, concepts, strategies, techniques, etc. However, even though the discourse-theoretical approach told us a good deal about the type of documents to search for, we still had to decide more

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specifically on what documents that would make it possible to shed light on the network topography and the network programme in our concrete research within the area of employment policy. To pin down the relevant documents we first had to decide on the levels of employment policy to include in the analysis. We decided to focus on the transnational and national levels (Britain, Denmark, France) and to largely ignore the local level. The reason for excluding the local level was very pragmatic: we simply did not have time to undertake a thorough analysis of the many documents covering the local level nor the space to present the results within the framework of a brief chapter like this. Secondly, we had to decide the historical period to be covered. Traces of a common European employment policy can be found all the way back to the inception of the EEC, and in particular the late 1980s and the early 1990s. We discussed the possibility of examining potential mutations in the network topography related to the Amsterdam Treaty of 1996/97 and the launching of the EES in 1997. The latter evidently marks a break with previous ways of pursuing employment policy at EU level. Although traces of employment policy can be found already in the Treaty of Rome, employment policy was simply not recognized as a policy area at the EU level before the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. However, it is not evident at all that this event changed the rationalities and norms supporting the ways in which the employment problem was framed. Nor is it evident that the adoption of the EES altered employment policies at national levels. Therefore, we saw good reasons to collect and analyse documents on these issues before 1997. However, time constraints again made us restrict our document studies to the period from 1997 to 2004. Having determined the levels and the period to be covered by the document analysis, we were now facing the challenge of deciding exactly what documents to collect at the transnational and national levels. At the level of the EU, priority was clearly given to network programmes. More specifically, the common EES was made the overall framework for document selection. In other words, documents relevant to the development of the common EES formed the basis of the study. These documents also provided some insight into the topography of the network formed in relation to the strategy, but in-depth research on network topography at the EU level was primarily carried out using the more interactive methods of producing data. As is well known to EU scholars, European law- and policy-making is flooded with different more or less formal standards of written communication, ranging from highly formalized legal sources to ‘white papers’, ‘position papers’, ‘communications’

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and ‘reports’. On top of that, constant rewriting and redefinition mean that many documents often occur in several versions. Obviously, it is not possible to turn every stone, but rather than preselecting certain documents as irrelevant, we followed the well-proven model of choosing some core documents and following the links and references from there within the usual pragmatic constraints. Our provisional shortlist of core documents included: 1. The treaty texts. However, these were swiftly dealt with. The relevant paragraphs are short and few. 2. The declarations of the European Council within the time frame, most importantly those from the meetings in Luxembourg (1997), Cardiff (1998), Cologne (1999) and Lisbon (2000). These define the overall framework of the strategy and the (very) broad policy goals. 3. The annual Council decisions/resolutions (1998 onwards) on the ‘Guidelines for Member States Employment Policies’, which set up the general means and ends of the strategy. 4. The Council recommendations on specific issues in selected member states produced from 2000 onwards. 5. The annual joint reports (1998 onwards) from the Commission and the Council on ‘Employment Policies in the EU and in the Member States’. These documents were all collected from the special homepage of the European Commission on EU employment policy. Methodologically speaking, it is worth noting that the individual interviews and focus group interviews conducted by some of the other pilot study team groups provided us with a number of unpublished and difficult-to-access documents. These included position papers, economic and statistical surveys conducted to support policy positions, etc. At the national level, we collected the following: 1. The National Action Plans for Employment from Denmark, Great Britain and France during the period 1998–2004. The NAPs were included in the compilation because we regarded them as the most fundamental documents at national level. Not only do they express the norms, goals, strategies and instruments of the national governments’ employment policies, but they also reflect the ways governments react to the guidelines, benchmarking and peer reviews organized by the Commission. Our initial assumption was that the NAP documents would provide us with extensive insights on the network programmes and some, albeit more limited, information on the network topography. As it turned

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out, the NAP documents had a lot to say about network programmes and, more surprisingly, quite a lot to say about the network topography as well. 2. Written inputs from the social partners regarding the formulation and evaluation of the NAPs in all three countries in the period 1998–2004. In the attempt to gauge the capacity of document analysis to map the network topography, we found it crucial to include the documents dealing with the NAP written by the social partners and other non-state actors. However, due to manpower constraints, we did not contact all relevant social partners in order to retrieve eventual publications by them on the NAP. Instead, in order to save manpower and time, we looked in the NAPs for inputs from the social partners. We found this a reasonable strategy in so far as direct incorporation into the text would suggest a direct influence by the social partners on the NAP. This strategy was supplemented with a more ad hoc collection from social partners who were interviewed by the other researchers in the team. 3. In Denmark only: newspaper articles reflecting the public debate on the EES and/or the NAPs. To gauge the ability of documents to shed light on some of the questions pertaining to democracy, notably on publicity and access, we decided to examine the extent to which the newspapers were dealing with the NAPs. The reason for examining only Danish newspapers was again manpower and time constraints. Needless to say, the way in which documents from the social partners were collected and the compilation of newspaper articles from Denmark put important limits on the adequacy of our analysis. In order to establish a (more) representative picture of the social partners and public media’s role in the NAP process in the three countries, a more systematic and time-consuming data collection is clearly necessary. Yet, as a means to discuss the capacity of document analysis as a method of studying network governance, we believe that the collected data is highly useful.

5.4

Analysing network topography

In this section, we discuss the capacity of the collected documents to illuminate the topography of networks within the area of employment policy. Such an enterprise implies, first, looking for direct actor references. Looking for actor references implies searching all the selected documents for concrete actors such as the European Commission, UNICE, the Department of Social Affairs, etc. The search was conducted, first, by simply reading through the documents. But in order to avoid overlooking

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references, we also used the search function in the electronic version of the documents (all documents were available in electronic format), cross-referencing documents and utilizing our prior knowledge from scientific articles on the issue and expert interviews. The search generated a valuable map of actors and their centrality for the network in terms of the frequency with which they appeared in the documents. The second step involved looking for the principles of network formation guiding the specification of interrelated subject positions. For instance, positioning ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) and UNICE as employees and employer, drawing on a labour market discourse of conflict, strikes and wage formation is vastly different from being assigned the role of social partner, drawing on a welfare discourse of common responsibility and shared understanding of necessities. Whereas the analysis of simple actor references made it possible to identify a network of cross-references, it was only through turning to the subject positions that we were able to tell whether actors were also positioned in a way congruent with network governance. In turning to the question of subject positions, we used the network map generated by the search for simple actor references and tried instead to search for the positions assigned to the identified actors such as ‘social partner’, ‘national authority’, ‘employees’, etc. In order to identify these positions, we read all the documents again paying attention to those parts where the actors identified above were mentioned. We noted what the actors themselves said and what was said about them: what strategic purpose and what capacities they were ascribing to themselves or were being attributed to them; what sort of discourse was being used in order to construe their purposes and capacities. As was the case with actor reference, our analysis was conducted both by reading through documents using electronic searches of all the documents. In the latter cases, we combined the names of the identified actors with variables suggesting network interactions, such as ‘social partners’, ‘participation’, ‘bargaining’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘agreement’. 5.4.1

The EU

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty introduced ‘a high level of employment’ as a matter of ‘common concern’ in the important article 2 and more specific provision in articles 125–130. As is always the case, however, formal changes in the treaty framework were preceded by a period of policy development in which ‘white papers’ and other documents play an important role. In this particular case, the famous Delors paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’ was quickly identified as a key document generally

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referred to as the real beginning of the period of policy development leading up to the formal inclusion of employment policy in the Amsterdam Treaty. The ideas put forward in this white paper were subsequently confirmed at the European Council meeting in Essen in 1994 and in later Council resolutions. Thus, even though the Amsterdam Treaty was established as a formal t0, key documents of the preceding period of policy development such as the Delors white paper and the conclusions of the Essen meeting had to be included. Having identified the departure point of our analysis in terms of the constitution of employment policy at the EU level, our first question was whether the Amsterdam Treaty also constituted a t0 in terms of network formation. That is, did the emergence of employment policy at the EU level imply the making of a European governance network within this policy area, and if so, what might the topography of such a network look like. The treaty text itself, however, is of little use when attempting to map the topography of governance networks. Besides the initial adherence to a high level of employment in article 2, the key text consists of title VIII, which specifies the overall objective of the policy (article 125), the role of the member states (article 126) and the EU institutions (article 217), the outline of the decision-making process (articles 128 and 129) and finally provides for the establishment of an Employment Committee (article 130). Anticipating the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (the treaty took effect in May 1999) an extraordinary ‘job summit’ was held in Luxembourg in November 1997. Essentially, the meeting was held in order to provide input to and confirm the Commission’s drafted versions of the first set of the overall employment policy guidelines and the first joint report on employment policy in the member states. In terms of actor reference, the first joint report only mentions member states. Following joint inputs from the social partners, however, more inclusive and specific principles of network formation followed. The first of these principles can be broadly designated as the ‘troika’ principle. In contrast to the treaty text, the Council resolution formally adopting the first set of employment guidelines explicitly mentions social partners as being pivotal to the success of EU employment policy. The resolution states that ‘the social partners at all levels will be involved in all stages of this approach and will make an important contribution to the implementation of these guidelines and the promotion of a high level of employment. That contribution will be regularly assessed’ (Council document 13200/97). In order to secure sufficient interaction with the social partners, the resolution states that the Council will organize regular ‘troika’ meetings every six months between the social partners, heads of state and government and

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the Commission. Thus, the troika principle constituted the original principle of network formation, assigning the role of ‘social partner’ to the labour market organizations, in this case primarily at the EU level. However, the early documents also displayed a fairly rudimentary form of the principle. In terms of network formation, the social partners are the only actors besides the EU institutions and national governments clearly identifiable in the first batch of key employment policy documents in the immediate wake of the Amsterdam Treaty. The joint report itself makes no reference to the social partners, but they are mentioned in the Council resolution. In general, the same principle is expressed in the guidelines, the recommendations and the joint reports published throughout the period under analysis. However, against this overall image of stability, a few developments should be mentioned. First, the troika principle gradually evolves into the more developed principle of ‘social dialogue’. From 1999 and onwards, reference is made to ‘intensive dialogue’ rather than troika meetings (Council Resolution 1999/C69/02). From 2000 and onwards, reference is made to the importance of the European Social Fund as well as regional and local authorities. Second, the role of ‘social partner’ is gradually extended to labour market organizations ‘at all levels’ (i.e. European, national and local). Finally, from 2001 and onwards, the principle of network formation evolves into the more inclusive ‘partnership principle’ known from regional policy, which is not limited to social partners, but also utilizes the more general position of ‘representatives of civil society’ (Council Decision 2001/63/ EC). The year 2001 also saw the Commission’s white paper on better European governance. The need for better governance was also stressed in an evaluation of the first five years of the EES carried out in 2002, which prompted a reform of the strategy in 2003. In terms of principles of network formation and actor inclusion, the only consequence of the reform was the addition of ‘a number of operational services’ to the already established principles of social dialogue and partnership with regional and local authorities (Council Decision 2003/578/EC). Thus, the analysis of network topography at the EU level made it possible to identify an original set of key actors including, besides the EU institutions themselves, national governments and social partners. The principle of network formation and role specification tying these actors together was also very explicitly discussed in the documents, originally in terms of a ‘troika’ principle. Over time, this principle was gradually refined in terms of ‘social dialogue’ and ‘partnership principle’, but without fundamentally changing the roles assigned to the actors. Thus, EU institutions, member states and municipalities are referred to, and positioned

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partly in their traditional capacity as, ‘authorities’ and ‘governments’, but are also committed to ‘dialogue’, ‘inclusion’, ‘setting targets’, ‘Common interests’, etc. Thus, our analysis clearly made it possible to identify a role congruent with network governance on the part of formal political institutions. The same holds true for the labour market organizations identified as social partners and the later other partners (civil society representatives) identified within the partnership principle. 5.4.2

Denmark

The first Danish NAP published in April 1998 does not contain any separate input from the social partners. Moreover, there is nothing in that NAP indicating that the social partners have played any significant role in its formulation. On the other hand, there are several explications of the role of the social partners in the negotiations over the general employment policies (e.g. creating a more flexible labour market, reconciling work and family), and in implementing some of the specific policies listed as part of the NAP. From 1999 onwards, the social partners have been included in the formulation of the Danish NAPs (see under Beskæftigelsesministeriet 2004) (NAP 1999: 20; see the ensuing NAPs). The partners include representatives of both employers and employees from both the private and the public sectors. The NAPs specify the particular guidelines to which the social partners have submitted contributions (ibid.: 20–1). The government’s argument for including these groups is that they are ‘central players’ in the ‘Danish labour market model’ which is based on ‘the co-operation method’ (NAP 2000: 33). This framing of the relationship between the state on the one hand, and the representatives of employers and employees on the other, in employment policy issues is articulated over and again in each of the Danish NAPs with little if any variation. Thus, the NAPs point to a persistent and strongly institutionalized norm regarding the positions of, and relations between, the state and the social partners. Apart from the representatives of the employers and the employees, the only other social partner mentioned in the formulation of the NAP is the Association of Handicapped Organizations, and they are included only from 2003 onwards (NAP 2003: 3). This sudden inclusion of representatives of disabled persons in the network is articulated as the (government’s) attempt to strengthen social cohesion and inclusion of Danish society (NAP 2003: 12–13). While this is an ambition that resonates well with the wider strategies formulated by the Commission, it is not an explicit part of any of the ten Employment Guidelines.

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The Danish NAP 2001 and the NAPs following this suggest that the private employers and employees, and the public employers and employees constitute two ‘sub-networks’. These two networks cooperate in the production of joint inputs to the NAP. The interactions within these two networks are not visible in the documents. The social partners also start contributing extensively to the NAPs in 2001. Their inputs are found both in the main text and, in full, in the appendices. While it is difficult to pin down the exact phrases influenced by the social partners, the documents leave little doubt that the partners have had significant influence on both formulating and implementing the NAP in the private, municipal and county, and state labour markets. This conclusion is corroborated by interviews presented elsewhere in this book. 5.4.3

Great Britain

From the inception of the first British NAP (see under Department of Work and Pensions 2004), the social partners were invited by the government (Department of Work and Pensions) to contribute to the NAP’s formulation. In its discussion on how to implement the overall British employment strategy, the 1998 NAP states that: ‘We cannot achieve this on our own. The social partners play a valuable role in taking forward this agenda. Both the CBI and the TUC have been consulted about the plan and have contributed to it’ (NAP 1998: 3). The credibility of this claim is reinforced by the written inputs to the NAPs from the social partners. Thus, the NAPs of 1998 and 1999 contain separate inputs from the social partners pertaining to measures to improve employability and modernize the organization of work (NAP 1998: 14–15, 31–2; NAP 1999: 15, 38). In 1999, the input from the CBI and TUC was further expanded to proposals to strengthen equal opportunity policies for women and men (NAP 1999: 42). Yet, the NAPs indicate at the same time that the character of the inclusion of social partners in the British NAP process differs substantially from those found in both Denmark and France. All the British NAPs (from 1998 to 2004) clearly testify to a much more circumscribed role for the national representatives of both the employers and the employees in policy formulation than in Denmark. The process is persistently described in all the British NAPs as one of ‘consultation’, rather than for example institutionalized (tripartite) negotiation. Thus, the CBI and TUC are heard, but qua their positioning as subjects to be consulted at the will of the government; they are not involved in any process of dialogue and argumentation. This is not to say that the CBI and TUC are wholly without influence. Allegedly, ‘the Government involves employer and employee representatives at all stages of the policy-making process, both domestic legislation and when

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implementing EU-directives’ (NAP 2003: 47). It is furthermore explained that the government has frequently asked the CBI and TUC to agree on areas of common ground by using various models, including Task Forces and detailed discussions at national and regional level. According to the government, these discussions have produced recommendations ‘which all parties have been able to endorse’ (NAP 2003: 47). The positioning of the actors in British employment policies seems to differ in yet another respect from the Danish and French cases. This difference may be glimpsed from the British NAPs’ recurrent use of the term ‘stakeholders’. In the NAP 2000, it is explained that the ‘stakeholders’ include not only the social partners, but also small business representatives, non-governmental organizations, representatives of client groups or even clients themselves (NAP 2000: 3). Thus, unlike the Danish and French NAPs, particular emphasis is put on the inclusion of small business representatives in the implementation of employment measures at regional and local levels, because their success is seen to depend on the establishment of conditions conducive for starting and developing businesses. The term ‘stakeholder’ seems to imply a different or at least broader subject position compared to that of ‘social partner’. Whereas the latter is mainly used in relation to groups participating in the design of political decision-making in order to ensure the legitimacy of public policies, the term ‘stakeholder’ refers to affected customers or interest groups both in the design and the implementation (or delivery) of policies. While the British NAPs do not explicitly define their use of the term ‘stakeholder’, it is noteworthy that the term is used over and again in relation to the efficient ‘delivery’ of employment policies (e.g. NAP 2001: 23; 2002: 40). Most recently (2004), the British government has tried to facilitate the voluntary and community sectors’ contributions to the employment strategy by linking up to the ChangeUp programme launched by the Active Community Directorate (Home Office) in June 2004 (NAP 2004: Annex D: 28). That programme is investing substantial financial resources in building the capacity of voluntary and community organizations to tackle local problems, such as unemployment and poverty (http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_ strategy/nap_2004/nap2004uk_annex_en.pdf). 5.4.4

France

In contrast to Denmark, the French NAP documents (see under Ministère de l’Emploi 2004) indicate that the social partners play a limited, albeit increasing role in the formulation or the implementation of the French NAPs. While all the NAPs contain passages claiming that the social partners

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were consulted in the formulation of the NAP (e.g. French NAP 1998: 2; 1999: 21), only the NAP 2004 contains separate inputs from the social partners. Then again, these inputs remain quite limited. The impression of limited direct influence by the social partner on the NAPs is reinforced by the consistent complaint of Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF), which is the largest and most influential employers’ organization representing companies within all sectors, over the government’s unwillingness to let the social partners participate in the making of the NAPs (MEDEF 2001, 2004). The analysis of the NAP documents suggests that social partners are interacting with the government on the NAP and that these interactions may be expanding since 1998. From the first NAP in 1998, it is clear that the social partners have had a role in designing and evaluating certain employment efforts, notably vocational and continued training programmes (NAP 1998: 10, 19, 21). Yet, the first French NAPs contain few if any explicit reflections on the role of the social partners in the implementation of the NAP. This role changes with the establishment of the Social Dialogue Committee for European and International Issues (CDSEI) in 2000/1. It is thus explained in the NAP 2001 that the government has intensified its cooperation with the social partners in the areas of recruitment difficulties, employment quality, active ageing, lifelong learning and a territorial approach to employment (NAP 2001: 2). It is claimed that most of the social partners contributed written inputs on these issues and that two meetings were held discussing the final draft of the NAP 2001 (ibid.). Yet, it is impossible to judge the actual extent of influence of the social partners in the formulation of the NAP from the documents. Perhaps as important as the direct influence of the social partners in the formulation of the NAP is the new subject position articulated for them in the NAP. Thus, the NAP 2001 articulates the need for a ‘more participative method’ that should not only enable more systematic participation of the social partners in the formulation of the NAP, but also enable them to influence the strategic themes entering the NAP (NAP 2001: 13). Social partners should no longer be considered merely as consultants, but as active participants who decide on the themes of the NAPs in cooperation with the government. This new positioning of the social partners is repeated in the ensuing NAPs (2002: 11; 2003: 51). In the NAP 2003, it is explained that: The conditions under which the commitments contained in this National Action Plan for Employment 2003 will be implemented and monitored over the next three years illustrate the new procedures for associating the social partners and their involvement in areas under

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their responsibility. A new method for co-operation and consultation between stakeholders has thus been initiated, contributing to the orientation, implementation, and evaluation of policies without relying solely on the national government. (p. 51) It is moreover explained that ‘partnership groups’ have been set up within the CDSEI to monitor the implementation and evaluate the results of several major themes of the NAP for Employment (NAP 2003: 51). In brief, while the actual influence of the social partners on the NAP may still be limited, the NAP documents testify to important rearticulations of the role of the social partners from 2001 onwards. In conclusion, our document analysis proved useful in mapping the network. At the EU level, it is possible to map a network of actors constituted in relation to the EES (see also Chapter 2). The treaty text itself specifies the basic division of competencies between the wellestablished EU institutions and the member states as well as the foundation for the Employment Committee established specifically in relation to the EES. Turning to the Council resolutions and decisions, it was furthermore possible to observe a gradual development in the principles guiding the relation between public and private actors from the troika principle through social dialogue to the partnership principle modelled on the inclusion of regional and local actors in the field of regional policy. The documents collected in Denmark, Great Britain and France have proven particularly useful for analysing the historical formation of networks. They are also useful in exploring the public measures taken by public authorities (metagovernors) to establish and facilitate the functioning of governance networks. Thus, they have – not very surprisingly – revealed particular historical and national variations in the formation and functioning of national networks evolving around the NAP process. Moreover, they show that the concept of ‘partner’ pervades the NAPs of all three member states. Despite important inter-country variations in the practical translation of that term, the NAP documents show that governments of all three countries are positioning themselves as the driving force, whereas the employers, trade unions and to a varying extent other actors are depicted as ‘partners’ who are regarded as legitimate participants in the NAP process. While the meticulous readings of the documents actually provide quite extensive information on the participation of social partners, the documents are clearly less suitable for illuminating the patterns of actor interactions, informal mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and various specific agendas pursued by the involved actors. Thus, questions like

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who is actually meeting, how often, who is the dominant actor and who is empowered are pretty hard if not impossible to determine from the documents alone. Despite these limitations, the documents do offer insights regarding certain democratic questions, such as: Who is formally entitled to participate, who else is urged to participate, what sections of the public or particular interests do these actors represent, in what ways and at what stages of the NAP process are the various actors participating, what are the possibilities for the wider public to gain insights into the NAP process, and to what extent are these possibilities actually used?

5.5

Analysing network programmes

In this section, we discuss the capacity of document analysis to shed light on network programmes, namely the institutionalized norms and logics of action as expressed in the strategies constituting the networks. In our analysis of the area of employment policy, we attempted to examine the capacity of the selected documents to account for the role of both procedural and substantive norms. Procedural norms are the standards for defining how a policy process or a mode of policy formulation and implementation should take place. In order to expose the procedural norms, we have gone through the documents checking for explicit instructions, guidelines, recommendations and discussions on how the employment policy process should be conducted. This was done in two steps: (1) Guided by the table of contents, we searched all documents for explicit instructions, guidelines, recommendations and discussions on how the employment policy process should be conducted; (2) based on the preliminary overview provided by step 1, we used the electronic search function to track down all occurrences of the terms ‘guideline’, ‘recommendation’, ‘strategy’ and ‘benchmarking’ to ensure that we had not overlooked what we found important to illuminate the procedural norms informing the NAP process. Substantive norms, on the other hand, refer to policy strategy, i.e. the overall values, objectives and goals of a particular policy area and the policy instruments. In order to shed light on the substantive norms, we went through all the documents to map the explicit objectives and goals of the employment policies. True to the discourse-analytical approach, we did not attempt to dislodge any hidden meaning ‘beneath’ or ‘in-between’ the lines of the documents. Discovering hidden goals and objectives was not part of our search. Rather, we simply took the documents’ statements at face value. More precisely, this implied: 1. An electronic search of all documents for the terms ‘aim’, ‘goal’, ‘objective’ and ‘strategy’. We deliberately repeated the search for the

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latter term, because our previous search for ‘strategy’ to identify procedural norms had showed that the term is used somewhat ambiguously in the documents: sometimes focusing on goals and sometimes on the means deployed to implement goals. 2. We then simply read what the objectives and goals were. 3. To be sure that we had not overlooked stipulated goals and objectives, which were formulated, for example, as ‘The government will seek to…’ we searched all the documents based on their tables of contents. 5.5.1

The EU

At the level of the EU, employment is defined by the EES. Since the Amsterdam Treaty and the Luxembourg summit of 1997, the EES has been maintained and developed in a series of documents published annually as previously described, as well as certain ‘ad hoc documents’ such as the highly influential ‘Wim Kok report’ and the communication from the Commission summarizing the five-year evaluation of the EES in 2003. Following the above distinction, we identified and recombined the sections of these documents dealing with substantive and procedural norms, both of which have been subject to considerable change and modification during the period of analysis. The former can be found in both the Council resolutions as well as the joint reports published by the Commission, whereas the concrete policy instruments can only be found in the latter and more specific documents. The procedural norms of the EES can be subsumed under the heading of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The core of the OMC can be identified already in the key articles of the Amsterdam Treaty, which clearly states that responsibility for employment policy resides with member states, which are only subject to coordination at the EU level and not legislative instruction. The concrete process of coordination between member states was developed at the Luxembourg summit in 1997 and was later dubbed the ‘Luxembourg process’. The term OMC, however, was first introduced in the proceedings from the Lisbon summit in 2000. The OMC consists of four procedural norms: (1) Setting short, medium and long-term guidelines for the EU with specific timetables for their achievement; (2) establishing performance indicators and benchmarks tailored to each member state and different sectors which allow comparison of best practice; (3) translating targets from the European to the national and regional levels and (4) periodic monitoring, peer review and evaluation with the emphasis placed on the process of mutual learning. In terms of network governance, the reading of the documents clearly

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made it possible to establish the OMC as an alternative to hierarchical steering and steering by economic incentives. Thus, the OMC clearly defines a particular policy process or ‘policy cycle’ based on monitoring, review and mutual learning rather than legal instructions or economic benefits. Since the Lisbon summit in 2000, the most important development has been the synchronization or ‘streamlining’ of different policy areas in a common policy cycle. Substantive norms: the EES is made up first and foremost of the overall guidelines. The guidelines specify the common priorities according to which member states are supposed to direct their national employment policies. The first set of guidelines – also referred to as ‘pillars’ – included ‘improving employability’, ‘developing entrepreneurship’, ‘encouraging adaptability in business and their employees’ and ‘strengthening the policies for equal opportunities’ (Council Document 13200/97). This first set of guidelines remained unchanged until 2003. Following the five-year evaluation and the report of the European Employment Taskforce (Jobs, jobs, jobs – Creating more employment in Europe), three ‘overall objectives’ were introduced: ‘full employment’, ‘improving quality and productivity at work’ and ‘strengthening social cohesion and inclusion’. Within these objectives, ten more specific guidelines were introduced (Council Decision 2003/578/EC). The overall objectives have remained unchanged, whereas the specific guidelines were overhauled in 2005 as a part of the ‘new start for the Lisbon strategy’ proposed by the Commission and later designated as the ‘Community Lisbon programme’ (Com (2005) 24 and Com (2005) 330). Currently, the EES is made up of eight ‘integrated guidelines’, which is part of a larger set of guidelines defining the renewed Lisbon strategy (Council Decision 2005/600/EC). In other words, the guidelines that make up the core substantive norms of the EES have been subject to two major revisions in the relatively short period of time between 1998 and 2005. However, neither of these revisions has fundamentally changed the policy substance of the EES. The image conveyed by the documents is one of stabilization and gradual modification rather than revolution. The overall guidelines have been supplemented by continuous work on indicators and benchmarks specifying in more detail how the performance of the different individual member states and the EU of 25 in general should be measured in relation to the overall objectives. The first joint report published by the Commission worked with basic indicators such as the total employment rate, the youth unemployment rate and long-term unemployment, as well as ‘employment related’ or ‘context’ indicators such as GDP and labour productivity. The report also introduced the ‘diamond methodology’, which is essentially a way of indexing and

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graphically presenting performance using four indicators (Joint Report 1998). Both these core indicators and the diamond methodology have been central to the assessment of member state performance by the Commission in the following joint reports. But several indicators have been added: the latest update includes 40 key indicators and 26 related context indicators. The indicators are proposed by the Commission, subject to comments by the Employment Committee and published in an annually updated ‘compendium in indicators for monitoring the employment guidelines’ (see EES). The indicators are still to be considered substantive norms in the sense that they do not in themselves provide regulatory measures, but rather quantifiable measures related to the overall objectives and specific guidelines. The development of these measures as conveyed by the relevant documents is marked by continuous expansion of the list of indicators and accumulation of data. At the operative level, guidelines and indicators are made on the basis of concrete suggestions and recommendations to individual member states. The joint reports summarize the input from the NAPs and the performance on selected indicators. Furthermore, the joint reports regularly include examples of ‘best practice’, which is to say ‘case studies’ or ‘case reports’ on particularly successful policy in different member states. Based on the joint reports, Council recommendations are issued, specifying challenges and suitable policy measures in each of the member states. The recommendations are, however, fairly general. The shape and form of these recommendations are another example of how the theoretical distinction between hierarchy and network governance can be found in the documents: rather than orders and legal instructions – the instrument of hierarchical steering and government – what we find is very general suggestions, which leave substantial room for concrete measures at the national, regional and local level. As such, the recommendations are clearly an example of the broad frames aimed at facilitating the mutual adjustment of autonomous actors. 5.5.2

The national level

The NAP documents show that the three member states are urged by the Council’s recommendations to problematize and act on the employment issues in particular ways and according to particular norms. While it is not possible to gauge from the NAPs to what extent the governments are actually changing their policies in accordance with the Council’s recommendations, the NAP documents clearly show that all three governments from 1999 onwards are taking great pains to explain what has already been done and what is being planned to accommodate the

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recommendations. It is during this process of explanation and argumentation that the governments start viewing their employment problems and the measures seen as necessary to deal with them in terms of particular substantive and procedural norms. This effectively changes the political game: the social partners and other NGOs are using the norms of inclusion propagated by the EU in their attempt to gain influence on national employment policies. Moreover, as discussed further below, the documents indicate that the substantive goals and the procedures underlying the national employment policies are pushed in a certain direction. An important substantial norm articulated in all the NAPs is, first, the objectification or definition of unemployment in a particular manner (with a need for activation, training, continued education, optimum economic incentives, etc.). Thus, since 1998, the NAP guidelines have emphasized the need for active and individually targeted measures to ensure that the unemployed are seeking jobs and/or enhancing their employability by the upgrading of skills. For example, whether due to the guidelines or other factors, the French NAPs indicate that the French employment policy is increasingly raising the demand of active jobseeking by the unemployed as a condition of receiving insurance/ benefits (French NAP 2004: 17). In the British and Danish NAPs, this norm is even more clearly articulated. Secondly, the NAPs view the employment problem not so much in terms of matching supply and demand of labour power, but more in terms of creating the right conditions for generating active, competent and entrepreneurial jobmakers and jobseekers. The French NAPs may again serve as an example. A recurring recommendation from the Council to the French government is to provide more optimal economic incentives to avoid premature retirement from the labour market and to make it more attractive to hire low-skilled workers (French NAP 2000: 19–20; NAP 2001: 3; NAP 2002: 8). Interestingly, the French government argues that its tax measures and reductions in social security payments in 1999 and 2000 intended to do exactly what the Council recommended (French NAP 2001: 3). These measures were further developed the following year (French NAP 2002: 8). The point is not so much whether these measures are a causal effect of the Council’s recommendation, nor whether they were designed in accordance with the intentions of the Council. The point is rather that the French government is now framing and problematizing its employment policy in terms of providing the proper economic incentives to reduce entry barriers to the labour market for young people and to make it less attractive to retire from the labour market prematurely.

