Democratic Governance and Non-State Actors

Democratic Governance and Non-State Actors

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Democratic Governance and Non-State Actors

ANNE-MARIE GARDNER

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DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

Copyright © Anne-Marie Gardner, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10874–5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gardner, Anne-Marie. Democratic governance and non-state actors / Anne-Marie Gardner. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–10874–5 1. Non-state actors (International relations) 2. Non-state actors (International relations)—Case studies. 3. Minorities—Political activity. 4. Minorities—Political activity—Case studies. 5. Autonomy—Case studies. 6. Democracy—Case studies. 7. Self-determination, National—Case studies. I. Title. JZ4059.G37 2010 321.8—dc22

2010028508

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: February 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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For Elise and Tom My favorite Mouse and Monkey

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

1 Setting Standards in the Modern World

1

2

Democratic Governance and Self-Determination

21

3

Kosovo: “Standards Before Status” and Beyond

45

4

Nagorno-Karabakh: Balancing Standards?

71

5

Western Sahara: Deserted Standards?

105

6 Conclusion

135

Notes

143

Bibliography

175

Index

189

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Figures and Tables

Figures 1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 4.1 5.1

Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment Assessing Self-Determination Claims: Myriad Factors Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment: Kosovo Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment: Nagorno-Karabakh Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment: Western Sahara

7 23 39 69 103 134

Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2

Overview of Case Studies International Empowerment Democratic Capacity

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15 28 29

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Acknowledgments

A book project of this nature begins with a simple, yet inherently daunting, goal: to make an original contribution to the field of political science. I hope this book indeed makes a small contribution, but I acknowledge that it would not have been possible without help throughout the endeavor. The project would likely not have become a book without the intellectual friendship and encouragement of Beth and Beth. I am grateful to Beth Bloodgood, who read and discussed more versions of the project in its early phases than she cares to remember. To Beth English, who gave sage advice on everything from the book’s content to the publishing process, I am also deeply indebted. I extend thanks to Michael Doyle, who never hesitated to read and provide comments on chapters and articles; the project is far better for his wise counsel. Thanks also go to Kate McNamara and Joanne Gowa, who offered direction and suggestions along the way. Most importantly, nothing in my life has been possible without family who provide everything from astute guidance to welcome diversions from research and writing. I cannot thank my parents, Ann and Leon Clodfelder, enough for their unflagging support and encouragement. Most of all, my husband Bill and my children, Elise and Tom, have bestowed immeasurable love and motivation throughout the life of the project, which makes it all worthwhile. From the early stages of the project, I received financial and intellectual support from various foundations and organizations. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Eisenhower Institute of World Affairs, the OSCE Researcher in Residence Program, the P.E.O. Sisterhood, the Princeton Society of Woodrow Wilson Fellows, and the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. In addition, some of this material is based upon work supported under a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. I also wish to express gratitude to the

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

numerous diplomats and others at the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, and other organizations who allowed me to interview them, sharing their knowledge and insights. I also owe a debt of appreciation to Chris Cecot for preparing the book’s excellent index. Finally, the Taylor and Francis Group and Cambridge University Press granted permission to reprint portions of my previously published articles in International Peacekeeping and Review of International Studies.

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Chapter 1 Setting Standards in the Modern World

State construction has been booming around the globe since the end of the Cold War. From the birth of multidimensional peacekeeping operations in the 1990s to ongoing democracy promotion in the Middle East and beyond, state building has become a growth industry. But not just any type of state will suffice. The ostensibly neutral term “state building” belies the implicit underlying project of fashioning liberal democratic states. International organizations and influential states have increasingly sought to hold both existing and emerging states accountable for their treatment of constituents using standards of governance defined in terms of human rights and democracy. States not adhering to these standards may be on the receiving end of verbal or monetary sanction by global bodies, conditionality on loans from international donors, loss of membership in multilateral institutions, and even intervention. Similar standards have also become the blueprint for nascent states emerging from the devastation of civil war or state collapse. But are substate actors measured by the same ideals of democratic governance? In other words, have these standards become a precondition for statehood as well as a measuring stick for existing and reemerging states? These questions, important in their own right, build on a robust tradition in the literature exploring the connections among democratic governance, peace, and international behavior—extending the analysis of institution promotion from domestic state institutions to substate actors. The answer also lays the groundwork to pose even more

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probing questions about the efficacy of imposing standards of governance on groups or governments that may have vastly different conceptions of legitimacy embedded in local governance and institutions. Questions of governance and legitimacy are particularly relevant for self-determination issues, in which a claimant group asserts its desire to govern itself either within or independent of the existing state. Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 offers an opportune time to reconsider the theoretical rationale behind the “Standards before Status” approach to this contentious self-determination claim in the context of these larger trends in democracy promotion and in comparison to other claims. The final international settlement proposal, presented in February, 2007, marked a continued effort to promote multiethnic democratic institutions and minority rights as the pathway to a stable and viable Kosovo. Such liberal democratic state building also appears to fit within broader global efforts to foster democracy and human rights. By comparing patterns in the international response to overtly disparate self-determination claims, this project shows how the international community holds substate actors accountable to standards of democratic governance. When self-determination claimant groups have internalized human rights and democratic ideals, they are more likely to receive international support for their claim in the form of empowerment (that is, efforts to acknowledge or promote self-governance). If the group fails to meet these standards, international actors incorporate them as conditions in conflict resolution or state-building efforts. In other words, if a group is demanding increased powers to govern themselves, then the international community seeks to influence how they will govern. Groups receive more international political support if they display the capacity for liberal democratic rule: representation, tolerance for minorities, and an emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution. The question of standards has been applied far beyond the Standards before Status policy in Kosovo. This approach has framed the broader international response to Kosovo and, indeed, other claims in the post–Cold War era.

Self-Determination, Democratic Ideals, and Security The end of the Cold War era ushered in a period of unprecedented American dominance in the international system. While the incidence

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and likelihood of interstate war has waned under this new “Pax Americana,” nationalism, ethnic conflict, and civil war are pushing their way onto the international agenda in new and complicated ways. Peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nations (UN) increasingly involve intricate, multidimensional post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts focused on establishing democratic institutions. State building in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere figures prominently on the international agenda, implicitly touting liberal democratic states as a panacea for many of the world’s ills. This underlying ideology variously engenders support, resistance, or even an embrace of democracy against Western interests, as with the electoral victory of Hamas. In addition, globalization of the international economy and transborder environmental issues make it more difficult to draw distinct lines around the affairs of a single state, further blurring the lines between international and domestic issues while meeting resistance from those who blame liberal economic policies for global disparities in income and opportunity. Within this milieu, minorities worldwide have been articulating claims for self-determination—seeking increased powers of self-government or even independence. How do these conflicts fit into the puzzle of an evolving international system? Some of these claims have remained unresolved on the international agenda for several decades, not only entangling those directly involved but often threatening to spill over into neighboring countries or draw in outside powers, thus widening the scope of the conflict. Witness the inability to hold a UN-sponsored referendum in Kashmir since the late 1940s, pushing two nuclear-armed states to the brink of war. Or consider the continuing saga of the Palestinians and Israel, which arguably engenders anti-Western sentiment throughout the Arab world. International law—including specific precepts on self-determination as applied to these conflicts—has not been enough to foster a resolution to these or other conflicts arising from self-determination claims. Some analysts simply point to these examples as a failure of international law in the face of strong geopolitical interests or international apathy. Under this view, the stalled referendum processes in Kashmir or Western Sahara demonstrate the irrelevance of legal solutions to violent conflicts—or even the irrelevance of the United Nations itself. Looking at a broader cross-section of cases in which self-determination claims have surfaced, one finds little overt consistency in the outcomes. Some claims engender hardly more than rhetoric from the international

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community, such as the Tibetan case, while others end in forcible international intervention—ostensibly to rescue an oppressed population, as in Kosovo. Some cases end when the disputed territory is incorporated into a state and other disputes end with autonomy or even independence for the claimants. Many claims are accompanied by violence, but others, such as the velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia or the ongoing wrangling over Quebec, are relatively peaceful. Scores of cases never make it to the international agenda, either crushed or accommodated by the government under which the claimant group lives. Given the obvious and multiple variations across cases, it appears difficult to understand the international response to such claims as based on some consistent underlying principles or rationale. How are the international responses to such varied cases as Tibet, Kosovo, Quebec, and Kashmir alike? By what criteria, if any, does the international community judge the validity of self-determination claims? Perhaps the consistency lies in principles fostered by the international community and its leading states. In the post–Cold War era, state behavior on a variety of fronts appears increasingly linked to norms of human rights and democratic governance. Liberal theories suggest that these norms influence how states conceptualize the roots of peace and stability, pointing to the spread of liberal democratic regimes and their positive effects on peace and conflict resolution.1 Seemingly to facilitate these trends, the international community has used various instruments to pressure non-liberal or emerging states to democratize or improve human rights conditions—a form of hegemonic socialization by Western liberal states that dominate many international organizations. Economic benefits and development assistance from international donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) have often been conditional on a government effecting changes in domestic policies or structures.2 In post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and state-building efforts undertaken by the United Nations have become almost by definition an exercise in establishing democracy and the rule of law patterned after the Western liberal democratic tradition; some scholars argue that democratic governance has emerged as the most accepted form of domestic government.3 Similarly, oppressive treatment of minority populations can trigger international sanctions or even military intervention.4 In terms of self-determination, it has been extensively argued in the literature that gross human rights abuses

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may lay the political, moral, and even legal grounds for separation.5 Such behavior challenges prevailing Realist approaches to international relations that discount the effect of regime type and have difficulty explaining why states would expend resources to systematically promote particular domestic institutional forms.6 It also defies a purely Legalist explanation that would correlate the international response to groups seeking self-government to the codified law of self-determination—of debatable application outside the colonial context—and the requirements for international formal legal recognition of states: control of a defined territory and population as well as an effective government. The response of the international community has been more varied and changeable than strict interpretation of the applicable law would suggest. Realist and Legalist approaches are not entirely wrong, but they only tell part of the story. Fostering democratization and assisting fledgling democracies through liberal democratic state building thus appears to be implicitly linked to the international community’s vision for securing international peace. This not only presents new practical problems for militaries, international organizations, and foreign policies long focused on the specter of interstate warfare, but also raises the theoretical question of how states define security in an era of increasing attention to human rights. Linkages between illegitimate governance, failed states, and violent conflict encourage closer examination of domestic issues and substate actors as factors in the analysis of international security.7 Subsequent chapters in this volume argue that human rights and democratic governance influence how states respond to issues and help define the limits of sovereign statehood in the international system, suggesting an operational definition of security linked to the idea of legitimate governance based on human rights and democracy. Because democratic governance emphasizes individual participation and human rights, the concept intuitively applies not only to states but to all institutions and governance practices—democracy all the way down. Just as a state’s sovereign rights come attendant with responsibilities, substate actors vying for sovereignty—or increased participation in the existing sovereign state—may be subject to similar responsibilities. This is especially true of self-determination claims, in which the focal point of contention is precisely a governance issue—namely, who rules over a people or territory and the inherent right of a population

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to decide the answer to that question. Given the increasing emphasis on rewarding adherence to international governance standards—and punishing deviation therefrom—the international community appears to have an interest in influencing the type of governing that a claimant group’s desire for self-rule would entail. In gauging how a group would govern, it seems logical for the international community to apply consistent standards to states as well as to “prestates.” I argue that the international community assesses a claimant group’s capacity for liberal democratic governance as a means of evaluating the group’s self-determination claim. In other words, how well has this substate group internalized standards of governance similar to those applied to states? What effect does this have on the international response to their claim?

Theory and Definitions While legal scholars and political philosophers have recounted the necessity of holding claimant groups accountable for their behavior,8 such normative theories have yet to be empirically tested. This project establishes a framework linking the character and behavior of a claimant group with international support for its claim. It draws on theories of international socialization9 as well as international-domestic interaction10 to argue that international standards of behavior adopted by substate groups resonate positively with the international community. In other words, the group receives a more favorable response for its political goals when it appears to have “bought into” or internalized the international standards. The independent variable, democratic capacity, measures how well the group conforms to international standards of governance and is a function of three interrelated characteristics: representation, tolerance, and peaceful conflict resolution. The dependent variable, international empowerment, measures international political support for exercising self-rule and includes promoting autonomy or other devolutions of authority. The higher or stronger the democratic capacity of a group, the more likely that group will receive international support for its claim. This project inserts an innovative perspective into several important strands of the international relations literature. First, it contributes

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High International Empowerment

Extensive international support to create alternative institutions or structures: supporting autonomy or independence, negotiating sovereignty with state International support limited to modifying existing institutions: recognizing elected representatives or ingroup institutions; supporting powersharing with national government

Low

International support premised upon change in constitution, leadership change, elections, human rights, minority rights guarantees Low

High Democratic Capacity

Figure 1.1 Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment.

to arguments that human rights and democratic governance influence how states respond to issues and help define the limits of sovereign statehood in the international system.11 Legitimacy has always been a key component of sovereignty and recent contributions to the literature have attempted to decouple formal legal sovereignty—recognition based on territorial control—from effective governance and the full benefits of sovereign statehood in the international system, which depend on a legitimate government as it is defined and accepted by the international community.12 Drawing on academic debates regarding humanitarian intervention and the nature of sovereignty in the post–Cold War era, this suggests an operative definition of security linked to the idea of legitimate governance based on human rights and democracy.13 It also extends these debates on the nature of sovereign responsibility to non-state actors, highlighting how these actors have attained presence and rights on the international stage as active political players in their own right.14 Using intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as a proxy for the international community in action provides insight into the operation of such organizations in the international system, especially in promoting democratic norms and placing constraints on the exercise of states’ geopolitical interests in security matters.15 This may be true whether democracy promotion is born of a conscious effort by an IGO

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to promote certain norms or domestic regime types (for example, the European Union) or a side effect of trying to accommodate multiple factions into power sharing arrangements for the sake of peace. My approach builds on literature positing that international- and domesticlevel norms interact, while also utilizing the explanatory leverage of combining power and ideas into a more comprehensive explanation of international outcomes.16 It also supplements the existing body of literature, primarily in the field of international law,17 on the response to self-determination claims by setting such claims in the context of other political and legal developments in international relations—namely, the increasing emphasis on democracy and human rights as standards of governance.18 From this overview, we can identify several terms and concepts that must be defined before proceeding with the derivation and application of the theory. The following sections will trace the evolution and meaning of self-determination, identify the relevant actors (central government, claimant group, and international community), and define the scope of this project in reference to legitimate governance, norms, and international action.

Self-Determination: Claimants and Concepts At its most basic, the principle of self-determination can be defined as freedom from alien domination and freedom to choose a form of government.19 In this project, the group advancing a claim for selfdetermination will be referred to as the claimant group and the state against which the claim is levied will be termed the central government. Over the course of the twentieth century, self-determination evolved from a general political principle into a legal right accorded to specified groups. The UN Charter offered the first step in this transformation by proclaiming as one of its purposes the promotion of “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.”20 Subsequent development of international custom, as exemplified by UN resolutions and declarations as well as state practice, set the parameters for decolonization following World War II.21 Several United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions in the 1950s presented the right to self-determination as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of human rights and an idea deserving respect

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from all member states.22 The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UNGA Resolution 1514) asserted, among other points, that all peoples have a right to selfdetermination and that continued subjugation is an impediment to world peace.23 One day later, the General Assembly passed Resolution 1541, which set out the criteria for defining the “self” (namely those territories which were both geographically separate and ethnically or culturally unique from the ruling authority24), the means by which the right could be exercised (informed and impartial democratic processes25), and the acceptable results of such a process (creation of a sovereign state, free association with another state, or integration with an existing state). Other UN instruments—including the 1966 International Human Rights Covenants and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States—further clarified and expanded this emerging legal right. Regionally, the 1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter declared as its purpose to “eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa,” and to this end asserted an “inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny.”26 From this evolution one can discern the law of self-determination as one general principle and a set a customary rules applicable to certain sets of cases—namely colonial peoples, populations under foreign occupation, and minorities denied access to government. The principle that serves as the overarching guideline—the essence of self-determination as articulated in the colonial period—is that self-determination requires the freely expressed will of the people involved. This guideline sets new constraints on the transfer of legal title to territory; the law precludes transfer of title in breach of selfdetermination, thus disallowing annexation without consultation of the people belonging to the affected territory.27 The rules of selfdetermination are more specific. For example, those covering colonial peoples detail who has the right to self-determination (colonial peoples), techniques for exercising that right (plebiscites or referenda), and the options available to them (independent statehood, integration with another state, or association with another state). While setting agreed standards for the decolonization process, these rules were expansive enough to allow the UN General Assembly discretion to decide what form the exercise of self-determination would take in particular cases.28

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But self-determination issues have much broader implications than this narrow legal definition. Most of the non–self-governing territories for which this body of law developed have become independent or have integrated with a neighboring state. Scholars and practitioners debate how far the instruments listed above can stretch to accommodate non-colonial claims, largely driven by ethnonationalism. Given the legal weight of the term as well as its symbolic power as a beacon of freedom, leaders of claimant groups use cries for self-determination to try to capitalize on international sympathies—attempting to internationalize issues by linking their situation or goals to international law and precedent in the rhetoric of self-determination or “neocolonialism.” However, the international community eschews such linkages, often associating demands for self-determination solely with separatist tendencies. The political ramifications of allowing every national group a separate right to self-determination and then conflating that right with independence are disturbing in a world where boundaries overlap and populations mingle. Despite Woodrow Wilson’s vision for a more harmonious world order after World War I, the ideal of having a state for every nation is unachievable without widespread violence and bloodshed. Instead, most statesmen and scholars alike would agree that self-determination is a loaded term often identified closely with secession and thus can be considered extremely destructive; diplomats often avoid the word altogether in both formal and informal discussions. Recent practice suggests an emphasis in diplomatic circles on self-determination as a more dynamic question of procedure—ongoing accommodation of all groups in the political process—rather than as a question of acquiring the status of an independent state.

Democratic Governance: Norms and International Standards In this project, I posit that the framework that best explains the international community’s response to self-determination claims draws upon values embedded in the international system, using ideas about legitimate governance and popular sovereignty—ideas that citizens should have a voice in government and enjoy broad political rights. These values reflect the regime type or ideals of the dominant powers in the system, influencing how security is defined and where the line

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between internal affairs and external relations should be drawn. The model shows how these values are extrapolated downward from the state level to substate actors and institutions. Specifically, international actors assess the relative democratic capacity of the claimant group in reference to international standards of legitimacy emerging in the post– Cold War era—international norms of human rights and popular sovereignty. This assessment results in predictable patterns of international empowerment, encouraging the internalization of these norms by the claimant group. This project tests the proposition that the international response to self-determination claims is explained by a framework forged from an interaction of norms across international and domestic levels. Norms are defined as standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity29 and are often imbued with moral or ethical concerns— suggesting how things ought to be and what values should be promoted through actors’ behavior. International norms are systemic standards or goals applicable to all state actors and domestic norms are ideals held by a particular polity or, in this project, a substate group. The framework I describe reflects the values of the dominant powers, influenced by ideational interactions with other actors and becoming embedded in intergovernmental organizations. This framework of standards (international norms) is then used to judge the normative structures, behaviors, and practices within states (indicative of domestic norms). The norms at play here are international standards of legitimacy based on human rights and popular sovereignty interacting with domestic norms embodied in substate governance relationships and institutions.

The International Community and International Empowerment This project focuses on the actions of the international community, a ubiquitous yet ambiguous phrase in international relations. In this project, international community represents a conceptual construct of the society of states in an anarchic system, acting according to agreed rules or standards.30 IGOs provide the best proxy for the construct of the international community: the debate and actions of IGOs are led by the most powerful members, who in turn are constrained by the norms and collective membership of the organization.31 In a similar

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vein, Will Kymlicka has described the term international community as a misnomer. Instead, the United Nations—and, by implication, other international organizations—reflect “asymmetries in global power, privileging the views and interests of the West.”32 This project’s use of the term international community embraces this critique of a universalistic understanding of the term without discarding the idea that standards and norms do indeed exist in the international sphere and that international organizations are instrumental in defining and operationalizing them.33 The collective legitimation enjoyed by the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, has been attributed to the recognition that it represents the collective sentiment of a respected part of the global community of states—not necessarily a consensus or a universal agreement.34 Leading powers exert the most influence in IGOs both in terms of economic and military capabilities as well as the values they promote, and thus these states are also the most influential in defining norms. These norms are in turn tempered by values and ideas promulgated by smaller powers and non-state actors in the international arena. The IGO provides political space for this interaction, either within its debates and forums or through its activities in the field. International organizations thus play an important role in combining power and ideas by institutionalizing and spreading such global norms and then incorporating them into the organization’s programs and actions, including their response to security questions. Focusing on the period of American dominance in the post–Cold War or contemporary era, the model developed in the following chapter and tested in the remainder of this book suggests how these Westerninspired values are applied to self-determination claims through various international organizations. The international community, acting through IGOs and promoting international standards of legitimate governance, implicitly judges self-determination claims and decides how to respond in individual cases according to the posited framework. This is not a consensus reached among all members, but reflects the prevailing view of legitimacy based on dominant states’ values as tacitly accepted and influenced by others that make up the organization. It may be a conscious process of democracy promotion, such as ascension requirements in the European Union, or it may be the unintended result of seeking to accommodate competing interests into

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a power-sharing settlement, as is often the case in UN peacekeeping. Foundational principles of the organization reflect an agreed baseline for the concept of legitimacy and provide a lens through which individual state interests—including the material interests of the dominant states—are filtered.35 Members of the organization respond to claims by framing the geopolitical facts of each case within the parameters of these principles. Before developing the model, it is important to address two possible misconceptions about the project. First, this is not a story about intervention or recognition. Rather than asking what drives international intervention (understood as military intervention) or formal international legal recognition (the process of recognizing a new sovereign state), my analysis examines the determinants of international empowerment. I define international empowerment as actions that promote change to existing state and substate institutions—or encourage the creation of new institutions at these levels—that elevate the status and governing responsibilities of a substate group within or even beyond the state. Empowerment is thus an endorsement of institutional modifications that give the group in question more autonomous governing powers. The model is also limited to the context of self-determination claims; it does not consider all internal conflicts and certainly not all forms of possible international interference in domestic affairs.36 While military intervention may be a result consistent with my analysis in some cases (for example, in Kosovo), international military intervention is not the central focus of this project. Second, this project also does not offer an empirical or normative approach to understanding particular outcomes for claims, most notably independence. I am not attempting to predict which claims will result in independence, nor do I pass judgment on which claims deserve independence. There are two aspects to analyzing the settlement of a self-determination claim: what are the parameters the international community establishes for negotiating a resolution and how will the parties involved agree to resolve the issue given their interests and political will. The first question is the subject of this project, highlighting aspects of how the international community becomes involved and what conditions they place on the claimant group in exchange for political support. Specific outcomes depend on a constellation

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of geopolitical and normative factors: great power interests, regional impacts, domestic balances of power, geopolitical and legal histories of the territory and dispute, economic incentives to settlement, level of violence, democratic institutions, and human rights issues. The focus here is on the parameters set by the international community within which the parties should negotiate, rather than on the imposition of particular solutions. Rather than envisioning specific outcomes, I argue that the international community responds instead to ongoing dynamic relationships and the nature of the substate claimant group. Though the model suggests that the international community works to establish the democratic domestic institutions deemed necessary for longterm conflict management, the project as a whole is not normative in aspiration. I do not proselytize what outcomes should be obtained in individual cases nor which cases most deserve independence. Instead, the analysis is positive in nature, showing how international norms are used by states or reflected in state action. I demonstrate how norms affect what states do, the limits of their independent pull, and their interaction with material factors, rather than describing what state action should be in an ideal world. While drawing on literature that offers a contemporary legal or normative definition of self-determination, this project proposes an operative definition of self-determination that is empirically grounded.

Case Studies and Alternative Frameworks This model attempts to extrapolate the framework utilized in peacebuilding activities to argue that governance issues are important in determining the international response to all self-determination claims. To illustrate the causal forces at work, I chose three ongoing self-determination claims from three different regions: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. The cases represent three separate stages of conflict resolution to determine if the model operates only in cases directly involving institution building. In NagornoKarabakh, the parties are engaged in mediation activities under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara corresponds

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SETTING STANDARDS IN THE MODERN WORLD Table 1.1

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Overview of Case Studies

Stage of Conflict Resolution

Focus of Mandate

Self-Determination Case

Mediation

Political: Minsk Group negotiations Military: ceasefire monitoring (mediation through Secretary-General’s good offices) Multidimensional (military, political, institution-building)

Nagorno-Karabakh

Peacekeeping

Peacebuilding

Western Sahara

Kosovo

Source: Table compiled by author.

to a different context for conflict resolution. The Kosovo case includes an active peacebuilding component in the backdrop of negotiations over resolution of the self-determination claim. In recent research, several scholars have shown the influence of liberal democratic norms in various aspects of multidimensional peacebuilding activities in which constructing institutions of governance is an overt function of the international presence. With this case selection, I attempt to extend their arguments to international involvement in conflict resolution prior to or falling short of multidimensional peacebuilding, while narrowing the focus to self-determination conflicts. The cases appear quite dissimilar on the surface, yet the underlying dynamics of the international response are explained by the proposed framework when a Realist or Legalist approach fails to account for the international community’s actions. Focusing on material factors and geopolitical interests, a Realist approach privileges the state as a unitary actor. The domestic character of the state and the substate groups working outside government are not relevant theoretical categories for understanding international outcomes. Realism would not predict international intercession to change regime type or domestic policies or to support a substate actor, unless such changes directly affect the intervener’s material interests. States and international organizations may take these actions for the sake of security, but the next step in understanding their behavior would be to examine how security is

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being defined. Increasingly, legitimacy of governance has become an international security issue, with legitimacy being positively linked to liberal democratic state building. The international standards used to promote legitimacy reflect the values of the dominant powers as engendered through international organizations. Following the values of the United States and its allies, security and stability in the international system are defined in reference to normative ideals for legitimate governance—democracy and human rights. Former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice pointed to the governance problems of weak and failing states as a rationale for security policies based on democracy promotion, espousing that “the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power.”37 Realism does not account for the role played by these values, or indeed for the fact that the regime type and the values of the dominant powers can have such an influence on defining security and on international behavior. In Kosovo, Realists would correctly identify Serbian aggression as a threat to regional peace and security inviting support for Kosovo from Western-led international organizations—focusing on potential destabilizing effects on neighboring countries and NATO allies. But this approach fails provide a convincing argument for the international community’s emphasis on multiethnic democratic governance as the key to stability, instead of partition and population transfers as some Realists suggest. A Realist explanation of the Nagorno-Karabakh case would cite oil as the crucial factor, suggesting international support for Azerbaijan driven by economic security interests. But the involvement of the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh predates knowledge of the significance of the Azeri oil reserves and the organization has consistently pressed issues unfavorable to Azerbaijan: human rights, participation of Nagorno-Karabakh leaders in the conflict resolution process, and territorial exchange that would seemingly reward Armenian aggression. The Realist view of the Western Sahara dispute, emphasizing support for Morocco from powerful allies such as the United States and France, correctly predicts Morocco’s foot-dragging toward a solution favorable to the native Western Saharans (Sahrawis). But this approach falters in explaining how active ideological support for the Sahrawis and attention to legal and humanitarian issues in US domestic debates set parameters for geopolitical developments.

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SETTING STANDARDS IN THE MODERN WORLD

17

The international response to self-determination claims is also not properly explained by a Legalist approach that looks primarily at codified international law as the determinant of state behavior. For this project, a Legalist view embodies positivist international legal scholars and international relations scholars from the neoliberal institutionalist camp who emphasize state commitment in creating law and, therefore, compliance with codified law.38 The laws of self-determination, as detailed above, are clarified only for decolonization cases and are not clearly applicable to all groups that make self-determination claims. The law itself is in transition; thus, testing for compliance with an evolving legal concept becomes an ambiguous, if not impossible, task. In other words, the question is not if or how the law is being followed (compliance), but rather how the law is being created: states are following norms prior to their codification as law, not acting in compliance with law qua law.39 Legalism, like Realism, also provides a state-centric approach to understanding international outcomes, elevating territorial integrity and non-aggression against states to a prominent position in decision making. But other laws or norms are used to determine which claims are valid, especially norms of human rights and popular sovereignty. These norms not only offer a different framework for interpreting claims, but also implicate non-state actors as important players in that framework. Without explicit legal prescriptions regarding the relation of these norms to self-determination claims, Legalism falls short in understanding which norms are relevant and how they are applied. A framework focused primarily on legal principles provides an incomplete understanding of the Kosovo crisis. The codified law on self-determination does not easily fit this case because Kosovo was not deemed a non–self-governing territory or colony. Likewise, nascent international humanitarian law was the subject of much policy and academic debate; international actions in Kosovo in 1999 were justified in legal terms by some actors but contested by others. Nagorno-Karabakh also does not fit traditional legal definitions of self-determination to which the most specific body of law applies. Azerbaijan insists that international law in defense of territorial integrity favors its claims to the territory over that of the Karabakh Armenians. However, Armenian counterarguments and the proposals of the OSCE have emphasized that such principles governing legal ownership of territory need to be balanced with other realities of the case, including the

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human rights situation of the Karabakh Armenians. Finally, the law of self-determination as formulated during decolonization and specifically applied to Western Sahara would allow the peoples of the territory to hold a referendum on self-determination. Yet, tepid support from the leaders of IGOs considered to be the vanguard of international law, combined with changes in the proposals for settlement that move away from the original referendum solution, appear to be a defeat for Legalism. In its proposals, the international community has applied a wider definition of self-determination, focusing on granting rights and giving people more voice in governance without endorsing changes in borders. A strict focus on the law of self-determination, which clearly stipulates that a referendum on independence be held in Western Sahara, cannot account for this interpretation and such a seemingly radical departure from the referendum solution. Thus, while both Realist and Legalist accounts contribute part of the answer for understanding the international response to selfdetermination claims, neither offers a theoretically complete answer. The missing key to the puzzle is to integrate power and ideas: to understand how the values of the dominant states in the system are utilized as international standards of legitimacy for evaluating domestic governance and non-state actors. By systematically analyzing international behavior in response to self-determination claims in the post–Cold War era, I offer an empirically grounded explanation for the international response to self-determination. This broadly liberal approach combines elements of self-determination’s legal evolution and normative dimensions while acknowledging the international and domestic political dynamics that serve to operationalize the concept through the actions of international organizations. Chapter 2 devises a framework to explain the international response to self-determination claims: when and how the international community chooses to promote liberal democratic governance in substate actors. My posited framework thus integrates material and normative factors into one approach, focusing both on the influence of dominant powers as well as the role of a normative framework constraining outcomes. I also answer questions left unexplained in other approaches by highlighting how security is defined in reference to norms of legitimacy and how these international standards are applied to domestic governance structures in the context of self-determination claims. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate how this model explains the variation in international

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support over time in Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. This offers a more dynamic picture of the international response to self-determination than either a Realist or Legalist approach, neither of which can explain variance in international support when material factors and codified law are static. As the case study chapters show, predictable changes in the international response occur as international perceptions of each claimant group’s democratic record has waxed and waned—all within the standards before status framework.

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Chapter 2 Democratic Governance and Self-Determination

The model developed in this chapter explores when and how the international community applies standards of liberal-democratic governance to non-state actors, in particular groups advancing selfdetermination claims.1 A new emphasis among academic and policy–making circles in international relations links governance with international security, defining illegitimate governance as a security concern meriting international attention. Legitimate governance in international parlance has become almost tantamount to the goal of fostering liberal democratic states. But we have few theoretical explanations for understanding the relationship between legitimate governance and security in the context of non-state actors, especially those involved in self-determination claims. Do international standards of legitimate governance apply to non-state actors? How are substate claimant groups assessed and how does this help determine the international response to particular self-determination claims? I posit that the framework used by the international community2 for evaluating self-determination claims draws upon normative conceptions of legitimate governance emerging in the post–Cold War international system, ideas that center on participation and political rights for all citizens. Specifically, international actors assess substate actors and their governance practices in reference to international standards of legitimacy—norms of human rights and popular sovereignty. The framework for gauging claims is constructed from an evaluation of the

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claimant group’s capacity for democracy (is the group participatory? Does it utilize democratic institutions for conflict resolution?). This assessment helps determine the level of political support for the group’s efforts at self-rule. The main hypothesis to be tested with the model is whether the highest levels of international empowerment (the most extensive support for autonomous governance structures) occur when the claimant group displays a high degree of democratic capacity. In these cases, the international community supports the claimant group’s efforts to establish more autonomous institutions or governing mechanisms separate from or in conjunction with existing state institutions. This model creates a framework forged from an interaction of norms across international and domestic levels. The first section of this chapter will demonstrate why other approaches, which focus primarily on geopolitical factors such as military or economic interests or on codified international law alone, fail to offer a compelling or complete argument to explain the international response to self-determination claims. Then I present my model and hypotheses, suggesting that the international community assesses how well the claimant group adheres to democratic governance standards in order to decide whether and how to support the group. Finally, the conclusion focuses on the explanatory power of a framework that combines material factors and norms.

Alternative Approaches to Assessing Self-Determination Claims This project argues that the international response to self-determination claims reflects in part the desire of the international community to encourage the spread of human rights and democratic governance in the post–Cold War world as a component of international security. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the best embodiment of the international community, establish parameters for the resolution of contemporary self-determination claims within the rubric of these norms, holding the claimant group accountable to international standards normally applied to states. In evaluating claims, the international community may consider several possible types of factors: international and domestic, material and normative (see figure 2.1). While acknowledging the importance of material factors at both levels

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SELF-DETERMINATION Material Factors

Figure 2.1

Normative Standards

Great power material interests; regional stability

International human rights laws; standards for popular sovereignty

Realist approach

Legalist approach

Balance of power among domestic actors; preservation of status quo structures

Nature and actions of claimant group; compatibility of domestic structures to international norms

Neo-institutionalist or modified Realist approaches

Liberal approach (regime type and interactive effects)

International

Domestic

23

Assessing Self-Determination Claims: Myriad Factors.

in explaining case–specific outcomes, this project attempts to isolate the role of international norms applied to domestic actors, positing an interaction between international standards and domestic conditions necessary to explain how claims are assessed. This interplay establishes a framework for assessing claims, setting parameters for action and affecting how material facts are interpreted in individual cases. My approach is thus broadly liberal, focusing on the role of domestic regimes and attention to political rights in shaping international behavior. Alternative approaches to understanding the international response to self-determination claims fail to account for this dynamic and the constraints it engenders. I consider these alternative approaches below. As a first cut at the question of international response to selfdetermination claims, one could suggest in the vein of a Realist argument that the international response to self-determination claims is a function of international material factors (see figure 2.1, upper left corner). Realists assert that states are autonomous actors in the international system, their behavior is determined by the anarchic condition of that system, and their actions are unbounded by moral or normative concerns.3 One could posit that international organizations mirror the power and material interests of their largest members, responding only to claims against weak states and only when the large states’ strategic interests are at stake; otherwise, claims are treated as domestic matters and the autonomy of

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the central government is respected. Under this view, self-determination as a concept has no theoretical usefulness; strategies promoted by the international community are a function of the constellation of material interests involved in individual cases, with preference given to preserving existing state borders and interests of the Great Powers. But this explanation is theoretically incomplete; states’ motivations may include a desire to support a particular normative system— upholding values that are seen as conducive to system stability or that a state’s leaders or population feel are intimately tied to the state’s identity and ought to be encouraged or replicated elsewhere. The growth of international human rights law—in canon, in voluntary adherence to the law, and in the willingness of states to enforce the law against other states—also belies the idea that states are simply atomistic power maximizers. This suggests that states’ conceptions of their self-interest and the requirements of international order are shaped and constrained by international moral or normative standards. Realists also presume that states are the only significant players in the international system; other actors who wish to affect international outcomes must approach states in size or material power to be effective. This view diminishes the role played by substate actors and domestic conditions highlighted here, as well as other non-state actors. Yet, contrary to Realist expectations, arguments based on norms and the attributes of domestic actors appear to influence patterns of response to self-determination claims. Alternatively, a second approach might argue that the international community responds to domestic material factors in the target state such as the balance of power between the parties (see figure 2.1, lower left corner). Modifying a Realist approach to capture domestic power dynamics, one could argue that the international response reflects relative parity between the parties—support for a self-determination movement that has achieved power to rival the central government or when the conflict has reached stalemate.4 But international involvement to promote a claimant group can occur before the sides reach parity, which in itself alters the power dynamics on the ground by elevating the status of a substate group.5 Humanitarian intervention suggests that the international community does intervene on occasion to aid the weakest of groups on considerations of principle, not power. Finally, the willingness of IGOs to support state–building and peacebuilding activities—including transitional authority efforts—counters the

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view that the international community supports only independently viable entities when they reach power on par with states. States not only attempt to shape the domestic regime type of other states, but also appear to respond to nonmaterial as well as material factors. One missing piece to the puzzle of understanding the international response to self-determination thus is the framework of international standards within which claims are assessed (see figure 2.1, upper right corner). Such a framework sets parameters for actions acceptable or justifiable to the international community, bounding material power and interests by establishing a context within which the activities and policies of the claimant group and the central government play out.6 The range of policy options available can be narrowed by weeding out those actions that are contrary to agreed norms or by selecting those that advance accepted standards. One argument supporting this perspective would be that rules codified in one time period can serve to constrain behavior in the following periods–the concept of institutionalized ideas as roadmaps.7 Under a strict interpretation of international law, the unfolding of decolonization and even application of the principle to noncolonial cases can be explained by the rules embodied in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. However, the normative content of self-determination has not been explicitly codified for noncolonial claims.8 Thus, analyzing post–Cold War self-determination cases is not a matter of reading the map so much as determining which map applies, often resulting in subjective interpretation of political histories, favoring past grievances over existing borders in some cases but not in others. This approach offers advantages over Realism by showing how states can be constrained by an established framework, but alone does not suggest what the content of that framework would be and how domestic actors and conditions affect the application of such a framework to individual claims.9 For contemporary self-determination claims, many legal scholars and political philosophers have suggested a new, post–Cold War content of selfdetermination constructed from ideas about human rights and popular sovereignty.10 But not all grievances resonate with the international community and this factor emphasizes the behavior (or misbehavior) of states, not necessarily the claimant group. The literature lacks a systematic attempt to operationalize these theoretical arguments by

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analyzing what domestic situations or types of arguments advanced by claimant groups evince support from the international community—in other words, an understanding of the process by which claims resonate positively with international standards. It seems there is a missing element—namely, the role of substate actors linking those norms to the validity of their claim for self-determination through their appeals and actions. Finally, the international community might be swayed by domestic standards, utilizing the normative framework suggested here to assess the claimant group’s capacity for democracy (potential for democratic governance) in the context of international standards of governance (see figure 2.1, lower right corner). Noted legal scholar Benedict Kingsbury avers that “principles of human rights are a major source of legitimation for claims made by nonstate groups” against their central government—and that the groups themselves need to be held accountable for their own violations of human rights.11 One may also look at the voice certain actors have on the world stage disproportionate to the amount of material power they possess but tied to the normative thrust of their arguments. Consider, for example, the boost in visibility and credibility when East Timorese leaders won the Nobel Peace Prize and subsequent support for their independence efforts, based in part on the victimization acknowledged by the award and their ability to present a potentially viable alternative. Thus, to more fully understand the international response to self-determination claims, we need to study the interaction between international and domestic normative standards—the framework of international standards within which claims are assessed as well as how substate actors reflect those standards. This interplay of international and domestic norms constitutes the framework by which the international community assesses self-determination claims and decides how to respond to particular claims.

Model and Hypotheses My model builds both on insights from studies of ethnic groups and secessionist conflicts12 and on a burgeoning literature that posits a two– level framework for understanding how international norms are given effect, highlighting the role of domestic level factors in this process.13 But while many of these latter theories describe how domestic factors

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affect the strength or use of international norms in the domestic sphere, I consider how the salience of domestic conditions embodying international norms affects decision-making in the international sphere. Building upon discussions of socialization and cross–level ideational models in the literature, I posit that domestic factors can help explain how self-determination appeals to the international community are interpreted. The international response to a self-determination claim is conditioned by an assessment of the claim’s validity vis-à-vis international norms; human rights law and emerging standards of democratic governance comprise the framework within which claims are advanced and evaluated. These norms are unique in that they focus on domestic governance and institutions as applied to substate actors—thus providing international standards for judging internal relationships and behavior, resulting in predictable patterns of international response to such claims. This suggests a process by which domestic actors utilize and internalize international norms when articulating self-determination appeals to the international community and the model predicts how this interaction affects the international response.14 In his discussion of socialization processes in international institutions, Alistair Iain Johnston argues that in order to test for socialization effects one needs three things: the characteristics of the social environment (here, norms of democratic governance); characteristics of the agents involved (here, the independent variable: democratic capacity); and a process of interaction (here, the dependent variable: international empowerment, as indicated by IGO reaction and response).15 I posit that the international community utilizes a normative framework to judge the claims and behavior of the domestic actors, assessing the claimant group’s capacity for democracy: how well does the group reflect emerging standards of democratic governance that are increasingly applied to states? The resultant values of the dependent variable measure the level of international empowerment, testing the hypothesis that more extensive support is associated with claims that are deemed more valid by the international community. The international response reflects a desire to increase the prospects for legitimate governance as defined by international norms, empowering a substate actor to increased self-rule under the auspices of international socialization practices to promote these norms. The

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international community may use various forms of socialization: coercion, persuasion, or social influence. When democratic capacity is low, the international community may attempt to pressure the claimant group to incorporate democratic governance norms through coercive techniques such as linking aid to the adoption of human rights provisions or improvements in institutions. If democratic capacity is weak, IGOs may also utilize more persuasive approaches to link progress on democratization to the group’s economic or other interests, for example facilitating economic regionalization on condition that all participants abide by democratic parameters. Finally, if the group has internalized the norms and displays a high democratic capacity, the international community can use social influence to appeal to the group as a potential member of the democratic society of states: act like a state to be treated like a state.16 In order to garner international support, the claimant group appeals to international norms of human rights and popular sovereignty— utilizing or internalizing emerging standards of democratic governance in their own behavior, often in the face of oppression or discrimination from the central government. In other words, a claimant group attempts to achieve international legitimation for its efforts to govern by international standards by highlighting its own democratic capacity in comparison to the central government. From this framework, the strongest claims to an internationally supported right to self-determination arise

Table 2.1

International Empowerment

Level of International Approaches to Empowerment Empowerment Low

Medium

High

Examples

Coercion

Use of sanction, conditionality to pressure claimant group to follow democratic norms Persuasion Appeal to claimant group’s selfinterest to link norm-following behavior to other rewards, such as economic Social Influence Appeal to claimant group as member of democratic community

Source: Table compiled by author. Categories of coercion, persuasion, and social influence are drawn from Johnston (2001), pp. 501–02. See footnote 17.

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from situations in which the claimant group embodies democratic standards absent in the central government. Because domestic sources of legitimacy may be at odds with the international standards of democratic governance, claimant groups may have different motivations for adopting or following democratic norms. The motivations of a single group can also vary across time as the norms become more internalized and wedded to domestic conceptions of legitimacy. If a group displays a low democratic capacity, it may adopt democratic norms at the behest of the international community for primarily instrumental reasons (to avoid sanction or to receive promised benefits). As the norms become more embedded and democratic capacity increases, the group may begin following the norms from enlightened self-interest, with normfollowing becoming intrinsically linked to material or economic gain. And finally, groups that have internalized the norms and have high democratic capacity may begin to follow the norms as an end in itself: they behave more democratically because they have built an identity or a reputation as a democratic entity. International norms thus bind and inform the discourse of making and judging appeals, while domestic factors such as the content of appeals and the internal embodiment of the international norms affect the international response to the claim.17 The main hypothesis that emerges from this model is that the level of international support for self-determination claims is in part a function the claimant group’s capacity for democratic rule. Unlike other

Table 2.2

Democratic Capacity

Measure of Claimant Group Examples Democratic Capacity Motivation Low

Instrumental

Medium

Enlightened Self-Interest

High

Internalization

Group acts in accordance with democratic norms to avoid sanction Group adopts democratic norms that are conducive to achieving longterm security or economic goals Group’s norm-following behavior overlaps with internal conceptions of legitimacy and identity of group

Source: Table compiled by author. Typology of response (instrumental, enlightened self-interest, internalization) drawn from Johnston (2001), p. 506. See footnote 18.

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definitions of self-determination, the criteria for assessing claims focus on the dynamics of governance relationships, rather than a one-time assessment of identities and material facts. The dependent variable— international empowerment—ranges from sanction to extensive support, as defined by the degree to which the international community promotes the group’s efforts at self-rule without imposing conditions on the exercise of that rule. The predicted outcomes emphasize how the international community advances international norms of human rights and democratic governance, highlighting the socialization of non-state actors to international standards. • Null Hypothesis: the international community does not attempt to apply democratic standards to substate actors. The level of support (empowerment) from the international community for a self-determination claimant group does not vary in response to changes in the group’s democratic attributes or behavior (democratic capacity). • Democratic Governance Hypothesis: the international community does apply standards of democratic governance to substate actors. Higher levels of support (empowerment) from the international community for a self-determination claimant group are more likely when the group displays greater democratic capacity.

In the following sections, I define the development of the model’s variables by tracing the prevalence of democratic standards in the international environment and detailing how these core ideas are transformed into operational concepts for assessing the self-determination claimant group. My model concentrates on the interaction of norms across levels, both because this process has been underemphasized in prior discussions of self-determination and also because these norms appear key to giving content to the concept of self-determination in the post–Cold War era. However, these normative factors do not operate in a vacuum. Normative appeals can be used instrumentally by actors to advance material interests or norms can inform strategic actions by influencing identities, policies, or the international environment itself.18 In order to understand more deeply the impact of this framework for assessing self-determination claims, the discussion of each variable will also address how normative factors interact with material conditions and how actors’ strategies influence each variable.

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Democratic Standards Human rights issues and democratic governance unquestionably form part of the discourse of contemporary international politics and states increasingly take action to uphold these principles, suggesting an American–led effort to link liberal democratic state building with international security. A framework forged from the internationaldomestic interaction of democratic standards adds two important features to understanding self-determination: a link between the measures used to judge state and non-state actors and an understanding of the conditional (in other words, non-absolute) nature of sovereignty. Many scholars have drawn connections between self-determination and normative issues such as human rights, but most have focused on the central government’s treatment of the group advancing a claim. Citing the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States—which upholds the protection of territorial integrity for “States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour”—many scholars assert that self-determination is satisfied when states possess representative government. Formal exclusion of a particular group from the political process or discrimination in income, social mobility, and participation relative to the group’s population thus indicate denial of the right to self-determination.19 Connecting selfdetermination to governance standards also suggests that state rights, such as noninterference and territorial integrity—traditionally privileged in the international system—are balanced against the rights of peoples; the latter can be used to justify intervention in ostensibly domestic matters. Just as gross human rights violations cannot be brushed under the rug of state sovereignty, so too denial of self-determination limits the exercise of sovereign rights. Territorial integrity is widely seen as the quintessential right of sovereign states and is compromised if a group is granted a right to secession. But most scholars agree that groups maintain a remedial right to secession when they have experienced gross, systematic, and persistent human rights abuses.20 Further, others suggest that territorial integrity is not guaranteed if the central government is not representative; unrepresentative states may be subject

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to international intervention.21 This conditionality is arguably implicit in the Declaration on Friendly Relations quoted above. Thus, interpreting self-determination within a democratic standards framework not only suggests that oppressed and discriminated peoples have the right to self-determination but also that international involvement and secession are potential consequences if the central government refuses to accommodate these groups. What this project adds is another layer to the puzzle: an assessment of the claimant group by similar standards. It appears—as the following chapters will demonstrate—that aspirants to sovereignty are bound by the same conditions upon which states are rewarded or sanctioned. If the outside parties to whom these groups appeal are indeed motivated by human rights and democracy frameworks, then self-determination movements have a strong incentive to portray themselves as an embattled minority, ruthlessly oppressed by the central government while struggling to establish nascent democratic institutions and practices. They may use the norms instrumentally, claiming to be victims of oppression or discrimination in order to gain international attention. International support for their claims would improve their relative power position vis-à-vis the central government, placing them on more equal footing for negotiations or providing protection against repression and violence—thus lowering important barriers to their cause. If this type of information manipulation is in evidence, it suggests that the parties to the conflict believe these factors to be relevant to international decision making and are structuring their appeals to fit to a particular normative framework for discourse and action. Other groups, by promoting the self-determination movement’s claim and the virtues of its leaders, may indirectly lend support to allegations of severe oppression and the relative democratic credentials of the claimant group.22 Though some groups may use the rhetoric of human rights and democracy purely instrumentally, a detailed examination of the group’s governance practices within its situational context can determine whether the group attempts to offer a more democratic alternative to the central government’s rule. Thus, the posited framework operates in conjunction with the material environment in two ways. First, the framework acts as a filter through which material facts are interpreted: internal actors justify their actions within this framework as the accepted discourse for self-determination claims and external actors use the framework as a template for gathering

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and processing information regarding a particular claim. This constitutes a regulative effect for norms, setting parameters for how claims are presented and interpreted. Material facts can also affect actors’ perceptions in applying the framework, providing the impetus for action—for example, reacting to violent conflict or refugee crises—or incentives for the instrumental use of norms. Far from showing the irrelevance of norms, this suggests that actors acknowledge them by fitting the framework to their interest–driven behavior or interpretations.23

Democratic capacity: measuring democratic governance If international governmental organizations are indeed facilitating the socialization of substate groups to the liberal international order, then we should expect them to reward a group’s progress toward democratization. But how is democratization assessed for non-state actors? Many claimant groups lack formal institutions of democratic governance, such as elections or participatory chambers, rendering such an assessment difficult. But even without formal processes and institutions, the organizational behavior and structure of some groups in relation to its treatment by the central government would indicate that the group has internalized democratic norms and would continue to draw upon them if allowed increased self-rule; in other words, they display the capacity to build such formal institutions of democratic governance (democratic capacity). One scholar outlines a threefold set of rights that lays the theoretical foundation for liberalism—freedom from arbitrary authority (rule of law), social rights (equality of opportunity and nondiscrimination), and democratic participation (to guarantee the other two rights).24 Emphasizing the values that undergird formal democratic institutions, my framework translates these rights into three indicators that the international community observes in order to gauge whether a group has internalized liberal democratic governance norms: representation and participation (democratic participation); mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution (rule of law—avoiding arbitrary decisions by rulers through institutionalized decision-making); and toleration toward minorities (equality and nondiscrimination). These parallel the conditions the international community places on developing states and in the context of peacebuilding operations: democratization, abiding by the rule of law rather than

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resort to violence and war, and adhering to the tenets of international human rights law, including the protection of minorities. Measuring democratic capacity of substate actors is thus akin to applying democratic governance standards to existing states. The first indicator of democratic capacity is the enabling mechanism for other rights in a liberal democratic system—representation and participation. Representation and participation among both the group’s leaders and rank-and-file provides evidence that the group has incorporated international notions of democratic governance. The group may not be formally democratic, holding periodic elections among multiple political parties, but it should reflect some notion of participation that allows for voice and dissent in the political process.25 The most active and vocal leaders must represent the group on whose behalf they claim to speak—especially if their leadership advocates radical outcomes or engages in militant activity. Followers should not be coerced or forced into service; governing practices should allow a forum for dissenting views to be considered. By the same token, infighting among factions reduces the credibility of the group’s claim by suggesting that group members do not feel represented beyond their chosen faction. The persuasiveness with which a leader from any one faction can represent the entire group is limited under these conditions.26 A functioning liberal democratic system is also based on equal rights and equality of opportunity. Thus, a group’s performance in guaranteeing minority rights to nonmembers indicates the claimant group’s acceptance of democratic standards.27 This accords with the liberal notion of balancing rights, in this case the rights of the group seeking self-determination and the rights of others who reside in the territory but do not identify with that group. Ideally, governing structures should allow equal opportunities for the majority and minorities to participate in decision-making, rather than giving the minority reason to exit through partition.28 If non–group members are driven out of the territory to create an ethnically homogenous zone or terrorized into either joining the movement or remaining neutral, then the claimant group will not be seen as respectful of the rights of others in their midst. In assessing the group’s treatment of minorities, the international community estimates the extent to which equal rights would

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be upheld by the group if it were, indeed, to exercise more powers of self-government. Finally, to help ensure freedom from arbitrary authority, the ruling powers must be placed within the limits of a system with mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. In theory, a democratic society follows the rule of law in order to protect and enhance the rights of its citizens. Within self-determination claimant groups, democratic standards would suggest a focus on compromise and engagement with the existing system: holding elected office in established institutions, utilizing the judicial system to seek redress for grievances, or proposing reform to those structures if they are implicated in the problem. Groups that shun available functioning institutional conflict resolution mechanisms and instead engage in terrorist activity, targeting civilian populations or using disproportionate violence, appear to exercise arbitrary power. In addition, noted legal scholar Hurst Hannum argues that terrorism takes voice away from moderates in a self-determination movement, thus decreasing the likelihood that such activity represents the wishes of all group members.29 On the other hand, groups that emphasize negotiated settlements and avail themselves of existing institutions, rather than new and potentially arbitrary sources of power, display an underlying commitment to rule of law and limited power inherent in democratic principles. These factors must also be considered within the context of each case or claim. It is difficult to eschew violence and utilize existing institutions in the face of oppressive regimes that block participation and perpetrate violence against the group. The central government may attempt to create conditions under which adherence to democratic norms is difficult for the group—forcing them to violence by blocking all other avenues of gaining attention or influencing domestic policies. The state may brand the claimant group as a terrorist organization or manipulate information about the group and its activities to justify government actions. Conversely, it is also difficult to appeal for change on the grounds of democratic rights if the central government invites participation and allows access to mechanisms for expressing and gaining redress for grievances.30 Taken together, these indicators constitute the independent variable of the model—the claimant group’s propensity for democratic governance

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(democratic capacity), measured on a continuum from intolerant (low capacity) to democratic (high capacity). I measure the independent variable—the group’s capacity for democracy—by examining the arguments, the lobbying, and the actions of the self-determination movement in relation to international standards of human rights and popular sovereignty, as well as outside support and assessments of the central government that substantiate the claim. In measuring the independent variable, the model does not seek to define specific universal definitions of democracy, human rights, and popular sovereignty. Rather, the goal is to distill from empirically grounded understandings of these norms what factors are perceived to be associated with their expression or abrogation.31 In other words, what are the core ideals undergirding democracy and human rights in the eyes of the international community? What actions support or taint international determinations of the presence of these norms—what clues do international actors seek? I argue that the essential components are representation, minority rights, and nonviolent conflict resolution rather than formal institutions such as voting or computable measures like the absolute level of inequality between majority and minority populations. Thus, the model assigns a value to the independent variable from intolerant to democratic (intolerant—somewhat intolerant—somewhat democratic—democratic) based on how well the group has internalized these norms within its given context.

International empowerment: promoting democratic governance The prevalence of the liberal international order coupled with the increasing influence of non-state actors leads states to attempt to socialize non-state actors in much the same way as it does smaller states in the system. When a group exhibits the indicators above, signifying that it is becoming socialized to international standards of democratic governance, the international community is more likely to respond positively to the claim. In other words, the higher the democratic capacity of the group, the more likely the international community will respond by empowering the group—acknowledging, supporting, or helping to create alternative structures that enable the group to exert more autonomy in political decision making. Examples include endorsing autonomy,

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devolution, or power-sharing plans; recognizing existing institutions or elected representatives of the group;32 or pressing for a referendum or negotiating terms favorable to the group. When the underlying norms are weak or absent, the international community may attempt to compel the group to internalize the norms by imposing conditionality requirements such as mandatory minority rights guarantees. In these cases, further empowerment is contingent upon adoption of democratic governance standards in the near future. The full range of the dependent variable measures the extent of international empowerment (sanction—conditional—limited—extensive). This scale captures the depth of self-governance supported (for example, supporting autonomy is more extensive than supporting language rights), the type of support (from statements of support to active participation on behalf of the group) and the degree of conditionality (limited empowerment may require some behavioral adjustments, while conditional empowerment denotes support is predicated on farreaching changes).33 Often when international interference in domestic affairs is analyzed, the emphasis is on the threshold for military intervention. Defining the dependent variable as international empowerment, this project both broadens and narrows this traditional focus on intervention. The scope here is broader, encompassing an entire range of tools—from rhetoric to sanctions to military intervention—that international actors may utilize in order to foster the establishment or growth of autonomous institutions of self-rule. This study is neither limited to military intervention nor focused on the precise location of the international response on this continuum of possible actions. Empowerment may be promoted by the international community through the use of diplomatic pressure or condemnation, pressure placed on the government in international mediation exercises, economic pressure (for example, conditions on aid or loans), monitoring of elections or democratization processes, or military intervention on behalf of the claimant group. The scope of interference is also narrower in this study than in many others because the model focuses on the particular content of the international response—the nature of the involvement rather than the means of implementation. The dependent variable measures the degree to which the international community supports the claimant group’s institutions and mechanisms of self-rule,

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attempting to isolate a particular type of support rather than all types of international interference or intervention. This framework also highlights why a focus on outcomes alone offers only a partial understanding of the international response to claims. Autonomy, independence, or other specific outcomes are associated with what the parties will accept, but external actors can establish expectations and interpretations of the validity of the claim, placing conditions on both sides as a precondition to longterm settlement.34 The range of these strategies (in other words, what particular form empowerment takes) depends upon the confluence of material and normative factors particular to each case (see figure 2.1). Material factors may include the size of the state, the threat of spillover, regional impact, and the relative power position of the claimant group. Normative factors include the level of discrimination or human rights violations as well as the state’s commitment to norms in treaties or through membership in IGOs. The interesting question for this project is not what settlement the international community imposes, but when and how the international community interacts with a substate actor aspiring to sovereignty. I posit that IGOs establish parameters within which negotiations take place without predetermining the content of the settlement. Endorsing the claim should not be conflated with supporting specific goals of the group regarding outcome; in other words, the international community can support a claim by endorsing increased self-governance without condoning independence as an outcome. This model does not explicitly test the propensity to support specific outcomes. Likewise, this should not be confused with the criteria for formal legal recognition or the process of granting such recognition to independent entities.35 The latter is based on conditions such as the control of territory, and not on the behavior or regime type of the government. In sum, the more a group has internalized norms of democratic governance, the more empowerment it is likely to receive from the international community. The relationship between the group’s democratic capacity and the international response is illustrated in figure 2.2. When the group is deemed more democratic—in other words, when it has a higher capacity for democratic governance according to these indicators—international support for the claim in the form of empowerment is more likely to occur. Conversely, support for intolerant

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Extensive international support to create alternative institutions or structures: supporting autonomy or independence, negotiating sovereignty with state

International Empowerment

Extensive

Limited

International support limited to modifying existing institutions: recognizing elected representatives or in-group institutions; supporting powersharing with national government

Conditional

Sanction

39

International support premised upon change in constitution, leadership change, elections, human rights, minority rights guarantees

Intolerant

Somewhat Intolerant

Somewhat Democratic

Democratic

Democratic Capacity

Figure 2.2 Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment.

groups is predicted to be, at best, highly conditional. In addition, we would expect the international response to each claim to vary over time as the claimant group improves or diminishes its democratic capacity. The cases detailed in subsequent chapters will focus on the latent similarities among three cases—Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara—that explain the ebb and flow of international support for their claims.

Case Studies and Alternative Theoretical Frameworks The next chapters apply the model to the Kosovar Albanians, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Sahrawis of Western Sahara. Taken together, these cases together exhibit geographic variation as well as offering a range of international organizations involved (UN, OAU, EU, and OSCE). These three cases are examined closely in subsequent chapters in order to see the process by which the response of the international community changes over time as patterns of empowerment

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develop and evolve. The detailed consideration of dynamic changes over time within each case shows how increased international empowerment obtains when a group has internalized democratic governance norms. Two alternative frameworks are tested against this model in analyzing the selected cases—a Realist framework, in which the concept of self- determination carries no theoretical weight and claims are judged according to their case–specific array of material interests involved; and a Legalist framework, which relies primarily on law developed during the decolonization era as the standard for judging claims according to legal precepts. A more complete understanding of self- determination cases requires an integrated examination of material and normative factors at both the international and domestic levels, especially the combination of power and ideas promoted through international organizations. A Realist explanation based on material factors would highlight the international community’s concern with regional stability and the geopolitical interests of dominant states (especially the United States). In this approach, self-determination is a superfluous concept, as cases are interpreted solely by the array of material interests involved with no reference to norms (see figure 2.1, upper left corner). Patterns may emerge across cases due to the relative size of the central government and the claimant group. Larger states would have more material power to quell a claim or the resources to manipulate the flow of information. Such states would also have greater voice in international organizations and be in a better position to block the organizations’ efforts than smaller states—thus we could expect less support for claimant groups in larger states. Beyond these patterns, Realists would emphasize the specific geopolitical interests in each case as the relevant factors determining the extent of international interference. Under this approach, one would not expect conditionality related to internal normative structure and principled devotion to human rights and minority rights as the root of security, as in Kosovo. It also provides an incomplete analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh case because it cannot explain the importance of democratization programs pressed by the international community in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and the influence of international perceptions that Azerbaijan is falling behind on this front. This view predicts Morocco’s foot-dragging in

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Western Sahara and support from powerful allies, but cannot account for the strength of the Polisario Front’s cause in influencing events. States indeed pursue their interests in approaching self-determination claims, but those interests can be informed by values—stability understood as connected to international principles. My perspective offers a consistency across cases not anticipated by a Realist focus on material interests and a response based solely on the constellation of geopolitical interests. • Alternative Hypothesis (Realist): the international community does not apply standards of democratic governance to substate actors. Higher levels of support (empowerment) from the international community are primarily a function of material factors and the geopolitical interests of states, especially dominant powers.

Conversely, a framework focused primarily on codified international law also provides an incomplete understanding of the international response to self- determination claims (see figure 2.1, upper right corner). The most applicable law to this case is the body of law on self-determination on the one hand and the international law of human rights on the other. The former offers inadequate counsel because it is in dispute, even among international lawyers. The established law on self-determination is most clearly applicable to former European colonies and historical precedent emphasizes independence as the preferred outcome. Yet most post–Cold War selfdetermination claims do not easily fit this description and the term self-determination is almost taboo in the international community given its strong association with independence movements. If the case does not fit this established law of self-determination—applied primarily to colonial territories, as defined in legal instruments and practice from decolonization—then a Legalist approach would look to other international law that may bear upon the particular case in order to delimit the international response. Some analysts have tried to describe Kosovo as a case of neocolonialism in order to fit it within the letter of the law on self-determination, but this move cannot account for the conditionality inherent in the international approach to Kosovo’s final status—international empowerment has been highly constrained by the criteria regarding changes in the

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Kosovars’ governance structures. The case of Nagorno-Karabakh is more difficult to classify as colonialism, but the international community has focused here on the relationship between the Karabakh Armenians and the central government rather than taking a stand on Armenia’s or Azerbaijan’s argument about the identity of the people and legal possession of the territory. In the case of Western Sahara, the Legalist approach describes the framing of the case fairly accurately until a recent shift to a greater emphasis on human rights and democracy. This change could be accommodated by a framework that focuses on the evolving relationship between the parties or on a range of outcomes associated with recognizing a valid selfdetermination claim. Thus, one can’t fully explain state behavior if one focuses only on whether behavior is determined by the existing and clarified law on self-determination; the law itself is in transition as potential new customary law emerges. One must identify a new normative framework and consider how it interacts across international and domestic levels as well as with material factors. • Alternative Hypothesis (Legalist): the international community does not apply standards of democratic governance to substate actors. Higher levels of support (empowerment) from the international community obtain when the claim fits the established legal definition of self-determination (states act in compliance with codified international law).

Neither of these alternative frameworks alone provides an adequate explanation of the international response to self-determination claims. Both miss key evidence related to the dynamic relationship between the parties and the standards applied to substate actors. They also both place more emphasis on outcomes—preservation of the state for Realists and independence circumscribed by the group’s identity for the Legalists—rather than on explaining widespread efforts to foster democratic governance. The explanatory power of the framework offered here is in its focus on assessing evolving relationships rather than outcomes; movement toward particular settlements is often conditional on normative change by one or both parties. The approach posited in this project also incorporates the actions and attributes of

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the claimant group—a key player in such claims—as an integral part of the process, suggesting when and how they have the most influence on international action. By combining power and ideas into one framework, we see the way norms can set parameters for interpreting material factors as well as establishing limits on the exercise of material power.

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Chapter 3 Kosovo: “Standards Before Status” and Beyond

“Unfortunately, where there is screaming nationalism there is no tolerance.”1

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 could be called a victory for the Kosovar Albanians who first declared independence in 1991. But the refusal of the international community to acknowledge this outcome until recently—and even then, far from unanimously— also deserves critical analysis. For years, the United Nations offered settlement proposals featuring multiethnic democratic institutions and minority rights as the pathway to a stable and viable Kosovo. The territory’s status as a de facto international protectorate under the aegis of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for almost a decade placed unparalleled governance responsibilities in the hands of the international community. How can we explain such international interference into the internal affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and later Serbia, and the focus on fostering a democratic regime in Kosovo? Using the framework developed in chapter 2, this chapter argues that the interaction of international standards of governance and the democratic capacity of the Kosovars explains a key dynamic in the international response to this contentious self-determination claim. Under this model, the international community acknowledged the oppressive treatment of Kosovo by the Serbian central government, but made its support for Kosovo also dependent on improvements in the claimant group’s capacity for democratic governance.

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Other approaches offer only partial explanations for this response. Realists would correctly identify Serbian aggression as a threat to regional peace and security that invited support for Kosovo from Western–led international organizations—focusing on potential destabilizing effects on neighboring countries and NATO allies. But this approach fails provide a convincing argument for the international community’s emphasis on multiethnic democratic governance as the key to stability, instead of partition and population transfers as some Realists suggest.2 A Legalist approach describes how the Kosovo case may affect the evolution of international law, but has difficulty explaining what specific legal precepts international actors were following from a body of law that is either not readily applicable or still developing. Instead, this chapter will show that the international community reacted positively to efforts by the Kosovars to construct their own institutions of democratic governance. The model presented here suggests that the proper lens for examining the Kosovo case is one of democratic governance standards—empowerment of a claimant group that displays a strong capacity for democracy, but highly conditional support when the group strays from international standards. Despite the horrific treatment of the Kosovars by the Serbian government, the international community refused to consider an ethnically purified Albanian state as a solution. Rather, throughout the last decade the United Nations and other external actors continued to insist upon the establishment of an inclusive, democratic regime in Kosovo. Much to the consternation of many Kosovars, international support for their claim came only on condition that they continue to adhere to international governance standards and denounce violence, especially terrorism. But while the UN Mission in Kosovo’s “Standards before Status” campaign popularized this approach beginning in 2003, this conditionality was neither new to post–1999 Kosovo nor unique to this case—similar patterns are evident in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara claims, as will be discussed in the following chapters.

Background With centuries of tumultuous and contested history between the Albanians and Serbs as a backdrop, the Kosovo crisis reignited in

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earnest in 1989.3 At that time, Kosovo was an autonomous province in southern Serbia with a population that was approximately 90 percent Albanian and heretofore had enjoyed many of the same privileges as Serbia and the other five constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). As Yugoslavia broke apart in the 1990s, the federal government weakened and Serbia came to dominate the rump state—and to exert virtually unchecked control over Kosovo.4 As Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia in the late 1980s, he used Kosovo as his whipping post. After effectively stripping Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989, Serbia instituted a series of discriminatory practices against the Albanian population, dismissing the vast majority of civil servants and state employees, instituting preferential housing practices for Serbs, and closing schools.5 While the Kosovar Albanians claimed a right to self-determination, proclaiming independence as their ultimate goal, the initial reaction of the international community was negative, as exemplified by the European Union denying their request for independence in 1991. The Albanians attempted to create a system of parallel institutions, most notably for health and education, led by an elected president of their self-proclaimed Republic of Kosova. Violence increased dramatically in 1997, as the Albanians increasingly threw their support behind factions that denounced nonviolence as an ineffective means to achieving independence. At the same time, the Serbian regime began a brutal campaign against the territory, ostensibly to rid Kosovo of terrorists. The international community, led by actions from the UN Security Council, the Contact Group, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), took aim at Serbian oppression without condoning independence for Kosovo—stressing empowerment of Kosovar Albanians within a reformed Yugoslav state as a first priority. Independence would only be considered an option if reform failed and empowerment was successful within international conditions. In October 1998, US envoy Richard Holbrooke struck a deal with Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in which the latter agreed to a phased withdrawal of troops from the territory, to be monitored by an OSCE observer mission. As the situation continued to deteriorate, the internationals brought the parties together to talk peace at Rambouillet outside of Paris. The draft agreement—eventually signed by the Kosovar Albanians under intense pressure from the West, but

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not by the Serbs—contained the seeds of the postwar formula for rebuilding sovereignty, pressing for reform of the Serbian government while simultaneously granting more self-government to the Albanians. When Milosevic refused to sign the agreement, members of NATO initiated a bombing campaign that lasted from March through June 1999. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which established the mandate for UNMIK, passed shortly after Milosevic capitulated and the bombing ceased. UNMIK administered the territory until Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. The unilateral declaration followed several attempts by the international community to reach a negotiated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia to no avail. After examining the weaknesses in other approaches to this case, the following sections of this chapter present evidence supporting the model’s main hypothesis: higher levels of international support for the claimant group are more likely when the group displays a strong capacity for democracy. This case shows how variations in international support to the Kosovars’ claim (levels of empowerment) resulted from fluctuations in the Kosovars’ perceived commitment to building functioning democratic institutions (measure of democratic capacity). Unlike other approaches to self-determination focused on defining peoples or identities in static terms, the framework offered here highlights the effects of such changes on the international response to the claim.

Alternative Explanations: Realist and Legalist Why did the international community respond as it did to the Kosovars’ self-determination claim? If independence was to be the ultimate outcome, why was almost a decade spent focused on building multiethnic democratic institutions? This chapter posits that the international response was not simply a matter of static material or legal facts, but rather an attempt to socialize a substate actor to the governance standards of the international community. Other explanations of this case are inadequate to understanding the international response to the self-determination claim in Kosovo. Realist approaches help determine when the international community intercedes and who leads the response, but cannot explain how they respond; one needs to

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reference international norms to understand how standards of democratic governance are linked to security in this context. Legalist explanations suggest how international principles and standards affect definitions of security and state interests, but existing law appears either inapplicable (if one cites the laws on self-determination written during the decolonization era) or still developing (if one refers to current debates over humanitarian intervention or human rights and self-determination). Only by coupling elements of these approaches with a focus on democracy promotion can one craft a convincing description of the international response to Kosovo’s claim.

Realist Explanation An explanation based on material factors, such as a Realist approach, might try to explain the international response to Kosovo solely in terms of geopolitical factors. Adherents to this approach would highlight the international community’s concern with regional stability and on preserving the borders of existing states. They would rightly focus on security issues and the lead role played by dominant powers in the system—in this case the United States as the post–Cold War hegemon and its European allies as dominant regional powers. Realists are correct to point out that the impetus for strong international action was rooted in Western interests. The United States and Western Europe were concerned about potential security threats emanating from this newest Balkan crisis: massive refugee flows, cross–border insurgency, and spillover to Macedonia or other areas that could invite a domino effect of government collapse. Ultimately, these states worried about the potential destabilizing effects on NATO allies Greece and Turkey as well as an underlying European interest in maintaining peace in its backyard. Once NATO issued a threat to the Serbian government, the question of intervention also became intertwined with the credibility of that threat—and the credibility of the alliance itself, struggling to define its mission after the demise of the Soviet Union. All of these factors suggest why pressure on the Serbian regime, and even military intervention, were in the interests of an alliance willing and able to undertake such a mission. But this framework cannot adequately account for the apparent devotion to human rights and minority rights as the root of security

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in the Balkans—including prior to and after NATO’s bombing campaign. Western states were indeed pursuing interests in Kosovo, but those interests were based on promoting a particular regime type as well as material interests—stability understood in relation to internationally recognized governance principles. Security in the Kosovo case was inexorably linked to human rights and democratic governance; Milosevic’s treatment of the Kosovar Albanians was understood as the root cause of the refugee problem, armed insurgency, and potential government instability in neighboring countries. This is evident if we look at how the issue was handled before, during, and after the events of 1999. Long before the refugee crisis erupted, and even before the Albanians turned to violence in 1997, the international community had identified the human rights situation in Kosovo as a potential powderkeg. An OSCE observer mission, begun in 1992, was mandated to observe and report on human rights abuses in Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina; Yugoslavia subsequently lost its membership in that organization on the basis of its abysmal human rights record. As the violence escalated over the winter of 1998–99, many international diplomats point to the Racak incident in January 1999—when Serbian forces were under direct orders to indiscriminately target civilians in an Albanian village, killing 45—as the single defining moment when the issue became internationalized. At that point the scale of the abuses, the targeting of civilians, and the imperviousness of Milosevic to international admonishment convinced NATO that the international community was justified to take more forceful action. Others have pointed out that an approach based on material interests would predict the West to have placed more emphasis on better relations with China and Russia, rather than straining such relations by pursuing a policy against the wishes of these other great powers—especially the NATO air strikes.6 How the security threat was addressed in the aftermath of 1999 is also telling. Without reference to the link between principles and the root cause of instability, a Realist approach provides inadequate counsel on UNMIK’s efforts to reconstruct democratic institutions in line with a model presumed to improve the chances for longterm peace. Complementing the underlying values of the United States and European states and shaped further by the foundational principles embedded in the organizations involved, UNMIK undertook the task of constructing a multiethnic society based on democratic values

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and human rights norms. If the international response was a matter of security based on material factors alone without reference to normative principles, Realists have suggested that partition of Kosovo and requisite population transfer would be necessary to achieve stability in the region.7 Yet, the international community held firm against that outcome—UN Special Representative for Kosovo Hans Haekkerup rejected the idea when Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Covic proposed it in July 2001. When the declaration of independence became inevitable, the international community still did not openly discuss partition, instead pressing Serbia not to foment rebellion and separation in the Serb–dominated north of the fledgling state. In Kosovo, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in more recent conflict resolution efforts in Montenegro, the international community has attempted to address self-determination issues by building democratic, multiethnic societies. The idea that democratic institutions may foster peace and stability goes beyond the material interests that inform a Realist approach.