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The structuring of the NAP reports according to the common guidelines and the member states’ subjection to peer review, benchmarking and Council recommendations all point to the promotion of the procedural norms informing the national employment policies. First, the NAPs of all three member states reflect attempts to promote particular tasks for, and new relations between, a particular set of policies. Other policies are simply excluded. The documents show that from the first NAP in 1998 until 2004, the common guidelines have urged/forced all three member states to reflect on how labour market policies, education policies, social policies and industrial development policies may work together in order to promote employment. In contrast, fiscal and monetary policies are not mentioned at all by the guidelines and they play no role in the peer review, benchmarking or the Council recommendations. Thus, fiscal and monetary policies are not regarded as legitimate devices for handling the employment problem, but seem instead to be reduced to the task of maintaining macroeconomic stability. While this trend could be observed to varying degrees in all the countries before 1997, the NAP documents show that the governments are increasingly seeing this particular combination of policies as essential for generating the right institutional conditions for promoting the creation of active, competent and entrepreneurial agents. Second, and more generally, the NAP process seems to facilitate the transformation of the relation between state and non-state actors. The three member states are urged to create networks enabling diverse actors to contribute to the handling of labour market problems. For example, from 2000 onwards, the British NAPs contain quite detailed discussions on how to accommodate the recommendations made by the Council to include the social partners more extensively. The British government’s standard reply to this recommendation is that the UK does not work through institutionalized social dialogue arrangements. Nonetheless, ‘The United Kingdom has a strong tradition of partnership and dialogue, particularly at enterprise and workplace level’ (British NAP 2003: 16). The British NAPs then go on to list how the government delegates employment tasks and thereby involves local business representatives, voluntary organizations, job-service centres, regional development assemblies and others. While the involvement of the social partners in the NAP process may not actually have increased over time, the documents clearly show that the problematization of how and to what extent they should be involved has gained impetus. For example, in the 2000 and 2001 French NAPs, the government responded to the Council’s recommendation of reinforcing

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cooperation with the social partners in modernizing the organization of work by explaining that it had already taken a number of relevant initiatives in dialogue with the major representatives of employers and employees (French NAP 2000: 25–7; NAP 2001: 2, see above). In the 2002 NAP, the French government was urged to include social partners more extensively in the efforts to promote lifelong learning (French NAP 2002: 10). At least in one case, one of the French employers’ associations used the recommendations from the Council and the Wim Kok report to argue for enhancing the inclusion of social partners in the NAP process (MEDEF 2004). In sum, the document analysis proved a valuable method for studying the network programmes at both the EU and national levels, in terms of procedural and substantive norms. The possibility of uncovering the basic programmes or norms and rationalities of a particular policy area through document analysis is hardly surprising. But document analysis also proved valuable in illuminating different modes of governance and their interrelationship. Thus, the document analysis clearly made it possible to identify various substantive and above all procedural norms supporting network governance, rather than hierarchical steering based on legal instructions. This is not to say that hierarchical steering played no role in the EES. The articles of the Amsterdam Treaty stipulating the member state obligations to pursue an active employment policy clearly indicate the continued importance of hierarchical steering. What the documents show then is not a transition from hierarchical steering to network governance, but rather the transformation of hierarchical steering so as to support network governance by forcing the member states to pursue an active employment policy within a broadly defined framework. The document analysis has demonstrated the possibility of monitoring historical trends. Even though the analysis covers a very short period of time, the analysis clearly shows that network governance in the field of the EES has been subject to constant modifications, expansions and variations. At the national level, the documents testify to the modest, but hardly insignificant, role played by the Amsterdam Treaty and the NAPs in forcing and urging the member states to consider employment issues and their policies according to particular substantial and procedural norms.

5.6

Conclusions

Our study clearly confirmed the potential of document studies inspired by discourse analysis to illuminate both network topography and network

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programmes. In terms of direct actor reference, however, document analysis can only provide an initial mapping of networks, which should be cross-checked with interviews and other sources of information. Furthermore, direct actor reference does not require a discourse-theoretical approach, but falls well within the representational mode of analysis. In terms of network topography, the particular strength of the discourseanalytical approach lies rather in the ability to uncover the principles of network formation guiding the specification of interrelated subject positions. But the most important benefit gained from choosing an approach to document analysis inspired by discourse analysis is undoubtedly the capacity to identify network programmes. However, there are also limits to document analysis. In summing up our experiences with document studies as an instrument of network analysis, we now turn to the research questions implied by the concepts of network topography and network programme. In terms of network formation and development, document analysis has proved useful in illuminating the historical formation of networks as well as principles of change and continuity. Our selection of documents enabled us to expose changes in the network topography and network programmes taking place from 1997 to 2004. However, our decision not to include documents from before 1997 meant that we cannot say much about whether the Luxembourg process implied a radically new way of thinking about employment policies or merely solidified certain discourses and norms already existing in the member states’ employment policies. Furthermore, document analysis fails when it comes to uncovering the everyday, unpublished interactions of the network. Although the documents have provided a relevant and in some cases a good overview of the network topography, the analysis of documents needs to be supplemented with other methods to provide a more detailed map of the character of the interactions within the network. For example, instead of time-consuming reading of many documents, the same insights might be gained more efficiently through interviews. As mentioned, the primary strength of document analysis is probably the study of what we have called network programmes. In this study we have attempted to cover both the procedural and substantive norms supporting the EES and the OMC process of producing and implementing the NAPs. Such an approach has provided insight into the epistemology of employment policy; the definition of policy problems and common knowledge and the conflicts about overall strategic goals and meso-level goals. Furthermore, document studies have proved valuable in establishing the norms for coordinating the policies deemed relevant to

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enhance employment. Documents have proved valuable in shedding light on the character of governing or steering. Document analysis has also proven highly useful in illuminating attempts at metagovernance. Even though documents are very strong on this point, comparing document studies with interviews, expert reports and other types of data is obviously still a matter of great interest. Such alternative data can provide insight into the interpretation of norms by concrete actors, direct contestation or strategies for circumventing norms while ‘keeping up appearances’ in relation to the norms of the dominant network programme. Finally, document studies are also valuable in relation to the issue of the democratic potentials and problems of network governance. Uncovering the principles of network formation provides insight into the rationalities for including some groups and excluding others from the various stages of the NAP process. Furthermore, documents also have a lot to say about the publicity of the processes in question. However, two caveats should be noted. First, documents are of little use in shedding light on equality and empowerment. They do have a lot to say about the subjectivities, such as the active jobseeker, the social partner, the stakeholder, presumed by the NAPs. Secondly and more generally, the discourse-analytical approach in itself is not tailored to pursue a more directly evaluative approach. Discourse analysis can be used to emphasize the contingency and particularity of social and political problems and solutions usually considered given, but it does not do so from the perspective of a preferred (democratic) model of action. A more direct evaluative approach, in other words, will require both the establishment of certain standards of democracy to serve as benchmarks for evaluation and also a different reading of the documents involved in order to measure more specifically the performance of the network against the selected benchmarks.

6 Qualitative Interviews: Studying Network Narratives1 Mette Zølner, Iben Ørum Rasmussen and Allan Dreyer Hansen

6.1

Introduction

The present chapter will discuss the strengths and limitations of qualitative interviews in comparison to other methods used when studying governance networks. We will do it on the basis of the 65 interviews that we, in the framework of the labour market policy pilot study, conducted in six different research settings on local and national levels. In the pilot study we used qualitative interviews in two ways: one was to provide data that other methods could not provide and the other was to supplement the data generated by other methods as part of a multimethod research strategy (see Introduction and Chapter 2). Indeed, qualitative interviewing is a method that rarely stands on its own as its results are most fruitful when combined with other qualitative methods, such as document study, observation, focus group interviews, or by quantitative methods (for example Borrás and Olsen, Chapter 9). However, as the aim of the present chapter is to illustrate the strengths of qualitative interviews in studying network governance, we will focus on the kind of data that this method is particularly well suited to generating, while we will merely comment, when appropriate, on ways in which qualitative interviews can be used in combination with other methods. In general, qualitative interviews have two strengths. One is to generate data that provides insights into interviewees’ individual experiences and, thereby, tells us about their observations of places and settings to which we have not been and could not go (Weiss 1994, as cited in Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 8–9). When studying network governance, this capacity is useful to shed light on aspects of policy interaction that often remain informal and therefore inaccessible through other methods. In this respect, qualitative interviews are likely to generate data that is 125

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valuable for addressing a number of research questions such as those relating to the formation, functioning, development and metagovernance of a governance network. A second strength of qualitative interviews is that it increases our insight into an interviewee’s perceptions of social reality and the interpretation of such perceptions (Weiss 1994, as cited in Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 8–9). With regard to research on governance networks, this capacity can provide us with an understanding of how network participants experience and evaluate policy interaction within governance networks. Hence, qualitative interviews are a means of obtaining the perspectives of those working inside a given policy process. In this chapter, we will focus on two substantial research questions regarding network governance that arose when undertaking the qualitative interviews. The first question relates to outlining of the contours of a governance network and it is irremediably linked to interviewing. Selecting respondents requires knowledge of the policy actors that are most relevant for interview purposes, that is, persons with the relevant experiences to elucidate the governance network in question. Finding such respondents is a challenge, since studies of network governance focus on policy interaction and, therefore, the relevant policy actors are not necessarily registered on lists of participants and the minutes of meetings, etc. Thus, this raises the question of how one should identify potential respondents. We will show how the process of selecting interviewees by the snowball method contributes to clarifying the contours of a governance network by elucidating the informal aspects of interactions between policy actors that are not detectable by studying formal documentation alone. The second question emerged in our reading of transcribed interviews that appeared to be particularly apt for shedding light on the different institutional norms for labour market policy, which was one of the factors that made us select Denmark, France and the UK as cases (see Torfing, Chapter 2). In this chapter, we will illustrate how qualitative interviews shed light on the values shared by the interviewees in a research setting and, thereby, on the governance norms of a given network. One way of analysing such norms is to read the transcribed interviews as the respondents’ narratives of the policy processes in which they partook. The advantage of such a narrative reading is to offer a common grid for analysing respondents’ sense making when narrating their individual experiences to the interviewer. From the outset, we should underline that the focus of the chapter is on the methodological issues rather than on the empirical ones. Thus, rather than presenting a systematic comparative analysis of the six cases in terms of network contours and norms, we will merely present empirical

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examples to the extent that these illustrate the methodological points we wish to make. Our emphasis on the methodological points explains why we structure this chapter in terms of setting up, conducting and analysing qualitative interviews. That is, we will first illustrate the process through which we selected interviewees. This part will point to the potentials of the snowball method as well as to some of the practical and methodological problems we encountered when applying it. Then we will address the question of how to conduct interviews with the aim of illustrating how we translated the pilot project’s research questions into the questions actually posed in the interviews. We will exemplify how these questions stimulated respondents to narrating their experiences. Subsequently, we will illustrate how a reading of transcribed interviews as narratives contributed in clarifying norms of good governance among the interviewees. However, before addressing these questions on setting up, conducting and analysing qualitative interviews, it is necessary to comment on the strengths and limitations of this method when studying network governance and to discuss the particular challenge of doing interviews in several institutional contexts.

6.2

Qualitative interviews in relation to the study of network governance

Within the social sciences, qualitative interviews are a well-known and commonly applied method on which there exists an overwhelming literature that discusses various aspects of the method thoroughly, and from different perspectives (i.e. Gubrium and Holstein 2002; Kvale 1996; Silverman 2003). A common definition of a qualitative interview is that it consists of a guided conversation between two individuals: an interviewer and an interviewee. The former asks questions and the latter answers. In this perspective, an interviewer can ask for precisely the information s/he needs, which, for instance, distinguishes it from generating data from documents. However, this perspective has been criticized for seeing interview data as existing independently of the interviewer–interviewee relation, and envisioning the interviewer as a miner who digs up the relevant data from the mind of the interviewee who is perceived to be a mere repository of factual information, perceptions, opinions and sentiments (Gubrium and Holstein 2002; Järvinen 2005; Kvale 1996; Ryen 2002: 338). Critics offer an alternative view on interview data as an ‘interactional co-construction of the interview’s content by the subjectivities of the

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respondent and the interviewer in the specific context in which the communication takes place’ (Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 15). That is, interview data does not exist independently of the interviewer, who, rather than gaining access to an interviewee’s individual experiences, contributes to co-producing such experiences by creating a setting in which the interviewee is encouraged to put such experiences into words. Thus, this perspective attributes a more active and non-neutral role to the interviewer and induces increased awareness on the subjectivities at stake in a given interview situation with bearings for the way in which interview data can be used, in particular for possibilities of generalization across time and space. In the pilot project on network governance, we have applied this latter perspective on interview data as a mutual co-construction between interviewer and interviewee in a situated context. We will come back to the implications of this perspective for the data collection and analysis, but before doing so a few words are required on the kinds of data with which qualitative interviews are likely to contribute to studies of network governance. According to the literature, the strength of qualitative interviews is to generate data on the interviewee’s individual experiences. By individual experiences we refer both to respondents’ observations from places and settings to which we have not been and could not go and his/her inner experiences, in the sense of his/her perception of the social reality and interpretation of such perceptions (Weiss 1994 as cited in Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 8–9). With regard to the governance network, these potentials make qualitative interviews particularly promising in two respects: first, qualitative interviews allow us to generate data on aspects of the governance networks that we cannot observe and that are not documented in other ways such as their history, formation, functioning and development as well as their members. In the following, we will refer to such information as factual. It is important to stress that this should not lead us to think that we believe in a possibility of getting access to pure facts. Accounts given by an interviewee will always reflect his/her perception of social reality and are influenced by the situated context in which they are told. But the interviewee does also give us some factual information. This ability to generate factual data makes interviews a particularly interesting tool in studies of network governance where the focus is on the process of policy-making. While official documents can reflect policy decisions, such as what a procedure should be, which bodies or organizations should be involved, and the policy in a certain field, they rarely tell us about what actually happened in the process of making a decision and writing a policy document. That is, for example,

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about the way in which a document came into being, about the way in which the negotiations concerning a particular policy outcome took place, the identification of policy actors present and their level of activity and, subsequently, the way in which a particular policy document was used, etc. Sometimes access to the minutes of meetings and other non-official documents does indeed shed some light on these processes, but this is far from being the case for all governance networks and, anyhow, it does not capture the more informal aspects of policy processes that are likewise important when studying governance networks. Thus, qualitative interviews with network actors are a valuable tool that can provide us with factual information on the governance network that we cannot gain from other sources nor observe ourselves. The second type of data that can be generated from qualitative interviews consists of an interviewee’s interior experiences, or inner experiences, in the sense of that which s/he perceived and how s/he interpreted this, and how it affected her/his thoughts and feelings (Weiss 1994, quoted in Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 8–9). In studies on network governance, this gives insight into how network participants make sense of the processes in which they partake, how they perceive democracy and efficiency of a given governance network as well as information about their norms regarding good governance in general. In other words, qualitative interviews provide us with a means to gain insights into diverse perspectives related to the inner workings of a given governance network; these insights come from various policy actors that are more or less involved in the policy process. This opens the possibility for getting not only the ‘official’ account, but likewise differing point of views that, otherwise, rarely come to the fore. In the pilot study we have applied qualitative interviews with a view to generating data on both interviewees’ observations of the policy processes in which they partook and their inner experiences of these processes. It is, however, evident that the quality of such data depends strictly on the interviewee in question, that is, in particular on his/her knowledge, involvement and memory of the policy processes in question. Since the content of an interview is considered to be the result of a joint construction of meaning by the interviewer–interviewee, another factor of importance is the interviewer–interviewee relation. For example, does the interviewee feel pressured to answer questions s/he does not know about or remember, or is it ‘OK’ to simply say ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember’. Likewise, questions, interview style and the setting for the interview might induce more or less descriptive or evaluative accounts by the respondents that need to be taken into account when considering the quality of the

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interview data. In the following parts of the chapter, we will address these issues when discussing our experiences gained from the pilot study interviews. Yet, before doing so, we will comment on a final aspect of the interviewee–interviewer relation that relates to the comparative character of the pilot study that comprised six case studies in three different nation states and three different localities. This implied that the research team, based in Denmark, was met with the challenge of conducting interviews in various institutional settings and in three different languages: Danish, English and French. Hence, the team was less familiar with some of the institutional contexts in question and interviewers were likely not only to be considered as a stranger to the policy field in question by the interviewee (Weiss 1994), but also to the specific institutional contexts. This raises questions in relation to the interviewer– interviewee relations and the co-construction of the interview data. The literature on interviews points to the fact that for an interviewer the challenge is to understand the meaning of the individual experiences that an interviewee talks about rather than simply hearing ‘what the interviewer’s own intellectual and ethical development has prepared her/him to hear’ (Johnson 2002: 106). This is a challenging aspect because, when interviewing, we tend to draw upon our common-sense cultural wisdom about people, places, manner and contexts, which can seriously diminish the quality of the interview. The quality of an interview and its value for our understanding of network governance therefore depends on the extent to which the interviewer is aware of such reflects and on his/her capacity to go beyond these (Johnson 2002: 103). This raises the question whether this is a particular challenge when the interviewer is not only a stranger to a particular research field, but likewise in the sense of being based in a different national context. In other words, in our pilot study, was it more difficult for a research team based in Denmark, to hear the meaning of what is being expressed by respondents in British and French institutional contexts, than in the Danish, and which precautions might be taken in order to enhance our capacity to ‘hear’ what all of the informants tell us? In order to enhance our capacity to ‘hear’ our informants, our strategy was to acquire a thorough knowledge of the research settings and an in-depth understanding of the institutional contexts before starting to conduct the qualitative interviews. This information was gained through several sources, such as a thorough reading of the secondary literature, informant interviews, interviews with experts in the field, document studies and also through less traditional means such as expert reports (see Torfing, Chapter 4). In addition, both when conducting and analysing

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interviews, we sought to be constantly aware of the common-sense cultural knowledge upon which we tended to draw. Moreover, in the phase of conducting and analysing interviews we paid thorough attention to feedback from the research field as well as from researchers well acquainted with a given institutional context. One example of an institutional difference that emerged when doing interviews was the very word ‘network’, which appeared to evoke rather different connotations among interviewees in the different research settings. While the word ‘network’ in a Danish context was considered neutral or even positive, in an English context respondents reacted quite differently, some positively and some with suspicion. Such observations needed to be taken into consideration in the subsequent interviews and when analysing the data. However, this example not only illustrates potential complications when doing research in less familiar institutional contexts, it also exemplifies one advantage of doing comparative research, namely pointing to observations that researchers or interviewees familiar with an institutional context might take for granted and therefore not notice. Hence, in the present example, the positive connotation of the word ‘network’ in a Danish institutional context only became obvious to the research team thanks to the comparison with the English and French contexts. Yet, while the research team compensated possible lack of knowledge on institutional contexts and logics in various ways, it was more difficult to deal with the implications of a respondent’s possible perception of the interviewer as a stranger. The literature on qualitative interviews deals with the issues of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality in the interview situation (Warren 2002: 94; Padfield and Proctor 1996), and with the insider–outsider problematic when studying exotic cultures, but it does not comment on the impact of being an ‘outsider’ in the sense of coming from a neighbouring institutional context. Yet, the literature does mention that one implication of being an outsider is that it might give ‘the advantage of naïveté, and of being a novice’ (Ryen 2002: 339). That is, a respondent might tell his/her individual experiences more explicitly, in the sense of explaining either that which is tacit knowledge for insiders to his/her institutional context or which s/he is less reticent to reveal to interviewers coming from outside. In other words, when doing interviews, it is not necessarily a disadvantage to be perceived as a stranger by the respondents; it might, in some cases, be turned into an advantage. In the following three sections we will expand on our strategy and experiences of using qualitative interviews in the pilot studies. We will proceed by following the three main steps that can be distinguished in the

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process of applying this method: selecting respondents, conducting interviews and analysing the generated data.

6.3

Selecting respondents

Selecting respondents is always a crucial step in the process of applying qualitative methods as it determines the quality of the data generated. Since our aim was to shed light on individual experiences, an obvious criterion for selecting the respondents was that they should be likely to have experienced the policy processes in question. Yet, finding such respondents was not simple. The character of a governance network implies that there is not necessarily a formal list of participants, and even when such a list exists, it is unlikely to include informal participants in the network. While such network participants might be found through a progressive unravelling of the network by using snowball sampling (see Torfing, Chapter 2 and below), this method suffers from the weakness of not pointing to policy actors that are excluded from a given governance network. This is an important aspect, not least with regard to the democratic implications of governance networks. Hence, our strategy for selecting interviewees was twofold. First, on the basis of concrete policy outputs, we planned to locate a couple of key actors that could then help us in locating other actors considered to be relevant for the policy field (see Torfing, Chapter 2). This is the snowball process that implies picking some respondents who have the necessary characteristics and, through their recommendations, finding other subjects (e.g. Gobo 2004: 449; Neuman 2000: 199–200; Warren 2002: 85–8). To get the snowball rolling, we decided to locate key actors within the respective policy processes and ask these to mention other relevant actors with whom they discussed the matter. In addition, for logistical reasons, it was already preferable to locate potential interviewees when finalizing the interview agreement with the key actors in order to be able to conduct all interviews at each level during the short time span of a couple of days. This was particularly important in the British and French contexts due to geographical distance. However, in parallel to the snowball method, we likewise planned to select a number of interviewees who were likely to be concerned and interested in employment policy initiatives, but who, for one reason or another, remained on the outskirts of, or completely excluded from, the given policy processes. Examples of such respondents were, in Grenoble, the social partners that were not part of the leading bodies of the local plan for the insertion of employees (PLIE); at the French national level,

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it was an association for the unemployed that was not consulted in the NAP procedure and; in the British local case, the trade unions and an NGO (see Torfing, Chapters 2 and 3 for further details on the research settings). This double strategy of selecting respondents proved to be successful, though in various ways depending on the characteristics of each research setting. We will now go into our experiences gained at the local levels as they illustrate potentials and difficulties in getting the snowball rolling as well as in combining sampling techniques. At all levels, we started out by locating key actors within the formalized procedures around the policy outputs. These investigations were based on documents and secondary literature but also on contacts with experts within the field that had knowledge of the formal and informal policy processes (i.e. experts on British, Danish, French and European employment policies, and informant interviews with French civil servants on the local level). In the Danish local level case study, the town of Køge, our preliminary documentation pointed to the Local Coordination Committees for Preventive Labour Market Measures (LCCs) as a key actor. We started by contacting a local civil servant supporting the LCC who, following up upon an informal interview on her role in the LCC, came to play the role of a gatekeeper in the sense of facilitating access to the research field (Neuman 2000: 352–3). That is, providing access to the committee members’ e-mail and phone numbers, to agendas and summaries from the committee’s meetings and observing a committee meeting in the LCC. At this occasion, the interviewer and the research project were presented to all committee members, and this turned out to be a very fruitful point of reference for establishing contact with interviewees. All the selected respondents but one agreed to give an interview. At the start, the interviewees were selected among the members of the LCC. However, with the aim of unravelling eventual networks that overlapped or surrounded the LCC, all interviewees were asked who they considered to be central and relevant actors in the policy process. This provided the interviewer with names of network actors, within or outside the LCC, which indicated that the governance network clearly went beyond the LCC. Interviewer Are there any persons/actors you think it would be relevant for me to interview?2 Respondent (member of the LCC) Apart from those with which you have already spoken there would only be Matt B. … You know, the professional adviser from the Confederation of Danish Employers. You can get in touch with him via Carl Johnson.3

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Follow-up questions to the above respondent gave an insight into the kinds of relations that existed between the participants in the formal and informal parts of the governance network: Respondent (member of the LCC) Yes, the Unions and the Employers’ Organizations widely understood as the broadly defined group. We talk. I’m in dialogue with Jonathan, and with the chairman here in the house, the head quarters for the local division of the United Federation of Danish Workers, or some of the others from the Confederation of Trade Unions. It could be Anne or John […], yes those two. In the earlier days I had conversations with Jane, the chairwoman in the Local Coordination Committee, about the Agenda for the Committee meetings, and also with some of the civil servants. But nothing of this has been formally organized. This quotation illustrates that the respondent discussed LCC issues with both members and non-members of the LCC. This led us to assume that the LCC only constituted the formal part of the governance network and that an informal governance network functioned in parallel with the LCC. Subsequent interviews confirmed this assumption as the respondents referred to the same forums in which they were working with some of the same persons from inside and outside the LCC. In the British local level case study, the city of Birmingham, initial investigations also led us to a key person that came to play the role of a gatekeeper, namely the secretary of the network of unemployment agencies. As early as the phone/e-mail contact, he guided us to other actors that he considered to be relevant. He set up a focus group interview with three persons and his advice played an important role in our selection of interviewees, also by pointing to policy actors that were ‘excluded’. The latter led us to conducting an interview with a trade union representative and one with a local volunteer organization. However, during the course of the interviews and the observation of a meeting it became clear that the gatekeeper had not mentioned a very central person in the network. Eventually, this network participant was also interviewed. In addition, in order to situate the network in a broader context some interviews were conducted with representatives from surrounding networks and levels (e.g. the regional). Unlike the Danish and British cases, it was more difficult to get the snowball rolling in the French local case study, Grenoble. Initial contacts were made with key persons within the PLIE. While the PLIE home page offered ample information on actors, both organizations and persons, simple contact details proved to be much harder to get, not to mention the

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difficulties this created when seeking to establish contact. Most respondents were contacted several times, first by e-mail, then by fax and finally by phone before they agreed to participate in an interview. Thus, as the field appeared to be difficult to access, we gave up on getting the snowball rolling from a distance and waited until the interview to get further personal contacts. Consequently, from within the leading bodies of the PLIE, we selected eight respondents as well as two from organizations that were not represented within these bodies, but which were likely to be concerned by, and interested in, employment policy initiatives (i.e. trade unions and employers’ associations). During interviews, the personal contact did indeed prove be a fertile way of getting beyond initial reticence. However, as ten interviews were conducted within the time span of a couple of days, it was not possible to follow up on the names and information within the time constraint of the pilot project. Thus, our experiences at local levels showed, firstly, that selecting respondents through the snowball process is a fruitful way to identify relevant policy actors that do not appear in formal documents or lists of participants. The process provided us with a first insight into informal contacts among the members as well as non-members of a given formally established group. In the case of Køge, these informal contacts turned out to play an important role in the policy process (see Torfing, Chapter 3). In addition, the process of selecting respondents in the local case studies illustrated that though the snowball process can be applied from a distance by phone/e-mail in some research contexts, it might require a personal contact in other contexts. Yet, such initial difficulties do not necessarily imply that the research field is inaccessible, but simply that a different approach is necessary. In Grenoble, the personal contact subsequently opened the possibility not only for getting the snowball rolling, had we had sufficient time for doing so on the spot, but likewise for gaining access to documents, participant observation, diaries and focus group interviews. Secondly, the local case studies in Birmingham and Køge showed a recurrent problem when relying on gatekeepers, namely that these are likely to shape, to a certain degree, the direction given to the research by channelling it ‘in line with existing networks of friendship and enmity, territory and equivalent boundaries’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983 as cited by Neuman 2000: 353). This points to the need to take into consideration the influence that gatekeepers and other respondents who help to get the snowball rolling, might have upon the research undertaken. Consequently, though a gatekeeper is valuable in providing access to the field, one needs to be cautious, in particular when relying on just one

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person. A third lesson learned when selecting respondents in the local cases was that whereas snowballing is efficient in unravelling the inner relations of networks, it is, not surprisingly, inefficient in shedding light on the external relations, not least on those excluded from the network. To do this, we do indeed need to combine the snowball method with other sampling strategies that identify policy actors that are excluded from, or are on the outskirts of, a given governance network. A final comment on our experiences of selecting respondents is that this process can be used as a source of information on a governance network in question. The first contact with the field, or contact failure, might give information on the network’s transparency or closeness and, possibly, on policy actors’ perception of it. For example, in Grenoble, some respondents answered instantly to the first contact (civil servants in national and departmental administration), others had to be solicited repeatedly by subsequent phone calls (PLIE administration), and in a few cases without any success (local politicians). One cannot draw conclusions from this, but it can be used as a way of raising questions about the research field, such as whether the PLIE administration and local politicians refrain from responding to initial contacts due to lack of time, lack of interest or internal troubles. And, similarly, the initial openness of the civil servants might make us wonder whether there were particular reasons why they were ready to tell researchers about their view concerning the PLIE. Such questions can be exploited further when conducting interviews as well as when applying other research techniques.

6.4

Conducting interviews

When using qualitative interviews, the second crucial phase is the actual conducting of the interviews, that is, the moment when the data is co-produced by an interviewee and an interviewer in a situated context. This requires not only reflections regarding the subjectivities at stake and the context (as discussed above), but also on the strategy which is applied for generating the data required for answering the research questions. The need for a strategy was even more crucial in the case of the present pilot study in which the 65 interviews were to be conducted in six different research settings and by a team of researchers. Moreover, due to geographical distance and individual skills, five researchers were involved in the data collection in Denmark, whereas only two researchers conducted the interviews in England and one in France.4 This implied that a common strategy had to be followed in order to ensure the subsequent comparability of the data generated.