Legalist Explanation Conversely, a framework focused solely on compliance with established legal principles also provides an incomplete understanding of the Kosovo crisis. One cannot argue that states were following the prescriptions of international law if the relevant law is shown to be either not directly applicable or itself in the process of definition and development. The most relevant bodies of law to the Kosovo claim are the body of law on self-determination on the one hand and the international law of human rights on the other. The former offers a weak framework of understanding outside the colonial context: who has a postcolonial right to self-determination and what does that right entail? The law on self-determination is most clearly applied to former European colonies, yet Kosovo does not easily fit this description because it was not deemed a non–self-governing territory or colony. Instead, under precedents set in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and relying on Yugoslav law, Kosovo was refused independence in 1991 because it did not have republic status under the Yugoslav constitution.8 In conventional discussions of self-determination, in which the right is exercised as a one– time event, this should have been the end of the discussion. Yet, the international community continued to insist on self-government for the

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Kosovar Albanians—in effect promoting internal self-determination under international democratic parameters. One could also look to international humanitarian law for guidance. Some have argued that people have an entitlement to democratic governance and others aver that oppressed peoples have a right to secession,9 but these are not consensus views and are based upon readings of existing legal instruments that do not explicitly specify these rights. As the debate on humanitarian intervention sparked by the Kosovo crisis shows, the body of international human rights law is detailed and robust in its positive prescriptions but vague on the role of the international community in upholding those rights in light of government abuses.10 This is also complicated by the fact that international law may be in flux. As one scholar describes: Beneath the military conflict in Kosovo there was an even more complex and ambiguous war of norms. On Belgrade’s side was the traditional norm ‘cuius regio, euis religio’, dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Its essence may be translated, for modern purposes, as ‘the ruler is entitled to make the rules in his own domain.’ That is, it prescribes non-intervention in other people’s domestic crises. The society of states had earlier accepted the view that Kosovo was a province of Serbia, so in Westphalian logic the troubles there were solely the concern of the government in Belgrade . . . As against that, the NATO powers could and did assert a newly emerging norm: that minorities, however troublesome, are not to be massacred, or driven into exile, or deprived of their human rights (as spelled out in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights) by the government under whose sovereignty they live. Thus one could say at the beginning of the crisis, that Belgrade was appealing to an old norm, and to the law based on it, whereas the NATO powers were appealing to a newer norm, with more recent formal endorsement in international law.11

Legal scholars admit there is a gap in the law, and one author suggests that NATO acted in “the gap between principles and exceptions, between law and politics”—responding in defense of fundamental moral principles over existing legal technicalities.12 When interviewed, one NATO official noted that there was no common legal position behind the alliance’s intervention in 1999—each member state justified the action differently in parliamentary debates or in public statements. All members agreed that the action was legitimate, but they

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were not all using the same legal arguments to support that assessment.13 Furthermore, a definitive answer on the legality of NATO’s intervention doesn’t address the character of the international response before and after 1999. Even the Kosovars’ declaration of independence in 2008 was met with varying interpretations of international law; namely, the international law governing recognition of new states. As with the debate over humanitarian intervention, the argument hinged on the lack of positive prescriptions: UNSC Resolution 1244 did not specifically rule out independence at the end of the future status discussions, but it did uphold Serbia’s sovereignty until the completion of that process. Serbia’s supporters vehemently denounced the unilateral action as a blatant breach of international law for violating Serbian sovereignty, declaring recognition of Kosovo illegal. Kosovo’s backers averred that their actions were consistent with UNSC Resolution 1244—independence and subsequent recognition were not specifically circumscribed and therefore fit within the gray areas of existing law.14 Thus, a Legalist focus on the law and legal principles can’t fully explain state behavior unless one explains how these principles were married to state interests in an operative framework.

Democratic Governance Explanation Based on the model in chapter 2, this chapter offers an explanation of the international response to self-determination claims which combines power and ideas: using principles and international norms to define states’ security interests and address security concerns. The promotion of democratic governance standards and international norms of human rights is planted as the root of stability in the post–Cold War system. Security interests are linked to support for democratic governance, especially in areas within the Western sphere of influence. Realist and Legalist approaches fail to explain how state interests and emerging international law based on these norms operate together to elicit the international response. I argue that the proper framework for understanding the level of support for a self-determination claim incorporates variations in the claimant group’s capacity for democratic governance. The following sections demonstrate how this variable explains the dynamics of international support for the Kosovars’ self-determination

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claim—support that waxed and waned in nuanced ways in response to the group’s perceived adherence to international democratic standards.

Tracing the International Response Milosevic Rising: 1990–94 Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in the late 1980s clearly came at the expense of Kosovar Albanians’ rights. Rallying the people to his nationalistic fervor, he declared in 1989 that “[e]very nation has a love which eternally warms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo.”15 Expressions of this love came in the form of attempting to reclaim Kosovo for the Serbs, despite the fact that Albanians comprised almost 90 percent of the population. After replacing two Albanian provincial party leaders with his own supporters in 1988—over the protests of local leaders in Kosovo—Milosevic succeeded in amending the Serbian constitution the following year to give Serbia control over police, courts, civil defense, and social and education policies in Kosovo. The Kosovo Provincial Assembly nominally approved these changes on March 23, but without a two–thirds majority; the Serbian Assembly confirmed the changes on March 28, effectively stripping Kosovo of its autonomy.16 Serbia responded to protests in Kosovo by imposing martial law in the province. In March 1990, the Serbian Assembly instituted the Programme for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo, designed to concentrate investment in Serb–inhabited areas in Kosovo and give preferential housing treatment to Serbs immigrating from other areas of the former Yugoslavia. On June 26, Serbia took more overt action against the Albanians under the guise of the so–called temporary measures, which resulted in the suppression of the Albanian language newspaper, the closing of the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the dismissal of thousands of Albanian state employees. According to one estimate, 115,000 of 170,000 people lost their jobs.17 By the end of 1992, Serbia had passed several hundred new laws—an average of 18 per month from 1990 to 1992—to end Albanian autonomy in all facets of civic and political life. The effect on the educational system was profound: only 6,000 of 36,000 Albanian primary school graduates were given

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places in secondary education, while all 4,000 Serbs and Montenegrins were assured places. Warren Zimmermann, US Ambassador to Belgrade from 1989 to 1992, lamented in his memoirs about the overwhelming support for these policies among Serbs: “During my first few weeks in Yugoslavia, I found that Milosevic’s trampling on Albanian rights was almost universally popular among Serbs, and not just those with a limited grasp of political issues.”18 Widespread human rights abuses were extensively documented by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Council for the Defense of Human Rights in Kosovo.19 In response, the Kosovars initially (1990–94) appeared committed to processes and institutions that promoted representation and peaceful conflict resolution. They reacted to the revocation of autonomy and the dissolution of the Kosovo Assembly by utilizing the disbanded assembly and a referendum process to declare independence, formally establishing the Republic of Kosova on September 7, 1991. The Kosovars proclaimed that 87 percent of the population participated in the referendum and 99.9 percent voted in favor of the constitution for the new republic. Ibrahim Rugova, President of the Association of Writers of Kosovo, was elected President in May 1992. In addition to the seats won in the elections, 42 parliament seats were distributed by proportional representation to various minorities, with 13 seats held for Serbs and Montenegrins; these latter seats were never filled.20 The new Albanian leadership focused on establishing parallel institutions—primarily for education and healthcare, two areas from which Albanians had been systematically excluded under new Serbian laws. In 1993, the parallel education system employed 20,000 teachers and other staff and had nearly 400,000 students from preschool through college.21 By 1998, the Mother Theresa Association was distributing humanitarian aid to 350,000 people, with 7,000 volunteers working at 91 medical clinics.22 To be sure, nonviolence was in part a tactical strategy in the absence of options for the Kosovars in the early 1990s. Rugova himself explained that the Serbs held the upper hand in weapons and armed forces: “we have nothing to set against the tanks and other modern weaponry . . . We would have no chance of successfully resisting the army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred.”23 However, the

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Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded that the nonviolent strategy was principled as well as tactical, influenced by ideas of democratic opposition in Eastern Europe.24 And although the nonviolent resistance and the withdrawal of Albanians from Serb institutions aided the Serb policy of marginalizing the Albanian community, it also focused international attention on the discrepancy between Serbia’s and Kosovo’s governance practices: “the fact that Albanians openly flout Serb authority by having their own institutions, which foster links with international institutions and organizations, is a blow to Serbian international prestige and claims of sovereign control.”25 On the domestic front, the ability to maintain the shadow state improved morale among the Albanians. They also considered it proof of their political maturity: they felt capable of governing an independent Kosovo.26 The international community praised the Albanians’ initial commitment to nonviolence and tried to find ways of reforming Serbian institutions and reintegrating the Albanian Kosovar community and its parallel structures under the Serbian umbrella. An early fact–finding mission to the area noted that the Albanians refused to participate in institutions that they did not see as their own. While not recognizing the parallel administration as a legal replacement for de jure Serbian governance, a 1992 report from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, which later became the OSCE) praised certain ministries as well as the effectiveness of the Kosovar leaders, thus implicitly acknowledging the Kosovars’ efforts at democracy building. As the first international organization to become engaged in the Kosovo issue, the OSCE concluded in 1994 that the resolution of the situation should be based on the establishment of democratic institutions in Kosovo and internationally brokered dialogue on the future status of the territory.27 Likewise, Council of Europe recommendations emphasized not only democratic reforms in the FRY, but also self-government, a new political status for Kosovo, and direct participation of Kosovo representatives in federal institutions. In December 1994, a UN General Assembly Resolution condemned “the measures and practices of discrimination and the violations of human rights of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo” and demanded that the FRY “establish genuine democratic institutions in Kosovo, including the parliament and the judiciary.”28 Statements from the Contact Group (comprised of the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy) repeatedly called for an

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enhanced status for Kosovo within the structure of the FRY, including meaningful self-administration.29 Thus, from 1990 to 1994, the Kosovar Albanians displayed high democratic capacity as exemplified by their system of parallel institutions, focus on nonviolence, and ostensibly inclusive attitude toward the Serbs in Kosovo. The international community responded with extensive empowerment efforts, pressing Serbia to reintegrate Albanians into the social and political structures of the province and to establish self-administration for Kosovo.

Dayton Disappointment: 1995–98 The Kosovar Albanians welcomed the attention of international actors, believing that there would be a direct connection between international concern over human rights violations and support for their goal of an independent Kosova Republic. In December 1992, a CSCE mission reported that the Albanians “obviously believe that sooner or later the international community will recognize their parallel authority in Kosovo, if this de facto situation lasts long enough.”30 They had hoped that the West would eventually see that Serbian rule over the province was a mere fiction; many thought their good behavior of nonviolence would be rewarded with a promise of independence in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords—and were sorely disappointed when that did not occur. Although Milosevic became preoccupied with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia until 1995, after signing the Dayton Accords he again turned his eyes on Kosovo. Faced with an influx of refugees from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia embarked on a type of colonization program, settling Serbs in Kosovo and encouraging Albanians to emigrate.31 In 1997, the Serbs launched a brutal repression campaign ostensibly focused on ridding the province of terrorists; Milosevic told German foreign minister Joschka Fischer that he would empty Kosovo of Albanians “within a week.”32 General Klaus Naumann, a German general who helped lead NATO’s bombing campaign, testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that Milosevic told him in October 1998 of the Serbian leader’s plan to deal with the ethnic imbalance in Kosovo by killing Kosovar Albanians. Although insisting that the Yugoslav government had every right to launch a counterinsurgency campaign, NATO repeatedly admonished Milosevic that his methods of counterterrorism—the overwhelming

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response by the Yugoslav army and special police as well as the targeting of civilians–were exacerbating the problem. From 1995 to 1998, these policies, coupled with the omission of Kosovo from the Dayton agreement, encouraged violent factions led by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to gain more public support within the province. Although Rugova’s party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), behaved as the sole representative of the Albanian Kosovars after winning the 1992 elections, the Albanians became increasingly factionalized. In 1994, other leaders denounced the LDK for its lack of results in gaining international attention and a split developed between the party and the government-in-exile.33 By 1996, there were 15 political parties in Kosovo, though the parallel institutions remained under the control of the LDK.34 Many Kosovars became disillusioned by the hierarchical structure of the LDK, finding the devolved structure of the KLA more appealing. The Albanian-American community switched their financial backing to the Homeland Calling fund, which supported the KLA. Although most Kosovars did not find it exceptional to simultaneously support both Rugova as their elected president and the violent KLA as the means to independence, their experiment in democratic governance was challenged by the increasing violence and even atrocities attributed to the KLA, as well as the internal factionalization among Albanian parties. Having wanted to harness the Kosovars’ democratic energy into reformed institutions for an autonomous Kosovo, the international community began to exhibit signs of frustration with this perceived backsliding in democratic capacity. In 1996, when the Albanians had split into 15 political parties, the West tried to unite them behind Rugova but failed. During US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s efforts to broker a peace deal in the fall of 1998, he found no unified voice in Kosovo and had to go from one room to another in order to procure agreement from several Albanian faction leaders. Expressing thinly disguised exasperation at this fragmented voice, the Contact Group reminded the Albanians that their negotiating team must be fully representative in order to speak authoritatively with regards to their self-determination claim. Throughout 1998, the Contact Group began to place more conditions on their support: applauding the commitment by the Kosovo leadership to peaceful dialogue while vehemently denouncing terrorist acts. Condemning the “excessive use of force” by Serbian police, UN

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Security Council Resolution 1160 (March 31, 1998) also berates “all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual.” It both lauds “the clear commitment of senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community to non-violence,” as well as underlines “that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process”35 —still pressing for increased autonomy, but treating the KLA as an illegitimate fringe faction divorced from the empowered senior leadership. Recalling past resolutions and foreshadowing the formula for UNMIK, UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (September 23, 1998) reiterated demands for a settlement based on “an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration.”36 However, the usual calls for an end to repression by the Serbian regime were now coupled with a condemnation of “all acts of violence by any party as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals,” implicitly placing demands for toleration on both parties.37 The international community thus responded to the diminishing levels of representation, tolerance, and peaceful conflict resolution with more conditions tempering their support. The drop in democratic capacity, measured by the increase in factionalization and violence, precipitated a more limited form of empowerment as the international community explicitly made continued support for selfgovernment conditional on changes in the Kosovars’ behavior.

UNMIK Established: 1999–2000 Defying international calls for toleration and cessation of violence, the Serbian regime intensified its expulsion campaign under the guise of fighting terrorism. The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 150,000–200,000 Kosovars were driven from their homes from January through mid-March 1999. International attempts to negotiate peace failed and the violence escalated. NATO initiated a bombing campaign to force Serbia to cease its attacks in Kosovo. With the situation in Bosnia as a backdrop, NATO was anxious to prevent spillover of the conflict to Macedonia, which could in turn destabilize NATO members Greece or Turkey. As early as 1998, NATO’s North Atlantic Council had deemed the situation in Kosovo “unacceptable.” Commencing Operation Allied

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Force, NATO General Secretary Javier Solana averred that “we are determined to continue until we have achieved our objectives: to halt the violence and to stop further humanitarian catastrophe . . . Our actions are directed against the repressive policies of the Yugoslav government, which is refusing to respect civilized norms of behaviour in this Europe at the end of the 20th century.”38 Explaining how the Kosovo crisis threatened the interests of NATO, a North Atlantic Council statement issued during the bombing campaign proclaimed that “[t]he crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”39 In response to those critics who would argue that NATO was not acting in its interests as a military alliance, one scholar suggests that the vital interest at stake in Kosovo was the nature of Europe: “What was primary to NATO were humane values, not protection of strategic resources or alliance partners . . . Recently enlarged, what was the point of NATO if not to guarantee liberal democracy within Europe?”40 There was an overwhelming sense that the alliance needed to act to prevent a repeat of the horrific ethnic cleansing that had occurred in Bosnia; Srebenica was in the back of everyone’s mind at NATO.41 But despite the overt humanitarian justifications for the NATO campaign, population expulsions intensified once the air strikes began, at which point “the Serbs went into an overdrive of barbarism” according to one NATO official.42 By June, as much as 90 percent of the Kosovar population had been driven from their homes.43 The Serbian government argued that the police were defending Yugoslav territory against terrorism and separatism, not attacking innocent citizens. The FRY Assembly concluded in 1998 that terrorist gangs and Albanian separatists had committed appalling crimes against humanity. Both the Serbs in Kosovo as well as the Serbian leadership in Belgrade countered the Albanians’ claims of oppression with arguments of their own. Kosovar Serbs felt that the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution was discriminatory toward Serbs and resisted efforts to return to its tenets after 1989. However, the international community’s response discounted the Serbs’ version of events and painted the Albanian actions as a proportionate response to Serbia’s repression campaign. Documenting the human rights situation in 1998–99, the OSCE concluded that “there was no balance or equivalence in the nature or scale of those violations—overwhelmingly it was the

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Kosovo Albanian population who suffered.”44 Similarly, a NATO postmortem of the events of 1999 argued that any violence perpetrated by the Albanians “paled in comparison to the premeditated, well– orchestrated, and brutally implemented campaign of violence and destruction conducted by the forces of the Yugoslav regime against the Kosovar Albanian population.”45 Shortly after Milosevic capitulated and the NATO bombing ceased, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the mandate for UNMIK, an international transitional administration based on de jure continued Serbian sovereignty and maximum de facto self-government for Kosovo. In this context, the United Nation’s establishment of a transitional self-government for Kosovo came only after extensive efforts to reform the Yugoslav regime to international standards and to empower the Kosovars within the framework of a democratic FRY. Thus, UNMIK’s establishment (1999–2000) represents the culmination of attempts to encourage democratic governance since the early 1990s; Kosovo’s future status was conditional on their behavior while under international administration. The stated international goal was to construct a democratic, multiethnic society—empowering the Kosovars to govern themselves, inclusive of non–Albanian minorities. Operationally, UNMIK consisted of four pillars: the UN civil administration (as a temporary authority to rule over Kosovo), OMIK (the OSCE institution and democracy building component), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, working on refugee return), and EU economic and reconstruction efforts—all supported by KFOR (The Kosovo Force, NATO’s security contingent). The OSCE role in particular was critical to establishing democratic governance according to international standards, using its experience to organize elections and establish functioning, multiethnic institutions. One OSCE official expressed confidence that the efforts of the organization “assist in developing a viable, truly multi-ethnic society and preparing locals to take over institutions built with solid, sound ideas like human rights and democracy.”46 The OSCE emphasized that true democracy can only be based on integration of all communities within Kosovo and creating a “climate of tolerance” among the various ethnicities living in Kosovo.47 The international community hoped to transition existing institutions that claimed popular legitimacy, such as the Presidency of Kosovo, into UNMIK’s Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS),

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capturing the underlying democratic impulses into internationally backed institutions until Kosovo–wide elections could be held.48 This proved difficult, as the various factions of the Kosovar leadership gave little more than token support to these efforts and the recalcitrant Serbs never fully participated in the JIAS.49 With the reassertion of moderate voices from the Albanian community in the 2000 municipal elections, the international community urged the Serbs to participate in the next round of elections and impressed upon the Albanian leadership the desirability of nonviolence and multiethnic institutions. The US delegation to the OSCE stressed in March 2000 that “the international community can help the Kosovars to assume greater responsibility for running their lives . . . But for this project to be a success, it will depend on the participation of both the ethnic Albanian and Serb populations.”50 Meanwhile, states continued to link the Kosovars’ democratic capacity with conditional international support and the potential for future status negotiations. In a statement to the OSCE Permanent Council in May 2000, Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway opined: “The international community gives enormous support [to Kosovo]. We should continue and be patient. But we must make it clear to the leaders that it must be deserved support and deserved progress—every day, every week.”51 Despite theoretical arguments that a population subjected to the level of oppression and violence incurred by the Albanian Kosovars has an incontrovertible right to secession, few except the Kosovars themselves consistently advocated immediate and unconditional independence. Instead, the international community offered a highly conditional path to potential—not assured—independence in the form of international transitional authority. Though Kosovars and their supporters lamented the lack of a defined end game or final status, the IGOs involved refused to entertain the notion of independence—unconditional, extensive empowerment—without first bolstering the Kosovars’ democratic capacity by establishing functioning, inclusive democratic institutions committed to peaceful conflict resolution.

Standards Before Status (2001–04) The decision of the Serb community to take part in the November 2001 Kosovo–wide elections was hailed as a victory for UNMIK and progress toward inclusive institutions. But much to the chagrin of

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the international community, Rugova proclaimed immediately after the November 2001 elections that the citizens of Kosovo “deserve independence.”52 However, the international community had already suggested that the Kosovars deserved nothing automatically and its treatment of the Serb minority from 2001–04 indicated that Kosovo had not yet fully internalized the basis for democratic governance. Four months elapsed after the November elections before the Albanian leadership chose a government, disappointing international observers. The four–month delay certainly had a negative impact on the image of the Kosovars and their ability to govern themselves, according to officials at the time.53 An assessment of the fledgling Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), designed to transition the KLA from guerrilla fighters on the fringe of Kosovo’s political landscape into a legitimate police force accepted by the whole community, lamented that the international community didn’t intervene to support an oppressed community just to see them inflict suffering on others. Upon leaving his post as head of UNMIK in 2001, Bernard Kouchner told the Kosovars in his farewell speech that the international view of Albanians had changed because of a few extremists, warning them that they should reverse this course in order to continue the progress Kosovo had begun under UNMIK. Hinting at goals of, and potential conditions on, EU assistance, a statement released in May 2001 proclaimed the European Union’s readiness “to continue to assist in the effort to build a democratic and prosperous society where violence is shunned and genuine reconciliation can be achieved.”54 The constant message, according to OSCE officials, was that if the Kosovars behave well toward minorities it could help them in terms of final status—“they might be in a position to claim independence in the eyes of the international community”—but if final status were to be an independent Kosovo, the international community “must be 100 percent sure that the Kosovo government is competent to govern a real multi-ethnic society.”55 This implicit emphasis on the steps necessary for the Kosovo leadership to prove they were capable of governing effectively—including tolerance toward Serbs and other minorities—was made explicit by the United Nations in 2002. Special Representative Michael Steiner proposed a set of benchmarks as a strategic planning tool leading to future status talks. The eight areas covered by the benchmarks included issues related to representation (functioning democratic institutions), tolerance (freedom of movement, property rights), and peaceful conflict

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resolution (rule of law, dialogue with Serbia, and transformation of the KPC), as well as economic issues. These were formalized into the Standards for Kosovo document in December 2003, operationalized in the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (March 2004), and publicized under the slogan “Standards before Status”—complete with a “Standards Bus” that rolled through the countryside to explain and promote the standards. According to UNMIK’s promotional materials, “The standards describe a multi-ethnic society where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of movement and equal access to justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic background.”56 Subsequent reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council measured progress against those standards as a precondition for the opening of future status negotiations. These efforts suffered a serious setback in the spring of 2004, when violence perpetrated by Kosovar Albanians against Serbs prompted the Secretary-General to report that the situation in Kosovo had deteriorated to “precarious” and that Kosovo still “has a long way to go” to fulfill the standards.57 To the international community, the violence “demonstrated that there continues to be a lack of commitment among large segments of the Kosovo Albanian population to creating a truly multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, and that some are determined to prevent it.”58 This compelled UNMIK to prioritize standards relating to security, sustainable returns, and rights of communities. Though some Kosovo supporters denounced the Standards before Status approach as an aberration, the framework in this project demonstrates how this period (2001–04) fits within a broader consistent response to the Kosovars’ claim. As the intolerance and violence increased, and the Albanians’ elected officials struggled to establish functioning representative institutions, the international community responded with more stringent and specific articulations of the path that would lead them closer to self-government or even independence. Thus, as the Kosovars’ democratic capacity diminished further, international empowerment became increasingly conditional and even less responsive to calls for unfettered independence.

Progress and Negotiations (2005–2008) Following the violence of March 2004—a significant low point in the international community’s efforts to foster tolerance, democratic

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institutions, and the rule of law—subsequent reviews from UNMIK note slow but progressive improvement vis-à-vis the standards (2005–08). In May 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Kai Eide as his special envoy to appraise the situation and assess the prospects for beginning the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. Eide’s assessment struck a tone of guarded optimism, marking a renewed period of political improvement while impressing upon the Kosovars that much more progress on standards implementation was needed. His recommendation to begin future status talks suggested a slight but measurable increase in democratic capacity—observing a political process that was underway and gaining momentum. But his description of the recent past as a period of political stagnation and widespread frustration indicated a long haul ahead.59 He noted improvement from the “total institutional vacuum” in 1999 to the passably functioning institutions in 2005 by remarking that “a new democracy is being built from the ground in a province without solid democratic traditions.”60 But pragmatism tempered praise. His report also emphasized that more work was imperative to improve representation, rule of law, and tolerance. Deficiencies in representation included local leaders who were still more beholden to clans and parties than the citizens they were elected to represent and Serb parallel structures that needed to be absorbed into existing institutions. A weak justice system with a backlog in the tens of thousands of pending cases indicated that rule of law was not yet firmly entrenched, though still an improvement in conflict resolution over the blood feuds endemic to Kosovo’s past. The democratic indicator most notably failing was tolerance. The provisional institutions had not adequately addressed the issues of refugee returns, monument and church rebuilding, and community rights in the aftermath of the 2004 violence. As a result, interethnic tensions remained strained and Eide noted that this did not bode well for a democratic, multiethnic Kosovo: “with regard to the foundation for a multi-ethnic society, the situation is grim.”61 Referring to the standards process, he lamented that some Kosovars saw it simply as an exercise to reach status talks—but others were genuinely committed to the underlying principles and “have the ambition to create a society with a European perspective, based on good governance and the rule of law.”62 Following Rogova’s death on January 21, 2006, the new president and prime minister reinvigorated outreach to Serb communities and again made progress on standards implementation. The democratic

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election of the new leadership “can be seen as a sign of the increased capacity of the institutions of Kosovo, which bodes well for the future when it will surely face additional challenges. These challenges can be more readily met if Kosovo’s leaders maintain their vision of a multiethnic and democratic society.”63 In a public Kosovo Assembly debate, Prime Minister Agim Ceku acknowledged a direct link between standards progress and the possible end points of the status discussions. Further indicating that the standards—and the principles behind them—were beginning to take deeper root in Kosovo’s institutions, the prime minister also vowed to continue standards as a high priority even after determination of Kosovo’s status. Indeed, beginning the status process appeared to have a positive effect on the commitment of Kosovar authorities to standards implementation, as the province made noteworthy improvement throughout 2006 and into 2007. The international response throughout this period can be characterized by continued pressure on the Kosovars to improve their democratic capacity, first as a requirement to opening status talks and later as an integral component of the talks themselves. This conditionality was apparent even in Eide’s October 2005 report. Eide emphasized that although the time was ripe for beginning future status talks, further progress on standards implementation was urgently required. He urged the international community—especially the European Union—to use its leverage in order to move standards implementation forward throughout the status process and beyond: “The standards process will require constant and determined efforts, stretching into and beyond the process of defining the future status of Kosovo.”64 SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan’s cover letter accompanying the report also makes it clear that launching status talks was not a reward for achievement of the international community’s ambitious goals, but a process imbued with ongoing commitments and conditions: “While standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process . . . I would emphasize that, at the same time, standards implementation must continue with greater commitment and results.”65 Following the admonitions in the 2005 report, standards implementation was linked to Kosovo’s European perspective in a European partnership document (December 12, 2005) that explicitly incorporated standards as requirements. The European Partnership Action Plan adopted by the Kosovo government embedded the values and principles of the UN standards framework into European

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integration work, replacing the 2004 Standards Implementation Plan.66 Thus, as Kosovo turned toward European integration as its future, the international community handed off the conditions for democratic governance from UNMIK to the European Union. Throughout 2006–07, UN reports on standards implementation praised the Kosovars’ sustained commitment to the process and urged Kosovo’s Serbs to take a more active role in existing institutions. In contrast to this empowerment of the Kosovars and the provisional institutions, the radical independence movement Vetevendosje was referred to as a “fringe element” when it attempted to influence the status process with violence in 2007.67 Similarly, the United Nations pressed Serbia to allow and encourage the Kosovo Serbs to fully participate in Kosovo’s governance. In recommending supervised independence in his March 2007 report, Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari reiterated that Kosovo’s future governance should be multiethnic, democratic, and based on the rule of law—in other words, ruled by principles of tolerance, representation, and peaceful conflict resolution at the heart of liberal democratic rule. But while his plan endorsed further empowerment of Kosovo, he also laid out the continuing conditions: international supervisors should focus on protecting community rights, encouraging further decentralization, and building institutional capacity.68 Thus, independence for Kosovo was neither automatic nor seen as the final chapter in promoting the democratic capacity of the Kosovars. Indeed, in the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly promised to adhere to the tenets of the Ahtisaari plan as the path to a democratic, multiethnic state with dreams of being integrated into the European Union.

Conclusion The Kosovars have displayed a variable, and at certain times very high, capacity for democracy based on the principles underlying democratic governance: representation, tolerance, and peaceful means of conflict resolution. Following the model, the international community has specifically responded to Albanian efforts at building democratic capacity and has also reacted unfavorably to deficiencies in this variable. Exercising self-determination—planning for the future governance of the province—thus includes an assessment of the claimant group’s record of democratic governance: its success in fostering representative

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institutions, tolerance for minorities, and a secure environment grounded in peaceful conflict resolution. Other approaches alone cannot fully account for this response. Realism cannot explain the connection between security and democratic governance evident in the international response to Kosovo. The international community addressed the leading states’ concerns regarding regional stability by attempting to reconstruct democratic institutions in ways not predictable by a Realist focus on geopolitical factors. In applying established legal doctrine to the case, a Legalist approach also falls short in predicting the international community’s emphasis on standards of democratic governance as preconditions for support and settlement of the claim. Neither the law of self-determination as codified and practiced during the decolonization era nor an emerging law of humanitarian intervention account for the international community’s attention to democracy and governance practices of substate actors. While demonstrating the effects of working within a normative framework, a Legalist approach does not offer specific guidance on the framework applied by the international community. By positing a connection between international security and democratic governance, I argue that the international response to selfdetermination claims is a reflection of the international community’s interest in establishing security by applying human rights and democratic governance standards to non-state actors. The international community never saw their role as one of imposing a solution upon Kosovo and Serbia. Even at the beginning of the 1998–99 crisis, the Contact Group made this clear: “It is for the parties themselves to determine a solution to the political status of Kosovo through negotiations.”69 When interviewed, officials at the OSCE highlighted their assistance in establishing the conditions within which these negotiations can take place. The international community also established parameters for the negotiation process and set conditions for both parties to adhere to international standards of democratic governance in exchange for continued support. In the words of one Western diplomat, Kosovo “can decide for itself what it wants to do when it grows up, but first we help it grow up.”70 The EU emphasized Serb participation and refugee return; the EU perspective also assumed that once the government and economy were functioning then the matter of formal borders (in other words, self-determination exercised through independence) would become less important.71 Always in the background were European standards

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1990–94: substantial autonomy within FRY/Serbia 2005–08 Begin future status talks; progress on standards

International Empowerment

Extensive

Limited

Conditional

1995–98: Substantial autonomy; denunciation of terrorism 1999–2000: UNMIK 2001–04: Standards Before Status campaign; response to violence

Sanction Intolerant

Somewhat Intolerant

Somewhat Democratic

Democratic

Democratic Capacity

Figure 3.1

Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment: Kosovo.

regarding the rule of law, institutional capacity to govern, and treatment of minorities; these conditions were ever present as a newly independent Kosovo began ascension discussions with the EU. Thus, international efforts provided a framework of democratic decision making in which such decisions could be made peacefully, laying the foundations for popular sovereignty, toleration, and peaceful conflict resolution. The future of Kosovo is the continuation of a dynamic legitimation process that includes relationships not only between Serbia and Kosovo but also between the Albanians and minorities in Kosovo. Throughout its involvement, the international community insisted that certain responsibilities be met in order to pave the way for discussions of sovereignty, regardless of whether the eventual outcome would be sovereign statehood or a lesser form of negotiated shared sovereignty with Serbia. Despite the frustrations of many Kosovars, this was the international approach since the early 1990s. The model presented here captures the dynamics of the relationship between the claimant group and the international response over time (see figure 3.1), as well as the consistency between this approach to Kosovo and the international response to other self-determination claims in the post–Cold War era, including Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

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Chapter 4 Nagorno-Karabakh: Balancing Standards?

“Therefore the question is not a matter of either-or but how to make those two principles [self-determination and sovereignty] somewhat work together.”1

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh—a mountainous enclave within the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan with a majority Armenian population—erupted into violence shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed and periodically threatens to do so again. It is one of Central Asia’s frozen conflicts, impacting both shortterm and longterm regional security within a volatile, oil–rich crossroads. Applying the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2, this chapter argues that the international community links democratic governance with the broader question of security as it addresses the self-determination claim. I argue that judging the democratic capacity of the claimant group is treated as an implicit component of comprehensive peace. The basis of the Karabakh Armenians’ claim centers on charges of economic, social, and cultural discrimination, as well as unpunished violence perpetrated by Azeri police and security forces against Armenians.2 The abuses culminated in episodes of intercommunal violence and the expulsion of Armenians from Azerbaijan in 1988. In November 1991, the Azerbaijani parliament abolished NagornoKarabakh’s status as an autonomous oblast (region) within Azerbaijan shortly after gaining its own independence from the Soviet Union. By

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1992, the OSCE attributed to the conflict refugee flows, human rights violations, and a legacy of animosity that would make future negotiations difficult. The 1994 ceasefire halted two years of active conflict, but also froze in place the Armenian occupation of western Azerbaijan and stranded hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Regional security remains precarious until these issues are settled. Rather than making a stark contrast between traditional security concerns and international norms, applying my posited framework demonstrates how intimately international security is informed by norms of human rights and democratic governance—and how international organizations implicitly and explicitly promote this definition of security. In tacit support of the self-determination claim advanced by the Karabakh Armenians against Azerbaijan, the OSCE has emphasized in its settlement efforts both human rights guarantees from Azerbaijan as well as improved adherence to democratic principles on the part of the Karabakh Armenians. From the onset of their involvement, the OSCE has framed the conflict and its possible resolution within the context of its foundational principles, summarized in the Decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act. These include not only territorial integrity of its member states but also a commitment to human rights and self-determination.3 European Union involvement supports this holistic approach by accentuating EU norms of democratic governance as the path to stabilization and regional security. Security in this context thus depends on balancing geopolitical factors and international norms into a richer vision of democratic governance and state security. Other approaches to understanding this case are theoretically incomplete because they do not focus on this interaction. Realism rightly points to the importance of great power interests in oil and regional security, but does not offer a comprehensive picture of what constitutes security by not showing how the emphasis on democratic principles reflects underlying crucial security concerns. By focusing primarily on interstate issues and territorial principles, Legalism emphasizes the Armenian aggression and the maintenance of Azerbaijan’s borders but is virtually silent on regime type, especially with regard to non-state actors. Although dissimilar from the Kosovo case in many ways, the Nagorno-Karabakh claim exhibits parallel patterns of international response—increased empowerment when the Karabakh Armenians

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display a higher democratic capacity and at best conditional support when they appear more intolerant. Such empowerment has been implicit in international conflict resolution efforts, primarily in two ways—recognizing the Nagorno-Karabakh leadership as a party to the conflict and encouraging or offering self-rule as a solution. By providing a framework to understand the pattern of conflict resolution, this case suggests that a democratic governance approach similar to the Standards before Status campaign in Kosovo can be applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh claim.

Background The Nagorno-Karabakh region is a mountainous enclave within present–day Azerbaijan that has been the focus of a long–running dispute between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. While the latent conflict has roots reaching back to the Russian Empire, the dispute resurfaced in the final years of the Soviet Union. This escalation was spurred by glasnost, the Soviet policy of openness, that encouraged Armenians to address perceived injustices from the contested 1923 transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia to the status of autonomous region within the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic. In 1987, NagornoKarabakh petitioned Moscow for transfer of the region to Armenia, claiming cultural and economic discrimination and “systematic Turkization.”4 Comparing the contemporary situation with the 1915 Armenian genocide, Andrei Sakharov argued in November 1988 that the “Armenian people are again facing the threat of genocide . . . for the Nagorno Karabagh this is a question of survival, for Azerbaijan—just a question of ambitions.”5 In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh Supreme Soviet voted to secede from Azerbaijan (a significant move, as the body was normally considered a rubber stamp not prone to independent action), sparking anti–Armenian violence in the city of Sumgait.6 The Soviets toyed with a special form of administration in January 1989— essentially direct rule from Moscow—in order to implement a rapid development plan for the region, but in November the USSR Supreme Soviet voted to reinstate direct Azeri rule over Nagorno-Karabakh. In December, the Armenian soviet and its Nagorno-Karabakh counterpart met in joint session to declare a united Armenian Republic.

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In the final months of 1990, the conflict erupted into overt violence. At that time, roughly 75 percent of the 189,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh were Armenian, with most Azeris living in or near the city of Susha.7 Azeri militia brigades engaged in a harassment campaign against Armenian villages in and around NagornoKarabakh. The Azeri militia often fought against Armenian militias that were supposed to have been disbanded and disarmed according to a July 1990 decree issued from Moscow; these armed clashes marked the initial escalation of the conflict. The Soviets tried to create a buffer along the Azerbaijani-Armenian border with elements from the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division of Fourth Army; this peacekeeping effort backfired when Red Army forces became active participants.8 Early the following year (April 1991), Soviet Interior Ministry troops joined with Azeri militia in initiating Operation Ring, surrounding and attacking Armenian villages. Residents of Getashen and Martunashen were forcibly deported to the Karabakh capital, Stepanakert, under justification that these villages had harbored the banned militias.9 The disintegration of the Soviet Union (USSR) caused ripple effects that further fueled the conflict. Nationalist revival intertwined with democratization and decentralization as the Soviet empire broke apart, producing ethnic tensions alongside other more laudable effects of glasnost. In Nagorno-Karabakh, longstanding resentment against the central government for limitations of cultural and religious freedom surfaced. With Armenians holding a democratic majority, the ruling soviet of the region was increasingly influenced by nationalist sentiment. Through elected representatives and institutions, Armenians governed most of the region, but were besieged as an enclave and subject to discrimination from the central government. Azerbaijan alleged that Azeris were being pushed out of Nagorno-Karabakh as early as 1988, while the Armenian side decried mob violence aimed at Armenians living in Azerbaijan. The first such violence occurred in Sumgait in February 1988; the most serious incident occurred in Baku in January 1990, when up to 100 Armenians were killed and, by most reports, the government made no serious effort to determine responsibility for killings. In September 1991, shortly after Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union, deputies to the Nagorno-Karabakh soviet proclaimed an independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. In response,

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Azerbaijan abolished the region’s autonomous status two months later (November 26, 1991). On December 10, Armenians in the disputed territory passed a referendum on independence as the Soviet Union crumbled to its demise. Though the Azeris living in Nagorno-Karabakh had boycotted the vote, the referendum was used to legitimate the new Nagorno-Karabakh Republic declared on January 6, 1992. Azerbaijan maintained that autonomy was again possible if external involvement (in other words, Armenian interference) in Nagorno-Karabakh ended and a Karabakh resolution demanding incorporation into Armenia was withdrawn. The Azerbaijani government refused any negotiations of parity between Azeri authorities and representatives of the Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh.10 Though tensions had escalated into sporadic violence from 1988 to 1992, active violent conflict ensued from 1992 to 1994. By the end of this phase, the conflict had claimed over 30,000 lives and left 1 million displaced.11 Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces seized the towns of Susha and Lachin in May 1992, establishing a corridor linking Armenia and the enclave. By October 1993, these forces occupied most of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas.12 The UN Security Council became involved in 1993, issuing four resolutions (UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884) calling for the cessation of hostilities, unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts, and eventual deployment of a peacekeeping force—as well as immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories. Anxious to exert its influence as a power broker in the near abroad, Russia mediated a ceasefire in 1994. But the primary vehicle for the international response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since 1992 has been the Minsk Group, mandated by the OSCE to provide a framework for conflict resolution, obtain agreement on the cessation of armed conflict, and plan for a peacekeeping force. The three cochairs of the Minsk Group (the United States, Russia, and France) visit the region and the three capitals, meeting representative of the three parties involved and then reporting back to the OSCE. They have submitted several proposals to the parties, always based on balancing OSCE principles—some form of selfgovernment for Nagorno-Karabakh (emphasizing self-determination) within a democratized Azerbaijan (focusing on human rights as well as territorial integrity). Despite the ceasefire that has been in place since 1994 and the continuing efforts of the OSCE to negotiate a permanent

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settlement to the conflict, hundreds of people are killed each year by sniper fire and landmines along the Line of Contact established by the ceasefire. The unresolved conflict remains a major impediment to stability and prosperity in this vital region.