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As stated above, the aim of using qualitative interviews was to acquire both factual information on the policy processes in question and an insight into the respondents’ perception of these. While the latter objective called for unstructured ethnographic interviews that would encourage respondents to narrate their experiences according to their own premises (Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 18), our need to acquire factual information made it necessary to ask some specific questions. To reconcile these two needs, we decided to hold semi-directed interviews that were also expected to enhance the comparability of results from Denmark, France and the UK. This was our point of departure for establishing two interview guides – one for each of the local and national levels – that aimed at facilitating stories told on the basis of the respondents’ experiences of concrete events. The guide was to function as a repertoire of questions that the interviewer could use as a reminder for issues to cover. Thus, rather than going through the interview guide systematically, the strategy was to start out with a simple question to get the interview going (Johnson 2002: 109). Additional questions could be fitted into the stream of talk and new issues raised when it was appropriate. The interview guides consisted of respectively 36 (national) and 67 (local) questions that were elaborated on the basis of the research questions concerning the formation and functioning of the networks, their norms and institutionalization and their democratic consequences (cf. Torfing, Chapter 2). In this chapter we focus mainly on questions regarding the formation and functioning of networks, but of course qualitative interviews gave valuable information regarding the other issues as well. The questions were both descriptive and evaluative. The descriptive questions aimed at making interviewees talk about the policy process as they had experienced it. Such descriptive questions included mostly a when, what or who that related to, for example, the formation of the network, the actors, and to the functioning of the governance network. In comparison evaluative questions contained a how or a why that required the respondents to elaborate on their reflection on issues such as their own role, that of other network participants, and on internal relations (e.g. hierarchies). However, despite the interview guides and the common strategy of how to apply them, interviews turned out to be quite different depending on the research setting, the individual interviewee, and interviewer. Thus, interviews lasted between one and two hours and the interviewer asked between 30 and 70 questions, depending on whether the respondent was talkative or not as well as on the way in which each interviewer applied the common strategy. Nevertheless, all interviews

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generated rich data that gave us insight into interviewees’ individual experiences both in terms of factual information about the governance network as well as about the interviewees’ perceptions of these. In the following, we will illustrate how we applied the descriptive and evaluative questions in the interview guide and the kinds of data that it generated. All interviews commenced with a descriptive question about a specific event. At the national level, it concerned telling the way in which the NAP 2004 had been formulated and adopted, and, at the local level, how a specific initiative for vulnerable groups of unemployed came into existence (see Torfing, Chapters 2 and 3). This initial question was phrased differently according to the presumed insight and role of the interviewee. Thus, at the French national level, a civil servant was asked to describe the NAP process in the following way: ‘… to start with, could you describe the NAP 2004, that is the policy process through which it was formulated’? Whereas to a social partner the similar question was phrased: ‘Could you describe your role in relation to the NAP 2004’? In almost all cases the answer to this question resulted, as was expected, in a story about the policy process in question that was rich in factual information that could be elaborated and clarified in the follow-up questions. For example, when describing the process of formulating the French NAP 2004, a civil servant started to talk about the relation between the national employment policy and the European Guidelines. A new minister of employment had arrived in spring 2004 and he presented, a few weeks before the deadline for the NAP, a new national policy programme for employment that, from the outset, had not taken into account the European Guidelines: Respondent […] his policy project consists of 20 points that do not resemble the European guidelines […] they are not incompatible, but they are presented differently. Interviewer They are presented differently. And what did you do in that case? Respondent Well, […] we rewrote the Ministers’ policy project in EU language and fitted his policy initiatives into the corresponding guidelines. This quote illustrates that a descriptive follow-up question gave insight into the working procedures applied in the network governance as part of the policy process, in this case how civil servants proceeded when writing the NAP document in 2004. Such knowledge on working procedures when formulating the NAP and its relation to national policy could not be acquired from reading the NAP or the minister’s policy plan. Another

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example on some of the abundant information concerning the policy processes provided to us by way of qualitative interviews comes from the Køge case study. A key person in the LCC was asked to describe the formation of this committee: Interviewer Who took the initiative to the new Coordination Committee [LCC]? Respondent (member of the LCC) It was started by the heads of the Social Service Departments after a meeting among them in the four municipalities. Well, they talk together on a regular basis. And they were the ones who sowed the seeds and presented the idea to our politicians. This example illustrates that by asking a specific question about concrete processes, such as who took the initiative to form the LCC, we obtained information on the process through which the governance network in question was formed. Since that information was not accessible in the existing formal documentation and as the respondent in the first round of questions did not provide it, it was necessary to ask follow-up questions in order to shed light on the formation process of the LCC. Yet, it is evident that when using such data one needs to take into account its quality, which depends on the memory, the knowledge and the perceptions of an interviewee. Other examples from our interviews illustrated this difficulty in relying on interview data. For example, when French interviewees were asked whether or not the NAP was voted on in the French Parliament, some said yes, others no. This question can be easily or better answered by data collected by other methods, but the example illustrates that factual information, be it formal or informal, is subject to the knowledge and the memory of the respondents in question and, therefore, reliability might be a problem. Thus, factual information generated from interviews should preferably always be compared with other data, and when only interview data exists, then opinions from other respondents must be included. This underlines the necessity of taking the reliability of the data into account and whenever possible triangulate data. Thus, the examples above illustrate that we obtained insights into factual aspects of the formation and functioning of governance networks that are valuable when used with appropriate concern for the quality of that data. Yet, the examples also illustrate that the data is far richer than the simple factual information. When answering descriptive questions, the interviewees also gave us insight into their perceptions of the event they described. That is, by ordering the described policy

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processes along a storyline and by relating these to one another in terms of causality, the interviewees implicitly gave us their perception of how and why things happened in one rather than in another way. Thus, in the example above on the process of creating the LCC, the interviewee indicates that the civil servants were the main actors and that they took action to persuade the politicians. In other words, this is the second kind of data generated by qualitative interviews: policy actors’ perceptions of social reality and their interpretation of such perceptions. In the following part, we will examine how such perceptions can be analysed through reading the transcribed interviews as narratives. Yet, before doing so, a few comments on how evaluative questions can be useful in soliciting interviewees’ explicit evaluations of the governance network in question. In all the interviews, descriptions and accounts given by respondents were followed up by evaluative questions with a view to encouraging their interpretations and evaluations. One example is from an interview with a local representative for the Danish employers’ organization who was asked to elaborate on why he thinks that the LCC had played a positive role in helping the vulnerable unemployed back into employment: Interviewer But why do you think that the Coordination Committee [LCC] make a difference in terms of bringing the vulnerable unemployed back into employment or ensuring that those who are the most likely to drop out of the labour market maintain their jobs? Interviewee (from the employers’ organization) Well, with the creation of the Committee our relationship to the politicians and to the top of the administrative system became much closer. Thus, we got a chance to explain how we operate in our companies, what we think needs to be done in order to employ more people or at least maintain the existing jobs. And, finally, what kinds of projects could be advantageous for us. This example illustrates that an evaluative question is a fruitful way of following up on an account as it allows the interviewee to state his opinion and thereby give insight into how this particular governance network is seen from the inside. In the concrete case, we learned about how one key actor evaluated the efficiency of the LCC. This does not imply, of course, that we can conclude that the LCC has been efficient in inserting the most vulnerable unemployed in absolute terms, but only that interaction and discussion with policy-makers are considered to be an important factor for defining successful policy initiatives. In addition, as discussed above concerning the answers received from descriptive questions, the interviewee orders his account on an implicit storyline. There is a before and after the creation of the LCC that is said to nurture more interaction

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and, therefore, improving the efficiency of the policy initiatives. In this way we likewise get a hint about the norms of good governance at stake: interaction and discussion are fruitful for the outcome. To sum up, in this part we have illustrated how we proceeded in generating interview data that contributes to shedding light on aspects of the governance network. Our experience was that although the interviewers used the same interview guides and a common strategy of how to apply it, the interviews turned out rather differently as a result of different interview situations, the interviewee and the style of the individual interviewer. This points to the fact that using qualitative interviews for comparative purposes is challenging even when these are semi-directed according to a similar interview guide. Of course triangulation might meet some of the challenge, but one needs to be aware of the importance of the context of the individual interview when using the information for comparative purposes. Nevertheless, despite the variety, the generated data was rich and this supports the idea that the flexible approach within a common broad strategy was fruitful as it allowed for adjustments according to the interview situation and the account of the interviewee. Moreover, asking to describe a concrete event, followed up by specific questions that could be either descriptive or evaluative, contributed to soliciting accounts that gave both factual information on the policy processes as well as insight into the interviewee’s perception of these. In addition, we also experienced that asking descriptive questions provided us not only with factual information, but, likewise, with insight into the interviewees’ perceptions. And vice versa, evaluative questions at times gave rise to factual information. It follows that the two sets of distinctions – factual/perceptual information and descriptive/evaluative questions – do not overlap one another and are to be related to two different parts of the process of interviews. Thus, distinguishing between descriptive and evaluative questions is useful when conducting interviews, whereas the distinction between factual and perceptual information is an issue when subsequently analysing qualitative interviews. Finally, what the above has also pointed to is the large variety and richness of the data generated. This raises the question of how to analyse the data with a view not only to answering our research questions, but also to ensuring comparability among the cases. Thus, we address the third crucial step of qualitative interviews.

6.5

Analysing policy actors’ narratives on labour market governance

In general, qualitative interviews generate rich data of a large variety, and as illustrated, this was also the case in the 65 interviews undertaken

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at local and national levels in the pilot study. This raises the question of how one can get an overview of the data and how one can analyse it. A first step was to transcribe the interviews, which had all been taped. Thus, the interviews were translated from an oral language into a written text, which made it easier to work with. It is worth noting that such a translation is likely to have an impact on the content, but this aspect is beyond the scope of this chapter (see e.g. Poland 2002; Rapley 2004). A second step in the analysis was the actual reading of the interviews. As documents, transcribed interviews can be analysed in various ways. When selecting a method it is, therefore, important to reflect upon the advantages of a specific method in relation to its applicability and the research questions. In the following, we will focus on how one method of analysing the interview data can be used to answer aspects of one of the pilot’s project research questions, namely norms concerning good steering. We chose to analyse the interview data as narratives, that is, to look for the ways in which respondents relate events to one other in a storyline constructing implicitly or explicitly, coherence and causal sequence (Czarniawska 2002: 735; Hollway and Jefferson 2000: 30–1). The narrative method emerged within the humanities as a method for analysing tales. The argument was that in a tale one can always distinguish a before and after a crisis that enforces a development and re-establishes order, in the sense of a better and more positive situation. To enact the process, the tale puts in place actors who either contribute to driving it forward or obstruct it (Järvinen and Mik-Meyer 2005). However, the narrative method has developed in various ways within the social sciences that use it to analyse the way in which social actors make sense of the social reality in which they live (Czarniawska 2002; Järvinen and Mik-Meyer 2005) and, as such, also in studies of policy processes (Torfing 2005). Obviously, analysing the present interview data as narratives is far from being the only way to proceed,5 but there were two main reasons which determined our choice to read the transcribed interviews as narratives: the first relates to the actual interview data. As illustrated above, it turned out that the descriptive and evaluative questions posed in the interviews solicited accounts of the policy processes that were more or less explicitly ordered on a storyline with actors and a plot. A second reason is that this method is fairly simple to apply even on a large database and it helps to distinguish inherent meaning structures within the interview texts. Such structures contribute to illustrating implicit and explicit ideas of what is good and bad and these can serve as a point of departure for making comparisons. Therefore, analysing the interview data as narratives is a promising step in a comparative analysis of norms concerning good

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steering. This focus refers back to the pilot project’s research questions, raised on the basis of institutional theory, on norms and takenfor-granted values that, within an institutional setting and policy field, contribute to shaping the praxis of policy actors (see Torfing, Chapter 2). Due to the limited scope of the chapter, we will merely give a few examples of such governance narratives. We focus on the different roles that social partners are attributed in narratives on the governance of labour market policy, since one can observe different traditions for partnership and network governance in the three different national contexts. Whereas Denmark is characterized by a long and strong corporatist tradition based on negotiated involvement of large and unified labour market organizations, one observes different traditions in both England and in France in which labour market organizations are weak and fragmented. Corporatist interest mediation is feeble on the national level in England, and though social partners are more involved on the national level in France, in both countries their involvement has more the shape of a consultation procedure than that of a negotiation (see Torfing, Chapter 2). When reading an interview as a narrative, we aimed at identifying a plot and a causal sequence that was projected on a storyline with a before and an after. In addition, we noted the parts that were attributed to the social partners. These narrative features were not explicitly present in each interview as one coherent story to be exemplified by one quote. Mostly, the narrative features came to the fore bit by bit when interviewees described or evaluated events. Thus, our reading consisted of putting together these bits and thereby constructing a narrative structure. One example of such a narrative appeared in the interview with a representative for the Danish local employers’ association that we mentioned above. In the narrative reading of the interview, the main plot appeared as the obligation to give the vulnerable group of unemployed the possibility to re-enter the labour market. The establishment of an LCC is presented as a factor that facilitates re-entry as it creates a closer contact with the local politicians and civil servants. In addition, agreement among the social partners is staged as a significant factor: Respondent (representing the local employers’ association) We are the social partners, and we come to an agreement. And it is preferable. In most cases we agree completely about what we think needs to be done in order to help the vulnerable citizens […] So, in most cases, we totally agree. And I really think it is necessary. Now we are having these, you know, strategic meetings about the directions we want to follow, and I think it took the politicians by surprise.

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The causal sequence is that because the social partners need to speak with one voice they coordinate their opinions before the meeting with politicians in the LCC. This illustrates the interviewee’s idea about how to govern the labour market efficiently: this is to be done primarily and among the social partners themselves. Within a research setting, one is unlikely to find just one narrative that all interviewees share, but rather a series of various narratives. This was likewise the case in our research interviews in the six case studies. Yet, as a subsequent step in the analysis, we focused on the similarities between the interviewees’ narratives within each case study. The aim was to investigate whether one narrative was shared within the group of interviewees involved in a specific policy process, as this could indicate the existence of common values on the steering of labour market policies. Indeed, the above-described narrative, presented by one interviewee from the local Danish employers’ association, turned out to be widely shared by all interviewees, be they trade unionists, politicians or civil servants. And though minor varieties could be observed, the shared narrative can be phrased in the following way: social partners should cooperate and strive to reach a consensus, since social/labour conflicts obstruct efficiency. This narrative and the role attributed to the social partners illustrate, thus, normative values concerning how employment policy should be governed and are shared by the network actors in the Køge case study. These normative values are quite different from those that appeared in our similar analysis of the interviews in the French local context. Here, the social partners were not represented in the leading bodies of the local employment policy plan (PLIE) and they were also completely absent from most interviewees’ narratives. Only when asked directly did interviewees (members of the PLIE) comment on the role of the social partners. A narrative shared by most interviewees in Grenoble was characterized by the causal sequence that stated: as the social partners were ideologically driven and fragmented, they were unwilling and incapable of contributing constructively to the reintegration of the vulnerable unemployed. Only one interviewee, who represented a trade union, presented a different narrative: his trade union could contribute useful knowledge about the labour market but did not have sufficient resources (time) to participate in the PLIE. The two examples above illustrate that a reading of the interview data can constitute a point of departure for analysing normative values of how to steer labour market policies: first as a way to investigate whether common narrative structures can be identified among the interviewees

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and, second, as a way to compare results from various governance networks. In addition, a third way to use the narrative reading of the interviews is to relate the results from the case studies to the institutional context within which they are situated. This can contribute to answering the question of the extent to which governance networks are shaped by the institutional context in which they emerge, that is their degree of path-dependency. The two local cases, commented on above, seem to illustrate that respectively the Danish and French national traditions of corporatist interest mediation remain strong: that is, to confirm a Danish tradition for a strong corporatist tradition based on negotiated involvement of large and unified labour market organizations, and a weak and fragmented French labour market organization. We conclude that reading qualitative interviews as narratives is a productive starting point for answering the research question about governance norms in a comparative perspective. Yet, this method also raises questions. One is related to the quality of the interview data. As a narrative illustrates the way in which an interviewee structures and gives meaning to his/her individual experiences when telling these to the interviewer, this raises the question of the extent to which interviewees’ narratives are valid with regard to their perception and norms in general. That is, would they narrate their experiences in the same way if they told the story to a different interviewer or/and a different context? A second question relates to the bearing of the results. That is, whether the clarified narratives only tell us about the interviewees’ perception or whether they also tell us about norms and perceptions among other network actors and social actors in a given institutional context. In the present pilot study, we have to leave these questions open, but triangulation can be applied to support the verisimilitude of the narrative told. And, of course when doing actual analysis one would not base the entire analysis on data generated by one method only, but relate findings from qualitative research interviews to those obtained from the other methods such as document studies and focus group interviews.

6.6

Conclusion

Our experiences have confirmed that the potentials of qualitative interviews are, indeed, to provide factual knowledge about governance networks and insights into participants in the network perceptions of these. We have stressed that an important strength of qualitative interviewing is to give access to factual knowledge that is required for studying policy processes, but which, more often than not, is inaccessible through other

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data due to the character of governance network. Yet, whether the data generated is used to give factual knowledge or clarify interviewees’ perceptions, it is crucial to take into account the quality of the data in terms of reliability and validity. This also implies giving due consideration to the process in which data from qualitative interviews is produced and to the way in which it is analysed. One aspect of this is the selection of interviewees: the selection is irremediably linked to the identification of the contours of a governance network. We have found that the snowball method is a fruitful way to unravel the network’s informal parts. Yet, to include perceptions of policy actors that are excluded or on the outskirts of it, it is necessary to draw on several sampling techniques, such as documentary research. This is likewise a way to ensure that we enter the research field through more than one entrance and avoid being overly influenced by a single gatekeeper or interviewee. A second aspect is the way interviews are conducted. We found that doing semi-structured interviews based on a common interview guide and strategy for applying it resulted in rather different interviews, which, however, all produced rich data. Asking interviewees to describe specific events gives rise, in most cases, to accounts providing factual knowledge and perceptions of these. Follow-up questions of descriptive and evaluative kinds are likely to both be required to make an interviewee elaborate upon a specific point of interest for the research, but likewise to induce the continuation of the guided conversation. Yet, the richness of the data and its variety also represent a challenge in terms of how to use it. A third aspect in the process of qualitative interviewing is, therefore, the analysis of the interview data. Our narrative reading of the transcribed interviews proved to be a starting point for analysing governance norms within a single interview as well as within a group of interviewees. This subsequently opens the possibility for comparing shared values between governance networks and relating these to predominant values within the respective institutional settings. Yet, though a narrative reading presents the advantages of being a common grid for how to analyse rich and diverse qualitative interview data, the result will always, to a certain extent, rely on the eyes of the reader, that is, on us as researchers. Thus, in a team of researchers, it is a good idea to make individual narrative readings and subsequently, compare the results. Yet, as this problematic as well as problems related to the quality of the data cannot be fully solved, one can only maintain a high degree of awareness all through the process of generating and analysing qualitative interviews. Part of this awareness is to relate interview data to other

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sources by way of triangulation, and as we have stated several times, qualitative interviews are most fruitful when combined with other data.

Notes 1. We are grateful for the constructive feedback given by the anonymous referee as well as by members of the research team at the Centre for Democratic Governance at Roskilde University. 2. All translations of quotes from Danish and French into English were done by the interviewers, respectively Iben Ørum Rasmussen and Mette Zølner. 3. All names in quotations are fictitious. 4. In England, two researchers conducted 3 interviews on national level and 14 on local level; in France, one researcher did 8 on national level and 14 on local level (of which 4 were informant interviews) and, in Denmark, five researchers conducted 6 interviews on national level and 20 on local level. The Danish local context is used as a case in Iben Ørum Rasmussen’s PhD thesis and therefore includes a relatively high number of interviews. 5. To give just one example of an alternative way to analyse interview data, one can mention discourse analysis. This method would read the material with a view to the way the different actors position themselves and others and thereby form chains of equivalences or differences (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Fairclough 1995; Hansen and Sørensen 2005). The choice of how to analyse interview data must of course be made in relation to the theoretical approach applied.

7 Studying Local Network Exclusion through Observation and Diaries Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing

7.1

Introduction

This chapter aims to explore how observations and diaries can be used in studying the interaction among social and political actors engaged in network-based governance and policy-making at the local level. It aims to show how observation studies can be used in analysing policy interaction in relatively formal network meetings and how diary studies can be used in analysing the more informal interaction among the network actors between such meetings. As such, the objective is to assess the merits and problems of non-standard methods for the study of new forms of interactive governance. The substantive research question concerns the form and character of the interaction within local governance networks. Governance networks are characterized by negotiated interaction among a variety of interdependent actors, and the positive contribution of governance networks to public policy and governance depends entirely on the form and character of this interaction. Hence, a governance network that fails to include the central stakeholders, marginalizes some of the included actors, is stalemated by internal conflicts, or is constrained by hierarchically imposed rules is not likely to make a positive contribution to efficient and democratic governance. In order to be able to study the conditions for successful network governance, we must carefully analyse the patterns of interaction in governance networks. In the present study of local network interaction, we shall focus in particular on the external and internal exclusion of policy actors (Young 2000). External exclusion exists when relevant and affected policy actors are denied access to formal or informal participation in a particular governance network, and internal exclusion exists when formally or informally included actors are marginalized in a way that 148

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systematically prevents them from influencing the discourse, agenda and actual decisions of a particular governance network. Although all governance networks are predicated on the exclusion of certain actors and an unequal distribution of resources and competences, the external and internal exclusion of relevant and affected actors may hamper the effectiveness of network-based policy processes because it prevents broad knowledge sharing as well as the development of joint solutions and programme responsibility. It also constitutes a serious democratic problem since the demands for equal access and equal influence are jeopardized. The external and internal exclusion of social and political actors can be revealed through a study of the patterns of interaction within particular governance networks. Hence, by studying network-based policy interactions, we will be able to see which actors are interacting in and between formal meetings and how they are interacting with each other. By carefully analysing what the policy actors say and do to each other, it becomes possible to see how the institutionalized rules, norms and discourses, which are shaped and invoked in the course of interaction, sustain different forms of external and internal exclusion. Methodologically, we use observation and diary studies to explore the patterns of network interaction and the implicit forms of external and internal exclusion. With regard to the external exclusion of policy actors, observation of formal meetings helps us to spot references to relevant actors who are excluded from the network and to uncover the rules, norms and discourses that create and sustain the actual pattern of inclusion and exclusion. Diary writing enables us to analyse the pattern and content of contacts between actors, both included and excluded. With regard to the internal exclusion of network actors, observation studies help us to unveil both the power games and the institutionalized discourses that produce systematic differences in political influence, whereas diary writing permits us to assess the subjective feelings of frustration and disempowerment emanating from different forms of political marginalization within the governance network. The analysis of the patterns of network interaction and the forms of external and internal exclusion will focus on local employment policy networks in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble. As described in Chapter 3, the Local Coordination Committees for Preventive Labour Market Measures (LCC) in Køge, the Employment Strategy Group (ESG) in Birmingham, and the Plan Local pour l’Insertion et l’Emploi (PLIE) in Grenoble are all formal, politically initiated governance networks aimed at developing and coordinating local employment policy. We focused on local rather than national or transnational governance networks

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because we expected greater difficulty in gaining permission to observe meetings and getting network actors to write and submit diaries at the national and transnational levels. This chapter begins by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using observation studies and diary writing in the analysis of negotiated network interaction. A description and assessment of how the two methods were applied in the pilot study then follow. After a brief account of the data and the strategy for analysing it, we present the main results from our analysis of the patterns of interaction and exclusion in the three local governance networks. In the conclusion we pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of observation studies and diary writing in the analysis of democratic network governance and suggest ways in which these two methods can be further developed in order to improve their analytical potentials.

7.2

Observation studies and diary writing

The standard methods used in empirical studies of governance networks are qualitative interviews and document studies. The advantage of qualitative interviews is that you can ask about almost everything you like, and you often get rather illuminating responses to descriptive, hermeneutic and normative questions. The analysis of documents in terms of calls for meetings, agendas, minutes, budget reports and relevant policy documents may also help to establish who said and did what, why and when and with what effect. However, both interviews and publicly available documents will often tend to tell us the nice, official and legitimate version of what goes on within a particular governance network and who participated in and influenced the negotiated policy output. The point is not that interviews and documents are ‘lying’, but rather that what you say in an interview and what you write in a publicly available document are subjected to a high degree of censorship. While not entirely eliminating this problem, observation studies and diary writing tend to offer a more direct and contemporaneous way of studying both the formal and informal aspects of the policy interaction that takes place in and between meetings in the network. Since observation studies and diary writing are not standard methods within the social sciences, we shall first explain the two methods and briefly assess their limits and potentials for studying network interaction. 7.2.1

The observation method

The observation method has a long history within natural science and psychology where observation has been used in connection with

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controlled experiments. It has even become the predominant method in anthropology where observation studies based on active participation constitute the backbone of ethnographic field studies. In the twentieth century, the observation method gradually found its way into the social sciences and was well represented in sociology. Whyte’s (1955) threeand-a-half-year field study in a poor Italian community in the USA is a classic example. Field studies have also been used within political science, but observation is normally non-participatory and the field of observation is often more temporally and spatially delimited. Hence, political scientists usually observe a specific object in a relatively limited time period, or in a series of short intervals. They will also usually delimit the object of observation to a specific event, location or person (Neuman 1997: 350). One of the central methodological debates in the field of observation studies concerns the role and position of the observer vis-à-vis the observed. Observation studies inspired by experimental methodology aim to make the observer as invisible as possible and seek to maintain a distance between the researcher and the observed in order to ensure that the observed phenomenon is not affected by the observer. By contrast, in studies inspired by the field study method, the observer is clearly visible and takes an active part in the processes and events being observed (Berg 1995: 86ff). But the researcher might also want to conduct participant observation while remaining invisible, or at least incognito. Hence, there are several examples of researchers who have participated in events and processes in order to observe them (Rosenhan 1973), but without revealing their role and identity as researchers. Since such studies raise large ethical problems, they are not frequently used. No matter whether the observer is visible or invisible, interaction between the observer and the observed will always tend to affect outcomes. However, the observer in political science field studies does not necessarily have to take an active part in the processes and events observed. The observer may try to act as passively as possible while observing a meeting or shadowing a person through a normal working week. Still, observation studies differ from controlled experiments, because of interaction effects. Observation based on non-participatory observation of contingent interactions is the most widely used observation method in political science, and it is also this method that will be applied in the present study. Within the social sciences, the most prominent strength of observation studies lies in their ability to uncover social and political interaction in practice. Observation studies can help to answer a series of highly important questions about interaction: How do social and political

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actors interact at a given time and place by using speech, gestures, body language and other forms of communication? How is their interaction regulated by formal and informal rules, norms and discourses defining a particular ‘logic of appropriateness’? What role does each actor play in relation to the others, and what are the relations of power between them? Answers to such questions are difficult to provide through interviews because the patterns and conditions of social and political interaction are seldom recognized by the participating actors. When asked such questions in an interview, participating actors tend to give rather inaccurate and misleading answers. Non-participatory observation is highly relevant as a means to illuminate formal and informal interaction within governance networks and to uncover different forms of external and internal exclusion. Most governance networks will hold regular meetings for smaller or larger groups of network actors and these meetings can be observed in order to gain a first-hand experience of the live interaction between the network actors. Non-participatory observation of network meetings makes it possible to study the formal interaction between the participating actors and to see whether they refer to other important actors who are not part of the network. However, to learn whether the informal network includes actors not formally included in the governance network, we cannot rely on observations of formal meetings; we have to observe one or several network actors over a longer period of time in order to see who they meet, where and how. However, observing a particular person during a week or a month is extremely costly and demanding and it can be difficult to find actors willing to be observed so intensively during a longer time period. Regardless of what or who is being observed, the observation of governance networks must always build on a high level of trust between the observer and the network actors. If the level of trust is too low, access will either be denied, or the performance observed will be more of a staged performance than in a normal process of interaction. For that reason, the application of the observation method in studies of governance networks requires the formation and cultivation of positive relations with one or two gatekeepers who can promote the creation of mutual trust between the observer and the observed network actors. While the observation method has some obvious advantages in the study of formal and informal network interaction, it also has some clear limitations. First of all, it is not possible to observe past events. Other types of data such as documents and interviews are needed in order to gain knowledge of the past. Second, it is not possible to decide what or who to observe without some prior knowledge about the field gained

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through analysis of other types of data. Finally, the observation method does not produce knowledge about how the individual actors perceive, interpret and evaluate the observed interaction processes. Again we need to supplement observation with other information. There are also some particular limitations of observation studies in relation to the analysis of governance networks: it is difficult to observe the formation and emergence of a governance network; it is difficult to get permission to observe governance networks riddled by conflict and crisis; not everything that goes on in a meeting can be observed (for example, electronic text messages and written minutes remain hidden). In addition, it is difficult to observe informal network interaction because it lacks clear demarcation in time and space. Despite these limitations, observation studies are well suited for analysing social and political interaction within formal and informal governance networks. However, the observation method cannot stand alone. It must be supplemented with other forms of data that are capable of producing knowledge about the past; about which negotiations and/or actors should be observed, and about how the observed actors perceive, interpret and evaluate the observed interaction. Diary writing is one of the methods that can help to identify informal networks and illuminate how the observed actors perceive, interpret and evaluate the observed interactions. 7.2.2

Diary writing

The diary writing method can be used to access social and political phenomena that are not amenable to observation because they are unfocused or take place outside predefined temporal or spatial boundaries, or because they are likely to be affected by the mere presence of an observer, even when the observer is not actively participating in the observed processes and events (Zimmerman and Wieder 1977). While diary studies have been widely used within literary studies (classical examples are Ponsonby 1923 and Fothergill 1974) and anthropology (see Maas and Kuypers 1974; Caplan 1997), there is limited use of the diary writing method within sociology, not least because diary writing seems to be going out of fashion in modern societies and is conceived by many to be a remnant of the past. However, both feminist researchers (Bell 1998) and health sociologists (Coxon 1996) have recently aimed to resurrect diary writing as a tool for accessing the situated, day-to-day experiences of personal life (Plummer 1983). Generally, there are three kinds of diaries (Allport 1942; Plummer 1983): the memoir, the log and the personal diary. The memoir, written by famous artists, politicians or athletes, is a rather impersonal, retrospective

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diary often written for publication. It looks back at significant events selected by the autobiographer and provides a more or less personal account of these. The log is a privately kept diary that records ongoing events as they occur. A good example is the kind of time budget schedules that are used in studies of health care and family life. The most frequently used diary method in political sociology is the personal diary, where informants are asked to keep an uncensored diary for a certain period of time and record their personal experiences with ongoing processes and events. Zimmerman and Wieder (1977) used this method in their study of Californian counter-culture in the 1970s. The personal diary is often used in combination with interviewing that takes extracts from the diary as the point of departure for further discussion and reflection. In contrast to the memoir, the log and the personal diary are both solicited by a researcher who instructs the diarists in what, how and when they should write. Whereas the log is a highly structured recording of particular kinds of activities and their allocation during a day, the personal diary is an unstructured recording of personal experiences with events and encounters significant to the diarist. The log and the personal diary are sometimes combined or fused, so that the diarists are asked both to record and reflect upon particular events and contacts, sometimes even by answering predefined questions in relation to the recorded activities. This kind of diary writing is known as a ‘feedback study’ as it provides feedback to the researcher on different processes and events the researcher does not have access to. The problem with feedback studies is that diarists are often reluctant to answer the questions since the act of answering constitutes a major distraction from their main tasks and activities. Another problem is that there is no way to verify whether the entries match actual events or sentiments. The alternative might be to use so-called ‘elicitation studies’ where the informants are asked to collect material objects, photos, sound bites, etc. that can be used later on as prompts for discussions and reflections in an interview. However, it is often difficult to determine what media the informants should collect and they may forget why they collected particular media. Hence, there is a trade-off ‘between accurate recall but burdensome logging (feedback) versus potentially inaccurate recall but unobtrusive logging (elicitation)’ (Carter and Mankoff 2005). The personal diary has several advantages as a tool for data collection (Elliott 1997). It is less time-consuming than field studies and closer to the field than a quantitative survey study. It helps to uncover social and political events and personal reflections that are invisible to the observing eye. It ensures proximity between the informants’ experiences and their

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record of these experiences and thereby helps to minimize the problems of inaccurate recall and retrospective censorship found in ethnographic interviews. It accommodates different styles and response modes as the diarists are free to choose how to express themselves and whether to draw on a descriptive, reflexive or emotional register. It captures the diarists’ own priorities (at least if the instructions to the diarists are not too detailed). Finally, it provides a crucial insight into the contexts within which the recording experience takes place. There are even reasons to believe that diary writing is particularly helpful in studies of informal interactions in and around governance networks. Personal diaries may report on phone calls, e-mails, chance encounters and informal meetings that take place between the formal meetings. But diary writing will also help to uncover the diarists’ identity and relations to the other actors; their hidden agendas, political strategies and personal feelings of frustration or enthusiasm concerning their political influence in the network; and their personal conception of the role and functioning of the governance network. The advantages of diary writing are matched by several limitations. First of all, it can be very difficult to motivate people to keep a diary and make persistent and informative entries about current events. Diary writing takes time and tends to interrupt the main activities of the diarists, and they might leave out important events because they are too busy living and acting to stop and record their feelings and reflections. Paying the diarists a small honorarium might in some cases help motivate people to participate in a diary writing project, but it does not guarantee that they will do a proper job. Another problem that links up with the first one is that the diary writing might lead to very different results in terms of the length and quality of the entries and the interpretation of the topic. There are reflexive people who find diary writing a natural and rewarding activity, while others find it a nuisance that disrupts the flow of events. The diarists can to a certain extent be disciplined by the instructions they are given about what they should record, and how and when, but large differences in length and quality seem to be unavoidable. A third problem is that even apparently long and thoroughly written diaries may contain some highly idiosyncratic observations, reflections and views that can be very difficult to interpret for the researcher. It might be totally unclear why the diarist has recorded a particular incident and the reflections upon the incident might be completely incomprehensible. The combination of the diary method with interviewing is helpful in such cases.