Alternative Explanations: Realist and Legalist Neither a Realist approach focusing primarily on material factors nor a Legalist framework guided strictly by the precepts of international law provides a convincing explanation for the international reaction to the Nagorno-Karabakh claim. A Realist explanation would emphasize American and Russian interests in controlling new oil reserves in Azerbaijan and thus favoring the Azeri side in resolving the conflict, but this oil was not discovered until after international involvement had begun. Great power interests in regional stability—especially Russia’s desire to exert influence in the near abroad coupled with American oil interests—might partially explain the international response to the self-determination claim in Nagorno-Karabakh, but alone they do not account for the importance of democratization and humanitarian issues as the basis of security discussions. A Legalist explanation offers incomplete counsel as well. Azerbaijan appears to have a stronger case under international law, as Armenia has been clearly identified as an aggressor and called upon by the UN Security Council to leave the occupied territory. But appeals to human rights concerns cast the Karabakh Armenians in a more favorable light and may elevate the human security of non-state actors alongside the legal case regarding title to territory. I argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh case is more accurately seen as an attempt to balance both geopolitical interests and interstate legal precepts with international norms of human rights and democratic governance into a holistic concept of security.

Realist Explanation A Realist approach to self-determination would focus on the geopolitical factors unique to each case—in particular, the interests of the leading states in the system—as the determinant of the international

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response. International interest in Azeri oil fields offers a reasonable starting point to consider outside geopolitical interests as the primary force behind international involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia, the United States, and various European powers (all members of the OSCE, along with the two state parties to the conflict), as well as neighboring Iran, are home to large oil industries wanting to explore and develop new sources of oil. Realism would highlight oil as a crucial geopolitical factor, arguing that the OSCE’s interest in resolving the conflict reflects the desire of its member states to establish a secure region and appease a negotiating partner in exchange for access to an abundance of future oil. This suggests that the most desirable outcome for these influential states would be a settlement in Azerbaijan’s favor, leaving that state able to negotiate and make longterm commitments without the distractions of further conflict. Quelling the NagornoKarabakh claim also minimizes the risks to outside investors of attacks on oil infrastructure as drilling and pipeline construction continues throughout the region. In an effort to develop strategic oil reserves in the Caspian Sea and elsewhere in and around Azerbaijan, a consortium of oil companies signed the $8 billion “deal of the century” in September 1994. The agreement granted drilling rights to exploit offshore oil fields on the Caspian shelf near Baku to oil companies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Japan.13 The total projected profits from this endeavor have been estimated at $100 billion or more, with 80 percent slated for the Azeri treasury. Another large deal, led by Russian LUKoil, followed in 1995. Between 1994 and 1998, international oil companies invested a total of $35 billion to develop Azerbaijan’s reserve.14 In the United States, oil interests lobbied to lift Section 907 of Freedom Supports Act, which bans all aid to Azerbaijan as long as it maintains its blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, oil may have a negative impact on finding a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Azeri oil wealth provides disincentive to compromise with Armenia while it believes the international community to be on its side; at the same time, Armenia has held pipelines hostage while the conflict remains unresolved.15 One possible pipeline route, called the peace pipeline, would have taken oil from Azerbaijan through Armenia to Turkey. Azerbaijan maintained that this route

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was possible if Armenia had been more cooperative in accepting OSCE proposals for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Azerbaijan tried to use the pipeline and promises of oil deals to provide incentives for resolving the dispute; meanwhile, Armenia tried use the pipeline as leverage to entice Azerbaijan to promises of security and autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh. Neither side was willing to compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh in order to build the route through Armenia, so in 1999, Azerbaijan approved construction of a pipeline through Georgia to Turkey. Dubbed the BTC pipeline for its BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan route, its opening in 2005 allegedly gave Azerbaijan “new clout in Washington.”16 This was the only other viable option, given that the United States would not allow a pipeline through Iran and a proposed route through Russia would run through war–ravaged Chechnya.17 Even the route through Georgia carries its own security risk: it passes 10 miles from the 1994 ceasefire line in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory18 and Georgia has been embroiled in its own self-determination issues, with Abkhazia and South Ossetia declaring independence in 2008. The oil factor works in conjunction with Russia’s interest in exerting influence in the near abroad, variously supporting both sides— some observers argue to prolong the conflict until Russia can play a pivotal role in its resolution19 —and American interests derived in large part from oil industry lobbies.20 According to one analyst, the BTC pipeline linking Azerbaijan and Georgia to the West via Turkey has implicitly pulled Azerbaijan closer to the United States and pushed Armenia closer to Russian and Iran.21 Russia courted Azerbaijan, telling one Azeri official that “the U.S. has come to your country and is plundering your natural resources, but not giving you any support. Why not go with us instead?”22 Other regional interests, including Turkey’s historical enmity with Armenia and the existence of a large Azeri population in Iran, also seemingly tilt international favor toward Azerbaijan. These factors, a Realist would argue, explain the involvement of the OSCE and the disproportionate emphasis on Russian and American mediation seeking to end the conflict, especially if this interference promotes terms amenable to Azerbaijan. As one analyst stated: “Oil is the prime lubricant in the search for a solution over Nagorno-Karabakh. With it, Azerbaijan has been seeking to appease all the major external and regional actors and isolate the Karabakh Armenians. Azerbaijan has even sought to attract Armenia by holding

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out the promise of a pipeline for ‘later’ oil, if only Armenia would cease to support self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh.”23 Given the level of outside interest in exploiting these reserves and complementary regional interest in stability, a Realist approach would predict international support for Azerbaijan in order to resolve the conflict and allow unimpeded access to Azeri oil. Thus, a Realist perspective would suggest that the international community would take Azerbaijan’s side against the Nagorno-Karabakh claim or at least remain neutral while trying to achieve a compromise settlement that satisfies all interested parties. But such a view is misleading and factually incomplete. The involvement of the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh “well predates” the world’s awareness of oil reserves’ significance according to one analyst.24 This contradicts the notion that the organization’s interest in the issue is primarily a veil for the oil interests of the largest members. The OSCE sent monitors to the region in early 1992 and formed the Minsk Group in March of that year to actively engage in seeking a resolution. From the beginning, the organization has pressed issues that are not favorable to Azerbaijan: continued emphasis on some form of self-governance to Nagorno-Karabakh, cessation of human rights abuses against Armenians in NagornoKarabakh and elsewhere in Azerbaijan, recognition of the NagornoKarabakh leadership as an independent participant in the negotiation process, and settlements that call for an exchange of territory or shared sovereignty over the enclave despite the fact that Armenia was clearly labeled as the aggressor and admonished to retreat from occupied territory. A Realist perspective cannot account for international empowerment given to the Karabakh Armenians and the focus on democratic principles as key elements in a negotiated settlement.

Legalist Explanation A Legalist approach predicts, first, that claimant groups fitting the definition of colonial cases, as defined by legal instruments and state practice from decolonization, would receive a high degree of international support. If the case does not conform readily to this definition, as with the Karabakh Armenians’ claim, a Legalist perspective would look to other relevant international law as it bears on the case for the determinants of the international response. The central legal issue on

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which the international community has taken a stance in the NagornoKarabakh is the Armenian incursion into Azerbaijan’s territory and the resulting occupation. Azerbaijan contends that over 5,000 square miles are under occupation (over 2,000 square miles in Nagorno-Karabakh and more than 3,000 square miles in surrounding territory)—approximately 15 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. The Security Council resolutions of 1993 reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to territorial integrity and sovereignty, emphasizing the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of forcible acquisition of territory. These principles clearly identified Armenia as being in violation of international law, calling for withdrawal of aggressor’s forces from Azerbaijan and for an end to Armenia’s expansionist policy. The resolutions appear to back Azerbaijan’s claims of title to the territory, implying that Azerbaijan’s rights as a sovereign member state of the United Nations will be protected by the international community. Far from promising support for the self-determination claim of the Karabakh Armenians, the resolutions make Armenian leaders fully aware of their violation of international law. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan applauded the adoption of the Security Council resolutions and its efforts to uphold international law, arguing that their precepts set a course of action for the OSCE Minsk Group— action based on respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and inviolability of borders.25 In late 2001, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister stated before the UN General Assembly that the right to self-determination must not take precedence over the principle of territorial integrity under any peace deal: “The right of self determination cannot be regarded as a right for forcible separation of a part of a territory of a state and it must not justify a violation of the territorial integrity of states.”26 Azerbaijan repeatedly stresses in statements presented to the OSCE that any acceptable settlement must be founded on principles of international law, citing UN resolutions as well as OSCE principles emphasizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan—an attempt to reify the sanctity of borders above other elements in the debate. They also warn of dangerous precedent effects if aggression is rewarded and refer to the Karabakh Armenians as illegal terrorist separatists.27 In their view, any discussion of self-determination must be considered within norms of international law, primarily the territorial integrity of states.28 Settlement proposals from Minsk Group, however, have not always satisfied the basic provisions and requirements of UN Security Council

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Resolutions 822 and 853 in Azerbaijan’s eyes—for example, by suggesting instead a potential land swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On one occasion, Azerbaijan issued a statement accusing the Minsk Group of straying from “the fundamental norms of international law, principles, the OSCE, and the very foundations of the Minsk process itself.”29 In a 2001 statement during presidential–level negotiations, Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev chastised: Instead of respecting norms and principles of international law and strengthening them rigorously, indecisiveness on the part of the international community is witnessed. Fundamental norms and principles of international law such as territorial integrity, inviolability of borders are being questioned, thus damaging the basis for the decades old international practice and international law, just to please 100,000 Armenians who live in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Obviously, peace, stability, and security achieved as a result of acceptance of military aggression can be neither strong, nor lasting.30

Countering arguments regarding the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Armenia has stressed both the stronger historical claim it feels it has to the territory as well as the inability of an oppressed people to continue to live within existing borders and conditions. Disputing the historical basis for Azerbaijan’s claim of title to territory, Armenia points out that the League of Nations refused to recognize the 1918–20 Azerbaijan Republic in part because the prospective state did not have effective control of the territory it claimed. This tidbit of historical legalism gives the Karabakh Armenians justification for claiming territory that was never, according to their argument, part of an independent Azerbaijan.31 To those who see a cut and dried case of territorial aggression, the Armenians argue that “the political realities cannot be reduced just to legal issues.”32 Thus, the Karabakh Armenians are adamantly against referring to the Nagorno-Karabakh as an area of Azerbaijani Republic, dismissing such language as an attempt to predetermine the final status of the territory. Armenia has also attempted to link the Nagorno-Karabakh selfdetermination issue with regional security as well as placing the issue within the context of international and Soviet legal frameworks.33 Armenia does not interpret the Security Council resolutions as requiring unconditional withdrawal from occupied areas, but allows withdrawal

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to occur as part of a settlement package.34 They hold the view that no single issue can be viewed in isolation, contending that security, the de facto political situation, and the desires of the enclave’s inhabitants should all bear upon the outcome.35 In an address to the OSCE Permanent Council, the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs noted: It is important to see the Karabagh conflict from the security perspective of those whose national aspirations have been denied and trampled for too long. It is equally important to bear in mind that Karabagh’s claim to independence is fully warranted under international law and the applicable Soviet laws that provided the framework for the Soviet republics to declare their independence in 1991 and thus secure formal recognition by the international community.36

The Armenian argument emphasized not only that the disputed enclave had never been part of independent Azerbaijan but also that “strengthening of democratic institutions and the protection of human and civil rights in each country in the region must become the foundation that holds together the regional security space.”37 Nagorno-Karabakh bases its claim to statehood not on a triumph of self-determination over territorial integrity—often seen as the quintessential clash of principles in international law—but rather on the legal basis for statehood as defined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933): population, defined territory, elected government, and the ability to enter into relations with other states.38 In sum, while most interpretations of international law appear to favor interference on behalf of Azerbaijan rather than supporting the Karabakh Armenians and thus rewarding Armenian aggression, Armenian counterarguments and the proposals of the Minsk Group have emphasized that such legal principles need to be balanced with other realities and legalities of the case. Legalism does not provide a broad enough umbrella to understand how democratic standards arguments are taken into account by the international community.

Democratic Governance Explanation Applying the model developed in chapter 2, we can now examine whether a framework constructed from principles of democratic governance offers a more convincing explanation for the international

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response to the self-determination claim in Nagorno-Karabakh than either the Realist or Legalist perspectives alone. The Realist and Legalist emphasis on the territorial integrity of existing states—on geopolitical and legal grounds, respectively—belies the importance of human rights and democratic principles that is attendant with the international response to this case. Neither of these alternatives supplies a complete explanation for addressing non-state actors and regime types. Only by examining the interplay of material and legal principles with international norms do we fully understand the nature and extent of the international response to Nagorno-Karabakh. The following sections gauge changes in the nature the claimant group, offering evidence of a positive international reaction when the claimant group exhibits adherence to democratic foundations.

Tracing the International Response Before the Storm: 1988–92 From 1988 to 1992, with the Soviet Union in decline, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians entertained hopes that the demise of Soviet rule would also bring the end of Azeri control over the region. They articulated their self-determination claim in this period primarily through institutional means: appeals to local representative bodies, references to Soviet law, and finally a referendum. Thus, they initially appeared committed to representative governance and peaceful conflict resolution, attempting to foster Western–style democratic institutions for a post–Soviet Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh people availed themselves of existing structures for redressing their grievances and furthering their goals. The regional soviet voted to secede in 1989 and formally requested permission from the Supreme Soviet to be annexed by Armenia. The USSR Supreme Soviet responded by reinstating direct rule from Azerbaijan in 1989. In 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh soviet declared the enclave to be an independent republic and Armenians in the region passed a referendum on independence. An OSCE observer mission in 1992 reported that Nagorno-Karabakh considered its declaration of independence valid under Soviet law and Azerbaijan’s subsequent actions as aggression against the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.39 They are reticent

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to resolve the matter within the existing constitution of Azerbaijan, which doesn’t recognize the territory. Armenia avers that the essence of the conflict with Azerbaijan lies in the rights, legitimate grievances, and security of the people living in Nagorno-Karabakh—as well as Azerbaijan’s refusal to accept principles enshrined in the UN Charter and CSCE Decalogue regarding peoples’ rights to self-determination and human rights in general.40 The International Crisis Group reported that the Armenians see Azerbaijan as genocidal and feel that the latter had lost its moral right to rule over the territory given its long record of discrimination and violence.41 With a legacy of Soviet–era discrimination in their collective historical memory, the Armenians suffered Azeri threats and attempts to impose rule by force as the response to their opening salvos of ostensibly peaceful self-determination. The Azeris sought to quell the Armenians’ aspirations through episodes of intercommunal violence, the expulsion of Armenians from Azerbaijan in 1988, and the reduction of NagornoKarabakh’s status from autonomous oblast in the USSR to merely a region within Azerbaijan in 1991. The Sumgait massacre in 1988 and Operation Ring in 1991 punctuate the Azeri use of force during this time. Because Armenia sees Azeri rule over Nagorno-Karabakh not only as a territorial threat but also as an attack on the very existence of a distinct people, the Armenians emphasize the unique Karabakh identity in advancing their claim. They highlight their separate historical heritage within a narrative of decades of Azeri mistreatment. Though Azerbaijan describes the conflict as an interstate dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia—dismissing the importance of a distinct Karabakh identity—Armenia insisted on the participation of NagornoKarabakh representatives in the peace process as early as 1992. In August 1992, the Karabakh Armenians objected that others besides their official delegation (which was chosen as elected representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh, based on decisions of the CSCE Council on March 24, 1992) were invited to participate in the preliminary meeting of the Minsk Group in Rome. They argued that both their statehood and rights were being ignored.42 Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has threatened to walk out of negotiations if recognition was given in any form to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan resists Armenian efforts to conflate the community and the territory, insisting that the elected

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leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh be labeled as representatives of the Armenian community only and frequently reminding the international community of the displaced Karabakh Azeri population. The Karabakh Armenians who comprised the democratic majority in the territory pressed its agenda in existing institutions, but did not move those institutions to include the Azeris’ voice. The dark mark of their otherwise positive democratic capacity in this period was a lack of tolerance toward non-Armenians, as evidenced by increasing tensions and the flood of Azeri refugees fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh. The early response to the brewing conflict from the international community coalesced around the OSCE, ostensibly reinventing itself for the post–Cold War era but still enmeshed in a residual East-West dynamic. By taking the lead in addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the OSCE implicitly and explicitly brought to bear the dual– prong approach of territorial security coupled with human dimension rights into a comprehensive notion of regional security. This reflected in part the original East-West compromise of the OSCE’s founding— the East’s desire to maintain the territorial status quo and the West’s promotion of human rights and democracy as an agent of change from within. The OSCE response mirrors this balance of external security focused on territory with internal security based on democracy and human rights. Thus, the OSCE has emphasized that the peaceful and lasting settlement of this conflict requires from all parties “respect for international obligations with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights including all those based on the Principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE,” and “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities, in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE,” as well as “respect for the inviolability of all borders, whether internal or external, which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement.”43 In an elaboration on the linkage between these principles and security, one OSCE official described how all of these Decalogue principles are implicated and stressed in a comprehensive approach to security. Safety and security in a region involves not only external or territorial stability but also human rights, good governance, an absence of corruption, a stable economy, and cooperation within the territory.44 To put these principles into effect, the primary vehicle for addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the OSCE has been the Minsk

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Group. Established in 1992, the Minsk Group has a mandate to provide a framework for conflict resolution, obtain agreement on the cessation of armed conflict, and eventually deploy a peacekeeping force. The 1992 Helsinki Additional Meeting requested the Chairman-inOffice (CIO) to convene a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to be held in Minsk. The planned conference never materialized, but the Minsk Group continues to mediate the conflict resolution efforts between the parties, primarily through the leadership of the three cochairs (France, Russia, and the United States). Other members of the group include Norway, Austria, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The cochairmanship was established at the December 1994 Budapest Summit and the mandate for the cochairs was established in March 1995. The cochair structure was revised to its current tripartite leadership in 1997. The CIO also has a personal representative (since 1995) assigned to the conflict in order to inform the CIO of developments in the region and to facilitate confidencebuilding and humanitarian and other measures. Also, the High Level Planning Group was established in 1994 in order to make recommendations on a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force. Minsk Group proposals for settlement center around some form of self-governance for the enclave, thus empowering the Karabakh Armenians and their claim. Proposed solutions have included a high degree of autonomy, a dual Azeri-Armenian protectorate, earned sovereignty, and a so–called common state. In an added tacit show of support for the claim, initial proceedings of the Minsk Group in 1992 were blocked by the question of representation relating to the Karabakh Armenians’ assertion of identity. Armenia wanted the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian party officially recognized as “elected representatives” but agreed to a compromise supported by the chairman whereby they would participate in working groups as “interested parties.”45 Throughout OSCE documents over the next decade, Nagorno-Karabakh representatives are referred to with their elected titles, albeit qualified with quotation marks (for example, “President” Kocharyan) as subtle acknowledgement of their efforts at representative government.46 Though not directly involved in negotiations, NagornoKarabakh authorities are kept informed by the OSCE through regular visits from the cochairs, who view the Karabakh Armenians’ participation as a key component of the overall process. As the US Mission to the OSCE noted in a statement: “The Co-chairs have welcomed the

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direct dialogue as complementary to the multilateral diplomatic track. Nevertheless, they also recognize that Nagorno-Karabakh authorities must be included in the process and the views of the population there taken into account.”47 Azerbaijan, however, discounts any separate identity and refers to the Karabakh Armenians as illegal terrorist separatists.48 According to Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh enjoyed autonomous status when the conflict erupted. President Aliyev stated that there was “no reason” for this conflict to break out.49 A subsequent statement from displaced Azeris reported that refugees—including Turks, Kurds, and Russians as well as Azeris—were treated savagely and forced out of Armenia. Many of these refugees or IDPs have stated a desire to return, albeit with international guarantees of security.50 Azerbaijan defends the cancellation of Karabakh autonomy as a justified reaction to an unconstitutional declaration of independence51 and the decision to use force as a proper response to aggression. Despite Azerbaijan’s efforts to characterize the conflict differently, the subtle recognition from the OSCE has added some legitimacy to the Karabakh Armenians’ identity as a separate entity. Though the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians made great strides in establishing and building representative institutions and relying on them for peaceful conflict resolution, their successes were marred by the absence of dissenting Azeri voices in the democratic process. This tyranny of the majority weakens their democratic capacity. The model used to examine the Kosovo claim in the previous chapter would predict limited or conditional support, given the flaws in the Armenians’ democratic capacity. Indeed, the international community’s response to the Nagorno-Karabakh claim has been conditional—recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians as a party to the conflict was given in exchange for participation in the OSCE’s conflict resolution efforts. Tacit support for increased self-governance was balanced with efforts to preserve Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Active Conflict: 1992–94 The Karabakh powderkeg exploded when sporadic violence erupted into an active conflict that lasted from 1992 to 1994, claiming over 30,000 lives and leaving 1 million displaced.52 The nonviolence and

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institutional approach of the previous period was replaced by increased levels of militarism and violence perpetrated by both sides. The Western–style parliamentary government established by NagornoKarabakh when it declared independence revealed an underlying militaristic tendency. The parliament elected a prime minister, who governed the enclave with the assistance of a quasi–military body, the State Defence Committee. (The committee was not dissolved until after the 1994 ceasefire.)53 As the product of ethnonationalist mobilization, these institutions were ethnically homogenous and had been established ostensibly to counter the discriminatory policies of the Azeri central government. They were designed as an alternative to Azeri rule for the seemingly beleaguered Armenian minority, not as institutions of integration for addressing ethnic tensions. As a result, the difference in the Karabakh Armenians’ behavior during this time period was markedly more aggressive and less tolerant. Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces seized territory in May 1992, establishing a corridor linking Armenia and the enclave, and by October 1993 had occupied most of Nagorno-Karabakh. The 1993–94 UN Security Council resolutions identified Armenia as the aggressor and denounced the escalation in violence. In February 1992, the Armenians committed what many consider to be their worst atrocity of the conflict. Azeri civilians attempting to escape the town of Khojali ahead of advancing Armenian forces were killed; estimates of the number killed in Khojali range from 200 to 1,000. The possible motivation for the attack may have been revenge for earlier violence—some members of the Armenian forces involved were reportedly men displaced from Baku and Sumgait—or it may simply have been an intimidation tactic.54 The violence was not limited to one side. One author estimates 7,000 to 8,000 Armenians were killed during this timeframe and 20,000 to 22,000 Azeris perished.55 But by the end of this period of conflict, over 700,000 ethnic Azeris, Kurds, and others had fled from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and captured areas of Azerbaijan. In a 1992 statement, Azerbaijan described Armenian actions along the borders as a scorched earth policy resulting in half a million IDPs and claimed the right to use every means to defend its independence and territorial integrity.56 Those sympathetic to the Armenian cause defended the expulsions as a consequence of the Azeri massacre of Armenians: “Why

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do the Red Cross and certain foreign governments always demand that we behave better than the Azeris? Why do they continue to remind us so aggressively about international law? Let the Azeris obey international law.”57 Reports of hostage-taking, torture of prisoners, and shelling of civilians implicated both sides during this period before Russia mediated a ceasefire in 1994. It is difficult to assess the Armenians’ treatment of Azeris within the occupied areas since the end of the active conflict, as most non-Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories to become IDPs in Azerbaijan.58 The international response called both sides to task for their behavior during this period, placing implicit conditions on the Armenians for continued attention to their claims. The UN Security Council resolutions emphasized the cessation of hostilities, unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts, and eventual deployment of a peacekeeping force as well as immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories. Though UN Security Council Resolution 853 called for the withdrawal of “occupying” forces and upheld the inviolability of borders, it also specifically named “Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region” as a party to the conflict. With the Azerbaijani side insisting that the conflict is an interstate issue between themselves and Armenia, this subtle recognition added further legitimacy to the Karabakh Armenians’ assertion of a separate identity. This response indicated that the issue could only be resolved by addressing the claims that triggered the aggression as well as the aggression itself. As the crisis descended into active conflict, the democratic capacity of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians fell noticeably. Despite the somewhat democratic institutions, the Karabakh Armenians’ government was infused with a hefty dose of military influence. These ethnically homogenous institutions and the appalling Khojali incident indicate a pervasive intolerance—perhaps in response to many years of perceived harsh treatment from the Azeri government—and a weak sense of the rule of law as a means to conflict resolution. In response to a somewhat intolerant non-state actor, the model would predict that the international community would display less support for the group. The international community did condemn those actions outside the realm of law and international norms (terrorist activity, aggression), but also recognized a glimmer of potential by naming them a party to the conflict and thus bestowing a modicum of legitimacy to their group. International support

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was highly conditional but did not fully concede to the Azeri position that the self-determination claim was entirely without merit.

The Aftermath of War: 1994–97 After variously offering support for both Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia used its influence in 1994 to broker a ceasefire in the conflict.59 In a nod to their role as a party to the conflict, not simply an appendage of Armenia, the Karabakh Armenians signed the ceasefire agreement and participated as parties in the ensuing peace talks. Following the ceasefire and ushering in a new period of de facto separation (1994–97), the Karabakh Armenians focused again on institution-building and strengthening their nascent state. During this time, they argued that Nagorno-Karabakh had solidified its own identity based on historical foundations, established an army, and practiced “a functioning mechanism of self-rule.”60 The State Defence Committee was dissolved in 1994 and replaced with a civilian government.61 The parliamentary system that worked through this quasi–military body was replaced with a presidential republic; Robert Kocharian was selected by parliament as the first president in 1994 and then won the first direct presidential elections in 1996. Party politics emerged and democracy appeared to be blooming moreso in Nagorno-Karabakh than in its patron, Armenia— the latter racked by an election fraud scandal. Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian’s reelection in 1996 was deemed “flagrantly undemocratic” as those who had led Armenia’s drive to independence turned to tight centralized rule. The opposition in Armenia was denied financial backing, received no access to the press, and had their candidates disqualified.62 Facing the ire of the voters, Ter-Petrosian selected Robert Kocharian as Prime Minister. Kocharian was viewed as a respected figure who could address Armenia’s economic problems.63 Kocharian’s move to Armenia proper gave the impression that the periphery was controlling politics at the center—and perhaps that democracy was more stable in Nagorno-Karabakh than in the homeland. As a backdrop to these developments, general perceptions of Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s relative success at democratic reforms also played into assessments of the conflict. Both countries were still relatively new democracies, but even in the face of Armenian election fraud, Azerbaijan was more widely regarded as an autocratic state mired

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in rampant corruption. The Azeri government adopted a constitution in 1995, held elections that the Council of Europe has called free and fair, and displayed dedication to the primacy of international law— Azerbaijan signed 15 conventions and abided by others, including the European Convention on Human Rights, before becoming a member of the Council of Europe. But even as early as 1992, an OSCE mission was more optimistic on the progress and future of democracy and human rights in Armenia than in Azerbaijan.64 The United States Institute of Peace reported pervasive corruption in the Azerbaijani system and an underdeveloped sense of nationhood that together might hinder the success of democratic institutions.65 Conduct of voting day in 1998, however, did count as a serious improvement over the “grotesque abuses” of 1993 and 1995;66 the improvement was attributed to outside pressure from organizations like the OSCE. But even so, the main opposition group boycotted the elections, leading to some skepticism of the efficacy of the electoral process in gauging the people’s will. While the OSCE recognized Azerbaijan’s progress in democratization, the organization also pointed out areas of future reform priorities, including institutional legal reform, capacity building, electoral procedures, civil society, freedom of the media, human rights, internally displaced persons, and small arms control—often a lengthier list than similar statements on Armenian reform.67 Azerbaijan’s economic blockade of Armenia, initiated in 1989, damaged the former’s international reputation, though the blockade itself was deemed legal.68 In contrast, Nagorno-Karabakh benefited not only from the positive impression of their own elections and institution building, but also from a generally favorable impression of the democratic reform process in Armenia, as compared to the slower pace of democratization in Azerbaijan. Observers suggest that the influence of the Armenian lobby in the United States Congress impacts the relative image of Armenia, its government, and its reform process. One OSCE official noted that the Armenian lobby knows how to deal with the West, but Azerbaijan remained stuck in a Soviet mindset, creating an advantage for the Armenian diaspora.69 In the US Congress, the Armenian government is seen as committed to democracy and having a pro– Western foreign policy, while congressional arguments have mistakenly referred to the Azeri occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azeri aggression against Armenia. Perceptions formed through 1992 of Armenians as victims and Azeris as aggressors persisted in the US

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Congress, despite the outflow of Azeri refugees and the Armenian actions in Khojali.70 During this time period, the international community sought to build on the nascent democratic foundations emerging in the region, capitalizing on the emergent democratic capacity of Nagorno-Karabakh and even encouraging the improvement of the democratic neighborhood. Nagorno-Karabakh was officially recognized as a party to the conflict at the Budapest Summit of 1994, once again giving it a small measure of legitimacy. Early settlement proposals sought to balance principles advanced by the two sides: self-government and territorial integrity. A 1996 OSCE draft decision stressed resolution of the conflict based on the observance of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Azerbaijan’s borders while granting autonomy to the population of Nagorno-Karabakh.71 In another report, the broadest possible self-rule for Nagorno-Karabakh was coupled with withdrawal from occupied territories and territorial integrity as necessary components of a political agreement.72 There is a belief shared between the Armenians and the international community that autonomy or increased self-rule is necessary for resolution of the dispute. Simply implementing human rights protection mechanisms would not suffice, given the history of war, the separate identity of the Karabakh people, and a perceived lack of credibility from the Azeris.73 The Minsk cochairs have echoed this sentiment, arguing that a definitive settlement must include “permitting Nagorno-Karabakh to benefit from a status entailing the highest degree of self-rule in accordance with OSCE norms and principles.”74 By 1996, Azerbaijan had accepted that Nagorno-Karabakh would be given the “maximum possible autonomy” for its final status, but they were unwilling to specify the parameters of that autonomy.75 In 1997, the cochairs presented a phased approach plan based on Armenian withdrawal followed by final status discussions, leaving final status negotiations to the Minsk Conference. This proposal suggested that Nagorno-Karabakh should remain within Azerbaijani territory, but with a degree of self-determination including its own constitution, flag, seal, and anthem as well as autonomously formed legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. Armenia would get territorial access to Nagorno-Karabakh through the Lachin Corridor and Azerbaijan would receive territorial access to Nakhichevan and Turkey. Under this proposal, Nagorno-Karabakh would also have a National Guard and police force while the Azerbaijani army, security, and police forces

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would not have the right to enter the territory without permission from the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities. The UN Security Council was envisioned as guarantor of the agreement.76 The Minsk Group’s proposal was accepted by Azerbaijan, accepted with reservations by Armenia, and rejected by Nagorno-Karabakh; Nagorno-Karabakh representatives wanted the final status discussions simultaneous with a negotiated withdrawal. The final nail in Ter-Petrosian’s political coffin was his stated support for the 1997 peace proposal. Kocharian was elected President of Armenia in 1998 after Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign. In response to their rejection of the peace deal, and with Kocharian’s role in the Armenian government ostensibly representing the Karabakh viewpoint, Nagorno-Karabakh was not formally considered a party to the conflict after 1997. During this period, the democratic capacity of Nagorno-Karabakh improved and the international community responded by pressing for a higher degree of self-government. After emerging from the shadow of war, Nagorno-Karabakh moved to transform its wartime government into a peacetime democracy. They renewed their commitment to representative, not military, government and rule of law by engaging with the OSCE conflict resolution process. Given the displaced Azeri population, the Karabakh Armenians’ tolerance can only be measured as middling at best by the absence of serious efforts to reintegrate IDPs or hold places for the Azeri voice in governing the territory in the future. The 1997 Minsk cochairs’ proposal favored broad self-government for Nagorno-Karabakh, essentially supporting their self-determination claim without condoning de jure independence.

Common State and Land Swap Rejected: 1998–2003 From 1998 to 2003, Nagorno-Karabakh appeared on the surface to be committed to establishing representative governance for its fledgling state with an elected government and unified support from the people. The nascent republic held several parliamentary and presidential elections, which observers have described as being fair and properly conducted.77 A monitoring delegation from the Public International Law and Policy Group concluded after the August 2002 presidential elections that “the expansion of democratic values and processes would facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region. Nagorno

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Karabakh has made demonstrable progress in building democracy and its authorities have made a serious effort to conduct the 2002 polls by democratic means.”78 However, the outward trappings of democracy belie remaining vestiges of militarism and an influential army indirectly involved in politics. Analysts have described Nagorno-Karabakh as “an intensely organized and militarized mini-state” in which the people share perceptions about the conflict and the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh: Cohesion rests on a widely shared and deeply rooted consensus to consolidate independence or to achieve unification with Armenia; an equally profound sense of imminent extirpation in the face of Azeri hostility and numerical superiority; an impression of international indifference; and a strong sense that Nagorno-Karabakh will survive only because of self-reliance and discipline, which allows little room for dissent.79

But rather than imposing authoritarian rule on a reluctant electorate, the leadership appears to be following the wishes of the majority. After being elected President of Armenia in 1998, Kocharian defended his hardline positions vis-à-vis Nagorno-Krabakh as reflective of his constituency, arguing that an entire generation knows NagornoKarabakh only as an independent country: “Nagorno-Karabakh has never been part of independent Azerbaijan and never will be.”80 Meanwhile, the Karabakh Armenians continued with their democratic institution-building, seeing a direct connection between their efforts and gaining support from the international community. In 2002, Nagorno-Karabakh presidential candidate Arkady Gukasyan commented that he “hoped [the recent elections] would bring closer the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s international recognition and the development of democracy in the republic.”81 Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Azerbaijan attempted to link the worldwide anti–terrorism campaign explicitly to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Azerbaijani Defence Minister, Colonel General S. Abiyev, said that the world community should treat Armenian “terrorism” in the same way that it has tackled the problem of terrorism in Afghanistan: “the terrorist acts in the USA were denounced by the Azerbaijani people. Over the last ten years, Azerbaijan has been a target for aggression and numerous terrorist acts . . . in particular, aggressive separatism, which is a variety of international terrorism [. . .]

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The resolve displayed in fighting against terrorism in Afghanistan should also be shown against Armenian terrorists.”82 Azerbaijan officials have stated openly that “humanitarian” or “anti-terrorist” military activity should be considered a legitimate response to such activity and threats to their state.83 He also said that Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territory were not just a base for terrorist training camps, but also a place used for the trafficking and cultivation of drugs. In this way, Azerbaijan tried to use the new language of the global war on terror to discredit the language of democracy and human rights from the Armenians and Nagorno-Karabakh. In response, the Armenians accuse Azerbaijan of preying on fears of international terrorism to block progress on their territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh: “We are concerned about the exploitation by our adversaries, especially Azerbaijan, of the terrorism issue and trying to put the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in that context [. . .] in the hope of gaining the sympathy of the international community.”84 Noting that Azerbaijan never refers to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh in its statements, the Armenians told the OSCE, We would suggest that this is both cause and symptom of the difficulties that this process of peace making is going to encounter. Not recognizing that there are in fact in Nagorno Karabagh a people that have over the years tried to express their own needs and aspirations, and to exercise their own rights, by making abstraction of them or, in fact, ignoring their very reality and to conveniently reduce the conflict simply to a conflict of two states, is symptomatic of the difficulty that our neighbor will have to encounter in the long term solution to this problem . . . if there is going to be some solution realism would require that at least in public statements the leadership of Azebaijan would give some indication that they are aware of the legitimacy of this people and their rights and their needs for security.85

The international response throughout this time (1998–2003) continued to offer tacit and limited support for the Karabakh Armenians’ self-determination claim. During 1998–99, the parties held no direct talks, but the OSCE’s Minsk Group continued to press for a more permanent peace agreement to replace the tenuous ceasefire. Not willing to give up on either Azerbaijan’s sovereignty or the rights of the Karabakh people, the Minsk cochairs have argued that a definitive settlement must include “permitting Nagorno-Karabakh to benefit

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from a status entailing the highest degree of self-rule in accordance with OSCE norms and principles.”86 Nagorno-Karabakh’s continued efforts at democratization assist their arguments for self-rule. Though the central government is the only election authority recognized by the international community, one Western diplomat highlighted that somewhat democratic elections in such regions can be a basis for the OSCE to push for an autonomous, self-governing unit within the sovereign state.87 In 1999, the OSCE floated the idea of merging NagornoKarabakh and Azerbaijan into a “common state,” but this was rejected by Azerbaijan. Armenians view the common state proposal as an effort to balance territorial integrity and self-determination, whereas the Azeris dismiss the common state proposal as a contradiction of the spirit of OSCE principles and summits88 —particularly the preservation of existing sovereign states. One OSCE official argued that proposals offering Nagorno-Karabakh status as a state within a state or suggesting a so–called common state are all fundamentally offering independence in the long run; one should be wary that such solutions run the risk of stirring up minorities everywhere, the official argued.89 Neither territorial integrity nor self-determination is an absolute under the OSCE approach to security, which balances human rights and sovereign rights of states. After a series of direct talks between the Armenian and Azerbaijani heads of state that culminated in meetings held in Key West on April 3–7, 2001, the parties reached agreement on a majority of the issues according to some analysts. This plan reportedly included a modified land swap, in which Azerbaijan would receive a land corridor to the enclave of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh would be transferred to Armenian sovereignty.90 One negotiator present hailed the resulting agreement as a “new comprehensive proposal,” but it failed to elicit a formal resolution due to resistance at home.91 After Key West, Armenia and Azerbaijan continued presidential headto-head talks, with Armenia representing Nagorno-Karabakh’s interests through Armenian President Kocharian, formerly President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Rather than the center taking over negotiations for the periphery, it seemed that the periphery was setting the agenda at the center. Underlying the various proposals, IGOs have offered broad support for the linkage between traditional security concerns and human rights issues. In 2002, a trilateral meeting of the UN, OSCE, and EU voiced

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these organizations’ determination to promote regional cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in order to facilitate the resolution of frozen conflicts. Participants also voiced their intention to step up efforts in the South Caucasus for further democratization of the countries of the region.92 The EU has also approached the region and its frozen conflicts with incentives for a combination of regional cooperation and an improved stance on human rights.93 Similarly, the Council of Europe established reform requirements in this vein when considering the possible admission of Azerbaijan and Armenia, noting that Azerbaijan will have to take care of election irregularities highlighted by a monitoring mission.94 As in Kosovo, the international community has continued to insist that the claimant group may exercise its rights to self-governance, but that those increased rights must be coupled with adherence to standards of democratic governance. In 2001 statements, Azeri President Heydar Aliyev stressed that Nagorno-Karabakh will be afforded “the highest degree of self-rule within the framework of the Azerbaijan territory and in an absolute conformity with the international norms and principles.”95 But at other times, the Azerbaijani government has expressed dissatisfaction that the Minsk Group proposals are in favor of independence or a status close to complete independence.96 One government official lamented that Azerbaijan sees the conflict “as an act of aggression, but the world sees it as a violation of individual rights.”97 Also, he notes that “we are losing this historical moment because the international community regards this as a question of human rights.” In contrast, Armenia has expressed some resentment at preconditions on exercising the peoples’ right of self-determination by negotiating a final status rather than letting the people of Nagorno-Karabakh alone decide.98 As the democratic capacity of the Karabakh Armenians improved with more frequent and more positively assessed elections, so too did the Minsk Group proposals trend more in their favor. Despite Azerbaijan’s attempts to paint it differently and insist on a narrow focus on borders, the international community included human rights and democratic progress in its discussion of the Nagorno-Karabakh self-determination claim. In 2001, the Armenian delegation to the OSCE denounced the sustained intransigence of the Azeris: “Had the Republic of Azerbaijan recognized and allowed the legally provided constitutional means whereby the population of Karabagh would have had the right, the

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recognized right by Azerbaijan to exercise its options and choose its self determination legitimately which it did, but whose legitimacy Azerbaijan refuses to recognize, we would not be having this debate.”99 Rather than a clear choice between sovereignty and self-determination, or between law and politics, the international response balanced the non-state actors’ human rights with the central government’s sovereign right to territory.

Prague Process and Constitutional Referendum: 2003–08 As Nagorno-Karabakh moved into its third decade of de facto separation (2003–08), it inched closer to solidifying its democratic credentials. It continued to hold elections, including the 2007 presidential elections that brought Bako Sahakyan to power, and drafted a constitution in 2006. The constitution passed in a national referendum on December 11, 2006. In praising the constitutional process, Armenian President Kocharian noted that the referendum, held in accordance with the highest norms of democracy, laid another stone in the foundation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s statehood. Since the first day of proclaiming independence, the Nagorno-Karabakh republic has walked through the path of democracy. This has been repeatedly confirmed by free and fair elections. The constitutional referendum not only continued the tradition of expressing will freely but also gave an opportunity to entrench democratic rules in the constitution of the country.100

Also in 2006, Nagorno-Karabakh officials decided to break from its loose association with other South Caucasus separatist regions. The Karabakh Armenians saw themselves as more democratic than the other breakaway republics and believed that distancing themselves from the others burnishes their international image and reputation. While they consider other conflicts to be the result of geopolitical forces and Moscow’s interests, they saw their own quest for self-determination based on the rights of the Karabakh people and more democratic than the others’.101 On occasion of Nagorno-Karabakh’s fifteenth anniversary, Karabakh President Arkady Gukasyan compared the success of the enclave’s democratic experiment with the vanguard of regional democratization: “The Nagorno-Karabakh people’s fight for independence is

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at the same time a fight for establishing democratic norms both inside our own state and in the whole region. Azerbaijan’s bellicose statements calling for a military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be explained by the lack of democracy in Azerbaijan.”102 With the death of Azerbaijan’s President Heydar Aliyev in 2003, Nagorno-Karabakh’s image also improved in comparison to developments in the de jure central government after 2003. Ilham Aliyev’s election to succeed his father as President in October, 2003, was widely deemed fraudulent by international observers.103 With a subsequent uncontested election in 2008 reelecting the younger Aliyev, Azerbaijan has been dubbed a “soft sultanate” in which power is passed from father to son, according to one independent Russian analyst.104 Azeri elections became increasingly corrupt as the country was flooded with oil revenue. Ceasefire violations and military budgets increased in potential preparation for a return to hostilities. As the conflict simmers, the younger generation in Azerbaijan fueled by anti–Armenian rhetoric in the media may favor a war of reconquest against Armenia.105 In public statements throughout this time, Aliyev threatened to return to the use of force and public support for the military option increased. Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008, Aliyev warned that he was buying weapons for a possible return to arms, and averred in 2007 that his country was capable of resolving the issues by military means.106 Symptomatic of their resistance to true compromise, in 2005 Aliyev claimed a “readiness to grant highest degree of autonomy that exists in the world,” but provided no details on what that would entail beyond vague references to Tatarstan.107 Azerbaijan adamantly opposed any compromise on unification (in other words, transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia) since Ilham Aliyev came to power. In comparison to Azerbaijan’s perceived recalcitrance, the democratic capacity of the Karabakh Armenians seemed even stronger. The international response fed upon the ostensibly increasing democratic capacity of Nagorno-Karabakh as the international community continued to press for a compromise solution that specified and guaranteed some form of self-government for Nagorno-Karabakh. An agreement without such guarantees might leave the enclave at the mercy of being reabsorbed into Azerbaijan and subject again to discrimination or assimilation. In muted contrast to the earlier UN Security Council resolutions condemning Armenia as the aggressor in the conflict, a 2005 UN General Assembly resolution condemning the occupation of

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Azeri territory failed to pass. Despite Azerbaijan’s continued insistence that its sovereignty over the region be fully restored, the Minsk Group proposals solidified around the central concept of maximal status for Nagorno-Karabakh coupled with withdrawal of Karabakh forces from five of the seven occupied regions.108 For its part, Nagorno-Karabakh has expressed willingness to discuss a horizontal solution, such as a variation of the confederation or common state setup, but not subordination to Azerbaijan.109 Another series of face-to-face talks took place in 2004, this time with the foreign ministers at the helm. These discussions moved away from the elusive comprehensive agreement to focus on a more incremental approach emphasizing the underlying principles of any agreement as a first step. The result of the so–called Prague Process—including 11 meetings between the foreign ministers—was an agreement by President Aliyev (Azerbaijan) and President Kocharian (Armenia) on a set of fair, balanced, and workable core principles upon which to build a settlement agreement. By 2007, they had agreed to seven of nine Basic Principles the cochairs put forth as the basis of any settlement. Those principles include redeployment of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, demilitarization of those areas, special accommodation for the corridor between Armenia and the disputed territory, return of refugees, and a referendum or popular vote on final status.110 These working principles thus balance traditional attention to Azerbaijan’s state sovereignty with a democratic process to capture the voice of a substate population. Like in Kosovo, agreement on principles has decoupled the determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s exact status from other security and confidence–building measures. Moving forward, there may be no substitute for time and the persistent efforts of the OSCE to give the parties—states and non-state actors— the opportunity and political space to find the right compromise to effect a solution. As one OSCE official commented, “You can try to put frozen conflicts in the microwave sometimes, but it doesn’t work.”111 This period marked continued progress for the Karabakh Armenians’ democratic capacity and continued support for a solution that recognizes some form of self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh. In hopeful preparation for an eventual agreement, the international community also promises tangible security and economic guarantees. The mandate of the High Level Planning Group, as a component of the Minsk process at the OSCE, is to prepare for an OSCE peacekeeping operation to

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deploy in the event of a settlement. The European Union has frequently expressed willingness to support a resolution with money for regional economic development while other Western officials have outlined a concrete plan for a large aid package for Nagorno-Karabakh.112 One can conceive of a virtuous cycle whereby establishing the rule of law invites foreign direct investment, which increases the revenue of the state, and which fosters satisfaction among the people and evaporates separatist grievances.113 Ultimately, however, international pressure and incentives cannot force the parties to agree. In the words of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, “Peace would be a great prize for everyone in the region, but to win that prize requires the courage of leaders to make painful compromises and the maturity of the population as a whole to accept them.”114

Conclusion How has Nagorno-Karabakh’s democratic capacity fluctuated over time, and has this made a difference in the international response to their self-determination claim? There is some evidence that the group does at times adhere to democratic norms in governance—they are generally representative and devoted to peaceful means of conflict resolution, though their conduct is somewhat inconsistent and has lapsed deeply into intolerance on occasion. The international community continues to respect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and cannot impose a settlement on the parties, but it has strongly voiced its position that the key to future regional security lies in the protection of human rights and increased self-government for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Unlike the predictions of other alternative explanations, which tend to focus on preserving Azerbaijani territorial integrity, the Minsk Group places the situation in the context of security based on human rights and democratic governance. Understanding how geopolitical and legal principles of security are balanced with international norms offers a more complete explanation for the international response to the Karabakh Armenians’ claim. Realist and Legalist approaches do not account for this comprehensive understanding of security and its effects on the international response to Nagorno-Karabakh. Both are primarily state centric,

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focusing on the territorial integrity of existing states over issues of legitimate governance. A Realist perspective highlights the importance of great power strategic interests in Azerbaijani oil reserves and would predict the international community to reflect those interests, ultimately supporting the Azerbaijani side in negotiations without international interference in domestic affairs. But this approach ignores the emphasis on democratization and human rights as the foundation of regional security in the OSCE’s efforts. Likewise, a Legalist approach would concentrate on Armenian aggression rather than on a claim that does not fit the classic colonial definition of self-determination. But this emphasis misses the centrality of international norms and the rights of substate actors in determining the scope of the international response to the case—the application of emerging law as well as established legal principles for self-determination. By combining geopolitical concerns and legal principles with international norms of human rights and democracy, my model provides a more complete explanation of the international response to NagornoKarabakh. The international community places democratic governance, defined in reference to human rights and democratic values, as the cornerstone of security in their approach. The efforts of the OSCE’s Minsk Group exemplify the understanding that security is fundamentally a matter of balancing different dimensions of security—geopolitical and legal factors with international norms. The cochairs have stated that they represent the political will of all OSCE participating states to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and promote all measures, including those of a humanitarian nature, designed to facilitate normalization and the prompt restoration of international legitimacy to the area. This is an important effort, which the CSCE has undertaken under its own responsibility, fully aware of the need to translate in terms of real life and the development of peaceful societies, the principles and commitments undertaken by the new Europe, united by the values of democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, and fundamental freedoms.115

The international community thus incorporates multiple principles of security—including democratic governance as well as geopolitical and legal factors—in an effort to bring lasting security to this disputed region.

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International Empowerment

Extensive 2003–08: Face-to-face talks; focus on core principles 1998–2003: Election response, highest degree of self-rule, common state

Limited

1994–97: Broad autonomy within Azerbaijan 1988–92: NK as ‘interested party’

Conditional

Sanction

1992–94: Active conflict; denunciation of NK violence

Intolerant

Somewhat Intolerant

Somewhat Democratic

Democratic

Democratic Capacity

Figure 4.1 Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment: NagornoKarabakh.

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Chapter 5 Western Sahara: Deserted Standards?

“What other solution could be more just, more legitimate, more democratic and more acceptable than the one that respects the will of the population . . . ?”1

As one of the last unresolved self-determination cases originating during decolonization, Western Sahara has been on the international agenda for decades. Yet, despite over forty years of international pressure, mediation, peacekeeping, and attempts to conduct a referendum, the issue remains unresolved. Does the approach detailed in chapter 2 apply to the international community’s engagement in Western Sahara? This chapter explains the international response to the Western Sahara case in the post–Cold War period in part as a function of the democratic capacity of the Sahrawis, or native Western Saharans. Despite obvious great power material interests in supporting Morocco, the international community has responded to the Sahrawis’ efforts at democratic rule with varying levels of empowerment, applying international pressure on Morocco for better treatment of the Sahrawi people while encouraging the Sahrawis’ functioning democratic processes. Other approaches offer only incomplete explanations of the international response. The Realist view of the Western Sahara dispute, emphasizing support for Morocco from powerful allies such as the United States and France, correctly predicts Morocco’s success in delaying and redefining the referendum process. But this approach falters in explaining how ideological support for the native Western Saharans and attention to legal and humanitarian issues in US domestic debates set parameters for geopolitical developments. Small states and non-state actors kept the issue active within a broad legal framework while even

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powerful states paid attention to human rights and democratic norms. From a Legalist perspective, the law of self-determination, as formulated during decolonization and specifically applied to Western Sahara, would allow the peoples of the territory to hold a referendum on selfdetermination that would likely grant independence to Western Sahara. Some consider the shift in emphasis to autonomy solutions instead of a “winner-take-all” referendum to be an abandonment of the legal framework and, ultimately, of self-determination altogether. Despite strong great power interests in supporting Morocco and a clear legal case for holding a referendum that would allow for Western Sahara’s independence, this chapter will explain how the international community has followed a middle path between material interests and adherence to international legal precepts. The international community, acting primarily through the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), has infused its response with an emphasis on democratic governance. They have chastised the Moroccans for their treatment of the Sahrawis and for their non-engagement with the settlement process while forging ahead with preparations for a referendum or another form of self-government for Western Sahara. In its proposals, the international community has applied a wider definition of self-determination, focusing on granting rights and giving people more voice in governance without endorsing changes in borders. They have tried to offer solutions based on how the territory and its people are governed, rather than predetermining a particular outcome. The proper perspective on this case is thus not to decide whether politics trumped law or vice versa, but rather to see how they operate together to lay the foundation for democratic governance according to international standards. This interaction provides for an international response within the rubric of international human rights and democratic values.

Background Western Sahara was a Spanish colony from 1884 to 1975. Facing potential largescale instability with the impending death of Francisco Franco, Spain decided to extricate itself from the Maghreb region in 1975. At the urging of the United States—also concerned about a possible power vacuum in Spain as well as the stability of the Moroccan

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regime—Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania met secretly to arrange for “a transition in a peaceful and mutually satisfactory fashion” of Western Sahara.2 The result of these negotiations was the Tripartite (or Madrid) Accords, signed in November 1975, which transferred authority from Spain to Morocco (the northern two-thirds of Western Sahara) and to Mauritania (the southern one-third).3 As Spain withdrew in early 1976, Western Sahara’s neighbors sent armies of occupation to their respective portions and as much as one-half the Sahrawi population fled to Algeria.4 The Polisario Front, a Sahrawi resistance movement to Spanish rule formed in 1973, protested the Madrid Accords and the denial of their right to self-determination. Upon Spain’s withdrawal, the Polisario Front immediately proclaimed an independent Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on February 16, 1976, and began armed resistance to the Mauritanian and Moroccan invasions. Mauritania withdrew in 1979 following a series of domestic upheavals, granting their portion of the territory to the Polisario Front. Morocco quickly took over the Mauritanian zone. Meanwhile, the Polisario Front received support from Algeria and Libya—the former interested both in countering Moroccan expansion and also in identifying the Polisario Front’s struggle for self-determination with their own—which proved key to the Polisario Front’s military victories in the early 1980s. At one time, the Polisario Front had effective control over three quarters of Western Sahara.5 They continued to insist on the Sahrawis’ right to self-determination, lobbying for support among members of the Organization of African Unity. Based on the findings of the Wise Men’s Committee—an ad hoc group of African leaders formed to investigate the Western Sahara dispute for the OAU—the organization sponsored a resolution at its meeting in July 1979 calling for a ceasefire and an internationally supervised referendum. In 1981, a Libyan-Moroccan reconciliation prompted King Hassan of Morocco to accept the idea of a “controlled referendum” and a peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. With the participation and support of Morocco, the OAU adopted a resolution establishing an implementation committee for a referendum, recommending a ceasefire, and requesting a UN peacekeeping force during the organization and holding of the referendum. In a 1982 show of support for the Polisario Front, the OAU Council of Ministers decided to seat a delegation from the SADR, precipitating a 19-member walkout and threatening the stability of the organization. The following year, Morocco

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and the Polisario Front were officially named by the OAU as parties to the conflict and urged to hold direct talks leading toward a ceasefire and referendum under UN and OAU auspices.6 The UN followed the OAU’s lead, passing resolutions beginning in 1985 that endorsed the OAU approach: direct negotiations, ceasefire, and a referendum under UN supervision. Increased international pressure and conducive political conditions led to the August 1988 Settlement Proposals, in which both parties agreed separately to a UN–sponsored ceasefire and a referendum using the 1974 Spanish census that had identified just under 74,000 Sahrawis as a basis for voter eligibility. The Security Council responded to this progress with a series of resolutions and requests for detailed plans from Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, culminating in the establishment of MINURSO on April 29, 1991. The two main prongs of MINURSO’s mandate were to monitor the ceasefire and conduct a referendum.7 The ceasefire was slated to begin September 6, 1991, with the referendum to be held the following January. The referendum has not yet been held,8 but the ceasefire has been in place since 1991 with only intermittent and relatively minor violations. Beginning in 1997, the UN revitalized efforts to resolve the issue. Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed James A. Baker III, former US Secretary of State, as Special Representative, clearing the path for the September 1997 Houston Accords—an agreement on the last contentious voter eligibility criteria.9 This allowed MINURSO’s Identification Commission to complete the identification process by December 30, 1999, having interviewed almost 200,000 potential voters and producing a list of over 86,000 eligible voters. The commission then began examining approximately 134,000 appeals.10 However, Baker resigned in 2004, after the parties’ recalcitrance stymied the proposals he submitted to the Security Council. The UN continues to play a central role in mediating a final settlement, acting through Special Envoys to float proposals that attempt to balance Morocco’s desire for sovereignty with the Polisario Front’s insistence on a referendum.

Alternative Explanations: Realist and Legalist How can we explain the international response to the Western Sahara case? This chapter demonstrates that the international response is in

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part a function of the claimant group’s capacity for democratic rule. Other explanations for the international response to the Western Sahara claim, including a Realist approach and a Legalist approach, tell only part of the story. A Realist explanation based primarily on geopolitical factors identifies the importance of US and French interests in supporting Morocco, but consequently would predict the issue to have been resolved in Morocco’s favor. Realism falters in explaining how both a legal framework and attention to human rights set parameters for geopolitical developments. A Legalist perspective highlights the effect a clear legal case for a referendum has had on the course of events for Western Sahara, despite opposition from strong great power geopolitical interests. Legalism rightly points to the strength of the underlying legal values, but fails to explain the emphasis in proposals on regime type and the behavior of non-state actors.

Realist Explanation A Realist explanation focuses primarily on outside geopolitical interests in Western Sahara throughout the dispute, especially as they relate to the local and regional balance of power. The regional dynamics have been dominated by a standoff between Morocco and Algeria in their quest for regional supremacy. At the global level, the Moroccan-Algerian feud simmered in the shadow of the Cold War, with the United States as a solid ally of Morocco and the Soviet Union supporting Algeria. In these contexts, the Western Sahara saga could be interpreted as simply a minor piece of wider power struggles. A closer examination is in order to understand why neither the ebbing of the Cold War nor the more recent rapprochement and attempts at regional cooperation between Morocco and Algeria have provided enough impetus to resolve the claim. Throughout the conflict, third party states have sought to balance Moroccan and Algerian interests so as not to unwittingly upset the regional balance of power. As the former colonial power, Spain had economic interests with both states, torn between the need for Algerian hydrocarbons and the desire to stop the Polisario Front’s raids on Spanish fishing vessels on the one hand and the necessity of protecting the Canary Islands fishing grounds near the Moroccan coast on the other.11 The primary international influences, however, have come from France and the United States, both supporting Morocco. France’s

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overriding concerns were in preserving its sphere of influence in the region—protecting the independence of Mauritania and the security of 40,000 French citizens living in Morocco—without an independent Sahrawi state in the middle.12 To this end, France not only provided reconnaissance and attack planes to support Mauritania’s fight against the Polisario Front but also became Morocco’s leading military supplier by 1978. The balancing act of the United States was somewhat more complicated. During the Cold War, the Western Sahara case had implications for its global struggle against the Soviet Union as well as for its need for strategic allies on Middle East issues. On one side, the United States did not want to alienate Algeria and other Third World nations or push the Polisario Front to seek support from Algeria’s Soviet patron, which remained neutral and distant from the conflict in its early years. However, US interests in Moroccan domestic and regional standing fostered a policy of official neutrality while selling arms and offering other aid to Morocco. The United States appeared committed to selfdetermination ideals, but also bestowed upon Morocco 20 percent of all US aid to Africa from 1975 to 2005.13 On the domestic front, the United States feared the collapse of King Hassan’s regime—which most analysts suggested was probable if the king were to lose Western Sahara—and, later, the political vacuum that could follow the downfall of his son and successor, Mohammed VI. These fears were intensified after the toppling of the Shah of Iran in February 1979.14 On the surface, the the Polisario Front’s struggle for self-determination was deemed secondary to the immediate American interest in stabilizing the Moroccan king’s regime and preserving a moderate Arab ally for its Middle East policies. In response to political change and necessity, states’ initial positions in the case transformed into tacit support for the referendum. French and Spanish attention to prestige issues changed their approach to the region. Spain realized that its past actions and the resulting case of incomplete decolonization could tarnish its imperial image and postcolonial national identity.15 A French-Algerian rapprochement in 1978, spurred in part by negative domestic reactions to French intervention in the conflict, precipitated a redirection of French policy from neocolonial and decidedly anti-Polisario to passively supporting a referendum, as France hoped to preserve a positive image in the Third World.16 Also

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worried by the 1988 Algerian riots, France pressed for a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict.17 Meanwhile, with the waning of the Cold War, the United States reoriented its interests toward regional security instead of a potential proxy battleground. Realizing the increasing unlikelihood of a military solution, the United States also began to see Algeria as less radical and, therefore, the possibility of a Polisario Front victory as less threatening. In this new context, Algeria was also seen as a counterweight to the conservative regime in Morocco.18 The United States now saw a Western Sahara resolution on the basis of the UNOAU plan as the best hope for regional stability and began treating both sides more evenhandedly.19 The possibility of new economic benefits not only provided incentives for the parties to the conflict to seek a solution, but also opened the possibility of a rich new ground for Western investment in an integrated regional economy. Algeria and Morocco, both suffering debilitating effects from the war, began discussing the possibility of a Maghrebi economic union (to include Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia), which led to a reduction in tensions between the two states.20 As one senior official told King Hassan, “in view of the international situation and our domestic problems, our only chance of survival is to create a Maghrebi union very soon. Unity is our only future.”21 King Hassan also wanted to return Morocco to the OAU, which Morocco had left in 1984 in protest of the organization’s recognition of the SADR, and saw agreement on the OAU plan as a way to appease other member governments. More recently, US security strategy has focused on building regional unity as a key to stability and prosperity for North Africa, encouraging American investments in the region through the Eizenstat Initiative.22 But such material factors alone cannot explain the persistence of a legal framework without great power support and the influence of democratic values in the formation of state interests. States reoriented their policies toward the focal point of the referendum solution as their perceptions of regional interests evolved. Realism can explain shifting interests, but falls short in linking underlying legal precepts and values to constraints on state action. In reconciling with Algeria, Morocco conceded to Algeria’s unwavering commitment to the self-determination principles at stake. Algerian President Benjedid asserted that “it was clear from the beginning that Algeria could never be expected to abandon

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its basic principles in defence of just issues and the rights of nations to self-determination. This is not possible as far as we are concerned, and our Moroccan brothers know this also.”23 In the United States, domestic opponents of Moroccan aid warned of the detrimental effect such support would have on principles that America had previously championed: human rights, indigenous peoples’ rights to land and resources, and self-determination. Stephen Solarz, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Africa, argued against arms sales to Morocco in 1979 by describing such a policy as “a fundamental contradiction of the principles on which our country was founded, as well as our commitment to human rights, if we were to assist in the suppression of a genuinely indigenous and internationally recognized effort to achieve self-determination, particularly in the absence of any compelling strategic considerations to the contrary.”24 Kofi Annan’s selection of James Baker as Special Envoy added the clout of an American statesman and provided tacit pressure on Morocco to honor its commitments. But a prominent American at the helm also offered a signal to the Polisario Front and its supporters that the United States was still willing to stand behind a multilateral solution under UN auspices—complete with its commitment to the referendum solution that the Polisario Front held dear.

Legalist Explanation A Legalist explanation would focus on established international law and precedent as the primary influence on unfolding events—in this case, the law of self-determination as formulated during decolonization and specifically applied to Western Sahara. A series of General Assembly resolutions, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and state practice in pressing the implementation of these prescriptions establish a clear legal case for Western Sahara within the countenance of the international law of self-determination for colonial peoples. The legal position as articulated in the above instruments would allow the people of the territory to hold a referendum on self-determination.25 In 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the first of many resolutions that specifically called on Spain to negotiate with Morocco and Mauritania in order to implement the Sahrawis’ right to selfdetermination. The following year, the UNGA passed a resolution

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encouraging Spain to settle the self-determination question through a referendum process. Similar resolutions passed almost each subsequent year through 1973. In 1972, UNGA Resolution 2983 explicitly mentioned independence as an option for Western Sahara. In response to the Madrid Accords, the UN General Assembly passed Resolutions 3458(A) and 3458(B). The first reiterated the call in previous resolutions for a referendum in Western Sahara while the second took note of the accords without endorsing them. Since the parameters of self-determination rejected the transfer of title without consulting the people of the territory in question, Spain did not legally transfer sovereignty but retained the right to sovereignty until the Sahrawis exercise their right to selfdetermination—what one analyst called more of a de-administration than decolonization.26 Morocco and Mauritania urged the General Assembly to request an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on whether Morocco or Mauritania had legal title to the territory of Western Sahara that could override the Sahrawis’ right to selfdetermination. In 1975, the court found that legal ties existed between some Western Saharan tribes and Morocco and Mauritania; however, these ties did not constitute territorial sovereignty for all peoples and therefore could not infringe upon the exercise of self-determination. The prevailing legal interpretation was that Western Sahara was a former colony awaiting a referendum on self-determination that would likely result in independence for the territory. The legal framework of the case affected how parties to the conflict appealed to the international community. Mauritania and Morocco initially fit their arguments within the parameters of legal reasoning: both believed to some degree that a referendum was unnecessary—Western Sahara would vote to be annexed by Mauritania or Morocco.27 In refusing to recognize the Sahrawis and the SADR as anything other than Moroccan subjects throughout the conflict, Morocco reiterated its own interpretation of the ICJ advisory opinion: that decolonization in this instance meant a restoration of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. One argument for Morocco’s divergent view is that the ICJ attempted to apply twentieth century, Western legal reasoning to governance and allegiance ties rooted in a precolonial, non–Western society.28 Trying a different tack, in 1976 the king insisted that Western Sahara had already exercised its right to self-determination when a meeting of the Jemaa (a territorial assembly of tribal elders) voted unanimously to reintegrate with Morocco.29

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Morocco also pointed to Sahrawi participation in Moroccan and Mauritanian elections in 1976–7730 and UNGA Resolution 3458(B), which took note of the Madrid Accords despite the call for a referendum in its companion resolution, UNGA Resolution 3458(A).31 Framing their struggle within the context of African decolonization provided the Polisario Front with a solid base of legal precedent. Indeed, the OAU’s involvement stemmed from its concern with decolonization of the African continent (as per its charter) and its concern with the principle of uti possidetis.32 While its actions indirectly aided the Moroccan occupation, the United States also framed its policies in deference to legal parameters. The official US neutrality policy accepted the administration but not the sovereignty of Morocco over Western Sahara.33 Thus, the United States could claim not to be supporting an illegitimate transfer of title to territory. This issue reappeared in the domestic debates over arms sales to Morocco when it was noted that the sales would necessitate the reformulation of a 1960 US-Morocco military agreement, which forbade the use of US weapons outside internationally recognized boundaries.34 Since the United States acknowledged the administration but not the sovereignty of Morocco over Western Sahara, use of weapons against the Polisario Front would constitute a violation of the agreement. In 2004, US Trade Representative Zoellik specified that trade and investment agreements concerning Morocco did not apply to the Western Sahara territory.35 Thus, enough international pressure existed to preserve the legal context of the Western Sahara case as an unresolved selfdetermination issue awaiting a referendum, despite the geopolitical interests involved. The legal case for a referendum has not changed, yet changes in the proposals for settlement that move away from the original referendum solution appear to be a defeat for Legalism. Both Javier Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali were likely influenced by their personal interests in favor of Morocco and displayed some partiality toward Morocco in their actions. When Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar agreed to modified voter eligibility rules in 1991, Special Representative Johannes Manz resigned in protest, stating that Moroccan actions constituted “a breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Peace Plan.”36 The former Secretary-General’s memoirs contained the following admission: “I was never convinced that independence promised the best future for the inhabitants of Western Sahara.”37 Reflecting on Boutros

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Boutros-Ghali’s tenure as Secretary-General, one Polisario representative described the period as “a nightmare” for their cause, claiming that the Secretary-General was decidedly in the hands of Morocco.38 Similarly, one scholar asserts that Boutros-Ghali “acted in such a way as to be interpreted by many as an attempt to align the UN position with Morocco.”39 In October 1995, Boutros-Ghali argued before the Security Council that the voter identification process was a means to foster dialogue and was never intended to be completed. This, of course, was tantamount to the Moroccan position: the referendum would not be legitimate unless it confirmed the Moroccan takeover of Western Sahara.40 Many observers have noted that Morocco was willing to go through the motions of a vote, but never agreed to hold a referendum that it might actually lose. The involvement of James Baker at first appeared to signal that the international community would finally resolve the issue with the legally-mandated referendum. Under Baker’s supervision, the identification process was completed, laying the groundwork for the referendum itself. But officials at the UN note that Baker’s role was to negotiate a resolution, even if that meant offering alternatives to the Settlement Proposals upon which the referendum is based. The so–called third way was discussed as early as 1997 as a possibility of breaking the impasse between the two sides’ hardened positions. Beginning in 2001, Baker— with the support of Secretary-General Annan as well as the implicit backing of the Security Council—presented a Draft Framework Agreement to the parties that was based on a new approach. This plan called for Western Sahara to be given autonomous status within Morocco for a period of five years, at which point the inhabitants would hold a referendum to approve or reject continued autonomy. The Polisario Front and its backers contended that the plan amounted to an abandonment of self-determination, since it moved away from the referendum solution as originally conceived under international law. Indeed, precedent shows that the General Assembly’s approach to self-determination was to offer sovereignty gained through independence or sovereignty surrendered through integration, but holds no place for earned or shared sovereignty.41 But upon considering the proposal, the Security Council adopted a resolution describing the plan as providing “for a substantial devolution of authority, which does not foreclose self-determination, and which indeed provides for it.”42 The international community now appears to cast a wider net in defining self-determination, focusing on

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political compromise, granting rights and giving people more voice in governance without endorsing changes in borders. A strict focus on the law of self-determination, which stipulates that a referendum on independence be held in Western Sahara, cannot account for this interpretation and such a seemingly radical departure from the referendum solution.

Democratic Governance Explanation The democratic governance model in chapter 2 is offered here as a more complete explanation than either Realism or Legalism alone. Realism misses the role of democratic values in the formation of great power interests and lacks an account for the influence of smaller states. Likewise, Legalism ignores the links between self-determination and underlying values of human rights and democracy and instead concentrates on the specific referendum mechanism specified in the legal history of the case. Neither provides a complete explanation for the emphasis on democratic governance and non-state actors inherent in the international response. In describing the predicted international response, this analysis focuses on the role of international norms undergirding self-determination and security in the post–Cold War era—democracy and human rights. These values shape the international response to the case, operating in conjunction with geopolitics and legal prescriptions. The next sections assess the Sahrawis’ adherence to international democratic governance standards, then links this variable to the international response to their self-determination claim. The analysis highlights how greater democratic capacity on the part of the Western Saharans has led to more extensive international empowerment.

Tracing the International Response Settlement Proposals: 1988–91 The August 1988 Settlement Proposals defined the parameters for discussing the Western Sahara claim for the next 20 years. In particular, the Polisario Front has held fast to the referendum promised in the

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agreement, denouncing attempts to stray from that goal or amend its reliance on the 1974 Spanish census. In preparation for governing an independent state, the Polisario Front has also established an effective system of governance over the estimated 90,000–160,000 Sahrawis in the refugee camps and beyond.43 The Polisario Front is not a traditional political party, but rather represents the vast majority of the Sahrawi population. In their chosen democratic form of governance (designed to prevent factions from forming and practiced universally in the Algerian refugee camps), there is much overlap between the Polisario Front and SADR; for example, the Executive Committee of the Polisario Front serves as the Executive Committee for SADR until independence, according to the SADR constitution.44 Eschewing ideology, the Polisario Front considers all Sahrawis except Moroccan collaborators to be members of the cause. Their commitment to independence is the bond which has effectively transcended tribal differences: “Historically speaking, independence and Islam are the only two themes that have consistently rung true for the tribesmen of the Western Sahara.”45 Their system of governance is based on participatory democracy. Every citizen is a member of a functional committee of 12 to 20 people; these operate by consensus, with a representative of each committee advancing to committees at higher levels. Mass meetings take place in the camps every one to two years, with an overwhelming majority participating in the governance structure of the Sahrawi people. This contrasts to most revolutionary movements that only control a minority of the population until the end of their struggle. One Polisario official highlighted the participatory nature of the structure: “Our goal is to develop the full cooperation of the people. We are required to encourage everyone to participate, give full adherence to the struggle and maintain morale. Yet we also must insure that the mass organizations be available for all people to participate. We must convince by means of consensus, not by imposing our will.”46 The leadership is also not technically a government-in-exile, as most government officials remain in Western Sahara. The decentralized nature of the structure fits with their stated goal of participatory democracy and a free market economy, as stated at the Eighth Congress in June 1991.47 Contrary to Moroccan counterclaims, the Polisario Front appears to exercise effective governance over the vast majority of the Sahrawi people.

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This participatory system and unified voice may have historical roots: the Sahrawis have almost never known domination from above, except during the colonial period, and have strong beliefs in personal empowerment and individual responsibility not often found in rigid class societies. Many who have studied the Polisario Front are impressed by the highly informed and politicized population and by the “noticeably homogeneous, collaborative and dedicated leadership. It suffered no serious factional splits; its unity was not sapped by divisive tribal or family loyalties, or by corruption.”48 Like many nationalist movements, the Polisario Front has glossed over potentially divisive issues and divulged little about kind of policies and programs it might implement post-independence.49 However, their strong sense of national identity resonates with the international community. And democracy as practiced in the camps offers a chance to demonstrate their capacity for post-independence governance, giving substance to the concept of citizenship to go along with their self-declared state, the SADR.50 To contrast these internal attempts at democratic rule, the Polisario Front claims that severe acts of repression—including imprisonment without trial, torture, and disappearances—occur in Moroccan– occupied territories. Amnesty International has documented many cases of Moroccan human rights abuses perpetrated against the Sahrawis and refugees in the camps tell stories of prisoners dropped from helicopters handcuffed and blindfolded or allegations of people being buried alive in mass graves.51 To the Sahrawis, the most obvious evidence of oppressive practices by the Moroccan government is their occupation of the vast majority of Western Saharan territory, discouraging most native Sahrawis from living there or participating in government decision-making. By 1987, Morocco had completed an earthen wall, or berm, that divided Western Sahara, leaving roughly 85–90 percent of the territory under Moroccan control and guarded by over 100,000 Moroccan soldiers.52 Morocco encouraged immigration from Morocco into its “southern province,” and about 100,000 settlers had moved into Western Sahara by 1991. The Sahrawi refugees from the occupied territory were joined by Sahrawis from Morocco, Mauritania, and western Algeria.53 Denied access to the mineral wealth and natural resources of their home territory, the Sahrawi people live as exiles and are dependent on outside aid for survival. In addition, Morocco has engaged in a policy of forcible “Moroccanization,” attempting to quell dissent by eliminating Sahrawis’ ethnic

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dress and cultural activities as well as suppressing their language.54 Indeed, one of the mainstays of Morocco’s approach to the Western Sahara issue is their claim that the territory and its people have always belonged to Morocco. For many years, King Hassan refused to engage in direct talks with the Polisario Front, recognizing Western Sahara and the Sahrawis only as “despoiled provinces,” “Moroccans who had gone astray,” “Algerian mercenaries,” or the Moroccan king’s “subjects.”55 Domestic politics and the instability of the Hassan regime were a large part of this ploy. King Hassan needed to garner support for his unstable regime by unifying widely disparate domestic political interests around a nationalist cause—the return of Morocco’s “lost provinces” in Western Sahara. When King Hassan finally agreed to direct talks, he did so on condition that the Polisario Front did not bring independence to negotiating table: “Our brothers still do not understand that Western Sahara is Moroccan and shall always be.”56 It wasn’t even until 1987 that Morocco acknowledged that their quarrel was with the Polisario Front and not agents of Algeria; this admission and the negotiations that ensued culminated in the 1988 Settlement Proposals. Citing the 1975 ICJ case that denied Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara, the Polisario Front has argued that Morocco cannot make the Sahrawi people disappear or turn them into Moroccans simply by waving a magic wand. Mohamed Abdelaziz, President of SADR and Secretary-General of the Polisario Front, stressed the persistence of the truth in combating Morocco’s attempts to define away an entire ethnic group: “The Moroccans said we didn’t exist, that we were an invention of President Boumedienne of Algeria. Boumedienne died in 1978, but we did not disappear. They said we were merely an extension of Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, but Gaddafi stopped supporting us and became an ally of Morocco. Our cause continued. They said we were an extension of international communism. International communism finished, but we remained.”57 In spite of Morocco’s documented mistreatment of the Sahrawis, the Polisario Front managed to build the foundations for democratic rule—a system that is highly participatory and representative. Despite Moroccan efforts to downgrade international–led engagement as discussions and not negotiations, the Polisario Front actively engaged with and supported the international efforts toward a referendum. Their intolerance toward Moroccans in the territory may be the one bleak spot on an otherwise high measure of democratic capacity, as

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Moroccan POWs were paraded through the camps prior to 1991. But in response to the Polisario Front’s underlying efforts at laying the foundation for democratic participation and engagement, the international community responded favorably. Early UN resolutions denounced Morocco’s efforts to flood the territory with Moroccans and demanded an end to Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara.58 Acting as representatives of the native Western Saharan population, the Polisario Front has stressed in its appeals to the international community a continued focus on the promised referendum and the wealth of international law supporting their claim. In the late 1980s, the Polisario Front mounted a lobbying effort in Europe, emphasizing its desire for self-determination and aimed at increasing outside pressure on Morocco.59 Through the years, the Polisario Front earned support from members of all Britain’s major political parties in both House of Commons and House of Lords.60 The Polisario Front’s lobbying had some success in American political opinion, especially in the US Congress, even though the State Department continued its generally pro–Morocco stance.61 Appealing to international law and democratic values thus garnered a widespread base of support for the Sahrawis, helping to keep the Western Sahara issue alive until the UN began to play a more direct role in implementing a resolution. The UN then moved steadfastly forward with plans to implement a referendum as described in the Settlement Proposals, resisting Moroccan efforts to hold a referendum merely to affirm the status quo. Thus, the Polisario Front’s high democratic capacity yielded extensive empowerment from the international community.