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When used to study policy interaction in governance networks, the diary method has some special limitations. It is difficult to select the potential diarists because the network actors are often very different and we cannot tell in advance who will do a good job and who will come up with new and interesting information. Moreover, some of the very busy network actors might appear impossible to persuade to participate in a diary writing project. On the other hand, it is sometimes the busy people who get the job done. Therefore, one might as well ask several or all the network actors to participate in a diary writing project. However, the people who end up writing and submitting a diary might not be representative of the governance network as such. Last but not least, it is difficult to define the relevant time span of diary writing. In some governance networks, the actors will have frequent and regular contacts with each other and here a relatively short time span will be enough to get a good picture of the form and character of the informal interactions. In other governance networks, the contacts between the actors will be sporadic and irregular and a short time span will capture only a few interesting incidents. Despite the limitations, diary writing provides a helpful supplement to observation studies and together the two methods can draw an interesting picture of both the formal and informal policy interactions in a governance network. In the next section we shall see how the two methods were put to work in a study of local governance networks in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble.

7.3 Undertaking observation and diary studies in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble When designing the comparative study of local employment policy networks in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble the observation method was granted a prominent role in the data collection process. However, since the study was only a pilot study with limited resources, we decided to restrict ourselves to observations of formal network meetings. We considered following and observing some of the central network actors in the time between two formal meetings to get a glimpse of their informal network contacts, but because of the high costs of such ‘shadowing’, we decided to rely on diary writing to cover the more informal contacts. In order to ensure a close link between observation and diary studies, we asked selected network actors to keep a network diary from two weeks before to one week after a formal meeting in the governance network we observed. The idea was to shed light on the form and character of the informal network interactions taking place in relation to a particular formal

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network meeting and relate these interactions to what happened in the observed meeting. We also hoped that the diaries would tell us how individual network participants anticipated, interpreted and evaluated the observed meeting. In order to facilitate comparison across the three local cases, we decided to produce a common set of guidelines structuring the researchers’ observations. The observation guide lists a number of questions about the participation and interaction in the observed meetings: What are the physical and organizational surroundings of the meeting? Who is present and who sent apologies? Where do they sit? Who speaks to whom? How many interventions do the actors make during the meeting? Who introduces the different items on the agenda, and who draws the final conclusions? Do the participants refer to actors outside the formal network as important players in the field of employment policy? What is the atmosphere like in the meeting? How do the actors arrive at a decision? Are common democratic norms observed in the interaction? After each meeting an extensive observation report was written summarizing the main findings in relation to the questions raised in the observation guide. The gatekeepers who had helped us in accessing the local governance networks and arranging interviews with the participants also helped us to get permission to observe formal network meetings. We ended up observing two formal network meetings in Køge, three in Birmingham and one in Grenoble. With the exception of Grenoble, where we only observed a meeting of the technico-administrative steering committee, we both observed joint meetings for the entire network as well as administrative subgroup meetings. The meetings were observed in their natural environment, and attended by different observers in varying numbers (due to the high costs of sending people abroad there were two observers in Køge and only one in Birmingham and one in Grenoble). The observers were dressed in a neutral way and did not participate in the meeting, but only stated their name and their reason for attending the meeting. The network diaries combined the log with the personal diary. The diarists were asked to briefly note the successive events and contacts in relation to the governance network and record their reactions to and feelings about these events and contacts. The diarists were sent an electronic file in which they were asked to make their entries. However, before they received the diary entry file, the diarists were asked to answer four basic questions about the form and role of the governance network and their personal background for participating in it. When they had returned the diary entry file, they were asked to answer four final questions about their personal role in the governance network and

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its contribution to effective and democratic governance. The questions and answers, which were also sent via e-mail, had the form of a structured supplement to the more open and unstructured diary writing. The gatekeepers were informed about the diary writing project and asked to inform the network about it. The formal network members were given a written description of the objectives, procedures and deadlines of the diary writing project at the end of a personal interview and asked to write and submit a diary for the requested period in return for a small honorarium. Most of those interviewed agreed to participate in the diary writing project, and we ended up receiving a total of eight network diaries. Generally, our observations of formal network meetings provided valuable knowledge about the actual patterns of interaction and the internal and external exclusions of actors. They gave us a first-hand impression of the role and functioning of the local governance networks and helped to identify the dominant actors. The network diaries provided important knowledge about the informal interactions among various actors between the formal meetings and about how the network actors interpreted and evaluated both the formal meetings and their informal contacts. However, not everything went well in the data collection. First, a major problem occurred when we were denied access to the network meeting in Køge around which the diary writing was structured. Our gatekeeper had helped us to get permission to observe a particular network meeting, but a few days before the meeting the permission was suddenly withdrawn. The reason we were given was that some of the items on the agenda were so sensitive and conflict-laden that the meeting would be held behind closed doors. This clearly showed that important political conflicts were being played out in the governance network and that was in itself interesting. However, the failure to observe the particular meeting meant that the intended triangulation of what we observed in the meeting with what the diarists recorded about the meeting had to be abandoned in Køge where we had received the largest number of diaries. Since we received very few diaries in Birmingham and Grenoble it did not make sense to make a comparison of the observations and the diaries there either. In order to avoid being caught in a similar situation in the future, it will be important to try to make a more binding contract with the governance networks regarding access to relevant meetings and to enhance the network actors’ trust in the researchers. Second, there was another unforeseen problem in the meetings we observed. Despite our eager attempt to acquaint ourselves with the scene of local employment policy, it proved to be quite difficult to follow the often rather technical discussions in the observed meetings. We had to

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concentrate a lot on the substantive and technical issues in order to understand what was going on and that made it difficult to keep the analytical focus on the pattern of interaction. This is evidenced by the observation reports which are much longer and more detailed in relation to the meetings in Køge where there were two observers than in Birmingham and Grenoble where there was only one observer. Finally, it proved to be much easier to get the network actors in Køge to write and submit network diaries than in Birmingham and Grenoble. Hence, we received five diaries in Køge, but only two in Birmingham and one in Grenoble. From the very beginning, we expected that it would be difficult to get the busy network actors to take the time to keep a diary. For that reason we offered each of the diarists a small honorarium of 200 euros on the return of their diary. But this did not create a strong enough incentive for all the potential diarists to write and submit a diary – or at least not in Birmingham and Grenoble where some of the public employees apparently felt that they could not receive the honorarium. This might have discouraged some of the public actors that tend to dominate the local governance networks in Birmingham and Grenoble. Still, it is difficult to explain why there was such a big difference in the willingness to write and submit diaries in the three localities. We applied exactly the same procedure in all three cases. Hence, formal network actors were informed about the diary writing project in writing and personally asked whether they would like to participate. They were guaranteed that the diaries would be treated anonymously. The instructions about the diary writing were repeated in the mail forwarding the introductory questions. Those who did not return the introductory questions on time were sent several reminders and they were finally sent the diary entry file, so that they could begin writing the diary on the specified date. Nevertheless, while the same number of diarists were recruited in all three cases, the return rates were much lower in Birmingham and Grenoble than in Køge. This can be explained by two general factors. The first has to do with the diarists’ feeling of nearness and obligation to the researchers. Whereas the diary writers in Køge might have felt a high degree of cultural and spatial proximity to the Danish research team, the diarists in Birmingham and Grenoble might have felt that the Danish researchers were strange, distant and unlikely to be seen again. This feeling of distance might have reduced their commitment to the promise of keeping and submitting a diary. In future studies the problem of the lack of proximity between the researchers and the governance network might be solved by collaborating with local researchers who are well known by the network actors.

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Another important factor concerns the relative integration of the network actors into the governance network. There is a clear pattern indicating that those who did not submit a diary are not so well integrated in the network as those who submitted a diary. Hence, we might hypothesize that the more that the network actors identify with the governance network, the more interested they will be in contributing to a research project that might help to improve the functioning of their governance network. Problems with varying degrees of identification with the governance network in question are difficult to solve. A conscious selection of diarists with a high degree of identification will give a very biased result. However, the failure to get the less integrated network actors to submit a diary will produce a similar bias. In addition to the two general factors, there are also some more specific factors that might help to explain the low return rates in Birmingham and Grenoble. Hence, in the ESG in Birmingham, the meeting around which the diary writing project was structured was suddenly postponed and that forced us to reschedule and extend the diary writing process. The complications that this may have caused for the diarists probably made some of them pull out. In the PLIE in Grenoble, the diary writing project coincided with a major crisis in the governance network that the diarists might not have wanted to share with outsiders through a personal diary. At least, it would have required a larger amount of trust on their part. Whatever the reasons for the low return rates in Birmingham and Grenoble, the methodological consequences for the present study are grave. Hence, it makes little sense to make cross-national comparisons based on such a low and varying number of diaries. As a consequence we decided to limit our ambitions to an exploratory assessment of diary studies as a means of identifying informal network interactions. However, despite the unforeseen problems that arose in the process of data collection, the combined use of observation and diary writing in the three local case studies produced very interesting data material that we shall now consider in greater detail.

7.4

The data material and how it was analysed

The data material consisted of six observation reports and eight network diaries including the diarists’ answers to the mini-survey that was conducted before and after the diary writing. The observation reports are from 6 to 14 pages long and are structured by the questions set out in the observation guide. First, there are observations concerning the overall character of the network meeting: Where and how was the meeting held?

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Who was participating? What was on the agenda? Then, there are observations about governance: How, and on which basis, were the individual participants acting? How were they interacting? What were the patterns of influence and conflict? How was the network metagoverned by various political authorities? Finally, there are observations about democracy: How was the external democracy functioning in terms of representation, publicity and accountability? How was the internal democracy functioning in terms of respect for common democratic norms, equality in deliberation and decision and handling of conflicts? How were the network actors empowered by the participation in the network? Observations were not made in relation to all the questions in the observation guide and a closer look at some of the observations reveals minor differences in how the different observers interpreted the questions. For example, whereas one observation report seemed to interpret metagovernance in terms of the external regulation of the network, another observation report seems to have interpreted metagovernance in terms of the external funding of network activities. Both interpretations are perfectly valid, and although they focus on different aspects of metagovernance, it is impossible to judge whether the two observers were looking for different things or just found different things. The mini-survey conducted in relation to the network diaries posed eight questions and asked the diarists to provide open answers. The first four questions aimed to get the diarists to describe the local scene for the enactment of network governance and ask them to identify the employment policy network he or she participated in, to account for the relevant actors that are either included or excluded from the network, to define the main objective of the network, and to describe his or her personal background for participating in the network. The last four questions aimed to get the diarists to reflect upon and evaluate the network processes that have been recorded in the network diary and ask the diarists to assess the overall contribution of the governance network to the formulation and implementation of active employment policy, their own role in the network, and the problems and potentials of the governance network in relation to the demand for effective and democratic governance. Despite the open answers, which make it difficult to summarize them, the survey questions are very helpful, especially in relation to illuminating inclusion and exclusion, the network actors’ background, and the problems of the governance network in relation to the production of effective and democratic governance. Hence, many answers point to the fact that the unemployed are consistently excluded from the governance network. The answers also document the network actors’ large

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experience with and knowledge of local employment policy. Moreover, they highlight the contribution of the local governance networks to interorganizational coordination, funding of new projects and initiatives, and the creation of possibilities for a range of actors to influence the output side of the public sector. Last but not least, the answers raise concerns about the predominance of certain actors in the network, the lack of accountability of the governance network as a whole, and the network actors’ failure to fully represent their respective organizations. We were very curious about the content of the network diaries. How long and detailed would they be and would they provide new insights vis-à-vis the qualitative interviews that we had conducted? First of all, the network diaries were not overly long, but varied from 2 to 6 pages and from 3 to 17 entries. Not surprisingly, the length and number of entries roughly corresponded with the self-reported centrality of the diarists. The more central the actors, the more entries they made. The entries were made in relation to a wide range of formal and informal contacts, meetings and events, which for the most part included other formal members of the network. This indicates that the big formal meetings in the local governance networks are just the tip of the iceberg that hides a lot of informal interaction. Quite surprisingly, there were very few entries in relation to contacts via e-mail, letters and phone calls. Since we are convinced that there are many such contacts among the network actors, the problem seems to be that the diaries do not capture these contacts. This may be due to our failure to instruct the diarists to include such contacts. We did not specify what kind of contacts the diarists should record and they may have interpreted contact as face-to-face contact. Many of the diarists’ entries are defensive and protect the diarist as they merely provide factual and descriptive accounts of the contacts and events that they encountered. For example, a diarist from Birmingham attended a meeting in a local Access to Employment Group and remarked: ‘The meeting was open to local employers, but poorly attended. I decided to return to my office in the afternoon to complete my status report for the ESG.’ Others take a more evaluative approach and make brief comments about the relative success of the various meetings and contacts in achieving what they were supposed to achieve. For example, another diarist from Birmingham remarked: ‘Very useful meeting to develop a coordinated response across all agencies’, and later in relation to a different meeting: ‘We were slowly reaching a consensus.’ Finally, many of the diary entries provide emotional responses to the contacts and events in the network, expressing personal grievances about the decisions that were made and the inappropriate behaviour of other network

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actors. For example, a diarist from the LCC in Køge noted: ‘I was really dissatisfied with the decisions that were made, and I found it hard to listen to all the success stories from the municipality in Køge’ and later ‘I was sad to discover that the secretary of the LCC is stopping.’ A diarist from Grenoble aired a personal frustration over the development of the network by asking: ‘How shall we ever be able to overcome the financial obstacles to the construction of a true partnership?’ The small but significant number of emotional responses demonstrates the value-added of diaries vis-à-vis qualitative interviews, where it is often difficult to elicit this kind of response. As for the content of the network diaries, we clearly see a lot of very different comments. Some of the diarists mostly comment on the political decisions and the functioning of the governance networks. Other diarists tend to reflect on their own role and strategies in relation to the other network actors. Finally, some diarists are merely preoccupied with speculations about hidden agendas and the other actors’ strategies. The latter is quite clear in the diaries from the representatives of the small, southern municipalities in the LCC in Køge, which is about to break up and become reorganized as a result of a large municipal reform passed by the Danish Parliament. The first step in the analysis of the data material consisted in reading the observation reports and the network diaries in order to establish a general picture of the formal and informal network interaction seen both through the eyes of the external observer and through the eyes of the participants. It soon became clear that both the observation reports and the network diaries contained many interesting points that could be used to characterize the interaction in the three local governance networks on various dimensions. The problem was how to be able to say something about the external and internal inclusion of social and political actors in the three governance networks. There were no explicit questions about external and internal exclusion in either the observation guide or the diary instructions, and the mini-survey, conducted in relation to the diaries, included only a rather general question about the inclusion and exclusion of relevant policy actors. However, questions about external and internal exclusion were implicit in many of the questions in the observation guide and were also dealt with spontaneously by some of the diarists. In order to undertake a systematic search for answers to the questions about external and internal exclusion, we coded the observation reports and diary data according to the analytical questions shown in Table 7.1. Since the number of observation reports and network diaries was relatively small we did not use any of the available

164 Table 7.1

Analysing external and internal exclusion

Observation reports

Network diaries

External exclusion

Internal exclusion

Are there any formally appointed network actors who are not present at the formal meeting in the governance network?

Do the physical and organizational circumstances of the meetings help to breed trust, a good atmosphere and equal participation?

Why are they not present?

How much do the different actors participate in the meeting? Who are the most active/inactive?

Are there participants in the meeting who are not formally appointed?

Who appears to be the most influential actor(s) and what seems to be the source of their influence?

What is their role?

Are there examples of direct power, indirect power or manipulated consensus?

Are there any references to relevant actors who are not present?

Is there a particular understanding of the values, objectives, problems, solutions, etc. that favours some actors rather than others?

Are norms and rules for inclusion/exclusion explicitly or implicitly invoked?

Are there institutional rules that favour some actors rather than others?

Who of the formal members from the network are the diarists in contact with, how often, and about what?

Are there contacts before the network meeting in order to prepare interventions in the meeting?

How are these contacts evaluated?

How were these contacts evaluated?

Who else do the diarists have contact with, how often and about what?

How is the big, formal meeting evaluated by the diarists?

How are these contacts evaluated?

How do the diarists perceive their own role and influence in the network?

What seems to determine who the diarists have contact with?

How do the diarists perceive the other network actors’ role and influence?

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software programs in the coding process, but coded the data material manually by marking successive parts of texts with an appropriate description of the content indicating which analytical aspect they help to illuminate. In order to check the reliability and validity of our coding we compared two independent codings of the same network diary, but we only found minor differences between the two codings. The final step in the analysis was to interpret the different parts of text in the context of the information and knowledge we had acquired through the interviews and documents that we had analysed earlier on.

7.5

Analysing observations and diaries: some tentative research results

Instead of presenting some clear-cut conclusions about the pattern of interaction in the local governance networks, we aim to show how the observation reports and the network diaries can be used in answering the crucial questions about the external and internal exclusion of actors detailed in Table 7.1. But before we do that, we shall briefly describe the patterns of interaction in the three governance networks on the basis of our reading of the observation reports and the network diaries. The general account of the internal network interactions will provide the background for the more detailed and specific analysis of the external and internal exclusion of actors. 7.5.1

The patterns of interaction in the local governance networks

The observation reports and network diaries from Køge add a lot of detail to the general picture of the network painted in Chapter 3. All the meetings in the LCC are apparently held in the City Hall in Køge and that is a clear indication of who is in control. The formal meeting for the entire network takes place in a nice and comfortable meeting room. Tea, coffee and snacks are served and the participants are seated at two different tables: one for the formally appointed members of the LCC and one for the administrative ‘observers’ who are not formal members of the network. All the participants meet on time and the large majority of them stay to the end of the meeting. With few exceptions, the organizations are not represented by their highest-ranking leaders. One of the public administrators is very active in the discussions, while the rest of them are rather passive and merely help to clarify technical issues. The politicians are, with the exception of the chair, not very active, and the social partners are mainly active when more concrete issues are discussed. Knowledge and the ability to

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identify and define policy problems seem to be the key resources for the network actors in the ongoing discussions and negotiations, but connections to the private labour market are also a central asset. Whereas the meeting in the administrative subgroup is rather informal and chaotic, the general meeting for all the network actors is formal and orderly. The actors seem to be quite preoccupied with formalities. Hence, there are a lot of discussions about the formal competence of the governance network and about whether or not to fund different concrete employment projects. By contrast, there seem to be very few political and strategic discussions of the overall goals and direction of the local employment policy. This observation is supported by the interviews and the minutes from other meetings. Both the administrative and organizational participants appear to be knowledgeable and well prepared for the meeting, whereas the politicians appear to be less well prepared. The actors seem to operate on the basis of a clear conception of their respective interests. At the same time, they all tend to recognize the need for cooperation and coordination. However, this does not mean that there is consensus about everything. In fact, there are persistent conflicts between public actors who aim to get funding for projects and activities run by the municipalities and the social partners who only want to fund private projects and activities. In addition, the trade unions have a preference for projects helping the weak unemployed and the employers have a preference for projects based on partnerships with private firms. The chair of the LCC (an elected politician who appeared to be rather ‘strong’ in a prior interview) leads the meeting, but one of the executive administrators often takes over the leadership by defining the problems to be discussed and summing up the conclusions. As a result, the chairman’s role is reduced to one of merely calling on people when it is their turn to speak. At times, there is a heated debate, but people tend to respect each other and their position can be changed by good arguments. There is a clear norm of consensus seeking through deliberation and many network actors regret that a vote was taken at the previous meeting. A trade union representative reported that she had received complaints about her voting from people in her own organization. The social partners seem to be more bound by mandates negotiated in their own preparatory meetings than by mandates issued by their respective organizations. The meeting generally seems to be preoccupied with negative coordination as a lot of time is spent on discussions about who is responsible for what and how to reduce conflicts and clashes between different actors and interests. The politicians want to increase the number of elected politicians in the LCC, but according to the legal regulations this is not possible without

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simultaneously increasing the number of social partners’ seats. The legal statutes demand that the municipalities must never have the majority of the seats in the LCC. Some of the administrators make comments in their diaries about the failure to include the unemployed and ordinary citizens in the governance network. In the meeting, concerns were raised about the lack of publicity in relation to the governance network and its activities. It is important to contact the local press in order to generate publicity about new initiatives. Internally, the network actors respect the common democratic norms about permitting everybody to speak, making explicit conclusions and approving the agenda and the minutes. There are no attempts to involve the passive actors and silence is taken as approval. The network seems to enhance participation and bring public and private actors together around the distribution of centrally provided funding. There is considerable room for conflict about how to spend the money, but the actors do not seem to be very concerned about the outcomes of the projects they fund. In Birmingham, the leading partners take turns holding the formal meetings in the ESG. We observed one meeting held in the central administrative building in the Birmingham City Council (the Alpha Tower) and two meetings held at the premises of the Learning and Skills Council. Tea, coffee and biscuits were served at all three meetings. People seem to know each other well and make small talk on arrival. The participants sat so that everybody could see each other and there seemed to be no systematic pattern to how people chose to sit. There were apologies from the representatives from the municipality of Solihull and the chairman of the ESG offered to talk to them about their frequent absence. Two participants arrived late because they were busy with other meetings. Several of the participating agencies and organizations were represented by relatively high-ranking administrators. Besides the formally appointed members, there was a secretary and a few guests who were also attending the meeting. The meeting was formal and professional and largely followed the written agenda. There was room for small comments, jokes and laughs, but in some cases there were also clear signs of tension and disagreement between the leading partners. The participants seemed to be well prepared. Several papers had been circulated in advance and more papers were circulated during the meeting. Many of the participants had been asked to prepare brief interventions in relation to the items on the agenda. Knowledge seemed to be the key resource in the negotiations and in some of the more technical discussions several of the participants seemed to be lost. The interests of the participating actors were not clearly voiced in the debates, and there

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seemed to be a common agenda about the need to enhance coordination and alignment of targets and resources. The debates were based on rather explicit norms about ‘trust’ and ‘true partnership’. Administrative questions about the funding of new projects and the monitoring of old projects were dealt with in the administrative subgroup, and that left considerable space for more proactive discussions about future funding, changing conditions and new initiatives. These discussions did not seem to rest on a common strategy or on common goals. However, the formulation of a joint strategy based on a positive coordination of the funding and activities of the different actors was discussed in both of the observed ESG meetings. Several drafts of a joint strategy with common objectives and priorities have been written, but the future of the governance network seems to be uncertain because the government’s new Local Area Agreement encourages closer cooperation and coordination between the public agencies at the local level. It is not clear whether closer institutional cooperation between the main partners will somehow make the ESG redundant. External conditions like the Local Area Agreement were discussed a lot in the meetings. So were the external sources of funding in terms of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and the European Social Funds. There was no reference to the NAP, but curiously enough, there were frequent references to the need to enhance the ‘employability’ of the unemployed, a term which clearly comes from the NAP and the EU’s Employment Guidelines. Common democratic norms were generally followed. The agenda and the minutes of the last meeting were jointly approved. People spoke one after the other and tended to respect each other’s opinions. With a few exceptions, everybody participated in the debate. However, the chair and the leading figures from the main partners spoke much more and much longer than the rest of the network actors. The chair seemed to introduce and conclude all the discussions and he also commented on nearly everything said by the other participants. Hence, there was a starshaped pattern of communication with the chair in the centre. In relation to the external social and political context, concerns were raised about the publicity of the ESG and there was a discussion of a report to be delivered to the Birmingham Strategic Partnership (BSP) as a part of a performance management exercise. This discussion clearly contributes to holding the ESG accountable for its performance, although it is unclear what will happen if the BSP is critical of the ESG. In Grenoble we observed a meeting in a technico-administrative committee (CTO) that is a subgroup of the PLIE, rather than a meeting for the entire network. The meeting was, like all other PLIE meetings, held

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in the Metro building, which is the headquarters of the cooperative association of the 27 municipalities in the Grenoble metropolitan area, and also where the PLIE has its staff offices. Hence, as in Køge and Birmingham, the network meetings take place in the centre of power and that gives the local governance networks a certain prestige. The PLIE meetings normally take place in a small meeting room where the participants sit so that everybody can see each other, but this particular meeting took place in a small conference hall with the technical equipment required for displaying PLIE’s new web page on a big screen. The participants had to sit in rows, and tea and coffee were available outside the conference hall. People arrived in good time for the meeting, and, except for one, everybody stayed to the end. There were more participants than normal because the meeting was to discuss criticisms of the local initiatives for the young unemployed (les Missions Locales). Some of the participants were not regular members of the technico-administrative committee, but administrative assistants and invited guests. Additional papers for the meeting were circulated and the participants registered their presence on a list that was circulated because they are paid an allowance of expenses for each meeting they attend. The participants generally seemed to be well prepared for the meeting and several people had been asked to prepare answers to particular questions in advance. Most of the items on the agenda were about monitoring, or critically evaluating, the existing activities and assessing the need for coordination. There were no strategic or proactive discussions about new initiatives, or about the overall objectives in the local employment policy. This is not surprising since it was a meeting in the technico-administrative subgroup of the PLIE. However, interviews and the minutes from other meetings confirm that strategic and proactive discussions are rare. Most of the participants in the meeting take part in the discussions that occur within a relatively formal setting, but tend to be quite lively with occasional tensions and conflicts that arise when the functional interests and domains of the participating agencies are manifested. The administrative leader of the PLIE chaired the meeting. He introduced and concluded the discussions. There seemed to be plenty of room for criticism, although the diary seems to suggest that these often have little, if any, effect. There were even repeated criticisms of the meetings in the PLIE, which are accused of taking up a lot of time and energy. Nevertheless, the meeting was generally conducted in an honest and respectful atmosphere. The network actors respected the standard democratic norms for interaction in the sense that they followed the agenda, respected and made room for each other, aimed to reach a consensus through deliberation

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and permit conflicts and criticisms to arise. There was relatively equal participation in discussion and decision-making and there were explicit discussions of the need for more publicity and more focus on outputs and outcomes. The accountability of the network was ensured in and through reports to the funding agencies about how the money is spent. There were discussions in the meeting about how important it is to get the private employers to take responsibility for the integration of the unemployed into the labour market, but that does not give rise to any reflections about how to include the employers, or more generally the social partners, in the governance network. 7.5.2

External exclusion in the local governance networks

The observation reports can help us to assess the pattern of participation and the prevalence of external exclusion. The first question in the upper left quadrant of Table 7.1 concerns the formally appointed network actors who were not present at the observed meeting. The observation report from the ESG meetings in Birmingham sheds light on this. At the beginning of the meeting it was noted that the representatives from the small municipality of Solihull were absent. Their recurrent absence is problematic as it hampers intermunicipal coordination. The chair offered to have a talk with the representatives from Solihull about their frequent absence from the ESG meetings, but why they are absent and what can be done about it were not discussed, despite interviews that show they feel marginalized by the Birmingham-centred agenda of the ESG. It seems to be accepted that Solihull is not an active participant in the network. They are not consciously excluded since their participation would clearly be welcomed by the network, but they are excluded by default since there is no attempt to make more room for issues of special relevance to Solihull. Just as there may be formally appointed actors who are consistently absent, there may also be participants in the meetings of the local governance networks who are not formally appointed. The observation reports enable us to see who is actually participating in the network meetings. In Birmingham there were different guests invited to the meetings and this is a way of facilitating flexible network participation. More peripheral actors can be drawn in when needed. In Grenoble, the administrative staff of the PLIE and administrative shadows of the politicians participated in the meeting, although they are not formal members. That is also the case in the LCC in Køge. The observation report explains the set-up: The formally appointed members of the LCC sit at one table and one public administrator from each of the four municipalities sit at

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another table. The fact that the administrators are placed at another table is to ‘remind everybody that we are not members of the council’, as one of the administrators whispered to us at the beginning of the first meeting. Nevertheless, one of the public administrators from the administrators’ table is very active in the meetings. In fact, he is more active than many of the formal members at the other table. The rest of the administrators are not very active and only answer the questions they are asked by the formal network members. The same goes for the secretary of the network and one of the executive administrators who are sitting next to the chair at the formally appointed members’ table. This extract from the observation report from Køge clearly demonstrates that the governance network is less exclusive than the official account of the membership might suggest and that the administrators are recognized as important network actors in their own right. The law states that the politicians should be represented in the network, and since these are supposed to head the public administration, there is no need to include the public administrators in the network. In fact, their inclusion could be seen as a democratic problem since the public administrators are not democratically elected. However, since the elected politicians at the local level are not professional, full-time politicians, they are not really heading the administration and they certainly do not have any detailed knowledge of what is going on at the administrative level. In order to compensate for this gap, six public administrators are informally included in the network, but in order to solve the democratic problem they are given a secondary status as observers. Most of the administrators accept this secondary role, but as we can see, a strong and strategic administrator is unlikely to be content with the role of a passive observer, especially where the elected politicians do not exercise strong political leadership. The observation reports also provide examples of the participants in the meeting mentioning relevant actors who are not included in the network. Hence, the observation report from Birmingham reports on a heated discussion of an action plan submitted by an important community-based organization, Enterprising Communities. Enterprising Communities has received Neighbourhood Renewal Funds (NRF) funding for a large, local employment project, but the funding is conditional upon the ESG’s approval of its action plan. However, the ESG is highly sceptical about the action plan, which is said to be too loose and generally ‘not worth the money’. The action plan is also accused of not being a result of a ‘true partnership’. This refers to Enterprising Communities’ fierce opposition

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to consultations with the ESG. In fact, Enterprising Communities has excluded itself from the ESG, which it conceives of as a ‘systemic’ network of public actors that would compromise its autonomous status as a civil society organization. The norms and rules governing the inclusion and exclusion of actors are also illuminated by the observation reports. There are two good examples of this. The first example is from Køge where the politicians suggested that each municipality should be able to appoint two politicians to the LCC, just as the social partners have two seats each. This triggered a heated discussion about the right size and composition of the network. The actors agreed that the network should not be too big, but they strongly disagreed about the number of seats each group of actors should have. The debate ended when the leading public administrator made it clear that according to the law, the politicians must not outnumber the social partners in the network. This shows that, although participation can be problematized in the name of equality, the actors accept the legal regulation of the membership as an incontestable fact. The legal metagovernance of inclusion and exclusion brings the discussions of how many representatives the different actors should have in the network to a close. The other example is from Birmingham. In one of the meetings the chair reminded participants of the apparently self-regulated norm for inclusion and exclusion in the network that defines the ESG as a network of ‘strategic actors’. This norm explains why the community-based organization Netwerc is not included in the ESG. Netwerc is a highly relevant actor that coordinates the activities of the local Employment Resources Centres, but it has been forced to work on the basis of a contract with Birmingham City Council, and it is therefore defined as a ‘provider’ rather than a ‘strategic actor’. However, the exclusion of Netwerc makes it difficult to explain why other private contractors such as Pertemps, Work Direct and Business Links are included. The chair claimed that this is because these private contractors can be considered strategic actors because of their size. However, the observations of the meetings make it hard to see in which sense the private contractors act as strategic actors. Most of the private contractors sent their apologies to the Employment Strategy Operations Group meeting; they did not introduce any items onto the agenda in the normal ESG meetings; and they were extremely passive during the general discussions in the meetings. This shows that the norms governing inclusion and exclusion are either inconsistently applied or, at least, it is possible to stretch them very far. The network diaries also help to establish the patterns of inclusion and exclusion by answering the questions raised in the lower left quadrant