MINURSO and the Identification Process: 1991–99 In 1991, MINURSO hit the ground with a dual mandate—monitor the ceasefire and conduct a referendum. The ceasefire took effect immediately and on August 28, 1994, MINURSO’s Identification Commission began its mammoth task of identifying and registering eligible voters. The parties became deadlocked over identification issues one year later and the commission suspended work in June 1996. When Kofi Annan succeeded Boutros Boutros-Ghali as UN Secretary-General in 1997, he inherited a stalled identification process. He selected former US Secretary of State James Baker as the man tasked with getting things moving

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again. In September, 1997, Baker brokered the Houston Accords, which articulated five agreed criteria for voter identification to continue; the process resumed on December 3, 1997.62 In October 1998, SecretaryGeneral Annan engineered a solution for the last three highly contested tribal groupings, allowing the Identification Committee to complete the identification process in 2000. The identification process was fraught with problems stemming from the vastly divergent views of the parties as to the purpose of the referendum. The Polisario Front’s position was to adhere almost singlemindedly to the Spanish census as the basis for the referendum. They argued that Western Sahara had acquired a national identity within its colonial boundaries before Spain left, in addition to whatever other tribal affiliations existed beyond the territory and the colonial period. Thus, for the Polisario Front, the colonial people defined which Western Saharans had the right of self-determination. In contrast, Morocco argued that Western Sahara was only an artificial colonial construct on historical Moroccan soil. They insisted instead on ties of allegiance as the basis of identity, which would include in the referendum all Saharans with links to the territory.63 These positions hardly changed over the course of the conflict, leading to a series of impasses in the process of identification underscored by the lack of agreement over the basic self-determination claim. The issues of defining the self and negotiating an acceptable outcome were to be addressed in parallel to the technical identification process. Indeed, the head of the Identification Commission later said, “Although not made explicit, it was my impression, subsequently reinforced by word and in action, that I was not expected to succeed; meaningful action lay elsewhere.”64 As the Polisario Front saw the referendum as its hope for becoming an independent state, they not only cooperated more readily with MINURSO’s Identification Commission but also worked to prepare themselves for their desired post–referendum independent status. They took steps to improve their institutions of representative governance, seeing the existing structures as the foundation for the transition to independence. Reforms adopted in 1991 by the Eighth Polisario Congress included a new democratic constitution with guarantees for freedom of expression, association, and movement. The congress also called for multiparty democracy and a free–market economy.65 They established committees for health and education as well as food distribution to lay the groundwork for institutions in their future state. These reforms

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stemmed from an orientation toward the people as future citizens, whose needs must be met through longterm planning and institutions, instead of transitory refugees.66 The camps also changed as an influx of cash and the return of the soldiers altered the economic landscape of the SADR—increasing wealth distribution, but also diminishing somewhat the role of women, who were primarily excluded from the new economic sphere.67 Morocco claims that the Polisario leadership does not reflect the wishes of the majority of the Sahrawi population, who want to return to Morocco, and that the SADR government exercises little or no effective control over either the Sahrawi population or the Western Sahara territory. Indeed, Morocco insists that the Polisario Front is simply a liberation front and not a government.68 Former Moroccan Interior Minister Driss Basri tried to portray the Polisario Front as a poor candidate for continued or increased self-government based on their failure to include all those with tribal ties to Western Sahara in the referendum: “If a large part of the Saharan population is victim of discrimination in the perspective of the self-determination referendum in the Sahara, we cannot convince our citizens to continue in the process.” He continued, “we are pluralist by conviction and glorify freedom . . . We are not faced with the totalitarian vision of the single party incarnated, in a grotesque manner, by the Polisario.”69 Likewise, the Polisario Front denounced Moroccan nationals in Western Sahara as a “substitute population” that should not participate in the referendum.70 They had been adamant that only a bare minimum of members of these groups should be considered potential voters, but in November 1998 the Polisario Front surprisingly accepted the Secretary-General’s proposal, signaling their resolve to conclude the referendum process. Morocco’s general recalcitrance at engaging with the international community and its prescriptions for the territory were evidence that Morocco had never been sold on the idea of a referendum, especially one that they would have the remotest possibility of losing. Echoing the view of many analysts, William Durch wrote that “Morocco really only consented to host a successful referendum that would destroy the Polisario Front’s claim to political legitimacy, and for all practical purposes withdrew its consent when the outcome of the referendum could not be assured.”71 When the United Nations began preparing for the process of identifying voters, Morocco presented 120,000 additional names to

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be added to the census list, and in December 1991 Secretary-General de Cuellar devised a modified set of voter eligibility criteria favorable to Morocco.72 Many of those on the extended list were Moroccan citizens, some of whom had fled to Morocco before 1974 as well as those who had moved into Western Sahara as part of a Moroccan immigration plan. According to Morocco, many of these southern Moroccans are extraterritorial Sahrawis descended from those who fled the territory in a 1958 rebellion against Spain or have other ties to the former colony, but most observers saw the action as a blatant attempt to flood the referendum voter registry with pro–Moroccan voters. While the identification of voters continued in fits and starts, Morocco treated the United Nations’ efforts with disregard or outright disdain. In 1992, Morocco announced that its upcoming national elections would include voters in Western Sahara (mostly Moroccans, as the majority of the Sahrawi people were in the refugee camps in Algeria). The elections included a plebiscite on constitutional reform that named Western Sahara as a region of Morocco, indicating Morocco’s efforts to predetermine or undermine the outcome of the referendum. When the identification process began in 1994, Morocco denied OAU observers entry into the identification centers and tried to bar press coverage of the process.73 In addition, the Polisario Front complained of “pressure, provocation, and manipulations” aimed at creating a climate of ambiguity around the voter identification process.74 Besides attempting to flood both the census list and the territory with voters sympathetic to a Moroccan takeover, Morocco challenged the verification process that involved using Polisario– and Moroccan–approved tribal elders at each identification center. They also filtered who could enter voter application centers in areas under their control, and on at least one occasion Moroccan troops pointed guns at UN military observers and threatened to shoot if the United Nations kept patrolling certain areas.75 Despite an implicit pro–Moroccan bias in the leadership of the United Nations in the early 1990s, the United Nations also tried to protect the integrity of the referendum by constraining Morocco from hijacking the voter identification process. When the Secretary-General released revised eligibility criteria in December 1991, the Special Representative resigned in protest. Even Morocco’s staunch ally, the United States, denounced the new list as unacceptable. The Security Council, possibly believing that any modification to the 1988 criteria

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unduly favored Morocco, issued a resolution wherein they “approved” the efforts of the Secretary-General but only “welcomed” his final proposal.76 Commenting on Morocco’s attempt to limit freedom of movement within MINURSO’s area of control, one deputy chairman of MINURSO’s Identification Commission, Frank Ruddy, lamented that “the Moroccans continue to treat the UN identification facilities as their own.”77 Even if adherence to the spirit of the 1988 Settlement Proposal was seen only as a first step toward direct negotiations, this stance effectively empowered the Polisario Front by legitimating their claim. Refusing Morocco’s attempt to define away a separate non–Moroccan Western Saharan identity tacitly acknowledged the Sahrawis as a distinct people. Their successful internal democratic capacity building contrasted favorably with the conservative, combative Moroccan regime and bolstered their credibility as legitimate members of the negotiations. The United Nations pressed for indirect talks—implicitly supporting the Polisario Front by disallowing Morocco to unilaterally annex the territory without further discussions. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali later suggested that while he did not expect the referendum itself to be successful, he had hoped that the process would help push the two parties toward direct negotiations. In 1993, a first meeting between the parties was held on neutral territory at the UN headquarters in Layounne, but a second meeting had to be fancifully engineered so that the two groups were in one hotel ballroom but on opposite sides of a fountain. Morocco could claim not to be in direct talks and the Polisario Front (on the other side of the fountain) could claim not to be meeting in a room under the dominion of the Moroccan king, whose portrait hung on the wall on the Moroccan delegation’s side of the fountain.78 When the Moroccan delegation to the October 1993 talks consisted entirely of Sahrawi members of the Consultative Council on Saharan Affairs—whom the Polisario Front considered nothing more than Moroccan nationals or, at worst, defectors—the Moroccans justified the delegation’s composition by arguing that the issue was a matter for the people of the territory to negotiate amongst themselves. The strong implication was that Moroccan sovereignty was not at issue, and therefore the highest levels of Morocco’s government did not need to be involved. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright denounced this stance as provocative.79

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Kofi Annan’s ascension to Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1997 and his subsequent appointment of James Baker fed new energy into the negotiations. Baker’s involvement and the implicit backing of the United States raised hopes of a settlement, which many observers now believed would be based on some type of limited autonomy.80 Indeed, Annan’s threefold directive to Baker was to assess the chance that a referendum would be held, improve the chances of holding a referendum, and—if the first two remained hopeless—advise on alternatives. Annan’s first report on Western Sahara, in February 1997, was frank in its assessment: it asked the Security Council whether the settlement plan was feasible as it stood and, if not, what adjustments could be made that were acceptable to both parties. Failing such compromise on the existing plan, the report sought other ways for the international community to help resolve the conflict.81 Realizing the necessity of both parties’ political will in order to bring a final resolution, the SecretaryGeneral warned that “should the prospects for putting the package of measures into effect remain elusive at the time of submission of my next report, it would be my intention to ask my Personal Envoy to reassess the situation and the viability of the mandate of MINURSO.”82 He visited the region personally in November 1998 to assess the situation and proposed measures for finishing the identification process. This personal involvement signaled the Secretary-General’s continued empowerment of the Polisario Front, by emphasizing that their voice needed to be heard in the negotiation process. During the early MINURSO years, the Polisario Front made slight improvements in their representative institutions and showed strong engagement with the UN efforts at conflict resolution. Their intolerance toward Sahrawi “defectors” presented as their negotiating partners did not show a high degree of inclusiveness, but should be viewed in the context of Moroccan mistreatment of Sahrawis in the occupied territory. Overall, the claimant group shows a modest increase in democratic capacity during this period. As the model suggests, the international community offered a high degree of empowerment to the Sahrawis through their engagement in the identification process and facilitation of negotiations. The United Nations continued to insist on a referendum, despite Morocco’s manipulations and recalcitrance. MINURSO provided the political space to explore a negotiated settlement, but first the international community recognized the Polisario Front as a legitimate negotiating partner.

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The technical work of the Identification Commission, according to its Chairman Eric Jensen, was “to keep the Settlement Plan in gear, albeit in low gear, for long enough to convince both parties and the outside world that identification should be a stepping-stone to self-determination by way of a negotiated agreement within or outside the Settlement Plan.”83 To set the stage for further progress, the international community responded to the democratic capacity of the Polisario Front and empowered them as an equal party to the negotiations.

Mapping the Third Way: 2000–07 The death of King Hassan in July 1999 suggested a possible turning point for the stalled Western Sahara negotiations. Earlier in the year, the Polisario Front’s defense minister noted that “King Hassan has been the main source of our problems and the main obstacle to resolving them. From all we hear, Sidi Mohammed [now King Mohammed VI] is more flexible and might want to relieve his people of a burden they never wanted.”84 Another report after the king’s death described the Western Sahara annexation as “King Hassan’s personal crusade,” and suggested that King Mohammed was likely to pursue other avenues to stabilizing his regime.85 Indeed, King Mohammed VI implemented some reforms—fairer parliamentary elections, increased representation of women—as he tried to present Morocco as the liberal face of Islam.86 Morocco also changed its constitution to allow more autonomy to its eight regions, including Western Sahara. Though Morocco became somewhat more democratic, Sahrawis in the occupied territory continued to face intimidation, harassment, threat of disappearance, and imprisonment.87 From 2004 to 2005, the Moroccan government’s Equity and Reconciliation Commission investigated disappearances and human rights abuses perpetrated by Morocco; it handled 20,000 complaints, doling out reparations and offering rehabilitation for victims of government oppression from 1955 through 1999. But even while the commission atoned for past abuses, the harsh government response to protests in 1999–2000 revealed early limits to Mohammed VI’s new image for Morocco. Accusations of torture and brutal interrogations were denounced as baseless by Moroccan authorities,88 but even some Moroccans began to wonder if the new king really represented a more tolerant and inclusive regime.89 Morocco

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points to its investments in roads, schools, ports, and hospitals in the territory as proof of its effective governance and counter to allegations of discrimination and oppression. In 2004, Morocco approved a new five–year, $800 million redevelopment plan in its southern provinces, including Western Sahara. However, since Morocco controls most of the territory, these improvements benefit mostly Moroccan immigrants and not the native Sahrawi population.90 Sahrawis in the occupied territory of Western Sahara have not been integrated with the rest of the population and have a lower standard of living than non-Sahrawis.91 Western Saharans participate in Moroccan parliamentary elections, although no Sahrawi candidates opposed to Moroccan sovereignty appear on the ballot.92 A 2008 Freedom House report described Moroccan governance of Western Sahara as only slightly better than the worst of the worst. Within this shifting landscape, the Polisario Front’s democratic capacity slid slightly downward. The continued strength of its democratic institutions was offset in this time period by its increased recalcitrance toward peaceful conflict resolution and its checkered history of tolerance, in particular with respect to Moroccan POWs. A reform movement within the Polisario Front in 2004 indicated some internal discontent with the elected leadership. Despite continued elections, the elite of the Polisario Front has hardly changed over the years and is drifting toward one–party rule.93 The Polisario Front has not been forthcoming about how exactly a post–referendum Western Sahara would look, but there are still positive indications that it would retain much of its representative governance and institutions. One analyst who studied the Polisario Front and their camps in depth reported that the Polisario Front’s rule has succeeded not only in creating robust functioning institutions, but has also created a sense of citizenship among the people. The markets and institutions of the camps, he argues, are “more pre-figurative of a real society than they were during the war.”94 In 2004, a Polisario official stated that the camps “represent a normal state within an immense abnormality.”95 Human Rights Watch and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees investigated Moroccan assertions that the Polisario Front limits freedom of expression and freedom of movement in camps, but found no evidence to substantiate the accusations.96 The SADR’s existence as a homogenous entity reveals mixed signals about how non-Sahrawis would be treated or integrated into a Western Sahara state or autonomous territory. Nationalism runs strong and

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unites the Sahrawi people,97 but not to xenophobic excess as in many ethnic conflicts. Despite some mistaken associations of the Polisario Front with Islamic fundamentalist groups in the region, there is evidence that a Polisario–led Western Sahara would be religiously tolerant as well. Islam is the official religion of the SADR, but in practice is not imposed by the state as in other more conservative Islamic countries.98 The Polisario Front’s refusal to release approximately 1,000 Moroccan POWs until 2001–2005 was one of the blackest marks on their otherwise tolerant democratic record. After years of stagnation in the conflict resolution process, the Sahrawis began to show signs of restlessness with the snail’s pace of progress. A 1999 peaceful protest in Layounne spread to other cities, sparking the 1999–2000 Intifada. Again in 2005, demonstrations staged by civil rights groups and students spread to other cities and morphed into pro– independence demonstrations. These protests were violently dispersed, and prominent human rights activists like Aminatou Haidar—who has been called the “Sahrawi Gandhi”—were detained and beaten for their role in organizing the events. After years of proclaiming a commitment to not fomenting or assisting revolutionary action against the Moroccan monarchy following a final peace agreement,99 in 2000 the Polisario Front began calling for a return to arms if the United Nations abandons the Peace Plan. SADR President Mohamed Abdelaziz declared in 2005 that “Sahrawi people cannot stay inactive forever. They will fight to defend their national rights with all legitimate means, including armed struggle.”100 In 2004, a nationalist manifesto circulated in the camps that urged a return to armed conflict. Prior to the Twelfth Polisario Congress in 2007, the Polisario Front indicated that they would discuss resumption of hostilities. When the completion of the identification process failed to yield a referendum, the Polisario Front was not persuaded that the United Nations had not abandoned self-determination for Western Sahara in favor of predetermined Moroccan sovereignty. They became less cooperative with UN efforts at conflict resolution. The Polisario Front argued in early 2003 that nothing in between independence and integration is possible because the issue is a question of sovereignty; their response to the Draft Framework Agreement in 2001 decried the plan as legitimizing Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara.101 The Polisario Front remained unconvinced that this denoted anything less than a Moroccan victory, trampling international law and the legal rights of the Sahrawis. “This may work for Morocco but

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not for the Sahrawi people,” according to a Polisario representative in Madrid, Brahim Gali.102 After 1999, the international response to the claim shifted slightly to more limited empowerment of the Sahrawis. While still insisting that the solution address the rights of Western Sahara, the United Nations searched for ways to implement those rights in the context of de jure Moroccan sovereignty. In 2000, in spite of compromise agreements that had allowed the Identification Commission to complete their task, the Secretary-General was pessimistic that the referendum would be held: After stating their respective positions, which were already known, neither party appeared willing to offer any concrete proposals to bridge the differences between them. They both insisted on a “winner-take-all” approach and did not appear willing to discuss a solution where each would get some, but not all, of what each wanted. Nor did they appear disposed to put aside mutual animosity and begin to negotiate a political solution that would resolve their dispute over Western Sahara.103

Annan issued another imperative to Morocco and the Polisario Front in June 2001, demanding that they spend the next five months in direct or indirect talks to establish a five–year framework that ends in referendum or else the United Nations would reconsider its role as mediator.104 Reportedly as early as 1997, Baker was directed to explore alternatives to the referendum including potential forms of enhanced autonomy. Baker floated this idea of a so–called third way—neither full independence nor full integration with Morocco—with the Polisario Front, but they rejected this option. Meetings in London in May 2000 “served only to reaffirm the widely divergent positions” of the parties, according to the head of the Identification Commission.105 The Secretary-General responded to the Polisario Front’s threats to resume fighting by stating that a return to hostilities must be avoided, though it was unclear how. In addition, the Secretary-General repeatedly admonished the Polisario Front to release Moroccan POWs, both in reports as well as in public statements, while virtually ignoring the Polisario Front’s assertions that Morocco was holding over 300 Polisario prisoners.106 With Baker’s presentation of the Draft Framework Agreement in 2001, the Security Council shifted its overt focus from setting a date for the referendum to exploring other options for political settlement. In his report accompanying Baker’s plan, Secretary-General Annan lamented that he had “serious doubts as to whether the Settlement Plan

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can be implemented in its present form in a way that will result in an early, durable and agreed resolution of the dispute,” and alluded to the success of similar solutions forged for other non–self-governing territories.107 Though the Security Council did not adopt the Draft Framework Agreement, it did encourage the parties to use it as a basis for negotiations and other proposals for settlement.108 UN Security Council Resolution 1301 reiterates support for a free and fair referendum, but behind the scenes France and the United States especially pressed for the third way or autonomy plans. On one hand, this approach seems to be the most peaceful and fair solution—based on a realization that a conflict that has lasted for over 25 years is unlikely to be resolved with the cast of a ballot and, instead, must involve political compromise. Not surprisingly, the Polisario Front considered it an affront to the prior progress toward a referendum and a diminishment of international support. According to one Polisario representative, “instead of maintaining the legitimacy of the electoral body identified by the principle of self-determination, Baker was giving Moroccan citizens the right to determine the fate of the Western Sahara.”109 A proposal presented to both sides in January 2003 fared only slightly better than the 2001 Draft Framework Agreement. In an attempt to craft a workable compromise, Baker amended the 2001 proposal to address the Polisario Front’s concerns. But both sides were still unwilling to meet each other in the middle, Morocco objecting to the inclusion of an independence option on the proposed referendum ballot and the Polisario Front accepting the plan as a starting point for further talks while still insisting that any agreement besides the Settlement Proposals would be unacceptable. The UN Secretary-General reported that although the latest proposal offered “what could be an optimum political solution,” both sides as yet lacked “the genuine will required to achieve a political solution to the conflict.” His report concludes with a dark assessment: “I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that unless and until the parties demonstrate their readiness to assume their own responsibilities and make the compromises necessary to reach a successful outcome to the conflict, a fresh initiative to find a solution to the question of Western Sahara is likely to suffer the same fate as earlier ones.”110 Without political will from the parties, both Baker plans suffered from the same fatal defect that plagues the negotiations. The all-or-nothing stances of Morocco and the Polisario Front are echoed in

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the “winner-take-all” nature of the referendum—even after a period of autonomy—with no envisioned enforcement mechanism. After Baker’s resignation in 2004, the dispute languished yet again.111 In 2006–07, Morocco prepared its own plan, similar to Baker’s first Draft Framework Agreement, entitled “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Saharan Region.” Like the Baker plans, the Moroccan proposal offered autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty plus local administration. However, a referendum on an autonomy statute (independence and integration would not be included as options) would be voted on by an unspecified population after the period of autonomy. A Group of Friends (United States, France, Great Britain, Spain, and Russia) presented the plan to the Security Council in April, 2007, describing it as a “serious and credible” attempt to move toward resolution.112 Meanwhile, the new UN Special Representative Peter van Walsum convened the first face-toface meetings between Morocco and the Polisario Front since 2000 in Manhasset, New York, beginning in June 2007. Despite Security Council admonitions requesting meaningful progress and negotiations without preconditions, van Walsum reported that the parties came to the table with the same rigid positions. Movement toward a final settlement will likely remain stalled until both sides are willing to abandon entrenched positions and move toward compromise: neither Western Saharan independence nor unconditional Moroccan annexation of the territory appear feasible for longterm sustainable peace. It had been clear to observers and insiders that the referendum process did not address the fundamental political problems of the dispute, but until the identification process was complete Morocco thought it could win a referendum and the Polisario Front was unwilling to abandon the idea of a referendum on independence.113 Both sides were convinced that the composition of the electoral rolls would predetermine the outcome of the referendum. Thus, Morocco was unwilling to accept the Identification Commission’s results that favored the Polisario Front. Though less extensive than in the previous time period, empowerment of Sahrawis’ cause is most evident in the international community’s continued insistence on a solution recognizing Western Sahara’s right to self-determination. The international community, as embodied by the United Nations, has stated that even a negotiated autonomy solution must be framed by international norms and acknowledgement

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of the rights and democratic capacity of the Sahrawi people. SecretaryGeneral Annan sought compromise by articulating not only that “there are many ways to achieve self-determination” but also that any autonomy solution that does not offer “devolution that is genuine, substantial and in keeping with international norms” will not resolve the issue.114 Resolution of the conflict and regional security are thus linked to fostering legitimate governance through support for a self-determination claim based on democracy and human rights.

Conclusion Consistency in the international community’s response to the Western Sahara self-determination claim has come neither from great power interests nor from international law codified during decolonization and applied to Western Sahara, but rather from a definition of selfdetermination based on norms of democracy and human rights. It is precisely this consistency of response that Realism and Legalism have difficulty explaining. Despite strong state interests to the contrary, the international community as a whole acknowledged the validity of the Sahrawis’ claim to self-determination and recognized their efforts to establish representative institutions and to engage with peaceful means of conflict resolution. Movement away from these markers of democratic capacity—as well as their questionable record of tolerance as indicated by their unwillingness to release all POWs—was met with less extensive support for autonomy or self-government. Understanding the international response in the context of democratic governance standards, my approach balances geopolitical pressures with legal prescriptions by focusing on human rights and the democratic aspirations of the Sahrawi people as an important determinant of the international response to their self-determination claim. Realist and Legalist alternative approaches alone do not provide adequate explanations for the international response to the Western Sahara claim. Though Realism highlights the importance of great powers’ influence on actions undertaken by the international community, it underestimates the importance of values held by those states and others in the system and the United Nations’ resulting attention to democratic principles in its resolution efforts. Drawing on its interests

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in not appearing to entirely subvert the international law and institutions it helped create, the United States was under domestic pressure to apply American democratic and human rights values abroad. Despite its ties to Morocco, the United States has been supportive of MINURSO, providing funds and equipment as well as warning of detrimental effects on the United Nations’ credibility if the issue is not resolved. A Legalist approach contributes an understanding of how the international response to the Western Sahara claim has developed within the parameters of international legal prescriptions since 1975, constraining the exercise of material interests. But this approach fails to account for the international community’s adherence to international norms evolving in parallel to these more static prescriptions, suggesting an outward reorientation of the case in the context of democratic governance. Security in Western Sahara and settlement of the selfdetermination claim appear to be premised on respect for human rights and democratic governance. My approach combines law and politics, positing that only a framework devised from their interaction can fully explain the international response. Geopolitical interests are enacted within a legal framework while that framework itself is affected by international norms and values embedded in international organizations. The United Nations has successfully kept the Western Sahara issue on the international agenda as an unresolved self-determination claim, despite state interests to the contrary. A Realist solution would preserve Moroccan sovereignty (the Moroccan negotiating position) and a purely Legalist solution would allow a referendum on independence (the Polisario Front’s steadfast position). Instead, the UN Secretary-General noted in his most recent report on the conflict, “Imagination and creativity will be needed if progress is to be made” beyond these two entrenched positions.115 The United Nations’ involvement as detailed in previous sections of this chapter places such eventual compromise within the context of improved human rights and increased self-government for Western Sahara, “which, in turn, would promote peace and stability in the region and would open the way to enhanced exchanges and cooperation between the countries of the Arab Maghreb Union.”116 If they agree on nothing else, UN officials and both parties to the conflict admit that the United Nations has succeeded in keeping the parties ostensibly engaged in seeking a solution without violence since the 1991 ceasefire.

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Efforts to create security in a war–torn region and uphold international law motivated a commitment that seemed better than the alternatives, even if the result was simply “getting nowhere quietly.”117 This tacit but resolute recognition of the validity of the Western Saharans’ right to self-determination thereby levels the playing field somewhat between a materially powerful state with influential allies and a self-declared state only recognized by the OAU and no more than one-third of the world’s states.118 Human rights, democracy, and security are thus all interconnected in the international response to the self-determination struggle in Western Sahara.

International Empowerment

Extensive

1988–91 Settlement Proposals: referendum 1991–99 MINURSO and the Identification Process

Limited

2000–07 The Third Way: autonomy followed by referendum

Conditional

Sanction Intolerant

Somewhat Intolerant

Somewhat Democratic

Democratic

Democratic Capacity

Figure 5.1 Sahara.

Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment: Western

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Chapter 6 Conclusion

Mirroring the international attention to promoting democratic governance among states, the theory and case studies presented here show that the international community also attempts to socialize substate actors to similar standards defined in reference to human rights and democratic values. Self-determination claimant groups that have internalized democratic norms are more likely to receive international support for their claim in the form of empowerment, in effect elevating the status of the claimant group through wider participation or increased self-rule. When the group falls short, the international community makes its support conditional on progress toward democratic governance goals. Standards before Status thus defines not only the international approach to Kosovo—for which the phrase was coined— but also the framework under which the international community assesses other contemporary self-determination claims. This democratic governance approach offers an explanation for the international response to self-determination claims that dovetails with broader trends and trajectories in international politics. American hegemony in the post–Cold War era has influenced the definition of security operationalized by international organizations. This Westerninspired conception of security implicates liberal democratic governance and human rights as important components of peace and stability. Like conditions tied to development loans or mandates for multifaceted liberal democratic peacebuilding efforts, democratic governance norms set parameters for the international community’s response to self-determination claims. As Dominik Zaum argues with respect to

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international state building, sovereign authorities are being held to a “standard of civilization” that includes democratic governance and human rights.1 Zaum shows how domestic legitimacy, as defined by the international community, is linked with the international recognition of a sovereign authority in the state building process. This project has confirmed that these tenets are applied not only as the blueprint for rebuilding states, but also in weighing a group’s claim to increased sovereign authority through self-determination. The more the claimant group appears to embody these elements of democratic governance—in other words, a higher democratic capacity—the more likely the international community will empower the group in their quest for increased self-governance. This approach recognizes the synergies of combining material interests and normative frameworks. Acknowledging the influence of the dominant members of the international community—in particular, the role of the United States since the 1990s—this project demonstrates that the normative values of the leading state or states have a role in determining outcomes along with material interests. The democratic governance framework reflects the regime type and liberal values of the United States in an era of American hegemony. With the United States as hegemon, international community values are influenced by Western liberal ideals—democratic governance and human rights inform the definition of security and thus the framework for responding to self-determination claims. Alistair Iain Johnston explains how norms can contribute to a socialization process in which social rewards (being empowered and given increased sovereign responsibility) take place within a defined social context (democratic governance linked to internal legitimacy and external security).2 In other words, for a group to receive the social rewards normally reserved for states, their behavior must meet the standards applied to states in the given social context. Thus, my approach draws on the boundary-setting influence of norms (like, but not limited to, international law), but within a social context that allows for their application to non-state actors. This project does not attempt to argue that these norms are universal, nor that they are permanent. To the contrary, an underlying assumption is that the norms embraced by the international community at a particular point in time reflect the values, not just the material interests, of the dominant powers. Other scholars have touched on trends in the evolution of legitimacy in the context of other research

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questions. Henry Kissinger noted the link between the definition of a legitimate order and the interests of the dominant powers.3 Francis Fukuyama argued that history has seen many forms of legitimacy, but “in today’s world the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy.”4 Similarly, Dominick Zaum compares the nineteenth-century notion of a standard of civilization that provided the backdrop for colonialism to a new standard of democratic governance that fuels today’s statebuilding efforts: “although the notion of a right to democratic governance remains highly contested, it is considered by the international community as the most appropriate form of domestic governance.”5 David Armstrong’s investigation of justice in international law notes that international society is a forum for socialization, which redefines understandings of state legitimacy. He continues, Where once legitimacy in international society required primarily the ability to demonstrate control over a specified territorial area and to perform certain limited international obligations, international legitimacy today is coming increasingly to involve considerations that were once deemed to be entirely matters of domestic concern for states, considerations that may be summed up by the term ‘good governance’: a set of norms embracing democracy, human rights, the rule of law and deregulated economics.6

In his discussion of the election component of state building, Robin Ludwig describes the disappearance of alternatives to liberal democratic governance with the end of the Cold War. By turning to the West for assistance, developing countries that were formerly clients of the Soviet Union began to replicate the economic and governance system of their new patron.7 The model in this project focuses on the contemporary definition of legitimacy and argues that this definition affects international behavior. Further studies could detail the evolution of legitimacy over time and how this process effected change in how the international community defined and responded to self-determination claims or other security issues. To say that norms of legitimacy vary over time also suggests that the norms may be more embedded—and, thus, have a stronger effect—in parts of the globe where democratic governance has a longer or stronger history, especially when linked to security concerns. There should be variation that ties the evolution of democratic governance or the prominence of democratic states in a particular region with the

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strength of the democratic norms in the independent variable. Though not an explicit part of this model, we can see possible evidence of such variation in the strength of the normative framework across the case studies. In Kosovo, the influence of norms appears strongest when the framework is aligned with Western interests in security. The United Nations, OSCE, and European Union all placed strong, specific democratic governance conditions on Kosovo in the name of security. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the OSCE’s interpretation of self-determination was balanced between territorial concerns and human rights, reflecting the organization’s internal debate over the components of security and stability. Russia and its emphasis on territorial integrity acted as a counterweight to Western norms and their influence on the human dimension in the OSCE definition of security. The Western Sahara case showed that norms can limit the effects of even Western great power interests; the embedded normative framework somewhat limited the United States and France from acting purely in their material interests. How do different regions define democratic governance and human rights in conjunction with security? How are disparities in proximity to a global hegemon reflected in how norms spread or affect behavior? This variation in the strength and application of norms across regions merits further research. However, such variation also implicitly suggests that international standards of democratic governance may not coincide with local standards of legitimacy. In his research on peacebuilding, Zaum notes that recognition of sovereignty is an external recognition of domestic authority, but the international community is “influenced by a particular conception of the appropriate relationship between state and society, a particular conception of domestic sovereignty.”8 Likewise, Ian Hurd intones that outside observers cannot make determinations of legitimacy on behalf of locals or those involved on the inside, they can only observe whether an audience accepts a government or institution as legitimate.9 Lessons from the peacebuilding literature further emphasize that equating liberal democratic government with stability is not necessarily effective: legitimate government leads to stability, but international standards of legitimacy “might be viewed as illegitimate by the local community.”10 David Chandler points out that this can lead to a disconnect between the institutions fostered by international peacebuilding efforts and the local political process; in other

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words, a divide between international and local sources of legitimacy.11 Johnston argues that social influence is not as effective if the target group does not self-identify with the social norms in question. So, if a self-determination claimant group does not subscribe to the social context of liberal democratic statehood, as presently conceived and promoted as legitimate by the West, then the use of social influence will be less effective in the socialization process described here.12 The case studies in this volume are consistent with Johnston’s model, illustrating that the international community relies on policies of coercion or sanction in the absence of democratic capacity—and, hence, a lack of identification with the liberal democratic social context—and persuasion or social influence in the form of more extensive empowerment when the group appears to self-identify as a budding democratic government. How do these debates and the possible disconnect between international and local standards of legitimacy affect socialization efforts and the prospect of success? Legitimacy by its very nature cannot be imposed, but under what domestic conditions are substate actors more receptive to socialization? What concepts of legitimacy at the local level are conducive to adopting international standards of legitimacy and how can the international community effectively foster those connections? More research is needed to outline the relationship between international standards of governance and local standards of legitimacy. These issues are of practical as well as theoretical importance. Self-determination seen as a question of the legitimacy of relationships may also be seen as a process of political legitimation that potentially could bolster the quest for lasting peace.13 Recent studies of post-conflict peacebuilding have begun to focus on problems of emphasizing formal institutions rather than the relationships that support them.14 Likewise, plebiscites may be the sine qua non of selfdetermination, but improving the legitimacy of the underlying institutions of both the central government and the claimant group may be a necessary first step to creating the conditions in which a referendum is a viable solution.15 Both in practice and analysis, policy solutions increasingly emphasize nonindependence and focus on various forms of federalism and autonomy as workable solutions to these conflicts. Territorial solutions such as partition or wholesale independence have lost favor to other types of solutions that focus on redefining domestic

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relationships—for example, through a combination of minority rights and autonomy. The focus of many post–Cold War attempts to outline feasible solutions to self-determination conflicts combines a deemphasis on redrawing borders (privileging domestic solutions) with a strengthening of regional or international linkages (giving the territory an international status).16 Bestowing some type of international status on substate autonomous entities is one way to think beyond the state at the international level while simultaneously preserving existing borders and states: rethinking the state without abandoning the state system.17 The work of bodies such as the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) or the United Nations’ Working Group on National Minorities display the practical application of these theories. For example, the HCNM focuses on internal self-determination, negotiating increased minority rights as the key to diminishing calls for secession.18 By understanding how international actors already incorporate these underlying norms into their response, this project lays the groundwork for analyzing the components of an effective policy to work toward longterm peace. Addressing self-determination issues may involve a reconceptualization of sovereignty as a process of continuous legitimation: power and control over territory can be divided among various groups in order to increase legitimacy of the overall governing structure.19 Autonomy and federalism may provide the foundation for resolution—perhaps not as an end in itself, but as an institutional structure within which rights can be addressed.20 Further research is also required to test the policy tools available to implement and enforce conditionality measures. A post hoc assessment could determine which, if any, conditionality requirements best create lasting democratic institutions and promote longterm peace.21 Though the stated policy goals of international organizations involved in selfdetermination claims focus on enhancing democratic governance as the path to longterm stability, their efforts often seem derailed by shortterm security crises. This necessitates further analysis of the relationship between the international community’s framework approach for resolving self-determination claims (the subject of this project) and its methods for addressing immediate security concerns. How stable are institutions born of conditionality requirements and do they address near-term security issues? Is there a relationship between the amount

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of coercion needed to implement the institutions and their stability? Answering these questions may shed new light on the question of when, how deeply, and how successfully the international community promotes legitimate governance— exactly how states and even substate actors are held accountable for adhering to standards of democratic governance.

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Notes

1

SETTING STANDARDS IN THE MODERN WORLD

Portions of chapter 1 are reprinted with permission from “Beyond standards before status: democratic governance and non-state actors,” by Anne-Marie Gardner Review of International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 03, July 2008, pp. 531–552 Copyright © 2008 British International Studies Association. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 1. Bruce M. Russet, “The Fact of the Democratic Peace” and “Why Democratic Peace?” and Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” all in Michael E. Brown et al. eds. Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). On the nature of the current liberal international order, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order,” Review of International Studies 25:2 (1999) pp. 179–96. 2. For example, see USAID, “Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity” (Washington, DC: USAID, 2002). For a critique of IFIs’ aid conditionality in the 1980s and 1990s, see Ved P. Nanda, “The ‘Good Governance’ Concept Revisited,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 603 (January 2006), pp. 269–283. 3. Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 40. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Michael Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War,” International Security 30:4 (Spring 2006), p. 88: “liberal values so clearly guide [peacebuilders] activities that we can call their collective efforts ‘liberal peacebuilding.’ ” See also Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For a similar approach in international law, see David Armstrong,

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4.

5.

6.

7.

NOTES

“Law, Justice, and the Idea of a World Society,” International Affairs 75:3 (July 1999), pp. 547–561. For an introduction to the debate on humanitarian intervention, see J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, eds. Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); David Rieff, At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005). For a critique, see David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006). Consensus among many legal scholars is that a postcolonial right to selfdetermination and, potentially, secession does exist and can be accommodated by current legal instruments, while several political philosophers advocate at least a remedial right to self-determination resulting in secession when serious human rights abuses have occurred over time. Robert McCorquodale, “Selfdetermination: A Human Rights Approach,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43:4 (October 1994) pp. 857–885; Benedict Kingsbury, “Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law,” Cornell International Law Journal 25:3 (1992) pp. 482–513; Hurst Hannum, “Self-Determination in the PostColonial Era,” pp. 12–44, in David Clark and Robert Williamson, eds. SelfDetermination: International Perspectives (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); and Allen Buchanan, “Self-Determination and the Right to Secede,” Journal of International Affairs 45:2 (Winter 1992) pp. 347–365. More generally, David Armstrong’s depiction of a somewhat progressivist approach to international law draws on similar arguments. Armstrong (1999). See p. 375 in John M. Owen, IV, “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 56:2 (Spring 2002) pp. 375–409. Owen describes how IGOs promote the creation of domestic institutions that reflect the regime type of the prevailing hegemon. See also Jon C. Pevehouse’s description of IGOs as vehicles for supporting democracy promotion in Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization,” International Organization 56:3 (Summer 2002) pp. 515–549. The literature on conflict resolution in Africa–where collapsed states and state building (and thus reconstruction of sovereignty) are central considerations in resolving conflict–highlight the dual nature of sovereignty and the need to focus on legitimacy. On sovereignty in failed states or conflict resolution in Africa see Francis M. Deng and Terrence Lyons, eds. African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1991); Francis M. Deng et al., eds. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington,

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D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996); Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds, eds. Elections and Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, D.C.: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1998); and Robert H. Jackson, Quasi- States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). On crises of legitimacy as a cause of internal conflict, see Monty G. Marshall, “Systems at Risk: Violence, Diffusion, and Disintegration in the Middle East,” in David Carment and Patrick James, eds. Wars in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); E. W. Nafziger et al., eds. The Origin of Humanitarian Emergencies in the Third World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Illegitimate rule can also be source of myths used to mobilize a population to conflict. Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18:4 (Spring 1994) pp. 5–39. 8. Kingsbury (1992). Kingsbury avers that “principles of human rights are a major source of legitimation for claims made by nonstate groups” against their central government–and that the groups themselves need to be held accountable for their own violations of human rights. Political philosopher Allen Buchanan discusses how to separate the right to repudiate a state’s control over territory (on justice grounds) from “the conditions that a new entity ought to satisfy if it is to be recognized as a legitimate state.” Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: The Moral Foundations of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 336–337. 9. Ikenberry and Kupchan describe three mechanisms of socialization: normative persuasion, external inducement, and international reconstruction. See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44:3 (Summer 1990), pp. 290–292. Deudney and Ikenberry argue that a common civic identity is part of the current liberal international order; to strengthen or encourage development of this identity thus may strengthen the order itself. See Deudney and Ikenberry (1999). 10. Martha Finnemore suggests that domestic preferences can emanate from interactions with IGOs acting as a conduit of norm diffusion. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). On domestic–international normative interaction, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998) pp. 887– 917; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999) pp. 83–114; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Organization 51:1 (Winter 1997) pp. 31–63; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr., “How do International Institutions Matter? The

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Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996) pp. 451–478. 11. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds. State Sovereignty as a Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Robert H. Jackson, Quasi- States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the rights and responsibilities associated with state sovereignty, see Deng et al., (1996) and Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). See also Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 12. The definition of legitimacy changes over time, given the character or regime type of the dominant state(s) in the system. See Armstrong (1999) p. 561. Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History,” Journal of International Affairs 48:2 (Winter 1995) pp. 353–368; Istvan Bibo The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies: A Study of SelfDetermination, Concord among the Major Powers, and Political Arbitration (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976); Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53:2 (Spring 1999) pp. 379–408; Alfred Cobban, The Nation- State and National SelfDetermination (London: Collins, 1969) p. 142; and Fowler and Bunck (1995). On sovereignty as a process: Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982): legitimacy based in continuous democratic processes; John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998): political relationship is static whereas value relationship is fluid; Biersteker and Weber (1996): constant renegotiation of sovereignty, p. 11; Richard A. Falk, “Sovereignty and Human Dignity: The Search for Reconciliation,” p. 33 in Deng and Lyons (1998): sovereignty as an evolving process to incorporate states’ responsibilities as well as their rights. On sovereignty as divisible: Inis Claude’s chunk versus basket approaches to sovereignty, described in Fowler and Bunck (1995). Some argue that illiberal states are the beneficiaries of fewer legal entitlements in the international community. See Gregory H. Fox, “New Approaches to International Human Rights: The Sovereign State Revisited,” in Sohail H. Hashmi, State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 129. 13. Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8:1 (Summer 1983) pp. 129–153; Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26:2 (Fall 2001) p. 98; Gary King and Christopher Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” Political Science Quarterly 116:4 (Winter 2001–2002) p.2; Caroline Thomas, “Global Governance, Development, and Human Security: Exploring the Links,” Third World Quarterly 22:2 (April 2001) pp. 160–162. On the state itself as a threat to security: William Bain, “The Tyranny of Benevolence: National

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Security, Human Security, and the Practice of Statecraft,” Global Society 15:3 (July 2001) p. 279; Thomas (2001) p. 160: human insecurity results from structures of power that determine who is entitled to security. 14. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998); Audie Klotz, “Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: the Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences,” European Journal of International Relations 8:1 (March 2002), pp. 49–76. 15. John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983); G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). On the idea that institutions persist after the hegemon is in decline, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39:4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614. Also, Knutsen argues that there is a third pillar of hegemony, in addition to military and economic power, that describes how accepted the leading power’s ideals are in the system. Torbjorn L. Knutsen, The Rise and Fall of World Orders (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999). On international promotion of domestic institutions, see Owen (2002). Owen describes how IGOs promote the creation of domestic institutions that reflect the regime type of the prevailing hegemon. Owen extends theories of institution promotion from the international to the domestic level. This study further extends this logic from the state to the substate level of institutions, both formal and informal. See Pevehouse’s description of IGOs as vehicles for supporting democracy promotion in Pevehouse (2002). For a discussion of whether and how international institutions matter more generally, see Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie. “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State,” International Organization 40:4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 753–775; Krasner (1983); John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5–19; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore,”The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53:4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 699–732; Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International Organization 52:4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 729–757. 16. On norms and domestic-international normative interaction, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Checkel (1999); Legro (1997); Cortell and Davis (1996); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48:2 (Spring 1994), pp. 185–214. See further discussion in chapter 2 of this volume.

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17. For example, Lea Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,” The Yale Journal of International Law 16:1 (Winter 1991), pp. 177–202; and Benjamin Neuberger, “National Self- determination: Dilemmas of a Concept,” Nations and Nationalism 1:3 (November 1995), pp. 297–325. For overviews, see Hannum in Clark and Williamson (1996); and Helen Quane, “The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Selfdetermination,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47:3 (July 1998), pp. 537–572. For legal scholars attempting to incorporate human rights and democracy into a legal definition of self-determination, see Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and McCorquodale (1994). 18. Mills argues (pp. 30–32) that if a state exists primarily to provide security for people, then sovereignty ultimately rests with the people. Kurt Mills, Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty (London: Macmillan Press, 1998). On human rights and democracy as standards of legitimate governance, see p. 260 in Gerry J. Simpson, “The diffusion of sovereignty: selfdetermination in the post-colonial age,” Stanford Journal of International Law 32:2 (1996), pp. 255–286. The historical roots of self-determination lie in President Wilson’s attempts to balance democracy and realpolitik in his vision for post-war Europe. See Hannum in Clark and Williamson (1996), p. 13. Also, origins of the concept lie in the French and American Revolutions, which advanced a new basis of state legitimacy based on popular representation. See p. 111 in Ravi Mahalingam, “Self-determination in the UN Era: A Response to Peter Sproat,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9: 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 109–123. For connection to a human rights framework, see Hannum in Clark and Williamson (1996) p. 32; and McCorquodale (1995). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty describes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the “moral code, political consensus and legal synthesis of human rights”: The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2002) at 2.16. See Brad Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) on emerging norms of illegitimacy; and legitimate governance evaluated in terms of popular will (not necessarily liberal democracy), highlighting an emerging norm of popular sovereignty. 19. External and internal self-determination, respectively. See for example Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 16–18. 20. UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1(2). 21. UN declarations and ICJ advisory opinions, while not legally binding, are generally considered to be indicative of customary law. For a discussion of the sources of international law, see Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, eds. Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Blackstone Press, 1991), pp. 13–47. 22. Resolutions 421 (1950); 637 (1952); and 118 (1957). See Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International

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23. 24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

37. 38.

149

Relations,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.124. Dixon and McCorquodale (1991), pp. 248–249. Halperin and Scheffer (1992), p. 22. This became known as the salt-water theory: for a people to have a right to self-determination, they had to be culturally distinct and separated from the colonizing state by an ocean. Further, the “UN could, when it deems necessary, supervise these processes.” Dixon and McCorquodale (1991), p. 251. Beth A. Payne, “The Western Sahara: International Legal Issues,” pp. 128– 129 in Yahia H. Zoubir and David Volman, eds. International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1993). Title to territory is defined as the “legal and factual elements which by virtue of the norms of international law must be present before territorial sovereignty may be validly acquired or maintained.” Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 16. Plebiscites were used in the decolonization process in British Cameroons, British Togoland, West Irian, and Equatorial Guinea, among others. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), p. 891. Katzenstein (1996) explains how norms can be constitutive (defining the identity of the actor) or regulative (setting standards of behavior); norms in this model serve both functions: helping to define valid claimants and influencing behavior of the parties involved as well as third party actors. Drawing on Hedley Bull’s notion of a society of states in Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Bilateral actions endorsed by an IGO or following international precepts could also be considered part of international community action. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 11. For more on global norms and the role of the United Nations in setting international standards, see Joe Sills, “The United Nations and the Formation of Global Norms,” pp. 47–76 in Jean E. Krasno, ed. The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004). Summary of Inis Claude’s depiction of collective legitimation described in Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy, and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 6. Owen (1997). Self-determination conflicts differ from other types of civil conflicts or civil wars in which the sides to the conflict are fighting for control over the whole state, rather than whether and how to allow more self-rule to one particular group. From Rice, “The Promise of the Democratic Peace: Why Protecting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security,” Washington Post, December 11, 2005. Both groups focus on state consent at the root of international law, while liberal or progressivist traditions in both fields allow a wider berth for evolution

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in extralegal normative frameworks which precede or set the context for understanding commitment and compliance issues. 39. Armstrong notes that “[c]onstant reiteration of good governance doctrines in legal documents gives them a taken-for-granted quality that leads eventually to their institutionalization as basic norms of international society.” Armstrong (1999), p. 561.

2

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Portions of chapter 2 are reprinted with permission from “Beyond standards before status: democratic governance and non-state actors,” by Anne-Marie Gardner Review of International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 03, July 2008, pp. 531–552 Copyright © 2008 British International Studies Association. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 1. At its most basic level, the principle of self-determination accords people the right to choose their political status, govern their own affairs, and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. For this project, selfdetermination claims are claims levied against the central government by an identifiable ethno–political group, arguing for more powers of self-rule–up to and often including demands for secession. The ensuing conflicts differ from other types of civil conflicts or civil wars in which the sides to the conflict are fighting over control over the whole state, rather than whether and how to allow more self-rule to one particular group. See Halperin and Scheffer (1992), pp. 1–25 and Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 27–49. In this book, the state against which the claim is levied is the central government and the group making the claim is the claimant group. 2. Chapter 1 explains the use of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as a proxy for the international community. 3. Classical Realists like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, as well as more recent scholars like Robert Gilpin, do acknowledge a role for ideational factors but focus primarily on material factors such as military or economic power. See, for example, Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 17–19. 4. Horowitz avers that international support is unlikely for weak secessionist movements. David L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). See also Hizkias Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987). Zartman and Berman describe one precondition for negotiation as a shift in the actual or perceived power balance

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5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12.

151

toward equality. I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 54–57. J.S. Mill argues that intervention on behalf of the weak deprives them of their right to free themselves. Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Essays on Politics and Culture (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963). Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement,” International Organization 44:3 (Summer 1990), pp. 341–378. Third party intervention in secessionist conflicts is always seen as biased against the central government. Also, one debate in the intervention literature concerns whether it is preferable to intervene on the side of the weaker or stronger party and whether such a thing as neutral intervention exists. Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 333–341. See e.g., Katzenstein (1996), p. 45. See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” pp. 3–30 in Goldstein and Keohane (1993). Recent attempts to define self-determination range from a focus on delimiting the notion of “peoples” who hold the right (usually an ethnic or linguisticallybased national group); to a focus on the history of the territory (pinpointing a “critical date” and who had legal title to the territory at that date); to arguments based on human rights (the right to secede in light of gross human right violations). See discussion in chapter 1. Similarly, neo–institutionalist approaches highlight the constraints that institutions can engender. While some scholars have argued that neoinstitutionalism should focus more on non-state actors–see, e.g., Martin and Simmons (1998)–the approach is still primarily state centric, as is the theory of institutionalized ideas. McCorquodale (1994); Kingsbury (1992); Hannum in Clark and Williamson (1996); Simpson (1996); Stephen Tierney, “In a State of Flux: Self-determination and the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 6:1–2 (1998–1999), pp. 197–233; and Michael Freeman, “The Right to Self-determination in International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy,” Review of International Studies 25:3 (July 1999), pp. 355–370.” Kingsbury (1992). Related literature includes studies of why ethnic groups choose violence, whether self-determination is based on norms, and whether autonomy may be a workable solution to such claims. See Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Gidon Gottlieb, Nation against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Hannum (1990); Ruth Lapidoth, “Sovereignty in Transition,” Journal of International Affairs 45:2 (Winter 1992), p. 325–346; Heraclides (1990) suggests that prior literature has given

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13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

NOTES more attention to classic civil wars than to communal or separatist conflicts; and Stephen M. Saideman, “Overlooking the Obvious: Bringing International Politics Back into Ethnic Conflict Management,” International Studies Review 4:3 (Fall 2002), pp. 63–86 (suggests need for work on conditions under which states take sides in ethnic conflicts). On two–level analysis, see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427–460; and Helen Milner, “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis among International, American and Comparative Politics,” International Organization 52:4 (1998), pp. 759–786. On norms and domestic-international normative interaction, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Checkel (1999); Legro (1997); Cortell and Davis (1996); and RisseKappen (1994). In addition, international legal scholars such as Antonio Cassese highlight the necessity of both international political pressure and internal political will to give effect to the norms embodied in international law. Cassese (1995). Some operational approaches to self-determination also employ two-level strategies, for example the inter–war approach to selfdetermination. See Martii Koskenniemi, “National Self-determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43:2 (April 1994), pp. 253–54; and Hannum (1990). Also, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Self-Determination and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1997). On a similar process–dialogue regarding truth claims–see Thomas Risse, “ ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54:1 (Winter 2000), pp. 1–39. Alistair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies Quarterly 45:4 (December 2001), pp. 487–515. Typology of interaction drawn from Johnston (2001), pp. 501–02. See especially page 506 in Johnston (2001). Katzenstein discusses the mutual and reinforcing linkages among normative context, identities, and policies. Katzenstein (1996). Similarly, Keck and Sikkink argue that transnational issue networks acting on principled beliefs do not try to convince states to act on principle instead of acting in their national interest; rather, these groups attempt to change perceptions of national interest so values coincide with interests. See Keck and Sikkink (1998). Neuberger (1995); Alexis Heraclides, “Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: In Quest of a Normative Symbiosis,” Journal of International Affairs 45:2 (Winter 1992), pp. 399–420; and Hannum in Clark and Williamson (1996). For an overview of this and other moral issues, see Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania to Quebec, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). See also Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985 (cited in International Crisis Group, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolving the Kosovo Crisis, Balkans Report No. 46: November 9, 1998, p. 10).

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21. Patrick Thornberry, “The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with some Remarks on Federalism” pp. 101–138 in Christian Tomuschat, ed. Modern Law of Self-Determination (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) and Mahalingam (1997). On intervention in dictatorships, see Kevin Ryan, “Rights, Intervention, and Self-determination,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 20:1 (Fall 1991), pp. 55–71. 22. Even actors motivated by principled beliefs can construct frames for discourse in strategic ways; principled actors are not immune from strategic politics. See Keck and Sikkink (1998). 23. Risse-Kappen suggests that material conditions alone can often explain the window of opportunity for action but not the particular ideational content of that action. Risse-Kappen (1994). 24. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 206–07. See also the description of liberal democracies in Russet, “Why Democratic Peace?” (1997) and Owen (1997). 25. Heraclides (1992). 26. Gregory J. Ewald, “The Kurds’ Right to Secede under International Law: Self-determination Prevails over Political Manipulation,” The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 22: 2–3 (Spring 1994), pp. 375–407. Adam Pzreworski notes that the defining facet of democracy is that parties accept losing, knowing that they could win in the next election. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991). Conversely, aggressive or excessive factionalization suggests that each subgroup fears that its voice will cease to be heard if it loses the leadership struggle. 27. Daniel K. Donnelly, “States and Substates in a Free World: A Proposed General Theory of National Self-determination,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 2:2 (Summer 1996), pp. 286–311. 28. Sometimes referred to as the problem of infinite breakaways. For a discussion, see David Little, “Religion and Self-Determination,” in Clark and Williamson (1996). 29. The UN’s past silence on the issues of Kurdish separatism and the Spanish Basques’ quest for independence may derive in part from the terrorism attributed to these groups. See discussion in Hannum (1990) and Ewald (1994). 30. For more detailed examination of how the government’s treatment of the group affects the international response, see Anne-Marie Gardner, “The Limits of Sovereignty: Democratic Norms and the International Response to Self-Determination Claims” (2003 PhD Dissertation, Princeton University). 31. Owen (1997). Owen argues that for the liberal peace to hold, it is more important that each side see the other as liberal, rather than determining whether each side meets a formal, objective definition of liberal. 32. Zartman’s discussion of internal conflicts highlights how existing governments often resist calls for mediation because the process of mediation inevitably strengthens the rebellion and gives it equal standing with the state.

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Thus, recognition of the claimant group by the international community as a negotiating partner signals that the conflict cannot be handled by the state and the group has a legitimate grievance (pp. 214–15). I. William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 33. Fewer conditions on support (moving to the upper right of the diagram) means socialization occurs with less coercion and more organic internalization. See Ikenberry and Kupchan’s three mechanisms of socialization, pp. 290–292 in Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990). 34. Heraclides (1990) lays out three forms of international reaction to internal war: diffusion and encouragement of the non-state party, reconciliation of the two sides, and isolation or suppression of the substate group (p. 345). 35. See Roth (1999); John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987); M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice 1815–1995, (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1997). Also, this is not to be conflated with legal title to territory. See Shaw (1996); and Brilmayer (1991).

3

KOSOVO: “STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS” AND BEYOND

Portions of chapter 3 are reprinted with permission from “Beyond standards before status: democratic governance and non-state actors, by Anne-Marie Gardner Review of International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 03, July 2008, pp. 531–552 Copyright © 2008 British International Studies Association. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 1. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic, quoted in OSCE document no. CIO.GAL/20/01 (May 24, 2001), p. 4. 2. Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO’s Empty Victory (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2000). See also Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “Dubious Anniversary: Kosovo One Year Later,” Policy Analysis 373 (June 10, 2000), pp. 1–14. For the theoretical argument behind this course of action, see Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Civil Wars,” International Security 20:4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–175. 3. For more detailed history of Kosovo, including the origins of both sides’ claims to the territory, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); and Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York City: New York University Press, 1998). 4. Though a federal Yugoslavia still existed, for analytical purposes Serbia will be treated as the central government due to its domination of the federation and direct control over Kosovo during this period.

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5. See The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 42. 6. David P. Forsythe, “Postscript: The Kosovo Crisis” in Forsythe, Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), p. 341. Layne and Schwarz, in a scathing attack on NATO’s actions, argue that the “fallout from Kosovo has also inflicted incalculable damage on America’s relations with Russia and China.” Layne and Schwarz (2000), p. 9. 7. Carpenter (2000). Nicola Butler notes that since the air strikes, NATO has been trying to rebuild NATO-Russia relations. Butler, “NATO: From Collective Defence to Peace Enforcement,” in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds. Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), p. 285. See also Layne and Schwarz (2000). 8. Kosovo did enjoy a unique status compared to other autonomous regions within the FRY. Though not a constituent republic, Kosovo sent representatives to the federal government, offering a somewhat better legal argument for independence. However, the European Union asserted that only constituent republics were entitled to independence under existing law regardless of this elevated status. 9. See discussion on this point in chapter 2. 10. See, e.g., Patrick Thornberry, “ ‘Come, friendly bombs . . .’: International Law in Kosovo,” in Michael Waller et al., eds. Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion (London: Frank Cass, 2001). The IICK report concludes that NATO’s actions were illegal but legitimate. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2001), pp. 163–198. 11. Coral Bell, “Force, Diplomacy, and Norms,” in Schnabel and Thakur (2000), pp. 450–451. 12. Hideaki Shinoda, “The Politics of Legitimacy in International Relations: A Critical Examination of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo,” Alternatives 25 (2000), pp. 525–529. 13. Interview with NATO official April 23, 2002. 14. See press release on Security Council public debate, February 18, 2008 (http:// www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9252.doc.htm accessed 6/5/08). Also, Chatham House, “Kosovo: International Law and Recognition,” Summary of the Chatham House International Law Discussion Group meeting April 22, 2008 (available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk). Further, the International Court of Justice ruled in July, 2010, that the unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law. 15. Malcolm (1998), p. 343. For more on Kosovo and the rise of Milosevic, see Malcolm (1998) and Woodward (1995). 16. The Kosovo Assembly was met with tanks and armored cars parked outside; some say that Serbian Communist Party ‘guests’ actually participated in the voting. Malcolm (1998), p. 344.

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17. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 42. Figures from the independent Kosovar Albanian Association of Trades Unions. 18. Quoted in Judah (2000), p. 57. 19. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 42. 20. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 45. 21. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 46. 22. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 107. These institutions were supported by a 3 percent income tax levied on a large and politically active Albanian diaspora abroad, but also received funding from within Kosovo and assistance from international NGOs. 23. Judah (2000), p. 61. 24. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 44. 25. Michael Salla, “Kosovo, Non-violence and the Break-up of Yugoslavia,” Security Dialogue 26:4 (1995), p. 431. Clark describes their efforts as “defining a new reality against Serb domination and so undermining it.” Clark (2000), p. 116. 26. William Joseph Buckley, ed. Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000), p. 147. 27. OSCE Document no. 28-CSO/Journal No. 3 (September 16, 1994). 28. Salla (1995), p. 435. Also, UN document no. A/RES/51/111 (March 5, 1997). 29. See Contact Group statement March 9, 1998, paras. 8–9. 30. See “Interim Report of Head of Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina,” OSCE Document (December 6, 1992). 31. Malcolm (1998), p. 352. 32. Buckley (2000), p. 240. Some debate the veracity of these claims; e.g., see Layne and Schwarz (2000), pp. 7–8. 33. Clark (2000), p. 118. 34. International Crisis Group, Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward (Balkans Report No. 58: March 12, 1999), p. 3. 35. UN Document no. S/RES/1160 (March 31, 1998). 36. UN Document no. S/RES/1199 (September 23, 1998). 37. UN Document no. S/RES/1199 (September 23, 1998). 38. Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General (March 25, 1999). For specific conditions necessary to halt the bombing campaign, see “The Situation in and around Kosovo”: Statement issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels (April 12, 1999): Both available at www.nato.int. 39. Statement on Kosovo issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. (April 23, 1999). Available at www.nato.int. 40. Forsythe, “Postscript” in Forsythe (2000), pp. 337–338. 41. Interview with NATO officials April 2002. 42. Interview with NATO official April 26, 2002. 43. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 82. Serbia contended that NATO campaign caused a refugee crisis, but this is widely disputed (p. 88). Estimates for refugees and IDPs from IICK report: 863,000

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44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71.

157

and 590,000, respectively. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), p. 90. Press release for OSCE documentary Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As Told. Available at www.osce.org. NATO, Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge (Report prepared from press conference given by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson on March 21, 2000), p. 8. Interview with OSCE official March 5, 2002. Interview with OSCE official March 15, 2002. See OSCE Document no. SEC.FR/945/99/Corr.1 (Restricted) of December 29, 1999. For more details on the JIAS, see Marcus Brand, “The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of Authority from UNMIK to Local Self-Government,” (Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiation, The Rehabilitation of War-Torn Societies Project, January 2003), especially pp. 11–16. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/123/00 (March 3, 2000). OSCE Document no. PC.DEL/262/00 May 5, 2000 (emphasis in original). Nicholas Wood, “Kosovan Victor Claims Win for Independence,” The Guardian (London) (November 19, 2001), p. 14. Interview with OSCE official February 26, 2002. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/334/01 (May 31, 2001). Interview with OSCE official March 6, 2002. UNMIK website http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/more_info.htm (accessed February 23, 2006). See para. 58 of UN Document no. S/2004/613 (July 30, 2004) and UN Document no. S/2004/348 (April 30, 2004). UN document no. S/2004/613 (July 30, 2004), para. 52. UN document no. S/2005/635 Annex (October 7, 2005). UN document no. S/2005/635 Annex (October 7, 2005). UN document no. S/2005/635 Annex (October 7, 2005). UN document no. S/2005/635 Annex (October 7, 2005). UN document no. S/2006/361, paragraph 23 (June 5, 2006). UN document no. S/2005/635, Annex (October 7, 2005). UN document no. S/2005/635, (October 7, 2005). UN document no. S/2006/361, paragraph 6 (June 5, 2006) and UN document no. S/2006/707, paragraph 14 (September 1, 2006). UN document no. S/2007/134 (March 9, 2007). UN document no. S/2008/168 (March 10, 2008). Contact Group statement April 29, 1998. Likewise, a Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation (no. 1368, April 22, 1998) stated: “The Assembly reaffirms its position that, without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, a long-term solution to the crisis in Kosovo can only be found on the basis of a mutually agreed solution.” Interview with OSCE official March 13, 2002. Interview with EU official April 10, 2002.

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NOTES

4

NAGORNO-K ARABAKH: BALANCING STANDARDS?

Portions of chapter 4 are reprinted with permission from “Beyond standards before status: democratic governance and non-state actors, by Anne-Marie Gardner Review of International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 03, July 2008, pp. 531–552 Copyright © 2008 British International Studies Association. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 1. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/717/01: Armenian delegation statement to Permanent Council of OSCE (October 1, 2001). 2. Stephen H. Astourian, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Dimensions, Lessons, and Prospects,” Mediterranean Quarterly 5:4 (Fall 1994), p. 90. 3. The 10 points of the Decalogue include geopolitical as well as other principles: sovereign equality, refrain from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention of internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, cooperation among states, and fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law. 4. Arie Vaserman and Rami Ginat, “National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17 (1994), p. 347. 5. Quoted in The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis: A Time for Resolution (Conference Proceedings), Washington, DC: 2000. 6. Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 27. 7. David Rieff, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Case Study in Ethnic Strife,” Foreign Affairs 76:3 (March/April 1997), p. 131. In 2005, 99.7 percent of the enclave’s 138,000 residents were Armenian. Karine Ohaniyan, “Karabakh Ponders Kosovo’s Independence,” The Moscow Times February 18, 2008. 8. Croissant (1998), p. 41. 9. Croissant (1998), pp. 41–42. 10. Report of OSCE Mission 12–18 Feb 1992 (visited Nagorno-Karabakh on February 17, 1992). 11. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/177/01 (March 16, 2001): The active phase of the conflict lasted from 1988–1994, claimed over 35,000 lives, and displaced over 1 million people. 12. Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, “Armenia’s New Autocrats,” Journal of Democracy 8:3 (1997), p. 80. The exact extent of Armenia’s role in the war from 1992–94 is not known, but is generally recognized as considerable. 13. Pavel Baev, Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 32; and Michael Mihalka, “Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian Peacekeeping: Prospects for a Second Dayton,” International Peacekeeping 3:3 (Autumn 1996), p. 21. Azerbaijan has been emboldened, thinking the West will help achieve diplomatically what it couldn’t militarily; oil

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14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

159

deals are also providing Azerbaijan with capital to rebuild and prepare for re-opening of hostilities. See introduction in Croissant (1998). Croissant (1998). Patricia Carley, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution,” (United States Institute of Peace Roundtable Report: December 1998) and Mihalka (1996). Thomas de Waal, “Fearing the Worst,” The World Today 62:12 (December 2006), p. 23. Mihalka (1996), p. 21. US law forbids American firms to do business with Iran, thus the US oil companies involved in extricating the oil would not be allowed to ship the oil through Iran. The Russian route through Chechnya would have been the cheapest option, but Azerbaijan expressed concerns regarding the ongoing conflict there. De Waal (2006), p. 24 Russia had given arms to Armenia worth over $1 billion; some say Moscow has an interest in keeping the conflict alive but “frozen” in order to maintain influence in the region and to secure for itself the role of key mediator. See Baev (1997), p. 37. Levon Chorbajian, et al. The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994), p. 75: Russian support oscillates between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian lobby in the United States is also an influential force, and has been able to influence perceptions of the case, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenian and Azerbaijan Thought Peace and War (New York: New York Press, 2003), pp. 252–253. Sabrina Tavernise, “A Northern Neighbor Growls, and Azerbaijan Adjusts,” New York Times, October 23, 2008, p. A14. Mihalka (1996), p. 21. Carley (1998). Proceedings from the OSCE Rome Conference 1992 (fourth session), statement from Azerbaijan delegation (August 1, 1992): condemns Armenia as aggressor and urges sanctions against Armenia, as per international law. Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Communication 274, October 20, 1993): In response to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 874, the statement reaffirms Azeri commitment to UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitment to peaceful resolution. Statement by the Republic of Azerbaijan (May 1993): In response to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 822, Azerbaijan notes that as the victim of aggression it appreciates this response aimed at the liberation of its occupied territories. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/839/01 (November 23, 2001) Restricted: Quoting statement made to UN General Assembly November 13–15, 2001. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/620/01 (September 6, 2001). OSCE document no. PC.DEL/707/01 (September 27, 2001). Interview with OSCE official February 26, 2002: Argued that OSCE response is not

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29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

NOTES principled–why is OSCE protecting territorial integrity in Moldova and Georgia, but not in Azerbaijan? Influence of Armenian lobby may explain this. It is obvious to him that proposals are biased toward Armenia and not based on international law. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/620/01 (September 6, 2001). OSCE document no. SEC.DEL/82/01 (April 5, 2001). International Crisis Group, Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, Europe Report No. 167 (October 11, 2005), pp. 4–5. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/719/01 (October 1, 2001). OSCE document no. PC.DEL/429/98 (October 8, 1998). OSCE document no. Communication 281 (October 21, 1993). UN Security Council Resolution 822 on April 30, 1993, after fall of Kelbajar: Recognized conflict as between Republic of Azerbaijan and “local Armenian forces” while rejecting forceful alteration of borders. All parties therefore welcomed Resolution 822. UN Security Council Resolution 853 adopted on July 29, 1993, following an attack on Agdam (Azeri city in eastern NagornoKarabakh). UN Security Council Resolution 884 passed on November 12, 1993, after Armenians attack Zangelan (the last Azeri–held town in the area). Resolution 884 called for Armenian withdrawal, but also mentioned Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh as parties to the conflict. Croissant (1998), pp. 89–95. The Armenian delegation to the OSCE has stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union created Pandora’s Box of overlapping legal issues. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/717/01 (October 1, 2001). OSCE document no. PC.DEL/429/98 (October 8, 1998). OSCE document no. PC.DEL/429/98 (October 8, 1998). International Crisis Group (2005), p. 5. Report of the OSCE Mission February 12–18, 1992. OSCE document dated April 20, 1993: Armenian statement in response to a note from Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan. International Crisis Group (2005), p. 6. Proceedings from the OSCE Rome Conference 1992 (fourth session), statement from Nagorno-Karabakh representative (August 4, 1992). Proceedings of OSCE CSO meeting January 27–28, 1992. Interview with OSCE official March 6, 2002. OSCE Minsk Group report, September 15, 1992. Katia Papagianni describes how participation from both elites and public builds legitimacy. See pp. 61–65 in Papagianni, “Participation and State Legitimacy,” pp. 49–71 in Vanessa Wyeth and Charles T. Call, Building States to Build Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008). OSCE document no. SEC.DEL/80/01 US Mission statement to the OSCE (April 3, 2001). OSCE document no. PC.DEL/620/01 (September 6, 2001). OSCE document no. SEC.DEL/82/01 (April 5, 2001). Proceedings from the OSCE Rome conference 1992 (third session). Report of the OSCE Mission February 12–18, 1992.

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161

52. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/177/01 (March 16, 2001): figures cover 1988–1994. 53. Razmik Panossian, “The Irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: Formal Institutions versus Informal Politics,” Regional and Federal Studies 11:3 (January 2001), p. 148. 54. De Waal (2003), pp. 170–72. 55. Panossian (2001), p. 161, footnote 7. 56. Proceedings from the OSCE Rome Conference 1992 (second session), statement from Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1992. 57. Rieff, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Case Study in Ethnic Strife” p. 128. Quote from Deputy Minister Atajanian. 58. See Rieff (1997) and Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994). 59. Russian support had oscillated between Armenia and Azerbaijan: support for Armenia while Azerbaijan was under the rule of the hardliner Elchibey, but tilted toward Azerbaijan when Aliyev enrolled Azerbaijan in the CIS in 1993. Lalig Papazian, “A People’s Will: Armenian Irredentism over Nagorno-Karabakh,” pp. 54–94 in Levon Chorbajian, ed. The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh: From Secession to Republic (Houndmills, Baskingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 75. 60. OSCE document no. REF.PC/179/96 Armenian statement to OSCE (March 7, 1996). 61. Panossian (2001), p. 148. 62. Bremmer and Welt (1997), p. 78. 63. For details on these political events, see Panossian (2001), pp. 152–153. 64. See OSCE document no. Communication 119 (March 27, 1992) Restricted. 65. Carley (1998). 66. British Helsinki Human Rights Group report (http://bhhrg.org/azerbaijan/ 8-apathy-not-fraud-undermines-azerbaijans.html). 67. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/184/01 (March 22, 2001): EU statement in support of Baku mission, notes its work on democratization, respect of human rights and the rule of law. Compare to less lengthy list in EU statement to Yerevan mission, PC.DEL/74/01 (February 8, 2001). 68. Thomas Ambrosio, “Congressional Perceptions of Ethnic Cleansing: Reactions to the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups,” The Review of International Affairs 2:1 (Autumn 2002), pp. 24–45. 69. Interview with OSCE official March 13, 2002. S. Neil MacFarlane and Larry Minear, Humanitarian Action and Politics: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies (Brown University), Occasional Paper Series No. 25: 1997, p. 51: Azeri diaspora numbers 1 million people–more dispersed, less prosperous, and less well organized than Armenians. For detailed analysis of Armenian lobby and its effects on perceptions and policy in the United States, see Ambrosio (2002). 70. Ambrosio (2002), p. 40. 71. OSCE document no. REF.S/17/96 draft decision of heads of State or Government on settlement of the conflict (November 5, 1996) Restricted.

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162

72.

73.

74. 75. 76. 77.

78.

79. 80.

81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

NOTES These Lisbon Principles were accepted by all OSCE members except Armenia. OSCE document no. REF.PC/735/96 (November 12, 2006) Restricted. Certain aspects need to be solved concurrently due to their interdependent nature: withdrawal from occupied territories; unimpeded access between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia; security of the territory and its population; territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and broadest possible self-rule for NagornoKarabakh; refugee return, observance of norms of international humanitarian law, and transparency in safeguarding regional security. OSCE document no. REF.PC/179/96 Armenian statement to OSCE (March 7, 1996) and OSCE document no. PC.DEL/639/01 (September 7, 2001). However, the Armenian delegation has also commented on autonomy: “People whose legally established rights were withdrawn once unilaterally, get very suspicious about settling for the same rights if they can be arbitrarily taken back by the same sovereign entity.” OSCE document no. PC.FR/12/99 Minsk co-chairs statement (May 12, 1999): ceasefire should not replace movement toward real peace. MacFarlane and Minear (1997), pp. 88–89. 1997 co-chairs proposal (Agreement II: Status). See reports from The British Helsinki Human Rights Group and the Public International Law and Policy Group (http://www.publicinternationallaw. org/news/nkjuly2005.html\; 2002: http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/ publications/reports/Nagorno_Election.html). See report from the Public International Law and Policy Group http://www. publicinternationallaw.org/publications/reports/Nagorno_Election.html). Voter turnout: 84,000 out of population of 150,000. OSCE documents no. PC.DEL/639/01 (September 7, 2001) and no. SEC.FR/404/01 (June 8, 2001) Restricted. MacFarlane and Minear (1997), p. 69. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/120/02 (March 5, 2002) Restricted. Kocharyan was President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, then Prime Minister of Armenia (1997), before being elected President of Armenia in 1998. Arminfo (Armenian news agency), “Polls Chance to Prove Karabakh is Democratic Country, President Says,” August 11, 2002 (supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring). OSCE document no. SEC.FR/14/02 (January 10, 2002) Restricted. See also SEC.FR/839/01 (November 23, 2001) Restricted. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/605/01 (August 16, 2001) Restricted. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/839/01 (November 23, 2001) Restricted: Armenian Foreign Minister, V. Oskanyan. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/376/00 (July 6, 2000). OSCE document no. PC.FR/12/99 Minsk co-chairs statement (May 12, 1999): ceasefire should not replace movement toward real peace. Interview with OSCE official March 13, 2002. The September 2001 and 1996 Nagorno-Karabakh elections were denounced by many OSCE members as illegal, as only the Azeri government is recognized as a legitimate election authority.