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of Table 7.1. Most of the diary entries are written in relation to meetings and contacts with the actors who are also present in the big, formal meetings in local governance networks. As the French diarist remarked: ‘Again I find myself in a meeting with all the usual actors from the PLIE.’ There are a few meetings, whether in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble, where the diarists get to meet other actors with whom they have a much weaker link. Hence, there are occasional meetings with private firms, public employers and community-based organizations, and these meetings tend to broaden the participation in the governance network and reduce the external exclusion. However, the influence of the ‘additional’ actors on the decisions in the network appears to be minimal. So, all in all, the local governance networks seem to be relatively closed. 7.5.3

Internal exclusion in the local governance networks

Formal or informal participation in the local governance networks does not guarantee that everybody has an equal chance to influence the network’s political decisions. Not only will the network actors have different resources, but institutional and discursive conditions will tend to favour the formulation, advancement and realization of some political strategies rather than others. The observation reports help to identify the actual patterns of influence by answering the questions raised in the upper right quadrant of Table 7.1. The first question about the physical and organizational conditions of network interaction in the formal meetings is well covered by the observation reports. All the meetings tended to take place on prestigious premises with nice meeting rooms where the tables were arranged in a way that encourages broad participation and interaction between equals. Tea, coffee and snacks were served in order to make sure that everybody felt welcome. An exception was the meeting in the subgroup of the PLIE in Grenoble which was held in a conference hall where the participants were seated so that they could not see each other and this is considered a breach of the logic of appropriateness. However, the attempt to provide a prestigious, egalitarian and welcoming environment for the network meetings cannot prevent patterns of unequal influence from arising. The most important and resourceful actors take over the scene, and there are no deliberate attempts in any of the three networks to counteract this, for example, by initiating a round where all the participants in the meeting are asked to express their opinion about a particular issue. Observations of network meetings provide rich opportunities for identifying instances of direct and indirect power. At the ESG meeting in

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Birmingham there was a long discussion of the consequences of the government’s Local Area Agreement (LAA). The chair dominated the discussion entirely. He has a great deal of knowledge of the field of employment policy and he speaks well, often and for a very long time. During one of his long interventions he got up and walked to the other end of the room to get a cup of coffee, while, apparently, expecting everybody to listen carefully to his speech. He sat down again, and during his next intervention he suddenly turned around to face one of the few other persons capable of challenging him in the discussions and asked him directly: ‘Are you OK with this?’ That speech act appeared as a clear demonstration of his power. Certainly, the potential opposition was completely demolished by this gesture. During his long speeches the chair tended to reveal the basis of his great power and influence. He constantly referred to his external networking with leading politicians, executive directors and other key power holders. He even presented an unofficial document about the LAA that was collected again after the participants in the meeting had had a quick look at it. That kind of networking is impossible for the other network actors to match and the result is a very unequal power relation between the well-connected chair and the rest of the network. Power is not always exercised in such a direct way. In the meeting in the technico-administrative subgroup of the PLIE in Grenoble, there is a good example of indirect power through the control of the agenda. When some of the participants began to voice serious criticisms of the local employment policy, the chair first repeatedly said that the criticisms had been noted and then finally silenced the critical voices by saying that such politically motivated criticisms should not be discussed in the technico-administrative committee, which is only supposed to deal with technical and administrative questions. There are clear examples of direct and indirect power in the network meetings, but the question is whether these power games systematically marginalize particular actors in the network. There is a risk that the same group of strong actors will tend to dominate the agenda setting and the actual decisions. The role of the informal network in the LCC in Køge would be an example of that. However, the presence of institutionalized norms about consensus seeking in all three networks seems to give the weak actors a certain power of veto. This forces the strong actors to take the views and opinions of the weak actors into account, though the strong actors might try to co-opt the weaker actors by creating a manipulated consensus. Discursive power can also be used by all the actors in the network in a way that tends to marginalize particular actors. The observation of the

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PLIE meeting in Grenoble provides a good example. The discourse pervading the governance network is very technical and it requires a detailed knowledge of the local employment policy to participate in the debate. This tends to marginalize the politicians and the social partners – not to mention the unemployed, who would certainly not have much chance of understanding what is going on if they were invited to participate in the governance network. The network diaries contribute to uncovering the patterns of influence in the network by answering the questions that are raised in the lower right quadrant of Table 7.1. The diaries of the network actors from Køge show that both the small municipalities and the social partners hold preparatory meetings before the formal meetings in the governance network. The meeting between the two small municipalities which are going to be kicked out of the network as a result of the municipal reform is more informal and circumstantial than the preparatory meeting between the social partners. The latter seems to be a regular meeting and it includes a highly influential representative from the employers’ organization, which is not a formal member of the LCC, but is a part of the informal network that tends to govern it. In one of the diaries we are told that the preparatory meeting between the social partners ‘aimed to produce a mutual adjustment of the expectations of the main meeting in the LCC, and discussed what the social partners could achieve in relation to the future organizational changes’. Unfortunately, there are no reflections about the result or the impact of the preparatory meetings. Nor are there any entries about the preparatory meetings between the social partners and the executive administrators that together constitute the inner circle of the governance network. The existence and impact of these meetings are covered by the interviews. As previously explained, the diaries provide very few evaluations of the formal network meetings. However, in the Grenoble diary we find several complaints about the predominance of the financing bodies in the decisions taken at the formal meeting in the governance network. The financing bodies tend to have a lot of power since they can decide to put more or less resources into the network, depending on what they think they will get for the money. This is very different from the governance networks in Køge and Birmingham, which both have their own financial means. However, despite the predominance of the financing bodies vis-à-vis the service-delivering bodies, the diarist feels that the arguments of the latter are taken well into account by the former. Hence, money is not the only important resource; knowledge and good arguments also seem to play a role.

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One of the Køge diaries gives a valuable insight into the self-perceived role of the secretary for the governance network. She is going to quit her job after the next meeting and in her diary she reflects on her role as a metagovernor: ‘My tasks revolve around networking: keeping the kettle boiling, phoning up people, asking about this or that, making sure that things happen as agreed, following up and support. I think my tasks are quite unusual compared to the normal tasks of a secretary.’ She is, no doubt, very active between the meetings, but the observation studies show that she is not very active in the meetings where she is merely answering technical questions and helping the chair to lead the meeting. Her role is to facilitate interaction and keep things together. She also has separate meetings with the different municipalities and everybody thinks that she is very helpful and impartial. Her metagovernance is extremely important in helping all the different actors to be able to influence the decisions of the network and in her diary she wonders why nobody has ever appreciated her job before the day she was quitting it. Network diaries can also be used to shed light on how the individual actors perceive the role of the other network actors. In Køge there are several remarks about how the chair must constantly rely on the administrators to clarify things. But there is also a highly interesting diary entry that shows the chair’s political skills and commitment to deliberation. In the crucial meeting, where it is decided that two of the small municipalities should leave the network, the decision was already taken in advance by the chair from Køge and the elected politician from the small municipality that is going to become fused with the municipality of Køge. A diarist describes how the chair handled this in the meeting: The chair seems a bit nervous, more than normally. She has the paper with the joint decision in her hand, but instead of presenting it right away to the other participants in the meeting, she opens up a long discussion about the future that lasts for about 45 minutes. All the usual people participate in the debate, which finally arrives at exactly the same decision as the one written down on the piece of paper that the chair holds in her hand. Hence, although the chair could have presented the governance network with a fait accompli, the deliberative logic of appropriateness in the network and the chair’s concern for maintaining good relations with everybody in the future means that further deliberation is preferred to a political dictate.

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We shall not attempt to draw any firm conclusions about external and internal exclusion in the three local governance networks, but the examples above make it clear that the observation and diary studies are helpful in identifying the patterns of participation and influence in a much more detailed and direct way than interviews. The strength of the observation reports is that they provide a fairly structured input to answering the questions posed by the researcher, whereas the strength of the less structured network diaries is that they cover the period between the formal meetings. However, the limitation of the network diaries is that they are not particularly rich in personal evaluations of the events and contacts that they are recording. This might be because the diarists have not been properly instructed, or because the diarists find it difficult to reveal their personal feelings in the diaries.

7.6

Concluding remarks on the use of observation and diaries in network studies

Compared to interviews, observation and diary studies provide a relatively unmediated access to the formal and informal interaction among the social and political actors engaged in network-based policy processes. Observation studies enable the researcher to get a direct experience of the multifaceted interaction process in formal meetings, whereas diary studies facilitate a relatively unstructured, personal and contemporaneous account of significant events and contacts in situations which are not amenable to observation. The data material produced by the observer and the diarist provide a valuable source for studying patterns of participation and influence and for uncovering the rules, norms and discourses that create and sustain different forms of external and internal exclusion. However, the advantages of observation and diary studies in terms of the open and relatively unstructured envisioning of social and political interaction also constitute a serious disadvantage as the contingent and somewhat impressionistic character of the observations and diary entries makes it difficult to conduct a systematic analysis of the data material. Hence, there is no guarantee that the observations and diary entries will actually illuminate the research questions formulated by the researcher. However, when used in combination with other methods, observation and diary studies can help to provide crucial insights into the multifarious interactions that would not otherwise have been obtained. The methodological design applied in the present study can be improved in many different respects. Trust building and a binding contract

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with the governance network might have prevented the unfortunate cancellation of our scheduled participation in the formal network meeting in Køge. The use of two observers in Birmingham and Grenoble would have increased the focus on the interactions during the meetings and might have produced better and richer observation reports. An alliance with local researchers and personal contacts with the diarists, for example, through phone calls in the crucial days before the beginning of the diary period, might have increased the return rates in Birmingham and Grenoble. Finally, interviews based on the network diaries would have helped to interpret some of less comprehensible remarks and further illuminated some of the interesting reflections. It is also possible to develop the methodological design by making video recordings of the formal meetings in order to be able to do microlevel analysis of particular exchanges during the meeting. In a study with more resources it would also be interesting to follow some of the network actors during a week or two to see who they meet with, how and when. In order to reduce the transaction costs of the diarists it might be useful to provide each of them with a Dictaphone and a few tapes and let them record their diary entries. The Dictaphone has the obvious advantage of being easy to use and portable, making recordings even more contemporaneous and spontaneous than written diaries. As such, new technologies can be extremely useful in observation and diary studies. However, it is our firm belief that even old-fashioned observation and diary writing can be a valuable source for the study of democratic network governance.

8 Interactive Focus Group Interviewing in Studies of Network Governance Bodil Damgaard and Eva Sørensen

8.1

Introduction

Focus group interviewing is a special type of research interviewing that links the interview method with the observation method. The researcher invites a number of selected respondents to participate in a group interview focusing on specific themes selected by the researcher. In the course of the interview, the researcher observes how the participants interact with one another. The method hence produces two outputs: spoken statements from the interviewees and observations registered by the researcher. The particular concern in this chapter is the possible contribution of a specific type of focus group interviewing in studies of governance networks, namely interactive focus group interviews. This specific type of focus group interviewing differs from traditional focus group interviews in at least to ways: firstly, the role of the researcher is reinterpreted from that of being a relatively neutral mediator to that of an active participant in the discussions comprising the interview session. Secondly, the overall idea of the larger research project, its problem definitions, hypotheses and preliminary research findings, which in traditional focus group interviews remain more or less unknown to the respondents, is taken up and debated in the course of the focus group interview itself. Interactive research is currently gaining momentum in the social sciences. The social constructivist turn and the increased call for problemdriven research have directed attention towards the need for interactive research methods that help to qualify the construction of research problems, the collection of relevant data and the evaluation of research results (Ansell 2005; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Silverman 2003; Nowotny et al. 2001; Holstein and Gubrium 1995). Scott et al. as quoted by Ansell define interactive research as: ‘a style of activity where researchers, funding agencies and “user groups” interact 179

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throughout the entire research process, including the definition of the research agenda, project selection, project execution and the application of research insights’ (Ansell 2005: 3). Thus defined, interactive research implies a radical degree of interaction between researchers and respondents that tends to evaporate the very distinction between them. In Ansell’s words, interactive research constitutes ‘a new research strategy that breaks down the artificial barriers between the researcher and the practitioner and promoting more practical research’ (Ansell 2005: 3). While we subscribe to the advantages of making researchers and respondents interact considerably closer than in traditional research, we find it neither possible nor fruitful to ignore their intrinsic differences. Hence, in this chapter we define interactive research in more modest terms as research that seeks to produce data through the study of how respondents react when confronted directly with problem definitions, research questions, research designs and preliminary research results produced by the researcher. Thus defined, interactive research represents yet another methodological tool box that can be drawn upon by researchers in order to produce empirical data. In this study, the purpose of using interactive focus group interviewing is to deepen our understanding of network governance, but we insist that the final analysis is our interpretation of data, although evidently inspired and influenced by arguments put forward by respondents. The chapter is structured in four sections. We first aim to contextualize and describe interactive focus group interviewing as a method of data gathering in general and in relation to governance networks in particular. The specific characteristics of interactive focus group interviewing vis-à-vis traditional focus group interviewing are outlined. Secondly, we offer a description of how the interactive focus group method was applied in the pilot project on multi-level network governance of European employment policy. We report from four case studies – one at the EU level and three at the local level in Køge, Birmingham and Grenoble, respectively – producing a total of six interactive focus group interviews. We consider advantages and disadvantages as well as practical matters when deciding on a specific design. Thirdly, attention is turned to the empirical findings seeking to answer the question of what knowledge was gained using interactive focus group interviewing. In presenting the research findings, we focus on the insights gained about the efficient and democratic functioning of the studied governance networks. In so doing, we focus explicitly on the norms and values prevailing within the governance networks in order to inform our knowledge about the degree to which these norms and values constitute patterns of interaction within the networks that enhance their democratic quality and ability to produce

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efficient governance. Fourthly and finally, we discuss the lessons learned in conducting interactive focus group interviews and analysing/using the results and point to ways in which the method may be improved and developed in the future.

8.2

Interactive focus group interviewing and network governance

Appraising possible contributions of the interactive focus group method in studies of governance networks requires a general understanding of this method and its relationship to adjacent methods. This section aims to provide such understanding in five steps. This is done by offering a brief historical account of the focus group method and its assimilation into the social sciences and by pinpointing its most significant advantages. We then set out to identify the main differences and similarities between the interactive focus group method and other methods: the single respondent interview, the participant observation method, and, particularly, the traditional focus group method. We conclude the section with an outline of how interactive focus group interviews can actually be set up and conducted. The focus group method was first developed in the beginning of the Second World War as a means of measuring the effects of radio programmes on army morale. It quickly spread to marketing, where it was put to use in the identification of consumer reaction to various products and commercials (Berg 1995; Morgan 1988). The method was confined to marketing until the late 1980s, when it was taken up in the social sciences. From there, it has developed into a widely used qualitative research method within the applied social sciences, particularly in evaluation studies, policy analysis and regarding organizational development (Berg 1995: 70). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the ‘focus’ in focus group interviews may either relate to a given structure in the group interviewed or the topic of the interview. As regards the attributes of the ‘group’ in focus groups, the literature is peculiarly inexplicit about what is obtained as opposed to single actor interviews. Berg offers a rare exception (1995: 68). He contends that individuals interviewed in groups have a synergetic effect on the interview, which results in a substantially different outcome compared to having asked the same individuals the same questions one by one. The specificity of focus groups, as opposed to group interviews, Berg claims, is that focus groups deliberately seek to promote criss-cross interaction and dialogue between the participants, and hence occasionally

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transforming the interviewer into an observer of group interaction (1995: 69). The successful entrance of the focus group method in social science is not surprising, since it has much to offer in studies of social interaction. Like other qualitative methods, it is particularly strong when the research is explorative or when the objective is to obtain a deeper and more detailed understanding of a given matter (Oates 2000: 187). However, one important advantage that the focus group method has compared to methods such as single respondent interviewing and observation is that it provides an inexpensive and fast means of producing a large amount of qualitative data. In the very same event, it is possible to interview several respondents and observe their interaction in practice (Berg 1995: 73). Another advantage is that the focus group method provides a means by which to bring together respondents whose relationship and interaction the researcher is particularly interested in studying, for example respondents who would otherwise never have met. In addition, the focus group method provides a way to observe interaction in practice in situations where there are no accessible events to observe. This is particularly relevant in studies of governance networks, as such events are often informal, spontaneous and difficult to locate. While interaction within formal governance networks can be studied through the observation of formal events such as meetings, it is more difficult to identify and gain access to relevant events in informal governance networks. Finally, focus group interviewing provides a rare opportunity to validate statements made by a respondent. While single respondent interviews provide the researcher with few possibilities to corroborate the collected information, focus group interviews ensure some level of in situ verification. The likelihood of a respondent providing misinformation is reduced, because the information may be contested by other participants. This controlling effect, however, is only present when the respondents know one another and have taken part in the same events. Even under such conditions, there may be situations in which all participants subscribe to a incorrect fact or interpretation or where known errors are not corrected given the strategic considerations and social dynamics within the group. The focus group interview at the EU level described below provides an example of this. The focus group method shares many similarities with the single respondent interview (presented in Chapter 6) and the observation method (presented in Chapter 7). Like the single respondent interview, the focus group method produces data about the way informants respond to questions raised by the researcher, and, like the observation method, it provides data about interaction in practice. However, there are also many differences between focus group interviewing and other data collection

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methods. While the single respondent interview produces data about the way in which an individual respondent perceives and interprets a given phenomenon, the focus group interview draws an image of how it is acceptable and meaningful to respond in a group. In other words, it provides data about the logics of appropriateness as well as the power relationships within the group. This renders the method well suited to produce knowledge about how a selected group of respondents construct and negotiate a shared understanding and a narrative about selected topics and related events (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990: 199; Berg 1995: 68). When confronting a group of respondents with a specific question and/or claim, the group must on-site find a way to talk about these issues in a manner that does not challenge the dominating norms and values within the group, the individual and collective identifications among the respondents, as well as the explicit and implicit power relations between them. This enables the researcher to study how different identities interact in order to negotiate and construct shared meaning, shared narratives of various events, and how they cope with the conflicts between them. Applied to the study of governance networks – and above all to informal governance networks – the method is particularly interesting on the grounds that it places the researcher at the heart of the internal functioning of governance networks: how do the network actors interact in order to produce shared narratives that facilitate network cooperation? What collective norms, rules and identifications regulate the interaction within the governance network? And how do these rules, norms and identifications facilitate or hamper efficient and democratic network governance? However, one must consider that the interaction observed in a focus group interview takes place in a constructed setting. Precisely the artificial setting is why observations from a focus group interview deviate from observations gathered via the traditional observation method. The observation method provides an opportunity to observe interaction processes that take place independent of the researcher. The researcher is a passive spectator. The same ideal of an unobtrusive researcher applies to traditional focus group interviews, while, in comparison, interactive focus group interviewing demands a much more active and influential researcher. In both traditional but particularly in interactive focus group interviews, the interaction between the respondents is much more mediated and controlled by the researcher than in an observation study. Focus group interviews therefore tend to produce more focused and guided data but less contextual and situated data as compared to observation data. These differences ought to be taken into consideration when selecting the method and analysing the data.

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It should now be clear that the focus group method is of great practical as well as substantial value to social science research in general and to network governance research in particular. As such, it represents an alternative as well as a supplement to other qualitative social science research methods. Interactive focus group interviewing represents a specific version of the focus group method that shares most of the characteristics and qualities of the traditional focus group method, as outlined above. However, the interactive focus group method deviates in two ways: in its perception of the role of the researcher and in its subjacent understanding of how and to what extent the content of the research project ought to be taken up for presentation and debate during focus group interviews. As to the first point, the interactive focus group method advocates that the researcher ought to play a more active role in the focus group interview than that of a mediator. Conventional perceptions of the researcher as being as imperceptible as possible during the interview session are substituted with an image of the researcher as actively contributing to the discussion and interaction taking place. Focus group interviewing provides the researcher with an arena in which s/he can actively study not only how specific strategic interventions affect the interaction between the participants in order to gain new insights about their perception of the topic at hand and the patterns of interaction between them, but also how these interventions might contribute to transforming these perceptions and patterns of interaction. Secondly, the interactive focus group method suggests that the participants in the focus group interview should be presented with the research project as such – the research questions and hypotheses, the datacollecting process, the data analysis and/or the preliminary research results. The idea is to use this as a means to contextualize the theme in focus and to gain knowledge about how the respondents understand and interpret the research project at different stages. In relation to the study of governance networks, the presentation of different aspects of the research project not only increases the solidity of the research results, it also serves as a means to push the respondents into ‘unsafe’ waters by confronting them with provocative statements that they must immediately find a way to relate to as a group. In sum, the interaction between the researcher and the respondents that distinguishes the interactive focus group interview from the traditional focus group interview refers both to the means with which the interview is conducted and the issues discussed. But how is an interactive focus group interview carried out? In the following, we discuss a number of crucial features to consider. Many

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considerations are valid for both traditional and interactive focus group interviewing. When necessary, however, we distinguish between the two and focus on the latter version. An important consideration when setting up an interactive focus group interview concerns the number of participants. The answer to this question depends on who the participants are and the issue up for discussion. Although there are no strict guidelines concerning the number of participants, the literature suggests that if focus groups are to function well, they ought to include no less than 4 and no more than 12 respondents (Oates 2000: 191). Too few respondents may reduce the group dynamic, whereas too many participants may make it difficult to carry out a conversation. With regard to the criteria by which to select participants, there is an array of options to choose from. The correct answer primarily depends on the character of the research question. Some research questions are best informed by choosing respondents who do not know one another, but are in the same position in different contexts. Other research questions point to the selection of participants who know each other and interact more or less frequently. Concerning studies on governance networks, if the aim is to compare rules and norms in different networks, then the former choice of participants appears to be the right choice, while efforts to study the functioning of one particular governance network point to the second choice of participants. When the potential participants are known to the researcher in advance (for example by previous observations or individual interviews), strategic considerations may also play a role in determining how to set up an interactive focus group interview. The presence of specific persons or representatives could for instance be expected to influence (positively or negatively) the willingness of other participants to provide opinions and information. Other factors to consider include the duration and location of the interview. As for how long a focus group session should last, no precise answer is found in the literature; however, somewhere between one and three hours is indicated in order to balance the need to go into depth with the selected theme and the danger of wearing out the participants. Regarding the matter of location, it is a good idea in most cases to select a neutral setting, but at the same time one that the participants are familiar with in order for them to reinvoke a sense of situatedness and contextualization in the group (Oates 2000: 191). When asking respondents to participate in a focus group, it is important to make it clear to them what the set-up is: where the meeting is to be held; how long it will last; who the other participants will be; the theme that is to be discussed; and the role that they are expected to play.

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The role of the researcher is a matter of central debate among social scientists using focus group interviews, particularly of the interactive kind. How much should the researcher structure the process and its theme? The general debate about the role of the researcher in focus group interviewing has recommended that the researcher ought to assume the role as a relatively passive and neutral moderator and facilitator. However, interactive focus group interviewing proposes much more active intervention by the researcher. The purpose of this intervention is to put the propositions of the research project much more directly and manifestly on the agenda. In the early stages of a research project, the problem definitions and initial hypothesis are tested while focus group interviews carried out in the later stages focus on aspects of the data collection methods and the preliminary research results. However, there are no clear-cut universal answers as to the optimal role of the researcher in interactive focus group interviews. Such considerations ought to take into account and be adjusted in the light of the specific dynamic of the individual focus group. No two groups are alike. While some groups must be stimulated with questions and viewpoints along the way, other groups are highly dynamic and the researcher may lean back and give priority to the role as an observer. No matter how the group functions, interactive focus group interviewing is a demanding process, in which the researcher must play two roles simultaneously: the interviewer and the observer. It is therefore a good idea in most cases for more than one researcher to participate in the event. One of the central tasks of the observer is to take notes regarding the non-verbal interaction between the participants. Another task consists of recording the event using a video camera or a tape recorder. Having concluded the focus group interview, the researcher is faced with the precarious problem of confidentiality (Berg 1995: 81; Oates 2000: 194). In a focus group interview, the researcher is not able to ensure confidentiality due to the participation of the other respondents. Of course, the researcher can raise this issue during the session and urge the participants to agree on confidentiality, but the individual respondents may not trust one another to the same degree as they might trust the researcher. However, this problem might not be all that serious, since the respondents are unlikely to bring up highly confidential matters in this type of interview. If the goal is to obtain highly confidential data, the focus group might not be the optimal method. Focus group interviews produce knowledge about what is socially acceptable to say, as opposed to what might be conflictive, unacceptable and inappropriate. On this basis, the question of confidentiality should already be considered when selecting the

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participants. If it is crucial for the researcher to get the participants to talk as openly as possible about a topic, then it is important to choose respondents that are likely to trust each other, either because they do not know one another and have no conflicting interests or because they have a relatively trusting relationship. In some studies, however, the most important thing is not to get the respondents to reveal their inner thoughts but to observe how they interact. An interaction process that reveals the existence of conflicts, dislikes and asymmetrical power relations can be a highly valuable outcome of a focus group interview. If the interactive focus group interview seeks to study such relations, it might be relevant to choose participants who do not necessarily trust each other. Outlining theoretical considerations and ideal conditions is one thing; their practical application is another. We now move from theory to practice.

8.3

Practical application

In this section, we describe how interactive focus group interviews were applied in four of the case studies on governance networks summarized in Chapter 3, producing a total of six such interviews. The significant variation between the cases – one relates to the transnational EU level and three to the local level in Britain, France and Denmark, respectively – will be used to sketch out and compare different ways to prepare and conduct interactive focus group interviews, but also to seek out common lessons from applying the same method to four highly different governance networks functioning in four substantially divergent contexts. Given the different contexts and governance networks as well as the different research resources available to carry out the interactive focus group interviews, it was decided not to opt for one common model for conducting the interactive focus group interviews. It was decided that the research teams for each location/level were free to decide when to carry out the focus group interview, who to invite, and how to conduct the session(s). Only for the focus group interviews realized late in the process, all of which took place at the local level, did the involved researchers concur that they would bring up two common themes during the sessions (on the application of the questions, see below). On the following pages, we aim to shed light on the numerous strategic choices that presented themselves to researchers in relation to conducting the interactive focus group interviews. We do this by attending to the various steps entailed in the process of preparing an interactive focus group interview and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the choices made. Table 8.1

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Table 8.1

Key characteristics of interactive focus group interviews EU level

Birmingham (Britain)

Grenoble (France)

Køge (Denmark)

Point in research process when the method was used

Early

Early

Late

Late

Late

Late

Criteria for inclusion

Organizational diversity

Experts/key actors

Repeating experts/key actors

Discourse diversity

Marginal position in network

Central position in network

Number of informants

5

3

2

4

3

4

Number of researchers

1

1

1

1

3

3

Location (Host/effect)

Research institute/neutral

Key actor/ neutral

Key actor/ neutral

Secondary actor/neutral

Key actor/ biased

Key actor/ neutral

Inquiry strategy

Open/ explorative

Open/ explorative

Comparative

Comparative

Narrow/ focused

Narrow/ focused

Introductory presentation by researcher/expert

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Duration (hrs) of session

3

1½

2¼

2

2

2

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summarizes key characteristics of the use of interactive focus group interviewing in the four cases. When to fit interactive focus group interviewing into the research design is the first question to consider once having decided to use the method. Two interviews were carried out early in the research process (EU level and Birmingham), while four were carried out late (Køge (2), Grenoble and, again, Birmingham). As expected, the interviewees in the cases where the method was used early basically provided factual information, which was used as an explorative means for preparing single respondent interviews, while the late application of the interactive focus group interview bestowed insights that were used to collect new data and test preliminary results in order to validate, nuance and sharpen the analysis. However, examining the sessions more closely reveals different experiences and outcomes that are not explained when only referring to the early/late divide, particularly as shown by the lessons from the two earlyapplied sessions. In both cases, the expectations were that the early interactive focus group interview would provide new information upon which to continue the research process, yet while expectations were more than met in the case of Birmingham, the session at the EU level was largely a disappointment. In spite of a mildly provoking introductory presentation made by an expert on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and the formulation of the European Guidelines (EGLs), disagreements among the interviewees were hardly voiced. The session turned out to assume the form of the researcher asking questions and each participant responding individually rather than entering into a discussion. Nuances in the problem definition were brought to the researchers’ attention, but basic issues and angles about the inclusion and exclusion of actors in the OMC/EGL processes at the EU level remained unaltered after the focus group interview. Evaluating the session afterwards, the research team reckoned that the lack of previous detailed knowledge impeded posing precise questions during the interview and consequently making the discussion sparkle. This could be one explanation. Another reason for the low level of voiced interaction between the participants could be the fact that the participants were all international top professionals who were not willing to expose disagreements in a focus group forum. Adding to this interpretation was the observation made during the session that no one wished to fall foul of the representative of the Commission. On several occasions, this person corrected the other participants if they – in his eyes – were wrong. His specific interpretation of a given question consistently met no objection from the rest of the group.