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163

88. Interview with OSCE officials March 4, 2002 and February 26, 2002. 89. Interview with OSCE official March 6, 2002. 90. International Crisis Group (2005), p. 14. Azerbaijan denies agreeing to such an exchange. 91. Interview with OSCE official March 4, 2002, and OSCE document no. CIO.GAL/74/01 (November 27, 2001). 92. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/120/02 (March 5, 2002) Restricted: On February 8, the final statement was issued of the trilateral meeting in Strasbourg of the United Nations, OSCE, and Council of Europe. 93. Interview with EU official March 12, 2002: the European Union pledged to support the resolution with money. The EU presents demarches to Baku and Yerevan on human rights–looking to uphold universal standards. The EU has an image as an honest broker, partly because it tries to remain neutral. The EU wanted more active political role in Caucasus–note pronouncement on February 26, 2001: The EU supports moves for conflict resolution, in favor of regional integration. The EU pushes human rights in virtually every statement. 94. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/20/01 (January 15, 2001). Restricted. 95. OSCE document no. SEC.DEL/18/01 (February 1, 2001). 96. OSCE document no. SEC/FR/146/01 (March 2001). Restricted: Aliyev speech to Parliament. 97. Phillip Petersen, “Security Policy in Post-Soviet Transcaucasia,” European Security 3:1 (Spring 1994), pp. 41–42: quote from an ethnic Ukrainian member of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights and Nationalities Policies on Nagorno-Karabakh. He doesn’t expect UN action, despite the Iraq precedent in responding to aggression against Kuwait, and says Azeris find it “very strange that Armenia could occupy Azeri territory with no reaction from NATO.” 98. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/534/00 (October 4, 2000): Armenian reaction to Lisbon principles, including “the self-determination of the people within the highest form of autonomy.” 99. OSCE document no. PC.DEL/717/01: Armenian delegation statement to Permanent Council of OSCE (October 1, 2001). 100. Arminfo (Armenian news agency), “Armenian Leader Hails Breakaway Karabakh Referendum,” December 11, 2006 (supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring). 101. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Karabakh Distances Itself from Other CIS Separatists – Armenian Agency,” June 17, 2006. 102. BBC Worldwide Monitoring “Separatist Karabakh Leader Urges Azerbaijan not to go to War,” September 2, 2006. 103. International Crisis Group, Azerbaijan’s 2005: Lost Opportunity Europe Briefing No. 40 (November 21, 2005). Footnotes 4 and 5 cite additional reports from ICG, OSCE, and Human Rights Watch denouncing the 2003 elections. 104. Levon Sevunts, “Breakaway State Still Struggling for Recognition,” The Washington Times, September 30, 2007, p. A7. Author quotes Sergie Markedov from the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, an independent Russian think tank.

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NOTES

105. De Waal (2006), p. 24. 106. “Bloodshed in Armenia Worries both Russia and the West,” The Economist (March 8, 2008). 107. International Crisis Group (2005), p. 13. 108. International Crisis Group (2005), p. 13: common state, autonomy, dual Azeri-Armenian protectorate, earned sovereignty, regional solution. 109. International Crisis Group (2005), p. 15. 110. OSCE Press Release, July 3, 2006 (obtained from www.osce.org on October 12, 2006). 111. Interview with OSCE official March 6, 2002. 112. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/404/01 (June 8, 2001) Restricted: plan then under discussion with the European Union, UNDP, the World Bank, and the United States. 113. Interview with EU official April 12, 2002. 114. OSCE document no. SEC.FR/14/02 (January 10, 2002) Restricted. 115. Interim Report of the Chairman of the Minsk Conference (June 29, 1992).

5

WESTERN SAHARA: DESERTED STANDARDS?

Portions of chapter 5 are reprinted with permission from “Self-Determination in the Western Sahara: Legal Opportunities and Political Roadblocks,” International Peacekeeping, 7:2 (Summer 2000), pp. 115–138 Available online at: http://www. informaworld.com. 1. Memorandum from The Polisario Front to the United Nations Security Council (February 16, 2007). Available at Sahara Press Service http://www. spsrasd.info/en/infos/2007/02/sps-e160207–3.html. 2. An invitation from Henry Kissinger to Prince Juan Carlos. Leo Kamil, Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987), p. 11. As inducement, Spain was to receive weapons and favorable terms on the renewal of air and naval base leases from the United States. See Stephen Zunes, “The United States in the Saharan War: A Case of Low-Intensity Intervention,” in Zoubir and Volman (1993), p. 54. 3. Morocco gained control of the lucrative phosphate deposits in the north, created an opportunity to neutralize (by deployment) the army from which two recent assassination attempts had originated, and bolstered King Hassan’s standing with domestic opposition groups which favored expansionism. Mauritania procured vast fishing resources off the southern coast of Western Sahara and established a buffer against Moroccan irredentism (which claimed not only Western Sahara but also Mauritania as part of a “Greater Morocco”). 4. John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), pp. 72–73. The author asserts that the “heavy-handed nature of the Moroccan takeover” led to the refugee exodus.

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5. Anthony G. Pazzanita, “Morocco versus Polisario: a Political Interpretation,” The Journal of Modern Africa Studies 32:2 (1994), p.270. Algeria provided the Polisario Front with rear bases, arms, training, and supplies. See Anthony G. Pazzanita, “Mauritania’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Protection,” The Journal of Modern Africa Studies 30:2 (1992), p. 285. The Moroccan response was to build a system of earthen berms that limited the Polisario Front’s ability control territory and slowly pushed the military advantage in Morocco’s favor. 6. Payne in Zoubir and Volman (1993), p. 135. 7. “The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara,” The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 3. The full mandate was to verify reductions of Moroccan troops, monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Polisario combatants to specified areas, ensure the release of political prisoners, oversee the exchange of prisoners, implement the repatriation of refugees, identify and register qualified voters, and organize a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results. The envisioned strength was 800–1000 civilian, 1700 military, and 300 police personnel. 8. Besides the original January 1992 date, several tentative dates for the referendum were set or suggested in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2000. 9. In January 1997, the advent of Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General ushered in a new international emphasis on the legal issues in the case and a revitalized effort to resolve the conflict through a free and fair referendum. Annan released his first report on Western Sahara two months after assuming the helm at the United Nations, and less than one month later he had selected James Baker III to serve as his special envoy to the region. According to Annan, Baker was chosen because the United Nations needed a “most distinguished statesman” of “high international reputation” to attempt to surmount the impasse and to underscore the importance Annan attaches to the issue. Both parties to the conflict viewed the choice favorably and as a potential watershed in resolving the stalemate; a Polisario representative called the appointment “a great step on the way to resolve the conflict.” After several visits to the region, Baker succeeded in bringing the parties into direct negotiations three times in 1997, culminating in the signing the Houston Accords in September. See Robert H. Reid, “Former U.S. Secretary of State Named Special Envoy on Western Sahara,” (Associated Press, March 17, 1994); John M. Goshko, “James Baker May be Named U.N. Envoy to Western Sahara,” Washington Post (March 4, 1997), p. A11; and Western Sahara Referendum Association, “Sahara Weekly News Update,” (Africa News Service, March 17, 1997). 10. UN document no. S/2000/131 (February 22, 2000), para. 6 and UN document no. S/2000/461 (May 22, 2000). Exact numbers: 195,589 identified; 86,412 eligible. See also Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 17. 11. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western Sahara: Background to Conflict. (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 299. Morocco feared a shift in the regional balance of power should the Polisario Front win control of

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12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

NOTES Western Sahara. Stephen J. Solarz, “Arms for Morocco?” Foreign Affairs 58:2 (1979/80), p. 285. Phillip C. Naylor, “Spain, France, and the Western Sahara: A Historical Narrative and Study of National Transformation,” pp. 17–52 in Zoubir and Volman (1993), p.35 and Thompson and Adloff (1980), pp. 263–265; and Jarat Chopra, Peace Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 176. Yahia H. Zoubir and Karima Benabdallah-Gambier, “The United States and the North African Imbroglio: Balancing Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara,” Mediterranean Politics 10:2 (July 2005), p. 188. An unfriendly regime in Morocco could adversely affect American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. As a tenuous US ally, King Hassan had facilitated talks between Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin, which led to the Camp David Accords, concluded military basing agreements for a US Rapid Deployment Force, and sent troops to Zaire (Congo) to protect Western interests tied to the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Naylor in Zoubir and Volman (1993), p. 31. Naylor in Zoubir and Volman (1993), p. 37. Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions,” The Journal of Modern Africa Studies 28:2 (1990), p. 233. Jacques Eric Rousellier, “Quicksand in the Western Sahara? From Referendum Stalemate to Negotiated Solution,” International Negotiation 10:2 (2005), p. 322. Zoubir (1990), pp. 232–234. Algeria’s problems compounded by a fall in oil prices, sparking urban riots in October 1988. Morocco war chest was being depleted by $1.5 million per day. Louis Wiznitzer, “Deal Stirs Hopes in North Africa: Secret Algeria-Morocco Could End Bloody Rebellion,” Toronto Star (May 24, 1988), p. A18. Zoubir (1990), p. 227. Zoubir (2005), p. 182. “President Benjedid Reiterates Algeria’s Position on Western Sahara Issue,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (September 27, 1988). Solarz (1979/80), p. 286. The Court’s opinion cited two special circumstances under which this constraint could be abrogated: when those seeking self-determination are not a ‘people’ or when a referendum is unnecessary. This follows from Resolutions 1514 and 1541, which laid the foundation for the colonial approach to selfdetermination questions. See discussion in chapter 1. Naylor in Zoubir and Volman (1993), p. 24. Zoubir (2005), p. 190: Even the United States has not recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. In Mauritania, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah had signed the Madrid Accords in part as a bulwark against Moroccan irredentism and under the mistaken belief that the Polisario Front would opt for integration with Mauritania, making a referendum unnecessary. Neither of these rationales was upheld by events. The Polisario Front had immediately attacked Mauritania, forcing Mauritania to align more closely with Morocco and accept Moroccan troops

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NOTES

28.

29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43.

167

in Mauritanian cities for defense. Army morale plummeted at this sign of Mauritania’s lack of defensive capability. The cost of the war, lost revenue from Polisario attacks on a vital rail link for transporting exports, a fall in world iron and copper prices, and a 1977–78 drought crippled the economy. These military and economic problems culminated in a July 1978 coup. The new government signed a peace treaty with the Polisario Front, agreeing to transfer its third of Western Sahara to the Sahrawi state–but Morocco took control as Mauritania pulled out in 1979. See Thompson and Adloff (1980), p. 273. See Abdeslam Maghraoui, “Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute,” Mediterranean Politics 8:1 (Spring 2003), pp. 119–20. Damis (1983), p. 74. the Polisario Front, however, questioned the legitimacy of the assembly, as two-thirds of the former Jemaa members had pledged support to the Polisario Front. The Jemaa vote in February 1976 prompted the formation of the SADR. Damis (1983), p. 80. Thomas M. Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” American Journal of International Law 70:4 (October 1976), p. 717. Rousellier (2005), p. 313. Zoubir (1990), p. 233. Solarz (1979/80), p. 286. Solarz argued that allowing US weapons to be used under the mantle of internal defense and security “would require us to ignore the clear intention of the international community to deal with the Western Sahara problem by political, not military, action as well as our own statements of support for a regional solution.” See pp. 291–92. Zoubir (2005), p. 190. Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Western Sahara Conflict: A Case Study in Failure of Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict,” California Western Law Journal 26:2 (Spring 1996), p.205. Manz’s most vehement objection was to Morocco’s policy of moving 170,000 people from Morocco into Western Sahara in order to support expansion of the census list. Chopra (1999), p. 169. Perez de Cuellar secured a seat on the board of a Moroccan corporation upon leaving the United Nations. Interview with UN official January 31, 2003. Zoubir (1996), p. 205. The author continues, “Indeed, some of the actions of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative may explain why Morocco has not found it in its interest to enter any serious negotiations with Polisario.” Jarat Chopra, “A Chance for Peace in Western Sahara,” Survival 39:3 (Fall 1997), p. 54. Boutros-Ghali, as a member of the Egyptian delegation to the OAU, had voted against seating the SADR in 1982. Rousellier (2005), p. 68. UN document no. S/RES/1359 (June 29, 2001). Cara Buckley, “Western Sahara’s Conflict Traps Refugees in Limbo,” New York Times, June 4, 2008: A10. Most estimates range from 150,000 to 175,000 refugees.

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NOTES

44. For details on the democratic political structure of the Polisario Front and SADR, see Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: Roots of a Desert War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983), pp. 339–341 and Zunes (1988), pp. 142–147. 45. Thompson and Adloff (1980), p. 251. 46. Zunes (1988), pp. 144–145. 47. Jacob A. Mundy, “Performing the Nation, Pre-Figuring the State: The Western Sahara Refugees, Thirty Years Later,” Journal of Modern African Studies 45:2 (2007), p. 282. 48. Hodges (1983), p. 339. 49. Hodges (1983), p. 342. 50. Mundy (2007), especially pp. 280 and 284–287. 51. Simpson (1992), p. 2147. 52. Mundy (2007), p. 279. The author states that 150,000 Moroccan soldiers were still present in the territory at that time, mostly along the berm. 53. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps (Morocco, Western Sahara, Algeria: Human Rights Watch, December 2008), p. 25. 54. Zunes (1988), pp. 142 and 154. 55. See Hodges (1983), p. 207; Yahia H. Zoubir, “Origins and Development of the Conflict in the Western Sahara,” pp. 1–16 in Zoubir and Volman (1993), pp. 9 and 3; and William J. Durch, “United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara,” pp. 406–434 in William J. Durch, ed. Evolution of Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 411, respectively. 56. “King Confirms Direct Contacts with Polisario,” APS Diplomatic Recorder 19:45 (November 9, 1996). 57. Simpson (1992), p. 2147. 58. UN documents no. S/RES/275 (1975), no. S/RES/3437 (1979), and no. S/ RES/3518 (1980) condemned Morocco’s takeover of Mauritania’s portion of Western Sahara. 59. Manuel Cabrales Rives, “Morocco: Decisive Turn Seen on Horizon in Western Sahara Conflict,” (Inter Press Service: September 18, 1989). 60. Chris Simpson, “Referendum Regrets,” West Africa No. 3926 (December 14–20, 1992), p. 2147. 61. Pazzanita (1994), p. 274 62. These criteria for inclusion in the identification process were: persons on the revised 1974 census, persons living in the territory in 1974 but not included in the census, close relatives (father, mother, children) of the previous two groups, persons whose father is a Saharan born in the territory, and members of Saharan tribes who have lived there for six consecutive or intermittently for 12 years before 1974. 63. Jensen (2005), p. 59. 64. Jensen (2005), p. 59. 65. Mundy (2007), p. 282.

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66. Pablo San Martin, “Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in the Western Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies 10:3 (September–December 2005), p. 568. 67. Mundy (2007), p. 288. 68. Laurence S. Hanauer, “The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to the Ethno-National Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case,” Emory International Law Review 9 (1995), p. 169. 69. “Morocco May Stop Saharan Identification Process if ‘discrimination’ Continues,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts from MAP News Agency, Rabat: (February 28, 1998). 70. UN document no. S/1995/779 (September 8, 1995). See discussion in Jensen (2005), p. 79. 71. Durch (1993), p. 430. 72. In addition to those counted on the 1974 census and their immediate families (the sole basis of voter eligibility in the 1988 settlement proposals), the list of possible voters now included persons whose father was born in Western Sahara or those who had lived in the territory either six consecutive years or twelve intermittent years. UN document no. S/23299 (December 19, 1991), paragraphs 29–31. 73. Chopra (1999), p. 171. 74. Panafrican News Agency, “80,000 Sahrawis Identified Since 1994,” Africa News February 8, 1998. 75. Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda, and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (Dordrecht, Boston, London; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), p. 196. 76. See Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, “The Western Sahara Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era,” pp. 227–240 in Zoubir and Volman (1993), pp. 233– 234. When Javier Perez de Cuellar left at the end of 1991, Boutros BoutrosGhali was left to continue negotiations on this issue. Also, Jensen (2005), p. 47. 77. Stephen Zunes, “Western Sahara: Peace Derailed?” Current History 95:601 (May 1996), pp. 229–232. Morocco has also restricted MINURSO’s ability to advertise to the population the opportunity to register and vote. Other examples of Moroccan stubbornness include blocking the deployment of peacekeepers, refusing to allow UN supplies to be unloaded at a Moroccan port, and not divulging the location or number of Moroccan troops. 78. Jensen (2005), p. 52. 79. Jensen (2005), p. 54. 80. Roula Khalaf, “Baker Brokers Referendum Plan for Western Sahara,” Financial Times (London), September 18, 1997, p. 4. 81. UN document no. S/1999/88 (January 28, 1999). See Chopra (1999), p. 62. 82. UN document no. S/1999/88 (January 28, 1999). 83. Jensen (2005), p. 75. 84. John F. Burns, “Sahara Impasse: Line in Sand or National Border?” The New York Times, June 16, 1999, p. A10.

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NOTES

85. Adel Darwish, “Hopes Rise for End to Saharan Dispute,” The Scotsman, July 26, 1999, p. 8. 86. On Moroccan reforms, see Elaine Sciolino, “At a Transition Moment, Morocco’s King is Mute,” New York Times, May 27, 2003, p. A3. 87. “Many Victims of Moroccan Presence,” The Gazette, February 27, 2000, p. B2. 88. US State Department Country Reports: Western Sahara 2007. 89. Giles Tremlett, “Morocco’s ‘King of the Poor’ Reveals Selfish Face,” The Observer November 4, 2001, p. 27. 90. Adekeye Adebajo, “Sheikhs, Soldiers, and Sand,” The World Today 56:1 (January 2000), pp. 19–21. 91. Laura E. Smith, “The Struggle for Western Sahara: What Future for Africa’s Last Colony?” The Journal of North African Studies 10:3 (September– December 2005), p. 556. 92. US State Department Country Reports: Western Sahara 2002. 93. Mundy (2007), pp. 282–83. 94. Mundy (2007), p. 293. 95. San Martin (2005), p. 568. 96. Buckley (2008), p. A10. 97. San Martin (2005), p. 566: Nationalism promoted the formation of a unified identity–defense against Moroccanization. 98. See Zunes (1988), p. 149 on Islam in the Sahrawis’ historical development. 99. Hodges (1983), p. 346. 100. San Martin (2005), p. 584. 101. Interview with UN official January 31, 2003, and UN document no. S/2002/749–letter from the Polisario Front to Security Council, circulated by Namibian delegation. 102. Giles Tremlett, “UN Admits Defeat on Western Sahara: Security Council Urged to Accept Annexation by Morocco,” The Guardian (London), June 22, 2001, p. 15. 103. UN document no. S/2000/683, paragraph 21. Further, paragraph 28 stated that the positions of the parties in interpreting some key elements of the settlement plan coupled with the problems encountered over the previous nine years don’t bode well for prospect of successful implementation. How the referendum results would be enforced has always been an issue–though never directly addressed. See paragraph 29. 104. Carola Hoyos and Toby Shelley, “Oil Drilling Strains Peace Settlement in the Western Sahara,” Financial Times (London) November 14, 2001, p. 15. 105. Jensen (2005), p. 103. 106. Compare UN document S/2003/565 (May 23, 2003) to the December 13, 2000 statement from the Sahrawi Ministry of Information, the latter claiming that Morocco holds 150 POWs and 208 political detainees who “have yet to receive proper interest from specialized organizations.” Statement accessed on June 24, 2003 from www.wsahara.net. 107. UN document no. S/2001/613 (June 20, 2001).

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NOTES 108. 109. 110. 111.

112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

118.

171

UN document no. S/RES/1359 (June 29, 2001). Interview with Polisario official January 31, 2003. UN document no. S/2003/565 (May 23, 2003), paras. 50–59. In an interview on PBS on August 19, 2004, Baker noted: “The closer we got to implementing [the plan] the more nervous I think the Moroccans got about whether they might not win that referendum.” UN document no. S/RES/1754 (April 30, 2007). Interview with UN official January 27, 2003 UN document no. S/2000/1029 (October 25, 2000) and Jensen (2005), p. 104. UN document no. S/2010/175 (April 6, 2010), para. 73. UN document no. S/2003/565 (May 23, 2003), para. 50. “An Endless Dance in the Desert.” The Economist, March 27, 1999: “Why does the UN plod wearily on? Perhaps because the alternatives are even worse. The Security Council is not prepared to rattle a sabre at Morocco, which enjoys the friendship of France and America. And if the UN pulled out, the Polisario rebels might carry out their threat to resume the war, and Algeria might join in on their side. The status quo legitimises Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara without accepting its sovereignty there, which would upset Algeria.” As of November 2001, down from 76 in 1995. Adekeye Adebajo, Selling Out the Sahara: The Tragic Tale of the UN Referendum (Cornell, NY: Institute for African Development, Cornell University, Occasional Papers Series, Spring 2002), p. 55. Rwanda notes that if a vote on seating the SADR in the OAU were held now, they wouldn’t garner as many votes as in past—but OAU later reiterates support for SADR. “On the Sahrawi Republic” Middle East News (from Info-Prod Research) April 14, 1999.

6

CONCLUSION

Portions of chapter 6 are reprinted with permission from “Beyond standards before status: democratic governance and non-state actors, by Anne-Marie Gardner Review of International Studies, Volume 34, Issue 03, July 2008, pp. 531–552 Copyright © 2008 British International Studies Association. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 1. Zaum (2007), p. 226. The paradox Zaum highlights is the modern effort, echoing John Stuart Mills and others, to use the concept such as ‘civilization’ to reconcile the self-determination of peoples (i.e., letting the people choose their form of government) to the self-determination of individuals (which requires a liberal democratic society). Modern peacebuilding emphasizes the latter by establishing liberal democratic institutions, but the lack of choice for the targets of state-building efforts curtails their collective self-determination. 2. Johnston (2001), pp. 487–515.

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3. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964). 4. Fukuyama (2004), p. 26. 5. Zaum (2007), p. 40. 6. Armstrong (1999), p. 560. 7. Robin Ludwig, “Free and Fair Elections: Letting the People Decide,” pp. 115– 162 in Krasno (2004). 8. Zaum (2007), p. 234. 9. Hurd (2007), p. 31. 10. Barnett (2006), p. 93. See also Philpott, (1995), pp. 353–368; and Paris (2004). In a similar vein, the human rights literature has wrestled with the issues of whether universal rights exist and, if so, where to draw the line between enforcing universal rights and allowing expressions of local culture. See Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, eds. International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) pp. 166–240 and R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 37–57. 11. David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of Statebuilding (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2006), p. 9. Similarly, a recent debate among international legal scholars focuses on whether there is an entitlement to democracy under international law and what role various states and institutions can legally play in democratic transitions. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, eds. Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 12. See Johnston (2001), pp. 501–502 on self-identification with social norms. 13. Kingsbury (1992), p. 501; Mills (1998); Kumar Rupesinghe, ed. Conflict Transformation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995) on conflict resolution in general as a process: p. 325. Tomuschat (1993), p. 17: the goal of selfdetermination resolution is accommodating legitimate claims of peoples and minorities without destroying institutions of government. 14. See, e.g., Paris (2004). 15. Through its work on premature elections in post–civil war situations, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has argued that elections are a source of stability not in and of themselves, but when citizenry believes in electoral processes; this climate must be created or nourished before holding elections. Current work explores the use of democratic institutions as conflict management tools. See IDEA website at www. idea.net. 16. Danspeckgruber (1997). Also, Jennone Walker, “International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts,” Survival 35:1 (Spring 1993), p. 106. Simpson asserts that the concept cannot be understood in either sphere apart from the other. Simpson (1996). 17. See p. 75 in Adam Watson, The Limits of Independence: Relations between States in the Modern World (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) as well as p. 81 in Mills (1998) on looking for solutions outside the sovereignty

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18.

19. 20.

21.

173

discourse; Cobban (1969) on the need to transcend the sovereign state; Danspeckgruber (1997); and Gottlieb (1993). Walter A. Kemp, ed. Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001); and Wolfgang Zellner and Falk Lange, eds. Peace and Stability Through Minority Rights (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). See, e.g., Lapidoth (1992); and James Gow, “Shared Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: Lessons from the Yugoslav War,” in Hashmi (1997), p. 177. See especially Hannum (1990) on autonomy, Tomuschat (1993) on federalism, and Rupesinghe (1995) on conflict transformation (through autonomy or power-sharing, e.g.). Also, Asbjorn Eide, “Peaceful Group Accommodation as an Alternative to Secession in Sovereign States,” in Clark and Williamson (1996) and Kemp (2001). Similar to studies testing the durability of peace agreements, e.g. Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

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Interviews Conducted with Officials at the Following Organizations United Nations (UN), New York City and Geneva Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Vienna and The Hague North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Brussels European Union (EU), Brussels International Peace Academy, New York City Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton Institut fuer Recht und Religion, Vienna Diplomatische Akademie, Vienna Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, The Hague

Websites, Documents, and Public Statements Contact Group (Kosovo) European Union Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org Minorities at Risk Project: www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ International IDEA: www.idea.int Minsk Group (Nagorno-Karabakh) North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE Archives in Prague, Czech Republic United Nations: www.un.org United States Institute of Peace: www.usip.org Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization: www.unpo.org

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Index

Abdelaziz, Mohamed, 119, 128 Abiyev, S., 94 Afghanistan, 3, 94–95 Ahtisaari, Martti, 67 Albright, Madeleine, 124 Algeria, 107, 109–111, 117–119, 123, 165, 166, 171 Aliyev, Heydar, 81, 87, 97, 99 Aliyev, Ilham, 99–100 Amnesty International, 55, 118 Annan, Kofi Baker and, 108, 112, 125, 165 election as UN Secretary-General, 165 Kosovo and, 66 MINURSO and, 120 Morocco and, 112, 115, 120–121, 125, 129, 132 Armenia, 16–18, 39–40, 42, 79–102, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163 Azerbaijan, 16–17, 40, 42, 71–103 aftermath of war with Armenia, 90–93 anti-terrorism efforts, 94–95 Armenia and, 71–73 EU and, 97 Minsk Group and, 93 OSCE and, 96–97 period following Soviet rule, 83–87 Baker, James A. III, 108, 112, 115, 120–121, 125, 129–131, 165, 171 Balkan crisis, 49–50 Basic Principles (Prague Process), 100

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Benjedid, Chadli, 111 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 51, 57, 59–60 Boumedienne, Houari, 119 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 114–115, 120, 124 BTC pipeline, 78 Budapest Summit (1994), 86 Camp David Accords, 166 Ceku, Agim, 66 Chechnya, 78 China, 50 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 56–57, 84–85, 102 see also Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Contact Group, 47, 56, 58, 68 Covic, Nebojsa, 51 Daddah, Mokhtar Ould, 166 Dayton Peace Accords, 57–59 declaration of independence, Kosovo, 2, 45, 48, 51, 53, 67, 99 declaration of independence, Nagorno-Karabakh, 83, 87 Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970), 31–32 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) see United Nations (UN), UNGA Resolution 1514

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INDEX

decolonization, 8–9, 17–18, 25, 40, 41, 49, 68, 79, 105–106, 110, 112–114, 132 democratic capacity, 33–36 Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 58 Draft Framework Agreement, 115, 128, 129–131 East Timor, 26 Eide, Kai, 62, 65–66 elections Azerbaijan and, 90–91, 97 democratic capacity and, 7, 33–34, 103 IDEA and, 172 international empowerment and, 37, 39 Kosovo and, 55, 58, 61–63, 65–66 Nagorno-Karabakh and, 90–91, 93–94, 96–99, 162 OSCE and, 61 state building and, 137 Western Sahara and, 114, 123, 126–127 European Union (EU), 39, 61, 63, 68–69, 72, 96–97, 101, 163 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 45, 47, 56–57, 60–61, 69 Fischer, Joschka, 57 France, 16, 56, 75, 86, 105, 109–111, 130–131, 138 Franco, Francisco, 106 Gaddafi, Muammar, 119 Gali, Brahim, 129 genocide, 73, 84 Georgia, 78, 97, 160 Group of Friends, 131 Gukasyan, Arkady, 94, 98 Haekkerup, Hans, 51 Haidar, Aminatou, 128

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hegemony, 4, 49, 135–136, 138, 147 Helsinki Additional Meeting (1992), 86 Helsinki Final Act, 72 High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), 140 High Level Planning Group, 86, 100 Holbrooke, Richard, 47, 58 Homeland Calling fund, 58 Houston Accords, 108, 121, 165 human rights Armenia and, 76, 79 Azerbaijan and, 75 democratic capacity and, 28, 34, 36 democratic governance and, 1, 21–22, 31–32 international empowerment and, 38, 39 international norms of, 11, 14, 16–18, 27–28, 30, 40–42 Kosovo and, 49–53 Legalsim and, 51–53 Milosevic and, 55–57 Nagorno-Karabakh and, 18, 75–76, 79, 83–85, 91–92, 95–98, 101–102 NATO and, 60–61 security and, 5, 68, 72 self-determination and, 4–5, 7–9, 22–26 state building and, 2 Western Sahara and, 106, 109, 112, 116, 118, 126–128, 132–134, 135–138 Human Rights Watch, 55, 127 humanitarian intervention, 7, 24, 49, 52–53, 68 Identification Commission, 108, 120–126, 129, 131 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 7, 11–12, 18, 22, 24, 27–28, 38, 62, 96

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INDEX internally displaced persons (IDPs), 72, 87–90, 93 see also refugees international community definition of, 11–12 response to self-determination, 22–26 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 57 International Crisis Group, 84 international empowerment democratic capacity and, 6–7, 22, 103, 134 democratic governance and, 11, 36–39, 116 elections and, 37, 39 human rights and, 38, 39 international community and, 11–14 international norms and, 11 Karabakh Armenians and, 79, 103 Kosovo and, 40–41, 64, 69 norms and, 21–22, 37–38 self-determination and, 27–30 Western Sahara and, 116, 134 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 172 Iran, 77–78, 110, 159 Iraq, 3, 163 Jemaa meeting, 113, 167 Jensen, Erik, 126 Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), 61–62 KFOR (Kosovo Force), 61 King Hassan, 107, 110–111, 119, 126 King Mohammed VI, 126 Kissinger, Henry, 137 Kocharyan, Robert, 86, 90, 93–94, 96, 98, 100 Kosovo background, 46–48

9780230108745_10_ind.indd 191

191

Dayton Peace Accords and, 57–59 declaration of independence, 2 democratic governance explanation, 53–54 international empowerment and, 41–42 international response, 4, 13 Legalist explanation, 17, 51–53 military intervention, 13 Milosevic and, 54–57 overview, 45–46 Realist explanation, 16, 49–51 security and, 40 self-determination and, 14–15, 41 Standards before Status, 62–64 UNMIK and, 59–62 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 58–59, 63 Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 63–64 Kouchner, Bernard, 63 legitimacy democratic governance and, 2, 29 international empowerment and, 11–13 international norms and, 11, 18, 21, 136–140 Kosovo and, 61 Nagorno-Karabakh and, 87, 89, 92, 95, 98, 102 Polisario Front and, 122, 130 security and, 16 sovereignty and, 7 Libya, 107, 111, 119 LUKoil, 77 Madrid Accords, 107, 113–114, 166 Manz, Johannes, 114, 167 Mauritania, 107–114, 118, 164, 166–167 Milosevic, Slobodan, 47–48, 50, 54–57, 61

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192

INDEX

Minsk Group, 15, 75, 79, 80–82, 84, 85–86, 92–93, 95, 97, 100, 101, 102 MINURSO see United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), 82 Morocco, 16, 40, 105–115, 118–131, 133 Mother Theresa Association, 55 multilateralism, 1, 87, 112 Nagorno-Karabakh active conflict, 87–90 after cease-fire, 90–93 background, 73–76 common state and land swap proposals, 93–101 declaration of independence and early state building, 83–87 democratic governance explanation, 82–83 democratization and, 40, 42 international response, 39, 69, 83–93 Legalist explanation, 17, 79–82 OSCE and, 14 overview, 71–73 Realist explanation, 16, 76–79 self-determination and, 15 Naumann, Klaus, 57 norms, international democratic capacity and, 33, 35–36 democratic governance and, 4, 7–8, 10–11, 30, 32–33, 40, 49, 53, 98–99, 101–102 domestic sphere and, 26–27 human rights and, 4, 11, 21, 51–52, 76 IGOs and, 12 international empowerment and, 21–22, 37–38 Legalism and, 17

9780230108745_10_ind.indd 192

legitimacy and, 21, 27–30, 137–138 peacebuilding activities and, 15 security and, 72, 80–81, 83, 89, 92, 96–97 self-determination and, 22–26, 116, 131–133 socialization and, 136, 139–140 North Atlantic Council, 59–60 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 16, 46–50, 52–53, 57, 59–61, 151, 156, 163 oil, 16, 71–72, 76–79, 99, 102, 159, 166 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) aftermath of war and, 91–93 Albania and, 56 Armenia and, 95–97, 100 Azerbaijan and, 96–97 HCNM, 140 international community and, 85–87 Nagorno-Karabakh and, 14, 16–17, 75, 79–83, 100 Kosovo and, 50, 60–63, 68, 72 oil and, 76–79 regional security and, 102 self-determination and, 39, 47, 138 see also Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Organization of African Unity (OAU), 9, 107–108, 111, 114, 123, 134 peacebuilding, 3–4, 14–15, 24, 33, 135, 138–139 peacekeeping, 1, 3, 13, 14–15, 74–75, 86, 89, 100, 105, 107 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 108, 114, 123 Polisario Front, 41, 107–112, 114–115, 116–133, 165, 166–167, 171 popular sovereignty, 10–11, 17, 21, 23, 25, 28, 36, 69

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INDEX post–Cold War era democratic governance and, 53, 137 international community and, 1–2, 4, 7, 11–12, 18 security and, 22, 49, 85, 116, 135 self-determination and, 18, 21, 25, 30, 41, 69, 116, 140 Western Sahara and, 105, 109–111 Prague Process, 98–101 Racak incident, 50 Rambouillet Conference, 47 Red Cross, 89 refugees Azerbaijan and, 72, 85, 87, 92, 100, 162 Kosovo and, 49–50, 57, 59, 61, 65, 68, 156 Morocco and, 117–118, 122–123, 127, 164, 165 United Nations and, 59, 61 see also internally displaced persons Rice, Condoleezza, 16 Ruddy, Frank, 124 Rugova, Ibrahim, 55, 58, 63 Russia Armenia and, 159, 161 Azeris and, 86–87, 89–90 Chechnya and, 159 ceasefire and, 90, 99 Kosovo and, 50, 56 Nagorno-Karabakh region and, 73, 75–78, 90 oil and, 78 Western Sahara and, 131, 138 Sahak, Bako, 98 Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 107, 111, 113, 117–119, 122, 127–128, 167, 171 Sahrawis, 16, 39, 105–108, 110, 112–114, 116–120, 122–129, 131–132

9780230108745_10_ind.indd 193

193

Sandjak, 50 secession, 10, 26, 31, 52, 62, 73, 83, 140, 144, 150 self-determination central government and, 8 claimant group and, 8 conflicts and international politics, 3–4 development of, 8–10 framework for international response to, 26–30 international response to, 22–26 Serbia Dayton Peace Accords and, 57–59 international community and, 47–48, 49–51, 68–69 Kosovo and, 45–47 Milosevic and, 54–57 NATO and, 49 Realist view of actions, 16 sovereignty, 53 UN and, 59–61, 67 Settlement Plan, 126, 129 Settlement Proposals (1988), 108, 116–120, 124, 130, 134 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) see Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Solana, Javier, 60 Solarz, Stephen, 112, 167 South Ossetia, 78 Soviet Union, 49, 71, 73–75, 81–84, 91, 109–110, 137 Standards before Status, 62–64 state building, 1–5, 16, 24, 31, 136–137, 144, 171 Steiner, Michael, 63 Ter-Petrosian, Levon, 90, 93 terrorism, 34–35, 46, 47, 57–60, 80, 87, 89, 94–95 title to territory, 76, 81, 114, 149

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194

INDEX

Tripartite Accords see Madrid Accords Turkey, 49, 59, 77–78, 86, 92 United Nations (UN) UN Declaration of Human Rights, 52, 148 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 59, 61 UN Security Council Resolution 1199, 59 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 48, 53, 61 UN Security Council Resolution 1301, 130 UNGA Resolution 1514, 9, 25 UNGA Resolution 3458, 113, 114 United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 106, 108, 120– 126, 133, 134, 169 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 45, 48, 50, 59, 61–65, 67, 69 United States Armenia and, 86, 91, 159 Draft Framework Agreement and, 130 hegemony, 136 international system and, 16, 136 Kosovo and, 49, 50, 56 Minsk Group and, 75, 86

9780230108745_10_ind.indd 194

MINURSO and, 133 Morocco and, 105, 109–112, 114, 123, 125, 131, 133 oil interests and, 77–78 self-determination and, 40 Spain and, 164 UNMIK and, 50 Western Sahara and, 105–106, 109–112, 114, 138 United States Institute of Peace, 91 Vojvodina, 50 Western Sahara background, 106–108 democratic governance explanation, 116 international response to, 108–116 legal issues and, 3 Legalist explanation, 42, 69, 112–116 MINURSO and identification process, 120–126 overview, 105–106 Realist explanation, 16, 40, 109–112 self-determination and, 14–15, 18–19 settlement proposals, 116–120 Third Way, 126–132 Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 148 Zimmerman, Warren, 55

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