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This observation leads to the issue of how to select the participants, which constitutes another central matter for careful consideration when conducting an interactive focus group interview. One such consideration regards the availability of the respondents. Interviewees with specialized knowledge are often busy people with tight agendas. Somewhat surprisingly, the least difficult focus group interview to set up turned out to be the one at the EU level. One explanation for this could be precisely the fact that because the respondents were all top professionals, participation in odd events such as an interactive focus group interview is part of their job. Lower-level officials or individuals with regular jobs alongside their involvement in the studied governance networks may not have such flexibility. As summarized in Table 8.1, the research groups employed different criteria for selecting participants for the interactive focus group interviews. At the EU level, the inclusion criterion was organizational diversity, i.e. the focus group was composed of representatives from organizations participating in the OMC/EGL processes. Six organizations were invited (one sent his apologies at the last minute) in order to cover the most important ones yet still be able to conduct the interview in an intimate atmosphere. Further to the above discussion regarding the lack of dynamics in the interview, the inclusion criteria may also have contributed. The interviewees appeared wary of the fact that they each represented different organizational interests and appeared to hold one another at bay on that account. The pattern of interaction taking form during the interview, evolving around an effort not to reveal conflicts, suggested low levels of mutual trust between the interviewees. The British case contrasts significantly with the EU case on this dimension. The invited participants – experts and at the same time key actors – appeared to be well acquainted and signalled high levels of trust. This assured a shared perception among the participants that sharing knowledge with the researcher was important. The same trio were invited for an interactive focus group interview both early and late in the research process. Unfortunately, one of the three respondents had changed jobs before the second interview and was no longer relevant to include. Replacing this person was considered, yet the most obvious choice as a substitute was not selected, as it was feared that his presence would be too dominating and hamper the interaction between the respondents. Similar strategic considerations about assuring a good and dynamic atmosphere in the focus groups led the research team in the Danish case

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to form two groups. Based on previously collected single respondent interviews and observation data, the researchers had identified an informal network composed of a few core participants. The research hypothesis was that this informal network had greater influence on local employment policy than the formally constituted governance network of which some of them were a part and others not. In order to explore this hypothesis, the researchers wished to confront selected respondents with this hypothesis and explore their reaction. At the same time, it was considered neither constructive for the research nor – and more importantly – ethically correct vis-à-vis the internal relationship between the members of the LCC (Local Coordination Committees for Preventive Labour Market Measures) to gather all of the implicated actors and making them discuss the asymmetric power structures in the group. Other situations could have called for such a direct and confronting research strategy (for example, between top professionals who supposedly would place less personal feeling into a message of exclusion/inclusion). In the given situation, however, the researchers opted to assign a number of actors regarded as having a relatively marginal position in the complex formal and informal patterns of networking to one focus group, while centrally placed network actors were assigned to another. As in Birmingham, it was also a concern to ensure that even less outspoken respondents were granted the possibility to voice their opinion, which was considered not likely had all of the respondents been invited to the same session. The inclusion criteria in the local French case were of yet another kind. Participants were invited according to their different discourses regarding how best to operate the local governance network (Plan Local pour l’Insertion et l’Emploi – PLIE), as they had come to the fore in previously performed single respondent interviews. Hence, state/local and public/ private cleavages were represented. However, despite having selected the participants specifically according to these divisions, during the interactive focus group interview, the respondents surprised by downplaying these differences, instead concurring that the main dividing line was whether or not they supported the PLIE leadership. This finding from the focus group interview was at odds with the findings from the individual interviews and begs the question of how to determine which data should carry more weight. Drawing on the experience from the EU level, furthermore, it could be suspected that interactive focus group interviews tend to make respondents agree more than otherwise would be the case in individual interviews. In only three of the six sessions, the number of interviewees participating in the interactive focus group interviews reached the ideal

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minimum of four participants. This was in particular due to the criteria of inclusion applied. Only in the second session in Birmingham did the reduced number of interviewees result in a problem, teaching the lesson that even when composed of experts, interactive focus groups ought to consist of more than two people in order to make a discussion sparkle. As to the number of researchers participating in the interactive focus group interviews, at least two researchers should ideally attend each session. Due to time and money restraints, however, this was not possible in the interviews conducted outside Denmark. On the other hand, three researchers participated in the two focus group interviews held in the Danish case. It was discussed whether this would be overwhelming for the respondents considering their number (three and four, respectively), yet the advantage was that each of the researchers had a specific field of interest and knowledge, allowing for in-depth follow-up questions within these areas during the course of the interview. The subsequent perception was that the interviewees had not been stunned by the number of researchers but had been happy to be able to elaborate on specific issues with the different researchers. In comparison, the researchers who conducted focus group sessions alone felt that it was difficult to simultaneously play the role of an observer and an interactive interviewer. This was not least the case in Birmingham at the focus group session with only two respondents, because it called for intensive interviewing. The location at which the interactive focus group interview is conducted is another factor to consider. Again, practical circumstances typically weighed heavier than theoretical considerations, albeit the subsequent evaluation (see Table 8.1) was that neutrality was obtained in five of the six sessions. The session that was organized most ideally was the one at the EU level, which was conducted at a neutral location. The other sessions were hosted by one of the participants. This was unproblematic in most cases given the rather symmetrical relationships between the participants. Only in that of the two Danish sessions in which marginally positioned actors participated was the choice of location – the municipal office – potentially problematic. By virtue of the criteria of inclusion, the entire group was subordinated to other actors, several of whom have their offices and ‘domains’ in the municipal office. On the other hand, the participants invited were accustomed to meeting at the municipal office; locating the focus group interview elsewhere would likely have caused confusion. The inquiry strategy amounts to yet another dividing dimension of how interactive focus group interviewing was conducted in the four cases. Here, the six interviews may be clustered in three pairs. The two

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early-applied interviews at the EU level and in Birmingham employed an open and explorative strategy of inquiry. The questions asked aimed to obtain information about the central participants included (and excluded); the main issues included in and excluded from the network agenda; and the nature of the decision-making processes in the governance networks. This contrasted with the comparative strategy used in the second interview in Birmingham and in the case of Grenoble. A comparative strategy in this context is one in which the themes raised were preceded by findings from the other case studies in order to provide perspective to the given local case. Staging the interview in a comparative perspective had three advantages: first, it served to broaden the researchers’ perspective on local network governance, reminding them to ask questions from other angles than the immediately (case-bound) obvious; second, it helped ensure that the same phenomena were not merely expressed differently; and third, the comparative strategy served as a means by which to ask delicate questions without jeopardizing the sympathy towards the researcher. Particularly in the French case, the comparative approach proved a constructive and inoffensive way to raise controversial issues, for example about the inclusion and exclusion of certain actors whom several respondents had shunned in individual interviews. For their part, the two late interactive focus group interviews carried out in the Danish case distinguish themselves, because the strategy of inquiry was more focused or narrow. The questions asked aimed at exploring the specific topic of the relationship between an informal and formal governance network rather than more general issues, as in the local cases in Grenoble and Birmingham. The use of introductory presentations is closely related to the inquiry strategy and has an impact on how the session is carried out. The narrow strategy of inquiry applied in the Danish cases inherently lays out the agenda of the interactive focus group interview. Primarily for that reason, it was decided not to make formal introductory presentations in these cases. Secondarily, the high researcher/respondents ratio also played a role in the decision. By leaving out a formal introductory presentation, the researchers aimed to downplay their obvious presence in the session. On the other hand, introductory presentations served as important aids for sketching out new angles or less well-known themes for the interviewees in the other interactive focus group interviews at the local level as well as at the EU level. In the British case, moreover, the presentation came to be regarded as a contribution from the researcher in exchange for interviews, diaries and observations. The subsequent presentation was rather detailed but did not have other strategic aims than to please the

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respondents by keeping a promise. Finally, the choice as to whether or not to make an introductory presentation had to do with time. In the Danish cases, it was found that an introductory presentation would have reduced the time available for interviewing at the cost of debate and discussion among the participants. This leads to the final dimension, namely duration. The six focus group interviews lasted from one to three hours, that is, within the recommendations. There appears to be an understandable tendency that more participants produce longer interviews. The above description of the way interactive focus group interviewing was implemented in this study of multi-level network governance in employment policy illustrates the multiple ways in which the focus group method can be applied. While the multiple ways in which we have applied the method might reduce a direct comparison of research results (nothing being equal), the multiplicity produces valuable data about the problems and potentials of different ways of applying the interactive focus group method to studies of governance networks.

8.4

Analysing network governance through focus group interviews

In all six cases, interactive focus group interviewing provided highly valuable data that would have been difficult to obtain via other research methods. Placing selected network actors together and confronting them with a number of carefully chosen themes and claims about their reality proved to produce important insights about how norms and values are played out within the individual governance networks. As we shall see, the most central norms and values of relevance for the efficient and/or democratic functioning of the governance networks were consensus, inclusion, openness, legitimacy, accountability and trust. However, these norms and values produced varying patterns of interaction within the different governance networks. In some cases, these norms and values tended to function as a cover-up for asymmetrical power relations, strict patterns of exclusion and an inability to cooperate, while in others, they tended to promote conflict resolution, inclusion of new actors and efficient cooperation. 8.4.1

EU level: measured respondents suggest asymmetrical relationships

One of the strengths of the interactive focus group method is that it produces data that helps reveal and qualify the relationship between the

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respondents, even if the relationship itself is not the actual focus of the session. One such example may be found in the transnational case. As may be recalled, the strategy of inquiry of this interactive focus group interview was open and explorative. The aim was to gather information about the position of a range of key organizations in the OMC and the EGLs. However, the session was characterized by participants voicing high levels of consensus and ostensibly eschewing disagreements. In spite of alternately attempting to entice and provoke the respondents to enter into a dialogue or discussion with one another, the researcher was not able to penetrate the highly professional walls of measured participation offered by the respondents. The result was only insignificant pieces of new information regarding the position of the respective participants on the OMC and EGLs. Despite the somewhat disappointing findings regarding the main goal of the session, the interactive focus group interview provided unexpected insights concerning the relationship between the key organizations involved in the formulation of the EGLs. First, based on observations (for example the order in which the interviewees spoke, interruptions, corrections and reformulations of the questions posed), the researchers interpreted the concurrency in the session more as a strategic behaviour on the part of the participants than as actual agreement. Among other things, it was observed that the representative from the Commission tended to go first in giving the authoritative story that the other respondents would subsequently agree on (see Box 8.1). This observation led to the development of the hypothesis that the lack of disagreement reflected a dominating position held by the European Commission vis-à-vis the social partners; this thesis was later supported by a social network analysis carried out by the same research team (see Chapter 9). The identification of an asymmetrical power relationship between the network participants raises questions regarding the horizontality of the network and opens for a series of discussions concerning the legitimacy and efficiency of this mode of governance. A second way in which the interactive focus group method contributed to the analysis of the governance network at the EU level was indirect and again related to the high levels of voiced agreement. The constant harmless statements during the focus group interview made the researchers suspicious, and they decided to conduct individual follow-up interviews. These interviews revealed rivalry between the social partners and NGOs, together with attempts on the part of the former to marginalize the latter (see Chapter 9).

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Box 8.1

Transnational case

Researcher Do you have some examples of learning taking place – for example in Spain, Holland, Italy or the UK? And do we need to attach the Open Method of Coordination with other means, for example financial means? Respondent 1 Let me give you the official response in 30 seconds – it’s a complement, not a substitute. We have four instruments; the social dialogue, the European Social Fund, harmonizing regulation and the Open Method of Coordination, working in both areas: employment and social inclusion. So the OMC is a complement, and it is not meant to be a substitute for any of the other instruments. The EES is a special kind of coordination.

8.4.2

Grenoble: advancing in the field of network governing efficiency and norms for decision-making

In the French case, the interactive focus group interview nuanced the picture of the PLIE that hitherto applied research methods had given of this local governance network. In particular, the method produced material that the researchers could use to illuminate the issue of network efficiency and norms for decision-making. Entering the session, the main perception of the PLIE in Grenoble was built on three pillars: (1) that it was predominantly operating by way of negative cooperation, that is by finding issues and methods upon which all participants could agree despite causing suboptimal performance of the network; (2) that the main purpose of the network was to obtain EU funding, without which the network would never have been created; and (3) that local politicians were to have very limited influence on the decisions made. Presenting these findings to the participants in the interactive focus group interview led to intense discussion. However, the participants did not refute the findings but explored and suggested various explanations. The argument that the inefficiency of the network was caused by the bad leadership of the PLIE (no representative of the PLIE was present at the session) received particular support. Further debate revealed that the bad leadership was seen to be rooted in the lack of a political plan for supporting and sustaining the network. Regardless of the fact that the PLIE was created at the initiative of local politicians, it was argued that the network was not sufficiently supported by the politicians nor properly linked to other local initiatives in the field. An example of this was voiced in a discussion on the technicality/complexity of the PLIE matters,

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French case

Respondent 1 I find that the CTO and the CPO somehow have ended up sliding over each other […] the CPO is not a … Respondent 2 … it should be a political instance, but it is not … Respondent 3 … with a political plan and a strategy … But, it is far from being that. At the CTO, this question was raised: What is the political plan? And finally … Respondent 2 Yes. And it was raised by the technicians. And later: Respondent 1 (external to the PLIE instances) A short while ago, we said that it was difficult to make a difference between the political committee (CPO) and the technical/administrative committee (CTO) [interrupted]. What I want to say, is that for any politician it is not enough to say – even if it is an interesting objective – that the weakest group of unemployed should have the opportunity to find a job. This is not a policy, it is an objective. A policy is to say how one is going to do it. [In the PLIE], one never says that.

which led to comments regarding the difficulty in making a difference between the PLIE’s political committee (CPO) and its technical committee (CTO) (see Box 8.2). The vivid discussion during the interactive focus group interview suggests an internal norm of openness in the PLIE and an acceptance of different perceptions on the part of the various participants. However, while the atmosphere in the discussions appears to suggest openness and inclusion, mention is also made in the interview that the debates do not seriously affect the decisions made by the PLIE leadership. Hence, the inclusive norm suggested in the tone of the discussions does not appear to carry over in the decision-making process (see Box 8.3). Another interesting aspect discussed in the French focus group interview was the assessed need to reformulate the approach to the unemployment policy directed at those with the weakest position vis-à-vis the labour market. The call was made for a ‘less social approach’ and adopting an approach focusing more on the employers’ need for qualified labour. If this position became the common understanding of the goal of local employment policy, it could be expected that leaders of enterprises were to obtain a more prominent position in the network, as argued by one of the participants in the focus group interview. In contrast to the Danish case, but in line with the British position, the French interviewees saw no immediate position for the social partners in the PLIE.

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Box 8.3

French case

Respondent 1 (participating in the CTO and CPO) I know why I participate in both the CTO and CPO – it is to make sure that what is said in the CTO isn’t distorted later on in the CPO … My feeling is that there is a path mapped out, a script that is written beforehand and whatever we do and say, we will arrive at the objective set in advance [describing a concrete experience from a meeting]. On the 18th, I defended a position alone against the rest of the participants. And afterwards I realized that it was my position that was retained, though it was not at all the decision of the group … And later: Respondent 1 … if the PLIE participants were not there, then the PLIE would not exist … it is useful to remind us of that fact now and then, because our feeling is that … Respondent 2 … a solution would be to not participate in the meetings! Respondent 3 … but everything would continue anyhow, even if we did not go to the meetings … Respondent 1 Yeah, exactly. You’re right! Respondent 2 And the remaining 1.6 million on the budget could be spent in less than a quarter of an hour if there was no one there to moan. But, then nobody would be there to apply for that funding either, and that might be the only problem if we did not go!

8.4.3

Køge: old habits die hard: the limited inclusion of new actors

In the Danish case, interactive focus group interviewing proved to be a convincing method for testing working hypotheses. There was support for the presentiment that a long-time existing informal network composed of key actors is in fact more influential regarding formulating and deciding on local employment policy than the LCC, which is formal, required by law and a rather young governance network. As described above, the researchers chose to carry out two focus group sessions inviting the four key actors composing the informal network (two of which are also appointed to the LCC) for one session and LCC members for the other session. Both sessions had a dual aim: first, to test the hypothesis that an informal network existed and, this done, to explore how the parallel existence of two networks with importantly overlapping participants and agendas – yet asymmetrical levels of influence – affects different aspects of network governance. Inclusion was one of the aspects of democracy that the researchers wanted to study. Several segments of the sessions suggest that formal

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Box 8.4

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Respondent 1 (public servant from small municipality) … the LCC has been characterized by the fact that Køge is the large municipality which previously had their own coordination committee. That has not made it easier to join the new multi-municipal LCC coming from the outside. Researcher This was something we seemed to hear in the individual interviews: that some actors are more central than others. That is what you are saying, isn’t it? Is that something the rest of you agree to? Respondent 2 (politician from large municipality) I won’t answer that. It’s not something I can answer. I think that I try to find common ground, that is … to make the complete round. But I can’t rule out that the small municipalities … I can only say that as a representative from the large municipality, it is not my intention to marginalize others. Respondent 3 (representative from marginalized organization) But this is nothing new … At the last seminar we talked a lot about it. Respondent 1 I’m not accusing any member of the committee to favour Køge consciously, not at all. But it is my experience that it permeates – well, that is a big word – but that the way of thinking is influenced by the past in the old LCC. The projects considered are the projects carried over from the old committee … Concepts and words seem to carry over … The terminology from Køge has snuck in.

inclusion in the LCC is not enough to assure real influence in the decisions made. The interviews revealed two different hurdles hindering a level playground: one relating to the fact that the studied LCC involves four municipalities and is an amalgamation of previously existing singlemunicipal LCCs (see Box 8.4). Of the four municipalities, Køge is by far the largest. The other hurdle refers to the existence of two parallel networks (see Box 8.5). The two segments suggest that inclusion and influence are two different things. Interestingly, it appeared that the members of the informal network were considerably more aware of and willing to acknowledge their own close relationship than were the outsiders. One of the outsiders gave the impression of not being consciously aware of the informal network and consequently did not find reason to worry about any democratic predicament. Others were clearly aware of their own marginal position, but while one appeared to have resigned and accepted the nature of the game, the other appeared to be in a personal dilemma as to whether to accept the situation or to cast himself in the role of Don Quixote fighting the windmills. In fact, members of the informal network appeared to be more aware of the issue of democratic failure, or at least quandary,

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Box 8.5

Danish case (group A)

Respondent 3 My understanding of this is that it is not only a matter of large versus small municipalities. Who is vital and who is not has a lot to do with specific persons. Some have a brighter star than others. Some are listened to more than others … It is not only a matter of speaking up. It is also a matter of who you are. On some occasions we have failed to include the entire committee on a decision and on some we have not said: ‘Wait a minute. This is a task for the committee and the decision is to be made by the committee.’ Different people enjoy different levels of status. Researcher Do you find that decisions are made outside of the committee? Respondent 3 No, it is something in the process. We receive a presentation and discuss what we have to agree on. Well, this and that. But there are some who feel they carry more weight than others … We could all speak up and say we won’t accept that, but we can also find out the lie of the land and accept that when there is someone who has said this and that – then that is the way it is going to be.

than the outsiders. On the other hand, the insiders expressed no desire to surrender their position. Another issue of interest to the researchers concerned the norms regulating the governance networks studied. Again, the interactive focus group interview proved to be an efficient method for gathering insight. Indeed, a segment from the session with the informal network showed the norms being played out in situ (see Box 8.6). The background for the segment is a relationship between the actors going back more than two decades. They all know one another very well from a variety of settings. Nonetheless, reference was made during the focus group interview to a situation in which the internal communication clearly had not functioned and the local press had been involved. From the observations, it was obvious to the researchers that this continued to impair the collaboration, particularly between the employers’ organization and the municipality. After touching upon other topics in the course of the interview, reconciliation was offered (the colloquial language points to the close relationship between the respondents despite the dispute) (Box 8.6). The segment shows how internal conflicts are handled. Disagreements are accepted and discussed – even in the presence of researchers – but reconciliation is important. Each actor recognizes the need for levelling out the dispute in order to re-establish the good relationship, which is paramount to obtaining results in the policy field. One way of doing this is by recognizing the diverging interests of the other part while continuing to convey one’s own position. While the fragment hence elucidates

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Respondent 1 (public servant) It is obvious that if the employers’ organization renounces allegiance to a municipal project in an article in the free local paper distributed to every household – including the companies – then we are fighting uphill … So, as we later talked about and which was my lesson – and I believe also the employers’ organizations’ lesson from all of this – because I was pissed off and said: ‘If we have to solve anything, then we must also live up to our positions and approach one another if we feel that someone has walked over us instead of going to the press.’ I know that this is naïve, because sometimes we attend to our interests precisely by going to the press. But the starting point – and that is what characterizes our work – is to call … either the mayor or me, and say: ‘This or that cannot be true. We’ll have to change some things, if you are really serious.’ That is the way we build trust in one another. So my lesson probably was that it is smart to be more careful, assuring that the social partners support such a declaration and that the support is not only found in our internal system and only concerns our own interests. And then I hope that the lesson for the employers’ organization perhaps was to give us another chance to nuance things. Respondent 2 (representative from the employers’ organization) [with a little smile and nodding] Point taken.

one of the norms in the studied network, it also hints at the close relationship between efficiency and democracy. Having ways of handling conflicts as portrayed is important for the efficiency of a governance network, as the alternative is a stalemate. At the same time, such ways are not likely to arise if all members do not voluntarily accept inclusion in the network. 8.4.4

Birmingham: legitimacy and accountability in agency networks

The British case distinguishes itself from the other cases, because an interactive focus group interview with the same participants was held both early and late in the research process. The first session was explorative and in addition to serving as the provider of factual information about the many regional and local governance networks in and around Birmingham, it also had a ‘gate-opener’ function in the subsequent research process. The comparative questioning strategy in the second session aimed to probe deeper into the understanding of the functioning of the Employment Strategy Group (ESG). This section focuses on what the data obtained during the second session may tell us about network governing in the employment area in Birmingham.

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Box 8.7

British case

Researcher One criterion of inclusion and exclusion that has been referred to in the individual interviews is the distinction between strategic and providing actors. In the interviews, many have indicated this as a main criterion. We want the strategic actors in the Employment Strategy Group, and not those who are merely providing. My question is, of course, whether this criterion actually holds water … Does this criteria work for you, or is it merely a way of looking upon which contractors in practice are not working well? Respondent 1 I would tend to suggest that it was not normal to have [three named contractors] as part of the AEG [an ESG subgroup]. Having said that, I think that their participation has actually worked out quite well. It has not been problematic. … Respondent 2 I will agree with you that there is not a proper rationale for including some of the partners or excluding others. There is not a definable rationale there. It follows down to some people’s interpretation and not necessarily our own interpretation of the membership. It is not a scientific decision to be fair. Researcher A political decision? Respondent 1 I think it came back to some partners being equal and more equal than others … I think the reason is that there is one very influential individual that actually wields a lot of power within the partnership. Researcher And what is that building upon? What is the base of that power? Respondent 1 I think a lot of it has to do with his own personal networking.

In comparison with the Danish LCC and the French PLIE, the ESG stands out as being predominantly an agency network. Members represent the two involved city councils, deconcentrated departmental agencies, privatized employment services, charity organizations and private companies providing services in the area. The latter actors are referred to as strategic actors. In sum, members are either commissioners or providers of services, while interest groups (for example the social partners) are unrepresented. Another fundamental difference lies in the fact that the ESG has no legal provision backing its existence, as do both the PLIE and the LCC. The ESG is purely a local initiative established on a local political initiative. The national British government strongly supports the development of local partnerships, but more so in words than in action. Based on these circumstances, legitimacy and accountability became central issues in the interactive focus group interview. One element of the French and Danish legislation on the PLIE and LCC, respectively, regards who gets to participate in these governance networks and,

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Respondent 1 I think this issue of the legal framework is interesting … There is no framework for having an Employment Strategy Group or equivalents in Britain at all. I think that is the reason why we are not held accountable for anything, because if something were to happen that did not happen right, what would happen probably at a Birmingham Strategic Partnership level or directly from central government to Job Centre Plus or LSC there would be an element of accountability there. The participants inside the Birmingham Strategic Partnership might then turn around to us in the Employment Strategy Group and say: ‘What can you do about this?’ or ‘What are you doing about this?’ but I think the actual accountability will reside at the Strategic Partnership level, because it all intends a purpose. The Employment Strategy Group need not exist. It does not have to exist. We could put a paper out this afternoon saying, ‘We tried really hard but it has never worked. We do not think we should meet any more.’ And we would not have to meet any more. That could happen, because there are no statutes requiring it to be there. I don’t know. Researcher That impacts on accountability? Respondent 1 Yes, the accountability will lie with the more formalized structures. I think our alliance with the Local Area Agreement in the Strategic Partnership will tie us together more, which is not a bad thing. If we are going to have more resources available in order to achieve things, then we must be more accountable for what we are using that resource for and what we are achieving. With one comes the other, which is fine.

in order to ensure legitimacy, a list of obligatory members has been created in each case. A similar model for input legitimacy is not replicated in the ESG, which would appear to have rather contingent criteria for inclusion, as the quotation in Box 8.7 suggests. While the ESG is not strictly governed through well-defined criteria for inclusion and exclusion, the ESG in Birmingham has a larger number of externally defined targets that must be met in comparison to the LCC in Køge and the PLIE in Grenoble. Hence, one reason for the ambiguous criteria for inclusion could be found in the fixed obligations to deliver. The interpretation made by the research team was that ideals for transparent criteria for inclusion yield to ideas of how to obtain efficiency. The notion of accountability is linked to the issue of legitimacy. Having been presented with an outline of the legal set-ups for the PLIE and the LCC, one of the informants in the British case elaborated on the consequences of working in a purely locally initiated governance network in which the lines of accountability are unclear (see Box 8.8).

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Accountability through some level of formalization appears to be important for the network actors, not only as a means by which to increase its democratic legitimacy, but also as a means for gaining increased authority and the ability to act. The research findings described and illustrated above indicate how the interactive focus group method can help produce valuable and focused knowledge about the norms and values regulating network interaction and how it might affect the efficient and/or democratic functioning of governance networks. The focus group interviews produced knowledge about the power relations among a group of network actors; rules and norms of inclusion and exclusion; conflict resolution; how to negotiate collective purpose; and how to measure governance efficiency; and how to valorize democratic norms. What is striking is firstly the strong degree to which the network actors tend to perceive the promotion of efficiency and democracy, not as a trade-off situation, but as two sides of the same coin. Second, it is interesting to see how the same norms tend to produce different concrete patterns of interaction in different governance networks.

8.5

Lessons from interactive focus group interviewing in studies of governance networks

Applying interactive focus group interviewing to the study of governance networks proved to strengthen the study, particularly on four accounts: first, new and valuable insights about the norms and logics of appropriateness regulating the interaction between the network actors were brought to the attention of the researchers. Secondly, while some of this data might have been produced by, for example, (a follow-up) single respondent interview, the interactive focus group interview applied late in the research process constituted a unique possibility to gather the respondents’ collective reaction to claims or questions including preliminary hypotheses. Thirdly, and related, the method permitted us to bring in situ validation measures into play. Last but not least, the interactive focus group interview proved useful as an element used in negotiating access to respondents in other phases of the research project. We echo the conclusion of several of the preceding chapters by advertising that the method considered – interactive focus group interviewing – provides important insight, but that it should not stand alone when conducting governance network studies. Considering the strategic implications of the interactive focus group interview for the entire research project may therefore be as important as the contribution of the method to the actual knowledge of the subject of governance networks.

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Not everything is rosy. Interactive focus group interviewing has important pitfalls that one must seek to avoid. On the other hand, the method is very flexible and may also be applied in a variety of ways, depending on the context. Cautious preparation is paramount and it is critical to be consciously aware of the choices made. Running through the experiences from the six sessions conducted, it is seen that: • early interactive focus group interviewing was fruitful in the case where the interviewees felt mutual trust but problematic where the respondents appeared to be watching each other; • one (or more) dominating interviewee(s) may have crucial influence on the remaining participants. This ought to be considered when deciding on inclusion criteria; • too few (⬍3) interviewees hampers group dynamics; • too few (⬍2) researchers makes it difficult to assure the full benefit of the session; • the aim of the interview is decisive for a number of other considerations (inclusion criteria, questioning strategy, location); and • how the interactive focus group interview was set up should be taken into account in the subsequent analysis. The above considerations relate to how the researcher assures the most efficient and fruitful production of data in order to illuminate the research question. However, this does not exhaust the list of obligatory ex ante reflections. More so than most other research methods used in social sciences, interactive focus group interviewing should be accompanied by ethical considerations related to the possible impact upon the object of study when the method is applied. Each of the issues listed (when, who, how, what and why) may enter into a dilemma between the aims and ambitions of the researcher and the likely impact on those studied. This is all the more the case when the object of study is a governance network. The researchers may be aware of some of the sensitive issues and attempt to overcome or reduce the problems, for instance by careful selection of participants into two distinct groups as in the local Danish case. Nevertheless, even a prudent selection of participants may produce a surprising and perhaps troublesome outcome. Did the interactive focus group interview in the local French case unwillingly promote resistance against the PLIE? Or did the choice of selection in the Danish case promote the informal network even further? While these considerations are weighty and important, one final lesson from the six interactive focus group interviews conducted was the positive response by the respondents. Respondents were generally very pleased to

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have the opportunity to go beyond merely informing the researchers about their governance network activities and engage in genuine discussion of themes that are of interest to themselves and their daily activities as well as to the researcher. As a method to further the relationship between the research community and the world of practitioners, the interactive focus group interview is excellent. This is not to say that the method could not be improved or exploited in new fields. Particularly attractive is the idea of directly applying interactive focus group interviewing to cross-country comparative governance network studies. In the pilot study, parallel interactive focus group interviews were conducted at the local level in three countries. By applying the method directly, we understand bringing together interviewees from each of the studied governance networks and conducting one common focus group interview. In order to draw the best out of such cross-country gatherings, the governance networks represented ought to share a common point of reference. In the study at hand, this means the choice of network participants operating in local governance networks. In order to illuminate the presence of a common ground, the cross-network focus group interview could be preceded by seminarlike sessions in which each governance network is presented. In crosscountry focus groups, language would be a problem, but the presence of a good interpreter would minimize this. From the perspective of the researcher, bringing together actors from different countries adds new possibilities and dimensions to comparative studies. Moreover, neatly in line with both network governance and interactive research, joint cross-country interactive focus group interviews would facilitate intergovernance network learning.

9 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods for the Analysis of Network Governance: Promises, Problems, Pay-offs and Potentials Susana Borrás and Hans-Peter Olsen

9.1

The promises of method-mixing for the analysis of network governance

Mixing methods as a research strategy to improve the exploratory and explanatory capacities of analysis is gaining attention in the social sciences (Skocpol 2003; Tarrow 1995). Yet, within the area of network research, there is a sharp demarcation between studies favouring quantitative techniques and studies favouring qualitative ways of analysing network governance (Marcussen and Olsen 2006). Nonetheless, network governance research is in need of both methodological approaches. As this anthology amply demonstrates, qualitative network analysis is a way to decipher the institutional and cultural context of network governance as well as the role of agency. However, qualitative studies have been criticized – and often rightly so – for failing to specify actual relationships. Networks are often assumed rather than mapped, which may bias causal inference. Thus, such approaches may ‘fail because the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the networks’ (Dowding 1995: 137). Quantitative methods for analysing governance networks, on the other hand, enable the rigorous mapping of social relationships and the identification of the relative importance of various networking activities (Hanneman 2001; O’Toole and Meier 2003). However, both small-n and large-n quantitative approaches lack sensitivity towards institutional 207

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context and agency. Mark Granovetter (cited in Krippner et al. 2004: 116–17) has outlined this problem in the following way: I urged those doing narrowly quantitative and structural social network analysis to think about how they were really a middle ground between larger cultural and political and economic phenomena at the macro level of institutions and individuals at the other side. […] [N]etworks are only interesting because they are where cooperation and trust and domination and compliance are actually produced, and those are crucial parts of every socio-economic system. But if you only look at the level of networks rather than at the more macroscopic or the more microscopic levels then you have no clue about how and why this production takes place. By combining methodological and analytical approaches, there is a considerable potential to address issues that each of the methodological approaches cannot do alone. The respective benefits and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative methods have been scrutinized by the mixed-methods literature, which has also drawn attention to how mixed-method approaches are a way to remedy these drawbacks (Brannen 1992; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). The main promise of mixing methods is that it may generate new insights unavailable to otherwise uni-methodological studies. Furthermore, mixed methods can increase the validity of results through the triangulation of multiple forms of inquiry. However, much work needs to be done with regards to how to cross-fertilize qualitative and quantitative research methods. This is particularly the case within the area of network analysis. This chapter addresses the mixed-method gap in governance network research by drawing on the specific experiences of using multiple methods in a specific pilot study about network governance in the context of the European Union. The main research question of the study has been to examine several detailed features of a governance network in terms of the centrality of its different actors, the density of interactions, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and the forms of metagovernance. These questions require both a general overview of the institutional embeddedness of networks, as Granovetter recommends, and a specific mapping of actual relationships, as Dowding suggests. This chapter reports and reflects upon one possible avenue for constructing mixed-method research designs in network analysis, which in our pilot study has been based on qualitative methods using document analysis, focus groups, individual interviews and a small-n quantitative network analysis.

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Before proceeding further, it is worth clarifying what is meant by mixed methods. We adopt the following definition: A mixed methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research. (Creswell et al. 2003: 212, emphasis in original) Furthermore, a mixed methods approach is one in which the researcher tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds (e.g. consequence-oriented, problem-centered, and pluralistic). (Creswell 2003: 18, emphasis in original) The chapter proceeds in the following way. First the experiences from the pilot study are outlined with an emphasis on the difficulties that the research team encountered when confronted with the task of data gathering. Second, the results generated from pilot study research are presented. Finally, the chapter reflects on the experiences and considers the prospects and limitations for further utilization of method-mixing research frameworks in governance network analysis.

9.2 9.2.1

Experiences from the pilot study: the problems General considerations about the research design

The pilot study chosen for the study of network governance at EU level deals with decision-making within the European Employment Strategy (EES). In 2003, new general policy guidelines for that strategy had to be decided. These guidelines were crucial in political terms, since they were to set up the political and working agenda for the EU’s employment policy for the subsequent three years. A formal process of decision-making was established according to the instrument of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), where the Commission had to put forward a concrete proposal defining the general guidelines, which in turn had to be discussed and decided in EMCO, the committee representing the member states, before being finally accepted at the Council of Ministers. However, in addition to these formal procedures, most central stakeholders in Brussels were also actively mobilized and interested in influencing the

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final shape of these guidelines along the lines of their particular interests. A specific network was naturally formed around that. There were three main research questions, namely, what density of interactions and centrality of actors characterize this transnational network governance? What are the patterns of stakeholders’ inclusion and exclusion in the network? And, what are the forms of metagovernance of the network? To elucidate these three large questions, the research team decided to use four different sets of data. These sets included a selected number of official documents and documents for debate from the main organizations formally and informally involved in the process, a focus group meeting arranged in Brussels with the main stakeholders in the EES process, a quantitative social network analysis on the basis of a questionnaire distributed widely among stakeholders and organizations operating at EU level, and, last but not least, a series of qualitative individual interviews arranged with the main stakeholders in Brussels. The data was gathered in the sequence mentioned above, that is, documents first, focus group second, quantitative network data third and individual interviews fourth. The same research team was in charge of conducting all steps in the data gathering and analysis (see Figure 9.1). The idea behind this design was to allow the research team to approach the object of study (governance networks) in a flexible and accurate way, posing new interpretative questions all the way through. Linked with that, a second reason for choosing this sequential design was that unexpected results or problems with data gathering would be approached in the next step, hence creating the possibility of solving them at later stages. This strategy was regarded as preferable to a strategy where different sets of data are collected simultaneously and interpreted all at once. The first two sets of data, from documents and the focus group (both qualitative data), provided the starting point. The objective with data gathering was to obtain evidence and information about the most important policy issues at stake, and to identify the stakeholders participating in the informal and formal decisions. In other words, this qualitative data was to provide an overall picture of the political context, the shape of the network and the actors involved. The next step was to confront these qualitative findings with the findings provided by quantitative network analysis. The quantitative data could indicate some general patterns of inclusion/exclusion, and the specific positions and roles assumed by each of the actors in the network. Within the social network analysis paradigm a vast array of quantitative methods have been developed, which can be employed on data gathered in matrices (binary or with values) representing the interactions among

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Docume Document analysis Focus group analysis Social network analysis Individual interviews analysis

Final overall analysis Figure 9.1

The collection and analysis of data

a set of actors. Actors are termed ‘nodes’ and the relations between them are ‘ties’. A series of simple and advanced statistical measurements can be undertaken with the help of social network analysis software (we used UCINET 6), which either describe the overall features of the network or the relative position of specific actors within the network and its various subgroups. In our case, the objective was to undertake several measurements of the density of interactions, of actors’ relative centrality, and of their distinctive brokerage roles in and across subgroups within the overall network (see section 9.3). Finally, the individual interviews were shaped in a semi-structured manner so as to obtain more qualified and finely grained data about the network. Therefore, it was particularly interesting to allow the interviewees to enjoy a relatively wide scope for expressing their opinions and points of view regarding the dynamics of the network, the inclusion and exclusion patterns of stakeholders, and the forms of metagovernance. 9.2.2

The concrete problems of gathering data

One general and typical problem related to method-mixing concerns how to ensure consistency within each of the sets of data, and among them. With this concern in mind, the research team prepared a set of methodological tools, one for each of the four data types to be collected, in order to achieve coherence. The methodological tools were internal documents stating the guidelines for data collection and data analysis. The codification of these methodological tools was an important exercise for the research team. It allowed us to foresee and address potential problems of consistency and of issues related to the collection of the

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data. In the discussions around the methodological tools, important choices and decisions were made in relation to the overall objectives of the research project and in relation to the time and economic resources available. We decided, for example, that the focus group would have no more than six participants, all of them from the EU-level organizations involved in the formulation and implementation of the EES; and that among these six people at least one should be from the European Commission, another from the employers’ association, and a third from the workers’ association. The reason behind this decision was that having six people would ensure a dynamic and stimulating discussion among participants and provide relevant information since these persons were directly involved in the negotiations. Once this strategy was determined, data gathering commenced. And so did the real problems. The research team encountered two problems in the collection of data about the transnational network governance of the 2003 EES guidelines. These were important but not insurmountable. The first problem concerned the data obtained in the focus group arranged in Brussels, which did not correspond to the expectations raised by the research team. Six persons representing the most important organizations and stakeholders in the area of employment policy were invited to take part in the focus group. For reasons explained in more detail in Chapter 8 of this book, which discusses interactive focus groups, the main problem with the focus group was that the information provided by the respondents was very formalistic, with very low added value to the information already gathered in the document analysis performed earlier. Basically, the focus group participants were very cautious in their responses, and the interaction between them was not fruitful in terms of providing additional information. In spite of these problems, the focus group dynamics demonstrated one interesting point: that the group shares a common understanding of the importance of showing unity to external observers, perhaps as an unspoken desire to legitimize their role in the EES policy process. As a matter of fact, several of the participants repeated several times in the three-hour long focus group that they were active supporters of the OMC procedures, defending themselves against the attacks of those who have criticized these open-ended procedures.1 This finding by the focus group was interesting in regard to the specific social dynamics involved in the group. But far from being the typical information outcome of a focus group, it was the result of the scientists’ own observations. The unexpectedly poor results of the focus group meant an important reconsideration of the strategy for data collection. The decision was to put more emphasis on the individual interviews in order to obtain

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important missing information, particularly regarding the dynamics of the network and inclusion/exclusion patterns. For that reason, and against the initial plans of the research team, it was also decided to conduct individual interviews with all the participants in the focus group. The hope was that a meeting ‘tête-à-tête’ with these persons would help obtain more nuanced answers and additional information that did not emerge in the focus group meeting. The second problem was related to the collection of quantitative network data. As defined in the methodological tools, this data was to be collected through a specifically designed questionnaire where respondents were asked to provide names, organizational affiliations and other data about the actors with whom they most frequently interact in the policy area of employment strategy. The data was to be collected in two simultaneous processes. One was a large survey, sending a questionnaire by e-mail to the 168 relevant people working for organizations that were involved directly and indirectly in the EES decision process. The other was to obtain quantitative data by asking the respondents of the focus group and of the individual interviews to fill in the quantitative questionnaire. The major problem encountered was that the large survey had an extremely low response rate, since only five questionnaires were returned. Although not unusual for surveys of this kind (Fink 2003), this result was unexpected. Fortunately, quantitative data was successfully obtained from the interviewees and focus group participants, since virtually all of them completed the questionnaire. Altogether we obtained 17 questionnaires that were valid, useful and representative for fulfilling the objectives of our social network analysis. The relational quantitative data obtained was highly relevant and highly representative for our analytical purposes since the 17 respondents represented 10 different organizations previously identified as the most central actors in the network, giving a matrix of 10 ⫻ 10 organizations, namely, DG Employment (Commission), the Committee of National Representatives (EMCO), the European Parliament (more specifically the Parliamentary Committee of Employment and Social Affairs), the European Confederation of Trade Unions (ETUC), the European Association of Industry (UNICE), the European Association of Public Employers (CEEP), the European Anti-Poverty Network, the most prominent NGO on social policy matters at European level (EAPN), the Economic and Social Committee, a minor EU institution representing social partners (ECOSOC), the Committee of the Regions (another minor EU institution representing local and regional governments in EU politics), and the Danish Employers’ Association (DA), which have been relatively

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active in the EES, mainly through UNICE, as we shall see in the next section). It is important to recall at this stage that social network analysis is a quantitative method based on a statistical approach. Therefore, the representativeness of the data depends on the way in which the data sampled reflects the features of the network; in other words, it is of paramount importance that the matrix contains relevant data covering the most important actors, and that the matrix is reciprocal.2 As mentioned before, the problems encountered in the data collection were important but not insurmountable, since relevant and substantial data was gathered. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the problems encountered, particularly regarding the focus group, the research design gradually shifted its emphasis to the social network analysis and the individual interviews.

9.3

Experiences from the pilot study: the pay-offs

In spite of the problems mentioned above, combining qualitative and quantitative data and methods produced some very interesting results, and the pay-off of combining methods largely exceeded the costs. The research questions were devoted to examining the dynamics that characterize transnational network governance, the pattern of stakeholder inclusion and exclusion, and the forms of metagovernance. The most important pay-off is that the sequential use of qualitative–quantitative– qualitative data and methods has generated a very detailed account of these three aspects of network governance. As to the first research question, the density of the network and the centrality of the actors in the network, the quantitative analysis of network density and of ego-network density provides an overall understanding of the network composition (see Table 9.1). Starting with the overall density of the network, the aggregated statistics show that, taken as a whole, the EES network is not very dense. Subsequent qualitative analysis of the individual interviews confirmed this and provided plausible explanations. Density here refers to the intensity of the interactions between organizations involved formally and informally in the definition of EES guidelines. In general terms, the organizations involved in the network seem to relate to relatively few other organizations, and hence, they tend to rely on other organizations as intermediary channels of influence. Between the values of 0 and 1, the mean of density of ties in the whole EES network is 0.320. This is an unusually low level of density for a small matrix (10 organizations), since extensive evidence in social network analysis says that small networks (10 or less) tend to be

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Different SNA measurements Size of ego network

Commission* EMCO EP† ETUC EAPN CEEP UNICE ECOSOC CoR‡ DA

8 3 4 5 2 5 6 3 1 1

Absolute number of ties 12 2 8 9 1 10 8 3 0 0

2nd step reachability (%)

Closeness centrality (%)

Betweenness centrality (%)

100 88.89 100 100 88.89 100 100 100 88.89 66.67

90.000 56.250 64.286 69.231 52.941 69.231 75.000 60.000 50.000 45.000

41.667 0.926 0.000 5.556 0.000 4.630 25.926 1.852 0.000 0.000

* DG Employment. † Parliamentary Committee of Employment and Social Affairs. ‡ Committee of the Regions.

more densely connected than large networks (Hanneman 2001: 41). It is also interesting to examine the standard deviation of this aggregated density, which is 0.466. This measurement indicates a substantial degree of variation within the network, showing that the density of the network is not evenly distributed across the organizations: some are more densely related than others. The quantitative data analysis reveals interesting results, but it is not able to provide answers as to why this network is less dense than expected. Possible answers came from the qualitative data gathered in the individual interviews. Our respondents indicated that the formal and semi-formal procedures of decision-making in the EES (respectively the EES agreed procedures, and the ‘social dialogue’ as a semi-formal procedure) generated some specific interaction dynamics, particularly between the Commission and EMCO in the first place, and between the Commission and the social partners in the second. The graphic representation of the network in Figure 9.2 distinguishes the three main EU institutions in black. It shows how the Commission is an important intermediary between the social partners and EMCO. With the sole exception of CEEP, the association of public employers, the other social partners at European level do not have direct interactions with EMCO. They seem to use the Commission as intermediary to get their voices heard at EMCO. This is the reason why Figure 9.2 illustrates the centrality of the Commission as the actor with the most interactions.

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Methods in Democratic Network Governance EAPN Committee of the Regions ETUC

European Parliament, Employment Committee

Commission DG Employment

UNICE

EMCO

CEEP

ECOSOC DA Figure 9.2

Graphic representation of EES governance network

A more nuanced evaluation of network density is provided by looking at a quantitative analysis of ego-networks. An ego-network is the total number of nodes to which each organization is directly connected. By comparing the properties of these ten ego-networks we will obtain a more detailed measurement of how each organization is linked to the rest of the network. A measurement of the size of the ten ego-networks (the number of nodes that each organization is directly connected to, plus itself) shows that the Commission scores highest with eight nodes, followed by UNICE (the employers’ association), ETUC (the association of European trade unions) and CEEP (public employers’ association). This is not surprising, since these organizations are the social partners. What is more surprising, though, is that EMCO has a quite low score (see Table 9.1). Taking now the number of ties, which is the number of connections among all organizations forming the ego-network of that organization, the weakness of EMCO is confirmed. Whereas the Commission, CEEP, UNICE and ETUC score respectively 12, 10, 9 and 8, suggesting their ego-networks are interconnected, EMCO scores only 2. Interestingly enough, the European Parliament, which is rather weak in terms of the size of its ego-network, scores relatively high here, showing that it is rather well connected. Two-step reach is another interesting measurement of relative density. It goes beyond the ego-network’s direct ties and

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reports the percentage of all actors within two direct steps from that actor. Not surprisingly, the Commission and the previously mentioned social partners reach 100 per cent of the network in two steps, but EMCO and other organizations like the Committee of the Regions, the anti-poverty NGO EAPN and the national employers’ association DA cannot reach the entire network in two steps. Why is the position of EMCO so weak in the network? How should we interpret these quantitative findings? Looking carefully at the responses of the questionnaires, we realize that our three EMCO respondents have tended to provide mostly names of other EMCO members. This is why our quantitative analysis pictures EMCO as a rather insulated and weak organization in the network. But, does this weak relational position correspond to an overall weakness of EMCO’s role in the process of setting up the EES guidelines? Again, the quantitative data is not precise enough to answer this question. The analysis needs to use the results of the qualitative data. Our interviews of EMCO members and of relevant representatives of the organizations in the network show that EMCO is a decisive organization in the formal and informal process of decision-making of EES guidelines. It is inside EMCO that negotiations take place and where real decisions are made before they move up to the Council of Ministers. Thus, it looks as if EMCO operates more inwardly and in conjunction with member states rather than towards the transnational dimension of organizational interactions at the EU level. In other words, EMCO does not actively engage in the ‘Brussels game’ and prefers to develop very few but solid ties with key EU-level actors, most notably the Commission, whereas it pays more attention to processes within and across member states represented in EMCO itself. The relationship between EMCO and the Commission is therefore very important in the decision-making process under the EES guidelines, particularly since the Commission conveys the views from other organizations operating at EU level to EMCO. As the Danish representative in EMCO puts it: ‘I think that much of the influence happens outside EMCO, I think it [influence] takes place in a close cooperation with the Commission in the bilateral meetings we have’ (interview with EMCO member). These findings about the dynamics of the governance network lead to our second research question about patterns of exclusion and inclusion in the network. The results of the quantitative network analysis reveal that there are very significant differences in terms of the centrality of the organizations in the network, and the individual interviews conducted afterwards provided evidence that some organizations have explicit strategies to exclude other organizations. The centrality of the organizations

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in the network will be measured quantitatively by looking at the ‘closeness’ and ‘betweenness’ of each organization. Closeness centrality measures the distance from each organization to all others, and shows the effort that an organization has to make in order to reach all other organizations in the network. Closeness centrality is measured in percentage. In our network, the Commission shows the highest score of 90 per cent, showing its clear centrality in the network, but is clearly followed by other organizations like UNICE or CEEP with 75 and 69 per cent respectively. Betweenness centrality is, however, a more interesting measurement because it examines the centrality of an organization to the extent that it falls on the shortest path between other pairs of actors in the network. In other words, betweenness measures the intermediary position of that particular organization. Here the Commission is clearly the most central organization in the network, scoring 41.6 per cent, followed in a second and a third term by UNICE (25.9 per cent) and CEEP (4.6 per cent). This very prominent betweenness centrality of the Commission confirms quantitatively the previous remarks about the Commission and EMCO. But most importantly for our research question is the fact that the data also shows the marginal position of other organizations in the network, particularly, the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and EAPN. In order to understand in detail the extent to which the specific strategies of inclusion and exclusion have been successful, we need to turn to qualitative data, since the quantitative analysis can tell us very little in this respect. The individual interviews, on the other hand, were more interesting on this topic. The social partners, particularly the employers’ associations UNICE and CEEP, insisted on the need to exclude any organization in the network other than the social partners. The CEEP representative was very explicit in this regard: ‘To be honest we are quite strict on this point. From the employer’s side we have the same concern. (…) When it comes to employment policy we really think that the social partners must be the only external part plus the governments, because we are the only [organizations] entitled to implement this policy.’ Their argument is that only those organizations with direct implementation responsibilities are entitled to be involved in the decision regarding the EES guidelines, which primarily means the social partners. By contrast, the Commission has developed an explicit strategy of including other non-governmental organizations and EU-based institutions in the attempt to gain centrality, particularly vis-à-vis EMCO. The third research question concerns the metagovernance of the network. Social network analysis provides interesting insights into metagovernance. By studying the different brokerage roles assumed by the actors

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in the network, it is possible to elucidate different ways in which actors mediate within the network. These results, which will mainly provide information about internal forms of metagovenance, will be contrasted and complemented by the information coming from the individual interviews. The idea of measuring quantitatively the brokerage role of the actors is that there are several possible roles depending on how a specific actor acts as broker between the actor who sends and the actor who receives the interaction. But in order to conduct the analysis of different brokerage roles, the whole set of actors in the network must be divided into groups according to their similar features. In our 10 ⫻ 10 matrix, the groups are: major EU institutions, social partners, NGOs and minor EU institutions (see the two left columns in Table 9.2). There are five types of brokerage roles (Gould and Fernandez 1989: 91–4). Coordinator is when an actor acts as broker between two actors (the source and the recipient) who belong to the same group as the broker; gatekeeper is when the source is from a different group, but intermediary and recipient are from the same group; representative is when the source and the broker are from the same group, but the recipient is from a different group; consultant is when the broker belongs to a different group than the source and recipient; and liaison is when all three actors, namely the source, the broker and the recipient, belong to three different groups. To put the typology schematically, we can think of the interaction Source → intermediary → recipient, in which the three involved actors can belong to either of the groups A, B and C. The possible brokerage roles can then be illustrated as follows: Coordinator: Gatekeeper: Consultant: Representative: Liaison:

A→A→A A→B→B A→B→A A→A→B A→B→C

In Table 9.2, showing the absolute brokerage scores, the Commission stands out as having much higher scores on all brokerage measurements. The liaison score of the Commission is particularly high, indicating its role as a ‘metagoverning’ entity in the network facilitating and constraining the activities of other actors. Another interesting result is the fact that UNICE seems to have a rather prominent role within the group formed by the social partners. When normalizing this data (dividing the raw scores by expected values given the size of each of the groups) the results tell the same story. The individual interviews have

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Table 9.2

Brokerage measures (in absolute scores) Coordination

Gatekeeper

Representative

Consultant

Liaison

Commission EMCO EP

2 0 0

9 0 0

9 0 0

6 0 0

24 2 0

50 2 0

Social partners

ETUC DA CEEP UNICE

0 0 0 4

2 0 2 4

2 0 2 4

0 0 2 0

2 0 0 2

6 0 6 14

NGOs

EAPN

0

0

0

0

0

0

Minor EU institutions

CoR ECOSOC

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 2

0 2

Groups

Actors

Major EU institutions

Total scores

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provided similar results in terms of the role of the DG Employment of the Commission. As a prominent member of the European Parliamentary Committee of Social Affairs put it: ‘(…) So I would say that the Commission is probably one of the most – if not the most – crucial factor or body in the development of the EES guidelines.’ Even though the interviews did not refer to these five types of brokerage roles, they provided interesting reflections about the role of the Commission, particularly pointing at the importance of the Commission as access point to the small and weak organizations in the network given their difficulties to be otherwise included. As the representative of EAPN mentioned when explaining her organization’s struggle to be heard in formal and informal channels, particularly to be included in the social dialogue: ‘Yes, it is difficult. (…) We need to be part (of it), to find a way to earn [recognition] other than the official recognition of the Commission.’

9.4 9.4.1

Potentials: lessons learned and future directions Practical experiences from the pilot study

The lessons learned from the pilot study in terms of combining data and research design are mainly of a practical character. First of all, the collection of quantitative data needs to be planned very carefully for several reasons. The relational character of network data raises some concerns to respondents in terms of the confidentiality and the use of the data. The low response level of the survey conducted is a reflection of these concerns. For that reason it might be necessary to collect the data manually in the presence of the researcher, rather than using impersonal and faceless web-based surveys. This procedure allows trust to be built up between the respondent and the researcher, and alleviates the concerns of the respondent regarding the final use of the data. Furthermore, our practical experience shows that it is also very important to provide respondents with access to the research results once they are published. The issue of reciprocity is another important aspect of quantitative data. Most social network analysis is based on data with binary values (0/1) clustered in reciprocal matrices, that is, matrices where the number of respondents is equivalent to that of recipients. In other words, if we know that A has relations with B, we need also to ask B about the relations with A. In practical terms, this means that ‘snowball’ sampling is the appropriate data collection strategy. But this is easier said than done. For this reason, the research design must be flexible and should be able to accommodate unexpected problems emerging in the process of data gathering, particularly quantitative data, while maintaining a focus on

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the key research questions. The second main lesson of our pilot study is that the contribution of the quantitative data analysis should be specified very clearly in relation to qualitative data. The quantitative data provided important information related to the research questions formulated at the onset of the project (see section 9.2.1), but it could not alone give full answers to those. The interviews came with very good and more precise responses complementing the quantitative findings of social network analysis. For this reason, it is of paramount importance that the interviews are prepared in such a way that aims at tackling the ‘blind spots’ the quantitative data was not able to elucidate. The researcher should consider beforehand what type of information is missing, so that the questions posed in the interview address the specific needs of data gathering that are requested to complete the research objectives successfully. 9.4.2

Reflections upon experiences

The preceding narrative from the pilot project illustrates how important results could be achieved by way of utilizing various research methods. Such results could not have been reached without method-mixing. Thus, in the study of network governance, the usage of multiple methods appears to be particularly promising because multifaceted patterns of interaction and influence are impossible to capture by the use of a single methodological tool. The boundaries between qualitative and quantitative data and analysis are much less clear-cut than is often suggested. This is very much true for the methodological component of the social network analysis paradigm, which in a number of ways is different from conventional statistical methods like, for example, OLS regression. Social network analysis is in fact highly applicable to method-mixing since key features of quantitative social network analysis, such as interpreting network visualizations, resemble qualitative research more than traditional quantitative methods. In this regard Bazeley (2003: 410) has made the following observation: ‘It is difficult to say whether social network analysis, involving the use of both graphs and indexes to describe the network [–], is a quantification of qualitative information or a qualitative interpretation of quantitative information. Really, it is both.’ Nevertheless, as the experiences from the pilot study show, methodmixing in network research is far from a straightforward task and it should be approached cautiously as serious pitfalls exist with regards to this approach. Method-mixing may, in some instances, be more compelling in theory than in practice. The researcher needs to carefully consider the

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amount of data that can feasibly be gathered since it is costly to collect and analyse multiple types of data. Likewise, during the research design phase, it is worthwhile to thoroughly evaluate how the different types of information provided by quantitative and qualitative data can effectively complement each other in order to provide answers to the main research questions.

Notes 1. The creation of the OMC in the late 1990s was followed by a heated debate among supporters and detractors of this method vis-à-vis the conventional method of binding regulation (Wincott 2001). 2. Reciprocity means that having asked actor a about relations with actors b and c, the researcher also asks actors b and c about their relation with a.

10 Conclusion Peter Bogason and Mette Zølner

We have unfolded our stories of the research experiences we have gained during a concrete empirical study of democratic network governance relating to EU-based labour market policy. Our aim was to enhance awareness and reflexivity in the research process in order to improve future fullscale studies of democratic network governance. In particular, we wanted to illustrate potentials and problems when applying a whole range of research techniques to a study of network governance. We have used expert reports, documentary interpretation, qualitative interviews, diaries, observation, focus groups interviews and quantitative social network analysis. Telling our experiences of how we went about doing research in practice has been a challenging but edifying exercise. This process of constructing our stories improved our awareness of the methodological choices we made, and their implications for various research techniques. We find ourselves better prepared in terms of knowledge of network governance as well as skills in applying research methods for future studies on governance networks.

10.1

Questions and answers

Our main message is, not so surprisingly, that none of the research techniques discussed should stand alone, and that a combination of different research techniques is required in studies of network governance. One advantage of doing so is, of course, that of triangulating data from various sources. But in addition, applying various kinds of research techniques allows us to collect complementary types of data and thereby capture various aspects of a given governance network that cannot be grasped by employing just one research technique. Thus, it is useful to 224

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apply several research techniques in order to identify a governance network: • reading relevant documents from a policy process can contribute to establishing an understanding of the official/formal part of a governance network; • interviews can be exploited to unravel more informal aspects through the application of the snowball method; • diaries can likewise contribute to this end by providing insights into network participants’ formal and informal contacts that take place in-between meetings; • observation of meetings provides a snapshot of those who are actually present and participating actively in the given network. Hence, an insight into the inner and outer circles of a governance network is created; • expert reports are useful as third-party observations, experiences and opinions of networks, including ideas of the roles of actors who for some reason or another have not been involved in the research process; • focus groups may be used for interviews based on preliminary analysis and they may be used for infusing ideas concerning the interpretation of ambiguous sets of data. These are but a few examples of how a combination of various research techniques enriches a study on network governance by providing different kinds of data, each of which grasps a particular aspect of a given network. Research techniques may be combined in numerous ways, and no universal recipe can be given as to how. The research techniques and designs must be chosen in relation to the specific research questions, the type of governance network, and the policy field under scrutiny, and with due respect to the phase of a research process one is in, as well as to the accessibility of data. Though our main conclusion concerns the need to draw on several research techniques, we did learn that each technique has its specific strengths and weaknesses. In Chapter 4, Torfing confirms our initial expectation that expert reports would be useful in the initial phase of mapping out the research field when doing comparative research in several institutional contexts. Moreover, he points out that expert reports are likely to provide insights and knowledge that are particularly useful in later phases of the research project, for example when analysing data collected by other research techniques. But Torfing also draws our attention to the

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fact that expert reports are not always a quick and accessible tool for gaining insight into an institutional context. In particular, finding competent experts willing to write reports as well as raising relevant questions requires thorough preparation and reflection by the researcher. In Chapter 5, Triantafillou and Esmark conclude that document analysis is useful to illuminate the official history of a governance network. That is, its formation process as well as changes and continuities in the functioning of a network. Reading documents can also provide insights, particularly into the ‘steering rationality’ of a given governance network, as well as into rationales for including some policy actor groups as participants, while others are excluded. On the other hand, and maybe not so surprisingly, documents are less apt to illuminate interaction among participants and they are not suited to uncovering informal aspects and person-related specificities within a governance network. In this respect, qualitative interviews complement documents, as Zølner, Dreyer Hansen and Ørum Rasmussen point out in Chapter 6. The two main strengths of qualitative interviews are to provide factual knowledge that is not accessible in public and formal sources, and to give insights into the perceptions of network participants. As the value of the interview data depends closely on the memory and the knowledge of interviewees, a wish for traditional reliability and validity of data will constitute a drawback, and if that is a goal, it requires thorough reflection upon the selection procedure regarding interviewees as well as the way in which interviews are conducted. An additional benefit, but also a challenge, of the qualitative interview data is its richness and variety, which calls for a method of analysis that goes beyond quoting participants. The authors do illustrate that reading qualitative interviews as a narrative is an approach that might serve to clarify governance norms. This also does away with one of the demands for strict reliability because the narrative is put into the context of the narrator rather than in an abstract generalized role of an ‘informed interviewee’. In Chapter 7, Sørensen and Torfing argue that the strength of observation and diary studies is that they provide a relatively unmediated access to the formal and informal interaction among network participants and, as such, these two techniques are likely to constitute a valuable source for studying patterns and participation within a given network. But the unstructured and somewhat impressionistic character of the data may be a disadvantage because it makes a systematic analysis of the data material difficult. This problem may be remedied by situating the data in its context; this makes the interpretation clearer, but with a less wide-ranging validity. Moreover, both techniques provide a ‘snapshot’ of interaction within a

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given network, but that does not offer a possibility for inserting the data in a longer perspective. In Chapter 8, Damgaard and Sørensen conclude that applying focus group interviews in the later phase of a research is useful. A focus group interview contributes by enriching the insights into the norms and logics of appropriateness that regulate the interaction within a network. Moreover, a focus group interview provides a possibility for gathering the collective reaction of respondents to preliminary research results. This is not only a rich source of data for researchers, but also an obvious opportunity for the respondents who, in general, appeared to be pleased to become engaged in a discussion with peers and researchers. However, the authors, likewise, point to a number of pitfalls that might hamper a productive outcome, and in particular, Damgaard and Sørensen stress the need for researchers to give ethical consideration to the possible impact a focus group interview might have on those studied. In Chapter 9, Borrás and Olsen tell us how a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques enrich and strengthen studies of network governance by generating new insights that neither qualitative nor quantitative research techniques could provide if they stood on their own. Whereas qualitative research techniques are well suited for comprehending the institutional context of network governance and the role of network actors, quantitative social network analysis enables a meticulous mapping of a network. The authors emphasize that it is particularly edifying to plan a sequential use of quantitative and qualitative techniques. They illustrate for example that while quantitative social network analysis might serve to provide an overall understanding of the network composition by mapping out its density and the centrality of actors, various qualitative techniques are crucial for interpreting such results. Nevertheless, the authors likewise point to problems in combining quantitative and qualitative data, in particular in terms of consistency within each of the sets of data.

10.2

Challenges in the research process

It has been no easy task to analyse policy networks. Some of our experiences have confirmed our initial expectations about the strengths and weaknesses of each research technique, as well as the challenges of doing studies on network governance. Indeed, it turned out to be a challenge to identify a governance network and its contours and to collect data on its informal aspects. Yet, other challenges occurred unexpectedly in the process of applying most research techniques.

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Gaining access to the research field was one challenge with which we were confronted when applying all research techniques, even collecting the required data for the quantitative social network analysis. Our experience was that getting access was possible in all institutional contexts and at all levels (transnational, national, local), but in some cases it was felt to be more cumbersome than in others. In general, access was facilitated, in particular by face-to-face contact. This was a crucial factor when collecting the questionnaire for the social network analysis and interviews as well as to access meetings for observation and establishing agreements with diary writers. Thus, presence in the research field is a crucial factor. It follows that one way to facilitate access is to invest a sufficient amount of research resources in a given governance network to allow for a certain presence in the field. As a matter of fact, access was achieved most easily in the Danish local-level case, Køge, in close proximity with the base of the research team and in which the highest number of researchers were involved. Yet, more importantly, our experiences also indicate that the openness of a governance network also depends on the way in which its participants perceive its functioning. Thus, whereas access to a governance network might be feasible in a period when a network is considered to be functioning well by its participants, it might be difficult or denied in periods of internal tension. Our experiences in Grenoble illustrated the difficulty in gaining access to such a network in the first place (Chapter 6), whereas the Danish case, Køge, exemplified how a rather open and welcoming governance network closed its doors when an issue that caused tension emerged (Chapter 7). As these experiences tend to indicate that it is most feasible to gain access to a network when there are few issues that cause conflict, we should bear this in mind when concluding on the efficiency and democracy of network governance in future full-scale studies. Another challenge was related to the seven cases taken from various institutional contexts. As the formation, form and functioning of a governance network tend to vary according to institutional settings and levels, the need to do comparative and multi-level analyses of network governance imposes itself. Yet, doing a comparative study of several institutional contexts is demanding. According to our experience, this implies general and thorough knowledge on the institutional contexts in question and, in addition, certain language proficiencies are a necessity. Certainly, outsourcing data collection to researchers with language proficiency is a possibility, but expensive language translations are subsequently required in order to making data sharing possible and to actually perform the comparative study. Furthermore, with regard to some policy fields, the outsourcing of data collection is also complicated by a high degree of technicality and

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many abbreviations that necessitate a certain familiarity with the field (Chapter 7). Even for local politicians, as network participants, the highly technical nature of labour market policy was said to be an obstacle as mentioned in the French case of Grenoble. Finally, the high degree of technicality encourages specialization within one case within a group of researchers, and this makes a subsequent comparative analysis difficult. To sum up, there are many challenges in doing comparative and multilevel research on network governance, and in order to face these challenges one needs a research team whose members not only possess the required qualifications, but also are capable of complementing one another in all phases of a research project.

10.3

Final points

To many observers and theorists, network governance is a fuzzy concept. But as our project shows, it represents something of importance going on in parts of the Western world, namely a challenge to the comprehension of the state as a modernistic, bureaucratic, top-down government, and the definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of social goods and values. Instead, we see the emergence of a more interorganizational state (Bogason and Toonen, 1998). Present-day Western states are increasingly dependent (for their success) on interactions with other societal actors; using a range of ‘instruments’ that include quasi-market forces and bargaining and negotiations with an intent to accomplish a give and take. Hierarchical instruments and organizations have not disappeared, but they are on the wane relative to new modes of interaction, which on the other hand may be said to take place ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997: 197–205). How can one perform an empirical analysis of network governance? We have used a mixed bag of techniques, and we have not used a very stringent research design. Why not? Because a traditional, top-down deductive approach is limited in its ability to serve as a starting point for network governance research for several reasons: • There is not much coherent theory to validate in this field of research. Rather, there are some, quite a few, concepts, and some general ideas of good and bad, and large variety. So the present day task is to create the comprehension of complex processes by qualitative assessments, not to confirm or reject propositions. • Governance networks are social constructs par excellence; they are identified and named by the researcher in a process of reconstructing

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•

•

•

• •

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communication patterns, and they may not always be perceived in the same way by those actually involved in the communication. Many networks exist only in context, and particularly the informal ones may only have a significance ad hoc. Therefore, the validity of network governance may only come about by making stories about them credible to other observers and participants; hard data about them may be next to impossible to collect. The contents of the stories depend very much on the ability of the researcher to interpret and contextualize observations and utterances, so it is possible that other researchers would conclude differently. Due to many uncertain factors, it is difficult to make a master design for the research beforehand; often one must ‘go for it’ and adapt to circumstances during the process. Consequently, research takes place in the natural setting, the real actors are to be contacted and interviewed or observed, although one can also use focus groups and the like for analysing factors beyond the present day. It follows from the above that the knowledge reaped from the research processes is very much contextual. Likewise, the resulting knowledge is inferred from the material at hand, and it is not transferred into propositions because the researcher lacks the theoretical superstructure to address such propositions.

One should not press the issue, a criticism of traditional research designs, too far, however. The study we made has not been an attempt to make a revolution and throw away all lessons from the past. There is a pathdependency based on past research experiences. The study therefore has been performed in a mixed bag of metatheoretical positions – a concoction of traditional social science and social constructivism based on, inter alia, hermeneutic interpretation. In traditional social science, mastering research techniques is a separate field of knowledge. The researcher initializes a process of operationalizing the theoretical basis for the research project, and then determines what research technique(s) will be adequate for collecting data. Often the researcher turns to an outside agency to carry through the actual data collection, for example a survey or a series of telephone interviews, Or, s/he sets up a research group of young scholars and/or senior students who are trusted with the task of collecting data and doing the preliminary structuring of what comes out of the data collection processes. Then, turning to the analysis, the researcher (in the role of a research director) comes back and more or less takes over the analysis, or (re)enters the process as

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the senior and close advisor on how to organize and develop the analysis. We have not parcelled out those tasks. All activities in the field were performed by seasoned researchers. Still, we could not go beyond adapting a general framework which we had set up beforehand, as explained in the introductory chapter. After that, we had to trust our ability to interpret activities in the field. A challenge, then, was that observation, reading and listening depend on the eyes that see and the ears that hear. For example, when we observed meetings within the governance network in the local cases, a common set of guidelines structured our observation processes. Yet, subsequently, observation reports revealed that the researchers had emphasized different aspects of metagovernance, i.e. one had pointed to external funding and another to external regulation (Chapter 7). Likewise, when conducting interviews, all researchers followed a common set of guidelines, but the data generated turned out to differ in terms of the issues covered and the degree of formality – depending on the research setting, the individual interviewee and the style of the interviewer (Chapter 6). These examples illustrate an additional challenge when doing comparative research. That is, when comparing, is it simply differences related to the process of collecting and analysing data settings that we make, which come to the fore, or are they actual differences in network governance? Whereas such ambiguity is a problem in traditional social science, we want to change a possible vice into a virtue. Making a collective research project an asset implies drawing systematically on several pairs of eyes and ears in the phases of collecting and analysing data. The clue is to understand social constructivism. In social constructivist research, the researcher is part and parcel of the research processes of creating and analysing data. This process cannot easily be separated from the theoretical side of the research process. Constructivist theory is explicitly contextual, and going back and forth between the data construction and theory development is the core business of the research process. Data mostly is treated as qualitative evidence about the research field (Erlandson et al. 1993: Ch. 5). Therefore, techniques like interviews (of many sorts) and (participant) observation are core activities in creating data which would not otherwise come into existence, except as tacit knowledge which of course is not well communicated. In addition, existing documents may be analysed in order to put the data from interviews, etc. into perspective, and one may also analyse the physical setting in which the research object(s) are being developed: the role of buildings, meeting rooms, offices (cubicles!), etc. in structuring the social processes and creating symbols linked to the daily routines of an organization or a network. In order to

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validate the results of such research techniques, the researcher may use several methods (Erlandson et al. 1993: Ch. 7). They include procedures, first of staying with the research field for a while in order to gain in-depth information, and second, of returning to those observed and/or interviewed and discuss the results with them. One may also involve various other stakeholders in such a process. The research techniques should be used in a process of triangulation where documents, interviews, observations, etc. are critically reviewed in a comparative process, based on the question of whether patterns emerge across the sources, or whether they contradict one another, and, if so, why. In addition, the researcher should communicate with other researchers in the research field for discussions of results, and s/he should keep a research journal that is used for reflecting on the research process and for documenting the unexpected, when it turns up first. Constructivist research gives the researcher the opportunity to work with practice. Networks are phenomena which the researcher often does not know much about beforehand, therefore it is wise to start from the bottom with activities involving some network members, and then build up knowledge about the network from there. For practical purposes, however, one often has to start out with some formal organization. This is a starting point only, and one need not ascribe any particular status to this organization beforehand. Developing knowledge from this starting point, then, is a process of interpretation (Hendriks 2003; Yanow 2003). The researcher interprets the relations between the relevant phenomena and thus builds up a context for how to understand, for example, network governance. It can be done actively as a process of learning for action for all participants, but it may also be done less actively, as a process of comprehension where participants broaden their horizons without having to modify what is learned into better practice. In network governance, then, the roles of actors may be difficult to identify. Public programmes will always exist, although their boundaries may be difficult to identify, particularly on the outcome side – several programmes may affect the same aspects of society, and many aspects are controlled by other factors than the instruments of public programmes. That is common knowledge. When we turn to (policy) networks, they may sometimes have some prescribed roles, particularly if they are backed up by formal rules. But apart from that, one would expect roles to develop as a consequence of processes that are difficult for an outside researcher to determine beforehand. In order to be better informed, the researcher therefore has to design and carry out projects in closer interaction with the ‘research object’, which in turn changes its status from being ‘just observed’ to becoming a more active part of the project development.

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Index Access to Employment Groups (AEGs), 64, 66, 67, 72, 162 action, appropriateness, 7 activation strategies, 26–7 actors actor reference, 108, 109 interdependence, 5, 7 Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi (ANPE), 56, 68 Amstrådsforeningen (ARF), 48 Ansell, C., 179–80 Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes (AFPA), 56, 68 backward mapping, 29–32 benchmarks, 118 Berg, B.L., 181–2, 186 Birmingham Access to Employment Groups (AEGs), 64, 66, 67, 72, 162 Advantage West Midlands (AWM), 63 agency networks, 201–4 Birmingham City Council (BCC), 66, 172 Birmingham Strategic Partnership (BSP), 64, 65, 72, 168 Employment Resources Centres, 172 Employment Strategy Group (ESG), 64, 65, 66, 67, 167, 168, 170, 171–2, 201–3 Employment Strategy Operations Group, 172 Enterprising Communities, 171–2 external exclusion, 170, 172–3 focus group interviews, 191, 193, 201–4 Framework for Regional Employment and Skills Action (FRESA), 63 Learning and Skills Council (LSC), 66, 67

Local Area Agreement (LAA), 65, 168, 174 local governance networks, 63–7, 167–8, 170, 171–2, 173–4, 201–4 Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF), 168, 171 Netwerc, 172 observation/diaries, 156–60, 171–2 private contractors, 172 Public Sector Agreement Targets, 66 Regional Skills Partnership (RSP), 63 respondent selection, 134, 135 selection, 28 West Midlands Regional Assembly (WMRA), 63 see also United Kingdom Bogason, Peter, 1–20, 224–32 Borrás, Susana, 20, 125, 207–23 brokerage roles, 218–21 censorship, 150, 155 Centre Européenne des Entreprises Publiques (CEEP) CEEP UK, 53 social partners, 44, 56, 213, 216, 218 citizenship, citizen movements, 5 civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 44–5, 55 co-action, 4 Comité du Dialogue Social pour les questions Européennes et Internationales (CDSEI), 56, 57–8, 88, 91, 114–15 Commission of the European Union, see European Commission Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 52–3, 55, 112, 113 Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), 56

239

240

Index

Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), 56 conflict, governance networks, 158 constructivism, qualitative methods, 2 corporatism Denmark, 27, 72, 92, 93, 143, 145 France, 26, 72, 92, 93, 143, 145 governance networks, 92 neo-corporatism, 4 United Kingdom, 52, 53, 72, 93, 143 Council of Ministers European Council (Essen, 1994), 30, 109 European Employment Strategy (EES), 44, 47 Creswell, J.W., 209 Damgaard, Bodil, 20, 179–206, 227 Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (DA), 48, 60, 61, 213 data data archives, 36, 38 structured data, 15 data collection diaries, 157–8 observation, 158–9 pilot study, 22, 37–8, 211–14 qualitative interviews, 127–8, 138–9 De Samvirkende Invalide Organisationer (DSI), 49, 60, 62 decision-making, metagovernance, 5–6 democracy, network governance, 5, 7, 95–6 democratic theory, research questions, 7–8, 35 Denmark Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen (AMS), 62 corporatism, 27, 72, 92, 93, 143, 145 Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (DA), 48, 60, 61, 213 De Samvirkende Invalide Organisationer (DSI), 49, 60, 62, 111 disabled persons, 49, 60, 62, 94, 111 employers’ organizations, 48, 49, 50 Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 48, 49, 50, 90 employment policy, 25–8, 51–2

European Employment Strategy (EES), 52, 107 expert reports, 85–6 flexicurity model, 58 Funktionærernes og Tjenestemændenes Fællesråd (FTF), 48, 60 General Practitioners’ Association (PLO), 60 Køge, see Køge labour market organizations, 27, 48–9, 143, 145 Landsorganisationen (LO), 48, 59–60, 61 National Action Plans (NAPs), 47–52, 90–1, 94, 97, 106–7, 111–12 National Employment Council, 47, 48, 49 national governance networks, 47–52 network topography, 111–12 newspaper articles, 107 Parliament, 47, 51, 94 shared narratives, 144 social democracy, 26 social partners, 27, 48–51, 60, 91–2, 94, 111–12 state capacities, 27 trade unions, 48, 49, 50, 59–60 unemployed, 59, 60, 63, 140, 143 unemployment benefits, 79 Derrida, Jacques, 100 diamond methodology, 118–19 diaries advantages, 154–5 anonymity, 159 content, 162–3 data collection, 157–8 data material/analysis, 160–5 defensiveness, 162 elicitation study, 154 feedback study, 154 gatekeepers, 158 idiosyncracies, 155 interactive processes, 156 length/quality, 155 limitations, 155 local network exclusion, 149, 164

Index log, 154, 157 memoir, 153–4 mini-survey, 157, 160, 161, 163 network diaries, 34, 157–8, 172–3, 175, 176 network integration, 160 network meetings, 158 payment incentives, 155, 159 personal diary, 154–5, 157 personal grievances, 162–3 policy evolution, 8 qualitative methods, 8, 14–15, 34, 153–6 research results, 165–77 response rates, 158, 159 self-reported centrality, 162 structured data, 14–15 types, 153–5 disabled persons, Denmark, 49, 60, 62, 94, 111 discourse analysis archive of a discourse, 104 methodology, 100–1 subject positions, 102, 108 types of documents, 104–5 welfare, 108 documentary analysis discourse, see discourse analysis document reading, 100–4 governance networks, 99–124 historical dimension, 103 policy decisions, 128–9 qualitative methods, 8–9, 11–12, 33, 150 representational model, 101, 104 documents accessibility, 12 archives, 104 audio-visual materials, 99 censorship, 150 physical artefacts, 99 text materials, 99 Dreyer Hansen, Allan, 19, 125–47, 226 empirical studies, findings, 41–73 employers’ organizations Denmark, 48, 49, 50 France, 56 United Kingdom, 52–5

241

Employment Committee (EMCO), 43–6, 50, 109, 119, 209, 213, 215–18 Employment Guidelines (EGLs) best practice, 74–5 Denmark, 48, 49, 50, 90 Employment Committee (EMCO), 43, 50, 209 European Employment Strategy (EES), 30, 75 expert reports, 81, 82 France, 56, 90, 138 Lisbon process, 46, 86 non-binding effect, 31 Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 30, 74, 189, 195, 209 social partners, 44, 109 translation, 77 United Kingdom, 87, 90 see also National Action Plans (NAPs) employment policy activation strategies, 26–7 core documents, 106 coupled/decoupled, 75 Denmark, 25–8, 51–2 European Union (EU), 24, 30–1, 43–7, 105–6, 108–11 France, 26–8, 58 high politics, 25 historical period, 105 historical transformation, 102 importance, 25 interviews, 13 local level, 31 National Action Plans (NAPs), 96–7 national level, 31, 106–7 network stories, 41–73 peer review, 90 pilot study, 21–40 transnational governance network, 43–7 United Kingdom, 26–8, 54, 87–8 England, see United Kingdom epistemology, post-positivism, 21 Esmark, Anders, 99–124, 226 European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), 44, 213, 217, 218

242

Index

European Commission documents, 12 dominating position, 189, 195 Employment Committee (EMCO), 43–6, 50 labour market organizations, 49 National Action Plans (NAPs), 31, 46, 54, 58, 74–5 social partners, 24, 49–50, 58, 92, 95 transnational governance, 47 European Employment Strategy (EES) common EES, 105 Council of Ministers, 44, 47 Denmark, 52, 107 Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 30, 75 European Commission, 44, 45 France, 56, 88 governance network, 216 launch, 105 network programmes, 105, 117–19 procedural norms, 117–18 substantive norms, 118 United Kingdom, 87 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), 44, 47, 213, 216 European Union (EU) Committee of the Regions, 45 Council, see Council of Ministers Economic Policy Committee, 43 Education Committee, 43 EES, see European Employment Strategy Employment Committee (EMCO), 43–6, 50, 109, 119, 209, 213, 215–18 employment policy, 24, 30–1, 43–7, 105–6 European Parliament, 44, 47, 213 focus group interviews, 189–90, 194–6, 212–13 guidelines, see Employment Guidelines, 30, 31, 43 job creation task force, 44 NAPs, see National Action Plans network programmes, 117–19 network topography, 108–11 OMC, see Open Method of Coordination

sixth Framework Programme for Research, 12 Social Protection Committee, 43 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 30, 105, 108, 109, 122 expert reports academic/non-academic compared, 85–9 advantages, 77–8 analysis, 84–97 assessment, 85–97 bias, 84–5 collection, 83 commissioning, 79–80 comparative analysis, 74–98 comparative studies, 76–8 comparison, 84 critical assessment, 79–84 Daubert case, 10–11 Denmark, 85–6 Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 81, 82 evidentiary reliability, 10–11 expert briefings, 83 France, 88–9 identification/selection of experts, 80–1 meaning, 8, 10–11 National Action Plans (NAPs), 76–7, 81–4 public administration, 11 queries, 83–4 research questions, 81–4 triangulation, 77, 78 United Kingdom, 86–8 United States, 10–11 focus group interviews advantages, 182 analysis, 194–204 asymmetrical relationships, 194–6 Birmingham, 191, 193, 201–4 class/themes, 15 confidential information, 186 constructed setting, 183 duration, 185 European Union (EU), 189–90, 194–6, 212–13 Grenoble, 191, 193, 196–8

Index group size, 185, 191–2 inquiry strategy, 192–3 in situ verification, 182 interactive processes, 15–16, 179–206 key characteristics, 187–9 Køge, 190–1, 198–201 lessons, 204–6 location, 185, 192 network governance, 179–206 observation, 183 qualitative methods, 8, 15–16, 34, 181–7 researchers, 179, 180, 183, 184, 186 selection, participants, 185, 188, 190 synergy, 181–2 see also qualitative interviews Foucault, Michel, 100, 104 Fourth Generation of Evaluation, 9–10 France Agence Nationale pour l’Emploi (ANPE), 56, 68 Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes (AFPA), 56, 68 centralization, 27 civil servants, 138 Comité du Dialogue Social pour les questions Européennes et Internationales (CDSEI), 56, 57–8, 88, 91, 114–15 Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT), 56 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), 56 corporatism, 26, 72, 92, 93, 143, 145 employers’ organizations, 56 Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 56, 90, 138 employment policy, 26–8, 58 Euroscepticism, 56 expert reports, 88–9 Force Ouvrière (FO), 56 Grenoble, see Grenoble labour market organizations, 145 Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF), 56, 114

243

National Action Plans (NAPs), 55–9, 88–9, 90–1, 94, 97, 106–7, 113–16, 120, 138 national governance networks, 55–9 network topography, 113–16 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 68 Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 56, 58 parliaments, 56, 94 Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique et européenne (SGCI), 56 social partners, 56–7, 91–2, 94, 113–15, 144 state capacities, 27 trade unions, 56 unemployed, 57 Funktionærernes og Tjenestemændenes Fællesråd (FTF), 48, 60 gatekeepers diaries, 158 observation, 152, 157, 158 respondent selection, 134, 135 governance local, see local governance networks policy analysis, 4 governance networks comparative/multi-level analysis, 21–40 composition/development/impact, 93–5 conflict, 158 corporatism, 92 documentary analysis, 99–124 informal networks, 182, 183 local, see local governance networks multiple methods, 32–4 output-based backward mapping, 28–32 policy outputs, 30 political/institutional context, 92, 93 see also network governance

244

Index

Granovetter, Mark, 208 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Grenoble external exclusion, 173 financing bodies, 175 focus group interviews, 191, 193, 196–8 internal exclusion, 173, 174, 175 local governance networks, 67–71, 168–70, 173, 174, 175, 196–8 observation/diaries, 156–60, 173, 175 Plan Local pour l’Insertion et l’Emploi (PLIE), 67–70, 132, 134–5, 136, 144, 168–9, 173, 174, 175, 191, 196–7 political committee (CPO), 197, 198 respondent selection, 134, 135, 136 selection, 28 technico-administrative committee (CTO), 168–9, 174, 197, 198 see also France Heclo, Hugh, 3 Hernes, Gudmund, 4 Human Capital, 7 indicators, 118 institutional context, governance networks, 92, 93 institutional theory new institutionalism, 4 research questions, 7, 35 interactive processes diaries, 156 focus group interviews, 15–16, 179–206 local governance networks, 165–77 observation, 151–2 social network analysis, 33 interactive research, definition, 179–80 interdependence, actors, 5, 7 interest representation, policy analysis, 4 interviews focus groups, see focus group interviews

qualitative methods, see qualitative interviews issue networks, meaning, 3 Job East, 59, 62 Køge access to meeting denied, 158 external exclusion, 170–1, 172 focus group interviews, 190–1, 198–201 internal exclusion, 174, 175, 176 Job East, 59, 62 limited inclusion, 198–201 Local Coordination Committees (LCCs), 59–62, 133–4, 139, 140, 143–4, 163, 165–7, 170–2, 174, 175, 191, 198–9 local governance network, 59–63, 165–7, 171, 172 nearness/obligation, 159 observation/diaries, 156–60, 171, 172, 176 respondent selection, 133–4 selection, 28 see also Denmark Kok, Wim, 44, 117, 122 labour market governance, network narratives, 141–5 labour market organizations Denmark, 27, 48–9, 143, 145 European Commission, 49 France, 145 United Kingdom, 27 Landsorganisationen (LO), 48, 59–60, 61 Lisbon process, 46, 86, 118 literature discussion, 35 local governance networks Birmingham, 63–7, 167–8, 170, 171–2, 173–4, 201–4 external exclusion, 148, 149, 164, 170–3 fragmentation, 92, 93 Grenoble, 67–71, 168–70, 173, 174, 175, 196–8 interactive processes, 165–77

Index internal exclusion, 148–9, 164, 173–7 Køge, 59–63, 165–7, 171, 172 local network exclusion diaries, 149, 164 external exclusion, 148, 149, 164, 170–3 internal exclusion, 148–9, 164, 173–7 observation, 149, 164 respondent selection, 132–3, 134, 136 study, 148–78 unemployed, 161 logic of appropriateness, 152, 173, 183 Luxembourg process, 117, 123 mapping network topography, 102–3, 108, 115 output-based backward mapping, 28–32 metagovernance decision-making, 5–6 National Action Plans (NAPs), 90 observation, 161 methodological individualism, 4 methodology academic genres, 1–2, 9–16 combining methods, 207–23 diamond methodology, 118–19 discourse analysis, 100–1 practical difficulties, 2 qualitative, see qualitative methods representation, 101 Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF), 56, 114 National Action Plans (NAPs) Denmark, 47–52, 90–1, 94, 97, 106–7, 111–12 employment policy, 96–7 European Commission, 31, 46, 54, 58, 74–5 expert reports, 76–7, 81–4 formulation/implementation/ evaluation, 91–2 France, 55–9, 88–9, 90–1, 94, 97, 106–7, 113–16, 120, 138

245

metagovernance, 90 political/institutional/discursive effects, 97 social partnership, see social partners United Kingdom, 52–5, 87, 94, 97, 106–7, 112–13, 121 window dressing, 88, 90 see also Employment Guidelines (EGLs) national governance networks Denmark, 47–52 France, 55–9 United Kingdom, 52–5 national level employment policy, 31, 106–7 network programmes, 119–22 negotiations common understanding, 5 negotiated economy, 4 policy analysis, 5 neo-corporatism, 4 network governance deductive approach, 229–30 definitions, 6–9 democracy, 5, 7, 95–6 empirical research, 6–9 focus group interviews, 179–206 hierarchical steering compared, 101 hybrid form, 5 meaning, 3–6, 101 network stories, 41–73 path-dependency, 92 public programmes, 10 qualitative interviews, 127–32 scope of analysis, 23–8 see also network governance network narratives labour market governance, 141–5 narrative reading, 141–5, 146 normative values, 144 qualitative interviews, 13, 125–47 variety of narratives, 144 network programmes analysis, 116–22 documents, 105 European Employment Strategy (EES), 105, 117–19 European Union (EU), 117–19 meaning, 102

246

Index

network programmes – continued national level, 119–22 Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 117–18 substantive norms, 116, 120 network theory, research questions, 7, 35 network topography analysis, 107–16 Denmark, 111–12 documents, 105 European Union (EU), 108–11 France, 113–16 mapping, 102–3, 108, 115 meaning, 102 network formation, 108, 109 United Kingdom, 112–13 networking planners, 4 networks linguistic connotation, 131 persons excluded, see local network exclusion policy analysis, 3 new institutionalism, policy analysis, 4 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) civil society, 44–5, 55 France, 68 social partners, 45 United Kingdom, 55 non-traditional evaluators, 9–10 Oates, C., 182, 185, 186 observation common guidelines, 157, 160 data analysis, 33–4, 160–5 data collection, 158–9 ethnography, 13 focus group interviews, 183 gatekeepers, 152, 157, 158 information collection, 8 interactive processes, 151–2 limitations, 152–3 local network exclusion, 149, 164 negotiation processes, 14 participation, 151 passive/non-participant, 14, 151–2 qualitative methods, 8, 13–14, 33–4, 150–3 research results, 165–77

Olsen, Hans-Peter, 20, 125, 207–23, 227 Open Method of Coordination (OMC) Denmark, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52 Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 30, 74, 189, 195, 209 France, 56, 58 network programmes, 117–18 United Kingdom, 53 Ørum Rasmussen, Iben, 19, 125–47, 226 output-based backward mapping, 28–32 parliaments Denmark, 47, 51, 94 European Parliament, 44, 47, 213 France, 56, 94 United Kingdom, 55, 94 partnerships, social, see social partners pilot study briefings by experts, 35 comparative nature, 23–4 countries, 25–8 data collection, 22, 37–8, 211–14 data overview, 33 employment policy, 21–40 lessons learned, 38–40 local sites, 28 managing collective research, 34–8 methodological focus, 22 output-based backward mapping, 28–32 pay-offs, 214–21 ‘pilot study survival kit’, 36–7 potentials, 221–3 practical experiences, 221–2 problems, 209–14 research design considerations, 209–11 research questions, 35–6 research strategy, 28–32 scope of analysis, 23–8 selection criteria, 24 SNA measurements, 215 time frame, 28 policy analysis governance, 4 interest representation, 4

Index negotiation, 5 networks, 3 new institutionalism, 4 top-down processes, 5 policy communities, meaning, 3 policy outputs, governance networks, 30 positivism methodological choice, 2 scientific truth, 21 postmodern conditions, 4 procedural norms, 103 process, consensus, 7 programme evaluation, 9 public programmes, network governance, 10 qualitative interviews actor perceptions, 33, 126, 128 additional insights, 125–6, 128–9 advantages, 125–6, 150 common strategy, 136–7 conduct, 136–41, 146 cultural knowledge, 130–1 data collection, 127–8, 138–9 data quality, 139, 146 definition, 127 descriptive questions, 137, 138, 139–40, 146 dialogue, 8 ethnographic, 137, 155 evaluative questions, 137, 140, 146 inner experiences, 129 insider/outsider problematic, 131 institutional norms, 126 interview guides, 137 languages, 130 meanings, 130 narrative reading, 141–5, 146 network governance, 127–32 network narratives, 33, 125–47 neutrality, 12–13 primary information source, 33 representativity, 12–13 respondent selection, 126, 132–6 semi-directed, 137 single respondent, 182, 183 storylines, 140, 142, 143 strengths, 128

247

transcription/translation, 142 unstructured, 137 see also focus group interviews qualitative methods combining methods, 207–23 constructivism, 2 diaries, see diaries documentary analysis, 8–9, 11–12, 33 focus groups, see focus group interviews Fourth Generation of Evaluation, 9–10 observation, see observation quantitative methods combining methods, 207–23 macro/microindicators, 9 questionnaires, social network analysis, 213–14 rational choice approach, 4 reflexivity, 4 research leadership managing collective research, 34–8 soft governance, 38 research process, challenges, 227–9 research questions democratic theory, 7–8, 35 expert reports, 81–4 institutional theory, 7, 35 network theory, 7, 35 pilot study, 35–6 resources, interdependence, 7 respondent selection Birmingham, 134, 135 contours of governance, 146 gatekeepers, 134, 135 Grenoble, 134, 136 information source, 136 Køge, 133–4, 135 local network exclusion, 132–3, 134, 136 policy outputs, 132, 133 qualitative interviews, 126, 132–6 snowballing, 31–2, 132, 134, 135–6, 146 trade unions, 134 reticulist planners, 4 Rhodes, Rod, 4 rule systems, 4

248

Index

Sammenslutningen af Landbrugets Arbejdsgiverforeninger (SALA), 48 Schmitter, P.C., 4 Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique et européenne (SGCI), 56 selection criteria, pilot study, 24 experts, 80–1 local governance networks, 28 respondents, see respondent selection self-regulation, 5 shadow of hierarchy, 71 snowballing, respondent selection, 31–2, 132, 134, 135–6, 146 social constructivism, 21 social network analysis asymmetrical power, 195 interactive processes, 33 questionnaires, 213–14 social partners Denmark, 27, 48–51, 60, 91–2, 94, 111–12 Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 44, 109 European Commission, 24, 48–50, 58, 92, 95 France, 56–7, 91–2, 94, 113–15, 144 governance networks, 39 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 45 partnership principle, 110–11 social dialogue, 110 stakeholders, 113 subject positions, 102, 108 transnational, 44 troika principle, 109–10 United Kingdom, 52–3, 55, 67, 87, 91–2, 94, 112–13 written inputs, 107 Sørensen, Eva, 5, 6, 19, 20, 35, 148–78, 179–206, 226, 227 stakeholders, 113 states, state–society relations, 4 storylines, qualitative interviews, 140, 142, 143

subject positions, 102, 108 subjectivity problems/opportunities, 2 research process, 2 substance norms, 103 substantive norms, 116, 118, 120 third sector organizations, 5 Torfing, Jacob, 5, 6, 16–17, 21–40, 41–73, 74–98, 126, 130, 132, 137, 138, 143, 148–78, 225, 226 trade unions Denmark, 48, 49, 50, 59–60 France, 56 respondent selection, 134 United Kingdom, 52–5, 67 Trades Union Congress (TUC), 52–5, 112, 113 transnational governance network, employment policy, 43–7 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 30, 105, 108, 109, 122 triangulation diaries, 158 expert reports, 77, 78 interview data, 139 validity of results, 34 Triantafillou, Peter, 99–124, 226 unemployed Denmark, 59, 60, 63, 140, 143 France, 57 United Kingdom, 67 Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE), 44, 47, 102, 213, 216, 218 United Kingdom activation strategies, 26 Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), 52 Birmingham, see Birmingham Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 52–3, 55, 112, 113 corporatism, 52, 53, 72, 93, 143 decentralization, 27 Department of Work and Pensions, 52–4, 64 employers’ organizations, 52–5

Index Employment Guidelines (EGLs), 87, 90 employment policy, 26–8, 54, 87–8 Euroscepticism, 87 expert reports, 86–8 Health and Safety Commission, 52 Job Centre Plus (JCP), 64, 66 job centres, 58 labour market organizations, 27 liberal welfare regime, 26 National Action Plans (NAPs), 52–5, 90–1, 94, 97, 106–7, 112–13, 121 national governance networks, 52–5 network topography, 112–13 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 55 Open Method of Coordination (OMC), 53

249

Parliament, 55, 94 Regional Development Agencies, 54 Skills Alliance, 54 social partners, 52–3, 55, 67, 87, 91–2, 94, 112–13 stakeholders, 113 state capacities, 27 Task Force on skills development, 52 Trades Union Congress (TUC), 52–5, 112, 113 unemployed, 67 voluntary organizations, 87, 92 United States, expert reports, 10–11 Whyte, W.F., 151 Work First, 7 workfare, 25, 87 Zølner, Mette, 1–20, 125–47, 224–32